Title: Internatl. Periodical Distrib. v. Bizmart, Inc.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Internatl. Periodical Distrib. v. Bizmart, Inc., 95 Ohio St.3d 452, 2002-Ohio-2488.] 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL PERIODICAL DISTRIBUTORS, APPELLANT, v. BIZMART, INC., 
D.B.A. OFFICEMAX, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Internatl. Periodical Distrib. v. Bizmart, Inc., 95 Ohio St.3d 452, 2002-
Ohio-2488.] 
Commercial transactions — R.C. 1302.98(C) is the saving statute to be applied 
to a commercial sales action. 
(No. 2001-0615 — Submitted February 26, 2002 — Decided June 12, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 77787. 
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
The saving statute to be applied to a commercial sales action is R.C. 1302.98(C). 
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MOYER, C.J. 
{¶1} 
International Periodical Distributors (“International”) appeals the 
judgment of the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s 
summary judgment for defendant, Bizmart, Inc., d.b.a. OfficeMax, in a breach-of-
contract action. 
{¶2} 
On January 4, 1995, International filed a breach-of-contract action 
complaint against Bizmart to recover $85,626 for magazines that International 
had sold and delivered to Bizmart over the course of several years.  Bizmart filed 
an answer and deposed International’s accounts receivable manager in an attempt 
to verify when the deliveries had been made to Bizmart.  The manager was 
questioned regarding International’s account ledger that identified the unpaid 
amounts for magazines delivered to Bizmart between 1991 and September 1993.  
On December 3, 1996, International voluntarily dismissed its action against 
Bizmart without prejudice. 
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{¶3} 
On December 2, 1997, International refiled its breach-of-contract 
action against Bizmart that it had voluntarily dismissed in December 1996. 
{¶4} 
Bizmart filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that 
International’s claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations in R.C. 
1302.98(A) and that the six-month saving provision of R.C. 1302.98(C) did not 
apply to the filing of International’s second complaint.  The trial court granted 
Bizmart’s motion for summary judgment and International appealed. 
{¶5} 
The court of appeals affirmed, holding that a separate limitations 
period applies to each delivery of magazines between August 1991 and 
September 1993.  The parties do not appeal this holding.  The court of appeals 
applied the saving provisions of R.C. 1302.98(C) instead of the general saving 
provision of R.C. 2305.19, and affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that 
International’s claims were barred under the statute.  The cause is now before this 
court upon the allowance of a discretionary appeal. 
{¶6} 
The issue before this court is whether R.C. 1302.98(C) or R.C. 
2305.19 applies to a voluntarily dismissed commercial sales action alleging 
nonpayment for goods. 
{¶7} 
Savings statutes may apply when a claim filed within the time 
required by a statute of limitations is dismissed without prejudice but the statute 
of limitations on the claim has already expired.  Savings statutes operate to give a 
plaintiff a limited period of time in which to refile a dismissed claim that would 
otherwise be time-barred.  We have stated that savings statutes should be liberally 
construed so that cases are decided on the merits rather than upon technicalities of 
procedure.  See Cero Realty Corp. v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. (1960), 171 Ohio St. 
82, 85, 12 O.O.2d 92, 167 N.E.2d 774; Greulich v. Monnin (1943), 142 Ohio St. 
113, 116, 26 O.O. 314, 50 N.E.2d 310. 
{¶8} 
The claims asserted by International were for transactions in goods 
and were therefore subject to the provisions of Article II of the Uniform 
January Term, 2002 
 
 
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Commercial Code (“UCC”), codified in Ohio as R.C. Chapter 1302.  See R.C. 
1302.02.  On December 3, 1996, when International dismissed its claim against 
Bizmart, the four-year statute of limitations of R.C. 1302.98(A) had expired on all 
of the deliveries made prior to December 3, 1992.  Therefore, an applicable 
saving statute could be applied to these claims.  However, as International admits, 
the limitations period had not expired for all of the deliveries made on and after 
December 3, 1992.  A saving statute cannot save these claims because, when 
International dismissed the actions, the statute of limitations had not yet expired. 
{¶9} 
The issue is which saving statute should be applied to the claim for 
all deliveries made prior to December 3, 1992. 
{¶10} International argues that the general saving statute, R.C. 2305.19, 
should apply to its claims.  Bizmart, conversely, contends that the UCC saving 
provision, R.C. 1302.98(C), should control. 
{¶11} R.C. 2305.19 states: 
{¶12} “In an action commenced, or attempted to be commenced, if in due 
time a judgment for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails otherwise than 
upon the merits, and the time limited for the commencement of such action at the 
date of reversal or failure has expired, the plaintiff * * * may commence a new 
action within one year after such date.” 
{¶13} International argues that R.C. 2305.19 should apply to revive 
certain of its claims that were dismissed on December 3, 1996, and refiled on 
December 2, 1997.  International concedes that under this theory, only those 
claims relating to goods sold on or after December 3, 1992, would be revivable.  
