Title: Davis v. Martin

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DARLENE A. DAVIS,  
 
Respondent Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
RICHARD M. MARTIN, 
 
Petitioner Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 119, 2005 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Family Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  File No. CN00-08554 
§  Petition No. 01-02632 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: September 9, 2005 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: November 9, 2005 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R1  
 
 
This 9th day of November 2005, upon consideration of the briefs on 
appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The respondent-appellant, Darlene A. Davis (“Mother”), filed 
an appeal from the Family Court’s February 23, 2005 order denying her 
motion to reargue the Family Court’s denial of her motion to reopen the 
Family Court’s judgment regarding custody and visitation.  We find no merit 
to the appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
                                                 
1 The Court has sua sponte assigned pseudonyms to the parties and their minor children.  
Supr. Ct. R. 7(d). 
 
2
 
(2) 
Mother is divorced from petitioner-appellee Richard M. Martin 
(“Father”).  The parties have two minor children, Jennie, age 10, and Karen, 
age 7.2  The parties have been involved in extensive custody litigation 
involving their two minor children since at least January 2001.  In July 2001, 
the children were removed from Mother’s home by DFS due to the 
unsanitary condition of the home and Mother’s abusive behavior.  They have 
resided with Father since that time.  There have been several hearings in this 
matter, with testimony from mental health experts, representatives of the 
Delaware Division of Family Services (“DFS”), a guardian ad litem, who 
was appointed by the Family Court to represent the interests of the children, 
and witnesses on behalf of both Mother and Father.  The children also have 
been interviewed by the Family Court.   
 
(3) 
On April 30, 2004, the Family Court held a hearing regarding 
custody of and visitation with the parties’ children.  The guardian ad litem 
testified that she believed it was in the children’s best interests for Father to 
continue to have primary residential custody and for Mother to continue to 
have visitation with the children at a visitation center rather than at her 
home.  She also testified that the children, especially the older one, are 
distrustful of Mother in light of their previous experiences with her.  Finally, 
                                                 
2 The parties also have a son, who is no longer a minor. 
 
3
she testified that Mother still has a problem with taking responsibility for the 
problems that developed with her children and that further therapy for 
Mother is indicated.  Following that testimony, the judge discussed with the 
guardian ad litem, the parties and their counsel some additional issues 
involving the children, including the possibility of counseling for the older 
child.   
 
(4) 
The judge then left the courtroom and the parties, assisted by 
their counsel, drafted an agreement concerning custody and visitation in 
light of their previous discussion with the judge.  When the judge returned to 
the courtroom, she helped the parties complete the agreement.  The judge 
then dictated the terms of the agreement for the record, which was 
subsequently issued as a stipulated order of the Family Court dated April 30, 
2004.  At no time did Mother voice any objection to the language of the 
agreement or complain about her counsel’s performance.   
 
(5) 
The stipulated order provides that Mother and Father will 
continue to share joint legal custody of the children and Father will have 
primary residential custody.  In the event Mother and Father are unable to 
reach a joint decision concerning the children, Father will have final 
decision making authority.  Mother will continue to have weekend visitation 
 
4
with the children at a visitation center and additional contact with the 
children by phone.   
 
(6) 
In this appeal, Mother claims that: a) the guardian ad litem 
lacked the necessary credentials to offer her opinion about Mother at the 
custody hearing; b) Mother’s attorney did not provide adequate 
representation 
and 
smelled 
of 
alcohol; 
c) 
the 
Family 
Court’s 
custody/visitation order violates Mother’s constitutional rights; d) the 
Family Court should not have accepted the testimony of Samuel 
Romirowsky, Ph.D., in one of its prior orders; and e) the Family Court 
abused its discretion by denying Mother’s motion to reopen the Family 
Court’s judgment regarding custody and visitation.   
 
(7) 
The Family Court may relieve a party from a final judgment 
pursuant to Family Court Civil Procedure Rule 60(b), which provides: 
 
 
 
. . . the Court may relieve a party . . . from 
                               a final judgment . . . for the following reasons: 
(1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
 
 
 
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence . . .;  
(2) fraud . . .; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the 
 
 
 
judgment has been satisfied . . .; or (6) any other 
 
 
 
reason justifying relief from the operation of  
 
 
 
the judgment. 
 
 
5
The decision whether to reopen a judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) is left to 
the discretion of the Family Court.3  When determining whether there has 
been an abuse of discretion, this Court considers two questions: a) whether 
the outcome of the action would be different if relief were granted; and b) 
whether substantial prejudice would be suffered by the non-moving party if 
relief were granted.4   
 
(8) 
Mother has failed to address any of the required factors for 
reopening a judgment.  Moreover, the transcript of the hearing reflects 
clearly that Mother agreed to the terms of the Family Court’s 
custody/visitation order.  While Mother appears to blame her counsel for 
failing to properly represent her at the hearing, the record does not reflect 
any deficiencies in Mother’s counsel’s representation and does not reflect 
that Mother was dissatisfied with any aspect of her counsel’s representation 
at the time of the hearing.  There is, moreover, no evidence that the Family 
Court abused its discretion either by denying Mother’s motion to reopen its 
judgment regarding custody and visitation or by denying Mother’s motion to 
reargue that decision.   
                                                 
3 Reynolds v. Reynolds, 595 A.2d 385, 389 (Del. 1991). 
4 Harper v. Harper, 826 A.2d 293, 297 (Del. 2003) (citing Tsipouras v. Tsipouras, 677 
A.2d 493, 495 (Del. 1996)). 
 
6
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Family Court is AFFIRMED.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice