Title: FBT Everett Realty, LLC v. Massachusetts Gaming Commission

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-13196 
 
FBT EVERETT REALTY, LLC  vs.  MASSACHUSETTS GAMING COMMISSION. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     February 4, 2022. - May 23, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, & 
Wendlandt, JJ. 
 
 
Gaming.  Constitutional Law, Taking of property.  Due Process of 
Law, Taking of property.  Unlawful Interference.  Contract, 
Interference with contractual relations.  Governmental 
Immunity.  Massachusetts Tort Claims Act. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
November 15, 2016. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Mitchell H. Kaplan, J., 
and, after transfer and special assignment, the case was heard 
by Kenneth W. Salinger, J., on a motion for summary judgment. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Christopher Weld, Jr., for the plaintiff. 
 
Melissa C. Allison, Special Assistant Attorney General, for 
the defendant. 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  The plaintiff, FBT Everett Realty, LLC (FBT), 
bought land in Everett (Everett parcel) before the legalization 
2 
 
of casino gaming in Massachusetts.  After legalization, FBT 
contracted to sell Wynn MA, LLC (Wynn), the property for $75 
million if Wynn could secure a license to develop and operate a 
casino on the Everett parcel.  During the license application 
process, the defendant Massachusetts Gaming Commission 
(commission) became concerned about, and investigated whether, 
there were hidden criminal ownership interests in FBT.  Without 
resolving the criminal ownership issue, the commission 
determined that FBT should not be allowed to receive a "casino-
use premium" on the sale of the Everett parcel.  The commission 
communicated this concern to Wynn, warning that its casino 
license application might be jeopardized if this issue was not 
addressed.  In response, Wynn reappraised the Everett parcel for 
its best non-casino use and pressured FBT to agree to lower the 
parcel's price to the newly appraised value of $35 million.  The 
result of the commission's refusal to allow FBT to receive a 
casino-use premium was to transfer the value of that premium to 
Wynn.  FBT later sued the commission to recover the lost $40 
million premium, alleging various claims, including tortious 
interference with contract and a regulatory taking. 
We conclude that FBT's tortious inference claim was 
properly dismissed because the commission is a public employer 
immune from suit for intentional torts under the Massachusetts 
Tort Claims Act (MTCA), G. L. c. 258.  We reverse, however, the 
3 
 
motion judge's decision to grant summary judgment on the 
regulatory takings claim.  The regulatory takings inquiry is a 
fact-intensive evaluation that should consider multiple factors, 
including not only reasonable investment-backed expectations but 
also the economic impact and character of the challenged 
regulatory action.  The motion judge here limited his analysis 
to the investment-backed expectations factor.  This was error, 
as he also should have considered the significant $40 million 
economic impact and the highly unusual character of the 
government action here -- conditioning the award of a casino 
license to Wynn on FBT not receiving a casino-use premium on the 
sale of the Everett parcel, thus effectively compelling the 
transfer of this economic benefit to Wynn.  As there are 
material disputed facts on exactly what the commission expected 
or required Wynn to do, and what Wynn did on its own initiative, 
summary judgment cannot be granted on this record. 
 
Background.  1.  Facts.  As appropriate in reviewing a 
grant of summary judgment, we "recite the material facts in the 
light most favorable to . . . the party who opposed the motion 
for summary judgment," here FBT.  Sarkisian v. Concept 
Restaurants, Inc., 471 Mass. 679, 680 (2015), citing Augat, Inc. 
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 117, 120 (1991).  We 
summarize the facts based on the parties' agreed statement of 
facts and the documents in the summary judgment record.  Ajemian 
4 
 
v. Yahoo!, Inc., 478 Mass. 169, 171 (2017).  See Mass. R. Civ. 
P. 56 (c), as amended, 436 Mass. 1404 (2002). 
In 2009, FBT bought the Everett parcel for approximately $8 
million.  Because the site was heavily contaminated, it required 
extensive environmental cleanup.  At the time of FBT's purchase, 
casino gambling was illegal in Massachusetts.  See Abdow v. 
Attorney Gen., 468 Mass. 478, 483 (2014).  FBT explored 
different potential uses for the site, including developing the 
property as a "big box" retail store or storage facility. 
Two years after FBT purchased the Everett parcel, the 
Expanded Gaming Act (gaming act), St. 2011, c. 194, was enacted, 
which created the commission, G. L. c. 23K, § 3, and legalized 
casino gambling at establishments operated by entities holding a 
category 1 license issued by the commission, G. L. c. 23K, §§ 2, 
19.  This legislation authorized the commission to issue a 
single category 1 license for each of three regions of the 
Commonwealth.  G. L. c. 23K, § 19 (a).  To operate a casino in 
Everett, a licensee would need to hold the category 1 license 
for "region A," the region encompassing the counties of Suffolk, 
Middlesex, Essex, Norfolk, and Worcester.  Id. 
After the gaming act passed, Wynn became interested in 
developing and operating a casino on the Everett parcel.  In 
late 2012, it accordingly entered into an option agreement with 
FBT, which provided that Wynn would pay FBT $100,000 per month 
5 
 
for the right to buy the parcel for $75 million if it were to be 
awarded the category 1 license for region A.  FBT also agreed to 
spend up to $2.5 million to obtain an easement to improve 
vehicular access to the property and to perform baseline 
environmental remediation on the site to bring it into 
compliance with applicable environmental laws. 
In January 2013, Wynn filed an application for a category 1 
license for region A.  When the commission receives an 
application for a gaming license, the commission's enforcement 
agency, the Investigations and Enforcement Bureau (IEB), is to 
investigate the "suitability" of the applicant and its 
affiliates to hold a gaming license.  G. L. c. 23K, § 12 (a).  
205 Code Mass. Regs. § 115.01 (2018).  In the course of this 
suitability investigation, IEB officers uncovered evidence 
leading them to suspect that Charles Lightbody, a convicted 
felon with apparent connections to organized crime, had a hidden 
ownership interest in FBT.  This evidence included recorded 
telephone calls between Lightbody and an inmate in Massachusetts 
State prison, as well as discrepancies in FBT's financial 
documents.1 
 
1 In the recorded call between Lightbody and the prison 
inmate, Lightbody is heard saying it is a "good thing . . . 
nobody knows who's involved," to which the inmate responds:  
"[Y]ou need to double blind it.  You need to triple blind it 
actually."  Lightbody then replies:  "Well, that's what we're 
doing." 
6 
 
When FBT's principals, Dustin DeNunzio, Anthony Gattineri, 
and Paul Lohnes, were questioned by the IEB about Lightbody's 
connection with the company, they explained that while Lightbody 
once had an ownership interest, this interest had been 
transferred to Gattineri before the option agreement with Wynn 
was signed.  The IEB continued to suspect, however, that 
Lightbody retained an ownership interest, and that FBT's 
principals were concealing his continuing interest in FBT and 
hence in the transaction with Wynn. 
The commission was troubled by what it believed to be a 
lack of candor by FBT's principals and their failure to fully 
cooperate with the IEB's investigation.  It was also anxious 
that individuals with a criminal background and associations 
with organized crime should not profit from the award of a 
casino license to Wynn for the Everett parcel. 
FBT alleges -- and the commission denies -- that the 
commissioners were angered by what they perceived as the FBT 
principals' lack of candor and obstructiveness, and sought to 
punish them by exacting a financial penalty on FBT.  The record, 
which is based on the limited discovery that has occurred so 
far, reveals some evidence supporting FBT's allegation.  At the 
commission's public meeting on Wynn's application and the FBT 
ownership issue, Commissioner James McHugh declared it 
"intolerable" for "people to tell [the commission] things that 
7 
 
aren't true" or to "hide things" from IEB investigators.  McHugh 
insisted on the importance of sending a message that dishonesty 
or lack of cooperation with the IEB's work would not be 
tolerated, remarking:  "[W]e've got to demonstrate that point 
early, and we've got to demonstrate that point often."  He also 
voiced his concern that "none of the appreciation of [the 
Everett parcel] that came from the sale" should "go[] to 
somebody who's been dishonest."  The IEB's director, Karen 
Wells, also testified during a related Federal criminal 
proceeding against Lightbody, DeNunzio, and Gattineri that the 
commission was concerned that if organized crime figures reaped 
a windfall from selling the Everett parcel to be developed into 
a casino facility, it would undermine public confidence in the 
casino licensing process.2 
Wells communicated the commission's concerns directly to 
Wynn's executives.  Indeed, as Wells subsequently stated at the 
commission's meeting on the FBT ownership issue, she informed 
Wynn that "their position regarding [FBT] receiving a financial 
windfall as a result of the gaming facility was something the 
IEB would report on regarding [Wynn's] suitability."  Upon being 
advised by Wells of the commission's concerns, and of the risk 
 
2 In October 2014, Lightbody, DeNunzio, and Gattineri were 
indicted on Federal charges for their alleged efforts to hide 
Lightbody's financial interest in the Everett parcel.  After a 
jury trial, all three were acquitted. 
8 
 
that the IEB would find it unsuitable for a license unless it 
took action responsive to these concerns, Wynn acted quickly to 
preserve its chances of receiving a gaming license, 
commissioning an appraisal of the Everett parcel based on its 
highest and best non-casino use.  The appraiser valued the 
parcel at $35 million, based on the determination that the most 
valuable non-casino use was likely as "large box retail."  Wynn 
then entered into negotiations with FBT regarding the purchase 
price.  Fearing that the commission would otherwise find Wynn 
unsuitable, dooming Wynn's license application and FBT's sale of 
the Everett parcel to Wynn, FBT agreed in November 2013 to amend 
the option agreement to reduce the price from $75 million to $35 
million, thus eliminating FBT's casino-use premium, while also 
capping FBT's obligations for environmental remediation at $10 
million. 
While it is disputed to what extent the commission was 
involved in directing or otherwise influencing the actions Wynn 
took to address the commission's concerns,3 the record discloses 
evidence that the commission's staff worked with Wynn in shaping 
its response.  In particular, Wynn's general counsel testified 
at the commission's meeting on the FBT ownership issue that the 
 
3 The commission denies in its brief that it "informed Wynn 
that it could address the commission's concerns by removing the 
'casino premium' from the purchase price" of the Everett parcel. 
9 
 
commission had "help[ed] . . . to craft a proposed curative 
action" that would allow Wynn's application to move forward. 
The commission accepted the removal of the casino-use 
premium as an adequate cure for its concerns, and in September 
2014, the commission approved Wynn's application for the region 
A category 1 license.  Three months later, Wynn purchased the 
Everett parcel from FBT for $35 million. 
2.  Procedural history.  In November 2016, FBT sued the 
commission in the Superior Court for intentional interference 
with contract, alleging that the commission tortiously 
interfered with FBT's option agreement with Wynn.  The 
commission moved to dismiss, contending that as a "public 
employer" under the MTCA, it was immune from suit for 
intentional torts such as intentional interference with 
contract.  Agreeing with the commission's argument, the motion 
judge dismissed FBT's tortious interference claim. 
While the commission's motion to dismiss the tortious 
interference claim was pending, FBT amended its complaint to add 
constitutional claims alleging a per se taking, a regulatory 
taking, and a violation of the contracts clause of art. I, § 10, 
of the United States Constitution.  The commission moved to 
dismiss these new claims.  Although the motion judge dismissed 
the per se taking claim and the contract clause claim, he 
allowed the regulatory taking claim to go forward, concluding 
10 
 
that FBT had alleged facts sufficient to plausibly suggest that 
the commission had coerced Wynn to negotiate a reduction in the 
purchase price that would eliminate the casino-use premium, and 
that this amounted to a regulatory taking.  To reach this 
conclusion, the motion judge considered in particular the 
economic impact of the commission's actions, FBT's reasonable 
investment-backed expectations, and the character of the 
commission's actions.  The judge understood the regulatory 
takings inquiry to be "fact sensitive," requiring the 
application of "several interrelated and well-established 
factors" recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Penn 
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-128 (1978) 
(Penn Central). 
While discovery was ongoing, and before any depositions had 
been taken, the commission moved for summary judgment on the 
remaining regulatory taking claim.  A different judge of the 
Superior Court reviewed the commission's summary judgment motion 
from the one who had reviewed its prior motions to dismiss.  
This judge granted summary judgment, observing that because FBT 
bought the Everett parcel before the passage of the gaming act, 
it could not reasonably have expected to later sell the property 
for purposes of casino development.  Because FBT could not 
establish that the commission had interfered with its reasonable 
investment-backed expectations, which the judge characterized as 
11 
 
an "[e]ssential [e]lement" of a regulatory taking claim, he 
concluded that the commission was entitled to summary judgment. 
FBT now appeals from the grant of summary judgment on its 
regulatory taking claim, as well as from the earlier dismissal 
of its tortious interference with contract claim. 
Discussion.  1.  Regulatory taking claim.  a.  Standard of 
review.  "We review an order granting or denying summary 
judgment de novo because the record before us is the same as the 
record before the motion judge, and the decision is a matter of 
law rather than of discretionary judgment."  Lynch v. Crawford, 
483 Mass. 631, 641 (2019).  Summary judgment is proper when the 
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party, shows that "there are no genuine issues of material fact 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law" 
(citation omitted).  Green Mountain Ins. Co. v. Wakelin, 484 
Mass. 222, 226 (2020).  See Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (c). 
b.  Regulatory taking inquiry.  To determine whether a 
government restriction on an owner's use of property has 
effected a compensable taking, where the restriction involves 
neither a physical invasion nor a complete deprivation of 
economically viable use, the Supreme Court has required a fact-
intensive inquiry "designed to allow 'careful examination and 
weighing of all the relevant circumstances.'"  Tahoe-Sierra 
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 
12 
 
535 U.S. 302, 321 (2002), quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 
U.S. 606, 636 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring).  See Connolly 
v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224 (1986); Kaiser 
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).  The Court has 
identified three factors, originally articulated in Penn 
Central, 438 U.S. at 123-128, as being of "particular 
significance" in this fact-dependent regulatory takings inquiry.  
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538-539 (2005); 
Connolly, supra at 224-225. 
Specifically, to determine whether a restriction on 
property rights amounts to a taking, courts are to "balanc[e] 
. . . the economic impact of the regulation, its interference 
with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the 
character of the government action."  Cedar Point Nursery v. 
Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2072 (2021).  Accord Fitchburg Gas & 
Elec. Light Co. v. Department of Pub. Utils., 467 Mass. 768, 
783-784 (2014), quoting Daddario v. Cape Cod Comm'n, 425 Mass. 
411, 416 (1997).4 
 
4 Both the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and art. 10 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights "prohibit the taking of private property 
for public use without just or reasonable compensation."  
Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Light Co., 467 Mass. at 775.  "To date, we 
have interpreted art. 10 consistently to provide property owners 
the same protection afforded under the just compensation clause 
of the Fifth Amendment."  Blair v. Department of Conservation & 
Recreation, 457 Mass. 634, 642 (2010).  There is no argument by 
13 
 
All three factors in the multifactor Penn Central test 
"should be taken into account" when determining whether a 
challenged regulation amounts to a taking.  Ruckelshaus v. 
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984) (Monsanto).  See Murr v. 
Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1943 (2017), quoting Palazzolo, 533 
U.S. at 617 (explaining that regulatory takings are to be 
evaluated based on "complex of factors" identified in Penn 
Central).  Accord Blair v. Department of Conservation & 
Recreation, 457 Mass. 634, 644 (2010) (characterizing regulatory 
takings standard as "[t]he multifactor Penn Central balancing 
test"); Leonard v. Brimfield, 423 Mass. 152, 154 (1996) (Penn 
Central's "several interrelated factors . . . are to be 
considered in determining whether a compensable taking has 
occurred"). 
Rather than considering all three factors in the 
multifactor Penn Central test, however, the motion judge relied 
on just a single factor.  The judge reasoned that because FBT 
could not demonstrate that the commission had interfered with 
FBT's reasonable investment-backed expectations, FBT had "no 
reasonable expectation of proving an essential element" of its 
regulatory takings claim, Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 
410 Mass. 706, 716 (1991), and summary judgment was proper.  He 
 
FBT here that the State Constitution provides greater protection 
than the Federal Constitution. 
14 
 
thus granted summary judgment for the commission without 
considering the other two factors identified in Penn Central, 
namely the economic impact and the character of the government 
action.  This was error, particularly given the significant 
diminution in value here -- lowering the amount paid from $75 
million to $35 million -- and the unusual and disputed character 
of the government action, which we discuss in more detail infra. 
In concluding that government interference with reasonable 
investment-backed expectations is essential to prove a 
regulatory taking, the motion judge relied heavily on Monsanto, 
467 U.S. 986.  There, the United States Supreme Court addressed 
whether the Environmental Protection Agency's use and disclosure 
of data that the plaintiff chemicals company had submitted in 
applying to register a pesticide amounted to a taking of the 
plaintiff's intellectual property.  Id. at 997-998.  After 
explaining that the evaluation of a regulatory takings claim is 
a fact-intensive inquiry that should take into account the three 
factors identified in Penn Central, the Court concluded that, 
with respect to certain of the data submitted, the absence of 
reasonable investment-backed expectations had a "force . . . so 
overwhelming" that it "dispose[d] of the taking question."  Id. 
at 1005.  Although focused on this factor, the Monsanto court 
also considered at least in passing the character of the 
regulation, stating that "pesticide sale and use . . . has long 
15 
 
been the source of public concern and the subject of government 
regulation."  Id. at 1007.  It also recognized the economic 
effects of the regulation, albeit without expressly balancing 
this factor in its analysis.  Id. at 998. 
The motion judge interpreted Monsanto to stand for the 
proposition that a regulatory taking claim must fail if the 
owner cannot prove interference with his or her reasonable 
investment-backed expectations.5  We believe this reads too much 
 
5 This interpretation has found limited support at the 
United States Court of Appeals level, particularly in the 
Federal Circuit.  See Love Terminal Partners, L.P. v. United 
States, 889 F.3d 1331, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ("The failure to 
establish reasonable, investment-backed expectations . . . 
defeats a regulatory takings claim as a matter of law" 
[alteration, quotation, and citation omitted]); Good v. United 
States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("the government is 
entitled to summary judgment on a regulatory takings claim where 
the plaintiffs lacked reasonable, investment-backed 
expectations").  The broad sweep of Federal courts of appeals, 
when faced with a regulatory taking claim, have, however, 
engaged in a fact-intensive inquiry applying the multifactor 
Penn Central balancing test.  See, e.g., Clayland Farm Enters., 
LLC v. Talbot County, Md., 987 F.3d 346, 353 (4th Cir. 2021), 
quoting Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1943 (explaining that Penn Central 
"requires" courts considering regulatory takings claims "to 
balance 'a complex of factors'"); Bridge Aina Le'a, LLC v. Land 
Use Comm'n, 950 F.3d 610, 625 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 
S. Ct. 731 (2021), quoting Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, 
Inc., 535 U.S. at 322 ("courts determine whether a regulatory 
action is functionally equivalent to the classic taking using 
'essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, designed to allow 
careful examination and weighing of all the relevant 
circumstances,' . . . set forth in the three Penn Central 
factors"); District Intown Props. Ltd. Partnership v. District 
of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874, 878-879 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. 
denied, 531 U.S. 812 (2000) ("regulatory takings cases should be 
considered on an ad hoc basis, with three primary factors [from 
Penn Central] weighing in the balance"). 
16 
 
into Monsanto.  We note that the Court has expressly cautioned 
that interference with investment-backed expectations is only 
"one of a number of factors that a court must examine" 
(quotation omitted).  Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc., 
535 U.S. at 326 n.23.  See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540 (Penn Central 
inquiry does not turn "exclusively" on regulation's economic 
impact and degree of interference with legitimate property 
interests); Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 634 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring) ("Investment-backed expectations . . . are not 
talismanic under Penn Central").  Moreover, as the Monsanto 
Court took care to observe, all three Penn Central factors are 
important, or at least may be important in determining whether a 
regulatory taking occurred, and should be considered in the 
regulatory takings inquiry.  This is particularly true, as in 
the instant case, where the economic impact is significant and 
the challenged government action is not, as it was in Monsanto, 
a standard regulatory practice. 
On this point, the Court's regulatory takings analysis in 
Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987), is instructive.  The Court 
held that a statutory provision that abolished the descent and 
devise of certain undivided fractional interests in allotted 
Native American lands took the property of the owners of those 
interests without compensation, id. at 718, despite finding it 
"dubious" whether the owners had any investment-backed 
17 
 
expectations in passing on their interests, id. at 715.  The 
near absence of any specific investment-backed expectations did 
not preclude the conclusion that there was a taking, because 
"the character of the Government regulation" at issue was 
"extraordinary," involving the virtual abrogation of the right 
to pass on a certain type of property to the owners' heirs.  Id. 
at 716. 
In sum, the motion judge erred in allowing summary judgment 
without considering the Penn Central factors other than 
reasonable investment-backed expectations.  Although this error 
does not in itself compel us to deny the commission summary 
judgment, reviewing the summary judgment record de novo, and 
applying all three Penn Central factors, we conclude that there 
are material disputed facts precluding summary judgment on the 
limited existing record, particularly in regard to the nature of 
the commission's actions. 
c.  Reasonable investment-backed expectations.  We begin by 
considering the extent of the commission's interference with 
FBT's reasonable investment-backed expectations.  We have 
recognized that an important determinant of the reasonableness 
of an owner's investment-backed expectations is the regulatory 
environment at the time that the owner purchased or otherwise 
took title to the property at issue.  See Leonard, 423 Mass. at 
155, citing Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1005 ("A property owner's 
18 
 
investment-backed expectations must be reasonable and predicated 
on existing conditions"). 
Here, FBT bought the Everett parcel two years before casino 
gaming was legalized in Massachusetts.  At the time it purchased 
the property, therefore, it could not reasonably have expected 
to sell the property as a site for the development of a casino.  
This would have been the case even if FBT had a subjective 
expectation that casino gambling would be liberalized, because a 
reasonable expectation must be "more than a unilateral 
expectation" (quotation and citation omitted).  Monsanto, 467 
U.S. at 1005.  See Bridge Aina Le'a, LLC v. Land Use Comm'n, 950 
F.3d 610, 633 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 731 
(2021) ("starry eyed hope of winning the jackpot if the law 
changes" does not give rise to reasonable investment-backed 
expectations [citation omitted]).  Given the primacy of the 
regulatory environment at the time of purchase in evaluating an 
owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations, the fact that 
casino gambling was illegal when the Everett parcel was 
purchased weighs heavily against a finding that FBT had 
substantial investment-backed expectations in reaping a casino-
use premium on the sale of the property that were interfered 
with by the commission. 
Nevertheless, while the regulatory environment at the time 
of acquisition is a critical consideration, that does not mean 
19 
 
that investment-backed expectations developed after the point of 
purchase should not be considered in the assessment of a 
property owner's reasonable expectations.  Here, following the 
legalization of casino gambling in 2011, FBT became interested 
in selling the Everett parcel for a casino use in the summer of 
2012, and entered into the option agreement with Wynn in 
December of that year.  From 2012 onwards, FBT made net 
investments of about $900,000 in the property; these investments 
would have included the costs of purchasing an easement, 
undertaking environmental remediation, and preparing and 
marketing the parcel for sale to potential casino developers.  
FBT's investments in the Everett parcel from 2012 onward were 
reasonable to the extent that they were made partly in reliance 
on the set of "existing [regulatory] conditions," Leonard, 423 
Mass. at 155, that prevailed after the gaming act was enacted. 
Regardless, even these additional post-gaming act 
investments do not give rise to reasonable investment-backed 
expectations because they remained subject to the long-shot 
gamble that a gaming license would be awarded to develop a 
casino on the Everett parcel.  "Speculative possibilities of 
windfalls do not amount to 'distinct investment-backed 
expectations.'"  Guggenheim v. Goleta, 638 F.3d 1111, 1120-1121 
(9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 988 (2011).  Here, the 
gaming act expressly provides that the commission "shall have 
20 
 
full discretion as to whether to issue a license," and 
accordingly, applicants "shall have no legal right or privilege 
to a gaming license."  G. L. c. 23K, § 17 (g).  Given the 
commission's very broad discretion, FBT could not have 
reasonably expected that Wynn would be awarded a region A casino 
gaming license. 
Thus, we agree with the motion judge that the reasonable 
investment-backed expectations factor weighs heavily against the 
finding of a regulatory taking.  At the time of purchase, 
gambling was not legal, and thus FBT could not then have had a 
reasonable expectation of selling its property for a casino use.  
Even allowing that postacquisition investments can sometimes 
give rise to reasonable investment-backed expectations, the 
prospect that Wynn would secure a casino gaming license was too 
speculative to ground reasonable investment-backed expectations 
in selling the Everett parcel with a casino-use premium. 
This does not, however, end our analysis.  The other two 
factors set out in Penn Central must be considered, and we do so 
here, before we can decide whether summary judgment is proper on 
the present limited record. 
d.  Economic impact.  While "diminution in property value, 
standing alone," does not establish a taking, the extent of the 
diminution in value caused by a challenged regulation -- the 
"economic impact" of the regulation -- is a relevant factor in 
21 
 
the regulatory takings analysis.  Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, 
131.  To measure economic impact, we "compare the value that has 
been taken from the property with the value that remains in the 
property."  Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 
U.S. 470, 497 (1987) (Keystone). 
In the instant case, there is the additional complication 
of whether it was the action of the commission, rather than 
Wynn, that caused economic loss to FBT.  In general, where the 
government pressures a third party to take action that 
diminishes the value of the plaintiff's property, the government 
is responsible, for regulatory takings purposes, for the 
economic impact of the third party's action if the economic harm 
to the plaintiff was "direct and intended" and "the government's 
influence over the third party was coercive rather than merely 
persuasive."  See A & D Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States, 748 
F.3d 1142, 1154 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
Here, before the challenged actions by the commission took 
place, FBT had negotiated an agreement that Wynn would pay it 
$100,000 per month for the right to buy the Everett parcel for 
$75 million if Wynn were to be awarded a casino gaming license.  
Although the relevant facts are disputed, the record -- when 
viewed in the light most favorable to FBT -- indicates that the 
commission intended to deprive FBT of any casino-use premium on 
the sale of the Everett parcel and that it coerced Wynn into 
22 
 
renegotiating the price for the parcel, reducing it from $75 
million to $35 million, by threatening to find Wynn unsuitable 
for a license. 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to FBT, 
the commission caused a $40 million reduction in the value of 
FBT's property by coercing action on the part of a third party, 
Wynn.  Given that this represents a more than fifty percent 
diminution in value, the economic impact of the commission's 
actions here was substantial. 
e.  Character of the government action.  Within the Penn 
Central inquiry, the "nature of the State's action" is a 
"critical factor in determining whether a taking has occurred."  
Keystone, 480 U.S. at 488.  The character of the government 
action is an important factor because the guiding aim of the 
regulatory taking inquiry is to "identify regulatory actions 
that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which 
government directly appropriates private property," Lingle, 544 
U.S. at 539, for which compensation is required, and to 
distinguish such actions from exercises of the police power 
aimed at protecting "public health, public safety, and public 
morals," Abdow, 468 Mass. at 489, where compensation is not due.  
The considerations that courts have subsumed under the character 
of the government action factor -- such as whether the action is 
harm-preventing or nuisance-abating and whether the action 
23 
 
burdens some owners disproportionately -- are probative in 
distinguishing between regulations of property that are closer 
to exercises of the police power and those that are closer to 
exercises of eminent domain.  See Merrill, The Character of the 
Governmental Action, 36 Vt. L. Rev. 649, 649, 672-673 (2012). 
The character of the regulatory action here is highly 
unusual.  When confronted with the possibility that someone with 
a criminal background had an undisclosed ownership interest in 
the parcel of land that a gaming license applicant intended to 
purchase to develop a casino, the commission did not continue to 
investigate until it could confidently determine whether there 
was in fact some undisclosed criminal ownership.  Whether it 
concluded that it did not have the time, means, or need to 
complete its investigation is not clear from this record. 
Regardless, instead of completing or concluding its 
investigation of the ownership interests in FBT, the commission 
made favorable consideration of the application subject to 
lowering the amount of money the owners of FBT would receive for 
the property, thereby giving one private party, Wynn, a 
multimillion-dollar windfall at the expense of another private 
party, FBT.  Whether the commission directed such a compelled 
transfer of property, or merely accepted it as a cure to its 
concerns about undisclosed criminal ownership interests at FBT, 
cannot be decided without further discovery. 
24 
 
In evaluating the character of the commission's actions 
here, we are conscious that the commission -- or, more 
specifically, the IEB -- is authorized by G. L. c. 23K, § 6 (b), 
to function as a "law enforcement agency" endowed with "such law 
enforcement powers as necessary to effectuate the purposes" of 
the gaming act.  To the extent that the commission acts to 
"prevent[] activities similar to public nuisances" or to "stop[] 
illegal activity," the restrictions it imposes in that capacity 
on the use of private property will be considered exercises of 
the police power that do not require compensation.  Keystone, 
480 U.S. at 492 & n.22.  Accord Giovanella v. Conservation 
Comm'n of Ashland, 447 Mass. 720, 735 (2006), cert. denied, 549 
U.S. 1280 (2007) (regulations "limited to mitigating harms or 
nuisances . . . typically do not require compensation").  
Indeed, we have specifically recognized that the "regulation of 
gambling . . . falls squarely within the core police power."  
Abdow, 468 Mass. at 489. 
The problem, however, is the character of the action taken.  
The commission had broad discretion in addressing its concerns 
about potential concealed, criminal ownership interests in FBT.  
For example, it could have refused to consider Wynn's bid 
altogether until the issue of the ownership interest was 
resolved.  Likewise, it could have rejected Wynn's bid if it 
could not resolve the ownership issue to its satisfaction.  In 
25 
 
the light most favorable to FBT, however, the commission 
essentially compelled the transfer of the FBT property from FBT 
to Wynn for $40 million less than the agreed upon price without 
in any way resolving the criminal ownership issues subject to 
the exercise of the commission's investigatory and law 
enforcement powers.  Government-compelled transfers of economic 
benefits from one private party to another in this context raise 
significant regularly taking concerns.  This is true even when 
done to punish one party for its lack of candor or to ensure 
such persons do not reap a financial windfall from the award of 
a gaming license or to address the public perception that this 
was even a possibility. 
Conditioning the grant of a governmental license on the 
renegotiation of a transaction between private parties in this 
way, so as to effectively transfer $40 million dollars from one 
to another, is "extraordinary."  Hodel, 481 U.S. at 716.6  Of 
 
6 Although the governmental action is extraordinary here as 
well as in Hodel, we do not mean to suggest that they are 
extraordinary in the same way.  In Hodel, 481 U.S. at 716, the 
government action that the Court found "extraordinary" was the 
"virtual[] . . . abrogation of the right [of Native Americans] 
to pass on a certain type of property . . . to one's heirs."  
Moreover, the particular property right that was abrogated was 
one of hallowed vintage, having "been part of the Anglo-American 
legal system since feudal times."  Id.  The nature of the 
government action here, involving in effect the compelled 
transfer of a substantial economic benefit from one private 
party to another as a condition of receiving a government 
license, is highly unusual and in that respect extraordinary, 
26 
 
particular concern is how the burden imposed on FBT to address 
the commission's legitimate concerns was transformed into a 
benefit for Wynn.  This transformation occurred despite Wynn 
having included the Everett parcel, owned by FBT, in its 
proposal, thus assuming some responsibility to resolve the 
ownership issue.  Regulatory takings are more likely to be found 
for regulatory actions that have a skewed distributional impact, 
imposing burdens exclusively on some owners while generating 
benefits for others. 
As the Supreme Court has explained, where a regulation 
"secures an 'average reciprocity of advantage' to everyone 
concerned," Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 
1003, 1018 (1992), quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 
U.S. 393, 415 (1922), it is more likely to be an exercise of the 
police power that "simply 'adjust[s] the benefits and burdens of 
economic life.'"  Lucas, supra at 1017, quoting Penn Central, 
438 U.S. at 124.7  But where, as here, the government action 
instead "singles out the owner," Giovanella, 447 Mass. at 735, 
 
but it does not raise the fundamental societal and property law 
issues that the challenged regulation did in Hodel. 
 
7 A regulation that restricts the use of property secures an 
"average reciprocity of advantage" when it is designed such that 
each owner is "burdened somewhat" by the restrictions that the 
regulation imposes on the use of their property, but each, "in 
turn, benefit[s] greatly from the restrictions that are placed 
on others."  Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491. 
27 
 
it is more akin to an exercise of eminent domain that calls for 
compensation.  See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 
825, 835 n.4 (1987) (regulatory taking likely where owners were 
"singled out to bear the burden" of regulation); Armstrong v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (takings clause "designed 
to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public 
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by 
the public as a whole"). 
Based on the limited record before us, taking the evidence 
in the light most favorable to FBT, we thus conclude that the 
character of the government action factor weighs in favor of 
finding a regulatory taking here. 
f.  Outcome of the regulatory takings analysis.  Viewing 
the evidence in the summary judgment record in the light most 
favorable to FBT, we conclude that while FBT did not have a 
reasonable investment-backed expectation in reaping a casino-use 
premium when selling the Everett parcel, the commission's 
actions had a substantial, $40 million economic impact on FBT.  
The highly unusual character of the commission's actions, 
effectively compelling the transfer of $40 million from one 
private party to another in order to secure a government 
license, weighs in favor of finding a taking.  When all three 
Penn Central factors are considered and balanced, therefore, we 
cannot say that the commission is entitled to judgment as a 
28 
 
matter of law on the available record.  The entry of summary 
judgment for the commission on FBT's regulatory taking claim was 
therefore error.  Accordingly, we reverse the motion judge's 
summary judgment order and remand FBT's regulatory taking claim 
to the Superior Court to allow the completion of discovery and 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  Only when the 
disputed facts surrounding the commission's actions are fully 
developed and resolved will it be possible to properly decide 
FBT's regulatory taking claim. 
2.  Intentional interference with contract claim.  
a.  Standard of review.  FBT appeals from the motion judge's 
dismissal of its tortious interference claim, arguing that the 
judge erred in determining that the commission is immune from 
suit for intentional torts, including intentional interference 
with contract, as a "public employer" under the MTCA. 
"We review the allowance of a motion to dismiss de novo."  
Meehan v. Medical Info. Tech., Inc., 488 Mass. 730, 732 (2021), 
quoting Magliacane v. Gardner, 483 Mass. 842, 848 (2020).  
Accepting the facts alleged in the complaint as true, we inquire 
whether the factual allegations are "sufficient, as a matter of 
law, to . . . plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief."  Dunn 
v. Genzyme Corp., 486 Mass. 713, 717 (2021), quoting Dartmouth 
v. Greater New Bedford Regional Vocational Tech. High Sch. 
Dist., 461 Mass. 366, 374 (2012). 
29 
 
b.  Immunity of "public employers" from liability for 
intentional torts.  The MTCA waives the governmental immunity 
that "public employers" have against tort liability for the 
"negligent or wrongful" conduct of their employees done "while 
acting within the scope of [their] office or employment."  G. L. 
c. 258, § 2.  But while public employers "shall be liable . . . 
in the same manner and to the same extent as a private 
individual under like circumstances" for the negligence of their 
employees acting within the scope of their office or employment, 
id., the MTCA's immunity waiver does not extend to claims for 
intentional torts, including claims for "interference with 
contractual relations."  G. L. c. 258, § 10 (c).  With respect 
to intentional tort claims, the preexisting common-law doctrine 
of governmental immunity, under which "public employers were 
generally not liable for the torts of their employees," still 
applies.  Spring v. Geriatric Auth. of Holyoke, 394 Mass. 274, 
285 (1985).  Consequently, even after the passage of the MTCA, 
"public employers remain immune from intentional tort claims."  
Id. 
The MTCA broadly defines "public employers" to include "the 
commonwealth . . . and any department, office, commission, 
committee, council, board, division, bureau, institution, agency 
or authority thereof"; however, "the Massachusetts Port 
Authority, or any other independent body politic and corporate" 
30 
 
are excluded.  G. L. c. 258, § 1.  Whether the commission may be 
sued for intentional interference with contract therefore 
depends on whether it is a public employer that is immune from 
suit for intentional torts or, instead, an independent body 
politic and corporate that "do[es] not enjoy immunity from 
intentional torts under § 10 (c)."  Lafayette Place Assocs. v. 
Boston Redev. Auth., 427 Mass. 509, 529 (1998). 
c.  Statutory text and legislative history.  "As with all 
matters of statutory interpretation, we look first to the plain 
meaning of the statutory language."  Commonwealth v. Mogelinski, 
466 Mass. 627, 633 (2013), citing International Fid. Ins. Co. v. 
Wilson, 387 Mass. 841, 853 (1983) ("the primary source of 
insight into the intent of the Legislature is the language of 
the statute").  The motion judge accordingly focused on the 
express provision in the MTCA that "any . . . commission" of the 
Commonwealth is a public employer, G. L. c. 258, § 1, coupled 
with the commission's specific designation as the "Massachusetts 
gaming commission" in the gaming act, G. L. c. 23K, § 3.  The 
plain language of the relevant statutory texts therefore 
strongly supports classifying the commission as a public 
employer. 
The motion judge also found the legislative history of the 
gaming act instructive.  An earlier version of the statute 
included a provision that would have established a 
31 
 
"Massachusetts Gaming Control Authority" with the power to "sue 
and be sued" and that was to be "liable in tort in the same 
manner as a private person."  2011 Senate Doc. No. 168.  This 
proposed language is entirely absent from the gaming act as 
enacted.  The judge found this to be compelling support for the 
proposition that the Legislature intended to classify the 
commission as a public employer immune from liability for 
intentional torts.  We agree that this legislative history is 
instructive.  The Legislature's rejection of an express proposal 
to fully waive the gaming regulation and enforcement agency's 
tort immunity strongly suggests that the Legislature did not 
intend for the commission to be liable for the intentional torts 
of its employees.  See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 442-443 (1987) ("Few principles 
of statutory construction are more compelling than the 
proposition that [the legislature] does not intend sub silentio 
to enact statutory language that it has earlier discarded in 
favor of other language" [quotation omitted]). 
d.  Case law interpreting G. L. c. 258, § 1.  The case law 
interpreting the statutory definition of public employers lends 
further support to the conclusion that the commission is a 
public employer.  Under G. L. c. 258, § 1, the Massachusetts 
Port Authority and "any other independent body politic and 
corporate" are excluded from the category of public employers.  
32 
 
To determine whether an entity qualifies as an independent body 
politic and corporate, the leading cases have examined the 
"financial and political independence" of the entity at issue.  
Commesso v. Hingham Hous. Auth., 399 Mass. 805, 808 (1987), 
citing Kargman v. Boston Water & Sewer Comm'n, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 
51, 56–57 (1984).  In testing the commission's financial and 
political independence, we apply two guidelines to channel our 
inquiry. 
First, we find it significant that after repeated 
amendments to the MTCA that have progressively whittled down the 
list of entities excluded from the definition of public 
employers,8 the Massachusetts Port Authority (Massport) is the 
sole entity that is expressly excluded from public employer 
status.  Accordingly, unless an entity enjoys a similar level of 
financial and political independence as Massport, we decline to 
classify it as an independent body politic and corporate.  
Moreover, because of the "desirability of making the c. 258 
regime as comprehensive as possible, thus avoiding reintroducing 
the 'crazy quilt' of immunities, . . . which the [MTCA] was 
 
8 See, e.g., St. 1992, c. 343, § 5 (including any "local 
water and sewer commission" as public employer); St. 1993, 
c. 110, § 227 (including any "municipal gas or electric plant, 
department, board and commission" as public employer); St. 2009, 
c. 25, §§ 123-124 (removing Massachusetts Bay Transportation 
Authority from list of excluded entities); St. 2009, c. 120, 
§ 40 (removing Massachusetts Turnpike Authority from list of 
excluded entities). 
33 
 
meant to replace," we resolve any doubts against designating an 
entity an independent body politic and corporate.  Lafayette 
Place Assocs., 427 Mass. at 532, quoting Rogers v. Metropolitan 
Dist. Comm'n, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 337, 338–339 (1984). 
We observe to begin with that the commission enjoys 
substantially less political independence than Massport, which 
we have described as "not merely a board or commission of the 
State government."  Opinion of the Justices, 334 Mass. 721, 734 
(1956).  While Massport is "placed" in what is now the 
department of transportation, St. 1956, c. 465, § 2,9 it is "only 
nominally" within the department, as it is "not to be subject to 
supervision or regulation in the ordinary sense of that or of 
any other department."  Opinion of the Justices, supra at 733.  
In contrast, the commission is far more closely supervised, 
being required to report monthly to the Governor, the Attorney 
General, and various committees of the Legislature on "total 
gaming revenues, prize disbursements and other expenses for the 
preceding month."  G. L. c. 23K, § 69.  The commission is 
further required to "report immediately" to the same recipients 
"any matter which requires immediate changes in the laws in 
 
 
9 The "department of public works" referenced in St. 1956, 
c. 465, § 2, was renamed the Massachusetts Highway Department, 
St. 1991, c. 552, and later merged into the Department of 
Transportation, St. 2009, c. 25.  See N-Tek Constr. Servs., Inc. 
v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 89 Mass. App. Ct. 186, 187 n.3 
(2016). 
34 
 
order to prevent abuses or evasions of the laws, rules or 
regulations related to gaming or to rectify undesirable 
conditions in connection with the administration or operation of 
gaming in the commonwealth."  Id. 
The commission's relative lack of political independence 
can perhaps best be illustrated by comparing the litigation 
independence that Massport enjoys with the control that the 
Commonwealth exercises over the litigation activity of the 
commission.  Massport is authorized "[t]o sue and be sued in its 
own name."  St. 1956, c. 465, § 3 (d).  In contrast, as the 
motion judge noted, the commission is designated by its enabling 
legislation as "a commission for the purposes of [G. L. c. 12, 
§ 3]."  G. L. c. 23K, § 3 (x).  A commission covered by that 
statute is not generally empowered to direct its own litigation 
decisions.  Instead, the Attorney General "shall appear" for the 
commission "in all suits and other civil proceedings . . . in 
which the official acts and doings of [the commission] are 
called in question."  G. L. c. 12, § 3.  Where a commission must 
be represented by the Attorney General in litigation under G. L. 
c. 12, § 3, we have recognized that "something other than that 
traditional attorney-client relationship exists," because it is 
not the commission that directs key decisions; rather, "the 
Attorney General . . . has control over the conduct of 
35 
 
litigation."  Secretary of Admin. & Fin. v. Attorney Gen., 367 
Mass. 154, 159 (1975).10 
The commission is also far less financially independent 
than Massport.  On the one hand, Massport is empowered to issue 
revenue bonds, St. 1956, c. 465, § 8, and to do so "without 
obtaining the consent of any department, division, commission, 
board, bureau or agency of the [C]ommonwealth," St. 1956, 
c. 465, § 10.  In addition, Massport is authorized to collect 
"tolls, rates, fees, rentals and other charges," and these 
charges it collects are "not . . . subject to supervision or 
regulation by any department, division, commission, board, 
bureau or agency of the [C]ommonwealth or any political 
subdivision thereof."  St. 1956, c. 465, § 14.  Massport is also 
empowered to "acquire property in its own name, the title to 
which is . . . in it and not in the Commonwealth."  Opinion of 
the Justices, 334 Mass. at 734.  See St. 1956, c. 465, § 3 (j) 
 
10 To be sure, the IEB, as the commission's enforcement 
agency, is authorized to bring actions in the Superior Court to 
"restrain, prevent or enjoin" violations of the gaming act or to 
"compel" compliance with orders issued by the IEB.  G. L. 
c. 23K, § 35 (c).  But this authorization to obtain court orders 
to back up its enforcement activities hardly undermines our 
conclusion that, because the commission is not generally 
empowered to make its own litigation decisions, it has been 
endowed with far less political independence than Massport.  The 
latter's broad power to sue and be sued in its own name 
indicates a far greater degree of political independence than 
the narrow power to bring suit to enforce compliance with the 
gaming act. 
36 
 
(Massport authorized to "acquire, hold and dispose of real and 
personal property"); St. 1956, c. 465, § 3 (k) (Massport 
authorized to "acquire in its own name" public or private lands 
and public or private ways); St. 1956, c. 465, § 4 (Massport 
authorized to purchase land, property, rights, rights of way, 
franchises, easements, and other interests in lands and to take 
title in its own name). 
On the other hand, the commission finances its activities 
from the Massachusetts Gaming Control Fund, which is funded from 
fees assessed annually on gaming licensees, initial licensing 
applications fees, as well as "appropriations, bond proceeds or 
other monies authorized by the general court and specifically 
designated to be credited [to the Gaming Control Fund]."  G. L. 
c. 23K, § 57.  Unlike Massport, therefore, the commission may 
not issue its own bonds to fund its expenditures but must rely 
either on the fees it collects or on financing specifically 
authorized by the Legislature. 
Moreover, while the commission is empowered to "collect 
taxes and fees" under the gaming act, G. L. c. 23K, § 4 (26), 
much of this revenue is channeled to entities other than the 
commission.  For example, all taxes the commission collects on 
gaming licensees' gaming revenue must be transferred to various 
funds, established by statute, for which the vast majority of 
37 
 
the monies are subject to appropriation.11  See G. L. c. 23K, 
§ 59.  In stark contrast to Massport, then, the commission does 
not control much of the revenue that it collects.  The 
commission also lacks the power to acquire and hold real 
property. 
Even without relying on the presumption against designating 
an entity an independent body politic and corporate, therefore, 
we are able to conclude that, because the commission enjoys 
significantly less political and financial independence than 
Massport, it is not an independent body politic and corporate 
under our precedents. 
In sum, the language of the MTCA and the gaming act, the 
legislative history of the gaming act, and our precedents all 
support the conclusion that the commission is a public employer 
immune from liability for intentional tort claims, including 
claims for intentional interference with contractual relations.  
Because FBT's tortious interference claim is barred by the 
commission's immunity from suit, we hold that the motion judge 
properly dismissed that claim. 
 
11 The exceptions are the Race Horse Development Fund, 
established under G. L. c. 23K, § 60, and the Community 
Mitigation Fund, established under G. L. c. 23K, § 61.  The 
monies transferred to these funds -- 2.5 percent and 6.5 percent 
respectively of tax revenue received from category 1 licensees, 
G. L. c. 23K, § 59 (2) -- are not subject to appropriation and 
are administered by the commission. 
38 
 
Conclusion.  We affirm the motion judge's allowance of the 
commission's motion to dismiss FBT's intentional interference 
with contract claim.  We reverse, however, the entry of summary 
judgment in favor of the commission on FBT's regulatory takings 
claim, which we remand to the Superior Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.