Title: Dickenson v. Babich

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Reversed May 28, 1958.
*473 Peery T. Buren and Allan G. Carson, Salem, argued the cause for appellant. On the brief were Carson, Carson & Gunnar and Peery T. Buren.
John C. Mull and Paul F. Burris, Salem, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
Before PERRY, Chief Justice, and LUSK, WARNER and KESTER,[*] Justices.
REVERSED WITH DIRECTIONS.
PERRY, C.J.
This is an action wherein plaintiff recovered damages against the defendant for alienating the affections of plaintiff's wife. From the judgment entered the defendant appeals.
Constructive service of summons was had upon the defendant by publication, as provided in ORS 15.140. The defendant appeared specially and moved to set aside the service had upon him. The trial court denied the defendant's motion and the defendant assigns this as error.
The action was commenced on December 29, 1953, and summons for personal service was placed in the hands of the sheriff of Marion county on December 30, 1953, and a "not found" return was made by the sheriff April 28, 1954. The plaintiff then obtained *474 service of summons upon the defendant by publication thereof while the defendant was physically present in the state of Washington.
The sufficiency of the plaintiff's affidavit for service of summons by publication is not questioned, but the efficacy of such service to permit the rendition of a personal judgment against the defendant is questioned.
The principal contention of the defendant is that, the action being one for recovery of a personal judgment, such constructive service will not endow the trial court with power to enter a judgment in personam against him. He relies upon Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 US 714, 24 L ed 565. Under the doctrine of this case, which arose in the state of Oregon, the principle of law therein announced relates to lack of due process in the service of summons by publication upon nonresidents. It is not questioned that this is still the law relative to nonresident defendants. However, the broad language which has been thought to prohibit acquisition of personal jurisdiction over any person beyond the boundaries of a state has since been re-examined as it affects a state's own residents. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 US 457, 61 S Ct 339, 85 L ed 278, 132 ALR 1357. Personal jurisdiction of a state's own residents through substituted personal service was recognized as probably sufficient to comply with the requirements of due process to authorize entry of a judgment in personam in McDonald v. Mabee, 243 US 90, 37 S Ct 343, 61 L ed 608.
In Milliken v. Meyer, supra, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States December 23, 1940, in construing a Wyoming statute which is substantially the same as ORS 15.110, it was determined that personal jurisdiction of a defendant could be acquired *475 through legislatively authorized personal service of summons issued out of a court and served personally upon a defendant in another state jurisdiction. This because a person domiciled in a state and enjoying its privileges of residence must accept the reciprocal duties imposed by that state; one of these duties being personal amenability to the courts of his domicile.
The area of inquiry thus opened is whether or not the defendant in this case was at the time of the commencement of the proceedings a citizen of this state and, if so, whether the method used in bringing him before the court complies with the requirements of due process.
There can be no doubt as to the domicile of the defendant at the commencement of the action, for his own affidavit, presented on the motion to set aside the service, states "he disposed of his domicile in the state of Oregon in the month of January, 1954," a time subsequent to the commencement of this action.
An examination of the opinions of this court discloses that we have consistently followed the rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, supra, and held that service by publication was insufficient to empower the trial court to enter a judgment strictly in personam against a defendant thus served. Since our opinions make no reference to the matter of the domicile of the defendant at the commencement of the action, it, therefore, appears that in the light of Milliken v. Meyer, supra, a review of this position as it affects our own citizens is necessary.
It is to be noted that in Milliken v. Meyer, supra, the Supreme Court of the United States relied heavily upon McDonald v. Mabee, supra, as apparently recognizing a distinction in the requirements of due process as between a nonresident defendant and a defendant *476 domiciled in the state seeking to enforce its jurisdiction. It should, also, be noted that Mr. Justice Holmes in speaking for the court in McDonald v. Mabee, supra, page 92, said:
The service obtained upon the defendant in Milliken v. Meyer, supra, was sustained because, in fact, it was personal service of process as provided by statute, that is, personal service as distinguished from constructive service by publication, although made without the state. It brought actual notice of the pending proceedings to the defendant.
Personal service of a copy of the summons and complaint upon a resident made beyond the borders of the state will give assurance that the defendant has received notice of the pending action, while merely mailing a copy of the summons and complaint to the last known place of residence can do no more than raise a presumption that a defendant has been notified.
Service of process by publication is at best a harsh and technical substitute for personal service of summons, Quattrochi v. Quattrochi, (1944, Mo App) 179 SW2d 757, even being described as a "miserable substitute" for personal service, Parker v. Scobee, 36 SW2d 303. And, even though ORS 15.140 provides for the forwarding of a copy of the complaint and summons to the last known place of residence of a defendant when publication of service of summons is sought, it is, in our opinion, the least likely substitute to give actual notice to a defendant "if substantial justice is to be done."
*477 Mr. Justice Holmes pointed out in McDonald v. Mabee, supra, p. 91:
1. The plaintiff's affidavit for publication states "that defendant is believed to be visiting with C.O. McKenzie at 552 South Sullivan Street, Seattle 8, Washington." Apprised of such facts, it appears to us a plaintiff, in order to meet the requirements of due process providing a service of summons most likely to give a defendant actual notice of the pendency of the proceedings, would be required to cause personal service outside the state to be made upon such defendant as provided in ORS 15.110, section (1) thereof reading as follows:
Service of summons by publication, so far as material to this opinion, is authorized as follows:
*479 Subsection (b) of ORS 15.120, supra, refers to circumstances under which residents of this state may be served by publication. Subsection (c) provides the circumstances under which service of summons by publication may be had upon nonresidents. Therefore, the legislature had in mind providing a service by publication upon nonresidents that would meet the requirements of due process under the holdings of Pennoyer v. Neff, supra, and authorizing a service by publication under other conditions upon its own residents. See annotations 126 ALR 1483; 132 ALR 1361. However, it is not necessary for us to consider whether or not the provisions of the statute for service by publication upon our own residents is sufficient to meet the constitutional requirement of due process where the defendant has left with the purpose of establishing domicile in another state, for the affidavit upon which the jurisdiction of the trial court must rest is insufficient to vest the trial court with jurisdiction. It is to be noted, the statute provides "the court * * * shall grant an order that service be made by publication of summons in any of the following cases:" Therefore, before the trial court is authorized to "grant an order" it must be made to appear to the court by affidavit that the situation is such that the service by publication is authorized.
2. The whole purpose of the affidavit is to advise the court of existing facts from which he may judicially determine, first, that the case is one in which the legislature has authorized service of summons by publication, Colburn v. Barrett et al., 21 Or 27, 26 P 1008, and, second, that it is necessary to proceed against the defendant by publication instead of by personal service, Dixie Meadows Co. v. Kight, 150 Or 395, 45 P2d 909.
*480 The plaintiff's affidavit, insofar as material, is as follows:
3. The legislature, in providing that service of summons by publication could be made upon our own residents, provided the conditions that must exist to give the courts jurisdiction. In this case, the applicable conditions to be set out in the affidavit were that the defendant had departed from the state to avoid service of summons, or he had departed from the state and remained absent therefrom six consecutive weeks. Neither of these facts appear in the plaintiff's affidavit. We have carefully searched the affidavit and there is not one word therein to indicate that the defendant left this state other than for the purpose of visiting in the state of Washington.
While the order of the trial court recites that the defendant "is absent from the state to avoid service of summons," the court's jurisdiction depends upon the affidavit, not the recitals of fact found in the order. Goodale v. Coffee, 24 Or 346, 33 P 990. The trial court being without jurisdiction the judgment rendered is void.
The motion to set aside the service of summons should have been sustained.
Reversed with directions to sustain the motion to set aside the service.
[*]  Resigned March 1, 1958.