Title: Green v. State Ind. Acc. Com.

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Affirmed December 19, 1952.
Motion for attorney's fee allowed January 21, 1953.
*161 Roy K. Terry, Assistant Attorney General, of Portland, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were George Neuner, Attorney General, of Salem; Ray H. Lafky, Assistant Attorney General, of Salem; T. Walter Gillard, and Don G. Swink, Assistant Attorneys General, of Portland.
Walter H. Evans Jr., argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Krause & Evans, of Portland.
Before BRAND, Chief Justice, and ROSSMAN, LATOURETTE, WARNER and TOOZE, Justices.
*162 AFFIRMED.
TOOZE, J.
The defendant State Industrial Accident Commission appeals from a judgment of the circuit court for Multnomah county, awarding compensation for permanent partial disability to the plaintiff Morgan H. Green. The case was tried to the court without intervention of a jury.
In the year 1943, while employed subject to the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law, plaintiff sustained a personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, caused by violent and external means. The injury was to his back. Part of the treatment for the injury consisted of an operation to his spine known as a "spinal fusion". Defendant closed his claim with an award of compensation for permanent partial disability equivalent to 100 per cent loss of function of an arm, the maximum award for permanent partial disability for an injury of that type. At that time disabilities were figured in degrees, and the award made to plaintiff amounted to 96 degrees.
Plaintiff resumed his place in industry, and in August, 1949, while again employed subject to the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law, he sustained another personal injury by accident. This latter injury was also to his back and in substantially the same part thereof as was the first injury. Again, as a part of his treatment, plaintiff had another operation on his spine known as a spinal fusion. This latter spinal fusion was on the opposite side, and the scar therefrom was approximately three inches longer than the operative scar from plaintiff's first operation.
*163 The parties stipulated at the time of trial that if a qualified physician were called to testify as a medical expert, he would testify that "as the proximate result of plaintiff's injuries of August 18, 1949, plaintiff sustained a permanent partial disability equivalent to 50 per cent loss of function of an arm", or, measured in degrees, of 66 degrees. In 1949 the legislature increased the maximum number of degrees for loss of an arm, or loss of function of an arm, from 96 degrees to 132 degrees. § 102-1760, OCLA, as amended by ch 537, § 6, Oregon Laws 1949.
Defendant paid all medical and hospital bills incurred on account of plaintiff's last injury, paid his compensation for his period of temporary total disability, but, upon closing his claim for compensation, refused to make a further award of compensation for permanent partial disability.
Defendant's refusal to make an award of compensation for permanent partial disability was based upon the proposition that plaintiff had already been awarded compensation for a permanent partial disability equivalent to 100 per cent loss of function of an arm as the result of his first accident, and an award for 100 per cent loss of function of an arm being the limit allowed under the law, no recovery could be had for additional permanent partial disability for further injuries to the same part of plaintiff's body.
The trial court rejected the contention of defendant. It made and entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, and, based thereon, entered judgment against defendant remanding plaintiff's claim for compensation to defendant and ordering defendant "to cancel and set aside its order of October 6, 1950, and to enter an order awarding plaintiff compensation for permanent *164 partial disability equivalent to 50 per cent loss of function of an arm, or 66 degrees, for the injuries sustained by him on August 18, 1949, in accordance with the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law."
The able trial judge gave careful consideration to the legal principles involved in this litigation. The facts were not in dispute. After considering the contentions of the respective parties, the trial judge prepared and filed a memorandum opinion in which he decided the issues. We are impressed with the reasoning of that memorandum opinion and believe it accurately states the law applicable to the situation. We adopt that opinion as the opinion of this court. Omitting the title of the cause, it is as follows:
2-4. Compensation for permanent partial disability is awarded not only for the purpose of compensating in a measure for the injury suffered by a workman, but also to assist him in readjusting himself so as to be able to again follow a gainful occupation. The law contemplates that the injured workman may, and perhaps will, again become employed in industry in some capacity. It would indeed be unjust if, while gainfully employed, the workman suffered another accident proximately resulting in additional permanent partial disability, he were denied any compensation therefor. We do not believe the legislature intended any such harsh result. The Workmen's Compensation Law must always be given a liberal interpretation. It is just a coincidence that plaintiff's second injury involved the same part of his body as that injured in the first accident, and that fact can have no bearing upon plaintiff's right to compensation for the permanent injury actually suffered as the result of the second accident. Payments for his first permanent partial disability award had long since terminated.
In our opinion, the 1935 amendment of subd. (h) of § 49-1827, Oregon Code, 1930 (now § 102-1763, OCLA) was not intended by the legislature to, nor did it, change the rules announced by this court in Cain v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 149 Or 29, 37 P2d 353, 96 ALR 1072.
*170 What is said in this opinion has reference solely to separate injuries received in separate accidents. We give no consideration to the argument of defendant respecting the segregation of various injuries arising out of the same accident and separate and distinct permanent partial disability awards therefor. That question is not involved in this case, and we, therefore, express no opinion upon it.
The judgment is affirmed.
ON RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES
Krause & Evans, of Portland, for the motion.
Before BRAND[*], Chief Justice, and ROSSMAN, LATOURETTE[**], WARNER and TOOZE, Justices.
MOTION ALLOWED.
TOOZE, J.
This matter is before us upon plaintiff's motion for the allowance of attorneys' fees as an incident to the affirmance by this court of the judgment of the trial court. The appeal was taken by the defendant State Industrial Accident Commission. Our opinion affirming the judgment against defendant was handed down December 19, 1952, but we did not include therein any allowance for attorneys' fees in this court. We point out, however, that no request was made therefor until the instant motion was filed.
5. In all cases where attorney's fees may or should be allowed by this court on appeal, the better practice is to make application therefor in the brief of the party entitled thereto. This is in the interests of a prompt and more efficient administration of the business of the court.
*171 Section 102-1774, OCLA, as amended by ch 303, Oregon Laws, 1945, provides as follows:
Under the express provisions of this statute, plaintiff is entitled to an allowance of attorneys' fees on this appeal. The fee so allowed is payable out of the Industrial Accident Commission fund, and is in addition, and not chargeable, to the compensation awarded plaintiff.
6. We have before us the record in this case, and from an examination thereof, we find that the sum of $250 is a reasonable sum to be allowed the plaintiff as attorneys' fees on this appeal. Spicer v. Benefit Ass'n. of Ry. Emp., 142 Or 574, 603, 17 P2d 1107, 21 P2d 187, 90 ALR 517.
Plaintiff may, therefore, add this amount to the costs awarded him on appeal.
[*]  Chief Justice when original decision was rendered.
[**]  Chief Justice when this decision was rendered.