Title: In re Kenneth S.

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2017 ME 45 
Docket: 
And-16-410 
Submitted 
 
On Briefs: February 23, 2017 
Decided: 
March 9, 2017 
 
Panel: 
ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE KENNETH S. 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  The mother of Kenneth S. appeals from a judgment of the District 
Court (Lewiston, Oram J.) terminating her parental rights pursuant to 
22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2) (2016).  She challenges the court’s determination 
that termination of her parental rights is in the child’s best interest, arguing 
that there is an alternative foster or adoptive placement for her and the child 
together; that her parenting deficits have not interrupted the child’s 
development; and that there are safety concerns in the current foster 
placement.  We affirm the judgment.   
[¶2]  On a petition by the Department of Health and Human Services 
filed in December 2014, two days after the child’s birth, the court granted a 
preliminary protection order as against both parents, see 22 M.R.S. § 4034 
(2016), and the child was placed in foster care.  In July 2015, the mother 
consented to a jeopardy order “based on [her] low cognitive ability, Autism 
 
2 
Spectrum Disorder, and behavioral [dysregulation] related either to her 
cognitive limitations or a mood disorder.”  See 22 M.R.S. §§ 4035-4036 (2016).  
DHHS filed a petition for termination of parental rights in September 2015, 
and in May, June, and July 2016, the court held a three-day contested hearing 
on the petition as to the mother.1  On August 3, the court issued a judgment 
terminating the mother’s parental rights, finding that despite her diligent 
efforts, she is unable to protect the child from jeopardy and is unable to take 
responsibility for him, and will not be able to do either within a time 
reasonably 
calculated 
to 
meet 
his 
needs, 
see 
22 
M.R.S. 
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii); and that termination is in the child’s best interest, 
see id. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a).  The mother timely appealed.  22 M.R.S. § 4006 
(2016); M.R. App. P. 2(b)(3).   
 
[¶3]  We review the trial court’s “factual findings for clear error and its 
ultimate conclusion regarding the best interest of the child for an abuse of 
discretion, viewing the facts, and the weight to be given them, through the 
trial court’s lens.”  In re R.M., 2015 ME 38, ¶ 7, 114 A.3d 212.   
[¶4]  Here, the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the 
child’s best interest is served by terminating the mother’s parental rights.  
                                         
1  The court terminated the father’s parental rights, with his consent, in November 2015.   
 
3 
With support in the record, the court found by clear and convincing evidence 
that the mother’s mental health limitations, which the court characterized as 
“intractable” and impervious to therapy or treatment, prevent her from being 
able to act as an independently functioning parent to the child.  As the court 
also found, the mother is at high risk for expecting the child to assume a 
parental role for her and is likely to be easily frustrated by any conflict with 
the child.  Despite her diligent participation in the reunification plan, the 
mother is not yet even ready to care for the child during a visit without 
supervision.  The mother herself requires daily living skills assistance and has 
a court-appointed limited guardian—her biological mother, the child’s 
grandmother.   
 
[¶5]  Although the mother advocates that the child be moved to an 
alternate adoptive placement with her former foster mother so that the 
mother can maintain a relationship with the child, the former foster mother 
was not a licensed foster parent at the time of the court’s decision,2 and there 
                                         
2  The former foster mother’s licensure had expired, and she was in the process of applying for a 
renewal of her license to operate a family foster home at the time of the termination hearing, 
pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 8102 (2016); 18 C.M.R. 10 148 016 (2011).  The court found that the 
licensure renewal process had “been delayed by administrative problems at DHHS.”   
 
4 
is no evidence that she has spent time with the child other than during visits 
she supervised between the child and the mother.3  
[¶6]  Additionally, we note that permanency planning for a child in 
foster care, 22 M.R.S. § 4038-B(4) (2016), and the best interest determination 
to be made in a termination proceeding, 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), are 
distinct from the question of who should adopt the child, which is addressed 
in an adoption proceeding governed by 18-A M.R.S. §§ 9-301 to 9-315 (2016).  
Nonetheless, in conducting a best interest analysis, the court may consider 
evidence that the current foster placement is furthering the child’s 
permanency plan, especially where that plan is to place the child for adoption.  
See In re K.M., 2015 ME 79, ¶ 11, 118 A.3d 812; In re Kayla M., 2001 ME 166, 
¶¶ 13-14, 785 A.2d 330 (explaining that the child’s best interest was met by 
termination where the child had spent most of her life with her foster family 
and was bonded with her foster parents and sibling); In re Charles G., 2001 ME 
3, ¶ 15, 763 A.2d 1163 (finding that the trial court’s best interest 
determination was not error, and affirming the court’s termination of parental 
                                         
3  The mother’s argument does not benefit from the statutory preference for a child to be placed 
with family members when the child is removed from a parent’s custody, because such a kinship 
placement does not extend to a parent’s former foster mother.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4003(3-A) (2016) 
(providing for placement of the child “with an adult relative when possible”); 22 M.R.S. § 4002(9-B) 
(2016) (defining “relative” as “the biological or adoptive parent of the child’s biological or adoptive 
parent, or the biological or adoptive sister, brother, aunt, uncle or cousin of the child”); cf. In re 
N.W., 2013 ME 64, ¶ 15, 70 A.3d 1219. 
 
5 
rights, where the child had a strong attachment to the foster family and the 
foster family wanted to adopt the child). 
[¶7]  Here, with support in the record, the court found that the child is 
attached to his foster parents and four foster siblings, with whom he has 
continuously resided almost since birth, and that the foster parents are even 
prepared to adopt the child.  The court did not err by finding that removal of 
the child from his current foster family—of which he is “an integral part”—
and placement with the mother’s own former foster mother “would benefit 
[the mother], but would not benefit [the child].”4  
[¶8]  These and other findings demonstrate that the court properly 
considered the statutory factors relevant to its determination of the child’s 
best interest for purposes of a termination proceeding—leaving to another 
day the issue of who should adopt the child pursuant to the considerations set 
out in 18-A M.R.S. § 9-308 and other applicable authority—including “the 
needs of the child, . . . the child’s age, [and] the child’s attachments to relevant 
persons,” 22 M.R.S. § 4055(2) (2016).  The court’s findings and ultimate best 
                                         
4  The court also did not err by finding that the child’s foster parents have adequately addressed 
safety issues with the physical structure of the foster home, which had been of some concern to the 
mother and DHHS.   
 
6 
interest determination are supported by the record and do not reflect an 
abuse of discretion.  
[¶9]  Finally, although not challenged by the mother, the court did not 
err by determining that DHHS had proved, by clear and convincing evidence, 
at least one ground of parental unfitness.  See Guardianship of Hailey M., 
2016 ME 80, ¶ 15, 140 A.3d 478. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jeffrey S. Dolley, Esq., Dolley Law Firm, Lewiston, for appellant mother 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of 
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human 
Services 
 
 
Lewiston District Court docket number PC-2014-89 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY