Title: City of Janesville v. CC Midwest, Inc.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2007 WI 93 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP267 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
City of Janesville, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
CC Midwest, Inc. a foreign corporation, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2006 WI App 21 
Reported at: 289 Wis. 2d 453, 710 N.W.2d 713 
(Ct. App. 2006—Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 11, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 11, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Rock-Janesville 
 
JUDGE: 
John W. Roethe 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
WILCOX, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins the concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
PROSSER, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
BUTLER, Jr., J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by Mark J. Steichen and Boardman, Suhr, Curry & Field LLP, 
Madison, and oral argument by Mark J. Steichen. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs by Alan 
Marcuvitz, Andrea H. Roschke, and Michael Best & Friedrich LLP, 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Alan Marcuvitz. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by James S. Thiel, Cari 
Anne Renlund, and Paul E. Nilsen, Madison, on behalf of the 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation. 
 
 
2007 WI 93
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP267  
(L.C. No. 
2003CV1288) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
City of Janesville, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
CC Midwest, Inc. a foreign corporation, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 11, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   This is a review of a 
decision of the court of appeals reversing the circuit court's 
judgment1 granting the City of Janesville (the City) a writ of 
assistance to remove the defendant, CC Midwest, Inc. (CC 
Midwest), from property that the City previously acquired by 
exercising its power of eminent domain.  The circuit court 
concluded that there were no issues of material fact and the 
City had met its statutory obligation to make available to CC 
Midwest a comparable replacement property/business as required 
                                                 
1 Judge John W. Roethe, Circuit Court for Rock County, 
presided. 
No. 
2004AP267   
 
2 
 
by Wis. Stat. § 32.05(8)(b)-(c) and Wis. Stat. § 32.19(2)(c) 
(2003-04).2  The circuit court also concluded that granting the 
City a writ of assistance did not deprive CC Midwest of any 
constitutional rights.  The court of appeals reversed.  It 
agreed that the question presented was one of law, but it held 
that "[b]ecause it is undisputed that none of the properties the 
City identified met [the statutory definition of comparable 
replacement property set out in § 32.19(2)(c)], the City was not 
entitled to a writ of assistance."  City of Janesville v. CC 
Midwest, Inc., 2006 WI App 21, ¶32, 289 Wis. 2d 453, 710 N.W.2d 
713 (emphasis added).  Accordingly, in a published opinion, it 
reversed the circuit court judgment.  Id.   
¶2 
We 
conclude 
that 
in 
satisfying 
its 
statutory 
obligation to make available a comparable replacement property, 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.05(8)(b)-(c), the City must identify 
one or more properties that meet the parameters of Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.19(2)(c)3 to serve as a comparable replacement business.  
Because we conclude that the City has done so and has made no 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 There are relocation payments not at issue in this case 
that are required by Wis. Stat. § 32.19.  However, monetary 
relief is not requested in this lawsuit.  As counsel for CC 
Midwest stated at oral argument, if CC Midwest prevails in this 
lawsuit, it will seek damages in another action.  
No. 
2004AP267   
 
3 
 
contrary concession in this regard,4 we reverse the decision of 
the court of appeals.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
On February 7, 2003, the City acquired the ownership 
of a property at 1627 South Jackson Street in the City of 
Janesville, 
Wisconsin 
(the 
Property), 
through 
condemnation 
proceedings.  The condemnation was part of a transportation 
project involving reconstruction of a street and construction of 
a railroad bridge, underpass, and drive.  The Property, 
consisting of approximately nine acres, was leased and occupied 
by CC Midwest.  Only 3.2 acres of the Property actually were 
used by CC Midwest.  CC Midwest is a wholly owned subsidiary of 
CenTra, Inc. (CenTra), and another wholly owned subsidiary of 
CenTra, Crown Enterprises, Inc., owned the Property that CC 
Midwest rented before the City acquired ownership of it.   
¶4 
CC Midwest operated a "less than truck-load business" 
on the Property, wherein customers sent and received freight in 
quantities less than a full semi-trailer load.  CC Midwest's 
trucks picked up freight and returned to the Property where the 
freight was unloaded.  Other trucks were later reloaded to 
complete full truckloads of freight.  They delivered their loads 
                                                 
4 At oral argument before this court, the City explained 
that it had not represented to the court of appeals that it had 
failed 
to 
identify 
a 
statutorily 
sufficient 
comparable 
replacement business, but that the court of appeals had 
misunderstood its position.  The City's brief to the court of 
appeals is consistent with the City's position before us.  
Therefore, it appears there was a misunderstanding at the court 
of appeals in regard to the City's position. 
No. 
2004AP267   
 
4 
 
to other terminals within CenTra's network, which covers 38 
states.  The building on the Property included 20 docks, 16 of 
which were arranged in a "cross-docking" configuration that 
allowed the trucks that were being unloaded to be directly 
across the terminal floor from the doors of the trucks that 
received the freight. 
¶5 
CC Midwest was notified of the City's plans to acquire 
ownership of the Property in November 2001.  In October 2002, 
the City advised CC Midwest by letter that it would need to 
relocate and would receive a 90-day notice of when it had to 
move.  The City explained that CC Midwest would be eligible for 
specified relocation assistance in accordance with Wisconsin's 
relocation assistance law.  The letter also listed seven 
properties that CC Midwest might "wish to consider" for 
relocation, including four properties identified by the City as 
"comparable replacement businesses."5  On February 6, 2003, the 
City notified CC Midwest that it had until May 8, 2003, to 
vacate and that CC Midwest was entitled to 30 days of rent-free 
occupancy commencing February 15, 2003.  The City also specified 
rent for any other period that CC Midwest occupied the premises.   
                                                 
5 The properties identified included five properties in 
Janesville with buildings on them:  3913 Whitney Street, 2727 
Venture Drive, 2535 Beloit Avenue, 401 East Conde Street, and 
1700 East Delavan Drive.  Because CC Midwest expressed an 
interest in constructing a facility, three parcels of vacant 
land in Janesville were also identified:  a parcel next to 2535 
Beloit Avenue, a parcel on Conde Street, and a parcel on Venture 
Drive.  The City stated that the 3913 Whitney Street property 
was the selected comparable for CC Midwest's present business.  
The cost of the Whitney Street property was represented to be 
$840,000, with a lease rate to be determined. 
No. 
2004AP267   
 
5 
 
¶6 
On February 24, 2003, the City notified CC Midwest of 
eight additional potential relocation sites.6  In March 2003, CC 
Midwest informed the City that none of the identified sites was 
a comparable replacement business because none satisfied its 
interpretation of the statutory criteria.  For example, CC 
Midwest rejected some properties because either the land or the 
building was too small; the buildings, in their present form, 
were not suitable for CC Midwest's operations; the site was too 
far away from the General Motors plant; or the site consisted of 
only vacant land.7  The City's position was that at least three 
                                                 
6 The suggested relocation sites included five trucking 
facilities for sale in Waukesha, Sheboygan, Wausau, and Neenah, 
Wisconsin, and Rockford, Illinois; two areas of land available 
in the Beloit Industrial Park and the Gateway Business Park 
(Beloit); and a 15-acre site on the Union Pacific Railroad in 
Sharon, Wisconsin.  The materials submitted to the circuit court 
show that the City identified a total of 20 properties during 
the period in which it negotiated with CC Midwest. 
7 CC Midwest stated that the property at 3913 Whitney 
Street, a vacant cross-docking trucking facility which the City 
had identified as the selected comparable for CC Midwest's 
business, was too small of a site at two acres and was located 
on the opposite side of town.  Because all of the properties the 
City identified required remodeling or new construction, CC 
Midwest rejected each one.  The following list explains why some 
of the properties were rejected: 
• 3040 West Wisconsin and 1700 East Delavan Drive, 
Janesville, were warehouses presently not suitable 
to cross-dock trucking operations.   
• 2535 Beloit Avenue, Janesville, was vacant land with 
a 
manufacturing 
building 
that 
might 
become 
available.  However, the owner advised CC Midwest 
the land was not for sale.   
No. 
2004AP267   
 
6 
 
of the sites were comparable replacement businesses under its 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 32.19(2)(c). 
¶7 
On April 14, 2003, the City advised CC Midwest that it 
must physically vacate the premises by May 16, 2003.  CC Midwest 
did not vacate by May 16, and the parties entered an occupancy 
agreement whereby CC Midwest could occupy the Property while the 
City sought a writ of assistance requiring CC Midwest to vacate.  
Under the agreement, CC Midwest surrendered a portion of the 
Property then owned by the City for the City's immediate 
construction needs.  The City agreed to continue to lease the 
Property to CC Midwest through September 30, 2003.  However, 
when CC Midwest had not vacated the Property by October 1, 2003, 
two years after the City had first notified CC Midwest that it 
would be required to move its business, the City filed this 
action. 
¶8 
The City sought a declaration that it had complied 
with Wis. Stat. ch. 32 and was entitled to a writ of assistance 
                                                                                                                                                             
• The site at 2701 Beloit Avenue, Janesville, was 
vacant land and CC Midwest was advised it was not 
for sale. 
• The trucking facility in Waukesha was in a Milwaukee 
suburb and priced similar to the City's value of the 
property from which CC Midwest had operated its 
business, but it was comprised of a smaller building 
on less than one third the size of the land. 
• Trucking terminals in Sheboygan, Wausau, and Neenah, 
Wisconsin, and Rockford, Illinois, and the vacant 
land in Beloit and Sharon, Wisconsin, were all too 
far from Janesville. 
No. 
2004AP267   
 
7 
 
directing CC Midwest to vacate the Property.  CC Midwest opposed 
the writ on the basis that the City had not "made available" a 
"comparable replacement property" as required by Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.05(8)(b)-(c).  The circuit court treated the City's motion 
as a motion for summary judgment.  The parties filed briefs and 
affidavits on whether the City met its obligation to make 
available a comparable replacement property.  In addition, CC 
Midwest argued that granting the writ would constitute a taking 
without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  The circuit court rejected the takings 
argument, concluded there were no issues of material fact, 
determined the City had met its obligation under § 32.05(8)(b)-
(c) and issued a judgment granting the City a writ of 
assistance. 
¶9 
CC Midwest appealed.  The court of appeals certified a 
question in regard to the meaning of "comparable replacement 
business" in Wis. Stat. § 32.19(2)(c), which we declined to 
accept.  The court of appeals then requested a second round of 
briefs from the parties and held oral argument.   
¶10 CC Midwest contended, as it had in the circuit court, 
that the City was not entitled to a writ of assistance because 
it had not "made available" a "comparable replacement property" 
as required under Wis. Stat. § 32.05(8)(b)-(c).  CC Midwest also 
renewed its argument that the granting of the writ would 
constitute a taking of its property without just compensation.  
The City argued that the relocation statute required it to 
No. 
2004AP267   
 
8 
 
identify property that could be made comparable to a replacement 
business and to offer the payment identified in Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.19(3) and (4m).  It identified four Janesville facilities, 
but CC Midwest rejected them because each required renovation.8  
The court of appeals said the City conceded at oral argument 
that none of the identified properties met the statutory 
criteria for a comparable replacement business in § 32.19(2)(c).9  
CC Midwest, 289 Wis. 2d 453, ¶¶7, 32.   
¶11 The court of appeals then concluded that under the 
plain language of the statutes and the judicial construction of 
"made available" from Dotty Dumpling's Dowry, Ltd. v. Community 
Development Authority of Madison, 2002 WI App 200, 257 Wis. 2d 
377, 651 N.W.2d 1, "the City could not require CC Midwest to 
vacate the property the City had acquired without identifying a 
comparable 
replacement property meeting the definition of 
§ 32.19(2)(c)."  CC Midwest, 289 Wis. 2d 453, ¶32.  The court of 
appeals also noted that CC Midwest said it had vacated the 
property and that the building it had occupied had been torn 
down.  Id., ¶32 n.10.  The court of appeals did not address CC 
Midwest's argument that the circuit court erred in concluding 
that the City had not violated CC Midwest's rights under Article 
                                                 
8 The Janesville facilities the City deemed most comparable 
to CC Midwest's business needs were 3913 Whitney Street, 1700 
East Delavan Drive, 2727 Venture Drive and 2535 Beloit Avenue. 
9 Before us, the City asserts it made no such concession, 
and the City's brief filed with the court of appeals shows no 
concession.   
No. 
2004AP267   
 
9 
 
I, Section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution or the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.  Id., ¶5 n.3.  
¶12 The City petitioned for review, which we granted.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶13 We review a grant of summary judgment independently, 
applying the same methodology as the circuit court.  AKG Real 
Estate, LLC v. Kosterman, 2006 WI 106, ¶14, 296 Wis. 2d 1, 717 
N.W.2d 835 (citing O'Neill v. Reemer, 2003 WI 13, ¶8, 259 
Wis. 2d 544, 657 N.W.2d 403); Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 
Wis. 2d 304, 315, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987).   
¶14 In order to determine whether summary judgment is 
appropriate in this case, we interpret Wis. Stat. § 32.05(8)(b)-
(c) and various provisions of Wis. Stat. § 32.19(2).  The 
interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review 
independently.  State v. Reed, 2005 WI 53, ¶13, 280 Wis. 2d 68, 
695 N.W.2d 315; State v. Setagord, 211 Wis. 2d 397, 405-06, 565 
N.W.2d 506 (1997).   
No. 
2004AP267   
 
10 
 
B. 
Relocation Assistance10  
¶15 The relocation assistance benefits to which property 
occupiers may be entitled as a result of eminent domain 
proceedings are set out in Wis. Stat. § 32.19(2), (3)11 and 
(4m).12  As we explain briefly below, these benefits are purely 
                                                 
10 A plurality of the court, Justice Jon P. Wilcox, Justice 
N. Patrick Crooks and Justice Patience Drake Roggensack, join 
the discussion of constitutional issues set forth in ¶¶16-21, 
making that portion of the opinion a lead opinion rather than a 
majority opinion.  A majority of the court join the remainder of 
the opinion. 
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.19(3)(a) provides in relevant part: 
Moving 
expenses; 
actual. 
 
The 
condemnor 
shall 
compensate a displaced person for the actual and 
reasonable expenses of moving the displaced person and 
his or her family, business or farm operation, . . .  
not to exceed $10,000, unless compensation for such 
expenses is included in the payment provided under 
sub. (4m). 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.19(4m)(b) provides in relevant part: 
In addition to amounts otherwise authorized by this 
subchapter, the condemnor shall make a payment to any 
tenant displaced person who has owned and occupied the 
business operation . . . who actually rents or 
purchases a comparable replacement business . . . for 
the displaced business . . . within 2 years after the 
date the person vacates the acquired property.  At the 
option of the tenant displaced person, such payment 
shall be either: 
1. 
The amount, not to exceed $30,000, which is 
necessary to lease or rent a comparable replacement 
business . . . for a period of 4 years.  . . .; or 
2. 
If the tenant displaced person elects to 
purchase a comparable replacement business . . ., the 
amount determined under subd. 1 plus expenses under 
par. (a)3. 
No. 
2004AP267   
 
11 
 
statutory and are not required in order to satisfy the 
constitutional mandates for just compensation to those whose 
property was taken for a public use under the United States 
Constitution or under the Wisconsin Constitution.13  
¶16 It is well settled law that the Fifth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution14 and Article I, Section 13 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution15 require the government to pay just 
compensation when private property is taken for public use.  
United States v. Welch, 217 U.S. 333, 339 (1910); Sonday v. Dave 
Kobel Agency, Inc., 2006 WI 92, ¶22 n.5, 293 Wis. 2d 458, 718 
N.W.2d 631.  However, the United States Supreme Court has 
determined 
that 
consequential 
losses, 
including 
relocation 
expenses, are not part of just compensation that the government 
is required to pay to private property owners.  United States v. 
                                                 
13 The concurrence of Justice Bradley concludes that it is 
unnecessary to discuss why the claim of CC Midwest is not 
constitutionally based.  Justice Bradley's concurrence, ¶65.  
However, before the court of appeals, CC Midwest argued its 
claim had a constitutional foundation; before us, the City 
briefed this issue; and as the dissent of Justice Prosser shows, 
there is a need to explain why relocation assistance benefits 
are a purely statutory claim.  Justice Prosser's dissent.  
14 The Takings Clause in the Fifth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution states, "nor shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation."  The Takings Clause 
is made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472 n.1 (2005) (citing 
Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chi., 166 U.S. 226 
(1897)).   
15 Article I, Section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
states, "[t]he property of no person shall be taken for public 
use without just compensation therefor." 
No. 
2004AP267   
 
12 
 
Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 377-78 (1946) (concluding that 
"evidence of loss of profits, damage to good will, the expense 
of relocation and other such consequential losses are refused in 
federal condemnation proceedings").  The Court explained, "it 
has come to be recognized that just compensation is the value of 
the interest taken.  This is not the value to the owner for his 
particular purposes or to the condemnor for some special use but 
a so-called 'market value.'"  Id. at 377.  Since the "market 
value" to which the owner is entitled "does not fluctuate with 
the needs of [the] condemnor or condemnee but with [the] general 
demand for the property," the Court determined that relocation 
expenses and other consequential losses are not considered in 
just compensation.  Id.   
¶17 We have recognized that "much authority exists for the 
proposition that the constitution does not require compensation 
for consequential losses."  Luber v. Milwaukee County, 47 
Wis. 2d 271, 277, 177 N.W.2d 380 (1970).  Contrary to this 
general proposition, in Luber, pursuant to the 1965 version of 
the statutes, we determined that "under property concepts one's 
interest in rental income is such as to deserve compensation 
under the 'just compensation' provision of the Wisconsin 
Constitution."  Id. at 279.  It was "undisputed that the 
pendency of the condemnation was the sole cause of the 
appellants' rental loss."  Id.  Since we determined that 
compensation for rental loss was constitutionally required under 
the just compensation clause of the Wisconsin Constitution, we 
held that Wis. Stat. § 32.19(4) (1965), insofar as it limited 
No. 
2004AP267   
 
13 
 
compensation for the taking to 12 months of rental losses, was 
unconstitutional.  Id. at 283.16 
¶18 In a subsequent examination of this issue, the court 
of appeals concluded that Luber "does not constitutionally 
mandate unlimited recovery for all consequential damages in 
eminent domain actions."  Hasselblad v. City of Green Bay, 145 
Wis. 2d 439, 442, 427 N.W.2d 140 (Ct. App. 1988).  In 
Hasselblad, the court of appeals determined that Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.19(4m), setting a $50,000 limit on business replacement 
damages for owner-occupied businesses, was not unconstitutional 
because there is no constitutional right to compensation for 
relocation expenses.  Id. at 440-41.  The court recognized that 
Luber was a "radical departure" from the prevailing rule that 
condemnation 
provides 
no 
recovery 
for 
consequential 
or 
incidental damages.  Id. at 442-43.  The court also stated that 
there was a rational basis for distinguishing the incidental 
damages awarded in Luber because "[r]ental losses bear a direct 
                                                 
16 In a subsequent case, we expressly limited the holding in 
Luber to the 12-month limit for rental income losses found in 
Wis. Stat. § 32.19(4) (1965).  Rotter v. Milwaukee County 
Expressway & Transp. Comm'n, 72 Wis. 2d 553, 562, 241 N.W.2d 440 
(1976).  In Rotter, we stated that a cause of action for all 
incidental damages was not created by Luber.  Id.  We also 
decided that claims for all constitutionally based damages must 
be presented to the condemnation commission to determine whether 
just compensation for the taking includes the claimed damage.  
Id. at 564.  That is, such a claim is a monetary claim that must 
be addressed as part of the takings phase of condemnation when 
the commission is deciding the issue of just compensation.  Id.  
The 
issues 
that 
CC 
Midwest 
may 
have 
presented 
to 
the 
condemnation commission are not before us on this review, and CC 
Midwest has made no monetary counterclaim here.   
No. 
2004AP267   
 
14 
 
relationship to fair market value that business replacement 
expenses do not."  Id. at 444.  
¶19 The dissent of Justice Prosser disagrees that CC 
Midwest's argument has no constitutional just compensation 
component.  He relies heavily on Kimball Laundry Co. v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949), for the proposition that the United 
States Supreme Court modified its rule of denying consequential 
losses as part of just compensation.  Justice Prosser's dissent, 
¶¶83-87.  However, the dissent misinterprets Kimball Laundry.  
In Kimball Laundry, the Court explained the different effects of 
a taking when it is only temporary and the owner is unable to 
transfer its business goodwill to another location.   
What, then, are the circumstances under which the 
Fifth Amendment requires compensation for such an 
intangible?  Not, indeed, those of the usual taking of 
fee title to business property, but the denial of 
compensation in such circumstances rests on a very 
concrete justification:  the going-concern value has 
not been taken.  Such are all the cases, most of them 
decided by State courts under constitutions with 
provisions comparable to the Fifth Amendment, in which 
only the physical property has been condemned, leaving 
the owner free to move his business to a new location.  
. . .  It is true that there may be loss to the owner 
because of the difficulty of finding other premises 
suitably situated for the transfer of his good will, 
and that such loss, like the cost of moving, is denied 
compensation as consequential.  
Kimball Laundry, 338 U.S. at 11-12.   
¶20 Accordingly, to fall within the rule set out in 
Kimball Laundry, the condemnor must take over the business 
opportunity, at least on a temporary basis, as well as taking 
the real property, such that the business owner could not move 
No. 
2004AP267   
 
15 
 
his business to a new location and may be required to renew his 
business at a location temporarily taken if the government quits 
the condemned site before the expiration of the condemnee's 
lease term.  See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 
339 U.S. 261, 264-65 (1950) (concluding that where there is only 
a temporary occupancy by the condemnor, the cost of temporary 
removal of the owner is a compensable loss under the Fifth 
Amendment).  Therefore, we disagree with Justice Prosser's 
dissent, as we have concluded that the usual rule that 
consequential damages are not part of constitutionally required 
just compensation applies here.  This is so, in part,17 because 
there are no facts to pull CC Midwest's claim into the rule set 
out in Kimball Laundry or Westinghouse Electric.  See also 
United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 33 (1984) 
(recognizing that absent a temporary taking, the Fifth Amendment 
does not require compensation for consequential damages arising 
from condemnation); Cmty. Redev. Agency of L.A. v. Abrams, 543 
P.2d 905, 913, 916 (Ca. 1975) (concluding that when a condemnor 
"takes the fee upon which a business is conducted and does not 
by the nature of its action wholly preclude the condemnee from 
transferring its going-concern or goodwill value to another 
location," just compensation is not due for the costs of moving 
the business, and also suggesting that any remedy for relocation 
costs lies with the legislature); Heir v. Del. River Port Auth., 
                                                 
17 Furthermore, as we have already explained, CC Midwest did 
not counterclaim for just compensation in this action by the 
City for a writ of assistance. 
No. 
2004AP267   
 
16 
 
218 F. Supp. 2d 627, 641-42 (D.N.J. 2002) (concluding that a 
Mobile Oil franchise that was lost as the result of condemnation 
was not a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment).18   
                                                 
18 Justice Prosser's dissent cites many cases that it 
proposes "undermine the foundations" of the rule against 
awarding consequential losses as part of condemnation.  Justice 
Prosser's dissent, ¶87.  However, in each of those cases the 
Supreme Court is not determining whether to award consequential 
damages, but rather, it is determining whether there was any 
"taking" of the claimed interest.  See Monongahela Navigation 
Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 327-28 (1893) (determining 
that the fair market value of the property included its 
productiveness, which was the franchise to take tolls at the 
lock and dam, as that right was taken with the property itself); 
Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84, 88-90 (1962) 
(concluding that an air easement over property used by aircraft 
taking off and landing made the home unbearable so that the 
easement constituted a taking requiring just compensation); 
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261-66 (1946) (concluding 
an air easement was a taking); Bd. of Regents of State Colleges 
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 575, 577-79 (1972) (concluding, in a case 
that did not involve condemnation, that many types of property 
interests are protected by due process); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto 
Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984) (concluding, in an action that 
did not involve condemnation, that trade secrets may be property 
rights that would be protected by the Takings Clause); Armstrong 
v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960) (concluding that 
materialmen's liens on boat hulls are compensable property 
interests under the Takings Clause); Louisville Joint Stock Land 
Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 601-02 (1935) (concluding that 
mortgages are protected by the Fifth Amendment and as such there 
were limitations on the bankruptcy power of Congress); Lynch v. 
United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934) (concluding that 
contracts 
the 
plaintiffs 
entered 
into 
with 
the 
federal 
government 
for 
"War 
Risk 
Insurance" 
are 
property 
rights 
protected by the Fifth Amendment).  Therefore, while all the 
cases cited by Justice Prosser's dissent address Fifth Amendment 
property interests, none set aside the general rule that 
consequential business loss occasioned by a condemnation is not 
compensable under the Fifth Amendment.  
No. 
2004AP267   
 
17 
 
¶21 In summary, we agree with the court of appeals' 
interpretation in Hasselblad and conclude that the relocation 
assistance benefits provided by Wis. Stat. § 32.19(3) and (4m) 
do not have a direct relationship to the fair market value of a 
tenant's 
interest, 
and 
therefore, 
are 
incidental 
or 
consequential 
damages 
that 
are 
not 
considered 
in 
the 
constitutional requirement for just compensation.  Consequently, 
CC Midwest's affirmative defenses to the City's petition for a 
writ of assistance present us with questions of only statutory, 
not constitutional, interpretation.   
C. 
Comparable Replacement Property/Business 
¶22 To determine whether the writ of assistance was 
properly issued in this case, we must interpret Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.05(8)(b)-(c) in regard to "comparable replacement property" 
and "made available" and Wis. Stat. § 32.19(2)(c) in regard to 
"comparable replacement business."  Statutory interpretation 
"begins with the language of the statute.  If the meaning of the 
statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry."  State ex 
rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 
2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659).  Statutes are 
interpreted in the context in which they are used, "as part of a 
whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-
related statutes."  Id., ¶46.  "[A] statute is ambiguous if it 
is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed 
persons in two or more senses."  Id., ¶47.  If a statute is 
No. 
2004AP267   
 
18 
 
ambiguous, the court may examine external sources, such as 
legislative history and the purpose of the statute.  Id., ¶48.  
¶23 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.05(8)(b)-(c) addresses writs of 
assistance sought subsequent to eminent domain proceedings and 
provides, in relevant part: 
(b) . . . 
The 
condemnor 
has 
the 
right 
to 
possession when the persons who occupied the acquired 
property vacate, or hold over beyond the vacation date 
established by the condemnor, whichever is sooner, 
except as provided under par. (c).  If the condemnor 
is denied the right of possession, the condemnor may, 
upon 48 hours' notice to the occupant, apply to the 
circuit court where the property is located for a writ 
of assistance to be put in possession.  The circuit 
court shall grant the writ of assistance if all 
jurisdictional requirements have been complied with, 
if the award has been paid or tendered as required and 
if the condemnor has made a comparable replacement 
property 
available 
to 
the 
occupants, 
except 
as 
provided under par. (c). 
(c) The condemnor may not require the persons 
who occupied the premises on the date that title 
vested in the condemnor to vacate until a comparable 
replacement 
property 
is 
made 
available. 
 
This 
paragraph does not apply to any person who waives his 
or her right to receive relocation benefits or 
services under s. 32.197 or who is not a displaced 
person, as defined under s. 32.19(2)(e), unless the 
acquired property is part of a program or project 
receiving federal financial assistance. 
Under the plain language of the statute, "there are three 
conditions precedent to the issuance of a writ of assistance: 
(1) compliance with all jurisdictional requirements; (2) payment 
or tender of the [relocation assistance] award; and (3) making 
available comparable replacement property to the occupants."  
Dotty, 257 Wis. 2d 377, ¶13 (quoting City of Racine v. 
No. 
2004AP267   
 
19 
 
Bassinger, 163 Wis. 2d 1029, 1035, 473 N.W.2d 526 (Ct. App. 
1991)).  At issue in this case are:  (1) the meaning of 
"comparable replacement property" employed in § 32.05(8)(b)-(c); 
(2) the identification component of the "made available" 
obligation 
of 
§ 32.05(8)(b)-(c); 
and 
(3) 
the 
meaning 
of 
"comparable 
replacement 
business" 
defined 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.19(2)(c).  
¶24 "Comparable replacement property" is not defined in 
Wis. Stat. § 32.05(8)(b)-(c).  However, we examine the language 
of surrounding or closely related statutes in order to interpret 
a statute in the context in which it is used.  Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  The relocation assistance law, Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.19 et seq., provides for payments to persons displaced by 
public projects in order that they be fairly compensated, not 
only for the property whose ownership is taken for a public 
purpose, but also for certain other financial consequences 
described in § 32.19.19  Section 32.19 is closely related to 
                                                 
19 The declaration of purpose set out in Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.19(1) provides: 
The legislature declares that it is in the public 
interest that persons displaced by any public project 
be fairly compensated by payment for the property 
acquired and other losses hereinafter described and 
suffered as the result of programs designed for the 
benefit of the public as a whole; and the legislature 
further 
finds 
and 
declares 
that, 
notwithstanding 
subch. II, or any other provision of law, payment of 
such relocation assistance and assistance in the 
acquisition of replacement housing are proper costs of 
the construction of public improvements. 
No. 
2004AP267   
 
20 
 
§ 32.05.20  For example, § 32.05(8)(c) expressly refers to the 
relocation assistance law and limits the requirement to make 
available a comparable replacement property to a "displaced 
person, as defined under s. 32.19(2)(e)," who has not waived his 
or her right to relocation assistance.   
¶25 There are three categories of property occupiers for 
whom the condemnor may be obligated to make available a 
"comparable replacement property" to a "displaced person" when a 
writ of assistance is sought following the exercise of the power 
of eminent domain:  (1) an occupier whose dwelling must be 
vacated, 
Wis. 
Stat. § 32.19(2)(b); 
(2) 
an 
occupier 
whose 
business operation must be vacated, § 32.19(2)(c); and (3) an 
occupier whose farming operation must be vacated, § 32.19(2)(d).  
Since the relocation assistance law is closely related to 
condemnation law, we conclude that the phrase "comparable 
replacement 
property" 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.05(8)(b)-(c) 
unambiguously includes all three categories of occupiers of 
property set out in § 32.19(2)(b)-(d).   
                                                 
20 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.19 et seq. is the relocation 
assistance law, and the procedural steps for condemnation are 
found at Wis. Stat. §§ 32.04-32.185.  While these statutes are 
related and sometimes overlap, they are separate and have 
different applications.  City of Racine v. Bassinger, 163 
Wis. 2d 1029, 1037 n.6, 473 N.W.2d 526 (Ct. App. 1991).  In some 
instances, 
condemnations 
occur 
without 
involving 
the 
displacement of persons, businesses, or farm operations and the 
relocation 
assistance 
statutes 
do 
not 
apply. 
 
Id.  
Alternatively, the government may acquire property by means 
other than through condemnation and the relocation assistance 
statutes may apply.  Id. 
No. 
2004AP267   
 
21 
 
¶26 Here, the identification component for a replacement 
property under Wis. Stat. § 32.05(8)(b)-(c) is linked to the 
meaning of "comparable replacement business."  This is so 
because 
in 
order 
to 
fulfill 
the 
statutory 
directive 
of 
§ 32.05(8)(b)-(c) when a business replacement is identified, it 
must be a business property that comes within the definition of 
Wis. Stat. § 32.19(2)(c).  Business replacement payments can be 
due to an occupier who is either an owner, § 32.19(4m)(a), or a 
tenant, § 32.19(4m)(b).  Therefore, because CC Midwest is a 
tenant, we must determine whether a "comparable replacement 
business" pursuant to § 32.19(2)(c) has been "made available" to 
this business tenant before a writ of assistance may issue 
pursuant to § 32.05(8)(b)-(c).   
¶27 While it is not necessary to examine the legislative 
history behind Wis. Stat. § 32.05(8)(b)-(c) because we have 
concluded that "comparable replacement property" is unambiguous, 
we agree with the court of appeals' qualification that "a person 
displaced by a condemnation [must] have comparable replacement 
property made available to the extent required by the relocation 
assistance 
law." 
 
Dotty, 
257 
Wis. 2d 
377, 
¶13 
(quoting 
Bassinger, 163 Wis. 2d at 1040).  The Legislative Reference 
Bureau (LRB) analysis of the original bill, 1981 S.B. 562, which 
created the language in § 32.05(8)(b)-(c) that requires a 
comparable replacement property to be made available, reveals 
that the statute was intended to clarify existing law and to 
create a new condition precedent to the issuance of a writ of 
No. 
2004AP267   
 
22 
 
assistance——not to create a new substantive right.21  Bassinger, 
163 Wis. 2d at 1040.  Therefore, in order to determine the 
substantive rights and what must be done to satisfy the 
conditions precedent, the parties must look to the relocation 
assistance 
statutes 
that defined a comparable replacement 
business prior to the legislature's addition of the language in 
§ 32.05(8) that requires a condemnor to make available a 
comparable replacement property.22   
¶28 We also agree with the court of appeals' analysis 
regarding the 1991 legislative rearrangement of the language in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.05(8),23 
when 
it 
concluded 
that 
"[t]he 
                                                 
21 The Legislative Reference Bureau Analysis of 1981 S.B. 
562 states, "[c]urrent law is unclear and contradictory in 
regard to the conditions and terms of continued occupancy by 
displaced persons during the period after acquisition but before 
displacement.  This bill provides that no person may be required 
to move without at least 90 days' written notice from the 
condemnor and until a comparable replacement property is made 
available." 
22 The language in Wis. Stat. § 32.05(8) requiring a 
condemnor to make available a "comparable replacement property" 
was created by 1983 Wis. Act 27 § 877, while the definition of 
"comparable replacement business" in Wis. Stat. § 32.19 was 
created by 1979 Chapter 221 § 283e.  
23 1991 Wis. Act 39, §§ 1030c-1030L, renumbered Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.05(8) to § 32.05(8)(b), deleted "[i]n this subsection, 
'condemnor' 
has 
the 
meaning 
given 
in 
s. 
32.185" 
from 
§ 32.05(8)(b) and created § 32.05(8)(a) using the exact same 
language; and deleted "that the condemnor may not require the 
persons who occupied the premises on the date title vested in 
the condemnor to vacate until a comparable replacement property 
is made available" from § 32.05(8)(b) and created § 32.05(8)(c) 
using the same language with the addition of an exception for 
those who waive relocation assistance or are not displaced 
persons, 
unless 
the 
project 
receives 
federal 
financial 
assistance. 
No. 
2004AP267   
 
23 
 
legislative tinkering made no substantive changes to the 
relevant language of Wis. Stat. § 32.05(8) . . . .  If anything, 
the 
linkage 
between 
the 
'made 
available' 
requirement 
of 
§ 32.05(8) and the relocation assistance law is strengthened by 
the 1991 revision."  Dotty, 257 Wis. 2d 377, ¶18.  In the 
June 14, 1991 draft of 1991 A.B. 91, the language proposed for 
§ 32.05(8)(c) stated, "the condemnor may not require the persons 
who occupied the premises on the date title vested in the 
condemnor to vacate until a comparable replacement property is 
made available pursuant to s. 32.19."  
¶29 While the parties do not dispute that the relocation 
assistance law determines the extent to which the condemnor is 
required to have "made available" a comparable replacement 
property, they do disagree over what the law requires by way of 
a replacement.  The City contends that according to Dotty, all 
that is required in order to meet its obligation to a business 
tenant 
is 
to 
provide 
assistance 
in 
locating 
properties, 
obtaining renovation cost estimates for properties in which the 
condemnee expresses an interest, and tendering the maximum 
relocation 
assistance 
payments 
due 
to 
a 
tenant 
under 
circumstances where the cost of remodeling or construction would 
exceed 
the 
statutory 
maximums 
set 
out 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.19(4m)(b).   
¶30 CC Midwest argues that Dotty is distinguishable 
because it addressed only the financial component of the 
condemnor's obligation to have "made available" a comparable 
replacement property.  We agree with CC Midwest.  In Dotty, the 
No. 
2004AP267   
 
24 
 
court of appeals did not address the identification component of 
the "made available" obligation of Wis. Stat. § 32.05(8)(b)-(c) 
by considering the definition of a comparable replacement 
business.  CC Midwest also contends that unless a comparable 
replacement business is identified that it can use, apparently 
without modification, it has the right to remain indefinitely in 
possession of the Property after legal title has passed to the 
City.  Stated otherwise, CC Midwest contends that identification 
has not occurred here because the properties proposed as 
comparable replacement properties do not meet its interpretation 
of 
the 
statutory 
definition 
of 
a 
comparable 
replacement 
business.  Accordingly, we focus on Wis. Stat. § 32.19(2)(c) to 
decide whether any of the properties the City identified satisfy 
the statutory definition of a "comparable replacement business."   
¶31 We begin with the plain language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.19(2)(c), interpreted in the context in which it is used 
and in relation to closely-related statutes.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 
633, ¶46.  Section 32.19(2)(c) provides: 
"Comparable replacement business" means a replacement 
business 
which, when compared with the business 
premises being acquired by the condemnor, is adequate 
for the needs of the business, is reasonably similar 
in 
all 
major 
characteristics, 
is 
functionally 
equivalent with respect to condition, state of repair, 
land area, building square footage required, access to 
transportation, 
utilities 
and 
public 
service, 
is 
available on the market, meets all applicable federal, 
state or local codes required of the particular 
business 
being 
conducted, 
is 
within 
reasonable 
proximity of the business acquired and is suited for 
the same type of business conducted by the acquired 
business at the time of acquisition. 
No. 
2004AP267   
 
25 
 
¶32 CC Midwest and the dissents interpret this definition 
as commanding a condemnor to satisfy the statute in a temporal 
way.  That is, both presume that Wis. Stat. § 32.19(2)(c) 
requires identification of a property from which CC Midwest 
could operate its business without modification of the property 
in any way.  The City interprets § 32.19(2)(c) in relation to 
other relocation assistance provisions such that identification 
of a property that after some modification can be used to carry 
on CC Midwest's business is sufficient to satisfy its obligation 
to have "made available" a comparable replacement property 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.05(8)(b)-(c).  Modification of 
property is not directly addressed in § 32.19(2)(c).  However, 
both interpretations appear reasonable.  Therefore, we conclude 
that the definition of "comparable replacement business" is 
ambiguous.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶47.   
¶33 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.19(2)(c) sets out a list of 
criteria to guide the condemnor in its identification of a 
comparable replacement business.  Many of the listed criteria 
are qualified in a way that shows that in order to satisfy the 
statute, identification of a property identical to the property 
that was condemned is not necessary. As examples of such 
qualifications, we note that a property that is "reasonably 
similar" to the major characteristics of the condemned property 
is sufficient.  § 32.19(2)(c).  A property that is "adequate" 
for the needs of the business will suffice, and a property that 
is "functionally equivalent" in regard to condition, state of 
repair, 
land 
area, 
building 
square 
footage, 
access 
to 
No. 
2004AP267   
 
26 
 
transportation, utilities and public service is all the statute 
requires.  Id.  The replacement property should be "within 
reasonable proximity" of the condemned property.  Id.  The other 
criteria of § 32.19(2)(c) assure that the type of business for 
which a replacement business is sought will be able to be 
conducted from the property suggested without running afoul of 
governmental regulations.    
¶34 As we consider Wis. Stat. § 32.19(2)(c), we conclude 
that in some respects, this case is Dotty in a different dress.  
In Dotty, the condemnee argued that before a writ of assistance 
could be issued, the condemnor was required to make available a 
replacement business property that met the condemnee's criteria 
and could be acquired without expending a sum greater than the 
total of its condemnation award and relocation benefits.  Dotty, 
257 Wis. 2d 377, ¶10.24  The cost to purchase and remodel the 
only property deemed worthy of further inquiry was "almost $1 
million more than the [condemnor had] made available to [the 
condemnee] in its condemnation award and proposed relocation 
assistance payments."  Id., ¶4.  Relying on Bassinger, the court 
stated that the condemnor was required to have made available a 
comparable replacement property "to the extent required by the 
                                                 
24 The 
criteria 
identified 
by 
the 
condemnee 
for 
its 
replacement property were:  "(1) the property would have to be 
in the same vicinity as the condemned restaurant property; (2) 
Dotty [the condemnee] must be able to own (not lease) the 
property; and (3) acquisition of the replacement property would 
not increase Dotty's existing level of business indebtedness."  
Dotty Dumpling's Dowry, Ltd. v. Cmty. Dev. Auth. of Madison, 
2002 WI App 200, ¶3, 257 Wis. 2d 377, 651 N.W.2d 1. 
No. 
2004AP267   
 
27 
 
relocation assistance law."  Id., ¶19 (quoting Bassinger, 163 
Wis. 2d at 1040).25  The court concluded that the condemnor "made 
available" a comparable replacement property to the necessary 
extent by:  
identifying potential replacement properties; 
obtaining renovation cost estimates for properties in which the 
condemnee expressed an interest; tendering the maximum business 
replacement payment; and offering to reimburse the condemnee for 
its other statutorily authorized relocation expenses.  Id., ¶21. 
¶35 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
expressly 
rejected 
the 
condemnee's argument that implied that the condemnee would never 
have to vacate the condemned property if the condemnor could not 
identify a replacement property acceptable to the condemnee that 
could be acquired for an amount not exceeding the condemnation 
award plus relocation benefits.  Id., ¶26.  The court stated 
that the condemnee's argument was "unreasonable and contrary to 
the 
legislative 
intent 
regarding 
the 
'made 
available' 
requirement."  Id.  The court went on to state, "[t]he 
obligation of the condemning agency under [Wis. Stat.] § 32.19 
is to assist in the procurement and acquisition of replacement 
                                                 
25 The issue in Bassinger was the meaning of the term 
"occupant" in Wis. Stat. § 32.05(8), in order to determine 
whether 
the 
condemnor 
was 
required 
to 
make 
available 
a 
comparable replacement property.  Bassinger, 163 Wis. 2d at 
1039.  The court determined that the term was ambiguous and the 
owner of a marina business would need to meet the definition of 
displaced person in Wis. Stat. § 32.19(2)(e) in order for the 
condemnor to be required to make available a comparable 
replacement property.  Id. at 1038-39.  The court concluded that 
the owner of the marina business that rented slips, but 
conducted no commercial activities on the property, did not meet 
the definition of a displaced person.  Id. at 1043. 
No. 
2004AP267   
 
28 
 
property, not to make a displaced business financially whole 
regardless of the cost to the condemning agency."  Id., ¶27. 
¶36 The court noted that under the relocation assistance 
law, the legislature expressly provided an exception to the 
statutory payment limits if a comparable dwelling was not 
available within the monetary limits.  Id., ¶28 (citing Wis. 
Stat. § 32.19(4)(c)).  However, no such exception exists when a 
comparable 
replacement 
business 
is 
not 
available. 
 
Id.  
Therefore, the maximum financial obligation of the condemnor to 
a business remained capped by the statutory limits.  Id.  In 
addition, 
the 
relocation 
assistance 
statutes 
"plainly 
contemplate that some business-owners will opt not to relocate 
or ultimately be unsuccessful in doing so."  Id., ¶29 (citing 
Wis. Stat. § 32.19(3)(b) and (c); Wis. Admin. Code §§ Comm 
202.56(4) and 202.58).   
¶37 In addition, a business occupier's right to payment in 
regard to a replacement business is addressed in Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.19(4m).  As CC Midwest is a tenant-occupier business, it 
could be entitled to a maximum of $30,000 for a replacement 
business.  § 32.19(4m)(b).  However, any such entitlement is due 
only if CC Midwest "actually rents or purchases a comparable 
replacement business" property within the time limits set out in 
the statute.  Id.  Therefore, the definition of "comparable 
replacement business" found in § 32.19(2)(c) applies to both the 
City's 
obligation 
to 
have 
"made 
available" 
a 
comparable 
replacement property pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.05(8)(b)-(c) 
No. 
2004AP267   
 
29 
 
and CC Midwest's opportunity for a replacement payment under 
§ 32.19(4m)(b). 
¶38 CC Midwest contends that none of the properties the 
City proposed meet the definition of a comparable replacement 
business set out in Wis. Stat. § 32.19(2)(c).26  If CC Midwest's 
statutory interpretation is correct, then under § 32.19(4m)(b), 
it would have no right to any payment for a replacement business 
if it were to purchase or rent one of the properties suggested 
by the City and later modify that property.  This is so because 
under CC Midwest's interpretation none of the properties would 
meet the § 32.19(4m)(b) requirement of being a "comparable 
replacement business." 
¶39 However, Wis. Stat. § 32.19(2)(c), as interpreted in 
Dotty, implies that a business owner may need to expend sums 
greater than the condemnation award plus relocation assistance 
payments in order to obtain a comparable replacement property, 
if such property is not available absent some modification.  
Dotty, 
257 
Wis. 2d 
377, 
¶27. 
 
This 
reasonably 
suggests 
modification of the property identified.  Alternatively, as 
referenced above, the statutes recognize that some business 
                                                 
26 Justice Wilcox notes that the City suggested vacant land 
sites as comparable replacement properties.  Justice Wilcox's 
concurrence, ¶62 n.2.  However, as his concurrence explains, CC 
Midwest voiced an interest in constructing its own, new 
facility.  (See Adler Aff. at 10.)  By identifying several 
parcels that had no structures on them, the City was responding 
to a possibility for CC Midwest that was suggested by its own 
representative, Tom Christ, in the relocation process.  (Id. at 
12.) 
No. 
2004AP267   
 
30 
 
owners will opt not to relocate or may go out of business.  Id., 
¶29.  Such alternatives also indicate that a property occupier 
does not have the right to indefinitely remain in possession of 
property after an eminent domain acquisition simply because a 
replacement business is not identified that satisfies the 
occupier's definition of § 32.19(2)(c). 
¶40 We conclude that the statutory language shows that 
relocation assistance provided under Wis. Stat. § 32.19(2)(c) 
does not require identification of a property that is identical 
to 
the 
property 
condemned 
or 
that, 
at 
the 
moment 
of 
identification, the property, without modification, can be used 
by the business that was relocated.  See Dotty, 257 Wis. 2d 377, 
¶21.27  Rather, it requires identification of a property that 
with modification can be used for the occupier's business.  For 
example, the land area of a property identified may be 
sufficient, but the building may have been used for another 
purpose and may need remodeling in order for the business to 
carry on its activities as it has in the past.  
                                                 
27 When the court of appeals addressed identification of 
replacement 
business 
properties, 
it 
spoke 
of 
"potential 
replacement properties."  Dotty, 257 Wis. 2d 377, ¶21.  Dotty 
had contended that Wis. Admin. Code § Comm 202.92(2)(b) and (d) 
required the payment of the costs of either renovation or new 
construction for the properties identified.  Id., ¶24 n.7.  The 
court of appeals agreed that renovation or construction costs 
were a consideration in examining the Community Development 
Authority's statutory obligation.  Id., ¶21.  However, it 
limited the amount of that obligation to the statutory cap for 
relocation expenses.  Id. 
No. 
2004AP267   
 
31 
 
¶41 That Wis. Stat. § 32.19(2)(c) does not require the 
identification of a property where no investment is required in 
order for the business to continue operating also is supported 
by Wis. Admin. Code § Comm 202, Relocation Assistance.  For 
example, § Comm 202.96 addresses "Tenant Occupiers" who rent the 
location from which their businesses are conducted.  It provides 
a "rental assistance" payment of up to $30,000, not only for 
rental assistance if the rental costs in a new location are 
higher than those costs were in the premises from which the 
business was ejected, § Comm 202.96(a), but also due to payments 
for modifications to the new premises if those costs are added 
to the rent, § Comm 202.96(b)1, or are paid by the tenant, 
§ Comm 202.96(b)2.   
¶42 As the court of appeals explained in Dotty, a 
condemnor has no open-ended obligation to provide a replacement 
property that is acceptable to the business being relocated.  
Dotty, 257 Wis. 2d 377, ¶¶26-27.  To conclude otherwise would 
cause the upper limits on relocation assistance payments to be 
meaningless. 
 
Id. 
 
Furthermore, 
interpreting 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.19(c) 
to 
permit a tenant to remain in a property 
indefinitely, as though the lease were perpetual, conflicts with 
the proposition that the complete condemnation of a property 
terminates the lease.28  See Wis. Mall Props., LLC v. Younkers, 
Inc., 2006 WI 95, ¶27, 293 Wis. 2d 573, 717 N.W.2d 703 
                                                 
28 The record does not contain a lease between CC Midwest 
and Crown Enterprises, Inc., the owner of the real estate. 
No. 
2004AP267   
 
32 
 
(concluding 
that 
"[c]omplete 
condemnation 
of 
a 
property 
terminates a lease attached to that property"). 
¶43 We also note that Wis. Stat. § 32.19(2)(c) is part of 
a statutory scheme wherein property is taken only for a public 
purpose.  If a comparable replacement business pursuant to 
§ 32.19(2)(c) 
were 
to 
require 
a 
property 
for 
which 
no 
modification was needed, some business properties condemned for 
public works projects never would be vacated due to the 
resources 
then 
available 
in 
the 
community. 
 
However, 
§ 32.19(2)(c) requires a business replacement that is only 
"adequate," 
not 
one 
that 
is 
identical. 
 
Interpreting 
§ 32.19(2)(c) 
otherwise, 
such 
that 
it 
would 
negate 
the 
opportunity to relocate a business if the resources available in 
a community were not sufficient to provide an identical business 
property, would prevent public works projects.  Such an 
interpretation would ignore the context in which § 32.19(2)(c) 
occurs, contrary to our usual rules of statutory construction.  
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  Accordingly, it is not reasonable 
to interpret § 32.19(2)(c) as requiring the displacing agency to 
identify a comparable replacement business that at the moment of 
identification can be used without modification.  
¶44 With this framework in mind, we turn to a comparison 
of the condemned property with one of those identified by the 
City. The condemned building had eight cross-docks, four end-
doors and approximately 6,000 square feet of space.  (Adler Aff. 
Ex. A at 7–10.)  The Property had ten parking spaces and 
approximately nine acres.  (Id.)  However, only 3.2 acres of the 
No. 
2004AP267   
 
33 
 
Property was utilized for the building or graded for trucking 
use.  (Boldt Rebuttal Aff. at 1.) 
¶45 The property proposed as a comparable replacement 
business at 1700 East Delavan Drive, Janesville, was within a 
couple of miles of the condemned property.  (Adler Dep. at 41, 
Oct. 23, 2003.)  It already had more than 20 side-by-side docks 
for truck loading and unloading, a building with 120,000 square 
feet of space located on 9.68 acres of property, and more than 
ten spaces for parking trucks.  (Id. at 42.)  The only 
characteristic it appeared to lack was cross-docks.  The City 
suggested that the long building with the current truck docks 
would need to be modified to add cross-docks.  (Id.)  CC Midwest 
offered no reason why cross-docks could not be constructed, and 
because CC Midwest was not interested in the facility, the City 
did not pursue the cost of adding cross-docks. 
¶46 It appears from the record before us that the property 
at 1700 East Delavan Drive is reasonably similar to the 
condemned property in all its major characteristics and that 
with the addition of cross-docks to the building, it will be 
functionally equivalent under Wis. Stat. § 32.19(2)(c).  In 
addition, as a prior trucking facility, there are apparently no 
governmental 
regulations 
that 
would 
prevent 
CC 
Midwest's 
trucking operation.  Therefore, we conclude that the identified 
property at 1700 East Delavan Drive is adequate for the needs of 
No. 
2004AP267   
 
34 
 
CC Midwest's "less than truck-load business," and meets the 
definition set out in § 32.19(2)(c).29  
¶47 CC Midwest refused to consider this property or any of 
the other properties that the City identified.  On October 7, 
2002, Thomas Christ, speaking on behalf of CC Midwest, explained 
that a property would be a "suitable replacement" only if it had 
the following attributes:  at least 10.5 acres;30 topography 
suitable for CC Midwest's building plans;31 access to roads; M-2 
zoning; adjacent to the Union Pacific Rail;32 and within a two-
mile distance from the General Motors plant.33  While the 
attributes that CC Midwest requested in a replacement property 
                                                 
29 The property at 3913 Whitney Street may also have met the 
Wis. Stat. § 32.19(2)(c) definition of a comparable replacement 
business.  It had cross-docks already in place, and the City's 
consultant said it could be used by CC Midwest.  (Adler Dep. at 
47–49.)  CC Midwest refused to consider it because it said its 
trucks, at 65 feet in length, were too large to maneuver into 
position.  (Adler Aff. Ex. H at 39-40, incorporating letter and 
drawing from Tom Christ.)  Because the circuit court did not 
resolve this factual dispute, we do not address it here. 
30 Of the approximately nine acres condemned here, CC 
Midwest was able to use only 3.2 acres for its building and 
parking areas.  (See Boldt Rebuttal Aff. at 1 in support of the 
City's petition for writ of assistance.) 
31 CC Midwest was a tenant of the condemned property that 
was owned by its parent company.  However, as mentioned earlier, 
CC Midwest was considering construction of its own facility.  
(Adler Aff. Ex. A at 10.) 
32 The condemned property had no rail spur or direct access 
to a rail line.  (See Boldt Aff. at 2 in support of the City's 
petition for writ of assistance.) 
33 CC Midwest earlier had explained that its service area 
covered south central Wisconsin.  (See Ryan Aff. at 6.) 
No. 
2004AP267   
 
35 
 
may be those that are best for CC Midwest's business, they are 
not necessary to fulfill the statutory parameters of Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.19(2)(c). 
¶48 Similar to the condemnor in Dotty, the City identified 
potential replacement properties that it has concluded satisfy 
the statutory requirements and could be modified for CC 
Midwest's business.  The City also has tendered the maximum 
business replacement payment, and offered to reimburse CC 
Midwest for other statutorily authorized relocation expenses.34  
CC Midwest does not contest that the City tendered the maximum 
business replacement payment and offered reimbursement for 
statutorily authorized relocation expenses.  As with the 
condemnee in Dotty, CC Midwest argues that it cannot be required 
to vacate the condemned property if a comparable replacement 
business under its interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 32.19(2)(c) is 
not provided.  We reject this argument as unreasonable and 
contrary to the legislative directive.  We conclude that the 
City has complied with its obligations here because one or more 
of the properties identified could, with modification, be used 
by CC Midwest to continue its business. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶49 We 
conclude 
that 
in 
satisfying 
its 
statutory 
obligation to make available a comparable replacement property 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.05(8)(b)-(c), prior to being 
                                                 
34 CC Midwest did not express interest in any of the 
properties, so obtaining renovation cost estimates is not an 
issue in this case. 
No. 
2004AP267   
 
36 
 
entitled to a writ of assistance, the City must proceed to 
identify one or more properties that meet the parameters of Wis. 
Stat. § 32.19(2)(c) to serve as a comparable replacement 
business.  Because we conclude that the City has done so and has 
made no contrary concession in this regard, we reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No.  2004AP267.jpw 
 
1 
 
¶50 JON 
P. 
WILCOX, 
J.   (concurring). 
 
When 
the 
legislature acts related to condemnation, it strikes a balance.  
See Wis. Stat. Ch. 32 (2003-04).  On one hand, there is 
Wisconsinites' right to property, be it in their homes or 
businesses.  On the other hand, there is the government power of 
eminent domain.  While eminent domain often serves a common 
good, Wisconsinites' right to property is fundamental to the 
principles upon which this country was founded.  So fundamental 
that it has been said "the great and chief end . . . of men's 
uniting 
into 
commonwealths 
and 
putting 
themselves 
under 
government is the preservation of their property."1  The 
protection of property rights is embedded in the Bill of Rights, 
see U.S. Const. amend. V, and the Wisconsin Constitution, see 
art. I, § 13.   
¶51 Reading the plain language enacted by the legislature, 
it becomes evident that it struck a balance that protected an 
individual's right to his or her property "until a comparable 
replacement 
property 
[was] 
made 
available."  
Wis. Stat. § 32.05(8)(c). 
 
This 
ensured 
that 
before 
the 
government could remove an individual from his or her property, 
an actual "comparable replacement property" had to be given in 
return.  Providing a "comparable replacement property" in the 
business context requires the government to satisfy the criteria 
of Wis. Stat. § 32.19(2)(c). 
                                                 
1 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 184 (Cook ed., 
Hafner 1947) (1690). 
No.  2004AP267.jpw 
 
2 
 
¶52 The 
majority 
concludes 
that 
§ 39.19(2)(c) 
is 
ambiguous.  I disagree.  Accordingly, I concur. 
I 
¶53 In 
defining 
types 
of 
"comparable 
replacement 
property," the legislature provided an extensive list of 
criteria that dictates what properties actually constitute 
"comparable 
replacement 
property" 
in 
different 
contexts.  
Specifically, 
different 
criteria 
exist 
for 
a 
replacement 
property 
to 
constitute 
a 
"comparable 
dwelling," 
Wis. Stat. § 32.19(2)(b), 
"comparable 
replacement 
business," 
Wis. Stat. § 32.19(2)(c), 
or 
"comparable 
replacement 
farm 
operation," 
Wis. Stat. § 32.19(2)(d). 
 
As 
enacted, 
these 
definitions ensure that the government finds a property that 
satisfies certain criteria, in exchange for an individual losing 
his or her property.    
¶54 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.19(2)(c) provides that:  
"[c]omparable 
replacement 
business" 
means 
a 
replacement business which, when compared with the 
business premises being acquired by the condemnor, is 
adequate for the needs of the business, is reasonably 
similar in all major characteristics, is functionally 
equivalent with respect to condition, state of repair, 
land area, building square footage required, access to 
transportation, 
utilities 
and 
public 
service, 
is 
available on the market, meets all applicable federal, 
state or local codes required of the particular 
business 
being 
conducted, 
is 
within 
reasonable 
proximity of the business acquired and is suited for 
the same type of business conducted by the acquired 
business at the time of acquisition.  
¶55 The 
plain 
language 
of 
the 
definition, 
and 
the 
grammatical choices the legislature made, establish that a 
property proposed by a government must satisfy a number of 
No.  2004AP267.jpw 
 
3 
 
criteria 
before 
it 
constitutes 
a 
"comparable 
replacement 
business."  The conjunctive list provides criteria that must be 
satisfied.   
¶56 Each criterion provided in the list begins with the 
same word: "is."  The distinct criteria are then conjoined with 
the word "and."  Put another way, the legislature provided that 
a "comparable replacement business" must satisfy each of the 
following criteria: 
(1) 
[I]s adequate for the needs of the business; 
(2) 
[I]s 
reasonably 
similar 
in 
all 
major 
characteristics; 
(3) 
[I]s functionally equivalent with respect to 
condition, state of repair, land area, building 
square 
footage 
required, 
access 
to 
transportation, utilities and public service; 
(4) 
[I]s 
available 
on 
the 
market, 
meets 
all 
applicable federal, state or local codes required 
of the particular business being conducted;  
(5) 
[I]s within reasonable proximity of the business 
acquired; and  
(6) 
[I]s suited for the same type of business 
conducted by the acquired business at the time of 
acquisition.  
See Wis. Stat. § 32.19(2)(c).  The legislature did not use the 
word "or" as the conjunction at the end of the list.  The 
legislature did not preface the criteria with any words that 
would indicate that a property's potential for modifications 
should be considered.  The legislature used the word "is" to 
preface each criterion, not "could be." 
¶57 In introducing the list, the legislature has also made 
clear that in assessing whether the government has satisfied 
No.  2004AP267.jpw 
 
4 
 
each criterion on the list, the proposed "comparable replacement 
business" must be compared to the existing business.  The 
legislature provided, "when compared with the business premises 
being 
acquired 
by 
the 
condemnor 
 . . . ."  
Wis. Stat. § 32.19(2)(c).  The focus on the comparison of the 
two properties stresses that whether a proposed property 
constitutes a "comparable replacement business" depends on the 
specifics of the existing business.  It is not good enough for 
the government to merely come up with some generic "business 
land," and move on with the condemnation process. 
¶58 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.19(2)(c) 
does 
not 
provide 
a 
draconian 
list 
of 
criteria. 
 
Rather, 
a 
number 
of 
the 
§ 32.19(2)(c) criteria provide a government leeway to ensure 
they do not have the nearly impossible task of making available 
an identical property.  For instance, a replacement business 
must merely be "adequate" for the needs of the business.  All 
the major characteristics need be only "reasonably similar."  
The replacement need be only within "reasonable proximity" of 
the business acquired.  If the property had to be identical, it 
seems the replacement would need to be more than adequate, 
actually similar in its major characteristics, and in close 
proximity to the acquired business.  As the legislature 
promulgated 
§ 32.19(2)(c), 
a 
government 
must 
satisfy 
six 
distinct and reasonable criteria. 
¶59 Upon 
reviewing 
the 
language 
enacted 
by 
the 
legislature, I fail to see any ambiguity. 
No.  2004AP267.jpw 
 
5 
 
II 
¶60 I agree with the majority that the 1700 East Delavan 
Drive property constituted a "comparable replacement property."   
¶61 Some of the other properties the City proposed were 
not even close to satisfying the § 32.19(2)(c) criteria.  For 
instance, five of the properties were not in south central 
Wisconsin.  Rather, they were in communities as far away as 
Neenah and Wausau.  Both communities are over 100 miles away 
from the existing business in this case.  Given that a 
"comparable replacement business" must be "within reasonable 
proximity of the business acquired," these properties constitute 
bizarre proposals.  For a "less than truckload" business that 
was part of an established multi-state network, with established 
client 
such 
as 
the 
General 
Motors 
plant 
in 
Janesville, 
properties that would result in hours more of driving hardly 
seem to constitute being within a "reasonable proximity" of the 
existing business.   
¶62 Ten of the properties proposed by the City were vacant 
lots.  Criterion three provides that the proposed property must 
be "functionally equivalent with respect to condition, state of 
repair, land area, building square footage required, access to 
transportation, utilities and public service."  In light of this 
requirement, it is hard to conclude that vacant lots could 
No.  2004AP267.jpw 
 
6 
 
constitute "comparable business property."  Vacant lots do not 
have things like "building square footage."2   
¶63 I raise the nature of some of the properties proposed 
by the City merely to reiterate that a government does not 
satisfy its § 32.19(2)(c) burden simply by proposing numerous 
properties. 
¶64 For the reasons stated, I concur. 
 
                                                 
2 The record indicates that at one point CC Midwest voiced 
an interest in constructing a new facility.  This purportedly 
explains why vacant lots may satisfy Wis. Stat. § 32.19(2)(c).  
Majority op., 38 n. 26.   
Wisconsin Stat. §§ 32.05(8)(b)-(c) and 32.19(2)(c) provide 
the criteria a government must satisfy if they seek a writ of 
assistance.  Nevertheless, a land owner or renter may choose to 
accept less than they are entitled to by statute.  In this case, 
CC Midwest considered accepting less than the statutory criteria 
required.  Then, it changed its mind and decided vacant lots 
were not acceptable, which was the position it has had since 
Janesville sought the writ of assistance.  Nothing in the 
statute suggests CC Midwest forfeited its ability to object to 
properties that did not meet the criteria because it considered 
an alternative earlier in the process.  
No.  2004AP267.awb 
 
1 
 
¶65 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
that part of the opinion that constitutes the majority opinion:  
the City of Janesville must identify one or more properties that 
meet the parameters of Wis. Stat. § 32.19(2)(c) to serve as a 
comparable replacement business. The record demonstrates that 
the City has done so here.  I write separately, however, as I 
cannot join that part of the opinion that constitutes only a 
lead opinion because it reaches out and unnecessarily discusses 
and decides a constitutional issue that was not advanced by 
either of the parties.1  I believe that it is unwise for this 
court to sua sponte raise and decide constitutional issues 
without the benefit of briefs and arguments. Because the lead 
opinion's constitutional discussion leaves lingering questions, 
I respectfully concur. 
¶66 It is not the role of this court to sua sponte 
resurrect and decide abandoned constitutional arguments. CC 
Midwest affirmatively abandoned its constitutional argument in 
                                                 
1 As noted in footnote 10 of the majority / lead opinion, 
only three justices join the discussion of the constitutional 
issues. Therefore, that portion constitutes only a lead opinion 
and not an opinion of the majority of the court. 
No.  2004AP267.awb 
 
2 
 
this court. It stated that it seeks "only to be protected to the 
extent guaranteed by the relocations law."2 
¶67 As I see it, the courts play a passive role in our 
system of government.  Unlike the legislative or the executive 
branch of government which have as their regular fare the 
responsibility to raise and resolve the issues of the day, our 
role is to respond to the issues presented.  This is true in all 
areas of the law, but especially true when it comes to 
constitutional issues.  The wisdom of such restraint is 
apparent.  
¶68 The rule of law is generally best developed when 
issues are raised by the parties and then tested by the fire of 
adversarial 
briefs 
and 
oral 
arguments. 
Indeed, 
"[t]he 
fundamental premise of the adversary process is that these 
advocates will uncover and present more useful information and 
arguments to the decision maker than would be developed by a 
judicial officer acting on his own in an inquisitorial system."  
Adam A. Milani & Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A Critical Look 
at Sua Sponte Decisions By Appellate Courts, 69 Tenn. L. Rev. 
                                                 
2 The lead opinion proffers excuses for its reaching out and 
asserts that "before the court of appeals, CC Midwest argued its 
claim had a constitutional foundation . . . ." Lead op., ¶15 n. 
13.  The court of appeals, however, did not address the 
constitutional takings issue. There was no cross-petition or 
brief filed by CC Midwest on the takings issue. The City of 
Janesville did preemptively discuss the constitutional issue in 
its brief because as the petitioner it had to file its brief 
first. However, CC Midwest did not respond to the issue. Such 
proffered excuses in reality provide no excuse at all. The 
opinion simply ignores the fact that CC Midwest affirmatively 
abandoned its constitutional argument in this court. 
No.  2004AP267.awb 
 
3 
 
245, 247 (2002), citing United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 
246 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
¶69 Nevertheless, 
the 
lead 
opinion 
launches 
its 
constitutional analysis.  It revisits our conclusion in Luber, 
where we discussed the interests of an owner of property and 
concluded that "under property concepts one's interest in rental 
income is such as to deserve compensation under the 'just 
compensation' provision of the Wisconsin Constitution."  Luber 
v. Milwaukee County, 47 Wis. 2d 271, 279, 177 N.W.2d 380 (1970).  
Lead op., ¶17.  Furthering its constitutional analysis, the lead 
opinion notes that this court in Rotter limited the holding of 
Luber to the statutory twelve-month limit for rental income 
losses, but warned that "payment and time limits set forth in 
sec. 32.19 may encounter constitutional difficulties."  Rotter 
v. Milwaukee County Expressway & Transp. Comm'n, 72 Wis. 2d 553, 
562-63, 241 N.W.2d 440 (1976).  Lead op. ¶17 n. 16. 
¶70 Citing 
Hasselblad 
v. 
City 
of 
Green 
Bay, 
145 
Wis. 2d 439, 442, 427 N.W.2d 140 (Ct. App. 1988), the lead 
opinion observes that in a subsequent examination, the court of 
appeals concluded that Luber did not "constitutionally mandate 
unlimited recovery for all consequential damages in eminent 
domain actions."  It explains that in Hasselblad the court of 
appeals held "that Wis. Stat. § 32.19(4m), setting a $50,000 
limit 
on 
business 
replacement 
damages 
for 
owner-occupied 
businesses, was not unconstitutional . . . ."  Id. at 440-41.  
Lead op., ¶18. 
No.  2004AP267.awb 
 
4 
 
¶71 Ultimately, 
the 
lead 
opinion 
concludes 
its 
constitutional 
analysis 
with 
the 
determination 
that 
"the 
relocation assistance benefits provided by Wis. Stat. § 32.19(3) 
and (4m) do not have a direct relationship to the fair market 
value of a tenant's interest, and therefore, are incidental or 
consequential 
damages 
that 
are 
not 
considered 
in 
the 
constitutional requirement for just compensation."  Lead op., 
¶21. 
¶72 The lead opinion's constitutional analysis leaves 
lingering questions about the nature of just compensation that 
were not presented or advanced for purposes of this review.  The 
text of the analysis leaves the reader wondering:  
• Is 
the 
lead 
opinion 
expanding 
the 
holding 
in 
Hasselblad? 
 
The lead opinion describes the holding in Hasselblad 
as follows:  "In Hasselblad, the court of appeals 
determined that Wis. Stat. § 32.19(4m), setting a 
$50,000 limit on business replacement damages for 
owner-occupied 
businesses, 
was 
not 
unconstitutional . . . ."  Lead op., ¶18.  Yet, the 
lead opinion's holding goes beyond the statute relied 
upon in Hasselblad.  It appears to extend the holding 
to a different statute, Wis. Stat. 32.19(3).  The 
opinion 
concludes 
that 
neither 
the 
relocation 
assistance 
benefits 
provided 
for 
in 
Wis. Stat. 
No.  2004AP267.awb 
 
5 
 
§ 32.19(3) 
nor 
the 
benefits 
in 
§ 32.19(4m) 
are 
constitutionally mandated.  Lead op., ¶21. 
• Are the interests of a tenant different than the 
interests of an owner for purposes of the lead 
opinion's constitutional analysis?   
 
The cases primarily relied upon by the lead opinion in 
its constitutional discussion, Luber, Rotter, and 
Hasselblad, are cases involving the interests of 
owners of property.  Midwest is a tenant, not an 
owner.3 
• As a threshold matter, does the record even support 
embarking on a constitutional "takings" analysis?   
 
It is unclear whether the record supports that 
Midwest, as a tenant, had any legally protected 
                                                 
3 In its constitutional analysis, the lead opinion cites to 
only one case that concerns the right of a tenant to just 
compensation.  In United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 
(1946), the United States Supreme Court determined that when the 
government took over temporary use of a building for a period 
beginning in 1942 and ending in 1945 with a right to surrender 
in 1943 or 1944 on 60 days notice, that relocation and 
incidental expenses were not admissible for the purpose of 
determining the market value of the tenants' leaseholds.  Id. at 
377-78.   In this case, there is no question presented about the 
market value of the leasehold of CC Midwest.  Rather, the issue 
presented is solely whether the City of Janesville complied with 
its statutory requirement of making available comparable rental 
properties. 
 
No.  2004AP267.awb 
 
6 
 
leasehold interest in continued occupancy of the 
property that could be a "taking." 
¶73 This court in Rotter warned that "payment and time 
limits set forth in sec. 32.19 may encounter constitutional 
difficulties."  Rotter, 72 Wis. 2d at 562-63.  Here, without 
prompting 
or 
argument, 
the 
lead 
opinion 
lifts 
Wis. Stat. § 32.19(3) and (4m) from the clouds of constitutional 
difficulty contemplated by this court in Rotter.  Perhaps the 
lead opinion is correct in its constitutional conclusions.  
Without argument and briefs I am unsure.  However, there is one 
thing about which I am sure: the rule of law is best developed 
when issues are raised by the parties and then tested by the 
fire of adversarial argument.  
¶74 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this concurrence. 
 
 
 
No.  2004AP267.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶75 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  When the court 
of appeals certified this eminent domain case to our court, it 
pointed to the difficulty of interpreting and applying the 
statutory language in Wis. Stat. §§ 32.05 and 32.19.  It also 
recognized the statewide implications of a decision on this 
subject.  After this court declined to grant the certification, 
the court of appeals undertook a careful review of the statutes 
as well as the cases and policy, actively participated in more 
than three hours of oral argument, and then produced an 
outstanding appellate opinion that is linear, clear, and highly 
persuasive.  City of Janesville v. CC Midwest, Inc., 2006 WI App 
21, 289 Wis. 2d 453, 710 N.W.2d 713.  I believe the court of 
appeals decision should be affirmed.  Because the majority 
believes otherwise, I respectfully dissent. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES 
¶76 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides in part that "private property [shall not] be taken for 
public use, without just compensation."  U.S. Const. amend. V.  
The United States Supreme Court has applied this private 
property protection to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 
(2001) (citing Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of 
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)).  Similarly, the Wisconsin 
Constitution provides in Article I, Section 13 that "The 
property of no person shall be taken for public use without just 
compensation therefor."  Wis. Const. art. I, § 13. 
No.  2004AP267.dtp 
 
2 
 
¶77 These two "takings" provisions embody a number of core 
principles.  In the discharge of its duties, a government may 
appropriate private property, but it may not do so without being 
liable to the obligation to pay just compensation.  United 
States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 465 (1903).  This obligation bars 
the government "from forcing some people alone to bear public 
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by 
the public as a whole."  Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 
384 (1994); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
¶78 The 
phrase 
"just 
compensation" 
evokes 
ideas 
of 
fairness and equity.  United States v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 
365 U.S. 624, 631 (1961).  "The guiding principle of just 
compensation is reimbursement to the owner for the property 
interest taken."  Id. at 633.  The owner shall receive the "full 
monetary equivalent" of what he loses.  United States v. 
Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970).  He is entitled to be put in 
as good a position pecuniarily as if his property had not been 
taken.  Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934). 
¶79 Historically, these salutary principles have been 
largely disregarded in the compensation of business owners whose 
business interests have been damaged or destroyed by government 
condemnation of underlying land.  See Lynda J. Oswald, Good Will 
and 
Going-Concern 
Value: 
Emerging 
Factors 
in 
the 
Just 
Compensation Equation, 32 B.C. L. Rev. 283 (1991).  The 
"business losses rule," according to Professor Oswald, limits 
constitutionally required compensation to the "value of the real 
property and fixtures taken."  Oswald, supra, at 286.  Thus, 
No.  2004AP267.dtp 
 
3 
 
historically, most business owners have not had a constitutional 
basis to recover for "lost profits during the relocation period, 
permanent reduction in profits because of the loss of an 
advantageous location, or the complete destruction of good will 
or going-concern value where a business cannot be relocated."  
Oswald, supra, at 286-87.  Business owners often have not been 
able to recover even if the difficulties of relocating put them 
out of business.  Oswald, supra, at 287.  The business losses 
rule is what the Supreme Court summarized in United States v. 
Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946), cited by the majority at 
¶16. 
¶80 Over time, the business losses rule has been subject 
to withering criticism because it conflicts with the plain 
No.  2004AP267.dtp 
 
4 
 
language of the Fifth Amendment and because it can be so 
palpably unfair to business interests.1 
¶81 In addition, a body of federal and state court 
decisions, as well as federal and state legislative reforms, 
have eroded the business losses rule and changed the atmosphere 
for evaluating just compensation claims.  Constitutional law on 
just compensation has not remained static. 
¶82 To illustrate, the majority opinion quotes from Petty 
Motor Co., which stated: 
The Constitution and the statutes do not define 
the meaning of just compensation.  But it has come to 
be recognized that just compensation is the value of 
the interest taken. . . .  It is recognized that an 
                                                 
1 See generally Nathan Bursdal, Just Compensation and the 
Seller's Paradox, 20 BYU J. Pub. L. 79 (2005); Charles M. Cork, 
A Critical Review of the Law of Business Loss Claims in Georgia 
Eminent Domain Jurisprudence, 51 Mercer L. Rev. 11 (1999); 
Michael DeBow, Unjust Compensation: The Continuing Need for 
Reform, 46 S.C. L. Rev. 579 (1995); Roger Clegg, Reclaiming the 
Text of the Takings Clause, 46 S.C. L. Rev. (1995); Alan T. 
Ackerman, Just Compensation for the Condemnation of Going 
Concern Value, 64 Mich. Bar J. 1314 (1985); D. Michael Risinger, 
Direct Damages: The Lost Key to Constitutional Just Compensation 
When Business Premises are Condemned, 15 Seton Hall L. Rev. 483 
(1985); Gideon Kanner, When is "Property" not "Property Itself": 
A Critical Examination of the Bases of Denial of Compensation 
for Loss of Goodwill in Eminent Domain, 6 Cal. W. L. Rev. 57 
(1969); Frank A. Aloi & Arthur Abba Goldberg, A Reexamination of 
Value, Good Will, and Business Losses in Eminent Domain, 53 
Cornell L. Rev. 604 (1968); Comment, "Just Compensation" for the 
Small Businessman, 2 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 144 (1966); 
Comment, An Act to Provide Compensation for Loss of Goodwill 
Resulting from Eminent Domain Proceedings, 3 Harv. J. on Legis. 
445 (1965); Emerson G. Spies & John C. McCoid, II, Recovery of 
Consequential Damages in Eminent Domain, 48 Va. L. Rev. 437 
(1962); Comment, Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age of 
Redevelopment: Incidental Losses, 67 Yale L.J. 61 (1957); Robert 
Kratovil & Frank J. Harrison, Jr., Eminent Domain——Policy and 
Concept, 42 Cal. L. Rev. 596 (1954). 
No.  2004AP267.dtp 
 
5 
 
owner often receives less than the value of the 
property to him but experience has shown that the rule 
is reasonably satisfactory.  Since "market value" does 
not fluctuate with the needs of condemnor or condemnee 
but with general demand for the property, evidence of 
loss of profits, damage to good will, the expense of 
relocation and other such consequential losses are 
refused in federal condemnation proceedings. 
Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. at 377-78.  In this passage, the Court 
states that it is "reasonably satisfactory" when a business 
owner receives less than the value of his property, but it does 
not explain why this is reasonably satisfactory to the owner. 
 
¶83 The truth is, the Supreme Court deviated from the 
business losses rule three years after Petty Motor in Kimball 
Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949).  The United 
States had taken possession of a laundry during World War II so 
that it could be used temporarily for the Army.  "Having no 
other means of serving its customers, the Laundry suspended 
business for the duration of the Army's occupancy."  Id. at 3.  
Over government objection, the Court upheld an award of $70,000 
annual rent to the owners, saying: 
We agree with both lower courts . . . that the proper 
measure of compensation is the rental that probably 
could have been obtained . . . .  [I]f the difference 
between the market value of the fee on the date of 
taking and that on the date of return were taken to be 
the measure, there might frequently be situations in 
which 
the 
owner 
would 
receive 
no 
compensation 
whatever. 
Id. at 7.   
¶84 But then the Court said more: "[W]hen the Government 
has condemned business property with the intention of carrying 
on the business . . . the taker acquires going-concern value, 
[and] it must pay for it."  Id. at 12.  "The Government's 
No.  2004AP267.dtp 
 
6 
 
temporary taking of the Laundry's premises could no more 
completely have appropriated the Laundry's opportunity to profit 
from 
its 
trade 
routes 
than 
if 
it 
had 
secured 
a 
promise . . . that it would not for the duration of the 
Government's occupancy of the premises undertake to operate a 
laundry business anywhere else in the City."  Id. at 14.  "The 
temporary interruption as opposed to the final severance of 
occupancy so greatly narrows the range of [the condemnee's] 
alternatives . . . that 
it 
substantially 
increases 
the 
condemnor's 
obligation 
to 
him." 
 
Id. 
at 
15. 
 
"We 
conclude . . . that since the Government for the period of its 
occupancy of petitioner's plant has for all practical purposes 
preempted the trade routes, it must pay compensation for 
whatever transferable value their temporary use may have had." 
Id. 
at 
16. 
 
In 
short, 
the 
Court 
ordered 
payment 
of 
"consequential" losses. 
¶85 In his concurrence, Justice Rutledge remarked that the 
Court had "recognized the possible compensability of intangible 
interests."  Id. at 22 (Rutledge, J., concurring). 
¶86 The dissent viewed the decision as "new constitutional 
doctrine."  Id. at 22 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  "The truth of 
the matter is that the United States is being forced to pay not 
for what it gets but for what the owner loses."  Id. at 23.  The 
dissent's opening salvo——"The United States took this plant in 
order to run a laundry for the Army, not for the public"——is so 
bogus that it illustrates why judicial attempts to defend the 
business losses rule have often failed.  Id. at 22. 
No.  2004AP267.dtp 
 
7 
 
¶87 The Kimball Laundry case is only one of several 
Supreme Court decisions that undermine the foundations of the 
business losses rule.  More than a century ago, the Supreme 
Court considered a case in which the United States condemned a 
company's lock and dam.  Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United 
States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893).  The Court held that the company 
was entitled to recover compensation for the franchise to exact 
tolls as well as the value of the tangible property taken.  Id. 
at 345.  In other cases, the Court has protected leasehold 
interests,2 
easements,3 
and 
intangible 
interests 
such 
as 
government entitlements,4 trade secrets,5 liens,6 and contracts 
in takings.7  The Court's decisions on takings by government 
regulation show the fluidity in takings law.  See Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922), in which Justice 
Holmes observed that, "The general rule . . . is, that while 
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation 
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."  Id. at 415.  
He added that, "We are in danger of forgetting that a strong 
public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to 
                                                 
2 United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946). 
3 Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United 
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). 
4 Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 
(1972). 
5 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984). 
6 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960); Louisville 
Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935). 
7 Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934). 
No.  2004AP267.dtp 
 
8 
 
warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the 
constitutional way of paying for the change."  Id. at 416.8 
¶88 In Wisconsin in 1970 this court issued a landmark 
decision discarding the rule that "consequential" damages are to 
be "suffered in legal silence."  Luber v. Milwaukee County, 47 
Wis. 2d 271, 276, 283, 177 N.W.2d 380 (1970).  The court 
invalidated 
a 
statutory 
limitation 
on 
one 
form 
of 
"consequential" damages.  The court's complete and measured 
opinion cited scholarly criticism of the business losses rule, 
several of this court's previous opinions, recent Wisconsin 
legislation providing relocation benefits to property owners, 
and the Wisconsin Constitution to explain and support its 
decision. 
¶89 The Luber opinion's "discard" of the business losses 
rule 
on 
state 
constitutional 
grounds 
may 
be 
subject 
to 
reconsideration.9  But this court may not undo legislation 
                                                 
8 The majority opinion attempts to distinguish cases cited 
in this discussion on the basis that they concern takings and 
not awards of consequential damages.  Majority op., ¶20 n.18.  
However, as the definition of "taking" has broadened over the 
years, the broadening of "just compensation" has followed 
accordingly.  The majority fails to acknowledge that today just 
compensation for a taking may include what previously has been 
categorized as consequential damages. 
9 The majority contends that this court "expressly limited 
the holding in Luber to the 12-month limit for rental income 
losses."  Majority op., ¶17 n.16 (citing Rotter v. Milwaukee 
County Expressway & Transp. Comm'n, 72 Wis. 2d 553, 562-63, 241 
N.W.2d 440 (1976)).  I disagree.  The crux of Rotter is to 
require strict compliance with the procedure in the condemnation 
statute even when making claims for consequential damages.  The 
Rotter court stated: 
 
[In Luber], owners of condemned property, sought 
recovery for rent loss for thirty-two months even 
No.  2004AP267.dtp 
 
9 
 
adopted in the wake and spirit of Luber simply because the court 
                                                                                                                                                             
though the statute only allowed recovery for rent loss 
for the twelve months preceding condemnation.  Our 
court majority held that the plaintiffs were entitled 
to 
the 
entire 
rent 
loss 
amount, 
placing 
such 
entitlement on constitutional grounds. . . .  Luber 
placed the thirty-two month rent loss within the items 
of compensable items of damage under sec. 32.19, 
Stats.  
It did not create a new category of 
"incidental" or "consequential" damages which could be 
brought directly to court without regard to the 
statutory procedure as to claims and without meeting 
the requirement of filing a claim with the commission 
or public body involved in a taking before going to 
court. 
 
The Luber holding is to be read and limited to 
its holding that the twelve-month limit as to rent 
losses allowable was constitutionally invalid.  It is 
true, as Luber noted, that when property is taken by 
condemnation "incidental damages are very apt to 
occur."  That is not to say that a cause of action for 
compensation for incidental damages has been created 
that has no basis or relatedness to the items made 
compensable by sec. 32.19, Stats.  It means only that 
payment and time limits set forth in sec. 32.19 may 
encounter constitutional difficulties . . . .  This 
does not alter the mandated procedural steps set forth 
in sec. 32.20, for the making of any and all claims by 
condemnees. 
 . . . All claims for compensation by condemnees 
must be filed with the commission or public body 
involved within the two-year time limit set by the 
statute.  It is only after disallowance of such claims 
by such commission or public body that there is a 
right to take the claim or the challenge to commission 
disallowance to court. 
Id. at 562-64 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
In this case, CC Midwest has not concocted a novel 
constitutional claim for compensation.  CC Midwest is insisting 
that the City of Janesville comply with the statute.  It is the 
city's 
failure 
to 
comply 
with 
the 
statute 
that 
creates 
"constitutional difficulties." 
No.  2004AP267.dtp 
 
10 
 
might not agree with it.  The majority opinion materially 
weakens current state legislation, and, unfortunately, this 
action may trigger the very litigation on constitutional issues 
that Wis. Stat. ch. 32 seeks to avoid. 
¶90 This case does not require us to decide constitutional 
issues about the scope of just compensation because we are asked 
to interpret statutes.  But a decision from this court 
substituting 
elusive 
and 
ambiguous 
"parameters" 
for 
the 
statutory requirement that a condemnor timely identify currently 
available "comparable replacement property" satisfying certain 
criteria, is bound to stir up legislative reaction. 
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION 
¶91 In its decision, the court of appeals explained that 
CC Midwest contended the City of Janesville was not entitled to 
a writ of assistance to remove CC Midwest because the City had 
not first made available a "comparable replacement property" as 
required 
by 
Wis. Stat. § 32.05(8)(b) 
and 
(c). 
 
City 
of 
Janesville v. CC Midwest, Inc., 2006 WI App 21, ¶6, 289 
Wis. 2d 453, 719 N.W.2d 713.  There was no dispute that the 
properties nominated by the City were not comparable replacement 
properties at the time CC Midwest was ordered to leave the 
property.  This was conceded by the City in oral argument on 
November 22, 2005.  Thus, the court of appeals addressed the 
legal question of what the City was required to do under the 
statutes to qualify for a writ of assistance.  The court treated 
this question as a matter of statutory interpretation. 
No.  2004AP267.dtp 
 
11 
 
¶92 I cannot improve on the court's analysis of the 
statute.  Consequently, I insert here paragraphs 11-19, 26, 28, 
30, and 31 from Judge Vergeront's opinion.  At the conclusion of 
these 13 paragraphs, I will add supplementary analysis. 
¶11 WISCONSIN 
STAT. 
§ 32.05 
provides 
the 
procedure for certain municipalities to follow when 
condemning land for certain public projects, and the 
parties agree that this is the applicable section.  
After describing the procedure for acquiring title and 
determining the amount of compensation to the property 
owner, this section addresses the occupants of the 
property and provides in part: 
 
Condemnation 
for 
sewers 
and 
transportation facilities.  (8) OCCUPANCY; 
WRIT OF ASSISTANCE; WASTE. 
 
. . . .  
 
(b) No person occupying real property 
may be required to move from a dwelling or 
move his or her business or farm without at 
least 
90 
days' 
written 
notice 
of 
the 
intended vacation date from the condemnor.  
The displaced person shall have rent-free 
occupancy of the acquired property for a 
period of 30 days, commencing with the next 
1st or 15th day of the month after title 
vests in the condemnor, whichever is sooner.  
Any person occupying the property after the 
date that title vests in the condemnor is 
liable to 
the condemnor for all waste 
committed or allowed by the occupant on the 
lands condemned during the occupancy.  The 
condemnor has the right to possession when 
the 
persons 
who 
occupied 
the 
acquired 
property vacate, or hold over beyond the 
vacation date established by the condemnor, 
whichever is sooner, except as provided 
under par. (c).  If the condemnor is denied 
the right of possession, the condemnor may, 
upon 48 hours' notice to the occupant, apply 
to the circuit court where the property is 
located for a writ of assistance to be put 
in possession.  The circuit court shall 
No.  2004AP267.dtp 
 
12 
 
grant 
the 
writ 
of 
assistance 
if 
all 
jurisdictional 
requirements 
have 
been 
complied with, if the award has been paid or 
tendered as required and if the condemnor 
has made a comparable replacement property 
available 
to 
the 
occupants, 
except 
as 
provided under par. (c). 
 
(c) The condemnor may not require the 
persons who occupied the premises on the 
date that title vested in the condemnor to 
vacate 
until 
a 
comparable 
replacement 
property is made available.  This paragraph 
does not apply to any person who waives his 
or her right to receive relocation benefits 
or services under s. 32.197 or who is not a 
displaced 
person, 
as 
defined 
under 
s. 
32.19(2)(e), unless the acquired property is 
part of a program or project receiving 
federal financial assistance. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶12 WISCONSIN 
STAT. 
§ 32.19, 
entitled 
"Additional items payable," provides for payments to 
persons displaced by public projects and includes 
payments to both owners and tenants and to businesses, 
farm operations, and individuals in dwellings, all as 
defined in this section.  The declaration of purpose 
in § 32.19(1) provides as follows: 
 
(1) DECLARATION 
OF 
PURPOSE. 
 
The 
legislature declares that it is in the 
public interest that persons displaced by 
any public project be fairly compensated by 
payment for the property acquired and other 
losses hereinafter described and suffered as 
the result of programs designed for the 
benefit of the public as a whole; and the 
legislature further finds and declares that, 
notwithstanding subch. II, or any other 
provision of law, payment of such relocation 
assistance and assistance in the acquisition 
of replacement housing are proper costs of 
the 
construction 
of 
public 
improvements. . . .  
¶13 A 
"comparable 
replacement 
business" 
is 
defined in WIS. STAT. § 32.19(2)(c) as: 
No.  2004AP267.dtp 
 
13 
 
 
[A] replacement business which, 
when compared with the business premises 
being acquired by the condemnor, is adequate 
for the needs of the business, is reasonably 
similar in all major characteristics, is 
functionally 
equivalent 
with 
respect 
to 
condition, 
state 
of 
repair, 
land 
area, 
building square footage required, access to 
transportation, 
utilities 
and 
public 
service, is available on the market, meets 
all applicable federal, state or local codes 
required of the particular business being 
conducted, is within reasonable proximity of 
the business acquired and is suited for the 
same type of business conducted by the 
acquired 
business 
at 
the 
time 
of 
acquisition. 
¶14 WISCONSIN STAT. § 32.19(3)(a) provides for 
payment of certain actual moving expenses as well as 
actual reasonable expenses necessary to reestablish a 
business not to exceed $10,000, with an exception; 
under para. (b) a displaced business may elect instead 
to receive a fixed payment established by regulation, 
which is capped at $20,000.  Paragraph (c) provides 
for an additional payment for persons who moved their 
businesses, elected payments under para. (a), and 
within two years of the receipt of that payment 
discontinued their business, up to a combined maximum 
of $20,000. 
¶15 WISCONSIN 
STAT. 
§ 32.19(4m)(b) 
addresses 
payments to business owners who rent and are displaced 
if 
such 
an 
owner 
either 
rents 
or 
purchases 
a 
comparable replacement business within two years after 
vacating the acquired property.  The condemnor must 
pay the owner of the displaced business based on a 
formula that compares the monthly rent paid for the 
acquired property to the monthly rent of a comparable 
replacement business in an amount not to exceed 
$30,000. 
¶16 Focusing first on the language of WIS. STAT. 
§ 32.05(8)(c), 
that 
section 
plainly 
prohibits 
a 
condemnor from requiring the occupant of the premises 
to vacate "until a comparable replacement property is 
made 
available," 
with 
certain 
exceptions 
not 
applicable here.  Subsection (8)(b) repeats that same 
obligation in the context of the issuance of a writ of 
No.  2004AP267.dtp 
 
14 
 
assistance: having "made a comparable replacement 
property available to the occupants . . . " (with the 
exceptions provided for in para. (c)) is one of the 
conditions for the issuance of the writ.  While there 
is no definition of "comparable replacement property" 
in § 32.05, WIS. STAT. § 32.19(2)(b), (c), and (d) 
define "comparable dwelling," "comparable replacement 
business," 
and 
"comparable 
replacement 
farm 
operation," each of these definitions corresponding to 
the categories of displaced persons defined in paras. 
(e) and (h) of § 32.19(2).  Neither party here has 
suggested that "comparable replacement property" in 
§ 32.05(8)(b) and (c) has any meaning other than that 
defined in § 32.19(2)(b)-(d).  We conclude that 
"comparable replacement property" in § 32.05(8)(b) and 
(c) plainly refers to those three categories of 
replacement properties as defined in § 32.19(2)(b)-
(d).  The applicable definition in this case is that 
of 
a 
"comparable 
replacement 
business" 
in 
§ 32.19(2)(c), as the City has implicitly conceded in 
its arguments. 
¶17 We conclude there is nothing in the language 
of WIS. STAT. § 32.19(3) or (4m), or any other 
subsection of WIS. STAT. § § 32.05 or 32.19, that 
supports the City's position that it need not make 
available a comparable replacement property meeting 
the definitions of § 32.19(2)(b)-(d), but instead need 
only identify property that could be made comparable 
and offer the payments required by § 32.19(3) and 
(4m). 
¶18 The moving expenses described in WIS. STAT. 
§ 32.19(3)(a) plainly are expenses that would be 
incurred in relocating to a comparable replacement 
property and cannot reasonably be read as limiting the 
condemnor's 
obligation 
to 
make 
a 
comparable 
replacement property available.  The payments under 
subsec. (4m)(b) are explicitly based on a comparison 
of rent for the acquired property to rent for a 
comparable 
replacement 
business 
and 
thus 
cannot 
reasonably be read as a limitation on the obligation 
to make available a comparable replacement property.  
The evident purpose of subsec. (4m)(b) is to provide 
some compensation to a displaced business owner where 
the rent for a comparable replacement business is 
higher than that previously paid; no language in the 
statute suggests that this compensation affects the 
No.  2004AP267.dtp 
 
15 
 
condemnor's obligation to make available a comparable 
replacement business property. 
¶19 Similarly, the City's argument that the 
payment in WIS. STAT. § 32.19(3)(c) is intended to 
fulfill the condemnor's obligation when there is no 
comparable replacement property has no basis in the 
statutory 
language. 
 
The 
comparable 
replacement 
property must be made available before the occupant 
can be required to vacate the acquired property, WIS. 
STAT. 
§ 32.05(8)(c), 
whereas 
the 
payment 
under 
§ 32.19(3)(c) is available only after the occupant has 
vacated.  The payment in this paragraph is available 
when a business owner moves the business, obtains 
payment for moving expenses, and then within two years 
of that payment decides to discontinue the business at 
the new location. 
. . . .  
¶26 Unlike the owner in Dotty Dumpling's, CC 
Midwest is not arguing that "make available" in WIS. 
STAT. § 32.05(8) means "pay for," which was the 
essence of the owner's argument in Dotty Dumpling's.  
Rather, 
CC 
Midwest's 
position 
is 
that 
"making 
available" a comparable replacement property under 
§ 32.05(8)(b) and (c) means identifying a property 
that meets the applicable definition in WIS. STAT. 
§ 32.19(b)-(d). 
. . . .  
¶28 We are persuaded that the issue presented on 
this appeal is not resolved by Bassinger or Dotty 
Dumpling's.  A requirement that a condemnor identify a 
comparable replacement property meeting the applicable 
definition in WIS. STAT. § 32.19(2)(b)-(d) before 
making an occupant vacate does not impose an "open-
ended" financial obligation on the condemnor and does 
not render the provisions for payments in § 32.19 
meaningless. 
 
It 
is 
not 
inconsistent 
for 
the 
legislature to provide that an occupant may not be 
required to vacate unless the condemnor has identified 
a 
comparable 
replacement 
property 
meeting 
the 
statutory definition, even though the condemnor's 
financial obligations to assist the occupant are 
limited by the provisions for payments in § 32.19. 
. . . .  
No.  2004AP267.dtp 
 
16 
 
¶30 We acknowledge that construing WIS. STAT. 
§ 32.05(8)(b) and (c) to require that the condemnor 
identify a comparable replacement property meeting the 
applicable definition in WIS. STAT. § 32.19(2)(b)-(d) 
may impose significant impediments to public projects 
in cases where no such property exists.  However, we 
do not agree our construction will lead to absurd 
results.  While there are important public policies 
that favor facilitating the condemnation of property 
and 
removal 
of 
occupants 
when 
the 
property 
is 
necessary for projects that benefit the public, there 
are also important public policies that favor ensuring 
that displaced occupants have a comparable property to 
move to.  It is for the legislature to decide the 
proper 
balance, 
within 
the 
parameters 
of 
constitutional requirements, between these policies 
when there is a conflict.  The legislature could 
reasonably decide that a condemnor should not be able 
to remove an occupant if there is no comparable 
replacement property for it to move to, even if this 
means modifying, or even not going ahead with, a 
desirable public project. 
¶31 We are satisfied that the legislature has 
expressed this intent in the plain language of WIS. 
STAT. 
§ 32.05(8)(b) 
and 
(c) 
and 
WIS. 
STAT. 
§ 32.19(2)(b)-(d).  The legislature could have stated 
that the condemnor could require an occupant to vacate 
if no comparable replacement property existed; it 
could have defined comparable replacement property in 
less restrictive ways; it could have provided that if 
the condemnor offers all the payments to which an 
occupant is entitled under § 32.19, it has satisfied 
the 
obligation 
to 
make 
available 
a 
comparable 
replacement property before requiring the occupant to 
vacate.  However, the legislature has done none of 
these things.  Instead it has chosen to plainly state 
that a condemnor may not require an occupant to vacate 
"until a comparable replacement property is made 
available," § 32.05(8)(c), and it has chosen to very 
specifically define three categories of comparable 
replacement properties in § 32.19(2)(b)-(d). 
CC Midwest, 289 Wis. 2d 453, ¶¶11-19, 26, 28, 30, 31. 
No.  2004AP267.dtp 
 
17 
 
ADDITIONAL COMMENT 
 
¶93 The City argues that this plain reading analysis is 
radical and cannot be supported by the legislative history.  I 
disagree. 
¶94 Courts 
have 
often 
said 
that 
the 
rule 
against 
consequential or incidental damages should be addressed by 
Congress or by state legislatures.  The advice from Justice 
Douglas on this point is quoted in Luber, 47 Wis. 2d at 277 
(quoting United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 
385 (1945) (Douglas, J., concurring)).  Both Congress and the 
Wisconsin Legislature have acted on this advice, and in the 
process they have made a valiant effort to head off costly 
litigation on the scope of just compensation.   
¶95 In 
1970 
Congress 
passed 
the 
Uniform 
Relocation 
Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act, P.L. 91-
646, 84 Stat. 1894; 42 U.S.C. §§ 4621-4638.  This legislation 
provided in part that the head of a federal agency could not 
approve any grant to a state agency for any program "which will 
result in the displacement of any person" unless the agency head 
had received satisfactory assurance that fair and reasonable 
relocation payments and assistance would be provided to or for 
the displaced person.  The Wisconsin Legislature rushed to 
comply with this federal law and, in most respects, it 
strengthened existing relocation benefits.  See Ch. 103, Laws of 
1971; 61 Op. Att'y Gen. 49 (1972); 61 Op. Att'y Gen. 197 (1972).  
In 1974 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws also promulgated a Uniform Eminent Domain Code that 
No.  2004AP267.dtp 
 
18 
 
included 
liberalized 
provisions 
on 
just 
compensation 
and 
relocation benefits. 
¶96 Wisconsin had begun statutory modification of the 
business losses rule in 1959.  See § 1, ch. 639, Laws of 1959.  
Section 32.19 was created in 1961.  See § 18, ch. 486, Laws of 
1961. 
 
Thus 
the 
subject 
of 
additional 
compensation 
and 
assistance was not new to the legislature.  But the federal act 
as well as the Luber decision generated substantial additional 
legislative activity. 
¶97 At the beginning of the 1981 legislative session, the 
declaration 
of 
purpose 
for 
relocation 
benefits 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 32.19(1)10 
and 
the 
definitions 
of 
"comparable 
dwelling," "comparable replacement business," and "comparable 
replacement 
farm 
operation" 
were 
already 
in 
place.  
Wis. Stat. § 32.19(1), (2)(f), (g), and (h) (1979-80).  But 
Wis. Stat. § 32.05(8) was much different from what it is today, 
because 
it 
made 
no 
reference 
to 
"comparable 
replacement 
property."  It read: 
 
(8) Occupancy; Writ of Assistance; Waste.  The 
condemnor 
shall 
allow 
any 
person 
occupying 
the 
property on the date that title vests in the condemnor 
to continue to occupy the property for at least one 
month after that date.  The condemnor may not charge 
rent for any property occupied after the date that 
title vests in the condemnor by a person who occupied 
the property on that date.  Any person occupying the 
property after the date that title vests in the 
condemnor shall be liable to the condemnor for all 
waste committed or allowed by the occupant on the 
lands condemned during the occupancy.  The condemnor 
                                                 
10 This was cited in ¶12 of the court of appeals decision.  
See ¶92 above. 
No.  2004AP267.dtp 
 
19 
 
shall have the right to possession when the persons 
who occupied the property on the date that title vests 
in the condemnor vacate, or one month after the date 
that title vests in the condemnor, whichever is 
sooner.  This time period may be extended by the 
circuit court, if the court deems it reasonable under 
the circumstances.  If the condemnor is denied the 
right of possession, the condemnor may, upon 48 hours' 
notice to the occupant, apply to the circuit court 
where the property is located for a writ of assistance 
to be put in possession.  The circuit court shall 
grant the writ of assistance if all jurisdictional 
requirements have been complied with and if the award 
has been paid or tendered as required. 
Wis. Stat. § 32.05(8) (1979-80). 
 
¶98 During the 1981 session, the Department of Industry, 
Labor and Human Relations (DILHR) asked Senator Jerome Van 
Sistine to introduce legislation amending Wis. Stat. § 32.05(8) 
and several other provisions in Chapter 32.  See 1981 S.B. 562.  
The bill analysis read in part: 
 
(1) Current law is unclear and contradictory in 
regard to the conditions and terms of continued 
occupancy by displaced persons during the period after 
acquisition but before displacement.  This bill 
provides that no person may be required to move 
without at least 90 days' written notice from the 
condemnor and until a comparable replacement property 
is made available. 
 
(2) Current law provides that if a comparable 
dwelling 
is 
not 
available 
within 
the 
statutory 
monetary limits, the condemnor may exceed the limits 
and make payments necessary to provide a comparable 
replacement 
dwelling. 
 
This 
bill 
requires 
the 
condemnor to exceed the monetary limits under these 
circumstances.  (Emphasis added.) 
¶99 Senator Van Sistine's bill did not pass, but Governor 
Anthony Earl submitted DILHR's "comparable replacement property" 
language in his first biennial budget, and it was approved 
No.  2004AP267.dtp 
 
20 
 
without change.  See 1983 Wis. Act 27, § 877; see also 1983 Wis. 
Act 27, § 878. 
¶100 In short, the requirement to make a "comparable 
replacement property" available was submitted to the legislature 
by the executive branch, first under Governor Lee Dreyfus, then 
under Governor Anthony Earl.  The language emanated from and was 
approved by DILHR which was charged with the responsibility of 
administering a major portion of the relocation provisions in 
the law.  Presumably, after years of working with state and 
federal laws on relocation, state regulators knew what they were 
doing.   
¶101 The DILHR package of proposals did not require a 
condemnor to exceed statutory payment limits for a "comparable 
replacement business" as it did for a "comparable dwelling."  
But the continuing caps on relocation payments for businesses 
and farm operations are mitigated somewhat by forcing the 
condemnor to strictly comply with the law.11  Strict compliance 
                                                 
11 "Because the power of eminent domain under WIS. STAT. ch. 
32 is extraordinary, we strictly construe the condemnor's power 
under WIS. STAT. § 32.05, while liberally construing provisions 
favoring 
the 
landowner, 
including 
available 
remedies 
and 
compensation."  TFJ Nominee Trust v. DOT, 2001 WI App 116, ¶10, 
244 Wis. 2d 242, 629 N.W.2d 57 (citing Miesen v. DOT, 226 
Wis. 2d 298, 304, 594 N.W.2d 821 (Ct. App. 1999)); see also 
Shepherd 
Legan 
Aldrian 
Ltd. 
v. 
Vill. 
of 
Shorewood, 
182 
Wis. 2d 472, 478, 513 N.W.2d 686 (Ct. App. 1994).  This 
formulation can be traced back to Aero Auto Parts, Inc. v. 
Department 
of 
Transportation, 
78 
Wis. 2d 235, 
241, 
253 
N.W.2d 896 (1977), in which the court quoted 1 Nichols, Eminent 
Domain § 3.213[4] (rev. 3d ed. 1976): 
The rule of strict construction applies to the power 
of the condemnor and to the exercise of such power.  
It is a rule intended for the benefit of the owner who 
is deprived of property against his will.  It follows, 
No.  2004AP267.dtp 
 
21 
 
requires a condemnor to identify a "comparable replacement 
property" that exists.  Strict compliance may nudge the parties 
to negotiate time to turn a potential "comparable replacement 
property" into an available "comparable replacement property"——
current availability being a condition precedent to issuance of 
a writ.  This is precisely what the statute requires. 
¶102 The City argues that the court of appeals' plain 
reading analysis is unreasonable because it may prevent the 
condemnor from ever removing the condemnee.  Again, I disagree. 
¶103 A party seeking a writ of assistance is required to 
make 
available 
a 
"comparable 
replacement 
property."  
Wis. Stat. § 32.05(8).  Whether a nominated property is a 
"comparable replacement property" is a question to be resolved 
by the circuit court.  If the condemnor prevails in court, it 
obtains a writ and forces the condemnee's removal.12  Hence, 
                                                                                                                                                             
therefore, that the converse of this rule is also 
true.  Statutory provisions in favor of an owner, such 
as provisions regulating the remedies of such owner 
and the compensation to be paid to him, are to be 
liberally construed.  
12 Wisconsin's business replacement payments, which were 
once considered a substantial right and a breakthrough in the 
law of eminent domain, have been eroded by time.  Since 1977 and 
1979 
when 
the 
legislature 
provided 
for 
maximum 
business 
replacement payments of $50,000 for business owners and $30,000 
for business tenants respectively, the legislature has never 
increased these maximums.  We understand that $50,000 from 1977 
and $30,000 from 1979 are not worth the same in today's world.  
According to the United States Department of Labor, what was 
worth $50,000 in 1977 is now worth $171,575.08, and what was 
worth $30,000 in 1979 is now worth $85,929.34.  U.S. Dep't of 
Labor, 
Bureau 
of 
Labor 
Statistics, 
http://www.bls.gov/bls/inflation.htm 
(last 
visited 
June 
26, 
2007).   
No.  2004AP267.dtp 
 
22 
 
compliance with the requirement greatly benefits the condemnor.  
If the condemnor does not prevail, it will look anew for 
"comparable replacement property"——with more precise information 
on what is required——or it will negotiate an agreement with the 
condemnee.   
¶104 A municipality should make a realistic assessment of 
whether a "comparable replacement property" is available early 
on 
and 
develop 
an 
appropriate 
strategy. 
 
A 
"comparable 
replacement property" may not always be available.  If the 
municipality is able to purchase the underlying property instead 
of condemning it, the municipality ought to be able to assume 
the original owner's rights under a lease.  Thereafter, it may 
seek to evict tenants under normal landlord-tenant law.  See 
Wis. Stat. §§ 704.17, 704.19.  If the municipality is required 
to condemn the property instead of purchasing it, it may be 
necessary to condemn the entirety of any business that would 
have occupancy rights on the property under Wis. Stat.§ 32.05(8) 
and pay accordingly.  The cost would be borne by the public, 
which presumably benefits from the taking. 
¶105 If the law is not interpreted in a way that requires 
the availability of a "comparable replacement property" tied to 
the definitions in Wis. Stat. § 32.19(2), it is likely to 
destroy existing businesses or leave individuals without a home. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Should the legislature want to minimize the disruption to 
business owners and tenants, it should increase the statutory 
maximums 
for 
business 
replacement 
payments 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 32.19(4m). 
No.  2004AP267.dtp 
 
23 
 
¶106 The majority is simply not prepared to apply clear 
statutory language.  Its injection of ambiguous "parameters" 
into the statutory scheme may help the condemnor but does 
absolutely nothing to help the condemnee.  Its apparent reliance 
on potential comparable replacement properties is a direct 
contradiction of the statutory language. 
¶107 For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
No.  2004AP267.lbb 
 
1 
 
¶108 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (dissenting).  I agree with 
and adopt, for purposes of this opinion, Justice Wilcox's 
concurring 
opinion,1 
and 
its 
discussion 
of 
"comparable 
replacement 
business" 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 39.19(2)(c).  
There is no need to repeat that analysis here.  Applying his 
analysis of the statute to the facts of this case, I strongly 
disagree with his conclusion that the property at 1700 East 
Delavan 
Drive 
in 
Janesville 
constituted 
a 
"comparable 
replacement business."2  Accordingly, I dissent. 
¶109 The affidavit of Michael Ryan, the terminal manager 
for 
CC 
Midwest, 
stressed 
the 
need 
for 
a 
cross-docking3 
arrangement for the loading and unloading of trucks.  The 
affidavit pointed out that the loading and unloading of freight 
is accomplished with forklifts, and that by far the most time 
efficient way to load and unload is with a cross-dock operation.  
This arrangement allowed CC Midwest to minimize "traffic jams" 
between forklifts. 
¶110 Without a cross-dock operation, according to Ryan, 
forklifts must loop out of the back of one truck and into the 
back of another.  This type of operation causes interference 
                                                 
1 That is, all but ¶60 of Justice Wilcox's concurring 
opinion.  In my view, the proper application of Justice Wilcox's 
analysis necessitates a dissent under these facts. 
2 I agree with Justice Wilcox that none of the other 
properties 
constitute 
a 
"comparable 
replacement 
business."  
Justice Wilcox's concurrence, ¶¶61-62. 
3 Cross-docking is a practice in logistics of unloading 
materials from an incoming semi-trailer truck and loading these 
materials in outbound trailers, with little or no storage in 
between. 
No.  2004AP267.lbb 
 
2 
 
between forklift operators and results in not only a loss of 
time and efficiency, but presents a safety hazard as well.  This 
is because freight is stacked on pallets up to seven feet high 
and eight and one-half feet wide.  Thus, the operator has 
virtually no visibility to the front. 
¶111 Ryan made it clear that cross-dock capabilities were 
essential to their less-than-truckload (LTL) process, and that 
any property that was to meet CC Midwest's needs must have this 
process, as their then-existing terminal did.  A total of twenty 
docks were needed, the same number CC Midwest then had in place. 
¶112 The 1700 East Delavan Property does not qualify as a 
"comparable 
replacement 
business" 
under 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.19(2)(c).  Without cross-docking capabilities, the property 
was not adequate for the needs of the business, was not 
reasonably similar in all major characteristics, was not 
functionally equivalent with respect to its condition, and was 
not suited for the same type of business conducted by the 
acquired business at the time of the acquisition.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 32.19(2)(c).  Compare Justice Wilcox's concurrence, 
¶56. 
¶113 The majority opinion dismisses CC Midwest's cross-
docking needs, indicating that CC Midwest offered no reason why 
cross-docks could not be constructed.  Majority op., ¶45.  
Taking that logic to its ultimate conclusion, a vacant lot would 
be adequate under the lead opinion's rationale. 
¶114 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 32.05(8)(c) 
provides 
that 
the 
condemnor may not require the persons who occupy the premises on 
No.  2004AP267.lbb 
 
3 
 
the date that title vests in the condemnor to vacate "until a 
comparable replacement property" is made available.  Given that 
the City failed to provide a property that satisfied the 
criteria of a "comparable replacement business," it failed to 
make 
a 
"comparable 
replacement 
property" 
available.  
Accordingly, the City should not have been granted a writ of 
assistance pursuant to § 32.05(8)(c).  CC Midwest should not 
have been forced to vacate the premises. 
¶115 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.  
 
 
No.  2004AP267.lbb 
 
1