Title: Johnson v. Wyoming

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2012
 
BILLIE 
COLLEEN JOHNSON,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County
The 
Honorable Michael N. Deegan, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Olson.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory 
A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Stewart M. 
Young, Faculty Director, Joshua B. Taylor, Student Director, Dustin J. Richards, 
Student Intern, of the Prosecution Assistance Program.  Argument by Mr. 
Richards.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      The appellant, 
Billie Colleen Johnson, was convicted of two counts of delivery of 
methamphetamine.  On appeal, she 
claims that the district court abused its discretion when it allowed the 
Confidential Informant (CI) to testify, although the appellant was not given the 
CI’s telephone number.  She also 
argues that the district court violated her constitutional rights when it 
considered the appellant’s failure to take responsibility for her criminal 
activity at sentencing.  We 
affirm.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      1.    Did the district court abuse 
its discretion when it allowed the CI to testify at trial, even though the CI’s 
telephone number was not provided to defense counsel?
 
            
2.    Did the 
district court violate the appellant’s right to a jury trial when it considered 
the appellant’s failure to accept responsibility for her criminal conduct at 
sentencing?
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      In June 2010, 
a CI 
working with the Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) called the 
appellant to arrange the purchase of two grams of methamphetamine.  A DCI agent fitted the CI with a wire, 
and the CI drove to a home in Campbell County where he met with the 
appellant.  The CI gave the 
appellant $400 and in exchange received two grams of methamphetamine in a 
zip-loc baggie.  The CI took the 
methamphetamine to the DCI office and an agent paid him $100 for his cooperation 
and assistance.
 
[¶4]      A few days later, 
the CI contacted the appellant again about purchasing methamphetamine.  The CI met the appellant outside of a 
bar, where the appellant gave the CI a tennis ball that contained a baggie 
filled with methamphetamine.  The CI 
then took the tennis ball to the DCI office, and was again compensated $100 for 
his cooperation. The appellant was charged with two counts of delivery of 
methamphetamine.  A jury found the 
appellant guilty of both counts, and the district court sentenced her to 
four-to-seven-years imprisonment.
 
DISCUSSION
 
Did 
the district court abuse its discretion when it allowedthe CI to testify at 
trial, even though the CI’s telephone number was not provided to defense 
counsel?
 
[¶5]      The appellant 
challenges the district court’s decision to allow the CI to testify at trial 
because, although defense counsel knew the CI’s name well before the trial 
began, the CI’s telephone number was not provided to defense counsel.  We will not disturb a district court’s 
decision on whether to allow particular evidence or testimony at trial absent an 
abuse of discretion.  Boykin v. State, 2005 WY 15, ¶ 5, 105 P.3d 481, 482 (Wyo. 2005).  “An 
abuse of discretion occurs when it is shown the trial court reasonably could not 
have concluded as it did.”  Id. at ¶ 5, at 
482-83.
 
[¶6]      As routinely done 
in criminal cases, the district court entered a criminal case management order, 
which contained the deadlines and dates for various matters in the case.  That order required the parties to 
disclose, no less than three working days before the pretrial conference, a list 
of trial witnesses with a summary of the expected testimony.  In response to that order, the State 
informed the appellant that it planned to call a witness identified as 
“Confidential Informant” who “may testify regarding his/her relationship with 
the [appellant], his/her knowledge of the facts surrounding the case, and any 
and all other matters within his/her knowledge having relevance to this 
case.”  After the pretrial 
conference, the district court filed a memorandum memorializing the conference, 
which stated:
 
The 
State avers it has informed defense counsel of the name of said CI and will 
shortly provide a telephone number of the CI to defense counsel.  The State, at least at this stage of the 
proceedings, is loathe to publicly identify the CI.  Defense counsel interposes no objection 
to this approach at the present time.
 
[¶7]      On the first day 
of trial, defense counsel objected to the CI’s proposed testimony because, 
despite the prosecutor’s statement at the pretrial conference and after several 
requests by defense counsel, the CI’s telephone number was never provided to 
defense counsel.1  Defense counsel also informed the court 
that, approximately five days before trial, the State represented it had told 
the CI that defense counsel wished to interview him, and the CI indicated that 
he did not want to meet with defense counsel.  The prosecutor acknowledged that he did 
not provide the phone number after originally stating he would and explained 
that he made the decision out of concerns for the CI’s safety.  The prosecutor informed the district 
court that recordings of the controlled buys between the CI and the appellant 
were circulated within the community.  
It was the prosecutor’s belief that they were being circulated in an 
attempt to identify and confront the CI.  
As a result of the disclosure, the prosecuting attorney’s office 
instituted a policy that the defense could listen to the recordings at the 
prosecuting attorney’s office.  
Further, the prosecutor would make arrangements for defense counsel to 
interview the CI, if the CI so agreed.
 
[¶8]      While the 
district court expressed concern about the issue being raised the morning of 
trial and the fact that the State was essentially an “interlocutor” for a 
witness, it determined that the CI could testify.  The district court was satisfied that 
the prosecutor had a valid reason for not releasing the CI’s telephone number, 
but had a procedure to make the CI available, and that the defense attorney knew 
the informant’s name.  Further, the 
district court found that the CI did not wish to speak with defense counsel, 
which was well within the CI’s rights.
 
[¶9]      “A criminal 
defendant does not have a general constitutional right to discovery.  Instead, his discovery rights are 
governed by statute, rule and court order.”  Ceja v. State, 2009 WY 71, ¶ 13, 208 P.3d 66, 68 (Wyo. 2009).  Rule 16 of 
the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the extent of discovery in a 
criminal case, and contact information for a witness is not a required 
disclosure under that rule.  See W.R.Cr.P. 16.  Further, in the criminal case management 
order, the district court only required the parties to provide a list of the 
witnesses and a summary of the expected testimony of each.  The prosecutor complied with that 
order.
 
[¶10]   We are somewhat troubled with the 
fact that the prosecutor represented to defense counsel at the pretrial 
conference that the CI’s phone number would be forthcoming, and then did not 
follow through with that representation.  
However, we believe the record supports the district court’s conclusion 
that the prosecutor had a legitimate reason for withholding the telephone 
number.  The prosecutor informed the 
district court that the recordings of the controlled buys were being circulated 
in the community in an attempt to identify and confront the CI.  Due to that behavior and the safety 
concerns of individuals who are cooperating with the State, the prosecuting 
attorney’s office created a policy prohibiting the release of CI contact 
information.  Defense counsel did 
not dispute any of these allegations.  
We believe that the safety of the CI was a legitimate reason to withhold 
the telephone number, particularly because it was information that the 
prosecutor was not required to produce under the discovery rules.  
 
[¶11]   The appellant argues that the 
prosecutor’s actions were a deliberate attempt to “hamper defense access” to the 
witness.  “As a general rule, a 
witness belongs neither to the government nor to the defense.  Both sides have the right to interview 
witnesses before trial.”  United States v. Carrigan, 804 F.2d 599, 
603 (10th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).  
However, the right to interview a witness “exists co-equally with the 
witnesses’ right to refuse to say anything.”  United States v. Black, 767 F.2d 1334, 
1338 (9th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).  
A prosecutor “may not interfere with a witness’s free choice to speak 
with the defense,” but it is not improper for the prosecutor to inform the 
witness that he may decline any interviews.  Id. 
 
[¶12]   Here, the record does not show that 
the prosecutor deliberately interfered with the appellant’s right to interview 
the CI.  Instead, it shows that 
defense counsel knew the informant’s name approximately two months before trial 
and, that while the prosecutor did not provide the CI’s telephone number, he did 
tell the CI that defense counsel wanted to interview him.  The prosecutor did not tell the CI he 
should refuse to be interviewed.  He 
told the CI that it was his decision whether he wanted to speak with defense 
counsel.  The CI declined to be 
interviewed.  The appellant’s right 
to interview the CI was not violated when the CI voluntarily decided not to 
speak with defense counsel.  Black, 767 F.2d  at 1338.  Therefore, the district court did not 
abuse its discretion when it determined the CI could testify at 
trial.
 
Did 
the district court violate the appellant’s rightto a jury trial when it 
considered the appellant’s failureto accept responsibility for her 
criminalconduct at sentencing?2
 
[¶13]   The appellant claims that the 
district court violated her right to a jury trial when it considered her failure 
to accept responsibility for her criminal conduct at the sentencing 
hearing.  This issue is being 
brought for the first time on appeal and, therefore, our review is limited to a 
search for plain error:
 
Even 
when constitutional error is alleged, each criterion must be satisfied or a 
claim for review under the plain-error doctrine will fail.  To establish plain error, the appellant 
must prove (1) the record clearly reflects the alleged error; (2) the existence 
of a clear and unequivocal rule of law; (3) a clear and obvious transgression of 
that rule of law; and (4) the error adversely affected a substantial right 
resulting in material prejudice to him.
 
Rathbun 
v. State, 
2011 WY 116, ¶ 28, 257 P.3d 29, 38 (Wyo. 2011) (quoting Zumberge v. State, 2010 WY 111, ¶ 4, 236 P.3d 1028, 1030 (Wyo. 2010)).
 
[¶14]   We readily find that the appellant 
has failed to carry her burden under the plain error standard of review.  The appellant relies solely upon this 
Court’s opinion in Guinn v. State, 
2009 WY 15, 201 P.3d 423 (Wyo. 2009), to demonstrate that the district court 
punished her for exercising her right to a jury trial.  In Guinn, we reversed the appellant’s 
sentence after finding that the district court suggested it was imposing a 
harsher sentence because the appellant chose to exercise his right to a jury 
trial instead of pleading guilty.  
Id. at ¶ 7, at 424-25.  Here, the appellant claims that the 
district court similarly violated her right to a jury trial when it stated at 
sentencing that it was influenced by the fact that the appellant “has really 
never accepted responsibility here for what she was convicted of.”  A review of the sentencing transcript in 
its entirety clearly demonstrates that the district court was not referring to 
the appellant’s decision to exercise her right to a jury 
trial.
 
[¶15]   At the sentencing hearing, the 
prosecutor made the following statement to the court:
 
[PROSECUTOR]:  Your Honor, [the appellant] comes before 
the court having been convicted of two counts of delivery of methamphetamine, 
and notwithstanding [the] substantial evidence elicited at trial, and also the 
evidence referenced by Agent Hipsag today, she maintains that apparently it is a 
conspiracy, and she wasn’t really involved in all of this, and she has refused 
to accept any responsibility for her actions.
 
When 
the appellant was given the opportunity to speak to the district court at 
sentencing, she stated “. . . I still do stick to the fact that I was innocent 
in this.”
 
[¶16]   When imposing sentence, the 
district court did consider that the appellant had not accepted responsibility 
for her actions; however, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the 
comment was directed at her decision to go to a jury trial.  Instead, it appears to be directed 
toward the fact that, despite the evidence presented against her at trial and 
the fact that a jury found her guilty, she still maintained that she was 
innocent.  A district court “is 
given broad discretion to consider a wide variety of factors about the defendant 
and his crime.”  Manes v. State, 2004 WY 70, ¶ 9, 92 P.3d 289, 292 (Wyo. 2004).  We have 
previously recognized that a defendant’s failure to accept responsibility for 
her criminal activity is an appropriate factor to consider at sentencing.  See Frederick v. State, 2007 WY 27, ¶ 
27, 151 P.3d 1136, 1145 (Wyo. 2007); Doherty v. State, 2006 WY 39, ¶ 35, 131 P.3d 963, 974 (Wyo. 2006); see also State 
v. Birch, 979 So. 2d 643, 648 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (“The defendant’s letter 
detailing his denial of responsibility can be regarded as a lack of remorse, and 
lack of remorse is a proper sentencing consideration.”).
 
[¶17]   Here, the record shows that the 
district court properly exercised its discretion when imposing sentence.  It considered the seriousness of the 
charges, the fact that the appellant was connected to a major drug dealer, her 
decision not to take responsibility for her conduct after conviction, and the 
ability to rehabilitate the appellant.  
After considering these factors, the district court sentenced the 
appellant to a term of imprisonment of four-to-seven years–far less than the 
maximum term of twenty years.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031 (Lexis 
Nexis 2011).  In Guinn, the district court clearly 
expressed that a defendant who does not plead guilty (i.e. chooses to exercise 
his right to a jury trial) will be viewed more harshly than a defendant who 
chooses to plead guilty.  Guinn, 2009 WY 15, ¶ 5, 201 P.3d  at 
424.  Here, there is nothing in the 
record to even remotely suggest that the district court punished the appellant 
more severely for exercising her right to a jury trial.  Therefore, we affirm the appellant’s 
sentence. 
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶18]   The district court did not abuse 
its discretion when it allowed the CI to testify at trial, although the CI’s 
telephone number was not previously provided to defense counsel.  Additionally, the district court did not 
violate the appellant’s right to a jury trial when it considered the appellant’s 
failure to accept responsibility for her criminal activity at sentencing.  Therefore, we affirm the appellant’s 
conviction and sentence. 
 
FOOTNOTES
1The 
pretrial conference was held on March 23, 2011, and the trial commenced on May 
23, 2011.
2A 
cursory review of the nationwide case law on this type of issue demonstrates 
that it is far more common to challenge a sentencing court’s consideration of 
one’s “acceptance of responsibility” as a violation of the Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, specifically one’s right to remain silent and 
not incriminate himself.  See, e.g., State v. Willey, 44 A.3d 431, 443 (N.H. 2012); Green v. State, 84 So. 3d 1169, 1171-72 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012); State v. 
Trujillo, 257 P.3d 1194, 1197-99 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011).  However, the appellant chose to raise 
this issue solely as a violation of her Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
trial.  Since she has not raised the 
Fifth Amendment issue at trial or in her appeal, the issue is waived and we will 
only consider whether there was a violation of her right to a jury trial.  See Smith v. State, 2009 WY 2, ¶ 32, 199 P.3d 1052, 1061 n.1 (Wyo. 2009).