Title: Charbonneau v. Holyoke Div. of Dist. Court Dep’t

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-11908 
 
JOSHUA CHARBONNEAU  vs.  PRESIDING JUSTICE OF THE HOLYOKE 
DIVISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT DEPARTMENT. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 8, 2015. - January 22, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.  
District Court.  Practice, Criminal, Plea.  Statute, 
Construction. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on May 13, 2015. 
 
 
The case was reported by Botsford, J. 
 
 
 
Paul R. Rudof, Committee for Public Counsel Services (Ryan 
M. Schiff, Committee for Public Counsel Services, with him) for 
the plaintiff. 
 
Susanne G. Reardon, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
defendant. 
 
William C. Newman, Chauncey B. Wood, & Joseph N. 
Schneiderman, for American Civil Liberties Union of 
Massachusetts & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
HINES, J.  In this appeal, we determine whether a standing  
order of the Holyoke Division of the District Court Department 
2 
 
(Holyoke District Court), prohibiting the tender of a so-called 
"defendant-capped" plea on the day of trial, contravenes the 
guilty plea procedure mandated in G. L. c. 278, § 18, and Mass. 
R. Crim. P. 12, as appearing in 442 Mass. 1511 (2004).  Joshua 
Charbonneau, who stands charged in the Holyoke District Court 
with larceny over $250, challenges the standing order on 
statutory and constitutional grounds.  He contends that the 
standing order violates his right to tender a defendant-capped 
plea at any time prior to trial because neither G. L. c. 278, 
§ 18, nor Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 imposes a time limit on such 
tenders.  He also asserts that the judicially imposed time limit 
unconstitutionally burdens his right to due process.  We 
conclude that the standing order conflicts with and impairs a  
defendant's right to tender a defendant-capped plea as provided 
in G. L. c. 278, § 18, and Mass. R. Crim. P. 12.  Consequently, 
we vacate the standing order on that ground and bypass 
Charbonneau's constitutional claim.1 
 
1.  Background.  On February 19, 2015, the presiding 
justice of the Holyoke District Court2 (presiding justice) 
promulgated a standing order applicable to trials beginning with 
                                                          
 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief filed by the American 
Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts and the Massachusetts 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
 
 
2 The record before us indicates that the presiding justices 
of the Greenfield and Orange Divisions of the District Court 
Department have promulgated similar standing orders. 
3 
 
the June, 2015, jury-of-six session.  In accordance with the 
standing order, a defendant who intended to proffer a defendant-
capped plea was required to do so at the final pretrial status 
conference which, in the Holyoke District Court, is scheduled 
for the Wednesday two weeks prior to trial.3  After this 
deadline, the court would only consider a so-called 
"Commonwealth-capped" plea on the day of trial. 
 
In response to concerns expressed by the defense bar, the 
presiding justice issued an "Amended Standing Judicial Order of 
the Holyoke District Court" on March 31, 2015 (amended standing 
order), extending the time during which a defendant could tender 
a defendant-capped plea.  The amended standing order provides 
that "the [c]ourt will allow a defendant-capped plea at any time 
during the case until 2:00 P.M. the day prior to the scheduled 
trial by judge or jury."  Amended standing order, supra at fifth 
par.  The standing order further provides that "[t]he [c]ourt 
will continue to accept unagreed pleas on the day of trial[.  
H]owever, the pleas will be Commonwealth-capped pleas on the day 
of trial and the defendant will not be allowed to withdraw a 
plea which exceeds his suggested sentence unless the [c]ourt's 
disposition exceeds the Commonwealth's recommendation."  Id. at 
seventh par.  The presiding justice, implicitly recognizing that 
                                                          
 
 
3 Although the parties refer to a "readiness" conference, we 
use the more recognized term of status conference. 
4 
 
the time limit imposed by the standing order might affect a 
defendant's exercise of his or her rights under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 18, and rule 12,4 explained that "the intent of this [s]tanding 
[o]rder is to recognize the need of the [c]ourt in efficiently 
managing the flow of cases within its jurisdiction in order to 
deliver justice efficiently and with speed and dignity."  Id. at 
fifth par.  More specifically, the standing order, conceived as 
part of a broader District Court Department trial readiness 
initiative, was proposed as a means to maximize "juror 
utilization."  By paring from the trial list those cases to be 
disposed by plea, the court would reduce the number of jurors 
summonsed to the court house for trial and minimize the burden 
to witnesses, police officers, and others compelled to appear 
for the trial. 
 
In April, 2014, Charbonneau was charged with one count of 
larceny over $250 and one count of larceny under $250.  At the 
first trial status conference, the Commonwealth filed a nolle 
                                                          
 
 
4 The apparent concern of the presiding justice of the 
Holyoke Division of the District Court Department (presiding 
justice) is reflected in the following language:  "The [c]ourt 
recognizes that the defendant-capped plea under [G. L. c. 278, 
§ 18,] is a mechanism that provides the defendant with an 
important opportunity to present to the [c]ourt an agreed or 
unagreed request for disposition along with the right to 
withdraw the plea if the [c]ourt exceeds the disposition.  This 
[s]tanding [o]rder is not intended to prevent the defendant from 
exercising this right in accordance with Rule 12 of the 
Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure."  Amended Standing 
Judicial Order of the Holyoke District Court, fifth par. (Mar. 
31, 2015). 
5 
 
prosequi of the misdemeanor complaint charging larceny under 
$250 and the remaining complaint was scheduled for trial on 
September 17, 2015.  Because Charbonneau's trial was scheduled 
to occur after the effective date of the standing order, his 
option to tender a defendant-capped plea at trial was 
foreclosed.  His remaining option was to tender this plea not 
later than 2 P.M. the day before trial.  Claiming an inviolable 
statutory right to tender a defendant-capped plea on the day of 
trial, Charbonneau petitioned a single justice of this court for 
relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  After a hearing, the 
single justice stayed implementation of the standing order and 
reserved and reported the case to the full court. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Right of review under G. L. c. 211, 
§ 3.  The presiding justice contends that Charbonneau may pursue 
other avenues of relief and has thus failed to establish a 
"substantial claim" or "irremediable" error sufficient to 
justify the extraordinary relief available under G. L. c. 211, 
§ 3.  Commonwealth v. Jordan, 464 Mass. 1004, 1004 (2012), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Richardson, 454 Mass. 1005, 1005-1006 
(2009).  We bypass the issue, however, because where a single 
justice reserves decision and reports a case to the full court, 
we grant full appellate review of the matters reported.  
Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 458 Mass. 11, 15 (2010). 
 
b.  Statutory right to tender defendant-capped pleas at 
6 
 
trial.  The procedure for tendering a guilty plea in the 
District, Boston Municipal, and Juvenile Court Departments is 
governed by G. L. c. 278, § 18, and Mass. R. Crim. P. 12.  See 
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 461 Mass. 256, 258 & nn.4, 5 (2012).  
General Laws c. 278, § 18, first par., provides: 
A defendant who is before the Boston municipal court 
or a district court . . . shall plead not guilty or 
guilty . . . .  Such plea of guilty shall be submitted 
by the defendant and acted upon by the court; 
provided, however, that a defendant with whom the 
commonwealth cannot reach agreement for a recommended 
disposition shall be allowed to tender a plea of 
guilty together with a request for a specific 
disposition. . . .  If such a plea, with an agreed 
upon recommendation or with a dispositional request by 
the defendant, is tendered, the court shall inform the 
defendant that it will not impose a disposition that 
exceeds the terms of the agreed upon recommendation or 
the dispositional request by the defendant, whichever 
is applicable, without giving the defendant the right 
to withdraw the plea. 
 
Similarly, rule 12 protects a defendant who chooses to tender a 
guilty plea from the risk of a higher sentence -- whether or not 
the parties agree on a recommendation for a specific 
disposition.  More specifically, rule 12 (c) (4) (A), as 
appearing in 470 Mass. 1501 (2015), applicable to 
recommendations for sentencing not agreed upon by the parties, 
provides that "the judge shall inform the defendant that the 
disposition imposed will not exceed the terms of the defendant's 
request without first giving the defendant the right to withdraw 
the plea."  Rule 12 (c) (4) (B), as appearing in 470 Mass. 1501 
7 
 
(2015), applicable to agreed-upon recommendations for 
sentencing, contains the virtually identical language. 
 
