Title: STATE v MCCLEAN

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

N o . 14295 IN THE SUPREME CCUKI' OF THE STATE OF FKNTANA 1978 STATE OF - , Plaintiff and Respodent, ANDREW L. MrXLEZW, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal f r c a n : District C o u r t of the Eleventh Judicial District, Honorable James M . Salansky, J c a d g e presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: - r e , Lympus and Doran, Kalispell , mntana Gary G . Doran argued, Kalispell, mntana For Respondent: Mn. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, mntana Leslie Taylor argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, mntana Pat Springer, County Attorney, Kalispell, mntana Stewart A . Pearce I1 argued, Deputy County Attorney, Kalispell, P 4 x k d m .- ; Filed: ' ' M r . ~ u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. ~ e f e n d a n t Andrew L. McClean appeals from h i s judgment of conviction following a jury t r i a l i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eleventh J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Flathead County. McClean was found g u i l t y of criminal s a l e of dangerous drugs, i n v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 54-132(1), R.C.M. 1947. Defendant was charged with s e l l i n g approximately one pound of marijuana t o Denny Beach, who i n t u r n sold t h e marijuana t o an undercover o f f i c e r of t h e Flathead County S h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e , Donald Bruce Bounds. Bounds t e s t i f i e d t h a t on September 12, 1977, he and Beach went t o a bar where they met defendant s h o r t l y a f t e r 9:00 p.m. From t h e r e Beach and defendant proceeded i n t o the r e a r parking l o t of the bar, while Bounds remained i n the bar and watched through a back window. H e t e s t i f i e d he saw defendant McClean reach i n h i s pickup, p u l l o u t a brown package and hand it t o Beach. Bounds then went outside, m e t Beach by h i s car and paid him $110. Beach and Bounds returned t o t h e i n s i d e of t h e bar where they m e t defendant once again. Bounds observed Beach give defendant s e v e r a l b i l l s , perhaps keeping a small commis- s i o n f o r himself. Then Beach and Bounds l e f t t h e bar i n Bounds' car. Defendant challenges h i s conviction on t h r e e grounds a r i s i n g from t h e conduct of h i s t r i a l . H i s f i r s t i s s u e c e n t e r s on a statement made by Bounds during cross-examina- t i o n t h a t Bounds had taken a polygraph test. Defendant contends t h e D i s t r i c t Court erred by f a i l i n g t o g r a n t a m i s t r i a l following t h e mention of polygraph t e s t i n g . second, defendant contends h i s case w a s prejudiced because he w a s not permitted t o p u t witnesses on t h e stand who would t e s t i - f y t h a t Bounds on numerous occasions had engaged i n t h e s a l e of a v a r i e t y of regulated drugs and had smoked marijuana. Third, defendant argues he d i d not have a f a i r t r i a l because t h e S t a t e was permitted t o amend i t s information s h o r t l y before t r i a l by adding Denny Beach a s a prosecution witness. Issue 1. Does t h e mention by a prosecution witness t h a t he has taken a polygraph test necessarily prejudice a criminal defendant's case so a s t o r e q u i r e t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o g r a n t a m i s t r i a l ? Bounds mentioned a polygraph test during cross-examina- t i o n by defendant's attorney: "Q. M r . Bounds, you a r e providing evidence a g a i n s t an individual on q u i t e a serious crime. A. Y e s sir. "Q. Now, you are s t a t i n g t h a t you w e r e not under t h e influence of marijuana t h a t evening. A. I know t h a t I wasn't sir. "Q. H o w do you know t h a t ? A. Because I h a d n ' t smoked any. I do not smoke mari- juana, sir. "Q. You do n o t smoke marijuana? A. N o sir. A s a matter of f a c t , I took a polygraph." The D i s t r i c t Court denied defendant's motion f o r m i s t r i a l . For a v a r i e t y of reasons, t h e use of polygraph d a t a and t h e accompanying opinion of t h e polygraph examiner a r e generally inadmissible i n criminal t r i a l s . The p r i n c i p a l reason p u t forward by c o u r t s i n r e j e c t i n g t h e use of such evidence is its questionable r e l i a b i l i t y . United S t a t e s v. Alexander ( 8 t h C i r . 1975), 526 F.2d 161, 167-68; United S t a t e s v. Marshall (9th C i r . 1975), 526 F.2d 1349, 1360; United States v. Tremont (6th C i r . 1965), 351 F.2d 1 4 4 , 1 4 6 , cert.den. 383 U.S. 944, 86 S.Ct. 1198, 16 L Ed 2d 207 (1966). Some eighteen years ago Montana followed t h e r u l e t h a t "'. . . [ u l n t i l it is established t h a t reasonable c e r t a i n t y follows from such tests, it would be e r r o r t o admit i n evidence t h e r e s u l t thereof' . . ." S t a t e v. Hollywood (1960), 138 Mont. 561, 575, 358 P.2d 437, 444 (quoting people v, ~ecker (1942), 300 Mich. 562, 2 N.W. 2d 503, 505). Despite numerous improvements in design and technique from the simple systolic blood pressure device at issue in the first polygraph decision, Frye v. United States (1923), 54 U.S.App.D.C. 46, 293 Fed. 1013, courts continue to doubt the "lie detector's" reliability. United States v. Alexander, supra, 526 F.2d at 164. As the court in Alexander concluded, "there are too many uncontrollable or unascertainable factors which may affect the polygraphist's conclusion as to the veracity or falsity of the examinee's responses." 526 F.2d at 165. See also Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific Evidence: An Analysis of Lie Detection, 70 Yale L.J. 694, 727 (1961). In People v . Carter (1957), 48 Cal.2d 737, 312 P.2d 665, 674, the California Supreme Court held it was error to permit a witness to testify that he had been willing to take a lie detector test, thereby permitting the jury to infer that the defendant was not willing. On the other hand, in Johnson v. State (Fla. App. 1964), 166 So.2d 798, the jury was made aware that a prosecution witness was a polygraph examiner and that the examiner had concluded that the defen- dant had at first lied to him concerning his whereabouts at the time of the alleged crime. Yet because the examiner revealed neither his actual test results nor his conclusions therefrom, and because the defendant later admitted to the examiner that he was in fact present at the scene of the crime, the court held that the polygraphist's testimony was not prejudicial. 166 So.2d at 805. The Alaska Supreme Court, relying on the ~lorida court's Johnson decision, applied the rule of whether the mention of polygraph was p r e j u d i c i a l t o a case very s i m i l a r i n its f a c t s t o t h i s appeal. Gafford v. S t a t e ( ~ l a s k a 1968), 440 P.2d 405. I n Gafford t h e S t a t e ' s witness, an undercover o f f i c e r , responded t o defense counsel's cross-examination by volunteering t h a t he had described t h e i n c i d e n t a t i s s u e t o a l i e d e t e c t o r . The Alaska c o u r t , quoting from Johnson held: ". . . [TI he m e r e f a c t t h a t t h e jury is ap- p r i s e d t h a t a l i e d e t e c t o r test was taken i s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y p r e j u d i c i a l i f no inference a s t o t h e r e s u l t i s r a i s e d o r i f any i n f e r - ences t h a t might be r a i s e d as = t h e r e s u l t a r e n o t p r e j u d i c i a l . " 440 P.2d a t 4 1 1 , quoting 166 So.2d a t 805. (Emphasis i n o r i - g i n a l . ) See a l s o People v. Martin (1965), 62 Ill.App.2d 203, 210 N.E.2d 798, 802, a f f ' d , (1966), 35 I11.2d 289, 220 N.E.2d 170; S t a t e v. Cor (1964), 1 4 4 Mont. 323, 348, 350, 396 P.2d 86, 99-100- Thus, d e s p i t e general policy a g a i n s t t h e use of poly- graph evidence, t h e i s s u e must be framed i n terms of its p r e j u d i c i a l e f f e c t on defendant. I n t h i s case t h e D i s t r i c t Court c o r r e c t l y denied defendant's motion f o r a m i s t r i a l . The reference t o polygraph was made under cross-examination by t h e S t a t e ' s witness. H e made no r e f e r e n c e t o t h e r e s u l t s of any such test although h i s answer c l e a r l y c a r r i e d t h e inference t h a t he had "passed" a test. There i s no sug- g e s t i o n t h a t t h e witness was coached i n advance t o make t h e reference. Cf. Gafford v. S t a t e , 440 P.2d a t 4 1 1 . F i n a l l y , any a c t u a l prejudice t o defendant appears minimal. The witness' response was t o questions concerning h i s own h a b i t s f o r marijuana use and d e a l t only i n d i r e c t l y with t h e charges a g a i n s t defendant. While such a r e f e r e n c e t o a l i e d e t e c t o r may have b o l s t e r e d t h e witness' c r e d i b i l i t y , it does n o t appear t o have done s o except perhaps t o r e h a b i l i t a t e him from a p o t e n t i a l l y highly p r e j u d i c i a l attempt a t impeachment. Issue 2 . May a party impeach a witness by putting witnesses on the stand to testify to specific instances of the witness' conduct which might show a motive to testify falsely? Defendant's second issue concerns the order limiting the introduction of impeachment evidence. In his brief defendant argues he should have been permitted to put wit- nesses on the stand to testify concerning Bounds' personal habits for marijuana use and thereby demonstrate that Bounds had a profit motive in obtaining a conviction. The witnesses available to the defense were willing to testify that Bounds had repeatedly sold and distributed dangerous drugs and had repeatedly indulged in the use and possession of drugs. The witnesses' testimony would have attempted to demonstrate that Bounds used his employment as an undercover narcotics officer to profit himself, to provide for his continuing use of drugs and to successfully secure future employment that he might continue his self-indulgences. The District Court ruled it would permit witnesses to testify only as to Bounds' "reputation for truth in the community". It refused to allow such testimony "to just vaguely uphold this profit motive, just by their testimony that he at different times was in the possession of drugs and offered them drugs." That testimony, the court con- cluded, was not relevant to the charges against defendant. Defendant argues that Rule 404(b), Mont.R.Evid., per- mits the introduction of evidence of specific acts of the witness, such as he offered, in order to show his motive to testify falsely against defendant. He contends that because Bounds used his employment with the sheriff's office as a cover for obtaining and selling drugs, it would only be l o g i c a l f o r him t o be biased and motivated t o t e s t i f y f a l s e l y . Rule 404(b), Mont.R.Evid., is i d e n t i c a l t o Rule 404(b) of t h e Federal Rules of Evidence. It s t a t e s : " ( b ) Other crimes, wrongs, a c t s . Evidence of o t h e r crimes, wrongs, o r a c t s is not admissible t o prove t h e character of a person i n order t o show t h a t he acted i n conformity therewith. I t may, however, be admissible f o r other purposes, such a s proof of motive, opportunity, i n t e n t , preparation, plan, knowledge, i d e n t i t y , o r ab- sence of mistake o r accident." Defendant relies on t h i s r u l e a s a means of proving Bounds' motive f o r t e s t i f y i n g f a l s e l y . However, i n t h i s case sub- s e c t i o n (b) must be read together with Rule 404 ( a ) (3) r e l a t i n g t o t h e character of a witness, which provides: "Character evidence not admissible - t o prove conduct, exceptions; other crimes; character i n issue. - " ( a ) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character o r a t r a i t of h i s character i s n o t admissible f o r t h e purpose of proving t h a t he acted i n conformity there- with on a p a r t i c u l a r occasion, except: " (3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided i n A r t i c l e VI." Thus, while evidence of a person's character is not o r d i n a r i l y admissible t o prove t h e person acted i n con- formity with t h a t character, t h e r e is an exception which is t h e s u b j e c t of Rule 608, Mont.R.Evid. Rule 608 dealing with impeachment and r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of witnesses contains two p a r t s . P a r t ( a ) l i m i t s an a t t a c k on a witness' c r e d i b i l i t y t o opinion o r reputation evidence on t h e witness' character f o r t r u t h f u l n e s s o r untruthfulness: " ( a ) Opinion and reputation evidence of charac- ter. The c r e d i b i l i t y of a witness may be a t - tacked o r supported by evidence i n t h e form of opinion o r reputation, b u t s u b j e c t t o these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admis- sible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise." Witness A, therefore, may give his opinion as to Wit- ness B's character, but he is limited to stating only his opinion of Witness B's character for truthfulness or untruth- fulness. Part (b) of Rule 608 deals with those instances in which opinion or reputation evidence concerning a witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness is admissible and proscribes, except in limited circumstances, the use of extrinsic evidence to prove specific instances of conduct. These limited circumstances are described in the second sentence of part (b), dealing with cross-examination of a witness who has testified concerning his own or another witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness: Thus, on direct examination Witness A may not bolster his opinion concerning the truthfulness or untruthfulness of Witness B by making reference to specific instances of B's conduct. On cross-examination, however, Witness A may be questioned on his opinion by reference to such specific instances. This cross-examination, however, is further limited by the trial court's discretion in determining whether it is in fact relevant to the issue of B's credi- b i l i t y . The p o i n t of Rule 608 f o r t h e purposes of t h i s appeal i s t h a t r e f e r e n c e t o s p e c i f i c i n s t a n c e s of a witness' conduct f o r t h e purpose of proving h i s c h a r a c t e r f o r t r u t h - f u l n e s s o r untruthfulness i s never permitted on d i r e c t examination. I n t h i s r e s p e c t Rule 608, which i s nearly i d e n t i c a l t o its f e d e r a l counterpart, a c t s i n conformity with Rule 4 0 5 ( a ) , which i s i d e n t i c a l t o t h e f e d e r a l r u l e . Rule 4 0 5 ( a ) , governing t h e methods of proving c h a r a c t e r , makes i n q u i r y i n t o s p e c i f i c i n s t a n c e s of conduct permissible only on cross-examination: " ( a ) Reputation o r opinion. I n a l l cases i n which evidence of character o r a t r a i t of c h a r a c t e r of a person i s admissible, proof may be made by testimony a s t o r e p u t a t i o n o r by testimony i n t h e form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable i n t o r e l e v a n t s p e c i f i c instances of conduct." See Advisory Committee's Notes t o Fed.R.Evid. 608(b), 56 F.R.D. 183, 268-69 (1972); Clarke, Montana Rules of Evi- dence: A General Survey, 39 Mont. L. Rev. 79, 120-21 (1978). Defendant's contention t h a t he w a s improperly denied t h e opportunity t o p u t various witnesses on t h e stand t o t e s t i f y a s t o witness Bounds' use of marijuana o r s a l e of drugs i s contrary t o Rules 405(a) and 608. This is p a r t i c u - l a r l y t r u e i n l i g h t of Rule 6 0 8 ( b ) ' s r e f e r e n c e t o t h e d i s - c r e t i o n of t h e c o u r t . This r u l e , along with Rule 403, g i v e s t h e t r i a l c o u r t wide d i s c r e t i o n t o exclude evidence which i n its view would c r e a t e a danger of u n f a i r p r e j u d i c e o r confu- s i o n of t h e issues: "Although r e l e v a n t , evidence may be excluded i f i t s probative value is s u b s t a n t i a l l y out- weighed by t h e danger of u n f a i r p r e j u d i c e , confusion of t h e i s s u e s , o r misleading t h e jury, o r by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, o r needless p r e s e n t a t i o n of cumulative evidence." Rule 403, Mont.R.Evid. Thus, t h e t r i a l c o u r t acted within its d i s c r e t i o n i n re- fusing t o permit defendant's witnesses t o t e s t i f y concerning s p e c i f i c instances of marijuana use by Bounds. Issue 3. Should t h e t r i a l c o u r t have granted a defense motion f o r a continuance a f t e r permitting t h e S t a t e t o amend i t s witness list on t h e morning of t r i a l ? On Friday, February 3, 1978, defendant's counsel r e - ceived t h e information t h a t Denny Beach had negotiated a plea with t h e county attorney, t h a t he would t e s t i f y f o r t h e S t a t e a g a i n s t defendant McClean, and f u r t h e r t h a t t h e S t a t e would s u b s t i t u t e one d e t e c t i v e f o r another a s a witness. Due t o a p r i o r commitment defense counsel l e f t t h a t weekend f o r a bar a s s o c i a t i o n conference i n another p a r t of t h e s t a t e . O n Monday morning, the 6th, t h e c o u r t granted t h e S t a t e ' s motion t o amend i t s information t o change t h e name of t h e d e t e c t i v e witness and t o add Denny Beach as a witness and granted defendant t h e noon hour t o interview Beach, r a t h e r than granting a continuance a s defendant requested. Defendant contends t h e S t a t e lacked good cause t o amend i t s l i s t of witnesses a s required by s e c t i o n 95-1803(a) ( I ) , R.C.M. 1947. "Good cause" was defined i n S t a t e v. Klein (1976), 169 Mont. 350, 547 P.2d 75, a s a " s u b s t a n t i a l rea- son". The policy i s t o avoid s u r p r i s e t o a defendant which would prejudice h i s case: "'Good cause' has been defined a s ' s u b s t a n t i a l reason', one t h a t a f f o r d s a l e g a l excuse. "The c o u r t should f i r s t determine whether the need f o r t h e a d d i t i o n a l witnesses and t h e rea- son f o r t h e i r not being disclosed earlier i s a ' s u b s t a n t i a l reason'. It should then deter- mine whether t h e r e i s prejudice based on sur- p r i s e and whether t h i s s u r p r i s e can be overcome by t h e granting of a continuance. I f t h e sur- p r i s e element can be overcome by a continuance, then t h e witnesses should be endorsed and t h e continuance granted. The s p i r i t and i n t e n t of t h e l a w is t h a t names and addresses of poten- t i a l witnesses should be disclosed a s soon a s they are known." 169 Mont. a t 354, 547 P.2d a t 77. H e r e , the S t a t e informed defendant's counsel of t h e change i n t h e information within hours a f t e r Beach's nego- t i a t e d plea. Defendant concedes t h e need f o r changing t h e name of t h e d e t e c t i v e who would t e s t i f y a s t o chain of evidence. Defense counsel chose t o keep h i s commitment t o t r a v e l t h e weekend before t r i a l , and, a s t h e S t a t e points o u t , defense counsel does not p r a c t i c e law alone. One of h i s p a r t n e r s could have interviewed Beach. Further, on t h e day of t r i a l , defense counsel chose t o keep a speaking engagement a t a bar luncheon r a t h e r than interview Beach. From a p r a c t i c a l standpoint it is d i f f i c u l t t o see how defense counsel could have adequately prepared f o r t r i a l without interviewing Beach i n any case. Under these circum- stances it i s hardly a case of s u r p r i s e t o defendant. H e knew of Beach's important r o l e i n t h e t r a n s a c t i o n f o r which he was t o be t r i e d . The t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t err by refusing t o g r a n t a continuance. The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court is affirmed. W e Concur: "/ J u s t i c e s (2'