Title: Com. v. Torres

State: pennsylvania

Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Document:

396 Pa. Superior Ct. 573 (1990) 579 A.2d 398 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Angel TORRES, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted July 9, 1990. Filed August 13, 1990. *574 Jack E. Grayer, Erie, for appellant. Douglas J. Wright, Asst. Dist. Atty., Girard, for Com., appellee. Before TAMILIA, JOHNSON and CERCONE, JJ. TAMILIA, Judge: Following a jury trial in September of 1988, appellant, Angel Torres, was convicted of aggravated assault (18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1)),[1] recklessly endangering another person (18 Pa.C.S. § 2705) and receiving stolen property (18 Pa.C.S. § 3925). Although Mr. Torres at that time was properly advised of his right to file motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment and the consequences of failing to do so, no post-verdict motions were filed. Mr. Torres was sentenced on November 15, 1988 to seven and one-half (7 1/2) to fifteen (15) years incarceration for the aggravated assault, five (5) years probation plus costs for the receiving stolen property (consecutive to the incarceration) and costs only for count two, recklessly endangering another person. Appellant was also ordered to make restitution. Neither a motion for reconsideration nor a direct appeal was filed *575 following sentencing. A pro se petition requesting collateral post-conviction relief was filed on January 3, 1989, and Bronislaw Sliwinski, Esq., was appointed to represent appellant.[2] Mr. Sliwinski was granted permission to withdraw from the case on March 30, 1989 due to the closing of his law office. Six months later, current counsel, Jack E. Grayer, was appointed. Mr. Grayer filed an amended petition seeking post-conviction relief which was denied without a hearing by the court on January 23, 1990. This appeal timely followed. The basic facts underlying this appeal are contained in appellant's brief as follows: Appellant's brief at pp. 5-6. On appeal, appellant offers two broad issues for our review: 1) Did the court below err in failing to grant an evidentiary hearing on whether defendant had waived his appellate rights? and 2) Did the PCRA Court err in refusing *576 to permit defendant to file a motion for reconsideration or modification of sentence? Prior to addressing those two issues, we believe it is important, in the interests of justice and judicial economy (so as to prevent appellant from later claiming the ineffectiveness of present counsel), to comment briefly on the other issues preserved for appeal in the pro se and amended PCRA petitions. These issues concern alleged pretrial and trial errors, i.e. suppression of appellant's statements to police (pro se PCHA petition # 9), hearsay (although appellant does not reveal the content of the alleged hearsay, a review of the trial transcript reveals no instances of inadmissible hearsay constituting error) (pro se PCHA petition # 12) and weight of the evidence as to the element of intent necessary for aggravated assault (amended PCRA petition, g). We have carefully reviewed these allegations of error and find them to be without merit. We will also take this opportunity to address a contention contained in the amended PCRA petition and the "summary of the argument" portion of appellant's brief but not in the argument portion thereof. We agree with the trial court's disposition of this issue in its Opinion: [1] Regarding petitioner's ineffectiveness claim on this issue, in light of the record a reasonable basis for failing to object can easily be found. [2] Petitioner also alleges trial counsel's failure to object to the instruction at time at issue as a basis for counsel's ineffectiveness. The allegation is a classic example of a boilerplate ineffectiveness claim. Not only does the basis for the claim (failure to object) lack any merit but counsel's inaction was reasonably based. Finally, the petitioner, if anything, benefited from the narrower definition of assault, and certaily [sic] based on the facts of the case cannot show any prejudice since it is clear from the evidence the officer was indeed acting "in the performance of his duty." (Slip Op., Connelly, J., 1/23/90, pp. 5-6.) Although we agree with the trial court that appellant was not prejudiced by the use of the words "making or attempting to make a lawful arrest" instead of "in the performance of his duty," it is important to emphasize that neither of these two phrases was necessary to the charge. As we indicated in footnote 1, supra, appellant was not charged with an assault upon a police officer (18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(2) or (3)). He was charged with aggravated assault under section 2702(a)(1), which goes to any person not specifically a police officer. The Commonwealth in this case inadvertently stripped the victim police officer of the special protections *578 he is afforded by statutes such as 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702. Moreover, the Commonwealth's brief does not even mention this issue, just as it failed to address other issues presented by this appeal. See footnote 4, infra. As to appellant's first allegation of error regarding the trial court's failure to grant an evidentiary hearing regarding the alleged waiver of appellate rights, while we agree that some of the trial judge's and prosecutor's statements regarding the court's "providing of an attorney" for an appeal could possibly be misunderstood, the court's closing statement to appellant, as well as his response, was perfectly clear "Now, if you can't afford an attorney you contact the Court immediately and we'll contact the proper officials here to have an attorney appointed for you, because if you want to take an appeal or question this sentence you'll have to do it in writing within ten days; do you understand that? Mr. Torres: Yes, sir." (S.T., 11/15/89, p. 8.) This instruction should have made it evident appellant had a duty to act in order to have an attorney appointed, but in any event, as we are now taking the opportunity to address all of appellant's allegations of error, he suffers no prejudice and remand for appeal nunc pro tunc is not necessary. We also find no merit to appellant's claim he should have been provided with translation services at sentencing as he was at trial. Initially, our review of the transcript shows no hesitancy on appellant's part in responding appropriately to the court's questions; moreover, appellant is familiar with the criminal process. Most importantly, however, is the appellant's failure to request a translator when he realized none was available. He was asked three times if he had any questions regarding the proceeding (S.T. at pp. 3, 4, 6). Each time he responded appropriately and did not indicate any lack of understanding. The appropriate time to request an interpreter is when one is needed, not later when results of a proceeding are unfavorable to one's position. We do not agree with appellant that it was his counsel's responsibility to say appellant did not understand. Appellant had numerous opportunities to do so himself. *579 In summary, as to appellant's first allegation of error, we find no merit counsel was not ineffective at trial or sentencing; the transcript reveals appellant was told he was required to initiate the process of obtaining a court-appointed attorney; appellant was not hampered or prejudiced by the lack of translation services at sentencing; and appellant now has not been prejudiced by the lack of an evidentiary hearing as to his waiver of appellate rights because we have considered and found all of his allegations of error to be without merit. Appellant's second argument alleges error by the trial court in refusing to permit him to file a motion for the reconsideration or modification of sentence nunc pro tunc after such permission was requested in his Post Conviction Relief Act petition. Because we find the sentencing court erred in ordering restitution without making the appropriate inquiries as to ability to pay, we agree the court erred in denying appellant the right to file a post-sentencing motion nunc pro tunc. The relevant portion of the statute regulating restitution provides as follows: 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106. It is evident that in this case the sentencing court failed to comply with section 1106. The court's entire statement as to restitution was: "There's quite a bit of money involved with the medical expenses involved. They're up over a couple thousand dollars now, but you'll have to pay all the restitution back." (S.T., 11/15/88, p. 8.) Commonwealth v. Hainsey, 379 Pa.Super. 376, 388-389, 550 A.2d 207, 213 (1988) quoting Commonwealth v. Fuqua, 267 Pa.Super. 504, 510, 407 A.2d 24, 27 (1979). Restitution has, as its primary purpose, the rehabilitation of the defendant. Commonwealth v. Cannon, 387 Pa.Super. 12, 563 A.2d 918 (1989); Commonwealth v. Celane, 311 Pa.Super. 93, 457 A.2d 509 (1982). An additional purpose of remand is to provide the complainant with some measure of redress. Commonwealth v. Melnyk, 378 Pa.Super. 42, 548 A.2d 266 (1988). As the sentencing court in this case neglected to comply with statutory and case law in ordering appellant to pay restitution, we are constrained to vacate *581 that portion of the sentence and remand for resentencing as to restitution only. "[T]he court in imposing restitution must make sure that the amount awarded not only does not exceed damages to the victim, but also does not exceed the [appellant's] ability to pay." Celane, supra at 102, 457 A.2d at 514, citing Commonwealth v. Erb, 286 Pa.Super. 65, 428 A.2d 574 (1981), and Fuqua, supra. As to part (b) of appellant's second allegation of error, appellant argues excessiveness of sentence and an abuse of discretion by the trial court in that it failed to consider evidence in mitigation of sentence. This argument focuses on the fact appellant was not given an opportunity of allocution prior to the imposition of sentence as is required by Commonwealth v. Thomas, 520 Pa. 206, 553 A.2d 918 (1989). Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1405, effective since 1973, provides in pertinent part: While it is undisputed Rule 1405 was in effect at the time appellant was sentenced, unfortunately, for appellant, the interpretation of the rule, as promulgated by Thomas, supra, was not. Our Supreme Court in Thomas discussed the history of "ancient inquiry," the right of a defendant to personally address the court prior to sentencing. This right, historically, was the means by which an accused could speak for himself plead for mercy. Although Rule 1405 provides only that a defendant has a right to speak at the sentencing proceeding, the Court in Thomas interpreted it to mean prior to sentencing. Id., 520 Pa. at 209-210, 553 A.2d at 918 (emphasis supplied). See Commonwealth v. Melvin, 392 Pa.Super. 224, 572 A.2d 773 (1990). As Thomas, supra, was decided on February 1, 1989, and appellant herein was sentenced on November 15, 1988, Thomas is not applicable. Appellant's argument, therefore, is without merit since he did have an opportunity to speak at the sentencing proceeding albeit after the sentence was imposed,[3] which is all that was required by Rule 1405 at that time. We find no merit, therefore, to appellant's argument as to his right to allocution prior to sentencing. As to appellant's general, sweeping statements regarding the failure of sentencing counsel to articulate evidence of personal background, circumstances of the crime as related to appellant's intoxication and his confusion, we find no arguable merit. The sentencing judge had the benefit of a presentence report which we can assume he considered even if at sentencing he failed to mention all of the details contained therein. Commonwealth v. Devers, 519 Pa. 88, 101-102, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (1988). With regard to the circumstances of the crime, these were fully developed in the jury trial and the jury, as fact finders, chose to believe the police officer's version of events when it convicted appellant. Having found error by the trial court only as to the sentence of restitution, we vacate only that portion of the sentence. The sentence of incarceration is affirmed.[4] The Order denying PCRA relief is reversed to the extent resentencing on the restitution portion of the judgment of sentence is required. Case remanded for proceedings consistent with this Opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished. [1] We note that although the victim of the aggravated assault was a police officer, appellant was charged under 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1) rather than (a)(2) which specifically concerns police officers as victims. As convictions under both sections are graded as felonies of the first degree, however, there is no effect on the propriety of the sentence. [2] Although captioned a Post Conviction Hearing Act Petition, the petition was actually filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act, effective April 13, 1988. [3] Appellant's entire statement consisted of the following: "Yeah, if the police officer would tell the truth I wouldn't be here right now because he's lying." (S.T., 11/15/88, p. 9.) [4] We believe it is necessary to admonish the Commonwealth/appellee for its failure to file a brief which even begins to adequately discuss the issues before this Court on appeal. Appellee's brief, in fact, did not even mention the restitution or allocution issues, both of which have arguable merit.