Title: WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIV. v. GARL

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIV. v. GARL2001 WY 5926 P.3d 1029Case Number: 00-225Decided: 07/06/2001

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                            

STATE OF 
WYOMING ex rel.

WYOMING 
WORKERS' SAFETY AND

COMPENSATION 
DIVISION,

Appellant(Petitioner),

 

v.

 

SHEILA 
L. GARL,

Appellee(Respondent).

 

 

W.R.A.P. 
12.09(b) Certifications from the District Court of Laramie 
County

The 
Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Gay 
Woodhouse, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Gerald 
W. Laska, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and David L. Delicath, Assistant 
Attorney General  

 Representing 
Appellee:

            
Bill G. Hibbler, Cheyenne, Wyoming  

  

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J.; GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ.; and DAN SPANGLER, D.J. 
(RET.)

 

            
KITE, Justice.

 [¶1]      The State of 
Wyoming ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division (the division) 
challenged an award of benefits in favor of Sheila L. Garl.  Following a hearing, the hearing 
examiner found Ms. Garl proved she suffered an injury for the purposes of the 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act; however, Ms. Garl failed to meet the 
timeliness requirement of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-502(a) (LEXIS 1999).  Nevertheless, the hearing examiner 
concluded Ms. Garl established a lack of prejudice to her employer and the 
division by clear and convincing evidence and, therefore, overcame the 
presumption of claim denial.  The 
division filed a Petition for Judicial Review in the district court, and Ms. 
Garl filed a Motion to Dismiss.  
Pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09(b), the district court certified the petition 
and the motion to this court.  We 
deny Ms. Garl's Motion to Dismiss and affirm the hearing examiner's order 
awarding benefits.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      The division 
raises these issues:

 

            
1.  Did the Hearing Examiner err in finding that Appellee's 
injury did not occur over a substantial period of time?

 

            
2.  Did the Hearing Examiner err in finding that Appellee 
established by clear and convincing evidence that neither her employer nor the 
Division [was] prejudiced by her untimely injury report?

 

            
3.  Whether dismissal is required because Petitioner is not a 
proper party or is without standing to pursue or perfect an appeal of the final 
agency decision in this matter.

 

Ms. Garl 
rephrases the issues as:

 

I.  Whether 
dismissal is required because Appellant/Petitioner is not a proper party or is 
without standing to pursue or perfect an appeal of the final agency decision in 
this matter?

 

            
II.  Whether the order finding compensable injury entered by 
the hearing examiner is supported by substantial evidence and is in accordance 
with law?

 

 

 

FACTS 

 

[¶3]      Ms. Garl was 
employed by the Wyoming Game and Fish Department (the employer).  As part of her duties in July 1999, she 
lifted and moved several heavy computers over a period of two to four 
weeks.  About a week after this 
project began, she suffered severe pain in her right shoulder.  Ms. Garl testified that she notified her 
supervisor and others at work that her shoulder hurt.  By September 1999, the pain had not 
subsided.  Accordingly, Ms. Garl 
made the first available appointment with a physician, which was on September 
29, 1999.

 

[¶4]      Six years prior, 
Ms. Garl had suffered an injury to the same shoulder when it was hyperextended 
and partially dislocated.  She 
underwent six weeks of therapy to improve her condition, which included muscle 
strengthening.  She testified that, 
in the interim, she had not suffered any further pain or problems with her 
shoulder until the most recent injury occurred at work.  The physician diagnosed Ms. Garl with an 
aggravation of a preexisting condition.  
The next day, Ms. Garl sought worker's compensation benefits and filed an 
injury report with the employer.  On 
October 8, 1999, Ms. Garl successfully underwent surgery to repair her 
shoulder.

 

[¶5]      The division 
denied benefits on October 5, 1999.  
In its Final Determination, the division contended Ms. Garl could not 
meet her burden of proof, her injury did not meet the required definition, the 
injury was preexisting, and she failed to timely report to her employer and 
timely file an injury report.  The 
case was referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings and was heard on 
March 23, 2000.

