Title: RICHARD A. MARSHALL, JR. V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RICHARD A. MARSHALL, JR. V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 164125 P.3d 269Case Number: 04-156Decided: 12/28/2005
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
RICHARD 
A. MARSHALL, JR.,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Tonya A. 
Morse, Cheyenne, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Dee Morgan, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. 
Morgan.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Richard Marshall 
was convicted following a jury trial of one count of aiding and abetting in the 
commission of aggravated robbery and one count of conspiracy to commit 
aggravated robbery. Marshall requests this Court review whether the prosecutor 
transgressed the tenets of Kwallek v. 
State, 596 P.2d 1372 (Wyo. 1979), and its progeny, whether he was deprived 
of a fair trial because of judicial bias, whether trial counsel rendered 
constitutionally ineffective assistance, and whether prosecutorial misconduct 
occurred during closing argument.  
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Marshall presents the 
following issues for our review:

 
 
I.          
Whether the prosecution's solicitation of testimony as to the guilty 
pleas of the co-conspirators or his use of the guilty pleas in argument was 
plain error that effectively denied Appellant his right to a trial on the 
merits?

 
 
II.          
Whether judicial bias deprived the Appellant of his constitutional right 
to a fair trial?

 
 
III.         
Whether ineffective assistance of counsel denied Appellant his 
constitutional right to a fair trial?

 
 
IV.        
Whether prosecutorial misconduct denied Appellant his constitutional 
right to a fair trial?

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On April 23, 
2003, three masked individuals robbed at gunpoint the Hilltop Barbershop in 
Casper.  Zachery Smith, Charles Garrison, Crystal 
Garrison and Marshall were later arrested and charged for the crime.  Smith and the Garrisons eventually pled 
guilty to charges arising from their criminal misconduct and testified against 
Marshall at his 
trial.  After a five-day trial, the 
jury found Marshall guilty of conspiracy to commit 
aggravated robbery and aiding and abetting in the commission of the same.  The district court sentenced Marshall to concurrent 
prison terms of five to eight years.  
This appeal followed.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 

Testimony 
Regarding Witnesses' Guilty Pleas

 
 
[¶4]      Marshall contends plain 
error occurred when the prosecutor elicited testimony from Smith and Crystal 
Garrison that they had pled guilty to charges stemming from the robbery of the 
Hilltop Barbershop.  This Court has 
consistently stated that "when two persons are indicted for separate offenses 
growing out of the same circumstance, the fact that one has pleaded guilty is 
inadmissible against the other."  Kwallek v. State, 596 P.2d 1372, 1375 
(Wyo. 1979); see also KP v. State, 
2004 WY 165, ¶ 14, 102 P.3d 217, 221-22 (Wyo. 2004); Adams v. State, 2003 WY 152, ¶ 27, 79 P.3d 526, 534 (Wyo. 2003); Capshaw v. 
State, 11 P.3d 905, 911 (Wyo. 2000); Mazurek v. State, 10 P.3d 531, 535 (Wyo. 
2000); Urrutia v. State, 924 P.2d 965, 969 (Wyo. 1996).  The rationale 
for the rule is that the evidence "is irrelevant and incompetent because it 
suggests that since the confederate is guilty, the defendant must also be 
guilty, and this inference violates the defendant's right to have his trial on 
its own merits."  Kwallek, 596 P.2d  at 
1375-76.

 
 
[¶5]      On appeal, 
Marshall fails 
to acknowledge that he waived this issue during trial.  During his cross-examination of Smith, 
he elicited detailed information concerning Smith's plea agreement with the 
State.  The State specifically 
requested clarification as to whether defense counsel was waiving any 
potentially available objection under Kwallek and its progeny.  Defense counsel expressly acknowledged 
he was indeed waiving any such objection.  
The exact same events took place during defense counsel's 
cross-examination of Crystal and Charles Garrison.  These exchanges clearly demonstrate that 
defense counsel waived any claim of error on this issue.  Therefore, we will not address it 
further.

 
 

Judicial 
Bias

 
 
[¶6]      Marshall next argues he 
was deprived of a fair trial because the trial judge was biased against him and 
his trial counsel.  As proof of this 
bias, Marshall 
alleges that the judge rebuked defense counsel, agreed with the State when it 
made objections, sustained objections before they were fully stated and 
interfered with counsel's examination of the witnesses.  Marshall claims the judge's actions impeded his 
ability to present a defense and implied to the jury that the judge thought 
defense counsel was incompetent, thereby prejudicing the jury against 
him.

 
 
[¶7]      Marshall's argument 
consists solely of factually and legally unsupported allegations of judicial 
bias.  In construing the word 
"bias," this Court has stated:

 
 
Bias is 
a leaning of the mind or an inclination toward one person over another.  The "bias" . . . must be personal, and 
it must be such a condition of the mind which sways judgment and renders the 
judge unable to exercise his functions impartially in a given case or which is 
inconsistent with a state of mind fully open to the conviction which evidence 
might produce.

 
 

Pearson 
v. State, 866 P.2d 1297, 1300 (Wyo. 1994) (citing Hopkinson v. State, 679 P.2d 1008, 1031 
(Wyo. 1984)); see also TZ Land & Cattle Co. v. 
Condict, 795 P.2d 1204, 1211 (Wyo. 1990).  In condemning the trial judge, Marshall has not pointed 
to any evidence that the judge was predisposed to rule against him or that the 
judge's rulings were based on anything other than the law and the facts before 
him.  Nor has Marshall cited to any 
authority that the alleged judicial improprieties he has identified, in and of 
themselves, legally constitute judicial bias.  Instead, Marshall has merely provided a list of adverse 
rulings from the trial transcript and a bald assertion that the trial court was 
biased against him.  An appellant 
must show more than the fact that a trial court ruled against him on any 
particular matter to demonstrate judicial bias.  Brown v. Avery, 850 P.2d 612, 616-17 
(Wyo. 
1993).  Marshall has failed to 
carry that burden.

 
 
[¶8]      Moreover, our 
independent review of the record reveals no evidence that the trial judge was 
biased against Marshall during any portion of the criminal 
proceedings.  The judge's conduct 
and his evidentiary rulings were based on sound reasoning and were consistent 
with the Wyoming Rules of Evidence.  
Simply put, we find no merit in Marshall's claim.

 

Ineffective 
Assistance of Trial Counsel

 
 
[¶9]      Marshall contends that 
trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.  Marshall's allegations of ineffectiveness 
revolve around two issues: defense counsel's failure to comply with notice and 
discovery requirements, resulting in the exclusion of expert medical testimony 
concerning his physical disability; and counsel's failure to object to the 
prosecutor's reference to Jury Instruction No. 19 during closing 
argument.

 
 
[¶10]   We review claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel under the following standard:

 
 
When 
reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the paramount 
determination is whether, in light of all the circumstances, trial counsel's 
acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance.  Herdt v. State, 891 P.2d 793, 796 
(Wyo. 1995); Starr v. State, 888 P.2d 1262, 1266-67 
(Wyo. 1995); Arner v. State, 872 P.2d 100, 104 
(Wyo. 1994); Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135, 145 
(Wyo. 
1986).  The reviewing court should 
indulge a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made 
all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional 
judgment.  Herdt, at 796; Starr, at 1266; Arner, at 104; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065, 
80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).

 
 
Under 
the two-prong standard articulated in Strickland and Frias, an appellant claiming ineffective 
assistance of counsel must demonstrate on the record that counsel's performance 
was deficient and that prejudice resulted.  
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687, 104 S. Ct.  at 
2064; Starr, at 1266; King v. State, 810 P.2d 119, 125 
(Wyo. 1991) (Cardine, J., dissenting); Campbell v. State, 728 P.2d 628, 629 
(Wyo. 1986); 
Frias, 722 P.2d  at 145.   In other words, to warrant reversal on a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must demonstrate that 
his counsel failed to "render such assistance as would have been offered by a 
reasonably competent attorney" and that "counsel's deficiency prejudiced the 
defense of the case."  Lower v. State, 786 P.2d 346, 349 
(Wyo.1990).  "The benchmark for 
judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so 
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial 
cannot be relied on as having produced a just result."  Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 686, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064.

 
 

Duke v. 
State, 2004 
WY 120, ¶ 36, 99 P.3d 928, 943 (Wyo. 2004), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 2513, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1113 (2005).  
The burden of proving that counsel was ineffective rests entirely on an 
appellant.  Id. (citing Asch v. State, 2003 WY 18, ¶ 11, 62 P.3d 945, 950 (Wyo. 2003); Barkell v. 
State, 2002 WY 153, ¶ 10, 55 P.3d 1239, 1242 (Wyo. 2002)).  "To satisfy his burden, an appellant 
must provide more than mere speculation or equivocal inferences."  Id. (citing Sincock v. State, 2003 WY 115, ¶ 37, 76 P.3d 323, 337 (Wyo. 2003); Barkell, ¶ 
13, 55 P.3d at 1243).

 
 
[¶11]   Marshall's first complaint concerns counsel's 
failure to introduce expert mental health testimony that he suffered from the 
physical disability fibromyalgia.  
According to Marshall, that testimony would have shown that 
he was incapable of driving due to his disability and, thus, negated the State's 
evidence that he drove the getaway vehicle during the robbery.  The problem with Marshall's ineffectiveness 
claim is that it is based on a faulty premise that the trial court disallowed 
the experts' testimony solely because counsel failed to timely comply with 
notice and discovery requirements.  
The record in this case reveals that the trial court ultimately excluded 
the testimony for two reasons:  the 
discovery violation and its determination that the mental health professionals, 
a psychologist and a counselor, were not qualified to testify about Marshall's physical 
disability.  Consequently, even if 
counsel failed to comply with discovery requirements, Marshall cannot show 
prejudice from counsel's conduct.  
The trial court still would have excluded the experts' testimony based on 
the experts' lack of qualifications.

 
 
[¶12]   Marshall also faults trial counsel for not 
objecting to the prosecutor's use of Jury Instruction No. 19 during closing 
argument.1  He claims that the prosecutor's comments 
regarding that instruction implied that "the judge endorsed and approved the 
testimony of the accomplices."  We 
summarily reject Marshall's claim for two reasons.  First, Marshall has not identified with specificity 
the comments upon which counsel was remiss in not objecting.  Second, compounding that glaring 
omission, Marshall has failed to provide any legal 
analysis supporting his ineffectiveness claim.  We have consistently stated that we will 
not consider claims devoid of cogent argument and citation to legal 
authority.  Duke, ¶ 49, 99 P.3d  at 946; Eustice v. State, 11 P.3d 897, 904 (Wyo. 
2000); Blumhagen v. State, 11 P.3d 889, 897 n.2 (Wyo. 2000).  We apply 
that rule in this instance.

 
 

Prosecutorial 
Misconduct

 
 
[¶13]   Marshall asserts that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct during closing argument because he personally vouched for the 
credibility of the State's witnesses and interpreted the jury instructions "in a 
manner that implied that [the] judge was advocating for the State's 
position."  With respect to claims 
of prosecutorial misconduct, this Court has stated:

 
 
Claims 
of prosecutorial misconduct are settled by reference to the entire record and 
hinge on whether the accused's case has been so prejudiced as to constitute the 
denial of a fair trial.  English v. State, 982 P.2d 139, 143 
(Wyo. 1999) (quoting Gayler v. State, 957 P.2d 855, 860 
(Wyo. 1998); Arevalo v. State, 939 P.2d 228, 230 
(Wyo. 
1997)).  The propriety of any 
comment within a closing argument is judged "in the context of the prosecutor's 
entire argument, considering the context of the statements and comparing them 
with the evidence produced at the trial."  
Wilks [v. State, 2002 WY 100], ¶ 26, [49 P.3d 975, 986 (Wyo. 2002)] (citing Burton v. 
State, 2002 WY 71, ¶ 11, 46 P.3d 309, [313] (Wyo. 2002)).  The burden of proving prejudicial error 
rests with the appellant.  Wilks, at ¶ 26; see also Taylor [v. State, 2001 WY 13], ¶ 19[, 17 P.3d 715, 722 (Wyo. 2001)]; Tennant v. 
State, 786 P.2d 339, 346 (Wyo.1990).

 
 

Duke, 2004 
WY 120, ¶ 100, 99 P.3d  at 957.

 
 
[¶14]   Because Marshall did not object at 
trial to the alleged incidents of misconduct, it is incumbent upon him to 
demonstrate plain error, which demands:

 
 
First, 
the record must be clear as to the incident which is alleged as error.  Second, the party claiming the error 
amounted to plain error must demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of 
law was violated.  Finally, that 
party must prove a substantial right has been denied him and, as a result, he 
has been materially prejudiced.

 
 

Id. at ¶ 
101, 99 P.3d  at 957.  We are 
reluctant to find plain error in a closing argument "lest the trial court 
becomes required to control argument because opposing counsel does not 
object."  Lafond v. State, 2004 WY 51, ¶ 35, 89 P.3d 324, 336 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Helm 
v. State, 1 P.3d 635, 639 (Wyo. 2000)).

 
 
[¶15]   Marshall's first allegation of prosecutorial 
misconduct is directed at the following remarks:

 
 
Why 
would anyone make that part of it up if it didn't happen?  Three people made that up and it didn't 
happen?

 
 
* * * * 

 
 
But, 
ladies and gentlemen, consider something else; that each one of these witnesses, 
independent of each other and without an opportunity to consult with each other, 
all three confessed before any plea agreement was entered.  

 
 
Appellant 
contends that these comments constitute impermissible vouching for the 
credibility of the State's witnesses.  
We disagree.  

 
 
[¶16]When 
viewed in proper context, the prosecutor's statements are a legitimate argument 
as to what inferences the jury should, or should not, draw from the evidence 
produced at trial, and what evidence and other factors the jury should weigh in 
evaluating the credibility of Smith, the Garrisons, and Marshall.  In the first statement, the prosecutor 
was merely commenting on the evidence that all three of the accomplices in the 
robbery, Smith and the Garrisons, said the same thing about the events leading 
up to the robbery.  The second 
statement is just a recap of the testimony concerning Smith's and the Garrisons' 
confessions and their plea agreements with the State  that they confessed to 
the crime before they were given a plea deal.  We have stated that the purpose of 
closing argument is to give both the prosecution and defense counsel the 
opportunity to explain the significance of the evidence and how it should be 
viewed.  Jeschke v. State, 642 P.2d 1298, 1302 
(Wyo. 
1982).  During closing argument, the 
prosecutor is entitled to comment on the evidence and to draw reasonable 
inferences from it in order to assist the jury in its fact finding 
function.  Taul v. State, 862 P.2d 649, 659 
(Wyo. 1993); McLaughlin v. State, 780 P.2d 964, 
967-68 (Wyo. 
1989).  We find that the 
prosecutor's comments did not transgress the line of permissible 
argument.

 
 
[¶17]   Marshall next takes issue with the prosecutor's 
statement:

 
 
And you 
have been instructed by the judge that many times inconsistencies are simply a 
matter of people seeing things different ways, forgetting things, or simply 
remembering them differently after eight months; or maybe you'll remember them a 
little differently if you're Charlie Garrison and you've been sitting in a jail 
cell for eight months, listening to people call you a rat because you told the 
police the very night he was arrested exactly what happened in this robbery. 

 
 
[¶18]   However, in asserting error, 
Marshall has 
failed to present a cogent argument, with citation to pertinent legal authority, 
explaining what rule of law the challenged comments violated in a clear and 
obvious way.  Nor has he provided 
any analysis as to how he was materially prejudiced by those comments.  Instead, Marshall merely provides a bald assertion that 
it was misconduct for the prosecutor to "interpret the jury instructions for the 
jury and in a manner that implied that [the] judge was advocating for the 
State's position."  Such is 
insufficient for this Court to find reversible plain error.2

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶19]   We find that Marshall waived any 
potential error regarding the testimony relating to the witnesses' guilty 
pleas.  Marshall has failed to 
convince this Court that any reversible error exists with respect to any of the 
issues raised in this appeal.  
Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Jury 
Instruction No. 19 pertains to accomplice testimony, following the language of 
W.Cr.P.J.I. 6.04 (2004).

 
 

2Marshall's complaint concerning the prosecutor's reference to 
Jury Instruction No. 19 also suffers from the same 
infirmity.