If we were to apply R.C. 2305.19, those claims would be saved, since 
International’s complaint was refiled within the one-year saving period. 
{¶14} The pertinent sections of R.C. 1302.98 read as follows: 
{¶15} “(A)  An action for breach of any contract for sale must be 
commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued. * * * 
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{¶16} “* * * 
{¶17} “(C) Where an action commenced within the time limited by 
division (A) of this section is so terminated as to leave available a remedy by 
another action for the same breach, such other action may be commenced after the 
expiration of the time limited and within six months after the termination of the 
first action unless the termination resulted from voluntary discontinuance or from 
dismissal for failure or neglect to prosecute.” 
{¶18} Bizmart contends that because this is a commercial sales case, the 
UCC’s saving provision, R.C. 1302.98(C), should apply.  R.C. 1302.98(C) gives a 
six-month grace period for plaintiffs to refile certain expired claims.  Bizmart 
argues that International refiled its claim well after the six-month saving period 
and therefore International’s claim is barred. 
{¶19} International argues that R.C. 1302.98(C) is actually not a saving 
statute and thus R.C. 2305.19 must be applied as the general saving statute 
provided in the Revised Code.  Specifically, International focuses on the portion 
of R.C. 1302.98(C) referring to “an action commenced within the time limited by 
division (A) of this section [that] is so terminated as to leave available a remedy 
by another action.”  (Emphasis added.)  International seems to reason that this 
phrase means that a plaintiff has an additional six months to refile a dismissed 
claim when the original four-year limitations period has not yet expired, and 
therefore R.C. 1302.98(C) is not a “saving” statute.  However, the fault in 
International’s argument is that it would render that portion of the statute 
superfluous.  A court must presume that the legislature intended the entire statute 
to be effective.  R.C. 1.47(B). 
{¶20} Our reading of R.C. 1302.98(C) causes us to conclude that it is a 
saving statute.  The only substantive difference between R.C. 1302.98(C) and 
2305.19 is the period of time provided a plaintiff to refile after the limitations 
period has expired.  Although not controlling, the Legislative Service 
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Commission’s summary of R.C. 1302.98(C) supports that conclusion:  “[(C)] is 
new, but is comparable to R.C. 2305.19 which allows a period of one year where 
an action has been terminated other than on the merits.”  Also supportive of the 
conclusion is the Official Comment to the UCC, which states, “Subsection (3) 
[(C) in Ohio] states the saving provision included in many state statutes and 
permits an additional short period for bringing new actions, where suits begun 
within the four year period have been terminated so as to leave a remedy still 
available for the same breach.” 
{¶21} Having verified the saving function of R.C. 1302.98(C), we turn to 
the only remaining question, i.e., whether R.C. 1302.98(C) or 2305.19 should be 
applied to the case at bar.  It is undisputed that the underlying contract was for a 
sale of goods.  The UCC therefore controls this case.  The purposes of the UCC 
are clearly stated in R.C. 1301.02: 
{¶22} “(A) Chapters 1301., 1302., 1303., 1304., 1305., 1306., 1307., 
1308., 1309., and 1310. of the Revised Code shall be liberally construed and 
applied to promote their underlying purposes and policies. 
{¶23} “(B) Underlying purposes and policies of those chapters are the 
following: 
{¶24} “(1)  To simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing 
commercial transactions; 
{¶25} “(2)  To permit the continued expansion of commercial practices 
through custom, usage, and agreement of the parties; 
{¶26} “(3)  To make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.” 
{¶27} Moreover, the Official Comment to UCC Section 2-725 (R.C. 
1302.98) states that “[t]he purpose of this section is to introduce a uniform statute 
of limitations for sales contracts, thus eliminating the jurisdictional variations and 
providing needed relief for concerns doing business on a nationwide scale whose 
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contracts have heretofore been governed by several different periods of limitation 
depending upon the state in which the transaction occurred.” 
{¶28} The purposes served by adoption of R.C. Title 13 are applicable 
here.  We are not persuaded that Ohio should stand apart from the vast majority of 
states that have adopted the UCC.  The statute clearly applies to the facts before 
us and we therefore hold that R.C. 1302.98(C) is the saving statute to be applied 
to a commercial sales action. 
{¶29} The trial court did not err when it applied R.C. 1302.98(C) to 
dismiss the complaint filed by International on December 2, 1997. 
{¶30} It should be noted that International’s complaint would have been 
barred even if International had refiled before the six-month deadline.  The saving 
provision of R.C. 1302.98(C) indicates that a claim can be refiled within six 
months of dismissal “unless the termination resulted from voluntary 
discontinuance.”  International voluntarily dismissed its first complaint and 
therefore would not have been permitted to file a second complaint after the 
statute of limitations had run. 
{¶31} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
COOK, J., concurs in judgment only. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., dissents. 
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Newman & Newman, Joel I. Newman and Paula J. Goodrich, for 
appellant. 
 
Baker & Hostetler, L.L.P., and Kyle B. Fleming, for appellee. 
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