Title: Trapp v. Roden

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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SJC-11863 
 
RANDALL TRAPP & another1  vs.  GARY RODEN2 & others.3 
 
 
 
Worcester.     October 5, 2015. - November 23, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Commissioner of Correction.  Imprisonment.  Religion.  Contract, 
Settlement agreement, Performance and breach. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
September 30, 2010.  
 
 
The case was heard by Cornelius J. Moriarty, II, J.  
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Richard C. McFarland for the defendants. 
                     
1 Robert Ferreira. 
 
2 Individually and in his official capacity as 
superintendent of the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at 
Norfolk (MCI-Norfolk). 
 
3 Cynthia Sumner, individually and in her official capacity 
as deputy superintendent of MCI-Norfolk, and Harold W. Clarke, 
individually and in his official capacity as Commissioner of 
Correction. 
 
2 
 
Jarrett M. Scarpaci for the plaintiffs. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Maggie Ellen Filler for Prisoners' Legal Services. 
 
Joel West Williams, of Pennsylvania, & Gabriel S. Galanda, 
of Washington, for Huy. 
 
Yale Yechiel N. Robinson, pro se. 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  Randall Trapp and Robert Ferreira, who are 
adherents of Native American religious practices, are both 
incarcerated at Department of Correction (DOC) facilities.  In 
2010, Trapp and Ferreira filed an amended complaint in the 
Superior Court contending, among other things, that the DOC's 
closure of the purification lodge4 at the Souza-Baranowski 
Correctional Center (SBCC) violates the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1 et 
seq. (2012) (RLUIPA); art. 2 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights; and a settlement agreement reached in 2003 to resolve a 
prior lawsuit brought by Trapp against the DOC.  The complaint 
named Gary Roden, Commissioner of Correction, and two DOC 
employees at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at 
Norfolk (MCI-Norfolk) as defendants.  After a jury-waived trial 
in July, 2012, a Superior Court judge concluded that the closure 
of the lodge at SBCC violated the plaintiffs' rights under all 
three asserted theories, and entered a declaratory judgment in 
                     
4 The parties use the term "purification lodge," while the 
term "sweat lodge" also is used by other Native American 
practitioners.  For simplicity, we use the more general term 
"lodge" to encompass all such structures. 
3 
favor of the plaintiffs on those claims.5  The DOC appealed, and 
we transferred the case to this court on our own motion.  We 
conclude that the closure of the lodge at SBCC violates RLUIPA 
and the settlement agreement.  Accordingly, we do not reach the 
constitutional question.6   
Background.  The dispute at the crux of this case dates 
back two decades.  In 1995, Trapp and four other inmates 
(Ferreira was not among them) filed a complaint in the Superior 
Court asserting that the DOC had violated their rights to 
exercise their religion.  After extensive litigation over a 
number of years, in 2003 the parties entered into a settlement 
                     
5 The plaintiffs' amended complaint asserted seven claims 
against the Department of Correction (DOC), among them State and 
Federal constitutional claims and several statutory claims 
arising out of the closure of lodges at MCI-Norfolk and the 
Souza-Baranowski Correctional Center (SBCC); the DOC's refusal 
to permit the plaintiffs to use kinnick-kinnick, which includes 
tobacco as an ingredient; and the DOC's refusal to permit the 
plaintiffs to use prayer beads of the color of their choice.  
 
With respect to the claims regarding SBCC, the Superior 
Court judge entered declarations for the plaintiffs on the 
constitutional claim under art. 2 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights, the statutory claim under the Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000cc-1 et seq. (2012) (RLUIPA), and the contract claim for 
breach of the settlement agreement.  The judge entered 
declarations in favor of the defendants on all the other claims 
in the complaint; the plaintiffs have not filed cross appeals on 
those counts.  Thus, the issues before us concern only the DOC's 
closure of the lodge at SBCC. 
 
6 We acknowledge the amicus briefs of Huy and Prisoners' 
Legal Services on behalf of the plaintiffs, and the amicus brief 
of Attorney Yale Yechiel N. Robinson. 
 
4 
agreement that required the DOC to construct a lodge at SBCC and 
another facility not at issue in this appeal.7  Under the terms 
of the agreement, the named plaintiffs and others who 
participate in Native American religious practices were promised 
the right to participate in ceremonies that were to be conducted 
at the lodges once each month.  The settlement agreement 
contained protocols setting forth the manner in which the lodges 
were to be constructed and the ceremonies conducted, all based 
on the traditions of the Wampanoag Tribe.  Further, the 
settlement agreement provided that the protocols could be 
altered if necessary as security needs dictated, but that such 
changes were to be made in consultation with the Massachusetts 
Commission on Indian Affairs.            
Under the protocols set forth in the settlement agreement, 
a lodge is constructed of sixteen saplings arranged in a circle 
and then bent and joined together to form a dome, which is 
covered by blankets or canvas.  A pit is dug in the ground in 
the middle of a lodge, to make space for rocks that are placed 
in it after they have been heated by a wood fire outside the 
lodge.  During a ceremony, water is poured onto the heated rocks 
to create the steam and heat necessary for the ceremony.  The 
settlement agreement required the lodges to be constructed 
                     
7 The settlement agreement also required the DOC to 
construct a lodge at MCI-Norfolk.  
5 
within a secured perimeter inaccessible to the general inmate 
population. 
The DOC built a lodge at SBCC in 2004  Within six months, 
however, it halted all ceremonies at the SBCC lodge, citing 
health concerns that resulted from smoke filtering into the main 
building from the wood fires used to heat the rocks.  According 
to the DOC, the SBCC facility has a closed ventilation system 
that does not permit windows to be opened; rather, air is pumped 
into the building in accordance with the amount of air required 
per person by law.  The DOC maintains that asthmatics working or 
residing within the facility complained of respiratory distress, 
compelling closure of the lodge. 
Trapp commenced this action in September, 2010; Ferreira 
was added as a plaintiff in November of that year.  At all times 
relevant to this litigation, Trapp has been incarcerated at MCI-
Norfolk.  Ferreira was incarcerated at MCI-Norfolk until 
February, 2012, when he was transferred to SBCC.   
In January, 2011, a Superior Court judge,8 ruling on the 
DOC's motion to dismiss, determined that because Ferreira was 
not a party to the 2003 settlement agreement he could not pursue 
any contract-based claims against the DOC based on breach of 
that agreement.  The motion judge also concluded that the 
                     
8 The motion to dismiss and the ultimate merits of the 
action were decided by different Superior Court judges. 
6 
plaintiffs could not recover damages because they had failed to 
exhaust their administrative remedies, and that therefore they 
could seek only equitable relief.  A jury-waived trial was held 
on the merits of the plaintiffs' statutory, constitutional, and 
contract claims in July, 2012; the trial involved numerous 
claims not at issue here. The trial judge issued his decision in 
September, 2012. As relevant to the DOC's appeal, the trial 
judge concluded that the closure of the lodge at SBCC violated 
RLUIPA, the settlement agreement, and art 2.   
The trial judge rested his conclusions on two findings of 
fact.  First, the judge found the closure of the lodge at SBCC 
was not based on security-related concerns but, rather, "on 
unconvincing references to health concerns" that "consisted of 
hearsay statements, which themselves offered dubious self-
diagnoses, such as asthma, without any medical foundation."  
Second, the judge found that the DOC "provided no reason to 
believe that the only feasible means of remedying the smoke 
inhalation problem was . . . by stopping the purification 
ceremonies altogether."  Specifically, the judge found that the 
DOC "said nothing to explain" why filtering the air inside the 
building or placing the lodge in a location that would disperse 
the smoke were not reasonable alternatives.9  
                     
9 The DOC has provided a sparse record on appeal.  It is 
thus unclear how, if at all, the DOC responded to these 
7 
Discussion.  The DOC challenges the trial judge's factual 
findings that it failed to provide adequate evidence in support 
of its asserted health concerns as the basis for closing the 
lodge.  The DOC also argues that the trial judge erred in 
concluding that the DOC failed to meet its burden, under 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1(a), to show that closing the lodge was in 
furtherance of a compelling government interest and was the 
least restrictive means possible.  Finally, the DOC argues that 
the trial judge erred when he concluded that the DOC committed a 
breach of the 2003 settlement agreement by closing the lodge.   
We conclude that the trial judge's findings of fact were 
not clearly erroneous, see Sheriff of Suffolk County v. Jail 
Officers & Employees of Suffolk County, 465 Mass. 584, 588 
(2013), and that the judge was correct in determining that the 
closure of the lodge violates RLUIPA and the settlement 
agreement. 
1.  Whether the DOC's closure of the SBCC lodge violates 
RLUIPA.  The parties agree that only Ferreira's rights are 
implicated under RLUIPA because he was the only plaintiff who, 
at the time of trial, was incarcerated at SBCC and, thus, could 
be burdened by the closure of the lodge.  Under RLUIPA's well-
established burden-shifting analysis, Ferreira bore the initial 
                                                                  
alternatives in the proceedings in the Superior Court.  On 
appeal, the DOC offers no comment on whether these alternatives 
discussed by the trial judge are reasonable. 
8 
burden to prove that DOC's closure of the lodge at SBCC 
"substantially burdens" his religious exercise.  See Holt v. 
Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015) (Holt).  Once he met this 
initial burden, the burden shifted to the DOC to show that its 
closure of the lodge was "in furtherance of a compelling 
governmental interest" and was "the least restrictive means of 
furthering that compelling governmental interest."  Id. at 863, 
quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).  
There is no dispute that Ferreira met his burden to 
establish that participation in Native American ceremonies at 
the lodge constitutes religious exercise as defined by the 
statute.  RLUIPA protects "any exercise of religion, whether or 
not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief," 
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A), as long as the exercise is based on 
"a sincerely held religious belief."  Holt, supra at 862, citing 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).  
The DOC does not challenge the sincerity of Ferreira's exercise 
or belief.   
Rather, the DOC argues that Ferreira has failed to prove 
that the inability to use the lodge for ceremonies is a 
substantial burden on his religious exercise because he still 
has alternative ways of "engaging in Native American practices."  
9 
Specifically, the DOC points to the availability of smudging10 
and pipe ceremonies at SBCC, along with other ceremonies such as 
"talking circles, singing, chanting, and the playing of musical 
instruments, including drums, rattles and a flute."  
Additionally, the DOC asserts that Ferreira has access to Native 
American "ceremonial items" to facilitate the exercise of his 
religion, including a headband, prayer beads, and a pipe.  In 
short, the DOC contends that it has not substantially burdened 
Ferreira's exercise of religion by closing the lodge because he 
has other ways to practice his religion.   
The United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Holt, 
supra at 862, forecloses the DOC's argument, as counsel conceded 
during argument before us.  In Holt, the petitioner, a devout 
Muslim inmate, challenged a decision of the Arkansas Department 
of Correction refusing to grant him an exception to its no-beard 
policy by permitting him to grow a one-half inch beard in 
accordance with his religious beliefs.  Id. at 859.  The United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas 
concluded that the no-beard policy did not substantially burden 
Holt's exercise of religion because he had been given a prayer 
rug and a list of distributors of Islamic material, he was 
                     
10 According to a DOC religious services handbook, smudging 
"is a process of using smoke to clear away negative energies and 
to attract positive energies," using sage, sweetgrass, and other 
plants to produce smoke.  
10 
permitted to correspond with a religious advisor, and he was 
permitted to observe holidays and maintain his desired diet.  
Id. at 862.  Rejecting the District Court's analysis, the United 
States Supreme Court explained that "RLUIPA's 'substantial 
burden' inquiry asks whether the government has substantially 
burdened religious exercise . . . , not whether the RLUIPA 
claimant is able to engage in other forms of religious 
exercise."  Id.  
Here, as in Holt, the alternate means Ferreira may have to 
practice his religion are irrelevant to the analysis of whether 
the DOC's closure of the lodge substantially burdens his 
religious exercise.  The DOC offers no additional argument in 
support of its position.  Thus, we have no trouble concluding 
that the DOC's absolute closure of the lodge at SBCC 
substantially burdens Ferreira's exercise of religion.  See 
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 721 (2005) ("RLUIPA . . . 
protects institutionalized persons who are unable freely to 
attend to their religious needs and are therefore dependent on 
the government's permission and accommodation for exercise of 
their religion").  
The DOC contends that even if the closure of the lodge at 
SBCC substantially burdens Ferreira's exercise of religion, it 
still should prevail because the closure was in furtherance of a 
compelling governmental interest and was the least restrictive 
11 
means of furthering that interest.  
The DOC has not identified evidence in the record to 
counter the trial judge's factual finding that the DOC failed to 
provide credible evidence in support of its asserted health 
justification.  Rather, the DOC emphasizes, as it did at trial, 
the statements of two witnesses, each of whom provided testimony 
in support of the health concerns on which the DOC's argument 
relies.  The first witness, Lynn Chernesky, a DOC employee, 
testified that, as a result of smoke from the wood fires used 
for the lodge ceremonies entering the building, "all our 
asthmatic staff and inmates became in distress."  Chernesky's 
testimony does not explain how she came to know of the supposed 
distress of the "asthmatic staff and inmates," such as whether 
they complained directly to her, whether she read complaints 
they had filed with someone else, or whether some third source 
relayed the information to her.  The DOC fails to point to any 
evidence in the record to support Chernesky's conclusory 
generalizations or counter the factual finding that her 
testimony was unpersuasive.  Further, we note in this regard 
that the DOC did not call a single inmate or DOC employee to 
testify about any distress, even minor, he or she may have 
personally experienced as a result of the wood fires burning 
outside during the monthly ceremonies. 
The second witness whose testimony the DOC identifies in 
12 
support of the compelling nature of its health interest is Todd 
Gunglach, a DOC engineer, whose expertise is in heating and 
ventilation systems.  Gunglach testified to the operation of the 
closed ventilation system at SBCC.  When asked whether he was 
familiar with the attempts to operate the lodge at SBCC, 
Gunglach responded that he was only familiar with a report 
commissioned by the DOC that, he stated, had concluded that it 
was "virtually impossible" to operate the lodge without smoke 
from the wood fires entering the facility.  The report Gunglach 
referenced was not introduced in evidence, and is not part of 
the record before us.  In any event, the DOC fails to identify 
any portions of Gunglach's testimony that support the contention 
that the smoke from the fires caused health concerns.  Rather, 
when asked whether he knew of any physical harm to people's 
health caused by indoor smoking at SBCC, not the wood fires 
burned outside, Gunglach responded, "Well, I'm not a 
physiologist.  I mean, we hear oftentimes about second-hand 
smoke and its effects on people.  So just from basic knowledge 
of the news and media reports of second-hand smoke, that's what 
I would be aware of."   
Based on the testimony of Chernesky and Gunglach, who 
provided the sole support for the DOC's argument, the trial 
judge concluded that the DOC's evidence supporting any 
compelling interest of health concerns was unpersuasive.  We 
13 
cannot conclude that this finding was clearly erroneous.  We 
agree that the DOC has failed to meet its burden by 
demonstrating that its decision to close the lodge at SBCC was 
motivated by a compelling government interest.  
We do not, however, read the trial judge's opinion to have 
concluded that health concerns may never serve as a compelling 
government interest under RLUIPA, as the DOC maintains it does.  
It is uncontroverted that the DOC has an interest in caring for 
the health of inmates in its custody.  See, e.g., Helling v.  
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993) ("We have great difficulty 
agreeing that prison authorities may . . . ignore a condition of 
confinement that is sure or very likely to cause serious illness 
and needless suffering the next week or month or year"); Good v. 
Commissioner of Correction, 417 Mass. 329, 335 (1994) 
("Recognizing that prison inmates are entitled to safe drinking 
water, the Department of Public Health requires that 
correctional facilities in the Commonwealth must provide at all 
times safe and sanitary drinking water"); Cryer v. Massachusetts 
Department of Correction, 763 F. Supp. 2d 237, 243 (D. Mass. 
2011) (prison ban on smoking in cells furthers compelling 
government interest of health and safety).     
The fatal flaw in the DOC's position is not that its 
asserted interest falls under the banner of health rather than 
security.  Rather, in this case, the DOC cannot prevail because 
14 
it failed to meet its burden to show that the claimed compelling 
interest was actual rather than speculative.  Prison officials 
may not "declare a compelling governmental interest by fiat."  
Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48, 59 (10th Cir. 2014).  The 
DOC was obligated to put forth something more than conclusory 
assertions regarding health concerns, and it failed to do so.  
The trial judge concluded that, on this record, a wood fire that 
burned outdoors once a month, near a facility that has a closed 
ventilation system, was not shown to pose a risk to the health 
of anyone within the facility.  The record supports this 
conclusion.  In reaching this result, we do not determine that 
the risk does not exist.  We conclude only that the evidence 
here was lacking and thus falls short of what RLUIPA requires.  
See Holt, supra at 867 (Sotomayor, J., concurring), quoting 106 
Cong. Rec. 16699 (2000) ("Indeed, prison policies 'grounded on 
mere speculation' are exactly the ones that motivated Congress 
to enact RLUIPA"). 
Finally, even if we were to conclude that the DOC's 
asserted health concerns constituted a compelling government 
interest in these circumstances, the DOC must prove that it used 
the least restrictive means to further that interest.  This is 
an "exceptionally demanding" standard that requires the DOC to 
demonstrate "that it lacks other means of achieving its desired 
goal without a substantial burden" on Ferreira's religious 
15 
exercise.  See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
2751, 2780 (2014).  "A prison cannot meet its burden to prove 
least restrictive means unless it demonstrates that it has 
actually considered and rejected the efficacy of less 
restrictive measures before adopting the challenged practice" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Spratt v. Rhode Island Dep't 
of Corrections, 482 F.3d 33, 41 (1st Cir. 2007).   
The DOC argues that it tested three different locations at 
SBCC to determine whether there was a location in the yard from 
which smoke would not enter the ventilation system, "but without 
success."  Chernesky's testimony supports the DOC's assertion 
that it conducted three test fires, but omits any credible 
explanation of how she knew smoke entered the building.  Rather, 
when asked what happened to the staff and inmates when the test 
fires were conducted, Chernesky repeated her conclusory refrain 
that "asthmatics became in distress," leading her to conclude 
that "we could not have a purification lodge."   
Assuming that the DOC had some reliable method to determine 
whether smoke entered the facility following the test fires in a 
quantity sufficient to cause adverse health consequences to 
those inside, this isolated effort fails to satisfy its burden.  
As the trial judge found, the DOC failed to consider whether it 
could filter the air within the facility, or whether it could 
disperse the air outside to prevent smoke from entering the 
16 
facility.  The DOC offers no explanation why neither of these 
alternatives was considered, or if they were considered, why 
they were rejected.  See Spratt v. Rhode Island Dep't of 
Corrections, supra at 41 n.11 ("[T]o meet the least restrictive 
means test, prison administrators generally ought to explore at 
least some alternatives, and their rejection should generally be 
accompanied by some measure of explanation").  See also 
Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d at 63.   
For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the 
DOC's closure of the lodge at SBCC was impermissible under 
RLUIPA. 
2.  Whether the closure of the SBCC lodge violates the 2003 
settlement agreement.  As an initial matter, we consider the 
DOC's argument that the claim is not properly before us because 
both Trapp and Ferreira lacked standing to pursue a breach of 
contract claim based on the 2003 settlement agreement, and the 
plaintiffs failed to amend their complaint expressly to include 
a claim relating to the closure of the lodge at SBCC. 
The DOC argued in its motion to dismiss that Ferreira 
lacked standing to enforce the 2003 settlement agreement because 
he was not a party to it.  The motion judge agreed. Because 
Ferreira has not raised this issue in a cross-appeal, we have no 
occasion to review it.    
The DOC argues that Trapp lacks standing to enforce the 
17 
settlement agreement with respect to the closure of the lodge at 
SBCC because he has never been, and was not at the time of 
trial, confined to that facility.  This argument fails.  "A 
settlement agreement is a contract and its enforceability is 
determined by applying general contract law."11  Sparrow v.  
Demonico, 461 Mass. 322, 327 (2012).  When a party is a 
signatory to a contractual agreement, a breach of contract is an 
injury sufficient to confer standing.  See Katz v. Pershing, 
LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 72 (1st Cir. 2012) ("The invasion of a common-
law right [including a right conferred by contract] can 
constitute an injury sufficient to create standing").  We 
conclude that, as a signatory to the 2003 settlement agreement, 
Trapp has a cognizable legal interest in ensuring that the DOC 
uphold its end of the bargain to protect the religious exercise 
of Native American inmates by providing a lodge for ceremonies 
at SBCC.  The DOC has pointed to no authority to support its 
position that a party to a contract alleging a breach lacks 
standing to pursue the claim.  See id. ("when a plaintiff 
                     
11 The settlement agreement contains the following 
provision:  
 
"This Settlement Agreement shall survive this action 
and be independently enforceable as a contract.  All 
parties acknowledge that if any party fails to comply with 
said Settlement Agreement, it will be deemed a breach of 
contract and will subject the non-complying part(ies) to 
legal action . . . ."   
 
18 
generally alleges the existence of a contract, express or 
implied, and a concomitant breach of that contract, her pleading 
adequately shows an injury to her rights").    
The DOC also contends that the breach of contract claim is 
not properly before us because the plaintiffs failed to amend 
their complaint expressly to include a claim arising from the 
closure of the lodge at SBCC.  While the amended complaint, 
filed in November, 2010, does not refer specifically to the 
closure of the lodge at SBCC, it does more generally assert that 
the DOC has "breached [its] contract with the plaintiffs by not 
allowing them to practice the Wampanoag traditions as stipulated 
in the contract between the parties."  Trapp asserts that the 
construction of lodges according to the Wampanoag traditions at 
three facilities, including SBCC, was a major component of the 
settlement agreement and thus encompassed by the amended 
complaint.     
We need not resolve this issue because we conclude that the 
DOC consented to the trial judge's consideration of the claim.  
See Mass. R. Civ. P. 15 (b), 364 Mass. 761 (1974) ("When issues 
not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied 
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as 
if they had been raised in the pleadings").  See Graham v. 
Quincy Food Serv. Employees Ass'n & Hosp., Library, & Pub. 
Employees Union, 407 Mass. 601, 615-616 (1990).  Here, it is 
19 
undisputed that the trial judge considered the issue whether the 
closure of the lodge at SBCC was lawful.  The DOC does not 
assert that it objected to Trapp's introduction of evidence 
related to the closure of the lodge at SBCC.12  To the contrary, 
the DOC introduced its own evidence, on which it now relies to 
support its arguments before us. Indeed, the only excerpts of 
trial testimony that the DOC has included in the record on 
appeal B- the testimony of Chernesky and Gunglach concerning the 
closure of the lodge at SBCC B- demonstrate its affirmative 
litigation of the issue whether it was justified in closing the 
lodge at SBCC.  Under these circumstances, we conclude that the 
DOC consented to litigating the closure of the lodge at SBCC, 
and the claim is properly before us. 
On the merits of the contract claim, the DOC argues that it 
has not committed a breach of the settlement agreement because 
the agreement contains a provision that permits altering its 
terms in response to institutional security concerns.  
                     
12 The DOC claims that it objected to the introduction of 
evidence at the motion to dismiss stage regarding the closure of 
the lodge at SBCC in relation to its argument that Ferreira 
lacked standing.  But the DOC does not assert that it objected 
to evidence on this issue at trial.  Further, we note that the 
DOC has not pointed to any statement in the record evidencing 
its objection to the introduction of evidence on the closure of 
SBCC, nor does the DOC contend that it raised the issue of the 
failure to amend the complaint to the trial judge in its motion 
for reconsideration.  Issues not raised in the trial court are 
considered waived on appeal.  See Carey v. New England Organ 
Bank, 446 Mass. 270, 285 (2006). 
20 
Specifically, the DOC contends that its health concerns, 
discussed above, provide a sufficient security rationale to 
justify the closure of the lodge.  
This argument fails.  First, as discussed supra, the trial 
judge found that the DOC's claim that it closed the lodge at 
SBCC for health reasons was unsupported by the evidence.  
Therefore, even if the settlement agreement permitted the DOC to 
close the lodge for health reasons, the DOC has failed to 
establish a factual predicate that would have permitted closure.   
Second, even if we were to conclude that the health 
concerns were properly supported by evidence, the agreement 
requires that the protocols may be altered "in consultation with 
the Massachusetts Commission on Indian Affairs."  It is 
undisputed that the DOC failed to consult with the Commission on 
Indian Affairs, and thus it has violated the settlement 
agreement on this ground also.    
 
Judgment affirmed.