Title: Vaughn v. State

State: tennessee

Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court

Document:

557 S.W.2d 64 (1977) Ricky VAUGHN, Petitioner, v. STATE of Tennessee, Respondent. Supreme Court of Tennessee. September 6, 1977. HENRY, Justice. This petition for the common law writ of certiorari raises the single question of the proper construction of Sec. 40-1131, T.C.A., relating to preliminary hearings. Petitioner was arrested on 14 June 1977, pursuant to a four-count indictment found by the Dyer County Grand Jury. No prior warrant of arrest was issued and no preliminary hearing was held. In the trial court, Petitioner (1) moved for a preliminary hearing, (2) filed a plea in abatement, and (3) moved to dismiss the indictment. All were grounded upon Sec. 40-1131, T.C.A., and all were overruled by the trial judge. Sec. 40-1131, T.C.A., reads as follows: The first paragraph of § 40-1131 was passed on May 12, 1971. The second paragraph was effective April 4, 1974. A preliminary hearing is not constitutionally required. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 90 S. Ct. 1999, 26 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1970); McKeldin v. State, 516 S.W.2d 82 (Tenn. 1974); McCracken v. State, 529 S.W.2d 724 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975). While this statute is not a model of clarity, we think its import is properly set forth in Harris v. State, 534 S.W.2d 868, 870 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975). When consideration is given to the evil sought to be corrected by Chapter 245, Acts of 1971, the legislative intent becomes even more apparent. Chapter 16, Acts of 1899 appears as Sec. 11575 in Williams' Tennessee Code and in the Code Supplement of 1950, and as Sec. 40-402 T.C.A. (original volume). It read, in pertinent part, as follows: This section was repealed by Chapter 245, Acts of 1971, which forms the basis of the first paragraph of Sec. 40-1131, T.C.A., which mandates a preliminary hearing irrespective of the convention of the grand jury but only in those cases wherein the accused was charged by arrest warrant. Nothing in Sec. 40-1131 mandates a preliminary hearing in those cases wherein the prosecution originated by presentment or indictment. The District Attorney General and law enforcement personnel are legally entitled to omit the normal arrest procedure and to take their cases directly to the grand jury whenever they feel it feasible to assume the potential hazard of an uncharged defendant's unceremonious departure from the jurisdiction. The writ is respectfully denied, but without prejudice to petitioner's right to assign appropriate error should an appeal be pursued.