Title: State v. Corey Richard Munoz Appeal from denial of motion to suppress; possession of marijuana

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (criminal)

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 36542-2009 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
COREY RICHARD MUNOZ, 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
Boise, February 2010 Term 
 
2010 Opinion No.  22 
 
Filed: March 16, 2010 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for Ada County.  The Hon. Michael E. Wetherell, District Judge. 
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
 
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP, Boise, for appellant.  Robyn A. Fyffe 
argued. 
 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.  John C. McKinney 
argued. 
 
 
 
EISMANN, Chief Justice. 
 
This is an appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress.  The central issue is whether 
the district court erred in believing the officer‟s testimony during the suppression hearing, where 
that testimony was irreconcilable with the same officer‟s testimony during the preliminary 
hearing.  We hold that the credibility of witnesses is for the trial court to determine and uphold 
the judgment of the district court. 
 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
On July 5, 2005, Detective Jason Pietrzak of the Garden City Police Department and 
another detective drove in an unmarked car to a trailer park reputed to be the residence of an 
individual named Marsh, who was wanted on an outstanding felony warrant.  They had a jail 
booking photograph and a physical description to identify Marsh.  They drove through the trailer 
 
2 
park and ran some of the license plates on vehicles they saw.  They also stopped and talked with 
a gentleman near the front entrance who appeared to be a caretaker.  As they were leaving, a 
green Geo automobile went past them into the trailer park.  They saw two people in the Geo, and 
the front-seat passenger looked like Marsh.  The detectives parked on the side of the road and 
waited. 
 
The Geo then drove out of the trailer park, and the detectives could see three people in it.  
The person who looked like Marsh was now sitting in the back seat, and the person who had 
driven the Geo into the trailer park was sitting in the front passenger seat.  A female was driving 
the Geo.  The detectives followed the Geo and radioed for officers in a marked patrol car to stop 
it.  At least two marked patrol cars responded and stopped the Geo about one and one-half miles 
from the entrance to the trailer park.1 
 
The patrol officers who stopped the Geo drew their weapons and ordered the occupants to 
get out of the car and walk back to where the officers were.  Three people got out of the Geo, and 
they were handcuffed, patted down for weapons, and separated.  The officers discovered that the 
person believed to be Marsh was actually Pfisterer.  He had an outstanding misdemeanor warrant 
and was arrested.  The two other occupants in the car were then unhandcuffed. 
 
Detective Pietrzak discovered a small amount of marijuana on the floorboard of the front 
passenger seat, where Corey Munoz had been sitting when the officers stopped the Geo.  He 
described it as a “chunk” of dried, compacted marijuana leaf about the size of a nine-volt battery.  
He asked Munoz if that marijuana was his, and Munoz answered that it was.  Detective Pietrzak 
asked Munoz if he had any more, and Munoz stated that he did and pulled a sandwich bag full of 
marijuana out of his pants pocket.  Detective Pietrzak then arrested Munoz for possession of that 
marijuana.  One of the central issues on this appeal is Detective Pietrzak‟s conflicting testimony 
regarding his discovery of the marijuana on the floorboard. 
 
On August 9, 2005, Munoz was charged with felony possession of more than three 
ounces of marijuana.  During the preliminary hearing held on November 25, 2005, Detective 
Pietrzak was asked why they searched the Geo.  He answered, “Well, once we placed Mr. 
Pfisterer under arrest, we searched incident to that arrest.”  He testified, “As far as the 
chronological order of it, . . .  I know that we went up and glanced, made sure there was no one 
                                                 
1 At some point, a third patrol car arrived at the scene of the stop. 
 
3 
in the car, nothing hazardous while we conducted our business 30 feet away or a car‟s length 
away from it.  After Mr. Pfisterer was arrested on the warrant, the vehicle was searched incident 
to his arrest.”  Detective Pietrzak was then asked whether “the only reason you go back to the 
vehicle to conduct a search is your belief it is a search incident to arrest of Mr. Pfisterer,” and he 
answered, “Absolutely.”  He added that “the actual physical search of the car, when I found the 
marijuana?  Yes that‟s incident to Mr. Pfisterer‟s arrest.”  (Emphasis added.)  When asked 
whether he looked through the window or opened the door of the Geo, Detective Pietrzak 
testified:  “I opened the door and began searching.  I looked above the visor, looked on the 
dashboard.  At some point, I looked on the passenger floor board and then found the marijuana.”  
(Emphasis added.) 
 
After Munoz was bound over to answer to that charge in the district court, he filed a 
motion to suppress, which was heard on August 28, 2006.  During that hearing, Detective 
Pietrzak gave a different version of how he discovered the marijuana on the floorboard of the 
Geo.  He testified that after the occupants were out of the Geo and before Pfisterer was arrested 
on the misdemeanor warrant, he walked up to the vehicle to make sure nobody else was in it.  
When asked if he noticed anything of evidentiary value, he stated that he did.  When asked what 
he noticed, he answered, “[T]here was a large piece of green dried marijuana that was on the 
front passenger side floorboard.”  When asked if it was in plain view, he answered, “Oh, 
absolutely.  It was in the middle of the floorboard.”  In response to further questioning, he 
testified that he did not have to open the car door to see the marijuana because the passenger 
door was open and he could see the marijuana from where he was standing on the street.2 
                                                 
2 Detective Pietrzak‟s testimony was as follows: 
 
Q.  Okay.  At that point in time then what did you do? 
 
A.  Well, prior to actually speaking to Mr. Pfisterer about that and spending time on radio 
traffic we needed to ensure there was only three people in the vehicle.  I walked up and made sure 
of that visually. 
 
Q.  Okay.  So in the time between talking to Mr. Pfisterer – well, excuse me, the time that 
the occupants were pulled out of the vehicle and the time that Mr. Pfisterer was arrested on the 
warrant, you went back to the vehicle just to make sure everybody was out of the vehicle? 
 
A.  Correct. 
 
Q.  Did you notice anything inside the vehicle of evidentiary value at that time? 
 
A.  Yes, I did. 
 
Q.  What did you notice? 
 
A.  Yes, there was a large piece of green dried marijuana that was on the front passenger 
side floorboard. 
 
Q.  Was it in plain view at that time? 
 
A.  Oh, absolutely.  It was in the middle of the floorboard. 
 
4 
 
In his motion to suppress, Munoz challenged:  (1) the stop of the Geo; (2) the search of 
the Geo “upon the questionable pretext of a „search incident to that arrest‟ [of Pfisterer]”; (3) 
questioning Munoz without giving him Miranda warnings; and (4) searching Munoz without 
probable cause (Munoz testified that Pietrzak walked over to him, patted him down, and 
removed the marijuana out of Munoz‟s pocket).  He sought to suppress “all items of evidence 
and all statements made.”  On September 5, 2006, the district court issued its decision and order 
denying Munoz‟s motion to suppress in its entirety. 
 
Munoz ultimately pled guilty to the charge, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his 
motion to suppress.  He was sentenced to a suspended prison term and probation, and then timely 
appealed. 
 
The appeal was first heard by the Idaho Court of Appeals.  It held that a witness who 
testifies under oath to two irreconcilable descriptions of an event and does not give any 
explanation for the inconsistency cannot, as a matter of law, be credible.  Therefore, all of 
Detective Pietrzak‟s testimony had to be, in essence, stricken.  Without that testimony, the State 
failed to prove that the marijuana in the Geo was lawfully obtained.  It had to be suppressed as 
did all other evidence as fruit of the presumptively unlawful vehicle search, including Munoz‟s 
statements and the marijuana from his pocket.  The Court of Appeals then reversed the order 
denying Munoz‟s motion to suppress.  The State filed a petition for review, which we granted.  
In cases that come to this Court on a petition for review of an opinion of the Court of Appeals, 
we directly review the decision of the lower court.  State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 819, 821, 172 P.3d 
1094, 1096 (2007). 
 
II.  ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1.  Did the district court err in holding that the stop of the Geo did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment? 
2.  Was there substantial and competent evidence supporting the district court‟s findings of fact 
regarding the search of the Geo? 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
Q.  Now, did you have to open the windows or the cars or anything to view that? 
 
A.  No, the door – on the passenger‟s side the door was open and on the driver‟s side the 
door was closed. 
 
Q.  So you could view that standing from the street where you were? 
 
A.  Yes. 
 
5 
3.  Did the district court err in holding that Miranda warnings were not required because 
Munoz‟s freedom of action was not curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest? 
4.  Did the district court err in holding that Munoz‟s act of pulling the marijuana out of his 
pocket was voluntary?  
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Did the District Court Err in Holding that the Stop of the Geo Did Not Violate the 
Fourth Amendment? 
 
Munoz was seized when the police stopped the Geo in which he was a passenger.  
Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 263 (2007). 
“When a defendant moves to exclude 
evidence on the grounds that it was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the 
government carries the burden of proving that the search or seizure in question was reasonable.”  
State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009). 
 
“An investigatory stop must be justified by some objective manifestation that the person 
stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity,” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 
417 (1981), or “is wanted for past criminal conduct,” id. at n.2.  In this case, the officers stopped 
the Geo to investigate their suspicion that a passenger was Marsh, for whom there was a felony 
arrest warrant.  That suspicion turned out to be incorrect.  The fact that the investigation showed 
that the officers were incorrect does not invalidate the stop.  An investigatory stop “does not deal 
with hard certainties, but with probabilities.”  Id. at 418.  Its purpose is to obtain information to 
determine whether a crime has been, is being, or is about to be, committed or whether the person 
is wanted for past criminal activity.  A reasonable-suspicion determination “need not rise to the 
level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of 
the evidence standard.”  United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002).  The determination 
“is grounded in the standard of reasonableness embodied in the Fourth Amendment.”  United 
States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228 (1985). 
 
The district court found that “the police acted reasonably in stopping the defendant‟s 
vehicle and ordering the occupants out.  The defendant had an individual in the back seat of his 
vehicle that looked to the police like a man wanted by them for felony probation violation and 
felony eluding.”  Munoz argues that the district court erred in holding that Detective Pietrzak had 
 
6 
a reasonable articulable suspicion in believing that the passenger in the Geo (Pfisterer) was 
Marsh.  He contends that Detective Pietrzak “momentarily observed Chris [Pfisterer] in the front 
passenger seat of the Geo as the two vehicles passed one another” and that “[d]uring this fleeting 
observation, the detective testified that he noted a „protruding ear . . . configuration,‟ that Mr. 
Marsh and Chris purportedly shared, both had brown hair and that height and weight were not 
„wildly outside‟ the information available to the detectives.”  According to Munoz, “These facts 
were insufficient to create a reasonable belief that [Pfisterer] was Mr. Marsh and to justify 
conducting the high risk traffic stop.” 
 
“[D]eterminations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de 
novo on appeal.”  Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996).  However, in conducting 
that review the appellate court “should take care both to review findings of historical fact only 
for clear error and to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and 
local law enforcement officers.”  Id.  The review must be based upon the totality of the 
circumstances, not upon an individual examination of each observation by the officer taken in 
isolation.  United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002). 
 
Detective Pietrzak and the other detective each had a photograph of Marsh and a physical 
description of him.  They had information that Marsh resided in the trailer park.  As they were 
leaving the trailer park, they saw the Geo drive past.  Both occupants of the Geo looked at the 
detectives as the Geo passed within five feet of the detectives‟ vehicle.  The detectives were in an 
SUV and were able to look down at the occupants and clearly see into the Geo.  Detective 
Pietrzak got a good look at the person he believed to be Marsh.   Detective Pietrzak testified that 
the individual they saw in the front seat “was very similar” to Marsh‟s photograph and he 
“looked to be the identical person we were looking for.”  He also stated that “the individual we 
were looking for had very large ears, and white male, smallerish,” and that Pfisterer matched the 
physical description of Marsh.  Considering the totality of the circumstances, the district court 
did not err in finding that the detectives reasonably believed that Pfisterer was Marsh. 
 
 
B.  Was There Substantial and Competent Evidence Supporting the District Court’s 
Findings of Fact Regarding the Search of the Geo? 
 
During the suppression hearing, Detective Pietrzak testified that before Pfisterer‟s arrest 
he walked up to the Geo to make sure nobody else was in it and that while standing on the street 
 
7 
and looking through the open passenger door3 he saw the marijuana on the floorboard.  The 
district court based its findings upon this testimony.  It found as follows: 
 
After the stop, Detective Pietrzak went up to the vehicle to make sure 
every one [sic] was out of it.  This action was also reasonable since it would make 
no sense for the police to order all occupants out of a vehicle during a traffic stop, 
for officer safety reasons, without allowing them the ability to look in the vehicle 
to make sure everyone was actually out.  Pietrzak then sees the marijuana on the 
floorboard in plain view, beneath where the defendant had been sitting.  He then, 
informally and briefly, asked the defendant, who was not handcuffed and not 
under arrest, about the marijuana in the car and the defendant told him that it was 
his and when asked if there was any more he handed Pietrzak the baggy of 
marijuana out of his clothes.  (Citation and footnote omitted.) 
 
 
Detective Pietrzak‟s testimony at the suppression hearing conflicted with his earlier 
testimony at the preliminary hearing.  There he testified that he “found” the marijuana while he 
was searching the Geo after Pfisterer‟s arrest.  Munoz contends:  “It is not possible to reconcile 
Detective Pietrzak‟s varying versions of events.  Therefore, his testimony cannot constitute 
substantial, competent evidence to support the district court‟s finding that the marijuana was in 
plain view and was insufficient to overcome the state‟s burden of showing that the warrantless 
search was reasonable.” 
 
“When we review an order granting or denying a motion to suppress, we accept the trial 
court‟s factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous.”  State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 84, 90 
P.3d 306, 309 (2004).  “Findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if they are supported by 
substantial and competent evidence.  Decisions regarding the credibility of witnesses, weight to 
be given to conflicting evidence, and factual inferences to be drawn are also within the discretion 
of the trial court.”  State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810, 203 P.3d 1203, 1209 (2009). 
 
During the suppression hearing, Detective Pietrzak was not questioned about his 
preliminary hearing testimony, nor was he asked to explain his conflicting testimony.  However, 
the district court was aware of the Detective‟s preliminary hearing testimony.  “The trial judge is 
in a far better position than we to weigh the demeanor, credibility and testimony of witnesses and 
the persuasiveness of all the evidence.  Therefore, we do not weigh the evidence.”  Hudelson v. 
                                                 
3 Detective Pietrzak testified that he did not open the passenger door, and there is no contention that any officer did.  
The inference is that it was left open by Munoz when he got out of the vehicle. 
 
 
8 
Delta Intl. Mach. Corp., 142 Idaho 244, 248, 127 P.3d 147, 151 (2005).  The district court‟s 
findings are supported by substantial, competent evidence.4 
 
“There is no legitimate expectation of privacy shielding that portion of the interior of an 
automobile which may be viewed from outside the vehicle by either inquisitive passersby or 
diligent police officers.”  Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 740 (1983) (plurality opinion).  Viewing 
the interior of a motor vehicle while standing outside of it is not a search within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment.  Id.  Once the officers had probable cause to believe that the item on the 
floorboard of the Geo was marijuana, they could enter the Geo to seize it.  Colorado v. 
Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 4 (1980).  Therefore, the district court did not err in upholding the search 
of the Geo. 
 
C.  Did the District Court Err in Holding that Miranda Warnings Were Not Required 
Because Munoz’s Freedom of Action Was Not Curtailed to a Degree Associated with 
Formal Arrest? 
 
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court held that the prosecution 
could not use exculpatory or inculpatory statements stemming from custodial interrogation of a 
defendant unless the questioning was preceded by what later became known as Miranda 
warnings.  The Court required, “Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has 
a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, 
and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.”  Id. at 444.  
Persons temporarily detained pursuant to ordinary traffic stops are not “in custody” for the 
purposes of Miranda.  Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984).  Even though the person 
                                                 
4 Under the law in effect at the time, the search of the Geo would have complied with the Fourth Amendment under 
either of Detective Pietrzak‟s versions of what occurred.  In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (footnote 
omitted), the United States Supreme Court had held that “when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of 
the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger 
compartment of that automobile.”  Under Belton, the Geo could have been searched incident to Pfisterer‟s arrest.  
After the suppression hearing in this case, the Supreme Court of the United States issued its opinion in Arizona v. 
Gant, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009), in which it narrowed Belton and held, “Police may search a vehicle 
incident to a recent occupant‟s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at 
the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.”  Because 
Pfisterer was apparently handcuffed and in the back of a patrol car when the Geo was searched and there is no 
indication that the Geo contained evidence related to his arrest, the search could not have been authorized as incident 
to his arrest.  Id.  Since Gant was issued over two and one-half years after the suppression hearing in this case, 
Detective Pietrzak obviously did not change his testimony to conform to that opinion. 
 
 
9 
is not formally arrested, “the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a 
suspect‟s freedom of action is curtailed to a „degree associated with formal arrest.‟”  Id. 
 
The district court found that Detective Pietrzak “informally and briefly, asked the 
defendant, who was not handcuffed and not under arrest, about the marijuana in the car and the 
defendant told him that it was his.”  The court also cited cases holding that Miranda 
requirements do not apply to noncustodial interrogations or where a person‟s freedom of action 
has not been curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest.  Thus, it is clear that the district 
court found that Munoz was not in custody for the purposes of Miranda when Detective Pietrzak 
questioned him about the marijuana on the floorboard of the Geo.  Munoz contends that this 
conclusion is contrary to the evidence. 
 
It is undisputed that when the officers stopped the Geo, they ordered the occupants out of 
the vehicle at gunpoint, patted them down for weapons, handcuffed them, and separated them 
while they investigated the identity of the person they believed was Marsh.  Once the officers 
determined it was not Marsh, but was Pfisterer, they arrested him on the misdemeanor warrant 
and put him in the back seat of a patrol car.  At that time, the felony stop was over.  Munoz and 
the female driver were unhandcuffed.  Munoz knew that they had been stopped because the 
officers thought that Pfisterer was Marsh.  The female occupant was allowed to retrieve 
something out of the Geo and was walking around, and Munoz testified that he was standing 
thirty to fifty feet from the Geo.   Less than ten minutes after Pfisterer‟s arrest, Detective Pietrzak 
and the other detective walked up to where Munoz was standing to ask him about the marijuana 
on the floorboard of the car.  By then, none of the officers had their weapons drawn, and the 
record does not indicate that there were any other officers near Munoz.  Detective Pietrzak 
testified regarding his questioning of Munoz as follows: 
 
Q.  Could you describe for the Court the nature of this conversation that 
you had with Mr. Munoz? 
 
A.  It was pretty light.  With the amount of marijuana that was on the 
floorboard, we just wanted to talk to him.  Just give him a ticket for it and be done 
with it. 
 
Q.  When you say it was “light,” why do you say that? 
 
A. You know, I was pretty open with him.  I asked him, hey, you know, 
was that yours on the floorboard.  He said that it was.  He identified it as 
marijuana and that he took ownership of it and I asked him if he had any more. 
 
 
 
10 
 
Just as a detention that is not custodial for the purposes of Miranda can become custodial 
if the person detained “thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him „in custody‟ for 
practical purposes,” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984), what may begin as a 
custodial detention can become noncustodial.  “[T]he only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable 
man in the suspect‟s position would have understood his situation.”  Id. at 442.  Munoz had the 
burden of proving that at the time he was questioned, he was in custody for the purposes of 
Miranda.  Id. at 441; State v. James, ___ P.3d ___, 2010 WL 292695 (Idaho Jan. 27, 2010).  The 
district court did not err in holding that at the time of the questioning, Munoz was not in custody 
for the purposes of Miranda. 
 
D.  Did the District Court Err in Holding that Munoz’s Act of Pulling the Marijuana Out of 
His Pocket Was Voluntary? 
 
The district court found that after Munoz admitted that the marijuana on the floorboard of 
the Geo was his, Detective Pietrzak “asked if there was any more [and] he handed Pietrzak the 
baggy of marijuana out of his clothes.  This police action was also reasonable and the defendant 
chose to voluntarily answer the detective‟s questions and produce the marijuana.”  On appeal, 
Munoz contends that his “consent to the search of his pocket, by producing the baggie of 
marijuana at the detective‟s request, was not the product of free will.” 
 
There was no search of Munoz‟s pocket.  After Munoz admitted that the marijuana on the 
floorboard was his, Detective Pietrzak asked if he had any more.  Munoz responded by 
voluntarily reaching into his pocket and pulling out the baggie of marijuana.  The Detective did 
not search Munoz, nor did he ask Munoz to empty his pockets or to produce the marijuana.  
Munoz‟s actions of reaching into his pocket and pulling out the marijuana were not in 
submission to an express or implied assertion of authority.  It was simply a voluntary response to 
the question of whether he had any more marijuana.5  The district court did not err in refusing to 
suppress that marijuana. 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Munoz does not argue that producing the marijuana was a testimonial communication.  Even if it were, he was not 
in custody for the purposes of Miranda, and therefore it could not be suppressed on that ground. 
 
11 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
 
 
 
Justices BURDICK, J. JONES, W. JONES and HORTON CONCUR.