Title: The Florida Bar v. Dewey Homer Varner, Jr.

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
_____________ 
 
No. SC06-1919 
_____________ 
 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR, 
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
DEWEY HOMER VARNER, JR., 
Respondent. 
 
[September 25, 2008] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We review a referee's report recommending that Respondent, Dewey Homer 
Varner, Jr., be found guilty of professional misconduct and be suspended from the 
practice of law for ninety-one days.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. 
Const.  For the reasons expressed below, we approve the referee’s findings of fact 
and recommendations as to guilt, but reject the referee’s recommended discipline.  
The serious and cumulative nature of Varner’s misconduct warrants a one-year 
suspension. 
FACTS 
 
The Florida Bar filed a three-count complaint against Varner alleging 
numerous violations of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar.  Following a formal 
hearing, the referee filed a report containing the following findings: 
Varner has been a member of The Florida Bar since October 25, 1974.  In 
The Florida Bar File No. 1987-26,200, Varner received a private reprimand for 
advertising violations.  In Florida Bar v. Varner, 780 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2001), he 
received a ninety-day suspension for filing a fictitious notice of voluntary 
dismissal. 
In February 2000, a client hired the law firm of Varner & Thorne, P.A. to 
represent him in connection with two workers compensation accidents.  Initially, 
Patricia Thorne, Varner’s law partner, took primary responsibility for the client’s 
files, but in November 2000 transferred the files to Varner due to medical issues.  
Varner never informed the client that his cases were no longer being handled by 
Thorne. 
In August 2003, opposing counsel had scheduled and noticed a physician’s 
deposition.  Upon receiving the notice, Varner telephoned opposing counsel and 
requested that the deposition be cancelled.  Opposing counsel stated that she would 
agree to cancel the physician’s deposition if Varner voluntarily dismissed the case.  
Varner filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of one of the client’s claims.  Varner 
 
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directed a copy of the notice of voluntary dismissal to be faxed to opposing 
counsel.   
The notice of voluntary dismissal stated that the client, through his legal 
counsel, sought the voluntary dismissal of all pending claims in his workers 
compensation case.  Varner intended to communicate that the client was aware of 
and consented to the dismissal of this case.  Varner knew, however, that the client 
did not know of it and had not authorized it. 
Before the referee, Varner falsely testified that Thorne expressly 
communicated the client’s authorization to file the notice of voluntary dismissal.  
This was untrue, as Thorne did not communicate the client’s permission to file the 
voluntary dismissal to Varner at any time.  In fact, Thorne did not receive the 
client’s authorization and did not know of the filing of the notice of voluntary 
dismissal until she received a letter from the client nearly a year later telling her so.   
The motion to voluntarily dismiss the client’s case was granted, and 
opposing counsel cancelled the scheduled deposition. 
Varner never told the client that the notice of voluntary dismissal had been 
filed or that his case had been dismissed.  After Varner had voluntarily dismissed 
the case, the client called the firm several times inquiring about his case.  Varner 
failed to respond.  It was not until June 2004—when a sympathetic member of 
Varner’s law firm support staff surreptitiously revealed it to the client—that the 
 
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client learned that his case had been dismissed.  The client then called the court 
himself and officially learned of the dismissal. 
Neither Varner nor anyone else from his law firm had ever informed the 
client that the law firm of Varner & Thorne had stopped representing him.  Neither 
Varner nor anyone else from his law firm ever returned the client’s file or took any 
steps to protect his interests after his case was dismissed.  Moreover, before filing 
the motion to dismiss, Varner never considered or reviewed the applicable statute 
of limitations and therefore did not know that, absent extraordinary remedies, the 
voluntary dismissal would deprive the client of his cause of action.  After 
discovering that his case had been voluntarily dismissed, the client had significant 
difficulty in reopening his case, as the statute of limitations had run. 
 
The referee recommended that Varner be found guilty of violating several 
Rules Regulating the Florida Bar: 3-4.2 (violation of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct is a cause for discipline); 3-4.3 (the commission by a lawyer of any act 
that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and justice, whether the act is committed in 
the course of the attorney's relations as an attorney or otherwise, whether 
committed within or outside the state of Florida, and whether or not the act is a 
felony or misdemeanor, may constitute a cause for discipline); 4-1.1 (a lawyer 
shall provide competent representation to a client); 4-1.2(a) (a lawyer shall abide 
by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation, and shall 
 
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consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued); 4-1.4(b) (a 
lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client 
to make informed decisions regarding the representation); 4-1.16(d) (upon 
termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably 
practicable to protect a client's interest, such as giving reasonable notice to the 
client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and 
property to which the client is entitled, and refunding any advance payment of fee 
that has not been earned); 4-3.2 (a lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite 
litigation consistent with the interests of the client); 4-8.4(a) (a lawyer shall not 
violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or 
induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another); 4-8.4(c) (a lawyer 
shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation); and 4-8.4(d) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct in 
connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice). 
The referee found the following aggravating factors:  (1) prior disciplinary 
offenses; (2) dishonest or selfish motive; (3) a pattern of misconduct; (4) multiple 
offenses; and (5) substantial experience in the practice of law.  The referee also 
found mitigating factors of (1) personal or emotional problems and (2) character or 
reputation. 
 
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As to discipline, the referee recommends a ninety-one-day suspension.  
Further, the referee awarded costs to the Bar in the amount of $8,074.94. 
Varner seeks review of the recommendations as to both guilt and the 
recommended discipline.  
ANALYSIS 
 
Varner appeals several of the referee’s factual findings as well as the 
recommended discipline.  We first address the factual findings and then discuss the 
appropriate discipline. 
A. The Referee’s Factual Findings 
Varner primarily argues that the referee’s findings that Varner failed to abide 
by the client’s decisions and that he engaged in dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation are not supported by competent, substantial evidence.  That is, 
Varner challenges the referee’s findings that Thorne had little control over the 
client’s case and that no conversation occurred between Varner and Thorne about 
the client’s consent to file a notice of voluntary dismissal.  Varner argues that he 
relied on Thorne’s assertions that the client consented to the voluntary dismissal. 
This Court's review of a referee’s factual findings is limited to determining 
whether they are supported by competent, substantial evidence.  This Court will 
not reweigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the referee.  Fla. 
Bar v. Frederick, 756 So. 2d 79, 86 (Fla. 2000); see also Fla. Bar v. Jordan, 705 So. 
 
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2d 1387, 1390 (Fla. 1998).  A respondent contesting factual findings cannot simply 
point to contradictory evidence when competent, substantial evidence supports the 
findings.  Fla. Bar v. Committe, 916 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 2005); Fla. Bar v. Nowacki, 
697 So. 2d 828, 832 (Fla. 1997). 
Varner primarily argues that evidence contradicts the referee’s findings and 
that he relied on Thorne’s alleged assertions.  The referee, however, who observed 
Varner’s demeanor, found incredible Varner’s testimony that he relied on Thorne’s 
assertions and found that Varner filed the notice of voluntary dismissal even 
though he knew that the client had not authorized it.  The referee’s decision to 
discount Varner’s testimony is supported by competent, substantial evidence in 
that: (1) all witnesses, including Varner, testified to Thorne’s compromised mental 
health and general inability to function as a lawyer during the period in question; 
(2) opposing counsel testified that Varner and his associates handled the client’s 
case because Thorne had “mental difficulties”; and (3) successor counsel testified 
that the client told him that Varner had been handling his case because Thorne 
“had been away.”  Further, although there was evidence that the client 
communicated with Thorne in August 2003, there is no evidence that this 
communication was related to the voluntary dismissal; in fact, Thorne testified she 
was attempting to reconnect with her clients because Varner had stopped referring 
 
