Title: Tufail v. Midwest Hospitality, LLC

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2013 WI 62 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP1451  
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Amjad T. Tufail, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Midwest Hospitality, LLC, d/b/a Midwest 
Hospitality (WI),  
LLC, 
          Defendant-Appellant, 
Aslam Khan, d/b/a Midwest Hospitality, 
          Defendant.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 344 Wis. 2d 297, 821 N.W.2d 412 
(Ct. App. 2012 – Unpublished)     
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 10, 2013   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 11, 2013   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
William S. Pocan   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
PROSSER, J., dissents. (Opinion filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Douglas W. Rose, Lora L. LoCoco, and Rose & deJong, S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Douglas W. Rose.    
 
For 
the 
defendant-appellant, 
there 
was 
a 
brief 
by 
Christopher T. Hale, Andrew G. Frank, and Hale and Wagner, S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Christopher T. Hale.  
  
 
 
2013 WI 62
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2011AP1451 
 
(L.C. No. 
2009CV13848) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Amjad T. Tufail, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Midwest Hospitality, LLC, d/b/a Midwest 
Hospitality (WI), LLC, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant, 
 
Aslam Khan, d/b/a Midwest Hospitality, 
 
          Defendant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 10, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.  The judgment of the circuit court is thereby 
affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.  This is a review of an 
unpublished opinion of the court of appeals, which reversed the 
circuit court's judgment awarding damages in favor of Amjad 
Tufail (Tufail).  The case before us involves a contract dispute 
No. 
2011AP1451 
   
 
2 
 
between 
the 
landlord, 
Tufail, 
and 
the 
tenant, 
Midwest 
Hospitality, LLC (Midwest Hospitality) over the terms of a 
commercial lease of property.1   
¶2 
Tufail, the petitioner, asserts that the court of 
appeals erred when it determined that Midwest Hospitality's 
early termination of the lease was justified by Tufail's 
misrepresentation.  Although he acknowledges that the lease 
unambiguously provides a representation that Midwest Hospitality 
may not be prevented from using the property for certain 
specified purposes, Tufail argues that operation of a fast-food 
restaurant with a drive-through is not among the purposes listed 
in the lease.  He further asserts that all of the uses 
identified in the lease are permitted uses of the premises under 
the City of Milwaukee zoning code.   
¶3 
Additionally, Tufail contends that the representation 
was not false given that the City of Milwaukee granted a special 
use permit allowing the operation of a Church's Chicken 
restaurant, including the operation of a Church's Chicken fast-
food restaurant with a drive-through.   
¶4 
We conclude that the representation does not include 
any use of the property as a Church's Chicken fast-food 
restaurant with a drive-through.  Additionally, there is no 
indication that any of the uses identified in the lease were 
prevented under the City of Milwaukee zoning code.   
                                                 
1 Tufail v. Midwest Hospitality, LLC, No. 2011AP1451, 
unpublished slip op. (Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2012), reversing the 
circuit court, William S. Pocan, J., presiding. 
No. 
2011AP1451 
   
 
3 
 
¶5 
We further conclude that the representation was not 
false because the circuit court found that Midwest Hospitality 
was not prevented from using the property for the uses specified 
in the lease, and its finding is not clearly erroneous.  
Therefore, Tufail did not breach the lease.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the court of appeals and remand, and the judgment of the 
circuit court is thereby affirmed.   
I 
¶6 
The contract dispute in this case concerns the terms 
of a commercial lease for a property located on West North 
Avenue in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.  Tufail had previously operated 
a restaurant called "New York Chicken" on the property before 
leasing the property to Midwest Hospitality.2         
¶7 
After 
purchasing 
the 
property 
in 
2000, 
Tufail 
submitted a request to the City of Milwaukee Development Center 
for a permit to operate a fast-food restaurant.  His application 
was denied, but Tufail appealed to the City of Milwaukee Board 
of Zoning Appeals.  On November 9, 2000, the Board of Zoning 
Appeals granted Tufail's request for a permit to operate a fast-
food restaurant for a ten-year period.  Under the terms of the 
permit, the New York Chicken restaurant was allowed to remain 
open until 4:00 a.m.   
¶8 
Sometime before the New York Chicken restaurant ceased 
operations in 2007 and again after operations ceased, Midwest 
                                                 
2 Tufail described the New York Chicken restaurant as "a 
chicken place" that was similar in nature to a Church's Chicken 
restaurant but with a different name. 
No. 
2011AP1451 
   
 
4 
 
Hospitality approached Tufail and inquired about opening a 
Church's 
Chicken 
restaurant 
on 
the 
property. 
 
Prior 
to 
negotiating the lease, Midwest Hospitality visited the former 
New York Chicken restaurant and conducted a walk-through of the 
property.  It then prepared a written lease and the parties 
negotiated its terms.   
¶9 
Tufail and Midwest Hospitality formally executed the 
lease in March 2008.  It was to be in effect for a five-year 
period beginning on April 1, 2008 and ending on March 31, 2013.  
Midwest Hospitality agreed to pay rent in the amount of $35,000 
for the first year, which was to be paid in equal installments 
on a monthly basis.   
¶10 Paragraph 5 of the lease specified the intended 
purposes for which the property may be used: 
5. Use of Premises.  Tenant may use and occupy the 
Premises for any lawful purposes, including, but not 
limited 
to, 
the 
retail 
sales, 
consumption, 
and 
delivery of food and beverages which shall include, 
but 
not 
be 
limited 
to, 
Chicken 
products, 
Fish 
products, bread products, salads, sandwiches, dessert 
items, promotional items, and any other items sold by 
any Church's Chicken store. 
Tufail also made representations in Paragraph 33 of the lease, 
which provide as follows, in relevant part: 
Landlord represents and warrants to Tenant that: 
. . . . 
(g) no existing restrictions, building and zoning 
ordinances, or other laws or requirements of any 
governmental authority prevent the use of the Premises 
for the purposes set forth in Paragraph 5 . . . . 
No. 
2011AP1451 
   
 
5 
 
Landlord hereby acknowledges that Tenant is relying 
upon 
all 
of 
the 
foregoing 
representations 
and 
warranties in executing this Lease and that matters so 
represented and warranted are material ones, and 
Landlord accordingly agrees that any misrepresentation 
or breach of such warranty will be reason for Tenant 
to terminate this Lease. 
Furthermore, the lease contained an integration clause providing 
that the written lease set forth all understandings between 
Tufail and Midwest Hospitality: 
This Lease, the exhibits, rider and addendum, if any, 
attached hereto and forming a part hereof set forth 
all the covenants, promises, agreements, conditions, 
terms, provisions and understandings by and between 
the Landlord and Tenant concerning the Premises.  
There are no other such matters, whether oral or 
written, between Landlord and Tenant other than are 
set 
forth 
herein. 
 
No 
change, 
modification, 
alteration, amendment, addition or deletion to this 
Lease shall be binding upon Landlord or Tenant unless 
it is in writing and executed by the person to be so 
charged with the same.  Landlord and Tenant have 
negotiated the terms of this Lease; therefore, this 
Lease shall not be interpreted or construed against or 
in favor of any party.   
 
¶11 After the lease was executed, Midwest Hospitality 
entered the property and began renovation.  It completed some 
initial preparation work, but did not ultimately complete the 
renovations.   
¶12 The renovation work ended in May 2008 when Midwest 
Hospitality was informed that it needed to obtain a special use 
permit in order to operate a fast-food restaurant with a drive-
through at the property.  A special use permit is a particular 
type of permit required by the City of Milwaukee in order to use 
a property for certain purposes under the zoning code.  Although 
No. 
2011AP1451 
   
 
6 
 
a sit-down restaurant3 is classified as a "Permitted Use," a 
fast-food restaurant4 is classified as a "Limited Use" requiring 
a special use permit.   
¶13 Upon being advised of the permit requirement, Midwest 
Hospitality applied for a special use permit to operate a 
Church's Chicken fast-food restaurant with a drive-through on 
the property.  The application was met with opposition by 
community 
groups 
that 
opposed 
adding 
a 
Church's 
Chicken 
restaurant to the neighborhood.5 
¶14 Despite the opposition, the City of Milwaukee Board of 
Zoning 
Appeals 
ultimately 
approved 
Midwest 
Hospitality's 
application for a special use permit in a written decision 
issued on September 22, 2008.  The special use permit was issued 
                                                 
3 A "sit-down restaurant" is defined in the zoning code as 
"a restaurant where the food or beverages sold are consumed at 
tables located on the premises, where taking food or beverages 
from the premises is purely incidental, where food or beverages 
are normally served utilizing nondisposable containers and 
utensils and where the consumption of food or beverages in 
vehicles on the premises in which the building is located does 
not regularly occur . . . ."   
4 A "restaurant, fast-food/carryout" is defined in the 
zoning code as "a restaurant other than a sit-down restaurant 
where the manner of preparation, packaging and serving of food 
or beverages encourages their consumption outside the building." 
5 Midwest 
Hospitality 
in 
its 
brief 
describes 
those 
individuals or groups opposing its application as "neighbors, 
physicians, 
Walnut 
Way 
Conservation 
Corporation 
(a 
local 
neighborhood 
association) 
and 
even 
a 
Wisconsin 
State 
Representative."   
 
No. 
2011AP1451 
   
 
7 
 
subject to certain conditions, which are set forth in relevant 
part as follows: 
10. That this use, both fast-food/carry-out and drive-
through, closes by 9:00 p.m. 
11. That this Special Use is granted for a period of 
one (1) year, commencing with the date hereof.   
At trial, a Midwest Hospitality representative testified that 
the conditions in the special use permit changed the business's 
profitability forecast and rendered the operation of a Church's 
Chicken restaurant on the property not worth the investment: 
Q.  And now could you have run the Church's Chicken at 
1635 West North with restrictions on the evening hours 
to 9:00 p.m. and a new review by [the Board of Zoning 
Appeals] every year? 
A.  No way.  It would just be impossible.  It wouldn't 
even be worth the investment. . . .  [The 9:00 closing 
restriction] changed our forecast that we had in mind 
for the profitability of this business . . . . 
¶15 After the special use permit was approved, Midwest 
Hospitality notified Tufail that it would stop paying rent.  It 
sent a letter to Tufail arguing that it was not responsible for 
the lease payments because a special use permit was required to 
operate a Church's Chicken fast-food restaurant with a drive-
through.  It therefore contended that Tufail made a false 
representation and that it was entitled to terminate the lease 
before the five-year term expired.   
¶16 Tufail, in turn, commenced the present action.  He 
alleged a breach of contract claim, an anticipatory breach of 
contract claim, and a claim for breach of the duty of good faith 
and fair dealing.  Midwest Hospitality later pled counterclaims 
No. 
2011AP1451 
   
 
8 
 
alleging a breach of contract, deceptive advertising contrary to 
Wis. Stat. § 100.18 (2009-10), and unjust enrichment.   
¶17 The circuit court presided over a three-day bench 
trial, which took place in March 2011.  At the conclusion of the 
trial, the circuit court made findings of fact relating to the 
claims advanced in the pleadings.  It found that the "vast 
majority of Church's Chicken restaurants have drive-through 
operations, but not all."  Additionally, "Midwest Hospitality's 
application for a special use permit to use the subject property 
for a fast-food restaurant with a drive-through was approved by 
the City of Milwaukee," and it was not "prevent[ed], in any way, 
[] from opening a Church's Chicken restaurant at the subject 
property with a drive-through and as a fast food restaurant."6   
¶18 Turning to examine the text of the lease, the circuit 
court determined that it unambiguously failed to set forth any 
use as a fast-food restaurant with a drive-through.  It 
concluded that "Midwest Hospitality was able to use the subject 
property for its intended use as set forth in the lease."  
Furthermore, it determined that "even if the subject lease was 
interpreted to include as an intended use a fast food restaurant 
with a drive-through, that intended use was allowed by the City 
of Milwaukee."  Ultimately, there was "no evidence presented 
that [Tufail's] representations and warranties were not true."   
                                                 
6 Additional discussion of the circuit court's findings of 
fact may be found at ¶¶39-41, infra. 
No. 
2011AP1451 
   
 
9 
 
¶19 Because Tufail did not breach the lease, the circuit 
court concluded that Midwest Hospitality's early termination of 
the lease was itself a breach of contract.  It proceeded to 
enter a judgment awarding Tufail $90,033.21 in damages.   
¶20 Midwest Hospitality appealed and the court of appeals 
reversed the circuit court.  Tufail v. Midwest Hospitality, LLC, 
No. 2011AP1451, unpublished slip op. (Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2012).  
It concluded that the "early termination of the lease was 
justified by Tufail's misrepresentation," stating that Tufail's 
representation 
that 
"no 
zoning 
laws 
restricting 
[Midwest 
Hospitality's] 
operation 
of 
a 
Church's 
Chicken 
fast-food 
restaurant on the leased premises" was "false from the moment 
the parties signed the lease."  Id., ¶¶1, 9.   
¶21 The court of appeals rejected Tufail's argument that 
he did not make a false representation because the lease does 
not set forth a use as a fast-food restaurant with a drive-
through.  Id., ¶8.  It concluded that by reference to "Church's 
Chicken," Paragraph 5 of the lease "allowed the operation as a 
Church's Chicken" and that it was "not necessary for the use 
provision in the lease to include additional words allowing 
operation of a fast-food restaurant.  A Church's Chicken is a 
fast-food restaurant."  Id.   
II 
¶22 This case requires us to determine whether Tufail 
breached the lease, a written contract, by making a false 
representation.  The interpretation of a contract presents a 
No. 
2011AP1451 
   
 
10 
 
question of law, which we determine independently of the 
conclusions rendered by the circuit court and the court of 
appeals.  Ehlinger v. Hauser, 2010 WI 54, ¶47, 325 Wis. 2d 287, 
¶47, 785 N.W.2d 328.   
¶23 Here, the circuit court presided over a three-day 
bench trial and made findings of fact.  We accept the circuit 
court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  
Phelps v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wisconsin, Inc., 2009 WI 74, 
¶34, 319 Wis. 2d 1, 768 N.W.2d 615.   
III 
¶24 The sole question presented on review is whether 
Tufail breached the lease by making a false representation.  The 
lease is a written contract and our analysis is controlled 
entirely by well-established canons of contract interpretation.  
Accordingly, as a preface to addressing the question presented, 
it is helpful to review those basic principles of contract 
interpretation relevant to the issue before us. 
¶25 Contract interpretation generally seeks to give effect 
to the parties' intentions.  Seitzinger v. Community Health 
Network, 2004 WI 28, ¶22, 270 Wis. 2d 1, 676 N.W.2d 426.  
However, "subjective intent is not the be-all and end-all."  
Kernz v. J.L. French Corp., 2003 WI App 140, ¶9, 266 Wis. 2d 
124, 667 N.W.2d 751.  Rather, "unambiguous contract language 
controls contract interpretation."  Id. 
¶26 Where 
the 
terms 
of 
a 
contract 
are 
clear 
and 
unambiguous, we construe the contract according to its literal 
No. 
2011AP1451 
   
 
11 
 
terms.  Maryland Arms Ltd. Partnership v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, 
¶23, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15 (quoting Gorton v. Hostak, 
Henzl & Bichler, S.C., 217 Wis. 2d 493, 506, 577 N.W.2d 617 
(1998)).  "We presume the parties' intent is evidenced by the 
words they chose, if those words are unambiguous."  Kernz, 266 
Wis. 2d 124, ¶9.   
¶27 If the terms of the contract are ambiguous, evidence 
extrinsic to the contract itself may be used to determine the 
parties' intent.  Seitzinger, 270 Wis. 2d 1, ¶22.  "A contract 
provision is ambiguous if it is fairly susceptible of more than 
one construction."  Mgm't Computer Servs., Inc. v. Hawkins, Ash, 
Baptie & Co., 206 Wis. 2d 158, 177, 557 N.W.2d 67 (1996). 
¶28 Contract language is construed according to its plain 
or ordinary meaning, Huml v. Vlazny, 2006 WI 87, ¶52, 293 Wis. 
2d 169, 716 N.W.2d 807, consistent with "what a reasonable 
person 
would 
understand 
the 
words 
to 
mean 
under 
the 
circumstances."  Seitzinger, 270 Wis. 2d 1, ¶22.  For a business 
contract, that is "the manner that it would be understood by 
persons in the business to which the contract relates." Columbia 
Propane, L.P. v. Wisconsin Gas Co., 2003 WI 38, ¶12, 261 Wis. 2d 
70, 661 N.W.2d 776. 
¶29 The court construes contracts "as they are written."  
Id., ¶12.  Ultimately, "the office of judicial construction is 
not to make contracts . . . but to determine what the parties 
contracted to do."  Marion v. Orson's Camera Centers, Inc., 29 
Wis. 2d 339, 345, 138 N.W.2d 733 (1966) (quoting Wisconsin 
No. 
2011AP1451 
   
 
12 
 
Marine & Fire Ins. Co. Bank v. Wilkin, 95 Wis. 111, 115, 69 N.W. 
354 (1897). 
¶30 Additionally, as this court recently stated, courts 
may not consider evidence of prior or contemporaneous oral or 
written agreements between the parties if a contract is fully 
integrated: 
A contract that represents the final and complete 
expression of the parties' agreement is considered 
fully "integrated." If the contract is integrated, 
absent the existence of fraud, duress, or mutual 
mistake, the court construing the contract may not 
consider evidence of any prior or contemporaneous oral 
or written agreement between the parties. 
Town Bank v. City Real Estate Development, LLC, 2010 WI 134, 
¶37, 330 Wis. 2d 340, 793 N.W.2d 476.  If a contract contains 
"an unambiguous merger or integration clause, the court is 
barred from considering evidence of any prior or contemporaneous 
understandings or agreements between the parties, even as to the 
issue of integration."  Id., ¶39; Peterson v. Cornerstone 
Property Development, LLC, 2006 WI App 132, ¶31, 294 Wis. 2d 
800, 720 N.W.2d 716 (quoting Ziegler Co. v. Rexnord, Inc., 139 
Wis. 2d 593, 608-09 n.11, 407 N.W.2d 873 (1987)) (courts may not 
consider extrinsic evidence to "vary or contradict the terms of 
a writing" when the contract is fully integrated). 
 
¶31 In this case, as quoted above, the lease at issue 
contains an integration clause.  It states that the entire 
agreement between the parties has been reduced to writing.  It 
plainly 
states 
without 
qualification 
that 
"all" 
of 
the 
understandings between the parties are set forth in the lease 
No. 
2011AP1451 
   
 
13 
 
and any attached exhibits, riders, or addendums.  Therefore, we 
are guided by the text of the lease, not by any extrinsic, 
unwritten understandings that may have existed between the 
parties.7  Id.; Peterson, 294 Wis. 2d 800, ¶31 (quoting Ziegler 
Co., 139 Wis. 2d at 608-09 n.11).    
¶32 Having reviewed the relevant canons of contract 
interpretation, we turn now to address the question of whether 
Tufail breached the lease by making a false representation.  Our 
inquiry hinges first on the meaning of Tufail's representation 
as it is written in the lease, and second, on whether the 
representation is false under the facts of this case.  The 
representation states as follows: 
Landlord represents and warrants to Tenant that: 
. . . . 
                                                 
7 Contrary to the unambiguous integration clause, Midwest 
Hospitality 
urges 
us 
to 
consider 
the 
parties' 
unwritten 
"understanding of Church's Chicken" as a fast-food restaurant.  
It contends that "Church's Chicken was understood to be a fast-
food restaurant by all parties," and that understanding is 
"inherent in interpreting [the lease's references to] 'Church's 
Chicken' . . . regardless of the absence of 'fast-food' in the 
Use of Premises provision."  In effect, it contends that "there 
is no such thing" as a sit-down Church's Chicken restaurant. 
Here, however, the parties have expressly stated that 
"[t]his Lease . . . set[s] forth all the . . . understandings by 
and between the Landlord and Tenant concerning the Premises."  
In 
light 
of 
the 
parties' 
unambiguous 
statement 
that 
no 
additional understandings existed between them concerning the 
lease, 
we 
decline 
to 
consider 
Midwest 
Hospitality's 
"understanding of Church's Chicken" as a particular type of 
fast-food restaurant when such an understanding is not presented 
in the text of the lease. 
No. 
2011AP1451 
   
 
14 
 
(g) no existing restrictions, building and zoning 
ordinances, or other laws or requirements of any 
governmental authority prevent the use of the Premises 
for the purposes set forth in Paragraph 5 . . . . 
Paragraph 5 of the lease, in turn, provides that: 
5.  Use of Premises.  Tenant may use and occupy the 
Premises for any lawful purpose, including, but not 
limited 
to, 
the 
retail 
sales, 
consumption, 
and 
delivery of food and beverages which shall include, 
but 
not 
be 
limited 
to, 
Chicken 
products, 
Fish 
products, bread products, salads, sandwiches, dessert 
items, promotional items, and any other items sold by 
any Church's Chicken store. 
¶33 Tufail 
acknowledges 
that 
the 
lease 
unambiguously 
provides that Midwest Hospitality may not be prevented from 
using the property for certain specified purposes.  He advances, 
however, that a fast-food restaurant with a drive-through is not 
among the "purposes set forth in Paragraph 5."  Furthermore, he 
asserts that all of the uses identified in Paragraph 5 are 
permitted uses of the premises under the City of Milwaukee 
zoning code.  Given that the City of Milwaukee granted a special 
use permit allowing the operation of a Church's Chicken 
restaurant, including the operation of a Church's Chicken fast-
food restaurant with a drive-through, he contends that the 
representation was not false.   
¶34 Midwest 
Hospitality 
likewise 
acknowledges 
the 
unambiguous text of the lease, but further argues that the lease 
No. 
2011AP1451 
   
 
15 
 
incorporates the fact that "Church's Chicken was understood to 
be a fast-food restaurant by all parties."8   
¶35 We construe the contract as it is clearly written.  
Midwest Hospitality may not be prevented from using the property 
for the purposes specifically identified in Paragraph 5.  
Paragraph 5 then identifies the various products which may be 
consumed, sold, distributed, or otherwise used on the property.    
¶36 Among the products identified in Paragraph 5 is 
counted "any other items sold by any Church's Chicken store."  
Midwest Hospitality argues, and the court of appeals concluded, 
that the reference to a "Church's Chicken" in Paragraph 5 
requires that a Church's Chicken fast-food restaurant with a 
drive-through may be operated on the property.  We reject that 
argument.   
                                                 
8 Tufail 
states 
in 
his 
brief 
that 
"[t]he 
lease 
is 
unambiguous," while Midwest Hospitality argues that Tufail 
"unambiguously warrantied that there were no zoning restrictions 
preventing . . . the contemplated use of the Property."  Their 
respective "unambiguous" constructions of the lease diverge 
greatly in scope.   
That 
the 
parties 
have 
construed 
the 
representation 
differently does not alone render it ambiguous.  Ambiguity is 
found where a contract "is fairly susceptible of more than one 
construction," not necessarily where different constructions are 
argued.  Mgm't Computer Servs., Inc. v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & 
Co., 206 Wis. 2d 158, 177, 557 N.W.2d 67 (1996).  We must 
interpret the lease "as it stands, even though the parties may 
have placed a different construction on it."  Cernohorsky v. 
Northern Liquid Gas Co., 268 Wis. 586, 593, 68 N.W.2d 429 
(1955); see also Brew City Redevelopment Group, LLC v. The 
Ferchill Group, 2006 WI App 39, ¶3, 289 Wis. 2d 795, 714 N.W.2d 
582.     
No. 
2011AP1451 
   
 
16 
 
¶37 A mere reference to products used by a "Church's 
Chicken store" does not represent that Midwest Hospitality may 
operate a Church's Chicken fast-food restaurant with a drive-
through.  The lease plainly provides that Midwest Hospitality 
may not be prevented from using the property for certain, 
specified purposes.  Notably absent from that list is any 
requirement that the property may be used as a fast-food 
restaurant with a drive-through.9   
¶38 Accordingly, we conclude that Tufail's representation 
requires simply that Midwest Hospitality may not be prevented 
from using the property for the purposes specifically identified 
in Paragraph 5.  Having ascertained the plain meaning of the 
representation, all that remains is to determine whether the 
representation is false under these facts.   
                                                 
9 Likewise, the lease does not set forth any requirements 
regarding the conditions specified in the special use permit 
relating to the hours of operation or the time period in which 
any permit must be renewed.  Despite the lack of reference to a 
fast-food restaurant or to the conditions set forth in the 
special use permit, the dissent interprets the lease to mean 
that Tufail "warrant[ied] that there were no zoning requirements 
with which Midwest had to comply in order to sell Church's 
Chicken products in a fast-food restaurant."  Dissent, ¶78; see 
also dissent, ¶¶94, 101.   
In relying on words that cannot be found in the lease, the 
dissent appears to rewrite it.  The representation in the lease 
simply states that no existing restrictions, building and zoning 
ordinances, or other laws or requirements prevent Midwest 
Hospitality from using the property for the purposes identified 
in Paragraph 5.  It focuses on whether Midwest Hospitality is 
prevented from using the property for certain purposes, not on 
whether 
Midwest 
Hospitality 
had 
to 
comply 
with 
various 
governmental regulations.  
No. 
2011AP1451 
   
 
17 
 
¶39 In this case, the circuit court made extensive 
findings of fact at the conclusion of a three-day bench trial.  
It 
found 
that 
"[t]he 
vast 
majority 
of 
Church's 
Chicken 
restaurants have drive-through operations, but not all."  There 
was "no evidence" showing that Tufail knew about the many other 
Church's Chicken restaurants, whether or not they had drive-
through 
operations, 
or 
about 
Church's 
Chicken 
franchise 
requirements such as closing times.   
¶40 The circuit court also found that the parties "entered 
into a written lease in March of 2008," which was, by its own 
terms, to last for a five-year period.  After the lease was 
signed and Midwest Hospitality took occupancy, it discovered 
that a special use permit was required from the City of 
Milwaukee "so that it could have a drive-through as part of the 
restaurant."   
¶41 Furthermore, the circuit court found that "Midwest 
Hospitality's application for a special use permit to use the 
subject property for a fast food restaurant with a drive-through 
was approved by the City of Milwaukee."  Although it observed 
that the approval "was not exactly as Midwest Hospitality may 
have wanted" due to the conditions in the special use permit, it 
found that Midwest Hospitality was not prevented, "in any way, 
[] from opening a Church's Chicken restaurant at the subject 
property."  The special use permit allowed operation "with a 
drive-through and as a fast food restaurant": 
But the special use permit as approved by the City of 
Milwaukee did not prevent, in any way, Midwest 
No. 
2011AP1451 
   
 
18 
 
Hospitality from opening a Church's Chicken restaurant 
at the subject property with a drive-through and as a 
fast food restaurant.  Therefore, the Court finds that 
even if the subject lease was interpreted to include 
as an intended use a fast food restaurant with a 
drive-through, that intended use was allowed by the 
City of Milwaukee.  The representations and warranties 
of Mr. Tufail contained in the lease itself are for 
the intended use as specifically set forth in the 
lease in paragraph five, and there was no evidence 
presented that those representations and warranties 
were not true.   
Accordingly, the circuit court determined that "the claim that 
Mr. Tufail made misrepresentations was not established."   
¶42 No one argues that the findings of the circuit court, 
to the extent that they set forth the dispositive facts of this 
case, are clearly erroneous.  Phelps, 319 Wis. 2d 1, ¶34.  We 
likewise see no indication that its findings are clearly 
erroneous.  Therefore, we are bound to accept those findings, 
including the circuit court's finding that Midwest Hospitality 
was not in fact prevented from opening a Church's Chicken 
restaurant at the subject property. 
¶43 Given the lack of any reference in the lease to a 
fast-food 
restaurant 
with 
a 
drive-through, 
there 
is 
no 
indication in the facts that the uses of the property, as they 
are stated in Paragraph 5 of the lease, were prevented.  There 
is no indication that any of the uses specified in Paragraph 5 
cannot be performed at a sit-down restaurant, which is a 
permitted use under the City of Milwaukee zoning code.  Rather, 
the fact that Midwest Hospitality was granted a special use 
permit specifically allowing use of the property as a Church's 
Chicken restaurant soundly refutes the premise that Midwest 
No. 
2011AP1451 
   
 
19 
 
Hospitality was prevented from using the property for any of the 
purposes stated in Paragraph 5.   
¶44 We further observe that even if we accepted Midwest 
Hospitality's 
argument 
that 
there 
is 
an 
"undisputed 
understanding of Church's Chicken" as a fast-food restaurant 
with a drive-through and that the representation incorporates 
that "undisputed understanding," the representation is still not 
false under these facts.  The circuit court expressly found that 
when the special use permit was granted by the City of 
Milwaukee, Midwest Hospitality was allowed to operate a Church's 
Chicken fast-food restaurant with a drive-through.   
¶45 The facts of this case indicate that although Midwest 
Hospitality was not prevented from using the property for the 
purposes identified in Paragraph 5 of the lease, those purposes 
alone did not necessarily ensure that the proposed Church's 
Chicken restaurant was worth Midwest Hospitality's investment.  
However, as the circuit court observed, "[t]here was nothing to 
prevent Midwest Hospitality from putting contingencies in the 
lease about hours of operation, a drive-through or anything else 
deemed necessary.  It did not."  We interpret only the contract 
to which the parties agreed.  Marion, 29 Wis. 2d at 345.  
¶46 Ultimately, the result of this case is compelled by 
basic principles of contract interpretation and by the circuit 
court's findings of fact following a three-day bench trial.  
Tufail explicitly represented in paragraph 33 of the lease that 
No. 
2011AP1451 
   
 
20 
 
Midwest Hospitality would not be prevented from using the 
property for the listed purposes. 
¶47 The circuit court found that there was no evidence to 
support the argument that the representations were untrue.  
Additionally, 
it 
found 
that 
Midwest 
Hospitality 
was 
not 
prevented 
"in 
any 
way" 
from 
opening 
a 
Church's 
Chicken 
restaurant at the leased property.   
• "The representations and warranties of Mr. Tufail 
contained in the lease itself are for the intended use 
as specifically set forth in the lease in paragraph 
five, and there was no evidence presented that those 
representations and warranties were not true." 
• "[T]he special use permit as approved by the City of 
Milwaukee did not prevent, in any way, Midwest 
Hospitality from opening a Church's Chicken restaurant 
at the subject property with a drive-through and as a 
fast food restaurant." 
¶48 Importantly, the circuit court specifically found that 
even if the lease was interpreted to include uses not explicitly 
listed in its terms——uses as a fast-food restaurant with a 
drive-through——that the evidence showed that such uses were not 
prevented.   
• "Therefore, the Court finds that even if the subject 
lease was interpreted to include as an intended use a 
fast 
food 
restaurant with a drive-through, that 
intended use was allowed by the City of Milwaukee." 
No. 
2011AP1451 
   
 
21 
 
¶49 There has been no showing that the circuit court's 
dispositive findings of fact are clearly erroneous.  No party 
has even attempted to advance such an argument.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that Tufail did not breach the lease by making a false 
representation.        
IV 
¶50 In sum, we conclude that the representation does not 
include any use of the property as a Church's Chicken fast-food 
restaurant with a drive-through.  Additionally, there is no 
indication that any of the uses identified in the lease were 
prevented under the City of Milwaukee zoning code.   
¶51 We further conclude that the representation was not 
false because the circuit court found that Midwest Hospitality 
was not prevented from using the property for the uses specified 
in the lease, and its finding is not clearly erroneous.  
Therefore, Tufail did not breach the lease.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the court of appeals and remand, and the judgment of the 
circuit court is thereby affirmed. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and remanded.  The judgment of the circuit court is 
thereby affirmed.   
 
No.  2011AP1451.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶52 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  Amjad Tufail 
(Tufail) and Midwest Hospitality, LLC (Midwest) entered into a 
lease in which Tufail unambiguously warranted that there were no 
local ordinances that would prevent Midwest from operating a 
fast-food Church's Chicken restaurant on Tufail's property.  The 
majority opinion concludes that Tufail did not breach this 
warranty because the lease did not define "Church's Chicken" as 
a fast-food restaurant.  However, the only reasonable meaning of 
"Church's Chicken" is a fast-food restaurant. 
¶53 Even if the lease were deemed ambiguous, the extrinsic 
evidence demonstrates that Church's Chicken is a fast-food 
restaurant, and both parties were aware of that fact when they 
signed the lease.  Tufail's warranty that no ordinances 
prevented the operation of a Church's Chicken was false because 
the Milwaukee zoning code requires any freestanding fast-food 
restaurant to have a special use permit.  Therefore, Tufail 
breached the lease. 
¶54 The majority opinion employs a sterile, technical 
interpretation of the lease that abandons the basic principles 
of contract interpretation.  When interpreting a contract, the 
court's goal has always been to effect the intent of the parties 
as it is expressed in the language of the contract.  The 
importance of upholding this principle cannot be overstated 
because people in business use contracts to try to minimize 
uncertainty in relation to their reasonable expectations.  
¶55 Parties generally enter agreements to advance their 
economic interests.  Risks, of course, are inevitable.  But if 
No.  2011AP1451.dtp 
 
2 
 
one party is able to frustrate the basic purpose of a contract 
through 
an 
unreasonable 
interpretation 
of 
its 
terms 
and 
commitments, instability will follow, and we will be left with a 
system of law that rewards the more cunning party and disregards 
mutual intent.  Because the majority opinion supports an 
implausible interpretation of the lease contract in this case, I 
must respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶56 In 
2000 
Tufail 
purchased 
a 
property 
with 
a 
freestanding building located at 1635 West North Avenue (the 
Property) in Milwaukee.  The Property was operated as a New York 
Chicken 
fast-food 
restaurant, 
and 
Tufail 
continued 
that 
operation until the fall of 2007.  The Property had formerly 
been a Church's Chicken.  In fact, Tufail later testified that 
"it was an old design Church's Chicken which [he] was running."  
Tufail was not inexperienced in the restaurant business; he 
owned four other restaurants.   
¶57 When he acquired the Property in 2000, Tufail wanted 
to continue operating the fast-food restaurant.  His request was 
denied by a city plan examiner.  Tufail was told that a fast-
food restaurant was a special use under the zoning code and he 
would need to obtain a special use permit.  He eventually 
acquired a ten-year special use permit from the Milwaukee Board 
of Zoning Appeals (BOZA).  When Tufail temporarily closed the 
restaurant in or about October of 2007, he had approximately 
three years left on his ten-year special use permit before it 
would have to be renewed.   
No.  2011AP1451.dtp 
 
3 
 
¶58 Midwest approached Tufail about opening a Church's 
Chicken restaurant at the Property both before and after Tufail 
shut down operation of his New York Chicken.  Midwest is a 
corporate entity that operates Church's Chicken restaurants and 
is owned by Aslam Khan (Khan).  Munshi Ali, a Church's Chicken 
manager at a different location, approached Tufail four or five 
times and stated that Khan wanted to lease Tufail's property to 
operate a Church's Chicken.  Khan himself eventually visited the 
Property with several other people affiliated with Church's 
Chicken.  Khan stated that he owned many Church's Chicken 
restaurants in the Midwest and said that Tufail's property value 
would go up if Church's Chicken moved in.   
¶59 Two or three days after Khan visited the Property, 
Khan sent an agent, Tariq Malik (Malik), to Tufail with a lease 
drafted by Midwest.  Malik and Tufail went to Tufail's attorney, 
who made some changes to the lease.  However, the attorney did 
not alter Paragraph 5, which contained the provisions regarding 
the use of the premises.  At some point before he signed the 
lease, Tufail visited a Church's Chicken at another location to 
see how Midwest would alter the Property.   
¶60 Tufail and Midwest entered into a five-year lease (the 
Lease) for the Property in March 2008.  The "Use of Premises" 
section in Paragraph 5 of the Lease stated: 
Tenant may use and occupy the Premises for any 
lawful purpose, including, but not limited to, the 
retail sales, consumption, and delivery of food and 
beverages which shall include, but not be limited to, 
Chicken 
products, 
Fish 
products, 
bread 
products, 
salads, sandwiches, dessert items, promotional items, 
No.  2011AP1451.dtp 
 
4 
 
and any other items sold by any Church's Chicken 
store. 
¶61 The "Representations and Warranties" section of the 
Lease, in Paragraph 33(g), stated that the landlord represents 
and warrants that "no existing restrictions, building and zoning 
ordinances, or other laws or requirements of any governmental 
authority prevent the use of the Premises for the purposes set 
forth in Paragraph 5."   
¶62 The 
Lease 
also 
stated 
at 
the 
end 
of 
the 
"Representations 
and 
Warranties" 
section 
that 
the 
representations and warranties "are material ones, and Landlord 
accordingly agrees that any misrepresentation or breach of such 
warranty will be reason for Tenant to terminate this Lease."   
¶63 Regarding 
interpretation 
of 
these 
provisions, 
Paragraph 38 of the Lease said, "This Lease shall be interpreted 
to the broadest extent possible to give full and fair meaning to 
the intentions of the parties hereto." (Emphasis added.) 
¶64 Midwest entered the Property and began remodeling it 
in May 2008.  According to Midwest, the Property required a 
substantial amount of cleaning and repair work.  However, 
Midwest suspended the renovation when it was denied a building 
permit.   
¶65 When Midwest applied for that permit, it was told that 
it would have to apply for a special use permit to operate a 
fast-food restaurant in a freestanding building.  The examiner 
for the City, Barbara Jones, stated in her denial letter that 
the Milwaukee zoning code did not allow the Property to be used 
as a fast-food restaurant.  Thus, Midwest unexpectedly learned 
No.  2011AP1451.dtp 
 
5 
 
that it was faced with the same obstacles with zoning ordinances 
that Tufail had faced roughly eight years earlier.  What Midwest 
did not know was that Tufail's business had been cited for 21 
health code violations by the city in 2007 and had antagonized a 
lot of nearby residents.   
 
¶66 On May 29, 2008, Midwest applied for a special use 
permit to operate a fast-food restaurant with a drive-through 
within 150 feet of residential property.  Four sections of the 
City of Milwaukee zoning code were in play.  Section 295-203-
9.f. defines a sit-down restaurant as: 
a restaurant where the food or beverages sold are 
consumed at tables located on the premises, where 
taking food or beverages from the premises is purely 
incidental, where food or beverages are normally 
served utilizing nondisposable containers and utensils 
and where the consumption of food or beverages in 
vehicles on the premises in which the building is 
located does not regularly occur, or where the 
restaurant is located within a building containing 
more than one principal use other than another 
restaurant.  This term does not include a tavern. 
¶67 Section 295-203-9.g. defines a fast-food or carry-out 
restaurant as "a restaurant other than a sit-down restaurant 
where the manner of preparation, packaging and serving of food 
or beverages encourages their consumption outside the building.  
This term does not include a tavern."  Section 295-603-2.o. 
requires that a fast-food restaurant be in a building containing 
at least one permitted use, or the restaurant must get a special 
use permit.  Finally, Section 295-603-2.j.3. states that a 
drive-through may not be located within 150 feet of residential 
property.   
No.  2011AP1451.dtp 
 
6 
 
¶68 Midwest's 
intended 
use 
of 
the 
Property 
was 
inconsistent with the definition of a sit-down restaurant.  The 
city immediately recognized that Church's Chicken, like the 
prior New York Chicken, is a fast-food restaurant and it would 
likely expect to use the existing drive-through.  Thus, without 
a special use permit, operating a Church's Chicken on the 
Property would violate two separate zoning code provisions: the 
prohibition 
against 
operating 
a 
freestanding 
fast-food 
restaurant and the prohibition against having a drive-through 
within 150 feet of residential property.   
¶69 In September 2008, approximately six months after it 
signed the Lease, Midwest obtained a special use permit to 
operate the restaurant.  However, the city imposed very 
different conditions on Midwest from the conditions it had 
imposed on Tufail.  Tufail obtained a ten-year permit; Midwest 
received a one-year permit with no assurance of renewal.  Tufail 
was permitted to operate until 4:00 a.m.  Midwest could operate 
its Church's Chicken until only 9:00 p.m.  The city's permit 
also required Church's Chicken to pick up all garbage within a 
one-block radius of the Property.  The president of Falcon 
Holdings, which operates Midwest, testified that it would be too 
expensive to take care of all the garbage within a block of the 
Property and that a Church's Chicken would be less profitable if 
it had to close at 9:00 p.m.   
¶70 The 
BOZA 
chairman 
stated 
that 
Midwest 
faced 
a 
difficult decision whether to invest "hundreds of thousands of 
dollars for a one year approval by this board.  There is no 
No.  2011AP1451.dtp 
 
7 
 
guarantee of an approval after one year."  The local community 
appeared to share the chairman's concern, and many city 
residents opposed the special use permit. 
¶71 Due to the long delay in obtaining any special use 
permit and then the severe restrictions added to the permit, 
Midwest stopped paying rent.   
II 
¶72 The 
plain 
language 
of 
the 
Lease 
unambiguously 
demonstrates that the parties intended for Midwest to operate a 
Church's Chicken fast-food restaurant on the Property.  The 
court's goal in contract interpretation is to discern the 
intentions of the parties as expressed in the language of the 
contract.  Town Bank v. City Real Estate Dev., LLC, 2010 WI 134, 
¶33, 330 Wis. 2d 340, 793 N.W.2d 476.  The court will look at 
the ordinary meaning of the contractual language, and if it is 
unambiguous, the contractual interpretation remains within the 
four corners of the contract.  Id.  A contract is ambiguous when 
"it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation."  
Id.   
¶73 The broad language in the Lease unambiguously suggests 
that Midwest could have operated almost any lawful business on 
the Property.  Paragraph 5 of the Lease states that "Tenant may 
use and occupy the Premises for any lawful purpose . . . ."  It 
was not unreasonable for Midwest to assume that it could operate 
a freestanding fast-food restaurant because that is a seemingly 
lawful purpose and because New York Chicken had operated on the 
property in that manner.  Moreover, the Lease quickly narrows 
No.  2011AP1451.dtp 
 
8 
 
its intent by adding the words "including . . . the retail 
sales, consumption, and delivery of food and beverages."  Then 
the Lease pinpoints its objective by naming "Chicken products, 
Fish products, bread products, salads, sandwiches, dessert 
items, promotional items, and any other items sold by any 
Church's Chicken store." (Emphasis added.) 
¶74 The Lease in this case is unambiguous because it uses 
"Church's Chicken" according to its ordinary meaning: a fast-
food restaurant.1  The Lease states that Midwest may use the 
Property for "retail sales, consumption, and delivery of food 
and 
beverages 
which 
shall 
include . . . Chicken 
products . . . and any other items sold by any Church's Chicken 
store."   
¶75 Courts must interpret a contract "in the manner that 
it would be understood by persons in the business to which the 
contract relates."  Columbia Propane, L.P. v. Wis. Gas Co., 2003 
WI 38, ¶12, 261 Wis. 2d 70, 661 N.W.2d 776.2  In the restaurant 
business, "Church’s Chicken is a highly recognized brand name in 
the Quick Service Restaurant sector and is one of the largest 
quick-service chicken concepts in the [w]orld."  Church's 
Chicken Celebrates Its Southern Hospitality with Kick Off of New 
                                                 
1 Interestingly, the first Church's Chicken restaurant was 
called "Church's Fried Chicken-To-Go."  One Man, One Chicken 
Legacy, 
Churchs.com, 
http://www.churchs.com/about.html 
(last 
visited June 25, 2013).  Church's Chicken has always been a 
fast-food restaurant. 
2 See also N. Gate Corp. v. Nat'l Food Stores, 30 
Wis. 2d 317, 321, 140 N.W.2d 744 (1966); All-Star Ins. Corp. v. 
APS Ins. Agency, Inc., 112 Wis. 2d 329, 333, 332 N.W.2d 828 (Ct. 
App. 1983); 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 337 (2004).    
No.  2011AP1451.dtp 
 
9 
 
Advertising 
Campaign, 
(Nov. 
3, 
2011), 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20111103005028/en/Church%E
2%80%99s-Chicken-Celebrates-Southern-Hospitality-Kick-
Advertising.  Because of Church's Chicken's "highly recognized 
brand name," the court of appeals had no trouble asserting that, 
"[i]t is undisputed here that a Church's Chicken is a fast-food 
restaurant.  It was not necessary for the use provision in the 
lease to include additional words allowing operation of a fast-
food restaurant.  A Church's Chicken is a fast-food restaurant."  
Tufail v. Midwest Hospitality, LLC, No. 2011AP1451, unpublished 
slip op., ¶8 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2012). 
¶76 Even though Tufail is correct that not everyone would 
understand what a Church's Chicken is, its reputation in the 
restaurant industry demonstrates that those in the business 
would know that it is a fast-food restaurant.3  Since the only 
reasonable meaning of "Church's Chicken" is a fast-food chicken 
restaurant, a paragraph that allows for the sale of "items sold 
by any Church's Chicken store" unambiguously contemplates the 
operation of the Property as a fast-food restaurant. 
¶77 Furthermore, the Lease explicitly calls for broad 
interpretation to avoid an unfair reading of the contract and to 
"give full and fair meaning to the intentions of the parties."  
It would not be reasonable to define "Church's Chicken" in a way 
that contradicts its true definition.  Midwest persuasively 
argues that "Church's Chicken" must refer to a fast-food 
                                                 
3 At trial, Tufail's own expert understood that a Church's 
Chicken is a fast-food restaurant and that Midwest intended to 
operate a freestanding Church's Chicken on the Property.   
No.  2011AP1451.dtp 
 
10 
 
restaurant because all Church's Chicken restaurants are fast-
food restaurants.  Since the zoning code did not permit a fast-
food restaurant on the Property and Church's Chicken is a fast-
food restaurant, Tufail's warranty that no ordinances prevented 
the operation of a Church's Chicken on the Property was false.4 
¶78 The problem with Tufail's warranty is apparent when 
compared to another Lease provision.  Paragraph 24(b) says, "If 
allowed by local governmental authorities, Tenant shall have the 
right to erect and maintain exterior free standing sign(s) in 
the location set forth on Exhibit 'A'.  Landlord agrees to 
cooperate 
fully 
with 
Tenant 
in 
obtaining 
all 
required 
governmental permits, licenses, approvals and variances for 
Tenant's sign(s)."  This paragraph is clear that the tenant 
might need to get government permits or variances in order to 
erect the desired signage.  In contrast, Paragraph 33(g) 
provides a broad warranty that there are no "requirements of any 
governmental authority" that would prevent the tenant from using 
the Property as specified in Paragraph 5.  Tufail was not forced 
to embrace the broad warranty in Paragraph 33(g).  He could have 
made a qualified commitment as appears in Paragraph 24(b), or he 
could have forthrightly disclosed the zoning regulations and 
made the Lease contingent upon receipt of a satisfactory special 
                                                 
4 The majority opinion observes that the circuit court made 
a finding of fact that not all Church's Chicken restaurants have 
a drive-through.  Majority op., ¶39.  However, the drive-through 
issue is a red herring.  Church's Chicken is undeniably a fast-
food restaurant chain.  The zoning code prohibited the operation 
of a freestanding fast-food restaurant regardless of whether 
that restaurant had a drive-through.  Tufail warranted against 
that obstacle.   
No.  2011AP1451.dtp 
 
11 
 
use permit.  However, because Tufail warranted that there were 
no zoning requirements with which Midwest had to comply in order 
to sell Church's Chicken products in a fast-food restaurant, 
Tufail must be held to his promise. 
III 
¶79 Tufail's warranty that no restrictions prevent the 
operation of a Church's Chicken is unambiguous, but even if 
"Church's Chicken" is deemed ambiguous, the parol evidence 
demonstrates that the parties understood Church's Chicken to be 
a fast-food restaurant.  If a contract is ambiguous, the court 
may use parol evidence to explain the ambiguous term.  Town 
Bank, 330 Wis. 2d 340, ¶38.  Tufail admitted that "[t]he 
intended purpose of the Lease, as represented by Midwest, was 
for it to open a new Church's Chicken restaurant at the Leased 
Premises."  Tufail had to know that Church's Chicken is a fast-
food restaurant because his New York Chicken restaurant was an 
old Church's Chicken.  Furthermore, Tufail saw that Church's 
Chicken is a fast-food restaurant when he visited one before 
signing the Lease.   
¶80 Tufail's visit is important because the parties' 
course of dealings can clarify contractual ambiguities.  See 
Martinson v. Brooks Equip. Leasing, Inc., 36 Wis. 2d 209, 219, 
152 N.W.2d 849 (1967).  In Martinson, the contract for the 
construction of a pool was ambiguous because it incorporated 
plans for a pool but did not explicitly incorporate plans for a 
filter system.  Id. at 218-19.  However, the evidence showed 
that the appellant knew that the filter system was part of the 
No.  2011AP1451.dtp 
 
12 
 
plans for the pool.  Id.  Furthermore, because the plans for the 
pool included the plans for the filter system and the contractor 
used a single set of plans to construct both, the plans for the 
filter system were part of the contract.  Id. at 219-20.  The 
course of dealings in the present case demonstrates that Tufail 
knew what the term "Church's Chicken" meant.  He had visited 
another Church's Chicken fast-food restaurant to see how Midwest 
would alter the Property.  This visit shows that the parties 
knew and intended that Midwest would operate a fast-food 
restaurant on the Property. 
¶81 Tufail's interpretation of the Lease is also suspect 
because it would render the inclusion of "Church's Chicken" 
meaningless, and courts avoid interpreting contracts to make 
portions superfluous.  See DeWitt Ross & Stevens, S.C. v. Galaxy 
Gaming & Racing Ltd. P'ship, 2004 WI 92, ¶44, 273 Wis. 2d 577, 
682 N.W.2d 839.  In DeWitt, a law firm provided services to 
Galaxy under a contract that charged interest on untimely 
payments, but Galaxy had no assets or income.  Id., ¶7.  
Galaxy's owner guaranteed full payment, but the guaranty was 
silent as to whether the owner would pay interest.  Id., ¶43.  
It would have been meaningless to include the interest clause in 
the contract with Galaxy, a company with no assets, unless the 
owner's guaranty for full payment included a guaranty to pay the 
interest.  Id., ¶¶46-47.  Similarly, it would make little sense 
for the Lease to mention "Church's Chicken" four times if that 
term could refer to any type of restaurant.  Tufail seems to 
suggest that since the Lease does not explicitly define 
No.  2011AP1451.dtp 
 
13 
 
"Church's Chicken," no warranty would be violated if a Church's 
Chicken could open and operate under any circumstance.  However, 
the "Church's Chicken" term is useful only if it refers to the 
Church's Chicken fast-food restaurants that actually exist. 
IV 
¶82 After a trial, the circuit court ruled in favor of 
Tufail.  In so doing, the court appears to have overlooked or 
discounted critical testimony, minimized the fast-food zoning 
problem to focus on the drive-through, shifted the blame to 
Midwest for failing to engage in due diligence, and disregarded 
an explicit provision in the Lease. 
 
¶83 From the outset, Midwest sought to lease Tufail's 
property to open and operate a Church's Chicken fast-food 
restaurant.  Paragraph 33(g) of the Lease was designed to 
minimize the hazard of an existing zoning barrier against the 
operation of a traditional Church's Chicken restaurant and to 
provide an escape clause from a five-year lease if an existing 
barrier unexpectedly materialized.  Midwest no doubt wanted a 
drive-through which is often, if not always, a component of a 
fast-food restaurant.  If a drive-through were the sole or major 
sticking point, the specific representations in the Lease might 
present a different case.   
¶84 The circuit court recast the facts and narrowed the 
issue.  The circuit court found that "there was no evidence 
presented that Tufail knew about the many other Church's Chicken 
restaurants, whether or not they had drive-through operations or 
other Church's Chicken franchise requirements." 
No.  2011AP1451.dtp 
 
14 
 
 
¶85 In my view, the statement about Tufail's knowledge is 
clearly erroneous, and the court's emphasis on the drive-through 
problem fails to deal with Midwest's legal argument that there 
were two zoning problems they had to face, contrary to Tufail's 
warranty.   
¶86 As to his knowledge, Tufail testified that the 
restaurant he bought in 2000 was a drive-through and carry-out 
fast-food restaurant: 
 
Q 
All right.  And when you bought [the 
Property], was it an ongoing restaurant? 
 
A 
It was a running restaurant.  It was a 
chicken place.   
 
Q 
What was the name of it then? 
 
A 
At that time it was a New York Chicken.  But 
basically it was a Church's Chicken place closed down.  
And the [previous owner], he bought it from Church's 
Chicken and put the name——  They didn't let him use 
their Church's Chicken.  They——  So he put a New York 
Chicken [there]. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶87 Tufail acknowledged that "it was an old design 
Church's Chicken which [he] was running."  (Emphasis added.)  He 
said that he used Church's Chicken equipment in his New York 
Chicken and suggested that Church's Chicken use the same 
equipment for its new operation.  Tufail visited another 
Church's Chicken in Milwaukee, and he discussed the new interior 
and exterior alterations that Midwest intended to make.  He 
expected that Midwest would make his property look like other 
Church's Chicken restaurants.  He testified that the purpose of 
No.  2011AP1451.dtp 
 
15 
 
the Lease "as it was presented by Midwest [was] to open a new 
Church's Chicken restaurant at the leased premises." 
¶88 In March 2007, before the Lease was fully negotiated 
and signed, Tufail was visited by Khan who oversees more than 
100 Church's Chicken franchises in the Midwest.  The circuit 
court and the majority appear to believe that Khan and Tufail 
never discussed what a Church's Chicken restaurant is all about, 
so that Tufail really did not know.  This view of the facts is 
unrealistic if not incredible and is directly contrary to 
Tufail's acknowledgment at trial that he understood Midwest 
could not operate the Property without a special use permit. 
¶89 In short, the court's finding that Tufail knew nothing 
about other Church's Chicken restaurants cannot be squared with 
the record. 
¶90 The court made another questionable finding of fact.  
The court found that, "[i]n early 2008, after the [New York 
Chicken] restaurant had closed, Tufail was then approached by 
representatives of Midwest Hospitality who sought to lease the 
subject property." (Emphasis added.)  Tufail's attorney, citing 
the record, writes in his brief:  "Midwest had approached Tufail 
about opening a Church's Chicken restaurant at the location 
prior to and immediately after Tufail temporarily ceased 
operations of his chicken restaurant." (Emphasis added.)  In 
short, Tufail's attorney corrected the circuit court's findings 
of fact. 
No.  2011AP1451.dtp 
 
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¶91 The court of appeals——in its recitation of facts——
simply disregarded the circuit court's mistaken "findings" on 
both matters discussed above. 
¶92 As noted, the circuit court found that "there was no 
evidence that Tufail knew . . . whether other Church's Chicken 
restaurants had drive-through operations."  It also found that 
"the vast majority of Church's Chicken restaurants have drive-
through operations, but not all." (Emphasis added.)  The latter 
finding is correct, but it is seriously incomplete.  The court 
made no finding that there was any Church's Chicken restaurant 
that was not a fast-food restaurant.  The court also made no 
finding that there was any freestanding Church's Chicken that 
did not have a drive-through operation.  More important for 
purposes of this case is that the Property had been operated as 
a freestanding fast-food restaurant and was intended by Midwest 
to be operated as a freestanding Church's Chicken fast-food 
restaurant.  The point is that the Property's operation as a 
fast-food restaurant was not allowed by the Milwaukee zoning 
code without a special use permit.  Tufail warranted otherwise. 
¶93 Although the circuit court made sparse findings of 
fact about Church's Chicken restaurants, it made lengthy 
findings about Midwest's lack of due diligence.  The court said: 
 
Brian Parrish is a commercial real estate broker 
who testified about industry custom and practice 
relating to commercial leases.  Parrish testified that 
prior to entering into commercial leases parties 
routinely perform due diligence and described that as 
the period of time prior to the occupant taking 
occupancy 
to 
uncover 
any 
issues 
that 
they 
may 
encounter that would inhibit them from doing what they 
intend to do at that property, and that includes 
No.  2011AP1451.dtp 
 
17 
 
government approvals, construction costs, financing, 
inspections.  He further testified that any issues of 
import to the tenant[,] those items could have been a 
contingency, a due diligence item, in the lease.  
Midwest 
Hospitality 
did 
not 
perform 
proper 
due 
diligence.  In fact, Mr. Habash specifically testified 
that Midwest Hospitality didn't do any due diligence.  
He stated it was because of trust and assurances by 
Mr. Tufail.  But the Court does not find the testimony 
of Mr. Habash about reliance on Mr. Tufail credible.  
Mr. 
Habash 
is 
a 
senior 
executive 
at 
Midwest 
Hospitality who has been involved with the lease and 
renovation of many prior Church's Chicken restaurants.  
Mr. Habash is the president of the independent 
franchise council of over 750 such restaurants.  Mr. 
Habash was at the subject property before entering 
into the lease and saw its poor condition.  It is not 
credible to believe that Mr. Habash relied upon 
statements of Mr. Tufail when making the decision of 
whether or not to have Midwest Hospitality enter into 
the subject lease.  Rather, it is more credible that 
Mr. Habash relied upon his own knowledge, experience, 
and personal inspection. 
(Emphasis added.)  
 
¶94 The circuit court's oral decision suggests that the 
court believed that Midwest should have thoroughly investigated 
all applicable zoning requirements before signing the Lease——
that Paragraph 33(g) does not mean anything because Midwest 
should have previously discovered the requirements for a special 
use permit.  These sentiments appear to substitute the court's 
expectations for the parties' intentions. 
¶95 The majority opinion does not acknowledge the circuit 
court's reliance on "due diligence" as a justification for not 
enforcing the warranties in the Lease.  This raises a very 
important issue of contract law. 
 
¶96 This court has observed that, "in general, the laws in 
existence at the time of the contract are incorporated into that 
No.  2011AP1451.dtp 
 
18 
 
contract."  Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 2006 WI 
107, ¶60, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 719 N.W.2d 408 (citing Von Hoffman v. 
City of Quincy, 71 U.S. 535, 550 n.30 (1866)).  The court of 
appeals has said: "It must be assumed that parties to a contract 
had knowledge of the law in effect at the time of the 
agreement."  Krause v. Mass. Bay Ins. Co., 161 Wis. 2d 711, 718, 
468 N.W.2d 755 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing Menard v. Sass, 127 
Wis. 2d 397, 399, 379 N.W.2d 344 (Ct. App. 1985)).   
 
¶97 Although these principles may be sound in general, 
parties seldom have equal knowledge of the law.  One party 
cannot sign a contract assuring the other party that it will 
have no problems under existing law and then assert a due 
diligence defense when that assurance proves false.  This axiom 
was eloquently stated in the English case of Redgrave v. Hurd: 
There is another proposition of law of very great 
importance which I think it is necessary for me to 
state, because, with great deference to the very 
learned Judge from whom this appeal comes, I think it 
is not quite accurately stated in his judgment.  If a 
man is induced to enter into a contract by a false 
representation it is not a sufficient answer to him to 
say, "If you had used due diligence you would have 
found out that the statement was untrue. You had the 
means afforded you of discovering its falsity, and did 
not choose to avail yourself of them."  I take it to 
be a settled doctrine of equity, not only as regards 
specific performance but also as regards rescission, 
that this is not an answer unless there is such delay 
as 
constitutes 
a 
defence 
under 
the 
Statute 
of 
Limitations. 
Redgrave v. Hurd, [1881] 20 Ch.D. 1 at 13 (Eng.) (first emphasis 
added).  One hundred years later, this ancient doctrine was 
embodied in our Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 172 (1981): 
"A recipient's fault in not knowing or discovering the facts 
No.  2011AP1451.dtp 
 
19 
 
before 
making 
the 
contract 
does 
not 
make 
his 
reliance 
unjustified unless it amounts to a failure to act in good faith 
and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing."   
 
¶98 If the Supreme Court of Wisconsin intends to reject 
these principles, it ought to explain why.  Rejection of these 
principles will certainly have implications for the enforcement 
of Wis. Stat. § 100.18, which was one of Midwest's counterclaims 
in this case.   
 
¶99 One other item undermines the ruling of the circuit 
court.  The court looked to Paragraph 5 of the Lease and said: 
"If Paragraph Five were vague or ambiguous in any way, the Court 
finds that the language contained therein was drafted by Midwest 
Hospitality and it should be construed against the drafter."  
This is directly contrary to Paragraph 36 of the Lease, which 
provides in part: "Landlord and Tenant have negotiated the terms 
of this Lease; therefore, this Lease shall not be interpreted or 
construed against or in favor of any party." (Emphasis added.)   
 
¶100 In sum, the majority opinion heavily relies on the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law of the circuit court and 
completely rejects the well-considered decision of the court of 
appeals.  This is a mistake of the first order. 
V 
 
¶101 The majority opinion also relies on the "integration 
clause" in the contract as precluding any consideration of parol 
evidence.  This too is an error because the integration clause 
applies only to prior agreements.  An integration clause "does 
not bar the use of extrinsic evidence to clarify the meaning of 
No.  2011AP1451.dtp 
 
20 
 
an ambiguous text."  Roth v. City of Glendale, 2000 WI 100, ¶49, 
237 Wis. 2d 173, 614 N.W.2d 467 (Sykes, J., concurring) (quoting 
Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d 603, 608 (7th Cir. 
1993)); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 214 
(extrinsic evidence is admissible to establish the meaning of a 
writing even if integrated).   
¶102 If there is an integration clause, courts "may not 
consider evidence of any prior or contemporaneous oral or 
written agreement between the parties."  Town Bank, 330 
Wis. 2d 340, ¶37 (footnote omitted).  In Town Bank, there was a 
commitment letter before the parties signed the contract, and 
the integration clause in the contract precluded consideration 
of the prior commitment letter.  Id., ¶41.  In the present case, 
there was no prior oral or written agreement regarding the 
Property or the definition of "Church's Chicken."  If there were 
any ambiguity in the term "Church's Chicken," the integration 
clause would not prevent the use of extrinsic evidence to 
interpret that term in the Lease. 
¶103 Even if the Lease were viewed as not specifying the 
operation of a Church's Chicken fast-food restaurant, the intent 
of the parties compels that interpretation.  Paragraph 5 of the 
Lease allows for the use of the Property to sell items 
traditionally sold by any Church's Chicken.  Items traditionally 
sold by Church's Chicken are fast-food items, and the only 
reasonable interpretation is that an establishment selling fast-
food items is a fast-food establishment.  Because the court's 
goal in construing a contract is to give effect to the parties' 
No.  2011AP1451.dtp 
 
21 
 
intent, Town Bank, 330 Wis. 2d 340, ¶33, it is reasonable to 
interpret the inclusion of "Church's Chicken" to mean that 
Midwest could operate a Church's Chicken fast-food restaurant. 
VI 
¶104 The majority opinion leans upon the fact that Midwest 
ultimately attained a special use permit to operate a fast-food 
restaurant with a drive-through.  This does not remedy Tufail's 
false warranty.  The Lease warranted that there were no 
ordinances or restrictions preventing the uses specified in 
Paragraph 5.  While Midwest obtained a one-year special use 
permit, that permit did not change the fact that operating a 
freestanding restaurant at the Property was not a permitted use.  
The city plan examiner denied Midwest's application to operate a 
Church's Chicken on the Property because the zoning code 
prevented such a use.  Midwest could have terminated the Lease 
at that point, but it acted in good faith and worked hard to 
obtain a special use permit.  Unfortunately, the excessive 
restrictions in the permit prevented Midwest from operating a 
Church's Chicken because the restrictions made it economically 
impracticable to do so.   
¶105 Tufail had a permit to operate his New York Chicken 
from 10:00 a.m. to 4:00 a.m.——18 hours a day, seven days a week.  
Midwest received a permit that allowed it to operate until only 
9:00 p.m., which likely was seven hours per day and 49 hours per 
week less than Tufail had operated.  If the Church's Chicken 
restaurant were designed to open at 11:00 a.m., the restaurant 
would operate only ten hours per day.  This completely scuttled 
No.  2011AP1451.dtp 
 
22 
 
Midwest's business model for a restaurant located at the 
intersection of North Avenue and 17th Street in Milwaukee.   
¶106 Moreover, the special use permit imposed another 
economic burden that prevented the operation of a Church's 
Chicken.  The requirement that Midwest pick up garbage within a 
one-block radius of the Property was prohibitive.  As the 
majority points out, a Midwest representative testified that the 
special use permit imposed restrictions that would have made the 
operation of a Church's Chicken "impossible."  Majority op., 
¶14.  An economic impossibility is just as preventative as a 
physical or legal impossibility.  The circuit court apparently 
failed to consider these insurmountable economic burdens when it 
stated that the special use permit "did not prevent, in any way, 
Midwest Hospitality from opening a Church's Chicken restaurant 
at the subject property with a drive-through and as a fast food 
restaurant." 
 
The 
special 
use 
permit's 
restrictions 
and 
uncertainty effectively prevented the operation of the Church's 
Chicken that the parties intended.   
VII 
¶107 When Tufail signed the Lease, he misrepresented that 
there were no ordinances that would prevent any use of the 
Property contemplated in Paragraph 5 of the Lease.  Although the 
Lease did not define "Church's Chicken," the only meaning of 
that term is a fast-food restaurant.  Even if "Church's Chicken" 
is ambiguous, the parol evidence demonstrates that both parties 
understood that a Church's Chicken is a fast-food restaurant.  
Since the Milwaukee zoning code states that a freestanding fast-
No.  2011AP1451.dtp 
 
23 
 
food restaurant is not a permitted use, Tufail breached his 
warranty. 
 
¶108 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2011AP1451.dtp 
 
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