Title: In re NonTestimonial Identification Order

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

In re Non-Testimonial Identification Order (99-353); 171 Vt. 227; 
762 A.2d 1239 

[Filed 01-Sep-2000]
[Motion to Stay Mandate Denied 25-Sep-2000 and 4-Oct-2000]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of  Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 99-353

In re Non-Testimonial Identification	         Supreme Court
Order Directed to R.H.
                                                 Original Jurisdiction

                                                 November Term, 1999

Ben W. Joseph, J.

William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and David Tartter, Assistant Attorney 
  General, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Robert Appel, Defender General, and Henry Hinton, Appellate Attorney, 
  Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       DOOLEY, J.   Defendant R.H. appeals from an order of the Lamoille
  District Court holding  him in civil contempt for refusing to comply with a
  nontestimonial identification order that required  him to submit to the
  collection of cheek epithelial cells (saliva) by swabbing the interior of
  his  mouth.  On appeal, defendant argues that (1) the affidavit filed in
  support of the nontestimonial  identification order does not show
  reasonable grounds to suspect that he committed the crime, and  (2) Article
  11 of the Vermont Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United
  States  Constitution require probable cause before a court may authorize
  collection of saliva by swabbing  the inside of the mouth.  We affirm.

       Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 41.1 provides the authority for
  nontestimonial 

 

  identification orders (NTOs).  Rule 41.1 provides that an NTO must be
  issued by a judicial officer  and be based on a sworn affidavit
  establishing:

    (1) that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has
    been  committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds, that need
    not  amount to probable cause to arrest, to suspect that the
    person named  or described in the affidavit committed the offense;
    and (3) that the  results of specific nontestimonial
    identification procedures will be of  material aid in determining
    whether the person named in the affidavit  committed the offense.

  V.R.Cr.P. 41.1(c).  The order may be issued prior to the arrest of a
  suspect, after arrest and prior to  trial, or during trial if special
  circumstances warrant it.  See id. 41.1(b).  The order may require the 
  suspect to appear at a specified time and place for identification by,
  among other things, fingerprints,  blood specimens, urine specimens, saliva
  samples, hair samples, handwriting examples, or voice  samples.  See id. 
  41.1(d), (m)(3).  If there is a danger that the suspect may flee, or alter
  or destroy  the evidence sought, the NTO may provide that a law enforcement
  officer detain the suspect in order  to bring the suspect before the
  judicial officer for expeditious identification procedures.  See id. 
  41.1(d).  Rule 41.1 "is intended to provide a procedure equivalent to a
  search warrant for obtaining  non-testimonial identification evidence." 
  Reporter's Notes, V.R.Cr.P. 41.1.  Rule 41.1, however,  authorizes the
  detention of suspects for the identification procedure on less than
  probable cause,  requiring only "reasonable grounds" to suspect the subject
  committed the identified crime.  V.R.Cr.P.  41.1.  

       The NTO in dispute was issued in the course of the investigation of a
  notorious homicide  committed some nine years ago.  Patricia Scoville, a
  28-year-old woman, was reported missing on  October 23, 1991, after she
  failed to return from a bicycle ride.  Her bicycle was found near Moss 
  Glen Falls, a rural, wooded area about four miles outside of Stowe and just
  off Route 100.  After a 

 

  six-day search, her body was discovered in a shallow grave, hidden under
  layers of leaves and pine  boughs.  She had suffered a deep laceration on
  the back of her head, and the cause of death was  found to have been
  asphyxia.  There were indications of sexual assault, and seminal fluid
  containing  DNA was found on the body.  

       On June 22, 1999, police obtained an NTO requiring defendant to
  provide a sample of his  saliva to compare with the DNA found at the crime
  scene.  The affidavit supporting the request for  the NTO indicates that
  defendant has a history of sexual assault and violence, and that he lived
  near - and was familiar with - the Moss Glen Falls area at the time of the
  homicide.  It contains the  following specific information:

    1.  Defendant was committed to the Vermont State Hospital in 1972 
    for four years after assaulting and attempting to rape a female
    who  was traveling alone.  Defendant used a knife during this
    attack.  He  also attacked two other people while hospitalized. 

    2.  Defendant was convicted of simple assault in 1977, after
    originally  being charged with lewd and lascivious conduct. 
    Further, he was  convicted of lewd and lascivious conduct in 1981.
    (FN1) Both of  these crimes are described in the affidavit as
    involving "assaults on  female strangers."

    3.  On October 13, 1997, defendant was arraigned on charges of 
    attempted kidnapping and attempted sexual assault, arising out of
    an  incident in which he was in his car when he saw a woman
    walking  alone.  He ran up behind her with a belt in his hands,
    held over his  head as if to strangle her.  He struggled with the
    victim, but she  eventually escaped.

    4. Defendant lived for many years in the area where the Scoville 
    homicide took place, and lived in that area at the time of the 
    homicide.  He lived with a girlfriend from the early 1980's until
    May 

 

    1991 in various towns around the area.  In 1990 and early 1991,
    they  lived together in Wolcott.  During that time defendant was
    not  employed but would leave the house for long periods during
    the day  and drive around in his car.

    5.  On May 19, 1991, defendant's girlfriend obtained an abuse 
    prevention order against him, removing him from their home.  She 
    claimed that they had a violent relationship: he struck her,
    threatened  to cut off her head with a chain saw, and attempted to
    rape her.  After  he was removed from their home, defendant lived
    with acquaintances  in Hyde Park.  He had his own car and
    continued to spend his days  driving around.  On occasion he would
    visit relatives in Barre,  traveling through Stowe on Route 100,
    past the area where the  Scoville homicide occurred.  Also during
    that time, defendant gave  one of the acquaintances with whom he
    was living, a wrecker  operator, detailed directions to a remote
    area off the Moss Glen Falls  Road in Stowe, an area close to the
    where the Scoville body was  recovered.  Then, in the Fall of
    1991, he was asked to move out of his  acquaintances' residence
    because of an unprovoked attack on a  mutual friend.  

       On the basis of these facts, the Lamoille District Court issued an NTO
  requiring defendant to  give a sample of his saliva to compare his DNA to
  that found on the Scoville body.  Defendant  moved to quash the NTO,
  arguing that the affidavit failed to show reasonable suspicion that he 
  murdered Patricia Scoville, and, in any event, that the applicable
  provisions of the Federal and  Vermont constitutions require that the
  prosecution show probable cause that he was responsible.  The  district
  court rejected the constitutional argument and held that the prosecution
  had shown reasonable  suspicion that defendant killed Patricia Scoville
  based on his opportunity to commit the crime, his  familiarity with the
  area, and his long history of sexual assault on women.

       When defendant failed to appear as ordered pursuant to the NTO, the
  court held him in  contempt.  Defendant appeals from that contempt
  adjudication raising the same challenges as he  raised in the district
  court.

       There is no claim that the prosecution has not met the first and third
  of the three prongs of the 

 

  NTO standard - there is probable cause that an offense has been committed,
  and the results of the  NTO procedure will be of "material aid" in
  determining whether defendant committed the crime.   Thus, the first
  question before us is whether the prosecution's showing meets the second
  prong of the  NTO requirements: Are there reasonable grounds to suspect
  that defendant committed the offense?  

       This prong involves a familiar standard, essentially identical to that
  established in Terry v.  Ohio,