Title: Horton v. Harwick Chem. Corp.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

Horton et al., Appellants, v. Harwick Chemical Corporation; A.W. 
Chesterton et al., Appellees. 
Robert Derrick, Appellant v. John Crane, Inc., et al., Appellees. 
[Cite as Horton v. Harwick Chem. Corp. (1995), Ohio St.3d] 
Civil procedure -- Appropriate summary judgment standard for 
proving causation in asbestos cases -- Torts -- Alternative 
liability cannot apply, when. 
1. 
For each defendant in a multidefendant asbestos case, the 
plaintiff has the burden of proving exposure to the defendant’s 
product and that the product was a substantial factor in 
causing the plaintiff’s injury. 
2. 
A defendant need not prove that he was exposed to a specific 
product on a regular basis over some extended period of time 
in close proximity to where the plaintiff actually worked in 
order to prove that the product was a substantial factor in 
causing his injury. (Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp. 
[C.A.4, 1986], 782 F.2d 1156, disapproved.). 
 
2
3. 
Summary judgment is proper in an asbestos case in the same 
circumstances as in any other case, i.e, when, looking at the 
evidence as a whole, (1) no genuine issue of material fact 
remains to be litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law, and (3) it appears from the 
evidence, construed most strongly in favor of the nonmoving 
party, that reasonable minds could only conclude in favor of 
the moving party. 
4. 
Alternative liability cannot apply if the defendants’ products 
do not create a substantially similar risk of harm. 
 
Nos. 94-115 and 94-1041 -- Submitted January 11, 1995 -- 
Decided September 13, 1995.) 
 
Appeals from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, 
Nos. 13872 and 14159.  
These consolidated cases arise from the asbestos-related injuries 
allegedly suffered by appellants Robert S. Derrick and Edward 
Horton.  Edward Horton worked for Dayton Tire and Rubber 
Company (“DTR”) from 1946 to 1980.  During his first four years at 
 
3
DTR, Horton worked in the general services department, where he 
performed cleaning duties throughout the DTR plant.  From 1950 
until his retirement, Horton worked as a tire builder, except for one 
year that he spent as a bias cutter in the tire building department.  
Horton alleges that his exposure to asbestos fibers at the DTR plant 
caused him to contract asbestosis, asbestos-related pleural 
thickening, and small airways obstruction. 
 
On July 13, 1990, Horton and others filed a personal injury 
action in the Summit County Court of Common Pleas against 
various manufacturers and distributors of asbestos products.  Mrs. 
Horton filed a claim for loss of consortium.  The part of the  case 
dealing with the Hortons was transferred to the Montgomery County 
Common Pleas Court on November 15, 1990. 
 
In 1992, seventeen of the defendants moved the court for 
summary judgment.  On December 30, 1992, the court sustained the 
motions of thirteen defendants, overruled the motions of two 
defendants, and struck the motions of two as untimely. 
 
4
 
The Hortons appealed to the Second District Court of Appeals 
the entry of summary judgment in favor of the thirteen.  They 
eventually dismissed their appeal on the record as to eight, leaving 
the following five defendants: (1) A.W. Chesterton Company 
(“Chesterton”), (2) McNeil (Ohio) Corporation (“McNeil [Ohio]”), 
(3) McNeil-Akron, Inc. (“McNeil-Akron”), (4) Pittsburgh Corning 
Corporation (“Pittsburgh Corning”), and (5) John Crane, Inc. (“John 
Crane”). McNeil (Ohio) and McNeil-Akron settled with the Hortons 
during the pendency of their appeal.  On November 23, 1993, the 
appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in favor of 
appellees, Chesterton, Pittsburgh Corning, and John Crane. 
 
Derrick, a lifetime nonsmoker but for a few months in his 
youth, worked at DTR from 1942 through 1975, except for two 
years of military service from 1953 to 1955.  Derrick served in a 
variety of capacities at the plant, including working in the receiving 
department, as a janitor, and in the Banbury mixer department.  He 
alleges that as a result of his exposure to asbestos fibers in the 
course of his employment at DTR, he contracted asbestosis and 
 
5
asbestos-related pleural thickening.  On February 8, 1991, Derrick 
filed a personal injury action in Montgomery County Common Pleas 
Court, alleging that his illness was the direct and proximate result 
of the shedding of asbestos fibers into the air of his work 
environment by the defective, asbestos-containing products of the 
named defendants. 
 
Fourteen of the defendants moved the trial court for summary 
judgment.  Derrick dismissed six of those defendants on the record, 
and on July 6, 1993, the court sustained the motions of five of the 
remaining defendants, and overruled the motion of one other. 
 
Derrick appealed to the Second District Court of Appeals the 
entry of summary judgment in favor of four defendants: (1) 
Chesterton, (2) McNeil (Ohio), (3) Pittsburgh Corning, and (4) John 
Crane.  According to the opinion of the court of appeals, 
McNeil(Ohio) settled with Derrick after the appeal was filed. 
 
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s summary 
judgments in favor of appellees Chesterton, Pittsburgh Corning, and 
John Crane on March 30, 1994.  Derrick appealed to this court and 
 
6
we consolidated his appeal with that of appellants Edward and 
Dorothy Horton. 
 
In both of these cases, the appellate court employed the 
“frequency-proximity” test set forth in Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh 
Corning Corp. (C.A.4, 1986), 782 F.2d 1156, to determine whether 
plaintiffs’ evidence regarding causation was sufficient to withstand 
defendants’ summary judgment motions.  Under the  Lohrmann test, 
to escape summary judgment a plaintiff must present evidence of 
“exposure to a specific product on a regular basis over some 
extended period of time in proximity to where the plaintiff actually 
worked.” Id. at 1162-1163.  This court never has specifically 
adopted the Lohrmann test. 
 
Both plaintiffs presented evidence that during the time that 
they worked for DTR asbestos-containing products of each of the 
appellees were present in the facility.  The trial and appellate courts 
held, however, that neither plaintiff demonstrated exposure to any 
of the appellees’ products on a regular basis over some extended 
 
7
period of time in proximity to where the plaintiff actually worked, 
and therefore granted summary judgment to the appellees. 
 
These case are before this court upon the allowance of 
motions to certify the records.  
____________________ 
 
Michael F. Colley Co., L.P.A., Daniel N. Abraham, Thomas F. 
Martello, Jr., and David K. Frank, for appellants. 
 
Baden & Jones Co., L.P.A., Thomas P. Erven and Nancy R. 
Blankenbuehler, for appellee A.W. Chesterton Company. 
 
Day, Cook & Gallagher, David L. Day and Dale D. Cook, for 
appellee John Crane, Inc.  
 
Hermann, Cahn & Schneider, Gary D. Hermann, Jay H. 
Salamon and Romney B. Cullers, for appellee Pittsburgh Corning 
Corporation. 
 
A. Russell Smith and R. Bryan Nace, urging reversal for 
amicus curiae, Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
 
8
Charles R. Armstrong and Carolyn T. Wonders, urging reversal for 
amicus curiae, United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of 
America, AFL-CIO, CLC.  
 
Joyce Goldstein Co., L.P.A., and Joyce Goldstein, urging 
reversal for amicus curiae, Cleveland Building and Construction 
Trades Council, AFL-CIO. 
 
Adams Legal Services and Russell J. Adams, urging reversal 
for amicus curiae, Asbestos Victims of America. 
 
Davis & Young Co., L.P.A., and Martin J. Murphy, urging 
affirmance for amicus curiae, Owens-Corning Fiberglas 
Corporation. 
 
Ronald G. Rossetti, Jr., urging affirmance for amicus curiae, 
Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys. 
 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, Mary Ellen Fairfield, Richard 
D. Schuster and Brent C. Taggart, urging affirmance for amici 
curiae, Acands, Inc., BF Goodrich Company and the Goodyear Tire 
& Rubber Company. 
 
9
 
Baker & Hostetler, Randall L. Solomon and John H. Burtch, 
urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Center for Claims Resolution. 
 
Bunda, Stutz & Dewitt, Robert A. Bunda, Barbara J. Stutz and 
Anne Y. Koester, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Owens-
Illinois, Inc. 
____________________ 
Pfeifer, J.   We are asked in this case to set forth the appropriate 
summary judgment standard for causation in asbestos cases, and 
specifically, whether Ohio courts should adopt the Lohrmann test.  
While this court is aware of the docketing problems that may exist 
with asbestos-exposure cases, we will not cause plaintiffs in such 
cases to carry a greater summary judgment burden than other 
personal injury plaintiffs.  In our view, the Lohrmann standard casts 
judges in an inappropriate role, is overly burdensome, and is 
unnecessary. 
We are also asked in this case to adopt alternative liability as a 
possible theory for recovery.  This court has recognized the 
viability of alternative liability in the past, but we find it 
 
10
inappropriate in the cases at hand, since there is no evidence that 
the defendants’ products created a substantially similar risk of 
harm. 
I 
In Pang v. Minch (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 186, 559 N.E.2d 1313, 
paragraph five of the syllabus, this court held that “[w]here a 
plaintiff suffers a single injury as a result of the tortious acts of 
multiple defendants, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to 
demonstrate that the conduct of each defendant was a substantial 
factor in producing the harm.” In the asbestos cases, the plaintiff 
also has the burden of proving exposure to asbestos-containing 
products. Goldman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. (1987), 33 Ohio 
St.3d 40, 42, 514 N.E.2d 691, 693. 
The Lohrmann test purports to be a tool for determining whether a 
plaintiff’s evidence of causation, i.e., whether a particular product 
was a substantial factor in producing the plaintiff’s injury, is 
sufficient to withstand summary judgment.  However, the test 
creates less a legal standard than a medical or scientific one.  Under 
 
11
Lohrmann, a product cannot possibly cause an injury unless a 
plaintiff has worked in close proximity to the product on a regular 
basis for an extended period of time. By employing the Lohrmann 
test, the trial judge usurps the traditional role of the medical or 
scientific expert, establishing a mechanistic test regarding 
causation which no contrary expert testimony can overcome.  The 
Lohrmann test puts trial judges in the position of having to find, for 
instance, that sporadic, intense exposure to asbestos over an 
extended period of time cannot cause asbestos-related disease. 
In effect, the Lohrmann test requires judges to take judicial notice 
that an asbestos-containing product can cause injury only when 
someone works in close proximity to the product on a regular basis 
over an extended period of time.  Evid. R. 201(B) describes the 
kind of facts which may be judicially noticed: 
“A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable 
dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready 
 
12
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot 
reasonably be questioned.” 
We certainly cannot say that there is no reasonable dispute as to 
what level of exposure can cause asbestos-related diseases.  In 
refusing to adopt the Lohrmann test in Schultz v. Keene Corp. 
(N.D.Ill. 1990), 729 F.Supp. 609, 615, the court wrote: 
“[The] rule * * * flies in the face of evidence which indicates that 
short periods of exposure -- from one day to three months -- can 
cause significant damage to the lungs. See Workplace Exposure to 
Asbestos: Review and Recommendations, U.S. Dep't of Health and 
Human Servs. and U.S. Dep't. of Labor, DHHS (NIOSH) Publication 
No. 81-103, at 3 (Nov. 1980).” 
Medical science suggests that very limited exposure to asbestos can 
cause mesothelioma, perhaps the worst of asbestos-related diseases. 
See, e.g., “Mesothelioma: Has Patient Had Contact With Even Small 
Amount of Asbestos?,” 257 JAMA 1569 (Mar. 27, 1987); New York 
Academy of Sciences, Cancer and the Worker (1977) 50, cited with 
approval in Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. (E.D. Tex. 1981), 
 
13
509 F.Supp. 1353, 1355, reversed on other grounds, 681 F.2d 334 
(C.A.5, 1982). 
The temporal aspects of the Lohrmann test are scientifically 
dubious.  “The length of time that an individual was exposed to 
asbestos does not in itself determine how serious the injury will be.  
Several factors, including individual idiosyncrasy, the intensity of 
the exposure, and the nature of the contaminant all play a part in 
the development of the disease.” Schultz, supra, 729 F.Supp. at 615, 
citing Zurich Ins. Co. v. Raymark Indus., Inc. (1987), 118 Ill.2d 23, 
37, 514 N.E.2d 150, 156. 
The proximity aspect of the Lohrmann test also chooses sides in a 
scientifically disputed area.  In these cases, Dr. Kenneth S. Cohen, 
a registered professional engineer, certified industrial hygienist, 
and asbestos inspector who holds a PhD in occupational health, 
testified through affidavit that asbestos fibers can travel significant 
distances through the air, resulting in substantial asbestos exposure 
even to employees who are not working directly or in close 
proximity to any product containing asbestos. 
 
14
Dr. Cohen described in his affidavit the process of “re-
entrainment,” by which the physical action of air movement, 
vibration, or physical trauma causes aerodynamically active 
asbestos fibers and particles to “take flight” and sail into the air.  
He stated that it was “more likely than not that some of the fibers 
and particles released in one corner of the [DTR] plant would travel 
on drafts and air currents throughout the plant, including to its 
furthest opposite point.”  Dr. Cohen stated that the theory that a 
worker would only be exposed to asbestos released in the immediate 
vicinity of his workplace is a “scientific impossibility,” due to the 
aerodynamic quality of the fibers and the plant’s inevitable air 
turbulence.  Dr. Cohen stated that the plaintiffs “were more likely 
than not substantially exposed to asbestos and talc fibers and 
particles from all manufacturers whose asbestos and talc containing 
products were used in the [DTR] facility during the periods they 
worked there.” 
 
It is not the province of the judge to immediately foreclose the 
validity of testimony such as Dr. Cohen’s.  The case that appellee 
 
15
Chesterton cites as the leading case regarding the “fiber drift” 
theory, Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc. (C.A.3, 1990), 914 F.2d 
360, actually recognizes the theory’s validity.  While allowing the 
use of the theory only with evidence of frequency and regularity, 
Robertson does nonetheless accept that a worker not in close 
proximity to the actual product may still inhale the product’s fibers: 
“The fiber drift theory can not stand alone; it must be supported by 
evidence showing the frequency of products’ use and the regularity 
of the plaintiff’s employment in an area into which there is a 
reasonable probability that the fibers drifted.” Id. 
The true worth of testimony like Dr. Cohen’s is determined in the 
jury room when weighed against competing testimony.  We are 
unwilling to close the door on the legitimacy of the “fiber drift” 
theory in every case in Ohio courts.  Indeed, the Lohrmann test is 
the product of the attempts of Maryland federal courts to deal with 
claims brought by employees of shipyards, workplaces so large that 
fiber drift might seem impossible.  The Lohrmann court stressed the 
immensity of the shipyard in that case as a reason for affirming the 
 
16
district court’s use of what later became known as the Lohrmann 
test: 
“[W]hen one considers the size of a workplace such as Key 
Highway Shipyard, the mere proof that the plaintiff and a certain 
asbestos product are at the shipyard at the same time, without more, 
does not prove exposure to that product.” Lohrmann, 782 F.2d at 
1162. 
We think it unwise to apply a rule designed for shipyards to 
workplaces of every size. 
More important, we think it unwise to apply a strict standard rooted 
in science when the science on the issue is unresolved. Lohrmann 
creates an all-knowing, trumping medical expert that disallows 
competing scientific viewpoints on the causes of asbestos-related 
diseases. 
The Lohrmann test is the result of the law and public policy 
outstripping the science at the heart of the asbestos problem.  
Sometimes when a phenomenon grounded in science creates public 
concerns, policymakers cannot wait for the science to catch up with 
 
17
those concerns, and a public-policy-generated pseudoscience can be 
the result.  The Lohrmann test creates such pseudoscience in an 
arena where there is a long tradition of leaving science to the 
experts. 
Also, the Lohrmann test invites a trial judge into the domain of the 
jury.  The temporal aspects of the test, frequency and regularity, are 
subject to an unlimited range of possibilities.  How many exposures 
does it take to meet the acceptable level of frequency?  Can a judge 
be sure that one less exposure could not have caused asbestos-
related disease?  What is a regular basis?  Does intense exposure 
over a shorter duration reduce the regularity requirement?  In 
regard to proximity, how close to the product is close enough?  Will 
a few feet make the difference? 
The Lohrmann test does not call for simple responses which follow 
directly from a presentation of the evidence.  Instead, the test 
involves a weighing of the plaintiff’s evidence on the sliding scale 
of the test’s three loosely defined criteria.  The inquiry by the trial 
judge should be whether there is evidence of exposure and evidence 
 
18
tying that exposure to the disease.  Whether that evidence is strong 
enough to prove causation is an issue for the jury. 
Finally, the Lohrmann test departs from our standard regarding 
summary judgment.  “Because summary judgment is a procedural 
device to terminate litigation, it must be awarded with caution.  
Doubts must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party.” Davis v. 
Loopco Industries, Inc. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 64, 66, 609 N.E.2d 
144, 145.  Plaintiffs in asbestos cases deserve that same degree of 
caution in their cases.  The Lohrmann test resolves doubts about 
causation mechanically in the favor of the defendant from the 
outset.  It stacks the deck against plaintiffs by foreclosing all but 
one avenue of proof of causation. 
For each defendant in a multidefendant asbestos case, the plaintiff 
has the burden of proving exposure to the defendant’s product and 
that the product was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s 
injury.  A defendant need not prove that he was exposed to a 
specific product on a regular basis over some extended period of 
time in close proximity to where the plaintiff actually worked in 
 
19
order to prove that the product was a substantial factor in causing 
his injury. 
Instead, we adopt the definition of “substantial factor” contained in 
Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1965), Section 431, Comment a: 
“The word ‘substantial’ is used to denote the fact that the 
defendant’s conduct has such an effect in producing the harm as to 
lead reasonable men to regard it as a cause, using that word in a 
popular sense, in which there always lurks the idea of 
responsibility, rather than the so-called ‘philosophical sense,’ 
which includes every one of the great number of events without 
which any happening would not have occurred.” 
Summary judgment is proper in an asbestos case in the same 
circumstances as in any other case, i.e., when, looking at the 
evidence as a whole, (1) no genuine issue of material fact remains 
to be litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law, and (3) it appears from the evidence, construed most 
strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that reasonable minds 
could only conclude in favor of the moving party. 
 
20
Thus, we decline to establish a formulaic approach in an area which 
defies that kind of analysis, and therefore do not adopt the 
Lohrmann test.  We therefore reverse the court of appeals and 
remand these cases to the trial court for a determination consistent 
with this opinion. 
II 
The theory of alternative liability originated in Summers v. Tice 
(1948), 33 Cal.2d 80, 199 P.2d 1.  In Summers, the plaintiff and the 
two defendants went hunting together.  The defendants negligently 
fired their guns simultaneously in the direction of the plaintiff and 
a pellet struck him in the eye.  Since the plaintiff could not identify 
the responsible defendant, the court shifted the causation burden to 
the defendants.  Id. at 86-87, 199 P.2d at 4-5. 
Alternative liability had its Ohio genesis in Minnich v. Ashland Oil 
Co. (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 396, 15 OBR 511, 473 N.E.2d 1199, 
syllabus, in which this court adopted the doctrine as set forth in 2 
Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1965), Section 433B(3): 
 
21
“Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is 
proved that harm has been caused to the plaintiff by only one of 
them, but there is uncertainty as to which one caused it, the burden 
is upon each such actor to prove that he has not caused the harm.” 
In Minnich, the plaintiff was injured when ethyl acetate he was 
using to clean a printing press ignited.  The complaint alleged that 
two companies had supplied ethyl acetate to Minnich’s employer; 
the supplier of the actual ethyl acetate that ignited was unknown, 
since it had been transferred to an unmarked bottle prior to its use 
by Minnich.  Thus, this court applied alternative liability, since 
each of the defendants had allegedly supplied an identical, 
defective product to the plaintiff. 
This court first faced the issue of alternative liability in asbestos 
cases in Goldman, supra.  This court in Goldman did not foreclose 
the possibility of the use of the theory in asbestos cases, but instead 
explained the limitations of its use therein.  In Goldman, the 
plaintiff could not identify any of the defendants as having supplied 
asbestos materials to his employer.  Thus, Goldman could not 
 
22
demonstrate that each of the defendants had acted tortiously.  As 
this court noted, while the theory of alternative liability relaxes the 
traditional requirement that the plaintiff prove that a specific 
defendant caused the injury, it applies only where the plaintiff 
shows that all the defendants acted tortiously. Goldman, 33 Ohio St. 
3d at 46, 514 N.E.2d at 696. 
The factor which makes alternative liability inappropriate in this 
case was mentioned in dicta in Goldman.  The present cases lack 
what was present in the seminal cases in this area: defendants 
creating a substantially similar risk of harm.  In Summers, for 
example, the defendants shot guns with identical ammunition in the 
direction of the plaintiff.  In Minnich, both defendants allegedly 
supplied the same defective chemical to the plaintiff’s employer.  
As this court stated in Goldman, “[a]sbestos-containing products do 
not create similar risks of harm because there are several varieties 
of asbestos fibers, and they are used in various quantities, even in 
the same class of product.” Goldman, 33 Ohio St.3d at 46, 514 
N.E.2d at 697.  The records in these cases fail to demonstrate that 
 
23
the level of risk posed by each of the defendants’ products is 
substantially similar. 
In the types of cases traditionally employing alternative liability, 
the plaintiff is unable even to differentiate between the possible 
responsible parties.  In the within cases, the plaintiffs can at least 
identify which products they were exposed to most, which 
contained the highest levels of asbestos, and which were used in a 
manner more likely to release fibers into the air. 
Alternative liability is a unique theory to be employed in unique 
situations.  This court in Minnich limited application of the theory 
to “situations similar to the one at bar.” Minnich, 15 Ohio St.3d at 
397, 15 OBR at 512, 473 N.E.2d at 1200.  Alternative liability 
cannot apply if the defendants’ products do not create a 
substantially similar risk of harm.  Since there is no evidence that 
defendants’ products created a substantially similar risk of harm, 
we will not apply the theory in the within cases.  We therefore 
agree with the appellate court on that issue. 
Judgments reversed and causes remanded. 
 
24
 
MOYER, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ.., concur in part and dissent in 
part. 
 
WRIGHT and COOK, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part. 
 
Moyer, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.     I concur in the 
first, third and fourth paragraphs of the syllabus and in the well-advised 
decision of the majority to reject the theory of alternative liability.  I dissent 
from the majority opinion because it does not provide the bench and bar with a 
test that can consistently be applied in asbestos cases.  I would adopt the 
“frequency-proximity” test adopted in the case of Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh 
Corning Corp. (C.A.4, 1986), 782 F.2d 1156. No persuasive argument has been 
given to persuade me that Ohio should not adopt the test applied in the majority 
of jurisdictions in the country that have considered the issue. 
 
For the foregoing reasons I would affirm the judgments of the court of 
appeals. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.     I 
enthusiastically concur in the clear, cogent and well-reasoned discussion of the 
majority concerning Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp. (C.A.4, 1986), 782 
F.2d 1156, and the so-called Lohrmann test.  I also concur in paragraphs two 
 
25
and three of the syllabus and in the ultimate judgment of the majority even 
though I must confess that I am unsure what I would do, upon remand, if I were 
the trial judge.  I respectfully dissent from paragraphs one and four of the 
syllabus and the discussion of the majority in Part II of the opinion concerning 
alternative liability. 
I 
 
Whether the majority does so intentionally or unintentionally, I believe 
the majority, by today’s decision, ends asbestos litigation in Ohio in 
multidefendant cases.  By saying, in the first paragraph of the syllabus, that a 
plaintiff in such cases “has the burden of proving exposure to the defendant’s 
product and that the product was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s 
injury” (emphasis added), the majority creates a standard that no plaintiff will 
ever be able to meet.  Each defendant in a multidefendant case will say that it 
was another defendant’s product that caused the injury, and a plaintiff, of 
course, will never be able to show that the injury was caused by, for example, 
the asbestos in the ceiling tiles rather than the asbestos which was wrapped 
around the pipes or heating ducts. 
 
The test for plaintiffs in asbestos cases should be no different from what 
 
26
it is for other plaintiffs in other multidefendant tort cases.  In asbestos cases, 
the test should be that a plaintiff must show that he or she has an asbestos-
related illness, that she or he was exposed to an asbestos product of the 
defendant(s) and that exposure to asbestos was a factor in causing plaintiff’s 
harm.  When plaintiff proves these facts by a preponderance of the evidence, 
the causation burden then shifts to defendants (who typically have better 
knowledge of their product placement) to show that it was not their product 
that caused the harm to plaintiff.  This then leads to the theory of alternative 
liability. 
II 
 
For its discussion of alternative liability, the majority relies principally 
on Minnich v. Ashland Oil Co. (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 396, 15 OBR 511, 473 
N.E.2d 1199, and dicta in Goldman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. (1987), 33 
Ohio St.3d 40, 514 N.E.2d 691.  I believe that neither case is on point and both 
can be easily distinguished. 
 
It is true that in Minnich, we applied, as set forth by the majority herein, 
alternative liability.  The distinguishing feature of Minnich from the case at bar 
is that in Minnich, it was clear that the harm had been caused by one of two 
 
27
actors but it was unclear which of the actors had caused the harm.  This court 
shifted the burden to both actors for each to prove that, individually, it was not 
the tortfeasor.  In the asbestos cases, the allegation is not that a single tortfeasor 
caused the injury.  Rather, the allegation is that the injury was caused by 
exposure to asbestos which was placed in the premises by several different 
actors, all of whom are alleged to be responsible. 
 
The same is true of Goldman.  In Goldman, the plaintiff could not show 
that any of the defendants had provided the asbestos materials alleged to have 
caused the injury.  Not so in the case at bar. 
 
Rather than citing either Minnich or Goldman, I would cite this court’s 
case of Huston v. Konieczny (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 214, 556 N.E.2d 505, which 
I find to be more directly on point.  In Huston, the plaintiff was involved in a 
beer party at a private home, which was attended by a number of persons, most 
of whom were under the legal drinking age.  Plaintiff Huston left the party in a 
car with two other guests.  The car was involved in an accident and plaintiff 
Huston was injured.  Plaintiff, along with his parents, sued a number of people, 
claiming that the defendants had provided (or permitted the providing of) 
alcohol to minors in violation of law and that this conduct resulted in plaintiff’s 
 
28
being injured.  Apparently a number of the guests at the party had brought beer 
with them, and a pony keg of beer and various cans and bottles of beer were 
commingled in a bathtub.  One of the issues in Huston presented the question 
whether a plaintiff, in a multidefendant action, is required to prove the specific 
source of the alcohol that allegedly contributed to plaintiff’s injury or whether 
it is enough, under the alternative liability theory, that two or more defendants 
committed tortious acts and that plaintiff was injured as a proximate result of 
the wrongdoing of at least one of the defendants. 
 
The trial court in Huston granted summary judgment to certain 
defendants.  The court of appeals reversed and we affirmed the judgment of the 
court of appeals.  Writing for a five-member majority of this court, Justice 
Herbert Brown cited 2 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1965), Section 
433B(3), which had been adopted by this court in Minnich, supra.  Justice 
Brown went on to say that:  “Comment f to subsection (3), supra, states that the 
reason for the exception is the unfairness of permitting tortfeasors to escape 
liability simply because the nature of their conduct and of the resulting injury 
has made it difficult or impossible to prove which of them caused the harm.  Id. 
at 446.  The exception applies when each of two or more actors has acted 
 
29
tortiously and the harm has resulted from the conduct of one or more of them.  
2 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1965), Section 433B, Comment g.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Huston, supra, 52 Ohio St.3d at 218, 556 N.E.2d at 510.  At 
219, 556 N.E.2d at 510, Huston goes on to say that “[a]pplying these principles 
to the present case, plaintiffs must show:  (1) that the beer furnished to 
underage persons came from the Cordells, Goodsite or the other named 
defendants, and (2) that Huston was injured as a proximate result of the 
wrongdoing of at least one of these defendants.”  (Emphasis added.)  Finally, 
and most tellingly, I believe, we said that “[t]he trial court erred when it 
granted summary judgment on the basis that plaintiffs failed to prove the 
specific source of the beer consumed by [the alleged driver] Bodnar.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Id. 
 
This is precisely the issue now before us.  In the case we are now 
considering, allegedly all the defendants before the court supplied products of a 
similar nature, some or all of which caused the injuries to these plaintiffs.  
Thus, since the theory of alternative liability is the law of Ohio today, Huston, 
supra, we should either follow Huston or overrule it.  Since the majority does 
not follow Huston, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. 
 
30
 
RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
 
WRIGHT, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.    I quite agree with 
the majority’s rejection of the theory of alternative liability in this case and join 
paragraphs three and four of the syllabus.  However, I vigorously disagree with 
its treatment of the court of appeals’ opinion and its rejection of the 
“frequency-proximity” test adopted in the leading case of Lohrmann v. 
Pittsburgh Corning Corp. (C.A.4, 1986), 782 F.2d 1156, which has been 
embraced in practically every other jurisdiction which has reviewed asbestos 
cases.1 
 
The majority and the appellants apparently accept the proposition that 
“the plaintiff has the burden of proving exposure to the defendant’s product 
and that the product was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s injury.” 
(Paragraph one of the syllabus.)  The majority goes on to state, “[W]e decline 
to establish a formulaic approach in an area which defies that kind of analysis,” 
and rejects Lohrmann.  What the majority has done is to adopt no test 
whatsoever and in the process relegate Pang v. Minch  (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 
186, 559 N.E.2d 1313, and Goldman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. (1987), 33 
Ohio St.3d 40, 514 N.E.2d 691, to meaningless pronouncements.  The majority 
 
31
appears to adopt what, for lack of a better term, could be described as the “fiber 
drift theory,” which, in essence, states that if there is some evidence that a 
defendant’s product was located in or near or somewhere in the vicinity of the 
place where plaintiff worked then there is potential liability, despite the total 
absence of a showing of plaintiff’s proximity to those products or evidence as 
to the frequency of the exposures.  I have no quarrel with the notion that 
asbestos particles have the ability to “take flight” and “sail” into the air.  
Appellant’s expert indicates that such particles might be released in one corner 
of a plant and travel by way of drafts and air currents throughout the immediate 
vicinity of a workplace.  However, what is lacking here is any evidence 
suggesting that any of defendant-appellees’ products were a substantial factor 
in causing the appellants’ injuries.  I think it goes without saying that under 
Ohio law, to get past a summary judgment a plaintiff must present evidence 
creating a probability, not a mere possibility, of a casual relationship between a 
defendant’s conduct or product and the alleged harm.  Is there sufficient 
evidence here to create a jury question where the plaintiffs merely show that 
there was a possibility that they may have been exposed to the defendants’ 
products where they worked?  Perhaps, but I suggest that the plaintiffs must 
 
32
present evidence that would tend to show the circumstances of the exposure, 
including some idea as to the time, place, and manner in which the product was 
used and where the plaintiff was in relation to the product.  The Second District 
Court of Appeals did just this and concluded that there was no evidence other 
than speculation to support the posture of appellants.   
 
Civ.R. 56, which deals with summary judgment, and our various 
decisions dealing with it place the trial court in the posture of a gatekeeper, 
whose role is to take from the jury’s province cases which fail to achieve a 
certain minimum amount of evidentiary proof.  This case is surely one that fails 
the test.  Due to the majority’s brevity in reviewing the facts, I feel that I should 
excerpt a portion of the court of appeals’ opinion which analyzes the law as it 
relates to the facts.  In its opinion in Horton (Nov. 23, 1993), Montgomery 
App. No. 13872, unreported, at 4-5, the court of appeals correctly noted that in 
Lohrmann, the Fourth Circuit required “a plaintiff to introduce evidence which 
would allow the jury to reasonably conclude that the conduct of the defendant 
was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s harm.  Id.  [Lohrmann, 782 
F.2d] at 1162.  That requirement was derived from the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts §431, which defines what constitutes legal cause.  Lohrmann held that 
 
33
simply showing that asbestos-containing products were present in a large 
workplace while the plaintiff worked there is not sufficient to meet the 
‘substantial factor’ test because it does not prove that the plaintiff was exposed 
to the asbestos-containing products.  Id.  Rather, the plaintiff must present 
evidence to show the frequency of the use of the product and the regularity of 
the plaintiff’s employment in proximity thereto.  Id.” 
 
The court of appeals properly stated, “The frequency-proximity test *** 
is not a test which is distinct from the substantial factor standard; rather, it is a 
tool to enable a court to determine whether the plaintiff in an asbestos case has 
put forth sufficient evidence against a defendant to show that a reasonable jury 
could find that the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing the 
plaintiff’s harm. *** 
 
“*** The frequency-proximity test does not require any greater showing 
than the substantial factor standard; rather, the test determines when the 
plaintiff has met his burden under that standard.”  Id. at 6-7.  
 
As noted by the court of appeals, “The basis for this assignment of error 
is an affidavit filed by the Hortons explaining the fiber drift theory as it relates 
to DTR.  Dr. Kenneth Cohen made the affidavit after an inspection of DTR 
 
34
conducted in 1989.  DTR closed a few weeks after Mr. Horton retired in 1980, 
so inferably the plant was in substantially the same condition at the time of the 
inspection as it was when he still worked there.  Dr. Cohen is a recognized 
expert in industrial hygiene.  The fiber drift theory holds that asbestos fibers 
can become airborne and drift away from their original source.  Through 
repeated disturbances by such forces as air currents or vibrations, these 
‘aerodynamically active fibers and particles’ can be transported throughout the 
plant.  Based on this theory, Dr. Cohen states that ‘[a]ny worker whose 
workplace was within the Dayton Tire and Rubber Company plant was an 
asbestos and talc breather if asbestos and talc fibers and particles were released 
within the confines of this facility.  The plaintiff workers who worked inside of 
this facility during use, installation, damage to, repair, or removal of asbestos-
containing and talc-containing products during their employment more 
probably than not suffered substantial occupational exposure to asbestos and 
talc fibers and particles by breathing them into their lungs ***.’ 
 
“Dr. Cohen does not confirm that any asbestos or talc fibers were ever 
released in DTR.  He does not name any manufacturers of any asbestos or talc 
present within the plant.  He refers to all workers inside of the facility, but he 
 
35
does not account for the fact that there was more than one building in the DTR 
plant.  In oral argument, counsel for the Hortons conceded that the fibers would 
only drift within the contained structures where the asbestos was located.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Id. at 7-8.   
 
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals.   
 
COOK, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
 
36
 
FOOTNOTE: 
 
1  See, e.g., Jackson v. Anchor Packing Co. (C.A.8, 1993), 994 F.2d 
1295; Tragarz v. Keene Corp. (C.A.7, 1992), 980 F.2d 411;  Robertson v. 
Allied Signal, Inc. (C.A.3, 1990), 914 F.2d 360; Menne v. Celotex Corp. 
(C.A.10, 1988), 861 F.2d 1453; Blackston v. Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co. 
(C.A.11, 1985), 764 F.2d 1480; Spaur v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. 
(Iowa 1994), 510 N.W.2d 854; Sholtis v. Am. Cyanamid Co. (1989), 238 
N.J.Super. 8, 568 A.2d 1196; Eckenrod v. GAF Corp. (Pa.Super. 1988), 544 
A.2d 50; Lockwood v. AC & S , Inc. (1987), 109 Wash.2d 235, 744 P.2d 605.