Title: In re B.M.

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
In re B.M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
B.M., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S242153 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Six 
B277076 
 
Ventura County Superior Court 
 2016025026 
 
 
December 27, 2018 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the court, in which  
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, 
Cuéllar, Kruger and Renner* concurred. 
Justice Chin filed a concurring opinion in which Justice  
Corrigan concurred. 
                                        
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate 
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 
section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
IN RE B.M. 
S242153 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
        Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1) (hereafter section 
245(a)(1)) prohibits “assault[ing] . . . the person of another with 
a deadly weapon or instrument other than a firearm.”  In this 
case, the juvenile court found that defendant B.M.’s use of a 
knife with a dull tip and slightly serrated edge, which the court 
referred to as a “butter knife,” violated section 245(a)(1).  On 
appeal, B.M. argued that insufficient evidence supported the 
juvenile court’s finding because she had not used the butter 
knife in a manner that was “ ‘capable of producing and likely to 
produce, death or great bodily injury.’ ”  (People v. Aguilar (1997) 
16 Cal.4th 1023, 1029 (Aguilar).)  In rejecting B.M.’s claim, the 
Court of Appeal expressly disagreed with In re Brandon T. 
(2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1491 (Brandon T.), which held that a 
butter knife had not been used as a deadly weapon in part 
because the knife had broken during the alleged assault and 
failed to cause significant bodily injury prior to breaking.  (Id. at 
pp. 1497–1498.) 
We hold, consistent with settled principles, that for an 
object to qualify as a deadly weapon based on how it was used, 
the defendant must have used the object in a manner not only 
capable of producing but also likely to produce death or great 
bodily injury.  The extent of any damage done to the object and 
the extent of any bodily injuries caused by the object are 
appropriate considerations in the fact-specific inquiry required 
by Penal Code section 245(a)(1).  But speculation without record 
IN RE B.M. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
support as to how the object could have been used or what injury 
might have been inflicted if the object had been used differently 
is not appropriate.  We conclude that the evidence here was 
insufficient to sustain a finding that the knife at issue was used 
as a deadly weapon, and we accordingly reverse the Court of 
Appeal’s judgment. 
I. 
On the morning of July 2, 2016, seventeen-year-old 
defendant B.M. returned to her family’s home after spending the 
night away.  She was unable to unlock the front door with her 
key, so she began knocking on the door.  When she received no 
response, she entered the house through a window.   
Upon entering the home, B.M. went to the bedroom of 
Sophia, one of her sisters, and asked her why she had changed 
the locks.  B.M. later acknowledged she was “mad” and “upset” 
when she confronted Sophia.  B.M. yelled and threw a phone at 
Sophia and then went downstairs to the kitchen, where she 
grabbed a metal knife from the counter.  B.M. testified she 
grabbed the knife because “it was just the heat of the moment, 
and [the knife was] just the first thing that caught [her] eye.”  
The knife was about six inches long, with a three-inch blade that 
was not “sharp” and had “small ridges” on one side.  Both B.M. 
and Sophia described the knife as a “butter knife.” 
B.M. returned to Sophia’s bedroom with the knife.  Sophia 
was clothed only in a towel because she had just gotten out of 
the shower when B.M. had arrived home.  Sophia testified that 
when she saw B.M. with the knife, she covered herself with the 
blanket that was on the bed because she “didn’t know what 
[B.M.] was going to do.”  She also testified that she “was pretty 
scared” because she thought B.M. “could really . . . hurt [her].”  
IN RE B.M. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
3 
On the witness stand, B.M. was asked, “So did you use a motion 
like to stab her?”  B.M. responded, “No, but as soon as I got close 
to her with the knife, she covered herself with the blanket.” 
B.M. approached Sophia, who was lying on top of the bed 
with her knees bent.  Sophia testified that B.M. “came . . . at 
[her] trying to stab [her]” and that from a distance of about three 
feet, B.M. made several “downward” “slicing” motions with the 
knife in the area around Sophia’s legs.  Sophia further testified 
that the knife hit her blanketed legs “a few” times and that the 
amount of pressure B.M. used was “maybe like a five or a six” 
on a scale from one to ten “if one is the least amount of pressure 
and ten is the most pressure.”  Sophia initially said B.M. poked 
her with the knife, but she later clarified that B.M. did not poke 
or stab her and that B.M. did not “hurt” her.  B.M. testified she 
only “wanted to scare [Sophia]” and “had no intentions in 
actually stabbing [Sophia] with [the knife].”   
B.M. then began arguing with her stepsister, who was also 
in the room.  The argument eventually turned physical, and the 
fight moved from the bedroom to the downstairs of the house 
before spilling outside.  During this altercation, Sophia called 
the police, who showed up and arrested B.M.  A police officer 
later testified that B.M. told him “she [had] wanted to scare 
Sophia and admitted to making several [downward] stabbing 
motions at the bedding . . . that Sophia had pulled up over her 
and the bed.”  A juvenile wardship petition was filed pursuant 
to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, alleging that 
B.M.’s use of the butter knife against Sophia was an assault 
with a deadly weapon under Penal Code section 245(a)(1).  (All 
undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.)  The 
juvenile court sustained the petition.  In concluding that B.M. 
had violated section 245(a)(1), the court noted that Sophia had 
IN RE B.M. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
4 
testified that she “did feel the [downward] slicing motion on her 
legs” applied with a pressure of “a five or a six out of ten.”  The 
court also observed that even though the case involved “ ‘just a 
butter 
knife,’ . . . the 
circumstances 
of 
what 
happened 
here . . . make it a felony.”   
B.M. appealed the juvenile court’s order.  As relevant here, 
the Court of Appeal rejected B.M.’s challenge to the sufficiency 
of the evidence supporting her adjudication under section 
245(a)(1).  The court reasoned that “[i]t matters not that 
[Sophia] was able to fend off great bodily injury with her 
blanket” or “that [B.M.] was not adept at using a knife” because 
B.M. “could have easily inflicted great bodily injury with this 
metal butter knife and just as easily [could] have committed 
mayhem upon the victim’s face.”  The court concluded that the 
juvenile court’s findings — “that the six-inch metal butter knife 
could be used to slice or stab, even though it was not designed 
for such,” and that the knife was in fact “used in a manner 
‘capable’ of producing great bodily injury” — were “not ‘wholly 
irreconcilable’ with the evidence.” 
The court also said Brandon T., supra, 191 Cal.App.4th 
1491, was “ ‘wrongly decided.’ ”  In that case, a juvenile “tried to 
cut [the victim’s] cheek and throat” with a knife that was “about 
three and a quarter inches long, with a rounded end and slight 
serrations on one side.”  (Brandon T., at pp. 1496–1497.)  While 
wielding the knife, the juvenile “moved his arm up and down, 
applying a slashing motion” that resulted in “ ‘welts’ ” and “ ‘a 
small scratch’ ” but did not draw blood.  (Id. at p. 1497.)  “The 
pressure that Brandon applied was not enough to cause death 
or great bodily injury to [the victim].  Yet it was too much 
pressure for the knife to bear, and the handle broke off.”  (Ibid.)  
The court in Brandon T. reversed the juvenile’s adjudication 
IN RE B.M. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
5 
under 
section 
245(a)(1), 
reasoning 
that 
“[t]he 
butter 
knife . . . had a rounded end, not a pointed one.  Brandon applied 
force, but the knife did not penetrate through the layers of [the 
victim’s] skin; sufficient force was used, however, to cause the 
butter knife to break during use.  Although [the victim] 
perceived that Brandon was trying repeatedly to cut him, the 
knife failed and was not capable of use as obviously intended.”  
(Brandon T., at pp. 1497–1498.)  The Court of Appeal here said 
that Brandon T. “gives undue emphasis to the lack of injuries” 
and that the fact that the knife “broke during the assault 
preventing further stabbing should not inure to the defendant’s 
benefit.” 
We granted review. 
II. 
“As used in section 245, subdivision (a)(1), a ‘deadly 
weapon’ is ‘any object, instrument, or weapon which is used in 
such a manner as to be capable of producing and likely to 
produce, death or great bodily injury.’ ”  (Aguilar, supra, 16 
Cal.4th at pp. 1028–1029.)  Although “[s]ome few objects, such 
as dirks and blackjacks, have been held to be deadly weapons as 
a matter of law” (id. at p. 1029), we have said a knife is not such 
an object (People v. McCoy (1944) 25 Cal.2d 177, 188), and the 
Attorney General does not argue to the contrary here.  “In 
determining whether an object not inherently deadly or 
dangerous is used as such, the trier of fact may consider the 
nature of the object, the manner in which it is used, and all other 
facts relevant to the issue.”  (Aguilar, at p. 1029.)  Our inquiry 
is limited to whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile 
IN RE B.M. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
6 
court’s finding that B.M. used the butter knife as a deadly 
weapon.  (In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 822–825.) 
A. 
At the outset, we clarify several principles that guide our 
analysis.  First, the object alleged to be a deadly weapon must 
be used in a manner that is not only “capable of producing” but 
also “ ‘likely to produce death or great bodily injury.’ ”  (Aguilar, 
supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1029, italics added.)  Although the Court 
of Appeal in this case recited the Aguilar standard, its analysis 
addressed only whether B.M.’s manner of using the butter knife 
was capable of causing great bodily injury, not whether it was 
likely to do so.  And the court misstated the standard by omitting 
the “likely” requirement when it said “an assault with a deadly 
weapon is complete when the defendant, with the requisite 
intent, uses an object in a manner which is capable of producing 
great bodily injury upon the victim.” 
The Attorney General argues that “capable of producing” 
and “likely to produce” are essentially the same because the 
term “ ‘likel[y]’ ” has the same meaning as “ ‘possib[le].’ ”  But 
this construction is at odds with the ordinary meaning of 
“likely.”  (See Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dict. (11th ed. 2014) 
p. 721 [defining “likely” as “having a high probability of 
occurring or being true” and “very probable”]; Black’s Law Dict. 
(10th ed. 2014) p. 1069 [defining “likely” as “probable”].)  It is 
also inconsistent with how we have treated the term “likely to 
produce great bodily harm or death” elsewhere in the Penal 
Code.  (See People v. Valdez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 778, 784 [the term 
“ ‘likely to produce great bodily harm or death,’ ” as used in the 
felony child abuse statute, § 273a, refers to situations in which 
IN RE B.M. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
7 
“ ‘ “the probability of serious injury is great” ’ ”]; People v. 
Sargent (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1206, 1223 [same].)   
Our case law on the crime of assault is also instructive.  
Assault is a general intent crime; it does not require a specific 
intent to cause injury.  (See People v. Williams (2001) 26 Cal.4th 
779, 782; People v. Rocha (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 898–899.)  The 
requisite mental state is “actual knowledge of the facts sufficient 
to establish that the defendant’s act by its nature will probably 
and directly result in injury to another.”  (Williams at p. 782; 
accord, Rocha, at p. 899.) 
The Attorney General further contends that the Court of 
Appeal sufficiently addressed the “likely” standard by noting 
that “ ‘[t]he use of an object in an assault increases the likelihood 
of great bodily injury.’ ”  But the fact that B.M.’s use of the butter 
knife may have increased the likelihood of serious injury does 
not establish that her use of the object was likely to cause serious 
injury.  An increase in likelihood from impossible to unlikely, for 
example, does not show that the object was likely to cause 
serious harm.  The use of an object in a manner “likely to 
produce” death or great bodily injury (Aguilar, supra, 16 Cal.4th 
at p. 1029) requires more than a mere possibility that serious 
injury could have resulted from the way the object was used. 
Second, the Aguilar standard does not permit conjecture 
as to how the object could have been used.  Rather, the 
determination of whether an object is a deadly weapon under 
section 245(a)(1) must rest on evidence of how the defendant 
actually “used” the object.  (Aguilar, supra, 16 Cal.4th at 
p. 1029; see People v. Beasley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1087 
(Beasley) [finding it “certainly conceivable” that a broomstick 
“might be wielded in a manner capable of producing, and likely 
IN RE B.M. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
8 
to produce, great bodily injury,” but declining to make such a 
finding because the record did not indicate “the degree of 
force Beasley used in hitting [the victim] with the stick”].) 
People v. Duke (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 296 (Duke) is 
instructive.  The defendant “use[d] . . . a headlock to hold his 
victim while he touched her breast.”  (Id. at p. 302.)  The victim 
said “[t]he headlock made her feel ‘choked’ but did not cut off her 
breathing.”  (Ibid.)  Although “[s]he felt that his hold on her was 
‘firm,’ [she] did not say that he tightened his grip.”  (Ibid.)  The 
court found insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for 
assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury, 
emphasizing that the inquiry focuses on “the force actually 
used,” not “the force that . . . could have [been] used.”  (Id. at 
p. 303.)  “[T]he fact that appellant could have easily broken [the 
victim’s] neck or could have choked her to the point of cutting off 
her breathing by exerting greater pressure on her neck or 
windpipe will not support the conviction of felony assault.  This 
would involve gross speculation on the part of the jury as to what 
the appellant would have done if he had not stopped of his own 
accord or had been stopped by outside forces.”  (Ibid.) 
Duke involved assault with force likely to cause great 
bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)) rather than assault with a 
deadly weapon.  But we noted in Aguilar that “except in those 
cases involving an inherently dangerous weapon[,] the jury’s 
decisionmaking process in an aggravated assault case . . . is 
functionally identical regardless of whether . . . the defendant 
employed a weapon alleged to be deadly as used or employed 
force likely to produce great bodily injury; in either instance, the 
decision turns on the nature of the force used.”  (Aguilar, supra, 
16 Cal.4th at p. 1035; see ibid. [“ ‘[A]ll aggravated assaults are 
IN RE B.M. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
ultimately determined based on the force likely to be applied 
against a person.’ ”].)  Duke’s reasoning is thus applicable here. 
Although it is inappropriate to consider how the object 
could have been used as opposed to how it was actually used, it 
is appropriate in the deadly weapon inquiry to consider what 
harm could have resulted from the way the object was actually 
used.  Analysis of whether the defendant’s manner of using the 
object was likely to produce death or great bodily injury 
necessarily calls for an assessment of potential harm in light of 
the evidence.  As noted, a mere possibility of serious injury is 
not enough.  But the evidence may show that serious injury was 
likely, even if it did not come to pass. 
Here, the Court of Appeal said B.M. could “easily have 
committed mayhem upon the victim’s face.”  But the evidence 
showed that B.M. used the butter knife only in the area of 
Sophia’s legs, which were covered with a blanket.  There is no 
evidence that B.M. stabbed, sliced, or pointed the butter knife 
toward or near Sophia’s face, or that B.M. attempted or 
threatened to do so.  Nor is there evidence that B.M. was flailing 
her hand with the butter knife or otherwise wielding it wildly or 
uncontrollably.  (Cf. People v. Simons (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 
1100, 1106 (Simons).)  The Court of Appeal’s remark about 
injury to the victim’s face is an impermissible conjecture as to 
how B.M. could have used the butter knife.  It is not a reasonable 
inference of potential injury based on evidence of how B.M. 
actually used the butter knife. 
Third, although it is appropriate to consider the injury 
that could have resulted from the way the object was used, the 
extent of actual injury or lack of injury is also relevant.  “[A] 
conviction for assault with a deadly weapon does not require 
IN RE B.M. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
10 
proof of an injury or even physical contact” (Brandon T., supra, 
191 Cal.App.4th at p. 1497), but limited injury or lack of injury 
may suggest that the nature of the object or the way it was used 
was not capable of producing or likely to produce death or 
serious harm.  In Beasley, the court explained that “bruises on 
[the victim’s] shoulders and arms are insufficient to show that 
Beasley used the broomstick as a deadly weapon.”  (Beasley, 
supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 1088.)  And in Brandon T., the 
court found insufficient evidence that a butter knife was used as 
a deadly weapon where “the knife would not cut” and instead 
“resulted in a small scratch on [the victim’s] cheek.”  (Brandon 
T., at p. 1497.)  The fact that applying only enough pressure to 
inflict a small scratch caused the knife to break indicated that 
the object, by its nature, was neither capable of producing nor 
likely to produce serious injury.  (Ibid.)  Contrary to what the 
Court of Appeal here said, Brandon T. properly considered the 
knife’s inability to cause more than a small scratch in evaluating 
whether the deadly weapon finding was supported by 
substantial evidence.  (See In re D.T. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th, 
693, 701 (D.T.) [“the knife [in Brandon T.] could not have 
produced a stabbing injury because it broke when the minor 
pressed it against the victim”].) 
B. 
With these principles in mind, we turn to the case before 
us.  Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the 
judgment, we conclude that the juvenile court’s finding that 
B.M. used the butter knife as a deadly weapon is not supported 
by substantial evidence, i.e., “ ‘evidence which is reasonable, 
credible, and of solid value.’ ”  (In re I.C. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 869, 
892.)  Under any plausible interpretation of the term “likely,” 
the evidence was insufficient to establish that B.M.’s use of a 
IN RE B.M. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
11 
butter knife against her sister’s blanketed legs was “ ‘likely to 
produce death or great bodily injury.’ ”  (Aguilar, supra, 16 
Cal.4th at p. 1029.) 
Several circumstances support this conclusion.  First, the 
record indicates that the six-inch metal knife B.M. used was 
“[t]he type of knife that you would use to butter a piece of toast”; 
it was not sharp and had slight ridges on one edge of the blade.  
(See Brandon T., supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1496–1498 
[butter knife with “rounded end” was incapable of causing 
serious injury even when applied to the victim’s face with 
enough force to break the knife]; D.T., supra, 237 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 701 [contrasting the butter knife in Brandon T. with a 
sharp pocketknife].) 
Second, B.M. used the knife only on Sophia’s legs, which 
were covered with a blanket.  There is no evidence that B.M. 
used or attempted to use the knife in the area of Sophia’s head, 
face, or neck, or on any exposed part of her body.  (See Beasley, 
supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 1087 [finding insufficient evidence 
that a broomstick was used as a deadly weapon where the 
defendant caused bruises on the victim’s arms and shoulders but 
“did not strike [the] head or face”].) 
Third, the moderate pressure that B.M. applied with the 
knife was insufficient to pierce the blanket, much less cause 
serious bodily injury to Sophia.  (See Brandon T., supra, 191 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1496–1497; People v. Brown (2012) 210 
Cal.App.4th 1, 7 [“[I]f injuries do result, the nature of such 
injuries and their location are relevant facts for consideration in 
determining whether an object was used in a manner capable of 
producing and likely to produce great bodily injury.”].) 
IN RE B.M. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
12 
The Court of Appeal, while acknowledging that “[t]he 
extent of the injuries, or lack of them, is relevant,” suggested 
that Sophia was not injured in part because B.M. “was not adept 
at using a knife.”  This circumstance “does not inure to [B.M.’s] 
benefit,” the court reasoned, just as lack of injury is not 
probative in “the typical assault with a deadly weapon with a 
firearm when the defendant has poor aim.”  But the record 
contains no evidence as to how adept B.M. was in using a knife, 
and in any event, it does not matter what injury B.M. could have 
inflicted if she had used the knife in a more adept manner.  (See 
ante, at pp. 8–9.)  Such conjecture strays from the focus on the 
manner in which a defendant actually used the object, whether 
adept or not.  Where a defendant uses a firearm with poor aim, 
lack of injury carries little weight not because it is appropriate 
to consider what injury could have resulted if the defendant had 
had better aim, but because in many circumstances using a 
firearm even with poor aim is likely to produce death or serious 
injury.  (See, e.g., People v. Bradford (1976) 17 Cal.3d 8, 20 [the 
defendant “fired five shots at [a police officer] while [the officer] 
was pinned under a car”]; People v. Peau (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 
823, 828 [evidence could not exclude the possibility that the 
victim was hit by bullets ricocheting from the pavement]; 
Gilmore v. Superior Court (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 416, 419 
[victim was killed “when the bullet ricocheted off the asphalt 
surface”].) 
The Attorney General reprises the Court of Appeal’s 
reasoning that Sophia could have been seriously injured had she 
not defended herself with the blanket.  But there is no evidence 
indicating that Sophia pulled the blanket over her legs after or 
in reaction to seeing B.M. begin a slicing or stabbing motion 
directed at Sophia’s exposed legs.  Sophia testified that B.M. 
IN RE B.M. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
13 
“came . . . at [her] trying to stab [her]” only “after [she] covered 
[herself].”  Further, as noted, nothing in the record suggests that 
B.M., who was aware that Sophia’s legs were covered and that 
the knife was not penetrating the blanket, then used or tried to 
use the knife on an exposed part of Sophia’s body.  To be sure, 
an aggressor should not receive the benefit of a potential victim 
fortuitously taking a defensive measure or being removed from 
harm’s way once an assault is already underway.  But the facts 
known to the aggressor before the assault, including defensive 
measures taken by the victim, are relevant to determining 
whether the aggressor used an object in a manner likely to cause 
serious injury.  
The juvenile court said it was “lucky” there were no 
injuries.  Even so, there is no evidence that B.M. attacked any 
other part of Sophia’s body despite the opportunity to do so.  Nor 
is there any evidence that B.M. initially tried to stab some other 
part of Sophia’s body but missed and instead hit Sophia’s 
blanket-covered legs.  It may be that B.M. could have caused 
serious injury if she had applied greater force, if she had applied 
the same force to Sophia’s exposed legs, if she had used the knife 
on Sophia’s head, face, or neck, or if she had wielded the knife 
in an uncontrolled or unpredictable manner.  But the inquiry 
must focus on the evidence of how B.M. actually used the knife, 
not on various conjectures as to how she could have used it. 
The Attorney General also echoes the Court of Appeal’s 
reasoning that B.M. was willing to go to great lengths to injure 
Sophia because B.M. grabbed the knife only after she was 
unable to harm Sophia by “hurling” a phone at her and pulling 
her hair.  But the record contains no facts regarding the phone 
itself or the manner in which B.M. threw the phone, and there 
is no allegation that B.M. used the phone in a manner likely to 
IN RE B.M. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
14 
cause serious injury.  Moreover, contrary to the timeline 
suggested by the Court of Appeal, the record indicates that B.M. 
pulled Sophia’s hair during Sophia’s phone call to 911, which 
occurred after B.M. used the knife against her.  The inference 
that B.M. was intent on seriously injuring Sophia is belied by 
the absence of any evidence that B.M. attempted to use the knife 
again after using it on Sophia’s blanket-covered legs.  It is true 
that Sophia said she was “scared” that B.M. “could really hurt 
[her]” when B.M. showed up in her room with the knife.  But 
Sophia’s perception, considered with the totality of the evidence 
as to how B.M. actually used the knife, does not amount to 
reasonable evidence of solid value that B.M. used the knife in a 
manner likely to produce great bodily injury. 
The Attorney General further notes that “an object can be 
a deadly weapon even if there is no contact or injury, and ‘ “even 
if it’s not actually used with deadly force.” ’ ”  But the cases he 
relies on involved a sharp object applied to a vulnerable part of 
the body (D.T., supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at pp. 697, 696 [“ ‘sharp’ 
and ‘pointy’ ” pocketknife used to “poke[]” someone “multiple 
times in the upper back” is a deadly weapon]; see id. at pp. 699–
701; People v. Page (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1469 
[“ ‘sharp[,] pointy’ ” pencil held up to someone’s neck]) or a sharp 
object wielded in a wild or uncontrolled manner (Simons, supra, 
42 Cal.App.4th at p. 1106 [the defendant, being chased by police 
officers, 
“ ‘flail[ed] his 
hands . . . [and] 
would 
bring 
[a] 
screwdriver forward’ ” when approached]).  Here, the knife was 
not sharp or pointy; it was not applied to any vulnerable part of 
Sophia’s body; and there is no evidence that B.M. wielded the 
knife wildly or uncontrollably. 
Viewing the totality of the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the judgment, we find it questionable whether a 
IN RE B.M. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
15 
trier of fact could reasonably conclude that the manner in which 
B.M. used the knife was capable of causing great bodily injury.  
But even if B.M.’s use of the knife were capable of causing great 
bodily injury, there is no substantial evidence that it was likely 
to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
 
We Concur: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
RENNER, J.* 
                                        
*  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate 
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 
section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
IN RE B.M. 
S242153 
 
Concurring Opinion by Justice Chin 
 
I concur in the majority opinion, which I have signed.  I do 
so with the understanding that we are not deciding the meaning 
of the word “likely” in the phrase “ ‘capable of producing and 
likely to produce, death or great bodily injury.’ ”  (People v. 
Aguilar (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1029, italics added (Aguilar).)  
The latter phrase was adopted by this court to define what 
constitutes a “deadly weapon” for purposes of Penal Code section 
245, subdivision (a)(1).  As I read the majority opinion, we reach 
no conclusion about the meaning of the word “likely” in the 
Aguilar standard, other than to say that it means something 
“more than a mere possibility.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 7; see id. 
at p. 9.) 
The majority opinion cites several definitions of the word 
“likely” according to which the word means “ ‘having a high 
probability,’ ” “ ‘very probable,’ ” or a “ ‘probability [that is] 
great.’ ”  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 6–7.)  The opinion cites those 
definitions as examples that disprove the Attorney General’s 
assertion that “likely” means “possible.”  (Id. at p. 6.)  The 
majority opinion should not be read as holding, based on those 
examples, that for purposes of Aguilar’s definition of what 
constitutes a deadly weapon, “likely” means “probable.”  Indeed, 
such a holding would be inconsistent with the majority’s 
citations to In re D.T. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 693, People v. Page 
(2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1466, and People v. Simons (1996) 42 
Cal.App.4th 1100.  (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 14.)  Those cases 
IN RE B.M. 
Chin, J., concurring 
2 
all involved the use of a sharp object in a threatening manner, 
and in all three cases an argument could be made that great 
bodily injury was not probable, but the deadly weapon finding 
was nonetheless upheld.  (See also In re Jose R. (1982) 137 
Cal.App.3d 269 [upholding a conclusion that a pin inserted in an 
apple was a deadly weapon, despite the fact that great bodily 
injury was arguably not probable].) 
In this case, we do not decide the question of what “likely” 
means in the context of the Aguilar standard, and I do not wish 
to prejudge that question, but our resolution of the question calls 
for a careful analysis like the one that appears in People v. 
Superior Court (Ghilotti) (2002) 27 Cal.4th 888, a decision 
involving the meaning of the word “likely” in the Sexually 
Violent Predators Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.), which 
refers to persons “likely to engage in acts of sexual violence” (id., 
§ 6601, subd. (d)).  That opinion shows that, in the context of a 
law designed to prevent a harm, “likely” can sometimes mean 
something less than “probable.” 
Turning to the facts of this case and mindful that we must 
construe the evidence in favor of the trial court’s judgment, I 
agree 
with 
the 
majority 
that 
“[u]nder any plausible 
interpretation of the term ‘likely,’ the evidence was insufficient 
to establish that [defendant] B.M.’s use of a butter knife against 
her sister’s blanketed legs was ‘ “likely to produce death or great 
bodily injury.” ’  (Aguilar, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1029.)”  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at pp. 10-11.)  Significantly, the evidence at trial in 
this case included close questioning of the victim, Sophia M., 
concerning how her sister used the butter knife against her.  
Sophia could not recall which way her sister held the knife, and 
refused, even when pressed by the prosecution and the court, to 
testify that her sister held the knife as one would a dirk or a 
IN RE B.M. 
Chin, J., concurring 
3 
dagger.  Instead, Sophia described her sister making a “few” 
slicing motions on Sophia’s blanketed legs, doing so with enough 
force that Sophia could feel it “a little.”  Using a butter knife — 
even one with small ridges on the blade — to make a few slicing 
motions across the blanket-covered legs of a healthy person is 
not, under any definition of the word “likely,” an act that is likely 
to produce great bodily injury. 
Based on the foregoing understanding of the majority 
opinion, I concur. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHIN, J. 
I Concur: 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re B.M. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 10 Cal.App.5th 1292 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S242153 
Date Filed: December 27, 2018 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Ventura 
Judge: Brian John Back 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Elizabeth K. Horowitz, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Donna Ford, under appointment by 
the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, 
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Michael J. Wise, Michael C. Keller and Steven E. 
Mercer, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Elizabeth K. Horowitz 
Law Office of Elizabeth K. Horowitz 
5272 South Lewis Avenue, Suite 256 
Tulsa, OK  74105 
(424) 543-4710 
 
Steven E. Mercer 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 269-6126