Title: State v. Maday

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2017 WI 28 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP0366-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Stanley J. Maday, Jr., 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 5, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 9, 2016 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Columbia 
 
JUDGE: 
Andrew W. Voigt 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BRADLEY, R. G., J. concurs (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, A. W., J. joined by ABRAHAMSON, J. 
dissents (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Thomas Balistreri, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the brief(s) was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief and oral 
argument 
by 
Megan 
Sanders-Drazen, 
assistant 
state 
public 
defender. 
 
 
 
 
 
2017 WI 28
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2015AP366-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2011CF442) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Stanley J. Maday, Jr., 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
APR 5, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   We review an unpublished, 
per curiam decision of the court of appeals that reversed the 
Columbia County circuit court's1 judgment of conviction taken 
against Stanley J. Maday Jr. ("Maday") and which granted Maday a 
new trial.  State v. Maday, No. 2015AP366-CR, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2015). 
¶2 
On January 15, 2013, following a jury trial, Maday was 
convicted of three counts of first-degree sexual assault of a 
                                                 
1 The Honorable W. Andrew Voigt presiding. 
No.  2015AP366-CR 
 
2 
 
child.  Maday moved for postconviction relief, arguing that he 
received ineffective assistance of counsel because:  (1) his 
counsel failed to object to two questions the prosecutor asked 
Catherine Gainey ("Gainey"), the social worker who conducted a 
cognitive graphic interview with the child victim in this case, 
and (2) his counsel should not have withdrawn an objection to 
the introduction of evidence about Maday's job-related training 
in the use of weapons and the use of force.   
¶3 
We hold that Gainey's testimony about the absence of 
indications during the cognitive graphic interview, either that 
K.L. had been coached or that K.L. was being dishonest, does not 
violate the Haseltine2 rule, and is therefore admissible.  We so 
hold for three reasons.  First, Gainey's testimony was limited 
to her observations of indications of coaching and dishonesty.  
Second, by limiting her testimony to indications of coaching and 
dishonesty, Gainey did not provide a subjective opinion as to 
K.L.'s truthfulness.  Third, testimony, such as Gainey's, may 
assist the jury.  Accordingly, we conclude that Maday's counsel 
was not ineffective for failing to object to Gainey's testimony 
and counsel's performance was therefore not deficient.   
¶4 
Furthermore, we conclude Maday's counsel was not 
ineffective for withdrawing his objection to the introduction of 
evidence of Maday's job-related training in the use of weapons 
                                                 
2 State v. Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d 92, 96, 352 N.W.2d 673 
(Ct. App. 1984) (prohibiting a witness from "giv[ing] an opinion 
that another mentally and physically competent witness is 
telling the truth"). 
No.  2015AP366-CR 
 
3 
 
and the use of force because Maday was not prejudiced by that 
testimony.   
¶5 
The decision of the court of appeals is, therefore, 
reversed. 
¶6 
We begin our analysis with a brief factual background 
and procedural history.  We then turn to a discussion of 
forensic interview techniques, the Haseltine rule, and the 
application of the Haseltine rule to Gainey's testimony in this 
case.  After concluding Gainey's testimony does not violate the 
Haseltine 
rule, 
we 
address 
Maday's 
claim 
of 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶7 
In November 2011, the mother of eleven-year-old K.L. 
found a letter authored by K.L. that described how Maday 
sexually assaulted K.L. on three occasions.  In the letter, K.L. 
described how, when she slept over at her friend's house, Maday 
(her friend's father) put his hands in her pants, placed his 
fingers in her vagina, and slipped his hands under her bra to 
feel her breasts.  After finding this letter, K.L.'s mother 
reported Maday to the police.  Due to the fact that K.L. was 
eleven years old, the police arranged to have K.L.'s allegations 
assessed by means of a forensic interview with a social worker.  
The 
social 
worker, 
Gainey, 
interviewed 
K.L. 
about 
her 
allegations.  Gainey conducted the interview using a type of 
forensic 
interview 
technique 
called 
a 
cognitive 
graphic 
interview. 
No.  2015AP366-CR 
 
4 
 
¶8 
For his part, Maday denied K.L.'s allegations, and 
pled not guilty to three counts of first-degree sexual assault 
of a child in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(b)3 and 
§ 948.02(1)(e).4  The case proceeded to trial by jury. 
¶9 
The trial began with the prosecutor calling K.L. to 
the stand.  Crying, K.L. read to the jury the letter she wrote 
to her mother: 
Dear Mom, I'm scared to tell you in person so I wrote 
this letter.  Stan has been sexually harassing me 
while I'm asleep.  I wake up to him either sticking 
his hand down my shirt and bra or down my pants and 
underwear.  I don't do anything because I'm afraid he 
will hurt me.  He's done this three times now.  He did 
it Friday night.  He stuck his hand down my pants and 
started rubbing there, and then he stuck his finger in 
my vagina.  Then he also stuck his hand down my shirt 
and my bra, grabbed my boob.  I was moving and was 
moving it around.  I know I should have told you the 
first time this happened, but I was too scared.  He's 
done it three times now, and I want it to stop now if 
I file papers against him or take him to court.  
Sincerely, [K.L.] 
At trial, K.L. explained the letter she wrote to her mother by 
further describing the sexual assaults.  K.L. testified about 
one of the assaults:  "I remember in the middle of the night 
that I woke up to Stan touching me and the T.V. being on and [my 
friend] still being next to me sleeping."  She also described 
                                                 
3 "Whoever has sexual intercourse with a person who has not 
attained the age of 12 years is guilty of a Class B felony."  
Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(b) (2009–10). 
4 "Whoever has sexual contact with a person who has not 
attained the age of 13 years is guilty of a Class B felony."  
Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(e) (2009-10). 
No.  2015AP366-CR 
 
5 
 
how, on another occasion, she awoke on the top bunk in her 
friend's bedroom to Maday touching her.   
¶10 K.L. testified that she did not open her eyes during 
these assaults until she knew Maday had left the room "[b]ecause 
I figured if he knew I was awake, he would end up hurting me."  
Only during the second assault did K.L. say she opened her eyes, 
but only briefly, lest Maday realize he woke her up.  K.L. also 
described how, on at least one occasion, Maday placed his finger 
in her vagina. 
¶11 During his cross-examination of K.L., Maday's counsel 
played portions of K.L.'s videotaped cognitive graphic interview 
with 
Gainey 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
showing 
the 
jury 
the 
inconsistencies——the precise number of fingers Maday inserted 
into her vagina and the exact dates of the assaults——between 
K.L.'s trial testimony and what K.L. told Gainey during the 
cognitive 
graphic 
interview. 
 
K.L. 
testified 
that 
the 
inconsistencies were the result of her "remembering new things" 
from being forced to think about what happened to her. 
¶12 The State subsequently called K.L.'s mother, and she 
testified that, when she returned home from work one day, she 
found the letter that K.L. had written on her bed.  She 
testified that after finding the letter she went to K.L.'s room 
where she woke up K.L. to talk about the letter.  K.L.'s mother 
testified that "[K.L.] was having a hard time talking" and that 
"[s]he was crying, shaking, scared," and "hysterical."  It was 
at this point, K.L.'s mother said, that she alerted the police. 
No.  2015AP366-CR 
 
6 
 
¶13 As part of the defense's case-in-chief, Maday's 
counsel called Gainey to testify about the cognitive graphic 
interview she conducted with K.L.  Gainey described the type of 
forensic interview technique, the cognitive graphic interview, 
that she uses when interviewing children about their sexual 
assault allegations and how it is "a rather highly structured 
interview."  She testified that she was "specially trained" in 
using the cognitive graphic interview "to not conduct leading 
interviews of children"; that she has conducted about fifty of 
these types of interviews; and that she has "had experiences in 
the past where children have been essentially prompted by an 
adult to give a certain type of answer during this interview" 
but that, by using the cognitive graphic interview, such 
prompting "become[s] apparent."   
¶14 Gainey 
also 
described 
how 
a 
cognitive 
graphic 
interview is designed to minimize the risk of false allegations 
by, among other things, avoiding leading questions and "mak[ing] 
sure there is consistency between what they are telling [the 
interviewer] or have told other people."  The point, according 
to Gainey, is to use the cognitive graphic interview to minimize 
the risk that a child's allegations are a result of coaching by 
another and to determine if the child fully understands the 
difference between truth and lies, along with the consequences 
of lying.   
¶15 Gainey testified that, when done correctly, the 
interviewer in a cognitive graphic interview uses open-ended 
questions to let the child introduce information into the 
No.  2015AP366-CR 
 
7 
 
conversation and express what happened in his or her own words.  
The interviewer also engages in a "truth–lie" discussion in 
order to determine if the child adequately understands the 
difference 
between 
the 
concepts 
of 
truth 
and 
lies, 
the 
importance of telling the truth, and the consequences of lying.  
At the end of an interview using "the proper interview 
technique," it "become[s] apparent" if a child has "been 
essentially prompted by an adult to give a certain type of 
answer."  In short, the cognitive graphic interview technique 
"is a way to insure that a child who has been coached does not 
continue with the false allegations." 
¶16 As 
it 
specifically 
pertains 
to 
the 
truth-lie 
discussion she had during her interview with K.L., Gainey 
testified, "We reviewed what's called the children's oath.  
It's, you know, do you promise to tell the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth, and the child at that point 
states typically yes.  In this case, [K.L.] did . . . ."  Gainey 
also recounted that "[K.L.] said somebody could get into trouble 
such as going to jail when asked if there are consequences for 
when people lie.  And then she promised to tell the truth after 
that." 
¶17 After Gainey testified about the cognitive graphic 
interview technique, her experience with it, and specifics of 
her interview with K.L., the prosecutor asked Gainey the 
following questions that are now at issue and that give rise to 
the first part of Maday's claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel: 
No.  2015AP366-CR 
 
8 
 
[Prosecutor:]  Was there any indication that [K.L.] 
had been coached in any way during her interview? 
[Gainey:]  No. 
[Prosecutor:]  Was there any indication that [K.L.] 
was not being honest during her interview with you? 
[Gainey:]  No. 
Maday's counsel did not object to these questions, and these 
questions essentially concluded Gainey's testimony. 
¶18 Maday also testified.  During his testimony, he read 
portions of his work records from his job as a sergeant at 
Columbia Correctional Institution.  He did so for the purpose of 
casting doubt on whether he could have been at home at the times 
K.L. claimed he assaulted her.  On cross-examination, the 
prosecutor had Maday read specific entries about job-related 
training sessions he attended for weapons training and use-of-
force training.  Maday's counsel objected to this line of 
questioning as irrelevant, but withdrew the objection.  The 
circuit court noted that "whether or not [K.L.] was aware of 
these specific trainings, I think it is probably true that she 
was generally aware" that correctional officers receive weapons 
and use-of-force training.  Maday testified that he never 
demonstrated these techniques for, or used them on, K.L. 
¶19 During closing arguments, the prosecutor asked the 
jury to believe K.L.  As part of his argument, the prosecutor 
referred to Gainey's testimony and reminded the jury that, 
during the cognitive graphic interview, Gainey did not see any 
indications that K.L. had been coached or was being dishonest.  
The prosecutor also commented on Maday's weapons and use-of-
No.  2015AP366-CR 
 
9 
 
force training saying, "He is trained in all those things so 
[K.L.]'s worry he might do something to her was very real to 
her.  It was very real to her."  In an effort to cast doubt on 
K.L.'s testimony, Maday's counsel replayed portions of K.L.'s 
cognitive graphic interview with Gainey to highlight the 
inconsistencies between K.L.'s interview and K.L.'s trial 
testimony.  In particular, he highlighted two inconsistencies:  
(1) the precise number of fingers Maday placed inside K.L.'s 
vagina and (2) the exact dates of the sexual assaults.  
¶20 After closing arguments, the circuit court instructed 
the members of the jury, for the second time during Maday's 
trial, on their role as the sole judges of the credibility of 
the witnesses.  Specifically, the circuit court instructed the 
jury that "[y]ou are the sole judges of the credibility, that is 
believability of the witnesses and of the weight to be given to 
their testimony." 
¶21 The jury chose to believe K.L.  It found Maday guilty 
of all three counts, and the circuit court sentenced Maday to 25 
years of initial confinement and 8 years of extended supervision 
on the first count, 15 years of initial confinement and 8 years 
of extended supervision on the second count, and 15 years of 
initial confinement and 8 years of extended supervision on the 
third count. 
¶22 On October 23, 2014, Maday filed a motion for 
postconviction relief.  In his motion, Maday argued he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel, which required the circuit 
court to grant him a new trial.  Maday claimed his counsel was 
No.  2015AP366-CR 
 
10 
 
ineffective (1) for failing to object to Gainey's testimony that 
she observed no indications of coaching or dishonesty during 
K.L.'s cognitive graphic interview and (2) for withdrawing the 
objection to the introduction of evidence of Maday's job-related 
weapons and use-of-force training.  The circuit court denied 
Maday's motion.  In denying Maday's motion, the circuit court 
noted that Gainey's testimony "is about as close as I can 
personally envision to the line of what is permissible versus 
impermissible."  But, it found Gainey's testimony about the 
absence of any indications of coaching and dishonesty during the 
cognitive 
graphic 
interview 
admissible 
because 
it 
"dealt 
specifically with the videotaped interview."  Therefore, there 
was no deficient performance.  The circuit court also noted that 
the evidence of Maday's job-related training in weapons and use 
of force was irrelevant but that the evidence was not 
prejudicial 
because 
it 
is 
likely 
commonly 
assumed 
that 
correctional officers have this type of training.  Thus, the 
circuit court found no ineffective assistance of counsel.  Maday 
appealed. 
¶23 The court of appeals reversed the circuit court.  
Maday, unpublished slip op., ¶21.  It determined that Gainey's 
testimony violated the Haseltine rule in that her testimony 
vouched for K.L.'s credibility, and that Maday's counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object.  Id., ¶¶19–20.   
¶24 The court of appeals did not address whether Maday's 
counsel was ineffective for withdrawing his objection to the 
evidence 
of 
Maday's 
job-related 
weapons 
and 
use-of-force 
No.  2015AP366-CR 
 
11 
 
training 
because 
Maday's 
first 
argument 
for 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel resolved the case.  Id., ¶20 n.3. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶25 Whether a defendant received ineffective assistance of 
counsel is a mixed question of law and fact.  State v. Erickson, 
227 Wis. 2d 758, 768, 596 N.W.2d 749 (1999).  "We will not 
disturb the circuit court's findings of fact unless they are 
clearly erroneous."  Id.  "[T]he circumstances of the case and 
the counsel's conduct and strategy" are considered findings of 
fact.  State v. Jenkins, 2014 WI 59, ¶38, 355 Wis. 2d 180, 848 
N.W.2d 786.  Whether counsel's performance was ineffective is a 
question of law that we review independently.  Erickson, 227 
Wis. 2d at 768. 
III.  DISCUSSION 
¶26 In order to assess Maday's claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, we first address whether Gainey's 
testimony about her observations of indications of coaching and 
dishonesty made during K.L.'s cognitive graphic interview 
violates the Haseltine rule.  To answer this question, we begin 
with an explanation of forensic interview techniques and the 
Haseltine rule.  We then address the admissibility of Gainey's 
testimony.  Second, we address Maday's claim for ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
A.  Forensic Interview Techniques 
¶27 Starting with a series of high-profile child sexual 
assault cases in the 1980s, the interview techniques used with 
the children during the investigation of some of these cases 
No.  2015AP366-CR 
 
12 
 
raised concerns that children were making false allegations of 
abuse.  See, e.g., McMartin v. Children's Inst. Int'l, 261 Cal. 
Rptr. 437 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372 
(N.J. 1994); see also Sena Garven et al., More than Suggestion:  
The 
Effect 
of 
Interviewing 
Techniques 
from 
the 
McMartin 
Preschool Case, 83 J. Applied Psychol. 347 (1998).  Indeed, a 
large number of what turned out to be false allegations caused 
the public to perceive children as less-than-credible witnesses 
because of their vulnerability to suggestion and coaching.  See 
Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1376 ("[O]ur common experience tells us 
that children generate special concerns because of their 
vulnerability, 
immaturity, 
and 
impressionability . . . .").  
Research on detecting false allegations from children following 
in the wake of these cases led to a marked improvement in the 
quality of forensic interview techniques used in child sexual 
assault investigations, allowing forensic interviewers to better 
meet the unique situations present in these instances.  See 
Garven et al., supra.   
¶28 The forensic interview techniques used today are 
accepted among experts and courts as effective tools for 
investigating child sexual assault allegations because these 
methods minimize the risk of false allegations of abuse that 
result from a child's vulnerability to suggestion and coaching.  
See Karen J. Saywitz & Lorinda B. Camparo, Contemporary Child 
Forensic Interviewing:  Evolving Consensus and Innovation over 
25 Years, in Children as Victims, Witnesses, and Offenders:  
Psychological Science and the Law 102, 105–06 (Bette L. Bottoms 
No.  2015AP366-CR 
 
13 
 
et al. eds., 2009); see also State v. Michael H., 970 A.2d 113, 
120 
(Conn. 
2009) 
("In 
order 
to 
discover 
child 
abuse, 
investigators 
often 
rely 
on 
forensic 
interviews . . . .").  
Indeed, allegations made by children present such a unique 
circumstance that forensic interview techniques are useful, even 
necessary, to combat the problems that arise with allegations of 
abuse made by children.  Cf. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1377 ("That 
an investigatory interview of a young child can be coercive or 
suggestive and thus shape the child's responses is generally 
accepted.  If a child's recollection of events has been molded 
by an interrogation, that influence undermines the reliability 
of the child's responses as an accurate recollection of actual 
events.").  
¶29 The 
forensic 
interview 
techniques 
used 
today, 
including the cognitive graphic interview technique Gainey used 
in this case, are designed to address the reliability problems 
that arise with allegations of abuse made by children and to 
avoid the problems caused by the interview techniques used 
previously.  See Saywitz & Camparo, supra, at 103.  There are a 
variety of types of forensic interview techniques used to 
accomplish these results.  For example, the court of appeals 
dealt with the "Step Wise" method, State v. Krueger, 2008 WI App 
162, ¶5, 314 Wis. 2d 605, 762 N.W.2d 114, and the Supreme Court 
of South Carolina dealt with the "Rapport, Anatomy, Touch, Abuse 
Scenario, and Closure" method, State v. Kromah, 737 S.E.2d 490, 
499 (S.C. 2013).  Here, though, Gainey used a type of forensic 
interview called the "cognitive graphic interview."  See Saywitz 
No.  2015AP366-CR 
 
14 
 
& Camparo, supra, at 109–10 (providing a brief description of 
the cognitive graphic interview technique). 
¶30 These different types of forensic interview techniques 
are marked by some common characteristics.  Id. at 105–06.  
First, forensic interview techniques use open-ended questions 
and avoid leading questions in an effort to allow the child to 
tell the story in his or her own words.  See State v. Hilton, 
764 So. 2d 1027, ¶20 (La. Ct. App. 2000), cert. denied, 786 So. 
2d 113 (La. 2001).  Second, forensic interview techniques employ 
truth–lie discussions wherein the interviewer evaluates the 
child's understanding of truth and lies and the child's 
understanding of the consequences for telling lies.  See State 
v. Douglas, 671 S.E.2d 606, 607 (S.C. 2009). 
¶31 The interviewer trained in a forensic interview 
technique looks for indications that a child has been coached to 
make the allegations of abuse or indications that the child is 
being dishonest in making the allegations of abuse.  See State 
v. Wembley, 712 N.W.2d 783, 790–91 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006), aff'd, 
728 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. 2007).  For example, a trained forensic 
interviewer looks at what information the child introduces into 
the conversation in response to questioning and looks for a 
child to communicate this information using a vocabulary and 
understanding consistent with the child's age.  See August 
Piper, Investigating Child Sex Abuse Allegations:  A Guide to 
Help Legal Professionals Distinguish Valid from Invalid Claims, 
36 J. Psychiatry & L. 271, 302–03 (2008).  The less information 
a child can produce on his or her own, the more likely a 
No.  2015AP366-CR 
 
15 
 
forensic interviewer will take this as an indication that the 
allegations of abuse are false.  The same holds true for how the 
child communicates that information.  Id. at 308.  In other 
words, a forensic interviewer evaluates whether a child's 
recollection of abuse is "told from a child's viewpoint, and 
[whether] 
sexual 
knowledge 
in 
the 
child's 
statements 
or 
behavior . . . is 
beyond 
that 
expected 
for 
the 
child's 
developmental stage."  Id.  The more "adult" the child's 
language, the more likely a forensic interviewer will consider 
the language to be an indication that the allegations of abuse 
are false.  
¶32 As another example, an expert trained in forensic 
interviewing remains alert for consistency with "explicit 
details."  Id. at 307.  "[A] vague or inconsistent account, 
delivered evasively or using the same rote phrases, detracts 
from the child's credibility."  Id.  "[A] child's refusal to 
discuss details of the abuse should alert the interviewer to the 
possibility of a fabricated allegation."  Id.   
¶33 These indications are often observable only within the 
context of a forensic interview and only to a 
trained 
interviewer and thus, taken as a whole, fall outside the realm 
of common knowledge.  E.g., Williams v. State, 970 So. 2d 727, 
¶¶24-27 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (admitting a forensic interviewer 
as an expert because her training in forensic interviewing gave 
her specialized knowledge).  Accordingly, a jury could benefit 
from an expert's assistance when interpreting and identifying 
the indications bearing on the independence of a child's 
No.  2015AP366-CR 
 
16 
 
allegations of abuse when such situations arise.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 907.02 (2013–14).   
B.  The Haseltine Rule 
¶34 "Under Wisconsin law, a witness may not testify 'that 
another mentally and physically competent witness is telling the 
truth.'"  State v. Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d 240, 249, 432 N.W.2d 913 
(1988) (quoting State v. Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d 92, 96, 352 
N.W.2d 673 (Ct. App. 1984)).  Often called the "Haseltine rule," 
this principle is rooted in the rules of evidence that say 
"expert testimony must 'assist the trier of fact to understand 
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.'"  State v. 
Pittman, 174 Wis. 2d 255, 267, 496 N.W.2d 74 (1993) (quoting 
Wis. Stat. § 907.02).  "Expert testimony does not assist the 
fact-finder if it conveys to the jury the expert's own beliefs 
as to the veracity of another witness."  Id.  The jury is the 
sole judge of credibility of the witnesses, and a witness who 
comments on the veracity of another witness usurps this role 
instead of assisting the jury in fulfilling it.  State v. 
Romero, 147 Wis. 2d 264, 278, 432 N.W.2d 899 (1988). 
¶35 Accordingly, in State v. Krueger, the court of appeals 
recognized that expert testimony from a social worker about her 
observations made during a forensic interview "on typical signs 
of whether a child has been coached or evidences suggestibility 
and whether the complainant child exhibits such signs" was 
admissible.  Krueger, 314 Wis. 2d 605, ¶14.  This was so because 
it would assist the jury to assess the credibility of the 
child's allegations of sexual assault.  Id., ¶¶14-15.  The 
No.  2015AP366-CR 
 
17 
 
social worker's testimony in Krueger was ultimately found 
inadmissible, though, because it went a step too far in that the 
social worker testified that she did not believe the child could 
maintain her story "unless it was something that she had 
experienced."  Id., ¶15.  This had the effect of the social 
worker providing her opinion as to the truth of the child's 
allegations.  Id., ¶16.  Thus, the social worker's testimony 
went beyond that of observations of indications of coaching and 
deceit she made during her forensic interview with the child 
and, rather, provided a subjective opinion that had the effect 
of stating that the child was truthful.  Id., ¶14.  Her 
testimony violated the Haseltine rule because it usurped the 
jury's role as sole judge of credibility of the witness as 
opposed to merely assisting the jury in that role.  It is fairly 
said, then, that while observations of indications of coaching 
and deceit the interviewers make during the course of forensic 
interviews 
may 
be 
received 
into 
evidence, 
statements 
of 
subjective opinion about the child's truthfulness are not to be 
received. 
¶36 Other jurisdictions, with a rule similar to our 
Haseltine rule, have allowed an expert such as Gainey to testify 
about observations made during the course of a forensic 
interview.  E.g., Wembley, 712 N.W.2d at 790–92; Williams, 970 
So. 2d 727, ¶¶15-17; State v. Champagne, 305 P.3d 61, ¶¶33-36 
(Mont. 2013).  For example, in State v. Kromah, the Supreme 
Court of South Carolina determined that those who are so trained 
may testify as to "any personal observations regarding the 
No.  2015AP366-CR 
 
18 
 
child's behavior or demeanor" during the forensic interview.  
Kromah, 737 S.E.2d at 500.  An opinion from a forensic 
interviewer, though, may not include the expression of the 
expert's belief that the child was being truthful.  Id. 
C.  The Admissibility of Gainey's Testimony Regarding 
Indications of Coaching and Dishonesty 
¶37 We turn now to the application of the foregoing 
principles to the particular testimony at issue in this case in 
order 
to 
determine 
whether 
Gainey's 
testimony 
about 
"indications" of coaching and "indications" of dishonesty during 
the cognitive graphic interview violated the Haseltine rule.   
1.  Gainey's Testimony Was Limited to Indications of Coaching 
and Dishonesty and Did Not Provide a Subjective Opinion 
Regarding K.L.'s Truthfulness 
¶38 As the circuit court found, and as the record bears 
out, Gainey's testimony was limited only to observations of the 
indications of coaching and dishonesty she made during the 
cognitive graphic interview she conducted with K.L.  The 
prosecutor first asked, "Was there any indication that [K.L.] 
had been coached in any way during her interview?"  (Emphasis 
added).  The prosecutor then asked, "Was there any indication 
that [K.L.] was not being honest during her interview with you?"  
(Emphasis added).  Importantly, both questions are limited to 
indications.  Neither question asked Gainey about her opinion or 
belief.  By limiting it to her observations of indications 
during the cognitive graphic interview, Gainey's testimony in 
response to these questions did not provide an opinion about the 
No.  2015AP366-CR 
 
19 
 
truth of K.L.'s allegations.  Rather, Gainey provided an opinion 
about indications she is trained to observe during a cognitive 
graphic interview, an interview technique developed specially 
for dealing with allegations of abuse made by children.  As 
such, Gainey was not "allowed to convey to the jury . . . her 
own beliefs as to the veracity of the complainant with respect 
to the assault," Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d at 256-57. 
¶39 Unlike the social worker in Krueger, Gainey did not 
take that extra step that turned her testimony into a subjective 
opinion about K.L.'s veracity, and thus into a violation of the 
Haseltine rule.  The State posed the following question in 
Krueger, "Based upon that, did you form an opinion as to whether 
or not [S.B.] was the product of any suggestibility or any 
coaching?" 
 
Krueger, 
314 
Wis. 2d 605, 
¶5 
(alteration 
in 
original).  The social worker answered: 
I did not get a sense from this child that she 
demonstrated a level of sophistication that [she] 
would be able to maintain some sort of fabricated 
story, for lack of a better way of describing it.  She 
did not appear to me to be highly sophisticated so 
that she could maintain that kind of consistency 
throughout unless it was something that she had 
experienced. 
Id. (emphasis added).  The exchange between the prosecutor and 
Gainey in this case is considerably different.  The prosecutor 
did not ask Gainey for an opinion of whether K.L.'s testimony 
"was the product" of suggestibility or coaching but, rather, 
asked Gainey about observable indications of coaching or 
dishonesty.  Further, Gainey did not testify that K.L. could 
No.  2015AP366-CR 
 
20 
 
only maintain the consistency of her allegations "unless it was 
something that [K.L.] had experienced."  Rather, Gainey provided 
testimony grounded in her training as a forensic interviewer by 
limiting her testimony to the indications she is trained to look 
for and, by testifying to a lack of any indications of coaching 
or dishonesty, Gainey avoided giving an opinion as to whether 
K.L.'s allegations were, in fact, true.   
2.  Gainey's Testimony May Assist the Jury 
¶40 Gainey's testimony may have assisted the jury in 
assessing the credibility of K.L.'s allegations and did not 
usurp the jury's role as the sole judge of credibility of the 
witness.  The indications a forensic interviewer, like Gainey, 
is trained to look for often fall outside the realm of common 
knowledge.  See, e.g., Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d at 250–52 (allowing 
expert testimony about the typical behavior of child sexual 
assault victims); Krueger, 314 Wis. 2d 605, ¶9 (examining expert 
testimony regarding signs of coaching).  Forensic interviewers 
are required to complete training in using such interview 
techniques, and given the unique circumstances present with 
assessing allegations of abuse made by children, it is, at a 
minimum, possible that the jury could benefit from the testimony 
of a forensic interviewer to help them more accurately assess 
the credibility of a child's allegations.  See Jensen, 147 
Wis. 2d at 256 ("While an expert's description of the behavior 
of victims of crime may assist the jury to understand the 
evidence in the case or to determine a fact in issue, an expert 
may be no more qualified to compare behavior patterns than the 
No.  2015AP366-CR 
 
21 
 
jury.  The jury may be able to draw the requisite inferences 
itself without the assistance of an expert.").  Accordingly, it 
is at least possible that Gainey, as a trained forensic 
interviewer, was able to assist, as opposed to usurp, the jury 
in its role as the sole judge of credibility of the witnesses.  
As the reasoning of Jensen makes clear, and as we recognize, 
juries are free either to make use of such testimony or 
disregard it and rely solely on their own collective wisdom and 
experience, in accord with the instructions provided to them by 
the circuit court.  See id.  
¶41 Based on the foregoing, we conclude Gainey's testimony 
is admissible. 
D.  Maday's Arguments Against Admission 
1.  The Question About Indications of Coaching 
¶42 Maday first argues that, even if testimony about 
indications 
of 
coaching 
is 
sometimes 
admissible, 
it 
is 
admissible only if it includes sufficient detail about what 
indications the interviewer is looking for because only then is 
the jury able to draw its own conclusions about the child's 
allegations.  See id. at 255-56.  Because these details were not 
provided here, Maday argues Gainey's testimony violates the 
Haseltine rule.  Maday argues in his brief, "Untethered to 
background information about the typical signs of coaching, an 
expert's statement that a child displays no such signs does 
little to assist the jury and runs an unacceptable 'risk that 
the jury could interpret the testimony as an opinion that the 
No.  2015AP366-CR 
 
22 
 
complainant is being truthful about the assault,'"  Jensen, 147 
Wis. 2d at 256. 
¶43 Gainey provided background information as context for 
her testimony in regard to the indications of coaching and 
dishonesty during the cognitive graphic interview.  On direct 
examination, defense counsel introduced the concept of a 
cognitive graphic interview by asking Gainey, "And that's a 
rather 
highly 
structured 
interview, 
isn't 
it?" 
 
