Title: Commonwealth v. Costa

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-13157 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  CONCETTO COSTA. 
 
 
 
Essex.     December 6, 2021. - July 1, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Due Process of Law, Probation revocation, Fair trial.  
Constitutional Law, Confrontation of witnesses, Fair trial.  
Fair Trial.  Practice, Criminal, Probation, Revocation of 
probation, Confrontation of witnesses, Fair trial, Hearsay.  
Witness, Impeachment, Credibility, Cross-examination.  
Evidence, Impeachment of credibility, Credibility of 
witness, Cross-examination, Hearsay. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 22, 2006. 
 
 
A proceeding for revocation of probation was heard by Kathe 
M. Tuttman, J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Patrick Levin, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
the defendant. 
 
Kathryn L. Janssen, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Maura Healey, Attorney General, & Gabriel Thornton, 
Assistant Attorney General, for the Attorney General, amicus 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
2 
 
 
 
Anthony D. Gulluni, District Attorney, & Katherine E. 
McMahon, Assistant District Attorney, for district attorney for 
the Hampden district & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
David E. Sullivan & Andrea Harrington, District Attorneys, 
& Jennifer K. Zalnasky & Thomas H. Townsend, Assistant District 
Attorneys, for district attorney for the northwestern district & 
another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  The probationer in this case had his probation 
revoked on the basis of hearsay statements by his former fiancée 
alleging, among other things, that the probationer had raped her 
repeatedly over a period of approximately four months when they 
were living together.  The probationer argues that the 
proceedings at the probation violation hearing did not comport 
with due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights because his accuser did not appear at the 
hearing to testify and to be cross-examined. 
 
A probationer's request for live testimony at a probation 
violation hearing implicates two due process rights:  (1) the 
right to confront adverse witnesses, and (2) the right to 
present a defense.  See Commonwealth v. Hartfield, 474 Mass. 
474, 479 (2016).  The probationer argues that both of these 
rights were violated at his probation violation hearing.  We do 
not agree that, in this case, the absence of the complainant, 
the probationer's former fiancée, violated the probationer's 
right to confront adverse witnesses, but we do agree that the 
3 
 
 
inability to question her violated his right to present a 
defense.  Accordingly, the decision on the asserted violation of 
probation must be vacated and set aside, and a new hearing must 
be conducted, at which the probationer may call the complainant 
as a witness in his defense.1 
 
1.  Background.  We recite the facts based on the evidence 
introduced at the evidentiary hearing and the final probation 
violation hearing, reserving certain details for later 
discussion. 
 
In 2008, the probationer pleaded guilty to four counts of 
rape and abuse of a child, G. L. c. 265, § 23, and one count of 
indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen, G. L. 
c. 265, § 13B.  In 2014, after completing a sentence of 
incarceration on three of the four convictions of rape, the 
probationer began a term of ten years of probation on the 
remaining convictions.  One of the conditions of that probation 
required the probationer to obey local, State, and Federal laws. 
 
On February 11, 2019, the complainant went to the Salisbury 
police station and met with Sergeant James Leavitt.  She told 
Leavitt that she had begun dating the probationer in May of 
 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the district 
attorneys for the Hampden and Plymouth districts in support of 
the Commonwealth, and the amicus brief of the Attorney General, 
as well as the amicus letter submitted by the district attorneys 
for the Berkshire and northwestern districts. 
4 
 
 
2018.  Soon thereafter, they became engaged.  They moved into an 
apartment together where they lived from October of 2018 to 
February of 2019.  The complainant told Leavitt that, after she 
moved in with the probationer, their relationship had become 
rife with violence and intimidation.  Leavitt assisted the 
complainant with an application for an abuse prevention order 
under G. L. c. 209A (209A order); in an attached affidavit, the 
complainant averred that the probationer had "forced himself on 
[her] sexually" and had threatened to kill her if she left him.  
Leavitt spoke by telephone with a judge of the trial court 
department, who issued an emergency 209A order.  Leavitt also 
made an appointment to meet again with the complainant the 
following day. 
 
On February 12, 2019, the 209A order was extended for a 
period of one year.  Later that day, the complainant returned to 
the Salisbury police station to provide Leavitt with a more 
detailed description of how her relationship with the 
probationer had changed shortly after they moved in together.  
She discussed, in detail, how the probationer physically forced 
her to engage in sexual activity.  These alleged incidents 
occurred numerous times each week, beginning in mid-October of 
2018 and continuing through the end of January 2019.  In 
addition, the complainant told Leavitt that, on several 
occasions, the probationer had threatened to stab her and kill 
5 
 
 
her.  She also said that the probationer would prevent her from 
leaving the apartment; he did so by grabbing her arms, yelling 
threats at her, and, in some instances, throwing her to the 
floor.  Based on the complainant's statements, a criminal 
complaint issued charging the probationer with multiple counts 
of rape, kidnapping, assault and battery on a household member, 
and making threats.  After the probationer was arrested, the 
Commonwealth moved that he be held without bail pending trial, 
pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58A; following a hearing on the 
Commonwealth's motion, the probationer was found to be dangerous 
and was ordered detained. 
 
In March of 2019, the complainant testified before a grand 
jury.  During her testimony, she explained how her relationship 
with the probationer had changed after they moved into their 
shared apartment.  She testified that the probationer became 
jealous and would accuse her of infidelity.  She described 
incidents of forced oral, vaginal, and anal sex.  She also 
explained that the probationer sometimes would prevent her from 
leaving the apartment by forcibly holding her, blocking her exit 
from the apartment, and threatening to kill her.  The grand jury 
returned indictments charging the probationer with rape, assault 
and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, assault and battery 
on a family or household member, kidnapping, intimidation of a 
witness, and threatening to commit a crime. 
6 
 
 
 
As a result of these indictments, a notice of probation 
violation issued.  The complainant told the assistant district 
attorney that she emotionally could not handle testifying at a 
probation violation hearing.  Accordingly, in lieu of calling 
the complainant to testify, the assistant district attorney 
sought to admit the complainant's statements to Leavitt at the 
Salisbury police station, her affidavit attached to her 
application for a 209A order, and her testimony before the grand 
jury.  Invoking his due process right to confront the witnesses 
against him, the probationer sought to preclude the Commonwealth 
from introducing these statements as unreliable hearsay.  The 
Commonwealth opposed the motion, and itself sought to preclude 
the probationer from calling the complainant to testify. 
 
At an evidentiary hearing on the Commonwealth's and the 
probationer's motions in June of 2019 (motion hearing), the 
Commonwealth submitted exhibits including a transcript of the 
complainant's grand jury testimony; the complainant's 
application for the 209A order, with the attached affidavit; and 
a Salisbury police department report that included Leavitt's 
proffered testimony as to what the complainant told him on 
February 11 and 12 of 2019.  The probationer's exhibits included 
six reports by a private investigator who had interviewed four 
of the probationer's and the complainant's neighbors, a former 
husband of the complainant, and a former boyfriend.  The 
7 
 
 
probationer also introduced material related to a 209A order 
that the same former husband had obtained against the 
complainant.  Neither party called any witnesses to testify.  
After reviewing the documentary evidence and considering the 
parties' arguments, a Superior Court judge denied the 
probationer's motion to exclude the complainant's hearsay 
statements and allowed the Commonwealth's motion to preclude the 
probationer from calling the complainant to testify. 
 
In late September of 2019, a different judge presided over 
the final probation violation hearing.  In an attempt to impeach 
the complainant's credibility, the probationer called a former 
husband and a former boyfriend of the complainant to describe 
statements they had made to the private investigator that were 
contained in the investigator's reports.  The hearing judge 
sustained many of the Commonwealth's objections to the 
introduction of testimony about the complainant's prior conduct, 
as described in the reports, because the judge concluded that 
the proffered testimony was opinion evidence and evidence of 
prior bad acts and, accordingly, was not relevant to any issue 
before the court.  The hearing judge allowed the probationer to 
elicit some testimony from the former husband about his disputes 
with the complainant concerning custody of their daughter, but 
only to the extent that such statements bore on a potential 
motive to fabricate allegations about the probationer; any 
8 
 
 
statements as to her prior bad acts or mental state were 
excluded.  The probationer also asked the hearing judge to 
reconsider the rulings which had been made by the judge who 
presided over the evidentiary hearing; the motion was denied. 
 
The hearing judge then found that the probationer had 
violated the terms of his probation by committing new crimes, 
revoked his probation, and sentenced him to five years of 
incarceration on the fourth count of rape for which he initially 
had been sentenced to ten years of probation.  The probationer 
appealed, arguing that the proceedings violated his due process 
rights to confront adverse witnesses and to present a defense.  
A panel of the Appeals Court affirmed the rulings.  See 
Commonwealth v. Costa, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 435 (2021).  One 
justice dissented on the ground that precluding the probationer 
from calling the complainant as a witness violated his right to 
present a defense.  Id. at 454.  We allowed the probationer's 
application for further appellate review. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The probationer argues that the decision 
to allow the Commonwealth to introduce the three documents -- 
the grand jury transcript, the statement to Leavitt, and the 
application for the 209A order -- setting forth the 
complainant's statements, without allowing the probationer to 
cross-examine the complainant, violated his due process right to 
confront the witnesses against him.  Similarly, the decision to 
9 
 
 
preclude him from calling the complainant to testify at the 
probation violation hearing impinged upon his right to present a 
defense.  In the probationer's view, the hearing judge 
compounded this constitutional error by excluding statements by 
the complainant's former husband and her former boyfriend that 
the probationer had intended to use to impeach the complainant's 
credibility. 
 
"Revocation hearings are not part of a criminal 
prosecution."  Commonwealth v. Durling, 407 Mass. 108, 112 
(1990).  "Thus, a probationer need not be provided with the full 
panoply of constitutional protections applicable at a criminal 
trial."  Id.  By the time such a hearing takes place, "the 
Commonwealth has already gone through the expense and the effort 
of convicting" the probationer of an offense warranting a period 
of probation, and therefore has an interest "in maintaining 
administrative efficiency and reducing costs."  Id. at 116.  
Nonetheless, the probationer continues to have a liberty 
interest at stake; having been afforded the opportunity to 
demonstrate rehabilitation and to reintegrate into society, a 
probationer obtains an interest in avoiding the arbitrary 
deprivation of that opportunity.  See id. at 115.  To protect 
these interests, due process requires, at a minimum, 
"(a) written notice of the claimed violations of [probation 
or] parole; (b) disclosure to the [probationer or] parolee 
of the evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in 
10 
 
 
person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; 
(d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse 
witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds 
good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a 'neutral 
and detached' hearing body such as a traditional parole 
board, members of which need not be judicial officers or 
lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as 
to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking 
[probation or] parole" (alterations in original). 
 
Id. at 113, quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 
(1973). 
 
"[T]he right to confront adverse witnesses and the right to 
present a defense are distinct due process rights separately 
guaranteed to probationers."  Commonwealth v. Kelsey, 464 Mass. 
315, 327 n.12 (2013).  Claims of violations of these rights 
"should not be conflated" and "must be analyzed separately."  
Hartfield, 474 Mass. at 479. 
 
a.  Right to confront adverse witnesses.2  Due process 
guarantees a probationer "the right to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer 
specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation)."  
Durling, 407 Mass. at 113, quoting Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786.  
When the revocation of probation is based solely on hearsay 
 
 
2 Because the judges who presided over the evidentiary 
hearing and the revocation hearing based their findings only on 
documentary evidence, we review the record evidence before them 
de novo.  Commonwealth v. Mazza, 484 Mass. 539, 547 (2020).  See 
Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 480 Mass. 645, 656 (2018) (findings 
drawn from documentary evidence "are not entitled to deference 
and we may review such evidence de novo"). 
11 
 
 
evidence, the proffered hearsay must have "substantial indicia 
of reliability" to satisfy the good cause requirement.  
Hartfield, 474 Mass. at 482, 484.  See Durling, supra at 118 
("the probationer's interest in cross-examining the actual 
source [and hence testing its reliability] is greater when the 
hearsay is the only evidence offered"). 
 
To determine whether hearsay has substantial indicia of 
reliability, a judge may consider, inter alia, 
"(1) whether the evidence is based on personal knowledge or 
direct observation; (2) whether the evidence, if based on 
direct observation, was recorded close in time to the 
events in question; (3) the level of factual detail; 
(4) whether the statements are internally consistent; 
(5) whether the evidence is corroborated by information 
from other sources; (6) whether the declarant was 
disinterested when the statements were made; and 
(7) whether the statements were made under circumstances 
that support their veracity." 
 
Hartfield, 474 Mass. at 484.  "There is no requirement that 
hearsay satisfy all the above criteria to be trustworthy and 
reliable."  Commonwealth v. Patton, 458 Mass. 119, 133 (2010). 
 
In this case, the complainant's statements satisfy multiple 
of the indicia of reliability discussed in Hartfield.  The 
complainant relayed events that she had personally experienced.  
See Durling, 407 Mass. at 117 n.4 ("Often the only witness with 
personal knowledge of the crime [in a rape case] is the 
victim").  She reported these events in February and March of 
2019, close in time to the alleged pattern of abuse, which 
12 
 
 
spanned the period from mid-October of 2018 to January of 2019.  
See Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. 217, 237-238, 238 n.18 
(2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1216 (2006) (citing research 
suggesting that sexual assault victims "often do not promptly 
report or disclose the crime for a range of reasons, including 
shame, fear, or concern they will not be believed"). 
 
Although the complainant did not identify any specific 
dates during the approximately four-month period she lived with 
the probationer, she did describe certain of the alleged 
offenses with a high degree of factual detail.3  See Durling, 407 
 
 
3 The complainant told Leavitt that the first incident of 
forced oral sex occurred in October of 2018, and she described 
with specificity how the probationer positioned his body over 
her head as she slept.  The complainant also explained that the 
forced sexual activity occurred approximately four to five times 
each week and included incidents of anal and vaginal sex.  The 
complainant identified particular parts of her body that would 
get bruised during the encounters.  On several occasions when 
the complainant resisted the probationer's advances, she said 
that he threatened her with physical violence, specifically that 
he would stab her and kill her.  She asserted that one time in 
the course of trying to force himself on her, after she resisted 
his advances, the probationer damaged a closet and left a 
knuckle print on a door and "something on the wall." 
 
 
The complainant said that during the months they lived 
together, the probationer increasingly would prevent her from 
leaving the apartment; he did so by grabbing her arms, yelling 
threats at her, and, in some instances, throwing her to the 
floor.  She indicated that these incidents occurred at least ten 
times each month.  In response to a question whether the 
probationer ever used weapons, the complainant recalled one 
occasion, after she and the probationer had gone to visit her 
son, when the probationer became upset and, after they returned 
to the apartment, he got a knife and "put it to" her throat. 
13 
 
 
Mass. at 121 (statements from police reports were factually 
detailed, not general or conclusory; they were therefore 
reliable).  Moreover, she repeated her allegations of rape, 
violence, and threats consistently to Leavitt and to the grand 
jury.4  See Patton, 458 Mass. at 135 (witness's consistent 
recitation of details concerning indecent assault and battery 
made statements reliable).  Other circumstances of her reporting 
also tended to suggest that the complainant's statements were 
reliable.5 
 
At the same time, the complainant's allegations do not 
satisfy other indicia of reliability discussed in Hartfield.  
 
 
4 The statements in the complainant's affidavit accompanying 
her application for a 209A order also generally were consistent 
with the statements the complainant made to Leavitt and with her 
testimony before the grand jury.  The probationer notes that the 
complainant made inconsistent statements about whether she had 
had consensual sex with him while they lived together.  She told 
Leavitt that she might have had consensual sex with the 
probationer a few times each month while they were living 
together, but she told the grand jury that they never had 
consensual sex.  Although this inconsistency bears on her 
credibility, it does not directly undermine the reliability of 
the complainant's allegations that the probationer repeatedly 
assaulted her. 
 
 
5 For instance, in describing the encounters, the 
complainant appeared visibly distressed, and at times cried or 
trembled.  The complainant told the prosecutor that she was 
anxious about testifying before the grand jury and felt as 
though she might vomit.  See Patton, 458 Mass. at 134 (display 
of declarant's demeanor while speaking added to reliability of 
statements).  Contrast Commonwealth v. King, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 
737, 741 (2008) (complainant's sarcastic demeanor when 
describing incidents of domestic abuse to police undermined 
reliability of complainant's statements). 
14 
 
 
For example, the allegations were not corroborated by 
independent sources.  It also is not evident that the complainant 
was a disinterested witness.6 
 
At root, however, there is no requirement that hearsay 
satisfy all indicia of reliability in order to be admissible.  
See Patton, 458 Mass. at 133.  As discussed, the complainant's 
allegations were based on her personal knowledge, and were made 
relatively close in time to the alleged incidents.  With a few 
exceptions, her statements generally were internally consistent, 
and certain incidents were described with a high degree of 
factual detail.  We discern no violation of the probationer's 
due process rights in the introduction of the complainant's 
prior recorded statements at the probation violation hearing. 
 
 
6 According to the probationer, the complainant had a motive 
to fabricate the allegations and therefore cannot be considered 
a disinterested witness.  Based on evidence proffered by the 
probationer, the complainant, among other things, was involved 
in a dispute with her former husband, who had physical custody 
of their daughter, over legal custody. 
 
 
The probationer's counsel asserted in an affidavit that the 
complainant had been planning to have her daughter visit her at 
the apartment, and that the probationer "was an impediment to 
this plan," apparently because of the probationer's prior 
convictions; the probationer mentions as well a concern 
expressed by his own probation officer at the idea of him living 
in a house with a twelve year old child, and a meeting that the 
probation officer had with the probationer and the complainant 
to discuss it. 
 
 
In addition, the probationer points to indications that the 
complainant had been diagnosed with a mental illness and was 
abusing drugs and alcohol. 
15 
 
 
 
b.  Right to present a defense.  The probationer argues 
that even if there was no constitutional impediment to the 
introduction of the complainant's statements in the 
Commonwealth's case-in-chief without calling her to testify, he 
must be allowed to call her as a witness in order to vindicate 
his due process right to present a defense. 
 
Due process requires that a probationer have "a meaningful 
opportunity to present a defense."  Hartfield, 474 Mass. at 480, 
quoting Kelsey, 464 Mass. at 321.  "We break no new ground in 
observing that an essential component of procedural fairness is 
an opportunity to be heard."  Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 
690 (1986).  Although a probationer's liberty interest is not 
the same as that of a criminal defendant, "[t]o conclude that 
revocation hearings never implicate considerations similar to 
those implicated in the adjudication of guilt would be to ignore 
the close functional nexus that may exist between criminal 
trials and probation revocation proceedings."  Kelsey, supra at 
325 n.10.  See id. at 322. 
 
Whether the due process right to present a defense has been 
violated turns on the "totality of the circumstances in each 
case."  Kelsey, 464 Mass. at 322.  An analysis of the totality 
of the circumstances "must be structured and applied to ensure 
that adequate weight is given to the protection of the 
constitutional right and to the importance of making a 
16 
 
 
'reliable, accurate evaluation of whether the probationer indeed 
violated the conditions of his probation.'"  Hartfield, 474 
Mass. at 480-481, quoting Kelsey, supra.  To that end, "a 
probationer has a presumptive due process right to call 
witnesses in his or her defense."  Hartfield, supra at 481.  
This presumption "may be overcome by countervailing interests, 
generally that the proposed testimony is unnecessary to a fair 
adjudication of the alleged violation or unduly burdensome to 
the witness or the resources of the court."  Id.  To safeguard a 
probationer's liberty interest, however, in evaluating the 
totality of the circumstances as to whether the testimony of a 
proposed witness is necessary in order for a probationer to 
present a defense, a judge must consider, at a minimum, three 
factors: 
"(1) whether the proposed testimony of the witness might be 
significant in determining whether it is more likely than 
not that the probationer violated the conditions of 
probation; (2) whether, based on the proffer of the 
witness's testimony, the witness would provide evidence 
that adds to or differs from previously admitted evidence 
rather than be cumulative of that evidence; and 
(3) whether, based on an individualized assessment of the 
witness, there is an unacceptable risk that the witness's 
physical, psychological, or emotional health would be 
significantly jeopardized if the witness were required to 
testify in court at the probation hearing" (citations 
omitted). 
 
Id.  As to the third factor, we have emphasized that a judge's 
assessment must be "individualized and evidence-based," and have 
rejected "a general rule that would prevent a probationer from 
17 
 
 
ever calling [a complainant alleging sexual assault] to testify 
in his or her defense."  Id. 
 
As at any probation violation hearing, here the probationer 
had a presumptive due process right to present a defense.  See 
Hartfield, 474 Mass. at 481.  We therefore consider whether the 
Commonwealth has successfully overcome the presumption that the 
defendant had a right to call the complainant to show that her 
allegations he committed new offenses were not credible and 
reliable.  With respect to the first Hartfield factor, in this 
case, the complainant's live testimony would be highly 
significant in determining whether the probationer had violated 
the condition of probation that he not commit another crime.  
See id.  The only witness with personal knowledge of the alleged 
offenses is the complainant.  Her material statements that the 
probationer raped her, forcibly kept her from leaving the 
apartment, and threatened her with violence were uncorroborated 
by independent sources.  Compare id. at 477 (complainant's 
allegation of rape was corroborated by deoxyribonucleic acid 
evidence; nonetheless, judge's decision to preclude probationer 
from examining complainant via live testimony was not harmless 
error).  Police did not observe any signs of physical injury to 
the complainant, and their investigation into her assertions was 
minimal. 
18 
 
 
 
The Commonwealth's case rested entirely on the 
complainant's credibility, and the probationer's "best chance" 
to impeach her credibility was through the complainant's live 
testimony.  See id. at 483.  See also Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782 
n.5 (recognizing cases where "there is simply no adequate 
alternative to live testimony"); Commonwealth v. Leiva, 484 
Mass. 766, 780 (2020) ("Subjecting the evidence to rigorous 
adversarial testing and entrusting an impartial fact finder as 
the judge of credibility are critical components of a 
functioning adversary justice system"); 5 Wigmore, Evidence 
§ 1367, at 32 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) (describing cross-
examination as "the greatest legal engine ever invented for the 
discovery of truth"). 
 
Although questioning a complainant where the complainant's 
statement is essentially the entirety of the Commonwealth's case 
generally might provide the best grounds for impeachment, here 
the probationer also provided ample, specific reasons to 
question the complainant's credibility.  According to the 
reports by the probationer's investigator, several of the 
probationer's and the complainant's neighbors said that, because 
the apartment walls were thin, they often heard the complainant 
arguing with the probationer.  These frequent fights consisted 
of the complainant screaming at the probationer, "yelling at the 
top of her lungs," while the probationer was quiet or said 
19 
 
 
nothing.  One neighbor characterized the complainant's treatment 
of the probationer as "verbal abuse."  Another neighbor reported 
seeing the complainant throwing the probationer's clothes over 
the railing from their second-floor apartment, and then telling 
the probationer to "go fetch, you fucking dog!"  The same 
neighbor described the complainant as "dishonest," and said that 
she frequently appeared intoxicated. 
 
The private investigator also spoke with two of the 
complainant's former partners, a former husband and a former 
boyfriend.  The husband's relationship with the complainant had 
lasted approximately three years, which he described as "the 
craziest three years of his life."  He and the complainant 
argued frequently. 
 
The former husband and the complainant had a daughter 
together; the husband obtained physical custody of the daughter 
when she was approximately nine months old, and she has remained 
in his custody since.  The former husband described some of the 
complainant's troubling interactions with her daughter, and with 
him.  For instance, on one occasion before a hearing in the 
Probate and Family Court, the complainant told the husband that 
she planned to "use old illicit text messages and photo[graph]s 
from [him], as leverage in order to get what she wanted in 
court."  Due to the age of the photographs, the husband thought 
they likely would not harm him. 
20 
 
 
 
The probationer's investigator also spoke with one of the 
complainant's former boyfriends; the two had lived together for 
about one and one-half years.  Among other things, the boyfriend 
said that he once saw the complainant in the bathroom, striking 
her own face to make it look red; when he asked her what she was 
doing, she told him, "You hit me, remember?" 
 
In addition to the likely significance of the complainant's 
testimony, we also must consider whether, based on the proffered 
evidence, the testimony would yield "evidence that adds to or 
differs from previously admitted evidence rather than be[ing] 
cumulative of that evidence."  See Hartfield, 474 Mass. at 481.  
The hearing judge determined that the probationer had not 
provided the court "with any information indicating that, if 
forced to testify, the Victim would testify differently at his 
revocation hearing than she did before the Grand Jury."  Thus, 
given the admissibility of the hearsay evidence, the judge 
concluded that the second Hartfield factor militated against 
requiring the complainant's live testimony.  "[T]he admission of 
[such] evidence does not mean that the probationer is absolutely 
barred from calling as a witness the declarant whose hearsay was 
admitted."  Id. at 482.  Proffered testimony is not cumulative 
so long as the probationer "seeks to elicit from the witness 
additional information that would support the inference that the 
probationer did not commit the violation or would demonstrate 
21 
 
 
that the hearsay evidence suggesting that he did commit the 
violation is unworthy of belief."  Id. 
 
At an evidentiary hearing, the probationer pointed to 
several lines of questioning which were not broached by the 
Commonwealth, but which he would have pursued if the complainant 
had testified.  For instance, he would have asked the 
complainant to explain her inconsistent statements regarding the 
circumstances of their relationship.  He would have pressed the 
issue of when the offenses occurred, given that the complainant 
did not provide specific dates.  Based on the notes from the 
interviews with the neighbors, the probationer would have 
questioned, among other things, the complainant's assertions 
that he often yelled at her.  The probationer also would have 
examined statements by the complainant to the grand jury that he 
had caused damage to the apartment, in light of an affidavit by 
the probationer's counsel that the landlord had been in the 
apartment after the allegations were made and had not seen any 
visible damage.  These lines of examination were not 
speculative; they were supported by admissible record evidence 
proffered by the parties. 
 
We turn to the third Hartfield factor, "whether, based on 
an individualized assessment of the witness, there is an 
unacceptable risk that the witness's physical, psychological, or 
emotional health would be significantly jeopardized if the 
22 
 
 
witness were required to testify in court at the probation 
hearing."  Hartfield, 474 Mass. at 481.  As discussed supra, 
Leavitt noted that the complainant appeared upset and often 
cried when she spoke to him.  When an assistant district 
attorney met with the complainant to assess the possibility of 
an indictment, the assistant district attorney observed that the 
complainant was crying and trembling when describing the 
incidents and the possibility of testifying before the grand 
jury.  In response to the assistant district attorney's inquiry, 
the complainant said that she was losing sleep and having 
nightmares.  She also indicated that she had sought assistance 
from a domestic abuse crisis center to help her cope with her 
anxiety.  When the complainant arrived to testify before the 
grand jury, she was accompanied by an advocate from such a 
center; the complainant told the assistant district attorney 
that she was anxious about testifying and felt as though she 
might vomit. 
 
Such circumstances plainly weigh in the Commonwealth's 
favor.  But, as we did in Hartfield, 474 Mass. at 481, we must 
reject "a general rule that would prevent a probationer from 
ever calling such an alleged victim to testify in his or her 
defense."  Because the probationer has a presumptive right to 
call witnesses in his defense, we must weigh the risk of the 
complainant becoming more distressed in light of the totality of 
23 
 
 
the circumstances.  Given the centrality of the complainant's 
credibility in this case, the minimal corroboration of her 
allegations, and the probationer's proffered reasons to doubt 
her credibility, we conclude that countervailing interests do 
not overcome the presumption, and the hearing judge erred in 
denying the probationer's request to call the complainant as a 
witness.  We also cannot say that the error was harmless, given 
the nature of the evidence the probationer has proffered 
concerning the likely grounds of impeachment.  See Kelsey, 464 
Mass. at 319. 
 
c.  Due process right to introduce impeachment evidence.  
The probationer also suggests that the hearing judge's exclusion 
of statements by a former husband of the complainant, and a 
former boyfriend, compounded the violation of the probationer's 
due process right to present a defense.  Such statements, the 
probationer contends, would have impeached the complainant's 
character for truthfulness. 
 
In criminal prosecutions, "[w]hen evidence concerning a 
critical issue is excluded and when that evidence might have had 
a significant impact on the result of the trial, the right to 
present a full defense has been denied."  Commonwealth v. 
Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 94 (1978), S.C., 385 Mass. 733 (1982), 
and cases cited.  See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 
(1973).  "As discussed, however, a probationer's right to 
24 
 
 
present a defense is not coextensive with the parallel right 
held by a criminal defendant."  Kelsey, 464 Mass. at 324. 
 
We note as an initial matter that where a probationer seeks 
to introduce impeachment evidence to realize his or her right to 
present a defense, there is no requirement that the evidence 
demonstrate substantial indicia of reliability.  See Durling, 
407 Mass. at 118.  In that case, we established such a 
requirement for situations where hearsay is offered as the only 
evidence of an alleged violation of probation, not when it is 
offered to impeach the credibility of a witness.  Id.  See 
Commonwealth v. Basch, 386 Mass. 620, 623 (1982) ("An out-of-
court statement introduced to impeach a witness, and not to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement, is not 
hearsay").  Excluding impeachment evidence as hearsay ironically 
would narrow the scope of admissible evidence, belying the 
overriding principle that probation revocation proceedings "must 
be flexible in nature."  Durling, supra at 114. 
 
Rather, in determining whether the exclusion of proffered 
impeachment evidence would deprive a probationer of "a 
meaningful opportunity to present a defense," a judge must 
consider "the totality of the circumstances."  Hartfield, 474 
Mass. at 480, quoting Kelsey, 464 Mass. at 321, 322.  As is the 
case for a criminal defendant, a probationer is "not necessarily 
deprived of the right to present his [or her] theory of defense 
25 
 
 
simply because the judge excludes a piece of evidence supporting 
such theory."  See Commonwealth v. Pickering, 479 Mass. 589, 596 
(2018), quoting Commonwealth v. White, 475 Mass. 724, 743 
(2016).  Where due process does not require the introduction of 
certain proffered impeachment evidence, a judge has the 
discretion to limit its admission by applying standard 
evidentiary rules.  See Durling, 407 Mass. at 117-118.  See also 
Hartfield, 474 Mass at 482, citing Commonwealth v. Odoardi, 397 
Mass. 28, 34 (1986) ("Where a probationer's examination of a 
witness strays into issues that are irrelevant to the 
determination of whether the probationer violated the conditions 
of probation, cumulative of other evidence, or unduly harassing 
to the witness, the judge, consistent with due process, may 
restrict the scope of such testimony"). 
 
Here, although the statements by the complainant's former 
husband and her former boyfriend detailing specific instances of 
the complainant's conduct support the probationer's challenge to 
the complainant's credibility, we cannot say that the hearing 
judge's decision to exclude these statements to the 
probationer's investigator deprived the probationer of his due 
process right meaningfully to present a defense.  As discussed, 
there was ample other evidence in the record, including the 
complainant's own statements, that was supportive of the 
probationer's theory of defense.  See Pickering, 479 Mass. 
26 
 
 
at 596.  Moreover, at the probation violation hearing, although 
much of his testimony was excluded, the probationer was able to 
elicit some testimony from the former husband about his disputes 
with the complainant concerning custody of their daughter, 
thereby suggesting that the complainant had a potential motive 
to fabricate her allegations. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  Precluding the probationer from calling 
the complainant as a witness at the probation violation hearing 
violated his due process right to present a defense.  Consistent 
with our precedent in Hartfield, 474 Mass. at 480-481, the 
probationer must be afforded the opportunity to call the 
complainant as a witness at such a hearing.  The finding that 
the probationer violated the conditions of his probation and the 
order revoking his probation are vacated and set aside.  The 
matter is remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
CYPHER, J. (dissenting in part).  I concur in the court's 
conclusion that the complainant's prior recorded statements were 
admitted properly at the probationer's final probation violation 
hearing (violation hearing)1 and that the surrender judge's 
exclusion of certain impeachment evidence did not deprive the 
probationer of his due process right to present a defense.  I do 
not agree, however, that the complainant must be compelled to 
testify in these circumstances, and I dissent from the portion 
of the opinion that so holds. 
Prior to the violation hearing, an evidentiary hearing was 
held on the Commonwealth's and the probationer's motions 
regarding the admissibility of the Commonwealth's proffered 
hearsay evidence and the right of the probationer to subpoena 
the complainant to testify (motion hearing).  At the motion 
hearing, the probationer offered evidence of the complainant's 
alleged unreliability.  This evidence overwhelmingly was second- 
and third-level hearsay, the reliability of which was not 
established.  The private investigator allegedly responsible for 
creating much of this evidence did not testify, nor did any of 
 
1 Although this hearing was docketed as a final probation 
surrender hearing, section 6 (B) of the guidelines for probation 
violation proceedings in the Superior Court (2016) refers to a 
hearing that, as here, consists of both "(1) an evidentiary 
hearing to adjudicate whether the alleged violation has 
occurred; and (2) upon a finding of a violation, a dispositional 
hearing," as a final violation hearing. 
2 
 
the second-level hearsay declarants.2  The probationer's attorney 
affidavits were -- with the exception of counsel's assertion 
that he is employed by the Committee for Public Counsel Services 
-- not based on any personal knowledge of the affiant, and the 
second-level hearsay declarants whose statements were relayed in 
those affidavits did not testify.3  Thus, the reliability of such 
evidence was not proved sufficiently to render it admissible 
even under the relaxed evidentiary standards surrounding 
probation violation proceedings, and the evidence should not 
factor into the court's analysis whether the probationer should 
have been permitted to subpoena the complainant to testify at 
the violation hearing.  Without this evidence, the probationer's 
proposed line of questioning was merely speculative, and the 
probationer's presumptive right to call the complainant as a 
witness was overcome by countervailing interests, including the 
likely trauma that testifying would cause to the complainant and 
the probationer's failure to establish that the complainant's 
live testimony was necessary to a fair adjudication of the 
alleged probation violation. 
 
2 The probationer brought the complainant's former husband 
and former boyfriend to testify at the violation hearing, but 
not at the motion hearing. 
 
3 The probationer had one of the second-level hearsay 
declarants, his landlord, testify at the violation hearing, but 
not at the motion hearing. 
3 
 
It is true that "a probationer has a presumptive due 
process right to call witnesses in his or her defense."   
Commonwealth v. Hartfield, 474 Mass. 474, 481 (2016).  However, 
that "presumption may be overcome by countervailing interests, 
generally that the proposed testimony is unnecessary to a fair 
adjudication of the alleged violation or unduly burdensome to 
the witness or the resources of the court."  Id.  In determining 
whether, in the totality of the circumstances, this presumption 
has been overcome, the court must consider, at a minimum, the 
following three factors: 
"(1) whether the proposed testimony of the witness might be 
significant in determining whether it is more likely than 
not that the probationer violated the conditions of 
probation; (2) whether, based on the proffer of the 
witness's testimony, the witness would provide evidence 
that adds to or differs from previously admitted evidence 
rather than be cumulative of that evidence; and 
(3) whether, based on an individualized assessment of the 
witness, there is an unacceptable risk that the witness's 
physical, psychological, or emotional health would be 
significantly jeopardized if the witness were required to 
testify in court at the probation hearing" (citations 
omitted). 
 
Id.  As to the third factor, this court has rejected "a general 
rule that would prevent a probationer from ever calling . . . an 
alleged [sexual assault] victim to testify in his or her 
defense."  Id.  However, this court also has "recognize[d] the 
risk that an alleged sexual assault victim might suffer trauma 
from having to testify at a probation violation hearing."  Id.  
In consideration of this risk, a court must conduct an 
4 
 
"individualized and evidence-based" assessment of the potential 
adverse effect of testifying on "the physical, psychological, or 
emotional health of an alleged sexual assault victim."  Id. 
As to the first factor, the defendant argues that the 
complainant's live testimony would be significant in determining 
whether it is more likely than not that the probationer violated 
the conditions of his probation because her credibility 
reasonably was at issue given the evidence the probationer had 
proffered on this point.  However, I would conclude that all of 
the proffered evidence was inadmissible, and thus not to be 
considered in the court's analysis. 
The probationer argues that the reports of his private 
investigator, his attorney's affidavits, and the affidavit of 
the complainant's former husband in an unrelated matter were 
admissible as hearsay statements where the formal rules of 
evidence do not apply to probation violation proceedings.  
However, even where the formal evidentiary rules are relaxed, 
such as here, the court must ensure that decisions are made on 
reliable evidence.  Therefore, hearsay evidence must bear 
"substantial indicia of reliability" to be admissible in 
probation violation proceedings.4  Hartfield, 474 Mass. at 482. 
 
4 The probationer argues that he should not be required, as 
the Commonwealth is, to show that his proffered hearsay evidence 
has substantial indicia of reliability.  This argument is 
5 
 
As a preliminary matter, the probationer's proffered 
evidence is hearsay.  The probationer argues that the proffered 
statements are not hearsay where, according to him, they were 
offered not to prove the truth of matter asserted, but to prove 
that the complainant "was an erratic and untrustworthy person 
and not a credible witness."  What this argument ignores is that 
the proffered statements only show that the complainant "was an 
erratic and untrustworthy person" if the statements were true.  
This is not a case where the statements were "offered for a 
purpose whose relevance flows simply from the fact that the 
statements were made."  Commonwealth v. Siny Van Tran, 460 Mass. 
535, 551 (2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Serrano-Ortiz, 53 Mass. 
App. Ct. 608, 614 (2002).  Where, as here, "a witness, expert or 
otherwise, repeats an out-of-court statement as the basis for a 
conclusion, . . . the statement's utility is . . . dependent on 
its truth.  If the statement is true, then the conclusion based 
on it is probably true; if not, not."  Williams v. Illinois, 567 
U.S. 50, 126 (2012) (Kagan, J., dissenting).  Thus, because the 
relevance of the statements proffered by the probationer depends 
entirely on their truthfulness, they cannot reasonably be 
characterized as anything other than hearsay. 
 
without merit where "one-sided evidentiary rules are inherently 
unfair."  Commonwealth v. Mayotte, 475 Mass. 254, 261 (2016). 
6 
 
As hearsay, the evidence may nevertheless be admissible 
under the relaxed evidentiary rules applicable in probation 
violation proceedings, provided that the evidence bears the 
requisite substantial indicia of reliability.  Hartfield, 474 
Mass. at 482.  In considering whether hearsay evidence bears 
substantial indicia of reliability, the court 
"may consider (1) whether the evidence is based on personal 
knowledge or direct observation; (2) whether the evidence, 
if based on direct observation, was recorded close in time 
to the events in question; (3) the level of factual detail; 
(4) whether the statements are internally consistent; (5) 
whether the evidence is corroborated by information from 
other sources; (6) whether the declarant was disinterested 
when the statements were made; and (7) whether the 
statements were made under circumstances that support their 
veracity." 
 
Id. at 484. 
The reports of the private investigator do not bear the 
requisite indicia of reliability.  First, the reports, as out-
of-court statements of the private investigator, are themselves 
hearsay, effectively asserting that those interviewed by the 
investigator made certain statements to the investigator.  The 
statements of the interviewees relayed in the report are, 
therefore, second-level hearsay and do not reflect any personal 
knowledge of the first-level hearsay declarant, the private 
investigator.5  As the Appeals Court noted, "neither the 
 
5 To the extent that the reports relay conversations or 
arguments that the witnesses allegedly had with the complainant, 
7 
 
[interviewees'] statements nor the investigator's reports of 
those statements were made under oath,"  Commonwealth v. Costa, 
99 Mass. App. Ct. 435, 440 n.7 (2021), and thus were not made in 
circumstances supporting their veracity.  Further, the defendant 
could have but did not call the private investigator or any of 
the second-level hearsay declarants to testify at the motion 
hearing.  Thus, no foundation was ever laid for the reports and 
no evidence of their authenticity is present in the record 
before us.  That alone is, I think, sufficient to belie any 
claim of reliability as to the reports themselves and, thus, as 
to any first- or second-level hearsay statements contained in 
the reports.  Additionally, the private investigator, as someone 
hired by the probationer, is not a disinterested declarant.6  
 
the complainant's statements constitute yet another level of 
hearsay -- at this point, third-level hearsay. 
 
6 As to the second-level hearsay contained in the reports of 
the private investigator, I would conclude likewise that they 
lack the requisite substantial indicia of reliability.  For 
example, according to his own statements, the complainant's 
former husband has been engaged in a prolonged and bitter 
custody dispute with the complainant and is, thus, far from a 
disinterested declarant.  Although his alleged statements are 
quite detailed and internally consistent, they are not 
corroborated by information from any other sources.  
Additionally, several of the statements do not appear to be 
based on personal knowledge, such as statements made about the 
complainant's conduct with their daughter or statements 
regarding calls the complainant allegedly placed to their 
daughter's school. 
 
I would likewise decline to characterize the complainant's 
former boyfriend as a disinterested declarant where his 
8 
 
Thus, as neither the first- or second-level hearsay contained in 
the private investigator's reports bear the requisite 
substantial indicia of reliability, the reports are inadmissible 
even under the relaxed evidentiary standards applicable in 
probation revocation proceedings. 
The probationer also proffered several documents related to 
restraining order proceedings initiated by the complainant's 
former husband against the complainant, including an affidavit 
by the former husband.  Although the former husband's affidavit 
was made under oath, and thus made in circumstances that support 
its veracity, it is unclear how much of the affidavit is based 
on personal knowledge or observation and, conversely, how much 
of the affidavit is based on second-level hearsay.7  Several of 
 
proffered statements indicate a contentious split from the 
complainant.  Much of the report related to the interview 
between the former boyfriend and the probationer's private 
investigator detailed alleged statements of the complainant, 
i.e., uncorroborated third-level hearsay statements.  The former 
boyfriend's own statements also were uncorroborated by 
information from other sources.  For example, the former 
boyfriend asserted that an altercation with the complainant 
resulted in his conviction for assault, for which I presume some 
court documentation is available and yet none was submitted to 
the motion judge to corroborate the former boyfriend's 
assertion.  Where the report asserts that the former boyfriend 
stated that "he wouldn't be surprised if [the complainant was] 
prostituting," the report also includes at least one second-
level hearsay statement that appears entirely speculative and 
not based on any personal knowledge of the declarant. 
 
7 Even if the affidavit is admissible, although it does 
discuss conduct that would be concerning as to the complainant's 
ability to parent her daughter, it does not discuss any 
9 
 
the statements contained in the affidavit appear not to be based 
on personal knowledge or observation, such as the former 
husband's assertions surrounding an incident that allegedly 
occurred while the complainant was driving their daughter and 
the complainant's alleged mental health diagnosis.8  Thus, the 
former husband's affidavit likely does not contain the requisite 
substantial indicia of reliability to render it admissible under 
 
allegedly dishonest conduct of the complainant, and thus does 
not bear on the complainant's credibility in this case. 
 
8 Additionally, I note that defendants in sexual assault 
cases routinely seek to admit evidence of their victims' mental 
health records, "[w]hether to be used as part of a legitimate 
defense, or as an intimidation tactic."  Herbert, Mental Health 
Records in Sexual Assault Cases:  Striking a Balance to Ensure a 
Fair Trial for Victims and Defendants, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1453, 
1453 (2005).  Where courts already face the issue of pervasive 
bias against rape victims, "introducing mental health records, 
when not directly relevant to the victim's ability to comprehend 
and recall the events of the sexual assault, will only lead to 
further bias and an even more unbalanced trial."  Id. at 1458.  
See Cole, She's Crazy (to Think We'll Believe Her):  Credibility 
Discounting of Women with Mental Illness in the Era of #MeToo, 
22 Geo. J. Gender & L. 173, 180 (2020) (Cole) ("the average 
police officer believes over [fifty percent] of sexual assault 
allegations are false"). 
 
The defendant sought to offer the complainant's purported 
mental health diagnosis as part of a broad effort to paint the 
complainant as generally unstable, and thus unbelievable.  This 
all-too common argument essentially boils down to, "What?  Don't 
believe her.  She's crazy."  Cole, supra at 173.  Whether or not 
such evidence is proffered for a proper purpose, the risk is 
ever present that it will serve to entrench existing biases 
against rape victims and prevent a fair adjudication of the 
case.  Id. at 187. 
10 
 
the relaxed evidentiary standards applicable in probation 
violation proceedings. 
As to the attorney affidavits submitted by the 
probationer's counsel, as the Appeals Court observed, they 
"asserted no personal knowledge of the events described 
[therein], and the attached photograph was undated."  Costa, 99 
Mass. App. Ct. at 441 n.10.  The first attorney affidavit 
summarized how the complainant allegedly spent Super Bowl Sunday 
of 2019 with the probationer and the probationer's mother.  The 
identity is unknown of the declarant or declarants who relayed 
the assertions contained in the affidavit to the probationer's 
counsel.  From the facts asserted, the declarant could have been 
the complainant, the probationer, or the probationer's mother.  
It is further unclear from whom or how the probationer's counsel 
learned that the complainant began a new relationship after 
accusing the probationer of the crimes that are the subject of 
the probation violation proceedings, or what relevance that 
alleged fact has to the complainant's credibility.  The second 
attorney affidavit was largely a summary of statements allegedly 
made to the attorney by the probationer's landlord, which 
statements constitute second-level hearsay.  Thus, where neither 
affidavit was based on personal knowledge and, instead, 
consisted almost entirely of second-level hearsay statements of 
unidentified declarants, where neither affidavit contains a 
11 
 
significant level of factual detail nor is corroborated by 
information from any other source, and where neither the first- 
or apparent second-level hearsay declarants were disinterested 
(with the possible exception of the probationer's landlord), the 
affidavits do not contain the requisite substantial indicia of 
reliability to render them admissible under the relaxed 
evidentiary standards for probation violation proceedings. 
The probationer's sole evidence of the complainant's 
purported lack of credibility was the above-described 
inadmissible, unreliable hearsay evidence.  The probationer 
argues that, regardless of whether the proffered evidence is 
inadmissible as a matter of law, the reports were nevertheless 
admitted as exhibits without objection during the motion 
hearing.  The Commonwealth's failure to object to their 
admission does not absolutely preclude an appellate court from 
reviewing whether their admission was erroneous.  See 
Commonwealth v. Yasin, 483 Mass. 343, 349 (2019), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Bettencourt, 447 Mass. 631, 633 (2006) ("we do 
'occasionally exercise our discretion' to consider an issue that 
is raised for the first time on appeal").  Further, and more 
importantly here, the fact of the admission of the probationer's 
hearsay evidence did not require that the motion judge credit 
the assertions made therein. 
12 
 
"Hearsay, once admitted, may be weighed with the other 
evidence, and given any evidentiary value which it may possess."  
Commonwealth v. Keevan, 400 Mass. 557, 562 (1987), quoting 
Mahoney v. Harley Private Hosp., Inc., 279 Mass. 96, 100 (1932).  
"It is the exclusive province of the hearing judge to assess the 
weight of the evidence."  Commonwealth v. Bukin, 467 Mass. 516, 
521 (2014), citing Commonwealth v. Janovich, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 
42, 50 (2002).  "A judge is not required to credit assertions in 
affidavits," Commonwealth v. Buckman, 461 Mass. 24, 43 (2011), 
cert. denied, 567 U.S. 920 (2012), or in any other hearsay 
statements.  This is true even where the hearsay statements are 
undisputed.  Commonwealth v. Thurston, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 548, 
551 (2002), citing Commonwealth v. Grace, 370 Mass. 746, 752 
(1976), and others.  Where the hearsay statements proffered by 
the probationer appear wholly unreliable for the reasons 
discussed supra, they possessed no evidentiary value, and the 
motion judge would have been entirely within her discretion to 
discredit them.  This court likewise should not consider them in 
its analysis of the three Hartfield factors. 
Without the probationer's proffered hearsay evidence, the 
probationer's proposed lines of questioning surrounding the 
complainant's credibility merely are speculative.  Where the 
record contains no evidence that we may consider to suggest that 
the probationer would be able to show, through the complainant's 
13 
 
live testimony, that "it was more likely than not that [she] 
fabricated the alleged rape[s]" and assaults, Hartfield, 474 
Mass. at 483, the defendant's argument that his examination of 
the complainant would be significant in determining whether it 
is more likely than not that the probationer violated the 
conditions of probation likewise is speculative.  Thus, the 
first Hartfield factor weighs in the Commonwealth's favor. 
As to the second factor, it is true that a witness's 
"testimony would not be cumulative where the probationer seeks 
to elicit from the witness additional information that would 
support the inference that the probationer did not commit the 
violation or would demonstrate that the hearsay evidence 
suggesting that he did commit the violation is unworthy of 
belief."  Hartfield, 474 Mass. at 482.  However, the 
probationer's claim that he would elicit noncumulative evidence 
from the complainant by attacking her credibility is mere 
speculation -- in the absence of any evidence that we may 
consider -- to suggest that the complainant's credibility is in 
doubt.  Thus, the second factor weighs in the Commonwealth's 
favor. 
To conclude otherwise would be to create an evidentiary 
system in probation proceedings in which any allegation of a 
witness's lack of credibility would result in the witness being 
compelled to testify, thus effectively rendering obsolete the 
14 
 
totality of the circumstances test articulated in Hartfield.  
Therefore, in my view, the probationer should, through reliable 
evidence, show that the witness's proposed testimony is more 
likely than not (1) to be "significant in determining whether it 
is more likely than not that the probationer violated the 
conditions of probation"; and (2) to provide "evidence that adds 
to or differs from the previously admitted evidence rather than 
be cumulative of that evidence," in order to establish the first 
and second Hartfield factors, respectively.  See Hartfield, 474 
Mass. at 481. 
Finally, I find no error in the motion judge's conclusion, 
as to the third Hartfield factor, that there was "a legitimate 
risk" that the complainant would suffer "considerable anxiety 
and emotional distress" if compelled to testify at the violation 
hearing.  As the majority notes, ante at    , the complainant 
appeared on multiple occasions and to multiple people -- 
including police Sergeant James Leavitt and the assistant 
district attorney assigned to the case -- to be distraught and 
fearful when discussing the alleged assaults against her by the 
probationer.  Additionally, the complainant was "extremely 
upset" and expressed to the assistant district attorney "extreme 
anxiety" at the prospect of testifying at the violation hearing.  
In the absence of any admissible evidence that we may consider 
regarding the complainant's alleged lack of credibility, 
15 
 
rendering speculative the significance and noncumulativeness of 
the complainant's proposed testimony, I must conclude that the 
complainant's "proposed testimony [appears] unnecessary to a 
fair adjudication of the alleged violation," Hartfield, 474 
Mass. at 481.  It also carries an unacceptable risk of 
retraumatizing the complainant for the reasons discussed supra.  
See id.  Where all three Hartfield factors weigh in favor of the 
Commonwealth, under the totality of the circumstances the 
probationer's presumptive due process right to call the 
complainant has been overcome by countervailing interests.  See 
id. 
I note that the probationer's presumptive due process right 
to call the complainant has been overcome largely due to the 
probationer's failure, even in light of the relaxed evidentiary 
standards surrounding probation violation proceedings, to submit 
admissible evidence that would allow a motion judge or this 
court to consider his arguments as to the first two Hartfield 
factors.  In other words, the Commonwealth has presented 
admissible evidence showing that all three Hartfield factors 
weigh in its favor and the probationer has failed to present any 
admissible evidence to rebut such a conclusion.  Even in the 
context of a claimed constitutional violation against a criminal 
defendant, courts regularly decline to entertain claims that 
have no evidence in the record to support them.  See 
16 
 
Commonwealth v. Leahy, 445 Mass. 481, 485 n.4 (2005) (dispensing 
with, as unsupported by any evidence, defendant's argument that 
Miranda waiver was involuntary because his release from being 
handcuffed to bench was conditioned on agreement to speak to 
police); Commonwealth v. Cruz, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 60, 66-67 
(2016) (affirming motion judge's rejection of defendant's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on finding "as a 
matter of fact and of law that the defendant presented no 
evidence to support his claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel"). 
The arguments regarding the complainant's credibility do 
not rise above the speculative level and are, thus, insufficient 
to rebut the Commonwealth's showing that all three Hartfield 
factors weigh in the Commonwealth's favor; as a result, in the 
totality of the circumstances, the Commonwealth's countervailing 
interests have overcome the probationer's presumptive due 
process right to call the complainant as a witness.  I would 
therefore affirm the motion judge's ruling precluding the 
probationer from calling the complainant as a witness at the 
violation hearing, and I dissent from that part of the majority 
opinion that holds otherwise.