Title: RICHARD JAMES GARZA V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RICHARD JAMES GARZA V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 64231 P.3d 884Case Number: S-08-0279Decided: 05/19/2010
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
RICHARD 
JAMES GARZA,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender; Tina Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Kirk A. 
Morgan, Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Mr. Morgan. 

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Craig.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant Richard 
James Garza appeals from the Judgment and Sentence convicting him of two counts 
of second degree sexual assault and imposing a combined prison sentence of 
twenty-one to twenty-seven years.  
Garza contends the district court erred at trial in admitting certain 
evidence and in instructing the jury, relied on improper factors in sentencing 
him, and erred in denying his motion for a new trial.  We affirm.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Garza offers 
these issues for our consideration:

 
 
I.          
Did the [district] court abuse its discretion when it allowed into 
evidence telephone recordings when said recordings were not proper impeachment 
material, and were not otherwise relevant?

 
 
II.         
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant's 
motion for a new trial based on unsupported assumptions not in the 
record?

 
 
III.        Did 
the district court err when it used factors which were neither found by the 
jury, nor allowed to be addressed by Appellant against him at his 
sentencing?

 
 
IV.       Did the 
district court's instruction to the jury that corroboration of a victim's 
testimony is not necessary to obtain a conviction for sexual assault, confuse or 
mislead the jury or place improper emphasis on the victim's 
testimony?

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The underlying 
facts of Garza's crimes are not of any special significance to the issues raised 
in this appeal, and we will not recite them in detail.  It suffices to note that, on June 19, 
2007, MG notified the Cheyenne Police Department that her nine-year-old 
daughter, JM, had been sexually assaulted by Garza.  Subsequent interviews of JM indicated 
Garza had sexually abused her over a period of years  starting when she was 
about four or five years old  and that the abuse included vaginal and anal 
penetration, as well as oral sex.  A 
sexual assault examination conducted on June 19 revealed a notch, or healed 
tear, on JM's hymen and a tender, red area inside the labia.  

 
 
[¶4]      The State 
ultimately charged Garza with four counts of second degree sexual assault under 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-303(a)(v) (Lexis 2005), and one count of third degree 
sexual assault under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-304(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2005).1  In May 2008, a jury found Garza guilty 
on two counts of second degree sexual assault and acquitted him on the remaining 
charges.  Garza filed a motion for 
new trial in September 2008 on the ground that JM had recanted her allegations 
of sexual abuse.  After a hearing, 
the district court denied the motion.  
The district court later sentenced Garza to consecutive terms of 
imprisonment of eleven to fifteen years on one count and ten to twelve years on 
the other count.  Additional facts 
will be set forth as necessary in our discussion of Garza's appellate 
issues.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
Admission 
of Tape Recordings

 
 
[¶5]      At trial, Garza's 
girlfriend, KV, was called by the State in its case-in-chief to testify 
regarding her recollection of the events on June 17, 2007, the last day JM 
alleged Garza had assaulted her.  
Immediately before KV testified, the prosecutor, defense counsel, and the 
district court discussed the use of certain tape recorded conversations between 
Garza and KV which occurred while Garza was incarcerated in the Laramie County 
Detention Center awaiting trial in this case.  The prosecutor indicated she would use 
the recordings for impeachment, pursuant to W.R.E. 613 and 801(d), only if KV 
denied making certain statements.    

 
 
[¶6]      During KV's 
testimony, the prosecutor attempted to use the recordings, and defense counsel 
objected.  Defense counsel argued 
that the prosecutor was impermissibly using the recordings in an attempt to 
introduce statements made by Garza to KV as substantive evidence in the State's 
case rather than for the stated purpose of impeaching KV with her prior 
statements.  Defense counsel further 
maintained that Garza's statements to KV were inadmissible hearsay and 
irrelevant to the issues at trial.  
The district court ultimately determined that the tape recordings, which 
indicated an attempt by Garza to influence the testimony of prospective 
witnesses, were admissible under W.R.E. 801(d)(2)(A) as admissions of a party 
opponent.2  The district court specifically found 
Garza's statements to be relevant because they tended to show "indicia of 
guilt."  The district court also 
found that the recordings were relevant and admissible insofar as they could 
impeach KV's testimony.  

 
 
[¶7]      Garza asserts 
reversible error in the admission of the tape recordings.  He essentially argues, in a nonsensical 
and confusing manner, that the recordings were improper impeachment material and 
otherwise irrelevant, inadmissible evidence.  In reviewing the propriety of the 
district court's evidentiary ruling, we are guided by the following 
principles:

 
 
Evidentiary 
rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court and include 
determinations of the adequacy of foundation and relevancy, competency, 
materiality, and remoteness of the evidence.  This Court will generally accede to the 
trial court's determination of the admissibility of evidence unless that court 
clearly abused its discretion.  We 
have described the standard of an abuse of discretion as reaching the question 
of the reasonableness of the trial court's choice.  Judicial discretion is a composite of 
many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means 
exercising sound judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.  In the absence of an abuse of 
discretion, we will not disturb the trial court's determination.  The burden is on the defendant to 
establish such an abuse.

 
 

Brown 
v. State, 
2005 WY 37, ¶ 12, 109 P.3d 52, 56 (Wyo. 2005) (quotation marks and internal 
citations omitted); see also Farmer v. State, 2005 WY 162, ¶ 8, 124 P.3d 699, 703 (Wyo. 2005); Holloman v. 
State, 2005 WY 25, ¶ 10, 106 P.3d 879, 883 (Wyo. 
2005).

 
 
[¶8]      We need not 
address the impeachment value of the tape recordings because we agree with the 
district court's ruling that they were admissible as statements by a party 
opponent under W.R.E. 801(d)(2)(A).  
We also agree with the district court that the recordings were relevant 
because they showed indicia of guilt.  
See Mazurek v. State, 10 P.3d 531, 543 (Wyo. 2000); 2 McCormick on 
Evidence § 265 (6th ed. 2006).  "We have followed the principle that 
evidence of an attempt to fabricate evidence is particularly harmful to a 
defendant since it is an incriminating circumstance inconsistent with innocence 
and tends to show consciousness of guilt."  
Miller v. State, 830 P.2d 419, 
427 (Wyo. 1992).  Accordingly, we 
find no abuse of discretion in the district court's admission of the challenged 
evidence.

 
 

Motion 
for New Trial

 
 
[¶9]      Approximately 
four months after his trial, Garza filed a motion for a new trial based on newly 
discovered evidence.  The motion was 
premised on a letter purportedly written by JM in which she recanted her 
allegations of sexual abuse.  The 
letter stated in relevant part:3

 
 
                        
to whom it may concern:

 
 
                        
IN RE:  of Richard 
Garza

 
 
Please 
let my Dad get out  Really Bad I 
miss him Dearly and plus I know he wants to get to smell the Roses and so he can 
see his KIDS and also I want to say I'M SORRY he Did Not Rape 
Me.

 
 
Garza 
indicated in his motion that "JM is willing to testify to this letter at [a] 
hearing," and requested that the matter be set for hearing.  As requested, the district court held a 
hearing on Garza's motion on September 15, 2008.  At that hearing, Garza relied 
exclusively on the recantation letter and did not present any testimony or other 
evidence in support of his motion.  
The district court denied Garza's motion for new trial, 
stating:

 
 
I 
have reviewed the motion.  I have 
reviewed with great care the letter that is presumably signed by the 
victim.  I have reviewed the case of 
Brown v. State, [816 P.2d 818 (Wyo. 
1991),] and in that [case the] supreme court says "Recanted testimony is viewed 
with the upmost [sic] suspicion."

 
 
In 
reviewing the letter the format of it by itself arouses suspicion in my 
mind.  It starts out "To Whom It May 
Concern," colon.  I know of no 
ten-year-old little girl who would write a letter addressed "To Whom It May 
Concern."

 
 
It 
goes on to say "In regard Richard Garza," colon.  I know of no ten-year-old children who 
would wite [sic] a letter in that format.

 
 
I 
have great recollection of the victim sitting in this witness stand over here 
and testifying to what in my mind was absolute clarity of the details of these 
allegations and of these charges.

 
 
I 
also have recollection of, and I reviewed my trial notes in preparing for this 
hearing, the testimony of [JM's cousin], MG, and [KV]; [KV] being a defense 
witness essentially, and her testimony was incredible.  It was clear to me that Mr. Garza and 
[KV] conspired to arrange for inaccurate information to be presented to the jury 
in court.

 
 
* 
* * *

 
 
I 
have also reviewed my notes regarding the testimony of the SANE[4] nurse.  I recall the photographs which 
demonstrated to my satisfaction and apparently to the jury's satisfaction that 
there was recent sexual contact.  
Certainly the SANE nurse did not know who was responsible for that 
contact.

 
 
The 
testimony of [JM's cousin], the testimony of the SANE nurse corroborated in my 
mind the testimony of the victim, that coupled with my instinctive doubt of the 
veracity of the information contained in this handwritten letter leads me to 
believe that it is not appropriate to grant a motion for a new trial.  

 
 
[¶10]   On appeal, Garza takes issue with 
the district court's denial of his motion for a new trial.  Garza's contention of error questions a 
discretionary decision of the district court.  Morganflash v. State, 2003 WY 120, ¶ 11, 
76 P.3d 830, 835 (Wyo. 2003); Griswold v. 
State, 2001 WY 14, ¶ 7, 17 P.3d 728, 731 (Wyo. 2001) (the decision to grant 
or deny a motion for new trial is within the sound discretion of the trial 
court).  We will not disturb the 
district court's decision absent a finding of an abuse of discretion.  Id.  In determining whether an abuse of 
discretion occurred, our focus is on the reasonableness of the district court's 
choice in light of the facts and circumstances.  Id.; Baumgartner v. State, 7 P.3d 912, 915 
(Wyo. 2000).

 
 
[¶11]   We have said that a motion for a 
new trial based on newly discovered evidence is not favored and should be viewed 
with caution.  Griswold, ¶ 8, 17 P.3d  at 731.  With respect to a new trial motion based 
on recanted testimony, we have also said:

 

 
We 
see no reason for deviating from the basic rule for evaluating district court 
decisions on motions for new trial.  
Opie v. State, 422 P.2d [84] at 85 [(Wyo. 1967)].  However, we will enlarge on that general 
rule somewhat to provide additional guidance in cases, such as this, which 
involve recanted testimony.  To that 
purpose, we agree with the Supreme Court of Montana that granting a person of 
questionable credibility and motive carte blanche to overturn the determination 
of a jury operating within the bounds of our constitutional protections is not 
conducive to the sound administration of justice.  State v. Perry, 232 Mont. 455, 
758 P.2d 268, 275 (1988).  
Therefore, we adopt the following rule espoused by that court, as well as 
several others:

 
 
In 
light of the inherent suspicion surrounding recanted testimony and the public 
interest in swift and sure justice, we believe the better reasoned approach to 
be that adopted by the Supreme Court of 
Kansas:

 
 
"When 
a new trial is sought on the basis of recanting testimony of a prosecution 
witness, the weight to be given such testimony is for the trial judge passing on 
the motion for a new trial to determine.  
The trial judge is required to grant a new trial only when he [or she] is 
satisfied the recantation of the witness is true." . . .  Id. 758 P.2d  at 275; (quoting 
State v. Norman, 232 Kan. 102, 652 P.2d 683, 689 (1982)).  See also Thacker v. Commonwealth, 
453 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Ky. 1970).

 
 

Brown 
v. State, 
816 P.2d 818, 822 (Wyo. 1991)).  
Recanted testimony

 
 

should 
be viewed with the utmost suspicion, Sims v. State, Wyo. 1972, 495 P.2d 256, and when a motion for a new trial, based upon recantation, is denied by the 
trial court, this court will ordinarily be bound by that decision.  Espy v. State, 1939, 54 Wyo. 291, 
92 P.2d 549, 559.  In Flaim v. 
State, Wyo. 1971, 488 P.2d 153, this court quoted the following language 
which is most appropriate to this case:  
"There is no form of proof so unreliable as recanting testimony. * * * 
Those experienced in the administration of the criminal law know well its 
untrustworthy character.'"  488 P.2d  
at 155.

 
 

Jones 
v. State, 
568 P.2d 837, 854 (Wyo. 1977).

 
 

Davis 
v. State, 
2005 WY 93, ¶ 45, 117 P.3d 454, 471 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 
[¶12]   Considering the applicable standard 
of review in light of the record before us, we cannot conclude an abuse of 
discretion occurred in this instance.  
The district court judge had been involved with this case from its 
inception.  He presided over the 
trial and was well acquainted with the evidence presented, including the 
detailed testimony of the victim.  
Based on his familiarity with the case, the district court judge was in 
the best position to determine the credibility of the recanting evidence.  From our vantage point, and given the 
very specific reasons as to why he found the letter not to be credible, we are 
convinced the district court judge exercised sound discretion in denying Garza's 
motion for a new trial.

 
 
[¶13]   Garza, however, maintains the 
district court should have held an evidentiary hearing regarding the authentic 
nature of the newly discovered evidence before ruling on his motion instead of 
summarily disposing of the credibility of the letter.  We reject Garza's argument for two 
reasons.  First, it is devoid of any 
pertinent legal support.  Second, we 
find it to be nothing more than an attempt by Garza to shift the blame to the 
district court for his failure to establish an entitlement to a new trial.  As already noted, the district court 
afforded Garza an evidentiary hearing and an opportunity to establish the 
validity of the victim's alleged recantation.   For whatever reasons, Garza chose 
to simply rely on the recantation letter and did not present any evidence 
corroborating or attesting to its truthfulness.  In light of these facts, we decline to 
provide Garza any relief.

 
 

Sentencing

 
 
[¶14]   Sentencing decisions are within the 
broad discretion of the sentencing court.  
DeLoge v. State, 2002 WY 155, 
¶ 9, 55 P.3d 1233, 1237 (Wyo. 2002).  
We will not disturb a sentence because of sentencing procedures "absent a 
showing by the defendant of an abuse of discretion, procedural conduct 
prejudicial to him, and circumstances that manifest inherent unfairness and 
injustice, or conduct that offends the public sense of fair play."  Id., ¶ 9, 55 P.3d  at 1237-38.   An error warrants reversal only if it is 
prejudicial and affects an appellant's substantial rights.   Roeschlein v. State, 2007 WY 156, ¶ 17, 
168 P.3d 468, 473 (Wyo. 2007).  The 
burden of establishing that the error was prejudicial rests with the 
appellant.  Id.

 
 
[¶15]   Garza maintains the district court 
abused its discretion and violated his due process rights when it sentenced 
him.  According to Garza, the 
district court impermissibly imposed harsher sentences based on its belief that 
he was responsible, through coercion or other means, for the victim's 
recantation letter, a fact which was not found by the jury as required by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 
120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004), and which he did not have an opportunity to 
admit or deny.  At the center of 
Garza's complaint are the following comments of the district 
court:

 
 
What 
makes this case worse, I think, than the cases that [the prosecutor] talked 
about is you convinced other people that you didn't do this.  You may have convinced yourself that you 
didn't do this or more tragically you may have convinced the victim that you 
didn't do this.  That in my mind 
amounts to a third rape of that person.

 
 
I 
don't know you well enough to know what your psychiatric or psychological 
conditions are, but when you set out to convince other people that you didn't do 
these things, you raped her all over again.  You raped her again when you got her, or 
you had somebody you align with, got her to sign that letter.  You raped her again.  

 
 
[¶16]   Although we are concerned with the 
tenor of these statements, there is no indication the district court's 
sentiments influenced its sentencing decision.  Viewing the district court's remarks at 
sentencing as a whole, and in proper context, it is apparent the district 
court's sentencing decision was based on its consideration of Garza's criminal 
conduct, the facts and circumstances surrounding the criminal offenses, and the 
information that had been brought to its attention during the criminal 
proceedings, including the victim's testimony and the other evidence adduced at 
trial.  While Garza may not like his 
sentences, there is simply no basis from which to conclude the district court's 
suspicions concerning the recantation letter resulted in a harsher sentence than 
would have otherwise been imposed.

 
 
[¶17]   Further, we find no merit in 
Garza's contention that the tenets of Apprendi and Blakely were transgressed in this 
instance.  Those cases involved the 
determination of facts that resulted in an enhancement of a criminal penalty 
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum.  
Here, each act of second degree sexual assault for which Garza was 
convicted and sentenced carried a minimum sentence of five years and a maximum 
sentence of life imprisonment.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-306(c)(i) (LexisNexis 2005).  The eleven-to-fifteen-year and 
ten-to-twelve-year prison sentences imposed by the district court were well 
within the prescribed statutory range.  
Apprendi and Blakely simply do not apply to the 
circumstances of this case.

 
 
[¶18]   In sum, Garza has not demonstrated 
that prejudicial error occurred at sentencing or that the district court abused 
its discretion in sentencing him.  
We therefore affirm the sentences imposed by the district 
court.

 
 

Jury 
Instruction

 
 
[¶19]   Garza asserts the district court 
erred in instructing the jury.  When 
reviewing claims involving jury instructions, we apply the following the 
standard:

 
 
A 
trial court is given wide latitude in instructing the jury and, as long as the 
instructions correctly state the law and the entire charge covers the relevant 
issues, reversible error will not be found.  Instructions must be considered as a 
whole, and individual instructions, or parts of them, should not be singled out 
and considered in isolation.  
Prejudice will be determined to exist only where an appellant 
demonstrates that the instruction given confused or misled the jury with respect 
to the proper principles of law.

 
 

Luedtke 
v. State, 
2005 WY 98, ¶ 28, 117 P.3d 1227, 1232 (Wyo. 2005) (internal citations 
omitted).

 
 
[¶20]   Garza specifically condemns the 
district court's decision to give, over his objection, Instruction No. 17, which 
states:  "Corroboration of a 
victim's testimony is not necessary to obtain a conviction for sexual assault." 
Garza concedes the instruction constitutes a correct statement of law, as it 
mirrors the language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-311 (LexisNexis 2009).  His complaint is that the instruction 
placed improper emphasis on the victim's testimony and served only to confuse 
and mislead the jury as to its responsibility in assessing the evidence and his 
guilt or innocence on the charged offenses.

 
 
[¶21]   We agree with Garza that the giving 
of this instruction was improper.  
In Story v. State, 721 P.2d 1020, 1044-46 (1986), we disapproved of a similar instruction, reasoning that an 
instruction highlighting or denigrating a victim's testimony has the potential 
to mislead the jury.  We advised 
trial courts that such an instruction should not be given.  

 
 
[¶22]   However, we find that the giving of 
the instruction amounted to harmless error under the circumstances in this 
case.  First, the record reveals 
that the testimony of the victim was corroborated by other evidence.  Although JM was the only witness to 
testify about the actual incidents of assault, her testimony was corroborated to 
an extent by the testimony of the SANE nurse who performed the sexual assault 
examination.  The SANE nurse 
testified that she observed, among other things, a notch, or healed tear, on 
JM's hymen and a "very tender red area that was on the inside part of the 
labia," which she opined was caused by "blunt force trauma."  In addition, JM's cousin testified about 
his conversations with JM and JM's demeanor shortly after the last alleged 
assault.  Since there was some 
corroboration of the victim's testimony, the challenged instruction, in essence, 
pertained to a moot point.

 
 
[¶23]   Further, the district court 
expressly instructed the jury that it must reach a verdict on the charged crimes 
beyond a reasonable doubt after examining all the evidence produced at 
trial.  The district court also 
instructed the jurors:  (1) they 
were the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and of what weight is 
to be given to the witnesses' testimony; (2) they should consider the testimony 
of any witness in light of all the evidence and any other factors bearing on 
believability and weight; and (3) they were to consider the instructions as a 
whole and should not place undue emphasis on any particular instruction or part 
thereof.  Viewing the district 
court's instructions as a whole, and presuming as we must that the jury followed 
the instructions, see Conine v. State, 2008 WY 146, ¶ 19, 197 P.3d 156, 163 (Wyo. 2008), we do not believe the jury was confused or misled by 
Instruction 17 as to its duty with respect to the trial evidence and its 
assessment of Garza's criminal culpability.  This is readily apparent by the fact the 
jury acquitted Garza on three of the five charged crimes.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶24]   Garza has not convinced this Court 
that reversible error occurred with respect to any of the issues raised in this 
appeal.  We therefore affirm in all 
respects the Judgment and Sentence of the district court.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1At the time of the offenses, the statutes 
provided:

 
 
§ 6-2-303.  Sexual assault in 
the second degree.

 
 
(a)  Any actor who inflicts 
sexual intrusion on a victim commits sexual assault in the second degree if, 
under circumstances not constituting sexual assault in the first 
degree:

 
 
            
* * * *

(v)  At the time of the 
commission of the act the victim is less than twelve (12) years of age and the 
actor is at least four (4) years older than the 
victim[.]

 
 
 
 
§ 6-2-304. Sexual assault in the third 
degree.

 
 
(a)  An actor commits sexual 
assault in the third degree if, under circumstances not constituting sexual 
assault in the first or second degree:

 
 
* * * *

(ii)  The actor is an adult 
and subjects a victim under the age of fourteen (14) years to sexual contact 
without inflicting sexual intrusion on the victim and without causing serious 
bodily injury to the victim[.]

 
 
The statutes were repealed on July 1, 2007, by 2007 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 
159, § 3.  Similar provisions are 
now contained in § 6-2-314 (LexisNexis 2009) and § 6-2-315 (LexisNexis 2009), 
respectively.

 
 

2W.R.E. 801(d)(2)(A), "Admission by Party-Opponent," provides that a 
statement is not hearsay if the statement is offered against a party and is his 
own statement.

 
 

3We have chosen to recite the letter as written without making any 
grammatical, punctuation, or other corrections.

 
 

4"SANE" is an acronym for "sexual assault nurse 
examiner."