Title: Ribera v. EMPLOYMENT SEC. COM.

State: new-mexico

Issuer: New Mexico Supreme Court

Document:

594 P.2d 742 (1979) 92 N.M. 694 Petra G. RIBERA, Petitioner-Appellee, v. EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION and Mrs. Brian O'Neil, Respondents-Appellants. No. 12040. Supreme Court of New Mexico. April 18, 1979. Rehearing Denied May 16, 1979. Jeff Bingaman, Atty. Gen., R. Baumgartner, Asst. Atty. Gen., Human Services Dept., Albuquerque, for respondents-appellants. Bruce P. Moore, Santa Fe, for petitioner-appellee. FEDERICI, Justice. Ribera (appellee) was employed as a housekeeper. She terminated her employment because of pain she suffered while performing her housekeeping duties. She had been advised by her physician that the pain which resulted from her arthritis would not cease so long as she continued the housekeeping job. It is undisputed that appellee suffered from arthritis for several years during her employment and that the original arthritic condition itself was not caused by the employment. Appellee applied for unemployment compensation after leaving her employment. The Employment Security Commission (now the Employment Services Division of the Human Services Department) disqualified appellee from receipt of unemployment benefits until she had obtained new work and earned wages equal to five times her weekly benefit amount, pursuant to § 51-1-7, N.M.S.A. 1978. Appellee filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the district court seeking review of the Commission's decision. The district court reversed the Commission's decision and it appeals. As its first point the Commission argues that the district court erred in its decision that the findings and conclusions made by the Commission, after hearing, were not supported by substantial evidence. *743 Section 51-1-7 reads: The Commission made the following findings and conclusions after its hearing on the matter: N.M.R.Civ.P. 81(c)(4), N.M.S.A. 1978 permits the filing of a writ of certiorari to the district court to review a decision of the Employment Security Commission. On review, the rule provides that: In Wilson v. Employment Security Commission, 74 N.M. 3, 389 P.2d 855 (1963), this Court reviewed the above rule and the authorities concerning the scope of review by the trial court and said: Id. at 6-8, 389 P.2d at 857-58. In Wilson, the Court also defined substantial evidence: Id. at 8, 389 P.2d at 858-59. In LeMon v. Employment Security Commission, 89 N.M. 549, 555 P.2d 372 (1976), this Court denied relief to a claimant for unemployment compensation benefits under facts quite similar to those in this case. The record in this case discloses that appellee's arthritic pain had existed for several years. Appellee suffered pain whether she worked or whether she was at home and was given lighter household duties by her employer because she suffered pain. Appellee's work aggravated her arthritic condition and she had been advised by her physician that the pain would not cease as long as she continued the housekeeping job. Further, the record shows that appellee was advised by her doctor not to do general housekeeping work. "This seems to be prima facie inconsistent with a claim for unemployment benefits, which necessarily alleges that claimant is able, available for and actively seeking new work." LeMon, supra, 89 N.M. at 551, 555 P.2d at 374. There is some question as to whether the Commission properly preserved its third point for review regarding the effect to be given to reports of two physicians submitted on behalf of appellee. In any event, the physicians' reports are neither conclusive nor dispositive on the question of whether incapacity caused by the illness or disability established good cause in connection with her employment. Neither of the reports submitted by the doctors stated that the disability was job related or job connected. Based upon all of the evidence, we find that there was substantial evidence to support the findings and conclusions made by the Commission and that the trial court erred in refusing to adopt the Commission's findings and conclusions. The trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded for entry of such order or judgment as may be necessary to sustain *745 appellant's original findings and conclusions. IT IS SO ORDERED. EASLEY and PAYNE, JJ., concur.