The statute, complemented by the rule, defines the two 
essential elements of a defendant-capped plea:  (1) the 
defendant shall tender a guilty plea; and (2) on the tender of 
the plea, the judge shall inform the defendant of his or her 
unconditional right to withdraw the plea if the proposed 
disposition exceeds the agreed-upon recommendation or that 
requested by the defendant.  In defining the requisites of a 
defendant-capped plea, neither the statute nor the rule 
incorporates a time limit.  Rather, the tender of a guilty plea 
triggers the sentencing protections inherent in a defendant-
capped plea.  The judge's recital of the defendant's right to 
withdraw the plea is mandatory, not discretionary. 
 
Both Charbonneau and the presiding justice rely on the 
absence of language specifying a timeframe for the tender of a 
defendant-capped plea to support their arguments regarding the 
validity of the standing order.  Charbonneau contends that where 
the statute and rule lack a specific provision imposing time 
limitations on the tender of a plea, none may be implied.  
Conversely, the presiding justice argues that the statute is 
silent as to when a plea may be tendered and that, as a 
consequence, the timing of the tender is a matter left to the 
court's discretion and may be governed by court management 
8 
 
rules.  The presiding justice further argues that the court may 
impose a reasonable limitation on the right to tender a 
defendant-capped plea, as a means of improving court efficiency.5  
We are not persuaded by the presiding justice's arguments and 
conclude that G. L. c. 278, § 18, and rule 12 preclude the 
imposition of a time limitation, as set forth in the standing 
order, on the tender of a guilty plea. 
 
 While we acknowledge that neither G. L. c. 276, § 18, nor 
rule 12 contains express language governing the timing of a plea 
tender, we disagree that the absence of such language permits a 
judicially imposed time limitation.  Applying familiar rules of 
statutory construction, we conclude that the Legislature's 
failure to include a time limit for the plea tender cannot 
justify an interpretation that undermines the purpose of the 
statute. 
 
If a statute is "simply silent" on an issue, "we interpret 
the provision 'in the context of the over-all objective the 
Legislature sought to accomplish.'"  Seller's Case, 452 Mass. 
804, 810 (2008), quoting National Lumber Co. v. LeFrancois 
Constr. Corp., 430 Mass. 663, 667 (2000).  Our task is to 
discern and implement the intent of the Legislature.  Oxford v. 
                                                          
 
 
5 In view of our conclusion that the standing order violates 
defendants' statutory right to tender a defendant-capped plea at 
trial, we need not reach the presiding justice's contention that 
the standing order's pretrial deadline is a reasonable limit on 
a defendant's due process rights. 
9 
 
Oxford Water Co., 391 Mass. 581, 587 (1984).  Based on our 
review of the statute as a whole, we conclude that the central 
purpose of G. L. c. 278, § 18, is to preserve a defendant's 
right to tender a defendant-capped plea.  This purpose is 
plainly discernible from the single mandate of the statute:  
that the court "shall inform the defendant that it will not 
impose a disposition that exceeds the terms of the agreed upon 
recommendation or the dispositional request by the defendant."  
G. L. c. 278, § 18.  This singular focus establishes that 
purpose as the sine qua non of the statute. 
 
The centrality of this purpose is further evinced by the 
timing of the statute's enactment.  The Legislature created the 
defendant-capped plea procedure at the same time that it 
eliminated the two-tier trial de novo system in the District 
Court and Boston Municipal Court Departments.  See Commonwealth 
v. Pyles, 423 Mass. 717, 720-721 (1996).  The trial de novo 
procedure, which originated in the Colonial era, allowed a 
convicted defendant to opt for a new trial.  See St. 1783, c. 
51.  In effect, this was a risk-free opportunity to put the 
Commonwealth to its proof of the crime charged.  Although the 
Legislature preserved the right to a jury trial when it 
eliminated the de novo trial, this change altered the balance 
that had previously favored defendants.  Viewing the elimination 
of the long-standing trial de novo system as a curtailment of 
10 
 
defendants' rights, the Legislature properly could create a 
statutory right to tender a defendant-capped plea as the 
appropriate counterbalance.  Thus, our analysis proceeds on the 
assumption that protection of the right to tender a defendant-
capped plea lies at the heart of the statute and that rule 12 
reinforces this purpose by incorporating a comprehensive scheme 
to protect that right. 
 
