Title: Allen v. Rampton

State: utah

Issuer: Utah Supreme Court

Document:

463 P.2d 7 (1969) 23 Utah 2d 336 Golden L. ALLEN, State Treasurer, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Calvin L. RAMPTON, Governor of the State of Utah, Sherman J. Preece, State Auditor of Utah, Herbert F. Smart, Director of Finance, W. Smoot Brimhall, Commissioner, Financial Institutions, and the Board of Examiners of the State of Utah, Defendants and Respondents. No. 11804. Supreme Court of Utah. December 31, 1969. A.M. Ferro, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for appellant. Raymond W. Gee, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for respondents. ELLETT, Justice. Appellant, Allen, is the duly elected, qualified, and acting treasurer of the State of Utah. The recent legislature enacted Chapter 206, Laws of Utah 1969, known as the State Money Management Act, which among other things created a division of investments in the office of the state treasurer. It further created an investment council within the division of investments to be composed of the state treasurer, the commissioner of financial institutions, and three other members appointed by the governor *8 by and with the advice and consent of the state treasurer and of the state senate. The act also provided for the employment of a chief administrative officer and a deputy administrative officer to be known as the financial analyst. These two officers are to be appointed by the state treasurer with the approval of at least four members of the investment council and are to serve at the will of the investment council. The act empowers the investment council to establish the policies of the division of investments, to direct the investment officer and the financial analyst, to adopt and promulgate rules and regulations pertaining to the investment of public funds, and generally to perform functions relating to the administration of public funds including the determination of the qualifications and control of depositories. Mr. Allen brought this suit for a declaratory judgment to determine that the act was unconstitutional in that it was an attempt to interfere with his duties as the state treasurer. The office of state treasurer is created by Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution of Utah, and the duties are set out in Article VII, Section 17, which reads: What are the duties required by the constitutional provision, and what "other duties" may the legislature require of the state treasurer? Those duties are not specified in the Constitution because there was, at the time the Constitution was drafted and adopted, the office of territorial treasurer whose duties were so well known to the framers of the Constitution that they may have considered it unnecessary to detail them. The state treasurer would have the duties of his predecessor, to wit, the duties that had theretofore been imposed upon the territorial treasurer, and those duties were assumed by the state treasurer in 1896 with the advent of statehood and have been performed by every state treasurer since that time. Among those duties has been that of the sole custodian of public funds. The state treasurer is liable on his bond for any loss of funds even where he is not at fault.[1] In speaking of the power of the legislature to add duties to constitutional officers, the Supreme Court of California in Love v. Baehr, 47 Cal. 364 (1874), at pages 367 and 368 said: Many cases have been decided by the courts of the various states which have a bearing upon the problem now before us. State ex rel. Kennedy v. Brunst, 26 Wis. 412, 7 Am.Rep. 84, 86 (1870), was a case brought by the sheriff of Milwaukee County to have a statute declared unconstitutional. The office of sheriff was created by the Constitution, and the statute in question provided that the House of Corrections of Milwaukee County should be the jail of *9 that county and that the inspector thereof should be ex officio the jailor of the county and have the exclusive charge and custody thereof and of the prisoners. The court in holding the statute unconstitutional said: The case of State ex rel. Josephs v. Douglas, 33 Nev. 82, 110 P. 177 (1910), involved a statute which made the secretary of state ex officio the clerk of the Supreme Court. In holding the statute invalid, the court at page 180 said: In 1965 the legislature of New Mexico enacted a statute providing for a transfer from the state auditor to the legislative audit commission all equipment, supplies, records, and all property held by him in his official capacity. It further provided that the state auditor should continue his duties until January 1, 1967, and after that date the salary of the state auditor would be one dollar per year. Even after 1967 the auditor was left with some duties and rights, including serving on the state board of finance and on the board of directors of the employees retirement association, and rights in the line of gubernatorial succession. In the case of Thompson v. Legislative Audit Commission, 79 N.M. 693, 448 P.2d 799 (1968), the court in holding the *10 act unconstitutional said at pages 802 and 803: The Arizona legislature passed an act creating the division of purchases and property control which placed some of the duties of the state auditor under the supervision of the state purchasing agent, an office created by the statute. In holding the act unconstitutional the court in Hudson v. Kelly, 76 Ariz. 255, 263 P.2d 362 (1953), at pages 366 and 369 said: The Constitution of Idaho sets up the office of auditor, while under the territorial government the officer was known as the comptroller. In the case of Gilbert v. Moody, 3 Idaho 3, 25 P. 1092, the court held that the office of comptroller had not been abolished by the Constitution that the name only had been changed to auditor. The Idaho Constitution provided that the executive officers, including the state auditor, should perform such duties as are prescribed by the Constitution and as may be prescribed by law. Thereafter the legislature created the office of controller and gave to the controller broad powers and duties, some of which belonged to the auditor. The constitutionality of this statute was questioned in the case of Wright v. Callahan, 61 Idaho 167, 99 P.2d 961 (Idaho 1940), wherein the court at pages 965 and 966 said: A case similar to the instant matter is that of Tucker v. State, 218 Ind. 614, 35 N.E.2d 270 (1941). The legislature of Indiana enacted a statute which placed the department of treasury in charge of a board consisting of the state treasurer (who was named as the chief administrative officer of the department), the governor, and the lieutenant governor. The Constitution of Indiana, like that of Utah, provides for the three separate and independent branches of government. In holding the statute unconstitutional, the Indiana court quoted from a prior Indiana case, State ex rel. Collett v. Gorby, 122 Ind. 17, 23 N.E. 678, 681 (1890), as follows: The court further quoted from the case of State ex rel. Hovey v. Noble, 188 Ind. 350, 21 N.E. 244, 247, 4 L.R.A. 101 (1889), as follows: The Constitution of the State of Colorado provided that the state treasurer would keep a separate account of each fund in his hands and report to the governor quarterly, in writing, under oath, the amount *12 of money in his hands, the place where deposited, and so forth, and it made the treasurer and his sureties responsible for any loss occurring to those funds. It further provided that the general assembly might provide by law further regulations for the safe-keeping and management of the public funds. House Bill No. 349 authorized the governor to dictate the particular banks in which public funds should be deposited, and the question of the constitutionality of that bill being raised in the legislature, the Supreme Court of Colorado was asked to give an opinion thereon. In the case of In re House Resolution Relating to House Bill No. 349, 12 Colo. 395, 21 P. 486 (1889), the Court at page 487 said: In regards to the power of the general assembly to provide by law for further regulations for the safekeeping and management of the public funds, the court said at page 488: This court has on many occasions said that for a statute to be held unconstitutional, it must clearly violate a provision thereof, and that if by any reasonable construction the statute can be made to harmonize with constitutional provisions, it will be so construed.[2] However, we cannot *13 shirk our duty to say that an act of the legislature is unconstitutional when it clearly appears to us that it conflicts with some provision of the state Constitution. The electorate of this entire state has chosen the plaintiff as its treasurer because of the confidence it had in his ability to perform the duties of his office and in his integrity. The act here questioned attempts to take from him those duties which have belonged to his office since statehood and prior thereto to the territorial treasurer. If he fails to measure up to the requirements of his office, that self-same electorate which elected him to office can remove him; and if he fails to keep safely the public funds entrusted to his care and keeping, then he and his bondsmen will have to respond for any losses sustained. To impose "ministers" upon him whom he can neither hire nor fire and who can choose the depositories for funds entrusted to his care which, if lost, will result in liability to him and his bondsmen is an undue interference with his constitutional rights and duties. Who is there to say that the appellant, the choice of the people of this state, is not qualified to select deputies knowledgeable in financial matters as would be the members of the division of investments? Would it not be better to run the investment officer or the fiscal analyst for the office of state treasurer at the next election if they be better qualified for the job than is the appellant, than to divest the state treasurer of the duties enjoined upon him by the Constitution of this state? The judgment of the trial court is reversed with directions to enter a judgment holding that Chapter 206, Laws of Utah 1969, insofar as it attempts to set up a Division of Investments or an Investment Council and otherwise interferes with the duties of the state treasurer is unconstitutional and void. Each party will bear its own costs. CROCKETT, C.J., and CALLISTER, TUCKETT and HENRIOD, JJ., concur. [1] Tooele County v. De La Mare, 90 Utah 46, 59 P.2d 1155, 106 A.L.R. 182 (1936). [2] Trade Commission v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., 21 Utah 2d 431, 446 P.2d 958 (1968); Gabler v. Utah State Teachers Retirement Board, 113 Utah 188, 192 P.2d 580, 20 A.L.R.2d 1022 (1948); Snow v. Keddington, 113 Utah 325, 195 P.2d 234 (1948).