Title: State v. Debra Ann Head

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2002 WI 99 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
99-3071-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Debra Ann Head,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2000 WI App 275 
Reported at:  240 Wis. 2d 162, 622 N.W.2d 9 
(Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 11, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 4, 2001   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Rock-Janesville   
 
JUDGE: 
Richard T. Werner   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins concurrence.   
WILCOX, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
CROOKS, J., joins concurrence. 
 
DISSENTED: 
   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
John D. Hyland, Marcus J. Berghahn and Hurley, Burish & 
Milliken, S.C., Madison, and oral argument by John D. Hyland. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by 
Christopher G. Wren, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Katherine R. Kruse, 
Walter J. Dickey and the Frank Remington Center, University of 
Wisconsin Law School, Madison, on behalf of the Frank J. 
Remington Center. 
 
 
2002 WI 99 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The 
final version will appear in the 
bound 
volume 
of 
the 
official 
reports.   
No.  99-3071-CR   
(L.C. No. 
98 CF 1693) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Debra Ann Head,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 11, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.  This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals1 which affirmed a judgment of 
the Rock County Circuit Court.  The petitioner, Debra Head 
(Debra), was convicted by a jury of first-degree intentional 
homicide for shooting and killing her husband, Harold Head 
(Harold).  She claimed that she had acted in self-defense.  To 
support her assertion, Debra attempted to introduce evidence of 
                                                 
1 State v. Head, 2000 WI App 275, 240 Wis. 2d 162, 622 
N.W.2d 9. 
No. 99-3071-CR  
2 
 
Harold's alleged threats and acts of violence towards her in the 
past, as well as her knowledge of Harold's threats and acts of 
violence towards others.  She argued that these incidents 
explained her mental state at the time of the shooting and 
justified her theory of self-defense. 
¶2 
After Debra made an offer of proof, Circuit Judge 
Richard T. Werner denied her motion to introduce most of the 
proffered evidence, finding that the evidence did not provide a 
sufficient factual basis to support a self-defense theory.  The 
court ruled that Debra was required to make a threshold showing 
that, viewed objectively, she had a "reasonable belief that she 
was preventing or terminating an unlawful interference with her 
person or actually believed that . . . the force used was 
necessary . . . to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm 
to her."  The court determined that Debra had not made such a 
showing and excluded evidence of Harold's abuse of Debra in the 
past and of her knowledge of Harold's violent acts towards 
others.  The court also denied Debra's request that it instruct 
the jury as to both: (1) perfect self-defense, which gives the 
jury a basis to find a defendant not guilty; and (2) imperfect 
self-defense, which permits the jury to find guilt on the lesser 
charge of second-degree intentional homicide. 
¶3 
The court of appeals affirmed Debra's conviction, and 
this court accepted her petition for review.  At issue in this 
appeal are the standards for raising perfect self-defense as a 
complete affirmative defense to a charge of first-degree 
intentional homicide, and imperfect self-defense (unnecessary 
No. 99-3071-CR  
3 
 
defensive force) to mitigate that charge.  This case requires us 
to examine the standards governing the admission of evidence of 
a victim's violent character and prior acts of violence, and the 
standards for jury instructions on self-defense. 
¶4 
First, we hold that a defendant seeking a jury 
instruction on perfect self-defense to a charge of first-degree 
intentional homicide must satisfy an objective threshold showing 
that she reasonably believed that she was preventing or 
terminating an unlawful interference with her person and 
reasonably believed that the force she used was necessary to 
prevent imminent death or great bodily harm.2  A defendant is 
entitled to an instruction on perfect self-defense when the 
trial evidence places self-defense in issue.  Perfect self-
defense is placed in issue when, under a reasonable view of the 
trial evidence, a jury could conclude that the state has failed 
to meet its burden to disprove one of the elements of self-
defense beyond a reasonable doubt.  We make no judgment whether 
Debra Head was entitled to an instruction on perfect self-
defense in this case.  We defer to the circuit court, which will 
hear the case on remand, to apply the correct standards for a 
self-defense instruction based upon evidence presented at trial. 
¶5 
Second, we hold that a defendant seeking a jury 
instruction on unnecessary defensive force (imperfect self-
defense) to a charge of first-degree intentional homicide is not 
                                                 
2 We use female pronouns throughout this opinion to avoid 
the wordy repetition of phrases such as "he or she" in a case 
involving a female defendant. 
No. 99-3071-CR  
4 
 
required to satisfy an objective threshold showing that she was 
acting under a reasonable belief that she was in imminent danger 
of death or great bodily harm or that the force she used was 
necessary to defend herself.  Rather, the defendant must show 
some evidence that she actually believed that she was in 
imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and actually 
believed that the force she used was necessary to defend 
herself.  A defendant is entitled to an instruction on 
unnecessary defensive force when the trial evidence places this 
mitigation defense in issue.  Unnecessary defensive force is 
placed in issue when, under a reasonable view of the trial 
evidence, a jury could conclude that the state has failed to 
meet its burden to disprove either that the defendant actually 
believed she was in danger of imminent death or great bodily 
harm or that she actually believed the force she used was 
necessary 
to 
defend 
herself, 
even 
if 
both 
beliefs 
were 
unreasonable. 
¶6 
Third, we hold that a defendant who claims self-
defense to a charge of first-degree intentional homicide may use 
evidence of a victim's violent character and past acts of 
violence to show a satisfactory factual basis that she actually 
believed she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily 
harm and actually believed that the force used was necessary to 
defend herself, even if both beliefs were unreasonable. 
¶7 
We conclude in this case that Debra's offer of proof 
established 
a 
sufficient 
factual 
basis 
for 
a 
claim 
of 
unnecessary defensive force (imperfect self-defense) and that 
No. 99-3071-CR  
5 
 
she should have been allowed to present evidence of Harold's 
violent character and past acts of violence at trial in an 
effort to mitigate the charge of first-degree intentional 
homicide.  Moreover, she was entitled to a jury instruction on 
second-degree intentional homicide on the basis of the evidence 
that was introduced at trial.  Because evidence that should have 
been admitted was excluded and because an instruction that 
should have been given was denied, we conclude that Debra Head 
is entitled to a new trial.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals and remand this case to the 
circuit court. 
¶8 
Finally, we conclude that Wis JI——Criminal 1014, the 
jury 
instruction involving 
the mitigation 
of 
first-degree 
intentional homicide to second-degree intentional homicide based 
on unnecessary defensive force, does not accurately reflect the 
law as set forth in this opinion.  We therefore request that the 
Wisconsin Criminal Jury Instructions Committee revisit and amend 
Wis JI——Criminal 
1014 
and 
other 
relevant 
instructions 
in 
accordance with this opinion. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶9 
Our objective in this opinion is not to determine 
whether the State adduced sufficient evidence to sustain Debra 
Head's conviction for first-degree intentional homicide.  Our 
objective is to determine whether the defendant offered a 
sufficient factual basis for self-defense, so that the court was 
required to admit some of her proffered evidence at trial and 
required to permit some or all of her theory of the case to go 
No. 99-3071-CR  
6 
 
to the jury.  Consequently, for purposes of this appeal, we 
present the defendant's proffered evidence and trial testimony 
in the light most favorable to the defendant and acknowledge 
that this one-sided perspective of events does not represent the 
full story. 
¶10 Debra Head was convicted of first-degree intentional 
homicide for shooting and killing her husband Harold on May 29, 
1998, at their home in the Town of Johnstown in Rock County.  
The Heads had been married for 22 years and had two daughters. 
¶11 In late January 1998 the Heads' 17-year-old daughter 
Brenda informed her mother that she was pregnant and that 21-
year-old Chad Graves was the father of her unborn child.  On 
Valentine's Day weekend, Debra and Brenda told Harold about the 
pregnancy, and he became enraged.  He went into the bedroom he 
shared with Debra.  He came out with two guns, stormed out of 
the house, and drove off to look for Graves, squealing his tires 
in the driveway.  Harold threatened to kill Graves if he found 
him.  He returned home later that night with his mother and 
brother, who had taken away his guns as well as a billy club 
that Harold kept in his vehicle. 
¶12 Over the next several months, Harold continued to make 
threats against Graves, once claiming that if he encountered 
Graves, "he’s dead; they’ll pick him up in a body bag."  Debra 
tried to avoid talk of their daughter's pregnancy because the 
mere mention of Graves' name would set Harold off.  "It was like 
you lit the fuse of a bomb," she said. 
No. 99-3071-CR  
7 
 
¶13 On the evening of May 28, 1998, Debra and Harold 
argued about their finances.  The argument was not heated. 
¶14 The next morning, May 29, Debra overslept.  Knowing 
that she would be late for work, she decided to stay home and 
talk to Harold again about their finances and apologize for not 
telling him the truth about not paying certain overdue bills.  
She testified that she had lied to her husband because she was 
afraid of his reaction.  Harold was asleep, lying on his left 
side, on the half of the bed closest to the bedroom door.  When 
Debra woke Harold by shaking his foot, he rolled over on his 
back and then to his right side, to face her.  She was standing 
next to the bed, at his feet.  Debra asked Harold if he were 
still upset about the events of the previous night.  He said 
that he was.  The two went on to discuss and work out some of 
the problems with their finances. 
¶15 Debra then turned the conversation towards Brenda and 
Graves.  This upset Harold, who began yelling that Graves had 
ruined his life and ruined Brenda's life.  Debra tried to reason 
with Harold, telling him that he was mistaken, that he would 
have to come around, that he could not disown his daughter and 
refuse to accept Graves or his unborn grandchild.  Harold became 
angry and said: "It's been all your fault ever since.  Your 
fault Brenda got pregnant.  It's your fault that this all 
happened."  He continued, "Fuck Chad and fuck you, too.  I'm 
sick of it."  Then he said: "Maybe I should just take care of 
you guys and get on with my life."  Debra understood this to be 
a threat, that Harold thought of her the same as he thought of 
No. 99-3071-CR  
8 
 
Graves.  She thought Harold was going to kill her and then kill 
Graves. 
¶16 Debra testified that Harold clenched his fists, threw 
back the covers, and rolled across the bed "like he was going to 
reach for something."  Debra knew that Harold kept a handgun 
under his side of the bed——the side on which she was now 
standing.  She grabbed the gun, knowing that "that's what he was 
going for." 
¶17 Debra was afraid.  "Harold made the first move like he 
was coming after me, and I reacted to protect myself."  She 
pointed the gun at her husband.  They spoke briefly, with Debra 
telling him that he was wrong in the way he was thinking about 
Brenda and Chad. 
¶18 Harold, 43, was a big man, 6 feet tall, 278 pounds.  
At first he appeared terrified, but as they spoke "he got more 
furious" and "that's when he made the move to come toward me."  
"There was a fire in his eyes that I had never seen before," and 
Debra was afraid.  At that instant, "it was like he was the 
weapon, I was the victim, and he had made that move; I reacted," 
she said.  "His hands were clenched into fists, and he was 
getting out of bed, coming at me." 
¶19 Debra then shot her husband twice, once in his chest, 
once in his midsection.3  An eight-year-old neighbor testified at 
                                                 
3 It is unclear which shot was fired first or which shot 
killed Harold Head.  The doctor who performed the autopsy 
testified at trial that the shot to Harold's chest was 
sufficient to kill him, and the shot to his midsection was 
sufficient to kill him without near-immediate medical attention. 
No. 99-3071-CR  
9 
 
trial that she heard the shots and that a second or two elapsed 
between the first and second shots. 
¶20 Debra called 911.  She told the operator that she and 
her husband had a fight and that, after he threatened to kill 
her, she shot him.  She said that she did not mean to shoot her 
husband and did not know that the gun was loaded. 
¶21 When police officers arrived, Debra went outside, 
crying.  She told the officers "that her husband had been 
threatening her friends and that she shot him; that she didn’t 
know the gun was loaded." 
¶22 Detective David E. Bier entered the house and found 
Harold's body in the bedroom "on his back on the bed.  His right 
leg was hanging over the edge of the bed and his left leg was 
still under the covers, and he had blankets over his upper torso 
and head."  Blood covered the floor and was splattered on the 
walls, the ceiling, and the filing cabinet.  Police officers 
found 26 guns, not counting the one used by Debra, in the 
bedroom.  All 26 guns were unloaded, but ammunition for many of 
them was also found in the bedroom.  The officers found 
firearms, ammunition, or knives in each of the other rooms of 
the house. 
¶23 Debra 
gave 
officers 
two 
oral 
and 
two 
written 
statements at the police station.  She repeatedly told officers 
that Harold had not physically abused her but that he had 
verbally abused her. 
No. 99-3071-CR  
10 
 
¶24 Debra Head was charged with first-degree intentional 
homicide, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 940.01 (1997-1998).4  She 
admitted that she had killed Harold, but claimed that she did so 
in self-defense.  Prior to her jury trial, Debra filed a motion 
in limine, seeking to assert self-defense and to admit "McMorris 
evidence" concerning Harold's violent character and his prior 
specific violent acts.5  She also sought to discuss her theory of 
defense and the proposed supporting evidence in her opening 
statement.  The circuit court allowed Debra to allude to self-
defense in her opening statement, but delayed ruling whether to 
admit the disputed evidence. 
¶25 After the State presented its case, the court allowed 
Debra to make an offer of proof regarding the evidence she 
sought to admit.  With the jury out, Debra testified about a 
1991 incident in their house in which Harold was threatening to 
kick a stuffed and mounted animal.  She went over to stop him.  
Harold "got really mad" and physically picked her up, throwing 
her off the arm of a couch.  Debra hurt her back, could not get 
up, and had to be taken to a local emergency room for x-rays.  
                                                 
4 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 versions unless otherwise indicated. 
5 Evidence of a victim's violent character and past violent 
acts is often referred to as McMorris evidence.  The term 
"McMorris evidence" refers to McMorris v. State, 58 Wis. 2d 144, 
150, 205 N.W.2d 559 (1973), a case in which this court ruled 
that a defendant who had established a "sufficient factual basis 
to raise the issue of self-defense" should be allowed to submit 
evidence of her personal knowledge of prior specific acts of 
violence by the victim of her assault. 
No. 99-3071-CR  
11 
 
"Now I suppose you're gonna tell everybody what I did," she 
quoted Harold as saying.  She replied, "[n]o, I won't.  We'll 
just make up a story," and tell people that "I fell out in the 
woods." 
¶26 Debra described an incident in 1996 when Harold was 
angry with her and chased her in their house.  "He chased me 
down the hallway towards our bedroom."  He "grabbed me and then 
we flew on to the bed" and broke the bed frame, she said. 
¶27 She told how Harold once threw a wrench at her and how 
he routinely twisted her arms, sometimes picked her up by the 
armpits and lifted her up off the ground until she cried, and 
repeatedly twisted her breasts. 
¶28 Debra said she had considered filing for divorce in 
1982, but Harold threatened to kill her if she ever actually 
filed.  He repeated that threat throughout their marriage.  She 
said she stayed with him partly because of fear. 
¶29 Debra also testified about a number of incidents of 
violence or threats of violence to others.  For instance, in 
1995 Harold threatened a supervisor at the General Motors plant 
where he worked, and was suspended for 30 days.  He had to 
undergo counseling and began taking Paxil [a prescription drug 
used to treat mental depression, panic disorder, and generalized 
anxiety disorder].  He stopped taking the drug in 1997.   
¶30 Debra described a "road rage" incident in September 
1997 in which Harold thought a woman had cut him off as she 
backed out of a driveway.  He yelled at the woman, then 
accelerated his vehicle, pulling in front of her car as they 
No. 99-3071-CR  
12 
 
came to a red light.  Then he stopped, jumped out of his truck, 
cursed at the woman, and kicked off the side mirror of her car. 
¶31 Debra also noted two incidents in the 1990s involving 
a neighbor.  In one incident, after an argument, Harold punched 
the neighbor in the face.  At a later date, the neighbor 
complained about Harold shooting a pistol in the back yard.  
Harold walked over to the neighbor, pistol in hand, "and was 
gonna hit him with it.  But then didn't hit him with the gun but 
hit him with his fist instead," Debra said. 
¶32 Debra also referred to an incident in 1996 or 1997, in 
which Harold retaliated against a six-year-old boy who had 
called him a vulgar name.  Harold twisted the boy's arm, hurting 
him, and had to go to court as a result.  The incident was 
offered as an example of Harold's short temper. 
¶33 Debra said that Harold "always thought everyone was 
against him."  Sometimes he would pound on the table, or throw 
things across the room.  One time he pushed a microwave off the 
counter to the floor, and another time he broke all the buttons 
off the VCR. 
¶34 In her offer of proof, Debra also testified in detail 
about the events that occurred the night before and the day of 
the shooting, as well as Harold's intense anger about his 
daughter's pregnancy. 
¶35 After Debra made her offer of proof, the court 
determined that she had not established a sufficient factual 
basis to support a claim of self-defense.  Therefore she was not 
allowed to present evidence regarding Harold's prior violent 
No. 99-3071-CR  
13 
 
conduct and character for violence6 and she could not argue at 
trial that she had acted in self-defense.  The court based its 
decision 
on 
its 
review 
of 
Wisconsin 
precedent 
and 
its 
                                                 
6 The following two exchanges illustrate how the court's 
ruling excluding evidence 
surfaced 
during 
the 
defendant's 
testimony at trial.  Debra explained the events that occurred 
after she and her daughter told Harold that Brenda was pregnant.  
She discussed Harold's return home that night and reported that 
his brother had taken away Harold's guns and his billy club. 
DEBRA HEAD:  It was like a police billy club.  I 
believe he always carried it in his vehicles just in 
case 
he 
came 
across, 
as 
he 
would 
always 
say . . . [interruption].  He would always say in case 
he came across . . . some little fucker that pissed 
him off. 
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY:  I object to that.  
That's also within the scope of the ruling.  I move to 
strike. 
THE COURT:  That motion is granted.  That answer is 
stricken.  Ladies and gentlemen, you are to disregard 
that answer. 
 
In another instance, as she described the shooting, Debra 
testified as follows: 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  Did he have a weapon? 
DEBRA HEAD:  He was the weapon.  His hands were 
weapons.  From the past experience, I knew what he was 
capable of. 
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY:  Objection, judge.  We 
have had hours worth of hearings on this point. 
THE COURT:  Yes, sustained. 
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY:  Motion to strike. 
THE COURT:  That portion of the answer will be 
stricken.  The jury is to disregard that part of the 
answer. 
No. 99-3071-CR  
14 
 
understanding 
that 
it 
could 
consider 
only 
contemporaneous 
threats made to the defendant in determining whether she had a 
sufficient factual basis to raise self-defense.  The court noted 
that Harold's threat to Debra on May 29, 1998, was not 
accompanied by violence, and that Harold did not possess a 
weapon.  The court therefore concluded that Harold's threat did 
not constitute a sufficient factual basis for her to assert 
self-defense. 
¶36 At the close of evidence, Debra Head's defense counsel 
requested that the court submit jury instruction Wis JI——
Criminal 1014, instructing the jury on perfect self-defense as a 
complete 
affirmative 
defense 
to 
first-degree 
intentional 
homicide and imperfect self-defense as a factor mitigating 
first-degree intentional homicide to second-degree intentional 
homicide.  The court had allowed Debra to testify as to what 
occurred the night before and the morning of Harold's death and 
the events that had unfolded on and after the day that Harold 
learned 
of 
his 
daughter's 
pregnancy. 
 
It 
found 
that 
"subjectively she's met whatever she would need to meet, but I 
don't believe that she's met the objective half of the 
equation."  Consequently, the court ruled that because Debra had 
failed to establish a sufficient factual basis to assert self-
defense, she was not entitled to any jury instruction on self-
defense.  The court instructed the jury only on first-degree 
intentional homicide. 
¶37 The jury returned a verdict of guilty of first-degree 
intentional homicide, and the circuit court sentenced Debra to a 
No. 99-3071-CR  
15 
 
mandatory term of life in prison.  The court allowed the 
Department of Corrections to determine the defendant's date of 
parole.  Debra appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed in a 
scholarly decision written by Judge Deininger.  State v. Head, 
2000 WI App 275, 240 Wis. 2d 162, 622 N.W.2d 9.  Judge 
Roggensack wrote a strong and effective dissent. 
¶38 The court of appeals determined that the circuit court 
did not err in refusing to permit Debra to introduce McMorris 
evidence.  Id. at ¶1.  Citing State v. Camacho, 176 Wis. 2d 860, 
869, 501 N.W.2d 380 (1993), the court concluded that both 
perfect and imperfect self-defense have objective as well as 
subjective components.  Id. at ¶20.  It said that Debra's claim 
of self-defense was based solely on her testimony and that her 
testimony "does not support her claim that she reasonably 
believed that she was acting in self-defense when she shot 
Harold."  Id. at ¶13.7   
                                                 
7 The court of appeals wrote: 
She did not testify that her husband made a direct 
verbal threat against her, or that he engaged in any 
overtly violent acts or gestures, in the moments 
leading up to the shooting.  Her testimony that she 
could not leave the bedroom was undermined by her 
statements that she was six feet from her husband, 
that he was lying down on the bed, and that she had a 
gun trained on him for several moments before she shot 
him. 
Based on Debra's own testimony, she was "in control" 
of the situation. 
Head, 2000 WI App 275, ¶13-14. 
No. 99-3071-CR  
16 
 
¶39 Having found that Debra had not adequately raised the 
issue of self-defense, the court concluded that the evidence of 
Harold's past violent behavior and character was inadmissible.  
Id. at ¶17.  
¶40 The court of appeals also determined that the circuit 
court did not err in declining to instruct the jury on self-
defense and mitigation.  Id. at ¶20.  The court again based its 
decision on its conclusion that Debra had failed to make a 
threshold 
showing 
that 
she 
reasonably 
believed 
she 
was 
threatened with an unlawful interference, as required by 
Camacho.  Id. at ¶¶20-21.  The court found that because Debra 
had failed to make the required showing and was therefore unable 
to present evidence of a subjective belief that she was acting 
in self-defense, she was not entitled to instructions on either 
perfect or imperfect self-defense.  Id. at ¶21. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶41 This 
case 
requires 
the 
court 
to 
interpret 
Wis. Stat. §§ 939.48(1), 
940.01(2) 
and 
(3), 
and 
940.05.  
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law which this 
court reviews de novo, benefiting from the analyses of the 
circuit court and the court of appeals.  State v. Busch, 217 
Wis. 2d 429, 441, 576 N.W.2d 904 (1998). 
¶42 This case also requires us to review the circuit 
court's decision to exclude proffered evidence and its decision 
not to submit certain instructions to the jury. 
¶43 The decision whether to admit or exclude evidence lies 
within the sound discretion of the circuit court.  Johnson v. 
No. 99-3071-CR  
17 
 
Kokemoor, 199 Wis. 2d 615, 635-36, 545 N.W.2d 495 (1996).  In 
reviewing a discretionary decision, we examine the record to 
determine if the circuit court logically interpreted the facts, 
State v. Rogers, 196 Wis. 2d 817, 829, 539 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 
1995), 
applied 
the 
proper 
legal 
standard, 
and 
used 
a 
demonstrated rational process to reach a conclusion that a 
reasonable judge could reach.  Glassey v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 176 
Wis. 2d 587, 608, 500 N.W.2d 295 (1993).  To properly exercise 
its discretion, a circuit court must "apply the correct standard 
of law to the facts at hand."  State v. Margaret H., 2000 WI 42, 
¶32, 234 Wis. 2d 606, 610 N.W.2d 475.  This court will reverse a 
discretionary decision if the circuit court's exercise of 
discretion "is based on an error of law."  Marten Transport v. 
Hartford Specialty, 194 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 533 N.W.2d 452 (1995).  
In its exercise of discretion, the circuit court's decisions to 
admit or exclude evidence are entitled to great deference, 
Martindale v. Ripp, 2001 WI 113, ¶29, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 629 N.W.2d 
690, but we will reverse the circuit court if we determine that 
it applied an incorrect legal standard.  
¶44 Ultimately, the court's willingness to entertain a 
defendant's theory of defense and submit requested instructions 
to the jury is grounded on the evidence presented to the trier 
of fact.  Whether there are sufficient facts to allow the giving 
of an instruction is a question of law which we review de novo.  
State v. Mayhall, 195 Wis. 2d 53, 57, 535 N.W.2d 473 (1995).  A 
court errs when it fails to give an instruction on an issue 
raised by the evidence.  Id. at 57-58 (citing Lutz v. Shelby 
No. 99-3071-CR  
18 
 
Mut. Ins. Co., 70 Wis. 2d 743, 750, 235 N.W.2d 426 (1975)).  If 
we determine that a circuit court has committed an error in 
failing to give a jury instruction, we must assess whether the 
substantial 
rights 
of 
the 
defendant 
have 
been 
affected.  
Wis. Stat. § 805.18(2). 
 
