Title: State v. Roberts

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 331PA99
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
SCOTT LYN ROBERTS
On writ of certiorari, granted by the Supreme Court
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(b), of an order of the Court of
Appeals vacating the judgment and commitment entered 22 April
1999 by Cornelius, J., in Superior Court, Randolph County, and
reinstating the judgment and commitment entered 22 July 1998 by
Martin (Lester P., Jr.), J. in Superior Court, Randolph County. 
Heard in the Supreme Court 16 November 1999.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Robert C.
Montgomery, Assistant Attorney General, for the State-
appellant.
The Exum Law Office, by Mary March Exum, for defendant-
appellee.
WAINWRIGHT, Justice.
On 22 July 1998, Superior Court Judge Lester P. Martin,
Jr., sentenced defendant to a minimum of eight months’ and a
maximum of ten months’ imprisonment for a class E, level II
felony.  In a letter dated 18 February 1999, the North Carolina
Department of Correction notified the Clerk of Superior Court for
Randolph County that the sentence imposed on 22 July 1998 did not
fall within the sentencing range for a class E offense as
provided for in the Structured Sentencing Act of 1994.  See
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.17 (1999).  On 4 March 1999, Judge Martin,
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outside the presence of defendant and his attorney, entered an
amended judgment sentencing defendant to a term of imprisonment
within the correct sentencing range for a class E, level II
felony:  a minimum of twenty-nine months and a maximum of forty-
four months.  See id. 
On 13 April 1999, defendant filed a motion for
appropriate relief claiming that when the term of imprisonment
was changed, he was not given notice or an opportunity to be
heard.  Defendant requested a hearing and prayed that the amended
judgment incarcerating defendant for more than his original
sentence be stricken and for any other relief deemed appropriate.
A hearing on defendant’s motion was held on 22 April
1999, before Judge C. Preston Cornelius in Randolph County
Superior Court.  Both defendant and his attorney were present. 
Judge Cornelius ruled the amended judgment had not been properly
entered because neither defendant nor his attorney had been
present.  Accordingly, he granted the requested relief contained
in defendant’s motion for appropriate relief and set aside the
amended judgment.  As the original sentence imposed was invalid,
Judge Cornelius then resentenced defendant to a minimum of
twenty-nine months’ and a maximum of forty-four months’
imprisonment, which is within the correct sentencing range.
On 9 June 1999, defendant filed a writ of mandamus with
the Court of Appeals, which the Court of Appeals treated as a
writ of certiorari.  The Court of Appeals allowed the petition
for writ of certiorari for the limited purpose of vacating the
judgment and commitment entered by Judge Cornelius on 22 April
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1999 and reinstating the judgment and commitment entered by Judge
Martin on 22 July 1998.  The State petitioned this Court for writ
of certiorari to review the order of the Court of Appeals, which
was allowed on 19 August 1999.
Defendant contends the resentencing by Judge Cornelius
was improper.  We disagree.  Trial courts are required to enter
criminal judgments consistent with the provisions of the
Structured Sentencing Act.  See N.C.G.S. § 15A-1331 (1999).  The
General Statutes clearly provide that a sentence of unauthorized
duration can be modified.  See N.C.G.S. § 15A-1445(a)(3)(c)
(1999) (providing that the State may appeal when it alleges the
sentence imposed “[c]ontains a term of imprisonment that is for a
duration not authorized by G.S. 15A-1340.17 . . . for the
defendant’s class of offense and prior record or conviction
level”).  “If resentencing is required, the trial division may
enter an appropriate sentence.”  N.C.G.S. § 15A-1417(c); see also
State v. Morgan, 108 N.C. App. 673, 425 S.E.2d 1 (1993) (holding
that the trial court had the authority to set aside a sentence
and to resentence a defendant if such resentencing is required),
disc. rev. improvidently allowed, 335 N.C. 551, 439 S.E.2d 127
(1994).  Moreover, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1417(a)(4), when a
court grants a motion for appropriate relief, the court can grant
“[a]ny other appropriate relief” in addition to the relief
specifically enumerated in the statute.  N.C.G.S. § 15A-
1417(a)(4) (1999).  The original sentence, which was imposed by
Judge Martin and reinstated by the Court of Appeals, violated the
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Structured Sentencing Act.  Therefore, the resentencing by Judge
Cornelius was proper in the instant case.
Defendant also contends this Court should dismiss the
State’s petition for writ of certiorari pursuant to N.C.G.S. §
15A-1422(f), which provides:
Decisions of the Court of Appeals on motions
for appropriate relief that embrace matter
set forth in G.S. 15A-1415(b) are final and
not subject to further review by appeal,
certification, writ, motion, or otherwise.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1422(f) (1999).  We disagree.  On 25 June 1999,
the Court of Appeals entered the following order:
The petition filed in this cause by
defendant on 9 June 1999 and designated
“Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the
Superior Court of Randolph County” is treated
as a petition for a writ of certiorari and is
allowed for the purpose of entering the
following order.  The judgment and commitment
entered in this cause on 22 April 1999 by
Judge C. Preston Cornelius is hereby ordered
VACATED and the judgment and commitment
entered in this cause on 22 July 1998 by
Judge Lester P. Martin, Jr. is hereby ordered
REINSTATED.
(Emphasis added.)
The Court of Appeals’ order simply reversed the
judgment and commitment entered by Judge Cornelius.  The order
did not constitute a decision by the Court of Appeals on
defendant’s motion for appropriate relief because it did not
review the decision by Judge Cornelius to grant the motion for
appropriate relief to defendant.
Defendant further contends that this Court does not
have jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 21(e) of the North Carolina
Rules of Appellate Procedure, which provides:
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Petitions for writ of certiorari to review
orders of the trial court denying motions for
appropriate relief upon grounds listed in
G.S. 15A-1415(b) by persons who have been
convicted of murder in the first degree and
sentenced to life imprisonment or death shall
be filed in the Supreme Court.  In all other
cases such petitions shall be filed in and
determined by the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court will not entertain petitions
for certiorari or petitions for further
discretionary review in these cases.
N.C. R. App. P. 21(e).
We disagree.  The above rule contemplates review of
petitions for writ of certiorari to review motions for
appropriate relief that have been denied.  As previously stated,
defendant’s motion for appropriate relief was allowed.  In
defendant’s motion for appropriate relief, he prayed the Court as
follows:  (1) that a hearing be held at a term of Superior Court,
Randolph County, North Carolina, on his motion for appropriate
relief; (2) that the amendment of the judgment incarcerating
defendant for more than his original sentence be stricken; and
(3) for such other and further relief as to which the court may
deem the defendant entitled.  Each of these requests for
appropriate relief was granted by Judge Cornelius.
For these reasons, the Court of Appeals erred in
vacating the sentence imposed by Judge Cornelius and in
reinstating the original sentence imposed by Judge Martin. 
Therefore, we reverse the order of the Court of Appeals and
remand to the Court of Appeals for further remand to the Randolph
County Superior Court for reinstatement of the sentence imposed
upon defendant by Judge Cornelius on 22 April 1999.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.