Title: Plaintiff v. Defendant

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Powell v. Markus, 115 Ohio St.3d 219, 2007-Ohio-4793.] 
 
 
[THE STATE EX REL.] POWELL, APPELLANT, v. MARKUS, JUDGE, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Powell v. Markus, 115 Ohio St.3d 219, 2007-Ohio-4793.] 
Extraordinary writs — Jurisdiction of retired judge — Denial of the writs 
affirmed. 
(No. 2007-0851 ─ Submitted September 12, 2007 ─ Decided  
September 20, 2007.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Scioto County, 
No. 06CA3129. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment denying writs of mandamus and 
prohibition to set aside a conviction and sentence based on the claim that the 
retired judge who presided over the criminal trial lacked authority to do so.  
Because the retired judge did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to 
preside over the criminal trial, we affirm. 
Criminal Trial 
{¶ 2} Appellee, Judge Richard M. Markus, served as a judge on the 
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas and voluntarily retired.  Supreme 
Court of Ohio Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer assigned Judge Markus to “preside 
in the Scioto County Court of Common Pleas, General Division, to hear case 04-
CR-1174, State of Ohio vs. Matthew Powell and to conclude any proceedings in 
which he participated.”    Judge Markus presided over the jury trial in the criminal 
case for appellant, Matthew Powell. 
{¶ 3} The jury found Powell guilty of tampering with evidence, and in 
August 2005, Judge Markus sentenced him to a term of imprisonment and 
imposed community-control sanctions.  On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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State v. Powell, Scioto App. No. 05CA3024, 2006-Ohio-5031.  We did not accept 
Powell’s discretionary appeal from the court of appeals’ judgment for review.  
State v. Powell, 113 Ohio St.3d 1413, 2007-Ohio-1036, 862 N.E.2d 843. 
Mandamus and Prohibition Case 
{¶ 4} In December 2006, Powell filed a complaint in the Court of 
Appeals for Scioto County for writs of mandamus and prohibition to set aside his 
conviction and prohibit the enforcement of his sentence.  Powell claimed that 
Judge Markus was not authorized to preside over his criminal case.  Judge Markus 
filed a motion for summary judgment, and Powell filed a memorandum in 
opposition and a motion to stay ruling on the motion until after a reasonable 
period of discovery.  In 2007, the court of appeals granted Judge Markus’s motion 
for summary judgment, denied Powell’s motion to stay, and denied the writ. 
Appeal 
{¶ 5} In his appeal as of right, Powell asserts that the court of appeals 
erred in dismissing his complaint.  Powell’s assertion lacks merit. 
{¶ 6} Powell asks the court to issue a writ setting aside the conviction 
and sentence, but direct appeal, not mandamus or prohibition, is the appropriate 
action by which to obtain this type of relief.  State ex rel. Nelson v. Griffin, 103 
Ohio St.3d 167, 2004-Ohio-4754, 814 N.E.2d 866, ¶ 3, 5 (mandamus and 
prohibition not available to compel judge to vacate convictions and sentence). 
{¶ 7} Certainly, “[i]f a lower court patently and unambiguously lacks 
jurisdiction to proceed in a cause, prohibition and mandamus will issue to prevent 
any future unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction and to correct the results of prior 
jurisdictionally unauthorized actions.”  State ex rel. Mayer v. Henson, 97 Ohio 
St.3d 276, 2002-Ohio-6323, 779 N.E.2d 223, ¶ 12. 
{¶ 8} Even so, assuming that mandamus and prohibition are appropriate 
actions to vacate Powell’s conviction and sentence, absent a patent and 
unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, “a court having general subject-matter 
January Term, 2007 
3 
jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party challenging that 
jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by appeal.”  State ex rel. Shimko v. 
McMonagle (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 426, 428-429, 751 N.E.2d 472. 
{¶ 9} For the following reasons, the court of appeals properly held that 
Judge Markus did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction in Powell’s 
criminal case. 
{¶ 10} First, the chief justice’s appointment of Judge Markus authorized 
him to proceed in the criminal case.  “Any voluntarily retired judge, or any judge 
who is retired under this section, may be assigned with his consent, by the chief 
justice or acting chief of the supreme court to active duty as a judge * * *.”  
Section 6(C), Article IV, Ohio Constitution.  This provision authorizes the 
assignment of a retired judge who is over 70 years old.  Id.  Nor did Judge 
Markus’s failure to report per diem compensation for his services to Scioto 
County establish any lack of authority.  See R.C. 141.16. 
{¶ 11} Second, Sup.R. 17(A) did not prevent Judge Markus from being 
assigned to preside over Powell’s criminal case.  This rule provides that “any 
municipal or county court judge who voluntarily has retired or who is retired by 
virtue of Article IV, Section 6(C) of the Ohio Constitution and who is not 
engaged in the practice of law, may consent to be assigned by the Chief Justice or 
acting Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to serve as a judge on any municipal or 
county court.”  (Emphasis added.)  But Sup.R. 17(A) is inapplicable because 
Judge Markus is a retired common pleas court judge and not a retired “municipal 
or county court judge.”  See, e.g., Sup.R. 1(A), which differentiates between 
courts of common pleas and municipal and county courts:  “these Rules of 
Superintendence for the courts of Ohio are applicable to all courts of appeal, 
courts of common pleas, municipal courts, and county courts in this state.” 
{¶ 12} Moreover, despite Powell’s claims, Judge Markus’s status as the 
president of Private Judicial Services, Inc. and his involvement in mediation, 
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arbitration, and private judging did not preclude his appointment.  Retired judges 
eligible for assignment need not comply with those canons of the Code of Judicial 
Conduct that preclude judges from serving as officers of certain business entities 
and from acting as an arbitrator or a mediator or otherwise performing judicial 
functions in a private capacity.  See Compliance with the Code of Judicial 
Conduct, Section D. 
{¶ 13} Finally, Judge Markus was not acting as a private judge in a civil 
case when he presided over Powell’s criminal case.  Therefore, the cases cited by 
Powell are distinguishable.  Cf. State ex rel. Russo v. McDonnell, 110 Ohio St.3d 
144, 2006-Ohio-3459, 852 N.E.2d 145, paragraph one of the syllabus; State ex 
rel. Peffer v. Russo, 110 Ohio St.3d 175, 2006-Ohio-4092, 852 N.E.2d 170, ¶ 19; 
State ex rel. MetroHealth Med. Ctr. v. Sutula, 110 Ohio St.3d 201, 2006-Ohio-
4249, 852 N.E.2d 722, ¶ 9. 
{¶ 14} Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals did not err in denying 
the writs.  Judge Markus did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to 
preside over the criminal trial, and Powell had an adequate remedy by way of 
appeal to raise his claim.  Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
James H. Banks, for appellant. 
 
Mark E. Kuhn, Scioto County Prosecuting Attorney, and Chadwick K. 
Sayre, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
______________________