Title: Rico-Villalobos v. Guisto

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED:  August 18, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
(SC S52042)
BALMER, J.
This original habeas corpus proceeding requires us to
determine whether, in a pretrial release hearing for a defendant
in a murder case, Oregon law permits the trial court to rely only
on evidence that would be admissible in the defendant's criminal
trial.  At defendant's (1) pretrial release hearing, the trial
court allowed the state to present hearsay evidence through the
testimony of a police detective.  Based on that evidence, the
trial court denied defendant's motion for pretrial release. 
Defendant challenged his continued pretrial incarceration (and,
indirectly, the trial court order denying his motion for pretrial
release) in this court by filing a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus.  For the reasons that we discuss below, we conclude that
the trial court properly interpreted and applied the relevant
statutory and constitutional provisions.  Accordingly, we dismiss
defendant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
The underlying facts are as follows.  Police arrested
defendant in connection with a homicide, and a grand jury
subsequently indicted him for aggravated murder and other crimes. 
Defendant requested a pretrial release hearing pursuant to the
procedures set out in ORS 135.230 to 135.290, relevant portions
of which we quote below.  At the hearing, the state's only
witness was the police detective who was in charge of the murder
investigation.  The detective summarized a variety of information
obtained in the course of the investigation.  He testified about
what he personally saw at the murder scene, including the
victim's body, and he identified photographs of the scene.  He
recounted statements made by several Spanish-speaking witnesses
who had been interviewed by a Spanish-speaking police officer,
hearsay statements from other witnesses, and inconsistent
statements made by defendant.  He also described medical records,
an autopsy report, and a DNA test conducted by the state police. 
Defendant cross-examined the detective, but he did not seek to
introduce any evidence of his own.
The central legal issue at the pretrial release hearing
was whether the state had met the constitutional and statutory
burden required for the trial court to deny defendant's motion
for pretrial release. (2)  Article I, section 14, of the Oregon
Constitution provides:
"Offences * * *, except murder, and treason, shall
be bailable by sufficient sureties.  Murder or treason,
shall not be bailable, when the proof is evident, or
the presumption strong." 
Similarly, ORS 135.240, the applicable pretrial release statute,
provides, in part:
"(2)(a) When the defendant is charged with murder,
aggravated murder or treason, release shall be denied
when the proof is evident or the presumption strong
that the person is guilty.
"(b) When the defendant is charged with murder or
aggravated murder and the proof is not evident nor the
presumption strong that the defendant is guilty, the
court shall determine the issue of release [in
accordance with the procedure for most other
offenses.]"
Before the trial court, defendant argued that the
evidence that the state introduced failed to demonstrate that the
"proof [was] evident" or the "presumption strong" that defendant
had committed murder.  Specifically, defendant argued, first,
that the state was required to produce "clear and convincing"
evidence of defendant's guilt and, second, that the state's
evidence must be "competent" evidence that would be admissible at
defendant's criminal trial.  Because much of the detective's
testimony consisted of hearsay that would not be admissible at
trial, defendant argued that the remaining evidence presented by
the state -- evidence that was not subject to any hearsay
objection -- was insufficient to meet the standard required to
deny defendant pretrial release.  
The state responded that it was required to show only
that the "circumstances indicate 'a fair likelihood' that the
defendant is in danger of being convicted of murder or treason,"
quoting State ex rel Connall v. Roth, 258 Or 428, 435, 482 P2d
740 (1971), and, further, that nothing prohibited it from using
hearsay testimony to make that showing. (3)  
The trial court held that hearsay evidence was
permitted in a pretrial release hearing.  The court then
considered and commented on the strength of the evidence that the
state had presented.  The court concluded that the state had met
its burden of showing that the "proof [was] evident" or the
"presumption strong" that defendant had committed the murder, and
the court therefore denied defendant's motion for pretrial
release.  Defendant then filed this original habeas corpus
proceeding, alleging that he was being incarcerated in violation
of ORS 135.240(2)(a) and Article I, section 14, of the Oregon
Constitution and seeking an order from this court directing the
trial court to release him or to hold a new hearing in which the
state was permitted to use only evidence that would be admissible
in defendant's criminal trial.  
Before turning to the merits of defendant's argument,
we first consider the threshold issue whether a habeas corpus
petition is an appropriate mechanism by which defendant may
challenge the trial court's order denying his motion to set bail
and the resulting continuation of his incarceration.  The state
argues that, even if defendant's legal analysis is correct, he
would not be entitled to traditional habeas corpus relief --
release from incarceration -- but only to a new hearing using
what defendant claims is the correct legal standard.  The state
suggests that we instead should treat defendant's petition as one
seeking a writ of mandamus in which he alleges that the trial
court erred by applying the incorrect legal standard in the
pretrial release hearing.  See ORS 34.110 (authorizing writ of
mandamus "to any inferior court * * * to compel performance of an
act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an
office, trust or station").
We agree with defendant that habeas corpus is one
permissible means to bring the legal issue that he raises to this
court.  With specified exceptions, "[e]very person imprisoned or
otherwise restrained of liberty, within this state * * * may
prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of
such imprisonment or restraint, and if illegal, to be delivered
therefrom."  ORS 34.310.  Article VII (Amended), section 2, of
the Oregon Constitution provides, in part, that this court "may,
in its own discretion, take original jurisdiction in * * * habeas
corpus proceedings."  Although habeas corpus petitions ordinarily
are filed in the circuit court, Ex Parte Jerman, 57 Or 387, 391,
112 P 416 (1910), defendant's petition alleges that his
incarceration resulted from a circuit court order.  Moreover,
this court previously has considered habeas corpus challenges to
pretrial release decisions when defendants raised substantial
legal issues regarding their incarceration.  See Collins v.
Foster, 299 Or 90, 698 P2d 953 (1985); Haynes v. Burks, 290 Or
75, 77 n 1, 619 P2d 632 (1980) (both considering denial of
pretrial release on writ of habeas corpus).  But see Connall, 258
Or at 429-30 (addressing denial of pretrial release in case
involving writ of mandamus, rather than habeas corpus).  
Here, defendant presently is incarcerated because the
trial court declined to allow pretrial release.  He raises
substantial legal issues regarding his statutory and
constitutional right to have bail set pending his trial unless
the proof of his guilt is "evident" or the "presumption" of his
guilt is "strong."  If defendant is correct that the trial
court's order improperly rests on evidence that would not be
admissible at trial, he is entitled at least to a new pretrial
release hearing at which the state would not be able to rely upon
some of the evidence that it introduced at the earlier hearing. 
If a new hearing were not held or if a new hearing were held and
the state's evidence did not meet the required standard,
defendant would be entitled to pretrial release.  Because of the
close connection between defendant's assertion that his
incarceration is unlawful and his right to be released if his
legal argument is correct, we conclude, on the facts here, that
habeas corpus is a permissible means for defendant to challenge
the trial court's denial of his request for pretrial release.  We
exercise our discretion to consider defendant's claims, and we
now turn to the merits.
The issue that divides the parties in this court is
whether the relevant statutory and constitutional provisions
permit the state, in a pretrial release hearing, only to rely on
evidence beyond that which would be admissible in defendant's
criminal trial. (4)  That inquiry requires us to interpret
those provisions.
This court's practice is to construe and apply
statutory sources of law before turning to constitutional
provisions.  State v. Snyder, 337 Or 410, 415-16, 97 P3d 1181
(2004).  Our primary source of statutory law regarding what
evidence is or is not admissible in a criminal action or
proceeding is the Oregon Evidence Code (OEC).  See OEC 101(1)
(OEC applies to "all courts," with exceptions not relevant here);
OEC 101(2) (OEC applies "generally" to "criminal actions and
proceedings").  OEC 101(4)(g), however, provides that, with the
exception of rules governing privileges, the Oregon Evidence Code
does not apply to "[p]roceedings under ORS chapter 135 relating
to * * * security release * * *[.]"  The state argues that,
because the hearing at issue here is a security release hearing
under ORS chapter 135, the Oregon Evidence Code rules regarding
exclusion or admission of hearsay at trial, OEC 801 to 806, do
not apply.  We agree.  The text of OEC 101(4)(g) demonstrates
that, whatever limitations may exist respecting the material that
a trial court may consider at a pretrial release hearing, the
hearsay rules in Oregon Evidence Code are not among them. (5)  
Defendant further argues that, as a statute, OEC
101(4)(g) cannot alter the constitutional requirements of Article
I, section 14.  That is true, but we are here simply interpreting
the text of the statute itself.  Moreover, as we explain below,
we also conclude that Article I, section 14, does not prohibit
the use of hearsay testimony in a pretrial release hearing.
For its part, the state argues that the legislature
demonstrated its intent to permit evidence at a pretrial release
hearing that would be inadmissible at trial when it enacted the
pretrial release statute, ORS 135.240(2)(a).  That statute,
quoted above, contains no limitation on the kind of evidence that
a court may consider in a pretrial release hearing.  In contrast,
the statute regarding evidence that the state may present to a
grand jury when it considers whether to indict a person -- which
was enacted at the same time as ORS 135.240(2)(a) -- specifically
provides that the grand jury "shall receive no other evidence
than such as might be given on the trial of the person charged
with the crime in question."  ORS 132.320(1).  We agree that the
legislature's decision expressly to exclude evidence that would
not be admissible at trial from a grand jury proceeding, but not
expressly to exclude such evidence from a pretrial release
hearing, supports the inference that we draw from OEC 101(4)(g)
that the legislature did not intend any such exclusion.  See PGE
v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 611, 859 P2d 1143
(1993) ("use of a term in one section and not in another section
of the same statute indicates a purposeful omission").
We now turn to the substantive provisions of ORS
135.240(2)(a) and Article I, section 14, which provide that bail
may be denied to a defendant charged with murder only when the
"proof" is "evident" or the "presumption strong."  As noted
above, if statutory sources of law provide a complete answer to
the legal question that a case presents, we ordinarily decide the
case on that basis, rather than turning to constitutional
provisions.  Here, however, the parties have treated the
applicable statutory and constitutional provisions as
coextensive, and we therefore pause to consider whether, in spite
of the parties' approach, there is any basis for concluding that
the legislature intended the statute to have a meaning different
from the constitutional provision.   
The provisions are substantively similar, although they
differ in several particulars.  The spelling, punctuation, and
word order used in ORS 135.240(2)(a) are contemporary, while
those used in Article I, section 14, reflect the writing
practices of an earlier day.  Additionally, the legislature added
to the statute the words "that the person is guilty" to identify
more clearly the referent to which the phrases "proof is evident"
and "presumption strong" apply.  That addition, however, simply
makes explicit in the statute what always has been implicit in
the constitutional provision, namely, that a defendant's right to
bail "upon sufficient sureties" does not apply to persons charged
with murder or treason if the "proof [that the person is guilty
of murder or treason] is evident" or the "presumption [that the
person is guilty of murder or treason is] strong."  Finally, ORS
135.240(2)(a) provides that "release shall be denied" when the
required proof is demonstrated, while Article I, section 14,
provides that the specified offenses "shall not be bailable." 
That difference is consistent with the elimination of the word
"bail" from the relevant statutes when the standards and
procedures for pretrial release were rewritten in 1973 as part of
the new code of criminal procedure.  See William C. Snouffer, An
Article of Faith Abolishes Bail in Oregon, 53 Or L Rev 273, 274-75 (1974) (describing elimination of bail and substitution of
different grounds for pretrial release, including release by
depositing security amount with clerk of court).  
Neither party suggests that any of those differences
between Article I, section 14, and ORS 135.240(2)(a) is a
substantive one, and we perceive no basis in the wording of the
provisions to hold otherwise.  Moreover, the legislative history
of ORS 135.240(2)(a) confirms that the legislature chose simply
to "restate[] the constitutional rule" in the statute and that it
rejected an attempt to use the Connall "fair likelihood" of guilt
standard because that was a less demanding standard than the
constitutional requirement of "evident" proof.  Haynes, 290 Or at
78.  See Snouffer, 53 Or L Rev at 281-82 (discussing legislative
history of the 1973 revisions to ORS chapter 135).  Thus, because
the legislature intended the statute to be coextensive with
Article I, section 14, we turn to the proper construction of that
constitutional provision.
The framers of the Oregon Constitution included Article
I, section 14, in the original constitution adopted in 1859.  In
construing a provision of the original constitution, this court
examines "[i]ts specific wording, case law surrounding it, and
the historical circumstances that led to its creation."  Priest
v. Pearce, 314 Or 411, 415-16, 840 P2d 65 (1992).  Our inquiry
considers the words of the provision as they would have been
understood and used by those who created the provision, and we
undertake to apply the principles embodied in the provision to
modern circumstances as those circumstances arise.  Smothers v.
Gresham Transfer, Inc., 332 Or 83, 91-92, 23 P2d 333 (2001).
Looking first to the words of Article I, section 14, we
note that the provision establishes two alternative means by
which the state may convince a judge that a person accused of
murder (or treason) should not be released on bail.  The judge
may deny bail if the state shows either that the "proof [of the
defendant's guilt] is evident" or that the "presumption [of the
defendant's guilt is] strong."  We consider separately those two
alternative standards, either of which, if met, would support the
denial of bail.  We do so by examining the meanings of these
words as the framers of the Oregon Constitution likely would have
understood them.  
"Proof" is the "conviction or persuasion of the mind of
a judge or jury, by the exhibition of evidence, of the reality of
a fact alleged."  2 John Bouvier, A Law Dictionary, Adapted to
the Constitution and Laws of the United States of America 305
(1839).  "In law and logic," according to another authority of
the time, "proof" is "that degree of evidence which convinces the
mind of the certainty of truth or fact, * * * or from the
testimony of others, or from conclusive reasoning."  2 Noah
Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language
(unpaginated) (1828).  "Evident" means "[p]lain; open to be seen;
clear to the mental eye; apparent; manifest."  1 Webster
(unpaginated).  Webster gives a legal example: "The guilt of an
offender cannot always be made evident."  (Emphasis in original.)
Webster defines a "presumption" as the "[s]upposition
of the truth or real existence of something without direct or
positive proof of the fact, but grounded on circumstantial or
probable evidence which entitles it to belief."  2 Webster at
(unpaginated).  Webster cites William Blackstone's discussion of
"presumptions," which describes them as "circumstantial evidence"
and an alternative to "positive proof."  3 William Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws of England *371 (1768).  Blackstone
there wrote:
"[N]ext to positive proof, circumstantial evidence or
the doctrine of presumptions must take place:  for when
the fact itself cannot be demonstratively evinced, that
which comes nearest to the proof of the fact is the
proof of such circumstances which either necessarily,
or usually, attend such facts; and these are called
presumptions, which are only to be relied upon till
contrary be actually proved. * * * Violent presumption
is many times equal to full proof; for there those
circumstances appear which necessarily attend the fact.
* * * Probable presumption, arising from such
circumstances as usually attend the fact, hath also its
due weight[.] * * * Light, or rash, presumptions have
no weight or validity at all."
Id. at *371-372 (emphasis in original; footnotes omitted).  In
that passage, Blackstone used the adjective "violent" to indicate
that the presumption is "strong" or has some quality "in such a
degree as to produce a very marked or powerful effect." (6) 
See 12 Oxford English Dictionary 222 (1933) (providing those
meanings of "violent").
The foregoing suggests that the "proof is evident"
when there is plain or direct evidence of the defendant's guilt
-- evidence that, in Blackstone's words, is "positive," rather
than "circumstantial."  In the absence of such direct evidence,
the defendant's likely guilt may be based on a "violent" or
"strong" presumption, one grounded on circumstantial evidence
worthy of credit.  That evidence must be of circumstances that
"necessarily" or "usually" would attend defendant's guilt; that
is, circumstantial proof that would give rise to a strong
presumption.  A strong presumption provides an inference that can
"be relied upon till the contrary be actually proved."  Article
I, section 14, thus allows a person charged with murder to be
held without bail when the "proof is evident" -- when there is
direct evidence of guilt -- or the "presumption strong" -- when
circumstantial evidence strongly indicates the accused's guilt.
While the text of Article I, section 14, shows that
the framers of the provision wanted to establish a high threshold
of proof before a person could be held without bail, even when
charged with murder, the words themselves do not suggest any
limit on the kind of evidence that would be admissible in a
proceeding to determine whether to allow bail.  
We turn to the history of Article I, section 14.  The
framers took the provision from Article I, section 17, of the
Indiana Constitution of 1851. (7)  Charles Henry Carey, The
Oregon Constitution 468 (1926).  No useful information regarding
the intended meaning of the provision appears in the records of
the constitutional convention.  See Claudia Burton and Andrew
Grade, A Legislative History of the Oregon Constitution of 1857 –
Part I, 37 Willamette L Rev 469, 526 (2001) (describing paucity
of record).  The background of the bail provision in other
jurisdictions, however, provides some insight into the goals of
the framers.  
At common law, all offenses, including capital
felonies, were bailable.  See Ex Parte Bryant, 34 Ala 270 (1859)
(discussing common law); State v. Hill, 5 SCL 89 (3 Brev) (1812)
(same).  Many early state constitutions, however, limited the
discretion of judges to allow bail in cases of murder and
treason.  See, e.g., Ala Const, Art I, § 17 (1819) ("All persons
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties,
except for capital offenses, when the proof is evident, or the
presumption great[.]"); Miss Const, Art II, § 24 (1875) ("[A]ll
persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for
capital offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption
great."); Ohio Const, Art VIII, § 12 (1802) ("all persons shall
be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses,
where the proof is evident or the presumption is great"); Pa
Const, Art IX, § 14 (1790) ("[A]ll prisoners shall be bailable by
sufficient sureties unless for capital offences, when the proof
is evident or presumption great[.]"); Northwest Ordinance, Art 2
(1787) ("All persons shall be bailable, unless for capital
offenses, where the proof shall be evident or the presumptions
great."); NC Const, § 39 (1776) ("All prisoners shall be bailable
by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offences when the
proof is evident or the presumption great."); Massachusetts Body
of Liberties (1641) ("No man[']s person shall be restrained or
imprisoned by any authority whatsoever, before the law hath
sentenced him thereto, if he can put in sufficient securitie,
bayle or mainprise, for his appearance, and good behavior in the
meane time, unlesse it be in Crimes Capitall, and Contempts in
open Court, and in such cases where some expresse act of [the
legislature] doth allow it[.]").
Early cases applying those provisions split over
whether the fact that a grand jury had returned an indictment was
sufficient proof to deny bail.  Some courts held that an
indictment was sufficient proof.  See, e.g., Hight v. United
States, Morris 407 (Iowa Terr 1845) (indictment is strongest
possible evidence of guilt before trial).  Others gave the
indictment some weight, but allowed the defendant to offer proof
to rebut the presumption that the indictment established.  See,
e.g., Ex Parte White, 9 Ark 222 (1848) ("It is true, as a general
rule, that an indictment raises no presumption against the
indictee as to his guilt of the crime charged against him; but
this does not prove that it does not raise presumption for all
the purposes of his capture and custody, and that for such
purposes it is perfectly conclusive till rebut[t]ed.").  Still
other appellate decisions approved trial court review of other
evidence along with the indictment.  See, e.g., Bryant, 34 Ala at
276-77 (court must review evidence offered and apply
constitutional standard).
As with our examination of the text of Article I,
section 14, our review of similar provisions in other state
constitutions and early cases interpreting them suggests that
those provisions imposed no particular limitations on the kind of
proof that a court could consider in determining whether or not a
defendant in a murder case was bailable.  
We turn to this court's prior cases.  As noted
previously, this court construed Article I, section 14, in
Connall.  In addition to the holding -- later rejected in Haynes
-- that the state need show only a "fair likelihood" that the
defendant would be convicted of murder, Connall also considered
the role of the grand jury indictment in the decision to deny
bail.  On that issue, this court agreed with the defendant that a
grand jury indictment, standing alone, was insufficient proof to
support a decision to deny bail.  258 Or at 435.  The court in
Connall did not review the history or text of Article I, section
14, in detail, but it relied on the reasoning and result in a New
Jersey case, State v. Konigsberg, 33 NJ 367, 164 A2d 740 (1960),
and held that the indictment was not conclusive or even prima
facie evidence sufficient to deny bail under the constitutional
standard.  Connall, 258 Or at 431-35.
The court in Connall held that, in addition to the
indictment, the state was required to offer "[o]ther competent
evidence." (8)  Connall, 258 Or at 435.  The court did not
describe what evidence, other than the indictment, would be
admissible in a bail hearing.  However, in describing the
indictment itself -- a document that would not be admissible
evidence in a criminal trial -- as "competent" evidence in a bail
hearing, the court necessarily rejected the view that a trial
court can deny bail only on the basis of evidence that would be
admissible at trial.  Connall thus recognized that evidence may
be "competent" for a bail hearing, even if it would not be
admissible at a criminal trial. 
In Haynes, this court revisited the issue of the
sufficiency and nature of the evidence required to meet the
constitutional standard that pretrial release not be denied
unless the proof of a defendant's guilt was evident or the
presumption strong.  Haynes did not address the specific issue
presented in this case:  whether the trial court in a pretrial
release hearing may rely on hearsay evidence that would be
inadmissible in the defendant's criminal trial.  However, the
court discussed in more general terms the nature of the trial
court's inquiry in a pretrial release hearing, a discussion that
sheds some light on the kind of evidence on which a pretrial
release decision may be based.  The court held that it was error
for the trial court to rely on the prosecutor's "assertions about
evidence that he 'feels' he 'may be able to introduce'" because
such assertions are not "proof."  Haynes, 290 Or at 89.  The
court stated:
"The magistrate must be shown information at the
hearing from which he can make his own independent
determination whether there is admissible evidence
against an accused that adds up to strong or evident
proof of guilt.  
"* * * * 
"[T]he question is * * * whether this court can assume
that the circuit court has reached an independent
judgment that evidence which will be admissible at
trial, unless met or explained, so strongly shows the
accused guilty of murder that the law forbids her
pretrial release on adequate security conditions."
Id.
Although this court criticized the trial court's
reliance on comments by the prosecutor about the evidence that he
might be able to introduce at trial, it determined from its own
review of the record that it could not "say that a judge could
not reasonably consider the evidence of plaintiff's guilt to be
strong," id. at 85, and held that the defendant was not entitled
to pretrial release.  Id.  The evidence in the record to which
the court adverted included hearsay testimony implicating the
defendant, the conviction of one codefendant, and the guilty plea
of another codefendant.  That is, much of the evidence that the
court relied on in denying pretrial release in Haynes was hearsay
testimony that would not itself have been admissible in a
criminal trial. (9)  However, from that information, the court
permissibly determined that "evidence which will be admissible at
trial" so strongly showed the defendant's guilt that pretrial
release could be denied.  Id. at 89 (emphasis added.)
Despite defendant's best efforts to expand the reach of
Haynes, that case does not support defendant's view that hearsay
testimony is inadmissible in a pretrial release hearing.  As
noted above, while Haynes held that a prosecutor's
representations about what the prosecutor "fe[lt]" he "could"
introduce, standing alone, did not meet the constitutional
requirement, this court itself reviewed hearsay evidence that
would not have been admissible at trial and reached its own
conclusion that pretrial release properly was denied.  Defendant
focuses on this court's statement in Haynes that the trial judge
must be able to determine "whether there is admissible evidence
against an accused that adds up to strong or evident proof of
guilt."  290 Or at 89 (emphasis added).  However, the court in
Haynes used the word "admissible," not as a description of the
evidence permitted at the pretrial release hearing, but rather as
a forward-looking description of the kind of evidence that the
trial judge must determine the state is likely to be able to
introduce at trial.  See id. ("the circuit court" must "reach[]
an independent judgment that evidence which will be admissible at
trial" meets the constitutional standard) (emphasis added).  And
the court distinguished that "admissible" evidence from the
"information" that the trial court may consider at the pretrial
release hearing.  For example, nothing in Haynes would prevent a
trial court from relying on a police officer's identification and
summary of a DNA test in a pretrial release hearing even though
that evidence is hearsay, if the court is able to determine that
the state likely will be able to introduce the DNA test at trial
with the proper foundation.  Conversely, if the evidence at the
pretrial release hearing turned on the hearsay statement of a
witness whose testimony would implicate the defendant, but also
showed that the witness had fled the country and would not be
available for trial, the state may well be unable to meet its
constitutional burden. 
As discussed above, the text and history of Article I,
section 14, and our cases interpreting that provision, place the
burden on the state at the pretrial release hearing to present
evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which the trial court
can make an independent determination that evidence that likely
will be admissible at trial shows that the proof of defendant's
guilt is "evident" or the "presumption strong"; however, that
provision does not preclude the state from making that showing by
means of hearsay evidence.
With that understanding of the relevant legal
requirements, we return to the evidence offered by the state at
defendant's pretrial release hearing.  The state's evidence
consisted not just of an indictment or of representations by a
prosecutor, but of detailed testimony by the detective in charge
of the murder investigation.  The detective did not simply state
conclusions regarding the evidence against defendant, but
identified specific witnesses and the substance of their
statements to the police.  That information tended to show that
defendant knew the victim; that defendant appeared at a hospital
emergency room with a stab wound in his leg on the same day that
the victim was stabbed; that defendant provided inconsistent
stories regarding how he was injured; that multiple witnesses
implicated defendant in the victim's death; and that blood found
on defendant's shoes was that of the victim.
Defendant cross-examined the detective on a variety of
issues, including the number and status of various witnesses, his
reasons for believing certain witnesses, and alternative theories
regarding the victim's death.  It is true, as defendant argues,
that his ability to test the state's evidence was limited because
much of that evidence was introduced as hearsay.  The issue under
Article I, section 14, however, is not whether defendant had the
same opportunity to test the state's evidence that he will have
at trial, but instead whether the evidence met the requirements
of the constitutional standard that we discussed above.  Although
much of the detective's evidence was hearsay, he described
witnesses whose testimony likely would be admissible at trial and
documentary evidence that, with the proper foundation, likely
would be admissible at trial.  On the record here, the trial
court had sufficient information to make an independent
determination that evidence that would be admissible at trial
demonstrated that the "presumption" of defendant's guilt was
"strong."  The trial court applied the correct constitutional and
statutory standards when it evaluated the evidence presented and
denied defendant's motion for pretrial release.
A person seeking habeas corpus relief must demonstrate
that his imprisonment or restraint is illegal.  ORS 34.310.  For
the reasons described above, defendant has not met that burden.
Petition for writ of habeas corpus dismissed.
1. In this proceeding, the defendant in the underlying criminal case is nominally the plaintiff,
and the State of Oregon is the defendant.  However, for the sake of clarity, throughout this opinion
we refer to the defendant in the underlying case as "defendant" and to the State of Oregon as the
"state."
2. ORS 135.230 to 135.290, originally enacted as part of the revision of the Code of Criminal
Procedure in 1973, set out the procedures and substantive standards for criminal defendants to be
released from custody pending trial or after a judgment of conviction, if the defendant has
appealed.  That revision eliminated the word "bail" from the Oregon statutes and instead adopted
the term "release" to describe a defendant's release from custody pending trial and the term
"security release" to describe release conditioned on a promise to appear in court that is secured by
money or property.  See ORS 135.230 (defining terms).  Nevertheless, parties and courts often
continue to use the term "bail" as shorthand to describe pretrial release or the amount of security
deposit required for such release.
3. In the trial court, the state, rather than relying on the bail provision of Article I, section 14,
of the Oregon Constitution, cited Article I, section 43(b).  That provision, which was added to the
constitution in 1999, provides, in part: "Murder, aggravated murder and treason shall not be
bailable when the proof is evident or the presumption strong that the person is guilty."  The quoted
sentence differs from the parallel sentence in Article I, section 14, only in the addition of the
crime of "aggravated murder" to the list of potentially nonbailable offenses and the addition of the
words "that the person is guilty" at the end of the sentence.  No party cited Article I, section 43(b),
in any brief in this court or suggested that the quoted sentence has any different meaning than the
parallel sentence in Article I, section 14.  We decide this case under ORS 135.240(2)(a) and
Article I, section 14, because those are the grounds upon which the parties briefed and argued the
case in this court, and we express no opinion as to whether Article I, section 43(b) states a
different standard for determining when bail may be denied.
4. In this court, the state no longer argues, as it did in the
trial court, that pretrial release may be denied if the state
shows a "fair likelihood" that defendant is guilty.  Rather, the
state agrees with defendant that this court in Haynes v. Burks,
290 Or 75, 619 P2d 632 (1980), rejected that phrasing of the test
in State ex rel Connall v. Roth, 258 Or 428, 482 P2d 740 (1971). 
In Haynes, this court concluded that the "fair likelihood" of
conviction standard was inconsistent with the constitutional and
statutory provisions quoted above -- requiring that the proof of
guilt be evident or the presumption of guilt strong -- because it
established too low a standard for the denial of pretrial
release.  290 Or at 79.  
5. Defendant argues that, at the least, OEC 101(4)(g) presents
no obstacle to his proposed objection to the use of hearsay
testimony at the pretrial release hearing -- and that is true -- but we fail to see how it in any
way helps his case.
6. Other sources make this definition of "violent presumption" explicit.  See 2 Benjamin
Vaughan Abbott, Dictionary of Terms and Phrases Used in American or English Jurisprudence
636 (1879) (defining "violent presumption" as "[a] strong presumption; a presumption of such a
nature as almost to amount to proof"); James A. Ballentine, Law Dictionary with Pronunciations
1342 (1930) (defining "violent presumption" as a "presumption which is very strong and forcible,
although not necessarily a conclusive or irrebuttable one").
7. Article I, section 17, of the Indiana Constitution of 1851 provided, in part: "Offences,
other than murder or treason, shall be bailable by sufficient sureties.  Murder or treason, shall not
be bailable, when the proof is evident or the presumption strong."
8. State v. Konigsberg, 33 NJ 367, 164 A2d 740 (1960), held that "competent" evidence was
required, and, although it did not discuss what evidence would be "competent," it suggested that
affidavits from witnesses would have been sufficient.  Id. at 747.  Konigsberg also held that a
prosecutor's statements about what the evidence would show were inadmissible hearsay, but
Connall did not rely upon or purport to adopt that holding, as it was not necessary to the decision
in Connall.  The New Jersey Supreme Court subsequently overruled the holding in Konigsberg
that hearsay was inadmissible in bail hearings.  See State v. Engel, 99 NJ 453, 466, 493 A2d 1217
(1985) (holding that, in bail hearing in capital murder case, hearsay evidence in form of
codefendant's confession may be considered in decision whether to deny bail). 
9. The evidence is summarized in the parties' briefs.  Haynes v. Burks, 2808 Oregon Briefs,
Tab 6 (1980).  Although this court's decision did not discuss the evidence in the record on which it
based its decision to deny pretrial release, the defendant-relator had argued that much of the
evidence was hearsay and should not have been considered.  (Brief at 19-20.)  This court
implicitly rejected that argument and instead relied on the test articulated above.