Title: State v. Donald J. McGuire

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2010 WI 91 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP2711-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Donald J. McGuire, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 320 Wis. 2d 482, 769 N.W.2d 877 
(Ct. App 2009-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 20, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 5, 2010   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth   
 
JUDGE: 
James L. Carlson   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Robert R. Henak and the Henak Law Office, S.C., Milwaukee, and 
oral argument by Robert R. Henak. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Daniel 
J. O’Brien, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 91
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2007AP2711-CR   
(L.C. No. 
2005CF80) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Donald J. McGuire, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 20, 2010 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of 
Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals, State v. McGuire, 
No. 2007AP2711-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. May 20, 
2009), affirming a judgment of the Walworth County Circuit 
Court, James L. Carlson, Judge.  Father Donald J. McGuire 
(McGuire) was charged in 2005 with five counts of indecent 
behavior with a child, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 944.11(2) 
(1965-66).  The charges were based on acts that McGuire 
committed between 1966 and 1968.  Although prosecutions under 
§ 944.11(2) are subject to the six-year statute of limitations 
No.  2007AP2711-CR 
2 
 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.74(1) 
(2007-08),1 
the 
statute 
of 
limitations was tolled while McGuire was not publicly a resident 
of Wisconsin.  Wis. Stat. § 939.74(3).2  A jury convicted McGuire 
on all five counts. 
¶2 
McGuire filed a postconviction motion that the circuit 
court denied.  The court of appeals affirmed.  In this court, 
McGuire raises four issues: (1) whether the tolling provision of 
Wis. Stat. § 939.74(3) is unconstitutional as applied to the 
facts of this case; (2) whether charges were barred by due 
process because of the roughly 36 years that passed between the 
offenses and the charges; (3) whether reversal in the interest 
of justice under Wis. Stat. § 751.06 is appropriate; and (4) 
whether McGuire was denied effective assistance of counsel. 
¶3 
We 
conclude 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.74(3) 
is 
constitutional as applied to the facts of this case.  It does 
not violate the Privileges and Immunities, Due Process, or Equal 
Protection 
provisions 
of 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution.  
Section 939.74(3) does not burden a fundamental right, and it is 
rationally related to the legitimate governmental interests of 
detecting crimes and apprehending criminals. 
¶4 
We next conclude that the charges were not barred by 
due process.  McGuire has failed to allege an improper motive or 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.74(3) has been part of the Wisconsin 
Criminal Code since December 1955. 
No.  2007AP2711-CR 
3 
 
purpose on the part of the State, which is a necessary 
prerequisite for dismissal based on pre-indictment delay. 
¶5 
We also are satisfied that McGuire received a fair 
trial in which the real controversy was fully tried and justice 
has not for any reason miscarried.  Therefore, reversal in the 
interest of justice is inappropriate. 
¶6 
Finally, we reject McGuire's contention that he was 
denied effective assistance of counsel.  The two decisions of 
trial 
counsel 
that 
McGuire 
claims 
constituted 
deficient 
performance were part of a reasonable trial strategy. 
¶7 
For the reasons set forth, we affirm the court of 
appeals. 
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶8 
The facts are disputed, but the evidence at trial 
showed the following: McGuire was a Jesuit priest who taught at 
the Loyola Academy in Wilmette, Illinois, a suburb of Chicago.  
The priests who taught at the school lived in a residence 
attached to the school.  Loyola Academy was not a boarding 
school, and students do not live on the campus.  Students were 
permitted in the Jesuits' residence only for limited purposes, 
such as helping to carry a package.  
¶9 
Victor B. was 13 years old when he began attending 
Loyola in the fall of 1966.  McGuire offered to counsel and 
tutor Victor, who was having trouble in school.  McGuire then 
had Victor live with him in his residence at Loyola.  While 
living in the room, Victor would sleep in the same bed as 
No.  2007AP2711-CR 
4 
 
McGuire, often in the nude.  The two began giving each other 
body massages, which included touching each others' genitals.  
¶10 During this time, McGuire became acquainted with 
Victor's uncle, Harry B.  In the spring of 1967, McGuire began 
visiting Harry's cottage in Fontana, Wisconsin.  While McGuire 
and Victor were in Wisconsin——whether they were riding in the 
car or at the cottage——McGuire would give Victor what he 
referred to as "horse bites," which he would perform by grabbing 
Victor below his groin and brushing his hand over Victor's 
genitals.  The "horse bites" continued through the summer of 
1968.  
¶11 Sometime around November of 1967, McGuire visited the 
Fontana cottage while Victor was there.  The only other person 
at the cottage at that time was Victor's grandmother.  While 
Victor was in bed, McGuire entered the room, and Victor 
pretended to be asleep.  McGuire put his hands down Victor's 
pants and squeezed his testicles and penis to wake him up.  
¶12 In the fall of 1968, Victor returned to Loyola Academy 
but stopped living in McGuire's room.  The sexual contact 
stopped at that time. 
¶13 Sean C. was 14 years old when he began attending 
Loyola Academy in August of 1968.  Because Sean was having 
problems getting to school, he was sent to see McGuire for 
guidance counseling.  McGuire suggested that Sean stay at Loyola 
to avoid the problem of getting to school in the morning.  
McGuire told Sean to tell his father that he was sleeping in 
McGuire's guidance office, when in fact Sean was staying in bed 
No.  2007AP2711-CR 
5 
 
with McGuire.  Sean testified that McGuire took steps to hide 
the fact that Sean was living with McGuire.  
¶14 While Sean was staying in McGuire's room, the two 
began to give each other massages.  During these massages, 
McGuire would touch Sean's penis and have Sean touch his.  
¶15 McGuire took Sean on several trips.  Sometime between 
Thanksgiving and Christmas of 1968, the two travelled together 
to the Fontana cottage on a Friday.  Sean was 14 years old at 
the time.  On Friday night at the Fontana cabin, McGuire began 
massaging Sean's penis with baby oil.  He then changed positions 
and told Sean to do the same to him.  The next night, the two 
performed the same acts again.  
¶16 Sean continued to live with McGuire during his 
freshman year at Loyola.  He would stay in McGuire's room 
roughly four nights a week, and sexual contact occurred nearly 
every day.  During the summer, McGuire and Sean traveled to 
Europe, and sexual contact occurred on this trip.  In the fall, 
Sean returned to living with McGuire, and the sexual contact 
continued.  
¶17 In February of 1970, Sean reported the sexual contact 
to Father Charles Schlax.  Later, several Jesuits——Father Renke, 
the president of Loyola; Father Beall, the principal; and Father 
Humbert, 
the 
headmaster——interviewed Sean.  Sean's father 
attended this meeting.  After Sean left the meeting, his father 
told him that he would not return to Loyola, and Sean was 
transferred to a different school.  Neither the school nor 
Sean's father contacted the police.  
No.  2007AP2711-CR 
6 
 
¶18 In June of 2003, Sean contacted an attorney about the 
sexual contact with McGuire.  On August 1, 2003, Sean filed a 
civil lawsuit against the Jesuits and McGuire.  
¶19 In August of 2003, Victor received a letter from the 
headmaster of Loyola Academy about reports of sexual misconduct.  
After he did some research, Victor contacted Sean's attorney, 
who put him in touch with Sean.  According to Victor and Sean, 
they did not know each other before they spoke on the phone in 
2003.  During their phone conversation, Sean obtained some 
information about the Fontana cottage, but both Victor and Sean 
later denied having discussed what McGuire had actually done to 
either of them or the layout of McGuire's room at Loyola. 
¶20 On February 7, 2005, a criminal complaint was filed in 
Walworth County charging McGuire with two counts of indecent 
behavior with a child, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 944.11(2) 
(1965).3  The complaint was later amended to add three additional 
counts.  
¶21 A four-day jury trial began on February 19, 2006.  
Victor and Sean both testified at trial; McGuire did not.  The 
jury found McGuire guilty on all five counts. 
¶22 McGuire filed a motion for postconviction relief 
asking for dismissal of charges or, alternatively, a new trial.  
He argued, inter alia, that the statute of limitations tolling 
                                                 
3 Wis. Stat. § 944.11 (1965-66) provided: "Any of the 
following may be imprisoned not more than 10 years: . . . (2) 
whoever takes indecent liberties with the privates of any person 
under the age of 18." 
No.  2007AP2711-CR 
7 
 
provision 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. § 939.74(3) was unconstitutional, 
reversal was warranted in the interest of justice, and the 
charges were barred by due process.  He also raised an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on the decision of 
his trial counsel, Gerald Boyle, not to investigate Harry B.'s 
wife, Elita, who would testify regarding Harry's unwillingness 
to give out keys to the Fontana cottage.  Finally, he argued 
that a new trial was warranted because McGuire discovered after 
trial that Robert Goldberg, who McGuire had known previously, 
would have testified that he saw Sean and Victor together 
shortly after they graduated from high school.4  After a hearing 
on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the court denied 
the motion.  
¶23 McGuire appealed, raising four arguments: (1) the 
charging delay violated his constitutional rights; (2) he 
received ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) the circuit 
court erroneously admitted other acts evidence; and (4) the 
circuit court erroneously allowed rebuttal evidence.  The court 
of appeals affirmed the circuit court on all four issues. 
¶24 McGuire petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on September 10, 2009. 
                                                 
4 In response to the State's claim that McGuire's trial 
counsel knew about Goldberg, McGuire also argued that if trial 
counsel had known about the evidence, his failure to investigate 
and call Goldberg constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 
No.  2007AP2711-CR 
8 
 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶25 The constitutionality of a statute is a question of 
law, which we review de novo.  State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶10, 
264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328.  Statutes are presumed to be 
constitutional, 
and 
a 
party 
challenging 
a 
statute's 
constitutionality must demonstrate that it is unconstitutional 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. Baron, 2009 WI 58, ¶10, 318 
Wis. 2d 60, 769 N.W.2d 34.  This presumption and burden apply to 
as-applied constitutional challenges to statutes as well as to 
facial challenges.  State v. Wood, 2010 WI 17, ¶15, 323 
Wis. 2d 321, 780 N.W.2d 63. 
¶26 Whether a defendant's right to due process was 
violated also presents a question of law that we review de novo.  
State v. Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d 600, 605, 499 N.W.2d 719 (1993). 
¶27 We review an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
as a mixed question of fact and law.  State v. Doss, 2008 WI 93, 
¶23, 312 Wis. 2d 570, 754 N.W.2d 150.  We uphold the circuit 
court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, but 
review 
de 
novo 
whether 
an 
attorney's 
performance 
was 
constitutionally deficient.  Id. 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶28 McGuire raises four issues, which we address in turn.  
First, we address whether the statute of limitations tolling 
provision of Wis. Stat. § 939.74(3) is unconstitutional as 
applied to the facts of this case.  Second, we address whether 
due process barred the filing of charges roughly 36 years after 
McGuire committed the offenses.  Third, we address whether 
No.  2007AP2711-CR 
9 
 
reversal is appropriate in the interest of justice.  Fourth, we 
address whether McGuire was denied effective assistance of 
counsel at trial. 
A. 
Constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 939.74(3) 
¶29 McGuire first argues that the statute of limitations 
tolling provision contained in Wis. Stat. § 939.74(3) is 
unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case.  He 
argues that it violates the Privileges and Immunities, Equal 
Protection, and Due Process provisions of the United States 
Constitution and their analogues in the Wisconsin Constitution.5 
¶30 With certain exceptions, "prosecution for a felony 
must be commenced within 6 years . . . after the commission 
thereof."  Wis. Stat. § 939.74(1).  However, "[i]n computing the 
time limited by this section, the time during which the actor 
was not publicly a resident within this state . . . shall not be 
included."  Wis. Stat. § 939.74(3).  It is undisputed that 
McGuire was not publicly a resident of Wisconsin at any point 
since the commission of the offenses. 
                                                 
5 "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all 
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."  
U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2.  The Fourteenth Amendment reads in 
relevant part:  
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of 
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also Wis. Const. art. I, §§ 1, 8. 
No.  2007AP2711-CR 
10 
 
¶31 This court addressed the constitutionality of Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.74(3) 
in 
State 
v. 
Sher, 
149 
Wis. 2d 1, 
437 
N.W.2d 878 (1989).  The defendant in Sher, a public resident of 
Florida, was charged with theft two years after the six-year 
statute of limitations had run.  Id. at 7.  He argued that 
§ 939.74(3) was unconstitutional as applied to the facts of his 
case because it violated both the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.  Id. at 10. 
¶32 The 
court 
first addressed Sher's privileges and 
immunities claim.  It noted that the clause does not require 
"absolute equality" between residents and nonresidents and 
permits disparate treatment because nonresidents "may present 
special problems for the administration of state laws."  Id. at 
11 (citing Taylor v. Conta, 106 Wis. 2d 321, 329, 316 N.W.2d 814 
(1982)).  The court then applied a three-part test to determine 
whether a statute is constitutional under the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause: 
First, this court must consider whether the statute 
disadvantages nonresidents as compared to residents.  
If 
there 
is 
a 
disadvantageous 
treatment 
of 
nonresidents, then this court examines the statute 
under the second step; whether the discrimination 
violates 
a 
fundamental 
right. 
 
Finally, 
if 
a 
fundamental right is infringed, this court must decide 
if the means employed [by the statute] bear a 
substantial relation to legitimate state objectives. 
Id. at 11 (alteration in original) (internal citations and 
quotation omitted). 
¶33 The 
court 
acknowledged 
that 
§ 939.74(3) 
"disadvantages" nonresidents because only public residents of 
No.  2007AP2711-CR 
11 
 
Wisconsin could claim the benefit of the statute.  Id. at 12.  
It then rejected the defendant's argument that § 939.74(3) 
burdened 
a 
fundamental 
right, 
reasoning 
that 
statute 
of 
limitations defenses are not fundamental rights.  Id. (citing 
Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 893 
(1988)).  See also Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 
314 (1945). 
¶34 Although the court did not need to inquire further, it 
went 
on 
to 
explain 
that 
a 
"substantial 
reason 
for 
discrimination" between nonresidents and residents existed: 
We find the provision is substantially related to 
several 
legitimate 
state 
objectives: 
the 
identification of criminals, the detection of crimes, 
and the apprehension of criminals. Investigation of 
crimes is easier for law enforcement officials when 
people central to the incident, and who may have vital 
information, are located within the state. . . .  Even 
if 
suspects 
are 
located, 
local 
law 
enforcement 
agencies may not possess enough resources to send 
someone to question or investigate the suspect who 
resides outside of Wisconsin. In such cases, Wisconsin 
authorities might have to rely on the resources of 
other state's police and could burden those other 
departments. 
In 
addition, 
cases 
which 
would 
be 
important here, may be given less attention if other 
authorities 
were 
responsible 
for 
investigation. 
Furthermore, if a suspect is charged, apprehension of 
them is easier if they are public residents than if 
they reside out of state.  
No.  2007AP2711-CR 
12 
 
Sher, 149 Wis. 2d at 14.6 
¶35 The Sher court next addressed the constitutionality of 
§ 939.74(3) under the Equal Protection Clause.  Id. at 15.  
Because § 939.74(3) did not burden a fundamental right, the 
court inquired into whether the legislature made an "irrational 
or arbitrary classification."  Id. (quoting State v. Bleck, 114 
Wis. 2d 454, 468, 338 N.W.2d 492 (1983)).  It reasoned that, 
because § 939.74(3) was "substantially related" to the state's 
interest in detecting crimes and identifying and apprehending 
criminals, the statute also was rationally related to those 
interests, as the "rationally related" test was a lesser 
standard than the "substantially related" test.  Id. at 16. 
¶36 McGuire argues that Sher is not controlling because 
Sher was decided as a facial challenge, not an as-applied 
challenge.  He asserts that this case is distinguishable from 
Sher for two reasons: (1) in this case, § 939.74(3) burdened his 
                                                 
6 Two decades have passed since the Sher decision, but we 
see no reason to alter its fundamental conclusions.  State v. 
Sher, 149 Wis. 2d 1, 437 N.W.2d 878 (1989).  This court has 
explained that statutes of limitation promote fair and prompt 
litigation and protect defendants from stale or fraudulent 
claims "brought after memories have faded or evidence has been 
lost."  Korkow v. General Cas. Co. of Wis., 117 Wis. 2d 187, 
198, 344 N.W.2d 108 (1984) (citation omitted).  However, some 
offenses have never had statutes of limitation; the legislature 
has 
lengthened 
statutes 
of 
limitation 
in 
certain 
cases, 
particularly cases involving minors; and scientific evidence 
such as DNA has frequently neutralized the argument that claims 
should not proceed because evidence is unreliable.  Because the 
tolling provision in Wis. Stat. § 939.74(3) long predated the 
offenses in this case, we see little or no basis for an argument 
that McGuire has a fundamental right to a statute of limitations 
defense. 
No.  2007AP2711-CR 
13 
 
fundamental right to present a defense; and (2) on these facts, 
§ 939.74(3) does not accomplish the statutory objectives set out 
in Sher.  As we see it, the facts of this case are similar to 
the 
facts 
in 
Sher, 
and, 
as 
with 
Sher, 
§ 939.74(3) 
is 
constitutional as applied to these facts.7 
¶37 First, the tolling of the statute of limitations did 
not deprive McGuire of the right to present a defense.  Although 
McGuire casts the deprivation under the tolling provision as a 
deprivation of the right to present a defense, § 939.74(3) 
deprived him only of the right to a statute of limitations 
defense.  Id.  His argument, if taken to its natural conclusion, 
would suggest that the constitution requires statutes of 
limitation in certain cases, lest defendants be deprived of 
their right to present a defense.  Yet, statutes of limitation 
are not constitutionally required.  Wisconsin has no statutes of 
limitation for certain crimes,8 while some states have no 
statutes of limitations for any criminal offense.9  The extent to 
                                                 
7 Although 
the 
court 
in 
Sher 
discussed 
the 
broad 
constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 939.74(3), Sher specifically 
argued that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to him.  
Sher, 149 Wis. 2d at 10 ("Sher's counsel contends he is not 
arguing that the tolling provision is unconstitutional on its 
face. 
Rather, 
he 
argues 
that 
the 
provision 
may 
be 
unconstitutionally applied in this case.").  For a thorough 
discussion of the difference between "facial" challenges and 
"as-applied" challenges, see State v. Wood, 2010 WI 17, 323 
Wis. 2d 321, 780 N.W.2d 63. 
8 These include several forms of homicide and sexual assault 
of a child.  Wis. Stat. § 939.74(2)(a).  
9 See, e.g. Bush v. State, 193 P.3d 203, 221 (Wyo. 2008).  
No.  2007AP2711-CR 
14 
 
which the passage of time burdens a fundamental right is a 
separate 
constitutional 
question 
independent 
of 
the 
constitutionality of § 939.74(3). 
¶38 Second, McGuire distinguishes Sher on the grounds that 
none of the statutory objectives described in Sher applies to 
him.  He argues that the interests of identifying criminals, 
detecting crimes, and apprehending criminals are not furthered 
by applying § 939.74(3) to these facts, because McGuire did not 
flee justice and was easy to locate. 
¶39 In truth, however, the facts in this case are closely 
related 
to 
identifying 
criminals, 
detecting 
crimes, 
and 
investigating those crimes.  When McGuire either transported a 
minor from Illinois to Wisconsin or met an Illinois minor in 
Wisconsin, he was able to engage in unlawful sexual activity 
with minors away from co-workers at Loyola Academy who were more 
likely to notice impropriety.  Correspondingly, because neither 
McGuire nor the victims were residents of Wisconsin, McGuire's 
sporadic visits to the state made the detection of his crimes by 
Wisconsin authorities and the reporting of his crimes by the 
minor victims to Wisconsin authorities, much less likely. 
¶40 The relevant facts here are analogous to the facts in 
Sher.  In Sher, the circuit court found as fact that the 
defendant "never left Wisconsin in an attempt to conceal or 
prevent knowledge of his whereabouts" and that "information was 
available to both private parties and law enforcement officials 
as to his residency status and whereabouts."  Id. at 7.  On 
No.  2007AP2711-CR 
15 
 
those facts, this court still concluded that § 939.74(3) bore 
substantial relation to the objectives described in that case. 
¶41 The fact that a defendant was not in hiding and did 
not flee justice does not render § 939.74(3) unconstitutional as 
applied to him.  Law enforcement agencies still may lack the 
resources to investigate a suspect outside the state; they may 
have to rely on the resources of police departments in other 
states, burdening those departments; and reliance on police 
departments in other states may result in lesser importance 
being 
given 
to 
investigating 
if 
other 
authorities 
are 
responsible for the investigation.  See Sher, 149 Wis. 2d at 14.  
These 
state 
interests 
would 
satisfy 
the 
constitutional 
requirements of the Privileges and Immunities Clause regardless 
of the fact that they may not be compelling in a given case. 
¶42 McGuire also argues that Wis. Stat. § 939.74(3) is 
unconstitutional because it violates the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses.  Because § 939.74(3) neither interferes with 
a fundamental right nor disadvantages a suspect class, we apply 
rational basis review to both the equal protection and due 
process claims. See State v. Jorgensen, 2003 WI 105, ¶¶32-33, 
264 Wis. 2d 157, 667 N.W.2d 318 (describing the similarities 
between due process and equal protection analysis); see also 
State v. Annala, 168 Wis. 2d 453, 468, 484 N.W.2d 138 (1992). 
¶43 McGuire again distinguishes Sher on the grounds that 
he is bringing an as-applied challenge, not a facial challenge.  
His argument, however, ignores the fact that the "basic 
formulation" of the rational basis test is the same in both 
No.  2007AP2711-CR 
16 
 
facial and as-applied challenges.  Smith v. City of Chicago, 457 
F.3d 643, 652 (7th Cir. 2006).  Under this standard, the 
constitution 
requires 
only 
that 
the 
statute 
creating 
a 
classification be "rationally related to a valid legislative 
objective."  Jorgenson, 264 Wis. 2d 157, ¶33 (quoting State v. 
McManus, 152 Wis. 2d 113, 130-31, 447 N.W.2d 654 (1989)).  The 
distinction between public residents and public non-residents 
set out in Wis. Stat. § 939.74(3) is rationally related to the 
legitimate 
government 
interests 
of 
identifying 
criminals, 
detecting 
crimes, 
and apprehending criminals.  Therefore, 
§ 939.74(3) is constitutional under both the Equal Protection 
and Due Process Clauses. 
B. 
Due Process Claim Based on Passage of Time 
¶44 McGuire next argues that the charges against him were 
barred by due process.  He argues that the 36-year passage of 
time between the commission of the offenses and the charges 
prejudiced his defense because critical witnesses died and 
evidence was destroyed.  
¶45 "The 
statute 
of 
limitations 
is 
the 
principal 
device . . . to protect against prejudice arising from a lapse 
of time between the date of an alleged offense and an arrest."  
State v. Wilson, 149 Wis. 2d 878, 903, 440 N.W.2d 534 (1989) 
(citing United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788-89 (1977)).  
Nonetheless, the statute of limitations is not the sole measure 
of a defendant's rights with respect to pre-indictment delay, 
and "the Due Process Clause has a limited role to play in 
protecting against oppressive delay."  Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 789.  
No.  2007AP2711-CR 
17 
 
Wisconsin has adopted a two-part test to determine whether pre-
indictment delay constitutes a due process violation: 
Where a defendant seeks to avoid prosecution based 
upon prosecutorial delay, it is clear that it must be 
shown that the defendant has suffered actual prejudice 
arising from the delay and that the delay arose from 
an improper motive or purpose such as to gain a 
tactical advantage over the accused. 
Wilson, 149 Wis. 2d at 904-05 (quoting State v. Rivest, 106 
Wis. 2d 406, 418, 316 N.W.2d 395 (1982)).  This court recently 
reaffirmed Wilson, holding that a defendant claiming a due 
process violation based on pre-indictment delay must show: "(1) 
actual prejudice as a result of delay; and (2) the delay arose 
out of an improper purpose, [such as to] give the State a 
tactical advantage over the defendant."  State v. MacArthur, 
2008 WI 72, ¶45, 310 Wis. 2d 550, 750 N.W.2d 910 (citing State 
v. 
Dabney, 2003 WI App 108, ¶30, 264 Wis. 2d 843, 663 
N.W.2d 366). 
¶46 McGuire acknowledges his inability to "establish that 
the delay resulted from some improper prosecutorial motive" or 
purpose.  Instead he argues that Wilson "misconstrued the 
authorities upon which it relied."  McGuire cites three United 
States Supreme Court cases that he claims Wilson misconstrued.  
A close examination of those cases reveals that Wilson properly 
interpreted and applied those cases. 
¶47 McGuire first argues that Wilson misconstrued United 
States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971).  In Marion, the Court 
explicitly declined to address "when and in what circumstances 
actual prejudice resulting from pre-accusation delays requires 
No.  2007AP2711-CR 
18 
 
the dismissal of the prosecution."  Id. at 324.  Therefore, 
Marion neither supports nor contradicts the holding in Wilson——
it simply did not address the issue decided in Wilson. 
¶48 McGuire next argues that Wilson misconstrued Lovasco.  
In Lovasco, the defendant based his due process claim on a 17-
month delay during an investigation.  Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 787.  
The Court explained that "investigative delay is fundamentally 
unlike delay undertaken by the Government solely 'to gain 
tactical advantage over the accused.'"  Id. at 795 (quoting 
Marion, 404 U.S. at 324).  It then held that "to prosecute a 
defendant following investigative delay does not deprive him of 
due process, even if his defense might have been somewhat 
prejudiced by the lapse of time."  Id. at 796.  The Court left 
"to the lower courts . . . the task of applying the settled 
principles of due process that we have discussed to the 
particular circumstances of individual cases."  Id. at 797. 
¶49 Thus, although Lovasco explicitly left the application 
of its rule under specific facts to future courts, it refused to 
find a due process violation based upon the facts of the case——
in which the state did not seek a tactical advantage.  The 
Court's language supports a distinction between prosecutions 
that are delayed because of an improper state motive and those 
that are delayed for other reasons. 
¶50 Finally, 
McGuire 
argues 
that 
Wilson 
misconstrued 
United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 (1984).  In Gouveia, the 
Court 
addressed 
the 
right 
to 
counsel 
for 
prisoners 
in 
administrative 
segregation 
awaiting 
indictment 
on 
federal 
No.  2007AP2711-CR 
19 
 
charges.  Id. at 182.  Addressing the concern that prosecutors 
might delay charges because the defendants were already in 
prison, the Court noted that a defendant still has a due process 
claim "if the defendant can prove that the Government's delay in 
bringing the indictment was a deliberate device to gain an 
advantage over him and that it caused him actual prejudice in 
presenting his defense."  Id. at 192 (citing Lovasco, 431 U.S. 
at 789-90). 
¶51 Like Lovasco, Gouveia clearly described the basic 
requirements of the Due Process Clause.  The Wilson court did 
not "misconstrue" Lovasco and Gouveia, but applied the due 
process requirements set out in those cases.  Indeed, Wilson is 
consistent with Lovasco's refusal to "adopt a rule which would 
[require prosecutors to charge as soon as they had evidence of 
guilt] absent a clear constitutional command to do so."  
Lovasco, 431 U.S. 795. 
¶52 Federal circuit court precedent confirms that Wilson 
correctly interpreted and applied Lovasco and its progeny.  
Nearly every federal circuit has adopted some variant of the 
No.  2007AP2711-CR 
20 
 
test adopted in Wilson.10  The Seventh Circuit has adopted two 
different tests.  See Wilson v. McCaughtry, 994 F.2d 1228, 1233 
(7th Cir. 1993).  Many Seventh Circuit cases have applied tests 
similar to that in State v. Wilson, by requiring the defendant 
to show that the prosecution delayed for either a "tactical 
advantage"11 or "impermissible purpose."12  In other cases, the 
Seventh Circuit has applied a test that balances prejudice to 
the defendant against the government's reason for the delay, but 
even this test still looks at the government's purpose for the 
delay.13  Acknowledging the split but declining to resolve it, 
                                                 
10 United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497, 1523 (5th Cir. 
1996); United States v. Hayes, 40 F.3d 362, 367 (11th Cir. 
1994); United States v. Engstrom, 965 F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir. 
1992); United States v. Brown, 959 F.2d 63, 66 (6th Cir. 1992); 
United States v. Hoo, 825 F.2d 667, 671 (2d Cir. 1987) ("no 
showing of an improper prosecutorial motive"); United States v. 
Sebetich, 776 F.2d 412, 430 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. 
Crooks, 766 F.2d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. 
Bartlett, 794 F.2d 1285, 1293 (8th Cir. 1986) (in dicta).  Only 
the Fourth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have adopted different 
tests.  See United States v. De Jesus Corona-Verbera, 509 F.3d 
1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 2007) (weighing length of delay against 
reasons for delay); Howell v. Barker, 904 F.2d 889, 895 (4th 
Cir. 
1990) 
(balancing 
prejudice 
against 
"government's 
justification for delay"). 
11 See, e.g., United States v. Wallace, 326 F.3d 881, 886 
(7th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Dickerson, 975 F.2d 
1245, 1252 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
12 See, e.g., United States v. Wellman, 830 F.2d 1453, 1460 
(7th Cir. 1987). 
13 See United States v. Doerr, 886 F.2d 944, 964 (7th Cir. 
1989) (weighing "actual prejudice . . . against the government's 
reasons for the delay"); see also United States v. Perry, 815 
F.2d 1100, 1103 (7th Cir. 1987). 
No.  2007AP2711-CR 
21 
 
the Seventh Circuit has noted that "were we required to choose 
between the two tests . . . , Gouveia would be powerful support 
for adopting a requirement that defendants show actual prejudice 
caused by a purposeful, tactical delay by the prosecution."  
McCaughtry, 994 F.2d at 1233 n. 5. 
¶53 Because McGuire has failed to identify any improper 
motive or purpose on the part of the State, we need not address 
whether McGuire was prejudiced by the delay.  In any event, 
McGuire has failed to meet the requisite showing of prejudice.  
"The death of a witness alone is not sufficient to establish 
prejudice."  United States v. Eckhardt, 843 F.2d 989, 995 (7th 
Cir. 1988).  The defendant must explain the substance and 
relevance of the witness's testimony; the showing must be 
concrete, not speculative.  Id. (citing United States v. 
Antonino, 830 F.2d 798, 804-05 (7th Cir. 1987)).   
¶54 McGuire identifies a number of deceased witnesses that 
he claims would have corroborated his defense and rebutted 
Sean's and Victor's testimony.  These witnesses include other 
priests living in the Loyola Academy residences; McGuire's 
secretary, John Gooch; Victor's uncle and owner of the Fontana 
cottage, Harry B.; and various relatives of Victor and Sean.  
McGuire asserts that the priests would testify that Sean and 
Victor could not have lived with McGuire undetected, Gooch would 
testify that McGuire was not involved with Victor and Sean, and 
Harry would testify that he did not give McGuire a key to the 
cottage. 
 
However, 
McGuire 
offers 
no 
support 
for 
these 
assertions. 
 
Simply 
identifying 
deceased 
witnesses 
and 
No.  2007AP2711-CR 
22 
 
describing testimony that they might have provided does not 
satisfy the requisite showing of actual prejudice. 
¶55 McGuire also argues that Loyola Academy records, 
including use of fleet vehicles and the reasons for Jesuits' 
absences from school, would constitute exculpatory evidence.  
Again, McGuire merely speculates that these documents would 
rebut Sean and Victor's testimony, but he fails to demonstrate 
that those documents would actually provide the evidence he 
claims. 
¶56 In sum, the charges against McGuire were not barred by 
due process because he has failed to allege an improper 
prosecutorial motive.  Furthermore, while he has identified 
potential witnesses and evidence that might have been relevant 
to issues at trial, his assertions about what that testimony 
would prove are speculative.  Consequently, he has failed to 
demonstrate the actual prejudice required to prove a due process 
violation. 
C. 
Reversal in the Interest of Justice 
¶57 McGuire next argues that reversal is warranted in the 
interest of justice under Wis. Stat. § 751.06.  He claims that 
the delay in bringing charges "so undermined" his ability to 
defend himself that the real controversy was not fully tried.  
¶58 Wisconsin Stat. § 751.06 describes this court's power 
of discretionary reversal: 
[I]f it appears from the record that the real 
controversy has not been fully tried, or that it is 
probable that justice has for any reason miscarried, 
the court may reverse the judgment or order appealed 
No.  2007AP2711-CR 
23 
 
from . . . and may direct the entry of the proper 
judgment or remit the case to the trial court for the 
entry 
of 
the 
proper 
judgment 
or 
for 
a 
new 
trial . . . . 
Id. 
¶59 We will exercise our discretionary power of reversal 
"only in exceptional cases."  State v. Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d 150, 
161, 549 N.W.2d 435 (1996).  In doing so, we look at the 
"totality of circumstances and determine whether a new trial is 
required to accomplish the ends of justice."  Id. (quoting State 
v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 735-36, 370 N.W.2d 745 (1985)). 
¶60 McGuire argues that, because of the delay, a new trial 
is an insufficient remedy, and asks for outright dismissal of 
the charges.  We conclude that discretionary reversal is 
inappropriate on these facts. 
¶61 In support of his argument that the real controversy 
was not fully tried, McGuire points to the same deceased 
witnesses and missing evidence that he cites to support his 
claim that the charges were barred by due process.  As we 
articulated 
earlier, 
his 
assertions 
regarding 
unavailable 
evidence were too speculative to constitute actual prejudice; 
for the same reason, we conclude that the real controversy was 
fully tried and justice has not miscarried. 
¶62 McGuire cites State v. Cuyler, asserting that it is 
analogous to the facts of this case because credibility was a 
central issue in both cases.  State v. Cuyler, 110 Wis. 2d 133, 
141-42, 327 N.W.2d 662 (1983).  In Cuyler, this court reversed 
for a new trial because the circuit court excluded evidence that 
No.  2007AP2711-CR 
24 
 
was 
admissible 
and 
material 
to 
the 
"critical 
issue 
of 
credibility," which was "a determinative issue" in the case.  
Id. at 141.  Cuyler does not, however, support the use of our 
discretionary reversal power in this case.  The evidence at 
issue in Cuyler was the testimony of police officers who would 
have testified as to the defendant's truthfulness.  Id.  We have 
no analogous situation in this case.  Unlike the court in 
Cuyler, we simply have no idea what most of the unavailable 
witnesses would have said or how their testimony might have 
affected the relevant issues. 
¶63 Additionally, while the unavailable evidence might 
have been relevant to the major issues at trial——Victor and 
Sean's claims about going to Fontana, the events of Sean's 
meeting with Father Schlax, and the credibility of Sean and 
Victor's claims that they lived in McGuire's room——those issues 
were fully tried by available evidence.  Father Schlax was 
available to testify, and the defense put Father Renke's notes 
of the meeting with Sean into evidence, which were used to 
impeach Sean's testimony regarding the events of the meeting.  
Similarly, the defense presented evidence and cross-examined 
prosecution witnesses to rebut Sean and Victor's testimony that 
No.  2007AP2711-CR 
25 
 
they had lived in McGuire's room.14  Most important, Sean and 
Victor themselves were both available for trial, and were 
rigorously cross-examined by McGuire's trial counsel. 
¶64 Based on the evidence presented at McGuire's trial, 
and without any indication of what the unavailable evidence 
would 
have 
demonstrated, 
we 
conclude 
that 
reversal 
is 
unwarranted because the real controversy was fully tried and 
justice was not miscarried. 
D. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
¶65 Finally, McGuire argues that he was deprived of 
effective assistance of counsel.  To prove an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must first demonstrate 
that counsel's performance was deficient, meaning that it "fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness."  Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).  Courts are "highly 
deferential" in scrutinizing counsel's performance, and "indulge 
a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the 
wide range of reasonable professional assistance."  Id. at 689.  
The defendant must also show that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense.  Id. at 692.  This requires a 
                                                 
14 For example, Father James Gschwend testified that the 
Jesuits were expected to be at evening meals and someone would 
have asked a Jesuit why he was missing meals, contradicting 
Victor's testimony that he ate with McGuire after the other 
Jesuits were finished eating.  McGuire's physician, Dr. Robert 
Ryan, testified regarding the layout of McGuire's room.  Father 
James Arimond, who lived in the residences at Loyola from 1964 
to 1967, testified that he never saw any young children in the 
residence in 1966 or 1967.  
No.  2007AP2711-CR 
26 
 
"reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."  
Id. at 694. 
¶66 McGuire first argues that Attorney Boyle unreasonably 
decided not to investigate and call Harry B.'s wife Elita, who 
would have testified that Harry was possessive about his keys 
and would not give them to just anybody.  Boyle explained that 
because he intended to argue that Sean was never in Fontana, 
whether McGuire had a key was not an issue in the case and he 
did not want to make it an issue.  Furthermore, he believed that 
Elita's testimony would have been directly refuted by Harry's 
sister Gertrude, who would have testified that McGuire had a key 
and could come and go at will.  Finally, he believed that 
Elita's 
testimony 
would 
have 
been 
both 
speculation 
and 
inadmissible hearsay. 
¶67 Boyle's decision not to investigate and call Elita was 
part of a reasonable trial strategy.  It is unclear what her 
trial testimony would have added.  She testified that she had 
"no idea" what Harry did with his keys prior to 1971, the year 
they were married.  The offenses in this case predated the 
marriage.  Thus, the speculative nature of her testimony 
confirms Boyle's reasoning that "[t]here was nothing to be 
gained" by presenting it.  
¶68 McGuire also argues that Boyle's performance was 
deficient because he failed to investigate and call Robert 
Goldberg.  Goldberg would have testified that he saw Victor and 
Sean together at dinner several times in 1972, at a residence 
No.  2007AP2711-CR 
27 
 
shared by Gooch and Eugene P.  At the time, Goldberg was 14 
years old.  
¶69 Boyle's decision not to call Goldberg constituted a 
reasonable trial strategy.  First, Goldberg's testimony would 
have corroborated Sean's statement to police that he saw McGuire 
together with Goldberg on the Loyola Academy campus.  Goldberg's 
testimony also would have raised questions about why McGuire was 
spending time with a 14-year-old boy who was not a student at 
Loyola.  Furthermore, his testimony would have placed Sean and 
Victor together with Eugene P.——who also alleged that McGuire 
sexually abused him——near the time of the offenses.  Finally, 
Goldberg 
would 
have 
been 
impeachable 
by 
prior 
criminal 
convictions.  Boyle came to the reasonable conclusion that, 
because Goldberg's testimony corroborated Sean's testimony, it 
was "the most dangerous thing [he] had heard from the beginning 
of the case until the end of the case."  
¶70 McGuire argues that, even if Boyle did not call 
Goldberg, he could not have reasonably made that decision 
without investigating Goldberg.  Counsel need not investigate 
every potential witness, but he "has a duty to make reasonable 
investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes 
particular investigations unnecessary."  State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 
111, ¶40, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305 (quoting Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 691).  The inherent danger in Goldberg's testimony 
outweighed any potential benefit it might have had to the 
defense.  Boyle made a reasonable decision that rendered further 
investigation of Goldberg unnecessary. 
No.  2007AP2711-CR 
28 
 
¶71 Because we conclude that Boyle's representation was 
not 
deficient, 
we 
need 
not 
address 
whether 
McGuire 
was 
prejudiced by counsel's representation. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶72 In sum, Wis. Stat. § 939.74(3) is constitutional as 
applied to the facts of this case.  It does not violate the 
Privileges and Immunities, Due Process, or Equal Protection 
provisions of the United States Constitution.  Section 939.74(3) 
does not burden a fundamental right, and it is rationally 
related to the legitimate governmental interests of detecting 
crimes and apprehending criminals. 
¶73 We also conclude that the delay in filing charges did 
not deprive McGuire of his due process rights.  Because McGuire 
concedes that he cannot demonstrate an improper motive or 
purpose on the part of the state, he has failed to allege a 
necessary prerequisite for dismissal based on pre-indictment 
delay. 
¶74 We are also satisfied that the real controversy was 
tried and justice has not miscarried for any reason.  Therefore, 
reversal in the interest of justice is unwarranted. 
¶75  Finally, we conclude that McGuire was not denied 
effective assistance of counsel.  Trial counsel pursued a 
reasonable trial strategy in deciding not to investigate or call 
either Elita or Goldberg. 
¶76 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the court of 
appeals. 
No.  2007AP2711-CR 
29 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2007AP2711-CR 
 
 
1