Title: DVORAK v HUNTLEY PROJECT IRRIGATIO

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 81-217 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 ROBER W. DVORAK and PATRICIA J. DVORAK, Plaintiffs and Respondents and Cross-Appellants, HUNTLEY PROJECT IRRIGATION DISTRICT, JOHN PROPP and NORMAN MAYNARD, Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Yellowstone Honorable Robert Wilson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Harwood, Galles & Gunderson, Billings, Montana Anderson, Brown, Gerbase, Cebull & Jones, Billings, Montana Rockwood Brown argued, Billings, Montana For Respondents: Keefer, Roybal, Hanson, Stacey and Jarussi, Billings, Montana Calvin J. Stacey argued, Billings, Montana Filed: DEc 2s " i 8 2 Submitted: October 26, 1981 Decided : bft 2 3 ~4 i ' M r . Chief J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . I n an a c t i o n f o r damages a g a i n s t an i r r i g a t i o n d i s t r i c t and two o f its employees f o r r e f u s a l to p r o v i d e i r r i g a t i o n water t o p l a i n t i f f s ' f a r m , t h e District Court awarded p l a i n t i f f s com- p e n s a t o r y and p u n i t i v e damages i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h a j u r y v e r d i c t . I n a p o s t - t r i a l o r d e r , t h e District Court vacated t h e award of p u n i t i v e damages a g a i n s t t h e i r r i g a t i o n d i s t r i c t and denied a new t r i a l . W e r e v e r s e and remand f o r a new t r i a l . On A p r i l 23, 1976, p l a i n t i f f s Roger and Ann Dvorak f i l e d a damage a c t i o n i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of Yellowstone County a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t s Huntley P r o j e c t I r r i g a t i o n District and two of its employees, Norman Maynard, its manager, and John Propp, a d i t c h r i d e r . P l a i n t i f f s sought a c t u a l damages f o r t h e i r c r o p l o s s e s i n 1974 and 1975 and p u n i t i v e damages of $50,000 a g a i n s t e a c h of t h e s e d e f e n d a n t s . The d e f e n d a n t s cross-claimed f o r puni- t i v e damages a g a i n s t p l a i n t i f f Roger Dvorak. On November 7 , 1980, t h e j u r y r e t u r n e d a v e r d i c t f o r p l a i n t i f f s i n t h e amount o f $5,000 compensatory damages and $40,000 p u n i t i v e damages a g a i n s t each of t h e t h r e e d e f e n d a n t s . The j u r y d e n i e d d e f e n d a n t s ' cross-claim a g a i n s t p l a i n t i f f Roger Dvorak f o r p u n i t i v e damages. T h e r e a f t e r , d e f e n d a n t s moved f o r a new t r i a l . The District Court s t r u c k t h e award o f p u n i t i v e damages a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t Huntley P r o j e c t I r r i g a t i o n District and d e n i e d a new t r i a l . Defendants a p p e a l from d e n i a l of t h e i r motion f o r a new t r i a l and p l a i n t i f f s c r o s s - a p p e a l from t h a t p a r t of t h e District C o u r t ' s o r d e r s t r i k i n g t h e $40,000 p u n i t i v e damages award a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t H u n t l e y P r o j e c t I r r i g a t i o n D i s t r i c t . W e restate t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d on a p p e a l or c r o s s - a p p e a l i n t h i s manner: 1. Did t h e manner of drawing t h e p r e s e l e c t e d j u r y list f o r t h i s t r i a l v i o l a t e s e c t i o n s 25-7-202 and 25-7-204, MCA, t h e r e b y denying a p p e l l a n t s ' r i g h t to a t r i a l b e f o r e a j u r y s e l e c t e d i n t h e manner provided by l a w ? 2. Were employees Maynard and Propp exempt o r immune from a p u n i t i v e damage judgment a g a i n s t them? 3 . Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err i n s t r i k i n g t h e p u n i t i v e damage award a g a i n s t Huntley P r o j e c t I r r i g a t i o n D i s t r i c t ? The p a r t i e s ' s u b - i s s u e s w i l l be d i s c u s s e d under t h e p r i n - c i p a l i s s u e s set f o r t h above t o t h e e x t e n t n e c e s s a r y f o r d e t e r - m i n a t i o n of t h i s a p p e a l . The I r r i g a t i o n District c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e manner i n which t h e j u r y was s e l e c t e d v i o l a t e d t h e a p p l i c a b l e Montana s t a t u t e s . The s t a t u t e s i n q u e s t i o n are as f o l l o w s : " 25-7-202. Judge -- to draw c a p s u l e s c o n t a i n i n g b a l l o t s . When an i s s u e of f a c t t o be t r i e d by a j u r y is brought to t r i a l , t h e d i s t r i c t judge i n t h e p r e s e n c e of t h e c l e r k of t h e c o u r t must o p e n l y draw o u t of t h e t r i a l j u r o r box as many o f t h e c a p s u l e s c o n t a i n i n g b a l l o t s w i t h t h e names o f j u r o r s t h e r e o n , one a f t e r a n o t h e r , as a r e s u f - f i c i e n t to form a jury." "25-7-204. -- Mode o f drawing c a p s u l e s . Before t h e f i r s t c a p s u l e c o n t a i n i n g a b a l l o t s h a l l have been drawn, t h e box must be c l o s e d and w e l l sha- ken so a s to t h o r o u g h l y mix t h e c a p s u l e s t h e r e i n . The d i s t r i c t judge must draw a c a p s u l e c o n t a i n i n g a b a l l o t w i t h t h e j u r o r ' s name t h e r e o n through an a p e r t u r e made i n t h e l i d l a r g e enough o n l y to admit h i s hand c o n v e n i e n t l y and w i t h o u t s a i d judge g a z i n g i n t o s a i d box b e f o r e or w h i l e drawing s a i d c a p s u l e ." The s t a t u t o r y p r o c e d u r e s set o u t above were n o t followed i n t h i s case. I n s t e a d , a deputy c l e r k of c o u r t removed paper s l i p s , n o t i n c a p s u l e s , from a metal box. The deputy c l e r k d i d n o t shake t h e box b e f o r e t h e names were drawn. The names drawn by t h e d e p u t y c l e r k were placed on a list t h a t w a s n o t drawn by l o t p r i o r t o t h e impaneling of t h e t r i a l j u r y . F i n a l l y , t h e most i m p o r t a n t d e p a r t u r e from t h e s t a t u t o r y procedure took p l a c e when t h e d e p u t y c l e r k drew t h e p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s ' names from t h e metal box o u t s i d e t h e p r e s e n c e of t h e d i s t r i c t judge. T h i s procedure v i o l a t e d t h e fundamental purpose of t h e s e s t a t u t e s , v i z . t o i n s u r e random s e l e c t i o n of t r i a l j u r o r s by l o t from t h e e n t i r e p a n e l o r a r r a y . The s t a t u t o r y r e q u i r e m e n t of e n c a p s u l a t i n g t h e b a l l o t s c o n t a i n i n g t h e j u r o r s t names and t h o r o u g h l y shaking t h e box b e f o r e drawing is t h e s t a t u t o r y method f o r a c h i e v i n g random s e l e c t i o n . The s t a t u t o r y r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t judge draw t h e names of t h e j u r o r s i n t h e p r e s e n c e o f t h e c l e r k of c o u r t is to i n s u r e t h a t t h e s t a t u t o r y p r o c e d u r e s are followed. The s t a t u t o r y v i o l a t i o n s h e r e d e f e a t e d t h e o b j ec- t i v e of i n s u r i n g random s e l e c t i o n . I n S t a t e v. District Court County of S i l v e r BOW ( 1 9 ~ 9 ) ~ 136 Mont. 354, 348 p.2d 143, t h i s Court d i s c u s s e d t h e importance of f o l l o w i n g t h e j U ~ Y select i o n s t a t u t e s and h e l d , " I t is n o t t h e r i g h t of t h e i n d i v i d u a l n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e d , b u t r a t h e r t h e e n t i r e j u r y s y s t e m and t h e s e l e c t i o n p r o c e d u r e s which must b e p r o t e c t e d , and when a showing is t i m e l y b r o u g h t b e f o r e t h i s c o u r t we would be remiss i n o u r d u t i e s i f we p e r m i t t e d material d e v i a t i o n or d e p a r t u r e from t h e p r o c e d u r e s s p e l l e d o u t by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . " 348 P.2d a t 146. T h i s Court r e a f f i r m e d t h e r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t t h e District Court f o l l o w t h e s t a t u t o r y mandate of j u r y s e l e c t i o n i n S t a t e v. F i t z p a t r i c k ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 174 Mont. 174, 569 P.2d 383, when we s t a t e d : " . . . S p e c i f i c a l l y , a l l d u t i e s d e l e g a t e d to t h e j u r y commission and d i s t r i c t c o u r t judge were performed by t h e c l e r k of c o u r t w i t h o u t any a p p a r e n t o v e r s e e i n g . While we have no cause to q u e s t i o n t h e good f a i t h of t h e p u b l i c o f f i c e r s i n v o l v e d , it is obvious t h e s t a t u t o r y scheme f o r s e l e c t i n g and drawing a j u r y w a s c o m p l e t e l y circumvented. The r u l e i n Montana is t h a t j u r i e s must be s e l e c t e d and drawn i n s u b s t a n t i a l compliance w i t h t h e l a w . Where t h e d i s r e g a r d f o r l e g i s l a t i v e mandates amounts t o more t h a n t e c h n i c a l i r r e g u l a r i t y s u b s t a n t i a l compliance h a s n o t been achieved." 569 P.2d a t 389. Respondents contend t h a t t h e j u r y s e l e c t i o n process used b y t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n t h i s c a s e w a s t y p i c a l of t h a t c o u r t . T h e r e f o r e , r e s p o n d e n t s contend t h a t c o u n s e l f o r t h e D i s t r i c t s h o u l d have known t h e procedure and o b j e c t e d to t h e j u r y selec- t i o n p r o c e s s immediately and he should n o t have waited u n t i l a week a f t e r t h e v e r d i c t had been e n t e r e d to make h i s o b j e c t i o n known. The b a s i c f l a w i n t h i s c o n t e n t i o n is t h a t c o u n s e l f o r t h e I r r i g a t i o n District d i d n o t d i s c o v e r t h e d i s c r e p a n c i e s i n t h e j u r y s e l e c t i o n p r o c e s s u n t i l a week a f t e r t h e t r i a l . F u r t h e r , c o u n s e l had no r e a s o n , p r i o r to h i s i n q u i r i e s , to s u s p e c t t h a t t h e s t a t u t o r y p r o c e d u r e s were n o t being f o l l o w e d . I n o t h e r words, t h e "means of knowledge" were n o t a v a i l a b l e f o r c o u n s e l to o b j e c t b e f o r e or d u r i n g t h e t r i a l . I n Ledger v. ~ c ~ e n z i e ( 1 9 3 8 ) r 1 0 7 Mont. 335, 8 5 P.2d 352, t h i s Court d i s c u s s e d t h e n e c e s s i t y of o b j e c t i n g t o t h e impaneling of a j u r y i n a t i m e l y manner. T h i s Court h e l d : " . . . t h a t i f c o u n s e l does n o t have t h e knowledge, o r means of knowledge, of t h e i r r e g u l a r i t y i n t h e drawing of t h e j u r y , o r t h e p a n e l from which it is s e l e c t e d u n t i l a f t e r t h e v e r d i c t , t h e q u e s t i o n may be r a i s e d f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e on motion f o r new t r i a l . " 85 P.2d 353. I n t h i s c a s e , c o u n s e l had a r i g h t to r e l y on t h e judge and c l e r k t o f o l l o w t h e i r s t a t u t o r y d u t i e s . The f a c t t h a t no a c t u a l p r e j u d i c e h a s been shown is i r r e l e v a n t . Whether a d i f f e r e n t ver- d i c t would have r e s u l t e d had t h e s t a t u t o r y p r o c e d u r e s been followed is p u r e l y s p e c u l a t i v e , c o n j e c t u r a l and i m p o s s i b l e t o d e t e r m i n e . The District Court went w e l l beyond a mere t e c h n i c a l d e p a r t u r e from t h e j u r y s e l e c t i o n s t a t u t e s and t h i s type of d e p a r t u r e n e c e s s i t a t e s t h e r e v e r s a l of t h e v e r d i c t and a retrial w i t h a j u r y s e l e c t e d i n t h e p r o p e r manner. To assist t h e District Court on r e t r i a l , we w i l l d e t e r m i n e two o t h e r i s s u e s r a i s e d i n t h i s a p p e a l . The second i s s u e p r e s e n t e d by t h e District is whether d e f e n d a n t s Propp and Maynard are exempt and immune from t h e exemplary and p u n i t i v e damages awarded a g a i n s t them. The Irri- g a t i o n District c o n t e n d s t h a t because of s e c t i o n s 2-9-104 and 2-9-105, MCA, Maynard and Propp are n o t l i a b l e f o r t h e $40,000 exemplary award. S e c t i o n s 2-9-104 and -105, MCA, d o n o t a p p l y to i n d i v i d u a l d e f e n d a n t s b u t t o t h e state and governmental e n t i t i e s . The sec- t i o n of Chapter 9 t h a t a p p l i e s t o i n d i v i d u a l d e f e n d a n t s is s e c t i o n 2-9-305 , MCA, which p r o v i d e s : "Governmental e n t i t y to be j o i n e d as defendant-- immunization and i n d e m n z i c a t i o n o f employees. (1) It is t h e purpose of t h i s s e c t i o n to p r o v i d e - - f o r t h e immunization and i n d e m n i f i c a t i o n of p u b l i c o f f i c e r s and employees sued f o r t h e i r a c t i o n s o t h e r t h a n i n t e n t i o n a l t o r t or f e l o n i o u s acts, taken w i t h i n t h e c o u r s e and scope of t h e i r employment. " ( 2 ) I n an a c t i o n brought a g a i n s t any employee o f a s t a t e , c o u n t y , c i t y , town, or o t h e r govern- m e n t a l e n t i t y f o r a n e g l i g e n t act, e r r o r , or o m i s s i o n or o t h e r a c t i o n a b l e conduct of t h e employee committed w h i l e a c t i n g w i t h i n t h e c o u r s e and scope of h i s o f f i c e or employment, t h e governmental e n t i t y employer s h a l l be made a p a r t y d e f e n d a n t t o t h e a c t i o n . " ( 3 ) Recovery a g a i n s t a governmental e n t i t y under t h e p r o v i s i o n s of p a r t s 1 t h r o u g h 3 o f t h i s c h a p t e r s h a l l c o n s t i t u t e a complete b a r to a n y a c t i o n or r e c o v e r y of damages by t h e c l a i m a n t , b y r e a s o n of t h e same s u b j e c t matter, a g a i n s t t h e employee whose n e g l i g e n c e o r wrong- f u l a c t , error, o r omission or o t h e r a c t i o n a b l e c o n d u c t gave rise to t h e claim. I n any such a c t i o n a g a i n s t a governmental e n t i t y , t h e employee whose conduct gave rise to t h e s u i t s h a l l be immune from s u i t by r e a s o n s of t h e same s u b j e c t matter i f t h e governmental e n t i t y acknowledges or is bound by a j u d i c i a l d e t e r - m i n a t i o n t h a t t h e conduct upon which t h e claim is brought arises o u t of t h e c o u r s e and scope of such employees1 employment, u n l e s s t h e c l a i m is based upon an i n t e n t i o n a l t o r t or f e l o n i o u s act o f t h e employee. " ( 4 ) In any a c t i o n i n which a governmental e n t i t y employee is a p a r t y d e f e n d a n t , t h e employee s h a l l be indemnified by t h e governmen- t a l e n t i t y employer f o r any money judgments or l e g a l expenses t o which he may be s u b j e c t as a r e s u l t of t h e s u i t u n l e s s t h e conduct upon which t h e claim is brought d i d n o t arise o u t of t h e c o u r s e and scope o f h i s employment or is a n i n t e n t i o n a l t o r t o r f e l o n i o u s act of tG employee ." ( ~ p h m a s i s added. ) Under t h i s s e c t i o n , i n d i v i d u a l d e f e n d a n t s are immune from b e i n g sued f o r t h e i r a c t i o n s u n l e s s t h e i r act is i n t e n t i o n a l or f e l o n i o u s . S e c t i o n 2-9-305(1), MCA. The I r r i g a t i o n District c o n t e n d s t h a t t h i s Court cannot s p e c u l a t e as t o whether t h e j u r y , i n t h e i r v e r d i c t , had found Propp and Maynard t o have committed a n i n t e n t i o n a l t o r t . The o r i g i n a l a c t i o n was based upon t h e v i o l a t i o n of sec- t i o n 85-7-1911(1), MCA, which states i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : "The board of commissioners s h a l l a p p o r t i o n t h e water f o r i r r i g a t i o n among t h e l a n d s i n t h e d i s t r i c t i n a j u s t and e q u i t a b l e manner . . ." The j u r y found t h a t t h e District had v i o l a t e d t h i s s e c t i o n and t h a t Propp and Maynard by t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l acts had a l s o v i o l a t e d t h i s s e c t i o n . There was a clear v i o l a t i o n of a s t a t u t o r y d u t y when t h e District, through t h e a c t s of Propp and Maynard, f a i l e d t o p r o v i d e water t o t h e Dvoraks. The " a c t " o f - f a i l i n g - to p r o v i d e water i n t h i s case w a s a r g u a b l y a n i n t e n t i o n a l a c t and as s u c h ---- - it would j u s t i f y a n award o f p u n i t i v e damages. S e c t i o n 27-8-221, - - - I MCA. The I r r i g a t i o n District c o n t e n d s t h a t no showing of a c t u a l malice was made and t h e r e f o r e t h e p u n i t i v e damage award a g a i n s t Propp and Maynard c a n n o t s t a n d . In F i r s t Sec. Bank of Bozeman v. Goddard (1979) ---- Mont . ---- I 593 P.2d 1040, 1048-10491 36 St.Rep. 854, 864-865, t h i s Court held: " I t is n o t n e c e s s a r y to show a c t u a l m a l i c e to r e c o v e r p u n i t i v e damages. Kwmk+w+ v. Holiday 'Narr;nqi?-0~ Rambler C o r p o r a t i o n (1978 ) , ---- Mon t . I 575 Y ---- P.2d 578, 35 St.Rep. 46. Fraud or malice may be a c t u a l or presumed. S e c t i o n 17-208, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 27-1-221, MCA. Implied malice may be shown by proof t h a t d e f e n d a n t engaged i n a c o u r s e of conduct knowing it to be harmful and u n l a w f u l . Ferguson v. Town Pump, I n c . v. Wallace Diteman ( 1 9 7 8 ) , Mon t . I 580 P.2d 915, 921, 35 St.Rep. 8 2 4 , 8 3 1 ; Miller v. Fox ( 1 9 7 7 ) 1 Mon t . , 571 P.2d 804, 34 St.Rep. 1367; Cashin v. Northern p a c i f i c Railway Company ( 1 9 3 4 ) 96 Mont. 92, 28 P.2d 862. "'Malice-in-law' is imp1 i e d where t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s conduct is u n j u s t i f i a b l e ." Here , Propp and Maynard s cond u c t was a r g u a b l y un j u s t i- f i a b l e i n t h a t t h e y i n t e n t i o n a l l y f a i l e d t o provide water to t h e Dvoraks' farm. T h e i r a c t i o n s , i f b e l i e v e d by t h e j u r y , a r e suf- f i c i e n t t o c o n s t i t u t e a v i o l a t i o n s u b j e c t i n g them to l i a b i l i t y f o r p u n i t i v e damages. The Dvoraks have c r o s s - a p p e a l e d , a l l e g i n g t h a t t h e District Court committed error by s t r i k i n g t h e p u n i t i v e damage award a g a i n s t t h e District. They p r e s e n t s e v e r a l c o n t e n t i o n s b u t w e need o n l y t o d i s c u s s whether Montana l a w provided f o r govern- m e n t a l immunity a t t h e t i m e t h i s a c t i o n arose. T h i s a c t i o n arose i n and is l i m i t e d to t h e summer of 1974, a f a c t t h a t was s t i p u l a t e d to by both p a r t i e s . The 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n p r o v i d e s i n S e c t i o n 1 8 , Article 11: " S e c t i o n 18. S t a t e s u b j e c t t o s u i t . The s t a t e , c o u n t i e s , c i t i e s , towns, and a l l o t h e r l o c a l governmental e n t i t i e s s h a l l have no immunity from s u i t f o r i n j u r y to a person or p r o p e r t y , e x c e p t as may be s p e c i f i c a l l y provided by l a w by a 2/3 v o t e of each house of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e ." The l e g i s l a t u r e d i d n o t p r o v i d e immunity f o r c e r t a i n state and governmental e n t i t i e s u n t i l it e n a c t e d s e c t i o n s 2-9-104 and 2-9-105, MCA, i n 1977. These s t a t u t e s do n o t a p p l y to t h i s a c t i o n and cannot be a p p l i e d r e t r o a c t i v e l y . S e c t i o n 1-2-109, MCA p r o v i d e s : "When laws r e t r o a c t i v e . N o l a w c o n t a i n e d i n any -- o f t h e s t a t u t e s of Montana is r e t r o a c t i v e u n l e s s e x p r e s s l y so d e c l a r e d . " The District Court e r r e d by s t r i k i n g t h e award of p u n i t i v e damages a g a i n s t t h e Huntley P r o j e c t I r r i g a t i o n District. Reversed and remanded f o r a new t r i a l . Chief J u s t i c e W e concur: Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d i s s e n t i n g : I r e s p e c t f u l l y d i s s e n t . The m a j o r i t y h o l d s t h a t t h e manner i n which t h e j u r y was s e l e c t e d v i o l a t e d s e c t i o n s 25-7-202 and 25-7-204, MCA, and t h e r e b y abridged t h e D i s t r i c t ' s fundamental. r i g h t s t o a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l j u r y . The m a j o r i t y r e l i e s upon S t a t e v. D i s t r i c t C o u r t , County of S i l v e r Bow ( 1 9 5 9 ) , 136 Mont. 354, 348 P.2d 143; Ledger v . MacKenzie ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 107 Mont. 335, 85 P.2d 352; and S t a t e v. F i t z p a t r i c k ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 174 Mont. 174, 569 P.2d 383. While each of t h e s e c a s e s does i n f a c t d i s c u s s t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r a D i s t r i c t Court t o f o l l o w t h e s t a t u t o r y procedures when s e l e c t i n g a j u r y , t h e r e a r e some i m p o r t a n t d i s t i n c t i o n s between t h e f a c t s i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e and t h o s e i n t h e c a s e s r e l i e d upon by t h e m a j o r i t y . I n S t a t e v. D i s t r i c t Court, County of S i l v e r BOW, s u p r a , t h e t r i a l judge f a i l e d t o f o l l o w t h e s t a t u t o r y p r o c e d u r e s f o r s e l e c t i n g a j u r y v e n i r e when he drew s l i p s o f p a p e r , which were numbered and r e p r e s e n t e d p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s , from t h e j u r y box. The s l i p s of paper were n o t enclosed i n s e p a r a t e black c a p s u l e s . The f a i l u r e t o f o l l o w t h i s s t a t u t o r y procedure was c h a l l e n g e d by c o u n s e l on t h e v e r y n e x t day, b e f o r e any j u r y was a c t u a l l y impaneled. T h i s Court held: " I t i s n o t t h e r i g h t o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l n e c e s s a r i l y involved, b u t r a t h e r t h e e n t i r e j u r y s y s t e m and t h e s e l e c t i o n p r o c e d u r e s which must be p r o t e c t e d , and when a showinq is t i m e l y brought b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t we would be remiss i n our d u t i e s i f we p e r m i t t e d m a t e r i a l d e v i a t i o n o r d e p a r t u r e f r o m t h e procedures s p e l l e d o u t by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . " (Emphasis added.) 348 P.2d a t 146. The g e n e r a l r u l e a s s e t o u t i n 50 C.J.S. J u r i e s , S175 a t 9 0 3 , e m p h a s i z e s t h e t i m e l i n e s s o f a n o b j e c t i o n by stating, "Objections because of irregularities in drawing or summoninq the j u r y should be made before the Bury is -------- ----- -- ........................... - impaneled and sworn, and if not so made ordinarily are not available after verdict on a motion in arrest or for a new trial." See, State v. Steen, (1916), 29 Id. 337, 158 P. 499. In this case no objection was made by counsel until one week after the verdict had been entered. This delayed objection cannot be considered timely, and it begs the question as to whether counsel would have objected had the verdict gone the other way. The District contends, and the majority agrees, that counsel did not discover the improper method of impaneling the jury until a week after the trial. They cite Ledger v. MacKenzie, supra, to support their argument that irregularities in selection of a jury panel can be objected to after a verdict has been entered. This is a misinterpre- tation of the holding Ledger. Ledger states the general rule that a party who fails to challenge or object waives an irregularity in the impaneling of a jury. 85 P.2d at 352. This Court, when discussing the "knowledge" necessary for a timely objection held: "Counsel had the means of knowledge, and while it may be true that the fact and manner of the drawing were not brought home to them personally, nevertheless such means of knowledge were at their command, and therefore, these cases do not come within the rule of the Missouri court." 85 P.2d at 353. Here, counsel also had the "means of knowledge," for he merely had to ask, at anytime, how the jury was impaneled. It is hard to imagine that, if counsel felt that the jury was not impartial at the time of trial, he would wait until a week a f t e r t h e v e r d i c t b e f o r e o b j e c t i n g t o t h e impaneling. S t a t e v . F i t z p a t r i c k , s u p r a , was n o t a r e v e r s a l t h a t was based upon t h e q u e s t i o n a b l e n a t u r e of t h e j u r y s e l e c t i o n p r o c e d u r e . I t was a reminder t o t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t t h a t i t s h a l l u s e a n d comply w i t h t h e j u r y s e l e c t i o n s t a t u t e s . T h i s Court s a i d , "[wle s t a t e d i n i t i a l l y t h a t t h i s m a t t e r was n o t p r o p e r l y r a i s e d on a p p e a l , b u t it is of s u f f i c i e n t import t o w a r r a n t a f u l l d i s c u s i o n f o r f u t u r e guidance." 569 P.2d a t 389. Here, a s i n F i t z p a t r i c k , t h e s e l e c t i o n of j u r o r s was n o t i n t o t a l compliance w i t h s e c t i o n s 25-7-202 and 25-7-204, MCA. However, t h e o b j e c t i o n t o t h e procedure was n o t t i m e l y and, t h e r e f o r e , should n o t be t h e b a s i s of a r e v e r s a l . F u r t h e r , t h e r e h a s been no i n d i c a t i o n t h e j u r y h e a r i n g t h e c a s e was a n y t h i n g b u t f a i r and i m p a r t i a l . i . . 0:- , . , + /a(- r;" C J u s t i c e