Title: Leiker v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Leiker v. State1999 WY 178994 P.2d 917Case Number: 98-87Decided: 12/28/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
STEPHEN LEIKER, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court of Natrona County: The Honorable Dan R. Spangler, 
Judge.

Sylvia Hackl, 
State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Cathleen E. 
Reed, Student Extern. Argument by Ms. Reed, representing 
appellant.

William U. Hill, 
Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director, Prosecution 
Assistance Program; and Michelle M. McColloch Burns, Student Intern. Argument by 
Ms. McColloch Burns, representing appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, and GOLDEN, JJ., and TAYLOR, J. 
Ret.

LEHMAN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      Convicted of 
larceny by bailee, appellant Stephen Leiker contends that during closing 
argument the prosecutor improperly instilled his own opinion regarding the 
weight of the evidence, shifted the burden of proof, and attacked the integrity 
of defense counsel infringing upon his right to a fair trial. Leiker failed to 
object at the time of the prosecutor's closing argument. Finding no plain error, 
we affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2]      Leiker presents 
one issue for our review:

The Appellant 
was denied a fair trial as guaranteed by the Due Process Clauses of the United 
States and Wyoming Constitutions because of prosecutorial misconduct during the 
closing argument.

The State 
restates the issue as:

Did counsel for 
the State commit prosecutorial misconduct in his closing 
argument?

FACTS

[¶3]      On January 17, 
1997, at about 10:00 a.m., Leiker borrowed Rhonda Davis' 1991 Pontiac Grand Am 
with the understanding that the vehicle had to be returned by 3:00 p.m. He 
returned before the designated time, but asked if he could borrow the car for an 
additional 45 minutes. Davis agreed, but told him to return the car promptly 
because she was loading the vehicle for an upcoming trip. Leiker did not return 
in 45 minutes.

[¶4]      Fifteen days 
later, on February 1, 1997, Leiker was apprehended by a Kansas Highway Patrolman 
on I-70 in Sherman County, Kansas. Leiker told the Patrolman that he had 
borrowed the car from Davis and that he was on his way to Missouri. After Leiker 
was taken into custody, inspection of the vehicle revealed a broken window, a 
bent wheel and fender, and an interior that "looked like it had been basically 
lived in for a few days."

[¶5]      At trial Leiker 
attempted to show that the incident resulted from miscommunication. Davis 
presented a different version of the facts, which her friend Nancy Stroh 
corroborated. Stroh testified that she heard the conversation wherein both 
parties understood the 45-minute time limit. A jury found Leiker guilty of 
larceny by bailee in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-402 (b) and (c)(i) 
(Lexis 1999),1 and he was sentenced to a term of 
four to six years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary. Leiker 
appeals.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶6]      Leiker did not 
object to the prosecutor's closing argument; and, therefore, our review is 
limited to a search for plain error.

A plain error 
analysis requires the appellant to demonstrate the violation of a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law, clearly reflected in the record, resulting in the 
abridgment of a substantial right of the party to his material prejudice. 
Arevalo v. State, 939 P.2d 228, 232 (Wyo. 1997). We are reluctant to find plain 
error in closing arguments "lest the trial court becomes required to control 
argument because opposing counsel does not object." James v. State, 888 P.2d 200, 207 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting Taul v. State, 862 P.2d 649, 659 (Wyo. 
1993)).

Montoya v. 
State, 971 P.2d 134, 136 (Wyo. 1998).

[¶7]      In reviewing 
claims of prosecutorial misconduct we look at the closing argument in the 
context of the entire record to determine whether the prejudice to the 
defendant's case amounted to the denial of a fair trial. Furthermore, we will 
not disturb the trial court's ruling concerning the scope of permissible 
argument absent a "clear or patent" abuse of discretion that creates a 
reasonable probability that the defendant would have received a more favorable 
verdict. Gayler v. State, 957 P.2d 855, 860 (Wyo. 1998); Arevalo v. State, 939 P.2d 228, 230 (Wyo. 1997).

DISCUSSION

[¶8]      Leiker contends 
that the prosecutor improperly introduced his own opinion into the closing 
argument regarding the weight of the evidence when he told the 
jury:

Ladies and 
Gentlemen, it's rare that I say this, but sometimes there are certain defenses 
that are truly laughable. They are funny.

[¶9]      In presenting 
closing argument, the prosecutor is entitled to reflect upon the evidence and to 
draw reasonable inferences from that evidence to assist the jury in its 
function. Armstrong v. State, 826 P.2d 1106, 1116 (Wyo. 1992); Jeschke v. State, 
642 P.2d 1298, 1301-02 (Wyo. 1982). "The purpose of closing argument is to allow 
counsel to offer ways of viewing the significance of the evidence." Virgilio v. 
State, 834 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Wyo. 1992); see also Pearson v. State, 811 P.2d 704, 
708 (Wyo. 1991); Browder v. State, 639 P.2d 889, 893 (Wyo. 1982). However, we 
have often stated that a prosecuting attorney may not inject his opinion as to 
the weight of the evidence when arguing to the jury. Harper v. State, 970 P.2d 400, 405 (Wyo. 1998); McLaughlin v. State, 780 P.2d 964, 967 (Wyo. 1989); Barnes 
v. State, 642 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Wyo. 1982). Furthermore, argument designed to 
appeal to the juror's passion or prejudice is improper. Gayler v. State, 957 P.2d  at 861; Armstrong v. State, 826 P.2d  at 1116.

[¶10]   Viewing the comment in light of the 
entire record, we cannot conclude that the remark improperly injected the 
prosecutor's opinion. Nevertheless, even assuming that the prosecutor's remarks 
were improper, Leiker failed to show that the error was so egregious as to deny 
him a substantial right or cause material prejudice. See Harper v. State, 970 P.2d 400. Applying the plain error analysis, Leiker failed to show that the 
prosecutor's remark resulted in a denial of a fair trial. Considering the entire 
record, there is no reasonable probability that Leiker would have enjoyed a more 
favorable verdict absent the remark. Consequently, the prosecutor's remarks were 
not fundamentally unfair to the trial process, and no plain error 
occurred.

[¶11]   Next, Leiker asserts that when the 
prosecutor argued the lack of evidence disproving the State's case, he shifted 
the burden of proof. At different times during his closing argument, the 
prosecutor said:

And there is no 
evidence at all that this car is not worth over $500.

There's no proof 
that it wasn't stolen.

There's 
absolutely no evidence that this car is not worth $500. There is no evidence 
that the defendant intended to return this car.

A fundamental 
principle of our system of criminal justice is that the burden of proof rests 
upon the State and never shifts. Harper, 970 P.2d  at 405; Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 75 (Wyo. 1989). We have, however, recognized that

[i]t is not 
improper for the government to draw attention to the failure or lack of evidence 
on a point, if it is not intended to call attention to the failure of the 
defendant to testify.

Vigil v. State, 
926 P.2d 351, 359 (Wyo. 1996) (quoting Knowles v. United States, 224 F.2d 168, 
169 (10th Cir. 1955)). The prosecutor raised the lack of evidence on a point and 
was not discussing the defendant's failure to testify. The comments, therefore, 
fall well within this standard and constituted proper argument for the closing 
statement.

[¶12]   Additionally, Leiker claims that 
the prosecutor overstepped the bounds of propriety by attacking the integrity of 
defense counsel. Leiker points to the end of the prosecutor's closing for the 
offending language:

Judge the 
defendant by his acts, not by his attorney's words. Not when he has every reason 
to lie.

(Emphasis 
added.)

[¶13]   Personal attacks on defense counsel 
are impermissible, and the United States Supreme Court has stated the general 
rule:

It is firmly 
established that the lawyer should abstain from any allusion to the personal 
peculiarities and idiosyncrasies of opposing counsel. A personal attack by the 
prosecutor on defense counsel is improper, and the duty to abstain from such 
attacks is obviously reciprocal.

United States v. 
Young, 470 U.S. 1, 10, 105 S. Ct. 1038, 1043, 84 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1985), (quoting ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice 4-7.8, p. 4.97). Viewing this last comment in the 
context of the entire closing, this remark was directed at Leiker and not 
defense counsel. The remark concluded the prosecutor's argument that, between 
Davis and Leiker, Leiker had the most to lose by being truthful. As such, it was 
not improper.

CONCLUSION

[¶14]   The prosecutor's statements were 
proper within the context of the entire argument. Furthermore, Leiker failed to 
show that the prosecutor's remarks deprived him of a substantial right or caused 
material prejudice resulting in fundamental unfairness to the trial 
process.

[¶15]   Affirmed.

Footnotes

1 Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-3-402 (Lexis 1999) provides in pertinent 
part:

(b) 
A bailee, a public servant as defined by W.S. 6-5-101(a)(vi) or any person 
entrusted with the control, care or custody of any money or other property who, 
with intent to steal or to deprive the owner of the property, converts the 
property to his own or another's use is guilty of 
larceny.

(c) 
. . . larceny is:

(i) 
a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of 
not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both, if the value of the 
property is five hundred dollars ($500.00) or 
more[.]