Title: People v. Gentile

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
JOSEPH GENTILE, JR., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S256698 
 
Fourth Appellate District, Division Two 
E069088 
 
Riverside County Superior Court 
INF1401840 
 
 
December 17, 2020 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, Groban, and Grimes* concurred. 
 
 
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate 
District, Division Eight, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
1 
PEOPLE v. GENTILE 
S256698 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
When an accomplice aids and abets a crime, the 
accomplice is culpable for both that crime and any other offense 
committed that is the natural and probable consequence of the 
aided and abetted crime.  Natural and probable consequences 
liability can be imposed even if the accomplice did not intend the 
additional offense.  (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 
1117 (McCoy).)  In People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155 (Chiu), 
we held that natural and probable consequences liability cannot 
extend to first degree premeditated murder because punishing 
someone for first degree premeditated murder when that person 
did not actually perpetrate or intend the killing is inconsistent 
with “reasonable concepts of culpability.”  (Id. at p. 165; see id. 
at p. 166.)   
In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 
(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) after determining that 
there was further “need for statutory changes to more equitably 
sentence offenders in accordance with their involvement in 
homicides.”  (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § l, subd. (b).)  Among other 
things, Senate Bill 1437 amended Penal Code section 188 to 
provide that “[e]xcept as stated in subdivision (e) of Section 189 
[governing felony murder], in order to be convicted of murder, a 
principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought.  Malice 
shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her 
participation in a crime.”  (Pen. Code, § 188, subd. (a)(3); all 
undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.)  We 
PEOPLE v. GENTILE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 2 
are asked to decide the effect of this amendment on the natural 
and probable consequences doctrine as it applies to second 
degree murder. 
We hold that Senate Bill 1437 bars a conviction for second 
degree murder under the natural and probable consequences 
theory.  We further hold that the procedure set forth in 
section 1170.95 is the exclusive mechanism for retroactive relief 
and thus the ameliorative provisions of Senate Bill 1437 do not 
apply to nonfinal judgments on direct appeal. 
I. 
In June 2014, Guillermo Saavedra was found beaten to 
death inside La Casita restaurant in Indio where he lived and 
worked as the caretaker.  Near his body was a broken chair, a 
broken beer bottle, a wooden stick, and a broken golf club with 
Saavedra’s blood on it, as well as bloody shoe and sock prints.  
Also found in the restaurant were cigarette butts containing 
DNA from defendant Joseph Gentile, Jr., his ex-wife Saundra 
Roberts, and Saavedra. 
Around 1:00 a.m. the day before Saavedra’s body was 
found, surveillance footage captured Gentile wandering around 
the nearby Royal Plaza Inn.  Several minutes later, another 
camera outside a laundromat next to the Royal Plaza Inn 
showed Gentile with Roberts and Roberts’s boyfriend Stephen 
Gardner.  When a detective retraced Gentile’s steps from the 
surveillance footage, he found a bloody sock containing 
Saavedra’s DNA as well as DNA consistent with Gentile’s 
profile. 
Gentile was charged with one count of first degree 
premeditated murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) with sentencing 
enhancements for personal use of a deadly weapon (id., 
PEOPLE v. GENTILE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 3 
§§ 12022, subd. (b)(1), 1192.7, subd. (c)(23)) and for one prior 
conviction (id., § 667.5, subd. (b)). 
At trial, the prosecution and Gentile presented dueling 
accounts of the events surrounding Saavedra’s death.  Saundra 
Roberts was the primary witness for the prosecution.  She 
testified that on the day Saavedra was killed, Roberts, Gentile, 
and Saavedra met at La Casita restaurant.  The three talked 
and drank alcohol there into the evening.  At one point, Gentile 
and Saavedra got into an argument, but they remained friendly 
and there was no violence.  After several hours, Roberts felt 
drunk and left to go sleep at a homeless encampment about one 
block away.  When Roberts woke up around 1:00 a.m. or 
1:30 a.m. that night, she went to a nearby convenience store and 
saw Gentile across the street in the parking lot of the Royal 
Plaza Inn.  Roberts approached Gentile and saw that his shirt 
was wet.  Roberts recalled Gentile saying that he had gotten into 
a fight with a man, that he “hurt him pretty bad,” and that he 
“might have killed” him.  Roberts called Gardner and asked him 
to bring a spare set of clothes, which he did.  When Gardner 
arrived and realized that the clothes were for Gentile, he became 
angry and left.  Roberts said she then left and did not see Gentile 
again. 
Gentile provided a different account to the police.  He said 
that when he arrived at the restaurant to meet Roberts, there 
was a man there he had never met.  Roberts told Gentile that 
she was staying at the restaurant with the man.  At some point, 
Roberts also told Gentile that the man had “been raping” her.  
Gentile then punched the man several times but did not use any 
weapon.  Roberts then said the man would never rape her again, 
and she began hitting him with what Gentile thought was a 
sledgehammer.  Gentile took the weapon away from Roberts, 
PEOPLE v. GENTILE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 4 
but she retrieved it and resumed hitting the man.  Gentile took 
the weapon away from Roberts a second time, threw it to the 
ground, and left the premises.  Gentile denied ever striking the 
man with a weapon. 
Gentile’s friend Charlotte Sullivan testified that Gentile 
was scheduled to visit her in Imperial Beach during the Fourth 
of July weekend in 2014.  In late June, around the time that 
Saavedra was killed, Gentile called to ask if he could come out 
earlier than planned.  When she agreed, Gentile came out later 
that same day.  When he arrived, Gentile’s hands were swollen, 
but he did not initially mention anything about being in or 
witnessing a fight.  Eventually, Gentile told Sullivan that he had 
gotten into a fight with another man.  He said that he was drunk 
and that Roberts had told him the other man had raped her.  
Gentile said he punched the other man a few times, but 
eventually the man apologized and Gentile stopped hitting him.  
At that point, Gentile said, Roberts had picked up a club and 
started hitting the man with it.  Gentile was arrested at 
Sullivan’s residence on June 28, 2014.  Sullivan testified that a 
day after the arrest, Roberts called her and said that the man 
who was killed had raped her and that Gentile got upset about 
it.  Roberts also said that Gentile and the man got into a fight 
and that she left before anything else happened.  Further, 
according to Sullivan, Roberts said that she later went back to 
the restaurant, “bleached everything,” and cleaned up the mess. 
The trial court instructed the jury on three separate 
theories of first degree murder:  (1) that Gentile was the direct 
perpetrator of the murder; (2) that he directly aided and abetted 
Roberts in the commission of murder; and (3) that he aided and 
abetted Roberts in the commission of felony assault with a 
deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), the natural and probable 
PEOPLE v. GENTILE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 5 
consequence of which was death.  During deliberations, the jury 
asked the court, “Are fists considered a deadly weapon?”  The 
court responded, “No.”  The jury then convicted Gentile of first 
degree murder and found not true that he personally used a 
deadly weapon.  The prosecution dismissed the prison prior, and 
the court sentenced Gentile to 25 years to life in prison. 
A series of appeals followed.  In Gentile’s first appeal, the 
Court of Appeal reversed his murder conviction after finding 
that the natural and probable consequences jury instruction for 
first degree murder violated Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th 155.  
(People v. Gentile (Feb. 27, 2017, E064822) [nonpub. opn.] 
(Gentile I ).)  The court found it “probable that the jury convicted 
defendant on an unauthorized legal theory” because the trial 
court had instructed the jury on the natural and probable 
consequences theory and the jury did not find that Gentile used 
a deadly or dangerous weapon in committing the crime, 
suggesting that the jury did not think he was the actual 
perpetrator.  (Ibid.)  The Court of Appeal remanded the case for 
the prosecution to decide whether to “retry [Gentile] for the first 
degree murder under theories other than natural and probable 
consequences” or to accept reduction of Gentile’s conviction to 
second degree murder.  (Ibid.)  It did not reach Gentile’s other 
claims.   
On remand, the prosecution elected to accept a reduction 
to second degree murder, and Gentile was sentenced to a prison 
term of 15 years to life.  Meanwhile, on September 30, 2018, the 
Governor signed Senate Bill 1437 into law, which, effective 
January 1, 2019, amended the Penal Code to modify accomplice 
liability for murder and the felony murder rule.  (Stats. 2018, 
ch. 1015.) 
PEOPLE v. GENTILE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 6 
Gentile appealed again, raising the issues the Court of 
Appeal left undecided in his first appeal.  He also sought leave 
to file a supplemental brief arguing that Senate Bill 1437 
applied retroactively to his conviction and that it eliminated 
second degree murder liability under a natural and probable 
consequences theory.  The Court of Appeal rejected Gentile’s 
arguments and affirmed his second degree murder conviction.  
(People v. Gentile (Nov. 15, 2018, E069088) [nonpub. opn.] 
(Gentile II ).)  It disposed of Gentile’s Senate Bill 1437 argument 
in a footnote.  Without deciding whether Senate Bill 1437 
applied retroactively, the court concluded that Senate Bill 1437 
“does not preclude convictions for second degree murder where 
the defendant is an active aider-abettor.  We denied defendant’s 
request because he was, at a minimum, an active aider abettor, 
if not the actual killer, for which a reduction to second degree 
murder was appropriate, pursuant to People v. Chiu (2014) 
59 Cal.4th 155, 166.”  (Ibid.) 
We granted Gentile’s petition for review and transferred 
the case to the Court of Appeal to reconsider Gentile’s second 
degree murder conviction in light of Senate Bill 1437 and “the 
court’s determination, in defendant’s prior appeal, that it is 
probable the jury convicted defendant of murder on the theory 
that he aided and abetted Saundra Roberts in a target crime 
that, as a natural and probable consequence, resulted in her 
murder of the victim.”  (People v. Gentile, S253197, Supreme Ct. 
Mins., Mar. 13, 2019.) 
On reconsideration, the Court of Appeal again affirmed 
Gentile’s second degree murder conviction.  (People v. Gentile 
(May 30, 2019) E069088, review granted and opn. ordered 
nonpub. Sept. 11, 2019, S256698 (Gentile III).)  It construed 
Gentile’s argument to contend that Senate Bill 1437’s 
PEOPLE v. GENTILE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 7 
amendments to section 189 “eliminate[d] all murder liability for 
aiders and abettors.”  (Ibid.)  The court concluded that such an 
interpretation of section 189 was contrary to the text of the 
statute and would conflict with our decision in Chiu.  It 
reiterated that Gentile’s conviction stands because “[a]t a 
minimum . . . [he] was a direct or active aider and abettor” of 
murder.  (Ibid.)  We granted review. 
II. 
Senate Bill 1437 “amend[ed] the felony murder rule and 
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to 
murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a 
person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to 
kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who 
acted with reckless indifference to human life.”  (Stats. 2018, 
ch. 1015, § l, subd. (f).) 
To further that purpose, Senate Bill 1437 added three 
separate provisions to the Penal Code.  First, to amend the 
felony murder rule, Senate Bill 1437 added section 189, 
subdivision (e):  “A participant in the perpetration or attempted 
perpetration of [qualifying felonies] in which a death occurs is 
liable for murder only if one of the following is proven:  
[¶] (1) The person was the actual killer.  [¶] (2) The person was 
not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, 
counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or 
assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the 
first degree.  [¶] (3) The person was a major participant in the 
underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human 
life, as described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.”  Because 
Gentile was not prosecuted under a theory of felony murder, this 
provision is not at issue here.  (§ 189, subd. (a).) 
PEOPLE v. GENTILE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 8 
Second, to amend the natural and probable consequences 
doctrine, Senate Bill 1437 added section 188, subdivision (a)(3) 
(section 188(a)(3)):  “Except [for felony murder liability] as 
stated in subdivision (e) of Section 189, in order to be convicted 
of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice 
aforethought.  Malice shall not be imputed to a person based 
solely on his or her participation in a crime.” 
Third, Senate Bill 1437 added section 1170.95 to provide 
a procedure for those convicted of felony murder or murder 
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to seek 
relief under the two ameliorative provisions above. 
Gentile argues that Senate Bill 1437’s amendments to 
section 188 eliminate second degree murder liability under the 
natural and probable consequences doctrine and that his second 
degree murder conviction must be reversed.  The Attorney 
General does not dispute Gentile’s interpretation of Senate 
Bill 1437 but argues that the erroneous natural and probable 
consequences jury instruction in his case did not prejudice him.  
Exercising our independent judgment (see People v. Lopez 
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 254, 268), we agree with the parties that Senate 
Bill 1437 bars a defendant from being convicted of second degree 
murder under a theory that the defendant aided and abetted a 
crime, the natural and probable consequence of which was 
murder. 
A. 
A person who aids and abets the commission of a crime is 
culpable as a principal in that crime.  (§ 31.)  Aiding and 
abetting is not a separate offense but a form of derivative 
liability for the underlying crime.  (People v. Francisco (1994) 
22 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1190.)  Our law recognizes two forms of 
PEOPLE v. GENTILE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 9 
liability for aiders and abettors.  (McCoy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 
p. 1117.)  First, under direct aiding and abetting principles, an 
accomplice is guilty of an offense perpetrated by another if the 
accomplice aids the commission of that offense with “knowledge 
of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent and [with] an intent 
to assist in achieving those unlawful ends.”  (People v. Perez 
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 1219, 1225.)   
Second, under the natural and probable consequences 
doctrine, an accomplice is guilty not only of the offense he or she 
directly aided or abetted (i.e., the target offense), but also of any 
other offense committed by the direct perpetrator that was the 
“natural and probable consequence” of the crime the accomplice 
aided and abetted (i.e., the nontarget offense).  (Chiu, supra, 
59 Cal.4th at p. 161.)  A nontarget offense is the natural and 
probable consequence of a target offense “if, judged objectively, 
the [nontarget] offense was reasonably foreseeable.”  (Ibid.)  The 
accomplice need not actually foresee the nontarget offense.  
“Rather, liability ‘ “is measured by whether a reasonable person 
in the defendant’s position would have or should have known 
that the charged offense was a reasonably foreseeable 
consequence of the act aided and abetted.” ’ ”  (Id. at p. 162.)   
Unlike direct aiding and abetting liability, culpability 
under the natural and probable consequences theory does not 
require an accomplice to share the direct perpetrator’s intent.  
Instead, “[a]ider and abettor culpability under the natural and 
probable consequences doctrine is vicarious in nature” and “ ‘is 
not premised upon the intention of the aider and abettor to 
commit the nontarget offense because the nontarget offense’ ” 
may not be intended at all.  (Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 164.)  
“[F]or example, if a person aids and abets only an intended 
assault, but a murder results, that person may be guilty of that 
PEOPLE v. GENTILE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 10 
murder, even if unintended, if it is a natural and probable 
consequence of the intended assault.”  (McCoy, supra, 25 Cal.4th 
at p. 1117.) 
 
The natural and probable consequences doctrine is not 
circumscribed by the felony murder principle that prohibits 
murder convictions premised solely on a lesser included offense 
of the murder itself, such as felony assault.  (See People v. 
Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522, 539–540.)  The natural and 
probable consequences doctrine also differs from the law of 
conspiracy, which holds a person liable for crimes that he or she 
agreed with one or more persons to commit and that a member 
of the conspiracy committed in furtherance of the agreement.  
(See People v. Smith (2014) 60 Cal.4th 603, 616–617.)  As one 
treatise notes, the natural and probable consequences doctrine 
is a theory of liability that often exposes a defendant to 
punishment for “a crime of intent although his culpability 
regarding its commission may be no greater than that of 
negligence.”  (Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law (2d ed. 
1995) § 30.05[B][5], p. 444.) 
Murder, whether in the first or second degree, requires 
malice aforethought.  (§ 187.)  Malice can be express or implied.  
It is express when there is a manifest intent to kill (§ 188, 
subd. (a)(1)); it is implied if someone kills with “no considerable 
provocation . . . or when the circumstances attending the killing 
show an abandoned and malignant heart” (§ 188, subd. (a)(2)).  
When a person directly perpetrates a killing, it is the 
perpetrator who must possess such malice.  (See People v. 
Concha (2009) 47 Cal.4th 653, 660 [“To satisfy the mens rea 
element of murder, the defendant must personally act with 
malice aforethought.”]; People v. Soto (2018) 4 Cal.5th 968, 974 
(Soto) [“The mental component [of implied malice] is the 
PEOPLE v. GENTILE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 11 
requirement that the defendant ‘knows that his conduct 
endangers the life of another and . . . acts with conscious 
disregard for life.’ ”].)  Similarly, when a person directly aids and 
abets a murder, the aider and abettor must possess malice 
aforethought.  (McCoy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1118 [“[O]utside 
of the natural and probable consequences doctrine, an aider and 
abettor’s mental state must be at least that required of the direct 
perpetrator.”].)  But until recently, when a person aided and 
abetted a nonhomicide crime that then resulted in a murder, the 
natural and probable consequences doctrine allowed him or her 
to be convicted of murder without personally possessing malice 
aforethought.  So long as the direct perpetrator possessed 
malice, and the killing was a natural and probable consequence 
of the crime the defendant aided and abetted, it did not matter 
whether the defendant intended to kill or acted with conscious 
disregard for human life.  (Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 165–
166.)   
In Chiu, we held that the natural and probable 
consequences doctrine cannot support a conviction for first 
degree premeditated murder.  (Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th at 
p. 167.)  We reasoned that in the context of murder, the natural 
and probable consequences doctrine serves the purpose of 
“deterring aiders and abettors from aiding or encouraging the 
commission of offenses that would naturally, probably, and 
foreseeably result in an unlawful killing.”  (Id. at p. 165.)  But 
this purpose “loses its force” when an accomplice is held culpable 
for first degree premeditated murder under a natural and 
probable consequences theory.  (Id. at p. 166.)  First degree 
premeditated murder carries significantly higher penalties than 
second degree murder and requires the additional mental state 
that the killing be “willful, deliberate, and premeditated.”  
PEOPLE v. GENTILE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 12 
(§ 189, subd. (a); Chiu, at p. 166.)  Whether or not the direct 
perpetrator killed with premeditation “has no effect on the 
resultant harm.  The victim has been killed regardless of the 
perpetrator’s premeditative mental state.”  (Chiu, at p. 166.) 
We further concluded that subjecting an accomplice to 
enhanced punishment based solely on the “uniquely subjective 
and personal” mental state of the direct perpetrator was 
inconsistent with “reasonable concepts of culpability.”  (Chiu, 
supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 166, 165.)  We found “the connection 
between the defendant’s culpability and the perpetrator’s 
premeditative state . . . too attenuated to impose aider and 
abettor liability for first degree murder under the natural and 
probable consequences doctrine.”  (Id. at p. 166.)  By contrast, 
we concluded “that punishment for second degree murder is 
commensurate with” a defendant’s level of culpability under the 
natural and probable consequences doctrine.  (Ibid.)  We thus 
left in place natural and probable consequences liability for 
second degree murder. 
After Chiu, the Legislature in 2017 adopted Senate 
Concurrent Resolution No. 48, which declared the Legislature’s 
intent to enact further “statutory changes to more equitably 
sentence offenders in accordance with their involvement in the 
crime.”  (Sen. Conc. Res. No. 48, Stats. 2017 (2017–2018 Reg. 
Sess.) res. ch. 175 (Senate Concurrent Resolution 48).)  The 
resolution recognized a “need for additional reform when 
addressing aider and abettor liability . . . , specifically the 
‘natural and probable’ consequences doctrine, which . . . results 
in greater punishment for lesser culpability.”  (Ibid.)  The 
Legislature found that the natural and probable consequences 
doctrine “result[s] in individuals lacking the mens rea and 
culpability for murder being punished as if they were the ones 
PEOPLE v. GENTILE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 13 
who committed the fatal act” and that “this leads to overbroad 
application.”  (Ibid.)  It also concluded that “[i]t can be cruel and 
unusual punishment to not assess individual liability for 
nonperpetrators of the fatal act . . . and impute culpability for 
another’s bad act, thereby imposing lengthy sentences that are 
disproportionate to the conduct in the underlying case.”  (Ibid.) 
A year later, the Legislature cited Senate Concurrent 
Resolution 48 when it enacted Senate Bill 1437.  (Stats. 2018, 
ch. 1015, § l, subd. (c) [“Senate Concurrent Resolution 48 
. . . outlines the need for the statutory changes contained in this 
measure.”].)  Among other things, Senate Bill 1437 modified the 
requirement of malice aforethought for purposes of murder.  
Now, except for felony murder, “in order to be convicted of 
murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice 
aforethought.  Malice shall not be imputed to a person based 
solely on his or her participation in a crime.”  (§ 188(a)(3), italics 
added.) 
The most natural meaning of this provision, construed in 
the context of Senate Bill 1437 as a whole and in the context of 
the Penal Code, bars a conviction for first or second degree 
murder under a natural and probable consequences theory.  
Except for felony murder, section 188(a)(3) makes personally 
possessing malice aforethought a necessary element of murder.  
Natural and probable consequences liability for murder contains 
no such requirement. 
The language of section 188(a)(3) requires a principal to 
“act with malice aforethought” in order to be convicted of 
murder, making no exception for accomplices or second degree 
murder.  (§ 188(a)(3).)  By its terms, section 188(a)(3) permits a 
second degree murder conviction only if the prosecution can 
PEOPLE v. GENTILE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 14 
prove the defendant acted with the accompanying mental state 
of mind of malice aforethought.  The prosecution cannot 
“impute[] [malice] to a person based solely on his or her 
participation in a crime.”  (Ibid.) 
Senate Bill 1437’s legislative findings confirm this 
straightforward reading of the statute.  The Legislature stated 
a need for “statutory changes to more equitably sentence 
offenders in accordance with their involvement in homicides.”  
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § l, subd. (b).)  Accordingly, the 
Legislature found it “necessary to amend the felony murder rule 
and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it 
relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed 
on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the 
intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying 
felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.”  (Id., 
§ 1, subd. (f).)  Critically, the Legislature said that with the 
exception of the felony murder rule, “[a] person’s culpability for 
murder must be premised upon that person’s own actions and 
subjective mens rea.”  (Id., § l, subd. (g), italics added.)  These 
findings, like the text of the statute, clearly indicate that the 
Legislature intended to restrict culpability for murder outside 
the felony murder rule to persons who personally possess malice 
aforethought. 
The natural and probable consequences doctrine is 
incompatible with this requirement because an aider and 
abettor need not personally possess malice, express or implied, 
to be convicted of second degree murder under a natural and 
probable consequences theory.  (See Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th at 
p. 164 [“ ‘the mens rea of the aider and abettor with respect to 
[the nontarget] offense is irrelevant’ ”]; People v. Culuko (2000) 
78 Cal.App.4th 307, 322 [“The natural and probable 
PEOPLE v. GENTILE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 15 
consequences doctrine . . . allows an aider and abettor to be 
convicted of murder, without malice . . . .”].)  Indeed, the natural 
and probable consequences doctrine authorizes precisely what 
Senate Bill 1437 forbids:  it allows a factfinder to impute malice 
“to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.”  
(§ 188(a)(3).)  Under the doctrine, “individuals lacking the mens 
rea and culpability for murder [are] punished as if they were the 
ones who committed the fatal act.”  (Sen. Conc. Res. 48, supra.) 
Further, we observe that in addition to amending the 
substantive law of murder, Senate Bill 1437 provided a 
procedure for defendants with eligible murder convictions to 
petition to have their convictions vacated through the trial 
court.  (§ 1170.95.)  This procedure expressly contemplates that 
defendants convicted of second degree murder can avail 
themselves of Senate Bill 1437’s ameliorative provisions.  Under 
section 1170.95, a defendant may petition to have his or her 
conviction vacated when, among other conditions, the following 
apply:  “The petitioner was convicted of first degree or second 
degree murder following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of 
a trial at which the petitioner could be convicted for first degree 
or second degree murder” (§ 1170.95, subd. (a)(2)), and “[t]he 
petitioner could not be convicted of first or second degree murder 
because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective 
January 1, 2019” (§ 1170.95, subd. (a)(3)).  If Senate Bill 1437 
were inapplicable to second degree murder, there would have 
been no need to include second degree murder among the 
convictions eligible for relief under section 1170.95. 
Apart from the Court of Appeal decision in this case, every 
published Court of Appeal opinion to address the issue has 
concluded that Senate Bill 1437 eliminates natural and 
probable consequences liability for murder regardless of degree.  
PEOPLE v. GENTILE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 16 
(See, e.g., People v. Lopez (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1102–
1103 & fn. 9, review granted on another issue Nov. 13, 2019, 
S258175 (Lopez); People v. Larios (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 956, 
964, review granted Feb. 26, 2020, S259983; People v. Verdugo 
(2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 320, 323, review granted on another issue 
Mar. 18, 2020, S260493; People v. Lewis (2020) 43 Cal.App.5th 
1128, 1135, review granted on another issue Mar. 18, 2020, 
S260598; People v. Medrano (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1001, 1007–
1008, review granted on another issue Mar. 11, 2020, S259948; 
People v. Lee (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 254, 262, review granted on 
another issue July 15, 2020, S262459; People v. Offley (2020) 
48 Cal.App.5th 588, 595.)  We agree with these authorities. 
B. 
The Court of Appeal here appeared to recognize that 
Senate Bill 1437 “intended to prohibit murder convictions where 
the participant was not the actual killer or a direct aider or 
abettor of the murderer.”  (Gentile III, supra, E069088.)  But it 
then misconstrued Gentile’s argument by stating that 
“[c]ontrary 
to 
defendant’s 
interpretation, 
section 189, 
subdivision (e) does not eliminate all murder liability for aiders 
and abettors.”  (Ibid.)  That was not Gentile’s argument in the 
Court of Appeal or in this court.  Gentile has consistently argued 
that Senate Bill 1437 eliminated aiding and abetting murder 
liability under the natural and probable consequences theory, 
not that it eliminated all aiding and abetting murder liability.  
Senate Bill 1437 does not eliminate direct aiding and abetting 
liability for murder because a direct aider and abettor to murder 
must possess malice aforethought.  (McCoy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 
p. 1118.) 
PEOPLE v. GENTILE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 17 
Nor is Gentile’s argument based on section 189.  He has 
consistently argued that section 188 eliminates natural and 
probable consequences liability for second degree murder.  
Section 189, subdivision (e) does not apply to this case; that 
provision addresses liability under the felony murder rule.  The 
jury in Gentile’s case was never instructed on the felony murder 
rule, and Gentile was not charged with a predicate felony that 
can serve as the basis for felony murder.  (§ 189, subd. (a).)  Nor 
does anyone argue that assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, 
subd. (a)(1)) — the crime that Gentile is alleged to have aided 
and abetted — is a qualifying felony for felony murder purposes. 
The Court of Appeal also reasoned that Gentile’s 
contention would run counter to Chiu, which “made clear that 
second degree murder liability is proportional to the culpability 
of an aider and abettor under the natural and probable 
consequences doctrine.”  (Gentile III, supra, E069088.)  But 
Senate Bill 1437 superseded that portion of Chiu by amending 
section 188 to require that a defendant personally possess 
malice aforethought to be convicted of murder, with only the 
exception of felony murder. 
The San Diego County District Attorney (District 
Attorney) as amicus curiae argues that Senate Bill 1437 should 
be interpreted only to modify the natural and probable 
consequences doctrine for murder rather than to eliminate it.  
The District Attorney argues that what section 188(a)(3) does is 
add the element of malice aforethought to natural and probable 
consequences liability.  In other words, the District Attorney 
contends that to be culpable for murder under the natural and 
probable consequences theory after Senate Bill 1437, a 
defendant must aid in and intend the commission of a target 
offense, the target offense must have foreseeably resulted in 
PEOPLE v. GENTILE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 18 
murder, and additionally the defendant must possess malice 
aforethought.  The District Attorney points to the fact that 
uncodified section 1, subdivision (f) of Senate Bill 1437 uses the 
word “amend.”  (Id., § 1, subd. (f) [“It is necessary to amend the 
felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences 
doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability 
is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not 
act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the 
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human 
life.”].) 
