Title: Dorsey v. Tarpley

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Dorsey v. Tarpley, No. 95, Sept. Term 2003.  Opinion by Harrell, J.
FAMILY LAW – CHANGE OF CHILD’S SURNAME – NO INITIAL SURNAME OR
CHANGE OF SURNAME – STANDARDS TO APPLY
There were no findings of fact made in the present case regarding the parties’ apparent and
material factual dispute whether the Father agreed to the child being given at birth solely the
Mother’s surname.  Based on the virtual absence of an evidentiary record, coupled with the
absence of judicial fact-finding, this case may not be categorized at this stage as either a “no
initial name” or a “change of name” case for purposes of the application of the correct legal
analysis.  The parties need to adduce evidence in support of their respective contentions and,
assuming that evidence presents the dispute the parties’ here argue, the Circuit Court needs
to resolve whether an agreement existed between the Mother and Father at birth to give the
child the surname of Dorsey.  Relevant factors would include the presence or absence of the
Father’s signature on 
the birth certificate, the Mother’s testimony, the Father’s testimony, and
the testimony of any relatives or others who were present during any discussion about naming
the child.  If the court finds that the Father acquiesced in the child’s surname at birth, the
Father, in order now to justify the desired change in the child’s surname to include his own,
must demonstrate “extreme circumstances” to justify changing the child’s surname.  If the
Father did not acquiesce in the naming of the child at birth, then the court should consider
what is in the best interests of the child.
Circuit Court for Mo ntgomery C ounty
Case # 00885
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 95
September Term, 2003
DEA MICHELLE DORSEY
v.
BRENDIN D. TARPLEY
Bell, C.J.
                    Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Opinion by Harrell, J.
Filed:   May 6, 2004
1 As directed in Maryland Rules 2-201 and 15-901, the case in the Circuit Court was
captioned “In Re: Alexander Craig Dorsey.”  On appeal, the parties and various court
administrative personnel inconsistently captioned the case as either “Dea Dorsey v.
Alexander Craig Dorsey” or “Dea Dorsey v. Brendin Tarpley.”  We believe, according to
Rule 8-111(a), that the more appropriate caption on appeal is as we reflect on the cover sheet
of this opinion.
Alexander Craig Dorsey (“the Child”) was born on 5 September 2000 in Montgomery
County, Maryland.  His name appeared as such on the birth certificate.  The Child’s
biological parents were not married at the time, nor did they marry subsequently.  On 14
January 2003, Brendin D. Tarpley (“the Father”), Appellee, filed in the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County a Petition for Name Change seeking to change the surname of the Child
from Dorsey to Dorsey-Tarpley.  Appellant, Dea Michelle Dorsey (“the Mother”), opposed
the Petition.
A hearing was held on 2 April 2003.  Counsel argued, but no evidence was adduced.
The Petition was granted and an Order for Change of Name was entered on 15 April 2003,
changing the Child’s name from Alexander Craig Dorsey to Alexander Craig Dorsey-
Tarpley.  The Mother, on 22 April 2003, filed a Motion for New Trial or, in the alternative,
to Alter or Amend Judgment.  The Circuit Court denied the motion, and the Mother
appealed.1  This Court, on its own initiative and before any further proceedings in the Court
of Special Appeals, issued a writ of certiorari.  378 Md. 617, 837 A.2d 928 (2003).
Appellant framed the following issue for appellate review:
Whether the lower court erred in granting the father’s petition to change the
child’s surname since the parents had agreed prior to the child’s birth [to] his
surname and the father failed to meet his burden of proof that the change was
2 Although presenting a single question for review, Appellant’s brief quixotically
offers four assertions under a section entitled “Questions of Fact Presented.”  Three of these
assertions break into its constituent parts the question for review and suggest conclusions
favorable to Appellant, while the fourth statement claims “the father’s petition should be
denied due to the doctrine of laches.”  After carefully reading Appellant’s brief, we found
only a single, short reference to the doctrine of laches buried in a paragraph on page 11.  A
review of the Record Extract revealed no argument or assertion of laches, as such, before the
Circuit Court.
The scope of appellate review is governed by Maryland Rule 8-131.  That rule
provides in part: “(a) Generally.– . . . Ordinarily, the appellate court will not decide any other
issue unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial
court, but the Court may decide such an issue if necessary or desirable to guide the trial court
or to avoid the expense and delay of another appeal.”  Our review of “arguments not raised
at the trial level is discretionary, not mandatory.”  State v. Bell, 334 Md. 178, 188, 638 A.2d
107, 113 (1994).  As this case is being remanded for other reasons, Appellant will have the
opportunity to raise and flesh out in the Circuit Court her new argument about the doctrine
of laches; thus, we shall not address it here.
2
in the best interest of the child and that extreme circumstances warranted a
change?[2]
I.
It is obvious that Alexander’s parents presently disagree over the proper surname for
him.  Apparently they also disagree about whether there was an agreement regarding his
surname at his birth.  Unfortunately, despite the latter disagreement, there was no fact-finding
by the hearing judge on this pivotal factual dispute.
The Mother contended that: 
[e]ven though the Father was the biological father of the Child, they had
agreed prior to the Child’s birth that he would [bear] the last name of the
Mother, irrespective of her marital status.  The Father had acknowledged their
agreement at the time their son was born.  He was present at the birth and
acquiesced to the Mother’s maiden name as the Child’s surname on the birth
certificate.  The Father never contested the Child’s surname until he was two
and a half years old.
3
Specifically, in her opposition to Petition for Name Change filed in the Circuit Court,
Appellant alleged that the Father “signed the minor child’s birth certificate and
acknowledgment of parentage with this understanding in mind at the time the child was
born.”
To the contrary, the Father contended that:
[a]t the time of the child’s birth, [the Mother] insisted that [the Father’s]
last name (Tarpley) would only be given to their son if [the Father] promised
to marry [the Mother].
For a myriad of difficult and emotional reasons, this promise could not
be made by [the Father] at that time.  The parties could not agree on the last
name for their child, emotions were high and members from both sides of the
family were present.  No agreement could be reached on the last name.  Over
[the Father’s] objection, [the Mother] used her last name (Dorsey) as the
child’s last name.
The Mother also argued in her trial court pleadings and papers that the Father was
happy with the Child’s surname until the Child was two and half years old and that the name
modification was sought to harass, annoy, and embarrass her.  In addition, she pointed to
bank accounts and assets, such as stocks, bonds, and life insurance, which had been
established previously with the Child’s surname of “Dorsey”.
At the hearing in the Circuit Court no witnesses testified and no documentary
evidence was offered.  The hearing judge, at the outset of the 2 April 2003 hearing,
questioned the attorneys about the case, based on the pleadings, and what they contended
represented a disposition in the best interests of the child.  The hearing, therefore, proceeded
4
as oral argument by counsel.  Approximately two-third’s of the way through the
comparatively short proceeding, the Father’s attorney stated:
“And what I would like to reiterate – and if Your Honor wants to
resolve the factual differences in this case, then I think perhaps the Court
would want to hear testimony on it.
“But there is a difference of opinion as to whether or not there was an
agreement reached when the child was born on what the child’s last name
would be.  They say there was an agreement.  My client says there was not an
agreement.  From our position, if there had been an agreement, we would not
be here today.”
(Emphasis added).  Unwilling to press the point about adducing evidence in support of his
representations, the Father did not mention again the notion of receiving evidence.  The
Mother likewise did not press this point.  The court apparently did not recognize any need
to resolve the apparent evidentiary dispute.  The hearing proceeded with more argument by
counsel, leading to the court’s announcement of its oral ruling.
The hearing judge concluded that it would best serve the interest of the Child to allow
the name change.  He reasoned that, although the law states that the court should be reluctant
to change a name, in this Child’s case:
“[H]e is not in school yet.  He is young, and it is a name that he is going
to use the rest of his life.  And I don’t think it goes back to whether there was
or was not an agreement when this child was born . . . . But the bottom line on
this is that . . . if I allow him the addition and the change of name—and it is
really an addition of a name—then both parents are represented.  And there is
some appeal to me—although certainly counsel’s argument is sound that most
people have one family name.  But on the other hand, here in a circumstance
where there is at least a separation, the child should at least carry the tradition
of both families.
“And it really comes down to how you all as parents handle this child
the rest of his life, and I don’t think, frankly, in the long run, whether I do this
5
or don’t do it, it is going to have great impact on his ultimate well-being.  But
I do believe that it is in his best interest to carry the name of both parents under
the circumstances where there is a separation.
“But as I told you before, I am one judge that is asked to make a
decision.  I have made it, I guess based upon what I believe is in the best
interest of the child and what factually is described to me, but it is not a
decision that is the same decision that some other judge might not make.”
The trial judge based his decision on the young age of the Child and, when the parents are
separated, the Child’s general interest in having the name of both parents.  The Mother
contends on appeal that the hearing judge was in error in concluding that these circumstances
alone justified a change of name.  For reasons we shall explain, we shall vacate the judgment
and remand for an evidentiary hearing and fact-finding before the court may decide the case..
II.
In general, parents are said to enjoy the right jointly to adopt any surname for their
child they wish to chose, “just as they determine what shall be a child’s given name.”
Lassiter-Geers v. Reichenbach, 303 Md. 88, 94-95, 492 A.2d 303, 306 (1985).  Neither
parent, however, “has a superior right to determine the initial surname their child shall bear.”
Id.
Unlike in the case where no initial surname is given a child at birth, the rule in a
change of name case is to “look at what is in the best interests of the child before determining
if a name change is warranted.”  West v. Wright, 263 Md. 297, 299, 283 A.2d 401,402
(1971), and cases cited therein.  Other than in the case of adoption proceedings, there is a
presumption against granting such a change except under “extreme circumstances.”  Id.
6
We have said that there are two paramount factors to consider when determining the
existence of “extreme circumstances.”  First, the court is to consider any evidence of
misconduct by a parent that could make the child’s continued use of the parent’s surname
shameful or disgraceful.  West, 263 Md. at 300, 283 A.2d at 403.  Second, the court is to
consider whether the parent wilfully abandoned or surrendered his or her natural ties to the
child.  Id.
Although the parties in the present case pled and argued a factual dispute as to
whether a consensus existed as to the Child’s surname at birth, there was no effort made by
the hearing judge to resolve this dispute.  Based on the virtual absence of a proper evidentiary
record, coupled with the absence of judicial fact-finding, this case may not be categorized
for analysis at this stage as either a “no initial name” or a “change of name” case.  The parties
must adduce evidence in support of their respective factual contentions and, assuming that
admissible evidence presents the dispute the parties argue existed at the Child’s birth, the
Circuit Court needs to resolve whether such an agreement existed between the Mother and
Father at birth, i.e., to give the Child the surname of Dorsey.  Relevant evidence bearing on
that, it seems to us, might be found in, among other places, the presence or absence of the
Father’s signature on the birth certificate or so-called “acknowledgment of parentage,” the
Mother’s testimony, the Father’s testimony, and/or the testimony of any relatives or other
witnesses who were present during any discussion about naming the Child at birth.
7
If there was an agreement to name the Child at that time, then, under our caselaw, the
petitioning parent, the Father in this case, must satisfy, by admissible evidence, the “extreme
circumstances” standard in order to generate a prima facie case for the name change he seeks.
West, 263 Md. at 300, 283 A.2d at 403.  In “change of name” cases, as noted previously,
abandonment and serious misconduct disgracing an existing surname are of paramount
importance because “they epitomize the sort of exceedingly negative behavior by a parent
that will justify changing the child’s surname, when the parents gave the child that parent’s
surname at birth.”  Shroeder v. Broadfoot, 142 Md. App. 569, 584, 790 A.2d 773, 782
(2002).  The focus in Maryland “change of name” cases involving minors is often on the
“extreme circumstances” of profoundly bad parental behavior.  No profoundly bad behavior
by the Mother has been alleged yet in the present case.
If there was no agreement regarding the name of the Child at birth, then, under our
caselaw, the Father must demonstrate that the desired name change is in the Child’s best
interest.  Lassiter-Geers, 303 Md. at 95, 492 A.2d at 307 (when there is no agreement
between the parties about what the initial surname of a child should be, the test is what is in
the best interest of the child).  When parents have not agreed upon their child’s surname,
there are a multitude of factors that usually are considered in deciding what is in the child’s
best interest.  While these factors also may include abandonment and serious misconduct,
these two touchstones are not primary or determinative in the analysis.
8
In Lassiter-Geers, we adopted a pure best interests standard for “no initial name”
cases.  Lassiter-Geers, 303 Md. at 94, 492 A.2d at 306.  The factors to consider, when they
exist and are appropriate in a given case, in deciding what surname will serve the best
interests of the child are: 1) the child's reasonable preference, if the child is of the age and
maturity to express a meaningful preference; 2) the length of time the child has used any of
the surnames being considered; 3) the effect that having one name or the other may have on
the preservation and development of the child's mother-child and father-child relationships;
4) the identification of the child as a part of a family unit; 5) the embarrassment, difficulties,
or harassment that may result from the child's use of a particular surname; 6) misconduct by
one of the child's parents disparaging of that parent's surname; 7) failure of one of the child's
parents to contribute to the child's support or to maintain contact with the child; and 8) the
degree of community good will or respect associated with a particular surname.  Shroeder,
142 Md. App. at 588, 790 A.2d at 785, and cases cited therein.
In the present case, the hearing judge concluded that he did not “think it goes back to
whether there was or was not an agreement when this child was born.”  He was mistaken.
The hearing judge then based his decision to grant the change of the Child’s surname on the
young age of the Child and the Child’s general interest in having the name of both parents
because the parents were not living together.  This is a misapplication of the law.
Accordingly, we shall vacate the court’s order and remand the case for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion.  If, based on the evidence, it is found that there was no
9
parental mutual agreement to name the child “Dorsey” at birth, the Circuit Court should be
guided by the appropriate best interest of the child factors set out above.  If the court
determines, however, that an agreement existed at birth, the court, before granting a name
change, must be satisfied that “extreme circumstances” justify that decision.  In any event,
an evidentiary hearing and fact-finding by the court are necessary before that decision is ripe
to be made.
DECREE 
OF 
2 
APRIL 
2003,
CHANGING THE CHILD’S NAME
TO ALEXANDER CRAIG DORSEY-
TARPLEY 
VAC ATE D. 
 
CASE
REMANDED TO THE CIRCUIT
COURT 
FOR 
MONTGOMER Y
C O U N T Y  
F O R  
F U R T H E R
P R O C E E D I N G S  
N O T
I N C O N S I S T ENT 
WIT H  
T H IS
OPINION.  COSTS TO BE PAID BY
APPELLEE.