Title: JEREMY FENTON V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JEREMY FENTON V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 51154 P.3d 974Case Number: 05-224Decided: 03/23/2007
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
JEREMY 
FENTON,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OFWYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; and Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Domonkos.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Eric A. Johnson, Director, 
Prosecution Assistance Program; and Geoffrey L. Gunnerson, Student Director, 
Prosecution Assistance Program.  
Argument by Mr. Gunnerson.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Jeremy 
Fenton (Fenton), entered a conditional plea of guilty to possession of 
methamphetamine with intent to deliver.  
The "condition" preserved Fenton's right to appeal the district court's 
decision to deny his motion to suppress the evidence which supported the charge 
to which he pled guilty.  Fenton 
asserts that the disputed evidence was obtained during an extensive search of 
his home, without the benefit of a search warrant issued by a judicial 
officer.  Thus, he contends that the 
search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, as well as Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4.  Fenton then concludes that the district 
court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence found during the 
unreasonable search, as well as the evidence gathered thereafter (fruit of the 
search), including incriminating statements he made at the time of his 
arrest.  We will reverse and remand 
with instructions that the district court enter an order granting Fenton's 
motion to suppress.

 
 
BURDEN 
OF PROOF BELOW

 
 
[¶2]      That the State 
bears the burden of proof with respect to justifying warrantless searches and 
seizures of a dwelling house is a well-established rule:

 
 
The 
United States Constitution and the Wyoming Constitution prohibit "unreasonable 
searches and seizures."  U.S. Const. 
amend. IV;  Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 
4.  We have stated that under both 
constitutions, warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless 
they are justified by probable cause and established exceptions.  Morris v. State, 908 P.2d 931, 935 
(Wyo.1995).  In addition to the 
consent exception to the warrant requirement, these specific exigent 
circumstances exceptions include:

--search 
of an arrested suspect and the area within his control;

--search 
conducted while in pursuit of a fleeing suspect;

--search 
and/or seizure to prevent the imminent destruction of 
evidence;

--search 
and/or seizure of an automobile upon probable cause;

--search 
which results when an object is inadvertently in the plain view of police 
officers while they are where they have a right to be; and

--search 
which results from an entry into a dwelling in order to prevent loss of life or 
property.

 
 

Hughes, 
¶ 11 (citing Andrews v. State, 
2002 WY 28, ¶ 18, 40 P.3d 708, ¶ 18 (Wyo.2002)).  The existence of exigent circumstances 
is dependent upon all of the facts or circumstances viewed in their 
entirety.  Hughes, ¶ 13.  When a proper objection or motion is 
made by a defendant, the State bears the burden of proving that one of these 
exceptions applies.  Mickelson v. State, 906 P.2d 1020, 1022 
(Wyo.1995); Dickeson v. State, 843 P.2d 606, 610 (Wyo.1992).

 
 

Pena v. 
State, 2004 
WY 115, ¶ 29, 98 P.3d 857, 870 (Wyo. 2004) (the affirmance in the Pena case relied on the "emergency 
assistance exception," as well as an exception that is designed to prevent loss 
of life or property); also see Guerra v. 
State, 897 P.2d 447, 452 (Wyo. 1995).

 
 
[¶3]      In this instance, 
the district court conducted a hearing and took evidence concerning the search 
and seizure at issue:  "In reviewing 
a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we do not interfere 
with the trial court's findings of fact unless the findings are clearly 
erroneous.  We view the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the trial court's determination because the trial 
court has an opportunity at the evidentiary hearing to assess the credibility 
of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make the necessary inferences, 
deductions, and conclusions.'"  Pena ¶ 25, 98 P.3d  at 869. 

 
 
[¶4]      We add the 
following because we wish to make clear that the issue presented in a case such 
as this is one of the most important known to Anglo-American 
jurisprudence:

 
 
The 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  
It provides:

 
 
The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized.  

 
 
            
"It is axiomatic that the 'physical entry of the home is the chief evil 
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.' "  State v. Straub, 749 N.E.2d 593, 597 
(Ind.Ct.App.2001) (quoting United States 
v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S. Ct. 2125, 32 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1972)).  "[A] home is 
entitled to special dignity and special sanctity and ... the proper way to 
search a home is to obtain a search warrant."  Brown v. State, 738 P.2d 1092, 1094 
(Wyo.1987).  Thus, searches and 
seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable, but 
there are a few "well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement."  Vassar v. State, 2004 WY 125, ¶ 19, 
99 P.3d 987, 995 (Wyo.2004).  
Consent and the existence of exigent circumstances are two of the 
exceptions to the warrant requirement.  
Pena v. State, 2004 WY 115, 
¶ 29, 98 P.3d 857, 870 (Wyo.2004);  
Meadows v. State, 2003 WY 37, 
¶ 24, 65 P.3d 33, 40 (Wyo.2003).