An 
error 
does 
not 
affect 
the 
substantial rights of a defendant if it is clear beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the 
defendant guilty absent the error.  State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, 
¶49, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.   
III. ANALYSIS 
¶45 At issue in this case are the standards for raising 
perfect self-defense as a defense to a charge of first-degree 
intentional homicide and unnecessary defensive force (imperfect 
self-defense) as a factor mitigating first-degree intentional 
homicide to second-degree intentional homicide.  A related issue 
involves the standards governing the admission of McMorris 
evidence concerning a homicide victim's violent character and 
prior acts of violence.  Presenting a defendant's theory of the 
case to the jury depends upon the evidence admitted at trial. 
¶46 As noted above, the circuit court in this case did not 
allow Debra Head to assert self-defense in any form or to submit 
evidence, including McMorris evidence, supporting such claims.  
The court emphasized that in order to show unnecessary defensive 
force as a factor mitigating first-degree intentional homicide, 
a defendant is required to show that she had a "reasonable 
belief that she was preventing or terminating an unlawful 
interference with her person or actually believed that force——
No. 99-3071-CR  
19 
 
that the force used was necessary to prevent . . . imminent 
death or great bodily harm."  The court determined that pursuant 
to Camacho, 176 Wis. 2d 860, "there is a subjective facet as 
well as objective facet to the defendant's actions and how the 
court must view a person——the facts and a person in those 
particular circumstances.  Clearly the subjective facts are as 
testified by Miss Head as to what she thought in her own head 
and objective facts are basically what surrounded the event." 
¶47 The court further stated that it had considered 
relevant precedent, and "all of that relevant case law describes 
facts with simultaneous violence or imminent threats of harm 
with a weapon in the hand of the victim as predicates to this 
type of testimony coming in."  The court concluded that in this 
case: 
 
[T]he court feels it has to look at . . . whether 
there is a basis, a factual basis, [relying] strictly 
on the threats that were made to Miss Head . . . . 
[T]here was not a weapon in Mr. Head's hand.  [H]e was 
not making a specific threat to Miss Head . . . I'm 
going to get you.  I'm going to kill you . . . . 
Bottom line is it was a threat not accompanied by any 
use of weapons at that time, not accompanied by 
violence at that time. 
¶48 The court added: "I think that the Court has to find a 
factual basis to let any of this evidence in that was testified 
to by Miss Head concerning the neighbor, concerning road rage, 
concerning these things that occurred in the '80s [and the 1991 
incident resulting in Debra's back injury].  I have not found 
that factual basis, so I will not admit the same." 
¶49 The court later stated that: 
No. 99-3071-CR  
20 
 
 
[A]t least at this juncture in the trial there has 
been no——I'm looking at it from the Camacho aspect of 
the objective and subjective facet, concerning Miss 
Head's conduct at the time.  Clearly the court feels 
that subjectively she's met whatever she would need to 
meet, but I don't believe she's met the objective half 
of that equation.  And there wasn't that sufficient 
factual basis, objective factual basis, to read that 
instruction at this point in time. 
¶50 Debra now argues that the circuit court erred by 
requiring her to show a simultaneous act of violence, or the 
presence of a weapon, in order to raise self-defense.  She also 
claims that the evidence presented in her offer of proof was 
sufficient to raise self-defense as an issue.  In making this 
argument, she does not dispute that a defendant attempting to 
raise the issue of perfect self-defense to a charge of first-
degree intentional homicide must meet an initial objective 
threshold.  She asserts instead that her offer of proof was 
sufficient to meet the objective threshold. 
¶51 Nor does she dispute the requirement of an objective 
reasonable threshold for a claim of unnecessary defensive force 
(imperfect self-defense) or ask that the holding in Camacho be 
overruled.  In an amicus curiae brief, however, the Frank J. 
Remington Center calls into question the validity of the Camacho 
determination that to raise the issue of imperfect self-defense, 
a defendant must first meet an objective reasonable threshold.  
It asserts that pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 940.01(2)(b), as 
revised in 1988, an objective threshold is not required for the 
mitigation of first-degree intentional homicide.  It claims that 
the legislative history of the 1988 revision of § 940.01 shows 
No. 99-3071-CR  
21 
 
conclusively that the legislature did not intend to require a 
defendant to meet an objective threshold to assert imperfect 
self-defense. 
¶52 The State asks us to reject any suggestion that 
Camacho misstates the requirements of raising imperfect self-
defense.  It contends that to establish a sufficient factual 
basis to raise self-defense, a defendant must, pursuant to 
Camacho, meet an objective threshold by showing a reasonable 
belief that she was preventing or terminating an unlawful 
interference with the defendant's person.  The State asserts 
that this threshold is the same whether a defendant claims 
perfect or imperfect self-defense, that to assert either type of 
self-defense, a defendant must make an initial threshold showing 
of objective reasonableness.  The State contends that Debra Head 
failed to meet this objective threshold and therefore was not 
entitled to assert perfect or imperfect self-defense. 
¶53 The initial questions for this court concern the 
standards for raising either perfect or imperfect self-defense, 
or both, to a charge of first-degree intentional homicide.  To 
resolve these questions, we must examine the law of homicide in 
Wisconsin both before and after the 1988 revision of the 
homicide statutes and revisit this court's decision in Camacho.  
We begin with the law of homicide in Wisconsin. 
A. Wisconsin's Law of Homicide 
¶54 The law of homicide in Wisconsin was revised in 1988.  
1987 Wis. Act 399.  Prior to the revision, Chapter 940 listed 
nine homicide offenses, including first-degree murder, second-
No. 99-3071-CR  
22 
 
degree murder, and manslaughter.  Wis. Stat. §§ 940.01, 940.02, 
940.05 (1985-86). 
¶55 Section 
940.01(1), 
first-degree 
murder, 
read 
as 
follows: "Whoever causes the death of another human being with 
intent to kill that person or another is guilty of a Class A 
felony."  Wis. Stat. § 940.01 (1985-86).  Subsection (2) defined 
"intent to kill" to mean "the mental purpose to take the life of 
another human being."  Wis. Stat. § 940.02 (1985-86).  This two-
element 
offense 
was 
punishable 
by 
life 
imprisonment.  
Wis. Stat. § 939.50(3)(a) (1985-86). 
¶56 Section 940.02, second-degree murder, prohibited the 
causing of death: 
 
(1) By conduct imminently dangerous to another and 
evincing a depraved mind, regardless of human life; or 
 
(2) As a natural and probable consequence of the 
commission of or attempt to commit a felony. 
Wis. Stat. § 940.02 (1985-86).  Second-degree murder was a Class 
B felony punishable by imprisonment not to exceed 20 years.  
Wis. Stat. § 939.50(3)(b) (1985-86). 
¶57 Section 940.05, manslaughter, prohibited the causing 
of death: 
 
(1) Without intent to kill and while in the heat of 
passion; or 
 
(2) Unnecessarily, in the exercise of his privilege of 
self-defense or defense of others or the privilege to 
prevent or terminate the commission of a felony; or 
 
(3) Because such person is coerced by threats made by 
someone other than his coconspirator and which cause 
him reasonably to believe that his act is the only 
No. 99-3071-CR  
23 
 
means of preventing imminent death to himself or 
another; or 
 
(4) Because the pressure of natural physical forces 
causes such person reasonably to believe that his act 
is the only means of preventing imminent public 
disaster or imminent death to himself or another. 
Wis. Stat. § 940.05 (1985-86).  Manslaughter was a Class C 
felony punishable by imprisonment not to exceed 10 years.  
Wis. Stat. § 939.50(3)(c) (1985-86). 
¶58 The 1988 revision categorizes homicides based upon the 
degree of culpability involved, as reflected in the mental 
element required for each offense.  Three of the framers of the 
revision——Walter Dickey, David Schultz, and James L. Fullin, 
Jr.——describe four gradations of mental element as follows: 
 
(1) The mental element is intentional when the 
actor has the purpose to cause death or is aware that 
death is practically certain to be caused by the 
conduct [Wis. Stat. § 939.23]; 
 
(2) The mental element is aggravated recklessness 
when the actor is aware that the conduct creates an 
unreasonable and substantial risk of death or great 
bodily harm to another under circumstances which show 
utter disregard for human life [Wis. Stat. §§ 939.24, 
940.02]; 
 
(3) The mental element is simple recklessness 
when the actor is aware that the conduct creates an 
unreasonable and substantial risk of death or great 
bodily harm to another [Wis. Stat. § 939.24]; 
 
(4) The mental element is negligence when the 
actor should realize that the conduct creates a 
substantial and unreasonable risk of death or great 
bodily harm to another [Wis. Stat. § 939.25]. 
Walter Dickey, David Schultz & James L. Fullin, Jr., The 
Importance of Clarity in the Law of Homicide: The Wisconsin 
No. 99-3071-CR  
24 
 
Revision, 1989 Wis. L. Rev. 1323, 1330 [hereinafter The 
Importance of Clarity]. 
¶59 These different mental elements are now embodied in 
different homicide statutes carrying different penalties. 
¶60 This case concerns an alleged intentional homicide.  
Intentional homicides are divided into two categories, first-
degree and second-degree.  First-degree intentional homicide, 
Wis. Stat. § 940.01, 
replaced 
first-degree 
murder, 
Wis. Stat. § 940.01 (1985-86).  It provides in relevant part: 
 
(1) OFFENSES.  (a) Except as provided in sub. 
(2), whoever causes the death of another human being 
with intent to kill that person or another is guilty 
of a Class A felony. 
 
  
. . . .  
 
(2) MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.  The following are 
affirmative defenses to prosecution under this section 
which mitigate the offense to 2nd-degree intentional 
homicide under s. 940.05: 
 
(a) Adequate provocation.  Death was caused under 
the influence of adequate provocation as defined in s. 
939.44. 
 
(b) Unnecessary defensive force.  Death was 
caused because the actor believed he or she or another 
was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm 
and that the force used was necessary to defend the 
endangered person, if either belief was unreasonable. 
 
(c) Prevention of felony.  Death was caused 
because the actor believed that the force used was 
necessary in the exercise of the privilege to prevent 
or terminate the commission of a felony, if that 
belief was unreasonable. 
 
(d) Coercion; necessity.  Death was caused in the 
exercise of a privilege under s. 939.45(1). 
No. 99-3071-CR  
25 
 
 
(3) BURDEN OF PROOF.  When the existence of an 
affirmative defense under sub. (2) has been placed in 
issue by the trial evidence, the state must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the facts constituting 
the defense did not exist in order to sustain a 
finding of guilt under sub. (1). 
 
Wis. Stat. § 940.01 (emphasis added). 
¶61 Second-degree 
intentional 
homicide, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 940.05, replaced manslaughter, Wis. Stat. § 940.05 (1985-86).  
It provides in relevant part: 
 
(1) Whoever causes the death of another human 
being with intent to kill that person or another is 
guilty of a Class B felony if: 
 
(a) In prosecutions under s. 940.01, the state 
fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
mitigating circumstances specified in s. 940.01(2) did 
not exist as required by s. 940.01(3); or 
 
(b) The state concedes that it is unable to prove 
beyond 
a 
reasonable 
doubt 
that 
the 
mitigating 
circumstances specified in s. 940.01(2) did not exist.  
By charging under this section, the state so concedes. 
 
(2) In prosecutions under sub. (1), it is 
sufficient to allege and prove that the defendant 
caused the death of another human being with intent to 
kill that person or another. 
 
. . . .  
 
(3) The mitigating circumstances specified in s. 
940.01(2) are not defenses to prosecution for this 
offense. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 940.05. 
¶62 First-degree intentional homicide and second degree-
intentional homicide have two elements in common: (1) the 
causing of death (2) with intent to kill.  The difference 
No. 99-3071-CR  
26 
 
between the two degrees of homicide is the presence or absence 
of mitigating circumstances.  The presence of mitigating 
circumstances, when not disproved by the state, reduces the 
degree of culpability involved, and likewise reduces the 
potential punishment.  First-degree intentional homicides are 
punished as Class A felonies.  Wis. Stat. § 940.01(1).  Second-
degree intentional homicides are punished as Class B felonies.  
Wis. Stat. §§ 940.01(2), 940.05(1). 
¶63 In this case, Debra Head attempted to raise the issue 
of self-defense as a complete defense to the charge of first-
degree intentional homicide.  She also attempted to raise 
unnecessary defensive force 
(imperfect 
self-defense) 
as a 
mitigating circumstance that would reduce the charge from first-
degree intentional homicide to second-degree. 
¶64 Wisconsin's self-defense statute, Wis. Stat. § 939.48, 
provides an affirmative defense to a person if the person 
reasonably believes that another is unlawfully interfering with 
her person, and if the person uses such force as the person 
reasonably believes is necessary to prevent or terminate the 
unlawful interference.  Section 939.48(1) reads: 
 
Self-defense and defense of others. 
 
(1) A person is privileged to threaten or 
intentionally 
use 
force 
against 
another 
for the 
purpose of preventing or terminating what the person 
reasonably believes to be an unlawful interference 
with his or her person by such other person.  The 
actor may intentionally use only such force or threat 
thereof as the actor reasonably believes is necessary 
to prevent or terminate the interference.  The actor 
may not intentionally use force which is intended or 
No. 99-3071-CR  
27 
 
likely to cause death or great bodily harm unless the 
actor reasonably believes that such force is necessary 
to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to 
himself or herself. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 939.48(1) (emphasis added). 
¶65 This key subsection in the self-defense statute has 
three 
sentences. 
 
The 
first 
sentence, 
stating 
general 
principles, is not adequate by itself to address perfect self-
defense to a charge of intentional homicide. 
¶66 Self-defense can be a complete affirmative defense to 
a variety of criminal charges, but the requirements for perfect 
self-defense 
are 
increased 
for 
an 
intentional 
homicide.  
Implicitly, the statute provides a perfect defense to a person 
charged with an intentional homicide when the person reasonably 
believed that an interference with her person involved the 
danger of imminent death or great bodily harm and reasonably 
believed that it was necessary to use force which was intended 
or likely to cause death or great bodily harm to prevent or 
terminate that interference.  
¶67 We are speaking here in the context of intentional 
killings——not reckless killings, or negligent killings, or 
accidental 
killings. 
 
In 
these 
intentional 
homicides, 
a 
defendant is not privileged to use deadly force——that is, force 
which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm—
—unless the person reasonably believes that the level of 
unlawful interference is such that the force used is necessary 
to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm.  Hence, if a 
person 
reasonably 
believed 
that 
she 
was 
preventing 
or 
No. 99-3071-CR  
28 
 
terminating an unlawful interference with her person and 
reasonably believed that the force used was necessary to prevent 
imminent death or great bodily harm, she is not guilty of either 
first- or second-degree intentional homicide. 
¶68 Imperfect self-defense was a component of the pre-
revision manslaughter statute, Wis. Stat. § 940.05.  The former 
§ 940.05 referenced imperfect self-defense as the causing of 
death 
"unnecessarily, 
in 
the 
exercise 
of 
[the 
person's] 
privilege of self-defense."  Wis. Stat. § 940.05(2) (1985-86). 
¶69 Unnecessary 
defensive 
force, 
codified 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 940.01(2)(b), 
is 
the 
current 
equivalent 
of 
imperfect self-defense.  It applies to situations in which a 
person intentionally caused a death but did so because she had 
an actual belief that she was in imminent danger of death or 
great bodily harm and an actual belief that the deadly force she 
used was necessary to defend her against this danger, if either 
of these beliefs was not reasonable.  Under these circumstances, 
the crime of first–degree intentional homicide is mitigated to 
second-degree intentional homicide. 
¶70 To sum up, under the present statutes, to prove first-
degree intentional homicide, the state must prove that the 
defendant caused the death of another with intent to kill.  
Wis. Stat. § 940.01(1).  If perfect self-defense is placed in 
issue by the trial evidence, the state must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that one of the defendant's beliefs was not 
reasonable.  Wis. Stat. § 939.48(1).  If unnecessary defensive 
force is been placed in issue by the trial evidence, the state 
No. 99-3071-CR  
29 
 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not 
actually believe she was preventing or terminating an unlawful 
interference with her person or did not actually believe that 
the force she used was necessary to prevent imminent death or 
great bodily harm——even if those beliefs were unreasonable——to 
sustain a conviction for first-degree intentional homicide.   
¶71 This brings us to the standards and requirements for 
raising perfect and imperfect self-defense. 
B. State v. Camacho 
¶72 In 1993 this court determined the standards for 
raising self-defense in Camacho, 176 Wis. 2d 860, a case 
involving the crime of attempted first-degree murder under the 
pre-revision homicide statutes.8  Camacho shot a deputy sheriff 
four times after the deputy had stopped his vehicle as it 
traveled on the highway.  Id. at 865.  Camacho, an illegal 
alien, informed the deputy that he did not have a driver's 
license.  Id. at 865-66.  The deputy returned to his squad car 
and verified that Camacho had no driver's license, and then 
again approached Camacho's car.  Id. at 866.  According to the 
deputy, when he leaned in towards Camacho's open window, Camacho 
grabbed an automatic weapon and shot him four times.  Id.    
                                                 
8 Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court opinion in Camacho 
was issued in 1993, the events at issue in the case occurred on 
March 3, 1988, before the January 1, 1989 effective date of the 
revisions to the homicide statutes.  State v. Camacho, 176 
Wis. 2d  860, 871 n.3, 501 N.W.2d 380 (1993).  Therefore the 
court applied the pre-revision homicide statutes in deciding the 
case. 
No. 99-3071-CR  
30 
 
¶73 Camacho's version of the events differed significantly 
from the deputy's.  He testified that the deputy had approached 
his car with his gun drawn, reached through the window and 
grabbed Camacho by the hair, and pointed his gun at Camacho's 
face.  Id.  Camacho asserted that he pulled away from the deputy 
and grabbed his own gun.  Id.  He admitted that he then shot the 
deputy.  Id. 
¶74 The State impeached Camacho's testimony at trial by 
presenting evidence of his prior statements to the effect that 
he was angry with the deputy because the deputy had allegedly 
called him crazy, but that the deputy had not pointed his gun at 
Camacho.  Id. 
¶75 The circuit court instructed the jury on attempted 
first-degree murder, self-defense, and attempted manslaughter.  
Id. at 867.  The court did not read the standard jury 
instructions but instead instructed the jury that, as to perfect 
self-defense, if Camacho's "conduct was not in self-defense or 
the defendant was not entitled to use self-defense and the 
belief by the defendant that he was entitled to use self-defense 
was unreasonable, then the defendant is guilty of the crime of 
attempted first degree murder."  Id.  The court also instructed 
the jury on "attempted imperfect self-defense manslaughter," 
stating that to find Camacho guilty it must find that Camacho 
intended to kill the deputy, and "was entitled to believe under 
the facts in this case that he was acting in self-defense, but 
the amount of force used was unnecessary or excessive."  Id. 
(emphasis added). 
No. 99-3071-CR  
31 
 
¶76 The jury found Camacho guilty of attempted first-
degree murder. Id. at 868.  The court of appeals reversed, 
concluding that the instructions submitted to the jury by the 
circuit court "seriously misstated the law" and "constituted 
prejudicial error."  Id. (quoting State v. Camacho, 170 Wis. 2d 
53, 59, 487 N.W.2d 67 (Ct. App. 1992)). 
¶77 This court reversed the court of appeals, holding that 
"a defendant charged with first-degree murder must show a 
reasonable belief that he was preventing or terminating an 
unlawful interference with his person before he can obtain a 
conviction of imperfect self-defense manslaughter."  Id. 
¶78 The Camacho court stated that "the absolute privilege 
of perfect self-defense" is applicable when a defendant shows 
all three of the following elements: 
 
(1) the defendant reasonably believed that he was 
preventing or terminating an unlawful interference 
with his person; (2) the defendant reasonably believed 
that force or threat thereof was necessary to prevent 
or terminate the interference; and (3) the defendant 
reasonably believed that the actual amount of force 
used was necessary to prevent or terminate the 
interference. 
Id. at 869.  Therefore, to acquit on the grounds of perfect 
self-defense, a jury must be able to believe that all three 
beliefs were reasonable. 
¶79 The court stated that according to Wis. Stat. § 940.05 
(1985-86), "imperfect self-defense manslaughter applies when a 
defendant causes the death of another human being 'in the 
exercise of his privilege of self-defense.'"  Id. at 871.  
No. 99-3071-CR  
32 
 
Noting that Wis. Stat. § 939.48(1) (1985-86) provided in part 
that "[a] person is privileged to threaten or intentionally use 
force 
against 
another 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
preventing 
or 
terminating what he reasonably believes to be an unlawful 
interference with his person by such other person," the court 
determined that "a person is privileged to act in self-defense 
only if that person reasonably believes that he is preventing or 
terminating an unlawful interference with his person."  Id. at 
871-72. 
 
The 
court 
concluded, 
after 
reading 
former 
Wis. Stat. § 940.05 
together 
with 
 § 939.48, 
that 
for 
an 
intentional 
killing 
to 
constitute 
imperfect 
self-defense 
manslaughter, a defendant must show that he was exercising his 
privilege of self-defense. Id.  Thus, a jury could not convict a 
defendant on the lesser charge of imperfect self-defense 
manslaughter without first finding that the defendant had met 
the threshold showing that the defendant's belief in the 
existence of an unlawful interference was reasonable.  Id. 
¶80 The Camacho decision was based on the 1985-86 version 
of the Wisconsin Statutes.  Id. at 871 n.3.  In its decision, 
however, the Camacho court also addressed the 1988 revision of 
the statutes, concluding that the legislature did not alter the 
crime of imperfect self-defense manslaughter, which "still 
consists of an objective threshold element and two subjective 
elements even though the Legislature changed the language of the 
No. 99-3071-CR  
33 
 
statute."9 Id. at 882-83.  The court concluded that under the 
revised statutes, a defendant must first show an objectively 
reasonable belief that she was preventing or terminating an 
unlawful interference with her person.  Id. at 883.  
 
Once a defendant passes this first hurdle, he is then 
entitled to a conviction of imperfect self-defense 
manslaughter 
if: 
(1) 
he 
had 
an 
actual, 
but 
unreasonable, belief that force was necessary because 
the unlawful interference resulted in an imminent 
danger of death or great bodily harm; or (2) he 
possessed a reasonable belief that force was necessary 
because the unlawful interference resulted in an 
imminent danger of death or great bodily harm but his 
belief regarding the amount of force necessary was 
unreasonable. 
 
Id.  
¶81 Although the Camacho decision states that the old 
requirements for raising imperfect self-defense are applicable 
to the revised homicide statutes, these new statutes were not in 
play before the court.10  Therefore, to determine whether a 
defendant must still meet the same objective threshold to assert 
                                                 
9 We note that while the pre-revision Wis. Stat. § 940.05(2) 
(manslaughter) referred to causing death "unnecessarily, in 
[the] exercise of the privilege of self-defense," the current 
Wis. Stat. § 940.05(2) 
(second-degree 
intentional 
homicide) 
refers to causing death with "[u]nnecessary defensive force."  
Wis. Stat. § 940.05(2) (emphasis added).  The current statute 
eliminates any reference to the "privilege of self-defense." 
10 For a critique of the Camacho decision's extension of an 
objective element to unnecessary defensive force under the 
revised homicide statutes, see Heather Ann Lieser, Note, State 
v. Camacho: The Judicial Creation of an Objective Element to 
Wisconsin's Law of Imperfect Self-Defense Homicide, 1995 Wis. L. 
Rev. 741-764. 
No. 99-3071-CR  
34 
 
imperfect self-defense after the 1988 revision, we will re-
examine and interpret the statutes in question. 
C. Statutory Interpretation 
¶82 Our goal in interpreting a statute is to discern and 
give effect to the intent of the legislature.  County of 
Jefferson v. Renz, 231 Wis. 2d 293, 301, 603 N.W.2d 541 (1999).  
We first examine the plain language of the statute to determine 
if it clearly and unambiguously sets forth the legislative 
intent.  State v. Setagord, 211 Wis. 2d 397, 406, 565 N.W.2d 506 
(1997).  If it does, we need go no further in interpreting the 
statute.  However, if the statutory language is unclear or 
ambiguous, we may look to the scope, history, context, subject 
matter, and object of the statute to determine the legislative 
intent.  Teague v. Bad River Band of the Lake Superior Tribe of 
Chippewa Indians, 2000 WI 79, ¶17, 236 Wis. 2d 384, 612 N.W.2d 
709.  Statutory language is ambiguous if it is capable of being 
understood in two or more different ways or in two or more 
different senses by reasonably well-informed persons.  Id.; 
Setagord, 211 Wis. 2d at 406. 
¶83 We look again at the language of the relevant 
statutes.  Wisconsin Stat. § 939.48, Self-defense and defense of 
others, also referred to as perfect self-defense, provides in 
relevant part: 
 
(1) A person is privileged to threaten or 
intentionally 
use 
force 
against 
another 
for the 
purpose of preventing or terminating what the person 
reasonably believes to be an unlawful interference 
with his or her person by such other person.  The 
actor may intentionally use only such force or threat 
No. 99-3071-CR  
35 
 
thereof as the actor reasonably believes is necessary 
to prevent or terminate the interference.  The actor 
may not intentionally use force which is intended or 
likely to cause death or great bodily harm unless the 
actor reasonably believes that such force is necessary 
to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to 
himself or herself. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 939.48(1). 
¶84 To 
raise 
the 
issue 
of 
perfect 
self-defense, 
a 
defendant must meet a reasonable objective threshold.  The trial 
evidence must show: (1) a reasonable belief in the existence of 
an unlawful interference; and (2) a reasonable belief that the 
amount of force the person intentionally used was necessary to 
prevent or terminate the interference.  Wis. Stat. § 939.48(1). 
¶85 Imperfect self-defense (unnecessary defensive force) 
mitigates 
the 
crime of 
first-degree 
intentional 
homicide.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 940.01(2) and (3) provide in relevant part: 
 
(2) MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.  The following are 
affirmative defenses to prosecution under this section 
which mitigate the offense to 2nd-degree intentional 
homicide under s. 940.05: 
 
. . . .  
 
(b) Unnecessary defensive force.  Death was 
caused because the actor believed he or she or another 
was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm 
and that the force used was necessary to defend the 
endangered person, if either belief was unreasonable. 
 
. . . .  
 
(3) BURDEN OF PROOF.  When the existence of an 
affirmative defense under sub. (2) has been placed in 
issue by the trial evidence, the state must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the facts constituting 
the defense did not exist in order to sustain a 
finding of guilt under sub. (1). 
No. 99-3071-CR  
36 
 
 
Wis. Stat. § 940.01(2) and (3) (emphasis added). 
¶86 Wisconsin Stat. § 940.05, 
Second-degree 
intentional 
homicide, provides in relevant part: 
 
(1) Whoever causes the death of another human 
being with intent to kill that person or another is 
guilty of a Class B felony if: 
 
(a) In prosecutions under s. 940.01, the state 
fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
mitigating circumstances specified in s. 940.01 (2) 
did not exist as required by s. 940.01 (3). 
 
Wis. Stat. § 940.05. 
¶87 These statutes are not ambiguous.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 939.48(1) requires reasonable beliefs for perfect self-defense 
in every case.  By contrast, Wis. Stat. § 940.01(2)(b) does not 
require reasonable beliefs.  It requires only actual beliefs 
even if they are unreasonable.  Unnecessary defensive force 
mitigates only one crime, first-degree intentional homicide.   
¶88 First-degree intentional homicide is mitigated to 
second-degree intentional homicide if a person intentionally 
causes a death because of an actual belief that the person is in 
imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, and an actual 
belief that the use of deadly force is necessary to defend 
herself, even if both of these beliefs are not reasonable.11  
Wis. Stat. § 940.01(2)(b). 
                                                 
11 Using different terms, a defendant may claim imperfect 
self-defense 
to 
first-degree 
intentional 
homicide 
if 
the 
defendant has a subjective belief that she is in imminent danger 
of death or great bodily harm and a subjective belief that she 
must use deadly force to prevent or terminate this danger, even 
if both of these beliefs——actually held——are unreasonable.   
No. 99-3071-CR  
37 
 
¶89 A defendant is entitled to prevail in this affirmative 
mitigation defense to first-degree intentional homicide unless 
the state is able to disprove part of the defendant's state of 
mind beyond a reasonable doubt.  This requires that the state 
show that the defendant did not have an actual belief in one or 
both elements. 
¶90 If a defendant had an actual but unreasonable belief 
that she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm 
and an actual but unreasonable belief that the force she used 
was necessary to defend herself, the defendant may prevail on 
imperfect self-defense, but not perfect self-defense, because 
perfect self-defense requires objective reasonableness. 
¶91 The imperfect self-defense statute does not require an 
initial threshold showing of an objectively reasonable belief in 
the existence of an unlawful interference before this defense 
can be asserted.  Such a requirement directly contravenes the 
language of Wis. Stat. § 940.01(2)(b), which explicitly provides 
that first-degree intentional homicide is mitigated to second 
degree if: "Death was caused because the actor believed he or 
she or another was in imminent danger of death or great bodily 
harm and that the force used was necessary to defend the 
endangered person, if either belief was unreasonable."  Wis. 
Stat. § 940.01(2)(b) (emphasis added). 
¶92 Although we usually do not consider extrinsic sources 
to aid our interpretation of a statute when we find statutory 
language unambiguous, we are mindful that our interpretation is 
at odds with the court's determination in Camacho.  We therefore 
No. 99-3071-CR  
38 
 
consider extrinsic sources to ensure that our interpretation of 
the homicide and self-defense statutes gives effect to the 
intent of the legislature.  See State v. Perez, 2001 WI 79, ¶36, 
244 Wis. 2d 582, 628 N.W.2d 820.  The legislative history of the 
revision of Wisconsin's homicide statutes offers compelling 
evidence to support our interpretation. 
¶93 As discussed above, Wisconsin's homicide statutes were 
revised in 1988.  The revision, which took effect on January 1, 
1989, was largely the work of a Special Committee on Homicide 
and Lesser Included Offenses (Committee), appointed by the 
Wisconsin Judicial Council in 1982.12  The Committee's draft was 
introduced as 1985 S.B. 279.  It was not acted upon but was 
reintroduced the following session as 1987 S.B. 191, and its 
provisions were inserted into the 1988 budget review bill.  1987 
Wis. Act 399. 
¶94 After the original proposal was drafted, and approved 
by the Judicial Council, it was reviewed by the Wisconsin 
Department 
of 
Justice, 
the 
Wisconsin 
District 
Attorneys 
Association, the State Public Defender, and a committee created 
                                                 
12 The 17-member Committee was chaired by Professor Walter 
Dickey.  The other members were Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice 
Shirley S. Abrahamson; Judge Michael J. Barron; Asst. Atty. Gen. 
David J. Becker; William U. Burke; William M. Coffey; Francis R. 
Croak; Jerome L. Fox; State Sen. Donald Hanaway; Asst. Dist. 
Atty. Michael Malmstadt; Judge Gordon Myse; Orlan L. Prestegard; 
Prof. Frank J. Remington; Asst. Pub. Def. Michael J. Rosborough; 
Rep. James A. Rutkowski; Janet Schipper; and Prof. David E. 
Schultz.  James L. Fullin, Jr. was the reporter.  Walter Dickey, 
David Schultz & James L. Fullin, Jr., The Importance of Clarity 
in the Law of Homicide: The Wisconsin Revision, 1989 Wis. L. Rev. 
1323, 1326 n.7 [hereinafter The Importance of Clarity].  
No. 99-3071-CR  
39 
 
by the State Bar of Wisconsin.  See The Importance of Clarity, 
supra 
at 
1328. 
 
The 
Judicial 
Council 
considered 
the 
recommendations it received and debated an amendment proposed by 
the Wisconsin District Attorneys Association (WDAA). 
¶95 The WDAA objected to the unnecessary defensive force 
statute.  Judicial Council Minutes of Apr. 19, 1985, at 9.  It 
proposed amending the statute to provide that first-degree 
intentional homicide is mitigated to second-degree when "[d]eath 
was caused because the actor, in the exercise of the privilege 
of self-defense or the defense of others, believed he or she or 
another was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, if 
that belief was unreasonable"  Id. (emphasis added). 
¶96 Assistant Attorney General David J. Becker, a member 
of the Committee, explained the proposed amendment, stating that 
it was raised in reference to a hypothetical situation in which 
a paranoid psychotic killed a girl scout delivering cookies 
because he unreasonably believed she was carrying not cookies 
but a bomb.  Id. at 10-11.  Becker explained that "under the 
WDAA proposal, one could still escape liability for first degree 
murder by believing one's life to be in danger, regardless of 
the reasonableness of that belief.  However, there must be a 
reasonable belief that the victim has unlawfully interfered with 
his person."  Id. at 11.  Becker expressed his belief that the 
then-current manslaughter 
statute applied only 
to actions 
undertaken "in the exercise of the privilege of self-defense."  
Id. 
No. 99-3071-CR  
40 
 
¶97 The Judicial Council entertained a motion to insert 
the words "in the exercise of the privilege of self-defense" 
into the draft of the second-degree intentional homicide 
statute.  The motion was defeated, 6 to 5 with 1 abstention.  
Id. at 13. 
¶98 The issue was raised again in a letter from Attorney 
General Bronson C. La Follette to Senator Lynn S. Adelman.  La 
Follette wrote that he supported the "comprehensive revision of 
Wisconsin's homicide statutes prepared by the Judicial Council."  
Letter from Attorney General Bronson C. La Follette to Lynn S. 
Adelman, Chairperson of the Senate Committee on Judiciary and 
Consumer Affairs (August 16, 1985).  However, La Follette asked 
Senator Adelman's committee to restore the phrase "in the 
exercise of the privilege of self-defense or defense of others."  
La Follette wrote: 
 
I make that suggestion because of concern about 
the person who kills another having no objective basis 
for resorting to self-defense of any sort (e.g., the 
paranoid psychotic who shoots down the girl scout 
approaching his front door, believing the box of 
cookies she is carrying to be a bomb intended to 
destroy him).  The Judicial Council's proposal would 
appear to allow such a person to escape conviction of 
first-degree 
intentional 
homicide 
(present 
first-
degree 
murder). 
 
