Title: Day v. Advanced M&D Sales

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED:  March 25, 2004
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
DAVID R. DAY,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
ADVANCED M&D SALES, INC.,
an Oregon corporation,
Respondent on Review.
(CC 0005-04933; CA A112790; SC S49988)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted January 12, 2004.
Robert A. Miller, Eugene, argued the cause and filed the
brief for petitioner on review.
Lisa Lear, Bullivant Houser Bailey PC, Portland, argued the
cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.  With her on
the brief were David R. Rocker, Ronald J. Clark and Bullivant
Houser Bailey PC.
RIGGS, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Jeffrey M. Kilmer, Judge Pro Tempore. 184 Or App 260, 56 P3d 454 (2002).
RIGGS, J.
This case requires us to decide whether plaintiff is
estopped from filing a complaint alleging common-law negligence
and violations of the Employer Liability Law, ORS 654.305 to
654.335 (1999), after he applied for and received workers'
compensation benefits.  On defendant's motion for summary
judgment, the trial court concluded that equitable and judicial
estoppel prohibited plaintiff from denying that he was a covered
worker under defendant's workers' compensation insurance and that
the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Law,
ORS 656.018, barred plaintiff's claims.  Without reaching the
issue of judicial estoppel, the Court of Appeals agreed that
equitable estoppel applied and affirmed the trial court's
decision.  Day v. Advanced M&D Sales, Inc., 184 Or App 260, 56 P3d 454 (2002).  For the following reasons, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the trial court, and remand the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.  
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We take the following facts from the Court of Appeals
opinion and the record.  We review the record in the light most
favorable to plaintiff, the nonmoving party below, and we draw
all reasonable inferences from the facts in his favor.  Greene v. Legacy Emmanuel Hospital, 335 Or 115, 118, 60 P3d 535 (2002).
Defendant employed plaintiff in two capacities.  First,
defendant employed plaintiff as a salesperson and paid him on a
commission-only basis.  Defendant's workers' compensation policy
covered plaintiff when he worked as a salesperson.  Defendant
also employed plaintiff as a floor installation contractor,
paying him on a per-job basis to install floor products that
defendant distributed.  Plaintiff carried his own workers'
compensation insurance for the time when he worked as an
installation contractor.
In October 1998, plaintiff attended a seminar that a
representative of a flooring products company conducted at
defendant's facility.  During the seminar, the representative
partially installed a laminated floor in defendant's showroom for
demonstration purposes.  After the seminar ended, plaintiff and
other attendees assisted in the completion of the unfinished
floor.  While cutting pieces of flooring for the demonstration
floor, plaintiff injured his hand.
After plaintiff's injury, plaintiff and defendant's
controller, Joe White, discussed the possibility of filing a
workers' compensation claim under defendant's workers'
compensation policy.  The parties do not describe that discussion
in detail. (1)  Neither party disputes, however, that, on
November 2, 1998, a notice of workers' compensation claim --
referred to as a Form 801 -- was completed and sent to
defendant's private insurance carrier, Liberty Northwest
("defendant's insurer"). 
The Form 801 contains two sections, the "worker's"
section and the "employer's" section.  The worker's section
includes information concerning the type of injury, the date and
time of the injury, and the treating physician and hospital, but
requests no information regarding the worker's employment.  The
employer's section contains questions regarding, for example, the
worker's employment and wages, the date that the worker left
work, and the circumstances surrounding the worker's injury. 
When it filled out that section in this case, defendant described
plaintiff's occupation as "Salesperson" and answered "Yes" to the
question, "Did injury occur during course of job?" 
Approximately a week after the Form 801 was filed,
plaintiff completed a "Work/Educational History" form that
defendant's insurer sent to him. (2)  Under the section
entitled "Employment at the Time of Your Injury," plaintiff
stated that his employer was Advanced M&D Sales; his job title was "Salesman"; and the specific duty that he performed was
"selling." 
Following an investigation, defendant's insurer
determined that plaintiff was a covered worker and entitled to
benefits.  Defendant's insurer accepted plaintiff's claim and,
over the course of the next year, paid out $24,817 in benefits
for his injury.  
In December 1999, plaintiff's attorney informed
defendant's insurer by letter that:
"It is our belief that [plaintiff] was not an employee
of Advanced M&D Sales at the time of the injury and
that he should not have a workers' compensation claim,
despite the previous correspondence to you from his
previous attorney. * * * Our claim is not a third party
claim under the statute but we do acknowledge that
Liberty Northwest has paid certain benefits to Mr. Day
for which [it] should be reimbursed out of any
settlement or judgment."  
In February 2000, defendant's insurer replied that it
was unaware of any authority allowing plaintiff to withdraw a
claim after the insurer accepted it, and indicated that it would
continue to process the claim.  The insurer also requested
suspension of plaintiff's benefits based on plaintiff's failure
to attend a scheduled medical examination. 
The record does not include a notice of acceptance, a
notice of closure, or any further information regarding activity
on plaintiff's claim.  In addition, the record does not include
any correspondence or order from, or information concerning any
action by, the Workers' Compensation Division of the Department
of Consumer and Business Services regarding plaintiff's claim.
In May 2000, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that
defendant's negligence and failure to comply with the Employer
Liability Law caused his injury.  Defendant moved for summary
judgment, arguing that the doctrines of equitable and judicial
estoppel precluded plaintiff from claiming that he was not a
"worker" subject to the workers' compensation system.  As a
result, defendant argued that the exclusive remedy provision of
the Workers' Compensation Law barred plaintiff's claims for his
work-related injuries.  The trial court granted defendant's
motion.
Plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed
on the ground that equitable estoppel barred plaintiff's claim. 
The court explained that equitable estoppel requires, in part, a
false representation of existing material fact upon which the
other party relies.  Day, 184 Or App at 264-66 (citing Coos
County v. State of Oregon, 303 Or 173, 180-81, 734 P2d 1348
(1987)).  Here, the court emphasized plaintiff's conduct in
response to his injury.  The court noted that plaintiff had
discussed the matter with defendant and that plaintiff decided to
file a claim following that discussion.  In the court's view,
plaintiff's decision to treat himself as an employee of defendant
and his subsequent acceptance of workers' compensation benefits
represented an implicit promise to abandon his right to pursue a
civil claim against defendant.  The court determined that
plaintiff's present change of mind satisfied the
"misrepresentation" element of equitable estoppel.  After finding
that the other elements of equitable estoppel also were
satisfied, the court concluded that the trial court properly had
precluded plaintiff from arguing in his civil action against
defendant that he was not a worker subject to the provisions of
the Workers' Compensation Law.  
DISCUSSION
The Workers' Compensation Law guarantees compensation
to subject workers for certain injuries that arise out of, and in
the course of, their employment, regardless of any fault or
negligence on the part of the employer.  Martelli v. R.A.
Chambers and Associates, 310 Or 529, 533, 800 P2d 766 (1990).  In
exchange for that coverage, the Workers' Compensation Law limits
the extent of complying employers' liability and restricts the
rights of subject workers to seek other remedies for workplace
injuries.  To that end, ORS 656.018 provides:
"(1)(a) The liability of every employer who
satisfies the duty required by ORS 656.017(1) is
exclusive and in place of all other liability arising
out of injuries, diseases, symptom complexes or similar
conditions arising out of and in the course of
employment that are sustained by subject workers, the
workers' beneficiaries and anyone otherwise entitled to
recover damages from the employer on account of such
conditions or claims resulting therefrom, specifically
including claims for contribution or indemnity asserted
by third persons from whom damages are sought on
account of such conditions, except as specifically
provided otherwise in this chapter.
"* * * * *
"(2) The rights given to a subject worker and the
beneficiaries of the subject worker under this chapter
for injuries, diseases, symptom complexes or similar
conditions arising out of and in the course of
employment are in lieu of any remedies they might
otherwise have for such injuries, diseases, symptom
complexes or similar conditions against the worker's
employer under ORS 654.305 to 654.336 or other laws,
common law or statute, except to the extent the worker
is expressly given the right under this chapter to
bring suit against the employer of the worker for an
injury, disease, symptom complex or similar condition."
ORS 656.018 applies if the injured person is a "subject
worker" at the time of the injury.  See ORS 656.005(28) (defining
"subject worker"); ORS 656.005(30) (defining "worker").  If the
injured person is not a "subject worker" or "worker" within those
definitions, then ORS 656.018 does not bar that person from
filing an action seeking other remedies for the injury against
the alleged tortfeasor.  See S-W Floor Cover Shop v. Nat'l
Council on Comp. Ins., 318 Or 614, 623, 872 P2d 1 (1994) (stating
that first determination is whether one is "worker" under ORS
656.005(28)); Bell v. Hartman, 289 Or 447, 452, 615 P2d 314
(1980) ("The key term in the statutory scheme is 'subject
worker.'  An employer is bound to assure payment of compensation
only for 'subject workers[.]'"). 
Although plaintiff cannot prevail if he is a worker
subject to a workers' compensation remedy, in its present
posture, this case does not require us to determine whether
plaintiff was a "worker" or "subject worker" at the time of his
injury.  The trial court did not decide that question; the
parties did not address it below or in the briefs to this court;
and we express no opinion on that issue. (3)  We face a
different question:  whether, under the circumstances of this
case, plaintiff's conduct in filing a workers' compensation claim
with his employer and his acceptance of workers' compensation
benefits from defendant's insurer estops him from alleging in the
present action that he was not a worker subject to the Workers'
Compensation Law at the time of his injury. 
As to that question, the parties first address
equitable estoppel.  Plaintiff contends that the Court of Appeals
erred by relying on equitable estoppel to preclude him from
asserting that he was not defendant's employee at the time of his
injury.  He argues that he made no false representation of
material fact either directly to defendant or in the forms filed
with defendant's insurer.  Rather, plaintiff argues, the filing
of the workers' compensation claim was based on a mutual, and
erroneous, conclusion of law from facts that were known to both
parties.   
Defendant adopts the Court of Appeals' analysis of
equitable estoppel.  Defendant asserts that, with knowledge that
he was covered by defendant's workers' compensation coverage only
if he was injured in his capacity as a salesperson, plaintiff
represented that he was injured in that capacity by filing a
workers' compensation claim.  Defendant contends that it relied
on that representation and would be harmed by plaintiff's present
attempt to withdraw his claim.
Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, "a person may
be precluded by his act or conduct, or silence when it was his
duty to speak, from asserting a right which he otherwise would
have had."  Marshall v. Wilson, 175 Or 506, 518, 154 P2d 547 (1944).  Equitable estoppel has five elements: 
"'To constitute estoppel by conduct there must (1)
be a false representation; (2) it must be made with
knowledge of the facts;  (3) the other party must have
been ignorant of the truth; (4) it must have been made
with the intention that it should be acted upon by the
other party; (5) the other party must have been induced
to act upon it[.]'" 
Coos County, 303 Or at 180-81 (quoting Oregon v. Portland Gen.
Elec. Co., 52 Or 502, 528, 95 P 722 (1908)); accord Bennett v.
City of Salem et al., 192 Or 531, 541, 235 P2d 772 (1951).  For
equitable estoppel to apply, the false representation "must be
one of existing material fact, and not of intention, nor may it
be a conclusion from facts or a conclusion of law."  Welch v.
Washington County, 314 Or 707, 716, 842 P2d 793 (1992) (internal
quotations omitted).  
Reading the record in the light most favorable to
plaintiff, as we do when reviewing a summary judgment in favor of
defendant, defendant's argument founders at the first Coos County
element.  As we explain below, considered separately or together,
plaintiff's conduct and statements do not amount to a
misrepresentation of material fact sufficient to invoke equitable
estoppel.  
As an initial matter, defendant does not allege that
plaintiff misrepresented when the injury occurred, what he was
doing when he was injured, or how he came to be working on the
demonstration floor at the time of his injury.  Moreover, we
disagree with defendant's view of plaintiff's conduct leading up
to the filing of his claim.  Defendant appears to argue that
plaintiff made a misrepresentation of fact during his discussion
with White, after which he completed the Form 801.  As previously
noted, however, defendant does not detail how plaintiff and White
reached the conclusion that plaintiff was entitled to file a
workers' compensation claim under defendant's insurance policy,
and the record, which on this point consists solely of two
paragraphs from White's affidavit, does not indicate that
plaintiff made any misrepresentation regarding his employment
status during the course of that discussion.  In particular,
defendant does not identify evidence in the record demonstrating
that plaintiff was aware of, or intended to abandon, his right to
file a complaint seeking other remedies for his injury, or that,
by approaching and discussing the matter with White, plaintiff
entered into an agreement to abandon his civil claim.  In this
procedural posture, we will not infer from White's affidavit that
plaintiff made any particular misrepresentation of material fact
concerning his employment status or other facts bearing on his
right to pursue other remedies.
We turn to plaintiff's decision to complete the Form
801.  Although defendant argues that the decision to file a claim
amounts to a misrepresentation of fact, the completion of that
form at most represented plaintiff's assertion that he was
legally entitled to workers' compensation benefits.  That
assertion was not one of fact; rather, it was a conclusion of law
based on a factual context.  Rubalcaba v. Nagaki Farms, Inc., 333
Or 614, 619, 43 P3d 1106 (2002) (determination of claimant's
status as  "worker" is conclusion of law, not finding of fact). 
That type of representation may not serve as the basis for
equitable estoppel.  Coos County, 303 Or at 181; see also Welch,
314 Or at 717 (refusing to apply equitable estoppel when
statements by county tax official were, at most, "a conclusion
from facts or a conclusion of law"); Bennett, 192 Or at 541
(declining to apply estoppel when statements were "mere
expressions of opinion").   
Johnson v. Dave's Auto Center, 257 Or 34, 476 P2d 190
(1970), demonstrates that principle as it applies to the filing
of a workers' compensation claim.  In Johnson, an injured worker
filed a workers' compensation claim for injuries resulting from a
car accident involving a coemployee and a truck that his employer
owned.  The injured worker also filed an action against both the
coemployee and his employer, alleging that he was injured as a
result of the coemployee's negligence.  In the workers'
compensation proceeding, the employer stated that the worker was
not an employee, and the Workers' Compensation Board denied the
claim.  Before the administrative review ended, the worker and
the State Compensation Department settled the claim for medical
costs and attorney fees "without any admission of liability by
either party as to the status of employment or nonemployment." 
Id. at 37 (internal quotations omitted).  Then, in their answers
to the worker's complaint, both the coemployee and the employer
argued that the worker's pursuit of workers' compensation
benefits and settlement of his claim estopped him from filing a
civil action against them.  
This court reversed the trial court's judgment in favor
of both defendants.  In doing so, the court first addressed the
effect of the filing of a workers' compensation claim in light of
the worker's uncertain employment status:
"From all that appears from the record in this
case, plaintiff may have been mistaken, in good faith,
as to the ultimate question of law or fact whether or
not he was an employee, based upon all of the
evidentiary facts.  Thus, based upon this record, we
hold that the filing by plaintiff of his claim with the
Workmen's Compensation Board for compensation which
would be payable only if he was an employee, did not,
of itself, bar plaintiff by the doctrine of election of
remedies or estoppel from later filing his complaint in
this case."  
Id. at 41 (emphasis in original).
Under Johnson, a worker may file a workers'
compensation claim, in the good faith belief that he is an
employee, without being estopped from later filing a complaint
claiming negligence on the part of his alleged employer. 
Similarly, in this case, the decision to file a workers'
compensation claim necessarily reflected plaintiff's belief that
he was an employee at the time of his injury, but that decision
was not a misrepresentation of material fact that estops him from
taking a contrary position in a later civil complaint.  
Plaintiff's statements in the claim forms and his later
acceptance of benefits do not alter our conclusion.  Plaintiff
made no representation on the Form 801 regarding his employment
status, and plaintiff's statements in the Work/Educational
History form responded to general queries about plaintiff's "job
title" and the specific duties performed in his job.  Those
answers -- on a form that sought information to aid the
determination of benefits and eligibility for vocational
assistance -- were not misrepresentations of material fact
regarding plaintiff's employment status at the moment of his
injury.  In addition, plaintiff's receipt of benefits did not
amount to a misrepresentation of fact.  As with the initial
filing of the claim, the acceptance of benefits merely reflected
plaintiff's conclusion from the available facts that his
employment status entitled him to benefits.
Indeed, this court previously has rejected an attempt
to manufacture a misrepresentation of fact from the receipt of
benefits in similar circumstances. In Frasure v. Agripac, 290 Or
99, 619 P2d 274 (1980), the claimant sustained a back injury
while working for Agripac, and he filed an aggravation claim with
his first employer, Permaneer, and Permaneer's insurance carrier. 
After the claimant had received time-loss and medical benefits under that claim,
the claimant's doctors reversed their earlier opinion and
concluded that the claimant had suffered a new injury and not an
aggravation.  The claimant promptly filed a new claim against
Agripac.  On review from the Workers' Compensation Board, the
Court of Appeals held that, by voluntarily accepting and
processing the aggravation claim and by voluntarily accepting
benefits pursuant to that claim, Permaneer, its insurance
carrier, and the claimant each were estopped from taking contrary
positions and were "bound by the consequences of their respective
actions."  Id. at 103 (internal quotations omitted). (4)  
This court reversed, stating that "[t]here is no
estoppel in this case."  Id. at 105.  Although Permaneer and its
insurance carrier had accepted the claim and had paid benefits to
the claimant for approximately 17 months, the court in Frasure
rejected the notion that the employer and its insurance carrier's
conduct in processing and accepting the claim were the type of
representations normally associated with equitable estoppel.  Id.
at 107 ("[N]either Agripac nor Chubb Pacific are 'guilty' of
making the type of representations normally associated with
estoppel.  They made (1) no false representations (2) with
knowledge of the facts (3) with the intention that the other
party rely upon it.").  Here, Frasure is inconsistent with
defendant's view that, by applying for and accepting workers'
compensation benefits, plaintiff misrepresented a material fact. 
Given the present state of this record and this court's previous
case law, we conclude that equitable estoppel does not bar
plaintiff from alleging in his complaint that he was not
defendant's employee at the time of his injury.
The Court of Appeals and the parties also discuss
estoppel by acceptance of benefits (more commonly known as quasi-estoppel). (5)  By invoking that doctrine, defendant relies on
plaintiff's decision to file a workers' compensation claim and to
accept workers' compensation benefits -- which defendant's
insurer voluntarily paid -- before filing the present action. 
Echoing its arguments with respect to equitable estoppel,
defendant contends that plaintiff is bound by his decision to
accept the benefits of the Workers' Compensation Law and is
precluded from pursuing other remedies.  Plaintiff responds that
he is not estopped from asserting the present claim in light of
his mistaken conclusion regarding his employment status.
Assuming, without deciding, that quasi-estoppel is
available to a litigant in Oregon, we decline to apply it in the
present case, because the workers' compensation statutory scheme
counsels against giving the acceptance of workers' compensation
benefits an estoppel effect.  The Workers' Compensation Law
encourages the swift and voluntary payment of workers'
compensation benefits.  ORS 656.262(4)(a) requires the first
installment of temporary disability compensation to be paid no
later than the fourteenth day after the subject employer has
notice or knowledge of the claim.  That requirement need not be
triggered at the request of the worker, as ORS 656.005(6) defines
"claim" as "a written request for compensation from a subject
worker or someone on the worker's behalf, or any compensable
injury of which a subject employer has notice or knowledge." 
(Emphasis added.)  In addition, ORS 656.262(10) allows employers
to provide compensation and then to challenge their liability for
the injury.  Similarly, that section also states that a worker's
"mere acceptance of such compensation [shall not] be considered a
waiver of the right to question the amount thereof."  Id.  Also,
even after the insurer provides written acceptance or denial of a
claim, the insurer may revoke the claim acceptance and deny the
claim "if such revocation of acceptance and denial is issued no
later than two years after the date of initial acceptance."  ORS
656.262(6)(a).  
By establishing a rapid "pay now, litigate later"
approach, the Workers' Compensation Law encourages the voluntary
payment and acceptance of benefits, and allows for the
possibility that new information later will affect a party's view
regarding the compensability of the claim.  By contrast, applying
estoppel upon a worker's acceptance of benefits would preclude
any opportunity to contest coverage thereafter, even if the
payment of benefits by private insurance carriers and nonsubject
employers later turned out to be erroneous.  Given the statutory
background, we decline to estop plaintiff from filing the present
action on the ground that he accepted workers' compensation
benefits from defendant's private insurer.  See Stovall v. Sally
Salmon Seafood, 306 Or 25, 757 P2d 410 (1988) (refusing to apply
equitable estoppel to workers' compensation claim in part due to
the statutory background involved); Frasure, 290 Or at 106-07
(refusing, in light of the policy and purpose of the Workers'
Compensation Law, to estop employer or insurer from denying
aggravation claim after employer previously accepted claim).
Finally, we address whether judicial estoppel applies.  
Parties invoke judicial estoppel "under certain circumstances to
preclude a party from assuming a position in a judicial
proceeding that is inconsistent with the position that the same
party has successfully asserted in a different judicial
proceeding."  Hampton Tree Farms, Inc. v. Jewett, 320 Or 599,
609, 892 P2d 683 (1995).  Judicial estoppel is "primarily
concerned with the integrity of the judicial process and not with
the relationship of the parties[.]"  Hampton Tree Farms, 320 Or
at 612 (emphasis added). 
The focus of that doctrine on acceptance of an earlier
position and harm to the judicial system defeats defendant's
effort to invoke judicial estoppel here.  As noted previously,
the record is devoid of any indication that an administrative or
judicial tribunal made a final determination regarding
plaintiff's status as a subject worker at the time of his
injury. (6)  Therefore, in the present posture, plaintiff's
attempt to take a contrary position in his complaint does not
implicate the type of harm to the judicial system for which
judicial estoppel is designed.  See Hampton Tree Farms, 320 Or at
609-10 (describing applications of judicial estoppel to prevent
litigants from playing "fast and loose with the courts," or to
preclude parties from taking inconsistent positions when they
benefitted from successful assertion of previously taken
position).
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
1. White's affidavit states:  
"8.  Subsequent to Mr. Day's accident, he
approached me about the possibility of submitting a
workers' compensation claim to Advanced M&D Sales,
Inc.'s workers' compensation carrier, Liberty
Northwest.  
"9.  Following discussions with Mr. Day, Mr. Day and I
concluded that he was injured within his capacity as a
commission only salesperson, and was therefore an employed
[sic] of Advanced M&D Sales, Inc. entitled to workers'
compensation coverage."
2. The Court of Appeals stated that the Work/Educational
History form "was then attached to the 801 form."  Day, 184 Or
App at 263.  The record indicates, however, that the Form 801 was
completed and sent to defendant's insurer about one week before
November 9, 1998, when plaintiff completed the Work/Educational
History form.
3. In addition, at this stage of the proceedings,
plaintiff does not argue that any statutory exception to the
limitation on a subject worker's right to seek other remedies
applies.  See ORS 656.154 (allowing injured worker to elect to
seek remedy against third person, not in same employ, whose
negligence or wrong caused injury); ORS 656.156 (allowing worker
to pursue action against employer if worker's injury or death
results from deliberate intention of employer).
4. Although the court did not specify the type of estoppel
on which it relied, the referee declined to apply equitable
estoppel, and the board adopted the referee's finding.  Id. at
104 n 4.
5. The Court of Appeals discussed plaintiff's acceptance
of benefits under the general heading of equitable estoppel. 
Day, 184 Or App at 265 (stating that court was examining case "in
the context of an alleged estoppel in pais based on the
acceptance of benefits"); id. at 267-68 (summarizing court's
conclusion in light of Coos County factors).  The Court of
Appeals, however, also cited an earlier case from that court that
referred to "estoppel by acceptance of benefits," which is a
distinct doctrine.  Id. at 265 (citing Hess v. Seeger, 55 Or App
746, 762, 641 P2d 23 (1982)).  In their briefs in this court, the
parties addressed estoppel by acceptance of benefits separately
from equitable estoppel.
6. Workers' compensation cases that defendant cites from
other jurisdictions each involved a favorable decision by a
previous tribunal or, at a minimum, approval of a settlement by a
previous tribunal.  See Dush v. Appleton Elec. Co., 124 F3d 957
(8th Cir 1997) (after adversarial hearing, state workers'
compensation court determined temporary total disability and
awarded plaintiff benefits); Risetto v. Plumbers and Steamfitters
Local 343, 94 F3d 597 (9th Cir 1996) (state workers' compensation
appeals board approved parties' settlement of workers'
compensation claim); Niles-Robinson v. Brigham & Women's Hosp.,
47 Mass App Ct 203, 711 NE2d 940 (1999) (state Department of
Industrial Accidents found plaintiff disabled); Drain v. Betz
Laboratories, Inc., 69 Cal App 4th 950, 81 Cal Rptr 2d 864 (1999)
(workers' compensation referee approved parties' compromise and
settlement); Jackson v. County of Los Angeles, 60 Cal App 4th
171, 70 Cal Rptr 2d 96 (1997) (workers' compensation judge issued
award based on parties' stipulations).