Title: Bellermann v. Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Light Co.

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-11492 
 
MARCIA D. BELLERMANN & others1  vs.  FITCHBURG GAS AND ELECTRIC 
LIGHT COMPANY. 
 
 
 
Worcester.     March 4, 2014. - October 30, 2014. 
 
Present:  Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. 
 
 
Electric Company.  Public Utilities, Electric company.  
Practice, Civil, Class action, Consumer protection case, 
Judicial discretion.  Consumer Protection Act, Class 
action, Unfair or deceptive act.  Administrative Law, 
Preclusive effect of decision.  Collateral Estoppel.  
Estoppel. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
January 7, 2009.  
 
 
Motions for class certification and for summary judgment 
were heard by Douglas H. Wilkins, J., and a decision denying 
class certification was reported by him to the Appeals Court. 
 
 
A proceeding for interlocutory review was heard in the 
Appeals court by Cynthia J. Cohen, J., and after consolidation 
of the appeals, the Supreme Judicial Court granted an 
application for direct appellate review.  
                         
1 Paul O'Connell, doing business as Lunenburg Exxon, also 
known as Lunenburg Gulf; Dee Anne Aylott; Gary H. Asher; Daisy 
Bacener; Beverly Christenson; Catherine J. Clark; Carl E. 
Fandreyer; Jacquelyn Poisson; Karen Thibeault; Genghis, Inc.; 
and Evans on the Common, on behalf of themselves and all others 
similarly situated. 
 
2 
 
 
 
Barry M. Altman & C. Deborah Phillips (James L. O'Connor, 
Jr., Edwin H. Howard, & James M. Galliher with them) for the 
plaintiffs. 
 
Gavin J. Rooney, of New Jersey (Natalie J. Kraner, of New 
Jersey, with him) for the defendant. 
 
Robin L. Main for Massachusetts Electric Company & others, 
amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  This case arises out of a major ice storm that 
struck areas of the northeastern United States in December, 2008 
(Winter Storm 2008).  The defendant, Fitchburg Gas and Electric 
Light Company (FG&E), is a public utility that provides electric 
service to customers in the municipalities of Fitchburg, 
Lunenburg, Townsend, and Ashby, which were among those affected 
by the storm.  FG&E is one of the utilities owned by Unitil 
Corporation (Unitil).  The plaintiffs are twelve residential and 
business customers of FG&E who lost power during Winter Storm 
2008.  They filed a suit in the Superior Court on behalf of 
themselves and those similarly situated, asserting claims of 
gross negligence and violation of G. L. c. 93A.  Pursuant to 
G. L. c. 93A, §§ 9 (2) and 11,2 and Mass. R. Civ. P. 23, as 
                         
2 General Laws c. 93A, § 9 (2), provides that "[a]ny persons 
entitled to bring [an] action [under § 9 (1) for an unfair or 
deceptive act or practice] may, if the use or employment of the 
unfair or deceptive act or practice has caused similar injury to 
numerous other persons similarly situated and if the court finds 
in a preliminary hearing that he adequately and fairly 
represents such other persons, bring the action on behalf of 
himself and such other similarly injured and situated persons."  
General Laws c. 93A, § 11, contains a similar provision 
applicable to business plaintiffs. 
 
3 
amended, 452 Mass. 1401 (2008) (rule 23),3 the plaintiffs moved 
to certify a class consisting of FG&E's residential and business 
customers; their dependents, tenants, and employees; and other 
users of electricity who sustained damages as a result of FG&E's 
inadequate preparation for and response to Winter Storm 2008.  
The parties also filed cross-motions for partial summary 
judgment on the plaintiffs' G. L. c. 93A claims.  In their 
motion for partial summary judgment, the plaintiffs sought issue 
preclusive effect of certain findings made by the Department of 
Public Utilities (DPU) in two prior administrative adjudications 
related to FG&E's conduct during Winter Storm 2008.  See D.P.U. 
11-01 (2011); D.P.U. 09-01-A (2009). 
 
After a combined hearing on these motions, the judge issued 
                         
3 Mass. R. Civ. P. 23, as amended, 452 Mass. 1401 (2008), 
provides, in relevant part: 
 
"(a) Prerequisites to Class Action.  One or more 
members of a class may sue or be sued as representative 
parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so 
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, 
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, 
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties 
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and 
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately 
protect the interests of the class. 
 
"(b) Class Actions Maintainable.  An action may be 
maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of 
subdivision (a) are satisfied, and the court finds that the 
questions of law or fact common to the members of the class 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members, and that a class action is superior to other 
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication 
of the controversy." 
 
4 
two decisions.  He denied the plaintiffs' motion for class 
certification, and, while determining that the application of 
offensive issue preclusion was appropriate, he also denied the 
motions for summary judgment as to all but two claims that are 
not at issue here.  The judge then reported his decision denying 
class certification to the Appeals Court pursuant to Mass. R. 
Civ. P. 64 (a), as amended, 423 Mass. 1403 (1996), and FG&E 
sought interlocutory review, pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 118, of 
the judge's decision as to issue preclusion.  A single justice 
of the Appeals Court allowed the petition for interlocutory 
review, and the two appeals were consolidated in the Appeals 
Court.  We allowed the plaintiffs' application for direct 
appellate review.  We conclude that the judge did not abuse his 
discretion in declining to certify a class and in applying issue 
preclusion to facts found after evidentiary hearings at the DPU.4 
 
Background.  We summarize the facts set forth in the 
judge's decisions, supplemented by other undisputed facts in the 
record. 
 
FG&E receives all of its electric power from four 
transmission supply lines owned by National Grid USA Service 
Company, Inc. (National Grid).  Each of these lines ties into a 
                         
4 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by Massachusetts 
Electric Company, doing business as National Grid; Nantucket 
Electric Company, doing business as National Grid; and Northeast 
Utilities. 
 
5 
substation in southwest Fitchburg.  From this substation, FG&E's 
network consists of sixty miles of subtransmission lines that 
feed into 680 miles of distribution lines.  At the time of 
Winter Storm 2008, FG&E had approximately 28,500 customers. 
 
1.  Winter Storm 2008.  Winter Storm 2008 was an ice storm 
that struck the northeastern United States, including FG&E's 
service territory, on December 11 and 12, 2008.  As a result of 
that storm, ice accumulated on utility poles and tree limbs in 
FG&E's territory, causing limbs and whole trees to fall onto 
FG&E utility poles, electrical lines, and other electrical 
infrastructure.  The storm also damaged the National Grid 
transmission lines that supply FG&E's system with power.  In 
total, Winter Storm 2008 resulted in power outages for over one 
million customers in New England, New York, and Pennsylvania, 
including one hundred per cent of FG&E's customers. 
 
2.  FG&E's preparedness and restoration efforts.  In 1992, 
sixteen years before Winter Storm 2008, the DPU had directed 
FG&E and several other utilities to "implement or to maintain a 
system for reviewing emergency plans on an annual basis," and 
had advised them that "it would be beneficial for each company 
to examine the other [c]ompanies' plans in order to consider the 
incorporation of useful changes."  D.P.U. 91-228, at 4 (1992).  
In 2002, the DPU further advised FG&E to "consider the use of 
extreme weather condition forecasts with outages or 
 
6 
contingencies simulated in the power flow model for plan[n]ing 
and designing [transmission and distribution] facilities." 
 
In 2006 and 2007, FG&E sent newsletters to its customers 
extolling its ability to respond to outages and asserting that 
"safety and service reliability are our first priorities."  FG&E 
also filed annual emergency restoration plans (ERPs) with the 
DPU; these plans set forth an overview of FG&E's service 
restoration processes and priorities, defined organizational and 
functional responsibilities, identified communications 
protocols, and described the framework required to restore power 
in the event of a major storm or other emergency.  Other severe 
ice storms occurred in Unitil's service area, but contrary to 
the recommendation in the DPU's 1992 order, FG&E did not study 
the storm preparation and response practices of other 
Massachusetts utilities.  FG&E's ERP in effect at the time of 
Winter Storm 2008 did not address a storm as severe and 
widespread as that storm.  
 
At the time of Winter Storm 2008, FG&E also had in effect a 
vegetation management policy providing tree-trimming cycles for 
each of the circuits in its system.  By the end of 2006, 
however, FG&E's vegetation management program had become 
underfunded, and FG&E had fallen behind on its tree-trimming 
schedule.  Rather than increasing its vegetation management 
budget, FG&E responded by adjusting downward its clearance 
 
7 
standards and vegetation management cycles. 
 
After Winter Storm 2008 struck, FG&E began restoring power 
to its customers on a rolling basis.  The process started early 
on December 12, once National Grid had repaired its transmission 
supply lines, when FG&E restored power to about five hundred 
customers in downtown Fitchburg whose underground network system 
was largely insulated from the weather.  To complete full 
restoration, however, FG&E had to repair 244 utility poles, 
192,729 feet of wire conductor, and 170 transformers.  FG&E did 
not employ a sufficient number of its own restoration crews to 
respond to Winter Storm 2008, and had only limited success in 
obtaining additional crews from other utilities.  By December 
20, more than 4,000 FG&E customers remained without power, and 
at the Commonwealth's request, National Grid stepped in to 
complete the necessary restoration work.  The last customers did 
not have power until December 25.  
 
The plaintiffs experienced outages beginning on either 
December 10, 11, or 12, and persisting for periods ranging from 
four to twelve days.  Although all were attributable to the 
storm, the immediate reasons for their loss of power differed.  
For example, some plaintiffs lost power due to damage to FG&E's 
subtransmission lines, whereas others lost power when trees in 
their yards, for which FG&E does not bear responsibility, fell 
on their individual service lines.  The plaintiffs' affidavits 
 
8 
set forth various damages caused by the outages, including lost 
income and business profits, burst pipes, dead plants and pet 
fish, spoiled food, and other expenses incurred as a consequence 
of and in response to the outages. 
 
3.  FG&E's public communications.  FG&E's ERP at the time 
of Winter Storm 2008 provided that one of its primary 
responsibilities during an emergency was "[t]o keep the public 
informed of the status of the restoration in a timely manner 
through direct contact with town and city officials and the news 
media."  According to FG&E, its principal method for 
communicating with the public during Winter Storm 2008 was 
through public service announcements (PSAs).  FG&E issued 
between one and five PSAs daily from December 11 through 
December 24. 
 
As of the morning of December 11, FG&E knew that the 
weather forecast was for "anywhere from 1/4 inch to more than 1 
inch of ice," that "the current thinking is that FG&E is in the 
worst position" of the Unitil subsidiaries, and that "1/4 inch 
of ice and a little wind would be problematic, so having a 
forecast of over 1 inch would likely result in an extended 
restoration period that could easily exceed one week."  
Nevertheless, FG&E issued the following PSA later that day:  
"Most electrical outages are expected to be for relatively short 
periods of time, only.  However, severe weather conditions can 
 
9 
create substantial damage to the electrical system, and 
restoration can take an extended period of time." 
 
Within the first few hours of Winter Storm 2008, FG&E had 
information that its system had suffered extensive damage that 
affected more than just its subtransmission and distribution 
facilities.  Accordingly, when it energized its subtransmission 
lines on December 14, it knew that this would not restore power 
to a large majority of its customers.  During this time, FG&E 
also learned that it would not have access to repair crews that 
it previously had believed would be available.  Nonetheless, 
from December 12 through December 15, FG&E's PSAs stated that it 
would "take days" or "several days" to restore power.  On 
December 16, FG&E's PSAs began referring to "restoration of all 
primary circuits" by the end of the week, without explaining 
that this did not mean that all customers would have their power 
restored by that time.  FG&E had information about the need for 
"extensive rebuilding of circuits," but it did not communicate 
this fact until December 19. 
 
FG&E's PSAs also served as the source of information for 
its customer service representatives.  From December 11 through 
December 25, FG&E's call center received 164,136 calls, of which 
only 32,327 reached a customer service representative.  Some 
customers who did speak with representatives, including two of 
the plaintiffs, received false predictions as to when they could 
 
10 
expect their power to be restored.  Others who attempted to call 
did not speak to representatives but were connected to automated 
recordings that provided no information about restoration times. 
 
4.  DPU proceedings.  On January 7, 2009, the DPU, pursuant 
to its regulatory authority under G. L. c. 164, §§ 1E and 76, 
opened an investigation into FG&E's preparation for and response 
to Winter Storm 2008.  The purpose of the investigation was to 
determine whether FG&E had satisfied its public service 
obligation to provide safe and reliable service.5  See D.P.U. 09-
01-A, at 6-8, and authorities cited. 
 
The DPU began its investigation by holding two public 
hearings and requesting written comments.  The DPU accepted both 
sworn and unsworn statements, although it informed the public 
that it would not rely on unsworn statements in its decision-
making process.  See 220 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.10(1) (2008) ("The 
[DPU] shall follow the rules of evidence observed by courts when 
practicable . . . .  All unsworn statements appearing in the 
record shall not be considered as evidence on which a decision 
                         
5 The order opening the investigation by the Department of 
Public Utilities (DPU) announced that it would focus on 
Fitchburg Gas and Electric Light Company's (FG&E's) 
(1) emergency restoration plan (ERP); (2) preparation for Winter 
Storm 2008 and management of restoration efforts; 
(3) cooperation with other utilities in sharing restoration 
resources; (4) procurement and allocation of out-of-State 
"mutual aid" crews; (5) communications with State and local 
public officials; (6) internal communications; (7) dissemination 
of information to the public; (8) transmission maintenance and 
outage scheduling; and (9) practices requiring improvement. 
 
11 
may be based").  As summarized in its final decision, the DPU 
received a total of two hundred forty-three oral comments and 
eighty written comments, describing a variety of problems 
regarding FG&E that customers experienced during the storm.  See 
D.P.U. 09-01-A, at 9-17. 
 
The DPU next conducted an adjudicatory proceeding pursuant 
to 220 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 1.01-1.15 (2008).  The Attorney 
General intervened in the proceeding as authorized by G. L. 
c. 12, § 11E (a).  On March 25, 2009, FG&E, represented by 
counsel, provided the DPU with prefiled testimony of various 
Unitil officials.  It also submitted a self-assessment report 
that included twenty-eight recommendations on how to improve its 
preparedness for and response to emergency events.  The DPU held 
evidentiary hearings from May 11 to May 15, at which both the 
Attorney General and FG&E presented witness testimony.  Both 
parties then filed initial briefs and reply briefs. 
 
The Attorney General proposed a number of remedies to 
address FG&E's alleged failures related to Winter Storm 2008.  
It urged the DPU to (1) require FG&E to adopt the twenty-eight 
improvements recommended in FG&E's self-assessment report, (2) 
fine FG&E $4.6 million, (3) deny FG&E recovery of storm-related 
costs, and (4) reduce FG&E's return on equity. 
 
In a 215-page decision, the DPU found "numerous and 
systematic" deficiencies in how FG&E prepared for and responded 
 
12 
to Winter Storm 2008.  D.P.U. 09-01-A, at xiii.  These 
deficiencies included inadequate planning and training for 
significant emergency events; inadequate preparation for Winter 
Storm 2008; unsatisfactory damage assessment after the storm; 
insufficient acquisition of external repair crews; various 
problems that prevented FG&E from restoring service in a timely 
manner; and a failure to provide the public with useful and 
accurate information, which "resulted in the inability of 
customers to plan appropriately for an extended outage."  See 
id. at 47, 60, 69, 83, 102, 121, 125.  The DPU concluded that 
each of these deficiencies constituted a violation of FG&E's 
obligation to provide safe and reliable service.  See id. at 52, 
60, 72, 83-84, 102, 121, 125.  The DPU also found that FG&E had 
engaged in deficient tree-trimming practices, which likely 
contributed to outages experienced during the storm.  See id. at 
xiii, 160. 
 
To remedy these failures, the DPU ordered FG&E to undertake 
a comprehensive independent management audit at its own expense; 
to implement, with some modifications, the twenty-eight 
improvements in its self-assessment report; and to provide 
progress reports regarding the implementation of these 
improvements.  See id. at 193-194, 208-214.  While acknowledging 
that FG&E's conduct might warrant monetary penalties, the DPU 
concluded that it lacked authority to impose the requested $4.6 
 
13 
million fine.  See id. at ix, 185, 189.6  The DPU decided to 
defer the questions of FG&E's storm-related cost recovery and 
return on equity until its next rate-setting proceeding.  See 
id. at 196, 198-199.  FG&E was notified properly of its right to 
appeal under G. L. c. 25, § 25, see 220 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.13, 
but did not file an appeal. 
 
The DPU addressed FG&E's cost recovery and return on equity 
in its next rate-setting decision, at which time FG&E sought to 
recover storm-related costs totaling $22,120,286.  See D.P.U. 
11-01, at 13-15.  The DPU adopted the findings in its 
investigatory decision, including those pertaining to specific 
failures by FG&E.  See id. at 16, 59, 66.7  Relying on these 
                         
6 Partly in response to FG&E's deficient performance during 
Winter Storm 2008, the Legislature enacted G. L. c. 164, § 1J, 
directing the DPU to establish standards for how electric 
utilities should prepare for and respond to emergency events, 
and authorizing the DPU to impose fines, totaling no more than 
$20 million, for violations of these standards.  See St. 2009, 
c. 133, § 4.  See also G. L. c. 164, § 85B (imposing 
requirements for utilities' emergency response plans); 220 Code 
Mass. Regs. §§ 19.01-19.06 (2010) (setting forth DPU's emergency 
performance standards).  In 2012, the Legislature adopted G. L. 
c. 164, § 1K, requiring the DPU to credit any penalties levied 
back to the utility's customers.  See St. 2012, c. 216, § 3. 
7 The DPU summarized the findings of its investigatory 
decision as follows: 
 
"[T]he [DPU] found that [FG&E's] lack of planning and 
training for a significant storm event left it unprepared 
to respond to the magnitude of system damage that it 
experienced during Winter Storm 2008.  D.P.U. 09-01-A at 47 
[(2009)].  The [DPU] determined that [FG&E's] lack of 
planning led to:  (1) its inability to restore service to 
its customers in a timely manner; (2) its failure to 
 
14 
findings, the DPU allowed recovery of costs that FG&E could not 
have avoided given the magnitude of Winter Storm 2008, but 
denied FG&E's request with respect to $6,954,492 in costs 
incurred because of FG&E's failures leading up to and during the 
storm.  See id. at 13-14.  The DPU also reduced FG&E's return on 
equity in part to reflect its deficient performance.  See id. at 
14.  FG&E again did not appeal from the DPU's decision. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Class certification.  With respect to both 
rule 23 and G. L. c. 93A, we review a grant or denial of class 
certification for an abuse of discretion.  See Salvas v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 452 Mass. 337, 361 (2008); Moelis v. 
Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 451 Mass. 483, 486 (2008).  Under both 
sets of certification requirements, the plaintiffs "do not bear 
the burden of producing evidence sufficient to prove that the 
requirements [of class certification] have been met," but need 
only provide "information sufficient to enable the motion judge 
to form a reasonable judgment" that the class meets the relevant 
                                                                               
communicate accurate and useful information to the public; 
and (3) its failure to coordinate its restoration efforts 
with local public safety officials.  [Id.]  Further, the 
[DPU] identified failures in:  (1) [FG&E's] pre-storm 
preparation; (2) external resource acquisition; (3) damage 
assessment; (4) communication efforts with the public, 
municipal officials, local safety officials, and life 
support customers; and (5) adherence to its tree trimming 
schedule.  [Id.] at 60, 71-72, 83-84, 121, 125, 127-128, 
135, 158-159." 
 
D.P.U. 11-01, at 16 (2011). 
 
15 
requirements.8  Weld v. Glaxo Wellcome Inc., 434 Mass. 81, 87 
(2001).  See Aspinall v. Philip Morris Cos., 442 Mass. 381, 391-
392 (2004); Kwaak v. Pfizer, Inc., 71 Mass. App. Ct. 293, 297 
(2008).  General Laws c. 93A, however, affords a judge less 
discretion to deny class certification than does rule 23.  See 
Salvas v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., supra at 370 n.66, citing 
Aspinall v. Philip Morris Cos., supra.   
 
To support class certification under rule 23, plaintiffs 
must satisfy the four elements of rule 23 (a) and the two 
additional elements of rule 23 (b).  Rule 23 (a) requires the 
plaintiffs to show that "(1) the class is sufficiently numerous 
to make joinder of all parties impracticable, (2) there are 
common questions of law and fact, (3) the claim of the named 
plaintiff representative is typical of the claims of the class, 
and (4) the named plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent 
the interests of the class."  Weld v. Glaxo Wellcome Inc., supra 
at 86.  In addition, rule 23 (b) requires them to show "that 
common questions of law and fact predominate over individualized 
                         
8 The source of such information depends on the stage of the 
proceeding at which the plaintiffs seek class certification.  
Early in the proceedings, plaintiffs may rely on the allegations 
in their complaint.  See Baldassari v. Public Fin. Trust, 369 
Mass. 33, 39-40 (1975).  Where, as here, the parties have 
undertaken discovery and proceeded to the summary judgment 
stage, the information should rest on the more developed record.  
See, e.g., Weld v. Glaxo Wellcome Inc., 434 Mass. 81, 85-86 
(2001) (motion judge properly considered "the pleadings, 
affidavits, briefs, and the earlier memorandum on summary 
judgment"). 
 
16 
questions, and that the class action is superior to other 
available methods for fair and efficient adjudication of the 
controversy."  Weld v. Glaxo Wellcome Inc., supra.  
 
Plaintiffs may bring a class action under G. L. c. 93A if 
they can show that they may seek relief for an unfair or 
deceptive act or practice under G. L. c. 93A, §§ 9 (2) or 11, 
that the act or practice "caused similar injury to numerous 
other persons similarly situated," and that they would 
"adequately and fairly represent[] such other persons."  G. L. 
c. 93A, §§ 9 (2), 11.  Where appropriate, "the public policy of 
the Commonwealth strongly favors G. L. c. 93A class actions."  
Feeney v. Dell Inc., 454 Mass. 192, 200 (2009).  In considering 
certification under G. L. c. 93A, a judge must bear in mind the 
"'pressing need for an effective private remedy' . . . and that 
'traditional technicalities are not to be read into the statute 
in such a way as to impede the accomplishment of substantial 
justice.'"  Aspinall v. Philip Morris Cos., 442 Mass. at 391-
392, quoting Fletcher v. Cape Cod Gas Co., 394 Mass. 595, 605-
606 (1985). 
 
Although the requirements of rule 23 (a) provide a "useful 
framework" for considering class certification under G. L. 
c. 93A, the similarity requirements of the rule do not equate 
with the requirement of G. L. c. 93A that the plaintiffs be 
"similarly situated" and have suffered a "similar injury" as 
 
17 
members of the class they seek to represent.  See Aspinall v. 
Philip Morris Cos., 442 Mass. at 391, quoting Fletcher v. Cape 
Cod Gas Co., 394 Mass. at 605.  The class action provisions of 
G. L. c. 93A also have "a more mandatory tone" than does rule 23 
in that they omit the predominance and superiority elements of 
rule 23 (b), see Fletcher v. Cape Cod Gas Co., supra at 605, 
quoting Baldassari v. Public Fin. Trust, 369 Mass. 33, 40 
(1975), but a judge retains some discretion to consider these 
factors in determining whether putative class members are 
"similarly situated" and have suffered a "similar injury."  See 
Moelis v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 451 Mass. at 489-490; 
Fletcher v. Cape Cod Gas Co., supra at 605-606. 
 
a.  Chapter 93A.  The Superior Court judge determined that 
the individual plaintiffs had proffered sufficient information 
to show unfair and deceptive conduct by FG&E against all its 
customers, but denied their motion for class certification based 
on his conclusion that they had not shown that such conduct 
caused "similar injury" to the putative class members.  The 
judge did not abuse his discretion. 
 
To pursue a class action under G. L. c. 93A, plaintiffs 
must show that the putative class members suffered "similar," 
although not necessarily identical, injuries as a result of the 
defendant's unfair or deceptive conduct.9  G. L. c. 93A, 
                         
9 Business plaintiffs under G. L. c. 93A, § 11, must have 
 
18 
§§ 9 (2), 11.  See Salvas v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 452 Mass. at 
364, quoting Spear v. H.V. Greene Co., 246 Mass. 259, 266 
(1923).  As with G. L. c. 93A claims generally, a causal 
connection must exist between the unfair or deceptive conduct 
and the injury, see Hershenow v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of 
Boston, 445 Mass. 790, 797-800 (2006), and the injury must be a 
"separate, identifiable harm" that is "distinct" from the unfair 
or deceptive conduct itself.  Tyler v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 
464 Mass. 492, 503 (2013).  General Laws c. 93A does not permit 
class certification for the purpose of addressing limited common 
issues short of class-wide liability.  See Fletcher v. Cape Cod 
Gas Co., 394 Mass. at 602.  Accordingly, plaintiffs must show 
that they can establish causation of such similar injury on a 
class-wide basis.  See Aspinall v. Philip Morris Cos., 442 Mass. 
at 397 n.19; Fletcher v. Cape Cod Gas Co., supra at 603-604. 
 
The plaintiffs concede that Winter Storm 2008 would have 
caused widespread power outages without regard to any failures 
by FG&E, and they do not seek to certify a class on the basis of 
such loss of power.  They press two other theories of injury 
instead:  (1) prolonged power outages caused by FG&E's failure 
to restore power more expeditiously, and (2) an inability to 
                                                                               
suffered a loss of "money or property."  Those seeking relief 
under G. L. c. 93A, § 9, by contrast, may recover for both 
economic and personal losses.  See Klairmont v. Gainsboro 
Restaurant, Inc., 465 Mass. 165, 175 (2013), and cases cited. 
 
19 
plan for the widespread and extended outages due to FG&E's 
unfair and deceptive communications system.10  We address these 
theories of injury in turn and conclude that neither one 
required the judge to certify a class. 
 
i.  Delay in restoration of power.  The plaintiffs argue 
that regardless of the cause of any initial loss of power, 
FG&E's numerous and systemic failures in planning for and 
responding to Winter Storm 2008 injured the putative class 
members by delaying restoration.  This theory of injury requires 
the plaintiffs to prove that the class members suffered longer 
outages than they would have but for FG&E's failures.  As the 
judge concluded, this theory of similar injury fails for the 
                         
10 In their brief, the plaintiffs indicate a third possible 
theory of injury:  that they paid for a level of emergency 
preparedness, efficient restoration, and accurate information 
that FG&E unfairly and deceptively failed to provide.  Where a 
defendant's unfair or deceptive conduct causes customers to 
receive a product or service worth less than the one for which 
the customers paid, the customers may pursue a class action 
under G. L. c. 93A to recover the amount by which they overpaid.  
See Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 630-631 (2008) 
(purchasers of motor vehicles could potentially certify class to 
recover overpayment for vehicles that unfairly or deceptively 
did not meet regulatory safety standards); Aspinall v. Philip 
Morris Cos., 442 Mass. 381, 397-399 (2004) (purchasers of light 
cigarettes could pursue class to recover difference between 
market price of cigarettes as sold and true market value of such 
cigarettes had they not been deceptively advertised).  In their 
motion for class certification, however, the plaintiffs did not 
seek to recover the amount by which they purportedly overpaid, 
focusing instead on their alleged damages associated with the 
power outages.  Cf. Aspinall v. Philip Morris Cos., supra at 397 
& n.19 (distinguishing class seeking to recover for personal 
injuries caused by defendant's deception, which would not have 
supported class treatment). 
 
