Title: Leslie v. Fresch. S.Ct. Order Granting Motion for Reconsideration, filed 11/28/2005 [pdf], 109 Haw. 423.

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

FoR puBLICArTON +
Sees
a
aS
HOWARD K. LESLIE, JR., Plaintiff-Appellant, s
> z

and z

   

ang

LEINOME LESLIE FRESCH, individually, and as next friend £9
HOWARD K. LESLIE, JR., and HOWARD K. LESLIE, SR.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,

THE ESTATE OF JAMIE K. TAVARES, Deceased, Defendant-Appellee,

and

JOHN DOES 1-10; JANE DOES 1-10; DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-10; DOE
‘CORPORATIONS 1-10; and DOE ENTITIES 1-10, Defendants

 

STATE OF HAWAI'I, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Lien Holder-Appellee,
and
JOSEPH L. WILDMAN and SIBILLA & WILOMAN, Intervenors-Appellees.

(civ. No. 97-0448)
ee
HOWARD K. LESLIE, JR., MEGAN LESLIE and MALYSSA LESLIE, minors,

through their Guardian Ad Litem MARLENE L. ANDUHA,
Appellants,

 

Plaintiff

JEFFREY K, KANUI, personal representative of THE ESTATE OF
JAMIE 'K. TAVARES, Defendant-Appellee,

and

JOHN DOES 1-10; JANE DOES 1-10; DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-10; DOE
CORPORATIONS 1-107 and DOE ENTITIES 1-10, Defendants.

 
‘*** FOR PUBLICATION ##*

JEFFREY K. KANUI, personal representative of THE ESTATE OF
AMIE K. TAVARES, Third-Party Plaintiff

LEIMOMI L. FRESCH and HOWARD K. LESLIE, SR.,

Third-Party Defendants
(Civ. No. 98-5468)

 

No. 24553

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(Civ. Nos, 97-0448 & 98-5468)

NOVEMBER 10, 2005
MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT BY LEVINSON, J.

In this consolidated appeal (Nos. 24553 and 24746), the

 

plaintiffs-appellants Howard K. Lesiie, Jr., Megan Leslie, and
Nalyssa Leslie (hereinafter, collectively, “the Appellants”)
appeal from the following judgment and orders entered by the
circuit court of the first circuit, the Honorable Eden Elizabeth
Hifo presiding: (1) the Noverber 9, 2001 judgment; (2) the
“findings of fact [(FOFs)], conclusions of law [(COLs)], and
order” filed August 22, 2001; (3) the February 26, 2001 order
granting Leslie, Je.’s January 17, 2001 motion to compel and for
conditional sanctions; (4) the circuit court’s January @, 2001
order granting the November 15, 2000 motion to intervene
submitted by the intervenor-appellees, attorney Joseph L. Wildman
and law firm Sibilla & Wildman (hereinafter, collectively, “the
Intervenors”]; and (5) the January 12, 2001 order denying Leslie,
Jr.'s November 15, 2000 motion for approval and confirmation of
‘** FOR PUBLICATION ***

settlement.

 

fon appeal, the Appellants contend that. the cizeuit

 

court erred in: (1) granting Wildnan and Sibilla & Wildnan leave
to intervene in the fairness hearing of February 27 and 28, 2001
(hereinafter, “the fairness hearing"), “because there are no

common questions of law or fact between any claimed ‘defense’ of
[the] Intervenors and the faizness hearing” and “because that, in
ppellee/third-party
defendant Leimoni Leslie] Fresch’s burden of proof”; (2) finding

 

effect, allowed them to carry (the plaintiff:

that the settlement proceeds were fairly allocated; (3) entering

 

judgment against Leslie, Jr. in favor of parties against whom
Leslie, Jr. had no claims and in favor of the defendant-appellee
Estate of Jamie K. Tavares, against whom Leslie, Jr.’s claims had
not been adjudicated; (4) entering judgnent against Megan and
Malyssa inasmuch as their claims in Civ. No. 98-5468 had never

been adjudicated; (5) finding that Megan and Malyssa were in

 

foster care when Leslie, Jr. was injured; and (6) finding that
Leslie, Jr. controls Megan's and Malyssa’s funds.

lie agree with the Appellants insofar as the circuit
court's Novenber 9, 2001 judgment prematurely disposed of Civ.
Wo, 98-5468. Consequently, we lack jurisdiction to address the
remaining points of error at this time. Accordingly, we renand
this matter to the circuit court for further proceedings, with
instructions to (1) vacate the Novenber 9, 2001 judgment and (2)

reinstate Civ. No, 98-468.
#8 FOR PUBLICATION

 

1. BACKGROUND

a motor

   

 

arose ¥
occurred on December 22, 1996, involving Leslie, Jr. and Tavares.
‘The accident killed Tavares and severely injured Leslie, Jr-,
placing him in a coma for approximately to months. On February
3, 1997, through the Intervenors, Fresch and the plaintift-
appellee/third-party defendant Howard K. Leslie, Sr. (Leslie,
Jr./s parents) sued Tavares’s estate for damages. Fresch sued as
Leslie, Jr.'s next friend as well as in her Sidividual capacity.

on June 2 and 10, and July 8, 1997, after L

 

ie, Jr.
regained consciousness, he and his parents signed settlement
agreements that provided for payouts totaling $320,000. on July
18, 1997, Fresch and Leslie, Sr. voluntarily dismissed Civ. No.
97-0448 with prejudice. On April 1, 1998, Leslie, Jr. moved to
vacate the dismissal, reopen the action, and rescind the
settlement, on the grounds, inter alia, that the settlement
distribution was unfair to Leslie, Jr. as a ward of the court.

on May 13, 1998, the circuit court denied the motion.
on duly 10, 1998, Leslie, Jr. timely filed a notice of appeal to
this court. In a published opinion filed on August 31, 1999, ve
held that

 

[absent an order from the trial court renoving the next
friend, the represented party renaine presumptively
Anconpatent for purposes of the litigation.

    

Ll ie ds unciear whether [Fresch) meant to [sign
‘and approve the settlement] in her capacity as next friend
or merely in her capacity as coplaintié®, Assuming,
srauendg, that Freseh did purport co execute the agreenents
GEiher copacity es Lesiie’s next friend... her
NGutherizetion” as ineufficient to validate’ the agreements
with regard to Leelie(, oF.) in the absence of the circuit
court’s approval

eslie v. Estate of Tavares (hereinafter, “Leslie 1”), 91 Hawai'i

4
‘** FOR PUBLICATION *#*

394, 401-02, 984 P.2d 1220, 1227-28 (1999) (emphasis in
1

   

 

dingly, we 2 ws:

 

[Wie vacate the circuit court's order . . . and remand for
Hurther proceedings, consistent with this opinion,
Concerning the fairness of the apportionment.  Fresch, as
Gesiiel, des]’s next friend, will Bear the burden of
Genonstzating to the circu:t court that the apportionment
was fair to Lesliel, Jr).

  

91 Hawai'i at 405, 984 P.2d at 1231.

On December 22, 1998, while Leslie I was pending on
appeal, Leslie, Jr. and his minor daughters Megan and Malyssa, by
their guardian ad litem (and mother) Marlene L. Anduha, filed
Civ. No. 98-S468, another negligence action arising out of the
same automobile accident, against Tavares’ and various
unidentified “Doe” parties.

on June 27, 2000, on motion by Tavares’s estate, the
circuit court consolidated Civ. No. 98-5468 with the recently
remanded Civ. No, 97-0448, pursuant to Hawai'i Rules of Civil
Procedure (HRCP) Rule 42(a).? The circuit court did not
expressly circunscribe the duration or effect of the
consolidation. On November 15, 2000, the Intervenors moved to
intervene “for the limited purpose of participating in the

Fairness Hearing and advocating in favor of the fairness of the

 

+ on April 17, 2000, by stipulation among the defendant~appeils
Jeffrey K, Kenly who 2 the pertonal representative of Tavares’s estate, and
the plaintiffs in Civ. No, 98-5468, Kanal was substituted es the party
Gefendant for the decedent Tavares.

