Title: P. v. Gutierrez

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

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Filed 8/15/02 (reposted  -- publishers use this version) 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
 ) 
 
 
 ) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
 ) 
 
 
 ) 
S018634 
 
v. 
 ) 
 
 
 ) 
San Bernardino County 
ISAAC GUTIERREZ, JR., 
 ) 
Super. Ct. No. VCR 3799 
 
 
 ) 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 ) 
 
 
 ) 
 
A jury convicted defendant Isaac Gutierrez, Jr., of the first degree murders of 
Billie Faye Jones and John Stopher (Pen. Code, § 187),1 first degree residential 
burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (a)), kidnapping of Rose V. (§ 207, subd. (a)), aiding and 
abetting the forcible rape of Rose V. (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)), and the attempted murder 
of Police Officer David Dunavent (§§ 664, 187).  Multiple-murder and lying-in-wait 
special circumstances (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3) and (15)) were found true; the latter in 
connection with the murder of Stopher.  The jury further found that defendant 
personally used a deadly weapon in the murders of Jones (garrote) and Stopher 
(shotgun), the kidnapping and forcible rape of Rose V. (shotgun), and the attempted 
murder of Officer Dunavent (handgun).  (§ 12022, subd. (b).)  After a penalty trial 
the jury returned a verdict of death.  The trial court denied the automatic motion to 
                                                 
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
indicated. 
 
 
2
modify penalty (§ 190.4, subd. (e)) and imposed the death sentence.2  This appeal is 
automatic.  (§ 1239.) 
Finding no prejudicial error, we affirm the convictions and judgment of death 
in their entirety. 
I.  FACTS 
A.  Guilt Phase 
1.  Prosecution evidence 
In August 1984, defendant was convicted in Kern County of assault with a 
deadly weapon (vehicle) on a peace officer and sentenced to state prison for four 
years.  At that time he was married to Rose V., his second wife, and they had a five-
year-old daughter.  They owned a house located on Montrose Street in Hesperia. 
In June 1985, while defendant was in prison, Rose V. met John Stopher, who 
soon moved in with her at the Montrose Street house.  Stopher, age 25, was a female 
who had been receiving large amounts of testosterone since age 18.  Stopher had a 
full-face dark beard, no breast development, and female genitalia.  In November or 
December 1985, Rose V. advised defendant that she was living with her boyfriend, 
i.e., Stopher, and that she was going to divorce him.  Defendant was angry, told 
Rose V. he was going to kill Stopher, and wrote her a letter memorializing his 
threats.  Rose V. filed for dissolution of marriage in April 1986. 
In August 1986, defendant was released from prison on parole.  In October 
1986, he moved into the Bakersfield home of his sister and his brother-in-law, 
Henry Lostaunau, a former police officer.  While in prison, defendant had 
communicated with Billie Faye Jones, a 41-year-old single mother who worked as a 
medical clerk at Kern County General Hospital and lived with her mother and two 
                                                 
2  
Defendant also received an aggregate determinate state prison term of 25 
years for the remaining convictions. 
 
 
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sons.  On October 30, 1986, Jones told her mother she was having dinner with 
defendant that evening and would also be seeing him again the following day, which 
was Halloween.  On the morning of October 31, Jones drove her 6-year-old son to 
school, returned home, left again in her van around 1:00 p.m. to run some errands, 
and never returned. 
Approximately 3:00 p.m. on the afternoon of October 31, defendant told 
Lostaunau he was going to Montgomery Ward and would need a ride home.  
Lostaunau went to pick up defendant at the arranged location, waited for over an 
hour, then returned home alone.  Defendant testified the plan was a ruse to get 
Lostaunau out of the house so that he could take firearms, which were kept in the 
home, without Lostaunau’s knowledge. 
Defendant has a son, Joseph, from his first marriage, who was 15 years old at 
the time in question.  On the afternoon of October 31, defendant picked up Joseph at 
the Greyhound bus station in Billie Faye Jones’s van.  Defendant testified he forced 
Joseph to accompany him.  They stopped briefly at the Lostaunau home to pick up 
guns and then drove to Hesperia, defendant telling Joseph he had “a little something 
to take care of” concerning his wife, Rose V.  They arrived at the house on Montrose 
Street, drove past it more than once, then parked on a street atop a nearby hill and 
waited for Rose V. and Stopher to return home.  Around 9:00 to 9:30 p.m., a member 
of the Hesperia Fire Department approached defendant and Joseph, who were seated 
in the parked van, questioned them briefly regarding a report of children setting off 
firecrackers in the area, then departed.  Shortly thereafter Rose V. and Stopher 
returned home.  Stopher went to take a shower in the master bathroom. 
Defendant and Joseph put on Halloween costumes consisting of rubber masks 
and capes that defendant had brought along.  Defendant put a .380 automatic pistol 
and a derringer in his jacket pockets, both of which he had taken from Lostaunau’s 
residence, and also concealed a shotgun under his cape. 
 
 
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According to defendant’s testimony,3 before he parked Jones’s van outside 
Rose V.’s house he had not told Joseph what his intentions were regarding his 
planned contact with V. and Stopher.  Defendant testified he threatened Joseph with a 
gun and ordered him to enter the home and assist him with whatever he was going to 
do inside.  Joseph told defendant, “Dad, I don’t want to do this.  I don’t want to be 
involved in it.”  Defendant struck Joseph in the head when he at first refused to enter 
the house. 
Rose V. testified that when she answered the doorbell defendant and Joseph 
shoved open the door and pushed her to the floor.  Defendant’s mask flew off.  
Rose V. thought defendant had a “rifle,” although she testified she did not know the 
difference between a rifle and a shotgun.  Joseph, wearing a Halloween mask, placed 
a handgun to Rose V.’s head.  When Rose V. screamed to warn Stopher, she was 
ordered to shut up.  Joseph stayed in the living room watching Rose V. with the 
handgun while defendant forced his way through the locked door of the bathroom and 
fatally shot Stopher with the 12-gauge shotgun.  Expert medical testimony 
established that Stopher was killed by a shotgun blast to the face and head that left 
brain tissue spattered about the shower stall.  Defendant fired four or five additional 
shotgun blasts into Stopher’s chest, abdomen and left arm. 
Defendant and Joseph dragged Rose V. out of the house and forced her into 
Jones’s van, hitting her in the head with a gun.  Defendant told Rose V., “your 
boyfriend back there, he’s gone; we blew him away.”  Defendant drove south toward 
the freeway while Joseph held a gun to Rose V.’s head.  Defendant told her to shut up 
and threatened that Joseph would cut her if she did not cooperate.  At defendant’s 
                                                 
3  
Portions of defendant’s testimony from Joseph’s juvenile court hearing on 
charges stemming from these crimes were read into the record at defendant’s trial.  
Defendant was called as a witness by the minor at those proceedings. 
 
 
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direction Joseph took some ropes, tied Rose V.’s hands behind her back, tied her 
ankles, blindfolded, and gagged her. 
Defendant drove south on Interstate 15 toward San Bernardino.  Although 
Rose V. knew Joseph, she did not realize he was the assailant accompanying 
defendant; at first he was wearing a Halloween mask, and thereafter she was 
blindfolded.  Using a knife, Joseph cut off her bra.  When he was unable to remove 
her pants, he cut the rope that was tying her, slicing a half-inch cut in her ankle.  
Joseph proceeded to rape Rose V.  When he was finished, defendant told him to 
make sure Rose V. could breathe and to keep her covered with a sheet. 
Nearing Coachella, defendant got off the freeway and stopped for gas.  Joseph 
took a gas can from the rear of the van and passed it out to defendant; as it was being 
placed back in the van some of the gas dripped on Rose V.’s face.  During the stop 
Rose V. also felt a finger being inserted into her vagina.  She was unable to tell who 
did this to her.  Defendant drove away from the gas station and was stopped by police 
a short time thereafter. 
Coachella Police Officer David Dunavent testified that shortly after midnight 
on November 1, 1986, he stopped defendant for driving with a headlight out.  
Defendant got out of the van and spoke with the officer at the rear of the vehicle.  He 
could not produce his drivers license or registration.  Officer Dunavent looked into a 
bubble window on the side of the van and saw someone looking out at him.  At that 
moment defendant placed a handgun to the back of Officer Dunavent’s neck.  Officer 
Dunavent heard a click, which he recognized as the sound of a gun dry firing on an 
empty chamber.  The officer turned and ordered defendant to halt or freeze and to 
drop the weapon.  Defendant fired a round at Officer Dunavent and a gun battle 
ensued.  The officer managed to radio for a backup while taking cover behind the 
patrol unit.  At one point Joseph exited from the van wielding a rifle or shotgun.  
Ultimately, defendant was wounded by a single bullet; neither Officer Dunavent nor 
 
 
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Joseph was hit during the exchange of gunfire.  Other police officers arrived and 
arrested defendant and his son. 
Inside the van, Rose V. managed to free her hands, remove the gag and call out 
to the police for help.  Police recovered three weapons from the ground in the area 
of Jones’s van.  The 12-gauge shotgun and Lostaunau’s .380 automatic pistol were 
near the front of the van; Lostaunau’s derringer was found at the rear of the vehicle. 
During the early morning hours of November 1, 1986, defendant was 
contacted by Coachella Police Detective Pete Yanez in the X-ray room of John F. 
Kennedy Memorial Hospital.  Defendant greeted Detective Yanez, whom he knew 
when he (defendant) had worked as a fireman at the Mecca fire station and Yanez was 
a Riverside deputy sheriff.  Yanez, who was in civilian clothes, told defendant he was 
a police officer and was there to administer a gun residue kit.  Defendant stated to 
Yanez, “Oh, God.  Oh, God.  I didn’t mean to kill both of them.  Oh, what did I do?  
Did I kill them?  Tell the officer I’m sorry.  Tell him I’m sorry.”  Detective Yanez, 
who was investigating the officer-related shooting, was not aware of defendant’s 
involvement in any murders. 
Following the arrest of defendant and his son, and the rescue of Rose V., 
Coachella police officers made a cursory search of the interior of Jones’s van.  
Possession of the vehicle was transferred to the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s 
Department, and it was towed to their storage facility in San Bernardino.  Two days 
later, on November 3, 1986, Detective Gary Stroup went to the storage facility after 
receiving information that Jones was the owner of the van and that she was missing.  
As he approached the door to the storage unit, Detective Stroup smelled a strong 
odor of decomposing flesh.  Reddish brown body fluids were seeping from the van, 
forming a puddle underneath the vehicle.  Detective Stroup entered the van, and after 
removing a footlocker and a duffel bag, found Jones’s body wrapped in a rug on the 
rear bench seat. 
 
 
7
Jones had been strangled with a ligature garrote that was still wrapped around 
her neck.  Her body was in an advanced state of decomposition.  The wooden handles 
of the garrote were behind Jones’s neck, indicating she was strangled from behind.  
She had been killed sometime in the afternoon or early evening of October 31, 
1986. 
The ends of the garrote were made of wooden doweling.  A criminalist 
compared the garrote handles to pieces of doweling found in Lostaunau’s 
Bakersfield residence where defendant had been staying, and it was determined they 
had come from the same piece of wood. 
A full search of the van pursuant to warrant was conducted on the night of 
November 3, 1986.  A Remington 308 rifle was recovered from under the seat 
where Jones’s body was found.  Also recovered from the van were a package of .380 
ammunition, a package of 308 Winchester ammunition, and a package of Winchester 
12-gauge shotgun shells.  A manila envelope containing notes was found in a suitcase 
inside the van.  On the back of the envelope were numerous notations, one of which 
included the words “make garrote.”  V. identified the handwriting as that of 
defendant.4  The notes also included the following entries:  “Mon. call Rose, Wed. 
gather all necessities, lic. plates off comm van, wig spook/Halloween store, wig 
shop, call/Billy dinner, make garrote.  Friday rendezvous w/J 1300 Greyhound.”  
Defendant also wrote the following:  “Deadlines:  Call Billy 3:00, J- 5:00, ETA 5 
PM Get to VV, *Call Don Oakes for closing time, carpet . . . gas cans . . . shovels.” 
2.  Defense 
Defendant denied killing Billie Faye Jones.  He claimed he found her in her 
van on the afternoon of October 31, 1986, already dead with the garrote tied around 
her neck.  He admitted killing Stopher with a shotgun; his defense to the murder was 
                                                 
4  
At the juvenile proceeding against Joseph, defendant admitted he wrote the 
three pages of notes in the manila envelope seized from Jones’s van. 
 
 
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that he became enraged when he confirmed his suspicions that John Stopher was a 
female.  Defendant further claimed he was intoxicated, had brain damage, and acted 
in accordance with a Hispanic code of conduct that required him to protect females 
in his family.  He repudiated his earlier incriminating testimony at Joseph’s juvenile 
court hearing, claiming he lied in that proceeding to protect his son. 
Defendant testified in his own behalf.  In 1983, he was fired for a second time 
from his long-standing job as a fireman with the State Department of Forestry as a 
result of his drinking problems.  In 1984, during a stop for drunk driving, defendant 
sought to evade arrest and led officers on a high-speed chase.  He was convicted by 
guilty plea of assault with a deadly weapon (vehicle) on a peace officer and 
sentenced to four years in prison. 
While in prison, defendant received a letter from Rose V. telling him she was 
considering a divorce.  He testified he felt it was “like the end of my life.”  
Thereafter, defendant was served with a summons for dissolution of marriage and a 
restraining order.  He was ordered to stay away from the Montrose Street residence 
and was prohibited from visiting his wife or daughter.  While in prison he telephoned 
home once and a male voice answered; it was then that defendant learned someone 
else was living with his wife and daughter.  Defendant became very hostile during the 
call, both he and Stopher threatening one another with harm. 
Defendant was released from prison nine months later, in August 1986.  He 
claimed Stopher threatened him and warned, “You come around my house, I’ll blow 
your fucking head off.”  Defendant believed he was talking to a man.  Stopher refused 
him permission to visit his daughter and told him they did not want him calling 
anymore.  Stopher also said he had a shotgun and if defendant came to the house, he 
would use the weapon on defendant.  Defendant testified that as of October 1986, he 
felt tormented, confused, angry, and admittedly began harboring feelings of violence 
toward Stopher.  He decided to go to Hesperia to find out about Stopher and to talk 
 
 
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to his daughter.  One week before he made the trip, he became outraged after 
speaking with his daughter, who indicated Stopher wanted her to call him “Dad.”  He 
came up with a plan to confront Stopher, fully aware that his planned actions would 
violate the terms of his parole and the restraining order. 
Defendant testified that he had had a relationship with Billy Faye Jones 
before he went to prison, and had corresponded with her from prison on a regular 
basis.  Shortly before the trip to Hesperia he told Jones he was leaving Bakersfield 
and she agreed to take him and his belongings to Victorville, where he claimed he 
had a truck at his sister’s house.  He testified Jones owed a large amount of money 
for drugs and was afraid for her life.  He claimed she asked him to protect her when 
she met with one of her drug dealers on October 30 at the Rancho Bakersfield Motel 
to try to purchase a large amount of cocaine.  She was afraid because they had 
threatened her before. 
Defendant claimed he took a .380 automatic handgun and a 12-gauge shotgun 
from his brother-in-law Lostaunau’s home, where he was staying, in order to protect 
Jones.  He testified Jones purchased the ammunition for the weapons.  On the night 
of October 30, he and Jones went to a motel in Bakersfield to meet her drug dealer.  
He gave Jones $500 for use in the transaction and was to receive some of the drugs 
in return.  The rendezvous was ultimately called off, although defendant briefly met 
one of the intermediaries, “Pablo.”  Defendant claimed Jones and Pablo drove him to 
see his son Joseph at the home of his first wife, Joseph’s mother.  Jones then 
dropped defendant off at the motel and asked him to spend the night there, saying she 
would contact him the next day.  Defendant spent the night alone in the motel room, 
drinking and taking methamphetamine that Jones had given him. 
Defendant denied any complicity in Jones’s murder.  He spoke with Jones 
over the telephone the next morning, October 31, and she was all right.  Later in the 
afternoon, however, he saw Jones’s van parked in the motel parking lot.  He 
 
 
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approached the vehicle and saw the driver’s door open and the keys in the ignition.  
He sat down in the van, looked into the back and saw Jones’s body with a garrote tied 
around her neck.  Defendant admitted he had made the garrote, but he claimed he had 
done so at Jones’s request because “she thought she might need it later on down the 
line.” 
Defendant moved Jones’s body to the bench-type seat in the rear of the van 
and covered her up.  Some of his personal belongings that were in the van—a 
footlocker, a chest and some papers—appeared to have been searched.  Defendant 
“freaked out” and felt he had to get away from there.  He did not call the police out 
of fear he would immediately be blamed for Jones’s death, and also because he was 
obsessed with going to Hesperia to confront Stopher and find out what was going on 
in Rose V.’s home. 
Defendant drove Jones’s van to the Greyhound bus terminal to pick up his son 
Joseph, then picked up his belongings and other weapons at his brother-in-law’s 
house.  He admitted using a ruse to get Lostaunau out of the house so that he could 
take weapons, including a .22-caliber rifle and a .22-caliber derringer, from the 
residence.  Defendant was concerned about Lostaunau since he was an ex-police 
officer and was aware of defendant’s parole status. 
Defendant drove to Hesperia in the company of his son with Jones’s body 
secreted in the rear of her van.  He brought Halloween masks to use as a ruse to gain 
entry into Rose V.’s house.  He claimed he was drinking beer and scotch while en 
route.  He recounted the brief encounter with a member of the Hesperia Fire 
Department while parked in the van in the vicinity of Rose V.’s house.  He claimed 
he was in an angry rage when he barged through the front door wielding a shotgun, 
broke down the locked master bathroom door, and observed Stopher in the shower.  
Defendant testified, “I saw a person that appeared to be a man with no penis or 
testicles screaming at me, telling me to get the fuck out of his house, threatening 
 
 
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me; and I had a shotgun in my hand.”  Defendant admitted he killed Stopher with the 
shotgun, stating he did so because Stopher “took his wife.”  He then “grabbed” 
Rose V. and ran out of the house to the van.  When asked why he grabbed Rose V. and 
forced her to accompany him, defendant testified, “I don’t know.  I—I have thought 
about that.  I wanted to talk to her.  I don’t know.” 
Defendant recounted the events of the return trip.  He testified he never 
forced his son to rape Rose V.  He admitted he had so testified at Joseph’s trial in 
juvenile court, but claimed he had lied in that proceeding to protect his son.  He 
recollected how he was stopped by Coachella Police Officer Dunavent 
approximately 10 miles outside the city of Mecca.  He testified he did not intend to 
kill Officer Dunavent, and did not have a gun in his hand when he got out of the van to 
confront the officer.  When asked if he put a gun to the officer’s head, defendant 
replied, “I don’t remember that.  No.”  Defendant admitted having the .380 pistol in 
hand by the time he attempted to run.  He claimed he only fired his weapon at 
Officer Dunavent after the officer drew his service revolver first and shot him in the 
leg. 
Anthropologist Michael Winkelman, who specializes in cross-cultural 
relations between Hispanic- and Anglo-Americans, testified that the Mexican-
American subculture in the United States is characterized by an extreme emphasis on 
the importance of the extended family and protecting the family’s honor.  According 
to Winkelman, defense of the family’s honor might require a man to take aggressive 
or even violent action, and such acts would be viewed as honorable regardless of how 
they are viewed under the law.  Winkelman testified that the Mexican-American 
subculture views homosexuality in the lowest of terms, lesbianism as particularly 
abhorrent, and divorce as unacceptable.  He would expect a response of outrage from 
an imprisoned Mexican-American male who learns his wife is involved in a lesbian 
relationship and is divorcing him. 
 
 
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Dr. Arnold Purisch, a clinical psychologist, testified that brain scans 
performed on defendant two to three years after the murders revealed he suffered 
from lesions in the frontal lobes of the brain.  The effects of stress, alcohol, and 
drugs on such lesions could lead to a condition known as “conditional neurological 
lesion.”  A person with damage to his frontal lobes would have somewhat intact 
intelligence but difficulty with his behavior in unstructured or unfamiliar situations, 
or when required to think on his feet. 
3. Rebuttal 
Detective Gary Stroup, who first discovered Jones’s body in the van, testified 
he contacted defendant in the hospital to ask him about the vehicle.  Defendant told 
Detective Stroup he had rented the van from someone named “Edwin,” and that he did 
not know the whereabouts of the owner of the van. 
B.  Penalty Phase 
1.  Prosecution evidence 
It was stipulated that all the evidence introduced in the guilt phase could be 
considered by the jury in deliberation of penalty.  The prosecution additionally 
presented evidence of the circumstances underlying defendant’s prior conviction of 
assault with a deadly weapon (vehicle) on a peace officer, and his possession of 
razor blades while in jail.  (§ 190.3, factor (b).)  During the drunk-driving incident 
that led to the assault conviction, defendant sought to evade arrest by leading six to 
10 Bakersfield police units on a high-speed chase; he attempted to run over two 
officers on foot and rammed his vehicle into one of the patrol cars.  At the time of 
the jail search that led to the discovery of the razor blades, defendant threatened jail 
deputies with the statement, “I’m going to get the gas chamber and before I leave 
here, I’m going to take out a deputy.” 
 
 
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2.  Defense evidence 
Officer Rodney Johnson was involved in the pursuit and arrest of defendant 
during the prior drunk-driving and assault incident.  Officer Johnson testified 
defendant was extremely intoxicated at the time of his arrest. 
Defendant’s mother testified that defendant spoke only Spanish during his 
early years of school and was teased by the White students.  Defendant quit school 
to join the marines at age 16.  Defendant’s brother testified that defendant was 
deployed to Cuba during the Cuban missile crisis and received various military 
awards.  Both defendant’s brother and sister asked for his life to be spared.  
Lawrence Biedebach testified that defendant offered to serve as a witness on his 
behalf, when no one else would come forward, in a matter involving an assault by five 
police officers on Biedebach.  Rodney Zenk participated in an alcohol rehabilitation 
program together with defendant and believed defendant could serve society by 
working with prison inmates on alcoholism issues.  Annabelle Hood recalled an 
incident when defendant’s ex-wife rescued Hood’s baby daughter from a near 
drowning and defendant performed CPR on the child. 
Jerry Enomoto, a former director of the California Department of 
Corrections, testified for the defense as an “independent consultant on correctional 
matters.”  Enomoto testified defendant told him he kept the razor blades in jail to cut 
a fungus condition he had on his hands, and “to sharpen pencils or cut things,” but not 
for use as weapons.  Enomoto reviewed various documents from defendant’s central 
file and testified there was nothing to indicate any history of violence during his 
institutional confinement.  Enomoto believed defendant would get along well in a 
“level IV” institutional placement, albeit the highest level of security in the prison 
system.  Enomoto also testified about two letters in evidence that defendant wrote to 
other inmates in which he related that a prison deputy had allegedly been disciplined 
for violating his and other inmates’ civil rights.  Defendant wrote, “he [the deputy] 
 
 
14
might go to jail, so I might kill again.”  Enomoto discussed the statements in the 
letters with defendant, who explained there was “no meaning behind it except anger.” 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Pretrial/Jury Selection Issues 
1.  Territorial jurisdiction/vicinage 
Defendant argues the San Bernardino County Superior Court lacked 
territorial jurisdiction to try him for the murder of Billie Faye Jones (count I), and 
for the attempted murder of Officer Dunavent (count VII).  He urges that because 
Jones’s murder took place in Kern County, only that county had territorial 
jurisdiction over the crime, and even if Jones’s murder could instead be tried in the 
county where her body was found, the proper jurisdiction would be Riverside 
County, where Jones’s van was first seized upon defendant’s arrest.  Defendant 
argues that only Riverside County had territorial jurisdiction over the crime of 
attempted murder of Officer Dunavent because that is the county in which the 
shootout with Officer Dunavent took place. 
Section 790, subdivision (a) provides, in pertinent part, “The jurisdiction of a 
criminal action for murder or manslaughter is in the county where the fatal injury 
was inflicted or in the county in which the injured party died or in the county in 
which his . . . body was found . . . .”  (Italics added.)  The amended information 
alleged that San Bernardino County had territorial jurisdiction over Jones’s murder 
because her body was found in that county within the meaning of section 790.  The 
magistrate at the preliminary hearing made an express finding that San Bernardino 
County had jurisdiction over Jones’s murder pursuant to section 790.  In opposing 
defendant’s first motion to dismiss count I of the information in the trial court, the 
prosecutor argued that since Jones’s body was first discovered in San Bernardino 
County concealed in the back of the van at the sheriff’s storage facility, that county 
 
 
15
had jurisdiction over her murder pursuant to section 790.  He argued further that 
while defendant claimed Jones’s murder occurred in Kern County—where he 
allegedly discovered her strangled in the van on the afternoon of October 31, 1986, 
and in which county she was last seen alive—there was no direct evidence at the 
preliminary hearing to establish with certainty where Jones had been killed. 
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss count I, finding there was 
sufficient evidence to support the magistrate’s ruling that San Bernardino County had 
jurisdiction over the Jones murder.  The court specifically found the evidence did 
not conclusively establish where Jones was killed, and that Jones’s body had been 
found in San Bernardino County, two to three days after the van had been impounded 
in that county’s sheriff’s storage facility.  A second motion to dismiss was brought 
on the same grounds after a substitution of counsel per People v. Marsden (1970) 2 
Cal.3d 118; the trial court again denied the motion. 
These rulings were correct.  Whether jurisdiction was proper was a question 
of fact which the prosecution had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  (People v. Cavanaugh (1955) 44 Cal.2d 252, 262.)  On review, a trial 
court’s determination of territorial jurisdiction will be upheld as long as there is 
“some evidence” to support its holding.  (People v. Kellett (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 
949, 956; People v. Tabucchi (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 133, 141.)  Here, the evidence 
established that Jones’s body was found in San Bernardino County, in a decomposed 
state and concealed inside her van, which had been impounded by police in Riverside 
County and towed to the San Bernardino storage facility several days earlier.  Under 
a plain reading of the word found as used in section 790, both the magistrate and the 
trial court properly rejected defendant’s claim that because police first seized the 
van in Riverside County, they had “found” Jones’s body in that county. 
The trial court also properly found that San Bernardino County had territorial 
jurisdiction over the attempted murder of Officer Dunavent (count VII) pursuant to 
 
 
16
section 781.  Section 781 provides, “When a public offense is committed in part in 
one jurisdictional territory and in part in another, or the acts or effects thereof 
constituting or requisite to the consummation of the offense occur in two or more 
jurisdictional territories, the jurisdiction of such offense is in any competent court 
within either jurisdictional territory.”  (Italics added.) 
The amended information alleged that the attempted murder of Officer 
Dunavent occurred in Riverside County, but that San Bernardino County had 
territorial jurisdiction over the offense because (1) the acts or effects of the 
attempted murder were requisite to the consummation of the other crimes charged, 
within the meaning of section 781, and (2) acts preliminary to and connected to the 
crime occurred in San Bernardino County, within the meaning of section 781.  The 
magistrate at the preliminary hearing made an express finding that San Bernardino 
County had jurisdiction over the attempted murder of Officer Dunavent pursuant to 
section 781.  In opposing defendant’s first motion to dismiss the information, the 
prosecutor argued defendant attempted to murder Officer Dunavent in Riverside 
County in order to avoid detection and apprehension for the kidnapping of Rose V., 
which crime commenced in San Bernardino County and was ongoing, with Rose V. 
bound and gagged in the van, as she was transported through Riverside County. 
In denying the first motion to dismiss count VII, the trial court found there 
was sufficient evidence to support the magistrate’s ruling that San Bernardino 
County had jurisdiction over the attempted murder of Officer Dunavent.  The court 
specifically found that the attempted murder was “requisite to the consummation of” 
Rose V.’s kidnapping.  The trial court reiterated its ruling in denying the second 
motion to dismiss count VII. 
These rulings were correct.  The holding in People v. Bismillah (1989) 208 
Cal.App.3d 80, 85, is instructive:  “Section 781 constitutes an exception to the rule 
when acts or effects of an offense occur in multiple counties.  Section 781 is 
 
 
17
remedial and, thus, we construe the statute liberally to achieve its purpose of 
expanding criminal jurisdiction beyond rigid common law limits.  [Citations.]  We 
therefore interpret section 781 in a commonsense manner with proper regard for the 
facts and circumstances of the case rather than technical niceties.  [Citation.]  [¶] 
Courts have construed the phrase ‘requisite to the consummation of the offense’ to 
mean requisite to achieving the offender’s unlawful purpose.  [Citation.]  Pursuant to 
this interpretation, venue is proper in a county where only preliminary arrangements 
or acts leading to commission of the crime occur, even though such acts are not 
essential elements of the charged offense.”  (Fn. omitted; see also People v. Kellett, 
supra, 134 Cal.App.3d at p. 956; People v. Tabucchi, supra, 64 Cal.App.3d at 
p. 140.) 
Here, defendant attempted to kill Officer Dunavent to avoid detection and 
arrest for the ongoing kidnapping of Rose V. that was initiated in her home where 
Stopher was killed in San Bernardino County.  Contrary to defendant’s claim, the fact 
that his attempted murder of Officer Dunavent took place in Riverside County is not 
dispositive, nor is it relevant that Officer Dunavent was not investigating the rape and 
kidnapping of Rose V., or that he had stopped defendant for an unrelated traffic 
infraction moments before the shootout.  Defendant’s attempted murder of Officer 
Dunavent to thwart detection and arrest was “requisite to the consummation of the 
[ongoing kidnapping].”  (§ 781.)  Since the kidnapping commenced in San Bernardino 
County, that county had jurisdiction to try the attempted murder charge. 
Defendant further contends that his right to a jury drawn from the vicinage of 
the crimes was violated because, in his view, that right requires that each crime be 
tried before a jury drawn from the county (more particularly, the judicial district) in 
which that crime occurred. 
The Sixth Amendment right to vicinage was not incorporated by the 
Fourteenth Amendment against the states—hence, the trial of all consolidated 
 
 
18
counts in this capital murder prosecution in San Bernardino County Superior Court 
offended no federal constitutional right of defendant’s.  (See People v. Ochoa 
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 426; Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 
1065.)  We find further that in the present case the same facts making venue proper 
in San Bernardino County also established that the charged crimes were committed 
in that county for vicinage purposes.  Defendant transported the body of murder 
victim Jones, concealed in her van, through Kern, Riverside, and San Bernardino 
Counties; Jones’s decomposed body was ultimately found in the van while it was 
impounded in a San Bernardino County Sheriff’s storage facility.  After killing 
Stopher, defendant kidnapped Rose V. from her home in San Bernardino County, 
bound and gagged her in the van, and transported her into Riverside County where, in 
an effort to avoid detection and arrest for his ongoing crime, defendant attempted to 
murder Officer Dunavent during the traffic stop. 
By these acts, defendant extended his commission of the murder of Jones 
into San Bernardino County, and his commission of the attempted murder of Officer 
Dunavent was a direct consequence of his ongoing crime of kidnapping commenced 
in San Bernardino County—“at least under the broad concept of commission courts 
have applied for purposes of determining proper vicinage.  (See People v. Martin 
(1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 883, 888-889 [where killing was performed in Ventura 
County, but defendant disposed of body in Santa Barbara County, vicinage as well as 
venue over murder charge was proper in latter county]; People v. Tamble (1992) 5 
Cal.App.4th 815, 820 [burglary of motor home located in San Luis Obispo County 
may be tried in Santa Barbara County, without obtaining waiver of vicinage rights, 
because burglars brought loot into that county; provision of § 786 allowing 
prosecution in jurisdictional district into which stolen property is carried ‘provides, 
in the broad sense, for prosecution where the crime was committed’]; People v. 
Campbell (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1432, 1447 [trial under § 786 accords with 
 
 
19
vicinage requirements because the statute ‘require[s] at least some act within a 
county . . . requisite to the offense charged before jurisdiction will attach’]; State v.  
Howell (1985) 40 Wn.App. 49 [theft of livestock may be prosecuted in county into 
which defendant allegedly took the cattle and tried to sell them: ‘ “[W]here the cause 
occurs in one county and the result in another,” ’ vicinage is proper in either].)”  
(People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 631-632.) 
Trial of counts I and VII in San Bernardino County did not violate defendant’s 
vicinage rights. 
2.  Severance 
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his 
motions to sever trial of the murder of Jones from trial of the murder of Stopher and 
the remaining charges.  He argues the error constituted a denial of his constitutional 
right to due process of law and a fair trial. 
Section 954 provides that “[a]n accusatory pleading may charge . . . two or 
more different offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses, under separate 
counts, . . . provided, that the court in which a case is triable, in the interests of 
justice and for good cause shown, may in its discretion order that the different 
offenses or counts set forth in the accusatory pleading be tried separately . . . .”  
Since the murders of Jones and Stopher were offenses of the same class, joinder was 
permissible in the first instance.  (People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 110; 
People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1315 (Bradford).) 
“ ‘ “The burden is on the party seeking severance to clearly establish that there 
is a substantial danger of prejudice requiring that the charges be separately tried.”  
[Citation.] [¶]  Refusal to sever may be an abuse of discretion where:  (1) evidence 
on the crimes to be jointly tried would not be cross-admissible in separate trials; (2) 
certain of the charges are unusually likely to inflame the jury against the defendant; 
(3) a “weak” case has been joined with a “strong” case, or with another “weak” case, 
 
 
20
so that the “spillover” effect of aggregate evidence on several charges might well 
alter the outcome of some or all of the charges; and (4) any one of the charges 
carries the death penalty or joinder of them turns the matter into a capital case.’ ”  
(Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1315.) 
“Significantly, if evidence on each of the joined crimes would have been 
admissible in a separate trial of the other crimes, such cross-admissibility 
‘ “ ‘ordinarily dispels any inference of prejudice . . . .’ ” ’  ([Bradford, supra, 15 
Cal.4th] at p. 1316.)  We examine the record before the trial court at the time of its 
ruling to determine whether the court abused its discretion in denying the severance 
motion.  (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 388.)”  (People v. Catlin, supra, 26 
Cal.4th at pp. 110-111, fn. omitted.)5 
One of the main factors considered by the trial court in denying severance 
was the cross-admissibility of the evidence with respect to all the charges.  We 
agree.  Defendant’s crimes were all connected.  He used Jones’s van, while her body 
lay concealed in the rear of the vehicle with the murder weapon, a garrote, still tied 
around around her neck, to drive to Hesperia to murder Stopher, and then to kidnap 
Rose V., aid and abet her rape, and transport her across county lines until his 
apprehension after the shootout and attempted murder of Officer Dunavent.  Notes 
in defendant’s handwriting were recovered from the van supporting the inference that 
he had planned Jones’s murder (e.g., “make garrote”) so he could use her van to 
travel to Hesperia and do harm to Stopher and Rose V. (e.g., “gather all necessities 
. . . Halloween store, wig shop . . . carpet . . . gas cans . . . shovels”).  There was also 
                                                 
5  
In a footnote, the Catlin court noted that “[n]ew constitutional and statutory 
provisions adopted by Proposition 115, adopted in June 1990 (see Cal. Const., art. I, 
§ 30, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 954.1) were not in effect at the time of the ruling on the 
severance motion and are not considered here.  (See People v. Bradford, supra, 15 
Cal.4th at p. 1314, fn. 13.)”  (People v. Catlin, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 111, fn. 3.)  
That observation likewise applies here. 
 
 
21
the evidence of statements made by defendant to Detective Yanez, shortly after his 
arrest, in which he admitted having committed the two murders.  (E.g., “Oh God.  I 
didn’t mean to kill both of them.”) 
The underlying evidence of each offense would have been admissible in a 
separate trial of the others to prove identity, motive, premeditation, planning and 
deliberation.  Nor was this a situation where a weak case was joined with a strong 
one in order to produce a spillover effect that unfairly strengthened or bootstrapped 
the weak case.  (See Frank v. Superior Court (1989) 48 Cal.3d 632, 639-641.)  
Although defendant admitted fatally shooting Stopher while denying complicity in 
the murder of Jones, in light of the evidence summarized above connecting 
defendant to Jones’s murder, the prosecution’s case against him for that murder, 
independent of his murder of Stopher, can hardly be characterized as a “weak” one.  
Moreover, this is not a situation in which convictions of both murders had to be 
secured in order to qualify defendant for the death penalty.  Multiple murder was not 
the only special circumstance that rendered defendant death eligible; the lying-in-
wait special circumstance alleged and found true in connection with Stopher’s 
murder itself qualified defendant for the ultimate penalty. 
We conclude the trial court was within its sound discretion in denying 
defendant’s motion to sever the Jones murder charge from the remaining charges.  
(People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 388.) 
3.  Wheeler error 
Twice during voir dire defendant claimed the prosecution was exercising its 
peremptory challenges to improperly excuse prospective Hispanic jurors on the 
basis of race, in violation of the federal and state Constitutions.  (See Batson v. 
Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 84-89; People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 
276-277 (Wheeler).)  The motions were denied, and the Wheeler claim is here 
renewed on appeal. 
 
 
22
Prospective jurors may not be excluded from jury service based solely on the 
presumption that they are biased because they are members of an identifiable group 
distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar grounds.  (People v. Johnson 
(1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1215 (Johnson); Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 276.)  A 
defendant bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of Wheeler error.  
(People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 164 (Turner).)  If the court finds a prima 
facie case has been shown, the burden shifts to the prosecution to provide race-
neutral reasons for the questioned peremptory challenges.  (Ibid.)  The prosecutor 
need only identify facially valid race-neutral reasons why the prospective jurors 
were excused.  (Purkett v. Elem (1995) 514 U.S. 765, 767; People v. Silva (2001) 
25 Cal.4th 345, 384.)  The explanations need not justify a challenge for cause.  
(Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 165.)  “Jurors may be excused based on ‘hunches’ and 
even ‘arbitrary’ exclusion is permissible, so long as the reasons are not based on 
impermissible group bias.  (People v. Hall (1983) 35 Cal.3d 161, 170.)”  (Turner, 
supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 165.) 
“While the fact that the jury included members of a group allegedly 
discriminated against is not conclusive, it is an indication of good faith in exercising 
peremptories, and an appropriate factor for the trial judge to consider in ruling on a 
Wheeler objection.”  (Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 168.)  Initially, we note that the 
petit jury and four alternates chosen to hear defendant’s case included four 
Hispanics:  Raul M., Daniel M., Richard P. and Cynthia M.  At one point during jury 
selection the prosecutor accepted the jury with six Hispanics included (Rudolph J., 
Raul M., Ray V., Arthur A., Richard P. and Cynthia M.); at another point he accepted 
the jury with five Hispanics (Ray V., Raul M., Arthur A., Richard P. and Cynthia M.). 
When defendant first raised a Wheeler objection, the court expressly found 
no prima facie case but nonetheless allowed the prosecutor to state his reasons for 
the peremptory challenges on the record.  Allowing the prosecutor to do so did not 
 
 
23
in itself constitute an implied finding of a prima facie case.  (People v. Davenport 
(1995) 11 Cal.4th 1171, 1200.)  In contrast, when defendant renewed the motion, 
the court made no express finding that a prima facie case had not been demonstrated 
but instead immediately asked the prosecutor to justify the questioned challenges.  
This does suggest an implied finding of a prima facie case.  (People v. Hayes (1990) 
52 Cal.3d 577, 605.)  The court proceeded to consider the challenges to each 
prospective juror individually. 
Defendant claimed four prospective jurors were challenged for purely racial 
reasons:  April P., Eva J., Arthur A. and Sergio L.  He also summarizes the 
prosecutor’s reasons for peremptorily excusing three other prospective jurors:  
Ernestine C., Daniel A. and Rudolph J.  Defendant concedes there were race-neutral 
grounds for the challenge to Rudolph J.; his position on the excusal of Ernestine C. 
and Daniel A. is less than clear. 
April P. is not of Hispanic origin; she apparently acquired her Hispanic 
surname through marriage.  Defendant argued below that this “counts,” and he 
reasserts that position here.  He is wrong.  True, in People v. Trevino (1985) 39 
Cal.3d 667, at page 684 (disapproved on other grounds in Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d 
at pp. 1219-1221) we held that “Spanish surnamed” sufficiently describes the 
cognizable class Hispanic under Wheeler—but only where no one knows at the time 
of the challenge whether the Spanish-surnamed prospective juror is Hispanic.  
(People v. Trevino, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 686.)  Here, April P. twice indicated on 
her juror questionnaire that she was White, and when the trial court asked her for the 
record whether she was Hispanic, she replied “No.”  Although the record reflects 
ample race-neutral reasons for the challenge to April P., we need not discuss them 
here, as her excusal was not based on race within the meaning of defendant’s 
Wheeler challenge. 
 
 
24
As noted, at one point the prosecutor accepted the jury while Rudolph J. was 
seated in the jury box.  Defendant concedes on appeal that there were race-neutral 
grounds for Rudolph J.’s excusal.  The record also reflects that Rudolph J. opposed 
the death penalty.  Although he indicated he would not automatically vote against it, 
there were further indications he had serious reservations about voting for it.  
Rudolph J. stated he could not face defendant after voting to put him to death.  He 
indicated the death penalty frightened him, that if he voted for death he would have to 
“pay for it in the end,” and that he would rather have someone else make the 
decision.  These statements alone would have served as valid race-neutral grounds 
for Rudolph J.’s excusal.  (Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 1218-1219.) 
On two occasions during voir dire the prosecutor accepted the jury while 
Arthur A. was seated in the jury box.  However, it also surfaced that Arthur A.’s 
father had been imprisoned for drug-related crimes.  This alone could serve as a valid 
race-neutral reason to excuse him.  (See People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 
1233, 1282 [fact that prospective juror’s relative had been convicted of a crime was 
a proper consideration justifying peremptory challenge]; People v. Sims (1993) 5 
Cal.4th 405, 430 [same].)  Arthur A. also related he had had a run-in with a CHP 
officer who stopped him for a traffic offense and allegedly tried to “rough [him] up” 
and harass him.  Although Arthur A. claimed he harbored no bad feelings about the 
episode, the prosecutor could still retain some doubts.  This circumstance too could 
alone serve as a race-neutral reason to excuse Arthur A.  (See Johnson, supra, 47 
Cal.3d at p. 1215 [peremptory challenge justified where prospective juror 
complained of police harassment].)  Finally, during questioning Arthur A. indicated 
he might rely too heavily on the expert opinion testimony of psychologists; he stated 
he could not vote for the death penalty if a psychologist concluded defendant had a 
mental problem that affected his conduct.  Since the prosecutor anticipated 
defendant would claim his state of mind at the time of the crimes would not support 
 
 
25
a conviction for Stopher’s murder, Arthur A.’s potential reaction to expert opinion 
testimony on mental defect defenses was an important concern.  Each of these 
reasons, individually or in the aggregate, could serve to justify the peremptory 
challenge of Arthur A. 
The prosecutor peremptorily challenged Eva J. because she appeared 
extremely emotional and overwhelmed by outside stresses, conditions that might 
compromise her ability to concentrate or fairly deliberate on the evidence.  She 
cried twice during voir dire, and the trial court’s notes confirmed the prosecutor’s 
belief that she was unduly “emotional.”  Numerous times during voir dire Eva J. 
referred to her “nerves” and to being under considerable stress.  Although she 
thereafter opined that her emotional state and the stressful circumstances would not 
interfere with her ability to consider the evidence, the prosecutor’s lingering 
concerns appear justified.  Factors indicating a difficulty or inability to focus on the 
evidence may serve to justify a peremptory challenge.  (See Mitchell v. Superior 
Court (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 624, 628.)6 
The prosecutor indicated he challenged Sergio L. primarily out of concern 
that he would place too much weight on the opinion testimony of psychologists.  As 
a teacher, Sergio L. had never disagreed with a psychologist’s evaluation of a student.  
When asked if he could disregard a psychologist’s opinion that he considered 
unreasonable, Sergio L. responded, “Well, if he’s an expert I don’t know how I really 
could disregard it.  I’d listen to it.  Because I’m not expert in that field.”  At one 
point during voir dire the trial court deemed it necessary to instruct Sergio L., in 
                                                 
6  
The prosecutor apparently misunderstood some of Eva J.’s responses 
concerning her views on the death penalty as unduly favoring the defense.  Although 
the prosecutor identified such as an additional reason for peremptorily challenging 
her, we agree with respondent that the record suggests the prosecutor’s mistaken 
belief was sincere and not a wilfully manufactured pretext for excusing a Hispanic 
juror, as urged by defendant. 
 
 
26
response to one of his answers, that it was the ultimate responsibility of the jurors to 
assess the credibility of witnesses, whether expert or otherwise.  Sergio L.’s attitude 
could reasonably be found to reflect a bias in favor of a class of potential witnesses, 
i.e., expert witnesses, which could serve to justify exclusion.  (Johnson, supra, 47 
Cal.3d at p. 1215.) 
The prosecutor also explained his concern that Sergio L. was “in the defense 
camp” when he seemed to keep agreeing with the defense, and when he related a 
previous jury experience where he believed some jurors had made up their minds 
before the defense had presented its case.  If the prosecutor sincerely believed 
Sergio L. would be skeptical of the People’s evidence, this too alone could justify 
the peremptory challenge.  (Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1217.)  The prosecutor 
also indicated Sergio L. had given him looks that made him uncomfortable.  Hostile 
looks from a prospective juror can themselves support a peremptory challenge.  
(Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 171; Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 275.)  During 
voir dire Sergio L. also stated he felt transsexuals were “sick human beings.”  Given 
murder victim Stopher’s sexual orientation, the prosecutor could rightfully harbor 
concern that Sergio L. might be biased against one of the victims in the case.  At one 
point Sergio L. commented that he would not be influenced by anyone’s opinion but 
his own.  The prosecutor could rightfully feel concerned that he would not be able to 
consider the opinions of his fellow jurors, itself another valid ground for a 
peremptory challenge.  (People v. Davenport, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1203.)  
Finally, the prosecutor was aware that Sergio L. had initially requested to be relieved 
from jury service for work-related reasons.  On this record, we find ample grounds 
to support the trial court’s determination that Sergio L. was excused for valid race-
neutral reasons. 
Ernestine C.’s negative experiences with law enforcement prompted the 
prosecutor to conclude she had a “jaundiced view” of the trial process that might 
 
 
27
hamper her from focusing on the evidence.  She gave a lengthy and detailed account 
of her son’s arrest for drunk driving, claiming he was harassed by authorities and 
falsely accused of using drugs while at a weekend facility in connection with the 
charge.  Her claim that she could remain impartial could be discounted in light of her 
fixation on the incident, which she related in great detail.  She also related she had 
received an unfair parking ticket that she successfully fought.  A prospective juror’s 
negative experiences with law enforcement can serve as a valid basis for peremptory 
challenge.  (Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 171.) 
The prosecutor challenged Daniel A. based on his strong biased views against 
the death penalty.  All of Daniel A.’s answers on the jury questionnaire reflected his 
strong opposition to the death penalty:  he felt it was unfair, he had moral objections 
to it, he would vote to abolish it if given the opportunity, and he would automatically 
vote for life imprisonment.  Although Daniel A. suggested his views were otherwise 
upon questioning during voir dire, the prosecutor justifiedly remained skeptical, and 
the circumstances supported the peremptory challenge.  (Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d 
at pp. 1218-1219.) 
Once a trial court has made a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate each of 
the stated reasons for a challenge to a particular juror, we accord great deference to 
its conclusion.  (People v. Fuentes (1991) 54 Cal.3d 707, 720; People v. Jackson 
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1197-1198.)  On this record we conclude the Wheeler 
motions were properly denied. 
B.  Guilt Phase Issues 
1.  Corpus delicti of rape (count V); admission of defendant’s juvenile 
court testimony regarding the rape; sufficiency of evidence of 
rape 
Defendant was charged in count V with aiding and abetting his son in the 
forcible rape of Rose V.  (§ 261, subd. (a)(2).)  Defendant contends the only 
 
 
28
evidence of his aiding and abetting the rape came from his testimony on behalf of his 
son at the latter’s juvenile hearing, and that the corpus delicti of the crime of rape 
was not independently established as the necessary predicate for introduction of 
such extrajudicial statements.  Respondent in turn argues that since defendant’s 
admissions were made during a judicial proceeding (his son’s juvenile hearing), they 
were not “extrajudicial” admissions within the meaning of the corpus delicti rule 
such as would require corroboration under that rule.  Respondent also urges that 
although defendant, in his first pretrial motion to dismiss (§ 995), asserted there was 
insufficient evidence to establish the corpus delicti of rape, he did not thereafter 
specifically object at trial to admission of his juvenile court testimony on corpus 
delicti grounds, and has therefore waived the claim on appeal.  (See People v. 
Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 186.) 
“In every criminal trial, the prosecution must prove the corpus delicti, or the 
body of the crime itself—i.e., the fact of injury, loss, or harm, and the existence of a 
criminal agency as its cause.  In California, it has traditionally been held, the 
prosecution cannot satisfy this burden by relying exclusively upon the extrajudicial 
statements, confessions, or admissions of the defendant.  (E.g., People v. Ochoa 
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 404 [ ]; People v. Jones [(1998)] 17 Cal.4th 279, 301; 
People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 364 [ ]; People v. Wright (1990) 
52 Cal.3d 367, 403 [ ]; People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441, 455 [ ]; People v. 
Cobb (1955) 45 Cal.2d 158, 161; People v. Amaya (1952) 40 Cal.2d 70, 75-76; 
People v. Simonsen (1895) 107 Cal. 345, 347; 1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal 
Law (3d ed. 2000) Elements, § 45, p. 250.)  Though mandated by no statute, and 
never deemed a constitutional guaranty, the rule requiring some independent proof 
of the corpus delicti has roots in the common law.  (Crisera, Reevaluation of the 
California Corpus Delicti Rule: A Response to the Invitation of Proposition 8 
 
 
29
(1990) 78 Cal. L.Rev. 1571, 1572-1573 [ ].)”  (People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 
1161, 1168-1169 (Alvarez).) 
Recently, in Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th 1161, we held that article I, section 
28, subdivision (d) of the California Constitution, the “Truth in Evidence” provision 
adopted by Proposition 8 in 1982, abrogated any corpus delicti basis for excluding a 
defendant’s extrajudicial statements from evidence.  (Alvarez, at p. 1165.)  
Accordingly, we need not decide whether defendant adequately preserved a corpus 
delicti objection to the admissibility of his juvenile court testimony, nor whether 
any admissions made during that testimony, themselves having been made in another 
judicial proceeding, were nonetheless “extrajudicial” admissions for purposes of the 
corpus delicti rule. 
We further held in Alvarez that California Constitution article I, section 28, 
subdivision (d) “did not abrogate the corpus delicti rule insofar as it provides that 
every conviction must be supported by some proof of the corpus delicti aside from 
or in addition to such statements, and that the jury must be so instructed.”  (Alvarez, 
supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1165.) 
To the extent defendant is renewing his claim that the corpus delicti of the 
crime of rape was not established below, his contention must fail.  In People v. 
Wright, supra, 52 Cal.3d 367, we explained:  “The elements of the corpus delicti are 
(1) the injury, loss or harm, and (2) the criminal agency that has caused the injury, 
loss or harm.  (Jones v. Superior Court (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 390, 393.)  ‘The 
independent proof may be by circumstantial evidence [citation], and it need not be 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  A slight or prima facie showing, permitting the 
reasonable inference that a crime was committed, is sufficient.  [Citations.]’ (People 
v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 624-625.)  It is not necessary for the independent 
evidence to establish that the defendant was the perpetrator.  (People v. Cullen 
(1951) 37 Cal.2d 614, 624; Jones, supra, at p. 393.)”  (People v. Wright, supra, 52 
 
 
30
Cal.3d at p. 404; see also People v. Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d 334, 368 [“We 
reemphasize that the quantum of evidence the People must produce in order to 
satisfy the corpus delicti rule is quite modest; case law describes it as a ‘slight or 
prima facie’ showing. [Citations.]”].) 
At trial, Rose V. testified that after defendant killed Stopher, defendant and 
Joseph dragged her out of the house and forced her into Jones’s van.  Defendant 
twice hit her on the back of the head with the rifle or shotgun.  She was also hit 
behind her right ear with a hard object she could not identify.  As they drove off and 
entered the freeway, defendant and Joseph kept telling Rose V. to shut up.  
Defendant told Joseph to gag her and tie her up.  Defendant warned Rose V. that if 
she did not cooperate, Joseph would cut her.  Joseph tied her hands behind her back 
with rope, tied her ankles, blindfolded and gagged her.  Rose V. testified that the man 
wearing the mask (later identified as Joseph) then raped her.  He cut off her bra with 
a knife and sliced a half-inch cut in her ankle when he could not remove her pants and 
had to cut the rope that bound her feet.  When Joseph finished raping Rose V., 
defendant told him to make sure she could breathe and to cover her with a sheet. 
Rose V.’s testimony regarding her rape, together with the corroborating 
circumstantial evidence, plainly established the corpus delicti of the crime 
independent of defendant’s admissions made at Joseph’s juvenile court hearing.  But 
defendant argues further that even if the corpus delicti of forcible rape was 
established generally, since he was charged only as an aider and abettor of Joseph 
who was the direct perpetrator of the rape, no evidence independent of defendant’s 
admissions at the juvenile hearing established his role as an aider and abettor of the 
crime. 
Defendant misconstrues the corpus delicti rule.  It is not necessary for 
independent evidence to establish defendant as the perpetrator in order to satisfy the 
rule.  (People v. Cullen, supra, 37 Cal.2d at p. 624; Jones v. Superior Court, 
 
 
31
supra, 96 Cal.App.3d at p. 393.)  More specifically, it has been held that in a case 
tried on an aiding and abetting theory, the requisite knowledge and intent required for 
aider-abettor liability are not elements of the corpus delicti that must be proved 
independently of any extrajudicial admissions for purposes of establishing the 
corpus delicti.  (People v. Ott (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 118, 131 [“the corpus delicti 
must be established with respect to the underlying criminal offense, rather than the 
theory of aiding and abetting which, in the absence of the commission of the main 
crime, would not be punishable at all”], disapproved on other grounds in People v. 
Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 556-559.) 
Last, defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction 
of aiding and abetting his son’s forcible rape of Rose V.  The claim was raised and 
rejected in a Penal Code section 1118.1 motion for judgment of acquittal at the 
close of the People’s case-in-chief.  It is without merit.  We have explained that 
defendant cannot assert a violation of the corpus delicti rule as a ground for 
excluding any incriminating admissions made during his testimony at the juvenile 
hearing, and that in any event, the corpus delicti of the crime of forcible rape was 
independently established exclusive of such admissions.  In denying defendant’s 
second pretrial motion to dismiss the forcible rape charge, the trial court found that 
any incriminating statements made at the juvenile hearing were admissions within the 
meaning of Evidence Code section 1220.  At trial, when defendant again objected to 
the reading of redacted portions of his testimony from Joseph’s juvenile court 
hearing, the trial court held a hearing pursuant to Evidence Code section 402, 
subdivision (b), and made findings that defendant was represented by counsel at the 
juvenile proceeding, had waived his right against self-incrimination, and that his 
testimony was not coerced and was freely and voluntarily given.  The credibility of 
defendant’s testimony at the juvenile proceeding was an issue for the jury’s 
determination. 
 
 
32
The trial court’s rulings were correct and supported by the evidence.  At the 
juvenile hearing, defendant had testified that at some point he stopped the van, got 
into the back, told Joseph to go to the front of the van, and then had intercourse with 
Rose V.  He testified he then ordered Joseph to “fuck her,” and forced his son to 
rape Rose V.  Defendant specifically testified at the juvenile hearing that he loved 
his son but was not lying to protect him.  In contrast, at his own trial defendant 
testified he was driving the van and was unaware of the rape when it occurred, that he 
did not tell Joseph to rape Rose V., and that he lied at Joseph’s juvenile court hearing 
in order to protect his son.  It fell to the jury to sort out the credibility of 
defendant’s testimony.  To the extent defendant claimed at the juvenile hearing that 
he had also raped Rose V., such testimony conflicted with Rose V.’s account of the 
crime in both her preliminary hearing and trial testimony—she testified defendant 
did not rape her.  Contrary to defendant’s criticism that the prosecution presented 
conflicting theories of the rape in the two proceedings and sought to have it both 
ways, the prosecution did not charge defendant as a direct perpetrator of the forcible 
rape of Rose V., but instead specifically charged him as an aider and abettor of 
Joseph’s crime.  The jury remained free to credit defendant’s juvenile hearing 
testimony that he aided and abetted Joseph’s act of forcible rape. 
We need determine only “ ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ (Jackson v. Virginia 
(1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319, italics omitted; see also People v. Kraft (2000) 23 
Cal.4th 978, 1053.)”  (People v. Catlin, supra, 26 Cal.4th 81, 139.)  Applying that 
standard, we find the evidence presented at trial, including Rose V.’s testimony of 
the circumstances surrounding her rape and defendant’s admissible testimony from 
his son’s juvenile court hearing on his own role in the crime, was sufficient to 
support his conviction of aiding and abetting the forcible rape of Rose V. 
 
 
33
2.  Miranda/Harris:  admission of defendant’s extrajudicial statement 
regarding his acquisition of Jones’s van for impeachment 
purposes 
During defendant’s cross-examination, the prosecutor stated that he desired 
to question defendant about a statement he made at the hospital after invoking his 
Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436) while being questioned 
about Stopher’s killing.  The prosecutor identified defendant’s statement as, “I rented 
the van from a guy by the name of Edwin.”  The prosecutor acknowledged the 
statement was inadmissible in his case-in-chief, but argued it should be admissible 
for the limited purpose of impeaching defendant pursuant to this court’s decision in 
People v. May (1988) 44 Cal.3d 309 (May), implementing the holding of Harris v. 
New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222 (Harris), since defendant had testified on direct 
examination that he had found the van with Jones’s body in it in the motel parking lot. 
Upon defendant’s objection, the court conducted a hearing on the 
admissibility of the statement pursuant to Evidence Code section 402, 
subdivision (b).  Richard Spady, the physician who treated defendant at Riverside 
General Hospital on November 3, 1986, the date defendant made the statement, 
testified defendant had undergone an operation two days earlier, was in stable 
condition, and was having a normal postoperative recovery with normal mental 
functioning.  Nurses’ reports for the date in question reflected defendant was awake, 
alert, and fully oriented.  He was on antibiotics and pain medication, but they would 
not be expected to appreciably affect his mental functioning.  Dr. Spady testified 
there was nothing he observed that would suggest defendant was not able to make a 
free and voluntary statement on the afternoon of the date in question. 
Detective Stroup testified he attempted to interview defendant at the hospital 
at 5:30 p.m. on November 3, 1986.  Defendant was coherent, although obviously in 
pain.  When advised of his Miranda rights defendant indicated he understood them.  
Detective Stroup asked defendant if he was willing to talk about the Stopher murder.  
 
 
34
At the time, the detective was unaware of Jones’s murder or who owned the van 
defendant was driving upon his arrest.  Defendant indicated he would talk a little bit, 
as much as he could without a lawyer being present.  When asked about the murder 
of Stopher, defendant would not answer and indicated he should probably have a 
lawyer before answering such questions.  Detective Stroup terminated the 
questioning.  He then began a second interview of defendant to determine where the 
van had come from and from whom defendant had acquired it.  Detective Stroup was 
not aware at that time that the owner of the van was, in fact, dead—his report just 
indicated police needed to know who the owner of the van was and how defendant 
had obtained the vehicle.  The report further reflected that he told defendant during 
the second interview that anything he would say would not be used in court against 
him, and that this was “over and above his Miranda waiver.”  When asked by the 
court what he meant by that advisement, Detective Stroup explained, “That I was 
there to talk to him about the death of Mr. Stopher.  And he—he’d advised me he 
didn’t want to discuss that.  And this was not dealing with Mr. Stopher.”  Detective 
Stroud testified that at that time he had no intention of using any information 
defendant gave him about how he obtained the van against him in court.  Defendant 
told the detective he had rented the van from an individual by the name of “Edwin,” 
that he did not know where the owner of the van was, and that he did not want to say 
anything else.  Detective Stroup terminated the questioning. 
The trial court ruled that the statement was obtained in violation of Miranda 
because it had been made during continued questioning after defendant had invoked 
his Miranda rights.  The court nevertheless found the statement admissible for the 
limited purpose of impeachment under May, supra, 44 Cal.3d 409, and concluded 
that its probative value for that purpose outweighed any possible prejudice to 
defendant.  On rebuttal, Detective Stroup testified he contacted defendant at the 
hospital at approximately 5:30 p.m. on November 3, 1986, asked him about the van, 
 
 
35
and that defendant stated he had rented it from a person named “Edwin” and did not 
know the whereabouts of the van’s owner. 
Defendant challenges the admission of the statement on a number of grounds.  
He emphasizes that his statement that he rented the van from a person named Edwin 
“obviously was untrue,” although he concedes the extrajudicial statement conflicted 
with his direct testimony at trial that he found the van in the motel parking lot with 
Jones already strangled inside.  Defendant argues the statement “was not relevant for 
admissibility under the May and Harris test because the statement was not 
incriminating in the required sense.”  By this he means the statement “was not 
impeaching because it was untrue, was not inculpatory, and was contrary to both the 
prosecution’s and the defense theories of the case as presented to the jury.” 
First, there is no requirement that extrajudicial statements ruled inadmissible 
under Miranda must be truthful in order for them to be available for the limited 
purpose of impeachment under Harris.  “The Harris court held that statements made 
to police under circumstances rendering them inadmissible under Miranda in the 
prosecution’s case in chief could be admitted for purposes of impeachment of a 
testifying defendant whose trial testimony was inconsistent with the earlier 
statements.”  (May, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 315; see Harris, supra, 401 U.S. at 
p. 226.)  Here, the impeachment value of defendant’s extrajudicial statement, 
whether true or not, was that it contradicted his testimony at trial and thereby bore 
upon the credibility of that testimony.  In his closing argument, the prosecutor urged 
the jury to find that because defendant lied when he told police he rented the van 
from a man named Edwin, his conflicting story at trial—that he was involved in an 
attempted drug buy with Jones at a motel, and that he found the van in the motel 
parking lot with Jones’s already strangled body inside—should likewise be 
disbelieved. 
Defendant’s remaining claims respecting the admissibility of the statement 
 
 
36
for impeachment purposes are likewise unavailing.  He argues that his statement was 
involuntary and thus excludable for all purposes, including impeachment.  (See 
Michigan v. Harvey (1990) 494 U.S. 344, 350-351.)  We have independently 
reviewed the record and find that the prosecution proved that the statement was 
voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence.  (People v. Badgett (1995) 10 Cal.4th 
330, 348; People v. Thompson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 166.)  Detective Stroup’s 
representation to defendant that the statement would not be used against him in court 
for any purpose complicates the matter somewhat, because the statement was 
ultimately used for impeachment.  Regarding the question of whether the detective’s 
representation rendered defendant’s statement involuntary, the trial court found that 
Detective Stroup was simply being truthful, in that he was unaware at the time that 
Jones was the van’s owner, much less that she had been killed and her body secreted 
in the van.  The court found it significant that since Detective Stroup was 
investigating the Stopher murder, and since defendant had halted the questioning 
about that crime in the first interview, the detective was simply conveying to 
defendant that any information defendant furnished about the van would not be used 
against him in the Stopher case, in which questioning had just been terminated at 
defendant’s request. 
Although Detective Stroup may not have harbored a subjective belief that any 
statement defendant made would be used against him in a prosecution for the murder 
of Jones—since the detective had no knowledge of Jones’s murder at the time—the 
voluntariness inquiry is, of course, concerned with defendant’s subjective state of 
mind at the time of the questioning, not that of Detective Stroup.  In that regard, 
defendant was plainly told that his statement would not be used against him in court 
for any purpose.  The legal circumstance that the statement ultimately was used 
against him in court for the limited purpose of impeachment under Harris and May 
does not bear directly on the inquiry of whether the statement was voluntary at the 
 
 
37
time it was made.  It is the fact that defendant was told any information he furnished 
about the identity or whereabouts of the van’s owner would not be used against him 
in court, and his possible reliance on that representation in making the statement that 
he rented the van from a person named Edwin, that does, of course, bear on the 
voluntariness inquiry.  The matter is further complicated because we know in 
hindsight that the information defendant furnished about the van’s owner, in actuality, 
was not true, a matter conceded by defendant.  In short, from the standpoint of 
voluntariness, Detective Stroup’s representation to defendant, that any information 
he furnished about his acquisition of the van would not be used against him in court, 
did not motivate defendant to reveal truthful and incriminating information, thereby 
possibly rendering such disclosures involuntary. 
In sum, although we disagree with the trial court’s specific conclusion that 
Detective Stroup’s state of mind in making the representation to defendant precludes 
a finding of involuntariness, the circumstance that the statement was ultimately and 
lawfully admitted against defendant in court for the limited purpose of impeachment 
does not alter our conclusion that the prosecution proved the voluntariness of the 
statement by a preponderance of the evidence.  (People v. Badgett, supra, 10 
Cal.4th at p. 348; People v. Thompson, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 166.)  In any event, 
even assuming arguendo it was error to admit the statement for impeachment 
purposes given Detective Stroup’s representation at the time it was made that it 
would not be used in court, the error was clearly harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  (People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 487, 509-510; see Arizona v. 
Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 306-312.)  Defendant concedes that the statement 
that he rented the van from a person named Edwin was not true, neither was it a 
confession, an incriminating admission, or other substantive evidence of guilt.  The 
only possible prejudice would flow from the impeachment value of the statement, 
but defendant’s credibility was already in serious question at trial.  Defendant 
 
 
38
testified, “I was lying throughout the trial proceedings of my son”; he testified he 
lied to his brother-in-law Lostanau; he testified he initially lied to Joseph about his 
intentions in going to Hesperia; he testified he lied to Officer Dunavent when stating 
upon being stopped that he was on his way home; and he testified he had lied to his 
second wife, Rose V., about his relationship or affair with Jones.  There was strong 
physical evidence pointing to defendant as Jones’s murderer, including that a garrote 
he admittedly made was found wrapped around her neck; that he secreted her body in 
the van and drove the vehicle across county lines; that he had a motive for the killing 
(use of Jones’s van to accomplish the Stopher murder and Rose V. kidnapping); and 
that after his arrest he made an admission of awareness that he had killed two 
persons (i.e., Stopher and Jones).  On this record it is clear beyond a reasonable 
doubt that impeachment with defendant’s extrajudicial statement that he rented the 
van from a person named Edwin did not prejudice his conviction of Jones’s murder. 
Defendant also complains that the giving of CALJIC No. 2.13, which instructs 
the jury, inter alia, that it can consider a prior inconsistent statement, not only for 
impeachment, “but also as evidence of the truth of the facts as stated by the witness 
on such former occasion,” permitted the jury to consider the statement for other 
than mere impeachment, in contravention of the Miranda ruling below.  The short 
answer is that a limiting admonition was never requested, nor was the trial court 
under a sua sponte obligation to give one.  (See Evid. Code, § 355; People v. Torrez 
(1995) 31 Cal.App.3d 1084, 1088.)  In any event, since the statement was neither a 
confession nor an admission and defendant concedes the statement was not true, 
there was no substantive, much less prejudicial, use to which the jury could have put 
the statement, even had the jury improperly applied CALJIC No. 2.13. 
Since use of the statement for impeachment or any other purpose could not in 
logic have prejudiced defendant’s conviction of Jones’s murder, his related claims 
of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel in connection 
 
 
39
with the admission of the statement and the giving of CALJIC No. 2.13 without a 
limiting instruction must be likewise be rejected. 
3.  Exclusion of third party culpability evidence 
Defendant contends the trial court erred when it made a ruling excluding any 
third party culpability evidence regarding the murder of Jones.  Defendant also urges 
that the trial court precluded submission of this defense to the jury when it rejected 
the following requested instruction:  “As an established principle, a defendant may 
show another person committed the crime and that he himself is innocent.”  We find 
no error. 
The issue of third party culpability evidence first surfaced when the 
prosecution sought a ruling prior to jury voir dire excluding any such evidence.  The 
motion was denied without prejudice at that time.  The matter resurfaced in 
anticipation of references to such evidence in defendant’s opening statement which 
was never forthcoming, and became the subject of a full hearing pursuant to People 
v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826 (Hall) at the close of the People’s case-in-chief. 
At the hearing, the defense presented the testimony of three witnesses.  
Defendant testified he had personal knowledge that Jones dealt in marijuana and 
other narcotics from the time he first met her in 1984.  He testified Jones owed a 
large sum of money to a drug dealer from a prior transaction, that she was putting 
together a drug transaction for late in the evening of October 30, 1986, and that she 
enlisted his services to protect her during the meeting.  Defendant was to be armed 
and await any indication she might be in trouble.  Defendant testified he obtained 
weapons from his brother-in-law’s house, that Jones purchased ammunition for the 
weapons, and that they met a Mexican man named Pablo at the arranged time on the 
evening of October 30.  The drugs never arrived.  Instead, the transaction was 
postponed and Jones and Pablo drove defendant to his first wife’s house to speak 
with his son Joseph, then dropped defendant off at the Bakersfield motel where he 
 
 
40
stayed alone in a room that night.  Defendant never saw Pablo again.  He did, 
however, call and speak with Jones on the telephone the following morning, October 
31, and she was all right at that time.  He thereafter came upon her van parked in the 
motel parking lot later that same afternoon, and found Jones dead inside, with the 
garrote, which he admittedly had made, tied around her neck. 
A second witness, Vickie Boen, testified she was an employee at Long’s 
Drugs in Bakersfield on October 30, 1986, and that she sold ammunition for a 
shotgun, a .380-caliber pistol, and a rifle to Jones near closing time (9:30 p.m.) on 
that date. 
The third witness at the Hall hearing, Jones’s daughter Sheva Jones, testified 
that on several prior occasions her mother had bought some marijuana, and twice 
split it with her friends.  Once she saw a balloon on her mother’s dresser that her 
mother said contained drugs.  She could not remember telling Detective Knapp that 
shortly before October 31, 1986, her mother said she was going to be involved in a 
drug transaction.  Defense counsel also indicated he had three additional witnesses 
who were not available to testify at the hearing:  Detective Knapp, who would testify 
to statements Sheva made to him about her mother’s involvement with drug 
trafficking; a second unidentified witness, who would testify he had seen Billie Faye 
Jones dealing marijuana and cocaine; and a third unidentified witness, who would 
testify he had bought narcotics from Jones. 
The trial court, relying on Hall, agreed that a criminal defendant has a right to 
present evidence of third party culpability where such evidence is capable of raising 
a reasonable doubt as to his guilt of the charged crime.  However, the court went on 
to observe that, as this court explained in Hall, “[W]e do not require that any 
evidence, however remote, must be admitted to show a third party’s possible 
culpability. . . .  [E]vidence of mere motive or opportunity to commit the crime in 
another person, without more, will not suffice to raise a reasonable doubt about a 
 
 
41
defendant’s guilt:  there must be direct or circumstantial evidence linking the third 
person to the actual perpetration of the crime.”  (Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 833.)  
Moreover, once evidence of this type has been found relevant and admissible, the 
court may nonetheless exercise discretion under Evidence Code section 352 to 
exclude it where its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of undue 
delay, prejudice or confusion.  (Hall, at p. 834.) 
The trial court agreed the defense could present evidence pertaining to 
Jones’s alleged drug dealings.  The court, however, was concerned about the hearsay 
nature of the testimony described in defense counsel’s offer of proof, and 
determined that such evidence should only be admitted through defendant’s own 
testimony.  As for whether there was sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt 
that a third party actually killed Jones, the court noted the evidence at best showed 
only that, according to defendant, Jones and one “Pablo” had been together on the 
evening of October 30, but that it was also established that Jones was alive, well, and 
at home on the following morning, October 31.  Indeed, defendant himself testified 
he spoke with Jones on the phone that next morning at her home, and that she had 
indicated she was okay.  Because there was no evidence that Pablo or any other 
identifiable suspect was with Jones from the time she was last seen, at approximately 
1:00 p.m. on October 31, until defendant allegedly found her dead in her van at 
approximately 2:30 p.m. that same afternoon, a foundation for admission of third 
party culpability evidence was not established. 
We agree with respondent that the trial court’s ruling under Hall was correct.  
We acknowledge that defendant testified Jones had told him a meeting about the 
drug transaction was going to occur on October 30 or 31, but there was no direct or 
circumstantial evidence to link Pablo or any other identifiable third party with Jones 
in the hours before her death, or indeed on the date of her death.  Although 
defendant’s testimony may have raised a suggestion that Pablo or some other third 
 
 
42
party involved in drug trafficking had a motive or possible opportunity to murder 
Jones, additional direct or circumstantial evidence was required to link Pablo or 
some other third party to the actual perpetration of the crime.  (Hall, supra, 41 
Cal.3d at p. 833.) 
We observe that the trial court did permit defendant to testify at trial, 
consistent with his testimony at the Hall hearing, about Jones’s past involvement in 
narcotics dealings, and about the asserted aborted transaction that had been 
scheduled to occur on the evening prior to her murder.  Indeed, the trial court 
indicated it would overrule any objection by the prosecutor to such testimony on 
mere grounds that it would encompass “drug culture, drug dealings, things of that 
sort.”  But the trial court properly found that there was no evidence, beyond mere 
speculation, that Pablo or some other third party either had been present with Jones 
on the day of her murder or had been shown to be connected to the crime in some 
other way.  And the court was further within its discretion under Evidence Code 
section 352 in concluding that the probative value of the proffered evidence, other 
than defendant’s own testimony (which was allowed), was outweighed by the 
potential prejudice and confusion it would likely engender.  We have in past cases 
upheld the exclusion of third party culpability evidence under analogous 
circumstances.  (See People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 684-686 [mere 
evidence of third party’s anger toward victim was insufficient basis to admit 
evidence linking him to crime]; People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1017-
1018 [third party’s possible motive alone insufficient to raise reasonable doubt of 
defendant’s guilt].) 
Defendant’s further argument that the trial court erred in rejecting his 
requested special instruction likewise must fail.  The instruction would have told the 
jury, “As an established principle, a defendant may show another person committed 
the crime and that he himself is innocent.”  The instructions given to the jury did not 
 
 
43
prevent them from considering any aspect of defendant’s testimony.  Refusal of the 
proffered special instruction was proper given the court’s ruling that third party 
culpability evidence, other than defendant’s own testimony, was being excluded 
under Hall and Evidence Code section 352.  Moreover, the proffered instruction was 
confusing to the extent it purported to address defendant’s “innocence,” since the 
jury was also properly instructed, in accordance with CALJIC No. 2.90, that 
defendant was presumed innocent until proven guilty, and that the burden of proving 
guilt fell to the prosecution. 
4.    Evidentiary rulings:  admission of evidence of threats; 
impeachment with prior conviction; cross-examination of defense 
expert witness 
Defendant contends that several other evidentiary rulings deprived him of a 
fair trial and prejudiced the guilty verdicts, requiring reversal.  None of the rulings, 
in our view, constituted error, prejudicial or otherwise. 
Over defendant’s objection, Rose V. was permitted to testify in the 
prosecution’s case-in-chief that several times during their marriage defendant told 
her he did not like police officers and wanted to kill or “blow one away.”  The 
testimony was admitted as probative of defendant’s state of mind in attempting to 
kill Officer Dunavent.  Thereafter, defendant testified on direct examination that he 
did not intend to kill Officer Dunavent and did not remember putting a gun to his 
head.  He also denied on cross-examination that he hated police officers or wanted 
to kill them, and testified he had never made any threats to kill law enforcement 
officers.  Accordingly, the prosecution was permitted to call Deputy Shafia on 
rebuttal to testify that on April 26, 1990, at the San Bernardino County jail, 
defendant told the deputy he wanted to “take out,” i.e., kill, a deputy.  The court 
specifically found the probative value of the evidence outweighed its potential for 
prejudice under Evidence Code section 352. 
 
 
44
Defendant challenges these rulings, claiming the statements made to Rose V. 
were too remote in time, that the statement made to Deputy Shafia was not probative 
because made while he was awaiting trial, and that all such evidence merely 
portrayed him as a bad or violent person.  The objections were properly overruled.  
The evidence was manifestly admissible to show defendant’s state of mind in 
attempting to murder Officer Dunavent.  (People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 
730, 757-758 [threats and statements of contempt for police]; People v. Karis 
(1989) 46 Cal.3d 612, 637-638 [threat to kill those who would send defendant back 
to prison].)  Nor, with regard to defendant’s statement to Deputy Shafia that he 
wanted to kill a deputy, does it matter that the statement was made after the instant 
crimes.  (People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 33-34.)  The trial court was within 
its sound discretion in overruling defendant’s objections and admitting the evidence.  
(People v. Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 214-215.) 
Defendant contends the trial court erred in ruling that he could be impeached 
with his 1984 prior conviction of assault with a deadly weapon (vehicle) on a peace 
officer.  He concedes the prior conviction was for a crime of moral turpitude, but 
urges it was excludable as too similar to the crime with which he was charged; the 
attempted murder of Officer Dunavent.  The claim is specious.  In cross-examining 
Rose V. in order to establish that she had betrayed defendant while he was in prison 
by entering into a relationship with Stopher, defense counsel expressly requested the 
trial court to reverse its prior ruling and rule admissible for impeachment purposes 
the 1984 prior conviction.  Pursuant to the request, the court determined the prior 
conviction was a crime of moral turpitude and expressly found that its probative 
value outweighed potential prejudice under Evidence Code section 352.  Thereafter, 
contrary to defendant’s assertions, it was defense counsel who, in questioning V., 
proceeded to first elicit before the jury the fact that defendant had been in prison 
and that he had served time for assault on a peace officer.  The doctrine of invited 
 
 
45
error bars defendant from challenging the ruling on appeal.  (People v. Cooper 
(1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 827-828.)  Moreover, as a substantive matter, the ruling 
admitting the prior conviction for impeachment purposes was not error, even though 
the prior offense was similar in some respects to the charged attempted murder of 
Officer Dunavent.  (People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301; see People v. 
Tamborrino (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 575, 590 [robbery priors identical to charged 
offense].) 
Defendant next complains of the admission of the rebuttal testimony of nurse 
Violet Garday.  After a hearing pursuant to Evidence Code section 402, 
subdivision (b), the trial court overruled defendant’s objection to the testimony of 
Garday, the head nurse at the San Bernardino County jail, regarding her opinion of 
defendant’s reputation for honesty.  Defendant objected on the ground that he had 
not elicited reputation evidence, and therefore Evidence Code section 1102 
precluded the prosecution from attacking his veracity.  Garday testified on rebuttal 
that as the head nurse she knew defendant while he was in the San Bernardino County 
jail; he was housed in the infirmary for nearly three years, during which period she 
had daily contact with him.  Based upon her contacts with him and discussions with 
other nursing staff, it was Garday’s opinion that defendant had a reputation for 
dishonesty. 
By taking the stand, defendant put his own credibility in issue and was subject 
to impeachment in the same manner as any other witness.  Moreover, the record 
reflects that defendant’s own expert witness, Dr. Pursich, testified on direct 
examination that in his opinion defendant was honest.  Garday’s rebuttal testimony 
that defendant had a reputation for dishonesty was properly ruled admissible.  (See 
People v. Harris (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1081.) 
Defendant also contends Garday gave what amounts to impermissible expert 
opinion testimony when she was asked on rebuttal, “Based on your contact with 
 
 
46
[defendant] on almost a daily basis for several years, have you seen any signs that 
he’s brain-damaged or has something wrong with his brain or mind?”  Garday replied, 
“No sir.”  As defendant concedes, there was no objection to the question or answer.  
Accordingly, the claim of error has not been preserved on appeal.  (Evid. 
Code, § 353, subd. (a); People v. Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 186.)  In any case, 
Garday was asked if, in her capacity as defendant’s daily nurse for a number of years, 
she had “seen any signs” that defendant was brain damaged or had something wrong 
with his mind—not whether it was her opinion that defendant was brain damaged.  
The specific question posed was subject to a layperson’s answer by someone with 
the length of contacts that Garday had with defendant.  Accordingly, defendant’s 
alternative claim that counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object 
must be rejected; counsel undoubtedly realized an objection would have been 
unavailing. 
5.  Felony murder as a theory of Stopher’s murder (count II) 
Defendant was charged with Stopher’s murder in count II.  The jury was 
instructed on three theories of first degree murder in connection with Stopher’s 
murder:  premeditated and deliberate murder, murder by lying-in-wait, and first 
degree felony murder, with the underlying felony being the burglary charged in count 
III.  Count III charged defendant with the residential burglary of Rose V.’s house.  
Five target felonies were alleged in connection with the burglary charge:  assault 
with a deadly weapon or firearm upon Rose V.; corporal injury to a spouse; false 
imprisonment by violence; menace, fraud, or deceit; kidnapping; and forcible rape.7 
                                                 
7  
Notably, Stopher’s murder was not alleged as a target offense of the burglary 
charged in count III.  Had the independent target offenses not been alleged in 
connection with the burglary charge, the merger doctrine might have applied.  (See 
People v. Wilson (1969) 1 Cal.3d 431, 439-442.) 
 
 
47
Defendant contends that as a matter of law the felony-murder theory was 
inapplicable to the murder of Stopher, and that it was prejudicial error to instruct the 
jury on felony murder in connection with that crime.  His argument is that his killing 
of Stopher was intentional, and hence the murder was not a negligent or accidental 
consequence of the predicate burglary, which as charged was directed at victim 
Rose V.  In so arguing defendant misconstrues felony-murder law. 
“ ‘[A]ll murder . . . which is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to 
perpetrate,’ certain enumerated felonies, including [burglary], ‘is murder of the first 
degree . . . .’  (Pen. Code, § 189.)  The mental state required is simply the specific 
intent to commit the underlying felony; neither intent to kill, deliberation, 
premeditation, nor malice aforethought is needed.  (See, e.g., People v. Coefield 
(1951) 37 Cal.2d 865, 868-869; see, generally, 1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal 
Law [(2d ed. 1988)] Crimes Against the Person, § 470, p. 528; see also People v. 
Hernandez (1988) 47 Cal.3d 315, 346 . . . .)  There is no requirement of a strict 
‘causal’ (e.g., People v. Ainsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984, 1016) or ‘temporal’ (e.g., 
People v. Hernandez, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 348) relationship between the ‘felony’ 
and the ‘murder.’  All that is demanded is that the two ‘are parts of one continuous 
transaction.’  (E.g., People v. Ainsworth, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1016; see, e.g., 
People v. Hernandez, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 348.)”  (People v. Berryman (1993) 6 
Cal.4th 1048, 1085.) 
The evidence reflects that defendant killed Stopher during the perpetration of 
the burglary of Rose V.’s residence—the burglary and murder were “parts of one 
continuous transaction.”  (People v. Ainsworth, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1016.)  
Rose V. testified that when she answered the doorbell defendant and his son shoved 
open the door and pushed her to the floor.  Joseph, wearing a Halloween mask, 
placed a handgun to Rose V.’s head; when she screamed to warn Stopher she was 
ordered to shut up.  Joseph stayed in the living room guarding Rose V. with a 
 
 
48
handgun while defendant forced his way through the locked door of the master 
bathroom and fatally shot Stopher with the 12-gauge shotgun.  There is no suggestion 
that any appreciable time elapsed between the time defendant and Joseph forced 
their entry into Rose V.’s home and subdued her and defendant’s forcible entry into 
the master bathroom where he killed Stopher.  Indeed, defendant observes in his 
opening brief that the killing of Stopher “coincided with the burglary.” 
Defendant’s assertion that his intentional killing of Stopher was unrelated to 
the burglary perpetrated with reference to Rose V. is therefore meritless, and his 
lengthy discourse on why the felony-murder instructions should be found prejudicial 
is unavailing.  He further urges that felony murder is inapplicable “where the 
independent intent to kill exists prior to or coincides with the commission of the 
predicate felony, [because] the killing is not committed during commission of the 
felony.”  Putting aside the fact that defendant claimed at trial he did not harbor intent 
to kill Stopher when he first entered the residence, it is clear that concurrent intent 
to kill and to commit the target felony or felonies does not undermine the basis for a 
felony-murder conviction.  (See, e.g., People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 607-
609; People v. Murtishaw (1981) 29 Cal.3d 733, 752.) 
Felony murder was a viable theory of Stopher’s murder and the jury was 
properly instructed as much. 
6.  Refusal of pinpoint voluntary manslaughter instruction 
The trial court gave the standard instructions on voluntary manslaughter and 
the requisite provocation necessary to reduce murder to manslaughter.  Defendant 
argues the court erred in refusing to additionally give three pinpoint manslaughter 
instructions proposed by the defense. 
The first, entitled “Manslaughter,” would have told the jury, “When the charge 
is intentional murder (as distinguished from felony murder), evidence that the 
 
 
49
defendant committed the homicide in a heat of passion, or evidence that by reason of 
mental disease, mental defect or intoxication he lacked capacity to harbor malice, 
may form the basis for a voluntary manslaughter verdict.” 
The second, entitled “Manslaughter:  Heat of Passion Defined,” would have 
told the jury, “The term ‘passion’ as used in the phrase ‘heat of passion’ need not 
mean rage or anger, but may be any violent, intense, high-wrought, or enthusiastic 
emotion, other than a passion for revenge, and includes a ‘passion’ which might be 
induced by a victim’s long-continued provocating [sic] conduct which causes a ‘long 
smoldering resentment’ on the part of the defendant towards the victim.” 
The third, entitled “Manslaughter:  Verbal Provocation,” would have told the 
jury, “To satisfy the objective or ‘reasonable person’ element of voluntary 
manslaughter, the accused’s heat of passion must be due to sufficient provocation.  
Verbal provocation may be sufficient.” 
The first instruction was, of course, properly rejected insofar as it misstated 
the law by invoking the defense of diminished capacity, which had been abolished by 
the Legislature.  (People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1013-1014; People v. 
Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1114.)8  The court refused the remaining two 
requested instructions, finding the standard instructions on voluntary manslaughter 
fully and adequately advised the jury on provocation and heat of passion. 
A criminal defendant is entitled, on request, to instructions that pinpoint the 
theory of the defense case.  (People v. Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1119; People v. 
Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1137; People v. Sears (1970) 2 Cal.3d 180, 190.)  
Here, defendant’s second requested instruction, entitled “Manslaughter:  Heat of 
                                                 
8  
The jury was properly instructed it could consider evidence of defendant’s 
mental defect or disorder to determine whether he actually formed the mental state 
required for specified crimes, including murder and manslaughter.  (See CALJIC 
No. 3.32.) 
 
 
50
Passion Defined,” appears derived from language in our past decisions.  (See, e.g., 
People v. Berry (1976) 18 Cal.3d 509, 515; People v. Borchers (1958) 50 Cal.2d 
321, 329; see also People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1251-1254 (Steele) 
[rejecting claim that similar pinpoint instruction should have been given because 
evidence failed to support giving of any heat of passion instruction].)  Some Courts 
of Appeal have concluded a trial court should not give such an instruction on request; 
others have determined such an instruction can and should be given if requested.  
(See, e.g., People v. Rupe (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1537, 1540-1542 [instruction 
should not be given even if requested]; cf. People v. Thompkins (1987) 195 
Cal.App.3d 244, 256-257 [instruction permitted]; see Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at 
p. 1252.)  In People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, this court found it error to 
refuse a requested pinpoint manslaughter instruction, explaining that “legally 
adequate provocation could occur over a considerable period of time,” although in 
Wharton the error was found harmless.  (Id. at pp. 571-572.) 
As explained in Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pages 1252-1253, however:  
“Since its adoption in 1872, section 192, subdivision (a), has described voluntary 
manslaughter as the unlawful killing ‘upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.’ . . .  
Also since its adoption in 1872, section 188 has stated that malice is implied ‘when 
no considerable provocation appears.’  (See People v. Williams (1969) 71 Cal.2d 
614, 623-624.)  Under this language, ‘[e]vidence of adequate provocation overcomes 
the presumption of malice.’  (Id. at p. 624.)  Accordingly, for voluntary 
manslaughter, ‘provocation and heat of passion must be affirmatively demonstrated.’  
(People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 719; see also People v. Breverman 
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 163.) 
“The heat of passion requirement for manslaughter has both a subjective and 
an objective component.  (People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 326-327.)  
The defendant must actually, subjectively, kill under the heat of passion.  (Id. at 
 
 
51
p. 327.)  But the circumstances giving rise to the heat of passion are also viewed 
objectively.  As we explained long ago in interpreting the same language of section 
192, ‘this heat of passion must be such a passion as would naturally be aroused in the 
mind of an ordinarily reasonable person under the given facts and circumstances,’ 
because ‘no defendant may set up his own standard of conduct and justify or excuse 
himself because in fact his passions were aroused, unless further the jury believe 
that the facts and circumstances were sufficient to arouse the passions of the 
ordinarily reasonable man.’  (People v. Logan (1917) 175 Cal. 45, 49.)”  (Steele, 
supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 1252-1253.) 
“To satisfy the objective or ‘reasonable person’ element of this form of 
voluntary manslaughter, the accused’s heat of passion must be due to ‘sufficient 
provocation.’ ”  (People v. Wickersham, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 326.) 
Although the trial court in this case instructed the jury on heat of passion 
voluntary manslaughter, it clearly did so out of an abundance of caution, as the 
evidence, in our view, arguably could not satisfy the requirement of provocation.  
Defendant planned the trip to Hesperia and outfitted himself with the weapons and 
items he would need to surprise his victims and ensure their demise.  He calmly 
waited in Jones’s van in the vicinity of Rose V.’s residence until Rose V. and Stopher 
returned home.  He gained entry to the home by ruse, quickly subdued his second 
wife, proceeded directly to the master bathroom, broke down the locked door, and 
fatally shot Stopher, who was in the shower, with several shotgun blasts.  If anything, 
defendant appears to have acted out of a passion for revenge, which will not serve to 
reduce murder to manslaughter.  Although the defense evidence was probative of 
whether defendant subjectively killed in the heat of passion, from an objective 
standpoint, the evidence arguably did not establish the requisite provocation 
necessary for conviction of voluntary manslaughter, rather than murder.  Since 
defendant was given the benefit of the doubt and standard manslaughter instructions 
 
 
52
were given, the court did not have to give yet additional instructions on the point.  
(People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1129-1130.) 
Beyond that, the standard manslaughter instructions given adequately covered 
the valid points in the proposed pinpoint manslaughter instructions.  (See CALJIC 
Nos. 8.40 [voluntary manslaughter defined], 8.42 [sudden quarrel or heat of passion 
and provocation defined], 8.43 [defining cooling-off period], 8.44 [no one specific 
emotion alone constitutes heat of passion], and 8.50 [distinguishing murder from 
manslaughter].)  Most importantly, even were we to conclude on this record that a 
pinpoint instruction should have been given explaining that legally adequate 
provocation can occur over a considerable period of time, the error would be 
harmless, as “nothing in [the standard instructions given] precluded the jury from 
finding adequate provocation resulting from conduct occuring over a considerable 
period of time,” and counsel’s argument to the jury fully explicated the defense 
theme of long-standing provocation in connection with the Stopher murder charge.  
(People v. Wharton, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 572.)  For the same reasons, it was not 
error to refuse to specially instruct the jury that words themselves can constitute 
sufficient provocation—the essence of defendant’s third requested and rejected 
pinpoint instruction. 
7.  Refusal of involuntary manslaughter instructions 
Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing his request that the jury 
be instructed on involuntary manslaughter in connection with Stopher’s murder.  
Section 192, subdivision (b), defines involuntary manslaughter as the unlawful 
killing of a human being without malice “in the commission of an unlawful act, not 
amounting to felony; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce 
death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection. . . .”  
Defendant’s theory below was that the jury could have found he brandished the 
murder weapon (the shotgun), a misdemeanor (§ 417, subdivision (a)(2)), and 
 
 
53
thereby found that he killed Stopher in the commission of an unlawful act not 
amounting to felony—i.e., misdemeanor brandishing of a firearm. 
Generally, involuntary manslaughter is a lesser offense included within the 
offense of murder.  (People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 274.)  Due 
process requires that the jury be instructed on a lesser included offense only when 
the evidence warrants such an instruction.  (Hopper v. Evans (1982) 456 U.S. 605, 
611; People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 424; People v. Kaurish, supra, 52 
Cal.3d at p. 696.)  Refusal to instruct on involuntary manslaughter in connection with 
the murder of Stopher was manifestly not error on these facts.  At trial, defendant 
testified he “fired” the shotgun at Stopher because Stopher “took [his] wife.”  In his 
opening brief before this court, defendant observes that “the shooting of Stopher . . . 
resulted from intentional conduct of [defendant] directed at Stopher as the 
objective. . . .”  The trial court correctly concluded the evidence did not warrant 
instruction on involuntary manslaughter.  Even were it otherwise, the fact that the 
jury rejected manslaughter and found defendant guilty of the first degree murder of 
Stopher precludes any possible error in the refusal to instruct on involuntary 
manslaughter.  (People v. Prettyman, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 276.) 
8.  Prosecutorial misconduct (guilt phase) 
Defendant complains of four alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct 
at the guilt phase.  “Prosecutors have wide latitude to discuss and draw inferences 
from the evidence at trial.”  (People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 522.)  
“Whether the inferences the prosecutor draws are reasonable is for the jury to 
decide.”  (Ibid.)  In order to preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for appeal, 
the defense must make a timely objection at trial and request an admonition.  
(People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 858; People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 
820.)  In the absence of a timely objection the claim is reviewable only if an 
 
 
54
admonition would not have otherwise cured the harm caused by the misconduct.  
(People v. Earp, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 858.) 
Defendant first urges us to find misconduct in the prosecutor’s cross-
examination of defense witness Kay Zenk.  Zenk testified her husband and defendant 
participated together in an alcohol- and drug-treatment program at a Veteran’s 
Administration hospital in 1984.  At that time she learned defendant would be going 
to prison.  Thereafter, Zenk and her husband visited defendant in prison.  Zenk 
testified defendant cared very much for his daughter and had a good relationship with 
his wife, Rose V., but that after the couple was going to get a divorce, defendant 
changed to a man with no purpose in life whose spirit was gone.  In an apparent 
attempt to rebut the defense suggestion that defendant was a caring and loving 
husband and father, the prosecutor cross-examined Zenk about the circumstance that 
defendant never spoke about his other children.  When the prosecutor then sought to 
question Zenk about whether defendant had told her of his belief that Rose V. had 
given birth to their daughter “just to trap him,” and that he did not want the baby and 
wanted Rose V. to get an abortion, defense counsel’s objections to the line of 
inquiry were sustained.  In front of the jury, the court admonished the prosecutor that 
there was no evidence on the subject matter of his inquiries.  The prosecutor 
asserted he had the evidence, but when he apparently pointed to a document, the 
court stated “that’s not evidence” and cautioned him against “that type of nonsense.”  
A mistrial motion based on the sustained objection was thereafter denied. 
Perhaps the prosecutor was alluding to the contents of a letter defendant 
wrote to Rose V. while he was in prison, or a letter he received from her, because 
the court immediately told the prosecutor he would be allowed to recall Rose V. on 
rebuttal to testify directly about the matters he was trying to explore through his 
 
 
55
cross-examination of Zenk.9  The prosecutor was of course entitled to seek to rebut 
the defense’s portrayal of defendant as a loving husband and father who would not 
have killed had Rose V. not betrayed him.  Nevertheless, it is error to seek to use 
hearsay as a substitute for properly admitted evidence.  But defense counsel’s 
contemporaneous objection to the line of inquiry was sustained, and the jury heard 
the court admonish the prosecutor that no evidence had been introduced as a 
foundation for the questions.  The prosecutor’s transgression was minor, and any 
possible prejudice was avoided through the admonition given.  In light of the 
properly admitted evidence that already cast serious doubt on defendant’s role as a 
good husband and father (e.g., defendant’s self-admitted acts of kidnapping his 
second wife after killing her lover, and his involving Joseph in the murderous plot 
and then aiding and abetting him in the rape of Rose V), the error was harmless. 
Defendant next assigns as prosecutorial misconduct questions on cross-
examination designed to elicit the fact that he was found in possession of drugs and 
prescription medications unlawfully obtained by him from other inmates in the 
county jail.  Several objections to this line of inquiry were sustained, others were 
overruled.  Defense counsel again sought a mistrial, arguing the prosecutor’s 
questions regarding defendant’s unlawful possession of drugs and medications while 
in jail had “no relevance to the charges in this case and were designed strictly to 
embarrass and somehow paint [defendant] in a negative light. . . .”  The court 
ultimately overruled defense counsel’s objections and denied the motion for a 
mistrial.  We find no error in the ruling.  A prosecutor is permitted wide scope in the 
cross-examination of a criminal defendant who elects to take the stand.  (People v. 
                                                 
9  
Subsequent to Zenk’s testimony, defendant was cross examined about the 
circumstances characterizing his marriage to Rose V. prior to his going to prison in 
1984.  Defendant believed it was Rose V. who accused him of making the statement 
that she had only gone through with the birth of their daughter in order to trap him. 
 
 
56
Mayfield (1996) 14 Cal.4th 668, 754.)  Defendant testified on direct examination 
that he used drugs with Jones and was involved in an attempted drug buy that aborted 
shortly before her death.  Defendant thereby opened the door to further inquiry 
concerning his admitted drug use.  In particular, the prosecution could seek to show 
that defendant’s possession and hoarding of drugs and medications while in the 
county jail was possibly probative on his performance on brain performance tests 
administered to him by defense expert Dr. Pursich while he was in the county jail.  
The prosecutor elicited from defendant the fact that he was on Motrin at the time he 
was interviewed by Dr. Pursich, and that he was found in possession of 74 Dilantin 
pills, a seizure medication that affects the brain, on August 24, 1989.  (Brain 
function tests were performed on defendant in the latter part of 1989, including an 
MRI on November 10, 1989.) 
Defendant also contends it was misconduct for the prosecutor, on cross 
examination, to ask his first wife if defendant had ever beaten her in the past.  His 
first wife, Joseph’s mother, testified defendant came to her house on the night of 
October 30, 1986, in the company of another Hispanic male, that defendant appeared 
intoxicated, but that she did not fear defendant at that time.  The prosecutor 
impeached her with her testimony from Joseph’s juvenile court trial that she feared 
defendant on that date.  When she claimed she could not recall her prior testimony, 
the prosecutor asked her if defendant had ever beaten her in the past.  At that point a 
defense objection to the line of inquiry was sustained.  We find no prejudicial 
misconduct.  The first wife had also testified in juvenile court that when defendant 
entered her house on the night of October 30, 1986, he pushed her aside.  Moreover, 
the jury was instructed that counsel’s questions are not evidence (CALJIC No. 1.02), 
and they were already fully aware, from defendant’s own testimony, that he had 
kidnapped Rose V., his second wife, after killing Stopher, her live-in partner, with a 
 
 
57
shotgun; that he fired shots at Officer Dunavent during the gun battle that led to his 
arrest; and that he was thus capable of great violence. 
Last, defendant argues the prosecutor committed misconduct during cross-
examination of Dr. Pursich through “improper belittlement and disparagement” of 
the defense expert.  To the extent defendant failed to object to the specific questions 
he now assigns as misconduct, he has waived the claim on appeal.  In any event, the 
record reveals no misconduct in the cross-examination of Dr. Pursich.  In particular, 
there was no impropriety in the prosecutor’s cross-examining Dr. Pursich in an 
effort to clarify his direct examination testimony and learn in how many past cases 
he had testified for the defense and found the defendants to be suffering from brain 
damage. 
C.  Special Circumstance Issues 
1.  Constitutionality of lying-in-wait special circumstance 
Defendant contends the special circumstance of lying in wait is 
unconstitutional because there is no significant distinction between the theory of 
first degree murder by lying in wait (i.e., one of the theories of the Stopher murder) 
and the special circumstance of lying in wait, and that the special circumstance 
therefore fails to meaningfully narrow death eligibility.  We have repeatedly rejected 
the same contention with respect to analogous facts and circumstances—see, e.g., 
People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 155; People v. Sims, supra, 5 Cal.4th at 
page 434; People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 322-323; People v. Wader 
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 669; People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 824; People 
v. Edelbacher, supra, 47 Cal.3d at page 1023; People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 
527, 557-558—and do so again here. 
“[M]urder by means of lying in wait requires only a wanton and reckless intent 
to inflict injury likely to cause death.  (People v. Ruiz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 589, 614; 
 
 
58
People v. Atchley (1959) 53 Cal.2d 160, 175, fn. 4 . . . .)”  (People v. Webster 
(1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 448.)10  In contrast, the lying-in-wait special circumstance 
requires “an intentional murder, committed under circumstances which include (1) a 
concealment of purpose, (2) a substantial period of watching and waiting for an 
opportune time to act, and (3) immediately thereafter, a surprise attack on an 
unsuspecting victim from a position of advantage . . . .”  (People v. Morales, supra, 
48 Cal.3d at p. 557; People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 388; People v. 
Sims, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 432.)  Furthermore, the lying-in-wait special 
circumstance requires “that the killing take place during the period of concealment 
and watchful waiting, an aspect of the special circumstance distinguishable from a 
murder perpetrated by means of lying in wait, or following premeditation and 
deliberation.  (People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1022.)”  (People v. 
Sims, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 434.) 
The distinguishing factors identified in Morales and Sims that characterize 
the lying-in-wait special circumstance constitute “clear and specific requirements 
that sufficiently distinguish from other murders a murder committed while the 
perpetrator is lying in wait, so as to justify the classification of that type of case as 
one warranting imposition of the death penalty.”  (People v. Sims, supra, 5 Cal.4th 
at p. 434.) 
2.  Insufficiency of evidence of lying in wait 
Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to establish that he 
murdered Stopher by means of lying in wait (an alternate theory to felony murder 
and premeditated and deliberate first degree murder under count II) and the related 
                                                 
10  
This is so because lying in wait as a theory of murder is “the functional 
equivalent of proof of premeditation, deliberation and intent to kill” (People v. Ruiz, 
supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 614, and cases cited; see § 189); hence, “a showing of lying in 
wait obviates the necessity of separately proving premeditation and deliberation 
. . . .”  (People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 162.) 
 
 
59
special circumstance finding that he murdered Stopher while lying in wait.  We 
disagree.  As in People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at page 388, “[w]e focus on 
the special circumstance because it contains the more stringent requirements.  
[(People v. Ceja (1993)  4 Cal.4th 1134, 1140, fn. 2.)]  If, as we find, the evidence 
supports the special circumstance, it necessarily supports the [lying-in-wait] theory 
of first degree murder.” 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, as we must, 
the evidence showed defendant planned the trip to Hesperia and that he intended to 
do harm to both Stopher and Rose V.  It further showed he and Joseph waited in 
Jones’s van for up to several hours while parked on a hill close to the Montrose 
Street house, waiting for Rose V. and Stopher to come home.  Indeed, defendant 
managed to converse with a member of the Hesperia Fire Department, who had 
approached them while they were parked in the van to inquire about a report of 
children playing in the area with fireworks, without disclosing his true murderous 
intentions.  When Rose V. and Stopher finally arrived home, defendant and Joseph 
surprised Rose V. by wearing masks (it was Halloween) to gain easy entry into the 
home by ruse.  Once inside, defendant wasted no time in subduing Rose V., directing 
Joseph to hold a gun to her head, and proceeding straight to the master bathroom 
where he broke down the locked door and fatally shot Stopher, who was in the 
shower, with several shotgun blasts to the head and torso.11 
We find the evidence plainly established that defendant intentionally 
murdered Stopher under circumstances that included a concealment of purpose, a 
                                                 
11  
Although defendant testified that when he broke through the bathroom door 
with shotgun in hand Stopher began screaming at him to get out of the house, and 
threatening him, the trial court later astutely observed, in the course of denying the 
automatic motion to modify the death verdict, that the photographs of the murder 
scene revealed only one of the sliding glass shower doors had been shattered by the 
gun blasts, leading to an inference that Stopher was showering behind the closed 
glass doors when defendant first opened fire. 
 
 
60
substantial period of watching and waiting for an opportune time to act, and, 
immediately thereafter, a surprise attack on his unsuspecting victims from a position 
of advantage.  (People v. Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 557.) 
3.  Cumulative effect of guilt phase and special-circumstance phase 
errors 
Defendant contends that even if we find no individual error in the guilt phase 
to have been prejudicial, the cumulative effect of all the errors he has identified 
requires reversal.  (See, e.g., People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 844-845.)  
Having found no prejudicial error at the guilt phase, there is no cumulative prejudice 
to assess. 
D.  Penalty Phase Issues 
1.  Constitutionality of California death penalty statute 
Defendant urges that California’s death penalty law violates the Fifth, Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution because (1) section 190.3, 
factors (a) and (b) are unconstitutionally vague, (2) there is no guidance regarding 
which circumstances are aggravating and which are mitigating, (3) irrelevant factors 
are not deleted, leading jurors to believe that the absence of mitigating factors is 
itself aggravating, (4) the jury is not required to make findings on which factors it is 
relying upon to impose death, (5) the jury is not required to unanimously agree on 
applicable aggravating factors, and (6) there is no requirement that death be found 
appropriate beyond a reasonable doubt.  Defendant acknowledges we have in past 
cases rejected each of these challenges to this state’s death penalty statute.  We do 
so again here, finding no reason to reconsider those prior decisions. 
Defendant’s claim that the death penalty law is unconstitutional because 
section 190.3, factors (a) and (b) are unconstitutionally vague has been repeatedly 
rejected by this court.  (See, e.g., People v. Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1246; 
People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 964; see also Tuilaepa v. California 
 
 
61
(1994) 512 U.S. 967.)  His claim that the death penalty law is unconstitutional 
because there is no guidance regarding which circumstances are aggravating and 
which are mitigating has likewise been rejected by this court.  (See, e.g., People v. 
Mayfield, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 806; People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 879, 919.)  
His claim that the death penalty law is unconstitutional because irrelevant factors are 
not deleted, leading jurors to believe that the absence of mitigating factors is itself 
aggravating, has repeatedly been rejected.  (See, e.g., People v. Raley, supra, 2 
Cal.4th at p. 919; People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 104-105.)  Defendant’s 
remaining claims, that the death penalty law is unconstitutional because the jury is 
not required to make findings on which factors it is relying upon to impose death, to 
unanimously agree on applicable aggravating factors, or to find death appropriate 
beyond a reasonable doubt, have likewise each been considered and rejected by this 
court in previous cases.  (See, e.g., People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 404-
406; People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 991-993.) 
2.  Factor (b) aggravating evidence 
Defendant challenges several aspects of the penalty phase instructions and 
arguments related to section 190.3, factor (b) (“The presence or absence of criminal 
activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or 
violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence.”).  Three 
instances of criminal activity involving the use or attempted use of force or violence 
or the express or implied threat to use force or violence were introduced in 
aggravation of penalty under factor (b).  These were: 
“(1)  Possession of a Deadly Weapon in a Jail, to wit:  razor blades, on April 
26, 1990, in violation of Penal Code section 4574; 
“(2)  Threatening an Executive Officer, to wit:  Deputy Shafia, on April 26, 
1990, in violation of Penal Code section 69; 
 
 
62
“(3)  Assault with a Deadly Weapon, to wit:  a vehicle, on February 14, 1984, 
in violation of Penal Code section 245. . . .” 
Defendant contends there was no evidence that the razor blades he possessed 
in jail were dangerous weapons, or that he used or threatened the use of force in 
connection with possessing them.  He argues that “as a matter of law” his possession 
of the razor blades could not constitute a violation of section 4574 or properly serve 
as evidence in aggravation under section 190.3, factor (b).  He is wrong on both 
scores. 
Section 4574 provides, in pertinent part, “any person who, while lawfully 
confined in a jail . . . possesses therein any . . . deadly weapon, . . . is guilty of a 
felony. . . .”  Deputy Shafia testified that during a search of defendant’s jail cell on 
April 26, 1990, six loose razor blades, and two additional safety razor heads 
containing blades, were found “located throughout his cell, randomly placed.”  
Deputy Shafia testified inmates are allowed to keep up to two safety razors in their 
cells for shaving, that the jail rules do not allow them to take apart the safety razors 
or remove the blades, and that homemade “slashing” weapons are commonly 
constructed by removing such blades and melting them into a plastic toothbrush 
handle or similar object.  Deputy Shafia testified further that defendant appeared 
upset that the search was being undertaken, and “right in the middle of it” defendant 
stated to him, in an angry voice, “I’m going to get the gas chamber and before I leave 
here I’m going to take out a deputy.” 
The evidence that defendant possessed numerous razor blades that had been 
removed from safety razors in the manner commonly used to construct jailhouse 
weapons, and placed “randomly” throughout his cell, all in contravention of jailhouse 
rules, constituted a violation of section 4574.  Although defendant was not observed 
using the razor blades as deadly weapons, his possession of the blades, and their 
placement throughout the cell (supportive of inferences that defendant wanted to be 
 
 
63
able to gain easy access to the blades from anywhere in his cell, or alternatively, that 
if his cell was searched it would be less likely that all the blades would be found) was 
sufficient to support an inference that they were being possessed for use as deadly 
weapons.  Defendant’s assertion that there was no direct evidence he actually 
intended to “manufacture a weapon” (i.e., affix handles to the blades) does not 
undermine our conclusion that a violation of section 4574 was demonstrated. 
Defendant’s possession of the razor blades for use as deadly weapons was 
validly considered as evidence in aggravation under section 190.3, factor (b), as it 
constituted “criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted 
use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence.”  
(See People v. Tuilaepa, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 589 [“a defendant’s knowing 
possession of a potentially dangerous weapon [here, loose razor blades] in custody is 
admissible under factor (b)”].)  The circumstance that defendant voiced a threat to 
“take out” Deputy Shafia or another jailhouse deputy while the search was underway 
further serves to characterize defendant’s possession of the contraband as an implied 
threat to use force or violence. 
Defendant further contends that as a matter of law his threat voiced to Deputy 
Shafia could not constitute a violation of section 69 or properly serve as evidence in 
aggravation under section 190.3, factor (b).  Again, he is mistaken. 
Section 69, in pertinent part, proscribes “attempts, by means of any threat or 
violence, to deter or prevent any executive officer from performing any duty 
imposed upon such officer by law . . . in the performance of his duty . . . .”  Deputy 
Shafia testified defendant was upset that the search of his cell was being undertaken, 
and “right in the middle of it” defendant stated to him, in an angry voice, “I’m going 
to get the gas chamber and before I leave here I’m going to take out a deputy.” 
Deputy Shafia was an executive officer within the meaning of section 69, and 
to the extent his official duties included overseeing the custody and control of 
 
 
64
defendant and his fellow inmates, a threat to kill a deputy constituted an attempt to 
deter or prevent Deputy Shafia from performing his official duties.  In any event, we 
agree with respondent that, “In the factual context in which the threat was made by 
[defendant], it is reasonable to infer [defendant’s] threat to kill a deputy was made 
with the intent to deter or prevent Deputies Shafia and Spencer from performing 
their duties related to the search.”  The fact that Deputy Shafia testified he did not 
take the threat personally does not undermine this conclusion—a violation of 
section 69 does not require a showing of the state of mind of the recipient of the 
threat.  (Cf. § 71 [threatening public employees and officers and school officials]; 
see People v. Tuilaepa, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 590.) 
Defendant observes that a violation of section 69 requires a specific intent to 
interfere with the executive officer’s performance of his duties (see People v. 
Patino (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 11, 27), and that the jury was not so instructed.  
Although specific instruction on the elements of other crimes introduced in 
aggravation under section 190.3, factor (b) is generally not required (see People v. 
Osband (1996) 13 Cal4th 622, 711), here the jury was instructed, through the 
language of CALJIC No. 3.30 (concurrence of act and general criminal intent), that 
general criminal intent was required for the crime of threatening an executive 
officer within the meaning of section 69.  The error, however, was clearly harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  There was evidence that defendant harbored the requisite 
specific intent.  Under the factual circumstances in which the threat was made (“right 
in the middle” of the search, and in an angry tone of voice), it is reasonable to infer 
the threat was intended to deter or prevent Deputy Shafia and his partner from 
performing their duties related to the ongoing search of defendant’s cell.  That 
evidence notwithstanding, given defendant’s attempted murder of Officer Dunavent 
by placing a gun to his head and pulling the trigger, and his prior conviction of assault 
with a deadly weapon on a peace officer in 1984, any misinstruction on the intent 
 
 
65
element of a violation of section 69 in connection with factor (b) was clearly 
harmless. 
Last, defendant contends the trial court erroneously allowed “double-
counting” of evidence of his 1984 prior conviction of assault with a deadly weapon 
(vehicle) on a peace officer under section 190.3, factors (b) and (c).  We have, 
however, in many past cases held that such double-counting is generally permissible, 
as each factor has a separate purpose.  (See, e.g., People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 
495, 549; People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 472; People v. Fierro (1991) 1 
Cal.4th 173, 230; People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 764.)  Moreover, there is 
no merit to defendant’s claim that the manner in which evidence of the prior 
conviction and evidence of the facts of the crime underlying the prior conviction was 
presented to the jury caused them to believe that evidence of two separate assault 
crimes was being offered in aggravation.  It is true that the prosecutor asked the 
court to instruct on the elements of assault with a deadly weapon generally, rather 
than assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer, apparently for the purpose of 
avoiding undue confusion.  However, the prosecution and defense twice stipulated at 
trial to the fact of the prior conviction, and the evidence presented at the penalty 
phase made it abundantly clear that the prior assault with a deadly weapon conviction 
to which defendant stipulated was based on the same assault with a deadly weapon on 
a peace officer in 1984 about which further factual evidence was being presented 
under factor (b). 
3.  Prosecutorial misconduct (penalty phase) 
We have already rejected defendant’s claim that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct in his cross-examination of several defense witnesses, including 
defendant himself, at the guilt phase.  Defendant also argues that the prosecutor 
committed misconduct in his arguments to the jury at the penalty phase.  Defendant, 
however, made no objection at any point during the prosecutor’s penalty phase 
 
 
66
arguments.  Accordingly, he has waived any claim of prosecutorial misconduct on 
appeal.  (People v. Osband, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 717.)  Nor was defense counsel 
ineffective for failing to raise any objections since, as next explained, the 
prosecutor’s arguments complained of, for the first time on appeal, were proper 
statements of the law and fair comment on the evidence. 
Defendant first argues the prosecutor misled the jury about the scope and 
nature of section 190.3, factor (a) by implying that factor (a) evidence could only be 
aggravating and not mitigating.  A review of the prosecutor’s argument regarding 
factor (a) reveals the prosecutor did not tell the jury, expressly or implicitly, that 
factor (a) evidence could never be mitigating, but only that the evidence of the 
crimes in this case was overwhelmingly aggravating.  The prosecutor emphasized that 
defendant committed two murders and a kidnapping, aided and abetted his 15-year-
old son in the rape of his second wife, and attempted to kill a police officer to avoid 
arrest.  He argued that Jones’s murder by slow strangulation with a garrote applied 
from behind was “a slow agonizing way of killing a person,” which reflected “a 
particular extreme type of depravity, an abandonment of human values,” as did 
defendant’s determination to involve his 15 year-old son in the planned crime spree.  
We deem these fair comment on the evidence under factor (a), and not misconduct. 
Defendant claims the prosecutor misstated the law in his argument to the jury 
regarding section 190.3, factors (e), (f), (g), and (j).  He urges, “a reasonable juror 
would conclude that if the evidence did not show factors (e), (f), (g), and (j) to exist 
as mitigation, as the prosecutor stated, those factors must aggravate, as the 
prosecutor intended to imply.”  A close reading of this claim reveals defendant is 
merely restating his belief, in the context of a challenge to the prosecutor’s 
arguments, that the law should require the various penalty factors under section 
190.3 to be specifically defined for the jury as aggravating or mitigating.  As we have 
explained, that is not the law.  (See ante, at p. 53; People v. Mayfield, supra, 14 
 
 
67
Cal.4th at p. 806; People v. Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 919.)  In each instance 
complained of, the prosecutor simply urged the jury to find there was no mitigating 
evidence under any of the four factors.  Thus, the prosecutor argued the murder 
victims were not participants in defendant’s homicidal conduct, nor did they consent 
to their own homicidal acts (factor (e)); that defendant’s crimes were not committed 
under circumstances which he reasonably believed to be a moral justification or 
extenuation for his conduct (factor (f)); that defendant did not act under extreme 
duress or under the substantial domination of another person (factor (g)); and that 
defendant was not an accomplice to the murders (with the exception of the rape of 
Rose V.), nor was his participation in their commission relatively minor (factor (j)). 
The prosecutor did not affirmatively tell the jury that the absence of 
mitigating evidence under any of these factors meant the factors should be viewed or 
counted as aggravating.  As we explained in People v. Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th at 
page 1095, “A reasonable juror would have understood and employed the language to 
mean nothing more objectionable than the tautology that the absence of mitigation is 
the absence of mitigation.”  Defendant acknowledges our observation in Berryman 
but urges it is illogical and wrong.  We decline his invitation to reconsider it. 
Defendant also contends the prosecutor improperly argued to the jury that his 
kidnapping of V. and his attempt to murder Officer Dunavent were aggravating 
“circumstances of the crime” under section 190.3, factor (a).  Defendant essentially 
reasserts his claim that factor (a) is unconstitutionally vague because “the jury is 
given no guidance regarding the time and space components of the ‘circumstances’ 
of the crime.”  We reject defendant’s suggestion that his kidnapping of Rose V. and 
his attempted murder of Officer Dunavent were not relevant and admissible under 
factor (a).  The jury convicted him of those crimes as well as the two murders, and 
they were patently part of the “circumstances of the crime” (factor (a)) that the jury 
was entitled to consider in deliberation of penalty. 
 
 
68
Finally, we reject defendant’s further argument that the prosecutor 
improperly sought “to bolster a weak, circumstantial case” by telling the jury 
defendant killed Jones for her van and to silence her because she knew of his plans.  
Defendant’s use of the van to carry out his murderous plans was itself circumstantial 
evidence of his motive to kill Jones.  His assertion on appeal that there was no 
evidence to support the prosecutor’s argument that he may have killed Jones to 
silence her because she knew of his criminal plans is belied by his own trial 
testimony:  he testified he had told Jones the entire truth about his plans.  Moreover, 
the circumstance that defendant’s written notes outlining his criminal intentions 
were among his personal effects stored in the van, together with his own testimony 
that his belongings appeared to have been searched when he discovered the van in the 
motel parking lot on the afternoon of October 31, 1986, supports an inference that 
Jones was murdered when she learned of defendant’s true intentions.  However 
Jones may have learned of defendant’s criminal plans, the prosecutor’s argument that 
defendant killed her to silence her was fair comment on the evidence and not 
misconduct. 
4.  Ineffective assistance of counsel (penalty phase) 
We have rejected defendant’s guilt phase claim that the trial court erred in 
excluding third party culpability evidence regarding the murder of Jones.  (Ante, at 
pp. 40-45.)  Defendant argues further that defense counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance by failing to pursue the admission of third party culpability evidence at the 
penalty phase as mitigating evidence.  We do not agree. 
In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must first 
show that his or her counsel’s performance was “deficient” because counsel’s 
“representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness . . . under 
prevailing professional norms.”  (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 
687-688; People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 925.)  Second, the defendant 
 
 
69
must demonstrate prejudice flowing from counsel’s act or omission—i.e., a 
“reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  (In re Sixto (1989) 48 Cal.3d 
1247, 1257, quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694.)  “Finally, it must also be 
shown that the [act or] omission was not attributable to a tactical decision which a 
reasonably competent, experienced criminal defense attorney would make.”  (In re 
Sixto, supra, at p. 1257.) 
Contrary to defendant’s assertion, we conclude defense counsel was not 
ineffective in failing to seek to introduce third party culpability evidence in 
mitigation at the penalty phase.  First, to the extent the defense did present evidence 
at the guilt phase regarding the failed drug transaction involving Jones, defendant, 
and a person named Pablo, all such evidence by stipulation was available for 
consideration by the jury at the penalty phase.  This included defendant’s testimony 
that Jones supposedly owed a large debt related to a drug transaction, that she had 
been threatened by her drug suppliers, and that she had enlisted the services of 
defendant to protect her.  In any case, given that the jury at the guilt phase had plainly 
rejected defendant’s claim that he was uninvolved in Jones’s murder by convicting 
him of the murder, defense counsel had an obvious tactical reason for refraining 
from once again urging the jury at the penalty phase to find that Pablo or some other 
third party had killed Jones.  It is not reasonably probable that defense counsel’s 
determination not to pursue the theme of third party culpability for Jones’s murder 
with any more vigor at the penalty phase prejudiced the penalty verdict.  (Strickland 
v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 690-691.) 
5.  Evidentiary ruling:  cross-examination of expert witness 
Defendant contends a ruling by the trial court improperly permitted the 
prosecutor to cross-examine defense expert Jerry Enomoto, a former director of the 
 
 
70
Department of Corrections, with police reports of defendant’s prior arrest incidents 
(furnished to the defense through discovery) which, defendant argues, were 
inadmissible hearsay.  The reports recounted two arrests in 1975 and one in 1979 
during which defendant was drunk and verbally threatened officers, or fled and had to 
be forcibly taken into custody. 
“It is common practice to challenge an expert by inquiring in good faith about 
relevant information, including hearsay, which he may have overlooked or ignored.”  
(People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 924.)  The short answer to defendant’s 
contention is that there was no objection and, accordingly, any claim of error has 
been waived on appeal.  (People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 1014 [failure to 
object to prosecutor’s references to jailhouse reports].)  In any event, the record 
reflects the defense expressly agreed to a procedure whereby the prosecutor and 
defense counsel were afforded an opportunity to review the materials (which had 
been furnished to the defense through discovery, and which counsel had apparently 
failed to provide to his witness) in preparation for Enomoto’s cross-examination.  
Then, during a second recess, defense counsel, Enomoto, and defendant were 
afforded an opportunity to discuss the witness’s testimony, with defendant expressly 
agreeing to the strategy being utilized.  Finally, the jury was specially instructed that 
the reports in question were to be considered only for the purpose of determining 
the weight to be given Enomoto’s testimony, and not for the truth of the matters 
regarding defendant’s prior conduct reflected in the reports.  Even were the reports 
improperly considered for their content, the jury had already found defendant guilty 
of attempting to kill Officer Dunavent in the guilt phase and knew he had previously 
been convicted of aggravated assault on a police officer.  There was neither error nor 
prejudice. 
 
 
71
6.  Instructions pertaining to penalty phase deliberations 
Defendant contends it was error for the trial court to refuse certain of his 
specially proposed penalty phase instructions.  We find no error respecting any of 
the individual claims. 
First, the trial court properly rejected defendant’s specially proposed 
instruction that would have listed the evidence he viewed as mitigating.  The 
instruction was patently argumentative and, among other things, would have usurped 
the jury’s proper role as fact finder at the penalty phase.12  A capital  
                                                 
12  
The proposed instruction read as follows: 
 
“Evidence has been introduced showing the defendant, Isaac Gutierrez, Jr., 
was a caring human being by coming to the aid of 61 year old Lawrence Biedeback 
while being assaulted; helped save the life of Annabelle Hood’s three year old 
daughter; and voluntarily sought treatment at the V.A. Hospital to correct his alochol 
problem.  Evidence also showed that Mr. Gutierrez worked hard to advance his 14 
year career as a Fireman only to be victimized by discrimination and wrongfully 
terminated; was responding productively and positively to prison life when he was 
emotionally devastated by [Rose V.’s] surprise notice that she was abandoning him; 
experienced unbearable frustration when he asked the courts to help resolve a 
custody and property dispute, but was turned away; reacted with paralyzing panic as 
he watched somebody named John Stopher come from nowhere to take control of 
defendant’s home and defendant’s daughter; became irrationally obsessed with rage 
and hopelessness when he killed John Stopher; demonstrated spontaneous remorse 
at JFK Hospital and a serene remorse in a letter he wrote to his mother.  [¶]  
Evidence was introduced showing Mr. Gutierrez can function and be productive 
within the prison system for the rest of his life.  [¶]  The evidence was not offered as 
a legal excuse for the crimes.  [¶]  The evidence was solely offered to show 
circumstances extenuating (that is, ‘mitigating’) the gravity of the crimes and 
explaining the reasons for defendant’s behavior.  [¶]  If you are satisfied these 
circumstances mitigate the gravity of the crimes and are not substantially 
outweighed by the factors in aggravation, then you may impose a sentence of Life 
Without Possibility of Parole.” 
 
 
 
72
defendant is not entitled to unduly argumentative instructions in the penalty phase.  
(See People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 1003-1004.)  Although instructions 
pinpointing the theory of the defense might be appropriate, a defendant is not 
entitled to instructions that simply recite facts favorable to him.  (See People v. 
Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 805-806.) 
Next, defendant argues the court erred in refusing his specially proposed 
instruction that would have told the jury that life without the possibility of parole 
means “defendant will be imprisoned for the rest of his life,” and that imposition of 
the death penalty means “defendant will be executed.”  Although the court initially 
indicated it would consider giving the instruction, thereafter the court determined to 
reject the instruction but permit counsel to argue its substance before the jury.  This 
ruling was correct.  In People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, we upheld the 
rejection of a similarly worded instruction, finding it inaccurate and prone to inviting 
speculation.  (Id. at pp. 130-131; see also People v. Padilla (1995) 11 Cal.4th 895, 
971-972; People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 561-562 [trial court not 
required to instruct that life without possibility of parole means just that].)  
Thompson further indicated that counsel’s proper argument to the jury 
characterizing the full nature of a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of 
parole was permissible.  (People v. Thompson, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 131, fn. 29.) 
The trial court also refused defendant’s specially proposed instruction that 
would have told the jury, “If you have a reasonable doubt as to which penalty to 
impose, death or life in prison without the possibility of parole, you must give the 
defendant the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict fixing the penalty at life in 
prison without the possibility of parole.”  Defendant would next have us assign error 
to the court’s refusal to give the instruction, but it was properly refused as it was 
patently wrong.  “ ‘[W]e have consistently rejected the contention that the beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard applies to the process of penalty determination . . . .’ ”  
 
 
73
(People v. Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1101; see also People v. Mayfield, 
supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 806; People v. Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1244; People 
v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 782.) 
Defendant next argues it was error to refuse his specially proposed 
instruction that would have told the jury, “You are instructed that nothing I have said 
requires you to reach a verdict of which penalty to impose.  [¶]  The possibility of a 
hung jury is an inevitable by-product of the requirement that a verdict must be 
unanimous.”  The ruling was correct.  “[T]here is no duty to instruct a jury regarding 
its possible failure to reach a [penalty] verdict in the absence of a request by the jury 
for an explanation.”  (People v. Wader, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 664; see also People 
v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 227; People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at 
p. 105.) 
Defendant proposed a special “Concluding Instruction” that he would have 
substituted for the standard instruction defining the weighing process, CALJIC No. 
8.88.13  He now argues it was error to refuse the instruction because it was 
necessary to advise the jury that the result of the weighing process had to be a 
                                                 
13  
The proposed instruction read as follows: 
 
“After having heard all of the evidence, and after having heard and considered 
the arguments of counsel, you shall consider, take into account and be guided by the 
applicable factors of aggravating and mitigating circumstances upon which you have 
been instructed.  [¶]  If you conclude that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the 
mitigating circumstances and that the imposition of the death penalty in this case is 
justified and appropriate, you may impose a sentence of death.  [¶]  To return a death 
judgment, you must be persuaded that the aggravating evidence is so substantial in 
comparison with the mitigating evidence that it warrants death instead of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  [¶]  The weighing process is not 
mathematical or mechanic, but a means to reach a reasoned decision about the 
appropriate penalty.  [¶]  You are free to reject the death penalty in this case if you 
decide, based on any evidence presented, that it is not the appropriate punishment.” 
 
 
 
74
reasoned decision as to penalty, and that a single mitigating factor could be 
sufficient to reject the penalty of death. 
There was no error.  Nothing in the standard weighing instruction suggested 
to the jury that it could make an arbitrary decision as to penalty, as opposed to a 
“reasoned decision.”  To the contrary, CALJIC No. 8.88 expressly instructed the jury 
to “consider, take into account and be guided by the applicable factors of aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances,” and further cautioned the jury not to engage in a 
“mere mechanical counting of factors.”  Nor was there any need to specially instruct 
the jury on the appropriate process of weighing mitigating factors.  In this regard, 
CALJIC No. 8.88 properly advised the jury that “To return a judgment of death, each 
of you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in 
comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life 
without parole.”  As we have explained, CALJIC No. 8.88 properly describes the 
weighing process as “ ‘merely a metaphor for the juror’s personal determination that 
death is the appropriate penalty under all of the circumstances.’ ”  (People v. 
Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1244, quoting People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 
1183, 1250.) 
Last, defendant contends the trial court should have given CALJIC No. 2.83, 
pertaining to the resolution of conflicting expert witness testimony, at the penalty 
phase.  The request was properly refused on the ground that no conflicting expert 
testimony was presented at the penalty phase.  Moreover, CALJIC No. 2.83 was 
given at the guilt phase and there was no need to reread it at the penalty phase.  (See, 
e.g., People v. Sanders, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 561 [no need to reread generic 
instructions at penalty phase that were given at guilt phase and did not conflict with 
penalty phase instructions]; People v. Danielson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 691, 723; People 
v. Wharton, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 600.) 
 
 
75
7.  Two-week suspension of penalty phase deliberations 
The jury was sworn to hear this case on June 18, 1990, and opening 
statements commenced that same day.  The record reflects that on that date the trial 
judge advised counsel and the jury that he would be unavailable for trial during the 
last week in August 1990.  Trial lasted through the summer.  In addition to the 
court’s scheduling a one-week vacation for the last week of summer, the record 
reflects that four of the 12 seated jurors, and two of the four alternates, had 
prearranged to take their vacations during that same last week of summer. 
The jury commenced penalty deliberations on Monday, August 20, 1990.  The 
jury requested a readback of certain testimony on Wednesday, August 22, 1990.  
Late in the afternoon of the following day, Thursday, August 23, 1990, with 
deliberations yet to produce a penalty verdict, the court adjourned the trial 
proceedings for a 13-day period, with the jurors ordered to return Wednesday, 
September 5, 1990.  Critically, defendant and his counsel expressly agreed to the 
arrangement.  Moreover, the trial judge indicated he had arranged for deliberations 
to continue in his absence without recess before another judge of the superior court 
bench who had agreed to fill in.  Defendant and his counsel declined that option, 
preferring instead to adjourn the proceedings until the first week of September. 
Thereafter, on Friday, August 31, 1990, San Bernardino County Superior 
Court Judge Robert Krug extended the recess one day, to Thursday, September 6, 
1990, because one juror would be unavailable until that date due to a death in the 
family.  On Tuesday, September 4, 1990, at a specially called hearing before the trial 
judge, the Honorable Ben T. Kayashima, who had returned, defendant and counsel 
expressly agreed to the one-day extension and declined an invitation to have an 
alternate juror seated to replace the juror who had to attend a funeral.  All in all, the 
recess spanned 13 calendar days (eight court days), given the two intervening 
weekends and the Labor Day holiday on Monday, September 3, 1990. 
 
 
76
Defendant urges us to find error in the eight-court-day (13-calendar-day) 
recess.  Defendant, however, is precluded from claiming error as he and his counsel 
expressly agreed to the recess arrangement, and further expressly declined the 
court’s invitation to continue deliberations uninterrupted before a substitute trial 
judge.  (See, e.g., People v. Johnson (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 778, 791-794 
[defendant’s failure to object to 17-day recess of jury deliberations for Christmas 
holiday break waived any claim of error]; People v. Harris (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 76, 
86 [failure to object to five-day recess of jury deliberations waived assignment of 
error on appeal].)  Nor has defendant demonstrated prejudice from the mutually 
agreed upon adjournment of proceedings.  His claim that the jury’s penalty verdict, 
returned on the same date court proceedings were reconvened, was the direct and 
prejudicial result of the recess, is none other than speculation. 
8.  Calculation of determinate sentence 
Defendant raises several challenges to the 25-year aggregate determinate 
term he received in addition to the death penalty.  We consider each in turn, finding 
only one has merit. 
First, the trial court imposed four 2-year firearm-use enhancements 
(§ 12202.5) under counts II (murder of Stopher), III (burglary), IV (kidnapping of 
V.), and VII (attempted murder of Officer Dunavent).  At the time of the offenses, 
the rule of In re Culbreth (1976) 17 Cal.3d 330 applied.14  The rule provided that 
even if there were multiple counts involving multiple victims of violent crime, a 
section 12022.5 enhancement could be imposed only once “if all the charged 
offenses are incident to one objective and effectively comprise an indivisible 
transaction . . . .”  (Culbreth, at p. 333.)  Since the trial court stayed imposition of 
the firearm-use enhancements under counts III (burglary) and IV (kidnapping), the 
                                                 
14  
Culbreth was subsequently overruled in People v. King (1993) 5 Cal.4th 59, 
79, but the holding in King was made prospective only.  (Id. at pp. 79-80.) 
 
 
77
court pragmatically complied with Culbreth respecting those counts.  (See People 
v. Rosalez (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 789-794 [Culbreth error harmless where 
enhancements run concurrently].)  Hence, even were we to find Culbreth error 
respecting those counts, no modification of the judgment would be required. 
In contrast, the two section 12022.5 enhancements under counts II (murder) 
and VII (attempted murder) were ordered to be served consecutively.  Accordingly, 
we must determine whether imposition of both enhancements violated Culbreth.  It 
did not.  The murder of Stopher and the attempted murder of Officer Dunavent 
occurred hours apart.  Defendant had ample time to reflect on his conduct between 
the two offenses, and he manifestly killed Stopher, and attempted to kill Officer 
Dunavent, for entirely different purposes.  Accordingly, “[t]he court could properly 
find no ‘indivisible transaction’ barring imposition of separate weapon 
enhancements.”  (People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 269.) 
There is no merit to defendant’s further claims that sentencing him on the 
burglary count in addition to terms for the rape and kidnapping convictions 
constituted double punishment in violation of section 654, or that the trial court gave 
inadequate reasons for imposing a full, consecutive term for the forcible rape 
conviction pursuant to section 667.6, subdivision (c).  However, there is merit to 
defendant’s argument that the court improperly imposed three separate five-year 
enhancements for his prior felony conviction of assault with a deadly weapon 
(vehicle) on a peace officer, pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a).  The record 
reflects that section 667, subdivision (a) enhancements were imposed under count I 
(Jones murder), imposed and stayed under count VII (attempted murder of Officer 
Dunavent), and imposed on counts III (rape) and IV (burglary) but ordered to be 
served concurrently under those counts.  Although, as a practical matter, defendant’s 
25-year aggregate determinate prison sentence thus included only one five-year 
enhancement added into the calculation, only one section 667, subdivision (a) 
 
 
78
enhancement should have been imposed in connection with the aggregate sentence.  
(See People v. Tassel (1984) 36 Cal.3d 77, 91.)  Accordingly, we shall order the 
section 667, subdivision (a) enhancements under counts III, IV, and VII stricken, and 
the abstract of judgment amended to reflect only one such enhancement imposed 
under count I. 
9.  Cumulative effect of penalty phase errors 
Defendant contends that the cumulative effect of the penalty phase errors 
requires reversal.  (See, e.g., People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 844-845.)  We 
have, however, found no appreciable error at the penalty phase, with the exception of 
the improper instruction on the requisite intent element regarding the threat to 
Deputy Shafia, an executive officer (§ 69), admitted in the prosecution’s case in 
aggravation, which error we have found clearly harmless.  (See ante, at p. 66.)  
Accordingly, there is no cumulative effect of penalty phase errors in this case. 
10.  Disproportionality of sentence 
Finally, defendant urges that his punishment is disproportionate to his 
individual culpability.  We cannot agree.  We have evaluated “whether [defendant’s] 
capital sentence is so ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the offense as to constitute cruel 
or unusual punishment under article I, section 17 of the California Constitution.”  
(People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 193.)  A death sentence is grossly 
disproportionate if it “shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of 
human dignity.”  (People v. Livaditas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 786.) 
The evidence in this case established that defendant murdered his friend, 
Billie Faye Jones, by strangling her from behind with a garrote he made.  He then 
took her van, with her body secreted in the vehicle and the garrote still wrapped 
around her neck, and proceeded to Hesperia after enlisting the assistance of his 15-
year-old son in his plan to do harm to Stopher and Rose V.  He gained entry into  
 
 
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Rose V.’s home by ruse, murdered Stopher in the shower with shotgun blasts to the 
face, head and torso, kidnapped Rose V., aided and abetted his minor son in raping 
her during her abduction, and upon being stopped by police with both his kidnapped 
victim and murdered victim in the van, attempted to murder Officer Dunavent by 
placing a gun to his head and pulling the trigger.  Two years earlier, defendant had 
been convicted of assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer when he tried to 
run over several officers with his car after leading them on a high-speed chase.  We 
conclude imposition of the death penalty in this case is not so disproportionate to 
defendant’s individual culpability for these crimes that it “shocks the conscience and 
offends fundamental notions of human dignity.”  (People v. Livaditas, supra, 2 
Cal.4th at p. 786.) 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The abstract of judgment is ordered amended to reflect imposition of one 
section 667, subdivision (a) enhancement under count I.  In all other respects the 
judgment is affirmed in its entirety. 
 
BAXTER, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
BROWN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
 
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See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Gutierrez 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S018634 
Date Filed: August 15, 2002 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Bernardino 
Judge: Ben T. Kayashima 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Paul M. Posner, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for  Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, 
Assistant Attorney General, William M. Wood, Holly D. Wilkins, Esteban Hernandez and Raquel M. 
Gonzalez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Paul M. Posner 
P.O. Box 2400 
Paso Robles, CA  93447 
(805) 238-5936 
 
Raquel M. Gonzalez 
Deputy Attorney General 
110 West A Street, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 645-2281