Title: Allen v. Nunez

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC16-1164 
____________ 
 
W. RILEY ALLEN, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JAIRO RAFAEL NUNEZ, et al., 
Respondents. 
 
October 4, 2018 
 
LEWIS, J. 
 
W. Riley Allen seeks review of the decision of the Fifth District Court of 
Appeal in Nunez v. Allen, 194 So. 3d 554 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016), on the basis that it 
expressly and directly conflicts with several appellate decisions of courts of this 
State regarding proposals for settlement, pursuant to section 768.79, Florida 
Statutes (2017), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442, for the purpose of 
assessing attorney’s fees.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. 
 
 
 
 
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This case originates from a motor vehicle accident in which Gabriel Nunez 
was operating a vehicle owned by his father, Jairo Nunez,1 when he struck a truck 
owned by Allen, which was lawfully parked along a street and unoccupied.  Id.   
Allen filed a one-count complaint against Gabriel and Jairo alleging that Gabriel  
negligently operated the vehicle and that Jairo, as the owner of the vehicle, was 
vicariously liable for his son’s negligent driving.  Id.  Allen sought damages for, 
among other things, the post-repair diminution in the value of his truck, the cost of 
the repairs, and the loss of use of his truck.  Id.  Respondents jointly answered the 
complaint.  Id.  Allen then served a separate proposal for settlement on each 
Respondent pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442.  Id.   
The proposal to Jairo provided: 
 
1. This Proposal for Settlement is made pursuant to Florida Statute § 
768.79, and is extended in accordance with the provisions of Rule 
1.442, Fla. R. Civ. P. 
 
2. The Proposal for Settlement is made on behalf of Plaintiff, W. 
RILEY ALLEN, and is made to Defendant, JAIRO RAFAEL 
NUNEZ. 
 
3. This Proposal for Settlement is made for the purpose of settling any 
and all claims made in this cause by Plaintiff, W. RILEY ALLEN, 
against defendant, JAIRO RAFAEL NUNEZ. 
 
                                          
 
 
1.  Hereinafter, Gabriel and Jairo Nunez may be referred to collectively as 
Respondents or individually according to their first names. 
 
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4. That in exchange for TWENTY THOUSAND AND 00/100 
DOLLARS ($20,000.00) in hand paid from defendant, JAIRO 
RAFAEL NUNEZ, Plaintiff agrees to settle any and all claims 
asserted against Defendant as identified in Case Number 2010–CA–
25627–0, brought in and for the Circuit Court in and for Orange 
County, Florida. 
 
5. This Proposal for Settlement is inclusive of all damages claimed by 
Plaintiff, W. RILEY ALLEN, including all claims for interest, costs, 
and expenses and any claims for attorney’s fees. 
 
Id. at 556 (footnote omitted).  Allen contemporaneously served an identical 
proposal for settlement on Gabriel, except that Gabriel’s name was substituted in 
place of Jairo.  Id.  Neither Respondent accepted his respective proposal; thus the 
proposals were considered rejected.  Id.; see also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442(f)(1) (“A 
proposal shall be deemed rejected unless accepted by delivery of a written notice 
of acceptance within 30 days after service of the proposal.”). 
After securing a final judgment in the sum of $29,785.97, Allen filed a 
motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes, and Florida 
Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442.  Nunez, 194 So. 3d. at 556.  Respondents moved to 
strike Allen’s proposals for settlement, contending that because paragraph 5 of the 
proposals stated that the monetary settlement was inclusive of all damages claimed 
by Allen, the proposals were ambiguous as to whether acceptance and payment of 
one of the $20,000 proposals for settlement would have resolved the case against 
both Respondents or only against the individual Respondent accepting the 
proposal.  Id. at 557.   
 
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The trial court granted Allen’s motion to enforce the proposals after finding 
the proposals for settlement were sufficiently clear and unambiguous; it was 
determined that Allen was entitled to be reimbursed $343,590 in attorney’s fees 
and legal assistant’s fees.  Id. at 555, 557.  Respondents appealed, asserting that the 
language contained in paragraph 5 of the proposals for settlement caused the 
proposals to be ambiguous and therefore unenforceable.  Id.  The Fifth District 
agreed, reasoning: 
Initially, paragraphs two, three, and four in each proposal for 
settlement make clear that payment of $20,000 by the [Respondent] 
named in the proposal would settle [Allen]’s claims brought in the 
case against that specific [Respondent].  However, paragraph five then 
stated that the proposal for settlement was inclusive of “all damages” 
claimed by [Allen].  As “all damages” claimed arguably are those that 
could have been (and were) imposed on both [Respondents] in this 
case, paragraph five of [Allen]’s proposal for settlement could be 
reasonably interpreted to mean that the acceptance of the proposal for 
settlement by only one of the [Respondents] resolved [Allen]’s entire 
claim against both [Respondents].  Put differently, if paragraph five 
had stated that the proposal was inclusive of all damages claimed by 
[Allen] against the individually named [Respondent], similar to the 
language in paragraph three of the proposal, there would have been no 
ambiguity. 
 
Id. at 558 (emphasis omitted).   
The district court relied on Tran v. Anvil Iron Works, Inc., 110 So. 3d 923 
(Fla. 2d DCA 2013), for support.  Nunez, 194 So. 3d at 558.  In Tran, the plaintiff 
was injured in an automobile accident and filed an action against the driver of the 
other vehicle and his corporate employer, which owned the vehicle.  Tran, 110 So. 
 
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3d at 924.  During litigation, plaintiff tendered separate proposals for settlement to 
the individual defendant and the corporate defendant.  Id.  Each proposal was 
specific as to the one defendant named therein and each stated that, as a condition 
of the proposal, the plaintiff would voluntarily dismiss, with prejudice, any and all 
claims against the specific defendant named in the proposal for settlement.  Id.  
Attached to the proposal for settlement was a copy of the proposed notice of 
voluntary dismissal with prejudice to be filed if the proposal was accepted.  Id.  
However, the attached dismissal notice named both defendants and indicated that 
the case would be dismissed against both defendants.  Id. at 924-25.  The Second 
District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s finding that the proposals for 
settlement were ambiguous because, while the body of the proposals did not 
indicate that both defendants would be dismissed, the notices of dismissal attached 
to the respective proposals did.  Id. at 927.  The district court held that the 
discrepancy could reasonably affect the decision to accept the proposal because 
one defendant might want to accept the proposal directed to it only if it knows for 
certain that its payment would result in the release of both defendants.  Id. at 926 
(“This may be especially significant in a case such as this where one defendant is 
the employer/owner of the car and the other defendant is the employee who was 
driving the car.”). 
 
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Likewise, the decision below held that the language in the proposals 
themselves raised the legitimate question as to whether acceptance resolved 
Allen’s claim for “all damages” against solely the named offeree or resolved the 
entire claim against both Respondents.  See Nunez, 194 So. 3d at 559.     
 
This review follows. 
ANALYSIS 
Attorney’s fees under offers of judgment are governed by section 768.79, 
Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442.  In relevant part, 
section 768.79 reads: 
(1)  In any civil action for damages filed in the courts of this 
state . . . [i]f a plaintiff files a demand for judgment which is not 
accepted by the defendant within 30 days and the plaintiff recovers a 
judgment in an amount at least 25 percent greater than the offer, she 
or he shall be entitled to recover reasonable costs and attorney’s fees 
incurred from the date of filing of the demand. . . . 
 
(2)  The making of an offer of settlement which is not accepted 
does not preclude the making of a subsequent offer.  An offer must: 
 
(a)  Be in writing and state that it is being made pursuant to this 
section. 
 
(b)  Name the party making it and the party to whom it is being 
made. 
 
(c)  State with particularity the amount offered to settle a claim 
for punitive damages, if any. 
 
(d)  State its total amount. 
 
 
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The offer shall be construed as including all damages which may be 
awarded in a final judgment. 
 
 
. . . . 
 
(6)  Upon motion made by the offeror within 30 days after the 
entry of judgment or after voluntary dismissal or involuntary 
dismissal, the court shall determine the following: 
 
 
. . . . 
 
(b)  If a plaintiff serves an offer which is not accepted by the 
defendant, and if the judgment obtained by the plaintiff is at least 25 
percent more than the amount of the offer, the plaintiff shall be 
awarded reasonable costs, including investigative expenses, and 
attorney’s fees, calculated in accordance with the guidelines 
promulgated by the Supreme Court, incurred from the date the offer 
was served. 
 
§ 768.79, Fla. Stat.  The relevant portions of the current version of rule 1.442 
provide: 
(c)  Form and Content of Proposal for Settlement. 
(1)  A proposal shall be in writing and shall identify the 
applicable Florida law under which it is being made. 
(2)  A proposal shall: 
(A)  name the party or parties making the proposal and the party 
or parties to whom the proposal is being made; 
(B)  state that the proposal resolves all damages that would 
otherwise be awarded in a final judgment in the action in which the 
proposal is served, subject to subdivision (F); 
(C)  state with particularity any relevant conditions; 
(D)  state the total amount of the proposal and state with 
particularity all nonmonetary terms of the proposal; 
 
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(E)  state with particularity the amount proposed to settle a 
claim for punitive damages, if any; 
(F)  state whether the proposal includes attorneys’ fees and 
whether attorneys’ fees are part of the legal claim; and 
(G)  include a certificate of service in the form required by rule 
1.080. 
(3)  A proposal may be made by or to any party or parties and 
by or to any combinations of parties properly identified in the 
proposal.  A joint proposal shall state the amount and terms 
attributable to each party. 
(4)  Notwithstanding subdivision (c)(3), when a party is alleged 
to be solely vicariously, constructively, derivatively, or technically 
liable, whether by operation of law or by contract, a joint proposal 
made by or served on such a party need not state the apportionment or 
contribution as to that party.  Acceptance by any party shall be 
without prejudice to the rights of contribution or indemnity. 
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442(c).  Proposals under the offer of judgment statute must strictly 
conform to these statutory and procedural requirements to entitle the offeror to 
attorney’s fees because the statute is in derogation of the common law that 
ordinarily requires each party to pay for its own attorney’s fees.  See, e.g., Pratt v. 
Weiss, 161 So. 3d 1268, 1271 (Fla. 2015) (citing Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. 
Hilyer Sod, 849 So. 2d 276, 278 (Fla. 2003); Gershuny v. Martin McFall 
Messenger Anesthesia Prof’l Ass’n, 539 So. 2d 1131, 1132 (Fla. 1989)).  This 
Court reviews a party’s entitlement to attorney’s fees pursuant to section 768.79 
and rule 1.442 de novo.  E.g., Pratt, 161 So. 3d at 1271 (citing Frosti v. Creel, 979 
So. 2d 912, 915 (Fla. 2008)).   
 
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Additionally, the proposal must be sufficiently clear and free of ambiguity to 
allow the offeree the opportunity to fully consider the proposal.  State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nichols, 932 So. 2d 1067, 1079 (Fla. 2006).  Nonetheless, this 
Court has not required the elimination of every ambiguity—only reasonable 
ambiguities: 
We recognize that, given the nature of language, it may be impossible 
to eliminate all ambiguity.  The rule does not demand the impossible.  
It merely requires that the settlement proposal be sufficiently clear and 
definite to allow the offeree to make an informed decision without 
needing clarification.  If ambiguity within the proposal could 
reasonably affect the offeree’s decision, the proposal will not satisfy 
the particularity requirement [of rule 1.442(c)(2)(C)-(D)]. 
 
Id.  Ultimately, “[p]roposals for settlement are intended to end judicial labor, not 
create more.”  Id. (quoting Lucas v. Calhoun, 813 So. 2d 971, 973 (Fla. 2d DCA 
2002)).  Accordingly, courts are discouraged from “nitpicking” proposals for 
settlement to search for ambiguity.  Carey-All Transp., Inc. v. Newby, 989 So. 2d 
1201, 1206 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (citing Nichols, 932 So. 2d at 1079). 
 
This Court recently rejected an argument that a nearly identical settlement 
proposal was ambiguous and therefore unenforceable on the matter of attorney’s 
fees.  Anderson v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 202 So. 3d 846 (Fla. 2016).  Anderson 
involved an armed robbery, carjacking, and shooting that occurred in the parking 
lot of an Embassy Suites hotel in Orlando, Florida.  Id. at 848.  Troy Anderson 
filed an action against Hilton Hotels Corporation (Hilton), W2007 Equity Inns 
 
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Realty, LLC (W2007), Interstate Management Company, LLC (Interstate), and 
SecurAmerica, LLC, for negligence.  Id.  Anderson’s wife, Paula Anderson, also 
sought damages for loss of consortium.  Id. at 849.  Anderson proposed offers of 
settlement to Hilton, W2007, Interstate, and SecurAmerica.  Id.  The offer made to 
Hilton, it its entirety, stated: 
PROPOSAL FOR SETTLEMENT ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF, 
TROY [ANDERSON], PURSUANT TO RULE 1.442 
 
Plaintiff, TROY ANDERSON, by and through his undersigned 
attorneys, hereby serves his Proposal for Settlement, pursuant to Rule 
1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, to Defendant, HILTON 
HOTELS CORPORATION, a foreign corporation, doing business as 
EMBASSY SUITES ORLANDO AT INTERNATIONAL DRIVE 
AND JAMAICAN COURT, also doing business as HILTON 
WORLDWIDE, and states in support thereof as follows: 
 
1. This Proposal for Settlement is made pursuant to Florida Statute § 
768.79, and is extended in accordance with the provisions of Rule 
1.442. Fla. R. Civ. P. 
 
2. This Proposal for Settlement is made on behalf of Plaintiff, TROY 
ANDERSON (“PLAINTIFF”), and is made to Defendant, HILTON 
HOTELS CORPORATION, a foreign corporation, doing business as 
EMBASSY SUITES ORLANDO AT INTERNATIONAL DRIVE 
AND JAMAICAN COURT, also doing business as HILTON 
WORLDWIDE (“HILTON”). 
 
3. This Proposal for Settlement is made for the purpose of settling any 
and all claims made in this cause by PLAINTIFF against HILTON. 
 
4. That in exchange for SIX HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND AND 
00/100 DOLLARS ($650,000.00) in hand paid from HILTON, 
PLAINTIFF agrees to settle any and all claims asserted against 
HILTON, as identified in Case Number 2009–CA–040473–O, 
brought in the Circuit Court in and for Orange County, Florida. 
 
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5. This Proposal for Settlement is inclusive of all damages claimed by 
PLAINTIFF, including all claims for interest, costs, and expenses and 
any claims for attorney’s fees. 
 
Id.  The offers to each defendant were identical other than the specifically 
designated party and the specific amount proposed.  Id.  Paula Anderson also made 
separate offers, identical to those of Anderson, to each of the defendants.  Id.  Prior 
to trial, however, Paula dismissed her cause of action.  Id.  Anderson obtained a 
favorable jury verdict that was twenty-five percent greater than the settlement offer 
and subsequently sought attorney’s fees.  See id. at 850, 857-58.  The trial court 
and the Fifth District both concluded that the term “PLAINTIFF” in paragraph 5 of 
Anderson’s offer could reasonably be interpreted to include both Anderson and his 
wife, Paula.  Id. at 850-51.   
On appeal, this Court acknowledged that the proposal clearly and 
consistently used the singular term “PLAINTIFF,” defined as Troy Anderson in 
paragraph 2.  Id. at 855.  This Court also recognized that paragraph 3 indicated that 
each proposal was designed to settle “any and all claims of PLAINTIFF [Troy 
Anderson] against [RESPONDENT],” clearly delineating that the only parties to 
be affected by acceptance would be Troy Anderson and the designated 
Respondent.  Id.  This Court further noted that the offer made by Troy Anderson 
made no reference to Paula Anderson or her loss of consortium claim, “which 
Anderson was not obliged to address in his claim.”  Id.  Paula Anderson had made 
 
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her own separate, nearly simultaneous offers to each of the Respondents.  Id.  This 
Court then held that 
[i]f a party receives two simultaneous offers from two separate 
parties, common sense dictates that the offeree should possess all the 
information necessary to determine whether to settle with one or both 
of the offerors.  In reading the entirety of Anderson’s proposals, the 
only reasonable interpretation is that Troy Anderson offered to settle 
only his claims with each Respondent in his offer. 
 
Id. (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).  Thus this Court quashed the Fifth 
District’s holding that Anderson’s proposals for settlement were ambiguous.  Id. at 
858.  
 
The Second District has also rejected arguments that similar settlement 
proposals were ambiguous and therefore unenforceable on the matter of attorney’s 
fees.  See Miley v. Nash, 171 So. 3d 145 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015); Bright House 
Networks, LLC v. Cassidy, 242 So. 3d 456 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018).   
Miley involved an accident between Martha Nash and Kyle Miley in a car 
owned by his father, Glenn Miley.  171 So. 3d at 147.  Martha filed a complaint 
against Kyle and Glenn seeking damages for her injuries; Garfield Nash, Martha’s 
husband, also sought damages for loss of consortium.  Id.  Martha and Garfield 
Nash pursued their claims against Glenn Miley solely under a theory of vicarious 
liability.  Id.  Prior to trial, Kyle offered a settlement proposal to Martha in “an 
attempt to resolve all claims and causes of action resulting from the incident or 
accident giving rise to this lawsuit brought by Plaintiff Martha Nash against 
 
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Defendant Kyle Miley.”  Id.  The proposal contained a condition that Martha 
dismiss her claims against both Kyle and Glenn, but did not address Garfield 
Nash’s pending claim for loss of consortium, which was ultimately dropped prior 
to trial.  Id.  After Martha obtained a favorable jury verdict that was significantly 
less than the amount in Kyle’s offer, the trial court denied Kyle’s motion for 
attorney’s fees for five reasons: the proposal (1) failed to specifically identify the 
claims to be resolved by it; (2) failed to address Garfield Nash’s loss of consortium 
claim; (3) failed to state with particularity any relevant conditions; (4) failed to 
state the amount and terms attributable to each party; and (5) required dismissal of 
both Kyle and Glenn without attributing the payment owed.  Id. 
 
On appeal, the Second District reversed and concluded that the proposal 
complied with rule 1.442.  Id.  Although the district court acknowledged that the 
language in the terms “all claims” that “[gave] rise to the lawsuit” could have been 
more definite, it concluded that these terms were not so ambiguous as to prevent 
Martha Nash from making an informed decision about settling her claim.  Id. at 
148.  The district court also held that the proposal did not need to address Garfield 
Nash’s claim for loss of consortium, which was a separate and derivative claim.  
Id. at 148-49 (“Because the proposal explicitly stated that it was to cover all claims 
brought by Martha Nash, it was not deficient for failing to address the other 
pending claim in the lawsuit brought by an entirely different plaintiff.”).  The 
 
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district court also concluded that the particularity requirement had been satisfied 
and further held that apportionment with respect to Glenn Miley was not required 
because he was only alleged to be vicariously liable.  Id. at 149 (citing Fla. R. Civ. 
P. 1.442).  Thus the Second District reversed the trial court’s order denying 
attorney’s fees.  Id. at 150. 
 
In Cassidy, five members of the Cassidy family filed a one-count complaint 
for breach of contract against Bright House.  242 So. 3d 458.  Bright House served 
one proposal for settlement on Albert B. Cassidy, who did not accept the proposal.  
Id.  Bright House filed a motion for attorney’s fees and costs after the trial court 
entered summary judgment in its favor.  Id.  The trial court denied Bright House’s 
motion because paragraph 4 of the proposal stated that acceptance of the offer 
would dismiss “all claims” against Bright House.  Id.  The trial court found that 
paragraph 4 created ambiguity with regard to which claims were to be dismissed.  
Id.  The Second District reversed, holding that the proposal did not contain a level 
of ambiguity that would “render Albert B. Cassidy unable to make an informed 
decision without needing clarification.”  Id. at 460.   
Albert B. Cassidy has no authority to cause the other plaintiffs’ claims 
to be dismissed.  It is clear that the Proposal was made only to Albert 
B. Cassidy and that the Proposal defines the claims to be resolved as 
those asserted in this action by Offeree (Albert B. Cassidy) against 
Offeror (Bright House).   
 
 
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Id.  The district court held that, when read as a whole, there was no ambiguity 
within the proposal that would reasonably affect Albert B. Cassidy’s decision.  Id.  
Thus the district court reversed the trial court’s order denying attorney’s fees.  Id. 
The Fourth District Court of Appeal has likewise rejected similar attempts to 
inject ambiguity into otherwise sufficient proposals.  See Kiefer v. Sunset Beach 
Invs., LLC, 207 So. 3d 1008 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017); Costco Wholesale Corp. v. 
Llanio-Gonzalez, 213 So. 3d 944 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017); Alamo Fin., L.P. v. Mazoff, 
112 So. 3d 626 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013); Land & Sea Petroleum, Inc. v. Bus. 
Specialists, Inc., 53 So. 3d 348 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).   
In Kiefer, Sunset Beach Investments, LLC (Sunset Beach), filed an action 
asserting claims of professional negligence against Kiefer, Kimley-Horn, and two 
licensed engineers.  207 So. 3d at 1009.  While the case was pending, Kiefer 
served Sunset Beach a proposal for settlement that included a required release as a 
condition of the agreement.  Id.  Simultaneously, each of the other codefendants 
served separate proposals for settlement on Sunset Beach.  Id.  Sunset Beach did 
not accept any of the proposals.  Id.  Kiefer prevailed on a motion for summary 
judgment, obtained judgment in his favor as to the only claim asserted against him, 
and subsequently filed a motion for attorney’s fees based upon the rejected 
proposal for settlement.  Id. at 1009-10.  The trial court denied Kiefer’s motion 
after finding the release attached to the proposal for settlement to be ambiguous.  
 
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Id. at 1010.  The trial court found ambiguity with the fact that, unlike each of the 
other paragraphs of the proposal for settlement and release, the fifth and sixth 
paragraphs of the release were not specifically limited to Kiefer and Sunset Beach.  
Id.  The fifth paragraph in question stated that the release covered “any and all 
claims for attorney’s fees, costs and premiums, as a result of the incident and 
matters set forth in the lawsuit.”  Id.  The sixth paragraph stated that Sunset Beach 
would release all claims that related to the lawsuit.  Id.  On appeal, the Fourth 
District reversed and held that the settlement proposal was unambiguous.  Id. at 
1011.  The district court held that, when read as a whole, the release related to 
Sunset Beach and Kiefer and not the other codefendants.  Id.  The district court 
relied on Anderson in holding the proposal for settlement was not ambiguous due 
to the fact that other claims remained and other parties were not mentioned.  Id. at 
1012.  Thus the Fourth District reversed the trial court’s order denying attorney’s 
fees.  Id.  
In Llanio-Gonzalez, Costco Wholesale Corporation (Costco) served a 
proposal for settlement on Elaine Llanio-Gonzalez, who brought an action for her 
injuries in a slip and fall.  213 So. 3d at 945.  Costco also served a proposal for 
settlement on Luis Gonzalez for his loss of consortium claim.  Id.  Each proposal 
included a required release as a condition of the agreement.  Id.  The attached 
releases provided that each plaintiff would release Costco and “all related, 
 
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associated or affiliated companies” from any and all claims.  Id.  The plaintiffs did 
not accept Costco’s proposals for settlement and Costco ultimately prevailed on a 
motion for summary judgment.  Id. at 946.  Costco then moved for attorney’s fees 
after obtaining judgment in its favor.  Id.  The trial court denied Costco’s motion 
after finding the releases attached to the proposals for settlement to be ambiguous.  
Id.  The trial court found ambiguity with the fact that each proposal for settlement 
contained narrow language offering to release only the defendant but the attached 
releases contained broader language releasing individuals and entities in addition 
to Costco.  Id.  On appeal, the Fourth District agreed with Costco that the proposals 
were unambiguous and were therefore enforceable.  Id. at 947.  The district court 
held that although the attached releases were more expansive, their effect was the 
same.  Id.  The district court held that the proposals for settlement and 
accompanying releases were sufficiently clear and definite to allow the plaintiffs to 
make an informed decision on whether to accept the proposals.  Id.  Thus the 
Fourth District reversed the trial court’s order denying attorney’s fees.  Id. 
Alamo Financing involved a motor vehicle accident between plaintiff, 
Matthew Mazoff, and defendant, Paola Alvarado-Fernandez; Alamo Financing 
owned the vehicle driven by Alvarado-Fernandez, while a separate entity, Alamo 
Rental (US), Inc., leased the vehicle to Alvarado-Fernandez.  112 So. 3d at 627.  
Mazoff sought damages from Alamo Financing and Alvarado-Fernandez, alleging 
 
