Title: New Jersey v. Brown

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

SYLLABUS

This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the
Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the
Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized.

         State v. Hakum Brown; State v. Rodney Brown (A-39-19) (083353)

Argued October 14, 2020 -- Decided January 25, 2021

LaVECCHIA, J., writing for the Court.

        These consolidated appeals present a common legal issue: whether state or federal
constitutional ex post facto prohibitions permit defendants to be charged with and
convicted of the enhanced third-degree offense of failure to comply with sex offender
registration requirements when each defendant’s registration requirement arose from a
conviction that occurred before the penalty for noncompliance was raised a degree.

        In 1995, Rodney Brown (R.B.) was convicted of sexual assault. In 2000, Hakum
Brown (H.B.) was convicted of sexual assault and endangering the welfare of a child. As
a result of those predicate convictions, H.B. and R.B. were subject to the sex offender
registration requirements imposed by Megan’s Law. At the time of H.B.’s and R.B.’s
sex-offender convictions, failure to comply with the registration requirements was
punishable as a fourth-degree offense. However, in 2007, the Legislature upgraded
failure to register to a third-degree offense. In 2014, H.B. failed to timely register with
his local police department. R.B. similarly failed to register in 2015. Each was charged
with third-degree failure to register.

       H.B. pleaded guilty but appealed, asserting there is an ex post facto violation in
being charged with third-degree failure to register when, at the time of his predicate sex-
offender conviction, failure to register was only a fourth-degree offense. R.B. pleaded
not guilty. He moved to dismiss his indictments on ex post facto grounds, and the trial
court granted R.B.’s motion in its entirety. The State appealed the dismissal of R.B.’s
indictments. The Appellate Division consolidated the State’s appeal in R.B.’s matter
with H.B.’s appeal from his conviction. Relying on State v. Timmendequas,  460 N.J.
Super. 346 (App. Div. 2019), the appellate court reversed H.B.’s conviction and affirmed
the dismissal of R.B.’s indictment. The Court granted certification.  240 N.J. 426 (2020).

HELD: Defendants suffered no ex post facto violation as a result of being charged with
failure-to-register offenses bearing the increased degree. The Legislature is free to
increase the penalty for the offense of failure to comply with the regulatory registration
requirement -- which is separate and apart from defendants’ predicate sex offenses --
without violating ex post facto principles as to those predicate offenses.
                                             1
1. In Doe v. Poritz, the Court found the Megan’s Law registration requirement to be
regulatory and remedial rather than punitive and therefore held that Megan’s Law’s
retroactive application to persons who had already been convicted of eligible sex offenses
did not subject past offenders to additional punishment and did not offend the Ex Post
Facto Clauses.  142 N.J. 1, 75 (1995). (pp. 9-12)

2. Two findings must be made for a law to violate the constitutional prohibition on ex
post facto laws. The court must determine: first, whether the law is retrospective, meaning
it applies to events occurring before its enactment or changes the legal consequences of
acts completed before its effective date; second, whether the law, as retrospectively
applied, imposes additional punishment to an already completed crime. (pp. 12-13)

3. Doe placed the registration scheme decidedly in the nonpunitive category as a civil,
administrative consequence. That the violation of that regulatory scheme is enforced
through separate criminal charges when and if the violation occurs does not make the
registration requirement itself penal. The registration requirement is not part of the penal
sentence for the predicate sex offense. Distilled to its essence, registration is retroactive
but not punitive. Prosecution for failing to register, however, is different. It addresses a
separate crime and is punitive but not retroactive. Viewed accordingly, just as the
Legislature was permitted to affix a criminal penalty for the prospective violation
denominated as failure to register, so too may it prospectively enhance the degree of such
a penalty. Federal courts and other state supreme courts have similarly held that failure
to register is an offense distinct from the original underlying sex offense. (pp. 13-17)

4. Megan’s Law imposed a term of community supervision for life (CSL) on individuals
convicted of certain sex offenses. In 2003, the Legislature replaced CSL with parole
supervision for life (PSL), a more restrictive post-release regime. In State v. Perez,  220 N.J. 423 (2015), the Court considered whether the Legislature could retroactively convert
an offender’s sentence of CSL to a sentence of PSL. Stressing that both “CSL and PSL
were and are intended to be penal rather than remedial post-sentence supervisory
schemes,” the Court held that such retroactive enhancement of an offender’s sentence
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. at 441-42. (pp. 17-19)

5. And in State v. Hester,  233 N.J. 381 (2018), the Court considered whether -- after a
2013 amendment that raised the degree of violation of CSL and mandated conversion
from CSL to PSL -- those heightened sanctions could be imposed on individuals who
began serving CSL prior to the amendment. The Court concluded that the defendants’
CSL violations should not be viewed as independent crimes but as “violations of the
general conditions of their supervised release” that were “integral parts” of the
defendants’ sentences. Id. at 397. By enhancing the penalty for violating those
requirements, the Legislature had impermissibly sought to “materially alter[] defendants’
prior sentences to their disadvantage.” Id. at 398. Increasing the defendants’ penalty for
violating CSL violated the Ex Post Facto Clause, just as in Perez. Id. at 398. (pp. 19-21)
                                              2
6. The Court stresses the foundational reasoning of Doe v. Poritz. Doe recognized the
registration requirement as an administrative obligation rather than a penal consequence
of the original predicate sex offense; the fact that violations of that administrative
obligation are themselves separately punishable does not alter the nature of the obligation
itself. Thus, imposition of that obligation did not involve a retroactive increase in
punishment for the predicate crime. And, by extension, increasing the penal
consequences for a violation of that obligation is similarly distinct from the punishment
imposed for the predicate crime. (pp. 21-22)

7. Hester involved aspects of the application of CSL and PSL, which are not
administrative obligations, but rather punitive measures imposed as part of the supervised
release of an offender convicted of a qualifying offense. Doe is the most relevant to the
circumstances present here, and adherence to Doe’s determination that registration is not
punitive should have precluded reliance on cases dealing with punitive consequences
such as PSL, CSL, and the requirements of the Sex Offender Monitoring Act, see Riley v.
State Parole Bd.,  219 N.J. 270 (2014), in the context of a challenge predicated on the
registration requirement. (pp. 22-25)

8. The Court disapproves of the analysis of Timmendequas and reverses the Appellate
Division’s decision in this matter, which relied on Timmendequas. If the Legislature has
the authority to create new penalties for noncompliance with administrative obligations,
as it did in Megan’s Law, it would be incongruous if it could not prospectively upgrade
the penalty for violating an existing administrative obligation. (p. 25)

      REVERSED. R.B.’s matter is REMANDED to the trial court. H.B.’s
conviction and sentence are REINSTATED.

       JUSTICE ALBIN, dissenting, does not see any basis to treat retroactively
imposed increased punishments for violations of CSL requirements and Megan’s Law
registration requirements differently for ex post facto purposes. Justice Albin notes that
both the CSL requirements and the Megan’s Law registration requirements are conditions
imposed at the time of sentencing for a defendant’s predicate sex offense; both mandate
lifetime compliance; and violations of both are punishable as crimes, subjecting offenders
to potential prison terms. In Justice Albin’s view, the Court should not retroactively
aggravate the penalty for failing to register based on an arbitrary distinction between CSL
and Megan’s Law registration. Justice Albin concludes that the 2007 amendment
increased the punishment for defendants’ violation of a condition of their sentences -- the
registration requirement -- and therefore materially altered their sentences to their
disadvantage in violation of the prohibition on ex post facto laws.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA,
SOLOMON, and PIERRE-LOUIS join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA’s opinion.
JUSTICE ALBIN filed a dissent.
                                             3
                SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                      A-
39 September Term 2019
                                 083353

                          State of New Jersey,

                          Plaintiff-Appellant,

                                    v.

                 Hakum Brown a/k/a Hakeem Brown,

                       Defendant-Respondent.
________________________________________________________________

                          State of New Jersey,

                          Plaintiff-Appellant,

                                    v.

                            Rodney Brown,

                        Defendant-Respondent.

                     On certification to the Superior Court,
                              Appellate Division.

                Argued                        Decided
            October 14, 2020              January 25, 2021

         Jennifer E. Kmieciak, Deputy Attorney General, argued
         the cause for appellant (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney
         General, attorney; Jennifer E. Kmieciak, of counsel and
         on the briefs).

                                    1
            James K. Smith, Jr., Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
            argued the cause for respondents (Joseph E. Krakora,
            Public Defender, attorney; James K. Smith, Jr., of
            counsel and on the briefs).

            Molly Linhorst argued the cause for amicus curiae
            American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (American
            Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation,
            attorneys; Molly Linhorst, Alexander Shalom, and Jeanne
            LoCicero, on the brief).

               JUSTICE LaVECCHIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

      New Jersey’s law governing the sex offender registration and

notification system,  N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23, is commonly known as Megan’s

Law, after the victim of a tragedy that spurred the law’s passage. Enacted in

1994, Megan’s Law imposed a registration requirement on convicted sex

offenders and, in its original form, made failure to register chargeable as a

fourth-degree offense. The statutory scheme has been amended a number of

times. Pertinent here is the 2007 amendment through which the Legislature

prospectively elevated failure to register to a third-degree offense.

      These consolidated criminal appeals present a common legal issue:

whether state or federal constitutional ex post facto prohibitions permit

defendants to be charged with and convicted of the enhanced third-degree

offense of failure to comply with sex offender registration requirements when

each defendant’s registration requirement arose from a conviction that

                                        2
occurred before the penalty for registration noncompliance was raised a

degree.

      For both defendants in this appeal, failure to register was punishable as a

fourth-degree offense at the time of the predicate convictions that subjected

each to Megan’s Law’s requirements. However, defendants’ failures to

register upon release from unrelated subsequent terms of incarceration

occurred after the increased degree in penalty took effect.

      We hold that defendants suffered no ex post facto violation as a result of

being charged with failure-to-register offenses bearing the increased degree.

Defendants committed the charged offenses after the effective date of the 2007

amendments, of which each had fair notice. This Court has consistently

regarded the Megan’s Law registration requirement as a legislatively imposed

regulatory consequence of committing a sex offense, as defined under Megan’s

Law, even though the Legislature has chosen to enforce that administrative

scheme with punitive consequences. The Legislature is free to increase the

penalty for the offense of failure to comply with the regulatory registration

requirement -- which is separate and apart from defendants’ predicate sex

offenses -- without violating ex post facto principles as to those predicate

offenses.

                                        3
      We distinguish in our holding today our prior decision in State v. Hester,

 233 N.J. 381, 398 (2018), where we held that the punishment for a violation of

a sentence of community supervision for life (CSL) cannot be made more

onerous than it was at the time of the underlying crime under ex post facto

principles because the CSL sentence is a punitive consequence of that

underlying offense. In contrast, an individual who violates the registration

requirement and is charged with the offense of noncompliance after the penalty

increase became effective is not subjected to a prohibited retroactive increase

in punishment for a past offense.

                                       I.

                                       A.

      In 1995, Rodney Brown (R.B.) was convicted of second-degree sexual

assault,  N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2, and was sentenced to three years in prison and CSL.

      In 2000, Hakum Brown (H.B.) was convicted of second-degree sexual

assault and third-degree endangering the welfare of a child,  N.J.S.A. 2C:24-

4(a). H.B. was sentenced to six years in prison and CSL.

      As a result of those predicate convictions, H.B. and R.B. were subject to

the sex offender registration requirements imposed by Megan’s Law.

Specifically, upon release from incarceration, H.B. and R.B. each were

required to register with the police department of the municipality in which he

                                       4
resided.  N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(a)(1), -2(c). At the time of H.B.’s and R.B.’s sex-

offender convictions, failure to comply with the registration requirements was

punishable as a fourth-degree offense. L. 1994, c. 133, § 2a. However, in

2007, the Legislature upgraded failure to register to a third-degree offense. L.

2007, c. 19, § 1 (codified at  N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(a)(3)).

      Pertinent to our present analysis, on August 25, 2014, H.B. was released

from incarceration on an unrelated offense but failed to timely register with his

local police department. R.B. similarly failed to register following his release

from incarceration (again on an unrelated offense) on December 23, 2015.

Each was charged with third-degree failure to register under  N.J.S.A. 2C:7-

2(a)(3), as well as third-degree violations of CSL,  N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(d).

                                       B.

      H.B. pleaded guilty and was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. He

appealed his conviction, asserting there is an ex post facto violation in being

charged with third-degree failure to register when, at the time of his predicate

sex-offender conviction, failure to register was only a fourth-degree offense.1

      R.B. pleaded not guilty to a parallel set of charges. He moved to dismiss

his indictments on ex post facto grounds, and the trial court granted R.B.’s

1
 The State did not raise a waiver argument before either the Appellate
Division or this Court, hence waiver is not an issue in this appeal.
                                        5
motion in its entirety. In doing so, the court applied State v. F.W.,  443 N.J.

Super. 476 (App. Div. 2016), which held that it violated ex post facto

principles to charge an individual with third-degree violations of CSL when, at

the time of one’s predicate sex-offense conviction, violation of CSL was a

fourth-degree offense. After applying that reasoning to the CSL charges in

R.B.’s indictment, the trial court determined that the logic of F.W. applied

with equal force to R.B.’s indictment for third-degree failure to register.

      The State appealed the dismissal of R.B.’s indictments; that appeal was

stayed when we granted certification in Hester to consider the ex post facto

argument in connection with the increase in offense degree for CSL violations.

After we issued our decision in Hester, the State conceded that R.B. and H.B.

could be charged with only a fourth-degree offense for their alleged violations

of CSL. Thus, the State abandoned the portions of its appeals concerning

defendants’ CSL violations. With respect to the remaining common issue

permeating both appeals, on July 31, 2019, the Appellate Division

consolidated the State’s appeal in R.B.’s matter with H.B.’s appeal from his

conviction. Thus, the consolidated appeals focused solely on the increase in

offense degree for defendants’ failure-to-register offenses.

                                        6
                                        C.

        In an unpublished decision, the Appellate Division reversed H.B.’s

conviction for the third-degree offense of failure to register and affirmed the

dismissal of R.B.’s indictment for the same offense.

        The appellate court began by reviewing the decision in Hester, homing

in on its conclusion that CSL is a condition of an offender’s sentence and that

violations of CSL therefore relate back to the date of the predicate sex offense

for ex post facto purposes. The court then referenced a recent published

opinion of the Appellate Division that considered whether to apply Hester’s

holding in respect of CSL violations to the offense of failure to register. State

v. Timmendequas,  460 N.J. Super. 346, 350 (App. Div. 2019). The

Timmendequas decision, written by the same appellate panel as in the instant

appeal, observed that the Legislature’s intent in penalizing failure to register

was punitive, even if the requirements themselves were not, and that an ex post

facto analysis was therefore compelled. Id. at 355. The Timmendequas court

concluded that, properly viewed, registration requirements are a condition of

an offender’s sentence, and the State’s enhanced penalties for failure to

register thus impermissibly “materially altered defendant’s prior sentence to

his disadvantage.” Id. at 357 (alterations omitted) (quoting Hester,  233 N.J. at
 398).

                                        7
      The appellate court followed the holding in Timmendequas in the instant

appeal and similarly concluded that the logic of Hester should apply to

Megan’s Law’s registration requirements. Accordingly, the Appellate

Division held that H.B. and R.B. could be charged with failure to register only

to the extent that the law permitted at the time of their predicate sex offenses,

namely as a fourth-degree offense.

      The State filed a petition for certification, which this Court granted.  240 N.J. 426 (2020).2 We also granted amicus curiae status to the American Civil

Liberties Union of New Jersey (ACLU).

                                        II.

      Before this Court, the State maintains its position that there is no ex post

facto violation in applying the 2007 amendment to  N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2 to sex

offenders who commit the new crime of failing to register after the effective

date of the amendment. According to the State, the violation of the civil

requirement of registration is a separate offense distinct from the original

conviction that was the predicate for being placed on Megan’s Law. The State

maintains that applying the amendment to a post-amendment failure to register

is not a retroactive increase in punishment for a past offense.

2
  A motion for leave to appeal in Timmendequas is currently pending before
this Court.
                                      8
      In a joint brief, defendants take the opposite view. Defendants argue

that the 2007 amendment to Megan’s Law, which had no purpose other than to

increase the penalty for failure to register, may not be applied retroactively

with respect to the predicate offense without violating the Ex Post Facto

Clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions. The ACLU urges, consistent

with the position of defendants, that mandatory registration under Megan’s

Law be viewed as part-and-parcel of defendants’ sentences for their underlying

offenses and that therefore, as was held in Hester for CSL, failure to register

should not be regarded as a new offense. Amicus thus contends that the 2007

amendment retroactively makes the punishment more burdensome for the same

offense in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clauses.

                                       III.

                                        A.

      In 1994, the Legislature enacted Megan’s Law, now codified at  N.J.S.A.

2C:7-1 to -23, for the express purpose of establishing a sex offender registry

that would “provide law enforcement with additional information critical to

preventing and promptly resolving incidents involving sexual abuse and

missing persons.”  N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1(b). The law requires any individual

convicted of certain sex offenses to register with the police department of the

municipality in which he or she resides.  N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(c). Megan’s Law

                                        9
further provided at the time that failure to register was punishable as a fourth-

degree offense. L. 1994, c. 133, § 2(a). In addition, annual address

verification obligations and registration requirements are imposed on a

registrant who moves into or out of New Jersey or changes his or her

residence. See  N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(c), (d).3

      In Doe v. Poritz,  142 N.J. 1 (1995), this Court upheld Megan’s Law

against a series of constitutional challenges. In relevant part, this Court held

the law’s registration requirements could be imposed on individuals whose

predicate sex offenses predated the law’s passage without running afoul of

State or Federal Ex Post Facto Clauses. Id. at 75. Integral to that holding was

the conclusion that the law’s registration requirements were remedial rather

than punitive. Id. at 73. Our Court acknowledged that although the State

cannot impose retroactive punishment on individuals for their past offenses,

the law’s registration requirements were instead a “collateral consequence” of

an individual’s conviction, id. at 77 n.18, which did not raise the same

constitutional concerns, id. at 75. That determination was key. Because the

 3 In 2014, legislative amendments to subsection (d) increased to an offense of
the third degree the penalty for failing to notify and re-register upon
relocation. Because both defendants were being released from prison when
charged with their offenses in this matter, they were not charged under
subsection (d), although subsection (d)’s obligations apply to them.
                                         10
Court found the registration requirement to be regulatory and remedial, the

Court held that Megan’s Law’s retroactive application to persons who had

already been convicted of eligible sex offenses in this and other jurisdictions

did not subject past offenders to additional punishment and did not offend the

Ex Post Facto Clauses. Ibid. That foundational determination has never been

shaken. This Court has consistently treated the registration requirement as a

civil consequence. State v. Perez,  220 N.J. 423, 440 (2015) (describing the

registration requirement as an “administrative obligation” distinct from a

punitive consequence); see also Riley v. State Parole Bd.,  219 N.J. 270, 297

(2014) (referring to Megan’s Law as a “nonpunitive civil statute”); In re

Commitment of J.M.B.,  197 N.J. 563, 601 (2009) (describing Megan’s Law as

a “remedial, non-punitive statute[]”).

      In 2007, the Legislature amended Megan’s Law, upgrading failure to

register from a fourth-degree offense to a third-degree offense. L. 2007, c. 19,

§ 1. The enhanced penalties applicable to an offense graded as third degree

are significant. While a fourth-degree offense carries a prison term of no

greater than eighteen months, an individual convicted of a third-degree offense

may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment between three and five years.

 N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(a)(3) to (4). The 2007 amendments took effect on March 1,

2007. L. 2007, c. 19, § 3.

                                         11
      That increase in penalty for failure to register gives rise to the present ex

post facto challenge.

                                         B.

      Both the New Jersey and United States Constitutions prohibit the

Legislature from passing ex post facto laws. N.J. Const. art. IV, § 7, ¶ 3 (“The

Legislature shall not pass any . . . ex post facto law . . . .”); accord U.S. Const.

art. I, § 10, cl. 1. We have interpreted the Ex Post Facto Clause in the State

Constitution in the same manner as its federal counterpart. Doe,  142 N.J. at
 42. Those clauses proscribe “any statute which . . . makes more burdensome

the punishment for a crime, after its commission.” Beazell v. Ohio,