But it is not unreasonable to say that Senate Bill 1437 
“amend[ed] . . . the natural and probable consequences doctrine, 
as it relates to murder,” by eliminating the doctrine’s 
applicability to murder while leaving the doctrine intact with 
respect to other crimes.  (Id., § 1, subd. (f).)  In any event, an 
uncodified statement of purpose cannot substitute for operative 
statutory language (see Scher v. Burke (2017) 3 Cal.5th 136, 
148–149; Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 
29 Cal.4th 53, 58–61).  By limiting murder liability to those 
principals who personally acted with malice aforethought, 
section 188(a)(3) eliminates what was the core feature of natural 
and probable consequences murder liability:  the absence of a 
requirement that the defendant personally possess malice 
aforethought.  As a result, the most natural reading of Senate 
Bill 1437’s operative language is that it eliminates natural and 
probable consequences liability for first and second degree 
murder.  Further, we agree with the Attorney General that the 
District Attorney’s proposed “hybrid doctrine” is “confusing and 
unnecessary” and is most likely not what the Legislature 
intended. 
PEOPLE v. GENTILE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 19 
The District Attorney points to two unpublished cases to 
illustrate the importance of creating a “hybrid doctrine.”  In one 
case, the driver in a drive-by shooting was convicted of second 
degree murder after he “observed rival gang members on [his 
gang’s] ‘turf’ ” and “drove up to the rivals at a rapid speed to 
scare them” as well as “beat them up and harm them,” at which 
point his companion suddenly opened fire and caused the death 
of one of the rival gang members.  (People v. Franco (Dec. 10, 
2012, D060354) [nonpub. opn.].)  In the other case, three gang 
members were convicted of second degree murder for ambushing 
and stabbing to death a person walking home, but the evidence 
was inconclusive as to which of the defendants actually caused 
the death of the victim.  (People v. Dean (Sept. 30, 2020, 
D074371) [nonpub. opn.].)  Without a “hybrid doctrine,” the 
District Attorney contends, these defendants would have 
“literally g[otten] away with murder.” 
As the Attorney General observes, however, second degree 
murder in both cases might have been pursued under a direct 
aiding and abetting theory.  Such a theory requires that “the 
aider and abettor . . . know and share the murderous intent of 
the actual perpetrator.”  (McCoy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1118).  
For implied malice, the intent requirement is satisfied by proof 
that the actual perpetrator “ ‘knows that his conduct endangers 
the life of another and . . . acts with conscious disregard for 
life.’ ”  (Soto, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 974.)  Therefore, 
notwithstanding Senate Bill 1437’s elimination of natural and 
probable consequences liability for second degree murder, an 
aider and abettor who does not expressly intend to aid a killing 
can still be convicted of second degree murder if the person 
knows that his or her conduct endangers the life of another and 
acts with conscious disregard for life. 
PEOPLE v. GENTILE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 20 
In other cases involving conduct resulting in a victim’s 
death, a murder prosecution can proceed under the “substantial 
factor” causation doctrine or the felony murder rule.  (See, e.g., 
People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 643; People v. Chun 
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1182.)  Moreover, the foreseeable result 
of a defendant’s actions, though insufficient by itself to result in 
liability for murder, remains relevant to assessing whether the 
defendant acted with malice aforethought or whether the 
defendant’s actions were sufficiently connected to the victim’s 
death as a matter of proximate cause. 
Even if the “hybrid doctrine” might theoretically reach 
some conduct not reached by the doctrines above, the universe 
of such conduct — where there is proof of malice aforethought 
but insufficient evidence of direct aiding and abetting or other 
liability for murder — seems ill-defined and, in any event, quite 
narrow.  We are not persuaded that the Legislature intended to 
preserve natural and probable consequences liability for murder 
through a “hybrid doctrine” that would apply to a vague and, in 
all likelihood, very small set of cases.  In addition, the District 
Attorney’s proposed jury instructions for the “hybrid doctrine” 
would unnecessarily complicate an already complicated body of 
law.  As the Attorney General explains, the core feature of the 
natural and probable consequences doctrine is that it eliminates 
the mental state requirement for the nontarget crime — here, 
eliminating the malice requirement for murder.  To instruct a 
jury on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, the 
essence of which is that malice is not required, and then ask the 
jury to assess whether the defendant acted with malice, would 
pose a substantial risk of confusion.  This further suggests that 
the Legislature did not intend to adopt a “hybrid doctrine,” and 
we decline to do so judicially.  
PEOPLE v. GENTILE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 21 
In sum, we hold that section 188(a)(3) bars conviction for 
second degree murder under a natural and probable 
consequences theory. 
III. 
When a trial court instructs the jury on alternative 
theories of guilt and at least one of those theories is legally 
erroneous at the time it was given, we normally assess whether 
the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under 
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.  (People v. 
Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 3.)  We “must reverse the 
conviction unless, after examining the entire cause, including 
the evidence, and considering all relevant circumstances, [we] 
determine[] the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
(Ibid.) 
Here, Senate Bill 1437 did not become effective until after 
Gentile’s conviction.  (§ 1170.95, subd. (a)(3) [“changes to 
Section 188 [and] 189 [are] made effective January 1, 2019”].)  
As a result, whether Gentile may obtain relief in this direct 
appeal depends on whether the ameliorative provisions of 
Senate Bill 1437 apply retroactively to cases not yet final on 
appeal.  Gentile argues that under In re Estrada (1965) 
63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada), the amendments Senate Bill 1437 
made to sections 188 and 189 should apply retroactively to cases 
on direct review.  The Attorney General contends that the text 
and structure of Senate Bill 1437 make clear that while its 
ameliorative provisions apply retroactively, defendants may 
seek relief only by filing a section 1170.95 petition in superior 
court.  The Courts of Appeal have uniformly agreed with the 
Attorney General’s view.  (Lopez, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at 
pp. 1113–1114, rev. granted on another issue; People v. 
PEOPLE v. GENTILE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 22 
Munoz (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 738, 751–753, review granted on 
another issue Nov. 26, 2019, S258234; People v. Martinez (2019) 
31 Cal.App.5th 719, 727–729 (Martinez); People v. Cervantes 
(2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 213, 220–221 (Cervantes); People v. 
Anthony (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1102, 1147–1158; People v. Bell 
(2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1, 10–11.)  We do as well:  The 
ameliorative provisions of Senate Bill 1437 do not apply on 
direct appeal to nonfinal convictions obtained before the law 
became effective.  Such convictions may be challenged on Senate 
Bill 1437 grounds only through a petition filed in the sentencing 
court under section 1170.95. 
Newly enacted legislation lessening criminal punishment 
or reducing criminal liability presumptively applies to all cases 
not yet final on appeal at the time of the legislation’s effective 
date.  (See Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 744–745.)  This 
presumption “rests on an inference that, in the absence of 
contrary indications, a legislative body ordinarily intends for 
ameliorative changes to the criminal law to extend as broadly as 
possible, distinguishing only as necessary between sentences 
that are final and sentences that are not.”  (People v. Conley 
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 657 (Conley); see People v. Frahs (2020) 
9 Cal.5th 618, 628–629; Estrada, at p. 745.)  
However, when ameliorative legislation sets out a specific 
mechanism as the exclusive avenue for retroactive relief, we 
have held that such legislation does not apply retroactively to 
nonfinal judgments on direct appeal.  (See Conley, supra, 
63 Cal.4th at pp. 656–659; People v. DeHoyos (2018) 4 Cal.5th 
594, 602–603 (DeHoyos).)  In Conley, we concluded that 
Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, did not 
apply retroactively to defendants whose convictions were not yet 
final on appeal based on three “interpretive considerations.”  
PEOPLE v. GENTILE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 23 
(Conley, at p. 657.)  First, Proposition 36 established a specific 
mechanism for defendants to seek resentencing in light of its 
ameliorative provisions, and that mechanism “dr[ew] no 
distinction between persons serving final sentences and those 
serving nonfinal sentences.”  (Ibid.)  Second, Proposition 36 did 
not make resentencing automatic; its provisions directed the 
trial court to evaluate whether early release would pose “an 
‘unreasonable risk of danger to public safety’ ” based on the 
defendant’s criminal history and other factors.  (Id. at p. 658.)  
Third, we explained that other complexities in the law — 
including the fact that it created a new set of sentencing factors 
that must be pleaded and proved by the prosecution and did not 
specify how the prosecution would meet that burden in a case 
where the defendant was already sentenced — indicated that 
“voters intended for previously sentenced defendants to seek 
relief” solely through a resentencing petition as provided by the 
initiative.  (Id. at p. 661; id. at pp. 659–660.) 
In DeHoyos, we held that Proposition 47, the Safe 
Neighborhoods and Schools Act, did not apply retroactively to 
cases on direct review.  (DeHoyos, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 603.)  
Proposition 47 contained a specific mechanism for resentencing 
that did not draw a distinction between persons serving final 
and nonfinal sentences.  (Ibid.)  And Proposition 47 did not 
automatically entitle defendants to relief; it required the trial 
court to assess whether early release would pose a risk to public 
safety.  (Ibid.)  Finally, although Proposition 47 did not create 
new sentencing factors that must be pleaded and proved by the 
prosecution, “other indicia of legislative intent” — including the 
breadth of the statement of purpose in the Voter Information 
Guide — indicated that the voters intended to extend relief to 
PEOPLE v. GENTILE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 24 
all defendants who had not yet completed their sentences, 
subject to the law’s resentencing mechanism.  (Ibid.) 
Similarly here, Senate Bill 1437 creates a specific 
mechanism for retroactive application of its ameliorative 
provisions.  Section 1170.95 lays out a process for a person 
convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and 
probable consequences theory to seek vacatur of his or her 
conviction and resentencing.  First, the person must file a 
petition with the trial court that sentenced the petitioner 
declaring, among other things, that the petitioner “could not be 
convicted of first or second degree murder because of changes to 
Section 188 or 189.”  (§ 1170.95, subd. (a)(3); see § 1170.95, 
subd. (b)(1)(A).)  Then, the trial court must “review the petition 
and determine if the petitioner has made a prima facie showing 
that the petitioner falls within the provisions of th[e] section.”  
(§ 1170.95, subd. (c).)  If so, the trial court must issue an order 
to show cause and hold a hearing to determine whether to vacate 
the murder conviction and to resentence the petitioner on any 
remaining counts.  (§ 1170.95, subds. (c), (d)(1).)  At the hearing, 
the prosecution must “prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing.”  (§ 1170.95, 
subd. (d)(3).)  “The prosecutor and the petitioner may rely on the 
record of conviction or offer new or additional evidence to meet 
their respective burdens.”  (Ibid.)  We express no view here on 
the questions regarding the section 1170.95 process that are 
before us in People v. Lewis (2020) 43 Cal. App. 5th 1128, review 
granted Mar. 18, 2020, S260598. 
Two considerations lead us to conclude that the 
Legislature intended section 1170.95 to be the exclusive avenue 
for retroactive relief under Senate Bill 1437.  First, the 
Legislature crafted a specific mechanism for seeking retroactive 
PEOPLE v. GENTILE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 25 
relief, and that mechanism does not distinguish between 
persons whose sentences are final and those whose sentences 
are not.  “That the Legislature specifically created this 
mechanism, which facially applies to both final and nonfinal 
convictions, is a significant indication that Senate Bill 1437 
should not be applied retroactively to nonfinal convictions on 
direct appeal.”  (Martinez, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 727.) 
Second, 
section 
1170.95 
by 
its 
terms 
does 
not 
automatically provide all defendants with a right to relief.  
Instead, it requires the sentencing court to assess the 
defendant’s eligibility for and entitlement to relief through a 
petition and hearing process in which the prosecution and the 
petitioner “may rely on the record of conviction or offer new or 
additional evidence to meet their respective burdens.”  
(§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(3), italics added; see § 1170.95, subds. (a), 
(c).)  The fact that Senate Bill 1437 provides the parties “with 
the opportunity to go beyond the original record in the petition 
process, a step unavailable on direct appeal, is strong evidence 
the Legislature intended for persons seeking the ameliorative 
benefits of Senate Bill 1437 to proceed via the petitioning 
procedure.”  (Martinez, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 728.)  We 
express no view on the circumstances in which new or additional 
evidence may result in the denial of relief to a defendant who 
has made a prima facie showing under section 1170.95.  We 
simply observe that the Legislature, while intending to provide 
relief to defendants whose convictions do not reflect their 
individual culpability, also allowed for the possibility that some 
convictions that implicate the ameliorative provisions of Senate 
Bill 1437 may nonetheless remain valid. 
The Office of the State Public Defender as amicus curiae 
contends that because Senate Bill 1437 completely abolished 
PEOPLE v. GENTILE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 26 
murder liability on a natural and probable consequences theory, 
the applicable precedent on retroactivity is not Conley or 
DeHoyos but People v. Rossi (1976) 18 Cal.3d 295.  Rossi was 
convicted of violating former section 288a, which criminalized 
all acts of oral copulation.  Before her conviction became final, 
the Legislature amended section 288a in a manner that 
legalized her conduct.  We reversed the conviction, stating that 
the Estrada rule applies not only when new legislation reduces 
punishment for a crime, but also “when criminal sanctions have 
been completely repealed before a criminal conviction becomes 
final.”  (Rossi, at p. 301.)  But Rossi did not involve ameliorative 
legislation that contained express provisions for obtaining 
retroactive relief.  It is true that Senate Bill 1437, unlike the 
statutes considered in Conley and DeHoyos, went beyond 
reducing punishment for particular crimes and altogether 
eliminated a theory of liability for murder.  But it did so in a 
manner that expressly provides a mechanism for retroactive 
relief.  In light of this feature, Rossi is inapt, and Conley and 
DeHoyos are more analogous to this case. 
The Office of the State Public Defender also contends that 
the word “may” instead of “shall” in the first sentence of 
section 1170.95 indicates that the Legislature did not intend the 
section 1170.95 petition process to be an exclusive remedy.  But 
the resentencing schemes we considered in Conley and DeHoyos 
also used “may” instead of “shall.”  (See Conley, supra, 
63 Cal.4th at p. 655; DeHoyos, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 598.)  By 
authorizing defendants to petition for relief, the word “may” in 
section 1170.95 does not suggest that relief on direct review is 
also available. 
Gentile makes several arguments for the availability of 
relief on direct appeal, but none is persuasive.  First, he argues 
PEOPLE v. GENTILE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 27 
that Conley and DeHoyos are distinguishable because Senate 
Bill 1437, unlike Proposition 36 and Proposition 47, does not 
mandate a separate inquiry into dangerousness or impose any 
other discretionary requirement for retroactive relief.  That is 
true, but section 1170.95 requires the superior court to 
determine on an individualized basis, after considering any new 
or additional evidence offered by the parties, whether the 
defendant is entitled to relief.  This suggests the Legislature’s 
intent to limit retroactive relief to the procedures in 
section 1170.95. 
Second, Gentile contends that the Legislature included 
section 1170.95 in order to “grant a form of super-retroactivity, 
over and above the retroactivity that the law would ordinarily 
provide, in order to extend the benefit of Estrada to those with 
final judgments” rather than seeking to “deny the benefit of 
Estrada to those with nonfinal judgments.”  But nothing in the 
statute’s text or legislative history supports this assertion.  The 
Legislature enacted Senate Bill 1437 several months after our 
decision in DeHoyos and more than two years after Conley.  Both 
cases had construed a resentencing mechanism that “dr[ew] no 
distinction between persons serving final sentences and those 
serving nonfinal sentences” to apply to both categories of 
persons.  (Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 657; see DeHoyos, 
supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 603.)  Against this backdrop, if the 
Legislature had intended section 1170.95 to apply only to 
defendants whose convictions had become final, we would expect 
the Legislature to have clearly said so. 
Third, Gentile argues that section 1170.95, subdivision (f) 
— which says, “This section does not diminish or abrogate any 
rights or remedies otherwise available to the petitioner” — 
suggests the petition process was not intended to be an exclusive 
PEOPLE v. GENTILE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 28 
mechanism for relief.  But there is “no indication that reversal 
of a defendant’s sentence on direct appeal without compliance 
with the procedures outlined in section 1170.95 was among the 
‘rights’ the Legislature sought to preserve in enacting Senate 
Bill 1437.”  (Martinez, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 729; see 
Cervantes, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 224–225.)  We rejected 
similar arguments with regard to Proposition 36 (see Conley, 
supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 661–662) and Proposition 47 (see 
DeHoyos, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 605–606), and we reject 
Gentile’s argument here as well. 
Fourth, 
Gentile 
says 
the 
Legislature 
included 
section 1170.95 in order to level the playing field for defendants 
with final convictions, since the typical remedy for a defendant 
with a nonfinal conviction would be reversal and remand for a 
new trial where new or additional evidence can be offered.  This 
argument also finds no support in the statute’s text or legislative 
history.  As the Attorney General observes, Gentile’s argument 
cannot be reconciled with the fact that allowing defendants to 
obtain automatic relief on direct appeal would “strip the 
prosecution of its statutorily granted right to introduce new or 
additional evidence to defend the continuing validity of the 
conviction” during the section 1170.95 process.   
Fifth, Gentile contends that the Legislature crafted the 
section 1170.95 petition process to “avoid unfairness . . . to 
parties who may not have previously litigated an issue that was 
not relevant but now is.”  He gives the example of a prosecutor 
who opted not to introduce evidence that the defendant acted 
with implied malice and was guilty of second degree murder 
because the prosecutor was pursuing a felony murder theory 
that did not require a showing of malice aforethought.  We agree 
that the Legislature authorized the parties to offer new or 
PEOPLE v. GENTILE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 29 
additional evidence during the section 1170.95 process in order 
to allow the parties to explore issues they did not explore under 
the prior state of the law.  The statute contemplates that such 
evidence may inform whether a conviction remains valid despite 
the ameliorative provisions of Senate Bill 1437.  But this aspect 
of the statute does not suggest that the Legislature intended to 
allow defendants to obtain relief from nonfinal judgments on 
direct review.  Instead, it suggests the opposite.   
Sixth, Gentile argues that because “Chiu applies to cases 
not yet final on direct appeal, it would be illogical to conclude 
the further and analogous change in the law effectuated by the 
amendment to Penal Code sections 188 and 189 does not.”  We 
see nothing illogical here.  Chiu’s applicability to nonfinal 
judgments does not make it unreasonable for the Legislature to 
require defendants to proceed under section 1170.95 in order to 
obtain relief on a claim not governed by Chiu. 
Apart from his statutory arguments, Gentile says that 
section 1170.95, as applied to a nonfinal conviction, violates the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution because it 
allows a judge rather than a jury to “redetermine an inmate’s 
guilt under the revised homicide statutes.”  He relies on People 
v. Ramos (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 99.  Ramos was convicted by a 
jury of unlawful transportation of heroin under a statute that 
prohibited any transportation of certain controlled substances.  
(Id. at pp. 100, 102.)  Before Ramos’s conviction became final, 
new legislation limited criminal liability to transportation of the 
enumerated controlled substances “for sale.”  (Id. at pp. 102–
103.)  The Court of Appeal held that because these changes were 
“retroactive” and applied to Ramos, and because a jury “did not 
determine whether the heroin she transported was for sale 
rather than personal use,” her conviction had to be reversed.  
PEOPLE v. GENTILE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 30 
(Id. at p. 103.)  But Ramos is not squarely on point because the 
ameliorative change was retroactive to cases on direct review.  
(Id. at p. 103 [“Defendant contends, the People concede, and we 
agree, the amendment is retroactive” on direct appeal and 
“applies to defendant.”].)  Here, we have determined that Senate 
Bill 1437’s ameliorative changes to sections 188 and 189 are not 
retroactive to cases on direct review.  This reasoning also rebuts 
the argument, raised by the California Attorneys for Criminal 
Justice, that Gentile’s instructional error argument must be 
addressed on direct review.   
The crux of Gentile’s argument is that the section 1170.95 
process violates the principle that “[o]ther than the fact of a 
prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted 
to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (Apprendi v. 
New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490; see Alleyne v. United States 
(2013) 570 U.S. 99, 103.)  In People v. Perez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1055 
(Perez), the defendant similarly argued that Proposition 36 
entitled eligible defendants to ameliorative relief and that any 
factual finding by the trial court resulting in the denial of relief 
was a finding that effectively increased his sentence in violation 
of Apprendi.  (Perez, at p. 1064.)  We disagreed, explaining that 
“Proposition 36 does not automatically reduce, recall, or vacate 
any sentence by operation of law.”  (Ibid.)  “It is up to the inmate 
to petition for recall of the sentence, and at all times prior to the 
trial court’s resentencing determination, the petitioner’s 
original . . . sentence remains in effect.  Under this scheme, a 
factual finding that results in resentencing ineligibility does not 
increase the petitioner’s sentence; it simply leaves the original 
sentence intact.”  (Ibid.) 
PEOPLE v. GENTILE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 31 
Gentile argues Perez is distinguishable on two grounds:  it 
involved a final conviction, not a nonfinal one as here; and the 
finding at issue in Perez did not concern a fact essential to the 
validity of the underlying conviction or the original sentence 
when imposed, insofar as Proposition 36 merely reduced the 
punishment for particular third strike convictions without 
disturbing the validity of those convictions.  (Perez, supra, 
4 Cal.5th at p. 1064.)  But this issue is not presented in this 
direct appeal.  Gentile has not filed a petition for resentencing 
under section 1170.95, nor do we have before us a 
section 1170.95 proceeding in which the trial court relied on 
facts not found by a jury to sustain an otherwise invalid 
conviction.  Accordingly, we have no occasion here to opine on 
whether denial of a section 1170.95 petition on the basis of such 
factual findings would run afoul of Apprendi. 
 
Further, Gentile contends that requiring defendants to 
pursue relief exclusively through section 1170.95 violates the 
appellate jurisdiction clause of the California Constitution by 
“cut[ting] off a significant limb of the Court of Appeal and this 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction and bestow[ing] it onto the 
superior court.”  (See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11, subd. (a) [with 
the exception of death penalty cases, the Courts of Appeal have 
appellate jurisdiction in virtually all cases where the superior 
courts had original jurisdiction, as well as in other cases when 
prescribed by statute].)  As a matter of constitutional avoidance, 
he says, we should construe the revisions to sections 188 and 
189 as applying retroactively to cases not yet final on appeal.  
The amicus brief of the California Attorneys for Criminal 
Justice echoes this argument.   
But nothing in the language of the appellate jurisdiction 
clause “conveys an intention to grant litigants a right of direct 
PEOPLE v. GENTILE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 32 
appeal from judgments in proceedings within the superior 
courts’ original jurisdiction.”  (Leone v. Medical Board (2000) 
22 Cal.4th 660, 666.)  “ ‘Giving the words their ordinary 
meaning, the provision serves to establish and allocate judicial 
authority, not to define or guarantee the rights of litigants.  
Indeed, the provision nowhere mentions direct appeals or a 
“right of appeal.” ’ ”  (Ibid.)   It is true that “[b]ecause the 
appellate jurisdiction clause is a grant of judicial authority, the 
Legislature may not restrict appellate review in a manner that 
would ‘ “substantially impair the constitutional powers of the 
courts, or practically defeat their exercise.” ’ ”  (Id. at p. 668.)  
But Senate Bill 1437 does not cause any such impairment.  
Although Gentile may not obtain relief from his sentence under 
the ameliorative provisions of Senate Bill 1437 on direct review, 
he may still exercise his right under section 1237 to appeal his 
felony conviction on other available grounds.  And if the superior 
court holds that Gentile is not entitled to relief under 
section 1170.95, he may appeal that ruling.  Because Senate 
Bill 1437 does not bar appellate review of Gentile’s claim for 
relief, it does not violate the appellate jurisdiction clause of the 
California Constitution. 
Finally, the Office of the State Public Defender argues 
that our reading of Senate Bill 1437 will lead to unnecessary 
delay if defendants await resolution of their direct appeals 
before filing a section 1170.95 petition.  But nothing prevents 
defendants from seeking to stay their direct appeals in order to 
pursue relief under Senate Bill 1437.  While a notice of appeal 
vests exclusive jurisdiction in the appellate court “until 
determination of the appeal and issuance of the remittitur” 
(People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 554), a defendant may 
nevertheless file a motion in the appellate court requesting a 
PEOPLE v. GENTILE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 33 
stay of the appeal and a limited remand for the purpose of 
pursuing section 1170.95 relief.  An appellate court may grant 
such a stay and limited remand where good cause supports the 
motion.  (See Martinez, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 729; 
Cervantes, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 226; see also People v. 
Awad (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 215, 220 [appellate courts may 
“issue a limited remand to the trial court, before reaching the 
merits of the appeal, for the specific purpose of allowing the 
lower court to entertain a . . . petition to recall a sentence” under 
Proposition 47].)  “In those cases where a stay is granted and a 
section 1170.95 petition is successful, the direct appeal may 
either be fully or partially moot.  If the petition is unsuccessful, 
a defendant may seek to augment the appellate record, as 
necessary, to proceed with any issues that remain for decision.”  
(Martinez, at p. 729.) 
In sum, we conclude that the ameliorative provisions of 
Senate Bill 1437 do not automatically apply to nonfinal 
judgments on direct appeal.  Gentile must proceed under 
section 1170.95 in order to obtain relief from his second degree 
murder conviction.   
IV. 
In Gentile I, the Court of Appeal observed that the 
superior court “instructed the jury at length that it could convict 
defendant of first degree murder” under a natural and probable 
consequences theory.  (Gentile I, supra, E064822.)  The court 
said “[t]he fact the jury did not find that the defendant used a 
deadly or dangerous weapon in the commission of the offense 
supports an inference that the jury convicted him on [a natural 
and probable consequences] theory” instead of viewing him as 
the direct perpetrator of the crime.  (Ibid.)  Indeed, the Attorney 
PEOPLE v. GENTILE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 34 
General’s briefing in Gentile I conceded that there was “no basis 
in th[e] record to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
jury ultimately rested its verdict on the theory that [Gentile] 
directly aided and abetted” the murder.  Noting “the 
pathologist’s determination that it would be difficult to cause 
the victim’s fractured clavicle and the rib below it with the fists 
alone,” and relying on the Attorney General’s concession that 
the record does not permit a conclusion that the jury’s first 
degree murder verdict was based on a valid ground, the Court 
of Appeal concluded it was “probable that the jury convicted 
defendant on an unauthorized legal theory.”  (Ibid.)   
Yet in the decision below, the Court of Appeal reached a 
different conclusion.  “[A]fter reviewing the record,” it concluded 
that Gentile “was a direct or active aider and abettor” of murder, 
and that “no resort to the natural and probable consequences 
theory applies.”  (Gentile III, supra, E069088.)  Given the 
Attorney General’s prior concessions and the fact that 
section 1170.95 permits the parties to offer “new or additional 
evidence” in a resentencing proceeding, the Court of Appeal was 
poorly positioned on direct review to conclude that “defendant 
was, at a minimum, an active aider-abettor who is not entitled 
to vacation of his murder conviction.”  (Gentile III, supra, 
E069088.)  In light of these considerations, that conclusion has 
no preclusive effect if Gentile files a petition for relief from his 
murder conviction under section 1170.95. 
Going forward, the parties agree that Gentile has made “a 
prima facie showing that he . . . is entitled to relief” (§ 1170.95, 
subd. (c)) in light of the Attorney General’s concessions and the 
Court of Appeal’s determination in Gentile I that it is “probable” 
the jury relied on a natural and probable consequences theory 
in finding him guilty of murder.  In their section 1170.95 
PEOPLE v. GENTILE 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
 35 
briefing, the parties are free to litigate what bearing, if any, 
doctrines of estoppel or preclusion may have in light of those 
prior concessions and the Court of Appeal’s determination in 
Gentile I. 
CONCLUSION 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed.  The 
matter is remanded to that court to affirm Gentile’s second 
degree murder conviction without prejudice to any petition for 
relief that Gentile may file under section 1170.95. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
GRIMES, J.* 
 
*  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate 
District, Division Eight, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Gentile 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion  
Original Appeal   
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted XXX 35 Cal.App.5th 932 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S256698 
Date Filed:  December 17, 2020 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Riverside 
Judge:  Graham A. Cribbs 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Eric R. Larson, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler and Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorneys 
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles Ragland, Lynne McGinnis, James H. 
Flaherty III, A. Natasha Cortina, Meredith S. White and Alan L. Amann, Deputy Attorneys General, for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Mitchell Keiter for Amicus Populi as Amicus Curiae. 
 
Summer Stephan, District Attorney (San Diego), Mark A. Amador, Linh Lam and Michael Runyon, 
Deputy District Attorneys for San Diego Country District Attorney as Amicus Curiae. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Eric R. Larson 
330 J Street, #609 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 238-5575 
 
Alan L. Amann 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 645-2277