Title: State v. Spillner.

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

LAW LIBRARY

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

000

STATE OF HAWAT', Plaintiff-Appellee-Respondent,,

MICHAEL SPILLNER, Defendant~Appellant-Petitioner.

 

No. 27722

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI FROM THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF “APPEAL:
(CITATION NOS. $878068M0 « 58780690) 2)

 

 

ans

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, AND DUFFY, JJ,

DECEMBER 24, 2007 8
_ 2
J., DISSENTING SEPARATELY 2

‘AND ACOBA,
&

‘on July 20, 2007, the defendant-appellant-pet itioner

Michael Spiliner filed an application for a writ of certiorari

urging this court to review the summary disposition order (S00)
of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) in Z,

13, 2007) (hereinafter, “the ICA's

No. 27722 (Haw. App. Apr.
S00}, which affirmed the ‘Ewa district court’s January 4, 2006

judgments, the Honorable Valerie W.H. Chang presiding, convicting
him of and sentencing him for one count each of driving while

unlicensed, in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS)
(offense one), and driving without

§ 286-102 (1993 & Supp. 2002)
(supp.

motor vehicle insurance, in violation of HRS § 431:10C-104
1997) (offense two). In his application, Spillner asserts that
the district court erred: (1) in denying his motion to suppress

the fruits of the March 1, 2005 traffic stop, during which
 

+4 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Honolulu Police Department Officer Arthur Takamiya cited Spillner
for offenses one and two; and (2) in convicting him on the basis
of illegally obtained evidence. on August 21, 2007, this court
granted Spiliner's application and, on October 31, 2007, we heard
oral argument.

For the reasons discussed herein, we conclude that
Spillner's points of error are ultimately meritless and,

therefore, affirm the ICA’s April 24, 2007 judgment on appeal.

1. BACKGROUND

on February 15, 2005, officer Takamiya stopped spiliner
for sporting illegal window tinting on his vehicle and, during
the stop, determined that Spillner had neither a valid driver's
License nor insurance for his vehicle. Officer Takamiya stopped
spillner’s vehicle again, @ week later, upon observing that the
illegal tinting had not been removed. At the time of the second
stop, Spillner’s girlfriend was driving the vehicle, which,
officer Takamiya determined, was still uninsured. Then, on
March 1, 2005, Officer Takamiya once again stopped Spiliner,
driving the same vehicle, and cited him for offenses one and two.
A, Spiliner's Pretrial Motion To Suppress And The Trial

On August 15, 2005, Spillner filed a motion to suppress
“evidence obtained from warrantless . . . seizures of [Spillner]
and/or (his) property,” which the district court consolidated
with its bench trial. Spillner asserted that:

2 LL! (nine justitication for the search and seizure

donaicted by’ tt {Olétcer: [Hukaniyal mac besed ca
Pelor contact with {spilines)

ves (O)fficer [Take
ispiiiner) naa obtair

 

 

2
‘+4 POR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
inaurance{) subsequent to the prior contact .

©.” the interrogation effectuated upon [Spillner]
Const itute(d) s seizure.

2. The stop snd seizure of (Spillner)’s person and
property was not supported by. . . @ reasonable suspicion
Based on specific articulable facts that any criminal
activity was afoot.

 

‘The charges against [Spillner] constitute fruits
of the Unlawful stop and seizure:

 

 

1 Smut form the untawful invasion, the evidence
« tod1d not Aave been ebtained,

(Citing U.S. Const. amends. IV (prohibiting “unreasonable
searches and seizures”), XIV (concerning due process); Haw.
Const. art. I, § 7 (prohibiting “unreasonable searches, seizures
and invasions of privacy”); State v, Bolosan, 78 Hawai'i 86, 690
P.2d 673 (1995).)

on November 30, 2005, the district court conducted both
the trial and the hearing on Spillner’s motion to suppress. The
only witness was Officer Takamiya, who testified for the
plaintift-appellee-respondent State of Hawai'i (hereinafter, “the
prosecution”). The prosecution elicited the following testimony

on direct examination:

 

@ —. ... (Were you assigned on foot or in a
Yehicie on March Ist [, 2008]?

A Ina vehicte

@ And what brought your attention to
[Spiliner} «

«(ola that very day?

A" Tsaw. . . [his] vehicle making a right

@  " And what brought your attention to (him?) 1
Know you saw the vehicle, but what mage it stand
oot?

a [0]ne to two weeks pricr to this day, 1

cited Spillner in the exact same vehicle
for having illegal front tints and no driver's
License and no insurance.
‘#4 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST! § HAA'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +44

° jacqlt]ou were able to recognize the
Geienaant?

A Yes.

@ He was fresh on your mind?

A Yes.

@ — And'dia you recognize the cari] of... the
person?

cee elotn.

Actually, 1 recognized the car first and then T

could see through the front windshield because

the tints were removed, .. - and I could see
© Spitiner driving,

 

 

 

 

@ And you' recognized his face?

A Yes.

@ Upon making this observation, what were
you thinking?

A Thats. "Sptiuner was driving without =
Licende and no insurance.

@ And what made you... think that?

A Because Ticited him one £0 tuo heeks prior()

_ = (flor driving without [2] license

and |. without insurance and also the
Mtegai | Einced windsnseld.

© 50, upon making these observations, what was
your next move?

A” E rocated him between a quarter mile to half @
nile up the street ss

@ And he...

x ¢ pultes over.

@ TAlnd once you stopped, who did you see
behind the wheel?

a SEN spiliner:

QS. . Was he atone in the vehicle’

A ies.

@ — And'did you ask him for nis... License?

A Tid knowing that he didn’t have one, but 7
still asked him for one

@ And what was hie response?

AO s3id he dosen't have one.

. . . « [{Objection to speculation overruled.)

Q "1. \"[pjia [spiziner] make any evatenonts at
Enis’ point?

A wot that I recali.

Q °°). (oria you ask for nis proof of insurance?

A ie

@ Was he able to provide that... 7

A foe

© What waa Ale response?
 

‘10+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
* snacehy Told’ ne that he didn't have any"

(Some ellipses added and one in original.) At this point,
Spillner essentially requested that the court strike Officer
‘Takamiya’'s response in accordance with Spillner’s motion to
suppress. The court indicated that it “w(ould] take (Spillner’s]
objection under advisement.” Spillner’s counsel then cross-
examined Officer Takamiya as follows:

° [Jou aid not observe any outward signs of

any traffic violations, isn't that true?
That's troe

 

nd he pulled over without incident?

©: >0->

ind you pulled him over... on the assumption
that Re hed no driver's igense and was noe
Sneurea?

ve

 

low, fron [your earlier traffic stop of

Spiiiner] to Maen Ist, 2005, you don’t het

Firstshand knowledge whether or not he obtained

2 License in those two weeks, isn't that true?

@ You don’t have any first-hand knowledge whether
oF not he obtained insurance... in those t™o
Weeks, {anrt that true?

A That's true

o>

 

Y

‘You just assumed based on your prior encounter
itn him Ghat he wasn’t inured’ and ne hed no
Seense?

1. . As far as the driver's license, that’s an

Assumption. As far as the insurance, T stopped

his girlfriend driving thet seme truck one week

prior without insurance with the same tinted
front windshield.

@ Gut between the tine thet you stopped and
Gited his girlfriend and when you stopped and
cited him on Mach Ist, you don’t have any
first-hand knowledge whether or not the vehicle
was insured in that one week's tine?

A That's correct.

 

 
 

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The district court also received into evidence, over
Spillner’s objection, what purported to be a self-authenticating
record from the City and County of Honolulu’s Division of Motor

Vehicle, Licensing and Permits denonstrating that Spillner did
not have a license on March 1, 2005. Without express reasoning,
the district court denied Spiliner’s motions to suppress and for
judgment of acquittal. As memorialized in its January 4, 2006
judgments, the district court found Spillner guilty as charged
1 330 hours of

 

and sentenced him to a total of $149.00 in fe
community service, and a one-year suspension of driving
privileges.
5. qd a 1
on January 20, 2006, Spiliner filed a timely notice of

appeal. On direct appeal, he reiterated, inter alia, his
position that his “stop and seizure . . . was not supported by

: a reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable
facts . . . that any criminal activity was afoot. The
interrogation was therefore without . . . justification. The
evidence obtained . . . and the resulting charges constitute
“fruits of the poisonous tree./” (Citing State v. Poaipuni, 98
Hawai'i 387, 392, 49 P.3d 353, 358 (2002).) Specifically,
Spiliner argued that, inasmuch as Officer Takamiya, by his own
admission, witnessed no violation in progress, he stopped
Spillner’s vehicle solely on the “assumption that Spillner had no
driver's license and that the vehicle was not insured,” based in
turn on the traffic stop that had occurred two weeks earlier.

(Emphasis omitted.) (Citing United States v. Sandoval, 829 F.
‘t+# FOR PUBLICATION IM WEST'S HAWAI'E REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
Supp. 355, 360 (D. Utah 1993) (mem.), gev'd, 29 F.3d 937, 538
(20th Cir. 1994); Robinson v, State, 388 So. 2d 286, 290 (Fla
Dist. Ct. App. 1980).) Spillner attempted to distinguish State
vi Kaleohano, 99 Hawai'i 370, 86 P.3d 138 (2002), by noting that,
in contrast to the police officer in Kaleohano, whose “prior

knowledge of the motorist’s criminal history . . . ‘heightened’

 

|... initial suspicions,” Officer Takamiya had no “*specific
articulable facts indicating the probability of current criminal
activity’”
(Quoting Kalechano, 99 Hawai’
anything, Spiliner maintained, it would have been “more

 

ide from the prior violations. (Bnphasis omitted.)
at 380, 56 P.3d at 148.) If

 

reasonable” for officer Takamiya to assume from Spillner’s having
removed the illegal tinting by the time of the instant stop that
he had obtained insurance and @ license in the interim as well.
In its answering brief, the prosecution simply
countered that officer Takamlya’s “observ[ing Spillner]" driving
a motor vehicle “one to two weeks after” their earlier encounter
was a “specific and articulable fact(]” that would give rise to a
reasonable suspicion. (Citing State v. Bohannon, 102 Hawai'i
228, 237, 74 P.34 980, 989 (2003).) The prosecution added that
none of the cases cited by Spillner “involve an ‘ongoing’
offense, . . . a past citation for [which] may provide a basis
for reasonable suspicion because there is an assumption . .
that the condition that le{]d to the prior citation may very well
still exist, absent any concrete information to contradict that
ssumption.” (Quoting State v, Decoteau, 681 N.W.2d 603, 806

(W.D. 2004) (“When an officer observes a person driving a
   

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
vehicle, and the driver's license was suspended when the officer
stopped him one week earlier, it is far from a ‘mere hunch’ to
suspect the driver's license is still under suspension.”).)
(Citing United States v, Hope, 904 F.2d 254 (7th Cir. 1990).)

In his reply brief, Spillner attempted to distinguish
Decoteay on the basis that the driving privileges of the
defendant in that case presumably would have been suspended for a
Gefinitive period of time, such that observing the defendant
driving within that period of revocation (assuming the officer

knew the duration of such period) would create a r

 

sonable
suspicion in and of itself, whereas officer Takamiya had no
reason to believe that Spillner had not applied for and received
2 license during the intervening two weeks and obtained insurance
during the intervening one week.

In its 800, the ICA decided that Officer Takamiya “had
‘reasonable suspicion that [Spillner] was engaged in criminal
conduct,’ ICA's S00 at 1 (quoting State v. Eleneki, 106 Hawai's
177, 160, 102 P.34 1075, 1078 (2004)}, and, therefore, affirmed
the district court's denial of Spiliner’s motion to suppress, the
judgment, and the sentence imposed, id. at 1-:
c. Lication Fo: to on: or

 

On July 20, 2007, Spiliner filed an application for a
weit of certiorari, which this court granted on August 21, 2007.
On October 31, 2007, we conducted oral argument on the issue of
whether Officer Takamiya’s brief detention of Spillner violated

Spillner’s constitutional protections against unreasonable

 

arches and seizures, as guaranteed by the fourth amendnent to
 

{FOR PUBLICATION IN WESE'S HAKAS'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *+*
the United States Constitution! and article I, section 7 of the
Hawai'i Constitution.*

At oral argument, Spillner essentially contended that
independent reasonable suspicion warranting a brief detention
could never exist for the crimes of driving without a license or
insurance. Rather, he argued that the criminal activity could
only be discovered as an incident of an independent traffic

violation observed by an officer, which would

 

independent justification for stopping the vehicle. He also

 

maintained that, regardless of how often an officer had stopped
an individual for driving without insurance, the officer would
never have independent grounds for reasonable suspicion to
conduct a brief investigatory stop in order to ascertain the
state of the vehicle's insurance, even if the stop were proximate
in time to multiple previous violations.

‘The prosecution emphasized that reasonable suspicion,
while more than a mere hunch, does not rise to the level of
probable cause. It conceded that it was possible for Spillner to
have corrected both his unlicensed condition and to have obtained
insurance on his vehicle, but maintained that that did not

preclude the officer from being reasonably suspicious that

 

1 The fourth amendnent to the United States Constitution provides in

relevant part that “[e]he right of the people to be secure in their person,
houses. pepers, and effecte, against unreasonable searches end seizures, shell
hot be violated vs +.”

 

 

2 the wording of article I, section 7 of the Hawai'i Constitution is

virtually identical to its federal counterpsrt, providing in relevant pert
That S{elhe right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
Sha effects ageinst unreasonable searches, seizures and invasions of privacy
shail not be violated ”

8
 

[FOR ZUBLICATION I WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++
Spillner was engaged in an ongoing violation when the officer
observed him operating his vehicle, particularly in light of the
fact that the second stop of the vehicle, a week after the
initial encounter, revealed that Spiliner had not, in the

interim, obtained insurance.

TT. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress
guidence is reviewed de novo to determine whether the
ruling was “right” or “wrong.” State w. Eiwsrae, 36
Hawai'i 226, 231, 30 P.3d 238, 245 {200T] ity

al jenking, 93 wawai'i 7, 100, 997 Poza 13, 26
(20007) the proponent of the motion to suppress ha
the burden of establishing, by # preponderance of the
evidence, that the statements or items sought to be
excluded vere unlawfully secured and that fis oF her
Fight to be free from unreasonable searches ox
seizures vas violated under the fourth amendment to

the United States Constitution and article 1

section 7 of the Hawaii Constitution e
Hilacn, 92°Hawai's 43, 40, 907 P.20 268, Fi TeSSoT
(citations onittes)

 

   

 

Kaleohano, 99 Hawai'i at 375, 56 P.3d at 143,
TIT. Discussion
Sipports “the coated Secures on acticulated Pay ae nee,

Sufficient To Justify A Brief, Investigatory Stop,

There is no dispute that a traffic stop is a form of
seizure for constitutional purposes. See, eax, Bohannon, 102
Fawas's at 237, 74 P.3d at 989 (citing Bolosan, 78 Hawai‘i at 92,
890 P.2¢ at 678). That being the case, the fruits of such a
traffic stop are illegally obtained and subject to suppression on
the defendant's motion unless

tthe police officer (can) point to

specific and areiculable caste

which, taken together with rational
Anferences from those facts,

10
‘see POR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

reasonably warrant that intrusion,”

we Ohios = 392 O-8-( Tei
FT TSe) 1. The vicimate test in
These situations must be whether
Elon’ these facts, measured by an
Objective standard, 2 (person) of
Feasonable caution would be
Warranted in Believing that criminal
Sctivity was afoot and that the
ction taken was appropriate
‘Legare x basneg, 158 Haw. (333.)
He Soe P23 (2207,) 32
(citations emitted)

 

 

Shake v. Powell, 61 Haw. 316, 321-22, 603
PEGs Teta 1979)

78 Nawai's at 92, 890 P.24 at 679) (sone
Brackets added and sone ofiitted)

Bohannon, 102 Hawai'i at 237, 74 P.3d at 989; see also State ve
Kearns, 75 Haw. $58, 569, 867 P.2d 903, 908 (1994) ("(T]he police
may temporarily detain an individual if they have a reasonable
suspicion based on specific and articulable facts that criminal
activity is afoot.” (Citing State v. Melear, 63 Haw. 488, 493,
630 P.2d 619, 624 (1981).)). In analyzing whether reasonable
suspicion supported a stop, this court considers the totality of
the circumstances. See, e.a., State v. Prendergast, 103 Hawai't
451, 454, 83 P.3d 714, 717 (2004); Bohannon, 102 Hawai'i at 238,
14 P.3d at 990.

The United States Supreme Court recently, in

considering the reasonableness of drug-interdiction traffic

 

stops, expounded on the “reasonable officer” standard employed

when weighing the totality of the circumstances:

men discussing how reviewing courts should make
reasonsble-suspicion determinations, we have said
Tepeatedly that they must look at the “totality of the
Elgcunstances” of each case eo see whether the
Getaining officer has # "perticularized and objective
is" for suspecting legal wrongdoing. “Ses, @.au,
inited States v. Cortes, 449 0-8. 11,) 417-(11e

 

  

an
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAWAI'I REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +4

 

((1981)1. this process allows officers to draw on
their own experience and specialized training to make
inferences fron and deductions abovt the comiative
information available to them that "might elude an
untrained person.” ail) at 418- See also Ornelas v
S517 U.S. 690, 699" (1996) "(reviewing
Gourt must give "due weight” to factual inferences
drawn by resident judges and local law enforcenent
gfficers). “Although an officer's reliance one mere
“shunch’ "is insufficient to justify a stop, Zexry.
«1, {292 0,5. Jat 27, the Likelinged of ceimiaet
activity need not rise’ to the level of probable cause,
‘and it falls considerably short of satisfying »
Preponderance of the evidence standard, [United St

wal Sokolew, (490 UsS. 117 (19630)
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273-74 (2002) (Some
internal citations omitted.) Moreover, the Arvizu Court
“recognized that the concept of reasonable suspicion is somewhat
abstract,” id. at 274, and that “[a] determination that
reasonable suspicion exists . . . need not rule out the
Possibility of innocent conduct,” id. at 277,

Spillner, neverthele:

 

}, interprets the “objective
standard” to mean that the theoretical reasonable observer may
not consider the knowledge of any prior contacts in forming
reasonable suspicion. In other words, Spillner urges that,
absent an overt, immediate predicate justification for the
traffic stop, such as an illegal maneuver by the driver, the fact
that the driver was inadequately credentialed a week or two prior
to the instant stop does not justify a stop today. we disagree.
Be % 1 ects,”

i Le rT

Activity.

The myriad decisions regarding reasonable suspicion

‘Criminal

decided by courts across the nation -- all grounded in a fact-

intensive, case-by-case approach -- turn on a careful balance

12
‘see oR PUBLICATION I WEST'S IANAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
between the importance of the state interests implicated and the
protections afforded citizens against unreasonable interference
with their persons and their effects. As the United States
Suprene Court articulated in Delaware v. Brouse, 440 U.S. 648
(1979), one of the landmark decisions concerning the standard for
reasonable grounds for effecting traffic stops,

(e)he essential purpose of the proscriptions in the
fourth Amendment is to impose a standard of
Efeasonableness™ upon the exercise of discretion by
Government officials, including law enforcenent
Sgentsy in order "'to safeguard the privacy a
Security of individuals against arbitrary Invasions

: % : 436 0.5. 207,
5a2 (uve), quoting Camara v. Munscinal Court, 267)
0:8. 523, 528 (196))- Thus, the permissiDility of 8
particular law enforcenent practice is sudged by
Balancing its sntrusion on the individual's Fourth

ndnent interests against its pronotion of
[egitinate governmental interests.

 

 

 

 

   

Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654-55 (footnotes and some internal citations
omitted); see also Kalechano, 99 Hawai'i at 379, $6 P.3d at 147

(“determining whether a seizure pursuant to a temporary

 

Investigative stop is constitutional also involves @ ‘weighing of
the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the
degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the
severity of the interference with individual 1iberty.’" (Quoting
Broun v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979).))-

The Prouse Court held that effecting a traffic stop
upon a vehicle, absent any observed violations of the traffic or
vehicle codes, solely to check on the validity of the driver's
License and insurance, amounted to an unreasonable seizure in
violation of the fourth amendnent to the United States
constitution. 440 U.S. at 663. The State of Delaware had argued
that the police officer’s random stop was justified by the

13
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state’s interest in promoting safe highways, but the Court
responded that “[t]he question remains . . . whether in the
service of these important ends the discretionary spot check is a
sufficiently productive mechanism to justify the intrusion upon
Fourth Amendment interests which such stops entail,” id. at 660.
The Court required “at least articulable and reasonable suspicion
that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not
registered,” id., because unprompted checks of randomly selected

d drivers or

 

vehicles was not likely to yield more unlicen
unregistered vehicles than would requiring police officers to
articulate a specific rationale supporting reasonable suspicion
that a particular driver was operating an unregistered vehicle or
driving without a license. Id, at 660-61. Weighing the
intrusion into constitutionally protected areas affected by the
stops against the lack of evidence that such stops advanced the
interests of highway safety, the Court concluded that “(t]he
marginal contribution to roadway safety possibly resulting from a
system of spot checks cannot justify subjecting every occupant of
every vehicle on the roads to a seizure . . . at the unbridled
discretion of law enforcement officials.” Id. at 661.

The danger of “the unbridled discretion of law
enforcenent officials,” id., also prohibits law enforcenent from
basing @ stop solely on an officer's knowledge of a particular
citizen's criminal background:

[Knowledge of a person's prior crininel involvement

Snsottlofent ts give rise to the equlssee ceasonable

Stspicions” thee is the diect tnruse of sur epinion

in x as ries 1i0s,

1107-08" (ioth. cir. i988); - =. and we have found no
case elsennere that even Suggests the contrary

 

 

 

a
 

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If the low were otherwise, any person with any
sort of crininal record ~~ or even worse, a person
with arzests bot no convictions =~ could be subjected
Tove fecry-type investigative stop by a Law
enforcesent officer at any time without the need for
any other justification at all. Any such rule would
eilarly ron counter to the requirement of & zeasonable
Suspicion, and of the need that such stops be
Justified’ in Light of a balancing of the competing
Interests at steke (United States v Place, 462 U.S.
G56, 703... (1983)

 

 

 

We must balance the nature and
quality of the intrusion on the
Sndividuel’s Fourth Anendrent interests
against the importance of the governmental
interests alleges ro justify th

[ntrosion. When the nature and extent of
the Setention are minimally intrusive of
the individual’s Fourth Anendment
Interests, the opposing law enforcement
Interests can support a seizure based on
Tess than probable cause,

Sandoval, 29 F.3d at 842-43 (emphasis in original), quoted in
United States v. Laughrin, 438 F.3d 1245, 1247 (10th Cir. 2006)

("*[K}nowledge of a person’s prior criminal involvement . . . is

 

 

 

alone insufficient to give rise to the requisite reasonable
suspicion,’” because “{u]nder the Fourth Amendment our society
does not allow police officers to ‘round up the usual
suspects’"); see also Robinson, 388 So. 2d at 290 (vacating the
denial of the defendant's motion to suppress and remanding for
discharge of the defendant where the court concluded that the
police officer on airport patrol effected the stop of the
defendant based solely on the officer’s personal knowledge of the
defendant’s criminal past). While this court has not fully

articulated its view of the proper role that a defendant’s

 

criminal record plays in formulating reasonable suspicion ~
assuming, given the fact-intensive nature of the inguiry, that

such an articulation is even possible -- it has favorably quoted

158
 

‘+4 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

the language from Sandoval and has “rejected the notion that a

person's prior reputation . . . , standing alone, was sufficient
to establish probable cause for an arrest and [has concluded

that], at best, [it] was entitled to only minimal weight when
combined with other elements.” Kaleohano, 99 Hawai'i at 377, 36
P.3d at 145 (quoting State v. Kanda, 63 Haw. 36, 48, 620 P.2d
2072, 1080 (1980) (emphasis added) ).?

Nevertheless, we mist be careful to distinguish (1) an
officer's improper reliance, in forming reasonable suspicion, on
# defendant's past law violations that have come to an end from
(2) an officer's reliance on knowledge of a suspected ongoing law

violation engaged in by the individual in questio:

 

the former,
Af relied upon alone to justify the stop, represents 2 violation
of @ citizen's reasonable expectation to be left alone and our
society's abhorrence of police practices that “round up the
voual suspects,’” Laughrin, 438 F.3d at 1247, while the latter,
if properly informed by the facts, represents good police work.
Indeed,

la] 1though we nave already enphasized chat a person's
prior history of drug arreata is. insufficient to
establish probable cause, svareness of past arrests
fay, when combined with other specific articulable
facts indicating the probability of current criminal
activity, factor into’ determination that reasonable
Suspicion, sufficient to warrant a temporery
investigate stop, exists.

Ealicians, 45 F-41070, 107e eh cle S857
emphasizing that ~[k]aowledge of . . . recent
relevant criminal conduct, while of doubt fol

 

 

2 _Tt Ls equally genecally uncontroverted that an unreasonable stop,
even if temporary, is one in which “the officer purposefully embarked on whet
\was legally nothing more than’a fishing expedition, apparently “win the hope
Ehat something might turn up.""" Sandoval, 29 F.3d’ at Sed. (quoting United

wt 18 F636 874, 878 (0th Che. 1994) (quoting Brome
Llinois, 4220-8. $90, 605 (1975)))

16

 

 

 
‘#8 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ++

szidentiary value in view of the strictures against
Proving quit by association or by a predisposition
Based on past criminal acts, is a permissible
component of the articulable suspicion required for a
erty stop.” (Emphasis in the original.)

 

Kalechano, 99 Hawai'i at 380, 56 P.3d at 148. We have also noted
that
[njeitner the fourth asendsent nor the Hawas's
Constitution
Fequire @ policeman who lacks the precise
Level of information necessary for
probable cause to arrest to simply shrug
his shoulders and allow 2 erine to occur
or a criminal £0 escape. On the contrary,
Terty recognizes that it aay be the
essence of good police work to agopt an
intermediate responst

Ad. (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145 (1972)); see
also Deboy v. Commonwealth, 214 S.W.3d 926, 928-29 (Ky. Ct. App.
2007) (distinguishing the well-established proposition that a
drivers criminal record alone can never justify an investigatory
stop from the ongoing nature of the offense of driving with a
suspended license, which rendered the officer's suspicion
reasonable based on personal knowledge that the defendant’ s
License had been suspended several months before) (citing
Decoteau, 681 N.W.2d at 606). In sum, articulated facts that

indicate that an offense is ongoing in nature support reasonable

 

suspicion that criminal activity continues to be afoot and,
therefore, help justify a brief investigatory stop to confirm or
Gispel those suspicions.

Spillner challenges this conclusion as applied to the
instant matter. He contends that, regardless of how close in
time prior criminal activity is with current activity of a

similar nature, the prior activity cannot be a factor in the

uv
‘464 FOR PUBLICATION TW WEST'S HAWAY'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +4
analysis of reasonable suspicion and that an officer's prior
knowledge of past violations, standing alone, can never, as a
matter of law, authorize a traffic stop predicated solely upon
the officer's suspicion that a driver is committing the offenses
of driving without a License or driving without adequate
insurance.

‘This absolutist proposition is demonstrably flawed.
Let us posit that, late one evening, an officer effects a valid
traffic stop of a vehicle after witnessing an uncontested
violation of the traffic or vehicle safety codes and, incidental
to that valid stop, the officer discovers that the driver is not
merely without his or her license but is, in fact, unlicensed to

drive in the jurisdiction. Upon encountering the same individual

 

later the same evening, once again driving -- at a time during
which the license-issuing authority has not yet reopened -~ the
officer would have more than reasonable suspicion to effect a
second brief traffic stop of the driver to investigate whether he
or she is driving without a license. Reasonable suspicion can,
therefore, be established that the defendant has fixedly refused
to cease prior criminal behavior, personally observed by the
officer, absent other observed violations of the traffic or
safety codes.

Even in light of @ more protracted interval, however,
during which the individual could have corrected the former
criminal behavior, a police officer may nevertheless have
reasonable suspicion that the person has, in fact, failed to

anend his or her behavior. To extend the hypothetical, if the

18
04 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *#*
second encounter occurs after the licensing authority has
reopened, it would then be conceivable for the defendant to have
renewed his or her license in the interim -- the realistic
Likelihood of the defendant doing so increasing with the passage
of time -- but, depending on the particular facts informing the
officer's decision, reasonable suspicion could still warrant
effecting a traffic stop of the driver, despite the possibility
of innocence, because “(a] determination that reasonable
suspicion exists . . . need not rule out the possibility of
innocent conduct,” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277; see also United
States v. Cortez-Galaviz, 495 F.3d 1203, 1208 (10th Cir. 2007)
("Reasonable suspicion requires 2 dose of reasonableness and
simply does not require an officer to rule out every possible
lawful explanation for suspicious circumstances before effecting
a brief stop to investigate further.) (concluding that reliance
on twenty-day old information that the driver did not have
Angurance did not render the investigatory stop unreasonable);
Decoteau, 681 N.W.2d at 806 (explaining that “[t)he reasonable
suspicion standard does not require an officer to rule out every
possible innocent excuse . . . before stopping a vehicle for
investigation,” and, insofar as “{p]robabilities, not hard
certainties, are used in determining reasonable suspicion,”
concluding that “(t]he officer’s suspicion is not rendered
unreasonable merely because the driver’s license may have been

reinstated in the intervening week”).

a9
‘+8 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAKAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *+*

c.
vity, Timeliness Of Inf aL
Present Matter Was Relatively Short, An
Insurance Violations, The Stop Was Sui
‘Suspicion.
1, Timeliness of the information is of less import in
‘engeing violations.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit recently observed that the timeliness -- the “freshness”
or “staleness” -- of the information upon which the officer

relies plays less of a factor in reasonable suspicion analysis if

 

the offense is of an ongoing natur

In situations where the criminal activity is of an
Ongoing nature, it will take longer for the
Geformation to becone stale. Sea United States v.
Gesene, 250 Fe3d e711, ¢80 (6th. CiF- 2007) (Evidence
Of ongoing criminal activity will generally defeat =
Claim of staleness.”) Driving without a valid License

Se'a continuing offense —~ in contrast; fay, £0 a
apeeding of parking violation

United States v, Sandridge, 385 F.3d 1032, 1036 (6th. Cir. 2004)
(emphasis added). The United States Court of Appeals for the

 

 

Tenth Circuit recently concurred:

[ile note at the outset thet timeliness of information
As but one of many factors in the mix when assessing
whether reasonable suspicion for an investigatory,
detention exists, and the relative isportance of
Umeliness in that'mix depends on the nature of the
criminal activity av issue fa., United states
eGanta, 405 F.30° 1273, 1177" {loeh ete. 2008) Tha,
For example, when the legal infraction at issue
typiseily woars on for days of weeks or months (Like,
sey, driving without a license or appropriate
emissions and safety certifications), rather than
Concludes quickly (Like, say, jaywalking oF mugging) ,
the tinelinsss of the information cn which the
Qovernnent relies to eftect an investigative detention
"recedes! in\ Lnportance™ compared te other actors,
‘such as the type and duration of (the) offe

SSoue!” 120s Zee ale united" staces vu tathis, 357

   

 

 

 

 

 

20
 

0 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HANAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +

F.34 1200, 1207 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting that “ongoing
sha continuous activity makes the passage of time Less
Eritical when judging the staleness of information”
(internal quotation omitted) |

 

Corter-Galaviz, 495 F.3d at 1209 (emphasis added). This court

has reached the same conclusion, in the context of

 

certaining
whether probable cause existed to support the issuance of a
search warrant:

Tf there is a reasonable basis in the affidavit for
the conclusion that the criminal activity alleged by
the informer is of continuing, ongoing nature, the
passage of tine between the informer’ s last
Observations of thet activity and the issuance of @
warrant ie Less significant than when no such showing
Te'nade in the attidavie

 

 

State v. Austria, 55 Haw. 565, 570, 524 P.2d 290, 294 (1974)
(concluding that a delay of twenty-one days did not render the

information stale). And, ultimately,

[the] existence (of reasonable suspicion] is assessed
ona case-by-case basis, in Light of ali attengant
Circumstances. When evaluating a claim of staleness,
Sourts do not measure the timeliness of information
Simply by counting the mumber of days that nave
@lepsed.” Rather, a court must assess the nature of
the information, ‘the nature and characteristics of the
Suspected criminal activity, and the likely endurance
of the information.

United State v. Pierre, 484 F.3d 75, 83 (1st. Cir. 2007).
2. Jing offense inti i 4s
of whether suspected criminal activity is still afoot.

Under circumstances in which the freshness of the

 

   

officer’s information, when combined with the nature of the

 

License revocation or suspension, has precluded -- or all but
precluded -- a defendant from obtaining the required credentials,
courts have concluded that the stop was supported by reasonable

suspicion. See, @.a., Stewart v. State, 469 S.£.2d 424, 425 (Ga.

21
YOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ 8 HAWAZ'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +*4

 

Ct. App. 1996) (determining that, where the officer knew that the
defendant had had his license revoked, a traffic stop of the
defendant, upon observing the defendant driving, was supported by
reasonable suspicion); State v, Duesterhoeft, 311 N.w.2d 866, 868
(Minn. 1981) (concluding that, where the shortest suspension
period for a license was thirty days, the officer’s personal
knowledge that the defendant’s license had been suspended one
month prior to the stop was sufficient to establish reasonable
suspicion and “was not the product of whim or caprice or desire
on the part of the officer to harass the defendant”); Decoteau,
681 N.W.2d at 806 (reasoning that a one-week interval between
knowledge of the suspension and the current stop did not render
the information stale nor the stop unreasonable); State v.
Gibson, 665 P.2d 1302, 1304-05 (Utah 1983) (holding that
reasonable suspicion warranted a stop effected fifteen months
after the last encounter with the defendant where the officer
knew that the defendant’s license had been suspended for at least
@ year).

Conversely, where the information relied upon by the
officer was so “stale” that, when considered in light of the
length of the license suspension or the ease in obtaining the
Proper credentials, the logical link between the former illegal
activity and any suspicion of current, ongoing criminal activity
had dissolved with the passage of time, courts have concluded
that investigatory stops were unreasonable. See, 2.0.,
McReynolds v, State, 441 So, 2d 1017, 1017-19 (Ala. Crim. App.
1983) (one year stale); Moody v. State, 842 So. 24 754, 758 (Fla.

22
ies POR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
2003) (noting that “when, as in this case, as many as three years
pass{) without any further information about @ person’s driving
status, and, when, as in this case, that person’s license can be
restored through @ simple administrative process, the staleness
of the officer's information is indeed an important factor,” and
sonable); Bovd v, State, 758 So. 24 1032,
1036 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (reasoning that because eight years

had passed since the officer last knew that the defendant’ s

ruling the stop unr

 

License was suspended and the officer did not know the length of
the suspension, the stop was not supported by reasonable
suspicion); Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 832 A.2d 1123, 1125,
1130-32 & n.9 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (holding that, where the
officer did not know the length of the defendant’s license
suspension and in light of the three-year interval between the
officer's last knowledge of the defendant’s license status and
the present stop, the stop was unreasonable under Pa. Const.

art. 1, $8).

Within these extrenes lies a range where reasonable
suspicion generally resides. We deen Sandridce and Laughrin to
be particularly instructive “bookends” with respect to the period
of tine during which an officer may have reasonable suspicion
that @ driver is engaged in an ongoing offense such as driving

without a Lict

 

 

In both cases, a police officer pulled the defendant
over solely on the basis of the defendant’s prior lack of a valid
license. In Sandridge, the officer had run a license status

check on the driver twenty-two days earlier, 385 F.3¢ at 1034; in

23
+++ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ++
Laughrin, the challenged stop followed the prior contact by
twenty-two weeks, 438 F.3d at 1246. In Sandridge, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the district
court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress, rejecting
the defendant’s argument that “any reasonable suspicion” had
Grown “stale” in light of the passage of twenty-two days. See
385 F.3d at 1036 (internal quotation signals omitted). on the
other hand, the Laughrin court distinguished Sandridge, reasoning
that “[t]wenty-two days is significantly less than 22 weeks,”
such that, in the absence of any particular knowledge on the
officer's part as to “the length of the prior suspension,” Ai:
“information was too stale to justify stopping [the defendant],
based on the five-month interval between the officer's knowledge
of Laughrin’s suspended license and the present stop. see 438
F.3d at 1247-48

3. Qn-the facts in the record, the stop was supported by

xeasonable suspicion
We believe that Sandridge, Laughrin, and other foreign

cases support the district court’s and the ICA’s implicit
conclusion that (1) Officer Takamiya’s one-week-cld knowledge

that Spillner’s truck did not carry valid insurance

 

and that
he had not acted to remedy the insurance violation in the

preceding week-long interval

 

and (2) his two-week-old
knowledge that Spillner was unlicensed were together sufficiently
fresh to give rise to reasonable suspicion to execute the
March 1, 2005 traffic stop. See generally Pierre, 484 F.3d at 84
(reasoning that the fact that (1) the officer had personal
knowledge that the defendant's license had been suspended for the

24
‘+2 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER 1+
entire previous year and (2) the officer had not been informed by
fellow officers that the defendant’s license status had changed
= where such information would be of interest in the on-going
investigation ~~ lent credence to the officers assumption that
the defendant’s license remained suspended and holding,
therefore, that reasonable suspicion justified the stop of
defendant for driving without a valid license five months later);
State v. Wade, 673 So. 2d 906, 907 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) ("a
Little less than two weeks” not stale); State v. Carrs, 568 So.
2d 120, 120-21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (“two days to 2 week”
not stale); Decoteau, 681 N.W.2d at 806 (recognizing reasonable

suspicion despite the possibility that “the driver's license may

have been reinstated in the intervening week”). Indeed, as the
court noted in Cortez-Galaviz,

tthe resolution of particularized and objective yet
Still ambiguous --' potentially Lavful, potentially
Gniawésl ~~ facts is the centFal purpose of an
Investigative detention. See Iilinsta-s. Wardlow, 528
rs, 123, 125 -. (2000) (veven in Tarey, the
Conduct Justifying’ the stop was ambiguous and
Susceptible of an innocent explanation ~~

Fecognized that the officers could detain’ the
ingivigusls to resolve the anbiguity."); Zerzv, 392

rs, at 22 (recognizing "that 2 police officer may in
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner
approach # person for perposes of investageting
Potsibie criminal behavior even though there 18 no
Brobable cause to make an arrest”)

   

 

  

 

 

 

495 F.3d at 1206.

4. Moreover le in light of the
Antexests advanced and the limited nature of the
inerusior

 

Ultimately, as noted supra, we analyze the
reasonableness of a traffic stop by weighing the interests

advanced by enforcing licensing, insurance, and other laws

25
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC RESORTER ++
related to highway safety against the nature and degree of the
intrusion by lew enforcement into motorists’ private lives.

Brouse, 440 U.S. at 654-55; Kaleshano, 99 Hawai'i at 379, 56 P.3d

at 147. there a brief investigatory stop, based on

 

particularized information regarding a specific driver, advances
the important state interest in highway safety, courts have
determined that such stops are not unreasonable intrusions into
the private sphere protected by the fourth amendment. See, s.a,
Gaccs, 568 So. 2d at 121 (applying the Browse analysis, weighing
the state’s interest in highway safety against the nature of the
intrusion, and concluding (1) that, unlike in Prouse, the
interests of highway safety would be advanced in the case before
it where, one week after an officer stopped the defendant for
driving with an expired license, he observed the defendant
@riving again, and (2) that the stop was, therefore, based upon
reasonable suspicion).

Driving is @ privilege, not a right. State v. Davia,
87 Hawai'i 249, 257, 953 P.2d 1347, 1355 (1998) (noting the
legislature's finding to that effect). The state has a
legitimate interest in ensuring the vehicles on its roadways are
properly insured and operated by licensed drivers. Weighing that
against the nature of the intrusion in the present case, where
the facts demonstrate that Officer Takamiya had a reason “to
pluck this needle from the haystack of cars on the road for
investigation,” Cortez-Galaviz, 495 F.3d at 1206 -- a reason that
was likely to advance the state’s interest in highway safety
leads us to conclude the stop was reasonable. Cf. Prouse, 440

 

26
404 POR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'E REPORTS AKD PACIFIC REPORTER

 

U.S. at 663 (holding that where the stop was truly random and had
no underlying rationale that demonstrated stopping the
defendant’s car rather than any other car on the highway would
advance highway safety, the stop vas unreasonable). The facts in
the present matter indicate that Officer Takamiya selected
Spillner neither at random nor based upon Spillner’s previous
criminal history, i.e
suspects, cf. Laughrin, 438 F.3d at 1247; Sandoval, 29 F.3d at
542-43, in order to pursue a general intuition that unauthorized

by rounding up the usual

   

 

driving was in the air, Neither do

 

the record reflect that
Officer Takamiya was engaged in a “fishing expedition,” Sandoval,
29 F.3d at S44, Rather, the facts indicate that Officer Takamiya
reacted to a specific and articulable belief, held particularly
as to Spillner, that Spillner's recent behavior of driving
without 2 license and insurance was ongoing, meaning that he had
not desisted by either refraining from driving or investing the
time and paperwork to obtain the necessary renewals.‘ Cf. State
ws Bonds, 59 Haw. 130, 130-32, 134, 136, 138, 577 P.2d 781,
782-84, 786-87 (1978) (wherein the officer “pulled (the defendant
@river] over for the purpose of ascertaining whether (the driver]
possessed a reconstruction permit as required by . .

ordinance,” but without even a hunch that the driver lacked such

“See Cortaz-Galaviz, 495 F.3d at 1209 (characterizing driving
without a 1Gense as an ongoing offense); Laughrin, 430 F.3d a0 2248 (ove
‘Right be argued that [the o]éficer ..... had reasonable suspicion to stop Hr.
Taughein based not on his griminal history, of driving without a valid
License, but on the ongoing violation of driving without a valid license
a ‘385 Frid at 1036 (*Oriving without a valid License sa ¢
in contrast, say, toa speeding oF parking violation

 

 

     

 

yt
Continiing offense
“Ie

20
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++

 

a permit or was committing any other violation, mandating
suppression of the nunchakus and marijuana found in the car).
Certainly, the fact known personally by Officer Takamiya, that
Spillner had not obtained insurance on his vehicle one week after
being advised that he was required by law to do so, indicated a
cavalier attitude on Spillner’s part toward the law and was
sufficient to justify a brief field detention by Officer Takamiya
to ascertain whether continued criminal activity were afoot. To
conclude otherwise on these facts would be to decide that an
officer in Officer Takamiya’s shoes, when confronted with a
driver who has been stopped repeatedly in recent weeks for
driving without 2 valid License or insurance and who is driving

again, must ignore “*recent relevant criminal conduct,’
Kalechano, 99 Hawai'i at 380, 56 P.3d at 148 (quoting Feliciano,

45 F.3d at 1074), and, instead, “shrug his shoulders and allow a
crime to occur,” ida, at 380, 56 P34 at 148 (quoting Adams, 407

U.S. at 145).

IV. CONCLUSION
In Light of the foregoing reasoning, we affirm the
ICA’s April 24, 2007 judgment on appeals

Brian R. Vincent,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,
for the plaintiff-appellee:
respondent State of Hawai'i

 

Okechukwu Amadi,
Deputy Public’ Defender (DPD) Peat reader
(Deborah L. Kim, DPD,
on the application; Yrone, Lostty tr +
Lila C.A. King, DPD, *
on the briefs), for the
defendant-appellant-
petitioner Michael Spillner

28