Title: City of Boise v. Ada County Appeal regarding magistrate court facilities

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 35432 
 
IN RE: FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT 
PROVIDED BY THE CITY OF BOISE.                                                 
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CITY OF BOISE,                                         
                                                       
          Petitioner-Appellant,                        
                                                       
v.                                                     
                                                       
ADA COUNTY and BOARD OF ADA 
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,      
                                                       
          Respondents.        
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Boise, May 2009 Term 
 
2009 Opinion No. 110 
 
Filed:  August 25, 2009 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Ada County.  Judges of the Fourth Judicial District Sitting en banc. 
 
The en banc panel‟s decision is affirmed. 
 
Boise City Attorney‟s Office, Boise, and Cooper & Larsen, Pocatello, for appellant.  
Gary L. Cooper argued. 
 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney‟s Office, Boise, for respondent.  Sherry A. Morgan 
argued. 
_____________________ 
 
J. JONES, Justice 
 
The City of Boise (the City or Boise City) appeals a decision by the district judges of the 
Fourth Judicial District denying the City‟s petition to vacate an order requiring it to provide 
suitable and adequate quarters for a magistrate‟s division of the district court (1980 Order or 
Order).  We affirm. 
I. 
 
In 1969 the Idaho Legislature enacted several pieces of court reform legislation.  See 
1969 Idaho Sess. Laws chs. 100-28, pp. 344-95.  Among other things, the legislation established 
the magistrate‟s division of the district court.  See I.C. § 1-2201.  In doing so, the legislation 
eliminated various lower courts that existed prior to the law, including probate courts, police 
2 
courts, and justice of the peace courts, and combined their functions into a single magistrate‟s 
division.  See I.C. § 1-103.  Under the restructured court system, counties are responsible for 
providing quarters, facilities, equipment, staff, and supplies for the magistrate‟s division.1  See 
I.C. § 1-2217.  Upon order of a majority of district judges in a judicial district, however, a city 
may be made responsible for providing quarters, facilities, equipment, staff, and supplies for a 
magistrate‟s division of the district court.  See I.C. § 1-2218.  Idaho Code sections 1-2217 and 1-
2218, the provisions establishing this scheme, provide: 
§ 1-2217.  Facilities and equipment provided by county 
Each county in the state shall provide suitable and adequate quarters for the 
magistrate‟s division of the district court, including the facilities and equipment 
necessary to make the space provided functional for its intended use, and shall 
provide for the staff personnel, supplies, and other expenses of the magistrate‟s 
division. 
 
§ 1-2218.  Facilities and equipment provided by city 
Any city in the state shall, upon order of a majority of the district judges in the 
judicial district, provide suitable and adequate quarters for a magistrate‟s division 
of the district court, including the facilities and equipment necessary to make the 
space provided functional for its intended use, and shall provide for the staff 
personnel, supplies, and other expenses of the magistrate‟s division. 
 
The costs incurred by a county or a city in providing facilities for the magistrate‟s 
division are offset through the apportionment of court-imposed fees.  Idaho Code section 31-
3201A establishes a schedule of fees to be imposed on individuals found guilty of felony, 
misdemeanor, and infraction offenses.  Id.  Pursuant to the statute, fees collected for such 
convictions are apportioned to either the county or the city, depending on which entity provided 
the court facilities.  The statute provides: 
The clerk of the district court . . . shall charge, demand and receive the following 
fees for services rendered by him in discharging the duties imposed upon him by 
law: 
. . . 
(b) A fee of seventeen dollars and fifty cents ($17.50) shall be paid, but not in 
advance, by each person found guilty of any felony or misdemeanor, except when 
the court orders such fee waived because the person is indigent and unable to pay 
such fee. If the magistrate court facilities are provided by the county, five dollars 
                                                 
1 The State of Idaho, however, has the responsibility of paying magistrate judges‟ salaries.  See I.C. § 1-2219.    
3 
($5.00) of such fee shall be paid to the county treasurer for deposit in the district 
court fund of the county; and twelve dollars and fifty cents ($12.50) of such fee 
shall be paid to the county treasurer who shall pay such fees to the state treasurer 
for deposit in accordance with subsection (p) of this section. If the magistrate 
court facilities are provided by a city, five dollars ($5.00) of such fee shall be paid 
to the city treasurer for deposit in the city general fund, two dollars and fifty cents 
($2.50) of such fee shall be paid to the city treasurer for deposit in the city capital 
facilities fund for the construction, remodeling and support of magistrate[] court 
facilities, and ten dollars ($10.00) of such fee shall be paid to the county treasurer 
who shall pay such fees to the state treasurer for deposit in accordance with 
subsection (p) of this section.  
 
(c) A fee of sixteen dollars and fifty cents ($16.50) shall be paid, but not in 
advance, by each person found to have committed an infraction or any minor 
traffic, conservation or ordinance violation . . . . If the magistrate court facilities 
are provided by the county, five dollars ($5.00) of such fee shall be paid to the 
county treasurer for deposit in the district court fund of the county; and eleven 
dollars and fifty cents ($11.50) of such fee shall be paid to the county treasurer, 
who shall pay such fees to the state treasurer for deposit in accordance with 
subsection (p) of this section. If the magistrate court facilities are provided by a 
city, five dollars ($5.00) of such fee shall be paid to the city treasurer for deposit 
in the city general fund, two dollars and fifty cents ($2.50) of such fee shall be 
paid to the city treasurer for deposit in the city capital facilities fund for the 
construction, remodeling and support of magistrate court facilities, and nine 
dollars ($9.00) of such fee shall be paid to the county treasurer who shall pay such 
fees to the state treasurer for deposit in accordance with subsection (p) of this 
section.  
 
I.C. § 31-3201A(b) & (c) (emphasis added). 
On the day the court reform legislation took effect, January 11, 1971, the district judges 
of the Fourth Judicial District entered an order requiring Boise City to provide a magistrate‟s 
division of the district court.  The order stated: 
It is hereby Ordered that, pursuant to Section 1-2218, Idaho Code, the City 
of Boise, Idaho, shall provide suitable and adequate quarters for two magistrates 
of the Fourth District Court Magistrates Division, including two courtrooms with 
related facilities and equipment necessary to make the space provided functional 
for its intended use, and the necessary supplies and non-judicial staff personnel to 
operate said courts. 
 
To comply with the order, Boise City established magistrate court facilities in an old fire station 
on Kootenai Street in Boise.  The facility housed support personnel, equipment, and supplies for 
two magistrate judges and was used to process misdemeanor and traffic violations.  All other 
magistrate‟s division functions were housed in facilities provided by Ada County in the Ada 
4 
County Courthouse.2  With the exception of the magistrate judges, all workers at the Kootenai 
Street facility were Boise City employees. 
The City‟s magistrate facilities remained on Kootenai Street until a new facility was 
opened in August 1981.  Construction of the new facility was prompted by an order the district 
judges of the Fourth Judicial District issued on October 9, 1980.  The 1980 Order provided:  
Pursuant to the authority of section 1-2218, Idaho Code, the City of Boise 
City, Idaho, be, and  
HEREBY IS ORDERED to provide suitable and adequate quarters for a 
Magistrate‟s Division of the District Court, including the facilities and equipment 
necessary to make the space provided functional for its intended use, and shall 
provide for the staff, personnel, supplies, and other expenses of the Magistrate‟s 
Division. 
 
Boise City‟s new facility – the Barrister facility – consisted of five courtrooms and 
various equipment, staff, and supplies.  By 1983, all misdemeanor and infraction cases filed by 
Boise City, Ada County, the Idaho State Police, Idaho Fish and Game, and the cities of Meridian, 
Garden City, Kuna, and Eagle were processed at the Barrister facility.3  Felony arraignments 
were also conducted there.  Pursuant to Idaho Code section 31-3201A, Boise City received the 
statutory fees for all convictions processed at the Barrister facility.   
Boise City initially paid for all of the personnel, equipment, and supplies at the Barrister 
facility.  Over time, however, Ada County began to supplement the Barrister personnel with its 
own employees.4  In addition, the Fourth Judicial District Trial Court Administrator began 
seeking voluntary contributions from other cities within Ada County to help fund the Barrister 
facility.  When the mayors of two of those cities – namely, Garden City and Meridian – declined 
to contribute, Ada County and Boise City filed a joint petition asking the district judges of the 
Fourth Judicial District to order contribution.  On August 12, 1994, the district judges granted the 
petition and entered an order requiring the cities of Garden City and Meridian to provide suitable 
and adequate quarters for a magistrate‟s division of the district court.  By the time proceedings in 
this matter were initiated in September 2007, neither Garden City nor Meridian had complied 
with the order. 
                                                 
2 In 1974, however, the juvenile division of the magistrate court was moved to a facility on West Denton Street in 
Boise.  Juvenile proceedings continue to be conducted at this facility. 
3 The remaining functions of the magistrate division, with the exception of juvenile proceedings, continued to be 
conducted at the Ada County Courthouse.  
4 Ada County employed court clerks and a supervisor at the facility. 
5 
 
In 1998, Ada County began developing plans for a new Ada County Courthouse and 
Administration Building.  The building was designed to house all Fourth District Court 
functions, except juvenile proceedings.  Consequently, the building would eliminate the need for 
Boise City‟s Barrister facility.   
 
In anticipation of completion of the new courthouse, Boise City and Ada County entered 
into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on October 1, 1999.  In addition to providing for the 
transfer of the City‟s Barrister employees to the County, the agreement outlined Boise City‟s 
continuing obligation to provide facilities, equipment, personnel, supplies, and expenses for a 
magistrate‟s division of the district court.  Pursuant to the MOA, once the magistrate‟s division 
was consolidated in the new courthouse, the City would fulfill its obligations under the 1980 
Order by reimbursing the County for its share of the magistrate‟s division‟s operational, 
equipment, and maintenance expenses.  The Boise City Council approved the terms of the MOA 
in Resolution No. 15642.  In doing so, the Council acknowledged that the City remained 
obligated under the 1980 Order and intended to fulfill its obligations through the MOA.   
 
Construction of the new Ada County Courthouse and Administration Building was 
substantially completed in January 2002.5  By February 2002, all of the functions of the 
magistrate‟s division, excluding only juvenile proceedings, were consolidated in the new facility.  
Since that time, the functions previously housed at the Barrister facility have remained in the 
new courthouse.   
Once the magistrate‟s division was consolidated, Ada County began receiving all of the 
court fees authorized by Idaho Code section 31-3201A.  After a series of negotiations, however, 
the County agreed to credit Boise City the $5.00 statutory fee for all misdemeanor and infraction 
cases filed by the City – thereby decreasing the amount the City was obligated to pay the County 
under the MOA.  The County would continue to receive the $2.50 capital facilities fee for the 
City‟s filings. 
Boise City continued making payments to the County pursuant to the MOA until 
September 2007.  Since that time the City has maintained that, under this Court‟s decision in 
Twin Falls County v. Cities of Twin Falls and Filer, 143 Idaho 398, 146 P.3d 664 (2006), it is no 
longer obligated to provide facilities for a magistrate‟s division of the district court and, 
                                                 
5 Boise City did not pay for any of the construction costs associated with the new courthouse and has no ownership 
interest in the facility.   
6 
therefore, is not required to reimburse the County for providing such facilities.  In an effort to 
confirm its position, the City filed a petition asking the district judges of the Fourth Judicial 
District to set aside the 1980 Order.  The County then filed a motion to intervene in the 
proceedings, which was granted over the City‟s objection.      
 
On April 18, 2008, the panel of district judges6 heard argument on Boise City‟s petition 
to set aside the 1980 Order.  After the hearing, the panel issued a memorandum decision and 
order denying the City‟s petition.  The panel reasoned that: (1) neither the consolidation of the 
magistrate‟s division nor this Court‟s decision in Twin Falls County relieved the City of its 
obligations under the 1980 Order; (2) there had not been a substantial change in circumstances 
that would justify rescinding the Order; and (3) the Order did not impose an unconstitutional tax 
on Boise City taxpayers.  Based on these considerations, the panel concluded Boise City failed to 
“meet its burden in demonstrating that there is sufficient and good cause to set aside the 
October 9, 1980 Order.”   
 
Boise City now appeals the panel‟s decision denying its petition.  The City argues that the 
panel should have vacated the Order because it is no longer legally or factually justifiable and it 
violates both the Idaho and United States Constitutions.  Further, the City contends that the panel 
imposed an improper burden of proof and erroneously allowed the County to intervene in the 
proceedings.  The County argues that the panel‟s decision was proper and requests an award of 
attorney fees on appeal.  
II. 
 
On appeal we are presented with five issues, namely, whether: (1) the panel erred by 
allowing Ada County to intervene in the proceedings pertaining to the City‟s petition; (2) the 
panel erred by requiring Boise City to show “good and sufficient” cause for vacating the 1980 
Order; (3) the panel‟s decision denying Boise City‟s petition was erroneous; (4) the 1980 Order 
and Idaho Code section 1-2218 impose an unconstitutional tax on Boise City taxpayers; and (5) 
Ada County is entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
                                                 
6 District Judge Mike Wetherell, a former Boise City councilman, did not participate on the panel, having recused 
himself.   
7 
A. 
 
In granting the County‟s motion to intervene, the panel relied on Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 24(a).  That rule permits intervention as a matter of right when: 
the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the 
subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the 
action may as a practical matter impair or impede [the] applicant‟s ability to 
protect that interest, unless the applicant‟s interest is adequately represented by 
existing parties. 
 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 24(a).  The panel reasoned that the rule authorized intervention because, by 
filing a petition, the City commenced a civil action in which intervention is permissible.  Further, 
since the County would suffer adverse financial consequences if the Order was set aside and 
there was no evidence that the City could adequately represent the County‟s interests, the County 
was entitled to intervene.   
The City argues that the panel erred in granting the County‟s motion to intervene.  It 
contends that intervention is only permissible in a civil action, not in an administrative 
proceeding, which is what its petition initiated.   In support of its argument, the City opines: (1) it 
did not file a complaint or lawsuit against any person or entity; (2) Idaho Code section 1-2218 is 
contained in the code chapter addressing the administration of courts and, therefore, does not 
contemplate litigation; (3) unlike in litigation, a panel of judges presides over decisions regarding 
section 1-2218 orders; and (4) the petition initiated a proceeding between the City and the district 
judges that did not involve Ada County.   
The County argues that the panel did not err in granting its motion to intervene.    
According to the County, intervention was proper because its “interests would be impacted by an 
adverse decision,”7 “there [was] no other party to represent [its] interests,” there was no evidence 
that intervention harmed the City or changed the outcome of the proceedings, and its 
participation “allowed for a more complete, balanced and thorough review of the issues 
presented in [the] petition.”  Further, it maintains that the City‟s petition initiated an “action” 
under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and, therefore, the City‟s attempt to characterize the 
proceedings as administrative in nature is unpersuasive.   
                                                 
7 Specifically, the County asserts that if the Order was rescinded, it would assume sole responsibility for funding the 
entire Fourth Judicial District Magistrate‟s Division, thereby increasing its financial obligations by approximately 
$700,000.00 per year.   
8 
While this proceeding may bear some similarity to a civil action, we decline to categorize 
it as such.  The County argues it is an action, having been commenced by the filing of the City‟s 
petition.  However, the County overlooks the fact that the proceeding was commenced when the 
1980 Order was entered.  The City‟s petition sought to vacate the Order entered by the district 
judges.  A proceeding commenced by a panel of district judges cannot properly be categorized as 
an action under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.  To do so would be to treat the judges as 
litigants, rather than disinterested decision-makers.  It is thus clear that we are not dealing here 
with a civil action under the civil procedure rules. 
Nor is this a typical administrative proceeding, as contended by the City.  While a panel 
of judges may be carrying out duties relating to the administration of court business in 
determining whether to issue an order under section 1-2218, we are dealing here with a petition 
seeking to set aside an existing order under that section.  A decision granting or denying a 
petition to set aside an existing order involves judicial decision-making and, as such, is not 
administrative in nature.  See 43A C.J.S. Injunctions § 396 (2008). 
We need not determine whether the proceeding fits neatly within the category of either a 
civil action or an administrative proceeding.  By the enactment of section 1-2218, the Legislature 
vested the district judges of a judicial district with the authority to order cities to provide suitable 
and adequate quarters for a magistrate‟s division of the district court.  The Legislature did not 
specify the procedures to be used in considering, issuing, modifying, or vacating such orders.  
However, the Legislature was obviously aware at the time that the courts possess inherent power 
to fashion suitable rules for carrying out their constitutional and statutory duties.  Indeed, Idaho‟s 
Territorial Legislature enacted a provision memorializing the courts‟ power to fashion the 
procedures necessary to perform their duties, and that provision, in its pre-statehood language, is 
now codified as Idaho Code section 1-1622.   
We have made it clear from time to time that the rule-making authority of the courts is 
not dependent upon legislative enactments.  In State v. Griffith, 97 Idaho 52, 58, 539 P.2d 604, 
610 (1975), we stated: 
While the legislature has authorized this Court to formulate rules of 
procedure, this Court has the inherent authority, made especially clear by the 
amended provisions of Article V, Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution, to make 
rules governing procedure in the lower courts of this state.  R.E.W. Construction 
Co. v. District Court of the Third Judicial District [, 88 Idaho 426, 400 P.2d 390 
(1965)].  The legislature need not repeal statutes made unnecessary by, or found 
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in conflict with, court reorganization and integration.  It is well settled in this 
state, as part of the rule-making power possessed by this Court, that the Court 
may by rule . . . make inapplicable procedural statutes which conflict with our 
present court system. 
 
See also J.I. Case Co. v. McDonald, 76 Idaho 223, 230, 280 P.2d 1070, 1074 (1955) (“where [a] 
statute or rule does not prescribe the procedure, the common law or other appropriate method 
will be followed in the exercise of inherent judicial power”).   
 
As previously mentioned, the Legislature has recognized the courts‟ inherent power in 
this regard by enactment of section 1-1622.  That section provides: 
When jurisdiction is, by this code, or by any other statute, conferred on a 
court or judicial officer all the means necessary to carry it into effect are also 
given; and in the exercise of the jurisdiction if the course of proceedings be not 
specially pointed out by this code, or the statute, any suitable process or mode of 
proceeding may be adopted which may appear most conformable to the spirit of 
this code. 
 
I.C. § 1-1622.  In Fox v. Flynn, 27 Idaho 580, 588, 150 P. 44, 47 (1915), referring to section 
3925 of Idaho‟s Revised Codes, which is identical to the present section 1-1622, the Court said: 
It would seem that, when jurisdiction is conferred upon the district court 
by the constitution in all cases, both at law and in equity, there is also conferred, 
as an incident of such grant, the power to make the same effective by any suitable 
process or mode of procedure which may be adopted, and that the district court 
could avail itself of the method of procedure prescribed by the statutes for the 
inferior courts, or as provided by section 3925, Rev. Codes . . . 
 
Thus, the panel had the requisite authority to employ a suitable process for determining whether 
to grant the County‟s request to intervene. 
We now turn to the question of whether the panel properly allowed the County to 
intervene.  In allowing the intervention, the panel relied on Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a).  
While we have indicated that this is not an action within the contemplation of the civil procedure 
rules, there is no reason why courts should not look to the procedural rules for guidance in 
circumstances such as these.  Rule 24(a) permits intervention as a matter of right when the 
applicant claims an interest relating to the transaction at issue and the applicant‟s ability to 
protect that interest may be impaired by the disposition.  That certainly is the case here.  The 
County had a substantial financial stake in maintaining the efficacy of the 1980 Order.  To deny 
10 
it the opportunity to appear and be heard would be repugnant of our concepts of fairness and due 
process. 
Even aside from the procedural rules, the panel had the authority to grant the County‟s 
motion to intervene.  Courts have the inherent power to grant intervention to persons who may 
be adversely affected by the outcome of a proceeding or when equitable principles otherwise 
require.  See 67A C.J.S. Parties § 93 (2009).  It is generally recognized that “courts [should] look 
with favor on intervention in a proper case, and . . . be liberal in permitting parties to intervene 
under the proper circumstances.”  Id.  If there is any doubt as to whether intervention is 
appropriate, a motion to intervene should usually be granted.  Id.  These principles hold true in 
various forms of proceedings, not just those involving the litigation of claims between adverse 
parties.  See In re Change of Name of Davenport, 641 N.W.2d 379, 383 (Neb. 2002) (holding 
that a father should be permitted to intervene in his child‟s name change proceeding under statute 
allowing intervention in litigation); City of Chicago v. Zik, 211 N.E.2d 545, 546 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1965) (allowing intervention in a demolition proceeding). 
Thus, under its inherent authority, as memorialized in section 1-1622, the panel was 
empowered to allow the County to intervene.  Surely, allowing a county to intervene in a city‟s 
proceeding to set aside a section 1-2218 order is in accordance with the spirit of the Idaho Code.8  
See In re the Petition of Idaho State Fed’n of Labor, 75 Idaho 367, 370, 272 P.2d 707, 708 
(1954) (relying on section 1-1622 “to adopt a suitable procedure which will furnish an 
opportunity for any interested person to appear at the hearing” where the governing statute 
provides no such process or procedure (quoting Roche v. Superior Court, 157 P. 830, 832 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1916))).  The Code vests counties with an interest in maintaining the efficacy of section 
1-2218 orders.  A decision relieving a city of its obligations under a section 1-2218 order has the 
effect of imposing those same obligations on the county.  Because the Code vests counties with 
an interest in section 1-2218 orders, giving counties the opportunity to be heard in proceedings 
regarding the continuing validity of such orders conforms to the spirit of the Code.  Therefore, 
the panel had the authority to allow the County to intervene in this proceeding and it properly 
exercised that authority. 
 
                                                 
8  Section 1-1622 states that where the course of proceedings is not provided, “any suitable process or mode of 
proceeding may be adopted which may appear most conformable to the spirit of [the Idaho Code].”  
11 
B. 
In denying the City‟s petition, the panel concluded the City failed to meet its burden of 
“demonstrating that there is good and sufficient cause to set aside the October 9, 1980 Order.”  
Relying on this Court‟s decision in Noble v. Fisher, 126 Idaho 885, 894 P.2d 118 (1995),9 the 
panel reasoned the City was required to show there had been a substantial and material change of 
circumstances that would justify rescinding the 1980 Order.   
On appeal, Boise City argues that the panel erred by requiring it to demonstrate “good 
and sufficient cause” for setting aside the 1980 Order.  In support of this argument, the City 
points out that section 1-2218 does not impose a burden of proof on cities seeking relief from 
orders issued pursuant to that section.  Accordingly, the City argues that, in deciding whether to 
set aside a section 1-2218 order, the burden is on the district judges “to analyze the condition of 
the existing magistrate facility and the need for the City to provide a separate magistrate 
facility.”  By imposing a different burden without notice, the City argues that the panel violated 
its right to due process.   
The County, on the other hand, argues that the panel‟s use of the “good and sufficient 
cause” standard was appropriate.  It maintains the City‟s assumption that it would not be required 
to meet a burden of proof was unreasonable. 
Section 1-2218 does not establish any standards for the review of orders issued pursuant 
to that section.  There are, however, well-established rules governing the review of a similar type 
of order which lend themselves to application in the current case.  Although not the same in all 
respects, section 1-2218 orders are similar to permanent mandatory injunctions10 in that they 
impose an affirmative, continuing obligation on cities to provide for a magistrate‟s division of 
the district court.  Both types of orders have “prospective application subject to continuing 
supervision,” “are open-ended in nature,” and “concern[] a continuing situation.”  42 AM. JUR. 
2D Injunctions § 302 (2009).  Accordingly, an examination of the standards governing review of 
injunctions is warranted.  
                                                 
9 Noble v. Fisher was a child support modification case in which the Court held, based on Idaho Code section 32-
709, that a support order may only be modified “upon a showing of a substantial and material change of 
circumstances.”  Noble, 126 Idaho at 888, 894 P.2d at 121. 
10 A mandatory injunction “orders an affirmative act or mandates a specified course of conduct.”  43A C.J.S. 
Injunctions § 13 (2009). 
12 
As a general rule, a final order resulting in the imposition of an injunction will not be 
reconsidered except upon a showing of good and sufficient cause.  See 43A C.J.S. Injunctions § 
394 (2009); 42 AM. JUR. 2D Injunctions § 302 (2009).  Good cause may be established by 
proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a change in circumstances has rendered the 
original injunction inequitable.  42 AM. JUR. 2D Injunctions § 306 (2009); see also Pac. Rivers 
Council v. Thomas, 936 F. Supp. 738, 742 (D. Idaho 1996).  The changed circumstance may be 
one of either fact or law.  Pac. Rivers, 936 F. Supp. at 742; 42 AM. JUR. 2D Injunctions § 306 
(2009).  In either case, the “change in circumstances must be sufficiently significant or 
substantial to make modification of the injunction just and equitable, or to make the injunction in 
its original form inequitable, no longer justified, or wrong, inequitable, or unjust.”  42 AM. JUR. 
2D Injunctions § 306 (2009).  Under this standard, a court has broad discretion in deciding 
whether to grant a party‟s motion to modify or set aside an injunction.  43A C.J.S. Injunctions § 
393 (2009); 42 AM. JUR. 2D Injunctions § 303 (2009).  The party seeking to have an injunction 
modified or set aside bears the burden of proof.  43A C.J.S. Injunctions § 396 (2009); see also 
First Sec. Bank, N.A. v. Stauffer, 112 Idaho 133, 139, 730 P.2d 1053, 1059 (Ct. App. 1986) 
(“The party moving to have an order or judgment vacated or set aside bears the burden of 
proof.”).      
It becomes evident that there are at least three general principles governing the review of 
orders imposing continuing obligations.  First, the party challenging the order bears the burden of 
proof.  Second, to satisfy its burden, the moving party must demonstrate that the order is no 
longer justified, due to either a change in the law or a change in the factual circumstances.  
Third, the reviewing tribunal has broad discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny a party‟s 
motion to modify or set aside an existing order.  The City has not presented any persuasive 
argument for exempting section 1-2218 orders from these general principles. 
In light of these standards, the panel did not err by requiring the City to show good and 
sufficient cause for setting aside the 1980 Order.  The panel correctly concluded that, as the 
moving party, the City carried the burden of proving that its petition should be granted.  It is 
well-established that a party seeking to set aside an order has the burden of proving the order is 
no longer justified.  See First Sec. Bank, 112 Idaho at 139, 730 P.2d at 1059.  Therefore, it would 
be unreasonable to conclude, as the City suggests, that the Legislature‟s failure to specify a 
burden of proof in section 1-2218 relieved the City of its obligation to demonstrate why the 1980 
13 
Order should be set aside.11  The panel‟s decision to rely on the good and sufficient cause 
standard was also appropriate.  As discussed above, that standard is frequently implemented in 
proceedings to modify or set aside an existing order.  In fact, although the City now contests the 
panel‟s use of the standard, the arguments the City made below and continues to make on appeal 
indicate that it knew it carried the burden of demonstrating good and sufficient cause for setting 
aside the 1980 Order.12  The City‟s primary argument for setting aside the 1980 Order was, and 
continues to be, that there has been a substantial and material change of circumstances since the 
issuance of the Order.  For these reasons, the City‟s argument that the panel employed the 
incorrect burden of proof is unpersuasive.   
C. 
In denying Boise City‟s petition, the en banc panel rejected the City‟s argument that the 
1980 Order was no longer legally or factually justifiable.  First, the panel found unpersuasive the 
City‟s argument that this Court‟s decision in Twin Falls County v. Cities of Twin Falls and Filer, 
143 Idaho 398, 146 P.3d 664 (2006), rendered the 1980 Order invalid.  The panel reasoned that 
Twin Falls County did not impact the validity of the 1980 Order because “there is nothing in the 
. . . Order which orders Boise City to pay a pro rata share for the cost of operating and 
maintaining the Ada County Courthouse.”  Rather, the Order only required Boise City to 
“[p]rovide suitable and adequate quarters for a Magistrate‟s Division,” “facilities and equipment” 
necessary to make the quarters functional, and the personnel, staff, supplies, and other expenses 
needed to operate the facility.  Because the 1980 Order did not require the City “to contribute to 
the costs of operating the Ada County Courthouse,” it was permissible under Twin Falls County.   
Next, the panel concluded that the Order was still factually justifiable.  It reasoned that, 
contrary to the City‟s assertions, the consolidation of the magistrate‟s division was not a material 
and substantial change in circumstances.  Because Boise City voluntarily chose to “fulfill its 
obligations under the . . . 1980 Order by allowing the Barrister courthouse functions to be 
transferred to the new Ada County Courthouse and by agreeing to pay for some of the costs of 
providing the Magistrate‟s Division of the District Court,” it could not claim that the 
                                                 
11 This is especially true since, other than requiring orders to be issued by a majority of district judges in a judicial 
district, section 1-2218 contains no procedural requirements for proceedings initiated pursuant to that section.  Thus, 
section 1-1622 gives the district judges the authority to adopt “any suitable process or mode of proceeding . . . which 
may appear most conformable to the spirit of [the] code.”  I.C. § 1-1622. 
12 For this reason, the City‟s contention that it did not have notice of the standard is unpersuasive.   
14 
consolidation relieved it of its obligations under the Order.  Further, since Boise City‟s 
misdemeanor and infraction filings continued to account for the majority of such filings in Ada 
County, the Order was still justified.13  On appeal, Boise City challenges the panel‟s conclusion 
that the 1980 Order is still legally and factually justifiable.   
 
The City argues the panel erred by failing to consider circumstances that have changed 
since the issuance of the 1980 Order – namely, the impact of this Court‟s decision in Twin Falls 
County, the existence of the new Ada County Courthouse, and the fact that the County now 
receives the court fees authorized by Idaho Code section 31-3201A.  The County argues the 
panel correctly concluded that the 1980 Order is still justified.  It contends that none of the City‟s 
proffered reasons warrant rescinding the Order.   
1. 
First, the City argues that the panel failed to recognize the impact of our decision in Twin 
Falls County v. Cities of Twin Falls and Filer, 143 Idaho 398, 146 P.3d 664 (2006).  It contends 
that, under Twin Falls County, when a county provides the building that houses the entire 
magistrate‟s division “there is no legal basis or justification for an Idaho Code § 1-2218 [o]rder 
requiring the cities in such a county to provide magistrate facilities.”  Thus, Ada County‟s 
decision to provide the building that houses the entire magistrate‟s division of the Fourth Judicial 
District obviated the need for the City to provide similar facilities.  Additionally, the City argues 
that Twin Falls County precludes cities from contracting with a county to satisfy their obligations 
under section 1-2218 orders.  It bases this argument on the statement in Twin Falls County that 
Idaho Code sections 1-2217 and 1-2218 “do not envision entwined or shared facilities and 
expenses.”  Twin Falls County, 143 Idaho at 400, 146 P.3d at 666.   
The County argues that the City has misconstrued the holding in Twin Falls County.  It 
contends that Twin Falls County only prohibits ordering cities to reimburse a county for their use 
of the county‟s courthouse facilities.  According to the County, nothing in Twin Falls County or 
Idaho Code section 1-2218 precludes a city from voluntarily contracting with a county to fulfill 
its obligations under a section 1-2218 order.  Therefore, the County contends Boise City‟s 
decision to fulfill its obligations under the 1980 Order by reimbursing the County for housing the 
functions of the magistrate‟s division does not justify vacating the Order.   
                                                 
13 For the fiscal year 2007, Boise City‟s misdemeanor and infraction filings accounted for more than 51% of all such 
filings in Ada County.  This figure is consistent with the City‟s filings for the past several years.   
15 
Contrary to the City‟s assertions, Twin Falls County only precludes a panel of district 
judges from ordering a city to reimburse a county for its use of county-owned facilities.  See 
Twin Falls County, 143 Idaho at 400, 146 P.3d at 666.  In that case, a county courthouse facility 
was used to house the district court and the entire magistrate‟s division thereof.  Id. at 399, 146 
P.3d at 665.  The county provided the equipment, personnel, supplies and expenses necessary to 
operate the entire facility.  Id.  Several cities within the county, however, reimbursed the county 
for their proportionate shares of the cost of maintaining the magistrate‟s division.  Id.  When 
efforts to renegotiate the amount the cities paid the county failed, a majority of the district judges 
issued an order pursuant to section 1-2218 requiring the cities “to pay a pro rata share for the cost 
of operating the magistrate‟s division.”  Id.  The cities appealed to this Court, which reversed the 
judges‟ order on a 3-2 vote after concluding that it exceeded their statutory authority.  The Court 
reasoned that section 1-2218 did not authorize the district judges to order the cities to reimburse 
the county for their use of the county courthouse.  Id. at 400, 146 P.3d at 666.  Rather, the statute 
only permitted the judges to order the cities to “provide suitable and adequate quarters for a 
magistrate‟s division.”  Id.  Because the order did not impose an obligation on the cities to 
provide suitable and adequate quarters for a magistrate‟s division, but instead required the cities 
to compensate the county for their use of county facilities, it exceeded the judges‟ statutory 
authority and was invalid.  Id.   
The 1980 Order does not run afoul of the holding in Twin Falls County.  Unlike the order 
in Twin Falls County, the 1980 Order only requires the City to provide suitable and adequate 
quarters for a magistrate‟s division – it does not require the City to reimburse the County for its 
use of the County‟s facilities.  Boise City‟s voluntary decision to begin fulfilling its obligations 
under the Order by contracting with Ada County is not the equivalent of the panel ordering it to 
do so.  Because the Order itself does not require the City to reimburse the County for its use of 
the County‟s courthouse, the Order does not exceed the panel‟s statutory authority. 
Nothing in Twin Falls County precludes a city from fulfilling its obligations under a 
section 1-2218 order by contracting with a county to house a division of the magistrate court.  
See Twin Falls County, 143 Idaho at 400, 146 P.3d at 666.  The problem in Twin Falls County 
was not the reimbursement scheme itself, but the fact that it was ordered by the district judges.  
Id. (stating that the district judges did not have “the authority to decide on the city‟s behalf how 
the city should comply with the statute”).  The decision simply rejected the proposition that, 
16 
when read together, sections 1-2217 and 1-2218 authorize a panel of district judges to order 
cities to “either provide their own building or provide for use of . . . [c]ounty facilities by 
compensating the [c]ounty for their proportionate share.”  Id.  Although there is language in 
Twin Falls County that, when read in isolation, may support the proposition that it is never 
permissible for cities and counties to share facilities, the statements were made in reference to 
the district judges‟ authority to order mandatory contributions for shared facilities.14  See id. at 
400-01, 146 P.3d at 666-67.  Moreover, the decision explicitly acknowledged a city‟s right “to 
make decisions regarding the facilities it must provide if ordered by the district judges.”  Id. at 
400, 146 P.3d at 666.   
Further, the language of section 1-2218 makes clear that cities are free to decide how they 
will comply with orders issued pursuant to that section.  The only mandatory obligations the 
statute imposes are that the quarters be “suitable and adequate,” consist of the facilities and 
equipment necessary to make the space provided functional for its intended use, and include the 
staff, personnel, supplies, and other expenses of a magistrate‟s division.  As such, once the 
district judges order a city to provide a magistrate‟s division, the discretion regarding how to 
comply with the order lies with the city. 
Here, the City‟s decision to fulfill its obligations under the 1980 Order by compensating 
the County for housing the magistrate functions previously located at the Barrister facility was 
permissible under both section 1-2218 and Twin Falls County.  Under those authorities, the City 
                                                 
14 Specifically, the decision states: 
 
These statutes clearly contemplate two distinct scenarios: section 2217 addresses a county‟s 
obligation to provide facilities and personnel, supplies, etc., whereas section 2218 speaks to a city‟s 
obligation to provide facilities and personnel, supplies, etc., upon order of the district judges. Idaho 
Code § 1-2218 does not require a city to provide facilities or other expenses.  In other words, I.C. §§ 
1-2217 and 2218 do not envision entwined or shared facilities and expenses. The entity which 
provides the building also provides the expenses associated with operating it. Thus, the district 
judges only had the authority to order the Cities to provide courthouse facilities.  
. . . 
Furthermore, any sharing of costs is accounted for in I.C. § 31-3201A, which, like I.C. §§ 1-2217 
and 2218, makes a distinction between magistrate court facilities provided by a city and those 
provided by a county. . . . Ordering reimbursement eliminates the distinction necessary for I.C. § 
31-3201A to work. If a city is ordered to reimburse a county for its proportionate use, how is one 
to know which entity, under I.C. § 31-3201A, has “provided” the facility? By ordering the Cities 
to reimburse the County, the district judges impermissibly blurred the line between a facility 
provided by a county and one provided by a city. 
 
Twin Falls County, 143 Idaho at 400-01, 146 P.3d at 666-67 (emphasis added). 
17 
has the discretion to determine the manner in which it will fulfill the obligations imposed upon it 
by the Order.  After several years of providing a separate facility, Boise City chose to begin 
fulfilling its obligations by contracting with Ada County.15   Thus, unlike the cities in Twin Falls 
County, Boise City voluntarily decided to fulfill its obligations through a reimbursement 
arrangement – it was not ordered to do so by the district judges.16 
The City‟s intent to fulfill its obligations by reimbursing Ada County is evidenced by the 
terms of the MOA.17  In the MOA, the City acknowledged that the 1980 Order obligated it “to 
provide suitable and adequate quarters for a Magistrate‟s Division of the District Court, 
including facilities, equipment, staff, personnel, supplies and other expenses necessary to process 
and support infractions and misdemeanors occurring within its city limits.”  To satisfy these 
obligations, the City agreed to “provide funding for maintenance and operating costs and for 
equipment as identified in the budget agreed upon annually” and to “reimburse the County for 
the transferred employees.”  In return, the County agreed “to accept the . . . payments in full and 
complete satisfaction of the City‟s obligations to provide facilities, equipment, staff, personnel, 
supplies and other expenses” for a magistrate‟s division.  The City would also “continue to 
receive its distribution of fines and court costs under the statutory formulae.”  These terms were 
to “remain in full force and effect until any amendment is agreed to by both parties.”  
Accordingly, the City continued making payments to the County even after the magistrate‟s 
division was consolidated. 
The theme underlying the City‟s contention that it is no longer obligated to contribute to 
the functioning of the magistrate‟s division is that, with the construction of the new courthouse, 
                                                 
15 The City contends that its decision to contract with the County was not voluntary.  It maintains that, although the 
County did not force it to move the magistrate functions housed at the Barrister facility into the new courthouse, the 
trial court administrator and administrative judge did.  However, the City has failed to point to any facts to support 
this argument.  The City also contends that it has no authority to determine where magistrate judges are chambered.  
Nevertheless, as this Court recognized in Twin Falls County, section 1-2218 gives cities discretion in locating the 
quarters to house a magistrate‟s division of the district court.  Thus, the City‟s authority to decide where the judges 
are chambered is irrelevant.  
16 The City is not, however, foreclosed from pursuing other options.  The MOA allows either party to seek review or 
renegotiation of its terms.  If that avenue does not work out, the City has the further option of following the literal 
language of the 1980 Order by providing suitable and adequate quarters for a magistrate‟s division to handle city-
generated cases.  Presumably, this latter course would require modification or termination of the MOA but whether 
or how that might occur is beyond the scope of our review.  
17 The City contests the panel‟s reliance on the MOA because the validity of that agreement was not before the 
panel.  The City‟s argument is unpersuasive, however, as the panel merely relied on the MOA as evidence of the 
method by which Boise City chose to fulfill its obligations under the 1980 Order – the panel was not concerned with 
the validity or enforceability of the agreement. 
18 
the County should shoulder the full burden of funding the magistrate‟s division and it is being 
put upon to carry through with its contractual undertakings pursuant to the MOA.  What the City 
fails to appreciate is that in enacting the court consolidation legislation the Legislature quite 
clearly contemplated that both counties and cities, particularly those cities that generate a 
substantial amount of court business, would have a role in shouldering the cost burden of 
magistrate‟s division facilities.  It was not the Legislature‟s intent to relieve cities of their pre-
existing obligation to maintain local courts but, rather, to provide a unified system and to ensure 
that where cities provided facilities for the magistrate‟s division to handle city cases, the 
facilities were suitable and adequate to do the job.  I.C. § 1-2218.  As pointed out in Twin Falls 
County: 
“[The magistrate‟s division] replaced a “patchwork quilt” of local courts which 
were disjointed in their efforts to administer justice.  Probate judges were elected 
on a partisan ballot with vacancies filled by appointment of county 
commissioners.  Justices of the peace were appointed by the county.  Municipal 
judges were appointed by the cities.  In most instances these were part-time 
positions.  Prior to the 1971 reforms, local courts were commonly held in “homes, 
barbershops, laundries, cafes, or wherever the justice of the peace could be found 
during judicial business hours . . .” 
 
