Title: Weintraub v. Flood Control District of Maricopa Co.

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

104 Ariz. 566 (1969) 456 P.2d 936 E.A. WEINTRAUB and Morris Weintraub, Appellants, v. FLOOD CONTROL DISTRICT OF MARICOPA COUNTY, a municipal corporation, by W.B. Burns, Mrs. James T. O'Neil, and L. Alton Pat Riggs, its directors, Appellee. No. 9612-PR. Supreme Court of Arizona. In Banc. July 10, 1969. *567 Evans & Kunz, by Donald R. Kunz, Snell & Wilmer, by B.C. Porter, Phoenix, for appellants. Shimmel, Hill, Kleindienst & Bishop, by Rouland W. Hill, Donald D. Meyers, Phoenix, for appellee. McFARLAND, Justice. Appellee Flood Control District of Maricopa County, a municipal corporation hereinafter referred to as the District petitioned this Court for and has been granted a review from a decision of the Court of Appeals, Division One, which reversed a summary judgment in favor of the District, and granted judgment in favor of appellants, E.A. and Morris Weintraub hereinafter referred to as the Weintraubs. 9 Ariz. App. 202, 450 P.2d 714. Decision of the Court of Appeals vacated. The Weintraubs owned 2,240 acres of land located a few miles outside the City of Phoenix. On May 23, 1960, the District gave public notice of the possibility that in the future certain property, or a part thereof, might be needed for flood-control purposes. (The described property included part of the Weintraubs' land.) Notice was given by the adoption and later recording of the following resolution: Nine months after the recording of the resolution, the Weintraubs demanded that the resolution be rescinded, claiming that their property had been taken by inverse eminent domain without compensation. About three and a half months thereafter, the District complied with the demand and passed a resolution which rescinded its former resolution, which also was recorded. Five months later the District filed this action for a declaratory judgment that the adoption and recording of the resolutions did not constitute a taking or a damage to the Weintraubs' property. The Weintraubs also counter-claimed for damages to their land in the total amount of $2,688,000. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the District, holding that the adoption and recording of the resolutions did not constitute or amount to a taking or damage. The judgment read, in part, as follows: The law is settled in Arizona, as stated in Gardiner v. Henderson, 103 Ariz. 420, 443 P.2d 416, that: Other jurisdictions have uniformly held that the mere publication of the fact that particular or specified property may be the subject of a future appropriation or condemnation action, or the plotting or planning thereof, is not a taking or damaging of such property entitling the owner to be compensated therefor. Bakken v. State of Montana, 142 Mont. 166, 382 P.2d 550; City of Houston v. Biggers, Tex.Civ.App., 380 S.W.2d 700; 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 135, p. 533; 26 Am.Jur.2d, Eminent Domain, § 169; Anno. in 64 A.L.R. 546. In the case of Hempstead Warehouse Corporation v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 572, 120 Ct.Cl. 291, it is stated: In City of Houston v. Biggers, supra, the court held: It is contended by the Weintraubs in their brief that the Board of Directors acted without authority when it caused the resolution to be recorded. Section 45-2361, as amended, of Arizona Revised Statutes, defines the procedure to be followed in order to effectively adopt or approve a comprehensive program of flood control. It is argued by the Weintraubs that the Board of Directors acted in derogation of that statute. The Board of Directors, by giving public notice of a possible future flood-control program, was not substituting a method for adoption of a comprehensive program which is different from that set forth in A.R.S. § 45-2361, as amended. Rather, the Board of Directors recorded the resolution for the following expressed reason: In Gardiner v. Henderson, supra, we held: The resolution adopted did not result in a taking of possession of the property; there was neither an order for possession nor payment of compensation which we have held to be mandatory. Therefore, the passing of the resolution did not result in inverse eminent domain as contended by the Weintraubs. The resolution not having resulted in the necessary steps for the taking of the property, the title was not affected. The District not having acquired any interest or title to the property, the Weintraubs, as far as the District was concerned, could have conveyed clear title. The Weintraubs, however, contend that the recording of the resolution was unauthorized and they were damaged thereby and therefore should receive compensation. The purpose of recording of an instrument is to give notice. Therefore, the question is whether such notice of acts and proposed acts of the project constituted a damaging of the property. It has been held that the mere plotting or planning for public improvements is not a taking or damaging of property. In Stafford v. People [of California], 144 Cal. App. 2d 79, 300 P.2d 231, the court said: In Chicago Housing Authority v. Lamar, 21 Ill. 2d 362, 172 N.E.2d 790, the court, in passing upon the question of whether land was damaged by reason of preliminary procedure, looking toward appropriation of land for public use, held: See also Silva v. City and County of San Francisco, 87 Cal. App. 2d 784, 198 P.2d 78; Eckhoff v. Forest Preserve District, 377 Ill. 208, 36 N.E.2d 245; City of Chicago v. Lederer, 274 Ill. 584, 113 N.E. 883; and Franco-Italian Packing Co. v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 408, 130 Ct.Cl. 736. It is clear from this line of cases that notice of preliminary proceedings of proposed actions which may result in taking land for public use is not a damaging of a property which would entitle the owner to compensation therefor. The recording of the resolution in the instant case could only give notice of such a possible proceeding and therefore would not be actionable. The fact that the statute does not specifically provide therefor is immaterial. However, the Weintraubs do not question the authority of the District to pass the resolution, but only complain of its recording of the instrument. Their contention is that the recording of the instrument was not in good faith. They admit that the project officers were acting within the scope of their agency, but that such acts were not in good faith and thereby became unlawful. The real question here is whether the District had a right to make the preliminary plans, and include them in the minutes. Since it did, anyone was entitled to inspect the record of the District; any other rule would require that political subdivisions conduct their activities under strict secrecy. Since publication of preliminary procedure does not constitute the taking or damaging of property in the instant case, then good faith in the recording is not an issue. There can be little question but what a prospective buyer would be entitled to go to the record and find out what was contemplated in regard to flood-control districts. The two cases upon which the Weintraubs rely namely, State ex rel. Morrison v. Helm, 86 Ariz. 275, 345 P.2d 202, and Whitestone v. Town of South Tucson, 2 Ariz. App. 494, 410 P.2d 116 are not in point. The question in those cases involved the abandonment of condemnation proceedings after judgment of the court. We hold there was no taking in this case, as a matter of law, and that no cause of action for damages arose by reason of the recording of the instrument. Decision of the Court of Appeals is vacated; judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed. UDALL, C.J., LOCKWOOD, V.C.J., and STRUCKMEYER, and HAYS, JJ., concur.