Title: State of Florida v. James E. Brake, Jr.

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

1. Section 787.025, Florida Statutes (1997), provides:
(1) As used in this section, the term:
(a) "Structure" means a building of any kind, either temporary
or permanent, which has a roof over it, together with the curtilage
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
  
____________
No. SC00-119
____________
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellant,
vs.
JAMES E. BRAKE, JR.
Appellee.
[September 20, 2001]
CORRECTED OPINION
HARDING, J.
We have on appeal a decision of a district court of appeal declaring a state
statute to be invalid.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
James E. Brake, Jr. was charged by information with violating section
787.025, Florida Statutes (1997).1  This statute makes it a third-degree felony for a 
thereof.
(b) "Dwelling" means a building or conveyance of any kind,
either temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof
over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging together
therein at night, together with the curtilage thereof.
(c) "Conveyance" means any motor vehicle, ship, vessel,
railroad car, trailer, aircraft, or sleeping car.
(2)(a) A person over the age of 18 who, having been previously
convicted of a violation of chapter 794 or s. 800.04, or a violation of a
similar law of another jurisdiction, intentionally lures or entices, or
attempts to lure or entice, a child under the age of 12 into a structure,
dwelling, or conveyance for other than a lawful purpose commits a
felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s.
775.083, or s. 775.084.
(b) For purposes of this section, the luring or enticing, or
attempted luring or enticing, of a child under the age of 12 into a
structure, dwelling, or conveyance without the consent of the child's
parent or legal guardian shall be prima facie evidence of other than a
lawful purpose.
(3) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this
section that:
(a) The person reasonably believed that his or her action was
necessary to prevent the child from being seriously injured.
(b) The person lured or enticed, or attempted to lure or entice,
the child under the age of 12 into a structure, dwelling, or conveyance
for a lawful purpose.
(c) The person's actions were reasonable under the
circumstances and the defendant did not have any intent to harm the
health, safety, or welfare of the child.
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person over eighteen, who previously has been convicted of a violation of chapter
2. Chapter 794, Florida Statutes, is entitled sexual battery.
3. Section 800.04, Florida Statutes, proscribes lewd or lascivious offenses
committed upon on or in the presence of persons under sixteen years of age.
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794,2 section 800.04,3 or a similar law in another state, to intentionally lure or entice
a child under twelve years of age into a structure, dwelling, or conveyance for
“other than a lawful purpose.”  Brake was previously convicted of indecency with a
child in Texas, a crime which is similar to that proscribed under Florida’s section
800.04.
According to the police report, on December 26, 1997, Brake approached 
M.C., a ten-year-old girl who was playing in front of her house, and asked her if
she wanted to see his house and get a toy.  Brake gave M.C. a stuffed animal and
she left with Brake on his bicycle.  While inside his residence, Brake asked M.C.  to
give him a hug and a kiss, which she did.  Brake also touched a mark on M.C.’s
left inner thigh.  Brake did not have permission or consent from M.C.’s parents to
take her.  M.C.’s parents reported her missing to their neighbors and M.C. was
found ninety minutes later with Brake.
After the trial court denied Brake’s motion to dismiss the information and
declare section 787.025 unconstitutional, Brake entered a plea of nolo contendere,
reserving the right to appeal the denial.  Brake was sentenced to nine months in
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county jail with credit for time served and five years’ probation.
The sole issue on appeal to the district court was the trial court’s denial of
Brake’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that the statute was unconstitutionally
vague for not defining the term “other than lawful purpose.”  The Second District
Court of Appeal ruled that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and reversed
Brake’s conviction.  See Brake v. State, 746 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).  The
State appealed the case to this Court, based upon the district court’s ruling that the
statute is unconstitutional.
On appeal, the district court found section 787.025 to be unconstitutionally
vague because it does not define the term “for other than a lawful purpose.”  Thus,
the district court concluded that the statute fails to give persons of common
intelligence adequate warning of the proscribed conduct and encourages arbitrary
and erratic enforcement.  See id. at 528.  The district court further concluded that
the three affirmative defenses set forth in the statute (that the defendant had a
reasonable belief that the action was necessary to prevent serious injury to the child;
that the action was for a lawful purpose; or that the defendant’s actions were
reasonable under the circumstances and defendant had no intent to harm the child)
could not supply the requisite meaning to the vague term.  The district court
identified two problems with the affirmative defenses supplying the definition:  (1)
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the affirmative defenses are part of an unconstitutional mandatory rebuttable
presumption which relieves the State of the burden of persuasion (lack of consent
of the child’s parent “shall be prima facie evidence of other than a lawful purpose”
which can be rebutted if defendant can adduce evidence of “lawful purpose”); and
(2) it is circuitous to rely on the “lawful purpose” affirmative defense to give
meaning to “other than lawful purpose” element of the offense.  See id. at 529.
Initially, we address the State’s contention that Brake has no standing to raise
a facial challenge to the statute because his conduct (luring a child to his house with
a toy and then asking for and receiving a hug and kiss from the child) is the very
conduct that is clearly prohibited by the statute and this conduct is not
constitutionally protected.  As this Court explained in Sieniarecki v. State, 756 So.
2d 68, 75 (Fla. 2000), a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied
lacks standing to raise a facial vagueness challenge on the ground that the statute
may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others in situations not before the
Court.  If the record demonstrates that a defendant has engaged in some conduct
clearly proscribed by the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute, then he cannot
successfully challenge it for vagueness or complain of its vagueness as applied to
the hypothetical conduct of others.  See id.; see also McKenney v. State, 388 So.
2d 1232, 1233 (Fla. 1980) (“A person whose conduct clearly falls within the
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statute's prohibition cannot reasonably be said to have been denied adequate
notice.”).
Sieniarecki involved the constitutionality of a statute which penalized a care
giver for the neglect of a disabled adult.  Sieniarecki was convicted under the
statute when her physically incapacitated mother, who was under Sieniarecki’s 
care, died from septicemia, which was aggravated by dehydration and malnutrition. 
This Court determined that the mother met the statutory definition of disabled, that
the facts showed that Sieniarecki had assumed responsibility for the care of her
mother, and that Sieniarecki’s failure to address her mother’s basic needs resulted
in the mother’s death and was squarely within the statute’s proscriptions.  Thus,
this Court determined that not only was the statute constitutional as applied to
Sieniarecki, but also that she lacked standing to raise a facial vagueness challenge. 
See id.
The instant case is distinguishable from Sieniarecki.  Although Brake clearly
falls into the group that the luring statute is intended to cover (persons over eighteen
years of age who have previously been convicted of a chapter 794 sexual battery
violation or a section 800.04 lewd or lascivious offense), it is not clear that he “has
engaged in some conduct clearly proscribed by the plain and ordinary meaning of
the statute” as did Sieniarecki.  Thus, Brake has standing to bring a facial vagueness
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challenge.
While the Second District Court of Appeal found section 787.025 to be
unconstitutionally vague, Brake argues on review before this Court that the statute is
both unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.  The doctrines of overbreadth and
vagueness are separate and distinct.  The overbreadth doctrine applies only if the
legislation “is susceptible of application to conduct protected by the First
Amendment.”  Southeastern Fisheries Ass'n, Inc. v. Department of Natural
Resources, 453 So. 2d 1351, 1353 (Fla. 1984).  Arguably, the statute can infringe
upon constitutionally protected First Amendment freedoms of expression and
association.  Where the asserted overbreadth of a law may have a chilling effect on
the exercise of First Amendment freedoms, a challenge will be permitted even by
one who does not show that his own conduct is innocent and not subject to being
regulated by a narrowly drawn statute.  See State v. Ashcraft, 378 So. 2d 284, 285
(Fla. 1979).  However, as discussed below, we find that the statute in the instant
case can be interpreted in such a way that it passes both constitutional challenges. 
The rules of statutory construction require this Court to resolve all doubts of
a statute in favor of its validity, when reasonably possible and consistent with
constitutional rights.  See Brown v. State, 629 So. 2d 841, 843 (Fla. 1994); State v.
Wershow, 343 So. 2d 605, 607 (Fla. 1977).  However, any doubt as to a statute’s
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validity that is raised in a vagueness challenge should be resolved "in favor of the
citizen and against the state."  Brown, 629 So. 2d at 843; Wershow, 343 So. 2d at
608.
In order for a criminal statute to withstand a void-for-vagueness challenge,
the language of the statute must provide adequate notice of the conduct it prohibits
when measured by common understanding and practice.  See Brown, 629 So. 2d at 
842; see also Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972).  "The
language of a statute must 'provide a definite warning of what conduct' is required
or prohibited, 'measured by common understanding and practice.'"  Warren v.
State, 572 So. 2d 1376, 1377 (Fla. 1991) (quoting State v. Bussey, 463 So. 2d
1141, 1144 (Fla. 1985)).
As this Court explained in Wershow, 
The requirements of due process of Article I, Section 9, Florida
Constitution, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States are not fulfilled unless the
Legislature, in the promulgation of a penal statute, uses language
sufficiently definite to apprise those to whom it applies what conduct
on their part is prohibited.  It is constitutionally impermissible for the
Legislature to use such vague and broad language that a person of
common intelligence must speculate about its meaning and be
subjected to arrest and punishment if the guess is wrong.
343 So. 2d at 608; accord Wyche v. State, 619 So. 2d 231, 236 (Fla. 1993).
Additionally, the statute must define the offense in a manner that does not
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encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.  See State v. Mark Marks,
P.A., 698 So. 2d 533, 537 (Fla. 1997); Brown, 629 So. 2d at 842.  A statute may
be worded so loosely that it leads to arbitrary and selective enforcement by vesting
undue discretion as to its scope in those who prosecute.  See McKenney, 388 So.
2d at 1234.
However, the legislature’s failure to define a statutory term does not in and of
itself render a penal provision unconstitutionally vague.  See State v. Fuchs, 769
So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 2000) (finding statute prohibiting contributing to the  delinquency
or dependency of a child not to be unconstitutionally vague).  In the absence of a
statutory definition, it is permissible to look to case law or related statutory
provisions that define the term.  See id. at 1009 (looking to other chapter laws and
case law for definitions of dependent and delinquent).  Further, where a statute
does not specifically define words of common usage, such words are construed in
their plain and ordinary sense.  See State v. Mitro, 700 So. 2d 643, 645 (Fla. 1997).
In other cases where the exact meaning of a term was not defined in a statute
itself, we have ascertained its meaning by reference to other statutory provisions,
case law, or the plain and ordinary meaning of a word of common usage.  See, e.g.,
Fuchs, 769 So. 2d at 1010 (finding that term “contributing to the delinquency or
dependency of a child” could be defined by reference to other chapters of Florida
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law and case law); Mitro, 700 So. 2d at 645 (finding that statute requiring
documentation of age for issuance of identification card containing date of birth
was not unconstitutionally vague because statute referenced another Florida statute
setting forth methods of acceptable proof of age for children being admitted to
school and terms “available” and “authenticated” could be given their common
dictionary definitions); L.B. v. State, 700 So. 2d 370, 371 (Fla. 1997) (looking to
dictionary to ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning of “common pocketknife” in
statute defining what constitutes a weapon which may not be possessed on school
property); State v. Hagan, 387 So. 2d 943, 945-46 (Fla. 1980) (finding that
prohibited netting area encompassed by the Charlotte County waters of Charlotte
Harbor could be ascertained with particular exactitude by looking at a different
statute which delineated the boundary lines of Charlotte County and that the terms
“trawling operation” and “trawling net” could be defined by industry custom or by
resort to a dictionary).
Here, we conclude that the term “for other than a lawful purpose”can be
defined in a manner that saves the statute from the constitutional scrap heaps of
vagueness and overbreadth and resolves any vagueness doubts in favor of
defendants.  See Brown, 629 So. 2d at 843.  While the district court found
“nothing in common usage” to help define the term, we conclude that the dictionary
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definition of “lawful,” i.e., “being in harmony with the law,” helps to illuminate the
statutory term.  Thus, the State must prove that the defendant lured or enticed the
child into the structure, dwelling, or conveyance for an “illegal” purpose, i.e., with
intent to violate Florida law by committing a crime.  Under this interpretation, the
statute provides adequate notice of the conduct it prohibits and is not susceptible
of application to conduct protected by the First Amendment.
The district court also determined that the statute creates an unconstitutional
mandatory rebuttable presumption in section 787.025 (2)(b), which provides that
luring a child “without the consent of the child’s parent or legal guardian shall be
prima facie evidence of other than a lawful purpose.”  Brake, 746 So. 2d at 529.
A mandatory presumption instructs the jury that it must infer the presumed
fact if the State proves certain predicate facts.  See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S.
307, 314 n.2 (1985); County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979) (“[A
mandatory presumption] tells the trier that he or they must find the elemental fact
upon proof of the basic fact, at least unless the defendant has come forward with
some evidence to rebut the presumed connection between the two facts.”).  In
contrast, a permissive inference suggests to the jury a possible conclusion to be
drawn if the State proves predicate facts, but does not require the jury to draw that
conclusion.  See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. at 314.  A mandatory rebuttable
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presumption requires the jury to find the presumed element once the State has
proven the predicate facts giving rise to the presumption, unless the defendant
persuades the jury that such a finding is unwarranted.  See id. at 314 n.2;
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 517-18 (1979).  Mandatory presumptions
violate the Due Process Clause if they relieve the state of the burden of persuasion
on an element of an offense.  See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. at 314; Marcolini v.
State, 673 So. 2d 3, 4 (Fla. 1996).
In assessing the constitutionality of such presumptions, the United States
Supreme Court “has generally examined the presumption on its face to determine
the extent to which the basic and elemental facts coincide.”  County Court v. Allen,
442 U.S. at 158.  As the Supreme Court explained in Leary v. United States, 395
U.S. 6, 36 (1969), “a criminal statutory presumption must be regarded as
‘irrational’ or ‘arbitrary,’ and hence unconstitutional, unless it can at least be said
with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow
from the proved fact on which it is made to depend.”
In the instant case, the statute permits the State to prove the mens rea element
of the offense (“for other than a lawful purpose”) by proving lack of parental
consent for the child to enter the structure, dwelling, or conveyance with the
defendant.  We cannot say with substantial assurance that a defendant’s unlawful
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intent can be so presumed.  For example, a neighbor who invites a child into their
house for a perfectly innocent reason is not likely to seek parental permission. 
Thus, section 787.025(2)(b) must be deleted as an unconstitutional statutory
presumption.
For the reasons discussed above, we reverse in part and affirm in part the
decision below.  As interpreted by this Court, we conclude that section 787.025 is
not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, but that section 787.025(2)(b) must be
deleted as an unconstitutional statutory presumption.  We remand to the trial court
to allow the defendant to withdraw his plea of nolo contendere and to conduct
further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, PARIENTE, and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
ANSTEAD, J, concurs specially with an opinion, in which PARIENTE and
LEWIS, JJ., concur.
QUINCE, J., concurs in result only.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
ANSTEAD, J., specially concurring.
I fully concur in the majority’s opinion in construing and upholding section
787.025.  As construed by the majority, this statute prohibits certain defined
persons from intentionally luring children under the age of twelve into a structure or
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conveyance for an illegal purpose.  Further, the State is not entitled to any
presumptions in proving its case in court.  As construed, I agree that the statute is 
a patently reasonable effort by our Legislature to protect Florida’s young children.
PARIENTE and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
An Appeal from the District Court of Appeal - Statutory or Constitutional Invalidity
Second  District - Case No. 2D98-02773
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Robert J. Krauss, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, and Diana K. Bock, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellant
Peter S. Baranowicz of Baranowicz & Calderon, P.A., Venice, Florida,
for Appellee