Title: FILLMORE TWP V SECRETARY OF STATE

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JUNE 14, 2005
TOWNSHIP OF CASCO, TOWNSHIP OF
COLUMBUS, PATRICIA ISELER, and
JAMES P. HOLK, 
Plaintiffs/Counter- 
Defendants-Appellants,  
v 
 
No. 126120 
SECRETARY OF STATE, DIRECTOR OF
THE BUREAU OF ELECTIONS, and CITY
OF RICHMOND, 
and 
WALTER K. WINKLE and PATRICIA A. 
WINKLE, 
 
Intervening Defendants/ 
 
Counter-Plaintiffs-Appellees.  
FILLMORE TOWNSHIP, SHIRLEY GREVING,
ANDREA STAM, LARRY SYBESMA, JODY
TENBRINK, and JAMES RIETVELD, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v 
No. 126369 
SECRETARY OF STATE and BUREAU OF 
ELECTIONS DIRECTOR, 
and 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
CITY OF HOLLAND, 
Intervenor-Appellee. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
CAVANAGH, J.  
These consolidated appeals present two issues. First, 
we must address whether a single detachment petition and a 
single vote on that petition, pursuant to the terms of the 
Home Rule City Act, MCL 117.1 et seq., may encompass 
territory to be detached from one city and added to more 
than one township.1  Second, if a single detachment petition 
and a single vote may encompass territory to be added to 
more than one township, we must determine whether a writ of 
mandamus compels the Secretary of State to issue a notice 
directing an election on the change of boundaries sought by 
plaintiffs in each case. Because we conclude that the Home 
Rule City Act does not allow a single detachment petition 
and a single vote on detachment for adding territory to 
multiple townships, mandamus is not proper in these cases. 
Accordingly, the decisions of the Court of Appeals are 
affirmed. 
1 While the Home Rule City Act, MCL 117.1 et seq.,
addresses various processes, the issue before this Court 
pertains solely to the process of detachment. 
2  
 
 
 
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
Casco Twp v Secretary of State 
Plaintiffs in this case are two adjacent townships— 
Casco Township and Columbus Township—and residents of those 
townships who seek to detach territory from defendant city 
of Richmond. 
The territory sought to be detached is 
territory that was previously annexed to the city of 
Richmond. 
Plaintiffs seek to present the ballot issue covering 
both townships in a single petition. 
This would result in 
a single vote about whether to detach territory from the 
city of Richmond and add the territory to Casco Township 
and Columbus Township. The residents of one township would 
be voting on the return of property to their township, as 
well as the return of property to a township in which they 
do not reside. 
The Secretary of State refused to approve 
an election on plaintiffs’ petition because an election on 
the petition would allow residents of one township to vote 
on, and possibly determine, a change in the boundaries of 
another township in which they do not reside. 
Plaintiffs 
filed 
a 
complaint 
for 
mandamus 
and 
declaratory 
relief. 
The 
circuit 
court 
dismissed 
plaintiffs’ complaint for mandamus to compel the Secretary 
of State to act because it was not clear that a single 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
petition seeking detachment from a city and addition of the 
territory to two townships was permitted by the Home Rule 
City Act. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of 
the circuit court. 
Casco Twp v Secretary of State, 261 
Mich App 386; 682 NW2d 546 (2004). 
We granted plaintiffs’ 
application for leave to appeal and ordered that the case 
be argued and submitted with Fillmore Twp v Secretary of 
State, 471 Mich 890 (2004). 
Fillmore Twp v Secretary of State 
Plaintiffs are Fillmore Township and electors from 
four townships—Fillmore Township, Holland Charter Township, 
Park Township, and Laketown Township-and the city of 
Holland who want to detach territory from the city of 
Holland and add the territory to the four townships. 
Plaintiffs filed a joint detachment petition with the 
Secretary of State, asking that the petition be certified 
and that a single election be held regarding the territory 
that was proposed to be detached from the city of Holland. 
The Secretary of State refused to certify the petition 
because the petition involved an effort to detach territory 
for addition to more than one township. 
Plaintiffs filed a complaint for mandamus in the Court 
of Appeals, and the complaint was held in abeyance pending 
the decision in the Casco Twp case. 
Unpublished order, 
4  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
entered May 19, 2003 (Docket No. 245640). 
Plaintiffs’ 
complaint was subsequently denied by the Court of Appeals 
on the basis of the Casco Twp decision. Unpublished order, 
entered May 6, 2004 (Docket No. 245640). 
We granted 
plaintiffs’ application for leave to appeal and ordered 
that the case be argued and submitted with the Casco Twp 
case. 471 Mich 890 (2004).2 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The proper interpretation of a statutory provision is 
a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Lincoln 
v Gen Motors Corp, 461 Mich 483, 489-490; 607 NW2d 73 
(2000). 
A trial court’s decision regarding a writ of 
mandamus is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. In re MCI 
Telecom Complaint, 460 Mich 396, 443; 596 NW2d 164 (1999). 
III. ANALYSIS 
These 
cases 
involve 
an 
issue 
of 
statutory 
interpretation. 
The 
primary 
goal 
of 
statutory 
interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the 
Legislature. 
Id. at 411. The first step is to review the 
2 Justice Young states that the majority “fails to
convey adequately the true character of the boundary
disputes at issue.” Post at 4. Yet the relevant facts are 
conveyed, and it is of no import if the history of these
cases was contentious or of a calculated nature. 
The 
statutory analysis is the same whether the parties were
friends, foes, or something in between. 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
language of the statute. 
If the statutory language is 
unambiguous, the Legislature is presumed to have intended 
the 
meaning 
expressed 
in 
the 
statute 
and 
judicial 
construction is not permissible. 
The Home Rule City Act, MCL 117.1 et seq., addresses 
four processes—incorporation, consolidation, annexation, 
and detachment.3  The issue before this Court pertains only 
to the process of detachment. 
Detachment means that 
territory is taken from an existing city and added to an 
existing township. 
Section 6 of the Home Rule City Act, MCL 117.6, 
provides that a detachment be initiated by “proceedings 
originating by petition therefor signed by 
qualified 
electors who are freeholders residing within the cities, 
villages, or townships to be affected thereby . . . .” 
(Emphasis added.) 
Notably, MCL 117.8 and MCL 117.11 
delineate the procedure for submitting a petition for a 
change of boundaries. 
MCL 117.8(1) provides in relevant 
part that “the board shall, by resolution, provide that the 
question 
of 
making 
the 
proposed 
incorporation, 
consolidation, or change of boundaries be submitted to the 
qualified electors of the district to be affected at the 
3 Recent amendments to the act do not affect the issue 
in this case. 
6  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
next general election or at a special election before the 
next general election.” 
(Emphasis added.) 
Likewise, MCL 
117.11(2) provides that “the question of making the 
incorporation, 
consolidation, 
or 
change 
of 
boundaries 
petitioned for shall be submitted to the electors of the 
district to be affected.” 
(Emphasis added.) 
Michigan 
election law defines a qualified elector as “any person who 
possesses the qualifications of an elector as prescribed in 
section 1 of article 2 of the state constitution and who 
has resided in the city or township 30 days.”4  MCL 168.10. 
Because Casco Township voters do not reside in 
Columbus Township, they are not “qualified electors” of 
Columbus Township who can sign a petition and vote on the 
detachment of territory from the city of Richmond for 
addition of the territory to Columbus Township. 
Likewise, 
because Columbus Township voters do not reside in Casco 
4 Const 1963, art 2, § 1 provides the following: 
Every citizen of the United States who has
attained the age of 21 years, who has resided in
this 
state 
six 
months, 
and 
who 
meets 
the 
requirements of local residence provided by law,
shall be an elector and qualified to vote in any
election except as otherwise provided in this
constitution. 
The 
legislature 
shall 
define 
residence for voting purposes. 
Pursuant to US Const, Am XVI, the minimum voting age
is now eighteen years. 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
Township, they are not “qualified electors” of Casco 
Township who can sign a petition and vote on the detachment 
of territory from the city of Richmond for addition of the 
territory to Casco Township. 
Therefore, a single petition 
and a single vote on multiple detachments violate the 
statutory language of the Home Rule City Act. 
Additional support for this position is found in the 
statutory language used in other parts of the Home Rule 
City Act. 
MCL 117.9(1) defines the “district to be 
affected” as the following: 
“The district to be affected 
by every such proposed incorporation, consolidation, or 
change of boundaries shall be deemed to include the whole 
of each city, village, or township from which territory is 
to be taken or to which territory is to be annexed.” 
(Emphasis added.) 
A change of boundaries for the district to be affected 
encompasses only one city and one township because a 
township’s voters can be qualified electors only in 
relation to their own township’s proposed change of 
boundaries and are affected only by their own township’s 
proposed change of boundaries. 
Therefore, it is only 
plausible that the “district to be affected” encompasses 
one 
city 
and 
one 
township. 
Accordingly, 
a 
single 
8  
 
 
   
                                                 
detachment petition and a single vote may only encompass 
territory to be added to one township.5 
Language in MCL 117.13, which sets forth the procedure 
following an election, further supports the principle that 
each township is considered a separate entity and there 
must be separate votes with respect to the territory to be 
detached from one city and added to each township. 
MCL 
117.13 states, “Territory detached from any city shall 
thereupon become a part of the township or village from 
which it was originally taken . . . .”  This indicates that 
the “district to be affected” is limited to the city in 
which the territory is located and the single township that 
seeks the return of the territory. 
Further, interpreting the “district to be affected” in 
detachment proceedings as the city from which the territory 
is to be detached and the township to which the territory 
is to be added recognizes that the consequences of 
detachment may be quite different for each township that 
5 Other jurisdictions have held similarly. See, e.g.,
City of Lake Wales v Florida Citrus Canners Coop, 191 So 2d
453, 457 (Fla App, 1966) (A qualified elector in area 1
cannot vote for the annexation in area 2 because the area 1 
voter is not within the territory affected.); People ex rel
Smith v City of San Jose, 100 Cal App 2d 57, 60; 222 P2d
947 (1950) (An annexation election was improperly held
because voters had to vote for the annexation of two 
parcels and could not vote separately for the annexation of
each parcel.). 
9  
 
 
 
 
seeks to gain property. 
For example, property rights and 
liabilities must be adjusted between the city and the 
township when there is a detachment. 
MCL 123.1. 
Debts 
must be apportioned and land may need to be sold. 
MCL 
123.2; MCL 123.3. The potential for dramatically different 
consequences of detachment are clearly indicated in the 
Fillmore Twp case. Four townships seek to detach land from 
the city of Holland. The Fillmore Township parcel is 1,054 
acres, the Holland Charter Township parcel is 3.33 acres, 
the Park Township parcel is 1.27 acres, and the Laketown 
Township parcel is 0.77 acres. 
It is reasonable to 
conclude that the effect of detachment will be quite 
different when one parcel is 1,054 acres and one parcel is 
a mere 0.77 acres. 
Moreover, allowing a single petition and a single vote 
on detachment from one city for the addition of territory 
to multiple townships does not allow voters to render a 
vote in support of the addition of territory to only one 
township. 
MCL 168.643a requires, in relevant part, the 
following: 
A question submitted to the electors of this
state or the electors of a subdivision of this 
state shall, to the extent that it will not
confuse the electorate, be worded so that a “yes”
vote will be a vote in favor of the subject
matter of the proposal or issue and a “no” vote 
10  
 
 
 
will be a vote against the subject matter of the
proposal or issue. 
However, a single vote on detaching territory from one 
city and adding the territory to multiple townships does 
not allow a voter who may only favor one of the multiple 
additions of territory to cast a “yes” vote. 
As stated by 
this Court in Muskegon Pub Schools v Vander Laan, 211 Mich 
85, 87; 178 NW 424 (1920), “Separate subjects, separate 
purposes, 
or 
independent 
propositions 
should 
not 
be 
combined so that one may gather votes for the other.” 
In 
Vander Laan, this Court noted that the erection of three 
new school buildings showed a common purpose and were part 
of a comprehensive plan to meet the educational needs of 
the city. 
In contrast, we find that detaching territory 
from one city and adding the territory to multiple 
townships does not indicate a common purpose because the 
needs 
and 
consequences 
of 
the 
additions 
to 
various 
townships may differ remarkably. 
Combining multiple 
additions of territory in a single detachment petition so 
that 
there 
is 
only 
a 
single 
vote 
indeed 
combines 
independent propositions “so that one may gather votes for 
the other.” 
When put into context, the text of the Home Rule City 
Act is unambiguous—a petition and a vote about detachment 
11  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
must involve only one city and one township. 
A contrary 
reading of the statutory language belies the fact that 
there will always be two parties to a detachment—the city 
and the township. Justice Young’s focus on the word “each” 
in the statute ignores that the provisions must be read in 
context. 
Interpreting the word “each” to mean that a 
detachment petition can encompass more than one township is 
contrary 
to 
the 
statutory 
language 
that 
relates 
to 
qualified electors and ignores the fact that the Home Rule 
City 
Act 
encompasses 
four 
distinct 
procedures– 
incorporation, consolidation, annexation, and detachment. 
Language in the statute that at first may appear to 
indicate that multiple townships may be involved in a 
single detachment petition and a single vote must be read 
in context and in consideration of the statutory language 
regarding qualified electors. 
Significantly, residents of 
one township are not qualified electors in a detachment 
proceeding when it comes to determining a change of 
boundaries for another township, and the statute cannot 
properly be interpreted in this manner.6 
6 This is consistent with principles espoused in past
cases from this Court. 
See, e.g., Robertson v Baxter, 57
Mich 127, 129; 23 NW 711 (1885) (“No person not living in
the township has any voice in its affairs.”). 
12  
 
 
 
Further, Justice Young’s reliance on this Court’s 
decision in Walsh v Secretary of State, 355 Mich 570, 574; 
95 NW2d 511 (1959), is misplaced. 
Walsh dealt with 
annexation, not detachment. 
Notably, in the multiple­
township annexation at issue in Walsh, the votes of each 
territory were considered separately. In essence, a single 
township could “veto” the annexation from taking place, no 
matter how many voters approved of the annexation in other 
townships. 
In contrast, in the detachment procedure at 
issue in these cases, the voters in a township have no 
“veto” power. 
The wishes of an entire township could 
effectively be ignored because voters in other townships 
believe that a detachment would be in their best interests. 
The “package” proposal in Walsh is hardly analogous to the 
detachment proceedings at issue in these cases. 
Our conclusion that a single detachment petition and a 
single vote on that petition may only encompass territory 
to be added to one township is in accord with the 
unambiguous statutory language. 
Thus, the Legislature is 
presumed to have intended the meaning expressed in the 
statute and judicial construction is not permissible. 
Finally, a writ of mandamus could be properly issued 
in these cases only if plaintiffs proved that (1) they had 
a clear legal right to the performance of the specific duty 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
that they sought to be compelled, and (2) the Secretary of 
State had a clear legal duty to perform the act. 
In re 
MCI, supra at 442-443. Because the Home Rule City Act does 
not allow a single detachment petition and a single vote on 
that petition to encompass territory to be detached from 
one city and added to more than one township, there was no 
clear legal right to have the Secretary of State authorize 
each petition for a single vote. 
Therefore, there was no 
clear legal duty that required the Secretary of State to 
act, and the writs of mandamus were properly denied in both 
cases before this Court. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Home Rule City Act, MCL 117.1 et seq., does not 
allow a single petition and a single vote to encompass 
detachment of territory from a city for the addition of 
that territory to multiple townships; thus, the Secretary 
of State did not have a clear legal duty to act. 
Therefore, 
mandamus 
was 
not 
an 
appropriate 
remedy. 
Accordingly, the decisions of the Court of Appeals are 
affirmed. 
Michael F. Cavanagh
Clifford W. Taylor
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly
Maura D. Corrigan
Stephen J. Markman 
14  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________ 
 
 
v 
STATE OF MICHIGAN  
SUPREME COURT  
TOWNSHIP OF CASCO, TOWNSHIP OF COLUMBUS, 
PATRICIA ISELER, and JAMES P. HOLK,  
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants-Appellants,  
V 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 126120 
 
SECRETARY OF STATE, 
DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF ELECTIONS, 
and CITY OF RICHMOND,  
Defendants-Appellees,  
and  
WALTER K. WINKLE and  
PATRICIA A. WINKLE,  
Intervening Defendants/ Counter-Plaintiffs-Appellees.  
FILLMORE TOWNSHIP, SHIRLEY GREVING, 
ANDREA STAM, LARRY SYBESMA, 
JODY TENBRINK, and JAMES RIETVELD,  
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 126369 
SECRETARY OF STATE and  
BUREAU OF ELECTIONS DIRECTOR,  
Defendants-Appellees,  
and  
CITY OF HOLLAND,  
Intervenor-Appellee.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
YOUNG, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
We granted leave to appeal in these consolidated cases 
to determine whether (1) the Home Rule City Act (HRCA)1 
permits the use of a single detachment petition and 
election when the territory to be detached from a city is 
to be transferred to more than one township and, (2) if 
such a procedure is allowed under the HRCA, whether 
plaintiffs2 are entitled to mandamus relief. 
I agree with 
the majority that plaintiffs are not entitled to writs of 
mandamus because I believe that any request for mandamus 
relief is premature at this time. 
I disagree, however, 
with the majority’s conclusion that the HRCA does not 
permit the use of a single detachment petition and vote 
thereon when transferring land to multiple townships. 
The Legislature was well aware of the political 
gamesmanship that occurs between municipalities in the 
context of boundary disputes. Indeed, our Constitution was 
changed to free the Legislature from this political 
1 MCL 117.1 et seq. 
2 Unless otherwise indicated, “plaintiffs” will be used
to refer collectively to the plaintiffs in both of the
cases that were consolidated. Similarly, “defendants” will
be used to refer to the defendants in both cases 
collectively, unless otherwise noted. 
2  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
quagmire.3
 
By 
enacting 
the 
HRCA, 
the 
Legislature 
established a standardized procedure to effectuate such 
changes in a manner that it viewed as fair and reasonable. 
A plain reading of all relevant language in the HRCA 
demonstrates that the use of a single detachment petition 
when transferring land to multiple townships is permitted. 
The Court of Appeals focused only on select text in the 
HRCA and thereby gave the statute a particular meaning that 
is insupportable when one considers all the language used 
by the Legislature in the HRCA. 
Its exercise in selective 
statutory 
interpretation 
not 
only 
undermines 
the 
Legislature’s intent in passing the HRCA, but also injects 
the judiciary—armed only with ill-defined notions of 
“fairness” and “justice”—as a referee in the inherently 
political, contentious, and tactical process of altering 
municipal boundaries. The majority opinion, while avoiding 
explicit reliance on extra-textual policy justifications, 
does not, in my view, give full meaning to all the relevant 
words in the statute. 
Accordingly, 
I 
respectfully 
dissent 
from 
the 
majority’s conclusion that a single detachment petition 
involving multiple townships is not permitted under the 
3 See the discussion in part III(A)(1) of this opinion. 
3  
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
     
 
 
 
                                                 
HRCA. 
In Casco Twp, I would grant the plaintiffs’ request 
for declaratory relief and deny their claim for a writ of 
mandamus. 
In Fillmore Twp, because the plaintiffs only 
sought a writ of mandamus, I would deny entirely their 
request for relief. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The majority fails to convey adequately the true 
character of the boundary disputes at issue. 
By glossing 
over much of the relevant history, the majority understates 
the inherently political and calculated nature of the 
disputes.4 
A. CASCO TWP V SECRETARY OF STATE 
The land at issue in this case has a long, contentious 
history. 
In July 1996, intervening defendants, Walter and 
Patricia Winkle, filed a petition with the State Boundary 
Commission (SBC) seeking to annex to the city of Richmond 
approximately 157 acres of land that they and other 
4 Contrary to the majority's assertion, I do not
contend that the factual background of these cases should
alter the statutory analysis. Ante at 5 n 2. 
Instead, I
simply point out that the majority opinion, in my view,
inadequately describes the true tactical and strategic
character of these ongoing territorial disputes. Moreover,
the lower courts clearly believed that the ability of
villages and townships to use the HRCA to their advantage
was 
unfair. 
Providing 
the 
full 
history 
of 
these 
territorial disputes helps to reveal the lower courts’
policy views. 
4  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
residents owned in Casco Township and Columbus Township. 
The Winkles hoped to develop their land for commercial use, 
but believed that commercial development could not occur 
unless their property was connected to the water and sewer 
lines offered by the city of Richmond. 
Before the Winkles’ July 1996 petition, however, 
Columbus Township and neighboring Lenox Township had 
entered into an agreement pursuant to 1984 PA 425 to 
transfer land from Columbus Township to Lenox Township.5  A 
similar 425 agreement was reached between Casco Township 
and Lenox Township. 
These 425 agreements were designed to 
prevent future annexations, such as the one initiated by 
the Winkles in July 1996. 
In November 1997, the SBC 
determined that the 425 agreements were invalid and decided 
instead to approve the annexation petition filed by the 
Winkles.6
 After protracted litigation, the SBC’s decision 
was eventually upheld by the Court of Appeals.7  The Court 
5 1984 PA 425 provides a detailed mechanism by which
municipal entities may transfer land to one another by
contract. 
MCL 
124.21 
et 
seq. 
Such 
intergovernmental
transfers are commonly referred to as “425 agreements.” 
6 A referendum is not required for an annexation if the
territory to be affected includes one hundred or fewer
residents. MCL 117.9(4). 
7 Casco Twp v State Boundary Comm, 243 Mich App 392;
622 NW2d 332 (2000). 
5  
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
of Appeals found that the 425 agreements between the 
townships of Columbus, Casco, and Lenox were “sham[s]” and 
“essentially an attempt to avoid annexation,” and upheld 
the SBC’s decision approving the annexation initiated by 
the Winkles.8
 In July 2001, this Court denied leave to 
appeal.9 
In December 2001, plaintiffs filed a single detachment 
petition with the Secretary of State, seeking to transfer 
from the city of Richmond to Casco Township and Columbus 
Township the same land that was involved in the prior 
annexation.10
 
The 
disputed 
territory 
consisted 
of 
8 Id. at 402. 
9 465 Mich 855 (2001). 
10 Under the HRCA, a detachment petition is normally
submitted to the county for certification. 
MCL 117.6 
However, if the territory to be affected is situated in
more than one county, certification must be sought from the
Secretary of State. 
At the time that plaintiffs filed
their petitions, § 11 of the HRCA provided: 
When the territory to be affected by any
proposed incorporation, consolidation or change
is situated in more than 1 county the petition
hereinbefore provided shall be addressed and 
presented to the secretary of state . . . . [MCL
117.11.] 
Because the city of Richmond is located in both St. Clair
County 
and 
Macomb 
County, 
the 
plaintiffs 
filed 
the 
detachment petition with the Secretary of State pursuant to
§ 11. 
6  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
approximately eighty-seven acres in Casco Township and 
seventy acres in Columbus Township. 
Unsure whether the HRCA permitted the use of a single 
detachment petition to transfer land to multiple townships, 
the Secretary of State requested an official opinion from 
the Attorney General interpreting the HRCA. 
Citing a 
pending lawsuit in Eaton County, Michigan, involving a 
factually similar dispute,11 and the Attorney General’s 
policy of declining to issue opinions that might affect 
ongoing litigation, the Attorney General refused to issue a 
formal opinion construing the HRCA. However, in a May 2002 
memorandum to the Department of State, Bureau of Elections, 
the Attorney General's Office provided “informal advice” 
regarding 
the 
use 
of 
a 
single 
detachment 
petition. 
Recognizing that there were “no cases directly on point 
that specifically address the issue,” the memorandum 
informed the Department of State that it was “reasonable to 
11 In City of Eaton Rapids v Eaton Co Bd of Comm'rs,
(Eaton Circuit Court, Docket No. 02-235-AZ 2002), residents
of Eaton Rapids Township and Hamlin Township filed a single
detachment petition to detach land from the city of Eaton
Rapids. 
Unlike the present case, however, the territory
involved in Eaton Rapids was situated in only one county,
thus eliminating the need for involvement by the Secretary
of State. 
In Eaton Rapids, the trial court upheld the use 
of a single detachment petition. 
The Court of Appeals
subsequently denied leave to appeal in an unpublished
order, entered April 16, 2002. (Docket No. 240215). 
7  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
refuse to certify” the petition.12  The Secretary of State 
subsequently notified the plaintiffs that she would not 
certify the detachment petition. 
The following month, the plaintiffs filed a complaint 
in the Ingham Circuit Court, seeking declaratory and 
mandamus relief against the defendants. 
After holding a 
hearing, the circuit court denied the plaintiffs’ request 
for mandamus relief, ruling that the HRCA was not “patently 
clear” regarding whether a single detachment petition may 
be used to transfer land to more than one township. 
The 
circuit court then dismissed the plaintiffs’ lawsuit 
without having addressed their request for declaratory 
relief. 
The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, 
claiming that the circuit court erred in denying their 
request for mandamus relief and in dismissing their lawsuit 
without deciding their request for declaratory relief. 
In 
divided opinions, the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
judgment of the circuit court.13
 The Court of Appeals 
majority held that the HRCA was ambiguous as to whether a 
12 Memorandum from the Attorney General's Office to the
Department of State, Bureau of Elections (May 14, 2002). 
13 Casco Twp v Secretary of State, 261 Mich App 386;
682 NW2d 546 (2004). 
8  
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
single detachment petition was permitted. 
Given the 
ambiguity, the majority decided that it “must consider the 
object of the statute and apply a reasonable construction 
that is logical and best accomplishes the HRCA’s purpose.”14 
Acknowledging that there was “no case law that 
directly addresse[d] the current situation,”15 the majority 
concluded that it was “clearly unfair” to allow the use of 
a single detachment petition when transferring land to 
multiple townships.16
 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals 
denied the plaintiffs’ request for mandamus relief. 
The 
Court of Appeals further held that the circuit court had 
“implicitly” denied the plaintiffs’ request for declaratory 
relief and affirmed the circuit court’s ruling denying 
declaratory relief.17
 The dissent disagreed with the 
majority’s conclusion that the HRCA was ambiguous and noted 
that the plain text of the HRCA permitted the use of a 
single detachment petition to transfer land to multiple 
14 Id. at 392-393. 
15 Id. at 393. 
16 Id. at 394. 
17 Id. at 395. 
9  
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
                                                 
townships. We granted leave to appeal and consolidated the 
case with Fillmore Twp v Secretary of State.18 
B. FILLMORE TWP V SECRETARY OF STATE 
As with the territory involved in the companion case 
of Casco Twp v Secretary of State, the disputed territory 
in this case also has a complex history. In 1997, Fillmore 
Township and the city of Holland entered into a 425 
agreement through which land in Fillmore Township was to be 
transferred to Holland. 
Pursuant to the referendum 
provision in 1984 PA 425, qualified electors in Fillmore 
Township filed a petition calling for a referendum on the 
425 agreement with the city of Holland. 
The voters 
ultimately defeated the 425 agreement in the referendum. 
Several months after the 425 agreement was defeated, 
in late 1998, landowners in Fillmore Township filed 
petitions with the SBC to annex approximately 1,100 acres 
to the city of Holland. 
The SBC approved the annexation, 
thereby 
transferring 
approximately 
1,100 
acres 
from 
Fillmore Township to Holland. 
Seeking to reverse the 
annexation effected by the SBC’s decision, in February 
2000, electors in Fillmore Township filed a petition with 
the Secretary of State to detach the land that was 
18 471 Mich 890 (2004). 
10  
 
 
                                                 
 
previously annexed. In August 2000, voters in Fillmore and 
Holland defeated the detachment proposal by a vote of 3,917 
to 2,614. 
In October 2002, the plaintiffs submitted a single 
detachment petition to the Secretary of State,19 again 
hoping to detach from the city of Holland the territory 
that was previously annexed from Fillmore Township. 
In 
addition 
to 
the 
Fillmore 
Township-city 
of 
Holland 
detachment, however, the petition also included three 
smaller detachments by which land would be detached from 
the city of Holland and added to Laketown Township, Park 
Township, and Holland Charter Township. 
Because the HRCA 
provides that “the whole of each city, village, or 
township” to be affected by the detachment is entitled to 
vote,20 by adding the additional three townships to the 
single detachment petition, the voting base for the 
detachment election was greatly expanded. 
The following table summarizes the acreage to be 
transferred by the detachment and the number of voters that 
19 Certification by the Secretary of State was required
under § 11 of the HRCA because the city of Holland is
situated in both Ottawa County and Allegan County. 
20 MCL 117.9 (emphasis added). 
11  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
would be added to the voting base by including each 
additional township in the single detachment petition:21 
Municipality 
Acres To Be 
Received from 
the Detachment 
Registered Voters
(as of November
2002) 
City of Holland 
-----
19,771 
Fillmore Township 
1,054 
1,854 
Laketown Township 
0.77 
4,166 
Holland Charter Township 
3.33 
15,221 
Park Township 
1.27 
11,989 
Thus, by including the three additional townships and 
detaching only an extra 5.37 acres, the voting base of the 
district to be affected would be expanded by an additional 
31,376 voters over what the voting base would be if only 
Fillmore Township and the city of Holland were involved. 
In November 2002, the Secretary of State refused to 
certify the detachment petition, relying on the September 
2002 decision by the circuit court disallowing the use of a 
single detachment petition in Casco Twp. 
In response to 
21 See brief of city of Holland at 9-10. 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
 
the Secretary of State’s refusal to certify the petition, 
the plaintiffs filed an original mandamus action in the 
Court of Appeals seeking to have the Court order the 
Secretary of State to certify the petition and schedule an 
election. 
The 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
ordered 
that 
the 
plaintiffs’ case be held in abeyance pending its resolution 
of Casco Twp. 
In March 2004, the Court of Appeals issued 
its opinion in Casco Twp, affirming the circuit court’s 
decision disallowing the use of a single detachment 
petition. 
Citing its opinion in Casco Twp, the Court of 
Appeals then denied the plaintiffs mandamus relief by order 
in May 2004.22  We granted leave to appeal and consolidated 
the case with Casco Twp v Secretary of State.23 
II. Standard of Review 
Whether 
the 
HRCA 
permits 
the 
use 
of 
a 
single 
detachment petition to transfer land to multiple townships 
is a matter of statutory interpretation, which is a 
question of law that is reviewed by this Court de novo.24 
22 Fillmore Twp v Secretary of State, unpublished order
of the Court of Appeals, entered May 6, 2004 (Docket No.
245640). 
23 471 Mich 890 (2004). 
24 Mann v St Clair Co Rd Comm, 470 Mich 347, 350; 681
NW2d 653 (2004); Peden v Detroit, 470 Mich 195, 200; 680
NW2d 857 (2004); Gladych v New Family Homes, Inc, 468 Mich
(continued…) 
13  
 
 
  
 
   
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
The constitutionality of the HRCA’s detachment procedure is 
also a question of law that is subject to review de novo.25 
This Court reviews a lower court’s decision regarding a 
request for mandamus relief for an abuse of discretion.26 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. THE HRCA AND THE SINGLE DETACHMENT PROCEDURE 
1.HISTORY OF THE HRCA 
The HRCA, enacted in 1909, is an intricate statute 
that has been amended in piecemeal fashion numerous times 
over the past century. 
Before the enactment of the HRCA, 
the Legislature directly enacted municipal boundary changes 
on a case-by-case basis through special legislation. 
Delegates 
to 
the 
1907-1908 
constitutional 
convention 
recognized the substantial burden this process imposed, as 
well as the confusion that resulted from hundreds of pieces 
(…continued) 
594, 597; 664 NW2d 705 (2003); Silver Creek Drain Dist v  
Extrusions Div, Inc, 468 Mich 367, 373; 663 NW2d 436 
(2003).  
25 Taxpayers of Michigan Against Casinos v Michigan,
471 Mich 306, 317-318; 685 NW2d 221 (2004); Wayne Co v 
Hathcock, 471 Mich 445, 455; 684 NW2d 765 (2004); DeRose v 
DeRose, 469 Mich 320, 326; 666 NW2d 636 (2003). 
26 Baraga Co v State Tax Comm, 466 Mich 264, 268-269;
645 NW2d 13 (2002); In re MCI Telecom Complaint, 460 Mich
396, 443; 596 NW2d 164 (1999). 
14  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
of such special legislation. 
The convention’s Address to 
the People stated: 
One of the greatest evils brought to the
attention of the Convention was the abuse 
practiced 
under 
local 
and 
special
legislation. The number of local and special
bills passed by the last legislature was four 
hundred fourteen, not including joint and 
concurrent resolutions. 
The time devoted to 
the consideration of these measures and the 
time required in their passage through the
two houses imposed a serious burden upon the
state. 
This 
section 
[prohibiting 
the 
enactment of special acts when a general act
can be made applicable], taken in connection
with the increased powers of local self­
government granted to cities and villages in
the revision, seeks to effectively remedy 
such condition. . . .  The evils of local and 
special legislation have grown to be almost
intolerable, 
introducing 
uncertainty 
and 
confusion into the laws, and consuming the
time and energy of the legislature which 
should be devoted to the consideration of 
measures 
of 
a 
general 
character. 
By
eliminating this mass of legislation, the 
work of the legislature will be greatly
simplified and improved.[27] 
27 2 Proceedings & Debates, Constitutional Convention 
1907, pp 1422-1423 (emphasis in original). 
In their 
Address to the People, the delegates were referring to
Const 1908, art 5, § 30, which provided: 
The legislature shall pass no local or 
special act in any case where a general act can
be made applicable, and whether a general act can
be made applicable shall be a judicial question.
No local or special act, excepting acts repealing
local or special acts in effect January 1, 1909
and receiving a 2/3 vote of the legislature shall
take effect until approved by a majority of the
electors voting thereon in the district to be
affected. 
15  
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
  
                                                 
Based 
on 
this 
overwhelming 
dissatisfaction 
with 
special 
legislation 
as 
a 
means 
to 
adjust 
municipal 
boundaries, 
delegates 
to 
the 
1907-1908 
constitutional 
convention debated whether to direct the Legislature to 
enact a general municipal boundary statute that would 
provide a framework for all future municipal boundary 
changes. 
The delegates proposed, and the people of 
Michigan eventually ratified, Const 1908, art 8, § 20, 
which provided: 
The legislature shall provide by a general
law for the incorporation of cities, and by a
general law for the incorporation of villages
. . . . 
With art 8, § 20 as a constitutional mandate, the 
Legislature enacted the HRCA the following year in order to 
establish 
a 
comprehensive, 
standardized 
procedure 
for 
initiating 
and 
approving 
all 
changes 
to 
municipal 
boundaries, 
including 
incorporations, 
annexations, 
detachments, and consolidations.28 
2. RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE HRCA 
As the majority correctly notes, three provisions of 
the HRCA are directly relevant in the present case. 
The 
28 The substance of Const 1908, art 8, § 20 was carried
forward into our current Constitution as Const 1963, art 7,
§ 21. 
16  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
detachment process is specifically authorized by § 6 of the 
HRCA, which provides: 
Cities may be incorporated or territory
detached 
therefrom 
or 
added 
thereto, 
or 
consolidation made of 2 or more cities or 
villages into 1 city, or of a city and 1 or
more villages into 1 city, or of 1 or more
cities or villages together with additional
territory 
not 
included 
within 
any
incorporated city or village into 1 city, by
proceedings originating by petition therefor
signed 
by 
qualified 
electors 
who 
are 
freeholders 
residing 
within 
the 
cities,
villages, or townships to be affected thereby
. . . .[29] 
However, because both the city of Richmond and the city of 
Holland are located in more than one county, rather than 
filing their detachment petitions with the county under § 
6, plaintiffs in both cases were required to file their 
petitions with the Secretary of State pursuant to § 11 of 
the HRCA. 
At the time of the present lawsuits, § 11 
provided: 
When the territory to be affected by any
proposed 
incorporation, 
consolidation, 
or 
change is situated in more than 1 county the
petition 
hereinbefore 
provided 
shall 
be 
addressed and presented to the secretary of
state, with 1 or more affidavits attached
thereto sworn to by 1 or more of the signers
of said petition, showing that the statements
contained in said petition are true, that
each signature affixed thereto is the genuine
signature of a qualified elector residing in
a city, village, or township to be affected 
29 MCL 117.6 (emphasis added). 
17  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
by the carrying out of the purposes of the
petition and that not less than 25 or such
signers reside in each city, village or 
township 
to 
be 
affected 
thereby. 
The 
secretary 
of 
state 
shall 
examine 
such 
petition and the affidavit or affidavits 
annexed, and if he shall find that the same
conforms to the provisions of this act he
shall so certify, and transmit a certified
copy of said petition and the accompanying
affidavit or affidavits to the clerk of each 
city, village or township to be affected by
the carrying out of the purposes of such
petition, together with his certificate as
above provided, and a notice directing that
at the next general election occurring not
less than 40 days thereafter the question of
making the incorporation, consolidation or 
change of boundaries petitioned for, shall be
submitted to the electors of the district to 
be affected, and if no general election is to
be held within 90 days the resolution may fix
a date preceding the next general election
for a special election on the question. If he
shall 
find 
that 
said 
petition 
and 
the 
affidavit or affidavits annexed thereto do 
not conform to the provisions of this act he
shall certify to that fact, and return said
petition and affidavits to the person from
whom they were received, together with such
certificate. The several city, village and
township clerks who shall receive from the
secretary 
of 
state 
the 
copies 
and 
certificates above provided for shall give
notice of the election to be held on the 
question 
of 
making 
the 
proposed
incorporation, consolidation or change of 
boundaries as provided for in section 10 of
this act.[30] 
30 MCL 117.11 (emphasis added). 
Effective January 1, 
2005, § 11 was amended. None of the amendments is material 
to the resolution of the present cases. 
18  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
    
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lastly, the phrase “district to be affected,” as used 
in § 11, is defined by § 9 of the HRCA: 
The 
district 
to 
be 
affected 
by 
the 
proposed 
incorporation, 
consolidation, 
or 
change of boundaries is considered to include
the whole of each city, village, or township
from which territory is to be taken or to
which territory is to be annexed.[31]
 
3. PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
When interpreting a statute, a court’s duty is to give 
effect to the intent of the Legislature based on the actual 
words used in the statute.32  If the statutory language is 
clear and unambiguous, no further construction is necessary 
or permitted.33  The statute is enforced as written.34   It 
is the duty of the judiciary to interpret, not write, the 
law.35 
31 MCL 117.9(1) (emphasis added). 
32 Shinholster v Annapolis Hosp, 471 Mich 540, 548-549;
685 NW2d 275 (2004). 
33 Lansing Mayor v Pub Service Comm, 470 Mich 154, 157;
680 NW2d 840 (2004); In re MCI, supra at 411. 
34 Stanton v Battle Creek, 466 Mich 611, 615; 647 NW2d
508 (2002); Huggett v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 464 Mich
711, 717; 629 NW2d 915 (2001); Anzaldua v Band, 457 Mich
530, 535; 578 NW2d 306 (1998); Sanders v Delton Kellogg
Schools, 453 Mich 483, 487; 556 NW2d 467 (1996). 
35 Koontz v Ameritech Services, Inc, 466 Mich 304, 312;
645 NW2d 34 (2002); State Farm Fire & Cas Co v Old Republic
Ins Co, 466 Mich 142, 146; 644 NW2d 715 (2002). 
19  
 
 
 
 
      
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Lansing Mayor v Pub Service Comm, this Court 
repudiated prior case law that held that a statute is 
ambiguous if it is susceptible to more than one meaning or 
if “reasonable minds can differ” regarding the statute’s 
meaning.36  Instead, as this Court stated in Lansing Mayor, 
a 
statutory 
provision 
is 
ambiguous 
only 
if 
it 
“‘irreconcilably conflict[s]’ with another provision, or 
when it is equally susceptible to more than a single 
meaning.”37
 In ascertaining whether an ambiguity exists, 
therefore, a court must employ conventional rules of 
construction and “give effect to every word, phrase, and 
clause in a statute.”38 
4. THE PLAIN TEXT OF THE HRCA PERMITS THE USE 
OF A SINGLE DETACHMENT PETITION TO TRANSFER LAND TO 
MULTIPLE TOWNSHIPS 
At its core, the Court of Appeals opinion in Casco Twp 
represents a deliberate decision to subordinate the actual 
text of the HRCA in favor of the Court of Appeals’ own 
abstract notions of fairness and justice. 
By choosing to 
give meaning to only some of the words in the HRCA and 
ignoring others, the Court of Appeals substituted its 
36 Lansing Mayor, supra at 165. 
37 Id. at 166 (emphasis in original; citation omitted). 
38 Id. at 165, 168; Koontz, supra at 312. 
20  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
conception of “fairness” for the policy determination made 
by the Legislature in writing the HRCA.39  While this à la 
carte method of statutory interpretation that focuses only 
on certain words in a statute is extraordinarily effective 
at allowing a court to reach a conclusion that it views as 
“fair” or “just,” it is an affront to the separation of 
powers principle. As this Court has stated numerous times, 
it is the duty of the judiciary to effectuate the intent of 
the Legislature by giving effect to every “word, phrase, 
and clause in a statute.”40 
39 The Court of Appeals opinion is replete with 
references to “fairness,” “injustice,” “prejudice,” and 
“absurd results.” 
Casco Twp, supra, 261 Mich App at 391,
394. 
The Court of Appeals stated, “In simple terms, it is
clearly unfair that citizens of one township be allowed to
vote on issues that affect another township. 
Indeed, the
townships’ combined voting strength could be used to 
overwhelm the city’s voting strength.” Id. at 394. 
Appellees also rely on vague notions of “fairness” and
“justice” in support of their position. 
See Winkle brief 
at 17 (permitting a multiple-township detachment would lead
to “absurd results which create injustice”); Secretary of
State brief at 35 (“‘[p]ublic policy requires that statutes
controlling the manner in which elections are conducted be
construed as fair as possible’”); City of Holland brief at
20 (a multiple-township detachment is “one of the most
egregious examples of . . . inherent mischief”). 
40 Lansing Mayor, supra at 168; Koontz, supra at 312;
Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare Sys, 465 Mich 53, 60; 631 NW2d
686 (2001). 
21  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
A close analysis of the text of the HRCA demonstrates 
that the statute is not ambiguous and that a single 
detachment petition may be used to detach land from a city 
and add it to multiple townships. 
Although the majority 
focuses extensively on § 9 of the HRCA,41 the majority 
notably fails to give full effect to the Legislature’s use 
of the word “each” in § 9. 
The section of the HRCA under which plaintiffs filed 
their petitions, § 11, provides that “the question of 
making the incorporation, consolidation or change of 
boundaries petitioned for, shall be submitted to the 
electors of the district to be affected . . . .”42
 Under 
§ 9, the HRCA defines “the district to be affected” as 
“includ[ing] the whole of each city, village, or township 
from which territory is to be taken or to which territory 
is to be annexed.”43
 By defining “the district to be 
affected” as including the whole of “each” city, village, 
or 
township, 
the 
Legislature 
contemplated 
that 
“the 
district to be affected” could include multiple townships 
in a detachment proceeding. 
41 Ante at 8.  
42 MCL 117.11 (emphasis added).  
43 MCL 117.9 (emphasis added).  
22  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The word “each” is not defined in the HRCA. 
Pursuant 
to MCL 8.3a, undefined statutory terms are to be given 
their plain and ordinary meaning, unless, of course, the 
undefined word is a term of art.44  Because “each” is not a 
term of art, this Court must therefore give the word its 
plain meaning. 
As this Court stated in Horace v City of 
Pontiac,45 “[w]hen considering a nonlegal word or phrase 
that is not defined within a statute, resort to a layman's 
dictionary . . . is appropriate.”46
 Moreover, it is 
appropriate 
to 
use 
a 
dictionary 
from 
the 
period 
contemporaneous to the statute’s enactment in order to give 
44 MCL 8.3a provides: 
All words and phrases shall be construed and
understood according to the common and approved
usage of the language; but technical words and
phrases, and such as may have acquired a peculiar
and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be
construed 
and 
understood 
according 
to 
such 
peculiar and appropriate meaning. 
See also Cox v Flint Bd of Hosp Managers, 467 Mich 1, 18;
651 NW2d 356 (2002); Koontz, supra at 312; Donajkowski v
Alpena Power Co, 460 Mich 243, 248-249; 596 NW2d 574
(1999). 
45 456 Mich 744; 575 NW2d 762 (1998). 
46 Id. at 756; see also Halloran v Bhan, 470 Mich 572,
578; 683 NW2d 129 (2004); People v Jones, 467 Mich 301,
304; 651 NW2d 906 (2002); Stokes v Millen Roofing Co, 466
Mich 660, 665; 649 NW2d 371 (2002); Robinson v Detroit, 462
Mich 439, 456 n 13; 613 NW2d 307 (2000); Consumers Power Co 
v Pub Service Comm, 460 Mich 148, 163; 596 NW2d 126 (1999). 
23  
 
 
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
full effect to the intent of the Legislature that enacted 
the statute.47 
Although the HRCA has been amended frequently over the 
past century, the relevant provisions of §§ 9 and 11 have 
remained unchanged in the HRCA since 1909, the year the 
HRCA was originally enacted. The word “each” is defined by 
The New American Encyclopedic Dictionary as “every one of a 
number 
considered 
separately, 
all.”48 
The 
Century 
Dictionary defines “each” as “Being either or any unit of a 
numerical 
aggregate 
consisting 
of 
two 
or 
more, 
indefinitely.”49 
Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of 
the English Language defines “each” as “Being one of two or 
more . . . Every one of any number or aggregation. . . .”50 
47 Cain v Waste Management, Inc (After Remand), 472
Mich 236, 247; ____ NW2d ____ (2005); see also Title 
Office, Inc v Van Buren Co Treasurer, 469 Mich 516, 522;
676 NW2d 207 (2004). 
Writing for the Court in Title 
Office, Justice Cavanagh noted that, in construing the word
“transcript” in the 1895 Transcripts and Abstracts of 
Records Act (TARA), it was proper for the Court to consult
a dictionary in use “[a]t the time of enactment of [the]
TARA.” Id. (emphasis added). 
48 The New American Encyclopedic Dictionary, p 1575
(1907) (emphasis added). 
49 The Century Dictionary: 
An Encyclopedic Lexicon of
the English Language, p 1813 (1906) (emphasis added). 
50 Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the
English Language, p 779 (1913) (emphasis added). 
24  
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
 
It is clear, therefore, that the word “each,” as used 
in 1909, means “all” and “every,” and plainly encompasses 
multiple entities. 
Indeed, by using “each” in § 9, the 
Legislature effectively said, as a definitional matter, 
that “the district to be affected” is to be comprised of 
“all” or “every” city, village, or township affected by the 
boundary change. 
The “district” is not limited to a 
predetermined number, but rather includes every municipal 
entity from which territory is to be taken or to which 
territory is to be added. 
Thus, while “the district to be 
affected” 
can 
certainly 
contain 
just 
two 
municipal 
entities, it can also include more than two entities.51 
Defendants argue that the Legislature’s use of the 
word “each” is not determinative because, by using “each,” 
the Legislature was simply referring to the two municipal 
entities 
that 
necessarily 
must 
be 
involved 
in 
any 
detachment proceeding: 
the city that will lose the land 
51 The Legislature’s use of the word “each” was not
limited solely to § 9 and the definition of “the district
to be affected.” 
For example, the same provision under
which plaintiffs filed their petitions, § 11, directly
states that the Secretary of State shall transmit a 
certified copy of the petition to “each city, village or
township to be affected by the carrying out of the purposes
of such petition . . . .” MCL 117.11 (emphasis added). 
25  
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
and the township that will gain the land.52
 Defendants’ 
argument is unpersuasive. 
Had the Legislature intended 
“each” to refer only to the two sides involved in a typical 
detachment proceeding—the donor city and the recipient 
township—and not to multiple recipient townships, the 
Legislature would have used the word “both,” not “each.”53 
The Legislature, however, did not limit “the district to be 
affected” to only two municipal entities by using the word 
“both.” 
Instead, it deliberately used the distributive 
adjective “each,” thereby referring to every municipality 
affected. 
It is only by assuming that “each” refers 
exclusively to the donor and recipient municipalities in a 
conventional 
detachment 
proceeding 
that 
the 
majority 
position may be sustained. 
There is no textual basis for 
52 The majority makes a similar, though more general,
argument. 
It notes that a reading of the HRCA “contrary”
to its own “belies the fact that there will always be two 
parties to a detachment—the city and the township.” 
Ante 
at 12 (emphasis in original). 
Conspicuously, the majority
neglects to give meaning to the Legislature’s use of the
word “each.” 
53 The New American Encyclopedic Dictionary, p 580
(1907) defines “both” as “two taken together” and The 
Century Dictionary: An Encyclopedic Lexicon of the English
Language, p 636 (1906) defines “both” as “The one and the 
other; the two; the pair or the couple, in reference to two 
persons or things . . . .” 
26  
 
 
 
    
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
making this assumption or otherwise limiting the customary 
meaning of “each.”54 
54 Further examination of the text of § 11 demonstrates
that a single detachment petition may be used to transfer
land to multiple townships. For example, § 11 states, “The
several city, village and township clerks who shall receive
from the secretary of state the copies and certificates
above provided shall give notice of the election to be held
. . . .” The word “several” is defined by The New American 
Encyclopedic Dictionary (1907) as “Consisting of a number;
more than two.” 
The use of “several,” therefore, also
indicates that the Legislature envisioned a situation under
which a single detachment petition could be used to 
transfer land to multiple townships. While it is true that 
“several” can also mean “separate” or “individual”—e.g.,
“they go their several ways”—such a meaning exists only in
the context of a plurality. 
“Several” only indicates
“individual” or “separate” if there is a larger collective
whole to begin with. 
At oral argument, defense counsel conceded that the 
word “several,” as used in the HRCA, means “more than a
couple.” 
Justice Young: 
I’m asking you to look at
section 11 that refers near the end: 
“The 
several city, village and township clerks who
shall receive from the Secretary of State copies
of the certificates.” 
I’m looking at the term
“several” there. Does that not indicate at least 
the potential for multiple— 
Counsel: Well again we go to kind of the
dictionary look at the definition and “several”
can mean one individual. 
Justice Young: Really? 
Counsel: I’m sorry, you’re talking about a
city, village or – 
Justice Young: 
Doesn’t “several” mean more 
than a couple? 
(continued…) 
27  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This construction of the HRCA is bolstered by the fact 
that, throughout § 11, the words “petition” and “election” 
are used in the singular even though the words “each” and 
“several” are used in the same sentences when modifying 
“city, village or township.” For example, § 11 states that 
the Secretary of State must transmit “a certified copy of 
said petition . . . to the clerk of each city, village or 
township to be affected by the carrying out of the purposes 
of such petition . . . .”55
 Section 11 further provides 
that “[t]he several city, village and township clerks . . . 
shall give notice of the election to be held . . . .”56 
While it is true that MCL 8.3b states that, in construing 
statutes, “[e]very word importing the singular number only 
(…continued) 
Counsel: Yes. 
55 MCL 117.11 (emphasis added). The word “petition” is
used in the singular three other times in § 11: 
The secretary of state shall examine such
petition and the affidavit or affidavits annexed 
. . . . If he shall find that said petition and 
the affidavit or affidavits annexed thereto do 
not conform to the provisions of this act he
shall certify to that fact, and return said 
petition and affidavits to the person from whom
they were received . . . . 
[Id. (emphasis
added).] 
56 Id. (emphasis added). 
28  
   
   
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
may extend to and embrace the plural number,” it is 
important to remember that MCL 8.3b is permissive, not 
mandatory. 
MCL 8.3b states only that the singular “may” 
extend to the plural. 
This Court addressed MCL 8.3b in Robinson, in which we 
construed the phrase “the proximate cause” within the 
context of the governmental immunity statute.57  As we noted 
in Robinson, MCL 8.3b "only states that a word importing 
the singular number ‘may extend’ to the plural. 
The 
statute does not say that such an automatic understanding 
is required.”58  We went on to hold that MCL 8.3 “provides 
that the rule stated in § 3b shall be observed ‘unless such 
57 MCL 691.1407(2) provides: 
Except 
as 
otherwise 
provided 
in 
this 
section, 
and 
without 
regard 
to 
the 
discretionary or ministerial nature of the
conduct 
in 
question, 
each 
officer 
and 
employee of a governmental agency . . . is 
immune from tort liability for an injury to a
person or damage to property caused by the
officer, employee, or member while in the
course of employment or service . . . if all
of the following are met: 
* 
* 
* 
(c) The officer's, employee's, member's,
or volunteer's conduct does not amount to 
gross negligence that is the proximate cause
of the injury or damage. [Emphasis added.] 
58 Robinson, supra at 461 n 18. 
29  
 
 
 
 
    
                                                 
 
 
 
 
construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent 
of the Legislature.’”59
 This Court concluded that because 
the Legislature chose to use the definite article “the” 
within the phrase “the proximate cause,” it “clearly 
evince[d] an intent to focus on one cause.”60 
The same is true in the present case. 
In § 11, the 
Legislature consistently referred to “petition” in the 
singular and used the phrase “the election.” 
There is no 
principled basis by which to say that “the” means “one” in 
Robinson, but “the” does not mean “one” when referring to 
“the election” mandated by § 11. 
Taken together, all of these textual clues demonstrate 
that the HRCA permits the use of a single detachment 
petition and election when transferring land to more than 
one township. 
Unlike the majority, which focuses only on 
select words in the HRCA, I believe that this Court is 
obligated to give effect to every word the Legislature used 
in writing the HRCA. 
I would hold, therefore, that the 
Court of Appeals erred in finding that the HRCA is 
ambiguous. 
No 
provision 
of 
the 
HRCA 
conflicts, 
irreconcilably or otherwise, with any other provision of 
59 Id.  
60 Id. at 458-459 (emphasis added).  
30  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
the HRCA. Nor is the HRCA equally susceptible to more than 
a single meaning. 
A plain reading of §§ 9 and 11 
demonstrates that the procedure used by plaintiffs in the 
present cases is permissible under the HRCA. 
The majority casually dismisses this Court’s decision 
in Walsh v Secretary of State,61 which explicitly recognized 
and permitted a single petition for a multiple–municipality 
annexation under the HRCA. 
In Walsh, we examined §§ 9 and 
11 of the HRCA. 
The case involved an annexation by the 
city of Lansing in which it sought to acquire four parcels 
of land from Lansing Township and one parcel situated in 
both Lansing Township and Delta Township. 
A single 
petition was filed with the Secretary of State for this 
multiple-township annexation. 
Although voters in the city 
of Lansing and Lansing Township approved the annexation, 
voters in Delta Township did not. 
The plaintiffs in Walsh argued that the annexation 
attempt was divisible and that we should approve the 
annexation of the parcels in Lansing Township, given that 
the Lansing Township voters approved the annexation. 
This 
Court disagreed. 
We held that the annexation was a 
“package proposition” and that, under the vote tabulation 
61 355 Mich 570; 95 NW2d 511 (1959). 
31  
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
provisions of § 9 in effect at the time, if any one of the 
“voting units” voted against the proposal, the whole 
proposal failed.62 
While it is true that Walsh involved an analogous 
annexation rather than a detachment, and that the primary 
focus in Walsh was on the vote tabulation provisions of the 
HRCA, not the definition of “district to be affected,” this 
Court accepted the use of a single “package” petition even 
though the land that was to be annexed consisted of five 
distinct parcels in two separate townships. 
Accordingly, 
the single petition procedure used by plaintiffs in the 
present cases is not “novel” as defendants contend. 
Indeed, as Walsh demonstrates, this Court’s own case law 
has countenanced the use of such a procedure under the HRCA 
in the closely analogous annexation context. 
5. 
THE MAJORITY’S RELIANCE ON THE HRCA’S “QUALIFIED 
ELECTOR” REQUIREMENT AND THE ELECTION CODE IS MISPLACED 
The majority bases its holding primarily on the 
“qualified elector” requirement in §§ 6 and 11 of the 
HRCA.63  Section 6 provides that detachment proceedings must 
be initiated by 
62 Id. at 574.  
63 Ante at 6-7.  
32  
 
 
 
 
   
 
                                                 
 
 
proceedings originating by petition therefor
signed 
by 
qualified 
electors 
who 
are 
freeholders 
residing 
within 
the 
cities,
villages, or townships to be affected thereby
. . . .[64] 
Section 11 requires affidavits showing that 
each signature affixed [to the petition] is
the genuine signature of a qualified elector
residing in a city, village or township to be 
affected by the carrying out of the purposes
of the petition and that not less than 25 of
such signers reside in each city, village or
township to be affected thereby.[65] 
The majority concludes that any multiple-township petition 
always violates the “qualified elector" rule because a 
signatory who is a qualified elector of township A is 
obviously not a qualified elector of township B, in that 
the signatory is not a resident of the territory “to be 
affected” in township B. 
The majority’s analysis is flawed. 
The “qualified 
elector” provision of § 11 merely requires that each 
signatory be a qualified elector of “a” city, village, or 
township affected by the detachment and that there be at 
least 
twenty-five 
signatures 
from 
“each” 
municipality 
affected. 
It is uncontested in the present cases that at 
least twenty-five qualified electors from each city and 
64 MCL 117.6 (emphasis added).  
65 MCL 117.11 (emphasis added).  
33  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
township 
involved 
signed 
the 
petitions.66
 
What 
the 
majority’s argument is actually advancing is the unstated 
predicate point that the “district to be affected” cannot 
encompass more than one township. 
However, because the 
Legislature has permitted the “district to be affected” to 
include multiple townships, as the textual analysis above 
and the Walsh case demonstrate, then every township that is 
bundled into the single petition is necessarily “affected” 
within the meaning of the “qualified voter” provision in § 
11.67 
The majority’s reliance on § 643a in the Michigan 
Election Law, MCL 168.643a, is also misplaced.68  While it 
is true that § 643a requires electoral questions to be 
submitted to voters in a “yes or no” format, there is no 
66 Similarly, § 6 simply requires that the signatories
be 
qualified 
electors 
of 
“the 
cities, 
villages, 
or 
townships to be affected thereby.” 
The Legislature
conspicuously referred to the municipalities in the plural. 
67 The majority also relies on MCL 117.13, which
states, “Territory detached from any city shall thereupon
become a part of the township or village from which it was
originally taken . . . .” 
Ante at 9. 
Contrary to the
majority’s assertion, this language does not prohibit the
use of a single detachment petition involving multiple
townships. 
It merely delineates which municipality will 
control the territory after the detachment is effectuated.
The language of § 13 applies with equal force if multiple
townships are involved in a single detachment proceeding. 
68 Ante at 10-11. 
34  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
reason why a single detachment petition and referendum 
involving multiple townships violates this requirement. 
Indeed, that was the exact situation in Walsh, which held 
that the multiple-township annexation was a “package” 
proposition and not divisible. 
In fact, the precise case that the majority cites for 
its § 643a rationale–Muskegon Pub Schools v Vander Laan69– 
involved a multiple-issue proposal that was put to the 
voters in a single “yes or no” format and upheld by this 
Court. 
In Vander Laan, a school district bundled bonding 
proposals for three separate school buildings into a single 
question to be submitted to the voters. 
This Court 
unanimously 
approved 
the 
use 
of 
the 
multiple-issue 
proposal.70  Although the Vander Laan Court acknowledged the 
rule established in other jurisdictions that “[s]eparate 
subjects, separate purposes, or independent propositions 
should not be combined [in a single electoral question] so 
that one may gather votes for the other,” it noted that 
there was no statutory basis for the rule in Michigan.71 
Nevertheless, the Vander Laan Court still imposed a 
69 211 Mich 85; 178 NW 424 (1920). 
70 Id. at 88-89. 
71 Id. at 87. 
35  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
“separate 
subjects” 
rule 
and 
ultimately 
upheld 
the 
multiple-issue proposal because it “was characterized by 
one common purpose . . . .”72 
I question the majority’s reliance on Vander Laan when 
the Vander Laan Court itself noted that there was no 
statutory basis for the “separate subjects” electoral rule 
that it recognized. 
Rather than rely on a judicially 
created rule that was premised on policy concerns in an 
unrelated area, I prefer to base my analysis of the 
multiple-township detachment procedure on the actual text 
of the HRCA. 
However, to the extent that Vander Laan—a 
case that did not even involve the HRCA—is controlling in 
the present cases, I believe that the multiple-township 
detachments are in accord with its holding because the 
detachments are united by a “common purpose.” 
6. DEFENDANTS’ REMAINING ARGUMENTS 
Defendants argue that to construe the HRCA so as to 
permit a single, multiple-township petition would lead to 
“absurd results.” 
However, in People v McIntire,73 this 
Court rejected the absurd results “rule” of construction, 
noting that its invocation is usually “‘an invitation to 
72 Id. at 88.  
73 461 Mich 147; 599 NW2d 102 (1999).  
36  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
judicial lawmaking.’”74  It is not the role of this Court to 
rewrite the law so that its resulting policy is more 
“logical,” or perhaps palatable, to a particular party or 
the Court. It is our constitutional role to give effect to 
the intent of the Legislature by enforcing the statute as 
written.75
 What defendants in these cases (or any other 
case) may view as “absurd” reflects an actual policy choice 
adopted by a majority of the Legislature and approved by 
the Governor. If defendants prefer an alternative policy 
choice, the proper forum is the Legislature, not this 
Court. 
After all, the Legislature has shown little 
reluctance in amending the HRCA over the past century. 
The defendants in Fillmore Twp also argue that if the 
detachment of 1.27 acres from the city of Holland for 
addition to Park Township is permitted, it would violate 
the “contiguity” rule articulated by this Court in Genesee 
Twp v Genesee Co,76 a case involving an annexation of land 
74 McIntire, supra at 156 n 2, quoting Scalia, A Matter 
of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1997), p 21. 
75 See People v Javens, 469 Mich 1032, 1033 (2004)
(Young, J., concurring). 
The exception, of course, is if
the statute is unconstitutional. 
76 369 Mich 592; 120 NW2d 759 (1963). 
37  
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
from Genesee Township to the city of Mt. Morris. 
In 
Genesee Twp, this Court stated: 
“So, as to territorial extent, the idea of
a city is one of unity, not of plurality; of
compactness or contiguity, not separation or
segregation. Contiguity is generally required
even in the absence of statutory requirement
to that effect, and where the annexation is
left 
in 
the 
discretion 
of 
a 
judicial
tribunal, contiguity will be required as a
matter of law.”[77] 
Recognizing that the requirement of contiguity was not 
“covered by any specific provision of the [HRCA],” the 
Court in Genesee Twp instead based its holding on non­
textual policy grounds: 
“the purpose sought to be served 
[by the HRCA] and the practical aspects of annexation 
. . . .”78 
However, this Court revisited the contiguity rule 
eight years later in Owosso Twp v City of Owosso.79
 We 
specifically 
stated 
in 
Owosso 
that 
“the 
judicial 
requirement of ‘contiguity’” articulated in Genesee Twp had 
been “superseded” when the Legislature amended § 9 of the 
77 
Id. 
at 
603, 
quoting 
37 
Am 
Jur, 
Municipal
Corporations, § 27, pp 644-645. 
78 Id. at 602. 
79 385 Mich 587; 189 NW2d 421 (1971). 
38  
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
 
HRCA in 1970.80  We found that the “substantive standards” 
established by the Legislature when it amended § 9 clearly 
displaced the court-made contiguity rule.81
 Defendants in 
the present cases would apparently have this Court ignore 
the 
legislative 
intent 
of 
§ 
9 
and 
resuscitate 
the 
judicially created contiguity rule in the HRCA context. 
would decline the invitation. 
7. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE HRCA 
Because I believe that the HRCA permits the use of a 
single detachment petition involving multiple townships, it 
is necessary to determine whether the HRCA’s authorization 
of such a procedure is constitutional. 
Defendants, 
particularly those in Fillmore Twp, contend that bundling 
numerous townships into a single petition and referendum 
unconstitutionally dilutes the vote of city residents.82 
80 Id. at 588-590. 
81 Id. at 590. The Court of Appeals elaborated on this
point in Bloomfield Charter Twp v Oakland Co Clerk, 253
Mich App 1, 34; 654 NW2d 610 (2002). 
82 It is worth noting that these consolidated cases do
not involve any allegations of discrimination, or the 
impairment of voting rights, on the basis of race or any
other 
suspect 
classification. 
See, 
e.g., 
Gerken,
Understanding the right to an undiluted vote, 114 Harv L R
1663 (2001). 
The sole issue of contention here is one of 
pure numerical vote dilution. 
Defendants claim that too 
many township voters would be included in the voting base
(continued…) 
39  
I 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Defendants argue that such vote dilution is prohibited 
under the Equal Protection Clause of US Const, Am XIV.83 
(…continued) 
if these referenda are allowed to proceed, to the extent 
that city voters would no longer have a meaningful vote.  
83 While defendants allege violations of both the
federal and state equal protection clauses, they base their
vote dilution argument almost entirely on federal case law.
They cite no Michigan cases analyzing vote dilution under
Const 1963, art 1, § 2. 
Instead, defendants simply state
in their brief that “Michigan courts interpret the state
equal 
protection 
clause 
similarly 
to 
the 
Fourteenth 
Amendment.” City of Holland brief at 39. 
It is important to note that the text of our state
Equal Protection Clause is not entirely the same as its
federal counterpart: 
US Const, Am XIV provides in pertinent part: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws. [Emphasis added.] 
Const 1963, art 1, § 2 provides: 
No 
person 
shall 
be 
denied 
the 
equal
protection of the laws; nor shall any person be
denied the enjoyment of his civil or political
rights 
or 
be 
discriminated 
against 
in 
the 
exercise thereof because of religion, race, color
or 
national 
origin. 
The 
legislature 
shall 
implement 
this 
section 
by 
appropriate
legislation. 
See also Lind v Battle Creek, 470 Mich 230, 234-235; 681
NW2d 334 (2004) (Young, J., concurring). 
(continued…) 
40  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
Given the facts surrounding defendants’ vote dilution 
claim, it is easy to understand their argument. 
As 
discussed in part I(B) of this opinion, it is obvious, for 
example, that the plaintiffs in Fillmore Twp deliberately 
included the three additional townships—Laketown, Holland 
Charter, and Park—as a means to equalize the voting 
disparity 
between 
the 
city 
of 
Holland 
and 
Fillmore 
(…continued)
Therefore, it is insufficient for defendants to rely
solely on federal case law regarding vote dilution, or
Michigan cases interpreting the federal Equal Protection
Clause, and then boldly announce that Const 1963, art 1, §
2 provides the same protections against vote dilution as US
Const, Am XIV. 
Because 
defendants 
have 
failed 
to 
address 
vote 
dilution directly under Const 1963, art 1, § 2, I decline
to examine the issue. 
As this Court stated in Mitcham v 
Detroit, 355 Mich 182, 203; 94 NW2d 388 (1959): 
It is not enough for an appellant in his
brief simply to announce a position or assert an
error and then leave it up to this Court to 
discover and rationalize the basis for his 
claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his
arguments, and then search for authority either
to sustain or reject his position. The appellant
himself must first adequately prime the pump;
only then does the appellate well begin to flow. 
Moreover, the constitutional provision upon which 
defendants base their argument, Const 1963, art 1, § 2, was
not relied on by the Court of Appeals. It was Const 1963,
art 1, § 1 that the Court of Appeals referenced in its
opinion. Casco Twp, supra, 261 Mich App at 394 n 27. 
Accordingly, 
I 
analyze 
defendants’ 
vote 
dilution 
argument solely under US Const, Am XIV—the issue that was
fully briefed by the parties. 
41  
 
 
 
                                                 
Township. 
In the initial August 2000 detachment vote that 
included only the city of Holland and Fillmore Township, 
voters rejected the detachment by a vote of 3,917 to 2,614 
(approximately sixty percent against, forty percent in 
favor). 
Recognizing that the number of voters in the city 
of Holland exceeded the number of voters in Fillmore 
Township by 19,771 to 1,854, almost a 10.7 to 1 margin, the 
plaintiffs bundled the three additional townships into the 
petition by seeking to detach an additional 5.37 acres 
(0.77 acres for Laketown Township, 3.33 acres for Holland 
Charter Township, and 1.27 acres for Park Township). 
By 
doing so, the plaintiffs were able to add an additional 
31,376 township voters to the voting base of the “district 
to be affected” and thereby exceed the voting base of the 
city of Holland. 
In order to evaluate defendants’ claims 
of 
unconstitutional 
vote 
dilution—an 
issue 
on 
which 
Michigan courts have been relatively silent—it is necessary 
to explore briefly the history of federal vote dilution law 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.84 
84 As an initial matter, it is important to note that
the state action requirement under Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence is satisfied here. 
Although the detachment
petitions in both cases were circulated and signed by
private citizens, the involvement of the Secretary of State
(continued…) 
42  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
The 
idea 
of 
“vote 
dilution”85 
as 
a 
cognizable 
constitutional 
harm 
originated 
in 
the 
context 
of 
congressional and state legislative apportionment cases. 
Initially, courts refused to get involved in claims 
regarding vote dilution. The issue was viewed as best left 
for the political process and considered nonjusticiable. 
The leading case establishing this view was the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Colegrove v Green,86 in 
(…continued) 
in certifying the petitions and ordering local authorities 
to hold elections is sufficient to constitute state action.  
See, e.g. Ellison v Garbarino, 48 F3d 192, 195 (CA 6, 1995) 
(“running elections” is a “typical example[ ]” of state 
action).  
85 Professor Melvyn R. Durchslag has noted: 
Voter dilution cases fall into two broad 
categories. First, there are those in which 
dilution occurs because (1) some persons are 
given votes weighted more heavily than others
similarly 
situated 
merely 
on 
the 
basis 
of 
residence, (2) votes are weighted according to a
factor which the state determines is reflective 
of “interest,” or (3) persons are excluded 
altogether from voting because the state deems
them to be “uninterested.” Second, there are 
those in which dilution occurs because equal
franchise is granted to persons allegedly without
interest, or with significantly less interest 
than other voters. [Durchslag, Salyer, Ball, and
Holt: Reappraising the right to vote in terms of
political “interest” and vote dilution, 33 Case W
Res L R 1, 38-39 (1982) (emphasis in original).] 
86 328 US 549; 66 S Ct 1198; 90 L Ed 1432 (1946). 
43  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
which 
voters 
challenged 
the 
Illinois 
congressional 
districting scheme because several of the districts were 
comprised of larger populations than others. 
Stating that 
the harm was one to “Illinois as a polity” and not a 
private wrong, the Court refused to intervene.87
 In 
rejecting the notion that the Court should get involved in 
what it viewed as a political question, Justice Frankfurter 
wrote that “[c]ourts ought not to enter this political 
thicket.”88  He went on to note: 
The remedy for unfairness in districting
is to secure State legislatures that will
apportion properly, or to invoke the ample
powers of Congress. . . . 
The Constitution 
has left the performance of many duties in
our governmental scheme to depend on the 
fidelity of the executive and legislative
action and, ultimately, on the vigilance of
the people in exercising their political
rights.[89] 
However, approximately fifteen years after Colegrove, 
the Supreme Court reversed course in the landmark case of 
Baker v Carr.90
 In Baker, the Court was presented with a 
constitutional challenge to the apportionment of the 
87 Id. at 552.  
88 Id. at 556.  
89 Id.  
90 369 US 186; 82 S Ct 691; 7 L Ed 2d 663 (1962).  
44  
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
Tennessee 
General 
Assembly. 
Despite 
significant 
demographic shifts that occurred within Tennessee, the 
state had not reapportioned its legislative districts in 
over sixty years. 
Voters filed suit and claimed that, in 
light of the drastic change in population, the state’s 
failure to reapportion the General Assembly amounted to a 
violation of their equal protection rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Court rejected the “political question” rationale 
used in Colegrove and held that the issue presented by the 
voters was justiciable. 
Justice Brennan, writing for the 
Court, stated that “the mere fact that the suit seeks 
protection of a political right does not mean it presents a 
political question.”91  The Court went on to hold that the 
Equal Protection Clause provided a proper vehicle by which 
to challenge the Tennessee apportionment system.92
 In its 
91 Id. at 209. 
92 Id. at 237. 
Commentators have questioned the
Supreme Court’s reliance on the Equal Protection Clause in
Baker, suggesting, instead, that the Republican Form of
Government Clause, US Const, art IV, § 4, would have been
more appropriate. 
As Judge Michael W. McConnell has 
written: 
A districting scheme so malapportioned that
a minority faction is in complete control,
without regard to democratic sentiment, violates
the basic norms of republican government. 
It 
(continued…) 
45  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
sweeping holding, the Court did not provide any guidelines 
regarding how the Equal Protection Clause should be applied 
to voting rights cases nor establish any standards by which 
(…continued)
would thus appear to raise a constitutional 
question under Article IV, Section 4, which 
states that “the United States shall guarantee to
every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government.” 
Constitutional standards under the 
Republican Form of Government Clause are ill­
developed, 
but 
surely 
a 
government 
is 
not 
“republican” if a minority faction maintains 
control, and the majority has no means of 
overturning it. 
[McConnell, The redistricting 
cases: 
Original 
mistakes 
and 
current 
consequences, 24 Harv J L & Pub Policy 103, 105­
106 (2000).] 
Professor Pamela S. Karlan has noted: 
[T]he doctrinal move to one person, one vote
was in no sense compelled, either by precedent or
by the absence of any alternative avenues to
judicial oversight. The decision to rely on the
Equal Protection Clause, rather than on the 
Guaranty Clause, has always puzzled me. Justice
William 
Brennan’s 
explanation—that 
there 
was 
precedent 
suggesting 
the 
general
nonjusticiability of the Guaranty Clause—would 
make more sense if not for the fact that there 
was also absolutely square precedent refusing to
entertain 
malapportionment 
claims 
under 
the 
Fourteenth Amendment [citing Colegrove]. 
If the 
Court had to overrule some precedent to review
apportionment and the refusal to reapportion,
then why was overruling Fourteenth Amendment 
precedent—and developing a unique set of equal
protection principles that apply nowhere else in 
constitutional 
law—the 
superior 
alternative? 
[Karlan, Politics by other means, 85 Va L R 1697,
1717-1718 (1999).] 
46  
 
 
   
   
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to implement the new role for the judiciary in such cases. 
Instead, the Court simply stated, “Nor need the [voters 
challenging the apportionment], in order to succeed in this 
action, ask the Court to enter upon policy determinations 
for which judicially manageable standards are lacking. 
Judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are 
well developed and familiar . . . .”93
 
With Baker creating the opening, courts soon began to 
wade head-high into the thicket of vote dilution claims. 
93 
Baker, 
supra 
at 
226. 
In 
dissent, 
Justice 
Frankfurter sharply criticized the Court for casting aside
the “political question” rationale of Colegrove. 
He 
challenged the majority’s conclusion that courts were 
equipped to handle such voting rights cases. 
Justice 
Frankfurter stated: 
The Framers carefully and with deliberate
forethought refused . . . to enthrone the 
judiciary. 
In this situation, as in others of
like nature, appeal for relief does not belong 
here. 
Appeal must be to an informed, civically
militant electorate. . . . 
* 
* 
* 
Unless judges, the judges of this Court, are
to make their private views of political wisdom
the measure of the Constitution—views which in 
all honesty cannot but give the appearance, if 
not reflect the reality, of involvement with the 
business of partisan politics so inescapably a
part 
of 
apportionment 
controversies—the 
Fourteenth 
Amendment, 
“itself 
a 
historical 
product,” 
provides 
no 
guide 
for 
judicial
oversight of the representation problem. [Id. at 
270, 301-302 (citation omitted).] 
47  
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two years after Baker, the Supreme Court decided Wesberry v 
Sanders94 and Reynolds v Sims,95 which established, as a 
fundamental tenet of equal protection jurisprudence, the 
“one-person, one-vote” standard for congressional districts 
and 
state 
legislative 
districts, 
respectively. 
In 
Reynolds, the Court stated that “the overriding objective 
must be substantial equality of population among the 
various districts, so that the vote of any citizen is 
approximately equal in weight to that of any other citizen 
in the State.”96 
The Court later made the one-person, one-vote standard 
applicable to local governments in Avery v Midland Co.97  In 
Avery, the Court invalidated the apportionment system for 
the Commissioners Court of Midland County, Texas, because 
it consisted of “single-member districts of substantially 
unequal population,” which favored rural voters over city 
voters.98
 
The 
Court 
reasoned 
that, 
because 
the 
Commissioners 
Court 
exercised 
“general 
governmental 
94 376 US 1; 84 S Ct 526; 11 L Ed 2d 481 (1964). 
95 377 US 533; 84 S Ct 1362; 12 L Ed 2d 506 (1964). 
96 Id. at 579. 
97 390 US 474; 88 S Ct 1114; 20 L Ed 2d 45 (1968). 
98 Id. at 475-476. 
48  
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
  
 
 
 
   
powers”99 and its actions had a “broad range of impacts on 
all the citizens of the county,”100 the one-person, one vote 
standard should apply.101
 
As 
Wesberry, 
Reynolds, 
Avery, and their progeny 
demonstrate, the one-person, one-vote standard has become a 
well-established 
principle 
in 
equal 
protection 
jurisprudence. At the same time, two notable exceptions to 
99 
Id. at 476, 484-485. 
Under Texas law, the 
Commissioners 
Court 
possessed 
wide-ranging 
powers,
including the authority to appoint officials and fill 
vacancies in county offices, contract on behalf of the
county, build roads, administer welfare programs, run 
elections, issue bonds, set tax rates, and adopt the county
budget. Id. at 476. 
100 Id. at 483. 
101 Id. at 484-485. 
After Avery, the Supreme Court
struck down numerous other local voting arrangements. See
Kramer v Union Free School Dist No 15, 395 US 621; 89 S Ct
1886; 23 L Ed 2d 583 (1969) (invalidating a New York law
that restricted voting in school district elections to
owners and lessees of taxable property within the school
district and to parents of children attending the schools);
Cipriano v City of Houma, 395 US 701; 89 S Ct 1897; 23 L Ed
2d 647 (1969) (invalidating a state law that limited the
vote in a municipal bond election to taxpayers); City of
Phoenix v Kolodziejski, 399 US 204; 90 S Ct 1990; 26 L Ed
2d 523 (1970) (same); Hadley v Junior College Dist of Metro
Kansas City, 397 US 50; 90 S Ct 791; 25 L Ed 2d 45 (1970)
(applying the one-person, one-vote standard to a junior
college electoral district); Bd of Estimate of New York 
City v Morris, 489 US 688; 109 S Ct 1433; 103 L Ed 2d 717
(1989) (invalidating the city of New York’s Board of 
Estimate because each of the five New York City borough
presidents possessed an equal vote on the Board, even
though the boroughs had “widely disparate populations”). 
49  
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
     
the one-person, one-vote rule are just as firmly entrenched 
in equal protection analysis. The first involves so-called 
“special 
purpose 
districts.” 
Under 
this 
exception, 
electoral districts that serve a specialized purpose, such 
as a water storage district, are exempt from strict 
scrutiny and the rigid one-person, one-vote standard 
because they perform functions that “‘so disproportionately 
affect different groups that a popular election’” is not 
warranted.102 
The second, and more relevant, exception to the one­
person, one-vote standard involves changes to municipal 
boundaries. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized the 
unique nature of boundary changes as early as 1907 in the 
seminal case of Hunter v Pittsburgh,103 nearly sixty years 
before the one-person, one-vote standard was established. 
In Hunter, the city of Allegheny was annexed to the city of 
102 Salyer Land Co v Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
Dist, 410 US 719, 728-729; 93 S Ct 1224; 35 L Ed 2d 659
(1973), quoting Hadley, supra at 56. Nearly a decade after
Salyer, in Ball v James, 451 US 355; 101 S Ct 1811; 68 L Ed
2d 150 (1981), the Supreme Court extended the Salyer
“special purpose district” exception to a water district 
that served many urban customers (including the city of
Phoenix), unlike the district in Salyer, which served 
mostly agricultural users. 
See also Briffault, Who rules 
at home?: 
One person/One vote and local governments, 60 U 
Chi L R 339, 359-360 (1993). 
103 207 US 161; 28 S Ct 40; 52 L Ed 151 (1907). 
50  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
Pittsburgh. 
Under state law, the votes in both cities on 
the annexation were aggregated. 
Voters in Allegheny, who 
were greatly outnumbered by voters in Pittsburgh, claimed 
that their votes were unconstitutionally diluted. 
The 
Supreme Court rejected the dilution claim and held that 
states have complete control over municipalities: 
The State, therefore, at its pleasure may
modify or withdraw all such powers, may take
without compensation such property, hold it
itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand
or contract the territorial area, unite the
whole 
or 
a 
part 
of 
it 
with 
another 
municipality, repeal the charter and destroy
the corporation. All this may be done,
conditionally or unconditionally, with or 
without the consent of the citizens, or even
against their protest. In all these respects
the State is supreme, and its legislative
body, conforming its action to the state 
constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained
by any provision of the Constitution of the
United States. Although the inhabitants and
property owners may by such changes suffer
inconvenience, and their property may be 
lessened in value by the burden of increased
taxation, or for any other reason, they have
no right by contract or otherwise in the
unaltered 
or 
continued 
existence 
of 
the 
corporation or its powers, and there is 
nothing in the Federal Constitution which 
protects 
them 
from 
these 
injurious
consequences. The power is in the State and
those who legislate for the State are alone
responsible for any unjust or oppressive
exercise of it.[104] 
104 Id. at 178-179. 
51  
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
 
This Court fully embraced the rationale of Hunter in 
Midland Twp v State Boundary Comm.105  The case involved an 
equal protection challenge to provisions of the HRCA that 
provided for a referendum if the area to be affected 
included more than one hundred persons, but excluded the 
possibility of a referendum when one hundred or fewer 
persons were affected. 
In rejecting the equal protection 
argument, Justice Levin, writing for the Court, directly 
relied on Hunter and held, “No city, village, township or 
person has any vested right or legally protected interest 
in the boundaries of such governmental units.”106 
Although Hunter preceded the establishment of the one­
person, one-vote standard by half a century, its holding 
has 
endured 
throughout 
modern 
equal 
protection 
jurisprudence.107
 Indeed, municipal boundary changes have 
105 401 Mich 641, 664-666; 259 NW2d 326 (1977). 
106 Id. at 664 (emphasis added). 
See also Rudolph
Steiner School of Ann Arbor v Ann Arbor Charter Twp, 237
Mich App 721, 736; 605 NW2d 18 (1999) (“‘No . . . person
has any vested right or legally protected interest in the
boundaries of . . . governmental units.’ 
Changing the
boundaries of political subdivisions is a legislative
question. The Legislature is free to change city, village,
and township boundaries at will.” [citations omitted].). 
107 Holt Civic Club v City of Tuscaloosa, 439 US 60,
71; 99 S Ct 383; 58 L Ed 2d 292 (1978) (“[W]e think that
[Hunter] 
continues 
to 
have 
substantial 
constitutional 
significance 
in 
emphasizing 
the 
extraordinarily 
wide 
(continued…) 
52  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
traditionally been exempted from the one-person, one-vote 
rule and strict scrutiny review.108
 This issue was 
addressed in detail by the Supreme Court in the leading 
case of Town of Lockport v Citizens for Community Action at 
the Local Level, Inc,109 which involved a claim by city 
voters that their votes were unconstitutionally diluted by 
rural voters. 
(…continued) 
latitude that States have in creating various types of 
political 
subdivisions 
and 
conferring 
authority 
upon 
them.”).  
108 Note, Interest exceptions to one-resident, one­
vote: Better results from the Voting Rights Act?, 74 Tex L
R 1153, 1168-1169 (1996) (“Even after political questions
like that in Hunter were found to be justiciable, the Court
has generally adhered to the rule of Hunter to decide equal
protection challenges to jurisdictional boundary changes.
Defining residency is a matter of state discretion subject
only to rational basis review.”). 
See also Briffault, 
supra at 342-343 (“Boundary change[s] . . . have been
defined as largely outside the scope of constitutional
protection. 
This has limited the impact of one person/one
vote 
on 
many 
traditional 
state-authorized 
local 
arrangements, preserving considerable flexibility for state
regulation of governance at the local level.”). 
In 1992, the California Supreme Court held that 
rational basis review applies to limitations on the right
to vote when a municipal boundary change is at issue.
Sacramento Co Bd of Supervisors v Sacramento Co Local 
Agency Formation Comm, 3 Cal 4th 903; 838 P2d 1198; 13 Cal
Rptr 2d 245 (1992). 
In doing so, the California Supreme
Court reversed precedent that held that strict scrutiny was
applicable. Id. at 917-922. 
109 430 US 259; 97 S Ct 1047; 51 L Ed 2d 313 (1977). 
53  
 
 
                                                 
  
In Lockport, Niagara County, New York, sought to amend 
its charter in order to provide for a strong form of county 
government headed by a county executive. 
New York law 
provided that such an amendment could only become effective 
upon approval by separate majorities of the voters who 
lived in the cities within the county and of the voters who 
lived outside the cities. 
The amendment to the charter 
failed both times that it was put to a vote. 
Although a 
majority of the city voters and a majority of the overall 
votes cast were in favor of the amendment, a separate 
majority of non-city voters in favor of the amendment was 
never achieved in either election. Residents of the cities 
filed suit, claiming that the concurrent-majority voting 
scheme unconstitutionally diluted their voting strength 
because 
it 
gave 
a 
small 
number 
of 
rural 
voters 
disproportionate voting strength. 
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the equal 
protection challenge.110
 In upholding the New York voting 
scheme, the Court focused on two points. 
First, it found 
that the Reynolds line of cases dealing with one person, 
one vote in the context of legislative representation were 
110
 Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment,
but did not write a separate opinion. 
54  
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
of “limited relevance” in analyzing the “single-shot” type 
of referendum facing the voters in Niagara County because 
the “expression of voter will is direct” in a referendum.111 
Second, the Court found significant the fact that the 
voters within the cities and those outside the cities would 
be affected differently if the county were to adopt a 
county executive model of government.112  The Court directly 
compared the situation at hand to one involving an 
annexation of land by municipalities and the distinct 
interests that would exist in such a context.113
 Applying 
rational basis review, the Court went on to hold that the 
statute’s 
concurrent-majority 
voting 
provision 
merely 
recognized “substantially differing electoral interests” 
and that it did not amount to a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause.114 
Lockport is particularly instructive in resolving 
defendants’ equal protection claims. 
Similar to the 
111 Lockport, supra at 266. 
112 Id. at 269-272. 
113 Id. at 271. 
See Briffault, Voting rights, home
rule, and metropolitan governance: The secession of Staten 
Island as a case study in the dilemmas of local self­
determination, 92 Colum L R 775, 797-798 (1992). 
114 Lockport, supra at 272-273. 
55  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Niagara County referendum in Lockport, the detachment 
elections in the present cases are also “single-shot” 
referenda, 
thus 
marginalizing 
much 
of 
the 
rationale 
surrounding the Reynolds line of cases pertaining to 
legislative representation. 
The expressed will of the 
voters in the detachment elections will be direct and 
unfiltered. 
Like the Supreme Court in Lockport, I also find 
significant the existence of disparate electoral interests 
between city and township residents. In the present cases, 
it is undisputed that the voters in the townships and those 
in the cities have “substantially differing electoral 
interests.” 
If 
the 
detachments 
are 
approved, 
one 
municipality will lose land and others will gain land, 
thereby implicating divergent interests in the city and the 
townships on a wide range of issues, including police and 
fire protection, school districts, taxes, sewer systems, 
road 
construction, 
commercial 
development, 
garbage 
collection, etc.115 Indeed, the majority itself recognizes 
this fact by noting the “potential for dramatically 
115 See, e.g., Lockport, supra at 269-271. 
56  
 
 
 
 
    
  
                                                 
 
 
 
 
different 
consequences” 
among 
municipalities 
if 
the 
detachments are permitted.116 
Given these differing electoral interests, I believe 
it is rational for the Legislature to permit the use of a 
single detachment petition to transfer land to multiple 
townships and that such a procedure does not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause. 
As the parties noted in their 
briefs and at oral argument, boundary disputes between 
townships and cities are nothing new. 
Indeed, such 
gamesmanship is not only commonplace, but to be expected 
given the inherently valuable nature of land in our 
society. 
For example, cities often craft annexation 
proposals with surgical precision so that the territory to 
be acquired from a township contains one hundred or fewer 
inhabitants and is thus exempt from a public referendum.117 
116 Ante at 10. 
117 Amicus brief of the Michigan Townships Association
at 2-3. As discussed in n 6 of this opinion, an annexation
of territory that contains one hundred or fewer residents
is subject only to approval by the SBC. MCL 117.9(4). 
Justice Levin recognized the gamesmanship that occurs 
between cities and townships in Midland Twp, supra at 679,
stating that “[c]ity and township strategies based on [the
one hundred-resident referendum threshold] are unavoidable.
In general, the city will seek to limit the area proposed
for annexation so that there are insufficient residents for 
a referendum and the township will seek to extend the area
to require a referendum. The motive or purpose of the city
(continued…) 
57  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
By repeating this process numerous times, a city may be 
able to acquire large amounts of land without ever seeking 
approval from voters. 
In light of such tactical territorial disputes between 
cities and townships, it is not irrational for the 
Legislature to permit several townships to amplify their 
voting strength by combining several different parcels into 
a 
single 
detachment 
petition. 
In 
fact, 
with 
the 
significant population disparities that exist between large 
cities and small townships, such a bundled petition may be 
the only way that certain detachments could ever be 
effectuated. 
By permitting several townships to combine 
efforts in a single petition, the Legislature has simply 
recognized that differing electoral interests exist and 
that, occasionally, similar entities will need to combine 
forces in order to have any meaningful opportunity at 
advancing 
their 
interests 
and 
achieving 
the 
various 
boundary changes authorized under the HRCA.118
 I believe 
(…continued) 
or township in drawing the proposed boundaries or in  
requesting a revision of boundaries is not material.”  
118 In addition to minimizing the effects of population
disparities 
between 
cities 
and 
townships, 
there 
are 
numerous other reasons why the Legislature may have 
permitted the use of a single petition to transfer land to
multiple townships. 
For example, it is possible that the
(continued…) 
58  
 
 
      
                                                 
 
 
 
that 
such 
a 
view 
by 
the 
Legislature 
is 
entirely 
reasonable.119 
Lockport and Hunter demonstrate that the one-person, 
one-vote standard does not apply in cases involving 
municipal boundary changes as it does, for example, in the 
context of legislative representation.120
 Instead, states 
(…continued)
Legislature recognized the substantial financial expense
that townships and cities face when holding elections and
that, by combining numerous detachments in one election, it
would be less expensive for the taxpayers to have a single
election 
than 
to 
have 
several 
separate 
detachment 
elections. 
119 
I 
find 
the 
cases 
on 
which 
defendants 
rely
unpersuasive. In Hayward v Clay, 573 F2d 187 (CA 4, 1978),
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals applied strict scrutiny
to an annexation proceeding that required separate majority
approval by freeholders. Hayward is easily distinguishable
from the present cases. 
Hayward involved a grant of
disproportionate voting strength to freeholders. 
No such 
land-based distinction in voting strength exists in the
present cases. 
Instead, the franchise is extended to all 
registered 
voters 
in 
the 
affected 
municipalities,
regardless of land ownership status. 
Defendants also cite 
Carlyn v City of Akron, 726 F2d 287 (CA 6, 1984), in which
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to apply strict
scrutiny to an annexation proceeding. 
While I appreciate
the dicta that defendants cite from Carlyn regarding when
strict scrutiny is to apply, I would choose instead to base
our resolution of this federal law question on clear 
precedent from the United States Supreme Court. 
120 Indeed, 
Lockport and Hunter, taken together,
illustrate that any claim of vote dilution in the municipal
boundary change context will be difficult to sustain,
absent dilution based on some suspect category such as
race. 
The Supreme Court explicitly rejected “dilution by
aggregation” in Hunter and “dilution by disproportionate
(continued…) 
59  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
maintain broad discretion over municipal boundary changes— 
discretion that is subject to rational basis review.121  The 
fact that the state has chosen to exercise this power 
partially through mechanisms provided under the HRCA, which 
includes public referenda on privately initiated boundary 
changes, in no way diminishes the state’s plenary control 
over municipal boundaries. 
Therefore, considering the 
differing 
electoral 
interests 
that 
undoubtedly 
exist 
(…continued)
weight” in Lockport. 
With both types of dilution having
been flatly rejected by the Supreme Court, it seems quite
clear that such cases are not viewed as traditional vote 
dilution matters, but as matters involving a state’s 
absolute authority over municipal boundaries. 
121 As Professor Briffault has written in discussing 
the effect of Lockport: 
To apply strict scrutiny to the distribution
of the vote concerning boundary changes would
inevitably entail a constitutional review of the
states’ municipal formation and boundary change
policies. But there are no generally accepted
principles for determining whether a particular
local government ought to exist, what that unit’s
geographic dimensions ought to be, or whether a
particular territory ought to be in that or 
another local unit. Thus, deference to the states
is 
consistent 
with 
both 
the 
lack 
of 
a 
constitutional vantage point for examining state
municipal formation and boundary change policies
and the traditional jurisprudence of federalism
that 
treats 
local 
governments 
as 
state 
instrumentalities and leaves the creation and 
structure of local governments to the states.
[Briffault, supra, 60 U Chi L R at 395-396.] 
60  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
    
 
 
                                                 
 
   
 
between municipalities in a detachment proceeding and the 
gross disparities in population that arise, I believe that 
the Legislature acted rationally in permitting, under the 
HRCA, the use of a single detachment petition when 
transferring land to more than one municipality. 
While the wisdom of such a policy choice by the 
Legislature might be debated, this Court is not the proper 
forum for such an undertaking. 
Our role is limited to 
determining whether the HRCA conforms to the Constitution. 
For the foregoing reasons, I believe that it does. 
 
 
 
B.
 
MANDAMUS RELIEF 
1. NATURE OF THE REMEDY 
A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy used to 
enforce 
duties 
mandated 
by 
law.122
 
It 
is 
entirely 
discretionary in nature.123  Before seeking mandamus relief, 
122 State Bd of Ed v Houghton Lake Community Schools,
430 Mich 658, 666; 425 NW2d 80 (1988); Teasel v Dep’t of
Mental Health, 419 Mich 390, 409; 355 NW2d 75 (1984);
Howard Pore, Inc v Revenue Comm’r, 322 Mich 49, 75; 33 NW2d
657 (1948); Sumeracki v Stack, 269 Mich 169, 171; 256 NW
843 (1934); Gowan v Smith, 157 Mich 443, 470; 122 NW 286
(1909). 
123 Donovan v Guy, 344 Mich 187, 192; 73 NW2d 471
(1955); Fellinger v Wayne Circuit Judge, 313 Mich 289, 291­
292; 21 NW2d 133 (1946); Geib v Kent Circuit Judge, 311
Mich 631, 636; 19 NW2d 124 (1945); Toan v McGinn, 271 Mich
28, 33; 260 NW 108 (1935); Sumeracki, supra at 171;
Industrial Bank of Wyandotte v Reichert, 251 Mich 396, 401;
232 NW 235 (1930); Miller v Detroit, 250 Mich 633, 636; 230
(continued…) 
61  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a plaintiff must complete all conditions precedent to the 
act that the plaintiff seeks to compel,124 including a 
demand of performance made on the official charged with 
performing the act.125
 Once this threshold is met, the 
plaintiff, bearing the burden of proof,126 must demonstrate: 
(1) a clear legal right to the act sought to be compelled; 
(2) a clear legal duty by the defendant to perform the act; 
(3) that the act is ministerial, leaving nothing to the 
judgment or discretion of the defendant; and (4) that no 
other adequate remedy exists.127 
(…continued) 
NW 936 (1930); Taylor v Isabella Circuit Judge, 209 Mich 
97, 99; 176 NW 550 (1920); Stinton v Kent Circuit Judge, 37 
Mich 286, 287 (1877).  
124 Cook v Jackson, 264 Mich 186, 188; 249 NW 619
(1933); Hickey v Oakland Co Bd of Supervisors, 62 Mich 94,
99-101; 28 NW 771 (1886). 
125 Stack v Picard, 266 Mich 673, 673-674; 254 NW 245
(1934); Owen v Detroit, 259 Mich 176, 177; 242 NW 878
(1932) (“[T]he discretionary writ of mandamus will not
issue to compel action by public officers without prior
demand for such action.”); People ex rel Butler v Saginaw
Co Bd of Supervisors, 26 Mich 22, 26 (1872). 
126 Baraga Co, supra at 268; In re MCI, supra at 442­
443. 
127 Baraga Co, supra at 268; In re MCI, supra at 442­
443; Houghton Lake Community Schools, supra at 666; Pillon 
v Attorney General, 345 Mich 536, 539; 77 NW2d 257 (1956);
Janigian v Dearborn, 336 Mich 261, 264; 57 NW2d 876 (1953);
Howard Pore, Inc, supra at 75; McLeod v State Bd of 
Canvassers, 304 Mich 120, 125; 7 NW2d 240 (1942); Rupert v
(continued…) 
62  
 
 
  
 
  
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
2. PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO MANDAMUS RELIEF 
While I agree with the majority that plaintiffs are 
not entitled to mandamus relief, I disagree with the 
majority’s rationale. The majority concludes that mandamus 
relief is improper because the HRCA does not permit the use 
of 
a 
single 
detachment 
petition 
involving 
multiple 
townships and, therefore, plaintiffs have no “clear legal 
right” to the relief they seek.128  For the reasons stated, 
I disagree with that conclusion. 
However, I believe that 
plaintiffs are not entitled to writs of mandamus because a 
request for such relief is premature at this time. 
As already discussed, before a writ of mandamus will 
be issued, a plaintiff must complete all conditions 
precedent to the act that the plaintiff seeks to compel.129 
While it is possible that plaintiffs may have already 
satisfied all requirements imposed by the HRCA, the 
Secretary of State has yet to make such a determination. 
The Secretary of State deferred her examination of the 
(…continued) 
Van Buren Co Clerk, 290 Mich 180, 183-184; 287 NW 425 
(1939); Toan, supra at 34; Sumeracki, supra at 171; Gowan,  
supra at 470-473.  
128 Ante at 13. 
129 See n 124 of this opinion. 
63 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
petitions until the antecedent question of whether the HRCA 
permits the use of a single petition involving multiple 
townships was resolved. The Secretary of State has not yet 
examined the petitions to determine whether they comply 
with all the other requirements of the HRCA. 
Therefore, 
plaintiffs’ requests for mandamus relief are premature. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The HRCA is not ambiguous. 
A plain reading of §§ 9 
and 11 demonstrates that the use of a single detachment 
petition is permitted when seeking to transfer land to 
multiple townships. 
Moreover, such a procedure comports 
with 
the 
Equal 
Protection 
Clause 
of 
the 
Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Plaintiffs are not entitled to mandamus 
relief, however, because the Secretary of State has yet to 
examine 
the 
petitions 
to 
determine 
whether 
all 
the 
conditions mandated by the HRCA have been satisfied. 
Accordingly, in Casco Twp, I would reverse the decisions of 
the Court of Appeals and the trial court and grant 
declaratory relief. Because the plaintiffs in Fillmore Twp 
did not seek declaratory relief, I would affirm the 
dismissal of their mandamus action. 
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur in 
part and dissent in part. 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
64