Title: Mendoza v. Fonseca McElroy Grinding Co.

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
LEOPOLDO PENA MENDOZA et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC., et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
 
S253574 
 
Ninth Circuit 
17-15221 
 
Northern District of California 
3:15-cv-05143-WHO 
 
 
August 16, 2021 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Kruger, Groban, 
and Jenkins concurred. 
 
Justice Cuéllar filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Liu 
concurred.   
 
1 
 
MENDOZA v. FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC. 
S253574 
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
California’s Labor Code requires that certain kinds of jobs 
performed on a public works project be compensated at a per 
diem rate no less than the prevailing wage paid in the area 
where the work is done.  (Lab. Code,1 § 1771.)  The Labor Code 
delineates with specificity the kinds of “public work” covered by 
the prevailing wage statutes.  (See §§ 1720–1720.9.) 
The question here is whether the prevailing wage must be 
paid 
for 
plaintiffs’ 
mobilization 
work, 
which 
involved 
transporting heavy machinery to and from a public works site.  
It is undisputed that operation of the machinery at the site 
qualifies as “public work.”  However, plaintiffs do not contend 
that mobilization is “public work” as that term is defined in the 
applicable statutes.  Instead, they argue that, under Labor Code 
section 1772, they are “deemed to be employed upon public 
work” because their mobilization work was performed “in the 
execution” of a public works contract.  Plaintiffs urge an 
interpretation of section 1772 that would enlarge the scope of 
the prevailing wage law to encompass activities that the 
Legislature has not otherwise defined as public work. 
This expansive interpretation is unsupported by either the 
statutory language or legislative history.  Section 1772 was not 
intended to define or expand the categories of work covered by 
 
1 Further unspecified section references are to the Labor Code. 
MENDOZA v. FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
2 
 
the prevailing wage law.  As a result, plaintiffs’ reliance on that 
statute is misplaced.2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Defendants are a roadwork construction company and its 
successor, which work on both public and private projects.  Part 
of the road construction process involves using milling 
equipment to break up existing roadbeds so that new roads can 
be built.  Plaintiffs are unionized engineers who operate the 
equipment.  Sometimes the heavy milling machines are not kept 
at the job site but are stored instead at a permanent yard or 
other offsite location.  In such cases, plaintiffs report to the 
offsite location, load the equipment onto trailers, and bring it to 
the job site.  This preparatory activity and equipment 
transportation is known as mobilization.3 
A master agreement between defendants and plaintiffs’ 
union established wage rates for onsite construction.  A separate 
memorandum of agreement (memorandum) set a lower wage 
rate for mobilization.  When assigned to public works projects, 
plaintiffs here were paid according to the master agreement and 
memorandum, receiving the prevailing wage for onsite work and 
the lesser memorandum rate for mobilization. 
 
2 To be clear, although we conclude that section 1772, standing 
alone, does not afford coverage for mobilization, we do not hold 
more broadly that mobilization necessarily falls outside the 
scope of the prevailing wage law’s protections.  (See post, at pp. 
33–34.)  
3 More specifically, mobilization entails:  loading the milling 
machines onto a trailer; securing the equipment; checking light, 
brake, and fluid levels of the truck transporting the trailer; 
driving to the construction site; and returning the truck and 
trailer to the storage yard. 
MENDOZA v. FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
3 
 
Plaintiffs sued in federal court alleging, inter alia, failure 
to pay the prevailing wage for mobilization done in connection 
with public works projects.  The parties filed cross-motions for 
partial summary judgment limited to whether mobilization fell 
under the prevailing wage law.  The district court ruled for 
defendants, concluding that mobilization was not covered by 
prevailing wage protection. 
After all remaining issues were settled, plaintiffs appealed 
the mobilization decision to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit.  The sole issue raised was “whether 
transporting heavy equipment to be used on public works 
construction is [done] ‘in the execution of the contract’ under 
California Labor Code section 1772.”  We accepted the Ninth 
Circuit’s request4 to decide whether the mobilization activity 
was covered by section 1772.5 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Prevailing Wage Law Overview 
California’s prevailing wage law was enacted in 1931 as 
an uncodified measure.  (1931 Act; Stats. 1931, ch. 397, §§ 1–6, 
pp. 910–912.)  Its federal counterpart, the Davis-Bacon Act (40 
U.S.C. § 3141 et seq.), was enacted the same year but is not 
 
4 Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.548(a). 
5 The Ninth Circuit framed the question as follows:  “Is 
operating engineers’ offsite ‘mobilization work’ — including the 
transportation to and from a public works site of roadwork 
grinding equipment — performed ‘in the execution of [a] 
contract for public work,’ [section 1772], such that it entitles 
workers to ‘not less than the general prevailing rate of per diem 
wages for work of a similar character in the locality in which the 
public work is performed’ pursuant to section 1771 of the 
California Labor Code?” 
MENDOZA v. FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
4 
 
completely coextensive with California's version of the law. 
(Kaanaana v. Barrett Business Services, Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 
158, 165 (Kaanaana).)  State and federal prevailing wage laws 
“responded to the dire economic conditions of the Great 
Depression, when private construction diminished severely and 
‘the oversupply of labor was exploited by unscrupulous 
contractors to win government contracts . . . .’ ”  (Kaanaana, at 
pp. 165–166; see Universities Research Assn. v. Coutu (1981) 450 
U.S. 754, 773–774.)   
The prevailing wage law is a minimum wage provision 
whose overall purpose is “to protect and benefit employees on 
public works projects.”  (Lusardi Construction Co. v. Aubry 
(1992) 1 Cal.4th 976, 985 (Lusardi).)  “This general objective 
subsumes within it a number of specific goals:  to protect 
employees from substandard wages that might be paid if 
contractors could recruit labor from distant cheap-labor areas; 
to permit union contractors to compete with nonunion 
contractors; to benefit the public through the superior efficiency 
of well-paid employees; and to compensate nonpublic employees 
with higher wages for the absence of job security and 
employment benefits enjoyed by public employees.”  (Id. at 
p. 987.)  Courts liberally construe the law to fulfill its purpose.  
(City of Long Beach v. Department of Industrial Relations (2004) 
34 Cal.4th 942, 949–950.) 
Those employed on “public works” must generally be paid 
at least the “prevailing rate of per diem wages for work of a 
similar character” in the area. (§ 1771.)  Under the current 
statutory scheme, the prevailing wage law does not apply to 
work done by a public agency with its own labor force.  (Ibid.)  
As we will discuss at some length, this statutory exclusion for 
MENDOZA v. FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
5 
 
government workers was not always in place.  (See post, at pp. 
10–20.) 
A contractor or subcontractor that does not pay the 
prevailing wage rate on a public works project is liable for the 
deficiency and subject to a penalty.  (§ 1775, subd. (a).)  The 
statutory payment obligation is independent of any contractual 
requirement. (Lusardi, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 981–982.)  For 
that reason, the fact that the parties’ memorandum provides 
lesser pay for mobilization does not settle the question here.  If 
the statutory scheme requires payment of the prevailing wage 
for a particular type of labor, it is irrelevant that the parties may 
have agreed to a lesser amount. 
The prevailing wage law describes with particularity the 
kind of “public works” that fall within its scope.6  Since the law’s 
adoption in 1931, it has encompassed certain “construction or 
repair work.”  (Stats. 1931, ch. 397, § 4, p. 912.)  Over the years, 
the statutory definition of “public works” has been amended to 
clarify and expand the scope of the activities it embraces.  As 
applicable here, section 1720, subdivision (a)(1) (hereafter 
section 1720(a)(1)) currently defines “public works” as 
“[c]onstruction,  alteration, demolition, installation, or repair 
work done under contract and paid for in whole or in part out of 
public funds . . . .”7  Other provisions of section 1720, 
 