 

  

+ Wace Rule 42(2) provides:

linen actions dnvolving a connon question of law or fact are
pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of
Gny orvell the matters in ieaue in the actions) it may order all
Ihe Scelone consolicated: and it aay make such orders concerning
proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or

 

 

 
#4 FOR PUBLICATION **4

initial apportionment of the settlement proceeds.” On January 8,

 

2001, the
on February 27 and 28, 2001, the circuit court
conducted the fairness hearing. Fresch did not appear. On
August 22, 2001, the circuit court (1) entered FOFs and COLs, (2)
ordered, pursuant thereto, “[t]hat no reallocation of the
settlenent funds is warranted,” and (3) “affirm{ed) the
allocation as fair and equitable as to each of the claimants,
including . . . Lesiie{,] Jr.” On September 19, 2001, Lesiie,
Je. timely filed a notice of appeal, which initiated No. 24553.
On Wovenber 9, 2001, the circuit court entered a judgment “in
favor of [the] [defendant [-appellee] Jeff{rey K.] Kanui as

Personal Representative for the Estate of . . . Tavares{,] [the]
Intervenors, . . . Leslie[,] Sr., [and] . . . Fresch; and against
++ + Leslie, Jr., Megan. . . and Malyssa . . . as to all claims

 

asserted in the above-captioned action.” On December 6, 2001,
the Appellants timely appealed from that judgment, thereby
initiating No. 24746. On February 22, 2002, this court

consolidated Nos, 24553 and 24746 under No. 24553.

TT, STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Conclusions of Law’

Hawaii appellate courts review conclusions of law de
novo, onder the right/wrong standard. "Under the
Fignt/reng standard, this court "examine(s] the facts and
anewer{s) the question without Deing required £9 give any
Weight to the rial court's answer to ie./*

 

 

> The “Standards of Review” section of the Appellants’ opening brief
oes not comply with Hawai"! Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 28(b)(5)- The

Appellants do not propose any standardis) of review applicable to their points
of erser tos, Sand €

     

 
 

FOR PUBLICATION ***

Leslie 1, 91 Hawai'i at 399, 984 P.2d at 1225 (quoting Robert's

Hawaii Sch. Bus, Inc.

 

Laypahgehoe. Trangp..Cos. 91 Hawai'i 274

 

239, 982 P.2d 853, 868 (1999)) (internal citations omitted)
(brackets in original).

5.

durisdiction

[xt 42 axiomatic that we are “under an obligation to ensure
{hat {we havel Jurisdiction to hear and determine each case
ane to dieniss an appeal on [our] own motion where. (we
Conclude (we) lack! Jurisdiction.” BIM, inc. v. Sageco,
De, 1 Haws 73,23, $49 P-20 1147, 1148 (9TE)~— TWnen we

 

 

 

‘ob Haw. Ses, 363, 714
Pred 956, 937 (i966)

Bacon v. Karlin, 68 Haw. 648, 650, 727 P.2d 1127, 1129 (1986).

IIT. DISCUSSION
iveuii ed ruciam t

Fres sre reno: ch.
Civ. No, 98-5468 Was Not Adjudicated On The Merits.

We will first address the Appellants’ fifth and sixth

points of error, because their resolution gives rise toa

threshold jurisdictional question.

‘The Appellants argue that the circuit court should not

have entered judgment in favor of Kanui, the Intervenors, Leslie,

Sr., and Fresch and against Leslie, Jr., Megan, and Malyssa,

inasmuch as (1) Leslie, Jr., Leslie, Sr., Fresch, and the

Intervenors had never asserted any claims against each other, and

(2) the circuit court never adjudicated Lesiie, Jr.'s, Megan's,

and Malyssa’s clains on the merits.

‘The Intervenors answer that entry of judgment may have

been “procedurally incorrect,” but was no more than harmless
‘44* POR PUBLICATION *#*

error. The Intervenors argue that “[a]t most, this (court

  

should vacate andiet
and remand with instructions . . . to enter dismissal of
Leslie[,] Jr.’s claims against [Kanui].”

The Appellants reply that the error was not harmless
because it affects the merits of Megan’s and Malyssa’s clains,
which “have not yet been adjudicated in any manner.”

We agree with the Appellants that the circuit court’s
Premature judgment in Civ. No. 98-5468 did not constitute

“harmless error.” Leslii

 

Jes, Megan, and Malyssa have the right
to have their claims in Civ. No. 98-5468 adjudicated on the
merits, Megan and Malyssa participated in the fairness hearing
through counsel, but, as the circuit court stated, this was an
exercise of their rights as parties to the consolidated case, and
Gid not extinguish the children’s own claims. Moreover, Fresch’s
and Leslie, Sr.'s preconsolidation dismissal of Civ. No. 97-0448,
absent agreement among the parties, did not bar Leslie, Jr.'s
later suit from commencing and running its course. In sum, the
circuit court’s November 9, 2001 judgment is premature to the
extent that it purports to dispose of Civ. No. 98-5468.

Accordingly, we renand this matter to the circuit court
for further proceedings with instructions to vacate the Novenber
9, 2001 judgment and to reinstate Leslie, Jr.’s, Megan's, and
Malyssa’s claims in Civ. No. 98-5468.

 

Furthermore, after the circuit court entered its August 22, 2002
order, a “judgnent™ was’ superfiuous. See Ditto v, McCurdy, 103 Hawat's 153,
165, £0°P.34 976, 980 (2003) (where earlier post-Judguent ‘order definitively
sigheled the end’ of the matters raised. - «4 it was unnecessary for the
cizcuit court to enter a second document”).

 

 

 

é
‘#* FOR PUBLICATION *##

 

Appeal From Civ, No. 97-0448 Is Premature: therefore
‘This Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over The Remaining Issues
‘Urapeeal =

Because we vacate the circuit court’s November 9, 2001
judgment and reinstate Civ. No, 98-5468, we lack jurisdiction to
decide the remaining issues on appeal from Civ. No. 97-0448.

‘The circuit court’s August 22, 2001 order disposed of
one and only one of the two underlying cases that the circuit
court consolidated. The circuit court designated neither its
August 22, 2001 order nor its November 9, 2001 judgment as final
pursuant to HRCP Rule 54(b) (2000).* Consequently, the remaining
points of error arise out of a consolidated case that is still
pending. Whether these circumstances deprive this court of
appellate jurisdiction® constitutes a question of first
impression in this state. Put differently, the question is
whether consolidation for convenience pursuant to HRCP Rule 42(a)
also causes the cases to merge into one for purposes of

determining finality of judgment.

 

+ HCP Rule S4(b) provides in relevant part:

hen more than one claim for relief is presented in an
action.” "or when multiple parties are involved, the court may
Girect tho entry of a final judgment ae to one or more but fewer
then all of the claine or parties only upon en express
Setermination that there i# n0 just reason for delay and upon an
Gtpress direction for the entry of judgnent. In the absence of
Such determination and direction, ony... form of decision
Which edjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights an
Uabsicies of fewer then all the parties shail not terminate the
action es to any of the clains or parties «s+

 

+ Sag towai's Revised Statutes (HRS) § 641-2(2) (1993), which
provides in relevant part that “[elppesis shall be allowed in civil matters
Grom ell Zinal. . . erders'.. . of cizeuit . . . courts... . to the suprene
court, «+ meexcept as otherwise provided by lai *

on duly 26, "2004, the Legislature amended HRS § 64271
Ree 208, §'66, at 943. Effective July 1, 2006, this a
upon the present mattar. See id $65, at 946.

8

 
 

 
##* FOR PUBLICATION **4

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) Rules 42(a) and

 

54(b) exe facially identice. to their Hawai" counterparts, but

 

the federal circuits are trifurcated in their interpretations of
those rules. The United States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth,
Tenth, and Federal Circuits have established the bright-line rule
that a judgment disposing of fewer than all claims and parties in
@ consclidated action is, per se, not appealable without Bule
S4(b) certification. Huene v. United States, 743 F.2d 703, 705
(9th Cir, 1984); Zeinity Broad, Corp, v. Eller, 827 F.2d 673, 675
(20th Cir, 1987); Spravtex, Inc. vs DIS &T, 96 F.3d 1377, 1382
(Fed. Cir, 1996); see also Dixon v. AN Gen, Corp., 454 A.2d 1357,
1359-1360 (D.C. 1983); Steck v, Aagaire, 789 P.2d 708, 709 (Utah
1990); State ex rel. Pac. Intermountain Express v. Dist. Court of
Second Judicial Dist., 387 P.2d 550, 552 (Wyo. 1963) ("It is
conceivable that there would be exceptional circumstances which
might influence the trial court to certify that there was no
cause for delay in entering the final judgment and thus permit an
appeal, but the propriety of such an arrangement can best be
determined by the court which tried the case.”). The Huene court
reasoned:

The [trial] court, in exercising its broad discretion to

order consolidation of actions presenting « comon issue of

iw or fect under fule 42(a), weighs the saving of time and

effort consolidation would produce ageinst any

inconvenience, delay, or expense that it would cause. An

appeal prior to the conclssion of the entire action could

Well frustrate the purpose for which the cases were

Sriginally consolidated. Not only could St complicate

matters in the (trial) court but it also could cause an

unnecessary duplication of efforts in the appellate court.
743 F.2d at 704 (citing 9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller,

Federa) Practice and Procedure § 2386 (1983).

 

10
+ FOR PUBLICATION *#*

‘The First and Sixth Circuits permit separate appeals.
th Inge Mice, Helicopter Aizlings, Inc, 469 F.74 439 (lat Gir
1972), the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

performed a “literal reading of Rule 54(b) in conjunction with

 

[FRCP] Rules 2 and 3."7 Id. at 441. Because the five
consolidated actions in that case had all been filed separately,
the court held that they retained “separate identities.” Id.
‘The court also stated that its “construction of the [FRCP] is
reinforced . . . when the theory behind consolidation of actions
is examined. ‘Consolidation is permitted as a matter of
convenience and economy in administration, but does not merge the
suits into a single cause... .'” Id, (quoting Johnson ve
Manhattan Railway Co., 289 U.S. 479, 496-97 (1933)).

‘The Sixth Circuit similarly concluded, in Beil v

Lakewood Eng. & Mfc. Co., 15 F.3d 546 (6th Cir. 1994), that
“*[{Jnasmuch as the consolidation of both actions below did not
merge the suits into @ single cause, it is beyond plerJadventure

= that the trial court's decision . . . terminating
[plaintife’s) action is a final appealable order not requiring
farther certification.’" Id, at 551 (quoting Lundblad vw.
Celeste, 874 F.2d 1097, 1103 (6th Cir. 1989), modified on other
gxounda, 924 F.2d 627, 629 (6th Cir. 1991)).

‘The remaining federal circuits apply case-by-case

tests. Hageman v. City Inv. Co., 851 F.2d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1988);
nited States v. $8,221,877.16 in U.S. Currency, 330 F.3d 141,

+ FRcp Rule 2 provides: “There shall be one form of action to be
known af ‘civil ection.'” FRCP Rule 3 provides: "A civil action is commenced
Byelling a conpleint with the court.” “The corresponding Hawai'i rules are
fextvally identical

 

 

n
*** FOR PUBLICATION *#*
148 (3d Cir. 2003); Eagers v, Clinchtield Coal co, 11 F.3d 35,
29(ath Cir. 2993}; Bde Sustakiex Siitens v. Cont!) spcinkler,
967 F.2d 145, 152 (Sth Cir. 1992); Brown v. United States, 976
F.2d 1104, 1107 (7th Cir. 1992); Tri-State Hotels, Inc. v. Fed
Deposit Ins. Corp., 79 F.3d 707, TIL (Bth Cir. 1996); Lewis
Charters, Inc. v. Huckins Yacht Corp., 871 F.2d 1046, 1048-49
(11th Cir, 1989); United States ex rel, Hampton v. Columbia/ICA,
318 F.3d 214, 217 (D.C. Cir. 2003)); see alse Gissell v. Kenmare
Tos, 463 N.W.2d 668, 671 (N.D, 1990) ("[We . . . consider the

   

extent and purpose of the consolidation and the relationship of

the consolidated actions . . .

 

For the following reasons, we adopt the “per se” rule
of the Ninth, Tenth, and Federal Circuits, whereby 2 judgment or
order in a consolidated case, disposing of fewer than all clains
among all parties, is not appealable in the absence of Rule 54(b)
certification, Flaws inherent in the other two approaches are
uncertainty for the litigants and the inefficiency of piecemeal

review. See Spravtex, Inc., 96 F.3d at 1382. We are persuaded
by Huene’s criticism of the case-by-case method:

This has the disadvantage of leaving the finelity of the
judgment hazy and subject to varying interpretations, In
eur opinion, it is essential that the point at which a
Sodgrent is’ final be crystal clear because appellate rights
Gepens upon it. the opportunity to appeal could be Lost by
a mistaken belief that the judgment se not final and a
Consequent failure to file timely a notice of appeal.” On
the other hand, uncertainty as to the finality of the
Judgment could lead to the premature filing of a notice of
aepeal with the consequent waste of tine and resources. A

jeond disadvantage of this approach is that the right to
Gecide whetner an sppeal is appropriate is taken from the
[trial] court that made the original Gecision to
consolidate. That court is best able to assess the original
urpose of the consoligation snd whether an interim appeal
Mould frustrate that purpes

743 F.2d at 704. Even as the Third Circuit reaffirmed the case-

 

 

 

 

 

 

12
‘+ FOR PUBLICATION ###
by-case rule in Bergman v. City of Atlantic City, 860 F.2d 560
(Bd Cir, 1988), it observed that “(nlo woll-counseled plaintiff
in th{e) circuits (that categorically permit separate appeals)
would ever join separate claims in a single complaint; he should
instead file a separate complaint for each claim and then have
them consolidated.” Id. at 565 1.9.

‘The rule adopted by the First and Sixth Circuits does
have the virtue of definitiveness, but a partial appeal under
this regime has the potential to unfairly impact ‘the matter(s)
remaining below. See generally Joan Steinman, The Effects of
Gase Consolidation on the Procedural Rights of Litigants, 42 UCLA
L. Rev. 717, 795 nn.252-53, 797 & nn.261-62 (1994-95)
("[Alppellate decisions [under this approach] are likely to have
at least stare decisis effect and may have collateral estoppel or
xes judicata effects . . . in the remaining consolidated cases.”)
(citing Jacqueline Gerson, Comment, The Appealability of Partial
Judgments in Consolidated Cases, $7 U. Chi. L. Rev. 169 (1990).

Moreover, even the “case-by-case” jurisdictions
generally require “certification unless the consolidation was for
limited purposes.” Spravtex, Inc., 96 F.3d at 1381; Hageman, @51
F.2d at 71 (“There is a strong presumption that the judgment is
not appealable absent Rule 54(b) certification. In highly
unusual circumstances, a litigant may be able to overcome this
presumption...
apparently consolidated the cases for all purposes.

Accordingly, we dismiss the present appeal as to the

 

In the present matter, the circuit court

Appellants’ remaining points of error for want of appellate

jurisdiction.

13
*** FOR PUBLICATION ###

In Light of the foregoing analysis, we remand this
matter to the circuit court for further proceedings with

instructions to vacate the November 9, 2001 judgment and

Gre

On the briefs: Pharr Plabnce—

Frederic W. Rohlfing 211 and
Isrrie Lee Stone, Aaa OS ding cones
CF Roni fing «stone,
for the pleintffeappeliant

iioward KY Leslie, Jr- Joe

cynthia A. Farias,
Tor’ the’ plaints f¢s-appellants Yenc outta:
egan' and Melyssa Leslie

reinstate Civ. No, 98-5468.

Milton S. Tani,
‘of Matsui Ching Sumida &
Tsuchiyana, for the defendant-
appellee/third-party plaintiff
Jeffrey K. Kanui

Jeffrey S. Portnoy,
of Cades Schutte Fleming & Wright,
for the intervenors-appellees
Joseph L. Wildman and
Sibille & Wildman

4