Title: Commonwealth v. Stewart

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11475 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  PAUL STEWART. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     March 6, 2014. - August 7, 2014. 
 
Present:  Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, 
& Lenk, JJ.1 
 
 
Controlled Substances.  Habitual Offender.  Constitutional Law, 
Search and seizure, Investigatory stop, Probable cause, 
Reasonable suspicion.  Threshold Police Inquiry.  Probable 
Cause.  Search and Seizure, Threshold police inquiry, 
Reasonable suspicion, Search incident to lawful arrest, 
Fruits of illegal search, Probable cause. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on July 23, 2008. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Frank 
M. Gaziano, J., and the cases were tried before Judith 
Fabricant, J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
James P. Vander Salm for the defendant. 
 
Zachary Hillman, Assistant District Attorney (Melissa L. 
Brooks, Assistant District Attorney, with him) for the 
Commonwealth. 
                     
1 Justice Ireland participated in the deliberation on this 
case prior to his retirement. 
2 
 
 
Michael J. Fellows, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
for Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
William W. Adams, for Tari Richardson, amicus curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
GANTS, J.  A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant of 
possession of a class B substance (cocaine) with intent to 
distribute, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (c).2  After that 
guilty finding, in the second part of a bifurcated trial, the 
jury found that the defendant had previously been convicted in 
2006 of distribution of a class B substance and in 1994 of 
assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, and that he 
had been committed to prison for not less than three years on 
each of these prior convictions.  As a result, the defendant was 
sentenced both under G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (d), which provides for 
a sentence of not less than five years nor more than fifteen 
years in State prison where a defendant is convicted of a 
violation of § 32A (c) after an earlier conviction of that 
offense, and under G. L. c. 279, § 25, as a habitual offender, 
which requires that the defendant "be punished by imprisonment 
in the [S]tate prison for the maximum term provided by law as a 
penalty for the felony for which he is then to be sentenced," 
which the judge determined to be the statutory maximum of 
fifteen years in State prison.  In an unpublished memorandum and 
                     
2 The jury found the defendant not guilty of possession of 
cocaine with intent to distribute in a school zone. 
3 
 
order pursuant to rule 1:28 of the Appeals Court, a panel of 
that court affirmed both the conviction and the sentence.  
Commonwealth v. Stewart, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 1135 (2012).  We 
granted the defendant's application for further appellate 
review. 
 
On appeal, the defendant claims that the judge erred in 
denying his motion to suppress, that the defendant was 
prejudiced by the admission of statements made by the prosecutor 
and some of the Commonwealth's witnesses that suggested that the 
defendant was known to be a drug dealer, and that the sentence 
was illegal because he was sentenced both as a subsequent 
offender and as a habitual criminal.  We conclude that the 
motion to suppress should have been allowed and therefore vacate 
the defendant's conviction.  Because the conviction is vacated 
and there is no significant likelihood that the case can be 
tried without the evidence that has been suppressed, we do not 
reach the trial or sentencing issues.3 
 
Motion to suppress.  We summarize the facts as found by the 
motion judge, supplementing those findings with evidence in the 
record that is uncontroverted and that was implicitly credited 
by the judge.  See Commonwealth v. Isaiah I., 448 Mass. 334, 337 
(2007), S.C., 450 Mass. 818 (2008), and cases cited. 
                     
3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services and counsel for Tari 
Richardson. 
4 
 
 
In the early evening of May 22, 2008, Sergeant Detective 
William Dwan, and Officers Peter Chu, John Ryle, and Brian 
Linehan of the Boston police department were returning to the 
police station in an unmarked sport utility vehicle after 
completing an undercover assignment.  In Boston's theater 
district, Dwan observed the defendant walking on Washington 
Street followed by two men and one woman.  The woman was 
counting currency.  Dwan recognized the defendant because he had 
arrested him for the distribution of "crack" cocaine to an 
undercover police officer three years earlier in the same area. 
The officers observed the group turn onto Hayward Place, a 
narrow one-way street which, in the officers' experience, was a 
popular area for drug use, because drug users could "duck into a 
number of doorways on the side street."  The officers parked 
near the intersection of Hayward Place and the Harrison Avenue 
extension.  From that vantage point, Dwan "observed the group 
huddle together in a doorway for a brief period of time, 
exchange something, and then separate." 
 
The woman and one of the men walked toward Washington 
Street, while the defendant and the other man walked down 
Hayward Place in the direction of the officers.  After the 
defendant had separated from the man with whom he had been 
walking and walked alone a short distance, Ryle and Chu left the 
vehicle and approached the defendant.  Ryle displayed his police 
5 
 
badge and ordered the defendant to stop and identify himself. 
The defendant complied.  Shortly thereafter, Dwan approached and 
asked the defendant where he had been.  The defendant denied 
that he had been at Hayward Place or had met others there. 
 
Dwan then inquired about the contents of the thin nylon 
backpack that the defendant was carrying, which "was noticeably 
weighed down with an object."  The defendant stated that the 
backpack contained his cellular telephone charger.  Dwan asked 
for permission to search the bag, whereupon the defendant 
removed the bag and handed it to him.  Dwan removed a hard box 
that was designed to look like a cigarette package, but was 
"noticeably heavier."  At this point, the defendant changed his 
mind and told Dwan that he could not look in the bag.  On 
opening the box, Dwan discovered that it was a digital scale, 
which contained a white powder residue that he believed to be 
cocaine.  The defendant was then arrested for possession of 
cocaine.  In the search of the defendant that immediately 
followed, the officers found money and a plastic bag containing 
twelve smaller packages of cocaine. 
 
The defendant moved to suppress all evidence seized as a 
result of his stop and subsequent arrest.  The motion judge 
found that the officers had probable cause to believe that the 
defendant had participated in a drug transaction at the time 
they stopped him, based on their observations, experience, and 
6 
 
familiarity with the defendant.  Accordingly, the motion judge 
concluded that the officers searched the defendant incident to a 
valid arrest, and denied the defendant's motion to suppress. 
 
A panel of the Appeals Court affirmed the denial of the 
motion to suppress, albeit on different grounds.  Commonwealth 
v. Stewart, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 1135.  The panel concluded that 
the officers' observations of "what they believed, based on 
their training and experience, to be a street-level drug 
transaction" created "at least reasonable suspicion to stop the 
defendant and inquire further into his activities."  The panel 
also concluded that the reasonable suspicion ripened into 
probable cause after the defendant lied about where he had just 
been.  Id. 
 
We accept the judge's findings of fact unless clearly 
erroneous.  Commonwealth v. Leahy, 445 Mass. 481, 485 (2005), 
citing Commonwealth v. Sicari, 434 Mass. 732, 746-747 (2001), 
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1142 (2002).  Applying this standard, we 
accept all the judge's findings except one:  his finding that 
Dwan "observed an exchange of an unknown object."  A careful 
look at Dwan's testimony reveals that he did not see such an 
exchange, but inferred from what he saw that an exchange had 
occurred.  Dwan testified that he had an unobstructed view of 
the four persons after they "huddled together," but could see 
only "their upper torso area."  When initially asked, "Did you 
7 
 
see any exchange at all," he answered, "No, I didn't."  The 
prosecutor later read Dwan an excerpt from his grand jury 
testimony, where he had stated, "On this occasion, I watched all 
three [sic] parties walk together, stop halfway up on Haeyward 
Place, and appear to make an exchange at that location."  The 
prosecutor attempted to rephrase Dwan's grand jury testimony by 
asking, "[Y]ou testified that you saw an exchange, correct?"  
Dwan answered, "yes," even though that was not what he said to 
the grand jury; he said there that they "appear[ed] to make an 
exchange."  There was no evidence at the motion hearing, either 
from what Dwan testified to at the hearing or before the grand 
jury, that Dwan actually observed an exchange. 
 
Our finding that Dwan did not see an exchange, but simply 
inferred from what he knew and saw that an exchange had 
occurred, is supported by the absence of any evidence as to who 
participated in the exchange.  If Dwan truly had observed an 
exchange, he could have testified to who made the exchange; he 
did not.  Consequently, there was no evidence that the defendant 
participated in the exchange that Dwan inferred had happened 
during the "huddle." 
 
We conclude that the investigatory stop of the defendant 
was supported by reasonable suspicion.  "A police officer may 
make an investigatory stop 'where suspicious conduct gives the 
officer reasonable ground to suspect that a person is 
8 
 
committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime.' . . .  
The action of the officer 'must be based on specific and 
articulable facts and reasonable inferences therefrom, in light 
of the officer's experience.'"  Commonwealth v. Gomes, 453 Mass. 
506, 510-511 (2009), quoting Commonwealth v. Wilson, 441 Mass. 
390, 394 (2004).  In view of Dwan's experience in drug 
investigations, he had reasonable grounds to suspect that he had 
witnessed a drug transaction based on the information he had 
earlier acquired (that the defendant, three years earlier, had 
been arrested for distributing narcotics to an undercover police 
officer in the theatre district of Boston) and that he had just 
acquired from his observations (three persons followed the 
defendant down a narrow street often used by drug users, with 
the woman counting currency as she walked, and then all four 
huddled briefly together in a doorway, before they dispersed). 
 
Based on reasonable suspicion, the officers lawfully 
stopped the defendant and questioned him as to what had just 
happened.  But reasonable suspicion alone was not sufficient to 
allow Dwan lawfully to open the hard cigarette box, where there 
was nothing to suggest that a weapon was inside.4 
                     
4 On appeal, the Commonwealth does not argue that the 
officers were justified in opening the cigarette box based on a 
reasonable belief that the defendant was armed and dangerous, 
and that the cigarette box may have contained a weapon.  See 
Commonwealth v. Gomes, 453 Mass. 506, 512 (2009). 
9 
 
 
Nor was opening the cigarette box lawful based on the 
defendant's initial consent to Dwan's looking inside his 
backpack, where the defendant had withdrawn his consent before 
Dwan opened the cigarette box.  A consent to search can be 
withdrawn or limited at any time before completion of the 
search.  United States v. Mitchell, 82 F.3d 146, 151 (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 856 (1996), citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 
U.S. 248, 252 (1991).  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Caputo, 439 
Mass. 153, 163 (2003), quoting United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 
F.2d 126, 129 n.3 (7th Cir. 1991) ("defendant's consent may 
limit the extent or scope of a warrantless search"); 4 W. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.1 (c) at 58 (5th ed. 2012) 
("consent usually may be withdrawn or limited at any time prior 
to the completion of the search").  Although evidence found 
during the search before the withdrawal of the consent may be 
lawfully admitted, a search must end on the withdrawal of 
consent where there is no other legal justification.  See United 
States v. Mitchell, supra; 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure, 
supra. Consequently, as the motion judge and the Appeals Court 
recognized, Dwan's opening of the cigarette box was lawful only 
if it was a search incident to arrest, supported by probable 
cause.  We therefore turn to the question whether there was 
probable cause to arrest the defendant at the time the box was 
opened. 
10 
 
 
"[P]robable cause exists where, at the moment of arrest, 
the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the police 
are enough to warrant a prudent person in believing that the 
individual arrested has committed or was committing an offense."  
Commonwealth v. Santaliz, 413 Mass. 238, 241 (1992), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Storey, 378 Mass. 312, 321 (1979), cert. denied, 
446 U.S. 955 (1980).  Probable cause may be established where 
the "silent movie" observed by an experienced narcotics 
investigator reveals "a sequence of activity consistent with a 
drug sale at a place notorious for illicit activity in 
narcotics."  Commonwealth v. Santaliz, supra at 242.  In 
Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 426 Mass. 703, 704 (1998), we concluded 
that probable cause existed where experienced narcotics officers 
observed a man who was known to have been arrested previously 
for narcotics sales engage in the following "silent movie" 
sequence:  the man approached the passenger side of a vehicle 
that had stopped at a street curb, put his head inside the open 
window and appeared to exchange words with the driver (the 
defendant), who was alone in the vehicle; the man ran away, only 
to return one minute later and exchange something with the 
driver of the vehicle, and then the man walked away and the 
vehicle drove off.  Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Santaliz, 413 
Mass. at 241, we found probable cause (although we "found the 
case 'close'") where an experienced narcotics officer saw this 
11 
 
"silent movie" sequence:  the defendant was seated near a woman 
on the front porch of a "soup kitchen" known as a place of high 
incidence of drug activity when a taxicab stopped in front of 
the building; the woman took something from her waistband and 
handed it to the defendant; the defendant silently handed the 
object to a person in the taxicab, who gave the defendant money 
in return; the person left in the taxicab, and the defendant 
gave the money to the woman.  Id. at 239-240. 
 
The "silent movie" sequence in this case is comparable but 
with two significant differences:  first, Dwan inferred that an 
exchange of something occurred but did not see an exchange; and, 
second, there was no evidence that the defendant exchanged 
anything himself.  As to the first difference, in each of the 
cases cited by the motion judge and by the Commonwealth where 
probable cause was found based on the inference of an illegal 
exchange, an officer saw the defendant make an exchange with 
another person.  See Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 426 Mass. at 704 
("Morales reached into the vehicle toward Kennedy, while Kennedy 
reached toward Morales"); Commonwealth v. Santaliz, 413 Mass. at 
240 ("The defendant handed the object to the woman, and she gave 
him money").  See also Commonwealth v. McCoy, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 
284, 286 (2003) (officers observed woman pass cash "through the 
rolled-down front-seat passenger's window to the passenger"); 
Commonwealth v. Gant, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 314, 315 (2001) (officer 
12 
 
"saw the defendant exchange something with Gonzalez").  Although 
we do not require "that an officer must actually see an object 
exchanged," the suspect's movements, as observed by the officer, 
must provide factual support for the inference that the parties 
exchanged an object.  Commonwealth v. Kennedy, supra at 710.  
See Commonwealth v. Levy, 459 Mass. 1010, 1011 (2011), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Kennedy, supra at 711 ("While we reject a per se 
rule that an officer must actually see an object exchanged to 
have probable cause to arrest," failure to see such exchange 
"weakens the Commonwealth's probable cause showing").  Here, the 
officer testified that the defendant and three companions 
huddled in a doorway, but his view was limited to their "upper 
torso area" and he did not testify to seeing the defendant make 
any hand movements suggesting an exchange or to seeing any 
object passing between the defendant and any of his companions.  
See, e.g. Commonwealth v. Levy, 459 Mass. at 1011 (finding no 
probable cause where "[n]o officer saw an actual exchange of any 
kind"). 
 
As to the second difference, in each of the cases cited 
above, the apparent exchange involved only two persons, with one 
of them being the defendant, so if there was any exchange, there 
was no doubt that the defendant participated in it.  Here, the 
defendant huddled with three individuals so, if there was an 
exchange, there was no certainty that the defendant participated 
13 
 
in it.  The failure to observe an actual exchange and the number 
of suspects who could have participated in any such exchange, 
when considered together, significantly weaken the weight of the 
Commonwealth's evidence.  Although that evidence is sufficient 
for reasonable suspicion, it falls short of probable cause. 
 
The defendant's false denial that he had been on Hayward 
Place or had met others there permits the reasonable inference 
that something occurred during that "huddle" that the defendant 
did not want to admit to the police and strengthens the 
suspicion that the defendant had participated in a drug 
transaction.  We recognize that, in some instances, the added 
inferential weight of a false denial may be sufficient to turn 
reasonable suspicion into probable cause.  See Commonwealth v. 
Riggins, 366 Mass. 81, 88 (1974) ("Implausible answers to  
police questions will, with other facts, support a finding of 
probable cause to conduct a search").  But we conclude here 
that, even when this inference is added to the weight of the 
totality of the evidence known to the officers before Dwan 
opened the cigarette box, the evidence still falls short of 
probable cause.  There inevitably is a narrow line separating 
reasonable suspicion from probable cause, but in this "silent 
movie," where the observing police officer saw four people in a 
huddle but did not see the defendant himself (or anyone) 
actually make an exchange, the inference of an actual 
14 
 
distribution of a controlled substance involving the defendant 
falls on the reasonable suspicion side of that line.5 
 
Therefore, we conclude that there was no probable cause to 
make an arrest when the cigarette box was opened, and that the 
opening of that box cannot be justified as a search incident to 
arrest.  Because the seizure of the plastic bag containing 
cocaine and the cash found during the search of the defendant 
was a fruit of the illegal search of the cigarette box, the 
cocaine and the cash should have been suppressed.  Where the 
prosecution's case rested primarily on the defendant's 
possession of these items, the admission of the cocaine and cash 
was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  The defendant's 
conviction must therefore be vacated and a new trial ordered. 
 
Because we vacate the conviction and doubt that the 
Commonwealth realistically can retry the case without the 
suppressed cocaine, we do not reach the issue regarding the 
legality of the defendant's sentence.  Nor need we reach the 
                     
5 We recognize that probable cause is an objective test, and 
does not depend on whether the officers subjectively believed 
there was probable cause, see Commonwealth v. Franco, 419 Mass. 
635, 639 (1995), citing Commonwealth v. Hason, 387 Mass. 169, 
175 (1982), but we note that Dwan, an experienced sergeant 
detective who had been in the drug control unit for nine years 
before this incident, did not arrest the defendant after he lied 
about his whereabouts.  Instead, Dwan placed the defendant under 
arrest only when Dwan saw the cocaine residue on the digital 
scale inside the cigarette box and even then arrested the 
defendant for possession of the cocaine residue, not for 
whatever happened during the "huddle" a few minutes earlier. 
15 
 
issue whether a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice 
arose from statements made by the prosecutor and some of the 
Commonwealth's witnesses that suggested that the defendant was 
known to be a drug dealer. 
 
Conclusion.  Because the defendant's motion to suppress 
should have been allowed, and the admission of the evidence that 
should have been suppressed was not harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt, we vacate the defendant's conviction and remand the case 
to the Superior Court to allow the Commonwealth the opportunity 
to decide whether it will enter a nolle prosequi or proceed with 
a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.