Title: Marshall v. Ortega

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Marshall v. Ortega, 87 Ohio St.3d 522, 2000-Ohio-481.] 
 
 
 
 
 
MARSHALL, APPELLEE, v. ORTEGA, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as Marshall v. Ortega (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 522.] 
Medical malpractice — Where party complies with R.C. 2305.11(B)(1) and sends 
multiple written notices of intent to sue prior to the expiration of the one-
year statute of limitations set forth in R.C. 2305.11(B)(1), the one-hundred-
eighty-day period begins to run from the date the last notice is received by 
the potential defendants. 
Where a party complies with the requirements of R.C. 2305.11(B)(1) and sends 
multiple written notices of intent to sue prior to the expiration of the one-
year statute of limitations set forth in R.C. 2305.11(B)(1), the one-hundred-
eighty-day period begins to run from the date the last notice is received by 
the potential defendants.  The statute of limitations for medical malpractice 
will not bar prosecution of an action for malpractice if that action is 
commenced within one hundred eighty days of the last notice. 
(Nos. 98-2543 and 98-2610 — Submitted October 12, 1999 — Decided January 
19, 2000.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 
72096. 
 
On April 12, 1994, defendant-appellant Dr. Bienvenido Ortega performed a 
laminectomy and spinal fusion on plaintiff-appellee Gladys Marshall. 
 
On February 9, 1995, Marshall, through her attorney, sent Dr. Ortega a letter 
informing him that she was contemplating bringing a medical malpractice action 
against him.  On March 9, 1995, Marshall’s attorney mailed a second letter to 
Ortega, which, unlike the first, explicitly claimed the benefit of R.C. 2305.11(B).1 
 
 
2
 
On September 1, 1995, Marshall filed a medical malpractice complaint 
against Ortega.  Marshall voluntarily dismissed the lawsuit on December 19, 1995, 
without prejudice. 
 
On January 19, 1996, Marshall refiled her lawsuit against Ortega.  Ortega 
moved for summary judgment, arguing that Marshall’s cause of action was time-
barred by R.C. 2305.11(B) because her complaint was not filed within one hundred 
eighty days from the time the first written letter was given.  The trial court granted 
Ortega’s motion for summary judgment.  The court of appeals reversed, finding 
that multiple letters are permissible under R.C. 2305.11(B)(1).  The court 
concluded that the lawsuit was timely since it was brought within one hundred 
eighty days from the time the second notice was given.  The Eighth District Court 
of Appeals found that its decision was in conflict with the decision of the Fourth 
District Court of Appeals in Woods v. Dutta (1997), 119 Ohio App.3d 228, 695 
N.E.2d 18, and entered an order certifying a conflict. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary 
appeal and upon our determination that a conflict exists. 
__________________ 
 
Mondello & Levey, Scott I. Levey and Frank P. Giaimo, for appellee. 
 
Weston, Hurd, Fallon, Paisley & Howley, L.L.P., Forrest A. Norman III and 
John A. Albers, for appellant. 
 
Lancione & Lancione, P.L.L., and John A. Lancione, urging affirmance for 
amicus curiae, Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
__________________ 
 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J.  The issue certified for our review is:  “Where 
a party timely files more than one statutory notice of intent to sue in accordance 
with R.C. 2305.11(B)(1), does the statute of limitations for medical malpractice bar 
prosecution of an action for malpractice commenced within 180 days of the latest 
 
 
3
of these notices?”  We answer this question in the negative and affirm the decision 
of the court of appeals. 
 
Generally, a medical malpractice lawsuit must be brought within one year 
after the cause of action accrues.  R.C. 2305.11(B)(1).  However, R.C. 
2305.11(B)(1) also provides an exception to this rule by affording litigants the 
opportunity to extend the one-year statute of limitations for an additional one 
hundred eighty days from the time proper notice is given to potential defendants. 
 
R.C. 2305.11(B)(1) states: 
 
“Subject to division (B)(2) of this section, an action upon a medical, dental, 
optometric, or chiropractic claim shall be commenced within one year after the 
cause of action accrued, except that, if prior to the expiration of that one-year 
period, a claimant who allegedly possesses a medical, dental, optometric, or 
chiropractic claim gives to the person who is the subject of that claim written 
notice that the claimant is considering bringing an action upon that claim, that 
action may be commenced against the person notified at any time within one 
hundred eighty days after the notice is so given.” 
 
In this case, we are asked to decide the effect of sending multiple statutory 
notices of intent to sue, more commonly referred to as one-hundred-eighty-day 
letters.  Ortega contends that under R.C. 2305.11(B)(1), a claimant has one 
opportunity to extend the period of limitations by notifying potential defendants of 
a possible lawsuit.  Ortega relies on Woods v. Dutta (1997), 119 Ohio App.3d 228, 
695 N.E.2d 18.  In that case, the claimant sent two one-hundred-eighty-day letters 
to the potential defendants and filed her complaint within one hundred eighty days 
from receipt of the second letter.  The Fourth District Court of Appeals found that 
the second letter was without effect, calculated the one-hundred-eighty-day period 
from the time the first letter was received, and found that the claimant’s cause of 
action was barred by the one-year statute of limitations.  In so holding, the court 
 
 
4
reasoned that the language of R.C. 2305.11(B) “evidences a legislative intent that a 
single, effective notice be given as opposed to multiple ones.”  Id. at 232, 695 
N.E.2d at 20.  Under this rationale, Ortega maintains that since Marshall did not 
commence her lawsuit within one hundred eighty days from when the first one-
hundred-eighty-day letter was received, Marshall’s cause of action is time-barred 
by the one-year statute of limitations. 
 
Marshall, however, believes that Woods v. Dutta was wrongly decided.  
Marshall maintains that R.C. 2305.11(B)(1) does not limit the number of one-
hundred-eighty-day letters that can extend the time limit.  She argues that where a 
claimant sends multiple one-hundred-eighty-day letters that are received within the 
one-year statute of limitations, the last written notice is controlling for purposes of 
extending the statute of limitations for one hundred eighty days.  We agree with 
appellee and do not find the reasoning employed by the Fourth District in Woods v. 
Dutta, supra, persuasive. 
 
Prior to its amendment in 1987, former R.C. 2305.11(A) referred to “a” 
written notice.  141 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3228-3229.  Thus, the court in Johnson v. 
St. Luke’s Hosp. (1981), 2 Ohio App.3d 427, 2 OBR 521, 442 N.E.2d 768, 
correctly held that former R.C. 2305.11(A) provided for the use of only one notice, 
and that where more than one notice was sent, only the first notice had any legal 
effect.  R.C. 2305.11(B), however, is not as restrictive as its predecessor.  R.C. 
2305.11(B)(1) now provides that “written notice” can extend the time limit.  Thus, 
in amending the statute, the General Assembly deleted the word “a” (referring to 
“a written notice”) from R.C. 2305.11.  We believe that this evidences the 
legislative intent that under the current version of R.C. 2305.11 more than one 
notice can be effective in extending the time limit. 
 
This interpretation is supported by sound policy considerations as well.  R.C. 
2305.11(B)(1) was enacted in order “to decrease the likelihood of frivolous 
 
 
5
medical malpractice claims by allowing parties and their attorneys additional time 
to investigate a potential claim which is brought to their attention shortly before the 
one-year statute of limitations expires.”  Edens v. Barberton Area Family Practice 
Ctr. (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 176, 177-178, 539 N.E.2d 1124, 1126.  To effectuate 
this purpose, claimants are afforded the opportunity to extend the one-year statute 
of limitations for one hundred eighty days.  In Edens, id. at 180, 539 N.E.2d at 
1128, we held that “where a statute such as R.C. 2305.11(B) is silent as to how 
notice is to be effectuated, written notice will be deemed to have been given when 
received.”  Thus, for purposes of calculating the one-hundred-eighty-day period, a 
claimant will have an additional one hundred eighty days from the time the notice 
is received by a potential defendant. 
 
Ortega argues that a claimant should not be able to send multiple one-
hundred-eighty-day letters to repeatedly extend the statute of limitations.  But R.C. 
2305.11(B)(1) does not afford a claimant the right to endlessly extend the statute of 
limitations.  Instead, R.C. 2305.11(B)(1) affords a claimant the right to extend the 
statute of limitations for a maximum period of one hundred eighty days beyond the 
one-year statute of limitations.  Thus, a claimant is able to receive the full benefit 
of the additional one hundred eighty days only if the one-hundred-eighty-day letter 
is received by the potential defendant on the last day of the period of limitations.  
If, however, a claimant sends a letter earlier but then needs additional time to 
investigate the claim, the claimant may choose to send an additional one-hundred-
eighty-day letter.  Under either scenario, the claimant is not seeking any more time 
than the statute allows.  However, if we accepted Ortega’s position and gave effect 
only to the first one-hundred-eighty-day letter, we would be cutting off a litigant’s 
right to obtain the maximum one-hundred-eighty-day extension.  We would thus 
be penalizing the claimant who needs additional time to investigate and, in 
particular, the claimant who acted responsibly on giving early notice to a potential 
 
 
6
defendant.  This result would run contrary to the purpose behind R.C. 
2305.11(B)(1) and unduly restrict a claimant’s ability to commence a lawsuit. 
 
Since the language of R.C. 2305.11(B) does not limit the number of 
effective one-hundred-eighty-day letters a claimant can send and since the 
legislative intent is to afford malpractice claimants with the maximum amount of 
time in which to investigate their claims, we find that a claimant is not limited to 
the time extension of a first one-hundred-eighty-day letter.  Instead, we hold that 
pursuant to R.C. 2305.11(B)(1), a medical malpractice claimant can send more 
than one effective notice of intent to sue prior to the expiration of the one-year 
statute of limitations set forth in R.C. 2305.11(B)(1). 
 
Clearly, to be valid, the one-hundred-eighty-day letter must comply with the 
requirements set forth in R.C. 2305.11(B)(1).2  The letter must be received within 
the one-year period of limitations and must state that the claimant is considering 
bringing a malpractice action against the recipient.  Although the statute does not 
designate the manner of service, clearly the preferable methods are those in which 
there is verification of receipt, such as registered or certified mail, so that a medical 
malpractice claimant can know and prove that the letters have been received by the 
potential defendants within the one-year statute of limitations. 
 
In sum, we conclude that where a party complies with the requirements of 
R.C. 2305.11(B)(1) and sends multiple written notices of intent to sue prior to the 
expiration of the one-year statute of limitations set forth in R.C. 2305.11(B)(1), the 
one-hundred-eighty-day period begins to run from the date the last notice is 
received by the potential defendants.  The statute of limitations will not bar 
prosecution of an action for malpractice commenced within one hundred eighty 
days of the last notice. 
 
Applying the statute to this case, we find that the one-hundred-eighty-day 
period began to run when the March 9, 1995 letter was received by appellant.  
 
 
7
Since appellee filed suit within that one-hundred-eighty-day period (on September 
1, 1995), her cause of action is not barred by the statute of limitations set forth in 
R.C. 2305.11(B)(1). 
 
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., 
concur. 
 
COOK, J., dissents. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. 
These letters were sent by appellee’s former counsel.  Although the 
argument was made to the lower courts that the first letter was merely a letter of 
representation, the court of appeals held that the letter was a valid notice.  Since 
that issue was not appealed to this court, and because the certified question implies 
that two valid notices were given, we are assuming, without deciding the issue, that 
the first letter was a valid notice. 
2. 
To have any effect, the one-hundred-eighty-day letter must also be received 
sometime during the last one hundred seventy-nine days of the one-year period of 
limitations.  Edens, supra, 43 Ohio St.3d at 178, 539 N.E.2d at 1126.  Otherwise, 
the notice is premature and the one-year statute of limitations will control.  Id. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  The majority declares that the legislative intent of 
R.C. 2305.11(B) is “to afford malpractice claimants with the maximum amount of 
time in which to investigate their claims.”  If this statement were true, there would 
be no statute of limitations.  After all, a statute of limitations by its very nature 
limits the amount of time for litigants to investigate their claims prior to filing. 
 
We are to construe statutes of limitations broadly so that cases may be 
decided on their merits.  See Gregory v. Flowers (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 48, 61 
 
 
8
O.O.2d 295, 290 N.E.2d 181, paragraph one of the syllabus; R.C. 1.11.  But here 
we are concerned with an exception to a statute of limitations — an exception 
which should be strictly construed in order to effectuate the public policy against 
stale claims.  See Powell v. Koehler (1894), 52 Ohio St. 103, 39 N.E. 195, 
paragraph three of the syllabus; see, also, Moore v. Dist. 50 of United Mine 
Workers of Am. (C.P.1954), 71 Ohio Law Abs. 317, 319, 131 N.E.2d 462, 463. 
 
Here, the parties agree that the first notice met the statutory requirements of 
R.C. 2305.11(B).  So the first notice was effective and was not nullified by the 
second one.  Given that receipt of the first notice (on February 16, 1995) started the 
one-hundred-eighty-day period, the complaint filed beyond the one-year statute of 
limitations and more than one hundred eighty days after receipt of the first notice 
was untimely. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals.