Title: DCSE/Morgan v. Lucas

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DCSE/VANESSA MORGAN, 
 
Petitioner Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
JEFFREY LUCAS, 
 
Respondent Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 545, 2005 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Family Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Kent County 
§  File No. CK02-04472 
§  Petition No. 05-07202 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted : February 24, 2006 
 
 
 
 
   Decided : May 17, 2006 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R1  
 
 
This 17th day of May 2006, upon consideration of the briefs of the 
parties and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The petitioner-appellant, the Delaware Division of Child 
Support Enforcement (“DCSE”), on behalf of Vanessa Morgan (“Aunt”), 
filed an appeal from the Family Court’s October 4, 2005 order adopting the 
June 3, 2005 order of the Family Court commissioner.2  The commissioner 
ordered DCSE’s child support petition against respondent-appellee, Jeffrey 
                                                 
1 The Court has sua sponte assigned pseudonyms to the parties and the minor child 
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 7(d). 
2 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 915(d) (1) (The Family Court “shall make a de novo 
determination of those portions of the Commissioner’s order to which objection is 
made.”)  
 
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Lucas (“Father”) to be dismissed without prejudice.  We find no merit to the 
appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
   
(2) 
On January 16, 2001, the minor child in question, Jarnell Lucas, 
was born to Father and Linda Johnson (“Mother”).  In February 2002, Father 
petitioned for sole custody of Jarnell and the Family Court granted his 
petition.  Mother was granted visitation.  In 2003, Father was incarcerated 
and left Jarnell with his mother (“Grandmother”), giving Grandmother 
temporary custody of Jarnell in a notarized letter.  At one point in 2004, 
Mother disappeared with Jarnell during a weekend visit.  Subsequently, 
Mother left Jarnell with Aunt, who now receives public assistance from the 
State to support Jarnell.  In February 2005, DCSE filed the instant petition 
for child support. 
 
(3) 
On June 3, 2005, a hearing was held before a Family Court 
commissioner.  The transcript of the hearing reflects the following.  An 
attorney for DCSE appeared, but Aunt did not appear.  At the time of the 
hearing, Father had been incarcerated for two years.  He was a participant in 
the Key South Program and was on track to be placed in the Crest Program.3  
Father estimated that he would be released at least as of February 2007.  
Father stated that he had no assets with which to pay child support and was 
                                                 
3 The Key South and Crest Programs are programs for inmates to address problems with 
substance abuse and transitioning to life outside prison. 
 
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not earning any money while in prison.  He stated that he still had sole 
custody of Jarnell and that Jarnell would be returned to him after his release 
from prison.4  None of the evidence presented by Father was contested by 
DCSE.  Based upon the evidence presented, the commissioner dismissed the 
petition without prejudice.    
 
(4) 
In this appeal, DCSE claims that the Family Court committed 
legal error and abused its discretion by adopting the commissioner’s order.  
Specifically, DCSE argues that, by failing to enter an order assessing at least 
the minimum amount of support owed under the Melson Formula,5 the 
Family Court absolved Father of his duty to support his child as required by 
Delaware law.  
 
(5) 
This Court’s standard of review of the Family Court’s adoption 
of a commissioner’s order is to examine the record for legal error and abuse 
of discretion.6  We will not disturb legal rulings or findings of fact unless 
they are clearly wrong.7  We will affirm the inferences and deductions of the 
                                                 
4 The commissioner noted that the last order in the file relating to custody was the 2002 
order awarding custody of Jarnell to Father. 
5 Under the Melson Formula, the amount of child support to be paid is calculated after 
determining the monthly net income of each parent, the primary support needs of the 
child and then making a standard of living adjustment.  Fam. Ct. Civ. R. 52(c).   
6 Jones v. Lang, 591 A.2d 185, 187 (Del. 1991). 
7 Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.W.V., Jr.), 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Del. 1979). 
 
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Family Court if they are supported by the record and are the product of an 
orderly and logical deductive process.8   
 
(6) 
The proper use of the Melson Formula requires more than a 
mechanical application of an algebraic equation.9  “The mathematical result 
which is the product of the Melson Formula can never be the basis of a child 
support order . . . until that result passes the litmus test of the rebuttable 
presumption.  When the calculation . . . is mixed together with the specific 
facts in a case, the result must be equitable.  If the result is inequitable, the 
presumption is rebutted and the support calculation . . . must yield to the 
extent that is necessary to balance the equities in the case.”10  In the case of 
an inmate with a minor child, this Court has held that incarceration is a 
foreseeable result of criminal activity and does not ipso facto relieve one of 
the duty to pay child support.11   
 
(7) 
DCSE first argues that the Family Court committed legal error 
by dismissing its petition for child support.  Its position is that, under 
Delaware law, at least a minimum support order must be entered in every 
case where support is sought from an incarcerated person, even if that person 
has no income or assets.  The caselaw does not compel such a result, 
                                                 
8 Solis v. Tea, 468 A.2d 1276, 1279 (Del. 1983). 
9 DCSE ex rel. Harper v. Barrows, 570 A.2d 1180, 1182 (Del. 1990). 
10 Dalton v. Clanton, 559 A.2d 1197, 1212 (Del. 1989). 
11 DCSE ex rel. Harper v. Barrows, 570 A.2d at 1183. 
 
 
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however.  While it is clear that incarceration does not ipso facto relieve a 
person from his or her duty of support, the Family Court still must balance 
the equities in rendering its decision.   
 
(8) 
In DCSE ex rel. Harper v. Barrows, a case heavily relied upon 
by DCSE, this Court held that the Family Court failed to properly balance 
the equities when it imposed a nominal support obligation on the 
incarcerated father, given the particular facts of that case.  There, the minor 
child in question lived with his mother, who had limited resources.  
However, the father had earned a substantial salary prior to his incarceration 
and had an interest in a profit sharing plan.  Thus, the resources available for 
support of the minor child were directly impacted by the father’s refusal to 
provide support.  Under those circumstances, this Court held that it “would 
be inequitable to have the support obligation discharged by one parent, or 
society, while the incarcerated parent retains available assets.”12  
 
(9) 
The factual circumstances of the instant case are different.  
Prior to his incarceration, Father petitioned for sole custody of Jarnell and 
the Family Court granted his petition.  There is no evidence that Father ever 
failed to provide support for Jarnell.  While Jarnell’s mother also owes 
Jarnell a duty of support, it does not appear that Father has ever filed an 
                                                 
12 DCSE ex rel. Harper v. Barrows, 570 A.2d at 1184. 
 
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action against Mother seeking such support.  While Father gave temporary 
custody of Jarnell to Grandmother, the record reflects that he has always 
intended to have Jarnell returned to him upon his release, which apparently 
will occur in early 2007.  The record further reflects that Father has no assets 
and is earning no money while incarcerated and that Jarnell is being 
supported, at least in part, by public assistance.  Thus, the resources 
available for Jarnell’s current support have not been impacted by the 
dismissal of the support petition at this time.   
 
(10) While the Family Court’s decision does not expressly so state, 
it reflects a reluctance to penalize a custodial parent who appears to be doing 
the best he can for his child under the circumstances.  While mindful that 
Father is solely responsible for his incarceration, that Father’s duty of 
support continues even while he is incarcerated and that there is a social cost 
involved when a child is supported by public assistance, we will not interfere 
with the exercise of the Family Court’s discretion in this case.  The Family 
Court dismissed the petition without prejudice.  Thus, if the circumstances of 
this case change at any point following Father’s release, the Family Court 
has the authority to issue a decision reflective of the equities as they exist at 
that time.   
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Family Court is AFFIRMED.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice