Title: Pace v. Hadley

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Pace v. Hadley1987 WY 130742 P.2d 1283Case Number: 87-130Decided: 09/22/1987Supreme Court of Wyoming
LESLIE JAN PACE AND WANDA 
MAE PACE, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS),

 
 
v.

 
 
LES HADLEY, BARRY 
ROCHFORD, MIKE CHENEY, MAHLON GRUBB, BERL TRAFTON, JOHN W. COYKENDALL, JULIUS 
JONES, DAVE THOMAS, CHUCK MAGGIO, CHUCK WILKINSON, AND KEN BIGLER, APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, SweetwaterCounty, Kenneth G. Hamm, 
J.

 
 
W. Keith Goody of King 
& Goody, Jackson, for 
appellants.

 
 
Patrick R. Day, Cheyenne, and Hugh Q. Gottschalk and Harry Shulman, 
Denver, Colo., for appellees.

 
 
Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

 
 

MACY, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Plaintiffs Leslie Jan 
Pace and Wanda Mae Pace (appellants herein) filed suit alleging negligence and 
culpable negligence on the part of defendants (appellees herein), who were 
co-employees of Mr. Pace at FMC Wyoming Corporation. The district court entered 
an order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants.

 
 

[¶2.]     We reverse and 
remand.

 
 

[¶3.]     Mr. Pace was employed 
as a class A mechanic for FMC Wyoming Corporation at its trona mine located in 
Sweetwater County, 
Wyoming. On August 15, 1986, in the 
course of his employment while working with a drill press, Mr. Pace severed his 
left arm just below the elbow. He was attempting to enlarge the center hole in a 
cone nut. He had been holding a bolt with his left hand in order to keep the 
cone nut straight and manually was feeding the drill press with his right hand. 
During the drilling process, the bolt slipped out of his hand causing his left 
forearm to be pushed against the drill bit.

 
 

[¶4.]     On November 13, 1986, 
plaintiffs filed a personal injury action against defendants, who had 
supervisory responsibilities concerning the safety of working conditions in the 
mine. Generally, this complaint alleged that defendants were responsible for the 
locking of a tool room holding necessary tools which, if used, would have 
prevented Mr. Pace's injuries. Also, on the same day the suit was filed, 
plaintiffs served defendants with interrogatories and requests for 
production.

 
 

[¶5.]     On December 23, 1986, 
defendant Barry Rochford filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), W.R.C.P., or, in 
the alternative, a motion for summary judgment. Likewise, the remaining 
defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Both of these 
motions were accompanied by memoranda and affidavits. In response to these 
motions, plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition generally stating that 
inadequate discovery had occurred; therefore, argument at that time was 
impossible.

 
 

[¶6.]     On February 9, 1987, 
the district court issued a decision letter announcing that it would convert the 
motions to dismiss filed by defendants into motions for summary judgment and 
allowed the parties until March 2, 1987, to file any additional affidavits or 
material in support of, or in opposition to, the motions. The next day, 
defendants filed a reply memorandum to plaintiffs' opposition to an order of 
dismissal and answered plaintiffs' first interrogatories and request for the 
production of documents. On February 26, 1987, plaintiffs filed a motion for 
continuance and opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Again, plaintiffs 
asked for additional time in which to make discovery and take depositions, and 
they alleged that it was absurd to require them to respond until such time as 
discovery had been completed.

 
 

[¶7.]     On March 3, 1987, the 
district court converted both of defendants' motions to dismiss to motions for 
summary judgment and issued another decision letter stating that there were no 
"genuine issues of material fact." 
(Emphasis in original.) On March 17, 1987, an order was filed by the district 
court in favor of defendants granting them summary judgment. This appeal 
followed.

 
 

[¶8.]     Plaintiffs raise the 
following issues:

 
 
"1) Did the District 
Court err in allowing the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to be converted to a Motion for 
Summary Judgment?

 
 
"2) Was the summary 
judgment improper because:

 
 
"a) there was a lack of a 
sufficient factual basis,

 
 
"b) genuine issues of 
material fact existed in the case, and

 
 
"c) [defendants] were not 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law?"

 
 
We need not specifically 
address these issues as we hold that plaintiffs were not allowed a reasonable 
time for discovery.

 
 

[¶9.]     Defendants filed their 
respective motions to dismiss and, in one case, in the alternative, motion for 
summary judgment only 40 days after the initial complaint in this case was 
filed. These motions were filed before defendants had replied to plaintiffs' 
interrogatories and request for production of relevant documents. Despite being 
apprised by plaintiffs that there had been inadequate time for making discovery 
and gathering important facts in the case, the district court issued a decision 
letter allowing plaintiffs only 21 additional days in which to gather 
information and oppose such motions. While we recognize that defendants made 
affidavits, answers to interrogatories, and production of documents prior to the 
deadline set by the district court, this information provided plaintiffs with 
only the first stepping stones in fully developing their case or, more 
importantly, in opposing defendants' motions.

 
 

[¶10.]  Mr. Pace was covered under the Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation Act and may recover from his co-employees only if he shows 
that they were culpably negligent. Section 27-12-103, W.S. 1977.1 "This court has said that culpable 
negligence is `willful and serious misconduct.'" Stundon v. Sterling, Wyo., 736 P.2d 317, 318 (1987). In order to 
prove that an actor has engaged in willful misconduct, it must be demonstrated 
that the actions were taken with a state of mind which approached intent to do 
harm. Id.; Bettencourt v. Pride Well Service, 
Inc., Wyo., 
735 P.2d 722 (1987). Also, it has long been recognized by this Court 
that:

 
 
"The initial burden is on 
the movant to show that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Once that showing is made, it is incumbent 
upon the party opposing the motion to come forward with specific facts to show 
that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Conclusory affidavits are 
insufficient and specific facts must be shown." Stundon v. Sterling, 736 P.2d  at 318 
(emphasis added and citations omitted).2

 
 

[¶11.]  Given the great burden placed upon 
plaintiffs to oppose both motions through the use of specific facts, ample time was not 
allowed for the development of the case through discovery.

 
 

[¶12.]  In our view, the plain language of Rule 
56, W.R.C.P.,3 mandates the entry of summary 
judgment only after there has been adequate time for discovery. For summary 
judgment to be properly issued, it must be established that the facts are clear 
and that no further inquiry into the facts is necessary to clarify the 
application of the law. As stated in Kimbley v. City of Green River, Wyo., 642 P.2d 443, 445 
(1982):

 
 
"[T]he fact that a motion 
to dismiss is being converted into a motion for summary judgment must be made 
known to all counsel together with a reasonable opportunity being afforded to 
the non-moving party to present that which he considers necessary to rebut the 
contention of the moving party.

 
 
"`We do not hold that a 
notice to convert a [Rule] 12(b)(6) motion into a summary judgment must be by 
written order, but the record must adequately demonstrate that all counsel were 
aware of the intentions of the district judge to treat the motion as converted, 
together with a reasonable opportunity 
afforded to the non-moving party to present, by way of affidavit or otherwise, 
anything necessary to rebut the contention of the moving party.'" (Emphasis 
added and citations omitted.)

 
 

[¶13.]  We are cognizant of the trial judges' 
laudable efforts to steward their dockets to the end that cases are disposed of 
in an expeditious manner. We also are aware that some trial judges have a 
tendency to prejudge cases and force settlement or summary disposition in their 
zeal to have a clean docket. A clean docket is not necessarily equated to 
justice. Attorneys must be given reasonable time to conduct meaningful and 
warranted discovery so that they may properly represent their 
clients.

 
 

[¶14.]  Reversed and remanded to permit a 
reasonable time for the parties to conduct their desired discovery pursuant to 
the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure before further proceedings are 
initiated.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 This section was amended and 
renumbered as § 27-14-104, W.S. 1977, effective July 1, 
1987.

 
 

2 Our analysis here does not address 
the question of the initial burden of production of evidence placed on the 
moving party by Rule 56, W.R.C.P. For the purposes of our discussion, we assume 
that the moving party has met initially the requisite evidentiary 
burden.

 
 

3 Rule 56, W.R.C.P., reads in 
applicable part:

 
 
"(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. - The 
motion shall be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. 
The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. * * 
*

 
 
* * * * * *

 
 
"(f) When affidavits are unavailable. - 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just." (Emphasis added.)