Title: Offen v. Brenner

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

M. Louis Offen v. Alan I. Brenner
Misc. No. 1, September Term, 2007.
LIBEL AND SLANDER - PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS - ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE
- ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS: Where a statement serves to initiate
an administrative proceeding, the defamed employee’s duties and
authority are a factor in considering whether the nature of the
public function of the proceeding is sufficient to warrant the
extension of an absolute privilege.
TORTS - DEFAMATION LAW  - ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE - ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS - NATURE OF THE PUBLIC FUNCTION OF THE PROCEEDING: A
defamed employee’s duties and authority are relevant to, but not
dispositive of, the nature of the public function of an
administrative proceeding when determining whether an absolute
privilege applies to statements that initiate the proceeding.
On Certification from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Case No. 05-2337
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
Misc. No. 1
September Term, 2007
M. Louis Offen
v.
Alan I. Brenner
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Wilner, Alan, M .
(Retired, specially assigned)
Cathell, Dale R.
(Retired, specially assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Raker, J. 
Filed:   November 14, 2007
Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, Md. Code
(1974, 2006 Repl. Vol.), §§ 12-601 to 12-609 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has certified the following question
of Maryland law:
“[I]n deciding whether a statement that led to an administrative
proceeding against a public employee is protected by absolute
privilege, should the duties and authority of the employee
against whom the statement was made be considered in
determining ‘the nature of the public function of the
proceeding’?”
Our answer to the Fourth Circuit’s question shall be a qualified yes; the duties and authority
of the employee are a useful factor, but should not be determinative, in considering the nature
of the public function of the administrative proceeding.
I.
We recite the facts as set out in the Certification Order.
“The plaintiff (and appellant in this certification
procedure), M. Louis Offen, M.D., is an employee with the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), working in
the Division of Vaccine Injury Compensation (DVIC).  Offen is
a neurologist who reviews claims filed against the DHHS by
persons seeking compensation for alleged vaccine-related injury.
Offen evaluates the merits of a claim and transmits his
conclusions to the Department of Justice (DOJ) lawyer assigned
to represent the DHHS on the claim.  The DOJ has the authority
to determine how to proceed with a claim.  Offen has no
authority in that regard.
“In 2004 Offen reviewed a Hepatitis B vaccine injury
claim and reported his conclusions to the assigned DOJ lawyer.
The DOJ lawyer then contacted Offen’s supervisor, Vito
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Caserta, M.D., for further assistance in evaluating the claim.
Caserta, in turn, discussed the claim with two other physicians,
the defendant, Alan I. Brenner, M.D., a rheumatologist who is
an outside consultant for DVIC, and Arnold Gale, M.D.  In May
2004 Offen forwarded certain materials related to the claim to
Brenner for his review.  Later, on July 30, 2004, Brenner sent a
letter to Offen’s supervisor, Caserta, which contained the
following passages:
“In the past several months I have had a
number 
of 
telephone 
calls 
and 
E 
mail
communications from Dr. Offen, each requesting
my private opinion on DVIC cases not officially
assigned to me for consultation. . . .
“The first of this latter type of call was
regarding the makeup of our Civilian Expert
Immunization Committee (CEIC).  The substance
of that call was to question me about the process
of selection of committee members.  I felt that the
tone of the questions was accusatory and, in my
opinion, defamatory and degrading to DVIC. . . .
“You will recall that, several months ago,
you arranged a telephone conference in which
you, Dr. Arnold Gale and I participated.  The
purpose of that conference was to discuss [the
Hepatitis B claim]. . . .
“About 2 months ago Dr. Offen called me,
stating that the case had not been presented in its
entirety and that you had misrepresented the facts
to induce Dr. Gale and me . . . .  My recollection
of the call was that Dr. Offen  accused you of
twisting the facts and of leaving out pertinent
information to suit some personal purpose and
that he wanted to send me the case record
suggesting that my review of the documents
would prove that our conclusion was in error.
“I have been very disturbed by the tone of
Dr. Offen’s accusations and the way in which he
has seemed to try to enlist my support in some
sort of personal vendetta against DVIC in general
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and several members of the office in particular.
Indeed I believe that Dr. Offen has had something
derogatory to say about each and every medical
officer involved.  Dr. Offen has also made it quite
clear that he has no respect for the leadership of
DVIC.  He positively gloated over Thom
Balbier’s transfer, telling me that Thom had been
removed for incompetence and stating that you
would be the next to go.
J.A. 6-7.
“This letter prompted Caserta to initiate formal DHHS
disciplinary proceedings against Offen, who was suspended for
five days without pay and stripped of some of his
responsibilities.  The administrative proceedings against Offen
were conducted according to the procedures set forth in the
agency’s regulations, and he does not contend that the
procedural safeguards were inadequate.”
II.
Dr. Offen filed a complaint, in the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, alleging defamation.  Dr. Brenner filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted.  Following a hearing, the district court dismissed the complaint in favor of
the defendant based on absolute immunity.  Dr. Offen appealed to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.  He contends that the district court erred in refusing to
consider his limited duties and authority when the court analyzed the nature of the public
function of the proceeding.  The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit certified the
question of law to this Court.
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The question before us arises from the application of factors set forth by this Court
in Gersh v. Ambrose, 291 Md. 188, 434 A.2d 547 (1981).  In that case, a staff member of the
Baltimore City Community Relations Commission filed a defamation suit for statements
made by an assistant state’s attorney at a quasi-legislative public hearing.  This Court found
the defense of absolute immunity did not apply, but noted as follows: “[W]e have decided
that whether absolute witness immunity will be extended to any administrative proceeding
will have to be decided on a case-by-case basis and will in large part turn on two factors: (1)
the nature of the public function of the proceeding and (2) the adequacy of procedural
safeguards.”  Id. at 197, A.2d at 551-52.  Although we have ruled on the interpretation of the
second factor of the Gersh test –  the adequacy of procedural safeguards – in several cases,
we have not yet had cause to examine the first factor in such detail, that of the nature of the
public function of the proceeding.
III.
Before this Court, Dr. Offen argues, first, that no significant public interest is
implicated to justify the application of absolute immunity under the first prong of the Gersh
test.  He contends the district court erred when it relied on an overly generalized public
interest.  The district court said “the important public function of administrative disciplinary
procedures is to have an orderly system of personnel, dedicated and competent employees,
and that’s especially important in the area of health.”  Dr. Offen argues his behavior would
1 The question of whether the public interest identified by the district court, “to have
an orderly system of personnel,” is sufficiently compelling to warrant an absolute privilege
is not before this Court.  We answer only the certified question of whether an employee’s
duties and authority should be taken into consideration when examining the nature of the
public function of the proceeding.
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not be of significant public concern and that the district court’s identification of an orderly
system of personnel is not a socially important concern that rises to the level of a vital public
interest.1
Second, Dr. Offen maintains that the district court erred when it failed to consider the
defamed employee’s duties and authorities in its analysis under the first Gersh factor.
According to Dr. Offen, the application of “the nature of the public function of the
proceeding” depends upon a factual inquiry into the employee’s duties and powers.  He relies
on Miner v. Novotny, 304 Md. 164, 498 A.2d 269 (1985), Imperial v. Drapeau, 351 Md. 38,
716 A.2d 244 (1998), and Reichardt v. Flynn, 374 Md. 361, 823 A.2d 566 (2003), to support
his conclusion, contending that when statements precede the initiation of an administrative
proceeding, each of those cases make necessary an evaluation of the essential public interest
of a particular category of employee.  Failing to consider the duties and authority of an
employee, according to Dr. Offen, creates a per se application of absolute privilege, allowing
generalized public interests to sufficiently support the first Gersh factor.
Dr. Brenner counters that the duties, responsibilities and authority of an employee
should not be dispositive as to whether a privilege applies.  He rejects the contention that the
justification for extending absolute immunity changes depending on whether an
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administrative hearing is pending at the time of the defamation or whether instead the
statement serves to initiate a subsequent proceeding.  He contends that the first Gersh factor
has been applied the same way regardless of this temporal difference, with the purpose of
ensuring that the nature of the proceeding factors into the public policy reason for extending
the privilege.  Dr. Brenner argues that adopting an approach where the first prong turns on
an inquiry into the rank of the defamed employee would deter legitimate complaints against
low-level employees for fear of retaliation.
IV.
Under Maryland law, to present a prima facie case of defamation, a plaintiff must
establish four elements: (1) that the defendant made a defamatory statement to a third person,
(2) that the statement was false, (3) that the defendant was legally at fault in making the
statement, and (4) that the plaintiff thereby suffered harm.  Smith v. Danielczyk, 400 Md. 98,
115, 928 A.2d 795, 805 (2007).  A defamatory statement is one “which tends to expose a
person to public scorn, hatred, contempt or ridicule, thereby discouraging others in the
community from having a good opinion of, or associating with, that person.”  Gohari v.
Darvish, 363 Md. 42, 55, 767 A.2d 321, 327 (2001) (quoting Rosenberg v. Helinski, 328 Md.
644, 675, 616 A.2d 866, 871 (1992)).  Depending upon the circumstances, a defendant in a
2 A conditional privilege protects a person from liability where the statement was
published in good faith “in furtherance of his own legitimate interests, or those shared in
common with the recipient or third parties, or where his declaration would be of interest to
the public in general.”  Gohari v. Darvish, 363 Md. 42, 56, 767 A.2d 321, 328 (2001)
(internal quotation omitted).  An absolute privilege differs from a conditional privilege
because “the former provides immunity regardless of the purpose or motive of the defendant,
or the reasonableness of his conduct, while the latter is conditioned upon the absence of
malice and is forfeited if it is abused.”  Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 97, 182 A.2d 54,
57 (1962).
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defamation suit may assert a conditional or an absolute privilege.2  Danielczyk, 400 Md. at
116-17, 928 A.2d at 806.  See generally DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, §§ 413-414
(2000).
An absolute privilege provides complete immunity from suit.  The grant of absolute
privilege was first applied in Maryland to witnesses in judicial proceedings in Hunckel v.
Voneiff, 69 Md. 179, 14 A. 500 (1888).  We have articulated the longstanding public policy
behind the privilege as follows:
“[I]t is of the greatest importance to the administration of justice
that witnesses should go upon the stand with their minds
absolutely free from apprehension that they may subject
themselves to an action of slander for what they may say while
giving their testimony. . . .  ‘The witness speaks . . . under the
control of the court; is compelled to speak, with no right to
decide what is immaterial; and he should not be subject to the
possibility of an action for his words.’”  
Id. at 187-88, 14 A. at 501 (internal citation omitted).  Based on this justification, we
provided absolute privilege for statements made by a witness in the course of judicial
proceedings.  Reichardt v. Flynn, 374 Md. at 366-67, 823 A.2d at 569 (quoting Hunckel, 69
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Md. at 193, 14 A. at 504); Bartlett v. Christhilf, 69 Md. 219, 223-27, 14 A. 518, 519-20
(1888).  The privilege applies even when the witness publishing the defamatory statement
does so maliciously, despite known falsity, or under otherwise unreasonable conduct.
Reichardt, 374 Md. at 367, 823 A.2d at 569; Schaub v. O’Ferrall, 116 Md. 131, 138, 81 A.
789, 792 (1911).  Maryland follows the minority English rule, where the privilege applies
irrespective of the statement’s relevance to the proceeding.  Reichardt, 374 Md. at 367, 823
A.2d at 569; Korb v. Kowaleviocz, 285 Md. 699, 703-04, 402 A.2d 897, 898-99 (1979);
Schaub, 116 Md. at 138-39, 81 A. at 792.
We have upheld the application of absolute privilege for statements by witnesses in
the courtroom during the course of a trial.  Korb, 285 Md. at 704, 402 A.2d at 899; Maulsby
v. Reifsnider, 69 Md. 143, 164, 14 A. 505, 511 (1888).   Absolute privilege applies also to
statements “contained in pleadings, affidavits or other documents directly related to the
case.”  Keys v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 303 Md. 397, 403-04, 494 A.2d 200, 203 (1985)
(applying absolute immunity to the issuance of a writ garnishing wages post-judgment); Di
Blasio v. Kolodner, 233 Md. 512, 197 A.2d 245 (1964) (finding stricken allegations are
protected by the privilege); Bartlett, 69 Md. at 227, 14 A. at 520 (holding privileged a
petition alleging contempt of court in an ongoing proceeding).  The privilege extends also
to statements that serve to initiate a judicial proceeding.  See, e.g., Kerpelman v. Bricker, 23
Md. App. 628, 630, 329 A.2d 423, 425 (1974).  In 1980, this Court extended the privilege
to statements prepared for possible use in an action, but not actually introduced as part of the
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proceeding.  Adams v. Peck, 288 Md. 1, 415 A.2d 292 (1980).  One year later, the Court
addressed whether absolute privilege could apply in administrative proceedings in Gersh v.
Ambrose, 291 Md. 188, 434 A.2d 547 (1981).
In Gersh, an assistant state’s attorney made allegedly defamatory remarks about a
member of the city’s community relations commission at a public hearing before that
commission.  While declining to apply the privilege in the particular case because of the lack
of formal procedure attendant to the open hearing and an insufficiently compelling public
interest, we nevertheless recognized that the absolute privilege afforded judicial proceedings
could extend to adjudicatory hearings before administrative bodies.  Id. at 193, 434 A.2d at
549-50.  We noted that when administrative proceedings’ framework and protections are
functionally comparable to judicial processes, immunity could be safely extended to cover
such proceedings.  Id. at 192-93, 434 A.2d at 549-50.  Importantly, the Court chose not to
limit the test for whether to apply the privilege to only the existence of adequate procedural
safeguards.  Instead, we provided that the analysis should examine such procedural
safeguards in conjunction with the nature of the public function of the proceeding:
“[W]e have decided that whether absolute witness immunity will
be extended to any administrative proceeding will have to be
decided on a case-by-case basis and will in large part turn on
two factors: (1) the nature of the public function of the
proceeding and (2) the adequacy of procedural safeguards which
will minimize the occurrence of defamatory statements.”
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Id. at 197, 434 A.2d at 551-52.  The Court declined to apply the doctrine of privilege because
the safeguards were insufficient and because the public interest was not sufficient to
outweigh potential harm to the individual, reasoning as follows:
“In the instant case the public interest sought to be advanced is
far less compelling . . . .  Moreover, we find nothing in the
record before us to indicate the presence of conditioning devices
or safeguards . . . which are present in judicial proceedings . . . .
The public benefit to be derived from testimony at Commission
hearings of this type is not sufficiently compelling to outweigh
the possible damage to individual reputations to warrant
absolute witness immunity.”
Id. at 196, 434 A.2d at 551 (emphasis added).  The test, since its establishment in Gersh, has
been applied by this Court in five cases.  
In Miner v. Novotny, 304 Md. 164, 498 A.2d 269 (1985), this Court applied absolute
immunity to citizen complaints of police brutality that led to an administrative hearing.  After
determining there were sufficient procedural safeguards under the second factor of Gersh,
we noted as follows:
“Our society vests its law-enforcement officers with formidable
power, the abuse of which is often extremely detrimental to the
public interest.  Citizen complaints of such abuses, and the
administrative disciplinary procedure which has been developed
to investigate these complaints, serve a public function of vital
importance by providing a mechanism through which abuses
may be reported to the proper authorities, and the abusers held
accountable.
“The viability of a democratic government requires that the
channels of communication between citizens and their public
officials remain open and unimpeded.  Were complaints such as
Novotny’s not absolutely privileged, the possibility of incurring
3 While both Dr. Offen and Dr. Brenner argue that McDermott supports their
respective positions on Gersh’s first factor, we did not reach an evaluation of the importance
of the nature of the public function identified in the case.  Our holding instead was that
(continued...)
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the costs and inconvenience associated with defending a
defamation suit might well deter a citizen with a legitimate
grievance from filing a complaint.  We therefore conclude that
the possible harm a false brutality complaint may cause to a
law-enforcement officer’s reputation, despite the procedural
safeguards provided by the LEOBR, is outweighed by the
public’s interest in encouraging the filing and investigation of
valid complaints.”
Id. at 176, 498 A.2d at 274-75.  The “inhibition of citizens’ criticisms of those entrusted with
their protection” was a “far worse evil” than the harm that “a false accusation of brutality
may have on a law-enforcement officer.”  Id. at 177, 498 A.2d at 275.
Next, in  McDermott v. Hughley, 317 Md. 12, 561 A.2d 1038 (1989), we reaffirmed
the basis for extending absolute immunity, to prevent unduly hindering important speech, and
to ensure that “otherwise actionable conduct thus is protected where the accused acts in
furtherance of a recognized socially important interest.” Id. at 23, 561 A.2d at 1044.  We
noted that McDermott “assert[ed] the importance to the public of having mental health care
professionals render unfettered diagnoses particularly where a police officer is involved.” Id.
at 25, 561 A.2d at 1045.  Nevertheless, we declined to extend the privilege to a psychologist
who issued a requested report evaluating the fitness of an officer in the police department’s
horse-mounted patrol unit because of the absence of procedural safeguards in the
proceeding.3
3(...continued)
immunity did not apply because procedural safeguards, as required under Gersh’s second
factor, were lacking.  We do note, however, the striking similarity of the cases factually,
because like in McDermott, Dr. Offen is accused of having no respect for his supervisor
and harboring a personal vendetta against certain employees.  The psychologist's
allegedly defamatory report in McDermott contended that the defamed employee referred
to his supervisor as a “Nazi,” complained about management style, and was refusing to
cooperate because “he did not like the Unit or the Unit commander.”  Id. at 19-20, 561
A.2d at 1042.  In the present case, Dr. Brenner's letter asserted that Dr. Offen had a
personal vendetta against the department, made derogatory remarks about its members,
and did not respect its leadership.
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In Odyniec v. Schneider, 322 Md. 520, 588 A.2d 786 (1991), a patient underwent a
required physical examination during the investigation of her pending medical malpractice
claim before the Health Claims Arbitration Office.  The examining doctor, who was expected
to later present his expert testimony before the arbitration panel, told the patient during his
assessment that her previous doctor had performed unnecessary medical procedures on her.
The treating doctor filed a complaint alleging defamation, and this Court held that absolute
immunity barred suit.  Where the statement was made by a witness in connection with a
legislatively-mandated arbitration process, we found that both prongs of the Gersh test had
been met.  The policy extending immunity under Gersh applied, “[t]aking full account of the
vital public function of health care malpractice proceedings initiated before arbitration
panels” as well as the procedural safeguards established by the claims arbitration process.
Id. at 534, 588 A.2d at 792-93.  We said further:  “The social benefit derived from free and
candid participation by potential witnesses in the arbitration process is essential to achieve
the goal of a fair and just resolution of claims of malpractice against health care providers,”
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stressing “the societal value of maintaining the integrity of the process itself.”  Id. at 534-35,
588 A.2d at 793.
We addressed the defense of absolute privilege in administrative proceedings again
in Imperial v. Drapeau, 351 Md. 38, 716 A.2d 244 (1998).  The question in that case was
whether an EMT could maintain a suit for defamation where a doctor, acting as a private
citizen, alleged the EMT’s incompetence in letters to the Governor and a member of
Congress.  This Court upheld the application of an absolute privilege.  Citing “the importance
to the public that all medical participants in the emergency medical system be competent,”
the Court said as follows: 
“Because the quality of pre-hospital, emergency medical care
can literally be a matter of life and death, it carries a very high
priority.  Accordingly, 
public 
policy 
encourages 
the
communication of information to public authorities responsible
for maintaining the quality of emergency medical services.”
Id. at 50, 716 A.2d at 250-51.