6 The prevailing wage law uses the plural term “public works” 
as well as the singular term “public work.”  (See §§ 1720, subd. 
(a)(1) & (2), 1770, 1771, 1772.)  We use the terms 
interchangeably. 
7 Although plaintiffs apparently did mobilization work on both 
public and private construction projects, we are concerned here 
only with work done under contract paid for in whole or in part 
with public funds. 
MENDOZA v. FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
6 
 
subdivision (a) not involved here provide additional definitions 
of “public works” in different contexts like street and sewer work 
(subd. (a)(3)), carpet laying (subd. (a)(4) & (5)), and tree removal 
(subd. (a)(8)).  Still other definitions of “public works” are 
contained in additional statutes.  (§§ 1720.2–1720.9.) 
Plaintiffs’ operation of milling machines at the job site 
clearly constitutes “public work” under section 1720(a)(1) 
because it involved “[c]onstruction,  alteration, demolition, 
installation, or repair work,” and all the labor engaged in here 
was “done under contract and paid for in whole or in part out of 
public funds . . . .”  But here we are concerned with mobilization, 
not onsite machine operation.  Plaintiffs do not argue that 
mobilization fits within one of the definitions of “public works” 
in the prevailing wage law.  Instead, they rely on section 1772, 
which derives from a provision in the uncodified 1931 Act.  (See 
Stats. 1931, ch. 397, § 1, p. 910.)  That section currently reads: 
“Workers employed by contractors or subcontractors in the 
execution of any contract for public work are deemed to be 
employed upon public work.”  (§ 1772.)  Plaintiffs claim their 
entitlement to the prevailing wage for offsite mobilization flows 
from this “deeming” provision.   
This court has not previously interpreted section 1772.  As 
discussed in more detail below, in recent decades a number of 
lower courts have concluded that section 1772 applies to tasks 
that are “ ‘ “an integrated aspect of the ‘flow’ process of 
construction.” ’ ”  (Williams v. SnSands Corp. (2007) 156 
Cal.App.4th 742, 753 (Williams); see Sheet Metal Workers’ 
Internat. Assn., Local 104 v. Duncan (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 
192, 205–206 (Sheet Metal).)  In effect, the framework adopted 
by these cases extends the coverage of the prevailing wage law 
to activities not statutorily defined as “public work,” so long as 
MENDOZA v. FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
7 
 
that labor is integrated into construction or other defined public 
work.  Over the years that interpretation led to controversy as 
to just what it meant for labor to be integrated into “the ‘flow’ 
process of construction” (Williams, at p. 753) and so to qualify 
as part of the “execution of [a] contract for public work” (§ 1772).  
The federal district court applied the “integrated aspect” test 
(Williams, at p. 753) but sided with defendants, concluding that 
mobilization is independent of, rather than integrated into, the 
construction work performed by plaintiffs at the public works 
site. 
Before considering the interpretation of section 1772 
adopted in recent lower court cases, we examine the section’s 
meaning anew, focusing first on its language and then on its 
legislative history.  
B. 
Section 1772 
Familiar principles guide our interpretation.  Our 
fundamental task is to determine the legislative intent and 
effectuate the law’s purpose, giving the statutory language its 
plain and commonsense meaning.  We examine that language, 
not in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as 
a whole to discern its scope and to harmonize various parts of 
the enactment.  (Coalition of Concerned Communities, Inc. v. 
City of Los Angeles (2004) 34 Cal.4th 733, 737.)  “If the language 
is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a 
literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the 
Legislature did not intend.  If the statutory language permits 
more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider 
other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and 
public policy.”  (Ibid.) 
MENDOZA v. FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
8 
 
The operative language of section 1772 has remained 
largely unchanged since 1931, when it first appeared as part of 
the uncodified prevailing wage law.8  (Stats. 1931, ch. 397, § 1, 
p. 910.)  Considering section 1772 in the context of the overall 
development of the prevailing wage law, it appears its aim was 
quite modest:  to ensure that the benefits of the prevailing wage 
law extend to those employed by contractors or subcontractors. 
As noted, the obligation to pay prevailing wages does not 
now apply to work carried out by a governmental entity’s own 
labor force.  Before the adoption of a statute expressly setting 
forth this exclusion (§ 1771), there was a vigorous debate about 
whether the prevailing wage law as originally enacted applied 
to government workers, as we explain below.  (See post, at pp. 
16–18; see generally Bishop v. City of San Jose (1969) 1 Cal.3d 
56 (Bishop).)  One aim of the public works scheme was and is to 
protect laborers who are not part of a governmental labor force.  
(Lusardi, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 987.) 
A governmental entity electing not to use its own labor 
force on a public works project could, conceivably, contract 
individually with outside workers to perform the required tasks.  
Alternatively, it could award a public works contract to a 
contractor or subcontractor that would use those it hired to do 
the work.  It appears that section 1772 was enacted to ensure 
that nongovernmental laborers were entitled to the prevailing 
wage whether they worked under a contract directly with a 
government entity, or under an agreement with a contractor or 
subcontractor awarded a public works contract.  That is to say, 
these nongovernmental workers are entitled to the prevailing 
 
8 See post, at pages 10 to 15. 
MENDOZA v. FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
9 
 
wage notwithstanding their employment relationship with a 
private contractor.  Even though their employment agreement 
was with a private entity, they were “deemed” to be employed 
upon public work if they were engaged in the private 
contractor’s “execution of [a] contract for public work.”  (§ 1772.) 
The obligation to pay prevailing wages to those employed 
on public works arises out of section 1771, which links the 
obligation to the kind of work done.  Section 1772, in turn, 
clarifies that workers employed by contractors or subcontractors 
“are deemed to be employed upon public work,” so long as they 
are employed by the contractor or subcontractor in “the 
execution of any contract for public work.”  Section 1774 further 
specifies that “[t]he contractor to whom the contract is awarded, 
and any subcontractor under him, shall pay not less than the 
specified prevailing rates of wages to all workmen employed in 
the execution of the contract.”    Section 1772 describes a 
category of persons entitled to the prevailing wage based on the 
work they do, while section 1774 describes who must pay them 
the prevailing wage to which they are entitled. 
The structure of the prevailing wage law tends to confirm 
this understanding.  The scheme appears in division 2, part 7, 
chapter 1 of the Labor Code.  Article 1 of the law, entitled “Scope 
and Operation,” defines the extent of prevailing wage coverage.  
(§§ 1720–1743.)  Article 2, entitled “Wages,” addresses the 
wages to be paid to those performing work encompassed by the 
law’s defined scope.  (§§ 1770–1785.)  Section 1772 is found in 
article 2.9 
 
9 These article enumerations and headings were included in the 
Legislature’s 1930’s codification of the Labor Code.  (See Stats. 
1937, ch. 90, pp. 241–243.) 
MENDOZA v. FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
10 
 
In the case of the prevailing wage law, the subject of each 
article is consistent with its heading.  Within article 1, sections 
1720 to 1720.9 describe the types of labor to which the law 
applies.10  In article 2, section 1772 focuses on the types of 
workers entitled to receive the prevailing wage when they 
perform work defined as “public work.”  As we have recently 
pointed out, however, the “protections afforded by the prevailing 
wage laws only extend to activities that qualify as public work.”  
(Kaanaana, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 167.)  Nothing in the plain 
language of section 1772 indicates it was intended to expand the 
categories of public work covered by the prevailing wage law. 
C. 
The Evolving Context of Section 1772 and Its 
Continuing Vitality  
Support for this interpretation is found in the legislative 
history of section 1772.  As noted, California and the federal 
government enacted prevailing wage laws during the Great 
Depression, when contractors intent on winning government 
contracts were able to exploit the oversupply of labor.  (See 
Kaanaana, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 165–166.) 
The current California scheme traces back to the 1931 Act.  
(Stats. 1931, ch. 397, § 1, p. 910.)  Section 1 of that uncodified 
measure contained two sentences that roughly correspond to 
sections 1771 and 1772 in the current version of the prevailing 
wage law.  Section 1 of the 1931 Act provided, in relevant part:  
 
10 An exception to this principle is found in section 1771 (of art. 
2), which extends coverage to “contracts let for maintenance 
work.”  This exception to the general structure of the prevailing 
wage law was added many decades after the scheme was 
codified as part of the Labor Code.  (Stats. 1974, ch. 1202, § 1, p. 
2593.) 
MENDOZA v. FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
11 
 
“Not less than the general prevailing rate of per diem wages for 
work of a similar character in the locality in which the work is 
performed . . . shall be paid to all laborers, workmen and 
mechanics employed by or on behalf of the State of California, or 
by or on behalf of any county, city and county, city, town, district 
or other political subdivision of the said state, engaged in the 
construction of public works, exclusive of maintenance work.  
Laborers, workmen and mechanics employed by contractors or 
subcontractors in the execution of any contract or contracts for 
public works with the State of California, or any officer or public 
body thereof, [or any political subdivision], shall be deemed to be 
employed upon public works.”  (Stats. 1931, ch. 397, § 1, p. 910, 
italics added.)   
The first sentence quoted above extended coverage to 
those “employed by or on behalf” of the government in 
constructing public works.11  The second sentence “deemed to be 
 
11 It appears the reference to workers “employed by” the state 
and its political subdivisions signified direct employees of the 
government.  While courts in two states have interpreted their 
prevailing wage laws to exclude direct governmental employees 
despite language applying the law to those employed “by or on 
behalf” of the government,  they did so only because of specific 
constitutional concerns or because the provision was overridden 
by a more specific statute excluding governmental employees.  
(See Bradley v. Casey (Ill. 1953) 114 N.E.2d 681, 683; State ex 
rel. Tucker v. Div. of Labor (W.Va. 2008) 668 S.E.2d 217, 229.)  
The 1931 Act contained no provision excluding government 
workers from its scope.  By contrast, a rudimentary prevailing 
wage law enacted in the 1890’s expressly excluded from its wage 
protections “persons employed regularly in any of the public 
institutions” of the state or its subdivisions.  (Stats. 1897, ch. 88, 
§ 1, p. 90.)  That law was repealed when the 1931 Act took effect.  
(See Stats. 1931, ch. 396, § 1, p. 909; Stats. 1931, ch. 397, § 1, p. 
 
