Title: State ex rel. Lange v. Indus. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Lange v. Indus. Comm., 111 Ohio St.3d 563, 2006-Ohio-6211.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. LANGE, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO 
ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Lange v. Indus. Comm., 111 Ohio St.3d 563, 2006-Ohio-
6211.] 
Workers’ compensation — Safety regulation for machines that are shut down 
does not apply to machine that must be turned on while workers make 
adjustments to it — Judgment denying writ of mandamus to compel 
Industrial Commission to allow claim affirmed. 
(No. 2005-2135 — Submitted September 19, 2006 — Decided December 13, 
2006.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,  
No. 04AP-1330, 2005-Ohio-5487. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} In this workers’ compensation case, an employee who was injured 
on the job alleges that his employer violated a specific safety rule adopted by the 
Administrator of Workers’ Compensation.  The Industrial Commission denied the 
employee’s claim, and the Tenth District Court of Appeals later denied the 
employee’s request for a writ of mandamus that would have directed the 
commission to reach a different outcome.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm 
the Tenth District’s judgment denying the writ. 
{¶ 2} The appellant is George Lange, who worked as a die setter at a 
General Motors assembly plant in Trumbull County.  (A die setter is a skilled 
worker who positions and adjusts cutting or stamping machinery.)  Lange was 
injured on the job in January 2002 when a metal-forming press closed on his left 
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hand during a die-changing procedure.  He received workers’ compensation 
benefits for his injuries. 
{¶ 3} Lange then sought additional compensation from the bureau, 
alleging – in accordance with Section 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution and 
R.C. 4121.47 – that his employer, General Motors, had committed a violation of a 
specific safety rule (“VSSR”).  The rule1 that Lange contended had been violated 
by his employer was Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-05: 
{¶ 4} “(D) Machinery control. 
{¶ 5} “* * * 
{¶ 6} “(2) When machines are shut down. 
{¶ 7} “The employer shall furnish and the employees shall use a device 
to lock the controls in the ‘off’ position or the employer shall furnish and the 
employees shall use warning tags when machines are shut down for repair, 
adjusting, or cleaning.” 
{¶ 8} A staff hearing officer at the Industrial Commission concluded, 
however, that the rule did not apply because Lange did not prove that the machine 
was shut down for repair, adjusting, or cleaning when the injury occurred.  The 
safety rule applies, by its own terms, only when a machine is shut down, and, 
according to the staff hearing officer’s decision, the press in question “was in 
operation at the time of the injury.” 
{¶ 9} That finding by the staff hearing officer was based on several 
sworn statements in the record.  One of those statements was Lange’s own 
affidavit, in which he explained that the die-changing procedure that he and his 
co-workers were performing at the time of his injury cannot be accomplished if 
the press is locked in the off position.  Instead, according to Lange’s affidavit, the 
                                                 
1 The regulation is now codified at Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-05(D)(2).  
January Term, 2006 
3 
ram must be raised and lowered to complete the die-changing process, and 
Lange’s injury occurred during one of those cycles. 
{¶ 10} Lange’s co-worker, who cycled the press during the die-changing 
procedure, likewise explained in an affidavit that he “activate[d] the press” when 
he “got the indication from the die truck driver that the die was in place.”  That 
step of “bring[ing] the press down on top of the die” is performed, the co-worker 
explained, “so that the top portion of the die can be clamped onto the press.” 
{¶ 11} Citing this testimony, the Industrial Commission’s staff hearing 
officer found that the press “was in operation because the die was being changed, 
and the press cannot be completely shut down while the die is being changed.”  
Therefore the safety rule then codified at Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-05(D)(2) did 
not apply, the hearing officer found, because that rule covers situations in which 
machines are shut down for repair, adjusting, or cleaning.  Finding the rule 
inapplicable to the situation that resulted in Lange’s injury, the hearing officer 
denied the VSSR claim. 
{¶ 12} Lange then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in December 
2004 in the Court of Appeals for Franklin County.  The court of appeals denied 
relief, however, finding that “the machine at issue here was kept running when 
relator and other employees were in the process of changing dies.”  “Therefore,” 
the court of appeals explained, “the machine here was not shut down and Ohio 
Adm.Code 4121:1-5-05(D)(2) is inapplicable.” 
{¶ 13} Lange has now filed an appeal as of right. 
{¶ 14} In order to be entitled to an additional workers’ compensation 
award for a VSSR, “the claimant must establish that an applicable and specific 
safety requirement existed at the relevant time, that the employer failed to comply 
with the requirement, and that the employer’s noncompliance was a cause of the 
injury.”  State ex rel. Supreme Bumpers, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 98 Ohio St.3d 134, 
2002-Ohio-7089, 781 N.E.2d 170, ¶ 46.  “VSSRs are factual questions to be 
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determined exclusively by the commission.”  State ex rel. Parks v. Indus. Comm. 
(1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 22, 27, 706 N.E.2d 774. 
{¶ 15} In this case, the Industrial Commission and the court of appeals 
both found that the safety requirement identified by appellant Lange – Ohio 
Adm.Code 4121:1-5-05(D)(2) – did not apply to the situation that resulted in his 
injury.  The rule requires employers to take certain steps when machines are shut 
down, and the machine that injured Lange was not, according to the Industrial 
Commission, shut down. 
{¶ 16} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, Lange had to show that the 
commission abused its discretion.  State ex rel. Mees v. Indus. Comm. (1972), 29 
Ohio St.2d 128, 130, 58 O.O.2d 319, 279 N.E.2d 861.  “When the record contains 
some evidence to support the commission’s factual findings, a court may not 
disturb the commission’s findings in mandamus.”  State ex rel. Mahoney v. Team 
Am. 3, Inc., 99 Ohio St.3d 532, 2003-Ohio-4830, 795 N.E.2d 628, ¶ 13. 
{¶ 17} The record in this case provides some evidence to support the 
commission’s finding that the machine in question was not shut down.  Both 
Lange and one of his co-workers explained in affidavits that the machine must be 
turned on and the ram must be raised and lowered during the die-changing 
process that the workers were performing at the time of Lange’s injury.  In light 
of that evidence, the commission did not abuse its discretion and the court of 
appeals properly denied mandamus relief. 
{¶ 18} To be sure, Lange argues that this case turns on the proper 
interpretation of the words “shut down” in the regulation rather than a factual 
dispute about whether the machine was on or off.  Yet “the interpretation of a 
specific safety requirement is within the commission’s sound discretion.”  State ex 
rel. Arce v. Indus. Comm., 105 Ohio St.3d 90, 2005-Ohio-572, 822 N.E.2d 795, ¶ 
19.  The commission’s interpretation of the words in a safety rule is reviewed 
January Term, 2006 
5 
under an abuse-of-discretion standard.  State ex rel. Edwards v. Indus. Comm. 
(2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 422, 423, 751 N.E.2d 468. 
{¶ 19} The commission did not abuse its discretion when it found that a 
safety regulation for machines that are “shut down” does not apply to a machine 
that must be turned on while workers make adjustments to it.  The commission’s 
interpretation is consistent with the oft stated principle that “all reasonable doubts 
concerning the interpretation of the specific safety requirement must be construed 
against its applicability to the employer.”  State ex rel. Arce v. Indus. Comm., 105 
Ohio St.3d 90, 2005-Ohio-572, 822 N.E.2d 795, ¶ 19.  See, also, State ex rel. 
Sanor Sawmill, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 101 Ohio St.3d 199, 2004-Ohio-718, 803 
N.E.2d 802, ¶ 14. 
{¶ 20} Indeed, this court has already accepted the commission’s view that 
this safety rule does not apply when a machine must be kept running while it is 
being cleaned, adjusted, or repaired.  See State ex rel. Harris v. Indus. Comm. 
(1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 152, 154, 12 OBR 223, 465 N.E.2d 1286 (“It was 
reasonable for the commission to hold that the rule does not apply when the 
machine is already running, because the fact of its running, itself, provides 
adequate warning”).  Based on that prior decision and the principle that “specific 
safety requirements must be strictly construed in the employer’s favor,” State ex 
rel. Lamp v. J.A. Croson Co. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 77, 78, 661 N.E.2d 724, the 
commission did not abuse its discretion when it found that Ohio Adm.Code 
4121:1-5-05(D)(2) did not apply to the facts presented by this case.  The rule was 
designed to protect workers when machines are shut down, and the commission 
reasonably concluded that a machine is not shut down when employees leave the 
machine turned on while making adjustments or repairs to it. 
{¶ 21} Perhaps additional safety measures could have been or should have 
been taken by General Motors or by Lange and his fellow employees to prevent 
the injury that he suffered.  The commission did not abuse its discretion, however, 
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when it found that the specific safety rule at issue does not apply to machines that 
are left running while being repaired, adjusted, or cleaned, and certainly some 
evidence supports the commission’s finding that this particular machine was not 
in fact shut down when Lange was hurt. 
{¶ 22} Because the Industrial Commission did not abuse its discretion 
when it denied Lange’s VSSR claim, we affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals denying mandamus relief. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Boyd, Rummell, Carach, Curry, Kaufmann & Bins-Castronovo Co., 
L.P.A., and Walter Kaufmann, for appellant. 
 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Derrick L. Knapp, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio. 
 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., and Kenneth A. Stump, for 
appellee General Motors Corporation. 
______________________