Title: Commonwealth v. Brown

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12313 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOHNELLE M. BROWN. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     November 7, 2017. - March 16, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, 
JJ. 
 
 
Assault and Battery.  Intimidation of Witness.  Witness, 
Intimidation.  District Court, Jurisdiction.  Practice, 
Criminal, New trial, Assistance of counsel, Instructions to 
jury, Sentence, Allocution, Restitution.  Restitution. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Cambridge Division 
of the District Court Department on May 2, 2014. 
 
 
The case was tried before Michele B. Hogan, J.; a 
restitution hearing was held before Daniel C. Crane, J.; and a 
motion for postconviction relief was heard by Hogan, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Luke Rosseel for the defendant. 
 
Melissa Weisgold Johnsen, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  A jury in the District Court convicted the 
defendant, Johnelle M. Brown, of assault and battery and witness 
2 
 
intimidation.  After beginning the sentencing hearing, the trial 
judge revoked the defendant's bail and delayed sentencing for 
four days.  After reconvening, the judge imposed a sentence of a 
one-year commitment to a house of correction, suspended for two 
years, probation, and restitution.  The defendant disputes the 
District Court's jurisdiction over the witness intimidation 
prosecution.  The defendant also appeals from the denial of her 
motion for a new trial, revocation of bail, and order of payment 
of restitution.  We affirm. 
 
Facts.  We recite the facts as the jury could have found 
them, reserving certain facts for later discussion. 
 
Mahboobe Aria and Mehdi Aria1 managed a restaurant.  On 
April 6, 2014, the restaurant closed at 2:30 A.M.  At 
approximately 2:40 A.M., Mahboobe and Mehdi were completing 
tasks relevant to closing the restaurant.  Mehdi was outside, 
cleaning the outdoor seating.  Mahboobe was inside. 
 
The defendant and a man arrived in an automobile and parked 
outside the restaurant.  The man was not identified by name at 
trial, but the defendant's motion for a new trial, appellate 
brief, and affidavits identify this man as Tyrell Carr.  Carr 
remained in the automobile while the defendant went into the 
                     
 
1 We refer to Mahboobe Aria and Mehdi Aria by their first 
names to avoid confusion. 
3 
 
restaurant.  Mahboobe was near the cash register when the 
defendant walked into the restaurant. 
 
Mahboobe told the defendant that the restaurant was closed.  
The defendant said that she needed to use the bathroom.  
Mahboobe refused to allow the defendant to use the bathroom 
because Mahboobe had already cleaned it.  The defendant said 
that she would "call [her] boyfriend" if Mahboobe refused her 
use of the bathroom; Mahboobe still refused.  The defendant took 
a bottle of juice from a refrigerator in the restaurant, placed 
it in front of the register, and told Mahboobe that she was 
going to purchase it.  Mahboobe replied that the credit card 
machine and cash register were already closed so she could not 
make any more sales.  The defendant opened the door to the 
restaurant and called out to someone.  Carr came inside the 
restaurant and loudly asked Mahboobe why she was not allowing 
the defendant to use the bathroom.  Mahboobe reiterated that the 
bathroom was closed. 
 
Carr waved a credit card at Mahboobe and offered to pay for 
the bottle of juice the defendant had placed on the counter.  
Mahboobe refused payment, explaining that the restaurant and 
credit card machine were closed.  Mehdi entered the restaurant 
and asked the defendant and Carr to leave.  The defendant took 
the juice bottle off the counter and threw it in Mahboobe's 
direction.  The bottle struck glass that separates the cashier 
4 
 
from the kitchen.  Carr grabbed Mehdi.  Carr hit and slapped 
Mehdi's face and pulled his shirt.  While Carr struggled with 
Mehdi, the defendant kicked the bathroom door.  Mahboobe 
retrieved a telephone from underneath the cash register and 
moved out from behind the counter toward the defendant.  
Mahboobe was standing one to two feet away from the defendant 
when she tried to dial 911.  The defendant grabbed the wrist of 
the hand in which Mahboobe was holding the telephone and said, 
"You're bad fuck."  After approximately one minute, the 
defendant let go of Mahboobe's wrist.  As Mehdi and Carr 
continued to fight, Mahboobe left the restaurant and telephoned 
911.  The defendant followed.  The defendant asked Mahboobe why 
she telephoned the police.  The defendant then punched Mahboobe 
in the face, causing Mahboobe to drop the telephone.  The 
telephone fell to the ground and broke.  A man was inside of a 
nearby bar when he "heard a commotion next door, like tables and 
chairs being banged around."  He and a bar security employee 
went outside and saw Mahboobe being punched in the face. 
The defendant opened the door to the restaurant and told 
Carr that Mahboobe had telephoned the police.  Carr came out of 
the restaurant and drove away with the defendant in a vehicle 
that had been parked on the street. 
5 
 
A police officer responded to the 911 call.  Upon arrival, 
he noticed that Mahboobe had a red mark on her face and Mehdi's 
head and mouth were bleeding. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Jurisdiction.  The defendant argues that, 
following our decision in Commonwealth v. Muckle, 478 Mass. 1001 
(2017), the District Court lacked jurisdiction over her case.2  
General Laws c. 218, § 26 (jurisdiction statute), confers 
jurisdiction upon the Boston Municipal Court (BMC) and District 
Court over prosecutions for "intimidation of a witness or juror 
under [G. L. c. 268, § 13B]."  General Laws c. 268, § 13B (1) 
(c) (i), (iii) (intimidation statute), proscribes intimidation 
of, inter alia, "a witness or potential witness[,] . . . a 
judge, juror, grand juror, prosecutor, police officer, [F]ederal 
agent, investigator, defense attorney, clerk, court officer, 
probation officer or parole officer."  In Muckle, supra at 1003, 
we held that, "the express inclusion of witnesses and jurors [in 
G. L. c. 218, § 26,] excludes all other persons listed in [G. L. 
c. 268, § 13B,] who are not expressly included."  In that case, 
the defendant was accused of intimidating an attorney in a case 
                     
 
2 The defendant raised this claim for the first time in a 
letter pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 16 (l), as amended, 386 Mass. 
1247 (1982), because Commonwealth v. Muckle, 478 Mass. 1001 
(2017), was decided after she had submitted her brief.  
Nonetheless, we consider the defendant's argument because issues 
of "subject matter jurisdiction 'may be raised at any time.'"  
Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 440 Mass. 147, 151 (2003), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Cantres, 405 Mass. 238, 240 (1989). 
6 
 
to which he was a party.  Commonwealth v. Muckle, 90 Mass. App. 
Ct. 384, 385-388 (2016).  We therefore affirmed the dismissal of 
the complaint in the BMC for lack of jurisdiction.  Muckle, 478 
Mass. at 1004. 
 
The defendant seeks to analogize her case to Muckle, 
arguing that the District Court did not have jurisdiction 
because, at the time of the assault, Mahboobe was not a 
"witness" but was a "potential witness."  The defendant seeks to 
draw a distinction between a "witness" and a "potential witness" 
in the intimidation statute.  However, when assessing the 
District Court's jurisdiction, we must begin our interpretation 
with the meaning of "witness" in the jurisdiction statute.  We 
interpret a statute's text, construing its words "by the 
ordinary and approved usage of the language."  Energy Express, 
Inc. v. Department of Pub. Utils., 477 Mass. 571, 576 (2017), 
quoting Meikle v. Nurse, 474 Mass. 207, 210 (2016).  We are 
bound to "interpret the statute so as to render the legislation 
effective, consonant with sound reason and common sense."  
Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 
445 Mass. 745, 749 (2006). 
 
The term "witness" is broadly used to characterize an 
individual with information that is pertinent to an 
investigation or case and is often used interchangeably with 
"potential witness."  See Commonwealth v. Rakes, 478 Mass. 22, 
7 
 
41 (2017) (describing individuals who might testify in future as 
"witnesses" and "potential witnesses"); Commonwealth v. Squires, 
476 Mass. 703, 711 (2017) (Gaziano, J., dissenting) (using 
"potential witnesses" to describe those who might see crime 
occurring); Commonwealth v. Williams, 475 Mass. 705, 708 (2016) 
(using "potential witnesses" to describe people interviewed by 
police); Commonwealth v. Watkins, 473 Mass. 222, 239-241 (2015) 
(using "witnesses" to describe people who testified during trial 
and those who did not testify but had relevant information that 
could have been offered during trial); Commonwealth v. Brewer, 
472 Mass. 307, 311 n.10, 313-315 (2015) (using "witness" to 
describe person present at shooting who gave statement to 
police, and describing people who had information to share at 
trial but did not testify as "witnesses" and "potential 
witnesses"); Commonwealth v. Collins, 470 Mass. 255, 270-273 
(2014) (using "potential witness" to describe those on witness 
list during trial); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 444 Mass. 102, 
110-111 (2005) (using "witness" to describe person's status when 
he was going to testify at hearing and after hearing had 
concluded); Commonwealth v. Finn, 362 Mass. 206, 207-208 (1972) 
(using "witnesses" to describe individuals present at scene of 
crime when discussing investigatory conversations with police 
and testimony at trial); Commonwealth v. McCreary, 45 Mass. App. 
Ct. 797, 800 (1998) (using "prospective witness," "potential 
8 
 
witness," and "witness" when describing facts of several witness 
intimidation cases).  The myriad uses of "witness" and its 
frequent convergence with "potential witness" suggest the 
ordinary meaning of "witness" encompasses victims of 
intimidation who could also be described as "potential 
witnesses."  Such a holding is consistent with our decision in 
Muckle, where we interpreted "juror" in the jurisdictional 
statute to encompass "juror" and "grand juror" in the 
intimidation statute. 
 
The distinction advocated by the defendant would cause the 
District Court to gain and lose jurisdiction repeatedly over 
prospective witness intimidation prosecutions during the course 
of a crime, investigation, trial, and subsequent proceedings.  
Indeed, Mahboobe's status at the time of the assault could be 
characterized as both a "witness" and a "potential witness."  
She was a "witness" to the assault of Mehdi with information to 
provide to the 911 operator and police officers and a "potential 
witness" to further criminal activity.  When the trial 
commenced, she was a "potential witness" who might have been 
called to testify and, upon being called, became a "witness."  
Common sense dictates that "witness" in the jurisdictional 
statute includes "a witness or potential witness at any stage of 
a criminal investigation, grand jury proceeding, trial or other 
criminal proceeding of any type," as protected by G. L. c. 268, 
9 
 
§ 13B (1) (c) (i).  Therefore, the District Court properly 
exercised jurisdiction over the prosecution of the defendant for 
witness intimidation. 
 
2.  Motion for a new trial.  The defendant moved for a new 
trial, arguing that counsel was constitutionally ineffective, 
the jury were improperly instructed, her right to allocution was 
violated, her right not to be placed in jeopardy twice was 
violated, and her restitution order was invalid.3  In support of 
her motion for a new trial, the defendant submitted numerous 
affidavits and exhibits.  After a nonevidentiary hearing, the 
judge denied the defendant's motion for a new trial "under all 
theories" but did not issue a written decision. 
 
The defendant appeals from the denial of her motion for a 
new trial, repeating the grounds on which she sought relief 
below.  A judge may grant a motion for a new trial "if it 
appears that justice may not have been done."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 
30 (b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001).  The judge may 
decide the motion on the basis of affidavits if those affidavits 
and the motion raise no "substantial issue."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 
                     
 
3 We address the merits of each of the defendant's claims, 
but do not necessarily analyze each argument she advances in 
support of those claims.  To the extent that we have not 
specifically addressed other points made by the defendant in her 
brief, they "have not been overlooked.  We find nothing in them 
that requires discussion."  Commonwealth v. Domanski, 332 Mass. 
66, 78 (1954). 
10 
 
30 (c) (3), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001).  "The 
decision on a motion for a new trial, as well as the decision 
whether to decide the motion on the basis of affidavits or to 
hear oral testimony, is left largely to the sound discretion of 
the judge."  Commonwealth v. Stewart, 383 Mass. 253, 257 (1981).  
We review the judge's denial of the defendant's motion for a new 
trial for clear error, according greater deference to that 
decision where, as here, the motion judge also presided over the 
trial.  Commonwealth v. Leng, 463 Mass. 779, 781 (2012) ("We 
extend special deference to factual determinations made by a 
motion judge who also was the trial judge . . ."); Commonwealth 
v. Degro, 432 Mass. 319, 334 (2000) ("A motion judge's findings 
will not be disturbed absent clear error"). 
 
a.  Ineffective assistance of counsel. In his opening 
statement, defense counsel argued that the defendant was 
defending her property, a debit card that Mahboobe had taken 
from her and refused to return.  Defense counsel presented no 
witnesses; instead, he elicited testimony in support of that 
defense during cross-examination.  The defendant claims that 
trial counsel was ineffective in failing to develop sufficient 
evidence of the defense of property and in advising her not to 
testify.  Specifically, she alleges that trial counsel should 
have called Carr to testify in support of her defense and that 
he should not have advised the defendant not to testify.  As 
11 
 
explained infra, even if the information provided in the 
affidavits were presented at trial, when considered in context 
with the testimony of the Commonwealth's witnesses, "we are not 
persuaded that [testimony] likely would have influenced the 
jury's decision."  Commonwealth v. Duran, 435 Mass. 97, 103-104 
(2001) (no ineffective assistance of counsel where potential 
testimony that could have resulted from investigation would have 
been outweighed by "strong" contradictory evidence). 
During cross-examination, defense counsel elicited from the 
responding police officer that Mahboobe gave him the defendant's 
debit card.  In contrast, Mahboobe testified that the police 
found the debit card on the restaurant's floor.  Counsel sought 
to exploit the difference between these statements to suggest 
that Mahboobe had kept the defendant's debit card, so the 
defendant had had to use force to recover the card.  The judge 
declined counsel's request for a "defense of property" jury 
instruction and permission to argue that theory in his closing 
argument.4 
                     
 
4 A defendant may successfully assert a defense of property 
defense if "(1) the defendant used only nondeadly force, and (2) 
the force used was 'appropriate in kind and suitable in degree, 
to accomplish the purpose.'"  Commonwealth v. Haddock, 46 Mass. 
App. Ct. 246, 248-249 (1999), quoting Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 
57 Mass. 154, 158 (1894).  The defendant must present "credible 
evidence" that she was defending her property in order to raise 
such a defense.  Haddock, supra at 248. 
 
12 
 
In furtherance of her claim in the motion for a new trial, 
the defendant submitted affidavits from Carr and herself about 
what their testimony would have been had defense counsel called 
them as witnesses.5  Implicit within the defendant's argument is 
the contention that, after investigating, counsel would have 
introduced Carr as a defense witness.  See Commonwealth v. Lang, 
473 Mass. 1, 15–16 (2015) (Hines, J., concurring) ("a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel that focuses on counsel's 
asserted failure to investigate a . . . defense is generally, 
and perhaps necessarily, linked to a claim that counsel was 
ineffective for not presenting . . . [that] defense at trial").  
On appeal, the defendant has not demonstrated that the judge 
committed a clear error in denying the motion for a new trial. 
 
Counsel was ineffective if his conduct fell "measurably 
below that which might be expected from an ordinary fallible 
lawyer" and "likely deprived the defendant of an otherwise 
                                                                  
 
The defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel argument 
is premised on the theory that counsel was ineffective for not 
introducing sufficient evidence to merit a defense of property 
instruction.  In making such an argument and failing to raise 
any claim that the judge erred, the defendant implicitly 
concedes that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient 
to warrant a defense of property instruction. 
 
 
5 Mahboobe is not identified by name in the affidavits, but 
it appears that both parties are referring to Mahboobe when 
describing their interactions with the woman working at the 
restaurant.  Therefore, when summarizing the affidavits, we use 
Mahboobe's name where appropriate. 
13 
 
available, substantial ground of defence."  Commonwealth v. 
Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974).  "In regard to the latter 
requirement, there ought to be some showing that better work 
might have accomplished something material for the defense" 
(quotations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Bell, 460 Mass. 294, 303 
(2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 435 Mass. 113, 123 
(2001). 
 
Carr's affidavit, considered with the evidence presented by 
the Commonwealth, is insufficient to show that his testimony 
"might have accomplished something material for the defense."  
See Commonwealth v. Satterfield, 373 Mass. 109, 115 (1977).  
Carr's affidavit is best summarized as follows:  Carr followed 
the defendant into the restaurant after he witnessed an argument 
inside the restaurant; the defendant told Carr that Mahboobe had 
her debit card; both the defendant and Carr left the restaurant 
at the urging of Mahboobe; Mahboobe held the defendant's debit 
card over her head while the defendant struggled to get the 
card; the defendant's "hand came into contact with [Mahboobe's] 
face"; and both Carr and the defendant left the area in Carr's 
automobile.  This potential testimony is only credible if all 
percipient witnesses are disbelieved.  See Commonwealth v. 
Jenkins, 458 Mass. 791, 809 (2011) ("Even had the attorney's 
advice been substandard, it would have made no difference.  For 
14 
 
the defendant to prevail, the jury would have had to disbelieve 
the testimony of virtually every other witness"). 
 
Counsel exploited inconsistencies in the testimony about 
whether the debit card was found on the floor or given to police 
by Mahboobe as skillfully as the facts permitted.  Although this 
discrepancy could have bolstered the proposed defense testimony, 
such a sliver of support is not enough to yield a conclusion 
that this testimony would have changed the outcome.  Therefore, 
the defendant was not prejudiced by the lack of testimony and 
the judge did not err in denying the motion for a new trial. 
 
The second claim raised under the rubric of ineffective 
assistance of counsel is the defendant's claim that counsel's 
advice caused her to unknowingly waive her right to testify.  
Testifying in one's own criminal defense is a fundamental right 
that must be waived knowingly and intelligently.  Jenkins, 458 
Mass. at 803.  The defendant has the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that, absent counsel's advice, she 
would have testified.  Commonwealth v. Lucien, 440 Mass. 658, 
671 (2004).  "It is not enough to say that counsel had 
discouraged [her] from testifying."  Id. 
 
The judge did not abuse her discretion when she denied the 
motion for a new trial.  The defendant's affidavit is best 
summarized as follows:  she asked Mahboobe to use the restroom; 
Mahboobe said the defendant would have to make a purchase in 
15 
 
order to use the restroom; the defendant gave Mahboobe her debit 
card and tried to make a purchase; Mahboobe took the defendant's 
debit card but told the defendant she did not meet the ten-
dollar minimum required for all debit card purchases; the 
defendant asked for her debit card; Mahboobe refused to return 
the debit card; Carr entered the restaurant and encouraged the 
defendant to leave; Mahboobe ushered both Carr and the defendant 
out of the restaurant, still holding the defendant's debit card; 
outside, Mahboobe held the defendant's debit card over the 
defendant's head; while the defendant reached for the card, her 
hand hit Mahboobe; the defendant never saw Mahboobe holding a 
telephone and did not knock a telephone from Mahboobe's hand; 
she and Carr left in Carr's automobile. 
The defendant's affidavit alleges that she would have 
testified had counsel informed her that her testimony would have 
been necessary to advance a defense of property defense.  When 
asking for a jury instruction on defense of property, counsel 
indicated that he had discussed the decision to testify with the 
defendant after Mahboobe testified.  The defendant was aware of 
all testimony against her.  Although counsel may have misjudged 
the minimum showing required to merit a defense of property jury 
instruction, the defendant nonetheless knew that the jury had 
heard no testimony about Mahboobe's keeping the defendant's 
debit card and the defendant seeking to recover it.  "It can 
16 
 
reasonably be inferred that the defendant, after listening to 
the testimony of the Commonwealth witnesses, realized that the 
jury would not hear [her] version of the events unless [she] 
placed it before them."  Degro, 432 Mass. at 337.  Nothing in 
the record, including the defendant's affidavit, indicates that 
counsel denied the defendant the opportunity to make her own 
decision.  See Commonwealth v. Marrero, 459 Mass. 235, 242 
(2011) (defendant did not prove that counsel sharing his "view" 
that defendant should not testify caused defendant involuntarily 
to waive right to testify).  The judge did not abuse her 
discretion by concluding that the defendant simply did not meet 
the burden of proving that her waiver was involuntary, 
unintelligent, or unknowing. 
 
b.  Inadequate jury instructions.  The judge told the 
jurors:  "It's essential that you confine your deliberations 
only to the evidence which is presented to you in the 
courtroom."  The defendant contends that because the judge did 
not instruct the jury to refrain from researching the case on 
the Internet, jurors could have searched for information about 
the defendant and found two news articles published online about 
the defendant's past alleged criminal activity.  The defendant 
did not object to this omission at trial or request that the 
judge specifically instruct the jury to refrain from Internet 
research.  Therefore, we consider whether the omission was error 
17 
 
and, if so, whether it created a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice.  Commonwealth v. Horne, 476 Mass. 222, 
225-226 (2017). 
 
The absence of a jury instruction specifically prohibiting 
research on the Internet is not, in and of itself, reversible 
error.  The judge instructed the jury to refrain from outside 
research, using social media, visiting the scene of the 
incident, and "talk[ing] to anyone outside of the jury about the 
case."  The better practice would have been to include in the 
instructions a prohibition on Internet research.  See 
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 660, 678 n.11 
(2005) ("[G]iven the simplicity, speed, and scope of Internet 
searches, allowing a juror to access with ease extraneous 
information about the law and the facts, trial judges are well 
advised to reference Internet searches specifically when they 
instruct jurors not to conduct their own research or 
investigations").  But this omission was not error where the 
judge's instruction forbade consideration of any outside 
information. 
 
Further, the defendant has demonstrated no substantial risk 
of a miscarriage of justice.  Jurors are presumed to have 
followed the judge's instruction not to consider any outside 
information.  See Commonwealth v. Watkins, 425 Mass. 830, 840 
(1997) ("We presume that a jury follow all instructions given to 
18 
 
it").  Nor is there any evidence in the record to rebut that 
presumption.  The record is devoid of evidence of any jurors 
using the Internet for any outside research, including 
discovering any information about the defendant.6  Without any 
indication that the jury were exposed to extrajudicial 
information about the defendant, there is no substantial risk of 
a miscarriage of justice in allowing the defendant's convictions 
to stand. 
 
c.  The sentencing hearing.  After her convictions, the 
judge held a sentencing hearing.  The Commonwealth recommended a 
one-year sentence in a house of correction, with the defendant 
serving ninety days and the balance of the sentence suspended 
for two years.  Defense counsel requested probation.  The judge 
allowed defense counsel to present mitigating information about 
the defendant, including details of her background and that she 
                     
 
6 The defendant's argument that she could not build such a 
record because she could not contact jurors is without merit.  
Rule 3.5 (c) of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct, 
as appearing in 471 Mass. 1428 (2015), permits attorneys to 
initiate contact with jurors after a verdict.  The attorney must 
notify counsel for the opposing party five business days before 
contacting any juror.  This rule went into effect on July 1, 
2015.  An attorney may contact jurors who were discharged before 
July 1, 2015, "if the case was on appeal as of that date."  
Commonwealth v. Moore, 474 Mass. 541, 551 (2016).  The defendant 
filed her notice of appeal from the verdicts on February 5, 
2015, and submitted her motion for a new trial on April 6, 2016.  
The defendant filed her notice of appeal from the denial of the 
motion for a new trial on January 3, 2017, allowing her notice 
of both the rule and our interpretation of its retroactivity. 
19 
 
was "very sorry" about the incident.  The judge then allowed the 
defendant to speak.  The defendant told the judge that she 
wished she had testified.  The judge told the defendant that she 
had had an opportunity to testify at trial and, now that the 
trial was over, the judge was "not going to hear [the 
defendant's] side."  The defendant further indicated her 
willingness to testify or to be subjected to the Commonwealth's 
cross-examination.  The judge then adjourned and ordered the 
defendant held without bail until the hearing resumed four days 
later.7 
 
When the hearing resumed, defense counsel spoke more about 
the defendant's background and requested mercy in the 
defendant's sentencing, reporting that she had been "absolutely 
distraught" while in custody.  The judge addressed the 
defendant, saying, "I trust that I got your attention by holding 
you over the weekend in custody."  The judge then sentenced the 
defendant to one year in a house of correction, suspended for 
two years, and ordered her to pay restitution.8 
                     
 
7 The final day of trial and the first sentencing hearing 
were held on Thursday, January 22, 2015.  The judge adjourned 
the hearing and held the defendant without bail until Monday, 
January 26, 2015. 
 
 
8 The judge also required the defendant to have no contact 
with the Arias or their restaurant, to have a mental health 
evaluation, and to attend anger management. 
20 
 
 
i.  Right to allocution.  The modern meaning of 
"[a]llocution is . . . the right to make a statement to the 
sentencing judge before he pronounces sentence."  United States 
v. Foss, 501 F.2d 522, 530 n.3 (1st Cir. 1974).  The defendant 
urges us to find a constitutional right to allocution and to 
hold that the judge violated that right by not allowing the 
defendant to finish speaking during the sentencing hearing.  We 
have never held that a defendant has a constitutional right to 
allocution, and we decline to do so now. 
 
A defendant's right to speak in his or her own defense was 
recognized by the common law as early as 1682.  Marshall, 
Lights, Camera, Allocution:  Contemporary Relevance or 
Director's Dream?, 62 Tul. L. Rev. 207, 209 (1987).  This was an 
opportunity for the defendant to offer what would now be 
considered defenses as defendants were not permitted to testify 
on their own behalf.  Id.  In 1689, the court's failure to ask 
the defendant if he had anything to say before a sentence was 
imposed required reversal.  Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 
301, 304 (1961), citing Anonymous, 3 Mod. 265, 266, 87 Eng. Rep. 
175 (K.B.).  Allocution has survived in our modern Federal 
criminal justice system as a mandate that a judge "permit the 
defendant to speak or present any information to mitigate the 
sentence."  Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii).  "Allocution, 
although always required under [F]ederal procedure to be invited 
21 
 
and allowed, is not -- at least so far as the invitation is 
concerned -- a constitutional right essential to fundamental 
fairness."  United States v. Leavitt, 478 F.2d 1101, 1104 (1st 
Cir. 1973).  There is no Federal constitutional right to 
allocution.  Id. 
Our approach in the Commonwealth, Mass. R. Crim. P. 28 (b), 
378 Mass. 842 (1979), is a similar, but more narrow view.9  Here, 
the defendant may speak for herself or have her attorney 
"present mitigating factors prior to sentencing."  Commonwealth 
v. Rancourt, 399 Mass. 269, 278 (1987).  We discern no source of 
a constitutional or common-law right to allocution separate from 
the opportunity provided by rule 28, and we see no reason to 
read one into the State Constitution, as the defendant has an 
opportunity to be heard and to testify on her own behalf. 
 
The requirements of rule 28 were satisfied when her 
attorney made a statement during sentencing and the judge 
permitted the defendant to speak.  The defendant contends that 
because the judge allowed her to speak at all, the judge erred 
in ceasing the defendant's allocution before the defendant 
finished speaking.  The judge had no obligation to do more than 
satisfy the requirements of rule 28, either through statements 
                     
 
9 "Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the 
defendant or his counsel an opportunity to speak on behalf of 
the defendant and to present any information in the mitigation 
of punishment."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 28 (b), 378 Mass. 842 (1979). 
22 
 
from the defendant or the defendant's attorney.  Even in 
satisfying rule 28, some reasonable limits are necessary.  See 
Commonwealth v. McKay, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 966, 968 (1987) (no 
error where sentencing judge allowed two people familiar with 
defendant "to address the court on the defendant's background 
and character but refused" to allow testimony about 
circumstances of crime).  The judge did not abuse her discretion 
by limiting the defendant's statements to permissible and 
relevant topics within rule 28.  The rule 28 opportunity to 
speak is not an unlimited right of a defendant to speak 
endlessly on irrelevant subjects or in a disruptive manner.  
Here, the defendant contested the facts presented at trial.  
Such statements are extraneous in a sentencing hearing and were 
therefore properly excluded. 
 
ii.  Double jeopardy.  The defendant contends that the 
judge punished her twice for a single offense, in violation of 
double jeopardy principles, when the judge held the defendant 
without bail pending the completion of the sentencing hearing 
and then imposed a sentence during the sentencing hearing. 
 
In order to determine whether a penalty violates double 
jeopardy principles, we analyze the statute that authorizes the 
restriction on the defendant's liberty.  See Hudson v. United 
States, 522 U.S. 93, 99-100, 103 (1997).  The defendant argues 
that the restriction on her liberty was imposed pursuant to 
23 
 
G. L. c. 276, § 58 (bail statute).  The bail statute does not, 
however, apply to postconviction confinement.  Rather, the bail 
statute governs pretrial detention.  Commonwealth v. Morales, 
473 Mass. 1019, 1020 (2016) (bail statute "establishes 
conditions for a defendant's initial release after arraignment, 
pending adjudication of the charges against him").  Once a 
conviction is attained, bail issues are moot.  Commesso v. 
Commonwealth, 369 Mass. 368, 374 (1975) ("Trial should not 
ordinarily be delayed pending bail review even though a 
conviction will make the bail issue moot").  Cf. Mendonza v. 
Commonwealth, 423 Mass. 771, 777 (1996) ("both cases are moot 
since both [defendants] have admitted guilt and are no longer 
subject to [G. L. c. 276,] § 58A").  The defendant's bail was 
revoked after she was convicted.  She was not punished twice for 
the same conviction.10,11 
                     
 
10 The defendant's time in custody was not a punishment, as 
the defendant urges us to hold.  Even if it were a punishment, 
the defendant would nonetheless not have been punished twice in 
violation of double jeopardy protections.  Had the judge 
sentenced the defendant to any period of incarceration or had 
the defendant violated the terms of her probation and had to 
serve her suspended sentence, the four nights in custody would 
have been credited toward that sentence.  See G. L. c. 279, 
§ 33A. 
 
 
11 Because the bail statute does not apply, we do address 
the defendant's additional argument that the judge did not 
comply with the statute's procedural requirements. 
24 
 
 
Further, judges have discretion to revoke bail after a 
conviction.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 28 (b).  At the conclusion of 
a criminal trial resulting in conviction, a judge is in the best 
position to determine whether it is necessary to revoke bail.  
The Commonwealth moved for sentencing immediately after the jury 
delivered their verdicts, but was not obligated to do so for 
seven days.  See G. L. c. 279, § 3A.  The judge's decision was 
not an unreasonable delay where the sentencing hearing was still 
held earlier than required by statute.  Despite the defendant's 
contention, the judge's statement that she hoped she "got [the 
defendant's] attention by holding [her] over the weekend in 
custody" was not an abuse of discretion.12  That statement came 
after defense counsel requested that the judge place the 
defendant on probation and reported "the last few days being 
held in custody has really opened her eyes."  The defendant's 
argument is essentially a contention that the judge simply could 
not revoke bail.13  Bail revocation after a conviction is 
decidedly within a trial judge's powers.  We discern no error.  
                     
 
12 A judge, of course, must be careful not to create the 
appearance of intemperance. 
 
 
13 The defendant's suggestion that a judge could not revoke 
bail and postpone a sentencing hearing for a reasonable time 
encourages hasty decision-making that could harm many defendants 
in the future.  Postponing sentencing provides a judge the 
opportunity to think about the sentence. 
25 
 
 
d.  Restitution hearing.  At the close of the sentencing 
hearing, the judge scheduled a restitution hearing and said, 
"I'm going to hold it because I know the facts of the case."  On 
the day of the hearing, the trial judge was not at the court 
house and a different judge presided over the restitution 
hearing.  The defendant requested a continuance so that the 
trial judge could preside over the hearing.  The hearing judge 
denied this request and proceeded with the hearing.  Mahboobe 
testified about the damage the defendant caused to the 
restaurant and her telephone.  Defense counsel conceded that 
each item was broken during the assault.  Mahboobe provided 
written estimates of repair costs and a receipt for replacing 
the telephone.  The judge ordered the defendant to pay $3,100 in 
restitution. 
 
The defendant identifies three issues in the disposition of 
her restitution hearing:  the restitution judge did not follow 
orders entered by the trial judge; her restitution order was not 
supported by adequate evidence; and counsel at the restitution 
hearing was ineffective. 
 
The defendant urges us to vacate her restitution order 
because a judge other than the trial judge conducted the 
restitution hearing.  We review the decision to proceed with the 
hearing for abuse of discretion.  Commonwealth v. Baro, 73 Mass. 
App. Ct. 218, 224 (2008).  A judge may preside over another 
26 
 
judge's proceedings following a verdict if the trial judge is 
"absen[t]" or "unavail[able]" and the judge believes he or she 
is able to fulfil the needs of the hearing.  Mass. R. Crim. P. 
38 (c), 378 Mass. 916 (1979).  Here, the trial judge was absent, 
and the restitution hearing judge's decision to preside over the 
hearing was far from an abuse of discretion.  A restitution 
hearing addresses the discrete issue of damages.  The judge 
needed no special knowledge of the trial unique to the trial 
judge to assess the evidence presented at the hearing.  He was 
capable of presiding over the hearing with no prejudice to 
either party. 
 
The defendant claims that the Commonwealth did not meet its 
burden of proving the amount of the loss.  The facts at the 
restitution hearing need only to be proved by a preponderance of 
the evidence, not to the higher standard required at the 
criminal trial.  See Commonwealth v. Denehy, 466 Mass. 723, 740 
(2014).  We review the judge's assessment of restitution for 
abuse of discretion.  Commonwealth v. McIntryre, 436 Mass. 829, 
836 (2002).  Restitution provides for the victim's economic 
losses caused by the defendant.  Id. at 834.  A valid 
restitution order is supported by evidence, including a victim's 
documentation of losses.  Id. 
27 
 
 
The defendant conceded that she caused the harm,14 and the 
Commonwealth properly proved the amount damaged.  Mahboobe 
submitted a receipt for replacing the broken telephone and 
estimates from contractors to fix the window and bathroom door 
damaged by the defendant.  The final determination of 
restitution was less than the "actual loss" proffered by 
Mahboobe.  See Commonwealth v. Henry, 475 Mass. 117, 129 (2016) 
("the amount of restitution may not exceed the victim's actual 
loss").  Therefore, the judge did not abuse his discretion when 
he ordered the defendant to pay restitution. 
 
The defendant also contends that counsel was ineffective at 
the restitution hearing for not disputing that the defendant 
caused the damage and for not cross-examining Mahboobe about the 
time gap between the incident and the invoices.  We evaluate 
whether counsel's behavior fell measurably below that which can 
be expected of an "ordinary fallible lawyer" and prejudiced the 
defendant.  Saferian, 366 Mass. at 96.  Counsel is not 
ineffective simply for not making a possible argument when that 
tactic had little chance of success.  See Commonwealth v. 
Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 664, 673-674 (2015), S.C., 478 Mass. 189 
                     
 
14 The defendant asserts that defense counsel's concession 
amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel.  We address that 
argument infra.  Assuming for the purpose of analysis that 
counsel's concession was proper, the judge did not err in 
relying upon it when determining restitution. 
28 
 
(2017) (counsel was not ineffective for not pursuing defense 
that was unlikely to succeed).  Mahboobe's testimony that the 
defendant caused the damage was consistent with her trial 
testimony.  Defense counsel had been unsuccessful in impeaching 
Mahboobe at trial and had no new tools with which to impeach 
Mahboobe.  Therefore, it was not unreasonable for defense 
counsel to concede that the defendant caused the damage.  
Similarly, defense counsel was not unreasonable in not cross-
examining Mahboobe about the difference between the alleged 
damage and the invoices she introduced to support her claim.  
Counsel did attempt to impeach Mahboobe's credibility about the 
amount of the damage, albeit through a different tactic.  
Counsel argued the invoices were not itemized or thorough enough 
and questioned Mahboobe about the high cost of each repair.  
Counsel did so with some success, obtaining a restitution order 
of more than $700 less than that requested by the Commonwealth.  
There was no error. 
 
Conclusion.  None of the defendant's claims merits 
disturbing the jury's verdicts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.