Title: Brannon v. City of Coeur D'Alene

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 38417 
JIM BRANNON, 
 
       Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO, a 
municipal 
corporation; 
SUSAN 
K. 
WEATHERS, in her capacity as the City of 
Coeur d’Alene City Clerk; and MIKE 
KENNEDY, in his capacity as the incumbent 
candidate for the City of Coeur d’Alene 
Counsel Seat #2, 
 
       Defendants-Respondents. 
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Coeur d’Alene, September 2012  
 
2012 Opinion No. 140 
 
Filed:  November 16, 2012 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk  
 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, 
Kootenai County.  Hon. Charles W. Hosack, District Judge.  
District court decision affirming election results, affirmed.  
Starr Kelso Law Office, Chtd., Coeur d’Alene, for appellant.  Starr Kelso argued.  
Scott W. Reed and Michael L. Haman, Coeur d’Alene, for respondents.   Michael 
L. Haman argued for respondents City of Coeur d’Alene and Weathers.  Scott W. 
Reed argued for Kennedy. 
_______________________ 
BURDICK, Chief Justice 
This case appeals the Kootenai County district court’s denial of Jim Brannon’s (Brannon) 
election contest of the Coeur d’Alene city council election in 2009.  In the official vote total, 
Brannon lost the election for seat 2 of the city council to Mike Kennedy (Kennedy) by five votes.  
Brannon then filed an election contest that alleged numerous irregularities and sought to set 
aside, void, or annul the election.  After a bench trial, the district court issued a memorandum 
decision that affirmed the election result, finding insufficient illegal votes or irregularities to 
change the outcome of the election.  On appeal, Brannon argues that the City delegated its 
election duties to Kootenai County in contravention of Idaho law, that the district court made 
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numerous factual and legal errors at trial, and that the district court erred in denying Brannon’s 
motion to disqualify and motion for new trial.  We affirm the decision of the district court. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The city of Coeur d’Alene held a general election on November 3, 2009.  As part of that 
election, Kennedy, the incumbent, was in a contest against Brannon for seat 2 on the city council.  
The official election results showed 3,165 votes for Kennedy and 3,160 votes for Brannon.  
On November 30, 2009, Brannon filed a complaint that included multiple claims and a 
request to set aside the results of the election.  An amended complaint was filed on December 10, 
2009.  The amended complaint named the following defendants: the city of Coeur d’Alene (the 
City), Susan Weathers (Weathers) in her capacity as city clerk, Kennedy in his capacity as 
incumbent candidate for city council seat 2, the entire city council individually, and the mayor.  
The amended complaint alleged numerous failures by the City and Kootenai County, including a 
failure to follow applicable election law that resulted in improper absentee ballots being counted. 
After some preliminary matters, only the City, Weathers, and Kennedy remained as 
defendants.  The original district judge assigned to the matter, the Honorable John T. Mitchell, 
voluntarily disqualified himself from the proceeding on December 4, 2009.  Judge Mitchell was 
replaced by Judge Benjamin R. Simpson.  Brannon filed a motion to disqualify Judge Simpson 
for cause under I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2)(4) on March 8, 2010, which the district court denied.  
However, Judge Simpson entered an order of voluntary disqualification on April 13, 2010.  
Senior Judge Charles W. Hosack was assigned to take jurisdiction in the matter.  On the first day 
of trial, Brannon filed a motion to disqualify Judge Hosack for cause under I.R.C.P. 
40(d)(2)(A)(1) and (4).  Judge Hosack denied the motion, and began the bench trial on 
September 13, 2010.  The trial consisted of five days of argument and testimony regarding the 
conduct of the election and the nature of the absentee ballots that were counted.   
The district court issued a memorandum decision on November 5, 2010, affirming 
Kennedy’s election victory.  Specifically, the decision found that there were insufficient illegal 
ballots to change the outcome of the election, and that the alleged irregularities did not constitute 
malconduct.   
Brannon filed a motion and memorandum for new trial, or in the alternative, to amend the 
judgment on November 8, 2010.  The motion was heard on December 7, 2010, and denied by the 
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district court in a January, 4, 2011 order.  Brannon timely filed a Notice of Appeal on November 
15, 2010, and filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on February 1, 2011.   
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Appellant raises the following issues on appeal: 
1. Whether the district court erred in denying Brannon’s Motion to Disqualify. 
2. Whether the district court erred in ruling that non-city residents were entitled to vote in 
the election under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act 
(UOCAVA). 
3. Whether the district court erred in refusing to order non-city residents who returned 
absentee ballots to testify as to their residence and for whom they cast their vote. 
4. Whether the district court erred in dismissing Brannon’s malconduct claim. 
5. Whether the district court applied an incorrect burden of proof for election contests. 
6. Whether the district court erred in finding that the county counted 2051 valid absentee 
ballots. 
7. Whether the district court erred in finding no error in the city’s vote counting or election 
result. 
8. Whether the district court erred in finding that the City could delegate city election duties 
to Kootenai County. 
9. Whether the district court erred in retaining only the claim to set aside the election for 
seat 2, and dismissing the claim to set aside the entire election. 
10. Whether the district court erred in denying the motion for new trial or amended 
judgment. 
11. Whether the City is entitled to costs and fees on appeal. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Whether the district judge erred in denying Brannon’s Motion to Disqualify. 
On September 13, 2010, Brannon filed a motion and an accompanying memorandum to 
disqualify Judge Hosack for cause.  In the motion, Brannon moved for disqualification under 
I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2)(A) on the grounds of interest and or prejudice against Brannon by Judge 
Hosack.  September 13, 2010 was also the scheduled first day of trial, so the motion for 
disqualification was argued immediately.  The 76-page motion and accompanying materials were 
filed at 8:50 a.m., and argument began at 9:16 a.m.  Judge Hosack denied the motion from the 
bench after hearing argument by both parties.  
On appeal, Brannon argues that the district judge erred when he denied the motion to 
disqualify Judge Hosack for cause.  More specifically, Brannon argues that the denial was not 
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based upon any analysis, that Judge Hosack never claimed that his disparaging prior statements 
on election contests were inaccurate, and that the district court failed to identify the discretion 
standard for its decision.  In response, the City argues that the motion was based solely on a 
vague comment made by the judge in an unrelated matter and was correctly denied.  
1. Standard of Review 
“Whether a judge’s involvement in a case reaches a point where disqualification from 
further participation in a defendant’s case becomes necessary is left to the sound discretion of the 
judge himself.” Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 206, 731 P.2d 192, 201 (1986). 
To determine whether there is an abuse of discretion this Court considers whether 
(1) the court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) the court acted 
within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with legal standards 
applicable to specific choices; and (3) the court reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason. 
Lee v. Nickerson, 146 Idaho 5, 9, 189 P.3d 467, 471 (2008). 
2. Whether the district judge erred in denying Brannon’s Motion to Disqualify. 
In the motion, Brannon moved for disqualification on the grounds of interest and or 
prejudice against Brannon by Judge Hosack.  In support, Brannon cites comments made by 
Judge Hosack in the transcript of a September 7, 2010 Contempt Hearing.  The September 7, 
2010 contempt hearing was prompted by the online publication of an affidavit by a non-party, 
Bill McCrory.  The hearing was to determine whether McCrory was in contempt when he 
published information regarding ballots and ballot envelopes that was subject to a confidentiality 
stipulation.  The hearing focused on the nature of the confidentiality and the potential disclosure 
of sensitive voting information. 
Brannon’s motion took exception to snippets of two comments by Judge Hosack.  First, 
that “Judge Hosack harbored and possessed unrevealed personal opinions that election contests 
of the nature of this case have ‘ramifications upon the average voter’ that are ‘not a salutary 
connotation.’”  Second, that the judge had an opinion that the process of voters “to be ‘grilled by 
a Judge’ to testify for whom they cast their ballot ‘is an anathema to everything about our 
democratic process.’” To Brannon, these comments indicate an opinion by the judge that this 
election contest is not beneficial to Coeur d’Alene.   
To properly understand the nature of Judge Hosack’s comments, they must be placed in 
context.  Below are Judge Hosack’s comments with the portions Brannon extracted in bold: 
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There are some very meritorious arguments here raised by Mr. Macomber with 
regard to the technical inadequacies of this particular contempt proceeding. 
And I’m not certain that we necessarily need a trial for the Court to 
resolve those. On the other hand, the Court has a concern in this litigation about 
the rights of the citizen voters. This type of litigation which may be and no doubt 
is and should be important in litigants has a ramification upon the average 
voter that in the view of this court is not a salutary connotation. 
And there’s been arguments even made in open court that because this is 
an election case, a court should exercise extraordinary powers never used in civil 
litigation before in the history of American jurisprudence and haul citizens back at 
their own cost into court for a hearing for trial because they voted. That's very 
disturbing to this court. The wisdom of the American democracy is not delivered 
by the fiercely partisan voting.  
The wisdom of the American democracy is delivered by the average 
citizen that goes down to the voting place on the day of the election and votes as 
they see best to serve their community and does so out of public duty. Not 
because they have some crusade or some test point that they want to prove, but 
because they want to see their community work. 
 To have litigation, publishing voters’ names, calling in whether their 
affidavits are correct, whether they're legal or illegal, whether they can be hauled 
into court, grilled by a judge with regard to their votes, is an anathema to 
everything about our democratic process. 
 So the secrecy, the confidentiality, the privacy of the voter is of 
paramount concern to the Court, and some apparent disregard of those issues by 
litigants or participants is of concern to this court. 
 
Argument on the motion for disqualification was heard on September 13, 2010, and after 
hearing argument from both parties, Judge Hosack denied the motion in a ruling from the bench.  
In his denial, Judge Hosack provided further context and clarification for his earlier comments: 
[T]he comments then that I made were in the context of whether or not to 
dismiss the contempt proceeding and while there were technical issues, at least 
superficially, prima facie, for purposes of a motion to dismiss, the issue before the 
Court was an alleged court order requiring confidentiality, an individual 
inspecting documents pursuant to that order of confidentiality and then that 
individual turning around and publishing that very information obtained through 
the confidentiality order on the Internet. Not only that, it pertained to ballots. 
After additional explanation, Judge Hosack denied the motion to disqualify.  “[T]hose comments 
were extremely limited, extremely focused and on a proceeding that as Mr. Kelso points out had 
absolutely nothing to do with this case.  So that’s how I can proceed.  And the motion to 
disqualify will be denied.”   
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Brannon brought his motion for disqualification under I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2)(A)(1) and (4).  
I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2)(A) states in pertinent part: 
Any party to an action may disqualify a judge or magistrate for cause from 
presiding in any action upon any of the following grounds: 
1. That the judge or magistrate is a party, or is interested, in the action or 
proceeding. 
. . . 
4. That the judge or magistrate is biased or prejudiced for or against any party or 
the case in the action. 
It is clear from the context that Judge Hosack’s comments were not aimed at Mr. 
Brannon, election contests generally, or at this election contest specifically.  His comments were 
narrowly focused on the public policy issue of voter privacy and confidentiality.  On the issue of 
judicial bias, this Court’s decision in Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 792, 229 P.3d 1146, 1154 
(2010), adopted a standard from the United States Supreme Court opinion in Liteky v. United 
States. 510 U.S. 540 (1994).  In Liteky, the Court noted that:  
[O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events 
occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not 
constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep seated 
favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. 
Id., at 555–56.  Based on this standard, Judge Hosack’s comments do not warrant 
disqualification, since the comments emphasized by Brannon were taken out of context and do 
not show any bias or interest.  Rather, they only refer to the weighing, in public policy terms, of 
election contests and voter privacy, which was the issue in the collateral proceeding.  These 
comments are nothing more than balancing the sacrosanct theory of secret ballots and the 
conflicting ability to have post-election evidentiary procedure.  Certainly nothing in these 
comments is directed against the concept of election contests or any of the parties in this 
litigation.  Therefore, they do not display favoritism or antagonism as would be required under 
Liteky.   
Brannon also argues that Judge Hosack did not explicitly state either the applicable legal 
standards or that this was an issue of discretion for the court.  Although Judge Hosack did not 
use the word “discretion” or give a detailed recitation of the applicable legal standards, he did 
not need to do so.  The ruling was detailed, based in reason, and within the bounds of the district 
court’s authority.  The above stated remarks by Judge Hosack did not express any bias or interest 
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in the matter before this Court, and his explanation at the motion hearing serves as confirmation.  
We therefore hold that the district court did not err by denying Brannon’s motion for 
disqualification of Judge Hosack.   
B. Whether the district court erred in ruling that non-city residents were entitled to vote in 
the election under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act 
(UOCAVA). 
After the trial, the district court issued a memorandum opinion that stated, in part, five 
disputed votes were legally cast under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting 
Act (UOCAVA).  On appeal, Brannon argues that UOCAVA does not apply under the municipal 
election laws, and that the district court erred in holding otherwise.  In response, the City argues 
that the law was properly applied, but even if the district court erred, that there was no 
admissible evidence on record regarding the vote of the five voters at issue.   
1. Standard of Review 
“This Court exercises free review over questions of law.” Fuller v. Callister, 150 Idaho 
848, 851, 252 P.3d 1266, 1269 (2011).  This Court also exercises “free review over matters of 
statutory interpretation.” KGF Dev., LLC v. City of Ketchum, 149 Idaho 524, 527, 236 P.3d 1284, 
1287 (2010) (quoting State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 327, 208 P.3d 730, 731 (2009)). “The 
interpretation of a statute ‘must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be 
given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole. If 
the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as 
written.’” Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 
(2011) (quoting State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003)). “A statute is 
ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one reasonable construction.” Porter v. 
Bd. of Trustees, Preston School Dist. No. 201, 141 Idaho 11, 14, 105 P.3d 671, 674 (2004). “We 
have consistently held that where statutory language is unambiguous, legislative history and 
other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed 
intent of the legislature.” Verska, 151 Idaho at 893, 265 P.3d at 506 (quoting City of Sun Valley 
v. Sun Valley Co., 123 Idaho 665, 667, 851 P.2d 961, 963 (1993)). 
2. Whether the district court erred in ruling that non-city residents were entitled to vote 
in the election under UOCAVA. 
The memorandum decision of the district court held that UOCAVA was meant to be 
applied equally to a citizen’s right to vote absentee, regardless of whether an election was 
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federal, state, or municipal.  The district court also noted that “[t]he issue will remain unsettled 
without further clarification by either a legislative body or appellate court.”  
Title 34, chapter 10 of the Idaho Code contains the general statutory provisions for 
absentee voting in Idaho.  As it existed in 2009, I.C. § 34-1002 stated that: “A person may make 
application for an absent elector’s ballot by use of a properly executed federal post card 
application as provided for in the laws of the United States known as uniformed and overseas 
citizens absentee voting act (UOCAVA, 42 U.S.C. 1973 ff, et seq.).” 
Title 50, chapter 4 of the Idaho Code contains the specific statutory provisions for voting 
in municipal elections.  At the time of the 2009 city election, I.C. § 50-443 read in pertinent part:  
Any registered elector may make written application to the city clerk for 
an official ballot or ballots of the kind or kinds to be voted at the election.  The 
application shall contain the name of the elector, his home address and address to 
which such ballot shall be forwarded. 
. . . 
A person in the United States service may make application for an absent 
elector's ballot by use of a properly executed federal post card application as 
provided for in the laws of the United States known as ‘Federal Voting Assistance 
Act of 1955.’  
I.C. § 50-443, Repealed by S.L. 2009, ch. 341, § 112, eff. January 1, 2011. 
The Federal Voting Assistance Act of 1955 (FVAA) is the short title for a federal voting 
law passed to ensure that members of the armed forces could more easily vote by absentee ballot. 
Aug. 9, 1955, ch. 656, 69 Stat. 584.  The FVAA was amended several times and ultimately 
repealed in 1986.  Id., Sec. 203, Repeals.  This repeal came in “[a]n Act to consolidate and 
improve provisions of law relating to absentee registration and voting in elections for Federal 
office by members of uniformed services and persons who reside overseas.” Id.  “This Act may 
be cited as the ‘Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act.’” Id., Sec. 101, Short 
Title. In terms of absentee voting, UOCAVA took the place of FVAA in federal law.   
 
To determine the effect of such a repeal, this Court has previously relied upon a general 
rule of statutory construction that states: 
Where one statute adopts the particular provisions of another by a specific 
and descriptive reference to the statute or provisions adopted, the effect is the 
same as though the statute or provisions adopted had been incorporated bodily 
into the adopting statute. When so adopted, only such portion is in force as relates 
to the particular subject of the adopting act, and as is applicable and appropriate 
thereto. Such adoption takes the statute as it exists at the time of adoption and 
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does not include subsequent additions or modifications of the statute so taken 
unless it does so by express intent. 
Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Barker, 38 Idaho 529, 533, 223 P. 529, 530 (1924) (citing 
Sutherland on Statutory Construction, § 405 (John Lewis ed., 2d ed.1904)).  This principle of 
construction is in accordance with interpretations from other jurisdictions.  See Hanson v. City of 
Omaha, 61 N.W.2d 556, 557 (Neb. 1953); Union Cemetery v. City of Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 2d 64, 
67, 108 N.W.2d 180, 181 (Wis. 1961); Egbert v. City of Dunseith, 24 N.W.2d 907, 910 (N.D. 
1946); United States v. Myers, 553 F.3d 328, 331 (4th Cir. 2009).  In Myers, the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals used the same principle of statutory construction:   
‘Where a reference statute incorporates the terms of one statute into the provisions 
of another act, the two statutes coexist as separate distinct legislative enactments, 
each having its appointed sphere of action.’ Sutherland Statutory Construction, 
supra, § 23:33 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, ‘[a]s neither 
statute depends upon the other's enactment for its existence, the repeal of the 
provision in one enactment does not affect its operation in the other statute.’ 
Myers, 553 F.3d at 331. 
 
Here, given the plain language in I.C. § 50-443, UOCAVA does not govern the process 
for absentee voting in municipal elections.  However, the above listed principles of statutory 
construction confirm an argument made by Brannon on appeal—that the FVAA 1955 provisions 
pertaining to persons in the United States service continued in force.  The 1986 repeal of FVAA 
had no impact on the operation of FVAA’s absentee voting provisions in the context of I.C. § 50-
553. Therefore, those provisions still governed absentee voting in the Coeur d’Alene 2009 
general election.1    
 
In terms of application to this case, there was no evidence presented at trial—and no 
argument made on appeal—that the five disputed votes were illegal under the provisions of 
FVAA.  Although the district court erred in concluding that UOCAVA applied to the disputed 
votes, Brannon failed to meet his burden for proving that the five votes were illegal.  Therefore, 
we hold that UOCAVA was not applicable to the 2009 general election, but in the absence of any 
evidence to the contrary, we uphold on other grounds the district court’s determination that the 
disputed votes were legally cast. 
                                                 
1 As noted above, I.C. § 50-443 was repealed effective January 1, 2011. S.L. 2009, ch. 341, § 112. Currently, 
absentee voting in Idaho municipal elections is governed by Title 34, chapter 10 of the Idaho Code, which 
incorporates UOCAVA in the procedure for absentee voting. 
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C. Whether the district court erred in refusing to order non-city residents who returned 
absentee ballots to testify as to their residence and for whom they cast their vote. 
On August 16, 2010, Brannon filed a motion to compel witnesses to attend the trial.  The 
motion sought to compel attendance of the five UOCAVA voters and asserted their testimony “is 
required to establish that they were not qualified electors in the said election.”  The district court 
denied the motion. 
Brannon argues that the district court erred when it refused to order non-city residents 
who had returned absentee ballots to testify as to their residence and for whom they voted.  In 
response, Kennedy calls the issue ridiculous, and argues that the district court correctly ruled 
against such an order.   
1. Standard of Review 
“This Court exercises free review over questions of law.” Fuller, 150 Idaho at 851, 252 
P.3d at 1269. 
2. Whether the district court erred in refusing to order non-city residents who returned 
absentee ballots to testify as to their residence and for whom they cast their vote. 
Argument on the motion to compel was heard on August 31, 2010.  During argument, 
Brannon’s counsel reiterated his stance on the issue, and the district court responded with an 
articulation of its position: 
Kelso: I find it inconceivable that a person who claims to be a resident of the city 
of Coeur d’Alene can’t be compelled to appear in court in the city of their 
residence.  If they’re not residents, I don’t expect them to show up.  I think it’s 
pretty clear from the nonservice that none of them are and they all voted for 
Kennedy.  Five.  I’m just puzzled why Kennedy is so concerned about keeping 
these people who voted for him from Canada and California out of the courtroom.   
The Court: Well, this is civil litigation and it’s being approached by the court as 
civil litigation and if you need to bring witnesses in from out of state, the way you 
always bring witnesses in from out of state, that’s not up to the court to issue 
orders and send airline tickets and make all the arrangements.  The court isn’t in 
the business of recruiting and providing witnesses for particular parties.  The 
parties themselves go out and do that.  That’s the way it’s handled in civil 
litigation.  And to devise a different rule for elections just because without any 
legal authority in the United States Jurisprudence that in elections, courts can 
require people to pick up their bags from New York and come at their own costs 
to Coeur d’Alene is just – I – I just kind of – just kind of end up muttering to 
myself. 
So I’m not in the habit of issuing orders for which I have no legal authority, no 
reason to do, and which I think in my own opinion should be utterly disregarded 
by the person that receives it. 
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The district court then denied the motion to compel.   
 
Brannon brought the motion to compel under I.C. § 34-2013, which defines the procedure 
in election contests:  
The proceedings shall be held according to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure so 
far as practicable, but shall be under the control and direction of the court, which 
shall have all the powers necessary to the right hearing and determination of the 
matter; to compel the attendance of witnesses, swear them and direct their 
examination; to punish for contempt in its presence or by disobedience to its 
lawful mandate; to adjourn from day to day; to make any order concerning 
immediate costs, and to enforce its orders by attachment. It shall be governed by 
the rules of law and evidence applicable to the case. 
Brannon argues that under I.C. § 34-2013, the district court has the power to compel testimony 
beyond the limitations found in the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.    
 
Under the language in I.C. § 34-2013, the district court was bound by the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure as far as practicable.  Additionally, I.C. § 34-2014 states that “[s]ubpoenas for 
witnesses may be issued pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.”  Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 45(g) states that “[a]t the request of any party subpoenas for attendance at a hearing or 
trial shall be issued as provided by Rule 45(a), and such subpoenas for a hearing or trial in a 
district court or magistrates division may be served at any place within the state.” The district 
court has no personal jurisdiction outside of the state boundaries except as provided by the Idaho 
long-arm statute.  See Knutsen v. Cloud, 142 Idaho 148, 150, 124 P.3d 1024, 1026 (2005). 
Idaho’s long-arm statute, I.C. § 5-514, defines the acts that would subject non-residents 
to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state.  However, the statute applies only to parties in an 
action, not to non-party witnesses.  See Knutsen, 142 Idaho at 150, 124 P.3d at 1026; Blimka v. 
My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 726, 152 P.3d 594, 597 (2007).  If Brannon wanted 
testimony from the five disputed voters, he could not rely upon the court to provide it.   
The district court was bound under I.C. § 34-2013 to follow the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure as far as practicable.  There is no rule of civil procedure that would require the district 
court to provide subpoenas to out-of-state non-party witnesses.  Therefore, we hold that the 
district court did not err when it denied Brannon’s motion to compel non-city residents to testify 
at trial.   
D. Whether the district court erred in dismissing Brannon’s malconduct claim. 
In a pretrial hearing, the district court dismissed the issue of malconduct and denied 
Brannon’s motion to file a third amended complaint.  At trial, the motion was renewed, but it 
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was denied by the district court in the memorandum opinion.  In addressing malconduct, the 
memorandum opinion stated that the motion to amend is denied “on the grounds the County was 
not a party.”   The district court also addressed the merits of the claim in the alternative:  
However, this Court finds that there is insufficient evidence in the record as a 
matter of law to find malconduct, and that the motion to amend also be denied on 
the alternative grounds that, even if the County were a party, the irregularities 
alleged in the proposed amended complaint simply fail to state a claim for 
malconduct under § 34-2001(1). 
Brannon argues that the district court erred in dismissing the claim of malconduct and by 
refusing to allow Brannon to amend the complaint to properly assert a claim of malconduct.  In 
response, Kennedy argues that Brannon’s amended complaint made no reference to the 
appropriate statute for malconduct, and that the evidence on the record establishes that no 
malconduct occurred.   
 
Title 34, chapter 20 of the Idaho Code articulates the grounds for, and procedure 
governing, election contests in Idaho for elections other than legislative or state executive 
offices:   
The election of any person to any public office, the location or relocation of a 
county seat, or any proposition submitted to a vote of the people may be 
contested: 
1. For malconduct, fraud, or corruption on the part of the judges of election in any 
precinct, township or ward, or of any board of canvassers, or any member of 
either board sufficient to change the result. 
. . . 
5. When illegal votes have been received or legal votes rejected at the polls 
sufficient to change the result. 
6. For any error in any board of canvassers in counting votes or in declaring the 
result of the election, if the error would change the result. 
I.C. § 34-2001. Idaho Code section 34-2001 does not define the term “malconduct,” but a 
working definition was previously articulated by this Court. 
Our statute does not define what constitutes malconduct of the officers of 
election, but it must be held that any proceedings which result in unfair elections, 
that deprive the qualified elector of the opportunity of peaceably casting his ballot 
and having it counted as cast, or that permit illegal votes to be cast and counted, 
are within the statutory provisions. 
Chamberlain v. Woodin, 2 Idaho 642, 645, 23 P. 176, 178 (1890).   
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The majority of the evidence, as well as the thrust of Brannon’s amended complaint and 
subsequent argument, is aimed not at malconduct, but rather the grounds in I.C. § 34-2001(5) 
and (6).  That is, whether any votes were illegal, or whether there were any errors in vote 
counting or canvassing.  Brannon’s brief on appeal contains an extensive argument aimed at 
establishing that malconduct occurred in the election.  However, the evidence offered in support 
at trial alleges neither fraud nor malconduct, but instead addresses alleged misinterpretations of 
the law, failure to follow election law to the letter, and errors in counting the absentee ballots.   
This Court previously held that “[a] showing that election officials failed to follow every 
election procedure precisely, without more, is insufficient under I.C. § 34-2101(1).” Noble v. 
Ada Cnty. Elections Bd., 135 Idaho 495, 504, 20 P.3d 679, 688 (2000).  While I.C. § 34-2101(1) 
pertains to malconduct in elections for legislative or state executive office, it is otherwise the 
equivalent of I.C. § 34-2001(1) and contains nearly identical language.  In Noble, the election 
contestant received fifty-one fewer votes than his opponent according to the official vote count.  
Id. at 497, 20 P.3d at 681.  The contestant questioned the legality of over 200 ballots, alleging 
malconduct and numerous irregularities that caused illegal ballots to be counted.  Id. at 498, 20 
P.3d at 682.  For Noble to succeed, he would have had to show that at least fifty-one illegal votes 
had been counted.  Id. at 501, 20 P.3d at 685.  This Court held that only ten votes were in 
dispute, and that the election contestant’s “evidence does not demonstrate that the election 
process was unfair or that the results are contrary to the actual will of the electorate.” Id. at 504, 
20 P.3d at 688.  The holding in Noble is consistent with that in Chamberlain. 2 Idaho 642, 23 P. 
176.   
As the district court noted, Chamberlain is factually distinguishable from the instant case 
because the malconduct there involved voter intimidation, the arrest of legal voters, and the large 
number of possibly illegal voters that voted without challenge.  Id. at 645, 23 P. at 178. 
Here, there is no evidence in the record that establishes, or even attempts to establish, that 
any irregularities resulted from malconduct, corruption, or coercion.  Nothing on the record 
would constitute the “more” required under Noble and illustrated in Chamberlain.  There is no 
evidence on the record that would clearly establish that the five disputed votes were cast and 
counted illegally.  Additionally, there is no evidence that any of the alleged irregularities would 
have changed the outcome of the election, or that the current result is “contrary to the actual will 
of the electorate.” Noble, 135 Idaho 504, 20 P.3d at 688.  Brannon failed to meet his burden, 
14 
 
therefore we hold that the district court did not err when it dismissed Brannon’s claim of 
malconduct.   
E. Whether the district court applied an incorrect burden of proof for election contests. 
Brannon continuously argued before the district court and now argues that the district 
court failed to properly shift the burden of proof to the defendant after he made a prima facie 
argument and met his burden of showing that illegal votes had been cast in sufficient numbers to 
potentially affect the outcome of the election.  In response, Kennedy argues that the burden never 
shifted because Brannon failed to present sufficient evidence at trial to support his claims.   
1. Standard of Review 
“This Court exercises free review over questions of law.” Fuller, 150 Idaho at 851, 252 
P.3d at 1269. 
2. Whether the district court erred when it did not shift the burden of proof to 
defendants. 
The issue of burden shifting was addressed in a December 7, 2010 post-trial hearing.  At 
the hearing the district court stated that: 
[T]here just isn’t any legal basis for this court to find that in this case I’m going to 
shift the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant. 
The – with the illegal voters, the – even if you had . . . a three vote difference, 
even if you found that there were four illegal voters, if you didn’t know how they 
vote, you don’t shift the burden anyway.  
Brannon now argues that the district court erred and that there is Idaho case law that establishes 
the burden of proof in election cases.   
The burden on proof issue in an election context was first discussed by this Court in 
Jaycox v. Varnum. 39 Idaho 78, 226 P. 285 (1924).  In Jaycox, this Court found that the election 
contestant lost to his opponent by two votes, with an additional three illegal votes that could not 
be attributed to either candidate.  Id. at 87, 226 P. at 288.  Even though the number of disputed 
ballots exceeded the margin of victory, this Court held that the contestant failed to prove that the 
result of the election would have been different if these illegal votes had not been received.  Id. at 
92, 226 P. at 289.    
The three illegal votes may have been cast for appellant or the third candidate, or 
divided among them. In order to overcome the prima facie effect of the returns, it 
would seem incumbent on appellant to prove not only the illegal votes, but also 
for whom they were cast. Both these elements of proof were required to show that 
the illegal votes affected the result, and that but for them appellant would have 
15 
 
been elected. It would be neither just nor logical to put the contestee at a 
disadvantage, because contestant was unable to sustain the burden of proof which 
rested upon him, contestee not being responsible for that fact.  The rule that the 
party who is seeking affirmative relief has the burden of proof is one which 
necessarily underlies all our procedure. A party may have a just cause, and lose 
the benefit of his evidence through causes not of his making and beyond his 
control; yet we hold he is not entitled to recover because of failure of proof.  It is 
true that there is not a complete analogy between an election contest and the 
ordinary civil proceeding, because in the former the public have an interest 
lacking in the latter. Nevertheless, we conclude that the general rule as to burden 
of proof must apply to election contests. 
Id. (emphasis added). More recently, Jaycox was quoted in Noble: 
I.C. § 34-2101(5) allows an election to be contested ‘[w]hen illegal votes 
have been received or legal votes rejected at the polls sufficient to change the 
result.’ The party contesting the election must initially prove that the number of 
illegal votes cast could have changed the result.  Since Risch won by fifty-one 
votes, Noble had to show that at least fifty-one illegal votes had been counted. 
The district judge found that only the ten absentee ballots where the elector had 
failed to sign the affidavit were illegal, and should not have been counted. 
Noble introduced evidence at trial indicating that an undetermined number 
of unused ballots from prior elections were removed from a warehouse and used 
to make up for ballot shortfalls. After fifty of the ballots were used, the remaining 
ballots were returned to the warehouse. Noble claims that because there is no 
record of how many were taken from the warehouse and how many were 
returned, some of these ballots could have been cast illegally. The district judge 
found that Noble had presented no evidence that a single one of these ballots had 
been improperly cast. 
 
. . . 
Weighing evidence and determining the credibility of witnesses is 
properly left to the trial court. On appeal, this Court finds no basis for overturning 
the district judge’s determination that the above evidence failed to show that any 
illegal votes had been cast. 
 135 Idaho at 500–01, 20 P.3d at 684–85 (internal citations omitted).  In Noble, this Court held 
that the party contesting the election had the burden to show that enough illegal votes were 
counted to change the result of the election.  Id. 
Here, Kennedy defeated Brannon by five votes according to the official election results.  
At trial, Brannon established that six votes were cast illegally.  One of the illegal votes was for 
Brannon, two were for Kennedy, one vote was probably for Kennedy, and the last two were 
undetermined.  The district court thus found that Kennedy prevailed by three votes, instead of 
five.   
16 
 
The only remaining issue of illegal votes centered on the five voters that voted absentee 
under UOCAVA.  After hearing the evidence, the district court found that all five voters were 
legal voters.  As discussed in section III.B above, the absentee voter provisions of UOCAVA did 
not apply to the City election and the district court erred in holding otherwise.  However, there is 
no evidence in the record showing for whom those five voters actually voted, or whether those 
votes were illegal under the proper statute, FVAA.  In the absence of such evidence, the standard 
applied in Jaycox and reinforced by Noble has not been met.  Therefore, we hold that the district 
court did not err, that the burden of proof remained on Brannon, and that Brannon failed to meet 
that burden.   
3. The factual issues of the accuracy of official vote count and the adequacy of the 
election canvass are moot since Brannon failed to meet his burden of proof.    
On appeal, Brannon challenges two factual findings by the district court.  First, Brannon 
argues that there is no competent evidence in the record to substantiate the district court’s finding 
that 2051 envelopes, each containing one legal absentee ballot, were received.  And second, 
Brannon argues that there was no competent evidence to support the district court’s finding that 
there was no error in counting votes or in declaring the election result. 
 
Idaho Code section 34-2001 states that:  
The election of any person to any public office, the location or relocation of a 
county seat, or any proposition submitted to a vote of the people may be 
contested: 
. . . 
5. When illegal votes have been received or legal votes rejected at the polls 
sufficient to change the result. 
6.  For any error in any board of canvassers in counting votes or in declaring the 
result of the election, if the error would change the result. 
As previously stated, there is no evidence that the five disputed votes are illegal under the 
applicable laws, or for whom the five votes were cast.  Therefore, there is no evidence on the 
record that would be sufficient to change the election result under the standard set forth in 
Jaycox. 39 Idaho at 92, 226 P. at 289. Although there is some question about the validity of 
Brannon’s allegations, there is no question that Brannon failed to introduce evidence that any of 
the alleged errors changed the election result.  In the absence of such evidence, the factual 
findings in regards to the number of votes or the method of vote counting, is moot.    
4. The legal issues regarding the delegation of the City election to Kootenai County, and 
the dismissal of Brannon’s claim to set aside the entire election, are also moot. 
17 
 
On appeal Brannon argues that the delegation agreement between the City and Kootenai 
County was in violation of the applicable municipal election law, I.C. § 34-1401.2  According to 
Brannon, from 1993 until 2011, Idaho municipal election laws did not expressly permit the 
delegation of the City’s or the city clerk’s election duties to the county.  Also in his brief on 
appeal, Brannon states that he has always viewed this election contest as a challenge to the entire 
2009 election, and that the district court erred when it dismissed his challenge as it pertains to the 
entire general election.  In support, Brannon cites his amended complaint, which alleges “acts or 
failures to act” on the part of the city and the city clerk.  In response, the City argues that there 
was no evidence introduced to suggest that the entire election should be disregarded, and that the 
focus of the case is Seat 2.   
As stated above, there is no evidence on the record that would be sufficient to change the 
election result under the standard set forth in Jaycox. 39 Idaho at 92, 226 P. at 289.   In the 
absence of such evidence, the legal questions regarding the delegation of election duties or the 
decision of the district court to dismiss Brannon’s general election claim, are moot.    
F. Whether the district court erred in denying the motion for new trial or amended 
judgment. 
On November 8, 2010, Brannon filed a motion for new trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6) 
and (7), or in the alternative to amend the judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(e).  After argument 
by the parties, the district court denied the motion.   
1. Standard of Review. 
“On appeal, this Court reviews a district court’s decision to grant or deny a new trial for 
an abuse of discretion and will not disturb that decision absent a manifest abuse of this 
discretion.” Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423, 429, 196 P.3d 341, 347 (2008) (citing 
Lanham v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 486, 497–98, 943 P.2d 912, 923–24 (1997)).  
To determine whether there is an abuse of discretion this Court considers whether 
(1) the court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) the court acted 
within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with legal standards 
applicable to specific choices; and (3) the court reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason. 
                                                 
2 It should be noted that Idaho Code section 34-1401 was amended subsequent to the 2009 election cycle.  S.L. 
2009, ch. 341, § 59, eff. Jan. 1, 2011.  Currently, I.C. § 34-1401 states that “[m]unicipal elections shall be conducted 
under the provisions of this chapter except for the specific provisions of chapter 4, title 50, Idaho Code.”  Idaho 
Code Section 50-403 currently states that “[f]or each city, the county clerk of the county is the chief elections officer 
and shall exercise general supervision of the administration of the election laws in the city . . . .” 
18 
 
