Title: KATHRYN ELAINE DUNCAN v. DUANE J. DUNCAN

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

KATHRYN ELAINE DUNCAN v. DUANE J. DUNCAN1989 WY 149776 P.2d 758Case Number: 88-252Decided: 07/11/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
KATHRYN ELAINE DUNCAN, 
APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

v.

DUANE J. DUNCAN, APPELLEE 
(DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Harry E. Leimback, 
J.

Ann M. Rochelle 
of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Casper, for appellant.

Richard Peek of 
Harden, Harden & Peek, Casper, for appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., THOMAS, URBIGKIT and MACY, 
JJ., and BROWN, Retired J.

BROWN, Justice, 
Retired.

[¶1.]     Appellant Kathryn 
Elaine Duncan (wife) appeals from an order of the district court denying her 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment modifying a divorce decree as to child custody and 
support. The sole issue to be decided is whether the Order of Modification was 
properly entered. We hold that it was not and therefore 
reverse.

[¶2.]     Wife and Duane J. 
Duncan (husband) were divorced on October 16, 1981. Pursuant to the divorce 
decree, wife received custody of the two children of the marriage and husband 
was ordered to pay child support. Following the divorce, wife moved to 
California for 
health reasons, leaving the children behind with their maternal 
grandparents.

[¶3.]     After wife's departure, 
husband filed a petition December 1, 1981, to modify the divorce decree seeking 
to have custody of the children awarded to him and to require wife to pay child 
support. Alleging an inability to locate the wife, husband attempted service on 
wife by publication, filing accompanying affidavits from his attorney. Based on 
its determination that service on wife was proper, the district court entered a 
default judgment against wife for her failure to respond to the petition and 
entered an Order of Modification on February 4, 1982, without the appearance of 
wife or an attorney representing her. The order awarded husband custody of the 
children and required wife to pay child support in the amount of $75 per month 
per child.

[¶4.]     Two years later, 
husband commenced an action under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support 
Act (URESA) in an effort to receive the child support payments pursuant to the 
Order of Modification. However, wife did not receive notice of either this 
action or the Order of Modification until 1987, when she was served in 
California. 
Immediately after notice of the URESA action and Order of Modification, wife 
moved to set aside the Order of Modification under W.R.C.P. 55 and 60, arguing, 
for the purposes of this appeal, (1) that the notice of the Petition for 
Modification was improper in that husband could have ascertained wife's 
whereabouts by exercising due diligence, and (2) that the district court lacked 
in personam jurisdiction over wife when it entered the Order of Modification, 
and thus could not order to her pay child support.

[¶5.]     The district court 
denied wife's motion on August 1, 1988, finding that service of process was 
proper on wife and that the court had personal jurisdiction over her such that 
it was within the court's authority to modify the original divorce decree. This 
appeal followed.

[¶6.]     The issue on appeal 
concerns the validity of the modification order transferring custody of the 
children from wife to husband and ordering wife to pay child support. W.S. 
20-2-113(a) provides that "[o]n the petition of either of the parents, the court 
may revise the decree concerning the care, custody, visitation and maintenance 
of the children as the circumstances of the parents and the benefit of the 
children requires." While the district court granting the divorce retains 
continuing jurisdiction to modify the custody and support aspects of the divorce 
decree, Nicholaus v. Nicholaus, 756 P.2d 1338, 1340 (Wyo. 1988), certain 
procedural steps must be fulfilled before the court can be said to have 
authority to modify the divorce decree. In this case, two important procedures 
were violated requiring this court to reverse the district court's 
order.

[¶7.]     It is the rule in 
Wyoming that 
personal service is required with regard to orders for child support. Rodgers v. 
Rodgers, 627 P.2d 1381, 1383-84 (Wyo. 1981). There, we 
stated:

An order for child 
support cannot issue without in personam jurisdiction.

"Orders for child 
support, being of the traditional in personam variety, must be based upon 
personal service within the jurisdiction * * *." Clark on Domestic Relations, § 15.1, p. 
489.

* * * * * 
*

The necessity of in 
personam jurisdiction to impose the duty to support is recognized in Wyoming's version of the 
Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, § 20-4-101, W.S. 1977, et 
seq.

[¶8.]     An order or decree for 
child support is binding only on a person over whom the court has in personam 
jurisdiction. W.R.C.P. 4-5; 24 Am.Jur.2d Divorce and Separation § 1020 at 1020 
(1983). In this case, husband completed service by publication. Under Rodgers, 
such service is insufficient to provide notice to wife; the district court 
lacked in personam jurisdiction over the wife allowing it to modify the divorce 
decree as to child support.

[¶9.]     While service by 
publication is insufficient for the purposes of a child support order, it has 
traditionally been held that service by publication can be sufficient where the 
issue to be decided is child custody. Nonetheless, in this case the service upon 
wife was insufficient for the child custody issue, but for a different reason. 
W.R.C.P. 4(f) contains the requirements to be fulfilled before service by 
publication can be deemed sufficient. It provides:

(f) Requirements for service by publication. 
- Before service by publication can be made, an affidavit of the party, his 
agent or attorney, must be filed stating that service of a summons cannot be 
made within this state, on the defendant to be served by publication, and 
stating his address, if known, or that his address is unknown and cannot, with 
reasonable diligence be ascertained, and that the case is one of those mentioned 
in paragraph (e) of this rule; and when such affidavit is filed, the party may 
proceed to make service by publication.

[¶10.]  In Emery v. Emery, 404 P.2d 745 (Wyo. 
1965), this court recognized that either a plaintiff or his attorney may file 
the affidavit, but that the affidavit cannot be filed by one for the other as 
the affidavit would be based on unpermitted hearsay:

We recognize that the 
affidavit required under the last paragraph of Rule 4(f) can be made by 
plaintiff, or it can be made by his attorney. It cannot, however, be made by one 
for the other. Such an affidavit at best could only be made on information and 
belief, and we construe the rule to require positive 
verification.

Id. at 
748.

[¶11.]  Here, husband's attorney filed the 
accompanying affidavit with the request to complete service by publication, 
stating that, "Defendant had no knowledge of Plaintiff's whereabouts." Clearly, 
this is a hearsay statement and not based on the attorney's personal knowledge 
of the whereabouts of wife. Under Rule 4(f) and Emery, this is not sufficient 
for proper service. The requirements of W.R.C.P. 4(f) are mandatory and any 
omission is fatal. National Supply Company v. Chittim, 387 P.2d 1010, 1012 
(Wyo. 1964). 
The rule must be "`strictly, literally, and fully complied with in order to 
render such service valid.'" Id. at 1012 (quoting 72 C.J.S. Process § 55 at 
1069). Husband failed to comply with W.R.C.P. 4(f) with respect to the proper 
filing of affidavits before service by publication could be permitted; 
therefore, notice was insufficient. Under these circumstances, the district 
court improperly modified the divorce decree.

[¶12.]  The district court's order dismissing 
wife's motion to set aside the default and Order of Modification is reversed.