Title: Futch v. Fla. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC14-1660 
____________ 
 
NILS FUTCH,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR 
VEHICLES, 
Respondent. 
 
[April 14, 2016] 
 
PERRY, J. 
 
Nils Futch seeks review of the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal 
in Futch v. Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 142 So. 3d 910 (Fla. 
5th DCA 2014), on the ground that it expressly and directly conflicts with two 
decisions of the Second District Court of Appeal in Department of Highway Safety 
& Motor Vehicles v. Robinson, 93 So. 3d 1090 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012), and 
McLaughlin v. Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 128 So. 3d 815 
(Fla. 2d DCA 2012), and a decision of the First District Court of Appeal in 
Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Edenfield, 58 So. 3d 904 (Fla. 
1st DCA 2011), on a question of law.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), 
 
 
- 2 - 
Fla. Const.  Because the Fifth District inappropriately granted certiorari review, we 
quash the district court’s decision and remand for reinstatement of the circuit 
court’s decision. 
 
During a traffic stop, Futch allegedly refused to submit to a blood-alcohol 
test.  The Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (“DHSMV”) 
suspended Futch’s driver license for one year, effective March 15, 2013.  Futch 
sought review of the driver license suspension.  See §§ 322.2615, 322.64, Fla. Stat. 
(2012).  During the administrative review, the hearing officer refused to permit 
Futch’s counsel to ask more than two questions of Futch’s expert witness.  The 
hearing officer subsequently upheld the suspension.  On certiorari review of the 
administrative decision, the circuit court found that the hearing officer’s actions 
denied Futch due process, and invalidated the suspension.  Futch v. Dep’t of 
Highway Safety & Motor Vehs., 21 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 16, 18 (Fla. 7th Cir. Ct. 
Sept. 3, 2013).  On second-tier certiorari review of the circuit court’s decision, the 
Fifth District agreed with the circuit court that the hearing officer violated Futch’s 
due process by refusing to allow his expert to testify.  See Futch, 142 So. 3d at 915.  
However, the Fifth District held that the circuit court was required to remand the 
case back to DHSMV for another administrative hearing, and “that the circuit court 
misapplied the law when it directed DHSMV to set aside the suspension and 
reinstate Futch’s driver’s license.”  Id. at 916. 
 
 
- 3 - 
 
“[A]ppellate courts must exercise caution not to expand certiorari 
jurisdiction to review the correctness of the circuit court’s decision.”  Nader v. 
Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehs., 87 So. 3d 712, 723 (Fla. 2012); see also 
Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523, 526 (Fla. 1995).  “[T]he 
departure from the essential requirements of law necessary for the issuance of a 
writ of certiorari is something more than a simple legal error.”  Allstate Ins. Co. v. 
Kaklamanos, 843 So. 2d 885, 889 (Fla. 2003) (citing Ivey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 
So. 2d 679, 682 (Fla. 2000)).  Certiorari is appropriate “only when there has been a 
violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of 
justice.”  Id. 
Here, the Fifth District inappropriately exercised its certiorari jurisdiction to 
review the circuit court order.  We reassert that “second-tier certiorari should not 
be used simply to grant a second appeal; rather, it should be reserved for those 
situations when there has been a violation of a clearly established principle of law 
resulting in a miscarriage of justice.”  Nader, 87 So. 3d at 717; see also 
Kaklamanos, 843 So. 2d at 889.  There was no miscarriage of justice here.  
Accordingly, because the Fifth District was without jurisdiction, we quash the 
decision below and remand for reinstatement of the circuit court’s decision.  
It is so ordered. 
 
 
 
- 4 - 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, J., dissents with an opinion, in which POLSTON, J., concurs. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
CANADY, J., dissenting. 
Although I acknowledge that the Fifth District did not state that the granting 
of second-tier certiorari relief requires a showing that the circuit court violated a 
clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice, I 
nevertheless would approve the result reached by the district court. 
On second-tier certiorari review, the district court must consider “whether 
the circuit court afforded procedural due process and whether the circuit court 
applied the correct law. . . .  [T]hese two components are merely expressions of 
ways in which the circuit court decision may have departed from the essential 
requirements of the law.”  Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523, 530 
(Fla. 1995).  A district court may only exercise its discretion to grant second-tier 
certiorari relief when the circuit court “has violated a clearly established principle 
of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice.”  Custer Med. Ctr. v. United Auto. Ins. 
Co., 62 So. 3d 1086, 1092 (Fla. 2010). 
When a circuit court reviewing an administrative order determines that 
certiorari relief is warranted, the court has only one option—namely, to “ ‘quash 
the order reviewed.’ ”  Broward Cty. v. G.B.V. Int’l, Ltd., 787 So. 2d 838, 844 
 
 
- 5 - 
(Fla. 2001) (quoting Tamiami Trail Tours Inc. v. R.R. Comm’n, 174 So. 451, 453 
(Fla. 1937) (on rehearing)).  And when an order is quashed on certiorari review,    
“ ‘it leaves the subject matter, that is, the controversy pending before the tribunal, 
commission, or administrative authority, as if no order or judgment had been 
entered . . . .’ ”  G.B.V., 787 So. 2d at 844 (quoting Tamiami, 174 So. at 454).  The 
law is clearly established that “ ‘[t]he [reviewing] court has no power [when] 
exercising its jurisdiction in certiorari to enter a judgment on the merits of the 
controversy under consideration[,] nor to direct the [tribunal, commission, or 
administrative authority] to enter any particular order or judgment.’ ”  Id. (quoting 
Tamiami, 174 So. at 454).  Consistent with these principles of law, the Fifth 
District “ha[s] consistently held that when a circuit court quashes a hearing 
officer’s order on due process grounds, the matter is to be remanded to the hearing 
officer for further proceedings.”  Futch, 142 So. 3d at 915. 
In this case, the Fifth District correctly recognized that this clearly 
established principle of law required the circuit court to remand the case for 
another administrative hearing.  See, e.g., G.B.V., 787 So. 2d at 844; Tamiami, 174 
So. at 453-54.  Accordingly, because the circuit court invalidated the suspension of 
Futch’s driver license—without the authority to do so—instead of quashing the 
order and remanding the case, the circuit court disregarded this Court’s precedent 
and the Fifth District’s precedent requiring that the matter be remanded for further 
 
 
- 6 - 
proceedings.  In doing so, the circuit court violated a clearly established principle 
of law. 
Although the Fifth District did not expressly hold that the circuit court’s 
violation of this clearly established principle of law resulted in a miscarriage of 
justice, I would conclude that the circuit court’s error resulted in a miscarriage of 
justice that is “sufficiently egregious or fundamental to merit the extra review and 
safeguard provided by certiorari.”  Heggs, 658 So. 2d at 531.  Specifically, the 
circuit court’s error denied DHSMV the opportunity for the suspension of Futch’s 
driver license to be properly considered by the hearing officer on the merits.  The 
circuit court’s error also resulted in a miscarriage of justice because it has 
precedential value in the Seventh Judicial Circuit, could affect many other 
administrative proceedings in that circuit, and substantially deprives DHSMV of its 
opportunity to sustain driver license suspensions in that circuit.  Moreover, in 
holding that “no miscarriage of justice” occurred under the facts of this case, the 
majority has arguably created a scenario immune from second-tier certiorari 
review in which any circuit court in the State of Florida can invalidate any 
administrative driver license suspension on the sole basis that an evidentiary error 
violates due process.  Majority op. at 3. 
The circuit court not only transgressed the limitations on the authority of a 
court granting first-tier certiorari relief but also violated a cardinal rule of the 
 
 
- 7 - 
appellate process.  When an error made in a ruling on an evidentiary question is 
identified in a review proceeding, the result is not an automatic victory for the 
party aggrieved by the error.  It is an “elementary” principle of the appellate 
process that “where findings are infirm because of an erroneous view of the law, a 
remand is the proper course unless the record permits only one resolution of the 
factual issue.”  Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 292 (1982).  Indeed, no 
principle of the appellate process is more firmly-fixed and well-understood.  The 
majority’s conclusory decision contravening this principle holds the potential for 
much mischief. 
In sum, the Fifth District was justified in granting certiorari relief because 
the circuit court violated a clearly established principle of law resulting in a 
miscarriage of justice.  I dissent. 
POLSTON, J., concurs. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions  
 
 
Fifth District - Case No. 5D13-3457 
 
 
(Volusia County) 
 
Eric Alan Latinsky of Damore, Delgado, Romanik & Rawlins, Daytona Beach, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
 
 
 
 
- 8 - 
Stephen Decatur Hurm, General Counsel, and Jason Helfant, Senior Assistant 
General Counsel, Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 
Lake Worth, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent