Title: Champa v. Weston Public Schools

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11838 
 
MICHAEL CHAMPA  vs.  WESTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS & others.1 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     September 9, 2015. - October 23, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
 
Public Records.  Municipal Corporations, Public record.  School 
and School Committee, Public record, Special education.  
Education, Special educational needs.  Individuals With 
Disabilities Education Act.  Family Educational Rights and 
Privacy Act.  Privacy.  Contract, Settlement agreement. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
November 14, 2012. 
 
 
The case was heard by Angel Kelley Brown, J., on motions 
for judgment on the pleadings, and entry of final judgment was 
ordered by her. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Doris R. MacKenzie Ehrens for the defendants. 
 
Peter F. Carr, II, for the plaintiff. 
                     
 
1 The superintendent of Weston Public Schools and the 
director of student services of Weston Public Schools.  We shall 
refer to the defendants collectively as the "school district." 
2 
 
 
Mary Ellen Sowyrda, pro se, amicus curiae, was present but 
did not argue. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
Maura Healey, Attorney General, & Peter Sacks, State 
Solicitor, for Department of Elementary and Secondary Education. 
 
Stephen J. Finnegan for Massachusetts Association of School 
Committees, Inc. 
 
Amy M. Rogers, Catherine L. Lyons, & Melissa A. Curran for 
Lyons & Rogers, LLC. 
 
Robert E. McDonnell, Charles L. Solomont, Caitlin M. 
Snydacker, Peter G. Byrne, Matthew R. Segal, & Jessie J. Rossman 
for American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts. 
 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  In this case, the question presented is 
whether settlement agreements between a public school and the 
parents of a public school student who requires special 
education services are "public records" or exempt from 
disclosure.  We conclude that the settlement agreements, 
regarding placement of students in out-of-district private 
educational institutions, are exempt from the definition of 
"public records" in G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth.  The 
agreements qualify as "education records" under 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1232g (2012 & Supp. II 2014), known as the Family Educational 
Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), and as such, fit within 
exemption (a) of the definition of "public records," G. L. c. 4, 
§ 7, Twenty-sixth (a) (exemption [a]).  The settlement 
agreements also contain information that relates to specifically 
named individuals, the disclosure of which may qualify as an 
"unwarranted invasion of personal privacy," and therefore fit 
within exemption (c), G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (c) 
3 
 
(exemption [c]).  We further conclude, however, that the 
settlement agreements may be redacted to remove personally 
identifiable information they contain, after which they become 
subject to disclosure under G. L. c. 66, § 10, the Massachusetts 
public records law.2   
 
Background.3  The defendant Weston Public Schools (school 
district) is obligated to provide a free and appropriate public 
education to all students or school-age children with 
                     
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the 
Department of Elementary and Secondary Education; American Civil 
Liberties Union of Massachusetts; Massachusetts Association of 
School Committees, Inc.; Lyons & Rogers, LLC; and Attorney Mary 
Ellen Sowyrda.  We note that Attorney Sowyrda is a partner in 
the law firm that represents the town in this case.  She is the 
head of the firm's special education group.  In these 
circumstances, her filing a separate brief, purportedly as an 
amicus, to make further arguments supporting the client's 
position, was ill-advised -- particularly as it appears from the 
record that Attorney Sowyrda participated in drafting the 
settlement agreement between the plaintiff and the town, and 
also represented the town earlier in this matter before the 
supervisor of public records.  See Aspinall v. Philip Morris 
Cos., 442 Mass. 381, 385 n.8 (2004) ("Briefs of amicus curiae 
are intended to represent the views of nonparties; they are not 
intended as vehicles for parties or their counsel to make 
additional arguments beyond those that fit within the page 
constraints of their briefs").  Cf. S.M. Shapiro, K.S. Geller, 
T.S. Bishop, E.A. Hartnett, & D. Himmelfarb, Supreme Court 
Practice § 13.14 (10th ed. 2013) (discussing disclosure 
requirements of United States Supreme Court Rule 37.6; 
suggesting that some amicus briefs deserve "a lesser degree of 
credibility"). 
 
3 In the Superior Court, judgment entered on cross motions 
for judgment on the pleadings.  See Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (c), 365 
Mass. 754 (1974).  We take the background facts from the 
complaint and the answer.   
4 
 
disabilities4 in accordance with G. L. c. 71B, § 1, and the 
Federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 
U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq. (2012).  From time to time, the school 
district enters into settlement agreements (agreements) with 
parents of students with disabilities to resolve disputes over 
entitlement to public funding for specific services or out-of-
district educational placements.  On January 17, 2012, the 
plaintiff, Michael Champa, a resident of the school district, 
sent a public records request for, as is relevant here, 
"[c]opies of all agreements entered into by the [school 
district] with parents and guardians, as part of the 
[individualized education program (IEP)] process,[5] in which the 
[school district] limited its contribution to education funding 
or attached conditions for it for out of district placements" 
                     
 
 
4 The Commonwealth's special education law, G. L. c. 71B, 
defines a "school age child with a disability" as "a school age 
child in a public or non-public school setting who, because of a 
disability consisting of a developmental delay or any 
intellectual, sensory, neurological, emotional, communication, 
physical, specific learning or health impairment or combination 
thereof, is unable to progress effectively in regular education 
and requires special education services . . . . The use of the 
word disability in this section shall not be used to provide a 
basis for labeling or stigmatizing the child or defining the 
needs of the child and shall in no way limit the services, 
programs, and integration opportunities provided to such child."  
G. L. c. 71B, § 1.   
 
 
5 The school district disputes that the settlement 
agreements (agreements) are part of the individual education 
program (IEP) process, but we have no need to resolve that 
dispute in order to decide this case.   
5 
 
for school years 2007-2012.  The school district's interim 
director of student services responded to the plaintiff's 
request in a letter dated January 30, 2012, stating that the 
information was not a matter of public record and that 
"disclosure of the requested student records, in whole or in 
part, would constitute a violation of the Family Education 
Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and the Massachusetts [Student] 
Record Regulations."  The plaintiff sought review by the 
supervisor of public records, who ruled that the records sought 
are exempt from disclosure.  The plaintiff then commenced this 
action in the Superior Court, seeking a declaration that the 
agreements were public records as well as a permanent injunction 
ordering their disclosure.6   
                     
 
6 The agreements between the school district and families 
are at the heart of the dispute in this case.  The record in 
front of the motion judge appeared to have contained what the 
judge referred to in her written memorandum of decision as a 
"sample settlement agreement," but the document she referenced 
is not included in the record before us (at least under that 
description).  The record here does contain a copy of an 
agreement between the school district and the plaintiff that 
concerns the educational programming of the plaintiff's 
daughter.  This agreement contains the daughter's name and her 
parents' names, and identifies the child as a child with special 
education needs.  Copies of IEPs prepared for the child are 
referenced in the agreement and attached to it.  The agreement 
refers to the child's private school placement.  Further, the 
agreement discusses the financial terms governing the private 
school placement and the child's transportation to and from that 
school.  Because the record only contains one agreement, we are 
not in a position to generalize about the types of information 
that the agreements may contain.  In support of the school 
district's motion to stay pending appeal, the school district 
6 
 
 
On cross motions for judgment on the pleadings, a judge in 
the Superior Court (motion judge) allowed the plaintiff's motion 
and denied the school district's.  The motion judge concluded 
that the agreements are "public records," not exempt under 
exemption (a), and although she recognized that certain portions 
of the agreements fell within the privacy exemption of exemption 
(c), she concluded that, with the name of the child and any 
description of the child's disability redacted, the agreements 
were subject to disclosure.  The final judgment declared that 
the agreements were public records, were not "student records" 
under the Massachusetts student record regulations or "education 
records" under FERPA, and were not exempt from disclosure 
pursuant to exemption (a) or exemption (c).  The school district 
was ordered to provide the plaintiff with a copy of all the 
agreements requested after the names of the students and any 
mention of disability were redacted, but further provided that 
                                                                  
submitted affidavits of the defendant superintendent and 
director of student services.  The affidavits aver that the 
agreements are maintained by the school district as part of an 
individual student's temporary education record, are kept in the 
student's special education file, and indicate that an agreement 
may contain information about a particular student's disability, 
progress, and needs, including emotional disabilities so serious 
that the student is not able to attend public school, and 
information about the educational services a student will 
receive.  Given the undeveloped state of the record in relation 
to the agreements, in reaching our decision on the present 
appeal, we have accepted as accurate the general descriptions of 
the contents of the agreements provided by these affidavits.   
 
7 
 
the school district could apply to the court for clarification 
as to any other "unanticipated" personal information that 
arguably might disclose the identity of a particular student.  
The school district filed a notice of appeal.   
 
Following the motion judge's decision allowing the 
plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings, the school 
district filed a motion to stay pending appeal, supported by 
affidavits of the superintendent and the director of student 
services, which the motion judge allowed "[d]ue to the unique 
nature of this case and the significance of such disclosure."  
We transferred the case to this court on our own motion.   
 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  "We review de novo a 
judge's order allowing a motion for judgment on the pleadings 
under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (c), 365 Mass. 754 (1974)."  Merriam 
v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., 464 Mass. 721, 726 (2013).  A 
motion for judgment on the pleadings tests the legal sufficiency 
of the complaint.  Minaya v. Massachusetts Credit Union Share 
Ins. Corp., 392 Mass. 904, 905 (1984).  For the purposes of a 
rule 12 (c) motion, all of the well-pleaded factual allegations 
of the nonmoving party are assumed to be true.  Id.   
 
2.  Public records law.  General Laws c. 66, § 10, of the 
Massachusetts public records law (public records law) requires 
access to public records in the possession of public officials.  
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston Retirement Bd., 388 Mass. 427, 430 
8 
 
(1983).  "Public records" are broadly defined, and include all 
"documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or 
characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of 
any agency, executive office, department, board, commission, 
bureau, division or authority of the [C]ommonwealth, or of any 
political subdivision thereof."  G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth.   
 
Due to the broad scope of the public records law, in any 
court proceeding challenging the withholding of a requested 
document, "there shall be a presumption that the record sought 
is public, and the burden shall be upon the custodian to prove 
with specificity the exemption which applies."  G. L. c. 66, 
§ 10 (c).  The statute's unambiguous language mandates 
disclosure of requested records limited only by the definition 
of "public records" found in G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth.  See 
DaRosa v. New Bedford, 471 Mass. 446, 451 (2015).  There is no 
dispute that as a general matter, the town's records, including 
the records of its schools, qualify as public records.  The 
question is whether the agreements are excepted from 
classification as public records because they fit within one or 
more of the statute's exemptions and, in particular, exemption 
(a) or exemption (c), or both.   
 
a.  Exemption (a):  exemption by statute.  The definition 
of public records exempts materials or data that are 
"specifically or by necessary implication exempted from 
9 
 
disclosure by statute."  G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (a).  In 
Massachusetts, the disclosure of information about public school 
students is governed in part by FERPA, and the Massachusetts 
student records law, G. L. c. 71, § 34D, and its implementing 
regulations, 603 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 23.00 (2006).  The 
disclosure of information regarding special education students 
such as the plaintiff's daughter is further governed by the 
IDEA, and the Massachusetts special education law, G. L. 71B.  
The motion judge concluded that the agreements did not qualify 
as "education records" under FERPA or as "student records" under 
603 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 23.00, and therefore exemption (a) did 
not apply.7  The motion judge interpreted or defined both 
"education records" and "student records" as including only 
documents directly relating to a student's academic progress, 
and determined that the agreements do not fit within such a 
definition.  We conclude that the definitions of these terms 
adopted by the judge were too narrow.   
                     
 
7 The parties do not appear to have brought the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et 
seq. (2012), or the Massachusetts special education law, G. L. 
c. 71B, to the attention of the motion judge.  In any event, the 
judge did not mention these statutes in her memorandum of 
decision.   
 
10 
 
 
i.  FERPA.  FERPA8 defines "education records" as materials 
that "(i) contain information directly related to a student; and 
(ii) are maintained by an educational agency or institution or 
by a person acting for such agency or institution."  20 U.S.C. 
§ 1232g(a)(4)(A).  Neither FERPA nor its regulations limit the 
definition of "education records" to material relating to the 
student's academic progress.  Under FERPA, the term "education 
records" has a broad scope.  See United States v. Miami Univ., 
91 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1149 (S.D. Ohio 2000) ("FERPA broadly 
defines 'education records'"); Belanger v. Nashua, N.H., Sch. 
Dist., 856 F. Supp. 40, 48 (D.N.H. 1994), aff'd, 294 F.3d 797 
(6th Cir. 2002).  See also Commonwealth v. Buccella, 434 Mass. 
473, 491 (2001) (Marshall, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1079 (2002), quoting 
5 J.A. Rapp, Education Law § 13.04[4][a] (2000) (education 
records under "broad mandate" of FERPA intended to cover all 
aspects of student's educational life that "relate to academic 
matters or status as a student").   
                     
 
8 The statute known as the Family Education Rights and 
Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012 & Supp. II 2014), 
does not expressly prohibit disclosure of "education records," 
but it does condition receipt of Federal funds on the 
nondisclosure of education records.  This is sufficient, as a 
practical matter, to satisfy the requirement that a statute 
exempt data or information by "necessary implication."  G. L. 
c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (a).   
11 
 
 
The agreements at issue are "education records" under FERPA 
because they satisfy both elements of the statutory definition.  
There is no dispute that the agreements "contain information 
directly related to a student" -- no one disputes that they 
contain the name of the student (as well as those of the 
student's parents) -- and they "are maintained by an educational 
agency."9  In addition, the agreements may establish a student's 
school placement and they appear to define, at least in part, a 
student's educational programming, two matters that fall 
directly within the ambit of academic matters and status as a 
student.  The school district maintains the agreements and keeps 
the documents in the individual student's special education 
file.   
 
The fact that the agreements fall within the coverage of 
exemption (a) does not end the matter.  The public records law 
specifically contemplates redaction of material that would be 
exempt, to enable the release of the remaining portions of a 
record.  G. L. c. 66, § 10 (a) (requiring disclosure of "any 
segregable portion of a record").  See Reinstein v. Police 
Comm'r of Boston, 378 Mass. 281, 288 n.15 (1979) ("The 1978 
amendment [to G. L. c. 66, § 10 (a),] requires disclosure of 
. . . any portion that falls within the statutory definition of 
                     
 
9 Further, the agreements do not fall within the list of 
statutory exceptions to "education records" under FERPA.  See 20 
U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(B).   
12 
 
'public record' after exempt portions have been deleted").  
Through its implementing regulations, FERPA provides a mechanism 
that allows a school to disclose information from education 
records publicly after removal or "de-identifi[cation]" of all 
personally identifiable information:  "[a]n educational agency 
or institution, or a party that has received education records 
or information from education records under this part, may 
release the records or information without the consent [of 
parents or eligible students] required by [34 C.F.R.] § 99.30 
after the removal of all personally identifiable information 
provided that the educational agency or institution or other 
party has made a reasonable determination that a student's 
identity is not personally identifiable, whether through single 
or multiple releases, and taking into account other reasonably 
available information."  34 C.F.R. § 99.31(b)(1) (2012).   
 
"Personally identifiable information," as used in FERPA, 
includes, but is not limited to, the student's name; the names 
of the student's parents or other family members; the address of 
the student or student's family; personal identifiers, such as 
the student's social security number; and indirect identifiers, 
such as the student's date of birth.  34 C.F.R. § 99.3 (2012).  
The definition also includes "[o]ther information that, alone or 
in combination, is linked or linkable to a specific student that 
would allow a reasonable person in the school community, who 
13 
 
does not have personal knowledge of the relevant circumstances, 
to identify the student with reasonable certainty," and 
"[i]nformation requested by a person who the educational agency 
or institution reasonably believes knows the identity of the 
student to whom the education record relates."  Id.  The 
analysis to determine what redaction is necessary will be a 
case-by-case determination that considers the request, the 
school and the community, and the availability to the requester 
of other information that indirectly identifies the student.  34 
C.F.R. §§ 99.3, 99.31(b)(1). 
 
ii.  Massachusetts student records law and regulations.10  
General Laws c. 71, § 34D, provides:  "The board of education 
                     
 
10 The student records statute, G. L. c. 71, § 34D, does not 
specifically address confidentiality of student records; 
confidentiality is dealt with in the regulations promulgated by 
the Department of Education (department) pursuant to § 34D.  See 
603 Code Mass. Regs. § 23.07 (2006).  Exemption (a) refers 
specifically to exemptions by "statute," and does not mention 
regulations.  The town and the plaintiff appear not to question 
that exemption (a) may cover material that a regulation requires 
to be treated as confidential, and more particularly, they 
appear to agree that material that would constitute part of a 
"student record" as defined in 603 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 23.02-
23.03 (2002) would fall within the scope of exemption (a).  
Their disagreement is over the question whether the agreements 
qualify as "student record[s]" under these regulations.  As 
discussed supra, we have concluded that exemption (a) applies in 
this case because FERPA fits squarely within the scope of 
exemption (a) and the agreements fit within the scope of FERPA's 
definition of "education records."  Because we interpret the 
department's student record regulations to treat as confidential 
the same types of information as FERPA does, we do not need to 
decide in the present case whether the word "statute" in 
exemption (a) should be interpreted to include "regulations" -- 
14 
 
shall adopt regulations relative to the maintenance, retention, 
duplication, storage and periodic destruction of student records 
by the public elementary and secondary schools of the 
[C]ommonwealth.  Such rules and regulations shall provide that a 
parent or guardian of any pupil shall be allowed to inspect 
academic, scholastic, or any other records concerning such pupil 
which are kept or are required to be kept."  In compliance with 
the statutory directive, the Department of Education 
(department) has promulgated student record regulations, 603 
Code Mass. Regs. §§ 23.00, directing that no third party shall 
have access to information in or from a student record without 
the consent of the eligible student or the parent.  603 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 23.07(4) (2006).   
 
The regulations define "[s]tudent [r]ecord" as "the 
[t]ranscript and the [t]emporary [r]ecord, including all 
information . . . regardless of physical form or characteristics 
concerning a student that is organized on the basis of the 
student's name or in a way that such student may be individually 
identified, and that is kept by the public schools of the 
Commonwealth."  603 Code Mass. Regs. § 23.02 (2002).  It is 
"limited to information relevant to the educational needs of the 
                                                                  
generally, or at least in this instance.  Rather, we assume, 
without deciding, that the department's student record 
regulations fit within the meaning of "statute" for purposes of 
exemption (a).   
15 
 
student."  603 Code Mass. Regs. § 23.03 (2002).  We agree with 
the motion judge that the agreements do not fit within the 
regulation's definition of "transcript";11 the issue is whether 
they are part of the student’s "temporary record."  The 
temporary record includes all information in the student record 
not contained in the transcript and is generally defined as 
"information clearly . . . of importance to the educational 
process."  603 Code Mass. Regs. § 23.02.12   
 
The record before us, limited as it is, indicates that an 
agreement is likely to contain information regarding a student's 
disability, progress, and needs -- information that is 
                     
 
11 The transcript "shall contain administrative records that 
constitute the minimum data necessary to reflect the student's 
educational progress and to operate the educational system. 
These data shall be limited to the name, address, and phone 
number of the student; his/her birth date; name, address, and 
phone number of the parent or guardian; course titles, grades 
(or the equivalent when grades are not applicable), course 
credit, highest grade level completed, and the year completed."  
603 Code Mass. Regs. § 23.02.  Independent of this regulation, 
the plaintiff appears to agree that insofar as the agreements 
contain the student's name and the parents' or guardians' names, 
this information should be redacted before the agreements are 
disclosed.   
 
 
12 The regulation further provides that "[s]uch information 
may include standardized test results, class rank (when 
applicable), extracurricular activities, and evaluations by 
teachers, counselors, and other school staff."  603 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 23.02.  This is the language on which the motion judge 
relied to conclude that the temporary record, and thus the 
student record, pertains to a student's academic progress.  Our 
reading of the pertinent regulations as a whole, however, 
persuades us that the "temporary record" has a broader scope 
than purely a measurement of academic progress.   
 
16 
 
unquestionably of importance to the student's "educational 
process," see 603 Code Mass. Regs. § 23.02, and "educational 
needs."  603 Code Mass. Regs. § 23.03.  The agreement, 
therefore, qualifies as part of the student's temporary record, 
and therefore as part of his or her "student record."  However, 
like FERPA, the Massachusetts student records law and 
regulations protect student records only as they pertain to 
certain information -- not entire documents.  See 603 Code Mass. 
Regs. §§ 23.02 (defining student record and temporary record as 
"all information . . . concerning a student"), § 23.07(4) (third 
parties shall not have access to "information in or from a 
student record" [emphasis added]).  Accordingly, under the 
public records law, any "segregable portion" of the record must 
be disclosed, if with the redaction it independently is a public 
record.  G. L. c. 66, § 10 (a).   
 
iii.  Special education law.13  The agreements by definition 
concern special education programs for the students to whom the 
agreements relate.  Both the Federal IDEA and the Massachusetts 
special education law, G. L. c. 71B, contain provisions 
protecting the confidentiality of the educational records of 
students with disabilities who receive special education 
                     
 
13 As mentioned, the applicability of the Federal IDEA and 
G. L. c. 71B apparently was not raised as an issue before the 
motion judge.  See note 7, supra.  We briefly consider the 
statutes here because they appear to be directly relevant.   
 
17 
 
services.  The IDEA adopts the confidentiality standards in 
FERPA and incorporates FERPA's definition of "education 
records," see 20 U.S.C. 1417(c),14 but its implementing 
regulations introduce additional procedural protections to 
safeguard the confidentiality of personally identifiable 
information for students with disabilities.  See 34 C.F.R. 
§§ 300.561, 300.572, 300.573 (2002).  And G. L. c. 71B, § 3, 
unlike G. L. c. 71, § 34D, contains explicit provisions about 
confidentiality of information concerning students with 
disabilities.15   
 
Nothing in these statutes suggests that records relating to 
students are confidential once all personally identifiable 
                     
14 "The Secretary shall take appropriate action, in 
accordance with [FERPA], to ensure the protection of the 
confidentiality of any personally identifiable data, 
information, and records collected or maintained by the 
Secretary and by State educational agencies and local 
educational agencies pursuant to this subchapter."  20 U.S.C. 
§ 1417(c).  See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.610, 300.611 (2006).   
 
 
15 General Laws c. 71B, § 3, provides, in relevant part:  
 
"The written record and clinical history from both the 
evaluation provided by the school committee and independent 
evaluation, if any, shall be made available to the parents, 
guardians, or persons with custody of the child.  Separate 
instructions, limited to the information required for 
adequate care of the child, shall be distributed only to 
those persons directly concerned with the care of the 
child.  Otherwise said records shall be confidential."   
 
Further, "[e]valuations and assessments of children and special 
education programs shall remain confidential and be used solely 
for the administration of special education in the 
[C]ommonwealth."   
18 
 
information is removed.  Rather, what is confidential is certain 
information, again indicating that redaction of such information 
may render the particular document a public record that must be 
disclosed on request under the public records law.   
 
b.  Exemption (c):  privacy exemption.  The statutory 
definition of public records also exempts materials or data that 
are "personnel and medical files or information; also any other 
materials or data relating to a specifically named individual, 
the disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion 
of personal privacy."  G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (c).  The 
inquiry under the privacy exemption "requires that the 
seriousness of any invasion of privacy be balanced against the 
public right to know."  Attorney Gen. v. Assistant Comm'r of the 
Real Prop. Dep't of Boston, 380 Mass. 623, 625 (1980).  "Where 
the public interest in obtaining information substantially 
outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy, the 
private interest in preventing disclosure must yield to the 
public interest" (citation omitted).  Attorney Gen. v. Collector 
of Lynn, 377 Mass. 151, 156 (1979).   
 
In identifying the existence of privacy interests, we 
consider, in part, whether disclosure would result in personal 
embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities, whether 
the materials sought contain intimate details of a highly 
personal nature, and whether the same information is available 
19 
 
from other sources.  Matter of a Subpoena Duces Tecum, 445 Mass. 
685, 688 (2006), quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Police Comm'r of 
Boston, 419 Mass. 852, 858 (1995).  See, e.g., Collector of 
Lynn, 377 Mass. at 157 (public disclosure of lists of tax 
delinquents results in personal embarrassment, but disclosure 
does not amount to intimate details that are highly personal in 
nature; disclosure required).   
 
The agreements may contain information that amounts to an 
unwarranted invasion of the student's personal privacy.  As 
previously discussed, the agreements may link the name of the 
individual student (and his or her family) to information about 
the services and programming the child will receive and 
information about the child's disability, progress, and needs.  
Further, the agreements are likely to identify the out-of-
district school, which may indirectly identify the child's 
disability.  This type of information is highly personal, and 
disclosure may result in embarrassment and potentially lead to 
stigma,16 bringing it within the scope of exemption (c).   
 
Nonetheless, like exemption (a), exemption (c) does not 
cover, and thereby authorizes withholding, information that does 
                     
 
16 When it enacted G. L. c. 71B, in 1972, the Legislature 
stated, "The General Court . . . finds that past methods of 
labeling and defining the needs of children have had a 
stigmatizing effect."  St. 1972, c. 766, § 1.  Currently, c. 71B 
calls for a flexible definition of disability "so as to minimize 
the possibility of stigmatization."  G. L. c. 71B, § 2. 
20 
 
