Title: Ward v. Commercial Ins. Co.

State: tennessee

Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court

Document:

372 S.W.2d 292 (1963) Pearl Wallace WARD, Petitioner, v. COMMERCIAL INSURANCE COMPANY and Faircloth Chevrolet Company, Defendants. Supreme Court of Tennessee. October 11, 1963. *293 Robert E. Banks and Jack R. Musick, Elizabethton, Street, Banks, Merryman & Musick, Elizabethton, of counsel, for petitioner. Simmonds, Bowman & Herndon, Johnson City, for defendants. WHITE, Justice. This is a workmen's compensation case in which Mrs. Ward alleges that her husband's death occurred on June 25, 1962, as the result of a heart attack which grew out of and in the course of his employment, and that the same was accidental in nature. The deceased was an automobile salesman in the employ of Faircloth Chevrolet Company. The bill alleged that Mrs. Ward's husband had a history of heart trouble commmencing in 1947 and carried medicine under the doctor's orders at all times, and that the employer was aware of these facts. It alleged that Mr. Ward had been required to work from eight to six, and every other day until nine at night. It alleged that Mr. Ward "worked long hours, was constantly moving about, standing on his feet, and in great strain * * *." "* * * on Monday, June 25, 1962, about 10:00 o'clock, A.M., * * * he had just completed the sale of an automobile to a customer, and was in the process of dealing with another customer, when he had a heart attack on the premises of Faircloth Chevrolet Company in Johnson City, Tennessee, and died on the premises shortly thereafter." The defendant's answer admitted that Ward died of a heart attack in the course of his employment, but denied that it arose out of the employment. The answer denied that the deceased had been engaged in any work which required any strain or exertion and further denied that his heart attack was in any way connected with his work or was accidental in nature. Upon completion of the proof the chancellor, in a memorandum opinion, found in favor of the petitioner and awarded to her and her minor child, a daughter of the deceased, full compensation benefits. A motion for a new trial being overruled, the defendants perfected their appeal to this Court and complain that the trial court committed error "in holding that James Edward Ward died as a result of an attack arising out of and in the course of his employment"; and that the court erred "in finding that there was material evidence to support an award of death benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act". In order to prepare the opinion in this case, it is necessary to recite the facts as established in the trial court. Mr. Ward had a history of heart trouble dating back to 1947, at which time he suffered a coronary occlusion and a definite myocardial infarction substantiated by electrocardiograms taken at the time. His wife testified that for two months before his death he had been suffering chest pains, which the heart specialist, Dr. Wofford, diagnosed as angina pectoris. He stated that these were often associated with coronary occlusions and myocardial infarction. *294 Dr. Wofford said that he first saw the deceased on June 13, 1962 in the emergency room at the hospital in connection with an attack of angina. He testified that through an electrocardiogram on June 14, 1962 his diagnosis that Mr. Ward had suffered a coronary occlusion causing severe damage to the heart muscle was verified. He said that he had given him several types of medication which he hoped would relieve his condition and: When Dr. Wofford was questioned on direct examination about the causal connection between Mr. Ward's activities in the course of his employment and his heart attack, he responded: And later to the question "Doctor, is it possible that physical exertion can precipitate or bring on a heart attack?", he answered: "Yes, sir, it is entirely possible." And continuing: And on cross-examination he was asked: A fellow employee, Floyd Rupe, testified concerning the general conditions of Mr. Ward's employment and the specific activities and conditions on the morning that he suffered the fatal attack. He said that the salesmen worked from eight to six, and *295 eight to nine on alternate days; that the job entailed standing a great deal and demonstrating, selling, closing and doing the paper work connected with selling automobiles, and sometimes putting the tags on the auto sold. He pointed out that because the salesmen were on a commission basis there was a good deal of worry about making sales. He said that it was common knowledge that Mr. Ward had a heart condition and carried medicine at all times. Mr. Rupe testified that on the morning in question the deceased attended a sales meeting at eight o'clock, and by ten o'clock when the attack occurred he had already sold one automobile and was in the process of working on another. He said: He said that at about ten o'clock he saw Mr. Ward doing something on the top of a car and that he suddenly stiffened, staggered backwards and fell. He rushed over and found that Mr. Ward had fallen so hard on the concrete that he split the back of his scalp and was bleeding from the wound. He related that he attempted to get a nitroglycerin pill down the man's throat but failed. Another salesman named Wagner testified as to the same things and sustained what Mr. Rupe had said: The death certificate showed that the deceased died of a coronary occlusion and stated that death occurred within five minutes of the onset. Mrs. Ward said that her husband often came home very tired and worn out from the long hours and worry and strain of his employment as a salesman. She also testified that he had some trouble sleeping nights because of pains in his chest. The defendants offered no proof. The appellants, defendants below, make two assignments of error. The first is that it was error to hold that Mr. Ward died of a heart attack arising out of his employment, and the second that there was no material evidence to support the chancellor's award. In regard to the causal connection between the deceased's employment and the fatal heart attack the chancellor said: In the case of Coleman v. Coker, 204 Tenn. 310, 312, 313, 321 S.W.2d 540, 541 (1958) this Court, in an opinion written by Mr. Chief Justice Burnett, held that this Court: Mr. Justice Swepston writing for the Court in Nashville Pure Milk Co. v. Rychen, 204 Tenn. 575, 579, 322 S.W.2d 432, 434-435 (1958), said: The Court also said in Coleman v. Coker, supra: These cases, supported by many more, resolve the question of law as to whether a death resulting from a heart attack in the course of employment can be compensable as arising out of the employment. These cases and many more also make it clear that in each case there is a question of fact which must be resolved by the trial court, to-wit: whether there actually was a causal connection between the heart attack and the employment. Mr. Justice Dyer made it very clear that in our review of the evidence on appeal we are required to take the evidence most favorable to the prevailing party below in a workmen's compensation case. City of Gallatin v. Anderson, 209 Tenn. 392, 394, 354 S.W.2d 84, 85 (1962); Johnson v. Anderson, 188 Tenn. 194, 196, 217 S.W.2d 939, 940 (1949). Mr. Justice Gailor in Anderson v. Volz Const. Co., 183 Tenn. 169, 173, 191 S.W.2d 436, 438 (1946), said: There are many more cases supporting this proposition listed under note 39 after T.C.A. § 50-1018 and many more under the same note in the 1963 Supplement to that section. In White v. Whiteway Pharmacy, Inc., 210 Tenn. 449, 454, 360 S.W.2d 12, 15 (1962), this Court stated that in a workmen's compensation case: Mr. Chief Justice Neil in Tapp v. Tapp, 192 Tenn. 1, 4-6, 236 S.W.2d 977, 978 (1951), made several observations which serve as a useful guide to trial judges in resolving the factual issues in cases under the Workmen's Compensation Act like the instant one. He pointed out that reasoning by way of analogy in borderline cases on the issue of "arising out of" the employment, serves no useful purpose and adds nothing to the law. He said that the Act should be liberally construed to secure the beneficiaries every protection which it authorizes, resolving any reasonable doubt as to whether the act or injury arose out of the employment, in favor of the employee whenever rationally possible. He said that the causal connection which the petitioner must prove "is meant not proximate cause as used in the law of negligence, but cause in the sense that the accident had its origin in the hazards to which the employment exposed the employee while doing his work." It would be a misinterpretation of these statements to hold that they were meant to effect the scope of this Court's review of the evidence. Our review continues to be only a review of the record to see if the chancellor's decision is supported by any material evidence. Mr. Chief Justice Neil *298 made this clear in Sandlin v. Gentry, 201 Tenn. 509, 517, 300 S.W.2d 897, 900-901 (1957), when he held: What we have said above means that our review in the instant case is limited to an examination of the record to see if there is any material evidence to support the chancellor's finding that there was a causal connection between Mr. Ward's employment and his fatal heart attack. The evidence, reviewed in this manner, poses the peculiarly perplexing definitional question of whether the medical testimony in this record is "material evidence". The appellant states in his brief, at page 14: 2 Larsen, Workmen's Compensation 322-323 (1961) puts this problem in its proper perspective: In the case of Boyd v. Young, 193 Tenn. 272, 246 S.W.2d 10 (1951), there was involved the issue of the causal connection between the employment and a cancer which ultimately had caused the death of an employee. In reviewing the record for material evidence to support the chancellor's award of compensation under the Act, Mr. Chief Justice Neil said: *299 Mr. Justice Tomlinson, in Lynch v. La Rue, 198 Tenn. 101, 278 S.W.2d 85 (1954), said: The Court also held in that case: The Court in upholding the compensation award (in these terms) noted that neither medical witness was willing to express an opinion that there was a definite causal connection between the 1945 accident and brain disease discovered in 1952. This language and rationale was again approved by this Court in Morrison v. James, 201 Tenn. 243, 245, 298 S.W.2d 714, 715 (1957), in which we upheld a trial judge's award in a workmen's compensation case as being supported by material evidence. In Combustion Engineering Co. v. Blanks, 210 Tenn. 233, 238, 357 S.W.2d 625, 627 (1962), we said: In the instant case Dr. Wofford, the heart specialist who had treated Mr. Ward for several weeks prior to his death, testified that he had told Mr. Ward to stay away from work and to remain completely quiet at home. At the same time he also testified that he could not say with any degree of medical certainty that there was a definite causal connection with the particular activities on the morning in question in the course of his employment and the fatal heart attack. The logical inference from his testimony is that he would not have told the deceased to stay away from his work if he thought it would not hurt him. His testimony, while manifesting the cautious tendencies which we have discussed, is still material evidence, from which a conclusion could be drawn in favor of the petitioner when coupled with the other testimony in the record. Indeed, Mr. Chief Justice Green once took judicial notice that rest and quiet are demanded if a victim of a serious heart ailment is to survive. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Gang, 184 Tenn. 188, 191, 197 S.W.2d 806, 807 (1946). As Mr. Chief Justice Neil said in Cunningham v. Hembree, 195 Tenn. 107, 115, 257 S.W.2d 12, 15 (1953), this is another borderline case where the chancellor obviously followed our guide in Tapp v. Tapp, supra, that "[a]ny reasonable doubt as to whether the act or injury of the employee arose out of the employment should be resolved in favor of the employee or dependent." Since we have found there is material evidence in the record to support the chancellor's award, we must affirm at the cost of the appellants. This case is affirmed and remanded for the entry of all orders and *300 decrees necessary to the enforcement of this opinion. BURNETT, C. J., DYER and HOLMES, JJ., and CLEMENT, Special Justice, concur.