Title: Jackson v. Shakespeare Found., Inc.

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC11-1196 
____________ 
 
GEORGE JACKSON, et al.,  
Petitioners, 
 
vs. 
 
THE SHAKESPEARE FOUNDATION, INC., et al., 
Respondents. 
 
[January 31, 2013] 
 
LEWIS, J. 
 
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the First District 
Court of Appeal in Shakespeare Foundation, Inc. v. Jackson, 61 So. 3d 1194 (Fla. 
1st DCA 2011), and concerns whether an action for fraud is within the scope of an 
arbitration provision in a contract for the purchase and sale of real property.  The 
First District certified that its decision is in conflict with the decision of the Fifth 
District Court of Appeal in Maguire v. King, 917 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005).  
We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.   
 
 
 
 
 
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FACTS  
 
In 2006, George Jackson, Kerry Jackson, and the Jackson Realty Team, Inc. 
(“the Jacksons”) decided to sell the real property that is the subject of the contract 
which forms the basis of this dispute.  They posted the following advertisement in 
the Bay County Multiple Listing Service:   
This is a Great affordable housing project.  Estimate from North Bay 
Engineering is $17,500 to get you to Dev order stage.  Topography 
and boundary survey completed recently by Dragon Surveying to be 
included in price.  Property is 165’on Everitt Avenue and 396’ deep, 
totally cleared and filled except for 10’ around fence line.  Zoning per 
City of PC is MU2, Mixed Use 2, Multi Family duplex, triplex or 
quadraplex be built on the property.  Recently tapped into Panama 
City Water and Sewer, with new commercial grade pump/lift station 
on site.  Local Engineering company has platted 10 duplexes could fit 
6 4 plexes.  Zoned 20 units per acre or 30 units total.  Wetlands study 
verifies No Wetlands.  One of Sellers is Licensed Fl. Realtor.   
 
(Emphasis added.)  When the Jacksons posted this advertisement, they had in their 
possession a Property Report Land Use Planning Analysis, which established, 
contrary to the advertisement, that 25% of the subject property constituted 
wetlands.   
 
The Jacksons and the Respondents—the Shakespeare Foundation, Inc., and 
the Herd Community Development Corp. (collectively the “Shakespeare 
Foundation” or the “Foundation”)—entered into negotiations for the purchase of 
the real property.  During the negotiations, the Shakespeare Foundation advised the 
Jacksons that they intended to develop the property into a twenty-seven unit low-
 
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income housing development.  The Shakespeare Foundation relied on the 
representations set forth in the advertisement and entered into a contract with the 
Jacksons for the purchase of the real property.   
In July 2007, after the Shakespeare Foundation tendered full payment to the 
Jacksons for the property, the Foundation held an onsite meeting with a builder and 
engineer.  The builder reported that the property might contain wetlands.  The 
Shakespeare Foundation hired an engineering firm to perform a wetlands 
delineation1
 
The Shakespeare Foundation thereafter filed an action against the Jacksons 
for fraudulent misrepresentation.  In the complaint, it was alleged that in the 
advertisement for the sale of the property, the Jacksons knowingly and falsely 
misrepresented that the property had no wetlands and that the property was suitable 
for the construction of thirty units, and the Shakespeare Foundation relied on these 
misrepresentations when entering into the contract.  The Shakespeare Foundation 
 on the property.  The firm provided the Shakespeare Foundation with 
a report that established that 0.39 acres of the 1.5 acre property was wetlands 
rendering it unbuildable.  The wetlands constituted 26% of the entire tract which 
was equal to nine of the twenty-seven units that the Shakespeare Foundation had 
intended to develop.   
                                         
1.  A “wetlands delineation” is “the act of establishing the boundary between 
wetlands and uplands (or non-wetlands).”  The Wetlands Regulation Center, 
Wetlands Delineation Under the Clean Water Act, 
http://www.wetlands.com/regs/tlpge02h.htm (last visited January 15, 2013). 
 
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contended that if it had been known that 26% of the property constituted wetlands, 
the property would have never been purchased because that percentage of wetlands 
made use of the property “economically unfeasible.”  The Shakespeare Foundation 
also asserted that the existence of the wetlands led to a delay in project 
development.  It was alleged that this delay of time caused the Foundation to miss 
a favorable real estate market in which the subject property could have been sold, 
and placed them in one of the worst real estate markets in the modern era.    
 
The Jacksons moved to dismiss the Shakespeare Foundation’s action.  They 
asserted that the fraud claim arose out of, and was related to, the contract and, 
therefore, fell within the arbitration provision of the contract.  The arbitration 
provision in the contract, titled “Default and Dispute Resolution,” states:  
 
14. DISPUTE RESOLUTION:  This Contract will be construed 
under Florida law.  All controversies, claims, and other matters in 
question arising out of or relating to this transaction or this Contract or 
its breach will be settled as follows:  
 
(a) Disputes concerning entitlement to deposits made and 
agreed to be made:  Buyer and Seller will have 30 days from 
the date conflicting demands are made to attempt to resolve the 
dispute through mediation.  If that fails, Escrow Agent will 
submit the dispute, if so required by Florida law, to Escrow 
Agent’s choice of arbitration, a Florida court or the Florida Real 
Estate Commission.  Buyer and Seller will be bound by any 
resulting award, judgment, or order.   
 
(b) All other disputes:  Buyer and Seller will have 30 days 
from the date a dispute arises between them to attempt to 
resolve the matter through mediation, failing which the parties 
 
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will resolve the dispute through neutral binding arbitration in 
the county where the Property is located.  The arbitrator may 
not alter the Contract terms or award any remedy not provided 
for in this Contract. . . .  This clause will survive closing.   
 
(Emphasis added.)  The Jacksons contended that the contractual provisions 
required the Shakespeare Foundation to submit the fraud claim to binding 
arbitration.  It was asserted that this provision required binding arbitration of the 
fraud claim because the scope of the contractual provision included all claims 
“arising out of or relating to this transaction or this Contract.”  (Emphasis added.)   
The trial court subsequently granted the Jacksons’ motion to dismiss, 
concluding that the arbitration provision in the contract required that the parties 
submit the fraud claim to arbitration.  The Shakespeare Foundation appealed the 
judgment of dismissal to the First District Court of Appeal.  See Shakespeare 
Found., 61 So. 3d at 1196.   
Decision of the First District 
 
On appeal, the First District examined whether the trial court erred in 
dismissing the action.  See id. at 1197-98.  The crux of the appellate court’s review 
was whether the fraud claim of the Shakespeare Foundation was within the scope 
of the arbitration provision of the contract.  See id. at 1198.   
The district court below concluded that the arbitration provision of the 
subject contract was broad in scope because its terms were to apply to all claims or 
controversies “arising out of or relating to” the contract.  See id. (concluding that 
 
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the “or relating to” language rendered the arbitration provision broad in scope).  
The district court then held that a claim falls within a broad arbitration provision if 
a “significant relationship”—i.e., a “contractual nexus”—exists between the 
contract and the claim.  See id.   
The district court, however, determined that the fraud claim here did not 
come within the broad scope of the arbitration provision because the fraud claim 
arose from a general duty established under the common law; not from an 
obligation arising under the contract.  See id. at 1199.  More specifically, the 
district court concluded that the fraud claim did not significantly relate to the 
contract because determination of this claim required neither reference to nor 
construction of the contract.  See id.  Rather, the district court held that the claim 
rested on the alleged false statements in the published advertisement and the 
general common law duty not to make fraudulent misrepresentations.  See id.  The 
court further determined that the fraud claim was not within the scope of the 
arbitration provision because the contract was only incidental to the dispute since 
the Shakespeare Foundation had the ability, as well as the right, to assert a fraud 
claim before the parties executed the contract.  See id.  The district court also 
concluded that the express language of the contract evinced an intent that a fraud 
claim would not be litigated under the contract and its arbitration provision.  See 
id.  Specifically, the district court held that the express language of the contract 
 
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only contemplates remedies for a breach of contract action, and prohibits an 
arbitrator from providing a remedy not specifically provided for in the provisions 
of the contract, such as a remedy in the event of a tort or fraud action.  See id.   
The First District ultimately held that the action based on fraud was not a 
dispute subject to arbitration under the contract, reversed the trial court’s order, 
and certified conflict with the decision of the Fifth District in Maguire.  See id. at 
1201.   
Conflict Case 
 
In Maguire, a buyer entered into a contract to purchase real property from 
the sellers.  See 917 So. 2d at 264.  The sellers represented that the real property 
would include two acres of drainage rights.  See id.  The parties articulated and 
reduced those rights into written form in an addendum to the purchase contract.  
See id.  After the parties closed on the contract, the buyer discovered that the 
sellers had previously transferred one acre of the agreed upon two acres of 
drainage rights in a previous sale of a different parcel.  See id.  The buyer filed an 
action against the sellers for specific performance, breach of contract, fraud in the 
inducement, fraudulent misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation.  See id. 
at 265.  Pursuant to an arbitration provision in the contract that is identical to the 
provision at issue in this case, the sellers moved to dismiss and compel arbitration.  
See id.  The trial court granted the motion with regard to the specific performance 
 
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and contract claims, but denied the motion to compel arbitration with regard to the 
fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims.  See id.  The trial court held that the 
arbitration provision did not apply to those claims because the claims were 
founded in tort law.  See id.   
On appeal, the Fifth District reversed and remanded, directing the trial court 
to compel arbitration of the fraud and misrepresentation claims.  See id. at 268.  
The appellate court held that a contractual nexus existed between the 
misrepresentation claims and the contract because the contract contained a broad 
arbitration provision, and the buyer based the misrepresentation claims on duties 
created by the contractual relationship between the parties.  See id. at 266 (“[T]he 
tort claims are nonsensical when divorced from the contractual obligation to 
deliver approximately two acres of drainage rights.”).  According to the appellate 
court, the fraudulent misrepresentation and fraud in the inducement claims arose 
from conduct pertaining to the agreement—i.e., the misrepresentation regarding 
the drainage rights which had been specifically incorporated into the written 
contract.  See id. at 267.   
ANALYSIS 
Standard of Review 
 
 
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss.  See 
Execu-Tech Bus. Sys., Inc. v. New Oji Paper Co. Ltd., 752 So. 2d 582, 584 (Fla. 
 
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2000).  This Court’s review of an order dismissing an action and compelling 
arbitration is limited to the four corners of the complaint and its incorporated 
attachments.  See Minor v. Brunetti, 43 So. 3d 178, 179 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010).  The 
purpose of the review is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint; not to 
determine factual issues.  See id.  All well pled allegations in the complaint are 
taken as true, with all reasonable inferences to be construed in favor of the 
nonmoving party.  See id.  The issue in this case also concerns a matter of contract 
interpretation, which is a question of law subject to de novo review.  See Chandler 
v. Geico Indem. Co.
Applicable Rules of Law 
, 78 So. 3d 1293, 1296 (Fla. 2011).   
 
Generally, the three fundamental elements that must be considered when 
determining whether a dispute is required to proceed to arbitration are: (1) whether 
a valid written agreement to arbitrate exists; (2) whether an arbitrable issue exists; 
and (3) whether the right to arbitration was waived.  See Seifert v. U.S. Home 
Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 636 (Fla. 1999).  Arbitration provisions are contractual in 
nature and remain a matter of contractual interpretation.  See id.  The intent of the 
parties to a contract, as manifested in the plain language of the arbitration 
provision and contract itself, determines whether a dispute is subject to arbitration.  
See id.  Courts generally favor such provisions, and will try to resolve an 
 
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ambiguity in an arbitration provision in favor of arbitration.  See id.; see also 
Qubty v. Nagda, 817 So. 2d 952, 956 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).  
Two basic types of arbitration provisions have emerged: (1) provisions with 
language and application narrow in scope, and (2) provisions with language and 
application broad in scope.  See Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 636-37.  An arbitration 
provision that is considered to be narrow in scope typically requires arbitration for 
claims or controversies “arising out of” the subject contract.  See id. at 636.  This 
type of provision limits arbitration to those claims that have a direct relationship to 
a contract’s terms and provisions.  See id.  In contrast, an arbitration provision that 
is considered to be broad in scope typically requires arbitration for claims or 
controversies “arising out of or relating to” the subject contract.  See id. at 637 
(emphasis added).  The addition of the words “relating to” broadens the scope of 
an arbitration provision to include those claims that are described as having a 
“significant relationship” to the contract—regardless of whether the claim is 
founded in tort or contract law.  See id. at 637-38. 
 
A “significant relationship” between a claim and an arbitration provision 
does not necessarily exist merely because the parties in the dispute have a 
contractual relationship.  See id.  Rather, a significant relationship is described to 
exist between an arbitration provision and a claim if there is a “contractual nexus” 
between the claim and the contract.  See id. at 638.  A contractual nexus exists 
 
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between a claim and a contract if the claim presents circumstances in which the 
resolution of the disputed issue requires either reference to, or construction of, a 
portion of the contract.  See id.  More specifically, a claim has a nexus to a contract 
and arises from the terms of the contract if it emanates from an inimitable duty 
created by the parties’ unique contractual relationship.  See id. at 639.  In contrast, 
a claim does not have a nexus to a contract if it pertains to the breach of a duty 
otherwise imposed by law or in recognition of public policy, such as a duty under 
the general common law owed not only to the contracting parties but also to third 
parties and the public.  See id. 
 
For example, in Seifert, this Court examined whether a negligence claim in a 
wrongful death action was within the scope of a broad arbitration provision in a 
contract for the sale and purchase of real property.  See 750 So. 2d at 635.  The 
Court held that a significant relationship did not exist between the negligence 
claim and the contract, and, as a result, the claim did not fall within the scope of 
the arbitration provision.  See id. at 642.  
The wrongful death action in that case arose after a wife and husband 
purchased a home.  See id. at 635.  After the couple moved into the home, the 
husband died inside the home due to the inhalation of carbon monoxide.  See id. at 
635.  This death occurred because an air conditioner located in the garage area 
captured carbon monoxide emissions from a running car engine in the garage and 
 
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transmitted the toxic emissions into the living area of the home.  See id.  The wife, 
as personal representative of her husband’s estate, filed a wrongful death action 
against the sellers of the home for strict liability, negligence, and breach of express 
and implied warranties.  See id.  The sellers moved to compel arbitration with 
regard to the negligence-type claims, arguing that although the claims were 
founded in tort law, all of the claims were within the scope of the arbitration 
provision in the purchase contract:   
13. ARBITRATION. Any controversy or claim arising under or 
related to this Agreement or to the Property (with the exception of 
“consumer products” as defined by the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-
Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 2301 
et seq., and the regulations promulgated under the Act) or with respect 
to any claim arising by virtue of any representations alleged to have 
been made by the Seller or Seller's representative, shall be settled and 
finally determined by mediation or binding arbitration as provided by 
the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. Section 1—14) and similar state 
statutes and not by a court of law. 
 
Id. (emphasis added).   
 
This Court disagreed with the sellers.  See id. at 640-42.  We held that the 
negligence-type claims did not have a significant relationship to the contract 
because they were founded in the tort of common law negligence and were 
unrelated to any unique legal duties imposed under the contract, i.e., the actions 
were predicated on the sellers’ breach of general common law duties of care owed 
to the injured parties; not on a breach of a unique duty imposed under the contract.  
See id.  The holding was supported by reference to the total absence of any 
 
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mention of rights regarding personal injury or negligence actions in the contract.  
See id.  We concluded that the absence of such language further signified that the 
parties did not intend for the arbitration provision to apply to the negligence-type 
claims.  See id. at 641-42. 
Instant Case 
We hold that the action here based on fraud is within the scope of the 
arbitration provision because it has a clear contractual nexus with, and thus a 
significant relationship to, the contract.  This relationship exists because: (1) the 
fraud claim is inextricably intertwined with both the circumstances that surrounded 
the transaction from which the contract emanated and the contract itself; and (2) 
resolution of the fraud claim requires the construction and consideration of duties 
arising under the contract. 
In this case, as in Seifert, the contract at issue has a broad arbitration 
provision because it subjects “[a]ll controversies, claims, and other matters in 
question arising out of or relating to this transaction or this Contract or its breach” 
to binding arbitration.  (Emphasis added.)  See Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 637 (holding 
that an arbitration provision which contains the phrase “arising from or relating to” 
is considered a broad arbitration provision because of the addition of the “or 
relating to” language).  However, in Seifert, this Court concluded that the 
negligence-type claims at issue did not have a significant relationship to a contract 
 
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that had a broad arbitration provision because a contractual nexus did not exist 
between the claims and the contract.  See id. at 640-42.  We held that this was 
because the claims did not require some reference to or construction of the 
contract, and pertained to the duty of care imposed by general common law in 
recognition of public policy.  See id. at 637, 640-41.   
In contrast to Seifert, here, although the fraud claim is based on common law 
fraud,2
                                         
2.  An aggrieved party proves common law fraud by establishing that: (1) 
the opposing party made a misrepresentation of a material fact, (2) the opposing 
party knew or should have known the falsity of the statement, (3) the opposing 
party intended to induce the aggrieved party to rely on the false statement and act 
on it, and (4) the aggrieved party relied on that statement to his or her detriment.  
See, e.g., Butler v. Yusem, 44 So. 3d 102, 105 (Fla. 2010) (listing the elements of 
fraudulent misrepresentation). 
 it is inextricably intertwined with both the circumstances that surrounded 
the transaction from which the contract emanated and the contract itself.  As 
alleged in the complaint as a basis for the action, the genesis of the fraud claim is 
that the Jacksons knowingly misrepresented facts in the published advertisement 
that the subject property did not contain wetlands when, in fact, the Jacksons knew 
of the wetlands’ existence through their own previous study which established that 
wetlands constituted 25% of the property.  The Shakespeare Foundation allegedly 
relied on the misrepresentations in the published advertisement and entered into the 
contract.  The subsequent damages the Shakespeare Foundation allegedly incurred 
 
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arose from the contract itself, i.e., by entering into the contract, the Foundation 
suffered the economic damage of owning property it was unable to develop or sell.   
Therefore, unlike the negligence-type claims in Seifert, the fraud claim at 
issue here is inextricably intertwined with both the transaction from which the 
contract arose and the contract itself—the reliance element of the claim emanates 
from the transaction from which the contract arose, and the damages element of the 
claim arises from the execution and existence of the contract itself.  Accordingly, 
the fraud claim has a significant relationship to the contract and is within the scope 
of the contract’s broad arbitration provision.  
Furthermore, the resolution of the fraud claim requires reference to and 
construction of both the contract’s arbitration provision and its “as is” provision.3
                                         
3.  In the contract, the Shakespeare Foundation elected the following 
provision: 
  
In particular, the arbitration provision of the contract limits the remedies for 
 
(1) Feasibility Study:  Buyer will, at Buyer’s expense and within 30 
days from Effective Date (“Feasibility Study Period”) determine 
whether the Property is suitable, in Buyer’s sole and absolute 
discretion, for 
 
 
 use. . . .  Buyer will deliver written 
notice to Seller prior to the expiration of the Feasibility Study Period 
of Buyer’s determination of whether or not the Property is acceptable.  
Buyer’s failure to comply with this notice requirement will constitute 
acceptance of the Property as suitable for Buyer’s intended use in its 
“as is” condition.   
 
(Emphasis added.)   
 
 
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disputes arising from the contractual relationship to those provided in the contract, 
stating that the “arbitrator may not alter the Contract terms or award any remedy 
not provided for in this Contract.”  The express remedies in the contract are limited 
to the parties’ rights in the event of a default, and the contract does not mention the 
parties’ remedial rights in the event of a fraud or tort action.   
This limitation of remedies in the arbitration provision may have an impact 
on the contract and the arbitration provision.  See Hialeah Auto., LLC v. Basulto, 
22 So. 3d 586, 590-91 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (holding as unconscionable an 
arbitration provision that resulted in the waiver of common law and statutory 
remedies).  However, we do not resolve such questions here as they were not 
presented for review nor addressed by the district court below.  These are issues 
that remain for consideration below as we address only the initial question 
concerning whether the arbitration clause may apply.   
 
The adjudication of the fraud action may also require reference to and the 
construction of the “as is” provision of the contract.  More specifically, the 
resolution of the fraud claim may require a determination as to whether that claim 
is negated due to an election of the “Feasibility Study” option under the “as is” 
provision of the contract.  By electing this option, the Shakespeare Foundation may 
have accepted the property “as is” for the intended use and waived any claims.  See 
Gilman v. Butzloff, 22 So. 2d 263, 265 (Fla. 1945) (“A party may waive any right 
 
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to which he is legally entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred by statute, or 
guaranteed by the Constitution.”).  Although the Shakespeare Foundation’s 
election of the option may not result in a waiver of the fraud claim, whether this 
argument is viable will require reference to, and the construction of, the contract 
and all other facts.  See, e.g., D & M Jupiter Inc. v. Friedopfer, 853 So. 2d 485, 
488-89 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (citing Oceanic Villas Inc. v. Godson, 4 So. 2d 689, 
690 (Fla. 1941)) (concluding that although a claim for fraudulent inducement of a 
contract may vitiate an “as is” provision, such a determination requires an 
examination of the contract and the circumstances surrounding its execution, and a 
resolution of whether a fraudulent representation occurred).   
The decision in Maguire is also consistent with our holding.  There, the 
parties entered into a contract for the sale of real property that contained an 
arbitration provision identical to the provision we consider in this case.  There, as 
here, the aggrieved party filed an action for fraud.  In relying on Seifert, the Fifth 
District in Maguire held that a contractual nexus existed between the fraud claims 
and the contract because the contract contained a broad arbitration provision, and 
the buyer based the fraud claims on misrepresentations regarding the property that 
was the subject of the contract, which were relied upon by the buyer in executing 
the contract.  See Maguire, 917 So. 2d at 266.  Similarly, in this case, a contractual 
nexus exists between the fraud claim and the contract because the Jacksons 
 
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allegedly misrepresented facts in the published advertisement concerning the 
property that was the subject of the contract, and the Shakespeare Foundation 
allegedly relied on those misrepresentations in entering into the contract.  
Therefore, in both Maguire and this case, the fraud claims at issue had a significant 
relationship to the contracts and were within the scope of the respective contracts’ 
arbitration provisions. 
Lastly, decisions from the United States Supreme Court and other state 
courts support the conclusion that the fraud claim here is within the scope of the 
broad language of the arbitration provision at issue.  See Prima Paint Corp. v. 
Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 397-403, 406 (1967) (holding that a 
claim for fraudulent misrepresentation was within the scope of a contract that 
required arbitration for “[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this 
Agreement or the breach thereof”); Parfi Holding AB v. Mirror Image Internet, 
Inc., 817 A.2d 149, 155 (Del. 2002) (holding that a fraud claim was within the 
scope of a broad arbitration provision that required the contracting parties to 
arbitrate “any dispute, controversy, or claim arising out of or in connection with” 
the contract); Green Tree Agency, Inc. v. White, 719 So. 2d 1179, 1180 (Ala. 
1998) (holding that a claim of fraud in the inducement was within an arbitration 
clause that required arbitration for “[a]ll disputes, claims, or controversies arising 
from or relating to this Contract or the relationships which result from this 
 
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Contract”); Quirk v. Data Terminal Sys., Inc., 400 N.E.2d 858, 860-61 (Mass. 
1980) (holding that a claim for fraud in the inducement was within the scope of an 
arbitration provision that required arbitration for all claims and disputes “arising 
out of, or relating to, this Contract or the breach thereof”); Flower World of Am., 
Inc. v. Wenzel, 594 P.2d 1015, 1016-17, 1019 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that a 
fraud claim was within the scope of an arbitration provision that required 
arbitration for “any controversy, dispute, claim or question arising out of, in 
connection with, or in relation to this Agreement or its interpretation, performance, 
or any breach thereof”).  
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, we conclude that the fraud action here filed by the Shakespeare 
Foundation has a contractual nexus with, and a significant relationship to, the 
contract between the Shakespeare Foundation and the Jacksons and is, as a general 
principle, within the scope of the contract’s broad arbitration provision.  We do not 
determine nor do we address any other issue beyond this threshold determination.  
We, therefore, quash the decision below, remand for further consideration, and 
approve the decision in Maguire to the extent that it is consistent with this opinion.   
It is so ordered.  
PARIENTE, QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
POLSTON, C.J, and CANADY, J., concur in result. 
 
 
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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED.   
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
First District - Case No. 1D10-1049 
 
 
(Bay County) 
 
Jean Marie Downing of Downing Law Offices, P.A., Panama City Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioners 
 
Leonard E. Ireland, Jr. of Clayton-Johnston, P.A., Gainesville, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondents