Title: Williams & Connolly v. PETA

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

1
PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY, LLP, ET AL. 
 
v. Record Nos. 052376  
and 061195    OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     April 20, 2007 
 
PEOPLE FOR THE ETHICAL TREATMENT OF 
ANIMALS, INC. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
David T. Stitt, Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the circuit court 
abused its discretion in imposing sanctions under Code § 8.01-
271.1 against six attorneys and their respective law firms based 
on motions they filed in pending litigation.  Additionally, we 
consider whether the circuit court erred in revoking the pro hac 
vice admission of one of those attorneys. 
In May 2002, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 
Inc. (PETA) filed a motion for judgment against Kenneth Feld, 
Richard Froemming, Joel Kaplan, Charles Smith, and John Does 1, 
2, and 3, alleging a violation of the Virginia Trade Secrets Act 
and common law and statutory conspiracy (PETA I).  Feld was 
dismissed from that action by nonsuit, but the litigation in 
PETA I remained pending with respect to the other defendants.  
In January 2004, PETA filed a second motion for judgment against 
Feld and John Does 1, 2, and 3, which contained allegations 
similar to those in PETA I (PETA II). 
 
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Feld made a motion to consolidate PETA I and PETA II, and 
in December 2004, Judge David T. Stitt conducted a hearing in 
the Circuit Court of Fairfax County (circuit court) on Feld’s 
motion (the December hearing).  At the December hearing, Judge 
Stitt advised the attorneys that if they needed to contact his 
law clerk by telephone, they should make certain that attorneys 
representing both parties participated in the telephone 
conference call.  The circuit court also advised the parties 
that the “general” rules applicable to all cases would govern 
the present litigation. 
The circuit court granted Feld’s motion to consolidate the 
trials of PETA I and PETA II, but denied his motion to 
consolidate discovery in the two cases.  After his motion to 
consolidate was denied, Feld made a motion requesting access to 
the discovery in PETA I, which the circuit court also denied. 
As part of the discovery in PETA I, PETA sought to depose 
Steven P. Kendall in Alexandria, Virginia on February 11, 2005.  
PETA did not notify Feld of the deposition because the 
deposition related only to discovery in PETA I, in which Feld 
was no longer a party.  Apparently aware of PETA’s intent to 
depose Kendall on that date, Feld issued a subpoena for Kendall 
to appear in Fairfax on the same date.  PETA made a motion to 
quash Feld’s subpoena, which the circuit court granted, holding 
that Feld’s subpoena was an attempt to circumvent the court’s 
 
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prior ruling refusing to consolidate discovery in the two 
actions. 
On February 18, 2005, PETA filed in the Clerk’s Office of 
the Circuit Court of Fairfax County a petition for rule to show 
cause (the petition), requesting that William B. Porter and 
Joseph G. Petrosinelli, the attorneys who had issued the 
subpoena for Kendall on behalf of Feld, be held in contempt of 
court for violating the circuit court’s several orders refusing 
to consolidate discovery in the two cases.  PETA did not notify 
Feld or his attorneys that PETA had filed the petition. 
On March 14, 2005, the circuit court issued a rule to show 
cause based on PETA’s petition (the March rule to show cause).  
The March rule to show cause directed Porter and Petrosinelli to 
demonstrate why they should not be held in contempt of court for 
violating the court’s orders declining to consolidate discovery 
in PETA I and PETA II. 
The March rule to show cause was issued on Monday, March 
14, 2005.  On Friday, March 11, 2005, one “business” day before 
the rule issued, following a hearing on a matter in PETA I (the 
March hearing), PETA’s counsel engaged in an unrecorded bench 
conference with Judge Stitt.  Feld’s counsel were not present at 
the hearing in question because they no longer were involved in 
PETA I.  As a result, Feld’s counsel did not know what, if 
anything, PETA’s counsel discussed with Judge Stitt. 
 
4
On April 8, 2005, Porter, Petrosinelli, and four other 
attorneys representing Feld (collectively, the Feld Attorneys) 
filed a motion to recuse and a motion to vacate, each with 
accompanying memoranda (the Feld Attorneys’ motions).  The Feld 
Attorneys argued in their motion to recuse that Judge Stitt had 
violated his ethical duties by considering PETA’s ex parte 
petition and issuing the March rule to show cause.  The Feld 
Attorneys also alleged in that motion that Judge Stitt had 
engaged in unethical conduct because he “kept the [p]etition 
secret for nearly a month.” 
The Feld Attorneys alleged that, in addition to Judge 
Stitt’s “inexcusable” consideration of PETA’s ex parte petition, 
Judge Stitt had engaged in other impermissible ex parte 
communications that required his recusal, including a telephone 
call PETA placed to Judge Stitt’s chambers and two statements 
PETA allegedly made at the unrecorded bench conference during 
the March hearing in PETA I.  The Feld Attorneys also alleged 
that PETA’s counsel made a statement at the March hearing in 
PETA I that he planned to contact Judge Stitt by telephone to 
set a date for the consolidated trials of PETA I and PETA II.1  
The Feld Attorneys conceded in the motion to recuse that they 
                     
1 The motion to recuse quoted a portion of the hearing in 
which Judge Stitt responded to PETA’s request to set a trial 
date, stating, “Get everyone on a conference call on Monday 
morning . . . if you want to make that motion. . . .” 
 
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were not present at the March hearing in PETA I, and that they 
did not know what transpired at the bench conference.  The Feld 
Attorneys further conceded that they did not know if PETA, in 
fact, had placed any telephone calls to Judge Stitt after the 
March hearing. 
The Feld Attorneys asserted in the motion to recuse that 
Judge Stitt’s actions demonstrated his “actual bias” in favor of 
PETA because his consideration of PETA’s petition was “wholly 
untenable under fundamental concepts of contempt law” and 
“show[ed] at least an appearance of favoritism toward PETA 
because he had previously warned both sides to refrain from 
engaging in ex parte contacts with the [c]ourt.”  In the motion 
to recuse, the Feld Attorneys accused Judge Stitt of “ignoring 
the basic tenets of contempt law,” “ignor[ing] the law in order 
to give a strategic advantage to PETA,” and “endors[ing] the 
[March rule to show cause] merely because PETA requested that he 
do so.”  The Feld Attorneys further asserted that Judge Stitt’s 
“finding of [an] apparent violation [of the court’s discovery 
order] is itself preposterous given the most basic law on 
contempt.”  In the memorandum in support of the motion to 
recuse, the Feld Attorneys asserted that “only a judge with bias 
or predisposition against a party could have issued [the March 
rule to show cause].” 
 
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In the motion to vacate, the Feld Attorneys argued that the 
March rule to show cause should be dismissed because 
Petrosinelli and Porter did not violate any discovery order of 
the circuit court.  The Feld Attorneys additionally argued in 
the motion to vacate that the March rule to show cause should be 
“discharged because of the improper ex parte procedures by which 
it was sought and entered,” and incorporated by reference the 
arguments set forth in the motion to recuse. 
PETA filed a motion for sanctions and an amended 
supplemental motion for sanctions (collectively, motions for 
sanctions), requesting that the circuit court impose sanctions 
on the Feld Attorneys and their law firms, Williams & Connolly 
LLP and Blankingship & Keith, PC, based on the Feld Attorneys’ 
motions.  PETA argued that sanctions under Code § 8.01-271.1 
were appropriate because the Feld Attorneys’ motions were not 
grounded in fact and were not warranted by law, and because 
pleadings and motions filed with an improper purpose are subject 
to sanctions under clause (iii) of the second paragraph of Code 
§ 8.01-271.1.  PETA further asserted that the Feld Attorneys’ 
motions were filed “in order to insult” the circuit court and 
constituted “a frontal attack” on the court. 
The Feld Attorneys filed a motion in opposition to PETA’s 
motions for sanctions, arguing that they did not make fraudulent 
assertions in the motion to recuse because they did not allege 
 
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that the ex parte communications between PETA and Judge Stitt 
“actually” occurred, but only that the communications 
“apparently” occurred.  The Feld Attorneys further asserted that 
they were “forced to speculate” about the contents of the 
communications because they were no longer participants in the 
proceedings in PETA I. 
The circuit court conducted a hearing in April 2005 on the 
March rule to show cause (the April hearing).  Feld argued at 
the April hearing that the circuit court should consider the 
motion to vacate and the motion to recuse, which were filed the 
day before the April hearing, prior to ruling on the March rule 
to show cause.  Judge Stitt agreed, and deferred ruling on the 
March rule to show cause until the circuit court had an 
opportunity to consider the motion to recuse and the motion to 
vacate, and PETA had been provided an opportunity to file briefs 
in response.  Although the April hearing did not concern the 
merits of the motion to recuse or the motion to vacate, Judge 
Stitt explained at that hearing that rules to show cause are 
routinely issued in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County based on 
ex parte petitions that are filed without notice to the opposing 
party. 
In May 2005, the circuit court conducted a hearing on the 
Feld Attorneys’ motions (the May hearing).  Judge Stitt 
concluded that the Feld Attorneys’ motions were filed “without 
 
8
reasonable legal and factual inquiry.”  Judge Stitt also noted 
at the May hearing, “I’ve never seen anything like [the language 
in the Feld Attorneys’ motions] outside of something filed by 
pro se [litigants] . . . . And the tone of that motion to recuse 
. . . it’s unacceptable, it’s contemptuous . . . it’s full of 
distortions of different things, twisting the meanings of 
things.” 
The circuit court indicated that based on the Feld 
Attorneys’ motions, the court planned to impose sanctions 
against the Feld Attorneys but delayed ruling on the amount of 
the award.  The circuit court additionally took under advisement 
the possibility of imposing criminal contempt penalties.  
Following the May hearing, the circuit court denied both the 
motion to recuse and the motion to vacate. 
In July 2005, the circuit court, acting sua sponte, issued 
a rule to show cause (the July rule to show cause) on the issue 
whether criminal contempt penalties were warranted based on the 
Feld Attorneys’ motions and Feld’s opposition to PETA’s motions 
for sanctions.  The July rule to show cause also directed the 
Feld Attorneys to show cause why the pro hac vice admission of 
four of the Feld Attorneys, including Barry S. Simon, should not 
be revoked.  
The circuit court conducted a hearing on PETA’s motions for 
sanctions in August 2005 (the August hearing).  At the hearing, 
 
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PETA’s counsel explained the numerous sources PETA had consulted 
prior to filing the petition without notifying Feld, including 
placing a telephone call to a deputy clerk of the circuit court 
to determine the customary practice for filing petitions for 
rules to show cause. 
At the August hearing, the circuit court stated that it 
planned to impose sanctions under Code § 8.01-271.1 based on its 
findings that the Feld Attorneys’ motions were not grounded in 
fact, were not warranted by law, and contained “contemptuous” 
language.  The circuit court dismissed the July rule to show 
cause, stating that the court was declining to impose criminal 
contempt penalties under Code § 18.2-456.  The circuit court 
also revoked Simon’s pro hac vice admission based on Simon’s 
shared responsibility for the content of the Feld Attorneys’ 
motions. 
After the August hearing, the circuit court granted PETA’s 
motions for sanctions and entered an order revoking Simon’s pro 
hac vice admission and imposing sanctions against the Feld 
Attorneys and their law firms in the amount of $40,000.  On the 
same day, the circuit court issued an order holding Petrosinelli 
in contempt of court based on the March rule to show cause and 
 
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dismissing the March rule with respect to Porter.2  The Feld 
Attorneys appeal the circuit court’s imposition of sanctions and 
revocation of Simon’s pro hac vice admission to the bar of this 
Commonwealth. 
Analysis 
 
We review the circuit court’s imposition of sanctions under 
Code § 8.01-271.1 pursuant to an abuse of discretion standard.  
Ford Motor Co. v. Benitez, 273 Va. 242, 249, 639 S.E.2d 203, 206 
(2007); Flora v. Shulmister, 262 Va. 215, 220, 546 S.E.2d 427, 
429 (2001); Flippo v. CSC Assocs. III, L.L.C., 262 Va. 48, 65, 
547 S.E.2d 216, 227 (2001).  The second paragraph of Code 
§ 8.01-271.1 sets forth the three certifications made by an 
attorney upon signing a pleading: 
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a 
certificate by him that (i) he has read the pleading, 
motion, or other paper, (ii) to the best of his knowledge, 
information and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, it 
is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law 
or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, 
or reversal of existing law, and (iii) it is not interposed 
for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of 
litigation. 
 
A court’s authority to award sanctions under Code § 8.01-271.1 
is explicitly stated in the statute: 
                     
2 The circuit court’s contempt finding against Petrosinelli 
is challenged in a separate appeal, Petrosinelli v. People for 
the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 273 Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ 
(2007). 
 
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If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed or 
made in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or 
upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who 
signed the paper or made the motion, a represented party, 
or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an 
order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of 
the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of 
the pleading, motion, or other paper or making of the 
motion, including a reasonable attorney’s fee. 
 
The three enumerated certifications contained in the second 
paragraph of Code § 8.01-271.1 are stated in the conjunctive.  
Thus, under the terms of the statute, an attorney makes all 
three representations when signing the described documents.  
Code § 8.01-271.1; Benitez, 273 Va. at 251, 639 S.E.2d at 207.  
With regard to acts of attorneys, the manifest purpose of the 
statute is to hold attorneys, who are officers of the court, 
responsible for specified failures involving the integrity of 
the documents that they have signed. 
Because an attorney certifies compliance with all three 
enumerated clauses of the second paragraph of Code § 8.01-271.1 
when signing a motion, pleading, or paper, the attorney’s 
failure to comply with any one of these statutory requirements 
invokes the sanctions provisions of the statute.  Benitez, 273 
Va. at 251, 639 S.E.2d at 207.  Under the plain language of the 
statute, a court “shall impose . . . an appropriate sanction” 
when the record shows that a pleading, motion, or other paper is 
“signed or made in violation of this rule.”  Code § 8.01-271.1; 
see Benitez, 273 Va. at 249, 639 S.E.2d at 206; Flora, 262 Va. 
 
12
at 220, 546 S.E.2d at 429; Oxenham v. Johnson, 241 Va. 281, 287, 
402 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1991).  Therefore, in reviewing the circuit 
court’s imposition of sanctions in the present case, we consider 
whether the record supports a conclusion that the Feld 
Attorneys’ motions (the motions) violated any one of the three 
statutory requirements found in the second paragraph of the 
statute. 
Clause (i) of the second paragraph, which states that an 
attorney’s signature certifies that he has read a motion, 
pleading, or paper before signing the document, is not at issue 
in this appeal.  Thus, we focus our attention on clauses (ii) 
and (iii) of the second paragraph of Code § 8.01-271.1.  We 
employ an “objective standard of reasonableness” in evaluating 
the written representations the Feld Attorneys made in the 
motions.  Benitez, 273 Va. at 253, 639 S.E.2d at 208; Flippo, 
262 Va. at 65-66, 547 S.E.2d at 227.  Pursuant to that standard, 
we consider whether “after reasonable inquiry, [counsel] could 
have formed a reasonable belief that the pleading[s] [were] well 
grounded in fact, warranted by existing law or a good faith 
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law, and not interposed for an improper purpose.”  
Flippo, 262 Va. at 65-66, 547 S.E.2d at 227; accord, Gilmore v. 
Finn, 259 Va. 448, 466, 527 S.E.2d 426, 435-36 (2000). 
 
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Clause (ii) — Factual Basis 
The Feld Attorneys argue that their motions were well 
grounded in fact within the meaning of clause (ii) of the second 
paragraph of Code § 8.01-271.1.  Although the motion to recuse 
contains numerous allegations, the Feld Attorneys in their brief 
filed in this Court rely on five essential alleged facts that 
they state “provided the impetus for the [m]otion to [r]ecuse.”3  
The Feld Attorneys contend that the motions were well grounded 
in fact because they were supported by the following alleged 
facts: 1) PETA submitted ex parte and without notice the 
petition for a rule to show cause making serious charges against 
two of the Feld Attorneys; 2) PETA allegedly did not file the 
petition with the Clerk of the circuit court but submitted the 
petition directly to Judge Stitt; 3) Judge Stitt allegedly held 
the petition for three weeks without notifying the Feld 
Attorneys of the petition; 4) Judge Stitt considered the ex 
parte petition for a rule to show cause after having admonished 
all attorneys to refrain from ex parte contacts in the case; and 
5) Judge Stitt issued the rule to show cause one “business” day 
after allegedly conducting an ex parte bench conference with 
PETA’s counsel in a trial in which the Feld Attorneys were not 
involved.  The Feld Attorneys assert that these alleged facts 
                     
3 As set forth above, the additional factual bases the Feld 
Attorneys allege in support of their motions were actions taken 
by PETA, not by Judge Stitt. 
 
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provided an objectively reasonable factual basis for their 
recusal request.  We disagree with this conclusion. 
Initially, we are compelled to observe that the Feld 
Attorneys’ brief filed with this Court contains a striking 
omission.  The Feld Attorneys do not mention the fact that in 
the motions, they used language that directly accused Judge 
Stitt of unethical conduct.  These allegations of unethical 
conduct were stark and sweeping, stating that Judge Stitt 
“[v]iolated [h]is [e]thical [o]bligations,” “ignored his ethical 
responsibilities,” and “acted directly counter to [those ethical 
responsibilities].”  We therefore must consider the Feld 
Attorneys’ arguments in the additional context of those written 
statements contained in the motions. 
Upon review of these allegations, we conclude that the 
record does not support the Feld Attorneys’ argument that there 
was an adequate factual basis for the motions.  At least three 
of the alleged facts on which the Feld Attorneys rely are 
inaccurate.  Other facts that the Feld Attorneys cite involve 
conduct attributable only to PETA, not to Judge Stitt.  In 
addition, the Feld Attorneys’ argument relies on speculation 
and, thus, is self-refuting of a conclusion that the motions 
were well grounded in fact. 
The first alleged fact on which the Feld Attorneys rely is 
that PETA filed the petition for a rule to show cause ex parte 
 
15
and without notice.  This filing, however, was an action taken 
by PETA, not by Judge Stitt.  Thus, that action was not relevant 
to the issues whether Judge Stitt had engaged in unethical 
conduct or had shown actual bias in favor of PETA and provided 
no factual support for the Feld Attorneys’ assertion that Judge 
Stitt had acted in such a manner.4 
The second alleged fact on which the Feld Attorneys rely is 
their assertion that counsel for PETA did not file the petition 
for a rule to show cause in the Clerk’s Office and instead 
submitted the petition directly to Judge Stitt.  Although 
counsel for PETA indicated in a “cover” letter to the petition 
dated February 18, 2005, that he intended to deliver the 
petition to Judge Stitt, the record before us shows that the 
petition actually was filed in the Clerk’s Office on February 
18, 2005.  This filing in the Clerk’s Office is shown by the 
Clerk’s date stamp, which appears on the face of the petition in 
the right-hand corner of the pleading.  The “cover” letter also 
was filed in the Clerk’s Office on February 18, 2005, as shown 
by the Clerk’s date stamp appearing in the right-hand corner of 
                     
4 The Feld Attorneys assert in their brief to this Court 
that they merely alleged in the motion to recuse that Judge 
Stitt’s actions created an “appearance” of bias. In fact, the 
motion to recuse alleged on at least five separate occasions 
that Judge Stitt’s consideration of the petition suggested or 
indicated his “actual bias.”  In addition, the Feld Attorneys 
argued that various actions undertaken by Judge Stitt were an 
“indication of Judge Stitt’s lack of impartiality,” and that 
Judge Stitt showed “favoritism toward PETA.” 
 
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that document.  Thus, the record before us refutes the Feld 
Attorneys’ contention that the petition was not filed in the 
Clerk’s Office but was “filed” privately with Judge Stitt.  We 
also observe that because the filing of the petition was an 
action taken by PETA, not by Judge Stitt, that act of filing 
could not have provided a factual basis for arguing that Judge 
Stitt acted unethically or had shown actual or apparent bias in 
favor of PETA. 
Nevertheless, the Feld Attorneys advance as a third alleged 
fact supporting the motion to recuse their contention that Judge 
Stitt “held” the petition for a rule to show cause in his 
chambers for three weeks.  They specifically alleged in their 
motion to recuse that Judge Stitt “kept the petition secret for 
nearly a month.”  The record does not support these assertions. 
There is no evidence in the record that Judge Stitt 
actually received the petition the day it was filed.  The record 
likewise does not show the date on which Judge Stitt received 
the petition for review.  Moreover, the record shows that no one 
“held” the petition “in secret” for several weeks.  Instead, as 
stated above, the record shows that the petition was filed in 
the Clerk’s Office on February 18, 2005, the same day that the 
petition was delivered to the courthouse.  Thus, the Feld 
Attorneys had no basis in fact for alleging on April 8, 2005, 
 
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the date of the motions, that Judge Stitt improperly “held” the 
petition “in secret” for any period of time. 
 
The fourth alleged fact cited by the Feld Attorneys as 
supporting the motions is that PETA’s counsel and Judge Stitt 
participated in an unrecorded bench conference on the Friday 
before the Monday date when Judge Stitt entered the rule to show 
cause.  This unrecorded conference occurred during a hearing in 
PETA I in which the Feld Attorneys were not involved, and they 
concede that at the time they filed the motions, they did not 
know the substance of the unrecorded bench conversation.  Thus, 
at the time they filed the motions, the Feld Attorneys merely 
speculated, without any basis in fact, that the timing of the 
bench conference provided a factual basis in support of the 
motions. 
 
The fifth alleged fact on which the Feld Attorneys rely is 
their contention that Judge Stitt issued the rule to show cause 
after admonishing “the parties against any ex parte contacts, 
including even ministerial contacts with his law clerk.”  In his 
directive of December 9, 2004, Judge Stitt stated: 
[I]f you need to contact my law clerk, . . . just get 
somebody from the other side on the line.  The way this 
case is going, we’re going to be real careful with things 
like that.  There’s been an awful lot of correspondence to 
the court and things, and we’re just going to have to 
formalize it a little bit. . . . The general rules 
regarding filings of motions, long briefings, and 
scheduling motions and so on, they apply to this case just 
 
18
like they apply to everything else.  They need to be abided 
by.  (Emphasis added.)  
 
This admonition plainly was intended to prohibit ex parte 
telephone communications with Judge Stitt’s law clerk.  Judge 
Stitt’s further comments demonstrate that he did not intend to 
alter in any other manner the routine practices of the Circuit 
Court of Fairfax County.  Thus, Judge Stitt’s issuance of the 
March rule to show cause after placing restrictions on the 
parties’ telephone access to his law clerk did not provide a 
factual basis for the Feld Attorneys’ assertions in the motions 
that Judge Stitt had acted unethically and with actual bias in 
issuing the March rule. 
We hold that these five bases advanced by the Feld 
Attorneys fail to establish a well grounded factual foundation 
for the motions.  The Feld Attorneys’ failure to comply with 
this requirement of clause (ii) of the second paragraph of Code 
§ 8.01-271.1, of itself, supports the circuit court’s imposition 
of sanctions.  Benitez, 273 Va. at 250-51, 639 S.E.2d at 207. 
Although this holding ordinarily would end further 
consideration of the arguments raised in this appeal, we 
nevertheless address the Feld Attorneys’ remaining arguments 
concerning the other provisions of Code § 8.01-271.1.  In view 
of the serious allegations the Feld Attorneys made against Judge 
Stitt in the motions, we conclude that it is appropriate to have 
 
19
a complete record addressing all the matters raised in this 
appeal.  
Clause (ii) — Basis in Law 
The Feld Attorneys argue that the motions also complied 
with the “law” component of clause (ii), because the motions 
were warranted by existing law or by a good faith argument for 
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.  See 
Code § 8.01-271.1.  Further narrowing the focus of this 
provision, the Feld Attorneys contend that the motions were 
warranted by existing law. 
In support of their argument, the Feld Attorneys rely 
primarily on two Rules of this Court, Rule 1:12 and Rule 4:15, 
and on Canon 3(B)(7) of the Canons of Judicial Conduct.  The 
Feld Attorneys contend that the two cited Rules of Court 
provided an objectively reasonable basis for the motions because 
those Rules collectively require that counsel of record in a 
case be given notice and provided copies of all pleadings, 
motions, and other papers filed in a pending case.  The Feld 
Attorneys also assert that Canon 3(B)(7) of the Canons of 
Judicial Conduct, which severely restricts a judge’s 
consideration of ex parte communications, provided an 
objectively reasonable basis in law supporting the motions.  We 
disagree with these arguments. 
 
20
 
Initially, we observe that Rule 1:12 requires that an 
attorney serve other counsel of record with copies of all 
pleadings, motions, and other papers “not required to be served 
otherwise.”  Id.  This Rule imposes a duty on counsel, not on 
the circuit court judge hearing a case.  Thus, while the Feld 
Attorneys may have had a legal basis under Rule 1:12 for arguing 
that Judge Stitt committed error in considering the petition for 
a rule to show cause when PETA had not served a copy of the 
petition on the Feld Attorneys, Rule 1:12 did not provide an 
objectively reasonable basis on which to argue that Judge Stitt 
had violated his ethical duties and had shown actual bias in 
considering the petition. 
 
The provisions of Rule 4:15 likewise did not provide an 
objectively reasonable basis supporting the Feld Attorneys’ 
assertion that Judge Stitt violated his ethical obligations and 
had shown actual bias in considering the petition for a rule to 
show cause.  Like Rule 1:12, the provisions of Rule 4:15 cited 
by the Feld Attorneys assign duties to counsel of record, not to 
a circuit court judge hearing a case.  Thus, in providing that 
“[r]easonable notice of the presentation of a motion shall be 
served on all counsel of record,” Rule 4:15(b) imposes on 
counsel filing a written motion the duty to notify opposing 
counsel of the intent to argue a matter before the circuit 
court. 
 
21
 
Because the cited provisions in Rules 1:12 and 4:15 do not 
impose any duties on a circuit court judge, those provisions did 
not provide an objectively reasonable basis on which to argue 
that Judge Stitt had violated his ethical responsibilities and 
had shown actual bias.  Therefore, we consider the remaining 
authority cited by the Feld Attorneys, Canon 3(B)(7) of the 
Canons of Judicial Conduct, which provides in material part: 
 
A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte 
communications, or consider other communications made to 
the judge outside the presence of the parties concerning a 
pending or impending proceeding except that: 
 
(a) Where circumstances require, ex parte 
communications for scheduling, administrative purposes 
or emergencies that do not deal with substantive 
matters or issues on the merits are authorized; 
provided: 
(i)The judge reasonably believes that no 
party will gain a procedural or tactical 
advantage as a result of the ex parte 
communication, and (ii) the judge makes 
provision promptly to notify all other 
parties of the substance of the ex parte 
communication and allows an opportunity to 
respond. 
 
Although the Canons of Judicial Conduct are not a source of 
law, we nevertheless consider the cited provision from the 
Canons because they are “instructive” on a central issue before 
us, namely, whether the Feld Attorneys had an objectively 
reasonable basis in law for contending that Judge Stitt violated 
his ethical duties in considering the ex parte petition and in 
issuing the rule to show cause.  See Wilson v. Commonwealth, 272 
 
22
Va. 19, 28, 630 S.E.2d 326, 331 (2006).  Thus, we review Canon 
3(B)(7) to determine whether it provided an objectively 
reasonable basis for the Feld Attorneys’ motions.  
We first observe that Canon 3(B)(7) addresses “ex parte 
communications.”  This provision plainly is intended to restrict 
private oral and written communications with a judge and does 
not encompass pleadings that have been filed as a matter of 
public record with the clerk of a circuit court.5  In contrast to 
private communications prohibited under Canon 3(B)(7), a rule to 
show cause is a procedural mechanism, employed as part of the 
public record in a case, that serves to place matters at issue 
before a court.  A court’s entry of such a rule affords all 
parties in a case an opportunity to be heard on the merits of 
the allegations prior to the court making any substantive 
findings of fact or any conclusions of law.  See James v. James, 
263 Va. 474, 478-79, 562 S.E.2d 133, 135-36 (2002). 
The question remains, however, whether after reasonable 
inquiry by the Feld Attorneys, this provision in Canon 3(B)(7) 
provided an objectively reasonable basis for their argument that 
Judge Stitt’s consideration of the petition and issuance of the 
rule to show cause was a violation of his ethical duties.  See 
                     
5 The “commentary” to Cannon 3(B)(7) does not discuss or 
refer to pleadings as a “communication.” 
 
23
Code § 8.01-271.1.  We conclude that the Feld Attorneys’ 
argument based on Canon 3(B)(7) was not objectively reasonable. 
Reasonable inquiry by the Feld Attorneys would have shown 
that the routine practice of the Circuit Court of Fairfax County 
is to consider ex parte petitions for a rule to show cause and 
to issue rules to show cause upon the filing of a sufficient 
affidavit by the petitioning party.  At the time the Feld 
Attorneys made the motions, there was a long-standing published 
order entered in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County stating:  
“It is the practice of this Court to issue summons on a rule to 
show cause upon affidavit or ex parte evidence without notice.  
The [r]ule simply puts the matter at issue . . . . Notice to the 
opposing party always is given thereafter by service of process 
and opportunity to be heard.”  Fairfax County v. Alward, 33 Va. 
Cir. 28, 28 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1993). 
The published order in Alward, available upon simple legal 
research, would have informed the Feld attorneys that Judge 
Stitt merely followed the routine practice of the Circuit Court 
of Fairfax County when he considered the petition and issued the 
rule to show cause.  In addition, the record shows that counsel 
for PETA obtained this same information concerning this routine 
practice of the Circuit Court of Fairfax County by placing a 
telephone call to a deputy clerk of the circuit court. 
 
24
We are not persuaded by the Feld Attorneys’ argument 
distinguishing the holding in Alward on the basis that it 
involved a chancery suit, rather than an action at law.6  The 
holding in Alward was not based on such a distinction.  
Moreover, even if this distinction provided the Feld Attorneys a 
basis for arguing that Judge Stitt committed error in 
considering and issuing the rule to show cause in an action at 
law, that distinction did not provide an objectively reasonable 
basis for arguing that Judge Stitt acted unethically in doing 
so. 
We emphasize that the legal issue the Feld Attorneys were 
required to consider, in drafting the motions alleging unethical 
conduct against Judge Stitt, was whether there was a reasonable 
basis in law for arguing that Judge Stitt had engaged in 
unethical conduct, not whether there was a reasonable basis for 
arguing that the routine practice of the Circuit Court of 
Fairfax County was erroneous because that practice was in 
conflict with other legal authority.  In their argument before 
this Court, the Feld Attorneys confuse these two separate 
issues. 
Although the Feld Attorneys correctly observe that local 
practice cannot alter substantive rights of parties provided by 
                     
6 As of January 1, 2006, Virginia abolished the procedural 
distinctions between actions at law and suits in chancery. 
 
25
statute, Rules of Court, and case law of this Court, see Lee v. 
Mulford, 269 Va. 562, 566-67, 611 S.E.2d 349, 351 (2005), the 
Feld Attorneys did not argue in their motions that the local 
practice of the Circuit Court of Fairfax County conflicted with 
such legal authority.  Instead, the Feld Attorneys argued that 
Judge Stitt acted unethically, when reasonable inquiry on their 
part would have shown that there was no basis for such a charge.  
Thus, even if the Feld Attorneys were warranted by law in 
advocating for the reversal of the routine practice of the 
Circuit Court of Fairfax County, their allegations were not 
objectively reasonable in accusing Judge Stitt of unethical 
conduct simply because he followed that routine practice.  
Accordingly, we hold that the record supports the circuit 
court’s award of sanctions on this separate basis that the Feld 
Attorneys’ motions were not warranted by existing law or a good 
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law, as required by clause (ii) of the second paragraph 
of Code § 8.01-271.1. 
Clause (iii) – Improper Purpose 
We next consider whether the provisions of clause (iii) of 
the second paragraph of Code § 8.01-271.1 provided an 
independent basis for the circuit court’s award of sanctions 
against the Feld Attorneys.  The Feld Attorneys argue that Judge 
Stitt did not find that the motions were filed for an “improper 
 
26
purpose.”  The Feld Attorneys note that while Judge Stitt 
referenced language in clause (ii) of the second paragraph of 
Code § 8.01-271.1 when imposing sanctions, he did not make a 
parallel reference to language in clause (iii).  Alternatively, 
the Feld Attorneys assert that the motions were not filed for an 
improper purpose but were filed “for the manifest and valid 
purpose of seeking the Trial Judge’s recusal.”  We disagree with 
the Feld Attorneys’ arguments. 
Judge Stitt stated that he was imposing sanctions under 
Code § 8.01-271.1 and, although he did not make specific 
reference to the language of clause (iii) when stating his 
decision, the record is replete with references in which he 
described the “unacceptable” and “contemptuous” character of the 
Feld Attorneys’ motions.  In addition, in rendering his 
decision, Judge Stitt stated that he was granting PETA’s motion 
for sanctions, which was based on both clauses (ii) and (iii) of 
the second paragraph of Code § 8.01-271.1.  We therefore 
consider whether the record supports a conclusion that the Feld 
Attorneys violated Code § 8.01-271.1 on the ground that the 
motions were filed for an improper purpose. 
The fact that the Feld Attorneys were seeking the recusal 
of the trial judge did not permit them to use language that was 
derisive in character.  Yet they liberally employed such 
language.  As stated above, the Feld Attorneys alleged in the 
 