20 
same reason that the plaintiffs cannot pursue a class action 
based on the initial loss of power:  causation would have to be 
resolved "on an individual (or small group) basis." 
 
As reflected by the differing lengths of time that outages 
were experienced, FG&E customers lost electric power for various 
reasons, and distinct obstacles impeded restoration of their 
power.  The plaintiffs have not indicated how long outages would 
have lasted in the absence of FG&E's failures.  Their expert 
testified that he made no attempt to estimate what a reasonable 
restoration period would have been, and the plaintiffs have not 
otherwise identified a model or method for determining how long 
outages would have lasted but for FG&E's failures. 
 
Even granting that FG&E's alleged systemic failures may 
have had a general tendency to delay restoration efforts, 
relying on such a general tendency to prove causation with 
respect to each individual class member would involve 
impermissible speculation or generalization.  See Salvas v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 452 Mass. at 361, quoting Weld v. Glaxo 
Wellcome Inc., 434 Mass. at 85.  Many customers, especially 
those who experienced shorter outages, may not have suffered 
prolonged outages due to FG&E's conduct.  If the plaintiffs were 
to prove FG&E's systemic failures, it would still remain for 
each class member to show that those failures caused a prolonged 
outage on an individual basis.  The nominal class action would 
 
21 
"degenerate in practice into multiple law-suits separately 
tried."  Fletcher v. Cape Cod Gas Co., 394 Mass. at 604 n.8, 
quoting Advisory Committee Notes to 1966 Revision, Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 23(b)(3), 28 U.S.C. (1982).  
 
The plaintiffs suggest that this inquiry would involve 
merely a question of damages.  However, if customers did not 
suffer a longer outage than otherwise would have occurred, their 
claims must fail for lack of causation.  See Hershenow v. 
Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of Boston, Inc., 445 Mass. at 800-801 
(rejecting G. L. c. 93A claim where plaintiffs failed to 
establish that statutorily noncompliant contract terms made them 
worse off than they would have been had contract complied with 
statute); Lord v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 60 Mass. App. Ct. 
309, 317-318, 322-323 (2004) (defendant entitled to judgment on 
G. L. c. 93A claim where its unfair or deceptive act did not 
cause plaintiff's injury).  The judge did not abuse his 
discretion in denying class certification with respect to this 
theory of injury. 
 
ii.  Inability to plan.  The plaintiffs' second theory of 
injury does not depend on what caused either the initial loss of 
power or the length of a particular outage.  They argue that 
FG&E's communications leading up to and during Winter Storm 2008 
consisted of deceptions and omissions that failed to provide 
them with accurate and useful information regarding the expected 
 
22 
scope and duration of outages.  They contend that this failure 
caused all members of the putative class to suffer the similar 
injury of an inability to plan for the outages.  The plaintiffs' 
affidavits aver that had FG&E properly informed them, they would 
have prepared for the outages in various ways, including 
arranging alternate living accommodations for themselves, their 
relatives, and their pets; purchasing generators; draining water 
from pipes to keep them from bursting; obtaining firewood; and 
stocking less perishable food or storing food elsewhere.  The 
plaintiffs also allege, pointing to statements made at the DPU 
public hearings, that the other putative class members likewise 
suffered damages due to their inability to plan.  The judge did 
not abuse his discretion in denying class certification on this 
theory of injury. 
 
Both in the Superior Court and in this appeal, the 
plaintiffs' arguments have not been clear about whether their 
claim rests on an alleged system of actively false and 
misleading statements by FG&E, or whether it rests instead on 
FG&E's alleged violation of an affirmative duty to provide its 
customers with useful information.  These claims are distinct.  
To the extent the plaintiffs assert the former claim, we agree 
with the motion judge that, although the named plaintiffs may 
prove that FG&E made deceptive statements as to them, they 
cannot establish causation on a class-wide basis because not all 
 
23 
class members were exposed to the same deceptive statements and 
because the announced time frames for restoration may have been 
accurate as to many class members.  See Kwaak v. Pfizer, Inc., 
71 Mass. App. Ct. at 300-301 (rejecting class certification of 
those seeking relief for deceptive advertising campaign, where 
not all class members encountered advertisements and variations 
existed in advertisements that proposed class members did 
encounter). 
 
To the extent the plaintiffs assert the second claim, they 
fare only slightly better.  The plaintiffs may be able to show 
that FG&E engaged in unfair or deceptive conduct with respect to 
all putative class members by violating an affirmative duty to 
provide useful information regarding the scope and duration of 
expected outages.  FG&E's ERP stated that one of its primary 
responsibilities during an emergency was "[t]o keep the public 
informed of the status of the restoration in a timely manner," 
and the DPU concluded that FG&E's public service obligation 
encompassed a duty to provide the public with "accurate and 
useful information" during an emergency event, designed to 
enable customers to plan accordingly.  See D.P.U. 09-01-A, at 
122, 125.  Cf. 940 Code Mass. Regs. § 19.05(1) (1998) ("It is an 
unfair or deceptive act or practice for a retail seller of 
electricity to fail to disclose material information about its 
products, services, or business, where such failure has the 
 
24 
capacity or tendency to deceive or mislead a reasonable 
consumer, or has the effect of deceiving or misleading such a 
consumer, in any material respect"); Evans v. Lorillard Tobacco 
Co., 465 Mass. 411, 465 (2013) (suggesting that breach of 
voluntarily-assumed duty to provide information may constitute 
violation of G. L. c. 93A).  The DPU found that FG&E did not 
"provide accurate and useful information to the public regarding 
restoration times" and noted that this "failure in communicating 
the extent of damage resulted in the inability of customers to 
plan appropriately for an extended outage."  D.P.U. 09-01-A at 
xi-xii, 125.  As the plaintiffs argue, and the judge agreed for 
purposes of FG&E's motion for summary judgment, although some of 
FG&E's PSAs did predict that restoration would take "days" or 
"several days," which arguably turned out to be accurate as to 
many customers, a fact finder could determine that these 
communications were too vague and general to satisfy a duty to 
inform.  Cf. Aspinall v. Philip Morris Cos., 442 Mass. at 394 
("advertising need not be totally false in order to be deemed 
deceptive in the context of G. L. c. 93A"). 
 
The judge was not required, however, to certify a class 
based on FG&E's alleged violation of this affirmative duty, 
especially where the plaintiffs did not proffer a method for 
proving on a class-wide basis that FG&E's failure to provide 
useful information actually interfered with the ability of the 
 
25 
different putative class members to plan for the outages.11 
 
As reflected by the variety of ways that the plaintiffs 
contend they would have responded to better information, this 
theory of injury would necessitate individualized inquiry 
regarding the counterfactual mental processes of each class 
member.  Indeed, many class members -- such as, perhaps, the 
approximately five hundred customers in downtown Fitchburg who 
lost power for only a few hours or those customers who already 
possessed power generators -- may not have planned any 
differently and therefore suffered no injury under this theory.  
Although individualized inquiries regarding affirmative defenses 
and, especially, calculation of damages do not preclude class 
certification on the question of liability, see Salvas v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 452 Mass. at 367-368; Aspinall v. Philip 
                         
11 The plaintiffs appear to assume that causation can be 
established on a class-wide basis on the theory that FG&E 
violated an affirmative duty to provide useful information, 
asserting that only the question of damages would require 
individualized inquiry.  The plaintiffs do not argue, and we 
therefore do not decide, whether, if the plaintiffs were to 
establish that FG&E violated an affirmative duty to warn, such 
proof, as in other contexts, would warrant a presumption that 
the warning would have been received and heeded.  See, e.g., 
Evans v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 465 Mass. 411, 442 (2013); 
Harlow v. Chin, 405 Mass. 697, 702-703 (1989).  Even assuming 
that FG&E would bear the burden of showing that any failure to 
provide useful information did not impede the ability of 
particular class members to plan for the outages, the judge 
still had discretion to deny class certification.  See Moelis v. 
Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 451 Mass. 483, 490-491 (2008) (judge 
could deny class certification where affirmative defenses would 
require highly fact-specific, individualized inquiry). 
 
26 
Morris Cos., 442 Mass. at 402, a judge retains discretion to 
deny certification based on such considerations.  See Moelis v. 
Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 451 Mass. at 490; Fletcher v. Cape Cod 
Gas Co., 394 Mass. at 603-604, 606-607.  Of course, the judge 
remains free to alter his decision as the litigation proceeds.  
See Moelis v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., supra at 491-492; 
Aspinall v. Philip Morris Cos., supra at 398 n.22, quoting 
School Comm. of Brockton v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against 
Discrimination, 423 Mass. 7, 14 n.12 (1996) ("decision as to 
class certification is not immutable"). 
 
iii.  Alternative classes and subclasses.  The plaintiffs 
propose three alternative classes and subclasses that they 
contend the judge should have certified:  (1) a subclass of 
approximately 17,000 FG&E customers who lost power for four days 
or more, (2) a class seeking only injunctive or declaratory 
relief, and (3) a subclass of approximately 4,000 customers who 
received estimated bills for December, 2008, that made no 
adjustment for the loss of power during that period.  Where a 
natural alternative class or set of subclasses would address a 
judge's concerns about certifying a class as initially proposed, 
the judge should redefine the original class or certify 
subclasses as appropriate.  See Kwaak v. Pfizer, Inc., 71 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 302 n.8, quoting Richardson v. Byrd, 709 F.2d 1016, 
1019 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Dallas County Comm'rs 
 
27 
Court v. Richardson, 464 U.S. 1009 (1983).  Furthermore, a judge 
may certify a subclass represented by only some named 
plaintiffs, with other named plaintiffs asserting different 
claims, if it makes sense to litigate these various claims in a 
single proceeding.  See, e.g., McGonagle v. Home Depot U.S.A., 
Inc., 75 Mass. App. Ct. 593, 597 (2009) (judge certified two 
subclasses each represented by only one named plaintiff).  
Nonetheless, the judge did not abuse his discretion in declining 
to certify any alternative classes or subclasses here. 
 
As to the first proposed alternative, narrowing the class 
to those who suffered outages of at least four days would not 
address the judge's concerns because it would not eliminate the 
need for individual inquiries regarding whether the extended 
outage resulted from FG&E's unfair or deceptive conduct and how 
the customers would have planned differently had they received 
better information.  As to the second alternative, the judge 
noted that the responses of the Legislature and the DPU to 
FG&E's conduct during Winter Storm 2008, see note 6, supra, may 
already have remedied the allegedly unfair or deceptive 
practices for which the plaintiffs seek equitable relief.  The 
judge permitted the plaintiffs' request for equitable relief to 
proceed on a nonclass basis, and if the plaintiffs succeed in 
proving the need for such relief, the judge may revisit his 
class certification decision at that time.  See Moelis v. 
 
28 
Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 451 Mass. at 491-492.  Cf. Brantley v. 
Hampden Div. of the Probate & Family Court Dep't, 457 Mass. 172, 
184 n.15 (2010) (class certification properly denied where 
equitable remedies requested by named plaintiff would afford 
relief to those similarly situated notwithstanding absence of 
class).  Finally, as to the third alternative, the judge 
acknowledged that an estimated-billing class might warrant 
certification but did not so certify because not all named 
plaintiffs had received estimated bills and the plaintiffs had 
requested such a class as just one of sixteen alternatives, 
without explaining how this class claim would fit together with 
the other claims brought by the named plaintiffs.  Because the 
estimated-billing claim rests on conduct distinct from that 
underlying the claims that FG&E failed to restore power and 
failed to provide useful information, the judge properly could 
demand additional information regarding such a class and how it 
would comport with the larger litigation.  See Kwaak v. Pfizer, 
Inc., 71 Mass. App. Ct. at 302 n.8. 
 
b.  Rule 23.  The plaintiffs also seek to certify a class 
under rule 23 on a claim of gross negligence.  This claim rests 
on FG&E's asserted "deficient emergency preparedness, service 
restoration and communications system."  We understand the 
plaintiffs' gross negligence claim to assert theories of injury 
analogous to those pressed under G. L. c. 93A, and therefore 
 
29 
affirm the judge's denial of such a class for the same reasons.  
See Kwaak v. Pfizer, Inc., 71 Mass. App. Ct. at 298 ("a 
certification that fails under c. 93A would fail under the 
requirements of rule 23 as well"). 
 
2.  Issue preclusion.  In its cross appeal, FG&E challenges 
the judge's application of offensive issue preclusion, also 
known as offensive collateral estoppel, to factual findings made 
by the DPU.  "The offensive use of collateral estoppel 'occurs 
when a plaintiff seeks to prevent a defendant from litigating 
issues which the defendant has previously litigated 
unsuccessfully in an action against another party.'"  Evans v. 
Lorillard Tobacco Co., 465 Mass. at 466, quoting Matter of 
Cohen, 435 Mass. 7, 15 (2001).  Offensive issue preclusion "does 
not require mutuality of parties, so long as there is an 
identity of issues, a finding adverse to the party against whom 
it is being asserted, and a judgment by a court or tribunal of 
competent jurisdiction."  Pierce v. Morrison Mahoney LLP, 452 
Mass. 718, 730 (2008), quoting Miles v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 
412 Mass. 424, 427 (1992).  Additionally, "the determination of 
the issues for which preclusion is sought must have been 
essential to the underlying judgment."  Matter of Brauer, 452 
Mass. 56, 67 (2008). 
 
