Title: State v. Johnson

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED:  August 4, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
MARTIN ALLEN JOHNSON,
Respondent on Review.
(CC CR9800590; CA A116313; SC S51591)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted January 7, 2005.
Janet A. Klapstein, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review. 
With her on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General, and Paul L. Smith, Assistant
Attorney General.
Susan F. Drake, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the
cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.  With her on
the brief were Peter A. Ozanne, Executive Director, and Peter
Gartlan, Chief Defender, Office of Public Defense Services.
GILLETTE, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed. 
*Appeal from Clackamas County Circuit Court,
Raymond R. Bagley, Jr., Judge. 193 Or App 250, 90 P3d 4, adh'd to on recons, 194 Or App    
28, 92 P3d 766 (2004). 
GILLETTE, J.
This criminal case, arising out of defendant's
conviction for third-degree rape, raises various issues relating
to the proper interpretation and application of Oregon's
statutory provisions respecting speedy trials, ORS 135.745 to
135.750.  Pursuant to those statutes, and based on facts of this
case, defendant moved to dismiss the charge in question.  The
trial court denied defendant's motion.  Defendant then pleaded
guilty, but reserved his speedy trial challenge.  See ORS
135.335(3) (authorizing such a procedure).  On defendant's
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the state had
failed to bring defendant to trial within a "reasonable period of
time," as one of the speedy trial statutes, ORS 135.747,
requires.  State v. Johnson, 193 Or App 250, 90 P3d 4, adh'd to
on recons, 194 Or App 28, 92 P3d 766 (2004).  On review, the
state argues that the Court of Appeals erroneously interpreted
and applied the speedy trial statutes.  The state also argues
that the Court of Appeals employed an erroneous standard of
review.  We conclude that the state's arguments about the meaning
and application of the statutes are not well taken and,
accordingly, affirm.
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The relevant facts are as follows.  In early 1998,
defendant became aware of the fact that he was the target of a
Washington County homicide investigation.  He fled the state. 
Shortly thereafter, the police obtained evidence that defendant
may have committed other crimes in a different venue, Clackamas
County, in 1997.  On the basis of that evidence, a Clackamas
County grand jury indicted defendant on April 9, 1998, charging
him with one count of third-degree rape and two counts of third-
degree sexual abuse.  Based on the Clackamas County indictment, a warrant for defendant's arrest issued four days later.  In the
meantime, the Washington County homicide investigation had
continued, ultimately leading to an indictment against defendant
in that county on a charge of aggravated murder.
Defendant eventually was apprehended in Florida.  On
March 4, 1999, the authorities returned defendant to Oregon to
face trial on the Washington County aggravated murder charge. 
Clackamas County put a "hold" on defendant with respect to the
rape and sexual abuse charges around that same time, (1) but it did not serve defendant with the April 1998 arrest warrant or
otherwise attempt to move the Clackamas County case forward.
According to defendant, he did not learn of the
Clackamas County "hold" or the charges connected with it until
November 2000 -- 20 months after his return to Oregon. (2)  At
that time, he still was in jail in Washington County awaiting
trial on the aggravated murder charge.  On November 24, 2000,
defendant filed a "Notice of Request for Early Trial" in
Clackamas County Circuit Court.  Clackamas County responded to
that notice by serving defendant with an arrest warrant on
December 20, 2000,  arraigning him in circuit court on December
21, 2000, and setting the case for trial on February 9, 2001.
Defendant subsequently requested and obtained several
postponements of the Clackamas County trial.  He also filed a
number of motions relating to his stated desire to represent
himself.  However, when the trial court inquired about
defendant's willingness to waive his speedy trial rights for
purposes of those requests and motions, defendant indicated,
albeit somewhat inarticulately, that he did not wish to waive his rights with respect to the 21-month period between his return to Oregon and his arraignment in Clackamas County. (3) 
Eventually, defendant moved to dismiss the Clackamas County
charges on both constitutional and statutory speedy trial
grounds.  The trial court denied the motion, finding that "the
delay in service of the arrest warrant [was] attributable to the
defendant's absence from the state" and that there were no
significant delays after defendant demanded a speedy trial other
than delays that occurred at defendant's request.  The trial
court did not specifically address and assess the 21-month delay
between defendant's return to Oregon and his arraignment.  As
noted, defendant thereafter pleaded guilty to the rape charge
pursuant to a plea agreement that resulted in dismissal of the
two sexual abuse charges and reserved defendant's right to
challenge the trial court's speedy trial ruling on appeal.
On appeal, defendant challenged the denial of his
speedy trial motion on statutory grounds only.  In the course of
that appeal, defendant acknowledged that the court could not hold the state responsible for the period before the authorities
arrested him in Florida and returned him to Oregon.  He argued,
however, that the state was responsible for the period after he
was returned to Oregon and during which Clackamas County failed
to move the case forward.  Defendant further argued that that 21-month delay was unreasonable and constituted grounds for
dismissal under ORS 135.747, which mandates dismissal of an
accusatory instrument when the state fails to bring a defendant
to trial within a "reasonable period of time."  The Court of
Appeals agreed with defendant that the 21-month prearraignment
delay was unreasonable and that, consequently, ORS 135.747
required the charges to be dismissed.  It therefore reversed the
trial court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss and
remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to dismiss the charges against defendant without prejudice.  Johnson, 193 Or
App at 257.  We allowed the state's petition for review.
II.  DISCUSSION
Before turning to the state's arguments, we set out the
statutory speedy trial provisions in their entirety.  The first
of those statutes is ORS 135.745, which is implicated only
indirectly in the present case.  That statute provides:   
"When a person has been held to answer for a
crime, if an indictment is not found against the person
within 30 days or the district attorney does not file
an information in circuit court within 30 days after
the person is held to answer, the court shall order the
prosecution to be dismissed, unless good cause to the
contrary is shown."
ORS 135.747, the statute that defendant cited in his motion to dismiss, provides:
"If a defendant charged with a crime, whose trial
has not been postponed upon the application of the
defendant or by the consent of the defendant, is not
brought to trial within a reasonable period of time,
the court shall order the accusatory instrument to be
dismissed."
