Title: Hahamovitch v. Hahamovitch

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC14-277 
____________ 
 
DIANNE L. HAHAMOVITCH N/K/A DIANNE LYNN HAHAMOVITCH, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
HARRY H. HAHAMOVITCH,  
Respondent. 
 
[September 10, 2015] 
 
POLSTON, J. 
 
We review the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in 
Hahamovitch v. Hahamovitch, 133 So. 3d 1008, 1016 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), in 
which the Fourth District certified conflict with the decisions of the Second 
District in Irwin v. Irwin, 857 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), and the Third 
District in Valdes v. Valdes, 894 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004).  Additionally, 
the Fourth District ruled upon the following question, which it certified to be of 
great public importance: 
Where a prenuptial agreement provides that neither spouse will ever 
claim any interest in the other’s property, states that each spouse shall 
be the sole owner of property purchased or acquired in his or her 
name, and contains language purporting to waive and release all rights 
 
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and claims that a spouse may be entitled to as a result of the marriage, 
do such provisions serve to waive a spouse’s right to any share of 
assets titled in the other spouse’s name, even if those assets were 
acquired during the marriage due to the parties’ marital efforts or 
appreciated in value during the marriage due to the parties’ marital 
efforts? 
Hahamovitch, 133 So. 3d at 1017.1  For the reasons expressed below, we approve 
the Fourth District’s decision in Hahamovitch and answer the certified question in 
the affirmative.  
BACKGROUND 
On January 20, 1986, before their marriage, Dianne and Harry Hahamovitch 
entered into a prenuptial agreement.  Around the time that the parties were entering 
into the prenuptial agreement, the husband was 46 years old and the wife was 28 
years old.  They were married on February 16, 1986, and remained married for 22 
years.  Two children were born out of the marriage.  On February 6, 2008, they 
filed for dissolution of marriage.   
The prenuptial agreement provided in pertinent part:  
2.  DIANNE’S RELEASE.  Except as otherwise provided for 
herein, in the event either of the Parties hereto institutes legal 
proceedings for . . . dissolution of marriage . . . , DIANNE hereby 
waives and releases, and is hereby barred from any and all rights and 
claims of every kind, nature and description that she may acquire or to 
which she may be entitled under the laws of any jurisdiction as a 
result of the marriage between the Parties, in and to any of HARRY’s 
property, including, but without intending thereby to limit the 
                                          
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. 
 
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generality of the foregoing, any and all right to alimony, either lump 
sum, rehabilitative, permanent, or otherwise, support and 
maintenance, equitable distribution, division of property, special 
equities, attorney’s fees, or any other rights that DIANNE may have 
against HARRY relative to financial issues. 
5.  RETENTION OF SOLE PROPERTY.  Except to the extent 
that the Parties may otherwise desire, HARRY and DIANNE shall, 
during their respective lifetimes, keep and retain sole ownership, 
control, enjoyment and power of disposition with respect to all 
property, real, personal or mixed, now owned or hereby acquired by 
each of them respectively, free and clear of any claim by the other. . . . 
9.  MUTUAL RELEASE.  In consideration of the marriage of 
the Parties to each other, and in consideration of the other provisions 
herein contained, each party agrees that neither will ever claim any 
interest in the other’s property and that the property of every kind, 
nature and description which either one has on the date of the[ir] 
marriage will remain the respective separate property of each after 
said marriage, and each agrees not to make any claim against the 
property of the other . . . . 
17.  TITLE PRESUMPTIONS.  It is additionally understood 
that if HARRY purchases, acquires, or otherwise obtains, property 
and title to said property is in HARRY’s name with DIANNE and no 
explanation is made as to the percentages of interest that either party 
has, then it shall be presumed that they shall be 50%-50% owners of 
said property.  If HARRY purchases, [a]cquires, or otherwise obtains, 
property in his own name, then HARRY shall be the sole owner of 
same.  If DIANNE purchases property in her name, then DIANNE 
shall be the sole owner of same. 
 
Id. at 1012 (alterations in the original but emphasis omitted). 
 
The Fourth District upheld the trial court’s conclusion that the prenuptial 
agreement was valid.  Id. at 1011.  Specifically, as the trial court’s order stated, 
“the parties prenuptial agreement was entered into freely and voluntarily[, b]oth 
parties had legal counsel throughout its preparation and execution stages[, t]here 
were multiple drafts of the prenuptial agreement prior to signing the final contract[, 
 
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and] their lawyers and their accountants expended great effort in drafting a 
prenuptial agreement that was fair, reasonable and one that [w]ife and [h]usband 
intended to be bound by.”  Additionally, the Fourth District “conclude[d] that the 
prenuptial agreement was fair when it was entered into,” noting that under the 
terms of the agreement, “[b]ased on the length of the marriage, which lasted over 
twenty years, the wife was entitled to receive about $1.9 million paid out over 
seven years.”  Id. at 1011 n.2.   
Furthermore, the Fourth District concluded that “[t]he language of the 
agreement was broad enough to waive the wife’s right to any asset titled in the 
husband’s name that was acquired during the marriage or that appreciated in value 
due to marital income or efforts during the marriage.”  Id. at 1015.  However, the 
Fourth District explained that other district courts have interpreted prenuptial 
agreements with substantially similar language to be insufficient to waive a 
spouse’s claim to the other spouse’s earnings, assets acquired with those earnings, 
and the enhanced value of the other spouse’s nonmarital property resulting from 
marital labor or funds.  Id. at 1013-16 (citing Irwin, 857 So. 2d 247; Valdes, 894 
So. 2d 264).       
ANALYSIS 
The wife argues that, because the prenuptial agreement makes no specific 
reference to enhancement in value of nonmarital property attributable to marital 
 
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labor or funds, the enhanced value is subject to equitable distribution.  Similarly, 
she also argues that, because the prenuptial agreement does not contain a specific 
provision that the husband’s earnings will be his separate property, they are not 
protected assets.2  However, because the broad language in the prenuptial 
agreement includes a waiver and release of all rights and claims to the other 
spouse’s nonmarital property, we disagree. 
Chapter 61, Florida Statutes, governs the dissolution of marriage.  Section 
61.079(4)(a) provides that “[p]arties to a premarital agreement may contract with 
respect to . . . [t]he disposition of property upon . . . marital dissolution.”  And 
section 61.075, Florida Statutes, addresses the “[e]quitable distribution of marital 
assets and liabilities.”  This section describes what constitutes marital assets and 
liabilities.  § 61.075(6), Fla. Stat.  Nonmarital assets and liabilities include those 
“excluded from marital assets and liabilities by valid written agreement of the 
parties.”  § 61.075(6)(b) 4., Fla. Stat. 
“A trial court’s interpretation of a prenuptial agreement is reviewed de novo, 
as such agreements are governed by the law of contracts.”  Taylor v. Taylor, 1 So. 
                                          
 
 
2.  The wife also argues that the trial court erred in curtailing discovery as to 
any commingled funds or jointly owned property.  However, the trial court did 
allow discovery to assets in which the wife may have had an interest in and, based 
on the trial court’s accurate interpretation of the prenuptial agreement, the 
additional requested discovery would be unnecessary and irrelevant.  Therefore, 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting discovery.   
 
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3d 348, 350 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009).  Where a contract is clear and unambiguous, it 
must be enforced pursuant to its plain language.  See Crawford v. Barker, 64 So. 
3d 1246, 1255 (Fla. 2011).  “In such a situation, ‘the language itself is the best 
evidence of the parties’ intent, and its plain meaning controls.’ ”  Id. (quoting 
Richter v. Richter, 666 So. 2d 559, 561 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)).   
 
In the valid prenuptial agreement in this case,3 the wife waived and released 
any and all rights and claims to all property solely owned by the husband at the 
time of the agreement or acquired in the future.  Specifically, the parties contracted 
that each party would “keep and retain sole ownership, control, enjoyment and 
power of disposition with respect to all property, real, personal or mixed, now 
owned or hereby acquired by each of them respectively, free and clear of any claim 
by the other,” that “each party agrees that neither will ever claim any interest in the 
other’s property,” and if one party “purchases, [a]cquires, or otherwise obtains, 
property in [his/her] own name, then [that party] shall be the sole owner of same.”  
Accordingly, based on the plain meaning of this language, any property the 
husband owned at the time of execution of the premarital agreement and any 
property the husband acquired in his name after the execution of the agreement, 
                                          
 
 
3.  The Fourth District accurately upheld the conclusion that the prenuptial 
agreement in this case was valid.  See Casto v. Casto, 508 So. 2d 330, 333 (Fla. 
1987).   
 
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including any enhancement in value or appreciation of such properties, are the 
husband’s nonmarital assets.   
When a prenuptial agreement includes such broad provisions but does not 
specifically waive a spouse’s claim to the other spouse’s earnings, assets acquired 
with those earnings, and the enhanced value of the other spouse’s property 
resulting from marital labor or funds, the Second and Third Districts have held the 
prenuptial agreement is not sufficient to waive a spouse’s right to seek equitable 
distribution of such assets.  See Irwin, 857 So. 2d at 248-49; Valdes, 894 So. 2d at 
267.  However, these distinctions run counter to a prenuptial agreement’s actual 
language that expressly encompasses all property solely owned by one spouse 
presently and in the future and that expressly waives all of the other spouse’s rights 
and claims in such property.   
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons expressed above, we approve the Fourth District’s decision 
in Hahamovitch, disapprove Irwin and Valdes to the extent they conflict with this 
decision, and answer the certified question in the affirmative.  
 
It is so ordered.   
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, and PERRY, 
JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED.   
 
 
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Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Fourth District - Case No. 4D10-3051 
 
 
(Palm Beach County) 
 
Jeanne Cleary Brady and Frank Ronald Brady of Brady & Brady, P.A., Boca 
Raton, Florida; Robert W. Sidweber and Karen Beth Weintraub of Sidweber & 
Weintraub, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Jane Kreusler-Walsh, Rebecca Mercier Vargas, and Stephanie L. Serafin of 
Kreusler-Walsh, Compiani & Vargas, P.A., West Palm Beach, Florida; Joel 
Michael Weissman and Sarah Allison Saull of Joel Weissman, P.A., West Palm 
Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent