Title: Brookwood Presbyterian Church v. Ohio Dept. of Edn.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Brookwood Presbyterian Church v. Ohio Dept. of Edn., Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-5710.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-5710 
BROOKWOOD PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, APPELLANT, v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF 
EDUCATION, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Brookwood Presbyterian Church v. Ohio Dept. of Edn.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-5710.] 
Charter schools — Eligibility for sponsorship — R.C. 3314.015(B)(3) and (D) 
and 3314.02(C)(1)(f) — Determination that entity is not education-
oriented is appealable. 
(No. 2009-1926 — Submitted June 9, 2010 — Decided November 30, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 
No. 09AP-303, 2009-Ohio-4645. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶ 1} The issue before us is whether a determination by the Ohio 
Department of Education pursuant to R.C. 3314.015(B)(3) that an entity is not 
education-oriented, and thus is ineligible for sponsorship of community schools, 
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2 
 
is appealable in accordance with R.C. 119.12.  We hold that R.C. 3314.015(D) 
grants such a right to review. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
{¶ 2} In November 2007, appellant, Brookwood Presbyterian Church 
(“Brookwood”), submitted an application to appellee, Ohio Department of 
Education (“ODE”), to sponsor community schools in Ohio.  Brookwood sought 
approval as a sponsor pursuant to R.C.  3314.02(C)(1)(f), which allows 
“education-oriented,” tax-exempt entities under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code to sponsor community schools.  Brookwood submitted information 
regarding both itself and its parent organization, the national Presbyterian Church 
USA.  In March 2008, ODE determined that Brookwood is not eligible to sponsor 
community schools, concluding that it is not an “education-oriented” entity as 
required by R.C. 3314.02(C)(1)(f).  Brookwood sought reconsideration of its 
eligibility to sponsor a community school, and on May 9, 2008, ODE again issued 
its determination that Brookwood was not eligible.  ODE stated, “Despite the 
contributions of the Presbyterian Church USA, in your original application and in 
the recently supplied supporting documentation, Brookwood Presbyterian Church 
is the legal entity making application for sponsorship; not the Presbyterian Church 
USA, nor any of the colleges associated with it.  The 501 c (3) [sic] 
documentation is for the national Presbyterian Church.  Thus the national 
Presbyterian Church should be the applicant, not Brookwood Presbyterian 
Church.  The national Presbyterian Church is clearly organized for religious 
purposes.  Brookwood Presbyterian Church, however, is the named applicant 
indicated in the original sponsorship application and supported by conversations 
with John Taracko and others in our office.  Neither the national Presbyterian 
Church nor Brookwood Presbyterian Church is eligible to apply to become a 
sponsor.  Also please know that no church has been approved as a sponsor.”  
(Emphasis sic.)  
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
{¶ 3} Pursuant to R.C. 119.12, Brookwood filed an administrative appeal 
in the Franklin County Common Pleas Court.  ODE filed a motion to dismiss the 
appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.  The common pleas court granted 
ODE’s motion to dismiss and dismissed the appeal for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction. 
{¶ 4} Brookwood appealed to the Tenth District Court of Appeals.  On 
September 8, 2009, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the common 
pleas court.  The court of appeals held that although R.C. 3314.015(D) states that 
ODE decisions disapproving an entity for sponsorship of a community school are 
appealable under R.C. 119.12, a more specific statute, R.C. 3314.015(B)(3), 
provides that ODE’s determination that an entity is not education-oriented is 
“final.”  The court concluded that the ODE’s determination was thus not subject 
to appeal.  2009-Ohio-4645, ¶ 9-10. 
{¶ 5} The cause is before this court upon the acceptance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
Law and Analysis 
{¶ 6} R.C. 3301.13 states the general rule that the ODE “[i]n the exercise 
of any of its functions or powers * * * shall be subject to Chapter 119. of the 
Revised Code.”  One of the statutory functions of ODE is to approve entities to be 
sponsors of community schools.  R.C. 3314.015(A)(2).  R.C. 3314.02(C)(1) sets 
forth six categories of entities that may become community-school sponsors, and 
R.C. 3314.02(C)(1)(f) makes eligible for sponsorship any qualified tax-exempt 
entity under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code that (i) has been in 
operation for at least five years prior to applying to be a community-school 
sponsor, (ii) has assets of at least $500,000 and a demonstrated record of financial 
responsibility, (iii) has been determined by ODE to be an education-oriented 
entity under R.C. 3314.015(B)(3) and has a demonstrated record of successful 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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implementation of educational programs, and (iv) is not a community school.  
