Title: STATE EX REL CITY MOTOR CO v DIS

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12858 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A , ex re1 CITY M O T O R C O M P A N Y , INC. , a corporation, Relators, THE DISTRICT C O U R T O F T H E EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A , I N AND F O R T H E C O U N T Y O F CASCADE, T H E HON. P A U L G. HATFIELD, DISTRICT JUDGE and FRED DOLBERG, Respondents. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING : For Relators : Marra and Wenz, Great F a l l s , Montana Joseph R. Marra argued, Great F a l l s , Montana Church, Harris, Johnson and Williams, Great Fa 11s , Montana For Respondents: Hoyt and Bottomly, Great F a l l s , Montana John C. Hoyt argued, Great F a l l s , Montana. Submitted: December 17, 1974 Decided : J A N . . 9l57""s M r . Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This i s an o r i g i n a l proceeding. Relator C i t y Motor Company seeks a w r i t of supervisory c o n t r o l o r other appro- p r i a t e w r i t d i r e c t i n g t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of Cascade County t o vacate its order denying r e l a t o r ' s motion f o r summary judg- ment under Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P., and t o e n t e r i n its stead an order granting t h e motion, a l l i n Cascade County cause No. 73754C. This Court heard counsel f o r r e l a t o r ex p a r t e and an - a l t e r n a t i v e w r i t was issued s e t t i n g a show cause hearing. Both p a r t i e s thereupon submitted b r i e f s and were represented by counsel on o r a l argument. The f a c t s a r e simple: Ronald P h i l l i p s , codefendant with r e l a t o r , was employed by r e l a t o r a s a new and used c a r salesman. O n t h e n i g h t of February 27, 1971, p l a i n t i f f i n cause No. 73754C was d r i v i n g h i s c a r i n t h e c i t y of Great F a l l s when he was s t r u c k broadside i n an i n t e r s e c t i o n by a vehicle driven by P h i l l i p s . A t t h e t i m e P h i l l i p s was using a "demonstrator" owned by r e l a t o r and provided f o r P h i l l i p s ' use. The complaint a g a i n s t r e l a t o r was predicated on t h e t h e o r i e s of respondeat superior and negli- gent entrustment. However, t h e answer denied P h i l l i p s was a c t i n g within t h e course and scope of h i s employment when he c o l l i d e d with p l a i n t i f f and t h a t r e l a t o r knew o r should have known about P h i l l i p s t d r i v i n g record. I n support of i t s motion f o r summary judgment, r e l a t o r r e l i e d on t h e depositions of P h i l l i p s and O l e Aafedt, s a l e s manager f o r r e l a t o r . It i s contended t h e former document c l e a r l y demonstrates t h a t P h i l l i p s was i n no way en- gaged i n r e l a t o r ' s business when t h e accident occurred and t h e latter shows t h a t r e l a t o r d i d everything reasonably expected of it i n ascertaining P h i l l i p s 1 d r i v i n g a b i l i t i e s . Rule 56, provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : " ( b ) * * * A p a r t y a g a i n s t whom a claim * * * i s asserted * * * may, a t any t i m e , move f o r a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any pa.rt thereof. "(c) * * * The motion shall be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. * * * P . summary judgment * * * may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages." In Silloway v. Jorgenson, 146 Mont. 307, 310, 406 P.2d 167, this Court discussed the rationale behind the provision for summary judgment: "The general purpose of Rule 56 is to promptly dispose of actions in which there is no genuine issue of fact, thereby eliminating unnecessary trial, delay, and expense. 6 Moore Fed.Prac.2dI S 56.11, page 2057 further states: "'A summary judgment is a judgment in bar that results from an application of substantive law to facts that are established beyond a reasonable controversy. The purpose of the hearing on the motion for such a judgment is not to resolve fac- tual issues. It is to determine whether there is any genuine issue of material fact in dispute; and if not, to render judgment in accordance with the law as applied to the established facts.' "At page 2131, Sec. 56.15 of 6 Moore Fed.Prac.2d that authority states the burden placed upon the party opposing summary judgment in these words: " ' * * * the party opposing motion must present facts in proper form--conclusions of law will not suffice; and the opposing party's facts must be material and of a substantial nature, not fan- ciful, frivolous, gauzy, nor merely suspicious.'" In Hager v. Tandy, 146 Mont. 531, 537, 410 P.2d 447, this Court said: " * * * on a motion for summary judgment the formal issues presented by the pleadings are not controlling and the court must consider the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, oral testimony and exhibits presented." See: Daniels v. Paddock, 145 Mont. 207, 399 P.2d 740; 3 Barron & Holtzoff, S 1236. Thus the determinative question here is whether respondent has raised factual issues that are material and of a substantial nature. After studying t h e whole record, e s p e c i a l l y t h e deposi- t i o n s of P h i l l i p s and Aafedt, we must conclude t h a t respondent has f a l l e n s h o r t of meeting t h i s burden. Was P h i l l i p s a c t i n g within t h e course and scope of h i s employment a t t h e t i m e of t h e February 27, 1971 accident? Re- spondent purports t o f i n d agency r e l a t i o n s h i p between r e l a t o r and P h i l l i p s on t h e b a s i s of c e r t a i n selected passages from Aafedt's deposition. For example: "Q. And what i s t h e purpose of giving your sales- men a demonstrator? A. W e l l , w e hope t o use it a s a t o o l t o sell Chevrolets. I would l i k e t o think t h a t i s what they use them f o r . "Q. And it i s your b e l i e f , a t any r a t e , t h a t any time a salesman i s i n a demonstrator t h a t it i s a s a l e s a s s e t t o City Motors? A. Y e s ; it cer- t a i n l y is. "Q. Now, then, do you think t h a t t h e more exposure you give your new vehicles by use on t h e c i t y streets of Great F a l l s t h e b e t t e r off City Motors i s ? A. I a m s u r e t h a t i s bound t o be t r u e . "Q. And was M r . P h i l l i p s given a demonstrator i n p a r t f o r t h e purpose of d r i v i n g it on t h e s t r e e t s so t h a t people can see your new vehicles? A . Along t h a t l i n e , yes. "Q. So t h a t i s what he was doing a t t h e t i m e of t h e accident, wasn't i t ? A. Driving one of our demonstrators? "Q. Y e s . A. Right. "Q. With your permission? A. Right. "Q. And you f e l t t h i s was i n furtherance of t h e b e n e f i t of City Motor Company. A. Right." Respondent a l s o quotes s e c t i o n 53-118, R.C.M. 1947, concerning d e a l e r ' s motor vehicle l i c e n s e p l a t e s , and c i t e s c a s e s i n o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s which have construed l i k e s t a t u t e s t o give rise t o a presumption t h a t a salesman d r i v i n g a c a r displa.ying d e a l e r ' s plates is operating it in the dealer's business, and this presumption continues in the absence of unequivocable evidence to the contrary. The chief difficulty with this line of argument is that it ignores the balance of Aafedtls testimony and Phillips' testimony altogether. Aafedt further testified: "Q. NOW, what do you expect your salesmen to do with the demonstrators you furnish them? A. Well, as I mentioned, want them to demonstrate them. They are, however, available for their own per- sonal use * * * they can even leave the city, they can leave the state with permission, prior per- mission. For personal use, but they are to be used as a demonstrator." On cross-examination: "Q. You didn't mean to imply by your testimony, did you, that at the time of the accident Ronald Phillips was in the course and scope of his employment? A. No; he was alone. He wasn't demonstrating the car. He was going home, so he wasn't heading toward a prospect, if that is what you mean. "Q. There was a question, somewhat ambiguous, that Mr. Hoyt asked you, and that is whether or not at the time of the accident, and I'm quoting the question to the best of my memory, whether or not at the time of the accident he was employed by City Motors, and my question to you is that you did not mean to imply by that answer, did you, that he was in fact acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident? A. No." The pertinent part of Phillips' testimony is this: "Q. Where had you been just prior to the accident? A. The Wrangler restaurant. "Q. Where were you going from there? A. Going home. "Q. Did you stop anywhere after you left the Wrangler before you had the accident? A. Yes, I did, I don't recall where. I picked up some hot dog buns and some milk or something of this sort, I can't recall. I know I picked it up, but I don't know if it was at a store, it might have been at Super America, next door. "Q. O n i n s t r u c t i o n s from your wife? A. Right. "Q. And from t h e time you l e f t t h e Wrangler t o t h e time of t h e happening of t h e c o l l i s i o n , w e r e you d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y engaged i n any business f o r City Motors Chevrolet Company? A. I would say no. "Q. Would it be c o r r e c t i f I s a i d you were on your way home t o have supper? A. Right. "Q. Relative t o t h e demonstrator program--and I r e f e r t o t h e f a c t t h a t you w e r e provided with a demonstrator--was t h a t demonstrator always used i n t h e course of City Chevrolet business? A. No." Respondent a l s o s t r e s s e s t h e f a c t t h a t while a t the r e s t a u r a n t P h i l l i p s met with one Charles P l a n t , who had previously led s e v e r a l customers t o him. However, t h e r e i s nothing i n t h e record i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e i r v i s i t on t h i s p a r t i c u l a r occasion w a s anything but s o c i a l . Had a l l these things been f a i r l y con- sidered and weighed, respondent may w e l l have found--as we do-- unequivocable evidence t h a t P h i l l i p s was a c t i n g outside t h e course and scope of h i s employment a t t h e time of t h e accident. Beyond t h i s , we d e t e c t a recurring theme i n respondent's reasoning: t h e mere f a c t t h a t a demonstrator on t h e s t r e e t i s of b e n e f i t t o the d e a l e r is enough t o make t h e dealer answer f o r t h e f a u l t s of h i s salesman who d r i v e s it. This asks too much, f o r it would hold t h e d e a l e r responsible a t a l l t i m e s . W e a r e not aware of any r u l e o r policy of agency law requiring such a sweeping application of t h e doctrine of respondeat superior. Moreover, t h e l a w i n Montana i s s e t t l e d on t h e point t h a t where an employee uses t h e master's c a r on a mission of h i s own, some s l i g h t i n c i d e n t a l b e n e f i t which may thereby accrue t o t h e master is i n s u f f i c i e n t t o warrant holding t h e master l i a b l e f o r t h e employee's negligent operation of t h a t vehicle. Monaghan v. Standard Motor Co., 96 Mont. 165, 173, 29 P.2d 278. Cases i n other j u r i s d i c t i o n s a r e i n agreement. See: Grier v. G r i e r , 192 N.C. 760, 135 S.E. 852; S l a t t e r y v. O'Meara, 1 2 0 Conn. 465, 181 A. 610; and Sullivan v. Associated Dealers, 4 Vlash,2d Since respondent has shown no f a c t s adequate t o support t h e r e q u i s i t e agency r e l a t i o n s h i p between P h i l l i p s and r e l a t o r a t t h e t i m e i n question, w e apply t h e prevailing r u l e of law a s declared by t h i s Court i n Monaghan: "It i s well s e t t l e d t h a t even though t h e d r i v e r of a c a r is t h e servant of t h e owner of t h e c a r , t h e owner is not l i a b l e unless a t t h e time of t h e accident t h e d r i v e r was a c t i n g within t h e scope of h i s a u t h o r i t y and i n regard t o h i s master's business. " To t h e same e f f e c t see: Harrington v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 97 Mont. 4 0 , 33 P.2d 553; Wilcox v. Smith, 103 Mont. 182, 62 Did r e l a t o r negligently e n t r u s t a demonstrator motor vehicle t o P h i l l i p s ? The g i s t of respondent's argument here i s t h a t r e l a t o r , by not obtaining a copy of P h i l l i p s ' d r i v i n g record from t h e Montana Highway P a t r o l , f a i l e d t o e x e r c i s e proper c a r e i n s e l e c t i n g P h i l l i p s f o r its s a l e s force. A s t o t h i s theory, r e l a t o r knew from P h i l l i p s ' job application t h a t he had had no motor vehicle accidents during t h e preceding f i v e year period and t h a t he possessed a v a l i d Montana d r i v e r ' s license. Aafedt t e s t i f i e d t h a t persons hired f o r s a l e s , a s opposed t o d r i v e r s p o s i t i o n s w e r e investigated f u r t h e r with r e s p e c t t o t h e i r general character and s a l e s a b i l i t y , but nothing more. What else could reasonably be expected of relator under the circumstances? Respondent c e r t a i n l y has not presented any hard f a c t s t o i n d i c a t e r e l a t o r knew o r should have known P h i l l i p s had anything other than a good driving record. W e think t h a t r e l a t o r , upon discovering P h i l l i p s t o be a duly licensed motor v e h i c l e operator, prima f a c i e was e n t i t l e d t o r e l y on h i s competency a s a d r i v e r . Piquet v. Wazelle, 3$16' 3 $-Pa. 463, 136 A. 787. That r e l a t o r inquired even f u r t h e r of P h i l l i p s bears out its contention t h a t every reasonable e f f o r t was made t o determine P h i l l i p s ' f i t n e s s a s an employee. To i n s i s t t h a t r e l a t o r was under an a f f i r m a t i v e duty ko a s c e r t a i n o r keep a b r e a s t of P h i l l i p s ' driving record would be t,o place upon r e l a t o r and o t h e r s s i m i l a r l y s i t u a t e d a burden u n j u s t i f i e d by e i t h e r i t s own needs o r t h e public good. Let a w r i t of supervisory c o n t r o l a s prayed f o r i s s u e i n accordance with our holdi';lg herein. J ' ; i t Chief J u s t i c e W e concur: -, , 8