Title: In re Christopher L.

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
In re CHRISTOPHER L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile 
Court Law. 
 
 
LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF  
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
CARLOS L., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
S265910 
 
Second Appellate District, Division One 
B305225 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
17CCJP02800 
 
 
April 25, 2022 
 
In re CHRISTOPHER L. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Kruger, 
Groban, Jenkins, and Peña* concurred. 
 
 
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate 
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 
section 6 of the California Constitution. 
1 
In re CHRISTOPHER L. 
S265910 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
California law requires the appointment of counsel for 
parents whose children are subject to dependency proceedings 
before the juvenile court.  When such parents are incarcerated, 
the law specifically provides for notice and the opportunity to be 
present, and prohibits a juvenile court from adjudicating a 
dependency petition without the presence of both counsel and 
the incarcerated parent except upon affirmative waiver by the 
parent.  These requirements, among others, protect the parent’s 
interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship and the 
child’s interest in having a dependency petition decided on the 
basis of all factors that bear on the child’s well-being. 
Here we decide whether it is structural error, and thus 
reversible per se, for a juvenile court to proceed with a hearing 
to determine its jurisdiction over a child and disposition of the 
wardship petition without an incarcerated parent’s presence 
and without appointing counsel for the parent.  We hold, as did 
the Court of Appeal, that while the provisions for presence and 
appointment of counsel are important protections for both the 
parent and the child, the juvenile court’s failure to comply does 
not require reversal per se. 
I. 
Christopher L. was born in December 2017 with a positive 
toxicology screen for amphetamines.  The Los Angeles County 
Department of Children and Family Services (Department) filed 
In re CHRISTOPHER L. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
 
a dependency petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions 
Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1), alleging that Christopher 
and his 10-month-old sibling, I.L., were at risk due to their 
mother’s (Mother) history of substance abuse and their 
respective fathers’ history of drug abuse, as well as Carlos L.’s 
criminal history.  (All undesignated statutory references are to 
the Welfare and Institutions Code.) 
The initial petition listed Carlos L. as I.L.’s alleged father 
and another man as Christopher’s alleged father.  But the 
juvenile court was also presented with documents establishing 
that Carlos L. was entitled to “presumed father” status with 
respect to Christopher, which carries with it the right to 
appointed counsel.  (In re Christopher L. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 
1172, 1177 (Christopher L.); see In re T.R. (2005) 132 
Cal.App.4th 1202, 1209; § 317.)  Like the Court of Appeal, we 
refer to Carlos L. as Father.   
The petition alleged that Mother’s ongoing substance 
abuse and Father’s criminal history and conduct placed the 
children at risk of serious physical harm.  The petition and 
detention report also alleged that Mother and Father each had 
other children who were prior dependents of the court and had 
received permanent placement services.  Based on these 
allegations, the Department indicated it might seek an order 
denying family reunification services pursuant to section 361.5, 
subdivision (b)(10) and (11), which allows the court to bypass the 
usual provision of reunification services, thus paving the way for 
termination of parental rights.   
At the time the children were detained and throughout the 
course of these proceedings, Father was incarcerated at the 
Sierra Conservation Center, a fire camp operated by the 
In re CHRISTOPHER L. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
3 
 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.  As relevant 
here, the Penal Code provides:  “In a proceeding . . . brought 
under Section 300 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, if the 
proceeding seeks to adjudicate the child of a prisoner a 
dependent child of the court, the superior court of the county in 
which the proceeding is pending, or a judge thereof, shall order 
notice of any court proceeding regarding the proceeding 
transmitted to the prisoner.”  (Pen. Code, § 2625, subd. (b).)  
“Upon receipt by the court of a statement from the prisoner or 
the prisoner’s attorney indicating the prisoner’s desire to be 
present during the court’s proceedings, the court shall issue an 
order for the temporary removal of the prisoner from the 
institution, and for the prisoner’s production before the court.”  
(Id., subd. (d).)  With exceptions not relevant here, “a petition to 
adjudge the child of a prisoner a dependent child of the court . . . 
may not be adjudicated without the physical presence of the 
prisoner or the prisoner’s attorney, unless the court has before 
it a knowing waiver of the right of physical presence signed by 
the prisoner or an affidavit signed by the warden, 
superintendent, or other person in charge of the institution, or 
a designated representative stating that the prisoner has, by 
express statement or action, indicated an intent not to appear 
at the proceeding.”  (Ibid.) 
Neither parent, nor counsel for either parent, appeared at 
the detention hearing.  The juvenile court found that the 
Department made a prima facie case for detention, set a 
combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing for March 2018, 
and ordered the Department to give notice to the parents.   
The Department provided notice to Father of the pending 
jurisdiction and disposition hearing.  He responded:  “I wanted 
to ask if a court appearance is necessary.  In your letter you 
In re CHRISTOPHER L. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
4 
 
stated that a court date of 3/9/18 will be set.  The reason why 
I’m asking is that this court date will delay my process on being 
transferred to a California Fire Camp.  If possible I was 
wondering can this matter be handled over the telephone.  If so, 
it would be very much appreciated if we took that route.  I love 
my kids and I will do anything in my power to be with them.  
The faster I get to camp, the faster I’ll be home. . . .  Please 
inform me of my options if a court appearance is needed to 
handle this matter.”  Father’s letter requested paternity testing 
for both children but indicated that regardless of the outcome, 
he would “love them as my own” and consider them “my kids.”  
Father’s letter was mentioned in and attached to the report 
prepared in anticipation of the jurisdiction and disposition 
hearing.   
Neither Father nor counsel for Father appeared at the 
March 2018 combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing.  The 
juvenile court suggested that the onus was on Father to make 
himself available and said, contrary to Father’s letter, that he 
had “not made himself available,” adding:  “[H]e’s been noticed, 
but he’s made no contact with [the Department].”  After hearing 
brief argument from the Department and counsel for the minors, 
the court sustained the petition as to both Father and Mother 
and denied the parents reunification services for both children.  
The court found it to be “in the best interest of these children to 
set a hearing to select a permanent plan of adoption, 
guardianship, or other planned living arrangements with a 
relative or foster care provider.”   
In November 2018, the court appointed counsel for Father.  
Counsel stated that Father objected to the Department’s request 
to terminate parental rights, and the matter was continued to 
the next month.  In December, Father made his first personal 
In re CHRISTOPHER L. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
5 
 
appearance in this case, via telephone.  At counsel’s request, the 
court ordered DNA testing to determine Christopher’s paternity 
and continued the proceedings as to Christopher.  The court 
terminated parental rights as to I.L.   
Christopher’s permanency hearing was held in March 
2020.  Father was present telephonically and represented by 
appointed counsel.  Counsel objected to the termination of 
parental rights but presented no evidence and offered no 
argument.  The court terminated Father’s parental rights.   
As relevant here, Father argued on appeal that he was 
denied due process of law at the combined jurisdiction and 
disposition hearing in March 2018 because it was conducted in 
his absence and without counsel present on his behalf.  
(Christopher L., supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1176–1177.)  The 
Court of Appeal agreed with Father that his status as presumed 
father of Christopher based on his marriage to Mother entitled 
him to appointed counsel at the hearing, and it held that the 
juvenile court violated Penal Code section 2625 by conducting 
the hearing without Father or his counsel being present and 
without a signed waiver from Father.  (Christopher L., at 
pp. 1184–1185, citing In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588, 
621–622.)  These errors, the Court of Appeal concluded, “affected 
the due process afforded Father at the jurisdiction/disposition 
hearing in that they denied him counsel at that hearing.”  
(Christopher L., at p. 1177.)  
Although the Court of Appeal agreed with Father that 
these errors violated due process, it held that automatic reversal 
was not warranted.  Citing In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901, 
915 (James F.), the court explained that not every due process 
error in dependency proceedings is reversible per se and that 
In re CHRISTOPHER L. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
6 
 
reviewing courts “should first consider whether an error in 
dependency proceedings is amenable to harmless error 
analysis — that is, whether potential prejudice from the error 
can be assessed without ‘necessarily requir[ing] “a speculative 
inquiry into what might have occurred in an alternate 
universe” ’ [citation] — and, if so, apply a harmless error 
analysis.”  (Christopher L., supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 1186.)  
The court determined that it could assess whether the juvenile 
court’s errors prejudiced Father in later proceedings based on 
the undisputed facts before it.  The relevant inquiry, according 
to the Court of Appeal, was whether there was a reasonable 
probability of a more favorable outcome (People v. Watson (1956) 
46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson)) if Father had been present at the March 
2018 hearing or had been represented by counsel.  (Christopher 
L., at p. 1188.) 
The Court of Appeal concluded that the bypass provisions 
under subdivisions (b)(10), (b)(12), and (e) of section 361.5 
applied to Father, and that Father could not have demonstrated 
that it would be in Christopher’s best interests to provide 
reunification 
services 
because 
Father 
had 
never 
met 
Christopher and acknowledged having little to no relationship 
with either child, and he would remain in custody past the 
maximum reunification period.  (Christopher L., supra, 
56 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1190–1191.)  On those grounds, the Court 
of Appeal held that the juvenile court’s errors were harmless 
under either the standard for state law error (Watson, supra, 46 
Cal.2d at p. 835) or the standard for federal constitutional error 
(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman)). 
We agree with the Court of Appeal that the juvenile court 
erred in failing to appoint counsel for Father for the combined 
jurisdiction and disposition hearing and also failed to comply 
In re CHRISTOPHER L. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
7 
 
with Penal Code section 2625.  The question is whether it is 
structural error, and thus reversible per se, for a juvenile court 
to proceed with a jurisdiction and disposition hearing without 
an incarcerated parent’s presence and without appointing the 
parent an attorney. 
II. 
The California Constitution provides:  “No judgment shall 
be set aside, or new trial granted, in any cause, on the ground of 
misdirection of the jury, or of the improper admission or 
rejection of evidence, or for any error as to any matter of 
pleading, or for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, 
after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, 
the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has 
resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”  (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)  
“When the error is one of state law only, it generally does not 
warrant reversal unless there is a reasonable probability that in 
the absence of the error, a result more favorable to the appealing 
party would have been reached.  ([Watson, supra,] 46 Cal.2d [at 
p.] 835.)”  (Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 
574.)  Federal constitutional errors require reversal unless the 
beneficiary of the error can show it was “harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.) 
But not all errors are amenable to harmless error analysis.  
We have, “in a number of contexts, [found] that certain errors, 
by their nature, result in a ‘miscarriage of justice’ within the 
meaning of the California harmless-error provision requiring 
reversal without regard to the strength of the evidence received 
at trial.”  (People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 493 (Cahill).)  
For example, per se reversal is required when a court refuses or 
fails to allow a party to present its entire case before the trier of 
In re CHRISTOPHER L. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
8 
 
fact (Fewel v. Fewel (1943) 23 Cal.2d 431, 433), when there is 
improper discrimination in jury selection (People v. Wheeler 
(1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 283), or when a codefendant is denied the 
right to separate counsel (People v. Douglas (1964) 61 Cal.2d 
430, 437–439). 
The same is true under federal law.  In holding that some 
errors of a constitutional dimension are amenable to harmless 
error analysis, the court in Chapman also recognized that “there 
are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their 
infraction can never be treated as harmless error . . . .”  
(Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 23.)  This category includes 
deprivation of the right to counsel (Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 
372 U.S. 335) and denial of the right to trial by an impartial 
judge (Tumey v. Ohio (1927) 273 U.S. 510).  (Chapman, at p. 23, 
fn. 84; see Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 309–310 
(Fulminante).) 
We adopted the term “structural” error in accordance with 
its usage in Fulminante:  “[J]ust as the United States Supreme 
Court recognized in its recent Fulminante decision that certain 
federal constitutional errors representing ‘structural defects in 
the constitution of the trial mechanism’ are not amenable to 
harmless error analysis (Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. [at 
p.] 309–310 (opn. by Rehnquist, C. J.)), under the California 
constitutional harmless-error provision some errors similarly 
are not susceptible to the ‘ordinary’ or ‘generally applicable’ 
harmless-error analysis . . . and may require reversal of the 
judgment notwithstanding the strength of the evidence 
contained in the record in a particular case.”  (Cahill, supra, 5 
Cal.4th at p. 493.) 
In re CHRISTOPHER L. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
 
A. 
In James F., we observed that the high court had not 
applied structural error analysis “outside the context of criminal 
proceedings” (James F., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 917), and we 
cautioned against “import[ing] wholesale, or unthinkingly,” the 
analysis of structural error from criminal cases into other 
contexts (id. at p. 916).  At the same time, we have never held 
that structural errors can arise only in the criminal context.  (Cf. 
Sandquist v. Lebo Automotive, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 233 [holding 
that an error regarding who should interpret a class action 
provision in an arbitration agreement was not amenable to 
prejudice analysis].) 
Father asks us to import the rule of structural error into 
the dependency context.  We considered in James F. whether a 
procedural error in appointing a guardian ad litem for a parent 
in a dependency proceeding was amenable to harmless error 
analysis.  The superior court in that matter failed to “explain to 
[the parent] what a guardian ad litem is or what powers a 
guardian ad litem has, nor did the court give [the parent] a 
meaningful opportunity to be heard in opposition to the 
appointment, and it inaccurately told [the parent] that the 
guardian ad litem was his ‘second lawyer.’ ”  (James F., supra, 
42 Cal.4th at p. 911.)  We concluded that the juvenile court’s 
failure to follow the proper procedure in appointing a guardian 
ad litem was amenable to harmless error analysis because 
“[d]etermining prejudice in this context does not necessarily 
require ‘a speculative inquiry into what might have occurred in 
an alternate universe.’ ”  (Id. at p. 915.) 
In reaching this holding, we observed that “[t]he rights 
and protections afforded parents in a dependency proceeding are 
In re CHRISTOPHER L. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
10 
 
not the same as those afforded to the accused in a criminal 
proceeding.”  (James F., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 915.)  “For 
example, a juvenile court may rely on hearsay contained in a 
social worker’s report to support a jurisdictional finding in a 
dependency case, although such evidence could not be used to 
establish guilt in a criminal proceeding.  [Citation.]  Also, unlike 
a defendant in a criminal proceeding, ‘[a] parent at a 
dependency hearing cannot assert the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule, since “the potential harm to children in 
allowing them to remain in an unhealthy environment 
outweighs any deterrent effect which would result from 
suppressing evidence” unlawfully seized.’ ”  (Ibid.)  “These 
significant differences between criminal proceedings and 
dependency proceedings,” among others, “provide reason to 
question whether the structural error doctrine that has been 
established for certain errors in criminal proceedings should be 
imported wholesale, or unthinkingly, into the quite different 
context of dependency cases.”  (Id. at pp. 915–916.) 
As Father observes, James F. did not address or disturb 
several Court of Appeal decisions that had found structural 
error in the dependency context, including cases involving 
failure to provide notice to the parent.  (See, e.g., In re Jasmine 
G. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1116 [failure to give proper 
notice to a parent facing termination of her parental rights]; 
Judith P. v. Superior Court (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 535, 558 
[failure to timely serve report recommending termination of 
reunification services in advance of a dependency hearing]; In re 
Josiah S. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 403, 417–418 [improper denial 
of a parent’s request for a contested hearing in a dependency 
proceeding]; In re Kelly D. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 433, 440 
[failure to provide notice and a contested hearing on the issue of 
In re CHRISTOPHER L. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
11 
 
visitation frequency “resulted in a miscarriage of justice” 
requiring reversal of the order, with no discussion of prejudice]; 
In re James Q. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 255, 268 [conditioning a 
contested hearing on an offer of proof was a “miscarriage of 
justice”].)    Moreover, we took care to note that there was no 
indication the father in James F. was “ ‘stripped . . . of his right 
to participate’ ”:  “Nothing suggests that [the father] was unable 
to express his wishes to the court, either directly or through his 
appointed guardian, that he lacked actual notice of the 
proceedings as they unfolded, that the guardian and the 
attorney appointed for [the father] failed to properly advocate 
for his parental interests, or that [the father] ever expressed 
dissatisfaction with the guardian ad litem or asked the juvenile 
court to vacate her appointment.”  (James F., supra, 42 Cal.4th 
at p. 917.)  We explained:  “[T]he use of flawed procedures in the 
appointment of a guardian ad litem for a parent does not 
inevitably and necessarily render dependency proceedings 
unfair in any fundamental sense” because “it is reasonable to 
infer, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that a guardian 
ad litem has acted zealously to preserve the parent’s interest in 
the companionship, care, and custody of the child, and thus that 
the parent benefited from the guardian ad litem’s appointment.”  
(Id. at p. 918.) 
In sum, although we declined to find structural error in 
James F., we did not foreclose its application in the dependency 
context. 
B. 
With this background, we turn to the question before us:  
whether the juvenile court’s failure here to appoint counsel or 
provide for Father’s presence at the combined jurisdiction and 
In re CHRISTOPHER L. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
12 
 
disposition hearing is structural error.  We begin by 
acknowledging that these errors are quite serious.  The hearing 
at issue is when the juvenile court determines whether there are 
sufficient grounds to assert jurisdiction over the child and 
whether family reunification services will be provided.  (1 Seiser 
& Kumli, Cal. Juvenile Courts Practice and Procedure (2021) 
§§ 2.100, 2.122 (Seiser).)  Not only are the stakes for the parent 
weighty, but also “it is implicit in the juvenile dependency 
statutes that it is always in the best interests of a minor to have 
a dependency adjudication based upon all material facts and 
circumstances and the participation of all interested parties 
entitled to notice.”  (Ansley v. Superior Court (1986) 185 
Cal.App.3d 477, 490–491 (Ansley).)  The right to counsel and 
participation not only protects the parent’s interests but also 
ensures that the juvenile court has the fullest picture of the 
relevant facts before disposing of a dependency petition.   
It is not sufficient that Father was appointed counsel and 
was present telephonically at the permanency planning 
proceeding.  The focus of that proceeding is different:  “ ‘Once 
reunification services are ordered terminated, the focus shifts to 
the needs of the child for permanency and stability.’ . . .  ‘A 
[permanency planning] hearing . . .  is a hearing specifically 
designed to select and implement a permanent plan for the 
child.’ . . .  It is designed to protect children’s ‘compelling rights 
. . . to have a placement that is stable, permanent, and that 
allows the caretaker to make a full emotional commitment to the 
child.’ ”  (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 52–53, citations 
omitted.)  Once a dependency proceeding moves into 
permanency planning, “the question is no longer whether the 
child should be returned to the parent, an issue already decided 
in the negative with the permanent plan of return to the parent 
In re CHRISTOPHER L. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
13 
 
having been rejected.  Instead, the issue is whether the child is 
adoptable and what the alternative permanency plan should 
be.”  (Seiser, supra, § 2.171; see In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 
614, 630–631 [discussing the proceedings under § 366.26 after 
reunification services have been denied or terminated]; In re 
Celine R., at p. 53 [“Indeed, the court must order adoption and 
its necessary consequence, termination of parental rights, 
unless one of the specified circumstances provides a compelling 
reason for finding that termination of parental rights would be 
detrimental to the child.”].)  Thus, unlike the father in James F., 
Father here was denied “ ‘his right to participate’ ” in a critical 
stage of a dependency case when the juvenile court failed to 
appoint counsel or provide for Father’s presence at the combined 
jurisdiction and disposition hearing.  (James F., supra, 42 
Cal.4th at p. 917.) 
In classifying the error here, we draw on Weaver v. 
Massachusetts (2017) 582 U.S. __ [137 S.Ct. 1899] (Weaver), 
which explained that “[t]here appear to be at least three broad 
rationales” for treating an error as structural.  (Id. at p. __ [137 
S.Ct. at p. 1908].)  “First, an error has been deemed structural 
in some instances if the right at issue is not designed to protect 
the defendant from erroneous conviction but instead protects 
some other interest.  This is true of the defendant’s right to 
conduct his own defense, which, when exercised, ‘usually 
increases the likelihood of a trial outcome unfavorable to the 
defendant.’ . . .  [¶] Second, an error has been deemed structural 
if the effects of the error are simply too hard to measure.  For 
example, when a defendant is denied the right to select his or 
her own attorney, the precise ‘effect of the violation cannot be 
ascertained.’  [Citation.]  Because the government will, as a 
result, find it almost impossible to show that the error was 
In re CHRISTOPHER L. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
14 
 
‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,’ [citation], the efficiency 
costs of letting the government try to make the showing are 
unjustified.  [¶] Third, an error has been deemed structural if 
the error always results in fundamental unfairness.  For 
example, if an indigent defendant is denied an attorney or if the 
judge fails to give a reasonable-doubt instruction, the resulting 
trial is always a fundamentally unfair one.  [Citations.]  It 
therefore would be futile for the government to try to show 
harmlessness.”  (Ibid.)  “These categories are not rigid.  In a 
particular case, more than one of these rationales may be part 
of the explanation for why an error is deemed to be structural.”  
(Ibid.) 
The first of the three Weaver rationales asks whether “the 
right at issue is not designed to protect the defendant from 
erroneous conviction but instead protects some other interest.”  
(Weaver, supra, 582 U.S. at p. __ [137 S.Ct. at p. 1908].)  As an 
illustration, Weaver mentions a criminal defendant’s right to 
conduct his or her own defense, “which, when exercised, ‘usually 
increases the likelihood of a trial outcome unfavorable to the 
defendant.’ ”  (Ibid.)  “That right is based on the fundamental 
legal principle that a defendant must be allowed to make his 
own choices about the proper way to protect his own liberty.  
[Citation.]  Because harm is irrelevant to the basis underlying 
the right, the Court has deemed a violation of that right 
structural error.”  (Ibid.) 
Here, the value of counsel and the parent’s presence at 
dependency proceedings is not limited to ensuring proper 
presentation of the parent’s position; it also ensures that the 
juvenile court has the fullest picture of the relevant facts before 
disposing of a dependency petition.  But this interest in the 
accuracy of the proceedings is not easily distinguished from the 
In re CHRISTOPHER L. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
15 
 
parent’s own interest because it also serves to protect the parent 
from an erroneous determination.  To that extent, it differs from 
the example Weaver offers to illustrate the first rationale and 
does not counsel in favor of treating the error here as structural. 
Nor does Weaver’s second rationale for finding structural 
error have applicability here.  We find it significant, as did the 
Court of Appeal, that the question of whether the errors here 
were harmless does not invariably require “a speculative inquiry 
into what might have occurred in an alternate universe.”  
(United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez (2006) 548 U.S. 140, 150.)  We 
discuss at some length the Court of Appeal’s assessment of 
prejudice not to express our view on whether the juvenile court’s 
errors were harmless (that issue is not before us), but rather to 
examine the feasibility of harmless error analysis in this 
context. 
The Department asked the juvenile court to exercise 
jurisdiction over Christopher and his sister based on allegations 
that Father’s criminal history and substance abuse endangered 
the children’s health and safety and placed them at risk of 
serious physical harm.  The Court of Appeal understood Father 
to have conceded that the juvenile court acted properly in 
sustaining the allegations and exercising jurisdiction over 
Christopher (Christopher L., supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 1189, 
fn. 5); the only question was whether the court properly denied 
reunification services to Father.  (Cf. post, at pp. 17–18.) 
“Section 
361.5, 
subdivision 
(b) 
contains 
several 
reunification ‘bypass provisions’ permitting (or, in some cases, 
requiring) a court to deny a parent reunification services” when 
it finds by clear and convincing evidence that one or more of the 
bypass provisions apply.  (Christopher L., supra, 56 Cal.App.5th 
In re CHRISTOPHER L. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
16 
 
at p. 1189.)  Two bypass provisions are relevant here.  First, 
section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10)(A) is applicable in light of the 
fact that a juvenile court had previously “ordered termination of 
reunification services for . . . half siblings of [Christopher] 
because [Father] failed to reunify with the . . . half sibling[s],” 
and “has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the 
problems that led to removal of the . . . half sibling of 
[Christopher] from that [Father].”  (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(10)(A).)  As 
the Court of Appeal explained, “Father does not challenge the 
applicability of this bypass provision, nor could he.  Father failed 
to reunify with two of his older children in dependency 
proceedings based on substance abuse issues, and Father has 
since continued his drug-related criminality.  Even if Father 
could offer evidence of efforts to address these issues, no such 
efforts could have supported a ‘reasonable effort to’ address 
finding (see § 361.5, subd. (b)(10)), given Father’s continuous 
drug-related criminality.”  (Christopher L., at p. 1189.) 
Second, it is also undisputed that section 361.5, 
subdivision (b)(12) is relevant.  Father had been convicted of a 
violent felony (robbery), for which he was incarcerated at the 
time of these proceedings.  (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(12) [“Reunification 
services need not be provided . . . when the court finds, by clear 
and convincing evidence . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . the parent or guardian 
of the child has been convicted of a violent felony, as defined in 
subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 of the Penal Code”].) 
When either of these 
bypass provisions applies, 
reunification services “shall not” be ordered unless the juvenile 
court finds, “by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification 
is in the best interest of the child.”  (§ 361.5, subd. (c)(2).)  In this 
court, as in the Court of Appeal, “Father makes no attempt to 
argue how a court could have concluded that services would 
In re CHRISTOPHER L. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
17 
 
have been in Christopher’s best interest, nor does he argue the 
bypass provision under section 361.5, subdivision (b) is 
inapplicable.”  (Christopher L., supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 1190.) 
We emphasize, as did the Court of Appeal, that the fact of 
a parent’s incarceration is not itself dispositive in the prejudice 
analysis.  (See Christopher L., supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 1192 [“there is no ‘ “go to prison, lose your child” ’ law in 
California”], quoting In re Brittany S. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 
1399, 1402.)  Section 361.5, subdivision (e)(1) requires the court 
to order “reasonable” reunification services to incarcerated 
parents “unless the court determines, by clear and convincing 
evidence, those services would be detrimental to the child.”  The 
statute enumerates numerous factors for consideration, and the 
Court of Appeal identified the following as the most relevant 
here:  “the age of the child, the degree of parent-child bonding, 
the length of the sentence, . . . the nature of the crime . . . , the 
degree of detriment to the child if services are not offered . . . , 
the likelihood of the parent’s discharge from incarceration . . . 
within the reunification time limitations . . . , and any other 
appropriate factors.”  (§ 361.5, subd. (e)(1); see Christopher L., 
supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 1190.)  On the facts of this case, the 
court concluded, “[T]here is not a reasonable probability that 
reunification 
services 
would 
not 
be 
detrimental 
to 
Christopher — even if Father had had counsel to advocate 
against such a finding. . . .  Father is not eligible for parole until 
approximately three years after Christopher was first detained, 
so Father’s incarceration would have fallen well outside the 
maximum reunification period, even if the court permitted an 
extension beyond the applicable six-month limit for children 
under three years old.  (See § 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(B), (3)(A) & 
In re CHRISTOPHER L. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
18 
 
(4)(A).)  As such, any services the court might order could not 
have successfully reunified Father with Christopher within the 
statutory time frame, which section 361.5, subdivision (e)(1) 
instructs they must in order to avoid proceeding to a 
permanency planning hearing.”  (Christopher L., supra, 56 
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1190–1191.) 
Importantly, the statutory scheme provides a mechanism 
for reconsideration of the court’s prior orders had Father 
believed there were grounds to do so.  Section 388 authorizes a 
parent “or other person having an interest in a child who is a 
dependent child of the juvenile court” to petition the juvenile 
court “to change, modify, or set aside any order of court 
previously made or to terminate the jurisdiction of the court.”  
(Id., subd. (a)(1); see Ansley, supra, 185 Cal.App.3d at pp. 481, 
487–488.)  The petition — sometimes referred to as an “Ansley 
motion” — must allege why the requested change is “in the best 
interest of the dependent child.”  (§ 388, subd. (b)(1).)  Section 
388 further says:  “If it appears that the best interests of the 
child or the nonminor dependent may be promoted by the 
proposed change or order . . . the court shall order that a hearing 
be held . . . .”  (§ 388, subd. (d).)  However, the court may 
summarily deny the motion if the petition fails to make a prima 
facie showing (1) that a change of circumstances or new evidence 
requires a changed order, and (2) that the requested change 
would promote the best interests of the child.  (In re Anthony W. 
(2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 246, 250.) 
In his briefing before this court, Father belatedly offers 
two theories of prejudice that should have been presented to the 
juvenile court in the first instance as possible grounds for 
reconsideration.  First, he suggests that if he had attended the 
March 2018 jurisdiction hearing, he could have persuaded the 
In re CHRISTOPHER L. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
19 
 
juvenile court that because he was a nonoffending parent and 
could have arranged for the children to be cared for by a relative 
while he served his prison term, there was no need for the court 
to assume jurisdiction over the children.  Second, he says he 
might have persuaded the juvenile court to reject the 
jurisdictional allegations against him as “stale,” thus rendering 
him a nonoffending parent.  But the jurisdictional report 
indicates that Father appears to have been arrested for burglary 
just eight months before these proceedings; that was the charge 
for which he was then serving a seven-year sentence.  The facts 
here are readily distinguishable from those in In re Isayah C. 
(2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 684, upon which Father relies.  In Isayah 
C., the Department did not file allegations against the father 
and conceded he was a nonoffending parent (id. at pp. 688, 695), 
the father had joint custody of the child (id. at p. 688), he was 
under arrest due to accusations made by the child’s mother (id. 
at pp. 687, 689), and he articulated a plan to send his child to 
identified relatives “pending his relatively short incarceration” 
(id. at p. 700). 
In any event, these arguments were not presented in a 
motion for reconsideration under section 388, nor were they 
presented to the Court of Appeal when the question of 
prejudicial error was decided.  Had Father presented these 
arguments below, they could have informed the Court of 
Appeal’s assessment of prejudice.  But even if such arguments 
might have made it more difficult to show that the errors here 
were harmless, that does not mean the errors are not amenable 
to harmless error review.  It would simply mean that the errors 
are “more likely to be prejudicial under the traditional 
harmless-error standard.”   (Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 503.)  
The fact that the statutory scheme enabled the Court of Appeal 
In re CHRISTOPHER L. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
20 
 
to assess prejudice based on the arguments before it weighs 
against a conclusion that the errors require automatic reversal. 
Finally, we turn to Weaver’s third rationale for structural 
error:  whether the error “always results in fundamental 
unfairness.”  (Weaver, supra, 582 U.S. at p. __ [137 S.Ct. at 
p. 1908].)  It is this rationale, Weaver explains, that calls for 
automatic reversal when “an indigent defendant is denied an 
attorney or if the judge fails to give a reasonable-doubt 
instruction.”  (Ibid.)  Here, we note the significant differences 
between criminal and dependency proceedings, as articulated in 
James F.:  “In a criminal prosecution, the contested issues 
normally involve historical facts (what precisely occurred, and 
where and when), whereas in a dependency proceeding the 
issues normally involve evaluations of the parents’ present 
willingness and ability to provide appropriate care for the child 
and the existence and suitability of alternative placements.”  
(James F., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 915.)  The presence of counsel 
generally helps to facilitate this assessment by ensuring that a 
more complete picture of the parent’s interests and ability to 
provide for the child’s care are presented to the court.  But it 
does not follow that the absence of counsel invariably results in 
unfairness in light of the statutory scheme governing 
reunification services.  Nor does it follow that absence of counsel 
from one stage of the proceeding necessarily renders the entire 
proceeding fundamentally unfair, especially where, as here, 
counsel was provided after the jurisdiction and disposition 
hearing, and could have utilized a statutory mechanism to seek 
reconsideration of any prior order by the juvenile court. 
Weaver cautions that “[a]n error can count as structural 
even if the error does not lead to fundamental unfairness in 
every case.”  (Weaver, supra, 582 U.S. at p. __ [137 S.Ct. at 
In re CHRISTOPHER L. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
21 
 
p. 1908].)  But in the dependency context, automatic reversal for 
errors that do not invariably lead to fundamental unfairness 
would exact a particularly steep cost.  “There is little that can 
be as detrimental to a child’s sound development as uncertainty 
over whether he is to remain in his current ‘home,’ under the 
care of his parents or foster parents, especially when such 
uncertainty is prolonged.”  (Lehman v. Lycoming County 
Children’s Services (1982) 458 U.S. 502, 513–514.)  “We 
emphatically agree that dependent children have a critical 
interest in avoiding unnecessary delays to their long-term 
placement.”  (In re A.R. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 234, 249; see James 
F., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 915 [“the ultimate consideration in a 
dependency proceeding is the welfare of the child [citations], a 
factor having no clear analogy in a criminal proceeding”].)  And 
we have repeatedly underscored the need to avoid delay in this 
context.  (See, e.g., In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 993 
[noting “the pointed and concrete harm that the child may 
suffer” from prolonged proceedings]; In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 
Cal.4th 295, 306 [children have a “compelling right[] . . . to have 
a placement that is stable, permanent, and that allows the 
caretaker to make a full emotional commitment to the child”].)  
Accordingly, we decline to adopt a rule of automatic reversal in 
cases involving the errors that occurred here.   
We caution that such assessment of harmlessness is 
unlikely to be available in every instance where a parent has 
been denied the right to counsel and the right to be present at a 
combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing.  These rights 
serve to ensure the fairness and reliability of the adversarial 
process, and there is likely to be “a grey area between the 
margins where the difference appointed counsel [or the parent’s 
presence] might have made during a dependency proceeding will 
In re CHRISTOPHER L. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
22 
 
be more difficult to reliably assess.” (In re. J.P. (2017) 15 
Cal.App.5th 789, 803 (conc. opn. of Baker, J.).)  The fact that 
harmlessness is ascertainable here counsels against a rule of 
automatic reversal.  But appellate courts should be wary of 
finding harmless error “[w]hen a counterfactual inquiry appears 
too difficult to responsibly undertake, or a counterfactual 
conclusion relies on inferences that really amount to 
guesswork.”  (Id. at p. 804 (conc. opn. of Baker, J.).) 
C. 
Finally, we address Father’s argument that the errors 
here are analogous to a complete deprivation of notice.  (Cf. In 
re Jasmine G., supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 1116; In re Kelly D., 
supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at pp. 439–440.)  Father acknowledges 
that the Department provided notice of the combined 
jurisdiction and disposition hearing, but he says, “[T]he trial 
court’s fundamental error in not acknowledging petitioner’s 
response to the notice that he did receive, has, in effect, resulted 
in a lack of notice altogether.”  He asks:  “What is the difference 
between a lack of notice and the failure of the trial court to 
acknowledge the defendant’s desire to contest the matter after 
notice has been given?”   
The Courts of Appeal that have addressed notice errors in 
the dependency context have attempted to draw a line between 
cases in which there was a complete deprivation of notice and 
cases in which there was some lesser defect as to notice, with 
only the former requiring automatic reversal.  (See, e.g., In re 
Marcos G. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 369, 387 [“When there is no 
attempt to serve a parent with notice the error is reversible per 
se; when there is error in a notice the question is whether the 
error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”].)  One court has 
In re CHRISTOPHER L. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
23 
 
explained that it “is the difference between a sound structure 
which fails due to human error and an unsound structure which 
can never support a fair process.”  (In re Jasmine G., supra, 127 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1118.)  The rationale may be that automatic 
reversal is necessary to deter egregious negligence when the 
state fails to even attempt to give notice.  A complete failure of 
the state process may also implicate dignity concerns not 
present when human error results in a notice defect. 
We express no view on the cases that have applied a rule 
of automatic reversal where there was a complete absence of 
notice.  We note only that there was no failure to give notice 
here, and no indication that the juvenile court’s or the 
Department’s failure to act properly on Father’s response to the 
notice arose from anything other than ordinary human error, or 
that the mistake at one stage of the proceedings rendered the 
entire process fundamentally unfair. 
To be sure, Father’s right to be present with counsel at the 
hearing may serve a dignitary interest apart from its utility in 
ensuring the reliability of the outcome.  (Cf. Weaver, supra, 582 
U.S. at p. __ [137 S.Ct. at p. 1908] [structural error may arise 
from violation of a right that “is not designed to protect the 
defendant from erroneous conviction but instead protects some 
other interest”].)  But Father did receive proper notice of the 
hearing, was present and represented at later hearings, and had 
recourse to a mechanism for reconsideration.  Any additional 
dignitary interest that might be served by the juvenile court 
acknowledging his desire to contest the matter is, in our view, 
insufficient to justify a rule of automatic reversal when weighed 
against 
Christopher’s 
“critical 
interest” 
in 
permanent 
placement.  (In re A.R., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 249.) 
In re CHRISTOPHER L. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
24 
 
In sum, the juvenile court committed serious errors when 
it proceeded with a combined jurisdiction and disposition 
hearing without appointing counsel for Father or providing for 
his presence at the hearing.  But the prejudicial effects of such 
errors, if any, are not beyond the ability of the courts to assess.  
Although this may not be true in all cases involving such errors, 
the fact that it is true at least in cases like this one — together 
with the “critical interest” that “dependent children have . . . in 
avoiding unnecessary delays to their long-term placement” (In 
re A.R., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 249) — leads us to conclude that 
a rule of automatic reversal is unwarranted. 
The question before us is limited to whether the errors 
here require automatic reversal.  We do not decide whether the 
errors, singly or in combination, are subject to the prejudice 
standard for state law error (see Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at 
p. 835) or the more stringent standard for federal constitutional 
error (see Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24).  Nor do we decide 
the merits of the Court of Appeal’s determination that the errors 
were harmless under either prejudice standard, as that issue is 
beyond the scope of the question on which we granted review. 
In re CHRISTOPHER L. 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
25 
 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
We Concur:  
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
PEÑA, J.* 
 
 
*  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate 
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 
section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  In re Christopher L.   
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal   
Original Proceeding   
Review Granted (published) XX 56 Cal.App.5th 1172 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S265910 
Date Filed:  April 25, 2022 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior    
County:  Los Angeles    
Judge:  Marguerite D. Downing 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Counsel: 
 
Christopher Blake, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Mazanec Law, Nicholas J. Mazanec; and Suzanne M. Nicholson for 
California Appellate Defense Counsel as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Mary C. Wickham and Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim 
Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Sarah Vesecky, Deputy County 
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.  
 
Jennifer B. Henning; and Johannah L. Hartley, Deputy County 
Counsel (Santa Barbara), for the California State Association of 
Counties as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Christopher Blake 
P.O. Box 90218 
San Diego, CA 92169 
(858) 274-1722 
 
Sarah Vesecky 
Deputy County Counsel 
500 West Temple Street, 6th Floor 
Los Angeles, CA 90012 
(213) 808-8777