Title: Francis v. Wynn Las Vegas, L.L.C.

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

127 Nev., Advance Opinion LO

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

JOSEPH FRANCIS, No, 54605
Appellant,

vs FILED

WYNN LAS VEGAS, LLC, D/B/A WYNN
LAS VEGAS, oct 06 zon
Respondent.

  

Appeal from a district court summary judgment in a contract
action. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Michelle Leavitt,
Judge.

Affirmed,

‘The Law Office of Gary M. Pakele and Gary M. Pakele, Reno,
for Appellant,

Pisanelli Bice PLLC and Todd L.. Bice and Debra L. Spinelli, Las Vegas,
for Respondent.

 

BEFORE SAITTA, C.J., HARDESTY and PARRAGUIRRE, Jd.

OPINION
By the Court, SAITTA, C.J.

In this appeal, we address several issues arising from a civil
litigant’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, The salient issue we consider is how, in response to a civil
litigant’s request for accommodation of his or her privilege, the district

court should proceed in order to prevent the opposing party from being

 

 

30474
os

unfairly disadvantaged. As it pertains to this matter, we address whether

 

the district court abused its discretion in refusing to permit appellant to
withdraw his invocation and in denying his request to reopen discovery.
Following the lead of well-established federal precedent, we
conclude that in response to a civil litigant’s request for accommodation of
his or her privilege, the district court should balance the interosts of the
invoking party and the opposing party's right to fair treatment. After
reviewing the particular considerations that bear on striking this balance
in the instant case, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its

 

jscretion in refusing to permit appellant to withdraw his invocation or in

denying his request to reopen discovery. We further conclude that the

 

istrict court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s NRCP
56(f) motion, nor did it err in granting respondent summary judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2007, during a trip to Las Vegas, appellant Joseph Francis
signed two casino markers! in favor of respondent Wynn Las Vegas, LLC,
d.b.a, Wynn Las Vegas for $2.5 million and $300,000. At the conclusion of
Francis’s trip, he had $800,000 on his front money account, comprised of a
‘$600,000 wire transfer and $200,000 in casino chips. Wynn applied this

1A casino marker “is an instrument, usually dated, bearing the
following information: the name of the player; the name . . . of the player's
bank; and the instruction ‘Pay to the Order of the casino for a specific
value in United States dollars.” Nguyen v. State, 116 Nev. 1171, 1173, 14
P.3d 515, 516 (2000). “If payment is not forthcoming, the gaming
establishment has the option to refer the customer for possible criminal
prosecution.” Id. at 1173, 14 P.3d at 517. We have explained that a casino
marker is the equivalent of a check for purposes of NRS 205.130(1), the
Nevada bad check statute. Id, at 1175, 14 P.3d at 518.

 

 
oe

{$800,000 to Francis’s outstanding markers, leaving a balance of $2 million
due and owing.

While Francis was incarcerated in Reno on an unrelated
matter, he persuaded Wynn to delay collection, but no payment from

Francis was forthcoming after his release. In e-mails that Francis sent to

 

representatives for Wynn, he acknowledged the debt and stated his
intention to pay, but he claimed that he was entitled to an unspecified
discount. Francis never paid Wynn any portion of the $2 million balance.
In June 2008, Wynn sued Francis for breach of contract,
conversion, unjust eririchment, and breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. Francis answered the complaint and asserted numerous
affirmative defenses and counterclaims for, among other things, breach of

contract, conspiracy, and extortion. The parties stipulated to a sched

 

ie
order and a discovery plan whereby discovery would close by April 6, 2009.
Wynn produced initial disclosures of over 100 documents. Francis
produced only a letter from Wells Fargo that stated his bank account had
been closed.

In September 2008, Wynn referred Francis to the Clark
County District Attorney's office, which initiated a criminal prosecution
against Francis. The criminal complaint charged Francis with theft and
passing a check with intent to defraud. The complaint stated that the
charges arose from his failure to pay Wynn the balance due on the casino
markers.

Meanwhile, discovery in the civil matter proceeded. Although
nothing in the record indicates that Francis had sought accommodation
from the district court regarding his concern that he would incriminate
himself by answering questions during his deposition, when Wynn

 
deposed him, he asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege to nearly every

question:

 

[WYNN'S COUNSEL]. Have you ever been
to the Wynn hotel and casino?

[FRANCIS]. I respectfully decline to answer
based upon my right to remain silent as
guaranteed... by the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and the State of
Nevada.

Q. Have you ever been in the state of
Nevada before?

A. I respectfully decline to answer based
upon my right to remain silent as guaranteed by
the Constitutions of the United States of America
and the State of Nevada.

Q. How much money do you believe that
you owe the Wynn hotel and casino?

A. I respectfully decline to answer based
upon my right to remain silent as guaranteed by
the Constitutions of the United States and the
State of Nevada.

‘There's a pending criminal action, sir.

 

 

Another representative excerpt of Francis's deposition is as

 

IWYNN'S COUNSEL]. Are there any
witnesses that have knowledge about your claimed
pain, suffering, and emotional distress?

[FRANCIS]. Right to remain silent.
Q. Are you married?

A. Right to remain
Q. Does anyone live in your home with you?
A. Right to remain silent.

Q. Do you have a father?

A. [think everyone has a father. Yes.

lont.

 

 
non

Q. Okay. Is he living?
A. Right to remain silent.
Q. What's his name?
A
Q. Do you have a mother?
A. Yes, I believe everyone does.
Q. What's her name?
A. Right to remain silent.

After several hours of similar answers from Francis, the

 

ight to remain silent.

deposition concluded with Francis’s counsel giving Wynn vague
indications that Francis would try to promptly cure his deposition.
Francis, however, made no attempt to cure his deposition or waive his
privilege, and as stipulated by the parties’ discovery plan, discovery closed
on April 6, 2009. Around this time, Francis filed a motion with the
discovery commissioner to reopen discovery, asserting that discovery
should be extended because the case was still in its infaney.

In May 2009, Wynn filed a motion for summary judgment,
accompanied by numerous affidavits and other documentary evidence
showing that Francis owed $2 million and refuting the allegations
contained in Francis's counterclaims. Wynn's motion pointed out that
Francis had conducted no discovery—he took no depositions, hindered
Wynn's ability to depose him, produced only a single document, and
propounded no interrogatories. ‘Thus, Wynn asserted that it was entitled
to summary judgment based not only upon Francis's bad faith assertion of
privilege but his failure to present any evidence contradicting Wynn's
evidence.

Francis opposed Wynn's motion for summary judgment,

asserting that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding the

 
oe

amount that he owed Wynn because he was entitled to a discount and
Wynn had failed to mitigate its damages. In addition, he argued that
discovery should be reopened because the discovery commissioner had
recommended that discovery be extended. Francis's opposition also stated
that he “may still cure any defects with regard to assertions of 5th
Amendment privilege,” and indicated that he had informed Wynn that he
would cure his deposition, Francis submitted no affidavits or other
evidence to rebut the evidence contained in Wynn's motion for summary
judgment. Finally, Francis sought an NRCP 56() continuance to conduct
discovery to oppose Wynn's motion, Francis's attorney submitted an
affidavit in support of the NRCP 56(f) motion, stating that she wished to
subpoena bank records and depose two individuals, She did not explain
why Francis had not subpoenaed these records or deposed these
individuals during discovery.

On June 8, 2009, during the hearing on Wynn's motion for
summary judgment, Francis’s counsel gave vague indications that Francis
would like to withdraw his privilege. The district court stated, in
portinent part:

[YJou can’t use the 6th Amendment as a sword
and a shield. You can't sit in a deposition and—
what's your father’s name? Right to remain silent.
Do you have a cell phone? Right to remain silent.
‘That's the most ridiculous exercise of the Sth
Amendment I think I've ever seen.

‘Thereafter, the district court indicated that discovery would
not be reopened and granted summary judgment against Francis on all
claims and counterclaims. It found that Francis owed Wynn $2 million on
the unpaid markers, The court determined that Francis had produced no
evidence rebutting Wynn's evidence and that he had improperly asserted

 
the Fifth Amendment privilege throughout his deposition. It also denied
Francis's NRCP 56(f) motion for a continuance, noting that Francis had
provided no explanation for his failure to undertake discovery or
adequately explain how extending discovery would produce a genuine
issue of material fact. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION
Whether the district court abused its discretion _in_refusing to permit
Francis to with wv uest_ to reopen

discovery
Francis asserts that the district court penalized him for

exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
because it did not give him an opportunity to withdraw his privilege. He
also contends that although his assertion of the privilege was overbroad,
the district court should have accommodated his privilege by granting his

request to reopen discovery. We disagree.

"In addition, Francis contends that the district court “eviscerated”
his evidence, affirmative defenses, and counterclaims as a sanction for his
invocation of the privilege. He asserts that this was an improper discovery
sanction under the factors set forth in Young v. Johnny Ribeiro Building,
106 Nev. 88, 93, 787 P.2d 777, 780 (1990). Francis’s premise is
fundamentally flawed. The district court did not exclude any evidence—
indeed, Francis never offered any evidence. Nor did the district court
strike any of Francis's defenses or counterclaims. Rather, the district
court entered summary judgment against Francis because he presented
absolutely no evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact on Wynn's
claims or his counterclaims. Schuck v. Signature Flight Support, 126 Nev.
__. _. 245 P.3d 542, 544 (2010). ‘Thus, at issue is whether the district
court proceeded appropriately in response to Francis's request for
accommodation when it refused to allow him to withdraw his invocation
and denied his request to reopen discovery. See U.S. v. 4003-4005 5th
Ave. Brooklyn, NY, 55 F.3d 78, 87 (2d Cir. 1995) (considering only
whether the district court's exclusion of evidence previously claimed to be
continued on next page

 

 
one

Standard of review

 

Determining how to proceed in response to a civil litigant’s
request for accommodation of his or her Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination is a matter within the discretion of the district

court. S.E.C. v. Graystone Nash, Inc,, 25 F.3d 187, 194 (8d Cir. 1994);

 

Johnson & Son, Inc. v, Morris, 779 N.W.2d 19, 27 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009).
for accommodation of his or her privilege

‘The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
may be invoked in both criminal and civil proceedings. Lefkowitz v.
Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805 (1977). Exercise of the privilege may not
be penalized. Spevack v, Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515 (1967). Nonetheless, an
invocation “is not a substitute for relevant evidence” and therefore, the
invoking party is not “freed from adducing proof in support of a burden

-. continued

privileged was a proper response to civil litigant’s invocation, although the
secondary effect of the exclusion was entry of summary judgment).
Accordingly, to the extent that the district court’s actions can be
considered discovery sanctions, they were not case concluding, and thus,

‘Young and its progeny are not implicated. See Bahena v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co,, 126 Nev. _, __, 285 P.3d 592, 596 (2010) (explaining that a

case concluding sanction is one which strikes an answer as to liability and
damages); Arnold v. Kip, 123 Nev. 410, 418, 168 P.3d 1050, 1055 (2007)
(utilization of the Young factors unnecessary where the sanctions imposed
was only a dismissal without prejudice, even though the dismissal was, in
effect, with prejudice due to the expiration of the statute of limitations on
the underlying claim); see also Meyer v, District Court, 95 Nev. 176, 180,
591 P.2d 259, 262 (1979) (order excluding the invoking party's testimony
unless she submitted to a deposition was not a sanction under the Nevada
Rules of Civil Procedure),

 

 
ren

which would otherwise have been his.” United States v. Rvlander, 460
U.S. 752, 758, 761 (1983). Stated differently, “{a] party who asserts the
privilege against self-incrimination must bear the consequence of lack of
evidence.” U.S. v. Taylor, 975 F.2d 402, 404 (7th Cir. 1992). Thus, it is
well-settled that a “claim of privilege will not prevent an adverse finding
or even summary judgment if the litigant does not present sufficient
evidence to satisfy the usual evidentiary burdens in the litigation.” U.S, v
4003-4005 5th Ave., Brooklyn, NY, 55 F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir, 1995).

We note, however, that courts must be mindful that because

 

the privilege is constitutionally protected, they “must carefully balance the

 

interests of the party claiming protection against
the adversary’s entitlement to equitable treatment.” Graystone Nash, 25
F.3d at 192. Because we have not previously had the occasion to elaborate

incrimination and

upon the various considerations that may, in certain circumstances, be

 

relevant to striking this balance, we turn to guidance from federal
caselaw.

Federal courts generally bogin their analysis of a request for
accommodation by examining the nature of the invocation. See, e.s., 4003-
4005 5th Ave, 55 F.3d at 84. Where the invoking party makes a timely
request for accommodation of a legitimate selfincrimination concern,
courts “should explore all possible measures” to accommodate the
privilege. Id,

If the invoking party attempts to withdraw his or her
invocation of the privilege, the manner and timing of the attempt becomes
another important consideration. [d, at 84-85. Notably, an attempted
withdrawal at the last minute of a proceeding strongly indicates that the
invoking party is abusing his or her privilege in order to gain an unfair

 
or

advantage. Id. at 85. In such a case, it may be appropriate for the trial
court to take severe remedial measures, such as preventing the invoking
party from presenting material previously claimed to be protected by the
privilege. Id, at 86.

Next, federal caselaw instructs that the nature of the civil
proceeding is often another significant consideration. Id, at 84. For
example,

 

special effort to accommodate the privilege may be warranted
where the defendant faces parallel civil and criminal proceedings brought
by different governmental entities arising from the same set of facts, See
Graystone Nash, 26 F.3d at 193-94 (“Courts must bear in mind that when

the government is

 

 

party in a civil case and also controls the decision as
to whether criminal proceedings will be initiated, special consideration
must be given to the plight of the party asserting the Fifth Amendment.”),
In such a case, the most appropriate manner in which to proceed in
response to a timely request for accommodation of the privilege might be
to grant a stay of the civil proceeding until the criminal matter is
concluded. $.E.C, v, Zimmerman, 854 F. Supp. 896, 899 (N.D. Ga. 1993),
Finally, the extent of prejudice that the opposing party will

 

 

incur if remedial action is not taken frequently becomes a dispositive
consideration. See, e.g., 4003-4005 Sth Ave,, 55 F.3d at 84. Extensive
remedial measures generally may be taken where the opposing party
would otherwise suffer substantial prejudice. Id, at 87; see Wehling v,
Columbia Broadcasting System, 608 F.2d 1084, 1089 (5th Cir. 1979) (trial
courts are “free to fashion whatever remedy is required to prevent
unfairness’).

In sum, depending on the particular circumstances involved in

a given case, a wide range of remedial measures may be taken when

10

 

 
balancing the interests of the invoking party and the opposing party's
right to fair treatment. See 4003-4005 5th Ave., 55 F.3d at 84 n.6 (“What
serves as an appropriate procedure for accommodating the interests of the

   

party asserting the Fifth Amendment, while at the same time respecting
opposing parties’ right to fair treatment within the litigation, will

necessarily vary from case to case."); United States v. U. S. Currency, 626
F.2d 11, 16 (6th Cir. 1980) (explaining that a flexible approach is optimal

 

because the trial court is in the best position to know what measures will
balance the competing interest

 

involved). With the foregoing principles
in mind, we consider whether the district court abused ite discretion in
refusing to permit Francis to withdraw his invocation or in denying his
request to reopen discovery.?

How and when the privilege was invoked

Francis's invocation was overbroad. Although answering some
of Wynn's questions at his deposition could have been incriminating, his
refusal to answer nearly every question was unjustifiable. See Doe ex rel.
Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 282 F.3d 1258, 1263 (9th Cir. 2000) {In the
civil context, the invocation of the privilege is limited to those
circumstances in which the person invoking the privilege reasonably
believes that his disclosures could be used in a criminal prosecution, or

8We recognize that because there is not an absolute right to reopen
discovery in the first instance, denying a request to reopen discovery is
arguably not a remedial measure at all. See MGM Grand, Ine. v. District
Court, 107 Nev. 65, 70, 807 P.2d 201, 204 (1991) (noting that the district
court has wide discretion in controlling pretrial discovery). We conclude,
however, that the district court’s denial of such a request is relevant to
evaluating whether the court adequately accommodated the privilege.

 

 
nos <a

could lead to other evidence that could be used in that manner.”)
Additionally, there is no indication in the record that Francis ever
requested the district court to accommodate his privilege. He never
sought, for example, to have his deposition sealed or to have reasonable
limits placed on its scope. See U.S. v, Parcels of Land, 903 F.2d 36, 45 (1st
Cir, 1990) (where civil defendant did not inform the court of “his
willingness to answer deposition questions if his motion to seal were
granted,” his argument that the district court failed to accommodate his
privilege appeared “contrived,” and striking the affidavit he offered in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment was an appropriate
remedial measure); S.E.C. v. Softpoint, Inc, 958 F. Supp. 846, 856
(S.D.N-Y, 1997) (civil litigants have an “obligation to seek assistance from
the Court” to accommodate a claim of privilege). Moreover, Francis was
represented by counsel during the course of the proceedings below,
undermining his claim, opportunistically made for the first time on
appeal, that because the district court did not warn him of the
ramifications that his improper invocation could have, he was oblivious to
those consequences. Cf, Graystone Nash, 25 F.3d at 192-94 (reversing
order barring defendants from offering any evidence after they invoked

Francis cites Meyer v, District Court, 95 Nev. 176, 591 P.2d 259
(1979), for the proposition that the district court was required to warn him
of the consequences of his invocation. Meyer did not hold that providing a
warning is the only manner that an invocation can be accommodated in
each and every situation. Moreover, Meyer did not involve a litigant’s
manipulative last-minute attempt to withdraw an overbroad invocation in
order to oppose a motion for summary judgment, and therefore, Meyer is,
‘not instructive on whether the measures taken by the district court in this
case were appropriate

12

 

 
on Be

 

the Fifth Amendment, in part because they appeared pro se and had no
indication that raising their privilege was improper).

How and when the privilege was attempted to be withdrawn

At the conclusion of Francis’s deposition, his counsel told
Wynn that Francis would promptly try to cure his deposition, But Francis
made no such attempt.* ‘Thereafter, in his opposition to Wynn's motion for
summary judgment and at the hearing on Wynn's motion for summary
judgment, Francis’s counsel gave the district court only vague indications
that Francis would be willing to withdraw his privilege. See Softpoint,
958 F. Supp. at 858 (precluding litigant from introducing affidavits to
oppose a motion for summary judgment where he “provided no firm
commitment that he actually [would] submit to deposition should the

Court accept his affidavits opposing summary judgment”).

 

In addition, the timing and context of Francis’s attempted
withdrawal was problematic. Francis waited until Wynn moved for
summary judgment to indicate to the district court that he might be
willing to withdraw his privilege. This last-minute attempt suggests that
Francis was abusing his privilege. See 4003-4005 5th Ave,, 55 F.3d at 86-
87 (affirming order barring litigant’s ability to present material he
previously claimed was privileged because he attempted to withdraw his
privilege only after faced with a motion for summary judgment); Softpoint,
958 F, Supp. at 857 (litigant’s attempted withdrawal of his privilege three

 

'Francis contends that Wynn should have taken steps to reconvene
his deposition. We reject Francis's attempt to shift the burden to Wynn to
renotice the deposition. It was incumbent upon Francis, not Wynn, to take
the initiative to cure his deposition.

 

13

 
months after his opponent moved for summary judgment was “a
manipulative “cat and mouse” approach to the litigation'—the type of
conduct that warrants barring a defendant's testimony in opposition to
summary judgment” (quoting 4003-4005 5th Ave., 55 F.3d at 85); see also
In_re Edmond, 934 F.2d 1904, 1308 (4th Cir, 1991) ({TJhe Fifth

 

Amendment privilege cannot be invoked

 

a shield to oppose depositions
while discarding it for the limited purpose of making statements to
support a summary judgment motion.”).

‘Nature of the proceeding

‘At the time of Francis’s deposition, there was a criminal
complaint pending against him in Las Vegas for theft and pa:

  

ing a check

with the intent to defraud. Because the factual circumstances underlying

 

the criminal complaint against Francis overlapped with the subject of
Wynn's action, the nature of the civil proceeding presented a danger of
self-incrimination. Nonetheless, because the civil action was brought by
Wynn, Francis did not face the predicament of defending parallel civil and
criminal proceedings brought simultaneously by governmental entities.

Extent.of prejudice to the opposing party

As discussed above, Francis asserted his Fifth Amendment
privilege to nearly every question that Wynn posed during his deposition.
‘Thus, Francis's tactics had already resulted in unnecessary expense to
Wynn and probable delay in obtaining discovery documents. Wynn would
have been further prejudiced if Francis were allowed to withdraw his
invocation or reopen discovery because Wynn had been forced to conduet
its discovery without the benefit of Francis's deposition. See S.E.C. v.
Merrill Scott & Associates, Ltd., 505 F. Supp. 24 1193, 1211 (D, Utah
2007) (prejudice would result if litigant were allowed to withdraw his
invocation at the last minute because the opposing party had developed its

4

 
ono. ae

 

discovery without first being able to test the defendant's assertions);
Softpoint, 958 F. Supp. at 857 (where litigant forced opposing party “to
bear the cost of a pointless deposition,” permitting him to withdraw his
privilege and submit an affidavit would result in prejudice because it
would “effectively ambush” his opponent with “evidence, defenses, and
denials that he concealed” until faced with a motion for summary
judgment).

On balance, the relevant considerations weigh heavily in favor
of the remedial measures taken by the district court to balance the parties!
competing interests. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit Francis to withdraw his
invocation or in denying his request to reopen discovery.

trict court abused
NRCP 56(f) motion for a continuance

Francis asserts that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his NRCP 56(f) motion for a continuance. He emphasizes that at
the time he filed his motion, the case was only about one year old.

Standard of review

‘The district court's refusal of an NRCP 56(f) continuance is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Aviation Ventures v. Joan Morris,
Inc, 121 Nev. 113, 118, 110 P.3d 59, 62 (2005).

NRCP 560)

NRCP 56(f) provides:

Should it appear from the affidavits of a party

opposing the motion (for summary judgment] that

the party cannot for reasons stated present by

affidavit facts essential to justify the party's

opposition, the court may refuse the application

for judgment or may order a continuance to permit
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken

   

15

 
or discovery to be had or may make such other
order as is just.

“[A] motion for a continuance under NRCP 56(f) is appropriate
only when the movant expresses how further discovery will lead to the
creation of a genuine issue of material fact.” Aviation Ventures, 121 Nev.
at 118, 110 P.3d at 62. Furthermore, if the movant has previously “failed
diligently to pursue discovery,” it is not an abuse of discretion for the
district court to deny the motion. Chance v. Pac-Tel Teletrac Inc,, 242
F.8d 1151, 1161 (th Cir. 2001); ef. Aviation Ventures, 121 Nev. at 119,
110 P.3d at 63 (where movant was diligent in conducting discovery, the
case was less than eight months old, and discovery had not started, the
district court abused its discretion in not granting NRCP 56({) motion)

Francis’s NRCP 56(f) motion stated that he wished to discover
facts in support of his affirmative defenses of laches and failure to
mitigate damages.* In support of his motion, his attorney filed an
affidavit stating that she wished to subpoena bank records and depose two
individuals, but she did not explain why Francis had not previously
subpoenaed these records or deposed these individuals during discovery.
It is undisputed that during discovery Francis produced only a single
document, conducted no depositions, and did not serve Wynn with a single
request for production, request for admission, or interrogatory. In other

We acknowledge that our review of Francis’s NRCP 56(f) motion
overlaps to a certain extent with our analysis of whether the district court
failed to properly accommodate Francis's Fifth Amendment privilege by
denying his request to reopen discovery. We nonetheless address these
issues separately because a request for an extension of discovery under
NRCP 56(f) involves a different legal analysis.

16

 

os

 
nee

words, Francis had not in any way diligently pursued discovery.

Accordingly, although only about one year had passed between the filing of

Wynn's complaint and the district court's entry of summary judgment, we

conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying

Francie's motion for an NRCP 56(0) continuance,

Whether the dis i Wynn summary judgment
Francis asserts that the district court improperly granted

Wynn summary judgment. This assertion is unavailing.

Standard of review
We review de novo an order granting summary judgment.
Schuck v, Signature Flight Support, 126 Nev. __, __, 245 P.3d 642, 544

(2010); Wood v, Safeway, Inc, 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029
(2005).
Summary judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate “when the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits, if any,
that are properly before the court demonstrate that no genuine issue of
material fact {remains}, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Wood, 121 Nev. at 731, 121 P.3d at 1031. If the party
moving for summary judgment will bear the burden of persuasion at trial,
that party “must present evidence that would entitle it to a judgment as a
matter of law in the absence of contrary evidence.” Cuzze v, Univ,
Cmty, Coll. Sys. of Nev., 123 Nev. 598, 602, 172 P.3d 131, 134 (2007). If
the nonmoving party will bear the burden of persuasion, the moving party
“may satisfy the burden of production by either (1) submitting evidence
that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim, or (2)
‘pointing out...that there is an absence of evidence to support the
nonmoving party's case.” [d, at 602-03, 172 P.3d at 134 (citation omitted)

7

 

 

 
or a

(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S, 317, 325 (1986). “In such
instances, in order to defeat summary judgment, the nonmoving party
must transcend the pleadings and, by affidavit or other admissible
evidence, introduce specific facts that show a genuine issue of material
fact.” Id, at 603, 172 P.3d at 134,

In support of its motion for summary judgment on its claims,
Wynn produced affidavits stating that Francis owed it $2 million on the
unpaid markers and copies of the markers, which were made payable to
Wynn and contained Francis's signature. Wynn also submitted e-mails
sent by Francis in which he acknowledged his obligation to pay Wynn.
Francis submitted no affidavits or admissible evidence to rebut Wynn's
motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, Francis provided no
“contrary evidence” that created genuine material
claims.” See id, at 602, 172 P.3d at 134.

sues of fact on Wynn's

 

In addition, Wynn produced evidence establishing that it did
not induce Francis to gamble, alter the casino markers in any way, or
engage in any of the activity that Francis alleged in his counterclaims,
Wynn also correctly pointed out that Francis had submitted no evidence
through affidavits or other admissible evidence to support his

counterclaims. ‘Therefore, Wynn was entitled to summary judgment on

"Francis argues that the amount of Wynn's damages was not
ascertained and therefore a genuine issue of material fact precluded entry
of summary judgment. We decline to consider this argument because
Francis did not cogently raise the issue in his opening brief; rather, he
raised it for the first time in his reply brief, thereby depriving Wynn of

fair opportunity to respond. See Weaver v. State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles,
121 Nev. 494, 602, 117 P.3d 193, 198-99 (2005) (arguments raised for the

first time in an appellant's reply brief need not be considered).

18,

 
om

 

Francis's counterclaims because it negated the essential elements of
Francis's counterclaims and successfully pointed out the absence of
evidence supporting his case. See id. at 602-03, 172 P.3d at 134,
CONCLUSION

‘The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
permit Francis to withdraw his invocation of his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination or in denying his request to reopen
discovery. Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in denying

Francis’s motion for a continuance under NRCP 56(). Consequently, as

 

 

Francis failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material
fact, the district court did not err in granting Wynn's motion for summary
judgment. Accordingly, we affirm the summary judgment of the district

court.

 

 

Parraguirre

19