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specifically that Alamo Financing was vicariously liable for Alvarado-Fernandez’s 
negligence.  Id.  Alamo Financing proposed an offer of settlement to Mazoff that 
contained a condition that Mazoff would release Alamo Financing and “their 
parent corporations, subsidiaries, officers, directors, and employees” from any and 
all claims.  Id.  Mazoff subsequently moved to add Alamo Rental as a defendant 
after learning that Alamo Rental was the entity that leased the car.  Id. at 628.   
Alamo Financing unsuccessfully moved for attorney’s fees after obtaining 
judgment in its favor.  Id.  On appeal, the Fourth District agreed with Alamo 
Financing that the proposal was not ambiguous and was therefore enforceable.  Id.  
The district court rejected Mazoff’s argument that the language “all Claims made 
in the present action by the party to whom this proposal is made including any 
claims that could be made against Defendant ALAMO FINANCING, L.P., which 
arise out of the same occurrence or event set forth in this action,” could extinguish 
Mazoff’s claims against Alvarado-Fernandez.  Id. at 629-30.  Specifically, the 
district court acknowledged that when read in isolation, this clause could suggest 
that Mazoff’s separate claims against Alvarado-Fernandez may be affected by his 
acceptance of Alamo Financing’s offer; nonetheless, the context of the entire offer 
indicated that Alamo Financing was the only offeror and the only party to be 
dismissed from suit upon Mazoff’s acceptance.  Id. at 630.  The Fourth District 
similarly dispensed with Mazoff’s suggestion that the proposal was unenforceably 
 
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ambiguous because it could have constituted a release of Alamo Rental, which was 
not a party to the lawsuit at the time the offer was made.  Id. at 630-31. 
In Land & Sea Petroleum, a seller made two separate proposals for 
settlement with the two different brokers with whom it was engaged in a contract 
dispute.  53 So. 3d at 351-52.  Other than the name of the individual broker, the 
proposals were identical and indicated that they would resolve “any and all claims 
that could have been or should have been brought” by the individually named 
broker against the seller upon payment of $500.  Id. at 352.  Neither broker 
accepted its respective proposal.  Id.  The seller prevailed on a motion for summary 
judgment and subsequently moved for attorney’s fees.  Id.  In response, the brokers 
contended that the proposals were ambiguous because they did not specify which 
side would pay the $500 and did not specify the claims that the proposals would 
settle.  Id.  The trial court ultimately denied the seller’s motion for attorney’s fees; 
on appeal, however, the Fourth District reversed.  Id. at 352-53.  The district court 
held that, because the only relationship that existed between the brokers and the 
seller arose from the brokerage contract, there were no other possible claims which 
could have existed between the parties either within or outside of the action.  Id. at 
353-54.  The district court also held that it was apparent that the seller was offering 
to pay each of the brokers $500 in exchange for resolving the brokers’ respective 
claims because the brokers were suing for a commission and the seller raised no 
 
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counterclaim.  Id. at 353 (“The brokers’ reliance on the fact that the seller did not 
expressly state that it would be the party paying the $500 seems to be the type of 
‘nit-picking’ which the second district cautioned against in Carey-All.”).   
There can be no doubt this Court possesses discretion to exercise jurisdiction 
in this case.  The dissent convolutes and misstates discretionary and subject-matter 
jurisdiction within the Florida Constitution.  Jurisdiction exists where a decision of 
a district court expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of another district 
court of appeal or of this Court on the same question of law.  Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. 
Const.; see also Knowles v. State, 848 So. 2d 1055, 1056 (Fla. 2003) (accepting 
jurisdiction based on conflict created by misapplication of decisional law); 
Robertson v. State, 829 So. 2d 901, 904 (Fla. 2002) (stating that misapplication of 
decisional law creates conflict jurisdiction); Acensio v. State, 497 So. 2d 640, 641 
(Fla. 1986) (accepting jurisdiction based on conflict created by misapplication of 
decisional law).  The decision below expressly and directly conflicts with this 
Court’s decision in Anderson and the decisions of the Second and Fourth Districts 
in Miley, Cassidy, Kiefer, Llanio-Gonzalez, Alamo Financing, and Land & Sea 
Petroleum.  In each of the seven conflict cases discussed, the point of law at issue 
was whether an offer by a single offeror to a single offeree was considered 
sufficiently clear and enforceable, although it did not address separate pending 
claims of other parties to the litigation.  However, in the decision below the Fifth 
 
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District determined that such an offer was ambiguous and unenforceable because it 
could have possibly affected the unaddressed claims of the other codefendant.  
Therefore, we properly have jurisdiction on this matter and quash the decision 
below.2  
The reading of Allen’s offers as espoused by the Respondents and the Fifth 
District was unreasonable under these circumstances and in contravention of this 
Court’s direction in Nichols.  Each proposal clearly and consistently used the 
singular term “PLAINTIFF,” which was defined as W. Riley Allen in paragraph 2.  
Moreover, paragraph 3 indicated that each proposal was designed to settle “any 
and all claims of PLAINTIFF against [RESPONDENT],” which by its clear terms 
suggested that the only parties to be affected by the proposal would be Allen and 
the designated Respondent.  In reading the entirety of this proposal, the only 
reasonable interpretation is that Allen offered to settle his claims with only the 
Respondent specified in each respective proposal.  
                                          
 
2.  Tellingly, the dissent states that this Court’s jurisprudence “in this area of 
the law seems inconsistently applied and unpredictable,” but “[e]ven if there are 
other cases . . . in conflict, I would not exercise jurisdiction.”  Dissenting op. at 27 
note 3.  However, the purpose of conflict review is the elimination of inconsistent 
views about the same question of law.  See Gerald Kogan & Robert Craig Waters, 
The Operation and Jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court, 18 Nova L. Rev. 
1151, 1231 (1994).  Therefore it is paramount this Court exercise jurisdiction to 
eliminate any inconsistencies in this area of law.  See, e.g., Wainwright v. Taylor, 
476 So. 2d 669, 670 (Fla. 1985). 
 
 
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If two codefendants each receive a proposal for settlement, in which they are 
specifically named, each codefendant should possess all the information necessary 
to determine whether to settle.  See Nichols, 932 So. 2d at 1079 (“[T]he settlement 
proposal [must] be sufficiently clear and definite to allow the offeree to make an 
informed decision without needing clarification.”).  In this context, it appears 
disingenuous to assert that there exists a legitimate question as to whether one 
codefendant’s acceptance could have settled the offeror’s claim against the other 
codefendant.   
The Respondents’ interpretation of the proposal for settlement ignores the 
well-established principle that “the intention of the parties must be determined 
from an examination of the entire contract and not from separate phrases or 
paragraphs.”  Moore v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 916 So. 2d 871, 875 (Fla. 
2d DCA 2005).  Thus, any potential ambiguity in paragraph 5 is resolved by 
examining the proposal for settlement as a whole.   
Therefore, we conclude that the proposal was unambiguous for the purpose 
of determining Allen’s entitlement to attorney’s fees. 
CONCLUSION  
Reading the plain language of Allen’s offers, we hold that these offers to 
settle his claims against the Respondents were unambiguous.  The “nitpicking” of 
these offers by the district court below to find otherwise unnecessarily injected 
 
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ambiguity into these proceedings and created more judicial labor, not less.  Cf. 
Nichols, 932 So. 2d at 1079.  Furthermore, the plain language of both section 
768.79 and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 indicate that Allen’s entitlement 
to attorney’s fees was actualized after he submitted sufficient offers and obtained 
satisfactory judgments in his favor.  Therefore, we quash the decision below and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, QUINCE, and LABARGA, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs with an opinion. 
POLSTON, J., dissents with an opinion, in which CANADY, C.J., and LAWSON, 
J., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
PARIENTE, J., concurring. 
 
I fully concur in the majority’s conclusion that the proposal for settlement in 
this case was unambiguous, and thus enforceable.  Majority op. at 22.  I write 
separately to, once again, highlight the proliferation of litigation surrounding 
proposals to settle, which runs counter to the entire purpose of these proposals—to 
reduce litigation.  In light of the exorbitant amount of litigation, I urge courts to 
focus on the goal of reducing litigation when reviewing a proposal for settlement.  
Additionally, because it is “impossible to eliminate all ambiguity,” courts must 
remember that a proposal need only “be sufficiently clear and definite to allow the 
 
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offeree to make an informed decision without needing clarification.”  State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nichols, 932 So. 2d 1067, 1079 (Fla. 2006).  
 
As the majority explains, proposals for settlement are governed by section 
768.79, Florida Statutes (2017), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442.  
Majority op. at 6.  Under section 768.79, if a plaintiff serves a proposal for 
settlement, which the defendant does not accept “and the plaintiff recovers a 
judgment in an amount at least 25 percent greater” than the proposal, the plaintiff 
is entitled to recover reasonable costs and attorney’s fees.  § 768.79(1).  The 
defendant can, likewise, recover reasonable costs and attorney’s fees if the plaintiff 
fails to accept the defendant’s proposal and “the judgment is one of no liability or 
the judgment obtained by the plaintiff is at least 25 percent less than” the 
defendant’s proposal.  Id.  Rule 1.442 sets forth the procedure for serving 
proposals for settlement, the form these proposals should take, and the substance 
they should include.   
This Court has explained that rule 1.442 “was implemented solely to 
encourage settlements in order to eliminate trials if possible.”  Unicare Health 
Facilities, Inc. v. Mort, 553 So. 2d 159, 161 (Fla. 1989); see Cheek v. McGowan 
Elec. Supply Co., 511 So. 2d 977, 981 (Fla. 1987).  Despite the intended purpose of 
the rule, however, I have expressed concern as to “whether either the rule or the 
statute is fulfilling its intended purpose of encouraging settlement or at times is 
 
