Title: Shively v. Bozanich

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 12/22/03 (reposted same date for minor counsel listing correction) 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
JILL SHIVELY, 
) 
 
 
) 
S094467 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/3 B130905 
PETER BOZANICH, as Deputy District 
) 
Attorney, etc., et al., 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
Super. Ct. No. BC 179915 
___________________________________ ) 
 
 
) 
JILL SHIVELY, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/3 B133983 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
BRIAN PATRICK CLARKE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Defendant and Respondent. 
 
___________________________________ ) 
 
In this case we consider the application of the statute of limitations to a 
defamation case in which plaintiff first learned that she had been defamed after 
purchasing and reading a book that contained defamatory remarks about her, 
remarks that were attributed to persons other than the author of the book.  
Ordinarily, a tort cause of action accrues and the limitations period 
commences when the injury occurs; for defamation this occurs, generally 
speaking, when the defendant communicates the defamatory statement to others.  
 
 
2
In some tort actions, the accrual of the cause of action is delayed until the plaintiff 
knew (or with reasonable diligence should have known) of the factual basis for the 
claim.  This so-called discovery rule has been applied to defamation actions in 
limited circumstances when the defamatory statement is made in secret or is 
inherently undiscoverable.  The question before us is whether the discovery rule 
may be employed to delay the accrual of a cause of action for defamation beyond 
the point at which the defamation no longer is secret but was made public in a 
book.  
In the present case, plaintiff alleged that the same defamatory statement 
was communicated on three separate occasions.  The first two occasions involved 
relatively private communications with only one or two listeners.  On the third 
occasion, the statement was recounted in the book, together with a description of 
the circumstances under which the statement originally was made and 
subsequently was repeated.   
With respect to the third occasion, there can be no question that the cause of 
action for defamation accrued and the statute of limitations ran from the date the 
book was first generally distributed to the public, regardless of the date on which 
plaintiff actually learned of the existence of the book and read its contents.  
Uniform authority establishes that the discovery rule does not apply to delay the 
accrual of a cause of action for a defamation contained in such a publication.  
Plaintiff’s causes of action based upon the defamatory statements contained in the 
book are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.   
With respect to the first two occasions on which these statements were 
communicated, even if the defamatory statements originally were made in 
confidence, any basis upon which to apply the discovery rule was dispelled by the 
publication of the book recounting these first two communications.  Accordingly, 
we decline to sanction the application of the discovery rule in the circumstances 
 
 
3
presented by this case.  We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal that in 
turn reversed the trial court’s entry of judgment in favor of defendants.  
I 
Plaintiff was a witness for the prosecution in a grand jury proceeding in 
which the prosecution sought the indictment of Orenthal James (O.J.) Simpson for 
the murder of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Lyle Goldman.  Ultimately, the 
grand jury proceeding was dismissed and the prosecution proceeded by way of 
information.  Evidently, plaintiff did not testify at the ensuing trial. 
Plaintiff alleged in a complaint filed on October 22, 1997, that she was 
defamed on three occasions.  The first was in June 1994 when, her complaint 
alleged, defendant Brian Patrick Clarke (with whom plaintiff at one time had been 
romantically involved) described plaintiff to Peter Bozanich, a deputy district 
attorney employed by Los Angeles County (County) and to Bozanich’s wife, 
fellow prosecutor Pam Ferrero, as “a felony probationer.”  The complaint alleged 
that plaintiff again was defamed when, in 1996, defendant Bozanich told 
defendant Joseph Bosco, an author, that plaintiff was on felony probation, adding 
that the district attorney’s office had “checked it out.”  The complaint alleged that 
plaintiff was defamed for a third time when, in December 1996, defendant Bosco 
and defendant William Morrow and Company (William Morrow) published 
Bosco’s book, entitled A Problem of Evidence, which recounted Clarke’s and 
Bozanich’s defamatory statements regarding plaintiff.  The book, a page of which 
is attached to the complaint, also stated that Bozanich had recounted to Bosco the 
circumstances under which he had heard Clarke’s statement.  The book further 
explained that it was plaintiff’s status as a felony probationer that accounted for 
the prosecution’s failure to call her as a witness at trial, not (as previously had 
been announced) the circumstance that she had sold her story to Hard Copy.  The 
 
 
4
specific defamatory words alleged in each of the causes of action in the complaint, 
however, were “[s]he’s a felony probationer.” 
Plaintiff’s complaint contained eight causes of action.  It named as 
defendants Clarke, Bozanich, the County (as the employer of Bozanich), Bosco, 
and William Morrow.  Three causes of action were alleged against Clarke, one for 
each of the three alleged defamations.  (Counts one, four, and six.)  Two causes of 
action were alleged against Bozanich, one for his statement to Bosco and one for 
the statement contained in the book.  (Counts two and seven.)  Two corresponding 
causes of action were alleged against the County as Bozanich’s employer, based 
upon Bozanich’s having uttered the defamatory remark in the course of his 
employment with the County.  (Counts three and eight.)1  Finally, one cause of 
action was alleged against Bosco and William Morrow for the statement contained 
in Bosco’s book.  (Count five.)  Each of the causes of action included allegations 
with respect to the asserted falsity of the alleged defamatory statement and 
defendants’ malice.  The specific allegation that is of importance to the issue in the 
present case is that plaintiff did not become aware that the defamatory statements 
had been made, and could not have become aware that they had been made, until 
the publication of the book A Problem of Evidence.  Plaintiff’s additional 
pleadings, as noted below, added the claim that she did not become aware of the 
defamatory statements until she bought and read the book in December 1996. 
Clarke demurred to the first cause of action on the ground that it was barred 
by the one-year statute of limitations applicable to defamation claims.  (See Code 
                                             
 
1  
The causes of action against the County included the allegation that on 
May 3, 1997, plaintiff had presented to the County a claim for the damages she 
sought in the complaint, as required by Government Code section 910. 
 
 
5
Civ. Proc., § 340, subd. (c).)2  The trial court sustained Clarke’s demurrer to the 
first cause of action without leave to amend, on the basis that the defamatory 
statement had been made more than one year prior to the filing of the complaint.  
The court subsequently clarified its order to reflect that, on the same basis, it had 
sustained the demurrer as to each of the three causes of action that had been 
alleged against Clarke.  A judgment was entered in favor of defendant Clarke on 
May 24, 1999.  Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal, case No. B133983.   
For their part, defendants Bozanich and the County answered the complaint 
and raised various affirmative defenses, including that the causes of action alleged 
against them were barred by plaintiff’s failure to file her claims against them 
within six months of the time her causes of action accrued, as required by the 
California Tort Claims Act.  (Gov. Code, § 911.2.)  Subsequently, these 
defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on that ground as to plaintiff’s 
four causes of action against them.  In their motion, they asserted that the causes 
of action accrued on September 18, 1996, the date by which they alleged the book, 
A Problem of Evidence, had been distributed in California.  They asserted that 
plaintiff filed her claim with the County on May 12, 1997, more than six months 
later, as demonstrated by County records.  In support of the motion, defendants 
submitted a declaration by William Murphy, vice-president of William Morrow, 
who declared that the book received general distribution in California in 
September 1996.  Attached to that declaration were detailed shipping records 
establishing the number of copies that were shipped to California bookstores 
between September 5 and October 21, 1996.   
                                             
 
2  
Prior to 2002, the relevant language was designated as subdivision (3) of 
Code of Civil Procedure section 340, but for convenience, the current designation 
(Code Civ. Proc. § 340, subd (c)), is used throughout this opinion. 
 
 
6
Plaintiff opposed the motion for summary judgment upon the ground, 
among others, that her causes of action against these defendants did not accrue 
until December 1996, when she bought and read the book and learned of the 
defamatory statements.  She also asserted that triable issues of fact remained 
concerning the date of the book’s publication and distribution, while maintaining 
that she had not had adequate time to engage in discovery.  In her mandatory 
statement of material facts in dispute (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)), 
however, plaintiff conceded it was undisputed that the book was shipped to 
California beginning on September 5, 1996; that almost 7,000 copies were shipped 
to California between that date and October 21, 1996; that the book was on sale in 
California no later than September 18, 1996; that thousands of copies were on sale 
in California no later than October 21, 1996; and that the official publication date 
for the book was October 3, 1996.  (The record also reflects that almost 33,000 
copies of the book had been shipped for distribution throughout the nation by 
October 21, 1996.)  Plaintiff also conceded as undisputed that she filed her tort 
claim on May 12, 1997, and that on May 21, 1998, the County provided notice of 
both her failure to comply with the requirement of the California Tort Claims Act 
that the claim be filed within six months (Gov. Code, § 911.2) and the 
requirements for a late-claim petition. 
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Bozanich and the 
County on the grounds that (1) plaintiff failed to file her statement of material 
facts in dispute in a timely manner (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)), and (2) 
plaintiff failed to file a timely claim with the County pursuant to the Tort Claims 
Act (Gov. Code, §  911.2) or to seek relief when the County denied her claim as 
 
 
7
untimely.  The trial court entered judgment in favor of defendants Bozanich and 
the County.  Plaintiff filed a second notice of appeal, case No. B130905.3 
The Court of Appeal consolidated the two appeals.  It reversed the two 
judgments, holding (both with respect to defendant Clarke and defendants 
Bozanich and the County) that the trial court erred in failing to consider the 
accrual date of plaintiff’s causes of action and the commencement of the period of 
limitations under the discovery rule.  Under that rule, according to the Court of 
Appeal, all of plaintiff’s causes of action accrued when plaintiff knew (or with 
reasonable diligence should have known) of the defamatory statements — a 
question for the jury to determine in this case. 
The Court of Appeal acknowledged that Code of Civil Procedure section 
340, subdivision (c) establishes a one-year statute of limitations for defamation 
actions, among others, but the court observed that most of the tort claims 
enumerated in that statute have been considered to be subject to tolling until the 
plaintiff learns of (or with reasonable diligence should have discovered) his or her 
injury.  The appellate court explained that the discovery rule has been 
characterized as applying to delay the accrual of a cause of action in cases in 
which the plaintiff cannot easily discover the injury or the plaintiff and the 
defendant are in a fiduciary relationship.  The court also noted that a defendant 
who conceals his or her identity or responsibility may be equitably estopped from 
relying upon the defense that the statutory limitations period has expired.  
                                             
 
3   
Neither of these judgments encompassed plaintiff’s claims against Bosco 
and William Morrow.  Although plaintiff named them as respondents in the 
appeals designated case Nos. B133983 and B130905, these defendants 
subsequently were dismissed as parties to the appeals.  Thus, the application of the 
statute of limitations to the causes of action alleged against Bosco and William 
Morrow is not before us in the present case. 
 
 
8
The Court of Appeal pointed out that both the discovery rule and the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel have been applied to defamation claims, whether 
they involve libel or slander.  The court commented that no California case has 
held the discovery rule and the doctrine of equitable estoppel inapplicable to a 
claim alleging libel or slander when the tort has been committed by a “non-mass-
media defendant.”  The court determined that the result should not be different as 
to a “non-mass-media” defendant merely because the defamatory statement of 
such a defendant has been republished in a “mass media forum.” It expressed 
concern that the term “mass media” unwisely could be deemed to include any type 
of publication, no matter how obscure, and that rigid application of the one-year 
statute of limitations could leave helpless those plaintiffs who have been defamed 
in obscure books or other media outlets.  The court held that “the discovery rule 
can be applied to toll the running of the statutory period for defamation against 
non-mass-media defendants, even though the fact of the initial defamation is 
brought to light in a mass media publication.”  The court also applied the 
discovery rule to toll the period of limitations imposed by the California Tort 
Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 911.2) with respect to claims against defendants 
Bozanich and the County.4   
Finally, the Court of Appeal concluded that a triable issue of material fact 
existed with respect to the question whether “the republication of defendants’ 
allegedly defamatory statements in [the] author’s book was, under all of the 
                                             
 
4   
The Court of Appeal also concluded that the trial court erred in granting the 
motion for summary judgment in favor of defendants Bozanich and County in part 
on the basis that plaintiff had failed to file a timely separate statement of disputed 
and undisputed facts.  (See Code Civ. Proc.,§ 437c, subd. (b).)  The Court of 
Appeal noted that, in their appellate briefing, defendants had not relied upon this 
basis for the judgment in their favor.  This issue is not before us. 
 
 
9
circumstances, sufficient to put plaintiff on reasonable notice that defendants had 
defamed her.  Until plaintiff had such notice, the running of the statute was 
tolled.”5   
Bozanich and the County petitioned for review.  Clarke did not.  
Nonetheless, because the two appeals were consolidated, both matters came before 
us when we granted review.  
II 
A 
Initially, we briefly describe relevant aspects of the law of defamation, 
including the so-called single-publication rule, to assist in understanding the 
allegations of plaintiff’s complaint and the application of the statute of limitations 
to these allegations. 
Defamation constitutes an injury to reputation; the injury may occur by 
means of libel or slander.  (Civ. Code, § 44.)  In general, leaving aside certain 
qualifications that are not relevant in this case, a written communication that is 
false, that is not protected by any privilege, and that exposes a person to contempt 
or ridicule or certain other reputational injuries, constitutes libel.  (Civ. Code, 
§ 45; Rest. 2d Torts, § 568, subd. (1).)  A false and unprivileged oral 
communication attributing to a person specific misdeeds or certain unfavorable 
characteristics or qualities, or uttering certain other derogatory statements 
                                             
 
5   
In a footnote stating that it was not called upon to decide whether there 
“might be some public policy reason against applying the discovery rule to toll the 
statute of limitations on causes of action against a mass media defendant,” the 
Court of Appeal nonetheless suggested that the discovery rule should apply to 
“mass media defendants.”  The court claimed that the Uniform Single Publication 
Act, adopted in California in Civil Code section 3425.1 et seq., applied merely to 
limit a plaintiff to one cause of action for a defamation contained in a “mass media 
publication,” but did not have any effect on the applicable statute of limitations.     
 
 
10
regarding a person, constitutes slander.  (Civ. Code, § 46; Rest. 2d Torts, § 568, 
subd. (2).)  The present case involves claims based upon both libel and slander.   
One of the elements of the tort of defamation is “publication.”  In general, 
each time the defamatory statement is communicated to a third person who 
understands its defamatory meaning as applied to the plaintiff, the statement is 
said to have been “published,” although a written dissemination, as suggested by 
the common meaning of that term, is not required.  Each publication ordinarily 
gives rise to a new cause of action for defamation.  (See Khawar v. Globe 
Internat., Inc. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 254, 268; Lundquist v. Reusser (1994) 7 Cal.4th 
1193, 1203; Smith v. Maldonado (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 637, 645; Kanarek v. 
Bugliosi (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 327, 332-333; Rest.2d Torts, § 577 & 
coms. b & c, pp. 201-202; id., § 578; 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 
1988) Torts, §§ 476-478, pp. 560-562; 1 Smolla, Law of Defamation (2d ed. 1997) 
§ 4:77-4:78, pp. 4-124-4-126; § 4:87, p. 4-136.3.)  In the present case, three 
separate “publications” are alleged — one by Clarke to Bozanich, one by 
Bozanich to Bosco, and one by Bosco and William Morrow in the book, A 
Problem of Evidence.  It is alleged that various defendants are jointly liable for 
some of the publications. 
The rule that each publication of a defamatory statement gives rise to a new 
cause of action for defamation applies when the original defamer repeats or 
recirculates his or her original remarks to a new audience.  (See Kanarek v. 
Bugliosi, supra, 108 Cal.App.3d at p. 332; Rest. 2d Torts, § 577A, subd. (1), 
com. a, p. 208; 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Torts, § 478, p. 562.)  That 
rule also applies when a person who heard, read, or saw the original defamatory 
remark repeats the remark to others (subject to qualifications not relevant here).  
(See Khawar v. Globe Internat., Inc., supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 268; Frommoethelydo 
 
 
11
v. Fire Ins. Exchange (1986) 42 Cal.3d 208, 217; Di Giorgio Corp. v. Valley 
Labor Citizen (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 268, 273.) 
It is under the latter application of the rule, presumably, that plaintiff 
alleged that Bozanich’s statement to Bosco, repeating Clarke’s original statement, 
gave rise to a cause of action for defamation against Bozanich. 
In general, the repetition by a new party of another person’s earlier 
defamatory remark also gives rise to a separate cause of action for defamation 
against the original defamer, when the repetition was reasonably foreseeable.  
(Mitchell v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 268, 281; 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. 
Law, supra, Torts, § 478, p. 562; 1 Smolla, Law of Defamation, supra, § 4:91, 
pp. 4-138-4-139.)  It is the foreseeable subsequent repetition of the remark that 
constitutes publication and an actionable wrong in this situation, even though it is 
the original author of the remark who is being held accountable.  (See, e.g., 
Schneider v. United Airlines, Inc. (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 71, 75-76.) 
It is under this rule, presumably, that plaintiff alleged causes of action 
against Clarke based upon Bozanich’s oral repetition of Clarke’s original remark, 
and against Clarke based upon Bosco’s and William Morrow’s repetition, in the 
book, of Clarke’s original remark.  Similarly, it is under this theory, presumably, 
that plaintiff alleged causes of action against Bozanich and the County based upon 
Bosco’s and William Morrow’s repetition, in the book, of the statement related by 
Bozanich to Bosco. 
Under the common law as it existed in the 19th century and early part of 
the 20th century, the principle that each communication of a defamatory remark to 
a new audience constitutes a separate “publication,” giving rise to a separate cause 
of action, led to the conclusion that each sale or delivery of a copy of a newspaper 
or book containing a defamation also constitutes a separate publication of the 
defamation to a new audience, giving rise to a separate cause of action for 
 
 
12
defamation.  (See 2 Harper et al., Law of Torts (1986) § 5.16, p. 126; 5 Witkin, 
Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Torts, § 479, p. 563.)  This conclusion had the 
potential to subject the publishers of books and newspapers to lawsuits stating 
hundreds, thousands, or even millions of causes of action for a single issue of a 
periodical or edition of a book.  This conclusion also had the potential to disturb 
the repose that the statute of limitations ordinarily would afford, because a new 
publication of the defamation could occur if a copy of the newspaper or book were 
preserved for many years and then came into the hands of a new reader who had 
not discovered it previously.  The statute of limitations could be tolled indefinitely, 
perhaps forever, under this approach. 
The difficulties created by the early common law rule are illustrated in a 
19th century English case that concluded a plaintiff could bring an action seeking 
redress for libel against a publisher based upon an allegedly defamatory remark 
contained in a newspaper issued 17 years prior to the plaintiff’s discovery of the 
defamation, on the theory that the sale to the plaintiff of the long-forgotten copy of 
the newspaper constituted a new publication, starting anew the running of the 
period of limitations.  (The Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer (Q.B. 1849) 117 Eng. 
Rep. 75.)  Despite the burdens created by the staleness and potential volume of the 
claims thus permitted, many American courts, and the reporters of the first 
Restatement of Torts, nonetheless adhered to the rule applied by the English court 
in the Duke of Brunswick case.  (Rest., Torts, § 578, com. b, p. 200; 1 Smolla, Law 
of Defamation, supra, § 4:93, p. 4-140.1.) 
Ultimately, many American courts began to reconsider the common law 
rule exemplified in the Duke of Brunswick case.  These courts recognized that the 
advent of books and newspapers that were circulated among a mass readership 
threatened unending and potentially ruinous liability as well as overwhelming (and 
endless) litigation, as long as courts adhered to the rule that each sale of a copy of 
 
 
13
a newspaper or a book, regardless how long after original publication, constituted 
a new and separate publication.  The early common law rule threatened a volume 
of litigation and a potential for indefinite tolling of the period of limitations that, 
these courts realized, would challenge the ability and willingness of publishers to 
report freely on the news and on matters of public interest.  (See Gregoire v. G.P. 
Putnam’s Sons (N.Y. 1948) 81 N.E.2d 45, 46-48 [collecting cases]; see also 
Hartmann v. Time, Inc. (3d. Cir. 1948) 166 F.2d 127, 134 [observing that the 19th 
century rule posed a threat to freedom of the press]; Applewhite v. Memphis State 
University (Tenn. 1973) 495 S.W.2d 190, 194 [noting that the rule posed threats of 
harassment, multiple recovery, and injury to the administration of justice]; Winrod 
v. Time, Inc. (Ill.App.Ct. 1948) 78 N.E.2d 708, 709-710.)   
Seeking to avoid both the multiplicity and the staleness of claims permitted 
by the rule applied in the Duke of Brunswick case, courts fashioned what became 
known as the single-publication rule, holding that, for any single edition of a 
newspaper or book, there was but a single potential action for a defamatory 
statement contained in the newspaper or book, no matter how many copies of the 
newspaper or the book were distributed.  (See, e.g., Gregoire v. G.P. Putnam’s 
Sons, supra, 81 N.E.2d 45, 46-48; see also Bradford v. American Media 
Operations, Inc. (E.D.Pa. 1995) 882 F.Supp. 1508, 1513-1514; Rinaldi v. Viking 
Penguin, Inc. (N.Y. 1981) 420 N.E.2d 377, 380-382; Winrod v. Time, Inc., supra, 
78 N.E.2d at pp. 708-709; Rest.2d Torts, § 577A, subd. (3); 2 Harper et al., Law of 
Torts, supra, § 5.16, pp. 126-128.)6  Of course, because each person who takes a 
responsible part in a publication of defamatory matter may be held liable for the 
                                             
 
6  The applicability of the single-publication rule to written publications that 
receive an extremely limited distribution is not an issue in the present case. 
 
 
14
publication (see Dunn v. Hearst (1903) 139 Cal. 239, 241; Osmond v. EWAP, Inc. 
(1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 842, 852), multiple causes of action, even under the single-
publication rule, could be brought in one proceeding against several defendants 
for a single defamatory statement.  (Wathan v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. (C.D. Ill. 
1986) 636 F.Supp. 1530, 1533-1536; Dubinsky v. United Airlines Master 
Executive Council (Ill.App.Ct. 1999) 708 N.E.2d 441, 454; 14 West U. Laws Ann. 
(1990) U. Single Publ. Act, comrs. note, p. 375.)   
Under the single-publication rule, with respect to the statute of limitations,  
publication generally is said to occur on the “first general distribution of the 
publication to the public.”  (Belli v. Roberts Furs (1966) 2140 Cal.App.2d 284, 
289; see also Bradford v. American Media Operations, supra, 882 F.Supp. at p. 
1514 [collecting cases].)  Accrual at that point is believed to provide adequate 
protection to potential plaintiffs, especially in view of the qualification that 
repetition of the defamatory statement in a new edition of a book or newspaper 
constitutes a new publication of the defamation that may give rise to a new cause 
of action, with a new accrual date.  (See Rinaldi v. Viking Penguin, Inc., supra, 
420 N.E.2d at p. 433.)7  Under this rule, the cause of action accrues and the period 
of limitations commences, regardless of when the plaintiff secured a copy or 
became aware of the publication.  (See Strick v. Superior Court (1983) 143 
Cal.App.3d 916, 923; McGuiness v. Motor Trend Magazine (1982) 129 
                                             
 
7   
Notwithstanding the single-publication rule, a new edition or new issue of a 
newspaper or book still constitutes a new publication, giving rise to a new and 
separate cause of action and a new accrual date for the purpose of the statute of 
limitations.  (Schneider v. United Airlines, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. 76; 
Kanarek v. Bugliosi, supra, 108 Cal.App.3d at p. 332 [separate causes of action 
for hardback and paperback editions of a book]; Rest.2d Torts, § 577A, subd. (3); 
1 Smolla, Law of Defamation, supra, § 4:93p. 4-140.2.) 
 
 
15
Cal.App.3d 59, 62-63; Belli v. Roberts Brothers Furs, supra, 240 Cal.App.2d at p. 
289; see also Morgan v. Hustler Magazine (N.D. Ohio 1987) 653 F.Supp. 711, 
717; Flynn v. Associated Press (Mass. 1988) 519 N.E.2d 1304, 1307-1308.) 
The single-publication rule largely has been codified in the Uniform Single 
Publication Act, which has been adopted in many states, including California.   
(Civ. Code, § 3425.3 (added by Stats. 1955, c. 867, § 1, p. 1481);8 McGuiness v. 
Motor Trend Magazine, supra, 129 Cal.App.3d at p. 61; Belli v. Roberts Brothers 
Furs, supra, 240 Cal.App.2d at p. 288; see also 1 Smolla, Law of Defamation, 
supra, § 4:93, p. 4-140.2; 2 Harper et al., Law of Torts, supra, § 5.16, pp. 127-128 
& fn. 8.)  The Uniform Single Publication Act was intended to reflect the common 
law single-publication rule.  (Wathan v. Equitable Life Assur. Co., supra, 636 
F.Supp. at pp. 1533-1536; Dubinsky v. United Airlines Master Executive Council, 
supra, 708 N.E.2d at p. 454; 14 West U. Laws Ann., supra, U. Single Publ. Act, 
comrs. note, p. 375.) 
B 
We next consider the application of the statute of limitations for 
defamation, which requires that an action be filed within one year of accrual of the 
cause of action, to the present case.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 340, subd. (c).)9  In 
                                             
 
8   
That section provides:  “No person shall have more than one cause of 
action for damages for libel or slander or invasion of privacy or any other tort 
founded upon any single publication or exhibition or utterance, such as any one 
issue of a newspaper or book or magazine or any one presentation to an audience 
or any one broadcast over radio or television or any one exhibition of a motion 
picture.  Recovery in any action shall include all damages for any such tort 
suffered by the plaintiff in all jurisdictions.”  (Civ. Code, § 3425.3.) 
9   
In addition, with respect to the claims against Bozanich for statements 
made in the course of his employment, and against the County as his employer, 
plaintiff was obliged to file a claim with the County within six months of the 
accrual of her cause of action.  (Gov. Code, § 911.2.) 
 
 
16
common with other statutory limitations of the period within which an action may 
be brought, this statute serves to protect potential defendants from stale claims and 
to encourage plaintiffs to be diligent.  Such provisions, by creating limits on the 
period during which a person’s conduct may engender litigation and liability, 
promote predictability and stability.  (See Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 
Cal.4th 383, 395-396.) 
In a claim for defamation, as with other tort claims, the period of 
limitations commences when the cause of action accrues.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 312; 
Norgart v. Upjohn Co., supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 397.)  As we have discussed, in 
general a cause of action in tort accrues at the time of injury, and a cause of action 
for defamation accrues at the time the defamatory statement is “published” (using 
the term “published” in its technical sense).  (Bernson v. Browning-Ferris 
Industries, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 926, 931; Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 
Cal.3d 1103, 1109; Schneider v. United Airlines, Inc., supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at 
p. 76; Strick v. Superior Court, supra, 143 Cal.App.3d at p. 922; see also Norgart 
v. Upjohn Company, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 397.)   
As noted, in defamation actions the general rule is that publication occurs 
when the defendant communicates the defamatory statement to a person other than 
the person being defamed.  (Cunningham v. Simpson (1969) 1 Cal.3d 301, 307; 
5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Torts, § 476, pp. 560-561; Rest.2d Torts, 
§ 577.)  As also has been noted, with respect to books and newspapers, publication 
occurs (and the cause of action accrues) when the book or newspaper is first 
generally distributed to the public.  (Strick v. Superior Court, supra, 143 
Cal.App.3d at p. 922; McGuiness v. Motor Trend Magazine, supra, 129 
Cal.App.3d at p. 61; Belli v. Roberts Brothers Furs, supra, 240 Cal.App.2d at p. 
289.) 
 
 
17
When we apply these definitions to plaintiff’s causes of action in the 
present case, it is evident that each is barred by the statute of limitations.  Plaintiff 
filed her claim with the County on May 12, 1997, and her complaint on 
October 22, 1997.  By contrast, the first alleged defamation was published in 
1994, more than one year prior to the filing of the complaint and more than six 
months prior to the filing of the claim with the County.  The second alleged 
defamation was published in 1996 sometime prior to September.  The third alleged 
defamation was communicated by means of the book, thousands of copies of 
which were distributed for sale in California, on a date (as plaintiff concedes) prior 
to October 21, 1996.  Even if we consider October 21, 1996 to be the date of 
publication, the complaint was filed a year and a day after that date and the claim 
with the County was filed more than six months after that date.    
Plaintiff contends, however, that pursuant to the so-called discovery rule, 
all of her causes of action accrued when she first learned of the defamatory 
statement.  She urges that, as a general rule of tort law, the accrual of a cause of 
action is tolled until the time the plaintiff knows (or with reasonable diligence 
should have known) that the injury occurred.  In her case, she claims, accrual 
occurred in December 1996, when she bought and read a copy of the book, A 
Problem of Evidence.  She asserts that the applicable statute of limitations should 
run from that time for all of her causes of action. 
We have recognized that in some instances, the accrual of a cause of action 
in tort is delayed until the plaintiff discovered (or reasonably should have 
discovered or suspected) the factual basis for his or her claim.  (See Norgart v. 
Upjohn Co., supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 397.)  In professional malpractice cases, for 
example, delayed accrual is justified on the basis that the expertise expected of 
professionals is beyond the ability of laypersons to evaluate, and on the further 
basis that it may be impossible for a layperson even to observe the professional’s 
 