Once a plaintiff establishes these initial requirements, 
the "central inquiry" becomes whether the defendant had a "full 
 
30 
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action."  
Pierce v. Morrison Mahoney LLP, 452 Mass. at 730, quoting Matter 
of Goldstone, 445 Mass. 551, 559 (2005).  Offensive issue 
preclusion may apply to the findings of an administrative agency 
"so long as the tribunal rendering judgment ha[d] the legal 
authority to adjudicate the dispute."  Alba v. Raytheon Co., 441 
Mass. 836, 841 (2004).  See, e.g., Stowe v. Bologna, 415 Mass. 
20, 22 (1993); Haran v. Board of Registration in Med., 398 Mass. 
571, 578-579 (1986); Commonwealth v. Two Parcels of Land, 48 
Mass. App. Ct. 693, 698 (2000).  A judge has wide discretion in 
deciding whether the doctrine should apply in a particular case.  
Matter of Brauer, 452 Mass. at 67. 
 
a.  Identity and essentiality of issues.  FG&E argues that 
the judge failed to identify the particular issues to be 
precluded and therefore did not determine whether they were 
essential to the DPU's judgment and identical to issues 
presented here.  FG&E points to the judge's statement that "[i]f 
this case goes to trial, the trial judge will continue to have 
discretion to make the final decision as to what issues are 
already determined and what issues remain for trial."   
 
Contrary to FG&E's assertion, however, the judge identified 
a number of DPU findings subject to issue preclusion.  He quoted 
the summary of the DPU's investigatory findings contained in its 
rate-setting decision, see note 7, supra, among them that FG&E 
 
31 
did not plan or train sufficiently for emergency weather events, 
that it did not prepare adequately for Winter Storm 2008, and 
that it did not communicate accurate and useful information to 
the public.  The judge then treated these findings as settled in 
determining whether the plaintiffs could establish G. L. c. 93A 
violations as a matter of law. 
 
These factual findings were essential to the DPU's decision 
that FG&E's various failures in preparing for and responding to 
Winter Storm 2008 constituted independent violations of its duty  
to provide safe and reliable service.  See D.P.U. 09-01-A, at 
52, 59, 71-72, 83-84, 121, 125.  The DPU also imposed numerous 
requirements on FG&E designed to remedy each of its noted 
failures.  See id. at 210-214.  Accordingly, the DPU's factual 
findings "b[ore] on the outcome of the case" and were essential 
to its judgment.  See Jarosz v. Palmer, 436 Mass. 526, 533 
(2002).  
 
Likewise, the DPU's factual findings are identical to 
issues here because the plaintiffs' various G. L. c. 93A and 
gross negligence claims rest on the same conduct that the DPU 
found deficient.  We reject FG&E's contention that the two 
adjudications do not present identical issues because the 
plaintiffs assert claims under G. L. c. 93A that the DPU does 
not have authority to address.  See D.P.U. 09-01-A, at 189.  
Issue preclusion may apply where the two adjudications involve 
 
32 
the same subsidiary findings, even if they involve different 
ultimate claims.  See Alba v. Raytheon Co., 441 Mass. at 843. 
 
The DPU's 215-page decision contains numerous subsidiary 
findings, and the plaintiffs asserted multiple theories of 
liability resting on different alleged failures by FG&E.  We 
therefore understand the motion judge's statement, that a trial 
judge has continued discretion as to issue preclusion, to be 
merely an acknowledgment of the inefficiency of conducting a 
full analysis of the preclusive effect of each subsidiary 
finding before it becomes clear what facts matter to the 
particular theories of liability that the plaintiffs assert at 
trial.  The motion judge committed no error in deciding that the 
trial judge should retain discretion to make final decisions 
regarding which issues are precluded and which ones remain. 
 
b.  Fairness.  FG&E also argues that, under the 
circumstances, application of issue preclusion would be unfair.  
"[F]airness is the 'decisive consideration' in determining 
whether to apply offensive issue preclusion."  Pierce v. 
Morrison Mahoney LLP, 452 Mass. at 730, quoting Matter of 
Goldstone, 445 Mass. at 559.  In making this determination, 
"courts generally ask whether (1) the party in whose favor the 
estoppel would operate could have joined the original action, 
(2) the party against whom it would operate had an adequate 
incentive to defend the original action vigorously, (3) 'the 
 
33 
judgment relied upon as a basis for the estoppel is itself 
inconsistent with one or more previous judgments in favor of the 
defendant,' and (4) 'the second action affords the defendant 
procedural opportunities unavailable in the first action that 
could readily cause a different result.'"  Matter of Brauer, 452 
Mass. at 70, quoting Haran v. Board of Registration in Med., 398 
Mass. at 577-578.  See Bar Counsel v. Board of Bar Overseers, 
420 Mass. 6, 11-12 (1995), quoting Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments § 29 (1982) (listing eight circumstances for judge to 
consider when determining propriety of applying offensive issue 
preclusion).  The judge enjoys "'wide discretion in determining 
whether' applying offensive collateral estoppel 'would be fair 
to the defendant.'"  Pierce v. Morrison Mahoney LLP, supra at 
731, quoting Bar Counsel v. Board of Bar Overseers, supra at 11.  
The party facing preclusion bears the burden of proof on the 
question of fairness.  See Bailey v. Metropolitan Prop. & Liab. 
Ins. Co., 24 Mass. App. Ct. 34, 37 (1987).  FG&E does not 
contest the first and third factors; its appeal focuses on the 
second and fourth factors. 
 
i.  Incentive to litigate.  FG&E argues that it did not 
have an adequate incentive to dispute its purported failures 
before the DPU.  It points out that the remedies imposed by the 
DPU in its investigatory decision consisted largely of 
improvements that FG&E already had volunteered to undertake in 
 
34 
its self-assessment report.  FG&E argues also that affording 
preclusive effect to the DPU findings would undermine its 
cooperative relationship with the DPU and frustrate the public 
utility regulatory scheme by discouraging utilities from 
offering such voluntary submissions.  See Bar Counsel v. Board 
of Bar Overseers, 420 Mass. at 11, quoting Restatement (Second) 
of Judgments § 29(1), (5) (in determining whether to apply issue 
preclusion, judge should consider whether "[t]reating the issue 
as conclusively determined would be incompatible with an 
applicable scheme of administering the remedies in the actions 
involved" and whether "[t]he prior determination may have been 
affected by relationships among the parties to the first action 
that are not present in the subsequent action").  These 
arguments are unavailing. 
 
First, FG&E understates its incentive to litigate before 
the DPU.  During the investigatory proceeding, the Attorney 
General urged the DPU to deny FG&E recovery of storm-related 
costs, to reduce FG&E's return on equity, and to impose a $4.6 
million fine as a result of FG&E's failures during Winter Storm 
2008.  Relying largely on the various failures found in its 
investigatory decision, the DPU in its rate-setting decision 
denied FG&E recovery of nearly $7 million dollars in storm-
related costs, and reduced FG&E's return on equity.  See D.P.U. 
11-01, at 14, 23, 72-73, 374-375, 425-427.  Furthermore, 
 
35 
although the DPU ultimately concluded that it lacked authority 
to impose a fine, FG&E faced the possibility that the DPU would 
reach a different conclusion.  Given the large financial stakes 
involved, FG&E had adequate incentive to litigate vigorously the 
facts found in the DPU decision.  See Matter of Goldstone, 445 
Mass. at 559-560. 
 
Second, applying issue preclusion would not undermine the 
public utility regulatory scheme because the large financial 
stakes involved here already provided a significant incentive 
for FG&E to litigate the DPU action "to the hilt."  See 
Commissioner of the Dep't of Employment & Training v. Dugan, 428 
Mass. 138, 145 (1998).  Moreover, partly in response to FG&E's 
failures during Winter Storm 2008, the Legislature authorized 
the DPU to impose fines of up to $20 million for violations of a 
utility's emergency preparation and service restoration duties, 
an action the Legislature would not have taken had it believed 
that potential liability of this magnitude would undermine the 
regulatory scheme.  See G. L. c. 164, § 1J. 
 
ii.  Different procedural opportunities.  As to the fourth 
fairness consideration, FG&E identifies three procedural 
distinctions between the two actions that, it contends, render 
issue preclusion inappropriate here:  (1) the DPU considered 
evidence not admissible in the Superior Court proceeding, (2) 
different parties bore the burden of proof in the two actions, 
 
36 
and (3) the DPU proceedings involved a more limited right of 
appeal.  A party seeking to avoid issue preclusion must show 
that the procedural distinctions "could likely result in the 
issue being differently determined."  Matter of Goldstone, 445 
Mass. at 561 n.7, quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments 
§ 29(2).  We conclude that FG&E has not demonstrated that these 
distinctions affected the DPU findings at issue. 
 
First, FG&E emphasizes that the DPU considered extensive 
public comments from individuals not subject to cross-
examination.  See D.P.U. 09-01-A, at 9-17.  After reviewing the 
record, the judge concluded that the DPU did not rely on the 
public comments in making any findings that might have 
preclusive effect in this case.  The DPU did reference certain 
public comments in discussing deficiencies in FG&E's management 
of restoration crews and the performance of its call center.  
See id. at 101, 103, 106, 120.  However, the DPU also relied on 
other evidence in finding these failures, and FG&E conceded that 
its crew logistics needed improvement and that its call center 
was overwhelmed during Winter Storm 2008.  See id. at 101-102, 
104-106, 112, 120-121.  Accordingly, the public comments likely 
did not affect the DPU's findings and therefore do not undermine 
the judge's application of issue preclusion.  See Commonwealth 
v. Two Parcels of Land, 48 Mass. App. Ct. at 699-700 (issue 
preclusion warranted notwithstanding agency's consideration of 
 
37 
hearsay evidence in first proceeding).  
 
Second, FG&E points out that the burden of proof has 
shifted from FG&E in the DPU proceedings to the plaintiffs in 
this case.  Compare Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Light Co. v. 
Department of Pub. Utils., 375 Mass. 571, 578-579 (1978) (once 
DPU challenges company's decisions, company faces burden of 
proving that those decisions comply with valid DPU policies), 
with Cleary v. Cleary, 427 Mass. 286, 297 (1998) (plaintiff has 
burden of proving violation of G. L. c. 93A).  Although a 
determination in a prior proceeding ordinarily has "no 
preclusive effect" where the burden has shifted away from the 
party facing preclusion, Jarosz v. Palmer, 436 Mass. at 532, a 
judge has discretion to grant preclusive effect to an issue if 
the burden of proof did not affect the outcome of the prior 
determination.  See Matter of Goldstone, 445 Mass. at 563-564.  
Cf. Bar Counsel v. Board of Bar Overseers, 420 Mass. at 12 
(noting that burden shifted between two proceedings but 
remanding for decision whether to apply issue preclusion).   
 
The DPU did not recite the burden of proof in its 
investigatory decision, and the decision contains no language 
suggesting that the DPU's factual findings rested on FG&E's 
failure to carry its burden.  See D.P.U. 09-01-A, at 58-60, 68-
72, 81-84, 97-102, 119-128, 132-136, 143-147, 158-160.  
Furthermore, as reflected by the twenty-eight recommended 
 
38 
improvements in its self-assessment report, FG&E largely did not 
dispute the DPU's findings pertaining to FG&E's deficient storm-
related conduct.  See id. at 199-204.  Thus, the shift in the 
burden of proof did not foreclose the judge from applying issue 
preclusion.  See Matter of Goldstone, 445 Mass. at 563-564 
(notwithstanding shift in burden of proof, issue preclusion 
warranted because facts were not disputed in first 
adjudication). 
 
Third, FG&E contends that it could not appeal the DPU's 
factual findings because G. L. c. 25, § 5, limited its right of 
appeal to "matters of law."  To the contrary, however, FG&E 
could have challenged the DPU's findings as "[u]nsupported by 
substantial evidence."  See G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (e); 
Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Light Co. v. Department of Pub. Utils., 
460 Mass. 800, 811 (2011).  This limited right of appeal has not 
prevented us from affording preclusive effect to administrative 
findings.  See, e.g., Stowe v. Bologna, 415 Mass. at 22; Brunson 
v. Wall, 405 Mass. 446, 451 (1989).  Nor does FG&E's decision 
not to appeal from the DPU's adjudications render the 
application of issue preclusion improper.  See Stowe v. Bologna, 
supra; Brunson v. Wall, supra; Conservation Comm'n of Falmouth 
v. Pacheco, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 737, 741-742 & n.5 (2000), and 
authorities cited. 
 
The DPU conducted a five-day adjudicatory hearing at which 
 
39 
FG&E was represented by competent counsel, and FG&E had a right 
to proffer evidence, subpoena witnesses, cross-examine witnesses 
under oath, present oral and written arguments, and appeal an 
adverse decision.  See 220 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 1.06(6)(f), 
1.10(9), 1.13.  See also Martin v. Ring, 401 Mass. 59, 63-64 
(1987) (emphasizing that precluded party "had ample opportunity 
in the prior adjudication to present evidence and to cross-
examine witnesses" and that he could have appealed from adverse 
administrative decision); Haran v. Board of Registration in 
Med., 398 Mass. at 578 (emphasizing that precluded party was 
represented by counsel at four-day administrative hearing).  The 
judge's application of issue preclusion was within the scope of 
his broad discretion. 
 
Conclusion.  We affirm the orders denying the plaintiffs' 
motion for class certification, denying the plaintiffs' motion 
for partial summary judgment, and denying in part FG&E's motion 
for partial summary judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.