Lee v. Nickerson, 146 Idaho 5, 9, 189 P.3d 467, 471 (2008). 
2. Whether the district court erred in denying the motion for new trial or amended 
judgment.  
Brannon made two arguments in his motion for new trial.  First, that there was 
insufficient evidence at trial to justify the verdict.   And second, that the district court erred by 
not shifting the burden of proof to the defendant after Brannon introduced sufficient evidence of 
ballot irregularities to shift the burden to the City.  
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) states that: 
A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of 
the issues in an action for any of the following reasons: 
. . . 
6. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is 
against the law. 
7. Error in law, occurring at the trial. . . . Any motion based on subdivisions 6 or 7 
must set forth the factual grounds therefor with particularity. On a motion for new 
trial in an action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has 
been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment. 
Argument on the motion was heard on December 7, 2010, and the district court denied 
the motion for new trial or amended judgment on January 4, 2011.  The order contained no 
explanation for the denial, however the hearing transcript contains extended reasoning from the 
district court. 
In his motion for new trial, Brannon attached five absentee ballot envelopes intended to 
cast doubt on the official absentee vote total.  However, the district court refused to reopen the 
trial to accept new evidence.  “The fact is that none of the absentee return envelopes were in 
evidence at the trial.  If someone submits an affidavit after the trial regarding putting something 
in that they could have put in during the trial . . . the justice system simply doesn’t work.”  On 
the issue of Judge Marano’s findings, the district court stated that “I found that he counted 2,051 
absentee ballots.  That’s the finding.  That’s what he testified to.”   
Addressing the burden of proof, the district court stated that it “will always be on the 
plaintiff.” As applied to any discrepancy in ballots, the district court remarked:   
All 10 [potentially illegal votes] could have been for Brannon. So there is 
a request here for the Court to make a finding that these excess ballots, although 
19 
 
they were all voted for the loser, who lost, nonetheless since they were excess 
ballots, let’s have a new election.  That’s absurd.  You’d have to know how the 
ballots were cast to make much sense.   
Given the reasons stated in the above sections, the district court acted within its discretion 
when it denied the motion for new trial.  Additionally, the district court’s analysis was consistent 
with the controlling precedent in Jaycox, 39 Idaho at 92, 226 P. at 289, and Noble, 135 Idaho at 
500–01, 20 P.3d at 684–85.  The burden of proof would only shift upon a finding of enough 
illegal votes to change the outcome of the election, and there was no evidence before the district 
court that would necessitate the burden shift.  No evidence was presented on whether the 
absentee votes were illegal under FVAA, nor any evidence for whether the disputed votes were 
cast for Brannon or Kennedy.  Additionally, the district court is not compelled to reopen the 
evidence, I.R.C.P. 59(A)(7) simply states that the court may reopen the evidence.  The district 
court reached its conclusion through an exercise of reason, and entered a decision within the 
bounds of its discretion. Therefore, we hold that the district court did not err when it denied 
Brannon’s motion for new trial.  
G. Whether the City is entitled to costs and fees on appeal. 
The City argues that it is entitled to costs on appeal under I.C. § 34-2036, I.R.C.P. 11, 
and I.A.R. 40, and attorney fees on appeal under I.C. § 12-120 and I.A.R. 41.  Kennedy argues 
that he is entitled to attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121.  In response, Brannon argues that the City 
failed to provide a basis for an award of fees under I.C. § 12-120.  As to fees under I.C. § 12-
121, Brannon argues that the appeal was not brought, pursued, or defended frivolously or 
without foundation: “In any deliberations of this matter the Court is asked to consider the 
statewide significance of the issues raised on this appeal and the extraordinary effort that was 
necessary to compile and present these issues with proper citation to the record, statutes, and 
case law to this Court.”   
Idaho Code section 12-121 states that: 
 In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney’s fees to the 
prevailing party or parties, provided that this section shall not alter, repeal or 
amend any statute which otherwise provides for the award of attorney’s fees. The 
term ‘party’ or ‘parties’ is defined to include any person, partnership, corporation, 
association, private organization, the state of Idaho or political subdivision 
thereof. 
On the issue of fees under I.C. § 12-121, “a party is entitled to attorney’s fees if the 
appeal merely invites the appellate court to second guess the trial court on the weight of 
20 
 
evidence. Attorney’s fees may also be awarded if the appeal was brought or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.” Crowley v. Critchfield, 145 Idaho 509, 514, 
181 P.3d 435, 440 (2007) (internal citation omitted).  However, “[i]f there is a legitimate, triable 
issue of fact or a legitimate issue of law, attorney fees may not be awarded under this statute 
even though the losing party has asserted factual or legal claims that are frivolous, unreasonable, 
or without foundation.” Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635, 639, 132 P.3d 392, 396 (2006).   
Since the proper application of UOCAVA is a legitimate and triable issue of law, we 
decline to award attorney fees. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We find that the district court did not err when it denied Brannon’s motion to disqualify.  
We also hold that the UOCAVA absentee voter requirements did not apply to municipal 
elections held prior to 2011, but that there is insufficient evidence in the record to conclude that 
the five disputed votes in this case were illegal.  We hold that the district court did not err when 
it refused to order non-city residents to testify about their residency at trial.  We also hold that 
the district court did not err in dismissing Brannon’s claims of malconduct.   
Further, we hold that the district court applied the proper burden of proof, and that the 
additional evidentiary and legal issues from trial are moot.  We hold that the district court 
properly denied Brannon’s motion for new trial. 
Finally, we award no attorney fees on appeal.  Costs to Respondents. 
Justices EISMANN, J. JONES, W. JONES and HORTON, CONCUR.