Title: Moustakis v. Wisconsin Department of Justice

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2016 WI 42 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2014AP1853 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Albert D. Moustakis, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
State of Wisconsin Department of Justice, 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
Steven M. Lucareli, 
          Intervenor. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 364 Wis. 2d 740, 869 N.W.2d 788) 
(Ct. App. 2015 – Published) 
PDC. No: 2015 WI App 63 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 20, 2016 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 4, 2016 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Lincoln 
 
JUDGE: 
Jay R. Tlusty 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
CONCURRED/DISSENTED:  
ROGGENSACK, C. J. concurs and dissents, joined 
by ZIEGLER, J. and GABLEMAN, J. 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Benjamin J. Krautkramer and Swid Law Offices, LLC, Mosinee, 
and oral argument by Scott A. Swid. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent, the cause was argued by Brian 
Keenan, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
Brad D. Schimel, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2016 WI 42
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2014AP1853 
(L.C. No. 
2014CV41) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Albert D. Moustakis, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
State of Wisconsin Department of Justice, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent, 
 
Steven M. Lucareli, 
 
          Intervenor. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 20, 2016 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals  Affirmed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals, Moustakis v. 
Wisconsin 
Department 
of 
Justice, 
2015 
WI 
App 
63, 
364 
Wis. 2d 740, 869 N.W.2d 788, affirming an order of the Circuit 
Court for Lincoln County, Jay R. Tlusty, Judge.   
¶2 
The circuit court dismissed an action brought by Vilas 
County District Attorney Albert Moustakis under Wis. Stat. 
No. 
2014AP1853   
 
2 
 
§ 19.356(4) 
(2013-14)1 
seeking 
to 
restrain 
the 
Wisconsin 
Department of Justice from releasing records pertaining to 
Moustakis in response to a public records request by The 
Lakeland Times, a newspaper located in Minocqua, Wisconsin.  The 
court of appeals affirmed the order of the circuit court.    
¶3 
This review raises a single question that was well-
stated by the court of appeals: Is a district attorney an 
"employee" as that term is used in Wis. Stat. § 19.356(2)(a)1. 
and defined in § 19.32(1bg) such that the district attorney may 
maintain an action for notice and pre-release judicial review of 
records under § 19.356(4)?2      
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 Moustakis v. Wis. DOJ, 2015 WI App 63, ¶11, 364 
Wis. 2d 740, 869 N.W.2d 788. 
The parties and the circuit court and court of appeals 
framed the issue presented as a question of standing, that is, 
does Moustakis have standing to bring his action?  Phrasing the 
issue as one of standing is asking, as we do, whether Moustakis 
falls within the ambit of the provisions of the public records 
law granting a record subject notice of the decision of an 
authority to provide a requester access to records and pre-
release judicial review of the decision to provide access.  See 
William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 Yale L.J. 
221, 236 (1988) ("'When a plaintiff seeks standing on the basis 
that an interest is protected by statute, the question whether 
that interest is legally protected for standing purposes is the 
same as the question whether plaintiff (assuming his or her 
factual allegations are true) has a claim on the merits.'") 
(quoting Stephen G. Breyer & Richard B. Stewart, Administrative 
Law and Regulatory Policy: Problems, Text, and Cases 1094 (2d 
ed. 1985) (footnote omitted)).    
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP1853   
 
3 
 
¶4 
To answer this question, we take the same approach as 
the court of appeals and the parties, namely, we analyze the 
interconnecting provisions of the public records law, Wis. Stat. 
§§ 19.21-.39, and apply them to the fact situation at hand.  The 
Wisconsin public records law is not always easy to read or 
decipher.  Multiple provisions of the public records law cross-
reference each other.  Nevertheless, by analyzing the public 
records law step by step, we can resolve the present case.  To 
enable easier reference to the text of the public records law as 
we discuss the cross-references, we have attached the text of 
the relevant statutes and constitutional provisions as Appendix 
A. 
¶5 
After analyzing the public records law and the 
parties' arguments, we conclude, as did the court of appeals, 
that a district attorney holds a state public office and is not 
an "employee" within the meaning of Wis. Stat. §§ 19.32(1bg) and 
19.356(2)(a)1.  Because the records at issue do not fall within 
                                                                                                                                                             
In other words, whether Moustakis fits within the group of 
individuals to whom the public records law grants notice and an 
opportunity for pre-release judicial review is a matter of 
statutory interpretation.  Standing and statutory interpretation 
are distinct and should not be conflated.  In the instant case, 
it is easier to frame the issue as a matter of statutory 
interpretation rather than as a matter of standing.  See 
Wisconsin's Envt'l Decade, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Wis., 69 
Wis. 2d 1, 11, 230 N.W.2d 243 (1975) (describing cases resolved 
"on the notion that the statute relied upon by the person 
seeking review did not give legal recognition to the interest 
asserted" as "rest[ing] upon statutory interpretation rather 
than the law of standing itself.").          
No. 
2014AP1853   
 
4 
 
the narrow exception to the general rule that a "record subject" 
is not entitled to notice or pre-release judicial review of the 
decision of an authority to provide access to records pertaining 
to that record subject, Moustakis may not maintain an action 
under Wis. Stat. § 19.356(4) to restrain the Department of 
Justice from providing The Lakeland Times access to the 
requested records. 
¶6 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals and the circuit court's order dismissing Moustakis's  
action under the Wisconsin public records law.     
¶7 
We remand the cause to the circuit court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion to consider Moustakis's 
amended complaint alleging two additional causes of action, the 
first seeking a writ of mandamus and the second asserting a 
challenge to the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 19.356.  The 
circuit court stayed proceedings on these two causes of action,3  
and these two causes of action are not at issue in this court.4  
I 
¶8 
For purposes of this review, the facts and procedural 
history are not in dispute.  
¶9 
In July 2013, The Lakeland Times sent a public records 
request to the Department of Justice regarding Moustakis.  The 
                                                 
3 This court granted Moustakis's petition for review but did 
not grant Moustakis's petition that the court accept an original 
action to decide the second and third causes of action.   
4 Moustakis, 364 Wis. 2d 740, ¶7 n.5. 
No. 
2014AP1853   
 
5 
 
request sought records of any "complaints or investigations 
regarding Vilas County District Attorney Al Moustakis" and 
records "regarding any investigation of [Moustakis's] conduct or 
handling of cases while district attorney."  The request also 
sought "information related to complaints and investigations 
regarding Mr. Moustakis that were completed or ended without any 
action taken against him[,]" as well as "any communications 
between Mr. Moustakis and [Department of Justice] since he took 
office in 1995."   
¶10 The public records custodian of the Department of 
Justice referred the request to the Department's Division of 
Criminal Investigation and Division of Legal Services to prepare 
a response.  The staff collected and reviewed the responsive 
documents and made numerous redactions.  The public records 
custodian approved the proposed response for release.  The 
response contained records relating to complaints against 
Moustakis that the Department of Justice ultimately found to be 
unsubstantiated.  
¶11 The public records custodian at the Department of 
Justice left Moustakis a telephone message advising him that the 
Department would be releasing records responsive to The Lakeland 
Times' public records request.  The Department also mailed a 
copy of the approved response to Moustakis.   
¶12 Moustakis received the redacted records from the 
Department of Justice on or about March 5, 2014, more than seven 
months after The Lakeland Times made its public records request.  
The Lakeland Times did not receive the redacted records at the 
No. 
2014AP1853   
 