not permit the identification of an individual.  Globe Newspaper 
Co. v. Boston Retirement Bd., 388 Mass. at 438.  As with 
exemption (a), the pertinent inquiry is whether the deletion of 
particular identifying information from the documents sought 
places the documents outside the exemption.  Id.  In assessing 
whether the documents contain identifying information, the 
inquiry must be considered "not only from the viewpoint of the 
public, but also from the vantage of those who [are familiar 
with the individual]."  Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 
U.S. 352, 380 (1976).  The agreements here, although they 
contain identifying information, also include information that 
does not appear to invade the reasonable privacy interests of 
students or their families.  Notably, once personally 
identifiable information is redacted, the financial terms of 
such agreements, which necessarily reflect the use of public 
monies, partially or fully, to pay for out-of-district 
placements, do not constitute an unwarranted invasion of 
personal privacy; indeed, the public has a right to know the 
financial terms of these agreements.  See Collector of Lynn, 377 
Mass. at 158.17  As is true with exemption (a), once the 
                     
 
17 The school district argues that the line item in its 
budget that identifies the amount the district spends on out-of-
school placements is sufficient to serve the purpose for which 
the plaintiff appears to want disclosure of the agreements, and 
therefore public access to the agreements is not necessary.  
This argument fails.  The school district does not meet its 
21 
 
appropriate redactions of personally identifiable information 
are made, the agreements will no longer fit within the scope of 
exemption (c) and must be disclosed.   
 
c.  Confidentiality clause.  Finally, the school district 
contends that the inclusion of a confidentiality clause in each 
of the agreements (other than the plaintiff's agreement) further 
prohibits their disclosure.18  The school district is incorrect.  
Although the agreement may have served as a private settlement 
of a dispute between the school district and one of the families 
living in the school district, the fact that the school district 
and the family contractually agreed to keep the settlement 
private cannot, by itself, trump the public records law and the 
school district's obligation to comply with the law's 
                                                                  
obligations with respect to the public records law by pointing 
out that the requester may be able to obtain some of the 
information from another source.  Cf. Attorney Gen. v. Collector 
of Lynn, 377 Mass. 151, 157 (1979) (tax delinquent records did 
not fit within exemption [c] but were subject to disclosure as 
public records; court noted, "the seriousness of any invasion of 
privacy resulting from disclosure of the records of real estate 
tax delinquents is reduced since substantially the same 
information is available from other sources").  Cf. also Bougas 
v. Chief of Police of Lexington, 371 Mass. 59, 64 (1976) (where 
documents do not fit within one of public records law 
exemptions, they are accessible by "'any person' whether 
intimately involved with the subject matter of the records he 
seeks or merely motivated by idle curiosity").   
 
 
18 According to the affidavit of the superintendent filed in 
support of the school district's motion to stay, all of the 
agreements contain confidentiality provisions except the 
agreement regarding the plaintiff's daughter.   
22 
 
requirements.19  Cf. Ackerly v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336, 1339 n.3 
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (discussing Federal Freedom of Information Act 
[FOIA], 5 U.S.C. § 552 [2012]:  "It will obviously not be enough 
for the agency to assert simply that it received the file under 
a pledge of confidentiality to the one who supplied it.  
Undertakings of that nature can not, in and of themselves, 
override the [FOIA]").  Cf. also Hechler v. Casey, 175 W. Va. 
434, 444 (1985) ("an agreement as to confidentiality between the 
public body and the supplier of the information may not override 
the [FOIA].  See Ackerly[, supra]").   
 
Conclusion.  The final judgment in this case was entered on 
cross motions for judgment on the pleadings.  We have concluded 
that both exemption (a) and exemption (c) to the definition of 
public records in G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth, apply to the 
agreements, but that personally identifying information in the 
agreements is subject to redaction, and when the agreements are 
properly redacted, they must be disclosed.  The facts are too 
undeveloped in the record before us to make a determination 
regarding the necessary and appropriate redactions of personally 
identifying information to be made; a remand of this case to the 
                     
 
19 This is not to say that every contractual agreement 
between a municipality or other public agency and a private 
party that contains a confidentiality clause is subject to 
disclosure as a public record; one of the statutory exemptions 
under G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth, may apply to the agreement.   
23 
 
Superior Court is necessary to permit this to be accomplished.  
See Georgiou v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Indus. Accs., 67 
Mass. App. Ct. 428, 437-438 (2006).20  The judgment of the 
Superior Court is vacated, and the case is remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.   
                     
 
20 It would be appropriate for the school district to 
propose redactions and, if there is a dispute, for the judge to 
rule on the disputed redactions before the entry of judgment, 
rather than through the vehicle of a postjudgment motion for 
clarification.