Title: Griffiths v. Griffiths

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

1 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 47099 
 
 
DONNA O. GRIFFITHS, 
 
     Plaintiff-Appellant- 
     Cross Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
STAN REED GRIFFITHS, 
 
     Defendant-Respondent- 
     Cross Appellant. 
_______________________________________ 
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
) 
Boise, June 2020 Term 
 
Opinion Filed: August 5, 2020 
 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Bonneville County. Michelle Radford Mallard, Magistrate Judge. Bruce L. Pickett, 
District Judge. 
 
The decisions of the district court are affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the case 
is remanded for further proceedings. 
 
David A. Johnson, P.A., Idaho Falls, for appellant.  
 
Nalder & Blake, PLLC, Idaho Falls, for respondent. 
_____________________ 
BRODY, Justice. 
 
This appeal arises from a divorce between Stan and Donna Griffiths. Donna appeals the 
Bonneville County district court’s decisions: (1) denying her motion to dismiss Stan’s appeal; and 
(2) reversing in part and affirming in part the magistrate court’s division of the marital estate. On 
appeal, Donna argues that the district court erred in denying her motion to dismiss Stan’s 
intermediate appeal pursuant to the acceptance of the benefits doctrine. Donna further argues that 
the district court erred in reversing several of the magistrate court’s rulings, including its valuation 
of hospital ownership shares, its award of an equalization payment to Donna, and its award of 
spousal maintenance to Donna. Stan cross-appealed, arguing that the district court erred in 
affirming the magistrate court’s admission of expert testimony and unequal division of marital 
 
2 
 
property. For the reasons stated below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case for 
further proceedings.  
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Stan and Donna were married on August 25, 1978. They raised three children during their 
marriage, all of whom are now adults. At the time of their divorce in 2015, both parties were 57 
years old. 
Stan is an orthopedic surgeon and has been practicing since 1989. Stan and two other 
physicians own their own medical practice, Summit Orthopedics Management and Consulting, 
LLC (SOM). Through his medical practice, Stan also holds a full or partial ownership interest in 
five other medical entities. At the time of divorce, Stan did not know how much longer he would 
continue working before retirement. While the divorce was pending, Stan had neck surgery to 
address a recent injury. Stan continued working after surgery.  
Donna has not worked since the first year of her marriage in 1979. Since then, she managed 
the household as a homemaker. During their marriage, the parties never discussed or considered 
Donna returning to work. Donna believes that she could get a job “if she needed to,” but would 
not be qualified for anything over minimum-wage.   
Stan controlled the parties’ finances during the marriage. Stan budgeted Donna either 
$4,500 or $6,500 a month for household bills. Further, Stan controlled a majority of the bank 
accounts and investments made during the marriage.  
The parties’ investment in Mountain View Hospital (MVH) is the dominant issue in their 
divorce. At the time of their divorce, the parties held two types of ownership units in MVH: (1) 
252 Class A units; and (2) 360 Class RE units. MVH is physician-owned and restricts its ownership 
units to Idaho licensed physicians with privileges to practice medicine at MVH. Because of the 
ownership restrictions, the units must be held in Stan’s name. Additionally, the ownership 
restrictions mean that the MVH units must be sold upon Stan’s retirement. The parties’ MVH units 
proved to be a lucrative investment. For example, in 2014, the parties’ MVH units produced an 
income of $538,226. Stan and the two other physicians that make up SOM formed Summit 
Orthopedic Equity, LLC (SOE) to collectively own additional Class A and RE MVH units.  
On October 24, 2013, after more than thirty-five years of marriage, Donna filed for divorce 
on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. Donna requested an unequal division of community 
 
3 
 
property in her favor and a spousal maintenance award. Stan agreed to the grounds for divorce, 
but contested an unequal division of community property.  
Prior to trial, in violation of the magistrate court’s temporary restraining order, Stan sold 
approximately $900,000 worth of MVH units without telling Donna, the magistrate court, or the 
parties’ attorneys. Stan did not produce any written record of the sale or disbursement of the 
proceeds. He later testified that he deposited the proceeds into a bank account that was included in 
the parties’ marital property division.  
Trial commenced on June 2, 2015. Valuation of the MVH Class A units was hotly 
contested. Donna called Keith Pinkerton as an expert witness to testify on the valuation of parties’ 
business entities, including the MVH units. Pinkerton was the only expert from either party to 
testify to valuation. Over Stan’s objection, Donna also called Diane Barker as an expert in divorce 
financial planning to demonstrate how different marital property divisions would affect the net 
worth of the parties over time. Stan called Kevin Oakey as a tax expert to testify to the tax burdens 
associated with dividing the parties’ business entities and investments. Donna later called Jason 
Coles as a tax expert to rebut Oakey’s testimony. New information regarding the parties’ finances 
came to light during the trial, requiring the magistrate court to set a final day of trial in July 2015.  
Before the trial concluded, the magistrate court entered a stipulated divorce decree. The 
stipulated divorce decree divided the martial property that the parties reached an agreement on, 
and postponed judgment on a valuation and division of the parties’ business entities.  
After trial, the magistrate court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law, along 
with a memorandum decision. In its memorandum decision, the magistrate court reached five 
conclusions relevant to this appeal: (1) the MVH Class A units were valued at $9,191 per unit, 
which was higher than Pinkerton’s expert opinion of $8,272 per unit; (2) Oakey’s opinion on the 
MVH units’ after-tax value was rejected; (3) Donna was awarded an unequal division of the 
community property, receiving 60% of the community property; (4) to achieve the unequal 
community property division, the magistrate court ordered Stan to pay Donna a $2,107,440 
equalization payment no less than one year from the magistrate court’s judgment; and (5) Donna 
was awarded $4,500 a month in spousal maintenance until Donna reached age 62. Overall, the 
magistrate court’s community property division awarded most of the parties’ liquidity and cash 
accounts to Donna, and awarded Stan all of the medical practice entities, including all of the MVH 
Class A and RE units. After the magistrate court entered judgment, Stan appealed the magistrate 
 