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new clients to her and was attempting to redirect her existing files to other 
attorneys.1   
In addition, opposing counsel testified that: (1) in the same telephone 
conversation in which Varner sought to continue a deposition and trial, he told 
opposing counsel that he would take a voluntary dismissal; and (2) opposing 
counsel was soon thereafter faxed a notice of voluntary dismissal.  Based on the 
limited time in which Varner could have secured consent and the evidence that 
Thorne was generally unavailable, the testimony from opposing counsel supports a 
finding that no client contact was made. 
Moreover, Varner stated that from May 2003 onward, including the time he 
filed the notice of voluntary dismissal, he did not trust Thorne because she had 
previously filed a false pleading.  Thus, it is suspicious at best that Varner would 
rely on information from Thorne when he knew about her compromised mental 
health and did not trust her.  Hence, even if Thorne did discuss the client’s consent 
with Varner, he knew such information was untrustworthy.  It is undisputed that 
the client did not authorize the filing of the notice of voluntary dismissal.  The 
referee’s finding that Varner failed to abide by his client’s decisions and engaged 
in conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or misrepresentation is supported by 
                                          
 
 
1.  Varner also argues that the referee improperly limited cross-examination 
of Thorne.  However, the record is clear that there was no such limitation. 
 
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competent, substantial evidence.  We approve these factual findings and 
recommendations as to guilt for rules 4-1.2(a) and 4-8.4(c). 
Varner also challenges the referee’s conclusion that he violated rule 4-1.1 by 
failing to competently represent his client.  However, it is clear that Varner failed 
to consider that the applicable statute of limitations had run on the voluntarily 
dismissed claim.  These conclusions are supported by testimony from both 
opposing counsel and successor counsel, who testified about Varner’s mishandling 
of the client’s case.2  We approve this finding and recommendation. 
Additionally, Varner challenges the referee’s conclusion that he violated rule 
4-3.2 by failing to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation.  In contrast to this 
assertion, the record demonstrates that the merits hearing for the dismissed claim 
would have occurred just eleven days after the notice of voluntary dismissal was 
served.  In light of the fact that the statute of limitations had run, dismissing the 
claim significantly postponed its resolution; the case had to be reopened 
extraordinarily and settled much later by successor counsel.  Accordingly, we 
approve this finding and recommendation. 
                                          
 
 
2.  Varner argues that one of the reasons he filed the notice of voluntary 
dismissal was because he believed that the client was attempting to perpetrate a 
fraud.  However, if Varner believed this to be the case and was unable to counsel 
the client to voluntarily dismiss the claim, the more provident course would have 
been for him to withdraw from the representation. 
 
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Varner further challenges the referee’s conclusion that he violated rule 4-
1.4(b) by failing to adequately communicate with his client.  Varner has admitted, 
however, to having no communication with his client and, as noted above, the 
referee found, based on competent, substantial evidence, that Varner did not rely 
on any assertion made by Thorne.  We therefore approve this finding and 
recommendation. 
Next, Varner challenges the referee’s conclusion that he is guilty of violating 
rule 4-1.16(d) by failing to provide successor counsel with a copy of the client’s 
file.  Thorne testified that, after her professional association with Varner dissolved, 
she took the client’s case with her and continued to work on the case until she was 
discharged.  Thorne also testified that due to tumultuous events before the 
dissolution,3 Varner withheld files from her and, for this reason, she did not 
believe that she was able to deliver the complete file to successor counsel.  
Successor counsel confirmed Thorne’s statements.  Accordingly, competent, 
substantial evidence supports the referee’s conclusion.  We approve this fi
and recommendati
nding 
on. 
                                          
Varner also challenges the referee’s findings as to aggravating and 
mitigating factors.  A referee’s finding as to aggravation and mitigation carries a 
 
 
3.  Thorne testified that Varner called the police on her and “the last couple 
of nights that [she] was there, [Varner] hired a security guard to keep [her] locked 
in [her] end of the office.” 
 
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presumption of correctness and will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous or 
without support in the record.  Fla. Bar v. Arcia, 848 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 2003).  First, 
Varner argues that the following aggravating factors should not have been found 
because he acted upon information received from Thorne and he was not 
inappropriately motivated to file the notice of voluntary dismissal:  (1) dishonest or 
selfish motive; (2) pattern of misconduct; and (3) multiple offenses.  However, as 
pointed out above, the referee discredited Varner’s testimony regarding his alleged 
conversation with Thorne.  Thus, the record supports these aggravating factors. 
Second, Varner challenges the referee’s decision not to find the following 
mitigating factors: (1) full cooperation with the Bar; (2) remoteness of a prior 
disciplinary matter; and (3) unreasonable delay in disciplinary proceeding.  A 
referee’s decision not to find that a mitigating or aggravating factor applies also 
carries a presumption of correctness and will not be disturbed unless clearly 
erroneous or without support in the record.  See Fla. Bar v. Morse, 784 So. 2d 414, 
415-16 (Fla. 2001); Fla. Bar v. Bustamante, 662 So. 2d 687, 687 (Fla. 1995). 
Competent, substantial evidence supports the referee’s decision not to find 
the mitigating factors proffered by Varner.  As to the first, full cooperation with the 
Bar, the referee actually found that Varner falsely testified under oath in the 
hearing in this case; such cannot be considered full cooperation.  As to the second, 
it is true that Varner’s prior disciplinary history is somewhat remote and that 
 
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remoteness of prior offenses may be used as a mitigating factor.  See Fla. Stds. 
Imposing Law. Sancs. 9.32(m); see also id. 9.22(a) (remote instances of minor 
misconduct, which is not the case here, shall not be considered as an aggravating 
factor).  However, the facts of Varner’s most recent disciplinary case are very 
similar to that of the present case.  In Florida Bar v. Varner, 780 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 
2001), the Court found that Varner knowingly made a false statement of material 
fact in creating a fictitious notice of voluntary dismissal.  Due to the striking 
similarity to the present case, the referee properly concluded that the remoteness of 
Varner’s prior disciplinary history did not mitigate Varner’s misconduct in the 
present case.   
As to the third, although it has taken some time for this case to proceed, 
Varner did not previously object to the length of time it has taken to process the 
present case.  In fact, counsel for Varner twice, on the referee’s behalf, filed 
motions for extension of time to submit the report of referee.  Further, grievances 
were filed against both Varner and Thorne, and it understandably took the Bar 
additional time to complete its investigation.  Thus, there is no basis to find that 
Varner’s misconduct was mitigated by any unreasonable delay. 
B. The Referee’s Recommended Discipline 
Finally, Varner challenges the referee’s recommendation as to discipline and 
argues that he should only receive a public reprimand.  The Bar argues that the 
 
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referee’s recommendation of a ninety-one day suspension should remain intact.  
We disagree with both parties and with the referee and conclude that a one-year 
suspension is the appropriate sanction for Varner’s misconduct. 
In reviewing a referee’s recommended discipline, the Court’s scope of 
review is broader than that afforded to the referee’s findings of fact because, 
ultimately, it is the Court’s responsibility to order the appropriate sanction.  See 
Fla. Bar v. Anderson, 538 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 1989); see also art. V, ' 15, Fla. 
Const.  Generally speaking, however, the Court will not second-guess the referee’s 
recommended discipline as long as it has a reasonable basis in existing case law 
and the Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.  See Fla. Bar v. 
Temmer, 753 So. 2d 555, 558 (Fla. 1999).  Further, the Court views cumulative 
misconduct more seriously than an isolated instance of misconduct.  Fla. Bar v. 
Carlon, 820 So. 2d 891, 899 (Fla. 2002). 
The most analogous case is, not surprisingly, Varner’s previous disciplinary 
case, Florida Bar v. Varner, 780 So. 2d 1.  In that case, Varner represented a 
personal injury client and mistakenly misrepresented to the insurer that he had filed 
suit against it on behalf of his client.  At the time the statement was made, Varner 
believed it to be true.  The insurer agreed to settle the case and mailed a check to 
Varner along with a letter requesting that Varner provide a notice of voluntary 
dismissal.  There having never been a case, Varner directed his secretary to prepare 
 