In deference to the legislative prerogative to provide this 
protection to a defendant, we are obliged to fashion a statutory 
interpretation that furthers rather than restricts the exercise 
of this right.  See Pyles, 423 Mass. at 721-722, quoting Weems 
v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 379 (1910) (Legislature's 
prerogative to cloak defendant with sentencing protections "is 
not to be interfered with lightly").  The prohibition of a 
defendant-capped plea on the day of trial unquestionably 
restricts the sentencing protections offered by the statute and 
the rule.  The standing order imposes more than a logistical 
time constraint; it is a substantive limit on defendants' 
sentencing protections.  In its operation, the standing order 
undermines the purpose of the statute because it permits a judge 
to bypass the mandated sentencing protections if, for any 
reason, the defendant does not tender a plea before the day of 
trial.  As we have discussed, we discern a legislative purpose 
to protect, without exception, a defendant's right to tender a 
11 
 
defendant-capped plea.  Because neither the statute nor the rule 
expressly permits the time limit imposed by the standing order 
and because the time limit undermines the purpose of the 
statute, we reject the presiding justice's contention that the 
standing order is a valid exercise of its administrative 
authority to manage the schedule of court business. 
 
Our interpretation draws support from the legislative 
history of G. L. c. 278, § 18.  The Legislature has not 
restricted the defendant-capped plea procedure, despite multiple 
revisions to both G. L. c. 278, § 18, and rule 12.  When the 
Legislature ended trials de novo and created the one-trial 
system, it explicitly retained defendants' right to request a 
specific disposition, find out if the court would impose a more 
punitive sentence, and withdraw their plea.  G. L. c. 278, § 18, 
as appearing in St. 1992, c. 379, § 193.  When the body charged 
with implementing the new trial system proposed restrictions on 
pleading rights, those recommendations were not incorporated in 
the final one-trial system.6  See SJC's Proposed Rules for One-
                                                          
 
6 The One-Trial Implementation Subcommittee of the District 
Court Committee on Caseflow Management proposed a rule that 
would have required "[a]ny plea or admission submitted by the 
defendant after the trial date has been scheduled" to be limited 
by the Commonwealth's requested disposition.  SJC's Proposed 
Rules for One-Trial System, Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly (22 
M.L.W. 287), Oct. 25, 1993, at 26 (publishing proposed rule 
4 [c] and commentary).  This Commonwealth-capped plea is in 
effect at the Superior Court.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 
12 (c) (4) (A), as amended, 470 Mass. 1501 (2015) ("In the 
12 
 
Trial System, Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly (22 M.L.W. 287), Oct. 
25, 1993, at 23.  In fact, the Legislature expanded the right to 
tender defendant-capped pleas to include the entire Juvenile 
Court Department.  See St. 1996, c. 200, § 37.  The history of 
rule 12 similarly evinces an expansion of the defendant-capped 
plea procedure.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 12, as appearing in 442 
Mass. 1511 (2004), and 470 Mass. 1501 (2015).  Rule 12 was 
strengthened to reflect the mandatory defendant-capped plea 
process provided by G. L. c. 278, § 18.  See Reporters' Notes to 
Rule 12 (2004), Mass. Ann. Laws Court Rules, Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, at 1493 (LexisNexis 2014-2015). 
 
 Last, while not dispositive, long-standing trial practice 
supports our view that a defendant's right to tender a 
defendant-capped plea at trial is an essential part of the 
fairness calculus in the guilty plea process.  See Goodwin, 458 
Mass. at 20 & n.12 (2010) ("defense capped plea" procedure 
common litigation practice since 1987 version of Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 12 [c] [2], as appearing in 399 Mass. 1215).  In Pyles, 423 
Mass. at 718, 722, which also involved the tender of a 
defendant-capped plea on the day of trial, we upheld the 
constitutionality of G. L. c. 278, § 18.  In that case, we had 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Superior Court, the judge shall inform the defendant that the 
disposition imposed will not exceed the terms of the 
prosecutor's recommendation without first giving the defendant 
the right to withdraw the plea"). 
13 
 
no occasion to address the timing of a defendant-capped plea, 
but we noted the prevalence of the practice.  Id. 
 
Although we implicitly addressed the point earlier in our 
analysis, we note briefly our rejection of the presiding 
justice's additional argument that judicial discretion to accept 
or deny a defendant-capped plea, see Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (a) (3) 
("A judge may refuse to accept a plea of guilty"), encompasses 
the authority to truncate the time in which defendants may 
tender such pleas.  The presiding justice argues that because 
"[n]either [r]ule 12 nor G. L. c. 278[,] § 18[,] establish[es] 
how many times a defendant may tender a defense capped plea," 
"[i]ndividual judges are free to formulate their own policy on 
this issue as the needs of their particular courts dictate."  
See Reporters' Notes to Rule 12 (2004), supra at 1490.  An 
individual judge's discretion to accept or reject a plea is not 
the same as the court's exercise of its discretion to establish 
trial management policies that impair a defendant's statutory 
rights.  First, the acceptance or refusal of a plea has 
constitutional dimensions not at issue here.  See Commonwealth 
v. Furr, 454 Mass. 101, 106-107 (2009) (pleas must be made 
intelligently and voluntarily to be effective waiver of right to 
trial).  Second, as explained above, under G. L. c. 278, § 18, 
and rule 12, a judge has no discretion to alter the statutory 
procedure by requiring the tender of a defendant-capped plea 
14 
 
before trial.  The statute and the rule mandate the judge to 
respond to the plea tender, not set deadlines to receive it. 
 
Any reliance on Rule 4(c) of the District/Municipal Courts 
Rules of Criminal Procedure fails for the same reason.  Rule 
4(c) does not confer judicial authority to forbid defendant-
capped pleas at trial (thereby indirectly setting time limits on 
the tender of defendant-capped pleas).  Rule 4(c) states:  "If 
the court rejects the dispositional terms . . . it shall so 
inform the defendant and the defendant shall be permitted to 
withdraw the plea or admission."  Rule 4(c) mimics the language 
of G. L. c. 278, § 18, and Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 (c) (4) (A), 
which require the judge to respond to a defendant's tender of a 
defendant-capped plea.  Further, and as described above, rule 
4(c) is a court rule, not an independent source of authority to 
trump a specific statutory right.  See Senior Hous. Props. Trust 
v. HealthSouth Corp., 447 Mass. 259, 271 (2006). 
 
Although we reject the standing order as a valid exercise 
of the Holyoke District Court's administrative authority, we are 
mindful and respectful of the case management and quality of 
justice imperatives underlying the presiding justice's 
promulgation of the standing order.  At the same time, we are 
compelled to establish boundaries that do not encroach on the 
rights of defendants.  We are especially protective of these 
boundaries where there exists, as here, a well-defined and 
15 
 
carefully guarded right to tender a defendant-capped plea.  The 
inherent authority of the judiciary, which we recognize fully, 
Campatelli v. Chief Justice of the Trial Court, 468 Mass. 455, 
475-476 (2014), cannot justify the standing order where it 
conflicts with Charbonneau's statutory right.  See Senior Hous. 
Props. Trust, 447 Mass. at 271 ("where there is an 
irreconcilable conflict between a court rule and a statute, the 
rule generally must yield to the statute"). 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For the reasons stated above, we are 
persuaded by Charbonneau's argument that the presiding justice 
may not promulgate a standing order imposing a time limit on 
defendant-capped pleas where the Legislature has not seen fit to 
do so.  Therefore, we vacate the standing order insofar as it 
purports to preclude the tender of a defendant-capped plea on 
the day of trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.