Title: State v Wesley Gardiner

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

FILED
anuary 82008
DA 06-0528
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2008 MT SN

 

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appelice, F th E D

* JAN x 7008

WESLEY JARED GARDINER, Ed Smith
(CLERKOF Tie SuPnee COURT
Defendant and Appellant, STATE OF MONTANA

 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Missoula, Cause No, DC-05-443
Honorable Douglas G. Harkin, Presiding Judge

‘COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Martin W. Judnich, Peter F. Lacny; Law Office of Martin W.
Judnich, Missoula, Montana

For Appellee:

Hon, Mike McGrath, Attomey General; Jonathan M. Krauss,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana

Fred R. Van Valkenburg, Missoula County Attomey; Suzy
Boylen-Moore, Deputy County Attorney, Missoula, Montana

 

Submitted on BriefS: June 26, 2007

Decided: January 8, 2008

~ ?*Clerk

 
Chief Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Cour.

{1 Pursuant to Section 1, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal
‘Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be cited as precedent. It shall be filed as 8
public document wit the Clerk ofthe Supreme Court and its case title, Supreme Court cause
number and disposition shall be included in this Court's quarterly list of noncitable cases
published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports
{2A jury in the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, found Wesley Jared
Gardiner not guilty of felony burglary and guilty of felony partner assault. The District Court
centered judgment, and Gardiner appeals. We affirm.
8. The issue on appeal is whether the District Court abused its diseretion in denying
Gardinee's motion for a mistrial.

BACKGROUND
{4 The State of Montana charged Gardiner with felony burglary and felony partner

assault. Before trial, the State moved to prohibit testimony by any witness regarding any

 

incidents between Gardiner and the victim. The District Court granted that motion.

{5 Atthe jury tial, the

 

testified that after her romantic relationship with Gardiner
had ended, she awoke one moming to find him sleeping on her living room couch. She
further testified that, when she told Gardiner to leave, he hit her in the forehead and in the

‘shoulder blade, and then put her in a headiock and took her to the floor. When her children
‘came to her aid and called 911, Gardiner left the home.
‘16 During cross-examination of Missoula police officer Kenneth Guy, who responded to
the 911 call, the following exchange occurred:

Q [by Gardiner’s counsel]. . . Did you ever ask [the victim) if Wes
[Gardiner] sometimes stayed there?

‘A. Tid not. She just stated that he was not wanted there and was not
tobe there.

Q.. Did you follow up with that to try and get more specificity of
whether he had been allowed at some point and then that was
revoked or whether it was just a blanket, can't come here, did you
follow up on that at all?

‘A. checked on the computer screen and looked at what she had told me
about some prior instances that I looked up,

Q. Okay, So you didn’t actually ask her?

‘A. She told me about him assaulting her in the past and I looked up
those report numbers.

Gardiner’s counsel then moved for a mistrial outside the presence of the jury. ‘The District,
Court denied the motion on the basis the question “did you follow up?” had opened the door
to evidence of other crimes. The court advised the State, however, to stay away from the
subject because the door was “not wide open yet.” The State neither inquired into other
incidents nor mentioned the subject in closing argument. ‘The defense did not request a
‘curative instruction, and none was given.

7 The jury found Gardiner not guilty of burglary but guilty of partner assault. The
District Court entered judgment, and Gardiner appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
48 We review a district court’s grant or denial of a motion for mistrial to determine
whether the district court abused its discretion. State v, Smith, 2005 MT 18, § 6, 325 Mont.
374,46, 106 P.34 553, 4 6 (citation omitted). The test for abuse of diseretion is whether the
trial court acted arbitrarily without employment of conscientious judgment or exceeded the
bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice. State v. Weldele,2003 MT 117,472,315
Mont. 452, §72, 69 P.3d 1162, $72 (citation omitted)
DISCUSSION

{9 Did the District Court abuse its diseretion in denying Gardiner’s motion for a
mistrial?

{10 A mistrial generally is appropriate when a reasonable possibility exists that
inadmissible evidence might have contributed to the conviction. State v. Partin, 287 Mont.
12, 18, 951 P.2d 1002, 1005 (1997) (citations omitted). However, we will not put a district
court in error for an action in which the appellant acquiesced or actively participated. State.
Harris, 1999 MT 115, 132, 294 Mont. 397, § 32, 983 P-2d 881, $32 (citation omitted). A

party waives the right to appeal an alleged error by acquiescing in, atively participating in or

 

not objecting to the error, Smith, § 10

11 Gardiner’s first contention on appeal is that Officer Guy's reference to prior assaults

 

‘was inadmissible. Itis undisputed that M. R. Evid. 404(b) generally prohibits evidence of
other crimes, wrongs or acts, Indeed, the District Court so nuled in response to the State's
Pretrial motion. Thus, Guy's reference to prior assaults was inadmissible pursuant to both M.
R. Evid. 404(b) and the court's pretrial ruling.

‘112. Gardiner next contends the District Court abused its discretion in determining he had
‘pened the door t0 the testimony. He advances no authority—from this or any other
Jurisdiction—in support of his position, Nor did he attempt to distinguish any of our “opened
the door” jurisprudence in his opening brief. See e.g. Smith, 15; Harris, §31;see also State
¥. Cesnik, 2005 MT 257, 4§ 14-17, 329 Mont. 63, 1§ 14-17, 122 P.3d 456, ¥§ 14-17; Stae v,
Weitzel, 2000 MI 86, 4 29, 299 Mont. 192, $29, 998 P.2d 1154, § 29. M.R. App. P.
12(1)() requires an appellant's opening brief to cite to authorities which support the
arguments presented on appeal

{13 The appellant bears the burden of establishing error by the trial court. See e.g. Inre
D-F., 2007 MI 147, 22, 337 Mont. 461, 22, 161 P.3d 825, 22; State v. Buck, 2006 MT
81, § 30, 331 Mont. $17, 4 30, 134 P.3d 53, $ 30; Rolison v. Bozeman Deaconess Health
Services, Inc. 2005 MT 95, 4 20, 326 Mont. 491, § 20, 111 P.34 202, 20. Gardiner has
failed to establish that the District Court's determination that he “opened the door”
constituted an abuse of discretion, For that reason, we do not reach Gardiner's other
contentions on appeal.

{14 With due respect to the dissenting and special concurring Justices, we are not

or even suggesting a new, more stringent briefing requirement, We realize itis

 

5
often true that no Montana authority directly on point exists, particularly as to fact-driven
issues such as the “opened the door” issue argued by Gardiner here and other strongly fact~
driven discretionary calls such as best interests of a child in dissolution cases. What we
‘expect of counsel in regard to such issues is that they analogize to or distinguish away from
existing cases; alternatively, parties present potentially persuasive authority from other
jurisdictions. In his opening brief, Gardiner’s counsel did nothing at all regarding cases
relating to “opening the door.”

{IS We conclude Gardiner has failed to establish that the District Court abused its

 

discretion in denying Gardiner's motion for a mistrial

16 Affirmed.

Chiet Jultice
We concur:

 

Tustice
Justice Patricia O. Cotter concurs
‘17 I concur with the Court's decision to affirm the District Court's denial of
Gardiner's motion for a mistrial. 1 do so because I would conclude that defense counsel
arguably “opened the door” by pressing the investigating officer—with an open and
incomprehensible question—about whether and why the defendant had once been
welcome in the victim's home but was no longer welcome. 1 write separately to state that
| disagree with the Court's rationale for affirming, and agree with the Dissent’s point that
Gardiner should not be faulted for failing to advance or distinguish legal authority for his
“opened the door” argument, The inguiry in such cases being wholly fact-driven, a

defendant should not be penalized with disregard of the merits of this issue for his failure

to provide the type of legal authority the Court requires here.

 
Justice James C. Nelson dissents.
{18 I dissent from the Court's decision.

$19 After conceding that Officer Kenneth Guy's responses to defense counsel's

 

questions included inadmissible other-crimes evidence in violation of M. R. Evid 404(b),
the Court disposes of Gardiner’s appeal by ruling that he did not advance authority
supporting his position that the District Court abused its diseretion in concluding that his
{questions “opened the door” to Officer Guy's answers, and that he did not distinguish any
of our “opened the door” cases. For this latter position, the Court “see” cites State v.
‘Smith, 2005 MT 18, § 15, 325 Mont. 374, | 15, 106 P.3d $53, 4 15, and State v. Harris,
1999 MT 115, 4 31, 294 Mont, 397, $31, 983 P.2d 881, 4 31; and “see also” cites State v.
Cesnik, 2005 MT 257, $4 14-17, 329 Mont. 63, $§ 14-17, 122 P.3d 456, $4 14-17, and

State v. Weitzel, 2000 MT 86, §29, 299 Mont. 192, § 29, 998 P.2d 1154, 429."

 

420. While this approach may be a facile way to avoid actually addressing and

resolving Gardiner's argument, I cannot agree with our disposing of this meritorious

  

appeal on that basis. Rather, the Court’s reliance on “implicit” authority, dicta, and
distinguishable case law, begs the question of what sort of direct” authority we expect

Gardiner to advance to demonstrate that he did not “open the door” to Officer Guy's

 

“See” cites are used in our opinions “when the cited authority (a) supports the stated
proposition implicitly or (6) contains dicta that support the proposition.” ALWD Citation
‘Manual 44,3 (3d ed, 2006) (hereafter ALWD). “See also” cites are used as support for the
proposition, but signal thatthe case is not as strong or direct as when no signal or “see” is used.
"See also” may be used “when the cited authority supports the point made, but is in some respect
distinguishable from previously cited cases.” ALWD 44:3

2 “Direct” authority is that which directly supports the stated proposition. ALIVD 44.22).

 

8
‘21 Either the questions defense counsel asked opened the door ot they did not. ‘This

‘is not a question upon which counsel can be expected to cite direct authority one way or

 

the other. If this Court expects Gardiner to somehow locate a case that ruled that his
Precise questions opened the door to the answers that Officer Guy gave, then we impose
‘upon him an impossible burden. 1 could find no such authority, and I challenge—in vain,
apparently—the Court to locate such a case, Moreover, if the Court expeets Gardiner to
distinguish from other “opened the door cases” his approach in seeking a mistrial and in
not requesting a curative instruction, then, as I will discuss infra, we impose upon him a
pointless burden,

‘122 Our task in this appeal is to determine whether the trial judge erred in ruling that
Gardiner’s questions opened the door to inadmissible testimony. ‘This determination, in
my view, involves a question of law ot mixed question of law and fact, which we review,

3

in either case, de novo.’ We can certainly make that decision without citing or

 

‘The question of whether a party has “opened the door” to certain testimony is not a matter of
discretion. Discretionary trial court rulings are ones which “encompass[] the power of choice
‘among several courses of action, each of which is considered permissible,” such as trial
‘administration issues, evidentiary rulings, and the scope of cross-examination. Steer, Inc, v
Department of Revenue, 245 Mont. 470, 475, 803 P.24 601, 603-04 (1990). The determination
that Gardiner did or did not “open the door” is nor a matter of choice. It is a matter of law or a
xed question of law and fact. See e.g, People v. Fabricio, 820 N.E.2d 863, 865 (N.Y. 2004)
‘Here, the sidebar conference focused on a pure question of law—whether defendant's
testimony ‘opened the door’ to the use of his prior inconsistent statement and whether the People
hhad a good faith basis to inquire about i."). In tum, the decision to allow the otherwise barred
testimony to be given is a matter of discretion. Once the trial court determines thatthe door has
been opened, it has discretion to let the testimony in or keep it out, I note that in Cesnit, we
‘concluded that “{s}ince Cesnik opened the door to the question of whether Sipe wanted Cesnik
‘banned from the club, testimonial evidence of certain phrases on Cesnik’s truck and clothing
‘were relevant to the jury's understanding of the strained relationship between the two men.”

   

 

 

 

   

9
 

distinguishing other “opened the door” cases—cither the District Court erred or it di not;
either defense counsel’s questions opened the door to inadmissible testimony or they did
not.

$23 I conclude that the questions at issue here required nothing more than “yes” or
“po” answers. ‘The questions were not open-ended and they did not require the sort of
narrative answer which Officer Guy gave. Indeed, Officer Guy's answers were not even
responsive to the questions asked, Based on the questions asked, the answers given, and
‘the fact that the witness was an experienced police officer who had been instructed by the
prosecutor not to mention the very other crimes evidence with which he gratuitously
supplemented his answer, I conclude that defense counsel's questions did not open the
door to Officer Guy's inadmissible testimony.

{24 On the matter of defense counsel's questions, the State goes to some length in
criticizing defense counsel's questions and questioning technique, and contends that he
should have asked leading questions on eross-examination and should have given Officer
Guy “verbal cues” as to how he was supposed to answer. I know of no statute or rule that
requires a particular form of question or questioning technique, the violation of which
compels the conclusion that the questioner “opens the door” to inadmissible testimony —

cither the question at issue required the witness to answer in an inappropriate manner or

 

‘not. ‘The words of the question actually used gover.

oo

Cesnik, $16. We stated that Cesnik opened the door—whether as a factual proposition, a legal
conclusion ora mixture ofthe two isnot clear—but certainly not as a matter of discretion.

 

10
 

25 Moreover, it is preposterous to suggest that Officer Guy—a trained and
experienced police officer who had been instructed by the prosecutor not to testify to

other-crimes evidence—needed “verbal cues” from defense counsel in order to avoid

 

disclosing impermissible testimony. In this regard, the record reflects that out of the
Presence of the jury and before Officer Guy was called to the stand, the matter of the
cthercrimes evidence was raised by the prosecutor and was discussed at length by the
Court, the prosecutor and defense counsel. (The discussion covers nearly four pages of
transcript.) It was the prosecutor's position that if defense counsel inquired of Officer
Guy “why” Gardiner was not interviewed by law enforcement, that would “open the door
to numerous other acts.” Defense counsel agreed that if he asked a “why” question that
‘would open the door to other-acts evidence. It was defense counsel's position, however,
that if he did not ask a “why” question, but simply asked Officer Guy “point blank” if
Gardiner was interviewed—ie., whether as a matter of fact there was or was not an
interview—that would not open the door to testimony regarding the reasons for there
being no interview. The court recognized the issue as a close call, but, nevertheless,
cautioned the prosecutor against “driv(ing] through a door” that defense counsel would
not have opened, The prosecutor stated she understood that. The trial judge then went
further and specifically admonished the prosecutor: “And your witnesses need to be
cautioned about volunteering supplemental answers” (emphasis added). In response, the
prosecutor assured the court: “They have been instructed that there's to be no mention of
prior assaults, the fact that he’s on probation, that this isa felony or partner assault, none

of that." Accordingly, on this record itis disingenuous for the State to argue that Officer
‘Guy needed “verbal cues” to avoid supplementing his answers to what were “yes” oF
“no” questions, with inadmissible testimony

426 The State then goes on to argue that Officer Guy's response was “within the
pounds of a normal response by a layman unversed in the intricacies of language and
correct legal procedure.” Officer Guy was not a “layman unversed in the intricacies of
language and correct legal procedure.” He was a trained police officer with 16 years
experience and he had been specifically instructed not to disclose the other crimes

 

ince, ‘That fact aside, it was Officer Guy's obligation as a police officer and as an

officer of the court! to respect Gardiner’s right to a fair trial and to avo

   

disclosing the

inadmissible evidence. Because police officers hold positions of

 

“great public tus,”
Bozeman Daily Chronicle v. Police Dept, 260 Mont. 218, 227, 859 P.2d 435, 440-41
(1993), we impose upon them stricter standards of conduct in the performance of their

official duties than we do on “laymfe}n unversed in the intrica

 

ss of language and

correct legal procedure.” For example, we have stated:

{A police officer's legal obligation, however, extends far beyond that of his
‘or her fellow citizens: the officer not only is required to respect the rights of
‘other citizens, but is sworn to protect and defend those rights. In order to
discharge that considerable responsibility, he or she is vested with
extraordinary authority. Consequently, when a law enforcement officer,
acting with the apparent imprimatur of the state, not only fails to protect a
citizen's rights but affirmatively violates those rights, it is manifest that
such an abuse of authority, with its concomitant breach of trust i likely to
have a different, and even more harmful, emotional and psychological
effect on the aggrieved citizen than that resulting from the tortious conduct
of a private citizen.

 

 

 

 

 

“Typically, a pol

officer is considered an “officer of the court.” Black's Law Dictionary 1114
(7th ed. 1999).

2
Dorwartv. Caraway, 2002 MT 240, § 43, 312 Mont. 1, 443, 58 P.3d 128, $43 (quoting
Binet v. Sabo, 710 A.24 688, 698 (Conn, 1998),

$27 Therefore, I cannot agree that Gardiner can be faulted when his counsel asked
specific questions that called for “yes” or “no” answers, only to receive completely
Uunresponsive and improper answers from Orficer Guy to the questions asked,

‘P8 _Finally, the State—and apparently this Court—faults Gardiner for not moving to

 

strike the offending’ testimony or request a cautionary instruction. ‘The State cites State v.
Conrad, 241 Mont. 1, 785 P.2d 185 (1990); State v. Long, 2005 MT 130, 327 Mont. 238,
113 P.3d 290; and State v. Henderson, 2005 MT 333, 330 Mont. 34, 125 P.34 1132. In
Conrad, the inadmissible other-crimes evidence was struck and the jury admonished to

disregard it, The opinion is silent on whether there was a motion to strike or for a

 

curative instruction. Conrad, 241 Mont. at 9, 785 P.2d at 190. Similarly, in Long, in
response to an unintentional mention of other crimes evidence (Long, $4 19, 26) to which
defense counsel objected (Long, $917, 26), the trial court gave a curative instruction
(Long, § 26). Again, the opinion is silent as to whether defense counsel moved to strike
or for a cautionary instruction, Defense counsel did move for a mistrial outside the
presence of the jury (Long ${ 17, 18) which was denied (Long. $26). In Henderson,
defense counsel did not object to the offending testimony. Henderson, 412. We stated
in Henderson that if counsel believed that the testimony at issue was inadmissible he

should have moved to strike or for a limiting instruction. Henderson, § 13. For that

proposition, we cited M. R. Evid. 103, and Long, $25. Rule 103 provides that error may
not be predicated upon a ruling which admits evidence unless a substantial right of the
party is affected and a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, Rule 103
imposes no requirement that counsel move to strike after making an objection. Either an
objection or a motion to strike suffices, Our citation to Long, § 25, does not establish a
different rule, As discussed infra, these authorities are simply a red herring, Defense
counsel did preserve his objection, and a motion to strike or for a curative instruction
‘would have been pointless.

29 Ina similar vein, but without analysis, the Court “see” cites Smith, There we

criticized defense counsel's failure to ask for a curative instruction and for thus

 

compounding the district court's error in admitting improper testimony. Smith, 415. Tn

Harris, we concluded that the accused waived his claim that the testimony was admitted

 

in error by failing to object. Harris, 4 31. The Court “see also” cites Cesnik. In that
cease—and unlike the instant case—we actually addressed the merits of Cesnik’s claim
that the court improperly admitted irrelevant and inflammatory testimony in cross-
examination because defense counsel “broached” the subject on direct examination. We
concluded that the court properly allowed the testimony as relevant evidence. Cesnik,
$414-17. Finally, the Court “see also” cites Weitzel. There again, we addressed the
merits of the “opened the door” testimony, concluding that Weitzel’s testimony on direct
examination clearly opened the door to the State for follow-up testimony on Weitzel's
history of gun ownership. Weitzel, $29.

30 As already noted, none of the State’s or the Court's authorities diretly compel the

conclusion that Gardiner opened the door to Officer Guy's inadmissible testimony. That

4
'Sthe elemental issue which we refuse to resolve. Iisa legal or factuaVlegal question
‘that must be resolved in the affirmative or negative based on the language of the question
asked,

‘31 To the extent thatthe State's and the Couns authorities sand for the proposition
that defense counsel should have objected to the inadmissible testimony, the record
reflects that counsel fulfilled that obligation by moving for a mistrial. Immediately
‘ollowing Officer Guy's improper testimony, defense counsel called for 8 sidebar and,

outside the presence of the jury, moved for a mistrial based on Officer Guy's non-

 

'8 argument on that motion, the trial court denied the

“a required todo. In response to Officer Guy's improper testimony, counsel moved for
‘mistrial outside the presence of the jury-—preisely what counsel did in Long. Long, $9
17,18; Thus, under Long, Gardner's objection was preserved as a mater of record inthe
‘ral cout. Defense counsel raised the objection by way of a motion for mistrial and the
trial court denied it.

‘$32 Ithe State's andthe Court's authorities are cited for the proposition that defense
Sounsel should have asked for a curative instruction, that is not a requirement here.
Having denied Gardiner’s motion fora mistrial, and having concluded that Officer Guy's
testimony was admissible, the court could hardly have been expected to then instruct the

5m to disregard the testimony orto view it with caution, On these fats a request fora
curative instruction by defense counsel would have been pointless, if not outright
contemptuous ofthe trial judge's evidentiary ruling.

433. For the above reasons, there was no obligation for defense ‘counsel on appeal to
site or distinguish “opened the door” eases asthe Court contends, Gardine's objection
to the offending testimony was preserved as a matter of record in the trial court in
accordance with our jurisprudence, and defense counsel properly raised and argued on
appeal the merits ofthe elemental questions we refuse addres Whether the trial court
ced in concluding that defense counsels questions “opened the door’ to Officer Guy's
inadmissible answers, and whether the court abused its dsretion in denying Gandiner’s
motion for mistrial

4634 In dsterminng that counsel failed to cite and distinguish other “opened the door”
cases, the Court imposes on counsel an impossible burden on the one hand—there are 09
cases interpreting the questions asked and the answers given here—and @ pointless
burden on the other-—Defense Counsel properly preserved his objection to OMTeer Guy's

testimony in the tral court and raised and argued

 

‘objection on appeal. Other “opened

 

the door” cases are irclevant on the merits of this issue, ither defense counsel's
questions opened the door or they did not. Bither the tial court erred in ruling Officer
Guy's tesimony admissible, or it didnot, The issue heres straightforward and properly
before us. We err in refusing to address the merits ofthis appeal

485. Finally, where there is a reasonable possibilty that inadmissible evidence might
have contributed tothe conviction, a mistrial is appropriate, State v. Partin, 287 Mont

12, 18, 951 P24 1002, 1005 (1997) (citing Staev, Walker, 280 Mont, 346, 383,930 P 24

16
—————

6 64 (1996). 1 conclude that, here, there was 4 reasonable possibility that Officer
0's improper tesimony contributed to Gadine’s conviction and that, as a result,
Gardiner was denied a fair til,

"86 I would hold thatthe District Court ‘rred in determining that defense counsel

‘motion for a mistrial,

B7 I dissent

~ dubtice

“ustice W. William Leaphar joins inthe Dissent of Justice James C. Nelson,

Mihi. ipl

7