Title: L.U. Sheep Co. v. Board of County Com'rs of County of Hot Springs

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

L.U. Sheep Co. v. Board of County Com'rs of County of Hot Springs1990 WY 39790 P.2d 663Case Number: 89-148Decided: 04/11/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
L.U. SHEEP COMPANY, A 
WYOMING CORPORATION; GARY KELLOGG AND BRENDA KELLOGG, HUSBAND AND WIFE; AND 
MAXINE KELLOGG,

 APPELLANTS 
(DEFENDANTS),

v.

BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF HOT SPRINGS, WYOMING, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Hot Springs County, Gary P. Hartman, J.

 

John W. Davis of 
Davis, Donnell, Worrall & Bancroft, P.C., Worland, and James L. Applegate, 
Hirst & Applegate, Cheyenne, for appellants.

J. John Sampson, 
Sheridan, for appellee.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1]      The question of 
what is the proper instruction to be given to the jury with respect to the 
measure of damages to the landowner for a partial taking of a privately owned 
road under the Wyoming Eminent Domain Act, §§ 1-26-101 to -817, W.S. 1977 (the 
Act), is the central issue to be resolved in this case. Collateral issues are 
asserted relating to the propriety of the cooperation of the United States 
Forest Service (USFS) in the road project; whether that cooperation resulted in 
the USFS being an indispensable party to the proceedings; whether Hot Springs 
County brought the action under the proper statutes; whether the trial court 
erred in excluding from evidence the report of court-appointed appraisers; and 
whether the trial court erred in granting motions submitted by Hot Springs 
County to suppress testimony concerning the involvement of the USFS in the 
project; certain testimony from the landowners whose property was taken; 
evidence about the rental value of the land; and evidence relating to road 
construction costs.

[¶2]      The trial court 
failed to instruct the jury about the proper measure of damages in this 
instance, and we must reverse and remand the case for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. Because the same issues are likely to arise upon 
retrial, we address the rulings of the trial court on the motions to suppress 
evidence. Those rulings appear to be incorrect in some instances in light of the 
proper measure of damages. We affirm the rulings of the trial court that 
established the posture of the USFS in connection with this case and excluded 
evidence concerning the involvement of the USFS. We also agree with the trial 
court that Hot Springs County could bring this case under the Act rather than 
under the statutes relating to the establishment of a county road. Sections 
24-3-101 to -127, W.S. 1977.

[¶3]      In their brief on 
appeal, styled "Brief for Appellants/Defendants," L.U. Sheep Company, and Gary 
Kellogg, Brenda Kellogg, and Maxine Kellogg (Kelloggs), set forth the following 
issues to be addressed by the Court:

"I. Whether or not the 
district court erred when it refused to instruct in accordance with existing 
statutory law.

"II. Whether or not the 
district court erred when it ruled that the joint enterprise of Hot Springs 
County and the Forest Service regarding the Grass Creek road project did not 
violate either Wyoming statutes or the Wyoming Constitution.

"III. Whether or not the 
district court erred when it held that it was proper for Hot Springs County to 
proceed under §§ 1-26-105 et seq.,1 rather than the county road 
statute, §§ 24-3-101, et seq.

"IV. Whether or not the 
district court erred when it refused to allow any evidence from the three 
appraisers who had been previously appointed by the court.

"V. Whether or not the 
district court erred by granting any of several motions in limine.

"VI. Whether or not the 
district court erred when it refused to hold that the Forest Service was an 
indispensable party to these proceedings."

The Board of 
County Commissioners of the County of Hot Springs, Wyoming (Hot Springs County), 
in its Brief for Appellee/Plaintiff, recites the same six issues as the 
appellants, and it adds the following statement of an additional 
issue:

"VII. Whether or not the 
jury verdict was supported by competent evidence presented at trial and should, 
therefore, be affirmed."

[¶4]      Hot Springs 
County filed its complaint seeking condemnation of a private road that had been 
constructed across the lands of L.U. Sheep Company and the Kelloggs. The action 
was commenced on March 3, 1988, well after the effective date of the Act, and 
the County did invoke its power of eminent domain pursuant to § 1-26-801. The 
purpose of the condemnation was to provide access to the Shoshone National 
Forest for recreation, the harvesting of timber, and the development and 
operation of oil and gas leases. The USFS had agreed to finance the acquisition 
of this road by Hot Springs County, and the record justifies the conclusion that 
the acquisition of the road was accomplished at the behest of the 
USFS.

[¶5]      The road involved 
in this case runs from Grass Creek in northern Hot Springs County to the border 
of the Shoshone National Forest. The road, which follows Grass Creek, had 
existed as a private road for many years. The length of the road where it 
crossed the Kelloggs' property was .94 of a mile and 6.84 miles where it crossed 
the property of L.U. Sheep Company. Significant improvements had been made to 
the road in the 1950s including, at the time of trial, about eighteen cattle 
guards and thirty-five culverts. Over the years, the landowners had permitted 
the road to be used for access to a youth camp and to the sites of timber and 
oil and gas operations. The owners, however, had denied access to other users of 
the road. Most of the surrounding land is used as pasture and hay 
meadows.

[¶6]      At the time their 
answer was filed, the Kelloggs and L.U. Sheep Company also filed a motion to 
join the USFS as an indispensable party, invoking the provisions of Rule 19, 
W.R.C.P. That was met by a subsequent motion on the part of Hot Springs County 
to suppress any mention of the USFS in the condemnation proceedings. The trial 
court found that the agreement between Hot Springs County and the USFS did not 
make the USFS an indispensable party in that a determination without the 
involvement of the USFS would not affect its substantial rights. For that 
reason, it denied the motion of the Kelloggs and L.U. Sheep Company, but it 
granted the motion of Hot Springs County, ruling that any reference to the USFS 
would be immaterial and irrelevant.

[¶7]      The procedural 
effort of Hot Springs County to confine the proceedings continued, and it filed 
motions to suppress evidence relating to the rental value of the private road; 
evidence demonstrating road construction costs; and testimony from the 
landowners about the collateral effects of making the road a public road. All of 
these motions were granted by the trial court. The judge stated that testimony 
from landowners concerning livestock losses and increased dust attributable to 
making the road public would be entirely speculative. No definite reasons were 
articulated for granting the other two motions. The argument of Hot Springs 
County was that the rental value of the road and the costs of construction were 
not relevant in determining the "before and after values" of the ranch 
properties that the partial taking affected. Hot Springs County maintained that 
the only proper measure of compensation in the case was to compare, in each 
instance, the value of the entire property before the partial taking with the 
value of the entire property after the partial taking.

[¶8]      In August of 
1988, the parties stipulated to certain facts and issues in the case. The effect 
of that stipulation was to establish the right of Hot Springs County to condemn 
the road under the Act, and the only issue left to be resolved was the question 
of just compensation for the condemnation of the private road. The trial court 
entered an order that reflected the stipulation of the parties and, pursuant to 
Rule 71.1(e), W.R.C.P., also provided for the appointment of three independent 
appraisers.

[¶9]      The appraisers 
were instructed by the court with respect to making a determination of the 
amount of just compensation, and they were told to be guided by §§ 1-26-701 
through -713, W.S. 1977, which is the compensation section of the Act.2 Prior to arriving at their 
determination of the values of the respective takings, the appraisers viewed the 
road, received and examined evidence, and held a hearing. The report of the 
appraisers was filed with the court on March 8, 1989.

[¶10]   The appraisers determined that the 
just compensation for the taking of the Kellogg lands was $33,350 and, for the 
taking of the lands of L.U. Sheep Company, just compensation was determined to 
be $128,000. In arriving at the just compensation for the value of the Kellogg 
lands taken, the appraisers included the loss of revenues for use of the road 
and damages to the remaining property caused by the general public. The 
appraisers relied upon these same factors in arriving at the value of the lands 
taken from L.U. Sheep Company, and they allowed additional compensation to that 
landowner for the diminution in value of its remaining lands. Hot Springs County 
labeled the appraisers' determinations improper and unacceptable.

[¶11]   Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 
71.1(j), W.R.C.P., the County requested a jury trial, and one was conducted on 
April 18 and 19, 1989. The appraisers' report was offered in evidence by the 
Kelloggs and L.U. Sheep Company, but the trial court refused to receive it into 
evidence stating that it was hearsay and that it would not assist the jury. At 
the trial, both sides presented experts who testified with respect to the 
appropriate compensation for the lands taken. The expert presented by the 
Kelloggs and L.U. Sheep Company testified that the value of the Kellogg land 
that was taken was $25,225 and that the value of the lands taken from L.U. Sheep 
Company was $201,012. Those amounts included compensation for the effect that 
the public road would have on the remaining lands. One of the experts called by 
Hot Springs County determined the value of the Kellogg taking to be $1,200 and 
the value of the L.U. Sheep Company taking to be $8,700. A second expert called 
by Hot Springs County placed those values at $1,950 for the Kellogg taking and 
$7,292 for the L.U. Sheep Company taking. These amounts represented the 
determinations made by the experts of the value per acre of the land taken 
multiplied by the number of acres taken.

[¶12]   The Kelloggs and L.U. Sheep Company 
offered these instructions on compensation to be given to the jury:

"Defendants' Instruction 
No. 24

"The fair market value of 
property for which there is relevant market is the price which would be agreed 
to by an informed Seller who is willing but not obligated to sell and informed 
Buyer who is willing but not obligated to buy.

"The fair market value of 
property for which there is no relevant market is its value as determined by any 
method of valuation that is just and equitable.

"In addition, the fair 
market value of the remainder of the property on the valuation date shall 
reflect increases or decreases in value caused by the proposed project, 
including the increase in damage to property by the general public which could 
reasonably be expected to occur as a result of the proposed actions of Hot 
Springs County.

"Defendants' Instruction 
No. 25

"This case involves a 
partial taking of property and, therefore, the measure of compensation is the 
greater of the value of the property rights taken or the amount by which the 
fair market value of the entire property immediately before the taking exceeds 
the fair market value of the remainder immediately after the 
taking."

The Kelloggs and 
L.U. Sheep Company relied upon §§ 1-26-702, -704, and -706, W.S. 1977, as 
authority for these instructions, but the trial court refused to give them. 
Instead, and over the objection of those parties, the jury was instructed that 
just compensation amounted to the difference between fair market value of the 
ranching properties as a whole immediately before and immediately after the 
taking.3 The jury was instructed as to the 
definition of fair market value and a method for determining that value,4 and the jury also was instructed 
not to consider those factors which it might find to be too remote, imaginary, 
or speculative.5 The jury was permitted to consider 
the effect of the county's use, which would be use by the public, of the road on 
the remaining lands. In addition, the jury was instructed that Hot Springs 
County was not responsible for the criminal acts of third parties on the Kellogg 
and L.U. Sheep Company lands due to the establishment of the public 
road.

[¶13]   The jury returned a verdict finding 
that just compensation to the L.U. Sheep Company for lands taken was $8,700 and 
just compensation to the Kelloggs for lands taken was $1,950. The district court 
entered a Judgment and Order reflecting that verdict.

[¶14]   The question of the proper factors 
to be taken into account in connection with a partial taking of land is also 
determinative of several of the evidentiary questions raised in this appeal. We 
cannot criticize the trial court for faithfully following the law articulated in 
Coronado Oil Company v. Grieves, 642 P.2d 423 (Wyo. 1982), where we held that 
the trial court committed reversible error by allowing evidence of damage 
factors that were not related to the "before and after" rule for the valuation 
of property. We there quoted, at 642 P.2d 433, the following language from 
Continental Pipe Line Company v. Irwin Livestock Company, 625 P.2d 214, 216, 25 
A.L.R.4th 607 (Wyo. 1981):

"`* * * [W]here there is 
a partial taking of property, as here, which will result in damages to the 
remainder not taken, the amount of just compensation to be awarded for that 
"taken or affected" is determined by application of the "before and after" rule, 
i.e. just compensation is the difference between fair market value of the entire 
parcel before the taking and that after the taking.'"

The trial 
court's instructions to the jury faithfully reflected the decision in the 
Coronado case to the extent that the court's Instruction No. 11, relating to 
factors to be taken into account in determining fair market value, was taken 
verbatim from an instruction we cited with approval there.

[¶15]   The Act became effective in 1981, 
and is the law to be applied in this case. In Coronado, 642 P.2d  at 433, we 
clearly stated in n. 4 that the Act had no application to that case. The Act 
covers the entire subject of eminent domain except that the provisions of the 
Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure are preserved to the extent that they do not 
conflict with the statute. Section 1-26-501, W.S. 1977. We presume that the 
legislature adopts statutes with full knowledge of existing state law, including 
court decisions and, for that reason, the legislature implicitly abrogated 
earlier contrary decisions in the law of eminent domain when it adopted the Act. 
Matter of Voss' Adoption, 550 P.2d 481 (Wyo. 1976); Snell v. Ruppert, 541 P.2d 1042 (Wyo. 1975). It follows that the reliance of the trial court on the rules 
of law articulated in Coronado was misplaced. In resolving the issue of the 
appropriate determination of compensation for a partial taking, we must define 
what the statute provides for damages and determine in what respects Coronado is 
not in harmony with the current statutes.

