Title: Claremont Police etc. v. City of Claremont

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 8/14/06  
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
CLAREMONT POLICE OFFICERS  
) 
ASSOCIATION, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S120546 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/3 B163219 
CITY OF CLAREMONT et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
Super. Ct. No. KS007219 
___________________________________ ) 
 
 
 
In this case, we consider a provision of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act 
(MMBA) (Gov. Code,1 § 3500 et seq.), which governs labor-management 
relations at the local government level.  Section 3505 mutually obligates a public 
employer and an employee organization to meet and confer in good faith about a 
matter within the “scope of representation” concerning, among other things, 
“wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment” (§ 3504).  A 
fundamental managerial or policy decision, however, is outside the scope of 
representation  
(§ 3504), and is excepted from section 3505’s meet-and-confer requirement. 
                                              
 
1  
All further statutory references are to the Government Code unless 
otherwise indicated. 
 
 
2
 
For reasons that follow, we conclude that there is a distinction between an 
employer’s fundamental managerial or policy decision and the implementation of 
that decision.  To determine whether an employer’s action implementing a 
fundamental decision is subject to the meet-and-confer requirement (§ 3505), we 
employ the test found in our decision in Building Material & Construction 
Teamsters’ Union v. Farrell (1986) 41 Cal.3d 651, 660 (Building Material).   
 
Applying that test to the case at hand, we reverse the judgment of the Court 
of Appeal. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Plaintiff Claremont Police Officers Association (Association) is an 
employee organization representing public employees of defendant City of 
Claremont (City), including police officers and recruits, police agents, 
communication officers, record clerks, jailors and parking enforcement officers.  
In May 2000, the City’s police department (Department) implemented a tracking 
program to determine if police officers were engaging in racial profiling.  The 
Association, as the “[r]ecognized employee organization,”2 did not request to meet 
and confer with the City beforehand.  Under the program, if an officer stopped a 
vehicle or person without issuing a citation or making an arrest, the officer was 
required to radio the Department with information about the stop, including the 
person’s race.  The program lasted one year. 
 
After the City’s police commission concluded that the data collected in the 
pilot tracking program was insufficient to determine whether officers engaged in 
                                              
 
2  
A “[r]ecognized employee organization” is “an employee organization 
which has been formally acknowledged by the public agency as an employee 
organization that represents employees of the public agency.”  (§ 3501, subd. (b).) 
 
 
3
racial profiling, the commission appointed a subcommittee and advisory panel to 
prepare a further study.  In February 2002, the police commission adopted the 
subcommittee’s recommendation that the Department implement a “Vehicle Stop 
Data Collection Study” (Study), which is at issue in this case.  This Study required 
officers on all vehicle stops to complete a preprinted scantron form called a 
“Vehicle Stop Data Form” (Form).  The Form included questions regarding the 
“driver’s perceived race/ethnicity,” and the “officers’ prior knowledge of driver’s 
race/ethnicity.”  On average, the Form takes two minutes to complete, and an 
officer may complete between four and six Forms for each 12-hour shift.  Each 
Form is traceable to the individual officer making the stop.  The Study was to last 
15 months, commencing July 1, 2002. 
 
In April 2002, the Association requested that the City meet and confer 
regarding the Study because it asserted “the implementation of policy and 
procedures in regards to this area falls under California Government Code section 
3504.”  On April 11, 2002, the City gave written notice disagreeing that the Study 
fell within the scope of representation under section 3504.  On June 27, 2002, the 
Department informed officers it would implement the Study effective July 1, 
2002.  On July 11, 2002, the Association filed a petition for writ of mandate to 
compel the City and the Department not to implement the Study until they meet 
and confer in good faith under the MMBA. 
 
On August 22, 2002, the superior court denied the petition.  In its detailed 
statement of findings and conclusions, the court concluded, among other things, 
that the Study did not substantially affect the terms and conditions of the 
Association members’ employment, and that “given the de minimus impact upon 
workload, and the predominantly policy directed objectives of the Study, . . . the 
Study falls primarily within management prerogatives under §3504, and is not a 
 
 
4
matter within the scope of representation requiring compliance with the meet and 
confer provisions of the MMBA.”  
 
The Court of Appeal reversed.  While it concluded the City’s decision to 
take measures to combat the practice of racial profiling and the public perception 
that it occurs is “a fundamental policy decision that directly affects the police 
department’s mission to protect and to serve the public,” the Court of Appeal held 
that “the decision precisely how to implement that fundamental policy, however, 
involves several variables affecting law enforcement officers and is not itself a 
fundamental policy decision.”3  The Court of Appeal explained that “the vehicle 
stop policy significantly affects officers’ working conditions, particularly their job 
security and freedom from disciplinary action, their prospects for promotion, and 
the officers’ relations with the public.  Racial profiling is illegal.  [Fn. omitted.]  
An officer could be accused of racial profiling and subjected to disciplinary action, 
denial of promotion, or other adverse action based in part on the information 
collected under the new policy.  For this reason, the manner that the information is 
collected and the accuracy of the data and data analysis are matters of great 
concern to the association’s members.”  
 
We granted review. 
                                              
 
3  
Although the Court of Appeal appeared at times to construe the City’s 
fundamental decision as the decision to undertake measures against the practice of 
racial profiling, on the one hand, and the implementation of that decision as the 
adoption of the Study, on the other, neither of the parties adopts such a broad 
construction; nor do we.  (See post, at pp. 8-10.)  
 
 
5
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. Background of the MMBA 
 
The MMBA applies to local government employees in California.  (Fire 
Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo (1974) 12 Cal.3d 608, 614, fn. 4 (Fire Fighters 
Union).)4  “The MMBA has two stated purposes:  (1) to promote full 
communication between public employers and employees, and (2) to improve 
personnel management and employer-employee relations.  (§ 3500.)  To effect 
these goals the act gives local government employees the right to organize 
collectively and to be represented by employee organizations (§ 3502), and 
obligates employers to bargain with employee representatives about matters that 
fall within the ‘scope of representation.’  (§§ 3504.5, 3505.)”  (Building Material, 
supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 657.)  The duty to meet and confer in good faith is limited to 
matters within the “scope of representation”:  the public employer and recognized 
employee organization have a “mutual obligation personally to meet and confer 
promptly upon request by either party . . . and to endeavor to reach agreement on 
matters within the scope of representation prior to the adoption by the public 
agency of its final budget for the ensuing year.”  (§ 3505.)  Even if the parties 
meet and confer, they are not required to reach an agreement because the employer 
has “the ultimate power to refuse to agree on any particular issue.  [Citation.]”  
                                              
 
4  
The MMBA has its roots in the 1961 enactment of the George Brown Act, 
which originally appeared as sections 3500 through 3509.  (See Stats. 1961, ch. 
1964, pp. 4141-4143.)  “The legislative revisions of 1968 and 1971 reserved those 
sections for the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act, and reenacted the George Brown Act, 
now limited to the relationship between the state government and state employees, 
as Government Code sections 3525-3536.”  (Glendale City Employees’ Assn., Inc.  
v. City of Glendale (1975) 15 Cal.3d 328, 335, fn. 5.)   
 
 
6
(Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 665.)  However, good faith under 
section 3505 “requires a genuine desire to reach agreement.”  (Placentia Fire 
Fighters v. City of Placentia (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 9, 25.) 
1. “Scope of representation” 
 
Section 3504 defines “scope of representation” to include “all matters 
relating to employment conditions and employer-employee relations, including, 
but not limited to, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, 
except, however, that the scope of representation shall not include consideration of 
the merits, necessity, or organization of any service or activity provided by law or 
executive order.”  (Italics added.)  The definition of “scope of representation” and 
its exception are “arguably vague” and “overlapping.”  (Building Material, supra, 
41 Cal.3d at p. 658; Fire Fighters Union, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 615.)  “ ‘[W]ages, 
hours and working conditions,’ which, broadly read could encompass practically 
any conceivable bargaining proposal; and ‘merits, necessity or organization of any 
service’ which, expansively interpreted, could swallow the whole provision for 
collective negotiation and relegate determination of all labor issues to the city’s 
discretion.”  (Fire Fighters Union, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 615.) 
 
Courts have interpreted “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment,” which phrase is not statutorily defined, to include the transfer of 
bargaining-unit work to nonunit employees (Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d 
at p. 659; Dublin Professional Fire Fighters, Local 1885 v. Valley Community 
Services Dist. (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 116, 119); mandatory drug testing of 
employees (Holliday v. City of Modesto (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 528, 530 
(Holliday)); work shift changes (Independent Union of Pub. Service Employees v. 
County of Sacramento (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 482, 487); and the adoption of a 
disciplinary rule prohibiting use of city facilities for personal use (Vernon Fire 
 
 
7
Fighters v. City of Vernon (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 802).  Notwithstanding section 
3504’s broad language, to require an employer to bargain, its action or policy must 
have “a significant and adverse effect on the wages, hours, or working conditions 
of the bargaining-unit employees.”  (Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 
659-660.) 
2. “Merits, necessity or organization” 
 
Even if an employer’s action or policy has a significant and adverse effect 
on the bargaining unit’s wages, hours, and working conditions, the employer may 
be excepted from bargaining requirements under the “merits, necessity, or 
organization” language of section 3504.  (Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 
660.)  This exclusionary language, which was added in 1968, was intended to 
“forestall any expansion of the language of ‘wages, hours and working conditions’ 
to include more general managerial policy decisions.”  (Fire Fighters Union, 
supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 616; Stats. 1968, ch. 1390, § 4, p. 2727.)  “Federal and 
California decisions both recognize the right of employers to make unconstrained 
decisions when fundamental management or policy choices are involved.”  
(Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 663; Berkeley Police Assn. v. City of 
Berkeley (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 931, 937 (Berkeley Police Assn.) [“To require 
public officials to meet and confer with their employees regarding fundamental 
policy decisions such as those here presented, would place an intolerable burden 
upon fair and efficient administration of state and local government”]; see also 
First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB (1981) 452 U.S. 666, 678-679 (First 
National Maintenance).) 
 
Such fundamental managerial or policy decisions include changing the 
policy regarding a police officer’s use of deadly force (San Jose Peace Officer’s 
Assn. v. City of San Jose (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 935, 947 (San Jose Peace 
 
 
8
Officer’s Assn.)), permitting a member of the citizen’s police review commission 
to attend police department hearings regarding citizen complaints and sending a 
department member to review commission meetings (Berkeley Police Assn., 
supra, 76 Cal.App.3d 931), and, in the context of private labor relations, closing a 
plant for economic reasons (N.L.R.B. v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co. (3d Cir. 
1965) 350 F.2d 191, 196 (Royal Plating)). 
B. Distinction Between an Employer’s Fundamental Decision and the 
Implementation and Effects of That Decision 
 
Both parties agree that the City’s decision to take measures against racial 
profiling, specifically its decision to implement the Study as a necessary first step, 
is a fundamental managerial or policy decision.  Racial profiling, which has been 
defined as “the practice of detaining a suspect based on a broad set of criteria 
which casts suspicion on an entire class of people without any individualized 
suspicion of the particular person being stopped” (Pen. Code, § 13519.4, subd. 
(e)), is expressly prohibited by statute (id., subd. (f)), and by the Department’s 
policy.5  The Legislature has made clear that the practice of racial profiling 
“presents a great danger to the fundamental principles of a democratic society.  It 
is abhorrent and cannot be tolerated.”  (Pen. Code, § 13519.4, subd. (d)(1).)  The 
City’s decision to implement the Study was made in hopes to “improve relations 
between the police and the community and establish the Claremont Police 
Department as an open and progressive agency committed to being at the forefront 
of the best professional practices in law enforcement.”  (See Building Material, 
                                              
 
5  
The Department’s policy provides:  “Officers shall stop persons on the 
basis of all available information, not solely on the basis of race or ethnicity.”  
(Dept. Rules & Regs., § 1.030.3.05.)   
 
 
9
supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 664 [matters relating to “the betterment of police-
community relations . . . are of obvious importance, and directly affect the quality 
and nature of public services”]; Berkeley Police Assn., supra, 76 Cal.App.3d at p. 
937 [same]; see also San Jose Peace Officer’s Assn., supra, 78 Cal.App.3d at p. 
946 [“the use of force policy is as closely akin to a managerial decision as any 
decision can be in running a police department”].)  Thus, the Association concedes 
that the City “may have the right to unilaterally decide to implement a racial 
profiling study.”  
 
However, the Association maintains that the Study’s implementation and 
effects involve many factors that are distinct from the City’s fundamental decision 
to adopt the Study.  These factors include, on the one hand, determining the 
methodology used in collecting the data, and on the other, determining the effects 
or use of the Study’s data, i.e., whether the data would be used only for study 
purposes, whether results based on the analyzed data or results regarding 
individual officers would be made public, whether and under what circumstances 
the results could be used against officers (including imposing discipline or 
denying promotions), and what the implications are for officers’ privacy and the 
potential for self-incrimination.  The Association concludes that meeting and 
conferring on the Study’s implementation and effects will not directly interfere 
with the City’s right to exercise its managerial prerogative.  The Association 
contends that although Building Material is distinguishable, it “completely 
recognizes this ‘dichotomy.’ ” 
 
The City, however, counters that the Court of Appeal misinterpreted 
section 3504 and calls this dichotomy “unprecedented.”  It maintains that a public 
employer’s fundamental decision and the implementation of that decision “are 
integral to the nature of the public agency and are thus, equally excluded from the 
bargaining process under Section 3504.”  The City’s amicus curiae, League of 
 
 
10
California Cities (League), argues that drawing an implementation distinction is 
both “artificial and unworkable” because “[i]t is pointless to adopt a policy if it 
cannot be implemented.”  According to the League, the Association’s contention 
begs the question “how the City could implement the Study and collect the data if 
it were not known how the data would be collected and how it would be used.”  
Another amicus curiae, Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, adds 
that “the policy and its implementation cannot be severed and analyzed separately.  
Rather, the former is interwoven with the latter, such that a decision to compel 
negotiation of the implementation would inevitably compel negotiation of the 
policy decision itself.” 
 
At the outset, we agree with the Association that there is a long-standing 
distinction under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) between an 
employer’s unilateral management decision and the effects of that decision (29 
U.S.C. § 158(d)), the latter of which are subject to mandatory bargaining.  (First 
National Maintenance, supra, 452 U.S. at pp. 681-682; id. at p. 677, fn. 15; 
Kirkwood Fabricators, Inc. v. N.L.R.B. (8th Cir. 1988) 862 F.2d 1303, 1306 
[“Requiring effects bargaining maintains an appropriate balance between an 
employer’s right to close its business and an employee’s need for some protection 
from arbitrary action”].)  In other words, although “an employer has the right 
unilaterally to decide that a layoff is necessary, he must bargain about such matters 
as the timing of the layoffs and the number and identity of employees affected.  
[Citation.]”  (Los Angeles County Civil Service Com. v. Superior Court (1978) 23 
Cal.3d 55, 64 [discussing cases under the NLRA]); see also 1 Chin et al., Cal 
Practice Guide:  Employment Litigation (The Rutter Group 2005) ¶¶ 6:80-6:84, p. 
6-11 [discussing effects bargaining under NLRA].)  For example, matters deemed 
subject to effects bargaining include severance pay, vacation pay, seniority, and 
pensions.  (N.L.R.B. v. Transmarine Navigation Corporation (9th Cir. 1967) 380 
 
 
11
F.2d 933, 939; Royal Plating, supra, 350 F.2d at p. 196 [union must have 
“opportunity to bargain over the rights of the employees whose employment status 
will be altered by the managerial decision”].) 
 
We agree with the City, however, that the issue before us is whether it was 
compelled to meet and confer with the Association before it required officers on 
their vehicle stops to fill out the Forms as part of the Study.  Based on the limited 
record before us, there is no evidence regarding what effects would result from 
implementing the Study; for instance, whether the data collected and later 
analyzed will result in discipline if an officer is found to have engaged in racial 
profiling,6 or whether the City will publicize the Study’s raw data.  It is also not 
clear from the record what exact methodology the City has adopted to analyze the 
collected data to determine any racial profiling.  Nor can we say that racial 
profiling studies have been so historically associated with employee discipline that 
their implementation invariably raises disciplinary issues.  (Cf. Holliday, supra, 
229 Cal.App.3d at p. 540 [various details of implementing mandatory drug-testing 
policy subject to meet-and-confer requirement].)  Thus, we do not decide the issue 
whether the City was required to meet and confer with the Association over any 
effects resulting from the City’s decision to implement the Study.  (See 
Fibreboard Corp. v. NLRB (1964) 379 U.S. 203, 223 (Fibreboard) (conc. opn. of 
                                              
 
6  
Regarding any discipline that may result from an officer’s failure to 
properly fill out the Form, the superior court found that “officers are already 
subject to discipline for not completing required reports.”  For purposes of the 
issue here, we conclude this type of discipline is distinguishable from any possible 
discipline which may be imposed if an officer is found to have engaged in racial 
profiling.  (See Berkeley Police Assn., supra, 76 Cal.App.3d at p. 938 [no change 
in working conditions where officers “were working under these rules and 
conditions even prior to the challenged practices”].) 
 
 
12
Stewart, J.) [an “extremely indirect and uncertain” impact on job security may 
alone suffice to conclude such decisions do not concern conditions of 
employment].)   
 
We disagree with the City’s amici curiae that drawing a distinction between 
an employer’s fundamental managerial or policy decision and the implementation 
of that decision, as a general matter, would be impossible or impractical.  The 
reality is that “practically every managerial decision has some impact on wages, 
hours, or other conditions of employment.”  (Westinghouse Electric Corporation 
v. N.L.R.B. (4th Cir. 1967) 387 F.2d 542, 548.)  Indeed, section 3504 of the 
MMBA codifies the unavoidable overlap between an employer’s policymaking 
discretion and an employer’s action impacting employees’ wages, hours, and 
working conditions.  (See ante, at p. 6; Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 
657; Fire Fighters Union, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 615.)  As we shall explain in 
greater detail below, while drawing a distinction may sometimes be difficult, the 
alternative—which would risk sheltering any and all actions that flow from an 
employer’s fundamental decision from the duty to meet and confer—is contrary to 
established case law.  (Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 660; see also First 
National Maintenance, supra, 452 U.S. at p. 686.)  Although Building Material 
did not specifically decide the issue, our decision, as the City acknowledges, 
expressly contemplates that the implementation of an employer’s fundamental 
decision (“action . . . taken pursuant to a fundamental managerial or policy 
decision”), is a separate consideration for purposes of section 3505’s meet-and-
confer requirement.  (Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 660.)   
 
Instead, we turn our focus to the City’s implementation of the Study, 
requiring officers to fill out the Forms in order to collect data on possible racial 
profiling. 
 
 
13
C. The Applicable Test 
 
Emphasizing that the Court of Appeal erroneously created an “automatic 
presumption that a meet and confer is required if implementation of a fundamental 
decision significantly affects the terms and conditions of employment,” the City 
urges that our decision in Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d 651, requires us to 
perform a balancing test that also considers the employer’s need for 
unencumbered decisionmaking.  If the balance weighs in favor of the employer, 
there is no need to bargain even if the employer’s action has a significant and 
adverse impact on the employees’ working conditions.  The Association counters 
that Building Material’s balancing test would apply only to the fundamental 
decision itself and not to its implementation or its effects.   
 
In Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d 651, the City and County of San 
Francisco unilaterally eliminated two bargaining unit positions and reorganized 
and reclassified duties of hospital truck drivers who were members of the Building 
Material and Construction Teamsters’ Union, Local 216 (Union).  The city 
transferred certain work duties to new positions that were not in the Union’s 
bargaining unit.  (Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 655.)  The Union 
requested to meet and confer with city agencies regarding the city’s action; 
however, the request was denied on grounds that this matter was not within the 
meet-and-confer obligations under the MMBA.  (Building Material, supra, 41 
Cal.3d at p. 656.) 
 
After reviewing the background and purposes of the MMBA (Building 
Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 657-660), we concluded that the city was 
required to meet and confer (§ 3505) with the Union because the city’s transfer of 
duties to a non-bargaining unit had a significant and adverse effect on the 
bargaining unit’s wages, hours, and working conditions.  (Building Material, 
supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 663-664.)  We rejected the city’s assertion that its action 
 
 
14
was exempted as a fundamental policy decision because it concerned the effective 
operation of local government.  (Id. at p. 664.)  The “decision to reorganize certain 
work duties was hardly ‘fundamental.’  It had little, if any, effect on public 
services.  Rather, it primarily impacted the wages, hours, and working conditions 
of the employees in question and thus was a proper subject for mandatory 
collective bargaining.  Indeed, defendants’ claim to the contrary is in conflict with 
the statutory framework of the MMBA:  any issue involving wages, for example, 
would affect the cost of government services, but such matters are specifically 
included in the scope of representation as defined in section 3504.”  (Ibid.) 
 
Going on to explain that an employer’s fundamental decision may have a 
significant and adverse effect on the bargaining unit’s wages, hours, or working 
conditions (Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 660), we considered whether 
“an action . . . taken pursuant to a fundamental managerial or policy decision” may 
be within the scope of representation (§ 3504), and thus subject to a duty to meet 
and confer.  (Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 660.)  As relevant here, 
such an action would encompass an employer’s steps to implement the details of 
the fundamental decision.  Under that circumstance, a balancing test would apply:  
“If an action is taken pursuant to a fundamental managerial or policy decision, it is 
within the scope of representation only if the employer’s need for unencumbered 
decisionmaking in managing its operations is outweighed by the benefit to 
employer-employee relations of bargaining about the action in question.”  
(Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 660, citing First National Maintenance, 
supra, 452 U.S. at p. 686; see Berkeley Police Assn., supra, 76 Cal.App.3d at p. 
937; see also San Francisco Fire Fighters Local 798 v. Board of Supervisors 
(1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1482, 1494 (San Francisco Fire Fighters).)   
 
The high court applied a similar balancing test in First National 
Maintenance, supra, 452 U.S. 666.  While recognizing an employer’s “freedom to 
 
 
15
manage its affairs unrelated to employment,” the high court balanced the 
competing interests to determine whether mandatory bargaining was required 
when a fundamental management decision directly impacted employment.  (First 
National Maintenance, supra, 452 U.S. at p. 677.)  The high court concluded:  
“[I]n view of an employer’s need for unencumbered decisionmaking, bargaining 
over management decisions that have a substantial impact on the continued 
availability of employment should be required only if the benefit, for labor-
management relations and the collective-bargaining process, outweighs the burden 
placed on the conduct of the business.”  (Id. at p. 679; see also id. at p. 686.)  In 
discussing the issues subject to collective bargaining (id. at p. 676), the high court 
explained that employers’ management decisions may range from having “only an 
indirect and attenuated impact on the employment relationship,” to being “almost 
exclusively ‘an aspect of the relationship’ between employer and employee,” to 
having “a direct impact on employment” though the decision is “ ‘not in [itself] 
primarily about conditions of employment . . . . ’ ”  (Id. at pp. 676-677, brackets in 
First National Maintenance; see also Fibreboard, supra, 379 U.S. at p. 223 (conc. 
opn. of Stewart, J.).)  
 
The balancing test under Building Material, which has been described as a 
“fluid standard” (San Francisco Fire Fighters, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 1494), 
properly considers the competing interests while furthering the MMBA’s neutral 
purpose to “promote communication between public employers and employees 
and to improve personnel management.  (§ 3500.)”  (Building Material, supra, 41 
Cal.3d at p. 660; see also First National Maintenance, supra, 452 U.S. at pp. 680-
681 [NLRA “is not intended to serve either party’s individual interest, but to foster 
in a neutral manner a system in which the conflict between these interests may be 
resolved”].)  We conclude it applies to determine whether management must meet 
and confer with a recognized employee organization (§ 3505) when the 
 
 
16
implementation of a fundamental managerial or policy decision significantly and 
adversely affects a bargaining unit’s wages, hours, or working conditions.   
 
In view of the vast range of management decisions and to give guidance on 
whether a particular matter is subject to a duty to meet and confer (§ 3505) under 
Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d at page 660, we find instructive the high 
court’s observation that “[t]he concept of mandatory bargaining is premised on the 
belief that collective discussions backed by the parties’ economic weapons will 
result in decisions that are better for both management and labor and for society as 
a whole.  [Citations.]  This will be true, however, only if the subject proposed for 
discussion is amenable to resolution through the bargaining process.”  (First 
National Maintenance, supra, 452 U.S. at p. 678, fn. omitted.)  To that end, when 
balancing competing interests a court may also consider whether “the transactional 
cost of the bargaining process outweighs its value.  [Citations.]”  (Social Services 
Union v. Board of Supervisors (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 498, 505 (Social Services 
Union) [discussing NLRA].)  We believe this “transactional cost” factor is not 
only consistent with the Building Material balancing test, but its application also 
helps to ensure that a duty to meet and confer is invoked only when it will serve its 
purpose. 
 
In summary, we apply a three-part inquiry.  First, we ask whether the 
management action has “a significant and adverse effect on the wages, hours, or 
working conditions of the bargaining-unit employees.”  (Building Material, supra, 
41 Cal.3d at p. 660.)  If not, there is no duty to meet and confer.  (See § 3504; see 
also ante, at p. 7.)  Second, we ask whether the significant and adverse effect 
arises from the implementation of a fundamental managerial or policy decision.  If 
not, then, as in Building Material, the meet-and-confer requirement applies.  
(Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 664.)  Third, if both factors are 
present—if an action taken to implement a fundamental managerial or policy 
 
 
17
decision has a significant and adverse effect on the wages, hours, or working 
conditions of the employees—we apply a balancing test.  The action “is within the 
scope of representation only if the employer’s need for unencumbered 
decisionmaking in managing its operations is outweighed by the benefit to 
employer-employee relations of bargaining about the action in question.”  
(Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 660.)  In balancing the interests to 
determine whether parties must meet and confer over a certain matter (§ 3505), a 
court may also consider whether the “transactional cost of the bargaining process 
outweighs its value.”  (Social Services Union, supra, 82 Cal.App.3d at p. 505.)  
 
Next, we apply the foregoing standard to the facts of this case to determine 
whether the City was required to meet and confer (§ 3505) with the Association 
before implementing the Study. 
D. Application to the Present Case 
 
Applying the test under Building Material, we conclude that the 
implementation of the Study did not have a significant and adverse effect on the 
officers’ working conditions.  (Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 660.)  
The record reflects that “[i]n those cases resulting in citation or arrest, the Study 
requires slightly more information to be collected by the officer than required in 
completing the citation or arrest report.”  Based on “undisputed evidence,” the 
superior court determined that officers may complete a Form in about two minutes 
and may complete between four and six such Forms in a 12-hour shift.  The 
superior court concluded that the impact on the officers’ working conditions was 
de minimis.  We agree and conclude the City was not required to meet and confer 
(§ 3505) with the Association before implementing the Study.  Because there was 
no significant and adverse effect, we need not balance the City’s need for 
unencumbered decisionmaking—in this case, its policymaking prerogative to 
 
 
18
eliminate the practice and perception of racial profiling and to determine the best 
means for doing so—against the benefit to employer-employee relations from 
bargaining about the subject.  (Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 660; see 
also First National Maintenance, supra, 452 U.S. at p. 686.)   
 
In conclusion, we emphasize the narrowness of our holding.  In 
determining that the City was not required to meet and confer with the Association 
before implementing the Study, we do not decide whether such a duty would exist 
should issues regarding officer discipline, privacy rights, and other potential 
effects (see ante, at pp. 11-12), arise after the City implements the Study.  Based 
on the record, that question is not before us.  
III.  DISPOSITION 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with our opinion. 
 
 
CHIN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY MORENO, J. 
 
 
I agree with the majority’s narrow holding that the City of Claremont (City) 
need not meet and confer regarding its decision to conduct a racial profiling study 
and to adopt a particular data collection method in implementing the study, and 
that we need not consider other issues raised by the Claremont Police Officers 
Association (Association).  As the majority states: “Based on the limited record 
before us, there is no evidence regarding what effects would result from 
implementing the Study; for instance, whether the data collected and later 
analyzed will result in discipline if an officer is found to have engaged in racial 
profiling, or whether the City will publicize the Study’s raw data.  It is also not 
clear from the record what exact methodology the City has adopted to analyze the 
collected data to determine any racial profiling.  Nor can we say that racial 
profiling studies have been so historically associated with employee discipline that 
their implementation invariably raises disciplinary issues.  (Cf. Holliday [v. City of 
Modesto (1991)] 229 Cal.App.3d [528,] 540 [various details of implementing 
mandatory drug-testing policy subject to meet-and-confer requirement].)  Thus, 
we do not decide the issue whether the City was required to meet and confer with 
the Association over any effects resulting from the City’s decision to implement 
the Study.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 11, fn. omitted.)  Instead, the majority opinion 
addresses only “the City’s implementation of the Study, requiring officers to fill 
out the Forms in order to collect data on possible racial profiling.”  (Id. at p. 12.)  
 
2 
That having been said, it is no doubt true that the study results may 
potentially be used to discipline police officers or may have other adverse 
employment consequences for them, because racial profiling is a serious form of 
police misconduct.  In my view, the use of the study as an additional basis for 
discipline would give rise to a duty on the City’s part to meet and confer with the 
Association.  The City’s adoption of a new basis for disciplining police officers 
goes to the heart of officers’ employment security, and is therefore one of the 
critical “terms and conditions of employment” at the core of Government Code 
section 3504.  (See Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo (1974) 12 Cal.3d 608, 
618.)  Although the City plainly has the authority and responibility to discipline 
officers who persistently engage in racial profiling, its unfettered right to do so 
does not outweigh the Association’s interest in ensuring, through negotiations 
with the City, that any such discipline follows due process and that the study 
results have been accurately and fairly analyzed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
I CONCUR:  
KENNARD, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Claremont Police Officers Association v. City of Claremont 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 112 Cal.App.4th 639 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S120546 
Date Filed: August 14, 2006 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Conrad Richard Aragon 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Lackie & Dammeier, Dieter C. Dammeier and Michael A. Morguess for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Rains, Lucia & Wilkinson and Alison Berry Wilkinson for Peace Officers Research Association of 
California’s Legal Defense Fund as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Liebert Cassidy Whitmore, Richard M. Kreisler, Mark H. Meyerhoff; Best Best & Krieger, Jeffrey V. 
Dunn, Sonia R. Carvalho and Sandra M. Schwarzmann for Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Alan L. Schlosser, Mark Schlosberg; and Peter Eliasberg for American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 
of Northern California and American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Southern California as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Jeffrey Kightlinger, Henry Barbosa, Henry Torres, Jr.; Atkinson, Andelson, Loya, Ruud & Romo, James F. 
Baca, Warren S. Kinsler, Nate Kowalski and Joshua E. Morrison for Metropolitan Water District of 
Southern California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Meyers, Nave, Riback, Silver & Wilson, Andrea J. Saltzman and Arthur A. Hartinger for League of 
California Cities as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Dieter C. Dammeier 
Lackie & Dammeier 
367 North Second Avenue 
Upland, CA  91786 
(909) 985-4003 
 
Michael A. Morguess 
Lackie & Dammeier 
367 North Second Avenue 
Upland, CA  91786 
(909) 985-4003 
 
Jeffrey V. Dunn 
Best Best & Krieger 
5 Park Plaza, Suite 1500 
Irvine, CA  92614 
(949) 263-2600