Title: STATE OF WYOMING, EX REL., WYOMING WORKERS' COMPENSATION DIVISION v. ANNE BORODINE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

STATE OF WYOMING, EX REL., WYOMING WORKERS' COMPENSATION DIVISION v. ANNE BORODINE1989 WY 226784 P.2d 228Case Number: 89-172Decided: 12/21/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
STATE OF WYOMING, EX REL., WYOMING WORKERS' COMPENSATION DIVISION, 
APPELLANT (PETITIONER),

v.

ANNE BORODINE, APPELLEE 
(RESPONDENT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, LincolnCounty, John D. Troughton, 
J.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., and Ronald Arnold, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.

George Santini, 
Graves, Santini & Villimez, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The problem presented 
in this case is whether the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act, §§ 27-12-101 
through 27-12-805, W.S. 1977, should be applied in a manner that limits an 
individual's choice of employments. The hearing officer entered an award in 
favor of the employee, Anne Borodine (Borodine), that was premised upon a 
disability relating to the employment in which Borodine was injured. That award 
was granted even though the hearing officer also found that it did not affect 
Borodine's ability to work in a more sedentary employment in which she had both 
formal training and experience. Upon review, the district court affirmed the 
award entered by the hearing officer. We find no error in the determination of 
the hearing officer, and we affirm the ruling of the district 
court.

[¶2.]     In this appeal, the 
Worker's Compensation Division of the State of Wyoming (State) advances two issues. These 
are:

"1. Whether the 
administrative hearing officer erred as a matter of law by finding that appellee 
had a loss of earnings capacity despite the fact that the hearing officer found 
the appellee could return to former, higher paying 
employment.

"2. Whether the 
administrative hearing officer's findings of fact are supported by substantial 
evidence."

Borodine 
expresses the problem with the statement of a single 
issue:

"Is the award of twenty 
percent (20%) permanent partial disability entered by the Hearing Officer 
supported by substantial evidence?"

[¶3.]     Borodine injured her 
back and her right wrist in a work-related accident on January 9, 1986. She then 
was employed as a painter/sandblaster with Western Coating & Sandblasting. 
On June 30, 1987, the District Court for the Third Judicial District entered an 
order finding that the January 9, 1986 accident had caused an injury to 
Borodine's back and a carpal tunnel injury to her right wrist. In May of 1988, 
Borodine received an award of permanent partial disability of five percent of 
the whole body based upon the work-related injury to her back. She did not, at 
that time, receive any award for the injury to her wrist. On September 21, 1988, 
she filed an Application and Claim for Permanent Total Disability Benefits. The 
State objected to this claim and, on February 28, 1989, a contested case hearing 
was conducted by the hearing officer, pursuant to § 27-14-602, W.S. 1977 
(Cum.Supp. 1987).

[¶4.]     Borodine testified at 
the contested case hearing and was subject to cross-examination by the State. 
She explained the facts relating to her injuries and her previous experience and 
training in various employment situations. The State relied upon the testimony 
of an independent consultant with a master's degree in petroleum geology to 
support its theory. Both sides stipulated to the admissibility of various 
exhibits, and the State particularly relied upon a Professional Rehabilitation 
Management Report. The State urged that the evidence demonstrated Borodine's 
prior experience and training as a geologist, and that her ability to perform 
work-related duties in that profession was not diminished by the accident which 
injured her back and her wrist.

[¶5.]     On March 15, 1989, the 
hearing officer entered his Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Order in 
which he granted Borodine an award for permanent partial disability in the 
amount of twenty percent of the body as a whole in addition to the five percent 
permanent partial physical impairment award made in May of 1988. In the findings 
portion of his order, the hearing officer compared Borodine's salary of $600 per 
week as a union painter with her salary of $175 per week as a bartender (the 
occupation she was pursuing at the time of the hearing). The hearing officer 
noted that Borodine's physical limitations prevented her from continuing in her 
secondary employment as a union painter. Based upon the evidence and the 
testimony presented at the hearing, it was the hearing officer's conclusion 
"that there [had] been a significant decrease in [Borodine's] earning capacity 
as a result of her work-related injuries preventing her from returning to work 
in her secondary employment as a union painter and that she [was] entitled to 
worker's compensation disability benefits in order to fully and adequately 
compensate her for such loss." The hearing officer also found "that in order to 
return [Borodine] to her previous level of earning capacity, it [was] both 
appropriate and necessary that she receive further education and training." The 
hearing officer noted that the disability award was compensation not only for 
Borodine's five percent physical impairment, but also for her loss of earning 
capacity.

[¶6.]     On April 21, 1989, the 
State filed in the district court a Petition for Judicial Review of the hearing 
officer's decision. The district court reviewed the record and briefs submitted 
by the parties before entering its Order Denying Petition for Review on July 13, 
1989. The district court affirmed the award made by the hearing officer, and the 
State appealed from that order to this court.

[¶7.]     The record demonstrates 
that Borodine had not only formal education but experience and additional 
training as a field geologist. Because of a slump in the petroleum industry she 
had sought employment as a painter/sandblaster, and she was pursuing that 
occupation at the time of her injury. Her prior experience and training as a 
painter/sandblaster enabled her to rely on that occupation as a secondary source 
of employment. The evidence that Borodine cannot return to her work as a painter 
because of her injuries is not contested in this record.

[¶8.]     The State argues that 
the hearing officer erred, as a matter of law, in interpreting § 27-12-403(h), 
W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Repl.), which provides, in pertinent 
part:

"* * * One (1) factor to 
be considered is the ability of the employee to continue to perform work for 
which he was reasonably suited by experience or training prior to the 
injury."

Section 
27-12-403(h), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Repl.), has been amended and renumbered as § 
27-14-405(b)(xvi), W.S. 1977 (June 1987 Repl.), with the relevant language being 
identical. The State contends that a proper statutory construction of this 
provision must focus on "what effect did Appellee's injury have on her ability 
to work at any jobs - not just the sandblasting/painting jobs." The State 
asserts that "[i]f an injured worker has the physical ability to return to a job 
for which she had prior experience and training, then there is no `loss of 
earnings capacity.'" The State then emphasizes the finding by the hearing 
officer that Borodine could return to work as a geologist, and the State's 
conclusion is that, as a matter of law, the finding, when related to a correct 
construction of the statute, prevented any award to Borodine for loss of earning 
capacity. Borodine's response is that the evidence does support the hearing 
officer's conclusion that there has been a substantial diminution of her earning 
capacity as a painter/sandblaster, and the award should, for that reason, be 
affirmed.

[¶9.]     For more than fifty 
years, we have accepted the principle that the "provisions of the [Wyoming] Workmen's 
Compensation Act * * * should receive a liberal construction to accomplish the 
benevolent purpose for which they were promulgated." Baldwin v. Scullion, 50 
Wyo. 508, 62 P.2d 531, 538 (1936). A correlative concept is that it is the worker, not the 
industry, who is the intended beneficiary of the worker's compensation 
provisions.

[¶10.]  We also have ruled that when an injury 
deprives the worker of the ability to rely on prior experience and training in a 
particular occupation, which results in a decrease of the worker's earning 
capacity, the injured workman is entitled to compensation. In McCarty v. Bear 
Creek Uranium Company, 694 P.2d 93, 95 (Wyo. 1985), in discussing loss of 
earning capacity, we quoted with approval from Vetter v. Alaska Workmen's 
Compensation Board, 524 P.2d 264, 266 (Alaska 1974), the 
following:

"`The concept of 
disability compensation rests on the premise that the primary consideration is 
not medical impairment as such, but rather loss of earning capacity related to 
that impairment. An award for compensation must be supported by a finding that 
the claimant suffered a compensable disability or, more precisely, a decrease in 
earning capacity due to a work-connected injury or illness. Factors to be 
considered in making this finding include not only the extent of the injury, but 
also age, education, employment available in the area for persons with the 
capabilities in question, and intentions 
as to employment in the future.'" (Emphasis added.)

The extent of 
the injured worker's disability pursuant to the loss of earning requirement 
becomes a question of fact. Any evidence, medical and non-medical, that is 
relevant may be considered by the hearing officer. Matter of Injury to Van 
Buskirk, 741 P.2d 120 (Wyo. 1987); State, ex 
rel. Worker's Compensation Division v. Lewis, 739 P.2d 1225 (Wyo. 
1987).

[¶11.]  The application of the statute that the 
State urges is not novel. It made essentially the same argument in State, ex 
rel. Worker's Compensation Division v. Colvin, 681 P.2d 269 (Wyo. 1984), when 
the effort was to shift the focus away from a loss of earning capacity in 
employment as a mechanical draftsman. There the State contended that the 
district court had erred in granting Colvin a disability award. Colvin had been 
trained as a mechanical draftsman, but he had been laid off from his job in that 
employment and, at the time of his injury, he was temporarily employed at a 
sawmill. In an accident in the sawmill, he lost a finger and suffered additional 
injuries to his drafting hand. Medical testimony established that Colvin's 
injuries resulted in an approximate 34 percent impairment in the use of his 
upper right arm, and the district court held that his work-related injuries 
justified a fifty percent permanent partial disability award with respect to his 
ability to perform work as a draftsman. The State's position, among other 
arguments, was that, because Colvin had experience and training that permitted 
him to pursue employment in other areas than working as a mechanical draftsman, 
he had suffered no compensable disability due to the injuries to his hand. It 
argued that the district court should discount the negative effect of Colvin's 
injuries on his earning capacity as a draftsman because he could seek employment 
elsewhere. The argument then was premised upon the State's interpretation of § 
27-12-403(h), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Repl.).

[¶12.]  In Colvin, 681 P.2d  at 272, we rejected 
the State's proposed construction of the statute saying:

"We believe that the 
statute [§ 27-12-403(h), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Repl.)] was designed to allow the 
trial court to consider the work for which a claimant was suited before the 
injury and how he was impaired in performing this work after the injury when 
determining the compensation a claimant should receive."

We held that 
Colvin was entitled to compensation because of the effect of the injury on his 
earning capacity as a mechanical draftsman, without regard to whether other 
employment was available. The thrust of that ruling was that Colvin's loss of 
prior experience and training as a draftsman constituted a compensable 
disability. If we should permit sophistry to erode the basic principles 
underlying the legislature's enactment of the worker's compensation laws (see 
Baldwin, 62 P.2d 531), incongruous results 
undoubtedly would occur.

[¶13.]  Colvin, stands for the proposition that 
in applying § 27-12-403(h), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Repl.), one of the factors to 
be considered is the claimant's ability to perform work for which that person is 
reasonably suited. Worker's Compensation Claim of Cannon v. FMC Corporation, 718 P.2d 879 (Wyo. 
1986). The language that the court invoked is clear to the end that it 
establishes that an injured employee's ability to perform work for which that 
person is reasonably suited is just one of the factors to be addressed in 
deciding how the injury affected earning capacity. At least in part, that focus 
must rest upon whether the injury will prevent or hinder the injured worker from 
continuing in, or returning to, an occupation for which that person has the 
proper training and experience. If it does, the worker has suffered a loss in 
earning capacity insofar as the prior experience and training qualified the 
worker for that particular occupation, and a compensable disability does exist 
without regard to whether or not the worker can pursue some different type of 
employment for which that person is reasonably suited.

[¶14.]  Certainly, that factor is only one 
consideration with respect to worker's compensation awards. In 1933, this court 
recognized that "[t]he permanent partial disability award * * * has regard 
primarily to the loss or impairment of a body member or function. This loss or 
impairment may or it may not result in reduction of earning power. It does 
deprive the employee of something of great value to him, and hence the 
legislature deemed it proper that the industry should make compensation 
therefor." In re McConnell, 45 Wyo. 289, 18 P.2d 629, 633 (1933) (emphasis 
added). The clear import of this language is that an injured workman is entitled 
to compensation for a disabling injury even though it may have little impact on 
earning capacity. Under our law, an employee can be compensated for either or 
both.

[¶15.]  In analyzing the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support the hearing officer's determination:

"We examine the entire 
record to determine if there is substantial evidence to support an agency's 
findings. If the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence, we 
cannot properly substitute our judgment for that of the agency, and must uphold 
the findings on appeal. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a 
reasonable mind might accept in support of the conclusions of the agency. It is 
more than a scintilla of evidence." Hohnholt v. Basin Electric Power Co-op, 784 P.2d 233, 234 (Wyo. 1989), quoting from Trout 
v. Wyoming Oil & Gas Conservation Commission, 721 P.2d 1047, 1050 
(Wyo. 
1986).

The application 
of this appropriate standard of review to the record in this case discloses 
substantial evidence to support the determination of the hearing officer that 
Borodine's earning capacity in the secondary employment of a painter was 
substantially diminished. We noted earlier that her loss of earning capacity is 
a question of fact to be resolved by the finder of fact, and substantial 
evidence to support that finding being encompassed in the record, the 
determination by the hearing officer must be affirmed. The essence of the 
problem presented in this case is not whether Borodine could return to geology 
and, for that reason, would not suffer a loss in earning capacity. Instead, the 
hearing examiner properly determined that Borodine no longer can rely on her 
prior experience and training as a union painter for her income. Because that 
capacity has been substantially diminished, Borodine did suffer a true loss of 
her earning potential. Nothing in our law requires Borodine to choose the 
employment which would not suffer diminution in earning capacity because of her 
injuries. See McCarty, 694 P.2d  at 95. In accord with the analysis and 
interpretation of the law in Colvin and Cannon, Borodine is entitled to 
compensation for the loss of her earning capacity in her employment as a 
painter. The determination by the hearing officer, as affirmed by the district 
court, that Borodine was eligible for benefits under the statute is consistent 
with the statute and our precedent; and it is supported by substantial 
evidence.

[¶16.]  The award entered by the hearing officer 
is affirmed.

MACY, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶17.]  I dissent. Contrary to the majority, I am 
of the opinion that Borodine failed to prove a loss of earning capacity or a 
true loss of her earning potential. Unlike Colvin, Borodine was not impaired 
from carrying on her primary profession for which she had training and 
experience. The legislature did not intend to compensate people for doing less 
than what they have a capacity or desire to do.