Title: Matthews v. Fetzner

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Matthews v. Fetzner1989 WY 40768 P.2d 590Case Number: 88-29Decided: 02/13/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
JAMES 
MATTHEWS, DOING BUSINESS AS UPTON PROCESSING, AND JAMES MATTHEWS, DOING BUSINESS AS 
NEWCASTLE PACK, 
APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

 
 
v.

 
 
ROBERT E. 
FETZNER, INDIVIDUALLY, AND DOUGLAS KROGMAN, INDIVIDUALLY, APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS), WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, JOHN ORTON, AS COMMISSIONER, 
ROBERT E. FETZNER, AS DIRECTOR, AND DOUGLAS 
KROGMAN, AS INSPECTOR (DEFENDANTS).

 
 
Appeal from 
the District Court, WestonCounty, Terrence L. O'Brien, 
J.

 
 
Gordon W. 
Schukei, Cheyenne, for appellant.

 
 
Steven R. 
Czoschke of Sheehan, Stevens, Edwards and Czoschke, Gillette, for appellees.

 
 
Before CARDINE, C.J., THOMAS, URBIGKIT and GOLDEN, 
JJ., and ROONEY, J., Retired.

 
 

CARDINE, Chief 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     The district court 
granted summary judgment holding appellees Dr. Robert Fetzner and Douglas 
Krogman immune from suit under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. Appellant 
James Matthews appeals claiming that the summary judgment was improperly granted 
because the controlling factual issue had been previously decided in his favor, 
was therefore res judicata, and precluded immunity for 
appellees.

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3.]     This case is before us 
a second time on appeal. Matthews v. Wyoming 
Dept. of Agriculture, 719 P.2d 216 (Wyo. 1986). A brief factual review is 
necessary to clarify the posture of this appeal. Matthews operates a meat 
processing plant in Upton, 
Wyoming which is subject to 
regulation by the Wyoming Department of Agriculture. In July of 1984, he filed 
suit against the department; its Commissioner, John Orton; and employees Fetzner 
and Krogman. Orton was sued in his official capacity while Fetzner and Krogman 
were sued in both their official and individual capacities. Matthews sought 
injunctive relief and damages. In December 1984, the trial court granted summary 
judgment in favor of all defendants holding that the Wyoming Governmental Claims 
Act (Claims Act), W.S. 1-39-101 through 119, barred all of Matthews' claims for 
damages. On appeal, we affirmed in part holding that the record established 
immunity and supported summary judgment for all defendants acting in their 
official capacities. We reversed the summary judgment granted Fetzner and 
Krogman in their individual capacities on the grounds that the decision was not 
supported by the record properly before the district court. We remanded for a 
determination of that issue. Matthews, 719 P.2d  at 222.

 
 

[¶4.]     While the first appeal 
was pending, there was a hearing on Matthews' request for a permanent 
injunction. As a result, defendants were enjoined from certain acts dealing with 
inspection of Matthews' meat processing facilities.

 
 

[¶5.]     After remand by this 
court, appellant Matthews and appellees Fetzner and Krogman filed motions for 
summary judgment on the question of defendants' liability in their individual 
capacities. The issue presented was whether appellees were acting within the 
scope of their duties as employees of the Department of Agriculture and were 
therefore immune under the Claims Act at the times they inspected Matthews' 
facilities. Appellees filed affidavits in support of their motion for summary 
judgment. Matthews relied primarily on a transcript of statements made by the 
court during the injunction hearing. The district court entered summary judgment 
for appellees, and this second appeal followed.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶6.]     Matthews argues that 
the question of whether appellees were acting within the scope of their duties 
had previously been decided during the injunction hearing, and therefore the 
district court was precluded from deciding against him because the issue was res 
judicata. Initially, we note that the doctrine that appellant is seeking to 
invoke is more properly termed collateral estoppel rather than res judicata. We 
said in Delgue v. Curutchet, 677 P.2d 208, 214 (Wyo. 1984):

 
 
"The 
interest served by both doctrines is essentially the same, but courts, including 
this court, have been careful to distinguish between the two. Res judicata can 
be described generally as that rule which precludes the presentation by parties 
or those in privity with them of the same claim that was resolved by an earlier 
judgment. The effect of collateral estoppel is that of preventing relitigation 
of issues which were involved actually and necessarily in the prior action 
between the same parties." (citations omitted)

 
 

[¶7.]     Here, the injunction 
hearing and the summary judgment proceedings are part of the same action between 
the same parties. Matthews' position is that a factual issue had been determined 
prior to the second summary judgment hearing and that he should therefore have 
been granted summary judgment as a matter of law. This is an application of the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel.

 
 

[¶8.]     For collateral estoppel 
to apply, the identical issue must have been actually and necessarily determined 
by the court. Delgue v. Curutchet, 677 P.2d  at 214; Roush v. Roush, 589 P.2d 841 
(Wyo. 1979). 
Further, collateral estoppel applies only when the party against whom the 
earlier decision is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the 
issue. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95, 101 S. Ct. 411, 415, 66 L. Ed. 2d 308 
(1980); Ten Mile Industrial Park v. Western Plains Service Corp., 810 F.2d 1518, 
1523 (10th Cir. 1987).

 
 

[¶9.]     On review of a summary 
judgment, we examine all of the information and material presented to the 
district court. Baldwin v. Dube, 751 P.2d 388 (Wyo. 1988). Careful examination of the 
transcript from the injunction hearing does not disclose that the scope of 
defendants' duties was either litigated or actually decided. In appellant's 
brief, he refers us to a portion of the transcript from the hearing on his 
request for a permanent injunction:

 
 
"[By the 
court] The court feels and finds that the application of these limitations and 
these policies are arbitrary, that they should be by written rule or regulation 
adopted after a hearing and following the requirements of the Administrative 
Procedure Act and on file with the Secretary of State.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"I think 
what has been done here amounts to harassment. The court so 
finds."

 
 

[¶10.]  We are unable to discern in these 
statements a decision by the district court that Fetzner and Krogman were acting 
outside the scope of their duties such that they would be liable for damages in 
their individual capacities. That rules and regulations were not in place may be 
a fact to be considered but does not rise to a finding that appellees were 
acting in their individual capacities. In truth, the court had reached an 
opposite conclusion in initially granting summary judgment to appellees. The 
transcript clearly shows that the district court considered the issue controlled 
by its decision in its original summary judgment.

 
 
"[By the 
court] Now, counsel has stated that an injunction should be cautiously granted 
and implied that perhaps plaintiff here would not be permanently damaged or 
perhaps might have some other relief, but by summary judgment we've held that he 
doesn't have any right to suit for damage. About all he's got left is [sic] 
to protect himself from this harassment is to have the Department of Agriculture 
enjoined." (emphasis added)

 
 

[¶11.]  The record does not support appellant's 
contention that the question of the scope of appellees' duties was actually and 
necessarily decided in his favor prior to the second summary judgment. 
Collateral estoppel did not preclude determination of the issue. Defendants 
produced affidavits in support of their summary judgment motion. Matthews 
produced nothing to controvert the prima facie facts in those affidavits other 
than his collateral estoppel claim.

 
 

[¶12.]  The summary judgment is 
affirmed.

 
 

ROONEY, J., Ret., 
filed a concurring opinion.

 
 

ROONEY, Retired 
Justice, concurring.

 
 

[¶13.]  I concur, and, as reasons for 
concurrence, I add that said by Justice Thomas and me in our opinions concurring 
in part and dissenting in part on the first appeal of this matter, i.e., 
Matthews v. Wyoming Department of Agriculture, 719 P.2d 216 (Wyo. 
1986).