Title: Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Lawrence

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Lawrence, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-4735.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-4735 
CINCINNATI BAR ASSOCIATION v. LAWRENCE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Lawrence, 
Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-4735.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Mental-health 
suspension 
terminated—Evidence 
demonstrates that cause for suspension has been removed—Showing that 
suspension should be terminated does not establish eligibility for 
reinstatement to practice of law—Review of underlying disciplinary 
complaint demonstrates multiple violations of Disciplinary Rules—One-
year suspension imposed, with reinstatement upon conditions. 
(Nos. 2004-1797 and 2013-0236—Submitted April 10, 2013—Decided  
October 31, 2013.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No.  04-005. 
_______________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Joy Lawrence of Cincinnati, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0030638, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1985.  In 
February 2004, relator, Cincinnati Bar Association, charged Lawrence with 
professional misconduct regarding two clients arising from her failure to maintain 
complete records of the client funds in her possession, withdrawal of unearned 
fees from her client trust account, failure to perform contracted legal work, and 
failure to cooperate in the resulting disciplinary investigation.  A probable-cause 
panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline certified 
relator’s complaint to the board. In June 2004, relator amended the complaint to 
add similar allegations of misconduct involving a third client. 
{¶ 2} We imposed a mental-health suspension pursuant to Gov.Bar R. 
V(7) in January 2005, based on evidence that Lawrence suffered from “a disorder 
of thought, perception, orientation and memory, which grossly impair[ed] her 
ability to meet the ordinary demands of life” and substantially impaired her ability 
to practice law following an August 2002 surgery that left her with significant 
cognitive deficits.1  The mental-health suspension effectively stayed the 
underlying disciplinary proceeding against Lawrence. 
{¶ 3} This matter is now before the court on the board’s certification that 
the cause for Lawrence’s mental-health suspension has been removed and on the 
board’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended sanction for the 
underlying misconduct.  The panel and board recommend that we terminate 
Lawrence’s mental-health suspension and find that she committed the charged 
misconduct.  They offer differing recommendations, however, on the appropriate 
sanction for that misconduct.  The panel recommends that Lawrence be 
                                                 
1.  On April 15, 2005, we also imposed a $250 sanction on Lawrence for her failure to comply 
with the applicable continuing-legal-education provisions of Gov.Bar R. X for the 2002-2003 
reporting period.  In re Report of Comm. on Continuing Legal Edn., 105 Ohio St.3d 1503, 2005-
Ohio-1739, 825 N.E.2d 1115.  It does not appear that the sanction has been satisfied. 
January Term, 2013 
 
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indefinitely suspended from the practice of law, while the board recommends a 
one-year suspension with certain conditions on her reinstatement. 
{¶ 4} For the reasons that follow, we adopt the board’s findings of fact 
and conclusions of law.  We further adopt the board’s recommendation to 
terminate Lawrence’s mental-illness suspension and to suspend her license for 
one year, with conditions on her reinstatement to the practice of law. 
Termination of the mental-health suspension 
{¶ 5} Lawrence applied to terminate her January 24, 2005 mental-health 
suspension in November 2011, alleging that the condition or conditions that 
caused her suspension had been removed.  See Gov.Bar R. V(7)(F).  In 
conjunction with her application, she submitted (1) an October 2011 report from 
Lawson Wulsin, M.D., Professor of Psychiatry and Family Medicine, who 
evaluated her and stated with “reasonable medical certainty” that Lawrence is 
“fully rehabilitated and has no cognitive impairment or other mental condition, 
which might interfere with or prevent her from resuming the competent, ethical[,] 
professional practice of law,”  (2) an affidavit from Special Counsel for the Ohio 
Attorney General’s office stating that Lawrence had paid Supreme Court of Ohio 
Account No. 8886079 in full, and (3) a report from the Commission on 
Continuing Legal Education, reflecting her continuing-legal-education (“CLE”) 
attendance since 2002. 
{¶ 6} Lawrence later submitted a report from her treating psychologist, 
Michael Lichstein, Ph.D., who expressed his professional opinion that Lawrence 
“is now fully capable of resuming her work as an attorney without any 
restrictions.”  Douglas Beech, M.D., the psychiatrist retained by the board to 
perform an independent medical evaluation reported that Lawrence’s condition 
has improved substantially, that she has taken measures to support her ability to 
practice law in a safe and responsible manner, that her treatment has been 
appropriate and should continue, and that he is not aware of any psychiatric 
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problem that would prevent her from being mentally fit to practice law.  The 
panel found that this medical evidence proved that Lawrence is no longer 
mentally ill as defined in R.C. 5122.01(A) and, therefore, recommended that her 
mental-health suspension be terminated.  While the panel found her competent to 
represent herself in the pending disciplinary matter, it ultimately determined that 
she is not presently competent to practice law. 
{¶ 7} The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact and certified to this 
court its conclusion that Lawrence is no longer mentally ill as defined in R.C. 
5122.01(A).  Because Gov.Bar R. V(7)(F) requires only “a showing of removal of 
the cause for the suspension,” we affirm this certification and terminate 
Lawrence’s mental-health suspension. Lawrence is not currently eligible for 
reinstatement to the practice of law, however, because she has not demonstrated  
full compliance with the terms of our suspension order, she has not fully complied 
with the CLE requirements of Gov.Bar R. X(3)(G), and relator’s underlying 
disciplinary complaint remains pending against her.  See, e.g., Cleveland Metro. 
Bar Assn. v. Polke, 135 Ohio St.3d 121, 2012-Ohio-5852, 984 N.E.2d 1045, ¶ 12-
13. 
{¶ 8} We now consider the board’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
and recommended sanction with regard to the underlying disciplinary complaint. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 9} The parties entered into stipulations of fact and misconduct, in 
which Lawrence admitted some, but not all, of the facts alleged in the complaint.  
On many of the specific details, Lawrence stated that she “does not deny” their 
accuracy, although she had no independent recollection of them.  However, she 
admitted that she committed all of the charged misconduct.  The pertinent 
stipulated facts and violations are summarized as follows. 
 
 
January Term, 2013 
 
5
The Points Matter 
{¶ 10} In February 2002, Carol Points gave Lawrence a $7,500 retainer to 
handle a postdecree child-custody matter and, in a written fee agreement, agreed 
to pay $250 per hour for those services.  Lawrence did not provide statements 
accounting for her fees, even when Points requested one to ascertain the status of 
her retainer more than a year into the representation.  Points terminated the 
relationship and filed a grievance with relator.  In July 2003, Lawrence provided a 
final billing statement reflecting that she was entitled to an additional $5,531 for 
her services, though she did not attempt to collect these funds. 
{¶ 11} Although Lawrence failed to provide documentation requested by 
relator’s investigators, the bank record that relator obtained by subpoena showed 
that she withdrew $4,000 from her client trust account on March 25, 2002.  She 
had not yet earned the full amount of that withdrawal.  Lawrence claimed that the 
withdrawal was the result of a mistake or a mathematical error, but was unable to 
explain how it occurred.  She does not dispute that her withdrawal of unearned 
fees predated her August 2002 surgery and resulting cognitive impairments. 
{¶ 12} The parties stipulated and the board found that this conduct 
violated DR 9-102(A)2 (requiring a lawyer to preserve the identity of client 
funds), 9-102(B)(3) (requiring a lawyer to maintain complete records of all client 
property coming into the lawyer’s possession and render appropriate accounts to 
each client), the oath of office that she took on her admission to the bar as set 
forth in former Gov.Bar R. I(8)(A), found at 11 Ohio St.3d xxvi, effective May 7, 
1984 (requiring an attorney to abide by the Code of Professional Responsibility 
and discharge the duties of attorney and counselor as an officer of the courts with 
fidelity to the court and the cause entrusted to the attorney), and Gov.Bar R. 
                                                 
2.  Relator charged respondent under the applicable rules of the former Code of Professional 
Responsibility because her misconduct occurred before the adoption of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct on February 1, 2007. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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V(4)(G) (prohibiting a lawyer from neglecting or refusing to assist in a 
disciplinary investigation). 
The Parks Matter 
{¶ 13} In September 2002, Linda Parks retained Lawrence to terminate 
her marriage.  Lawrence estimated that her fee would be $1,800 for a dissolution 
and $2,500 for a divorce.  Parks paid the $2,500 divorce retainer, but later 
directed Lawrence to draft dissolution documents.  Although Lawrence timely 
prepared the documents and had the parties execute them, she failed to file them 
within 45 days as she had promised and did not respond to Parks’s repeated 
attempts to contact her.  And when she finally filed the documents, she did not 
submit the required shared-parenting plan or qualified-domestic-relations order.  
Nor did she advise Parks that she had filed the dissolution or inform her of the 
scheduled hearing date.  She also failed to respond to Parks’s request for an 
accounting of her time and fees and to the relator’s investigation of the resulting 
grievance. 
{¶ 14} The parties stipulated and the board found that this conduct 
violated DR 2-106(A) (prohibiting a lawyer from making an agreement for, 
charging, or collecting an illegal or clearly excessive fee), 6-101(A)(3) 
(prohibiting neglect of an entrusted legal matter), 7-101(A)(1) (prohibiting a 
lawyer from intentionally failing to seek the lawful objectives of his client), 7-
101(A)(2) (prohibiting a lawyer from intentionally failing to carry out a contract 
of employment for legal services), 7-101(A)(3) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
intentionally prejudicing or damaging a client during the course of the 
professional relationship), 9-102(B)(3), and 9-102(B)(4) (requiring a lawyer to 
promptly pay or deliver funds that a client is entitled to receive), her oath of 
office, and Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G). 
 
 
January Term, 2013 
 
7
The Dyke Matter 
{¶ 15} David E. Dyke retained Lawrence in October 2002 to represent 
him in his divorce.  He paid a $2,500 retainer and agreed to pay $250 per hour for 
her services.  Lawrence filed Dyke’s divorce complaint, but she did not provide 
him with a copy and failed to respond to his requests for information.  In August 
2003, the domestic relations court issued a show-cause order to determine why 
the case should not be dismissed for lack of prosecution.  Lawrence did not 
respond to that order or attend the hearing, and Dyke was not present because she 
had given him the wrong date for the hearing.  Dyke terminated the representation 
and requested an accounting of his retainer and a refund of any unearned fees, 
which Lawrence failed to provide.  Once again, she failed to provide documents 
requested by relator as part of its investigation. 
{¶ 16} The parties stipulated and the board found that this conduct 
violated DR 6-101(A)(3), 7-101(A)(1), 7-101(A)(2), 7-101(A)(3), 9-102(B)(3), 
and 9-102(B)(4), her oath of office, and Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G). 
{¶ 17} We adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct with respect 
to each of these three counts. 
Sanction 
{¶ 18} The parties did not agree on an appropriate sanction.  Relator 
recommends an 18-month suspension, stayed on the conditions that she complete 
18 months of monitored probation and enter into an Ohio Lawyers Assistance 
Program (“OLAP”) contract.  Lawrence has not suggested any specific sanction 
for her misconduct, but has expressed her intent to comply with the sanction and 
any conditions imposed. 
{¶ 19} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 
sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16. In making a final 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B). Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21. 
{¶ 20} The panel found that several mitigating factors were present, 
namely, that Lawrence made full restitution to Parks and Dyke and did not seek to 
recover the balance of fees owed by Points.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(c).  It 
noted that she did not act with a selfish motive and that she was generally 
cooperative in the most recent proceedings, with the exception of her refusal to 
produce medical records—an issue that relator apparently elected not to pursue.  
The panel also found that Lawrence had already served a seven-year license 
suspension and that the various medical reports jointly submitted by the parties 
found no impediment to her practice of law.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(b)and (c). 
{¶ 21} Lawrence submitted three letters of reference attesting to her 
integrity and fitness to practice.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(e).  The first was 
from a special agent who came to know Lawrence when she reported Medicaid 
fraud to the Ohio Attorney General.  The agent stated that Lawrence had 
personally reviewed thousands of documents, drawn reasonable conclusions from 
them, exposed critical facts, and served an indispensable role in the investigation.  
The second was from a Connecticut attorney who had enlisted Lawrence’s help in 
understanding Ohio probate law.  The attorney reported that Lawrence’s 
assistance was invaluable and praised her knowledge of the relevant Ohio law. In 
the third letter, attorney William J. Reynolds reported that he had had both 
personal and professional dealings with Lawrence and found her to have an 
extremely acute analytical ability that was enhanced by her ethical and moral 
standards.  He stated that he would not hesitate to practice law with her or retain 
her to represent him personally. 
January Term, 2013 
 
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{¶ 22} We also find that Lawrence does not have any prior discipline, see 
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), and that she entered into a two-year mental-health 
contract with OLAP in July 2012. 
{¶ 23} The panel did not find any of the aggravating factors enumerated 
in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1), though we note that Lawrence did commit multiple 
offenses.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(d). 
{¶ 24} The panel acknowledged the three medical reports stating that 
Lawrence is no longer mentally ill and detailing her successful efforts to 
rehabilitate herself after suffering a brain injury that left her with significant 
cognitive deficits. The panel also acknowledged her many positive achievements 
during her suspension, including her efforts to stay current in her chosen areas of 
practice by obtaining certification as an Ohio guardian ad litem, obtaining 
guardianship certification from the National Guardianship Association, and 
completing multiple mediation training sessions through this court, her design and 
execution of a CLE seminar to educate members of the bar about the effects of 
depression and anxiety in the legal profession, her grass-roots campaign to reform 
guardianship practices for adults in Ohio with intellectual and developmental 
disabilities, and her assistance to the Ohio Attorney General’s Medicaid Fraud 
Control Unit in an investigation initiated as the result of a complaint she had filed. 
{¶ 25} But, citing differences between Lawrence’s testimony at the 
August 2012 hearing and the letters and reports submitted by her character 
references and treating professionals—none of whom testified at the hearing—
and noting several missteps in her handling of her own disciplinary case, the panel 
concluded that she is not presently competent to return to the practice of law.  
Therefore, the panel recommended that we deny Lawrence’s application for 
reinstatement and indefinitely suspend her from the practice of law. 
{¶ 26} Although the board adopted the panel’s findings with regard to 
aggravation and mitigation, it recommends that we suspend Lawrence from the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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practice of law for one year and condition her reinstatement on compliance with 
the rigorous petition requirements of Gov.Bar R. V(10)(B) through (G).  As part 
of the petition process, the board would require Lawrence to submit evidence that 
she has completed a current mental-health assessment, that a qualified health-care 
professional has found that she is able to return to the competent, ethical, and 
professional practice of law, and that she has entered into and is in compliance 
with an OLAP contract.  Once reinstated, the board would also require Lawrence 
to serve two years of monitored probation.  In support of that sanction, the board 
cited Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Polke, 135 Ohio St.3d 121, 2012-Ohio-5852, 
984 N.E.2d 1045.  In Polke, we terminated a mental-health suspension and 
imposed a one-year stayed suspension for the attorney’s underlying misconduct, 
which included two violations of DR 1-102(A)(5) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice), six 
violations of DR 6-101(A)(3) and 7-101(A)(2), and four violations of DR 9-
102(B)(4).  Polke at ¶ 12, 15, 22. 
{¶ 27} In Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Nigolian, 87 Ohio St.3d 147, 718 
N.E.2d 417 (1999), we considered misconduct similar to Lawrence’s.  Nigolian 
failed to provide one client with statements for services rendered, failed to 
account for the use of the client’s $10,000 retainer, and failed to maintain 
identifiable records of the funds held on deposit for the client.  Id. at 148.  He also 
deposited another client’s $1,500 retainer into his personal account, prepared 
documents in the client’s case but failed to file them, failed to appear at a 
scheduled hearing, and failed to prepare and submit a journal entry as ordered by 
the court.  Id.  We found that the attorney’s conduct violated DR 6-101(A)(3), 7-
101(A)(2), 9-102(A)(2) (requiring funds belonging in part to a client and in part 
presently or potentially to a lawyer to be deposited in a client trust account and 
permitting the lawyer to withdraw the undisputed portion belonging to him or 
her), 9-102(B)(3), and 9-102(B)(4), and Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G).  Id. at 149.  For 
January Term, 2013 
 
11
those infractions, we imposed a one-year suspension with six months stayed on 
the condition that Nigolian take six hours of CLE courses in law-office 
management.  Id. at 149-150. 
{¶ 28} In addition to committing violations comparable to those at issue in 
Polke and Nigolian, Lawrence also charged a clearly excessive fee and 
intentionally prejudiced or damaged those clients during the course of her 
representation.  But more significantly, she withdrew unearned funds from her 
client trust account before they were fully earned, and this conduct occurred 
before she suffered her brain injury. 
{¶ 29} On these facts, we find that the board’s recommended sanction of a 
one-year actual suspension from the practice of law is appropriate.  Moreover, the 
recommended conditions on Lawrence’s reinstatement will give relator, the 
board, and this court the opportunity to address any lingering concerns about 
Lawrence’s ability to resume the competent, ethical, and professional practice of 
law. 
{¶ 30} Accordingly, we suspend Lawrence from the practice of law for 
one year.  In the event that she seeks to return to practice, she shall be required to 
petition this court for reinstatement, and in addition to all of the requirements of 
Gov.Bar R. V(10)(B) through (G), she shall be required to submit documentation 
that (1) she has completed a current mental-health assessment performed by a 
qualified health-care professional, (2) a qualified health-care professional has 
found her capable of returning to the competent, ethical, and professional practice 
of law, and (3) she has entered into an OLAP contract for a duration to be 
determined by OLAP and complied with all treatment recommendations.  On 
reinstatement, Lawrence will serve a two-year period of monitored probation in 
accordance with Gov.Bar R. V(9).  Costs taxed to Lawrence. 
Judgment accordingly. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, 
FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
_________________________ 
Edwin W. Patterson III, Bar Counsel, Anita S. Cross, and Beth Silverman, 
for relator. 
Joy Lawrence, pro se. 
_________________________