Title: State v. Marquis D. Rosenburg

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
95-1760-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Marquis D. Rosenburg, 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
March 20, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
January 10, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Washington 
 
JUDGE: 
James B. Schwalbach 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs (in 
the court of appeals) and oral argument by Colin C. Hagensick, 
Milwaukee. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Susan K. Ullman, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief (in the Supreme Court) was James E. Doyle, attorney 
general. 
 
No. 95-1760-CR 
 
1 
  
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 95-1760-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
  
Plaintiff - Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
Marquis D. Rosenburg, 
 
 
Defendant - Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
  MAR 20, 1997    
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court 
for Washington County, James B. Schwalbach, Judge.  Reversed. 
¶1 
WILLIAM 
A. 
BABLITCH, 
J. 
 
Marquis 
D. 
Rosenburg 
(Rosenburg), appeals his conviction for escape from custody, 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 946.42 (1993-94).  While Rosenburg was 
a probationer on work-release from the county jail, he failed to 
return to jail.  As a result, he was convicted of escape.  
Rosenburg appeals his conviction, relying on State v. Schaller, 
70 Wis. 2d 107, 233 N.W.2d 416 (1975), which held that a 
probationer confined in a county jail as a condition of 
probation could not be convicted of escape for failure to return 
from work release.  The State of Wisconsin (State) contends that 
the legislature’s 1983 amendments to the probation statute 
overruled Schaller and, hence, bring Rosenburg’s failure to 
return to jail within the purview of the escape statute.  We 
disagree.  We conclude that the 1983 amendments to the probation 
statute did not affect the escape statute in any way relevant to 
No. 95-1760-CR 
 
2 
this case and, therefore, Schaller governs the escape statute 
that was in effect when Rosenburg committed the act for which he 
was charged and convicted of escape.
1  Accordingly, we reverse. 
¶2 
The relevant facts are not in dispute.  As a result of 
his four misdemeanor convictions, Rosenburg was placed on 
probation.  As a condition of probation, the circuit court 
ordered him to serve 11 months in the Washington County jail 
with 
work-release 
privileges 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
973.09(4)(1993-94), cited below.
2  On August 13, 1994, while on 
work-release, Rosenburg failed to return to jail.  Consequently, 
the State charged him with escape. 
¶3 
Rosenburg moved to dismiss the charge, relying on 
Schaller, 70 Wis. 2d 107.  The circuit court denied Rosenburg’s 
motion, concluding that the legislature’s 1983 amendments to the 
probation statute functionally overruled Schaller.  Following a 
bench trial, Rosenburg was convicted of escape.  On appeal, the 
court of appeals certified the matter to this court asking us to 
                     
1 Rosenburg was charged and convicted under Wis. Stat. 
§ 946.42 (1993-94).  The escape statute was amended in 1996.  
Because the question is not before us, we decline to rule on the 
impact the 1996 amendments have on Schaller. 
2 Section 973.09(4), Stats., provides in relevant part: 
The court may also require as a condition of 
probation that the probationer be confined during 
such period of the term of probation as the court 
prescribes, but not to exceed one year.  The 
court may grant the privilege of leaving the 
county jail, Huber facility or tribal jail during 
the hours or periods of employment or other 
activity under s. 303.08(1)(a) to (e) while 
confined under this subsection. 
No. 95-1760-CR 
 
3 
determine whether the legislature’s 1983 amendments to the 
probation statute overruled Schaller. 
¶4 
The issue before us is whether the 1983 amendments to 
the probation statute modified the effect of our interpretation 
of the escape statute in Schaller, i.e., whether the 1983 
amendments to the probation statute make a probationer subject 
to the escape statute for failure to return to jail from work 
release when he or she is subject to an order of confinement as 
a condition of probation. 
¶5 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law 
which we review de novo without deference to the decisions of 
the lower courts.  Eby v. Kozarek, 153 Wis. 2d 75, 79, 450 
N.W.2d 249 (1990).   
¶6 
The cardinal rule in statutory interpretation is to 
discern the intent of the legislature.  Scott v. First State 
Ins. Co., 155 Wis. 2d 608, 612, 456 N.W.2d 152 (1990).  We 
ascertain legislative intent by examining the language of the 
statute, as well as its scope, history, context, subject matter, 
and purpose.  Id.; see also Voss v. City of Middleton, 162 Wis. 
2d 737, 
749, 
470 
N.W.2d 
625 (1991). 
 When 
determining 
legislative intent, we must assume that the lawmakers knew the 
law in effect at the time they acted. Milwaukee v. Kilgore, 193 
Wis. 2d 168, 183, 532 N.W.2d 690 (1995). 
¶7 
The escape statute in effect at the time of the 1983 
amendments had been interpreted by this court in Schaller.  
Thus, we begin our analysis with an examination of Schaller, in 
which we concluded that probationers serving time in jail as a 
condition of probation cannot be convicted under the escape 
No. 95-1760-CR 
 
4 
statute.  Next, we examine the probation statute in effect when 
Schaller was decided and the 1983 amendments to the probation 
statute.  Finally, we consider whether the 1983 amendments to 
the probation statute affected our interpretation of the escape 
statute. 
¶8 
In Schaller, the court interpreted the escape statute. 
 Schaller, 70 Wis. 2d 107.  Schaller held that a probationer, 
confined to jail as a condition of probation, was not subject to 
the escape statute for failure to return to jail from work 
release.  Id.  In reaching its conclusion, the court looked at 
the language of the escape statute which stated that it governs 
persons in custody.  Id. at 110.  The statute defined “custody” 
as the “’actual custody’ of an institution [or of] a peace 
officer or institutional guard and ‘constructive custody’ of 
prisoners 
outside 
the 
institution.” 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 946.42(5)(b)(1973-74).  The escape statute explicitly referred 
to the custody of probationers: “[custody] does not include the 
custody of a probationer or parolee by the department of health 
and social services or a probation or parole officer unless the 
prisoner is in actual custody . . . .”  Schaller, 70 Wis. 2d at 
110 (emphasis added). 
¶9 
The Schaller court concluded that a probationer is in 
actual custody only during periods of actual confinement.  Id. 
at 113. During periods of release, the court concluded, a 
probationer was within the statutory exception to "custody," 
and, therefore, could not commit an “escape” during such a 
release.  Id.  
No. 95-1760-CR 
 
5 
¶10 Construction given to a statute by the supreme court 
becomes part of the statute unless the legislature subsequently 
amends the statute to effect change.  State ex rel. La Follette 
v. Circuit Court, 37 Wis. 2d 329, 341, 155 N.W.2d 141, 147 
(1967).  The substantive language of the escape statute 
pertinent to this action did not change between the time of our 
interpretation of the escape statute in Schaller and the facts 
that gave rise to this case.  Thus, the matter would seem to be 
resolved.  However, the State argues that it is the amendment to 
the probation statute that alters our interpretation of the 
escape statute in Schaller.  The interaction of two statutes can 
create an ambiguity in the law.  Wyss v. Albee, 193 Wis. 2d 101, 
110, 532 N.W.2d 444 (1995).  Ergo, we examine the probation 
statute in our interpretation of the escape statute. 
¶11 At the time of Schaller, the probation statute read in 
relevant part: 
 
The court may also require as a condition of 
probation that the probationer be confined in the 
county jail between the hours or periods of his 
employment 
during 
such 
portion 
of 
his 
term 
of 
probation as the court specifies, but not to exceed 
one year and the court shall require him to pay the 
costs as provided in s. 56.08(4).  While confined 
pursuant to this subsection he shall be subject to all 
the rules of the jail and the discipline of the 
sheriff. 
Wis. Stat. § 973.09(4)(1973-74).  In 1983, the legislature 
amended the probation statute to read in relevant part: 
 
The court may also require as a condition of 
probation that the probationer be confined during such 
period 
of 
the 
term 
of 
probation 
as 
the 
court 
prescribes, but not to exceed one year.  The court may 
grant the privilege of leaving the county jail . . . 
during the hours or periods of employment or other 
activity under s. 56.08(1)(a) to (e) while confined 
under this subsection.  The court may specify the 
necessary and reasonable hours or periods during which 
No. 95-1760-CR 
 
6 
the probationer may leave the jail . . . or the court 
may delegate the authority to the sheriff. . . . While 
subject to this subsection, the probationer is subject 
to s. 56.08(1), (3) to (6), (8) to (12) and (14), all 
the rules of the county jail, Huber facility or tribal 
jail and the discipline of the sheriff.   
1983 Wis. Acts 104, § 1; 254, § 5; 538, § 260 (emphasis added). 
Wis. Stat. § 973.09(4)(1983-84).  The amended probation statute 
gives the sheriff more control over the probationer.  It allows 
the sheriff, under Wis. Stat. § 303.08(10), to discipline the 
probationer by refusing to permit him or her to leave jail for 
work release.  The State argues that this new power to 
discipline the probationer, by denying him or her permission to 
leave the jail for work release, gives the sheriff constructive 
custody of probationers during work release periods.  The State 
argues that this modification in custodial control undermines 
Schaller’s analysis of the escape statute.  We disagree. 
¶12 The language in the escape statute that was applied to 
Rosenburg expressly applies only to the probationer who is in 
actual custody.  Wis. Stat. § 946.42(1)(a)(1993-94).   Under 
Schaller, Rosenburg’s failure to return to jail at the end of 
his work day is not a violation of the escape statute because he 
was not in actual custody.  
¶13 Therefore, 
the 
only 
issue 
is 
whether 
the 
1983 
amendments to the probation statute in some way modify our 
interpretation of the escape statute.  We must presume that the 
legislature was aware of our decision in Schaller when it 
amended the probation statute.  Kilgore, 193 Wis. 2d at 183. 
¶14 The plain language of the amended probation statute 
reveals no hint of legislative intent to alter Schaller’s 
No. 95-1760-CR 
 
7 
interpretation 
of 
the 
effect 
the 
escape 
statute 
has 
on 
probationers who fail to return from work release.   
¶15 Nor 
does 
the 
legislative 
history 
of 
the 
1983 
amendments indicate that the legislature amended the probation 
statute in response to Schaller.  Indeed, the legislative 
history of the amendments to the probation statute does not 
reflect any intent to alter the law of escape.  On the contrary, 
the legislative history of these amendments indicates that the 
legislature’s actions were motivated by a desire to ease 
administrative burdens of the probation system, and to harmonize 
the sheriff’s administration of the work-release program. 
¶16 In sum, we find nothing in the language, or the 
legislative history of the amended probation statute, to 
indicate an intent by the legislature to affect our holding in 
Schaller.  The court’s construction of a statute will stand 
unless the legislature specifically changes the particular 
holding.  City of Muskego v. Godec, 167 Wis. 2d 536, 545, 482 
N.W.2d 79, 83 (1992).  We conclude that the legislature did not 
change our holding in Schaller when it enacted the 1983 
amendments to the probation statute. 
¶17 We note that in 1996, the legislature amended the 
escape statute.  1995 Wis. Act 154.  While the 1996 amendment is 
not applicable to Rosenburg because his failure to return to 
jail occurred in 1994, the language and history of the new 
escape statute indicate that the legislature itself believed 
that the 1983 amendments to the probation statute did not affect 
the escape statute.  The Legislative Reference Bureau’s analysis 
of the 1996 amendment provide: 
 
No. 95-1760-CR 
 
8 
This bill makes various changes relating to 
persons who are confined in a jail or similar facility 
as a condition of probation: 
 
. . .  
 
2. Current law provides penalties for persons who 
escape from custody.  The prohibitions apply to a 
person on probation only when the person is in actual 
custody, such as in custody in a jail.  This bill 
makes a probationer subject to the escape law at all 
times when he or she is subject to an order of 
confinement as a condition of probation. 
¶18 We are careful to note that the legislative history of 
the 1996 amendments is not dispositive of the legislature’s 
intent 
in 
1983. 
 
Nonetheless, 
this 
clear 
expression 
of 
legislative intent to change the escape statute reinforces our 
conclusion. 
¶19 We conclude that the 1983 amendments to the probation 
statute did not modify Schaller.  Therefore, we hold that the 
escape statute in effect at the time Rosenburg failed to return 
to jail did not apply to a probationer who failed to return to 
jail while released from the sheriff’s actual custody.  Hence, 
Rosenburg did not fall within the purview of the escape statute 
when he was convicted for failure to return to jail from work 
release.  Accordingly, we reverse. 
By the Court.— Order and judgment reversed.