Title: Maine v. Koehler

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT     
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2012 ME 93 
Docket: 
Pen-11-359 
 
SRP-11-360 
Argued: 
April 12, 2012 
Decided: 
July 12, 2012 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, 
JJ. 
 
 
STATE OF MAINE 
 
v. 
 
COLIN KOEHLER 
 
 
SAUFLEY, C.J. 
 
[¶1]  After a jury trial, Colin Koehler was found guilty of the intentional or 
knowing murder of a young woman he had known for less than a day, and the 
court sentenced him to life in prison.  See 17-A M.R.S. §§ 201(1)(A), 1251 (2011).  
Koehler challenges several rulings on evidence, procedure, motions, and jury 
instructions.  He also challenges his sentence, primarily on the grounds that there 
was insufficient evidence of premeditation, that he has no substantial criminal 
history, and that his mental health evaluations failed to reveal any significant 
psychological or psychiatric disorders linked to criminality.  We discern no error in 
the court’s trial rulings, and we conclude that the court acted within its sentencing 
authority in imposing a life sentence.  We affirm the judgment of conviction and 
the life sentence entered in the Unified Criminal Docket (Bangor, Anderson, J.). 
 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the jury 
rationally could have found the following facts beyond a reasonable doubt.  See 
State v. Severy, 2010 ME 126, ¶ 3, 8 A.3d 715. 
 
[¶3]  Colin Koehler first met the victim on the afternoon of August 7, 2009, 
when his friend, Justin Ptaszynski, brought her to Koehler’s apartment.  Koehler 
was then thirty-four years old, and the victim was nineteen.  During that afternoon, 
Koehler had a conversation on his cell phone with Jessica Palmer, who was—or 
had recently been—his girlfriend.  Koehler and Palmer had an argument because 
Palmer was jealous and angry that the victim, whom she knew, was at Koehler’s 
apartment. 
 
[¶4]  Later, Koehler came up behind the victim while she was sitting in his 
apartment and made a stabbing motion toward her with a knife that was in a 
sheath.  He said to Ptaszynski and another friend, “Can you imagine?  What if?”  
The victim did not appear to have heard him and did not react in any way. 
[¶5]  Ptaszynski stayed with Koehler that night.  The next morning, 
Saturday, August 8, the two encountered the victim while walking outdoors, and 
the three walked to a downtown park in Bangor together sometime before noon.  
They walked to the river and, after walking for about fifteen minutes, came upon a 
shack.  The victim went inside to look around.  Ptaszynski stayed outside.  Koehler 
 
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entered the shack after the victim.  After a couple of minutes, Koehler swung a 
katana knife, with a blade measuring nearly ten inches, through the victim’s 
abdomen.  The victim fell on her knees crying, and Ptaszynski saw Koehler stab 
her in the throat while saying, “Shut the fuck up.”  The victim died of these 
multiple sharp-force injuries. 
 
[¶6]  Soon thereafter, Koehler and Ptaszynski went to a supermarket to 
return videos that Ptaszynski had in his pocket.  A security video from the 
supermarket shows them doing this.  They then went to Koehler’s residence, where 
Koehler cleaned off the knife in his sink.  Also that day, Ptaszynski destroyed the 
soles of his shoes and discarded the shoes in a dumpster behind a friend’s 
apartment. 
 
[¶7]  The next morning, Sunday, August 9, Koehler went to the Bangor 
Police Department to ask the police to drop charges that he had lodged a week 
earlier against Palmer’s ex-boyfriend, Kenneth Creamer.  At about the time that he 
was at the police department, he exchanged text messages with Palmer and 
Creamer.  Koehler stated in his messages to Palmer, “U were still fuckn ken that 
girl told me it was her last words i warned u what would hapen to anyone that 
came between us boo,” and “Wana see her i dont think anyones found her yet.”  He 
sent a text message to Creamer in which he proposed that they meet “under the 395 
bridge bangor side,” to which Creamer replied, “Sorry but i was trained not to meet 
 
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my enemy on their ground and terms your gonna have to do better than that.”  
Koehler replied, “To bad [the victim] didnt know that lol.”  He then sent a text 
message to Palmer that said, “R u goin to the cops on me.”  Time-stamped video 
recordings from the police station show Koehler using the buttons on a cell phone 
at roughly the same time of day that the text messages were sent. 
 
[¶8]  Koehler also called Creamer sometime around 11:45 a.m., threatened 
him, and said that he had killed a woman by stabbing her in the stomach.  He told 
Creamer that she had yelled, “What the fuck?” and that he stabbed her in the throat 
to shut her up.   
 
[¶9]  Later in the evening, Palmer visited Koehler and told him that she did 
not believe that he had killed someone.  He told her that he had stabbed the victim 
in the stomach and she had said, “What the fuck?” 
[¶10]  Palmer and Creamer learned the next day, Monday, August 10, that 
the victim was dead.  They went to the police and turned over their cell phones. 
[¶11]  On the following day, Tuesday, August 11, the police interviewed 
Ptaszynski and the other friend who was present when Koehler made a stabbing 
motion behind the victim.  Ptaszynski turned over his clothing from the day of the 
murder, and no blood was found on any of it. 
[¶12]  The police obtained a search warrant for Koehler’s residence, and 
when they arrived there to execute it, they knocked on the door and called 
 
5 
Koehler’s cell phone repeatedly.  They could hear his cell phone ringing inside the 
apartment, and they saw a face in a window briefly.  The Special Response Team 
used tear gas and entered the apartment.  They brought Koehler out barefoot and in 
handcuffs.  The investigating detectives brought him to their unmarked police car 
and read him his Miranda rights.  Koehler agreed to talk to them.  The detectives 
took him to the police station and interviewed him for approximately three hours.  
Throughout the interview—including after being shown a video of him walking 
with the victim and Ptaszynski—Koehler consistently and calmly denied having 
seen the victim after the Friday night when he met her. 
[¶13]  In searching Koehler’s apartment, the police found a pair of jeans that 
DNA testing revealed were spattered with the victim’s blood.  Koehler’s DNA was 
found inside the waist and inner thigh area of the jeans, and Ptaszynski’s DNA was 
not.  In Koehler’s apartment, the police also found the shirt that Koehler had been 
wearing, which had red-brown stains on it, and they found two Japanese swords.  
Between Koehler’s box spring and mattress, the police found a sheet of plywood 
that had a human figure drawn on it.  The plywood was scarred with stab and cut 
marks. 
[¶14]  Based on information from Ptaszynski, the police found a katana 
knife in a sheath in a retaining wall not far from Koehler’s apartment.  Koehler 
later told a fellow inmate at the Penobscot County Jail that he had stabbed and 
 
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sliced through the victim’s throat.  He also told the inmate where he had hidden the 
weapon.  A small reddish-brown stain on the knife near the hilt tested 
presumptively positive for blood, though the sample could not be confirmed as 
human blood, and no DNA was detected on the swab that was taken. 
[¶15]  Koehler was charged by complaint, and later indictment, with one 
count of intentional or knowing murder, 17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A).  Koehler 
moved to suppress the statements that he made when the police interrogated him as 
well as the statements that he made to fellow inmates at the Penobscot County Jail. 
[¶16]  After evidentiary hearings on the motions, the court held that 
Koehler’s statements to police during the interrogation were admissible, as were 
Koehler’s statements to two fellow jail inmates.  The court granted the motion to 
suppress a third inmate’s testimony. 
[¶17]  Koehler next moved in limine to suppress photographs of the victim’s 
body and evidence of the bladed weapons that were discovered in his apartment.  
The court denied these motions and also ruled that a photo of the plywood target 
would be admissible.  The matter then proceeded to a five-day jury trial that ran 
from September 27 to October 1, 2010.  During the trial, Koehler made several 
evidentiary objections that the court overruled. 
[¶18]  Both after the State’s case and after his presentation of his own case, 
Koehler moved for a judgment of acquittal.  The court denied each motion 
 
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notwithstanding Koehler’s argument that Ptaszynski had failed to identify him in 
the courtroom. 
[¶19]  Koehler objected to the reading of the State’s requested instruction on 
accomplice liability on the ground that the State had offered no evidence that 
Koehler had helped someone else kill the victim.  The court gave the instruction 
because it concluded that the jury could find, if it believed some evidence and not 
other evidence, that Ptaszynski had the knife and that Koehler was an accomplice 
in the crime. 
[¶20]  The jury returned a verdict of guilty.  Before sentencing, Koehler 
moved for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.  The court held an 
evidentiary hearing on the motion at which it heard testimony from another inmate 
who had been in jail with Koehler.1  The inmate testified that he spent time with 
the victim on the morning of her death and that she walked away from him 
between 11:00 a.m. and 12:00 p.m.  Direct examination revealed that he had, at 
some point before being interviewed by police, stated that he had seen the victim 
walk away at 11:30 with two or three men, none of whom were Koehler.  The 
court denied the motion for a new trial on the ground that the testimony could not 
possibly change the outcome of the trial. 
                                         
1  The record reflects that this inmate did not share a jail cell with Koehler but did spend time with him 
in the jail’s common areas. 
 
