Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Mandelman

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2014 WI 100 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP584-D   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Michael D. Mandelman, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
Michael D. Mandelman, 
          Respondent-Appellant.   
 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST MANDELMAN  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
August 1, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant, there were briefs by Spiros 
S. Nicolet and Nicolet Law Offices, Milwaukee. 
 
 
For the complainant-respondent, there was a brief by Julie 
M. Spoke and the Office of Lawyer Regulation.  
 
 
 
2014 WI 100
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2011AP584-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Michael D. Mandelman, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael D. Mandelman, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
AUG 1, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.  Attorney's 
license 
revoked.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Although Attorney Michael D. Mandelman 
entered into a stipulation with the Office of Lawyer Regulation 
(OLR), pursuant to which he pled no contest to the 221 counts of 
misconduct pending against him and agreed that his license to 
practice law in Wisconsin should be revoked, he has filed an 
                                                 
1 The parties' stipulation and the referee's report refer in 
multiple places to 23 remaining counts.  The lists of dismissed 
and remaining counts in the stipulation clearly state, however, 
that 23 counts were dismissed and 22 counts remained pending. 
No. 
2011AP584-D   
 
2 
 
appeal from the report and recommendation of the referee, 
Attorney Christine Harris Taylor, which was based on that 
stipulation.  Essentially, he seeks through his appeal to 
comment on certain characterizations and findings by the referee 
and 
to 
provide 
additional 
support 
for 
the 
referee's 
recommendation to make his revocation effective as of the date 
of his prior suspension, May 29, 2009. 
¶2 
When we review a referee's report and recommendation 
in an attorney disciplinary case, we affirm the referee's 
findings of fact unless they are found to be clearly erroneous, 
but we review the referee's conclusions of law on a de novo 
basis. 
 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Inglimo, 
2007 WI 126, ¶5, 305 Wis. 2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 125.  We determine 
the appropriate level of discipline to impose given the 
particular facts of each case, independent of the referee's 
recommendation, but benefiting from it.  In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 
660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶3 
After reviewing this matter and considering Attorney 
Mandelman's appeal, we accept the referee's factual findings and 
legal conclusions based on the parties' stipulation.  We further 
agree that the 22 counts of misconduct support the revocation of 
Attorney Mandelman's license to practice law in this state, 
which we make effective as of the effective date of his prior 
suspension.  Because the record is not sufficient to award 
restitution to any particular person, we direct Attorney 
Mandelman to work with the OLR and his former colleague, 
No. 
2011AP584-D   
 
3 
 
Attorney Jeffrey A. Reitz, to determine who is owed money from 
the trust accounts utilized by Attorney Mandelman and in what 
amounts.  Finally, because Attorney Mandelman litigated this 
matter vigorously prior to entering into the stipulation, we 
order Attorney Mandelman to pay the full costs of this 
proceeding, which were $16,943.16 as of April 2, 2014.   
¶4 
The OLR initiated this disciplinary proceeding with 
the filing of a 45-count complaint.  Attorney Mandelman filed an 
answer, which effectively denied many of the complaint's factual 
allegations and expressly denied the counts of professional 
misconduct.  During the pre-hearing phase of this proceeding, 
the OLR dismissed 23 counts due to evidentiary problems, leaving 
22 counts to be resolved.   
¶5 
After Attorney Mandelman had filed a summary judgment 
motion on the 22 remaining counts and the OLR had filed its 
response, 
Attorney 
Mandelman 
entered 
into 
a 
stipulation, 
pursuant to which he withdrew his answer to the complaint and 
pled no contest to the remaining 22 counts of misconduct.  He 
agreed in the stipulation that the referee could use the 
relevant allegations of the complaint as the factual basis for 
finding misconduct on those remaining 22 counts.  He further 
agreed with the OLR's sanction request for the revocation of his 
license to practice law in this state, retroactive to May 29, 
2009, 
the 
effective 
date 
for 
his 
most 
recent 
one-year 
suspension.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mandelman, 
2009 WI 40, ¶28, 317 Wis. 2d 215, 765 N.W.2d 788 (Mandelman IV).   
No. 
2011AP584-D   
 
4 
 
¶6 
The 
stipulation 
contained 
the 
necessary 
representations 
by 
Attorney 
Mandelman 
and 
the 
OLR.  
Specifically, the parties agreed that Attorney Mandelman's plea 
of no contest and his stipulation to the OLR's requested level 
of discipline was not the result of plea bargaining.  Attorney 
Mandelman represented that he understood the allegations of 
misconduct 
against 
him 
and 
his 
right 
to 
contest 
those 
allegations; that he understood the ramifications of his entry 
into the stipulation; that the understood his right to consult 
counsel and that he had, in fact, retained counsel in this 
matter; and that his entry into the stipulation had been knowing 
and voluntary. 
¶7 
The referee's report accepted the parties' stipulation 
and Attorney Mandelman's no contest plea and determined that the 
stipulated facts supported legal conclusions that Attorney 
Mandelman had engaged in the remaining 22 counts of professional 
misconduct.  The referee's factual findings and conclusions of 
law are described in the following paragraphs. 
¶8 
Attorney Mandelman was admitted to the practice of law 
in this state in January 1980.  He has been the subject of 
professional discipline on six previous occasions: 
 In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mandelman, 
158 Wis. 2d 1, 460 N.W.2d 749 (1990) (Mandelman 
I) (one-year suspension imposed for 27 counts of 
misconduct, including multiple counts of failure 
to act with diligence, failing to return files to 
clients 
promptly, 
simultaneously 
representing 
multiple clients with adverse interests, settling 
a client's claim without authorization, failing 
to 
communicate 
with 
clients, 
and 
making 
a 
No. 
2011AP584-D   
 
5 
 
misrepresentation 
to 
the 
Board 
of 
Attorneys 
Professional Responsibility (BAPR)); 
 In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mandelman, 
182 Wis. 2d 583, 514 N.W.2d 11 (1994) (Mandelman 
II) (18-month suspension imposed for misconduct 
that included failing to act with diligence, 
failing to respond to clients' requests for 
information, 
failing 
to 
refund 
a 
client's 
retainer, violating the rules regarding client 
trust accounts following his 1990 suspension, and 
failing 
to 
provide 
complete 
and 
accurate 
responses to BAPR);2 
 Private 
Reprimand 
99-18 
(consensual 
private 
reprimand imposed in 1999 for making a false 
statement of fact to a tribunal); 
 Private 
Reprimand 
06-21 
(consensual 
private 
reprimand imposed in 2006 for drawing a check 
from his business account to pay the mortgage 
payment of a personal injury client); 
 In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mandelman, 
2006 WI 45, 290 Wis. 2d 158, 714 N.W.2d 512 
(Mandelman III) (nine-month suspension imposed 
for multiple instances of misconduct, including 
failure to act with reasonable diligence, failure 
to utilize a written fee agreement in a medical 
malpractice case, and persuading his client to 
sign a prospective release of claims against him 
without 
the 
client 
obtaining 
independent 
representation); and  
 In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mandelman, 
2009 WI 40, 317 Wis. 2d 215, 765 N.W.2d 788 
(Mandelman IV) (one-year suspension imposed for 
misconduct that included collecting a fee without 
performing any work for the client, failing to 
                                                 
2 For reasons that are not disclosed, the referee omitted 
the 1990 and 1994 suspensions from her report.  They were listed 
in the OLR's complaint, however, and therefore were subject to 
Attorney Mandelman's stipulation.  Moreover, in any event, this 
court can take judicial notice of its prior decisions and 
orders. 
No. 
2011AP584-D   
 
6 
 
provide the client with a written settlement 
statement, retaining a client's funds for more 
than four years, making misrepresentations to a 
client, failing to obtain a client's signature on 
a settlement check and to deposit the settlement 
funds into the client trust account, and failing 
to provide a client's file and funds to the 
client). 
¶9 
Some general background information is necessary for a 
number of the counts of misconduct in the present disciplinary 
proceeding.  Prior to 1999 Attorney Mandelman was the sole owner 
of his own law firm.  He maintained client trust accounts at 
what were then known as M&I Bank and TCF Bank.  
¶10 In 
1999 
Attorney 
Jeffrey 
Reitz 
joined 
Attorney 
Mandelman's firm.  From 1999 to November 2001, Attorneys 
Mandelman and Reitz were co-owners of the law firm, which was 
known as Reitz and Mandelman LLC.  During this time, the firm 
used the M&I Bank trust account exclusively.  Trust account 
funds remained in the open but dormant TCF Bank trust account. 
¶11 Between November 2001 and May 2005, the name of the 
law firm became Reitz, Mandelman & Lawent LLC.  Attorney Reitz, 
however, became the sole shareholder for a large part of this 
time, with Attorney Mandelman becoming an employee of the firm.  
In June 2004, when disciplinary actions were pending against 
both Attorney Reitz and Attorney Mandelman, they formed a new 
service corporation, which they named Heartland Legal Group 
S.C., although they continued to practice under the name Reitz, 
Mandelman & Lawent LLC. 
¶12 In December 2002, the law firm opened a new trust 
account with Tri City Bank.  As had occurred with the TCF 
No. 
2011AP584-D   
 
7 
 
account, Attorneys Mandelman and Reitz did not close the M&I 
trust 
account. 
 
That 
account 
simply 
sat 
dormant 
for 
approximately the next six years, with only a few disbursements 
being made from it over that span.  As of December 31, 2006, 
that account still held $6,307.02, with outstanding un-cashed 
disbursement checks against the account of $5,542.58 and another 
$994.44 in funds for which no disbursement checks had been 
written. 
¶13 When Attorney Reitz's license was suspended in May 
2005,3 Attorney Mandelman re-acquired full ownership of the law 
firm and formed another new service corporation by the name of 
Mandelman & Associates, S.C.  Despite the creation of this new 
service corporation and the lack of any limited liability 
company, Attorney Mandelman continued to refer to the law firm 
as a couple of different limited liability companies,4 including 
on his letterhead.  In addition, Attorney Mandelman also ceased 
using the Tri City Bank trust account and opened yet another new 
client trust account at Pyramax Bank.  As with the prior trust 
accounts, the Tri City Bank trust account essentially lay 
dormant for the next three years, with the exception of a few 
disbursements. 
                                                 
3 In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Reitz, 2013 WI 27, 
346 Wis. 2d 375, 828 N.W.2d 225. 
4 He referred to the firm at different times as Mandelman & 
Lawent LLC or Mandelman, Georges & Lawent LLC.  No such limited 
liability companies were created. 
No. 
2011AP584-D   
 
8 
 
¶14 Effective July 1, 2006, Attorney Mandelman's license 
was suspended.  Attorney Reitz did not simply re-acquire 
ownership of the existing firm at that time.  Instead he formed 
a new law firm, Reitz, Parker & Lawent, S.C. (RPL), and opened a 
new client trust account for that firm (the RPL trust account).  
The RPL firm then apparently acquired Attorney Mandelman's 
existing firm.  Attorney Mandelman's trust account at Pyramax 
Bank apparently sat dormant for the next two years until the 
majority of undistributed funds remaining in that account were 
transferred to the RPL trust account. 
¶15 The first count to which Attorney Mandelman pled no 
contest, count two of the complaint, alleged that he had 
violated Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 20:7.5(a)5 (and SCR 20:7.1(a)6) 
by making false or misleading communications regarding the name 
and organizational status of his law firm.  The referee 
concluded that the stipulated facts supported a conclusion of 
misconduct on this count. 
                                                 
5 SCR 20:7.5(a) provides: 
A lawyer shall not use a firm name, letterhead or 
other 
professional 
designation 
that 
violates 
SCR 20:7.1. A trade name may be used by a lawyer in 
private practice if it does not imply a connection 
with 
a 
government 
agency 
or 
with 
a 
public 
or 
charitable legal services organization and is not 
otherwise in violation of SCR 20:7.1. 
6 SCR 20:7.1(a) provides that a lawyer shall not make a 
false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the 
lawyer's services, such that the communication "contains a 
material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact 
necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not 
materially misleading." 
No. 
2011AP584-D   
 
9 
 
¶16 Count three of the complaint related to J.N., a client 
of Attorneys Mandelman and Reitz in 2003 and 2004.  When 
Attorney Reitz's license was suspended in May 2005 and Attorney 
Mandelman resumed ownership of the law firm, $700 in settlement 
funds belonging to J.N. remained in the Tri City Bank trust 
account.  Neither Attorney Mandelman nor Attorney Reitz ever 
paid the $700 sitting in the Tri City Bank trust account to J.N.  
The referee concluded that Attorney Mandelman's failure to 
disburse 
the 
$700 
to 
J.N. 
constituted 
a 
violation 
of 
SCR 20:1.15(d)(1).7 
¶17 Counts 
four 
through 
seven 
relate 
to 
Attorney 
Mandelman's representation of and appointment as guardian ad 
litem 
for 
S.M. 
in 
connection 
with 
the 
approval 
and 
implementation of a minor settlement.  When the circuit court 
approved the settlement, it directed Attorney Mandelman to 
purchase an annuity for S.M. and then to place the remaining 
settlement funds into his trust account.  The court further 
instructed Attorney Mandelman to negotiate reduced payments to 
                                                 
7 SCR 20:1.15(d)(1) provides: 
Notice and disbursement.  Upon receiving funds or 
other property in which a client has an interest, or 
in which the lawyer has received notice that a 3rd 
party has an interest identified by a lien, court 
order, 
judgment, 
or 
contract, 
the 
lawyer 
shall 
promptly notify the client or 3rd party in writing.  
Except as stated in this rule or otherwise permitted 
by law or by agreement with the client, the lawyer 
shall promptly deliver to the client or 3rd party any 
funds or other property that the client or 3rd party 
is entitled to receive. 
No. 
2011AP584-D   
 
10 
 
the subrogated medical providers who had provided care to S.M.  
Specifically, the court's order stated that if the remaining 
settlement funds were insufficient to pay the subrogated medical 
providers, Attorney Mandelman was required to reduce his fee so 
that the providers could be paid first.  Any balance remaining 
after the payment of the subrogated medical providers' claims 
and Attorney Mandelman's fee was to be paid to S.M. 
¶18 On January 18, 2006, the sum of $30,870 in settlement 
funds for S.M. was deposited into Attorney Mandelman's Pyramax 
Bank trust account.  Despite the circuit court's order, Attorney 
Mandelman immediately disbursed $18,125 to himself in full 
payment of his one-third contingent fee.   
¶19 After Attorney Mandelman's license was suspended on 
July 1, 2006, a balance of $5,770.29 remained in S.M.'s 
subsidiary account.  That amount was subsequently transferred to 
the RPL trust account, where it remained more than two years 
later.  No further payments to subrogated medical providers were 
paid, nor was any portion of the remaining funds paid to S.M. 
¶20 The referee concluded that these facts supported four 
counts 
of 
misconduct, 
including 
a 
lack 
of 
diligence 
(SCR 20:1.3),8 a failure to pay trust account funds to their 
proper recipient over the approximately six months between the 
deposit of those funds in his trust account and the suspension 
of 
Attorney 
Mandelman's 
license 
(SCR 20:1.15(d)(1)), 
                                                 
8 SCR 20:1.3 provides that "[a] lawyer shall act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client." 
No. 
2011AP584-D   
 
11 
 
disobedience of the trial court's order to pay the subrogated 
parties before collecting his fee (SCR 20:3.4(c)),9 and engaging 
in 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit, 
or 
misrepresentation by immediately taking his full contingent fee 
before paying the subrogated parties (SCR 20:8.4(c))10. 
¶21 Counts eight and nine of the complaint relate to 
Attorney Mandelman's representation of A.B. in a divorce action 
from 1997 through 2000.  In the fall of 2000, $75,449.99 
belonging to A.B. was deposited into Attorney Mandelman's trust 
account.  A.B. did not authorize Attorney Mandelman to use the 
trust account funds to pay the law firm's $25,465 outstanding 
invoice nor did he pay that invoice using other funds.  For the 
next four years, Attorney Mandelman did not disburse any of the 
trust account funds to A.B. or anyone else; the funds simply sat 
in the trust account not earning interest.  Although $6,000 of 
the trust account funds were disbursed to the law firm in May 
2005 pursuant to a settlement, the rest of the funds still 
remained in the trust account. 
¶22 The referee determined that by failing to resolve the 
proper division of the $75,449.99 for more than four years, 
Attorney Mandelman had failed to act with reasonable diligence 
                                                 
9 SCR 20:3.4(c) provides that a lawyer shall not "knowingly 
disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, except for 
an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation 
exists." 
10 SCR 20:8.4(c) provides that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation." 
No. 
2011AP584-D   
 
12 
 
and promptness, in violation of SCR 20:1.3.  She also concluded 
that 
the 
multi-year 
delay 
in 
disbursing 
the 
funds 
had 
constituted a violation of former SCR 20:1.15(b)11 and current 
SCR 20:1.15(d)(1). 
¶23 Counts 16 and 17 relate to negative balances in 
subsidiary trust accounts for three clients and a company owned 
by Attorney Mandelman.  For example, on one occasion Attorney 
Mandelman disbursed $2,500 to his law firm in payment of its 
fees from a client's subsidiary trust account, although that 
client only had $1,500 on deposit in the trust account, creating 
a shortfall for that client of $1,000.  On another occasion, he 
had a check written to his law firm for $4,000 from trust 
account funds allegedly belonging to a company he owned.  The 
company, however, had no funds in the trust account at that 
time, creating a negative balance in that company's subsidiary 
account of $4,000.   
¶24 The referee determined that the negative balances in 
the four subsidiary accounts resulting from disbursements of 
                                                 
11 Former SCR 20:1.15(b), effective prior to July 1, 2004, 
provides: 
Upon receiving funds or other property in which a 
client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall 
promptly notify the client or third person in writing.  
Except as stated in this rule or otherwise permitted 
by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall 
promptly deliver to the client or third person any 
funds or other property that the client or third 
person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the 
client or third person, shall render a full accounting 
regarding such property.  
No. 
2011AP584-D   
 
13 
 
more funds from those subsidiary accounts than were present in 
those accounts had resulted in the improper use of other 
clients' funds, in violation of former SCR 20:1.15(a),12 current 
                                                 
12 Former SCR 20:1.15(a), effective prior to July 1, 2004 
provides: 
A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the 
lawyer's own property, that property of clients and 
third persons that is in the lawyer's possession in 
connection with a representation or when acting in a 
fiduciary capacity.  Funds held in connection with a 
representation or in a fiduciary capacity include 
funds held as trustee, agent, guardian, personal 
representative of an estate, or otherwise.  All funds 
of clients and third persons paid to a lawyer or law 
firm shall be deposited in one or more identifiable 
trust accounts as provided in paragraph (c).  The 
trust account shall be maintained in a bank, savings 
bank, trust company, credit union, savings and loan 
association or other investment institution authorized 
to do business and located in Wisconsin.  The trust 
account shall be clearly designated as "Client's 
Account" or "Trust Account" or words of similar 
import.  No funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm, 
except funds reasonably sufficient to pay or avoid 
imposition 
of 
account 
service 
charges, 
may 
be 
deposited 
in 
such 
account. 
 
Unless 
the 
client 
otherwise directs in writing, securities in bearer 
form shall be kept by the attorney in a safe deposit 
box in a bank, savings bank, trust company, credit 
union, 
savings 
and 
loan 
association 
or 
other 
investment institution authorized to do business and 
located in Wisconsin.  The safe deposit box shall be 
clearly designated as "Client's Account" or "Trust 
Account" or words of similar import.  Other property 
of a client or third person shall be identified as 
such and appropriately safeguarded.  If a lawyer also 
licensed in another state is entrusted with funds or 
property 
in 
connection 
with 
an 
out-of-state 
representation, this provision shall not supersede the 
trust account rules of the other state. 
No. 
2011AP584-D   
 
14 
 
SCR 20:1.15(e)(5)(a),13 and current SCR 20:1.15(f)(1)(b).14  The 
referee also determined that Attorney Mandelman's payment to his 
law firm of money from his firm's trust account that the law 
firm was not entitled to receive had constituted a violation of 
SCR 20:8.4(c). 
¶25 Counts 18 and 21 also relate to Attorney Mandelman's 
trust account records.  In connection with Attorney Mandelman's 
petition for reinstatement from the nine-month suspension 
imposed in 2006, the OLR asked Attorney Mandelman to produce 
bank statements and other trust account records.  Attorney 
Mandelman and his accountant, Constance Hackbarth, produced only 
some of the requested records.  The electronic ledgers provided 
by Hackbarth were incomplete and showed that there had still 
been funds in the Pyramax Bank trust account just before it had 
been closed.  In addition, Attorney Mandelman did not file with 
the OLR any overdraft reporting agreement for the Pyramax Bank 
                                                 
13 SCR 20:1:15(e)(5)(a) provides that "[a] lawyer shall not 
disburse funds from any trust account unless the deposit from 
which those funds will be disbursed has cleared, and the funds 
are available for disbursement." 
14 SCR 20:1.15(f)(1)(b) provides: 
A subsidiary ledger shall be maintained for each 
client or 3rd party for whom the lawyer receives trust 
funds that are deposited in an IOLTA account or any 
other pooled trust account.  The lawyer shall record 
each receipt and disbursement of a client's or 3rd 
party's 
funds 
and 
the 
balance 
following 
each 
transaction.  A lawyer shall not disburse funds from 
an IOLTA account or any pooled trust account that 
would create a negative balance with respect to any 
individual client or matter. 
No. 
2011AP584-D   
 
15 
 
trust account.  He also did not report the existence of any 
trust accounts on his Fiscal Year 2006 State Bar Dues Statement 
that he filed in August 2005. 
¶26 The referee found two ethical violations based on 
these facts.  First, he determined that Attorney Mandelman had 
failed to create and retain complete and accurate trust account 
records, in violation of SCR 20:1.15(e)(6).15  He also concluded 
that Attorney Mandelman's failure to list his active trust 
accounts on his dues statement and to certify that he was in 
compliance with his record-keeping and overdraft reporting 
requirements had constituted a violation of SCR 20:1.15(i)(1) 
and (2).16 
                                                 
15 SCR 20:1.15(e)(6) 
provides 
that 
"[a] 
lawyer 
shall 
maintain complete records of trust account funds and other trust 
property and shall preserve those records for at least 6 years 
after the date of termination of the representation." 
16 SCR 20:1.15(i)(1) and (2) provides: 
(1)  Annual requirement.  A member of the state 
bar of Wisconsin shall file with the state bar of 
Wisconsin annually, with payment of the member's state 
bar dues or upon any other date approved by the 
supreme court, a certificate stating whether the 
member is engaged in the practice of law in Wisconsin.  
If the member is practicing law, the member shall 
state the account number of any trust account, and the 
name of each financial institution in which the member 
maintains a trust account, a safe deposit box, or 
both, as required by this section.  The state bar 
shall supply to each member, with the annual dues 
statement, or at any other time directed by the 
supreme court, a form on which the certification must 
be made. 
(2)  Trust account record compliance.  Each state 
bar member shall explicitly certify on the state bar 
No. 
2011AP584-D   
 
16 
 
¶27 Counts 26 and 28-30 relate to the commingling of 
Attorney Mandelman's personal and business funds with client 
funds in his client trust accounts and the failure to report 
certain income on the tax returns of Attorney Mandelman or his 
businesses.  In the years that they practiced together, 
Attorneys Mandelman and Reitz personally carried significant 
amounts of debt, as did the law firm that they owned.  The law 
firm's business accounts were also frequently overdrawn.  Those 
firm business accounts, as well as personal accounts belonging 
to Attorneys Mandelman and Reitz, were subject to liens and 
garnishments at various points in this time period. 
¶28 In May 2003 Attorney Mandelman incorporated Heartland 
Holding Group, Inc. (Heartland) for the purpose of investing in 
real estate.  Attorney Mandelman's co-owner of Heartland was an 
individual by the name of Steve Weston.  Attorney Mandelman 
reported 
in 
a 
May 
2007 
deposition 
in 
his 
reinstatement 
proceeding that many of his assets were actually titled in 
Weston's name.  Attorney Reitz was listed as the registered 
agent for Heartland. 
¶29 In October 2004, Attorney Mandelman endorsed and 
deposited a check in the amount of $189,451 payable to Heartland 
into the law firm's Tri City Bank trust account.  Over the next 
three months, $188,451 of this amount was disbursed from the 
trust account via 32 separate trust account checks.  Although 
                                                                                                                                                             
certificate described in par. (1) that the member has 
complied with each of the record-keeping requirements 
set forth in subs. (f) and (j)(5). 
No. 
2011AP584-D   
 
17 
 
Attorney Mandelman was not an owner of the law firm at this time 
and Attorney Reitz had no ownership interest in Heartland, 25 of 
these trust account checks were made payable to Attorney Reitz 
personally and another six checks were made payable to the law 
firm.  One such check was paid to Paul J. Stein "for Payroll 
Account."  The last portion of these funds was disbursed to 
Attorney Mandelman personally via a June 2, 2005 check.   
¶30 The OLR later asked Attorney Mandelman about how the 
Heartland 
real 
estate 
transaction 
and 
the 
subsequent 
disbursements had been reported for income tax purposes.  
Attorney Mandelman initially responded by claiming that the 
Heartland real estate transaction had been a "possible 1031 
exchange" so there would have been no taxable gain, but the way 
that the proceeds were deposited into and disbursed from the law 
firm's trust account was not compatible with that provision of 
the federal tax code.  Attorney Mandelman never provided the OLR 
with income tax information for Heartland regarding this 
transaction, and his personal 2004 federal income tax return did 
not report any capital gain or loss from the transaction. 
¶31 The referee concluded that the failure to report the 
Heartland real estate transaction and any accompanying gains or 
losses on any corporate or personal income tax return had 
constituted a violation of SCR 20:8.4(c) and the standard of 
conduct set forth in case law such as In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Owens, 172 Wis. 2d 54, 56-57, 492 N.W.2d 157 
(1992), which is enforced via SCR 20:8.4(f). 
No. 
2011AP584-D   
 
18 
 
¶32 Attorney 
Mandelman 
also 
deposited 
other 
funds 
belonging to another business he owned, Liberty Holding Company 
Ltd. (Liberty Holding), into the law firm trust account and then 
transferred those funds to the law firm via trust account 
checks.  In addition, the firm's trust account records showed 
that there was a "Mandelman" subsidiary account in the client 
trust account.  Between May 2005 and November 2006, Attorney 
Mandelman deposited over $110,000 into the firm's Pyramax Bank 
trust account that was recorded in the "Mandelman" subsidiary 
account.  Most of that money, approximately $83,000, was 
subsequently disbursed from the trust account via what were 
labeled on the firm's trust account ledgers as "cashiers."  No 
payees for these "cashiers" were identified.  Further, when the 
OLR asked for a list of cashier's checks that had been purchased 
with these funds, Attorney Mandelman did not produce them.  
Finally, a number of automated payments were disbursed from the 
Mandelman subsidiary account for bank fees and credit card fees, 
which resulted in a negative balance in the subsidiary account 
at times.  Attorney Mandelman never explained how he had 
subsequently 
covered 
those 
negative 
balances 
or 
to 
what 
businesses those fees had related.   
¶33 The referee determined that these facts supported 
three counts of misconduct.  First, he found that Attorney 
Mandelman had twice violated SCR 20:1.15(b)(3)17—one violation 
                                                 
17 SCR 20:1.15(b)(3) provides that "[n]o funds belonging to 
the lawyer or law firm, except funds reasonably sufficient to 
pay monthly account service charges, may be deposited or 
retained in a trust account." 
No. 
2011AP584-D   
 
19 
 
for depositing and disbursing the funds belonging to his Liberty 
Holding 
business 
and 
one 
violation 
for 
deposits 
and 
disbursements related to the "Mandelman" subsidiary account.  In 
addition, the referee found that the deposit of over $110,000 
from unknown sources into the "Mandelman" subsidiary account and 
the disbursements out of that subsidiary account to unknown 
payees for unknown purposes, without having created any records 
identifying the source, payee, or purpose of the transactions, 
had violated SCR 20:8.4(c). 
¶34 Count 34 relates to another "Mandelman" subsidiary 
account that was created in the RPL trust account following 
Attorney Mandelman's suspension in July 2006.  Over the next 
approximately 18 months, there was a relatively large number of 
transactions attributed to this "Mandelman" subsidiary account.  
Some of these transactions do not appear to have related to any 
particular client and some did not appear on the RPL trust 
account ledgers.  In addition, more funds were withdrawn from 
this subsidiary account than were deposited into it, resulting 
in a negative balance.  The referee concluded that by using the 
RPL client trust account to make unrecorded and unexplained 
personal and business deposits and withdrawals after his 2006 
suspension, Attorney Mandelman had violated SCR 20:8.4(c). 
¶35 Count 40 relates to Attorney Mandelman's claiming of 
$122,000 in business expenses related to "accrued bills" on his 
2005 income tax returns.  When the OLR discussed these claimed 
expenses with Hackbarth, she asserted that $84,616 of this 
amount represented "prepaid expenses," which she described as 
No. 
2011AP584-D   
 
20 
 
costs incurred for clients prior to settlement of their personal 
injury cases or prior to billing, which had been accumulating 
over the years but had never previously been claimed as 
expenses.  The firm's records showed, however, that the firm had 
indeed been reimbursed for many of these "prepaid expenses" 
during the time period when Attorney Reitz had been the owner 
and had been obligated to report firm income and expenses for 
tax 
purposes. 
 
Attorney 
Mandelman 
tried 
to 
provide 
an 
explanation to the OLR as to why he had deducted these allegedly 
accumulated expenses from his 2005 income, but his response did 
not correspond to what Hackbarth had told the OLR or to what was 
shown on the firm's financial records.   
¶36 The referee determined that recklessly claiming a 
$122,000 business expense for "accrued bills" on his federal 
income tax return, when many of the claimed "prepaid expenses" 
had been previously reimbursed to the firm or could not be 
substantiated, had violated a standard of conduct set forth in 
Owens, 172 Wis. 2d at 56-57, contrary to SCRs 20:8.4(f)18 and 
20:8.4(c). 
¶37 Count 42 also relates to inaccurate information on 
Attorney Mandelman's federal tax return, although this time for 
the 2006 tax year.  Specifically, the referee found that 
Attorney Mandelman had reported $33,888.89 in residual income 
                                                 
18 SCR 20:8.4(f) provides that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "violate a statute, supreme court rule, supreme 
court order or supreme court decision regulating the conduct of 
lawyers." 
No. 
2011AP584-D   
 
21 
 
paid to him from the RPL law firm after his July 2006 
suspension, when the RPL trust account records showed that he 
had been paid at least $65,614.93 in legal fees during this 
time.  The referee determined that this underreporting of 
income, which she found to have been reckless, had also violated 
the standard set forth in Owens, 172 Wis. 2d at 56-57, contrary 
to SCRs 20:8.4(f) and 20:8.4(c). 
¶38 Counts 43 and 44 relate to the representation of B.R., 
who had been injured in a motorcycle accident in April 2005.  
Shortly after B.R. had retained the law firm, Attorney Reitz had 
left the firm due to his disciplinary suspension and Attorney 
Mandelman worked on B.R.'s case.  When Attorney Mandelman's 
license was suspended, he did not inform B.R. of his suspension 
or advise him that he should find another attorney of his 
choosing.   
¶39 After his suspension, Attorney Mandelman submitted an 
affidavit to the OLR pursuant to SCR 22.26(1)(e), which requires 
a suspended attorney to certify that the attorney has provided 
written notice of the suspension to all clients with pending 
matters.  Attorney Mandelman submitted this affidavit despite 
not having informed B.R. of his suspension and not identifying 
B.R. on an attached list of pending clients.19   
                                                 
19 As noted above, Attorney Reitz's RPL law firm apparently 
acquired Attorney Mandelman's law firm following Attorney 
Mandelman's 2006 suspension.  Consequently, Attorney Reitz took 
over responsibility for B.R.'s matter.  B.R., however, was never 
informed of this change in law firms or asked to consent to the 
change. 
No. 
2011AP584-D   
 
22 
 
¶40 The 
referee 
concluded 
that 
Attorney 
Mandelman's 
failure to notify B.R. of his July 1, 2006 suspension and to 
advise B.R. to seek representation of his choice elsewhere had 
constituted a violation of SCR 22.26(1),20 which is enforced via 
                                                 
20 SCR 22.26(1) provides: 
On or before the effective date of license 
suspension or revocation, an attorney whose license is 
suspended or revoked shall do all of the following: 
(a)  Notify by certified mail all clients being 
represented in pending matters of the suspension or 
revocation and of the attorney's consequent inability 
to act as an attorney following the effective date of 
the suspension or revocation. 
(b)  Advise the clients to seek legal advice of 
their choice elsewhere. 
(c)  Promptly provide written notification to the 
court or administrative agency and the attorney for 
each party in a matter pending before a court or 
administrative agency of the suspension or revocation 
and of the attorney's consequent inability to act as 
an attorney following the effective date of the 
suspension or revocation.  The notice shall identify 
the successor attorney of the attorney's client or, if 
there is none at the time notice is given, shall state 
the client's place of residence.  
(d)  Within the first 15 days after the effective 
date 
of 
suspension 
or 
revocation, 
make 
all 
arrangements for the temporary or permanent closing or 
winding up of the attorney's practice.  The attorney 
may assist in having others take over clients' work in 
progress. 
(e)  Within 25 days after the effective date of 
suspension or revocation, file with the director an 
affidavit showing all of the following: 
(i)  Full compliance with the provisions of the 
suspension or revocation order and with the rules and 
No. 
2011AP584-D   
 
23 
 
SCR 20:8.4(f).  In addition, Attorney Mandelman's filing of an 
affidavit that falsely claimed that he had notified all clients 
with pending matters and that a list of all clients with pending 
matters was attached to the affidavit violated SCR 20:8.4(c) and 
SCR 22.26(1)(e), which is enforced via SCR 20:8.4(f). 
¶41 Finally, Count 45 relates to Attorney Mandelman's 
representation of G.W., a six-year-old boy who had been burned 
by a hot fudge dispenser in a restaurant.  G.W.'s mother 
retained Attorneys Reitz and Mandelman in January 2002 to pursue 
a claim on G.W.'s behalf against the restaurant and its insurer.   
¶42 The 
referee 
concluded 
that 
Attorney 
Mandelman's 
failure over a period of four and a half years to obtain and 
present a settlement offer21 to G.W.'s parents, to initiate a 
                                                                                                                                                             
procedures regarding the closing of the attorney's 
practice. 
(ii)  A list of all jurisdictions, including 
state, federal and administrative bodies, before which 
the attorney is admitted to practice. 
(iii)  A list of clients in all pending matters 
and a list of all matters pending before any court or 
administrative agency, together with the case number 
of each matter.  
(f)  Maintain records of the various steps taken 
under this rule in order that, in any subsequent 
proceeding instituted by or against the attorney, 
proof of compliance with the rule and with the 
suspension or revocation order is available. 
21 A June 2006 note from Attorney Mandelman's paralegal 
showed that there had been a $5,000 settlement offer from the 
restaurant or its insurer.  This settlement offer, however, was 
never communicated to G.W.'s mother. 
No. 
2011AP584-D   
 
24 
 
civil action, or to advise the parents that he did not believe 
G.W.'s claims were worth pursuing had demonstrated a failure to 
act with reasonable diligence and promptness, in violation of 
SCR 20:1.3.   
¶43 The referee recommended that Attorney Mandelman's 
license be revoked, but that the effective date of the 
revocation should be concurrent with the start of Attorney 
Mandelman's most recent one-year suspension.  In addition to 
relying on the parties' stipulation, the referee determined that 
revocation was supported by prior decisions containing similar 
violations.  See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Gedlen, 
2007 WI 121, 
305 Wis. 2d 34, 
739 N.W.2d 274; 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings 
Against 
Sheehan, 
2007 WI 3, 
298 Wis. 2d 317, 725 N.W.2d 627; In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Weigel, 2012 WI 124, 345 Wis. 2d 7, 823 N.W.2d 798.  The 
referee also took into account this court's endorsement of the 
concept 
of 
progressive 
discipline. 
 
See, 
e.g., 
In 
re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Nussberger, 2006 WI 111, ¶27, 
296 Wis. 2d 47, 719 N.W.2d 501.  The referee further considered 
a number of aggravating and mitigating factors.  Aggravating 
factors included Attorney Mandelman's significant disciplinary 
history, the fact that the trust account violations in this 
proceeding had been part of a pattern of misconduct, the 
presence of a dishonest or selfish motive (using the client 
trust accounts to conceal personal income and recklessly filing 
tax returns that misrepresented his income), the large number of 
violations in this proceeding, Attorney Mandelman's intentional 
No. 
2011AP584-D   
 
25 
 
failure to provide information or documents that were requested 
by the OLR, and the harm suffered by Attorney Mandelman's 
clients.   
¶44 On the mitigating side, the referee acknowledged 
Attorney Mandelman's claim that he had been suffering from 
chronic fatigue due to having Hepatitis C.  The referee further 
acknowledged that during the time period relevant to this 
proceeding, Attorney Mandelman had undergone another round of 
therapy that had not worked.  She also considered the affidavit 
of a doctor that Attorney Mandelman had submitted.  The referee 
stated, however, that while the affidavit had addressed the 
effects of Hepatitis C in general, it had failed to aver that 
Attorney Mandelman had actually suffered from those side effects 
during the relevant time period.   
¶45 With respect to her recommendation for a May 2009 
effective date, the referee noted that the misconduct at issue 
here occurred primarily during 2004-2007, which was the same 
time period as the misconduct that was at issue in Mandelman IV.  
Moreover, Attorney Mandelman's license has remained suspended 
well past the one-year period of suspension imposed in that 
case.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Cooper, 
2013 WI 55, ¶25, 348 Wis. 2d 266, 833 N.W.2d 88.  The referee 
concluded 
that 
under 
these 
circumstances 
the 
period 
of 
revocation should run concurrently with the one-year suspension 
that began on May 29, 2009. 
¶46 The 
referee 
further 
recommended 
that 
Attorney 
Mandelman should be required to pay the full costs of this 
No. 
2011AP584-D   
 
26 
 
proceeding.  The OLR's statement of costs indicates that as of 
April 2, 2014, the costs of this proceeding were $16,943.16. 
¶47 The referee did not make any recommendation with 
respect to restitution.  The OLR filed a statement on 
restitution, which did not ask for any restitution award.  With 
respect to the representations of B.R. and G.W., the OLR notes 
that there was no allegation or finding that Attorney Mandelman 
had misappropriated or misapplied client funds.  As to the 
various trust account violations, the OLR asserts that there is 
not a readily ascertainable amount that would meet its criteria 
for restitution and that it could ask this court to award to 
specific payees.  It states that it has not been able to 
determine whether the funds in the various trust accounts were 
or were not ultimately disbursed to the rightful owners.  The 
OLR notes that in the Reitz decision, this court ordered 
Attorney Reitz to distribute all funds in his trust accounts to 
the rightful owners, or if the rightful owners could not be 
identified, to transfer the funds to the state treasurer's 
office 
as 
unclaimed 
or 
unidentifiable 
property.  
346 Wis. 2d 375, ¶42.  The OLR states that Attorney Mandelman 
has agreed to work with Attorney Reitz and the OLR to accomplish 
the same task for his clients.   
¶48 We now turn to Attorney Mandelman's appeal, which is 
somewhat strange in that he is not asking this court to overturn 
any of the legal conclusions of misconduct nor is he requesting 
a less severe sanction than that recommended by the referee.   
No. 
2011AP584-D   
 
27 
 
¶49 Attorney Mandelman specifically does not challenge any 
of the factual findings that underlie the counts of misconduct 
or the legal conclusions of misconduct.  In light of Attorney 
Mandelman's stipulation to those facts, we accept the referee's 
findings of fact based on the remaining allegations of the 
complaint.  We further determine that those findings adequately 
support the legal conclusion that Attorney Mandelman did engage 
in the 22 ethical violations alleged in the remaining counts of 
the complaint.   
¶50 The primary focus of Attorney Mandelman's appeal is 
essentially a number of arguments urging this court to consider 
additional information regarding his accountant and the effects 
of his Hepatitis C infection as mitigating factors that would 
lessen his culpability for his violations without changing the 
end result recommended by the referee.  He contends that the 
referee's discussion of mitigating factors contained erroneous 
findings of fact and did not give sufficient consideration to 
these two mitigating factors.   
¶51 With respect to the actions of Hackbarth, Attorney 
Mandelman 
relies 
extensively 
on 
opinions 
from 
the 
OLR's 
accountant expert, who disputed Hackbarth's analysis of certain 
issues and the way that certain items had been reported on 
Attorney Mandelman's income tax returns.  Attorney Mandelman 
asserts that he expected Hackbarth, as a certified public 
accountant, to make a proper evaluation of the records that he 
and the law firm submitted to her so that she could compile 
accurate accounting records for the law firm and prepare his 
No. 
2011AP584-D   
 
28 
 
personal income tax returns.  He further contends that it was 
Attorney Reitz's responsibility to ensure that Hackbarth had all 
of the information she needed to do both the accounting and the 
tax return preparation.  If Hackbarth did not have all of the 
necessary information, Attorney Mandelman argues that it was her 
responsibility to make this fact known to him so that he could 
get her everything she needed.   
¶52 We agree with the OLR's contention that Attorney 
Mandelman never explicitly argued to the referee that his 
reliance on Hackbarth should be considered a mitigating factor.  
In his statement in support of the stipulation, which was 
provided to the referee before she prepared her report, Attorney 
Mandelman did discuss generally his view of how things had 
operated with respect to the law firm's trust accounts and the 
preparation of his income tax returns and his view that 
Hackbarth's record-keeping and preparation of his tax returns 
had been substandard.  This discussion, however, occurred in the 
context of providing "background information" about the trust 
account violations and of arguing that the referee should 
conclude that his conduct with respect to the false income tax 
returns was not intentionally fraudulent.22  Attorney Mandelman 
did not mention his reliance on Hackbarth as a mitigating factor 
in the section of his memorandum discussing mitigating factors.  
Thus, the referee did not err in failing to include an explicit 
                                                 
22 The referee did issue an amendment to her report that 
clarified that Attorney Mandelman's filing of false tax returns 
was reckless rather than intentional. 
No. 
2011AP584-D   
 
29 
 
discussion of Hackbarth's shortcomings in the section of her 
report dealing with mitigating factors.  Moreover, the limited 
information included in Attorney Mandelman's memorandum in 
support of the stipulation did not demonstrate that his reliance 
on Hackbarth had been reasonable and in good faith.   
¶53 Attorney Mandelman also argues that the referee failed 
to give proper consideration to the affidavit of Dr. Michael G. 
Karos regarding the effects of Hepatitis C.  In particular, 
Attorney Mandelman challenges the referee's statement that while 
Dr. Karos' affidavit described the effects of the condition in 
general, it failed to state directly that Attorney Mandelman had 
suffered from those effects during the relevant time period.   
¶54 We acknowledge that Dr. Karos' affidavit not only 
discussed generally the side effects of the condition and the 
treatments, but also indicated that the disabling fatigue that 
accompanies the condition and its treatments did afflict 
Attorney Mandelman.  Nonetheless, the affidavit did not provide 
all of the necessary evidence to prove that the Hepatitis C 
should be a mitigating factor.  "A medical condition will not be 
considered in mitigation of discipline unless that condition is 
explicitly found to have caused the misconduct."  In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Schwartz, 134 Wis. 2d 18, 22, 
397 N.W.2d 98 (1986).  Dr. Karos did not state when Attorney 
Mandelman had suffered the fatigue and the other side effects 
(i.e., whether at the time of some or all of the misconduct).  
He also never opined that the fatigue or the other side effects 
had been a cause of Attorney Mandelman's misconduct.  Thus, the 
No. 
2011AP584-D   
 
30 
 
referee did not err in refusing to rely on the Hepatitis C 
infection as a reason to recommend a less severe sanction, 
especially where Attorney Mandelman had stipulated to the level 
of discipline.   
¶55 Attorney Mandelman also challenges on appeal the 
referee's statement that his misconduct was as serious, if not 
more so, than the misconduct described in the Gedlen, Sheehan, 
and Weigel decisions.   
¶56 It is true that not all of the misconduct that 
occurred in Gedlen, Sheehan, and Weigel is also present in this 
case.  That is not unusual, however.  Rarely do two attorney 
discipline cases involve precisely the same set of facts or the 
exact same list of violations.  What is important is that in 
those decisions, the attorney's license to practice law in this 
state was revoked, and their misconduct was not clearly more 
serious than the misconduct committed by Attorney Mandelman.   
¶57 In the present case, Attorney Mandelman did commingle 
his personal and business funds with client trust funds, he did 
convert the trust funds of clients by engaging in trust account 
transactions that left negative balances in his own subsidiary 
accounts, he did fail to deliver trust funds to clients for many 
years, he did keep incomplete and inaccurate trust account 
records (such that determining who is still owed money is a very 
difficult task), and he did on multiple occasions file income 
tax returns that were recklessly false, whether because of 
failing to report income or because of claiming expenses to 
which he was not entitled.  He showed a multi-year lack of 
No. 
2011AP584-D   
 
31 
 
diligence in one matter, failed to notify a client of his 
suspension in another, and also gave a false affidavit to the 
OLR.  Moreover, this is not the first time that Attorney 
Mandelman is being disciplined for his misconduct.  It is the 
seventh time, and the fifth time that his misconduct has been 
serious enough to warrant having his license to practice law 
suspended.  We think that it is not improper to say that 
Attorney Mandelman's conduct is as serious as the misconduct in 
Gedlen, Sheehan, and Weigel, and that, in light of his lengthy 
disciplinary history, he should receive the same sanction that 
they did, namely the revocation of their licenses to practice 
law in this state. 
¶58 We further conclude that a retroactive effective date 
of Attorney Mandelman's suspension would be appropriate under 
these circumstances.  We have previously stated, including in a 
prior decision involving Attorney Mandelman, that retroactive 
effective 
dates 
of 
suspensions 
and 
revocations 
may 
be 
appropriate where the "'misconduct occurred prior to the 
[earlier] disciplinary proceeding and [the attorney's] license 
has remained suspended well beyond the period of suspension 
previously imposed.'"  Cooper, 348 Wis. 2d 266, ¶25 (quoting 
Mandelman II, 182 Wis. 2d at 592).  The misconduct at issue in 
this case did occur before the prior proceeding and Attorney 
Mandelman's license has remained suspended from May 2009 to the 
present time, a much longer period than the one-year suspension 
imposed in Mandelman IV.   
No. 
2011AP584-D   
 
32 
 
¶59 Attorney Mandelman does not object to the referee's 
recommendation that he should bear the full costs of this 
proceeding.  Although he ultimately stipulated to the remaining 
22 ethical violations, he had vigorously litigated this matter 
up to that point, which necessitated the expenses incurred by 
the OLR and the referee.  Consequently, we see no reason to 
depart in this case from our general policy of imposing full 
costs upon an attorney who engaged in misconduct. 
¶60 Finally, 
we 
address 
the 
issue 
of 
restitution.  
Although it does appear that there were funds in the various 
trust accounts Attorney Mandelman or his firm maintained that 
were never disbursed to the proper clients or third parties 
before those trust accounts were closed, there is a lack of 
records from which the OLR or this court can determine what 
amounts are owed and to whom.  Consequently, we conclude that 
there is not a sufficient basis upon which we could order 
restitution in favor of any particular client or third party.   
¶61 Because our inability to order restitution to specific 
persons stems from the lack of records caused by Attorney 
Mandelman and/or his colleagues, we are unwilling simply to 
disregard the issue of restitution completely.  First, we note 
that 
in 
order 
for 
Attorney 
Mandelman 
to 
petition 
for 
reinstatement, he will be required to allege in good faith and 
then to prove that he "has made restitution to or settled all 
claims of persons injured or harmed by [his] misconduct . . . . 
or, if not, [his] explanation of the failure or inability to do 
so."  SCR 22.29(4m).  We also conclude that we should follow the 
No. 
2011AP584-D   
 
33 
 
path we took with Attorney Reitz in his disciplinary proceeding, 
where we ordered him to disburse all funds in his trust account 
to their rightful owners or to transfer the funds to the state 
treasurer's office if the rightful owner cannot be identified or 
located.  Reitz, 346 Wis. 2d 375, ¶¶40, 42.  The OLR states that 
Attorney Reitz has been working with that agency to determine 
the former law firms' restitution obligations and that Attorney 
Mandelman has agreed to work with the OLR and Attorney Reitz to 
complete that endeavor.  We formalize that obligation here. 
¶62 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Michael D. Mandelman 
to practice law in Wisconsin is revoked, effective May 29, 2009. 
¶63 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Michael D. Mandelman shall 
work with the Office of Lawyer Regulation and Jeffrey A. Reitz 
to determine whether any of the funds in the client trust 
accounts he controlled should have been paid to particular 
individuals or entities and, if so, in what amounts.  If such a 
determination is made, Michael D. Mandelman shall pay the amount 
owed to the applicable individual or entity.   
¶64 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Michael D. Mandelman shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding. 
¶65 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, if Michael D. Mandelman is 
able to determine that restitution is owed to a particular 
individual or entity, the payment of restitution shall occur 
before the payment of costs to the Office of Lawyer Regulation.  
¶66 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, to the extent he has not 
already done so, Michael D. Mandelman shall comply with the 
No. 
2011AP584-D   
 
34 
 
provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of any attorney 
whose license to practice law has been revoked. 
 
 
No. 
2011AP584-D   
 
 
 
1