Title: State v. Long

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Long, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-849.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-849 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. LONG, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State v. Long, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-849.] 
Criminal law—Sentencing—Youth as mitigating factor for juvenile offender—
R.C. 2929.03(A)—Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
(No. 2012-1410—Submitted June 11, 2013—Decided March 12, 2014.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-110160,  
2012-Ohio-3052. 
____________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1. A court, in exercising its discretion under R.C. 2929.03(A), must separately 
consider the youth of a juvenile offender as a mitigating factor before 
imposing a sentence of life without parole.  (Miller v. Alabama, ___ U.S. 
___, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), followed.) 
2. The record must reflect that the court specifically considered the juvenile 
offender’s youth as a mitigating factor at sentencing when a prison term of 
life without parole is imposed. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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____________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case, we are asked whether a trial court violates the Eighth 
Amendment by imposing a sentence of life imprisonment without parole for an 
aggravated murder committed by a juvenile.  We hold that a court, in exercising 
its discretion under R.C. 2929.03(A), must separately consider the youth of a 
juvenile offender as a mitigating factor before imposing a sentence of life without 
parole in light of Miller v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 
407 (2012). 
I.  Case Background 
{¶ 2} Appellant, Eric Long, and his two codefendants were charged in a 
13-count indictment with several offenses stemming from two separate shootings 
in March 2009.  When the offenses were committed, Long was 17 years old.  
According to public information from the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and 
Correction, codefendant Fonta Whipple was 26 years old, and codefendant 
Jashawn Clark was 25.  http://www.drc.state.oh.us/OffenderSearch/Search.aspx. 
{¶ 3} Following a joint jury trial, all three codefendants were found guilty 
of two counts of aggravated murder, three counts of felonious assault, two counts 
of having weapons while under disability, one count of improperly discharging 
firearm into a habitation, and various firearm specifications.  Long was also 
convicted of one count of carrying concealed weapons.  At a joint sentencing 
hearing with his two codefendants, Long was sentenced to consecutive terms of 
life imprisonment without parole on the aggravated murder counts and an 
additional 19 years on the remaining counts and specifications, also consecutive. 
{¶ 4} Long appealed to the First District Court of Appeals.  Among the 
various assignments of error, he challenged his consecutive sentences of life 
imprisonment without parole.  Long argued that the trial court had failed to 
consider the factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12(A), (B), (C), (D), and (E) and the 
January Term, 2014 
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principles and purposes of sentencing.  Specifically, he contended that the trial 
court had failed to consider his youth as a mitigating factor on the record and that 
a life term on a teenager amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. 
{¶ 5} In rejecting Long’s assignment of error based on the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, the First District noted that the 
United States Supreme Court had recently held that a mandatory life-without-
parole sentence for juvenile offenders is cruel and unusual punishment in Miller v. 
Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407.  The court of appeals 
distinguished Miller on grounds that the sentence imposed by the trial court was 
not mandatory.  R.C. 2929.03(A) allows the trial court to exercise its discretion 
when sentencing for aggravated murder by imposing life imprisonment without 
parole or with parole eligibility after 20, 25, or 30 years. 
{¶ 6} The appellate court further determined that the trial court “was able 
to consider whether Long’s ‘youth and its attendant characteristics, along with the 
nature of his crime, made a lesser sentence (for example, life with the possibility 
of parole) more appropriate.’  Miller at [2460].”  2012-Ohio-3052, ¶ 52.  The 
court of appeals then detailed how it believed the record reflected that the trial did 
consider Long’s youth and its attendant characteristics.  Id. at ¶ 53-54. 
{¶ 7} We accepted Long’s discretionary appeal on reconsideration.  133 
Ohio St.3d 1502, 2012-Ohio-5693, 979 N.E.2d 348.  The sole proposition of law 
before this court is that “[t]he Eighth Amendment requires trial courts to consider 
youth as a mitigating factor when sentencing a child to life without parole for a 
homicide.”  In adopting this proposition, we further hold that the record must 
reflect that the court specifically considered the juvenile offender’s youth as a 
mitigating factor at sentencing when a prison term of life without parole is 
imposed. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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II.  Legal Analysis 
 
A.  Eighth Amendment 
{¶ 8} The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, 
“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and 
unusual punishments inflicted.”  As we recently noted, “Central to the 
Constitution’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is the ‘precept of 
justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] 
offense.’ ”  In re C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729, 
¶ 25, quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 
793 (1910).  As applied to juveniles, the United States Supreme Court has held 
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and the 
imposition of life without the possibility of parole for nonhomicide offenses.  
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005); Graham 
v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010).  Most recently, 
the Eighth Amendment was held to ban mandatory life-without-parole sentences 
on juveniles in Miller. 
 
B.  Threshold Question  
{¶ 9} We first address Long’s threshold question of whether despite being 
convicted of aggravated murder, Long committed a “homicide” offense as that 
term is used in Graham.  The United States Supreme Court stated in Graham that 
a “juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished 
moral culpability,” id. at 69, and held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the 
imposition of a life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile for a nonhomicide 
offense, id. at 82.  Long argues that by using a complicity instruction, the trial 
court permitted the jury to convict him of aggravated murder without necessarily 
finding that he acted with prior calculation or with a specific intent to kill.  He 
concludes that this means that he was not actually convicted of a homicide 
offense and could not be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole pursuant 
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5 
 
to Graham.  But because Long did not raise this issue in the court of appeals or 
argue it in his memorandum seeking jurisdiction in this court, we will not 
consider this issue, as it is not properly before the court.1  See State v. Chappell, 
127 Ohio St.3d 376, 2010-Ohio-5991, 939 N.E.2d 1234 ¶ 26. 
{¶ 10} We now turn to Long’s argument that Miller requires us to remand 
this case for a resentencing hearing that complies with Miller and Graham. 
 
C.  Miller v. Alabama 
{¶ 11} Long argues that Miller requires a trial court to consider the 
defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics when imposing sentence if that 
defendant committed the offense as a juvenile.  And he contends that the record 
must show that the trial court actually considered the defendant’s youth.  We 
agree. 
{¶ 12} In Miller, the United State Supreme Court began by reviewing its 
previous decisions regarding the sentencing of juveniles. 
 
Roper and Graham establish that children are constitutionally 
different from adults for purposes of sentencing.  Because 
juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for 
reform, we explained, “they are less deserving of the most severe 
punishments.”  Graham, 560 U.S. at 68, 130 S.Ct. at 2026, 176 
L.Ed.2d 825.  Those cases relied on three significant gaps between 
juveniles and adults.  First, children have a “ ‘lack of maturity and 
an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,’ ” leading to 
recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking.  Roper, 543 
U.S., at 569, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1.  Second, children “are 
                                                 
1 For this same reason, we also will not address Long’s argument that we should hold that the 
Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 9, requires that all children have the right to a meaningful 
opportunity for release regardless of the crimes they have committed. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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more vulnerable . . . to negative influences and outside pressures,” 
including from their family and peers; they have limited “contro[l] 
over their own environment” and lack the ability to extricate 
themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings. Ibid. And 
third, a child’s character is not as “well formed” as an adult’s; his 
traits are “less fixed” and his actions less likely to be “evidence of 
irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].”  Id., at 570, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed. 
2d 1. 
 
Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2464, 183 L.Ed.2d 407. 
{¶ 13} The Miller court continued: 
 
Most fundamentally, Graham insists that youth matters in 
determining the appropriateness of a lifetime of incarceration 
without the possibility of parole. In the circumstances there, 
juvenile status precluded a life-without-parole sentence, even 
though an adult could receive it for a similar crime.  * * *  “An 
offender’s age,” we made clear in Graham, “is relevant to the 
Eighth Amendment,” and so “criminal procedure laws that fail to 
take defendants’ youthfulness into account at all would be flawed.” 
Id., at ___, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825. 
 
Id. at 2465-2466. 
{¶ 14} Miller concluded, “Although we do not foreclose a sentencer’s 
ability to make that judgment [to impose life without parole] in homicide cases, 
we require it to take into account how children are different, and how those 
differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.”  
Id. at 2469.  It reiterated: 
January Term, 2014 
7 
 
 
Our decision does not categorically bar a penalty for a class of 
offenders or type of crime—as, for example, we did in Roper or 
Graham.  Instead, it mandates only that a sentencer follow a 
certain process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant 
characteristics—before imposing a particular penalty. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Id. at 2471. 
{¶ 15} The Miller decision does not lay out the “certain process” that trial 
judges should follow when sentencing juveniles.  Long urges that this court 
should follow the lead of the Wyoming Supreme Court and require the 
consideration of the following factors when sentencing a juvenile offender to life 
without the possibility of parole:  (1) the character and record of the juvenile, (2) 
the background and mental and emotional development of the juvenile, (3) the 
juvenile’s chronological age and the immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to 
appreciate the risks and consequences associated with youth, (4) the family and 
home environment that surrounds the juvenile, (5) the circumstances of the 
offense, including the extent of the juvenile’s participation and the way familial 
and peer pressure may have affected the juvenile, (6) whether the juvenile could 
have been charged with and convicted of a lesser offense if not for 
incompetencies associated with youth, such as the juvenile’s relative inability to 
deal with police and prosecutors or to assist his own attorney, and (7) the 
juvenile’s potential for rehabilitation.  Bear Cloud v. State, 2013 WY 18, 294 P.3d 
36, ¶ 42. 
{¶ 16} Although the Wyoming factors may prove helpful to courts as they 
select appropriate sentences for juveniles, we note that Ohio statutes do not 
require such findings.  In imposing a prison sentence, the sentencing court has 
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discretion to state its own reasons in choosing a sentence within a statutory range 
unless a mandatory prison term must be imposed. 
 
D.  Ohio Sentencing  
{¶ 17} In Ohio, two statutory sections serve as a general guide for every 
sentencing.  First, R.C. 2929.11(A) provides that the overriding purposes of 
felony sentencing “are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and 
others and to punish the offender.”  To achieve these purposes, the trial court 
“shall consider the need for incapacitating the offender, deterring the offender and 
others from future crime, rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution.”  Id.  
The sentence must be “commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness 
of the offender’s conduct and its impact upon the victim, and consistent with 
sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders.”  R.C. 
2929.11(B).  Thus, both the nature of the offender and the possibility of the 
offender’s rehabilitation are already points for the court’s sentencing deliberation. 
{¶ 18} Second, R.C. 2929.12 specifically provides that in exercising its 
discretion, a trial court must consider certain factors that make the offense more 
or less serious and that indicate whether the offender is more or less likely to 
commit future offenses.  Although youth is not individually mentioned in the 
statute, an offender’s conduct is considered less serious when there are 
“substantial grounds to mitigate the offender’s conduct, although the grounds are 
not enough to constitute a defense.”  R.C. 2929.12(C)(4).  R.C. 2929.12(C) and 
(E) also permit a trial court to consider “any other relevant factors” to determine 
that an offense is less serious or that an offender is less likely to recidivate.  An 
offender’s youth and the attendant circumstances of youth may be considered 
under either of these provisions pursuant to Miller before the court imposes a 
sentence on a juvenile.  R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 do not prevent a court from 
considering youth as a factor that makes an offense less serious or makes an 
offender less like to commit future offenses. 
January Term, 2014 
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{¶ 19} As applied to a juvenile found guilty of aggravated murder under 
R.C. 2929.03(A), then, Ohio’s sentencing scheme does not fall afoul of Miller, 
because the sentence of life without parole is discretionary.  Nor is our criminal 
procedure flawed under Graham and Miller by failing to take into account that a 
defendant is a youthful offender.  Nevertheless, for clarification we expressly hold 
that youth is a mitigating factor for a court to consider when sentencing a 
juvenile.  But this does not mean that a juvenile may be sentenced only to the 
minimum term.  The offender’s youth at the time of the offense must still be 
weighed against any statutory consideration that might make an offense more 
serious or an offender more likely to recidivate.  Yet because a life-without-parole 
sentence implies that rehabilitation is impossible, when the court selects this most 
serious sanction, its reasoning for the choice ought to be clear on the record. 
 
E.  Long’s Sentencing Hearing 
{¶ 20} Long argues that the trial court’s sentencing statement fails to 
demonstrate that it followed the dictates of Miller to consider youth as a 
mitigating factor.  He acknowledges that Miller had not yet been decided when he 
was sentenced but argues that due to his age he should have received only a 
minimum sentence.  The state contends to the contrary that the record shows that 
the trial court did consider Long’s youth before imposing sentence because the 
sentencing memoranda, presentence investigation report, and statement by Long’s 
attorney at sentencing detail Long’s history, character, and condition.  The trial 
court also had information concerning a number of aggravating factors that 
support the sentence of life without parole. 
  
1.  Sentencing Memoranda  
{¶ 21} Long submitted a sentencing memorandum requesting the 
minimum sentence before his sentencing hearing.  It focused on Long’s youth and 
argued:  
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Adolescents, are more vulnerable, more impulsive, and less self-
disciplined that adults, and are without the same capacity to control 
their conduct and to think in long-range terms.  They are 
particularly impressionable and subject to peer pressure, and prone 
to experiment, risk-taking and bravado.  Crimes committed by 
youths may be just as harmful to victims as those committed by 
older persons, but they deserve less punishment because 
adolescents may have less capacity than adults to control their 
conduct.  Moreover, youth crime as such is not exclusively the 
offender’s fault; offenses by the young also represent a failure of 
family, school, and the social system, which share responsibility 
for the development of America’s youth. 
 
(Footnotes omitted.) 
{¶ 22} The state in its sentencing memorandum also noted that Long was a 
juvenile at the time of offenses but pointed out that he had already accumulated a 
lengthy juvenile record and had been committed to the Department of Youth 
Services before the juvenile court relinquished jurisdiction over him.  Yet in its 
memorandum, the prosecutor treated the three defendants as a group, although 
two had been adults when the crime was committed.  With regard to the 
aggravated murder counts, the state requested 
 
that the Court impose upon each Defendant consecutive prison 
terms of Life imprisonment without parole.  In making this request 
the State notes each Defendant’s youth (which means that even 
after thirty years they could still pose a danger to society); each 
Defendant’s total lack of remorse for his crimes; each Defendant’s 
total and complete imperviousness to rehabilitative efforts in the 
January Term, 2014 
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past; each Defendant’s criminal history as a predictor for future 
criminal behavior; and the utter and senseless violence perpetrated 
in this case against persons who had not harmed or threatened 
harm to Defendants. 
 
Although both memoranda acknowledged Long’s status as a juvenile at the time 
of the offense, they used that fact for divergent purposes—Long, to request the 
minimum sentence; the state, to justify the maximum sentence. 
{¶ 23} In addition to the sentencing memoranda, a presentence 
investigation report was prepared for the trial court’s review.  Long declined to 
provide a statement; so other than his juvenile record and a list of pending counts, 
the report contains sparse details on his educational and family background or his 
physical and mental condition. 
 
2.  Sentencing Hearing 
{¶ 24} Each defendant’s attorney addressed the court before sentencing.  
Long’s counsel stated: 
 
 
As the Court is aware, he was 17 when this happened.  He 
was a juvenile.  He was not previously convicted like the other two 
defendants.  He doesn’t have time already.  He starts with a clean 
slate in front of this Court. 
 
Your Honor, I would ask you to consider imposing the 
minimum term, because Eric won’t even be eligible for parole until 
he’s 47, and a lot can happen between now and that point, where 
he’s going to gain perspective, where he will become more secure, 
after all, he was a child.  He was a juvenile when this happened.  I 
think that puts him in a different light than the other two 
individuals. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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I think the Court can also glean from watching him 
throughout this whole process in a different situation.  His 
demeanor, the way that he’s dealt with this situation shows that he 
is dissimilar to his co-defendants. 
 
I think you can describe him sort of as a deer in headlights 
through the last portion of this court trial.  I’d ask the Court to take 
that into consideration and give him a glimmer of hope, giving 
him a chance that some day he can return to society, hopefully a 
changed and rehabilitated man. 
 
I’d like you to take that into consideration.  Judge, I’d ask 
you to impose minimum sentences, even though the minimum 
sentence in this case is very significant, and I’ll submit it. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  It is obvious that defense counsel raised the issue of Long’s 
youth as a mitigating factor. 
{¶ 25} The state, however, argued that Long and his codefendants should 
get the maximum penalty: 
 
I ask the court to impose a sentence of life without parole on each 
of these defendants, because I think that’s the only thing that will 
protect the public. 
 
I know that youth is usually a mitigating factor.  In this 
case, we have people, despite their youth, that, as they stand before 
the Court, have shown no inclination to change, or to show that 
they recognize the terrible damage they’ve done.  Why would you 
give a sentence that’s going to let them out, even at some date in 
the future?  I ask the Court to make sure they stay where they are, 
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and stay where they cannot hurt anybody else, and give them a 
sentence of life without parole. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  It thus appears that the state was suggesting that for this 
defendant, youth was not a mitigating factor. 
{¶ 26} The trial court stated: 
 
 
Having tried this case and heard this case for four weeks, 
having had experience with Mr. Whipple and Mr. Clark, having 
observed also the violent history and record of Mr. Long, it’s clear 
to me that all three defendants, for whatever reason, don’t value 
human life. 
 
I mean, the violence, senseless, just indiscriminate violence 
absolutely, as everyone has said here, absolutely no remorse.  It’s 
chilling.  It’s chilling to see you three stand here, and I have no 
doubt in my mind that if you walked out the door of this 
courtroom, you would kill again, and it wouldn’t bother you.  And 
that’s sad, but it’s true. 
 
After considering the risks that you’ll commit another 
offense, the need for protecting the public, nature and 
circumstances of these offenses, your history, character and 
condition, Court finds that prison sentences are required. 
 
The trial court proceeded to impose sentence on each count, ordering all three 
defendants to serve life without parole on the aggravated-murder counts. 
{¶ 27} This record is presented to show that Long raised his youth as a 
mitigating factor but that the state argued the opposite.  Because the trial court did 
not separately mention that Long was a juvenile when he committed the offense, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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we cannot be sure how the trial court applied this factor.  Although Miller does 
not require that specific findings be made on the record, it does mandate that a 
trial court consider as mitigating the offender’s youth and attendant 
characteristics before imposing a sentence of life without parole.  For juveniles, 
like Long, a sentence of life without parole is the equivalent of a death penalty.  
Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2463, 183 L.Ed.2d 407.  As such, it is not to be imposed 
lightly, for as the juvenile matures into adulthood and may become amenable to 
rehabilitation, the sentence completely forecloses that possibility. 
{¶ 28} The record shows a group sentencing of three that included one 
defendant who was a juvenile at the time of the crime.  Eric Long was situated 
differently but might not have been given the benefit of the consideration of youth 
as a mitigating factor.  Therefore, his sentence did not comport with the newly 
announced procedural strictures of Miller v. Alabama.  We therefore reverse the 
judgment of the First District and vacate Long’s sentence of life in prison without 
the possibility of parole, and we remand the case to the trial court for 
resentencing. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 29} The United States Supreme Court has indicated in Roper, Graham, 
and Miller that juveniles who commit criminal offenses are not as culpable for 
their acts as adults are and are more amenable to reform.  We agreed with this 
sentiment in In re C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729.  
Miller did not go so far as to bar courts from imposing the sentence of life without 
the possibility of parole on a juvenile.  Yet because of the severity of that penalty, 
and because youth and its attendant circumstances are strong mitigating factors, 
that sentence should rarely be imposed on juveniles.  Miller, ___ U.S. ___, 132 
S.Ct. at 2469, 183 L.Ed.2d 407.  In this case, the trial court must consider Long’s 
youth as mitigating before determining whether aggravating factors outweigh it.  
January Term, 2014 
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We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this cause 
to the trial court for resentencing. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
O’DONNELL and KENNEDY, JJ., dissent. 
____________________ 
O’CONNOR, C.J., concurring. 
{¶ 30} I concur in the majority’s judgment, opinion, and syllabus. 
{¶ 31} I write separately to make clear two important points upon which 
all members of this court agree:   a trial court must consider youth as a mitigating 
factor when formulating a sentence for a crime committed by a juvenile, but the 
court retains its broad discretion to determine how much weight to give that 
factor.  This appeal illustrates the tension in that equipoise. 
{¶ 32} There is nothing novel about the fact that our youth commit 
murders and mayhem.  But the legal lens through which we view their sentencing 
has changed. 
{¶ 33} The United States Supreme Court has made clear that courts must 
treat youths who commit murders and other serious crimes differently from adults 
who commit those same crimes.  See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, ___U.S. ___, 132 
S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) (holding that the imposition of mandatory 
life-without-parole sentences on individuals who committed murders while they 
were under the age of 18 violates the Eighth Amendment); Graham v. Florida, 
560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) (holding that imposition of 
life-without-parole sentences on juveniles who did not commit homicides violates 
the Eighth Amendment); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 
L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (holding that executions of individuals who were under the age 
of 18 when they committed their crimes violates the Eighth and Fourteenth 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Amendments).  In so doing, the court has reminded us, repeatedly, that “[a] 
child’s age is far ‘more than a chronological fact.’ ”  J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 
___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 2403, 180 L.Ed.2d 310 (2011), quoting Eddings v. 
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115, 102 S.Ct. 869, 731 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982).  Indeed, the 
court has seemed frustrated that it has repeatedly noted to us that minors are less 
mature and responsible than adults, that they are lacking in experience, 
perspective, and judgment, and that they are more vulnerable and susceptible to 
the pressures of peers than are adults.  See id. at 2404.  Generally stated, the 
rationale for the disparate treatment is that “juveniles have diminished culpability 
and greater prospects for reform” and “ ‘are less deserving of the most severe 
punishments.’ ”  Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2464, quoting Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2026.  
We, as judges, must consider an offender’s youth when determining which 
sentence to impose. 
{¶ 34} But at the same time, the court has not suggested that courts 
cannot, or should not, impose significant sanctions on youthful offenders.  To the 
contrary, it has recognized that it is “beyond question” that a youth who commits 
a murder deserves severe punishment.  Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2469.  And it has held 
that a state is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile offender 
convicted of a nonhomicide crime; the state need only offer a meaningful 
opportunity for the juvenile offender to be released, “based on demonstrated 
maturity and rehabilitation.”  Graham, 560 U.S. at 75. 
{¶ 35} The constitutional question, then, is how much to consider an 
offender’s youth, and how much to consider his crime.  See Graham, 560 U.S. at 
67. 
{¶ 36} Ohio’s sentencing scheme generally requires judges not only to 
protect the public, but also to punish and rehabilitate the offender by imposing 
sanctions that are commensurate with the offender’s conduct and its impact on the 
victim.  R.C. 2929.11(A) and (B).  The General Assembly has afforded judges 
January Term, 2014 
17 
 
great discretion in fashioning proper sentences, constrained only by guideposts 
that require the sentencing judge to consider certain factors that help determine 
the seriousness of the crime and the likelihood of recidivism. R.C. 2929.12.  
Today, we reaffirm that discretion, but we add to the sentencing calculus by 
holding that an offender’s youth must be an articulated consideration in the 
sentencing analysis, at least in cases in which life without parole is a potential 
sanction. 
{¶ 37} Our syllabus and analysis are clear.  Our holdings today make clear 
that a judge must separately consider youth as a mitigating factor and that the 
record must clearly reflect that that consideration took place in sentencing an 
offender to life without parole for offenses committed as a minor.  Those holdings 
are paramount.  But in joining them, I caution that our law requires only that 
youth be considered as a factor.  It does not mandate any particular result from 
that consideration. 
{¶ 38} As a court of last resort, our role is to ensure that sentences meted 
out by a judge are sentences that comply with statutory commands and 
constitutional principles.  It is not to second-guess decisions made by a trial judge 
on whether, on the facts, any offender, including youthful offenders, should be 
given a particular sentence. 
{¶ 39} In remanding this cause, we do not opine on the merits of Long’s 
sentence.  We simply ensure that whatever sentence the judge imposes, even if the 
sentence remains the same, is imposed according to all protections the law affords 
the offender.  Though “appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to the 
harshest possible penalty will be uncommon,” Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2649, 183 
L.Ed.2d 407, they do arise. 
{¶ 40} Reasonable minds will certainly differ as to which sentence is most 
fitting for Eric Long.  But whether we believe that the juvenile justice system 
failed Long, or that Long failed the system, the result is the same:  dead young 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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men, wounded young men, incarcerated-for-life young men.  None of us should 
take much solace in that. 
____________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 41} I respectfully dissent. 
{¶ 42} Eric Long was almost 18 years old when he, Fonta Whipple, and 
Jashawn Clark fired assault-style weapons into a dwelling in Lincoln Heights, 
striking Kyrie Maxberry in the face and Mark Keeling in the spine.  Days later, he 
participated in the killing of Scott Neblett and Keith Cobb, both of whom were 
shot to death with the same assault-style weapons while driving on Interstate 75 
north of Cincinnati. 
{¶ 43} A jury found him guilty of two counts of aggravated murder, three 
counts of felonious assault, two counts of having weapons while under disability, 
one count of improperly discharging a firearm into a habitation, one count of 
carrying concealed weapons, and various firearm specifications, and as a result 
the trial court imposed a sentence of consecutive terms of life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole on the murder counts plus an additional term of 
19 years on the remaining counts and specifications, served consecutively.  While 
there is no question that the United States Constitution permits the imposition of a 
sentence of life without parole on a juvenile offender convicted of murder in 
appropriate circumstances, the singular question presented here is whether the 
trial court sufficiently indicated that it had considered Long’s youth to be a 
mitigating factor before imposing sentence. 
{¶ 44} The only argument Long advanced in the trial court focused on the 
proposition that a juvenile offender’s youth is a mitigating factor.  In his 
sentencing memorandum in that regard, Long asserted, “The importance of 
treating a defendant’s youth as a mitigating factor cannot be underestimated,” and 
he noted that juveniles are less mature, more impetuous, and more susceptible to 
January Term, 2014 
19 
 
outside influence and psychological damage while also lacking the experience, 
judgment, and capacity to control their conduct.  He maintained that youth crime 
is not exclusively the juvenile offender’s fault, but represents a failure of family, 
school, and society.  And he emphasized that his culpability is diminished by his 
youth, immaturity, and vulnerability to peer pressure from his adult codefendants.  
Thus, Long urged that he should not be sentenced to life in prison without the 
possibility of parole based on his chronological age (17 years and 9 months) at the 
time of his crimes. 
{¶ 45} At the sentencing hearing, his defense counsel reiterated these 
same arguments, emphasizing that Long was a juvenile offender, contrasting his 
culpability with that of the adult codefendants and asking for “a glimmer of hope” 
and “a chance that some day he can return to society, hopefully a changed and 
rehabilitated man.”  The state agreed that “youth is usually a mitigating factor” 
but discounted it, given Long’s “horrendous” juvenile record and his complete 
failure to show any interest in rehabilitation or to acknowledge the harm he 
caused. 
{¶ 46} At sentencing, the trial court said that it had considered the 
“circumstances of [these] offenses, your history, character and condition,” and it 
sentenced Long to life in prison without the possibility of parole.  The First 
District Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the trial court had discretion 
to impose life with or without parole and “was able to consider whether Long’s 
‘youth and its attendant characteristics, along with the nature of his crime, made a 
lesser sentence (for example, life with the possibility of parole) more 
appropriate.’ ”  2012-Ohio-3052, ¶ 52, quoting Miller v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, 
132 S.Ct. 2455, 2460, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012).  The appellate court determined 
that the trial court had considered those factors, because defense counsel had 
focused on Long’s youth as a mitigating factor and the trial court had stated it 
considered Long’s “history, character and condition.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 47} This court accepted Long’s discretionary appeal on one proposition 
of law: “The Eighth Amendment requires trial courts to consider youth as a 
mitigating factor when sentencing a child to life without parole for a homicide.” 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
{¶ 48} In construing the Eighth Amendment, the United States Supreme 
Court adopted categorical bans on sentencing practices specially focused on 
juvenile offenders based on their lesser culpability and greater potential for 
rehabilitation.  In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 
L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), the court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the 
imposition of capital punishment on children under the age 18.  And in Graham v. 
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), it concluded that 
the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentence of life without the possibility of parole 
for a juvenile convicted of a nonhomicide offense. 
{¶ 49} Most recently, in Miller v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 
2460, 183 L.Ed.2d 407, the court held that a state sentencing scheme that requires 
“mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their 
crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual 
punishments.’ ”  Comparing sentences of life without parole for juvenile 
offenders to a death sentence, the United States Supreme Court applied its 
precedents demanding individualized sentencing in capital cases and required that 
the juvenile offender have “an opportunity to advance,” and the sentencer have “a 
chance to assess,” any mitigating factors.  Id. at 2467. 
{¶ 50} The court, however, declined to categorically bar the imposition of 
a sentence of life without the possibility of parole on juvenile offenders, 
explaining that “[a]lthough we do not foreclose a sentencer’s ability to make that 
judgment in homicide cases, we require it to take into account how children are 
different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them 
to a lifetime in prison.”  Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2469.  Thus, the court determined 
January Term, 2014 
21 
 
that “a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating 
circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Id. at 2475. 
{¶ 51} Unlike the sentencing scheme invalidated in Miller, here, Long had 
“an opportunity to advance,” and the trial court had “a chance to assess,” Long’s 
youth as a mitigating factor.  Ohio does not have a mandatory penalty scheme that 
requires the trial court to sentence all offenders—juvenile and adult—to life 
without parole in these circumstances.  Rather, R.C. 2929.03(A)(1) vests the trial 
court with discretion to impose life imprisonment with or without the possibility 
of parole on an offender found guilty of aggravated murder.  Thus, Ohio’s 
sentencing statutes do not violate Miller, which struck down only those 
sentencing schemes that completely foreclose the consideration of the youth of a 
juvenile offender. 
{¶ 52} Further, nothing in Miller prescribes the weight that the court must 
give this mitigating factor in imposing sentence; even in the context of capital 
sentencing, “the Constitution does not require a State to ascribe any specific 
weight to particular factors, either in aggravation or mitigation, to be considered 
by the sentencer.”  Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 512, 115 S.Ct. 1031, 130 
L.Ed.2d 1004 (1995).  Rather, as we explained in State v. Jackson, 107 Ohio St.3d 
53, 2005-Ohio-5981, 836 N.E.2d 1173: 
  
We have long held that in imposing sentence, the 
assessment of and weight given to mitigating evidence are within 
the trial court's discretion. State v. Lott (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 
171, 555 N.E.2d 293. “The fact that mitigation evidence is 
admissible ‘does not automatically mean that it must be given any 
weight.’ State v. Steffen (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 31 OBR 273, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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509 N.E.2d 383, paragraph two of the syllabus.” State v. Mitts 
(1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 223, 235, 690 N.E.2d 522. 
 
Id. at ¶ 106.  Thus, although a trial court is required to consider youth as a 
mitigating factor, it may exercise its discretion as to what weight it will give to 
that factor in connection with the other relevant sentencing factors. 
{¶ 53} Nor does Miller require the court to explicitly state that it has 
considered any particular mitigating factor.  And as we reiterated in State v. 
Davis, 116 Ohio St.3d 404, 2008-Ohio-2, 880 N.E.2d 31, ¶ 363, “ ‘While a 
sentencing court must consider all evidence of mitigation, it need not discuss each 
factor individually.’ State v. Phillips (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 102, 656 N.E.2d 
643, citing Parker v. Dugger (1991), 498 U.S. 308, 314-315, 111 S.Ct. 731, 112 
L.Ed.2d 812.”  Contrary to the majority’s assertion, the trial court’s failure to 
“separately mention that Long was a juvenile when he committed the offense” 
does not mean that “we cannot be sure how the trial court applied this factor” or 
otherwise conduct an effective review of the sentence.  Majority opinion at ¶ 27.  
No one disputed that Long was a juvenile, and in any case, the Supreme Court 
recognized in Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 750, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 
L.Ed.2d 725 (1990), that the sentencer need not make written findings concerning 
mitigating circumstances in order for an appellate court to perform an effective 
review. 
{¶ 54} Significantly, in Miller, the court implicitly recognized that 
although the youth of a juvenile offender is a mitigating factor, the mitigating 
weight of youth necessarily decreases as the offender grows older; in fact, Miller 
noted that there are differences between a 14-year-old offender and a 17-year-old 
offender and directed courts “to take into account the differences among 
defendants and crimes.”  Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2469, 183 L.Ed.2d 407, fn. 8.  Yet 
here, Long was only three months shy of his 18th birthday, and he presented no 
January Term, 2014 
23 
 
concrete information about his personal background or family history that would 
have allowed the court to evaluate his mental condition and development, 
maturity, and relative culpability for his crimes.  Long cannot fail to present 
specific mitigating evidence and then fault the trial court for not considering it.  
Compare State v. Lott, 97 Ohio St.3d 303, 2002-Ohio-6625, 779 N.E.2d 1011, 
¶ 21 (“the burden of going forward with the evidence of a mental state, as a 
mitigating factor during a capital trial, is on the accused”). 
{¶ 55} It cannot be assumed that the trial court ignored Long’s argument 
that his chronological age at the time of the offense, standing alone, sufficiently 
mitigates his conduct to make a sentence of life without parole inappropriate.  
Rather, it is manifest that whatever significance the trial court attributed to Long’s 
youth, it did not outweigh his “violent history and record,” his lack of remorse 
and likelihood to “kill again,” and the seriousness of his crimes, which involved 
firing assault-type weapons into an occupied dwelling and at occupants of a 
speeding vehicle, killing two persons and seriously injuring two others.  In my 
view, the trial court carefully followed the law in this area and properly exercised 
its discretion in concluding that a sentence of life without the possibility of parole 
was appropriate in this case.  I would therefore affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
____________________ 
 
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ronald W. 
Springman, Chief Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Stephen P. Hardwick, 
Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Peter K. Glenn-Applegate, 
Deputy Solicitor, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Attorney General. 
 
Marsha L. Levick, urging reversal for amicus curiae Juvenile Law Center. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Kilpatrick, Townsend & Stockton, L.L.P., and Gia L. Cincone, urging 
reversal for amicus curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
_________________________