Title: SOS STAFFING SERVICES, INC. v. FIELDS

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

SOS STAFFING SERVICES, INC. v. FIELDS2002 WY 14154 P.3d 761Case Number: 01-93Decided: 09/24/2002
April Term, A.D. 2002

 
 

SOS 
STAFFING SERVICES, INC., a

Utah 
corporation, and DANIEL L. PILLON,

 

Appellants(Defendants/Third 
Party Plaintiffs),

 

and

 

SCHLUMBERGER 
TECHNOLOGY

CORPORATION, 
a Texas corporation,

                                                                                                

                      
Appellant(Third Party Defendant),

 

v.

 

PAUL 
D. FIELDS,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 from 
the United States District Court for the District of 
Wyoming

The 
Honorable William F. Downes, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellants SOS Staffing Servs., Inc. and Pillon:

Gregory 
C. Dyekman and Brian C. Shuck of Dray, Thomson & Dyekman, P.C., Cheyenne, 
WY.  Argument by Mr. 
Dyekman.

 

Representing 
Appellant Schlumberger Technology Corp.:

Steven 
G. Greenlee and C. Michael Montgomery of Montgomery, Kolodny, Amatuzio, Dusbabek 
& Parker, L.L.P., Denver, CO.  
Argument by Mr. Greenlee.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

George 
Santini of Ross, Ross & Santini, L.L.C., Cheyenne, WY.  Argument by Mr. 
Santini.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN,* KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 

 

LEHMAN,  Justice.

 

[¶1]      This 
case comes to us on two certified questions from the United States District 
Court for the District of Wyoming: 

 

1.  Is 
a temporary employee entitled to "co-employee immunity" under the Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation Act for injuries he allegedly caused to a co-worker while 
working within the scope of his employment for the same 
employer?

 

2.  Is 
a temporary employment services provider vicariously liable to a worker 
allegedly injured by a temporary employee provided by the temporary employment 
services provider to the worker's employer?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶2]      The certification 
order from the United States District Court sets forth the following undisputed 
facts:

 

[¶3]      Dan Pillon was 
hired as an employee by Schlumberger Technology Corporation in 1980.  As of March 31, 1997, Mr. Pillon worked 
for Schlumberger as a senior operator.  
On March 31, 1997, Mr. Pillon resigned from his employment at 
Schlumberger so that he could access his profit sharing account in order to buy 
a ranch.  As part of his 
resignation, Mr. Pillon wanted to continue working for Schlumberger, and it was 
agreed between Mr. Pillon and Schlumberger that he could continue to work for 
the company under a temporary employee arrangement.

 

[¶4]      SOS Staffing 
Services provided temporary employment services to Schlumberger.  SOS Staffing provided payrolling 
services to Schlumberger with respect to Mr. Pillon.  Mr. Pillon was referred to SOS Staffing 
by Schlumberger to be hired and placed on the SOS "payroll."  Mr. Pillon then worked for Schlumberger 
as a temporary employee for a time determined by Schlumberger, and Schlumberger 
would pay SOS Staffing a fee from which SOS Staffing would pay Mr. Pillon.  Mr. Pillon's work for Schlumberger did 
not change with the change in his status from regular employee to temporary 
employee.  The nature, scope, 
details, manner, and method of Mr. Pillon's day-to-day work and duties did not 
change.  He continued to work as a 
senior operator, with the very same duties and responsibilities as a regular 
employee.  His typical work 
assignments were the same as before.  
He continued to be supervised by the same Schlumberger 
employees.

 

[¶5]      SOS Staffing 
provided no other services to Schlumberger with respect to Mr. Pillon other than 
the administrative payrolling services.  
SOS Staffing did not control the nature, scope, details, manner, or 
method of Mr. Pillon's day-to-day work or duties while he worked for 
Schlumberger as a temporary employee.  
SOS Staffing did not select, interview, screen, evaluate, supervise, or 
train Mr. Pillon.  Instead 
Schlumberger controlled, and had the right to control, the nature, scope, 
details, manner, and method of Mr. Pillon's day-to-day work and duties while he 
worked for Schlumberger as a temporary employee.  It was Schlumberger's obligation to 
interview, screen, select, refer, evaluate, supervise, and train Mr. 
Pillon.

 

[¶6]      On November 30, 
1997, Mr. Pillon was driving a Schlumberger vehicle to a well site as part of 
his duties as a senior operator for Schlumberger.  Mr. Fields, a regular employee of 
Schlumberger, was a passenger in the vehicle and was traveling to the well site 
as part of his duties as an operator for Schlumberger.  On the drive to the well site, Mr. 
Pillon unexpectedly encountered ice on the road, steered the Schlumberger 
vehicle to the side of the road, and hit a concrete culvert.  As a result, the vehicle rolled on its 
side.  Mr. Fields claims he was 
injured in this accident.  Mr. 
Fields received worker's compensation benefits for these alleged 
injuries.

 

[¶7]      Schlumberger and 
SOS Staffing are separate corporations that filed separate employer reports for 
purposes of complying with the provisions of the Wyoming Worker's Safety and 
Compensation Act.  On the report 
submitted on behalf of SOS Staffing, Daniel Pillon is listed as an employee of 
SOS at the time of the accident, and SOS Staffing paid premiums on his behalf to 
the Wyoming Worker's Safety and Compensation Division.  At the time of the accident, Paul Fields 
was listed as an employee of Schlumberger, and Schlumberger paid premiums to the 
Wyoming Worker's Safety and Compensation Division on his 
behalf.

 

[¶8]      Fields originally 
filed his complaint against SOS Staffing and Pillon in state court.  Pillon and SOS filed a notice of removal 
of the action to the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming on 
the basis of diversity of citizenship.  
Once in federal district court, Pillon and SOS answered and filed a 
third-party complaint against Schlumberger, claiming that they were entitled to 
indemnification by Schlumberger in the event it was determined that Fields was 
entitled to recover from them.  
Thereafter, Pillon, SOS, and Schlumberger moved for summary 
judgment.  Fields filed a response 
which was followed by Schlumberger's motion to certify the issues to this 
court.  The motion to certify was 
unopposed, and the federal district court entered its certification order on May 
2, 2001.

 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶9]      We review 
questions certified to this court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 11.  We review a district court's statutory 
interpretation de novo.  Basin 
Elec. Power Co-op v. Bowen, 979 P.2d 503, 506 (Wyo. 1999).  The primary objective in interpreting 
statutory language is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent.  US West Communications, Inc. v. 
Public Service Comm'n, 988 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Wyo. 1999).  Legislative intent is ascertained 
initially and primarily from the words used in the statute.  Wyoming Comty. College Comm'n v. 
Casper Comty. College Dist., 2001 WY 86, ¶16 31 P.3d 1242, ¶16 (Wyo. 
2001).  We look first to the 
plain and ordinary meaning of the words used in the statute.  Id. at ¶17.  When the words are clear and 
unambiguous, a court impermissibly risks substituting its own views for the 
intent of the legislature if it attempts to interpret or construe the statute on 
any basis other than the language used by the legislature.  Id. at ¶16.  Where statutory language conveys a clear 
and definite meaning, this court neither faces the need nor acquires the license 
to construe the statute.  US 
West, at 1064 (citing Matter of SYM, 924 P.2d 985, 987 (Wyo. 
1996)).

 

[¶10]   A statute is clear and unambiguous 
if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree on its meaning 
with consistency and predictability.  
Wyoming Comty. College Comm'n, at ¶17.  A statute is ambiguous if it is vague, 
uncertain, or subject to varying interpretations.  Id.  While differing opinions as to the 
meaning of a statute are not conclusive of ambiguity, they may be evidence of 
ambiguity.  Id.  Ultimately, whether a statute is 
ambiguous is a matter of law to be determined by the court.  Id.

 

[¶11]   In interpreting statutory language, 
we review all parts of the statute in pari materia, giving effect to each 
word, clause, and sentence so that no part will be inoperative or 
superfluous.  Matter of Interest 
of WJH, 2001 WY 54 ¶16, 24 P.3d 1147, ¶16 (Wyo. 2001).  We will not interpret statutes in a 
manner which renders any portion meaningless or produces absurd results.  Id.  

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

Applicability 
of co-employee immunity

 

[¶12]   In answering the first certified 
question, we begin with the language contained in our own Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-101, et seq.  In doing so, we are mindful of the 
legislative intent expressed in § 27-14-101(b) that the common law rule of 
"liberal construction" shall not apply and the Act is not to be given a broad 
liberal construction.  

 

[¶13]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-104 
(LexisNexis 2001), the immunity provision of Wyoming's Worker's Compensation 
Act, provides as follows:

 

(a)  The 
rights and remedies provided in this act for an employee including any joint 
employee, and his dependents for injuries incurred in extrahazardous employments 
are in lieu of all other rights and remedies against any 
employer and any joint employer making contributions 
required by this act, or their employees acting within the scope 
of their employment unless the employees intentionally act to cause physical 
harm or injury to the injured employee, but do not supersede any rights and 
remedies available to an employee and his dependents against any 
other person.

 

(b)  No 
contract, rule, regulation or device shall operate to relieve an employer from 
any liability created by this act except as otherwise provided by this 
act.

 

(c)  This 
act does not limit or affect any right or action by any employee and his 
dependents against an employer for injuries received while employed by the 
employer when the employer at the time of the injuries has not qualified under 
this act for the coverage of his eligible employees, or having qualified, has 
not paid the required premium on an injured employee's earnings within thirty 
(30) days of the date due. 

 

(Emphasis 
added.)

 

[¶14]   Under subsection (a) of this 
section, an employer making the required worker's compensation contributions is 
absolutely immune from liability for injuries suffered by an employee in the 
course of extrahazardous employment.  
Additionally under subsection (a), the immunity available to employers 
extends to their employees so long as they are acting within the scope of their 
employment and do not intentionally cause injury to a fellow employee.  Finally, subsection (a) specifies that 
the immunity provision leaves fully intact an injured employee's rights against 
any person other than his employer or another employee of his employer.  The first question we must answer, then, 
is whether Pillon was an employee of Schlumberger at the time of Fields' injury 
or was instead an "other person" within the meaning of § 27-14-104(a).  In making this determination, we look to 
the 1997 version of the Act in effect at the time of Field's 
injury.

 

[¶15]   The term "employee" is defined in § 
27-14-102(a)(vii) (Michie 1997) of the Act as follows: 

 

(vii)  "Employee" 
means any person engaged in any extrahazardous employment under any appointment, 
contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written, and 
includes legally employed minors and aliens authorized to work by the United 
States department of justice, immigration and naturalization service.  "Employee" does not 
include:

 

(A)  Any 
individual whose employment is determined to be casual 
labor;

 

(B)  A 
sole proprietor or a partner of a business partnership;

 

(C)  An 
officer of a corporation unless coverage is elected pursuant to W.S. 
27-14-108(k);

 

(D)  Any 
individual engaged as an independent contractor;

 

(E)  A 
spouse or dependent of an employer living in the employer's 
household;

 

(F)  A 
professional athlete;

 

(G)  An 
employee of a private household;

 

(H)  A 
private duty nurse engaged by a private party;

 

(J)  An 
employee of the federal government;

 

(K)  Any 
volunteer unless covered pursuant to W.S. 27-14-108(e);

 

(M)  Any 
prisoner or probationer unless covered pursuant to  W.S. 
27-14-108(d)(ix);

 

(N)  An 
elected public official, except for a duly elected or appointed 
sheriff;

 

(O)  The 
owner and operator of a motor vehicle which is leased or contracted with driver 
to a for-hire common or contract carrier. . . .

 

(P)  A 
member of a limited liability company unless coverage is elected pursuant to 
W.S. 27-14-108(n).

 

Reading 
this section alone, and giving the language its plain and ordinary meaning, it 
would seem that Pillon was an employee within the meaning of the Worker's 
Compensation Act he was a person engaged in extrahazardous employment under a 
contract of hire at the time Fields was injured and did not fall within any of 
the exclusions set forth in (vii)(A) through (P).  However, § 27-14-102(a)(vii) cannot be 
read in isolation; it must be read in light of other provisions of the Act, and 
effect must be given to each word, clause, and sentence so that no portion is 
rendered meaningless or superfluous.  
Matter of Interest of WJH, 2001 WY 54 ¶16.  

 

[¶16]   Pillon and SOS Staffing argue in 
their reply brief that in determining whether Pillon is entitled to immunity 
under § 27-14-104, the court need look only at the definition of employee 
contained in the act.  We do not 
agree.  As we have said, § 27-14-104 
merely extends the immunity available to employers to "their" employees; it does 
not create immunity for employees separate and apart from that available to 
their employers.  If an employer is 
not entitled to immunity for some reason, neither are its employees.  Therefore, in determining whether an 
employee is entitled to immunity, we must also determine whether the employer 
is, in fact, an employer as defined by the Act.

 

[¶17]   W.S. 27-14-102(a)(viii) (Michie 
1997) provides as follows:

 

(viii)  "Employer" 
means any person or entity employing an employee engaged in any extrahazardous 
occupation or electing coverage under W.S. 27-14-108(j) and at least one (1) of 
whose employees is described in W.S. 27-14-301.  "Employer" 
includes:

 

(A)  The 
department of employment for Federal Job Training Partnership Act participants 
if that participation does not otherwise establish a covered occupational 
arrangement between the employer and employee 
relationship;

 

(B)  The 
governmental entity for which recipients of public assistance perform work if 
that work does not otherwise establish a covered employer and employee 
relationship;

 

(C)  The 
governmental entity for which volunteers perform the specified volunteer 
activities under W.S. 27-14-108(e);   

 

(D)  The 
governmental entity for which prisoners and probationers work or perform 
community service under W.S. 27-14-108(d)(ix) or (xv);

 

(E)  An 
owner-operator of a mine at which any mine rescue operation or training 
occurs;

 

(F)  A 
temporary service contractor for a temporary 
worker;

 

(G)  Any 
person, contractor, firm, association or corporation otherwise qualifying under 
this paragraph as an employer and who utilizes the services of a worker 
furnished by another contractor, joint employer, firm, association, person or 
corporation other than a temporary service contractor, 
joint employer, independent contractor or owner and operator excluded as an 
employee under subparagraph (a)(vii)(O) of this section;

 

(H)  Any 
employer otherwise qualifying under this paragraph as an employer and 
participating in a school-to-work program approved by the department of 
employment, any local school district board of trustees, community college 
district board of trustees or the department of education, and the employer 
previously elected coverage in writing pursuant to W.S. 27-14-108(m). 

 

(Emphasis 
added.)

 

[¶18]   Giving the language in the section 
its plain and ordinary meaning, it is clear that a temporary service contractor 
is the "employer" of a temporary worker for purposes of the Worker's 
Compensation Act.  Subsection (F) 
expressly provides that a temporary service contractor is the employer for a 
temporary service worker.  
Consistent with subsection (F), subsection (G) clearly provides that the 
term "employer" includes anyone using the services of a worker furnished by 
another, except in the case of a temporary service contractor furnishing 
the services of a worker to another.  
In the latter case, unlike other situations involving workers furnished 
to another, the temporary service contractor is the "employer" for Worker's 
Compensation pursuant to the plain language of subsection (F).  Section 27-14-102(a)(xxv) (Michie 1997) 
further clarifies subsections (F) and (G) by defining "temporary service 
contractor" as "any person, firm, association or corporation conducting a 
business that employs individuals directly for the purpose of furnishing 
services of the employed individuals on a temporary basis to 
others."

 

[¶19]   Schlumberger, Pillon, and SOS 
Staffing cite Franks v. Olson, 975 P.2d 588 (Wyo. 1999) as support for 
their argument that Pillon is a co-employee and immune from liability under 
Wyoming's Worker's Compensation Act.  
However, Franks was decided under the 1992 version of the Act 
which did not contain the temporary service contractor language contained in the 
Act at the time of Field's injury.  
Absent the specific language added in 1995 defining temporary service 
contractors as the employer, the court looked to the definitions of employee and 
employer contained in the 1992 version and, based upon those definitions, 
concluded that Olson was a co-employee and immune from liability.  Because Franks was decided under 
an older version of the Act which did not include the current temporary service 
contractor language, the case is not relevant to our 
determination.

 

[¶20]   Giving the applicable statutory 
language its plain and ordinary meaning, SOS Staffing was a temporary service 
contractor pursuant to § 27-14-102(a)(xxv) and was Pillon's employer pursuant to 
§ 27-14-102(a)(viii)(F).  Given the 
very specific language of W.S. 27-14-102(viii)(G) excluding temporary service 
contractors, Schlumberger was not, and by express statutory directive could not 
be, Pillon's employer for purposes of the Worker's Compensation Act.  The conclusion that Schlumberger was not 
Pillon's employer as that term is expressly and very specifically defined in 
Wyoming's worker's compensation statutes compels the further conclusion that the 
immunity available to Schlumberger does not extend to Pillon.  As we have said previously, Pillon is 
entitled to immunity only to the extent that immunity is available to his 
employer.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-104(a).  Stated differently, 
employee immunity is merely an extension of the employer immunity.  Pillon's employer, SOS Staffing, has no 
immunity from liability for injuries to Fields because SOS Staffing paid no 
premiums on his behalf, and he is not an SOS Staffing employee.  SOS Staffing having no immunity from 
liability for Fields' injuries, Pillon likewise has no such 
immunity.

 

[¶21]   In reaching this result, we are 
aware that many legal authorities and jurisdictions which have addressed the 
issue have reached the opposite result.  
Restatement, Second, Agency § 227 (1958) states that "[a] servant 
directed or permitted by his master to perform services for another may become 
the servant of such other in performing the services."  30 C.J.S., Employers' Liability, 
§ 175 (1992) states "[a]n employee of one employer who is lent to, and becomes 
subject to the control of, another employer is generally regarded, as far as 
concerns the application of the fellow-servant rule, as the employee of the 
employer to whom he is lent."  
Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999) similarly defines 
"employee" as "a person who works in the service of another person (the 
employer) under an express or implied contract of hire, under which the employer 
has the right to control the details of work performance."  Black's specifically acknowledges that 
the employer of an employee borrowed from another may be entitled to assert 
immunity under worker's compensation laws in some jurisdictions.   While we are aware of these 
authorities, we are constrained by the specific language in Wyoming's worker's 
compensation statutes to hold that Pillon is not an employee of Schlumberger and 
for that reason Schlumberger's immunity from liability for Fields' injuries does 
not extend to Pillon.

 

Vicarious 
liability of SOS Staffing

 

[¶22]   Certified question two asks us to 
determine whether a temporary employment services provider is vicariously liable 
to a worker injured by a temporary employee provided by the temporary employment 
service to the worker's employer.  
We impute vicarious liability to employers for the acts of their 
employees where the employer controls the details of the employee's work 
activities.  State ex re. 
Workers' Safety & Compensation Div. v. Sparks, 973 P.2d 507, 511 
(Wyo. 1999).  Vicarious liability 
does not attach where the employer retains no right of control.  Id. 

 

[¶23]   Here, the certified facts are that 
SOS Staffing provided no services with respect to Pillon except administrative 
payrolling services.  SOS Staffing 
did not control the nature, scope, details, manner, or method of Pillon's 
day-to-day work or duties while he worked for Schlumberger as a temporary 
employee.  Schlumberger controlled 
and had the right to control the nature, scope, details, manner, and method of 
Pillon's day-to-day work and duties while he worked for Schlumberger.  On the date of the injury, Pillon was 
driving a Schlumberger vehicle to a well site as part of his duties as a senior 
operator for Schlumberger when he encountered ice on the road, steered the 
vehicle to the side, and hit a concrete culvert.  The vehicle rolled on its side, and 
Fields was injured.  Under these 
facts, we cannot impute any negligence on the part of Pillon to SOS 
Staffing.  

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶24]   We answer the certified questions 
as follows:

 

1.  Schlumberger 
was not Pillon's employer at the time of Field's injuries under the very 
specific language of Wyoming's Worker's Compensation Act.  Pillon is not, therefore, entitled to 
immunity from liability for Fields' injuries.

 

2.  SOS 
Staffing did not retain control of Pillon's work activities while hired out as a 
temporary worker for Schlumberger and is not, therefore, vicariously liable for 
Field's injuries.