R.C. 3114.02(C)(1)(f). 
{¶ 7} Pursuant to R.C. 3314.015(B)(3), it is up to the ODE to determine, 
pursuant to criteria adopted by rule, whether the tax-exempt entity applying for 
sponsorship is education-oriented.  R.C. 3314.015(B)(3) further provides, “Such 
determination of the department is final.” 
{¶ 8} ODE found that Brookwood is not an education-oriented entity as 
required under R.C. 3314.02(C)(1)(f)(iii) and denied its application for 
sponsorship.  Brookwood seeks to appeal ODE’s determination pursuant to R.C. 
3314.015(D).  R.C. 3314.015(D) grants a right of appeal to entities disapproved 
for community-school sponsorship: “The decision of the department to 
disapprove an entity for sponsorship of a community school or to revoke approval 
for such sponsorship * * * may be appealed by the entity in accordance with 
section 119.12 of the Revised Code.” 
{¶ 9} The crux of this case is the interplay between R.C. 3314.015(B)(3) 
and 3314.015(D).  R.C. 3314.015(D) grants a right of appeal to entities 
disapproved for community-school sponsorship; the question is whether R.C. 
3314.015(B)(3) takes it away in certain circumstances.  ODE asserts that its 
determination that Brookwood is not education-oriented is final and therefore not 
subject to appeal based upon R.C. 3314.015(B)(3). 
{¶ 10} R.C. 1.51 provides the guiding principle in determining the 
interaction between statutes: “If a general provision conflicts with a special or 
local provision, they shall be construed, if possible, so that effect is given to 
both.”  We should not, however, seek out a conflict where none exists. 
{¶ 11} Whether R.C. 3314.015(D) and 3314.015(B)(3) conflict depends 
upon the meaning of “final” in regard to the board of education’s determination of 
whether an entity is education-oriented under R.C. 3314.015(B)(3).  Does “final” 
mean that the administrative process is complete and the matter is ripe for appeal 
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
to the common pleas court, or does “final” mean that the unsuccessful, would-be 
sponsoring entity is consigned to an administrative abyss?  We hold that R.C. 
3314.015(B)(3) establishes that a determination that an entity is not education-
oriented is a “decision of the department to disapprove an entity for sponsorship 
of a community school” under R.C. 3314.015(D) and therefore “may be appealed 
by the entity in accordance with section 119.12 of the Revised Code.” 
{¶ 12} R.C. 3314.015(D) grants the right to an R.C. 119.12 appeal to any 
entity disapproved for sponsorship.  R.C. 3314.015(B)(3) would conflict with 
R.C. 3314.015(D) if it stated that the department’s determination whether an 
entity is education-oriented was “not appealable.”  It does not – it merely says that 
the determination is “final.”  We can look to our own jurisprudence and the Ohio 
Constitution to determine the legal significance of the word “final.”  In Walburn 
v. Dunlap, 121 Ohio St.3d 373, 2009-Ohio-1221, 904 N.E.2d 863, at ¶ 13, this 
court explained, “ ‘It is well-established that an order must be final before it can 
be reviewed by an appellate court.  If an order is not final, then an appellate court 
has no jurisdiction.’ Gen. Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am. [1989], 44 Ohio St.3d 
[17] 20, 540 N.E.2d 266.”  Section 3(B)(2), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution 
grants courts of appeals appellate jurisdiction “as may be provided by law to 
review and affirm, modify, or reverse final orders or actions of administrative 
officers or agencies.” (Emphasis added.)  Thus, in our system of law, “final” can 
mean the opposite of “not appealable.” 
{¶ 13} Had the General Assembly intended that the department's 
determination of whether an entity is education-oriented not be subject to 
administrative appeal, it could have done so by appropriate language, i.e., by 
specifying that the department's decision is final and not subject to appeal.  See 
Riedel v. Consol. Rail Corp., 125 Ohio St.3d 358, 2010-Ohio-1926, 928 N.E.2d 
448, ¶ 9 (General Assembly would have used specific language if it had intended 
R.C. 2307.93(C) to administratively dismiss an entire tort action instead of simply 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
a claim).  In fact, the General Assembly has employed this language carefully to 
specify when certain final actions are not appealable.  See R.C. 2712.21 (decision 
by common pleas court regarding appointment of arbitrator “is final and not 
subject to appeal”), 3318.051(E) (decision of School Facilities Commission to 
approve or not approve transfer of money under section “is final and not subject 
to appeal”), and 5126.0214 (decision of director of developmental disabilities 
whether to waive removal requirement “is final and not subject to appeal”).  The 
statute at issue here includes no comparable prohibition against appealability. 
{¶ 14} The appellee points to appellate court decisions holding that a 
statute’s characterization of an administrative body’s holding as final precludes 
review through an R.C. 119.12 appeal.  E.g., Carney v. School Emps. Retirement 
Sys. Bd. (1987), 39 Ohio App.3d 71, 528 N.E.2d 1322 (holding that a statute 
precluded an administrative appeal from a decision of the School Employees 
Retirement System’s board because the decision was final according to statute); 
State ex rel. Shumway v. Ohio State Teachers Retirement Bd. (1996), 114 Ohio 
App.3d 280, 284, 683 N.E.2d 70, fn. 1 (holding that a statute precluded an 
administrative appeal from a decision of the State Teachers Retirement System 
board because the statute provided, “Any determination of the board under this 
division shall be final”); Heartland Jockey Club, Ltd. v. Ohio State Racing Comm. 
(Aug. 3, 1999), 10th Dist. No. 98AP-1465, 1999 WL 566857 (holding that a 
statute that provides that a decision of the State Racing Commission is “final” is 
not subject to appeal through R.C. 119.12). 
{¶ 15} The cases cited by ODE are inapposite.  In those cases, the statutes 
lacked what is present in this case – a specific, statutory grant of jurisdiction to 
the trial court to review the decisions of the administrative body pursuant to R.C. 
119.12.  Here, that makes all the difference. 
{¶ 16} Why did the General Assembly term the ODE’s determination of 
whether an entity is education-oriented “final”?  Ours is not to question why.  But 
January Term, 2010 
7 
 
of the four requirements set forth in R.C. 3314.02(C)(1)(f) for a tax-exempt entity 
to qualify as a community-school sponsor, the board’s determination of the other 
three qualifiers is mechanical: whether the entity “has been in operation for at 
least five years prior to applying to be a community school sponsor,” R.C. 
3314.02(C)(1)(f)(i); whether the entity “has assets of at least five hundred 
thousand dollars and a demonstrated record of financial responsibility,” R.C. 
3314.02(C)(1)(f)(ii); and whether the entity “is not a community school,” R.C. 
3314.02(C)(1)(f)(iv).  Those factors are black-and-white.  Only the “education-
oriented” factor requires a nuanced approach requiring a subjective and 
substantive judgment of the board.  It is a determination different in character 
from the other R.C. 3314.02(C)(1)(f) factors.  And by calling that determination 
“final” but not calling it “not subject to appeal,” the General Assembly has 
concluded that that judgment is susceptible of review pursuant to R.C. 119.12. 
{¶ 17} The ODE asserts that there is a two-tiered process for approving 
community-school sponsors, a preliminary judgment of eligibility followed by an 
application review.  The ODE argues that the application process is open only to 
an “eligible entity” and that its R.C. 3314.015(B)(3) “education-oriented” 
determination is part of determining eligibility to apply for sponsorship.  The 
ODE further argues that the R.C. 3314.015(D) right to appeal is granted only to 
“eligible entities” disapproved for sponsorship.  However, the statutes at issue set 
up no such two-tiered process and do not use the term “eligible entity.”  Although 
the Administrative Code at times uses the term “eligible entity,” it does not use 
that term in describing the right to appeal.  Ohio Adm.Code 3301-102-03(G) uses 
the language of the statute, referring to the right to appeal of “an entity,” not “an 
eligible entity”:  
{¶ 18} “The decision of the department to disapprove an entity for 
sponsorship of a community school may be appealed by the entity in accordance 
with section 119.12 of the Revised Code.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 19} Thus, even if the ODE employs a two-tiered approval process for 
community-school sponsorship, the right to appeal applies to an entity 
disapproved at either tier. 
{¶ 20} The determination of whether an entity is education-oriented is 
substantive and important.  R.C. 3314.015(B)(3) and 3314.015(D) should be 
construed so as not to conflict, allowing an entity to appeal the board’s R.C. 
3314.02(C)(1)(f)(iii) determination.  The board’s power to determine whether an 
entity is education-oriented is no trifle, and the grant of a right to appeal in R.C. 
3314.015(D) is a check on that power. 
{¶ 21} Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and 
remand the cause to the trial court. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, and LANZINGER, JJ., 
concur. 
BROWN, C.J., and CUPP, J., dissent. 
__________________ 
BROWN, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶ 22} At the heart of this matter is the meaning of the word “final” in 
R.C. 3314.015(B)(3).  The majority has decided that use of the single word 
“final” means final and appealable.  Because I believe that the correct 
interpretation of “final” as used in R.C. 3314.015(B)(3) is that the determination 
of the Ohio Department of Education (“ODE”) whether an entity is education-
oriented is not subject to appeal under R.C. 119.12, I respectfully dissent. 
{¶ 23} The primary assumption for the majority’s interpretation is that the 
General Assembly used the word “final” as a legal term of art to mean a judgment 
or order that is subject to appellate review.  The majority further assumes that the 
General Assembly would have stated explicitly that determinations of education-
January Term, 2010 
9 
 
oriented status are “final and not subject to appeal” if it had intended for there to 
be no appeal right under R.C. 3314.015(B)(3), particularly given that R.C. 
3314.015(D) grants a general appeal right for ODE denials of applications to 
sponsor community schools.  The majority cites several statutory provisions in 
which the General Assembly has provided explicitly that a decision is “final and 
not subject to appeal.”  See R.C. 2712.21, 3318.051(E), and 5126.0214. 
{¶ 24} The majority’s assumptions are not borne out by other provisions 
of the Revised Code.  If the General Assembly so clearly intended for the use of 
“final” in R.C. 3314.015(B)(3) to mean final and appealable without actually 
using those words, why is the Revised Code replete with instances in which the 
General Assembly explicitly says both when it intends a decision to be reviewable 
on appeal?  See R.C. 3769.0810(I) (decision by the State Racing Commission to 
impose certain assessments is “final, subject to appeal under section 119.12 of the 
Revised Code”), 3905.14(G) (decision by the superintendent of insurance to issue 
a cease-and-desist order is final, and “[t]he final order may be appealed”),  
3905.50(F) (“All final orders and decisions of the superintendent [of insurance] 
are subject to judicial review”), 4141.26(F) (“The validity of any general order or 
rule of the director [of job and family services] * * * or of any final order or 
action of the unemployment compensation review commission respecting any 
such general order or rule may be determined by the court of common pleas of 
Franklin county”), 4517.58 (decision of the Motor Vehicle Dealers Board is “final 
* * * except that any person adversely affected by the decision may appeal in the 
manner provided by sections 119.01 to 119.13 of the Revised Code”), 4731.23(E) 
(decision of the State Medical Board is “final * * * except that the certificate 
holder may appeal in the manner provided by Chapter 119. of the Revised 
Code”), 4763.11(F) (decision of Real Estate Appraiser Board “is final, subject to 
review in the manner provided for in Chapter 119. of the Revised Code and 
appeal to any court of common pleas”), and 5709.22(B) (“The final determination 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
[by the tax commissioner] is subject to appeal”); see also R.C. 5703.70(C)(3), 
5711.31, and 5727.47(E). Would it not have been sufficient under the majority’s 
interpretation for the General Assembly to provide simply that decisions under 
these statutes are final?   
{¶ 25} And what is this court to make of the host of other instances in 
which the General Assembly has simply provided that a decision of an 
administrative agency or other individual or entity is “final”?  See R.C. 
122.30(C)(1)(2), 122.42(A)(2), 122.74(A)(2), 124.03(A)(1), 145.01(R)(3), 
173.19(F), 742.01(L)(3), 1513.05, 1515.02, 3302.10(J), 3306.34(I), 3307.01(B), 
3307.74(E), 3309.01(A) and (B), 3309.31(E), 3311.06(G), 3314.08(O)(2)(d), 
3769.02, 3769.089, 5126.281(A)(3), and 5505.01(S)(3). Did the General 
Assembly intend for all of these decisions to be final orders subject to review on 
appeal even where the statutes make no mention of an appeal right?    
{¶ 26} The lesson gained from a review of the varying uses of the word 
“final” throughout the Revised Code is that the word is susceptible of more than 
one meaning.  Where statutory language is susceptible of more than one meaning, 
the rules of statutory interpretation must be applied to determine the true intent of 
the legislature.  Wingate v. Hordge (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 55, 58, 14 O.O.3d 212, 
396 N.E.2d 770.  A guiding principle of statutory interpretation is that the statute 
must be construed as a whole and each of its parts must be given effect so that 
they are compatible with each other and related enactments.  Humphrys v. Winous 
Co. (1956), 165 Ohio St. 45, 49, 59 O.O. 65, 133 N.E.2d 780. 
{¶ 27} By interpreting the statutory scheme as establishing a two-stage 
process for the review of applications to sponsor community schools, R.C. 
3314.015(B)(3) can be construed in a way that gives each part of the statute effect 
and renders the statute compatible with the other statutes governing these 
sponsorship applications.  R.C. 3314.02(C)(1) allows only six categories of 
entities to sponsor community schools.  Therefore, ODE must make a preliminary 
January Term, 2010 
11 
 
determination regarding whether an entity falls within one of these categories and 
is eligible to become a sponsor of a community school.  ODE’s administrative 
regulations specifically define an entity that falls within one of the categories 
enumerated in R.C. 3314.02(C)(1) as an “eligible entity.”  Ohio Adm.Code 3301-
102-02(H).  For an entity claiming eligibility under R.C. 3314.02(C)(1)(f), this 
preliminary determination of eligibility includes a determination, within the 
discretion of ODE, whether the entity is education-oriented.  R.C. 
3314.02(C)(1)(f)(iii) and 3314.015(B)(3). 
{¶ 28} Once there has been a preliminary determination that an entity is 
an eligible entity, ODE must review the application in light of its rules regarding 
the criteria, procedures, and deadlines for processing applications to become a 
sponsor of a community school.  Ohio Adm.Code 3301-102-03.  A decision 
disapproving an application from an entity listed in R.C. 3314.02(C)(1) is subject 
to appeal pursuant to R.C. 119.12.  R.C. 3314.015(D); see also Ohio Adm.Code 
3301-102-03(G). 
{¶ 29} Most of the determinations regarding eligibility under R.C. 
3314.02(C)(1) are mechanical and involve no exercise of discretion by ODE.  
Certainly, an ODE determination that an applying entity fails to satisfy one of 
these mechanical criteria would result in the end of consideration of that entity’s 
application for community-school sponsorship, yet no one could reasonably 
suggest that such a determination is based upon the merits of the application or 
that such a determination is entitled to appellate review. 
{¶ 30} A finding that an entity is education-oriented admittedly is 
different from most of the other preliminary eligibility requirements.1  It contains 
                                          
 
1.  R.C. 3314.02(C)(1)(e) provides that a community school may be sponsored by a designee of 
the board of trustees of any of the 13 state universities or the board of trustees itself as long as a 
mission of the proposed school will be “the practical demonstration of teaching methods, 
educational technology, or other teaching practices that are included in the curriculum of the 
university's teacher preparation program approved by the state board of education.”  R.C. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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a subjective component and requires exercise of discretion by ODE.  But this 
determination is no more on the merits of the application than any other 
determination made by ODE under R.C. 3314.02(C)(1).  It is also the only one of 
the criteria under subsection (C)(1)(f) that the General Assembly found necessary 
to designate as “final.”  This language suggests that the General Assembly 
recognized the potential for attempted litigation on this issue, but intended to 
foreclose such litigation because it is not a decision on the merits of the 
application that would be subject to appeal in accordance with R.C. 3314.015(D). 
{¶ 31} Viewing the ODE’s review of a community-school sponsorship 
application under R.C. 3314.015 as a two-stage process is further supported by 
the last sentence of R.C. 3314.02(C)(1), which permits any entity that falls within 
one of the six enumerated categories to enter into preliminary agreements with 
any person or group of individuals proposing to establish a new community 
school to finalize plans for the school, to establish a governing authority for the 
school, and to negotiate contracts.  R.C. 3314.02(C)(2).  The ability of an eligible 
entity to enter into preliminary agreements prior to a final decision on the merits 
of its application to sponsor a community school presumes that there has been a 
threshold determination by ODE that an entity falls within one of the R.C. 
3314.02(C)(1) categories. 
{¶ 32} The majority’s interpretation renders superfluous the language in 
R.C. 3314.015(B)(3) that “[s]uch determination of the department is final.”  If, as 
the majority contends, a determination that an entity is not education-oriented is a 
disapproval of the entity for sponsorship of a community school under R.C. 
3314.015(D), why did the General Assembly specifically include language in 
                                                                                                                   
3314.015(B)(2) provides that ODE shall determine, pursuant to criteria adopted by administrative 
rule, “whether the mission proposed to be specified in the contract of a community school to be 
sponsored by a state university board of trustees or the board's designee under division (C)(1)(e) of 
section 3314.02 of the Revised Code complies with the requirements of that division.” Like a 
determination that an entity is education-oriented, a determination that the mission complies with 
R.C. 3314.02(C)(1)(e) is final. 
January Term, 2010 
13 
 
R.C. 3314.015(B)(3) that determinations that an entity is education-oriented are 
final?  Why is a determination regarding whether an entity is education-oriented 
singled out in the statute? 
{¶ 33} The majority claims that it is not our place to question why the 
General Assembly chose to treat determinations of education-oriented status 
differently from all other ODE decisions under R.C. 3314.02 and 3314.015.  It is 
precisely our place to do so.  It is this court’s role to interpret Ohio statutes.  That 
interpretation can be aided by ascertaining the intent of the legislature where the 
statutory language is susceptible of more than one meaning.  In ascertaining 
legislative intent, this court must presume that the language employed was 
deliberate and meaningful. 
{¶ 34} R.C. 3314.015(D) generally grants a right to appeal ODE decisions 
disapproving an entity for sponsorship of a community school.  But R.C. 
3314.015(B)(2) and (3) designate as final two types of decisions by ODE: the 
approval of the mission of schools sponsored by state universities and the 
determination of whether an entity is education-oriented. By specifying only those 
determinations as final, the General Assembly clearly intended to convey that 
these subjective decisions should be treated differently than other subjective 
decisions made by ODE regarding community-school sponsorship.  The only 
reasonable explanation for this different treatment of these determinations is that 
the General Assembly intended to provide exceptions to the general appeal right 
granted in R.C. 3314.015(D) for certain decisions requiring ODE’s exercise of 
discretion. 
{¶ 35} Additionally, the majority’s rejection of the two-stage application 
process yields strange results.  The majority concludes that a decision finding that 
an entity is not an entity specified in R.C. 3314.02(C)(1) is a decision 
disapproving the entity for sponsorship of a community school, which would be 
appealable under R.C. 3314.015(D).  Yet the majority also appears to conclude 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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that an ODE determination that an entity does not fall within the group of entities 
set forth in R.C. 3314.02(C)(1) for any reason other than that the entity is not 
education-oriented under R.C. 3314.02(C)(1)(f)(iii) is not subject to appeal under 
R.C. 3314.015(D).  The majority has to read language into R.C. 3314.02(C)(1)(a) 
through (e) and (f)(i), (ii), and (iv) to render these determinations not subject to 
appeal under R.C. 3314.015(D) in order to justify its conclusion that an ODE 
determination that an entity is not education-oriented is a decision disapproving 
the entity for sponsorship of a community school. 
{¶ 36} Based on the language of R.C. 3314.015 in its entirety and the 
other statutory provisions regarding community schools, I believe that the General 
Assembly intended for ODE’s determination regarding whether an entity is 
education-oriented not to be subject to review under R.C. 119.12.  It is clear to me 
that the majority believes that an ODE determination that an entity is not 
education-oriented ought to be subject to review on appeal and not consigned to 
what it perceives to be “an administrative abyss.”  Perhaps this would be the wiser 
course.  But the General Assembly has given us a statute that cannot be read 
reasonably to permit this outcome without reading significant additional language 
into the statutory scheme and rendering portions of the scheme ineffective or 
redundant.  It is not our place to substitute our views about how the process of 
applying for community-school sponsorship ought to work for the procedure set 
forth by the General Assembly.  Accordingly, I dissent. 
__________________ 
 
CUPP, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 37} A plain and fair reading of the statute in question, I believe, is that 
the decision of the Ohio Department of Education (“ODE”) regarding whether the 
applicant, Brookwood Presbyterian Church (“Brookwood”), is an education-
oriented entity is final, in the plain and ordinary sense of the word “final,” as that 
word is used in R.C. 3314.015(B)(3).  “Final” in this context means “leaving no 
January Term, 2010 
15 
 
further chance for action, discussion, or change; deciding; conclusive [a final 
decree].”  (Emphasis sic.)  Webster’s New World Dictionary, Third College 
Edition (1988) 506.  Contrary to the interpretation of the majority, the legislature 
has clearly expressed its intent that the decision of ODE on this issue may not be 
appealed.  I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
{¶ 38} My conclusion is not based upon any public-policy considerations, 
which are not within the province of the courts when the intent of the legislature 
is clear.  It is not for us to decide whether the General Assembly has made a wise 
policy choice or an undesirable policy choice in entrusting this determination to 
ODE. 
{¶ 39} I generally agree with most of Chief Justice Brown’s analysis, but I 
would note also that appellant Brookwood, while not granted a statutory right of 
appeal, is not without a remedy.  An action in mandamus is available when a 
statute makes an agency’s decision, such as the one here, “final” in that it may not 
be appealed through the usual appeals process.  See, e.g., Ohio Academy of 
Nursing Homes v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 114 Ohio St.3d 14, 2007-
Ohio-2620, 867 N.E.2d 400, ¶ 26 (“courts have determined that a writ of 
mandamus provides an appropriate balance between the extreme of allowing no 
challenge at all and the other alternative of completely ignoring the explicit 
directive that an agency’s particular determination is not meant to be 
appealable”). 
{¶ 40} In fact, appellant has filed an action in mandamus with this court to 
challenge ODE’s decision.  The mandamus action has been stayed pending the 
resolution of this case.  Case No. 2009-2055, State ex rel. Brookwood 
Presbyterian Church v. Ohio Dept. of Edn., motion for stay granted, 124 Ohio 
St.3d 1479, 2010-Ohio-430, 921 N.E.2d 249.  Appellant alleges in the complaint 
in that case that it has operated an educational program since 2002 to provide 
services to special-needs students who are not adequately served in traditional 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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education programs and that students are referred to appellant’s program by area 
schools, public community schools, juvenile court personnel, counseling services, 
and parents.  Based on these allegations, appellant’s mandamus action may well 
have merit.  But that action in mandamus is the proper manner in which to address 
this issue—not this appeal. 
{¶ 41} Consequently, while I would hold that appellant does not have a 
right of appeal due to the specific requirement of R.C. 3314.015(B)(3), I would 
simultaneously lift this court’s stay of the presentation of evidence and the 
briefing of appellant’s mandamus action, and proceed to a resolution of case No. 
2009-2055.  Because the majority decides otherwise, I must respectfully dissent. 
__________________ 
Buckley King, L.P.A., Donell Grubbs, and James S. Callender Jr., for 
appellant. 
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Solicitor General, 
Elisabeth A. Long, Deputy Solicitor, and Mia Meucci, Assistant Solicitor, for 
appellee. 
______________________