 

[¶6]      At the hearing, 
the division offered a physician's testimony that Ms. Garl's injury was not 
work-related but rather was the natural progression of her previous injury.  The division's physician had not 
examined Ms. Garl or personally asked her about her injury.  The hearing examiner found the opinion 
of Ms. Garl's physician more credible than the speculative opinion offered by 
the division's physician.  The 
hearing examiner determined Ms. Garl proved she had sustained a material 
aggravation to a preexisting shoulder condition and, therefore, sustained an 
injury covered by the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act.  The hearing examiner also concluded the 
evidence did not support the division's contention that the injury occurred over 
a substantial period of time.

 

[¶7]      Finally, the 
hearing examiner determined Ms. Garl knew or should have known she sustained a 
work-related injury when she made an appointment to seek medical treatment for 
her shoulder pain.  Therefore, she 
failed to timely file an injury report.  
However, the hearing examiner concluded Ms. Garl showed by clear and 
convincing evidence that neither the division nor the employer was prejudiced in 
investigating her accident or in monitoring her medical treatment.  The hearing examiner issued an order 
finding a compensable injury on April 20, 2000.  The division filed a Petition for 
Judicial Review in the First Judicial District Court.  Subsequently, Ms. Garl filed a Motion to 
Dismiss asserting the division was not a proper party and, therefore, did not 
have standing to appeal.  Pursuant 
to W.R.A.P. 12.09(b), the district court certified all issues to this 
court.

 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶8]      An administrative 
agency's decision certified directly to this court is reviewed under the same 
appellate standards applicable to the reviewing court of the first 
instance.  Collicott v. State ex 
rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 2001 WY 35, ¶4, 20 P.3d 1077, ¶4 (Wyo. 2001).  Our 
judicial review is limited to those considerations specified in Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 16-3-114(c) (LEXIS 1999) which provides in pertinent 
part:

 

(c)  To the extent necessary to make a 
decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant 
questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and 
determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.  In making the following determinations, 
the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party 
and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

 

                        
. . .

 

(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside 
agency action, findings and conclusions found to be:

 

(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 
of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law;

 

. . .

 

(E) Unsupported by substantial 
evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by 
statute.

 

[¶9]      The 
interpretation and correct application of the provisions of the Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act are questions of law over which our review authority is 
plenary.  Collicott, ¶4.  Conclusions of law made by an 
administrative agency are affirmed only if they are in accord with the law.  Id.  We do not afford any deference to the 
agency's determination, and we will correct any error made by the agency in 
either interpreting or applying the law.  
Id.

  

DISCUSSION

 

A.        
Occurrence of the Injury

 

[¶10]   The first question is whether Ms. 
Garl was required to prove the elements of a single occurrence injury or an 
injury which occurred over a substantial period of time.  The hearing examiner found the evidence 
did not support the division's assertion that the injury occurred over a 
substantial period of time.  The 
distinction is significant as the consequence of incurring an injury over a 
substantial period of time results in a higher burden of proof for the 
claimant.  Yenne-Tully v. Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Division, Department of Employment, 12 P.3d 170, 172 (Wyo. 2000).  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-603(a) 
(LEXIS 1999) reads:

 

(a)  The 
burden of proof in contested cases involving injuries which occur over a 
substantial period of time is on the employee to prove by competent medical 
authority that his claim arose out of and in the course of his employment and to 
prove by a preponderance of evidence that:

 

(i) 
There is a direct causal connection between the condition or circumstances under 
which the work is performed and the injury;

 

(ii) The 
injury can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work as a 
result of the employment;

 

(iii) 
The injury can fairly be traced to the employment as a proximate 
cause;

 

(iv) The 
injury does not come from a hazard to which employees would have been equally 
exposed outside of the employment;  
and

 

(v) The 
injury is incidental to the character of the business and not independent of the 
relation of employer and employee.