27
motion to recuse that Judge Stitt “ignor[ed] the basic tenets of 
contempt law,” “create[d] an appearance, at the very least, that 
[he] will ignore the law in order to give a strategic advantage 
to PETA,” and “ignored his ethical responsibilities [and] acted 
directly counter to them.” 
The circuit court made several observations concerning the 
language used by the Feld Attorneys.  The circuit court noted, 
“[T]here is some very contemptuous language in those filings.  
It’s unacceptable.”  The circuit court further observed, “I’ve 
never seen anything like [the language in the Feld Attorneys’ 
motions] outside of something filed by pro se [litigants] 
. . . .” 
Additionally, the court found that the pleadings were not 
helpful to determining the issues in the case.  The circuit 
court stated, “[N]ot only do I not find there’s a legal basis 
for [the motion to recuse], but the things that are in this 
motion, some of them didn’t even happen, and the rest of them 
were either twisted or distorted in a manner that I found to be 
highly inappropriate.” 
The circuit court declined to hold the Feld Attorneys in 
criminal contempt under Code § 18.2-456(3) for their use of 
contemptuous language.  Explaining its decision, the circuit 
court stated that “contempt findings do have some very serious 
ramifications for attorneys’ careers,” and “[the] contempt power 
 
28
absolutely is to be used sparingly, and I think I can accomplish 
what I need to in this situation without it.”  Thus, the record 
shows that the circuit court elected to use the sanctions 
provisions of Code § 8.01-271.1 in lieu of the stronger contempt 
power. 
We hold that the record before us demonstrates that the 
Feld Attorneys’ motions were filed for an improper purpose and, 
thus, violated clause (iii) of the second paragraph of Code 
§ 8.01-271.1.  Contemptuous language and distorted 
representations in a pleading never serve a proper purpose and 
inherently render that pleading as one “interposed for [an] 
improper purpose,” within the meaning of clause (iii) of the 
second paragraph of Code § 8.01-271.1.  Such language and 
representations are wholly gratuitous and serve only to deride 
the court in an apparent effort to provoke a desired response. 
As we held in Taboada v. Daly Seven, Inc., 272 Va. 211, 
215-16, 636 S.E.2d 889, 891 (2006), clause (iii) of the second 
paragraph of Code § 8.01-271.1 “is designed to ensure dignity 
and decorum in the judicial process.  This provision deters 
abuse of the legal process and fosters and promotes public 
confidence and respect for the rule of law.”  Id. at 216, 636 
S.E.2d at 891. 
We observe that clause (iii) in the second paragraph of the 
statute also is intended to prevent use of intemperate language 
 
29
that serves no objective purpose other than to ridicule or 
deride a court.  Because the language found in the Feld 
Attorneys’ motions clearly falls within this proscription, we 
hold that the Feld Attorneys’ motions were filed with an 
“improper purpose,” within the meaning of clause (iii). 
The Feld Attorneys argue, nevertheless, that the circuit 
court erred in its award of sanctions because that award was 
based in part on the motion to vacate the rule to show cause 
against Petrosinelli and Porter (motion to vacate).  The Feld 
Attorneys assert that the motion to vacate was objectively 
reasonable because Petrosinelli and Porter did not violate any 
order of the circuit court.  
In deciding this issue, we recognize that the circuit court 
dismissed the March rule to show cause against Porter.  Also, we 
have held in Petrosinelli v. People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals, 273 Va. ___, ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___(2007) (this day 
decided), that the circuit court abused its discretion in 
holding Petrosinelli in contempt of court.  These holdings 
establish that the motion to vacate was “warranted by existing 
law” to the extent that it argued that Petrosinelli and Porter 
should not be held in contempt of court.  However, the 
determinative consideration before us is that the motion to 
vacate additionally incorporated by reference the motion to 
recuse, which we have held was not warranted by existing law or 
 
30
a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or 
reversal of existing law, and was filed for an improper purpose.  
Therefore, because the Feld Attorneys made the motion to recuse 
part of their motion to vacate, the circuit court did not abuse 
its discretion in basing its award of sanctions in part on the 
motion to vacate.7 
The Feld Attorneys also contend that the circuit court 
“erred in sanctioning the Feld Attorneys for filing Feld’s 
[o]pposition to PETA’s [a]mended and [s]upplemental [m]otion for 
[s]anctions.”  The record, however, fails to show that this 
pleading was a basis for the circuit court’s award of sanctions.  
As stated above, the circuit court granted PETA’s motion for 
sanctions and PETA’s Amended and Supplemental motion for 
sanctions.  Neither of those motions for sanctions contained any 
reference to the Feld Attorneys’ opposition to sanctions.  
Therefore, we conclude that the Feld Attorneys’ argument on this 
issue is without merit because it is not supported by the 
record.8 
                     
7 The Feld Attorneys note that Judge Stitt found that the 
motion to vacate “incorporated” the motion to recuse.  The Feld 
attorneys do not challenge this conclusion, but argue only that 
the motion to recuse was objectively reasonable. 
8 Although the July rule to show cause mentions the 
opposition to sanctions as a pleading that the circuit court 
considered at its May 25, 2005 hearing, the July rule to show 
cause was ultimately dismissed.  In addition, although the 
circuit court stated at the hearing on the July rule to show 
cause that the parties were in court on “five pleadings,” 
 
31
In summary, we conclude that the record demonstrates the 
Feld Attorneys committed three separate violations of Code 
§ 8.01-271.1, each of which independently supports the circuit 
court’s impositions of sanctions.  On these three separate 
bases, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its 
discretion in imposing sanctions on the Feld Attorneys under 
Code § 8.01-271.1.9 
Revocation of Pro Hac Vice Admission 
 
The Feld Attorneys also argue that the circuit court abused 
its discretion in revoking Simon’s pro hac vice admission.  The 
Feld Attorneys contend that Simon did not engage in any 
misconduct, because the content of the motions was objectively 
reasonable.  We disagree with the Feld Attorneys’ arguments. 
 
This Court has not previously determined the standard of 
review for a court’s revocation of an attorney’s pro hac vice 
admission.10  In Virginia, the admission of attorneys on a pro 
hac vice basis is governed by Rule 1A:4, which authorizes courts 
in this Commonwealth to permit counsel who are not licensed or 
                                                                  
including the opposition to sanctions, the circuit court 
ultimately granted PETA’s motion for sanctions consisting of two 
separate documents, neither of which mentioned the opposition to 
sanctions. 
9 We do not address the amount of the sanctions award 
because the Feld Attorneys have not assigned error regarding the 
amount of the award. 
10 We observe that certain amendments to Rule 1A:4 will 
become effective July 1, 2007.  Rule 1A:4, as amended, will 
provide that the “grant or denial” by a court of a motion to 
proceed pro hac vice is discretionary. 
 
32
admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction, but are licensed 
to practice law in another state or in the District of Columbia, 
to appear as counsel in a particular case. 
An attorney who is not licensed or admitted to practice law 
in this Commonwealth does not have a right to appear as counsel 
but may request permission to do so on a limited and temporary 
basis related to the conduct of a particular case.  See Rule 
1A:4.  Such a pro hac vice admission is a privilege that is 
solely permissive in nature.  See id. (referring to permission 
to appear as a “privilege”); Ortiz v. Barrett, 222 Va. 118, 127, 
278 S.E.2d 833, 837 (1981) (referring to attorney licensed in 
another jurisdiction as having “privilege” to file pleading in 
Virginia court); Horne v. Bridwell, 193 Va. 381, 385, 68 S.E.2d 
535, 538 (1952) (explaining that attorney licensed in foreign 
jurisdiction must prove existence of that license before 
obtaining “privilege” of appearing as counsel in Virginia); see 
also Thomas v. Cassidy, 249 F.2d 91, 92 (4th Cir. 1957) (holding 
that pro hac vice appearances are not a “right but a mere 
privilege”). 
We hold that Virginia courts have broad discretion in 
determining whether to revoke an attorney’s pro hac vice 
admission.  A court may revoke the pro hac vice admission of 
counsel at any stage of court proceedings when it appears that 
counsel’s conduct adversely impacts the administration of 
 
33
justice.  See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 399 F.3d 924, 929 
(8th Cir. 2005), aff’d, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2557 (2006); 
United States v. Ries, 100 F.3d 1469, 1471 (9th Cir. 1996); 
State Industries, Inc. v. Jernigan, 751 So.2d 680, 682 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2000). 
In deciding to revoke Simon’s pro hac vice admission, the 
circuit court explained: 
[T]he conduct of the defense in this case generally to date 
has reflected a very inadequate understanding of Virginia’s 
ethical requirements, much less an understanding of the 
level of professionalism that our [C]hief [J]ustices, the 
current one and the previous one, as well as many others in 
the [S]tate have worked so hard to instill.  Admission pro 
hac [vice] is not a right, it’s a courtesy and a privilege, 
and considering everything that’s happened in this case, 
particularly these filings, Mr. Simon’s pro hac vice 
[admission] is revoked. 
 
The circuit court’s conclusion that the Feld Attorneys’ 
pleadings did not reflect the level of professionalism expected 
of attorneys in Virginia demonstrates that the circuit court 
carefully considered the issue before revoking Simon’s pro hac 
vice admission.  All the Feld Attorneys were equally responsible 
for the pleadings they filed.  Therefore, we conclude that when, 
as here, a circuit court acts within its discretion in imposing 
sanctions on attorneys for pleadings they have filed in 
violation of Code § 8.01-271.1, the circuit court does not abuse 
its discretion in revoking the pro hac vice admission of one of 
the attorneys who filed those pleadings.  Accordingly, we hold 
 
34
that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in revoking 
Simon’s pro hac vice admission in this case. 
For these reasons, we will affirm the circuit court’s 
judgment. 
Affirmed. 
JUSTICE AGEE, with whom JUSTICE KINSER joins, concurring in part 
and dissenting in part. 
 
I concur with the majority opinion’s analysis of the motion 
to recuse as it relates to the award of sanctions by the circuit 
court under Code § 8.01-271.1.  The record would support a 
finding by the circuit court that portions of the motion to 
recuse were not well grounded in fact or warranted by existing 
law and were interposed for an improper purpose within the 
meaning of clauses (ii) and (iii) of the second paragraph of 
Code § 8.01-271.1.  However, the award of sanctions by the 
circuit court was not based solely on the motion to recuse, but 
on “the language in the referenced pleadings.”  The referenced 
pleadings included not only the motion to recuse but also the 
motion to vacate the rule to show cause (motion to vacate) and 
the amended reply in support of the motion to vacate the rule to 
show cause (amended reply). 
I do not find that the record supports an award of 
sanctions either for the motion to vacate or the amended reply 
(collectively the “vacation pleadings”).  Therefore, in my view, 
 
35
the circuit court abused its discretion in the order of August 
26, 2005, by imposing sanctions on the Feld Attorneys based on 
the vacation pleadings.  For similar reasons, I would also find 
that the circuit court abused its discretion in that order by 
revoking the pro hac vice admission of Barry S. Simon.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from those portions of the 
majority opinion and would reverse the judgment of the circuit 
court and remand for further proceedings. 
I.  CODE § 8.01-271.1 SANCTIONS 
 
PETA’s supplemental motion for sanctions specifically 
requested sanctions under Code § 8.01-271.1 with regard to the 
motion to vacate.  At the August 18, 2005 hearing on that motion 
and the July 1, 2005 rule to show cause, the circuit court was 
very specific as to the pleadings under consideration: 
I don’t think there’s any question that we’re only 
proceeding on civil sanctions at this point.  
Also, on the documents that were listed in the rule to 
show cause we are proceeding [1] on Feld’s motion to recuse 
and for evidentiary hearing, [2] on Feld’s reply in support 
of motion to recuse and for evidentiary hearing, [3] on 
Feld’s opposition to PETA’s amended and supplemental motion 
for sanctions, [4] on Feld’s motion to vacate the rule to 
show cause or in the alternative response to the rule, and 
 
36
[5] on Feld’s amended reply in support of the motion to 
vacate the rule to show cause.  (Emphasis added.) 
 
If that was not sufficiently clear, the court then 
reiterated what was to be considered at the hearing:  “What 
we’re going to have now are argument on the sanctions for filing 
those five pleadings,” which included the vacation pleadings.  
Throughout the August 18, 2005 hearing, the circuit court 
consistently referred in the plural to all the pleadings that it 
had specifically listed as it considered the application of Code 
§ 8.01-271.1 sanctions against the Feld Attorneys for “those 
pleadings.” 
At the conclusion of presentations from counsel at the 
hearing, the circuit court reiterated its consideration was of 
the “referenced pleadings,” including the motion to recuse and 
the vacation pleadings.  Further, the August 26, 2005 order 
grants PETA’s supplemental motion for sanctions, and that 
supplemental motion for sanctions specifically referenced the 
motion to vacate.  Thus, it is clear from the record that the 
award of sanctions in the order of August 26, 2005, was based, 
in part, on the vacation pleadings. 
The majority opinion does not contend the vacation 
pleadings, by their actual language, violate any of the 
provisions of Code § 8.01-271.1.  Indeed, the arguments in the 
 
37
vacation pleadings go solely to the validity of the circuit 
court’s contempt judgment against Joseph G. Petrosinelli, which 
is the subject of the companion case, Petrosinelli v. People for 
the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 273 Va. ___, ____ S.E.2d ___ 
(2007), which is also decided this day.  In that case, we agree 
with the arguments made in the motion to vacate, determine that 
the circuit court’s finding of contempt was in error and reverse 
the judgment of the circuit court.  273 Va. at ___, ___ S.E.2d 
at ___.  There is simply no contention, either by PETA or the 
majority, that language used in the vacation pleadings is 
violative of Code § 8.01-271.1. 
Nonetheless, the majority opinion assumes a legally 
sufficient nexus between the motion to recuse and the motion to 
vacate which warrants the consideration of the vacation 
pleadings as being part of the motion to recuse for sanctions 
purposes.  The majority opinion recites that “because the Feld 
attorneys made the motion to recuse part of their motion to 
vacate, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in basing 
its award of sanctions in part on the motion to vacate.” 
A reading of the actual language used in the vacation 
pleadings does not support this conclusion.  The motion to 
recuse was neither incorporated nor made part of the motion to 
 
38
vacate.  The only reference in the motion to vacate11 to the 
motion to recuse is as follows: 
It is undisputed that PETA submitted its Petition and 
supporting 42-paragraph affidavit to the Court ex parte.  It is 
also undisputed that the Court considered the ex parte 
communication and relied on it to issue the Rule.  See Rule at 1 
(“And the Court having reviewed the petition and finding there 
is adequate cause to issue a Rule to Show Cause, and that an 
order of this Court was apparently violated . . . .”) (emphasis 
added). 
PETA’s submission of this ex parte communication, and the 
Court’s consideration of it, violated the Rules of the Supreme 
Court of Virginia.  See generally Motion to Recuse (April 8, 
2005). 
The motion to vacate says what it says.  It only references 
the motion to recuse with the term “[s]ee generally” and neither 
incorporates nor adopts any part of the motion to recuse into 
the motion to vacate.  The signal “see generally” means that the 
“[c]ited authority presents helpful background material related 
to the proposition.”  The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation 
47 (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 18th ed. 2005).  It 
is not the equivalent of “incorporated.”  There is simply no 
                     
11 There is no reference to the motion to recuse of any nature 
whatsoever to be found in the amended reply. 
 
39
nexus within the actual text of the pleadings at issue to 
substantiate that the motion to recuse is subsumed within the 
motion to vacate so as to vitiate the independent validity of 
the motion to vacate in the consideration of the propriety of 
the circuit court’s award of sanctions. 
In my view, the circuit court’s judgment awarding sanctions 
under Code § 8.01-271.1 must be reviewed based upon the actual 
language of the vacation pleadings, which does not invoke the 
assertions of the motion to recuse.  So viewed, there is simply 
no ground upon which the circuit court could award Code § 8.01-
271.1 sanctions based on the vacation pleadings.  This Court has 
recognized in earlier decisions that where there are multiple 
aspects of a party’s pleadings, some of which are sanctionable 
and others of which are not, the portion of the sanctions 
awarded in respect of non-sanctionable filings cannot stand.  
See Nedrich v. Jones, 245 Va. 465, 474-76, 429 S.E.2d 201, 206-
07 (1993).  Where an award of sanctions is based “in whole or in 
part” on a portion of the filings that is not sanctionable, the 
circuit court has erred.  See Oxenham v. Johnson, 241 Va. 281, 
289-90, 402 S.E.2d 1, 5-6 (1991) (abuse of discretion not to 
distinguish between sanctionable and non-sanctionable conduct in 
fixing the amount of a fee sanction award).  However, in the 
present context there is no basis upon which the judgment 
granting sanctions against the Feld Attorneys can be severed or 
 
40
apportioned on appeal between the motion to vacate and the 
motion to recuse.12  See, e.g., Green v. Virginia State Bar, 272 
Va. 612, 618, 636 S.E.2d 412, 416 (2006) (vacating sanction 
imposed by the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board and 
remanding for further proceedings to determine a more 
appropriate sanction); Barrett v. Virginia State Bar, 272 Va. 
260, 273, 634 S.E.2d 341, 348 (2006) (vacating sanction and 
remanding for further proceedings because not all behavior was 
sanctionable). 
Accordingly, the judgment of August 26, 2005, imposing 
sanctions on the Feld Attorneys should be reversed and the case 
remanded to the circuit court for a determination, exclusive of 
the vacation pleadings, as to whether sanctions against the Feld 
Attorneys are warranted and, if so, in what amount. 
II.  REVOCATION OF PRO HAC VICE ADMISSION 
For similar reasons, I would reverse the circuit court’s 
judgment revoking the pro hac vice status of one of the Feld 
Attorneys, Barry S. Simon.  As with the sanctions determination 
under Code § 8.01-271.1, the circuit court based its decision to 
                     
12 At the May 25, 2005 hearing, PETA requested sanctions in the 
amount of $40,000 “to enforce the sanctions, to draw up these 
briefs, these oversized briefs that we had to deal with, the 
emergency nature of it.”  The circuit court considered PETA’s 
request at the August 18, 2005 hearing and awarded sanctions in 
the amount of $40,000 “to compensate [PETA] to some extent for 
what they’ve had to expend on this issue.”  Both the request by 
PETA and the award by the circuit court included the vacation 
pleadings as part of the consideration. 
 
41
revoke the pro hac vice status of this attorney because “Mr. 
Simon was in charge [with respect to] the referenced filings.”  
The circuit court further stated that “considering everything 
that has happened in this case, particularly these filings, Mr. 
Simon’s admission pro hac vice is revoked.”  “[T]he referenced 
filings” and “these filings” refer to the same pleadings under 
consideration for Code § 8.01-271.1 sanctions, which included 
the motion to vacate and the amended reply.  The circuit court, 
therefore, based its revocation of Simon’s pro hac vice 
admission in part upon the vacation pleadings, in which neither 
Simon nor any of the other Feld attorneys committed any type of 
infraction. 
Thus, in my view, the circuit court abused its discretion 
in revoking Simon’s pro hac vice status by considering the 
vacation pleadings as a basis for revocation.  Thus, I would 
reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand the case 
for further consideration, exclusive of the vacation pleadings, 
as to whether Simon’s pro hac vice status should be revoked. 
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority 
opinion to the extent set forth above.