Title: Suter v. Stuckey

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Judith Suter v. Darryl A. Stuckey
No. 9, September Term, 2007.
APPEALS - RIGHT OF REVIEW - DOMESTIC VIOLENCE - PROTECTIVE ORDER:
Family Law § 4-507 provides for a right of appeal from the entry
of a protective order from the District Court to the Circuit
Court and the appeal shall be heard de novo. 
APPEALS - RIGHT OF REVIEW:  The right to appeal may be lost by
acquiescence in or consent to a final judgment.  Accordingly,
absent fraud or coercion, no appeal lies from a consent judgment.
APPEALS - RIGHT OF REVIEW - ESTOPPEL, WAIVER, OR AGREEMENT - TRIAL
DE NOVO: Absent fraud or coercion, a party may not appeal a
protective order entered by consent pursuant to the Domestic
Violence Protection Act.
In the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County
Case No. CADV06-10916
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 9
September Term, 2007
JUDITH SUTER
v.
DARRYL A. STUCKEY
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Wilner, Alan M.
(Retired, specially assigned)
Cathell, Dale, R.
(Retired, specially assigned) 
JJ.
Opinion by Raker, J. 
Filed:   November 14, 2007
This case arises out of a final protective order issued by the District Court of
Maryland, sitting in Prince George’s County, at the request of Judith Suter, petitioner.  We
granted certiorari to consider the following question:
“In a domestic violence protective order proceeding originating
in the District Court, is a respondent estopped from appealing to
the circuit court a protective order entered by consent?”
Suter v. Stuckey, 398 Md. 314, 920 A.2d 1058 (2007).
I.
Judith Suter filed a petition for a temporary protective order (“TPO”) in the District
Court of Maryland, sitting in Prince George’s County, on April 13, 2006.  In the petition for
protection from domestic violence, Ms. Suter indicated that Darryl Stuckey, the respondent,
punched her, slapped her, detained her against her will and “pointed his gun in [her] face and
threaten[ed] to shoot” her.  Petitioner described the triggering events as follows:
“On April 5, 2006, Darryl Stuckey started an argument
with me because I didn’t take his phone calls.  The argument
lead into him slapping in my face, then punching me.  He took
me by my neck and threw me around the room.  He then reached
for his gun that was under the mattress and pointed it in my face,
threatening to shoot me.  He then hit me with the gun on the side
of my head.  I ran to call 911 from the cordless phone.  He had
removed all the cordless phones out of the house.  I ran into his
office to call 911 and we started fighting again.  I punched him
in his face and started throwing stuff at him to protect myself . . .
I finally dialed 911.  They picked up and asked me questions.
He then started taking things out of the house.  He took all my
keys and my handbag out of the house.  He took my laptop and
hid that.  The police came and asked both of us questions.  My
fiancé and I and my daughter have been living together for over
a year.  We were planning on a wedding in St. Kitts on July 15,
1 Maryland Code (1984, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 4-506(c) of the Family Law Article reads,
in pertinent part, as follows:
“(1) If the respondent appears before the court at a protective
order hearing or has been served with an interim or temporary
(continued...)
-2-
2006.  I was afraid of my life and my daughter’s.  The police
arrested him because there was evidence of abuse on my face.
They released him around 2:30 am that morning.
“On April 12, 2006, he came up to my place of
employment and started an argument.  He took my house keys
and my car keys and told me not to come home.  I am now
homeless and carless.  I took the gun out of the house on
Monday and gave it to the police yesterday when I called them.
. . . The gun had bullets in it.  He stole my cell phone, my
handbag, my camera, my coat and other work files. . . .”
Ms. Suter requested a wide spectrum of relief.  In addition to asking for the court to
order Stuckey to refrain from abusing, threatening, harassing, contacting or attempting to
contact her, she asked that Stuckey be ordered to stay away from her residence, her
daughter’s school and her place of work.  Ms. Suter asked also that Stuckey be ordered to
attend counseling and to pay emergency family maintenance.  Finally,  Ms. Suter asked that
she be awarded use and possession of the family car.
That same day, the Court issued the TPO, essentially granting the relief requested by
Ms. Suter and scheduling a final protective order hearing on April 20, 2006.  Five days later,
the court entered a final protective order by consent pursuant to Maryland Code (1984, 2006
Repl. Vol.), § 4-506(c) of the Family Law Article.1
1(...continued)
protective order, or the court otherwise has personal jurisdiction
over the respondent, the judge:
“(i) may proceed with the final protective order hearing; and
“(ii) if the judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that the
alleged abuse has occurred, or if the respondent consents to the
entry of a protective order, the judge may grant a final protective
order to protect any person eligible for relief from abuse.”
2 Unless otherwise noted, hereinafter references to § 4-507 will be to Maryland Code
(1984, 2006 Repl. Vol.), §4-507 of the Family Law Article.
3 Maryland Rule 7-102 (2007) reads as follows:
“(a) De Novo. Except as provided in section (b) of this Rule,
an appeal shall be tried de novo in all civil and criminal
actions.
(continued...)
-3-
On May 17, 2006, respondent Darryl Stuckey noted an appeal to the Circuit Court for
Prince George’s County.  Respondent based his appeal partly on Maryland Code (1984, 2006
Repl. Vol.), § 4-507(b) of the Family Law Article,2 which provides for a de novo appeal in
the Circuit Court from a District Court grant or denial of relief based on a petition for a final
protective order.  Section 4-507(b) reads as follows:
“(1) If a District Court judge grants or denies relief under a
petition filed under this subtitle, a respondent, any person
eligible for relief, or a petitioner may appeal to the circuit court
for the county where the District Court is located.
“(2) An appeal taken under this subsection to the circuit court
shall be heard de novo in the circuit court. . . .”
Stuckey also based his appeal on Maryland Rule 7-102 (a) (2007), which governs appeals
from the District Court to the Circuit Court.3 
3(...continued)
“(b) On the Record. An appeal shall be heard on the record
made in the District Court in the following cases:
“(1) a civil action in which the amount in controversy exceeds
$5,000 exclusive of interest, costs, and attorney’s fees if
attorney’s fees are recoverable by law or contract;
“(2) any matter arising under § 4-401 (7)(ii) of the Courts
Article;
“(3) any civil or criminal action in which the parties so agree;
“(4) an appeal from an order or judgment of direct criminal
contempt if the sentence imposed by the District Court was
less than 90 days’ imprisonment; and
“(5) an appeal by the State from a judgment quashing or
dismissing a charging document or granting a motion to
dismiss in a criminal case.
4 Maryland Rule 2-551 (2007), in relevant part, reads as follows:
“(a) Generally.  When review by a court in banc is permitted by
the Maryland Constitution, a party may have a judgment or
determination of any point or question reviewed by a court in
banc by filing a notice for in banc review.  Issues are reserved
for in banc review by making an objection in the manner set
forth in Rules 2-517 and 2-520. Upon the filing of the notice, the
Circuit Administrative Judge shall designate three judges of the
(continued...)
-4-
In the Circuit Court, Ms. Suter filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing the appeal
was time-barred and Stuckey was estopped from appealing a consent judgment.  Following
a hearing, the Circuit Court granted the motion to dismiss and affirmed the Final Protective
Order.  Suter filed a motion for a new trial and/or motion to amend judgment on August 22,
2006, which was denied.
Stuckey requested an in banc review of the Circuit Court ruling, pursuant to Md. Rule
2-551.4  Respondent again argued that § 4-507(b) and Md. Rule 7-102 (a) entitled him to a
4(...continued)
circuit, other than the judge who tried the action, to sit in banc.
. . .
“(g) Dismissal.  The panel, on its own initiative or on motion of
any party, shall dismiss an in banc review if (1) in banc review
is not permitted by the Maryland Constitution, (2) the notice for
in banc review was prematurely filed or not timely filed, or (3)
the case has become moot, and the panel may dismiss if the
memorandum of the party seeking review was not timely filed.
“(h) Further Review. Any party who seeks and obtains review
under this Rule has no further right of appeal. The decision of
the panel does not preclude an appeal to the Court of Special
Appeals by an opposing party who is otherwise entitled to
appeal.”
-5-
de novo hearing in the Circuit Court.  Ms. Suter argued that no appeal lies from a consent
judgment.
The panel ruled that based on statutes governing appeals from the District Court to the
Circuit Court in domestic violence protective order cases, Stuckey was entitled to a de novo
appeal.  In its written opinion and order, the panel first found the cases cited by Ms. Suter
“not applicable” because those cases involved “[a]ppeals from the Circuit Court to the Court
of Special Appeals” which are on the record appeals, not de novo appeals.  The panel
reasoned as follows: 
“The instant case is distinguishable in the respect that this is a
domestic violence case in the District Court being appealed to
the Circuit Court.  Without the use of speculation or facts not in
the record it is impossible to determine what benefit the party
may have gained.  There was no case law presented nor any
discovered through the Court’s research that Fry [v. Coyote
5 Unless otherwise noted, subsequent references herein to Sec. 12-401 shall be to
Maryland Code (1976, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 12-401 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article.
-6-
Portfolio, 128 Md. App. 607, 739 A.2d 914 (1999)] and its
brethren could be applied to this matter.”
The in banc panel found Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 12-401 of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article,5 “controlling and dispositive.”  Section 12-401 states, in
pertinent part, as follows:
“(f) . . . In a civil case in which the amount in controversy
exceeds $5,000 exclusive of interest, costs, and attorney’s fees
if attorney’s fees are recoverable by law or contract, in any
matter arising under § 4-401(7)(ii) of this article, and in any case
in which the parties so agree, an appeal shall be heard on the
record made in the District Court.  In every other case, including
a criminal case in which sentence has been imposed or
suspended following a plea of nolo contendere or guilty, and an
appeal in a municipal infraction or Code violation case, an
appeal shall be tried de novo.”
The in banc panel concluded that the case sub judice was an example of “every other case”
that would be tried de novo under the section because appeals from a domestic violence
protective order are not noted in the companion exceptions.  The panel concluded also that
Md. Rule 7-102 and § 4-507 support the finding that Stuckey was entitled to a de novo
appeal.  The panel reversed the Circuit Court and remanded the case for a trial de novo.
This Court granted M s. Suter’s petition for writ of certiorari.  Suter v. Stuckey, 398
Md. 314, 920 A.2d 1058 (2007).
6 Final protective orders must expire, absent modification by the circuit court, within
twelve months of their entry.  Section 4-506(g)of the Family Law Article, Maryland Code
(1984, 2006 Repl. Vol.) reads as follows:
“(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, all
relief granted in a final protective order shall be effective for the
period stated in the order, not to exceed 12 months.
“(2) A subsequent circuit court order pertaining to any of the
provisions included in the final protective order shall supersede
those provisions in the final protective order.”
-7-
II.  
We address first the threshold question of whether this case is moot.  A case is moot
when there is no longer an existing controversy when the case comes before the Court or
when there is no longer an effective remedy the Court could grant.  Human Resources, v.
Roth, 398 Md. 137, 143, 919 A.2d 1217, 1221 (2007); Attorney Gen. v. A. A. County School
Bus, 286 Md. 324, 327, 407 A.2d 749, 752 (1979).  The protective order at issue here expired
under its own terms on April 18, 2007.  Section 4-506(g)(1) of the Family Law Article,
Maryland Code (1984, 2006 Repl. Vol), provides that “all relief granted in a final protective
order shall be effective for the period stated in the order, not to exceed 12 months.”6  Section
4-507 allows an extension or modification of the protective order only “during the term of
the protective order.”  Now that the order has expired, the Court may not modify it.  Even
were we to agree with respondent, there is no possible relief that could be granted.  This
appeal is therefore moot.
-8-
Ordinarily, our inquiry would end here.  Roth, 398 Md. at 143, 919 A.2d at 1221
(2007); see also State v. Peterson, 315 Md. 73, 82, 553 A.2d 672, 677 (1989); Mercy Hosp.
v. Jackson, 306 Md. 556, 562, 510 A.2d 562, 565 (1986); State v. Ficker, 266 Md. 500, 506-
07, 295 A.2d 231 (1972) (“Appellate courts do not sit to give opinions on abstract
propositions or moot questions, and appeals which present nothing else for decision are
dismissed as a matter of course.”).  Under certain circumstances, however, this Court has
found it appropriate to address the merits of a moot case.  Roth, 398 Md. at 143, 919 A.2d
at 1221.  If a case implicates a matter of important public policy and is likely to recur but
evade review, this court may consider the merits of a moot case.  Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md.
244, 250, 674 A.2d 951, 954 (1996) (“This Court in rare instances, however, may address the
merits of a moot case if we are convinced that the case presents unresolved issues in matters
of important public concern that, if decided, will establish a rule for future conduct.”); Lloyd
v. Supervisors of Elections, 206 Md. 36, 43, 111 A.2d 379, 382 (1954) (“[I]f the public
interest clearly will be hurt if the question is not immediately decided, if the matter involved
is likely to recur frequently, and its recurrence will involve a relationship between
government and its citizens, or a duty of government, and upon any recurrence, the same
difficulty which prevented the appeal at hand from being heard in time is likely again to
prevent a decision, then the Court may find justification for deciding the issues raised by a
question which has become moot, particularly if all these factors concur with sufficient
-9-
weight.”).  See also S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 219 U.S. 498,
515, 31 S. Ct. 279, 283, 55 L. Ed. 310 (1911).
Ms. Suter urges this Court to consider the merits of this case, despite its having now
become moot, because an important public policy is implicated and the very limited nature
of protective orders means that this problem will continue to evade review. We agree that this
case is one of those rare cases that presents an unresolved issue of important public concern.
Accordingly, we exercise our discretion to address this issue because it implicates an
important public policy, it is likely to recur, and on recurrence it will evade review.  
We have recognized protection from domestic violence as a significant important
public policy concern to trigger review of moot cases.  See, e.g., Katsenelenbogen v.
Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. 122, 125, 775 A.2d 1249, 1251 (2001); Coburn, 342 Md. at 250,
674 A.2d at 954.  There were 23,813 domestic violence cases filed in Maryland District
Court in fiscal year 2006.  MARYLAND JUDICIARY, ANNUAL STATISTICAL ABSTRACT: FISCAL
YEAR 2006, Table DC-8.13, District Court: Domestic Violence Cases Filed and Terminated,
5 Year Comparative Data: Fiscal Years 2002-2006 411 (2006), available at
http://www.courts.state.md.us/publications/annualreport/reports/2006/2006_annual_repor
t.pdf.  A large number of these end in consent judgments.  In addition to being prevalent,
such judgments will evade review because they expire under their own terms within, at most,
a year.  For these reasons we will consider the merits of the matter before us.
7 The 1980 Protection from Domestic Violence Act, 1980 Md. Laws, Chap. 887, is
now codified at Maryland Code (1984, 2006 Rep. Vol.), §§ 4-501 et seq. of the Family Law
Article.
-10-
III.
Ms. Suter argues that appeals from domestic violence protective orders entered by
consent in the District Court should be governed by this Court’s long-standing jurisprudence
providing that no appeal shall lie from a consent order.  Ms. Suter argues that to allow a de
novo appeal from a consent order in the domestic violence context would be contrary to the
intent of Maryland’s Protection from Domestic Violence Act.7  Ms. Suter cites to both the
protective purpose of the Act and the Legislature’s grant of concurrent jurisdiction and full
equitable powers to the District Court as evidence that the Legislature intended that
protective orders entered by consent in the District Court should be treated with the same
finality as the same orders entered by consent in the Circuit Court.  Ms. Suter notes also that
permitting a de novo appeal would disturb the bargain struck between the parties because one
of the benefits bargained for was the cessation of litigation.  Ms. Suter then posits that
disrupting freely made bargains would be contrary to the protective function the Legislature
intended to serve in passing the Protection from Domestic Violence Act.
Stuckey presents three bases for his position.  First, he argues that he is entitled to
appeal to the Circuit Court pursuant to § 4-507(b)(1).  That section provides, in pertinent
part, as follows:
8 For the purposes of this analysis, the terms “judgment,” “order” and “decree” are
functionally interchangeable.  See Black’s Law Dictionary 858 (8th Ed. 2004) (“The term
judgment includes an equitable decree and any order from which an appeal lies” (citation
omitted)); Id. at 441  (“consent decree. . . . also termed consent order.”)
-11-
“If a District Court judge grants or denies relief under a petition
filed under this subtitle, a respondent, any person eligible for
relief, or a petitioner may appeal to the circuit court for the
county where the District Court is located.”
Section 4-507(b)(2) provides that an appeal taken under § 4-507(b)(1) to the Circuit Court
shall be heard de novo.  Second, he relies also upon § 12-401.  Finally, he relies upon Rule
7-102(a), which provides that “except as provided in Section (b) of this Rule, an appeal shall
be tried de novo in all civil and criminal cases.”
Stuckey maintains that the Legislature provided that any appeal from the District
Court to the Circuit Court is to be de novo, and it is irrelevant whether the order entered in
the District Court was by consent.  He argues that the plain language of the statute should
control, and that if appeals from consent judgments are to be excluded, the Legislature should
amend the statute to preclude them explicitly. 
IV.
It is a well-settled principle of the common law that no appeal lies from a consent
decree.8  This Court first recognized the principle in 1848 in the case of Williams v. Williams
when it stated “where a decree is made by consent of counsel, there lies no appeal or
9 Apparently, the first recognition of this principle in Maryland occurred in the High
Court of Chancery in 1824 in Ringgold’s Case, 1 Bl. 5, 9, 12 (Md. Ch. 1824) (summarizing
English treatment of the subject : “at common law, no writ of error will lie from a judgment
by default or by consent; so in equity the decree or order appealed from must have been
adverse, and not made by the express or tacit consent of the appellant: as when a party thinks
proper not merely to decline opposition to measures which the Court would enforce, but, by
himself or his counsel, consents to a decree or order, there lies no appeal from it, even though
he gave no such authority to his solicitor; his remedy being against his counsel; nor can any
appeal be made generally available from a decree by default, or, as it would seem, from a
decree taking the bill pro confesso.” (citations omitted)).  In 1848 the High Court of
Chancery, while considering an appeal from a consent decree allowing the sale for forfeiture
of a mortgage, found that if a judgment “settled the questions of right between the parties”
the appeal should be entertained, “no matter whether the decision was adverse, or by consent
or default.” Chesapeake Bank v. McClellan, 1 Md. Ch. 254, 255 (Md. Ch. 1848).  This Court
disapproved Chesapeake Bank v. McClellan in Emersonian Apartments v. Taylor, saying the
rule in Chesapeake “is not the law as announced by this court in case of consent in equity
cases.” Emersonian Apartments v. Taylor, 132 Md. 209, 214, 103 A. 423, 424 (1918).
-12-
rehearing.”9  Williams v. Williams, 7 Gill. 302, 305, 32 Md. 231, 234 (1848) (quoting 
Bradish
v. Gee, 27 Eng. Rep. 152, Ambl. 229 (1754)).  The rule was the same in the chancery courts
of England, where the issue of consent decrees arose.  See, e.g., Wood v. Griffith, 35 Eng.
Rep. 590, 1 Mer. 35 (1815); Bradish v. Gee, 27 Eng. Rep. 152; Downing v. Cage, 21 Eng.
Rep 961, 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 165 (1699); and DANIELL’S CHANCERY PRACTICE 1110-11 (8th
British ed., 1901).  We have had many opportunities to reaffirm the basic principle that a
judgment, if it was consented to, cannot be appealed.  See Bryant v. Social Services, 387 Md.
30, 42, 874 A.2d 457, 463 (2005); Long v. State, 371 Md. 72, 86, 807 A.2d 1, 9 (2002); Dietz
v. Dietz, 351 Md. 683, 690, 720 A.2d 298, 302 (1998); Osztreicher v. Juanteguy, 338 Md.
528, 534, 659 A.2d 1278, 1281 (1995); Chernick v. Chernik, 327 Md. 470, 481, 610 A.2d
770, 775 (1992); Globe American v. Chung, 322 Md. 713, 716-17, 589 A.2d 956, 957
10 The rule is otherwise if there was no actual consent.  If there was no actual consent
because the judgment was coerced, exceeded the scope of consent, or was not within the
jurisdiction of the court, or for any other reason consent was not effective, an appeal will be
entertained.  See, e.g., Bryant v. Social Services, 387 Md. 30, 41-42, 874 A.2d 457, 463
(2005); Chernik v. Chernik, 327 Md. 470, 477, 610 A.2d 770, 773 (1992); Long v. Runeyon,
285 Md. 425, 429-30, 403 A.2d 785, 788 (1979); Mercantile Trust Co. v. Schloss, 165 Md.
18, 24-25, 166 A. 599, 601-02 (1933).
-13-
(1991); Banegura v. Taylor, 312 Md. 609, 615, 541 A.2d 969, 972 (1988); WSSC v.
Riverdale Fire Co., 308 Md. 556, 560, 520 A.2d 1319, 1321 (1987); Franzen v. Dubinok,
290 Md. 65, 68, 427 A.2d 1002, 1004 (1981); Long v. Runyeon, 285 Md. 425, 429-430, 403
A.2d 785, 788 (1979); Suburban Dev. Corp. v. Perryman, 281 Md. 168, 171, 377 A.2d 1164,
1165 (1977); Lohss and Sprenkle v. State, 272 Md. 113, 118-19, 321 A.2d 534, 538 (1974);
First Federated Com. v. Comm’r, 272 Md. 329, 332, 322 A.2d 539, 542 (1974); Rocks v.
Brosius, 241 Md. 612, 630, 217 A.2d 531, 541 (1966); Mercantile Trust Co. v. Schloss, 165
Md. 18, 24, 166 A. 599, 601 (1933); Emersonion Apartments v. Taylor, 132 Md. 209,
214,103 A. 423, 424 (1918); Gable v. Williams, 59 Md. 46, 1882 WL 4508, *2 (1882);
Williams v. Williams, 7 Gill. 302.10 
The rule that there is no right to appeal from a consent decree is a subset of the
broader principles underlying the right to appeal.  The availability of appeal is limited to
parties who are aggrieved by the final judgment.  Thompson v. State, 395 Md. 240, 248-9,
909 A.2d 1035, 1041 (2006) (citing Adm’r, Motor Vehicle Adm. v. Vogt, 267 Md. 660, 664,
299 A.2d 1, 3 (1973)).  A party cannot be aggrieved by a judgment to which he or she
acquiesced.  See Dietz, 351 Md. at 689-90, 720 A.2d at 301-02.  The “right to appeal may be
-14-
 lost by acquiescence in, or recognition of, the validity of the decision below from which
the appeal is taken or by otherwise taking a position which is inconsistent with the right of
appeal.”  Rocks v. Brosius, 241 Md. at 630, 217 A.2d at 541.  The rationale for this general
rule “has been variously characterized as an ‘estoppel’, a ‘waiver’ of the right to appeal, an
‘acceptance of benefits’ of the court determination creating ‘mootness’, and an
‘acquiescence’ in the judgment.”  Franzen v. Dubinok, 290 Md. at 68, 427 A.2d at 1004
(1981).
The nature of a consent judgment precludes appeal.  Consent judgments “are
essentially agreements entered into by the parties which must be endorsed by the court.  They
have attributes of both contracts and judicial decrees.”  Chernick v. Chernick, 327 Md. at
478, 610 A.2d at 774 (1992) (citing Local Number 93 v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501,
519, 106 S. Ct. 3063, 3073, 92 L. Ed.2d 405 (1986)).  Like contracts, the parties bargain and
provide consideration.  Consideration is not always tangible. In the case of a consent
judgment, the fact that “the parties give up any meritorious claims or defenses they may have
had in order to avoid further litigation” may serve as consideration.  Long v. State, 371 Md.
72, 86, 807 A.2d 1, 9 (2002).
In Chernik, this Court addressed the impact of one of the parties’ change of mind on
a consent order which had been signed and filed with the court.  Chernik, 337 Md. at 484,
610 A.2d at 777. We held that where the underlying bargaining was not unconscionable nor
the product of duress, “[t]he fact that one of the parties may have changed his or her mind
-15-
shortly before or after the submitted consent order was signed by the court does not
invalidate the signed consent judgment.” Id.  The contractual nature of the consent decree
meant that when there was uncoerced “bargaining for the reciprocal promises made to one
another” the end product should not be disturbed. Id. at 480, 610 A.2d at 774. 
The public policy of promoting settlement agreements by ensuring finality is another
reason to disallow appeals from consent judgments.  The Court in Chernick pointed to the
desirability of settlement agreements that are binding and enforceable. Id. at 481, 610 A.2d
775 (citing McClellan v. Kennedy, 8 Md. 230 (1855)).  In Long v. State, the Court explained
that “treating settlement agreements in civil cases contemplating a consent judgment,
including their interpretation, as any other binding contract ‘is consistent with the public
policy dictating that courts should look with favor upon the compromise or settlement of law
suits in the interest of efficiency and economical administration of justice and the lessening
of friction and acrimony.’”  Long v. State, 371 Md. at 84-85, 807 A.2d at 8 (quoting Clark
v. Elza, 286 Md. 208, 219, 406 A.2d 922, 928 (1979)).  Although the issue in this case is
moot, as future guidance to the lower courts we turn to the question of whether a party may
appeal the entry of a consent protective order in the District Court.
V.
11 We need not consider Md. Rule 7-102 in determining whether there is a right to
appeal from a domestic violence protective order entered by consent.  We have previously
made clear that the Maryland Rules do not grant a right to appeal.  Dvorak v. County Ethics,
400 Md. 446, 452 n. 10, 929 A.2d 185, 189 n. 10 (2007); Urbana Civic v. Urbana Mobile,
260 Md. 458, 462-463, 272 A.2d 628, 631 (1971).
12 The Domestic Violence Protection Act was enacted originally by Chapter 887 of the
Acts of 1980 and was codified originally as §§ 4-501-4-506 of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article, Maryland Code (1974, 1980 Cum. Supp.).  In 1984, the statute was
repealed and reenacted by Chapter 296, §1 of the Acts of 1984 and recodified in the Family
Law Article of the Maryland Code (1984) at §§ 4-501 through 4-516.
-16-
The weight placed on the language of § 4-507 and § 12-401(d) by Stuckey and the
panel merits a close examination of those statutes.11  Accordingly, we review the historical
context in which each statute arose.
We turn first to § 4-507.  Section 4-507 is part of a broader statutory scheme enacted
in 1980 as the Domestic Violence Protection Act. See Md. Code (1984, 2006 Repl. Vol.), §§
4-501 through 4-516 of the Family Law Article.12  In 1992, the Legislature substantively
amended the provisions of the Act, extending the period of available relief, expanding the
definition of those eligible for relief, granting courts the ability to modify a protective order
and establishing penalties for violations of the order.  1992 Md. Laws, Chap. 65.  Section 4-
507, in pertinent part, read as follows:
“(b)(1) If the District Court grants or denies relief under a
petition filed under this subtitle, a respondent, any person
eligible for relief, or a petitioner may appeal to or file a petition
for modification in the circuit court of the county where the
district court is located.
13 Further amendments to § 4-507 did not produce changes relevant to this discussion.
In 1994 the provision previously contained in § 4-507(b) that allowed the circuit court to
modify protective orders was repealed and provision was made to allow the judgment of the
District Court to remain in effect while appeals were taken.  1994 Md. Laws, Chap. 469.  In
1997, § 4-507 (a) was amended to establish that subsequent circuit court orders superseded
provisions of the protective order and to allow for an extension of time for the final
protective order.  1997 Md. Laws, Chap. 307.  The 2002 amendments to § 4-507 brought the
language into alignment with the Constitutional amendment expanding the authority of
District Court commissioners to issue interim domestic violence protective orders. 2002 Md.
Laws, Chap. 235.
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“(2) An appeal or petition for modification taken under this
subsection to the circuit court shall be heard de novo in the
circuit court.”13 
Md. Code (1984, 1992 Cum. Supp.), § 4-507 of the Family Law Article.  Section 4-506(c)(2),
which was added also by this enactment, read as follows:
“If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the
alleged abuse has occurred, or if the respondent consents to the
entry of a protective order, the court may grant a protective
order to protect any person eligible for relief from abuse.”
Md. Code (1984, 1992 Cum. Supp.), § 4-506(c)(2) of the Family Law Article.
The language in 4-506(c) allowing a judge to enter a final protective order “if the
respondent consents to the entry of a protective order” was added by an amendment from the
Judicial Proceedings Committee at the first reading of S.B. 282, enacted as Chapter 282 of
the Acts of 1992.  DEPARTMENT OF LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE, JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
COMMITTEE, AMENDMENT TO SENATE BILL 282, SB0282/197662/1 (1992).  The provision
for a de novo appeal to the circuit court contained in § 4-507 originated by amendment from
the House Judiciary Committee and was recommended for adoption by the Conference
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Committee at the third reading.  DEPARTMENT OF LEGISLATIVE SERVICES, CONFERENCE
COMMITTEE REPORT, SB0282/217669/1 (1992).
The 1992 amendments were a major legislative undertaking to strengthen the domestic
violence law of Maryland.  See Triggs v. State, 382 Md. 27, 45-46, 852 A.2d 114, 125-26
(2004).  One of the concerns surrounding the adoption of the bill was the burden it would
create on the District Court system.  See DEPARTMENT OF FISCAL SERVICES, FISCAL NOTE:
REVISED TO S.B. 282 (1992).  A manifestation of this concern was that a provision creating
access to relief under the subtitle on a “24 hour basis” was removed by amendment before
the bill was passed.  See 1992 M d. Laws, Chap. 65.  Proponents argued that “while this new
relief will impose some additional burden on the District Court, our overriding concern
should be on the burden imposed on the abused mother and children.” ATTORNEY GENERAL
JOSEPH CURRAN JR., LETTER TO THE HONORABLE WALTER M. BAKER, CHAIRMAN OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS COMMITTEE, February 11, 1992 (hereinafter Curran letter).  Curran
informed the Judicial Proceedings Committee that settlement before hearing, which was
common in the District of Columbia court proceeding upon which portions of the 1992 bill
was modeled, “could dramatically reduce the number of cases the district court has to hear
and, thus, mitigate the burden of dealing with” the more complex remedies afforded in the
new bill.  Id. 
Proponents of the bill described the availability of emergency family maintenance in
District Court as an essential innovation. Id.  Previously, issues of child support would have
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to be litigated in the circuit court, with delays of up to four months. Id.  Allowing emergency
family maintenance in the District Court shifted the burden of circuit court litigation “to the
abuser — if he is unhappy with the order, he files a case in circuit court and the support issue
is examined de novo.” Curran Letter (emphasis in original).  Allowing review in the circuit
court was a way to ensure access for victims while preserving due process rights for
respondents in protective order cases.  See JUDITH A WOLFER, LEGAL DIRECTOR, HOUSE OF
RUTH, TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS COMMITTEE (S.B. 282)
(1992).
We look next to § 12-401.  Section 12-401 is the general provision that governs
appeals from final judgments of the District Court.  The District Courts were created in 1970
by Constitutional amendment.  The implementing legislation retained the right to trial de
novo in civil cases where the amount in controversy was less than $1,000.  1970 Md. Laws,
Chap. 528.  As subsequently codified, the provision for appeals, in pertinent part, read as
follows:
“(a) An appeal from a judgment of the District Court in a
criminal, motor vehicle, or civil case shall be taken to the Circuit
Court in the county in which the judgment was rendered.  If the
case was originally tried in Baltimore City, an appeal in a
criminal or motor vehicle case shall be taken to the Criminal
Court of Baltimore and in a civil case to the Baltimore City
Court.  In any case, except a civil case involving a claim of one
thousand dollars ($1,000) or more, there should be an absolute
right to a trial de novo. . . .”
Md. Code (1957, 1970 Cum. Supp.), Art. 26 §156.
14 In the 1970 Session Laws, strikeout indicated matters stricken from the bill and all
capitals indicated matters added by amendment.  See 1970 Md. Laws, Chap. 1.
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During the 1971 legislative session the provision was amended as part of a larger
revision of the duties and judicial compensation structure of the District Courts.  1971 Md.
Laws, Chap. 423.  Interestingly, the original bill, House Bill 512, was amended from a
proposal to eliminate de novo appeal from the District Court to language that merely
curtailed the scope of the de novo appeal granted in the 1970 law.  The session law reads, in
relevant part, as follows:
“In any case the court shall hear and decide the appeal on the
record made in the District Court.  There shall be no right to a
trial de novo in the appellate court.  IN CIVIL CASES
INVOLVING A CLAIM OF LESS THAN FIVE HUNDRED
DOLLARS, IN CRIMINAL CASES, AND IN TRAFFIC
CASES, THERE SHALL BE A TRIAL DE NOVO IN ALL
APPEALS.  HOWEVER, BY AGREEMENT OF THE
PARTIES, THE APPEAL MAY BE HEARD AND DECIDED
ON THE RECORD MADE IN THE DISTRICT COURT.  IN
ANY CIVIL CASE INVOLVING A CLAIM OF FIVE
HUNDRED DOLLARS OR MORE THE APPEAL SHALL BE
HEARD AND DECIDED ON THE RECORD MADE IN THE
DISTRICT COURT.” 14
Id.  In 1972, the statute was amended, again without substantive change.  See 1972 Md.
Laws, Chap. 181, § 24.  Section 12-401 was enacted in its current form in the 1973
codification of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.  1973 M d. Laws Spec. Sess.,
Chap. 2.  As subsequently codified, the statute read, in pertinent part, as follows:
“(c) De novo and on record appeals. — In a civil case in which
the amount in controversy exceeds $500, and in any case in
15 There have been only two changes in the language of the sentence in § 12-401
dealing with de novo trial.  In 1978 an appeal in a municipal infraction was added to those
appeals tried de novo.  1978 Md. Laws, Chap. 735.  In 1982, an appeal from a code violation
was added.  1982 Md. Laws, Chap. 844.
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which the parties so agree, an appeal shall be heard on the
record made in the District Court.  In every other case, including
a criminal case in which sentence has been imposed or
suspended following a plea of nolo contendere or guilty, an
appeal shall be tried de novo.”
Md. Code (1974), § 12-401 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.  There have been
many subsequent amendments to § 12-401.  None have wrought substantive change to the
provision providing for trial de novo,15 which now reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
“(f) De novo and on record appeals. — . . . In every other case,
including a criminal case in which sentence has been imposed
or suspended following a plea of nolo contendere or guilty, and
an appeal in a municipal infraction or Code violation case, an
appeal shall be tried de novo.”
Id.
VI.
We now turn to consider the application of §§ 4-507 and 12-401 to domestic violence
protective orders entered by consent.  When construing a statutory scheme, our primary
purpose is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature.  Caroll v. Konits, 400 Md. 167, 191, 929
A.2d 19, 34 (2007).  To do so, we first examine the plain language of the statute.
Broadwater v. State, 401 Md. 175, 201, 931 A.2d 1098, (2007).  “The meaning of the
plainest language is controlled by the context in which it appears.” Caroll, 400 Md. at 193,
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929 A.2d at 35 (citations omitted).  The context of a statute is an important aid to our
determination of legislative purpose.  Johnson v. Baltimore, 387 Md. 1, 12, 874 A.2d 439,
446 (2005); Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 514-15, 525 A.2d 628, 632
(1987).  That context is informed by “a bill’s title and function paragraphs, amendments that
occurred as it passed through the legislature, its relationship to earlier and subsequent
legislation, and other material that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative
purpose or goal.” Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 515, 525 A.2d at 632.  
Here we must consider the effects of both § 4-507 and § 12-401.  In the case where
two statutes apply to the same situation, we first attempt to reconcile them, and then, if the
statutes remain contradictory, the more specific statute controls.  Park & Planning v.
Anderson, 395 Md. 172, 183, 909 A.2d 694, 700 (2006); State v. Ghajari, 346 Md. 101, 115-
16, 695 A.2d 143, 149-50 (1997).  Accordingly, we first examine the more specific statute,
§ 4-507, and look to reconcile our interpretation with § 12-401.
We have examined the broader context of § 4-507 and found the Domestic Violence
Protective Act to be a remedial statute designed to protect victims of domestic violence.
Triggs v. State, 382 Md. 27, 45, 852 A.2d 114, 125 (2004); Katsenelenbogen v.
Katsenelenbogen 365 Md. 122, 133-34, 775 A.2d 1249, 1256 (2001); Coburn v. Coburn 342
Md. 244, 252, 674 A.2d 951, 955 (1995); Barbee v. Barbee, 311 Md. 620, 623, 537 A.2d
224, 225 (1988).  If protective orders entered by consent were appealable, the incentive for
domestic violence victims to enter into such agreements would be diminished.  The reduction
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or elimination of the option to enter protective orders by consent implicates another
legislative goal.  In the 1992 amendments, where the provisions at issue here emerged, the
Legislature was concerned also with the costs of implementation.  Protective orders entered
by consent save administrative costs of trial.  Allowing a de novo appeal from a consent
order inevitably increases costs. 
In construing a statute, it is a long-standing rule of statutory interpretation that the
common law will not be repealed by implication.  Robinson v. State, 353 Md. 683, 693, 728
A.2d 698, 702 (1999); Lutz v. State 167 Md. 12, 15, 172 A. 354, 355-356 (1934).  A statute
is “not presumed to repeal the common law further than is expressly declared, and that a
statute, made in the affirmative without any negative expressed or implied, does not take
away the common law.” Robinson, 353 Md. at 693, 728 A.2d at 702 (quotations omitted).
In Lutz, we said as follows:
“The rules of the common law are not to be changed by doubtful
implication, nor overturned except by clear and unambiguous
language.  In order to hold that a statute has abrogated common
law rights existing at the date of its enactment, it must clearly
appear that they are repugnant to the act, or the part thereof
invoked, that their survival would in effect deprive it of its
efficacy and render its provisions nugatory.” 
Lutz, 167 Md. at 15, 172 A. at 356 (quoting 25 R.C.L. 1054).  If the common law and the
statute are in conflict, however, “the common law yields to the statute to the extent of the
inconsistency, and a statute which deals with an entire subject-matter is generally construed
as abrogating the common law as to that subject.” Id. (internal citations omitted). 
16 We have suggested in the past that “the structure of the appeals statutes, i.e.,
conferring a broad, general grant of appeal subject to enumerated limitations, further suggests
that they are meant to represent the entire subject matter of the law of appeals.”  State v.
Green, 367 Md. 61, 78, 785 A.2d 1275, 1284 (2001).  We continue to affirm this principle
insofar as the appeals statutes do address that subject matter.  No part of the appeals
provisions contained in Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl. Vol.), §§ 12-101 to 12-502 of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, address consent judgments in any way.
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Maryland common law is clear that, as a general rule, the only persons who may
appeal a judgment are those aggrieved by that judgment.  Thompson, 395 Md. at 248-49, 909
A.2d at 1041.  The corollary that a judgment entered by consent may not be appealed is well
supported in our jurisprudence.  Bryant, 387 Md. at 42, 874 A.2d at 463.  There is no express
declaration contained in the text of § 4-507 or anywhere in the legislative history that
purports to abrogate or limit the common law rule that a party must be aggrieved in order to
have the right to appeal.  Section 4-507 makes no mention of orders entered by consent.  The
Legislature was silent on the matter and we will not read this statute as an abrogation of the
common law rule that a party may not appeal from a consent judgment.
Indeed, § 4-507 does not conflict with the common law16 because its provisions can
be given full effect without derogation from the common law. If “a respondent, any person
eligible for relief, or a petitioner” is construed as only referring to those respondents, persons
eligible for relief and petitioners that are aggrieved by the judgment of the District Court the
statute and the common law are both given full expression.  This Court has said “[i]t needs
no authorities to support the proposition that one cannot appeal from a decree wherein the
relief he prays for has been granted.” Mugford v. City of Baltimore,185 Md. 266, 269, 44
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A.2d 745, 746 (1946).  A construction allowing appeals only in the event that a party is
aggrieved by the judgment of the District Court is consistent with common law and the intent
of the Legislature in enacting § 4-507.  Accord Bd. of Supervisors v. Pinnell, 166 S.W.2d 882
(Ky. 1942) (although appeals from the quarterly court are usually considered de novo, they
are final judgments and are thus subject to the rule that there is no appeal from a consent
judgment); Bigler v. Bigler, 260 P. 1081 (Colo. 1927) (although appeal from a will contest
is tried de novo, absent statutory instruction to the contrary, the general principle that there
is no right to appeal from a consent judgment will apply).  It is the one we adopt here. 
Section 12-401 may be construed in harmony with § 4-507.  The language at issue in
§ 12-401 is the result of amendments that softened the original grant of the right of de novo
appeal from decisions of the District Court.  The 1970 establishment of the District Courts
granted “an absolute right to trial de novo.”  1970 Md. Laws, Chap. 528.  The next legislative
session produced a change that represented an apparent compromise between an absolute
right to a de novo appeal and its complete elimination, proposed in the original reading of
House Bill 512.  1971 Md. Laws, Chap. 423.  Instead of either extreme, the Legislature chose
a compromise of enumerated instances of de novo appeals.  Id.  This sequence of legislative
events suggests that when the Legislature means to grant the absolute right of appeal, it is
capable of doing so.  The Legislature instead chose to circumscribe the right of appeal de
novo, and, although it has expanded it slightly since 1972, it has never chosen to return to the
language granting the “absolute right.” 
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Section 12-401(f) determines the mode of appeal from a District Court judgment and
does not grant or constrain the right of appeal.  The grant of a right to appeal in domestic
violence protective orders is governed squarely by § 4-507.  In Harper v. State, 312 Md. 396,
540 A.2d 124 (1988), this Court considered the mode of appeal appropriate for contempt
cases heard in the District Court.  The State argued that subsections 12-401(d) and (e) of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Md. Code (1974, 1984 Repl. Vol., 1987 Cum.
Supp.), which are equivalent to subsections 12-401(f) and (g) today, did not apply to
contempt cases.  Id. at 401, 540 A.2d 126.  The State reasoned that because the right to
appeal from a contempt case was granted by § 12-402 of the 1987 Code, not § 12-401(a),
subsections 12-401(d) and (e) did not apply.  Id.  The Court assumed arguendo that § 12-402
granted the right to appeal and held that §§ 12-401(d) and (e) governed all determinations
of whether an appeal from the District Court was on the record or de novo.  Id. at 404, 540
A.2d 128. 
The fact that § 12-402 was “silent concerning the characteristics of th[e] appeal” and
that no other statute addressed the mode of appeal was integral to the Court’s decision to look
to § 12-401.  Id.  In considering appeals from domestic violence protective order, the right
to appeal and the mode of appeal are delineated in § 4-507.  It is therefore unnecessary, in
the absence of any express grant of an absolute right to de novo trial in § 12-401, for this
Court to consider the applicability of § 12-401(f) any further.
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In the case sub judice, the reviewing court need not look beyond the Order to see that
it was entered by consent and note that respondent has not challenged the validity of that
consent nor the jurisdiction of the District Court in entering the Order.  The mere entry of a
consent order is evidence of the benefits accruing to respondent under a judgment.  A consent
order ensures that the two parties will not be subject to the further time and expense of
litigation, a tangible benefit.  See Long,  371 Md. at 86, 807 A.2d at 9.  Like any contract,
respondent’s and petitioner’s reciprocal promises act as consideration.  See Chernik, 337 Md.
at 480, 610 A.2d at 774.  Stuckey was spared the uncertainty of further litigation.
Moreover, in this case there was evidence that Stuckey benefitted materially from the
agreement to an order by consent.  For instance, in the TPO the District Court awarded
exclusive use and possession of the shared residence to Ms. Suter.  The final protective Order
omitted this provision, although the judge had the power to order that relief under Maryland
Code (1984, 2006 Repl Vol.), § 4-506(d)(4) of the Family Law Article.  The Court also did
not order Stuckey to provide emergency family maintenance, § 4-506(d)(9), participate in
counseling, § 4-506(d)(11) or any of the other relief available under § 4-506(d).  Md. Code
(1984, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 4-506(d) of the Family Law Article.  The entry of the consent
judgment gave Stuckey the benefit of certainty that Ms. Suter would be granted no further
relief.  Stuckey benefitted from the entry of the consent Order by getting what he bargained
for – cessation of litigation under terms he agreed to.
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Stuckey agreed to the entry of the Order by consent.  After agreeing to the Order,
Stuckey was no longer an aggrieved party.  Instead, he received the result he wanted and
intended at the time.  Stuckey’s consent is evidence that the Order was a disposition in his
favor.  Absent any allegation of irregularity in the entrance of the judgment, the right to
appeal from the consent judgment simply did not exist under § 4-507.
JUDGMENT 
OF 
THE 
CIRCUIT
C O U R T  
V A C A T E D ;  
C A S E
REMANDED TO THAT COURT
WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO DISMISS
THE APPEAL AS MOOT. COSTS TO
BE PAID BY THE RESPONDENT.