4 
 
court’s findings, conclusions, and judgment to the district court, raising twenty-one issues on 
appeal.  
Subsequently, the district court issued an order staying execution of the judgment pending 
appeal. The stay order required Stan to continue paying Donna $4,500 a month in spousal support, 
and allowed the parties to retain possession of the homes and real property awarded to them. 
Further, the stay order appointed a receiver to collect distributions from the MVH units while the 
appeal was pending and to provide quarterly accounting of the parties’ financial activities.  
While the appeal was pending, Donna filed an amended motion to dismiss the appeal. In 
her motion, Donna argued that Stan “accepted the benefits” of the judgment by: (1) retaining 
$133,139 in MVH distributions after judgment was entered that he did not turn over to the receiver; 
(2) retaining $40,140.86 in distributions during the pendency of appeal that he did not turn over to 
the receiver; (3) spending $46,937.20 on renovations to the home he was awarded in the judgment; 
and (4) transferring $106,666.67 in MVH distribution from SOE to SOM rather than to the 
receiver. As such, Donna argued that Stan’s appeal should be dismissed pursuant to the 
“acceptance of the benefits doctrine.” The district court denied the motion, concluding that 
although Stan accepted some benefits of the judgment, the acceptance of the benefits doctrine did 
not apply to prevent Stan’s appeal.  
The district court issued a memorandum decision on Stan’s appeal, reversing in part and 
affirming in part the rulings of the magistrate court. The reversed rulings included: (1) the 
magistrate court’s valuation of the MVH Class A and RE units; (2) its decision to reject the after-
tax value of the MVH units; (3) the equalization payment; and (4) Donna’s spousal maintenance 
award. The district court affirmed the admission of Barker’s expert testimony and the unequal 
division of community property. Donna timely appealed, and Stan subsequently filed a cross-
appeal.  
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing the decision of a district court sitting in its capacity as an appellate court: 
The Supreme Court reviews the trial court (magistrate) record to determine 
whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate’s 
findings of fact and whether the magistrate’s conclusions of law follow from 
those findings. If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow 
therefrom and if the district court affirmed the magistrate’s decision, we affirm 
the district court’s decision as a matter of procedure. 
 
5 
 
In re Estate of Brown, 166 Idaho 472, 476, 461 P.3d 754, 758 (2020) (quoting Losser v. Bradstreet, 
145 Idaho 670, 672, 183 P.3d 758, 760 (2008)). “Thus, this Court does not review the decision of 
the magistrate court.” Pelayo v. Pelayo, 154 Idaho 855, 859, 303 P.3d 214, 218 (2013). “Rather, 
we are ‘procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the decisions of the district court.’” Id. 
(quoting State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 415 n.1, 224 P.3d 480, 482 n.1 (2009)).  
III. 
ANALYSIS 
A. The district court did not err in denying Donna’s motion to dismiss the appeal 
pursuant to the acceptance of the benefits doctrine. 
The district court denied Donna’s motion to dismiss Stan’s appeal. The district court 
recognized that Idaho has adhered to the acceptance of the benefits doctrine since this Court’s 
decision in Bechtel v. Evans, 10 Idaho 147, 77 P. 212 (1904). Bechtel defined the doctrine as 
follows: “If the party has collected his judgment, and, in seeking to gain more by the prosecution 
of an appeal, thereby incurs the hazard of eventually recovering less, then his appeal should be 
dismissed.” Id. at 150, 77 P. at 213. However, the district court concluded that subsequent case 
law relaxed Bechtel’s strict standard. Further, because the acceptance of the benefits doctrine is 
grounded in equity and similar to the doctrine of quasi-estoppel, the district court adopted the 
requirement of quasi estoppel that a party must be unfairly prejudiced or disadvantaged for the 
doctrine to apply. In its application of the doctrine, the district court concluded that Stan accepted 
the benefits of the magistrate court’s judgment in paying for home renovations and receiving MVH 
distributions, but held that the acceptance of the benefits doctrine did not apply because Donna 
failed to demonstrate that she was unfairly prejudiced or disadvantaged by Stan accepting these 
benefits. Additionally, the district court held that Stan did not accept benefits for the purposes of 
the acceptance of the benefits doctrine where he used MVH distributions to pay taxes and where 
Stan’s business entity, SOM, received MVH distributions rather than himself personally.  
1. Idaho’s acceptance of the benefits doctrine: the Bechtel rule. 
Idaho adopted the acceptance of the benefits doctrine in Bechtel v. Evans, 10 Idaho 147, 
77 P. 212 (1904):  
If the party has collected his judgment, and, in seeking to gain more by the 
prosecution of an appeal, thereby incurs the hazard of eventually recovering less, 
then his appeal should be dismissed. If, on the other hand, the appeal is from such 
an order or judgment as that he could in no event recover a less favorable judgment, 
and that he incurs no hazard of ever receiving less than the judgment already 
collected by him, we see no objection to the prosecution of his appeal. 
 
6 
 
Id. at 150, 77 P. at 213. The purpose behind the doctrine is to prevent “a plaintiff from prosecuting 
an appeal which, if successful, might result in a reduced recovery.” Basic Am., Inc. v. Shatila, 133 
Idaho 726, 745, 992 P.2d 175, 194 (1999). Put differently, the doctrine is intended to prevent a 
situation where the appellate court would find that the appellant was not entitled to an amount 
already received. HealthONE v. Rodriguez ex rel. Rodriguez, 50 P.3d 879, 887 (Colo. 2002).  
 
Bechtel is still good law in Idaho, and subsequent cases have affirmed Bechtel’s 
pronouncement of the acceptance of the benefits doctrine. Basic Am., 133 Idaho at 745, 992 P.2d 
at 194 (referring to “the Bechtel rule” when analyzing the acceptance of the benefits doctrine); see 
also Stockyards Nat’l Bank of Chicago v. Arthur, 45 Idaho 333, 339, 262 P. 510, 512 (1927) 
(analyzing “the rule laid down in the Bechtel [sic] [c]ase”). Idaho also recognizes, however, that 
the doctrine does not apply where the benefits accepted are separate and distinct from the benefits 
disputed on appeal. Burnham v. Bray, 104 Idaho 550, 553, 661 P.2d 335, 338 (Ct. App. 1983). In 
other words, an exception applies where the appealing party would be entitled to the benefits 
regardless of the outcome on appeal. See id. 
The acceptance of the benefits doctrine is often compared to other equity-based legal 
doctrines, such as the doctrine of quasi-estoppel. In Mitchell v. Zilog, Inc., 125 Idaho 709, 874 
P.2d 520 (1994), this Court analyzed the issue of quasi-estoppel, and stated that “[t]he doctrine of 
quasi-estoppel has its basis in acceptance of the benefits; it precludes a party from asserting to 
another’s disadvantage a right inconsistent with a position previously taken by him or her.” Id. at 
715, 874 P.2d at 526; see also Alpine Vill. Co. v. City of McCall, 154 Idaho 930, 937, 303 P.3d 
617, 624 (analyzing an estoppel issue and comparing it to the acceptance of the benefits doctrine). 
Because the doctrine is anchored in equity, some courts have altered or relaxed the acceptance of 
the benefits doctrine by adding the quasi-estoppel requirement: that the opposing party must be 
disadvantaged or prejudiced to prevent another party’s appeal. Kramer v. Kastleman, 508 S.W.3d 
211, 227 (Tx. 2017) (“Thus, before denying a merits-based resolution to a dispute, courts must 
evaluate . . . whether the opposing party will be unfairly prejudiced.”).  
Importantly, this Court has not previously imposed a prejudice or disadvantage 
requirement on the acceptance of the benefits doctrine. Thus, as it stands today, the Bechtel rule 
does not include a requirement that the opposing party be prejudiced to assert the acceptance of 
the benefits doctrine. In fact, since Bechtel, the three cases that have squarely addressed the 
acceptance of the benefits doctrine did not alter Bechtel’s core rule. See Basic Am., 133 Idaho at 
 
7 
 
745, 992 P.2d at 194; Arthur, 45 Idaho at 339, 262 P. at 512; Burnham, 104 Idaho at 553, 661 P.2d 
at 338. While Burnham adopted an exception to the rule—where the benefits accepted are separate 
from the benefits disputed on appeal—it did not add a prejudice requirement. 104 Idaho at 553, 
661 P.2d at 338.  
Additionally, although quasi-estoppel and the acceptance of the benefits doctrine are both 
anchored in equity, they are separate doctrines. Quasi-estoppel precludes a party from asserting to 
another’s disadvantage a right inconsistent with a position previously taken, and applies where it 
would be unconscionable to allow a person to maintain such an inconsistent position with one in 
which he previously benefited. Alpine Vill. Co., 154 Idaho at 937, 303 P.3d at 624. The acceptance 
of the benefits doctrine merely examines whether a party appeals the benefits of an accepted 
judgment, and does not examine whether the appellant’s position was consistent on appeal. See 
Basic Am., 133 Idaho at 745, 992 P.2d at 194. Accordingly, the Bechtel rule is still good law in 
Idaho, and it does not impose the same prejudice requirement associated with other equity-based 
legal doctrines.  
2. The Bechtel rule does not apply to preclude Stan’s appeal. 
Applied to this case, the Bechtel rule asks whether Stan could end up with a reduced 
recovery in prosecuting his appeal. Basic Am., 133 Idaho at 745, 992 P.2d at 194. Donna asserts 
that Stan accepted the benefits of the magistrate court’s judgment in four instances: (1) by 
renovating the marital home that he was awarded; (2) accepting $133,139.00 in MVH 
distributions; (3) using MVH distributions to pay taxes; and (4) diverting MVH distributions from 
SOE to SOM rather than adding them to his personal bank account or transferring them to the 
receiver. Donna argues that Stan could have a reduced recovery on remand because Stan 
challenges the MVH Class A units’ valuation on appeal. Donna argues that if the MVH units’ 
valuation is reduced on remand, the entire property award could be reshuffled, leading to reduced 
recovery for Stan. Additionally, Donna argues that on remand, the magistrate court may order a 
new trial on all or part of the issues in the divorce under Idaho Rule of Family Law Procedure 807. 
If that is the case, Donna argues the magistrate court should re-value the MVH units because five 
years have passed since their initial valuation, and the units have likely increased in value. We 
disagree with Donna’s arguments. Even though Stan “accepted” certain benefits of his property 
awards, he did not trigger the Bechtel rule. 
 
8 
 
Starting with the marital home, this property award is not disputed in Stan’s appeal. The 
acceptance of one part of a judgment does not prevent an appeal from a separate, disconnected part 
of the judgment. Burnham, 104 Idaho at 553, 661 P.2d at 338. Here, Stan was awarded the marital 
home. Stan did not appeal this portion of his property award. Donna did not cross-appeal any 
portion of the magistrate court’s order. On intermediate appeal, the district court remanded the 
valuation of the MVH Class A units and the equalization payment. Thus, even on remand, Stan’s 
award of the marital home is disconnected from the valuation and equalization payment. As such, 
Stan’s improvements to the marital home did not trigger the Bechtel rule to prevent his appeal. 
Next, Donna asserts that Stan trigged the acceptance of benefits doctrine by accepting 
$133,139 in MVH distributions. It is not disputed that Stan accepted these benefits, or that he 
appealed the MVH Class A units’ valuation. However, the Bechtel rule does not apply unless a 
party accepts benefits and risks a reduced award on appeal. Stan does not risk a reduced award of 
MVH units through his appeal. For starters, restrictions on MVH ownership prohibited Donna 
from being awarded MVH units on remand. The MVH units must be owned by a physician with 
patient privileges at MVH. Thus, the only way Stan’s award of MVH units would be reduced on 
appeal is if the magistrate court imposed a mechanism for Donna to receive distributions 
individually, such as a constructive trust, or if Stan was ordered to sell a portion of the units to pay 
Donna. The magistrate court rejected Donna’s suggestion to impose a constructive trust, and 
Donna did not cross-appeal Stan’s award of MVH units.  
Even if the magistrate court reduced the value of the MVH units as Stan advocates should 
be done, it would not reduce Stan’s initial 40% community property division. Thus, Stan’s appeal 
does not risk a reduced property award.   
Similarly, Stan did not trigger the Bechtel rule when he used MVH distributions to pay 
taxes or when SOE transferred MVH distributions to SOM. Again, the Bechtel rule applies when 
a party risks a reduced award on appeal. Because Stan does not risk a reduced property award in 
his appeal, the Bechtel rule does not preclude his appeal. 
Donna argues that the magistrate court could order a new trial to revalue and redistribute 
the entire community property estate pursuant to I.R.F.L.P. 807(D), which would leave open the 
possibility that Stan receives a reduced community property award from the initial distribution. 
This argument fails. Rule 807(D) does allow a magistrate court to order a new trial on its own 
initiative. The magistrate court must do so no later than fourteen days after entry of the magistrate 
 
9 
 
court’s judgment. That window of opportunity has long since passed in this case. Accordingly, the 
district court did not err in denying Donna’s motion to dismiss the appeal.  
B. The district court erred in reversing the magistrate court’s valuation of the MVH 
Class A units. 
The district court reversed the magistrate court’s valuation of the parties’ MVH units. 
Donna argues that the magistrate court’s valuation was based on substantial and competent 
evidence and that the district court failed to adhere to its proper appellate role by substituting its 
own judgment on the valuation for that of the magistrate court. We agree and reverse the district 
court’s decision. 
In divorce proceedings, valuation of community property is within the discretion of the 
trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal if it is supported by substantial and competent 
evidence. Stewart v. Stewart, 143 Idaho 673, 677, 152 P.3d 544, 548 (2007) (citing Chandler v. 
Chandler, 136 Idaho 246, 249, 32 P.3d 140, 143 (2001)). “Substantial and competent evidence is 
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion.” Hurtado v. Land 
O’Lakes, Inc., 153 Idaho 13, 17, 278 P.3d 415, 419 (2012) (quoting Uhl v. Ballard Med. Prods., 
Inc., 138 Idaho 653, 657, 67 P.3d 1265, 1269 (2003)). Substantial evidence does not mean 
uncontradicted evidence. Id. “The trial court, not this Court on appeal, resolves the conflicting 
evidence and determines the weight, credibility[,] and inferences to be drawn from the evidence.” 
Chandler, 136 Idaho at 249, 32 P.3d at 143 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
At trial, Pinkerton was the only expert who testified on the valuation of the MVH units. 
Pinkerton’s testimony outlined the various valuation approaches he used in formulating his 
opinion. Pinkerton testified that in 2014, Symbion purchased Class A units from a physician 
ownership group for $9,191 per unit. Taking the $9,191 Symbion sale price, Pinkerton applied a 
10% discount to account for lack of control, factored in the restrictions on the MVH units’ 
marketability, and reached a value of $8,272 per unit.      
Pinkerton’s testimony also described the difference between the Symbion sale price 
($9,191) and his eventual valuation ($8,272). Pinkerton testified that those two values were derived 
using the exact same method. Pinkerton further testified that he ultimately chose the $8,272 
valuation because he thought it was “a conservative number.” Pinkerton testified: 
Well, I went with [$8,272], which is the [Symbion] transaction adjusted for control 
– for lack of control, only because I think it’s a conservative number. It’s not my 
job to puff. I don’t want to have a value that is too high. When I look at the income 
 
10 
 
approach, there’s some – there’s some numbers there that, you know, I think there’s 
some real value in parts, but there’s a little bit more in terms of assumptions there. 
So I tried to go with something that felt more concrete, and what I believe is more 
concrete. And I think [$8,272] is a realistic number, and that’s why I chose it. 
(Emphasis added). 
The magistrate court considered Pinkerton’s opinion and determined that the Symbion sale 
price was the most reasonable of the five values presented. In adopting the Symbion sale price, the 
magistrate court reasoned: 
The [court] must still then determine the value of the MVH Class A [units]. Donna’s 
own expert and her counsel posit a number of ways in which the [units] can be 
valued. Each method appears to be sound. However, Pinkerton concludes that the 
Fair Market Value for the MVH Class A [units] is [$8,272] per unit. The most 
reasonable valuations, in the [court’s] opinion, are Pinkerton’s conclusion of a Fair 
Market Value of [$8,272] per unit and the recent sale price of [$9,191] per unit. 
The actual sale price has two advantages. The first and foremost is that it is an actual 
transaction that the [court] can reply upon. Secondly, it falls squarely in the mid-
range of Pinkerton’s indications of value using different valuation methods. If you 
include Evan’s formula value, it still leaves the [$9,191] per unit price in the mid-
range of the six different pre-tax values the [court] was asked to consider. The 
[court] hereby adopts the value of [$9,191] per unit for the MVH Class A units.   
(Internal record citations omitted).  
The district court provided multiple reasons for why the magistrate court erred in accepting 
Pinkerton’s valuation, none of which are supported by the record or the law.  
First, the district court concluded that the magistrate court erred in using the Symbion sale 
price because it was offered only to explain how Pinkerton arrived at the fair market value of the 
MVH Class A units, and that a “single sale . . . by definition is not substantial evidence.” However, 
the Symbion sale price was not offered just to show how Pinkerton arrived at his eventual 
valuation. Rather, it was included with five separate valuations, each supported by a particular 
valuation method. Further, although the district court held that a single sale “by definition” is not 
substantial evidence and suggests that more than one piece of evidence is required, there is no such 
requirement. Substantial and competent evidence is “relevant evidence that a reasonable mind 
might accept to support a conclusion.” Hurtado, 153 Idaho at 17, 278 P.3d at 419. In some 
circumstances, substantial evidence may, in fact, consist of a single piece of evidence. 
Second, the district court concluded that the Symbion sale price reflected an “additional 
value added on the shares for the purchase of a majority share in [MVH], which undoubtedly adds 
value to the [units].” The district court further concluded that “Pinkerton’s uncontested testimony” 
 
11 
 
supported that the Symbion price was inflated because Symbion paid for majority control in MVH. 
Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, Pinkerton did not apply a discount to the Symbion sale 
price to correct any premium paid for “majority control” in MVH. Rather, Pinkerton applied a 
10% discount for lack of control regarding the units’ restrictions on marketability—i.e., physician 
only ownership. In fact, Pinkerton’s testimony refutes the district court’s conclusion that the 
Symbion sale was for a majority share in MVH. On cross-examination, Pinkerton’s testimony was 
attacked multiple times on this very point. Pinkerton denied that Symbion paid for a controlling or 
majority interest in MVH. Pinkerton testified that Symbion “purchased minority interests, which 
they assembled into control. They purchased minority interests from various physician 
shareholders [including Stan], and to put it all together, they have [sic] control. But they didn’t pay 
for control.” Thus, the district court faulted the magistrate court for failing to consider Pinkerton’s 
“majority control” discount, when Pinkerton applied no such discount. 
Third, the district court concluded that, because Pinkerton’s testimony was uncontradicted, 
and the magistrate court did not make any specific finding challenging the $8,272 value, the 
magistrate court erred by not adopting it. The fact that Pinkerton’s conclusion was uncontradicted 
is not determinative in considering whether the magistrate court supported its ultimate valuation 
with substantial and competent evidence. Valuation of the community property is within the 
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed if it is supported by substantial and competent 
evidence. Stewart, 143 Idaho at 677, 152 P.3d at 548. Here, the magistrate court adopted the 
Symbion price over Pinkerton’s conclusion, and supported its decision with substantial and 
competent evidence. Accordingly, the district court erred in reversing the magistrate court’s 
valuation. 
C. The district court erred in concluding that the magistrate court failed to consider 
Stan’s tax consequences.  
Donna contends that the district court erred in holding that the magistrate court failed to 
make specific findings of fact regarding the future tax consequences Stan will incur to make the 
equalization payment. Specifically, Donna argues that the district court again substituted its own 
judgment for that of the magistrate court. We agree.  
The district court erred in concluding that the magistrate court failed to make specific 
findings regarding Stan’s hypothetical future tax consequences. Contrary to the district court’s 
conclusion, nothing in this Court’s jurisprudence required the magistrate court to consider the 
 
12 
 
hypothetical future tax consequences of selling MVH units in its valuation. Existing case law has 
only required trial courts to consider actual tax consequences in valuations where the trial court 
orders the sale of a community property asset. In Carr v. Carr, the Court of Appeals held that 
where a community property asset sale is ordered by the court, the trial court “should” consider 
the tax consequences of the sale in its valuation. 108 Idaho 684, 690, 701 P.2d 304, 310 (Ct. App. 
1985). However, Carr does not address whether a trial court must consider the tax consequences 
of a hypothetical future asset sale.  
The district court, citing Vierstra v. Vierstra, 153 Idaho 873, 292 P.3d 264 (2012), held 
that tax consequences are to be considered in a valuation where the property asset was more likely 
than not going to be sold. The district court’s holding both misconstrued this Court’s holding in 
Vierstra, and applied a valuation rule that does not exist in Idaho.  
In Vierstra, the divorcing parties’ largest community property asset was a dairy farm. 153 
Idaho at 874, 292 P.3d at 265. The magistrate court did not know whether either party would be 
able to “buy-out” the other party’s interest in the dairy farm. Id. As such, the magistrate court gave 
the wife the first option to buy the dairy farm. Id. If she could not finance the dairy farm, then her 
husband would have the option to buy. Id. Whoever purchased the farm was required to pay the 
dairy farm’s taxes and make an equalization payment to the party who did not purchase the dairy 
farm. Id. If neither party could purchase the dairy farm, it would be sold. Id. The magistrate court 
calculated that whoever purchased the farm would face approximately $1,006,000 in tax liability. 
Id. at 875, 292 P.3d at 266. The magistrate court issued an order stating that if the party who 
purchased the farm did not pay taxes on the farm, or if the tax liability was lower than $1,006,000, 
the non-purchasing party could petition the court to adjust the judgment and seek an equalization 
payment. Id. After the wife unsuccessfully attempted to finance the dairy farm, the husband 
successfully exercised his purchase option. Id. The wife later petitioned the court for an 
equalization payment, presenting evidence that the farm’s tax liability was $85,036, which was 
$920,964 less than determined by the magistrate court. Id. The magistrate court denied the wife’s 
motion to adjust, and on intermediate appeal the district court held that the magistrate court erred 
in creating a procedure for post-judgment modification of the property division. Id. at 880, 292 
P.3d at 271. Thus, the issue this Court decided was whether the magistrate court had jurisdiction 
to consider the wife’s motion to adjust the property division to account for the reduced tax burden. 
Id.   
 
13 
 
The district court’s reliance on Vierstra is misplaced. The district court asserted Vierstra 
for the proposition that tax consequences are considered where the property was more likely than 
not going to be sold, but Vierstra contains no such holding. Vierstra analyzed whether the 
magistrate court erred in creating a post-judgment procedure and whether the magistrate court had 
jurisdiction to hear the wife’s petition. Id. at 880, 292 P.3d at 271. Vierstra did not analyze the 
magistrate court’s valuation. 
While this Court has never considered whether a trial court must take into account the tax 
consequences of a hypothetical, future liquidation in valuing a community property asset, 
persuasive authority from other jurisdictions provides that post-sale liquidation value is disfavored 
over the present fair market value of an asset. Sommers v. Sommers, 660 N.W.2d 586, 590 (N.D. 
2003). See also In re Wolters, 123 A.3d 1008, 1015 (N.H. 2015); Orgler v. Orgler, 568 A.2d 67, 
71–77 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1989). In Sommers, the trial court rejected the wife’s fair market 
value of her husband’s orthodontic practice in favor of the husband’s future liquidation value, 
which considered the future tax consequences of a sale. Id. at 589. The North Dakota Supreme 
Court reversed the valuation, holding that the trial court erred in choosing a liquidation value when 
no evidence suggested that sale of the practice was required “anytime soon.” Id. at 590. The 
Sommers court explained its position on liquidation value by observing:  
While liquidation value, rather than fair market value, may be appropriate under 
certain circumstances involving distressed conditions, liquidation value is the least 
favored method of valuing any type of marital property in a divorce. Ordinarily, 
fair market value, not liquidation value, is the proper method of valuing property in 
a divorce.   
 Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The court further held that, where an asset is 
not going to be liquidated, expenses that would only be incurred in liquidation should not be 
deducted. Id. (citing Heggen v. Heggen, 452 N.W.2d 96, 99 (N.D. 1990)). Thus, persuasive 
authority suggests that liquidation value, or future sale value, need not be considered unless there 
is evidence that the sale is imminent or required. 
 
Additionally, decisions from New Jersey and New Hampshire provide further support for 
the magistrate court’s decision. A New Jersey appellate court held that the “hypothetical tax 
consequences upon the future sale or transfer of marital assets should not be deducted from present 
value for equitable distribution purposes. The hypothetical tax is simply too speculative to permit 
a reduction in value.” Orgler, 568 A.2d at 73. Further, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed 
 
14 
 
a trial court’s valuation that accounted for estimated tax consequences. In re Wolters, 123 A.3d at 
1015. The Wolters court held: 
We conclude, therefore, that, because sale or transfer of the properties at issue was 
neither required by the trial court’s order, nor certain to occur within a short time 
after the divorce decree, the trial court erred to the extent that, when valuing the 
properties for distribution, it reduced the value of those properties to account for 
estimated taxes that would be due by the parties in the event of a sale or transfer of 
the properties. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s distribution order and 
remand for distribution of assets consistent with this opinion.  
Id. (emphasis added). 
The reasoning of these other jurisdictions is persuasive. Here, there was no evidence 
presented that the sale of MVH units was certain to occur within a short time after the divorce 
became final or would be required by the magistrate court’s division of community property. 
Although Stan testified that he would need to sell his MVH units when he retires, Stan did not 
testify to a specific anticipated retirement date at trial, nor did he testify that his retirement was 
imminent. Stan testified that he did not know how long he was going to continue working, that 
there was nothing “definite” about how long he would continue to work, and that his neck injury 
made him “worried.” While Stan further testified that his neck injury gave him “doubts” about 
continuing to perform surgery in the future, such testimony did not contradict the magistrate 
court’s finding that neither party intended to immediately liquidate, sell, or otherwise dispose of 
their assets. Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, Stan did not testify that his retirement was 
“impending” or that he “need[ed] to retire soon.” Stan’s uncertainty about his future employment 
did not mean that his retirement was “impending.” Further, the fact that Stan was “worried” about 
his neck injury did not suggest that his retirement was imminent. 
The district court further concluded—and Stan argues on appeal—that the magistrate 
court’s equalization payment created an immediate need for Stan to sell his MVH units. However, 
the magistrate court did not order or require Stan to sell his assets. See In re Wolters, 123 A.3d at 
1015. Although Stan argues that the magistrate court’s division effectively did order him to sell 
MVH units, this argument assumes that selling Stan’s MVH units was the only possible avenue to 
fund the equalization payment. Selling MVH units may certainly be an option, but the record does 
not suggest that was Stan’s only option. For instance, Stan could get a loan or mortgage one of his 
homes. Further, the district court failed to consider the fact that Stan’s distributions from the MVH 
units could pay a substantial part of the equalization payment. The MVH units produced $528,266 
 
15 
 
in distributions alone in 2014. Thus, liquidating MVH units was not Stan’s only option to make 
the equalization payment.  
Additionally, persuasive authority suggests that hypothetical tax consequences on the 
future sale or transfer of marital assets should not be deducted from present value for equitable 
distribution purposes. See Orgler, 568 A.2d at 73. Here, the entire purpose of the equalization 
payment was to serve as an equitable distribution for the parties. The equalization payment was 
ordered because Stan received the most valuable income-producing assets in the property division; 
his occupation and these assets afford him substantial on-going income. 
Rather than reviewing the magistrate court’s valuation for substantial and competent 
evidence, the district court made no mention of substantial and competent evidence in its tax 
consequences analysis. Instead, the district court substituted its own inference on Stan’s tax 
liability over the magistrate court’s regarding the equalization payment. The district court appears 
to have based this inference on Stan’s argument on intermediate appeal that he did not have enough 
liquid assets to cover the equalization payment. Essentially, the district court found the 
equalization payment to be an imminent taxable event that needed to be considered by the 
magistrate court in its valuation. However, as discussed above, hypothetical future tax 
consequences are not required to be considered in a trial court’s valuation. Thus, the district court 
improperly drew its own inferences regarding the evidence of Stan’s tax liability over that of the 
magistrate court. 
Finally, the district court erred in concluding that the magistrate court failed to give Stan’s 
testimony regarding his neck injury consideration in its findings. The magistrate court made 
multiple findings of fact regarding Stan’s neck surgery and its impact on his job. For example, the 
magistrate court found that Stan “had neck surgery during the pendency of the divorce” and that 
he “continued his employment after the neck surgery.” In its memorandum decision, the magistrate 
court noted that “Stan recently had neck surgery but has continued to practice in his field.” Thus, 
the magistrate court did not ignore Stan’s testimony about his neck injury. Accordingly, the district 
court erred in reversing the magistrate court’s valuation for failing to consider Stan’s future tax 
consequences. 
D. The district court erred in reversing Donna’s equalization payment award. 
The district court held that the magistrate court erred in awarding Donna a $2,107,400 
equalization payment. The district court concluded that because the equalization payment was 
 
16 
 
based “almost entirely upon the valuation of the [MVH] Class A [units],” its prior determination 
that the magistrate court erred in its valuation of the MVH Class A units justified a remand to 
adjust the equalization payment. Additionally, the district court mirrored two conclusions from its 
tax consequences analysis: (1) the magistrate court failed to consider Stan’s “hardship” in making 
the equalization payment without having to sell his MVH units; and (2) the magistrate court did 
not take into account Stan’s neck injury and its effect on his future earning capacity. Thus, the 
district court remanded the equalization payment to determine an amount reflective of Stan’s future 
earning capacity and the value of Stan’s MVH Class A units.  
 
Because the district court erred in reversing the magistrate court’s decisions on valuation 
and tax consequences, the district court further erred in reversing the equalization payment on 
those same erroneous grounds.    
E. The district court erred in remanding Donna’s spousal maintenance award. 
The district court reversed the magistrate court’s award of spousal maintenance, holding 
that the magistrate court failed to address the first step in determining whether spousal maintenance 
is warranted pursuant to Idaho Code section 32-705(1). Specifically, the district court held that the 
magistrate court failed to make findings of fact regarding whether Donna had sufficient property 
to provide for her reasonable needs and whether she was unable to support herself through 
employment. Additionally, the district court held that the magistrate court erred in two other 
aspects of its spousal maintenance decision: (1) by concluding that Donna only had her assets to 
live off of and would exhaust them without income; and (2) by failing to factor into Stan’s earning 
capacity his unrebutted testimony that he faced early retirement.  
Spousal maintenance awards are governed by Idaho Code section 32-705, which provides: 
1. Where a divorce is decreed, the court may grant a maintenance order if it finds 
that the spouse seeking maintenance: 
(a) Lacks sufficient property to provide for his or her reasonable needs; and 
(b) Is unable to support himself or herself through employment. 
2. The maintenance order shall be in such amounts and for such periods of time that 
the court deems just, after considering all relevant factors which may include: 
(a) The financial resources of the spouse seeking maintenance, including the 
marital property apportioned to said spouse, and said spouse’s ability to meet 
his or her needs independently; 
(b) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education and training to enable 
the spouse seeking maintenance to find employment; 
 
17 
 
(c) The duration of the marriage; 
(d) The age and the physical and emotional condition of the spouse seeking 
maintenance; 
(e) The ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his 
or her needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance; 
(f) The tax consequences to each spouse; 
(g) The fault of either party. 
Awarding spousal maintenance under Idaho Code section 32-705 is within the discretion 
of the trial court and requires the trial court to give due consideration to each party’s financial 
needs and abilities. Papin v. Papin, 166 Idaho 9, 37, 454 P.3d 1092, 1120 (2019). To determine if 
a trial court abused its discretion, this Court considers whether the trial court (1) perceived the 
issue as one of discretion, (2) acted within the outer boundaries of that discretion, (3) acted 
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it, and (4) 
reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 
P.3d 187, 195 (2018). “This Court does not expect mathematical precision in calculating to the 
dollar how much maintenance is required, nor must the record support a specific amount.” Stewart, 
143 Idaho at 680, 152 P.3d at 551 (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). “The award, 
however, must be supported by substantial and competent evidence.” Id.  
Donna argues that the district court again substituted its own judgment for that of the 
magistrate court. Further, Donna argues that the district court failed to identify an abuse of 
discretion in the magistrate court, and that the magistrate court supported its award of spousal 
maintenance with substantial and competent evidence. We agree.  
Section 32-705(1) provides that spousal maintenance may be awarded if the spouse seeking 
maintenance: “(a) [l]acks sufficient property to provide for his or her reasonable needs; and (b) 
[i]s unable to support himself or herself through employment.” Under Idaho law, “reasonable 
needs” accounts for the standard of living established during the marriage. Stewart, 143 Idaho at 
680, 152 P.3d at 551. There is no requirement under Idaho law that a spouse must exhaust all of 
her assets before an award of spousal maintenance is appropriate. Id.  
In its memorandum decision and conclusions of law, the magistrate court considered both 
of these factors. Starting with the “reasonable needs” factor, the magistrate court determined that 
Donna’s only income would be from the interest accrued from her property award. As a result, the 
magistrate court concluded that Donna would have to live off her assets to support her reasonable 
 
18 
 
needs. Further, the magistrate court noted that during the last few years of Donna’s marriage, she 
received an allowance of $4,500 per month from Stan for daily expenses and household bills. 
Turning to Donna’s ability to support herself through employment, the magistrate court found that 
Donna has not held a job in over thirty-five years. During the marriage, neither she nor Stan 
considered her going back to work as an option. While Donna testified that she could likely get a 
job “if she needed to,” she would only be eligible for a minimum-wage position. Further, the 
magistrate court found that Donna is at an age where any continued education to earn above 
minimum-wage would take longer than her working years are likely to last. Thus, the magistrate 
court sufficiently articulated an appropriate rationale for Donna’s spousal maintenance award. 
Although the district court did not specifically articulate this point, it appeared to take issue 
with the magistrate court’s failure to make specific findings regarding section 32-705(1)(b) in the 
section of its memorandum decision discussing spousal maintenance. However, the magistrate 
court discussed Donna’s employment prospects at length earlier in its memorandum decision 
analyzing the property division under Idaho Code section 32-712. Additionally, the magistrate 
court’s findings of fact regarding Donna’s employment prospects are supported by substantial and 
competent evidence in the record. Thus, the magistrate court did not fail to consider Donna’s 
employment prospects in its findings of fact and conclusions of law.  
The district court noted three additional errors in the magistrate court’s findings of fact and 
conclusions outside of section 32-705(1), none of which are supported by the record or the law. 
First, the district court held that the magistrate court erred in its factual findings and conclusions 
by stating that Donna only had her assets to live off and that she would exhaust them in the process. 
The district court held that Donna contradicted this finding when she testified that she would be 
willing to find a minimum-wage job if needed. The district court did not cite any authority for this 
position, but rather stated that there is “no case law that this [court] can find that states a minimum-
wage job is not sufficient enough to be considered when evaluating the financial needs of a spouse 
seeking maintenance.” The district court suggested that it was inappropriate for the magistrate 
court to conclude that Donna’s only income would be her assets as long as she was capable of 
working a minimum-wage job. Contrary to the district court’s reasoning, the magistrate court did 
consider the fact that Donna was capable of minimum-wage employment in its memorandum 
decision. Further, this Court has never required the trial court to consider whether a spouse is 
capable of working a minimum-wage job before awarding spousal maintenance. This Court 
 
19 
 
recently analyzed a similar situation in Papin v. Papin, 166 Idaho 9, 454 P.3d 1092 (2019), which 
affirmed a spousal maintenance award. Id. at 37–38, 454 P.3d at 1120–21. This Court affirmed the 
magistrate court’s conclusion that the spouse would be unable to support herself, even though she 
had a history of minimum-wage employment. Id. at 38, 454 P.3d at 1121. Thus, the district court’s 
reliance on Donna’s ability to get a minimum-wage job is misplaced.  
Second, the district court repeated the same assertion from above regarding Stan’s earning 
capacity and his unrebutted testimony regarding his neck injury and “early retirement.” Again, 
nothing in the record supports the district court’s conclusion that Stan is facing early retirement, 
or that his earning capacity will be affected by his neck injury. Stan testified that he did not know 
when he is going to retire, which does not suggest that his retirement is impending, imminent, or 
earlier than anticipated.  
Third, the district court held that the magistrate court erred in finding that Donna would 
exhaust her assets without a spousal maintenance award because nothing in the record suggested 
that she would exhaust her sizable property award without maintenance. It is not clear that the 
magistrate court concluded that Donna would, in fact, exhaust all of her assets without spousal 
maintenance. The magistrate court concluded that Donna’s income would be the interest from 
property award assets. The magistrate continued, stating that “[t]his would mean that Donna would 
have to live off her assets and exhaust them in the process while Stan went forward earning 
upwards of $500,000 a year by conservative estimates.” (Emphasis added). In any event, even if 
the magistrate court did conclude that Donna would exhaust all of her assets, a party is not required 
to exhaust her assets to be eligible for spousal maintenance. Stewart, 143 Idaho at 680, 152 P.3d 
at 551. Thus, whether the magistrate court supported this statement with a specific factual finding 
does not serve as an independent basis of error. Accordingly, the district court erred in reversing 
the magistrate court’s spousal maintenance award. 
F. The district court did not err in affirming the magistrate court’s admission of Diane 
Barker’s expert testimony. 
At trial, Donna called Barker as an expert witness in divorce financial planning. Stan 
objected to her testimony, arguing that Barker did not qualify as an expert under Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 702 and that her conclusions invaded the province of the trial court in dividing the 
parties’ community property. The magistrate court overruled Stan’s objection and allowed 
 
20 
 
Barker’s testimony. The district court affirmed the magistrate court’s decision to admit Barker’s 
expert testimony.   
The trial court’s decision to admit or exclude expert testimony is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. Thurston Enters., Inc. v. Safeguard Bus. Sys. Inc., 164 Idaho 709, 716, 435 P.3d 489, 
496 (2019). Error is “disregarded unless the ruling is a manifest abuse of the trial court’s discretion 
and affects a substantial right of the party.” Id. (quoting Perry v. Magic Valley Reg’l Med. Ctr., 
134 Idaho 46, 50–51, 995 P.2d 816, 820–21 (2000)). When reviewing for abuse of discretion, this 
Court considers whether the trial court (1) perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2) acted within 
the outer boundaries of that discretion, (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to 
the specific choices available to it, and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
Lunneborg, 163 Idaho at 863, 421 P.3d at 195.   
The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by I.R.E. 702, which provides: 
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, 
or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert’s 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. 
I.R.E. 702.  
 
On cross-appeal, Stan argues that the magistrate court erred in admitting Barker’s 
testimony because Barker does not qualify as an expert pursuant to I.R.E. 702, Barker’s testimony 
was unreliable, and Barker’s testimony was speculative and unsubstantiated. We decline to 
consider these arguments because Stan has failed to demonstrate that a substantial right has been 
affected. Under the Idaho Rules of Evidence, a party “may claim error in a ruling to admit or 
exclude evidence only if the error affects a substantial right of the party.” I.R.E. 103(a). Similarly, 
under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, “[a]t every stage of the proceeding, the court must 
disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party’s substantial rights.” I.R.C.P. 61. 
Further, a party appealing an evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion “must demonstrate both the 
trial court’s abuse of discretion and that the error affected a substantial right.” Hurtado, 153 Idaho 
at 18, 278 P.3d at 420.  
We decline to consider issues on appeal unless they are supported by argument and 
authority. Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010). “Consequently, 
because an appellant can only prevail if the claimed error affected a substantial right, the appellant 
must present some argument that a substantial right was implicated.” Hurtado, 153 Idaho at 18, 
 
21 
 
278 P.3d at 420. Here, although Stan argues, in passing, that the magistrate court abused its 
discretion in admitting Barker’s expert testimony, he presents no argument that the alleged error 
affected a substantial right. Accordingly, Stan has waived this issue.   
G. The district court did not err in affirming the magistrate court’s unequal community 
property division. 
The magistrate court made an unequal award of the parties’ community property. The 
magistrate court awarded Donna 60% of the community property, leaving Stan with the remaining 
40%. The district court affirmed this distribution.  
The trial court’s disposition of community property is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
Stewart, 143 Idaho at 677, 152 P.3d at 548. There must be a “compelling reason” for an unequal 
division of community property. I.C. § 32-712(1)(a); Moffet v. Moffet, 151 Idaho 90, 97, 253 P.3d 
764, 771 (Ct. App. 2011). To determine if a trial court abused its discretion, this Court considers 
whether the trial court (1) perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2) acted within the outer 
boundaries of that discretion, (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the 
specific choices available to it, and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Lunneborg, 
163 Idaho at 863, 421 P.3d at 195. 
 
On cross-appeal, Stan contends that the magistrate court erred in making an unequal 
property division because Donna, in her testimony, did not ask for an unequal community property 
division. Stan further argues that the magistrate court erred in engaging in a cursory review of the 
factors in Idaho Code section 32-712 and ignored several aspects of Donna’s ability to work that 
cut against an unequal property division. Stan argues that the magistrate court abused its discretion 
because it failed to act within the textual boundaries of Idaho Code section 32-712 and failed to 
base its findings on an exercise of reason.  
The district court did not err in affirming the magistrate court’s unequal community 
property division. In settling on an unequal property division, the magistrate court concluded: 
Considering all the factors in Idaho Code [s]ection 32-712, but especially the 
duration of the marriage; the age, health, occupation, amount and source of income, 
vocational skills, employability, and liabilities of each spouse; and the present and 
potential earning capacity of each party[,] the [court] concludes that an unequal 
division of property is necessary to make an equitable division of the community 
property. 
The magistrate court supported this conclusion with factual findings based on the record. The 
magistrate court found that the parties’ sources of income were Stan’s medical practice, business 
 
22 
 
entities, and the MVH units. Ownership of MVH units is restricted to physicians. Thus, Donna did 
not control or directly contribute to any of the parties’ income. Stan is a practicing orthopedic 
surgeon, earning approximately $189,240 in annual salary. Stan’s salary of course does not reflect 
the substantial income he receives (which substantially exceeds his annual salary) as an owner of 
MVH units. Donna has not held a job since 1979. While Donna testified that she could get a job if 
she needed to, she did not believe she would be eligible for anything over minimum-wage. Further, 
both parties were 57 years old at the time of their divorce. The magistrate court concluded that at 
Donna’s age, the possibility of continued education leading to a high paying job was unlikely. 
Based on the foregoing, the magistrate court sufficiently supported its decision to award an unequal 
community property distribution in Donna’s favor. As such, the district court did not err in 
affirming this decision.  
 
Stan’s arguments challenging the magistrate court’s decision lack merit. First, Stan argues 
that a portion of Donna’s testimony binds her to an equal, or 50/50, community property division. 
At trial, Donna’s attorney asked her if she was requesting to receive anything more than an exact 
equal division of property, to which she responded, “No.” Donna’s attorney clarified this 
statement, asking Donna if she wanted to receive exactly what was listed on her proposed property 
division, to which Donna responded, “Yes.” Donna’s proposed property division awarded herself 
85% of the MVH Class A units. Donna may have been confused on the witness stand, but an award 
of 85% of the MVH Class A units would most likely result in an unequal property award in her 
favor. Even if Donna clearly asked for an equal division of community property on the stand, Stan 
failed to cite any authority suggesting that Donna’s words in response to a legal—not factual—
question during an examination bound the magistrate court to an equal property division. 
Notwithstanding Donna’s testimony, Donna’s Verified Complaint for Divorce asked for an 
unequal award of community property in her favor. Further, the division of community property 
is within the discretion of the magistrate court, not the parties’. 
 
Second, Stan argues that the magistrate court engaged in only a cursory review of the 
factors listed under Idaho Code section 32-712. This argument is not supported by the magistrate 
court’s memorandum decision. The magistrate court quotes the entirety of Idaho Code section 32-
712, and engages in a thorough discussion of the factors that bear on this case before reaching its 
conclusion.  
 
23 
 
 
Third, Stan argues that the magistrate court “ignored any evidence which mitigated [sic] 
against an unequal property division.” Stan argues that the magistrate court ignored the fact that 
Donna was capable of obtaining a minimum-wage job, that Donna’s living expenses were only 
$4,000 a month, and that Donna was capable of earning more than 30% of her monthly living 
expenses through minimum-wage employment. Stan further asserts that the magistrate court 
ignored the fact that Donna was scheduled to receive over $2 million in cash assets. Stan’s 
arguments lack support in the record and the law. Contrary to Stan’s assertion, the magistrate court 
did consider that Donna was capable of minimum-wage employment. Further, nothing in Idaho 
Code section 32-712 requires the magistrate court to consider a party’s monthly expenses and 
weigh them against their potential earning capacity. Finally, the magistrate court did recognize 
that it was awarding Donna over $2 million in cash assets. Thus, Stan’s argument that the 
magistrate court exceeded the outer boundaries of its discretion under Idaho Code section 32-712 
fails. In addition, Stan failed to demonstrate how the magistrate court failed to reach its conclusion 
based on an exercise of reason, or provide any authority to support that assertion. We decline to 
consider arguments that are not supported by argument and authority. See Bach, 148 Idaho at 790, 
229 P.3d at 1152. The magistrate court did not abuse its discretion in awarding an unequal 
community property division. Accordingly, the district court did not err in affirming the magistrate 
court.    
H. Stan’s award of costs on intermediate appeal is vacated. 
Donna appeals the district court’s award of costs to Stan as the prevailing party on 
intermediate appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 40. Because we reverse the district court’s 
decision on intermediate appeal, Stan is no longer the prevailing party on intermediate appeal. 
Thus, we vacate the district court’s award of costs to Stan.  
I. Attorney fees and costs for this appeal.  
Both parties request attorney fees on appeal to this Court pursuant to Idaho Code section 
12-121. Attorney fees under this statute may be awarded to the prevailing party when an appeal is 
brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. I.C. § 12-121.  
Section 12-121 fees are only available to a prevailing party. Inv’r Recovery Fund, LLC, v. 
Hopkins, Dkt. Nos. 46247, 2020 WL 3583817, at *11 (Idaho July 2, 2020). The prevailing party 
question examines the overall view of the action rather than a claim-by-claim analysis. Idaho 
Military Historical Soc’y, Inc., v. Maslen, 156 Idaho 624, 630, 329 P.3d 1072, 1078 (2014). Here, 
 
24 
 
although Stan technically prevailed on Donna’s motion to dismiss the appeal, Donna prevailed on 
every other issue. Thus, Donna is the overall prevailing party on appeal. Notwithstanding, we 
decline to award Donna attorney fees. This appeal raised complex appellate and family law issues 
that were supported with argument and authority. Accordingly, neither party is entitled to attorney 
fees on appeal.  
Additionally, Stan seeks an award of costs on appeal if he is the prevailing party pursuant 
to I.A.R. 40. This rule provides that “costs shall be allowed as a matter of course to the prevailing 
party unless otherwise provided by law or order of the Court.” I.A.R. 40(a). We hold that Stan is 
not entitled to costs on appeal because he is not the prevailing party.  
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the district court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. We affirm the 
following decisions of the district court: (1) the decision denying Donna’s motion to dismiss the 
appeal; (2) the decision affirming the magistrate court’s admission of Diane Barker’s testimony; 
and (3) the decision affirming the magistrate court’s unequal community property division. 
However, we reverse the following decisions of the district court and remand the case back to the 
district court with instructions to affirm the magistrate court on the following issues: (1) the 
valuation of the MVH Class A units; (2) the consideration of tax consequences; (3) the equalization 
payment; (4) spousal maintenance; (5) and Stan’s costs on intermediate appeal. Costs are awarded 
to Donna. 
 
Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices BEVAN, STEGNER, and MOELLER CONCUR.