6 
 
same time that Moustakis received them.  The Department asserts 
that it provided Moustakis with notice and a copy of the 
response as a professional courtesy and that it was not required 
to do so by law.5  
¶13 Moustakis notified the Department of Justice (through 
his counsel) of his intent to seek judicial review of the 
Department's decision to release the requested records.  On 
March 10, 2014, Moustakis filed this action under Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.356(4) to enjoin the Department from releasing the records 
at issue.   
¶14 The Department moved to dismiss the action, arguing, 
as we explained above, that Moustakis was not an "employee" as 
that term is defined in Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1bg) and that, as a 
result, Moustakis may not maintain an action under § 19.356(4) 
to restrain the Department from providing access to the records 
relating to him that are responsive to The Lakeland Times' 
public records request. 
                                                 
5 The Department of Justice appears to argue it was not 
required to provide notice to Moustakis under Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.356(2)(a)1.  Other statutory notice requirements exist.  
See Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9)(a)-(b).  Moustakis relies on Wis. 
Stat. § 19.356(9)(a) and (b) to bolster his interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 19.356(2)(a)1. and the definition of "employee" in 
Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1bg).  He sometimes seems to assert that he 
should have received notice under Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9)(a) and 
(b) and an opportunity to augment the record.  Moustakis's basic 
and repeated position, however, is that he does not want release 
of the records at all.  We address these claims more fully in 
¶¶50-62.      
No. 
2014AP1853   
 
7 
 
¶15 The circuit court dismissed Moustakis's action on July 
1, 2014, about one year after The Lakeland Times made its public 
records request to the Department of Justice, concluding that 
Moustakis was not an employee as defined in Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.32(1bg) and as a result may not maintain an action under 
§ 19.356(4).  The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
order dismissing the action.  Moustakis sought review in this 
court.   
II 
¶16 The interpretation and application of statutes present 
questions of law that this court determines independently of the 
circuit court and court of appeals while benefiting from the 
analyses of these courts.  Journal Times v. Police & Fire 
Comm'rs Bd., 2015 WI 56, ¶42, 362 Wis. 2d 577, 866 N.W.2d 563. 
¶17 To determine the meaning of a statute, we look to the 
language of the statute.  Schill v. Wis. Rapids Sch. Dist., 2010 
WI 86, ¶49, 327 Wis. 2d 572, 786 N.W.2d 177.  "Each word should 
be looked at so as not to render any portion of the statute 
superfluous."  Hubbard v. Messer, 2003 WI 145, ¶9, 267 
Wis. 2d 92, 673 N.W.2d 676 (note with citations omitted).   
¶18 "[A]scertaining plain meaning requires us to do more 
than focus on a single, isolated sentence or portion of a 
sentence."  Teschendorf v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 2006 WI 89, 
¶12, 293 Wis. 2d 123, 717 N.W.2d 258 (citation and quotation 
marks omitted).  Instead, "[w]e consider the meaning of words in 
the context in which they appear."  Force ex rel. Welcenbach v. 
Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2014 WI 82, ¶30, 356 Wis. 2d 582, 850 
No. 
2014AP1853   
 
8 
 
N.W.2d 866.  "We favor an interpretation that fulfills the 
statute's purpose."  State v. Hanson, 2012 WI 4, ¶17, 338 
Wis. 2d 243, 808 N.W.2d 390 (citation omitted).   
III 
¶19 We 
adopt 
the 
organization, 
statutory 
analysis, 
reasoning, and, at times, language of the decision of the court 
of appeals in our interpretation of the public records law and 
application of the law to the parties' arguments.  The court of 
appeals organized its analysis of the statutes as follows, and 
so do we:  
A. 
The public records law embodies the fundamental concept 
in Wisconsin of transparent government.  This concept 
guides our interpretation of the provisions of the public 
record law.6   
B. 
The general rule is that no "authority" is required to 
notify a record subject prior to providing to a requester 
access to a record containing information pertaining to 
that 
record 
subject. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.356(1).  
Furthermore, "no person is entitled to judicial review of 
the decision of an authority to provide a requester with 
access to a record."  § 19.356(1).  The public records 
law contains an exception to this general rule for three 
narrow categories of records.  § 19.356(2)(a)1.-3.  If 
the record at issue falls in one of these three narrow 
                                                 
6 See infra, ¶¶21-23; Moustakis, 364 Wis. 2d 740, ¶¶12-13. 
No. 
2014AP1853   
 
9 
 
categories of records, a "record subject" may maintain an 
action under § 19.356(4) seeking a court order to 
restrain the authority from providing access to the 
requested record.7 
C. 
The only one of these three exceptions that Moustakis 
claims pertains to him is the one set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.356(2)(a)1.  This provision applies to certain 
records pertaining to an "employee."  The application of 
§ 19.356(2)(a)1. to Moustakis's records turns on whether 
Moustakis is an "employee," as defined in § 19.32(1bg).   
1. 
Moustakis is not an employee within the first part 
of the definition of "employee" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.32(1bg).8  He holds the elective office of 
Vilas County District Attorney. 
2. 
Moustakis is not an employee within the second part 
of the definition of "employee" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.32(1bg).  Moustakis, as Vilas County District 
Attorney, is not "employed by an employer other than 
an authority."9 
D. 
Interpreting the definition of "employee" in the public 
records law as excluding a state public office does not 
                                                 
7 See infra, ¶¶24-28; Moustakis, 364 Wis. 2d 740, ¶¶13-14. 
8 See infra, ¶¶34-36; Moustakis, 364 Wis. 2d 740, ¶¶15-17. 
9 See infra, ¶¶37-49; Moustakis, 364 Wis. 2d 740, ¶¶18-20. 
No. 
2014AP1853   
 
10 
 
render 
the 
term 
"employee" 
used 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.356(9)(a) mere surplusage.10   
¶20 Thus, because the records at issue do not fall within 
the narrow category described in Wis. Stat. § 19.356(2)(a)1.,  
Moustakis may not maintain an action under § 19.356(4) seeking a 
court order restraining the Department of Justice from providing 
access to the requested record.11   
A 
¶21 We begin with the following legislative declaration: 
"Except as otherwise provided by law, any requester has a right 
to inspect any record."  Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a). 
¶22 The legislature has explicitly stated the public 
policy as follows: "[I]t is . . . the public policy of this 
state that all persons are entitled to the greatest possible 
information regarding the affairs of government and the official 
acts of those officers and employees who represent them."  Wis. 
Stat. § 19.31.   
¶23 In light of this policy, the legislature has stated 
that the public records law "shall be construed in every 
instance 
with 
a 
presumption 
of 
complete 
public 
access, 
consistent with the conduct of governmental business.  The 
denial of public access generally is contrary to the public 
                                                 
10 See infra, ¶¶50-59; Moustakis, 364 Wis. 2d 740, ¶¶21-23. 
11 See infra, ¶¶60-61; Moustakis, 364 Wis. 2d 740, ¶¶13-15. 
No. 
2014AP1853   
 
11 
 
interest, and only in an exceptional case may access be denied."  
Wis. Stat. § 19.31.12  
B 
¶24 Under the public records law, the general rule is that 
a record subject is not entitled to notice prior to an 
"authority" granting a requester access to a record containing 
information pertaining to the "record subject."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.356(1).13  Furthermore, subject to three narrow exceptions, 
"no person is entitled to judicial review of the decision of an 
authority to provide a requester with access to a record."  
§ 19.356(1).    
                                                 
12 Moustakis argues that public policy does not favor the 
release of the uncorroborated or untrue accusations contained in 
the records at issue. The public policy declared by the 
legislature, however, favors disclosure as a general rule, 
rather than nondisclosure.  
The parties acknowledge that the Department of Justice 
sought to balance "the public interest in disclosure against the 
public interest in non-disclosure" when deciding whether to 
release the records at issue and redacted materials from the 
record.  See Milwaukee Journal Sentinel v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 
2009 WI 79, ¶56, 319 Wis. 2d 439, 768 N.W.2d 700 (discussing the 
balancing test). Because we conclude that Moustakis is not 
entitled to pre-release judicial review of the records at issue 
and we do not have the records at issue (that is, we have 
neither the original records nor the redacted records), we do 
not review the Department's decision to release the redacted 
records. 
13 Some records that are subject to disclosure contain 
"personally identifiable information" about certain individuals. 
These individuals are known as "record subjects."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.32(2g). 
No. 
2014AP1853   
 
12 
 
¶25 The legislature excluded three narrow categories of 
records from these general rules that no authority is required 
to notify a record subject prior to providing to a requester 
access to a record containing information pertaining to that 
record subject and that no person is entitled to judicial review 
of the decision of an authority to provide a requester with 
access to a record.  See Wis. Stat. § 19.356(2)(a)1.-3.  
¶26 An "authority"14 intending to release records falling 
within one of these three narrow categories of records must 
provide notice to the record subject before releasing the 
records and the record subject has the opportunity to seek pre-
release judicial review.  Wis. Stat. §§ 19.356(2)(a), 19.356(4).  
The record subject may commence an action (within the time 
specified in the public records law) seeking a court order "to 
                                                 
14 An "authority" is defined in Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1) as 
follows: 
"Authority" means any of the following having custody 
of a record: a state or local office, elective 
official, 
agency, 
board, 
commission, 
committee, 
council, department or public body corporate and 
politic created by the constitution or by any law, 
ordinance, rule or order; a governmental or quasi-
governmental corporation except for the Bradley center 
sports 
and 
entertainment 
corporation; 
a 
special 
purpose district; any court of law; the assembly or 
senate; a nonprofit corporation which receives more 
than 50% of its funds from a county or a municipality, 
as defined in s. 59.001 (3), and which provides 
services related to public health or safety to the 
county or municipality; a university police department 
under s. 175.42; or a formally constituted subunit of 
any of the foregoing. 
No. 
2014AP1853   
 
13 
 
restrain the authority from providing access to the requested 
record."  Wis. Stat. § 19.356(3), (4). 
¶27 The three exceptions granting rights to a record 
subject are set forth in Wis. Stat. § 19.356(2)(a)1., 2., and 3.  
These three provisions were intended to limit this court's 
holdings 
in 
Woznicki 
v. 
Erickson, 
202 
Wis. 2d 178, 
549 
N.W.2d 699 (1996), and Milwaukee Teachers' Education Ass'n v. 
Milwaukee Board of School Directors, 227 Wis. 2d 779, 596 
N.W.2d 403 (1999).15  In Woznicki and Milwaukee Teachers, this 
court held that public employees were entitled to notice and to 
seek pre-release judicial review of the response to records 
requests pertaining to them.16  By enacting § 19.356(2)(a)1., 2., 
and 3., the legislature sought to limit the rights afforded by 
these cases "only to a defined set of records pertaining to 
employees residing in Wisconsin."  2003 Wis. Act. 47, Joint 
Legis. Council Prefatory Note.17   
                                                 
15 See Local 2489, AFSCME v. Rock Cnty., 2004 WI App 210, 
¶2, 277 Wis. 2d 208, 689 N.W.2d 644 (stating that 2003 Wis. Act 
47 was enacted in response to Woznicki v. Erickson, 202 
Wis. 2d 178, 549 N.W.2d 699 (1996), and Milwaukee Teachers' 
Education Ass'n v. Milwaukee Board of School Directors, 227 
Wis. 2d 779, 596 N.W.2d 403 (1999)). 
16 See Milwaukee Teachers, 227 Wis. 2d at 797-98; Woznicki, 
202 Wis. 2d at 195. 
17 The court of appeals refers to the Prefatory Note to 2003 
Wis. Act 47 by the Joint Legislative Council's Special Committee 
on Review of the Open Records Law as confirming the court of 
appeals' interpretation of the public records law.  Legislative 
history 
may 
be 
consulted 
to 
confirm 
a 
plain 
meaning 
interpretation.  Teschendorf v. State Farm Ins. Co., 2006 WI 89, 
¶14, 293 Wis. 2d 123, 717 N.W.2d 258. 
No. 
2014AP1853   
 
14 
 
¶28 Thus, the exceptions in Wis. Stat. § 19.356(2)(a)1., 
2., and 3. are the only instances in which a record subject has 
a statutory right to receive notice and seek pre-release 
judicial review of a response to a public records request.  
C 
¶29 Moustakis asserts that the records at issue fall into 
one of these three narrow exceptions, namely, Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.356(2)(a)1., that he is thus entitled to notice and pre-
release judicial review of the records pertaining to him, and 
that he may commence an action seeking a court order to restrain 
the Department of Justice from providing access to the requested 
records.  This exception, § 19.356(2)(a)1., applies to a record 
"containing information relating to an employee that is created 
or kept by the authority and that is the result of an 
investigation into a disciplinary matter involving the employee 
or 
possible 
employment-related 
violation 
by 
the 
employee . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 19.356(2)(a)1. (emphasis added). 
¶30 The application of Wis. Stat. § 19.356(2)(a)1. to 
Moustakis's records turns on whether Moustakis is an "employee" 
for purposes of that provision.  
¶31 "Employee" is defined in Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1bg) as 
"any individual who is employed by an authority, other than an 
individual holding local public office or a state public office, 
or any individual who is employed by an employer other than an 
authority" (emphasis added). 
¶32  Thus, Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1bg) creates two categories 
of employees:  Individuals who are employed by an "authority"——a 
No. 
2014AP1853   
 
15 
 
category narrowed by the limiting clause excluding persons 
holding local public office or a state public office as 
employees——and those who are employed by an employer other than 
an "authority." 
¶33 As we previously stated, "authority" is defined in the 
public records law.  See Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1).  The definition 
of "authority" includes a vast number of governmental entities 
"having custody of a record," including, as relevant here, "a 
state or local office."   
1 
¶34 Moustakis concedes, as he must, that he holds a state 
office and that he is not an "employee" of an authority under 
the first part of the definition of "employee" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.32(1bg) that explicitly excludes from the definition of 
"employee" an individual holding a "state public office."   
¶35 Analyzing the definition of "state public office" in 
the public records law, we agree with Moustakis that he is not 
an "employee" under the first part of the definition of 
"employee" in Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1bg).  An individual is 
excluded as an employee under § 19.32(1bg) if he or she holds a 
"state public office."  A "state public office" is defined in 
§ 19.32(4).  This provision reveals that a "state public office" 
has the meaning given in § 19.42(13) (with exceptions not 
relevant in the instant case).  Reading § 19.42(13), we learn 
that "state public office" includes "all positions identified 
under s. 20.923(2) . . . ."  Section 20.923(2) contains a list 
of "constitutional officers and other elected state officials."  
No. 
2014AP1853   
 
16 
 
Within that list, section 20.923(2)(j) refers specifically to "a 
district attorney."   
¶36 Moustakis, the Vilas County District Attorney, is thus 
the holder of a "state public office" and does not qualify as an 
"employee" under the first part of the definition of "employee" 
set forth in § 19.32(1bg). 
2 
¶37 Even though Moustakis holds a state public office, he 
argues that he nevertheless qualifies as an "employee" under the 
second part of the definition of "employee" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.32(1bg).  According to Moustakis, he is "employed by an 
employer other than an authority," namely, he is employed by the 
State of Wisconsin.   
¶38 In Moustakis's view, the definition of "employee" in 
Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1bg) is disjunctive and the two parts are not 
connected.  Thus, even if Moustakis is not an "employee" under 
the first part of the definition of employee in Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.32(1bg), he argues that he is an "employee" under the 
second part of that definition. 
¶39 Specifically, Moustakis asserts that he is not an 
"employee" of the Vilas County District Attorney's office, which 
is identified as an "authority" under Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1).  
Moustakis contends he works in the office of the district 
attorney but that the indicia of employment demonstrate that he 
does not work for that office.  He asserts that he works for the 
State of Wisconsin.  The State of Wisconsin is not specifically 
mentioned in the definition of "authority."  See Wis. Stat. 
No. 
2014AP1853   
 
17 
 
§ 19.32(1).   
¶40 Moustakis reasons that because he is employed by the 
State of Wisconsin, which is not specifically identified as an 
"authority" under Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1), he is an "employee" 
under the second part of the definition of employee in 
§ 19.32(1bg).  He claims he is thus employed by an employer 
other than an "authority."   
¶41 Moustakis's interpretation of the second part of the 
definition of "employee" is unpersuasive for several reasons.     
¶42 Moustakis argues that he is an "employee" of the State 
of Wisconsin by relying on the Black's Law Dictionary's 
definition of "employer."  The word "employer" is not defined in 
the public records law.  Black's Law Dictionary defines 
"employer" as "one who controls and directs a worker . . . and 
who pays the worker's salary or wages."18  Moustakis reasons that 
because no person within the Vilas County District Attorney's 
Office has the capacity to direct, control, or pay him, his 
employer is the State of Wisconsin rather than his elective 
office.        
¶43 A significant difficulty with Moustakis's argument is 
that although the statutory definition of "authority" does not 
explicitly include the State, the statutory definition of 
                                                 
18 The 
complete 
Black's 
Law 
Dictionary 
definition 
of 
"employer" is:  "A person, company, or organization for whom 
someone works; esp., one who controls and directs a worker under 
an express or implied contract of hire and who pays the worker's 
salary or wages."  Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
No. 
2014AP1853   
 
18 
 
"authority" does include a "state or local office" and "an 
elective official."  See Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1).  A district 
attorney in Wisconsin is a "state office" and a district 
attorney is also an elective official.   
¶44 Moustakis tries to distinguish between holding a state 
public office and being employed by that office.  He points out 
that his employment derives from the Wisconsin constitution, as 
well as the salary-fixing statutes that classify him as holding 
a "state public office."19  As a result, he concludes that he is 
an "employee" of the State of Wisconsin.       
¶45 We agree with the court of appeals that Moustakis's 
distinction between holding a state public office and being 
employed by a state public office is unsupported by law, creates 
confusion, is contrary to any reasonable reading of the public 
records law, and is unpersuasive: 
The distinction Moustakis seeks to draw 
between "holding" a state public office and 
being "employed" by a state public office is 
entirely of his making.  Moustakis is a 
district 
attorney, 
which, 
as 
we 
have 
indicated, is a "state public office" under 
the statutes Moustakis cites.  A state 
office is an "authority" as that term is 
defined in § 19.32(1), and, but for the 
exclusionary 
clause 
in 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.32(1bg), Moustakis would qualify as an 
"employee" under the first category as an 
"employee" employed by an "authority."  That 
                                                 
19 Moustakis 
cites 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
Article 
VI, 
Section 4; Wis. Stat. § 19.32(4); Wis. Stat. § 19.42(13)(c); and 
Wis. Stat. § 20.923(2)(j) to buttress his claim that he is an 
"employee" of the State of Wisconsin. 
No. 
2014AP1853   
 
19 
 
Moustakis would otherwise qualify as an 
"employee" of an "authority" means that he 
cannot also be employed by "an employer 
other 
than 
an 
authority." 
 
Moustakis's 
contrived argument fails to account for the 
straightforward notion that he both holds 
the state office of district attorney and is 
an 
employee 
of 
that 
office; 
the 
two 
capacities are not mutually exclusive. 
Moustakis, 364 Wis. 2d 740, ¶20. 
¶46 In sum, Moustakis contends that he holds a "state 
public office" and that under the second part of the definition 
of "employee" in Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1bg) he is an employee of 
the State of Wisconsin, which is not mentioned in the definition 
of "authority."    
¶47 We conclude, as did the court of appeals, that 
Moustakis is not an employee under Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1bg).  
Under a plain reading of the text of the first part of the 
definition 
of 
"employee" 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.32(1bg), 
Moustakis qualifies as an employee of an authority.   
¶48 Because Moustakis is an employee of an authority under 
the text of the first part of the definition of "employee" in 
Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1bg), Moustakis cannot be an individual 
employed by an employer other than an authority under the second 
part of the definition of "employee."  The two parts of the 
definition 
of 
"employee" 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.32(1bg) 
are 
interconnected.  Although Moustakis is excluded from the first 
part of the definition of "employee" in Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1bg) 
by the statutory language excluding an individual holding a 
No. 
2014AP1853   
 
20 
 
state public office as an employee,20 the first part of the 
definition of "employee" makes clear that Moustakis is not an 
individual employed by an employer other than an authority.  
Accordingly, Moustakis is not employed by an employer other than 
an authority under the second part of the definition of 
"employee" in § 19.32(1bg).        
¶49 We agree with the Department of Justice that the plain 
language, context, structure, and the interrelated provisions of 
the public records law all show that Moustakis is employed by an 
"authority" and that he is not an employee under Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.31(1bg).    
D 
¶50 Moustakis argues that interpreting the term "employee" 
in Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1bg) to exclude anyone holding a "state 
public office," would render the term "employee" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.356(9) mere surplusage.   
¶51 We 
disagree 
with 
Moustakis. 
 
Interpreting 
the 
definition of "employee" in the public records law to exclude 
individuals holding "state public office" does not render the 
term "employee" as used in Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9)(a) mere 
surplusage. 
                                                 
20 Because we decide the instant case based on the 
definition of "employee,"  we need not, and do not, address the 
Department of Justice's argument that the documents at issue 
were not the result of an investigation into a disciplinary 
matter involving the employee and therefore do not fit within 
Wis. Stat. § 19.356(2)(a)1.   
No. 
2014AP1853   
 
21 
 
¶52 Section 19.356(9) states (with emphasis added):  
(a) 
Except as otherwise authorized or required by 
statute, if an authority decides under s. 19.35 
to 
permit 
access 
to 
a 
record 
containing 
information relating to a record subject who is 
an officer or employee of the authority holding a 
local public office or a state public office, the 
authority shall, before permitting access and 
within 3 days after making the decision to permit 
access, serve written notice of that decision on 
the record subject, either by certified mail or 
by personally serving the notice on the record 
subject.  The notice shall briefly describe the 
requested record and include a description of the 
rights of the record subject under par. (b).   
(b) 
Within 5 days after receipt of a notice under 
par. (a), a record subject may augment the record 
to 
be 
release 
with 
written 
comments 
and 
documentation selected by the record subject.  
Except as otherwise authorized or required by 
statute, the authority under par. (a) shall 
release the record as augmented by the record 
subject.    
¶53 Wisconsin Stat. § 19.356(9)(a) and (b) create a notice 
requirement distinct from the notice provided for in Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.356(2)(a)1.  Under Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9)(a) and (b), when 
an authority decides to permit access to a record containing 
information relating to "a record subject who is an officer or 
employee of the authority holding a local public office or state 
public office, the authority shall" provide written notice to 
the record subject and an opportunity to augment the record to 
be released.   
¶54 Moustakis sometimes seems to assert that he should 
have received notice under Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9)(a) and (b) and 
an opportunity to augment the record.  Moustakis's basic and 
No. 
2014AP1853   
 
22 
 
repeated position, however, is that he does not want release of 
the 
records 
at 
all. 
 
Moustakis 
relies 
on 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.356(9)(a) and (b) chiefly to bolster his argument that he 
is an "employee" as defined in Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1bg) and that 
none of the records at issue should be released.   
¶55 Moustakis reasons that, based on the language of Wis. 
Stat. § 19.356(9)(a), the term "employee" in the statutes must 
include some individuals holding state public office.  Moustakis 
asserts that under the usual rules of statutory interpretation, 
the statutory definition of "employee" in § 19.32(1bg) should be 
read into § 19.356(9)(a).  According to Moustakis, if "employee" 
as defined in § 19.32(1bg) does not include an individual who 
holds state or local public office, the term "employee" in Wis. 
Stat. § 19.356(9)(a) has no meaning.   
¶56 Moustakis's reasoning has superficial appeal.  But, as 
the court of appeals noted, Moustakis's attempt to insert the 
definition of the term "employee" into Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9)(a) 
"creates a befuddling mess of that statute."21   
¶57 We agree with the court of appeals' interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9)(a).  The court of appeals' approach 
appropriately harmonizes both statutes.  The use of the word 
"employee" in Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9) does not change the proper 
interpretation of that term in Wis. Stat. §§ 19.32(1bg) and 
19.356(2)(a)1.   
                                                 
21 Moustakis, 364 Wis. 2d 740, ¶23. 
No. 
2014AP1853   
 
23 
 
¶58 The phrase in Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9)(a) referring to 
"a record subject who is an officer or employee of the authority 
holding a local public office or a state public office" is 
intended to be read as a restrictive clause modifying the term 
"record subject."22  Thus, an individual who is not an "employee" 
under Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1bg) may still qualify as an "officer 
or employee of the authority holding a local public office or 
state public office" under Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9)(a).   
¶59 The court of appeals explains Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.356(9)(a) as follows:  
[W]e conclude the phrase "who is an officer or 
employee of the authority holding a local record [sic] 
office or state public office" was intended to be read 
as one restrictive clause modifying the term "record 
subject" in § 19.356(9)(a).  Contrary to Moustakis's 
argument, this interpretation of § 19.356(9)(a), which 
is based on a straightforward, common sense reading of 
that statute, is fully consistent with § 19.32(1bg) in 
that both statutes recognize there are individuals who 
are employed by an "authority" and who also hold a 
local or state public office.  In this sense, an 
individual who is not an "employee" under § 19.32(1bg) 
may nonetheless qualify as an "officer or employee of 
the authority holding a local public office or state 
public office" under § 19.356(9)(a).23     
¶60 This interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9)(a) is 
consistent with Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1bg) and construes each 
provision in a manner that serves each provision's purpose.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the inclusion of the term 
                                                 
22 Moustakis, 364 Wis. 2d 740, ¶23. 
23 Moustakis, 364 Wis. 2d 740, ¶23. 
No. 
2014AP1853   
 
24 
 
"employee" in Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9)(a) does not alter the 
definition of "employee" in Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1bg). 
¶61 Moustakis 
sometimes 
appears 
to 
argue 
that 
the 
Department of Justice violated his rights to notice and an 
opportunity 
to 
augment 
the 
record 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.356(9)(a) and (b).  Moustakis does not ask, however, for 
any relief for any violation of Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9)(a) and 
(b).  Aside from Moustakis's argument about the relationship 
between Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9)(a) and (b) and the definition of 
"employee" in Wis. Stat. §§ 19.32(1bg) and 19.356(2)(a)1., 
Moustakis's limited discussion of Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9)(a) and 
(b) may be read as part of his claim that Wis. Stat. § 19.356, 
as 
interpreted 
by 
the 
Department 
of 
Justice, 
is 
unconstitutional.  That claim remains pending in the circuit 
court.   
¶62 Moustakis's focus in this court is on pre-release 
judicial review under Wis. Stat. § 19.356(2)(a)1. and (4) of the 
Department of Justice's decision to provide records responsive 
to The Lakeland Times' request.  Moustakis's goal in this court 
is an order restraining the Department of Justice from providing 
access to the requested records.  Considering the arguments of 
the parties, we need not and do not address Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.356(9)(a) and (b) further.   
* * * * 
¶63 After analyzing the public records law and the 
parties' arguments, we conclude, as did the court of appeals, 
that a district attorney holds a state public office and is not 
No. 
2014AP1853   
 
25 
 
an "employee" within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1bg) and 
19.356(2)(a)1.  Because the records at issue do not fall within 
the narrow exception to the general rule that a "record subject" 
is not entitled to notice or pre-release judicial review of the 
decision of an authority to provide access to records pertaining 
to that record subject, Moustakis may not maintain an action 
under Wis. Stat. § 19.356(4) to restrain the Department of 
Justice from providing The Lakeland Times access to the 
requested records. 
¶64 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals and the circuit court's order dismissing Moustakis's 
action under the Wisconsin public records law.  We remand the 
cause for further proceedings. 
By the Court.–The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
No. 
2014AP1853   
 
26 
 
APPENDIX A: Relevant Statutes and Wisconsin Constitutional 
Provisions 
 
Wis. Stat. § 19.31 – Declaration of policy. In recognition of 
the fact that a representative government is dependent upon 
an informed electorate, it is declared to be the public 
policy of this state that all persons are entitled to the 
greatest possible information regarding the affairs of 
government and the official acts of those officers and 
employees who represent them.  Further, providing persons 
with such information is declared to be an essential 
function of a representative government and an integral 
part of the routine duties of officers and employees whose 
responsibility it is to provide such information.  To that 
end, ss. 19.32 to 19.37 shall be construed in every 
instance with a presumption of complete public access, 
consistent with the conduct of governmental business.  The 
denial of public access generally is contrary to the public 
interest, and only in an exceptional case may access be 
denied. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 19.32 – Definitions.  As used in ss. 19.32 to 
19.39: 
 
(1) 
"Authority" means any of the following having custody 
of a record: a state or local office, elective 
official, 
agency, 
board, 
commission, 
committee, 
council, department or public body corporate and 
politic created by the constitution or by any law, 
ordinance, rule or order; a governmental or quasi-
governmental 
corporation 
except 
for 
the 
Bradley 
center 
sports 
and 
entertainment 
corporation; 
a 
special purpose district; any court of law; the 
assembly or senate; a nonprofit corporation which 
receives more than 50% of its funds from a county or 
a municipality, as defined in s. 59.001(3), and which 
provides services related to public health or safety 
to the county or municipality; a university police 
department under s. 175.42; or a formally constituted 
subunit of any of the foregoing. 
 
. . . . 
 
 
(1bg) "Employee" means any individual who is employed by an 
authority, other than an individual holding local 
public office or a state public office, or any 
No. 
2014AP1853   
 
27 
 
individual who is employed by an employer other than 
an authority. 
 
. . . . 
 
(2) "Record" means any material on which written, drawn, 
printed, 
spoken, 
visual, 
or 
electromagnetic 
information or electronically generated or stored data 
is recorded or preserved, regardless of physical form 
or characteristics, which has been created or is being 
kept by an authority.  "Record" includes, but is not 
limited to, handwritten, typed or printed pages, maps, 
charts, photographs, films, recordings, tapes, optical 
disks, and any other medium on which electronically 
generated or stored data is recorded or preserved.  
"Record" does not include drafts, notes, preliminary 
computations and like materials prepared for the 
originator's 
personal 
use 
or 
prepared 
by 
the 
originator in the name of a person for whom the 
originator is working; materials which are purely the 
personal property of the custodian and have no 
relation to his or her office; materials to which 
access is limited by copyright, patent or bequest; and 
published materials in the possession of an authority 
other than a public library which are available for 
sale, or which are available for inspection at a 
public library. 
 
(2g) "Record subject" means an individual about whom 
personally identifiable information is contained in a 
record. 
 
. . . . 
 
(4) "State public office" has the meaning given in s. 
19.42(13), but does not include a position identified 
in s. 20.923(6)(f) to (gm). 
Wis. Stat. § 19.35 Access to records; fees. 
(1) RIGHT TO INSPECTION. (a) Except as otherwise provided by 
law, any requester has a right to inspect any record. 
Substantive common law principles construing the right 
to inspect, copy or receive copies of records shall 
remain in effect.  The exemptions to the requirement 
of a governmental body to meet in open session under 
s. 19.85 are indicative of public policy, but may be 
used as grounds for denying public access to a record 
No. 
2014AP1853   
 
28 
 
only if the authority or legal custodian under s. 
19.33 makes a specific demonstration that there is a 
need to restrict public access at the time that the 
request to inspect or copy the record is made. 
. . . . 
 
Wis. Stat. § 19.356 – Notice to record subject; right of action 
 
(1) Except as authorized in this section or as otherwise 
provided by statute, no authority is required to 
notify a record subject prior to providing to a 
requester access to a record containing information 
pertaining to that record subject, and no person is 
entitled to judicial review of the decision of an 
authority to provide a requester with access to a 
record. 
 
(2) (a) Except as provided in pars. (b) to (d) and as 
otherwise authorized or required by statute, if an 
authority decides under s. 19.35 to permit access to a 
record specified in this paragraph, the authority 
shall, before permitting access and within 3 days 
after making the decision to permit access, serve 
written notice of that decision on any record subject 
to whom the record pertains, either by certified mail 
or by personally serving the notice on the record 
subject. 
The 
notice 
shall 
briefly 
describe 
the 
requested record and include a description of the 
rights of the record subject under subs. (3) and (4).  
This paragraph applies only to the following records: 
 
1. 
A record containing information relating to an 
employee that is created or kept by the 
authority 
and 
that 
is 
the 
result 
of 
an 
investigation 
into 
a 
disciplinary 
matter 
involving the employee or possible employment-
related violation by the employee of a statute, 
ordinance, rule, regulation, or policy of the 
employee's employer. 
 
2. 
A record obtained by the authority through a 
subpoena or search warrant. 
 
3. 
A record prepared by an employer other than an 
authority, if that record contains information 
No. 
2014AP1853   
 
29 
 
relating to an employee of that employer, 
unless the employee authorizes the authority to 
provide access to that information. 
 
(b) Paragraph (a) does not apply to an authority who 
provides access to a record pertaining to an 
employee to the employee who is the subject of 
the record or to his or her representative to the 
extent 
required 
under 
s. 
103.13 
or 
to 
a 
recognized or certified collective bargaining 
representative to the extent required to fulfill 
a duty to bargain or pursuant to a collective 
bargaining agreement under ch. 111. 
 
(c) Paragraph (a) does not apply to access to a 
record 
produced 
in 
relation 
to 
a 
function 
specified in s. 106.54 or 230.45 or subch. II of 
ch. 111 if the record is provided by an authority 
having responsibility for that function. 
 
(d) Paragraph (a) does not apply to the transfer of a 
record by the administrator of an educational 
agency to the state superintendent of public 
instruction under s. 115.31(3)(a). 
 
(3) Within 5 days after receipt of a notice under sub. 
(2)(a), 
a 
record 
subject 
may 
provide 
written 
notification to the authority of his or her intent to 
seek a court order restraining the authority from 
providing access to the requested record. 
 
(4) Within 10 days after receipt of a notice under sub. 
(2)(a), a record subject may commence an action 
seeking a court order to restrain the authority from 
providing access to the requested record.  If a record 
subject commences such an action, the record subject 
shall 
name 
the 
authority 
as 
a 
defendant. 
Notwithstanding s. 803.09, the requester may intervene 
in the action as a matter of right.  If the requester 
does not intervene in the action, the authority shall 
notify the requester of the results of the proceedings 
under this subsection and sub. (5). 
 
(5) An authority shall not provide access to a requested 
record within 12 days of sending a notice pertaining 
to that record under sub. (2)(a).  In addition, if the 
record subject commences an action under sub. (4), the 
No. 
2014AP1853   
 
30 
 
authority shall not provide access to the requested 
record during pendency of the action. If the record 
subject appeals or petitions for review of a decision 
of the court or the time for appeal or petition for 
review of a decision adverse to the record subject has 
not expired, the authority shall not provide access to 
the requested record until any appeal is decided, 
until the period for appealing or petitioning for 
review expires, until a petition for review is denied, 
or until the authority receives written notice from 
the record subject that an appeal or petition for 
review will not be filed, whichever occurs first. 
 
(6) The court, in an action commenced under sub. (4), may 
restrain the authority from providing access to the 
requested record. The court shall apply substantive 
common law principles construing the right to inspect, 
copy, or receive copies of records in making its 
decision. 
 
(7) The court, in an action commenced under sub. (4), 
shall issue a decision within 10 days after the filing 
of the summons and complaint and proof of service of 
the summons and complaint upon the defendant, unless a 
party demonstrates cause for extension of this period.  
In any event, the court shall issue a decision within 
30 days after those filings are complete. 
 
(8) If a party appeals a decision of the court under sub. 
(7), the court of appeals shall grant precedence to 
the appeal over all other matters not accorded similar 
precedence by law.  An appeal shall be taken within 
the time period specified in s. 808.04(1m). 
 
(9) 
(a) Except as otherwise authorized or required 
by statute, if an authority decides under s. 
19.35 to permit access to a record containing 
information relating to a record subject who is 
an officer or employee of the authority holding a 
local public office or a state public office, the 
authority shall, before permitting access and 
within 3 days after making the decision to permit 
access, serve written notice of that decision on 
the record subject, either by certified mail or 
by personally serving the notice on the record 
subject.  The notice shall briefly describe the 
No. 
2014AP1853   
 
31 
 
requested record and include a description of the 
rights of the record subject under par. (b). 
 
(b) Within 5 days after receipt of a notice under 
par. (a), a record subject may augment the record 
to 
be 
released 
with 
written 
comments 
and 
documentation selected by the record subject. 
Except as otherwise authorized or required by 
statute, the authority under par. (a) shall 
release the record as augmented by the record 
subject. 
 
 
Wis. Stat. § 19.42 – Definitions.  In this subchapter [code of 
ethics for public officials and employees]:  
 
. . . . 
 
 
(13) "State public office" means:  
 
. . . . 
 
(c) All positions identified under s. 20.923(2), (4), 
(4g), (6)(f) to (h), (7), and (8) to (10), except 
clerical positions. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 20.923 - Statutory salaries.  The purpose of this 
section is to establish a consistent and equitable salary 
setting mechanism for all elected officials, appointed state 
agency heads, division administrators and other executive-level 
unclassified positions.  All such positions shall be subject to 
the 
same 
basic 
salary 
establishment, 
implementation, 
modification, administrative control and application procedures.  
The salary-setting mechanism contained in this section shall be 
directed to establishing salaries that are determined on a 
comprehensive systematic basis, bear equitable relationship to 
each 
other 
and 
to 
the 
salaries 
of 
classified 
service 
subordinates, and be reviewed and established with the same 
frequency as those of state employees in the classified service. 
 
. . . . 
 
(2) CONSTITUTIONAL OFFICERS AND OTHER ELECTED STATE OFFICIALS. 
 
. . . . 
 
No. 
2014AP1853   
 
32 
 
(j) The annual salary of a district attorney shall be 
set under s. 978.12. 
 
Wis. Const. Article VI, Section 4 – County officers; election, 
terms, removal; vacancies.  SECTION 4. 
 
(1) (a) Except as provided in pars. (b) and (c) and sub. 
(2), coroners, registers of deeds, district attorneys, 
and all other elected county officers, except judicial 
officers, sheriffs, and chief executive officers, 
shall be chosen by the electors of the respective 
counties once in every 2 years. 
 
. . . . 
 
(c) Beginning with the first general election at which the 
president 
is 
elected 
which 
occurs 
after 
the 
ratification of this paragraph, district attorneys, 
registers of deeds, county clerks, and treasurers 
shall be chosen by the electors of the respective 
counties, or by the electors of all of the respective 
counties 
comprising 
each 
combination 
of 
counties 
combined by the legislature for that purpose, for the 
term of 4 years and surveyors in counties in which the 
office of surveyor is filled by election shall be 
chosen by the electors of the respective counties, or 
by the electors of all of the respective counties 
comprising each combination of counties combined by 
the legislature for that purpose, for the term of 4 
years. 
 
. . . . 
 
(5) All vacancies in the offices of coroner, register of 
deeds 
or 
district 
attorney 
shall 
be 
filled 
by 
appointment. The person appointed to fill a vacancy 
shall hold office only for the unexpired portion of 
the term to which appointed and until a successor 
shall be elected and qualified. 
 
. . . . 
No.  2014AP1853.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶65 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J. (concurring in part, 
dissenting in part).   I concur with the conclusion of the 
majority opinion that the questions presented are questions of 
statutory interpretation, not of standing.1  I also concur that 
Albert D. Moustakis, the Vilas County District Attorney, is not 
an employee within the definition set out in Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.32(1bg), although I do not agree with all of the majority 
opinion's reasoning upon which its statutory interpretation is 
based.   
¶66 I dissent because the majority opinion chooses not to 
address obligations of the Department of Justice (DOJ) under 
Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9)(a) and (b), which must be met prior to 
release of the public records that the Lakeland Times seeks.2  
Nothing in the record shows that Moustakis received the notice 
required by § 19.356(9)(a), and without notice sufficient to 
satisfy § 19.356(9)(a) and (b), the DOJ is without statutory 
authority 
to 
release 
records 
that 
are 
at 
issue 
here.  
Accordingly, I would reinstate Moustakis's action under the 
public records law that the circuit court dismissed, and I 
respectfully concur in part and dissent in part from the 
majority opinion. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶67 The 
majority 
opinion 
ably 
narrates 
the 
factual 
background for the case before us; therefore, I will set out 
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶3 n.2. 
2 Id., ¶¶53, 60-61. 
No.  2014AP1853.pdr 
 
2 
 
only those facts necessary to enable the reader to follow my 
discussion below.   
¶68 Although the record is far from clear, apparently an 
allegation was made that Moustakis was not properly carrying out 
the functions of his office as Vilas County District Attorney.  
The DOJ investigated the allegation and determined it was 
without merit.  The Lakeland Times newspaper made a public 
records request of the DOJ asking for records that relate to the 
DOJ's investigation.   
¶69 Moustakis believes he has rights relative to the 
release of the DOJ's records of the investigation pursuant to 
various subsections of Wis. Stat. § 19.356.  The DOJ does not 
agree.  Accordingly, Moustakis filed this action to enforce what 
he believes are his statutory rights relative to the requested 
records.3  The circuit court agreed with the DOJ, and dismissed 
Moustakis's claims under Wisconsin's public records law.  The 
court of appeals affirmed.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶70 In order to answer the questions presented but 
unaddressed by the majority opinion, I interpret and apply Wis. 
Stat. § 19.356(9)(a) and (b).  Statutory interpretation and 
application 
present 
questions 
of 
law 
that 
we 
decide 
independently, while benefitting from the discussions of the 
                                                 
3 Moustakis subsequently amended his complaint to assert 
constitutional and common law rights.  Those claims remain in 
the circuit court and are not part of this review.   
No.  2014AP1853.pdr 
 
3 
 
court of appeals and the circuit court.  State v. Hanson, 2012 
WI 4, ¶14, 338 Wis. 2d 243, 808 N.W.2d 390.   
B.  Statutory Interpretation 
¶71 Moustakis contends that "[a]t the barest of minimums, 
the court system must have standing to address the failure of a 
custodian to provide a Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9) notice where 
applicable prior to the release of a record."4  The DOJ has 
asserted that it is not required to provide Moustakis with 
notice under § 19.356(9)(a) because he "is not entitled to 
invoke 19.356."5 
¶72 Statutory interpretation begins with the plain meaning 
of the words chosen by the legislature.  Wis. Indus. Energy 
Group, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Wis., 2012 WI 89, ¶15, 342 
Wis. 2d 576, 819 N.W.2d 240.  If their meaning is plain, we 
apply that meaning and go no further.  Kalal v. Circuit Court 
for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 
110.  However, if a statute is "'capable of being understood by 
reasonably well-informed persons in two or more senses', then 
the statute is ambiguous."  Watton v. Hegerty, 2008 WI 74, ¶15, 
311 Wis. 2d 52, 751 N.W.2d 369 (quoting Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
¶47).   
¶73 Wisconsin Stat. § 19.356(9) is my focus.  It states in 
relevant part: 
                                                 
4 Br. of Pl.-Appellant-Pet'r at 19.   
5 Tr. of April 3, 2014 Proceedings at 17.   
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(a) Except as otherwise authorized or required by 
statute, if an authority decides under s. 19.35 to 
permit access to a record containing information 
relating to a record subject who is an officer . . . 
holding a local public office or a state public 
office, the authority shall, before permitting access 
and within 3 days after making the decision to permit 
access, serve written notice of that decision on the 
record subject . . . .  The notice shall briefly 
describe 
the 
requested 
record 
and 
include 
a 
description of the rights of the record subject under 
par. (b). 
(b) Within 5 days after receipt of a notice under 
par. (a), a record subject may augment the record to 
be released with written comments and documentation 
selected by the record subject.  Except as otherwise 
authorized or required by statute, the authority under 
par. (a) shall release the record as augmented by the 
record subject. 
¶74 The DOJ agrees that Moustakis is an officer holding 
state public office.  However, the DOJ asserts that Moustakis 
has no right to prior notice of an impending release of public 
records.  The DOJ asserts that it gave Moustakis prior notice 
simply as a "courtesy."6   
¶75 Wisconsin Stat. § 19.356(9)(a) is not an example of 
artful drafting, which has generated part of Moustakis's 
argument that he is an employee within the meaning of Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.32(1bg).  However, the application of § 19.356(9)(a) in 
regard to notice requirements for the case before us is plain.  
This is so in part because Moustakis is the Vilas County 
District Attorney and in part because the DOJ has the records 
under consideration.  Therefore, Moustakis comes within the 
plain meaning of § 19.356(9)(a), which describes an "officer 
                                                 
6 Id. 
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. . . holding . . . a state public office," and the DOJ comes 
within "the authority" in possession of the public records at 
issue.   
¶76 In regard to notice, the plain meaning of Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.356(9)(a) imposes statutory obligations that the DOJ must 
meet before it can release public records that relate to this 
record subject (Moustakis) who is an "officer" who holds "state 
office."   
¶77 For example, Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9)(a)'s directive 
which begins as:  "[T]he authority shall, before permitting 
access . . . serve written notice of that decision on the record 
subject," imposes affirmative obligations on the DOJ prior to 
release of these public records.  Id.  First, the DOJ must give 
Moustakis written notice.  Id.  Second, the notice must be given 
three days prior to release of the records.  Id.  Third, notice 
must be served on Moustakis either by certified mail or personal 
service.  Id.  Fourth, the written notice must briefly describe 
the records at issue.  Id.  Fifth, the written notice must 
inform Moustakis that he has five days after "receipt of a 
notice" in which to exercise his right to augment the records.  
Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9)(b).  Sixth, the DOJ must explain that 
Moustakis may augment the records with "written comments and 
documentation" of his choice.  Id.  And finally, if Moustakis 
augments the records, the notice must provide that the DOJ shall 
release the records as augmented by Moustakis.  Id.  
¶78 "Wisconsin has a long history of holding public 
employees accountable through providing complete public access 
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to records that will assist in the public's review."  Schill v. 
Wis. Rapids Sch. Dist., 2010 WI 86, ¶212, 327 Wis. 2d 572, 786 
N.W.2d 177 (Roggensack, J., dissenting).  I dissented in Schill 
because the lead opinion and the concurrence prevented access to 
emails that teachers received on work computers during work time 
in contravention to Wisconsin's tradition of open government.  
Id., ¶211.   
¶79 The notice of Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9)(a) promotes open 
government.  It increases transparency in regard to actions 
taken in the course of governmental business because it permits 
both sides of a concern to be placed before the public.  The 
§ 19.356(9)(a) notice is also an important aspect of fundamental 
fairness to public officers, who serve the people of Wisconsin.  
Dismissal of Moustakis's public records action stands in the way 
of both policies, which are supportive of good government.  
Accordingly, I would hold that the records at issue here cannot 
be released at this time due to the DOJ's failure to fulfill its 
statutory obligations related to the release of the records to 
Lakeland Times. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶80 I dissent because the majority opinion chooses not to 
address obligations of the DOJ under Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9)(a) 
and (b), which must be met prior to release of the public 
records that the Lakeland Times seeks.  Nothing in the record 
shows 
that 
Moustakis 
received 
the 
notice 
required 
by 
§ 19.356(9)(a), 
and 
without 
notice 
sufficient 
to 
satisfy 
§ 19.356(9)(a) and (b), the DOJ is without statutory authority 
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to release records that are at issue here.  Accordingly, I would 
reinstate Moustakis's action under the public records law that 
the circuit court dismissed, and I respectfully concur in part 
and dissent in part from the majority opinion.   
¶81 I am authorized to state that Justices ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND 
ZIEGLER 
and 
MICHAEL 
J. 
GABLEMAN 
join 
this 
concurrence/dissent. 
 
 
 
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