Gainey 
responded, "Yes."  Defense counsel asked next, "Why do you go 
through that kind of structure . . . when interviewing a child?"  
Gainey answered, "I'm specialized, specially trained in that 
technique to not conduct leading interviews of children.  We 
also videotape and do that format of an interview so the video 
can be introduced rather than having the child testify at every 
hearing." 
¶44 On 
cross-examination, 
the 
prosecutor 
expanded 
on 
defense counsel's questioning and asked Gainey about the 
cognitive graphic interview technique that she uses to conduct 
forensic interviews: 
Q. 
Can you explain more fully the benefits of 
conducting the cognitive graphic type interviews 
with children? 
A. 
The benefit most importantly is to have that 
interview done on video so in a matter where the 
case is taken to the criminal level, the video 
can be submitted versus having the child appear 
and testify at multiple hearings. 
Q. 
But the interviewing technique you have been 
trained on? 
No.  2015AP366-CR 
 
23 
 
A. 
Oh, I'm sorry.  The technique is to make sure the 
child fully understands the difference between 
truth and lies so they understand if they are 
making up allegations, there are consequences for 
those lies.  Also to make sure that there is 
consistency between what they are telling me or 
have told other people.  I'm not sure if there is 
anything else I'm missing from your question. 
Q. 
No.  I think that's fully answered my question.  
We did not watch the whole video.  We just 
watched the sort of midsection when you were 
actually discussing the allegations that she had 
made.  So at the beginning part of the video that 
we didn't see, you cover the difference between 
truth and lie? 
A. 
Yes. 
Q. 
And was [K.L.] actually placed under oath? 
A. 
She 
was. 
 
We 
reviewed 
what's 
called 
the 
children's oath.  It's, you know, do you promise 
to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 
but the truth, and the child at that point states 
typically yes.  In this case she did, and then we 
have them sign their name to the document as 
well. 
Q. 
Did in this instance you also cover consequences 
for not telling the truth? 
A. 
Correct.  And I believe with this interview she 
said somebody could get into trouble such as 
going 
to 
jail 
when 
asked 
if 
there 
[are] 
consequences for when people lie.  And then she 
promised to tell the truth after that. 
Q. 
How long have you been conducting these kinds of 
interviews? 
A. 
I would say [I] probably was trained at least, 
well, probably going on three years. 
¶45 Gainey also described how she avoids leading questions 
because she wants the child to introduce information into the 
conversation: 
No.  2015AP366-CR 
 
24 
 
Well, for example, where did your dad touch you.  
Okay, so you are indicating that, as the interviewer, 
I 
know 
that 
this 
man 
even 
though 
you 
haven't 
identified him [as] the person that touched you, they 
did touch you.  If the child has not offered that 
information, you don't introduce that information.   
Gainey also described how she uses cognitive graphic interview 
techniques to "kind of open the door for children to talk about 
if something has happened to them" by using body diagrams: 
We show them a body diagram.  We go over the different 
body parts, have them use the words that they prefer 
to describe the different body parts.  Then we ask 
them has anybody or do you know what parts on your 
body are okay or not okay for other people to touch.  
Then have them identify those body parts, and then we 
simply ask has anybody touched you anywhere on your 
body.  They can indicate yes or no or where those 
things happened. 
¶46 After describing how she avoids leading questions and 
uses body diagrams, Gainey further testified: 
Q. 
And you conduct the interview that way because it 
makes the answers more reliable? 
A. 
Yes. 
Q. 
Have you had experiences in the past where 
children have been essentially prompted by an 
adult to give a certain type of answer during 
this interview? 
A. 
Yes. 
Q. 
And does that become apparent when you use the 
proper interview techniques? 
A. 
Yes. 
Q. 
So using these interview techniques is a way to 
insure that a child who has been coached does not 
continue with the false allegations during the 
interview? 
No.  2015AP366-CR 
 
25 
 
A. 
Yes. 
¶47 In light of the testimony described above, we conclude 
Gainey did provide a sufficient contextual basis to testify 
about the indications she observed or, more to the point, did 
not observe during the course of her cognitive graphic interview 
with K.L.  Jensen requires Gainey to provide sufficient detail 
about what she is trained to look for, see Jensen, 147 
Wis. 2d at 255, and Gainey did so.  Gainey discussed the truth-
lie discussion she engaged in.  She described the open-ended 
questions she used, and she described how she tried to have K.L. 
describe the assaults in K.L.'s own words.  
2.  The Question About Indications of Dishonesty 
¶48 Second, Maday argues that even if Gainey is allowed to 
testify about indications of coaching, Gainey should never have 
been allowed to testify about indications that K.L. "was not 
being honest." 
¶49 Viewed in isolation, a question about indications of 
whether a witness was "being honest" would seem to go more 
directly to truthfulness than a question about indications of 
coaching.  Here, though, we are not viewing Gainey's testimony 
in isolation, but rather, we view it in the context of a 
cognitive graphic interview.  Gainey was not asked to, and in 
fact did not, opine about the veracity of another witness's 
testimony.  Rather, Gainey was asked about her observations of 
indications of dishonesty during a cognitive graphic interview.  
We honor the principle that a jury normally needs no help 
assessing whether a witness is telling the truth.  However, we 
No.  2015AP366-CR 
 
26 
 
must also recognize the development of specialized, technical 
interview methods for investigating allegations of child sexual 
abuse as well as the case law that gives them life in the 
courtroom.  See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-7-123 (Supp. 2016) 
(allowing the use of a videotaped forensic interview as evidence 
if certain conditions are met); Michael H., 970 A.2d at 116 
(using a forensic interview to investigate allegations of child 
sexual abuse); Hilton, 764 So. 2d 1027, ¶20 (using a forensic 
interview at the Jefferson Parish Children's Advocacy Center as 
part of an investigation into allegations of child sexual 
abuse); Wembley, 712 N.W.2d at 790-92 (allowing testimony of a 
forensic interview conducted at CornerHouse in a child sexual 
abuse case); Champagne, 305 P.3d 61, ¶36 ("The District Court 
properly allowed Matkin to testify about a matter to which she 
had training and experience:  whether a victim had been 
coached."); Kromah, 737 S.E.2d 490 (outlining the parameters for 
admitting testimony of a forensic interview called the "Rapport, 
Anatomy, Touch, Abuse Scenario, and Closure" method); Douglas, 
671 S.E.2d 606 (evaluating testimony from a forensic interviewer 
in 
a 
case 
involving 
child 
sexual 
abuse); 
Krueger, 
314 
Wis. 2d 605 (using a forensic interview called the "Step Wise" 
method to investigate allegations of child sexual abuse); see 
also Victor I. Vieth, The Forensic Interviewer at Trial:  
Guidelines for the Admission and Scope of Expert Witness 
Testimony Concerning an Investigative Interview in a Case of 
Child Abuse, 36 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 186 (2009).  
No.  2015AP366-CR 
 
27 
 
¶50 Any concerns we may have that Gainey was commenting on 
K.L.'s veracity were addressed during Gainey's testimony in that 
Gainey was clear that a cognitive graphic interview helps only 
to increase the reliability of allegations from children.  When 
the prosecutor asked, "And you conduct the interview that way 
because it makes the answers more reliable," Gainey answered, 
"Yes."  Of at least equal importance, Gainey also answered, 
"True," in response to defense counsel's question asking, "There 
is no way for you when conducting an interview to decide to know 
whether or not previous interviews or questioning has influenced 
the child's memory."  Gainey never implied, much less said, that 
K.L. was telling the truth.  Rather, her testimony was expressly 
limited both as to scope (the cognitive graphic interview) as 
well as to the fact that, based upon her training and 
experience, she did not see any indications of dishonesty, all 
of which the jury was free to either use for assistance or 
disregard entirely. 
¶51 Therefore, Gainey's testimony does not violate the 
Haseltine rule because her testimony was limited to commenting 
on observations of indications she made during her cognitive 
graphic interview with K.L. and her testimony included the 
foundation of her training and experience. 
E.  The Circuit Court's Instructions 
¶52 The circuit court instructed the jury on two occasions 
that it, the jury, was the sole judge of credibility of the 
witnesses.  We generally assume that the jury follows its 
instructions.  E.g., State v. Anthony, 2015 WI 20, ¶89, 361 
No.  2015AP366-CR 
 
28 
 
Wis. 2d 116, 860 N.W.2d 10.  With no reason to set this 
assumption aside, we assume here that the jury fulfilled its 
role as the sole judge of credibility and determined the 
credibility of K.L.'s testimony for itself.  While Gainey's 
testimony is admissible, the circuit court's proper instruction 
of the jury helps us in reaching our conclusion because it 
provides additional assurance that Gainey did not usurp the 
jury's role as the sole judge of credibility of the witnesses.   
F.  Maday's Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
¶53 Maday claims his counsel was ineffective for failing 
to object to Gainey's testimony and for withdrawing an objection 
to the introduction of evidence of Maday's job-related training 
in weapons and use of force.  We address each claim in turn, and 
ultimately, 
we 
conclude 
that 
neither 
claim 
results 
in 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
1.  The Strickland Test 
¶54 Under the Sixth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution 
and 
Article 
I, 
Section 
7 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, a criminal defendant has the constitutional right 
"to 
the 
effective 
assistance 
of 
counsel," 
Strickland 
v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (quoting McMann v. 
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)).  Thus, a criminal 
defendant is denied his constitutional rights when he or she 
receives ineffective assistance of counsel.  The test to 
determine ineffective assistance of counsel is a two-prong test 
commonly known as the "Strickland test."  Erickson, 227 
Wis. 2d at 768.  Under the first prong, the defendant must show 
No.  2015AP366-CR 
 
29 
 
that counsel's performance was deficient.  Id.  Here, the 
question for the court is whether counsel's performance fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness.  State v. Thiel, 
2003 WI 111, ¶19, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305.  Under the 
second prong, the defendant must show that he was prejudiced by 
counsel's deficient performance.  Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d at 768.  
Here, the question for the court is whether the deficient 
performance undermines confidence in the outcome.  Id. (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).  Both prongs must be satisfied in 
order to find ineffective assistance of counsel.  Id. 
2.  Counsel's Failure to Object to Gainey's Testimony Is Not 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
¶55 It follows that Maday's counsel was not deficient for 
failing to object to Gainey's testimony because we hold that her 
testimony is admissible.  State v. Johnson, 2004 WI 94, ¶24, 273 
Wis. 2d 626, 681 N.W.2d 901.  Counsel's performance cannot be 
considered deficient for failing to object to admissible 
evidence.  See State v. Maloney, 2005 WI 74, ¶¶25-30, 281 
Wis. 2d 595, 698 N.W.2d 583.  Even though the admissibility of 
Gainey's testimony at the time of the trial may have been 
unclear, this does not mean counsel was required to object to 
Gainey's testimony.  Id. (discussing that counsel has no duty to 
object to every possible violation, particularly when the state 
of the law is unsettled or unclear).  In fact, it is axiomatic 
that "[c]ounsel is not required to object and argue a point of 
law that is unsettled."  Id., ¶28 (quoting State v. McMahon, 186 
Wis. 2d 68, 84, 519 N.W.2d 621 (Ct. App. 1994)).   
No.  2015AP366-CR 
 
30 
 
¶56 In sum, Maday did not receive ineffective assistance 
of counsel because counsel's performance was not deficient.  
There is no need to analyze prejudice because his claim for 
ineffective assistance of counsel cannot satisfy both prongs.  
Id., ¶14 ("We need not address both components of the inquiry if 
the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one."). 
3.  Counsel's Withdrawn Objection to the Training Evidence Is 
Not Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
¶57 In addition to claiming ineffective assistance of 
counsel based on his counsel's failure to object to Gainey's 
testimony, 
Maday 
claims 
his 
counsel 
was 
ineffective 
for 
withdrawing an objection to the introduction of evidence of his 
job-related training in weapons and use of force.  Because 
neither party disputes that this evidence is irrelevant, we will 
assume without deciding that counsel's performance was deficient 
when he withdrew his objection to introduction of the evidence.  
See State v. Smith, 207 Wis. 2d 258, 274–75, 558 N.W.2d 379 
(1997).  Thus, the first prong is assumed to be satisfied, and 
we move to the second prong to look for prejudice. 
¶58 When determining if counsel's deficiency undermines 
confidence in the outcome of the trial and amounts to prejudice, 
"a court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the 
totality of the evidence before the judge or jury."  Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 695.   
¶59 The totality of the evidence before the jury in this 
case shows no reason why our confidence in the outcome should be 
undermined.  Before the training evidence even entered the 
No.  2015AP366-CR 
 
31 
 
courtroom, K.L. testified that she did not report the sexual 
assaults earlier because she was afraid of Maday and because she 
knew he had weapons.  Further, the jury's perception of Maday 
likely did not change by hearing testimony of his training 
because, as the circuit court noted, it is likely commonly 
assumed that someone of Maday's position, i.e., a correctional 
officer, has training in weapons and use of force.  Thus, there 
is no prejudice here, and Maday cannot meet the second prong.  
We are not persuaded that admitting evidence of Maday's training 
in weapons and use of force undermines confidence in the outcome 
given the totality of the evidence before the jury.   
¶60 In short, Maday cannot show he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  As to his first claim, we conclude there 
is no deficient performance, and as to his second claim, we 
conclude there is no prejudice. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶61 We hold that Gainey's testimony about the absence of 
indications during the cognitive graphic interview either that 
K.L. had been coached or that K.L. was being dishonest does not 
violate the Haseltine rule, and is therefore admissible.  We so 
hold for three reasons.  First, Gainey's testimony was limited 
to her observations of indications of coaching and dishonesty.  
Second, by limiting her testimony to indications of coaching and 
dishonesty, Gainey did not provide a subjective opinion as to 
K.L.'s truthfulness.  Third, Gainey's testimony may assist the 
jury.  Accordingly, we conclude that Maday's counsel was not 
ineffective for failing to object to Gainey's testimony.  
No.  2015AP366-CR 
 
32 
 
Counsel's 
performance 
was 
not 
deficient 
because 
Gainey's 
testimony is admissible.   
¶62 Furthermore, we conclude Maday's counsel was not 
ineffective for withdrawing his objection to the introduction of 
evidence of Maday's job-related training in the use of weapons 
and the use of force because Maday was not prejudiced by that 
testimony.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No.  2015AP366-CR.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶63 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I join the 
majority opinion's reversal of the decision of the court of 
appeals and also join its ineffective assistance analysis in 
part F.  I write separately for two reasons:  (1) this case 
should have been analyzed only under the ineffective assistance 
test, and (2) the third factor the majority uses to support its 
Haseltine analysis signals a change in the law where none was 
intended. 
I 
¶64 Maday's issues should be reviewed only under an 
ineffective assistance of counsel analysis because his trial 
counsel:  (1) failed to object when the prosecutor asked Gainey 
the two questions Maday argues violate Haseltine, and (2) 
withdrew an objection to the questions on Maday's use of weapons 
and force training.  See State v. Carprue, 2004 WI 111, 274 
Wis. 2d 656, ¶¶36-47, 683 N.W.2d 31 ("[A]bsence of any objection 
warrants that we follow 'the normal procedure in criminal 
cases,'" which is to address the alleged error "within the 
rubric of the ineffective assistance of counsel." (quoted and 
cited sources omitted)); see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 
U.S. 365, 374-75 (1986) (in absence of objection, error should 
be analyzed under ineffective-assistance-of-counsel standards, 
even when error is of constitutional dimension).  The majority 
analyzed the Haseltine issue on the merits, independently from 
an ineffective assistance review, and after deciding the merits 
of the Haseltine issue, proceeded to analyze ineffective 
assistance.  I disagree with this approach for many of the 
No.  2015AP366-CR.rgb 
 
2 
 
reasons this court expressed in Carprue.  It also unnecessarily 
lengthens the opinion and may lead to problematic consequences.  
In particular, this court's use of an altered standard of review 
in unobjected-to error cases could create a lack of certainty 
for the bench and bar as to when a case like Maday's will be 
limited to ineffective assistance review and when an unobjected-
to error will be decided on the merits.  The majority opinion's 
independent Haseltine analysis worked here because it concluded 
there was no Haseltine violation.  If the majority opinion 
concluded Haseltine was violated, what would have been the next 
step?  Under the proper ineffective assistance review, our 
analysis would proceed to the second prong of the ineffective 
assistance test. 
¶65 Although this court may in limited situations overlook 
a forfeited or waived issue, see State v. Long, 2009 WI 36, ¶44, 
317 Wis. 2d 92, 765 N.W.2d 557 (this court may address a waived 
issue 
in 
certain 
circumstances); 
see 
also 
Carprue, 
274 
Wis. 2d 656, ¶¶36-39 (discussing reasons why this court is 
reluctant to overlook non-objected-to error in criminal cases), 
the majority does not explain why it did not follow this court's 
normal 
procedure 
of 
limiting 
our 
review 
to 
ineffective 
assistance. 
¶66 Our review under the ineffective assistance test 
requires a defendant to show:  (1) deficient performance; and 
(2) prejudice.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984); State v. Jenkins, 2014 WI 59, 355 Wis. 2d 180, ¶¶35-37, 
848 N.W.2d 786.  To prove deficient performance, Maday must show 
No.  2015AP366-CR.rgb 
 
3 
 
specific acts or omissions by trial counsel that are "outside 
the wide range of professionally competent assistance."  See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.  To prove prejudice, Maday must 
demonstrate his trial counsel's errors were so serious that he 
was deprived of a fair trial and a reliable outcome.  See id. at 
687.  To satisfy the Strickland prejudice prong, Maday "must 
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.  A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."  
See id. at 697.  We need not address both deficient performance 
and prejudice if Maday fails to prove either one.  See id. at 
697.  This court's review of ineffective assistance claims 
presents mixed questions of law and fact:  (1) findings of facts 
will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous, and (2) the 
legal 
conclusions 
"of 
whether 
counsel's 
performance 
was 
deficient and prejudicial to the defense are questions of law 
which this court reviews independently."  State v. Johnson, 153 
Wis. 2d 121, 127-28, 449 N.W.2d 845 (1990). 
¶67 The majority opinion followed our normal procedure in 
reviewing Maday's weapons-training claim by analyzing that claim 
only under ineffective assistance.  As noted, I join that part 
of the majority's opinion. My analysis focuses on the alleged 
ineffective assistance based on a violation of Haseltine.  I 
conclude Maday failed to establish ineffective assistance here 
because his trial counsel's decision to withhold objections to 
the two questions asked of Gainey during cross-examination was 
No.  2015AP366-CR.rgb 
 
4 
 
not 
outside 
the 
wide 
range 
of 
professionally 
competent 
assistance and therefore not deficient.  This was not deficient 
performance because, as the majority explains at great length,1 
the answers did not cross the Haseltine line.  The Haseltine 
rule provides:  "No witness, expert or otherwise should be 
permitted 
to 
give 
an 
opinion 
that 
another 
mentally 
and 
physically competent witness is telling the truth."  State v. 
Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d 92, 96, 352 N.W.2d 673 (Ct. App. 1984). 
Asking Gainey whether she saw any indications, during the 
cognitive graphic interview of K.L., that K.L. had been coached 
or was not being honest did not elicit a subjective opinion that 
K.L. was telling the truth or that the sexual assault occurred.  
Gainey did not convey to the jury that she personally believed 
K.L.'s testimony or that Maday committed the sexual assaults.  
Gainey's testimony was limited to her observations that during 
the cognitive graphic interview, she saw no indications of 
coaching or suggestion or dishonesty.  This testimony does not 
cross the Haseltine line and is permissible.  See State v. 
Krueger, 2008 WI App 162, ¶14, 314 Wis. 2d 605, 762 N.W.2d 114 
(explaining that precedent and logic both support permitting 
"expert testimony on typical signs of whether a child has been 
coached or evidences suggestibility and whether the complainant 
child exhibits such signs").  Because the failure to object was 
                                                 
1 I agree with much of the majority's analysis on the 
cognitive graphic interview; I also agree with the reasons the 
majority opinion sets forth in ¶¶39-40 as to why Gainey's 
testimony did not violate Haseltine.  See State v. Haseltine, 
120 Wis. 2d 92, 96, 352 N.W.2d 673 (Ct. App. 1984). 
No.  2015AP366-CR.rgb 
 
5 
 
not deficient, it is not necessary to analyze whether the 
failure to object prejudiced Maday. 
II 
¶68 My second concern with the majority's 
Haseltine 
analysis involves the third factor it uses to support its 
independent Haseltine analysis:  "Third, testimony, such as 
Gainey's, may assist the jury."  Majority op. ¶3; see also 
majority op. ¶61.  I have no doubt this is true.  Testimony like 
Gainey's will assist the jury.  However, neither party raised a 
concern under Wis. Stat. § 907.022 or argued the testimony would 
not assist the jury. 
¶69 Maday raised the issue of whether his counsel should 
have objected on the basis that Gainey's testimony violated 
Haseltine—not whether Gainey's testimony satisfied Wis. Stat. 
§ 907.02.  My concern is that the majority's use of the "assist 
the jury" factor may suggest to the bench and bar that this 
court has changed the Haseltine test.  We have not.  The 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 907.02(1) limits the admission of expert 
testimony: 
If 
scientific, 
technical, 
or 
other 
specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand 
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, 
training, 
or 
education, 
may 
testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if the 
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, the 
testimony is the product of reliable principles and 
methods, and the witness has applied the principles 
and methods reliably to the facts of the case. 
(Emphasis added.) 
No.  2015AP366-CR.rgb 
 
6 
 
Haseltine test remains the same.  The majority's use of the 
"assist the jury" factor was not intended as a stand-alone, 
independent factor.  Rather, the majority declares that Gainey's 
testimony did not violate Haseltine because all three of the 
factors it lists in ¶¶3 and 61 are present here.3 
¶70 For these reasons, I respectfully concur. 
                                                 
3 Although this court discussed Wis. Stat. § 907.02 (1985-
86) in State v. Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d 240, 432 N.W.2d 913 (1988), 
it did so in a very different context.  The challenged testimony 
involved a school guidance counselor testifying that the 
victim's reactive behavior was consistent with victims of sexual 
abuse.  Id. at 248-49.  The defense used the reactive behavior 
to argue the complainant fabricated the sexual assaults.  Id. at 
251-52.  The State used the testimony to counter that defense, 
suggesting the reactive behavior was caused by sexual assault.  
Id. at 252.  This court held, in that context, "an expert 
witness may be asked to describe the behavior of the complainant 
and then to describe that of victims of the same type of crime, 
if the testimony helps the jury understand a complainant's 
reactive behavior."  Id. at 257.  Maday's case does not present 
the same context. 
No.  2015AP366-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶71 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  The State of 
Wisconsin seeks review of an unpublished per curium decision of 
the court of appeals that reversed the conviction of Stanley 
Maday, granting him a new trial.  The court of appeals 
determined that the State violated what heretofore has been a 
rule in Wisconsin held sacrosanct——under no circumstances may an 
expert witness opine on whether another witness is being 
truthful. 
¶72 At issue is whether a social worker's expert testimony 
at trial impermissibly vouched for the credibility of a child 
witness.  Until today, the fundamental premise that the jury is 
"the lie detector in the courtroom" has properly limited the 
admissibility 
of 
expert 
testimony 
regarding 
a 
witness's 
credibility.  State v. Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d 92, 96, 352 
N.W.2d 673 (1984) (citing United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 
907, 912 (9th Cir. 1973)). 
¶73 However, 
in 
this 
case 
the 
majority 
concludes 
otherwise.  It determines that Haseltine permits a social 
worker's expert testimony that she saw no indication that the 
witness was dishonest during her interview.  Additionally it 
puts its imprimatur on testimony that she saw no indication that 
the witness had been coached to make false allegations.  
Majority op., ¶3. 
¶74 In reaching its conclusion, the majority misconstrues 
Wisconsin precedent, distorting and expanding the limited 
exceptions allowing for expert testimony until they swallow the 
rule.  As a result, it allows social science to usurp the jury's 
No.  2015AP366-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
role as the lie detector in the courtroom.  The majority further 
errs in reconfiguring the expert's testimony by creating out of 
whole cloth the necessary foundational facts, which even the 
State concedes are nonexistent in this record. 
¶75 Contrary to the majority, I conclude that the social 
worker's expert testimony that she saw no indications of 
dishonesty 
crossed 
the 
line 
drawn 
by 
Haseltine. 
 
It 
impermissibly vouched for the credibility of the child witness. 
¶76 Similarly, I determine that the testimony addressing 
indications of coaching was impermissible.  Although our 
precedent establishes that coaching testimony may fall within a 
Haseltine 
exception 
if 
the 
proper 
factual 
foundation 
is 
established, no such foundation exists in this record. 
¶77 Because I further conclude that Maday's trial counsel 
was ineffective by failing to object to this vouching testimony, 
I 
would 
affirm 
the 
court 
of 
appeals. 
 
Accordingly, 
I 
respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶78 From the outset, the majority misconstrues well-
established Wisconsin precedent, distorting and expanding the 
limited exceptions allowing for expert testimony until they 
swallow the rule. 
¶79 Thus, I begin as the majority should have, with 
Haseltine's rule that "[n]o witness, expert or otherwise, should 
be permitted to give an opinion that another mentally and 
physically competent witness is telling the truth."  Haseltine, 
120 Wis. 2d at 96. 
No.  2015AP366-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
¶80 Because the majority opinion substantially alters the 
limited exceptions permitting expert testimony, I pause to set 
those forth here.  Haseltine determined that in only limited 
circumstances will expert testimony aid a jury.  Id. at 96-97.  
For example, the Haseltine court explained that an incest victim 
may exhibit behaviors, such as not immediately reporting the 
incest or recanting allegations, which might lead jurors to 
believe that the victim is not telling the truth.  Id. at 97.  
It reasoned that an expert "could explain that such behavior is 
common among incest victims as a result of guilt, confusion, and 
a reluctance to accuse a parent."  Id. at 97. 
¶81 In 
State 
v. 
Jensen, 
147 
Wis. 2d 240, 
244, 
432 
N.W.2d 913 (1998), this court permitted a guidance counselor to 
testify regarding specific changes in the victim's behavior at 
school, such as acting out in class and noncompliance with 
homework.  After addressing the specific behaviors exhibited by 
children who had been sexually abused, the guidance counselor 
testified that the victim's behavior was consistent with the 
behavior of child sexual abuse victims.  Id. at 246-48. 
¶82 The Jensen court concluded that the counselor's 
testimony 
was 
permissible 
because 
"the 
expert 
witness's 
knowledge and experience might have assisted the jury in this 
case."  Id. at 246.  It determined that "the reactions and 
behavior of sexually abused children are not ordinarily matters 
of common knowledge and experience and that the jury might 
therefore be aided by the witness's specialized knowledge in 
this area."  Id. 
No.  2015AP366-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
¶83 Thus, Jensen explained that "an expert opinion is 
useful for disabusing the jury of common misconceptions about 
the behavior of sexual assault victims."  Id. at 251.  Jensen 
was explicit, however, that "the expert witness must not be 
allowed to convey to the jury his or her own beliefs as to the 
veracity of the complainant with respect to the assault."  Id. 
at 256-57. 
¶84 More recently, in State v. Krueger, the court of 
appeals permitted "expert testimony on typical signs of whether 
a child has been coached or evidences suggestibility and whether 
the complainant child exhibits such signs."  2008 WI App 162, 
¶14, 314 Wis. 2d 605, 762 N.W.2d 114.  The Krueger court 
observed that testimony about a child's consistency, coupled 
with testimony regarding the behavior of like-aged children, 
could help the jury understand the interview and rebut a defense 
theory of coaching or suggestion.  Id., ¶15.   Thus, Krueger 
explained that "[s]igns of coaching or suggestion could fall 
into the realm of knowledge that is outside that of a lay-person 
jury."  Id. 
¶85 The Krueger court provided specific guidance regarding 
the bounds of permissible testimony.  Appropriate testimony 
addresses "objective signs or behavior indicative of whether the 
child's rendition is of the child's own making——whether truthful 
or not."  Id., ¶15 n.10.  Krueger further detailed that in 
addition to patterns of consistency, examples of objective 
behaviors include the child's ability to supply peripheral 
details of the alleged incident, the use of language that 
No.  2015AP366-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
reflects the word usage of an adult, or the reporting of 
information not appropriate for the developmental level of the 
child.  Id. 
¶86 The 
majority 
misconstrues 
Wisconsin 
precedent 
by 
ignoring that Krueger, and not Jensen, addressed the type of 
coaching testimony at issue in this case.  Krueger makes clear 
that an expert must testify to objective signs or behaviors of 
coaching before offering an opinion as to whether a child 
witness exhibited those signs or behaviors.  Id.  Yet, this 
requirement is absent from the majority opinion, which contends 
that under Jensen an expert's qualifications provide sufficient 
foundation for her testimony. 
¶87 Discussing Jensen, the majority asserts that it simply 
"requires [the social worker] to provide sufficient detail about 
what she is trained to look for, . . . and [she] did so."  
Majority op., ¶47 (citing Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d at 255).  In its 
analysis, the majority quotes at length from the expert's 
testimony regarding her training and experience in conducting 
this type of interview.  Majority op., ¶¶44-46.  Thus, the 
majority 
concludes 
that 
the 
social 
worker 
"provide[d] 
a 
sufficient contextual basis to testify about the indications she 
observed or, more to the point, did not observe during the 
course of her cognitive graphic interview with K.L."  Majority 
op., ¶47. 
¶88 The majority distorts the Jensen exception because 
Jensen does not require that an expert testify only about the 
methods she uses in interviewing a child witness or her training 
No.  2015AP366-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
in using these methods before offering a conclusion.  A social 
worker's interview methods, as well as training in using these 
methods, certainly pertain to her qualifications as an expert.  
However, whether the social worker was properly qualified as an 
expert witness is not at issue here.1  What is in dispute is 
                                                 
1 At the outset of this dissent I observe that we are 
reviewing an unpublished per curium opinion of the court of 
appeals.  In accepting review of such opinions, this court runs 
the risk of unwittingly changing or developing the law in 
unintended ways.  Such appears to be the case here. 
Without citing to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 
U.S. 579 (1993), the majority opinion decides that the social 
worker in this case is a qualified expert witness based on the 
forensic interview technique she used in eliciting testimony 
from the child witness.  According to the majority, the forensic 
interview techniques used today are accepted by experts and 
courts to reliably test the accuracy of a child's allegations of 
sexual assault.  See, e.g., majority op., ¶¶28, 29, 49, 50. 
However, no case cited by the majority in its lengthy 
opinion has even addressed, much less recognized as reliable, 
the "cognitive graphic interview" technique.  The only time that 
the "cognitive graphic interview" technique appears in Wisconsin 
jurisprudence is over 14 years ago in a case where the 
conviction was reversed because the circuit court precluded the 
defense from challenging the reliability of the technique.  
State v. St. George, 2002 WI 50, 252 
Wis. 2d 499, 643 
N.W.2d 777. 
Undaunted by this reality, the majority sua sponte cloaks 
this technique with the patina of reliability and asserts that 
"we must [] recognize the development of specialized, technical 
interview methods for investigating allegations of child sexual 
abuse as well as the case law that gives them life in the 
courtroom."  Majority op., ¶49. 
What supplemental  information does the majority provide to 
support its assertion that this is a reliable standard?  None. 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP366-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
whether the expert's testimony impermissibly vouched for the 
credibility of the child witness. 
¶89 Haseltine, Jensen and Krueger, do not allow a social 
worker to offer an opinion as to whether a witness showed signs 
of dishonesty.  Instead, our precedent permits an expert to 
testify about the behaviors of victims of abuse and the 
objective signs or behaviors of coaching.  An expert may offer 
an opinion regarding whether a witness showed signs of coaching 
only after providing a foundation by testifying about the 
objective signs or behaviors of coaching and whether a witness 
exhibited those signs.  Krueger, 314 Wis. 2d 605, ¶15 n.10. 
¶90 Under the majority's expansion of the law, every 
qualified expert could offer a conclusion regarding whether a 
witness showed signs of dishonesty or coaching provided that she 
                                                                                                                                                             
All we know from the social worker's testimony is that in 
addition to using non-leading questions and a body diagram, the 
technique consists of the following three component parts:  (1) 
make sure the child understands the difference between truth and 
lies, and the consequences of a lie; (2) assess the consistency 
in the child's story; and (3) administer an oath to the child to 
tell the truth.  There is nothing special or scientific about 
these component parts (As a parent of four children I had 
several occasions to use this approach, although I usually did 
not administer an oath.). 
Whether a witness qualifies as an expert under the Daubert 
standard is engendering substantial debate and litigation in 
this state.  However, it is not at issue in this case.  
Nevertheless, the majority reaches out——without benefit of 
briefs or oral argument——to analyze and decide whether this 
witness, employing the "cognitive graphic interview" technique, 
is a qualified expert witness.  In determining that she is, the 
majority appears to be implicitly deciding that her testimony 
meets the Daubert standard. 
No.  2015AP366-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
was properly qualified as a witness.  The Haseltine rule, which 
the majority purports to follow, would be swallowed by the 
exceptions. 
II 
¶91 I turn next to address whether the testimony in this 
case is permissible under the Haseltine rule or one of the 
limited exceptions set forth in Haseltine, Jensen and Krueger.  
The expert testified that during the interview there was no 
indication that the witness was dishonest.   Additionally, 
without any foundational testimony regarding the objective signs 
or behaviors of coaching, the expert confirmed that there was no 
"indication that [the witness] had been coached in any way 
during her interview."  I address each in turn. 
A 
¶92 In determining the expert could testify that she saw 
no indication of dishonesty, the majority violates the essential 
Haseltine rule and allows purported social science to usurp the 
jury's role as the lie detector in the courtroom. 
¶93 The majority acknowledges that when "[v]iewed in 
isolation, a question about indications of whether a witness was 
'being honest' would seem to go more directly to truthfulness 
than a question about indications of coaching."  Majority op., 
¶49.  However, the majority excuses this testimony by reasoning 
that "[h]ere, though, we are not viewing Gainey's testimony in 
insolation, but rather, we view it in the context of a cognitive 
graphic interview."  Id. 
No.  2015AP366-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
¶94 It reasons that "[a]ny concerns we may have that 
Gainey was commenting on K.L.'s veracity were addressed during 
Gainey's testimony in that Gainey was clear that a 'cognitive 
graphic 
interview' 
technique 
helps 
only 
to 
increase 
the 
reliability of allegations from children."  Id., ¶50.  According 
to the majority, "[t]he forensic interview techniques used today 
are accepted among experts and courts as effective tools for 
investigating child sexual assault allegations because these 
methods minimize the risk of false allegations of abuse that 
result from a child's vulnerability to suggestion and coaching."  
Id., ¶28. 
¶95 There is no basis for the flexibility the majority 
finds in the law.  Wisconsin precedent is clear and unambiguous 
that "[u]nder no circumstances may the expert venture an opinion 
about whether the subject is being truthful or whether the crime 
occurred."  7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice Series: 
Wisconsin Evidence § 608.3, at 489-90 (3rd ed. 2008); see also 
Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d at 96; Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d at 256-57; 
Krueger, 314 Wis. 2d 605, ¶19; State v. Romero, 147 Wis. 2d 264, 
278, 432 N.W.2d 899 (1988). 
¶96 The law does not place as much faith in interview 
techniques as does the majority.  Social science, as the 
majority 
acknowledges, 
may 
be 
deemed 
reliable 
today 
and 
unreliable in the future.  See majority op., ¶27. 
¶97 Indeed, experts and commentators agree that "the 
fields of [mind sciences] have not developed to a point where 
these 
practitioners 
are 
likely 
to 
be 
better 
judges 
of 
No.  2015AP366-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
truthfulness than a lay jury."  7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin 
Practice 
Series: 
Wisconsin 
Evidence 
§ 608.3, 
at 
485.  
Consequently, the law of evidence "remains justifiably skeptical 
of the role of the various mind sciences in assessing 
credibility, as best seen in the blanket exclusion of polygraph 
evidence."  Id. at 485-86. 
¶98 This court has recognized that a psychiatrist has "no 
specialized ability to assess the truthfulness of [a witness's] 
account."  State v. Kleser, 2010 WI 88, ¶105, 328 Wis. 2d 42, 
786 N.W.2d 144 (citing State v. Moran, 728 P.2d 248, 255 (Ariz. 
1986) (citing People v. Bledsoe, 681 P.2d 291, 300 (Cal. 1984) 
("Psychologists and psychiatrists are not, and do not claim to 
be, experts at discerning the truth.  Psychiatrists are trained 
to accept facts provided by their patients, not to act as judges 
of patients' credibility.")).  As Haseltine cautioned, an 
expert's opinion on truthfulness provides only an "aura of 
scientific reliability," which must not replace the jury as the 
lie detector in the courtroom.  See 120 Wis. 2d at 95. 
¶99 Accordingly, it the proper role of the jury, and not 
an expert witness, to determine whether a witness is truthful.  
Id. at 96.  The jury in this case had the opportunity to watch 
the child witness's videotaped testimony and observe her 
testimony at trial.  By concluding that the context of a 
"cognitive graphic interview" permits an expert to testify about 
a witness's truthfulness, the majority allows social science to 
usurp the jury's role as lie detector in the courtroom. 
No.  2015AP366-CR.awb 
 
11 
 
¶100 The 
majority 
repeatedly 
contends, 
however, 
that 
because the expert did not use the word "opinion," and instead 
said that she saw no "indications" of dishonesty, her testimony 
will aid the jury.  It errs because as this court has explained, 
the vouching rule does not become "inapplicable simply because a 
witness does not use specific words such as 'I believe X is 
telling the truth' . . . "  Kleser, 328 Wis. 2d 42, ¶102.  
Indeed, "[t]here is no requirement that an expert explicitly 
testify that she believes a person is telling the truth for an 
expert's opinion to constitute improper vouching testimony."  
Id. 
¶101 A "requirement that specific words be used would 
permit the rule to be circumvented easily."  Id.  That is 
exactly what the majority allows the State to do here, when it 
determines 
that 
the 
expert's 
testimony 
that 
she 
saw 
no 
indications of dishonesty is admissible. 
¶102 Contrary to the majority's assertions, this testimony 
is not admissible even if it addresses a witness's truthfulness 
only in the context of a cognitive graphic interview.  Haseltine 
prohibits expert testimony regarding a witness's credibility and 
therefore prohibits the expert's testimony about whether the 
witness was being honest during her interview.  120 Wis. 2d at 
96.  A unanimous court of appeals determined that this testimony 
clearly crossed the Haseltine line.  I agree. 
B 
¶103 Next I address whether the expert's testimony that she 
saw no indications that the witness had been coached is 
No.  2015AP366-CR.awb 
 
12 
 
permissible under one of the limited exceptions set forth in 
Haseltine, Jensen and Krueger.  I begin by invoking and 
paraphrasing the maxim:  the majority may be entitled to develop 
its own opinion, but it is not entitled to develop its own 
facts.  Out of whole cloth, the majority develops its own 
factual record, which even the State concedes is nonexistent. 
¶104 Haseltine and Jensen permit expert testimony about the 
typical behavior of victims of abuse.  Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d at 
97; Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d at 246.  The expert's testimony in this 
case did not address the typical behavior of victims of abuse, 
such as a delay in reporting or acting out in school.  
Consequently, I need not further address this limited exception. 
Instead, the testimony here focused on the interview process.  
Thus, I examine the limited exception for coaching testimony 
derived from an interview and permitted under Krueger. 
¶105 Krueger 
reasoned that testimony about whether a 
child's behavior during an interview is consistent with the 
behavior of like-aged children could both help a jury understand 
the interview and rebut a defense theory of coaching.  314 
Wis. 2d 605, ¶14.  Under Krueger, admissible testimony addresses 
"objective signs or behavior" such as a child's ability to 
supply peripheral details of the alleged incident, the use of 
language that reflects the word usage of an adult, or the 
reporting of information not appropriate for the developmental 
level of the child.  Id., ¶15 n.10. 
¶106 The expert in this case gave none of the foundational 
testimony that Krueger requires.  Without any foundational 
No.  2015AP366-CR.awb 
 
13 
 
testimony 
regarding 
the 
objective 
signs 
or 
behaviors 
of 
coaching, the expert witness baldly concluded that there was no 
indication that the witness had been coached in any way during 
her interview. 
¶107 To 
fill 
a 
void 
in 
the 
record, 
the 
majority 
reconfigures the expert's testimony here.  It asserts that she 
"provided background information as context for her testimony in 
regard to the indications of coaching and dishonesty during the 
cognitive graphic interview."  Majority op., ¶43.  Not only is 
there no support for this assertion in the trial transcript, 
even the State did not contend that she testified about any 
objective signs or behaviors of coaching. 
¶108 At oral argument, counsel for the State repeatedly 
conceded that the proper foundation had not been laid for the 
social worker's conclusions that she saw no indication of 
coaching.  When the State's counsel was asked what objective 
indications the expert observed, he responded: 
 "I understand that we didn't have the foundation.  I 
concede that.  We don't have the foundation. It's not 
there." 
 "If you're asking what is the foundation in this case, 
there wasn't very much of a foundation." 
 "Well this gets back to Justice Abrahamson's question 
about whether there was this foundation here and I'd 
have to say that I don't know, the record doesn't tell 
us." 
No.  2015AP366-CR.awb 
 
14 
 
¶109 Rather than determine that the expert impermissibly 
opined that the witness showed no indications of coaching, the 
majority over-reaches by sua sponte attempting to lay the 
foundation for the testimony.  Indeed, the majority tells the 
reader everything the expert should have told the jury, but did 
not. 
¶110 Relying on a journal article, the majority informs the 
reader that a child's inability to supply information on her 
own, the use of adult language, giving vague or inconsistent 
accounts, and refusing to discuss details of the abuse are all 
objective indications of coaching or suggestibility.  Majority 
op., ¶¶31-32 (citing August Piper, Investigating Child Sex Abuse 
Allegations:  A Guide to Help Legal Professionals Distinguish 
Valid from Invalid Claims, 36 J. Psychiatry & L. 271, 302-03 
(2008)). 
¶111 Given its lengthy recitation of the indications of 
coaching an expert might identify during a cognitive graphic 
interview, the majority opinion might lead the reader to believe 
that the expert discussed these indications during her trial 
testimony.  She did not.  Although the majority's discussion may 
be informative, it does not remedy the fact that none of the 
objective signs or behaviors of coaching was presented to the 
jury. 
¶112 Without the necessary foundation, the social worker's 
testimony does not assist the jury in making a credibility 
determination——it instead makes that determination for the jury.  
All that the jury was told is that the expert concluded that she 
No.  2015AP366-CR.awb 
 
15 
 
saw no indications of coaching.  This contravenes Haseltine's 
prohibition because it does not fall within the limited 
exception allowing for objective signs of coaching under 
Krueger. 
¶113 The 
Krueger 
court 
provided 
specific 
guidance, 
carefully circumscribing the bounds of permissible testimony.  
It cautioned that "testimony regarding coaching may more readily 
border on truthfulness, as compared to the analysis of reactive 
behavior."  314 Wis. 2d 605, ¶15 n.10; see also id., ¶21 (Brown, 
C.J., concurring).  Unfortunately, the majority heeded neither 
the 
caution 
nor 
the 
bounds 
of 
permissible 
testimony. 
Accordingly, the coaching testimony here is inadmissible because 
without the necessary foundational testimony, it violates the 
Haseltine rule. 
III 
 
¶114 Because I conclude that the social worker's testimony 
impermissibly vouched for the credibility of the witness, I 
address next whether Maday received ineffective assistance of 
counsel when his trial counsel failed to object to the expert 
testimony. 
¶115 Maday must demonstrate that his trial counsel's 
performance was deficient and that the deficient performance 
prejudiced his defense in order to prevail on a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  To show prejudice, a defendant must 
demonstrate that there is "a reasonable probability that, but 
for 
counsel's 
unprofessional 
errors, 
the 
result 
of 
the 
No.  2015AP366-CR.awb 
 
16 
 
proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable probability 
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome."  Id. at 694. 
¶116 Several Wisconsin cases have addressed whether the 
admission of impermissible Haseltine testimony is prejudicial 
pursuant to Strickland when a defendant's trial is a pure 
credibility contest.  See, e.g., Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d at 96; 
Krueger, 314 Wis. 2d 605, ¶¶17-19.  All have concluded that such 
testimony is prejudicial because it undermines confidence in the 
reliability of the outcome of the trial.  See, e.g., Krueger, 
314 Wis. 2d 605, ¶20; Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d at 96. 
¶117 Of particular import, the Krueger court concluded that 
whether the victim's account of a sexual assault is corroborated 
by 
independent 
evidence 
is 
significant 
in 
determining 
performance and prejudice.  314 Wis. 2d 605, ¶18.  Krueger 
explained 
that 
because 
the 
issue 
at 
trial 
was 
one 
of 
credibility, the expert's opinion, "with its aura of scientific 
reliability, creates too great a possibility that the jury 
abdicated its fact-finding role to the psychiatrist and did not 
independently decide [the defendant's] guilt."  Id. (quoting 
Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d at 96). 
¶118 The court in Krueger concluded that the risk of 
prejudice was too great in a one-on-one credibility battle:  
"[t]here 
is 
a 
significant 
possibility 
that 
the 
jurors . . . simply deferred to witnesses with experience in 
evaluating the truthfulness of victims of crime.").  Id., ¶18 
(citing Romero, 147 Wis. 2d at 279).  This "possibility gives 
No.  2015AP366-CR.awb 
 
17 
 
rise to the reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel's 
error, the jury would have had a reasonable doubt respecting 
guilt."  Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695). 
¶119 Here, there was no physical or DNA evidence introduced 
at trial so the main issue was whether the child or Maday was 
more credible.  This scenario, as discussed above, enhances the 
risk of prejudice.  To tip the balance, Maday offered 
inconsistencies between the child witness's testimony in the 
videotaped interview and her testimony at trial.  However, such 
evidence pales in comparison to the potency of an "expert" 
vouching for the credibility of the child. 
¶120 The prosecutor's closing argument further amplified 
the improper influence of the expert's testimony by emphasizing 
that the expert did not observe indications that the victim "was 
lying": 
You [] got to hear from a social worker who was 
specially trained to conduct these interviews. She 
told you there was nothing that she saw that indicated 
that [the witness] had been coached or that she was 
lying. Neither of those things were present during her 
interview with [the witness]. 
In fact, one of the purposes of that specific 
interview technique that she uses is to remind the 
child there are consequences for lying. . . . [A]nd 
again, there was nothing to indicate that [the 
witness] 
was 
making 
anything 
up. 
That’s 
called 
reliability, and it makes [the witness's] account more 
credible. 
This testimony that the witness was not lying or making anything 
up "clouded the crucial issue of credibility."  Romero, 147 
Wis. 2d at 267. 
No.  2015AP366-CR.awb 
 
18 
 
¶121 Thus, similar to Krueger, there is too great of a risk 
that the jury abdicated its fact-finding role to the expert 
witness.  Contrary to the majority's assertion, a standard 
instruction advising the jury that it is to be the sole judge of 
credibility is insufficient to cure the problem.  This standard 
instruction was likely given in every case where an expert's 
testimony 
was 
deemed 
impermissible 
under 
Haseltine 
and 
prejudicial under Strickland. 
¶122 The risk that the jury abdicated its fact-finding role 
to the expert gives rise to the reasonable probability that, but 
for trial counsel's error, the jury would have had a reasonable 
doubt regarding Maday's guilt.  Because counsel's error is 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the 
proceeding, I determine that Maday was prejudiced.  See Krueger, 
314 Wis. 2d 605, ¶18 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 
¶123 In sum, I conclude that the social worker's expert 
testimony impermissibly vouched for the credibility of the child 
witness.  The testimony that she saw no indications of 
dishonesty simply crosses the line drawn by Haseltine.  Although 
the testimony addressing indications of coaching may fall within 
a Haseltine exception if the proper factual foundation is 
established, no such foundation exists in this record. 
¶124 I further conclude that Maday's trial counsel was 
ineffective by failing to object to this testimony.  Thus, I 
would affirm the court of appeals opinion reversing a circuit 
court order denying Maday's motion for postconviction relief.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
No.  2015AP366-CR.awb 
 
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¶125 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
No.  2015AP366-CR.awb 
 
 
 
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