Title: State v. Coburn

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Coburn (2005-033); 179 Vt. 448; 898 A.2d 128

2006 VT 31

[Filed 14-Apr-2006]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                   
                                 2006 VT 31

                                No. 2005-033


  State of Vermont                               Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.                                        District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 1, Windham Circuit

  Gary Nelson Coburn                             November Term, 2005


  Robert Grussing III, J.

  William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, David Tartter, Assistant Attorney
    General, and Sara R. Parsowith, Legal Intern (On the Brief), Montpelier,
    for Plaintiff-Appellee.

  William E. Kraham of Weber, Perra & Munzing, P.C., Brattleboro, for
    Defendant-Appellant.


  PRESENT:  Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and Burgess, JJ.

        
       ¶  1.  BURGESS, J.   Defendant appeals his conviction for criminal
  refusal under 23 V.S.A. § 1201(b).  The statute makes it a crime for a
  person suspected of driving under the influence to refuse a police
  officer's reasonable request for a breath test if that person has a prior
  DUI conviction.  Defendant argues that the standardized paragraph read by
  police to DUI suspects, warning them that refusing a breath test may be
  charged as a crime, is incomprehensible as a matter of law and therefore
  violates due process.  Defendant also argues that, absent a comprehensible
  warning, the State failed to prove that the police officer's request for a
  breath test was "reasonable," which is a required element of the statutory
  offense. (FN1)  We affirm.

                                     I.

       ¶  2.  Defendant does not dispute the facts.  On February 26, 2004,
  defendant was pulled over for speeding.  Upon suspicion that defendant was
  driving under the influence, the police officer requested a preliminary
  breath test.  Defendant refused.  The police officer arrested defendant
  and, upon returning to the police station to administer an evidentiary
  breath test, read the following standardized warning aloud to defendant:

    If you refuse to provide an evidentiary test, and if you have
    either been previously convicted of an offense pursuant to Title
    23 section 1201 or of any section of present or prior law of this
    or any other jurisdiction which prohibited operating, attempting
    to operate, or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle
    on a highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or
    drugs, or both, or while having .08 percent or more by weight of
    alcohol in the person's blood or an alcohol concentration of .08
    or more, or if you have been involved in an accident/collision
    resulting in serious bodily injury or death of another, you may be
    charged with the crime of criminal refusal.
   
  When asked whether he understood the warning (which was one portion of a
  lengthier set of advisements), defendant said he did and persisted in his
  refusal to take a breath test.  Defendant declined to exercise his right to
  speak with an attorney before making his decision.  Defendant, who had a
  prior DUI conviction, was charged with criminal refusal.

       ¶  3.  Before trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence of
  his refusal, arguing that, as a matter of law, the standardized warning
  could not be understood by a person of ordinary intelligence, and therefore
  any conviction based on his refusal would violate due process.  The trial
  court denied this motion in a written order.  While acknowledging that the
  warning read to defendant was "arguably confusing," the court concluded
  that, at most, a suspect might be uncertain as to how the statute would be
  applied in his or her particular situation.  The court determined that the
  warning was effective in conveying "that a refusal to submit to the
  evidentiary breath test could result in a charge of criminal refusal under
  some circumstances.  Most reasonable listeners will also understand that a
  refusal could result in a charge of criminal refusal if there is a prior
  DUI."

       ¶  4.  At trial, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal at the
  conclusion of the State's case, forwarding a similar but distinct argument. 
  Instead of contending that the language of the warning was unclear as a
  matter of law, defendant argued that the warning was unclear under the
  particular facts and circumstances of this case, and that, because the
  warning was unclear, the State had failed to prove a necessary element of
  the offense: that the officer's request for a breath test was reasonable. 
  The trial court rejected this argument from the bench, emphasizing that
  this issue required a factual inquiry and determining that, because the
  State had presented evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude
  the officer's request was reasonable, a judgment of acquittal was not
  warranted.
   
       ¶  5.  Next, the defendant presented his case, during which he put
  on extensive expert testimony by a professor of linguistics.  Applying a
  variety of analytical methods, the expert opined that the standardized
  warning, which is lengthy and contains multiple subordinate clauses, was so
  complex that it could not be readily understood when read aloud.  Defendant
  then renewed his motion for acquittal at the close of the defense case,
  arguing that the expert testimony demonstrated that the standardized
  warning was so unclear that the officer's request for a breath test could
  not be found reasonable.  The court again deferred to the jury,
  acknowledging that the expert testimony was strong, but concluding the
  finder of fact was not obligated to accept the expert's conclusions.


       ¶  6.  Defendant requested a jury instruction requiring the State to
  prove "[t]hat the law enforcement officer clearly warned [defendant] of his
  rights and the consequences of refusing the test," including that the
  suspect "will be charged with the crime of criminal refusal if he refuses
  the test and has a prior DUI conviction."  Out of what appears to have been
  an abundance of caution, the trial court did instruct the jury that the
  officer's request for a breath test was reasonable if: (1) the officer had
  a reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving under the influence; and
  (2) the warning read by the officer prior to requesting the breath test
  would advise a person of ordinary intelligence of the consequences of
  refusing the test.  The jury returned a verdict of guilty.

                                     II.

       ¶  7.  Defendant presents two alternative arguments on appeal.  First,
  defendant argues that the language of the standardized warning is so
  unclear that it violates due process as a matter of law.  Second, he argues
  that because the standardized warning is unclear, the State failed to prove
  that the officer made a "reasonable request under the circumstances," as
  required by the statute.  23 V.S.A. § 1201(b).  We reject both contentions.
   
                                     A.

       ¶  8.  Defendant raised his due process argument in the motion to
  suppress evidence of his refusal.  On appeal from the denial of a motion to
  suppress, we review the legal conclusions of the trial court de novo.  See
  State v. Rheaume, 2005 VT 106, ¶ 6, 16 Vt. L. Wk. 278,