Title: Carrubba v. Moskowitz

State: connecticut

Issuer: Connecticut Supreme Court

Document:

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PAUL CARRUBBA ET AL. v.
EMILY J. MOSKOWITZ
(SC 17157)
Borden, Norcott, Katz, Palmer and Vertefeuille, Js.
Argued January 12—officially released July 26, 2005
George W. Kramer, for the appellants (plaintiffs).
Robert J. Kor, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion
BORDEN, J. The named plaintiff, Paul Carrubba, act-
ing individually and as parent and next friend of his
minor son, Matthew Carrubba,1 appeals, following our
grant of certification,2 from the judgment of the Appel-
late Court affirming the trial court’s judgment granting
the motion to dismiss of the defendant, Emily J.
Moskowitz. The plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court
improperly concluded that: (1) the defendant, who had
been appointed by the trial court pursuant to General
Statutes § 46b-543 to represent the plaintiff’s minor chil-
dren in a prior marital dissolution action, was entitled
to qualified, quasi-judicial immunity in the action
against her for intentional and negligent infliction of
emotional distress; and (2) the plaintiff, acting on behalf
of Matthew Carrubba as his parent and next friend,
lacked standing to assert a claim of legal malpractice
against the defendant. We affirm the judgment of the
Appellate Court, although we reach a different conclu-
sion regarding the scope of the immunity to which the
defendant is entitled.
The Appellate Court set forth the following relevant
facts and procedural history. ‘‘In the prior marital disso-
lution action between [the plaintiff] and his former wife,
Carrubba v. Carrubba, Superior Court, judicial district
of Hartford, Docket No. 541518 (September 2, 1994),
the defendant served as court-appointed counsel for
the minor children, Jessica Carrubba and Matthew Car-
rubba. The marriage was dissolved on February 11,
1997. On November 2, 1998, in a postjudgment motion,
[the plaintiff] sought to disqualify the defendant.4 The
court denied the motion.
‘‘On November 13, 2000, the [plaintiff] commenced
the present action by filing a two count complaint. In
the first count, the [plaintiff] claimed that the defendant
intentionally or negligently had caused [the plaintiff] to
suffer emotional distress. In the second count, Matthew
Carrubba, through his father and next friend, [the plain-
tiff], alleged legal malpractice against the defendant.
On December 12, 2000, the defendant filed a motion to
dismiss the action. The court granted the defendant’s
motion as to both counts and subsequently denied the
[plaintiff’s] motion to reargue.’’ Carrubba v. Moskowitz,
81 Conn. App. 382, 384–85, 840 A.2d 557 (2004). Addi-
tional facts will be set forth as necessary.
The plaintiff then appealed to the Appellate Court,
which affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Id., 384.
The Appellate Court concluded that, as to the first
count, the defendant was entitled to qualified, quasi-
judicial immunity; id., 385; and, as to the second count,
that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue on behalf of
his son. Id., 401. This certified appeal followed.
I
The plaintiff first claims that the Appellate Court
improperly concluded that the defendant, who had been
appointed by the trial court to represent the minor
children pursuant to § 46b-54 in the prior dissolution
action, was entitled to qualified, quasi-judicial immu-
nity. We agree with the Appellate Court that the defen-
dant was entitled to immunity, but we disagree as to
the proper scope of the immunity. We conclude that
attorneys appointed by the court pursuant to § 46b-
54 are entitled to absolute, quasi-judicial immunity for
actions taken during or, activities necessary to, the per-
formance of functions that are integral to the judicial
process.
We first note that, in the trial court, the defendant
raised the defense of immunity in her motion to dismiss.
Id., 399. Because the Appellate Court determined that
the defendant was entitled only to qualified immunity, it
also concluded that, in the future, the proper procedural
vehicle through which attorneys appointed pursuant to
§ 46b-54 could raise immunity would be as a special
defense, not through a motion to dismiss. It is unneces-
sary for us, however, in resolving the present case, to
consider whether a motion to dismiss was the proper
procedural vehicle by which to raise absolute immunity
because that question is not presented in this appeal.
The plaintiff waived any claim of procedural error by
requesting that the trial court address the merits of the
motion, despite the plaintiff’s simultaneous contention
that a motion to dismiss was not a proper procedural
vehicle by which to raise the defense.5
Section 46b-54 (a) provides that ‘‘[t]he court may
appoint counsel for any minor child or children of either
or both parties at any time after the return day of a
complaint under section 46b-45, if the court deems it
to be in the best interests of the child or children. . . .’’
(Emphasis added.) In analyzing this statutory language,
we have stated that the guiding principle governing the
appointment of counsel for a minor child in a marital
dissolution action is the best interests of the child.
Schult v. Schult, 241 Conn. 767, 777, 699 A.2d 134 (1997).
‘‘The appointment of counsel lies firmly within the trial
court’s discretion in the best interests of the child. . . .
Counsel may also be appointed ‘when the court finds
that the custody, care, education, visitation or support
of a minor child is in actual controversy . . . .’ General
Statutes § 46b-54 (b). The statute further provides that
‘[c]ounsel for the child or children shall be heard on
all matters pertaining to the interests of any child,
including the custody, care, support, education and visi-
tation of the child, so long as the court deems such
representation to be in the best interests of the child.’
General Statutes § 46b-54 (c). The purpose of appoint-
ing counsel for a minor child in a dissolution action
is to ensure independent representation of the child’s
interests, and such representation must be entrusted
to the professional judgment of appointed counsel
within the usual constraints applicable to such repre-
sentation.’’
(Citations
omitted.)
Schult
v.
Schult,
supra, 778.
We also have recognized the dual role imposed upon
attorneys appointed pursuant to § 46b-54. In Schult v.
Schult, supra, 241 Conn. 776, for example, we concluded
that, in an action for dissolution of marriage, an attorney
appointed by the court pursuant to § 46b-54 may advo-
cate for a position different from that recommended
by the guardian ad litem. In our analysis, we recognized
the dual responsibilities of the court-appointed attorney
for a minor child both to safeguard the child’s best
interests and to act as an advocate for the child. Id.,
778–79. ‘‘As an advocate, the attorney should honor
the strongly articulated preference regarding taking an
appeal of a child who is old enough to express a reason-
able preference; as a guardian, the attorney might
decide that, despite such a child’s present wishes, the
contrary course of action would be in the child’s long
term best interests, psychologically or financially.’’ Id.,
779–80. The tension between these dual roles imposed
upon the attorney appointed pursuant to § 46b-54
became apparent in Ireland v. Ireland, 246 Conn. 413,
438–39, 717 A.2d 676 (1998), in which we concluded
that it was improper for an attorney appointed pursuant
to § 46b-54 to submit an unsolicited report to the court,
supported only by his personal opinion, containing a
conclusion as to the proper outcome of the case. In
that context, although we recognized the principle that
an attorney for the child should provide ‘‘ ‘independent
representation of the child’s interests,’ ’’ we concluded
that, regarding the manner in which an attorney for
the minor child may present information to the court,
‘‘such representation is limited to the type of representa-
tion enjoyed by unimpaired adults. In other words, the
attorney for the child is just that, an attorney, arguing
on behalf of his or her client, based on the evidence in
the case and the applicable law.’’ Id., 438. We must
determine in the present case whether it is the duty of
the attorney to serve the best interests of the child, or
her duty to act as the child’s advocate, that controls
for purposes of determining whether she is entitled to
immunity and, if so, what level of immunity.
Because
any
immunity
accorded
to
attorneys
appointed pursuant to § 46b-54 would be derived from
judicial immunity, we first examine the policy reasons
underlying judicial immunity.6 It is well established that
‘‘a judge may not be civilly sued for judicial acts he
undertakes in his capacity as a judge.’’ Lombard v.
Edward J. Peters, Jr., P.C., 252 Conn. 623, 630, 749
A.2d 630 (2000). This role of judicial immunity serves
‘‘to promote principled and fearless decision-making by
removing a judge’s fear that unsatisfied litigants may
hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption
. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Spring v.
Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 565, 362 A.2d 871 (1975).
Although we have extended judicial immunity to protect
other officers in addition to judges, that extension gen-
erally has been very limited. ‘‘This fact reflects an
[awareness] of the salutary effects that the threat of
liability can have . . . as well as the undeniable tension
between official immunities and the ideal of the rule
of law . . . . The protection extends only to those who
are intimately involved in the judicial process, including
judges, prosecutors and judges’ law clerks. Absolute
judicial immunity, however, does not extend to every
officer of the judicial system.’’ (Citation omitted; inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Lombard v. Edward J.
Peters, Jr., P.C., supra, 631. Furthermore, even judges
are not entitled to immunity for their administrative
actions, but only for their judicial actions. Id.
We repeatedly have recognized that ‘‘[a]bsolute
immunity . . . is strong medicine . . . .’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id.; see also DeLaurentis v.
New Haven, 220 Conn. 225, 242, 597 A.2d 807 (1991).
Therefore, not every category of persons protected by
immunity are entitled to absolute immunity. In fact,
just the opposite presumption prevails—categories of
persons protected by immunity are entitled only to the
scope of immunity that is necessary to protect those
persons in the performance of their duties. ‘‘[T]he pre-
sumption is that qualified rather than absolute immunity
is sufficient to protect government officials in the exer-
cise of their duties.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Spears v. Garcia, 263 Conn. 22, 36, 818 A.2d 37 (2003);
see also General Statutes § 4-165.7 In limited circum-
stances, however, courts have extended absolute judi-
cial immunity to officials insofar as they perform
actions that are integral to the judicial process. Massa-
meno v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 234 Conn.
539, 567–68, 663 A.2d 317 (1995). For example, because
prosecutors are such an ‘‘integral part of the judicial
system’’; id., 567; this court has repeatedly recognized
that they are entitled to absolute immunity ‘‘for their
conduct as participants in the judicial proceeding.’’
DeLaurentis v. New Haven, supra, 242; see also Lom-
bard v. Edward J. Peters, Jr., P.C., supra, 252 Conn.
631; Spring v. Constantino, supra, 168 Conn. 563. By
contrast, we declined to extend immunity to public
defenders, reasoning that, unlike a prosecutor, who is
a ‘‘ ‘representative of the state,’ ’’ and has a ‘‘duty to see
that impartial justice is done to the accused as well as
to the state,’’ a public defender’s ‘‘role is that of an
adversary and his function does not differ from that of
a privately retained attorney.’’ Spring v. Constantino,
supra, 566–67. In legislatively overruling Spring, the
legislature granted public defenders only qualified
immunity, impliedly deeming that level of protection to
be sufficient to protect them in the exercise of their
duties.8
Although the presumption is that qualified immunity
is sufficient to protect most government officials in
the justified performance of their duties, courts have
extended absolute immunity to a variety of judicial and
quasi-judicial officers. See, e.g., Babcock v. Tyler, 884
F.2d
497
(9th
Cir.
1989)
(court-appointed
social
worker), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1072, 110 S. Ct. 1118,
107 L. Ed. 2d 1025 (1990); Moses v. Parwatikar, 813
F.2d 891 (8th Cir.) (court-appointed psychologist), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 832, 108 S. Ct. 108, 98 L. Ed. 2d 67
(1987); Demoran v. Witt, 781 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1986)
(probation officer); Boullion v. McClanahan, 639 F.2d
213 (5th Cir. 1981) (bankruptcy trustee); T & W Invest-
ment Co. v. Kurtz, 588 F.2d 801 (10th Cir. 1978) (court-
appointed receiver); Burkes v. Callion, 433 F.2d 318 (9th
Cir. 1970) (court-appointed medical examiner), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 908, 91 S. Ct. 2217, 29 L. Ed. 2d 685
(1971). The determining factor in all these decisions is
whether the official was performing a function that was
integral to the judicial process.
In considering whether officials sued under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 should be accorded absolute judicial immunity,
the United States Supreme Court has applied a three
factor test, which we now adopt for the purpose of
determining whether an attorney appointed pursuant
to § 46b-54 should be accorded absolute immunity
under our state common law. In its immunity analysis,
the court has inquired: ‘‘[1] whether the official in ques-
tion perform[s] functions sufficiently comparable to
those of officials who have traditionally been afforded
absolute immunity at common law . . . [2] whether
the likelihood of harassment or intimidation by personal
liability [is] sufficiently great to interfere with the offi-
cial’s performance of his or her duties . . . [and 3]
whether procedural safeguards [exist] in the system
that would adequately protect against [improper] con-
duct by the official.’’ C. English, ‘‘Mediator Immunity:
Stretching the Doctrine of Absolute Quasi-judicial
Immunity: Wagshal v. Foster,’’ 63 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
759, 766 (1995), citing to Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S.
478, 513–17, 98 S. Ct. 2894, 57 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1978).
For the sake of clarity, we first consider the second
and third prongs of the test, both of which support
granting absolute immunity to attorneys appointed pur-
suant to § 46b-54. First, a substantial likelihood exists
that subjecting such attorneys to personal liability will
expose them to sufficient harassment or intimidation
to interfere with the performance of their duties. In
fact, the threat of litigation from a disgruntled parent,
unhappy with the position advocated by the attorney
for the minor child in a custody action, would be likely
not only to interfere with the independent decision mak-
ing required by this position, but may very well deter
qualified individuals from accepting the appointment
in the first instance. Second, there exist sufficient proce-
dural safeguards in the system to protect against
improper conduct by an attorney for the minor child.
Because the attorney is appointed by the court, she is
subject to the court’s discretion and may be removed
by the court at any time. Additionally, the attorney for
the minor child, just as any other attorney, is subject
to discipline for violations of the Code of Profes-
sional Conduct.
The first prong of the test, the functional inquiry, by
its very nature, must be performed on a case-by-case
basis. Gardner v. Parson, 874 F.2d 131, 146 (3d Cir.
1989). In performing its functional analysis, the Appel-
late Court considered the general nature of the func-
tions performed by attorneys for a minor child.
Although we consider the Appellate Court’s analysis
relevant to the initial determination of whether such
attorneys as a class of individuals are entitled to immu-
nity, the functional inquiry ultimately hinges on the
relevant functions performed by the defendant in the
present case. By illustration, as we explain later in this
opinion, courts have generally accorded guardians ad
litem absolute immunity. They have done so, however,
by directing a functional inquiry to the specific facts of
the case. For example, one court stated that under
the functional approach, guardians ad litem ‘‘would be
absolutely immune in exercising functions such as testi-
fying in court, prosecuting custody or neglect petitions,
and making reports and recommendations to the court
in which the guardian acts as an actual functionary or
arm of the court, not only in status or denomination
but in reality.’’ Id. Absolute immunity would not be
available, however, when persons who would normally
be accorded immunity ‘‘perform acts which are clearly
outside the scope of their jurisdiction.’’ Cok v. Cosen-
tino, 876 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1989).
As for the general function of attorneys appointed
pursuant to § 46b-54, the Appellate Court correctly
points out that such attorneys differ from privately
retained attorneys in general and public defenders in
particular in that attorneys for minor children ‘‘[serve]
at the discretion of the court’’ and therefore have less
independence than public defenders in representing
their clients. Carrubba v. Moskowitz, supra, 81 Conn.
App. 391. Because, as we have explained, the statute
provides that the appointment is for the purpose of
promoting the best interests of the child, the representa-
tion of the child must always be guided by that overarch-
ing goal, despite the dual role required of the attorney
for the minor child. Thus, the appointed attorney’s duty
to secure the best interests of the child dictates that
she must be more objective than a privately retained
attorney. Furthermore, because the overall goal of serv-
ing the best interests of the child always guides the
representation of the child, the dual obligations
imposed on the attorney for a minor child, namely, to
assist the court in serving the best interests of the child
and to function as the child’s advocate, are not easily
disentangled. In other words, the duty to secure the
best interests of the child does not cease to guide the
actions of the attorney for the minor child, even while
she is functioning as an advocate. Thus, as the Appellate
Court noted, in this respect, the attorney for the minor
child ‘‘functions in a manner vastly different from that
of a privately retained attorney or public defender. We
agree with the views on that issue expressed by other
courts that have stated that ‘[w]hen a statute gives a
court the power to appoint an attorney for children in
[dissolution or] custody disputes, that advocate must
represent the children’s interests alone. In so doing, the
attorney is not to take a passive role but should present
all evidence available concerning the child’s best inter-
ests. The attorney is not simply to parrot the child’s
expressed wishes. . . . Thus, this obligation imposes
a higher degree of objectivity on a child’s attorney than
that for an attorney representing an adult.’ . . . In re
Marriage of Barnthouse, 765 P.2d 610, 612 (Colo. App.
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1021, 109 S. Ct. 1747, 104
L. Ed. 2d 184 (1989).’’ Carrubba v. Moskowitz, supra,
391–92.
In its discussion of the proper scope of the immunity
that should be accorded to attorneys for minor children
appointed by the court pursuant to § 46b-54, however,
the Appellate Court simply stated, with no further elabo-
ration, that based on its thorough review of the func-
tions of attorneys for minor children, that ‘‘qualified
[immunity] rather than absolute immunity should
apply.’’ Id., 396. This conclusion, however, is inconsis-
tent with the Appellate Court’s stated reasons for
according such attorneys immunity in the first place.
That is, the primary reason that led the court to con-
clude that court-appointed attorneys for minor children
are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity was that they
perform functions integral to the judicial process in
carrying out the purpose of § 46b-54—to assist the court
in determining and serving the best interests of the
child. Id., 392–93. We traditionally have recognized that
individuals who perform such functions should be
accorded absolute, not qualified immunity. See, e.g.,
Massameno v. Statewide Grievance Committee, supra,
234
Conn.
567–68
(discussing
absolute
immunity
accorded to prosecutors by United States Supreme
Court); Lombard v. Edward J. Peters, Jr., P.C., supra,
252 Conn. 631 (noting that judges’ law clerks are entitled
to absolute immunity).
Furthermore, we agree with the Appellate Court that,
in the performance of this function, for the purposes
of an immunity analysis, the court-appointed attorney
for the minor child most closely resembles a guardian
ad litem. Carrubba v. Moskowitz, supra, 81 Conn. App.
394. Of course, we recognize that such attorneys per-
form a hybrid role because of their simultaneous duty
to function as an advocate for the child. That function,
however, must always be subordinated to the attorney’s
duty to serve the best interests of the child. Even when
an attorney for the minor child functions less as a guard-
ian ad litem and more as an advocate because of factors
such as the child’s advanced age, maturity level and
ability to articulate her preferences, the shifting of the
balance from an objective evaluator of the child’s best
interests to personal advocate happens because those
factors increase the likelihood that the child is able
accurately to identify and to make choices to pursue
her own best interests independently, without the aid
of an objective assistant to the court. Thus, even the
advocacy role of the appointed attorney for the minor
child may be reconciled with the attorney’s primary
duty—to assist the court in serving the best interests
of the child. Therefore, we see no reason to accord
appointed attorneys for minor children a lesser level
of immunity than that traditionally accorded to guard-
ians ad litem, at least in the performance of those func-
tions that are integral to the judicial process.
Courts in other jurisdictions have almost unani-
mously accorded guardians ad litem absolute immunity
for their actions that are integral to the judicial process.
See, e.g., Fleming v. Asbill, 42 F.3d 886, 889 (4th Cir.
1994);9 Cok v. Cosentino, supra, 876 F.2d 3; Gardner v.
Parson, supra, 874 F.2d 131; Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d
1437, 1466–67 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108
S. Ct. 97, 98 L. Ed. 2d 58 (1987); Kurzawa v. Mueller,
732 F.2d 1456, 1457–58 (6th Cir. 1984); Babbe v.
Peterson, 514 N.W.2d 726 (Iowa 1994); Tindell v.
Rogosheske, 428 N.W.2d 386, 387 (Minn. 1988); Billups
v. Scott, 253 Neb. 287, 571 N.W.2d 603 (1997); Collins
v. Tabet, 111 N.M. 391, 806 P.2d 40 (1991). Courts have
reasoned that the duty of a guardian ad litem to secure
the best interests of the minor children places the guard-
ian ‘‘squarely within the judicial process to accomplish
that goal’’; Kurzawa v. Mueller, supra, 1458; and, there-
fore, that a grant of absolute immunity is both appro-
priate and necessary in order to ensure that the guardian
will be able to ‘‘function without the worry of possible
later harassment and intimidation from dissatisfied par-
ents.’’ Id. One court noted its concern that ‘‘[w]ithout
immunity, guardians ad litem would act like litigation
lightening rods. Lawsuits would, in the words of
Learned Hand, ‘dampen the ardor of all but the most
resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching
discharge of their duties.’ Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d
579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949, 70
S. Ct. 803, 94 L. Ed. 1363 (1950).’’ Short v. Short, 730
F. Sup. 1037, 1039 (D. Colo. 1990). These same reasons
support the extension of the same scope of immunity
to attorneys appointed pursuant to § 46b-54. We now
consider the particular, relevant functions performed
by the defendant in the present case.
The plaintiff alleged in the complaint that the defen-
dant: (1) insulted him and called him names during
several meetings at which all three counsel were
present;10 (2) insisted that the plaintiff enter into coun-
seling, despite the fact that no therapist had made such
a recommendation; (3) made negligent and reckless
misrepresentations about the plaintiff to the court on
various occasions; (4) was represented as a client by
the same law firm that represented the plaintiff’s former
spouse; and (5) acted as a de facto guardian ad litem.
The first three allegations do not allege that the defen-
dant acted outside of her function as an attorney for
the minor children. The fourth allegation, that she was
represented by the same firm that represented the plain-
tiff’s former spouse, does not give rise to a cause of
action for intentional or negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress. The last allegation, that she acted as a
de facto guardian ad litem, is not, as we have noted
previously, inconsistent with her role as an attorney
for the minor children. All of the allegations, with the
exception of the conflict of interest claim, basically
express dissatisfaction with the manner in which the
defendant carried out her court-appointed role. More-
over, the fact that some of the allegations of the com-
plaint claim that she did so in an intentional, rather than
a merely negligent manner, does not defeat absolute
immunity. See Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospi-
tal, 272 Conn. 776, 790, 865 A.2d 1163 (2005) (noting that
distinction between qualified immunity and absolute
immunity is that persons protected by latter immunity
are not liable for malicious ‘‘conduct and statements’’);
Spears v. Garcia, supra, 263 Conn. 36 (identifying
exception to municipal employees’ immunity ‘‘ ‘where
the alleged acts involve malice, wantonness or intent
to injure, rather than negligence’ ’’ and concluding that
qualified, rather than absolute immunity, applied).
Therefore, because the complaint was not grounded on
any conduct by the defendant in which she acted out-
side the usual role of an attorney for the minor children,
she is entitled to absolute immunity.
II
The plaintiff next claims that the Appellate Court
improperly concluded that the trial court properly
granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss when the
Appellate Court determined that the plaintiff, as next
friend of Matthew Carrubba, lacked standing to bring
a legal malpractice claim against the defendant. We
disagree.
The Appellate Court set forth the following relevant
additional facts: ‘‘[The plaintiff] brought count two of
the complaint on behalf of his son, Matthew Carrubba.
The count alleged that during the custody and dissolu-
tion action, Carrubba v. Carrubba, supra, Superior
Court, Docket No. 541518, the defendant deviated from
the standard of care required by attorneys who repre-
sent minor children. In its memorandum of decision,
the court concluded that the plaintiff . . . did not have
standing because (1) his interests were adverse to his
child’s interests and (2) he failed to demonstrate preju-
dice to his own case.’’ Carrubba v. Moskowitz, supra,
81 Conn. App. 401.
The Appellate Court agreed with the trial court that
the plaintiff lacked next friend standing to bring the
action because his interests were adverse to those of the
child, Matthew Carrubba. We agree with the Appellate
Court that the proper test for determining whether a
person is the proper party to bring an action on behalf
of a minor child as a guardian or next friend is ‘‘whether
that person’s interests are adverse to those of the child’’;
id., 402; and we also agree that, because the plaintiff’s
interests were adverse to those of Matthew Carrubba,
he lacked standing to bring the action on behalf of
Matthew Carrubba as his next friend.
‘‘If a party is found to lack standing, the court is
without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the
cause. . . . A determination regarding a trial court’s
subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. When
. . . the trial court draws conclusions of law, our
review is plenary and we must decide whether its con-
clusions are legally and logically correct and find sup-
port in the facts that appear in the record. . . .
‘‘Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of
the court to adjudicate the type of controversy pre-
sented by the action before it. . . . [A] court lacks dis-
cretion to consider the merits of a case over which it
is without jurisdiction. . . . The objection of want of
jurisdiction may be made at any time . . . [a]nd the
court or tribunal may act on its own motion, and should
do so when the lack of jurisdiction is called to its atten-
tion. . . . The requirement of subject matter jurisdic-
tion cannot be waived by any party and can be raised
at any stage in the proceedings. . . .
‘‘Standing is not a technical rule intended to keep
aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substan-
tive rights. Rather it is a practical concept designed to
ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits
brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that
judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others
are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and
vigorously represented. . . . These two objectives are
ordinarily held to have been met when a complainant
makes a colorable claim of direct injury [that] he has
suffered or is likely to suffer, in an individual or repre-
sentative capacity. Such a personal stake in the out-
come of the controversy . . . provides the requisite
assurance of concrete adverseness and diligent advo-
cacy. . . . The requirement of directness between the
injuries claimed by the plaintiff and the conduct of the
defendant also is expressed, in our standing jurispru-
dence, by the focus on whether the plaintiff is the proper
party to assert the claim at issue. . . .
‘‘Standing is established by showing that the party
claiming it is authorized by statute to bring suit or is
classically aggrieved. . . . The fundamental test for
determining aggrievement encompasses a well-settled
twofold determination: [F]irst, the party claiming
aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific,
personal and legal interest in [the subject matter of
the challenged action], as distinguished from a general
interest, such as is the concern of all members of the
community as a whole. Second, the party claiming
aggrievement must successfully establish that this spe-
cific personal and legal interest has been specially and
injuriously affected by the [challenged action]. . . .
Aggrievement is established if there is a possibility, as
distinguished from a certainty, that some legally pro-
tected interest . . . has been adversely affected.’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Broadnax v. New Haven, 270 Conn. 133, 153–54, 851
A.2d 1113 (2004).
We recently noted that the United States Supreme
Court, in Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 110 S.
Ct. 1717, 109 L. Ed. 2d 135 (1990), stated that, ‘‘to estab-
lish next friend status, a person: (1) ‘must be truly
dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose
behalf he seeks to litigate . . . [and] must have some
significant relationship with the real party in interest’;
id., 163–64; and (2) ‘must provide an adequate explana-
tion—such as inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or
other disability—why the real party in interest cannot
appear on his own behalf to prosecute the action.’ Id.,
163.’’ In re Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus by
Dan Ross, 272 Conn. 653, 659–60 n.7, 866 A.2d 542, cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1165, 115 S. Ct. 1133, 130 L. Ed. 2d
1095 (2005). Under normal circumstances, parents of
a minor child satisfy both prongs of this test because
they are presumed to act in the best interests of the
minor child.
We agree with the Appellate Court, however, that, in
a custody dispute, ‘‘parents lack the necessary profes-
sional and emotional judgment to further the best inter-
ests of their children. Neither parent could be relied on
to communicate to the court the children’s interests
where those interests differed from his or her own.
. . . A parent’s judgment is or may be clouded with
emotion and prejudice due to the estrangement of hus-
band and wife.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Carrubba v. Moskowitz, supra, 81 Conn. App. 402–403.
The Appellate Court also correctly points out that ‘‘[t]he
defendant was responsible for undertaking actions that
represented the best interest of the minor, Matthew
Carrubba, and it was precisely those actions to which
[the plaintiff] had objected.’’ Id., 404. ‘‘If parents could
penetrate the shield of immunity merely by bringing
suit in the child’s name, that tactic would undermine
the public policy goals supporting the immunity’’; id.;
which we granted in part I of this opinion. Therefore,
because the plaintiff’s interests are adverse to the minor
child, he lacks standing to bring a claim of legal malprac-
tice on the child’s behalf as next friend.
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
1 Because Paul Carrubba is the sole plaintiff under both counts of the
complaint, albeit in two different capacities, hereafter we refer to him as
the plaintiff.
2 We granted the plaintiff’s petition for certification to appeal, limited to
the following issues: ‘‘(1) Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that
the defendant was entitled to qualified immunity?’’ and ‘‘(2) Did the Appellate
Court properly conclude that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring this legal
malpractice action against the defendant?’’ Carrubba v. Moskowitz, 268
Conn. 916, 847 A.2d 310 (2004).
3 General Statutes § 46b-54 provides: ‘‘(a) The court may appoint counsel
for any minor child or children of either or both parties at any time after
the return day of a complaint under section 46b-45, if the court deems it to
be in the best interests of the child or children. The court may appoint
counsel on its own motion, or at the request of either of the parties or of
the legal guardian of any child or at the request of any child who is of
sufficient age and capable of making an intelligent request.
‘‘(b) Counsel for the child or children may also be appointed on the motion
of the court or on the request of any person enumerated in subsection (a)
of this section in any case before the court when the court finds that the
custody, care, education, visitation or support of a minor child is in actual
controversy, provided the court may make any order regarding a matter in
controversy prior to the appointment of counsel where it finds immediate
action necessary in the best interests of any child.
‘‘(c) Counsel for the child or children shall be heard on all matters per-
taining to the interests of any child, including the custody, care, support,
education and visitation of the child, so long as the court deems such
representation to be in the best interests of the child.’’
4 ‘‘[The plaintiff] sought to disqualify the defendant because (1) Matthew
Carrubba’s therapist had indicated to [the plaintiff] that it may not have
been in the child’s best interest for the defendant to represent him, (2) the
defendant had verbally insulted [the plaintiff], (3) the defendant had a con-
flict of interest because the law firm of Berman, Bourns and Currie, the
same firm that represented [the plaintiff’s] former wife, Andrea Carrubba,
represented the defendant as a client, (4) the defendant had acted as a de
facto guardian ad litem as opposed to an attorney, (5) the defendant had
recommended that [the plaintiff] seek counseling prior to Matthew Carrub-
ba’s return, (6) the defendant had misrepresented that Matthew Carrubba
was doing well at home with Andrea Carrubba, (7) the defendant improperly
stated that the Institute of Living, a mental health facility in Hartford, had
requested her to terminate [the plaintiff’s] parental rights and (8) the defen-
dant was biased against [the plaintiff].’’ Carrubba v. Moskowitz, 81 Conn.
App. 382, 384 n.1, 840 A.2d 557 (2004).
5 The Appellate Court noted that the plaintiff stated in his brief to the
trial court: ‘‘The trial court dismissed the first count of the [plaintiff’s]
complaint, holding that [the defendant’s] actions in that role should be
protected from tort liability. The issue of judicial immunity, however, does
not implicate the court’s jurisdiction. The court treated the defendant’s
motion to dismiss as a motion to strike or a motion for summary judgment.
In doing so, the [plaintiff believes] that court [acted improperly]. For the
sake of judicial economy, however, the [plaintiff asks] the Appellate Court
to address the issue of whether attorneys for minor children are entitled
to judicial immunity.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Carrubba v. Moskowitz, supra, 81 Conn. App. 399.
6 The parties have not presented the question of whether, irrespective of
any immunity, the defendant owed the plaintiff any duty of care. Cf. Zamstein
v. Marvasti, 240 Conn. 549, 559, 692 A.2d 781 (1997) (court-appointed psychi-
atrist who had performed evaluation of plaintiff’s children to determine
whether they had been sexually abused owed plaintiff no duty of care,
because imposing such duty would be contrary to state’s public policy of
encouraging reporting and investigation of suspected child abuse). Thus,
we need not decide that issue.
7 General Statutes § 4-165, which grants qualified immunity to state officers
and employees, provides in relevant part: ‘‘No state officer or employee
shall be personally liable for damage or injury, not wanton, reckless or
malicious, caused in the discharge of his duties or within the scope of his
employment. . . .’’
8 The legislature, through the enactment of Public Acts 1976, No. 76-371,
§ 2, added public defenders to the definition of ‘‘state officers and employ-
ees’’ entitled to qualified, statutory sovereign immunity pursuant to § 4-165.
9 Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found
that the guardian ad litem had absolute immunity for purposes of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, it also found that the guardian was not entitled to immunity under
state law because both the common law and applicable statutes of South
Carolina make clear that a guardian ad litem is liable to his or her ward for
negligent performance of the guardian’s duties. Fleming v. Asbill, supra, 42
F.3d 889.
10 The plaintiff alleges that the defendant called him an ‘‘ ‘[a]sshole,’ ’’ a
‘‘ ‘[b]astard,’ ’’ and stated that the plaintiff was ‘‘ ‘[k]illing these kids.’ ’’