Title: Weinstein v. Hurlbert

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2012 ME  
84 
Docket: 
Kno-11-399 
Argued: 
May 10, 2012 
Decided: 
June 28, 2012 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and 
JABAR, JJ. 
 
 
ANDREW WEINSTEIN et al. 
 
v. 
 
RICHARD HURLBERT et al. 
 
 
LEVY, J. 
 
[¶1]  Richard Hurlbert, Audrey McGlashan, and Hurlbert-McGlashan, LLC 
(collectively, Hurlbert) appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court (Knox 
County, Hjelm, J.) declaring that Andrew and Melinda Weinstein (collectively, 
Weinstein) hold title to a portion of land through adverse possession.  Hurlbert 
argues that the trial court erred because Weinstein failed to satisfy his burden of 
establishing the required elements of an adverse possession claim.  We agree and 
vacate the judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  Hurlbert has record title to several parcels of land in Owls Head, 
including a portion of waterfront property known as Cliff Street that extends from 
 
 
 
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the end of Beach Street south and adjacent to the water.1  Weinstein owns property 
within the “L” created by the intersection of Beach and Cliff Streets, abutting 
Hurlbert’s property.  Cliff Street forms the record eastern boundary of Weinstein’s 
property.  This action arises from the parties’ dispute about ownership of the Cliff 
Street property. 
 
[¶3]  A jury-waived trial was held in the Superior Court at which a number 
of neighbors and former property owners from the neighborhood surrounding Cliff 
Street testified about the use of the property over time.2  With respect to 
Weinstein’s adverse possession claim, the court found the following facts, which 
have support in the record. 
 
[¶4]  Morris and Barbara Coates previously owned the property now owned 
by Weinstein (the “Weinstein property”) that is adjacent to the Cliff Street 
property.  The Coateses acquired the Weinstein property in 1984,3 and began to 
maintain the Cliff Street property by mowing the lawn, first themselves, and then 
by hiring a friend and nearby resident to help.  This friend mowed the area before 
the Coateses’ arrival for the summer months and transplanted rosa rugosa bushes 
                                               
 
1  There is no dispute that Hurlbert holds record title to the Cliff Street property. 
 
2  At trial, the parties presented additional issues about the ownership and access to the Cliff Street 
property, including claims for prescriptive easements, declaratory judgment regarding ownership, and 
nuisance.  Because Hurlbert only appeals from the portion of the judgment addressing adverse possession, 
the additional claims will not be addressed. 
 
3  Weinstein argues that the Coates’s acquisition of the property in 1984 began the prescriptive period. 
 
 
 
 
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in a row along the seaward edge of the lawn area on the Cliff Street property.4  
Barbara Coates maintained and pruned the plantings and gardened on the Cliff 
Street property. 
 
[¶5]  When Weinstein acquired the property in 2004, he rebuilt the house 
and began to occupy it for the summer in 2005.  During construction, workers 
stored building materials on the Cliff Street property.  Because the construction 
and storage of materials damaged the lawn, Weinstein had the area regraded and 
reseeded.  The Weinsteins maintained the Cliff Street property in a manner similar 
to the Coateses: they mowed the lawn, or hired someone to mow; they pruned the 
rosa rugosa bushes; and they otherwise kept up the area.  When Hurlbert’s 
predecessor-in-interest posted a notice intended to prevent a prescriptive easement 
claim, as well as stakes marking the property boundary, Weinstein removed the 
sign and the stakes.  Weinstein’s general maintenance ended when Hurlbert began 
to mow the Cliff Street property in 2009, after having acquired title in 2008.  
However, between 1984 and 2008, no one other than the Coateses and the 
Weinsteins maintained the Cliff Street property. 
 
[¶6]  Other members of the community historically used the Cliff Street 
property but that use diminished in the mid-1980s.  Before the mid-1980s, local 
residents used the property for games of horseshoes and as a place for children to 
                                               
 
4  The rosa rugosa bushes mark the eastern boundary of the area in dispute. 
 
 
 
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play.  Later, children of the family that owned the property abutting the southern 
boundary of the Weinstein property used the Cliff Street property to cross between 
their land and the Beach Street area.  Boats were infrequently left on the lawn of 
the Cliff Street property, but this practice was limited after the mid-1980s.  The 
only person who left a boat on the lawn for more than a brief moment during 
transport was the same friend of the Coateses who planted the rosa rugosa bushes 
and helped them maintain the Cliff Street property.  There was evidence that 
a prior owner of another portion of Hurlbert’s property used the Cliff Street 
property as a turnaround for his car, but there was no evidence about how often he 
did this. 
 
  [¶7]  The court entered a written decision and judgment declaring that 
Weinstein holds title to the Cliff Street property by adverse possession.5  The court 
undertook a comprehensive analysis and, after observing that the acquisition of 
land by adverse possession is disfavored, see Striefel v. Charles-Keyt-Leaman 
P’ship, 1999 ME 111, ¶ 4, 733 A.2d 984, concluded that Weinstein had proved that 
he and his predecessors-in-title had used the disputed property for a period of at 
                                               
 
5  The Cliff Street property was described in the judgment as follows: 
 
a portion of the land described in a deed to defendants Richard Hurlbert and Audrey 
McGlashan recorded at book 3924 page 228 in the Knox County Registry of Deeds, such 
portion consisting of land bounded to the south by the land owned by Seagrave Cottage, 
LLC; to the west by the land that the plaintiffs owns [sic] through record title; to the 
north by Beach Street; and to the east by a line that runs on the seaward side of the rosa 
rugosa bushes.   
 
 
 
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least twenty years in a manner that satisfied the recognized criteria for adverse 
possession, see Weeks v. Krysa, 2008 ME 120, ¶ 12, 955 A.2d 234.  Hurlbert 
appeals. 
II.  LEGAL ANALYSIS 
 
[¶8]  “A party claiming title by adverse possession has the burden of 
proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that possession and use of the 
property was (1) actual; (2) open; (3) visible; (4) notorious; (5) hostile; (6) under 
a claim of right; (7) continuous; (8) exclusive; and (9) for a duration exceeding the 
twenty-year limitations period.”  Id.  Because a claim of adverse possession is 
a mixed question of law and fact, “whether the necessary facts exist is for the trier 
of fact, but whether those facts constitute adverse possession is an issue of law for 
the court to decide.”  Id. ¶ 11 (quotation marks omitted).  
 
[¶9]  Here, there is no indication that either party requested additional 
findings of fact pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52(a).  Therefore, “we will infer that the 
court made all findings necessary to support its conclusions, and we will review 
the court’s express and inferred findings of fact for clear error.”  Weeks, 2008 ME 
120, ¶ 11, 955 A.2d 234.  The trial court’s findings will be affirmed if supported by 
competent evidence.  Id.   
 
[¶10]  Hurlbert contends that the trial court’s decision was at odds with our 
precedent, particularly with respect to our decision in Weeks v. Krysa, 2008 ME 
 
 
 
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120, ¶ 1, 955 A.2d 234.  Hurlbert asserts that the Coateses’ and Weinsteins’ use of 
the Cliff Street property was no more notorious or hostile than the use at issue in 
Weeks—“casual, seasonal use of an undeveloped waterfront lot,” id. ¶ 2, which 
included recreational use, id. ¶ 9, maintenance of a garden that encroached on to 
the property, id. ¶ 18, and occasional brush and tree cutting, id. ¶¶ 6, 19. 
 
[¶11]  Although the trial court distinguished the facts of Weeks from those of 
the present case by concluding that the property was not a “vacant shorefront lot,” 
but instead, “the waterfront lawn of the house now owned by Weinstein” and 
“a prominent part of the outdoor living space connected specifically to the 
residence,” we cannot agree that the minor factual differences supporting this 
conclusion are sufficient to establish that the Weinsteins’ and their predecessors’ 
use of the property was hostile and notorious.  For the full prescriptive period, the 
adverse use of the property was limited to seasonal lawn mowing, the planting and 
pruning of several bushes, minimal gardening, a single instance in which building 
supplies were stored on the property, and removal of a posted notice intended to 
prevent a prescriptive easement and stakes placed on the property by the record 
owner. 
 
[¶12]  The “notorious” and “hostile” elements of adverse possession require 
more.  Seasonal grass mowing is not enough.  Cf. Dowley v. Morency, 1999 ME 
137, ¶ 16, 737 A.2d 1061 (noting, for the purposes of boundary acquiescence, that 
 
 
 
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“the mere cutting of grass is insufficient to produce a visible line of occupation”).  
Although more than grass mowing was found to have occurred here, the additional 
adverse acts were also seasonal, or largely isolated events.  Nor were those adverse 
acts made more compelling by evidence that other neighbors occasionally used the 
property in a manner consistent with uses typically made of vacant land in 
a neighborhood.  See Weeks, 2008 ME 120, ¶ 15, 955 A.2d 234 (noting Maine’s 
“open lands tradition”).  In light of the public policy disfavoring the acquisition of 
land through adverse possession, Weinstein’s use of the property was not 
sufficiently hostile and notorious to put the true owner “on notice that the land in 
question is actually, visibly, and exclusively held by a claimant in antagonistic 
purpose,” id. ¶ 13 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
The entry is: 
Judgment vacated.  Remanded for entry of 
judgment consistent with this decision. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
 
David J. Perkins, Esq., and N. Quinn Collins, Esq., Perkins Olson, P.A., 
Portland, for appellants Richard Hurlbert, Audrey McGlashan, and Hurlbert-
McGlashan, LLC 
 
Judy A.S. Metcalf, Esq., and Ryan P. Dumais, Esq., Eaton Peabody, 
Brunswick, for appellees Andrew and Melinda Weinstein 
 
 
 
 
 
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At oral argument: 
 
David J. Perkins, Esq., for appellants Richard Hurlbert and Audrey 
McGlashan 
 
Judy A.S. Metcalf, Esq., for appellees Andrew and Melinda Weinstein 
 
 
 
Knox County Superior Court docket number RE-2009-16 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY