Title: State v. Adams.

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 101,432 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
TAURUS ADAMS, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
Appellate review of an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct involving improper 
comments to the jury follows a two-step analysis. First, the appellate court decides 
whether the comments were outside the wide latitude that the prosecutor is allowed in 
discussing the evidence. Second, the appellate court decides whether those comments 
constitute plain error; that is, whether the statements prejudiced the jury against the 
defendant and denied the defendant a fair trial.  
 
2. 
In the second step of the two-step prosecutorial misconduct analysis, the appellate 
court considers three factors:  (1) whether the misconduct was gross and flagrant; (2) 
whether the misconduct showed ill will on the prosecutor's part; and (3) whether the 
evidence was of such a direct and overwhelming nature that the misconduct would likely 
have had little weight in the minds of jurors. None of these three factors is individually 
controlling. Moreover, the third factor may not override the first two factors unless the 
harmless error tests of both K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 60-261 (refusal to grant new trial is not 
erroneous if party's substantial rights were not affected) and Chapman v. California, 386 
2 
 
U.S. 18, 22, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, reh. denied 386 U.S. 987 (1967), have been 
met. 
 
3. 
If a party does not object to a jury instruction at trial, an appellate court reviews a 
claim that the instruction is erroneous under the clearly erroneous standard.  
 
4. 
 
Instructions are clearly erroneous only if the reviewing court is firmly convinced 
there is a real possibility that the jury would have rendered a different verdict if the error 
had not occurred. 
 
5. 
The Pattern Instructions for Kansas (PIK) Crim. 3d 68.09, which states that the 
charged offense includes lesser offenses and the defendant can be found guilty of the 
charged offense, a lesser offense, or could be found not guilty, is not erroneous. PIK 
Crim. 3d 68.09, when read with elements instructions that include a transitional statement 
explaining the order in which instructions are to be considered, fully and accurately 
informs the jury it can consider lesser offenses and provides the jury with an orderly 
method for doing so.  
 
6. 
The Pattern Instructions for Kansas (PIK) Crim. 3d 54.01, which states that 
ordinarily a person intends all of the usual consequences of his or her voluntary acts, does 
not mislead the jury into believing that the State does not have to prove that the defendant 
premeditated a killing. PIK Crim. 3d 54.01 contains a permissive inference that may be 
considered by jurors along with all the other evidence in the case and does not replace the 
required element of criminal intent necessary for conviction in those cases where criminal 
intent is a necessary element of the offense. Other standard pattern instructions clearly 
3 
 
inform the jury of the State's burden to prove every element, including proving 
premeditation and an intent to kill. 
 
 
Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; THOMAS L. BOEDING, judge. Opinion filed 
April 15, 2011. Affirmed. 
 
 
Meryl Carver-Allmond, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the 
brief for appellant. 
 
 
Robbin L. Wasson, senior assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Jerome Gorman, 
district attorney, and Steve Six, attorney general, were with her on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
LUCKERT, J.:  Taurus Adams was convicted by a jury of premeditated first-degree 
murder, in violation of K.S.A. 21-3401(a), and criminal use of a weapon, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of K.S.A. 21-4201. Adams now appeals from his conviction 
for premeditated first-degree murder, arguing (1) the prosecutor committed misconduct 
during closing argument, (2) the trial court erred by giving the jury instructions on 
premeditated first-degree murder and its lesser included offenses in descending order of 
severity, and (3) the trial court erred by instructing the jury regarding criminal intent and 
premeditation in a manner that impermissibly lessened the State's burden of proof.  We 
reject Adams' arguments and affirm his conviction.   
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
On the night of December 23, 2007, a fight broke out near a bar at The Legends in 
Kansas City, Kansas. Defendant Adams was at the scene with two friends, twin brothers 
Jeff and Jake Lichtenberger. The victim, Ratsamy Phanivong, was at the crowded bar to 
celebrate a friend's birthday.  
4 
 
 
Adams explained at trial that, on the day of the shooting, he was moving out of his 
residence into his parents' house and had loaded a few items into his car, including 
clothing, computer equipment, and his gun. Because the gun and ammunition were 
expensive, Adams did not want to leave them in the car, so he placed those items in his 
pockets.  
 
That night, Adams, Jeff, and Jake went to a party. When they left the party, Adams 
was ready to go back to his parents' house, but the twins wanted to go to The Legends for 
a drink. They drove to The Legends, and Jeff and Jake went into the bar while Adams 
and another friend, Wes Murphy, stayed in the car.  
 
Inside the bar, Jake made his way onto the dance floor. As Jake was dancing, a 
man confronted him about looking at his "girl" or dancing with her. The man asked if 
Jake and his brother wanted to go outside and fight. Then, Phanivong walked up and 
shoved Jake backwards a foot or two. Jake threw his beer in Phanivong's face. A group of 
Phanivong's friends walked up, but bouncers broke up the ruckus and told Phanivong to 
leave the bar. A short time later, the bouncers also told the twins to leave because of the 
drink-throwing incident. About that time, Adams, who had gotten cold in the car, came 
into the bar, asking for the car keys. The three friends left the bar together. 
  
According to Jeff's trial testimony, as Adams and the twins turned to walk to the 
parking garage, Phanivong, who had not left the vicinity, saw them and asked Jeff, "Who 
threw that drink in my face?" Jeff did not want any trouble so he told Phanivong that "we 
didn't throw the drink." Adams and the twins were walking away when Phanivong took a 
swing at Jeff, hitting the back of his head. Jeff briefly fell to the ground and got back up. 
Adams jumped between Jeff and Phanivong and said they were not looking for trouble. 
With that, Phanivong punched Adams in the head. Adams pulled out a .40 caliber 
handgun from his waistband and fired two fatal shots at Phanivong. Adams and the twins 
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ran to their car, while Adams repeatedly said, "Let's go, let's go, let's go." They could not 
drive away, however, because security guards and bouncers detained them.  
 
Another witness, Phanivong's friend Bounkhong Inhnarath who had left the bar 
with Phanivong, testified to a slightly different version of events. According to Inhnarath, 
while inside the bar, Phanivong argued with someone (apparently Jake) who threw a 
drink in Phanivong's face. A bouncer escorted the two friends out of the bar through a 
side door. It was a cold night, and Inhnarath used his cell phone to call another friend, 
who was still inside the bar and who had driven them to the bar. While waiting for their 
driver to exit the front door of the bar, Phanivong and Inhnarath encountered Adams, 
Jake, and Jeff exiting the bar. Inhnarath was waiting by the door, and Phanivong was 
waiting further back. After the three men passed by Inhnarath, Phanivong yelled to his 
friend that those were the guys who "started shit with me inside." Adams and the twins 
approached Phanivong and another altercation ensued, during which Inhnarath heard 
Adams say, "You want some of this?" From where he stood, Inhnarath did not see 
anybody throwing punches, although he admitted that he heard a "moving noise like 
almost like a thumping noise." Adams then pulled out a handgun and fired two shots at 
Phanivong, killing him. Inhnarath testified that when Adams pulled out the gun, 
Phanivong started slowly backing up.  
 
Waleed Shabibi, a friend of Phanivong and Inhnarath, also testified. He explained 
that he and his girlfriend arrived outside at the bar as Inhnarath was calling the person 
who had driven him to the bar. According to Shabibi, Phanivong and Inhnarath were 
upset about the beer-throwing incident and being ejected from the bar. Shabibi testified 
that he was walking his girlfriend to the front entrance of the bar when he heard 
Phanivong and Inhnarath arguing with the other three men. Almost immediately after 
noticing the argument, Shabibi saw two muzzle flashes and heard shots.  
 
6 
 
Another witness, Stephanie Couch, was leaving the bar with some friends when 
she noticed a scuffle between two "groups"—two men who she initially thought were of 
Hispanic descent but later determined were of Asian descent against two Caucasian men 
and an African-American man. Phanivong and Inhnarath are of Asian descent, Jake and 
Jeff are Caucasian, and Adams is African-American. Couch noticed yelling, arguing, and 
"some punches." She testified that she "heard screaming . . . about a girl." Couch saw one 
man of Asian descent and one Caucasian throw a punch. She thought the Caucasian's 
punch made contact, although no one fell to the ground. Couch testified that the African-
American man drew his gun and shot.  
 
Several other eyewitnesses testified. One saw a man of Asian descent punching 
someone in a group of three, then saw a man pull out his gun and heard him ask, "You 
sure you wanna do this?" The man then fired shots. A security guard was standing inside 
the front entrance of the bar before the shooting. He watched Adams and the twins as 
they walked from the bar and then saw Phanivong and Inhnarath approach them. He 
testified that he saw them arguing, and one of the men of Asian descent was "a little more 
excited than everyone else" because he was "moving his arms around." According to the 
security guard, no punches were exchanged, and he was preparing to call for help in 
breaking up the argument when two shots were fired.  
 
Adams testified in his own defense. He told the jury, "I'm not guilty. I was just 
defending myself." Adams explained that as he left the bar with his two friends, he was in 
the lead. He noticed one man waiting outside the door, later identified as Inhnarath, and 
another man, later identified as Phanivong, further back. Phanivong walked up to Jeff and 
said, "Hey, man, you throw a drink on me?" After Jeff told him they did not want any 
trouble and that he did not throw a drink on him, Phanivong said, "Let's fight" and took a 
swing. Adams testified that Phanivong was angry—"real hot"—and "jumping around." 
Adams was walking away with the twins when Phanivong hit Jeff in the back of the head, 
7 
 
and Jeff fell down. When Jeff stood up, Phanivong was still "coming at him," so Adams 
stepped between the two men to break up the scuffle.  
 
According to Adams, he told Phanivong, "We don't want no problems, man. Hey, 
it's Christmas time. . . . I'm ready to go home. . . . We don't have to have no problems, 
man, let's just go home." Phanivong said something like, "What's up?" And then 
Phanivong punched Adams in the temple.  
 
Adams testified that at that point he looked over and saw the other man, Inhnarath, 
pull out a knife with a 5- or 6-inch blade. Adams said he pulled out his gun because he 
felt threatened and thought the gun would diffuse the situation. 
 
Adams said he did not point the gun at anybody at first—he just pulled it out of his 
pocket, told the men to "back up," and pointed the gun at the ground "to make the gun 
visible." Adams started backing away and said something like, "We don't have to do this. 
You sure you want to do this?" Instead of retreating, Phanivong started for Adams' gun, 
and Inhnarath came at Adams with the knife. As Phanivong dove for the gun, he pushed 
Adams' arm. Then Adams lifted up the gun and fired a shot, aiming for Phanivong's 
shoulder. Adams testified: "It wasn't my intent to kill him. The whole . . . thing was . . . it 
was foolish, it was senseless, it was silly. But if somebody was gonna die over something 
foolish and silly, I didn't want it to be me." Adams shot Phanivong a second time because 
"he kept coming." After the second shot, Phanivong fell down.  
 
Adams saw Inhnarath digging in Phanivong's pocket and feared that Inhnarath was 
trying to find a gun. Adams froze, and one of the twins grabbed his jacket and said, 
"Come on, let's go, let's go, let's go." The three friends then ran to the parking garage. 
They climbed into the car but did not leave because the car was surrounded by men who 
Adams thought were police officers. He opened the car door and threw down the gun 
because he "didn't want to get shot" by the police.  
8 
 
 
The bouncers and others came to the assistance of Phanivong. Kansas City, 
Kansas, police officers arrived on the scene shortly thereafter and took the occupants of 
the car into custody. None of the bouncers or police officers testified to finding a knife. 
Indeed, no other witnesses mentioned a knife, and Inhnarath denied having a weapon that 
night. 
 
Adams was charged with the premeditated killing of Phanivong, in violation of 
K.S.A. 21-3401, and the criminal use of a weapon, in violation of K.S.A. 21-4201. He 
was convicted as charged. Adams now makes a timely appeal over which this court has 
jurisdiction under K.S.A. 22-3601(b)(1) (conviction of an off-grid crime).  
 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
 
Adams first contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing 
argument by making misstatements of law and attempting to inflame the jury, which 
denied Adams a fair trial. This contention lacks merit. 
 
Adams complains about three specific statements made by the prosecutor. Defense 
counsel only objected to one of the prosecutor's statements (the third one), which was 
made during the rebuttal portion of the State's closing argument. Regardless, this court 
has recently reiterated that a contemporaneous objection to prosecutorial misconduct 
during closing argument is not required in order to preserve the issue for appeal. State v. 
Stone, 291 Kan. 13, 17, 237 P.3d 1229 (2010); State v. King, 288 Kan. 333, 349, 204 P.3d 
585 (2009); State v. McReynolds, 288 Kan. 318, 322-23, 202 P.3d 658 (2009).  
 
9 
 
Standard of Review 
 
In reviewing claims of prosecutorial misconduct, this court utilizes a familiar two-
step analysis: 
 
"In general, appellate review of an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct 
involving improper comments to the jury follows a two-step analysis. First, the appellate 
court decides whether the comments were outside the wide latitude that the prosecutor is 
allowed in discussing the evidence. Second, the appellate court decides whether those 
comments constitute plain error; that is, whether the statements prejudiced the jury 
against the defendant and denied the defendant a fair trial. State v. Albright, 283 Kan. 
[418, 428, 153 P.3d 497 (2007)]. 
 
"In the second step of the two-step analysis, the appellate court considers three 
factors: '(1) whether the misconduct was gross and flagrant; (2) whether the misconduct 
showed ill will on the prosecutor's part; and (3) whether the evidence was of such a direct 
and overwhelming nature that the misconduct would likely have had little weight in the 
minds of jurors. None of these three factors is individually controlling. Moreover, the 
third factor may not override the first two factors unless the harmless error tests of both 
K.S.A. [2010 Supp.] 60-261 [refusal to grant new trial is not erroneous if party's 
substantial rights were not affected] and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, [22,] 17 L. 
Ed. 2d 705, 87 S. Ct. 824 [reh. denied 386 U.S. 987] (1967) [conclusion beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result 
of the trial], have been met. [Citations omitted.]' State v. Albright, 283 Kan. at 428." State 
v. McReynolds, 288 Kan. 318, 323, 202 P.3d 658 (2009). 
 
See State v. Tosh, 278 Kan. 83, 93, 91 P.3d 1204 (2004) (second step essentially directed 
to whether misconduct was so prejudicial that it denied defendant a fair trial).  
 
10 
 
First Statement 
 
The first claim of misconduct alleged by Adams is the prosecutor's statement 
during rebuttal that "[t]his case doesn't just mean something to the defendant. It means 
something to Ratsamy Phanivong. This is the only chance he will ever have to have 
someone held accountable for taking his life. So this day is as much about him if not 
more than anyone else." Adams argues that this statement was improper for two reasons: 
(1) It was an improper appeal to base the jury's deliberations on sympathy for the victim, 
and (2) it was a misstatement of the law.  
 
With regard to Adams' argument that the statement was an improper appeal for 
sympathy, a prosecutor crosses the line of appropriate argument when that argument is 
intended to inflame the jury's passions or prejudices or when the argument diverts the 
jury's attention from its duty to decide the case on the evidence and controlling law. Tosh, 
278 Kan. at 90. Arguing the prosecutor crossed this line, Adams suggests that the 
comments in this case are similar to those in State v. Henry, 273 Kan. 608, 621, 44 P.3d 
466 (2002). In Henry, the prosecutor urged the jury to think about Mother's Day and how 
the victim's mother felt. This court reversed and remanded for a new trial, in part, because 
the prosecutor's comment inflamed the passions of the jury and caused prejudice. In 
contrast, the statements in this case are not as inflammatory. Even so, the comments 
focus on sympathy for the victim.   
 
Plus, this court has held that a prosecutor's argument regarding the impact of a 
crime on a victim or a victim's family may constitute reversible error because it diverts 
attention from the evidence and law. See Tosh, 278 Kan. at 92 (finding that the 
prosecutor's statements that the jury should convict the defendant in order to protect his 
daughter was one of the bases for reversible prosecutorial misconduct); State v. Donesay, 
265 Kan. 60, 85-88, 959 P.2d 862 (1998) (murder victim's widow testified in detail 
regarding her relationship with her husband and her husband's friendly disposition; the 
11 
 
admission of this testimony was irrelevant as to the crime charged and constituted 
reversible error).  
 
The statement in this case more subtly focused on sympathy for the victim than 
did the statements at issue in Henry, Tosh, or Donesay. Nevertheless, in light of those 
cases, we conclude that the prosecutor's statement about the victim is improper. As in the 
prior cases, the prosecutor's argument diverts attention from the jury's function of 
determining guilt based on the instructions rather than because of sympathy.  
 
Adams argues the error is compounded because the prosecutor's comments also 
misstate the law. Specifically, he argues the trial was not Phanivong's "only chance" to 
hold someone accountable for his death and, even if that was true, it is the prosecutor's 
responsibility, not the juror's, to bring criminal charges against an accused person. Adams 
asserts that "the jury could have been misled to believe that the only options were for it to 
convict [Adams] or allow the killing to go completely unpunished." The State responds 
that these were the only two options available to the jury because it is undisputed that 
Adams shot the gun, and, therefore, the only question is whether the shooting was in self-
defense.  
 
The State's position ignores several points which we consider valid and which lead 
us to the conclusion that the comments misstate the law. First, the comments ignore the 
possibility that the jury would not be able to unanimously agree on a verdict. Second, the 
comments ignore the availability of civil redress. Finally, the comments suggest that the 
case was brought on behalf of the victim rather than the people of Kansas.  
 
Because the comments are both an improper appeal for sympathy for the victim 
and a misstatement of the law, we conclude the comments are improper. Consequently, 
we must consider whether the comments constitute plain error. The first factor in this 
determination is whether the conduct was gross and flagrant. In this regard, as we have 
12 
 
noted, the call for sympathy in this case is much more subtle that in Henry, Tosh, and 
Donesay. Additionally, the prosecutor only made a passing reference to the victim and 
did not dwell on or repeat the point. Hence we conclude the comments are not gross or 
flagrant. 
 
The second factor to be considered in determining whether there is plain error is 
whether the comment showed ill will. Regarding this factor, Adams suggests that Henry, 
Tosh, and Donesay are not of recent origin and stand for well-established principles. On 
the other hand, in suggesting there was no ill will, the State points to the fact that the 
statements were made in the rebuttal portion of the prosecutor's argument, were 
responding to arguments made by defense counsel regarding the importance of the case 
to Adams, and were immediately preceded by the prosecutor urging the jury to "follow 
the law and decide this case based upon the evidence and the law as you're instructed. 
That was your oath. That's the right thing to do." As the State argues, we have repeatedly 
considered similar factors when assessing whether the prosecutor demonstrated ill will. 
See, e.g., State v. Martinez, 290 Kan. 992, 1016, 236 P.3d 481 (2010); State v. Murray, 
285 Kan. 503, 517, 174 P.3d 407 (2008). However, these cases should not be read to 
suggest that a prosecutor is given carte blanche authority to misstate the law as long as 
the misstatements are isolated to the rebuttal, are in response to defense arguments, or are 
accompanied by an admonition to follow the law and base the verdict on the evidence. 
We are especially reluctant to give these circumstances very much weight when the 
prosecutor's comments cross a well-established line that separates appropriate argument 
regarding the facts from an inappropriate invocation of sympathy.  
 
The final factor in determining if a prosecutor's misconduct was plain error is 
whether the evidence was of such a direct and overwhelming nature that the misconduct 
would likely have had little weight in the minds of the jurors. In this regard, we must 
consider that a misstatement of the law, whether by the prosecutor or by the court, denies 
the defendant a fair trial where the facts are such that the jury could have been confused 
13 
 
or misled by the misstatement. State v. Magallanez, 290 Kan. 906, 915, 235 P.3d 460 
(2010); Henry, 273 Kan. at 619.  
 
We conclude the statements in this case do not rise to the level of depriving 
Adams of a fair trial. We are persuaded to this viewpoint for several reasons. First, the 
reference to the victim was made in passing and was not repeated or emphasized. Second, 
the statement was not as egregious as those made in Henry, Tosh, or Donesay. Third, the 
misleading statement that the trial was the only chance the victim had of holding 
someone accountable is analogous to a line of cases where we concluded plain error had 
not occurred even though the court erroneously instructed the jury that "another trial 
would be a burden on both sides." PIK Crim. 3d 68.12 (2005 Supp.). (The current version 
of this pattern instruction removes the inappropriate language. See PIK Crim. 3d 68.12 
[2009 Supp.]). Although the statement in the instruction differs from the prosecutor's 
argument, the implication is similar because both are misstatements that pressure the jury 
to reach a verdict. Yet, we held in State v. Salts, 288 Kan. 263, 266, 200 P.3d 464 (2009), 
that the misstatement in PIK Crim. 3d 68.12 (2005 Supp.), which came from the judge in 
the jury instructions and therefore presumably had more gravitas than an argument by 
counsel, did not require reversal. This court reasoned that the jury had been instructed on 
the matters that they were to consider and the elements that the State would have to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Given that, the statements, while inappropriate, would not 
mislead the jury into ignoring their charge. Similarly, we do not see the prosecutor's 
misstatement as misleading the jury in light of the instructions, especially when the 
comment was made in the context of the prosecutor urging the jury to follow the 
instructions. 
 
Finally, there was strong evidence before the jury to support the defendant's 
convictions. Although eyewitness accounts of the incident contained variations regarding 
punches thrown and the ethnicity of the persons arguing, there was no question that 
Adams killed Phanivong. The primary issues of fact argued to the jury were intent and 
14 
 
self-defense. Regarding self-defense, although Adams testified a knife had been pulled 
and that led to his belief that he needed to respond with a deadly weapon, there was no 
corroborating eyewitness account or physical evidence to support this testimony, even 
though the circumstances were such that a jury could likely conclude that someone, 
especially Adams' friends, would have supported his testimony if it was true. Given that, 
there was strong support for the State's theory that, even if Adams subjectively believed 
he needed to defend himself, this belief was objectively unreasonable, and hence Adams 
acted with excessive force.  
 
On appeal, Adams' counsel focuses on the element of premeditation, arguing that 
the evidence of this element was weak. This argument ignores Adams' damning 
testimony where he described his actions, admitted to making the decision to shoot the 
gun, and explained that "if somebody was gonna die over something foolish and silly, I 
didn't want it to be me." This testimony presents evidence that Adams thought about and 
intended to kill before he fired the fatal shots, albeit as a result of what the jury concluded 
was an objectively unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense. In light of this strong 
evidence supporting the State's theory, we conclude the misconduct would likely have 
had little weight in the minds of the jurors when considering the issues of intent, 
premeditation, and self-defense. 
 
Second Statement 
 
The second claim of misconduct alleged by Adams is the following statement 
made by the prosecutor during the main portion of the State's closing argument: "Do not, 
I implore you, sanction this behavior. You agree to the defendant's theory that this was 
self defense you are sanctioning his behavior." Adams argues that in making this 
statement, the prosecutor asked the jury to consider issues irrelevant to Adams' guilt or 
innocence. Instead, in an attempt to appeal to the juror's sense of community, the jury 
was asked to consider whether to generally condone this type of behavior.  
15 
 
 
Adams contends that this case is similar to State v. Finley, 268 Kan. 557, 998 P.3d 
95 (2000) (Finley I), where the prosecutor stated the following during closing argument: 
 
"'You know, they say all the time that our police department enforces our laws in 
this country, that's not true. It's you guys. We have people in Topeka that make our laws, 
we have people in my office that prosecute them, but you all have the job of enforcing 
them. You all can find that he committed these crimes and hold him responsible for them. 
We cannot tolerate this kind of drug use in our community, especially when a person 
dies. You have to find him guilty. Thank you.'" Finley I, 268 Kan. at 571. 
 
The Finley I court found the statement was reversible misconduct because the last 
remarks addressed to the jury—"'We cannot tolerate this kind of drug use in our 
community, especially when a person dies. You have to find him guilty.'"—were grounds 
completely unrelated to the question the jury should have considered. Further, it was not 
clear whether the error had little, if any, likelihood of changing the result of the trial. 
Finley I, 268 Kan. at 572. The Finley I decision relied, in part, on State v. Ruff, 252 Kan. 
625, 847 P.2d 1258 (1993), where the prosecutor committed reversible misconduct by 
urging the jury, "'[D]o not allow this conduct to be tolerated in our county.'" Ruff, 252 
Kan. at 631. This court found the prosecutor's implication problematic—that if the jury 
found Ruff not guilty, her conduct would be tolerated. 
 
In this case, however, in focusing on the statements imploring the jury not to 
sanction the behavior, Adams removes the passage from its context, and in context a 
different meaning is conveyed. The prosecutor stated: 
 
"Do not, I implore you, sanction this behavior. You agree to the defendant's 
theory that this was self defense, you are sanctioning his behavior and the evidence does 
not support it. He's asking you to ignore people, ignore evidence, and most importantly, 
ignore the law because you do not bring a gun to a fist fight and you do not shoot 
16 
 
someone who's only attacking physically even if that's true, and I'm not saying it is. 
There's some real dispute there." (Emphasis added.)  
 
In context, the complained of statement is more akin to State v. Finley, 273 Kan. 
237, 42 P.3d 723 (2002) (Finley II), relating to the retrial after Finley's first appeal 
resulted in a remand and new trial. In that second trial, the prosecutor asked the jury not 
to let the defendant "'get away with'" his crime. This court found no misconduct stating: 
 
"[T]he prosecutor's comment in this case was not an appeal to community interests in the 
sense that a not guilty verdict would have some sort of negative impact on the 
community. Rather, the prosecutor was arguing the defendant should not escape 
responsibility for this crime based on his highly implausible story . . . ." Finley II, 273 
Kan. at 245.  
 
See State v. Cravatt, 267 Kan. 314, 332, 979 P.2d 679 (1999) (finding no 
prosecutorial misconduct for telling jury, "'Don't let a murderer go free because of 
these half-baked theories the defense has presented to you.'").  
 
 
Like the situation in the Finley II case, the prosecutor in Adams' case was 
not making some type of appeal to community interests; rather, the prosecutor 
was arguing that the evidence did not support Adams' theory of self-defense. 
Adams' claim of prosecutorial misconduct fails. 
 
Third Statement 
 
The third claim of misconduct alleged by Adams is the following italicized 
statement made by the prosecutor during the rebuttal portion of the State's closing 
argument: "We agree on one thing. This sure as heck would have been a different 
situation if the defendant had just walked away. He could have gone to the bouncers, he 
could have run to the parking garage." (Emphasis added.) Defense counsel objected to 
17 
 
this statement and, out of the hearing of the jury, argued to the trial judge that the 
prosecutor misstated the law by implying that Adams had a duty to retreat. The 
prosecutor argued that she was merely responding to defense counsel's statement to the 
jury that the situation could have been reversed—that Adams could have been killed and 
the State could have been prosecuting someone for Adams' murder.  
 
The judge allowed the prosecutor's rebuttal statement and noted that "[t]he jury 
has been instructed, I presume they're going to read the instructions that there is no duty 
to retreat." Nevertheless, neither the judge nor counsel specifically reminded the jury of 
that instruction. 
 
The prosecutor did somewhat clarify her point, however, when her rebuttal 
continued:  
 
"The defendant had a number of options starting with not bringing a gun. That's 
what led to [Phanivong's] murder, nothing else. The defendant had options. . . . The bully 
in this case was the man who wanted to settle a fight not with words, not even with some 
shoving, but with a gun. There's your bully."  
 
 
In context, the complained of statement was consistent with the State's theory that 
Adams used excessive force rather than acted in justifiable self-defense. Additionally, it 
should be noted that the prosecutor never actually told the jury that Adams had a duty to 
retreat, and the comments were ambiguous with regard to the point in time at which the 
prosecutor suggested Adams should have walked away. In other words, she could merely 
have been saying that Adams had a choice to walk away when angry words were 
exchanged and before he felt a need to defend himself, i.e., before the point in time when 
the right to defend himself arose.  
 
