Title: Cooper v. Burnor

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Cooper v. Burnor (98-133); 170 Vt. 583; 750 A.2d 974

[Opinion Filed 23-Nov-1999]
[Motion for Reargument Denied 13-Jan-2000]

                                 ENTRY ORDER
					
                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 98-133

                              APRIL TERM, 1999

Germaine Cooper 	               }	APPEALED FROM:
	                               }
	                               }
     v.	                               }	Franklin Superior Court
	                               }	
David Burnor	                       }
                                       }
	                               }	DOCKET NO. S359-96Fc	

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Plaintiff Germaine Cooper filed suit in Franklin Superior Court
  against defendant David Burnor  for damages resulting from an automobile
  accident.  Plaintiff appeals the judgment, claiming that  the court erred
  by (1) excluding, as a discovery sanction, plaintiff's testimony regarding
  a  measurement that contradicted defendant's testimony; (2) failing to
  instruct the jury that a  violation of a motor vehicle safety statute
  constitutes a rebuttable presumption of negligence; and  (3) failing to
  instruct the jury on safety rules regarding stopping on the wrong side of
  the  highway.  We affirm. 

       The accident occurred at dusk in the fall of 1993.  Plaintiff was
  heading west on Route 36 in the  Town of Fairfield when defendant,
  traveling eastbound, crossed over to the opposite side of the  road in
  order to deliver a paper to a residential mailbox.  A third motorist, Ann
  Serro, who was  following defendant in the eastbound lane remained in her
  lane of travel.  As plaintiff drove  west, she approached a hill, at the
  top of which she saw defendant's vehicle facing her, stopped  alongside her
  lane of the road.  Plaintiff swerved to avoid defendant's vehicle and lost
  control,  entering the eastbound lane and colliding with Serro's vehicle. 
  Plaintiff sustained injuries.
	
       The jury found plaintiff slightly more negligent than defendant and
  consequently judgment was  entered for defendant.  See 12 V.S.A. § 1036
  (plaintiff cannot recover under comparative  negligence statute when
  plaintiff's negligence exceeds defendant's negligence).  This appeal 
  followed. 

                                     I.

       Plaintiff first contends that the court improperly excluded
  plaintiff's testimony as to her  measurement of the distance between the
  mailbox and the edge of the paved highway which  contradicted defendant's
  testimony.  The evidence differed on the factual issue of where 
  defendant's vehicle was located when plaintiff took evasive action.  The
  state trooper who   investigated the accident testified that there was
  sufficient room between the mailbox and the  edge of the road for a vehicle
  the size of defendant's to stop clear of the lane of travel.   Defendant
  testified that on the day of the accident, the mailbox was located eight
  feet from the  edge of the highway pavement and his vehicle was only five
  and one-half to six feet wide.   Defendant maintained that there was ample
  room for his vehicle to be completely removed from  the pavement or nearly
  so at the time of the accident.  

       During her testimony, plaintiff stated that she had measured the
  distance from the mailbox to the  edge of the pavement.  Defense counsel
  objected to plaintiff's testimony, noting that there was no  disclosure
  during discovery of a witness who had investigated the accident

 

  other than the state trooper.  Plaintiff proposed to testify that, based
  upon her measurement, the  mailbox was less than three feet from the edge
  of the highway pavement, directly contradicting  defendant's testimony of
  eight feet.  The court sustained the objection.

       Plaintiff asserts that the court abused its discretion and unfairly
  prejudiced plaintiff's case when it  excluded the testimony as a discovery
  sanction. We find no abuse of discretion.
	
       At trial, when defense counsel objected to plaintiff testifying about
  her measurement, plaintiff's  counsel offered to prove "that there's less
  than three feet between where a car would pull up and  the edge of the
  pavement," noting that plaintiff's testimony directly contradicted
  defendant's  testimony that the mailbox was six to eight feet from the edge
  of the road.  The court stated that  "You've got to disclose [during
  discovery] that there was some other measurements in the  investigation." 
  At oral argument, plaintiff's counsel disclosed that plaintiff measured the
  spot  after defendant testified at trial and thus plaintiff's testimony was
  offered in rebuttal.  The timing  of plaintiff's measurement, however, was
  not mentioned at the time of the ruling at trial.    

       It was within the trial court's discretion to exclude the testimony
  assuming, as it did, that the  evidence was acquired early on in the
  preparation for trial and not disclosed in discovery. Thus,  the court's
  ruling was not error.

                                     II.

    
       After instructing the jury on the legal standard of care, plaintiff's
  counsel objected, arguing that  the jury was not instructed that, if it
  found a violation of the safety statute by either party, it  created a
  rebuttable presumption of negligence. 

       Proof of the violation of a safety statute creates a prima facie case
  of negligence.  Bacon v.  Lascelles, 165 Vt. 214, 222,