Title: Robert & Ardis James Found. v. Meyers

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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SJC-11898 
 
ROBERT AND ARDIS JAMES FOUNDATION & another1  vs.  
DANIEL MAXWELL MEYERS. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 10, 2015. - April 21, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Contract, Implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  
Damages, Breach of contract, Sale of stock.  Corporation, 
Stock. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
November 16, 2006.  
 
 
After transfer to the business litigation session, the case 
was heard by Christine M. Roach, J.  
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review.  
 
 
 
Joseph L. Bierwirth, Jr. (Ryan P. McManus & Thomas J. 
Carey, Jr., with him) for the plaintiffs. 
 
Kevin P. Martin (Katherine C. Sadeck with him) for the 
defendant. 
 
 
LENK, J.  This case considers whether there was a breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in a 
                     
 
1 Robert James. 
 
 
 
2 
 
contract dispute between two sophisticated investors.  In 1998 
and 1999, Robert James, acting on behalf of the Robert and Ardis 
James Foundation charitable foundation (foundation), agreed to 
advance over $650,000 to Daniel Meyers, the defendant, to 
purchase shares of stock in what was then a young, privately 
held company that Meyers had cofounded, in exchange for a 
portion of the proceeds of an eventual sale of those shares.  
The agreement was memorialized in two single-page, non-
integrated letters that set out formulas by which to calculate 
the distribution of proceeds, but did not discuss the timing of 
sale.  In 2006, following nearly two years of unsuccessful 
efforts to get Meyers to discuss bringing the agreements to a 
close, the foundation filed a complaint against Meyers seeking 
specific performance and damages. 
 
After a six-day bench trial in the business litigation 
session of the Superior Court in 2011, a judge found that Meyers 
had committed a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing, and awarded damages based on a date of breach of 
July 31, 2006.2  The Appeals Court reversed, see Robert & Ardis 
James Found. v. Meyers, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 85, 86 (2015), and we 
granted the foundation's application for further appellate 
                     
 
2 The judge ruled in Daniel Meyers's favor on the 
foundation's remaining claims:  division and distribution of the 
stock; dissolution of a claimed partnership or joint venture; 
declaration of an agency relationship; imposition of an implied 
contract term; payment of dividends; and declaratory judgment. 
 
 
 
3 
 
review.  Meyers argues that he did not commit a breach of the 
implied covenant, and that the damages award should be vacated.  
We conclude that the trial judge's decision was not erroneous, 
and affirm the decision. 
 
1.  Background.  We recite the facts found by the trial 
judge, supported by relevant trial testimony and documentary 
evidence, reserving certain details for later discussion.3  
Meyers graduated from Brandeis University in 1984 with an 
undergraduate economics degree, and spent the next seven years 
working in the financial services industry.  In 1991, Meyers and 
Stephen Anbinder started a company that provided loan 
origination and related services for higher education students.  
The company was incorporated in 1995 as First Marblehead 
Corporation (First Marblehead), a privately held Delaware 
corporation with headquarters in Massachusetts.  From its 
incorporation through 2005, Meyers served as First Marblehead's 
chief executive officer (CEO) and as the chair of its board of 
directors.  Upon request from First Marblehead's board of 
directors, he returned to those positions in 2008. 
                     
 
3 At trial, the judge heard testimony from six witnesses and 
admitted ninety-three exhibits in aid of interpreting the 
agreements at issue.  Neither party argues that the admission of 
extrinsic evidence violated the parol evidence rule.  See Uno 
Restaurants, Inc. v. Boston Kenmore Realty Corp., 441 Mass. 376, 
379 n.2 (2004).   
 
 
 
4 
 
 
Robert James, who was eighty-six years old at the time of 
trial, has been a professional investor for over forty years.  
He received a master's degree in business administration with 
honors from Harvard Business School and has had an extensive 
career in both public service and private industry, including 
time spent at the Central Intelligence Agency, in the United 
States Navy, and in the oil industry.  Robert James is a trustee 
of the foundation, organized under the laws of New York as a 
charitable section 501(c) foundation.  The purpose of the 
foundation is to "give [the James's accumulated] money away."  
At all relevant times, his wife, Ardis James, and children, 
Catherine James Paglia and Ralph James, were also trustees of 
the foundation.4  Like their father, Catherine James Paglia and 
Ralph James graduated from Harvard Business School.   
 
During the 1990s, Catherine James Paglia was a principal of 
a private equity firm that invested in First Marblehead, and 
invested in First Marblehead personally.  Ralph James served 
variously as First Marblehead's executive vice president, 
president and chief operating officer, and vice chairman.  As a 
result of his children's connections to First Marblehead, Robert 
James developed a business friendship with Meyers, and they 
began to meet socially.  Robert James considered the First 
Marblehead business plan "quite a brilliant thing."  In 
                     
 
4 Ardis James passed away in July, 2011. 
 
 
 
5 
 
November, 1997, he bought ten thousand shares of Meyers's 
privately held stock in First Marblehead for $360,000.   
 
a.  The 1998 and 1999 agreements.  In 1998, First 
Marblehead offered its shareholders the right to purchase 
additional shares on a pro rata basis commensurate with each 
shareholder's percentage of existing ownership of the company.  
Because Meyers and Anbinder both lacked sufficient capital to 
participate in the rights offering, they were concerned that the 
offering would dilute their percentage of ownership of First 
Marblehead.  Meyers turned to Robert James for help.  The deal 
they eventually struck led to this litigation.  
 
In exchange for the right to share in the proceeds of the 
sales of such shares, Robert James agreed to provide Meyers and 
Anbinder with the capital to purchase, in their own names, their 
maximum allotment of shares under the rights offering.  The 
agreement was memorialized in a February 20, 1998, letter from 
Meyers to Robert James (1998 agreement), which was drafted for 
Meyers by First Marblehead's outside counsel.  The letter read: 
"Dear Bob: 
 
 
"This letter will confirm our agreement regarding the 
purchase of common stock of The First Marblehead 
Corporation in the current rights offering by Steve 
Anbinder and me. 
 
 
"We have agreed that Steve and I will exercise our 
rights to purchase 18,627 and 13,161 shares, respectively, 
of stock @ $20.00 per share and that you will advance the 
funds to each of us in return for the right to participate 
 
 
 
6 
 
in the proceeds of sales.  The total of the advances will 
be $635,760.  The advances will be without recourse and 
will be repaid solely out of proceeds when the stock is 
sold. 
 
 
"Steve and I will take title to the stock in our own 
names.  Each of us will deliver the newly-issued share 
certificate[s] to you, and you will retain the certificates 
in your possession until the stock is sold.  You may also 
vote the stock as you see fit. 
 
 
"Upon the sale of the stock, you will be entitled to 
the sale proceeds up to a sale price of $30 per share.  The 
balance of the sale proceeds, if any, will be divided 50% 
to you and 50% to either Steve or me.  Either Steve or I 
may assign all or part of our interest to a third party. 
 
 
"If this letter accurately reflects the terms of our 
agreement, I ask that you sign the duplicate copy of the 
letter and return it to me." 
 
Robert James signed the letter in March, 1998, and eventually 
wired the advances directly to First Marblehead using funds from 
the foundation.5  Anbinder and Meyers also signed the letter.    
 
In January 1999, First Marblehead engaged in another rights 
offering.  The parties executed a second letter agreement on 
January 25, 1999 (1999 agreement).  The language of the 1999 
agreement was almost identical to the language of the 1998 
agreement -- the only differences were the numbers of shares to 
be purchased, and the formula for calculating the division of 
the proceeds upon sale.  Robert James directed the foundation to 
advance the agreed-upon funds to First Marblehead.  Between the 
                     
 
5 Although Robert James signed the letter in his own name, 
he testified that he intended to sign it on behalf of the 
foundation.   
 
 
 
7 
 
two agreements, Robert James advanced $1,114,965 of foundation 
funds to First Marblehead, $653,340 of which was used to 
purchase shares in Meyers's name.6 
 
First Marblehead made its initial public offering on 
October 31, 2003, and the value of the stock increased 
dramatically over the next few years.7  Starting in 2005, after 
Meyers stepped down from his positions as CEO and chair of the 
board of directors, First Marblehead began issuing quarterly 
dividends to shareholders.  Meyers ultimately received almost 
$2.5 million in dividends for the shares that were purchased 
pursuant to the 1998 and 1999 agreements.  He did not distribute 
any of those dividends to Robert James or the foundation. 
 
b.  Efforts to conclude the agreements.  The foundation 
first sought to bring the 1998 and 1999 agreements to a close in 
2004.  Catherine James Paglia testified that she telephoned 
Meyers multiple times that year for that purpose, and left him 
several voicemail messages that he did not return.  In October, 
                     
 
6 The remainder of the funds was used to purchase shares in 
Anbinder's name. 
 
 
7 As a result of a succession of stock splits, each of the 
shares subject to the 1998 and 1999 agreements was approximately 
sixty shares at the time of trial.  Thus, the 31,107 shares 
owned by Meyers that were originally subject to the agreements 
were 1,866,420 shares in 2011.  On October 31, 2003, the stock 
price was approximately $14 per share.  By July 31, 2006, the 
price had increased to approximately $30 per share.  By January 
2007, several months into this litigation, the stock was trading 
at around $56 per share.  Stock values declined significantly, 
however, after the stock market crashed in 2008.  
 
 
 
8 
 
2004, she also sent Meyers and Anbinder an electronic mail 
message that sought to "negotiate an equitable distribution" of 
the shares in order to bring the agreements to a close.  While 
Anbinder eventually agreed to a distribution of that sort,8 
Meyers never responded to Catherine James Paglia's message.  
Meyers also did not respond to repeated efforts during 2005 and 
2006 by both Catherine James Paglia and Robert James to reach 
him over the telephone in order to discuss concluding the 
agreements. 
 
Meyers knew from conversations with Anbinder that the 
foundation wished to conclude the agreements.  When Anbinder 
asked him "why [he] wanted this aggravation [of the James 
dispute] in his life," however, Meyers stated that he had no 
interest in discussing the possibility of selling the shares 
with Robert James or his daughter.  Nonetheless, between 2003 
and 2006, Meyers sold over three million shares of other First 
Marblehead stock that he owned, for more than $86 million.  
Meyers explained at trial that he made a conscious decision to 
sell his personally held shares of First Marblehead as opposed 
to agreeing to sell or divide the shares held with the 
                     
 
8 The foundation and Anbinder ultimately agreed that 
Anbinder would receive half of the proceeds of the sale of the 
stock that had been purchased in his name using the foundation's 
funds. 
 
 
 
9 
 
foundation, because that way he could continue to collect 
dividends from the shares purchased with the foundation's funds.  
 
After receiving advice from the foundation's counsel that 
the foundation needed to secure the proceeds of its investment, 
Robert James sent Meyers a letter on July 10, 2006, asking to 
meet in order to discuss the conclusion of the agreements.9  
Meyers finally replied on August 21, 2006, via a letter from his 
personal attorney.  In the letter, Meyers stated that, "as the 
owner of the stock, [he] retain[e]d full discretion as to when 
it will be sold."  He added that he "would welcome any specific 
proposal by the foundation that would make him reasonably whole 
in exchange for surrendering control of a portion of his stock 
                     
 
9 He wrote, 
 
 
"Dear Dan: 
 
 
"It has been a long time since you and I have spoken.  I 
have tried to call you a few times but I am not sure that I have 
the correct number.  I would really enjoy getting together to 
see what you are up to in your new situation. 
 
 
"Also, as you can see from the attached letter, I am 
getting some pressure from the attorney for the Foundation to 
address our mutual interests in the 1.24 million shares of First 
Marblehead stock.  As you probably know, in December 2005 I was 
able to negotiate a resolution with Steve Anbinder relating to 
the other portion of the First Marblehead stock, and I would 
very much like to reach a comparable agreement with you.  I 
think it is in both of our interests to do that. 
 
 
". . . 
 
 
"Please give me a call so that we can get together for 
breakfast or lunch." 
 
 
 
10 
 
and forgoing future dividends on it, taking into account [First 
Marblehead's] apparently healthy prospects for continued 
growth."  On November 16, 2006, the foundation filed the instant 
lawsuit.10   
 
2.  Discussion.  "We accept the judge's findings of fact in 
a bench trial unless they are clearly erroneous, . . . and the 
credibility of the witnesses rests within the purview of the 
trial judge" (citation omitted).  See Weiler v. PortfolioScope, 
Inc., 469 Mass. 75, 81 (2014) (Weiler).  However, "[t]he judge's 
legal conclusions are reviewed de novo."  Anastos v. Sable, 443 
Mass. 146, 149 (2004).  Based on the trial judge's findings of 
fact in this case, we discern no error in her determinations 
that Meyers committed a breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing and that July 31, 2006, was the date of 
breach. 
 
a.  Nature of the agreements.  The 1998 and 1999 letter 
agreements were silent concerning the time at which the stock 
would be sold.  At trial, the parties had opposite views on how 
to interpret that silence.  The foundation asked the judge to 
supply a contract term imposing on Meyers an obligation to sell 
the shares if the foundation so demanded.  Robert James 
testified that it had been "essential" to him that he and Meyers 
                     
 
10 The complaint was later amended to add Robert James as a 
plaintiff. 
 
 
 
11 
 
agree on when to sell the stock.  He explained, "Otherwise I'm 
in this forever," adding, 
 
"Our agreement between Dan and me, it was [not] that 
specific, but the idea was that we were protecting each 
other.  You get into something like this, in one page it's 
so, who can forecast what's going to come up?  We take care 
of each other.  That was our agreement." 
  
 
Meyers, on the other hand, maintained that the absence of a 
specific timing term in the written documents reflected a 
bargained-for decision by the parties.  He explained that an 
early draft of what became the 1998 agreement had included 
language that Robert James could retain the share certificates 
in his possession "until such time as we agree that the stock 
should be sold" (emphasis added).  Because the final version of 
the document removed the reference to mutual agreement and 
included financial terms that were more profitable for the 
foundation, he contended that he had bargained for and secured 
complete discretion over when, or if, the shares would be sold.  
In his view, there was no time limit on his holding of the 
shares, he had no obligation ever to make the shares productive 
of income or capital for the foundation, and, if he wished, he 
even could leave them to his heirs.   
 
The judge concluded that the parties had not reached a 
mutual understanding about the time to sell the stock that was 
reflected in the written documents.  She declined either to 
supply a term requiring Meyers to sell "on demand," or to 
 
 
 
12 
 
construe the agreements as giving Meyers "sole and unbridled 
discretion" regarding the timing of sale.  Nonetheless, she 
credited Robert James's testimony regarding the nature of the 
parties' "gentleman's" agreements, "whereby the two would share 
the future risks and rewards of purchasing additional First 
Marblehead stock."  She also credited testimony that Meyers's 
intent in executing the 1998 and 1999 agreements was to "foil" 
efforts by other early shareholders in First Marblehead to 
dilute Meyers's and Anbinder's percentage ownership of the 
company, and that Robert James had agreed to assist Meyers on 
the understanding that he would participate in the proceeds of 
sale of the stock.  The judge did not, however, credit Meyers's 
interpretation of the agreements, describing them as "neither 
rational nor fair."  She explained,  
 
"Meyers's interpretation would now effectively deprive 
the Foundation forever of the benefit of its bargain 
through a profitable sale of the stock.  Meanwhile, Meyers 
has experienced all of the benefit of the bargain of owning 
additional stock he could not have owned but for James." 
 
 
 
We defer to the judge's assessment of the nature of the 
parties' contractual arrangement.  "[A] contract should be 
construed to give it effect as a rational business instrument 
and in a manner which will carry out the intent of the parties" 
(citation omitted).  Starr v. Fordham, 420 Mass. 178, 192 
(1995).  The agreements here clearly contemplated sale at some 
point, because they set out formulas for the distribution of the 
 
 
 
13 
 
eventual proceeds "[u]pon the sale of the stock."  Yet as long 
as Meyers continued to hold the shares, the foundation would 
receive no return on its initial investment, and had no recourse 
against Meyers or Anbinder personally if the stock decreased in 
value.  On the other hand, any time of sale would have resulted 
in a profit for Meyers, because he risked none of his own money 
in the purchase of the shares.  Given the trial testimony and 
documentary evidence, the judge did not err in concluding that 
the foundation had a reasonable expectation that it would share 
in the eventual profits from sale before the proverbial Twelfth 
of Never.11  Compare Shayeb v. Holland, 321 Mass. 429, 430-431 
(1947) (construing sale contract to require performance within 
reasonable time).   
 
b.  Implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  
Mindful of the fact that every contract in Massachusetts is 
subject to an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
see Anthony's Pier Four, Inc. v. HBC Assocs., 411 Mass. 451, 471 
(1991) (Anthony's Pier Four), and that "[a] breach occurs when 
one party violates the reasonable expectations of the other,"  
Chokel v. Genzyme Corp., 449 Mass. 272, 276 (2007) (Chokel), and 
cases cited, the judge ruled that Meyers had committed a breach 
of the covenant in this case by ignoring and declining to honor 
                     
 
11 "And that's a long, long time."  See The Twelfth of Never 
(J. Livingston & P.F. Webster), on Johnny Mathis Gold:  A 50th 
Anniversary Celebration (Sony BMG Music Entertainment 2006). 
 
 
 
14 
 
Robert James's and Catherine James Paglia's "clear, rational, 
and good faith efforts" on behalf of the foundation to resolve 
the contractual relationship between the parties.  Although the 
judge acknowledged that the foundation had never formally 
demanded that Meyers sell the shares, in her view, Meyers's 
position was "unfaithful" to what she found to have been "the 
intended and agreed upon expectations of the contract, including 
the trust [Robert] James reasonably placed in Meyers regarding 
sale of the stock."  She concluded,  
 
"I find and rule it was part of Meyers'[s] duty of 
good faith and fair dealing implied in the Agreements with 
James to, upon reasonable request, engage in reasonable 
efforts to arrive at a reasonable time for sale and thus 
resolve the contracts, rather than continuing to assert his 
right to delay sale and collect dividends indefinitely."  
 
Given the trial judge's findings regarding the nature of the 
agreements, we agree with this conclusion.   
 
"The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied in 
every contract, . . . including contracts between sophisticated 
business people" (citations omitted).  See Weiler, supra at 82.  
The covenant "exists so that the objectives of the contract may 
be realized."  Ayash v. Dana–Farber Cancer Inst., 443 Mass. 367, 
385, cert. denied sub nom. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Ayash, 546 
U.S. 927 (2005).  It provides "that neither party shall do 
anything that will have the effect of destroying or injuring the 
right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract."  
 
 
 
15 
 
Anthony's Pier Four, supra at 471-472, quoting Druker v. Roland 
Wm. Jutras Assocs., Inc., 370 Mass. 383, 385 (1976).  "In 
determining whether a party violated the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, we look to the party's manner of 
performance. . . .  There is no requirement that bad faith be 
shown; instead, the plaintiff has the burden of proving a lack 
of good faith. . . .  The lack of good faith can be inferred 
from the totality of the circumstances."  Weiler, supra, quoting 
T.W. Nickerson, Inc. v. Fleet Nat'l Bank, 456 Mass. 562, 570 
(2010).  However, "[t]he scope of the covenant is only as broad 
as the contract that governs the particular relationship."  
Ayash v. Dana–Farber Cancer Inst., supra.   
 
The totality of the circumstances found by the trial judge 
shows that Meyers failed to effectuate in good faith the sales 
of stock that the agreements clearly contemplated.  Although 
Meyers knew from his conversations with Anbinder that the 
foundation wished to bring the agreements to a close, he refused 
to speak with Robert James and Catherine James Paglia for nearly 
two years regarding effectuating the sale of the shares.  During 
the same time period, Meyers collected millions of dollars in 
dividends on those shares that he kept for himself, but sold 
millions of other shares of First Marblehead stock that he owned 
for many times what he had initially paid for them.  Taking an 
unwarranted view of his contractual rights, he thus sought to 
 
 
 
16 
 
achieve for himself a better deal than the sharing of risks and 
rewards for which the judge found he had originally bargained.  
See Anthony's Pier Four, supra at 472 (attempt to thwart 
conclusion of agreement as pretext to obtain more favorable 
terms constitutes breach of implied covenant).   
 
Unlike in Eigerman v. Putnam Invs., Inc., 450 Mass. 281, 
288 (2007), and Chokel, supra at 277, where we determined that 
decisions to buy and exchange shares only at particular times 
did not result in a breach of the implied covenant because the 
agreements at issue in those cases provided the defendants with 
sole discretion regarding the timing of sale, the trial judge 
here explicitly found that Meyers did not have such discretion.  
His actions therefore violated the foundation's reasonable 
expectations that he would "engage in reasonable efforts to 
arrive at a reasonable time for sale."  Otherwise put, by 
turning a deaf ear to the foundation's repeated requests, 
thwarting the effectuation of the agreements, he destroyed or 
injured the foundation's right to receive the fruits of those 
agreements.   
 
Our decision here is more analogous to our recent decision 
in Bay Colony R.R. Corp. v. Yarmouth, 470 Mass. 515, 524 (2015), 
where we concluded that a defendant's inaction constituted a 
breach of the implied covenant.  There, the town of Yarmouth 
terminated a waste transportation contract that it had made with 
 
 
 
17 
 
the plaintiff railroad company after the railroad company lost 
its lease to a local rail line.  See id. at 516.  The railroad 
company sought to continue to transport the waste by truck 
rather than rail, as permitted by its contract, but the town did 
not allow it to do so, purportedly on the basis that a waste 
transportation permit that the Department of Environmental 
Protection (DEP) had issued to the town did not allow for the 
long-term trucking of waste.  Id. at 516-517.  Although the town 
believed that the DEP would modify its permit upon request, id. 
at 524 n.10, it made no effort to seek such a modification.  Id. 
at 524. 
 
We held that the jury reasonably could have concluded that 
the town's unwillingness to accommodate the railroad company's 
efforts to perform on the contract resulted in a breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, because it 
violated the railroad company's reasonable expectations under 
the contract.  Id.  Likewise here, Meyers's unwillingness for an 
extended period of time even to speak with Robert James or 
Catherine James Paglia regarding the disposition of the stock 
was contrary to their reasonable expectations on behalf of the 
foundation.  See 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 370, at 356 (2004) 
("whenever the cooperation of the promisee is necessary for 
performance of the promise, there is a condition implied that 
the cooperation will be given"). 
 
 
 
18 
 
 
Although the implied covenant "may not . . . be invoked to 
create rights and duties not otherwise provided for in the 
existing contractual relationship," Uno Restaurants, Inc. v. 
Boston Kenmore Realty Corp., 441 Mass. 376, 385 (2004), no such 
rights or duties were created in this case.  We disagree with 
Meyers's contention on appeal that the judge impermissibly 
imposed on the parties a duty to negotiate a new deal, a 
characterization that the judge squarely rejected in her ruling 
posttrial that "[t]he court did not find a duty to negotiate."  
To the contrary, while the parties remained free to strike a new 
deal with a different formula for allocating proceeds -- as 
happened with Anbinder -- they were under no obligation to do 
so.  Their duty was instead to cooperate in effectuating the 
existing, agreed-upon deal on its own terms.  The judge's 
determination that Meyers had committed a breach of the implied 
covenant was grounded in the fact that he had taken an extreme 
and unwarranted view of his rights under the contract, and 
accordingly had declined to engage with the foundation's efforts 
to effectuate the sale and division of proceeds as to which it 
had a reasonable expectation.  As she made clear in her ruling 
on posttrial motions, the judge determined only that "Meyers 
breached his duty to resolve the Agreements in good faith 
pursuant to their terms."   
 
 
 
19 
 
 
Meyers's other arguments that he did not commit a breach of 
the implied covenant are similarly unavailing.  While the judge 
recognized that the foundation never explicitly demanded that 
Meyers sell the shares, the absence of a demand is beside the 
point because no such demand was required.  Based on her 
findings regarding the nature of the contractual relationship 
between the parties, to which we defer, the judge determined 
correctly that Meyers failed to effectuate the agreements in 
good faith when he did not respond in a timely manner to the 
foundation's repeated inquiries.  See Weiler, supra at 82.  
Furthermore, the response that Meyers finally gave on August 21, 
2006, via a letter from his personal attorney, does not alter 
our analysis.  In her post-trial rulings, the judge explicitly 
rejected Meyers's contention that the August 21, 2006, letter 
established his good faith willingness to perform his 
obligations under the agreements.  The judge explained, "I did 
not, I do not, and I cannot so find."  Moreover, she "found 
sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence throughout the 
record -- including but by no means limited to the parties' 
respective demeanors in testifying -- to find a breach by 
Meyers." 
 
c.  Date of breach.  The judge ultimately set the date of 
breach at July 31, 2006, stating that July, 2006, "was the 'end 
date' pursuant to what the record supports to have been nearly 
 
 
 
20 
 
two years of efforts by plaintiffs to achieve sale of the 
stock."  She awarded the foundation damages equal to the value 
of its portion of the shares on that date pursuant to the 
formulas set out in the 1998 and 1999 agreements.  Meyers argues 
that there was no evidentiary basis for this finding.  The date 
of breach and the reasonable time for performance of a contract, 
however, are questions for the trier of fact.  See Karen Constr. 
Co. v. Lizotte, 396 Mass. 143, 149 (1985); Powers, Inc. v. The 
Wayside, Inc., of Falmouth, 343 Mass. 686, 691 (1962).  
Furthermore, "an element of uncertainty in the assessment of 
damages is not a bar to their recovery . . . . [W]here, as here, 
the difficulties in determining damages arise in large part from 
[the defendant's conduct], . . . [a] reasonable approximation 
will suffice" (quotations and citations omitted).  National 
Merchandising Corp. v. Leyden, 370 Mass. 425, 430 (1976). 
 
Recognizing that there is often an element of uncertainty 
in the assessment of damages, we defer to the trial judge's 
finding.  July 31, 2006, was three full weeks after Robert 
James's final letter on behalf of the foundation prior to the 
start of this litigation.  Although Robert James's letter was 
relatively informal, in keeping with the parties' course of 
dealings, it followed nearly two years during which Meyers had 
opted not to respond in any form to the foundation's repeated 
requests to discuss concluding the agreements.  That delay was 
 
 
 
21 
 
in sharp contrast to the foundation's experience in dealing with 
Anbinder, who responded to Catherine James Paglia's initial 
inquiries regarding the effectuation of sale.  While the 
resolution of the Anbinder agreement involved terms different 
from the formulas contained within the 1998 and 1999 written 
agreements, it was not clearly erroneous for the judge to apply 
those formulas in order to calculate damages.12   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
                     
 
12 Meyers additionally argues that "non-recourse" provisions 
in the 1998 and 1999 agreements prevent recovery beyond the 
current value of the stocks purchased using the foundation's 
money.  Because he did not raise this argument at trial, 
however, it has been waived.  See Central Transp. Inc. v. 
Package Printing Co., 429 Mass. 189, 195 (1999), quoting Royal 
Indem. Co. v. Blakely, 372 Mass. 86, 88 (1977).