Title: Schaefer v. Allstate Ins. Co.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

SCHAEFER, APPELLANT, ET AL. V. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Schaefer v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1996), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Insurance -- Automobile liability -- Each person covered by an 
uninsured motorist policy who is asserting a claim for loss of 
consortium has a separate claim subject to a separate per 
person policy limit -- Provision in insurance policy which reaches 
a contrary result is unenforceable. 
Each person who is covered by an uninsured motorist policy and who is 
asserting a claim for loss of consortium has a separate claim subject to a 
separate per person policy limit.  A provision in an insurance policy 
which reaches a contrary result is unenforceable.  (Tomlinson v. Skolnik 
[1989], 44 Ohio St.3d 11, 540 N.E.2d 716, and Dues v. Hodge [1988], 36 
Ohio St.3d 46, 521 N.E.2d 789, paragraph two of the syllabus, 
overruled.) 
 
(No. 95-269 -- Submitted March 5, 1996 -- Decided September 4, 1996.) 
 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 94APE04-
507. 
 
On November 8, 1985, Jeanette Schaefer, plaintiff, and her husband, 
David Schaefer, plaintiff-appellant, were involved in an automobile collision 
 
2 
with an uninsured motorist whose negligence was the sole proximate cause of 
the collision.  At the time of the collision, the Schaefers carried uninsured 
motorist coverage with limits of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per 
occurrence with defendant-appellee, Allstate Insurance Company (“Allstate”). 
 
Mr. and Mrs. Schaefer each filed claims for personal injury with Allstate, 
which were eventually submitted to arbitration.  The award was vacated by the 
court of appeals and the cause was remanded for trial.  This court affirmed.  
Schaefer v. Allstate Ins. Co.  (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 708, 590 N.E.2d 1242.  At 
trial, Mr. Schaefer withdrew his personal injury claim and instead sought 
damages for loss of consortium.  The court instructed the jury that it could 
award Mrs. Schaefer up to $100,000 for her injuries as well as up to $100,000 
to Mr. Schaefer for his loss of consortium claim.  The jury awarded the 
Schaefers $100,000 each.  Allstate filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict, arguing that the Schaefers together were entitled to recover no 
more than $100,000 based on the language contained in the insurance policy.  
The court denied the motion and Allstate appealed. 
 
3 
 
Relying upon Tomlinson v. Skolnik (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 11, 540 N.E.2d 
716, the appellate court reversed the trial court and found that Mrs. Schaefer’s 
claim for personal injuries and Mr. Schaefer’s claim for loss of consortium 
were both subject to the single $100,000 per person limit. 
 
Just prior to this court’s decision to accept jurisdiction, Allstate 
voluntarily paid Mrs. Schaefer the full amount of the single per person limit of 
coverage.  This action prompted the plaintiffs to dismiss Mrs. Schaefer from 
the appeal. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary 
appeal. 
__________ 
 
McCarthy, Palmer, Volkema, Boyd & Thomas, Robert G. Palmer and 
Michael S. Miller, for appellant. 
 
Lane, Alton & Horst and Rick E. Marsh, for appellee. 
__________ 
 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J.   We are asked to decide whether Mrs. 
Schaefer’s personal injury claim and Mr. Schaefer’s loss of consortium claim 
 
4 
share a single per person limit of uninsured motorist coverage, or whether they 
each have available to them a separate per person limit to provide 
compensation for their own claims.  In answering this question, we must 
determine the validity, in light of recent case law, of an automobile insurance 
policy provision which limits recovery for all causes of action arising out of 
bodily injuries sustained to one person to a single per person limit.  For the 
following reasons, we find such a provision unenforceable.  Accordingly, we 
find that Mr. Schaefer’s claim for loss of consortium constitutes a separate 
compensable injury subject to its own per person limit.  The judgment of the 
court of appeals is reversed. 
 
In construing provisions in an automobile insurance policy, we are 
mindful of the basic tenet that the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage and 
its mandatory offering is “to protect persons from losses which, because of the 
tortfeasor’s lack of liability coverage, would otherwise go uncompensated.”  
Martin v. Midwestern Group Ins. Co. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 478, 480, 639 
N.E.2d 438, 440, citing Abate v. Pioneer Mut. Cas. Co. (1970), 22 Ohio St.2d 
161, 165, 51 O.O.2d 229, 231, 258 N.E.2d 429, 432.  Furthermore, since R.C. 
 
5 
3937.18(A)(1) is remedial legislation, it must be liberally construed in order to 
effectuate the legislative purpose.  Martin, 70 Ohio St.3d at 480, 639 N.E.2d at 
440, citing Curran v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 33, 54 
O.O.2d 166, 266 N.E.2d 566.  An insurance policy provision will be deemed 
unenforceable if the provision is contrary to the statute and its purpose.  Martin 
at 480, 639 N.E.2d at 440.  With these principles in mind, we now turn to the 
insurance policy which Allstate provided to its insureds. 
 
The policy at issue contained the following pertinent provision, included 
within its Uninsured Motorists Insurance Coverage: 
 
“Limits of Liability 
 
“The coverage limit stated on the declarations page for: 
 
“(1) ‘each person’ is the total limit for all damages arising out of bodily 
injury to one person in any one motor vehicle accident. 
 
“(2) ‘each accident’ is the total limit for all damages arising out of bodily 
injury to two or more persons in any one motor vehicle accident.” (Emphasis 
added.) 
 
6 
 
Although this provision clearly states that Mr. Schaefer’s claim for loss 
of consortium, arising from the bodily injuries sustained by his spouse, shares 
her single per person limit, nevertheless, Mr. Schaefer contends that he and his 
wife are not subject to a single $100,000 per person limit of liability.  Instead, 
he believes that he should be compensated for his own separate claim and be 
awarded an additional $100,000 for his loss of consortium claim.  He argues 
that such a result is dictated by our decision in Savoie v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co. 
(1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 500, 620 N.E.2d 809.1  He contends that since a 
wrongful death beneficiary has a separate claim subject to a separate per person 
limit, he, too, should be compensated for his own claim rather than be subject 
to his spouse’s single per person limit of liability.  Allstate, however, contends 
that there is no need to resort to Savoie as the cases of Dues v. Hodge (1988), 
36 Ohio St.3d 46, 521 N.E.2d 789, and Tomlinson v. Skolnik (1989), 44 Ohio 
St.3d 11, 540 N.E.2d 716, directly support its position that the provision is 
valid.   
 
Dues and Tomlinson do indeed support Allstate’s position.  However, 
based upon our decision in Savoie and cases culminating in its decision, we 
 
7 
need to revisit Dues and Tomlinson to determine whether they comport with the 
current law of our state. 
 
In Dues, we held that “[a]n insurance policy provision that limits 
recovery for all causes of action arising out of bodily injury to one person to a 
single limit of liability is a valid restriction of uninsured motorist coverage.”  
Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.  In so holding, however, Dues overruled 
Auto-Owners Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lewis (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 156, 10 OBR 490, 
462 N.E.2d 396, which had held that a separate per person limit of uninsured 
motorist coverage must be available to provide compensation both for the 
personal injury claim brought by a father on his son’s behalf and for the 
father’s own derivative claim for the loss of his son’s services.  In Auto-
Owners, the court had reasoned that “[w]ere this not the rule, [an insured] 
could conceivably be in the position of having less coverage than he paid for, 
despite the fact that [the insured] has individual claims arising from” the 
accident which physically injured his son.  Id., 10 Ohio St.3d at 161, 10 OBR at 
495, 462 N.E.2d at 401. 
 
8 
 
As its rationale for overruling Auto-Owners, the court in Dues merely 
stated that “R.C. 3937.18(A)(1) does not indicate that it was intended to 
override reasonable limitations on the amount of coverage.”  Dues, 36 Ohio 
St.3d at 49, 521 N.E.2d at 793.  However, such an interpretation disregards the 
rule that language in an insurance policy must be read strictly in favor of the 
insured and contravenes the public policy concern that uninsured motorist 
coverage is to protect motorists from the dangers of uninsured motorists.    
 
Applying Dues, Tomlinson, 44 Ohio St.3d 11, 540 N.E.2d 716, held that 
an insurer may, by appropriate language, limit all claims arising out of a single 
bodily injury to a single per person limit of coverage.  Id. at paragraph one of 
the syllabus. 
 
However, since Tomlinson was announced, this court has declined to 
apply it to wrongful death claims.  See Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Phillips (1990), 
52 Ohio St.3d 162, 556 N.E.2d 1150, where a sharply divided court considered 
the same language considered in Tomlinson in the context of liability limits in a 
tortfeasor’s insurance policy and found that a wrongful death claim, another 
type of derivative action, could not be subject to a single person limit.  
 
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Although the plurality decision distinguished Tomlinson on the basis that 
Tomlinson was a loss of consortium case, it questioned its validity.  Id. at 164, 
556 N.E.2d at 1152.  However, the concurring opinion asserted that the 
majority opinion should be read as overruling Tomlinson.  Id. at 166, 556 
N.E.2d at 1154, fn. 4 (H. Brown, J., concurring). 
 
In an effort to bring stability, consistency, and clarity to the state of 
automobile insurance law in Ohio, this court decided Savoie, supra.  In Savoie, 
we held that beneficiaries in a wrongful death action each are entitled to a 
separate per person limit of coverage under an uninsured motorist policy.  Id., 
67 Ohio St.3d 500, 620 N.E.2d 809, paragraph one of the syllabus.  In so 
finding, we recognized that R.C. 2125.02(A)(1) created separate rights to 
recovery.  Id. at 504, 620 N.E.2d at 812.  However, we believe that the logic of 
the decision in Savoie should now be applied to loss of consortium claims in 
personal injury cases.2 
 
Ohio common law recognizes that when one spouse is injured, the other 
spouse is also damaged and may assert his or her own cause of action against 
the tortfeasor for those damages--i.e., a claim for loss of consortium.  Clouston 
 
10 
v. Remlinger Oldsmobile Cadillac, Inc. (1970), 22 Ohio St.2d 65, 74, 51 
O.O.2d 96, 101-102, 258 N.E.2d 230, 235.  “Consortium consists of society, 
services, 
sexual 
relations 
and 
conjugal 
affection 
which 
includes 
companionship, comfort, love and solace.”  Id., paragraph three of the syllabus.  
Even though a loss of consortium claim is derivative in that it is dependent 
upon the defendant’s having committed a legally cognizable tort upon the 
spouse who suffers bodily injury, Bowen v. Kil-Kare, Inc. (1992), 63 Ohio 
St.3d 84, 93, 585 N.E.2d 384, 392, it is nonetheless legally separate and 
independent from the claim of the spouse who suffered the bodily injury.  Id. 
 
The fact that loss of consortium is a creation of the common law does not 
meaningfully differentiate spouses bringing those actions from spouses who are 
beneficiaries under the wrongful death statute. It is the separate injury which 
parties to both kinds of claims suffer that entitle them to separate per person 
limits. Thus, we see no valid reason to distinguish between wrongful death 
claims and loss of consortium claims in personal injury cases.   Therefore, we 
hold that each person who is covered by an uninsured motorist policy and who 
is asserting a claim for loss of consortium has a separate claim subject to a 
 
11 
separate per person policy limit.  A provision in an insurance policy which 
reaches a contrary result is unenforceable.  Because Tomlinson and paragraph 
two of the syllabus of Dues do not comport with the law of this state, we now 
expressly overrule them and return the law to where it was before those cases 
overruled Lewis. 
 
Applying our holding to the facts of this case, we find that Mr. 
Schaefer’s claim for loss of consortium is subject to its own per person limit of 
liability.  Thus, the jury award to Mr. Schaefer in the amount of $100,000 is 
reinstated.  The court of appeals’ decision overturning this verdict is reversed. 
                                                                                                 Judgment reversed. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurs separately. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and COOK, J., separately dissent. 
 
HILDEBRANDT, J., dissents. 
 
LEE H. HILDEBRANDT, JR., J., of the First Appellate district, sitting for 
WRIGHT, J. 
Footnotes: 
 
12 
1   Mr. Schaefer also argues that the policy provision is invalid under State 
Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Alexander (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 397, 583 N.E.2d 309, 
since it improperly reduces or eliminates uninsured motorist coverage for a 
claim arising from a recognized tort.  However, it is unnecessary to address this 
argument as Savoie is dispositive of the issue presented in this case. 
2   See, also, Cole v. Holland (1996), ___ Ohio St.3d ___, ___ N.E.2d ___, 
which applies paragraph three of the syllabus of Savoie to hold that in a 
personal injury case, an insurer’s setoff applies against the insured’s damages, 
not against the policy limit of uninsurance/underinsurance coverage.  Thus, 
Cole also expands the logic announced in Savoie to cases involving nonfatal 
injuries. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurring.     I concur with the majority.  I write separately to respond, 
in part, to the dissent of Justice Cook.  That dissent says that the majority “depart[s] from the 
sound reasoning contained in Dues and Tomlinson.”  I respectfully submit that the majority is 
doing no more than returning the law to where it was before Dues and Tomlinson were 
decided.  The change in the law was brought about by intervening elections which placed 
new justices on this court.  If the often-quoted (when convenient) rule of stare decisis had 
 
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been followed, then the law in the case now before us would have remained as it was pre-
Dues and Tomlinson. 
 
The statute in question, R.C. 3937.18(A)(1), provides that insurance policies issued in 
this state must include uninsured motorist coverage “for the protection of persons insured 
thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured 
motor vehicles because of bodily injury * * * suffered by any person insured under the 
policy.”  In this case, we know (1) that the policy in question contains an uninsured motorist 
provision; (2) that Mr. Schaefer is an insured under that policy; and (3) that he is legally 
entitled to recover damages for his loss of consortium claim (his damages) from the 
uninsured motorist tortfeasor.  These are the only qualifications.  The statute does not say that 
by policy language, these rights of an insured may be limited or compromised. 
 
In Sexton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 431, 23 O.O.3d 
385, 433 N.E.2d 555, a father had a derivative claim arising out of the death of his seventeen-
year-old daughter, who was killed as a result of an automobile accident caused by an 
uninsured driver.  In a four-to-three vote, this court held that the father had a separate claim 
under his own insurance policy even though the daughter was not an insured under the terms 
of the father’s policy.  This court did so in interpreting R.C. 3937.18. 
 
Two years later, in 1984, this court decided Auto-Owners Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lewis 
(1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 156, 10 OBR 490, 462 N.E.2d 396.  Between the decision in Sexton in 
February 1982 and the decision in Lewis in April 1984, the election of November 1982 took 
 
14 
place.  In that election one of the dissenting votes in Sexton was replaced by a new justice, 
who then voted with the majority in Lewis.  In Lewis, this court held in paragraph two of the 
syllabus, unambiguously and unequivocally, that “[w]here separate and independent causes 
of action arise from injuries caused by an uninsured motorist and such injuries are covered by 
the uninsured motorist provision of an automobile insurance policy, the policy limits 
applicable to uninsured motorist coverage will be available to each cause of action.”  
(Emphasis added.)  The vote was five to two, with the two dissenters being two of the three 
dissenters in Sexton, continuing their dissent. 
 
Then, in April 1988, this court decided Dues v. Hodge (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 46, 521 
N.E.2d 789.  Between the 1984 decision in Lewis and the 1988 decision in Dues, two more 
elections (November 1984 and November 1986) took place.  At the 1984 election, two new 
justices joined the court.  The two justices in dissent in Lewis remained on the court.  At the 
1986 election, two more new justices were elected, replacing two of the justices who were in 
the majority in Lewis.  Combined, these two elections (1984 and 1986) brought about a new 
majority deciding the issue that is, once again, before us.  Thus, in April 1988, in Dues, a 
majority of this court overruled paragraph two of the syllabus in Lewis (although not doing so 
in the syllabus of Dues) and held in paragraph two of the syllabus of Dues that “[a]n 
insurance policy provision that limits recovery for all causes of action arising out of bodily 
injury to one person to a single limit of liability is a valid restriction of uninsured motorist 
coverage.”  This was, of course, completely opposite to the holding in Lewis (and arguably 
 
15 
Sexton), case law that had been in effect only since 1984 (Lewis) and 1982 (Sexton).  The 
only intervening events effecting this change were two elections (1984 and 1986).   
 
Subsequently, in Tomlinson v. Skolnik (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 11, 540 N.E.2d 716, 
with a visiting judge joining the majority to make four and one of the members of the Dues 
majority now joining the dissenters (albeit for a different reason), this court by a vote of four 
to three reaffirmed and followed paragraph two of the syllabus of Dues.  Thus, until today, 
the law of Dues and Tomlinson, which changed the law of Lewis (and Sexton), remained. 
 
Now, yet two more elections affecting this equation (November 1988 and November 
1992) were held.  Today, a new majority (which includes one of the justices dissenting in 
Dues and Tomlinson), returns the law to what it was (Lewis) before all of this started.  
Accordingly, I concur. 
 
HILDEBRANDT, J., dissenting.  The majority in this case holds that “[e]ach 
person who is covered by an uninsured motorist policy and who is asserting a 
claim for loss of consortium has a separate claim subject to a separate per 
person policy limit” and that, therefore, “[a] provision in an insurance policy 
which reaches a contrary result is unenforceable.”  Accordingly, the majority 
opinion holds that the insurance contract limits in this case for “each person,” 
as defined in the contract as “all damages arising out of bodily injury to one 
 
16 
person in any one motor vehicle accident,” are invalid.  I cannot agree with 
these holdings. 
 
In Savoie v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 500, 620 N.E.2d 
809, this court held that a wrongful death beneficiary has a separate damage 
claim subject to a separate per person limit.  The majority now extends the 
holding in Savoie to this case where Mr. Schaefer’s separate claim is based 
upon loss of consortium resulting from physical injuries suffered by his wife in 
an automobile accident. 
 
Subsequent to this court’s decision in Savoie, the legislature amended 
R.C. 3937.18.  Specifically, R.C. 3937.18(H) provides as follows: 
 
“Any automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance 
that includes coverages offered under division (A) of this section and that 
provides a limit of coverage for payment for damages for bodily injury, 
including death, sustained by any one person in any one automobile accident, 
may, notwithstanding Chapter 2125 of the Revised Code, include terms and 
conditions to the effect that all claims resulting from or arising out of any one 
person’s bodily injury, including death, shall collectively be subject to the limit 
 
17 
of the policy applicable to bodily injury, including death, sustained by one 
person, and, for the purpose of such policy limit shall constitute a single claim.  
Any such policy limit shall be enforceable regardless of the number of 
insureds, claims made, vehicles or premiums shown in the declarations or 
policy, or vehicles involved in the accident.” 
 
Section 10 of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20 explains R.C. 3937.18(H) as follows: 
 
“It is the intent of the General Assembly in enacting division (H) of 
section 3937.18 of the Revised Code to supersede the effect of the holding of 
the Ohio Supreme Court in its October 1, 1993 decision in Savoie v. Grange 
Mut. Ins. Co. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 500 [620 N.E.2d 809], that declared 
unenforceable a policy limit that provided that all claims for damages resulting 
from bodily injury, including death, sustained by any one person in any one 
automobile accident would be consolidated under the limit of the policy 
applicable to bodily injury, including death, sustained by one person, and to 
declare such policy provisions enforceable.”  (145 Ohio Laws, Part I, 239.) 
 
Although this amended statute was not in effect at the time of the 
accident or at the time this case was filed, I find it instructive on how this case 
 
18 
should be decided.  Rather than extend Savoie to the facts of this case in 
contravention of amended R.C. 3937.18(H), I would reaffirm this court’s 
holding in Dues v. Hodge (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 46, 521 N.E.2d 789.  I would, 
therefore, find the per person limit language in this policy a valid restriction of 
coverage.  Because Mrs. Schaefer recovered the policy limits under this 
language for her bodily injuries, I would hold that Mr. Schaefer has no right to 
recovery for his claim for loss of consortium arising from his wife’s physical 
injuries under this insurance policy. 
 
I, therefore, respectfully dissent. 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion.
 
Neither public policy considerations nor the Savoie case mandates the 
majority’s conclusion that ignores the plain language set forth in this insurance 
contract.   The Dues and Tomlinson cases were decided correctly and I would 
not limit or overrule them. 
 
This insurance contract limits “each person” coverage to “the total limit 
for all damages arising out of bodily injury to one person in any one motor 
vehicle accident.”   Together, our decisions in Dues and  Tomlinson hold that a 
 
19 
loss of consortium claim is a derivative action and is not a separate bodily 
injury claim, and, therefore, the policy language at issue here is a valid 
restriction of coverage.  In Dues v. Hodge (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 46, 49, 521 
N.E.2d 789, 793, this court stated that “R.C. 3937.18(A)(1) does not indicate 
that it was intended to override reasonable limitations on the amount of 
coverage available for each accident.” 
 
Rather than overruling Dues or Tomlinson, Savoie limited the application 
of the second paragraph of the Dues syllabus to “cases involving a single 
bodily injury which has not resulted in wrongful death.”   Savoie v. Grange 
Mut. Ins. Co. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 500, 509, 620 N.E.2d 809, 816.  That is 
exactly the situation which now presents itself to this court. 
 
With all due respect, I am unpersuaded by the majority to join in its 
about-face from the sound reasoning contained in Dues and Tomlinson.  
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the appellate court.    
 
Moyer, C.J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.