Title: JK v. MK

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JK v. MK2000 WY 1095 P.3d 782Case Number: C-99-1Decided: 05/02/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming

JK, 
as next best friend of her minor child and grandchild, DK and BABY X, Appellant 
(Petitioner),

v.

MK, DK, and ELLEN McGEE, as an individual and in her 
official capacity, and THE WYOMING CHILDREN'S SOCIETY, Appellees 
(Respondents).

 

                     
           

Appeal from the District Court 
of Laramie County Honorable H.

Hunter Patrick, 
Judge.

  

    Representing 
Petitioners: Joe A. Baca and Sue Davidson of Aspen Ridge Law Offices, P.C., 
Cheyenne, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Baca.

     
Representing Respondents: Gary R. Scott of Hirst & Applegate, 
P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.

     
Representing The State of Wyoming: Gay Woodhouse, Attorney 
General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; Harry D. Ivey, Assistant 
Attorney General; Christopher Petrie, Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Petrie.

 

    
Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and HILL, 
JJ.

 

    
GOLDEN, Justice.

  [¶1]        After signing a consent to 
adoption and relinquishment of child custody, the minor natural father (Father) 
immediately notified Appellee Wyoming Children's Society (WCS) of his intent to 
revoke his consent.  Father's 
mother, on behalf of her son and the baby (collectively, Petitioners), began 
judicial proceedings to revoke Father's consent and relinquishment and obtain 
custody of his newborn son, Baby X.  
He joined individuals Ellen McGee of WCS, the natural mother (Mother), 
and natural maternal grandmother (collectively, Respondents) in his suit, but 
never served the prospective adoptive parents.  Months later, after the adoption decree 
was apparently finalized, the district court granted summary judgment to 
appellees ruling that, as a matter of law, no statutory grounds existed for 
revoking Father's consent.  
Petitioners appeal.

 

[¶2]          We dismiss those issues 
requiring joinder of the prospective adoptive parents and affirm the grant of 
summary judgment on the issue of whether fraud or duress existed requiring 
Father's consent to be set aside.

  

                                     
ISSUES

 

[¶3]          Petitioners present these 
issues for our review:

 

I.  Was 
Father's consent to adoption given under duress or as a voluntary, knowing 
waiver, at a time when he was competent to give consent as required by 
law?

 

II. Does W.S. § 1-22-109 violate the U.S. and Wyoming 
Constitutions or was it unconstitutionally applied in the facts of this 
case?

 

III. Should guardians ad litem be appointed to 
represent minors in adoption cases?

 

[¶4]          Respondents present this 
single statement of the issue:

 

1.  Did 
the district court err in granting summary judgment to all of the Respondents on 
all of the claims asserted by the Petitioners in their Amended 
Petition?

 

[¶5]          The State of Wyoming filed a 
brief stating these issues:

 

I.  
Whether Appellant was denied procedural due process by operation of Wyo. 
Stat. § 1-22-109.

 

II.  
Whether Appellant was denied substantive due process by operation of Wyo. 
Stat. § 1-22-109.

 

III.  
Whether Wyo. Stat. § 1-22-109 violates the U.S. and Wyoming 
Constitutional rights to equal protection.

 

                                     
FACTS

 

 [¶6]        Because this appeal is from an 
order of summary judgment, we review the facts in the light most favorable to 
Petitioners.  In Re HC, 983 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Wyo. 1999).

 

[¶7]          Seventeen-year-old Father 
suspected that his eighteen-year-old girlfriend (Mother) was pregnant in early 
February of 1998, and confronted her about it.  Mother denied she was pregnant.  On the morning of February 23, 1998, 
Mother picked up Father at his house before school began and asked him to drive 
her to a hospital in Ft. Collins, Colorado, because she was experiencing stomach 
pains.  He took her to the emergency 
room in Ft. Collins and doctors informed him that Mother was pregnant and the 
birth was imminent.  Mother 
delivered a son that afternoon.  On 
the day of the birth, a social worker visited the couple and discussed the 
possibility of adoption.  During 
that meeting, Father believed that the social worker informed them that if the 
couple did decide to put the baby up for adoption, they would have up to six 
months to change their minds and get the baby back.  Also on that day, the maternal and 
paternal grandmothers arrived at the hospital and more discussions concerning 
adoption were held with the couple.  
The paternal grandmother contacted Father's aunt in Salt Lake City and 
asked if she would consider adopting the baby; however, the aunt declined. Late 
that night, Father drove back to Cheyenne to get clothes for both him and 
Mother, returned to the hospital, and spent the night in Mother's hospital 
room.

 

 [¶8]        The next day, Father did not go to 
school and stayed with Mother.  
Another social worker arrived and offered free counseling to the Mother 
and talked to both about adoption. At Mother's request, that social worker 
contacted a child adoption agency in Cheyenne, Wyoming.  Father testified in his deposition that 
this social worker also informed them they would have a six-month period for 
changing their minds.

 

[¶9]          Ellen McGee from the Wyoming 
Children's Society (WCS) arrived at the hospital about midday of February 
24.  She brought profiles of 
adoptive families, a notary, and consent and relinquishment of custody papers 
for the couple to sign. After speaking to the couple about several of the 
profiles, Ms. McGee asked if the couple 
was ready to sign the papers.  The 
couple declined and stated that they needed more time to think about it.  The maternal grandmother arrived, and 
Ms. McGee stated that she would be back in an hour and left. She returned in 
less than an hour, primarily discussed adoption with the maternal grandmother 
while the couple listened, but was told that the couple needed more time and 
more profiles. Ms. McGee offered to place the baby in foster care, and Mother 
informed her that the baby would be left in the hospital.  Mother preferred that the baby stay at 
the hospital for the full forty-eight hour post-birth time that was routinely 
recommended for newborns.  In her 
affidavit, the maternal grandmother states that she was assured by the hospital 
that the baby would not be considered abandoned for this time period.  Father left the hospital to go to work, 
and Mother was discharged and left the hospital with the maternal grandmother 
and returned home to Cheyenne.

 

[¶10]      Late in the evening of February 
24, Mother, the maternal grandparents, Father, and the paternal grandmother met 
at Mother's house and further discussed the adoption. Mother and Father told 
their parents that they needed more time, and it was agreed that more time would 
be given to them.  A few minutes 
later, Mother's parents had the couple rejoin them for further discussions.  Mother stated that she wanted to give 
the baby up for adoption, and Father stated that he thought adoption would be 
best.  The paternal grandmother 
apparently indicated that she disagreed with adoption but would not 
interfere.  The maternal grandmother 
stated that she would contact WCS, and it was agreed that Father would return 
the next day.  Father and his mother 
left to return home.  Father told 
his mother that he wanted to keep the baby, but that he had told Mother he would 
support her decision.

 

 [¶11]     Father did not go to school again 
on February 25, and he returned the next morning to Mother's home without the 
paternal grandmother.  He learned 
that Ms. McGee was expected and waited with Mother and her parents for Ms. McGee 
to arrive.  He did not contact his 
mother, and she was not present that morning.  Father testified that during the wait, 
the maternal grandmother and Mother discussed the good choice that had been 
made, but Father did not participate.  
Ms. McGee and another woman arrived and, in his affidavit, Father claims 
that Ms. McGee told Father that if he did not remove the baby from the hospital, 
the state of Colorado was going to take the baby as an abandoned baby.  Ms. McGee read a relinquishment of 
custody and consent to adoption form to the couple, pointing out variations 
between the two forms, and then had Father and Mother each sign a form.  At some point, the couple selected the 
adoptive family, who remained nameless.  
Father could not remember whether it was before or after he signed the 
consent.

 

[¶12]       In his deposition, Father 
testified that he believed that he was releasing and relinquishing his child to 
foster care to avoid abandonment and was consenting to adoption by the family 
selected at a later time.  He 
testified that he believed that the actual adoption papers would be signed 
later.  Father was not given a copy 
of the papers he had signed. At the deposition, Father was asked, "Do you 
understand what this statement means, `I acknowledge and agree that this 
relinquishment and consent terminates all rights which I have to this child.'" 
Father replied, "I'm giving up my rights for the baby from what I 
understand."

 

 [¶13]     After he signed these papers, 
Father informed Mother that he believed the baby should not be placed in foster 
care and given up for adoption.  He 
believed that Mother agreed and was going to arrange to get the baby back.  Later, the couple and the maternal 
grandmother shopped for and purchased baby clothes to take to the adoption 
agency.  Father thought the clothes 
were purchased for the purpose of keeping the baby and told his mother that they 
would be picking up the baby that day.  
On February 27, Father, Mother, and the maternal grandmother delivered 
the baby clothes to the agency, and the couple held the baby.  Mother and Father signed a form that 
required the adoptive parents to provide pictures of the baby to the birth 
mother several times a year until age five and then every six months until the 
age of majority. This form was signed with the first names of Father and Mother 
and the adoptive parents.  The date 
beside all four names is February 27, apparently the date that the adoptive 
parents were given physical custody of the baby.  At the adoption agency, Father learned 
that Mother still intended to give the baby up for adoption.  He left the agency, contacted his mother 
and asked her to intervene.  Father, 
his mother, and brother went to the agency and asked Ms. McGee to return the 
baby to him.  Father was told that 
the baby had already been placed with the adoptive family.  Ms. McGee refused to assist Father in 
the return of his baby, and angry words were exchanged.

  

[¶14]       Father hired legal counsel, 
and on March 4, 1998, counsel filed a petition requesting the district court to 
establish Father's paternity, award him custody of the minor child, establish 
child support, revoke and rescind the Relinquishment of Parental Rights and 
Consent to Adoption, declare Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-109(d) unconstitutional, 
issue a temporary restraining order and enjoin adoption proceedings which have 
been or may be initiated with respect to Baby X, require Baby X to be turned 
over to Father pending further hearing, and requested attorneys' fees and costs 
and money damages for negligent and/or intentional infliction of emotional 
distress and conspiracy.  This 
petition was brought against Mother, the maternal grandmother, Ms. McGee, 
individually, and WCS.  The adoptive 
parents were not joined in the action.

 

[¶15]       In the petition, Father 
alleged that WCS had told him that the baby was in the custody of "Baby X's 
prospective adoptive parents."  An 
"Affidavit in Compliance with W.S. § 20-5-110" was filed by Father stating that 
this unknown couple had physical custody of the child. On March 5, 1998, Father 
filed a motion to appoint a guardian ad litem for Baby X. On March 17, a 
response was filed to the petition, admitting that Baby X had been placed in the 
custody of the prospective adoptive parents.  Affirmative defenses alleged were a 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, plaintiffs do not 
have standing to bring the action, and the petition was unsigned by the attorney 
of record.  Father filed an amended 
petition on March 17, 1998, that included John Doe 1 and Jane Doe 1 and 
petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. In his amended petition Father alleged 
that he was informed Baby X had been placed in the custody of Baby X's 
prospective adoptive parents, John Doe 1 and Jane Doe 1, who had not been 
identified as of March 13, 1998.  In 
their response to the amended petition, Respondents denied this allegation in 
its entirety despite having admitted in the earlier answer that the baby was in 
the physical custody of the prospective adoptive parents. Petitioners filed an 
attorney's consent to appointment as guardian ad litem, and Respondents objected 
to the appointment of a guardian ad 
litem.  On April 16, 1998, the 
State, which was served but not joined as a party, filed its response to the 
constitutional claim.

 

[¶16]      On May 11, 1998, the district 
court denied the motion to appoint a guardian ad litem for the baby.  Apparently, this order followed a 
hearing; however, the transcript has not been included in the record.  On July 6, 1998, the district court 
notified the parties that it intended to dismiss the petition sua sponte.  Respondents WCS and Ms. McGee filed a 
motion for summary judgment on July 10, 1998, and Mother and the maternal 
grandmother filed a motion for summary judgment on July 27, 1998.  Apparently in the interim, depositions 
were taken; however, only selected portions have been made a part of the 
record.  On August 4, 1998, 
Petitioners filed a motion to amend the petition, filed an amended petition that 
did not include the prospective adoptive 
parents as parties, renewed their 
motion to appoint a guardian ad litem for Baby X, filed a motion to appoint a 
guardian ad litem for the father, a motion to require production of hospital 
records and release, a motion to order notice in adoption proceedings, and a 
combined motion opposing the motions to dismiss and for summary 
judgment.

 

 [¶17]     Although the record does not 
contain the transcript, apparently a hearing was held on these motions, and on 
September 29, 1998, the district court issued an order allowing the amended 
petition, dismissing it with prejudice and granting summary judgment to 
Respondents, denying notice of adoption proceedings and granting costs to 
Respondents. Petitioners did not file any motions to stay adoption proceedings 
pending appeal, but filed a notice of appeal that did name John and Jane Doe 1 
on October 29, 1998.  On appeal, 
Petitioners' brief presents neither issue nor argument on their money damages 
claims, and they have apparently abandoned them. Oral argument was held on 
September 22, 1999, and at that time, this Court was informed that the baby's 
adoption had been finalized in August of 1998.  The adoptive parents have never been 
identified or served in any of the above actions.

  

                                   
DISCUSSION

 

[¶18]      Adoption was not known at common 
law and is a creature of statute to be strictly construed.  Adoption of MM, 652 P.2d 974, 979 (Wyo. 
1982).  The basic principles 
permeating the law of adoption are fundamental liberty interests and the best 
interests of the children.  Matter 
of TR, 777 P.2d 1106, 1118 (Wyo. 1989) (Golden, J., dissenting).  Under Wyoming's statutory adoption 
scheme, natural parents may consent to adoption and relinquish custody of their 
child after the birth.  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-22-109 (LEXIS 1999).  Their 
consent is irrevocable unless obtained by fraud or duress, and the consent of a 
minor parent is valid and may not be revoked solely because of minority.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-109(d) (LEXIS 
1999).

 

[¶19]       In Wyoming, a natural 
parent's attempt to revoke his consent to adoption and relinquishment of custody 
is considered a threshold issue to be resolved before entry of a final adoption 
decree.  We have said that until the 
threshold question of consent is resolved the identity of the adoptive parents 
is irrelevant as is the fitness of the adoptive parents and the best interests 
of the child.  Matter of Adoption of 
RHA, 702 P.2d 1259, 1264 (Wyo. 1985).  
In Matter of Adoption of MSVW, 965 P.2d 1158 (Wyo. 1998), this Court held 
that a natural father has the right to attend the adoption hearing for the 
opportunity to contest the validity of his consent when the claim is made before 
the entry of the final adoption decree.  
Id. at 1164.  In this case, 
following a hearing on the issue of whether his consent was valid, Father's 
motion to attend the adoption proceedings was denied.  This Court has previously held that once 
the issue of consent has been resolved, under Wyoming's statutory scheme, the 
natural father is "a stranger to the adoption proceedings."  Adoption of RHA, 702 P.2d  at 1264.  On appeal, Father presents the issue of 
whether his consent is irrevocable under Wyoming statute.

 

 [¶20]     Petitioners, however, did not join 
or serve the prospective adoptive parents in their final amended petition.  Because resolution of the consent issue 
presumably adjudicates the rights of the prospective adoptive parents, it would 
appear they are indispensable parties as to all issues presented by 
Petitioners.    
Unfortunately, the record is not adequate to properly inform us as to why 
the prospective adoptive parents are not parties.  At oral argument, Petitioners claimed 
that WCS refused to divulge their names, making service impossible.  Also at oral argument, counsel for the 
appellees informed the Court that the adoption of the baby had been finalized in 
another jurisdiction, presumably out of state; however, the final adoption 
decree is not part of the record, and, therefore, not properly before us.  Petitioners seem to be aware of the 
final adoption decree and have pursued their appeal, and we have, therefore, 
decided to address the threshold issue 
of whether Father may revoke his consent under the statutes.  Petitioners have also pursued their 
constitutional and guardian ad litem issues, but we find that their failure to 
join the adoptive parents precludes our review of those issues.  We first address this issue of 
indispensable parties.

 

                             
Indispensable Parties

 

[¶21]       Adoption of RHA permits us 
to determine the validity of a natural parent's consent under Wyoming statute 
without regard to whether the adoptive parents have been joined.  Consent of the natural parent to the 
adoption of the child is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a valid and binding 
decree of adoption, and, ordinarily, 
consent proceedings are the first part of a bifurcated procedure for an adoption 
under the jurisdiction of a Wyoming court.  
See Adoption of AMD, 766 P.2d 550, 552 (Wyo. 1988). Where, as here, the 
parties do not present the court with a final adoption decree because it has 
apparently been entered in another jurisdiction, we are limited to the 
Petitioners' request that we determine whether, as a matter of law, Father's 
consent is irrevocable under Wyoming statute.  Father's other claims that the statute 
is unconstitutional and the district court erred in failing to appoint guardian 
ad litems for him and the baby raise the issue of whether the claims must be 
dismissed because the adoptive parents are indispensable parties and were not 
joined in the final amended petition and have not been properly served with this 
appeal.  The issue of indispensable 
parties is one which this Court may raise upon its own motion.  State, By and Through Christopulos v. 
Husky Oil Co. of Delaware, 575 P.2d 262, 268 (Wyo. 1978).

 

[¶22]       In this appeal, it is not 
clear to us that the final adoption decree was entered outside of Wyoming, but 
we note that usually adoption decrees are issued under the particular state's 
own statutory scheme.  If in fact 
the adoption has been accomplished in another state, presumably the Petitioners 
will have the option of setting aside the adoption under the consent revocation 
procedures or other applicable sections of that state's statutory scheme.  However, neither the record nor the 
parties have fully informed this Court of the exact nature of their relief 
sought in light of the finalized adoption decree in another jurisdiction, and we 
therefore proceed as if no finalized adoption decree has 
issued.

 

 [¶23]     Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure 19 
requires "[j]oinder of persons needed for [a] just adjudication."  A court must first determine if the 
person in question meets certain criteria, and, if so, the person is considered 
a "person to be joined if feasible."  
W.R.C.P. 19(a).  In cases 
where joinder is not feasible, the court must then examine four considerations 
to determine whether "in equity and good conscience" the action should 
proceed.  W.R.C.P. 19(b).  If, in equity and good conscience, the 
action cannot proceed without the person in question, that person is considered 
indispensable and must be joined or dismissal will result.  Lamb v. Wyo. Game and Fish Comm'n, 985 P.2d 433, 439 (Wyo. 1999); W.R.C.P. 19(b); Albrecht v. Zwaanshoek Holding 
En  Financiering, B.V., 762 P.2d 1174, 1178 (Wyo. 1988); Reilly v. Reilly, 671 P.2d 330, 332 (Wyo. 1983). Rule 
19(c) states:

 

Pleading reasons for nonjoinder. - A pleading 
asserting a claim for relief shall state the names, if known to the pleader, of 
any persons as described in subdivisions (a)(1) and (a)(2) hereof who are not 
joined, and the reasons why they are not joined. 

 

The proper procedure for 
complying with Rule 19(c) is contained in W.R.C.P. Form 
26:

 

      Allegation of 
reason for omitting party.

 

When it is necessary, under Rule 
19(c), for the pleader to set forth in his pleading the names of persons who 
ought to be made parties, but who are not so made, there should be an allegation 
such as the one set out below:
 

John Doe named in this complaint is not made a party 
to this action, because he is not subject to the jurisdiction of this 
court.

 

Petitioners' final amended 
petition did not name Jane and John Doe as a party and did not assert any reason 
for not joining them.

 

 [¶24]     We stated in Rivermeadows, Inc., 
v. Zwaanshoek Holding & Financiering, B.V., 761 P.2d 662, 668 (Wyo. 
1988):

 

This Court has long recognized the traditional 
definition of an indispensable party with regard to W.R.C.P. 19(a).  In American Beryllium & Oil 
Corporation v. Chase, 425 P.2d 66, 68 (Wyo. 1967) (quoting from Amerada 
Petroleum Corporation v. Rio Oil Co., 225 F. Supp. 907, 910 (D.C. Wyo. 1964)), 
quoted in Reilly v. Reilly, 671 P.2d 330, 332 (Wyo. 1983), we 
stated:

 

"An indispensable party has been defined as one 
without whose presence before the court a final decree could not be made without 
either affecting his interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition 
that its final determination might be wholly inconsistent with equity and good 
conscience.  Whether or not a person 
is an indispensable party cannot be determined by a prescribed formula because 
the facts peculiar to each case are determinative of that question."  

 

See also Johnson v. Aetna 
Casualty & Surety Co. of Hartford, Conn., 608 P.2d 1299, 1305 (Wyo. 1980), 
Albrecht, 762 P.2d  at 1178.  A 
series of four tests are set forth in these cases, a negative response in any 
one of which renders the absent party indispensable.  These tests are:

 

            1. Is the 
interest of the absent party distinct and separable?

 

  

2. In his absence can the court render judgment 
between the parties before it?

 

3. Will the decree made in his absence have no 
injurious effect on his interests?

 

4. Will the final determination in his absence be 
consistent with equity and good conscience?

 

  Oxley v. Mine and Smelter Supply Co., 
439 P.2d 661, 663 (Wyo. 1968).  We 
do not see that any of these questions can be answered in the affirmative and 
decide that the prospective adoptive parents are indispensable parties whose 
joinder is required for the constitutional and guardian ad litem 
issues.

 

 [¶25]     Having decided that joinder is 
necessary, we must determine whether joinder is feasible, and if not, whether 
equity and good conscience allows us to proceed.  It would appear that joinder of the 
adoptive parents was possible.  At 
the time this action was commenced, the baby was in the physical custody of the 
adoptive parents, and apparently no adoption petition had been filed in a 
Wyoming court.  Petitioners had 
several procedural routes by which to locate the baby.  Because Petitioners had requested 
custody and filed an affidavit of compliance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-5-110 
(LEXIS 1999), Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-5-111 (LEXIS 1999) required the district 
court to order service on the party having physical custody of the child; 
however, Petitioners never requested that action by the district court.  Petitioners requested the district court 
to enjoin adoption proceedings but failed to request a hearing on the matter and 
never acted upon the petition for writ of habeas corpus.  The record shows that the Petitioners 
did not serve any interrogatories on WCS to determine the child's whereabouts or 
inquire as to whether Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-5-101 (LEXIS 1999)1 had been implicated.  Whether these avenues remain open to 
Petitioners cannot be determined upon the record that we have, but the record 
does not permit us to determine that joinder is not feasible.  We dismiss the appeal as to the 
constitutional and guardian ad litem issues.  Petitioners may amend their petition and 
proceed with discovery to determine the location of the child and the status of 
the adoption proceedings.

 

                             
Revocation of Consent

 

 [¶26]     Father contends that his consent 
should be revoked under the statute for fraud, duress, and for minority created 
by the following circumstances as set forth in his 
pleading:

 

27. [Father] signed a form under fraud or duress and 
without knowledge of what he was doing and involuntarily, thinking that he had 6 
months within which to exercise the option to rescind the form he had 
signed.

 

28. [Father] executed the form on February 25, 1998 
without having the opportunity to deliberate and reflect in the decision and 
without the opportunity to seek independent counsel, and to ponder the 
alternatives available as required by law, the failure of which also amounts to 
duress and fraud in light of the force of circumstances represented by the facts 
of the case and averments set forth herein by paragraphs 1 et. 
seq.;

 

29.  
Respondent McGee is not an attorney authorized to practice law. She is 
[a] layman.  Respondent McGee, as an 
individual and a representative of Respondent, Wyoming Children's Society, 
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law at all times and in all instances 
when she gave [Father] legal advice about the adoption process in Wyoming and in 
having obtained his signatures to the consent form.

 

30.  
Ellen McGee told [Father] he would be considered to have abandoned his 
infant son within forty-eight hours of his birth if a decision as to his son's 
placement had not been made.

 

                                     
Duress

 

 [¶27]     We have said that "[d]uress exists 
whenever one, by the unlawful act of another, is induced to perform some act 
under circumstances which deprive him of the exercise of free will."  Adoption of MM, 652 P.2d  at 978.  Generally, "where the natural parent has 
executed the consent after having been given an opportunity to deliberate and 
reflect on the decision and to seek independent advice and counseling and to 
ponder the alternatives available to [him], duress does not exist."  Id. at 978.  In Matter of TR, 777 P.2d  at 1111, we 
discussed other courts' recognition of duress caused by the "force of 
circumstances," but the majority did not apply it.  Father contends that the totality of 
circumstances here constituted duress under either 
definition.

 

[¶28]       Father alleges the totality 
of the circumstances from the day of the birth when he learned he was to be a 
father until he signed the adoption papers placed him under duress.  We find that the circumstances from the 
time of the birth until Father signed the papers cannot be characterized as 
wrongful or unlawful acts constituting legal duress.  Father and Mother first explored the 
notion of adoption by their own volition on the day of the birth, independently 
requested WCS contact them, independently requested more profiles of adoptive 
families, studied and selected a family, and both continued to examine that 
option until each signed their consent.  
If Father believed that he had six months to change his mind about 
adoption, Father has been very clear in the record to note that this mistake was 
caused by misinformation from Colorado social workers and not by WCS or Ms. 
McGee.  Under Wyoming statute, 
mistake is not cited as a reason that would vitiate consent, particularly in the 
case where Father's mistake was not known or should not have been known by Ms. 
McGee or WCS.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-22-109 (LEXIS 1999); See also Matter of TR, 777 P.2d  at 1111 (plurality 
opinion stating that undue influence was not a statutory grounds for revoking 
consent.)

 

                                     
Fraud

 

 [¶29]    
We have said that "when fraud is alleged - in the context of an adoption 
consent - the representations must relate to a past or existing fact, and may 
not ordinarily be predicated upon a representation which relates to the 
future."  Adoption of D.P., 583 P.2d 706, 708 (Wyo. 1978).  However, 
fraud must be plead with particularity.  
W.R.C.P. 9.  Respondents 
concede that fraud was plead properly in Father's amended petition.  Fraud must be established by clear and 
convincing evidence and will not be imputed to any party when the facts and 
circumstances out of which it is alleged to arise are consistent with honesty 
and purity of intention and a person's good character.  Adoption of Hiatt, 69 Wyo. 373, 382-83, 
242 P.2d 214, 216 (Wyo. 1952).

 

[¶30]      In his affidavit, Father claims 
that on the morning he went to Mother's house for further discussions with Ms. 
McGee, she told him that "if the baby was not taken away from the hospital, the 
State would take the baby as an abandoned baby." Father characterizes this 
statement as a "lie" and, relying upon In Re Bourne Estate, 393 P.2d 808 (Wyo. 
1964), claims that Ms. McGee's conduct throughout was "constructive fraud 
consist[ing] of all acts, omissions, and concealment involving breach of a legal 
or equitable duty resulting in damage to another, and exists where such conduct, 
although not actually fraudulent, ought to be so treated when it has the same 
consequence and legal effects."  
Father states that he then signed the papers, believing he was 
placing the baby in foster care and the 
actual adoption papers would be signed later.  In her defense, Ms. McGee claimed at 
oral argument that this statement is a true and honest statement and argues that 
Father has admitted  neither she nor 
the other WCS agent told Father he was placing the baby in foster care or that 
he was not signing "actual adoption papers."

 

[¶31]       The night before the 
statement was made and with his mother present, Father had agreed that the baby 
should be placed for adoption.  The 
maternal grandmother told Father that she would contact Ms. McGee the next 
morning, and Father arrived at Mother's home the next morning and stayed to meet 
with Ms. McGee.  Father claims that 
he stayed to look at additional profiles and signed the papers because Ms. McGee 
told him that the baby would be considered abandoned if he did not.  Father provides no proof that Ms. 
McGee's statement was a lie, but even assuming that Ms. McGee lied when stating 
that the baby would be considered abandoned that day, and she did it with the 
intent to have Father sign the papers at that time in the absence of his mother 
and without further reflection, whether these circumstances and statements 
constitute fraud must be examined in conjunction with the consent form signed by 
Father.  Ms. McGee read a consent 
form to Father that plainly stated the baby would be placed for adoption, 
Father's rights to the baby would be terminated, and custody would be 
relinquished.  In his deposition, 
Father stated that he understood that he was giving up his rights to the baby 
when he signed the form.  He does 
not allege that Ms. McGee told him that he could change his mind later.  We find that Father signed the documents 
under the mistaken belief that he could revoke his consent within the next six 
months, and his mistaken belief that his signature was not final is insufficient 
to revoke his consent.  Under these 
circumstances, because Ms. McGee did not know and had no reason to know of 
Father's mistaken belief, our standard of review requires that we view her 
statement as informational, complete, and not fraudulent.

 

 [¶32]     Father contends that, as a minor, 
his consent was not knowing and voluntary because he received advice from WCS, 
and not independent representation, while under pressure from Ms. McGee and the 
maternal grandmother, and because he consented so quickly after the birth.  Further, he claims that his mistaken 
belief that he could revoke his consent within six months proves that his 
consent was not knowingly and intelligently made after examining all of the 
options available to a minor unprepared to support the baby.  Father is essentially arguing that WCS 
should have advised him to seek independent legal counsel who could have plainly 
explained his legal rights to him under Wyoming statute and its failure to 
provide that notification to a minor provides grounds for this Court to find his 
consent was involuntary and should be revoked.  Further, he asks us to rewrite the 
statute and provide for the right to have some time period after the birth, 
whether a minor or an adult, before consent is permitted.  Both of these concepts are embodied in 
the Uniform Adoption Act and the statutes of many other states; however, Wyoming 
statutes provide for neither. 2 Ann M. Haralambie, Handling Child Custody, Abuse 
and Adoption Cases, Uniform Adoption Act, at 78 (1999 Cum. Supp. App. 
14-2).  Although Father complains 
that the statute's design works to the disadvantage of minors freely and 
knowledgeably consenting, we have said that unless constitutional or judicial 
decision says otherwise, the adoption statutes represent public policy in this 
area.  Adoption of MM, 652 P.2d  at 
978.  The legislature, therefore, 
has the prerogative of permitting a minor to consent immediately after birth and 
with the independent representation of his own choosing, whether legal counsel, 
family or others, and forgo independent legal representation.  Father's minor status does not permit 
revocation of his consent.

 

[¶33]       Father also states that 
"Father was not given sufficient opportunity to reflect on his decision and to 
seek independent advice and counseling and to ponder the alternatives which the 
adoption specialist, Ellen McGee, had a duty to assure would occur."  He provides expert testimony in the form 
of an affidavit to support his position 
that Ms. McGee owed Father a duty and breached that duty in various ways.  Presumably, Father is referring to a 
tort duty, but does not specify what tort and does not provide further argument 
or authority for this proposition.  
Whether an adoption specialist owes a duty to the natural father 
presents a cause of action not 
recognized in Wyoming and whether it should be recognized presents a question of 
law that we have not yet decided.  
Father provides no argument or authority that such a duty should be 
recognized in this jurisdiction, and we are unable to further consider the 
issue.2

  

                                   
CONCLUSION

 

[¶34]      Under Wyoming law, Petitioners' 
failure to join and serve the adoptive parents limits us to deciding whether 
summary judgment was properly granted to respondents on the threshold issue of 
whether Father can revoke his consent under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-109.  Under the statute, consent may be 
revoked only for fraud or duress, and absent those circumstances, is 
irrevocable.  Father's consent to 
the adoption was not secured by either fraud or duress and is irrevocable under 
Wyoming statute.  All other claims 
are dismissed, allowing Father to pursue all other claims in the appropriate 
jurisdiction.

 

    

FOOTNOTES

1 
Interstate Compact on Placement of Children.  WCS claims that it is a private 
agency.  In Adoption of MM, 652 P.2d  
at 981, we stated that this statute applied to private agency 
placements.

  

2 Father 
began his analysis by informing us that the consent form Father signed was a 
contract and subject to the contract defenses of mistake, fraud, duress and 
minority. We have said that when a party seeks damages in tort against the other 
party to a contract, the general rule is that tort liability can only result 
when a contracting party has a duty independent of its contractual duties.  JBC of Wyoming Corp. v. City of 
Cheyenne, 843 P.2d 1190, 1197 (Wyo. 1992) (citing Preferred Marketing Assoc. Co. 
v. Hawkeye Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 452 N.W.2d 389 (Iowa 1990)).  The court must decide if a duty exists 
as a matter of law.  Hamilton v. 
Natrona County Educ. Ass'n, 901 P.2d 381, 384 (Wyo. 1995).  Essential to any negligence cause of 
action is proof of facts which impose a duty upon defendant.  See, ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, 632 P.2d 925, 931 (Wyo. 1981).  The 
question of the existence of a duty is a matter of law for the court to 
decide.  Id. at 932.  A duty exists where, "upon the facts in 
evidence, such a relation exists between the parties that the community will 
impose a legal obligation upon one for the benefit of the other - or, more 
simply, whether the interest of the plaintiff which has suffered invasion was 
entitled to legal protection at the hands of the defendant."  Goodrich v. Seamands, 870 P.2d 1061, 
1064 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 
§ 37, at 236 (5th ed. 
1984).