Title: State v. Bonny

State: utah

Issuer: Utah Supreme Court

Document:

477 P.2d 147 (1970) 25 Utah 2d 117 STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Louis W. BONNY, Jr., Defendant and Appellant. No. 12087. Supreme Court of Utah. November 23, 1970. John D. O'Connell, of Salt Lake Legal Defender Assn., Salt Lake City, for defendant-appellant. Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Lauren N. Beasley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff-respondent. CROCKETT, Chief Justice: Louis Walton Bonny, Jr., seeks to reverse his conviction of escape from the Utah State Prison. He had been committed in 1967 for second-degree burglary. On November 4, 1969, on the basis of facts not material to this appeal, he was charged with the crime of escape by a complaint filed in the City Court of Salt Lake City. Two days later, on November 6, 1969, his counsel filed on his behalf a request for final disposition of the escape charge pursuant to Sec. 77-65-1, U.C.A. 1953, which provides that any charge pending against a prisoner shall be disposed of within 90 days after the filing of such a demand. After appropriate proceedings in which the defendant was bound over to the district court, defendant and his counsel, Mr. John D. O'Connell, appeared for arraignment in the district court on January 26, 1970. The court indicated a trial date of January 28, which would have been within the 90-day period. However, for reasons set out below, the trial was actually set for February 9, 1970, five days beyond the 90 days prescribed by the statute. At the beginning of the trial defense counsel moved to dismiss on that ground. The motion was denied, and the defendant was found guilty. On appeal the defendant's sole contention is that the court erred in refusing to grant his motion to dismiss just referred to. The statute relied upon by the defendant, Sec. 77-65-1, in pertinent part provides: The emphasized language of the statute just quoted makes it clear that if there is a reasonable basis in the record to support the proposition that the trial court granted a continuance "for good cause shown" it was within his discretion and authority to do so. At the time of arraignment, the defendant and his counsel being present, after the entry of a plea of not guilty, the following colloquy occurred concerning the setting of a trial date: It will thus be seen that the situation dealt with by the trial court falls clearly within the emphasized portion of Sec. 77-65-1 quoted above. The court offered a trial date within the 90 days, that is, on January 28, 1970. It was at the request of, and in order to accommodate, the defendant's counsel, (with the defendant at his side) that he not be forced to trial on the 28th when he had another commitment, that the trial court indicated a setting for February 9th, just five days beyond the 90-day period, which was agreed to by the defense. Inasmuch as this occurrence took place within the 90-day period,[1] the court certainly then had jurisdiction of the matter in which the statute says that it "may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance." The order made was within the authority of the court; and was entirely reasonable and practical under the circumstances. (All emphasis added.) Affirmed. No costs awarded. CALLISTER, TUCKETT and HENRIOD, JJ., concur. ELLETT, Justice (concurring). I concur but wish to add another reason for doing so: The defendant prematurely demanded final disposition of the case before the information was filed.[1] He was tried well within the 90 days following the filing of the information. [1] Thus differing from State v. Wilson, 22 Utah 2d 361, 453 P.2d 158, where the majority opinion commented: "The State's attorney, within the 90-day period, for good cause [shown] could have moved for a continuance beyond the period proscribed"; and see also State v. Belcher, 25 Utah 2d 37, 475 P.2d 60 (1970). [1] State v. Belcher, 25 Utah 2d 37, 475 P.2d 60.