Title: STATE v SMITH

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 14928 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, FORREST JORDAN SMITH, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the First Judicial District, Honorable Gordon Bennett, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Harold H. Harrison argued, Helena, Montana For Respondent : Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Chris Tweeten argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Charles Graveley argued, County Attorney, Helena, Montana Submitted: February 19, 1980 Decided: MAR 2 7 l g a M r . ~ u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Defendant was convicted i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t of t h e crime of sexual i n t e r c o u r s e without consent and was sentenced t o t e n y e a r s i n t h e Montana S t a t e Prison, with t h e l a s t nine years suspended. Defendant appeals from t h e above conviction and judgment. This case a r o s e from a complaint f i l e d by Mary Rose Cloninger a l l e g i n g t h a t defendant forced her t o engage i n sexual i n t e r c o u r s e i n t h e e a r l y morning hours of August 4 , 1978. There i s no d i s p u t e t h a t on t h a t morning t h e defen- d a n t and t h e complainant engaged i n sexual i n t e r c o u r s e . The s o l e i s s u e a t t r i a l was whether t h e a c t w a s committed without consent. Evidence taken during t h e t r i a l revealed t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t r i x , a former barmaid, and defendant had known each o t h e r f o r a period of approximately t e n years; t h a t during t h e i r teenage y e a r s t h e p r o s e c u t r i x had o f t e n telephoned defendant and w a s f a m i l i a r with defendant's voice on t h e telephone; t h a t during those years they were on many occa- s i o n s alone together; t h a t both t h e p r o s e c u t r i x and defen- d a n t w e r e involved i n rodeo a c t i v i t i e s as w e r e t h e i r respec- t i v e f a m i l i e s ; t h a t defendant had previously gone with t h e p r o s e c u t r i x ' s younger sister C a r r i e f o r about a year; t h a t C a r r i e had never complained t o t h e p r o s e c u t r i x of defendant making any untoward o r i n s u l t i n g approaches t o her; and t h a t a t t h e time of t r i a l C a r r i e was s t i l l q u i t e f r i e n d l y with defendant and vehemently objected t o her sister's rape charges, as d i d o t h e r members of t h e family. With r e s p e c t t o t h e i n c i d e n t o u t of which t h e p r e s e n t case a r o s e , t h e testimony of the p r o s e c u t r i x i n d i c a t e s t h a t between 3 : 3 0 and 4:00 a.m. on August 4 , 1978, defendant telephoned the prosecutrix and told her that he was at a party and asked if she would cook breakfast for him. She agreed to do so, and defendant arrived at her residence shortly thereafter. She had not dressed and was wearing only a light, clinging robe and nothing else. After breakfast the prosecutrix testified she offered to allow defendant to use a spare bedroom. She testified she did this because she knew defendant had to be at work at 7:00 that morning at a location relatively close to the Cloninger residence. When she was showing him to the room, the defendant made a sexual advance at the prosecutrix, which she rebuffed. She then returned to her bedroom. A few minutes later, defendant entered her bedroom and forcibly accomplished an act of sexual intercourse with her. She testified that she screamed and struggled, but ceased her resistance because of fear for her safety. This fear stemmed in part from a previous incident where defendant had allegedly assaulted her physically for calling him a "son-of-a-bitch." Defendant's story is consistent with the prosecutrix's testimony up to the point where she offered to allow defen- dant to sleep at her house. According to defendant, he had been drinking in a bar for several hours and had then gone to a house party at the home of a friend. He testified that he considered himself to have been drunk. He called the prosecutrix because he desired some female companionship for the night, though he admitted that there were no previous instances of sexual relations between them. He testified that he went over to the prosecutrix's house after his request for breakfast was granted. ~ccording to defendant, when Ms. Cloninger offered to allow him to sleep at her house, she told him he could sleep anywhere he wanted t o , and then she went t o bed; t h a t she d i d n o t take him t o any room; t h a t he was completely famil- iar with t h e layout of t h e house; t h a t it would n o t have been necessary f o r her t o show him t h e l o c a t i o n of any room; t h a t he took h i s shoes and socks o f f i n t h e kitchen, went i n t o t h e bedroom through a door t h a t was open and l i f t e d up t h e covers and crawled i n t o bed beside her; t h a t he s t i l l had h i s s h i r t and pants on; t h a t they s t a r t e d necking and he k i s s e d her on t h e l i p s , neck, nipples and unzipped her bathrobe a l l t h e way; t h a t she o f f e r e d no o b j e c t i o n t o any of t h i s ; t h a t she d i d n o t c r y o r scream; t h a t he took h i s c l o t h e s o f f i n t h e course of which he unbuckled h i s b e l t and undid h i s buttons and zipper and pushed h i s pants down; t h a t during a l l t h a t t i m e he w a s not holding her i n any way except t h a t he had h i s a r m around her; t h a t she d i d n o t o b j e c t o r resist i n any way, nor d i d she ever t e l l him t o s t o p ; t h a t she responded t o him and he completed t h e sex a c t with her and she appeared t o cooperate; t h a t when it w a s over he w a s laying beside her and they s t a r t e d t a l k i n g ; t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t r i x w a s t a l k i n g about her boyfriend Ed and s t a t e d t h a t " a f t e r he went t o c o l l e g e t h i s f a l l t h a t we could start going out"; t h a t defendant t o l d her t h a t he had never men- tioned anything about going o u t together and t h a t with t h i s she became very angry and t o l d defendant t o " g e t t h e h e l l o u t of t h e house, you son-of-a-bitch"; t h a t with r e s p e c t t o t h e doctor l a t e r f i n d i n g a l i t t l e redness around her w r i s t t h a t he d i d n o t hold her w r i s t , pinch it o r anything of t h a t s o r t ; and, t h a t when he l e f t t h e home of t h e p r o s e c u t r i x t h a t morning, he had no suspicion whatever t h a t she would accuse him of rape. The p r o s e c u t r i x d i d n o t phone f o r h e l p upon t h e depar- t u r e of defendant b u t showered and went t o a g i r l f r i e n d ' s house, Diane Trankel, and from t h e r e , some t i m e later, t h e a u t h o r i t i e s were c a l l e d . The following i s s u e s a r e presented t o t h i s Court f o r review: 1. Is t h e evidence s u f f i c i e n t t o support t h e v e r d i c t ? 2. Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t err i n r e f u s i n g defendant's cautionary i n s t r u c t i o n t h a t "the c r i m e of sexual i n t e r c o u r s e without consent i s easy t o charge and d i f f i c u l t t o r e f u t e " ? 3 . Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r i n r e f u s i n g t o i n s t r u c t t h e jury on t h e s t a t u t o r y p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t i n t r o d u c t i o n of t h e v i c t i m ' s p r i o r sexual conduct? 4. Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t err i n r e f u s i n g t o i n s t r u c t t h e jury t h a t knowledge of t h e v i c t i m ' s lack of consent i s an element of t h e offense of sexual i n t e r c o u r s e without consent? 5. Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s improperly "give undue prominence" t o t h e S t a t e ' s case? 6. Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t err i n giving I n s t r u c t i o n Nos. 7 , 8, and 10 on t h e ground t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s w e r e i r r e l e - v a n t t o t h e i s s u e s and evidence presented? This case, l i k e s o many o t h e r s , is c l o s e . The very f a c t t h a t t h e "consent" o r t h e very c a s e i t s e l f i s h o t l y contested and r e s t s s o l e l y on the testimony of t h e p r o s e c u t r i x o r one person and remains uncorroborated p u t s a hard burden on t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n s o f a r a s a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t i s concerned, o r on t h i s Court on s u f f i c i e n c y of evidence. The l a w i s almost as c l o s e a s t h e f a c t s i n t h e s e matters. I n i t i a l l y , defendant a l l e g e s t h a t t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n denying defendant's motion f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t of acquit- t a l . H e contends t h a t various i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s make t h e p r o s e c u t r i x ' s version of t h e f a c t s i n h e r e n t l y improbable. The evidence was t h e r e f o r e i n s u f f i c i e n t t o convict. Defen- d a n t submits t h a t i n t h e t r i a l of c a s e s of a l l e g e d rape, t h e c o u r t should view evidence over and above t h e s u b s t a n t i a l evidence r u l e a p p l i c a b l e i n o t h e r cases t o determine whether o r n o t evidence of t h e a l l e g e d crime i s i n h e r e n t l y improbable. D e Armond v. S t a t e (0kla.Cr. 1955), 285 P.2d 236; S t a t e v. Shouse (1953), 57 N.M. 701, 262 P.2d 984; S t a t e v. Richardson (1944), 48 N.M. 544, 154 P.2d 224. Defendant a l s o c i t e s Montana cases which support t h e i n h e r e n t l y improbable test t o determine s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e evidence i n rape cases. S t a t e v. Moe (1923), 68 Mont. 552, 219 P. 803-; S t a t e v. McIlwain (1921), 60 Mont. 598, 201 P. 270. The S t a t e contends t h e r e is nothing i n h e r e n t l y improba- b l e about t h e scenario presented by t h e prosecutrix. I t a r - gues t h a t t h i s case f a l l s i n t o t h e class of cases t y p i f i e d by S t a t e v. Peterson (1936), 102 Mont. 495, 59 P.2d 61, and S t a t e v. Gaimos (1916), 53 Mont. 118, 162 P. 596, where t h e testimony of t h e prosecutrix, although impeached t o an e x t e n t , was i n t e r n a l l y c o n s i s t e n t and worthy of b e l i e f by a jury s o inclined. Section 46-16-403, MCA, provides: "When, a t t h e c l o s e of t h e s t a t e ' s evidence o r a t t h e c l o s e of a l l t h e evidence, t h e evidence i s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o support a f i n d i n g o r v e r d i c t of g u i l t y , t h e c o u r t may, on i t s own motion o r on t h e motion of t h e defendant, dismiss t h e ac- t i o n and discharge t h e defendant . . ." The general r u l e i n Montana appears t o be t h a t a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t of a c q u i t t a l i s appropriate i n criminal c a s e s "only where t h e S t a t e f a i l s t o prove i t s case and t h e r e i s no evidence upon which a jury could base i t s v e r d i c t . " S t a t e v. Yoss (1965), 146 Mont. 508, 409 P.2d 452, 455. "The d e c i s i o n whether t o dismiss the charge o r d i r e c t a v e r d i c t of a c q u i t t a l l i e s within t h e sound d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l c o u r t and w i l l be d i s t u r b e d on appeal only when abuse i s shown." S t a t e v. J u s t (1979), Mont. , 602 P.2d 957, - Defendant's second contention i s t h a t t h e r e f u s a l of t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o g i v e t h e cautionary i n s t r u c t i o n , " t h e charge of rape i s e a s i l y made and d i f f i c u l t t o r e f u t e , " e s p e c i a l l y where, a s here, t h e proof of lack of consent rests e n t i r e l y on t h e uncorroborated testimony of t h e p r o s e c u t r i x , i s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . This Court faced a s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n r e c e n t l y i n S t a t e v. J u s t , supra, wherein w e s t a t e d : " I n s t r u c t i o n s s i m i l a r t o t h e one above were of- f e r e d i n t h e e a r l i e r cases of S t a t e v. Keeler (1916), 52 Mont. 205, 211, 156 P. 1080, 1081, and S t a t e v. Mihalovich (1924), 69 Mont. 579, 585, 22 P. 695, 697. I n each of those cases, t h i s Court held t h a t t h e t r i a l judge's r e f u s a l t o give t h e i n s t r u c t i o n was proper when t h e r e was nothing i n -- t h e record t o suggest -- t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t r i x was motivated by p r i v a t e malice o r a d e s i r e f o r revenge . . . The test f o r deter- --- mining t h e p r o p r i e t y of giving an i n s t r u c t i o n such as t h a t o f f e r e d defendant w a s set f o r t h --- i n t h e r e c e n t c a s e of S t a t e v. Ballew (19751, -- -- 166 Mont. 270, 276, 532 P . 2 d 4 0 7 , 411: ' . . . it i s c l e a r t h a t r e f u s a l s t o g i v e such an in- s t r u c t i o n w i l l be e r r o r only when some s p e c i f i c cause i s shown f o r d i s t r u s t i n g t h e testimony of t h e complaining witness. Such causes might include manifest malice, d e s i r e - f o r revenge, or an absence of corroborating evidence tending t o - - - t h e f a r + ~ t ~ s ~ i f i e d t o bv t h e complain- support = - -- -- --- ------ _ = - - - & i n g witness.'" 602 P.2d a t 964. (Emphasis added.) ( C i t a t i o n s omitted.) A s pointed o u t above, t h e matter a t hand is troublesome. This should a l e r t a t r i a l judge t o proceed with extreme caution, because t h e search f o r t r u t h i s going t o be e l u s i v e and d i f f i c u l t , and fundamental f a i r n e s s i s n o t e a s i l y ob- t a i n e d under t h e s e kinds of circumstances. The reasons are c l e a r why a l l a v a i l a b l e means be used t o impress upon t h e jury t h a t uncorroborated testimony of one person t o decide a criminal cause i s n o t t h e usual s i t u a t i o n , even though acceptable by t h e l a w i n t h i s cause, and t h a t they should proceed f a i r l y b u t with a d d i t i o n a l caution i n t h i s kind of matter. H e r e t h e r e was undisputed d i r e c t evidence t h a t t h e r e had been more than casual t r o u b l e between t h e s e p a r t i e s i n t h e p a s t when defendant a l l e g e d l y s t r u c k t h e prosecutrix. The i n c i d e n t s , however, stemming from defendant's r e l a t i o n - s h i p with t h e p r o s e c u t r i x ' s sister, w e r e n o t based on drink o r sex, b u t on defendant's objection t o being c a l l e d a "son- of-a-bitch" by t h e p r o s e c u t r i x upon two of t h e occasions. Defendant t e s t i f i e d t h a t a f t e r t h e sex a c t was com- p l e t e d on t h e n i g h t of t h e a l l e g e d rape, t h e p r o s e c u t r i x suggested a "going o u t together r e l a t i o n s h i p , " a f t e r her boyfriend "Ed" returned t o college. Defendant s t a t e s he demurred, and again, without any apparent f e a r of being beaten, she t o l d him, " g e t t h e h e l l o u t of m y house you son- of-a-bitch." There i s no question t h a t t h e s e i n c i d e n t s , t r u e o r f a l s e , a r e properly i n t h e record, together with some o t h e r impeachment on p e r i p h e r a l matters. Further, t h e r e i s no question t h a t t h i s evidence e n t i t l e d defendant t o t h e cau- t i o n a r y i n s t r u c t i o n . The evidence c l e a r l y m e e t s t h e stan- dard of p r i v a t e malice, d e s i r e f o r revenge and absence of corroboration on t h e c r i t i c a l matters of consent, a l l as required by S t a t e v. Ballew (1975), 166 Mont. 270, 275-76, 532 P.2d 407, 410-11, and cases c i t e d t h e r e i n . F a i l u r e t o g i v e a cautionary i n s t r u c t i o n i n t h i s kind of matter, a s previously s t a t e d , i s more s e r i o u s than i n t h e ordinary criminal causes and r e q u i r e s r e v e r s a l . Therefore, the remainder of defendant's issues for review need not be considered. The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the cause for a new trial, / - Justice We concur: Mr. Chief Justice Frank I. Haswell, deeming himself dis- qualified, did not participate. M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d i s s e n t i n g : I d i s s e n t . I n m y opinion t h e majority here improperly s u b s t i t u t e s t h e i r opinion f o r t h a t of t h e jury. Admittedly, t h e f a c t s i t u a t i o n i s unusual b u t t h a t is what jurors a r e f o r and they, n o t t h i s Court, heard t h e testimony, saw t h e w i t - nesses and were i n a f a r b e t t e r p o s i t i o n t o weigh t h e evidence. A s t o t h e giving of t h e precautionary i n s t r u c t i o n , I f a i l t o f i n d the t r i a l c o u r t i n e r r o r when it follows t h e case l a w e s t a b l i s h e d i n t h i s S t a t e . A s r e c e n t l y a s l a s t year w e upheld t h e r e f u s a l t o give such an i n s t r u c t i o n i n S t a t e v. J u s t (1979), - Mont . , 602 P.2d 957, 36 St.Rep. 1649. See a l s o , S t a t e v. Ballew (1975), 166 Mont. 270, 532 P.2d 407. I f i n d no need t o search elsewhere f o r a u t h o r i t y t o overturn t h i s case when w e have, i n m y opinion, ample a u t h o r i t y t o s u s t a i n t h e lower c o u r t .