[¶16]   The repeal of §§ 1-26-101 to -405, 
W.S. 1977, and their replacement with the Act was the culmination of the work of 
a joint legislative committee that was commenced in 1979. See Report No. 1, 
Eminent Domain Study, Joint Judiciary Interim Committee (1979). The impetus for 
the study and the subsequent revision of the eminent domain statutes was the 
increased use of the power of eminent domain by public utilities and 
energy-related industries that experienced tremendous growth in Wyoming during 
the preceding years. Comment, Wyoming Eminent Domain Act: Comment on the Act and 
Rule 71.1 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, 18 Land & Water L.Rev. 
739 (1983). The Committee noted that the earlier statutes pertained to 
compensation only in a marginal way and that the rules for compensation at that 
time were guided by Rule 71.1, W.R.C.P., and the decisions of the Wyoming 
Supreme Court. Report No. 2, Eminent Domain Study, Joint Judiciary Interim 
Committee, at 16 (1979). The new Act changed this aspect of the law.

[¶17]   The sections relating to 
compensation for the taking of land by the power of eminent domain are found in 
Art. 7 of the Act. The following sections are pertinent to the disposition of 
this case:

"Section 1-26-702. 
Compensation for taking:

"(a) Except as provided 
in subsection (b) of this section, the measure of compensation for a taking of 
property is its fair market value determined under W.S. 1-26-704 as of the date 
of valuation.

"(b) If there is a 
partial taking of property, the measure of compensation is the greater of the 
value of the property rights taken or the amount by which the fair market value 
of the entire property immediately before the taking exceeds the fair market 
value of the remainder immediately after the taking.

"Section 1-26-704. Fair 
market value defined:

"(a) Except as provided 
in subsection (b) of this section:

"(i) The fair market 
value of property for which there is a relevant market is the price which would 
be agreed to by an informed seller who is willing but not obligated to sell, and 
an informed buyer who is willing but not obligated to buy;

"(ii) The fair market 
value of property for which there is no relevant market is its value as 
determined by any method of valuation that is just and equitable.

* * * * * *

"Section 1-26-706. 
Compensation to reflect project as planned.

"(a) If there is a 
partial taking of property, the fair market value of the remainder on the 
valuation date shall reflect increases or decreases in value caused by the 
proposed project including:

"(i) Impairment of the 
use of his other property caused by the condemnation; and

"(ii) The increase in 
damage to his property by the general public which could reasonably be expected 
to occur as a result of the proposed actions of the condemnor;

"(iii) Any work to be 
performed under an agreement between the parties.

"Section 1-26-709. 
Compensation for growing crops and improvements.

* * * * * *

"(b) The compensation for 
an interest in improvements is the higher of the fair market value of the 
improvements, assuming their immediate removal from the property, or the amount 
by which the existence of the improvements enhances the fair market value of the 
property.

* * * * * *

"Section 1-26-711. Taking 
of leasehold interest.

"(a) If all or part of 
the property taken includes a leasehold interest, the effect of the condemnation 
action upon the rights and obligations of the parties to the lease is governed 
by the provisions of the lease, and in the absence of applicable provisions in 
the lease, by this section.

"(b) If there is a 
partial taking and the part of the property taken includes a leasehold interest 
that extends to the remainder, the court may determine that:

"(i) The lease terminates 
as to the part of the property taken but remains in force as to the remainder, 
in which case the rent reserved in the lease is extinguished to the extent it is 
affected by the taking; or

"(ii) The lease 
terminates as to both the part taken and the remainder, if the part taken is 
essential to the purposes of the lease or the remainder is no longer suitable 
for the purpose of the lease.

"(c) The termination or 
partial termination of a lease under this section shall occur at the earlier of 
the date on which, under an order of the court, the condemnor is permitted to 
take possession of the property, or the date on which title to the property is 
transferred to the condemnor.

"(d) This section does 
not affect or impair a lessee's right to compensation if his leasehold interest 
is taken in whole or in part."

[¶18]   In an earlier appeal of the 
Coronado case, we said that eminent domain statutes are to be strictly construed 
in favor of the landowners to the end that no person will be deprived of the use 
and enjoyment of his property except by a valid exercise of that power. Coronado 
Oil Company v. Grieves, 603 P.2d 406 (Wyo. 1979). We have no question that the 
legislature intended to continue this rule of construction when it adopted the 
present Act. In drafting the Act, the legislature looked to the California 
eminent domain law, Cal.Civ.Proc.Code §§ 1230.010-1273.050 (West 1982), and the 
Uniform Eminent Domain Code (U.L.A.), 13 U.L.A. 1 (1986).6 Comment, Wyoming Eminent Domain 
Act: Comment on the Act and Rule 71.1 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, 
18 Land & Water L.Rev. at 739-40. Most of Art. 7 of the Wyoming Eminent 
Domain Act is taken from the Uniform Eminent Domain Code, §§ 1001 to -16. We do 
note the difference in § 1-26-706, W.S. 1977, entitled "Compensation to reflect 
project as planned," which is quoted above and § 1006 of the Model Eminent 
Domain Code which has the same title. Section 1006 of the Model Eminent Domain 
Code reads as follows:

"(a) If there is a 
partial taking of property, the fair market value of the remainder on the 
valuation date shall reflect increases or decreases in value caused by the 
proposed project including any work to be performed under an agreement between 
the parties.

"(b) The fair market 
value of the remainder, as of the date of valuation, shall reflect the time the 
damage or benefit caused by the proposed improvement or project will be actually 
realized."

It was this 
language that was included in Report No. 3, Eminent Domain Study, Joint 
Judiciary Interim Committee, at 14 (1979).7 In arriving at a determination of 
the legislative intent, we consider the plain language of the statute. E.g. 
Belle Fourche Pipeline Company v. State, 766 P.2d 537 (Wyo. 1988). The overall 
purpose of the Act and the plain language of § 1-26-706 demonstrate a 
legislative intent that the landowner should be compensated for all losses that 
he can establish as attributable to the taking. The adjustment in the language 
by the legislature from the language of the Uniform Act makes this intent quite 
evident.

[¶19]   Our decision in the second Coronado 
case, 642 P.2d 423, did not consider the expanded range of compensation factors 
that the legislature recognized in adopting the Act. Pursuant to the provisions 
of the Act, the landowner whose property is the subject of a partial taking is 
entitled to prove not only the difference between the fair market value of the 
property prior to the taking and the fair market value of the remainder after 
the taking, under the "before and after rule," but he also is entitled to prove 
the value of the property rights taken. The measure of compensation is the 
greater of those alternative amounts. Section 1-26-702(b), W.S. 1977. The 
landowner may prove the fair market value of the property taken by any method of 
valuation that is just and equitable if there is no relevant market establishing 
the value. Section 1-26-704(a)(ii), W.S. 1977. In § 1-26-706(a)(i), the 
legislature provided that the fair market value of the remainder should reflect 
increases or decreases in value caused by the proposed project including 
"impairment of the use of [the landowner's] other property caused by the 
condemnation" and, in the following subsection (ii), provision is made for 
"increase in damage to [the landowner's] property by the general public which 
could reasonably be expected to occur as a result of the proposed actions of the 
condemnor; * * *." The effect of this statutory scheme is to permit the 
landowner to establish the appropriate amount of just compensation for a partial 
taking by any rational method so long as he is able to introduce competent 
evidence to that end.

[¶20]   The application of these concepts 
requires us to reverse the Judgment and Order in this case. In considering the 
validity of instructions to a jury, we must determine whether the instructions, 
taken as a whole, adequately advise the jury of the applicable law. Banks v. 
Crowner, 694 P.2d 101 (Wyo. 1985). Proper instructions should be clear 
declarations of the pertinent law. Short v. Spring Creek Ranch, Inc., 731 P.2d 1195 (Wyo. 1987). The ruling of a trial court on an instruction will not 
constitute reversible error unless there is a showing of prejudice, which 
connotes a demonstration by the complaining party that the instruction misled or 
confused the jury with respect to the applicable principles of law. DeJulio v. 
Foster, 715 P.2d 182 (Wyo. 1986). In relying upon the concepts articulated in 
Coronado, 642 P.2d 423, the trial court failed to afford adequate instruction to 
the jury on the proper factors to consider in awarding just compensation. Its 
reliance upon that case excluded the application of the Act. The two 
instructions offered by the Kelloggs and L.U. Sheep Company that the trial court 
refused to give encompassed correct statements of the law applicable in this 
case.

[¶21]   This brings us to rulings that the 
trial court made with respect to the motions relating to the admissibility of 
certain evidence. Even though we reverse for other reasons, it is appropriate to 
consider these rulings because of the likelihood that they will arise in 
connection with a new trial. The Kelloggs and L.U. Sheep Company raised the 
validity of these rulings in their fourth and fifth issues.

[¶22]   The fourth issue addresses the 
ruling of the district court that it would not receive the report of the 
appraisers into evidence. The Kelloggs and L.U. Sheep Company contend that this 
ruling was premised on an erroneous ground by the trial court. In our judgment, 
this ruling was correct, however, for at least three reasons. First, § 1-26-711, 
W.S. 1977, sets forth the rules relating to the taking of a leasehold interest 
and makes no reference to compensation to the landowner, but the appraisers 
included compensation for loss of lease revenues in their report. Second, the 
clear implication of one of the holdings of the court in Coronado, 642 P.2d 423, 
is that compensation does not include any factor for loss of business, and the 
appraisers' report included a loss of business factor in the form of lease 
revenues. Third, the involvement of appraisers pursuant to Rule 71.1, W.R.C.P., 
in effect, constitutes a panel like a special master to advise the court, and 
the product of the appraisers' deliberations and consideration of just 
compensation should not be weighed in the balance of evidence at a jury trial 
which clearly is a determination de novo and not a review of the 
appraisers' recommendation.

[¶23]   What we have said with respect to 
the admissibility of the appraisers' report also serves to control the rental 
value of the road. In our judgment, rental value of the land taken is the 
substantial equivalent of the loss of business foreclosed by Coronado, 642 P.2d 423, and that rule has not been adjusted by the Act. To the contrary, the 
specific provisions of the statute, § 1-26-711, W.S. 1977, relating to the 
taking of a leasehold interest do not provide for compensation to the landowner. 

[¶24]   The admission of evidence is 
controlled generally by Rules 401, 402, and 403, W.R.E.8 Rulings on the admission of 
evidence are within the sound discretion of the trial court and, in the absence 
of a clear abuse of discretion, its rulings will not be disturbed. Taylor v. 
State, 642 P.2d 1294 (Wyo. 1982). This exercise of the sound discretion of the 
trial court includes its determinations with respect to adequacy of foundation, 
the relevance of the proffered evidence, the competency of the proffered 
evidence, the materiality of the proffered evidence, and its remoteness, and the 
court's ruling with respect to any factor will be upheld on appeal absent the 
clear abuse of that discretion.

[¶25]   Because of our reversal of this 
case, which will encompass a remand for a new trial, the question of 
admissibility of certain of this evidence does arise anew. The report of the 
appraisers and evidence as to the rental value of the road is not relevant with 
respect to the question of fair compensation under Art. 7 of the Act. Section 
1-26-706, W.S. 1977, however, clearly provides for the inclusion of the factors 
of impairment of use of the landowner's other property and the increase in 
damage to his property by the general public which could reasonably be expected 
to occur as a result of the condemnation. The evidence of the effects of the 
road becoming public that was offered through the testimony of the landowners is 
relevant so long as it does not encompass mere speculation in violation of the 
concept set forth in Coronado, 642 P.2d 423. In our judgment, the taking of a 
private road encompasses the immediate removal of the road, which is an 
improvement within the contemplation of § 1-26-709(b), W.S. 1977. Consequently, 
evidence of road construction costs may well be relevant as to its market value. 
In this regard, we emphasize that the trial court retains its discretion, and 
the other requirements for admissibility of evidence that also come within the 
discretion of the trial court may still be applicable.

[¶26]   We cannot discern any relevance 
attaching to the evidence of the involvement of the USFS in this project. A 
similar question has been presented to this court before. In that instance, we 
stated:

"Defendants argue that 
they should have been allowed to adduce testimony tending to show that the 
Federal Government rather than the State of Wyoming was paying the bill. * * * 
Apparently the idea underlying the request was that juries regard Federal 
projects as pork barrels which may be tapped without pain to the conscience or 
injury to the residents of the State. Our experience is that the citizens who 
serve on juries are fully cognizant of the harm to State taxpayers which results 
from unwarranted Federal spending. In any event, the argument is without merit, 
and no authorities are cited to warrant consideration of the point." Barber v. 
State Highway Commission, 80 Wyo. 340, 342 P.2d 723, 725-26 (1959).

That concept is 
as applicable now as it was then and, consequently, we uphold the ruling of the 
trial court with respect to the evidence of the involvement of the USFS in the 
project.

[¶27]   We turn then to the contention by 
the Kelloggs and L.U. Sheep Company that the arrangement between Hot Springs 
County and the USFS transgressed the Constitution of the State of Wyoming or its 
statutes. The Brief of Appellants/Defendants directs us to Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 
37, which provides:

"The legislature shall 
not delegate to any special commissioner, private corporation or association, 
any power to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal improvements, 
moneys, property or effects, whether held in trust or otherwise, to levy taxes, 
or to perform any municipal functions whatever."

In our judgment, 
this section has no applicability to the issues presented in this case. Neither 
Hot Springs County nor the USFS is a "special commissioner, private corporation 
or association." E.g. Lund v. Schrader, 492 P.2d 202 (Wyo. 1971). Furthermore, 
the property taken really had nothing to do with any municipal property or 
function. We are not referred to any other provisions of our Constitution to 
support the argument of appellants and, thus, we conclude that there is no 
constitutional infirmity in the arrangement between Hot Springs County and the 
USFS.

[¶28]   Neither are we persuaded of any 
statutory violation. Section 16-1-101, W.S. 1977, upon which the Kelloggs and 
L.U. Sheep Company rely, states, in pertinent part:

"In exercising, 
performing or carrying out any power, privilege, authority, duty or function 
legally vested in any one (1) or more of them by Wyoming law, the state of 
Wyoming, and any (1) or more of its counties, * * * agencies, * * * [and] 
commissions * * * may cooperate * * * with like entities or authorities of * * * 
the United States. Cooperation may be informal or subject to resolution, 
ordinance or other appropriate action, and may be embodied in a written 
agreement specifying purposes, duration, means of financing, methods of 
operations, termination, acquisition and disposition of property, employment of 
executive and subordinate agents and other appropriate provisions."

It is true that 
a county has only the power expressly granted by statute or reasonably implied 
from other powers that are granted. Haddenham v. Board of County Commissioners 
of Carbon County, 679 P.2d 429 (Wyo. 1984). Still, the legislature can delegate 
a part of its powers to both cities and counties for the exercise of 
governmental functions. Carter v. Board of County Commissioners of Laramie 
County, 518 P.2d 142 (Wyo. 1974). The legislature has expressly ceded to 
counties the power to acquire property through eminent domain and, furthermore, 
it has afforded to counties the authority to cooperate with an agency of the 
United States in carrying out this power. Section 16-1-101, W.S. 1977. In making 
its agreement with the USFS, it is clear that Hot Springs County did not go 
beyond its delegated powers.

[¶29]   The Kelloggs and L.U. Sheep Company 
contend that it was improper for the court to permit Hot Springs County to 
proceed under the Act instead of the provisions of the statutes which relate to 
the establishment of county roads. Sections 24-3-101 to -127, W.S. 1977. It is 
to be recalled that the parties stipulated that Hot Springs County had the right 
to condemn the road under the Act. General authority teaches, however, that a 
stipulation between the parties as to the correct law of the case is not binding 
upon the court. Cf. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company v. Langdon, 624 P.2d 240 
(Wyo. 1981). See cases cited in 83 C.J.S. Stipulations § 10.e. (1953). For that 
reason, we will consider this issue on its merits.

[¶30]   The Kelloggs and L.U. Sheep Company 
argue that the more specific statutes, which they perceive to be Sections 
24-3-101 to -127, W.S. 1977, should have been invoked rather than the general 
statute, which they describe as the Act. It is true that a specific statute will 
govern over a general statute enacted on the same subject, but this is a rule of 
statutory construction that is invoked only for the purpose of determining 
legislative intent. Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973 (Wyo. 1988). We discern 
nothing in the statutes relating to the establishment of a county road, §§ 
24-3-101 to -127, that demonstrates a legislative intent concerning the Act that 
is any different from that which we already have articulated. Furthermore, in 
the first case of Coronado, 603 P.2d 406, we held that, insofar as condemnation 
is concerned, there is no statutory declaration that any remedy is exclusive. We 
do not find any statutory declaration of an exclusive remedy that has been 
adopted subsequent to that decision. Pursuing this case under the Act was 
appropriate and permissible.

[¶31]   We turn then to the claim of error 
arising out of the refusal of the trial court to require the USFS to be joined 
as an indispensable party pursuant to Rule 19, W.R.C.P. Earlier, we commented 
upon the irrelevance of evidence about the involvement of the USFS in this 
project. The only possible reason that the USFS could be joined as an 
indispensable party is if "in [its] absence complete relief cannot be accorded 
among those already parties." Rule 19(a), W.R.C.P. The sole issue to be tried in 
this case was the amount of just compensation to the Kelloggs and L.U. Sheep 
Company for the taking of their property. The determination of that issue 
affords complete relief between Hot Springs County and the landowners, and the 
fact that the USFS may have some financial interest in the outcome of the case 
does not serve to make it an indispensable party. Rochester Methodist Hospital 
v. Travelers Insurance Company, 728 F.2d 1006 (8th Cir. 1984); Venuti v. 
Riordan, 702 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1983). Consequently, the trial court did not err 
in this regard.

[¶32]   Hot Springs County took no appeal 
from the judgment in this case. For that reason, we normally would not consider 
its assertion of the sufficiency of the evidence. In any event, our judgment 
that the case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial makes any 
consideration of the sufficiency of the evidence in this instance superfluous. 
We simply need not discuss it.

[¶33]   The district court did not instruct 
the jury properly with respect to the measure of just compensation for a partial 
taking pursuant to the Act. An application of the proper measure of just 
compensation demands that the trial court reconsider some of its rulings with 
respect to evidentiary matters. We hold that the trial court correctly ruled 
that the USFS is not an indispensable party in this action, and that any 
evidence with respect to its involvement in the road project is irrelevant and, 
for that reason, not admissible. The cooperation of Hot Springs County with USFS 
does not infringe upon any constitutional or statutory requirement, and it was 
appropriate to permit this action to proceed under the Act.

[¶34]   The Judgment and Order of the 
district court is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial. Except for 
those aspects of the trial court's determinations that have been affirmed, the 
new trial should be conducted in a manner consistent with this 
opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 We assume appellants 
meant section 1-26-501. Sections 1-26-101 to -405, including § 1-26-105, were 
repealed in 1981.

2 The appraisers were 
instructed as follows:

"The measure of just 
compensation to be paid to Defendant is the difference between the fair market 
value of the Defendant's lands immediately prior to the imposition of the 
easement and the fair market value of the Defendant's lands immediately 
thereafter.

"What comparable land 
changes hands for on the market at about the time of taking is usually the best 
evidence of market value available. Sales at arm's length of similar property 
are the best evidence of market values. These sales are referred to as 
comparable sales. In taking comparables into consideration, you should give 
weight only to those sales which are not too remote in time and made only where 
general market and economic conditions were similar to those existing on the 
date of the taking and within the same immediate area.

"You are instructed that 
your assessment of the value of land actually taken in this matter shall be 
based on market value. Market value has been generally defined as the price the 
land will bring when it is offered for sale by one who desires but is not 
obliged to sell it, and is bought by one who desires but is not obliged to buy 
it. The damages cannot be enhanced by the landowner's unwillingness to sell 
because of any sentiment which he has for the property.

"In determining the 
reduction, if any, in the fair market value of the Defendant's lands, you may 
consider all factors which you find to have an effect on fair market value. 
However, any factors which you consider must be direct and certain and may not 
be remote, imaginary or speculative.

"In determining damages, 
if any, to Defendant's remaining land, you may consider every lawful use the 
Plaintiff may make of the land condemned, and you may consider every element of 
damage affecting the fair market value of the remaining lands resulting from use 
and maintenance of the road on the easement or way of necessity."

3 Instruction No. 6, given 
by the court, advised the jury:

"The measure of just 
compensation to be paid to the Defendants is the difference between the fair 
market value of Defendants' land immediately prior to the imposition of the 
easement and the fair market value of the Defendants' land immediately 
thereafter."

4 Instruction No. 7, given 
by the court, advised the jury:

"* * * The market value 
is the price which would be agreed to by an informed seller who is willing but 
is not obligated, to sell it and by an informed buyer who is willing, but not 
obligated, to buy * * *."

Instruction No. 9, given 
by the court, advised the jury:

"In determining market 
value, you may take into consideration evidence of sales of land that you find 
to be comparable to the land involved in this lawsuit which occurred within a 
time reasonably near the date of the taking."

5 Instruction No. 11, 
given by the court, advised the jury:

"In determining the 
reduction, if any, in the fair market value of Defendants' land, you may 
consider all factors which you find to have an effect on fair market value. 
However, any factors which you consider must be direct and certain and may not 
be remote, imaginary, or speculative.

"In determining damages, 
if any, to Defendants' remaining land, you may consider every lawful use the 
Plaintiff may make of the land condemned, and you may consider every element of 
damage affecting the fair market value of the remaining land resulting from 
construction, operation, maintenance, and the use by Plaintiff of the County 
road easement on Defendants' land."

6 The Uniform Eminent 
Domain Code was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws in 1974. It became the Uniform Law Commissioners' Model Eminent 
Domain Code in 1984. 13 U.L.A. 1. The only state to substantially adopt the 
Model Eminent Domain Code has been Alabama, but its statutes contain numerous 
variations, omissions, and additional matter. 13 U.L.A. 4 (1986).

7 A latter draft proposed 
eliminating subsection (b) of the Uniform Act from the Wyoming statute. Working 
Draft No. 4, Eminent Domain Study, Joint Judiciary Interim Committee, at 22 
(1980).

8 Rule 401, W.R.E., 
states:

"`Relevant evidence' 
means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence." Rule 402, W.R.E., states:

"All relevant evidence is 
admissible, except as otherwise provided by statute, by these rules, or by other 
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. Evidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible."

Rule 403, W.R.E., 
states:

"Although relevant, 
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, 
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence."