Title: Lonardo v. Quaranta

State: rhode-island

Issuer: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Document:

205 A.2d 837 (1964) EMMA LONARDO v. MARY QUARANTA et al. Ex. No. 10594. Supreme Court of Rhode Island. December 21, 1964. Pontarelli & Berberian, Aram K. Berberian, Providence, for plaintiff. Higgins, Cavanagh & Cooney, Joseph V. Cavanagh, Kenneth P. Borden, Providence, for defendant Joseph Mansolillo. POWERS, Justice. This is an action of case "for libel and interference with right of burial," as laid in the plaintiff's writ. It charges the defendants with joint and several liability and they severally demurred to each count of the plaintiff's two-count declaration. Their demurrers were sustained by a superior court justice and the case is before us on the plaintiff's bill of exceptions, her *838 sole exception being to the sustaining of the demurrers as aforesaid. In the interest of avoiding the uncertainty which sometimes arises from paraphrasing, we deem it advisable to set forth counts I and II of plaintiff's declaration in full in an appendix hereto. For our immediate purposes, however, the first count alleges substantially that plaintiff is the eldest daughter of the late Luberta Cusimano and enjoyed a close position of love, trust and confidence with the deceased; that defendants are the sister of the deceased and the funeral director engaged to handle the burial arrangements; that plaintiff had no knowledge of deceased's illness and subsequent death until reading the obituary notice; that defendants jointly and severally took control of the body for burial purposes and, knowing of plaintiff's close relationship with the deceased and intending to destroy her reputation, caused plaintiff's name to be omitted from the obituary notice; that they prevented her from attending the wake of the deceased and from sitting with the deceased's family during the requiem mass; that they caused plaintiff to be seated at the rear of the church, prevented her from joining the leadership of the cortege, and caused her to follow at the rear; and that they prevented plaintiff from standing near the body of the deceased during interment. The plaintiff avers that these acts and deeds were the equivalent of publication and were intended to show, did show, and people believed contrary to the fact that plaintiff enjoyed neither filial relationship with the deceased nor possessed her trust and confidence and that, by committing these grievances, defendants brought plaintiff into "great disrepute, ridicule, contempt, and disesteem within her community." The second count for interference with "right of burial," alleges that this right vested in plaintiff as the eldest daughter of the deceased, but that defendants wantonly and maliciously interfered with it causing plaintiff to suffer mental anguish. The two counts are followed by the averment "All to the plaintiff's damage $10,000" and a claim for punitive damages. Each defendant demurred to the first count on the ground, inter alia, that it failed to state a cause of action for libel. We think their position to be well taken and the sustaining of their demurrers thereto to be correct. The count would appear to be defective in several respects but we need point to only one. In Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 30 R.I. 13, at page 18, this court stated its conviction that an essential element of an action for libel was that the defamatory publication should be by printing or writing, or by signs or pictures. We are not persuaded that this requirement should be so far relaxed as to be applicable to the circumstances of the instant case. The plaintiff freely acknowledges that the publication of the obituary notice or any one of the other acts set out is insufficient in and of itself. Rather, she contends, that taken in the aggregate, they are equivalent to a publication of a malicious falsehood. Assuming, without deciding, that the acts complained of can be so grouped, and further assuming that, considered as a group, they can be equated to a publication, such publication lacks the necessary element heretofore stated. The defendants' demurrers to the second count are based on the ground, inter alia, that it does not state a cause of action in case. We think their position correctly states the law in this jurisdiction. They are content, however, to rest on the proposition that plaintiff's bald allegation that she, being the eldest daughter, possessed the right of burial, is insufficient. They contend that where a claim is made after burial, the controlling element is that of consent, citing Hackett v. Hackett, 18 R.I. 155, 26 A. 42, 19 L.R.A. 558, and Gardner v. Swan Point Cemetery, 20 R.I. 646, 40 A. 871. *839 These, however, are causes in equity and are concerned, as are the cases cited therein, with the ex post facto enforcement of rights cognizable in equity. We entertain no doubt as to their correctness but, in our judgment, they do not reach the issue here present, namely, the right to recover money damages in an action at law for conduct which may, in equity, have warranted injunctive relief before burial or afforded a corrective remedy thereafter. No case in point has been called to our attention nor have we found any in the course of our independent research. There is thus presented a question of first impression, at least in this jurisdiction. However, the courts have generally held that, except for libel or slander where in certain circumstances a defamatory statement may be actionable per se, recovery cannot be had in an action of case, absent an allegation of actual damages. See Simone v. Rhode Island Co., 28 R.I. 186, and Henry v. Cherry & Webb, supra. Moreover, the question is one that involves public policy. Never to our knowledge having been considered by the general assembly, we are not persuaded that it should be resolved by this court in favor of a litigant whose claim to money damages rests on the circumstances here present. The plaintiff's exception is overruled, and the case is remitted to the superior court for further proceedings.