 
Nevertheless, although not clearly or strongly conveying the meaning Adams 
seeks to impute, arguably the prosecutor's statement implied a duty to retreat, and such an 
18 
 
implication was contrary to the judge's instruction to the jury. See K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 21-
3218(a); PIK Crim. 3d 54.17 (use of force in defense of a person); PIK Crim. 3d 54.17-A 
(no duty to retreat). We think this implication is a reasonable one to draw because the 
district judge, during the bench conference, discussed the duty to retreat—apparently 
because he felt the implication had been made. Hence, we conclude the comments that 
were made before the bench conference were improper.  
 
 
We note that the weak implication left by the ambiguous comments could have 
been erased if the judge or prosecutor had reminded the jury of the instruction that 
explained there was no duty to retreat or if the judge had sustained the objection. Instead, 
an arguably weak suggestion was strengthened when the court overruled the objection.  
 
 
That being said, as we consider the second prong of our analysis of whether those 
comments are plain error, we conclude the statement did not deny Adams a fair trial. As 
indicated, the statements were ambiguous and not of a gross or flagrant nature. In 
addition, the statement was minimized by the prosecutor's follow-up comment explaining 
the State's theory that excessive force was used by Adams. These comments suggest to us 
that the earlier statements were not motivated by ill will. Moreover, as discussed above, 
the trial court properly gave the self-defense jury instruction which clearly stated there 
was no requirement to retreat. See State v. Bunyard, 281 Kan. 392, 406, 133 P.3d 14 
(2006) ("[A] prosecutor's misstatement of the law must be considered in the context of 
the jury instructions given by the court."). Further, although Adams' testimony contained 
some support for his theory of self-defense, there was strong evidence supporting a 
criminal conviction. As a result, we conclude that the comments likely had little weight in 
the minds of the jurors, and we find the error was harmless. 
 
 
Additionally, we do not find plain error when we consider the cumulative effect of 
the two comments that we have found to be improper. As we have noted, neither point 
was dwelled on nor was one misstatement associated with the other. The statements do 
19 
 
not become more egregious when considered together. Finally, the comments, even when 
considered together, would have little weight in the minds of the jurors. The cumulative 
impact of the two statements was harmless under either K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 60-261 or 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, reh. denied 386 
U.S. 987 (1967). 
 
1. ORDER OF HOMICIDE JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Next, Adams complains for the first time on appeal about the order in which 
certain jury instructions were given. Specifically, he argues that the trial court erred by 
instructing the jury on premeditated first-degree murder and its lesser included offenses 
in descending order of severity. Adams contends that instructing the jury in this manner 
infringed on his constitutional right to the presumption of innocence. This contention 
lacks merit. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
Because Adams did not raise this objection to the jury instructions at trial, this 
court reviews this issue under the clearly erroneous standard. See K.S.A. 22-3414(3); 
Magallanez, 290 Kan. at 918; State v. Vasquez, 287 Kan. 40, Syl. ¶ 6, 194 P.3d 563 
(2008). "Instructions are clearly erroneous only if the reviewing court is firmly convinced 
there is a real possibility that the jury would have rendered a different verdict if the error 
had not occurred." Vasquez, 287 Kan. 40, Syl. ¶ 6; see State v. Ellmaker, 289 Kan. 1132, 
1139-40, 221 P.3d 1105 (2009); Salts, 288 Kan. at 265-66. 
 
The jury was instructed on the elements of premeditated first-degree murder, then 
intentional second-degree murder, then voluntary manslaughter, and then involuntary 
manslaughter. After the premeditated first-degree murder instruction was given, and 
20 
 
before the lesser offense elements instructions were given, the trial court gave the 
following jury instruction, Instruction 7, consistent with PIK Crim. 3d 68.09: 
 
"The offense of murder in the first degree with which the defendant is charged 
includes the lesser offenses of murder in the second degree, voluntary manslaughter, and 
involuntary manslaughter. 
 
"You may find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, or murder in the 
second degree or voluntary manslaughter or involuntary manslaughter or not guilty. 
 
"When there is a reasonable doubt as to which of one or more offense the 
defendant is guilty, he may be convicted of the lesser offense only. 
 
"Your Presiding Juror should sign the appropriate verdict form. The other verdict 
forms are to be left unsigned."  
 
The trial court also used a transitional statement between the charged offense and 
the next less serious of the lesser offenses. For example, the jury was instructed that "[i]f 
you do not agree that the defendant is guilty of Murder in the First Degree as charged in 
Count I, you should then consider the lesser included offense of Murder in the Second 
Degree." Then the trial court instructed on the elements of the lesser offense of 
intentional second-degree murder. Similar transitional language was used to instruct the 
jury that if it did not agree that Adams was guilty of second-degree murder, it should 
consider voluntary manslaughter. If it did not agree that he was guilty of voluntary 
manslaughter, it should consider involuntary manslaughter.  
 
According to Adams, these instructions told the jury to convict him of 
premeditated first-degree murder without considering the lesser included offenses or that 
the jurors should only consider the lesser offenses if they acquitted him of premeditated 
first-degree murder. Adams argues that this is contrary to K.S.A. 21-3109, which states 
that a defendant is innocent until proven guilty, and that "[w]hen there is a reasonable 
21 
 
doubt as to which of two or more degrees of an offense he is guilty, he may be convicted 
of the lowest degree only." In Adams' view, this statute requires juries to consider the 
charged crime and the lesser included offenses together or in ascending order of severity.  
 
It is important to note, however, that instruction No. 7, quoted above, is nearly 
identical to K.S.A. 21-3109. Further, Adams' argument is inconsistent with our decisions 
in State v. Lawrence, 281 Kan. 1081, 1091, 135 P.3d 1211 (2006); State v. Roberson, 272 
Kan. 1143, 1153-55, 38 P.3d 715 (2002), disapproved on other grounds State v. Gunby, 
282 Kan. 39, 144 P.3d 647 (2006); and State v. Trujillo, 225 Kan. 320, 590 P.2d 1027 
(1979).  
 
In Trujillo, the earliest of these decisions, the reverse of Adams' argument was 
made. In other words, Trujillo argued that the jury need to be instructed regarding "which 
lesser offense was the more serious." Trujillo, 225 Kan. at 324. This court stated that in 
the interests of promoting an orderly method of considering the possible verdicts, "a trial 
court should instruct on lesser included offenses in the order of severity beginning with 
the offense with the most severe penalty." Trujillo, 225 Kan. at 324. Nevertheless, this 
court concluded that there could have been no prejudice from the free-form instructions 
because Trujillo was found guilty of the crime charged. Trujillo, 225 Kan. at 324. 
 
Likewise, in Lawrence, 281 Kan. 1081, this court restated our approval of the PIK 
method of ordering the jury's deliberation on lesser included offenses, stating: "'The 
pattern instructions offer an orderly method of considering possible verdicts. The pattern 
instructions offer a transitional statement that can be inserted at the beginning of the 
elements instructions of lesser offenses.' [Citation omitted.]" Lawrence, 281 Kan. at 
1091.  
 
In Roberson, 272 Kan. 1143, the defendant raised a similar argument to the one 
raised in the present case. The defendant argued that an instruction stating "'[i]f you do 
22 
 
not agree that the defendant is guilty'" was erroneous because it required the jury to reject 
a conviction on the greater charge before considering lesser included offenses. Roberson, 
272 Kan. at 1154. This court rejected that claim because there was nothing in the 
instruction requiring a unanimous decision on the greater charge before considering the 
lesser charges. We also read all the instructions together, which indicated that the "jury 
was fully and accurately informed that it could consider the lesser offenses." Roberson, 
272 Kan. at 1155; see State v. Carter, 284 Kan. 312, Syl. ¶ 14, 160 P.3d 457 (2007) 
("Instructions that direct jurors to move on to consideration of lesser included offenses 
only if they do not agree or if they do not find defendant guilty are not coercive and 
correctly state the law."); State v. Korbel, 231 Kan. 657, 661, 647 P.2d 1301 (1982) 
(rejecting defendant's argument that the words "'if you cannot agree'" in jury instruction 
coerced the jury into returning a verdict of guilty on the more severe charge).  
 
Here, the jury was instructed, in accordance with PIK Crim. 3d 68.09, that the 
charged offense included lesser offenses and that Adams could be found guilty of the 
charged offense, a lesser offense, or could be found not guilty. Taking these instructions 
together with the elements instructions, the jury was fully and accurately informed that it 
could consider the lesser offenses, and the jury had an orderly method for doing so. 
Neither the jury instructions nor their order of presentation are clearly erroneous. 
 
3. DEFINING CRIMINAL INTENT AND PREMEDITATION 
 
For Adams' final argument, he contends that three jury instructions on criminal 
intent and premeditation impermissibly lessened the State's burden to prove premeditated 
first-degree murder. This contention also lacks merit. 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
Standard of Review 
 
As in the previous issue, Adams did not object to these jury instructions at trial. 
Therefore, this court reviews this issue under the clearly erroneous standard as well. See 
K.S.A. 22-3414(3); State v. Magallanez, 290 Kan. 906, 918, 235 P.3d 460 (2010); 
Ellmaker, 289 Kan. at 1139-40.  
 
Adams complains about instruction Nos. 6, 11, and 17, which provided the 
following guidance to jurors: 
 
"Instruction No. 6 
"The defendant is charged in Count I with the crime of Murder in the First 
Degree. The defendant pleads not guilty. 
"To establish this charge, each of the following claims must be proved: 
1. That the defendant killed Ratsamy Phanivong; 
2. That such killing was done with premeditation; and 
3. That this act occurred on or about the 23rd day of December, 2007, in 
Wyandotte County, Kansas. 
"Premeditation means to have thought over the matter beforehand, in order to 
have formed the design or intent to kill before the act. Although there is no specific time 
period required for premeditation, the concept of premeditation requires more than the 
instantaneous, intentional act of taking another's life."  
 
"Instruction No. 11 
"As used in these instructions the word 'intentionally' means conduct that is 
purposeful and willful and not accidental. Intentional includes the terms 'knowing,' 
'willful,' 'purposeful' and 'on purpose.' 
"As used in these instructions the word 'willfully' means conduct that is 
purposeful and intentional and not accidental. 
"As used in these instructions the words 'heat of passion' means any intense or 
vehement emotional excitement which was spontaneously provoked from circumstances. 
24 
 
Such emotional state of mind must be of such degree as would cause an ordinary person 
to act on impulse without reflection."  
 
"Instruction No. 17 
"Ordinarily a person intends all of the usual consequences of his voluntary acts. 
This inference may be considered by you along with all the other evidence in the case. 
You may accept or reject it in determining whether the State has met its burden to prove 
the required criminal intent of the defendant. This burden never shifts to the defendant."  
 
Adams argues that instruction Nos. 6 and 11, viewed together, correctly required 
the jury to find that he intended to kill Phanivong willfully, purposefully, and not 
accidentally, but instruction No. 17 "[told] the jury to infer that Mr. Adams intended to 
kill Mr. Phanivong simply because he committed an act that led to his death." In other 
words, the jury could have been led to believe that only the voluntary act of shooting had 
to be thought over beforehand, not the killing. Therefore, Adams concludes that 
instruction No. 17 created an inference that "destroyed" the State's burden to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Adams intended to kill Phanivong.  
 
We disagree because the instructions clearly advised that the intent to kill and 
premeditation were separate elements and that the State was required to prove both. 
Moreover, Adams' arguments have been consistently rejected by this court. See, e.g., 
Ellmaker, 289 Kan. 1132, Syl. ¶ 4 ("An instruction containing a permissive inference 
does not relieve the State of its burden because the State is still required to convince the 
jury that an element, such as intent, should be inferred based on the proven facts."); State 
v. Stone, 253 Kan. 105, 107, 853 P.2d 662 (1993) (instruction creates permissible 
inference rather than improper rebuttable presumption; therefore does not violate due 
process rights); State v. Harkness, 252 Kan. 510, 525-27, 847 P.2d 1191(1993) 
(instruction allowing jury to draw inference that defendant intended all consequences of 
his voluntary acts and that any such inference was required to be considered along with 
other evidence did not unconstitutionally shift burden of proof on intent to defendant); 
25 
 
see also State v. Hernandez, 44 Kan. App. 2d 524, Syl. ¶ 4, 239 P.3d 103 (2010) ("Under 
the facts of this case, the instructions of intent and premeditation as a whole did not 
impermissibly lessen the State's burden to prove attempted first-degree murder."). 
 
To prove first-degree murder, the State must prove that the defendant killed the 
victim intentionally and with premeditation. K.S.A. 21-3401(a); see State v. Trussell, 289 
Kan. 499, 503, 213 P.3d 1052 (2009) (State required to prove specific intent to kill and 
premeditation to convict of first-degree murder). The legislature has defined "intentional" 
as "purposeful and willful and not accidental." K.S.A. 21-3201(b). Under element 1 of 
instruction No. 6, the jury was required to find that Adams intentionally killed 
Phanivong. Element 2 stated the premeditation requirement and clearly required that the 
killing be premeditated. Thus, contrary to Adams' argument, the instruction left no room 
for the jury to conclude that only the act of shooting had to be premeditated. 
 
Further, the definition of premeditation in instruction No. 6, which is identical to 
the definition in PIK Crim. 3d 56.04(b), reiterated that the killing had to be premeditated 
and that "the concept of premeditation requires more than the instantaneous, intentional 
act of taking another's life." (Emphasis added.)  
 
In addition, instruction No. 5, which Adams does not discuss and which 
corresponds to PIK Crim. 3d 52.02, clearly informed the jury of the State's burden to 
prove every element. Instruction No. 17 did not alter the other instructions' guidance on 
the State's burden of proof. As explained in the PIK Committee's Notes on Use for PIK 
Crim. 3d 54.01 (on which instruction No. 17 is based), the inference of intent instruction 
"is a rule of evidence and does not deal with the required element of criminal intent 
necessary for conviction in those cases where criminal intent is a necessary element of 
the offense"; see also PIK Crim. 3d 54.01-A, Notes on Use ("This instruction must not be 
confused with PIK Crim. 3d 54.01 . . . which is a rule of evidence and does not purport to 
charge the jury to find criminal intent necessary for conviction."); State v. Lassley, 218 
26 
 
Kan. 752, 756, 545 P.2d 379 (1976) (stating that the inference of intent instruction 
pertains to the presumption of intent which is merely a rule of evidence). Moreover, the 
"instruction is designed to make it crystal clear that the 'presumption' is only a permissive 
inference, leaving the trier of fact free to consider or reject it." PIK Crim. 3d 54.01, 
Comment. In fact, instruction No. 17 emphasized: "You may accept or reject [the 
inference] in determining whether the State has met its burden to prove the required 
criminal intent of the defendant."  
 
In concert with the other instructions given regarding the State's burden, there can 
be no real danger that a jury would be misled as to what the State was required to prove. 
As given, the instructions referenced above properly and fairly stated the law. The 
criminal intent and premeditation jury instructions were not clearly erroneous, and PIK 
Crim. 3d 54.01, which states that ordinarily a person intends all of the usual 
consequences of his voluntary acts, did not mislead the jury into believing that the State 
did not have to prove the defendant premeditated the killing. PIK Crim. 3d 54.01 contains 
a permissive inference that may be considered by jurors along with all the other evidence 
in the case and does not replace the required element of criminal intent necessary for 
conviction in those cases where criminal intent is a necessary element of the offense. 
Other instructions clearly informed the jury of the State's burden to prove every element, 
including proving premeditation and an intent to kill. 
 
Affirmed. 
 
RICHARD M. SMITH, District Judge assigned. 1 
 
1 REPORTER'S NOTE:  Pursuant to the authority vested in the Supreme Court 
by art. 3, § 6(f) of the Kansas Constitution, Judge Smith was appointed to hear case No. 
101,432 to fill the vacancy on the court created by the retirement of Chief Justice Robert 
E. Davis. 
27 
 
* * * 
 
BEIER, J., dissenting:  I respectfully dissent from my colleagues' disposition of this 
case, because I believe the prosecutorial misconduct that all of us agree existed was 
unavoidably reversible error.  
 
The only truly contested issue for the jury on the murder charge in this case was 
whether defendant Taurus Adams acted in justifiable self-defense during a bar fight or 
with premeditation and intent to kill Ratsamy Phanivong. In my view, conflicting 
evidence on the behavior of Adams and Phanivong made this issue far from open and 
shut. 
 
Under such circumstances, the prosecutor's repeated misstatements of the law and 
encouragement of purely emotional responses from members of the jury undermine my 
confidence in the verdict. Even if the prosecutor's missteps were not gross and flagrant or 
motivated by ill will—and I think the clarity of precedent on their inappropriateness 
means that they were—the harmless error test of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22, 
87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, reh. denied 386 U.S. 987 (1967), cannot be met.  
 
I would therefore reverse and remand for new fair trial.   
 
JOHNSON, J., joins in the foregoing dissent.