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a notice of voluntary dismissal with a fictitious case number, signed it, and mailed 
a copy of it to the insurer.  The referee found no aggravating factors, and also 
found that Varner’s misconduct was mitigated by remorse and a good faith effort at 
restitution.  We suspended Varner for ninety days.  In so doing, we stated that the 
most troublesome aspect of the case was Varner’s deliberate deception where 
an error is made in the representation of a client, but instead of the 
error being admitted, an attorney develops a deception to cover up the 
error so that it will go undetected. . . .  Varner . . . chose to keep this 
truth to himself and hatched a scheme to conceal the error.  Varner’s 
decision to go forward with a deception rather than honestly admitting 
to his mistake is so contrary to the most basic requirement of candor 
that we cannot countenance a short-term suspension in this instance. 
Id. at 5-6. 
The present case demonstrates that Varner has not learned from his previous 
mistakes and has continued his deceptive practices.  Varner still fails to grasp the 
concept of honesty.  In fact, before the referee, in an attempt to blame his former 
law partner, who was suffering from compromised mental health at the time of the 
events, Varner testified falsely.   
Further, Varner’s present misdeeds are more egregious than those in his 
previous case and warrant a rehabilitative suspension.  A significant fact in this 
case is that, unlike the previous case, Varner’s actions seriously affected a client.  
Here, Varner acted without his client’s consent; caused, through his lack of 
competence, the client to nearly abandon an entire cause of action; and filed a false 
 
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pleading in the workers compensation case.  Standard 4.42(a) states that 
suspension is appropriate when “a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a 
client and causes injury or potential injury to a client.”  (Emphasis added.)  The 
potential for client injury was great because when Varner filed the notice of 
voluntary dismissal, the statute of limitations had run, causing the dismissal to 
effectively be with prejudice.  Although the client was later allowed to reopen his 
case, that result was far from guaranteed. 
 
Although we agree with the referee’s recommendation that Varner’s 
misconduct warrants a rehabilitative suspension, we disagree with the 
recommendation of a ninety-one day suspension.  The profession of the practice of 
law requires lawyers to be honest, competent, and diligent in their dealings with 
clients, other lawyers, and courts.  Clients expect no less from their lawyers and 
place great trust in lawyers in their times of need.  Lawyers trust each other to 
accurately represent their clients’ interests and courts trust lawyers to do the same.  
Varner has broken these basic trusts that all lawyers must maintain. 
We have imposed a one-year suspension where the lawyer has violated 
similar duties to the client.  In Florida Bar v. Broome, 932 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 2006), 
the respondent engaged in multiple instances of client neglect, inadequate 
communication, contempt, excessive fees, an instance of misrepresentation, and a 
failure to respond to the Bar’s investigation.  In one of those instances, Broome 
 
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waived a criminal defendant’s speedy trial rights without his knowledge or consent 
and later failed to forward that defendant’s file to successor counsel.  In imposing 
the one-year suspension, however, we noted that the respondent’s misconduct 
might have warranted disbarment if not for the substantial mitigation presented in 
that case, which included a finding that the respondent was clinically depressed at 
the time the incidents transpired and had no prior disciplinary history. 
Here, no compelling mitigating evidence exists.  That Varner engaged in 
only one act of client neglect and misrepresentation, and that he did not charge 
excessive fees, suggests only that his misconduct warrants something less than 
disbarment.  See also Fla. Bar v. Glueck, 985 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 2008) (disbarring 
lawyer for, among other things, multiple acts of client neglect).  In light of the 
gravity of the type of misconduct committed and the cumulative nature of Varner’s 
misconduct, we conclude that the appropriate discipline is a one-year suspension.   
CONCLUSION 
Dewey Homer Varner, Jr., is hereby suspended for one year.   
The suspension will be effective thirty days from the filing of this opinion so 
that Varner can close out his practice and protect the interests of existing clients.  If 
he notifies this Court in writing that he is no longer practicing and does not need 
the thirty days to protect existing clients, this Court will enter an order making the 
suspension effective immediately.  
 
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Dewey Homer Varner, Jr., shall accept no new business from the date this 
opinion is filed until he is reinstated.   
Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson Street, 
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from Dewey Homer 
Varner, Jr., in the amount of $8,074.94, for which sum let execution issue. 
 
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, C.J., WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS, BELL, JJ., and 
CANTERO, Senior Justice, concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar  
 
Kenneth Lawrence Marvin, Director of Lawyer Regulation, The Florida Bar, 
Tallahassee, Florida, and Lorraine Christine Hoffmann, Bar Counsel, The Florida 
Bar, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Complainant 
 
Kevin P. Tynan of Richardson and Tynan, PLC, Tamarac, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent