Title: MARK JUSTICE v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

MARK JUSTICE v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1989 WY 130775 P.2d 1002Case Number: 88-189Decided: 06/12/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
MARK JUSTICE, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, JohnsonCounty, James N. Wolfe, 
J.

Wyoming Public Defender Program: 
Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender, Michael Cornia, Appellate Counsel, 
Cheyenne, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Sylvia Lee Hackl, Sr. 
Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ., and 
GRANT, District Judge.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The primary problem the 
court must address in this case, an appeal by Mark Justice from his conviction 
for the crime of aggravated robbery, is his claim of lack of relevancy of 
evidence of collateral misconduct which he contends was admitted improperly, 
preventing him from having a fair trial. The several matters of accused evidence 
(which include testimony about events other than collateral misconduct) related 
to evidence of his theft of fishing tackle prior to the charged armed robbery; 
the prior forgery of a check of the robbery victims; testimony concerning his 
desire to kill the victims to assure that they could not later testify that they 
had recognized him at the crime scene; testimony of an accomplice about the 
reactions of robbery victims; and testimony from the victims about the impact of 
crime on them. In addition, questions are raised concerning the propriety of the 
limiting instruction that the court gave to the jury; the chilling of 
presentation by Justice of evidence that he had no prior felony convictions; 
whether there was any possibility that the admission of the accused evidence 
constituted harmless error; and whether the doctrine of cumulative error should 
be invoked to reverse the conviction. The court is satisfied from an analysis of 
this record, in light of the pertinent law, that no reversible error was 
committed, and the judgment and sentence is affirmed.

[¶2.]     Mark Justice was tried 
by the jury on a single count of aggravated robbery in violation of §§ 
6-2-401(a)(ii) and (c)(ii) and 6-3-402, W.S. 1977.1 After the jury found him guilty, 
Justice was sentenced to a term of not less than seven and one-half nor more 
than twelve and one-half years in the state penitentiary, with credit given for 
pre-trial incarceration. It is from that judgment and sentence that Justice has 
taken this appeal.

[¶3.]     In his Brief of 
Appellant, Justice lists these issues:

"I. Whether it was error 
to admit testimony concerning alleged theft of fishing tackle by the 
defendant.

"II. Whether it was error 
to admit testimony concerning alleged forgery by the 
defendant.

"III. Was the limiting 
instruction given by the court concerning the use of the evidence of prior `bad 
acts' sufficient?

"IV. Was the admission of 
the `bad act' evidence harmless error?

"V. Was the admission of 
`victim impact statements' error?

"VI. Was it plain error 
to admit testimony to the effect that the defendant wanted to kill the 
witnesses?

"VII. Was appellant's 
lack of prior felony convictions admissible?

"VIII. Was the admission 
of the `expert' testimony of Randy Morgan plain error? 

"IX. Should the doctrine 
of cumulative error apply?"

The State of 
Wyoming sets 
forth the following issues:

"I. Whether it was proper 
to admit evidence of events which constituted an integral part of the aggravated 
robbery.

"II. Whether the 
admission of testimony regarding the effect of the crime on the victims was 
error, and requires reversal of Appellant's conviction.

"III. Whether Randy 
Morgan's testimony regarding the reactions of robbery victims was offered as 
expert testimony, and was properly admitted.

"IV. Whether the trial 
court properly instructed the jury to disregard defense counsel's statements 
regarding Appellant's criminal history.

"V. Whether the multiple 
alleged errors may be combined to require reversal under the concept of 
cumulative error."

In his Reply 
Brief, Justice then offers this statement of an additional 
issue:

"Whether the admission of 
the evidence of the alleged theft, forgery and desire of the defendant to kill 
the victims was harmless."

[¶4.]     On June 21, 1987, at 
approximately 9:45 P.M., a man, his wife, and the wife's teen-age sister were 
the victims of an armed robbery occurring in their home at the LakeStop, 
located about one-quarter mile from LakeDeSmet 
and some seven miles north of Buffalo. The LakeStop is 
a convenience store, tackle and bait shop, and a small gas station which offers 
merchandise and services to fishermen and others who frequent LakeDeSmet as a recreational area. The 
circumstances of the robbery were captured succinctly by defense counsel in 
closing argument when he said that the man, woman, and girl "are three good, 
decent, nice folks who are the victims of a brutal, savage robbery, * * *." 
Three men burst into their living quarters at the LakeStop, and two of them, brandishing 
pistols, directed the man and the teen-age girl, who were watching television in 
the living room, to lay face down on the floor. In a few minutes, the wife, who 
had gone to bed in the bedroom, was brought into the living room by one of the 
robbers and directed to lay down next to her husband. The three victims were 
bound, and their faces were covered with a blanket so that they could not 
observe the robbers. The cash from their business operations, two shotguns, and 
a rifle were taken by the robbers who then made their escape in the wife's Buick 
automobile.

[¶5.]     Mark Justice, who was 
charged in January, 1988 with being one of the perpetrators of the aggravated 
robbery, first was associated with the LakeStop and 
the victims during the construction phase of the LakeStop in April of 1987. He had been hired 
by a foreman for the construction to assist in building fences, decks, and 
similar things. After working for some twenty-eight days, Justice left the 
LakeStop when the construction phase had been finished 
but, some four days later, after the store had been opened, he appeared and 
camped out at LakeDeSmet. A day or so later, 
he asked about a job with the victims, and they advised him that they had no 
money with which to hire an employee. Justice then suggested that he was 
completely at loose ends and that he would work for a while if they would give 
him a place to stay, board, and whatever they might be able to pay him. The 
ultimate arrangement was that he could work for approximately thirty days during 
which time he would be furnished board and room and, at the end of that time, 
the husband would give him a 1978 Yamaha motorcycle.

[¶6.]     Justice worked for the 
victims for about two weeks. He built some small toolsheds, helped put boats in 
and out of the water, and even helped with running the store on some occasions. 
Then, one day, he was sent to Buffalo to pick up an auger that had been left 
there for repairs. Justice did not return as promptly as expected, and the 
husband, later in the afternoon, went looking for him and found him drinking 
with some friends. He asked Justice if he was coming home. Justice said that he 
would be along soon, and the husband asked him to take the car home promptly. 
Justice then drove the car in an abusive manner and smashed the stereo system 
with his foot or his hand. There followed a period of literal uproar during 
which Justice was driving his motorcycle in a reckless and dangerous manner, and 
the husband and he had a quarrel which was precipitated by an inquiry about 
checks missing from the checkbook. Justice decided to go look for the checks 
when the husband decided he would call the sheriff, and he did return in about 
an hour and a half. He was even more intoxicated. He produced one check, but he 
said that the other was lost. What followed was a very angry discussion between 
Justice and the husband during the course of which Justice offered to fight the 
husband several times. The wife and her sister became quite upset and frightened 
about his conduct.

[¶7.]     Ultimately, Justice 
went to sleep and, the next morning, the husband told him he would have to 
leave. He filled the motorcycle with gas and sent Justice on his way. The 
husband then went to the IGA store to inquire about the missing check because 
Justice had admitted cashing the check there to pay for film for the business. 
The wife had given him $20 for that purpose, but he had used the cash to 
purchase beer for himself and his friends. When the husband was leaving the IGA 
store, Justice came up on his motorcycle and asked for some money. The husband 
furnished some $6 or $7 worth of change that he had in his vehicle, and Justice 
then left. The armed robbery at the LakeStop occurred on the evening of the 
following day.

[¶8.]     At the trial in this 
case, the only element of the offense that was in issue was the identity of Mark 
Justice as one of the perpetrators. There clearly was no dispute whatsoever 
about any of the other elements of the crime. Because of the circumstances of 
the robbery and the requirement that they keep their heads covered, none of the 
victims could identify Justice. The direct evidence connecting Justice with the 
crime came from an accomplice whose testimony clearly established the element of 
identity so far as Justice was concerned. The accomplice, however, had a lengthy 
prior criminal history, and the prosecuting attorney had agreed not to prosecute 
him for this crime in exchange for testimony against Justice. The accomplice had 
been connected with the crime because the rifle that was stolen was discovered 
in a search of the home of a relative of the accomplice, and the relative 
promptly explained the source of the rifle. Due to the concern that arose over 
the credibility of the accomplice, the prosecutor chose to inject other evidence 
concerning identity into the case. The other evidence was designed to 
corroborate the testimony of the accomplice, but it led to the contentions of 
error made by Justice in this appeal.

[¶9.]     The claims of error in 
the admission of evidence relate to the theft of fishing tackle from the Lake 
Stop which the accomplice said Justice retrieved the day after the robbery from 
the place where he had buried it; the forgery of the check by Justice at the IGA 
store; and the testimony of the accomplice that Justice wanted to kill everyone 
at the Lake Stop on the night of the robbery. In connection with these claims of 
error, Justice asserts the inefficacy of a limiting instruction with respect to 
curing any prejudice, and these claims of error are important in the final 
contention of cumulative error.

[¶10.]  The matter of the check first came up 
during the testimony of the husband who was explaining the events leading up to 
the termination of Justice's employment at the LakeStop. He stated that after discussing the 
damage to the stereo system with Justice, he went back to the car and examined a 
checkbook which had been in it. He testified that he then realized that two 
checks were missing, and he asked his wife about them. At about this juncture, 
an objection was lodged to the lack of materiality and the absence of a 
foundation. The witness then was asked if he had discussed the checks with 
Justice, and he answered that Justice told him he did not know where the checks 
were. He said that when he advised Justice that he would call the sheriff, 
Justice asked for two hours to see if he could get the checks. According to the 
husband's testimony, Justice explained that one of his drinking companions must 
have taken them. He testified that Justice left and came back in about an hour 
and a half. He returned only one check, and he said he didn't know where the 
other check was, that it must have been lost. The husband went on to relate 
that, in the course of a rather heated discussion, he said that he was going to 
call the sheriff because he didn't know where the check was. The husband then 
related that the next morning when he woke Justice up, Justice told him that he 
had forged the check at the IGA for film because he had spent the money intended 
for the film on beer. No objection was interposed at this point. The husband 
then testified about his attempts to discover the amount of the check through 
IGA, and after having identified the check, an objection to its admission was 
sustained on the ground that it was not relevant.

[¶11.]  The other objectionable material came in 
during the examination of the accomplice. The stage had been set when the 
husband testified, without objection, that he went looking around the place the 
second day after the robbery, after hearing noise during the night, and found 
some footprints. He then discovered that someone had dug a hole behind the 
propane tank. He reported that there was dirt scattered around; there were some 
tennis shoe tracks; a cardboard box was in the hole; and it appeared that the 
box had been taped up. He told one of the law enforcement officers about it and, 
within a couple of days, rain washed out the tracks. He said that he was only 
aware that someone had dug a hole.

[¶12.]  In connection with a concern about some 
proffered testimony from the investigating officer, the following appears in the 
record:

"THE COURT: All right. 
With regard to the, you know, testimony about the digging around behind the 
propane tank, I guess when [the accomplice] testifies, he's going to testify 
that the defendant told him that he had hidden some stuff there and that after 
the robbery he had gone back and picked it up.

"MR. GODDARD: And 
produced it.

"THE COURT: And he 
produced it, and that's to - you're offering that to establish the credibility 
of the defendant - no, [the accomplice] - his credibility.

"MR. GODDARD: 
Yes.

"THE COURT: Because there 
has been testimony by [the husband] that he found the ground disturbed. He heard 
somebody rustling around outside and found the ground disturbed a day or two 
after the event.

"Well, I guess it's 
relevant, but I'm going to do it with this, because I think there's been twice 
that there's been some testimony about him forging this check, and I'm going to 
let it in, but I'm also going to give the defense an instruction that, you know, 
that whether the defendant did or did not commit forgery or whether he had taken 
anything from them at some other time, he is not being charged with that, and 
they can't consider that and they should not in any way allow that to influence 
their decision as to whether or not he's guilty of the charge that he's alleged 
to have committed - the armed robbery.

"MR. TATE: I thank the 
Court for that instruction, but if you think about it, if 
-

"THE COURT: You don't 
have to have the instruction if you don't want it.

"MR. TATE: I want the 
instruction, but if you think about it - but if you're saying that that evidence 
should not in any way influence their judgment, then by definition, that 
evidence is not relevant.

"THE COURT: It's not 
irrelevant because it does go to the credibility. I mean that's my opinion. It 
doesn't mean it's right but that's my opinion."

The accomplice 
then was permitted to testify as follows:

"Q How long did Mark stay 
at your house then?

"A Approximately two 
weeks, maybe two and a half weeks.

"Q Did you ever return to 
LakeDeSmet?

"A 
No.

"Q Did 
Mark?

"A Mark 
did.

"Q What were the 
circumstances?

"MR. TATE: Objection, 
your Honor. This is irrelevant.

"THE COURT: Overruled. 

"Q (By Mr. Goddard) What 
were the circumstances?

"A Mark wanted me to 
bring him back up to the Lake Stop for a box of tackle, and I told him that he 
was crazy to want to come back up to the Lake Stop. This was just two days after 
the robbery took place. So I told him that I would not take him back up here. So 
he got on his motorcycle and said that he was going back to the LakeStop to dig up the tackle and that he 
would be back the following morning.

"Q Where did the tackle 
come from?

"A From when he was 
working in the store.

"MR. TATE: Objection, 
your Honor. Foundation.

"THE COURT: Well, he'll 
have to state how he knows if he knows.

"Q (By Mr. Tate) Did Mark 
tell you where the tackle came from?

"A 
Yes.

"Q Where did he tell you 
that it came from?

"A From the 
store.

"Q And how did it get in 
the box?

"A He would work in the 
store, and I guess he worked by himself, and he loaded up 
-

"MR. TATE: Excuse me. 
Your Honor, I object. We're having the witness testify about things he's 
guessing about. He's obviously speculating and concluding about things he knows 
nothing about.

"THE COURT: Well, he can 
testify as to what the defendant told him. If he doesn't know, he's going to 
have to -

"Q (By Mr. Goddard) To 
your knowledge, how did the materials get in the box?

"A Mark put them 
there.

"Q And so you wouldn't 
take him but he went anyway.

"A 
Right.

"Q What happened then? 
When did you next see him?

"A The following 
morning.

"Q And please explain to 
the jury what happened then.

"A He got to my house on 
his motorcycle. He had a great big cardboard box full of tackle, two fishing 
poles, two new reels, probably a thousand dollars worth of 
tackle.

"Q What did he do with 
it?

"A Poured it out all over 
my floor.

"Q How did it 
appear?

"A Like it was in the 
ground?

"Q Why do you say 
that?

"A Mark had told me that 
he buried this box of tackle next to the propane tank at the LakeStop.

"Q Okay. So did it have 
dirt then?

"A Yes, it 
did."

[¶13.]  The accomplice also testified that there 
was concern about the victims recognizing Justice. That concern was expressed, 
and Justice thought that everybody should be killed so that there would not be 
any witnesses. The accomplice testified that Justice thought the victims would 
recognize him and killing them would guarantee that they would not. The 
accomplice then claimed to have persuaded Justice not to kill the people because 
of his impression of the effect of the circumstances surrounding an armed 
robbery upon victims. He said:

"Q Is there a pattern 
that happens when you're doing - I don't know if I can qualify you as an expert 
- something that happens when you're doing an armed robbery and you point the 
gun?

"A Well, it automatically 
puts the receiver in a state of shock.

"Q And you've noticed 
that?

"A 
Yes.

"Q And does that make it 
difficult for them to recognize you at a later time?

"A Yes, it 
does."

This latter 
testimony serves as the basis for the contention that the accomplice should not 
have been permitted to testify about the reactions of crime 
victims.

[¶14.]  In the course of his testimony, the 
accomplice explained that there was a boat behind the LakeStop and that on their way to accomplish 
the robbery they went into the boat where Justice got a baseball cap which he 
put on and tucked his hair underneath it. He then pulled the cap down so that 
somebody looking at him could not see his face, and he donned a pair of 
sunglasses. In addition, he took a green fatigue-like jacket to cover his 
tatoos. The accomplice also testified that it was from the boat that the rope 
was taken to be used to bind up the victims.

[¶15.]  We address together the claims of error 
relating to the admission of evidence focusing upon the context of this trial. 
Justice claims the evidence not to be relevant to any of the elements of the 
charged offense but, in making that claim, the element of the identity of 
Justice as a perpetrator is omitted. Identity, in fact, was the only element of 
the offense that was in any way in issue at this trial. Consequently, relevancy 
must be considered in the context of establishing the identity of Justice as a 
perpetrator of this offense, or, in the instance of the evidence about Justice 
suggesting that the victims be eliminated, as a part of the history of the event 
or the natural development of the facts.

[¶16.]  The accomplice related to the jury that 
Justice wanted to kill the victims and that he was successful in his effort to 
dissuade Justice during the testimony in which the accomplice described the 
events surrounding the commission of the crime. That testimony certainly would 
not enhance the impression the jury might have of Justice, but it clearly fits 
the rule articulated in Crozier v. State, 723 P.2d 42 (Wyo. 1986). Not only does 
it form a part of the history of the event, but it, indeed, did serve to enhance 
the natural development of the facts. See Makinen v. State, 737 P.2d 345 
(Wyo. 1987). 
It explained the steps that Justice took to disguise himself, and those steps 
manifested familiarity with the surroundings at the LakeStop. Familiarity with the surroundings 
clearly is relevant with respect to the identity of Justice as a perpetrator. 
See Miller v. State, 755 P.2d 855 (Wyo. 1988); 
Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036 (Wyo. 1987).

[¶17.]  Much the same justification is present 
with respect to the testimony about the check, including the fact that Justice 
admitted forging it. This testimony also served to enhance the natural 
development of the facts and, indeed, was an almost indispensable event with 
respect to explaining the quarrel between the male victim and Justice on the 
night before Justice was discharged. Justice's statement to his accomplice that 
he was owed money by the husband and wife for work he had done at the LakeStop came into evidence without objection, 
and the testimony about the checks, like this latter statement, served to 
demonstrate animosity toward the victims and a motive for revenge. The evidence 
of motive is relevant and admissible. Shaffer v. State, 640 P.2d 88, 31 
A.L.R.4th 166 (Wyo. 1982). It is material "because evidence 
of motive can lead to an inference of identity which is an element of this 
crime." Coleman v. State, 741 P.2d 99, 105 (Wyo. 1987).

[¶18.]  A bit deeper analysis is necessary with 
respect to the testimony about the theft of the fishing tackle. As is evident 
from the cross-examination of the accomplice and the closing argument on behalf 
of Justice, it was the theory of the defense that the accomplice, being 
presented with an opportunity to obtain leniency for himself but not wishing to 
disclose the true identity of the other robbers, seized upon Justice as a person 
to implicate. Essentially, the argument was that the accomplice needed to name 
some individual, and Justice was vulnerable to the accusation. The theory was 
not implausible, and the need that was perceived by the prosecuting attorney to 
corroborate the testimony of the accomplice is understandable. The male victim 
knew that something had been dug up from behind the propane tank. It is unlikely 
that it would have occurred to the accomplice to talk about someone digging up 
fishing tackle and bringing it back to Casper unless the event had occurred. The 
accomplice explained that the person who returned with the fishing tackle was 
one of the robbers, and it was clear that Justice had the opportunity to take 
and conceal the fishing tackle. In the context of this case, the relevancy on 
the issue of identity is obvious for this court and, consequently, that 
testimony was admissible under Rule 404(b), W.R.E., despite the objection of 
Justice and the attack that was mounted upon this evidence. 
Shaffer.

[¶19.]  Our review of the record persuades us 
that the trial court also properly balanced the probative value of this evidence 
against the danger of unfair prejudice and appropriately resolved that issue in 
favor of admitting the evidence in accordance with Rule 403, W.R.E. See Coleman. 
We are satisfied that there was no error committed in the admission of the 
evidence of the forgery, the theft of the fishing tackle, or the explanation of 
Justice's articulated desire to kill the victims. We should not have addressed 
the testimony about Justice's desire to kill the witnesses under our usual rule 
of judicial restraint because that could only be considered under the plain 
error doctrine in the absence of objection. Lauthern v. State, 769 P.2d 350 
(Wyo. 1989). 
We addressed that issue on the merits only because it was so interwoven with the 
other issues.

[¶20.]  Having thus disposed of the concerns 
expressed in Justice's issues I, II, IV, and VI, we will turn to his attack upon 
the limiting instruction which the court gave. That instruction, read to the 
jury at the close of the evidence, stated:

"You are instructed that 
you are not to consider any evidence elicited during the trial regarding the 
alleged forgery of a check or the theft of fishing gear as evidence of the crime 
of Robbery."

Such an 
instruction may be given even over the objection of defense counsel at trial. 
Jozen v. State, 746 P.2d 1279 (Wyo. 1987). A limiting instruction, in this 
context, does serve to correct possible prejudice. Coleman, 741 P.2d 99; Bishop 
v. State, 687 P.2d 242 (Wyo. 1984), cert. 
denied 469 U.S. 1219, 105 S. Ct. 1203, 84 L. Ed. 2d 345 (1985). Justice's suggestion that the instruction was legally insufficient 
and, therefore, could not serve to cure error in the admission of evidence need 
not be addressed because no objection was made either to the content of the 
instruction or to its being given to the jury. Rule 31, W.R. Cr.P.; Sybert v. 
State, 724 P.2d 463 (Wyo. 1986). For that issue to be preserved for 
appeal, there was a duty to make a specific legal objection, in the absence of 
which, reliance must be upon the plain error doctrine, which Justice does not 
assert. Lauthern; Cutbirth v. State, 663 P.2d 888 (Wyo. 1983); Britton v. State, 643 P.2d 935 (Wyo. 1982). While Justice 
appears to contend that such an instruction does not serve its purpose because 
it is not effective communication with the jury, that contention does not serve 
to further his argument. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we assume 
that a jury has the ability to follow instructions and does abide by those 
instructions. Madrid v. State, 592 P.2d 709 
(Wyo. 1979); Downs v. State, 581 P.2d 610 
(Wyo. 
1978).

[¶21.]  We treat further, but briefly, the 
contention that the accomplice's testimony regarding the reaction of robbery 
victims was not admissible. That claim is premised upon the ground that the 
accomplice improperly was permitted to testify as an expert with respect to the 
reactions of crime victims. The record discloses that Justice simply is mistaken 
about the proffer of such evidence as expert testimony. In fact, it was not 
offered as expert opinion, but the important disclosure from the record is that 
no objection was made at the time the testimony was offered. The result of the 
failure to object is that the claim of error is waived for purposes of this 
appeal according to our usual rule. Story v. State, 721 P.2d 1020 (Wyo. 1986), cert. denied 
479 U.S. 962, 107 S. Ct. 459, 93 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1986). The matter cannot be 
approached under the plain error rule because justification does exist in the 
law for receiving the evidence. See Braley v. State, 741 P.2d 1061 (Wyo. 1987); McDaniel v. State, 632 P.2d 534 (Wyo. 1981). Thus, there 
does not appear to be any clear and unequivocal rule of law which the admission 
of this testimony clearly violated.

[¶22.]  We turn then to the contention of Justice 
that evidence that he had no felony convictions improperly was excluded. We note 
first that no such evidence was offered by Justice. The subject was broached by 
defense counsel in his opening statement when he advised the jury that Justice 
had never been convicted of a felony. The prosecutor complained about that, 
demanding that Justice testify or that other evidence be submitted that he had 
not been convicted of a felony. The court then advised the prosecuting attorney 
that a corrective admonition would be given to the jury unless the evidence was 
presented. Justice now contends that he should have been permitted to offer 
evidence of his good character without himself taking the stand, but that his 
counsel was discouraged from introducing any different evidence because of the 
nature of the court's ruling. The court did, in fact, advise the jury that it 
should disregard defense counsel's statements relating to Justice's criminal 
history. There is no question that this instruction was proper in the absence of 
evidence. Boyd v. State, 528 P.2d 287 (Wyo. 1974), cert. denied 423 U.S. 871, 96 S. Ct. 137, 46 L. Ed. 2d 102 (1975). So far as the claim that the defense was 
chilled by the nature of the court's ruling, there is nothing in the record to 
support that contention. In chambers, counsel had ample opportunity to object to 
the court's response, but counsel recognized the impropriety of the earlier 
remark in advising the court that he would not do that again. It seems clear 
that, in the absence of an offer of proof with respect to evidence, the claim by 
Justice that the presentation of his defense theory was chilled by the court's 
ruling is not an adequate premise upon which to base any conclusion of error. 
See Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991 (Wyo. 1984).

[¶23.]  The final error then to be addressed is 
the claim of Justice that the court committed error in the admission of 
testimony from the victims as to the impact of the crime upon them. The State 
defends the admission of this testimony by distinguishing Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S. Ct. 2529, 96 L. Ed. 2d 440 (1987), upon which Justice relies. Booth involved the introduction of 
testimony relating to the victim of a homicide. The Supreme Court held that the 
information was not relevant to a capital sentencing decision and that the 
admission of the evidence created a constitutionally unacceptable risk of the 
imposition of the death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner. It is 
true that the court limited the decision to the use of such testimony in the 
context of the Booth case. The State relies upon rulings in other state courts 
which have distinguished Booth and have refused to apply it to comments by a 
prosecutor as to the impact of crime on the victims. People v. Dyer, 45 Cal. 3d 26, 246 Cal. Rptr. 209, 753 P.2d 1 (1988); People v. Miranda, 44 Cal. 3d 57, 241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127 (1987), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 108 S. Ct. 2026, 100 L. Ed. 2d 613, reh. denied ___ U.S. ___, 109 S. Ct. 4, 101 L. Ed. 2d 956 (1988); 
State v. Brown, 320 N.C. 179, 358 S.E.2d 1, cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 108 S. Ct. 467, 98 L. Ed. 2d 406 (1987). The State also points to other cases in which 
the admission of such testimony has been determined to be harmless. Hill v. 
Thigpen, 667 F. Supp. 314 (N.D.Miss. 1987); People v. Poggi, 45 Cal. 3d 306, 246 Cal. Rptr. 886, 753 P.2d 1082 (1988); State v. Post, 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 513 N.E.2d 754 (1987), cert. denied ___ 
U.S. ___, 108 S. Ct. 1061, 98 L. Ed. 2d 1023, reh. denied, ___ U.S. 
___, 108 S. Ct. 1492, 99 L. Ed. 2d 719 (1988); State v. Bell, 293 S.C. 391, 360 S.E.2d 706 (1987), cert. denied ___ 
U.S. ___, 108 S. Ct. 734, 98 L. Ed. 2d 682 (1988). In addition, the State relies upon Killebrew v. State, 746 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. App. 1987), in which, in the context of an aggravated assault case, 
the Texas 
court concluded that victim impact testimony properly was admitted. We note that 
in this latter case, and in People v. Hines, 165 Ill. App.3d 289, 116 Ill.Dec. 382, 518 N.E.2d 1362, cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 109 S. Ct. 236, 102 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1988), the victim impact evidence was admitted during the punishment phase 
of the proceedings.

[¶24.]  It is clear that the testimony offered by 
the victims of this crime with respect to how it affected them in connection 
with their lives after the crime is absolutely irrelevant with respect to the 
issues before the jury. Their discussion of the impact of the crime upon them 
could not in any way serve to establish any of the elements of the crime of 
aggravated robbery. The only purpose must have been to attempt to arouse the 
passions of the jury. Consequently, we are satisfied that the admission of such 
evidence is error, and the trial courts are cautioned not to permit such 
evidence to be presented unless there is a clear justification of relevance. In 
the context of this case, however, we are persuaded that such evidence was 
harmless. Given the other evidence against Justice, which the trial court aptly 
described as overwhelming, the admission of the testimony about the impact on 
the victims did not constitute prejudicial error. See Hyde v. State, 769 P.2d 376 (Wyo. 1989); Ortega v. State, 669 P.2d 935 
(Wyo. 
1983).

[¶25.]  Because none of the claims of Justice 
with regard to error have been found to be correct other than the admission of 
the victim impact testimony, we see no need to address his claim of prejudice 
arising from cumulative error. A claim of cumulative error depends upon error 
being recognized, and that predicate is not present in this 
case.

[¶26.]  We find no reversible error in the trial 
of this case, and the judgment and sentence is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 6-2-401, W.S. 
1977, provides, in pertinent part:

"(a) A person is guilty 
of robbery if in the course of committing a crime defined by W.S. 6-3-402 
he:

* * * * * 
*

"(ii) Threatens another 
with or intentionally puts him in fear of immediate bodily injury * * 
*.

* * * * * 
*

"(c) Aggravated robbery 
is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not less than five (5) years nor more 
than twenty-five (25) years if in the course of committing the crime of robbery 
the person:

* * * * * 
*

"(ii) Uses or exhibits a 
deadly weapon or a simulated deadly weapon."

Section 6-3-402, 
W.S. 1977, provides, in pertinent part:

"(a) A person who steals, 
takes and carries, leads or drives away property of another with intent to 
deprive the owner or lawful possessor is guilty of 
larceny."