Title: Schefer v. City Council of Falls Church

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan,1 Koontz, Lemons, Goodwyn, and 
Millette, JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 
 
ANTON E.B. SCHEFER 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 090803 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
 
 
      April 15, 2010 
CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF  
FALLS CHURCH 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 
William T. Newman, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether a zoning ordinance, 
which establishes different building height regulations on 
one-family dwellings in the same zoning district, violates the 
provisions of Code § 15.2-2282.  We also consider an equal 
protection challenge to that zoning ordinance. 
BACKGROUND 
 
The material facts are not in dispute.  Anton E.B. 
Schefer2 owns 12 lots in the City of Falls Church (the “City”), 
all of which are zoned R1-B, a medium-density residential 
district.  Falls Church City Code § 38-17 (2006).3  Under the 
                     
1 Justice Keenan participated in the hearing and decision 
of this case prior to her retirement from the Court on March 
10, 2010. 
2 Schefer died on February 18, 2010 during the pendency of 
this appeal.  Counsel for Schefer filed a motion for this 
Court to retain jurisdiction pursuant to Code § 8.01-20.  In 
its reply, the City did not oppose the motion.  We granted the 
motion by order dated March 15, 2010. 
3 All references to the Falls Church City Code contained 
in this opinion relate to the 2006 version since the parties 
and the circuit court relied exclusively on this version 
below.  Since 2006, the City’s code has been renumbered and 
City’s zoning ordinance, the minimum lot area requirement for 
one-family dwellings in the R1-B zoning district is 7,500 
square feet.  Falls Church City Code § 38-17(e)(1).  Lots, 
such as those owned by Schefer, that are comprised of a lot 
area of less than 7,500 square feet, but were lawfully created 
prior to this requirement, are designated as “Substandard 
lots” under the City’s zoning ordinance.  Falls Church City 
Code § 38-28(b)(2). 
 
In 2006, the City adopted Zoning Ordinance 1799, amending 
the permissible height and yard set-back regulations for a 
one-family dwelling on substandard lots throughout the City’s 
residential districts.  Falls Church City Code § 38-28(b)(2) 
(as amended Dec. 11, 2006).  Prior to the enactment of this 
ordinance, the maximum building height for “residential use” 
on all lots in the R1-B zoning district was “the lesser of 
thirty-five (35) feet or two and one-half (2½) stories.”  
Falls Church City Code § 38-17(e)(4).  With the enactment of 
Ordinance 1799, the City created a formula for calculating the 
allowable building height of one-family dwellings on 
substandard lots within the City’s “R” (residential) zoning 
districts.  Falls Church City Code § 38-28(b)(2).  That 
formula provides that “substandard lot building height shall 
                                                                
portions have been amended.  The amendments are not pertinent 
to the issues presented in this appeal. 
 
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be determined as a ratio of actual lot area to the required 
lot area, multiplied by the maximum allowable height in the 
underlying zoning district.  However, the substandard lot 
building height shall not be required to be less than twenty 
five (25) feet.”  Id.  Thus, the maximum height of one-family 
dwellings on substandard lots in the R1-B zoning district will 
range between 25 to 35 feet, depending on the size of each 
lot.  The maximum height of one-family dwellings on “standard” 
lots in the R1-B zoning district remains 35 feet.  
 
Schefer hired a licensed surveyor to evaluate the 
potential impact of Ordinance 1799 on one of his substandard 
lots.  The surveyor first determined that the lot’s actual 
area of 6,007 square feet when compared to the required lot 
area of 7,500 square feet presented a ratio of 0.8010.  
Multiplying 0.8010 by the maximum allowable height of 35 feet, 
the surveyor concluded that 28.04 feet was the maximum 
building height allowed for this lot. 
 
Thereafter, Schefer filed a declaratory judgment action 
against the City,4 claiming that Ordinance 1799 violates the 
provisions of Code § 15.2-2282 and deprives him of equal 
protection under the law.  The parties subsequently filed a 
joint statement of facts and cross-motions for summary 
                     
4 Specifically, the “City Council of the City of Falls 
Church, Virginia” was named as the defendant.  
 
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judgment.  After conducting a hearing on the motions, the 
circuit court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment, 
denied Schefer’s motion for partial summary judgment, and 
dismissed Schefer’s case with prejudice.   
 
We awarded Schefer this appeal, which presents only 
questions of law to review de novo.  Board of Zoning Appeals 
v. Board of Supervisors, 276 Va. 550, 552, 666 S.E.2d 315, 316 
(2008).  
DISCUSSION  
 
Schefer asserts that Ordinance 1799 should be declared 
void because it is in plain violation of Code § 15.2-2282.  
The thrust of his assertion is that the express language of 
Code § 15.2-2282 prevents the City from imposing different 
building height regulations on one-family dwellings in the R1-
B zoning district based solely on lot size.  Thus, the focus 
of our analysis of this issue is whether Ordinance 1799 
violates the requirement of Code § 15.2-2282 that “[a]ll 
zoning regulations shall be uniform for each class or kind of 
buildings and uses throughout each district.”  In this regard, 
Schefer maintains that “uniform” means “identical.” 
 
Schefer also asserts an equal protection challenge to 
Ordinance 1799.  Schefer contends that Ordinance 1799 is 
facially discriminatory and, thus, unconstitutional on its 
face.  Additionally, Schefer maintains that the City failed to 
 
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establish that Ordinance 1799 is “substantially related to the 
public health, safety, or welfare.”  See Board of Supervisors 
v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128, 140, 216 S.E.2d 199, 210 (1975).  
 
We begin our review of Schefer’s challenges to Ordinance 
1799 with the well-established Dillon Rule of strict 
construction.  The Dillon Rule “provides that ‘municipal 
corporations have only those powers that are expressly 
granted, those necessarily or fairly implied from expressly 
granted powers, and those that are essential and 
indispensable.’ ”  Marble Techs., Inc. v. City of Hampton, 279 
Va. 409, 417, 690 S.E.2d 84, 88 (2010) (quoting Board of 
Zoning Appeals, 276 Va. at 553-54, 666 S.E.2d at 317); accord 
Board of Supervisors v. Countryside Investment Co., 258 Va. 
497, 502-05, 522 S.E.2d 610, 612-14 (1999); City of Chesapeake 
v. Gardner Enters., 253 Va. 243, 246, 482 S.E.2d 812, 814 
(1997).  Thus, “[w]hen a local ordinance exceeds the scope of 
this authority, the ordinance is invalid.”  City of 
Chesapeake, 253 Va. at 246, 482 S.E.2d at 814; see also Board 
of Supervisors v. Reed’s Landing Corp., 250 Va. 397, 400, 463 
S.E.2d 668, 670 (1995) (“If there is a reasonable doubt 
whether legislative power exists, the doubt must be resolved 
against the local governing body.”).  There is no dispute that 
pursuant to Code § 15.2-2280 the General Assembly has 
authorized any locality by ordinance to zone the territory in 
 
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its jurisdiction.  Code § 15.2-2282 addresses the scope of 
this general authority.  
 
Code § 15.2-2282 provides that “[a]ll zoning regulations 
shall be uniform for each class or kind of buildings and uses 
throughout each district, but the regulations in one district 
may differ from those in other districts.”  This requirement, 
commonly referred to as the “uniformity requirement,” was 
modeled after § 2 of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act 
(“SSZEA”), published by the United States Department of 
Commerce in 1926, which states in part that all zoning 
“regulations shall be uniform for each class or kind of 
buildings throughout each district, but the regulations in one 
district may differ from those in other districts.”  SSZEA §2 
at 6 (emphasis added).  This or a similar requirement appears 
in the zoning enabling acts of nearly every state.  1 Patricia 
E. Salkin, American Law of Zoning § 6:25 (5th ed. 2009).  
Virginia clearly adopted the SSZEA language verbatim, with the 
exception of adding “uses” to its requirement.  
 
The crux of the uniformity requirement is to assure that 
zoning regulations are nondiscriminatory.  See, e.g., Anderson 
House, LLC v. Mayor & City Council of Rockville, 939 A.2d 116, 
131 (Md. 2008) (“Many jurisdictions agree that the kind of 
discrimination violative of the uniformity requirement occurs 
when a zoning ordinance singles out a property or properties 
 
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for different treatment than others similarly situated.”); see 
also Harris v. Zoning Comm’n, 788 A.2d 1239, 1258 (Conn. 2002) 
(“The thrust of the statutory requirement of uniformity is 
equal treatment.”); Rumson Estates, Inc. v. Mayor & Council of 
the Borough of Fair Haven, 828 A.2d 317, 329-30 (N.J. 2003) 
(“Uniformity is not absolute and rational regulations based on 
different conditions within a zone are permissible so long as 
similarly  situated property is treated the same.”).  As the 
drafters of the SSZEA noted, “[The uniformity requirement] is 
important, not so much for legal reasons as because it gives 
notice to property owners that there shall be no improper 
discriminations, but that all in the same class shall be 
treated alike.”  SSZEA §2, at 6 n.19; see also 1 Salkin, 
supra, at § 6:25. 
 
Likewise, we declared in Bell v. City Council of 
Charlottesville, 224 Va. 490, 496-97, 297 S.E.2d 810, 814 
(1982) that the uniformity requirement “is in reality a 
statutory reaffirmation of the equal protection of the law 
guaranteed to all persons by the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution.”  Generally, under an equal protection analysis, 
“[w]hen a land use permitted to one landowner is restricted to 
another similarly situated, the restriction is discriminatory, 
and, if not substantially related to the public health, 
 
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safety, or welfare, constitutes a denial of equal protection 
of the laws.”  Rowe, 216 Va. at 140, 216 S.E.2d at 210. 
 
With these principles in mind, we resolve the issue 
whether Ordinance 1799 violates Code § 15.2-2282 by examining 
the plain language of the statute.  See Logan v. City Council, 
275 Va. 483, 492, 659 S.E.2d 296, 301 (2008) (“We determine 
the General Assembly’s intent from the words employed in the 
statutes.”); City of Richmond v. Confrere Club of Richmond, 
239 Va. 77, 80, 387 S.E.2d 471, 473 (1990) (“Legislative 
intent is determined from the plain meaning of the words 
used.”).  Code § 15.2-2282 requires uniform zoning regulations 
“for each class or kind of buildings and uses throughout each 
district.” (emphasis added).  By its plain terms, the 
uniformity requirement applies only to those “buildings and 
uses” of the same “class or kind.” 
 
Schefer maintains that one-family dwellings are 
“buildings and uses” of the same “class or kind” and, 
therefore, the City must impose identical building height 
regulations on standard and substandard lots in the R1-B 
zoning district.  We conclude, however, that this case is 
equally about two “kind[s]” of “uses” as contemplated by Code 
§ 15.2-2282, that is residential use on standard lots and 
residential use on substandard lots.  There is no dispute that 
the City uniformly applies its building height regulations for 
 
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one-family dwellings on standard lots and uniformly applies 
its building height regulations for one-family dwellings on 
substandard lots in the R1-B zoning district.  In sum, under 
Ordinance 1799 the building height regulations for one-family 
dwellings on all substandard lots are applied identically, and 
those regulations for one-family dwellings on standard lots 
are applied identically.  We thus hold that Ordinance 1799 
does not violate the uniformity requirement of Code § 15.2-
2282.  
 
We now turn to Schefer’s equal protection challenge.  We 
review this challenge in accordance with the following well-
settled principles: 
The legislative branch of a local government in the 
exercise of its police power has wide discretion in 
the enactment and amendment of zoning ordinances. 
Its action is presumed to be valid so long as it is 
not unreasonable and arbitrary.  The burden of proof 
is on him who assails it to prove that it is clearly 
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that it 
bears no reasonable or substantial relation to the 
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. 
The [C]ourt will not substitute its judgment for 
that of a legislative body, and if the 
reasonableness of a zoning ordinance is fairly 
debatable it must be sustained.   
 
Board of Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 660, 107 S.E.2d 
390, 395 (1959) (emphasis added).  Moreover, “[w]hen 
presumptive reasonableness ‘is challenged by probative 
evidence of unreasonableness, the challenge must be met by 
evidence of reasonableness.’ ”  Board of Supervisors v. 
 
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McDonald’s Corp., 261 Va. 583, 590, 544 S.E.2d 334, 339 (2001) 
(quoting Board of Supervisors v. Jackson, 221 Va. 328, 333, 
269 S.E.2d 381, 385 (1980)) (emphasis added); see also Kisley 
v. City of Falls Church, 212 Va. 693, 697, 187 S.E.2d 168, 171 
(1972) (“the presumption governs unless it is overcome by 
unreasonableness apparent on the face of the ordinance”). 
 
Schefer contends that the City has failed to meet its 
burden by failing to offer evidence of the reasonableness of 
Ordinance 1799.  Yet, as the party challenging a presumptively 
reasonable zoning ordinance, Schefer has the initial burden of 
offering evidence of its unreasonableness.  Schefer, however, 
has consistently maintained that Ordinance 1799 is facially 
discriminatory and that its “reasonableness or lack thereof is 
irrelevant.”  Because Ordinance 1799 is not inherently suspect 
and does not infringe upon the exercise of a fundamental 
right, we reject Schefer’s assertion that it is facially 
discriminatory.  See Estes Funeral Home v. Adkins, 266 Va. 
297, 304, 586 S.E.2d 162, 165 (2003); Cupp v. Board of 
Supervisors, 227 Va. 580, 596, 318 S.E.2d 407, 415 (1984).  
Accordingly, we conclude that Schefer did not present 
sufficient evidence to show that Ordinance 1799 is 
unreasonable and, thus, failed to rebut the presumption of its 
validity.   
 
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CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons, we will affirm the circuit court’s 
judgment awarding summary judgment in favor of the City.  
Affirmed. 
 
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