Title: Hovnanian Land Inv. Group, L.L.C. v. Annapolis Towne Centre at Parole, L.L.C.

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

HEADNOTE:
Hovnanian Land Investment Group, LLC, et al,  v. Annapolis Towne Centre at Parole, LLC,
No. 71, September Term, 2010
CONTRACTS—WAIVER—EFFECT OF NON-WAIVER CLAUSES—Contract clauses
purporting to prohibit the ability to modify their agreement or waive conditions do not
prevent waiver or modification of that contract.  Instead, when the party's actions clearly
indicate an intent to disregard a condition or modify the agreement, the trier of fact may
disregard the clause.
CONTRACTS—WAIVER—CONDITIONS PRECEDENT—WAIVER IMPLIED BY
CONDUCT—Whether one party’s actions amounted to an express or implied waiver is
usually a question of fact.  Summary judgment is only appropriate when there is no factual
dispute.  In this case, the court was asked to resolve a factual dispute and draw inferences
from the parties’ actions and communications.
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County
Case No. C-08-129816
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 71
September Term, 2010
                                                                             
HOVNANIAN LAND INVESTMENT
GROUP, LLC, et al.
v.
ANNAPOLIS TOWNE CENTRE AT
PAROLE, LLC
                                                                             
Bell, C.J.,
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbera,
JJ.
                                                                             
Opinion by Adkins, J.
Bell, C.J. Joins in Judgment Only
                                                                             
Filed:     July 20, 2011
In this case, we must revisit contracts with “non-waiver” clauses and determine
whether and how a party to such a contract can waive its requirements and conditions. 
Respondent, the owner of a large, mixed-use development near Annapolis, Maryland, agreed
to sell a portion of the property to Petitioner, a developer, for the construction of a residential
tower.  The contract required certain conditions to be met by Respondent prior to the closing,
and also contained a clause saying that any waiver or modification of the contract had to be
in writing.  After two years of negotiation by the parties,  Petitioner terminated the agreement
and refused to go to closing, alleging that Respondent failed to meet a condition precedent
regarding the establishment of a maintenance fee system for the development’s common
areas. 
 Respondent filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, seeking
a declaratory judgment that Petitioner breached the contract.  Petitioner, in its answer, alleged
that the Respondent failed to meet the condition precedent regarding common area
maintenance funding, and that this breach relieved it of its obligation to purchase the land
at closing.  The trial court, in granting summary judgment, held that the Petitioner waived the
condition precedent regarding common area maintenance funding, even though there was no
written waiver as required by the contract’s non-waiver clause.  The Court of Special
Appeals affirmed.  We granted certiorari, Hovnanian Land v. Annapolis Towne Centre, 415
Md. 337, 1 A.3d 467 (2010), to answer the following questions, rephrased for brevity and
clarity:1
1) 
Can waiver of a contract right be inferred from a party’s
conduct where the contract contains an express “non-waiver”
provision requiring any waiver to be in writing? 
2) 
Did the Circuit Court err in finding that Petitioner waived
the condition precedent in this case, when there was no signed
waiver?
3) 
Did the seller strictly fulfill a condition precedent
requiring it to “provide annual assessments against the office
and retail portions of the Development” when it recorded a
declaration that the seller will enter into separate, unrecorded
contracts with “some of all Parcel Owners”?
The Petition for Writ of Certiorari presented the questions as follows:
1
1) 
In a matter of first impression for this Court, can waiver
of a contract right be inferred from a party’s conduct where the
contract contains an express “non-waiver” provisions requiring
any waiver to be in writing.  
2) 
Did the Circuit Court err in finding that Petitioner, as a
matter of law, waived (and is estopped from asserting) a
contractual condition precedent where the contract contained a
non-waiver provision, there was no such signed waiver, and
there was no evidence that the parties agreed to waive the
requirements of the non-waiver provision itself?
3) 
Did the Circuit Court err in finding that a condition
precedent requiring the seller of real property to record a
declaration that “shall provide annual assessments against the
office and retail portions of the Development” for the purpose
of funding common area maintenance was strictly fulfilled by a
declaration that did not provide any such assessments but rather
allowed the seller to enter into unrecorded contracts with “some
or all Parcel Owners”?
2
We shall hold that a condition precedent may be waived by a party’s conduct, despite
a non-waiver clause.  Whether Hovnanian’s actions amounted to a waiver, however, was a
dispute of material fact that could not be resolved on summary judgment.  The question of
whether Respondent strictly fulfilled the condition set forth in question (3) also involved
material questions of fact, and so summary judgment was inappropriate. We shall therefore
reverse and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
1. 
The Annapolis Towne Centre and The Purchase Agreement
Annapolis Towne Centre at Parole, LLC (“ATC”), the Respondent, is the owner and
developer of a 33-acre, mixed-use development known as the Annapolis Towne Center at
Parole (the “Development”).  As contemplated by ATC, the entire project would be declared
a land condominium pursuant to the Maryland Condominium Act.  See Maryland Code,
(1974, 2003 Repl. Vol.), § 11-101, et seq. of the Real Property Article.  The “units” of ATC’s
land condominium were a mixture of office, retail, and residential parcels.   The
2
Development also had one additional and unusual feature—the Declaration and plat showed
a nominal common element of only one square foot.  Areas that would typically be included
Some of the residential parcel “units” would later be subdivided into a more
2
traditional land condominium.  The original Declaration classified those land condominiums
as “Tier 2 Condominiums,” and the purchasers of individual residential units as “Tier 2
Owners[.]”
3
in a common area were instead designated as the “Common Facilities Parcel.”   ATC 
3
retained ownership of the Common Facilities Parcel even after the other parcels were sold,
and planned to pay for its upkeep by collecting annual common area maintenance (“CAM”)
fees from each of the parcel owners.
This case deals with “Parcel 14" and “Parcel 15,” residential parcels at the western
end of the development, abutting Riva Road.  As with the other residential parcels, ATC
sought a residential developer to purchase these parcels and construct residential towers and
parking garages.  Petitioner Hovnanian Land Investment Group, LLC (“Hovnanian”),  a
4
residential developer who, on March 3, 2005, entered into a Purchase and Development
Agreement (the “Purchase Agreement”) with HTC for Parcels 14 and 15.  Under the
Purchase Agreement, Hovnanian was to construct three residential towers on the properties,
containing 550 residential units, each with a minimum of 1,300 net useable square feet.
Section 14 of the Purchase Agreement, titled “Seller’s Undertakings,” required ATC
to meet certain obligations prior to the closing.  Relevant here, Section 14(d) addressed the
funding of common area maintenance (“CAM”):
. . . [ATC] shall be solely responsible for . . . recording a
declaration (the “Declaration”) for the maintenance of the
The Common Facilities Parcel included roads, sidewalks, and parking areas, areas
3
typically designated as common elements and owned in common by all parcel owners within
the land condominium.
Hovnanian Land Investment Group, LLC is an affiliate of K. Hovnanian Homes of
4
Maryland, LLC.  In this opinion, we will refer to either entity as “Hovnanian,” except when
it is necessary to distinguish between the two.  
4
common areas of the Development[ ]. . . .  The Declaration . .
5
. shall provide annual assessments against the office and
retail portions of the Development for the purpose of
providing funds for the maintenance of the office and retail
buildings and associated common areas . . . .  The Declaration.
. . shall also provide that each owner of a condominium unit
shall pay an annual fee of [$1,200], which annual fee shall
increase at the rate of three percent (3%) per annum to be
calculated on a per diem basis.  
(Emphasis added).   The Purchase Agreement thus required ATC to establish predetermined
6
CAM fees for Hovnanian’s parcel, and provide CAM funding for the other parcels. 
The Purchase Agreement stated that Hovnanian’s obligation to go to closing “shall
be conditioned upon completion” of the conditions precedent, and gave Hovnanian certain
remedies in case ATC failed to meet them:
If [ATC] is unable or unwilling to complete or fulfill its
obligations as set forth . . . for the parcels to be closed upon,
[Hovnanian] may at its option (i) close on said parcels to be
closed upon notwithstanding [ATC’s] failure but without
waiving [ATC’s] obligations to perform hereunder, or (ii) delay
the applicable Closing until after [ATC] has satisfied its
obligations, or (iii) terminate this Agreement and have its
Deposit returned[.]
The Purchase Agreement also contained a non-waiver clause:
No change or modification of this Agreement shall be
As an alternative to creating a declaration, the Purchase Agreement allowed ATC to
5
create a separate umbrella association charged with maintaining the common areas.  It is
undisputed that ATC did not create such an association.
Section 14 of the Purchase Agreement also directed ATC to, inter alia, obtain
6
easements, subdivide parcels, and obtain zoning approvals.  The dispute in this appeal
involves only the Common Area Maintenance fees provision.  
5
valid unless the same is in writing and signed by Purchaser and
Seller.  No purported or alleged waiver of any of the provisions
of this Agreement shall be binding or effective unless in writing
and signed by the party against whom it is sought to be enforced.
2. 
The Declaration and Dispute over Common Area Maintenance Funding 
As described above, the Purchase Agreement required ATC to record a declaration
providing for (1) a $1,200 annual CAM fee for residential unit holders and (2) annual
assessments against the other parcel owners in the development.  ATC drafted the provision
for Common Area Maintenance in Section 10.2.4 of the Declaration, which read as follows: 
Payment of Common Area Maintenance Costs.  While
this Towne Centre Declaration is in effect, some or all Parcel
Owners, Tier 2 Councils, Tier 2 Owners and/or other Persons
shall periodically pay to [ATC] respective shares of the
Common Area Maintenance Costs (each of which payments
required to be made by any Person is referred to herein as a
CAM charge) pursuant to one or more Recorded Supplemental
Agreements between [ATC] and one or more of those Persons.
[ATC] shall be responsible for payment of the rest of the
Common Area Maintenance Costs, which [ATC] shall allocate
among the parts of the Retail Component (except for the Target
Parcel 11 Unit).[ ]
7
The Declaration thus addressed the CAM funding responsibilities of other parcels with a
To avoid confusion, we have excerpted a later draft of Section 10.2.4, first circulated
7
on August 28, 2006.  Earlier drafts of the Declaration contained a slightly different version
of 10.2.4, although the differences are not relevant for the purposes of this appeal. 
Specifically, a version circulated July 21, 2006 included references to a “Special Covenants
Period,” during which the CAM payments would be required.  ATC quickly abandoned the
concept of a “Special Covenants Period” and opted to draft a Declaration which would be
“perpetual in its duration.”  This modification was unrelated to any concerns raised by
Hovnanian, and contained relevant references to “Supplemental Agreements.”  After the
August 2006 revisions, Section 10.2.4 was not changed again.
6
placeholder provision, which promised future agreements with parcel owners in lieu of
establishing, in the Declaration, a detailed funding mechanism in the Declaration.  
8
On May 11, 2006, ATC first provided Hovnanian with a draft of the Declaration, and
a proposed Supplemental Agreement between Hovnanian and ATC.  The draft Declaration
indicated that CAM funding details would be handled in Supplemental Agreements with the
parcel owners, and the draft Supplemental Agreement for Hovnanian included such a
provision. 
Counsel for Hovnanian responded on July 20, 2006, with a memo including questions
and comments.  Relevant here, Hovnanian posed four questions:
1) If Target stops paying its annual fees, what are the remedies? 
Who is authorized to pursue them?  What are obligations of
developer to pursue them? 
2) Is developer also obligated to pay fees based upon square
footage it owns or controls?  If developer stops paying for any
reason, what are the remedies and who is authorized to pursue
them?
3) Why does 10.2.4 provide that “some” Parcel Owners etc shall
pay share of CAM and not all?  Who will not be obligated to
pay?
* * * 
5) Section 10 of Supplemental Agreement provides for
recordation of Memorandum and not the Supplemental
ATC would eventually enter into three such Supplemental Agreements; an
8
unrecorded one with the Target Corporation regarding its retail parcel and two recorded
agreements with other residential developers.
7
Agreement.  Why? Aren’t purchasers of residential units entitled
to see the entire Supplemental Agreement since they are paying
these monthly, annual fees beginning at $1200 per year and with
3% increases annually?
Hovnanian also provided comments regarding the draft Supplemental Agreement,  stating:
“[Hovnanian] wants the fees to be payable by unit owners and not by [Hovnanian,]” and that
“it must be clear that each unit owner must pay the annual fees directly to [ATC].”
Hovnanian thus flagged the CAM fees provision of the Declaration for further discussion. 
On July 25, 2006, counsel for ATC responded to Hovnanian’s questions, as follows:
1) This project has been structured as though it were a
traditional mixed-use center, with parcel sales to the residential
developers.  The residential developers are limited to a fixed
CAM charge and the Developer is obligated to maintain the
Common Facilities Parcel, which are all the streets and common
parking areas.  The Developer can pass those charges on to its
retail tenants, or pay for them out of its pocket, but it is still
obligated to maintain [the Common Facilities Parcel] in
accordance with the documents.  If Target doesn’t pay its fees,
the Developer can pursue Target or come up with the extra cash
itself.  The Developer has the same choice if the residential
parcels don’t pay their fees.  
2) See #1 but, in addition, if the Developer doesn’t maintain the
Common Facilities Parcel in accordance with the Declaration,
any of the parcel owners can bring an action against it.  
3) See #1.
5) We have no problem recording this.  Debbie had indicated
that K-Hov might want to divide this charge up differently (with
larger units paying larger portions) and we thought that fee
would be included in your condominium documents for your
parcels but recording the Supplemental Agreement is fine.
8
With regard to the Supplemental Agreement, ATC merely noted that those issues had been
“Discussed.”
ATC sent updated drafts of the Declaration to Hovnanian on August 1, 2006, and
August 15, 2006.  Each of these revisions contained substantially similar provisions
regarding the use of Supplemental Agreements.  Hovnanian provided ATC comments on the
second draft on August 17, 2006.  These comments, addressing a number of issues in the
Declaration, did not expressly address 10.2.4 or the specifics of CAM funding.
ATC circulated new drafts, with identical CAM sections, on August 28, 2006 and
September 14, 2006.  On September 18, 2006, Hovnanian provided detailed comments to the
September 14 draft Declaration, including comments on the CAM funding provision.  
9
Hovnanian stated, in relevant part:
3.  Definition of Common Area Maintenance Costs.  The
definition seems to exclude real property taxes and fees to the
Operator.  These costs should be included in the CAM.  If not,
then we need to have a clear understanding of this to explain to
our client.  If this is variable depending on Parcel Owner, then
perhaps this should be addressed by Supplemental Agreements
if you deem it appropriate, but then the Declaration should so
state.  We need to understand this issue better.  
ATC’s counsel responded the same day, stating “Fees to [ATC] are included in CAM and
we can add that.  Taxes are not and Section 9.5 says at the end that some parcel owners are
required by Supplemental agreements to pay them.”
The majority of Hovnanian’s comments dealt with other provisions in the
9
Declaration.
9
On October 12, 2006, ATC’s counsel stated:
In order to stay on our construction schedule at this project, we
must file the [Declaration] by the end of this month. . . . We
have received comments from some of you since the last version
of the Declaration was circulated and [we] will be incorporating
those to the extent we can.  If anyone has comments that have
not yet been submitted, please get those to us.  
On October 30, 2006, ATC recorded its “Towne Centre Declaration” (the “Declaration”),
and circulated the recorded version to Hovnanian on November 6, 2006.
On November 15, 2006, ATC and Hovnanian amended the Purchase Agreement.  This
amendment removed Hovnanian’s obligation to purchase a portion of the property where one
of the buildings was to be constructed, reduced the purchase price from $33,184,000 to
$22,927,000, and allowed Hovnanian to extend the closing date from November 1, 2007 to
February 1, 2008 by paying ATC an extension fee of $100,000.
In late 2006, ATC continued its negotiations with the Target Corporation, which was
purchasing a large retail parcel in the project.  On December 12, 2006, as those negotiations
approached a close, counsel for ATC emailed Hovnanian, indicating that the revised
Declaration would be recorded on December 20, 2006.
On December 15, 2006, counsel for Hovnanian responded with the following email: 
Once again, I am amazed at the ability of you and Greg
[] to balance all of the varying interests in this project.  I am
submitting the following comments to the above draft. . . . There
are not a lot of comments.
* * *
10
It appears that the payment of CAM for each Parcel, including
Parcel 15, is going to be dealt with in the Supplemental
Agreement.  
The remainder of the e-mail addressed Section 10.2.2(b), which is not at issue in this case.  
10
ATC delayed the recording of the Amended Declaration until January.  It circulated
drafts on January 4, January 11, and January 16, 2007.  After this last circulation, ATC and
Hovnanian went back and forth regarding certain provisions in the Amended Declaration. 
On January 17, 2007, Hovnanian’s counsel wrote: 
. . . On behalf of [Hovnanian] I am providing the following
comments regarding the January 4, 2007 version of the
Declaration.  These comments and questions are not new.  We
have raised them in the past and we thought that it was agreed
that they would be made, but as you will see, we are not certain
that the language that now exists addresses the concerns
sufficiently. 
* * *
The email continued:
10
Section 10.2.2(b) requires the Operator to be responsible for
replacement of “capital” improvements due to ordinary wear and
tear.  This is as close as the Declaration seems to come to
creating an obligation on the party of the Declarant or Operator
to accumulate reserve funds for the repair or replacement of
Common Area improvements.  Will this statement allow
[Hovnanian] to disclose to the ultimate residential unit purchaser
that there is a reserve fund for future “capit[a]l” improvements
in order to reduce the chances of a substantial special
assessment in the future?  Will we be disclosing that the Land
Declaration requires the Developer to make up any costs beyond
the annual CAM paid by owners of all the Parcels?
11
10.2.4.  Payment of the Common Area Maintenance Costs.  As
I read Section 10.2.4 it provides, in relevant part, that Tier 2
Owners and/or other Persons shall periodically pay to [ATC]
respective shares of the Common Area Maintenance Costs. . . . 
This language, together with the portion of Section 14d of the
original Purchase and Development Agreement that has not
been changed by the most recent amendment, has led me to
interpret this above language to mean that [ATC] will begin
assessing the annual CAM directly from each purchaser of a
Tier 2 residential unit when that person settles from the builder[]
of that Tier 2 residential condominium and will continue to do
so per month until the full CAM has been collected (or the pro-
rated amount for that first year).  It is not my understanding that
[Hovnanian], the Parcel Owner, or the Tier 2 Council of Unit
Owners once the Tier 2 residential condominium is created will
be doing the collection of the CAM from its future unit owners
and remitting the same in lump sums to [ATC].  We need to
confirm that [ATC] will pursue the individual Tier 2 unit owners
for the annual fee of $1,200[.]
The next day, ATC’s counsel replied and stated:
. . . I believe both of these issues can be dealt with in our
Supplemental Agreement with Hovnanian, if need be. . . . On
the [CAM issue], we do have a different understanding and we
can talk about that.  It has always been our intention to bill the
Association for the total CAM due and that the Association
would collect from its members.  It would be a total nightmare
for the Towne Centre Council to be billing and chasing each
individual condominium owner. . . . We can talk about that
more.  I’m sure we can both get comfortable with it.  
We have been in the process of closing with Target since last
Thursday and we are concluding today, with the recordation
immediately after.  
In another email on January 18, ATC reiterated that, because of practical limitations, it
wanted to address Hovnanian’s concerns in a Supplemental Agreement:
12
. . . That document was signed off by Target, Prudential and
Bank of America last Thursday (the day set for the actual
closing) and funding happened today based upon it.  The title
company has the entire package for recording and may be
recording it this afternoon.  We can’t make any change at this
point.  I’m not sure a language change is even necessary on that
but, if it is, we can address it in the Supplemental Agreement for
your parcel. 
On January 19, 2007, Hovnanian’s counsel responded:
Not a problem. I’m fine with addressing this and our other
concerns later (if it is appropriate for the Supplemental
Agreement then I am fine with addressing them in that
document), but please keep in mind that we have always made
it clear that we have never given our final sign off on the
recorded document, that we do have outstanding unresolved
issues, and that we have only been giving our approval on the
changes Target made to this latest draft, which happened very
quickly, in an effort to meet your deadlines with Target.  Our
previous e-mails confirm this understanding but I wanted to
confirm this in response to your last email.  Therefore, I hope
that you did not expect that any of the changes we may have
needed in an amended Declaration made it to the one you are
recording now, because they are not included at this point and
remain outstanding. 
ATC’s counsel responded, also on January 19, 2007:
. . . We honestly feel that the issues you raised that needed to be
addressed in the Amended Declaration have been and that is
why we have copied you and Earle on all the redrafts.  Both of
the other residential developers are OK with the recorded
document.  Greg was careful to include revisions we agreed
upon at our last meeting.  If any issues need to be dealt with, we
need to do so in the Supplemental Agreement if possible.  Now
that Target has closed on their parcel, they will need to approve
of any changes to the Declaration, which will be a difficult if not
impossible process.
The next day, January 20, 2007, Hovnanian’s counsel replied:
13
We were repeatedly told by you and Greg that we would
address any of [Hovnanian’s] open issues in an amended
Declaration, and I have told the same to my client.  If I did not
have that comfort level from you, then I would have protested
against recordation prior to my client signing off.  I cannot rely
on the comfort level of the other residential developers in order
to get my client comfortable so I cannot focus on their
satisfaction with the document.  I’m absolutely fine with
addressing our concerns in a Supplemental Agreement if it is
possible and if it accurately resolves the concerns.  If not, then
we will have to amend the Declaration and work through it with
Target. . . .  I do not anticipate new problems, but some of our
longstanding issues have not been addressed and we absolutely
have to have my client’s approval of this document.  
On January 22, 2007, without further comment from Hovnanian, ATC recorded an Amended
and Restated Declaration (the “Amended Declaration”).
Over the next year, the project proceeded towards closing, with both parties making
preparations.  During this time, Hovnanian and ATC frequently communicated, though not
specifically with regard to the Declaration’s CAM provisions.  The CAM provisions,
apparently, were discussed at an April meeting, after which ATC sent an email discussing
collateral CAM fee issues.  On April 6, Hovnanian responded, saying only that it “need[ed]
11
to set up a follow-up meeting on other condo doc issues[.]” After this communication,
however, the record demonstrates that Hovnanian did not again mention the specifics of
10.2.4 or its use of Supplemental Agreements, in 2007.  
The email discussed whether Hovnanian would disclose annual budgets to the
11
residential unit owners, how ATC and Hovnanian would deal with unpaid CAM fees, and
when liens would arise on Hovnanian’s parcel.
14
As they approached the original closing date, November 1, 2007, Hovnanian paid
$100,000 to extend that date to February 1, 2008.  Yet, even with the delayed closing date,
Hovnanian soon realized the extent to which the recent housing collapse had reached the
markets.   Hovnanian began privately preparing an offer package to sell its interest in the
12
project to another party.  These attempts would prove unsuccessful.    
Additionally, Hovnanian sought an additional extension and/or a discount from ATC
throughout January of 2008.   The negotiations began to fall apart in late January, as the
13
parties could not agree on an acceptable extension deal.  Throughout these negotiations,
Hovnanian referenced market difficulties as the major hangup.  For example, the regional
president at Hovnanian stated, in an email dated January 3, 2008, that the original purchase
price “could work over time with the cooperation of the market but it doesn’t now and unless
things drastically and quickly improved, there is almost no discount that would work over
the next 6 months.”  Similarly, in an email on January 30, 2008, the regional president wrote: 
Isn’t something better than nothing plus we are still your best
chance to get to closing as soon as possible?  If the market and
financing were available, we would be there.  Do you think there
is someone else who is willing to step up in this market and pay
our Purchase Price less $4M (portion of our $7M deposit net to
you after taxes). 
This realization, and the potential that they would be unable to go to closing, was
12
demonstrated through internal emails provided to the trial court.
The extension negotiations were conducted in a series of emails between David
13
DeMarco, a regional president of Hovnanian, and Mike Dietrich, a principal of Greenberg
Gibbons, ATC’s principal.  Hovnanian proposed a no-cost extension of six months, with
discounts for earlier closing and monthly penalties for extensions beyond six months. 
15
After its last efforts to obtain an extension had failed, Hovnanian then turned to the Purchase
Agreement and “attempted to ascertain whether all of the conditions precedent to closing
were met.”
3. 
Termination of the Purchase Agreement and Litigation
On Feburary 1, 2008, Hovnanian’s president sent a letter to ATC, asserting that ATC
had failed to fulfill conditions precedent.
The unfulfilled conditions include items contained in the
following sections of the Agreement: Section 3 (c), (d) and its
subsections, (g) (h), Section 4 and Section 14 (c) and (d).  
On March 3, 2008, ATC responded in a letter asserting that the condition had been complied
with, as the Amended Declaration provided for annual assessments through the use of
Supplemental Agreements.  The letter also asserted that Hovnanian had agreed to deal with
the CAM fees in a Supplemental Agreement, a draft of which ATC included with the letter. 
Hovnanian disagreed, and faxed a letter to ATC the next day declaring that the Purchase
Agreement was terminated for a failure to fulfill the conditions precedent.
ATC filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County,  seeking a
14
declaratory judgment that Hovnanian had breached the contract, and other injunctive relief.  
15
Hovnanian answered, claiming that its obligations were relieved by ATC’s failure to comply
ATC filed the complaint on February 29, 2008, before the final communications
14
regarding ATC’s alleged failure to meet the contractual conditions.
Specifically, ATC sought to stem any attempt by Hovnanian to recover permitting
15
and development fees paid to Anne Arundel County.
16
with the condition precedent.  Both parties filed motions for summary judgment on the issue
of whether ATC had complied with the condition precedent regarding Section 14(d) and the
CAM maintenance fees.  The Circuit Court issued an order on February 24, 2008, granting
ATC’s motion for summary judgment on that issue.   In its opinion, it held that Section
16
10.2.4 of the Declaration “strictly complied” with Section 14(d) of the Purchase Agreement: 
. . . In the context of this transaction, the only reasonable reading
of § 14(d) is that ATC was required to establish a mechanism
for the funding of the office and retail CAM charges, rather than
specifying the amount of the assessments in the Declaration. 
Since parcels would ultimately be sold to a diverse selection of
office and retail users ranging from large single users such as
Target, to individual boutique stores, logic dictates that the
assessments against individual Parcel owners would require a
level of customization to reflect the nature and extent of each
Parcel’s ultimate use.  
Since it may be unrealistic to predict CAM costs into the
future, due to changing the maintenance needs and expenses, it
is logical that a condominium declaration establish a formula or
methodology by which CAM charges can be determined in
perpetuity, rather than establish a fixed amount.  
* * *
The court agrees with ATC that the Agreement does not
require the Declaration to assess a particular dollar amount
against the office and retail portions of the Development.  . . .
[and] the court finds that the requirement for assessing the office
and retail portions of the Development was met by § 10.2.4 of
the [Declaration.]
The Circuit Court had previously issued an order on February 4, 2009, which it
16
vacated in the February 24 “Supplemental Order.”
17
In an alternative holding, the Court concluded that Hovnanian waived the CAM funding
condition through its actions: 
[Hovnanian’s] waiver went beyond mere silence.  In fact,
while [Hovnanian], through its counsel, raised issues regarding
other portions of the Declaration which are not the basis of any
claim of default, it did not complain of those provisions which
it now alleges entitled it to terminate the Purchase Agreement. 
After reviewing drafts of the Declaration which contained the
supposedly offending language, [Hovnanian], through its
counsel, acknowledged the applicable provisions and their
impact, and never objected to these provisions.  
[Hovnanian] treated the Agreement as valid [from its
recording on January 22, 2007] until February 1, 2008, when it
became clear that its repeated requests for modification of the
Purchase Agreement, or for a further extension to closing,
would not be attainable.  
After the parties agreed to dismiss the remaining claims, the Circuit Court entered a final
judgment on March 12, 2009.
Hovnanian filed a timely notice of appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  Before that
Court, Hovnanian criticized the Circuit Court’s decision as ignoring the non-waiver clause
in the contract.  In an unreported opinion, the intermediate appellate court aligned with  the
Circuit Court, holding that:
. . . Hovnanian impliedly agreed to the mechanism by only
raising objections not here relevant.  It was clear for well over
a year before February 1, 2008, that ATC could not strictly
comply with section 14d, as Hovnanian now interprets 14d. 
While later actions by Hovnanian might be equivocal if taken
out of context, in context they are unequivocal and support
waiver and estoppel. Hovnanian’s conduct supports the
conclusion that it waived the non-waiver clause in the
18
Agreement as well as the substantive conditions in Section 14d. 
The Court of Special Appeals, determining that Hovnanian had waived the condition, did not
reach the question of whether the Declaration strictly complied with the conditions of the
Purchase Agreement.  Hovnanian then sought certiorari from this Court. 
DISCUSSION
I. 
Waiver of Conditions Precedent and Non-Waiver Clauses
As a threshold issue, we consider Hovnanian’s claim that a party may not waive a
contract right through its conduct if the contract contains a “non-waiver” clause.  Although
Hovnanian casts this issue as “a matter of first impression,” we find ample case law
addressing the effect of similar clauses.
  This Court’s treatment of non-waiver clauses can be traced back to our decision in
Freeman v. Stanbern Const. Co., 205 Md. 71, 106 A.2d 50 (1954). There, in a dispute
between a general contractor and its subcontractor, the trial court excluded testimony
regarding an oral modification to the written contract, reasoning that any such modification
was impermissible under a contractual requirement that modifications be approved in writing
by the general contractor.  Id. at 76, 106 A.2d at 53.  On appeal, this Court disagreed that the
existence of the clause was dispositive:
. . . The rule has been accepted by the Courts, both State and
Federal, that, even though a written contract stipulates that it
may not be varied except by an agreement in writing,
nevertheless the parties, by a subsequent oral agreement, may
modify it by mutual consent.
19
* * *
We hold that a subsequent oral modification of a written
contract may be established by a preponderance of the evidence.
Of course, if the written contract provides that it shall not be
varied except by an agreement in writing, it must appear that the
parties understood that this clause was waived. However, such
a clause may be waived by implication as well as by express
agreement. 
Id. at 79, 106 A.2d at 55.  
In Freeman, we relied on opinions from two of our country’s most preeminent  jurists,
Benjamin Cardozo and Oliver Wendell Holmes, who each addressed similar clauses while
on their respective state high courts.  Judge Cardozo, writing for the Court of Appeals of
New York, resoundingly rejected a party’s attempt to rely on a non-waiver clause:
Those who make a contract may unmake it. The clause which
forbids a change may be changed like any other. The prohibition
of oral waiver may itself be waived. * * * What is excluded by
one act is restored by another. * * * Whenever two men
contract, no limitation self-imposed can destroy their power to
contract again.
Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 122 N. E. 378, 381 (N.Y. 1919).  We also relied on
then-Judge Holmes’ opinion in Bartlett v. Stanchfield, 19 N. E. 549, 550 (Mass. 1889), where
he reasoned:
Attempts of parties to tie up by contract their freedom of dealing
with each other are futile. The contract is a fact to be taken into
account in interpreting the subsequent conduct of the plaintiff
and the defendant, no doubt. But it cannot be assumed, as a
matter of law, that the contract governed all that was done until
it was renounced in so many words, because the parties had a
right to renounce it in any way and by any mode of expression
20
they saw fit. They could substitute a new oral contract by
conduct and intimation, as well as by express words.
Freeman clearly instructs us that Maryland and other courts will readily look past a non-
modification clause, and focus on the actions of the parties. 
Ten years later, this Court considered, specifically, whether a party could impliedly
waive a condition precedent in a contract that, under the statute of frauds, was required to
be written.  See Bio-Ramo Drug Co. v. Abrams, 229 Md. 494, 499, 184 A.2d 831, 833–35
(1962).  In Bio-Ramo, a lease provided the tenant with an option to purchase the property,
subject to a strict written notice requirement.  The landlord orally agreed to the tenant’s
request to purchase the property, but the tenant did not provide written notice as required by
the lease.  Before this Court, the landlord argued that the writing requirement was
dispositive.  We disagreed, and remanded to the trial court to determine whether waiver
occurred.  To support our holding, we quoted 2 Corbin, Contracts, § 310, which reads:
If the plaintiff has failed to perform some condition
precedent (express, implied, or constructive) to the defendant’s
duty under the written contract, and that failure was caused by
the defendant himself, can the plaintiff get judgment on the
written contract without performing the condition? The answer
is clearly yes; and the cases generally support the answer * * *.
This assumes that the non-performance of the condition was not
caused by the plaintiff's own inability to perform, and that but
for the defendant's request, agreement, or other conduct, the
plaintiff would have performed the condition. If the defendant
later repudiates or otherwise breaks the contract, he cannot use
the plaintiff's failure to perform on time as a defense.
* * *
21
The foregoing principles apply even where the plaintiff’s
non-performance of a condition was caused by an oral
agreement substituting something else. This is true even though
the oral agreement is itself within the statute and unenforceable,
and even though it was the plaintiff and not the defendant who
proposed the substitution. If the plaintiff would have performed
the condition but for the oral agreement with the defendant, he
can enforce the written contract.
Id. at 500–01, 184 A.2d at 834. See also id. (“The statement in 4 Williston, Contracts (3d
ed.), § 595, and the Restatement, Contracts, § 224, are to the same effect.”).  Bio-Ramo
demonstrates that neither contractual writing requirements nor the statute of frauds prevent
oral or implied waiver in all circumstances.  
This Court next examined an attempt to prohibit modification to a contract by conduct 
in Pumphrey v. Pelton, 250 Md. 662, 245 A.2d 301 (1968).  There, a contract between Dairy
Queen and a franchisee forbade the franchisee from selling non-Dairy Queen products, and
the contract contained the following clause: “No waiver, in whole or in part, of any breach
or violation of this contract shall be deemed a waiver of any subsequent breach or violation.”
Id. at 669, 245 A.2d at 305.  Yet, the franchisor knew of non-Dairy Queen sales at the store
from the inception of the contract, and acquiesced to the practice.  In the ensuing dispute, the
franchisor alleged an ongoing breach, and relied on the non-waiver clause as evidence that
it had not agreed to allow the sales in question. 
After recalling the duty of a party to assert its rights after a breach,  the Pelton Court
17
The Pelton Court stated that, to avoid waiver, a party must “assert[] his intention to
17
(continued...)
22
expressed equitable concerns about allowing a party to hide behind a contractual provision
when his actions suggested otherwise.  It quoted Judge Learned Hand’s observation that a
party who remains silent “may have so conducted himself as impliedly to assure the
newcomer that he does not object, and the newcomer may have built upon that assurance.” 
Pelton, 259 Md. at 669, 245 A.2d at 305 (quoting Dwinell-Wright Co. v. White House Milk 
Co., 132 F. 2d 822, 825 (2d Cir. 1943)).  Recognizing the applicability of the doctrine of
equitable estoppel, the Court said:
The whole doctrine of equitable estoppel is a creature of
equity and governed by equitable principles. It was educed to
prevent the unconscientious and inequitable assertion of rights
or enforcement of claims which might have existed or been
enforceable, had not the conduct of a party, including his spoken
and written words, his positive acts and his silence or negative
omission to do anything, rendered it inequitable and
unconscionable to allow the rights or claims to be asserted or
enforced.
Id. at 669–70, 245 A.3d at 305 (quoting Johnson Lumber Co. v. Magruder, 218 Md. 440,
447-448, 147 A. 2d 208 (1958)).  Finding these concerns weightier than a strict adherence
(...continued)
17
retain the rights accruing to him as a result of said breach[.]” Pumphrey v. Pelton, 250 Md.
662, 667, 245 A.2d 301, 304 (1968) (quoting John B. Robeson v. Gardens, 226 Md. 215,
222–24, 172 A. 2d 529 (1961)).  The Pelton Court supported this case law with excerpts
from the existing treatises.  See 3 Williston, Contracts, § 688 (Rev. ed.) (when a party to a
contract “continue[s] in spite of a known excuse, the defense thereupon is lost and the injured
party is himself liable[.]”); Restatement of the Law of Contracts, § 309 (“Where the duty of
a party to a bilateral contract has been discharged by a failure of a condition . . . he is again
subjected to the duty if he renders any further performance[.]”); 3 A Corbin, Contracts, § 755
(same).  
23
to the contractual language, this Court held that the Dairy Queen franchisor had waived the
contractual provision and therefore could not terminate the contract on those grounds. 
Pelton, 250 Md. at 671, 245 A.2d at 306.  
Since Pelton, Maryland courts have consistently reaffirmed that a party can modify
or waive contractual provisions despite a provision purporting to limit those abilities.  See
Charles Burton Bldrs. v. L & S Constr. Co., 260 Md. 66, 87-89, 271 A. 2d 534, 545-46
(1970) (project owner waived contractual provision requiring that additional work by
contractor be in writing by requesting and accepting the extra work); Taylor v. University
Nat'l Bank, 263 Md. 59, 282 A.2d 91 (1971) (although original contract with non-waiver
clause specified that later sales of notes would be “without recourse,” the parties negotiations
and later agreement indicated waiver of that provision); University Nat'l Bank v. Wolfe, 279
Md. 512, 369 A.2d 570 (1977) (contract’s writing requirement not dispositive on issue of
later modification of that contract);  600 N. Frederick Rd., LLC v. Burlington Coat Factory
of Md., LLC, ___ Md. ___, ___ A.2d ___ (filed April 22, 2011) (modification valid even
though it did not comply with contractual writing and signature requirement).
The Maryland approach, moreover, is consistent with the universal approach of
commentators to disfavor strict adherence to non-waiver or non-modification clauses. 
Corbin states:
Parties to a contract cannot, even by an express provision in that
contract, deprive themselves of the power to alter or vary or
discharge it by subsequent agreement.  At common law, an
express provision in a written contract that no rescission or
24
variation is valid unless it too is in writing will not invalidate a
subsequent oral agreement to the contrary.  Similarly, a
provision that an express condition of a promise or promises in
the contract cannot be eliminated by waiver, or by conduct
constituting an estoppel, is wholly ineffective.  The promisor
still has the power to waive the condition, or be estopped by
conduct from insisting upon it, to the same extent that he would
have had this power without that provision.
8-40 Corbin, Contracts, § 40.13 (2011); accord 25 Williston, Contracts, § 39:17 (4th ed.
2008) (“It is well established that a party to a contract may waive a condition precedent to
his or her own performance of a contractual duty” and that “contract remains enforceable
despite the nonoccurrence of the condition.”).18
Hovnanian disagrees that this case law controls here.  Instead, Hovnanian attempts to
separate this case from the herd by distinguishing between “mutual” waiver and waiver of
a condition precedent: 
. . . [Maryland] cases merely establish that contracts may be
mutually modified orally or by conduct even if the original
agreement contained a provision requiring that modifications be
in writing.  The underlying rationale of those cases is that such
a modification produces a new agreement, and the original
agreement is ended by the new one which contradicts it.
* * * 
This case. . . does not present an example of parties who
As we noted in Charles Burton Bldrs. v. L & S Constr. Co., 260 Md. 66, 87-89, 271
18
A. 2d 534, 545-46 (1970), Freeman v. Stanbern Constr. Co., 205 Md. 71, 106 A.2d 50
(1954), and its progeny are “in accord with the general law.” (citing 17A C.J.S. Contracts §
377 c (1963); 6 Corbin, Contracts § 1294 (1962); 4 Williston, Contracts, § 591 (3rd ed.
1961)).
25
mutually waive or modify their contract.  Rather, the Court of
Special Appeals held that [Hovnanian] waived its right to insist
on strict compliance with the closing conditions in the Purchase
Agreement when it “rais[ed] objections not here relevant” while
remaining silent about the failures that ultimately constituted its
basis for terminating the agreement.  Neither the nature of
waiver in general, nor the facts of this case in particular, present
a situation where the parties mutually agreed to form a new
agreement and thus end the original one.  
(Emphasis in original) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
We are not persuaded.  To be sure, our case law does require mutual knowledge and
acceptance, whether implicit or explicit, of the non-conforming action.  See Myers v. Kayhoe,
391 Md. 188, 206-07, 892 A.2d 520, 531-32 (2006) (finding no waiver from one party’s
statement because that statement was not communicated to the other party); DIRECTV, Inc.
v. Mattingly, 376 Md. 302; 829 A.2d 626 (2003) (finding no modification occurred when one
party merely presented a modified contract to the other, with no evidence that the receiving
party accepted or knew of the changes).  Here, however, the alleged non-conformance was
“mutual” in that ATC drafted and proposed the assertedly non-compliant declaration while
Hovnanian scrutinized it and provided substantial feedback.  Moreover, a condition
precedent usually benefits one of the two parties, and the benefitted party’s actions will
weigh more heavily.  See Traylor v. Grafton, 273 Md. 649, 688, 332 A.2d 651, 674 (A
performance condition created by a financing contingency clause in a real estate sale contract
may be “altered by the parties or waived by the one for whose benefit the condition was
made.”); Bargale Indus., Inc. v. Robert Realty Co., 275 Md.638, 645, 343 A.2d 529, 534
26
(1975) (promisee waived condition regarding value of mortgage commitment by accepting
proposal of promisor for less than the amount specified in the contract).
Moreover, our treatment of non-waiver clauses is clearly not limited to changes that
can be cast as “mutual modifications.”  Taken as a whole, our caselaw shows a persistent
unwillingness to give dispositive and preclusive effect to contractual limitations on future
changes to that contract.  This approach applies to the entire catalogue of possible alterations
in contractual rights and obligations, whether it is mutual modification, novation, waiver of
remedies, or, as here, a waiver of condition precedent.  A requirement that waiver must be
“mutual” is an evidentiary hurdle, not a categorical limitation.  
Hovnanian further argues that the principles of freedom of contract require
enforcement of the non-waiver clause, despite any other actions of the parties.  Hovnanian
criticizes the Court of Special Appeals’s decision as “contrary to the fundamental principles
of Maryland contract law,” specifically the “central principle . . . that unambiguous contract
provisions such as [Section 14(d)] are to be enforced as written[,]” and cites Kasten Const.
Co. v. Rod Enters., Inc., 268 Md. 318, 330, 301 A.2d 12, 19 (1973) for the proposition that
the courts should not, “under the guise of construction, rewrite the contract made by the
parties.” 
We have recently rejected a similar argument, and held that the freedom of contract
does not guarantee the validity of a non-waiver clause:
Generally, where the language of a contract is unambiguous, its
plain meaning will be given effect.  There are exceptions,
27
however, to this rule. For instance, the common law rule is that
even where the contract specifically states that no
non-written modification will be recognized, the parties may
yet alter their agreement by parol negotiation.
600 N. Frederick Rd., __ Md. at __, __ A.2d at __ (emphasis added) (quotation marks and
citations omitted).  As 600 N. Frederick Road reaffirms, the freedom to contract is not
limited to the contract as written.  Instead, the freedom to contract includes the freedom to
alter that contract.  Hovnanian was free, after signing the initial contract, to waive a condition
for which it had bargained.  See, e.g, 8-40 Corbin on Contracts § 40.13 (2011) (“Parties to
a contract cannot, even by an express provision in that contract, deprive themselves of the
power to alter or vary or discharge it by subsequent agreement.”).  Provisions in a contract
which purport to limit this ability of parties to modify their contract, implicitly or explicitly,
are disfavored.  Accordingly, we agree with the Court of Special Appeals that a party may
waive, by its actions or statements, a condition precedent in a contract, even when that
contract has a non-waiver clause.
II.  
The Alleged “Waiver” In This Case
We next review the Circuit Court’s grant of ATC’s motion for summary judgment. 
The Circuit Court, apparently at the suggestion of the parties, resolved the issue on summary
judgment, concluding as a matter of law that Hovnanian had waived the condition precedent. 
Yet, “whether subsequent conduct of the parties amounts to a modification or waiver
of their contract is generally a question of fact to be decided by the trier of fact.” University
Nat'l Bank v. Wolfe, 279 Md. 512, 523, 369 A.2d 570, 576 (1977).  See also Bio-Ramo Drug
28
Co., 229 Md. 494, 184 A.2d 831 (1962) (reversing trial court’s dismissal of claim based on
non-waiver clause and remanding for determination, on the merits, as to whether condition
was waived);  Battista v. Savings Bank of Baltimore, 67 Md. App. 257, 507 A.2d 203 (1986)
(“[T]he question of waiver was one for the jury[.]”). 
Indeed, the waiver inquiry requires resolution of many factual disputes and drawing
of factual inferences.  We look to the totality of a party’s actions when determining whether
waiver, or modification of the contract, has occurred.  “Waiver is the intentional
relinquishment of a known right, or such conduct as warrants an inference of the
relinquishment of such right, and may result from an express agreement or be inferred from
circumstances.”  Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Blumberg, 234 Md. 521, 531, 200 A.2d 166, 172
(1964).  Waiver “may result from implication and usage, or from any understanding between
the parties which is of a character to satisfy the mind that a waiver is intended.”  Canaras v.
Lift Trust Services, Inc., 272 Md. 337, 360–61, 322 A.2d 866, 879 (1974).  “[A]cts relied
upon as constituting a waiver of the provisions’ of a contract must be inconsistent with an
intention to insist upon enforcing such provisions.”  Gold Coast Mall, Inc. v. Larmar Corp.,
298 Md. 96, 109, 468 A.2d 91 (1983) (quoting Bargale Industries, Inc., 275 Md. at 643, 343
A.2d at 533).  Even if the relevant statements and communications of the parties are
uncontested, the court must determine whether those statements (and actions) amounted to
an understanding between the parties that the condition would no longer be enforceable. 
In this inquiry, the court looks at the party’s actions both before and after the alleged
29
breach.  A party can waive a condition precedent by agreeing, in advance, to a course of
action which would not otherwise comply with a contractual requirement. See, e.g., Taylor, 
263 Md. at 64, 282 A.2d at 94 (“What here took place was a modification of the contract .
. . by the very act of negotiating the notes” which were different than the original
agreement.).  A party may also waive a condition precedent after a breach by failing to assert
its remedies for that breach.   See Nat’l School Studios, Inc. v. Mealey, 211 Md. 116, 131,
126 A. 2d 588, 596 (1956) (“It has been held in this State that one may waive the breach of
the contract and later be bound by his election.”) (citing Key v. Dent, 6 Md. 142 (1854) and
Orem v. Keelty, 85 Md. 337, 36 A. 1030 (1897)).  A party’s inaction or silence is relevant,
especially when that party is silent in response to a breach. See Jaworski v. Jaworski, 202
Md. 1, 10, 95 A. 2d 95, 99 (1953) (“He who is silent when he ought to have spoken, will not
be heard to speak when he ought to be silent.”).
We do not mean to say that non-waiver clauses should be ignored altogether.  Non-
waiver clauses, although not favored by courts, must be considered by the trier of fact.  The
party alleging waiver must show an intent to waive both the contract provision at issue and
the non-waiver clause.  See, e.g., Freeman, 205 Md. at 79, 106 A.2d at 55 (“Of course, if the
written contract provides that it shall not be varied except by an agreement in writing, it must
appear that the parties understood that this clause was waived.”).
Given the highly factual nature of the waiver inquiry, it is an uncommon case in which
the issue can be resolved by summary judgment.  In previous cases, we have reversed grants
30
of summary judgment and remanded for resolution of the factual disputes.  University Nat'l
Bank v. Wolfe, 279 Md. 512, 526, 369 A.2d 570, 578 (1977) (reversing trial court’s ruling,
as a matter of law, that party was negligent, and remanding for factual finding regarding
waiver); Bio-Ramo, 229 Md. at 501, 184 A.2d at 834 (reversing trial court’s dismissal of
complaint and remanding for factual finding regarding waiver).  Occasionally, however, the
waiver is so obvious that a ruling can be made as a matter of law.  See Myers, 391 Md. at
207, 892 A.2d at 531 (affirming grant of summary judgment because “[no] rational trier of
fact [could] conclude that [the one statement at issue], standing alone, constituted an implied
waiver”);  DIRECTV, Inc. v. Mattingly, 376 Md. at 311; 829 A.2d at 631 (summary
19
judgment appropriate when only evidence of modification was presentment of modified
contract, without any evidence of acceptance or knowledge of the changes).
Despite the parties’ respective  contentions that the undisputed facts require  judgment
in their respective favor, as a matter of law, we do not see this case as falling within the
unusual category in which waiver is determined upon cross-motions for summary judgment. 
In reviewing the grant of ATC’s motion for summary judgment, we review the record in the
light most favorable to Hovnanian, the non-moving party.  See John L. Mattingly Constr. Co.
We were able to resolve the waiver issue in Myers v. Kayhoe, 391 Md. 188, 892
19
A.2d 520 (2005), because there was only one communication at issue: a buyer’s statement
to its real estate agent.  The seller argued that the statement amounted to waiver, even though
the real estate agent never communicated the statement to the seller.  Because that issue was
never communicated to the seller, we were able to determine, objectively, that there was no
“understanding between the parties[.]” Id. at 206-07, 892 A.2d at 531.
31
v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 415 Md. 313, 325, 999 A.2d 1066, 1073 (2010), and cases
cited therein.  Under this standard of review, we must give Hovnanian the benefit of “any
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the [well-pleaded] facts[.]”  Rhoads v.
Sommer, 401 Md. 131, 148, 931 A.2d 508, 518 (2007).  Summary judgment is thus
appropriate only if there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [] the party in
whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Md. Rule 2-501. 
Under this standard, it is at least a “permissible inference” that Hovnanian did not
waive the condition precedent.   The record certainly demonstrates that Hovnanian had some
disagreement or need for clarification on a number of issues regarding the CAM fees,
including what was included in those fees and how they would be collected.  In granting
summary judgment for ATC, the Circuit Court limited the import of those communications
through factual inferences.  These determinations are not appropriate at the summary
judgment stage.  
The same rules apply with respect to Hovnanian’s motion for summary judgment
against ATC.  Hovnanian, arguing against waiver, insists that “no facts [] demonstrated
waiver of the non-waiver clause in particular.”  Hovnanian thus argues that the trial court,
and the intermediate appellate court, “collapse[d] the analysis into a single inquiry and
ignore[d] whether a separate waiver of the non-waiver clause occurred.”  Hovnanian avers
that the only evidence on the issue of waiving the non-waiver clause is that “[Hovnanian] and
ATC scrupulously observed the formality of amending the Purchase Agreement in writing,
32
and the parties amended the Purchase Agreement in writing on each of the three occasions
they agreed to modify its terms.” 
We disagree.  The waiver of the non-waiver clause need not be explicit and
independent from the underlying waiver; rather, waiver of that clause may be implied from
the very actions which imply waiver of the condition precedent, as our previous cases
demonstrate.  See, e.g. Freeman, 205 Md. 71, 106 A. 2d 50 (in contract with written
modification clause, oral waiver of contract conditions was valid even though there was no
separate waiver of modification clause);  Taylor, 263 Md. 59, 282 A.2d 9  (party waived both
“no recourse” clause and formal writing requirement by signing later agreements “with full
recourse”); Charles Burton Builders, Inc. v. L & S Constr. Co., 260 Md. 66, 271 A.2d 534
(1970) (project owner waived contract’s writing requirement and provision regarding “extra
work” by requesting and accepting that extra work; no separate or explicit evidence of waiver
of writing requirement).   It is only necessary that the trier of fact consider the non-waiver
20
clause in its deliberations.
Hovnanian also argues that the “integration” clauses contained within the formal
amendments to the Purchase Agreement foreclose a finding of any oral or implied waiver.21
Hovnanian’s approach would further raise equitable concerns.  Under its
20
interpretation of the law, a party could explicitly waive a condition, and induce reliance by
the other party, while holding back the “trump” card of the non-waiver clause.  Neither our
precedents nor equitable principles allow this result.  
Each of the written amendments, entered into on May 3, 2005,  November 15, 2006,
21
and June 27, 2007, contained the following clause:  
(continued...)
33
Maryland law generally recognizes the validity and effect of integration clauses. See, e.g.,
Pumphrey v. Kehoe, 261 Md. 496, 505, 276 A.2d 194, 199 (1971) (an integration clause,
“although not absolutely conclusive, is indicative of the intention of the parties to finalize
their complete understanding in the written contract[.]”); Kasten Constr. Co. v. Rod
Enterprises, Inc., 268 Md. 318, 301 A.2d 12 (1973) (courts generally should not look beyond
the contract to evidence of prior statements or agreements, especially when contract contains
integration clause).  The last integration clause here was contained in the June 27, 2007
amendment, which, by reaffirming the original contract, purported to be a complete summary
of the “prior agreements, conditions, [and] undertakings between the parties[.]” (Emphasis
added).  As Hovnanian argues, such an integration clause can be seen as wiping clear any
prior oral or implied agreements that were not included in the contract. 
But there is evidence of waiver occurring after this last integration clause.  As ATC
describes, Hovnanian continued its silence regarding the alleged breach of Section 14(d) for
six months, and allegedly took multiple actions that reaffirmed the existence of the contract,
(...continued)
21
. . . Except as amended herein, this Amendment, together with
the Agreement, constitutes the entire understanding of the
parties with respect to the Property. The Agreement and all
terms and conditions therein are hereby ratified, confirmed,
reinstated and otherwise in full force and effect, binding upon
Seller and Purchaser, and nothing contained in this Amendment
shall be construed to relieve either Seller or Purchaser of any
obligations as set forth in the Agreement, except as herein
specifically modified.  
34
including paying $100,000 to extend the closing date from November 1, 2007 to February
1, 2008.  A trier of fact could reasonably conclude that Hovnanian’s later silence about the
condition precedent, coupled with actions indicating it considered the condition fulfilled,
constituted a modification or waiver of the condition after the last integration clause.  
III. 
Strict Fulfillment of the Condition Precedent
The Circuit Court held, in the alternative, that the Amended Declaration strictly
fulfilled the condition precedent of Section 14(d) in the Purchase Agreement. 
The condition precedent read as follows:
. . . [ATC] shall be solely responsible for . . . recording a
declaration (the “Declaration”) for the maintenance of the
common areas of the Development[.] . . .The Declaration . . .
shall provide annual assessments against the office and retail
portions of the Development for the purpose of providing
funds for the maintenance of the office and retail buildings and
associated common areas[.] . . . The Declaration. . . shall also
provide that each owner of a condominium unit shall pay an
annual fee of [$1,200], which annual fee shall increase at the
rate of three percent (3%) annum to be calculated on a per diem
basis.  
(Emphasis added).
ATC drafted the provision for Common Area Maintenance in Section 10.2.4 of the
Declaration, which read as follows:  
. . . [S]ome or all Parcel Owners, Tier 2 Councils, Tier 2 Owners
and/or other Persons shall periodically pay to [ATC] respective
shares of the Common Area Maintenance Costs. . . pursuant to
one or more Recorded Supplemental Agreements[.] . . . [ATC]
shall be responsible for payment of the rest of the Common Area
Maintenance Costs, which [ATC] shall allocate among the parts
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of the Retail Component (except for the Target Parcel 11 Unit).
The Circuit Court held that Section 10.2.4 of the Declaration strictly fulfilled Section 14(d)
of the Purchase Agreement. Section 14(d) requires ATC to “provide annual assessments” in
the Declaration.  The Circuit Court interpreted this passage to merely require a “mechanism”
for CAM funding, and held that the Supplemental Agreements were part of the recorded
Declaration by way of incorporation.  The Circuit Court declared that this interpretation was
the “only reasonable reading of [§ 14(d).]”
To uphold the summary judgment, we must conclude that the Circuit Court’s
interpretation of Section 14(d) was the only reasonable one.  We cannot do so.  Hovnanian
strongly disputes that the condition could be satisfied with a promise of future agreements,
and claims that ATC’s mechanism deprives it of protections that a more detailed provision
in the Declaration was supposed to have provided.  In the context of this mixed-use
development, a fact-finder could find Hovnanian’s view the most reasonable.  The funding
for upkeep of common areas is an important, and heavily negotiated, issue in mixed-use and
commercial developments.  The specific funding provisions may be especially important to
a tenant in a project which is dominated by a major tenant:
. . . Although most landlords agree to credit cost contributions
of major tenants before determining a tenant's pro rata share, if
that major tenant is not paying its full share, the rest of the
tenants end up making up the deficiency. Major tenants often do
not pay their full pro rata share, primarily because of the
strength of their leverage in lease negotiations.
Marc E. Betesh & Nancy M. Davids, Negotiating Common Area Maintenace Costs, 23
36
Probate & Property 40, 42 (2009).  Moreover, due to the common area scheme in this
project, wherein the ATC entity would be responsible for Common Area Maintenance, rather
than a jointly-managed condominium association, Hovnanian had no direct recourse against
any other tenant that failed to pay its CAM obligations. 
Given these concerns, and the factual dispute about how the Section 14(d) condition
precedent could be satisfied, we hold that the grant of summary judgment was inappropriate. 
Although a court may often be able to determine, as a matter of law, that a condition
precedent was strictly fulfilled, that is not so in this case.   The trier of fact should determine
this issue on remand.  
CONCLUSION
In inquiring whether a party has waived a contractual right, the existence of a non-
waiver clause is not dispositive.  Instead, Maryland law focuses on the actions of the party,
and will find waiver where the actions or the words of the party clearly indicate such an
intent.  When a contract has a non-waiver clause, a party claiming waiver must show a clear
intent to waive both the non-waiver clause and the underlying contract provision.  Waiver
of a non-waiver clause may be shown through the same actions that prove waiver of the
contract clause at issue.  The Circuit Court’s conclusion on the waiver issue, as well the
interpretation of the condition precedent, required it to resolve factual disputes and draw
inferences regarding the intent of the parties.  Resolution of those issues at summary
judgment was therefore inappropriate.
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JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
REVERSED.  REMANDED TO THAT COURT
WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO VACATE THE
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT AND
REMAND TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.  COSTS TO BE SPLIT
EVENLY BETWEEN THE PARTIES.  
Chief Judge Bell joins this decision in judgment only.  
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