Title: State v. Kingman

State: washington

Issuer: Washington Supreme Court

Document:

77 Wn.2d 551 (1970) 463 P.2d 638 THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Petitioner, v. W. KENNETH KINGMAN et al., Respondents.[*] No. 40888. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department One. January 8, 1970. The Attorney General and John J. Champagne, Assistant, for petitioner. Murray & Hanna, by H.B. Hanna, for respondents. WEAVER, J. By writ of certiorari, the state seeks review of an order denying its petition for an order of public use and necessity. The petition alleges: and that the property It appears from briefs of counsel (a) that the land to be acquired is a 300 foot strip of waterfront approximately 150 *552 feet wide between the public highway and Lake Chelan; (b) that the state's action is based upon Laws of 1965, Ex. Ses., ch. 170, § 62, p. 2716, as amended by Laws of 1967, ch. 108, § 5, p. 492, and (c) the purpose of the action is to preserve the natural beauty of the locale. Specifically, it is to preserve a beautiful view of Lake Chelan and the foothills beyond. Photographs illustrate the state's position. [1] Except for the phrase "good cause appearing," the trial court, in its order after trial, gives no reason for denying the certificate of public use and necessity. The rule is this: The doctrine of the Lange case, supra, and cases citing it, limit us to a consideration of whether there is evidence to support the findings of fact upon which the trial court based the conclusion that the state acted in "bad faith [and was], arbitrary, capricious or fraudulent ..." Here we run into a void. For some reason, which does not appear in the record, the trial court did not make and enter findings of fact and conclusions of law. The rules of court are not new. For years CR 52(a)(1) has provided: [2] Although a trial court's oral opinion may be used as a reference in the interpretation of findings of fact (Rutter v. Rutter, 59 Wn.2d 781, 784, 370 P.2d 862 (1962)), it is not a finding of fact. Quigley v. Barash, 135 Wash. 338, 237 P. 732 (1925); Ferree v. Doric Co., 62 Wn.2d 561, 566, 383 P.2d 900 (1963), and authorities cited. The present posture of the record is only an invitation to read the evidence, consider it de novo, and second guess the trial court. This we cannot do. *553 This abortive review could have been eliminated had CR 52 (d) been followed: The order denying the petition for public use and necessity is set aside; the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. HUNTER, C.J., HAMILTON and McGOVERN, JJ., and DONWORTH, J. Pro Tem., concur. [*] Reported in 463 P.2d 638.