Title: Thomas v. Bethea

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

David Thomas v. Marsharina Bethea
 No. 7, Sept. Term, 1998
Attorney malpractice; negligence in recommending settlement; measure of damages.
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 95079017/CL-194080
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 7
September Term, 1998
______________________________________
DAVID THOMAS
v.
MARSHARINA BETHEA
______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Raker
Wilner
Cathell,
   JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Wilner, J.
Chasanow and Cathell, JJ., concur and dissent.
______________________________________
Filed: October 9, 1998
In Prande v. Bell, 105 Md. App. 636, 656, 660 A.2d 1055, 1065 (1995), the Court of
Special Appeals held that an attorney may be liable for professional malpractice for
recommending that a client’s case be, or not be, settled on particular terms if “the attorney’s
recommendation in regard to settlement was one that no reasonable attorney, having
undertaken a reasonable investigation into the facts and law as would be appropriate under
the circumstances, and with knowledge of the same facts, would have made.”  Applying
Prande v. Bell, the appellate court in this case reversed a judgment N.O.V. entered by the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City and reinstated a $125,000 judgment entered against an
attorney upon a jury verdict.   We granted certiorari to review that decision and shall affirm
it.
BACKGROUND
Like most cases tried on their merits, some of the relevant facts in this action were in
dispute.  Because what is before us is the appropriateness of a judgment N.O.V., overturning
the effect of a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, we must view the evidence and the
permissible inferences from that evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs.  Impala
Platinum v. Impala Sales, 283 Md. 296, 389 A.2d 887 (1978); Houston v. Safeway, 346 Md.
503, 697 A.2d 851 (1997).   The principal issues before us, however, are essentially legal,
rather than factual, ones.
In August, 1981, petitioner, David Thomas, commenced representation of the
 The record shows the elder Ms. Bethea’s name sometimes as Gerinne and sometimes as
1
Gerinna.  The child, Marsharina, was married by the time of trial in this case.  Her current surname
is Gillard.  
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respondents, Marsharina Bethea (a minor) and her mother, Gerrine Bethea,  in a lead paint
1
poisoning case.  Eventually, suit was filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against
three landlords — the owners of 209 East Lafayette Avenue, 1322 Myrtle Avenue, and 1217
East Preston Street, each of whom was alleged to be responsible for the elevated level of lead
in Marsharina’s blood.  The owners of the first two properties were served; Thomas was
unable to effect service on the owner of the Preston Street property, however.  In December,
1983, Thomas received an offer of settlement from the two served defendants in the amount
of $2,500, but the offer was conditioned on a general release of all three defendants.
Allegedly upon Thomas’s recommendation, Gerrine Bethea, on behalf of herself and
Marsharina, accepted the settlement offer and executed the releases demanded by the settling
defendants.  
In March, 1995, nearly 12 years after accepting the settlement, Marsharina filed this
lawsuit against Thomas in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, alleging that, as a result of
Thomas’s failure to properly investigate, prosecute, and litigate her claim and his
recommendation to Gerrine that she accept a settlement that was “grossly inadequate to cover
the damages,” Gerrine accepted the $2,500 settlement.  Following the decision in Prande v.
Bell, supra, Marsharina amended her complaint to add the allegation that Thomas’s
recommendation to settle “was one that no reasonable attorney, having undertaken a
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reasonable investigation of the facts and law as would be appropriate under the
circumstances, and with the knowledge of the same facts, would have made.”  The essence
of her case, as it was presented at trial, was Thomas’s recommendation that the Betheas
accede to a release of the unserved owner of 1217 East Preston Street, W.H. Groscup &
Sons, Inc., as a condition of the $2,500 settlement.  Although her expert witness testified to
the inadequacy generally of the $2,500 settlement, Marsharina later stipulated that the
alleged breach of the standard of care by Thomas concerned only the settlement with respect
to Groscup.  With that stipulation, her contention was not that $2,500 was an unreasonable
consideration for releasing the owners of the other two properties, but rather that a valuable
case against Groscup was surrendered for no compensation at all.  
In that regard, Marsharina presented evidence that Gerinne advised Groscup, before
entering into the lease, that Marsharina had an elevated lead level, that Groscup informed her
that the apartment was free of lead paint, that there was, in fact, flaking or peeling lead paint
there, and that there was $300,000 of insurance on the property.  Her expert witness, C.
Christopher Brown, Esq., opined that “the settlement that was entered into by Mr. Thomas
was woefully inadequate in terms of what the fair amount, reasonable amount would have
been in light of the facts of the case and the law applicable to the case; and that as a
consequence no reasonable attorney should have entered into such a settlement.”  Mr. Brown
stated that a reasonable lawyer might settle for such a small amount if the landlord had no
assets or threatened bankruptcy, or if the client herself was in some way irresponsible, but
that neither those factors nor any similar ones were present in this case.  His view was that
 As we indicated, there was a significant dispute over the propriety of Mr. Thomas’s conduct.
2
Thomas stated that the case against Groscup was weak, in part because of conflicts in the evidence,
that Gerinne insisted that the case be settled, and that he got the best settlement possible.  His expert,
George Russell, Esq., opined that “the settlement made by Mr. Thomas was not only reasonable but
because of the problems he had in the case was ultimately a gift because had the case gone to trial he
could not have won the case . . . .”  
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Marsharina had a “strong case” which “should not merely be settled for $2500, but a case
which should be off to a trial for however much the jury determines is an appropriate sum.”2
No evidence was produced by the plaintiff as to what a reasonable settlement amount would
have been in 1983 or what a likely verdict would have been had the case proceeded to trial.
It was, instead, left to the malpractice case jury to determine what kind of verdict would have
been returned had the lead paint poisoning case against Groscup been tried on its merits.
At the conclusion of trial, the court submitted a number of specific issues for the jury
to resolve.  In response to the questions posed, the jury determined that (1) Groscup was
negligent in regard to the presence of a lead paint hazard; (2) the presence of that hazard was
a substantial factor in causing injury to Marsharina; (3) Thomas’s recommendation in regard
to the settlement of Marsharina’s lead paint poisoning case was one that no reasonable
attorney would have made; (4) the amount that a reasonable attorney would have
recommended to Gerrine for Marsharina’s claims was $25,000; and (5) Marsharina sustained
$125,000 in damages as a result of her exposure to lead paint at 1217 East Preston Street.
Upon those special verdicts, judgment was initially entered in favor of Marsharina in the
amount of $125,000.  That judgment was soon vacated, however.  Concluding that the proper
measure of damages, assuming liability, would have been the amount of a reasonable
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settlement with Groscup in 1983, and not the value of Marsharina’s claim against that
defendant, and finding that there was no evidence as to what a reasonable settlement would
have been, the court granted Thomas’s motion for judgment N.O.V. and entered judgment
in his favor.
In an unreported Opinion, the Court of Special Appeals, applying its decision in
Prande v. Bell,  reversed the judgment N.O.V. and reinstated the $125,000 judgment entered
on the jury’s verdict.  It concluded that, in the case before it, evidence of the fair settlement
value was unnecessary.  Citing RONALD E. MALLEN AND JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL
MALPRACTICE, § 32.11, at 190, 4  ed. (1996), the appellate court held that “[w]here the issue
th
concerns the value of a lost cause of action, both the amount of the probable judgment and
its collectibility are for the jury to decide . . . and the jury decided that the amount of the
probable judgment was $125.000.”  Bethea v. Thomas, No. 367, Slip op. at 5 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. November 3, 1997).
DISCUSSION
A.  Attorney’s Liability For Negligently Recommending Settlement
Prande v. Bell arose out of the settlement of two motor vehicle tort claims.  In April,
1984, Ms. Prande was involved in an accident with Susan Spillman.  Claiming that the
accident was entirely Spillman’s fault and that she sustained permanent injuries as a result,
 Several attorneys from the firm were involved in the events that led up to the settlements.
3
For the sake of convenience only, we shall refer to all of them, collectively, as Bell, notwithstanding
that other attorneys in the firm were more directly involved than Mr. Bell.
-6-
Prande retained Bell and his firm to file a claim against Spillman.   Five months later, in
3
September, 1988, Ms. Prande was involved in another accident, this time with Lance
Wishart.  Contending that the accident was Wishart’s fault and that it exacerbated the
injuries she had sustained in the Spillman collision, she employed Bell and his firm to file
a claim against Wishart.  Eventually, suits were filed against Spillman and Wishart.
The Spillman case was the first to be scheduled for trial.  Prior to the September, 1990
trial date, upon Bell’s recommendation, Prande settled that case for $7,500.  In March, 1992,
again upon Bell’s recommendation, Prande agreed to settle the Wishart suit for $3,000.
When she later reneged on the Wishart agreement, the settlement was enforced, and  Prande
then sued Bell for malpractice for having recommended the two settlements.  The Circuit
Court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the ground of non-mutual collateral
estoppel — that, by agreeing to the settlements with the tort defendants, she was precluded
from relitigating those claims against her attorneys.
The Court of Special Appeals concluded that a release signed in the underlying tort
action did not preclude a lawsuit against the attorney for having negligently recommended
the settlement if the question of the attorney’s negligence was not decided in the tort action.
It held that “[w]hen a client sues a lawyer for malpractice resulting from the settlement of
an earlier claim and the issue of the attorney’s negligence was not decided in the earlier
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adjudication, the party claiming the malpractice has not been given a fair opportunity to be
heard on the issue of the attorney’s negligence.”  Prande, 105 Md. App. at 652,  660 A.2d
at 1063.  As a matter of public policy, the court continued, “[i]t would be patently unfair to
allow attorneys who may have committed malpractice in handling a case to turn around and
rely on a defense that effectively says that, because the client knowingly settled his or her
case, the issue of whether the attorney was negligent was also settled.”  Id. at 654, 660 A.2d
at 1064.  Mindful, however, of the fact that, unlike other failings that have been held to
constitute malpractice — missing a statute of limitations, failure to do adequate research and
preparation, missing a deed, mortgage, or judgment in searching a title, for example —
recommendations as to settlement involve judgment calls, for which there are no bright lines,
the court concluded that there was a range for honest differences of opinion in making
settlement recommendations, and that, accordingly, “[a] recommendation to settle or not to
settle on particular terms is not malpractice simply because another lawyer, or even many
other lawyers, would not have made the same recommendation under the alleged
circumstances.”  Id. at 656, 660 A.2d at 1065.
In line with that view, the court adopted the heightened standard for judging
malpractice in this context that we previously mentioned:  there is no malpractice unless “the
attorney’s recommendation in regard to settlement was one that no reasonable attorney,
having undertaken a reasonable investigation into the facts and law as would be appropriate
under the circumstances, and with knowledge of the same facts, would have made.”  Id.
Prande v. Bell is not a unique case.  More than a dozen States have dealt with the
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question of whether, and under what circumstances, a client who settles a dispute on terms
that the client later determines were unreasonably disadvantageous, may sue his or her
lawyer for having negligently recommended the settlement.  The great majority of those
States have reached conclusions consistent with those reached in Prande v. Bell, except that
they have applied general, not heightened, negligence standards in doing so.
The cases present a number of issues.  One, which predominated the discussion in
Prande v. Bell, is whether non-mutual collateral estoppel bars a client who has settled an
underlying dispute from later suing his or her attorney for advice given in connection with
the settlement — whether the giving of a release and the acceptance of the settlement
proceeds precludes the client from later litigating the fairness or value of the settlement in
an action against the lawyer.  Nearly all courts in which that defense has been raised have
rejected it, for much the same reason it was rejected in Prande.  The malpractice suit does
not constitute a collateral attack on the settlement itself (or any judgment entered pursuant
to it), which remain unaffected by a verdict for or against the attorney.  The issue in the
second case is the attorney’s negligence, which, ordinarily, was neither raised nor resolved
in the action that was settled.  Even courts that disagree sharply on whether, as a matter of
public policy, a malpractice suit should lie for negligence in recommending a settlement
agree that collateral estoppel is no bar to such an action.  See  Muhammad v. Strassburger,
et al., 587 A.2d 1346 (Pa. 1991); Ziegelheim v. Apollo, 607 A.2d 1298 (N.J. 1992);
Baldridge v. Lacks, 883 S.W.2d 947 (Mo. App. 1994); Cook v. Connolly, 366 N.W.2d 287
(Minn. 1985).
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A second, more substantive, issue arises from the premise, recognized in Prande, that
a recommendation as to settlement of a dispute in, or susceptible to, litigation is a subjective
judgment call and posits whether a lawyer should later be called to account for the exercise
of that judgment.  This issue embodies the concern that the allowance of such an action for
negligently recommending a settlement may have the undesirable effect of chilling
settlements, prolonging litigation, and encouraging frivolous malpractice suits by former
clients who settle their dispute and later decide that the settlement was, in some way, unfair.
Defendants have urged that lawyers will become reluctant to negotiate and recommend
settlements, which the law encourages and the judicial system depends upon, if they face the
prospect of later being sued for having made the recommendation.  As we shall see, the great
majority of courts, though acknowledging those concerns, have not allowed them to override
the application of well-established principles of tort law.  Like the Court of Special Appeals
in Prande v. Bell, they have treated the negotiation and recommendation of settlements much
the same as other legal work done by an attorney and have concluded that a lawyer may be
held liable, at least under some circumstances, if the recommendation is the product of
professional negligence and the client can prove harm.
These kinds of cases have tended to fall into two categories, although they sometimes
contain features of both.  One category involves situations in which the client claims that he
or she was given little choice but to settle on disadvantageous terms because the lawyer
failed in some other respect to prepare or prosecute the case properly, thereby diminishing
the prospect of success if the litigation continued.  The gravamen of the action in those
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situations is not so much that the lawyer negligently recommended a settlement that was
unreasonably low, but that what otherwise would be an unreasonably low settlement was
essentially forced on the client because of other deficiencies by the lawyer.  If the client was
aware of those deficiencies prior to settling, the settlement itself, given the circumstances
then faced by the client, may not have been unreasonable at all, and, indeed, may have been
entirely prudent.  The question still is raised of whether, by agreeing to the settlement, the
client should be barred from litigating its fairness in a suit against the lawyer, and the answer
appears to be “no.”  See, for example, Fishman v. Brooks, 487 N.E.2d 1377 (Mass. 1986);
Cohen v. Lipsig, 459 N.Y.S.2d 98 (A.D. 1983); Schaefer v. Manfredi, 549 N.Y.S.2d 59
(A.D. 1989); Lowman v. Karp, 476 N.W.2d 428 (Mich. App. 1991); Brooks v. Brennan, 625
N.E.2d 1188 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).  See also Central Cab Co. v. Clarke, 259 Md. 542, 270
A.2d 662 (1970), where we held that a malpractice action against an attorney based on
neglect was not barred by the fact that the client had settled the underlying case.
Cases in the second category focus more on the settlement itself, although they are
often grounded, to some extent, on the attorney’s failure to know the relevant facts or law
or to appreciate the real value of the case.  A common complaint in this category is that the
lawyer’s settlement recommendation was flawed because, as the result of a deficient
investigation, the lawyer significantly undervalued the client’s case and thus made a
settlement recommendation that bore no reasonable relationship to what likely would have
resulted had the litigation been pursued.  In that setting, it is not that the client was
knowingly forced to settle for less than the case was worth, as much as the client having been
 Lurking in some of these cases, of course, is the prospect that, if the settlement
4
recommendation proceeded from an inadequate investigation of the relevant facts or law, as opposed
to a simple misjudgment as to what a court might do if the case proceeded, that same inadequacy
could well become manifest at trial and result in a less favorable verdict than otherwise might be
obtained.  In that situation, subject to adequate proof, a malpractice case would likely lie against the
attorney, and the question is fairly raised whether a different result should pertain because the
lawyer’s failings resulted in a lower recovery through settlement.
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misinformed as to what the case was, in fact, worth.   Occasionally, the complaint is made
4
that the settlement was recommended by the lawyer in order to cover up some other act of
malpractice that prejudiced the case and that might have been revealed if the litigation
proceeded.  
In any of these situations, allowance of the lawsuit presents a number of subsidiary
issues with which courts have had to wrestle.  There may be a question of limitations,
although not presented here with respect to Marsharina.  There is nearly always a question
of the measure of damages, and with it debates over the standards to be applied and the
nature of the proof required.  Assuming liability, is the measure of damages what the plaintiff
likely would have obtained had the case proceeded to trial or other adjudication, or is it what
a reasonable settlement would have been (assuming that the case could have been settled on
terms other than it was), and, in either event, are such damages reasonably calculable or are
they too speculative?  If they are calculable, who makes the calculation, and upon what
evidence?  If the measure is what a reasonable settlement would have been, is expert
testimony necessary to establish that amount?  If the measure is what a judge or jury would
have done had the case proceeded to adjudication, is expert testimony necessary to establish
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that result or does the trier of fact in the malpractice case make that determination by
essentially trying a case within a case?  These, and other, questions are daunting, but they
have not proved insurmountable.
A few courts have declined to permit an action against an attorney based on
negligence in recommending a settlement.  The case most often cited for that approach is the
decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Muhammad v. Strassburger, et al., supra,
587 A.2d 1346.  The plaintiffs there employed the defendant law firm to represent them in
a medical malpractice action against two physicians and a hospital allegedly responsible for
the death of their infant son following surgery.  Suit was filed against the doctors and the
hospital.  Following discovery, the defendants offered $23,000 in settlement, which the
plaintiffs said they would accept.  At a pre-trial conference, that amount was increased to
$26,500 at the court’s suggestion.  Prior to actual payment, the plaintiffs changed their mind,
but the court, finding that the $26,500 had been agreed to, upheld the settlement.  After an
unsuccessful appeal, the plaintiffs sued their lawyers for fraudulent misrepresentation,
fraudulent concealment, non-disclosure, breach of contract, negligence, and outrageous
conduct.  The court’s opinion does not reveal the details of any of those counts.  The trial
court dismissed the action as barred by collateral estoppel.  The intermediate appellate court
reversed that determination.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed that the action was not barred by collateral
estoppel, but refused to countenance it on public policy grounds.  Concerned that permitting
such an action would violate “our strong and historical public policy of encouraging
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settlements” (id. at 1349), the court declared that a lawyer could not be held liable for simple
negligence in recommending a settlement, but that liability could attach only if the settlement
was procured by fraud:
“Simply stated, we will not permit a suit to be filed by a
dissatisfied plaintiff against his attorney following a settlement
to which that plaintiff agreed, unless that plaintiff can show he
was fraudulently induced to settle the original action.  An action
should not lie against an attorney for malpractice based on
negligence and/or contract principles when that client has agreed
to a settlement.  Rather, only cases of fraud should be
actionable.”
Id. at 1348.
The court appeared to limit the right of action, even when based on fraud, to where
“the lawyer knowingly commits malpractice, but does not disclose the error and convinces
the client to settle so as to avoid the discovery of such error . . . .”  Id. at 1351 (emphasis
added).  Although the plaintiffs in Muhammad had, indeed, charged the lawyers with
fraudulent concealment, the court held that the allegations were “mere suppositions” and
otherwise insufficient to state a cause of action.  The two dissenters complained that the
majority had just declared a “lawyer’s holiday.”
The Muhammad decision represents a distinct minority view.  It is not only
inconsistent with most of the cases decided prior to its rendition, none of which are even
mentioned in the opinion, but it has been expressly rejected by all of the courts that have had
the benefit of considering it.  Perhaps the earliest repudiation came from the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Ziegelheim v. Apollo, supra, 607 A.2d 1298.  The plaintiff there sued the
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lawyer who had represented her in her divorce action for advising her to settle for far less
than she likely would have obtained from the court.  Evidence showed that the lawyer not
only failed to discover significant assets of the plaintiff’s husband but advised her that she
could expect to get only 10% to 20% of the marital estate when, given the state of her health,
the gross disparity in earning capacities, and the high standard of living the couple enjoyed
during their marriage, she could have expected an award of about 50%.  The trial court
entered summary judgment for the lawyer, which the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed.
Rejecting the Pennsylvania approach, urged by the defendant, the court noted, at 1304:
“Although we encourage settlements, we recognize that litigants
rely heavily on the professional advice of counsel when they
decide whether to accept or reject offers of settlement, and we
insist that the lawyers of our state advise clients with respect to
settlements with the same skill, knowledge, and diligence with
which they pursue all other legal tasks. ”
In that regard, the court  added that “[a]fter all, the negotiation of settlements is one
of the most basic and most frequently undertaken tasks that lawyers perform.”  Id.  The court
did not expect its decision to “open the door to malpractice suits by any and every
dissatisfied party to a settlement” for plaintiffs “must allege particular facts in support of
their claims of attorney incompetence and may not litigate complaints containing mere
generalized assertions of malpractice.”  Id. at 1306.  It made clear that attorneys will not be
held liable simply because they are unable to persuade their adversary to accept particular
terms or because their strategies  prove unsuccessful.  The law, it said, demands only that
attorneys handle their cases with knowledge, skill, and diligence, not that they be infallible
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or always secure optimum results for their clients.
In Grayson v. Wofsey, Rosen, Kweskin and Kuriansky,  646 A.2d 195 (Conn. 1994),
the Connecticut Supreme Court also rejected Muhammad.  As in Ziegelheim, the plaintiff in
Grayson sued the attorneys who had represented her in her divorce action for failing to
prepare her case properly, as a result of which she agreed to a settlement that she claimed
was not reflective of her legal entitlement.  Evidence was presented that the lawyers had
failed to discover and evaluate significant assets and income of the husband and that, based
on the true value of the marital estate and the husband’s actual income, she could have
expected to receive through a court judgment $1,000,000 more in property distribution and
$35,000 more in alimony than she was entitled to receive under the settlement recommended
by the lawyers.  In her subsequent malpractice action, the jury awarded damages of
$1,500,000, which the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed.  Though expressing the same
preference for settlements as the Pennsylvania court, the Connecticut court declined the
defendants’ invitation “to adopt a rule that promotes the finality of settlements and judgments
at the expense of a client who, in reasonable reliance on the advice of his or her attorney,
agrees to a settlement only to discover that the attorney had failed to exercise the degree of
skill and learning required of attorneys in the circumstances.”  Id. at 199.  Aligning itself
with what it regarded as “the majority of courts that have addressed this issue,” it expressly
declined “to adopt a rule that insulates attorneys from exposure to malpractice claims arising
from their negligence in settled cases if the attorney’s conduct has damaged the client.”  Id.
Like the New Jersey court, the Connecticut court did not expect its ruling to impede
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settlements or increase litigation in general or malpractice cases in particular. Rejection of
Muhammad also appears in McWhirt v. Heavey, 550 N.W.2d 327 (Neb. 1996); Malfabon v.
Garcia, 898 P.2d 107 (Nev. 1995); and Baldridge v. Lacks, supra, 883 S.W.2d 947 (Mo.
App. 1994).  The Missouri court was the most explicit:
“Defendants ask this court to adopt the Pennsylvania view as set
forth in Muhammad.  The language in that case, however, goes
well beyond the proposition that settled cases should not be
readily revisited.  In essence, defendants ask us to grant
attorneys immunity from civil liability in cases where their
clients have settled, absent some affirmative misrepresentation
or fraud by the attorney.  We do not believe it would serve the
interests of justice to do so.  Accordingly, we refuse to adopt a
‘bright line’ rule that protects attorneys from liability where a
plaintiff has made a submissible case of negligence.”
Baldridge, 883 S.W.2d at 952. 
The principle that a lawyer may be held liable for negligence in the handling of a case
that was ultimately settled by the client, whether based on deficiencies in preparation that
prejudiced the case and more or less required a settlement or on a negligent evaluation of the
client’s case, has been accepted by nearly every court that has faced the issue.  In addition
to the cases cited above, see Edmondson v. Dressman, 469 So. 2d 571 (Ala. 1985); Callahan
v. Clark, 901 S.W.2d 842 (Ark. 1995); Bill Branch Chev. v. Philip L. Burnett, 555 So. 2d
455 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); McCarthy v. Pedersen & Houpt, 621 N.E.2d 97 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993); Braud v. New England Ins. Co., 534 So. 2d 13 (La. Ct. App. 1988); Fishman v.
Brooks, supra, 487 N.E.2d 1377 (Mass. 1986); Lowman v. Karp, supra, 476 N.W.2d 428;
Cook v. Connolly, 366 N.W.2d 287 (Minn. 1985); Bruning v. Law Offices of Palagi, P.C.,
  In Becker, a panel of the appellate division recognized the cause of action and held that it
5
was not barred by the fact that the underlying case was settled.  In N. A. Kerson Co. v. Shayne,
Dachs, Etc., 397 N.Y.S.2d 142 (A.D. 1977), a different panel had concluded otherwise.  One judge
of that panel concurred in the result based on the lack of evidence that the plaintiff would have done
better had the litigation continued, not because the action was barred by the settlement.  The New
York Court of Appeals affirmed in Kerson, but for the reasons stated in the concurring opinion.  See
408 N.Y.S.2d 475 (1977).  Subsequent attempts in New York to hold a lawyer liable for malpractice
in a case that was settled have generally foundered because of insufficient evidence that the plaintiff
would have done better, but, based on Kerson, it appears that settlement of the underlying action is
not a bar to a malpractice claim, and that a plaintiff can recover upon a showing that “the settlement
entered into was improvident and that [the plaintiff] would have been entitled to a more beneficial
settlement, but for the defendant’s alleged misconduct.”  Rapp v. Lauer, 644 N.Y.S.2d 569 (A.D.
1996); see also Laing v. Bushin, 540 N.Y.S.2d 14 (A.D. 1989); Rogers v. Ettinger, 558 N.Y.S.2d
540 (A.D. 1990).
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551 N.W.2d 266 (Neb. 1996); Malfabon v. Garcia, supra, 898 P.2d 107; Rodriguez v.
Horton, 622 P.2d 26 (N.M. App. 1980); Becker v. Julien, Blitz & Schlesinger, 406 N.Y.S.2d
412 (A.D. 1977 );  DePugh v. Sladoje, 676 N.E.2d 1231, 1239 (Ohio Ct. App.  1996);
5
Crowley v. Harvey & Battey, 488 S.E.2d 334 (S.C. 1997); Helmbrecht v. St. Paul Ins. Co.,
362 N.W.2d 118 (Wis. 1985); Hipwell by and through Jensen v. Sharp, 858 P.2d 987 (Utah
1993).
In Flaherty v. Weinberg, 303 Md. 116, 128, 492 A.2d 618, 624 (1985), we confirmed
that a former client may have an action against a lawyer if the client can prove (1) the
attorney’s employment, (2) the attorney’s neglect of a reasonable duty, and (3) loss to the
client proximately caused by that neglect of duty.  There is nothing extraordinary about
applying that principle to an attorney’s recommendation regarding the settlement of a dispute
in, or susceptible to, litigation.  Absent an explicit instruction by the client to the contrary,
exploring, and, indeed, developing and encouraging settlement opportunities have always
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been regarded as within the scope of an attorney’s representation, and they are especially so
today, as the courts struggle to handle efficiently the increasing burdens placed upon them.
Statistics show that the vast majority — upwards of 90% or more — of the civil actions filed
in Maryland and throughout the country settle without adjudication.  Settlement is the most
common end and is often the principal objective of litigation.  There can be little doubt that
clients routinely anticipate that their cases will be settled and that they rely heavily on their
lawyer’s recommendation regarding settlement, expecting that the lawyer has a sufficient
understanding of the relevant facts, law, and prospects to make an intelligent
recommendation.  We therefore join the chorus of States that have rejected Muhammad.
We share the concern expressed by the Court of Special Appeals in Prande v. Bell
that lawyers not be regarded as negligent simply because another lawyer, or even most
lawyers, with the benefit of hindsight, would not have made the recommendation at issue.
We also share that court’s observation that the factors that the lawyer must consider in
developing a settlement recommendation, as well as the recommendation itself, “are mostly
subjective in nature,” and that there can legitimately exist “a range for honest differences of
opinion in making settlement recommendations.”  Id. at 656, 660 A.2d at 1065.  Nonetheless,
we see no reason to adopt any heightened standard of negligence.  Lawyers, like doctors and
other professionals, are often called upon to make judgment calls with which their colleagues
may disagree.  Those calls, if challenged, can be examined in the light of the traditional
standard applicable to professional negligence actions.  That is the standard applied by
courts in other States, and we are aware of no indication that its application has caused any
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significant problem.  The standard in Maryland is that announced in Cochrane v. Little, 71
Md. 323, 332, 18 A. 698, 701 (1889), and confirmed in Kendall v. Rogers, 181 Md. 606,
611, 31 A.2d 312, 314 (1943):
“[E]very client employing an attorney has a right to the exercise,
on the part of the attorney, of ordinary care and diligence in the
execution of the business intrusted to him, and to a fair average
degree of professional skill and knowledge; and if the attorney
has not as much of these qualities as he ought to possess, and
which, by holding himself out for employment he impliedly
represents himself as possessing, or if, having them, he has
neglected to employ them, the law makes him responsible for
the loss or damage which has accrued to his client from their
deficiency or failure of application.”
B.  The Measure and Proof of Damages
As we observed, the gravamen of Marsharina’s complaint with respect to the
settlement centered on the demand that Groscup —  the unserved owner of 1217 East Preston
Street —  be released along with the owners of the other two properties.  Through her
stipulation, she abandoned any assertion that $2,500 was an inappropriate amount for the
release of the two paying defendants.  Her position was that Thomas was negligent in
recommending that, through Gerrine, she accede to the release of Groscup as a condition of
the settlement with the two other defendants — that, because Marsharina had a good case
against Groscup, who had a $300,000 insurance policy, Thomas should have recommended
that the settlement offer, with that condition, be rejected, and that the case be pursued against
the three defendants.  Consonant with her stipulation, Marsharina did not seek any damages
arising from the release of the two paying defendants, implicitly accepting that, had the case
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proceeded against them, she would have received no more than the $2,500 she and her
mother got.  Consonant with her view that the case should have proceeded to trial against
Groscup, Marsharina presented no evidence of what a reasonable settlement would have
been with respect to Groscup or even that a settlement could have been effected with that
defendant.  The sole basis of her case against Thomas was that, upon his recommendation,
a valuable case against Groscup was given away for no recompense.  The only damages she
sought from Thomas, therefore, was the amount she likely would have recovered from
Groscup had the case proceeded to trial — the difference between that amount and zero.
Thomas urges that that was an inappropriate measure of damages.  Citing LEGAL
MALPRACTICE, § 29.38, 4th ed. (1996), he urges that, in a negligent settlement case, the
measure of damages is the difference between the reasonable settlement value and what was,
in fact, obtained in settlement.  Without any supporting evidence, the jury found the
reasonable settlement value of the case against Groscup to be $25,000, and, subject to his
argument that no action at all should be permitted, Thomas contends that the maximum
judgment permissible in this case would be $25,000.
Thomas’s citation to LEGAL MALPRACTICE is misplaced.  Those authors do not state,
or even suggest, that the only measure of damages in a negligent settlement case is the
difference between the actual settlement and a reasonable settlement.  They simply point out
that, among the various situations in which lawyers are charged with malpractice, are those
in which the client seeks the difference between the amount paid or received and what should
have been paid.  In that setting, they point out that the plaintiff “not only must establish that
 Judge Chasanow, in dissent, would hold that the plaintiff does not have to prove that the
6
case could have settled at a higher amount.  He cites no authority for such a proposition, and we
know of none.
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concluding such a settlement fell outside the standard of care, but also what would have been
a reasonable settlement and that such sums would have been agreed to and could have been
paid.”  LEGAL MALPRACTICE, § 29.38 at 745.  See, for example, Whiteaker v. State, 382
N.W.2d 112 (Iowa 1986), where the plaintiff claimed, alternatively, that his lawyer’s
negligence cost him a favorable judgment and a lost settlement opportunity.  As to the latter,
the plaintiff would have to prove that a settlement probably would have occurred.  If that is
6
how the plaintiff frames the case, Thomas’s view as to the measure of damages would be
correct.  If, for example, the client produces evidence that (1) the settlement recommended
by the lawyer was one that a lawyer exercising reasonable skill, judgment, and diligence
would not have recommended under the circumstances, (2) had that settlement offer not been
accepted, the defendant in the underlying case would and could have settled for substantially
more, and (3) that higher amount would have been a reasonable settlement, one that a lawyer
exercising reasonable skill, judgment, and diligence would have recommended, the proper
measure of damages would indeed be the difference between what reasonably could have
been obtained and what, in fact, was obtained.
That kind of evidence is not easy to produce, however.  Absent some compelling
circumstances, the settling adversary in the underlying case is not likely to admit that, had
the lawyer held out, it would have offered substantially more in settlement than was, in fact,
-22-
offered, and evidence from other persons, either as to settlement value or as to the actual
prospect of a better settlement, has been regarded as speculative.  See, for example, Fuschetti
v. Bierman, 319 A.2d 781 (N.J. Super. 1974); Merzlak v. Purcell, 830 P.2d 1278 (Mont.
1991).  Extraneous evidence of settlement value might be relevant to establish liability —
that the settlement actually recommended and concluded was one that a lawyer exercising
reasonable skill, judgment, and diligence would not have recommended —  but it cannot
reasonably serve to establish the measure of damages absent a showing that the case would
likely have been settled for the higher amount.  A lawyer cannot be held liable for not having
held out for a settlement that could not have been achieved in any event.
Because of the practical difficulties in establishing the reasonable prospect of a better
settlement, and perhaps for other reasons as well, it is not uncommon for plaintiffs in the
position of Marsharina to frame their case as it was framed here, to assert that, given the
inadequacy of the settlement offer, the lawyer should have recommended that the offer be
rejected and that the litigation be pursued to adjudication.  When so framed, the measure of
damages necessarily becomes the difference between what was accepted in settlement and
what likely would have been received from the adjudication.  That is the approach most
commonly taken by the courts.  See, for example, Grayson v. Wofsey, Rosen, Kweskin and
Kuriansky,  supra, 646 A.2d 195; Callahan v. Clark, supra, 901 S.W.2d 842; Baldridge v.
Lacks, supra, 883 S.W.2d 947; McWhirt v. Heavey, supra, 550 N.W.2d 327.
The normal way in which that approach is implemented is through what has become
known as a trial within a trial, or a suit within a suit, i.e., litigating before the malpractice
 There are circumstances in which the issue of whether the plaintiff would have prevailed in
7
the underlying case is more appropriate for a court to determine, rather than a jury.  See, for example,
Daugert v. Pappas, 704 P.2d 600 (Wash. 1985), where the alleged negligence was in failing to
perfect an appeal.  Recognizing that, normally, the determination of whether the plaintiff would have
been successful, but for the lawyer’s negligence, is a jury issue, the court held that, in determining
whether appellate review would have been granted and, if granted, would have been successful
depended on an analysis of the law and appellate procedure and that a judge was in a better position
than a jury to make those determinations.
-23-
jury the underlying case that was never tried.  Mallen and Smith point out that “[t]his is the
accepted and traditional means of resolving the issues involved in the underlying proceeding
in a legal malpractice action” and “avoids speculation by requiring the plaintiff to bear that
burden of producing evidence that would have been required in the underlying action.”
LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra, § 32.8, 4th ed. and 1998 Supp.   See Pickett v. Haislip, 73 Md.
7
App. 89, 533 A.2d 287 (1987); cert. denied, 311 Md. 719 (1988); Fishman v. Brooks, supra,
487 N.E.2d 1377 (Mass. 1986); Haberer v. Rice, 511 N.W.2d 279 (S.D. 1994); Nika v.
Danz, 556 N.E.2d 873 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990); Lieberman v. Employees Ins. of Wausau, 419
A.2d 417 (N.J. 1980); Houghton v. Leinwohl, 376 A.2d 733 (Vt. 1977); Herston v. Whitesell,
374 So. 2d 267 (Ala. 1979); Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686
(Minn. 1980).
The “case within a case” or “suit within a suit” approach has been criticized on a
number of grounds — that it does not represent an accurate or complete reconstruction of the
original lawsuit; that the evidence may not be of the same quality as that which would have
been offered in the underlying case; that there is an artificiality to it; that it is unfair to
require the plaintiff to litigate the case against his or her own lawyer, who has superior
-24-
knowledge about the strengths and weaknesses of the case, including knowledge obtained
from the client’s own confidences; and that, because the original defendant is not a party, the
malpractice plaintiff may not have the benefit of discovery against that defendant to marshal
evidence in support of his claim.  See Developments in the Law — Lawyers’ Responsibilities
and Lawyers’ Responses, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1557, 1568-69 (1994); Melissa A. Thomas,
When Is an Attorney’s Breach of Fiduciary Duty in Missouri Not Legal Malpractice?, 63
MO. L. REV. 595, 600-601 (1998); John Leubsdorf, Legal Malpractice and Professional
Responsibility, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 101, 148-150 (1995); Polly A. Lord, Loss of Chance in
Legal Malpractice, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1479, 1480-1485 (1986).  The courts have not seemed
eager to adopt any of the alternatives that have been suggested, however, so the trial within
a trial approach continues to be used.  It was not an inappropriate method in this case.  
C.  The Evidence
To prevail under a trial within a trial approach, Marsharina was required to prove
(1) that Thomas was negligent in recommending acceptance of the settlement; (2) that
Groscup could have been served within a reasonable time in order to permit the action to
proceed against it; (3) that Groscup was liable to Marsharina under a theory pled in the
complaint against it and had no exculpating defense to the action; (4) that Marsharina
suffered compensable injury; and (5) the amount of damages that (i) would have been
awarded by the jury had the case against Groscup proceeded to trial, and (ii) would have
been collectible with reasonable effort.
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Although Thomas contends that the evidence produced by Marsharina was legally
insufficient, his attack, to a large extent, is misdirected.  Principally, he complains that no
evidence was elicited as to what a reasonable settlement with Groscup would have been,  or
that one could have been effected.  That was also the concern that led to the judgment
N.O.V.  As already discussed, however, that was not the basis of Marsharina’s case, either
as to liability or as to the measure of damages.  The testimony of Mr. Brown, a conceded
expert, sufficed to support the jury’s determination that no reasonable attorney would have
recommended acceptance of the settlement calling for the release of Groscup and that the
case should have proceeded to trial.  That determination, especially when based on the
heightened standard of liability enunciated in Prande v. Bell, amounted to a determination
of negligence on the part of Mr. Thomas.
Aside from noting the lack of evidence that Groscup ever could have been served,
Thomas does not otherwise attack the sufficiency of the evidence relating to Groscup’s
liability — i.e., that, had the case proceeded against Groscup, a favorable verdict would have
resulted.  The fact that, had the case proceeded, Groscup could have been served is
something the jury could infer.  The record does not indicate why Thomas had been unable
to serve Groscup prior to the settlement, or, indeed, what efforts he made to obtain service,
but the record does establish that Groscup was an existing corporation, apparently a
Maryland corporation, that did business and owned property in Maryland, and that it was
served in this case.
Thomas does not, in his brief, challenge the evidence leading to the jury’s conclusions
 Judge Chasanow, in dissent, complains about the ad damnum demand in the complain
8
drafted and filed by Thomas being used as evidence against him.  Thomas has made no such
complaint in his brief, and we therefore need not address in this case whether the admission of that
document, for that purpose, was proper.
-26-
that Groscup was negligent “with regard to the presence of a lead paint hazard” and that the
presence of lead paint at 1217 East Preston Street was a substantial factor in causing injury
to Marsharina.  Nor, except for urging a different standard for measuring damages, does
Thomas challenge the evidence describing the injuries suffered by Marsharina, leading to the
jury’s determination that she sustained $125,000 in damages.8
On this record, we agree with the Court of Special Appeals that the judgment N.O.V.
was in error.
JUDGMENT OF COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.
I have no doubt that there may be differing procedures employed for a “trial within a trial”
1
and that a trial within a trial may often be unjust to the client as well as the attorney, for example,
where the attorney’s negligence has resulted in the loss of vital evidence necessary to prove the
plaintiff’s claim.  The “trial within a trial” procedure at issue is the procedure used in the instant case.
There may be times when some acceptable form of  trial within a trial procedure might be justifiable,
but it should not be anything like the “trial within a trial” in the instant case.
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Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Chasanow, J.:
I concur in the majority’s holding that a cause of action exists for legal malpractice
by negligently recommending an inadequate settlement.  I dissent from the portion of the
majority opinion approving what the majority calls the “trial within a trial” procedure
employed in the instant case.  Lawyers too are entitled to justice when they are parties to
litigation and I cannot think of a more unjust and unfair procedure than the “trial within a
trial”  procedure used to determine the attorney’s liability and the amount of the damages in
1
the instant case.  
Twelve years after the case against three separate landlords was settled, the plaintiff
sues his former attorney for “[r]ecommending to the Plaintiff’s mother the acceptance of a
settlement which was grossly inadequate to cover the damages in the Plaintiffs case.”  The
plaintiff presented evidence that the settlement was inadequate as to this defendant.  Two
alternative damage determinations were made by the jury.  First, the jury found that the
-1-
reasonable settlement value was $25,000, and second, the jury found that, based on the trial
within a trial procedure, the verdict would have been $125,000.  The jury either recognized
that there were severe problems in proving the plaintiff’s underlying case since the settlement
value was only 20% of the verdict value (yet the jury found liability in the underlying case)
or the verdicts graphically illustrate the injustice of the trial within a trial procedure for
determining damages.  I would affirm the $25,000 verdict for reasonable settlement value,
but not the $125,000 award for what the majority calls a “trial within a trial.”
Whether we view the cause of action as negligent recommendation of settlement or
loss of a chance to obtain a favorable verdict at trial, the recovery should not be the “trial
within a trial” damages.  There was never any certainty that the plaintiff would have
prevailed at his trial against the landlord; thus, the most the plaintiff lost by settling was not
the full trial recovery against the landlord but the less than 100% probability of prevailing
multiplied by the likely damages.  If the plaintiff lost a 60% chance of recovery of a
$100,000 verdict, the plaintiff lost $60,000. The plaintiff did not lose a 100% chance of
prevailing nor 100% of the damages that might have been awarded against the landlord.  The
reasonable settlement value as well as the loss of a chance of prevailing at trial should both
be computed by the likelihood of success weighed with the probable verdict in the event the
jury finds liability.  Both the damages for loss of a chance or damages for reasonable
settlement value should be similar as both should recognize the chance that the plaintiff
might not prevail in the underlying case.  In addition, both should also take into account the
savings in not having to pay trial expenses such as expert witnesses, discovery costs, etc.
-2-
These are things that were not factored into the “trial within a trial” damages in the instant
case.     
Damages for recommending an inadequate settlement ought to be the reasonable
settlement amount and the plaintiff ought not to have to prove that the case would have
settled for that amount.  In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we can assume both
parties would wish to avoid litigation costs and trial uncertainties by settling a case at the
reasonable settlement value.  Reasonable settlement amounts can be calculated by juries.  We
assume in all tort cases that a jury can calculate the amount of damages, and similarly, juries
should be able to determine the probability of a plaintiff’s verdict in the underlying litigation.
Settlement value is a product of these two as reduced by the savings in litigation expenses.
In addition, there will be some expert testimony as to reasonable settlement value as part of
the plaintiff’s proof of liability and it is probable the defendant will also have expert
testimony on this issue.
In contrast to the determination of reasonable settlement value,  the trial within a trial
procedure is grossly unfair to the defendant attorney because it permits irrelevant and highly
prejudicial evidence to serve as a basis for the jury’s findings.  In the instant case, the
plaintiff had to prove liability by evidence that the settlement was inadequate.  To do this the
plaintiff must call other attorneys to testify about the likelihood of success in the underlying
case, i.e., that a reasonable jury probably would have found for the plaintiff and that the
settlement amount was far less than what a reasonable jury would probably award.   This
testimony will obviously influence the jury in their “trial within a trial” deliberations.  In
-3-
addition, an attorney representing a client will probably reassure the client by estimating the
probability of success and the probable verdict with the utmost optimism and will do so in
communications with any insurance adjuster and opposing counsel.  The attorney when filing
suit will unquestionably present the client’s case and the client’s damages in the best possible
light and will base the ad damnum clause on the highest conceivable award.  Under the trial
within a trial procedure approved in the instant case, all of those statements by the attorney
come into evidence against the attorney as admissions by a party-opponent.  It seems absurd
to have a trial within a trial where a plaintiff’s declaration and ad damnum clause can be used
to prove the plaintiff’s liability and damages, and this is in addition to allowing expert
attorney witnesses to tell the jury their assessment of liability and their opinion as to what
a reasonable damage award should be.
In the instant case, the plaintiff acknowledges in his brief that “Christopher Brown,
Esquire, after being duly qualified as an expert by the Court, testified that in his opinion the
settlement recommended by Mr. Thomas was one which no reasonable attorney under the
circumstances would have recommended.  He evaluated the underlying lead poisoning case
as a ‘very strong case, and as a consequence a case which should be off to a trial for however
much the jury determines is an appropriate sum.’” The trial within a trial is obviously not a
recreation of the underlying tort trial because this testimony that is necessary to prove the
attorney’s liability for giving unreasonable advice as to settlement would not have been
admissible in the underlying tort trial.  In addition, since plaintiff’s former attorney is now
a defendant, the attorney’s prior positive statements about the plaintiff’s case and even the
-4-
declaration prepared by the attorney were admissible as admissions by a party-opponent.
Plaintiff called the defendant attorney as one of his primary witnesses and brought out the
following:
“[Plaintiff’s Counsel]: I want to hand you what has been marked
as plaintiff’s exhibit number 10.  At the moment it is for
identification.  Tell me if you can identify that document?
[Defendant]: Yes, I can.
[Plaintiff’s Counsel]: What is it?
[Defendant]: It is the complaint, with the power of attorney to
bring suit as next friend dated August 31, 1981 attached to it on
the back.
[Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Does it bear your signature?
[Defendant]: Yes, it does.
[Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Was that filed by you in the circuit court
in Marsharina Bethea’s case?
-5-
[Defendant]: I caused it to be filed in the court, yes.  There
would have been a jury trial prayer attached to it as well.
[Plaintiff’s Counsel]: I’ll offer this into evidence.
[The Court]: That’s plaintiff’s exhibit what?
[Plaintiff’s Counsel]: It is marked ten, your honor.
[The Court]: All right.  Plaintiff’s exhibit 10 admitted in
evidence.
[Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Now Mr. Thomas, if you would, could
you read that, I think that is called the declaration, is that
correct?
[Defendant]: Yes.
[Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Would you look at the ad damnum clause?
What is the ad damnum clause, that tells how much you are
suing for, correct?
-6-
[Defendant]: Yes.
[Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Can you read that ad damnum clause to
the jury?
[Defendant]: One million dollars.
[Plaintiff’s Counsel]: I’m sorry?
[Defendant]: One million dollars.
[Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Have you seen this?
[Defendant’s Counsel]: Yes.
[Plaintiff’s Counsel]: And in that declaration Mr. Thomas, is it
true that again you had alleged that the child had suffered
permanent and irreparable brain damage?
[Defendant]: Yes.
-7-
[Plaintiff’s Counsel]: And you announced that three separate
groups of landlords had inflicted that injury upon Marsharina
Bethea by their violations of the Maryland state law.  Isn’t that
correct?
[Defendant]: Three different properties, yes.
[Plaintiff’s Counsel]: That’s what I’m saying, there was 209
East Lafayette Avenue, you sued correct?
[Defendant]: Yes.
[Plaintiff’s Counsel]: 1322 Myrtle Avenue you sued, is that
correct?
[Defendant]: Yes.
[Plaintiff’s Counsel]: And 1217 East Preston Street you sued, is
that correct?
[Defendant]: Yes.
-8-
[Plaintiff’s Counsel]: And at the time that you filed that
complaint — I’m sorry, declaration, it was your belief as an
officer of the court that it was well founded in fact and in law,
is that correct?
[Defendant]: Yes.
[Plaintiff’s Counsel]: And you so certified as an attorney when
you filed a document with the court, isn’t that correct?
[Defendant]: That is right.
Under the trial within a trial procedure approved by the court, since the plaintiff’s
former attorney is now a party defendant, the pleadings filed by the attorney on behalf of the
plaintiff and the prior optimistic statements and high damage estimates made by the attorney
on behalf of the plaintiff are now admissions by a party-opponent.  See Maryland Rule 5-803
(a) (1) admitting “[t]he party’s own statement, in either an individual or representative
capacity.”
Any attorney who has ever settled a plaintiff’s case or contemplates settling a
plaintiff’s case should carefully read the majority’s opinion.  As a result of this decision, any
plaintiff who has accepted an attorney’s advice to settle a claim merely has to find another
-9-
attorney to opine that the settlement was inadequate and should not have been recommended.
 This should not prove too difficult.  The client can then file suit to seek the verdict value of
the case without the risks and costs that would have been associated with the underlying trial,
and the plaintiff can use the declaration filed by the attorney, the letters written to the
insurance adjuster, the initial settlement demands and all the positive things the attorney told
the client about the case as admissions to prove liability and damages.  In addition, the jury
will hear from other “expert” lawyers about the merits of the underlying cause of action and
the probable amount a reasonable jury would award.  The jury will probably be less
sympathetic to an attorney than it would have been to the real defendant, especially when the
attorney is forced to switch hats and now disparage the former client’s case that the attorney
had previously been extolling.  This is not a “trial within a trial,” it is a “debacle within a
trial.” What tort trial would permit the plaintiff’s declaration to serve as proof of liability and
damages?  What tort trial would permit an “expert” attorney to testify as to the defendant’s
probable liability and what a reasonable damage award would be?  This Court would not
permit any other class of tort defendants to be judged as unfairly as it permits attorneys to
be judged in legal malpractice cases.  I would affirm the $25,000 reasonable settlement value
award and not the $125,000 “trial within a trial” award.
Judge Cathell has authorized me to state that he joins the views expressed in this
concurring and dissenting opinion.