Title: In re Bucknam

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

IN_RE_BUCKNAM.92-134; 160 Vt. 355; 628 A.2d 932


 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 92-134


 In re Deborah Bucknam                        Supreme Court


                                              Original Jurisdiction


                                              March Term, 1993




 Wendy S. Collins, Special Bar Counsel, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee

 Edwin A. Amidon, Jr. of Roesler, Whittlesey, Meekins and Amidon, Burlington,
    for defendant-appellant



 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.




      JOHNSON, J.   The Professional Conduct Board concluded that respondent-
 attorney Deborah Bucknam violated several provisions of the Code of
 Professional Responsibility in dealing with a client and his wife over a
 six-month period in 1989.  The Board recommended that respondent be sus-
 pended from the practice of law for a period of thirty days and that she be
 placed on probation for a period of one year under the following conditions:
 that she successfully complete the multi-state professional responsibility
 exam, that she forego the collection of any expenses from complainants, and
 that she not be found to have committed similar ethical violations.  On
 appeal, respondent challenges three of the six violations found by the
 hearing panel and adopted by the Board.  She argues that the remaining three
 violations warrant only an admonition with no probationary period.  We con-
 clude that a public reprimand is a more appropriate sanction than a one-
 month suspension, given the facts of this case.  In all other respects, we
 adopt the Board's recommended sanctions.
                                     I.
      In January 1987, respondent agreed to represent complainants on a
 contingency basis regarding a worker's compensation claim and a tort suit
 against the husband's former employer, the Goss Tire Company.  The husband
 signed a retainer agreement.  After filing a worker's compensation claim
 against Goss Tire, respondent persuaded complainants that it was also
 necessary to file a worker's compensation claim against Asplundh Tree
 Company, a subsequent employer that had also denied a claim for benefits by
 the husband, and to add Asplundh as a defendant in the tort suit to be filed
 against Goss Tire.  In November 1987, respondent filed a worker's
 compensation claim against Asplundh and, two months later, a civil suit
 against both Asplundh and Goss Tire.
      In early 1988, respondent settled the Goss Tire worker's compensation
 case for $1008.  She retained 20% for her legal services and remitted the
 balance to complainants without retaining any money to cover her expenses.
 In July 1988, respondent sent complainants a bill for expenses, totaling
 $580.  Complainants did not pay the bill, and neither respondent nor
 complainants discussed the bill again.
      In December 1988, Goss Tire filed a motion for summary judgment in the
 civil suit on the ground that worker's compensation was the husband's
 exclusive remedy.  Within a month, Asplundh filed a motion to dismiss on the
 same ground.
      About that time, the husband contacted another lawyer because he was
 frustrated by what he perceived to be respondent's failure to keep him
 informed of progress with the lawsuits.  The lawyer suggested he resolve the
 problem with respondent.  In early February, complainants met with
 respondent and, among other things, mentioned that they had contacted
 another lawyer because of their frustration over the lack of progress in
 their cases.  Angered by complainants' lack of gratitude for her work on the
 cases, respondent suggested that they retain another lawyer if they were not
 happy with her services.  Complainants stated that they did not want to
 retain another lawyer because it would mean a great deal of lost time and
 effort.
      A few days after this meeting, on February 6, the superior court
 dismissed the civil suit against Asplundh without prejudice to refile after
 resolution of the Asplundh worker's compensation claim.  On March 6,
 respondent wrote a letter to complainants informing them of the dismissal.
 In that letter, she stated that a fee agreement had never been reached
 regarding the Asplundh claim, that she would continue to represent them only
 on an hourly basis, that she charged $80 per hour and required a $750
 retainer, and that she would presume they did not want her to represent
 them if she did not receive the retainer and a signed agreement by March 15.
 Complainants immediately called respondent and told her they had understood
 that the actions against both Goss Tire and Asplundh would be handled on a
 contingency basis.  Respondent disagreed.  Because respondent was unwilling
 to represent complainants in the Asplundh claim on a contingency basis,
 complainants agreed to allow respondent to withdraw from the pending cases.
      Complainants then contacted the lawyer to whom they had previously
 spoken.  In turn, the lawyer contacted respondent, who said she wanted to
 withdraw from all of the remaining matters involving complainants, but would
 not release the case files until complainants reimbursed her for out-of-
 pocket expenses, which amounted to $498.  On April 3, respondent mailed a
 letter to complainants, with a copy to the lawyer, confirming her agreement
 with complainants to withdraw, stating that she would not release the files
 unless complainants paid her expenses, and warning complainants that they
 would be responsible for the entire amount of her attorney's fees unless the
 expenses were paid within fifteen days.  Respondent also sent complainants a
 statement itemizing the expenses.  The wife called respondent to challenge
 the accuracy of the statement and to obtain copies of the underlying bills,
 but respondent neither returned the calls nor supplied the requested
 information.
      On April 12, the lawyer with whom complainants had been consulting
 entered his appearance in the Asplundh worker's compensation claim.  That
 same day, he wrote respondent, stating that complainants had not agreed to
 be responsible for her fees in the event they could not pay her expenses
 within fifteen days, and that he believed the canons of ethics required her
 either to continue zealous representation of complainants in the Goss Tire
 civil suit or to allow complainants access to the files, regardless of
 whether expenses were paid, so that they could secure other representation.
 Respondent was incensed by the letter, which she considered patronizing and
 sexist.
      On April 17, the superior court granted summary judgment to the
 employer in the Goss Tire civil case at a hearing attended by respondent.
 Complainants' new attorney learned of the order on April 25 and suggested
 that complainants call respondent and ask her if anything had happened in
 the case.  The next day, when the wife inquired about the status of the
 case, respondent told her that the court had not yet issued a decision.
 Respondent first informed complainants of the court's order at a meeting on
 April 29.
      At that meeting, complainants stated that they wanted respondent to
 appeal the order.  Respondent agreed to do so if complainants paid the
 filing fee, the cost of a transcript, and $100 per month towards expenses.
 Although complainants did not believe they could make the payments, they
 agreed to do so.  Respondent filed the appeal, but complainants failed to
 make payments as agreed.  On June 21, respondent wrote complainants that she
 would seek to withdraw from the case if they did not pay her $100 within
 five days.  When complainants did not respond to her letter, respondent
 filed a motion to withdraw in early July on the ground that complainants had
 "failed to abide by the retainer agreement."  When complainants sought to
 obtain a copy of the retainer agreement, respondent told her office manager
 not to give them one.
      On July 26, complainants filed a letter opposing respondent's motion to
 withdraw.  The letter stated that complainants were not in violation of the
 retainer agreement and that respondent had failed to provide them with bills
 supporting her accounting of expenses even though they had asked for such
 proof three times.  Complainants' letter angered respondent because she
 believed that her office manager had sent them copies of the bills, although
 she did not verify whether this had been done.  In fact, in late June or
 early July, respondent's staff had compiled a list of expenses, totaling
 $809, incurred on behalf of complainants, along with copies of checks and
 invoices substantiating the charges; however, complainants did not receive
 this accounting until after it was sent to bar counsel in connection with
 the present disciplinary action.
      On August 1, complainants' new attorney asked respondent to state (1)
 her conditions for releasing the file of the Goss Tire civil suit, and (2)
 her expectations for future payments in the event she was permitted to
 withdraw and complainants prevailed on appeal.  Respondent stated that she
 would turn over the file under the following conditions: (1) "All costs
 which have been expended on [complainants'] behalf will be paid," and (2)
 "[w]e will expect to receive 1/3 of whatever fees you receive in the event
 this matter is successfully appealed."
      On August 10, respondent's motion to withdraw was granted.  At the
 hearing on the motion, the husband stated among other things, that
 respondent had yelled at him and failed to provide him with a complete
 accounting of the expenses, and that he was unable to pay the expenses.
 Acting on this Court's order, respondent sent a copy of the retainer
 agreement to complainants' new attorney.  She also sent him a letter stating
 that because the husband had made false allegations to the Vermont Supreme
 Court, she would now release the file only under the following conditions:
 complainants pay either $800 in expenses plus her full fee should the appeal
 prove successful, or an estimated $2200 based on the number of hours billed
 on the case.  Complainants made no payments to respondent, and complainants'
 new attorney would not take over the appeal without reviewing medical
 evidence in the file held by respondent.  On November 20, 1989, the Goss
 Tire appeal was dismissed because complainants failed to comply with an
 entry order requiring the filing of a printed case and brief.
      Based on this sequence of events, the hearing panel found that
 respondent had violated ethical rules by:

      (1) lying about the status of the Goss Tire civil suit, in violation of
 DR 1-102(A)(4) (dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation);

      (2) attempting to unilaterally alter the Asplundh fee agreement, in
 violation of DR 1-102(A)(4) and (5) (conduct prejudicial to administration
 of justice) and DR 7-101(A)(3) (damaging client during course of
 professional relationship);

      (3) wrongfully demanding reimbursement of expenses before the
 conclusion of the case, in violation of DR 1-102(A)(4) and (5), and 7-
 101(A)(3);

      (4) negligently failing to provide an expense accounting, in violation
 of DR 1-102(A)(7) (conduct adversely reflecting on lawyer's fitness to
 practice law);

      (5) falsely asserting an oral agreement between herself and her
 clients, in violation of DR 1-102(A)(4) and DR 1-102(A)(7); and

      (6) failing to release a file to the detriment of her clients, in
 violation of DR 1-102(A)(4) and (7), DR 7-101(A)(3), and DR 2-110 (A)(2)
 (lawyer shall not withdraw without taking reasonable steps to avoid
 prejudicing client, including delivering all papers to which client is
 entitled).
      The majority of the three-member panel recommended that respondent be
 suspended from the practice of law for thirty days followed by a period of
 probation to last until she successfully completed the multi-state
 professional responsibility examination.  The majority also recommended that
 respondent be required to reimburse complainants for fees retained that
 exceeded any judgment she collected based on expenses owed by complainants.
 In a minority opinion, the panel chair recommended that respondent be
 publicly reprimanded rather than suspended.  After noting various mitigating
 and aggravating circumstances, the Professional Conduct Board adopted the
 sanctions recommended by the panel majority, with certain clarifications
 regarding reimbursement to complainants.
                                     II.
      Respondent concedes that she misrepresented the status of the Goss Tire
 civil suit to complainants, attempted to unilaterally alter the implied-
 in-fact agreement in the Asplundh worker's compensation matter, and
 negligently failed to provide complainants with cancelled checks for out-of-
 pocket expenses.  She also concedes that she handled the fee dispute with
 complainants poorly.  Nevertheless, she contends that, given the mitigating
 factors and the absence of prejudice to complainants resulting from these
 three violations, the appropriate sanction is admonition without a period of
 probation.
                                     A.
      Respondent argues that two of the violations found by the Board are
 unsupported by the record.  First, she contends that the evidence does not
 support the Board's conclusion that she falsely asserted an agreement by
 complainants to pay expenses within fifteen days.  We agree.
      The disputed March 22, 1989 letter reads as follows:
      This is to confirm our agreement that I am withdrawing from the
      case of Favreau vs. Goss, et al.  I will give you your file when I
      receive my out-of-pocket expenses, which amount to $498.00.

      By this agreement, you are not responsible for any other
      attorney's fees.  As I indicated to you over the telephone, this
      is more than fair to you since we spent many hours on your case.

      Therefore, if I do not receive money for the expenses within 15
      days, you will be responsible for the entire amount of my
      attorney's fees.

      On its face, the letter confirms only that there was an agreement that
 respondent would withdraw from the case.  Rather than asserting an oral
 agreement that complainants would be liable for attorney's fees, the third
 paragraph of the letter is, at worst, a threat to charge complainants for
 her fees unless they paid her out-of-pocket expenses within fifteen days.
 Respondent may not have had a right to demand attorney's fees in the event
 of nonpayment of expenses, but that fact does not transform the third
 paragraph into a false assertion of an agreement.  This Board's finding of a
 violation is not "'clearly and reasonably supported by the evidence.'"  In
 re Rosenfield, 157 Vt. 537, 543, 601 A.2d 972, 975 (1991) (quoting In re
 Wright, 131 Vt. 473, 490,