Title: P. v. Medina

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1 
Filed 6/22/09 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S155823 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/4 B189049 
JOSE JESUS MEDINA et al., 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendants and Appellants. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. MA028151 
 
____________________________________) 
 
In this case, a verbal challenge by defendants (members of a street gang) 
resulted in a fistfight between defendants and the victim (a member of another 
street gang).  After the fistfight ended, one of the defendants shot and killed the 
victim as he was driving away from the scene of the fight with his friend.  The jury 
found the gunman guilty of murder and attempted murder of the friend, as the 
actual perpetrator, and two other participants in the fistfight guilty of those 
offenses as aiders and abettors.  The Court of Appeal affirmed the gunman‟s 
convictions, but reversed the participants‟ convictions.  It held there was 
insufficient evidence that the nontarget offenses of murder and attempted murder 
were a natural and probable consequence of the target offense of simple assault 
which they had aided and abetted.   
Because a rational trier of fact could have concluded that the shooting death 
of the victim was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the assault, on the facts 
2 
of this case, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal relating to the 
nonshooting defendants.   
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On the evening of January 2, 2004, Manuel Ordenes and his wife Amelia 
Rodriguez continued their New Year‟s celebration with a party at their home in 
Lake Los Angeles, California.  Their neighbors Kirk and Abraham, a friend, Lisa, 
and Jason Falcon were present at their house.  Jose Medina (“Tiny”), George 
Marron, and Raymond Vallejo, self-described members of the Lil Watts gang, 
were also present.  Although Falcon was not identified as a gang member, he was 
always with Medina, Marron, and Vallejo.  Ordenes had formerly been a member 
of the Lennox gang, a Lil Watts rival, although the two gangs were not rivals in 
the Lake Los Angeles area.  Everyone was drinking alcohol and using 
methamphetamine.   
Around 11:00 p.m., Ernie Barba drove to Ordenes‟s house with his friend, 
Krystal Varela, to pick up a CD.  Barba went to the house, while Varela stayed at 
the car.  When Ordenes or Rodriguez answered the door, Barba asked, “What‟s 
up?”  On direct examination, Ordenes stated he heard aggressive voices inside the 
house saying, “Where are you from?”  Later on cross-examination, he clarified 
that he heard Vallejo say, “Who is that?” and then ask Barba, “Where are you 
from?”  From his experience as a former gang member, Ordenes knew that when a 
gang member asks another gang member “where are you from?” he means “what 
gang are you from?” a question which constitutes an “aggression step.”  He also 
knew that, if the inquiring gang member was an enemy, the question could lead to 
a fight or even death.  If that gang member had a weapon, he would use it.  
Wanting to avoid problems in his house, and concerned that somebody was going 
to get killed, Ordenes ordered, “Take that into the streets, go outside, don‟t 
disrespect the house.”   
3 
Medina, Marron, Vallejo, and Falcon left the house and joined Barba on the 
front porch.  Once outside, Medina, Marron, and Vallejo approached Barba and 
continued to ask, “Where are you from?”  Barba replied, “Sanfer,” signifying a 
San Fernando Valley gang.  Vallejo responded, “Lil Watts.” Medina remarked, 
“What fool, you think you crazy?”  Vallejo then punched Barba.  Medina and 
Marron joined in the fight.  According to Ordenes, Barba, even though 
outnumbered, defended himself well and held his own against the three attackers.  
All three “couldn‟t get [Barba] down.”  Krystal Varela confirmed that Barba was 
defending himself well.   
Ordenes attempted to break up the fight and pull the attackers off Barba, 
but Falcon held him back.  Eventually, Ordenes was able to pull Barba away and 
escort him to his car which was parked in front of the house.  Barba got into the 
driver‟s seat, while Krystal Varela got into the passenger seat.  At the car, Ordenes 
advised Barba to leave.   
Varela heard someone in the yard say, “get the heat,” which she understood 
to mean a “gun.”  Barba closed the driver‟s side door and drove off.  As Ordenes 
was walking back to his house, he heard Lisa yell from the doorway, “Stop, Tiny. 
No, stop.”  Amelia Rodriguez then saw Medina walk into the middle of the street 
and shoot repeatedly at Barba‟s car as it drove away.  Lisa, who was standing next 
to Rodriguez, yelled, “Tiny, you know you‟re stupid.  Why you doing that?  
There‟s kids here.  You f‟d up.”  Barba died of a gunshot wound to the head.   
The prosecution charged Medina, Marron, Vallejo, and Falcon with first 
degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))1 and with attempted willful, 
deliberate, premeditated murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)).  Under the prosecution‟s 
                                              
1  
All statutory references are to the Penal Code.  
4 
theory at trial, Medina was guilty as the actual perpetrator, while Marron, Vallejo, 
and Falcon were guilty as aiders and abettors.   
At trial, Hawthorne Police Officer Christopher Port testified as the 
prosecution‟s gang expert.  Officer Port was assigned to the gang intelligence unit 
and was familiar with the Lil Watts gang, a violent street gang from Hawthorne.  
He testified that Lil Watts gang members primarily committed narcotics offenses 
involving possession and sales, vandalism, and gun-related crimes, including 
assaults with firearms and semiautomatic firearms, drive-by shootings, and 
homicides.  The police had identified defendants Medina and Vallejo as members 
of the Lil Watts gang, based on field contacts and their gang tattoos.  The police 
considered Marron to be “affiliated” with the Lil Watts gang, having seen him 
with Lil Watts gang members, including Medina and Vallejo.   
Officer Port testified that the Lake Los Angeles area where Ordenes lived is 
considered a “transient area for gangs.”  When a new gang member arrives there, 
he feels a need to establish himself by demanding respect, which is “the main 
pride” of a gang member.  Officer Port testified that gang members view behavior 
that disrespects their gang as a challenge and a “slap in the face” which must be 
avenged.  Gang members perceive that, if no retaliatory action is taken in the face 
of disrespectful behavior, the challenger and others will view the gang member 
and the gang itself as weak.  According to Officer Port, violence is used as a 
response to disrespectful behavior and disagreements and as a means to gain 
respect.  
Officer Port stated that, when a gang member asks another person, “where 
are you from?” he suspects that person is in a gang and wants to know what gang 
he claims as his.  In response to hypothetical questions, Officer Port opined that 
when Barba responded “Sanfer,” he was claiming membership in that gang, and 
that the Lil Watts gang members had viewed Barba‟s response as disrespectful and 
5 
had started a fight to avenge themselves.  Officer Port stated that a gang member 
who asks that question could be armed and probably would be prepared to use 
violence, ranging from a fistfight to homicide.  He explained, “In the gang world 
problems or disagreements aren‟t handled like you and I would handle a 
disagreement. . . . When gangs have a disagreement, you can almost guarantee it‟s 
going to result in some form of violence, whether that be punching and kicking or 
ultimately having somebody shot and killed.”   
Ordenes testified that it is important for a gang to be respected and, above 
all, feared by other gangs.  Once a gang is no longer feared, its members lose 
respect, are ridiculed, and become vulnerable and subject to attack by other gangs.  
He stated that death is sometimes an option exercised by gang members as a way 
to maintain respect.  Ordenes further stated there are a lot of gang members 
occupying their “turfs” with guns. 
The jury acquitted codefendant Falcon, but found defendants Medina, 
Marron, and Vallejo guilty as charged, and found true various enhancement 
allegations, including that the crimes were committed for the benefit of a gang.  
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1).)   
The Court of Appeal affirmed Medina‟s conviction, but reversed the 
convictions of Marron and Vallejo on the ground there was insufficient evidence 
that the nontarget crimes of murder and attempted murder were a reasonably 
foreseeable consequence of simple assault, the target offense they had aided and 
abetted. 
We granted the Attorney General‟s petition for review regarding the 
reversals of Marron‟s and Vallejo‟s judgments. 
6 
II.  DISCUSSION 
The Attorney General argues that, when the facts are viewed as a whole, 
there is substantial evidence to support the murder and attempted murder 
convictions of defendants Marron and Vallejo.  We agree.   
Substantial evidence is evidence which is “ „reasonable in nature, credible, 
and of solid value.‟ ”  (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576.)  “In 
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine „whether, after 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational 
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.‟ ”  (People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 509.)  We must 
presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact that the trier of fact 
could reasonably deduce from the evidence.  (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 
1199, 1206.)  “The focus of the substantial evidence test is on the whole record of 
evidence presented to the trier of fact, rather than on „ “isolated bits of evidence.” ‟ 
[Citation.]”  (People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 261.) 
It is undisputed that Marron and Vallejo knowingly and intentionally 
participated in the fistfight that preceded the shooting, that Medina alone shot the 
victim, and that the jury convicted Marron and Vallejo of murder and attempted 
murder as aiders and abettors under the natural and probable consequences 
doctrine.   
“A person who knowingly aids and abets criminal conduct is guilty of not 
only the intended crime [target offense] but also of any other crime the perpetrator 
actually commits [nontarget offense] that is a natural and probable consequence of 
the intended crime.  The latter question is not whether the aider and abettor 
actually foresaw the additional crime, but whether, judged objectively, it was 
reasonably foreseeable.  (People v. Prettyman [(1996)] 14 Cal.4th [248,] 260-
262.)”  (People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1133.)  Liability under the 
7 
natural and probable consequences doctrine “is measured by whether a reasonable 
person in the defendant‟s position would have or should have known that the 
charged offense was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the act aided and 
abetted.”  (People v. Nguyen (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 518, 535.)   
“[A]lthough variations in phrasing are found in decisions addressing the 
doctrine — „probable and natural,‟ „natural and reasonable,‟ and „reasonably 
foreseeable‟ — the ultimate factual question is one of foreseeability.”  (People v. 
Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 107.)  Thus, “ „[a] natural and probable 
consequence is a foreseeable consequence‟. . . .”  (Ibid.)  But “to be reasonably 
foreseeable „[t]he consequence need not have been a strong probability; a possible 
consequence which might reasonably have been contemplated is enough. . . . ‟  (1 
Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (2d ed. 1988) §  132, p. 150.)”  (People v. 
Nguyen, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 535.)  A reasonably foreseeable consequence 
is to be evaluated under all the factual circumstances of the individual case (ibid.) 
and is a factual issue to be resolved by the jury.  (People v. Olguin (1994) 31 
Cal.App.4th 1355, 1376; People v. Godinez (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 492, 499.)   
Here, the Court of Appeal held there was insufficient evidence to support a 
finding that Medina‟s act of firing a gun was a reasonably foreseeable 
consequence of the gang attack in which defendants Marron and Vallejo 
participated.  In so holding, the Court of Appeal reviewed gang violence cases 
affirming the defendants‟ liability as aiders and abettors.  (People v. Gonzales 
(2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1, 10-11 [fatal shooting during gang-related fistfight was 
natural and probable consequence of fistfight]; People v. Montes (1999) 74 
Cal.App.4th 1050, 1056 [shooting of rival gang member during retreat from fight 
was natural and probable consequence of gang fight in which defendant wielded a 
chain]; People v. Olguin, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 1376 [defendant‟s punching 
of victim during gang confrontation foreseeably led to fatal shooting of victim by 
8 
fellow gang member]; People v. Godinez, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th 492, 499-500 
[fatal stabbing of rival gang member either during or after fistfight was natural and 
probable consequence of fistfight]; People v. Montano (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 221, 
226 [defendant‟s aiding and encouragement of battery on victim foreseeably led to 
shooting of victim by fellow gang members].)   
In evaluating those cases, the Court of Appeal distilled six factors it 
considered material to their holdings: “(1) the defendant had knowledge of the 
weapon that was used before or during his involvement in the target crime; (2) the 
committed crime took place while the target crime was being perpetrated; (3) 
weapons were introduced to the target crime shortly after it ensued; (4) the fight 
which led to the committed crime was planned; (5) the gangs were engaged in an 
ongoing rivalry involving past acts of violence; or (6) the defendant agreed to or 
aided the commission of the committed crime.”  The Court of Appeal observed 
that, in each of the cases reviewed, more than one of the above factors was 
present.   
In evaluating this case, the Court of Appeal found it significant that none of 
the above factors were present, focusing on facts that were missing, rather than on 
the actual evidence presented.  (See People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 12 
[rather than focus on the evidence that actually existed, the Court of Appeal 
“focused on what it found lacking in the prosecution‟s case”].)  However, as the 
Attorney General points out, prior knowledge that a fellow gang member is armed 
is not necessary to support a defendant‟s murder conviction as an aider and 
abettor.  (People v. Montes, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 1056 [“[g]iven the great 
potential for escalating violence during gang confrontations, it is immaterial 
whether [defendant] specifically knew [fellow gang member] had a gun”]; People 
v. Godinez, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 501, fn. 5 [“although evidence indicating 
whether the defendant did or did not know a weapon was present provides grist for 
9 
argument to the jury on the issue of foreseeability of a homicide, it is not a 
necessary prerequisite”]; People v. Montano, supra, 96 Cal.App.3d at p. 227 
[defendant‟s liability for aiding and abetting attempted murder not dependent on 
awareness that fellow gang members possessed deadly weapons].)  Likewise, prior 
gang rivalry, while reflecting motive, is not necessary for a court to uphold a gang 
member‟s murder conviction under an aiding and abetting theory.  (See People v. 
Olguin, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1382-1383 [gang enhancement upheld even 
though no evidence of “prior relationship between the killers and their victim, and 
no reason for animosity other than gang-related insults”].)  Thus, although 
evidence of the existence of the above listed factors may constitute sufficient 
evidence to support an aider and abettor‟s murder conviction under the natural and 
probable consequence theory, these factors are not necessary to support such a 
conviction.  (Cf. People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1125 [guidelines in 
People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27 regarding premeditated murder 
“are descriptive, not normative”].)  We do not view the existence of those factors 
as an exhaustive list that would exclude all other types and combinations of 
evidence that could support a jury‟s finding of a foreseeable consequence.  (Cf. 
Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1125.)  In other words, the absence of these factors 
alone is not dispositive.   
In examining the whole record in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found that the 
shooting of the victim was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the gang 
assault in this case.  Medina, Marron, and Vallejo, members of the Lil Watts gang, 
repeatedly challenged Barba by asking, “Where are you from?”  When Barba 
responded, “Sanfer,” Vallejo declared he was a member of another gang, “Lil 
Watts.”  Medina remarked, “What fool, you think you crazy?”  Apparently 
10 
viewing Barba‟s response as disrespectful behavior, Medina, Marron, and Vallejo 
then attacked Barba. 
The Court of Appeal emphasized there was no evidence that the assailants 
used weapons or were armed during the fistfight, or that the two gangs involved 
were in the midst of a “war” or had been involved in prior altercations.  It further 
stressed that the shooting occurred after the fistfight had ended.  However, the 
Court of Appeal‟s analysis ignores the testimony of the gang expert, Officer Port, 
and of Ordenes, and other evidence.   
According to Ordenes, a gang member‟s query “where are you from?” 
means “what gang are you from?” and is a verbal challenge, which (depending on 
the response) could lead to a physical altercation and even death.  Officer Port 
affirmed that a gang member who asks, “where are you from?” could be armed 
and probably would be prepared to respond with violence, ranging from a fistfight 
to homicide.  As a former gang member, Ordenes foresaw precisely that result.  
He feared that somebody might get killed after Vallejo verbally challenged Barba, 
and, because of that fear, ordered defendants to “take that into the streets.”   
Once the fight ensued, the three men could not get Barba down.  Despite 
being attacked and outnumbered by three aggressors, Barba defended himself well 
and held his own.  Ordenes interrupted the fistfight while Barba was performing 
well and before the three attackers could vindicate themselves.  Given the gang-
related purpose of the initial assault and the fact that, despite being outnumbered, 
Barba exhibited strength against three aggressors who could not avenge 
themselves in response to what they considered disrespectful behavior by Barba, 
the jury could reasonably have found that a person in defendants‟ position (i.e., a 
gang member) would have or should have known that retaliation was likely to 
occur and that escalation of the confrontation to a deadly level was reasonably 
11 
foreseeable as Barba was retreating from the scene.  (See, e.g., People v. Olguin, 
supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 1376.)   
The record supports that implicit finding by the jury.  First, according to the 
testimony, gang members emphasize the need for respect, primarily in the form of 
fear.  Officer Port testified that gang members view behavior that disrespects their 
gang as a challenge and “slap in the face” which must be avenged.  Gang members 
perceive that, if no retaliatory action is taken in the face of disrespectful behavior, 
the challenger and other people will view the gang member and the gang itself as 
weak.  Ordenes, a former gang member, confirmed that once a gang is no longer 
feared, its members lose respect, are ridiculed, and become vulnerable and subject 
to attack by other gangs.  According to Officer Port, violence is used as a response 
to disrespectful behavior and disagreements, and as a means to gain respect.  
Ordenes confirmed that gang members consider death as a means to maintain 
respect in some circumstances.  
Second, the record reveals that Lil Watts was a violent street gang that 
regularly committed gun offenses.  Officer Port testified that Lil Watts members 
were involved “in all sorts of gun charges,” including assaults with firearms, 
semiautomatic firearms, drive-by shootings, and homicides.  Ordenes affirmed that 
many gang members occupied their turfs with guns.  Regarding this specific 
incident, Ordenes ordered the Lil Watts gang members outside because he was 
concerned that somebody would be killed.  Thus, because Lil Watts members had 
challenged a rival gang member, the jury could reasonably have inferred that, in 
backing up that challenge, a Lil Watts member either would have been armed or 
would have or should have known a fellow gang member was or might be armed.   
Third, although there was no evidence the two gangs involved had an 
ongoing rivalry, Officer Port stated that the Lake Los Angeles area is considered a 
“transient area for gangs” where newly arrived gang members demand respect to 
12 
establish themselves in that territory.  Ordenes testified that members of Lil Watts, 
Sanfer, and Pacoima (another gang) live in the Lake Los Angeles area.  Thus, 
escalating the violence with a gun was a foreseeable way for a Lil Watts gang 
member to exact revenge for Barba‟s initial disrespect and his later show of 
strength against the three aggressors, thereby establishing Lil Watts‟s turf 
domination in the neighborhood.  
Fourth, although Vallejo argues that the fistfight and shooting were not one 
uninterrupted event, but rather two separate incidents, the evidence showed that 
Medina, Marron, and Vallejo did not consider the fight to be over and that the 
shooting resulted directly from that fight.  Eyewitnesses testified that the events 
happened very quickly, in a matter of seconds, not minutes.  After Ordenes had 
broken up the fight, someone yelled, “get the heat,” just before the shooting.  The 
Court of Appeal commented that this was “[t]he only piece of evidence that might 
support an inference that someone other than Medina knew the shooting would 
take place.”  But it reasoned that the evidence was “speculative” since there was 
no indication of who said, “get the heat,” and the statement was made after the 
fistfight ended.   
The Court of Appeal‟s reasoning is flawed for two reasons.  First, in the 
gang context, it was not necessary for there to have been a prior discussion of or 
agreement to a shooting, or for a gang member to have known a fellow gang 
member was in fact armed.  (People v. Montes, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 1056.)  
Second, the Court of Appeal incorrectly concluded there was no indication of who 
said, “get the heat” and ignored the causal relationship between the fistfight and 
the order to “get the heat.” 
Although there was no direct evidence of who specifically ordered, “get the 
heat,” there was circumstantial evidence regarding the identity of the declarant.  
That evidence revealed that one of the gang participants actually knew that at least 
13 
one fellow gang member had a gun.  It was unlikely that Medina yelled “get the 
heat” to himself.  Other evidence established that Rodriguez, like her husband, 
ordered the men to take their dispute outside because she was concerned for her 
children; Rodriguez yelled for the men to stop fighting; Ordenes successfully 
broke up the fistfight; Ordenes‟s neighbors Kirk and Abraham remained in the 
house during the fight; and Ordenes‟s friend, Lisa, tried to stop the shooting when 
she yelled from the doorway, “Stop, Tiny. No, stop.”  That evidence reflects that 
the people at the party other than defendants either wanted the fighting to end or 
were not present during the fighting, and had no reason to want Barba shot.  In 
addition, Medina, Marron, Vallejo, and Falcon fled before the police arrived.  (See 
People v. Haynes (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1294 [factors suggesting aiding 
and abetting includes “presence at the scene . . . , companionship, and conduct 
before and after the crime, including flight”].)  The jury could reasonably have 
concluded that one of the Lil Watts members yelled, “get the heat,” and that either 
Medina was asking his companions for a gun, or a companion was telling him to 
get out a gun.2  The fact that at least two of the gang members knew a gun was 
available at the scene is further evidence that gun violence was foreseeable. 
                                              
2  
The dissenting opinion argues that it was equally reasonable for the jury to 
have concluded that Medina himself shouted for a gun, his companions did not 
know what he was talking about, and when no one responded, he retrieved the gun 
himself.  (Dis. opn., at p. 4.)  Nevertheless, the dissent does not dispute that, in 
view of all the evidence presented at trial, the jury could have reasonably 
concluded that one of the Lil Watts gang members yelled, “get the heat,” and that 
either Medina was asking for and received a gun from a companion, or a 
companion was telling Medina to get out a gun.   
 
“[O]ur role on appeal is a limited one.”  (People v. Ochoa, supra, 6 Cal.4th 
at p. 1206.)  Under the substantial evidence rule, we must presume in support of 
the judgment the existence of every fact that the trier of fact could reasonably have 
deduced from the evidence.  (Ibid.)  Thus, if the circumstances reasonably justify 
the trier of fact‟s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
14 
Thus, the evidence shows there was a close connection between the failed 
assault against Barba (in which Marron, Vallejo, and Medina directly participated) 
and the murder of Barba (People v. Prettyman, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 269); 
Medina shot Barba because he disrespected Lil Watts (People v. Olguin, supra, 31 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1383); and the shooting and death were “ „not an unreasonable 
result to be expected from the [assault].‟ ” (People v. Martinez (1966) 239 
Cal.App.2d 161, 178-179 [conspirators liable for killing by coconspirator that 
went outside of express objective of conspiracy to disturb the peace; killing was 
reasonable result to be expected from contemplated acts].)  
Finally, the Court of Appeal unduly emphasized the differences between 
this case and other gang cases while ignoring the similarities.  As in this case, in 
People v. Olguin, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th 1355, a confrontation between three 
members of a gang and the victim — who they felt had shown them disrespect — 
escalated from mere shouting and a punch, to the shooting of the victim.  Initially, 
the three gang members believed that the victim (possibly a member of a defunct 
gang) had defaced their gang graffiti, and they interpreted the defacement as a sign 
of disrespect and a challenge to their territorial claim.  The confrontation began 
with the three gang members and the victim shouting at each other.  Mora, one of 
the three gang members, then punched the victim, who was drunk, and knocked 
him down.  As other men approached the victim to give him aid, the victim stood 
up and began walking towards the three gang members.  Olguin, a second member 
of the gang, pulled out a gun and fired, killing the victim with a single shot to the 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does 
not warrant reversal of the judgment.  (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 
1054.)   
15 
chest.  Despite the fact there was no evidence of a prior relationship between the 
defendants and their victim and no reason for animosity other than gang-related 
insults, the court found the shooting was a foreseeable consequence of the punch 
and found Mora liable for the murder of the victim.  (Id. at pp. 1375-1376, 1382-
1383.)  Noting that the victim did not appear intimidated by being outnumbered, 
the court concluded that “escalation of this confrontation to a deadly level was 
much closer to inevitable than it was to unforeseeable . . . .”  (Id. at p. 1376.)3   
In People v. Montes, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th 1050, the victim was shot as he 
was retreating from a fight between two rival gangs.  Although defendant struck 
the victim (a rival gang member) with a chain after the victim produced a knife, no 
guns were displayed or used during the fight.  As the victim was about to drive off 
after the fight ended, defendant‟s confederate retrieved a gun from a nearby 
vehicle, ran up to the victim, and shot him several times.  Rejecting the 
defendant‟s argument that he did not know his confederate had a gun, the Montes 
court held that the homicide was a reasonable and natural consequence of the gang 
attack in which defendant participated.  It reasoned that escalating violence is a 
foreseeable consequence to be expected in gang confrontations.  (People v. 
Montes, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 1056.)   
In People v. Montano, supra, 96 Cal.App.3d 221, the court found the 
defendant guilty of attempted murder as an aider and abettor even though he had 
not fought with the victim.  There, the defendant and a codefendant tricked a 
member of another gang into getting in their car by claiming to be members of the 
                                              
3  
Although the Olguin court commented that Mora knew Olguin was armed, 
Olguin claimed at trial that he did not tell Mora or the third gang member he was 
armed.  (People v. Olguin, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1366, 1376.)  Despite the 
court‟s assertion, there does not appear to have been any evidence refuting 
Olguin‟s claim.    
16 
same gang.  They drove the victim to a remote area where another codefendant 
met them.  The two codefendants ordered the victim out of the car and escorted the 
victim to a nearby tree, while the defendant remained inside the car.  The first 
codefendant produced a handgun and gave it to the second codefendant, who shot 
the victim.  At the urging of the first codefendant, the second codefendant shot the 
victim again.  Defendant argued there was insufficient evidence to support his 
attempted murder conviction as an aider and abettor; he contended he had only 
aided or encouraged a battery by suggesting the beating of the victim and had had 
no knowledge of his codefendant‟s intent to shoot the victim.   
The Montano court rejected the argument, reasoning that “The evidence 
was clear that the attack upon [the victim] was an aspect of gang warfare and that 
he was attacked on the basis of his membership in the rival 18th Street gang.  The 
frequency with which such gang attacks result in homicide fully justified the trial 
court in finding that homicide was a „reasonable and natural consequence‟ to be 
expected in any such attack.  It is, therefore, clear that [the defendant‟s] guilt of 
aiding and abetting an attempted murder does not depend upon his awareness that 
[either codefendant], or both of them, had deadly weapons in their possession.”  
(People v. Montano, supra, 96 Cal.App.3d at p. 227.) 
The dissenting opinion examines Ordenes‟s and Officer Port‟s testimony 
relating to the consequences of the challenge “Where are you from?” and 
concludes that, at most, they believed that a homicide was a possible, not 
probable, consequence of that challenge.  The dissent emphasizes that Ordenes‟s 
actions in ordering the gang members out of his house and breaking up the fight 
further reflects that Ordenes did not foresee that the verbal challenge would 
probably result in a homicide.  (Dis. opn., at pp. 4-7.)   
Although the dissent (echoing the Court of Appeal) emphasizes that the 
shooting was not a probable consequence of the verbal challenge, the ultimate 
17 
factual question is one of reasonable foreseeability, to be evaluated under all the 
factual circumstances of the case.  (People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 
Cal.4th at p. 107; People v. Nguyen, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at pp. 531, 535.)  The 
precise consequence need not have been foreseen.  (Cf. People Schmies (1996) 44 
Cal.App.4th 38, 50 [proximate cause principles].)  Even if Ordenes had not 
actually pinpointed, from the verbal challenge alone, the precise form of ensuing 
violence, he did foresee that the verbal confrontation by the Lil Watts gang 
members would likely escalate into some type of physical violence.  Officer Port 
agreed that the challengers would be prepared to use physical violence.  
Nor was it required that Vallejo and Marron “must have known Medina 
was armed.”  (Dis. opn., at p. 6, fn. 2.)  The issue is “whether, under all of the 
circumstances presented, a reasonable person in the defendant‟s position would 
have or should have known that the [shooting] was a reasonably foreseeable 
consequence of the act aided and abetted by the defendant.”  (People v. Nguyen, 
supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 531, italics added.) 
Contrary to the dissent‟s suggestion, there was more here than just verbal 
challenges by gang members.  (Dis. opn., at p. 7.)  There was evidence that Barba 
refused to succumb to the gang assault despite being substantially outnumbered 
and defendants were unable to avenge themselves because of Barba‟s show of 
strength; gang culture (in which defendants were involved) emphasizes respect, 
fear, and retaliatory violence in the face of disrespectful behavior; Lil Watts was a 
violent street gang that regularly committed gun offenses; and a Lil Watts gang 
member had ready access to a gun at the scene.  Even if the three aggressors did 
not intend to shoot Barba when they verbally challenged him, or at the start of the 
fistfight, it was or should have been reasonably foreseeable to these gang members 
that the violence would escalate even further depending on Barba‟s response to 
their challenge.  (See, e.g., People v. Olguin, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 1376 
18 
[refusal to show intimidation despite being outnumbered]; People v. Montes, 
supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 1053 [victim produced a knife].)  Thus, given the fact 
that defendants were unable to avenge themselves for the perceived multiple 
instances of disrespectful behavior by Barba, the jury could reasonably have found 
that defendants would have or should have known that retaliation was likely to 
occur and that escalation of the confrontation to a deadly level was reasonably 
foreseeable as Barba was retreating from the scene. 
Accordingly, viewing the whole record in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, we find there was sufficient evidence to support the murder and 
attempted murder convictions of defendants Marron and Vallejo.   
III.  DISPOSITION 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal relating to defendants 
Marron and Vallejo. 
 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY MORENO, J. 
 
 
I dissent.  In my view, the Court of Appeal reached the correct conclusion 
when it reversed the convictions of defendants Marron and Vallejo.  I agree with 
the Court of Appeal that insufficient evidence supported those convictions based 
on the theory that the shooting of Barba by defendant Medina was a natural and 
probable consequence of the assault on Barba in which Marron and Vallejo 
participated.  The Court of Appeal did not reach this conclusion lightly.  The court 
applied the deferential substantial evidence standard of review to its inquiry.  It 
also recognized the grim reality that disputes between gang members are in a 
different category from disputes between civilians.  “As gang violence has become 
more prevalent and innocent bystanders have become victims of the violence in 
ever increasing numbers, our courts have recognized that a dispute between two 
neighbors and one between two gang members can lead to different 
consequences.”  Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal determined that even in the 
context of gang violence there was insufficient evidence to support the jury‟s 
verdict as to Vallejo and Marron. 
The Court of Appeal carefully compared decisions affirming convictions of 
gang members based on the natural and probable consequences theory with the 
facts of this case in light of the reasonable forseeability requirement.  (People v. 
Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 260 [natural and probable consequences 
doctrine “is based on the recognition that „aiders and abettors should be 
2 
responsible for the criminal harms they have naturally, probably and foreseeably 
put in motion‟ ”].)  In each case it considered, the Court of Appeal observed that 
the evidence supporting the convictions of the nonperpetrator included one or 
more crucial facts that were absent from this case.  “In evaluating the cited cases, 
several facts emerge which support the courts‟ conclusions that each defendant 
was liable for the committed crime under the natural and probable consequences 
theory:  1) the defendant had knowledge of the weapon that was used before or 
during his involvement in the target crime; 2) the committed crime took place 
while the target crime was being perpetrated; 3) weapons were introduced to the 
target crime shortly after it ensued; 4) the fight which led to the committed crime 
was planned; 5) the gangs were engaged in an ongoing rivalry involving past acts 
of violence; or 6) the defendant agreed to or aided the commission of the 
committed crime.  In all of these cases, more than one of these facts were 
present.”1 
By contrast, the court noted that there was no evidence that either Vallejo 
or Marron had knowledge that Medina was in possession of a gun before or during 
the fistfight with Barba.  “Indeed,” the court observed, “there was no evidence that 
anyone had a weapon of any kind prior to the shooting.”  The shooting of Barba 
did not occur during the assault on him by Medina, Vallejo and Marron.  Rather, 
                                              
1  
The majority faults the Court of Appeal for “focusing on the facts that were 
missing, rather than on the actual evidence presented.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 8.)  I 
disagree with this characterization.  The Court of Appeal did not give short shrift 
to the evidence potentially supporting the convictions — indeed, the majority feels 
compelled elsewhere in its opinion to contest the Court of Appeal‟s discussion of 
some of that evidence.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 10-12.)  By definition, however, a 
finding that evidence is insufficient to support a judgment must be based on 
evidentiary deficiencies, and so, necessarily, a reviewing court would emphasize 
such deficiencies. 
3 
the testimony of the three percipient witnesses — Ordenes, Rodriguez, and Varela 
— was that the fight had broken up, Ordenes had walked Barba to his car and put 
him inside of it, and Barba had begun to drive away when Medina alone walked 
into the middle of the street and started firing.  There was no evidence that the 
assault on Barba was planned by the defendants, much less that it was a retaliatory 
act in the course of ongoing gang warfare between the “Lil Watts” and “Sanfer” 
gangs.  In fact, the gang expert, Officer Port, testified that these gangs were not 
even rivals.  Finally, there was no evidence that there was any prior agreement 
between the defendants to go out looking for a “Sanfer” gang member to assault. 
Contrary to the Attorney General‟s contention, by making this comparison, 
the Court of Appeal was not establishing a standard of evidence that must be met 
before a conviction based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine will 
be affirmed in the context of gang violence.  Rather, the court was attempting to 
determine the contours of that doctrine by reference to extant case law, and 
particularly, to cast some practical light on the elusive concept of foreseeability, 
given that “no published case to date gives a clear definition of the terms „natural‟ 
and „probable[]‟. . . .”  (Com. to CALCRIM No. 403 (2008 ed.) p. 173.)  It was 
necessary for the Court of Appeal to examine precedent to determine the nature, 
quality and quantum of evidence found to be sufficient to sustain a conviction 
under that doctrine in order to determine whether the evidence was sufficient in 
this case. 
What the Court of Appeal found was that the “only piece of evidence that 
might support an inference that someone other than Medina knew the shooting 
would take place was Varela‟s testimony that she heard someone say, „Get the 
heat,‟ just prior to the sound of gunfire.”  To this, I would add the majority 
opinion‟s assertion — echoed by the Attorney General at argument — that both 
Ordenes and Port, the gang expert, testified, in effect, that a homicide is a 
4 
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the challenge, “Where are you from?”  I 
disagree with the majority‟s characterization of this evidence. 
The majority opinion places enormous weight on the “Get the heat” 
testimony and goes to some lengths to establish, circumstantially, that the person 
who uttered this statement must have been either Vallejo or Marron.  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at pp. 12-13.)  That analysis proceeds, however, from an ipse dixit 
assumption:  “It was unlikely that Medina yelled „get the heat‟ to himself.”  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 13.)  Medina was the one person in this episode who knew there 
was a gun somewhere because he used it to kill the victim.  It is not unlikely, 
therefore, that Medina yelled out, “Get the heat.”  But this does not necessarily 
imply that his codefendants must have known Medina had a gun with him.  It only 
establishes that Medina, who was evidently quite angry that the attack on Barba 
had been broken up, shouted for a gun, not that anyone knew what he was talking 
about.  It is just as reasonable to conclude that he shouted this command and, 
when no one responded, he got the gun himself.  Indeed, this conclusion is more 
consistent with the testimony of Rodriguez that, after everyone scattered, Medina 
stepped out into the street with the gun and fired it. 
The other bit of evidence on which the majority relies is testimony 
regarding the consequences of the challenge, “Where are you from?”  The 
majority asserts:  “According to Ordenes, a gang member‟s query „where are you 
from?‟ means „what gang are you from?‟ and is a verbal challenge, which 
(depending on the response) could lead to a physical altercation and even death.  
Officer Port affirmed that a gang member who asks „where are you from?‟ could 
be armed and probably would be prepared to respond with violence, ranging from 
a fistfight to homicide.  As a former gang member, Ordenes foresaw precisely that 
result.  He feared that somebody might get killed after Vallejo verbally challenged 
5 
Barba and, because of that fear, ordered defendants to „take that into the streets.‟ ”  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 10.) 
An examination of the reporter‟s transcript belies the majority‟s 
characterization of this evidence.  What the transcript discloses is that both 
Ordenes and Port — and the former with considerable prodding from the 
prosecutor — were, at most, describing possible — not probable —  
consequences.  For example, what Ordenes actually said, based on his experience 
as a gang member, was that the question, “Where are you from?” “would go on to 
a fight or whatever.  [¶] [Q.]  Or what?  [¶]  [A.]  Or whatever else would happen.  
[¶]  [Q.]  What other things could happen from that?  [¶]  [A.]  Well, death.   [¶]  
[Q.]  Death as by how?   [¶]  [A.]  Whatever.  Whatever you can use.   [¶]  [Q.]  
Okay.  So if you have a weapon —  [¶]  [A.]  You would use it.”  (Italics added.) 
Thus, in my view, Ordenes‟s testimony describes a possible event, not a 
probable one, that might occur if weapons were present (but Ordenes did not 
testify that he knew or even suspected any of the defendants in this case were 
armed).  The gang expert‟s testimony was equally attenuated.  The expert testified 
that if the question “Where are you from?” was answered unsatisfactorily, “it‟s 
some form of misunderstanding that can go into some physical altercation.  They 
can go from a fistfight to disrespecting each other . . . verbally and all the way as 
far [as] homicide.”  (Italics added.) 
Like Ordenes, then, the expert did no more than describe a range of 
possible results from a fistfight to verbal insults and, perhaps somewhere down the 
line, a killing, although how far down the line was not elucidated.  Moreover, 
when the expert was asked, “when a gang member usually asks that question to 
someone else, in your experience are they usually armed?” the expert replied, 
“They can be.  It‟s my opinion that if you‟re going to ask that question, that you‟re 
probably prepared to be in some form of altercation following the answer.”   
6 
(Italics added.)  “Some form of altercation,” of course, is exactly what happened in 
this case — a fistfight.  It does not necessarily encompass a homicide.2 
Nor do I agree that Ordenes‟s testimony about his concern when he told 
defendants and Barba to take their dispute outside the house was because he 
foresaw a probable homicide.  It was the prosecutor who raised this specter:  “[Q.]  
Okay.  And when you heard somebody say, „Where are you from,‟ did that start to 
concern you a little bit?  [¶]  [A.]  Yes, it did.  [¶]  [Q.]  Okay.  And is that for the 
reasons you just stated right now, that you knew that somebody was going to get 
killed?  [¶]  [A.]  For the reason that I didn’t want no problems to my house and 
also that reason too.  [¶]  [Q.]  Okay.  So what happened after you heard the words, 
„Where are you from?‟  [¶]  [A.]  I said, „Take that into the streets, go outside, 
don’t disrespect the house.‟ ”  (Italics added.) 
Again, despite the prosecutor‟s prodding, Ordenes‟s testimony is not 
evidence that he reasonably foresaw a homicide as a consequence of the challenge.  
Instead, his testimony evinced a concern that he did not want a fight — a fistfight 
or some other physical altercation— inside his house where there were women and 
children.  That this domestic concern, rather than fear of a probable homicide, was 
behind his command for the men to leave his house is reflected in his wife‟s 
                                              
2 
The majority highlights Port‟s general testimony that the “Lil Watts” gang 
participated in crimes involving firearms, and concludes:  “[B]ecause Lil Watts 
members had challenged a rival gang member, the jury could reasonably infer that, 
in backing up that challenge, a Lil Watts member either would have been armed or 
would have or should have known a fellow gang member was or might be armed.”  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 11.)  I disagree with the conclusion that it can be reasonably 
inferred from Port‟s testimony that, because some gang members participated on 
some occasions in gun-related crimes, these particular defendants must have 
known Medina was armed in the specific circumstances of this case — where 
members from two gangs, who were not rivals, met at a party house in neutral 
territory. 
7 
testimony.  Rodriguez also told the men to leave the house because, as she 
testified, “they were kind of getting loud, so I told — they had my front door open 
and it was cold, so I told them to take that outside because my kids are in back 
asleep, and then I closed the door.” 
Moreover, Ordenes‟s conduct after ordering the men out is not consistent 
with the majority‟s interpretation of his testimony.  Had he suspected a killing was 
in the offing, one would think he would have done something to protect himself 
from getting caught in the crossfire, but he did not.  Rather, he followed the men 
outside, broke up their fight and walked Barba to his car, telling him, “ „Just get in 
the car, just leave, I‟ll take care of it.‟ ”  These are not the acts or the words of 
someone who is fearful that a killing is imminent.  They are the acts and words of 
someone who is prepared for a low-level altercation that can be smoothed over 
eventually once the participants have been separated.  Thus, I disagree with the 
majority‟s characterization of Ordenes‟s testimony as reflecting a fear “that 
somebody might get killed after Vallejo verbally challenged Barba . . . .”  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 10.) 
Stripped to its essence, what the majority holds is that the challenge 
“Where are you from?” is so provocative in the context of gang culture that any 
response up to and including murder is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of 
that utterance, so as to justify a murder conviction not only of the actual 
perpetrator but also of any other gang members involved in the target offense, 
whatever the surrounding circumstances.  I cannot subscribe to such an expansive 
interpretation of the natural and probable consequences doctrine even in the 
context of gang violence, which no one doubts is a plague upon some of our 
state‟s most vulnerable communities. 
I must agree with the Court of Appeal:  “Notwithstanding the violence 
which most gang confrontations spawn, on our facts, viewed objectively, we 
8 
cannot conclude that an unplanned fight between unarmed combatants in front of a 
residence was reasonably likely to lead to a shooting resulting in death.  In 
essence, the Attorney General is asking us to create a new theory of liability.  An 
aider and abettor would be responsible for any crime that was a natural and 
possible consequence of the target crime.  That, we cannot do.”  
Neither can I. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
WE CONCUR:  
KENNARD, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Medina 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 153 Cal.App.4th 610 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S155823 
Date Filed: June 22, 2009 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: William R. Pounders 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Chris R. Redburn, under appointment by the Supreme Court; and Joy A. Maulitz for Defendant and 
Appellant Jose Jesus Medina. 
 
John Steinberg, under appointment by Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant George J. Marron. 
 
Mark D. Lenenberg, under appointment by Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant Raymond Vallejo. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. 
Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Victoria B. Wilson, Kristofer Jorstad, Joseph P. Lee and Mary 
Sanchez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
John Steinberg 
P.O. Box 8148 
Berkeley, Ca  94707-8148 
(510) 559-8051 
 
Mark D. Lenenberg 
P.O. Box 940327 
Simi Valley, CA  93094-0327 
(805) 526-5988 
 
Mary Sanchez 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 897-2364