Title: STATE v. KING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 
 
No. 13–1061 
 
Filed June 26, 2015 
 
 
STATE OF IOWA, 
 
 
Appellee, 
 
vs. 
 
DONALD JOSEPH KING, 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, 
James D. Scott, Judge. 
 
 
A criminal defendant challenges the admission of evidence 
collected by his parole officer in parolee defendant’s home under the Iowa 
Constitution.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Rees Conrad Douglas, Sioux City, for appellant. 
 
 
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Martha E. Trout, Assistant 
Attorney General, Patrick A. Jennings, County Attorney, and Mark A. 
Campbell, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee. 
 
 
 
2 
 
CADY, Chief Justice. 
 
In this appeal, we consider the constitutionality of a warrantless 
search of the home of a parolee by a parole officer that uncovered 
evidence used to prosecute and convict the parolee of the crime of 
possession of a controlled substance as a habitual offender.  We must 
determine whether the search was unconstitutional or was justified by 
the special needs of the State, based on a balancing of the governmental 
interests served by the search against the privacy interest of the parolee 
protected under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.  On our 
review, we find the search by the parole officer did not violate article I, 
section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.  We affirm the judgment and sentence 
of the district court.   
 
I.  Background Facts and Proceedings.   
 
Donald King was released on parole from a correctional institution 
in Iowa on June 28, 2012.  He was serving a sentence of incarceration at 
the correctional institution after being convicted of the crimes of 
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), possession of 
a controlled substance (methamphetamine) with intent to deliver, and 
theft in the second degree.  The parole officer assigned to supervise King 
while on parole was Emmanuel Scarmon.  As a condition to his release, 
King was required to sign a “Parole Order and Agreement.”  The 
agreement contained numerous terms, including a consent-to-search 
provision and an agreement to abstain from the use, purchase, and 
possession of any drug.   
 
King moved into an apartment in Sioux City and found 
employment.  In September and October 2012, however, he tested 
positive for methamphetamine.  He was placed into an inpatient drug-
treatment program and returned to his apartment upon completing the 
 
3 
 
program on January 4, 2013.  King was required to continue the drug-
treatment program on an outpatient basis, and he was required to find 
employment.  He was also required to wear an electronic monitoring 
bracelet, which would allow his probation officer to track his movements.   
 
On January 14, Scarmon met with King at the probation office.  
During the meeting, King complained about the outpatient treatment 
program and seemed to be losing his motivation to succeed at parole.  He 
expressed the notion that it might be easier to return to prison.  In the 
days following the meeting, the monitoring system signaled that King had 
not left his apartment for two days.  King was required to attend drug 
treatment and to look for employment during this time.  The monitoring 
system also signaled that the bracelet might have been subjected to 
tampering.  Scarmon was concerned that King was on the verge of 
another relapse into drugs or might abscond from parole.   
 
On January 17, Scarmon and another parole officer, Todd Hruska, 
made a home visit to check on King.  When Scarmon and Hruska arrived 
at the apartment, King was present and allowed them inside.  King lived 
alone.  Scarmon checked the monitoring bracelet worn by King.  It did 
not show any signs of tampering.  Scarmon then administered a breath 
test to determine if King had been consuming alcoholic beverages.  The 
test did not detect the presence of any alcohol.  King explained that he 
had not left his apartment over the last few days because he had been 
sick.   
 
Scarmon had learned from experience that he could not always 
trust parolees to provide honest answers to his questions.  The search 
provision in the parole agreement was a means for him to help verify if 
the information provided to him by parolees was correct.  He also utilized 
home searches to make sure parolees were generally living in an 
 
4 
 
environment consistent with the goal of rehabilitation when questions 
and concerns would surface during the course of supervision.  A search 
was an effective means to discover signs of inappropriate activity that 
could hamper the success sought by parole.   
 
Scarmon decided he should check King’s bedroom for signs of any 
activity detrimental to parole, including the presence of drugs or drug 
paraphernalia.  He was aware of King’s history of drug use, including 
intravenous use of drugs and drug use while on parole.  After Scarmon 
informed King of his intention to search, King did not refuse, but instead 
led the parole officers to his basement bedroom.  Scarmon promptly 
observed a sunglasses case located on the headboard of the bed.  He 
opened the case and discovered two small bags of marijuana and rolling 
papers.  Scarmon arrested King for violating his parole.  Hruska placed a 
call to the police.   
 
King was subsequently charged with one count of possession of 
marijuana, third offense, a class “D” felony, as a habitual offender.  This 
charge was based on the marijuana found in his bedroom by Scarmon.  
King moved to suppress the marijuana as evidence in the prosecution.  
He claimed the search of his bedroom and sunglasses case violated 
article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution, and his consent to the search 
under the parole agreement did not constitute a waiver of his 
constitutional right.  The State resisted the motion.  It argued the search 
was valid either as a “special needs” search or as a “consent” search 
under the parole agreement.  The district court overruled the motion, 
ultimately ruling that the search was supported under the special-needs 
doctrine.   
 
At a bench trial, King was convicted of possession of a controlled 
substance, marijuana, third offense, as a habitual offender.  The district 
 
5 
 
court sentenced King to a period of incarceration not to exceed fifteen 
years.  The sentence was suspended, and King was placed on probation 
for two years.  King appealed the judgment and sentence based on the 
denial of his motion to suppress.   
 
II.  Standard of Review.   
 
We review de novo claims based on the district court’s failure to 
suppress evidence obtained in violation of the state constitution.  State v. 
Kern, 831 N.W.2d 149, 164 (Iowa 2013).   
 
III.  Analysis.   
 
Article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution expresses “[t]he right of 
the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable seizures and searches,” 
and requires warrants to be particularized and issued only upon 
probable cause.  Iowa Const. art. I, § 8 (emphasis added).  The federal 
counterpart to Iowa’s right is found in the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.  U.S. Const. amend. IV (“The right of the 
people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause . . . .”).  The text of both provisions applies its protection to all 
people, including people who may be detached totally from any suspicion 
of criminal behavior, although the right is most often applied in the law 
to people suspected of engaging in criminal behavior.1  See United States 
1The assertion of and claims regarding the right primarily arise in the criminal 
context due to the sole means of remedy: the suppression of evidence in a prosecution 
against an accused that was obtained in or because of an unconstitutional search or 
seizure of the accused, their home, or things.  Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 634, 
85 S. Ct. 1731, 1740, 14 L. Ed. 2d 601, 611 (1965) (“We also affirmatively found that 
the exclusionary rule was . . . the only effective remedy for the protection of rights 
under the Fourth Amendment . . . .”), abrogated on other grounds by Griffith v. 
Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 320–22, 107 S. Ct. 708, 712–13, 93 L. Ed. 2d 649, 656–57 
(1987); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–88, 83 S. Ct. 407, 417, 9 
L. Ed. 2d 441, 455 (1963) (holding evidence obtained at the exploitation of an illegal 
search and seizure cannot be used against the person searched); see also State v. Cline, 
                                      
 
 
 
6 
 
v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265–66, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1060–61, 
108 L. Ed. 2d 222, 232–33 (1990) (examining the meaning of “the people” 
in the context of Fourth Amendment protections); Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S. Ct. 507, 511, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 582 (1967) 
(“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”).  Overall, the 
right protects people against warrantless searches, with carefully crafted 
exceptions.   
 
The declaration of the right in the context of its ownership by the 
people projects a powerful statement.  It identifies the importance of the 
right to our founders and the prominence of the right in society.  See 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624–35, 6 S. Ct. 524, 529–35, 29 
L. Ed. 746, 749–52 (1886) (describing in detail the development of the 
right and its importance to the founders), abrogated on other grounds by 
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301–02, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 1647, 18 
L. Ed. 2d 782, 788–89 (1967).  Yet, the thrust of the right does not speak 
in absolutes, but reason.  See State v. Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d 101, 107 
(Iowa 2001) (“The essential purpose of the Fourth Amendment ‘is to 
impose a standard of “reasonableness” upon the exercise of discretion by 
government officials . . . .’ ” (quoting State v. Loyd, 530 N.W.2d 708, 711 
(Iowa 1995))).  This approach permits the reasonableness of searches to 
adapt over time to new challenges given to the people and government 
that were not contemplated at the time the provision was framed.  It 
allows the right to take on a new shape over time in response to new 
understandings of those times when government is permitted to conduct 
617 N.W.2d 277, 291 (Iowa 2000) (“There is simply no meaningful remedy available to 
one who has suffered an illegal search other than prohibiting the State from benefiting 
from its constitutional violation.”), overruled on other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 
N.W.2d 601, 606 n.2 (Iowa 2001).   
_________________________ 
 
7 
 
a reasonable search, including the search of people or places for 
purposes primarily unrelated to the enforcement of criminal laws.  See, 
e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335–36, 105 S. Ct. 733, 739–40, 
83 L. Ed. 2d 720, 730–31 (1985) (examining the reasonableness of 
warrantless school searches).  These future circumstances can both 
expand the types of warrantless searches permitted by the right, just as 
it could diminish the number or type of exceptions over time.  See State 
v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 283 (Iowa 2000) (declining to adopt a good-
faith exception to the exclusionary rule under the Iowa Constitution), 
overruled on other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 n.2 
(Iowa 2001).  Over approximately the last fifty years, new needs of the 
government to conduct warrantless searches primarily unrelated to law 
enforcement have challenged the shape of the right through what has 
become known as the special-needs doctrine.  See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 
332–33 & n.2, 340–41, 105 S. Ct. at 737–38 & n.2, 742, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 
728–29 & n.2, 734.   
 
A.  Special-Needs Doctrine.  The special-needs doctrine first 
surfaced under our federal jurisprudence in Camara v. Municipal Court, 
387 U.S. 523, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967).  In Camara, the 
Court articulated a test to determine if and for what reason a warrant 
would be needed for an administrative search.  Id. at 532–33, 539–40, 87 
S. Ct. at 1732–33, 1736, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 937–38, 941 (finding a warrant 
was only necessary when entry of inspectors was refused in order to 
inform the homeowner of the limits of the search, that the inspector was 
authorized, and the necessity of the search to enforce the municipal 
code).  Camara was followed by T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340–42 & n.7, 105 
S. Ct. at 742–43 & n.7, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 733–35 & n.7, in which the Court 
applied a special-needs test to determine if public school officials needed 
 
8 
 
a warrant to conduct searches of school lockers.  The doctrine derived its 
name from the concurring opinion of Justice Blackmun, who stated: 
“Only in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond 
the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-
cause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its 
balancing of interests for that of the Framers.”  Id. at 351, 105 S. Ct. at 
748, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 741 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).   
 
In Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 107 S. Ct. 3164, 97 L. Ed. 2d 
709 (1987), the Court considered the special-needs doctrine in the 
context of a probationary search.  In doing so, the basic application of 
the doctrine surfaced for the first time.  See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873, 107 
S. Ct. at 3168, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 717.  The Court acknowledged that “[a] 
probationer’s home, like anyone else’s, is protected by the Fourth 
Amendment’s requirement that searches be ‘reasonable.’ ”  Id.  On the 
other hand, it recognized that “a State’s operation of a probation system 
. . . presents ‘special needs’ beyond normal law enforcement that may 
justify 
departures 
from 
the 
usual 
warrant 
and 
probable-cause 
requirements.”  Id. at 873–74, 107 S. Ct. at 3168, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 717.  
The conditions placed on the liberty of probationers “are meant to assure 
that the probation serves as a period of genuine rehabilitation and that 
the community is not harmed by the probationer’s being at large,” which 
requires and justifies the exercise of supervision to ensure the conditions 
of probation are followed.  Id. at 875, 107 S. Ct. at 3169, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 
718.  The Court ultimately held that requiring a warrant would remove 
supervisory power from the probation officer and place it in the warrant 
judge, interfere with quick responses to violations, and reduce the 
deterrent effect that the searches would create.  Id. at 876, 107 S. Ct. at 
3170, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 719.  Even the dissent found probation supervision 
 
9 
 
fell within a special-needs category to justify the examination of the 
reasonableness of probation-related searches and ultimately concluded 
the threshold probable-cause requirement for a warrant should be 
lowered because supervision advances rehabilitation “by allowing a 
probation agent to intervene at the first sign of trouble.”  Id. at 881–83, 
107 S. Ct. at 3172–73, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 722–24 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting).  Justice Blackmun observed that the probation officer 
monitors compliance with the conditions placed on the probationer’s 
liberty and that a search of the home for violations may be necessary to 
ensure that compliance.  Id. at 883, 107 S. Ct. at 3173, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 
723.  He concluded the special-needs doctrine should not apply in 
Griffin’s case because the search of his home was not a normal probation 
search, but involved a tip from police to uncover evidence of a new 
criminal violation; therefore, Griffin’s status as a probationer should not 
justify the special exception.  Id. at 885, 107 S. Ct. at 3174, 97 L. Ed. 2d 
at 725.   
 
In 1989, the Court extended the special-needs doctrine to cover 
drug testing by railroads pursuant to federal regulations in Skinner v. 
Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 103 
L. Ed. 2d 639 (1989).  These tests were permitted when specific rules 
were violated or a supervisor had a reasonable suspicion based on 
specific observations that the employee was under the influence of 
alcohol.2  Id. at 611, 109 S. Ct. at 1410, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 655–56 (citing 
49 C.F.R. § 219.301(b) (1987)).  The Court held the government had an 
2Though performed by the railroad companies, there were sufficient “indices of 
the Government’s encouragement, endorsement, and participation” to implicate the 
Fourth Amendment.  Skinner, 489 U.S. at 615–16, 109 S. Ct. at 1412, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 
658–59.   
                                      
 
 
10 
 
interest in regulating railroad employee conduct to ensure safety for both 
the traveling public and the employees, and this interest presented a 
special need beyond normal law enforcement that might justify a 
departure from the warrant requirement.  Id. at 620–21, 109 S. Ct. at 
1415, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 661–62.  The Court found the standardized 
nature of the tests, the minimal discretion of administering them, and 
the practical difficulties of railroad supervisors obtaining a warrant from 
a magistrate while evidence dissipates all weighed against the necessity 
of requiring a warrant.  Id. at 622–24, 109 S. Ct. at 1416–17, 103 
L. Ed. 2d at 663–64.  The Court noted that although other cases 
indicated a warrantless search must be based on probable cause or at 
least “ ‘some quantum of individualized suspicion,’ ” if the privacy 
interests are minimal then the search might be reasonable even absent 
such suspicion.  Id. at 624, 109 S. Ct. at 1417, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 664 
(quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560, 96 S. Ct. 
3074, 3084, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116, 1130 (1976)).  The reasonable 
expectations of privacy of employees were found to be diminished 
because the employees worked in an industry that was highly regulated 
to ensure the safety of everyone.  Id. at 627, 109 S. Ct. at 1418, 103 
L. Ed. 2d at 666.3   
3The railroad industry’s experience . . . persuasively shows, and common 
sense confirms, that the customary dismissal sanction that threatens 
employees who use drugs or alcohol while on duty cannot serve as an 
effective deterrent unless violators know that they are likely to be 
discovered.  By ensuring that employees . . . know they will be tested 
upon the occurrence of a triggering event, the timing of which no 
employee can predict with certainty, the regulations significantly 
increase the deterrent effect of the administrative penalties associated 
with the prohibited conduct.   
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 629–30, 109 S. Ct. at 1420, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 668.   
                                      
 
 
11 
 
Safety was again the paramount concern of the Court in National 
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 
103 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1989).  The search in Von Raab involved testing by 
the Customs Service for drug use among three groups of employees: 
those directly involved in drug interdiction, those carrying firearms, and 
those handling classified material.  Id. at 660–61, 109 S. Ct. at 1388, 
103 L. Ed. 2d at 699.  The program was designed for deterrence and 
could not be used in criminal prosecution without consent from the 
tested employee, setting it outside the needs of normal law enforcement 
and within the special-needs test.  Id. at 666, 109 S. Ct. at 1391, 103 
L. Ed. 2d at 702.  The Court found the imposition of the warrant 
requirement would bring normal or routine employment decisions to a 
constitutional magnitude and could compromise the mission of the 
Customs Service if warrants were needed without providing any 
additional protection to personal privacy of the employees.4  Id. at 666–
67, 109 S. Ct. at 1391, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 702–03.  Further, the Court 
found the government’s need to conduct the searches outweighed the 
privacy interests of those who carried firearms and engaged in drug 
interdiction, but the need did not clearly outweigh the privacy interests of 
those handling classified information.  Id. at 668, 678, 109 S. Ct. at 
4A warrant serves primarily to advise the citizen that an intrusion is 
authorized by law and limited in its permissible scope and to interpose a 
neutral magistrate between the citizen and the law enforcement officer 
“engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”  But 
in the present context, “the circumstances justifying toxicological testing 
and the permissible limits of such intrusions are defined narrowly and 
specifically . . . and doubtless are well known to covered employees.”   
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 667, 109 S. Ct. at 1391, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 703 (citation omitted) 
(quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S. Ct. 367, 369, 92 L. Ed. 436, 
440 (1948) (first quote); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 622, 109 S. Ct. at 1416, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 
663) (second quote)).   
                                      
 
 
12 
 
1392, 1397, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 704, 710.  The Court reasoned that drug 
use by agents whose job was to prevent drugs from entering the country 
might create a conflict of interest that would interfere with the successful 
execution of their duties and that those customarily using firearms could 
not risk impaired perception or judgment caused by drug use.  Id. at 
670–71, 109 S. Ct. at 1393, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 705.  However, the Court 
found no evidence whether those with access to “classified” information 
actually had access to sensitive information that might merit the 
mandatory testing and could not find the overly broad category 
reasonable.  Id. at 678, 109 S. Ct. at 1397, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 710.  The 
dissent acknowledged that “whether a particular search has been 
‘reasonable’ . . . depends largely upon the social necessity that prompts 
the search.”  Id. at 681–82, 109 S. Ct. at 1399, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 712–13 
(Scalia, J., dissenting).  However, it did not find sufficient social necessity 
to require drug testing of Customs Service employees handling classified 
material without evidence of a real drug use problem among them.  Id.   
The analysis the Court used in Vernonia School District 47J v. 
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 132 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1995), to 
examine drug testing of students is very useful.  First, the Court 
considered the nature of the privacy interest intruded upon by the search 
and the legitimacy of the privacy expectation.  Id. at 654, 115 S. Ct. at 
2391, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 575.  The second factor considered was the 
complained-of character of the intrusion.  Id. at 658, 115 S. Ct. at 2393, 
132 L. Ed. 2d at 577 (recognizing urinalysis intrudes on a traditionally 
shielded private function).  Finally, the court analyzed “the nature and 
immediacy of the governmental concern at issue here, and the efficacy of 
this means for meeting it.”  Id. at 660, 115 S. Ct. at 2394, 132 L. Ed. 2d 
at 579.  Rather than a minimum level of interest, the Court found the 
 
13 
 
governmental interest needed to be important enough to outweigh the 
privacy interest and the extent of the intrusion.  Id. at 661, 115 S. Ct. at 
2394–95, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 579.  The Court found the drug problem 
among students in the community was severe enough to permit random 
warrantless, suspicionless urinalysis of students who participated in 
sports.  Id. at 664–65, 115 S. Ct. at 2396, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 582.  Justice 
O’Connor dissented, suggesting that suspicion-based searches were not 
impracticable 
in 
the 
particular 
context, 
rendering 
the 
blanket 
suspicionless search unreasonable.  Id. at 671, 679–81, 115 S. Ct. at 
2399, 2403–04, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 586, 591–92 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(“Protection of privacy, not evenhandedness, was then and is now the 
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
In Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 117 S. Ct. 1295, 137 L. Ed. 2d 
513 (1997), the Supreme Court placed boundaries on the special-needs 
exception as to warrantless, suspicionless searches.  The State of Georgia 
wanted to mandate drug testing for political candidates similar to the 
requirements for railroad employees in Skinner and border patrol agents 
in Von Raab.  Chandler, 520 U.S. at 308–09, 117 S. Ct. at 1298, 137 
L. Ed. 2d at 519–20.  However, the Court found “[o]ur precedents 
establish that the proffered special need . . . must be substantial—
important enough to override the individual’s acknowledged privacy 
interest, sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth Amendment’s normal 
requirement of individualized suspicion.”  Id. at 318, 117 S. Ct. at 1303, 
137 L. Ed. 2d at 526.  In order to find a special need, there must be an 
indication of concrete dangers, not merely hypothetical ones, that justify 
departing from the basic prescriptions of the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 
318–19, 117 S. Ct. at 1303, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 526.  “[W]here the risk to 
public safety is substantial and real, . . . searches calibrated to the risk 
 
14 
 
may rank as ‘reasonable.’ ”  Id. at 323, 117 S. Ct. at 1305, 137 L. Ed. 2d 
at 529. 
Overall, the most pertinent federal precedent in the special-needs 
area for the present case is Griffin.5  The Griffin Court held the special-
needs exception applied to a search of a probationer’s home by a 
probation officer, even when conducting the search for law enforcement 
purposes rather than probationary purposes.  483 U.S. at 874–75, 107 
S. Ct. at 3169, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 717–18 (majority opinion).  The other 
special-needs cases shape and modify how special-needs exceptions are 
evaluated and applied.  While several of the opinions permit 
suspicionless searches, those are limited by the findings of minimal 
privacy rights that are invaded, Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624, 109 S. Ct. at 
1417, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 664, and the requirement that the governmental 
need has to be important enough to override the privacy rights of the 
individual, Chandler, 530 U.S. at 318, 117 S. Ct. at 1303, 137 L. Ed. 2d 
at 526.  Moreover, the only concerns that have made it through the 
Court’s important-concern test are drugs in schools or relate to the 
safety of the public and individuals. Acton, 515 U.S. at 664–65, 115 
S. Ct. at 2396, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 582 (majority opinion); Von Raab, 489 
U.S. at 668, 109 S. Ct. at 1392, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 704 (majority opinion); 
5Although United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 S. Ct. 587, 151 L. Ed. 2d 
497 (2001), and Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 165 L. Ed. 2d 250 
(2006), both considered the constitutionality of searches of probationer homes, both did 
so under a straight reasonableness analysis under the Fourth Amendment, not utilizing 
a special-needs analysis similar to that done in Griffin.  Knights, 534 U.S. at 117–18, 
122 S. Ct. at 590–91, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 504–05 (deciding that warrantless searches of 
probationers may be reasonable outside the special-needs context); see also Samson, 
547 U.S. at 847, 126 S. Ct. 2196, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 256 (holding a condition of release 
“can so diminish or eliminate a released prisoner’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
that a suspicionless search by a law enforcement officer would not offend the Fourth 
Amendment”).  Thus, an examination of these cases would not apply to our special-
needs analysis.   
                                      
 
 
15 
 
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620–21, 109 S. Ct. at 1415, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 662; 
see also Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 454–55, 110 S. 
Ct. 2481, 2487–88, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412, 423 (1990) (upholding a 
warrantless, suspicionless sobriety checkpoint using empirical data to 
support its need and efficacy).   
 
In 2003, we applied the special-needs doctrine in a case involving 
the search of a school locker by school officials.  State v. Jones, 666 
N.W.2d 142–43 (Iowa 2003).  In doing so, we borrowed from the federal 
jurisprudence and adopted the three-factor test to determine if the 
doctrine would support the warrantless search of the lockers.  Id. at 146.  
Under the analysis, we considered (1) the nature of the privacy interest at 
stake, (2) the character of the intrusion, and (3) the nature and 
immediacy of the government concern at stake and the ability of the 
search to meet the concern.  Id.  We applied these factors to uphold a 
warrantless random search of school lockers.  Id. at 150.   
 
We have not applied the special-needs doctrine beyond the search 
of school lockers.  We have evaluated the doctrine, however, in the 
context of the search of the home of a parolee by police officers who 
suspected the parolee had drugs inside the house.  See generally Kern, 
831 N.W.2d at 165–72.  Yet, we did not assess the doctrine beyond the 
specific circumstances of the case.  See id. at 170–72.  These 
circumstances revealed police officers conducted the search for the 
primary purpose of gathering and using evidence for a criminal 
prosecution.  Id. at 171.  Thus, evaluating the case through the lens of 
our search and seizure clause, we did not see the doctrine as a means to 
enable law enforcement officers to carry out their duties in gathering 
evidence of criminal activity.  Id. at 170.  Moreover, the circumstances of 
the case did not demonstrate any reason that the warrant requirement of 
 
16 
 
the right against unreasonable search and seizure would have frustrated 
the purpose of the search.  Id. at 172.  Accordingly, we did not view the 
doctrine as a means to excuse requiring law enforcement officers to 
obtain a search warrant under the Iowa Constitution.  Id.   
 
Thirty-three years earlier, we addressed some of the underpinnings 
of the special-needs doctrine in the context of the search of an apartment 
of a parolee initiated by his parole officer, without making any specific 
reference to the doctrine.  State v. Cullison, 173 N.W.2d 533 (Iowa 1970).  
In that case, we rejected the theories used to minimize the constitutional 
protections of parolees and held that parolees maintain the same 
safeguards afforded all people against warrantless searches involving 
evidence of new crimes.  Id. at 538.  The search conducted in Cullison 
began as a parole-related visit by a parole officer to determine the reason 
the parolee failed to show up for work.  Id. at 534.  After leaving and then 
returning to the apartment, the parole officer asked to search a locked 
room of the apartment to investigate for any other parole violations.  Id. 
at 535.  The parole officer “became suspicious” after the parolee objected 
to his request to have the locked door opened and after the parolee told 
him there was something in the room that he did not want him to see.  
Id.  The parole officer knew at the time that there had been recent 
burglaries in the area, and he sought the assistance of a police officer to 
assist in entering and searching the room.  Id.  We held the search 
violated the Federal Search and Seizure Clause because it was not based 
on probable cause.  Id. at 539–40.  The special-needs doctrine was not 
fully developed at the time, and the facts of the case blurred any line 
between a search by a parole officer to carry out the parole mission and a 
search by law enforcement personnel for evidence of criminal activity.  
See id.  Nevertheless, we expressed no constitutional criticism of the 
 
17 
 
search of the apartment by the parole officer until the officer became 
suspicious of the contents of the locked room and obtained the 
assistance of a police officer to pursue that suspicion.  Id. at 538 
(protecting the parolee’s constitutional safeguards only “as to a new and 
separate crime”). 
 
In State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260 (Iowa 2010), we held that a 
search by police of a motel room occupied by a parolee was unreasonable 
under the search and seizure clause of the Iowa Constitution when based 
solely on the parolee’s status.  Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 289–91.  
Notwithstanding, we acknowledged “[a] properly limited, nonarbitrary 
warrantless search of the home by a parole officer might conceivably be 
supported under the ‘special needs’ doctrine.”  Id. at 288.   
 
In State v. Short, 851 N.W.2d 474 (Iowa 2014), we were confronted 
with “an investigatory search by law enforcement related to new crimes” 
at the home of a probationer.  Short, 851 N.W.2d at 477.  We held “the 
warrant requirement has full applicability to home searches of both 
probationers and parolees by law enforcement.”  Id. at 506.  We declared 
a search by law enforcement without an adequate warrant violated the 
search and seizure clause of the Iowa Constitution, but acknowledged 
the search involved “was not a probationary search.”  Id. at 477, 505.  
We again reserved the question whether searches by probation or parole 
officers as a part of their ordinary duties would be permissible.  Id. at 
505.  At the same time, we emphasized that the warrant requirement 
cannot be overcome by notions of reasonableness detached from the 
protections sought.  Id. at 502. 
 
B.  Application.  The facts at issue in this case bring us directly to 
that point in time when we now fully confront whether the special-needs 
doctrine of governmental concerns that justify a warrantless search 
 
18 
 
includes the search of the home of a parolee by a parole officer for the 
purpose of carrying out the mission of parole.  We do this, not to 
overturn or alter our prior opinions concerning searches and seizures as 
related to parolees, but rather, to answer the question expressly left open 
by those decisions.  See id. at 505 (reserving the question of a search by 
a parole officer as part of ordinary duties for another day); Kern, 831 
N.W.2d at 170–71 (explaining any special-needs doctrine “would require 
that the search by a parole officer be designed to fit the special needs of 
parole” before concluding such a situation did not exist in that case); 
State v. Baldon, 829 N.W.2d 785, 789 (Iowa 2013) (noting no evidence 
was introduced about a need for the parole officer to search consistent 
with the general mission of parole); Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 288 (noting 
that “[a] properly limited, nonarbitrary warrantless search of the home by 
a parole officer might conceivably be supported under the ‘special needs’ 
doctrine”); Cullison, 173 N.W.2d at 544 (Stuart, J., dissenting) (arguing 
the majority did not answer the question of whether a parole-officer 
search as part of ordinary duties fits within a warrantless-search 
exception).  We analyze the parole search issue by considering the three 
factors identified in Jones.   
1.  Nature of the privacy interest.  The first factor considers the 
nature of the privacy intruded upon by the search.  Jones, 666 N.W.2d at 
146.  In considering this factor, we start with the principle that parolees 
have the same expectation of privacy in their homes as persons not 
convicted of crimes and not on probation or parole.  Cullison, 173 N.W.2d 
at 537–38 (majority opinion); see also Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 290–91.  
Yet, that equal footing recognized under our Iowa Constitution 
predominantly exists in the context of the search and seizure by law 
enforcement officers for evidence of crimes.  See Kern, 831 N.W.2d at 
 
19 
 
164–65, 170–71.  Unlike people not on parole from a sentence of 
incarceration resulting from a prior criminal conviction, parolees are 
under the supervision of the government pursuant to a written parole 
agreement.  See Iowa Code § 906.1 (2013); Iowa Admin. Code r. 201—
45.1(2).  These agreements require the parolee to submit to searches and 
other governmental intrusions not permitted against people not on 
parole.  Iowa Admin. Code r. 201—45.2 (describing standard conditions 
of parole and permitting additional special conditions to be imposed in 
the agreement).  See generally Baldon, 829 N.W.2d at 789–802 (tracing 
the use and effect of consent-to-search clauses).  If a term of the 
agreement is not followed, the parole can be revoked and the parolee 
returned to confinement to serve out the remainder of the sentence.  
Iowa Admin Code r. 201—45.4.  Thus, the expectation of privacy in a 
home enjoyed by parolees can come at an expense not faced by people 
not on parole.  In other words, parolees can share the full expectation of 
privacy afforded nonparolees only if the parolee chooses to violate the 
parole agreement by refusing to permit a reasonable search and risk 
paying the possible price of revocation of parole.   
 
In Cullison, the parole agreement did not require the parolee to 
permit the parole officer to search the apartment, nor did it give the 
parolee notice that such a search might occur.  173 N.W.2d at 534 
(“Teeters executed an instrument by which he agreed to conduct himself 
honestly, obey the law, keep reasonable hours, refrain from excessive use 
of intoxicants, and remain at all times in Montgomery County.”).  Thus, 
the parolee maintained the same expectation of privacy enjoyed by people 
not out on parole and required the state to justify the warrantless search 
on other grounds permitted under the constitution, not simply his status 
as a parolee.  See id. at 537–38.  Because no such grounds existed and 
 
20 
 
no other grounds supported the search, a warrant was necessary for the 
search to be constitutional.  Id. at 540. 
 
In this case, King did not choose to maintain his privacy interest 
by refusing access to his residence or the bedroom of his residence.  
Instead, he complied with the terms of parole by allowing the parole 
officers into his apartment and showing them to his bedroom to conduct 
the search.  Of course, these acts of compliance did not establish an 
independent ground to search based on a waiver of his constitutional 
rights.  See Baldon, 829 N.W.2d at 802–03.  No such independent 
grounds existed.  However, the acts of compliance did place the 
government and King on different footing than the government and the 
parolee in Cullison, in which the search was refused.  See 173 N.W.2d at 
535.  The parole officers conducted, and King did not refuse, the search 
pursuant to the terms of the parole agreement.  Further, unlike Cullison, 
the parole agreement served to diminish the expectation of privacy of the 
parolee in relation to his parole officer by placing him on notice that such 
a search might occur.  Thus, we must decide if the interests of the 
government under these circumstances are strong enough to prevail over 
the legitimate privacy interests of a parolee who has failed to refuse or in 
any way signal a lack of consent to a search the parolee had notice could 
occur.  This approach continues to protect the long-standing and 
historical protections tied to a home under article I, section 8 of the Iowa 
Constitution, but recognizes these protections can at times be altered by 
the provisions parolees must comply with under parole agreements to 
maintain their conditional freedom.  Thus, a legitimate expectation of 
privacy exists, even if altered by the parole agreement as it relates to the 
parole officer, and our task is to determine whether the right has been 
violated by considering the competing interests at stake.  See State v. 
 
21 
 
Lowe, 812 N.W.2d 554, 567–68 (Iowa 2012) (evaluating whether a 
legitimate expectation of privacy existed before addressing if there had 
been an unreasonable intrusion upon it).  We therefore proceed to the 
second factor to consider the character of the intrusion posed by the 
policy behind the search.  Jones, 666 N.W.2d at 148.  
 
2.  Character of the intrusion.  The policy of a parolee search is 
embedded in the supervisory relationship between the parole officer and 
the parolee, as well as the historical purpose and goal of our system of 
parole.  See generally Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 478–79, 92 
S. Ct. 2593, 2598–99, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484, 492–93 (1972).  A review of this 
history helps reveal the character of the intrusion in this case.   
 
The theory of parole originated in Alexander Maconochie’s system 
of supervising the British penal colony in Australia in the 1840s, where 
prisoners earned marks and progressed through gradations of servitude 
to earn their ticket-of-leave.  1 Neil P. Cohen, The Law of Probation and 
Parole § 1:11, at 1-17 to -18 (2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter Cohen].  In the 
1850s, Ireland adapted the idea into their penal system under the 
leadership of Walter Crofton, who introduced the element of postrelease 
supervision.  Id. § 1:11, at 1-18; Joan Petersilia, Parole and Prisoner 
Reentry in the United States, 26 Crime & Just. 479, 488 (1999) 
[hereinafter Petersilia].  The parole system made it to America in 1876 
when adopted for the juvenile reformatory system in New York, with the 
addition of indeterminate sentencing.6  1 Cohen § 1:12, at 1-19; 
Petersilia, 26 Crime & Just. at 488.  It spread quickly to other states, no 
6The timing here is an important consideration in constitutional analysis.  The 
Iowa Constitution was passed in 1857.  The Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution was ratified in 1791 and officially adopted in 1792.  Even the concept of 
parole would have been foreign to the statesmen who debated and created the search 
and seizure protections we are striving to balance against the needs of society.   
                                      
 
 
22 
 
longer restricted to juveniles.  1 Cohen § 1:12, at 1-19.  Today, most 
states and the federal government have statutes and regulations 
providing for parole and methods of supervision and enforcement that 
vary widely, making comparisons among and between jurisdictions of 
limited utility.7  See id. § 1:21, at 1-30; Petersilia, 26 Crime & Just. at 
494–96.   
 
Iowa first provided “for a system of reform and parole” in 1907 with 
an act pertaining to “Indeterminate sentences and reformatory.”  1907 
Iowa Acts ch. 192 (codified at Iowa Code §§ 5718-a4 to –a26 (1907 
Supp.)).  The Act converted one of the state penitentiaries into a 
reformatory.  Iowa Code § 5718-a4.  The reformatory was available for all 
female convicts and first-time male convicts between ages sixteen and 
thirty who were not convicted of specified heinous crimes.  Id. §§ 5718-
a5, -a27.  The Act also established indeterminate sentences for the first 
time for all crimes except murder and treason.  Id. § 5718-a13.  The 
board of parole was also established and delegated the “power to 
establish rules and regulations” for releasing persons to parole.  Id. 
§§ 5718-a14, -a18.  It allowed  
prisoners . . . to go upon parole outside of the penitentiary 
buildings, . . . but to remain while on parole in the legal 
custody of the wardens . . . and under the control of the said 
board of parole and subject, at any time, to be taken back 
and confined within the penitentiary.   
7In the first case to reach the U.S. Supreme Court involving a parole question—
in the form of a separation-of-powers challenge—the Court deferred to a decision by the 
state supreme court permitting delegation of judicial powers in the legislative creation of 
indeterminate sentencing as permissible under the state constitution, further stating 
that it did not present a question under the Federal Constitution.  Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 
U.S. 71, 83–84, 23 S. Ct. 28, 32, 47 L. Ed. 79, 85 (1902) (examining an Illinois parole 
statute passed in 1899).   
                                      
 
 
23 
 
Id. § 5718-a18.  The board was further empowered to determine when 
the parolee had sufficiently become a law-abiding citizen and when he or 
she could be released from parole.  Id. § 5718-a20.   
 
Early on, Iowa courts treated parole as “a conditional pardon.”  
Kirkpatrick v. Hollowell, 197 Iowa 927, 931, 196 N.W. 91, 92 (1923).  
Parole was considered “a conditional and experimental release before 
expiration of sentence.”  Addis v. Applegate, 171 Iowa 150, 173, 154 
N.W. 168, 176 (1915) (Salinger, J., concurring).  In 1923, the 
extraordinary session of the Iowa legislature amended the Code sections 
on charitable, correctional, and penal institutions.  1923 Iowa Acts 
Extraordinary Sess. (unpublished) ch. 55, §§ 481 to 506-a1 (Iowa 1924) 
(codified at Iowa Code §§ 3782–3811 (1924)).  Among other provisions, 
probation as we now know it was created, but under the name “court 
parole” (as opposed to the “board parole” dealing with the release of those 
already in prison).  See Iowa Code §§ 3786, 3788, 3800 (providing for 
“parole before commitment” by the board of those not previously 
convicted of a felony and for the court to suspend sentence and parole).  
It is this probation or court parole—also called “bench parole”—that the 
Iowa courts referred to as “a matter of grace, favor, and forgiveness.”  
Pagano v. Bechly, 211 Iowa 1294, 1298, 232 N.W. 798, 799–800 (1930) 
(comparing suspended sentence and parole to a pardon, within the 
conditions and limitations provided by statute); see also Cole v. Holliday, 
171 N.W.2d 603, 605 (Iowa 1969); State v. Boston, 234 Iowa 1047, 1051, 
14 N.W.2d 676, 679 (1944).   
 
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court had occasion to 
examine the Iowa system of parole in Morrissey, in a challenge to Iowa’s 
method of parole revocation.  Part of the examination included a 
description of parole officers and their role:  
 
24 
 
 
The parole officers are part of the administrative 
system designed to assist parolees and to offer them 
guidance.  The conditions of parole serve a dual purpose; 
they prohibit, either absolutely or conditionally, behavior 
that is deemed dangerous to the restoration of the individual 
into normal society.  And through the requirement of 
reporting to the parole officer and seeking guidance and 
permission before doing many things, the officer is provided 
with information about the parole and an opportunity to 
advise him.  The combination puts the parole officer into the 
position in which he can try to guide the parolee into 
constructive development.   
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 478, 92 S. Ct. at 2599, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 492–93.  
Just a few months later, we observed the similarities between probation 
and parole—that although probation and parole take place at opposite 
ends of a prison sentence, with probation resulting from judicial action 
before prison and parole resulting from administrative action following 
prison, “both follow conviction and imposition of sentence.”  State v. 
Wright, 202 N.W.2d 72, 76 (Iowa 1972).   
The Iowa legislature revised the criminal code in 1976, effective 
January 1, 1978.  1976 Iowa Acts ch. 1245 (codified in scattered sections 
of Iowa Code (1979)); id. ch. 1245, ch. 4, § 529.  One provision replaced 
the legal custody of parolees with departmental supervision of parolees.  
Prior to the revision, Iowa Code section 247.9 provided that “[a]ll paroled 
prisoners shall remain, while on parole, in the legal custody of the 
warden or superintendent and under the control of the chief parole 
officer.”  Iowa Code § 247.9 (1977).  The new statute provided that 
“[e]very person while on parole shall be under the supervision of the 
department of social services, which shall prescribe regulations for 
governing persons on parole.”  Iowa Code § 906.5 (1979).   
In 1983, the Iowa Department of Social Services was reorganized, 
establishing the Iowa Department of Corrections.  Iowa Code ch. 217A 
(1985)).  At that time, the parole functions were transferred to the newly 
 
25 
 
created department of corrections.  Id. § 906.1.  Today, parole officers are 
still part of the department of corrections, working out of the local 
judicial district department of correctional services.  Iowa Code § 906.2 
(2013).8   
 
When granting parole, the board of parole does not grant an 
inmate “the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only 
. . . the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special 
parole restrictions.”  Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480, 92 S. Ct. at 2600, 33 
L. Ed. 2d at 494.  “Conditional” liberty means that in order to remain in 
the community instead of being re-incarcerated, the parolee must comply 
with both standard conditions of parole required of all parolees, and 
special conditions imposed depending on the needs of that particular 
case.  Iowa Admin. Code r. 201—45.2(1) (listing standard conditions); id. 
r. 201—45.2(2) (providing for the imposition of parolee-specific special 
conditions).  A parole officer has the obligation to monitor the compliance 
with those conditions of each of the persons under supervision.  See id. 
r. 201—45.4, .6 (requiring parole officer recommend when to revoke, 
continue, or discharge parole).  Today, our legislature has statutorily 
defined parole as  
the release of a person who has been committed to the 
custody of the director of the Iowa department of corrections 
by reason of the person’s commission of a public offense, 
which release occurs prior to the expiration of the person’s 
term, is subject to supervision by the district department of 
8The board of parole is independent from the department of corrections, with 
members appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the senate.  Iowa Code § 904A.3.  
However, the majority of members of the board are expected to be “knowledgeable in 
correctional procedures and issues.”  Id. § 904A.2.  The board has a duty to create and 
review any parole programs and procedures.  Id. § 904A.4(3); id. § 906.3.  However, the 
board of corrections has rulemaking power over the administration of the parole 
system.  Id. § 904.105(6)–(7); id. § 906.5(4).   
                                      
 
 
26 
 
correctional services, and is on conditions imposed by the 
district department.   
Iowa Code § 906.1.   
 
The supervision component of parole necessarily involves intrusion 
by government into the lives of parolees as they assimilate back into 
society.  See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874–75, 107 S. Ct. at 3169, 97 L. Ed. 2d 
at 718.  But, the intrusions based on the policy of the purpose of parole, 
rehabilitation of the parolees and maintaining public safety, are 
unrelated to the purpose of gathering evidence of criminal behavior that 
has already occurred for the purpose of enforcing laws through a 
criminal prosecution.  See Kern, 831 N.W.2d at 170–72; Ochoa, 792 
N.W.2d at 286.  The parole officer needs to be able to evaluate the 
parolee’s compliance with all the conditions of the parole agreement to 
determine if any assistance is needed, to evaluate if the parolee is ready 
for discharge, or to revoke parole if necessary.  Iowa Code §§ 906.2, .15; 
Iowa Admin. Code r. 201—45.4.  While criminal prosecutions can result 
from parolee conduct subject to conditions of parole that is also criminal 
conduct, the intrusions are often considered a necessary part of the 
supervision and an essential ingredient to the success of parole.  1 
Cohen, § 17:7, at 17-11 to -12.  Without reasonable intrusions, the goal 
and purpose of parole would be difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish.  
See id. §§ 17:16–:17, at 17-27 to -29 (discussing the exclusionary rule 
and the necessity of searches in relation to parole revocation).   
 
The character of the particular intrusion at issue in this case, of 
course, is the search of the residence of a parolee by a parole officer.  Yet, 
the intrusion in this case was much different than we confronted in 
Cullison.  See 173 N.W.2d at 534–35.  In Cullison, the parolee not only 
refused to permit his parole officer to search the locked room, but the 
 
27 
 
warrantless search that followed was conducted with the aid of a law 
enforcement officer and pursued with a suspicion that the room might 
contain evidence of a new and independent crime.  Id. at 535.  The initial 
intrusion by the parole officer in the apartment, however, was consistent 
with the mission of parole and was not part of the analysis that found 
the search of the home to be unconstitutional.  See id. at 538.  Instead, 
the intrusion only ran afoul of the Iowa Constitution when the search 
became intertwined with the state’s interest in law enforcement after the 
parolee placed limits on the search area.  See id. at 539–40.  Thus, 
Cullison did not address the constitutionality of all parole searches, and 
its holding does not preclude all parole searches.  See id. at 544 (Stuart, 
J., dissenting).  Rather, we confined our analysis in Cullison to 
nonconsensual warrantless parole searches of “the parolee’s living 
quarters in connection with the prosecution of a new and independent 
criminal action.”  Id. at 535 (majority opinion).  The question we 
answered was “what constitutional rights, if any, an individual 
surrenders upon conditional release from one of our state penal 
institutions.”  Id.  We did not address how the answer to that question 
would affect a parole search, pursuant to a parole agreement, that was 
divorced from the objectives of law enforcement and confined to the 
special needs of parole officers in supervising parolees.  See id. at 537–
38.   
 
A distinction exists between searches to pursue the purposes of 
law enforcement and those to pursue the purposes of carrying out the 
mission of parole.  See Kern, 831 N.W.2d at 170.  The special needs of 
parole are divorced from the general interests of the state in law 
enforcement.  See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 79–80, 
121 S. Ct. 1281, 1289–90, 149 L. Ed. 2d 205, 217 (2001) (requiring the 
 
28 
 
nature of the special need be “divorced from the State’s general interest 
in law enforcement”).  Thus, the special role of parole officers in carrying 
out the objectives and policy of parole becomes critical to the analysis.  
See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 858–59, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2203, 
165 L. Ed. 2d 250, 263–64 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  As identified 
in Griffin, the special role of parole and probation is derived from the 
“ongoing supervisory relationship—and one that is not, or at least not 
entirely, adversarial—between the object of the search and the 
decisionmaker” not present in other searches.  483 U.S. at 879, 107 
S. Ct. at 3171, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 721.  Indeed, not all objects of a parole 
search are subject to criminal investigation outside of parole, including 
conditions limiting alcohol consumption and persons with whom the 
parolee may associate.  Yet, for the special-needs analysis to apply, the 
reasons for the search must be the interest in supervising the 
reintegration of parolees into society, “not, or at least not principally, the 
general law enforcement goal of detecting crime.”  Samson, 547 U.S. at 
859, 126 S. Ct. at 2203, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 264.  
 
At the same time, an intrusion permissible under article I, section 
8 must be narrowly defined.  The purpose of search and seizure clauses 
“is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary 
invasions by governmental officials,” Camara, 387 U.S. at 528, 87 S. Ct. 
at 1730, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 935; and the traditional exceptions to the 
warrant requirement are “specifically established and well-delineated,” 
Katz, 389 U.S. at 357, 88 S. Ct. at 514, 19 L. Ed. 2d at 585, to maintain 
safeguards when a warrant is impractical.  See Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 
278–79.  Thus, an exception permitting special-needs parole searches 
must contain measures to protect against unfettered discretion by the 
state.  Samson, 547 U.S. at 860, 126 S. Ct. at 2204, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 
 
29 
 
264.  For parole searches to meet this requirement, the intrusion must 
serve at every point the mission and policy of parole as it applies to that 
particular parolee, not general law enforcement.   
 
The character of the intrusion is also shaped by the scope of the 
search.  The scope is limited to only those actions reasonable to ensure 
the parolee’s compliance with the parole conditions with the goal of 
rehabilitation.  If the scope of the parole search becomes too broad, it can 
take on the form of a search that serves the goals beyond the mission of 
parole.  See Kern, 831 N.W.2d at 170 (describing when police presence 
shifts the purpose of the search beyond parole goals).  Additionally, 
intrusions into certain areas within the house or containers within the 
home can heighten the privacy interest at stake.  See United States v. 
Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822–23, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2172, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572, 
592 (1982) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment provides protection to the owner of 
every container that conceals its contents from plain view.  But the 
protection afforded by the Amendment varies in different settings.” 
(Citation omitted.)).  Therefore, the parole officer must limit the scope of 
the search to only those areas necessary to ensure compliance with the 
specific parole conditions the parole officer has a reasonable suspicion 
have been violated and only to the extent a reasonable person would find 
appropriate under the facts supporting that suspicion. 
 
“[R]easonable suspicion is based on an objective standard: whether 
the facts available to the officer at the time of the stop would lead a 
reasonable person to believe that the action taken by the officer was 
appropriate.”  State v. Kinkead, 570 N.W.2d 97, 100 (Iowa 1997).  This 
determination is made “in light of the totality of the circumstances 
confronting the officer,” including specific, articulable facts and the 
rational inferences drawn from them.  State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197, 
 
30 
 
204 (Iowa 2004).  The standard is more than a hunch or unparticularized 
suspicion, but less demanding than showing probable cause.  State v. 
Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625, 626 (Iowa 2001); Kinkead, 570 N.W.2d at 
100.  We have upheld the reasonable-suspicion standard in vehicular 
stop contexts for investigatory purposes, while requiring probable cause 
to effect a seizure.  State v. Tyler, 830 N.W.2d 288, 293, 298 (Iowa 2013).  
“[R]easonable cause may exist to investigate conduct which is subject to 
a legitimate explanation and turns out to be wholly lawful.”  State v. 
Richardson, 501 N.W.2d 495, 497 (Iowa 1993). 
 
In this case, the search extended into the bedroom of the parolee 
and included the search of a sunglasses case located on the headboard 
of the bed.  Thus, the search extended beyond a visual inspection for 
drugs in plain view and into a more personal space of the parolee beyond 
the area of the initial encounter.  See generally State v. Oliver, 341 
N.W.2d 744, 745–47 (Iowa 1983) (explaining the requirements to 
establish a plain view exception to search and seizure law).  This 
intrusion made the search more invasive, but not necessarily detached 
from the policy behind the search.  The concerns that prompt the parole 
search in general need to be broad enough to achieve the purpose of 
parole, but narrow enough that the search not be arbitrary or depart 
from the parole mission.  A parolee knows his home is subject to search 
under the parole agreement, and the policy prompting the need to search 
could be jeopardized if the search area is too constrained.  Furthermore, 
King lived alone.  The search did not intrude upon the privacy interests 
of other persons.   
 
As to the search of the sunglasses case, it is commonly 
documented and understood that drugs and their paraphernalia are 
often hidden in small, everyday containers.  See State v. Finch, No. 02–
 
31 
 
1148, 2003 WL 22828750, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2003) (Altoid 
tin); see also State v. Lowe, 812 N.W.2d 554, 564, (Iowa 2012) (fruit can); 
State v. Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d 185, 189 (Iowa 2008) (cigarette pack); State 
v. Eubanks, 355 N.W.2d 57, 58 (Iowa 1984) (makeup case); State v. 
Meksavanh, No. 12–1878, 2014 WL 3749356, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. 
July 30, 2014) (lamp shade, dresser drawer, purse, floor of backseat of 
car); State v. Simmons, No. 12–0567, 2013 WL 1750986, at *1 (Iowa Ct. 
App. Apr. 24, 2013) (cover of a speaker); State v. Hoosman, No. 09–0067, 
2010 WL 1579428, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2010) (fake can of soda, 
CD case, ball of lint in laundry room); State v. Palmer, No. 03–1824, 2006 
WL 126439, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2006) (flashlight).  We have 
established a principle that there must be a nexus between the place 
searched and the object of the search.  State v. Hoskins, 711 N.W.2d 720, 
728 (Iowa 2006).  This nexus includes “the nature of the items involved, 
the extent of the defendant’s opportunity for concealment, and the 
normal inferences as to where the defendant would be likely to conceal 
the items.”  State v. Groff, 323 N.W.2d 204, 212 (Iowa 1982).  Thus, 
Scarmon’s search for evidence of drug-addiction relapse needed to be 
limited to those containers and areas that normal inferences, based on 
his past experience and knowledge of King, would lead him to believe 
King would conceal drugs or paraphernalia.  A sunglasses case fits 
within 
the 
parameters 
to 
conceal 
methamphetamine 
and 
its 
paraphernalia, the suspected relapse drug.  Additionally, the container 
was in plain view within the bedroom.  More private areas within the 
bedroom were not entered.   
 
The policy behind parole searches cannot be achieved if the search 
is so constrained that it would exclude the ability to search those 
common areas where the object of the search would be most commonly 
 
32 
 
found.  This approach is consistent with the nexus requirement 
applicable to all searches and serves to both constrain the scope of the 
search and make the search broad enough to serve its goal.  See 
Hoskins, 711 N.W.2d at 728 (permitting logical inferences in nexus 
consideration).   
 
Overall, the character of the intrusion is modified when the parolee 
does not refuse the search.9  It is also modified when the discretion to 
search is narrowed by the mission of parole and divorced from the 
general law enforcement objectives.  The search also takes on a less 
intrusive character when it is confined to areas directly related to the 
concern that supported the decision to search.  The policy of a parole 
search is separate from policies that promote the discovery of evidence to 
use in a new and independent prosecution.  Accordingly, we proceed to 
consider the nature and immediacy of the concerns of the parole officer 
that led to the search of King’s apartment.   
 
3.  Nature of governmental concerns and efficacy of search 
policy.  The general governmental concern at stake in this case involves 
compliance by parolees with the conditions of their parole to prevent 
recidivism.  The policies of rehabilitating parolees and maintaining public 
safety are both enforced through the mechanism of the supervision of the 
parolee and the conditions imposed for the duration of parole.  The board 
of parole is instructed to release those persons who can be released 
“without detriment to the community or to the person.”  Iowa Code 
§ 906.4(1).  The parole officer is then tasked with the responsibility to 
“keep informed of each person’s conduct and condition” to encourage 
9Because the issue was not raised here, we do not determine the effect a refusal 
by the parolee would have had on the search.   
                                      
 
 
33 
 
rehabilitation and ensure public safety.  Id. § 906.2; see also 1 Cohen 
§ 17:7, at 17-10 to -11 (“The . . . parole officer has the primary 
responsibility for supervision of a parolee’s . . . rehabilitative progress.  
This caseworker . . . owes a responsibility to the public to ensure that 
[those] who pose a threat to public safety are not permitted to remain 
free . . . .”).  Ultimately, the parole officer’s concern is the prevention of 
future crime through rehabilitation and close supervision until that 
rehabilitation is achieved.  See 1 Cohen § 1:20, at 1-29, § 17:1, at 17-2.  
The legislature expressly directed parole officers to “use all suitable 
methods to aid and encourage the person to bring about improvement in 
the person’s conduct or condition.”  Iowa Code § 906.2. 
The specific nature of the concerns of government that gave rise to 
the search in this case related to a reasonable suspicion of drug use and 
loss of interest in completing parole by the parolee.  These concerns 
surfaced from information obtained by the parole officer in his 
supervisory role.  No law enforcement officers or law enforcement 
information was involved.  The concerns related to the purposes and 
objectives of King’s parole, not the enforcement of criminal laws.  Even 
though the parole officer suspected parole violations that included 
unlawful activity, the concern that motivated the search was not 
formulated or acted upon by the parole officer for the primary purpose of 
enforcing the law.   
 
The absence of an adversarial relationship between the parolee and 
the parole officer in this case is important in identifying the concerns of 
government.  Only the parole officer, through the ongoing relationship 
with the parolee, possesses the knowledge of both the conditions 
imposed on a particular parolee and the conduct signaling a violation 
that rises to the level of a reasonable suspicion of parole violation that 
 
34 
 
needs to be pursued by the parole officer.  If such conduct has risen to a 
level that involves law enforcement officials who approach the parole 
officer with suspicions of new criminal wrongdoing they want to pursue, 
the matter has moved beyond the scope of the government’s concern of 
parole compliance and into the realm of law enforcement.  This factor 
distinguishes this case from our prior parolee search cases that involved, 
in varying degrees, law enforcement officers and law enforcement 
purposes.  See Kern, 831 N.W.2d at 157 (involving law enforcement 
officers searching with suspicion but no warrant with the approval of a 
parole officer who arrived part way through the search); Ochoa, 792 
N.W.2d at 262–63 (involving police officer conducting a suspicionless, 
warrantless search); Cullison, 173 N.W.2d at 535 (involving parole and 
police officer searching with suspicion of a specific new criminal activity).  
This factor does not transform the case into those involving a detached 
magistrate, but it helps reduce the evil sought to be eliminated by the 
search and seizure clause when the decision to search is made by a law 
enforcement officer.  See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 876, 107 S. Ct. at 3170, 97 
L. Ed. 2d at 719 (“Although a probation officer is not an impartial 
magistrate, neither is he the police officer . . . .”).  There was no evidence 
that the parole officer in this case was motivated by the goals and 
purposes of law enforcement.   
 
The specific, articulable concerns of the parole officer giving rise to 
a reasonable suspicion to support a search derived from information 
associated with the supervision of parolees.  The concerns involved 
specific behaviors and comments of the parolee, an evaluation of the 
likelihood of violations of particular parole agreement conditions, and a 
triggering event in the form of the monitoring bracelet alert.  This factor, 
requiring a particularized concern with specific articulable facts and 
 
35 
 
reasonable suspicion to support the search, helps prevent arbitrary 
discretionary searches under the search and seizure clause.   
 
The immediacy of the government concerns were derived from the 
general mission of parole supervision.  The supervision of parolees 
requires intervention “at the first sign of trouble” and “at an earlier stage 
of suspicion.”  Id. at 883, 107 S. Ct. at 3173, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 723 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).  “[R]esearch suggests that more intensive 
supervision can reduce recidivism.”  Id. at 875, 107 S. Ct. at 3169, 97 
L. Ed. 2d at 718 (majority opinion).  Moreover, delays in searching can 
reduce the deterrent effect provided by prompt searches.  Id. at 876, 107 
S. Ct. at 3170, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 719.   
 
We recognize there are other less intrusive means for probation 
officers to discover whether or not a parolee is violating a provision in the 
parole agreement prohibiting drug use.  The collection of a substance 
from the body for drug testing is one such means, as the facts of this 
case disclose.  However, the supervision of a parolee requires latitude 
and real-time responses.  A response geared to the discovery of drugs in 
a house can present a more comprehensive view of the problems that 
need to be addressed by a parolee for the parole officer.  A different 
picture is presented for the parole officer by the discovery of drugs in the 
home of a parolee than from the detection of drugs in the blood or urine 
of a parolee, including a means to gauge the severity of the relapse.  
Thus, a search can provide a better vehicle than drug testing to meet the 
legitimate concerns of government.   
 
The balance of the three factors from Jones is critical to our finding 
a special need to allow narrowly tailored parolee searches.  See 666 
N.W.2d at 145–46.  Overall,  
 
36 
 
the question in every case must be whether the balance of 
legitimate expectations of privacy, on the one hand, and the 
State’s interests in conducting the relevant search, on the 
other, justifies dispensing with the warrant and probable-
cause requirements that are otherwise dictated by the 
[Search and Seizure Clause].   
Samson, 547 U.S. at 864, 126 S. Ct. at 2206–07, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 267.  
On balance, we conclude parole officers have a special need to search the 
home of parolees as authorized by a parole agreement and not refused by 
the parolee when done to promote the goals of parole, divorced from the 
goals of law enforcement, supported by reasonable suspicion based on 
knowledge arising out of the supervision of parole, and limited to only 
those areas necessary for the parole officer to address the specific 
conditions of parole reasonably suspected to have been violated.  The 
facts of this case satisfy this narrowly tailored standard.  We do not 
address the application of this standard to probationers or how the scope 
of the search might be affected by the expectations of privacy held by 
others living in the same home.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of 
the district court.   
IV.  Conclusion.   
We adopt a special-needs exception that authorizes parole officers 
to search the home of a parolee without a warrant for purposes of parole 
supervision.  We affirm the judgment and sentence of the district court. 
AFFIRMED.   
Waterman, Mansfield, and Zager, JJ., join this opinion.  Mansfield, 
J., files a separate concurring opinion in which Waterman, J., joins.  
Appel, J., files a dissenting opinion in which Wiggins and Hecht, JJ., 
join.   
 
 
 
37 
 
#13–1061, State v. King 
MANSFIELD, Justice (concurring specially).   
 
I join the court’s opinion.  While I would also sustain the search for 
the reasons set forth in my dissent in State v. Baldon, 829 N.W.2d 785, 
835–47 (Iowa 2013) (Mansfield, J., dissenting), I realize the court has 
taken a different view.  I concur in the court’s well-reasoned analysis and 
application of the special-needs doctrine.   
 
Waterman, J., joins this special concurrence.   
 
38 
 
#13–1061, State v. King 
APPEL, Justice (dissenting). 
 
I respectfully dissent. 
 
I begin with a survey of what I regard as cardinal first principles of 
search and seizure law under article I, section 8.  Second, I examine the 
degree to which the majority opinion conforms to those principles.  Third, 
I suggest alternative approaches to the problems presented in this case.  
Finally, I emphasize the importance of narrowly interpreting the 
significance of this case. 
I.  Principles of Search and Seizure Law. 
 
A.  Overview of the Warrant Requirement.  I begin with a brief 
review of the language of our search and seizure provision in article I, 
section 8, which states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable seizures 
and searches shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
issue but on probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons and things to be seized.   
Iowa Const. art. I, § 8. 
 
The warrant clause of article I, section 8 has a number of 
substantive constitutional requirements.  First, there must be probable 
cause for a search.  Id.  Second, the warrant must describe with 
particularity the place to be searched.  Id.  Third, the warrant must 
describe with particularity the persons and things to be seized.  Id.   
 
Each 
of 
these 
substantive 
requirements 
has 
independent 
constitutional importance.  The gateway requirement of probable cause 
of course serves to limit government discretion and avoid general 
searches. 
 
The 
particularity 
requirements, 
however, 
are 
also 
constitutionally essential.  They are proportionality requirements.  Even 
 
39 
 
when 
gateway 
probable 
cause 
is 
present, 
the 
proportionality 
requirements of article I, section 8 serve to ensure that when a search is 
warranted, the search is limited in scope by the nature of the underlying 
problem.  For instance, with respect to place, a warrant with ample 
probable cause to search a “silver in color passenger train car” for 
evidence of gambling infractions does not authorize the search of a 
nearby “red caboose.”  Long v. State, 132 S.W.3d 443, 444–45, 447, 451 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).  As to items, a 
warrant to search for drugs does not authorize the officer to seize checks, 
a social security card, or other items of identification.  People v. Pitts, 13 
P.3d 1218, 1220, 1223–24 (Colo. 2000) (en banc).  
 
The genius of the gateway and proportionality requirements is that 
the government must satisfy these requirements before a neutral and 
detached magistrate.  See State v. Short, 851 N.W.2d 474, 502 (Iowa 
2014).  This eliminates the risk of ex post facto explanations that 
conform to the nature of the evidence ultimately found and ensures the 
decision regarding compliance with constitutional norms is made before 
a person not “engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out 
crime.”  Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S. Ct. 367, 369, 92 
L. Ed. 436, 440 (1948).  As was noted by Judge Hufstedler some time 
ago, “The requirement that [a probation] officer articulate his reasons for 
making a search before he searches is a substantial deterrent to 
impulsive and arbitrary official conduct and a real safeguard against 
after-the-fact justifications.”  Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 257 (9th 
Cir. 1975) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).  The risk of ex post facto 
explanations is very real.  It is, of course, a fundamental principle of 
search and seizure law that the validity of the search is not affected by 
what it turns up.  As we stated long ago, “No amount of incriminating 
 
40 
 
evidence, whatever its source, will supply the place of [a] warrant.”  
McClurg v. Brenton, 123 Iowa 368, 372, 98 N.W. 881, 882 (1904); see 
also United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595, 68 S. Ct. 222, 228–29, 92 
L. Ed. 210, 220–21 (1948).  Yet, when incriminating evidence is found, 
there is a temptation to manipulate the facts or distort search and 
seizure law in order to uphold the search and sustain the resulting 
criminal conviction.  That is why in Johnson, the United States Supreme 
Court held a warrantless search was invalid even though there was likely 
ample probable cause to support the search.  333 U.S. at 13–15, 68 
S. Ct. at 368–69, 92 L. Ed. at 440–41.  As Justice Frankfurter noted, 
“[T]he safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies 
involving not very nice people.”  United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 
69, 70 S. Ct. 430, 436, 94 L. Ed. 653, 662 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting), overruled on other grounds by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 
752, 768, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 2042–43, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685, 696–97 (1969).  
“ ‘[T]he procedure of antecedent justification . . . is central to the Fourth 
Amendment.’ ”  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359, 88 S. Ct. 507, 
515, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 586 (1967) (quoting Osborn v. United States, 385 
U.S. 323, 330, 87 S. Ct. 429, 433, 17 L. Ed. 2d 394, 400 (1966)).   
 
As a result, whenever the warrant requirement is found to be 
inapplicable, many important restrictions on governmental power are 
lost.  Not only is the gateway requirement of probable cause at risk, so 
too is the proportionality requirement.  Further, the requirement that the 
government explain the basis for the search before it occurs in order to 
avoid post hoc explanations is totally lost.  That is why in Short, we 
reinvigorated what is sometimes called the “warrant preference” 
approach to search and seizure law under article I, section 8.  851 
N.W.2d at 497; see generally James J. Tomkovicz, Divining and Designing 
 
41 
 
the Future of the Search Incident to Arrest Doctrine: Avoiding Instability, 
Irrationality, and Infidelity, 2007 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1417 (2007) (advocating 
the warrant preference approach as the best interpretation of search and 
seizure law).  
 
B.  Constitutional Provisions Related to Search and Seizure 
Limit Arbitrary Exercise of Government Power.  Historically, the 
Crown’s claimed authority to engage in sweeping searches for violations 
of British mercantile policies toward the colonies was a central cause of 
the American Revolution.  See State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 271 (Iowa 
2010).  The focus of the famous Paxton’s Case was the legality of writs of 
assistance, “which gave customs officers open-ended authority to search 
homes for evidence of customs violations.”  Id. (citing Tracey Maclin, The 
Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical Review, 77 B.U. L. Rev. 
925, 946 (1997)).  When James Otis delivered his famous defense in 
Paxton’s Case, calling for specific warrants and characterizing “ ‘the 
freedom of one’s house’ ” as among “ ‘the most essential branches of 
English liberty,’ ” id. (quoting William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth 
Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning, 602–1791, at 377–78 (2009) 
[hereinafter Cuddihy]), the rhetoric moved a young lawyer attending the 
court session, John Adams, to later declare, “ ‘[t]hen and there the Child 
Independence was born,’ ” id. at 272 (quoting Jacob W. Landynski, 
Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court: A Study in Constitutional 
Interpretation 37 (1966) [hereinafter Landynski]).  What is clear from the 
history is that constitutional provisions related to search and seizure 
were designed to be a limitation on government power.  Neither article I, 
section 8 nor the Fourth Amendment is an enabling act extending the 
reach of government.   
 
42 
 
 
The focus of search and seizure law is eliminating arbitrary 
exercise of government power whenever it might be used.  While the text 
of article I, section 8, like the Fourth Amendment, is challenging, it is 
clear that the search and seizure strictures are not limited to criminal 
matters.  Other constitutional concepts, like the federal right against 
self-incrimination, contain express limitations to criminal proceedings.  
See U.S. Const. amend. V.  No such limitation is contained in article I, 
section 8.  Article I, section 8 is not a constitutional chameleon that 
changes color when the government invader presents a civil identification 
card rather than a badge of law enforcement.  The underlying motivation 
of the government official is not and cannot be the determining factor.  
As Justice Brandeis taught us years ago, “The greatest dangers to liberty 
lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without 
understanding.”  Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479, 48 S. Ct. 
564, 573, 72 L. Ed. 944, 957 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); overruled 
on other grounds by Katz, 389 U.S. at 353, 88 S. Ct. at 512, 19 L. Ed. 2d 
at 583. 
 
In any event, parole officers, like probation officers, have at least 
two functions.  Parole officers may serve the state interest by assisting 
the parolee to complete parole successfully and be reintegrated into the 
community.  They also serve another purpose, however: ensuring that 
persons convicted of crimes, who are more likely to engage in criminal 
activity than members of the public generally, do not commit additional 
crimes.  See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 120–21, 122 S. Ct. 
587, 592, 151 L. Ed. 2d 497, 506 (2001) (recognizing dual concern of the 
state in context of probationer’s residence search).  These two purposes 
of parole officers recognized in Knights are conjoined twins and cannot 
easily be surgically separated.  Ordinarily, in search and seizure 
 
43 
 
jurisprudence, we do not inquire into the subjective motivation of 
government officials.  See State v. Simmons, 714 N.W.2d 264, 274 (Iowa 
2006).  That said, a home visit more likely reflects the function of 
assisting in a parolee’s rehabilitation, while a specific search in private 
areas of a residence is more likely to be pursuant to the parole officer’s 
law enforcement function.   
 
C.  The Freestanding Reasonableness Clause as Ahistorical and 
Antithetical to the Constitutional Values of the Warrant Clause.  We 
discussed the relationship between the reasonableness clause and the 
warrant clause in Short, 851 N.W.2d at 501–02.  It simply cannot be that 
the reasonableness clause is a freestanding provision that trumps the 
warrant clause.  Id.  Otherwise, the warrant clause would be 
superfluous.  See Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 70, 70 S. Ct. at 436, 94 L. Ed. 
at 662 (“One cannot wrench ‘unreasonable searches’ from the text and 
context and historic content of the Fourth Amendment.”).  Indeed, the 
meaning of reasonableness, certainly at the time of the adoption of the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, from which article 
I, section 8 was derived, was likely used in the Blackstonian sense and 
was a stand in for “lawful.”  See Short, 851 N.W.2d at 501. 
 
Those 
that 
emphasize 
reasonableness 
over 
the 
warrant 
requirement often use a balancing test to determine the applicability of 
the warrant requirement to broad categories of persons.  The categorical 
reasonableness test allowing courts to make pragmatic assessments of 
the need for government action balanced against the interests of citizens 
in determining the applicability of search and seizure requirements is not 
explicitly mentioned in the text of article I, section 8 or in the Fourth 
Amendment.  The categorical reasonableness test was not invented until 
relatively recently.  See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the 
 
44 
 
Age of Balancing, 96 Yale L.J. 943, 948 (1987) [hereinafter Aleinikoff] 
(noting balancing, as a “method of constitutional interpretation, . . . first 
appears in majority opinions in the late 1930’s and early 1940’s”).  As 
noted by a leading scholar, reasonableness that engages in relativistic 
balancing efforts reflects recent, “ideologically-driven judicial choices, not 
a rendition of the original understanding.”  Thomas Y. Davies, Correcting 
Search-And-Seizure History: Now-Forgotten Common-Law Warrantless 
Arrest Standards and the Original Understanding of “Due Process of Law,” 
77 Miss. L.J. 1, 224 (2007); see also Aleinikoff, 96 Yale L.J. at 948–49.   
 
Categorical balancing tests present a troublesome methodology.  A 
constitutional vision of search and seizure employing categorical 
balancing fails to zealously protect the rights of citizens because it is not 
based 
on 
transparent 
and 
preestablished 
constitutional 
norms.  
Untethered to such norms, categorical balancing is based on a quasi-
legislative process in which the court makes pragmatic policy 
determinations that paternalistically relieve classes of government 
activity from the central restrictions on government power contained in 
the warrant requirement of article I, section 8.   
 
Further, 
categorical 
or 
not, 
balancing 
tests 
based 
upon 
reasonableness run the risk of being no test at all.  An amorphous 
doctrine based on reasonableness threatens to engulf search and seizure 
law.  See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 369–70, 105 S. Ct. 733, 
757–58, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720, 752–53 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part); Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 83, 70 S. Ct. at 443, 
94 L. Ed. at 669 (“It is no criterion of reason to say that the district court 
must find [a search] reasonable.”); see also Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ 
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 637, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1424, 103 L. Ed 2d 639, 673 
(1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that absent warrant and 
 
45 
 
probable cause standards, the concept of reasonableness is “virtually 
devoid of meaning, subject to whatever content shifting judicial 
majorities, concerned about the problems of the day, choose to give to 
that supple term”); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth 
Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 393 (1974) (stating reliance on 
reasonableness threatens to turn search and seizure law into “one 
immense Rorschach blot”).  See generally Short, 851 N.W.2d at 501–02 
(criticizing freestanding reasonableness-clause theory).   
 
D.  Security of the Home as Central to Search and Seizure 
Protection.  Oh, the words of Pitt the Elder! 
“The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the 
forces of the Crown.  It may be frail; its roof may shake; the 
wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain 
may enter; but the King of England may not enter; all his 
force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.” 
Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 270 (quoting Nelson B. Lasson, The History and 
Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
49–50 (1937)); see also Short, 851 N.W.2d at 495–96.    
The concept of the home as one’s castle was a central part of 
English law that the colonists brought to the new world.  See Short, 851 
N.W.2d at 501.  In his oration in Paxton’s Case, Otis pronounced that 
“ ‘the freedom of one’s house’ was among ‘the most essential branches of 
English liberty.’ ”  Id. (quoting Cuddihy at 377–78).  John Adams 
remembered that Otis argued that the writ of assistance in the case was 
“ ‘against the fundamental principles of law, the privilege of house.’ ”  
Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 271 (quoting Landynski at 34). 
 
The concept of a home as one’s castle came to Iowa, too.  Iowa 
Governor Robert Lucas stated at the first Iowa constitutional convention 
that he deemed the most important right was “ ‘to secure to the poor 
 
46 
 
man a little spot of ground where he could build him a cottage and have 
a home for himself and family, free from the fear of being turned out of 
doors.’ ”  Id. at 275 (quoting Fragments of the Debates of the Iowa 
Constitutional Conventions of 1844 and 1846, at 159–61 (1900)).  In 
McClurg, we declared, “At the closed door of the home, be it palace or 
hovel, even bloodhounds must wait till the law, by authoritative process, 
bids it open.”  123 Iowa at 372, 98 N.W. at 882. 
 
There is something about a home that generates poetic language in 
the context of searches and seizures.  The notion of “home sweet home” 
may seem trite to some, but it is universal in our legal culture.  It is no 
surprise that protection of the home against government intrusion has 
been declared one of the prime purposes of search and seizure law.  In 
the first substantive search and seizure case, Boyd v. United States, the 
Supreme Court broadly noted that the purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment is to protect against invasions of “the sanctity of a man’s 
home and the privacies of life” from “government and its employes.”  116 
U.S. 616, 630, 6 S. Ct. 524, 532, 29 L. Ed. 746, 751 (1886), abrogated on 
other grounds by Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 302, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 
1647–48, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782, 789 (1967).  As stated more recently in 
United States v. United States District Court, “physical entry of the home 
is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is 
directed.”  407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S. Ct. 2125, 2134, 32 L. Ed. 2d 752, 
764 (1972); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37–38, 121 S. 
Ct. 2038, 2045, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94, 104 (2001); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 
U.S. 740, 750, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 2098, 80 L. Ed. 2d 732, 743 (1984); 
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589–90, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1381–82, 63 
L. Ed. 2d 639, 653 (1980); Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 277. 
 
47 
 
 
E.  The Role of Expectation of Privacy in Determining 
Applicability of the Warrant Requirement.  In Katz, Justice Harlan 
surprised everyone, perhaps even himself, when he penned a concurring 
opinion that simply took off and has had a life of its own.  389 U.S. at 
360–62, 88 S. Ct. at 516–17, 19 L. Ed. 2d at 587–88 (Harlan, J., 
concurring).  In Katz, the United States Supreme court overruled the 
Olmstead case, a highly formalistic opinion which held government 
eavesdropping did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it involved 
no physical trespass.  Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466, 48 S. Ct. at 568, 72 
L. Ed. at 951 (majority opinion); overruled by Katz, 389 U.S. at 353, 88 S. 
Ct. at 512, 19 L. Ed. 2d at 583 (majority opinion).  In his concurring 
opinion, Justice Harlan noted shortcomings in traditional trespass 
theory in search and seizure jurisprudence.  Katz, 389 U.S. at 362, 88 S. 
Ct. at 517, 19 L. Ed. 2d at 588 (Harlan, J., concurring).  He stated that 
the Fourth Amendment also protected “reasonable expectations of 
privacy.”  Id.   
 
Justice Harlan plainly never intended his formulation to replace all 
previous search and seizure law.  His phrase was designed to supplement 
existing law and extend search and seizure protections to include 
government eavesdropping.  See generally Short, 851 N.W.2d at 504 
(explaining that the reasonable expectation of privacy standard was not 
designed to dilute search and seizure protections).  In United States v. 
White, Justice Harlan made it clear that all intrusions significantly 
jeopardizing Fourth Amendment liberties should require a warrant.  401 
U.S. 745, 786–87, 91 S. Ct. 1122, 1143, 28 L. Ed. 2d 453, 478 (1971) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting).   
 
In a remarkable turn of events, Justice Harlan’s “reasonable 
expectations of privacy” somehow became the test of the scope of the 
 
48 
 
Fourth Amendment.  And, in one of the great ironies of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, it was now used as a tool to reduce the reach 
of Fourth Amendment protections!  The test became a legal boomerang in 
the hands of a later Supreme Court.  
 
It may well be the time has come to abandon the reasonable-
expectations-of-privacy test.  Although born with the best of intentions 
and with excellent pedigree, it has been on legal parole now for a number 
of years.  The reasonable-expectations-of-privacy test runs the risk of 
converting search and seizure law into a mere notice requirement.  
Indeed, in California v. Carney, the United States Supreme Court 
declared, improbably, that pervasive public regulation of automobiles 
and their drivers through licensure, registration, equipment regulation, 
and rules of the road puts drivers “on notice” that the passenger 
compartment, which has nothing to do with registration, equipment or 
rules of the road, may be searched without a warrant.  471 U.S. 386, 
391–92, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2069–70, 85 L. Ed. 2d 406, 413–14 (1985). 
The time has probably come to revoke parole on the reasonable-
expectations-of-privacy test.  No warrant required.  The better approach 
to privacy is that provided by the Oregon Supreme Court, which has 
declared that the issue is not the privacy one reasonably expects, but the 
privacy to which one has a right to enjoy.  State v. Tanner, 745 P.2d 757, 
762 n.7 (Or. 1987) (en banc); see Short, 851 N.W.2d at 504.  
Alternatively, the analysis could focus on the text: the right of citizens to 
be “secure” in their houses, papers, and effects.  See Thomas K. Clancy, 
Fourth Amendment: Its History and Interpretation 47 (2008); Ochoa, 792 
N.W.2d at 277.  Such an approach would be consistent with the original 
purpose of the reasonable-expectations-of-privacy test in Katz.  See 389 
U.S. at 362, 88 S. Ct. at 517, 19 L. Ed. 2d at 588. 
 
49 
 
 
F.  Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement.  While the warrant 
requirement is central to search and seizure law, there have been well-
recognized exceptions to it, including searches and seizures incident to 
arrest and arising from exigent circumstances when, for instance, crime 
is ongoing or, the health and safety of individuals are imminently 
threatened.  We have repeatedly stated, however, that warrantless 
searches are “virtually ‘per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’ ”  State v. 
Baldon, 829 N.W.2d 785, 791 (Iowa 2013) (quoting Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2043, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 
858 (1973)).  These exceptions, however, must be jealously guarded and 
“carefully drawn.”  State v. Strong, 493 N.W.2d 834, 836 (Iowa 1992).   
 
We have of course recognized exceptions to the warrant 
requirement, and I do not quarrel with the proposition that they exist.  
However, as in Camara v. Municipal Court, an exception to the warrant 
requirement generally requires that the government demonstrate it is 
simply inherently impracticable to obtain a warrant to accomplish the 
compelling governmental mission.  387 U.S. 523, 536–39, 87 S. Ct. 
1727, 1735–36, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930, 940–41 (1967).  For instance, it would 
be impossible to obtain a warrant prior to a Terry-type pat down without 
arresting the suspect.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 
1879, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 905 (1968).  In Camara, it would have been 
impossible to obtain a warrant based upon probable cause at a specific 
location because, while there certainly was an infestation within the 
geographic area, there was no way to determine which specific residence 
was experiencing the problem.  See 387 U.S. at 536–38, 87 S. Ct. at 
1735, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 939–41.  A search incident to arrest must 
 
50 
 
necessarily occur simultaneously with the arrest, not after the passage of 
time required to obtain a warrant.   
 
In considering exceptions to the warrant requirement, there is a 
distinction between inherent impracticability and mere inconvenience.  
Obtaining a warrant is always inconvenient in the sense that it imposes 
some burdens on law enforcement.  If mere inconvenience were enough 
to excuse the warrant requirement, there would be little left of it.  
Instead, inherent impracticability requires that, given the nature of the 
problem and the policy being advanced, one simply cannot get a warrant 
based on probable cause prior to the search. 
 
The question of inherent impracticability of obtaining a warrant 
was considered in a study of probation in Wisconsin.  The survey found 
that a warrant requirement would not unduly burden probation officers.  
Howard P. Schneiderman, Conflicting Perspectives from the Bench and the 
Field on Probationer Home Searches—Griffin v. Wisconsin Reconsidered, 
1989 Wis. L. Rev. 607, 664 (1989).  There is no reason to think a 
different result would occur in the context of parole.    
 
G.  Rejection of Act of Grace, Waiver, or Constructive Custody 
Theories for Parolees.  Finally, it is important to note that we have 
rejected the theories that parolees are not entitled to search and seizure 
protections because they are in “constructive custody,” have “waived” 
their search and seizure rights, or are on parole only through “an act of 
grace.”  See Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 290–91.  In Ochoa, we rejected all 
these theories, noting that although the state may have the power to 
imprison a parolee, the fact that the parolee is released into the 
community is the overriding factor for search and seizure analysis.  See 
id. 
 
51 
 
 
II.  Analysis of the Majority Opinion in Light of Search and 
Seizure Principles. 
 
Unfortunately, the majority opinion does not apply many of the 
above principles in a straightforward fashion.  The constitutional value of 
a warrant—not simply the probable cause determination, but also the 
proportionality requirements and the requirement of justification before 
the fact—is not considered.  The majority opinion on occasion, citing 
United States Supreme Court precedent, flirts with a version of 
“reasonableness” though ultimately rejects its most protean rendition in 
a footnote.  Further, the majority does not seem to recognize the 
constitutional importance of the house-as-a-castle doctrine.  And, it 
ironically uses the concept of reasonable expectations of privacy as a 
sword to cut at the core of search and seizure protection in the home.   
 
While the majority uses “special needs” to support its result, it 
glides over the critical question, namely, whether it is inherently 
impracticable to obtain a warrant or just inconvenient.  Further, it does 
not address the fact that parole officers have two functions, including a 
law enforcement function.  
 
The majority seeks to limit the scope of the powers of parole 
officers in several ways.  It requires “reasonable suspicion.”  Reasonable 
suspicion is a tool of particularity that can help cabin government 
conduct.  See Baldon, 829 N.W.2d at 823 (Appel, J., specially 
concurring); Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 273.  Reasonable suspicion is said to 
exist when “articulable facts which, taken together with the rational 
inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer” 
to investigate further.  Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334, 110 S. Ct. 
1093, 1098, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276, 286 (1990).  It is something more than a 
hunch, but something less than probable cause.  See State v. Tague, 676 
N.W.2d 197, 204 (Iowa 2004) (detailing reasonable suspicion standard); 
 
52 
 
Craig S. Lerner, Reasonable Suspicion and Mere Hunches, 59 Vand. L. 
Rev. 407, 459–60 (2006) (same).  An officer’s subjective belief that he or 
she has sufficient suspicion to justify the intrusion is insufficient to 
satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard.  See Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 
S. Ct. at 1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 905–06.   
 
However, here, there was no more than a hunch, especially after 
the parole officers determined the ankle bracelet was functioning 
properly and King had a reasonable explanation for why he had been in 
his residence for the last two days.  My view is consistent with a number 
of cases.  For instance, in People v. Thornburg, probation officers 
recovered pornographic DVDs in a search of a probationer’s bedroom.  
895 N.E.2d 13, 14–15 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).  Although the home visit, 
pursuant to a probation agreement, was not cited as raising a 
constitutional problem, the search of the bedroom was invalid because it 
lacked reasonable suspicion.  Id. at 19.  In United States v. Payne, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the 
defendant’s two prior drug convictions and an anonymous tip did not 
amount to reasonable suspicion.  181 F.3d 781, 789–91 (6th Cir. 1999).  
One court noted that a factor in determining whether a search was based 
on reasonable suspicion or a hunch was whether a parolee had a 
reasonable explanation for his whereabouts, which was certainly present 
in this case.  See Commonwealth v. Edwards, 874 A.2d 1192, 1196 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2005).    
 
III.  Alternative Constitutional Visions. 
 
A.  Approach in Cullison.  In my view, it would have been far 
easier, far simpler, and far more consistent with search and seizure 
constitutional norms, to simply follow the rule in State v. Cullison, 173 
N.W.2d 533 (Iowa 1970).  In Cullison, we rejected stripping or diluting the 
 
53 
 
rights of parolees based on “what may best be described as a socio-
juristic rationalization, i.e., protection of the public and constructive 
custody.”  Id. at 536.  Such an approach was not “constitutionally sound, 
reasonable, fair or necessary.”  Id.  We further stated that the “ ‘dilution’ 
theory begins and ends nowhere, being at best illusory and evasive.”  Id.  
Plainly, in Cullison, we rejected a categorical balancing test based on 
“reasonableness.”  See id.  
 
The majority opinion in this case flies directly against the Cullison 
precedent.  It does precisely what Cullison cautioned against, namely it 
dilutes the search and seizure protections of parolees based upon “socio-
juristic rationalization.”  See id.  It is error to do so.     
 
B.  The Home Visit: Differentiating Between Parole Officers’ 
Functions of Rehabilitation and Law Enforcement.  The majority 
opinion evinces a pragmatic concern for the benevolent role of parole 
officers.  No doubt, parole officers, like the government officers in Knights 
performing a search of a probationer’s residence, perform a dual function 
of rehabilitating parolees while also ensuring that the law is enforced.  
See 534 U.S. at 120–21, 122 S. Ct. at 592, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 506.  
Ordinarily, it is difficult to separate dual purposes, and Cullison stands 
for the proposition that we should not try to do so.  
 
But there is an alternative constitutional vision.  Under that vision, 
a home visit is not a search.  The purpose of the home visit is to meet 
with the parolee and determine the status of the parolee in his or her 
rehabilitation effort.  When a parole officer begins to look into places in 
the residence outside common areas, such as bedrooms, however, the 
law enforcement function objectively predominates and a warrant is 
required. 
 
54 
 
 
There is support for this theory in caselaw.  A number of cases 
hold that a home visit by a parole officer is not a search.  See, e.g., United 
States v. LeBlanc, 490 F.3d 361, 367 (5th Cir. 2007); Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 
at 250; State v. Moody, 148 P.3d 662, 666–67 (Mont. 2006).  A home visit 
in areas in which visitors are commonly entertained is likely to be 
conducted for benevolent purposes of parole, namely, assisting the 
parolee in completing parole and reintegrating into the community.  A 
visit in private areas of the residence, however, is more likely to be a law 
enforcement function.  Thus, under this line of cases, the authority to 
conduct a home visit in areas in a residence in which visitors are 
customarily allowed does not carry with it the authority to conduct a 
search of private areas of the residence.  See State v. Guzman, 990 P.2d 
370, 373–74 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (“[T]he authority to conduct a home visit 
under the conditions of probation does not encompass the authority to 
conduct a search.”).  The home visit, however, cannot be used as a 
subterfuge to avoid the probable cause burden that must be met to 
support an investigative search.  “Once the purpose behind the search 
shifts from a home visit to a quest for evidence to be used in a criminal 
prosecution, the [government] may only enter the premises upon 
securing a warrant supported by full probable cause.”  Commonwealth v. 
Young, No. CRIM. A. 98-11253, 1999 WL 218423, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
Mar. 30, 1999).   
 
C.  Lack of Reasonable Suspicion.  A third constitutional vision 
simply requires that the concept of reasonable suspicion have some 
teeth.  In this case, the facts supporting reasonable suspicion, 
particularly after the ankle bracelet issue was resolved, were rather thin.  
The difference between reasonable suspicion and a hunch is difficult to 
describe, perhaps, but in this case, the evidence falls short of what is 
 
55 
 
required to support a warrantless search.  This is particularly so given 
our general admonition, expressed years ago, that we give the search and 
seizure provisions of article I, section 8 “a broad and liberal 
interpretation for the purpose of preserving . . . liberty.”  State v. Height, 
117 Iowa 650, 661, 91 N.W. 935, 938 (1902). 
IV.  Narrow Interpretation of This Case. 
Finally, I note that the majority opinion is extremely limited.  It 
does not apply to the activities of law enforcement.  It does not endorse 
freestanding reasonableness, a hungry beast that could threaten the 
warrant requirement.  It is limited to a search for drugs when the 
underlying crime for which the parolee was convicted is a drug offense 
and when the particularity requirement of reasonable suspicion has been 
determined to be present.  It reserves the question of whether a parolee 
has a right to refuse the search.  Most importantly, this case should not 
be seen as a wholesale adoption of so-called “special needs” as developed 
by the ever-expanding cases of the United States Supreme Court.   
For the reasons stated above, I dissent.   
Wiggins and Hecht, JJ., join this dissent.