 
 

Gompf v. 
State, 2005 
WY 112, ¶ 17, 120 P.3d 980, 985 (Wyo. 2005); Rideout v. State, 2005 WY 141, ¶ 16, 122 P.3d 201, 205 (Wyo. 
2005).  Both the Gompf case and the Rideout case are instructive here, 
because in those cases, once the police felt they had probable cause to search, 
they secured the premises to be searched and sought judicially supervised search 
warrants (or as in Rideout written 
consent of the home owner).

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶5]      The 
constitutionality of a particular search or seizure is a question of law that we 
review de novo.  Pena ¶ 25, 98 P.3d  at 
869.

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶6]      The following 
affidavit of probable cause, dated February 9, 2005, was submitted to the 
circuit court in support of a warrant for Fenton's arrest by Laramie County 
Deputy Sheriff Bruce Dexter:

 
 
            
On February 9, 2005 at approximately 12:05 PM Deputy Bruce Dexter and 
Deputy Craig Harvey went to Lisa Brown's home, 300 East Prosser, Space 152.  Deputy Dexter needed to talk to Lisa 
Brown and Jeremy Fenton about a stolen car case he is investigating and they are 
suspects.  Lisa Brown answered the 
door and let the deputies into her trailer.  Jeremy Fenton was also at the 
residence.  Deputy Harvey saw in 
plain view sitting on top of stereo speakers in the living room a small plastic 
baggie containing marijuana and marijuana residue on a piece of paper.  Deputy Harvey took that as 
evidence.  Deputy Dexter found 
papers from Lowes that had burnt and unburnt marijuana laying on a shelf of the 
coffee table in the living room.  
Deputies searched the residence for other evidence.  There was a Brinks Home Security lock 
box sitting on the floor between the kitchen area and living room area.  Initially Fenton and Brown said the lock 
box belonged to Lisa Brown's brother, Chad Brown and they did not have a key for 
it.  Deputy Hollenbach responded to 
help us at the trailer.  Hollenbach 
found a key among a set of keys that Brown and Fenton said belonged to 
them.  The key opened the box.  Inside the box was $1030 in cash in a 
black leather wallet that contained the Wyoming driver's license and Social Security 
card for Jeremy Fenton.  There was a 
plastic baggie that contained numerous small baggies, 1 Gram Precision Pocket 
Tech electronic scale, 1 gray plastic cigarette box that contained 2 plastic 
baggies of crystal methamphetamine.  
One baggie contained approximately 5.5 grams of methamphetamine and 1 
baggie contained approximately 3 grams of methamphetamine.  Both tested presumptive positive for 
methamphetamine.

            
Jeremy Fenton admitted the money was his rent money and they had to lock 
the money in the box because they had a problem with people stealing property 
from the residence.

            
During the booking process Fenton admitted he knew the methamphetamine 
was in the lockbox and he told a friend he did not want the "stuff" there 
because he did not want to get into trouble for it.

 
 
[¶7]      Fenton filed his 
motion to suppress on May 10, 2005.  
A memorandum of law in support of the motion to suppress was entered in 
the district court record on May 16, 2005.  
In it, Fenton did not contest the seizure of evidence found in plain 
view.  On May 16, 2005, the State 
filed a response to the motion to suppress.  In it, the State asserted that the 
officers were within the bounds of the law in seizing evidence that was in plain 
view.  Relying principally on Andrews v. State, 2002 WY 28, 40 P.3d 708 (Wyo. 2002), the State contended that Fenton was required to assert a 
possessory interest in the lock box where the methamphetamine was found before 
he could complain of the search, and furthermore that he lacked standing to 
complain of the constitutionality of the search.  The State then conceded that both Brown 
and Fenton objected to the further search of their home, but that exigent 
circumstances required the police to proceed with the 
search.

 
 
[¶8]      At a hearing held 
on May 16, 2005, the district court heard evidence concerning the motion to 
suppress.  The State called two 
witnesses in support of its burden to establish the reasonableness of the 
contested search and seizure.  The 
first to testify was Deputy Sheriff Bruce Dexter.  His testimony established that Fenton 
and Lisa Brown were suspected of stealing a car.  Deputy Dexter talked with Brown via 
telephone on February 8, 2005, and he told her he would "be getting with her the 
next day."

 
 
[¶9]      Deputy Dexter and 
Deputy Craig Harvey arrived at the trailer that was the home of Fenton and Brown 
shortly after Noon on February 9, 2005.  
Brown invited the deputies into her home and about that same time Fenton 
came into the living room area from another part of the trailer.  As he entered the trailer, Deputy Harvey 
noticed a "little bit" of marijuana resting on a "piece of paper" on top of a 
stereo speaker.  The "piece of 
paper" turned out to be a copy of some of the papers Deputy Dexter already had 
that related to the auto theft investigation.  Both that "piece of paper" and the 
marijuana were seized as evidence that was in plain view.  Brown said the marijuana was hers.  Deputy Dexter then continued to look 
around the living room and on a shelf "underneath the top of the coffee table" 
he saw what looked like a little bit of marijuana.  That was also seized as evidence.  Brown took responsibility for that 
marijuana as well.

 
 
[¶10]   At that point Dexter informed Brown 
he "was going to look around the rest of the trailer, that this marijuana I had 
found gave me probable cause to do so.  
So I started looking.  I 
walked into the kitchen area.  There 
was a big old green Army kind of duffel bag sitting on top of the counter."  Dexter then walked around to the other 
side of the kitchen counter (the counter divided the kitchen and the living 
room) and looked further into the kitchen.  
There he found a "handheld police scanner" and a plastic baggie with 
about a gram of marijuana in it.  
Deputy Dexter grabbed the closed duffel bag and "jostled it a bit, and it 
sounded like it was full of glass."  
In fact it was full of glass, and Brown told the deputies that the duffel 
bag belonged to her father but the glass contents belonged to a girl they had 
recently kicked out of the apartment because they suspected she was using 
drugs.

 
 
[¶11]   Deputy Dexter "continued to look 
around in the trailer."  He noticed 
a black "Brinks home security lockbox" sitting on the floor right at the end of 
the counter.  Dexter testified that 
the lockbox aroused his suspicions because it "would be a good place to store 
drugs, money.  I'd already found 
some marijuana in there."  In answer 
to an inquiry who owned the box, Brown said it belonged to her brother, Chad 
Brown.  Brown denied having a key 
for the lockbox and, although Fenton himself didn't speak during this interlude, 
Dexter assumed she was speaking for both of them.  Dexter also found some keys on the 
kitchen counter and Brown said they were hers.   Dexter tried a couple of the keys 
on the lockbox but was unable to open it.

 
 
[¶12]   At about this time a third Deputy 
arrived, Deputy Hollenbach.  He was 
in the area and apparently heard radio traffic and decided to come over and help 
out.  As Deputy Dexter was in the 
process of writing a citation to Brown because of the marijuana, Deputy 
Hollenbach began checking the keys and eventually was able to open the 
lockbox.  Inside the lockbox, the 
deputies found a man's wallet and it contained Fenton's driver's license, social 
security card, and $1,030.00 in cash.  
They also found glass pipes that appeared to have methamphetamine 
residue, a container with two baggies of methamphetamine that totaled 8.5 grams 
in weight, additional packaging material (baggies) similar to those that 
contained the marijuana found earlier, and a small scale used for weighing out 
drugs.  Once the lockbox had been 
opened, Fenton answered some questions.  
He stated that the money was their "rent money," and that it was in the 
lockbox because they had a problem with people who stayed with them, or who were 
invited over, stealing from them.

 
 
[¶13]   Fenton was arrested and given 
Miranda warnings.  He was then taken 
to jail where, with respect to the methamphetamine, he acknowledged; "I knew it 
was in there, I was trying to get rid of it.  I didn't want to get in there."  According to Dexter's testimony, Fenton 
also told the police at that point that he was on probation for a prior drug 
charge and that he had had a positive urinalysis test for methamphetamine.  Fenton made no statement as to ownership 
of the lockbox.  It was only Brown 
who stated that it belonged to her brother.  However, Fenton did not disagree with 
Brown's statement that it belonged to her brother and he never claimed it as his 
own.  It is evident from the 
testimony that the deputies treated this as tacit agreement that the security 
box was not Fenton's.  Deputy Dexter 
also testified that the trailer was the home of both Brown and Fenton.  We also take note at this juncture that 
the facts relied upon at the suppression hearing were that it was the home of 
both Fenton and Brown.  Deputy 
Dexter's testimony also established that Deputy Harvey largely stayed near the 
front door and did the bagging of evidence, while he and Deputy Hollenbach 
searched the trailer.  Dexter also 
walked "to the west end of the trailer through the kitchen area back to the 
bedroom, looked around."

 
 
[¶14]   During cross-examination this 
exchange took place concerning the search of the living 
room:

 
 
Q.  Okay.  And you decide  at that point does it 
go through your mind that you better start searching other places in the room 
that maybe these people have drugs?

A.  Yes.

Q.  And 
you think, well, boy, I better start looking around in 
here?

A.  Yes.

Q.  Okay.  So you bend down and look at the coffee 
table at that point?

A.  That's 
exactly what I did.

Q.  Okay.  And how far do you have to bend down to 
look under that coffee table?

A.  A 
foot and a half, two feet.

Q.  Okay.

A.  It 
was enough when I bent over.

Q.  Okay.  You didn't have to get on your 
knees?

A.  No.

Q.  But 
you had to bend over, and you were probably touching your knees when you were 
looking?

A.  Close 
to it.  I don't know if I was 
touching my knees but I was bent over pretty good.

 
 
[¶15]   Dexter conceded that he pulled out 
the remainder of the items under the coffee table to "see if there was anything 
else," and that he looked "all over the living room and the kitchen area," as 
well as behind the couch.  Dexter 
also conceded that since he had found drugs in the living room he thought he 
should search further, including the kitchen and under the kitchen sink.  The duffel bag was found in the kitchen 
(although its contents were not visible).  
He also found another baggie of marijuana there, items that were not 
visible from the front door or living room.  Dexter continued his general search of 
the remainder of the house, including the bedroom (where he found a bong and a 
propane torch inside a closed cabinet).  
He looked in, around, and under clothing in the bedroom and generally 
searched the bedroom (including "maybe" looking under the mattress which was on 
the floor), taking as evidence a radio shack book, but leaving behind a second 
police frequency radio.  Later he 
found yet another larger police frequency scanner behind the couch in the living 
room which he did not take into evidence.  
The scanner could be seen from the kitchen area by someone looking out 
into the living room area.

 
 
[¶16]   Deputy Harvey also testified.  His testimony repeated much of what 
Deputy Dexter had to say, but added a few additional insights to the search and 
seizure process at issue here.  For 
instance, he related that Brown became upset when Harvey found the first evidence of marijuana, 
"she became upset that we needed a warrant to search."  Deputy Dexter explained to Ms. Brown 
that this was "in plain view, we had probable cause to search further."  Deputy Harvey also testified that Fenton 
admitted the methamphetamine was his, which is somewhat different, and perhaps 
contradictory of Deputy Dexter's testimony.

 
 
[¶17]   Although the next two observations 
are only of tangential importance to the resolution of this case, we deem them 
of enough significance to briefly outline them.  It is clear from the transcript that the 
time allowed for this hearing was limited.  
Apparently the defense attorney had indicated the hearing wouldn't take 
more than "half an hour," and the district court was concerned because " we 
have people waiting back in here"  
Defense counsel's cross examination of Deputy Dexter was fairly 
thorough.  She did cease her 
questioning immediately after she was interrupted by the district court, but she 
also indicated she was done with her cross-examination.  Before beginning a much briefer 
cross-examination of Deputy Harvey, defense counsel looked to the district court 
for guidance asking, "Do you want me to go ahead?  I mean, it is already 4:25."  The district court indicated defense 
counsel should proceed, but only a few questions were asked.  Second, we note that both defense 
counsel and the prosecutor indicated to the district court that they were not 
very well prepared for the hearing.

 
 
[¶18]   In an "Order Denying Motion to 
Suppress," the district court made these findings based on the information 
gathered at the hearing:

 
 
In 
Laramie County District Court Docket 27-672, the Defendant's Judgment and 
Sentence, filed October 31, 2003, placed him on probation after he pled guilty 
to the possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. § 31-7-1031(a)(i)( [LexisNexis] 2002).  The fifth term of Defendant's probation 
stated that he was not to "use or possess alcohol, drugs or controlled 
substances or associate with those who do and shall, upon the request of law 
enforcement officers or probation officers submit to all tests and searches 
relative to the use thereof."1

On 
February 9, 2005, Laramie County Sheriff's Deputies Bruce Dexter and Craig 
Harvey were investigating a stolen vehicle report.  The deputies thought that the Defendant 
and his girlfriend, Lisa Brown, may have had some knowledge on the subject.  The deputies went to Brown and 
Defendant's mobile home and knocked on the door.  Brown allowed the deputies into their 
home.  As they were discussing the 
theft in the Defendant's living room, Deputy Harvey noticed that there was 
marijuana lying on top of [a] stereo speaker in plain view.  Deputy Harvey confiscated the 
marijuana.  Ms. Brown claimed that 
the marijuana was hers.

On the 
floor below the kitchen counter, in plain view from the living room, there was a 
small security lockbox.  The 
deputies asked Brown and the Defendant, who owned the lockbox, but both denied 
ownership claiming that it belonged to Brown's brother.  On the counter, Deputy Hollenbach found 
a set of keys which Brown claimed as her own.  Deputy Harvey then opened the lockbox 
using one of the keys on the key ring and discovered Defendant's wallet in the 
lockbox, along with approximately $1030 in cash, 8 grams of methamphetamine, a 
digital scale, packaging materials as are commonly used in the distribution of 
methamphetamine, and assorted drug-related paraphernalia.  Defendant was then placed under arrest 
and advised of his Miranda rights.  
When questioned later, the Defendant continued to claim that the lockbox 
belonged to Brown's brother but admitted that he knew the box contained 
methamphetamine and admitted that he was on probation for a prior drug 
charge.

 
 
DISCUSSION:

            

The 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 4 of 
the Wyoming Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures.  Burgos-Seberos v. State, 969 P.2d 1131, 
1133 (Wyo. 
1998).  Generally, reasonableness is 
determined by balancing the public's interest and the individual's right to 
personal security free from arbitrary interference by law enforcement 
officers.  Damato v. State, 64 P.3d 700, 704 (Wyo. 
2003).  Any analysis of the 
"reasonableness" of the seizure of the methamphetamine must take into account 
the probationary status of the Defendant and the specific terms contained in the 
order placing him on probation as well as his denial of ownership of the 
lockbox.

            
As might be expected, probationers do not enjoy the full panoply of 
rights which the U.S. and Wyoming Constitutions afford 
an ordinary citizen who is not on probation.  Although a probationer is entitled to 
Fourth Amendment protection, a probationer does not enjoy the absolute liberty 
to which every citizen is entitled, but only a conditional liberty depending on 
special probation restrictions.  
Id. at 
1257.  Unlike an ordinary citizen, a 
warrantless search of a probationer's residence without probable cause or 
exigent circumstances, does not necessarily violate Fourth Amendment as long as 
"reasonable grounds" for such a search exist.  Id.

            
In Jones v. State, the Wyoming 
Supreme Court recognized the validity of a condition of probation requiring the 
probationer to submit to searches upon demand by law enforcement.  41 P.3d  at 1258.  In Jones, the Court 
stated:

We hold 
that in cases where the unlawful possession, consumption, or abuse of alcohol or 
a controlled substance was an element or contributing factor in the underlying 
crime, or where the evidence at sentencing suggests that the unlawful 
possession, consumption or abuse of alcohol or a controlled substance will 
likely affect a defendant's rehabilitation and the prospect of future criminal 
conduct, reasonable grounds exist to include as a probationary condition random 
searches of the defendant, his residence and his vehicle for the presence of the 
offending substances.

Id. at 
1258.  However, Jones also provides 
that in order for the warrantless search provision to be constitutional, it must 
also be reasonable. Id.

Nixon v. 
State, 18 P.3d 631 (Wyo. 2001) holds a warrantless search of a probationer's home must be 
based upon a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in unlawful 
activity.  Nixon, 18 P.3d  at 636.  The officer "must be able to point to 
specific and articulable facts that, taken together with rational inference from 
those facts, reasonably warrant a belief  that a condition of parole has been 
or is being violated.  Id.

The 
Court finds that the deputies were legally upon the premises, that they had 
reasonable cause to believe that the Defendant was violating at least one of the 
terms of his probation and that as a result the Defendant was obliged to submit 
to searches relative to his use of drugs.

There is 
an alternative theory upon which the Court may rely in determining whether the 
motion should be granted.  In order 
to object to the legality of the search the Defendant must have an expectation 
of privacy in the item searched.  Andrews v. State, 40 P.3d 708, 712-13 
(Wyo. 2002).  A defendant has no 
expectation of privacy in an object searched if he "abandons" the object 
searched.  Id. at 713.  See also United States v. Garzon, 119 F.3d 1446, 1449 (10th Cir. 1997).  Consequently, the Defendant lacks 
standing to complain of an illegal search or seizure of property which he has 
abandoned or of which he has disclaimed ownership.  Garzon, 119 F.3d  at 1449.  A person abandons an object when he 
explicitly disclaims an interest in the object.  Id. 
at 1452.  Given that both Brown and 
the Defendant affirmatively asserted that the lockbox, which was in plain view 
to the officers legally on the premises, belonged to a third party, the 
Defendant has no expectation of privacy in the box and as a result the Defendant 
has no standing to object to the legality of the search of the 
lockbox.

 
 
CONCLUSION:

 
 
            
In conclusion, the Court finds that the warrantless search of Defendant's 
residence was proper for several reasons.  
The deputies were legally on the premises based on the fact that Brown 
let them into the house.  After the 
deputies saw the marijuana in plain view, they had reasonable suspicion to 
believe that the Defendant/probationer was committing a drug crime or at a 
minimum associating with someone who was in possession of drugs which was also 
prohibited by the probationer's judgment and sentence.  Defendant was required by the conditions 
of his probation to submit to random searches by law enforcement relative to the 
use of drugs or alcohol.  Secondly, 
because both the Defendant and Ms. Brown denied ownership of the lockbox and 
asserted that the box belonged to a third person, the Defendant has no standing 
to object to the legality of the seizure and search of the lockbox.  Therefore, the Court finds that no 
Fourth Amendment violation transpired.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶19]   Our analysis will be brief because 
there is not much to be said about the issues raised.  We conclude that the resolution of this 
case has nothing to do with the law that relates to searches and seizures 
conducted pursuant to the terms of a probation/parole agreement.  That was not an issue even broached 
during the hearing on the motion to suppress, it was not a factor in the police 
officer's presence at the Fenton/Brown home, and the police officers were not 
aware that Fenton was on probation -- although discovery of that information was 
only a phone or radio call away.  
The district court erred as a matter of law to the extent it relied upon 
the terms of the probation agreement in denying the motion to suppress.  See People v. Sanders, 31 Cal. 4th 318, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 630, 73 P.3d 496, 505 
(Cal. 
2003).

 
 
[¶20]   With respect to the other issues at 
large, we will note only that the search at issue here was per se unreasonable 
under the governing law, as has been the case since the institution of the 
Constitutions we are called upon to interpret.  The burden was on the State to prove by 
a preponderance of the evidence that there was some exception or circumstance 
that demonstrated that the search was not unreasonable.  The State failed to meet that burden 
and, therefore, we are compelled to conclude that the search was unreasonable as 
a matter of law.  The Andrews2 case is simply not in point, 
and it does not support a conclusion that Fenton lacked standing to challenge 
the search of the contents of the Brinks Home Security lockbox.  None of the other exceptions to the 
warrant requirement advanced by the State, as they pertain to the search of a 
dwelling house, are availing.  Our 
independent review of other recognized exceptions are not called into play by 
the evidence brought forward by the State.  
We decline to dilute the governing law as it pertains to such searches by 
trying to contort these circumstances into a procrustean bed that will not 
accommodate them.  The record is 
clear beyond cavil that the police officers did have probable cause which would 
have justified the issuance of a search warrant by a judicial authority, and 
that too was just a phone/radio call away during the early afternoon hours of 
February 9, 2005.  See Gompf, 120 P.3d 980, and Rideout, 122 P.3d 201.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶21]   We hold that the district court 
erred in denying Fenton's motion to suppress.  The judgment and sentence of the 
district court is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the district court 
for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1We do not 
question the accuracy of this quotation from Fenton's probation agreement.  However, it would have been better 
practice, certainly, for a copy of that agreement to have been included in the 
record by the prosecution or the district court.  See Wayt v. State, 912 P.2d 1106, 1109 
(Wyo. 1996) 
("Wayt is chargeable with the  
knowledge that a court may take judicial notice of its own records in 
cases closely related to the one before it.").

 
 

2In Andrews the search involved property 
belonging to Andrews, but which was located in his parents' house.  Andrews agreed to allow  a search of two duffel bags, but denied 
that a third duffel bag was his.  
His parents consented to the search of the third bag, and we held that he 
lacked standing to challenge the search.  
Andrews, ¶¶ 7-28, 40 P.3d  
at 710-14.