- 25 - 
having the opposite effect of increasing litigation.”  Campbell v. Goldman, 959 So. 
2d 223, 227 (Fla. 2007) (Pariente, J., specially concurring); see Lamb v. 
Matetzschk, 906 So. 2d 1037, 1042-43 (Fla. 2005) (Pariente, C.J., specially 
concurring); Sec. Prof’ls Inc. v. Segall, 685 So. 2d 1381, 1384 (Fla. 4th DCA 
1997).  
In Lamb, the Court interpreted rule 1.442 “to require differentiated offers of 
judgment, regardless of whether the offer emanates from or is directed to joint 
parties who have a common interest.”  906 So. 2d at 1042 (Pariente, C.J., specially 
concurring).  Specifically, the Court “prohibit[ed] a joint offer by a plaintiff 
directed towards two defendants, one of whom [wa]s only vicariously liable for the 
acts of the other defendant.”  Id. at 1044 (Pariente, C.J., specially concurring).  I 
questioned whether this approach would actually foster the primary goal of rule 
1.442 to encourage settlements and reduce litigation, particularly in cases “where 
the liability of one defendant is based on vicarious liability and the issue of 
vicarious liability is undisputed.”  Id. (Pariente, C.J., specially concurring).  
Likewise, in Campbell, I “reluctantly agree[d]” with the majority’s 
conclusion that section 768.79 and rule 1.442 “require[d] that an offer of 
settlement cite the Florida law on which it is based.”  959 So. 2d at 227 (Pariente, 
J., specially concurring).  My reluctance stemmed from the fact that “there was no 
lack of clarity, uncertainty, or confusion” in the offer in Campbell, because 
 
- 26 - 
although the plaintiff’s offer did not mention the statute, the offer did specify that it 
was made pursuant to rule 1.442.  Id. (Pariente, J., specially concurring).  Thus, it 
was a minor omission, not an actual ambiguity, that spawned an unnecessary 
amount of litigation.  
This case presents another example of unnecessary litigation prompted by a 
clearly unambiguous proposal for settlement.  As the majority explains, by 
“nitpicking” the precise wording of the proposals in this case, the district court 
“unnecessarily injected ambiguity into these proceedings and created more judicial 
labor, not less.”  Majority op. at 22-23.  Rather than comb through the terms of a 
proposal in search of ambiguity, I again urge courts to refrain “from ‘nitpicking,’ ” 
and find a proposal unenforceable only when there is a reasonable ambiguity as to 
its meaning.  Anderson v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 202 So. 3d 846, 853 (Fla. 2016) 
(quoting Carey-All Transp., Inc. v. Newby, 989 So. 2d 1201, 1206 (Fla. 2d DCA 
2008)).  
POLSTON, J., dissenting. 
 
 
Because the Fifth District’s decision in Nunez v. Allen, 194 So. 3d 554, 556 
(Fla. 5th DCA 2016), does not expressly and directly conflict with the decisions 
 
- 27 - 
argued by the Petitioner during jurisdictional briefing, this Court does not have the 
constitutional authority to review this case.3  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
 
Specifically, this case is distinguishable from Anderson v. Hilton Hotels 
Corp., 202 So. 3d 846 (Fla. 2016).  In Anderson, 202 So. 3d at 849, 854-55, this 
Court considered whether the term “Plaintiff” in separate proposals for settlement 
from two different plaintiffs to multiple defendants could reasonably be construed 
to include both plaintiffs.  This Court held that the proposals for settlement were 
unambiguous as they were clearly only intended to settle the claims of the 
individual plaintiff named in the proposals.  Id.  In contrast, in this case, there was 
only one plaintiff who sent two proposals for settlement to two different 
defendants, a father and son.  Nunez, 194 So. 3d at 556.  The Fifth District 
determined that the proposals for settlement were ambiguous because it was 
unclear whether the language “all damages claimed by the Plaintiff” (where both 
defendants were coextensively liable for all of the alleged damages) meant that 
payment of the delineated amount (which was the same figure in both proposals) 
would settle the case as to one or both of the defendants.  Id. at 558.  Therefore, 
because there was only one plaintiff in Nunez rather than the two plaintiffs 
                                          
 
 
3.  In my view, our jurisprudence in this area of the law seems inconsistently 
applied and unpredictable.  Even if there are other cases cited by the majority (not 
argued by the Petitioner) that are in conflict, I would not exercise jurisdiction. 
 
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involved in Anderson, and because different clauses were analyzed, Nunez and 
Anderson do not conflict. 
 
Additionally, Nunez is not in conflict with Kuhajda v. Borden Dairy Co. of 
Alabama, 202 So. 3d 391 (Fla. 2016).  In Kuhajda, 202 So. 3d at 395, this Court 
considered whether an offer for settlement must meet a requirement stated in 
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 that is not listed in section 768.79, Florida 
Statutes.  This Court in Kuhajda, 202 So. 3d at 395, also considered whether “the 
failure to include the attorney’s fees language in the offer of judgment” created 
ambiguity when attorney’s fees were not sought in the pleadings.  Therefore, 
because Kuhajda addressed different issues of law than Nunez, the decisions do not 
conflict.   
Accordingly, because there is no express and direct conflict between Nunez 
and the decisions argued by the parties during jurisdictional briefing, this Court 
does not have the authority to review this case.  I respectfully dissent. 
CANADY, C.J., and LAWSON, J., concur. 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Direct 
Conflict of Decisions  
 
 
Fifth District - Case No. 5D14-4386 
 
 
(Orange County) 
 
W. Riley Allen of Riley Allen Law, Orlando, Florida; and Thomas D. Hall of The 
Mills Firm, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
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for Petitioner 
 
Elizabeth C. Wheeler of Elizabeth C. Wheeler, P.A., Orlando, Florida,  
 
 
for Respondents