Finally, this Court, in Reichardt v. Flynn, 374 Md. 361, 823 A.2d 566 (2003), applied
the privilege to bar suit regarding defamatory statements made by parents and their children
to public school authorities alleging sexual misconduct on the part of Flynn, a high school
teacher and coach.  We found that both prongs of Gersh were satisfied.  As to the first prong,
we quoted the language of the Court of Special Appeals finding that the first Gersh prong
was met:
“[T]here is really nothing more important to the core of the
well-being of our community, our State and our nation than the
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public school system.  It is unquestionably an issue of strong
public interest that students and parents should be protected
from suit for reporting a teacher’s alleged sexual misconduct.”
 
Id. at 373, 823 A.2d at 573 (internal quotation omitted).  The second prong of Gersh was the
primary focus on appeal.  The Court of Special Appeals had found an absolute privilege did
not apply because Flynn lacked a right to appeal his suspension by the Superintendent, and
even if he had a right to appeal, the procedural safeguards of the proceeding were inadequate
because the alleged defamation had preceded the hearing and any safeguards therein.  We
disagreed and reversed, finding that Flynn was entitled to appeal his suspension to the
Montgomery County Board of Education and subsequently to the State Board of Education.
We also noted that the availability of procedural safeguards only after an initial adverse
action satisfied the second factor of Gersh, since “[t]his same situation . . . is going to exist
in every case in which a complaint is made about government personnel, and the complaint
initiates an administrative proceeding.”  Id. at 376, 823 A.2d at 575.
With this background in mind, we turn to the specific certified question from the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
V.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals asks us to clarify how to apply the first Gersh
factor when an allegedly defamatory statement is made prior to the institution of
administrative proceedings.  See Gohari v. Darvish, 363 Md. at 74, 767 A.2d at 338 (noting
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that in defamation cases, “the existence of [a] privilege . . . is a question of law for the
court.”).  
The fact that we have not thus far had cause to base a denial of privilege on the
insufficient public nature of the proceeding should not lead to the mistaken conclusion that
the first Gersh factor is subject to only a cursory inquiry.  We made clear in Gersh that any
extension of absolute privilege “will turn in large part on two factors,” setting forth the
importance of a dual inquiry into both the nature of the public function of the proceeding and
the adequacy of procedural safeguards.  Gersh, 291 Md. at 197, 434 A.2d at 551-52.  This
Court has consistently examined both factors to determine whether a privilege exists.  See,
supra, Part IV.  The public policy underpinnings of Gersh support the idea that quasi-judicial
processes alone are insufficient justification for privilege.  We held the existence of privilege
depended on procedural safeguards and “the nature of the question into which it is [the
tribunal’s] duty to inquire.”  Gersh, 291 Md. at 196, 434 A.2d at 551 (quoting Trapp v.
Mackie, 1 All E.R. 489, 492 (1979), 1 W.L.R. 377 (H.L. 1978)).
In keeping with the policy reasons for extending the privilege, this Court said in
Odyniec, and repeated in Imperial:
“Gersh, Miner, and McDermott thus stand for the proposition
that absolute witness immunity will not be extended to a
nonjudicial proceeding unless the same policy considerations
which underlie application of the privilege in the judicial sphere
are also present.  It must appear from the nature and conduct of
the proceeding that society’s benefit from unfettered speech
during the proceeding is greater than the interests of an
individual who might be defamed during that proceeding.”
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Odyniec, 322 Md. at 531, 588 A.2d at 791 (emphasis added); Imperial, 351 Md. at 48, 716
A.2d at 249.  The overarching purpose of the first Gersh factor in considering the nature of
the proceeding’s public function is to require more than procedural safeguards for an
extension of privilege to nonjudicial settings.  Without the first factor, the mere existence of
quasi-judicial processes could protect every defamatory statement that leads to a proceeding
from becoming actionable.  Such a result would lead to a per se immunity for administrative
proceedings.  It would collapse the inquiry into the nature of the public function of the
proceeding into simple reliance on the nature of administrative proceedings in and of
themselves.
Dr. Brenner argues that the quote from Odyniec, calling for “the same policy
considerations” for the extension of the privilege in both judicial and administrative
proceedings, supports his contention that the justification for applying privilege must be the
same, regardless of whether an administrative proceeding is pending or not yet initiated at
the time of the defamatory statement.  The phrase “same policy consideration,” however,
refers to the policy interest in favor of fostering freedom of expression, even at the cost of
individual reputation.  This justification occurs only when both the nature and conduct of the
proceeding raise it to the level that implicates favoring free speech over potential harm.  We
have held that the sufficiency of procedural safeguards does not vary depending upon
whether the defamation occurs during or instead initiates an administrative proceeding.  See
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Reichardt, 374 Md. at 376-77, 823 A.2d at 575.  It does not follow, however, that nature of
the public function will be the same, regardless of temporal difference.
In McDermott we said that “otherwise actionable conduct thus is protected where the
accused acts in furtherance of a recognized socially important interest.”  McDermott, 317
Md. at 23, 561 A.2d at 1044.  It follows that when the nature of the public function of the
proceeding is that it acts to protect a socially important interest, absolute immunity should
apply.  In the context of ongoing judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings, we
have recognized the socially important interest that “it is of the greatest importance to the
administration of justice that witnesses should go upon the stand with their minds absolutely
free from apprehension that they may subject themselves to an action of slander for what they
may say while giving their testimony.”  Hunckel, 69 Md. at 187, 14 A. at 501.  We have
relied on a similar justification for the extension of privilege in cases of ongoing
administrative proceedings.  Odyniec, 322 Md. at 534, 588 A.2d at 792 (noting the vital
public function of “the arbitration machinery established by the legislature for health care
malpractice claims” encouraged the extension of privilege to the witnesses before arbitration
panels). 
In evaluating “the nature of the public function of the proceeding” when
administrative proceedings have not yet been initiated at the time the defamatory statement
is published, we have found justification for the privilege in Miner, Imperial, and Reichardt.
Each of those cases emphasized the socially important interest in allowing for the
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protestation and reporting of alleged abuses of the public trust as a result of official conduct.
This Court laid out the importance of this public interest in Miner, noting that citizen
complaints of police brutality abuses “serve a public function of vital importance by
providing a mechanism through which abuses may be reported to the proper authorities, and
the abusers held accountable.  The viability of a democratic government requires that the
channels of communication between citizens and their public officials remain open and
unimpeded.”  Miner, 304 Md. at 176, 498 A.2d at 275.  The importance of not deterring
citizen complaints outweighed the possible harm of defamatory statements.  
Similarly, in Reichardt, the complained-of abuse affected the public school system,
which the Court called “the core of the well-being of our community, our state and our
nation.”  Reichardt, 374 Md. at 373, 823 A.2d at 573.  We expressed a similar public
function as the one we found in Miner, stating “[i]t is unquestionably an issue of strong
public interest that students and parents should be protected from suit for reporting a
teacher’s alleged sexual misconduct.”  Id.  Finally, in Imperial, this Court noted the life and
death situations entrusted to emergency medical technicians to emphasize how the
competence of such workers critically affects the public at large.  Again our focus was on
allowing the unhindered reporting of complaints, as we observed that “public policy
encourages the communication of information to public authorities responsible for
maintaining the quality of emergency medical services.”  Imperial, 351 Md. at 50, 716 A.2d
at 250.
4 Miner, Imperial and Reichardt have all identified a significant public interest that
protects against abuses upon the public by certain officials.  We do not suggest that this is
the only justification that might suffice under the first Gersh factor in future cases.
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By identifying the socially important interest of avoiding abuses upon the public
welfare, this Court emphasized the public function of the eventual proceeding.  The phrase
“the nature of the public function” implies a further inquiry into the nexus between the
socially important interest (the public function) and the proceeding.  It requires an
examination of an identified public interest, and how it is advanced by the proceeding.  This
Court has found that in cases where a citizen questions official conduct and protests the
abuses of public officers, the nature of the public function to protect the public from such
abuse is served well by an administrative proceeding.  A nexus exists between the
proceeding’s function and a legitimate public interest, such as avoiding abuses upon the
public.4
Examining “the nature of the public function of the proceeding” sheds light on the
proceeding’s effect on the public and its impact on a socially important interest.  It therefore
may be necessary in some cases to examine the public authority or duties entrusted in the
employee.  The duties and authority attendant to a particular position may determine how
much influence an official has over the public from his or her position, which in turn can
affect how closely the proceeding serves a public interest.  From our jurisprudence, it follows
that the “nature of the public function of the proceeding” therefore also includes an inquiry
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into a person’s power over the public when the identified public interest is an important
check on that power.
In Miner, the connection between the public interest in protecting society from the
abuse of power and the duty and authority of the police officer was self-evident.  We said
“[o]ur society vests its law-enforcement officers with formidable power, the abuse of which
is often extremely detrimental to the public interest.”  Miner, 304 Md. at 176, 498 A.2d at
274-75.  In Reichardt we stated “[i]f ‘public school teacher’ were substituted for
‘law-enforcement officer,’ the above-quoted passage would be fully applicable in the case
at bar.”  Reichardt, 374 Md. at 371, 823 A.2d at 572.  Both cases dealt with the yielding of
considerable authority and power over the public trust.  Extending absolute privilege in
Miner was preferable to “the inhibition of citizens’ criticisms of those entrusted with their
protection,” directly implicating the duty law enforcement officers have to protect the public
at large.  Miner, 304 Md. at 177, 498 A.2d at 275.  The same duties of trust and protection
were implicated in Reichardt when the Court said: “It is unquestionably an issue of strong
public interest that students and parents should be protected from suit for reporting a
teacher’s alleged sexual misconduct.”  Reichardt, 374 Md. at 373, 823 A.2d at 573.  And in
Imperial we said, “the importance to the public that all medical participants in the emergency
medical system be competent is self-evident,” focusing on the particular category of
employee and the public’s interest in its duty and authority.  Imperial, 351 Md. at 50, 716
A.2d at 250.  In each of these cases, the Court considered the employee’s duty and authority
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in evaluating the nature of the public function served by prospective administrative
proceedings.
By contrast, Dr. Offen contends that he has no authority or power over the public.  He
characterizes himself as a low-level employee making only recommendations on claims,
which the Department of Justice (DOJ) then has the power to adopt or not.  Dr. Brenner
argues that this characterization is disingenuous and that Dr. Offen’s position of expertise
and the importance of handling vaccination claims effectively results in a system that defers
to the recommendations provided by personnel such as Dr. Offen and relies on their
credibility.  Dr. Brenner’s rebuttal highlights the importance of determining how Dr. Offen’s
duties relate to the important interest identified by the trial court.  We would not separate Dr.
Offen’s duties and responsibility from an evaluation of the nature of the public function of
the proceeding in this case.
In keeping with our reasoning that “the nature and scope of such proceedings are too
varied to be circumscribed by specific criteria,” Gersh, 291 Md. at 197, 434 A.2d at 551, the
inquiry into the duty and authority of a defamed employee is not determinative.  As we have
indicated, whether a privilege will apply is to be determined on a case-by-case basis.  Id.  In
McDermott, we listed several procedural failures in holding the investigation did not meet
Gersh’s second factor.  This Court stated that it was not “implying either that the above is
a complete listing of factors or that each of the factors listed is always required.”
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McDermott, 317 Md. at 26, 561 A.2d at 1045.  The same can be said of our holding here
under the first Gersh factor.
Accordingly, under Maryland defamation law, the duties and authority of the
employee against whom a statement was made should be considered, but are not dispositive,
in determining the nature of the public function of an administrative proceeding when
deciding whether a statement that led to that proceeding against an employee is protected by
absolute privilege.
CERTIFIED QUESTION OF LAW
ANSWERED AS SET FORTH ABOVE.
COSTS TO BE EQUALLY DIVIDED
BY THE PARTIES.