Title: Rigler v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Rigler v. State1997 WY 80941 P.2d 734Case Number: 96-113Decided: 06/18/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

DENNIS 
EUGENE RIGLER,

 Appellant (Defendant), 

 

v. 

 

THE STATE OF WYOMING, 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from District Court, Campbell County

 The 
Honorable Terrence L. O'Brien, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

 Michael N. Deegan, Gillette.

 Representing 
Appellee:

William U. Hill, Attorney 
General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; and D. Michael Pauling, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

 

MACY, Justice.

 [¶1]      Appellant Dennis 
Rigler appeals from his convictions for three counts of second-degree sexual 
assault, six counts of taking indecent liberties with a minor, and one count of 
attempted second-degree sexual assault.

 

[¶2]      We affirm. 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      Appellant 
requests that we review a number of issues on appeal:

 

# 
1: Whether or not trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in his 
representation of appellant.

# 
2: Whether or not the trial court committed reversible error in not adhering to 
the Dean procedure for admission of 404(b) evidence; and whether or not the 
trial court committed plain error in failing to properly instruct the jury on 
the limited purpose of 404(b) evidence.

# 
3: Whether or not the trial court committed reversible error in allowing an 
expert witness to vouch for the credibility of witnesses; and whether or not the 
trial court committed plain error in failing to give a cautionary instruction to 
the jury.

# 
4: Whether or not the trial court committed plain error in failing to properly 
instruct on the presumption of innocence.

# 
5: Whether or not the trial court committed plain error in failing to properly 
instruct on attempt to commit second degree sexual 
assault.

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      While they were 
living in California, Appellant began to molest his older daughter, MDR, under 
the pretext of disciplining her for bad behavior. MDR was twelve or thirteen 
years old at that time. Appellant continued to molest MDR after they moved to 
Gillette. A jury convicted him of two counts of taking indecent liberties with a 
minor and two counts of second-degree sexual assault for the assaults against 
MDR which took place in Wyoming.

 

[¶5]      Appellant also 
began to molest his younger daughter, CTR, when she was thirteen years old. He 
was convicted of one count of attempted second-degree sexual assault and one 
count of taking indecent liberties with a minor for those 
acts.

 

[¶6]      Appellant 
similarly victimized two of his daughters' fifteen-year-old friends, LC and BJT. 
Appellant was convicted of one count of second-degree sexual assault and two 
counts of taking indecent liberties with a minor for his assaults against LC and 
of one count of taking indecent liberties with a minor for his assault against 
BJT.

 

[¶7]      Appellant 
appealed to this Court after the trial court pronounced the sentence against 
him. We subsequently remanded the case so that the trial court could hold an 
evidentiary hearing on Appellant's claim that his trial counsel had performed 
ineffectively. After the hearing was held, the trial court determined that 
Appellant had received effective assistance of counsel, and the case was 
returned to this Court for a final resolution.

 

DISCUSSION

 

A. Other Bad Acts

 

[¶8]      The trial court 
held a pretrial hearing to determine whether evidence of Appellant's other bad 
acts was admissible at his trial. The State argued that the other bad acts 
evidence was admissible to show a course of conduct, criminal design, common 
criminal plan, pattern of abuse, and motive and to overcome Appellant's claim 
that the victims fabricated their stories or had improper motives for alleging 
that the assaults had occurred. The trial court concluded that the other bad 
acts evidence which is at issue in this appeal was relevant and that the 
probative value of the evidence outweighed the danger of Appellant being 
unfairly prejudiced. Consequently, evidence of other bad acts which were 
committed by Appellant against BJT and MDR was admitted at the trial. Another 
girl, LA, was also allowed to testify that Appellant had assaulted her even 
though the State did not charge Appellant with any crimes for his actions 
against her.

 

[¶9]      Appellant 
contends that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting the other 
bad acts evidence because the trial court failed to follow the procedure set 
forth in Dean v. State, 865 P.2d 601 
(Wyo. 1993). He claims that the trial court (1) neglected to articulate its 
reasons for finding that the probative value of the evidence outweighed the 
prejudicial effect of such evidence; and (2) failed to specifically address, at 
the pretrial hearing, a certain part of BJT's testimony about Appellant's other 
bad acts. Appellant also argues that LA's testimony was not 
relevant.

 

[¶10]   W.R.E. 404(b) governs the 
admissibility of other bad acts evidence:

 

(b) Other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts. - Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident.

 

Under both the test set 
forth in Dean, 865 P.2d  at 606, and 
the test recently established in Vigil v. 
State, 926 P.2d 351, 357 (Wyo. 1996), in order for the trial court to admit 
other bad acts evidence, it must determine that the evidence is relevant and 
that the probative value of the evidence outweighs the danger that the defendant 
will be unfairly prejudiced.

 

A 
trial court's decisions regarding admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence 
are entitled to great deference on appeal. If a legitimate rationale can be 
shown for the admission of such evidence, we will not find abuse of 
discretion.

Ross v. State, 930 P.2d 965, 968 (Wyo. 1996) (citation 
omitted).

 

[¶11]   Appellant claims that the trial 
court committed reversible error when it failed to specifically consider and 
discuss the factors on the record which are set forth in the second footnote of 
Dean.1 This Court stated in Dean that, in balancing the probative 
value of the evidence against the prejudicial effect, the trial courts should 
consider the factors outlined in footnote two. 865 P.2d  at 609-10 n. 2. We 
declared that the trial court "must then articulate its findings of relevancy 
and how it weighed probative value against the countervailing factors." 865 P.2d  
at 609. This Court did not, however, state that the trial courts are obligated 
to make a specific finding on each consideration.

 

[¶12]   In Sorensen v. State, 895 P.2d 454, 457 
(Wyo. 1995), we applied the Dean 
rationale and reversed the appellant's conviction because the trial court failed 
to make a determination on the record as to the probative value and the 
prejudicial effect of the other bad acts evidence which was admitted at the 
trial. This case does not, however, involve a situation where the trial court 
did not make findings on the probative value and the prejudicial effect of the 
other bad acts evidence. In fact, the trial court specifically found that, 
although the evidence was obviously prejudicial to Appellant, it was not 
unfairly prejudicial and that the probative value of the evidence outweighed the 
danger of unfair prejudice. We conclude that this finding was sufficient and 
that the trial court did not commit a reversible error by failing to make 
express findings on each of the factors which were set forth in the second 
footnote of Dean.

 

[¶13]   Appellant also asserts that the 
trial court erred by failing to review some of the other bad acts testimony 
which was presented by BJT. Appellant complains that the trial court did not 
specifically rule on the admissibility of BJT's testimony that Appellant had 
felt her breasts under the pretext of checking for cancer. Appellant did not, 
however, object at the trial to that particular testimony. We stated in Vigil, 926 P.2d  at 355, and Gunderson v. State, 925 P.2d 1300, 1303 
(Wyo. 1996), that, when a proper objection is not made to the other bad acts 
evidence, the State is not required to establish its admissibility and the trial 
court is not obligated to conduct a hearing on the matter. Appellant, therefore, 
waived his right to have the trial court make an express determination on the 
admissibility of that portion of BJT's testimony by failing to 
object.

 

[¶14]   Appellant further contends that 
LA's testimony concerning his uncharged assaults against her was irrelevant. LA 
testified that Appellant had sexually assaulted her six years earlier when she 
was ten years old. Exercising an abundance of caution, the trial court 
considered the admissibility of LA's testimony at the pretrial hearing and at 
another hearing which was held during the trial outside of the jury's presence. 
The trial court concluded that the evidence was admissible under W.R.E. 
404(b).

 

[¶15]   Appellant maintains that the 
uncharged acts against LA were too remote in time from the charged acts to be 
considered relevant. He also argues that the State did not have a substantial 
need to introduce the evidence and that the State did not present the evidence 
for a proper purpose under W.R.E. 404(b).

 

[¶16]   The trial court acknowledged that 
Appellant's acts against LA were somewhat remote in time from the charged acts; 
however, it determined that the admission of LA's testimony was justified 
because of the similarity in the victims' ages and the stated purposes of the 
testimony. The trial court concluded that the evidence was admissible to show modus operandi, preparation, plan, and 
intent. The evidence was also important to the issue of whether the other 
witnesses were credible, especially in light of Appellant's contention that the 
other victims fabricated their claims. Considering the record and the 
fact-specific nature of this case, we conclude that the trial court's reasoning 
was not faulty under either Dean or 
Vigil. The trial court did not, 
therefore, abuse its discretion in admitting LA's testimony.2

 

[¶17]   Appellant contends that the trial 
court committed plain error by failing to give an oral or written instruction 
which would have limited the purpose for which the jury could consider the other 
bad acts testimony given by MDR and BJT. He claims that he properly requested 
that an instruction be given and that the trial court was, therefore, 
responsible for formulating and giving an appropriate instruction to address all 
the other bad acts testimony.

 

[¶18]   A criminal defendant is entitled, 
upon making a proper request, to have a jury instruction given which sets forth 
the limited purpose for which the evidence is being admitted. See Vigil, 926 P.2d  at 357; Dean, 865 P.2d  at 610. If, however, the 
defendant does not present an appropriate request, the trial court is not 
required to give the limiting instruction. See Vargas-Rocha v. State, 891 P.2d 763, 
770 (Wyo. 1995); see also Vigil, 926 P.2d  at 357. Counsel may 
decide not to request that a limiting instruction be given in order to avoid 
drawing the jury's attention to the potentially damaging testimony. Beintema v. State, 936 P.2d 1221, 1228 
(Wyo. 1997). 

 

[¶19]   After LA testified, the trial court 
gave an instruction which cautioned the jury about the limited purpose for which 
her testimony was being admitted. The trial court stated outside of the jury's 
presence:

I 
gave what I thought was a comprehensive limiting instruction to the jury. 
However, [Defense Counsel], if there's anything that you think I need to add by 
way of a limiting instruction, I'll be happy to do that 
now.

The defense counsel replied: 
"I believe you covered it, Your Honor." This limited exchange between the trial 
court and Appellant's counsel was not sufficient to be considered a request for 
a cautionary instruction to address all the other bad acts testimony which had 
been presented. The conversation concerned only LA's testimony, and the defense 
counsel agreed that the given instruction was adequate. The trial court did not, 
therefore, err by failing to give a comprehensive limiting 
instruction.

 

B. Expert Testimony

 

[¶20]   Appellant contends that the trial 
court erred by allowing an expert witness to vouch for the victims' credibility. 
The State argues that the expert's testimony was 
acceptable.

 

[¶21]   Expert testimony concerning sexual 
assaults is permissible under W.R.E. 702 to explain a victim's behavior. Betzle v. State, 847 P.2d 1010, 1023 
(Wyo. 1993). An expert may not, however, testify directly as to a victim's 
credibility or truthfulness. Id.; Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 617-18 
(Wyo. 1993). This Court has stated that testimony which may help the jury in 
understanding another aspect of the case is admissible even though it 
incidentally supports another witness's credibility. Curl v. State, 898 P.2d 369, 374 (Wyo. 
1995); see also Betzle, 847 P.2d  at 
1024.

 

[¶22]   In this case, the expert testified 
in general about how he evaluated and diagnosed children who had reportedly been 
sexually abused. He stated that he began by taking histories of the children's 
lives and trying to ascertain their problem areas. The expert testified that he 
made his diagnoses in accordance with the guidelines set forth by the American 
Psychiatric Association. The State asked: "How important is the reliability of 
the children's statements to you in these kinds of cases in the diagnosis that 
you make?" Appellant objected to the question, claiming that it was improper 
because it infringed on a jury function. The trial court overruled the 
objection, and the expert stated that reliability was important. The State asked 
the expert: "[D]o you have practices and procedures that you follow or rules of 
thumb that you follow in determining reliability of the reports that you 
receive?" Before the expert could answer the question, the trial court cautioned 
the State to avoid questioning the expert about his opinions on the victims' 
reliability. When the State resumed questioning the expert, it did not seek an 
answer to its prior question.

 

[¶23]   The expert testified that he had 
applied the codes from the DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF THE AMERICAN 
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION in evaluating MDR and diagnosing her as being a victim 
of sexual abuse. He stated that, in forming his diagnosis, he took into 
account

her demeanor, her affect around discussing her - her 
story, her story of events, how she related that in terms of her emotion, the 
story itself in terms of spontaneity, consistency, her handling of some of the 
trauma and the story, how she attempted to cope, which in some ways is 
comparable to how victims of sexual abuse cope with that, her thinking patterns 
of how she perceives the world, how she interacts with interpersonal 
relationships.

Children in adolescence are very dependent on their 
care givers. They look to them for guidance in value systems and her - her view 
of herself in that relation. So I was looking for patterns to how victims are 
impacted by offenders. Those are the indicators that - that - that come to 
mind.

The expert discussed MDR's 
demeanor and how it related to typical responses which are given by childhood 
sexual abuse victims. The State asked: "You indicated the story itself was a 
factor that led to your diagnosis. Could you describe that more fully?" 
Appellant objected to the question, and the trial court again cautioned the 
prosecutor. The expert did not answer the question.

 

[¶24]   The expert also testified about his 
evaluations and diagnoses of CTR, LC, and BJT. He discussed the diagnostic 
techniques that he had used in evaluating each girl. These techniques were 
essentially the same as those he had used to diagnose MDR. He concluded that 
each girl was a victim of sexual abuse.

 

[¶25]   In this case, the expert did not 
testify directly about the truthfulness or veracity of the victims' statements. 
The expert's testimony about the importance of the reliability of an alleged 
victim was general testimony regarding his diagnostic and evaluation techniques. 
We condoned this type of expert testimony in Brown v. State, 736 P.2d 1110, 1114-15 
(Wyo. 1987). The trial court carefully monitored the dialogue to be sure that 
the expert did not directly discuss the victims' 
reliability.

 

[¶26]   The fact that the reliability 
testimony was never related to the victims distinguishes this case from Zabel v. State, 765 P.2d 357 (Wyo. 
1988). In Zabel, an expert testified 
about various means of determining whether an alleged victim was lying or 
fabricating her story. 765 P.2d  at 359-60. The expert testified about how the 
fabrication factors related to the victims in that case. Id. This Court ruled that the admission 
of the expert's testimony in Zabel 
was plain error because the expert had testified directly about the victims' 
veracity. 765 P.2d  at 361-63. In this case, by contrast, the expert was allowed 
to discuss the reliability factor in the abstract, but he did not step over the 
line into improper testimony by directly discussing the victims' 
veracity.

 

[¶27]   The expert testified that he had 
determined that the victims had been sexually abused. Such testimony is 
acceptable as long as an expert's determination was not made exclusively on the 
basis of a victim's version of the criminal act. See Hayes v. State, 935 P.2d 700, 704 
(Wyo. 1997); compare Whiteplume v. 
State, 841 P.2d 1332 (Wyo. 1992) with 
Hayes, 935 P.2d 700. The expert based his diagnoses on a number of factors 
which related the victims' behavior to typical responses which are given by 
child hood sexual abuse victims. The testimony was, therefore, appropriate under 
W.R.E. 702, and the trial court did not err by admitting the expert's 
testimony.

 

[¶28]   Appellant also argues that the 
trial court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury that the 
expert's testimony had been admitted for a limited purpose. Appellant did not, 
however, request that such an instruction be given. As we explained in the other 
bad acts section of this opinion, a party is not entitled to have a judge give a 
limiting instruction unless the party properly requests that one be given. See Vargas-Rocha, 891 P.2d  at 770. The 
trial court did not, therefore, err by failing to give an instruction which 
limited the scope of the expert's testimony.

 

C. Jury Instructions

 

[¶29]   Appellant maintains that the trial 
court committed plain error by erroneously instructing the jury in Instructions 
Nos. 3 and 10. The State argues that the instructions were 
proper.

 

[¶30]   The trial court must instruct the 
jury on the law which is applicable to the issues that were actually raised by 
the evidence presented at the trial. Baier v. State, 891 P.2d 754, 756 (Wyo. 
1995). We give the trial courts wide latitude in instructing the jury, and we 
"will not find reversible error in the jury instructions as long as the 
instructions correctly state the law and the entire set of instructions 
sufficiently covers the issues which were presented at the trial." Harris v. State, 933 P.2d 1114, 1126 
(Wyo. 1997). In determining whether the trial court has met its obligation to 
properly instruct the jury, we view the instructions in their entirety and read 
them together. Baier, 891 P.2d  at 
756. Appellant did not object to the instructions which the trial court gave; 
therefore, in order to prevail on appeal, he must show that the trial court 
committed plain error in instructing the jury. See Spencer v. State, 925 P.2d 994 (Wyo. 
1996).

 

[¶31]   Appellant claims that, in 
Instruction No. 3, the trial court improperly instructed the jury 

that it could find the defendant guilty if it found 
that the presumption of innocence was "overcome" by the evidence rather than 
instructing the jury that the presumption of innocence must be overcome by 
"proof beyond a reasonable doubt" before the defendant could be found 
guilty.

He claims that the 
instruction erroneously informed the jury that it should apply the preponderance 
of the evidence standard rather than the reasonable doubt standard. Instruction 
No. 3 stated:

The 
burden of proving a defendant guilty rests upon the State and it never shifts 
throughout the trial. A defendant is not required to prove his 
innocence.

 

The 
fact that a defendant is charged with a crime may not be considered evidence of 
guilt. Nothing is taken by implication against a defendant, the law raises no 
presumption against him; rather, the presumption of law is in favor of his 
innocence.

 

The 
presumption of innocence is not merely a matter of form which the jury may 
disregard; it is part of the law of the land and it is a right guaranteed to 
every person accused of [a] crime. The presumption of innocence continues with a 
defendant through all stages of a trial and until the case is decided by the 
jury. Only if the presumption has been overcome by the evidence may a defendant 
be found guilty.

This instruction did not 
inform the jury that it should apply the preponderance of the evidence standard. 
Instead, the trial judge focused on instructing the jury that the State had the 
burden of proof and that Appellant was presumed to be innocent. Instruction No. 
4 addressed the reasonable doubt standard and stated in relevant 
part:

With respect to each charge you must consider the 
elements instruction for that crime. The test you must use is 
this:

 

If 
you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of the elements of 
that crime has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find 
[Appellant] not guilty of that crime.

 

If, 
on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that 
each of the elements of that crime has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, 
then you should find [Appellant] guilty of that crime.

When we consider all the 
instructions together, we conclude that the jury was adequately informed about 
the quantum of evidence which would be necessary to convict Appellant. In the 
event that the jury was confused by Instruction No. 3, Instruction No. 4 made it 
clear that the reasonable doubt standard was the appropriate standard. See Compton v. State, 931 P.2d 936, 942 
(Wyo. 1997). The trial court did not, therefore, err by giving Instruction No. 
3.

 

[¶32]   Appellant also argues that, in 
Instruction No. 10, the trial court erred by improperly instructing the jury on 
the law of attempted second-degree sexual assault. Instruction No. 10 
stated:

 

The necessary elements of Count VI (attempted second 
degree sexual assault) are:

1. The acts occurred on or about January 20 to 
February 10, 1995.

2. The acts occurred in Campbell County, 
Wyoming.

3. [Appellant] intended to inflict sexual intrusion 
(sexual intercourse) on CTR and to cause her submission by means that would 
prevent resistance by a victim of ordinary resolution.

4. [Appellant] took a substantial step toward the 
commission of the crime.

 

A 
"substantial step" is conduct which is strongly corroborative of the firmness of 
the person's intention to complete the commission of the 
crime.

 

The intent with which an act was done is a condition 
of the mind that is seldom, if ever, capable of direct and positive proof. 
Because we have no power to directly observe the condition of a person's mind, 
the best we can do is infer it from the evidence produced during the trial. In 
deciding that issue you may consider the defendant's acts, the manner in which 
they were done, the means used, and all the circumstances surrounding the 
acts.

 

[¶33]   Appellant contends that the trial 
court should have instructed the jury in accordance with the recently revised 
WYOMING PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CRIMINAL. He maintains that, under the new 
pattern jury instructions, the elements of second-degree sexual assault should 
have been set out in a separate instruction from the elements of attempt. 
Appellant argues that, by combining the attempt elements and the second-degree 
sexual assault elements in the same instruction, the trial judge confused the 
jury with the concepts of intent and attempt.

 

[¶34]   Instruction No. 10 included all the 
essential elements of the crime of attempted second-degree sexual assault. See WYO. STAT. §§ 6-1-301, 6-2-303 
(1988). We do not require that specific language be used in instructing the jury 
as long as the instruction contains a correct statement of the law. Compton, 931 P.2d at 939-40; see also Alberts v. State, 642 P.2d 447, 
452 (Wyo. 1982). The trial court did not err by combining the attempt elements 
with the second-degree sexual assault elements because the instruction that was 
given clearly set out all the elements which the jury needed to find in order to 
convict Appellant. See Compton, 931 P.2d  at 940. This Court stated in Compton that the "`intent to commit the 
underlying offense is an essential element of criminal attempt.'" 931 P.2d  at 
940 (quoting People v. Frysig, 628 P.2d 1004, 1007 (Colo. 1981) (footnote omitted)). We conclude, therefore, that 
Instruction No. 10 properly informed the jury of the mental element of the crime 
of attempted second-degree sexual assault and that the instruction was not 
confusing. Since the trial court did not err by giving Instructions Nos. 3 and 
10, we do not need to apply the plain error doctrine in this 
case.

 

D. Ineffective Assistance of Trial 
Counsel

 

[¶35]   Appellant contends that he was 
denied his constitutional right to have effective assistance of counsel at his 
trial. He claims that his counsel was deficient in sixteen different aspects, 
effectively denouncing his counsel's performance at every turn. The trial court 
held a protracted evidentiary hearing on Appellant's claim. At the conclusion of 
the hearing, the trial judge ruled that Appellant had received effective 
assistance from his trial attorney.

 

[¶36]   In order to prevail on his claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, Appellant must make the dual showings that 
his counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance 
prejudiced his defense. Bloomquist v. State, 914 P.2d 812, 819 (Wyo. 1996). We 
have reviewed the relevant portions of the record and the voluminous transcript 
from the evidentiary hearing and conclude that, although in hindsight 
Appellant's attorney may have done some things differently, his performance did 
not fall to the level of being considered constitutionally defective. Further, 
the record shows that Appellant was convicted on the facts which were presented 
at the trial. Any errors which were committed by the trial counsel were minor 
and did not prejudice Appellant's defense or affect the outcome of the trial. We 
will not, therefore, go through the tedious and, in this case, unavailing task 
of addressing each of Appellant's contentions that his attorney's performance 
was inadequate.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶37]   The trial court did not commit 
reversible error in this case, and Appellant received effective assistance from 
his trial counsel.

 

[¶38]   Affirmed.

 

Footnotes

1 In determining the probative value of 
prior bad acts evidence, the trial court should consider the following 
factors:

1. How clear is it that the defendant 
committed the prior bad act?

2. Does the defendant dispute the issue 
on which the state is offering the prior bad acts 
evidence?

3. Is other evidence 
available?

4. Is the evidence unnecessarily 
cumulative?

5. How much time has elapsed between the 
charged crime and the prior bad act?

Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it 
tempts the jury to decide the case on an improper basis. In balancing against 
its probative value the unfair prejudice created by the evidence, the trial 
court should consider the extent to which the evidence distracts the jury from 
the central question whether the defendant committed the charged crime. The 
trial court should weigh these additional factors against the probative value of 
the evidence:

1. The reprehensible nature of the prior 
bad act. The more reprehensible the act, the more likely the jury will be 
tempted to punish the defendant for the prior act.

2. The sympathetic character of the 
alleged victim of the prior bad act. Again, the jury will be tempted to punish 
the defendant for the prior act if the victim was especially 
vulnerable.

3. The similarity between the charged 
crime and the prior bad act. The more similar the acts, the greater is the 
likelihood that the jury will draw the improper inference that if the defendant 
did it once, he probably did it again.

4. The comparative enormity of the 
charged crime and the prior bad act. When the prior act is a more serious 
offense than the charged crime, the introduction of that act will tend to place 
the defendant in a different and unfavorable light.

5. The comparative relevance of the 
prior bad act to the proper and forbidden inferences. Evidence of the prior bad 
act may be much more probative of bad character than it is of any legitimate 
inference permitted by Rule 404(b).

6. Whether the prior act resulted in a 
conviction. The jury may be tempted to punish the defendant if they believe he 
escaped punishment for the prior bad act.

Dean, 865 P.2d  at 609-10 n. 2 (citations omitted).

2 Appellant also alludes to a possible 
error which resulted from the trial court's failure to conduct in camera 
hearings at the trial to determine the admissibility of all the other bad acts 
evidence. He does not, however, offer a clear explanation of what the trial 
court's supposed legal error was. We will not, therefore, consider his 
contention.