Id.  at 404, 146 P.3d at 670 (Schroeder, C.J., dissenting).  Thus, the Legislature‟s intent was to 
unify and bring order to the system, not to require counties to bear the full burden of providing 
for the needs of the magistrate‟s division.  Unless the Legislature contemplated that cities could 
be called upon to continue shouldering the burden of providing court facilities for city-generated 
cases, no reason existed for the enactment of section 1-2218.  The City is not being put upon here 
to shoulder any burden that the court consolidation legislation did not contemplate a city might 
have.18  The Twin Falls County decision did not alter that situation. 
In sum, Twin Falls County did not relieve the City of its obligations under the 1980 
Order.  The terms of the MOA indicate that the City intended to fulfill its obligations under the 
                                                 
18  The Legislature obviously recognized that a city will generate court cases.  Indeed, I.C. § 50-302(1) provides for 
cities to enact and enforce ordinances.  The Legislature also recognized that enforcement of ordinances may entail 
confinement of violators.  I.C. § 50-302A provides that violators are to be confined in the city jail but allows the city 
to use the county jail provided that the city pay the county for the cost of keeping the violators.  Further, I.C. § 20-
605 allows a county to charge a city for confinement of convicted persons who were charged by city officers for 
violation of state motor vehicle laws or city ordinances.  Thus, it cannot be said that a city, which we assume will 
pay the cost of enforcing its ordinances, as well as the cost of confining violators, would be put upon by also having 
to shoulder the burden of processing those cases through the court system. 
19 
Order by contracting with Ada County.19  In exchange for the County providing the quarters, 
facilities, equipment, staff, supplies, and expenses for the magistrate‟s division, the City would 
compensate the County for the transferred employees and for its share of the maintenance, 
operating, and equipment costs.  Such a voluntary arrangement is a permissible way for the City 
to fulfill its obligations under the 1980 Order.  Thus, the panel correctly concluded Twin Falls 
County was not a substantial and material change of circumstance that would justify rescinding 
the Order.   
2. 
Next, the City contends that the panel erred by failing to consider the adequacy and 
suitability of the new Ada County Courthouse.  It maintains that, upon receiving a request for 
relief from a section 1-2218 order, the district judges are obligated to analyze the suitability and 
adequacy of existing facilities.  The City argues only upon a finding that existing facilities are 
unsuitable or inadequate may such an order be upheld.  Because the panel did not consider either 
the adequacy or suitability of the new Ada County Courthouse, the City contends that the panel‟s 
decision upholding the 1980 Order was unlawful.  Thus, the City regards as irrelevant the fact 
that its filings continue to account for the majority of the magistrate divisions‟ caseload.    
The County argues that the construction of the new courthouse is immaterial to the 
validity of the Order.  Because filings by Boise City continue to account for the majority of the 
magistrate divisions‟ misdemeanor and infraction cases, the original justification for the Order 
remains despite the new facilities.  The County maintains the City‟s assertion that there must be 
an actual necessity for a separate facility is without merit because no such requirement is found 
in the statute.  Further, the County argues that because the decision to consolidate the 
magistrate‟s division into one facility was made jointly by the City and the County, the City 
should not be relieved of its obligations under the Order based on the existence of the new 
facility. 
The panel did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the City remained obligated 
under the 1980 Order despite the construction of the new Ada County Courthouse.  Nothing in 
section 1-2218 requires the district judges to find that existing county facilities are unsuitable or 
                                                 
19 Additionally, the Boise City Council Resolution approving the MOA specifically acknowledged the City‟s 
“continuing responsibility to provide facilities and staffing for the Magistrate‟s Court” and “affirm[ed] its intent to do 
so through [the MOA].”   
20 
inadequate or that a separate facility is necessary before issuing a section 1-2218 order.20   
Rather, the “suitable and adequate” requirement contained in the statute refers to the type of 
quarters a city must provide if ordered to house a magistrate‟s division.  The “necessary” 
requirement refers to the facilities and equipment a city must provide to make the quarters 
functional for their intended use.  Accordingly, the panel did not err in concluding that the 
construction of the new courthouse was not a substantial and material change of circumstance.   
One further observation is necessitated by the posture of this case.  This is not a situation 
where the panel was implementing an order pursuant to section 1-2218.  The Order was issued in 
1980 and no appeal was taken at that time.  Where a panel of judges is considering whether to 
vacate or modify an existing order the primary consideration relates to the magistrate‟s division 
caseload generated by the city.  Section 1-2218 is obviously designed to allow the district judges 
to require a city to provide the necessary facilities to accommodate that caseload.  The panel 
stated as the principal ground for its decision: 
Boise City also argues that the Court should vacate the Order because 
circumstances have changed substantially since 1980.  While it is certainly 
undeniable that Ada County and Boise City have seen significant changes since 
1980, one aspect of community affairs that affects the court system remains 
unchanged:  Boise City accounts for the greatest percentage and the greatest 
number of misdemeanor and infraction filings in Ada County.  This unchanged 
fact alone mitigates against setting aside the Court‟s Order of October 9, 1980.   
 
The panel correctly identified and relied upon this primary consideration in declining to vacate 
the 1980 Order.  That, plus the fact that the City voluntarily entered into the MOA, wherein it 
recognized its continuing responsibility to provide court facilities for city cases and chose to 
meet its obligation by providing funds instead of facilities, clearly justifies the panel‟s decision.  
It is unnecessary to opine what, if any, additional considerations might be appropriate in the 
event of an initial order under section 1-2218. 
3. 
Lastly, the City maintains the panel‟s decision ignored the fact that the City no longer 
receives the statutory court fees authorized by Idaho Code section 31-3201A, which are 
distributed to the entity that provides the facilities for the magistrate‟s division.  It regards Ada 
                                                 
20 Every county is required to provide a courthouse for the conduct of judicial business.  I.C. § 31-1001.  The fact 
that a courthouse may contain more judicial space than necessary to accommodate the present county caseload has 
no bearing on the responsibilities a city may have to provide for handling of city-generated cases.   
21 
County‟s receipt of the fees as “an additional statutory recognition that the entity providing the 
facilities is the entity which must pay for its operation.”  The County contends the fact that the 
City no longer receives the fees is irrelevant because it “does not mean . . . [the City is] „not 
entitled‟ to receive the fees under the statute.” 
As mentioned above, Idaho Code section 31-3201A imposes court fees on individuals 
found guilty of felony, misdemeanor, and infraction offenses.  I.C. § 31-3201A(b) & (c).  The 
fees are apportioned to either the county or the city, depending on which entity provided the 
facility in which the case was filed.  Id.  When a county provides the magistrate court facility, it 
receives a $5.00 court cost fee for every conviction.  Id.  When a city provides the facility, it 
receives the $5.00 court cost fee and an additional $2.50 capital facilities fee.  Id. 
The fact that the City no longer directly receives the statutory fees does not mean it has 
been relieved of its obligations under the 1980 Order.  Initially, as part of its agreement with the 
County, the City would “continue to receive its distribution of fines and court costs” under 
section 31-3201A.21  After subsequent negotiations, however, the fee distribution agreement was 
changed.  Under the new arrangement, the County would credit Boise City the $5.00 fee as a 
“court cost credit,” but the County would receive the $2.50 capital facilities fee since it owned 
the building that housed the consolidated magistrate‟s division.22  Thus, the fact that the City no 
longer received all of the section 31-3201A fees was the result of its reimbursement agreement 
with Ada County.  It was not an implicit recognition that the City was no longer obligated under 
the 1980 Order.  Because the City chose to fulfill its obligations under the 1980 Order by 
contracting with the County, it is disingenuous for the City to argue that the terms of the 
agreement somehow relieved it of its obligations under the 1980 Order.  The district judges, 
therefore, did not err in concluding the fee arrangement agreed upon by the parties was not a 
substantial change of circumstance that justified vacating the Order.       
D. 
 
In declining to vacate the 1980 Order, the panel of district judges rejected Boise City‟s 
argument that the Order imposed a duplicative and non-uniform tax in violation of article VII, 
section 5 of the Idaho Constitution.  The panel reasoned that section 1-2218 and the 1980 Order 
                                                 
21 Nevertheless, the County stopped remitting the fees to the City in 2002 after the magistrate‟s division was 
consolidated.   
22 The negotiations were between the City and the County Clerk.  The final agreement was never reduced to writing, 
but the City acquiesced in the arrangement until it quit making payments in 2007.     
22 
do not impose a tax.  Even if they did, however, the tax was not duplicative or non-uniform.  
Either way, the panel concluded the Order was constitutional. 
On appeal, Boise City argues the panel erred in concluding that the payments made under 
the MOA did not constitute a tax.  The City argues that the 1980 Order imposed a tax on Boise 
City taxpayers because it mandated “a forced contribution by the public at large to meet public 
needs.”  See Brewster v. City of Pocatello, 115 Idaho 502, 505, 768 P.2d 765, 768 (1988).  By 
requiring the City to provide facilities, equipment, staff, personnel, and other expenses for a 
magistrate‟s division, the Order imposed a financial liability on the City, thereby allegedly 
creating a “forced . . . tax levy on city residents.”  The City also challenges the panel‟s 
conclusion that the 1980 Order and section 1-2218 are constitutional.  It contends that the Order 
and statute impose a non-uniform, duplicative tax in violation of article VII, section 5 of the 
Idaho Constitution.  Additionally, it contends the taxes violate equal protection, both facially and 
as-applied to Boise City.   
 
The County argues that the panel correctly concluded the 1980 Order did not impose a 
tax on Boise City residents.  The County points out that the Order itself did not impose a tax, 
instead it leaves the method of complying with its requirements up to the City.  Further, the 
County argues that the City has means other than taxation to pay for the obligations imposed by 
the Order.  Specifically, the City could use service fees, fines, and licensing fees to fund the 
obligations.  Finally, the County argues that, even if the Order did impose a tax, the tax is 
uniform and not duplicative. 
A tax is generally defined as “an enforced contribution exacted pursuant to legislative 
authority for the purpose of raising revenue to be used for public or governmental purposes.”  84 
C.J.S. Taxation § 1 (2009).  Because taxation is a legislative function, a citizen‟s obligation to 
pay a tax “is a purely statutory creation.”  Id. § 2.  Thus, taxes may not be assessed or collected 
until the legislature levies a tax.  Id. § 423.   A statute does not levy a tax unless it “fixes the 
amount or rate to be imposed.”  Id. § 1.   
The City‟s attempt to characterize the 1980 Order as a tax is unpersuasive.  Neither the 
Order nor section 1-2218 levied a tax on City taxpayers.  The language of the Order, which 
traces the language of the statute, does not even mention taxation let alone require the City to 
fulfill its obligations under the Order by taxing its residents.  Instead, the Order imposes a 
general obligation on the City to provide suitable and adequate quarters for a magistrate‟s 
23 
division of the district court.  It leaves decisions regarding how to fund the facility to the City‟s 
discretion.  Moreover, neither the Order nor the statute establishes any fixed amount the City 
must expend to fulfill its obligation of providing suitable and adequate quarters for a magistrate‟s 
division.  As such, they did not levy a tax.23  Finally, the purpose of a section 1-2218 order is not 
to raise general revenue.  Such orders are issued for the sole purpose of providing suitable and 
adequate quarters for a magistrate‟s division.  Consequently, neither the 1980 Order nor section 
1-2218 imposed a tax on City taxpayers. 
Similarly, the City‟s payments to the County under the MOA are not the equivalent of a 
tax assessed by the County.  See, e.g., United States v. Maryland Cas. Co., 323 F.2d 473, 475 (5th 
Cir. 1963) (stating that “federal taxes do not arise out of contractual obligations, but rather by 
federal law”).  The City voluntarily entered into the MOA, in which it agreed to fulfill its 
obligations under the Order by compensating the County.  Such a voluntary reimbursement 
scheme could hardly be compared to a tax.  If that were the case, any contract or agreement 
requiring the City to make payments would constitute taxation. 
In sum, neither the 1980 Order, section 1-2218, nor the MOA levied a tax on Boise City 
taxpayers.  Because no tax was imposed, we need not address the City‟s arguments that the 
purported tax violated article VII, section 5 of the Idaho Constitution and equal protection.  
E. 
The County requests an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code section 
12-121.  It argues that, as the prevailing party, it is entitled to fees because the City failed to 
show the panel misapplied well-established law.  The City argues that the County is not entitled 
to attorney fees under section 12-121 because the appeal was not brought frivolously.  Further, it 
contends that section 12-121 does not apply in cases where a county is an adverse party. 
Under Idaho Code section 12-121, a court may award attorney fees to the prevailing party 
in a civil action.  I.C. § 12-121.  An award of attorney fees pursuant to the section may only be 
made when the court “is left with the abiding belief that the appeal was brought, pursued or 
defended frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation.”  Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho, 710, 
718, 170 P.3d 375, 383 (2007) (quoting Balderson v. Balderson, 127 Idaho 48, 54, 896 P.2d 956, 
                                                 
23 Had the Order attempted to levy a tax, it would have been invalid since the panel did not have the authority to impose 
a tax on the City.  See 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 423 (2009) (stating that levying a tax is a legislative function and not a 
judicial function).   
24 
962 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Such circumstances exist when an appellant has 
only asked the appellate court to second-guess the trial court by reweighing the evidence or has 
failed to show that the trial court incorrectly applied well-established law.  Nelson, 144 Idaho at 
718, 170 P.3d at 383.  Conversely, fees generally will not be awarded when “the losing party 
brought the appeal in good faith and where a genuine issue of law was presented.”  Id. 
The County is not entitled to an award of fees under section 12-121.24  Although the 
County is the prevailing party on appeal, it failed to demonstrate that the City brought its appeal 
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.  The City‟s petition raised legitimate legal and 
factual questions regarding the impact of this Court‟s decision in Twin Falls County.  Because 
the County has not asserted any other basis for an award of fees,25 its request for fees is denied. 
III. 
 
The panel‟s order granting the County‟s motion to intervene and its decision declining to 
set aside the 1980 Order are affirmed.  Neither party is entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
 
Chief Justice EISMANN, and Justices BURDICK, W. JONES, and HORTON 
CONCUR.   
                                                 
24 Contrary to the City‟s assertion, Idaho Code section 12-117 does not provide the sole basis for an award of fees in 
this case.  That section permits an award of fees in actions between a “state agency, a city, a county or other taxing 
district and a person.”  I.C. § 12-117(1) (emphasis added).  Here, the action is between two governmental entities, 
not a governmental entity and a person. 
25 While the County argues it is entitled to fees under “all . . . pertinent statutory and case law,” it did not identify 
that law in its argument or explain why it is entitled to fees under any specific authority.  Since the County failed to 
support its general request with argument and authority, we will not consider the issue.  See Bingham v. Montane 
Res. Assocs., 133 Idaho 420, 427, 987 P.2d 1035, 1042 (1999) (“This Court will not consider issues cited on appeal 
that are not supported by propositions of law, authority or argument.” (quoting Meisner v. Potlatch Corp., 131 Idaho 
258, 263, 954 P.2d 676, 681 (1998))).