Title: McLane v. Vereen

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
 
EILEEN M. McLANE, 
FAIRFAX COUNTY ZONING ADMINISTRATOR 
 
v.   Record No. 081863 
 
 
    OPINION BY 
JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
                 June 4, 2009 
DEREK B. VEREEN, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
R. Terrence Ney, Judge 
 
In this case involving fines imposed for a violation of a 
zoning ordinance, we consider whether the circuit court erred 
in ordering the payment of fines in an amount less than the 
rate specified in a consent decree endorsed by the affected 
property owners and Fairfax County. 
 
In April 2006, Eileen M. McLane, the zoning administrator 
for Fairfax County (the County), issued a notice to Derek B. 
Vereen and Angelique Vereen stating that the Vereens had 
violated certain provisions of the Fairfax County Zoning 
Ordinance (the zoning ordinance) by keeping on their property 
inoperable vehicles, tires, trailers, boats, a mobile home, and 
other debris.  Four months later, after the Vereens had failed 
to take action to remedy the violation, the County filed a 
complaint in the circuit court asking the court to declare that 
the property was a “junk yard” prohibited by the zoning 
ordinance and to issue an injunction requiring the Vereens to 
remove the described items from their property. 
 
After agreeing to settle their dispute, the County and the 
Vereens stipulated to the terms of their settlement in a 
consent decree, which the circuit court entered on June 4, 
2007.  The consent decree contained the parties’ agreement that 
the Vereens’ use of the property as a “junk yard” violated the 
zoning ordinance, and that the Vereens would bring the property 
into compliance with the zoning ordinance within 60 days. 
 
In the consent decree, the parties also agreed that if the 
Vereens failed to comply with the decree’s terms, the Vereens 
would pay to the County $100 per day “for every day the [c]ourt 
finds a violation.”  The decree stated that “[p]ayment of this 
amount shall be in addition to any additional sanctions the 
[c]ourt may impose upon a finding of contempt for any 
violation” of the decree.  In addition, the decree prohibited 
the Vereens from using the property as a “junk yard” in the 
future.   
 
Finally, the decree stated that the parties and the court 
agreed that the terms of the decree were reasonable and would 
not be modified “except by the written agreement of the parties 
. . . with the approval of [the] [c]ourt.”  Above the circuit 
court judge’s signature, the decree read, “THIS CAUSE IS 
ENDED.” 
 
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At the Vereens’ request, the County later extended the 60-
day deadline for an additional 30 days, allowing the Vereens 
until September 2, 2007 to bring the property into compliance.  
The Vereens did not meet this extended deadline. 
 
About four months later, the County filed a motion for a 
rule to show cause in the circuit court asserting that the 
Vereens had failed to comply with the terms of the consent 
decree.  The County asked, in part, that the circuit court 
impose fines on the Vereens in the amount of $100 per day “for 
every day they [were] found to be in violation of the [c]onsent 
[d]ecree” until they complied with the decree’s terms. 
 
In accordance with the County’s request, the circuit court 
ordered the Vereens to appear in court on February 15, 2008 to 
show cause, if any, why they should not be held in contempt for 
violating the terms of the consent decree.  At a hearing held 
on that date, the circuit court granted the Vereens’ request 
for a continuance until March 14, 2008. 
 
At the March 14, 2008 hearing, the County presented 
evidence that the Vereens still had not complied with the terms 
of the consent decree.  The circuit court continued the case a 
second time until April 4, 2008. 
 
After completing the removal of the prohibited debris from 
their property on March 27, 2008, the Vereens filed a motion in 
the circuit court opposing the County’s request for imposition 
 
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of the fines.  At a hearing in June 2008, the County requested 
that the circuit court order the Vereens to pay fines in the 
amount of $20,600 to cover the period of 206 days, from 
September 2, 2007 to March 27, 2008, that the Vereens were in 
violation of the consent decree. 
 
After the hearing, the circuit court issued a letter 
opinion imposing fines in the total amount of $3,500.  The 
circuit court stated that “[b]y seeking these sanctions now[,] 
after the Vereens are in compliance[,] the Zoning Administrator 
is no longer using [the fines] as an incentive to induce 
compliance, but rather as a penalty for the Vereens’ delayed 
compliance.”  On June 18, 2008, the circuit court entered final 
judgment incorporating these holdings. 
 
The County filed a motion for reconsideration, again 
asking the court to fix the fines in accordance with the terms 
of the consent decree.  The circuit court denied the County’s 
motion in an order dated July 9, 2008, which stated that the 
consent decree was not “self[-]executing,” and that the fines 
of $100 per day were unreasonable “[b]ased on the specific 
facts present in this case.”  The order further stated that 
because the Vereens had brought their property into compliance 
with the zoning ordinance, the fines requested by the County 
would constitute a penalty.   
 
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On appeal, the County argues that the circuit court did 
not have authority to amend the terms of the consent decree, 
because that decree became a final judgment 21 days after its 
entry and its terms were not later subject to change.  The 
County further observes that the parties and the circuit court 
agreed that the decree’s terms were reasonable, and that the 
decree could be modified only with the consent of all the 
parties.  Therefore, the County asserts that the circuit 
court’s judgment was plainly wrong because the circuit court 
lacked any authority to deviate from enforcing the stated terms 
of the decree. 
 
In response, the Vereens initially raise two procedural 
challenges to the County’s appeal.  First, the Vereens argue 
that the County’s appeal should be dismissed because the County 
failed to note an appeal from the circuit court’s order of July 
9, 2008 and instead noted its appeal after entry of the June 
18, 2008 order.  The July 9, 2008 order, which denied the 
County’s motion for reconsideration, stated for the first time 
that the consent decree was not self-executing, and restated 
the court’s earlier holding that the fines provided in the 
consent decree were unreasonable and imposed a penalty.  
According to the Vereens, the circuit court’s holding that the 
consent decree was not self-executing was an alternative 
holding that the County failed to appeal. 
 
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Second, the Vereens contend that the County’s appeal is 
barred because the County failed to object to the circuit 
court’s determination that the consent decree was not self-
executing.  We disagree with these procedural arguments. 
 
We have stated that a final order or decree is one that 
disposes of the entire matter before the court, giving all the 
relief contemplated and leaving nothing to be done by the court 
except the ministerial execution of the court’s order or 
decree.  Comcast of Chesterfield County, Inc. v. Board of 
Supervisors, 277 Va. 293, 301, 672 S.E.2d 870, 873 (2009); 
Upper Occoquan Sewage Auth. v. Blake Constr. Co., 275 Va. 41, 
60, 655 S.E.2d 10, 21 (2008); James v. James, 263 Va. 474, 481, 
562 S.E.2d 133, 137 (2002); Daniels v. Truck & Equipment Corp., 
205 Va. 579, 585, 139 S.E.2d 31, 35 (1964).  Here, the order 
disposing of the whole subject and giving all the relief 
contemplated was the order that the circuit court entered on 
June 18, 2008.  In that order, the circuit court determined 
that the fines provided in the consent decree were unreasonable 
and reduced the total amount payable by the Vereens to $3,500. 
 
The circuit court’s statement in the July 9, 2008 order, 
that the consent decree was not self-executing, merely provided 
an additional explanation of the court’s earlier action and was 
not an alternative holding to which the County was required to 
 
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note an objection and an appeal.  Therefore, we conclude that 
the County’s appeal is not procedurally barred. 
 
In addressing the merits of the County’s appeal, the 
Vereens contend that the circuit court correctly determined 
that the daily fines provided in the consent decree were 
unreasonable and constituted unenforceable penalties.  The 
Vereens assert that the circuit court appropriately reduced the 
amount of the fines because, once the Vereens removed the 
debris from their property, the County could not reasonably 
maintain that the fines were a necessary incentive to obtain 
compliance with the zoning ordinance.  We disagree with the 
Vereens’ arguments. 
 
A consent decree contains some elements of a judgment 
rendered after trial but in other respects resembles a 
contractual agreement.  See Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of 
Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 519 (1986); 
United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 235-
38 (1975); Fuller v. Troy, 169 Va. 490, 494, 194 S.E. 668, 669 
(1938); Culpeper Nat’l Bank v. Morris, 168 Va. 379, 385, 191 
S.E. 764, 767 (1937).  A consent decree may only be entered by 
a court having jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject 
matter of the litigation.  Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Eades, 
248 Va. 285, 288, 448 S.E.2d 631, 633 (1994); see Culpeper 
Nat’l Bank, 168 Va. at 385, 191 S.E.2d at 767.  The parties 
 
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entering into a consent decree achieve a continuing basis for 
the court’s jurisdiction to enforce the terms of their 
agreement.  Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 280-81 (4th Cir. 
2002); see Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 438 (2004); Rufo v. 
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378 (1992); 
Culpeper Nat’l Bank, 168 Va. at 386, 191 S.E. at 767. 
 
The two essential components of a consent decree are: 1) 
the substantive terms of the parties’ agreement concerning the 
matter in controversy; and 2) the judge’s endorsement of the 
order or decree rendering its terms enforceable by the court.  
See Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 248 Va. at 288, 448 S.E.2d at 633; 
Fuller, 169 Va. at 494, 194 S.E.2d at 669; Culpeper Nat’l Bank, 
168 Va. at 385-86, 191 S.E.2d at 767.  A judge entering a 
consent decree ordinarily does not engage in any adjudication 
of the facts or the law that may be applicable to the decree’s 
terms.  Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 248 Va. at 288, 448 S.E.2d at 
633; Culpeper Nat’l Bank, 168 Va. at 385, 191 S.E.2d at 767. 
 
When a consent decree is final in nature, it is 
enforceable in the same manner as any other court decree or 
order and may be enforced by the imposition of sanctions or by 
a contempt citation.  See Frew, 540 U.S. at 438; Rufo, 502 U.S. 
at 378; Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 248 Va. at 288, 448 S.E.2d at 
633; Culpeper Nat’l Bank, 168 Va. at 386, 191 S.E. at 767; see 
also Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 530.  Because a consent decree 
 
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that is final in nature constitutes a judgment of a court, such 
a decree is conclusive and is not subject to collateral attack 
except on jurisdictional grounds or for fraud or collusion.  
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 248 Va. at 288, 448 S.E.2d at 633; 
Culpeper Nat’l Bank, 168 Va. at 385-87, 191 S.E. at 767; see 
Fuller, 169 Va. at 494, 194 S.E. at 669. 
 
In view of these principles, the central issue before us 
is whether the consent decree containing the agreement between 
the County and the Vereens was a final judgment.  As we already 
have observed, a final judgment is one that disposes of the 
entire matter before the court, giving all the relief 
contemplated and leaving nothing to be done by the court except 
the ministerial execution of the court’s order or decree.  
Comcast of Chesterfield County, Inc., 277 Va. at 301, 672 
S.E.2d at 873; Upper Occoquan Sewage Auth., 275 Va. at 60, 655 
S.E.2d at 21; James, 263 Va. at 481, 562 S.E.2d at 137; 
Daniels, 205 Va. at 585, 139 S.E.2d at 35.  A circuit court may 
only alter the terms of a final judgment for 21 days after its 
entry.  Rule 1:1. 
 
The fact that a consent decree may later be the subject of 
an enforcement action, requiring a court to receive evidence to 
determine whether the decree’s terms have been violated, does 
not resolve the issue whether the decree was final when 
rendered.  The content of a consent decree, not the possibility 
 
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of a future enforcement action, determines whether the decree 
qualifies as a final judgment. 
 
In the present case, we conclude that the consent decree 
was a final judgment.  The consent decree contained the 
parties’ agreement that the Vereens would comply with the 
zoning ordinance within 60 days and refrain from any future use 
of the property as a “junk yard,” or pay to the County a fine 
of $100 per day for every day that they were found to have been 
in violation of these terms.  The decree also stated the 
parties’ agreement that the above terms were reasonable and 
could not be modified without the written consent of the 
parties and the approval of the court.  Additionally, the 
decree provided that a copy thereof would be recorded among the 
County land records “to give notice of the prohibitions and 
restrictions contained herein to any successors-in-interest of 
the Vereens.” 
 
These terms of the consent decree provided a final 
resolution of the parties’ dispute and set the daily fine to be 
imposed for any failure to comply with the decree’s terms.  
Thus, we conclude that the consent decree, considered as a 
whole, disposed of the entire matter before the court, gave all 
contemplated relief, and left nothing to be done except the 
ministerial execution of the court’s decree.  See Comcast of 
Chesterfield County, Inc., 277 Va. at 301, 672 S.E.2d at 873; 
 
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Upper Occoquan Sewage Auth., 275 Va. at 60, 655 S.E.2d at 21; 
Daniels, 205 Va. at 585, 139 S.E.2d at 35.  Accordingly, the 
consent decree was a final decree whose terms were not subject 
to alteration by the court after 21 days.  See Rule 1:1. 
 
We observe that had the parties wanted the consent decree 
to be subject to modification by the court on motion of one 
party, they could have provided so in the decree, thereby 
agreeing to the entry of a decree not final in nature.  
Moreover, if the circuit court had considered it essential to 
retain authority to alter the decree’s terms, the circuit court 
could have declined to enter a consent decree unless the 
parties agreed to the addition of such a provision. 
 
The Vereens argue, nevertheless, that the circuit court 
was authorized to change the terms of the present consent 
decree, because the circuit court held that in light of the 
Vereens’ compliance, payment of the full amount of fines would 
result in the imposition of an unlawful penalty.  The Vereens 
argue that the circuit court’s action to prevent imposition of 
a penalty is supported by our holding in O’Brian v. Langley 
School, 256 Va. 547, 507 S.E.2d 363 (1998).  We disagree with 
this argument. 
 
The plaintiffs in O’Brian had entered into a contract 
enrolling their daughter as a student at a private school.  Id. 
at 549, 507 S.E.2d at 364.  The contract provided that in the 
 
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event that they withdrew the enrollment after June 1 of the 
calendar year, they would not be entitled to any refund of the 
amount due for the upcoming school year.  Id. at 549-50, 507 
S.E.2d at 364.  We held that the fact that the plaintiffs had 
entered into a contract containing this liquidated damages 
clause did not prevent the plaintiffs from later litigating 
whether the clause imposed an invalid penalty.  Id. at 551, 507 
S.E.2d at 365. 
 
This holding in O’Brian is inapposite to the issue before 
us.  We are not concerned here with a liquidated damages 
provision of a contract, but with the terms of a final judgment 
entered by a court having subject matter jurisdiction and 
jurisdiction of the parties.  That final judgment is conclusive 
of the matters adjudicated and is not subject to collateral 
attack on the grounds that the judgment is unreasonable.  See 
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 248 Va. at 288, 448 S.E.2d at 633; 
Culpeper Nat’l Bank, 168 Va. at 385-87, 191 S.E.2d at 767-68.  
Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court erred in reducing 
the amount of fines owed by the Vereens to the County. 
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the circuit court’s 
judgment and will enter final judgment in favor of the County 
in the amount of $20,600. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
 
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