MENDOZA v. FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
12 
 
employed upon public works” those who work for contractors or 
subcontractors.  The latter sentence, which is the predecessor of 
section 1772, appeared to clarify that prevailing wage protection 
extends not only to those employed directly by the government, 
as confirmed in the first sentence, but also to those who were 
employed by contractors or subcontractors.12 
The statutory construction used in the 1931 Act parallels 
prevailing wage legislation in other states that extended the law 
to workers “employed by or on behalf” of public entities.  Indeed, 
the statutory language at issue appears in state prevailing wage 
laws adopted before the federal Davis-Bacon Act was enacted.  
In an 1891 Kansas law applied to workers “ ‘employed by or on 
behalf’ ” of the state or its political subdivisions, the legislation 
clarified 
that 
“ ‘persons 
employed 
by 
contractors 
or 
subcontractors in the execution  of any contract . . . shall be 
deemed to be employed by or on behalf of’ ” the state or one of its 
political subdivisions for purposes of the law.  (Johnson, 
Prevailing Wage Legislation in the States (Aug. 1961) 84:8 
Monthly Lab. Rev. 839, 840, italics added.)  The italicized 
provision, which could be found in other state prevailing wage 
 
910.)  It is telling that the Legislature chose not to include a 
similar exclusion for government workers in the 1931 Act.  It 
only took such action in 1974.  (Stats. 1974, ch. 1202, § 1, p. 
2593.) 
12 Although the reference in the first sentence to workers 
employed “on behalf of” governmental entities might be 
construed to extend to work done under contract, the import of 
that language could be subject to debate.  (See Division of Labor 
Stand. v. Friends of Zoo (Mo. 2001) 38 S.W.3d 421, 422–424.)  
The second sentence left no doubt that the protections of the law 
extended to employees of private contractors engaged in public 
works. 
MENDOZA v. FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
13 
 
laws, was interpreted by the Arizona Supreme Court to ensure 
that those employed by private contractors receive the benefit of 
wage guarantees provided to governmental workers by deeming 
them to be public employees for purposes of the law.  (See State 
v. Miser (Ariz. 1937) 72 P.2d 408, 413.) 
Some early state prevailing wage laws, like the 1931 Act, 
employed a slightly different formulation, clarifying that those 
“ ‘employed by contractors or subcontractors in the execution of 
any contract . . . for public works . . . shall be deemed to be 
employed upon public works.’ ”  (Logan City v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah (Utah 1934) 38 P.2d 769, 770, italics 
added.)  Whether the “deeming” conferred by different statutes 
was extended to government employment status, as in Kansas, 
or to the status of employment on a contract for public work, the 
apparent purpose was the same.  Either formulation was 
designed to ensure that daily wage workers employed by private 
contractors on public works would receive the prevailing wage.  
The language that is now incorporated in section 1772 has 
no counterpart in the federal Davis-Bacon Act.  (See 40 U.S.C. 
§§ 3141–3148.)  That is not surprising.  The Davis-Bacon Act by 
its plain terms has never extended to governmental 
employees.13  There was no need to clarify that workers 
 
13 As originally enacted, the Davis-Bacon Act required that 
“every contract” for certain public work include a provision 
specifying that the wages paid “by the contractor or 
subcontractor on the public buildings covered by the contract” 
shall be at least the prevailing rate.  (Pub. L. No. 798 (Mar. 3, 
1931) 46 Stat. 1494.)  The federal statutory scheme thus only 
extended to contract work.  (See also Pub. L. No. 402, § 2 (Aug. 
30, 1935) 49 Stat. 1011, 1012.)  The Davis-Bacon Act continues 
to apply exclusively to work performed by contractors or 
subcontractors.  (See 40 U.S.C. § 3141(a) & (c).) 
MENDOZA v. FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
14 
 
employed by private contractors received the benefits of the 
federal law because they were its only intended beneficiaries.    
But that was not the case in California, at least at the time of 
the 1931 Act.  While California’s prevailing wage law is said to 
share the purposes of the federal Davis-Bacon Act (City of Long 
Beach v. Department of Industrial Relations, supra, 34 Cal.4th 
at p. 954), the statutory language adopted in the 1931 Act bears 
a closer relation to state prevailing wage laws from that period. 
When the prevailing wage law was codified in 1937, 
section 1 of the 1931 Act was split into two new sections, 1771 
and 1772.  (Stats. 1937, ch. 90, p. 243.)  Section 1771 provided:  
“Not less than the general prevailing rate of per diem wages for 
work of a similar character in the locality in which the public 
work is performed, and not less than the general prevailing rate 
of per diem wages for legal holiday and overtime work shall be 
paid to all workmen employed on public works, exclusive of 
maintenance work.”  (Ibid.)  Section 1772 provided:  “Workmen 
employed by contractors or subcontractors in the execution of 
any contract for public work are deemed to be employed upon 
public work.”  (Ibid.)   
Again, the original function of section 1772 appears to 
have been simply to ensure that those employed by a contractor 
or subcontractor were given the same protection as others, 
including those employed by the government itself.  Prevailing 
wages were due “all workmen employed on public works” 
(former § 1771, added by Stats 1937, ch. 90, p. 243), with 
workmen employed by contractors or subcontractors “deemed to 
be employed upon public work” for the purposes of the statutory 
obligation to pay prevailing wages (former § 1772, added by 
Stats 1937, ch. 90, p. 243). 
MENDOZA v. FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC. 
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15 
 
The 1937 codification of the prevailing wage law notably 
omitted the reference to those employed “by or on behalf” of the 
state or its political subdivisions.  (Compare former § 1771, 
added by Stats. 1937, ch. 90, p. 243, with Stats. 1931, ch. 397, 
§ 1, p. 910.)  But there is little reason to believe the omission  
reflected a legislative intent to exclude governmental workers 
from the scope of the prevailing wage law.14  Section 1771 as 
adopted in 1937 applied to all “workmen employed on public 
works,” with no exclusion for direct governmental employees.  
(Former § 1771, added by Stats. 1937, ch. 90, p. 243.)  The 
explicit exclusion of prevailing wage entitlement for government 
workers was not adopted by the Legislature for nearly 40 years.  
(Stats. 1974, ch. 1202, § 1, p. 2593.) 
Because section 1772 has not been substantively amended 
since it became part of the Labor Code in 1937,15 its essential 
function as to contract work should be no different than when it 
was originally enacted:  If public work is performed in the 
execution of a contract, the fact a laborer is doing that work as 
an employee of a contractor or subcontractor does not eliminate 
entitlement to prevailing wages. 
 
14 The California Code Commission prepared a Proposed Labor 
Code in 1936 that recommended the codification of various labor 
statutes into a single Labor Code.  Notably, the Proposed Labor 
Code contained no comment or annotation associated with 
proposed section 1771 that would indicate an intent to change 
the meaning or scope of the provision in the 1931 Act from which 
that statute was derived.  (Cal. Code Com. Office, Proposed 
Labor Code (1936) p. 88.)   
15 The sole amendment to the text enacted in 1937 was to replace 
“[w]orkmen” with “[w]orkers.”  (Stats. 1992, ch. 1342, § 7, 
p. 6602.) 
MENDOZA v. FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
16 
 
The 
principal 
counterargument 
to 
this 
original 
understanding of section 1772 is that, at least as of today, the 
statute might be considered surplusage.  Decades after section 
1772 was enacted, the companion statute, section 1771, was 
amended to directly specify that its protections extend only to 
work done under outside contract:  “This section is applicable 
only to work performed under contract, and is not applicable to 
work carried out by a public agency with its own forces.”  (Stats. 
1974, ch. 1202, § 1, p. 2593.)  Because section 1771 is now 
expressly limited to contract work, there is no longer any need 
to clarify that those employed by contractors or subcontractors 
are also entitled to prevailing wage protection. 
Even if section 1772 might be considered surplusage now, 
that was not the case when it was first enacted.  There is 
considerable historical support for this interpretation in 
addition to the legislative history.  In the years after the 
codification of the Labor Code, the Attorney General on several 
occasions confirmed the understanding that, as originally 
enacted, section 1771 applied to a government’s own employees.  
In 1944, the Attorney General was asked to opine about a public 
works project that had originally been put out to bid but that 
was to be completed with day laborers hired by and under the 
supervision of the county.  The Attorney General concluded that, 
under section 1771, the county was obligated to pay prevailing 
wages for construction work performed by the day laborers hired 
directly by the county.  (3 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen 399, 401 (1944).) 
Sixteen years later, the Attorney General again concluded 
that prevailing wage requirements applied to government 
employees.  (35 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 1 (1960).)  Specifically, the 
Attorney General opined that prevailing wage requirements 
applied to employees of a flood control district while 
MENDOZA v. FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
17 
 
constructing things like channels and dams.  In addition, the 
prevailing wage law applied to county employees that 
constructed storm-water conduits, highway bridges, and 
buildings.   (Ibid.)  The Attorney General noted that former 
section 1720, subdivision (a) (now 1720(a)(1)), which applies to 
contract work, was not implicated.  However, the work was 
covered under former subdivisions (b) and (c) of section 1720, 
which applied to work done for certain special districts and to 
street, sewer, or other improvement work done under the 
direction and supervision of the state or one of its political 
subdivisions.16  (35 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., at p. 2.) 
Consistent with the Attorney General’s 1960 opinion, a 
1961 survey of prevailing wage laws in the 50 states reported 
that California’s prevailing wage law applied to specified 
governmental employees:  those working on “irrigation, 
reclamation, street, and sewer projects.”  (Johnson, Prevailing 
Wage Legislation in the States, supra, 84:8 Monthly Lab. Rev. at 
p. 842, fn. 17.)  California was identified as one of 14 states that, 
at the time, extended prevailing wage protection to government 
workers.  (Ibid.)  For at least three decades following its 
enactment, section 1771 could have been understood as covering 
certain governmental workers while section 1772 served the 
purpose of clarifying that employees of private contractors were 
likewise protected. 
This court took a contrary view of section 1771’s coverage 
in Bishop, supra, 1 Cal.3d 56.  Interpreting that provision in 
light of sections 1720 and 1724, the court concluded “that section 
1771 is by its own terms applicable only to work performed 
 
16 Former subdivisions (b) and (c) of section 1720 now appear, in 
substance, in subdivision (a)(2) and (3) of that same statute. 
MENDOZA v. FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
18 
 
under contract, and is not applicable to work carried out by a 
public agency with its own forces.”  (Bishop, at p. 64.)  Thereafter 
the Legislature codified this holding when it amended section 
1771 in 1974.  (O.G. Sansone Co. v. Department of 
Transportation (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 434, 459 (Sansone).) 
Bishop was a closely contested 4–3 decision.  The majority 
focused on provisions in the prevailing wage law emphasizing 
the law’s application to contracted work, noting that “the entire 
tenor [of the law] discloses a legislative purpose to deal only with 
contracted public work, and not with work done by a 
municipality by force account.”  (Bishop, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 
64.)  It is true that the bidding process and the intricacies of 
private contracts can require specificity and provisions not 
involved when governmental entities use their own workers.  
The court also emphasized that the Legislature had not 
amended the prevailing wage law since a 1959 Court of Appeal 
decision concluded the “ ‘prevailing wage and competitive 
bidding statutes have no application to work undertaken by 
force account or day labor.’ ”  (Id. at pp. 64–65, citing Beckwith 
v. County of Stanislaus (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 40, 48.)  But the 
statement in the 1959 decision was dicta and unsupported by 
any analysis or citation to legal authority.  (Beckwith, at p. 48.)  
Indeed, the case did not concern the application of the prevailing 
wage law or cite a single provision in that scheme.  (Bishop, at 
p. 72 (dis. opn. of Peters, J.).)  Further, the Legislature’s 
subsequent inaction, assuming it was even aware of the passing 
reference to the prevailing wage law in the 1959 decision, has 
no bearing upon the legislative intent at the time section 1771 
was enacted decades earlier.  
The lengthy dissent in Bishop pointed out, among other 
things, that the majority’s interpretation largely ignored other  
MENDOZA v. FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
19 
 
subdivisions of section 1720 defining “public works” to include 
activities not performed under contract, including work 
performed by special governmental districts as well as street 
and sewer work.  (Bishop, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 70 (dis. opn. of 
Peters, J.).)  The majority also failed to consider the legislative 
history of section 1771 and its interplay with section 1772.   
The incomplete analysis in Bishop led to an erroneous 
interpretation of section 1771, and for that reason Bishop v. City 
of San Jose, supra, 1 Cal.3d 56 is overruled to the extent it is 
inconsistent with our conclusion that section 1771 as originally 
enacted applied to direct governmental employees.  Because 
Bishop was superseded by statute when section 1771 was 
amended to exclude government employees, the overruling of 
the Bishop majority’s section 1771 analysis has no practical 
effect.  Government employees are now expressly excluded from 
the scope of the prevailing wage law.  (§ 1771.)  However, our 
rejection of Bishop does confirm that section 1772 as we have 
interpreted it served an important purpose at its inception, 
when the prevailing wage law extended to those employed 
directly by the government.  The statute was not surplusage at 
the time of its enactment. 
Even if Bishop were correctly decided and section 1771 did 
not apply to government workers at the time of its enactment, 
section 1772 would still have served a valuable purpose, if only 
to clarify the application of the law.  It could certainly have been 
argued that employees of subcontractors engaged in public work 
came within the prevailing wage law.  But section 1772 removed 
any doubt and continues to do so.  A contractor cannot avoid the 
prevailing 
wage 
obligation 
by 
parsing 
out 
tasks 
to 
subcontractors.  Further, section 1772 has been interpreted to 
extend prevailing wage entitlement to workers whose services 
MENDOZA v. FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
20 
 
are used by a main contractor or subcontractor even when there 
is no formal employment relationship.  As the Public Works 
Manual prepared by the Office of the Labor Commissioner 
suggests, section 1772 extends protection to workers “whose 
services are ‘utilized’ in furtherance of the business of another, 
notwithstanding the technical absence of an employer-employee 
relationship, or a person ‘engaged in’ a task for another under 
contract, or orders to do it.”  (Dep. of Industrial Relations, Div. 
of Labor Standards Enforcement, Public Works Manual (May 
2018) § 2.2, p. 3.)  Thus, section 1772 continues to serve an 
important purpose in defining the types of workers entitled to 
the law’s protection. 
D. 
Plaintiffs’ Focus on “Execution” and “Deemed” 
Plaintiffs’ attempt to expand the scope of the prevailing 
wage law beyond the definition of “public works” largely rests on 
the meaning of the terms “execution” and “deemed” in section 
1772.   
Plaintiffs first point to the term “execution” in section 
1772, as used in the phrase “in the execution of any contract for 
public work.”  They claim the term broadly means “carrying out 
and completion of all provisions of the contract, regardless [of] 
whether that work would constitute a public work[] if it were 
viewed independently.”  (See Williams, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 750.)  This interpretation would bring within the scope of 
the prevailing wage law any activity required to fulfill a public 
works contract, even if the work did not qualify as a defined 
“public work.”   
This expansive role for the phrase “in the execution of” is 
inconsistent with the Legislature’s approach to defining what is 
encompassed by that term.  When the Legislature has expanded 
MENDOZA v. FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
21 
 
the reach of the law, it has done so by changing the definitions 
of “public works” in article 1.  (See generally §§ 1720–1720.9.)  
These amendments reflect a deliberate and specific intent to 
delineate and parse out what kind of labor constitutes “public 
works.”  Over the decades the Legislature has revisited and 
refined the scope of public works definitions.   For example, the 
Legislature has taken care to specify that “public works” means 
certain hauling of refuse to an outside location, but not if the 
refuse consists of recyclable materials that are separated and 
sold.  (§ 1720.3.)  As another example, the hauling and delivery 
of ready-mixed concrete to fulfill a public works contract 
constitutes a “public work,” but this same provision does not 
extend to the hauling and delivery of asphalt.  (§ 1720.9, subd. 
(a).) 
Plaintiff’s proposed interpretation would render these 
distinctions meaningless if section 1772 extends the prevailing 
wage law to any work required to fulfill a public works contract.  
There is little reason to believe the Legislature would take great 
pains to specify what constitutes “public works” in article 1 
while broadening the scope of coverage through section 1772 to 
encompass activities not expressly falling within those carefully 
crafted definitions. Plaintiffs provide no limiting principle to 
their proposed expansion.  Nor does the plain language of 
section 1772 furnish any limitation on plaintiffs’ proposed 
understanding.   
A more reasonable interpretation of “in the execution of” 
is that it simply clarifies which workers are entitled to the 
prevailing wage when employed by contractors.  All workers are 
not universally so entitled.  Laborers receive the benefits of the 
law if they are employed to carry out public works.  The qualifier 
“in the execution of [a] contract for public work” in section 1772 
MENDOZA v. FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
22 
 
establishes that limitation.  The effect of plaintiff’s proposal 
runs contrary to legislative intent.  The Legislature has taken 
great care over decades to precisely categorize, in article 1, just 
what kinds of labor constitute public works.  Yet plaintiffs’ 
approach would throw aside that careful drafting by allowing a 
different result under an interpretation of an imprecise statute 
that has gone largely unchanged for over 90 years.  If the 
Legislature so intends, it is, of course, empowered to take that 
action.  We will not divine such an intention on its behalf. 
Plaintiffs also focus on the use of the word “deemed.”  They 
argue that even if work being performed under contract is not 
“public work” when considered in isolation, it could still be 
“deemed” a public work if the terms of section 1772 are satisfied.  
In effect, they would expand the scope of the prevailing wage 
law by “deeming” as “public work” an activity the Legislature 
has not so designated. 
This approach misconceives the role that “deemed” plays 
in section 1772.  As used in the statute, “deemed” modifies the 
types of workers entitled to the prevailing wage, not the types of 
labor those workers perform.  The statute is not structured to 
say that work done “in the execution of any contract for public 
work [is] deemed to be . . . public work.”  Instead, it is the 
workers who are “deemed to be employed upon public work.”  
(§ 1772.)  Section 1772 focuses on which workers are entitled to 
the prevailing wage, not upon the types of work that qualify for 
coverage. 
Further, interpreting “deemed” in the sense urged by 
plaintiffs would assign undue importance to opaque language 
that does not otherwise signal an intent to expand the law’s 
scope.  If the Legislature had intended to expand the scope of 
MENDOZA v. FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
23 
 
the prevailing wage law to capture work that does not fit within 
the provisions defining “public works,” it is unlikely it would 
have used such a subtle approach to achieve that end.  “ ‘The 
Legislature “does not, one might say, hide elephants in 
mouseholes.” ’ ”  (Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership 
(2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158, 1171.) 
E. 
Judicial and Administrative Decisions 
 
1. 
Court of Appeal Cases 
While this court has not previously interpreted section 
1772, the provision has been the subject of several lower court 
opinions.  None of these decisions provides a persuasive reason 
to depart from the interpretation outlined here.  For the reasons 
explained below, we disapprove those decisions in whole or in 
part.  
No California case meaningfully touched upon section 
1772 for decades after its enactment.  The first case arguably to 
do so was Sansone, supra, 55 Cal.App.3d 434, in 1976.  There, 
the court considered whether truck drivers who delivered 
materials used in building roads were entitled to the prevailing 
wage.  The court quoted sections 1772 and 1774 but otherwise 
included no analysis or discussion of those statutes.  (Sansone, 
at p. 441.)  The issue as framed was whether the trucking 
companies that employed the drivers were subcontractors 
within the meaning of the prevailing wage law.  (Ibid.)   
Finding no California cases discussing who qualifies as a 
subcontractor under the prevailing wage law, the court turned 
to the federal Davis-Bacon Act (40 U.S.C. § 3141 et seq.).  
(Sansone, supra, 55 Cal.App.3d at p. 442.)  Under the federal 
scheme, a supplier of standard building materials, referred to as 
a “bona fide” materialman or material supplier, is not 
MENDOZA v. FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
24 
 
considered a subcontractor.  A bona fide material supplier is 
therefore exempt from the obligation to pay its employees, 
including truck drivers, the prevailing wage. For the Davis-
Bacon Act exemption to apply, the supplier must sell goods to 
the general public, the location from which the supplies are 
obtained may not be established specifically for the particular 
public works project, and the supply location cannot be situated 
on the public works site.  (Ibid.) 
Sansone held the trucking companies qualified as 
subcontractors who used their employees to fulfill a public 
works contract and, thus, were obligated to pay prevailing 
wages.  (Sansone, supra, 55 Cal.App.3d at p. 445.)  Two key 
factors distinguished the companies from those material 
suppliers exempt from federal prevailing wage requirements.  
First, the roadbuilding materials were obtained from a location 
adjacent to the project site and established specifically to serve 
that site.  (Id. at pp. 443–444.)  Second, the trucking companies 
were carrying out a term of the prime contract, which required 
the prime contractor to furnish the materials.  (Ibid.)   
In reaching its decision, the Sansone court also looked to 
Green v. Jones (Wis. 1964) 128 N.W.2d 551 (Green), a decision of 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court interpreting that state’s 
prevailing wage law.  (Sansone, supra, 55 Cal.App.3d at p. 443.)  
The Wisconsin decision contrasted hauling from a commercial 
location operating continuously, which would not be covered, 
with hauling from a location set up solely to serve the project, 
which would be covered.  (Id. at p. 444.)  But the Wisconsin court 
went further, stating that regardless of the source of the 
materials, the drivers would be covered if the materials were 
immediately utilized on the improvement.  (Ibid.)  In assessing 
coverage, it considered whether “ ‘[t]he drivers’ tasks were 
MENDOZA v. FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
25 
 
functionally related to the process of construction’ ”  and the 
“ ‘delivery of materials was an integrated aspect of the “flow” 
process of construction.’ ”  (Ibid., citing Green, at p. 563, italics 
added.)  While Sansone ostensibly focused on whether the 
trucking companies were subcontractors rather than material 
suppliers, its approach has served to influence California’s 
section 1772 jurisprudence.  That influence was due in part to 
Sansone’s citation to Green and its embrace of the notion that 
work integrated into the construction process is covered under 
the prevailing wage law.  (See Williams, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th 
at pp. 752–754; Sheet Metal, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at pp. 205–
206.) 
The next California case to address section 1772 was 
Williams, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th 742, which like Sansone 
involved truckers hauling materials.  In Williams, truckers 
removed unused construction materials like excess rock and 
sand from construction sites.  (Williams, at pp. 746
The 
.)  
747
–
as whether the 
characterized the legal question 
 
court
Williams 
truckers removing the construction materials were employed 
” of the contract under section 1772.  
 
‘in the execution’
 
“
truckers were 
 
e
The court concluded th
, at p. 749.)  
Williams
(
at 
. 
Id
(
 
 
under that statute.
to the prevailing wage 
 
not entitled
.)  
753
 
p.
 
Williams began the analysis by focusing on the definition 
of “execution” within section 1772, concluding that the term 
“plainly means the carrying out and completion of all provisions 
of the contract.”  (Williams, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 750.)  
Then, while acknowledging that Sansone concerned who is or is 
not a subcontractor under the prevailing wage law, Williams 
turned to that case to “inform[] [the] assessment of the intended 
reach” of the law to workers employed “ ‘in the execution’ ” of a 
MENDOZA v. FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
26 
 
public works contract.  (Ibid.)  Relying on Sansone and Green, 
Williams emphasized a task’s functional relationship to the 
process of construction and whether a task was “ ‘an integrated 
aspect of the “flow” process of construction.’ ”  (Id. at p. 751, 
citing Green, supra, 128 N.W.2d at p. 563.)  In assessing 
coverage, Williams considered whether a task was required to 
carry out a term of the public works contract, whether the work 
was performed at the project site or a site “integrally connected” 
to the project site, and whether work performed off the actual 
construction site was necessary to fulfill the contract.  (Williams, 
at p. 752.) 
There was no evidence of a functional relationship 
between the actual construction and the subsequent removal of 
unused materials.  Accordingly, Williams held the removal work 
was “unrelated to the performance of the prime public works 
contract . . . .”  (Williams, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 753.)  It 
was “no more an integral part of the process of the public works 
project than the delivery of generic materials to the public works 
site by a bona fide material supplier.”  (Ibid.)  According to the 
Williams court, “there was no evidence from which a 
determination could be made that the off-hauling was ‘an 
integrated aspect of the “flow” process’ [citation] of the 
project.”17  (Williams, at p. 754.) 
 
17 After Williams the Legislature amended the definition of 
“hauling of refuse,” a covered public work under section 1720.3, 
to clarify that the term “includes, but is not limited to, hauling 
soil, sand, gravel, rocks, concrete, asphalt, excavation materials, 
and construction debris.”  (§ 1720.3, subd. (b), as amended by 
Stats. 2011, ch. 676, § 1.)  Consistent with our analysis here, it 
did so by amending the relevant section in article 1. 
MENDOZA v. FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
27 
 
The only other California case to consider the meaning of 
section 1772 is Sheet Metal, 229 Cal.App.4th 192, which 
concerned coverage for offsite fabrication.  In Sheet Metal, a 
community college entered into a public works contract to 
upgrade its facilities, including the update of a heating and 
cooling system.  A firm that made a variety of ductwork and 
other sheet metal components at its permanent offsite facility 
subcontracted to make, and then install, its components into the 
college system.  (Id. at p. 196.)  The issue was whether the firm’s 
workers who made the ductwork offsite were entitled to the 
prevailing wage.  The court concluded there was no such 
entitlement.  It reasoned “the work was not done ‘in the 
execution’ of the contract within the meaning of section 1772.”  
(Id. at p. 214.)  It observed that the offsite facility’s location and 
existence were wholly unrelated to the particular public works 
project.  (Ibid.) 
Sheet Metal built upon the foundation deduced from 
Sansone and Williams, which emphasized that the critical factor 
in assessing coverage under section 1772 is “whether it is 
integrated into the flow process of construction.”  (Sheet Metal, 
supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 206.)  The decision also relied to a 
significant extent on a federal regulation defining the “site of the 
work” for purposes of the Davis-Bacon Act to exclude 
“ ‘permanent . . . fabrication plants . . . of a contractor or 
subcontractor whose location and continuance in operation are 
determined wholly without regard to a particular Federal or 
federally assisted contract or project.’ ”  (Sheet Metal, at p. 210, 
citing 29 C.F.R. § 5.2(l)(3) (2014).)   
These three cases are the only published California 
opinions that have purported to interpret section 1772 since its 
enactment.  Plaintiffs urge they should be disregarded because 
MENDOZA v. FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
28 
 
they apply a standard derived from the federal Davis-Bacon 
Act’s limitation on coverage to persons “employed directly on the 
site of the work.”18  (40 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1).)  According to 
plaintiffs, California’s prevailing wage law includes no such 
geographical limitation on coverage.  They argue that even if 
there was a valid reason for applying principles derived from 
federal law to hauling and offsite fabrication, those principles 
should not be used more generally to define the scope of section 
1772.  
It is unnecessary to consider the geographical scope of the 
prevailing wage law to assess the validity of the approach taken 
in Sansone, Williams, and Sheet Metal.19  Those cases primarily 
involved whether a company is a subcontractor within the 
meaning of the prevailing wage law.  While the factors they 
employed may be valid to resolve that narrow question, they are 
not necessarily useful to resolve whether an activity is 
performed “in the execution” of a public works contract under 
section 1772.  The reliance on their approach for this different 
purpose has led to an interpretation of section 1772 that 
expands its application to tasks that might not otherwise qualify 
as public works, simply because they have some functional 
relationship or integration with public work.  That expansion is 
not supported by the language or legislative history of section 
 
18 Aside from federal authority, Sansone also relied upon the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court decision in Green, supra, 128 
N.W.2d 1.  (Sansone, supra, 55 Cal.App.3d at pp. 443–444.)  Like 
the federal Davis-Bacon Act, Wisconsin limited its coverage to 
“ ‘work on the site.’ ”  (Green, at p. 6.) 
19 We express no view concerning whether California’s 
prevailing wage law places a geographic limitation on coverage 
in relation to the public works site.  
MENDOZA v. FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
29 
 
1772.  It instead originates from the federal Davis-Bacon Act, 
which contains no statutory language analogous to section 1772. 
Further, the approach in Sansone, Williams, and Sheet 
Metal causes coverage to turn on factors other than an activity’s 
definition as a public work.  To the extent coverage is premised 
upon whether an activity is integrated into the flow process of 
construction, the approach ignores the carefully crafted 
definitions of public work contained in the prevailing wage law.  
Moreover, it is not entirely clear what it means for an activity to 
be “integrated” into construction or other defined public work. 
To the extent it might be argued the Legislature has 
acquiesced in the existing construction of section 1772 by failing 
to amend or clarify its provisions, the argument is not 
persuasive.  “In the area of statutory construction, an 
examination of what the Legislature has done (as opposed to 
what it has left undone) is generally the more fruitful inquiry.  
‘[L]egislative inaction is “ ‘a weak reed upon which to 
lean’ ” . . . .’ ”  (Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 
Cal.3d 1142, 1156; accord, Saint Francis Memorial Hospital v. 
State Dept. of Public Health (2020) 9 Cal.5th 710, 723.)  Since 
Sansone was decided, the Legislature has actively defined and 
modified the definitions of “public works.”  (See, e.g., Stats. 2000, 
ch. 881, § 1, p. 6517; Stats. 2001, ch. 938, § 2, p. 7509; Stats. 
2012, ch. 810, § 1; Stats. 2015, ch. 739, § 1.)  These actions are 
not consistent with an interpretation of section 1772 that would 
expand the scope of the prevailing wage law as plaintiffs urge. 
The prevailing wage law as written and amended does not 
support an interpretation of section 1772 that expands the law’s 
scope beyond defined “public works.”  To the extent O.G. 
Sansone Co. v. Department of Transportation, supra, 55 
MENDOZA v. FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
30 
 
Cal.App.3d 434, Williams v. SnSands Corp., supra, 156 
Cal.App.4th 742, and Sheet Metal Workers’ Internat. Assn., 
Local 104 v. Duncan, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th 192, suggest to the 
contrary or are otherwise inconsistent with this opinion, they 
are disapproved.20  
In his dissent in Busker v. Wabtec Corp. (Aug. 16, 2021, 
S251135) ___ Cal.5th ___ (dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J.) (Busker), 
Justice Cuéllar argues that the majority “overturns decades of 
legal decisions that had established a persuasive, workable 
framework for interpreting and applying” section 1772.21  
(Busker, at ___ [p. 3] (dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J.).)  However, it is 
precisely because the existing “framework” is so unclear that the 
Ninth Circuit asked this court to address the application of 
section 1772 in two separate cases.  (See ante, at p. 3; Busker, at 
___ [p. 26].)  The interpretation we adopt turns on careful 
consideration of the text of section 1772 and its history, not upon 
concerns about whether the current interpretation is difficult to 
administer.  In any event, the existing framework could hardly 
be described as workable. 
 
20 We express no view as to whether Sansone and its progeny 
have continued vitality in assessing whether an employer is a 
subcontractor (as opposed to bona fide material supplier) within 
the meaning of the prevailing wage law.  
21 The dissent has chosen to set forth the bulk of its section 1772 
analysis and critique of the majority’s approach in a separate 
opinion filed in Busker, a decision filed concurrently with this 
opinion.  (See dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J., post, at p. 2; Busker, supra, 
___ Cal.5th at ___ [p. 27, fn. 17].)  The reader is directed to 
Justice Cuéllar’s dissent in Busker for a more complete 
explanation of the dissent’s approach to interpreting section 
1772 and its response to the majority’s analysis here.  (Busker, 
at ___ [pp. 1–24] (dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J.).) 
MENDOZA v. FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
31 
 
The difficulty in applying the approach taken in Sansone 
and its progeny is exemplified by the three “factors” the dissent 
identifies as relevant to assessing “whether labor is done in ‘the 
execution of [a] contract for public work’ under section 
1772 . . . .”  (Dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J., post, at p. 2.)  The factors 
include “whether the labor is (1) functionally related to the 
construction process; (2) integrated into that process; and (3) 
done to fulfill the prime contractor’s obligation to complete a 
public works aspect of the project.”  (Id. at pp. 2–3, fn. omitted.)  
These factors are not “longstanding,” as Justice Cuéllar’s Busker 
dissent suggests (Busker, supra, ___ Cal.5th at ___ [p. 12] (dis. 
opn. of Cuéllar, J.)), but instead are derived from a hodgepodge 
of considerations found in Sansone, Williams, and Sheet Metal.  
Moreover, despite the emphasis in Justice Cuéllar’s Busker 
dissent on the importance of the terms “execution” and “deemed” 
in section 1772 (see Busker, at ___ [pp. 3–4] (dis. opn. of Cuéllar, 
J.)), the three-part test does not even mention them.  Instead, 
the test relies on broad and undefined terms not found in the 
statute: 
 
“functionally 
related,” 
“construction 
process,” 
“integrated,” and “public works aspect of the project.”  (Id. at ___ 
[pp. 10–11] (dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J.).)   
Justice Cuéllar’s Busker dissent acknowledges that some 
“judgment” will be required “to discern whether a particular 
type of labor has a functional or integrated relationship with 
contracted-for public work.”  (Busker, supra, ___ Cal.5th at ___ 
[p. 14] (dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J.).)  However, the shifting 
characterization of how section 1772 is to be applied points to 
the extreme difficulty in exercising that judgment.  At one point, 
Justice Cuéllar’s Busker dissent refers to “[w]ork critically 
related” to the execution of a public works contract.  (Busker, at 
___ [p. 2] (dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J.), italics added.)  Elsewhere, it 
MENDOZA v. FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
32 
 
refers to “labor that is not unduly attenuated from the actual 
construction work or other defined public work, and instead 
bears a logical connection to the preconstruction, construction, 
or postconstruction process.”  (Id. at ___ [p. 11] (dis. opn. of 
Cuéllar, J.), italics added.)  At another point, it describes “tasks 
vital to the performance and completion of covered ‘public work’ 
. . . .”  (Id. at ___ [p. 24] (dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J.), italics added.)  
Finally, it describes section 1772 as covering “labor performed 
in preparation for, in furtherance of, or otherwise bearing a 
critical relationship to defined public work and the public works 
project as a whole . . . .”  (Id. at ___ [p. 24] (dis. opn. of Cuéllar, 
J.), italics added.)  The differing and expansive terms used to 
describe the application of section 1772 illustrate the inherent 
difficulty in applying the test laid out in the dissent.  It is simply 
not the case that the majority approach rejects a persuasive or 
workable framework for interpreting and applying section 1772. 
2. 
Administrative Decisions 
In addition to case law interpreting section 1772, 
administrative decisions of the Department of Industrial 
Relations (Department) have also applied the statute.  Amicus 
curiae Division of Labor Standards Enforcement cites several 
coverage decisions from the 1980’s and 1990’s interpreting 
section 1772 to apply to mobilization.  These decisions do not 
have a precedential effect.  (See Kaanaana, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 
p. 179.)  Further, the Department has no comparative 
advantage over the courts in deciding an issue of pure statutory 
interpretation.  (Kaanaana, at p. 179; Center for Biological 
Diversity v. Department of Fish & Wildlife (2015) 62 Cal.4th 204, 
236.)  Nevertheless, while “ultimate responsibility for statutory 
interpretation rests with the courts, an agency’s interpretation 
MENDOZA v. FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
33 
 
‘is “one among several tools available to the court” when judging 
the [statute’s] meaning and legal effect.’ ”  (Id. at p. 178.)   
In his Busker dissent, Justice Cuéllar argues that the 
Department’s decisions deserve “serious consideration and offer 
further insight into what the statute means.”  (Busker, supra, 
___ Cal.5th at ___ [p. 7] (dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J.).)  He 
acknowledges the decisions have “dutifully applied the approach 
in Sansone, Williams, and Sheet Metal for effectuating section 
1772.”  (Busker, at ___ [p. 13] (dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J.).)  But that 
is precisely why they add nothing to the analysis.  An 
administrative interpretation that is clearly erroneous, even if 
long-standing and consistent, is entitled to no deference.  (See 
Sara M. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 998, 1012.)  Because 
the decisions apply the same approach to section 1772 as 
Sansone and its progeny, they offer no valid reason to extend 
coverage to mobilization under that statute.  
F. 
Application to Mobilization 
In light of our interpretation of section 1772, the answer 
to the Ninth Circuit’s certified question is simple.  That statute 
does not expand coverage to labor not otherwise defined as 
public work.  Unless mobilization qualifies as public work, an 
employer has no obligation to pay the prevailing wage to those 
who perform it.  Section 1772 cannot independently serve as the 
basis for concluding that the prevailing wage must be paid for 
mobilization.   
This conclusion does not rule out the possibility that 
prevailing wages must be paid for mobilization work under some 
MENDOZA v. FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
34 
 
other theory.22  But that issue is not before us.  The Ninth 
Circuit’s question is limited to whether mobilization is covered 
under section 1772. 
While this court may restate the certified question (Cal. 
Rules of Court, rule 8.548(f)(5)), we lack the power to reshape 
the federal litigation that gave rise to the question in the first 
instance.  When we decide a question of California law posed by 
another court, we are limited to an issue that “could determine 
the outcome of a matter pending in the requesting court.”  (Cal. 
Rules of Court, rule 8.548(a)(1).)  The broader issue of whether 
plaintiffs are entitled to be paid the prevailing wage under any 
conceivable theory is beyond the scope of the pending federal 
litigation.  The sole issue presented on appeal to the Ninth 
Circuit was whether section 1772 afforded coverage for 
mobilization.  A decision concerning whether mobilization 
qualifies as “construction” or other defined “public work” would 
not only consider a defense to the partial summary judgment 
motion not raised by the plaintiffs, but it would also not address 
the narrow legal issue before the Ninth Circuit. 
Plaintiffs did raise the issue of whether transportation of 
equipment to the work site should be treated as “travel time,” 
which, they claim, must be compensated at the prevailing wage.  
 
22 As used in the prevailing wage law, for example, the term 
“ ‘construction’ ” 
includes 
“preconstruction” 
and 
“postconstruction” phases of construction work.  (§ 1720(a)(1); cf. 
Priest v Housing Authority of City of Oxnard (1969) 275 
Cal.App.2d 751, 756.)  In addition, section 1720, subdivision 
(a)(3) 
defines 
“ ‘public 
works’ ” 
to 
include 
“[s]treet . . . 
improvement work.”  We express no view as to whether 
mobilization qualifies as construction, street improvement 
work, or any other category of “ ‘public works’ ” defined in 
section 1720 et seq. 
MENDOZA v. FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
35 
 
To the extent their contention is premised upon the application 
of section 1772, the argument fails for the reasons articulated 
above.  If travel time does not fall under a definition of public 
work, section 1772 does not independently provide a basis for 
coverage.  Insofar as there may be some other statutory basis for 
compensating travel time at the prevailing rate, that issue is 
beyond the scope of the question certified by the Ninth Circuit. 
Justice Cuéllar’s dissents here and in Busker argue in 
quite forceful terms that a different approach to the 
understanding of “public works” is called for.  They set out what 
our colleagues urge would be a better interpretation of the 
statutory language, and they reject the notion that coverage is 
limited to defined “public works.”  They fail to acknowledge, 
however, that this is a legislative function.  The Legislature may 
of course choose, or decline, to modify the definitions of “public 
works” it has chosen over the decades.  That is a policy choice to 
be considered by the Legislature after input from all interested 
parties and the exercise of its own judgment as to how best serve 
the sometimes competing goals it seeks to achieve.  
In our view, it is not the role of the judiciary to usurp that 
legislative prerogative.  Reading existing legislative enactments 
with care is not “pernicious” or merely an exercise in “judicial 
modesty.”   (Busker, supra, ___ Cal.5th at ___ [pp. 2, 3] (dis. opn. 
of Cuéllar, J.).)  Instead, it is an approach, firmly established in 
our jurisprudence, that honors the important safeguards served 
by the separation of powers.  “[C]onstru[ing] the law liberally” 
is a different enterprise from rewriting the law to have it read 
as we think best.  (Busker, at ___ [p. 2] (dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J.).) 
We emphasize two points, lest there be any confusion.  
First, the prevailing wage law covers what the Legislature says 
MENDOZA v. FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC. 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
36 
 
it covers.  Second, our holding is narrow.  We merely address the 
question posed by the parties and the Ninth Circuit:  whether 
section 1772, standing alone, expands the scope of the term 
“public works” to embrace labor that is not covered by the 
definitions enacted as part of section 1720 et seq.  Nothing we 
say here should be read to condone any attempt to ignore the 
protections or obligations of the prevailing wage law. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
We answer the Ninth Circuit’s question as follows.   
Section 1772 does not expand the categories of public work that 
trigger the obligation to pay at least the prevailing wage under 
section 1771.  Here there is no contention that mobilization 
qualifies as defined “public work.”  Under the circumstances, 
section 1772 does not provide a basis for requiring plaintiffs to 
be paid the prevailing wage for that work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
1 
MENDOZA v. FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC. 
S253574 
 
Dissenting Opinion by Justice Cuéllar 
 
Plaintiffs (Leopoldo Pena Mendoza, Elviz Sanchez, and 
Jose Armando Cortes) worked as engineers for a public works 
roadway construction project.  They operated heavy milling 
machines to break up the existing roadbeds so that new roads 
could be built.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 2.)  This was 
unquestionably “ ‘public works’ ” labor under Labor Code section 
1720, subdivision (a)(1),1 as it clearly involved “[c]onstruction, 
alteration, demolition, installation, or repair work . . . .”  
(§ 1720, subd. (a)(1).)  The majority agrees.  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 6.) 
Plaintiffs 
also 
had 
to 
engage 
in 
“mobilization” 
work:  transporting the milling machinery to and from offsite 
storage locations and preparing it for use.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 
2 & fn. 3.)  There was little prospect that plaintiffs could 
complete the construction work they were hired to do without 
mobilizing the machines used to repave the roadways.  The 
majority 
nonetheless 
rejects 
plaintiffs’ 
argument 
that 
mobilization labor qualifies for prevailing wage coverage under 
section 1772, which provides that “[w]orkers employed by 
contractors or subcontractors in the execution of any contract for 
public work are deemed to be employed upon public work.”  
(§ 1772.)  By its account, section 1772 in no way relates to the 
 
1  
Further unspecified section references are to the Labor 
Code. 
MENDOZA v. FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC. 
Cuéllar, J., dissenting 
2 
scope of work covered, and instead simply ensures coverage for 
contract workers engaged in defined public works activities.  
(See, e.g., maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1–2, 8–10, 14, 21–22.)  
That’s a conclusion I cannot embrace.  I respectfully 
dissent for the same reasons explained more fully in my 
separate dissenting opinion in the other prevailing wage case we 
also decide today, Busker v. Wabtec Corp. (Aug. 16, 2021, 
S251135) __ Cal.5th __ (Busker).   
Because of the prevailing wage law’s critical function in 
protecting workers employed on public works, we must interpret 
the law liberally.  (City of Long Beach v. Department of 
Industrial Relations (2004) 34 Cal.4th 942, 949–950.)  For 
several decades, the Courts of Appeal and Department of 
Industrial Relations (DIR) have fulfilled their obligation in 
construing section 1772 by interpreting it to cover certain work 
critically related to the “execution of” (ibid.) a public works 
contract.  (See, e.g., O.G. Sansone Co. v. Department of 
Transportation (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 434, 443–444 (Sansone); 
Williams v. SnSands Corp. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 742, 752–
753; Sheet Metal Workers’ Internat. Assn., Local 104 v. Duncan 
(2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 192, 205–206, 211–214 (Sheet Metal).)  
These cases provide us with three factors that help determine 
whether labor is done in “the execution of [a] contract for public 
work” under section 1772:  whether the labor is (1) functionally 
related to the construction process; (2) integrated into that 
MENDOZA v. FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC. 
Cuéllar, J., dissenting 
3 
process; and (3) done to fulfill the prime contractor’s obligation 
to complete a public works aspect of the project.2   
The majority nonetheless breaks with this established 
authority without justification.  It glosses over section 1772’s 
language deeming workers engaged in the “execution of” a public 
works contract — i.e., working to carry out and complete the 
construction or other related tasks for the project — to be 
employed on “public work.”  (§ 1772.)  It papers over this 
language, and in the process disapproves of long-standing 
authority providing a workable framework for applying it, on 
the basis of an implausible reading of the section’s exceedingly 
spare legislative history.  And its interpretation undermines the 
prevailing wage law’s purposes; among other things, it 
encourages public works employers to segment out labor not 
defined as “public works,” but nonetheless constituting labor as 
crucial as it is integral to public works projects, so that they can 
pay lesser wages. 
I add two brief observations to my Busker dissent (Busker, 
supra, __ Cal.5th at p. __ [pp. 1–24] (dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J.)), 
underscoring how the majority’s interpretation errs as it 
specifically relates to mobilization work.  First, mobilization 
naturally merits prevailing wage coverage based on its critical 
relationship with covered public work.  The three factors from 
the Sansone line of cases reinforce this conclusion.  The 
mobilization at issue here was functionally related to and 
 
2  
Although the Sansone line of cases refers to the 
“construction” process (see, e.g., Sansone, supra, 55 Cal.App.3d 
at p. 444), its principles would apply to any other type of activity 
that qualifies as “public work.”  I therefore use “construction” 
here as an umbrella term for all the kinds of labor defined by 
the statute as public work. 
MENDOZA v. FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC. 
Cuéllar, J., dissenting 
4 
integrated into the covered milling work and the project as a 
whole because the road construction as contracted for could not 
occur unless the machines arrived promptly, worked properly, 
and were removed when they served their purpose.  Moreover, 
plaintiffs had to engage in mobilization to fulfill the prime 
contractor’s contractual obligation to build new roads.  The 
contractor owned the milling machines and elected to store them 
offsite.  It directed its own employees to prepare and transport 
them so those employees could then use the machines as part of 
the road construction called for by the contract.   
In 
other 
words, 
the 
mobilization 
of 
specialized 
construction equipment by the skilled workers who would use 
them at the jobsite was sufficiently connected with the execution 
of a public construction project to be deemed public work under 
section 1772.  (Cf. Allied Concrete & Supply Co. v. Baker (9th 
Cir. 2018) 904 F.3d 1053, 1061 [explaining how prevailing wage 
coverage for ready-mix concrete drivers, as opposed to drivers 
supplying standard building materials, makes sense because 
the former “are more integrated into the construction process” 
and “are more skilled than other drivers and provide a material 
that is more important to public works projects than other 
materials such that paying the prevailing wage will attract 
superior drivers and improve public works”].)  Excluding this 
labor from coverage under section 1772 despite its critical role 
makes no sense. 
Also calling into question the majority’s interpretation:  It 
flies in the face of the DIR’s consistent position covering 
mobilization work under section 1772.  As the DIR’s Division of 
Labor Standards and Enforcement argues in its amicus curiae 
brief and illustrates in the past coverage determinations that it 
provides in its request for judicial notice, the agency has for 
MENDOZA v. FONSECA MCELROY GRINDING CO., INC. 
Cuéllar, J., dissenting 
5 
decades followed Sansone and interpreted the section as 
covering mobilization labor based on the labor’s critical 
relationship to covered work.  Neither defendants (Fonseca 
McElroy Grinding Co. Inc. and Granite Rock Company) nor the 
majority identify any circumstance where the DIR has 
determined that mobilization is not covered. 
Because plaintiffs’ mobilization work critically facilitated 
the public works roadway construction project, section 1772 
entitled them to prevailing wages for this labor.  They performed 
this labor “in the execution of” the contract for the roadway 
project, and section 1772’s language therefore “deemed” them 
“to be employed upon public work.”  (§ 1772.)  But the majority 
narrows this statutory language beyond recognition.  So with 
respect, I dissent. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
I Concur: 
LIU, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Mendoza v. Fonseca McElroy Grinding Co., Inc. 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding XX on request by 9th Circuit (Cal. Rules of 
Court, rule 8.548) 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S253574  
Date Filed: August 16, 2021 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:   
County:   
Judge:  
 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Justice At Work Law Group, Tomas E. Margain; Esner, Chang & 
Boyer, Stuart B. Esner and Holly N. Boyer for Plaintiffs and 
Appellants. 
 
Altshuler Berzon, Eileen Goldsmith and Zoe Palitz for International 
Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail & Transportation Workers, Sheet 
Metal Workers’ Local Union No. 104 as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
David Balter, Kristin García, Luong Chau and Lance Grucela for 
Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Labor Standards 
Enforcement as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Simpson, Garrity, Innes & Jacuzzi, Paul V. Simpson and Sarah E. 
Lucas for Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
Rutan & Tucker, Paul Aherne and Alyssa Roy for Construction 
Employers’ Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and 
Respondents. 
 
Cook Brown, Dennis B. Cook and Stephen McCutcheon for Modular 
Building Institute, Northern Alliance of Engineering Contractors and 
Western Electrical Contractors Association, Inc., as Amici Curiae on 
behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Sweeny, Mason, Wilson & Bosomworth and Roger M. Mason for United 
Contractors as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and 
Respondents. 
 
Jeffer Mangels Butler & Mitchell, Kerry Shapiro, Matthew D. Hinks 
and Martin P. Stratte for California Construction and Industrial 
Materials Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and 
Respondents. 
 
Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, Robert R. Roginson and 
Ryan H. Crosner for Associated General Contractors of California as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Atkinson, Andelson, Loya, Ruud & Romo, Robert Fried, Thomas A. 
Lenz and Elizabeth P. Lind for Associated Builders and Contractors of 
California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Stuart B. Esner 
Esner, Chang & Boyer 
234 East Colorado Boulevard, Suite 975 
Pasadena, CA 91101 
(626) 535-9860 
 
Tomas E. Margain 
Justice At Work Law Group 
84 West Santa Clara Street, Suite 790 
San Jose, CA 95113 
(408) 317-1100 
 
Paul V. Simpson 
Simpson, Garrity, Innes & Jacuzzi, P.C. 
601 Gateway Boulevard, Suite 950 
South San Francisco, CA 94080 
(650) 615-4860 
 
Robert R. Roginson 
Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C. 
400 South Hope Street, Suite 1200 
Los Angeles, CA 90071 
(213) 457-5873