Title: Nevada State Board of Architecture v. District Court

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

435 Nev, Advance Opinion 47
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

NEVADA STATE BOARD OF
ARCHITECTURE, INTERIOR DESIGN
AND RESIDENTIAL DESIGN,
Petitioner, FILED
vs.
‘THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT ocr #5 28
COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, gh
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
CLARK; AND THE HONORABLE
KATHLEEN E. DELANEY, DISTRICT
JUDGE,
Respondents,

and
DENNIS E. RUSK,
Real Party in Interest.

No. 76792

 

Original petition for a writ of prohibition challenging a district

 

court order denying a motion to dismiss a petition for judicial review in a
professional licensing matter.

Petition granted.
Louis A. Ling, Reno,
for Petitioner.

Nersesian & Sankiewicz and Robert A. Nersesian, Las Vegas,
for Real Party in Interest.

 

1A-HOId

 
BEFORE HARDESTY, STIGLICH and SILVER, JJ.

OPINION
By the Court, STIGLICH, J.:

We grant this petition for a writ of prohibition to clarify that
premature petitions for judicial review do not vest subject’ matter
jurisdiction in the district court. A petition for judicial review may not
precede the administrative agency decision it contests, and the agency
decision must satisfy NRS 233B. 125 in order to constitute a decision subject
to judicial review. The underlying petition for judicial review was filed after
the administrative agency stated its disposition on the record, but that
utterance did not include findings of fact and conclusions of law with a
concise and explicit statement of the underlying facts in support. The
disposition that was stated on the record accordingly did not constitute a
final decision for purposes of commencing the period set forth in NRS
233B.130(2Xa) in which an aggrieved party may seek judicial review.
Consequently, because the underlying petition for judicial review was filed
before the administrative agency's written order, which did constitute a
final decision, the petition failed to comply with the relevant statutory
requirements. Accordingly, the petition did not vest jurisdiction in the
district court. Dismissal is an appropriate remedy where the district court
lacks jurisdiction. Because the district court incorrectly concluded that the
agency's oral decision as stated on the record was subject to challenge by
judicial review when it denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss, we grant the
petition for a writ of prohibition and direct the district court to grant

  

petitioner’s motion to dismiss.

 

 

 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Real party in interest Dennis Rusk was a licensed architect in
Nevada. In 2011, the Nevada State Board of Architecture, Interior Design
and Residential Design (Board) held a hearing on two complaints that
alleged that Rusk’s designs failed to include required fire-and-life-safety
design elements. The Board concluded that Rusk violated Nevada law and
ordered that Rusk pay a fine, pay the Board's fees and costs, complete
certain courses while his registration as an architect was placed on
probation, and submit to related conditions on these mandates. Rusk
petitioned the district court for judicial review of the Board's decision, and
the district court affirmed. Rusk appealed that affirmance to this court, and
wwe dismissed the appeal for failure to timely file an opening brief. Rusk v.
Nev. State Bd. of Architecture, Interior Design & Residential Design, Docket
No. 61844 (Order Dismissing Appeal, July 30, 2013).

In 2016, Rusk moved to vacate the Board's disciplinary order in
light of newly discovered evidence, and the Board denied Rusk’s motion.
The district court granted Rusk’s subsequent petition for judicial review
and remanded to the Board with a mandate to consider whether to vacate
its 2011 disciplinary order in light of newly discovered evidence. On
October 25, 2017, the Board held a hearing pursuant to the district court’s
mandate and unanimously passed an oral motion to deny Rusk relief and
uphold the original disciplinary order. ‘The Board stated its disposition on
the record without discussing specific findings of fact or conclusions of law

supporting its decision and announced that a written order would be
forthcoming. On November 9, 2017, before the Board filed its written order,

 

 
Rusk petitioned for judicial review of the Board’s oral October 25 decision,
On December 1, 2017, the Board issued its written order. On January 9,
2018, and without Rusk having supplemented his petition after the Board's
December 1 order, the Board moved to dismiss Rusk’s petition as
jurisdictionally infirm. The district court denied the Board’s motion,
concluding that the Board's oral decision at the October 25 hearing was a
sufficient basis for Rusk’s petition for judicial review. The Board petitioned
this court for a writ of prohibition to challenge the district court’s order
denying its motion to dismiss.
DISCUSSION

‘The Board petitions for a writ of prohibition, arguing that NRS
233B.130(2X@) sets forth a mandatory jurisdictional requirement and that
the district court did not have jurisdiction to consider Rusk’s petition for
judicial review because he did not file it in the 30-day period after the
Board's written decision. Whether a district court may exercise jurisdiction
over a premature petition for judicial review is a matter of first impression.

A writ of prohibition may issue when a district court acts
without or in excess of its jurisdiction and the petitioner lacks a plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy at law. NRS 34.320; NRS 34.330; Smith v.
Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 107 Nev. 674, 677, 818 P.2d 849, 851 (1991).
Whether a writ of prohibition will issue is within this court's sole discretion.
‘Smith, 107 Nev. at 677, 818 P.2d at 851. Petitioners bear the burden of
showing that this court's extraordinary intervention is warranted. Club
Vista Fin. Servs., LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 128 Nev. 224, 228,
276 P.3d 246, 249 (2012). This case presents a jurisdictional issue of first

 

 
impression and accordingly warrants consideration on the merits. See Bd.
of Review, Nev. Dep't of Emp't v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 133 Nev. 253,
255, 396 P.3d 795, 797 (2017).

An administrative agency's order must contain detailed findings of fact and
conclusions of law to constitute a final decision for purposes of judicial
review

Before considering the effect of a prematurely filed petition for
judicial review, we must determine whether the Board's oral October 25,
2017, order constituted a final decision for purposes of NRS Chapter 233B.

We review matters of statutory interpretation de novo. Liberty
Mut. v. Thomasson, 130 Nev. 27, 30, 317 P.3d 831, 833 (2014). Nevada's
Administrative Procedure Act (NAPA), codified at NRS Chapter 233B,
provides for judicial review of administrative decisions. Id. at 30, 317 P.3d
at 834. NRS 233B.130(2Xd) requires a petition to be filed after service of
an administrative agency's final decision. NRS 233B.125 provides that a
final decision “must be in writing or stated in the record} . .. must include
findings of fact and conclusions of law,...must be based upon a
preponderance of the evidence[,]. . . [and] must be accompanied by a concise
and explicit statement of the underlying facts supporting the findings.” The
final decision requirements ensure that the decision has sufficient detail to
satisfy due process and permit judicial review. State, Dep't of Commerce v.
Hyt, 96 Nev. 494, 496, 611 P.2d 1096, 1098 (1980).

‘The Board's statement of its disposition in the record lacked the

requisite findings of fact and conclusions of law to constitute a final decision
pursuant to NRS 233B.125. At the conclusion of the October 25, 2017,
hearing, one of the board members moved to uphold the Board’s 2011

 

 

 
disciplinary order, the motion was seconded, the board members
unanimously voted to affirm the 2011 order, and the chairman announced
that a written order would be drafted and circulated. No further statement
of the decision’s basis or reasoning was made. A board member assented to
Rusk’s counsel that nothing would take effect and no limitations period
would begin to run until the written order was produced.t As the Board's
October 25 disposition as stated in the record summarily presented its
ruling without any further legal or factual explanation, the October 25
disposition was not a final decision under NRS 233B.125 for purposes of
commencing the NRS 233B.130(2Xd) filing period. See Poremba v. S. Nev.
Paving, 133 Nev. 12, 14, 20, 388 P.3d 232, 235, 239 (2017) (concluding that
an administrative appeals officer's summary disposition without detailed

"The following colloquy between Rusk’s counsel Robert Nersesian and
board members took place:

Mr. Mickey: . .. Motion carries. With that, I believe
the next step is that we must draw up an order. So
he if—I—I can't if you would get that please and we
could go ahead and get the order crafted. Thank
you.

Mr. Nersesian: Thank you.

Mr. Mickey: And we will adjourn.

Mr. Nersesian: So I will get an order and nothing is
effective and no time frames are running until I get
the order?

 

Ms. Long: That’s correct.
Mr. Nersesian: Okay.

 

 
findings of fact or conclusions of law did not satisfy NRS 233B.125);
Dickinson v. Am. Med. Response, 124 Nev. 460, 469, 186 P.3d 878, 884
(2008) (same). In contrast, the Board's December 1, 2017, written order
contains a thorough explanation of the procedural history of this dispute,
detailed findings of fact regarding Rusk's professional performance and
whether the disputed evidence showed that Rusk met his professional
standard of care, and the Board's legal conclusion after considering Rusk’s
new evidence that Rusk violated Nevada law with regard to his work on the
projects, as alleged in the original disciplinary complaint. Accordingly, we
conclude that the period for Rusk to file a petition for judicial review to
challenge the Board's disposition did not begin to run with its October 25
oral decision but rather with its December 1 written order and that Rusk’s
November 9 petition for judicial review was prematurely filed.

Rusk’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. Rusk’s
argument that the October 25 oral order adopted the Board’s original 2011
disciplinary order and thus incorporated the 2011 findings of fact and
conclusions of law fails because the purpose of the 2017 hearing was to
investigate whether newly discovered evidence provided cause to vacate the
2011 order. Accordingly, new findings of fact and conclusions of law were
required to comply with the district court's mandate to the Board, and a
petition for judicial review of the Board’s 2017 disposition would need to
challenge the basis for that 2017 disposition. Further, Rusk’s reliance on

Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Windsor Hall Rest Home,
653 A2d 181 (Conn. 1995), is misplaced because that decision is

 

 
distinguishable. Unlike here, the administrative officer in Windsor Hall
orally stated thorough factual findings and legal conclusions that supported
the commission's decision, such that the basis for the decision was clear and
adequate for judicial review. 653 A.2d at 183-84. The Board did not proffer
findings and conclusions supporting and explaining its disposition until it,
produced the December 1 written order.

A prematurely filed petition for judicial review does not vest jurisdiction in
the district court

We look to the statutory language of NRS 233B.130(2) to
determine whether a prematurely filed petition for judicial review may be
considered. Petitions for judicial review must name the agency and all
parties of record to the administrative proceeding as respondents; be filed
in the district court in Carson City, in the county where the petitioner
resides, or in the county where the agency proceeding took place; be served
on the Attorney General or a person designated by the Attorney General
and on the person serving in the named agency's administrative head's
office; and “[ble filed within 30 days after service of the final decision of the
agency.” NRS 233B.130(2). Where a statute's meaning is unambiguous, we

 

give effect to the plain meaning of its language. Bd. of Review, 133 Nev. at
255, 396 P.3d at 797. NRS 233B.130(2) plainly states that the petition must,
be filed after service of the final decision. Rusk filed his petition 22 days
before the Board's order was filed, let alone served. A prematurely filed
petition like Rusk’s thus does not satisfy the NRS 233B.130(2)
requirements. Rusk’s argument that the provision creates a filing deadline,
rather than a filing period, fails because the petition must be filed “within

 

 
30 days after,” creating a period within which the relevant act must occur.
We have held that the requirements to name the agency, file the petition in
the proper venue, serve the petition on the Attorney General, and file the
petition within 30 days of the decision are mandatory and jurisdictional.
Heat & Frost Insulators & Allied Workers Local 16 v. Labor Comm'r, 134
Nev. 1, 4, 408 P.3d 156, 159 (2018); see also Washoe Cty. v. Otto, 128 Nev.
424, 432, 282 P.3d 719, 725 (2012) (requiring strict compliance with
statutory requirements for petitions for judicial review). Insofar as Rusk
argues that he had to file his petition prematurely to avoid being
procedurally barred had the Board's oral decision been a final decision, this
contention does not excuse his failure to satisfy the procedural
requirements of NRS 233B.130(2). Moreover, Rusk’s counsel was explicitly
told that the Board's decision would not take effect and the limitations
period would not begin until the written order was produced. We conclude
that a premature petition for judicial review does not satisfy the
jurisdictional requirement to timely file the petition. Accordingly, Rusk’s
premature petition for judicial review did not vest jurisdiction in the district

court,

 

 
CONCLUSION
Because the district court lacked jurisdiction over Rusk’s
petition for judicial review, we grant the Board's petition for extraordinary
relief. The clerk of this court shall issue a writ of prohibition directing the
district court to grant the Board’s motion to dismiss Rusk’s petition for
judicial review for lack of jurisdiction.? In light of this opinion, we vacate
the stay previously imposed by this court on October 12, 2018.

Aika AL 4
8

tiglich

We concur:

— than 4
Hardesty

 

reliance on Las Vegas Fetish & Fantasy Halloween Ball, Inc.
v. Ahern Rentals, Inc., 124 Nev. 272, 182 P.3d 764 (2008), is misplaced, as
that case is distinguishable. That decision treated the date to file a
memorandum of costs as creating a filing deadline, rather than a filing
period, and thus permitted a prematurely filed memorandum. 124 Nev. at
278, 182 P.3d at 768. Unlike the statutory requirements here, however, a
memorandum of costs is not jurisdictional, Eberle v. State ex rel. Nell d.
Redfield Tr., 108 Nev. 587, 590, 836 P.2d 67, 69 (1992), because the statute
specifically permits the court to grant additional time, see NRS 18.110(1);
Adelson. v. Harris, 774 F.3d 803, 810 (2d Cir. 2014) (observing that Nevada
statutes that permit the court to extend a time period are not jurisdictional).
‘The court lacks such discretion as to a petition for judicial review, Otto, 128
Nev. at 434-35, 282 P.8d at 727, and thus Las Vegas Fetish & Fantasy is not
instructive here.