ORS 135.750 then provides:
"If the defendant is not proceeded against or
tried, as provided in ORS 135.745 and 135.747, and
sufficient reason therefor is shown, the court may
order the action to be continued and in the meantime
may release the defendant from custody as provided in
ORS 135.230 to 135.290, for the appearance of the
defendant to answer the charge or action." 
Finally, ORS 135.753(2) provides that an order of dismissal
pursuant to ORS 135.745 or ORS 135.747 
"is a bar to another prosecution for the same crime if
the crime is a Class B or C misdemeanor; but it is not
a bar if the crime charged is a Class A misdemeanor or
a felony." (4)
Before this court, the state contends that the Court of
Appeals decision to reverse the trial court's denial of
defendant's motion to dismiss on statutory speedy trial grounds
arose out of an erroneous interpretation and application of ORS
135.747.  We address each of the state's arguments below.
A.  Standard of Review
The state argues, first, that the Court of Appeals
applied an erroneous standard of review under ORS 135.747 by
treating the trial court's decision not to dismiss the case
against defendant as a question of law when, by statute, that
decision is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. 
The state argues, in that regard, that ORS 135.747 must be read
in tandem with ORS 135.750.  The state then points to the
discretionary wording of ORS 135.750 -- "the court may order the
action to be continued" -- as evidence that the legislature
intended to "grant a wide range of discretion as to a trial
court's determination of both reasonableness and remedy for
delay." 
The state's argument presents an issue of statutory
construction, to be considered under the paradigm set out in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 859 P2d 1143 (1993).  That paradigm requires us to look first at the text and context of the statute and to proceed to other interpretive sources only if the statute under examination remains ambiguous. Id. at 611.  We turn, first, to the relevant text.
It is undebatable that ORS 135.747 and ORS 135.750 must
be read together.  The latter statute expressly refers to the
former and appears on its face to confer some authority on the
trial court to continue an action in spite of the requirement in
ORS 135.747 that the court dismiss a charge when the state fails
to bring the defendant to trial within a reasonable time.  As
noted, the state emphasizes the fact that ORS 135.750 contains
wording that connotes discretion -- "may order the action to be continued" (emphasis added) -- and argues that that discretion extends to the "reasonableness" inquiry in ORS 135.747, as well as to the remedy for delay.  
A close reading of the wording of ORS 135.750, however,
does not bear out the state's claim that it embodies a broad
grant of discretion.  For example, the text of that statute
reveals that, for ORS 135.750 to apply, it first must be true
that a defendant has not been tried "as provided in * * * ORS
135.747[.]"  In other words, for ORS 135.750 to apply, it first
must be true that the state has failed to bring the defendant to
trial "within a reasonable period of time" as ORS 135.747
requires.  That reading of ORS 135.750 suggests that any
discretion that the wording "may order" confers on the trial
court cannot include discretion with respect to the question
whether the delay described in ORS 135.747 was "reasonable." 
Thus, the words of discretion in ORS 135.750 cannot be read to
reach back and turn the predicate "reasonableness" determination
that ORS 135.747 contemplates into a discretionary one.
Neither is the scope of the discretion that ORS 135.750
confers on the trial judge very broad.  ORS 135.750 provides
that, "if" the defendant was not tried in accordance with ORS
135.747 and "sufficient reason therefor is shown," then the trial
court may order the action to be continued.  That conditional
framing shows that the "sufficient reason" requirement is a
precondition for the trial court's exercise of discretion; it is
not an object of that discretion.  Put differently, the statute
grants no more discretion to the trial court with respect to what
qualifies as a "sufficient reason" than it does with respect to
whether a given time period is "reasonable" under ORS 135.747.  
Finally, we find it significant that ORS 135.750
requires that the "sufficient reason therefor" referred to in the
statute be "shown."  That wording indicates that, to the extent
that the trial court determines that there is "sufficient reason"
for a delay, such reason must, in one way or another, appear in
the record.  Such a requirement seems incompatible with the idea
that the existence of "sufficient reason" is a matter of judicial
discretion. 
The foregoing points, which are based on purely textual
analysis, strongly indicate that a trial court's discretion to
continue an action under ORS 135.750 is limited.  Specifically,
the text indicates that a trial court does have some discretion
to continue a case in spite of an unreasonable delay, but only if
the trial court first determines, based on evidence that is
before it, that there was sufficient reason for the failure to
try the defendant within a reasonable period of time.  
We acknowledge, however, that the foregoing textual
analysis leaves out any consideration of other contextual
information that the state contends is relevant at this level,
including information about the historical evolution of the
statutes and the cases applying older versions of the statutes. 
Moreover, a purely textual reading of the statutes raises some
difficult questions about the intended operation of the statutes
as a whole.  When read together, the statutes have a circular
quality that suggests to us that some earlier meaning has been
lost.  In particular, it seems inescapable that any determination
of a "reasonable period of time" for bringing a defendant to
trial, as described in ORS 135.747, would involve some
examination of the reasons for any delay.  And, if that is so, as
logic suggests that it should be, then the intent behind the
requirement in ORS 135.750 that "sufficient reason therefor [be]
shown" becomes difficult to discern.  In such circumstances, the
historical evolution of the statutes and the case law not only
provide context for determining whether and to what extent ORS
135.747 and ORS 135.750 imbue trial courts with discretion, but
also provide insight into understanding the intended collective
operation of the statutes. 
We turn then, to the state's argument that certain
contextual clues -- in particular, the historical evolution of
the statutes and the cases interpreting them -- establish that
the legislature intended to imbue trial courts with very broad
discretion in deciding motions brought on statutory speedy trial
grounds.  We first examine the historical evolution of the
statutes.
The earliest version of the speedy trial statutes
appeared in chapter XXX of the original 1864 Criminal Code.  At
the time of the enactment of those early statutes, the state's
trial courts did not sit continuously, as they do today. 
Instead, the courts sat in "terms," which, at least initially,
were determined by the comings and goings of circuit-riding
judges.  Thus, the earliest versions of the statutes at issue
here all employed the concept of "term of court" to describe what
the statutes required:
"§ 319.  When a person has been held to answer for
a crime, if an indictment be not found against him at
the next term of the court at which he is held to
answer, the court must order the prosecution to be
dismissed unless good cause to the contrary be shown.
"§ 320.  If a defendant, indicted for a crime,
whose trial has not been postponed upon his application
or by his consent, be not brought to trial at the next
term of the court in which the indictment is triable,
after it is found, the court must order the indictment
to be dismissed, unless good cause to the contrary be
shown.
"§ 321.  If the defendant be not indicted or
tried, as provided in the last two sections, and
sufficient reason therefor be shown, the court may
order the action to be continued from term to term, and
in the meantime may discharge the defendant from
custody, on his own undertaking of bail, for his
appearance to answer the charge or action at the time
to which the same is continued." 
General Laws of Oregon, Crim Code, ch XXX, §§ 319-321, p 382
(Deady 1845-1864) (emphasis added).
Under those original statutes, the trial court's
decision to dismiss or to continue an action was a prospective
one that was made at the end of a term of court and, so far as we
can tell, without any necessity of a motion by the defendant. 
Indeed, it is entirely possible to interpret the early versions
of the speedy trial statutes as mere directions to trial courts
about clearing their dockets, rather than as conferring any
particular rights on criminal defendants.  However, the statutes
long have been understood to confer on criminal defendants a
right to dismissal, which could be raised at a later term by a
motion for dismissal.  See, e.g., Johnston v. Circuit Court,
Mult. Co., 140 Or 100, 106, 12 P2d 1027 (1932) ("petitioners have
not shown * * * facts sufficient to bring them within the statute
entitling them to dismissal of the indictment").  That reading of
the statutes may have resulted from the fact that the statutes
were associated, fairly early on, with the constitutional speedy
trial guarantee.  See, e.g., State v. Breaw, 45 Or 586, 587, 78 P
896 (1904) (stating that then-extant version of section 320 was
intended to preserve speedy trial right guaranteed by Article I,
section 10, of Oregon Constitution).
Notably, the early versions of the statutes do not
suffer from the same circularity that we have noted in their
present versions.  For one thing, the phrasing used in the first
clause of section 321 ("[i]f a defendant be not indicted or
tried, as provided in the last two sections") is more closely
aligned with the terminology of the referenced statutes ("if an
indictment be not found against him"; "[i]f a defendant * * * be
not brought to trial") (all emphasis added).  Also, strikingly,
the phrase "sufficient reason therefor be shown" in section 321
seems to be a direct reference to the phrase "unless good cause
to the contrary be shown" that appears in the preceding two
sections.  Both phrases seem to refer to good or sufficient
reasons not to dismiss the prosecution or indictment.  In
general, that overlap suggests that the two statutes at that time
did not involve separate inquiries but, instead, the inquiry
under section 321 merely repeated and expanded upon the inquiries
under sections 319 and 320.  Specifically, the first two clauses
of section 321 appear to recap the directives of the foregoing
sections (dismissal of prosecution or indictment required unless
good cause for not dismissing is shown), while the remainder of
the statute provides a more detailed description of the
consequence of a "good cause" or "sufficient reason" showing. 
And, because that consequence is framed conditionally, it seems
clear that the trial court's discretion to choose between
dismissing and continuing an action that the state has not
prosecuted timely exists only after the state has shown
"sufficient reason" for not dismissing.
The cases interpreting and applying the early speedy
trial statutes neither confirm nor contradict the foregoing view
about how the statutes operated together.  In fact, the early
cases seem to ignore section 321 altogether, focusing solely on
the mandate and "good cause" exception as set out in section 320. 
See, e.g., State v. Goldstein, 111 Or 221, 224 P 1087 (1924),
(referring only to "good cause" wording of section 320); State v.
Lee, 110 Or 682, 224 P 627 (1924) (same); State v. Bateham, 94 Or
524, 186 P 5 (1919) (same).  However, if we are to make sense of
section 321 at all, we think that it must be read in the way that
we have described.  
In any event, the foregoing three provisions remained
in the criminal code, occasionally renumbered but essentially
unchanged in substance, for almost 100 years.  By 1959, however,
the state's trial courts no longer scheduled their work according
to "terms" of court, and the legislature moved to eliminate
references to scheduling cases by "terms" from the state's
statutes.  In a single statute, Oregon Laws 1959, chapter 638,
the legislature removed such references from more than 20
provisions of the civil and criminal codes and replaced them with
other definite or indefinite deadlines and time periods. 
Sections 319, 320, and 321 of the 1864 Deady Code -- which were
by that time denominated, respectively, as ORS 134.110, ORS
134.120, and ORS 134.130 -- all were amended by that act.  
Former ORS 134.110 (1959), originally section 319, was
amended to provide for indictment within 60 days instead of "at
the next term."  Former ORS 134.130 (1959), originally section
321, was amended to remove the descriptive phrase "from term to
term."  And, of particular significance here, former ORS 134.120
(1959), originally section 320, was amended by removing the words
"unless good cause to the contrary is shown" and by requiring
that a charged defendant be tried within a "reasonable period of
time." (5) 
Given the context in which the changes to former ORS
134.120 (1959), originally section 320, occurred, the choice to
replace the phrase "next term of court" with the phrase
"reasonable period of time" is unremarkable.  Presumably, the
legislature had the idea that, in that particular context, an
indefinite but objectively rational time period was more
appropriate than a definite one.  Beyond that, there is no reason
to believe that the 1959 legislature was imparting any particular
content to the term "reasonable."  
On the other hand, the legislature's choice to remove
the final phrase of former ORS 134.120 (1959) -- "unless good
cause to the contrary is shown" -- is enigmatic.  We can only
guess that the legislature removed the "good cause" phrase
because that phrase was unnecessary, in light of the added
"reasonable period of time" phrase in the same statute and the
"sufficient reason" phrase in former ORS 134.130 (1959),
originally section 321. (6)  In any event, we find nothing in
the removal of the "good cause" phrase that would suggest an
intent to change the general operation of former ORS 134.120
(1959), either by itself or in combination with former ORS
134.130 (1959). (7)  Throughout, the conditional framing of the
clause that conveys discretion -- "may order the action to be
continued" -- has remained the same.  Thus, we are persuaded
that, after the amendments, as before, former ORS 134.120 (1959)
and former ORS 134.130 (1959) mandated that trial courts dismiss
an indictment that the state did not timely prosecute, unless the
state showed good or sufficient reason for not dismissing, in
which case the trial court had discretion to continue the
action. (8) 
Although the foregoing historical exercise has altered
our view somewhat of the overall intended operation of the speedy
trial statutes, (9) it has not altered our original view that,
for the most part, the court must decide the issues that arise
under those statutes as a matter of fact and law, rather than
discretion.  In particular, it confirms our view that a trial
court's discretion arises only after the court has determined
that the state has shown "good cause" or a "sufficient reason"
for not dismissing the action, in spite of what otherwise would
be an unreasonable delay.  Our examination of the historical
evolution of the statutes shows that the words conferring
discretion in ORS 135.750 -- "may order the action to be
continued" -- are and always have been subject to a condition,
that is, the existence in fact of good or sufficient cause not to
dismiss.    
The state contends far more, however.  It asserts that
this court's early cases reveal that this court viewed the "good
cause" determination itself to be a matter of judicial
discretion.  It is true that the pre-1959 cases often do describe
the determination of "good cause" under the earliest version of
ORS 135.747, and the overall choice between dismissing or
continuing an action, as being ones that are committed to the
discretion of the trial court.  See, e.g., Lee, 110 Or at 687
(describing question of whether to grant a continuance as "vested
by law in the trial court"); Bateham, 94 Or at 529 ("the case
made by the state of 'good cause to the contrary' appeals largely
to the discretion of the trial court").  However, the relevance
of those statements is weakened considerably by the fact that
none of the early cases cite or even acknowledge the existence of
former section 321.  
In fact, it may be that the early idea of trial court
discretion in this matter derived in part from this court's
failure to consider former section 321 at that time.  It is,
after all, the wording of former section 321 (and its present-day
equivalent, ORS 135.750) that describes the discretion of trial
courts to continue an action in this context, clearly limiting
that discretion to circumstances in which the court already has
made a legal determination of "sufficient cause."  However, in
many of its early cases, this court appeared to treat the "good
cause" exception in former section 320 as if it appeared in a
vacuum and simply posited, without explanation, that abuse of
discretion standard applied.  See, e.g., Lee, 110 Or at 687
(applying that analysis).  Perhaps even more importantly, it
appears that, in at least some of those cases, this court simply
was applying the standard for reviewing general trial court
orders to continue or postpone trials.  See id. (reasoning that
"good cause" was shown by general trial court order continuing
all cases until succeeding term that was order within general
discretion of trial court).      
As the foregoing discussion suggests, in many of its
early cases, this court often used the terms "discretion" and
"abuse of discretion" imprecisely to describe the deference that
appellate courts ordinarily extend to trial courts with regard to
issues of fact.  Thus, with regard to the perennial issue of
whether a congested trial court docket qualified as "good cause
to the contrary," this court has been deferential to trial
courts' determinations that their dockets in fact were too
overburdened and described the review of such facts in terms of
"discretion."  In Bateham, for example, the court apparently
referred to a legal determination in noting that it had lately
decided in State v. Bertschinger, 93 Or 404, 177 P 63 (1919),
that "an accumulation of undetermined cases is sufficient to
prevent discharge of the defendant."  Bateham, 94 Or at 527.  The
court then stated that defendant should have met the state's
factual showing that the court's docket was full with evidence to
the contrary, such as sworn statements disclosing that there were
times during the term when the trial court could have heard the
case.  The court concluded by stating that "[t]he case made by
the state of 'good cause to the contrary' appeals largely to the
discretion of the trial court."  Id.  However, viewed in that
context, the court's reference to "discretion" appears to be a
comment about deference to the trial court's apparent factual
finding that there had been no opportunity to hear defendant's
case because of an overcrowded docket.  
Similarly, in State v. Barrett, 121 Or 57, 59, 254 P
198 (1927), the court explained that it had affirmed the trial
court's denial of a speedy trial motion because of deference to
that court's apparent finding that defendant had consented to
postponement.  In doing so, the court stated that, "[i]n passing
upon motions preliminary to trial where questions of fact are
involved, the trial court is in a better position to determine
the fact than an appellate court, and for that reason, such
questions of fact are not open for review upon appeal, unless the
error is palpable and there has been a clear abuse of
discretion."  Id. at 59-60 (emphasis added).
Although the statements about "discretion" and "abuse
of discretion" in Barrett and Bateham related to reviewing
determinations of disputed facts, some later cases by this court
were not so precise, citing Barrett and Bateham in a way that
suggested that the "abuse of discretion" standard applied
generally to the trial court's ultimate decision to dismiss or
continue an action.  For example, in Johnston, 140 Or at 104,
this court cited Barrett for the following proposition:
"This court will not review the trial court's
finding that the indictment should not be dismissed,
for the reason that the defendant consented to the
postponement of the trial, or that there was good cause
shown why the indictment should not be dismissed unless
error is palpable and there has been a clear abuse of
discretion."
Another illustrative case is State of Oregon v.
Kuhnhausen, 201 Or 478, 266 P2d 698, 272 P2d 225 (1954).  In that
case, the defendant sought dismissal on speedy trial grounds
because the trial court had continued her case until the next
term after apparently setting civil cases ahead of the
defendant's criminal prosecution.  The trial court denied the
defendant's motion and, in a split decision, this court affirmed. 
The majority acknowledged the desirability of trying criminal
cases promptly, but explained that that consideration was only
one of many factual matters that a trial court must evaluate in
deciding whether "good cause" under former ORS 134.120 (1953)
existed to not dismiss an indictment.  Id. at 539.  Ultimately,
the majority treated the "good cause" determination under former
ORS 134.120 (1953) as one within the trial court's discretion. 
Id. at 544.
In contrast to the majority opinion, however, the
dissent went to great lengths to put the "abuse of discretion"
terminology in its place.  The dissent insisted that, contrary to
the majority's view, the question of whether there existed "good
cause" for purposes of former ORS 134.120 (1953) was one of law,
not judicial discretion.  The dissent acknowledged that various
cases decided under former ORS 134.120 (1953) referred to
judicial "discretion," but explained that those references
pertained only when the determination of "good cause" rested on
issues of fact.  Thus, the dissent distinguished the
"discretionary," i.e., factual, issues in Bateham, with the issue
before the court in Kuhnhausen: 
"[In Bateham], the trial court, in passing upon
the motion to dismiss, was required to consider and
decide upon the facts.  It is obvious that the facts
set forth in the affidavits filed by the state, if
accepted as true by the trial court, established 'good
cause to the contrary.'  In passing upon those facts as
a preliminary to the order denying the dismissal, the
trial court necessarily exercised a judicial
discretion.
"But in the instant case, the facts are
undisputed!  There are no conflicts in the evidence. 
It follows, therefore, that the only question for
determination is whether those undisputed facts
constitute 'good cause to the contrary as a matter of
law.  The finding of the trial court that they did
constitute 'good cause' for the continuance beyond the
statutory limit, is a legal conclusion; it is not a
finding of fact based upon disputed testimony.  Hence,
in the light of the undisputed facts, no occasion arose
for an exercise of judicial discretion." 
Kuhnhausen, 201 Or at 569 (Tooze, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original).  Elsewhere in its opinion, the Kuhnhausen dissent
explained that "good cause" is a legal standard and does not call
for an exercise of discretion.  In that regard, the dissent
invoked the definition of "discretion" that appeared in State v.
Lewis, 113 Or 359, 230 P 543 (1924):
"'Discretion is the power exercised by courts to
determine questions to which no strict rule of law is
applicable, but which, from their nature and the
circumstances of the case, are controlled by the
personal judgment of the court.  1 Bouvier's Law Dict.
P. 884.  It cannot be exercised where a strict rule of
law is applicable, as the term 'discretion' implies the
absence of any such rule.  Where there is a clearly defined and well-settled applicable rule of law, the
courts are bound to enforce the rule, and discretion is
at an end.'"
Kuhnhausen, 201 Or at 565 (Tooze, J., dissenting) (quoting Lewis,
113 Or at 364) (emphasis omitted).  The dissent opined that a
"good cause" determination does not appeal to the personal
judgment of a court, but instead involves a strict rule of law.   
 We agree with the foregoing discussion in the
Kuhnhausen dissent -- a discussion that the Kuhnhausen majority
never really addressed, much less overcame.  We acknowledge the
temptation to treat indefinite terms like "good cause,"
"sufficient reason," and "reasonable period of time" as calling
for a subjective determination and, thus, as invoking personal
judgment.  However, it is clear that, when such terms appear in a
statutory context, they are focused on real, albeit sometimes
difficult to discern, legal standards:  the legislature's view of
what is "good," "sufficient," or "reasonable."  As such, in the
absence of a factual dispute, a determination that "good cause"
not to dismiss has been shown under former section 320 (or that
"sufficient reason" not to dismiss has been shown under present-day ORS 135.750) invokes an objective standard and must be
reviewed for legal error. (10)  In no case would judicial
discretion play any role in the "good cause" determination of
former section 321.  And, more importantly for our purposes,
neither would it play any role in the "reasonable period of time"
and "sufficient reason" determinations required by the present-day statutes.
For the foregoing reasons, we are unpersuaded that the
cases cited by the state provide good authority for employing an
"abuse of discretion" standard of review either with respect to
the trial court's "reasonableness" determination under ORS
135.747 or its "sufficient reason" determination under ORS
135.750.  Judicial discretion comes into play respecting the
ultimate decision under ORS 135.750 whether to grant or deny a
motion to dismiss, but it does so only if the trial court first
has drawn a legal conclusion from factual findings that the state
showed "sufficient reason" not to dismiss the action.  Thus, the
"abuse of discretion" standard applies when an appellate court is
reviewing a trial court's decision under ORS 135.750 to continue
an action in spite of an unreasonable delay, but only if the
appellate court first has determined that the state showed
"sufficient reason" in the trial court for overriding the mandate
to dismiss in ORS 135.747 when a delay is unreasonable.  In the
present case, where the controversy clearly centered on whether
the time until trial was "reasonable" and whether "sufficient
reason" for continuing the action had been shown, there is no
basis for applying an "abuse of discretion" standard.  We reject
the state's arguments to the contrary.
B.  "Reasonable Period of Time" Under ORS 135.747 and "Sufficient
    Reason" to Continue Under ORS 135.750
The state next asserts that the Court of Appeals erred
in holding that the state had not brought defendant to trial
within a "reasonable period of time" within the meaning of ORS
135.747.  The state argues that the question whether a trial has
occurred within a "reasonable period of time" necessarily
includes consideration of whether there was "good cause" for any
delay.  The state contends that, in the present case, there was
good cause for the 21-month delay in question, noting that
defendant already was involved in a complex aggravated murder
proceeding in Washington County.  According to the state, it was
"important" and in defendant's best interest to allow that more
serious charge to proceed to trial first.  
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals seemed to accept
that "good cause" was part of the reasonableness analysis under
ORS 135.747, but it did not accept the state's contention that
there was good cause for the delay in the present case. (11) 
Defendant, however, argues that the causes for a delay are
relevant under only ORS 135.750, because only that statute
directs a trial court to consider whether the state has shown
"sufficient reason" for a delay in deciding whether to continue
an action that otherwise would be subject to mandatory dismissal.
Based on text alone, defendant's theory is plausible: 
ORS 135.747 nowhere defines the concept of a "reasonable period
of time," and it is possible to read that phrase as focusing on
only the superficial reasonableness of the time period and not 
involving any inquiry into the circumstances that might have
caused any delays.  However, this court has stated on various
occasions that, for purposes of ORS 135.747, the question whether
a time period is "reasonable" involves examination of all  the
attendant circumstances.  See, e.g., State v. Emery, 318 Or 460,
467, 869 P2d 859 (1994); State v. Jackson, 228 Or 371, 377, 365
P2d 294 (1961) (both so stating).  Circumstances that cause delay
(that is, the reasons for delay) would appear to fall within that
description.  Thus, the court's cases establish that the causes
for delay are a significant part of the "reasonableness"
calculus.  In fact, when there is a delay (that is, when the
state takes longer than ordinarily would be expected to bring a
defendant to trial on a given charge), the circumstances that
cause the delay generally will determine whether the delay (and
thus, the overall time period for bringing the defendant to
trial) is reasonable.
Turning to the facts of the present case, we have
little difficulty in concluding that the time period in question
-- 21 months to execute an arrest warrant issued on an indictment
-- is greater than would be expected. (12)  As such, we must
determine whether there was good reason for the delay, rendering
the time period "reasonable."
The state argues that there was good cause for the
delay because defendant was awaiting trial on a more serious
charge in another county.  The state notes that the trial court
indisputably "would have known that aggravated murder trials are
complex and time-consuming" and "could have concluded * * * that
it was more important to allow defendant's more serious charges
to proceed to trial first."  However, as a matter of law, that
assertion is not an acceptable reason for the delay.  As the
Court of Appeals noted in its opinion, the state had no right to
decide unilaterally that delay was necessary, and defendant's
speedy trial rights thus could be waived, because it was
"important" for defendant to deal with the aggravated murder
charge first.  Johnson, 193 Or App at 256. 
The state also contends that the record demonstrates
that defendant engaged in obstructionist tactics by absconding to
avoid prosecution on the Washington County charge, by filing a
stream of pro se motions of questionable merit, and by constantly
changing his mind about whether he wished to be represented by
appointed counsel.  According to the state, that pattern supports
the conclusion that the time period within which defendant was
brought to trial was reasonable.  The difficulty with that
argument, however, is that defendant's tactics in no way explain
the particular delay that is at issue here, that is, the 21-month
period after authorities returned defendant to Oregon and before
defendant was served and arraigned.  Thus, even if
obstructionist, defendant's actions are not relevant to the issue
of the reasonableness of the delay in this case.  
The state also suggests that the delay was reasonable
in light of resource deficiencies in the Oregon state court
system.  Although that argument never was articulated in the
trial court, the state suggests that "this court can and should
presume that the trial court was fully aware of the status of its
docket."  We do not doubt that the trial court was aware of the
status of its docket.  Nothing in the present record, however,
gives us any insight into the status of that docket.  In any
event, the condition of the trial court's docket cannot explain
why the state took 21 months to bring defendant into court.    Ultimately, there is nothing in the record that
supports the conclusion, or even the implication, that there was
good cause for the 21-month delay in this case.  In the absence
of any explanation for such an extended delay, we must agree with
the Court of Appeals that, as a matter of law, the state failed
to bring defendant to trial within a "reasonable period of time"
under ORS 135.747.
That conclusion, however, does not end our analysis.  
As discussed above, the historical evolution of the speedy trial
statutes informs us that the legislature intended the trial court
to have discretion under ORS 135.750 to continue a case, in spite
of an unreasonable delay, if "sufficient reason therefor is
shown."  Although we have characterized that phrase as a legal
standard, we have not discussed its meaning and limits.  
The obvious question that arises with respect to such a
phrase is "sufficient" in what respect?  The statute itself
contains no express clues about the answer to that question, and
there is no recorded legislative history.  Further, as discussed
previously, this court's cases applying the speedy trial statutes
appear to have ignored ORS 135.750 and its predecessors.  In
theory, this court's early cases involving the "good cause to the
contrary" wording in the predecessor to ORS 135.747 would be
relevant because, as we have discussed, the phrase "sufficient
reason therefor" in the original statutes essentially referred to
that "good cause" wording.  Those cases contain examples of what
represented "good cause to the contrary" from this court's
perspective, (13) but provide no general rule.  
In the absence of any other explanation of the phrase,
we assume that the legislature intended a meaning consistent with
its overall purpose in enacting the speedy trial statutes.  We
assume, in other words, that a "sufficient reason" not to dismiss
is one that has some relevance to, and does not essentially
undermine, the overall purpose of those statutes.  Elsewhere,
this court has described that purpose in terms of "provid[ing] a
method for dismissing cases that are languishing in the criminal
justice system without affecting the state's ability to
reprosecute serious charges."  Emery, 318 Or at 467.  In that
same context, this court has stated that the statutes provide a
"'housecleaning' mechanism triggered by the length of time that a
particular case has been in the system, rather than by the effect
of the delay on a particular defendant."  Id. 
In light of that statutory purpose, we conclude that
none of the reasons that the state has offered in support of the
trial court's decision amounts to "sufficient reason" not to
dismiss.  The state's first reason -- the "importance" of trying
a more serious charge against defendant first -- seems merely to
be an attempted usurpation of defendant's right to determine for
himself whether he is willing to waive his speedy trial rights to
that end.  The state's second reason -- that defendant engaged in
obstructionist conduct -- is irrelevant to the statutes'
"housecleaning" purpose.  That beneficial housecleaning purpose
is in no way undermined if an irritating defendant, even one who
is insincere about his desire for a speedy trial, is permitted to
force the state to demonstrate its interest in prosecuting him by
obtaining a new indictment.  We also reject the state's third
reason -- limited judicial resources -- because it has no factual
basis in this record.  We therefore conclude, as a matter of law,
that no "sufficient reason" for refusing the mandate of ORS
135.747 was "shown" in the trial court.
C.  Application of ORS 135.747 to Prearraignment Period
The state next contends that the 21-month delay between
defendant's indictment and his arraignment is not relevant under
the speedy trial statutes.  The state argues that ORS 135.747 is
"silent" with respect to when the speedy trial clock begins to
run, but that the statute's references to defendant's
"application" for "postponement" suggest that that statute
applies only after a court actually is in a position to schedule
a trial or grant a postponement -- in other words, after the
court has arraigned the defendant.  The state also argues that
the placement of ORS 135.747 in chapter 135 of the criminal code
-- a chapter that is devoted to arraignment and pretrial matters
that necessarily follow arraignment -- supports the idea that the
statute is directed only at post-arraignment delays.  Finally,
the state suggests that we should discount earlier cases
expressly holding that the statutory speedy trial right begins at
indictment, because those cases are mere relics of the time when
this court construed the speedy trial statute as implementing the
constitutional speedy trial right.  The state acknowledges that
the constitutional speedy trial right begins at indictment, but
argues that, given that the statutory and constitutional speedy
trial analyses have now been separated in our jurisprudence, see
Emery, 318 Or at 467-70 (illustrating point), the time periods
covered by the two rights also can, and should, be disconnected.
To consider that argument, we again turn to the PGE
analytical paradigm.  At the text and context level of that
paradigm, we conclude that, with respect to the issue of the
temporal scope of the speedy trial right, the text of ORS 135.747
is at least strongly suggestive of the answer.  Specifically, ORS
135.747 pertains "[i]f a defendant charged with a crime * * * is
not brought to trial within a reasonable period of time." 
Presumably, that means that, once a defendant stands "charged
with a crime," his or her trial must take place within a
reasonable period of time.  Although there may be room for debate
with respect to the range of actions that the legislature
intended by the term "charged," there can be little doubt that a
defendant who has been indicted by a grand jury has been "charged
with a crime" within the meaning of the statute.
As noted, the state argues that the wording of the
second clause of ORS 135.747 -- "whose trial has not been
postponed upon the application of the defendant or by the consent
of the defendant" -- suggests that the statute pertains to only
the time period after arraignment when a defendant can apply for,
and a trial court can grant, a postponement.  However, that
argument places undue emphasis on words that describe the
exception to the rule, at the expense of the rule itself.  The
rule provides, rather clearly, that trial delay becomes an issue
when a defendant is charged.  The narrower compass of the
exception to the rule is perfectly understandable given the fact
that, until he or she has been arraigned, a defendant would have
no basis for making the kinds of requests that the exception
contemplates. 
The state suggests that it is irrational to read ORS
135.747 as pertaining to a time when the trial court has had no
opportunity, and even lacks the jurisdiction, to schedule a
trial.  But that suggestion rests on the unsupported premise that
ORS 135.747 is directed primarily at trial courts and is
concerned primarily with trial scheduling.  In that regard, we
note that ORS 135.747 applies if criminal defendants are not
"brought to trial" within a reasonable time.  Although it is true
that the prosecution always is constrained by the trial court's
schedule, it is the prosecution, and not the trial court, which
bears the primary responsibility for "bringing" a criminal
defendant to trial.  As such, there is nothing irrational about
reading ORS 135.747 as applying at any time when the prosecutor
has the power to move the case forward, including the period
before arraignment but after the defendant stands "charged with a
crime."  We read the statute to operate that way.
D.  Availability of Remedy of Dismissal to Defendants Who Have
Sought or Consented to Any Postponement
The state finally argues that the remedy described in
ORS 135.747 is not available at all to individuals like defendant
who, at any time in the proceeding, have sought or consented to a
postponement of trial.  In support of that argument, the state
notes that ORS 135.747 contains a restrictive clause -- "whose
trial has not been postponed upon the application of the
defendant or by the consent of the defendant" -- that necessarily
refers to the subject of the last antecedent clause (that is, to
a "defendant charged with a crime").  The state concludes that
the statute must be read to exclude categorically from the
statute's protections any defendant who ever has sought or
consented to a delay, even if the defendant sought or consented
to such a delay only after the reasonable time period that the
statute contemplated already had run.
Looking at the text of ORS 135.747 solely as a
grammatical exercise, the state's reading of the clause is a
reasonable one.  Against that permissible grammatical reading,
however, stands both rationality and longstanding interpretation
by this court.  With respect to the first point, we cannot
imagine what purpose would be served by a scheme that requires a
defendant, in order to preserve his or her right to a remedy for
the state's violation of the speedy trial statutes, to object to
any request for postponement by the state and to refrain from
requesting any postponement on his or her own part, regardless of
reason or necessity.  
As to the latter consideration, we point first to the
holding in State v. Chadwick, 150 Or 645, 47 P2d 232 (1935), that
the defendant's requests for minor continuances did not bar the
statutory remedy of dismissal when the trial court had failed to
set the defendant's case for trial over two terms of
court. (14)  Twenty-four years later, in State v. Crosby, 217
Or 393, 405-06, 342 P2d 831 (1959), this court explained that a
defendant's request for or consent to a postponement merely tolls
the relevant speedy trial period. (15)  Although this court
essentially has followed that "tolling" approach since
Crosby, (16) the legislature has not been moved to amend the
relevant wording to specify that it intends a different approach. 
In short, the state's interpretation of the statute,
although plausible on a purely textual level, becomes implausible
when viewed in the context of this court's case law and the
general assumption that statutes are rational.  We conclude that
a defendant is not categorically barred from the protections that 
ORS 135.747 offers because a postponement of trial occurred with
the defendant's consent or at the defendant's own instigation.   
The state also argues that, even if a defendant is not
categorically excluded from the statutory remedy of dismissal by
requesting or consenting to any delay, he or she is excluded by
the clear terms of the statute from a remedy for any delay to
which he or she requests or consents.  We agree with that
assertion.  The state, however, then suggests that that rule
serves as a bar to dismissal in this case, because defendant here
consented to the very 21-month delay that is at issue by failing
to demand a trial when he knew that the charges were pending
against him.  That argument assumes that defendant knew about the
Clackamas County charges all along -- a factual assertion that
has no support in the record.  In addition, the state's consent
theory runs contrary to the well-established principle that it is
the state's obligation, and not the defendant's, to bring a
defendant to trial within a reasonable period of time.  See,
e.g., State v. Vawter, 236 Or 85, 87, 386 P2d 915 (1963) (in
Oregon, "it is not incumbent upon the accused to demand a trial
or take affirmative action to enforce his right to a speedy
trial").  
The state also suggests that defendant impliedly waived
his right to a remedy for the 21-month prearraignment delay by
requesting continuances and filing a stream of dilatory motions
after he was arraigned.  However, we cannot view those actions as
an implied waiver of defendant's right to a remedy for the
earlier delay, particularly when defendant expressly, if somewhat
inarticulately, reserved his speedy trial rights for the earlier
delay whenever he sought a continuance.
III.  CONCLUSION
We reject each of the state's challenges to the Court
of Appeals decision in the present case.  We agree with that
court that the state failed to bring defendant to trial "within a
reasonable period of time" under ORS 135.747.  We conclude,
moreover, that no "sufficient reason" was shown in the trial
court for overriding the mandate of dismissal in ORS 135.747. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the indictment against defendant
should have been dismissed.  
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed.
1. The exact date of the so-called "hold" does not appear
in this record.  Moreover, the nature of the "hold" is unclear. 
As the Court of Appeals noted, Johnson, 193 Or App at 252 n 1,
there is no information or documentation in the record that
explains precisely what was done respecting the Clackamas County
charges, who did it, or by what authority.  We note that, in
future cases of this kind, a more complete record would be
helpful.   
2. The state suggested in the Court of Appeals that defendant knew of the Clackamas
County charges immediately on his return to Oregon.  However, we agree with the Court of
Appeals, Johnson, 193 Or App at 255, that the record does not establish that fact.
3. The evidence suggests that at least some of defendant's
requests and motions at the time were attempts to manipulate the
system, raising doubts as to the sincerity of his speedy trial
demand.  The trial court apparently so viewed defendant's
maneuvers.  However, questions about the sincerity of defendant's
post-arraignment demand for a speedy trial have no bearing on the
question whether, at that time, the state already had violated
defendant's statutory speedy trial rights by failing to proceed
against him within a reasonable time after his return to Oregon.  

4. Third-degree rape is a Class C felony.  ORS 163.355(2).
5. The resulting amended 1959 statutes provided:
"134.110.  When a person has been held to answer
for a crime, if an indictment is not found against him
within 60 days after the person is held to answer, the
court shall order the prosecution to be dismissed,
unless good cause to the contrary is shown.  
"134.120.  If a defendant indicted for a crime,
whose trial has not been postponed upon his application
or by his consent, is not brought to trial within a
reasonable period of time, the court shall order the
indictment to be dismissed."
"134.130.  If the defendant is not indicted or
tried, as provided in ORS 134.110 and 134.120, and
sufficient reason therefor is shown, the court may
order the action to be continued and in the meantime
may discharge the defendant from custody on his own
undertaking of bail for his appearance to answer the
charge or action at the time to which the same is
continued."
6. Shortly after the amendments were adopted, this
court stated that, in light of the new "reasonable
period" phrase, the removal of the "good cause" phrase
was "without significance." 
State v. Jackson, 228 Or 371, 377, 365 P2d 294 (1961). 
That was so, in the court's view, because "the question
of reasonable time cannot be determined without
inquiring into the question whether there was good
cause for delay."  Id.
7. As we have noted, the legislature's clear overall
purpose in enacting the amendments was to remove
references to term-based scheduling.  There is no hint
anywhere in the statute that the legislature had any
other purpose in mind.
8. None of the subsequent amendments to the statutory
scheme imply an intent to alter that basic operation. 
In 1971, the legislature amended ORS 134.110 to shorten
the time period that a defendant may be "held to
answer" prior to indictment to 30 days.  Or Laws 1971,
ch 286, § 1.  That amendment clearly had no effect on
the overall operation of the speedy trial statutes.  
In 1973, the legislature amended all three
statutes to their present form, as part of a major
overhaul of the code of criminal procedure.  Or Laws
1973, ch 836, § 204. In general, the changes sought to
take into account the possibility of charging a
defendant by information, rather than indictment. 
Thus, in ORS 135.747, the legislature replaced the term
"indicted" with "charged" and the term "indictment"
with "accusatory instrument."  Similarly, in ORS
135.750, the legislature replaced the phrase "indicted
or tried" with "proceeded against or tried."  It is
clear that, in enacting those changes, the legislature
did not intend to alter in any way the operation of the
statutes as described above.
9. In particular, it demonstrates that, when ORS 135.750 states that, if
"sufficient reason therefor is shown," it is referring to sufficient reason not to
dismiss the indictment, rather than sufficient reason for an otherwise unreasonable
delay.   
10. Of course, any trial court decision as to a
disputed issue of fact will be reviewed under a far
more deferential standard.  
11. In rejecting the state's arguments that good cause existed for the 21-month
delay, the Court of Appeals wrote:
"The first problem with that argument is that it was not advanced below and,
consequently, the record is undeveloped in that regard.  In particular, nothing in
the factual record establishes that the Clackamas County prosecutor delayed
serving defendant with the arrest warrant and bringing him to trial for that
reason."
Johnson, 193 Or App at 256.
12. Generally speaking, we would expect the police to execute
such warrants within a matter of weeks, not months.  We
recognize, of course, that there are aspects of warrant service
that are beyond the control of the police, the first and foremost
being the ability of the police to locate the defendant. 
However, those are matters that can and should be presented as
reasons for delay.   
13. There are numerous cases stating that an overcrowded docket or, as the cases put it, an
"accumulation of undetermined cases," may amount to good cause not to dismiss.  See, e.g.,
Bateham, 94 Or at 528 (stating principle); State v. German, 163 Or 642, 645, 98 P2d 6 (1940)
(same).  According to State v. Clark, 86 Or 464, 473, 168 P 944 (1917) "good cause" existed to
continue a prosecution to another term when a jury had been discharged after failing to reach a
verdict.  On the other hand, imprisonment on another charge apparently did not constitute good
cause.  See State v. D'Autremont, 212 Or 344, 349, 317 P2d 932 (1957) (so holding).
14. Chadwick was concerned with the original speedy trial
statute, which defined speedy trial in more definite terms than
does the present statute, but which contained the identical
exception for postponements for which the defendant initiates or
agrees. 
15. Crosby also was decided under the original speedy trial
statute, set out above.  As such, the relevant speedy trial
period was "the next term of court in which the indictment is
triable."  217 Or at 395-96 (quoting then-applicable version of
former ORS 134.120).
16. For cases illustrating this point, see Haynes v. Burks, 290
Or 75, 619 P2d 632 (1980); State v. Harrison, 253 Or 489, 455 P2d
613 (1969); State v. Robinson, 217 Or 612, 343 P2d 886 (1959).  
The state suggests that this court's cases are in
conflict as to the meaning and application of the restrictive
clause that is at issue.  However, we see nothing in the cases
that the state cites -- Jackson, 228 Or 371, D'Autremont, 212 Or
344; Johnston, 140 Or 100, and State v. Hedrick, 233 Or 137, 377
P2d 325 (1962) -- that indicates that this court ever applied the
rule for which the state contends.  At most, those cases show
that the statutory remedy is unavailable for a particular delay
when the defendant instigated or consented to that delay.