 

[¶11]   We note the parties' agreement that 
Ms. Garl's injury occurred over a two-week period and the real dispute at issue 
is whether that constitutes a single brief occurrence or one which occurred over 
a substantial period of time.  The 
determination of whether an injury was a single occurrence injury or an injury 
which occurred over time is one of fact.  
Murray v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation 
Division, 993 P.2d 327, 331 (Wyo. 1999).  We afford respect and deference to an 
administrative agency's findings of fact if they are supported by substantial 
evidence.  Aanenson v. State ex 
rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division, 842 P.2d 1077, 1079 (Wyo. 
1992).

 

[¶12]   The legislature does not provide 
direction as to the distinction between what constitutes an injury that was the 
result of a single brief occurrence as opposed to an injury which occurred over 
a substantial period of time.  
See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-503 (LEXIS 1999).  Yenne-Tulley, 12 P.3d  at 172, 
provides this court's most extensive direction regarding Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-603 (LEXIS 1999): 

 

[Section] 
27-14-603 was intended to require a higher burden of proof for workers claiming 
benefits for illnesses or injuries developing over time without a definite 
triggering accident or event.  Such 
situations might include repetitive motion injuries or repeated exposure to 
caustic or carcinogenic substances.  
In contrast, we have rejected the application of § 27-14-603 when the 
claimant's injury was precipitated by a single, identifiable 
incident.

 

[¶13]   We conclude there is substantial 
evidence to support the hearing examiner's factual findings.  In the absence of legislative guidance, 
we are hesitant to identify an exact time line which would distinguish between 
an injury that was the result of a single brief occurrence as opposed to an 
injury which occurred over a substantial period of time.  In this instance, Ms. Garl testified 
that she noticed pain after the first week of the project and the pain 
persisted.  Specifically, she 
stated, "About a week in to installing those computers, which involved picking 
them up and moving them around, and big heavy boxes, my shoulder started to 
hurt."  Her testimony suggests the 
injury occurred within a reasonably definite time period, which would adequately 
satisfy the requirement for a definite triggering accident or event.  We will not require rigid temporal 
precision.  

 

[¶14]   In addition, the hearing examiner 
was in the best position to judge the conflicting testimony offered at the 
hearing.  The hearing examiner's 
conclusion was reasonable given the speculative nature of the division's medical 
expert testimony, which was not based on a personal evaluation of Ms. Garl.  We conclude the hearing examiner did not 
err in deciding that Ms. Garl's injury did not occur over a substantial period 
of time.

 

B.        
Prejudice

 

[¶15]   The division argues the record 
demonstrates both the employer and the division were prejudiced in investigating 
the injury and monitoring Ms. Garl's medical treatment.  Ms. Garl failed to file a report within 
ten days as required by § 27-14-502(a).  
To overcome a presumption of claim denial for failure to timely file, Ms. 
Garl must show a lack of prejudice to her employer or the division in 
investigating the injury and monitoring medical treatment by clear and 
convincing evidence.  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 27-14-502(c) (LEXIS 1999).  
Whether a claimant has established a lack of prejudice pursuant to 
§ 27-14-502(c) is a question of fact.  
Payne v. Frontier Refining, Inc., 993 P.2d 313, 316 (Wyo. 
1999).  This court will affirm the 
hearing examiner's findings of fact if they are supported by substantial 
evidence.  Beitel v. State ex 
rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 991 P.2d 1242, 1244-45 (Wyo. 
1999).

 

[¶16]   We note our recent opinion in 
Wesaw v. Quality Maintenance, 2001 WY 17, ¶14, 19 P.3d 500, ¶14 (Wyo. 
2001), wherein we stated that the presumption of claim denial "does not arise 
unless an employee failed to report within 72 hours and failed to file an 
injury report within ten days."  In 
this instance, the hearing examiner did not make a determination as to whether 
Ms. Garl satisfied the seventy-two-hour report requirement.  Nevertheless, the failure to do so is of 
no consequence as we agree with the hearing examiner that prejudice did not 
exist.

 

[¶17]   The fact that Ms. Garl did not seek 
continuing medical treatment until after she filed for worker's compensation 
benefits and had seen a physician only one time prior to filing for benefits was 
an important consideration in the prejudice determination.  In addition, surgery was the only 
treatment recommended by Ms. Garl's physician.  There is no evidence to suggest surgery 
would have been avoided through conservative treatment during the time period 
between Ms. Garl's recognition of her injury and her injury report.  In fact, her treating physician stated 
that the only alternative procedure, an MRI, did not have the potential to 
improve the shoulder condition.

 

[¶18]   Finally, the division argues that, 
had Ms. Garl reported her injury when she first noticed pain, her employer could 
have altered her work assignment to avoid further damage to her shoulder.  There is nothing in the record to 
suggest a modification of her lifting activities would have made a 
difference.  The division's 
physician even testified the damage to Ms. Garl's shoulder was initiated prior 
to the injury at issue.  Moreover, 
there is evidence in the record to support Ms. Garl's assertion that she told 
her supervisor upon noticing pain in her shoulder.  This evidence is in dispute; however, 
the agency as the trier of fact is charged with weighing the evidence and 
determining the credibility of witnesses.  
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division v. 
Conner, 12 P.3d 707, 709 (Wyo. 2000).  
Under all the facts and circumstances, we conclude there is substantial 
evidence to affirm the hearing examiner's determination that Ms. Garl rebutted 
the statutory presumption that her claim should be denied.

 

C.        
Dismissal

 

[¶19]   Ms. Garl contends the division does 
not have standing to pursue an appeal from an award of benefits by the Office of 
Administrative Hearings.  This issue 
is entitled to a de novo review.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-614 (LEXIS 1999) provides in pertinent part:  "The director may appeal to the district 
court from any order or judgment of the hearing examiner awarding compensation 
or declining to award compensation although he was not a party to the 
proceedings before the hearing examiner."

            

[¶20]   We must interpret § 27-14-614 to 
properly resolve whether the division has standing to appeal.  This court interprets statutes by giving 
effect to the legislature's intent.  
Beitel, 991 P.2d  at 1246.  
We begin by making an inquiry relating to the ordinary and obvious 
meaning of the words employed according to their arrangement and 
connection.  Id.  We give effect to every word, clause, 
and sentence and construe together all components of a statute in pari 
materia.  Id.

 

[¶21]   Ms. Garl points to the current 
statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-13-101(a)(ii) (LEXIS 1999), which defines 
"director" as "the director of the division."  Furthermore, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-13-101(a)(iv) (LEXIS 1999) defines "division" as the "department of 
employment."  Consequently, Ms. Garl 
reasons that the only person with standing to appeal is the director of the 
department of employment, not the division.

 

[¶22]   The division contends "Garl's 
argument attempts to take advantage of confusion created by the legislature's 
inconsistent modification of the Worker's Compensation Act."  As noted by the division, prior to the 
Wyoming Government Reorganization Act of 1989 (WGRA), the division was part of 
the state treasurer's office.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-12-102(a)(v) (Michie 1983); 1989 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 139, § 
1.  At that time, the director was 
defined as "the director of the division."  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-12-102(a)(iv) (Michie 1983).  Pursuant to the WGRA, the division was 
assigned to the department of employment. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-2-2002(d)(i) 
(LEXIS 1999); 1989 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 139, § 1.  The WGRA defined "director" as "the 
administrative head of a department."  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-2-1703(a)(vi) (LEXIS 1999); 1989 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 
138, § 1.  Concurrently, the 
legislature defined "administrator" as "the administrative head of a division 
within a department."  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 9-2-1703(a)(i) (LEXIS 1999); 1989 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 138, § 1.  It is apparent that the legislature 
failed to change the references to "director" in the current form of the Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation Act to "administrator."  There is no question the division itself 
was a proper party with standing to appeal.  Upon review of the applicable statutory 
provisions and the legislative history, we conclude the Petition for Judicial 
Review was properly brought before this court.

 

[¶23]   Ms. Garl's Motion to Dismiss is 
denied, and the hearing examiner's order awarding benefits is 
affirmed.