Title: City of Perris v. Stamper

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

~ SEE CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION ~ 
Filed 8/15/16 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
CITY OF PERRIS, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S213468 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/2 E053395 
RICHARD C. STAMPER et al., 
) 
 
) 
Riverside County 
 
Defendants and Appellants. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. RIC524291 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
The City of Perris (the City) is located 70 miles east of Los Angeles.  This 
case involves the City‘s condemnation of a 1.66-acre strip of defendants‘ property 
in order to build a road.  By taking the strip, the City has divided the property into 
two irregularly shaped parcels.  The City claimed that defendants would have been 
required to dedicate the strip to the City, with no compensation, had they sought to 
put the property to its highest and best use, i.e., light industrial development.  The 
City thus offered to pay defendants the agricultural (undeveloped) value of the 
strip, relying on City of Porterville v. Young (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1260 
(Porterville).)  Porterville held that when a city takes a portion of undeveloped 
property, which it would have lawfully required the owner to dedicate to the city 
as a condition of developing the remainder of the property, the owner is entitled to 
compensation based on the undeveloped state of the property rather than its 
highest and best use.  (Id. at pp. 1265–1269.) 
2 
The trial court agreed with the City that Porterville applies here and that 
defendants were entitled to a stipulated agricultural value of $44,000 for the 
taking.  In reaching this conclusion, the trial court found the City‘s dedication 
requirement to be lawful under Nollan v. California Coastal Commission (1987) 
483 U.S. 825 (Nollan) and Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994) 512 U.S. 374 (Dolan).  
Those cases hold that in order to satisfy the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, a dedication requirement must have an ―essential nexus‖ to the valid 
public purpose that would be served by denying the development permit outright 
and must be ―rough[ly] proportion[al]‖ to ―the impact of the proposed 
development‖ at issue.  (Dolan, supra, 512 U.S. at pp. 390, 391; Nollan, supra, 
483 U.S. at p. 837.)  The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court on the 
applicability of Porterville but held that the legality of the dedication requirement 
under Nollan and Dolan should have been decided by a jury, not a judge.  For this 
reason, and because of certain evidentiary errors, the Court of Appeal sent the case 
back to the trial court to revisit the legality of the dedication requirement under 
Nollan and Dolan. 
We granted review on two questions:  First, is the constitutionality of a 
reasonably probable dedication requirement under Nollan and Dolan a question 
that must be resolved by a jury pursuant to article I, section 19 of the California 
Constitution?  Second, was the City‘s dedication requirement a ―project effect‖ 
that must be ignored in determining just compensation for the taking under Code 
of Civil Procedure section 1263.330? 
As to the first question, we hold that the essential nexus and rough 
proportionality inquiries under Nollan and Dolan are properly decided by a court, 
not by a jury.  Our precedent holds that article I, section 19 of the California 
Constitution, which governs eminent domain, requires only factually intensive 
questions directly related to compensation to be submitted to a jury.  (See 
3 
Metropolitan Water District of So. California v. Campus Crusade for Christ, Inc. 
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 954, 971–973 (Campus Crusade).)  Because the Nollan and 
Dolan issues are mixed questions of law and fact in which the legal issues 
predominate, and because the constitutionality of a dedication requirement is 
analytically prior to any factual dispute as to whether the condemner would 
actually impose the requirement, the questions belong to the court. 
As to the second question, we hold that the project effect rule generally 
applies, and Porterville does not apply, to situations where it was probable at the 
time the dedication requirement was put in place that the property designated for 
public use was to be included in the project for which the property is being 
condemned.  The applicability of the project effect rule thus turns on a preliminary 
factual question to be decided by the court.  Because the trial court believed the 
project effect rule was categorically inapplicable in this situation, it made no 
factual findings bearing on the rule‘s applicability.  Such findings may be made on 
remand. 
I. 
In 1985, defendants (the Owners) purchased the property at issue (the 
Property), a rectangular plot measuring approximately 9.12 acres located north of 
Ramona Expressway and south of Markham Street.  The Property is zoned to 
allow light industrial development.  The Owners originally purchased the Property 
for their metal fabricating businesses, but the Property remained undeveloped at 
the time this suit was filed.   
A. 
This controversy concerns a 1.66-acre strip of land that the City sought to 
condemn in 2009 in order to complete construction of a portion of Indian Avenue, 
a secondary arterial street designed to channel truck traffic toward Harley Knox 
Boulevard en route to Interstate 215.  This strip, which arcs through the Property, 
4 
comprises roughly 20 percent of the Property and splits the remainder into two 
roughly triangular parcels — one is 5.5 acres, the other is 2.0 acres — on either 
side.  A map showing the Property and the 1.66-acre strip at issue appears in an 
appendix to this opinion. 
For many years, the City was a predominantly agricultural community, but 
it has recently experienced significant growth and has developed a more diverse 
economy.  Historically, Indian Avenue was an undeveloped right of way that ran 
north-south in a straight alignment and did not abut the Property.  But in 1999, the 
City amended its general plan and circulation element by passing resolution No. 
2756, which rerouted the Indian Avenue right of way south of Ramona 
Expressway (the southern realignment) so that it would no longer run straight but 
would instead curve to the northeast before intersecting Ramona Expressway.  A 
circulation element is a required component of a municipality‘s general plan and 
consists of ―the general location and extent of existing and proposed major 
thoroughfares, transportation routes, terminals, any military airports and ports, and 
other local public utilities and facilities, all correlated with the land use element of 
the plan.‖  (Gov. Code, § 65302, subd. (b)(1).)  
The catalyst for the southern realignment of Indian Avenue was the 
building of a large distribution center by Lowe‘s Companies, Inc. (Lowe‘s), south 
of Ramona Expressway.  In order to develop a site big enough to accommodate its 
distribution center, Lowe‘s asked the City to realign Indian Avenue around to the 
east of the original Indian Avenue right of way south of Ramona Expressway.  
The City agreed to vacate its original Indian Avenue right of way south of Ramona 
Expressway, and in return, Lowe‘s agreed to dedicate to the City the property 
needed for the southern realignment of Indian Avenue. 
Indian Avenue was then partially developed as a road for carrying truck 
traffic south of Ramona Expressway.  At the time of this lawsuit, Indian Avenue 
5 
remained undeveloped north of Ramona Expressway, where the Property is 
located.  This meant that Indian Avenue ended as it met Ramona Expressway, 
forming a T-junction. 
In 2005, the City passed resolution No. 3430, which adopted an updated 
circulation element that outlined a number of changes to the future roadway 
network throughout the City in order to facilitate growth over the next 25 years.  
As part of the amended circulation element, the Indian Avenue right of way was 
realigned north of Ramona Expressway (the northern realignment), mirroring the 
road‘s curved alignment to the south.  Once its northern portion was developed, 
Indian Avenue would become a continuous, bell-shaped street that would curve to 
the northeast at the Lowe‘s distribution center, cross Ramona Expressway, and 
then curve to the northwest to reconnect with its original north-south alignment at 
its intersection with Markham Street.   
The City conducted studies to determine the ideal path for the northern 
realignment of Indian Avenue.  The City Engineer testified that the objective was 
to find the ―shortest, safest[,] and most logical alignment‖ for Indian Avenue while 
minimizing injury to property owners.  The City chose an alignment that would 
utilize the 1.66-acre strip of the Property as well as portions of several other 
properties that the City eventually acquired by donation or purchase.  
On October 14, 2008, the City wrote a letter to the Owners, pursuant to 
Government Code section 7267.2, offering to buy the 1.66-acre strip for $54,400.  
On January 9, 2009, the City made a revised offer of $54,800.  The Owners did 
not accept either offer. 
On February 19, 2009, the City notified the Owners that a City Council 
meeting would be held on March 10, 2009, to consider a resolution to acquire the 
property via condemnation.  The resolution said:  ―The Project will improve traffic 
flow and ease congestion through the Project Area.‖  In addition, the project ―will 
6 
improve traffic safety, provide a means of access to the properties located adjacent 
to the Project, and will provide an identity to this revitalized area and enhance 
property values.‖  The City Engineer who advised the City Council on the 
resolution further explained in a declaration that ―[t]he Indian Avenue right of 
way, which is currently unimproved between Ramona Expressway and Harley 
Knox Boulevard . . . must be developed to accommodate the increased traffic flow 
and public safety issue[s] due to the lack of turnways and increased congestion in 
the immediate area.‖  Traffic in that area had increased due to ―the business parks 
and industrial complexes that have been completed in the recent year.‖  
In addition to the truck traffic generated by the Lowe‘s distribution center, 
traffic was expected to increase due to the construction of the Ridge Commerce 
Center (Ridge or the Ridge project), which included a 1.9-million-square-foot 
warehouse and over 1,200 parking spaces.  The City approved the Ridge project 
on the condition that its developers would bear the costs of building Indian 
Avenue north of Ramona Expressway along the path prescribed by the 2005 
amendments to the circulation element.  Ridge will therefore bear the costs of any 
compensation ultimately awarded to the Owners.   
 
Around the time it approved the Ridge project, the City also created the 
North Perris Road and Bridge Benefit District, which requires developers and 
businesses in parts of north Perris — parts that include the Property — to 
contribute to the expense of building roads in the vicinity.  Any commercial 
development on the Property would be conditioned on the Owners‘ making 
contributions to the benefit district.   
 
The City Council unanimously adopted the resolution condemning the 
Property at its March 10, 2009, meeting.  This condemnation action was filed 
shortly thereafter.  While the suit was proceeding, the City took possession of the 
1.66-acre strip and began building the northern stretch of Indian Avenue.  By 
7 
February 2012, while the Court of Appeal‘s decision was pending, Indian Avenue 
was completed.  The road is now open to the public. 
B. 
On April 17, 2009, the City filed an eminent domain complaint in the 
superior court.  Among its pretrial motions, the City sought to have the trial court 
rule on two questions that, if answered in the affirmative, would trigger 
application of the Porterville doctrine:  (1) whether the disputed dedication had an 
essential nexus to the Owners‘ projected development of their property and was 
roughly proportional to the impacts of that development under Nollan and Dolan, 
and (2) whether it was reasonably probable that the City actually would have 
imposed such a dedication requirement as a matter of fact.  The trial court held 
that it could decide both questions and, after a bench trial, determined that the 
dedication requirement was both constitutional and reasonably probable.   
As to the issue of just compensation, the Owners filed a motion arguing that 
the City should be prohibited from introducing evidence that it would have 
required the 1.66-acre strip to be dedicated before granting the Owners a permit to 
undertake light industrial activities on the Property.  According to the Owners, this 
evidence violated the project effect rule of Code of Civil Procedure section 
1263.330.  (All undesignated statutory references are to this code unless otherwise 
specified.)  The trial court denied the motion.  The upshot was that a jury would 
have had to value the 1.66-acre strip based on its agricultural (that is, 
undeveloped) use.  Because the Owners had not prepared testimony regarding the 
agricultural value of the Property, they stipulated that the value of the 1.66-acre 
strip was $44,000.00, as suggested by the City‘s appraiser.  On February 23, 2011, 
the trial court entered judgment in the amount of $44,000. 
 
The Court of Appeal reversed in part and affirmed in part.  First, relying on 
our decision in Campus Crusade, supra, 41 Cal.4th 954, the Court of Appeal 
8 
concluded that the trial court had impermissibly ―usurped the role of the jury‖ by 
deciding the Nollan and Dolan issues, and by deciding whether there was a 
reasonable probability that the City would have actually imposed the dedication.  
The Court of Appeal ordered that on remand, the questions of whether the 
dedication requirement would have been reasonably probable and whether it was 
constitutional should be submitted to a jury.   
 
Next, the Court of Appeal held that the trial court had erred in applying 
Nollan and Dolan by considering evidence that the City might have agreed to pay 
the Owners additional compensation at a later date if the Owners proposed a low-
impact development on the Property.  Neither party has asked us to review that 
holding. 
 
The Court of Appeal went on to agree with the trial court that the project 
effect rule does not apply in this case, explaining that the City generally requires 
all landowners to dedicate rights of way that are shown on the City‘s circulation 
element before granting them permission to develop their property.  (See Perris 
Mun. Code, §§ 18.08.040, 18.24.020.)  Therefore, the Court of Appeal held, the 
trial court was correct that evidence of the City‘s dedication requirement was 
admissible on the issue of just compensation. 
 
Finally, the Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred in permitting two 
of the City‘s witnesses who were not designated as experts — the City Manager, 
Richard Belmudez, and the City Engineer, Habib Motlagh — to offer expert 
testimony relevant to the Nollan and Dolan issues.  The Court of Appeal remanded 
for a new hearing. 
 
We granted review to resolve one of the issues raised by the City‘s petition 
for review:  whether the constitutionality of a dedication requirement under Nollan 
and Dolan must be resolved by the court or by a jury under article I, section 19 of 
the California Constitution.  We also agreed to review one of the issues raised in 
9 
the Owners‘ answer to the City‘s petition:  whether the dedication requirement 
was a project effect that must be ignored in determining just compensation under 
section 1263.330. 
II. 
At the core of this dispute is the City‘s claim that it would have required the 
Owners to dedicate — i.e., relinquish without compensation — portions of the 
Property to the City for road construction, in accordance with the 2005 circulation 
element, if the Owners had ever sought to develop the Property for light industrial 
use.  Although the Property is zoned for such use, it is undisputed that the Owners 
could not take advantage of that zoning status without first acquiring a permit 
from the City.  The Owners seek $1.3 million in compensation for the 1.66-acre 
strip, a value based on the Property being put to its highest and best use.  But the 
City contends that such an amount would provide a major windfall for the Owners 
because they could never have put the 1.66-acre strip to light industrial use.  Such 
use of the Property, according to the City, would have been premised on the 
Owners‘ giving the 1.66-acre strip to the City for free. 
We begin with a review of the background law.  The Court of Appeal 
ordered a new hearing on the Nollan and Dolan questions in light of its findings of 
evidentiary error, and we did not grant review to decide the constitutionality of the 
City‘s dedication requirement.  Nevertheless, the high court‘s takings 
jurisprudence informs both of the issues on which we granted review, and it 
provides a useful starting point for understanding the Porterville doctrine and the 
protections that landowners have in this context. 
A. 
The takings clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits a governmental entity 
from taking private property for public use without just compensation.  In 
construing this prohibition, the high court has held that governmental entities may 
10 
impose conditions that limit landowners‘ use of their property so long as the 
conditions do not cause a ―permanent physical invasion‖ or ―completely deprive 
an owner of ‗all economically beneficial us[e]‘ of her property.‖  (Lingle v. 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. (2005) 544 U.S. 528, 538 (Lingle), citing Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. (1982) 458 U.S. 419 and Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council (1992) 505 U.S. 1003, 1019.) 
When a governmental entity demands that a landowner dedicate a portion 
of his or her property as a condition of granting a permit to develop the property, 
there is a ―heightened risk that the purpose [of the dedication requirement] is 
avoidance of the compensation requirement, rather than the stated police-power 
objective.‖  (Nollan, supra, 483 U.S. at p. 841.)  ―Under the well-settled doctrine 
of ‗unconstitutional conditions,‘ the government may not require a person to give 
up a constitutional right — here the right to receive just compensation when 
property is taken for a public use — in exchange for a discretionary benefit 
conferred by the government where the benefit sought has little or no relationship 
to the property.‖  (Dolan, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 385.)  For this reason, the high 
court in Nollan held that the constitutionality of a dedication requirement turns on 
whether there is an ―essential nexus‖ between the dedication and the public 
purpose that would otherwise be served by denying the permit outright.  (Nollan, 
at p. 837; see Lingle, supra, 544 U.S. at p. 547; Dolan, at p. 386.) 
Building on Nollan, the high court in Dolan held that a dedication, in order 
to satisfy the Fifth Amendment, must have not only an essential nexus to the 
public purpose that would be served by denying the permit, but also ― ‗rough 
proportionality‘ ‖ to that public purpose.  (Dolan, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 391; see 
Lingle, supra, 544 U.S. at p. 547.)  ―No precise mathematical calculation is 
required, but the city must make some sort of individualized determination that the 
required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the 
11 
proposed development.‖  (Dolan, at p. 391.)  The high court further observed that 
―[d]edications for streets, sidewalks, and other public ways are generally 
reasonable exactions to avoid excessive congestion from a proposed property use.‖  
(Id. at p. 395.)  In Dolan itself, however, the city had not met its burden of 
demonstrating the need for such a dedication because it had simply asserted that 
the dedication requested ― ‗ ―could offset some of the traffic demand‖ ‘ ‖ 
generated by the landowner‘s proposed development.  (Ibid.)  This was ― ‗ ―a far 
cry from a finding that the bicycle pathway system will, or is likely to, offset some 
of the traffic demand.‖ ‘ ‖  (Ibid.) 
We have described the requirements of Nollan and Dolan as follows:  
―Where the local permit authority seeks to justify a given exaction as an 
alternative to denying a proposed use, Nollan requires a reviewing court to 
scrutinize the instrumental efficacy of the permit condition in order to determine 
whether it logically furthers the same regulatory goal as would outright denial of a 
development permit.  A court must also, under the standard formulated in Dolan, 
determine whether the factual findings made by the permitting body support the 
condition as one that is more or less proportional, in both nature and scope, to the 
public impact of the proposed development.‖  (Ehrlich v. City of Culver City 
(1996) 12 Cal.4th 854, 868 (plur. opn. of Arabian, J.); see id. at p. 912 (conc. & 
dis. opn. of Werdegar, J.).) 
Nollan and Dolan announce ―a type of intermediate scrutiny‖ of dedication 
requirements.  (Santa Monica Beach, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 
952, 966; id. at pp. 965–967.)  When a court applies this intermediate scrutiny, 
―[t]he proper inquiry is not into the subjective motive of the government agency, 
but whether there is, objectively, sufficient connection between [the dedication 
requirement]‖ and the public purpose that would be served by denying the 
development permit.  (Landgate, Inc. v. California Coastal Com. (1998) 17 
12 
Cal.4th 1006, 1022 (Landgate).)  ―This type of objective inquiry is consistent with 
the principle that courts do not delve into the individual purposes of 
decisionmakers in a quasi-adjudicative proceeding, but rather look to the findings 
made by the governmental agency and determine whether these are based on 
substantial evidence.‖  (Ibid.) 
III. 
Turning now to the case before us, we begin with the issue raised by the 
City:  whether the essential nexus and rough proportionality inquiries under 
Nollan and Dolan must be submitted to a jury. 
The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution does not 
guarantee landowners a jury trial in eminent domain proceedings because no such 
jury right existed in England or the colonies in 1791.  (See United States v. 
Reynolds (1970) 397 U.S. 14, 18 (Reynolds).)  California‘s original 1849 
Constitution did not guarantee a jury right in eminent domain proceedings for 
similar reasons.  (See Koppikus v. State Capitol Commissioners (1860) 16 Cal. 
248, 253–254.)  But the 1879 drafters of our Constitution amended the original 
document‘s takings clause ―in reaction to . . . private railroad companies‘ 
speculative computation of benefits‖ in eminent domain cases.  (Los Angeles 
County Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. Continental Development Corp. 
(1997) 16 Cal.4th 694, 705 (Continental Development).)  The revised takings 
clause, which now appears in article I, section 19, says in relevant part:  ―Private 
property may be taken or damaged for a public use and only when just 
compensation, ascertained by a jury unless waived, has first been paid to, or into 
court for, the owner.‖  (Cal. Const., art. I, § 19, subd. (a).)  Our Constitution thus 
guarantees landowners the right to have a jury determine the amount of just 
compensation owed for a taking. 
13 
We have long held that this jury right applies only to determining the 
appropriate amount of compensation, not to any other issues that arise in the 
course of condemnation proceedings.  ― ‗[A]ll issues except the sole issue relating 
to compensation[] are to be tried by the court,‘ including, ‗except those relating to 
compensation, the issues of fact.‘ ‖  (Campus Crusade, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 971; 
see Hensler v. City of Glendale (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1, 15 (Hensler); People v. 
Ricciardi (1943) 23 Cal.2d 390, 402; Vallejo & Northern R. R. Co. v. Reed 
Orchard Co. (1915) 169 Cal. 545, 556.)  ― ‗ ―It is only the ‗compensation,‘ the 
‗award,‘ which our constitution declares shall be found and fixed by a jury.  All 
other questions of fact, or of mixed fact and law, are to be tried, as in many other 
jurisdictions they are tried, without reference to a jury.‖ ‘ ‖  (Campus Crusade, at 
p. 971, italics added.) 
Thus, legal questions that affect the type of compensation to which a 
landowner is entitled in a condemnation action must be decided by the court.  ―For 
example, we have held that what constitutes the larger parcel (for purposes of 
determining severance damages) ‗is essentially a question of law for the 
determination of the court‘ (Oakland v. Pacific Coast Lumber and Mill Co. (1915) 
171 Cal. 392, 397); whether separate parcels may be aggregated and considered as 
one larger parcel is ‗an issue of law to be decided by the trial court‘ (City of San 
Diego v. Neumann [(1993)] 6 Cal.4th [738,] 757); and whether a taking has 
substantially impaired access to the remaining property is ‗a matter of law‘ for the 
court (Breidert v. Southern Pac. Co. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 659, 664).  Similarly, it is 
for the trial court to decide whether a party had acquired an avigation easement 
over a neighboring property that was condemned (Pacific Gas & E. Co. v. 
Peterson (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 434, 438) and, more generally, to determine 
whether a party had a cognizable legal interest in the condemned property.  
14 
(County of San Diego v. Miller (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 424, 433.)‖  (Campus 
Crusade, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 971.) 
Such questions belong to the trial court even when answering them may 
require the court to examine factual circumstances — i.e., when the legal question 
is really a ―mixed issue[] of law and fact where the legal issues predominate.‖  
(Campus Crusade, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 973; see Emeryville Redevelopment 
Agency v. Harcros Pigments, Inc. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1117 (Emeryville 
Redevelopment).)  For example, this court in Neumann had to determine as a 
matter of law whether several parcels the City of San Diego sought to take from 
the landowners should be aggregated.  The trial court was required to determine 
and weigh several facts bearing on whether the landowners‘ intended use of the 
aggregated larger parcel was reasonably probable in the near future, ―includ[ing], 
among other things, evidence of the existing uses of the property, the time and 
expense necessary for their termination, the physical adaptability of the property 
for use as an integrated whole, the existing and the proposed zoning applicable to 
the several parcels in question, local market conditions, the local regulatory 
climate, and the property owner‘s plans for development.‖  (City of San Diego v. 
Neumann, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 757.)  Although these were ―indeed factual 
issues,‖ the ultimate question ―whether, taken as a whole, they support a finding 
that a larger parcel exists remained an issue of law to be decided by the trial 
court.‖  (Ibid.) 
Similarly, whether access to a property has been ―substantially impaired‖ 
for purposes of determining severance damages is a question for the court, even 
though ―[s]ubstantial impairment cannot be fixed by abstract definition; it must be 
found in each case upon the basis of the factual situation.‖  (Breidert v. Southern 
Pac. Co., supra, 61 Cal.2d at p. 664.)  In addition, whether a condemner‘s 
precondemnation conduct is ―unreasonable‖ and thus triggers precondemnation 
15 
liability has repeatedly been held to be a question for the court despite the factual 
aspects of such an inquiry.  (See Redevelopment Agency v. Contra Costa Theatre, 
Inc. (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 73, 79.)  And whether a landowner is entitled to 
damages for loss of goodwill is a question for the court even though it requires a 
determination of whether a particular loss of goodwill is compensable within the 
meaning of section 1263.510, subdivision (a).  (See Emeryville Redevelopment, 
supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1116–1117.) 
By contrast, Campus Crusade held that two pure questions of fact directly 
pertaining to the proper amount of compensation were reserved to the jury.  First, 
we said that whether it is reasonably probable a city would change the zoning 
status of the landowners‘ property in the near future was a jury question.  (Campus 
Crusade, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 966–967.)  Second, because the landowner had 
introduced credible evidence that the remaining portion of its property would be 
worth less after the proposed taking due to hazards associated with a pipeline the 
government proposed to install on the property, the extent of the resulting 
severance damages was a jury question.  (Id. at pp. 972–973.) 
Applying Campus Crusade, the Court of Appeal below held that a jury, not 
the trial court, should have decided whether it is reasonably probable that the City 
would have actually attempted to impose the dedication requirement on the 
Owners had they sought to develop the Property for light industrial use.  But the 
Court of Appeal also held that the trial court had ―usurped the role of the jury‖ by 
deciding the Nollan and Dolan issues.  We conclude, contrary to the Court of 
Appeal, that the Nollan and Dolan issues are for the court, not a jury, to decide 
because they are mixed questions of law and fact in which the legal issues 
predominate.  Further, they are questions that must be resolved before a 
condemner is entitled to even argue that, as a matter of fact, it would have actually 
imposed the disputed dedication requirement. 
16 
Whether a dedication requirement meets the essential nexus and rough 
proportionality tests is a matter of means-ends scrutiny familiar to constitutional 
adjudication.  This inquiry requires a court to evaluate whether a legislative or 
quasi-adjudicative body has made sincere and reasoned planning decisions, and to 
balance landowners‘ ―vulnerab[ility] to the type of coercion that the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits‖ (Koontz v. St. John’s River Water 
Management (2013) 570 U.S. __, __ [133 S.Ct. 2586, 2595]) against the reality 
―that many proposed land uses threaten to impose costs on the public that 
dedications of property can offset.‖  (Id. at p. __ [133 S.Ct. at p. 2595].)  Juries are 
not well equipped to decide such fundamental questions about the limits of 
lawmaking power.  Indeed, juries are no better equipped to make such 
determinations than they are to determine whether economic legislation ―rests 
upon some rational basis‖ (United States v. Carolene Products Co. (1938) 304 
U.S. 144, 152), whether a state law that impedes the flow of interstate commerce 
―is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits‖  (Pike v. Bruce 
Church, Inc. (1970) 397 U.S. 137, 142), or whether an infringement on a 
fundamental liberty interest, a legislative policy based on a suspect classification, 
or a content-based restriction on protected speech ―is narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling state interest‖ (Reno v. Flores (1993) 507 U.S. 292, 302; see Grutter v. 
Bollinger (2003) 539 U.S. 306, 326; Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union 
(1997) 521 U.S. 844, 879). 
Although the Nollan and Dolan inquiries often require the trial judge to 
find certain facts, the court‘s primary task is to apply the law to known facts.  In 
most cases, there is no need to weigh conflicting evidence because the crux of the 
inquiry is whether ―the findings made by the government agency . . . are based on 
substantial evidence.‖  (Landgate, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1022; see Dolan, supra, 
512 U.S. at p. 391 [―the city must make some sort of individualized determination 
17 
that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the 
proposed development‖].)  In other words, a court typically need only determine 
whether the condemner has done its constitutionally required homework. 
It is true that when a condemner invokes Porterville, the Nollan and Dolan 
inquiries may affect the amount of compensation to which a landowner is entitled 
insofar as Porterville has no applicability where a dedication requirement does not 
meet constitutional standards.  In other words, if a dedication would be 
unconstitutional if actually imposed, the landowner is entitled to compensation 
based on the property‘s highest and best use, not on its unimproved state, and 
evidence of the dedication would not be admissible on the issue of just 
compensation.  But all of the legal questions or mixed questions of fact and law 
discussed above similarly affect the landowner‘s compensation by permitting the 
jury to consider or preventing it from considering certain types of recovery.  Those 
questions are nonetheless reserved to the court because of their legal character and 
because they are questions that frame the ultimate factual inquiry into the amount 
of compensation owed.  (See Campus Crusade, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 972–973.)  
The Nollan and Dolan inquiries are analytically prior questions that must be 
answered in order to determine whether a dedication requirement would be a 
lawful taking if actually imposed as a condition of developing the property.  In 
other procedural contexts, such as an inverse condemnation action, the court 
would undoubtedly decide such a question.  (See San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. 
Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 893, 951 [―There is no right to jury trial on the 
issue whether there has been a taking in the first instance.‖]; see Hensler, supra, 8 
Cal.4th at p. 15; Dina v. People ex rel. Department of Transportation (2007) 151 
Cal.App.4th 1029, 1044–1045.)  Neither article I, section 19 of the California 
Constitution nor Campus Crusade requires a different rule here simply because the 
18 
Nollan and Dolan issues arise by way of the Porterville doctrine instead of a direct 
challenge to the dedication requirement. 
Relying on the Court of Appeal decision in City of Hollister v. McCullough 
(1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 289 (Hollister), the Owners contend that the Nollan and 
Dolan issues are for a jury to decide because they are ―a sub-issue within the 
larger issue of determining the reasonable probability of a dedication 
requirement.‖  (See Hollister, at p. 297 [―[P]roof that a conditional dedication is a 
‗reasonable probability‘ requires a showing not only that plaintiff would probably 
have imposed the dedication condition if defendants had sought to develop the 
property, but also that the proposed dedication requirement would have been 
constitutionally permissible.  This is so because it is not a ‗reasonable probability‘ 
that a governmental entity would actually succeed in imposing an unconstitutional 
dedication requirement.‖].)  But the constitutionality of a dedication requirement is 
not part of the reasonable probability determination, for it is incorrect to say there 
is no reasonable probability that a condemner would ever succeed in imposing an 
unconstitutional dedication.  The condemner would succeed, for example, if the 
constitutional dedication were left unchallenged.  The constitutionality of the 
dedication is a separate question and must be separately considered.  On this 
limited point, we disapprove City of Hollister v. McCullough, supra, 26 
Cal.App.4th 289, 297, although we agree with Hollister‘s main premise that a city 
may not rely on Porterville if the dedication it claims it would have imposed is 
unconstitutional under Nollan and Dolan. 
Finally, the Owners rely on several federal cases to show that a jury must 
resolve the Nollan and Dolan issues.  Those cases are of limited relevance because 
a landowner‘s right to a jury in a condemnation case is a question of state 
constitutional law.  (See Reynolds, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 18.)  In any event, the 
substance of those cases does not support the Owners‘ position. 
19 
First, the Owners rely on City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes (1999) 526 
U.S. 687, which held that a trial court in a civil rights suit brought under section 
1983 of title 42 of the United States Code (section 1983) had properly permitted a 
jury to consider whether a city‘s repeated denials of a developer‘s request for a 
permit amounted to a regulatory taking.  But that holding was based on the 
Seventh Amendment right to a jury in section 1983 suits; the high court made 
clear it was not addressing the role of a jury in an ordinary condemnation or 
inverse condemnation suit not brought pursuant to section 1983.  (See Del Monte 
Dunes, at pp. 711–712, 721.)  Moreover, the landowners in Del Monte Dunes did 
not argue that the city‘s zoning laws amounted to a regulatory taking; they argued 
that the city had effected a taking by not following its zoning laws.  (Id. at p. 722.)  
Thus, the high court ―d[id] not address the proper trial allocation of the various 
questions that might arise‖ where, as here, it is alleged that ―the city‘s general 
regulations were unreasonable as applied to [the landowners‘] property.‖  (Ibid.)   
Next, the Owners cite Skoro v. City of Portland (D.Or. 2008) 544 
F.Supp.2d 1128, a condemnation action in which the court allowed the jury to 
determine the essential nexus inquiry under Nollan with respect to one of the 
contested dedications.  (Id. at p. 1137.)  But Skoro‘s holding on this point was 
simply a denial of summary judgment; the court did not consider whether Nollan‘s 
essential nexus inquiry was, as a rule, appropriate for a jury to decide. 
Finally, the Owners cite a string of section 1983 cases in which juries have 
been permitted to address factually intensive mixed questions of fact and 
constitutional law.  But those cases had nothing to do with takings and did not 
involve applying judicial scrutiny to the acts of a legislative or quasi-adjudicative 
action. 
In sum, we hold that in a condemnation action, the constitutionality of a 
dedication requirement under Nollan and Dolan is a question to be decided by a 
20 
court, not a jury.  This question is analytically distinct from, and prior to, the 
factual determination of whether it is reasonably probable that the condemner 
would actually impose the dedication as a condition of permitting development of 
the property at issue.  
IV. 
We now consider the Owners‘ contention that even if the City‘s dedication 
requirement is lawful and its imposition is reasonably probable, the project effect 
rule of section 1263.330 bars the City from introducing evidence of the dedication 
requirement at a trial on just compensation.  In addressing this claim, we begin 
with further explanation of the law concerning just compensation when a city 
condemns property that is subject to a lawful dedication requirement. 
A. 
The measure of compensation in a condemnation case ―is the fair market 
value of the property taken.‖  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1263.310.)  ―The fair market 
value of the property taken is the highest price on the date of valuation that would 
be agreed to by a seller, being willing to sell but under no particular or urgent 
necessity for so doing, nor obliged to sell, and a buyer, being ready, willing, and 
able to buy but under no particular necessity for so doing, each dealing with the 
other with full knowledge of all the uses and purposes for which the property is 
reasonably adaptable and available.‖  (Id., § 1263.320, subd. (a).)  ―A jury should 
consider all those factors, including lawful legislative and administrative 
restrictions on property, which a buyer would take into consideration in arriving at 
the fair market value.‖  (People ex rel. State Public Works Board v. Talleur (1978) 
79 Cal.App.3d 690, 695–696 (Talleur).) 
 
Applying these principles, the Court of Appeal in Porterville held that 
when a city would lawfully have conditioned development of property upon the 
owner‘s dedication of a portion of the property, the fair market value of that 
21 
portion in a subsequent condemnation action is its value in its undeveloped, 
agricultural state.  (See Porterville, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1267–1269.)  
Although this rule is conventionally called the Porterville doctrine, its origins 
predate the Porterville case.  (See City of Fresno v. Cloud (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 
113, 123 (City of Fresno); People ex rel. Department of Public Works v. Investors 
Diversified Services, Inc. (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 367, 374, 376 (Investors 
Diversified).)  For almost five decades, courts have applied the doctrine to 
determine the fair market value of dedicated property where the dedication serves 
to facilitate road construction to offset the impact of developing the rest of the 
property.  (See State Route 4 Bypass Authority v. Superior Court (2007) 153 
Cal.App.4th 1546, 1551–1552 (State Route 4); Hollister, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 297; Porterville, at p. 1269; City of Fresno, at pp. 119–120; Investors 
Diversified, at pp. 372–373.) 
The rationale for this rule is that there is no way the owner could put the 
dedicated portion to use in a developed state:  ―[I]f the remainder of the parcel is 
not developed beyond its present agricultural use, [the] owner will have been paid 
exactly what the take was worth; if the remainder of the parcel is developed for 
commercial purposes, [the] owner will have been paid for the land he would have 
been required to dedicate to [the] city to obtain the building permits or conditional 
use permit necessary for the commercial development.‖  (Porterville, supra, 195 
Cal.App.3d at p. 1269.)  In other words, because the owner faces a choice of either 
giving the dedicated portion to the government for free or using that portion in its 
undeveloped state, the most that a willing buyer would pay for the portion subject 
to the dedication requirement is its value in its undeveloped state.  If the owner 
were compensated based on the highest and best use of the property, the owner 
would get a windfall — i.e., payment based on developed value for property that 
could not have been developed under any circumstances.  Such a result would be 
22 
at odds with the Fifth Amendment principle that ―[t]he owner is to be put in as 
good position pecuniarily as he would have occupied if his property had not been 
taken.‖  (United States v. Miller (1943) 317 U.S. 369, 373; see Continental 
Development, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 704.) 
As noted, the applicability of Porterville is predicated on two inquiries.  
First, the dedication requirement must be constitutional under Nollan and Dolan.  
Second, there must be ―a reasonable probability that development of the property 
would have been conditioned on dedication of the property taken.‖  (Hollister, 
supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 297; see State Route 4, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 1551; Contra Costa County Flood Control and Water Conservation Dist. v. 
Lone Tree Investments (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 930, 936 (Contra Costa Flood 
Control); Porterville, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1268–1269; City of Fresno, 
supra, 26 Cal.App.3d at pp. 120–121.)  In other words, it must be reasonably 
probable that the condemner would actually impose the dedication requirement as 
a condition of development.  
Neither the Owners nor their amici curiae suggest that Porterville should be 
discarded.  The Owners acknowledge that a finder of fact may consider certain 
types of dedication requirements when valuing land in condemnation proceedings.  
In their briefing, they argue that ―typical dedications‖ ―placed on all similarly 
situated properties based on long-established plans‖ are admissible in determining 
just compensation, while ―a unique [dedication] requirement growing out of the 
agency‘s project‖ is not. 
The Owners and their amici curiae contend, however, that it is improper to 
apply Porterville on the particular facts here.  They claim that the City‘s 2005 
decision to realign Indian Avenue in its revision of the City‘s circulation element, 
which gave rise to the requirement that the Owners dedicate a portion of the 
Property to the City as a condition of light industrial development, was part of the 
23 
―project‖ at issue here.  Thus, they argue, the project effect rule requires the 
exclusion of any evidence regarding the City‘s dedication requirement in 
determining just compensation. 
B. 
The project effect rule is codified in section 1263.330, which states in 
pertinent part:  ―The fair market value of the property taken shall not include any 
increase or decrease in the value of the property that is attributable to any of the 
following:  [¶] (a) The project for which the property is taken.  [¶] . . . [¶] (c) Any 
preliminary actions of the plaintiff relating to the taking of the property.‖  The rule 
serves to prevent the amount of compensation owed for a taking from being 
altered by the project served by the taking or by any government action that affects 
the value of an intended taking.  As the Owners explain, if the government is 
condemning property to build a reservoir, it need not pay lakefront prices for the 
property.  And if the government is condemning property to build a sewage plant, 
it does not get a discount because its project renders the property less desirable. 
The California Law Revision Commission Report‘s comment on section 
1263.330, subdivision (a) makes clear that it was intended to incorporate the rule 
in Merced Irrigation District v. Woolstenhulme (1971) 4 Cal.3d 478 
(Woolstenhulme).  (Recommendation Proposing the Eminent Domain Law (Dec. 
1974) 12 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep., pp. 1833–1834 (Law Revision 
Commission Report).)  In Woolstenhulme, a plan to increase and stabilize the size 
of a lake and to develop recreational facilities led to a rise in the value of land near 
the lake.  By 1963, the public became aware of the plan, and land values began to 
rise.  In 1965, it became probable that the defendant‘s property would be taken for 
the lake improvement.  In 1967, the irrigation district sought to condemn the 
defendant‘s land. 
24 
We reaffirmed in Woolstenhulme that a property owner whose property is 
condemned will not be compensated for any increase in value due to speculation 
that the property will be taken in order to facilitate development of a proposed 
project.  (Woolstenhulme, supra, 4 Cal.3d at pp. 490–492.)  On the other hand, a 
property owner can be compensated for increases in valuation that result from a 
property‘s proximity to a proposed project, up to the point that it becomes 
probable the property will be included in the project.  (Id. at p. 496.)  On that 
basis, the court concluded that the defendant should not be compensated for the 
increases in value that occurred after 1965.  (Id. at pp. 498–499.)  Although 
Woolstenhulme concerned a limitation on an owner‘s right to have the value of its 
property enhanced by probable condemnation, its logic applies equally to limit the 
condemner‘s right to capitalize on the diminution of property value after probable 
condemnation.  (Law Revision Com. Rep., supra, at pp. 1833–1834 [§ 1263.330 
was intended to treat enhancements and diminutions in property value the same].) 
Subdivision (c) of section 1263.330, which concerns ―preliminary actions 
by the plaintiff relating to the taking of the property,‖ has a different provenance.  
Subdivision (c) was enacted verbatim as proposed by the Law Revision 
Commission, which cited Buena Park School District of Orange County v. Metrim 
Corp. (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 255, as the basis for its proposal.  (Law Revision 
Com. Rep., supra, at pp. 1832, 1835.)  In Metrim, the preliminary action at issue 
was the filing of a prior condemnation action, which was dismissed a few days 
later upon the filing of a second condemnation action.  (Metrim, at p. 258.)  By 
bringing the initial action, the condemner prevented the property owner from filing 
a final subdivision map that it otherwise would have filed the next day, with the 
result of lowering the property‘s value.  (Ibid.)  Metrim explained that the 
condemner could not benefit from this reduction in property value because it was 
25 
attributable to ―steps taken by the condemning authority toward th[e] acquisition 
[of the property].‖  (Id. at p. 259.) 
Cases applying section 1263.330, subdivision (c) have involved municipal 
zoning laws explicitly or implicitly enacted for the purpose of suppressing 
property values before an intended taking.  (See City of San Diego v. Barratt 
American, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 917, 937–938; City of San Diego v. 
Rancho Penasquitos Partnership (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1030–1040  [city 
enacted a zoning ordinance prohibiting development in an area where it 
anticipated taking land for a state highway]; see also People ex rel. Department of 
Public Works v. Graziadio (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 525, 529–530 [applying similar 
principles before § 1263.330‘s enactment].)  Under this line of cases, the 
condemner exercises its police power for the purpose of furthering the 
condemnation of property, and subdivision (c) mandates that any effect of such 
action by the condemner on the value of the property must be discounted. 
Just as the date of probable inclusion in a project is important in applying 
subdivision (a) of section 1236.330, it is also relevant to applying subdivision (c).  
In general, once it becomes probable that a property will be included, the probable 
inclusion weighs heavily in favor of the conclusion that subsequent government 
action that has the potential of devaluing the property is a ―preliminary action[] . . . 
relating to the taking of property‖ within the meaning of section 1263.330, 
subdivision (c). 
This conclusion is consistent with the Porterville doctrine.  Courts have 
applied that doctrine in cases where a dedication requirement was clearly in place 
before the city contemplated a project for which condemnation may be necessary.  
In Porterville itself, the city condemned a 12-foot wide strip of land to widen a 
street, and testimony established that had the property been developed, the city 
would have routinely required developers to dedicate the same strip for the same 
26 
purpose.  (Porterville, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d 1260, 1263 & fn. 4.)  In other cases, 
the facts are less clear but could be read as establishing that the public agency 
originally contemplated the construction of a public work prompted by, and 
contingent on, the development of adjacent property.  (See, e.g., Contra Costa 
Flood Control, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th 930, 932 [public agency expected to obtain 
the needed land for a flood control channel by requiring property owners to 
dedicate land as a valid condition of development].)  
Thus, the Porterville doctrine applies when the evidence establishes that a 
dedication requirement reflects an agency original expectation that an 
improvement would occur as a result of development of adjacent properties in 
order to mitigate the impact of such development.  When it later becomes clear 
that the properties at issue have to be condemned to undertake the mitigating 
improvement, the property is valued in its undeveloped state.  (Cf. City of San 
Diego v. Rancho Penasquitos Partnership, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 1034 
[evidence showed that ―the City was attempting to prevent development on 
properties subject to possible condemnation in order to freeze or depress values‖].)  
Such dedication requirements are not ―preliminary actions . . . relating to the 
taking of property‖ under section 1263.330, subdivision (c) and can legitimately 
be considered in the valuation of the property. 
Moreover, dedication requirements imposed before inclusion in a project 
becomes probable cannot be considered part of ―the project for which the property 
is taken‖ pursuant to section 1263.330, subdivision (a).  Nothing in the language 
or legislative history of subdivision (a) indicates an intent to cover steps taken by a 
public agency to mitigate the impact of development, independent of any project.  
Of course, dedication requirements to mitigate the impact of anticipated 
development must still meet the nexus and rough proportionality tests of Nollan 
and Dolan. 
27 
The situation is different, however, when a dedication requirement is put in 
place after it becomes probable that the property subject to the dedication will be 
included in a project, and a city subsequently seeks to condemn the property.  We 
decline to extend the Porterville doctrine to that situation.   
Thus, in a condemnation action, when a government entity makes a claim 
under Porterville that it would have required a dedication of some or all of the 
property being condemned had the property been developed, courts determining 
just compensation should look to whether that dedication requirement was put in 
place before it was probable that the property would be included in a government 
project.  Probable inclusion in a government project means that at the time the 
dedication requirement was put in place, (1) the government was engaging in a 
―project‖ — that is, a public work the government intended to pursue — for which 
it intended to acquire property by purchase or condemnation, if necessary, as 
opposed to a contingent plan to mitigate possible development on adjacent 
property through dedications; and (2) it was probable the property at issue would 
be included in that project.  Under such circumstances, the project effect rule 
applies and the Porterville doctrine does not.   
In this case, the northern realignment of Indian Avenue to include the 1.66-
acre strip at issue first appeared in the City‘s 2005 amendment to the circulation 
element of its general plan.  With that designation came, by operation of the City‘s 
ordinance, a requirement to dedicate that strip of land if the larger parcel were 
developed.  Contrary to suggestions in the Owners‘ brief, this designation of the 
strip in the 2005 circulation element did not, in itself, establish that it was probable 
in 2005 that the City would condemn that strip.  As the cases above imply, when a 
public agency designates property for future public use in a planning document, it 
may well expect to acquire the property through dedications in response to future 
development rather than by purchase or condemnation.  A circulation element is a 
28 
required component of a city‘s general plan, which in turn is a ―statement of 
development policies‖ that sets out a city‘s ―objectives, principles, standards, and 
plan proposals.‖  (Gov. Code, § 65302.)  A circulation element is an anticipatory 
document, subject to amendment and updating (id., §§ 65301.5, 65358), which 
provides guidance for future development in light of predicted changes in 
population, traffic, and other variables.  It is not a map of probable future 
condemnations, and the designation of a future roadway on a circulation element 
is not necessarily a ―preliminary action[] . . . related to the taking of property‖ 
under section 1263.330, subdivision (c).  For the same reason, such a designation 
is not necessarily part of a ―project for which property is taken‖ under section 
1263.330, subdivision (a). 
Nevertheless, other evidence may show it is probable that the property will 
be included in the project.  (See Woolstenhulme, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 498 
[approving the trial court‘s reliance upon evidence of the timetable of the project 
for which the land was condemned to determine the date of probable inclusion 
within project]; People ex rel. Department of Water Resources v. Andresen (1987) 
193 Cal.App.3d 1144, 1154 [testimony regarding the expectations of the parties 
based on contemporaneous knowledge].)  Relevant evidence in this context 
includes not only facts bearing on when the inclusion of the property became 
probable, but also the nature and circumstances of the dedication requirement and 
other evidence bearing on the reasonable expectations of the parties.  Porterville 
itself involved a standard frontage dedication requirement imposed on multiple, 
similarly situated properties, tending to show that these requirements predated and 
were imposed independently of a plan to condemn the property.  (Porterville, 
supra, 195 Cal.App.3d 1260, 1263 & fn. 4.)  Indeed, the Porterville doctrine 
originated in the context of standard dedication requirements that would be 
triggered by anticipated favorable zoning changes.  (City of Fresno, supra, 26 
29 
Cal.App.3d at pp. 118–119; Investors Diversified Services, Inc., supra, 262 
Cal.App.2d at p. 376; see also Talleur, supra, 79 Cal.App.3d at pp. 696–697 [Cal. 
Coastal Act of 1976 predated and was unrelated to condemnation of property].)   
By contrast, a nonstandard dedication requirement and a record devoid of 
an agency‘s imposition of similar requirements may tend to show that the 
designation of the property for public use was related to the agency‘s planned 
inclusion of the property in an upcoming project.  Also, a short period between the 
time the property is designated for public use and the time the agency first signals 
its intention to condemn the property may support an inference that inclusion was 
probable when the dedication requirement was put in place. 
Justice Cuéllar takes the view that ―[t]he project effect rule has no 
application where the agency can show that the dedication on which it relies was 
lawful and would actually have been imposed, independent of the project.‖  (Conc. 
& dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J., post, at p. 6.)  He would focus the inquiry on ―whether it 
is ‗reasonably probable‘ that a public agency would actually have imposed the 
dedication as a condition of development even in the absence of the project.‖  (Id. 
at p. 7.)  But readers may legitimately wonder to what extent this formulation will 
yield results that differ from ones reached under the approach we adopt today, 
since evidence tending to show that a public agency, at the time of imposing a 
dedication, planned to condemn the property for inclusion in the project will also 
tend to diminish the inference that the agency would have imposed the dedication 
independent of the project.  In any event, we see no reason why, under section 
1263.330, a dedication requirement cannot sometimes be considered a project 
effect.  Nor do we see a basis to conclude that the trial court‘s consideration of the 
timing and circumstances of the agency‘s imposition of the dedication 
requirement, in accordance with the project effect rule, will result in a windfall to 
property owners. 
30 
Because the date of a property‘s probable inclusion within a project is a 
preliminary factual determination that pertains to the admissibility of evidence 
regarding valuation, it is for the trial court rather than the jury to determine.  
(Woolstenhulme, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 498, fn. 12; see also ante, at pp. 16–17 
[preliminary legal questions in condemnation actions, even when factual inquiry is 
required, are for the court].)  In this case, the parties do not appear to agree on 
when it became probable that the 1.66-acre strip would be included in the Indian 
Avenue northern alignment project, but the trial court did not make any finding on 
this issue because it believed the project effect rule did not apply at all. 
Accordingly, we remand to the trial court to determine whether inclusion of 
the property at issue in the project for which the property was ultimately 
condemned was probable in 2005, when the designation of the property first 
appeared in the circulation element as part of the northern alignment of Indian 
Avenue and a dedication requirement was put in place.  The trial court is also 
directed to reconsider whether the required dedication of the 1.66-acre strip passes 
muster under Nollan and Dolan in light of the errors in its inquiry identified by the 
Court of Appeal, which the City does not contest.  The trial court in its sound 
discretion may begin with either the project effect inquiry or the Nollan/Dolan 
inquiry, and then engage the second inquiry only if the first does not resolve the 
case.  If the court does undertake the Nollan/Dolan inquiry, it must determine 
whether the City has shown that the dedication at issue, a strip comprising almost 
20 percent of the property running through its middle, would have an essential 
nexus to a valid public purpose that would be served by denying the permit and 
would be roughly proportional to the impact of any future development. 
31 
 
CONCLUSION 
We hold, contrary to the Court of Appeal below, that the constitutionality 
of a dedication requirement under Nollan and Dolan is a question for a court, not a 
jury.  We further hold that the project effect rule generally applies, and the 
Porterville doctrine does not apply, when it is probable at the time a dedication 
requirement is put in place that the property subject to the dedication will be 
included in the project for which the condemnation is sought.  We remand this 
case to the Court of Appeal with instructions to remand to the trial court for 
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.   
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
WE CONCUR:  
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
Neither the federal nor the state Constitution bars the government from 
taking private property to further a legitimate public purpose, so long as the 
property owner receives just compensation.  (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.; Cal. 
Const., art. I, § 19, subd. (a).)  At issue in this case are the rules for calculating 
precisely what compensation is just.   
Under California law, the proper measure of compensation when the 
government takes private property ―is the fair market value of the property taken.‖  
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1263.310.)  The fair market value, in turn, reflects the price 
that an informed but disinterested buyer would negotiate with a similarly 
positioned seller on the date of valuation, each with full knowledge of the 
property‘s highest and best use.  (Id., § 1263.320, subd. (a); see City of San Diego 
v. Neumann (1993) 6 Cal.4th 738, 744.)  The knowledge imputed to the parties in 
this hypothetical negotiation consists of ― ‗all the facts which would naturally 
affect [the property‘s] value‘ ‖ and ― ‗which enter into the value of the land in the 
public and general estimation, and tend[] to influence the minds of sellers and 
buyers.‘ ‖  (Merced Irrigation Dist. v. Woolstenhulme (1971) 4 Cal.3d 478, 493 
(Woolstenhulme), italics added.)  Crucially, this knowledge would encompass, as 
the majority readily acknowledges, ― ‗lawful legislative and administrative 
restrictions on property, which a buyer would take into consideration in arriving at 
the fair market value.‘ ‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 20, quoting People ex rel. State 
2 
Public Works Bd. v. Talleur (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 690, 695-696.)  The jury –– 
which, unless waived, is charged with determining the amount of compensation 
(Cal. Const., art. I, § 19) –– may consider this information, along with all the other 
relevant facts governing permissible uses of the property.  Allowing the jury to 
weigh such information helps ensure that the compensation awarded is ―just to the 
public as well as to the landowner.‖  (Los Angeles County Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority v. Continental Development Corp. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 
694, 716.)   
The likelihood that some portion of the property could never be developed 
is one fact that would indisputably bear on permissible uses of any undeveloped 
property.  For example, where a public agency lawfully demands that a landowner 
dedicate a portion of the property to the public as a legitimate condition for 
granting a permit to develop the remainder of the parcel, no compensation is due.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 21; see Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994) 512 U.S. 374, 391; 
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission (1987) 483 U.S. 825, 836 (Nollan).)  
The Fifth Amendment does not shield a landowner from responsibility to mitigate 
the burdens imposed on the public by a parcel‘s development, and the mitigation 
undertaken by the public entity — e.g., roads, drainage, habitat preservation — 
often redounds to the benefit of the landowner as well as to the public generally.  
So long as there is an ―essential nexus‖ (Nollan, at p. 837) and ― ‗rough 
proportionality‘ ‖ (Dolan, at p. 391) between the required dedication and the 
projected impact of the development, the dedication results from a valid exercise 
of the public entity‘s police power, not from a taking.  (Nollan, at p. 836.)    
In some situations, a landowner will not yet have sought to develop the 
property, but there is a reasonable probability that a public agency would lawfully 
condition any future development on a dedication of land to offset the 
development‘s effects.  This probable future dedication is likewise a fact that 
3 
would bear on the property‘s permissible uses.  Under California case law, the fair 
market value of the dedicated land is therefore based on its undeveloped, 
agricultural state.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 20-21; City of Porterville v. Young 
(1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1260, 1265-1269 (Porterville).)  This is so, as the majority 
explains, because the landowner would never have been able to develop the 
dedicated portion of the property.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 21.)  ―[I]f the remainder 
of the parcel is not developed beyond its present agricultural use, [the] owner will 
have been paid exactly what the take was worth; if the remainder of the parcel is 
developed for commercial purposes, [the] owner will have been paid for the land 
he would have been required to dedicate to [the] city to obtain the building permits 
or conditional use permit necessary for the commercial development.‖  
(Porterville, at p. 1269.)   
Here, a public agency asserts that the strip of land sought for condemnation 
is the same strip it would have required the property owner to dedicate as a 
condition of development.  The property‘s valuation as undeveloped, agricultural 
land thus depends on (1) whether the hypothetical dedication could lawfully have 
been imposed, and (2) whether it was reasonably probable the agency would 
actually have imposed the dedication as a condition of development, even in the 
absence of the project.  (Porterville, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1268-1269 
[record showed that the dedication would have been required as a condition of 
development even if the city had not undertaken its street-widening project]; City 
of Fresno v. Cloud (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 113, 119 [trial court erred in excluding 
evidence of a ―high probability‖ that building permits would not have been issued 
without the street dedications].)  Where those two elements are satisfied, ―the most 
that a willing buyer would pay for the portion subject to the dedication 
4 
requirement is its value in its undeveloped state.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 21.)1  If, 
on the other hand, ―the owner were compensated based on the highest and best use 
of the property [as light industrial], the owner would get a windfall — i.e., 
payment based on developed value for property that could not have been 
developed under any circumstances.‖  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 21; see Contra Costa 
Flood Control etc. Dist. v. Lone Tree Investments (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 930, 935-
936 [―Lone Tree would receive a windfall if it were to receive commercial value 
for a strip of land that would never be developed and that a buyer knew could not 
be developed‖].)   
Such a payment would not only be a windfall.  It would be unconstitutional.  
(See Redevelopment Agency v. Gilmore (1985) 38 Cal.3d 790, 809 (conc. opn. of 
Mosk, J.).)  A compensation award that would make the owner better off than if 
the property were never taken is flatly contrary to the constitutional requirement 
that just compensation be ―just to the public as well as to the landowner.‖  (Los 
Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. Continental 
Development Corp., supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 716; accord, United States v. 
Commodities Corp. (1950) 339 U.S. 121, 123.)   
I therefore part company with the majority to the extent it mandates such a 
windfall when (in its words) ―it was probable at the time the dedication 
requirement was put in place that the property designated for public use was to be 
included in the project for which the property is being condemned.‖  (Maj. opn., 
                                              
1  
Some jurisdictions go so far as to deny compensation altogether for the 
dedicated land, even when the owner has not yet sought to develop the property.  
(See State v. Sturmfels Farm Ltd. Partnership (Mo.Ct.App. 1990) 795 S.W.2d 
581, 587 [where the dedication requirement would have been constitutional and 
was reasonably likely to have been imposed, landowners suffer ―no compensable 
loss‖].)    
 
 
5 
ante, at p. 3.)  The extra layer of analysis it purports to add to the Porterville 
inquiry is as difficult to understand as it is to apply.  Nor can the majority point to 
a single authority, in this state or any other jurisdiction, that has applied a ―date of 
probable inclusion‖ analysis to exclude an entirely lawful, reasonably probable 
dedication from the determination of just compensation.  This omission is 
particularly striking, given that ―every court across the United States that has 
decided the issue has held that future dedication requirements are admissible‖ in 
determining just compensation for the dedicated land.  (Herman & Martinez-
Esteve, The Admissibility of Dedication Requirements in Condemnation Cases:  
No Longer the Road Less Traveled (Nov. 2011) 85 Fla. Bar J. 20, 22, italics 
added.)  Most importantly, the majority fails to explain how the windfall it has 
now required public agencies to pay to random, lucky property owners can be 
reconciled with the state Constitution.     
What the majority appears to believe is that the project effect rule compels 
it to exclude evidence of a hypothetical dedication from the valuation of property 
lawfully subject to a dedication requirement.  This rule provides that ―[t]he fair 
market value of the property taken shall not include any increase or decrease in the 
value of the property that is attributable to . . . [¶] (a) The project for which the 
property is taken‖ or ―(c) Any preliminary actions of the plaintiff relating to the 
taking of the property.‖  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1263.330.)  But section 1263.330 is 
merely a codification of just compensation principles.  (See Woolstenhulme, 
supra, 4 Cal.3d at pp. 496-497; Buena Park School District of Orange County v. 
Metrim Corp. (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 255.)  Where, for example, property was 
initially expected to be attractively close to an artificial lake but was eventually 
condemned to build the lake, evidence of the project‘s effect on the property‘s 
value is inadmissible from the point at which it became reasonably probable that 
the property would in fact be taken for the project.  (Woolstenhulme, at p. 484.)  
6 
And where property is condemned for a freeway, the valuation of the property 
should exclude a zoning restriction barring any development on the property that 
would be inconsistent with the proposed freeway.  (City of San Diego v. Rancho 
Penasquitos Partnership (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1034, 1038-1039.)         
This case is different.  The project effect rule has no application where the 
agency can show that the dedication on which it relies was lawful and would 
actually have been imposed, independent of the project.  When the agency makes 
this showing, it has done all it needs to prove that any decrease in the value of the 
property is ―attributable to‖ the exercise of its lawful police power to compel a 
dedication — and is therefore not ―attributable to‖ the project for which the 
property is being condemned or any preliminary actions relating to the taking of 
the property.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1263.330.)  In other words, where the agency 
could have (and would have) required that the property be dedicated to mitigate 
the effects of any development, the agency has shown that the dedicated land 
could never have been developed, even if the agency had not undertaken the 
project in which it is currently engaged.  Nothing in the language or legislative 
history of the project effect statute indicates an intent to exclude evidence of 
lawful dedications that mitigate the effects of developing a property and that 
would have been imposed as a condition of development, independent of any 
project then being undertaken.  
Nor does our case law support the majority‘s approach.  In State Route 4 
Bypass Authority v. Superior Court (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1546, for example, the 
joint powers agency formed to facilitate the construction of a new highway 
instructed its member agencies to condition the grant of any development 
applications on the dedication of a 110-foot right-of-way ― ‗lying about the 
centerline of the SR4 Bypass.‘ ‖  (Id. at p. 1551.)  A city engineer testified that this 
dedication requirement was designed to facilitate the project and that, in applying 
7 
the dedication requirement, he ―would not typically take into account any traffic 
study done in connection with a [particular] development or the nature of the 
development proposed.‖  (Id. at p. 1553.)  Although there is certainly room to 
question whether the Court of Appeal correctly determined that the dedication was 
lawful or reasonably probable in that case, it nonetheless seems plain that the 
dedication requirement there was put in place after inclusion of the affected 
properties became probable.  (Accord, Dept. of Trans. v. Lundberg (Or. 1992) 825 
P.2d 641, 648 [upholding the admission of evidence concerning the city‘s 
dedication requirement on the issue of valuation, even though the dedication was 
adopted after the city and state had decided on a plan to widen the avenue that 
served as a state highway, and the dedication was enacted to ―implement‖ the 
project].)                   
What the majority also fails to recognize is that its asserted policy 
justifications for cutting back on Porterville, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d 1260, have 
already been addressed –– in Porterville itself.  To resolve whether it is 
―reasonably probable‖ that a public agency would actually have imposed the 
dedication as a condition of development even in the absence of the project, the 
trier of fact may indeed consider whether the dedication requirement is a 
―standard‖ one that has been ―imposed on multiple, similarly situated properties.‖  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 28.)  The factfinder may also consider whether there has 
been only ―a short period between the time the property is designated for public 
use and the time the agency first signals its intention to condemn the property‖ (id. 
at p. 29), to the extent the closeness in time casts doubt on the likelihood the 
public agency would actually have imposed the dedication as a condition of 
development.  How much weight to accord these facts is properly reserved to the 
trier of fact.       
8 
Instead, the majority‘s approach is likely to generate mischievous effects — 
and not only for the trier of fact.  The majority‘s reliance on the concept of an 
agency‘s ―original expectation,‖ or what a public agency ―originally 
contemplated‖ (maj. opn., ante, at p. 26) represents a substantial retreat from the 
well-settled rule that ―[t]he proper inquiry is not into the subjective motive of the 
agency‖ — an inquiry that would violate ―the principle that courts do not delve 
into the individual purposes of decisionmakers in a quasi-adjudicative proceeding‖ 
— but (rather) whether the agency‘s findings are based on substantial evidence.  
(Landgate, Inc. v. California Coastal Com. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1006, 1022; see maj. 
opn., ante, at pp. 11-12, quoting Landgate.)  Courts avoid such investigation into 
the subjective mental states of public decisionmakers for good reason.  Because 
public agencies rarely if ever operate entirely as unitary actors, it is far from 
obvious what it means to divine their ―intent‖ in this context.  The majority‘s 
approach may also encourage or even force public agencies to postpone planning 
related to a project until a dedication requirement has already been established, 
which would unduly and unnecessarily hamper the planning process.  (See 
Klopping v. Whittier (1972) 8 Cal.3d 39, 45, fn. 1.)  Indeed, to say that a public 
agency can exact a lawful and reasonably probable dedication valued as 
undeveloped land only when the ultimate use of the dedicated property is unknown 
or unforeseeable all but encourages agencies to engage in willful blindness, by 
pitting good planning against a fair price for the property.   
Finally, the majority leaves unanswered a panoply of questions about how 
its new rule is supposed to be applied and what effects it will have.  For example:   
A public project typically has multiple justifications, and a dedication may 
be sought to offset myriad effects from development.  Must the dedication be 
excluded from valuation, even though it was lawful and would have been imposed 
as a condition of development, when the agency is unable to show that the 
9 
dedication was ―contingent on‖ development of adjacent property (maj. opn., ante, 
at p. 26) or is otherwise unable to exclude the possibility that the dedication might 
also serve valid public purposes unrelated to development of the property?   
The majority puts determinative weight on the date the dedication 
requirement was put in place.  Does the majority‘s approach effectively nullify ad 
hoc dedication requirements?   
Will identical dedications on identical types of property trigger different 
levels of compensation, depending on what the agency originally contemplated or 
how far along the project is?  When a dedication is lawfully made a condition of 
development, but the property is probably included in a project, must the property 
owners who have submitted applications to develop their property be paid for the 
dedication — a dedication the government would otherwise have obtained ―for 
free‖ (maj. opn., ante, at p. 21)?  And how should buyers and sellers in the market 
value a potential dedication when the value of that dedication will be determined 
entirely on the relative timing of the imposition of a dedication requirement and 
the commencement of the project for which the dedication is sought?   
These questions are crucial under our law, but they are not ones the project 
effect rule is capable of answering.  The project effect rule, as interpreted in our 
case law, ensures only that the condemned property‘s valuation is not distorted by 
a public agency‘s preparations for the project, or by the project itself.  But where a 
strip of the property in question would lawfully have been taken to offset the 
impact of developing the rest of the parcel — even if the project never existed — 
then the probable future dedication is neither a ―project‖ nor preliminary actions 
―relating‖ to the project within the meaning of section 1263.330 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure.  That the majority fully agrees with this proposition (see maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 26 [―Nothing in the language or legislative history of subdivision 
(a) indicates an intent to cover steps taken by a public agency to mitigate the 
10 
impact of development, independent of any project‖]) makes its apparent 
retrenchment from Porterville all the more difficult to understand. 
 Under the approach I endorse, by contrast, the task for the trial court on 
remand would remain straightforward — sensitive to the realities of the planning 
process, and in accordance with established law.  Quite simply:  Does the 
dedication satisfy Porterville?  To answer that question, the trial court would 
consider whether requiring the owners to dedicate a middle strip comprising 
almost 20 percent of their property would have an essential nexus to the valid 
public purpose that would be served by denying the permit, and whether the 
dedication would be roughly proportional to the impact of any future development.  
(See Rohn v. City of Visalia (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1463 [a dedication 
constituting 14 percent of the property, which would be used to realign a city 
street, was an improper condition under Nollan, supra, 483 U.S. 825, on the 
owner‘s application to convert a residence to an office building].)  If so, a jury 
would determine whether it was reasonably probable the city, even in the absence 
of the project, would have required a dedication of this scope.  If the city fails to 
satisfy either element of Porterville, then the city‘s condemnation of the strip can 
fairly be characterized as part of the Indian Avenue project, and the purported 
dedication requirement, under the project effect rule, should be excluded from the 
jury‘s valuation of the property.  
So I concur with the majority that the first prong of the Porterville inquiry 
is a question for a court, not a jury.  But otherwise, I respectfully dissent.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CUÉLLAR, J.   
 
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion City of Perris v. Stamper 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 218 Cal.App.4th 1104 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S213468 
Date Filed: August 15, 2016 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Riverside 
Judge: Dallas Holmes* 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis, K. Erik Friess and Nisha Verma for Defendants and 
Appellants. 
 
Luke A. Wake; Paul J. Beard II, Jennifer F. Thompson and Jonathan W. Williams for Pacific Legal 
Foundation and NFIB Small Business Legal Center as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and 
Appellants. 
 
Aleshire & Wynder, Eric L. Dunn, Sanaz K. ―Sunny‖ Soltani, Pam K. Lee and Adriana P. Mendoza for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Shute, Mihaly & Weinberger, Andrew W. Schwartz, Maya Kuttan and Laura D. Beaton for League of 
California Cities and California State Association of Counties as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Retired judge of the Riverside Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 
6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
K. Erik Friess 
Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis 
1900 Main Street, Fifth Floor 
Irvine, CA  92614-7321 
(949) 553-1313 
 
Sanaz K.―Sunny‖ Soltani 
Aleshire & Wynder 
18881 Von Karman Avenue, Suite 1700 
Irvine, CA  92612 
(949) 223-1170