Title: State v. Hendricks

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Hendricks (2000-205); 173 Vt. 132; 787 A.2d 1270

[filed 16-Nov-2001]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of  Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                No. 2000-205

State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.	                                         District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 1, Windham Circuit

Thomas Hendricks	                         November Term, 2000

David Suntag, J.

Dan M. Davis, Windham County State's Attorney, and Tracy Kelly Shriver, Deputy
  State's Attorney, Brattleboro, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

William E. Kraham Brattleboro, for Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       AMESTOY, C.J.   Defendant Thomas Hendricks appeals a jury conviction
  for second  degree domestic assault.  Defendant claims that the trial court
  erred in: (1) rejecting the plea  agreement; (2) taking judicial notice of
  family court proceedings between defendant and the victim;  (3) admitting
  prior bad acts evidence involving the same victim; (4) permitting the
  jurors to take  notes; and (5) issuing jury instructions.  Defendant also
  claims the trial court failed to give him credit  for time spent in
  custody.  We affirm with respect to all claims except the last which is
  moot. (FN1)

 

       This case arises out of lengthy and volatile relationship between
  defendant and Michele Lee  (Ms. Lee or the victim), defendant's former
  girlfriend of fourteen years. Defendant and Ms. Lee  cohabitated, worked
  together and had two children. On January 25, 1999, during an argument, Ms. 
  Lee claimed that defendant grabbed her by the throat and banged her head
  against the wall.  She  stated that when she fought back, defendant pushed
  her into the floor, and that when he let her go,  she kicked him in the
  groin.  Ms. Lee left the residence, but returned later to pick up
  medication and  clothing.  When she returned, she stated that defendant
  knocked her down to the ground and choked  her.  A police officer who
  interviewed Ms. Lee at the hospital emergency room noted that she was 
  "visibly upset," and that she had bruises on her neck and numerous
  abrasions on the right corner of  her mouth and on the right side of her
  back. 

       Defendant's son told the police officer that he had observed the
  couple fighting, and that he  had intervened to separate them.  Defendant,
  however, stated that Ms. Lee had kicked him in the  groin, bit his finger
  and hit him in the head, and that he had merely pushed her away in
  self-defense.   Defendant had "a small laceration to the left pinky finger
  and a lump on the top left side of the head."

       The day after the alleged assault, defendant was arraigned on a charge
  of second degree  aggravated domestic assault, in violation of 13 V.S.A. §
  1044(a)(2). (FN2)  In April 1999, while the  case was pending, defendant
  was arraigned on new charges, including one felony count violation of  an
  abuse prevention order, and two misdemeanor counts for violating his
  conditions of release.   Defendant initiated contact with Ms. Lee by
  sending her a thank you card.

       On September 15, 1999, pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant entered
  a guilty plea to the 

 

  felony charge for violating the relief from abuse order, and to one
  misdemeanor count for violating  his conditions of release.  The State
  agreed to dismiss the aggravated domestic assault charge and the  second
  misdemeanor charge of violation of conditions of release.  The State also
  agreed to  recommend a sentence of eighteen to forty-two months, all
  suspended except sixty days.  Under the  agreement, defendant would, at
  sentencing, be free to argue for a lesser sentence. 

       On September 24, prior to the sentencing hearing, defendant was
  charged with three felony  violations of the abuse prevention order and one
  violation of conditions of release.  On September  15, defendant had
  approached Ms. Lee outside of family court. The following day, the rear
  window  of Ms. Lee's friend's automobile was smashed while he was visiting
  her at her home.  Although there  is no evidence that defendant smashed the
  window, the next day defendant approached Ms. Lee at  her home and said,
  "Thank you for leaving your shades up so I know that he wasn't there."  
  Defendant subsequently contacted Ms. Lee by telephone on more than one
  occasion, sent her flowers  and a marriage application, and approached her
  at her home several times.

       At the October 1 sentencing hearing, the State attempted to rescind
  its plea agreement.   Defendant argued that the State and the court were
  bound by the terms of the September 15th  agreement.  The court refused to
  allow the State to withdraw from the plea agreement, but noted, "I  haven't
  accepted the plea agreement yet.  I took [defendant's] plea, deferred
  acceptance of the  agreement and sentencing until we had the hearing."  The
  court also informed defendant, prior to the  start of the hearing, that it
  had taken judicial notice of family court files concerning defendant and 
  the victim.  At the conclusion of the hearing at which both defendant and
  the victim testified, the  court rejected the plea agreement. The court
  gave defendant the opportunity to withdraw his plea,  which he chose to do,
  and the aggravated domestic assault charge was set for trial.

 

       At trial, the court issued preliminary instructions to the jury on the
  essential elements of the  offense, and instructed them on their ability to
  take notes during the course of the trial. Defense  counsel did not object
  to either charge.  The court provided jurors with pads and pencils,
  permitted  the jurors to take notes and use them during deliberations.  The
  court asked the jurors to destroy  these notes after trial.   

       Following a one-day trial, at which the jury heard testimony from a
  police officer, the victim,  defendant, defendant's son and a neighbor,
  defendant was found guilty of second degree domestic  assault.

                                     I.

       Defendant first contends that he is entitled to specific performance
  of the plea agreement  under V.R.Cr.P. 11.  Criminal Rule 11(e)(2)
  provides:

    [T]he court, before entry of the plea, may accept or reject the 
    agreement, or defer its decision as to acceptance or rejection
    until  there has been an opportunity to consider the presentence
    report.  The  plea agreement shall not be binding upon the court
    nor shall it limit  the court in the judgment and sentence to be
    imposed unless the court  accepts the plea agreement under
    subdivision (e)(3) of this rule.

  Rule 11(e)(3) requires the court, upon accepting the plea, to "inform the
  defendant that it will  embody in the judgment and sentence the disposition
  provided for in the plea agreement or a less  onerous disposition."
  V.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(3).  The next subsection provides that:

    If the court rejects the plea agreement or defers decision upon
    it, the  court shall inform the parties of this fact, advise the
    defendant  personally in open court that the court is or may not
    be bound by the  plea agreement, pursuant to Rule 32(d) afford a
    defendant who has  already pleaded the opportunity to then
    withdraw his plea.

  V.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(4).

 

       Defendant contends that the court accepted the plea agreement at the
  September 15th hearing.  However, the court, after finding the pleas to be
  knowing and voluntary, stopped short of accepting  and entering judgment on
  them.  Defendant cites to the court comment that the State's sentence 
  recommendation is "the worst that could happen to you at the sentencing
  hearing," in order to  establish that the pleas were accepted.  However,
  the court also stated "[t]his isn't settled until we  come back and do the
  sentencing," and thereby clearly deferred acceptance pending a sentencing 
  hearing.    

       We have previously rejected the argument that acceptance of the plea
  agreement must be  presumed unless the court explicitly rejects the
  agreement or defers its decision.  State v. Delisle, 162  Vt. 293, 300,