Application 
of 
the 
mitigating 
circumstance of unnecessary defensive force ought at 
least to be conditioned on a reasonable belief that 
some unlawful interference with the person, though 
perhaps not one justifying resort to deadly force, was 
threatened.  The restoration of the words, "in the 
exercise of the privilege of self-defense or defense 
of others," is designed to impose that requirement. 
Id.  
No. 99-3071-CR  
41 
 
¶99 Tellingly, even though both the Wisconsin District 
Attorneys Association and the Department of Justice specifically 
asked to amend the proposed second-degree intentional homicide 
revision by inserting a "reasonable belief of an unlawful 
interference" threshold, neither the Judicial Council nor the 
legislature inserted such a requirement.  Instead, the Judicial 
Council's bill was introduced without language establishing a 
reasonableness threshold, and the legislature enacted it in the 
same form.  In effect, the legislature accepted the Judicial 
Council's bill in toto. 
¶100 The intent of the Special Committee on Homicide is 
illuminated in The Importance of Clarity, which was published 
nearly contemporaneously with the effective date of the revision 
and authored by the chair of the committee, another member of 
the committee, and the committee's reporter (Walter Dickey, 
David Schultz, and James L. Fullin, Jr., respectively).  The 
Importance of Clarity, supra at 1393 n.7.13  In The Importance of 
Clarity, the writers state: 
 
                                                 
13 This court has recognized that articles by drafters of 
statutes, authored contemporaneously with the enactment of the 
statutes, may be viewed as "authoritative statement[s] of 
legislative intention."  State v. Genova, 77 Wis. 2d 141, 151, 
252 N.W.2d 380 (1977) (quoting State v. Hoyt, 21 Wis. 2d 284, 
299-300, 128 N.W.2d 645 (1964)).  The court has also stated that 
a law review article by the principal drafter of the 1956 
revised 
criminal 
code, 
published 
contemporaneously 
with 
enactment of the code, was "persuasive authority when construing 
a particular statute."  State v. Williquette, 129 Wis. 2d 239, 
254, 385 N.W.2d 145 (1986). 
No. 99-3071-CR  
42 
 
 
The mitigating circumstance identified in section 
940.01(2)(b) is referred to as "unnecessary defensive 
force" and is the equivalent of what became known as 
"imperfect self defense" under prior law.  The basis 
for 
the 
mitigation 
is 
the 
defendant's 
actual 
(subjective) belief that it was necessary to use force 
to defend herself (or another) from imminent death or 
great bodily harm.  If such a belief is actually held, 
it mitigates first-degree intentional homicide to 
second-degree intentional homicide, even if the belief 
is unreasonable. 
Id. at 1333 (emphasis added). 
¶101 Thus, our determination that an objective threshold is 
not required to raise imperfect self-defense is consistent with 
the articulated public policy behind the statutory revisions.  
The homicide revision "advances the principle that degrees of 
culpability should reflect the different mental states required 
for each offense.  The revision created offenses that have 
clearly defined mental elements and assigned penalties based on 
the relative blameworthiness of the conduct."  Id. at 1333.  As 
Justice Bablitch later observed in Camacho: 
 
[a] person who has previously been the victim of a 
violent 
crime 
who 
later 
panics 
and 
under 
an 
unreasonable but actual belief takes the life of 
another because he or she actually believes that his 
or her person is in danger is not as culpable as one 
who kills in cold-blood for no reason other than to 
murder another.  These two people should not be 
treated the same. 
Camacho, 176 Wis. 2d at 887 (Bablitch, J., dissenting).  
¶102 The revised statute contemplates that a person who 
causes a death because she actually believes that she is in 
imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, even if that 
belief is unreasonable, is less culpable than one who simply 
No. 99-3071-CR  
43 
 
kills, 
with 
the 
intent 
to 
kill, 
without 
mitigating 
circumstances. 
¶103 Based on the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 940.05(2), 
supported by the legislative history and articulated public 
policy behind the statute, we conclude that when imperfect self-
defense is placed in issue by the trial evidence, the state has 
the burden to prove that the person had no actual belief that 
she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, or no 
actual belief that the amount of force she used was necessary to 
prevent or terminate this interference.  If the jury concludes 
that the person had an actual but unreasonable belief that she 
was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, the person 
is not guilty of first-degree intentional homicide but should be 
found guilty of second-degree intentional homicide. 
¶104 In light of this analysis, we must modify Camacho to 
the 
extent 
that 
it 
states 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 940.01(2)(b) 
contains an objective threshold element requiring a defendant to 
have a reasonable belief that she was preventing or terminating 
an unlawful interference with her person in order to raise the 
issue of unnecessary defensive force (imperfect self-defense). 
D. Placing Self-Defense and Imperfect Self-Defense in Issue 
¶105 Having 
determined 
that 
no 
"objective 
reasonable" 
threshold is required to raise a claim of imperfect self-
defense, we turn to the question of how to raise the issue of 
self-defense at trial. 
¶106 Perfect self-defense is a privilege recognized in 
Wis. Stat. § 939.45(2).  Before a privilege may be considered by 
No. 99-3071-CR  
44 
 
the fact-finder, the defendant must raise the privilege as an 
affirmative defense.  State v. Trentadue, 180 Wis. 2d 670, 674, 
510 N.W.2d 727 (Ct. App. 1993).  Once the defendant successfully 
raises an affirmative defense, the state is required to disprove 
the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. Stoehr, 134 
Wis. 2d 66, 84 n.8, 396 N.W.2d 177 (1986). 
¶107 Unnecessary defensive force is also an affirmative 
defense, Wis. Stat. § 940.01(2), but not a privilege under 
Wis. Stat. § 939.45.  When the issue of unnecessary defensive 
force (imperfect self-defense) "has been placed in issue by the 
trial evidence, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the facts constituting the defense did not exist in order 
to sustain a finding of guilt under sub. (1)."  Wis. Stat. 
 § 940.01(3). 
¶108 In this case, the circuit court concluded that Debra 
Head failed to establish a sufficient factual basis to support 
any claim of self-defense.  The court found that Debra failed to 
raise either perfect or imperfect self-defense so as to require 
it to admit self-defense evidence or submit the requested self-
defense instructions to the jury.  The court followed Camacho, 
and ruled that the threshold for admitting evidence to support 
imperfect self-defense was the same as the objective reasonable 
threshold for admitting evidence to support perfect self-
defense.  The court also concluded that McMorris evidence could 
not be used to establish the factual basis required for either 
theory of self-defense.  We disagree with several of these 
determinations. 
No. 99-3071-CR  
45 
 
¶109 In a case of this nature, in which the defendant is 
charged with first-degree intentional homicide, the defendant 
will consider each potential defense.  For instance, the defense 
theory may be that the defendant did not intend to kill.  This 
defense could lead to conviction of a lesser charge, with a 
reduced penalty.  The defense may emphasize one of the factors 
under Wis. Stat. § 940.01(2), such as adequate provocation or 
unnecessary defensive force, to mitigate the offense to second-
degree intentional homicide, which also carries a reduced 
penalty.  The defense may claim perfect self-defense under 
Wis. Stat. § 939.48(1), which would permit the jury to find the 
defendant not guilty of any offense. 
¶110 Raising 
the 
affirmative 
defense 
of 
unnecessary 
defensive force should not present great difficulty.  We have 
already determined that the defendant is not required to meet an 
objective 
reasonable 
threshold. 
 
Consequently, 
unnecessary 
defensive 
force 
must 
have 
a 
lower 
threshold 
for 
the 
admissibility of evidence than perfect self-defense, which does 
have an objective reasonable threshold.  Unnecessary defensive 
force also has a lower threshold than "adequate provocation," 
because "provocation" is defined as "something which the 
defendant reasonably believes the intended victim has done which 
causes the defendant to lack self-control completely at the time 
of causing death."  Wis. Stat. § 939.44(1)(b) (emphasis added). 
¶111 Debra Head argues that a defendant attempting to place 
self-defense in issue should be required to meet a burden of 
production, not a burden of persuasion.  We agree.  This court 
No. 99-3071-CR  
46 
 
addressed the procedure for raising a mitigating circumstance 
with an objective threshold in State v. Felton, 110 Wis. 2d 485, 
329 N.W.2d 161 (1983), a case in which a defendant claimed that 
she had killed her husband in the "heat of passion."  The court 
stated that: 
 
The burden upon the defendant where a heat-of-
passion defense is projected is merely the burden of 
production as opposed to the burden of persuasion.  It 
is for the accused to come forward with some evidence 
in rebuttal of the state's case——evidence sufficient 
to raise the issue of the provocation defense.  The 
burden of persuasion, of course, always remains upon 
the state. 
Felton, 110 Wis. 2d at 507 (emphasis added).14 
¶112 We concluded in Felton that to place a mitigating 
factor in issue, there need be only "some" evidence supporting 
the defense.  Id. 
¶113 This court expounded on the "some"-evidence standard 
in State v. Mendoza, 80 Wis. 2d 122, 258 N.W.2d 260 (1977),15 
where we examined the showing required to warrant the submission 
of a manslaughter instruction to the jury.  The court stated 
that in determining whether to submit an instruction regarding 
imperfect self-defense, the circuit court must determine whether 
                                                 
14 Barbara Felton admitted to killing her husband while he 
slept, but claimed that she was a battered spouse and had acted 
in self-defense.  State v. Felton, 110 Wis. 2d 485, 488, 329 
N.W.2d 161 (1983).  She claimed on appeal that her trial counsel 
was ineffective in not asserting that she had acted in the 
"heat-of-passion," which qualified as manslaughter under the 
pre-revision Wis. Stat. § 940.05(1).  Id. 
15 For additional discussion, see State v. Schulz, 102 Wis. 
2d 423, 307 N.W.2d 151 (1981). 
No. 99-3071-CR  
47 
 
a reasonable construction of the evidence will support the 
defendant's theory "viewed in the most favorable light it will 
'reasonably admit of from the standpoint of the accused.'"  Id. 
at 153 (quoting Ross v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 160, 172, 211 
N.W.2d 827 (1973)).  The court concluded that if the evidence 
viewed most favorably to the defendant supported the defendant's 
theory, it was the role of the jury to determine whether to 
believe the defendant's theory.  Id.  In other words, "if under 
any reasonable view of the evidence the jury could have a 
reasonable doubt as to the nonexistence of the mitigating 
circumstance, the burden has been met."  The Importance of 
Clarity, supra at 1347.   
¶114 The standard established in Felton and Mendoza for 
determining whether a defendant is entitled to submission of a 
jury instruction based on self-defense cannot be lower than the 
standard for raising this issue before trial for the purpose of 
admitting evidence.  The court of appeals, in this case, wrote 
that our citation to Thomas v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 483, 192 
N.W.2d 864 (1972), in the McMorris case, implied that the 
question "whether to admit evidence of a defendant's knowledge 
of prior acts of violence on the part of the victim should be 
decided on the same standard as that applied when determining 
whether the jury may be instructed on the issue of self-
defense."  Head, 2000 WI App 275, ¶10 n.7. 
¶115 We 
think 
that 
the 
standard 
for 
giving 
a 
jury 
instruction on self-defense may, in some circumstances, be 
higher than the standard for admitting self-defense evidence at 
No. 99-3071-CR  
48 
 
trial, because a defendant's claim of self-defense may be so 
thoroughly discredited by the end of the trial that no 
reasonable jury could conclude that the state had not disproved 
it.  In any event, the threshold for admitting evidence at trial 
is either lower or the same as the threshold for giving a jury 
instruction.  This means that if, before trial, the defendant 
proffers "some" evidence to support her defense theory and if 
that evidence, viewed most favorably to her, would allow a jury 
to conclude that her theory was not disproved beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the factual basis for her defense theory has 
been satisfied. 
¶116 Logically, the threshold for perfect self-defense 
evidence is higher than the threshold for imperfect self-defense 
evidence because of the objective reasonableness required for 
perfect self-defense and because the consequences for the state 
of not disproving perfect self-defense are much greater than the 
consequences 
of 
not 
disproving 
imperfect 
self-defense.  
Nonetheless, the elements of the two affirmative defenses so 
overlap that it would be very challenging for the court to 
exclude evidence that could come in for one affirmative defense 
but not for the other.  These issues should be clearer at the 
close of trial after all the evidence has come in.  Although it 
may be difficult, as the State suggests, to "unring the bell" 
after a defendant has alluded to perfect self-defense throughout 
the trial, the defendant is not entitled to a perfect self-
defense instruction unless perfect self-defense has a reasonable 
basis in the evidence. 
No. 99-3071-CR  
49 
 
¶117 We next consider what evidence a court should consider 
in determining whether "some" evidence exists to place self-
defense in issue.  In this case, Debra Head filed a motion in 
limine seeking to admit McMorris evidence regarding Harold 
Head's violent character and his past acts of violence.   
¶118 After Debra made her offer of proof, the circuit court 
determined that she had not established that a sufficient 
factual basis existed to support a claim of self-defense.  The 
court therefore did not allow Debra to present McMorris evidence 
of Harold's violent character and past acts of violence. 
¶119 In 
determining 
whether 
Debra 
had 
established 
a 
sufficient factual basis to raise self-defense, the circuit 
court focused on the testimony regarding events that occurred 
the night before and the morning of the shooting.  It excluded 
most of the evidence that was not contemporaneous with the 
shooting, including past incidents of Harold's physical abuse to 
Debra herself. 
¶120 In its brief to this court, the State asserted that 
the 
circuit 
court 
was 
correct 
in 
not 
considering 
non-
contemporaneous evidence and evidence of violence to others in 
evaluating the sufficiency of Debra's showing of "some" evidence 
of self-defense.  In essence, the State asserted that a 
defendant wishing to introduce McMorris evidence is required to 
make an objective threshold showing of a factual basis for a 
self-defense 
claim 
without 
using 
the 
McMorris 
evidence.  
According to the State's brief, if a defendant made an objective 
threshold showing separate from the McMorris evidence, the 
No. 99-3071-CR  
50 
 
McMorris evidence would be probative; however, if the defendant 
could not make a separate showing, the McMorris evidence would 
have no probative value.  This position has some textual support 
in McMorris, where the court said that the question was whether 
the defendant, "after establishing a factual basis to raise the 
issue of self-defense, may introduce evidence of personal 
knowledge of prior acts of violence on the part of the victim to 
prove what the defendant believed to be the turbulent and 
violent character of the victim."  McMorris v. State, 58 Wis. 2d 
144, 147, 205 N.W.2d 559 (1973) (emphasis added). 
¶121 Prior to oral argument, however, the State altered its 
position, "acced[ing] to the view that a defendant can use 
McMorris evidence to establish the factual basis for a claim of 
self-defense and can use it to satisfy both the subjective and 
objective prongs of the Camacho test."  Letter from Christopher 
G. Wren, Assistant Attorney General, to Wisconsin Supreme Court 
(October 4, 2001).  
¶122 We 
accept 
the 
State's 
concession 
that 
McMorris 
evidence may be used to establish a factual basis to support a 
self-defense claim.  McMorris evidence may not, as we held in 
McMorris, be admitted if a sufficient factual basis for a claim 
of self-defense is not established, but the McMorris decision 
does not mandate that a defendant establish her sufficient 
factual 
basis 
for 
self-defense 
wholly 
separate 
from 
the 
proffered McMorris evidence. 
¶123 We conclude that evidence of a victim's violent 
character and of the victim's prior acts of violence of which a 
No. 99-3071-CR  
51 
 
defendant has knowledge should be considered in determining 
whether a sufficient factual basis exists to raise a claim of 
self-defense.  Such evidence may be probative of a defendant's 
state of mind and whether she actually believed that an unlawful 
interference was occurring, that danger of death or great bodily 
harm was imminent, or that she needed to use a given amount of 
defensive 
force 
to 
prevent 
or 
terminate 
the 
unlawful 
interference.  In determining any of these issues, the circuit 
court should consider all the evidence proffered.  
¶124 In summary, we conclude that a defendant need not meet 
an objective reasonable threshold to assert imperfect self-
defense.  Rather, the defendant must show evidence of actual 
beliefs that she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily 
harm and that the force she used was necessary to defend 
herself.  In order to place imperfect self-defense in issue, a 
defendant need present only "some" evidence of self-defense.  In 
determining whether the defendant has established a sufficient 
factual basis for the defense, the circuit court should consider 
all the evidence at hand, including evidence presented by the 
state and any McMorris evidence that is proffered. 
¶125 If 
a 
defendant 
were 
charged 
with 
second-degree 
intentional 
homicide 
instead 
of 
first-degree 
intentional 
homicide, 
the 
mitigating 
circumstances 
specified 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 940.01(2) would not be available as defenses.  
Wis. Stat. § 940.05(3).  In these circumstances, a defendant 
claiming perfect self-defense has to meet the same "some"-
No. 99-3071-CR  
52 
 
evidence standard, but her evidence would be measured against an 
objective reasonable threshold. 
E. Admission of McMorris Evidence 
¶126 In a case in which a defendant asserts self-defense 
and wishes to present McMorris evidence, the court must 
determine whether the defendant has sufficiently placed self-
defense into issue.  McMorris, 58 Wis. 2d at 152.  If the court 
determines that the defendant has presented a sufficient factual 
basis for a claim of self-defense, it must determine whether to 
admit any or all of the proffered McMorris evidence.  Id. 
¶127 Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is generally 
irrelevant and inadmissible in criminal actions: 
 
(2) OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS.  Evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that the person 
acted in conformity therewith.  This subsection does 
not exclude the evidence when offered for other 
purposes, 
such as 
proof 
of 
motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident. 
Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2).  However, when a defendant sufficiently 
raises the issue of self-defense in a trial for homicide or 
assault, such evidence may be relevant and admissible.   
¶128 Admissibility is not automatic.  As a general rule, 
McMorris evidence may not be used to support an inference about 
the victim's actual conduct during the incident.  Werner v. 
State, 66 Wis. 2d 736, 743, 226 N.W.2d 402 (1975).   
 
[T]he testimony relates to the defendant's state of 
mind, showing what [her] beliefs were concerning the 
victim's character.  Such evidence helps the jury 
determine whether the defendant "acted as a reasonably 
No. 99-3071-CR  
53 
 
prudent 
person 
would 
under 
similar 
beliefs 
and 
circumstances" in the exercise of the privilege of 
self-defense [if the defense theory is perfect self-
defense]. 
Id. 
 
It 
may 
be 
admitted 
because 
it 
"bear[s] 
on 
the 
reasonableness of the defendant's apprehension of danger at the 
time of the incident."  McMorris, 58 Wis. 2d at 149. 
¶129 The admission of McMorris evidence implicates the 
exercise of sound and reasonable discretion by the circuit 
court. Id. at 152.  The evidence should be probative of the 
defendant's beliefs in relation to her defense.  If the court 
determines that the evidence is relevant, the court should admit 
it as it would any other relevant evidence, excluding it only if 
its "probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.03. 
F. Application to this Case 
¶130 To determine whether the circuit court properly denied 
Debra Head's motion to admit McMorris evidence and properly 
refused to allow Debra to assert self-defense, we must apply the 
standards we have articulated to the facts of the case.  We look 
first to Debra's offer of proof to determine whether it, along 
with 
any 
evidence 
introduced 
during 
the 
State's 
case, 
sufficiently placed self-defense in issue.  In making this 
determination, we will consider the McMorris evidence that Debra 
offered. 
No. 99-3071-CR  
54 
 
¶131 In her offer of proof, Debra testified to her belief 
that she was in imminent danger and that she used the necessary 
amount of defensive force to prevent death or great bodily harm.   
¶132 Debra also testified about Harold's temper.  She 
claimed that he was very short-fused and throughout the 1990s 
became violent after losing his temper.  She stated that during 
1997-98, she avoided subjects that would "light his fuse" to 
"avoid being hit."  She further asserted that she was afraid of 
Harold on the morning of his death because of her history with 
him. 
¶133 Debra recounted the story of her daughter's pregnancy 
leading up to the shooting.  Debra claimed that Harold found out 
about Brenda's pregnancy on Valentine's weekend in 1998 and was 
"very angry."  He stormed into the bedroom and came out with two 
pistols, one uncased.  He stated that "he was gonna go out and 
look for that little fucker, meaning [Graves]," and that he 
"would kill him."  Debra claimed that she was concerned for her 
safety as well as that of her daughters and Graves.  After this 
incident, Debra was "on egg shells" not knowing when Harold was 
going to "explode."  Debra asserted that she was afraid of 
Harold because he was bigger than she was and because she knew 
of his ability to hurt people. 
¶134 Finally, she testified in detail about the shooting.  
She claimed that she awakened Harold after their daughters had 
left for school.  They began to talk about financial matters and 
then about their daughter's pregnancy.  When they began 
discussing Graves, Harold was "pissed off."  He accused her of 
No. 99-3071-CR  
55 
 
"instigat[ing] this whole thing as far as covering up for Brenda 
being pregnant.  And not teaching her how not to get pregnant."  
She urged Harold to give Graves a chance, and Harold said 
"[f]uck that.  It's been all your fault ever since.  Your fault 
Brenda got pregnant.  It's your fault that this all happened.  
Fuck Chad and fuck you, too.  I'm sick of it.  Maybe I should 
just take——get——take care of you guys and get on with my life." 
¶135 Debra contended that she took his statement as a 
threat, that "he was gonna kill me . . . whenever he had the 
chance at that time."  She stated that his comments put her "in 
the same category" as Graves.  Debra claimed that Harold made a 
move by throwing the covers aside, so she reached down and got 
the gun from the floor at the side of the bed.  She raised the 
gun and pointed it at Harold, and he "made like he was going to 
sit up," and then he moved his leg out from under the covers.  
"He made that move to sit up and come towards me and that's when 
I pulled the trigger." 
¶136 Debra testified that she thought Harold was going to 
"try to get the gun away from me and kill me."  She felt 
threatened because she thought Harold was "coming after" her, 
even though she had the gun, and was "afraid he would take the 
gun away" and shoot her.  Debra claimed that she shot Harold a 
second time because after the first shot, he "made a move where 
his upper torso was like he was getting up." 
¶137 Virtually all this evidence is part of the trial 
record.  The other specific incidents proffered by Debra——
Harold's threats to kill Debra if she filed for divorce, 
No. 99-3071-CR  
56 
 
Harold's throwing Debra against the couch and injuring her back, 
Harold's chasing Debra into the bedroom and breaking the bed 
frame, Harold's hurling the wrench, Harold's twisting Debra's 
arms and breasts, Harold's threats to his supervisor, Harold's 
road rage, Harold's assaults on a neighbor, Harold's retaliation 
against a little boy who cursed at him——tend to illuminate the 
defendant's state of mind and her beliefs, reasonable or 
unreasonable, at the moment of the shooting. 
¶138 The totality of the defendant's proffer was clearly 
sufficient to raise the issue of imperfect self-defense for the 
jury, requiring the court to admit at least some of the 
character evidence and some of the McMorris evidence of specific 
acts of violence by Harold towards Debra and others.  The 
admitted evidence alone was sufficient to require the submission 
of a jury instruction on unnecessary defensive force.  The 
court's erroneous decisions excluding all this self-defense 
evidence did not constitute harmless error.  They went beyond 
harmless error to impair fundamentally the defendant's ability 
to present a defense.  Consequently, we cannot say that it is 
clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have 
found the defendant guilty absent the error. 
¶139 The circuit court itself, when assessing Debra's offer 
of proof, stated: "Subjectively she's met whatever she would 
need to meet, but I don't believe that she's met the objective 
half of the equation." 
¶140 Inasmuch 
as 
imperfect 
self-defense 
requires 
only 
actual beliefs, even if they are unreasonable, the court's own 
No. 99-3071-CR  
57 
 
statements require reversal of the conviction.  The court 
erroneously exercised its discretion based on an incorrect 
statement of the law as set forth in this opinion.   
¶141 We think the defendant's version of events and her 
offer of proof also required the admission of evidence, 
including McMorris evidence, to support a perfect self-defense 
theory.  We make no judgment whether the court should have given 
an 
instruction 
on 
perfect 
self-defense, 
because 
we 
have 
deliberately painted a one-sided picture of the facts and not 
described the state's expert testimony or the inconsistencies in 
the defendant's story.  We defer to the circuit court on remand 
to apply the principles of this opinion to requests for jury 
instructions. 
¶142 Because the circuit court did not correctly apply the 
law to the admission of trial evidence to support the two 
defense theories of self-defense as well as the submission of 
her requested jury instruction on unnecessary defensive force, 
we reverse the decision of the court of appeals which affirmed 
the defendant's conviction of first-degree intentional homicide, 
and remand the case to the circuit court. 
G. Jury Instructions 
¶143 Finally, we turn to the issue of jury instructions.  
The circuit court in this case denied Debra Head's request for 
submission of Wis JI——Criminal 1014, "First Degree Intentional 
Homicide: Self-Defense: Second Degree Intentional Homicide——
§ 940.01(2)(b); § 940.05."  The court stated that it had ruled 
on the self-defense issue throughout the trial, and it "[did 
No. 99-3071-CR  
58 
 
not] think there's a sufficient factual basis to instruct on 
this self-defense pursuant to 1014 or any other self-defense 
theory." 
¶144 It is clear that the circuit court declined to 
instruct the jury on self-defense because it had already 
determined that Debra Head had not presented evidence sufficient 
to place self-defense in issue.  That determination was 
erroneous because Debra's offer of proof contained sufficient 
evidence to place self-defense in issue.  Because of its 
decision not to allow Debra to assert self-defense or to present 
evidence supporting self-defense, the court could not properly 
instruct the jury as to second-degree intentional homicide 
(unnecessary defensive force) or self-defense.  The court 
instructed 
the 
jury 
only 
as 
to 
first-degree 
intentional 
homicide, Wis JI——Criminal 1010, not second-degree intentional 
homicide, first-degree reckless homicide, or self-defense.16  The 
jury was left with only two options——convict Debra Head of 
first-degree intentional homicide or find her not guilty of any 
offense without openly considering self-defense. 
¶145 Although we conclude that Debra Head was entitled to a 
jury instruction on second-degree intentional homicide, we note 
that Wis JI——Criminal 1014 "First Degree Intentional Homicide: 
Self 
Defense: 
Second 
Degree 
Intentional 
Homicide.——
§ 940.01(2)(b); § 940.05," does not accurately reflect the law 
                                                 
16 On appeal, Debra does not assert that the circuit court's 
decision not to instruct on first-degree reckless homicide was 
erroneous.  
No. 99-3071-CR  
59 
 
of homicide and self-defense as set forth in this opinion. 
Instruction Wis JI——Criminal 1014 provides in relevant part: 
 
The Criminal Code of Wisconsin provides that a 
person is 
privileged 
to 
intentionally 
use 
force 
against another for the purpose of preventing or 
terminating what [she] reasonably believes to be an 
unlawful interference with [her] person by such other 
person.  However, [she] may intentionally use only 
such force as [she] reasonably believes is necessary 
to prevent or terminate the interference.  [She] may 
not intentionally use force which is intended or 
likely to cause death unless [she] reasonably believes 
that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death 
or great bodily harm to [herself]. 
 
As applied to this case, the effect of the law of 
self-defense is that if the defendant reasonably 
believed that [she] was preventing or terminating an 
unlawful interference with [her] person and reasonably 
believed the force used was necessary to prevent 
imminent death or great bodily harm to [herself], the 
defendant is not guilty of either first or second 
degree intentional homicide. 
 
If the defendant caused the death of (name of 
victim) with the intent to kill, reasonably believed 
that [she] was preventing or terminating an unlawful 
interference with [her] person, and actually but 
unreasonably believed the force used was necessary to 
prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to 
[herself], the defendant is guilty of second degree 
intentional homicide. 
 
If the defendant caused the death of (name of 
victim) with the intent to kill and did not reasonably 
believe that [she] was preventing or terminating an 
unlawful interference with [her] person or did not 
actually believe the force used was necessary to 
prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to 
[herself], the defendant is guilty of first degree 
intentional homicide. 
 
Wis JI——Criminal 1014. 
No. 99-3071-CR  
60 
 
¶146 Wis JI——Criminal 
1014 
is 
inconsistent 
with 
our 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. §§ 940.01 and 940.05, and our 
determination that no threshold determination of a reasonable 
belief in an unlawful interference is required to mitigate 
first-degree 
intentional 
homicide 
based 
on 
the 
use 
of 
unnecessary defensive force.  The jury instruction requires 
amendment.  We therefore request that the Wisconsin Criminal 
Jury Instructions Committee revisit Wis JI——Criminal 1014. 
¶147 We note in making this request that the 1989 and 1991 
versions of Wis JI——Criminal 1014 "reflected the [Criminal Jury 
Instruction] Committee's conclusion that any actual, that is, 
subjectively held, belief in the need to act in self-defense 
mitigated an intentional homicide to second degree.  The 
Committee had concluded that this was true whether or not the 
belief is reasonable."  Comment 12 to Wis. JI——Criminal 1014.  
Comment 12 further notes that: 
 
The Committee has revised the instructions to 
reflect the Camacho threshold requirement by adding 
the following phrase or its equivalent where needed in 
the first degree intentional homicide instructions:  
"that the defendant reasonably believed that he was 
preventing or terminating an unlawful interference 
with his person."  Because the instructions are 
drafted to emphasize what the state must prove to 
justify a finding of guilt, the addition of this 
"threshold" requirement in effect gives the state 
another option in meeting its burden to prove that the 
defendant 
was 
not 
acting 
under 
the 
mitigating 
circumstances referred to as imperfect self-defense.  
The state may disprove the mitigation by showing that 
the defendant did not "reasonably believe that he was 
preventing or terminating an unlawful interference 
with his person." 
No. 99-3071-CR  
61 
 
Id.  We believe that the versions of Wis JI——Criminal 1014 in 
place prior to the revisions reflecting the Camacho decision may 
accurately reflect the law, as we have explained it in this 
case.  However, it is not the supreme court's role to draft jury 
instructions.  Nommensen v. Am. Cont'l Ins., 2001 WI 112, ¶40, 
246 Wis. 2d 132, 629 N.W.2d 301.  We therefore request that the 
Wisconsin Criminal Jury Instructions Committee revisit and amend 
Wis JI——Criminal 1014 in accordance with this opinion. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶148 We hold that a claim of imperfect self-defense, which 
mitigates first-degree intentional homicide to second-degree 
intentional homicide, does not require a showing that a person 
who 
used 
unnecessary 
defensive 
force 
was 
acting 
with 
a 
reasonable belief of an unlawful interference with her person.  
We conclude that Debra Head's offer of proof established a 
sufficient factual basis for both perfect and imperfect self-
defense.  She was entitled at trial to submit some evidence of 
Harold's violent character and past acts of violence to support 
her self-defense theory.  She should have been given an 
instruction on unnecessary defensive force.  We therefore 
conclude 
that 
Debra 
Head 
is 
entitled 
to 
a 
new 
trial.  
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals, 
and remand this case to the circuit court. 
¶149 We also conclude that Wis. JI——Criminal 1014, the jury 
instruction involving the mitigation of first-degree intentional 
homicide to second-degree based on unnecessary defensive force, 
does not accurately reflect the law as set forth in this 
No. 99-3071-CR  
62 
 
opinion.  We therefore request that the Wisconsin Criminal Jury 
Instructions Committee revisit and amend Wis. JI——Criminal 1014 
in accordance with this opinion. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded. 
 
 
No.  99-3071-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶150 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (concurring).  
I join the majority opinion, but write separately because I 
disagree with the statement of the harmless error standard set 
forth in ¶¶44 and 138 for the reasons set forth in my dissents 
in State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, 
and State v. Tomlinson, 2002 WI 91, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___. 
¶151 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this concurrence.   
 
 
No.  99-3071.jpw 
 
1 
 
¶152 JON P. WILCOX, J.   (concurring).  The court today 
goes much further than it needs to in order to decide this case.  
I would only find it necessary to assess the circuit court's 
initial determination to exclude the McMorris evidence.  Still, 
because I would find the circuit court's decision in that 
respect clearly erroneous, I would come to the same result as 
the majority, and remand the case for a new trial. 
¶153 The question of whether or not to admit evidence is a 
decision left to the discretion of the circuit court.  State v. 
Cardenas-Hernandez, 219 Wis. 2d 516, 525, 579 N.W.2d 678 (1998).  
We will sustain a discretionary act of the circuit court if it 
assessed the relevant facts, applied the proper standard of law, 
and reached a reasonable conclusion based on the facts and the 
law.  Lane v. Sharp Packaging Sys., 2002 WI 28, ¶19, 251 
Wis. 2d 68, 640 N.W.2d 788.  Whether the circuit court used the 
proper legal standard, however, is a question of law we review 
independently 
of 
the 
circuit 
court, 
benefiting 
from 
its 
analysis.  Id. 
¶154 In this case, I would conclude that the circuit court 
erred in its application of the legal standard of whether or not 
to allow Debra Head to present McMorris evidence.  As the 
majority notes, the State has conceded the point that McMorris 
evidence may be used by a defendant to establish a factual basis 
to support a self-defense claim.  Majority op. at ¶121.  I agree 
with this concession.  Under Wis. Stat. § 901.04(1) (1997-98),17 
 
                                                 
17 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are 
to the 1997-98 version. 
No.  99-3071.jpw 
 
2 
 
Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of 
a person to be a witness, the existence of a 
privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be 
determined 
by 
the 
judge . . . . In 
making 
the 
determination the judge is bound by the rules of 
evidence only with respect to privileges and as 
provided in s. 901.05.18 
Thus, in making an admissibility determination, the judge is not 
limited to evidence that would be admissible at trial.  In this 
sense, the present case is not unlike the situation in Bourjaily 
v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987), where the United States 
Supreme Court ruled that, when deciding the admissibility of 
hearsay evidence as a statement of a co-conspirator, the trial 
court, when making the preliminary finding of the existence of a 
conspiracy, can consider the hearsay statements themselves. 
¶155 Here, the court did not properly consider the rule of 
Wis. Stat. § 901.04(1) 
when 
making 
its 
admissibility 
determination.  For reasons similar to those we articulated in 
State v. Felton, 110 Wis. 2d 485, 509-10, 329 N.W.2d 161 (1983), 
and State v. Hoyt, 21 Wis. 2d 284, 301-03, 128 N.W.2d 645 
(1964), Debra's offer of proof about her husband's past acts 
does inform the court's decision of whether the threshold 
standard for at least imperfect self-defense is met.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 940.01(2)(b).  However, the court in this case 
expressly limited its consideration to the facts contemporaneous 
to the shooting, rather than consider all relevant, non-
privileged evidence as required by the statute.  As a result of 
this limitation, Debra was not allowed to present McMorris 
                                                 
18 Wis. Stat. § 901.05 governs the admissibility of certain 
medical test results. 
No.  99-3071.jpw 
 
3 
 
evidence at trial.  See majority op. at ¶¶48-49.  This explicit 
failure to consider the other evidence was a misapplication of 
the proper standard of law, and the circuit court's decision to 
exclude the McMorris evidence from trial was, therefore, clearly 
erroneous.  Furthermore, the error was clearly prejudicial to 
Debra Head. 
¶156 Because I would find that the circuit court erred in 
not 
considering 
the 
McMorris 
evidence 
itself 
in 
its 
determination of whether to allow Debra Head to present a claim 
of perfect or imperfect self-defense, I would remand the case to 
the circuit court for a new trial, allowing the introduction of 
McMorris evidence. 
¶157 Finally, on a separate issue, I briefly note that I 
agree with the majority's articulation of the harmless error 
rule.  Majority op. at ¶44. 
¶158 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur.  
¶159 I am authorized to state that Justice N. PATRICK 
CROOKS joins this opinion.   
 
No.  99-3071.jpw 
 
 
 
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