8 
[¶21]  The court then proceeded to sentencing.  The presentence 
investigation report compiled and summarized Koehler’s life history and included 
as attachments (1) Koehler’s out-of-state criminal history, (2) his Maine driving 
record, (3) a psychological evaluation accompanied by a neuropsychological 
evaluation and a psychiatric evaluation, (4) medical history information, (5) reports 
concerning Koehler’s behavior while in jail, and (6) a recidivism risk-assessment 
evaluation.  The court also received letters and heard statements from the victim’s 
family. 
[¶22]  Koehler had one prior conviction for making terroristic threats, for 
which he was fined.  Otherwise, his convictions were all for traffic-related 
infractions. 
[¶23]  Koehler’s psychological evaluation indicated that he has unrealistic 
thinking and persecutory ideation.  Although he measured low on the psychopathy 
checklist and was in the lower half of the scale for risk of future violence, testing 
demonstrated that Koehler poses a risk of future criminality that is equal to or 
higher than that of 68.4% of inmates.  In his psychiatric evaluation, Koehler was 
diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, marijuana addiction in full 
remission in a controlled environment, and dyscalculia (an innate difficulty in 
learning or understanding math and related concepts).  Although he had displayed 
antisocial behaviors and traits, he was not diagnosed with any personality disorder, 
 
9 
and the psychiatrist did not believe that his medical history of encephalitis affected 
his functioning. 
[¶24]  Koehler had a history of difficulties in school, particularly with math.  
He graduated from high school with average grades and earned an associate’s 
degree in art and design.  He held several jobs after graduating but had ceased 
work and begun to receive disability benefits primarily due to pain arising from 
Reiter’s Syndrome, a form of inflammatory arthritis. 
[¶25]  After being placed in jail, Koehler was written up multiple times.  He 
was found to have passed notes, drawn an inappropriate picture of a prison staff 
member, trafficked in contraband by filing down a toothbrush to make a sharp 
instrument, and threatened another inmate.  To the extent that he challenged the 
resulting sanctions through administrative appeals, the sanctions were upheld.  
Despite his transgressions, Koehler sees himself as a model inmate. 
[¶26]  After considering these sentencing materials and the trial record, the 
court made the following findings, all of which have support in the record.  The 
murder was premeditated; Koehler brought his knife with him and used it to 
commit the crime.  His motive for the murder—to prove to Palmer that he was not 
involved with the victim—was “ridiculous” and “senseless.”  There was no mental 
health or situational trigger for the killing, and it was not a crime of passion.  
 
10 
Koehler placed no value on the victim’s life whatsoever.  The court set the basic 
sentence at life. 
[¶27]  The court found, as mitigating factors, that Koehler had no substantial 
criminal history, had no prior antisocial diagnosis, and had a close relationship 
with his family.  The court found that the lack of any mental health diagnosis was 
only a limited mitigating factor, however, because Koehler’s commission of this 
crime made it impossible to predict whether he would reoffend; there was no 
condition to treat or effort that could be made to prevent him from reoffending. 
[¶28]  As aggravating factors, the court found that the victim’s family has 
suffered an enormous loss, that Koehler lacks remorse as evidenced by his 
nonchalance in the videos taken of him soon after the murder, and that he 
persuaded others of lower intelligence to lie for him, which demonstrated what 
little regard he has for others.  Based on these factors, the court arrived at a final 
sentence of life imprisonment.  Koehler timely appealed from his conviction, and 
we granted him leave to appeal from his sentence.  See M.R. App. P. 2, 20(g), (h). 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Judgment of Conviction 
[¶29]  Despite Koehler’s multiple attacks on the court’s evidentiary and trial 
rulings, we discern no errors.  The court did not err or abuse its discretion in 
(1) admitting in evidence Koehler’s statements to police as voluntarily made after 
 
11 
waiver of his Miranda rights, see State v. Dodge, 2011 ME 47, ¶¶ 11, 12, 17 A.3d 
128; State v. Warren, 2008 ME 154, ¶ 12, 957 A.2d 63; State v. Nielsen, 2008 ME 
77, ¶ 22, 946 A.2d 382; State v. Basu, 2005 ME 74, ¶ 19, 875 A.2d 686; State v. 
Lockhart, 2003 ME 108, ¶¶ 22-24, 33, 830 A.2d 433; State v. Marden, 673 A.2d 
1304, 1309 (Me. 1996); State v. Cooper, 617 A.2d 1011, 1013-14 (Me. 1992); 
(2) admitting the testimony of the single jailhouse informant who testified at trial, 
see State v. Pettingill, 611 A.2d 88, 90 (Me. 1992); (3) admitting evidence of 
Koehler’s possession of two other Japanese swords and his use of a plywood 
target, see State v. Filler, 2010 ME 90, ¶ 17, 3 A.3d 365; State v. Ardolino, 1997 
ME 141, ¶ 10, 697 A.2d 73; (4) admitting a photograph of the victim’s body, see 
State v. Irving, 2003 ME 31, ¶ 23, 818 A.2d 204; cf. State v. Conner, 434 A.2d 
509, 512-13 (Me. 1981); (5) admitting evidence of a telephone conversation 
between Koehler and Palmer, see M.R. Evid. 602; State v. Long, 656 A.2d 1228, 
1230 (Me. 1995); State v. Googins, 640 A.2d 1060, 1062 (Me. 1994); 
(6) excluding evidence that police administered a polygraph to secure a witness’s 
testimony, see State v. Lavoie, 2010 ME 76, ¶ 14, 1 A.3d 408; State v. Burnham, 
427 A.2d 969, 971 (Me. 1981); (7) allowing a witness’s recollection to be 
refreshed, see M.R. Evid. 612(a); State v. Hamel, 2007 ME 18, ¶ 3, 913 A.2d 1287; 
see also Cope v. Sevigny, 289 A.2d 682, 687 (Me. 1972); (8) instructing the jury on 
accomplice liability, see State v. Caouette, 462 A.2d 1171, 1175 (Me. 1983); 
 
12 
(9) denying Koehler’s motions for judgment of acquittal, see Severy, 2010 ME 
126, ¶ 8, 8 A.3d 715; State v. Cook, 2010 ME 85, ¶ 7, 2 A.3d 333; or (10) denying 
Koehler’s motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, see State v. 
Cookson, 2003 ME 136, ¶ 29, 837 A.2d 101, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 852 (2004). 
[¶30]  Accordingly, without further discussion, we affirm the court’s entry 
of the judgment of conviction and its denial of Koehler’s post-judgment motions.  
We now review the court’s entry of a sentence of life imprisonment. 
B. 
Life Sentence 
[¶31]  Koehler contends that the basic sentence was improperly determined 
because the only factor weighing in favor of a life sentence was premeditation, a 
finding that was inaccurate, and that the maximum and final sentence resulted from 
an improper weighing and balancing of the mitigating and aggravating factors.  He 
argues that the killing was “an impulsive act of a confused and distraught lover.” 
[¶32]  We review a trial court’s sentence for disregard of the relevant 
sentencing factors or abuse of the court’s sentencing power.  State v. Reese, 2010 
ME 30, ¶¶ 22-23, 30, 991 A.2d 806, cert. denied, 178 L. Ed. 2d 211. 
[¶33]  By statute, a person convicted of murder “shall be sentenced to 
imprisonment for life or for any term of years that is not less than 25.”  
17-A M.R.S. § 1251.  A sentencing court in a murder case follows a two-step 
process for determining the sentence.  See 17-A M.R.S. §§ 1201(1)(A), 1252-C 
 
13 
(2011); State v. Waterman, 2010 ME 45, ¶ 25 n.1, 995 A.2d 243 (noting that the 
usual third step of the sentencing process—suspension of part or all of a sentence 
and imposition of probation—is inapplicable in murder cases, citing to 
17-A M.R.S. §§ 1201(1)(A) and 1252-C).  First, the court determines the basic 
term of imprisonment based on an objective consideration of the particular nature 
and seriousness of the crime, taking into account the sentencing principles of 
deterrence, restraint, minimization of correctional experience that may promote 
future criminality, and the elimination of inequalities in sentencing that are 
unrelated to legitimate criminological goals.  17-A M.R.S. § 1252-C(1); Reese, 
2010 ME 30, ¶ 18, 991 A.2d 806; see 17-A M.R.S. § 1151(1), (3), (5) (2011).  
Second, the court sentencing for a murder conviction determines the final period of 
incarceration based on the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors, additionally 
taking into account sentencing principles related to rehabilitation, restitution, and 
differentiation of sentences to account for the individual circumstances of the 
defendant and to achieve a just outcome.  17-A M.R.S. § 1252-C(2); Reese, 2010 
ME 30, ¶ 19, 991 A.2d 806; see 17-A M.R.S. § 1151(1), (2), (6) (2011); see also 
Waterman, 2010 ME 45, ¶ 25 n.1, 995 A.2d 243. 
[¶34]  A court may set a basic sentence of life in prison only if the murder is 
accompanied by one or more aggravating circumstances.  See State v. Shortsleeves, 
580 A.2d 145, 149-50 (Me. 1990); State v. Wilson, 669 A.2d 766, 768-69 (Me. 
 
14 
1996).  Although we did not, in Shortsleeves, identify all possible aggravating 
circumstances, see Waterman, 2010 ME 45, ¶ 44, 995 A.2d 243, we did hold that 
one significant aggravating circumstance is premeditation-in-fact, meaning a 
planned, deliberate killing, Shortsleeves, 580 A.2d at 149-50. 
[¶35]  Next, in examining aggravating and mitigating factors, a court may 
also consider the following: whether a defendant has an antisocial, hostile, 
unstable, or psychopathic character, id. at 150; the defendant’s age, intelligence, 
and prior criminal history, id. at 150-51; the defendant’s susceptibility to 
rehabilitation, id. at 150; the defendant’s lack of remorse, State v. Wood, 662 A.2d 
908, 913 (Me. 1995); Shortsleeves, 580 A.2d at 150; and the defendant’s refusal to 
take responsibility, State v. Gauthier, 2007 ME 156, ¶ 33 n.7, 939 A.2d 77; State v. 
Bates, 2003 ME 67, ¶ 27, 822 A.2d 1129. 
[¶36]  Regarding the basic period of incarceration, the court found, and the 
record supports, that although Koehler had no reason to have a grudge against the 
victim, he premeditated the murder, even signaling the possibility to Ptaszynski 
and another friend the day before, and carried it out, without passion or 
provocation, to prove something to Palmer. 
[¶37]  In its weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors, the court found 
that, although the lack of any psychological indicators constituted a mitigating 
factor, the weight of that evidence was limited given the senselessness of Koehler’s 
 
15 
decision to murder the victim.  The court found that this fact made predicting 
re-offense impossible, and it found as aggravating factors that Koehler lacked 
remorse, was nonchalant about the gravity of the crime, was willing to persuade 
and pressure others to lie for him, and committed a crime that resulted in the 
victim’s death and had a devastating impact on her family.  Given these findings 
and the voluminous supporting evidence offered at trial and at sentencing, the court 
did not disregard the relevant sentencing factors or abuse its sentencing power in 
determining that the identified aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating 
factors of his attachment to his family and his lack of significant prior antisocial 
behavior.  The court did not disregard the relevant sentencing factors or abuse its 
sentencing power in setting a final sentence of life imprisonment.  See 
Shortsleeves, 580 A.2d at 149-50. 
[¶38]  Faced with the senseless, unprovoked, cold-blooded murder of a 
young woman by a defendant who showed a chillingly remorseless response to his 
own act, the court’s ultimate decision that Koehler should never be at liberty in 
society again is fully supported in Maine law. 
 
The entry is: 
Judgment and sentence affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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On the briefs: 
 
Peter J. Cyr, Esq., Law Offices of Peter J. Cyr, Portland, and Richard L. 
Hartley, Esq., Law Offices of Richard L. Hartley, Bangor, for appellant 
Colin Koehler 
 
William J. Schneider, Attorney General, and Donald W. Macomber, Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of 
Maine  
 
 
At oral argument: 
 
Peter J. Cyr, Esq., for appellant Colin Koehler 
 
Donald W. Macomber, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee State of Maine 
 
 
 
Penobscot County Superior Court docket number CR-2009-761 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY