Title: Kincaid v. Erie Ins. Co.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Kincaid v. Erie Ins. Co., Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-6036.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-6036 
KINCAID, APPELLEE, v. ERIE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Kincaid v. Erie Ins. Co., Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-6036.] 
An insured does not have standing to maintain an action against his insurance 
company for coverage of an alleged loss when he did not file a claim for 
the loss or give any notice to the insurer of the loss before filing the 
complaint. 
(No. 2009-1936 — Submitted September 28, 2010 — Decided  
December 16, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 92101,  
183 Ohio App.3d 748, 2009-Ohio-4372. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
{¶ 1} Appellant Erie Insurance Company (“Erie”) appeals from the court 
of appeals’ judgment that appellee, Don B. Kincaid Jr., has standing to file an 
action for insurance coverage when he did not present a claim for a loss 
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potentially covered by his insurance and did not give notice to the insurer of the 
alleged loss prior to filing a complaint. 
{¶ 2} Because it is undisputed that Erie has not denied or refused to pay 
a claim for a loss potentially covered by insurance, we hold that there is no 
justiciable controversy between adverse parties in this case.  Appellee lacks 
standing to pursue his claims because he did not present a claim, did not give 
notice to the insurer of the alleged loss, and the insurer has not denied payment.  
Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the trial 
court’s judgment dismissing the case. 
Facts 
{¶ 3} In 2001, Kincaid was involved in a motor-vehicle accident.  At the 
time, he had a liability insurance policy issued by Erie.  Kincaid was sued for 
damages resulting from the accident, and Erie hired counsel to represent him 
pursuant to the policy’s liability section.  The case was eventually settled and 
dismissed. 
{¶ 4} In 2008, Kincaid filed a class-action complaint alleging that Erie 
had failed to compensate and reimburse him and all other similarly situated Erie 
policyholders for expenses such as postage, travel expenses, and actual loss of 
earnings that they incurred during Erie’s defense of their liability claims.1  
Kincaid alleged that these are covered expenses under the “additional payments” 
provision of the policy’s liability-protection section.  Kincaid asserted causes of 
action for breach of contract, bad faith and breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment, and he sought declaratory relief. 
{¶ 5} Erie filed an answer admitting that Kincaid’s insurance policy 
included coverage for “additional payments.”  Erie admitted that it does reimburse 
its insureds for expenses incurred if they are documented and presented as a 
                                          
 
1.  The class was never certified.   
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
claim.  But Erie pointed out that Kincaid had never requested reimbursement or 
presented a claim for reimbursement of expenses.  Erie denied that Kincaid or any 
other member of the purported class had sustained damages, because Erie had not 
received any documents or claims for reimbursement. 
{¶ 6} Erie filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings in accordance 
with Civ.R. 12(C), which the trial court granted without opinion.  The court of 
appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the cause of action for unjust 
enrichment, but reversed the dismissal of causes of action for breach of contract 
and bad faith and for declaratory relief.  The court concluded that Kincaid’s 
insurance policy did not require him to notify Erie of these expenses before filing 
a lawsuit demanding reimbursement and that his complaint had satisfied the 
liberal notice pleading requirements in Civ.R. 8. 
{¶ 7} The cause is before this court upon the acceptance of a 
discretionary appeal.  124 Ohio St.3d 1442, 2010-Ohio-188, 920 N.E.2d 373. 
Analysis 
{¶ 8} The issue before us is whether an insured lacks standing to file an 
action for insurance coverage when the insured has not presented a claim to the 
insurer and has failed to give notice to the insurer of the alleged loss.  Erie 
contends that under these circumstances, a court could issue only an advisory 
opinion on whether an insured is entitled to coverage. 
{¶ 9} Standing is a preliminary inquiry that must be made before a court 
may consider the merits of a legal claim.  Ohio Pyro, Inc. v. Dept. of Commerce, 
115 Ohio St.3d 375, 2007-Ohio-5024, 875 N.E.2d 550, ¶ 27; Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. 
of Commrs. v. State, 112 Ohio St.3d 59, 2006-Ohio-6499, 858 N.E.2d 330, ¶ 22.  
It is an issue of law, so we review the issue de novo.  Id. at ¶ 23.  To have 
standing, a party must have a personal stake in the outcome of a legal controversy 
with an adversary.  Ohio Pyro, ¶ 27.  This holding is based upon the principle that 
“it is the duty of every judicial tribunal to decide actual controversies between 
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parties legitimately affected by specific facts and to render judgments which can 
be carried into effect.  It has become settled judicial responsibility for courts to 
refrain from giving opinions on abstract propositions and to avoid the imposition 
by judgment of premature declarations or advice upon potential controversies.” 
Fortner v. Thomas (1970), 22 Ohio St.2d 13, 14, 51 O.O.2d 35, 257 N.E.2d 371.  
See also Section 4(B), Article IV, of the Ohio Constitution. 
{¶ 10} An actual controversy is a genuine dispute between adverse 
parties.  State ex rel. Barclays Bank PLC v. Hamilton Cty. Court of Common 
Pleas (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 536, 542, 660 N.E.2d 458;   Corron v. Corron 
(1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 75, 79, 531 N.E.2d 708.  It is more than a disagreement; the 
parties must have adverse legal interests.  Id;  Mid-American Fire & Cas. Co. v. 
Heasley, 113 Ohio St.3d 133, 2007-Ohio-1248, 863 N.E.2d 142, ¶ 9.  Within 
these legal parameters, we examine the pleadings to determine whether under 
Civ.R. 12(C), dismissal was appropriate. 
{¶ 11} Kincaid’s primary claim is breach of contract based on the policy’s 
“additional payments” provision.  Kincaid alleged that he had fulfilled all of the 
conditions precedent for his liability claim – he complied with the insurer’s 
requests and cooperated with his defense attorneys – but that Erie had not 
reimbursed him for expenses such as postage, travel expenses, and loss of 
earnings incurred when he attended depositions and other legal proceedings at 
Erie’s request.  Kincaid has not alleged specific damages.  Instead, Kincaid 
contends that he will be able to identify and document the expenses that he 
incurred through discovery of Erie’s files. 
{¶ 12} It is undisputed that the liability protection section of the Erie 
policy provides coverage for “additional payments,” such as court costs, litigation 
expenses, prejudgment and post judgment interest, and “reasonable expenses 
anyone we protect may incur at our request to help us investigate or defend a 
claim or suit.  This includes up to $100 a day for actual loss of earnings.” 
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
{¶ 13} It is undisputed that Kincaid never informed Erie that he had 
incurred expenses, or requested reimbursement for any expenses, and that the 
complaint, which does not identify a specific amount of unpaid expenses, was the 
first notice that Erie received of Kincaid’s claimed loss.  And since Kincaid never 
filed a claim, it is obvious that Erie never denied his claim or refused to pay his 
expenses.  We have held that “[a] cause of action for breach of contract does not 
accrue until the complaining party suffers actual damages as a result of the 
alleged breach.”  Midwest Specialties, Inc. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1988), 
42 Ohio App.3d 6, 536 N.E.2d 411, paragraph one of the syllabus.  Until Erie 
refuses to pay a claim for a loss, Kincaid has suffered no actual damages for 
breach of contract, the parties do not have adverse legal interests, and there is no 
justiciable controversy. 
{¶ 14} Kincaid argues that there is no language in the policy that requires 
him to notify Erie in any particular way or within a certain time in order to 
recover his expenses.  This is the rationale the appellate court used to reverse the 
trial court’s dismissal of the action.  Yet the appellate court acknowledged that “it 
may seem illogical that an insurer is required to pay for expenses that the insured 
never notified the company about.”  Kincaid v. Erie Ins. Co., 183 Ohio App.3d 
748, 2009-Ohio-4372, 918 N.E.2d 1036, ¶ 20.  We agree.  It is illogical; and it 
defies common sense to expect an insurer to pay for incidental expenses that it 
does not know its insured incurred. 
{¶ 15} The policyholder is in the best position to know what out-of-pocket 
expenses he or she incurred.  Only the insured knows whether he or she incurred 
travel expenses when attending a deposition.  The mere fact that the insured 
attended a deposition does not mean that there were travel, mileage, or parking 
expenses associated with it.  Only the insured knows whether he or she suffered a 
loss of earnings.  There are many reasons why an insured would not suffer an 
actual loss of earnings when attending a deposition:  he or she may have been 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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unemployed, retired, or salaried.  Without documentation and a request, an insurer 
does not know whether the insured has incurred expenses and requires 
reimbursement. 
{¶ 16} The policyholder who believes that he or she is entitled to 
reimbursement must make the insurance company aware of the claim and give it 
the opportunity to pay.  The insurer provides each policyholder with a copy of the 
written insurance policy that expressly discloses the potential availability of 
benefits including reimbursement for expenses.  The insured has a duty to 
examine the coverage provided and is charged with knowledge of the contents of 
the policy.  Fry v. Walters & Peck Agency, Inc. (2001), 141 Ohio App.3d 303, 
312, 750 N.E.2d 1194;  Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Fodor (1984), 21 Ohio App.3d 
258, 262, 487 N.E.2d 571.  Kincaid had a defense lawyer representing him during 
the underlying litigation, and Kincaid could have consulted that attorney in 
interpreting his policy.  He also has counsel representing him in this case, and 
they filed this action without first attempting to seek reimbursement from Erie. 
{¶ 17} To be justiciable, a controversy must be grounded on a present 
dispute, not on a possible future dispute.  Mid-American Fire, 113 Ohio St.3d 
133, 2007-Ohio-1248, 863 N.E.2d 142, ¶ 9. Because Erie was not advised of 
Kincaid’s claim and has not refused to pay, there is no dispute and there can be no 
breach of contract.  A claim for bad faith grounded in the insured’s wrongful 
refusal to pay likewise fails as a matter of law, since Erie did not refuse to pay.  
Zoppo v. Homestead Ins. Co. (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 552, 644 N.E.2d 397.  An 
action for declaratory judgment also requires an actual controversy; a possible 
future controversy is not sufficient.  Mid-American Fire at ¶ 9. 
{¶ 18} Amici curiae contend that this is one of several similar putative-
class-action lawsuits filed by the same lawyers against various insurance 
January Term, 2010 
7 
 
companies for de minimis litigation-related expenses.2  In Gallo v. Westfield Natl. 
Ins. Co., 8th Dist. No. 91893, 2009-Ohio-1094, the Eighth District Court of 
Appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 
12(B)(6).  The court concluded that although Gallo had not notified Westfield or 
requested reimbursement of expenses, the complaint provided the insurance 
company with fair notice of her claim and satisfied the liberal notice pleading 
requirements in Civ.R. 8. 
{¶ 19} Unlike Gallo, this case was resolved on a Civ.R. 12(C) motion for 
judgment on the pleadings.  The trial court considered both the complaint and the 
answer.  In an effort to artfully establish sufficient allegations of breach of 
contract to meet the basic pleading requirements of Civ.R. 8(A) and 9(C), the 
plaintiff vaguely alleged that he had performed but that Erie had not. Nowhere in 
the complaint does the plaintiff allege that Erie refused to pay or that it ever 
denied a claim that was submitted. Thus, this pleading is insufficient to meet the 
minimal requirements of Civ.R. 8(A). 
Conclusion 
{¶ 20} We hold that there is no actual controversy between adverse parties 
in this case because Erie has not refused to pay Kincaid for expenses that may be 
covered by the “additional payments” provision of the policy.  Until a claim has 
been denied, there is no actual controversy and the insured has no injury for 
breach of contract.  A court may not issue an advisory opinion on whether an 
insured is entitled to insurance coverage, and an advisory opinion is what is being 
sought in this case, since no loss has been identified and no claim has been made 
for payment. Upon review of the pleadings, we hold that no material factual 
                                          
 
2.  See Kavouras v. Allstate Ins., Co. (Dec. 1, 2008), N.D. Ohio E.D. No. 1:08-CV-571; Cika v. 
Progressive Preferred Ins. Co., Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-08-653115; Negron v. Nationwide 
Property & Cas. Ins. Co., Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-08-650310; Hosey v. State Farm Mut. Auto., 
Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-08-656919; Lycan v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-
07-644127.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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issues exist and that Erie was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Therefore, 
Civ.R. 12(C) dismissal was appropriate.  See State ex rel. Midwest Pride IV, Inc. 
v. Pontius (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 565, 570, 664 N.E.2d 931. 
{¶ 21} We reverse the appealed portion of the judgment of the court of 
appeals and reinstate the trial court’s judgment dismissing the action. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
 
BROWN, C.J., and PFEIFER and CUPP, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
BROWN, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶ 22} Until 40 years ago, Ohio’s courts dismissed complaints when they 
contained improper phrasing or other technical mistakes.  But in 1970, this court 
adopted a notice-pleading standard.  Civ.R. 8(A).  The goal of a notice-pleading 
standard is to avoid dismissal of claims because of hyper-technical legal 
requirements.  Notice pleading is just that—a pleading that gives notice of the 
claims asserted.  But today, the majority ignores the plain meaning of Civ.R. 8(A) 
and the concept of notice pleading.  The majority concludes that a general 
averment in a complaint that all the conditions precedent have been met is 
insufficient to preclude a judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendant 
under Civ.R. 12(C).  Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s 
holding that Civ.R. 8(A) requires more than what Kincaid pleaded to withstand a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings. 
{¶ 23} Civ.R. 8(A) requires that a complaint contain only a short and 
plain statement of the claim showing that the party is entitled to relief and a 
demand for judgment.  Civ.R. 8(E) further directs that averments contained in a 
pleading be simple, concise, and direct.  Because Civ.R. 8 clearly establishes that 
Ohio is a notice-pleading state, Ohio law does not ordinarily require a plaintiff to 
plead operative facts with particularity.  Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 95 
January Term, 2010 
9 
 
Ohio St.3d 416, 2002-Ohio-2480, 768 N.E.2d 1136, ¶ 29.  Civ.R. 9(C) provides: 
“In pleading the performance or occurrence of conditions precedent, it is 
sufficient to aver generally that all conditions precedent have been performed or 
have occurred.” 
{¶ 24} Kincaid’s complaint sets forth four counts against Erie, three of 
which are at issue here: a breach-of-contract claim, a bad-faith claim, and a 
request for declaratory relief.  The complaint consists of general averments setting 
forth the nature of the action as well as jurisdiction and venue, averments 
outlining the relevant contractual language, factual averments regarding the 
actions of Kincaid and Erie, and other factual averments supporting each of the 
claims before this court.  Kincaid’s complaint also avers: “All conditions 
precedent to Defendant’s payment obligations under its standard form motor 
vehicle liability insurance policies have been performed by the named Plaintiff * 
* *.”  Additionally, Kincaid attached the relevant insurance contract to his 
complaint.  Thus, the complaint meets the requirements of Civ.R. 8(A). 
{¶ 25} The matter before us is based upon the trial court’s dismissal of 
Kincaid’s claims under Civ.R. 12(C).  Civ.R. 12(C) motions are intended to 
resolve questions of law.  State ex rel. Midwest Pride IV, Inc. v. Pontious (1996), 
75 Ohio St.3d 565, 570, 664 N.E.2d 931.  Under Civ.R. 12(C), dismissal is 
appropriate only when a court “(1) construes the material allegations in the 
complaint, with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in favor of the 
nonmoving party as true, and (2) finds beyond doubt, that the plaintiff could 
prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.”  Id.  
“Thus, Civ.R. 12(C) requires a determination that no material factual issues exist 
and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Id.  Taken 
together, these requirements set a high bar for the moving party to prevail on a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings. 
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{¶ 26} The majority frames this case as one involving an issue of 
standing, a legal issue susceptible to resolution on a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings.  But the issue regarding standing is based upon Erie’s assertion of 
specific factual averments that contradict the factual averments contained in 
Kincaid’s complaint.  Erie contends that Kincaid lacks standing because he did 
not present a claim to Erie for his alleged loss or give any other notice to Erie of 
his alleged loss, which Erie asserts is a condition precedent to coverage under the 
insurance contract.  Conversely, Kincaid’s complaint, in accordance with the 
explicit directive of Civ.R. 9(C), asserts generally that he had performed all the 
conditions precedent to coverage under the contract.  Whether Kincaid performed 
all the conditions precedent to coverage is a material question of fact.  Because 
the parties’ pleadings contain competing factual averments regarding whether 
Kincaid presented a claim or gave other notice of his alleged loss, the courts must 
construe Kincaid’s factual averments as true for the purposes of a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings.  Construing Kincaid’s factual averments as true, his 
complaint contains sufficient information to support actionable claims under the 
notice-pleading standard and to withstand a motion for judgment on the pleadings. 
{¶ 27} Today the majority takes as true the factual averments contained in 
Erie’s answer and affirms the dismissal of Kincaid’s claims based upon those 
averments.  In doing so, the majority overlooks the notice-pleading standard of 
Civ.R. 8 and questions the sufficiency of a pleading that satisfies Civ.R. 9(C).  By 
requiring more specific factual averments to establish that the conditions 
precedent to reimbursement from Erie had been met, the majority frustrates 
Civ.R. 8(A) and 9(C), which were adopted in 1970 to prevent complaints from 
being dismissed on common-law pleading technicalities.  A motion for summary 
judgment, not a motion for judgment on the pleadings, is the proper vehicle for 
Erie’s arguments.  Therefore, I dissent. 
 
CUPP, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
January Term, 2010 
11 
 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 28} Kincaid allegedly caused an injury in an automobile accident and 
was sued.  Kincaid assisted Erie in defending him, and, in so doing, he allegedly 
incurred expenses and missed time at work.  The insurance policy that Kincaid 
had with Erie states: 
{¶ 29} “We will make the following payments in addition to the limit of 
protection: 
{¶ 30} “* * * 
{¶ 31} “5. reasonable expenses anyone we protect may incur at our 
request to help us investigate or defend a claim or suit.  This includes up to $100 a 
day for actual loss of earnings.” 
{¶ 32} Kincaid chose to seek payment for expenses by filing suit against 
Erie.  Erie asserts and the majority opinion holds that Kincaid should have made a 
request to Erie, been denied, and then filed suit.  It is difficult to understand why 
Kincaid must follow that course of action, because the policy does not require it; 
the policy is silent about how to seek reimbursement. 
{¶ 33} As we have stated many times, “ ‘[w]here provisions of a contract 
of insurance are reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation, they will 
be construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured.’ ”  
Hacker v. Dickman (1996), 75 Ohio St. 118, 119, 661 N.E.2d 1005, quoting King 
v. Nationwide Ins. Co. (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 208, 519 N.E.2d 1380, syllabus.  
(Emphasis added in Hacker.)  See also Gomolka v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. 
(1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 27, 29-30, 472 N.E.2d 700; Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. 
Price (1974), 39 Ohio St.2d 95, 68 O.O.2d 56, 313 N.E.2d 844, syllabus.  
Because there are no policy provisions indicating when or how Kincaid must 
make a request for payment, a liberal interpretation in favor of Kincaid would 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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allow him to seek payment in the manner he prefers, whether directly or by a 
lawsuit. 
{¶ 34} Furthermore, the issue before us is not whether Erie owes a 
payment to Kincaid or how Kincaid should seek reimbursement, the issue is 
whether Kincaid should have a chance to establish that Erie owes him payment 
for expenses.  There is no way to reach that issue without examining the contested 
facts of this case.  Accordingly, it is inappropriate to dismiss the case on the 
pleadings.  Peterson v. Teodosio (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 161, 175, 63 O.O.2d 262, 
297 N.E.2d 113 (“The spirit of the Civil Rules is the resolution of cases upon their 
merits, not upon pleading deficiencies”).  I would affirm the judgment of the court 
of appeals.  I dissent. 
__________________ 
 
CUPP, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 35} Although I concur in Chief Justice Brown’s dissent, I write 
separately only to add an additional point that I believe is important to a fuller 
understanding of why I dissent from the majority decision. 
{¶ 36} I believe that the underlying concern of the majority is the 
potential for significant abuse of the discovery process should lawsuits enabled by 
creative pleading techniques, like those utilized here by Kincaid, go forward.  
Although not revealed in Kincaid’s complaint, an essential fact that was conceded 
by Kincaid’s counsel at oral argument is that Kincaid has never made a claim to 
defendant Erie Insurance Company (“Erie”) for the expenses Kincaid seeks to 
recover in this lawsuit.  In fact, even in his complaint, Kincaid does not state a 
specific dollar amount for expenses he allegedly incurred.  Thus, even if Erie 
wanted to reimburse Kincaid for his expenses, it has no information from which 
to determine how much Kincaid may be entitled to receive. 
{¶ 37} Nevertheless, this situation does not justify a deviation from our 
long-standing interpretation of the notice-pleading requirements.  Erie is not 
January Term, 2010 
13 
 
without recourse to protect itself against discovery initiated by Kincaid if his 
discovery request is overbroad or unduly burdensome.  Erie may request a 
protective order to protect it from “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or 
undue burden or expense.”  Civ.R. 26(C).  The trial court may fashion a protective 
order in any number of ways, including ordering that “the discovery not be had” 
or that “certain matters not be inquired into or that the scope of the discovery be 
limited to certain matters.”  Civ.R. 26(C). In this case, requests for admissions 
under Civ.R. 36 might be sufficient to establish the necessary facts for the trial 
court to rule on a motion for summary judgment or partial summary judgment. 
{¶ 38} Therefore, I must respectfully dissent. 
__________________ 
W. Craig Bashein and John Hurst; and Paul W. Flowers Co., L.P.A., and 
Paul W. Flowers, for appellee. 
Weston Hurd, L.L.P., Shawn W. Maestle, and Ronald A. Rispo, for 
appellant. 
Ulmer & Berne, L.L.P., Marvin L. Karp, Joseph A. Castrodale, and Brad 
A. Sobolewski, urging reversal for amici curiae Progressive Preferred Insurance 
Company, Progressive Direct Insurance Company, Progressive Casualty 
Insurance Company, and Progressive Specialty Insurance Company. 
Carpenter, Lipps & Leland, L.L.P., Michael H. Carpenter, and Katheryn 
M. Lloyd, urging reversal for amici curiae Nationwide Property and Casualty 
Insurance Company, Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Nationwide 
Mutual Insurance Company, Nationwide Insurance Company of America, 
Nationwide Assurance Company, and Nationwide General Insurance Company. 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P, Thomas E. Szykowny, and 
Michael Thomas, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Insurance Institute. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Davis & Young, L.P.A., and Richard M. Garner, urging reversal for 
amicus curiae Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys. 
______________________