 
18
application of this expertise.  (See Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & 
Gelfand (1971) 6 Cal.3d 176, 188.)  As observed by the Courts of Appeal here and 
in several other decisions, the discovery rule most frequently applies when it is 
particularly difficult for the plaintiff to observe or understand the breach of duty, 
or when the injury itself (or its cause) is hidden or beyond what the ordinary 
person could be expected to understand.  (Evans v. Eckelman (1990) 216 
Cal.App.3d 1609, 1614-1615; see also Mark K. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop 
(1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 603, 610-611; Prudential Home Mortgage Co. v. Superior 
Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1246-1247.)   
When the basis for a claim has been published in the public record or has 
been the subject of publicity, several cases have declined to apply the discovery 
rule, commenting that the plaintiff may be expected to be sufficiently diligent to 
discover the basis for his or her claim within the statutory period.  (See Utility 
Cost Management v. Indian Wells Valley Water Dist (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1185, 1197 
[rejecting application of the discovery rule to a claim for refund of an assertedly 
excessive charge, when the basis for the plaintiff’s claim could have been 
discovered by means of the public reporting requirements that were imposed by 
statute on the defendant]; Norgart v. Upjohn Co., supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 408-409, 
fn. 7 [relying upon press coverage in rejecting the plaintiffs’ claim that, because 
they had no actual or constructive suspicion concerning a defendant’s culpability, 
they could not have amended their complaint to name the defendant within the 
period of limitations]; McKelvey v. Boeing North American, Inc. (1999) 74 
Cal.App.4th 151, 160-161 & fn. 11 [referring to publicity as a basis for rejecting 
tolling under a statutory discovery rule]; 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1996) 
Actions, § 602, p. 773; but see Prudential Home Mortgage Co. v. Superior Court, 
supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1247-1248 [observing that public records may impart 
 
 
19
“presumptive notice” of the basis for a claim, but declining to hold that they 
always do so as a matter of law].) 
This court and other courts in California and elsewhere have recognized 
that in certain circumstances it may be appropriate to apply the discovery rule to 
delay the accrual of a cause of action for defamation or to impose an equitable 
estoppel against defendants who assert the defense after the limitations period has 
expired.   
An example of equitable estoppel is presented in Bernson v. Browning-
Ferris Industries of California, Inc., supra, 7 Cal.4th 926, in which a company 
allegedly circulated among various press outlets a defamatory dossier concerning 
the plaintiff, a city council member.  When the plaintiff learned of the dossier and 
accused the defendant of being its author, the defendant denied authorship, both to 
the plaintiff personally and in a letter printed in the Los Angeles Times.  The 
defendant also demanded that the newspaper retract its assertion that the defendant 
had been the author.  Although the normal rule is that ignorance of the identity of 
the defendant is not a basis for tolling the statute of limitations, under the 
particular circumstances this court determined that as a matter of equity, the 
defendant should be estopped from profiting from its own misconduct in 
precluding the plaintiff from ever ascertaining the identity of the defendant.  
(7 Cal.4th at pp. 932-933, 936.)  We acknowledged, in passing, that the discovery 
rule has been applied to defamation cases.  (7 Cal.4th at pp. 931-932.) 
That rule has been applied when the defamatory statement is hidden from 
view as, for example, in a personnel file that generally cannot be inspected by the 
plaintiff.  The rationales offered in support of the application of the discovery rule 
to defamation cases are equitable in nature.  The cases turn upon the circumstances 
in which the defamatory statement is made and frequently involve a defamatory 
writing that has been kept in a place to which the plaintiff has no access or cause 
 
 
20
to seek access.  The plaintiff’s inability to discover the libel when it first was 
“published” and placed in a confidential file would render unjust any holding that 
the cause of action accrued and the period of limitations commenced when the 
writing was placed in the file.  
For example, in a case upon which plaintiff places great emphasis, the court 
in Manguso v. Oceanside Unified School Dist. (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 725 
determined that a teacher’s cause of action for libel against a school principal did 
not accrue until the teacher knew or had reasonable cause to learn of the libelous 
material the principal had placed in her personnel file.  The court explained that 
statutes of limitations are intended to protect defendants from unexpected, stale 
claims when the plaintiff has slept on his or her rights, but that the discovery rule 
provides an exception when the plaintiff has used reasonable diligence to protect 
these rights.  The court asserted that the discovery rule is intended to avoid 
unjustly depriving plaintiffs of their causes of action when they have been diligent, 
and to relieve plaintiffs of the obligation to file a claim prior to the time they 
reasonably could be expected to discover it.  (Id. at pp. 730-731; see also Staheli v. 
Smith (Miss. 1989) 548 So.2d 1299, 1303 [collecting cases limiting the discovery 
rule to private or confidential publications and holding that an “inherently 
undiscoverable” libel contained in a tenure recommendation may be subject to the 
discovery rule]; Tom Olesker’s Exciting World of Fashion, Inc. v. Dun & 
Bradstreet, Inc. (Ill. 1975) 334 N.E.2d 160, 164 [applying the discovery rule to the 
transmittal of a defamatory credit report]; Flynn v. Associated Press, supra, 519 
N.E.2d at p. 1307 [suggesting that in defamation actions, the discovery rule 
applies only to “inherently unknowable” publications].)  As for oral defamatory 
remarks (that is, slander), plaintiff has cited one case in which the court assumed 
the same analysis would apply.  (See McNair v. Worldwide Church of God (1987) 
197 Cal.App.3d 363, 379-380.) 
 
 
21
The discovery rule has not, however, been applied to postpone the accrual 
of a cause of action based upon the publication of a defamatory statement 
contained in a book or newspaper.  The rule constitutes an exception to general 
rules concerning the accrual of a cause of action — an exception based upon 
equity.  Plaintiff does not explain satisfactorily how the equitable considerations 
that may apply to a defamation that is hidden from view might apply to a 
defamation that is made public in a book. 
Indeed, courts uniformly have rejected the application of the discovery rule 
to libels published in books, magazines, and newspapers, pointing out that 
application of the discovery rule would undermine the protection provided by the 
single-publication rule.  (McGuiness v. Motor Trend Magazine, supra, 129 
Cal.App.3d at pp. 62-63; Schweihs v. Burdick (7th Cir. 1996) 96 F.3d 917, 920-
921; Barrett v. Catacombs Press (E.D.Pa. 1999) 64 F.Supp.2d 440, 444-446; 
Bradford v. American Media Operations, Inc., supra, 882 F.Supp. at pp.1514, 
1518-1519; Morgan v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., supra, 653 F.Supp. at p. 717; 
Rinsley v. Brandt (D.Kan. 1977) 446 F.Supp. 850, 852-853; Flynn v. Associated 
Press, supra, 519 N.E.2d at pp. 1307-1308 [collecting cases]; Holloway v. Butler 
(Tex. App. 1983) 662 S.W.2d 688, 693; see also Tom Olesker’s Excit. W., etc. v. 
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., supra, 334 N.E.2d at p. 164 [distinguishing “hidden” 
defamatory statements by a credit reporting agency from statements published in 
books and newspapers].)  
Plaintiff asks us to deviate from this authority in order to produce an 
assertedly equitable result, based upon her contention that she has been a 
reasonably diligent litigant — even as to the allegedly defamatory statement 
published in the book, A Problem of Evidence.  But, as one court explained, 
although application of the discovery rule may be justified when the defamation 
was communicated in confidence, that is “in an inherently secretive manner,” the 
 
 
22
justification does not apply when the defamation occurred by means of a book, 
magazine, or newspaper that was distributed to the public.  (McGuiness v. Motor 
Trend Magazine, supra, 129 Cal.App.3d at p. 63.)  Even a decision that applied 
the discovery rule to a defamatory statement contained in a confidential credit 
report distinguished the case before it from defamations of the kind alleged in the 
present case, on the ground that “the publication has been for public attention and 
knowledge[,] and the person commented on, if only in his role as a member of the 
public, has had access to such published information.”  (Tom Olesker’s Excit. W., 
etc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., supra, 334 N.E.2d at p. 164.)   
As is evident, application of the discovery rule to statements contained in 
books and newspapers would undermine the single-publication rule and reinstate 
the indefinite tolling of the statute of limitations intended to be cured by the 
adoption of the single-publication rule.  If we were to recognize delayed accrual of 
a cause of action based upon the allegedly defamatory statement contained in the 
book, A Problem of Evidence, on the basis that plaintiff did not happen to come 
across the statement until some time after the book was first generally distributed 
to the public, we would be adopting a rule subjecting publishers and authors to 
potential liability during the entire period in which a single copy of the book or 
newspaper might exist and fall into the hands of the subject of a defamatory 
remark.  Inquiry into whether delay in discovering the publication was reasonable 
has not been permitted for publications governed by the single-publication rule.  
Nor is adoption of the rule proposed by plaintiff appropriate simply because the 
originator of a privately communicated defamatory statement may, together with 
the author and the publisher of a book, be liable for the defamation contained in 
the book.  Under the rationale for the single-publication rule, the originator, who is 
jointly responsible along with the author and the publisher, should not be liable for 
millions of causes of action for a single edition of the book.  Similarly, consistent 
 
 
23
with that rationale, the originator, like the author or the publisher, should not be 
subject to suit many years after the edition is published. 
We conclude, therefore, that the causes of action that are based upon 
publication of the defamatory material in the book, A Problem of Evidence  
namely, the causes of action that would hold Clarke and Bozanich, respectively, 
(and the County as Bozanich’s employer) liable for the allegedly foreseeable 
repetition of their defamatory statements published in the book  must be barred.   
The Court of Appeal reached a contrary conclusion, based upon the 
assertedly confidential nature of the first two defamatory publications made by 
Clarke and Bozanich.  We believe, however, that the court failed to recognize the 
presence of separate causes of action alleged against Clarke and Bozanich for the 
statements contained in the book.  The circumstance that plaintiff understandably 
might not be aware of Clarke and Bozanich’s earlier confidential communications 
would have no bearing on the application of the statute of limitations to a later, 
separate defamation that was contained in the book, and for which plaintiff seeks 
to hold Clarke and Bozanich responsible.  Clarke’s and Bozanich’s liability in this 
respect was essentially the same as the potential liability of the book’s author and 
publisher, and, with regard to the latter category of defendants, the single-
publication rule applies without any possibility of doubt.   
The Court of Appeal’s opinion, in a footnote, questioned the basis for and 
legitimacy of the single-publication rule even as applied to defamations contained 
in books and newspapers.  It asserted that the rule has nothing to do with the 
statute of limitations, but this assertion is untenable.  The history of the rule, the 
basis for its adoption, and the cases cited above demonstrate the fallacy of this 
position.  Without purporting to answer all potential attacks on the rule, we believe 
that our discussion has established that the single-publication rule is supported by 
 
 
24
settled authority and by legitimate policy concerns, and that it should apply in the 
present case as we have determined. 
Next, we examine whether accrual of plaintiff’s remaining causes of action 
should be tolled pursuant to the discovery rule.  These causes of action are alleged 
against Clarke, for his original defamatory statement, and against Clarke for 
Bozanich’s repetition of that defamatory statement; against Bozanich, for his 
repetition, in the course of his employment with the County, of the defamatory 
statement to Bosco, and against the County as Bozanich’s employer.   
We acknowledge that the discovery rule has been applied to such inherently 
covert defamations as entries in personnel records, and also to communications by 
credit reporting agencies to their subscribers.  (See, e.g., Manguso v. Oceanside 
Unified School Dist., supra, 88 Cal.App.3d at pp. 730-731; Schweihs v. Burdick, 
supra, 96 F.3d at p. 921 [declining to apply the discovery rule to a book, but 
observing that “[t]he courts seem to apply the discovery rule in situations where 
the defamatory material is published in a manner likely to be concealed from the 
plaintiff, such as credit reports or confidential memoranda.  In these situations, the 
injustice that results from the expiration of the limitations period before discovery 
of the plaintiff’s injury is more likely to occur”]; Tom Olesker’s Excit. W., etc. v. 
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc,. supra, 334 N.E.2d at p. 164.)  Applying the discovery rule 
to delay accrual of a cause of action based upon an asserted defamation contained 
in a faculty tenure report, one court observed: “Those states having directly 
addressed the discovery rule in defamation cases have generally applied it in those 
very limited situations where the allegedly libelous statement occurred in private 
or confidential publications [that are] not readily available to the plaintiff or the 
public.”  (Staheli v. Smith, supra, 548 So.2d at p. 1303.) 
These authorities might support plaintiff’s position if the original 
defamatory statements made by Clarke and Bozanich had not been disseminated in 
 
 
25
the book, and if plaintiff had learned of them for the first time through, for 
example, an entry in a police report, an employment record, or an unexpected 
disclosure by someone to whom the essentially private defamations had been 
repeated.  We believe, however, that the equitable basis for applying the discovery 
rule — that a plaintiff should not forfeit a cause of action based on a confidential 
communication that he or she had no reasonable basis for discovering — no longer 
exists once the original defamatory statement is published in a book that was 
distributed to the general public.  In such circumstances, not only is the basis for 
the claim not hidden, but it has been trumpeted.   
The Court of Appeal did not appear to recognize that, even with respect to 
the two presumably confidential communications, the equitable basis or rationale 
for applying the discovery rule in the case of inherently secret or confidential 
communications ceases once a book recounting these communications is 
published and is distributed to the general public.  The book in the present case 
repeated the earlier defamatory statements and attributed them to Bozanich and 
Clarke.  We can see no justification for applying the discovery rule to delay the 
accrual of plaintiff’s causes of action beyond the point at which their factual basis 
became accessible to plaintiff to the same degree as it was accessible to every 
other member of the public.  The situation facing plaintiff was analogous to that 
presented in other cases where the factual basis for the claim is a matter of public 
record and thus does not invoke the rationale for applying the discovery rule.  (See 
Utility Cost Management v. Indian Wells Valley Water Dist., supra, 26 Cal.4th at 
p. 1197; McKelvey v. Boeing North American, Inc., supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at pp. 
160-161 & fn. 11.)  We conclude that any equitable ground supporting the 
application of the discovery rule to the earlier defamations ceased to exist once the 
book was published and was distributed to the general public.   
 
 
26
III 
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is 
reversed and the matter is remanded to the Court of Appeal for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
BROWN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
 
 
27
See last page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Shively v. Bozanich 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 85 Cal.App.4th 363 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S094467 
Date Filed: December 22, 2003 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Reginald A. Dunn 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Hill & Hill, Monique Shana Hill and Gregory Charles Hill for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Law Office of Robert Cooper and Robert Cooper for Paul Ingerson as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff 
and Appellant. 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Franscell, Strickland, Roberts & Lawrence, David D. Lawrence, Cindy S. Lee and Jin S. Choi for 
Defendants and Respondents Peter Bozanich and County of Los Angeles. 
 
Davis Wright Tremaine, Kelli L. Sager, Alonzo Wickers IV, Rochelle L. Wilcox and Thomas R. Burke for 
California Newspapers Publishers Association, Los Angeles Times Communications, LLC, The Copley 
Press, Inc., ABC, Inc., Magazine Publishers of America, Inc., News America, Inc., Cable News Network, 
National Broadcasting Company, Inc., and Time Inc., as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and 
Respondents Peter Bozanich and County of Los Angeles. 
 
Thomas W. Newton for California Newspaper Publishers Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Defendants and Respondents Peter Bozanich and County of Los Angeles. 
 
Karlene W. Goller for Los Angeles Times Communications, LLC, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Defendants and Respondents Peter Bozanich and County of Los Angeles. 
 
Harold L. Fuson, Jr., and Judith Fanshaw for The Copley Press, Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Defendants and Respondents Peter Bozanich and County of Los Angeles. 
 
 
 
 
 
28
 
 
 
Page 2 - counsel continued - S094467 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Jean Zoeller for ABC, Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents Peter Bozanich 
and County of Los Angeles. 
 
Squadron Ellenoof Plesent & Sheinfeld and Slade R. Metcalf for Magazine Publishers of America, Inc., as 
Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents Peter Bozanich and County of Los Angeles. 
 
Jan F. Constantine for News America, Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents 
Peter Bozanich and County of Los Angeles. 
 
David Vigilante for Cable News Network as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents 
Peter Bozanich and County of Los Angeles. 
 
Andrea Hartman for National Broadcasting, Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and 
Respondents Peter Bozanich and County of Los Angeles. 
 
Paul Gardephe for Time Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents Peter Bozanich 
and County of Los Angeles. 
 
No appearance for Defendant and Respondent Brian Patrick Clarke. 
 
 
 
 
 
29
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Gregory Charles Hill 
Hill & Hill 
The Center Promenade 
1001 Partridge Drive, Suite 105 
Ventura, CA  93003 
(805) 477-0069 
 
Cindy S. Lee 
Franscell, Strickland, Roberts & Lawrence 
225 South Lake Avenue, Penthouse 
Pasadena, CA  91101-3005 
(626) 304-7830 
 
Kelli L. Sager 
Davis Wright Tremaine 
865 Figueroa Street, Suite 2400 
Los Angeles, CA  90017 
(213) 633-6800