Title: Carson v. Wyoming State Penitentiary

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Carson v. Wyoming State Penitentiary1987 WY 39735 P.2d 424Case Number: 86-76Decided: 04/07/1987Supreme Court of Wyoming
n the Matter of the Protest Upon the Worker's Compensation 
Claim of: Gary L. CARSON, Appellant (Claimant/Employee)

 
 
v.

 
 

WYOMING STATE 
PENITENTIARY, Appellee (Employer), The State of Wyoming, ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division, 
Appellee (Objector)

 
 
Michael 
R. O'Donnell, for Appellant.

 
 
A. G. 
McClintock, Attorney General; Josephine T. Porter, Assistant Attorney General; 
and Patrick J. Crank, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellees. 

 
 
Brown, 
C.J., and Thomas, Cardine, Urbigkit, and Macy, JJ.  Brown, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion. 

 
 
URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

 
 
URBIGKIT, 
J., delivered the opinion of the Court; BROWN, C.J., filed a dissenting 
opinion.

 
 
[¶1.]     Can the trial court, in 
awarding Worker's Compensation benefits for an inmate injured at a confinement 
institution, offset benefits paid against maintenance costs at the 
institution?

 
 
[¶2.]     This issue is here 
following the trial court's denial of a Rule 60(b), W.R.C.P. motion, which we 
now reverse.1

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3.]     Claimant Gary Carson, 
while incarcerated at the Wyoming State Penitentiary, claimed that a back injury 
occurred in December, 1984, while shoveling snow at the institution. A Worker's 
Compensation claim followed, answered by a penitentiary protest that Carson's injury resulted 
from falling out of bed.

 
 
[¶4.]     On November 7, 1985, 
following an October trial, the district court found in favor of Carson and awarded 
benefits from the date of the award. Any question regarding the effective date 
of the award is a matter of trial fact and his work record, neither of which is 
available for review here, first because both are more properly a matter of 
initial decision, and, second, because no evidentiary record is available from 
which a disagreement with the trial court's decision could be documented for 
this court to review. Nuspl v. Nuspl, Wyo., 717 P.2d 341 (1986); Feaster v. Feaster, 
Wyo., 721 P.2d 1095 (1986).

 
 
[¶5.]     Carson contends that he 
did not know about the limitation on his award until after the appeal time had 
expired, at which time he initiated a pro-se motion from the penitentiary to 
vacate pursuant to Rule 60(b), W.R.C.P. The motion was denied February 6, 1986, 
and this appeal ensued, with counsel now appointed to represent him on 
appeal.

 
 
[¶6.]     We will first address 
the substantive issue of offset, and then analyze whether Rule 60(b) was 
available to the claimant absent an appeal from the initial 
decision.

 
 
OFFSET 
DURING CONFINEMENT

 
 
[¶7.]     The State argues 
thoughtfully, but without authority, that where the claimant is an inmate, the 
purpose of the benefits, to support the claimant during a "healing period," is 
absent, and that consequently the trial court has discretion to offset. Our 
review of the statute leads us to a contrary conclusion that, if eligibility is 
established, the trial court has no discretion to deny payments or offset 
maintenance costs against payments.

 
 
[¶8.]     In Matter of Injury to Spera, Wyo., 713 P.2d 1155, 1157-1158 (1986) 
this court stated:

 
 
"* * * * 
Incarceration has no effect upon benefits which are in the nature of insurance 
which has become payable as a covered loss. * * * *

 
 
* * 
*

 
 
"* * * * 
The worker's disability payments cannot be characterized as mere governmental 
largesse that can be eliminated when the worker's needs are fulfilled from 
another governmental source. Rather, the worker's statutory right to disability 
payments is akin to a contract right. * * * *

"* * * * 
Because there is no statutory exception which eliminates benefits when a worker 
is jailed, the benefits are due the worker even if his needs are fulfilled from 
another governmental source. The state legislature can change our statute to 
suspend payments during periods of incarceration, much like a private insurer 
might place conditions on his coverage. But in the absence of legislation, we 
decline the State's invitation to make that policy shift 
ourselves."

 
 
[¶9.]     The State's effort to 
distinguish our holding in Spera, by arguing that this case involves an 
offset rather than a denial of benefits, is unpersuasive. Worker's Compensation 
benefits are personal in nature, and payment of those benefits shall only be 
made to the person designated by the statute. 2 Larson, Worker's Compensation § 
58.46 (1986). We find no statutory provision which would accommodate the trial 
court's decision, and consequently, we hold that payment of the benefits to this 
employer, Wyoming State Penitentiary, as with any other employer, for 
work-incurred injuries was improper.

 
 
[¶10.]  The legislature, in its 1986 special 
session, accurately perceived the problem of the incarcerated claimant, and 
enacted the statutory provision contained in fn. 1. We will not provide, by 
judicial legislation, a retroactive effect to that later enactment, particularly 
so because that law does not become effective until July 1, 
1987.

 
 
AVAILABILITY 
OF RELIEF UNDER RULE 60(b)

 
 
[¶11.]  This court has held that relief under 
this rule is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, McBride v. McBride, 
Wyo., 598 P.2d 814 (1979); Martellaro v. 
Sailors, Wyo., 515 P.2d 974 (1973); 
Atkins v. Household Finance Corp. of 
Casper, Wyo., 581 P.2d 193 (1978), 
and the provisions are not a substitute for appeal. Paul v. Paul, Wyo., 631 P.2d 1060 (1981); Kennedy v. Kennedy, Wyo., 
483 P.2d 516 (1971). This court discussed Rule 60(b) 
discretion in McBride v. McBride, supra, 598 P.2d  at 816, quoting from Moore:

 
 
"In 7 
Moore's Federal 
Practice, Para. 60.19, p. 237 (1979), an apt summary of criteria which the trial 
court may consider in exercising its discretion is set forth as 
follows:

 
 
"'* * * 
* the general desirability that a final judgment should not be lightly 
disturbed; the procedure provided by Rule 60(b) is not a substitute for an 
appeal; the Rule should be liberally construed for the purpose of doing 
substantial justice; whether, although the motion is made within the maximum 
time, if any, provided by the Rule, the motion is made within a reasonable time; 
if relief is sought from a default judgment or a judgment of dismissal where 
there has been no consideration of the merits, whether in the particular case 
the interest of deciding cases on the merits outweighs the interest in orderly 
procedure and in the finality of judgments, and whether there is merit in the 
defense or claim, as the case may be; if relief is sought from a judgment 
rendered after a trial on the merits, whether the movant had a fair opportunity 
to present his claim or defense; whether there are any intervening equities 
which make it inequitable to grant relief; and any other factor that is relevant 
to the justice of the judgment under attack, bearing always in mind that the 
principle of finality of judgments serves a most useful purpose for society, the 
courts, and the litigants--in a word, for all concerned.'"

 
 
[¶12.]  We have since restated our conception of 
discretion in a fair and clear definition by Justice Brown in Martin v. State, Wyo., 720 P.2d 894, 897 
(1986):

 
 
"Judicial 
discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from 
objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is 
right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously."

 
 
[¶13.]  This court must decide whether the trial 
court, in its exercise of Rule 60(b) discretion which resulted in the denial of 
benefits to Mr. Carson, misconstrued the basic structure of Worker's 
Compensation benefits established by statute and founded on Art. 10, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution (amended by 
vote of the people of Wyoming in the 1986 
election):

 
 
"No law 
shall be enacted limiting the amount of damages to be recovered for causing the 
injury or death of any person. Any contract or agreement with any employee 
waiving any right to recover damages for causing the death or injury of any 
employee shall be void. As to all extrahazardous employments the legislature 
shall provide by law for the accumulation and maintenance of a fund or funds out 
of which shall be paid compensation as may be fixed by law according to proper 
classifications to each person injured in such employment or to the dependent 
families of such as die as the result of such injuries, except in case of 
injuries due solely to the culpable negligence of the injured employee. The fund 
or funds shall be accumulated, paid into the state treasury and maintained in 
such manner as may be provided by law. The right of each employee to 
compensation from the fund shall be in lieu of and shall take the place of any 
and all rights of action against any employer contributing as required by law to 
the fund in favor of any person or persons by reason of the injuries or death. * 
* * *"

 
 
[¶14.]  We conclude, under the required liberal 
construction of the Worker's Compensation Act, Matter of Injury to Millsap, Wyo., 732 P.2d 1065 (1987), that the statutory and 
constitutional promise of Workers Compensation cannot be withdrawn by an 
incorrect exercise of discretion under Rule 60, W.R.C.P. so that granted 
benefits are not paid to the injured worker.

 
 
[¶15.]  Reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings in conformity herewith.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Our decision will have limited 
precedential effect in Wyoming on the substantive issue. In 1986, the 
special session of the legislature adopted a provision effective July 1, 
1987:

 
 
"Any individual serving time in any 
penal or correctional institution who is an employee under this act is not 
eligible for benefits for injuries suffered during the period of incarceration 
under this section. Upon release, any remaining benefits for which the 
individual would otherwise qualify for under this section shall be paid from and 
after the date of release." Section 27-14-404(f), W.S.1977.

 
 
Gary Carson has been released from 
confinement, but the benefits were also terminated by court order shortly after 
his release.

 
 
BROWN, 
C.J., filed a dissenting opinion.

 
 
BROWN, 
Chief Justice, dissenting.

 
 
[¶16.]  I do not disagree with the majority's 
well-reasoned opinion regarding the substantive issue of offset. I am certain 
that the legislature never intended that a denizen of the prison collect 
worker's compensation benefits.2 My disagreement with the majority 
is that this court need not address the issue of offset 
whatsoever.

 
 
[¶17.]  We have consistently held that an 
application under Rule 60(b), Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, is not a 
substitute for an appeal. See, Matter of Injury to 
Seevers, 
Wyo., 720 P.2d 899, 903 (1986); McBride v. McBride, Wyo., 598 P.2d 814 (1979); Martellaro v. Sailors, Wyo., 515 P.2d 974 
(1973); and Kennedy v. Kennedy, Wyo., 
483 P.2d 516 (1971). Further, it is well recognized that the 
proponent of a Rule 60(b) motion has the burden of establishing that his claim 
falls within one of the six specific instances enumerated by Rule 60(b)1 and that the trial 
court abused its discretion in denial of Rule 60(b) relief. See, Matter of Injury to Seevers, supra; U.S. Aviation, 
Inc. v. Wyoming Avionics, Inc., Wyo., 664 P.2d 121 (1983); McBride v. 
McBride, supra; Martellaro v. Sailors, supra; and Turnbough 
v. Campbell County Memorial Hospital, 
Wyo., 499 P.2d 595 (1972). Yet, the majority, in this case, allows Rule 
60(b), W.R.C.P., to be stretched and expanded past those guidelines and become a 
substitute for an appeal.

 
 
[¶18.]  In Silk v. 
Sandoval, 435 F.2d 1266, 1267-1268 (1st 
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1012, 91 S. Ct. 2189, 29 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1971), reh. denied, 
404 U.S. 876, 92 S. Ct. 29, 30 L. Ed. 2d 123 (1971), Judge Aldrich addressed the issue of whether Rule 60(b) was 
the proper method for review of an error of law committed by the trial court. 
The court said:

 
 
"We 
neither understand the basis for this interpretation, nor sympathize with it. If 
the court merely wrongfully decides a point of law, that is not 'inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect.' Moreover, these words, in the context of the 
rule, seem addressed to some special situations justifying extraordinary relief. 
Plaintiff's motion is based on the broad ground that the court made an erroneous 
ruling, not that the mistake was attributable to special circumstances. We would 
not apply the same equitable conception to 'mistake' as seems implicit in the 
three accompanying grounds, under the principle of noscitur a 
sociis."

 
 
[¶19.]  Further, In Matter of Injury to Seevers, supra, where appellant did not appeal the trial 
court's order dismissing the employee worker's compensation claims but instead 
filed a Rule 60(b) motion, alleging error of law in the trial court's ruling, as 
is the case here, we affirmed the trial court in its denial of relief under Rule 
60(b). There we said:

 
 
"This 
Court has consistently held that a movant holds no absolute right to have 
judgment vacated under Rule 60(b) but must show an exceptional circumstance 
specified in the rule. Sanford 
v. Arjay Oil Company, Wyo., 686 P.2d 566 
(1984). Review of a court's decision on a Rule 60(b) motion is confined 
to a determination of whether the court abused its discretion, and it is the 
movant's burden to bring his cause within the claimed grounds of relief and to 
substantiate these claims with adequate proof. We will reverse an order denying 
relief under Rule 60(b) only if the trial court clearly was wrong. McBride v. McBride, Wyo., 
598 P.2d 814 (1979)."

 
 
[¶20.]  In this case, appellant failed to file 
notice of appeal with respect to the district court's November 7, 1985, order 
and instead filed a "Motion to Vacate" on December 19, 1985, challenging the 
November 7, 1985, order. He evokes Rule 60(b) as his vehicle for appeal. 
Moreover, appellant has not shown some "special situation justifying 
extraordinary relief" or that "the trial court was clearly wrong." The only 
basis alleged in support of the Rule 60(b) motion by appellant is that the 
court's order was void and that an incorrect date was specified by the court in 
awarding benefits. Appellant made no effort to show that the court's order was 
void or cite any authority or cogent argument in support of his contention that 
the order is void.2 Therefore, appellant 
totally failed to show that he is entitled to relief under Rule 60(b) or that 
the trial judge abused its discretion in denying such 
relief.

 
 
[¶21.]  This court has never held, at least until 
now, that a Rule 60(b) motion was the proper vehicle for bringing an alleged 
error of law before the court. Finding that none of the factual allegations made 
by the appellant would justify relief under Rule 60(b) and that appellant has 
attempted to substitute a Rule 60(b) motion for an appeal, I would, therefore, 
affirm the trial court in its denial of Rule 60(b) relief. 

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1See, the dissent of Justice Thomas, 
In Matter of 
Injury to Spera, Wyo., 713 P.2d 1155, 1158 (1986); and footnote 1 in the 
majority opinion wherein it is noted that the legislature in reaction to 
Spera, 
supra, hastened to correct the absurd result of 
allowing a prisoner to enjoy the benefits of worker's compensation and the 
hospitality of prison simultaneously.

 
 

2Rule 60(b), W.R.C.P., provides in 
part:

 
 
"Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable 
neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc.--On motion, and upon such terms 
as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons; (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new 
trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 
extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, 
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise 
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. * * * *"

 
 

4An incorrect order is not necessarily a 
void order.