Title: KENNETH ERMIL JONES V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

KENNETH ERMIL JONES V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 44Case Number: S-08-0281Decided: 04/16/2010NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
KENNETH 
ERMIL JONES,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable John R. Perry, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Michael 
H. Reese of Michael Henry Reese, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Craig.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Following a jury 
trial, Kenneth Ermil Jones was convicted of second degree sexual abuse of a 
child and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of five to fifteen years.  Jones challenges his conviction, raising 
claims regarding the district court's denial of his motion for judgment of 
acquittal, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's verdict, and 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  
We affirm.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Jones presents 
these issues for our consideration:

 
 
I.          
Trial counsel made a Rule 29 motion at the close of the prosecution's 
case in chief.  The [district] court 
denied the Defendant's Rule 29 motion.  
Did the district court err in denying Appellant's motion for judgment of 
acquittal?

 
 
II.         
Was there sufficient evidence to sustain a guilty verdict in this case 
for sexual abuse of a minor?

 
 
III.        Was 
there ineffective assistance of counsel for 1) failure to seek a bill of 
particulars in light of an absence of detail about which conduct constituted 
sexual abuse and/or 2) failure to submit an Eagan 
instruction?

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      In September and 
October of 2007, Jones lived in a mobile home occupied by his girlfriend, LW 
(hereinafter Mother), and her two young children, RH (age seven) and TH (age 
six).  One morning, Mother returned 
home early from work and discovered Jones in bed with RH.  Mother noticed that Jones' front was 
pressed against RH's back, in what she described as a "spooning" position.  Mother woke Jones, ordered him out of 
the room, and told him he was not allowed to be in the same bed as her son.  However, she again found Jones in bed 
with RH on another occasion.    

 
 
[¶4]      Around 
mid-October, Mother evicted Jones from the mobile home and instructed him to 
stay away from her and the boys.  
She also contacted the Wyoming Department of Family Services and the 
Gillette Police Department.  
Following an investigation, which included interviews with both RH and 
Jones, the State charged Jones with one count of sexual abuse of a minor in the 
second degree under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-315(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2009).1  

 
 
[¶5]      At trial, RH 
testified Jones would crawl into bed with him after his mother left for work, 
and that both of them would be wearing only their underwear.  RH testified that, on those occasions, 
Jones would place his body against RH's back and his hands on RH's belly.  RH also stated there were times he would 
wake up in his mother's bedroom, lying in bed with Jones.  RH further testified Jones occasionally 
touched him on the parts of his body that his "underwear covers up," both in the 
"front" and the "back," where nobody is supposed to touch.  He stated that when Jones touched him in 
the back, it was usually when he was in trouble and was getting a spanking.  However, when Jones touched him in the 
front, it was "different" and not when he was in trouble.  RH stated Jones' hand would be moving as 
he touched him in the front.  

 
 
[¶6]      Detective Rebecca 
Elger of the Gillette Police Department testified regarding her interview of 
Jones, which was conducted shortly after Mother reported his behavior with RH to 
police and the Department of Family Services.  According to Detective Elger, Jones 
admitted to sleeping in the same bed with RH on several occasions and cuddling 
with him.  He reported he felt a 
void when Mother would go to work and "that he would go and get [RH] and bring 
him to the bed and cuddle with him, or he would go to [RH's] bed and cuddle with 
him there." Jones revealed he would get an erection when he cuddled with RH, and 
that he would always push away from RH because he did not want RH to notice his 
reaction.  Jones also acknowledged 
he may have touched RH's penis as he was helping RH tuck in his shirt, or at 
times when RH would sit on his lap to do homework, but he insisted it was always 
accidental.  

 
 
[¶7]      At the close of 
the State's case, defense counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal.  The district court denied the motion, 
concluding the State had made a prima facie showing of the necessary elements of 
the charged crime.  Thereafter, the 
defense rested without presenting any evidence.  The jury found Jones guilty of the 
charged offense, and the district court imposed a prison sentence of five to 
fifteen years.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 

Denial 
of Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

 
 
[¶8]      The salient 
portion of W.R.Cr.P. 29(a) reads as follows:

 
 
The 
court on motion of a defendant or of its own motion shall order the entry of 
judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment, 
information or citation after the evidence on either side is closed if the 
evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or 
offenses.

 
 
When 
ruling upon a motion for judgment of acquittal, a trial court is called upon to 
determine, as a matter of law, whether in its opinion there is sufficient 
evidence to sustain the charge.  On 
review of the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, this Court has the 
same duty.  Montez v. State, 2009 WY 17, ¶ 18, 201 P.3d 434, 440 (Wyo. 2009).  We 
recently reiterated the principles governing a judgment of acquittal 
motion:

 
 
[T]he 
district court must assume the truth of the evidence of the State and give to 
the State the benefit of all legitimate inferences to be drawn from that 
evidence.  If a prima facie case is 
demonstrated when the evidence is so examined, the motion for judgment of 
acquittal properly is denied.  It is 
proper to grant a motion for judgment of acquittal only if there is no 
substantial evidence to sustain the material allegations relating to the offense 
that is charged.  Such a result is 
indicated if the evidence requires the jury to speculate or conjecture as to the 
defendant's guilt or if a reasonable juror must have a reasonable doubt as to 
the existence of any of the essential elements of the crime when the evidence is 
viewed in the light most favorable to the State.

 
 

Martinez 
v. State, 
2009 WY 6, ¶ 11, 199 P.3d 526, 530 (Wyo. 2009) (internal citations 
omitted).

 
 
[¶9]      Jones 
disagreement with the district court's denial of his motion for judgment of 
acquittal primarily rests on his contention that the district court should have 
considered the rule articulated in Eagan 
v. State, 58 Wyo. 167, 128 P.2d 215 (1942) and the corpus delicti rule in evaluating the 
adequacy of the State's evidence.  
We reject Jones' contention of error for several 
reasons.

 
 
[¶10]   First, Jones' reliance on the Eagan rule is misplaced.  That rule states:

 
 
Where 
an accused is the sole witness of a transaction charged as a crime, . . . his 
testimony cannot be arbitrarily rejected, and if his credibility has not been 
impeached, and his testimony is not improbable, and is not inconsistent with the 
facts and circumstances shown, but is reasonably consistent therewith, then his 
testimony should be accepted.

 
 

Eagan, 
58 Wyo. at 198, 128 P.2d  at 226.  As 
indicated, the Eagan rule applies 
only to testimony by the accused.   
Cheatham v. State, 719 P.2d 612, 623 (Wyo. 1986); Cutbirth v. 
State, 663 P.2d 888, 890 (Wyo. 1983).  
In this case, Jones did not testify and, therefore, there was no 
testimony given by him that the district court, or for that matter the jury, 
could accept or reject.  Even if we 
were to consider the testimony of Detective Elger relating Jones' statements as 
his testimony, it is clear Jones was not the sole witness to the criminal event, 
as the rule mandates.  Leeper v. State, 589 P.2d 379, 382 (Wyo. 
1979).  RH testified about his 
contact with Jones.  Mother also 
testified about certain relevant facts, which corroborated parts of RH's 
testimony.  Given the circumstances, 
we are satisfied the Eagan rule is 
inapplicable and provides Jones no relief.

 
 
[¶11]   Second, Jones' argument regarding 
the corpus delicti rule is likewise 
flawed.  While Jones is correct that 
independent proof of the corpus 
delicti must exist apart from a defendant's extrajudicial confession or 
admission, Simmers v. State, 943 P.2d 1189, 1199 (Wyo. 1997); Kolb v. 
State, 930 P.2d 1238, 1248 (Wyo. 1996); Betzle v. State, 847 P.2d 1010, 1021-22 
(Wyo. 1993); Konopisos v. State, 26 
Wyo. 350, 354-55, 185 P. 355, 356 (Wyo. 1919), he is incorrect in his assertion 
that insufficient evidence existed outside the statement he gave to Detective 
Elger.  In Simmers, we identified the sort of 
corroborating evidence that must exist in order to prove the commission of a 
crime: 

 
 
[The] 
corroborating evidence need only consist of substantial evidence that the 
offense has been committed, so that the evidence as a whole proves beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the crime 
charged.

 
 
Corroborating 
evidence is adequate if it supports the essential facts admitted sufficiently to 
justify a jury inference of the truth of the confession. The quantity and type 
of independent corroborating evidence depends upon the facts of each case.  However, circumstantial evidence can be 
used to corroborate a confession.

 
 

Simmers, 
943 P.2d  at 1199 (quoting United States 
v. Clark, 57 F.3d 973, 976 (10th Cir. 1995)) (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted). 

 
 
[¶12]   Here, evidence of Jones' wrongdoing 
was presented through avenues other than the statement he gave to Detective 
Elger  most prominently, the testimony of the victim.  RH testified Jones would get into bed 
with him wearing only his underwear and, at times, he would sleep in his 
mother's bed when only Jones was there.  
He also testified Jones would touch him on that area of the front of his 
body that his underwear covered, that Jones' hand would be moving at those 
times, and that Jones touched him differently on a similar area of the rear of 
his body when he was in trouble.  
Additionally, RH's mother testified she saw Jones lying in RH's bed, with 
RH's body pressed against his.  
While this evidence, in and of itself, may not rise to proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the testimony required to overcome the corpus delicti rule need not rise to 
that level.  Instead, it need only 
provide substantial corroboration that the offense has been committed, 
sufficient to allow the trier of fact to infer the truth of the confession.  Simmers, 943 P.2d  at 
1199.

 
 
[¶13]   Detective Elger's testimony 
regarding Jones' statement consisted primarily of information about him sleeping 
in bed with RH.  This information 
was directly corroborated by RH and his mother's testimony.  Jones argues that, because neither RH 
nor his mother gave testimony about his sexual arousal, that portion of his 
statement cannot be used as evidence against him.  However, that interpretation far expands 
the scope of the corpus delicti 
rule.

 
 
[¶14]   As we stated in Simmers, the "corroborating evidence 
need only consist of substantial evidence that the offense has been committed, 
so that the evidence as a whole proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant is guilty of the crime charged."  
Simmers, 943 P.2d  at 
1199.  Since RH and his mother 
substantially corroborated Jones' statement, the district court could infer the 
truth of that statement, even if every single factual detail had not been 
corroborated.  Therefore, it was 
appropriate for the district court to consider all of Detective Elger's 
testimony regarding Jones' statement, in conjunction with the rest of the 
evidence, in determining whether the State had presented a prima facie 
case.

 
 
[¶15]   Lastly, we agree with the district 
court that sufficient evidence existed for the case to be submitted to the 
jury.  As explained above, the 
State's evidence indicated Jones had touched RH in the front where his underwear 
covers.  The evidence also revealed 
RH would wake up and find Jones in bed with him, and Jones would often get an 
erection while he was lying in bed with RH, indicating sexual arousal.  Assuming the truth of that evidence and 
affording the State the benefit of all legitimate inferences to be drawn from 
it, the State had made a prima facie showing that Jones had engaged in sexual 
contact with RH.  Thus, it was 
proper for the district court to allow the jury to determine whether the State 
proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

 
 

Sufficiency 
of the Evidence

 
 
[¶16]   Jones further contends his 
conviction cannot stand because the evidence, as a whole, is insufficient to 
support the jury's determination that he touched RH's intimate parts with the 
intention of sexual arousal, gratification or abuse.  When reviewing a sufficiency of the 
evidence claim, we must determine whether the evidence and any reasonable 
inferences drawn from it, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, 
are adequate to permit a reasonable trier of fact to find guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Granzer v. State, 2008 WY 118, ¶ 23, 193 P.3d 266, 273 (Wyo. 2008); Lemus v. 
State, 2007 WY 111, ¶ 47, 162 P.3d 497, 509 (Wyo. 2007); Statezny v. State, 2001 WY 22, ¶ 15, 18 P.3d 641, 645 (Wyo. 2001).  It is 
the jury's responsibility to resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the 
evidence and draw reasonable inferences from the facts.  Sotolongo-Garcia v. State, 2002 WY 185, 
¶ 11, 60 P.3d 687, 689 (Wyo. 2002).  
We will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury but will only 
determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals could have 
found the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Conine v. State, 2008 WY 146, ¶ 5, 197 P.3d 156, 159 (Wyo. 2008); Grissom v. 
State, 2005 WY 132, ¶ 24, 121 P.3d 127, 136 (Wyo. 
2005).

 
 
[¶17]   The record reveals that the State 
established at trial how RH referred to his intimate parts through the following 
examination:

 
 
[Prosecutor]   Are there certain parts of your 
body that nobody is supposed to touch but you?

 
 
[RH]    Yes.

 
 
Q         
Okay.  What parts -- where 
are those parts of your body?

 
 
A         
Just up on top of my belly.

 
 
Q         
Say that again, please.

 
 
A         
Just the top of my belly.

 
 
Q         
Okay.  Is there anyplace else 
that nobody else is supposed to touch?

 
 
A         
Down by the knees, and on the front and the back.

 
 
Q         
Okay.  Is [sic] there some 
clothes that you wear that cover up just that part of your 
body?

 
 
A         
Yes.

 
 
Q         
What clothes is [sic] that?

 
 
A         
My pants.

 
 
Q         
Are there any other things you wear inside your pants that just cover up 
those parts?

 
 
A         
Yes.

 
 
Q         
What's that?

 
 
A         
My underwear.  

 
 
Based 
upon this testimony, the jury could reasonably conclude RH was referring to his 
genitals when he discussed the "front" and "where his underwear covers."  Once the jury had an understanding of 
RH's terminology, the jury could reasonably conclude from the following 
testimony that Jones had touched RH on the genitals:

 
 
[Prosecutor]   Okay.  We've talked a little bit about the part 
of your body where your underwear covers up.  Do you remember if there's been any big 
people, like your mom or [Jones] or maybe doctors, anybody in the last year has 
touched that part of your body where underwear covers?

 
 
[RH]    Yes.

 
 
Q         
Okay.  Who has touched that 
part of your body?

 
 
A         
Sometimes the doctors, and sometimes my mom, and sometimes 
[Jones].

 
 
Q         
Okay.  When the doctors did 
it, was it when you went to the doctors and you weren't feeling 
good?

 
 
A         
Can you say that again, please?

 
 
Q         
Well, when you say the doctors looked at that part -- touched that part 
of your body, did you actually go -- maybe your mom took you to see the 
doctor?

 
 
A         
Yes.

 
 
Q         
Okay. Let's talk about when your mom does that.  Did she do that -- do you remember if 
there was some reason that she was doing that?

 
 
A         
Yes.

 
 
Q         
What was that?

 
 
A         
Sometimes I've been -- sometimes naughty, and sometimes whenever I'm 
taking a bath.

 
 
Q         
So taking a bath or sometimes when you were naughty.  Okay.  When you were naughty, would she touch 
the front part of your body or back part of your body?

 
 
A         
The back and front.

 
 
Q         
Okay.  Now, let's talk about 
when [Jones] would do that.  Were 
you in trouble when [Jones] did that?

 
 
A         
Sometimes, and sometimes not.

 
 
Q         
Okay.  Let's talk about the 
times when you weren't in trouble.  
What part of your body would he touch then?

 
 
A         
My front and the back.

 
 
Q         
Okay.  When he touched those 
parts, what part of his body would he touch you with?

 
 
A         
His hand.

 
 
Q         
Do you remember, was his hand moving?

 
 
A         
Yes.

 
 
Q         
Can you tell me how it was moving?

 
 
A         
It was -- I really can't remember that.

 
 
Q         
Okay.  You say he also 
touched the back part of that area where your underwear covers.  Was that when you were in trouble or 
other times?

 
 
A         
Whenever I was in trouble. 

 
 
Q         
And how would he touch the back side when you were in 
trouble?

 
 
A         
He would just  I'm not really sure.  I can't remember. 

 
 
Q         
Was it like a spanking?

 
 
A         
Yes.

 
 
Q         
Okay.  [RH], when [Jones] 
would touch the front part where your underwear goes, would that be the same -- 
would he touch it the same way that he touched your back side, or would it be 
different?

 
 
A         
It would be different.  

 
 
[¶18]   Additionally, the jury heard 
through the testimony of RH and his mother that, on several occasions, Jones 
would "spoon" with RH  that is, have the front of his body pressed against the 
back of RH's body  while lying with him in bed.  The jury also learned from Detective 
Elgers' testimony that Jones admitted to having an erection on several occasions 
when he cuddled with RH in bed.  
Although there was no direct testimony Jones had touched RH's genitals 
while lying in bed with him, the fact that Jones frequently would lay with RH 
knowing he would be aroused could have led the jury to reasonably infer that 
when Jones did touch RH's genitals on other occasions, he did so with the intent 
of becoming sexually aroused.  We 
conclude the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's guilty 
verdict.

 
 

Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel

 
 
[¶19]   In his last contention of error, 
Jones claims he was denied his right to the effective assistance of 
counsel.  In particular, Jones 
faults counsel for failing to request a jury instruction incorporating the Eagan rule and failing to request a bill 
of particulars to clarify the facts underlying the criminal charge.  In analyzing ineffectiveness claims, we 
have stated:

 
 
When 
reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the paramount 
determination is whether, in light of all the circumstances, trial counsel's 
acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance.  The reviewing court 
should indulge a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance 
and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional 
judgment.

 
 
Under 
the two-prong standard articulated in Strickland [v. Washington] and Frias 
[v. State], 
an appellant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate on the 
record that counsel's performance was deficient and that prejudice resulted. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. [668,] 687, 104 S.Ct. [2052,] 2064[, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 
(1984)]; Frias, 722 P.2d [135,] 145 [(Wyo. 1986)].  In other words, to warrant reversal on a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must demonstrate that 
his counsel failed to "render such assistance as would have been offered by a 
reasonably competent attorney" and that "counsel's deficiency prejudiced the 
defense of the case." Lower v. State, 786 P.2d 346, 349 (Wyo.1990). "The 
benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's 
conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the 
trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Strickland, 
466 U.S.  at 686, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064.

 Asch 
[v. 
State, 
2003 WY 18,] ¶ 11[, 62 P.3d 945, 950 (Wyo. 2003)]. The burden of proving that 
counsel was ineffective rests entirely on an appellant. [Id.]  To satisfy his burden, an appellant must 
provide more than mere speculation or equivocal inferences. Sincock v. 
State, 2003 WY 115, ¶ 37, 76 P.3d 323, [337] (Wyo. 
2003).

 
 

Duke 
v. State, 
2004 WY 120, ¶ 36, 99 P.3d 928, 943 (Wyo. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1062, 125 S. Ct. 2513, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1113 (2005) (some internal citations omitted).  We have further stated that, to satisfy 
the prejudice prong, an appellant must demonstrate the existence of a reasonable 
probability that, absent counsel's deficient performance, the result of the 
proceedings would have been different.  Martinez v. State, 2006 WY 20, ¶ 23, 
128 P.3d 652, 663 (Wyo. 2006).  
The failure to make the required showing of prejudice will 
defeat an ineffectiveness claim.  Id.

 
 
[¶20]   We can readily dispose of Jones' 
claim concerning counsel's failure to seek an Eagan instruction.  As previously discussed, the Eagan rule was not applicable under the 
facts of this case and, consequently, an Eagan instruction would not have been 
appropriate even if counsel had requested that one be given.  Counsel's failure to pursue a jury 
instruction that, most likely, would have been refused by the district court 
does not constitute ineffective assistance.  See Duke, ¶ 80, 99 P.3d  at 952 (counsel not 
ineffective for failing to pursue lesser-included offense instruction which 
lacked a legal basis and would have been refused by trial court); Blakeman v. State, 2004 WY 139, ¶ 35, 
100 P.3d 1229, 1238 (Wyo. 2004) (counsel not ineffective for failing to seek 
exclusion of evidence properly admissible under W.R.E. 404(b)); Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 58, 43 P.3d 80, 102 (Wyo. 2002) (ineffectiveness cannot be premised on counsel's 
failure to file suppression motion where no underlying basis existed for 
motion); Herdt v. State, 891 P.2d 793, 799 (Wyo. 1995) (ineffectiveness cannot be premised on counsel's failure to 
seek relief which is not available).

 
 
[¶21]   We also find no basis for 
concluding that counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to seek a 
bill of particulars.  Jones contends 
that, because the charging document failed to provide sufficient notice of the 
conduct constituting the unlawful sexual contact, a bill of particulars was 
essential to his ability to adequately defend against the criminal charge.  In this regard, Jones claims he was 
forced to defend against numerous allegations of sexual contact without knowing 
which one gave rise to the criminal charge.  In assailing counsel, however, Jones has 
failed to explain how a bill of particulars would have altered or significantly 
aided the defense strategy in this case, which was a general denial of any 
wrongdoing.  Jones has also failed 
to provide any analysis, within the context of the facts in this case, how the 
outcome of his trial might have been different absent the alleged attorney 
error.  Needless to say, Jones has 
not demonstrated that counsel's assistance was constitutionally 
ineffective.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶22]   We hold that the district court 
properly denied Jones' motion for judgment of acquittal, and that sufficient 
evidence exists to sustain Jones' conviction.  We also find Jones has not shown that 
defense counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance.  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Section 6-2-315(a)(ii) makes it unlawful for a person who is sixteen (16) 
years of age or older to engage in sexual contact with a victim who is less than 
thirteen (13) years of age.  "Sexual 
contact" is defined in § 6-2-301(a)(vi) (LexisNexis 2009) as 

 
 
touching, with the intention of sexual arousal, gratification or abuse, 
of the victim's intimate parts by the actor, or of the actor's intimate parts by 
the victim, or of the clothing covering the immediate area of the victim's or 
actor's intimate parts[.]

 
 
Section 6-2-301(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2009) defines "intimate parts" as "the 
external genitalia, perineum, anus or pubes of any person or the breast of a 
female person[.]"