Title: State v. Fetelee. Concurring Opinion by J. Nakayama [pdf]. ICA Opinion, filed 04/18/2007 [pdf], 114 Haw. 151. S.Ct. Order Accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, Designating Case for Oral Argument, and Ordering of Supplemental Briefing, filed 08/29/2007 [pdf], 115 Haw. 200.

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

 

--+ 000

 

STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,
FAA P. FETELEE, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.

 

No. 27482

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CR. NO. 03-31-1374)

 

SANUARY 31, 2008

  

FE
&
c

MOON, C.J. LEVINSON, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JO=5/3
NAKAYAMA, J., CONCURRING SEPARATELY a

210180 Le wyr aayg

 

OPINION OF THE COURT BY MOON, C.J.

on August 29, 2007, this court accepted a timely

application for a writ of certiorari, filed by
P. Fetelee on July 17, 2007,

 

pet itioner/defendant-appellant F:
requesting that thie court review the May 17, 2007 judgment of
(cA), entered pursuant to its

the Intermediate Court of Appeals
April 18, 2007 published opinion in State v. Fetelee, 114 Hawai‘{
151, 157 P.3d 590 (App. 2007). Therein, the ICA affirmed the

 
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Circuit Court of the First Circuit’s! August 3, 2005 judgment of
conviction and sentence. Following a jury trial, Fetelee was
convicted of: (1) attempted murder in the second degree, in
violation of Hawai'i Revised statutes (HRS) §§ 705-500 (2893),
707-702.5 (2983), and 706-656 (1993 & Supp. 2006); (2) attempted
assault in the second degree, in violation of HRS §§ 705-500,
707-712(2) (a) (2993); and (3) theft in the fourth degree, in
violation of HRS § 708-833 (1993).

Briefly stated, during the early morning hours of June
8, 2003, Fetelee becane involved in three incidents that occurred
in and around his apartment building located near the Waimalu
Zippy'’s restaurant in ‘Aiea, Hawai'i. The first incident in the
chain of events occurred in one of the apartments in the
building, but did not result in any charges against Fetelee
(hereinafter, the apartment incident]. The second incident
occurred in the parking lot of Fetelee’s apartment building where
Fetelee came upon a wonan from whom he stole ten dollars and was
charged with theft. The third incident involved Fetelee’s

confrontation of two Micronesian men who were walking down the

 

street fronting Fetelee’s apartment building. As a result,
Fetelee was charged with attempted murder for repeatedly stabbing

one of the males and with assault for punching and kicking

 

unconscious the other male. One of the focal points of this case

 

‘The Honorable Michael D, wilson presided over the underlying trial
and sentencing proceedings:

 
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involves the admission of the events that occurred during the
apartment incident as part of the res gestae’ of the charged
offenses

In hie application, Fetelee essentially contends that
the ICA committed grave error in acknowledging the common law res
gestae doctrine as an exception as to Hawai'i Rules of Evidence
(ERE) Rule 404(b) (Supp. 2006) (governing evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts), quoted infra, to allow otherwise
inadmiseible evidence, i,e,, the apartment incident, into the
record. specifically, Fetelee argues that the ICA erred in
holding that: (1) the apartment incident was part of the res
geatae of the charged offenses; (2) the apartment incident was

admissible

 

8 reg geatae exception to HRE Rule 404(b); (3) the

trial court did not abu

 

ite discretion in allowing

 

respondent /plaintif£-appellee State of Hawai'i (the prosecution)
to reopen its case-in-chief to adduce evidence of the apartment
incident; and (4) the trial court’s failure to give a limiting

instruction prior to admitting testimony regarding the apartment
incident did not constitute error. Oral argunent before the

supreme court was held on December 6, 2007.

‘As discussed more fully infra, we adopt the view that

 

the use of “zee gestae" as an independent basis for the admission

* me term xen gestae is defined as (t]he evente at is
events contenporaneous with then.” Black's Law Dictionary 33:
2008)

  

sue, or other
(ech ea.

 

 

 
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of evidence should be abandoned in the wake of Hawaii‘s well-
developed and long-standing rules of evidence. In light of our
pronouncement today, we are compelled to vacate the ICA’s May 17,
2007 judgment on appeal and the trial court’s August 3, 2005
judgment of conviction and sentence, and remand the case to the
trial court for a new trial consistent with this opinion.
1. BACKGROUND

A. Bactual Backsround

As previously stated, Fetelee became involved in a
series of events during the early morning hours of June 8, 2003.
‘The facts surrounding each of these events as related by the ICA
in its opinion are essentially unchallenged; thus, the background
information is gleaned therefrom. Moreover, inasmuch as the
issues raised by Fetelee in his application center around the res
gestae evidence and the reopening of the prosecution's case-in-

chief, the recounting of the ti

 

stimony of the relevant witnesses
has been similarly limited in scope for such purposes.

Angela Lopez, who lived in the sane apartment building
as Fetelee, testified that,

prior to Sune 8, 2003, Fetelee had visited her apartment to
Pale to her sister. On the night of dune 7 into the early
oraing hours of June 6, 2003, Lopez was in the living room
Of her apartment with her friends, Tony, Eadie Freeman
(Freenen), and Josh. Fetelee knocked ca Lopez's door and
opened the door before she got to it Fetelee initially

asked Loper whether she could get him any drugs. Lopez
fecalled that Fetelee was intoxicated and had an “angry kind
Gf voice.” "She testsfied that Petelee was saying “wnat
‘mat to ‘Tony, her sister's boyfriend, like he was vin a way
Calling out" Tony. ‘"Fetelee came into her sparteent, picked
Sp a fan, and threw it straight up at the ceiling

Petelee's throwing of the fan caused the fan to Becone

 

   

 
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unplugged from the wall, which, in turn, caused the Lights
Ye'the apartment to’ go out. Lopes testifies that Feteiee
then svent after" Freesan and, even though it was “kind of
Gark," it looked Like Fetelee punched Freeman. she
testified thati,] after Fetelee attacked Freeman, Freeman
and Josh ran out the back door, Fetelee chased Tony out of
the sparteent to the neighbor's apartment upstairs. Lopes
stated thet Petelee returned later, apologized, and then
Tete’

Fetelee, 114 Hawai'i at 153, 157 P.3d at 592. When asked whether

 

Fetelee appeared “calm” when he returned to apologize, Lopez
responded in the affirmative. Lopez further indicated that she

was unsure as to how much tine had passed between the apartment

 

incident and Fetelee’s apology; she testified, however, that “it

was like maybe ten minutes, less than ten -- it was -- it was

very short period of time.”
‘As will be explained more fully infxa regarding the
circumstances of his testimony, Freeman testified that,

in the early morning hours of June 8, 2003, he vas in
Lopes's apartment. Fetelee cane to the door of the
apartment and nicely asked Lope: if someone could move the
Ven that was blocking Ais parking space. Lope: went
Upseairs, talked to the people upstairs, and came back in
the aparteent. ‘The people upstairs did not move the van,
and Petelee cane back, pounded on Lopes's apartment docr,
and then entered the apartment. Fetelee was becoring angry
Because he had to go somewhere. Lopez started yelling at
Peteles for poundiag on the door, and then Fetelee began
yelling at everyone, Preenan cbserved that Fetelee was
Grunk and “just kind of mad. Fetelee was standing right
ext to Freeman when Fetelee threw the fan and the
Clectricity went off. When the lights went out, Freeman
fenained seated. Proenan testifies that he then felt
Something that he thought wae a fist hit him on the right
Side of his jaw area. Preenan identified Fetelee as the
perton who hit him. Preenan ran out of the apartment and
Fetrested co a gas station doen the street, where he talked
to one of hie friends fora few minutes. hen Freenan
Ferurned to the apartnent, he noticed the police and the
anbulance.  Preenan estimated that roughly ten minutes had

japeed between the tine Fetelee hit him and the tine he
Feturned to the apartment.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Ide at 154, 157 P.3d at 593.

 
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After leaving the apartment building, Fetelee came upon

Kuulei Lincoln in the parking lot area of the apartment building.
In describing that encounter, Lincoln testified that,

din the early morning hours of June $, 2003, she was walking
to Lopes's apartment when she et Fetelee in the driveway in
front of the apartnent Building where Petelee’s and Lopez's
Aparteents were located. she stated that (,] fron his body
motions and the way he called to her, Fetelee "locked
angry.* Petelee asked Lincoln if she had a cigarette and
any woney. Lincola anewered "no" as to the money. AS
Tincoin pulled out her cigarette pack, @ ten dollar Bill
Came cut, and Fetelee graibed the bili. Lincoln testified
Ehat she eid not ek for the money back because she did not,
want to create « hassle,

Lincoln testifies that(,] as she and Fetelee were
talking, two Micronesian boys’ ((later identified ae Michael
Hartnan’ and his cousin, Kenver Alik)] walked by then.
Lincoln testified chat Fetelee was still angry and began
yelling st the boys, "what, you think you guys tough?” The
tio boys dia not gay anything -- they Just shook their heads
Sno. Fetelee thea hit (areman] twice in the face, and
[dartman) fell fo the ground. [Alix] was trying to’ help
Iareman] out of the middle of the road when Ferelee nit
[alikl with his hand,” Fetelee Fan upstairs to his spartment
and returned with a fanny pack. Fetelee pulled a knife fron
hie fanny pack and stabbed’ (alik] . Fetelee proceeded to
Tifle through the backpack of one of the Micronesians.
Eincoin testified that at no tine aid she observe the two
Hicronseisn boys say or do anything to make Fetelee angry.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Id, at 155, 157 P.3d at 594. According to Alik,’ he and Hartman
had taken the bus to ‘Aiea from McKinley Car Wash, where they
worked, arriving at around 1:30 to 2:30 a.m. on June 8, 2003.

As the two men walked from the bus stop, Alik noticed two
people, Fetelee anda vonan, in the parking lot near
Pevelee' aparteent Building

Alik testified that he was walking ahead of Hartman.
He heard Petelee say "You're « tough guy," andl.) when Alix
Yooked back, he sav Fetelee hit Hartman and Hartman fall to
the ground. After Hartman vas on the ground, Fetelee kicked
Hareman in the face. Alik chought Hartsan was dead becau
Hartman didnot nove and there was blood coming out of i
hove’ Alix van to help Harenan and a fight ensued between
Riik and Fetelee, Neither of the men were successful in
hitting or kicking the other. Alix took off his backpack,
hit Fetelee with it, and then acted like he was going to
poll something cut of the backpack. At this point, Fetelee
Fan tovards his apartment building!

 

 

 

 

  

  

2 ALSk teatified with the assistance of a Chuukese interpreter

 

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OO

Alik began to pull Hartman across the street towards
their house, But Hartnan becane too heavy to pull. Fetelee
Peturned with a emall black bag. ALlk dropped Martean, took
Off his backpack, and hit Fetelee with the Backpack.

Fetelee pulled a knife from the black bag. Alik testified
that he tried to run, bat Fetelee caught him and stabbed hin
Gnee in hie side and once in his stomach, Alik tried to run
Ggein, but he fell, and Fetelee stabbed him behind hie right
22t, valik went to hie aparenent and called hie cousins to
Gone help Hartsan, who was still lying on the street. Alik
Ecotitied that he remembered losing conseicusness in the
fnbulance and not regaining it until one menth later in the
hospital, ‘He teutifies that at no tine while he was walking
hone id he threaten Fetelee or challenge Fetelee to

fight.

 

 

 

 

Id, at 154-55, 157 P.34 $93-94, Several other witnesses

 

testified for the prosecution;* however, their testimony
inconsequential for purposes of Fetelee’s application.
In his defense, Fetelee called David B. Clark, who
witnessed the altercation between Fetelee and the Micronesian
nen. Clark testified that, in the early morning of June 8, 2003,
he was riding his bike while looking for his wife who had not
come hone. Clark observed Fetelee arguing with two Micronesians.
Clark witnessed Fetelee strike one of the Micronesians, who
dropped to the ground. Clark rode away, continuing to search for
his wife. At come point, Clark turned around and came back in
the direction of Fetelee. According to Clark, one of the
wicronesians was swinging a backpack at Fetelee. When Fetelee
yanked the backpack, a knife came out. Clark testified that the

man tried to poke Fetelee with the knife and Fetelee grabbed the

 

«me other witnesses who testified for the prosecution included:
(a) wareman; (2) Allk’s eieter, Nexima Alix; (3) Mary Takenori, the manager of
WalaMIS'Sipoy's who observed the crime scene iamediately following the
Jncldent; (#) Thonae O'Callaghan, M.D., a surgeon at Queen's Medical Center
AES‘Ekonied alin and Hartman on June @, 2003) and (5) Nonolulu Police
Peparenent officer Neal Murakami, who had responded to the incident.

 

     

 
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man’s arm and neck. Clark indicated that, as a result of the

 

struggle between the man and Fetelee over the knife, the man w
stabbed. Clark, however, stated that he did not see a knife in
Fetelee’s hand.

Clark testified that he was arrested and put in jail
the next day for an unrelated reason. While Clark was
incarcerated, he saw Fetelee at O'ahu Community Correctional
Center and heard that he was "there for killing someone at
tippy's{.]” He testified that “I seen what took place and to ne,
that’s not -- I mean that’s not right.” Clark told Fetelee, "If
you need me, 1 going to the Salvation Army. If you need me for
your stuff, have your attorney whatever, fine with me. That's
where 1/11 be.”

Fetelee testified in his own defense, stating, inter

alia, that

he returned hone to find three cars parked in the parking
Tot. He went to Lopes's apartment at around 12:30.p.m. or
32:00 mignighe and told Lopez co tell whoever ovinJed one of
the. | care to move it so that hie girlfriend could park
her van.’ He testified that he was "ali drunk already” vhen
he entered Lopez'® apartment. He vent upets

Cane back down, no one had oved the car and the police were
bout co ticket the van. He went back to Lopez's apartment
and pounded on the door, Feteles went in the apartment to
Had*out who owed the car; he cold the people in the
apartment co nove the car before he "bust up" the car.
Petelee denied challenging anyone in the apartment to a
Fight or threatening to kill anyone there. He testified
that he was upset, But not sad. He testified that he cwent
nove up the fan and it Rit the roof," but he “never try hurt
Gnybody.” He denied that he punched Freeman) he stated that
(then be turned sround in the hallway, “is eide went hit”
Freeman. He testified that he “walked,” not ran, after
Tony. Petelee went upstaire to his apartment, past the
Gpatinent where Tony was, and then about five to ten minutes
iter returned to Lopes’ apartment to apologize. He
testified that he told Lopes he was "sorry about the
Ineldent," he never meant to do that, and be "was only nad.”

 

 

 

  

 

 

 

 
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He went back to his apartment for about ten minutes, drank
beer, and then went outside to the parking lot. ar

thie point, Fetelee cane into contact first with
then the tuo Micronesien men.

 

Fetelee, 114 Hawai'i at 157, 157 P.3d at 596 (original brackets
omitted). Fetelee stated that he

av [Lincoln] across the street, and I call fed Lincoln] for
cone, Then she cane. I ask(ed Lincoln) if 1 can have one
cigarettel]. So she glalve me one cigarette]

. . “And'r'ask(ed] for one lighter, and r 1i[t] the
Cigarette]; and that's when I turn(ed) around, and I [sav]
the two. [Microneelan] guys:

When asked whether he saw ‘anything like a ten-dollar bill
sticking out of her pocket or on the ground or anything like
that,” Fetelee answered in the negative, stating "I never see
anything.” Fetelee again reiterated on cross-examination that he
never asked Lincoln for any money nor did he ever see any money
sticking out of her pocket or on the ground.

Fetelee then proceeded to relate his encounter with the
two Micronesian men. He explained that he first approached the
two Micronesian men because he thought they were the same two
cwicronesian guys [that] always bother -- bother [his then-
girlfriend] when she go [to the] store.” Fetelee recounted that,
when he saw the two Micronesians, he

went call them up. T told them, eh, what you guys think you
Gove bad, ah?” You guys think you ail that, ah? And then
thay Just standing over there and looking at'me. “And the
other guy(, iug., Harenan,] was trying (to) say something.

 

 

 

(artnan] vas crying to talk, but T told hin straight up. 1
told hin, you know, 1 don't understand what you trying to
say. And then (Alik] was try[ing to] tell me, no, no, 20,
wmen't ue. And then 1 cone Close, and I understand, and t
Cell him what? [Alik] said waen't us, we don’t know
nothing. And right there, told him for real, you telling

 
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me the truth? And then he say okay, yes. Then T shake his
Band. 1 told him I’m 20 sorry. So 1 shake hie hand.

=. i told’ (Aish), oh -- 1 tell Bim, ob, T so sorry for
Scoping you guys ike thie. And then when 1 look Like
Chie, (Haremas] was right behind me, And when I turn, he
novel Sol'was thinking to my sina this guy going to punch
me. So that's why 1 went turn around and then I punch
(areman)

T'hit (iartman]. When he went £211 down, he stay
gown, “and 1 just stand over there. i sever Like kick him.
never like > anything. I Sust stay stand over there
because I-aee he #0 snali and so tiny eo T never like bust,
Rim'up. Sod see Bim lying down, and I ust etay over
there. 1 hear sonebody was saying, eh, Ret, dug, Alik,)
Feaching inside his bag, he reaching inside hie bag. S01
turn around, and I see (Aik)

i tum'and (Alix) -- because thie thing happen and the
geyl, Lage, Mareman,) wae aeill Tying down. When 1
Gaining around, [dartnan) wae trying to] eit up. And no
ore tine for ne for walk around him. 1 just went accident
Yun over him, and then I run stvaight to my =~ sy ~~ my

aparteent.

 

 

    

 

Fetelee stated that he ran into his apartment because

Z was kind of worry about the guy was reaching inside his
bag. Sot was thinking to run to the epartnent and get my
CD. or ay radio outeide sy house and my CD back -- only sy
© bag. Get CD inside,

 

i Went’ (into my apartment], dump all the CD was inside
‘the bag. "then T came back with the bag for'-- 7 was
Ehinking for -- Just for make them thinking like T have
fonething. But when -- when I came down, 7 see then crose
the street already.

 

ten't'saw them across the street and I valk over
there, T'said what you going pull out your bag? And then T
SoD bever reach to the guy, and he(, ie., Alsk,] was
tying Ite] ‘swing (hie) bag at me already. But ~

Tinen’ [LAK] lock at me, then he start swinging the bag
at me.” And the fret swing went hit the CD beg that T had.
The Cb -""it's the cD bag that I had. It vent. dropping
When T vae looking at Bim and he try to swing again but it
Bike he holding the beg like thie. I sever know what is
[neide the bag, nothing. When he vas trying to) ewing
again and right there, i grab the bag and 7 pull the bag
Guy from him. When i vas pulling che bag avay from him and
Tee the knife, be holding the knife on his hand. The he
etarted suinging at ne like two tines like that, and Twas
Semping Up. Kas kind of look stupid because one big quy was
jumping over this guy(, Lec, Hartman). So Tend up jumping
over this guy. I sever know what happen. Nothing happen
linea T Jump beck and the knife went fall down and he’ run,
Aad that's why I look, wow. And then I walk away. I Srab
‘my CD bag, and then I'walk away.

 

 

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Fetelee further testified that he “never try hurt anybody. All I
do, me and him -- all I did wae try defen[d] myself, and I never
know that T hurting him."
B. Procedural History

‘on June 23, 2003, the prosecution charged Fetelee, via
a three-count complaint, with attempted murder in the second
Gegree, attempted assault in the second degree, and theft in the
second degree, in violation of HRS § 708-831(1) (a) (1993 & Supp.
2004), Trial was scheduled to commence on April 21, 2005.

2, Motions in Limine
Prior to trial, both Fetelee and the prosecution filed

motions in limine.

jee moved the (trial) court to exclude from use at
ffisl, sneer alis, testimonial of docunentary eviden
Felating to. (1) any other sbad acts” involving Fetelee and
(2) any unfavorable evidence against Fetelee that might not
technically be considered bad acts” under HRE [Rule]

Soe (@)], 0) but that should be excluded as irrelevant under
BRE [Rule] 402 or ae unfairly presudicial under HRE [Rule]
403. "The (prosecution) sought, inter alla, a ruling from
the’ [trial] coure

 

 

 

 

= +. admitting evidence that Fetelee
returned to Bis residence and became enraged
when he found a vehicle blocking the driveway.

  

+ nme Rule 404 (b) provices:

Bvidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not aduiseible
fo prove the character of a person in order to show action
fn conformity therewith. It'may, however, be admissible
Where such evidence is probative of another fact that is of
Consequence to the determination of the action, such a
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
Knowledge, identity, modus operandi, or absence of mistaks
of accident. in criminal cases, the proponent of evidence
fo be offered under this ubsection shall provide reasonable
notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court
Gxcuses pretrial notice on'good cause shown, of the da
Yocation, and general nature of any such evidence it intends
to introduce at trial

 

  

 

 

 

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Fetelee forcibly entered the apartment of . .
Lopez and. confrontes Preenan regarding the
parked vehicle; Petelee punched Freeman and left
fhe apartment. While Petelee was still engry he
Confronted.» . Lincoln, desanded money from
her and renoved a ten dollar Bill fron her
pocket without permission... . Fetelee's
Sttention was drawn to Wariman ands
ALk(.]" Evidence regarding Fetelee's conduct
Coward Freeman ia relevant to prove state of
‘ning, motive, and intent. BRE Rsles 401, 402,

 

 

 

Fetelee, 114 Hawai" at 153, 187 P.3d at 592 (original brackets
omitted) -
on April 19, 2005, the trial court held a hearing on

the motions, at which time, the prosecution called Lopez ai

 

witness. In addition to the testimony previously recounted,

 

Lopez additionally testified that

fohe did not become aware of the incident [involving Ali
Hartman) ‘that occurred in the early morning hours ef dune &
2002 cuteide her apartment until che walked outeide in the
Garly worming. She estimated that it "was hours" between
the tise Feteiee left her apartnent and the tine of that
Incident, but she vas not sure how many hours.

 

 

Id. (footnote omitted). As stated by the ICA in ite opinion:

The (prosecution) contended the incident in Lopez's
apartennt should be aaniteed to prove Fetelee'® intent,
State of mind, opportunity, and motive. The. [prosecut fon]
argued that (,] while Lopez appeared to have “sone failure of
Fecollection* regarding the "time element,” the charged
[neldente had Gecurred no more than ten minutes after the
incigent in Lopez's apartoent -- while Fetelee was still
angry and upset. The (prosecution) advised the (trial)
court thats witness (Preenan) had indicated that the
Charged offenses occurred right after the incident in
Lopez's apartment and the (prosecution) planned to have
Preenan testify. The [prosecution] asked the [trial] court
to take the matter under advisement unell se could locate
Preenan. the [trial] court reserved ruling on the issue
Until Freeman had been located and given an opportunity to
ceseiey.

 

 

 

 

 

Id, at 153-54, 157 P.3d at 592-83.

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2. Trial Proceedings

A five-day jury trial commenced on April 21, 2005. on
April 22, 2005, the prosecution rested without the trial court
having ruled on the motions in limine. Defense counsel moved for
judgment of acquittal, which the trial court denied. Thereafter,
the defense called Clark as a witness.

However, before the conclusion of Clark's testimony,
the prosecution informed the trial court that it had located
Freeman and requested that the trial proceedings be suspended in
order to continue the hearing on the motions in limine.

3. Continued Hearing on Motions in Limine
Outside the presence of the jury, the trial court heard

the testimony of Freeman, discussed supra. Thereafter, the trial

 

court ruled:

It's the judgment of the court that there is sufficient
evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that within a
Eine period of as snort ae three minutes before Mr.
Fetelee's contact with Me, Lincoln, he wae angry and
{ntoxicates and that he was angry and intoxicated wnile
engaging is

hecordingly,
Coineddent with tl ged offenses as to constitute the
ee gestae of the alleged offenses. Though the incident
‘oes not constitute a prior bad act, it is noted that ite
Felevance does include an explanation of [Fetelee]'s motive,
that Se, to nanifese the anger he continued to experience 3c
a result of the Incident in M8. Lopes's apartment. With
Fespect to (HRE) Rule 403, while the evidence is adaittedly
prejudicial, it is of significant probative value to core
utters of proot required by the prosecution. Por these
Teasons, [Fetelee]'s notion in limine to exclude evidence of
the defendant's conduct in Me. Lopes" s aparenent is denied.

 

 
   

 

 

 

Fetelee, 114 Hawai'i at 154, 157 P.34 at 593 (emphasis added).
‘As will be discussed more fully infra, the prosecution,
following the trial court’s ruling on Fetelee’s motion in limine,

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orally moved to reopen its case-in-chief to allow Freeman to
testify regarding the apartment incident. Defense counsel
objected, however, and alternatively argued that, should the
trial court grant the motion, the defense would like an
opportunity to recall Lopez. The trial court granted the
prosecution's motion to reopen, permitting the testimony of
Freeman and further examination of Lopez regarding the apartment
incident.

4, Continued Jury Trial Proceedings

When trial resumed, Clark was allowed to finish

 

testifying in Fetelee’s defen

 

ereafter, the prosecution
called both Freeman and Lopez, whose testimony was substantially

the same ae their testimony pursuant to the motions in limine,

 

Aiscussed supra.‘ At the conclusion of Lopez's testimony, the
prosecution again rested. Defense counsel renewed Fetelee’s
notion for judgment of acquittal, which the trial court denied.
5. dury Instructions
After the close of the evidence, the trial court
instructed the jury on April 26, 2005. With respect to the

apartment incident, the trial court instructed the jury:

 

‘However, as the ICA indicated, although Freeman testified at the
hearing on the motions in limine thet Fetelee Mt him with hie fiet, *Freenan
testified [at trial) chat he was hit by a fist, but aid not know if 0
Fetelee who Mit him." Feteles, 114 Hawai'i at 184, 157 P.3d at 593.

 

  

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You have heard evidence regarding an incident which
allegedly occurred at Angela Lopes's apartrent. You mist
Rot use this evidence to determine that the defendant is
Person of bad character ang, therefore, must have committed
Ehe offences charged in this case. Such evidence may be
considered by you only on the isgue of (Petelee] 's state of
‘mind, motive, opportunity, and inteat, and for no other
purpose.

 

   

Fetelee did not request the trial court to instruct the jury with
a Limiting instruction prior to either Freeman’s and/or Lopez's
testimony regarding the apartment incident
6. The Jury's Verdicts
on April 27, 2005, the jury returned verdicts, finding

Fetelee guilty of attempted murder in the second degree and

 

attempted assault in the second degree; however, on the charge of
theft in second degree, the jury found Fetelee guilty of the
included offense of theft in the fourth degree. The trial
court's judgment of conviction and sentence was entered on August
3, 2005. Fetelee was sentenced to, inter alia, a term of life
imprisonnent with the possibility of parole. On September 2,
2005, Fetelee filed his notice of appeal.
appeal Before the ICA

on appeal before the ICA, Fetelee argued that the trial

 

court erred in admitting evidence of the apartment incident.
specifically, Fetelee maintained that: (1) "the trial court
erred in finding that the [apartment] ‘incident . . . was
sufficiently coincident with the alleged offenses as to

constitute [part of] the xes gestae of the alleged offens

 

(original brackets omitted); (2) the “evidence constituted ‘other

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crimes, wrongs or acts’ committed by Fetelee and was subject to
exclusion under HRE [Rule] 404{(b),]*; and (3) the evidence wae
neither relevant nor probative of the underlying charges and
should have been excluded pursuant to HRE Rules 402 and 403

Fetelee also argued that the trial court abused its discretion in

 

allowing the prosecution to reopen ite case. Finally, Fetelee
contended, for the first time on appeal, that (although a
Limiting instruction was included as part of the charge to the
jury) the trial court erred in failing to give a limiting
instruction immediately prior to Freeman's and Lopez‘s trial
testimonies regarding the apartnent incident.

in ite April 18, 2007 published opinion, the ICA
affirmed the trial court’s judgment of conviction and sentence.
Feteles, 114 Hawai'i at 160, 157 P.34 at 599. First, the ICA
concluded that “[t]he [trial] court properly admitted evidence of
the [apartment] incident . . . as part of the res gestae of the
charged offenses,” id., at 156, 157 P.3d at 595 (emphasis
omitted), because the apartment incident, “the exchange with
Lincoln, and the unprovoked assault on the two Micronesian men
were reasonably contemporaneous with one ancther[,]" id. at 157,
187 P.3d at 596. Second, the ICA concluded that “[t]here is a
xg gestae exception to BRE Rule 404(b)[,]* id, and such

exception was

 

tisfied in this case because the apartment
incident (1) ‘is linked to the crimes charged[,]”" id. at 159, 157
P.3d at 598, (2) “is relevant to provide the jury with an

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explanation as to why Fetelee was so angry and agitated[,]" id,

and (3) “ie evidence that was necey

 

ry to complete the story for
the jury." Id. Third, the ICA concluded that the trial court
Aid not abuse its discretion in allowing the prosecution te
reopen ite case. Id, at 159-60, 157 P.3d at 598-99. Finally,
the ICA concluded that “[tJhe [trial] court did not commit plain
error in failing to instruct the jury, prior to the trial
testimony of Lopez and Freeman, on the limited purpose of their
testimony.” Id. at 160, 157 P.24 at 599 (emphasis omitted).

‘The ICA entered its judgment on appeal on May 17, 2007.
Fetelee filed his application for a writ of certiorari on July
37, 2007. Thereafter, this court accepted Fetelee’s application
on August 28, 2007. In accepting his application, this court
ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing the
following issues:

maintains any
‘of Evidence

 

(2) if eo, whether rea gestae evidence is
tthe HRE Rule 403 balancing test-(")

 

jubject to

on October 3, 2007, Fetelee and the prosecution filed their

respective supplemental briefs, which are discussed infra as they

 

+ BRE Rule 403 (2993) provides that:

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
Value ie substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or wisleading the jury,
Sr by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumlative evidence.

 

 

 

 

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becone relevant to the particular issue. As previously stated,

 

this court heard oral argument on December 6, 2007.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

‘The admissibility of evidence requires different
standards of review depending on the particular rule of
evidence at issue.” State vi Pulae, 83 Hawai's 229, 246, 925
Pid 797, 814. (2996).

When application of a particular evidentiary
rule can yield only one correct result, the
proper standard for sppellate review is the
Fight/wrong standaré. However, the traditional
Abuse Of discretion standard should be applied
fn the case of those rules of evidence that
Foguire # *Judgeent call” on the part of the
Erisl court.

Kd, at 246-47, 925 P.26 at 614-15 (citations omitted) .

“prior bad act* evidence under (RE) Rule
406(0) . « ie admigeible when it ie 1)
Felevani and 2) more probative than prejudicial.
Atrial court's determination that evidence is
Srelevane" within the Neaning of HRE Rule 402
(1585) 1, quoted intye,] ia reviewed under the
right/wrong standard of review. dowever,

trial’ Court's belancing of the probative value
Of prior bad act evidence against the
prefudicial effect of #uch evidence under HRE
fule 403...” Se reviewed for abuse of
Ssecretion, fin abuse of discretion occurs when
the coure clearly exceeds the bounde of reason
or disregards rules or principles of law to the
Siparaneial detriment of a party 1itigant.

 

 

 

 

Beate v. torres, #5 Hawas's 427, 422, 945 7.20 049, 953
(app. 1997) (footnotes, interaal quotation marks, and
citations) omitted).

State v, Cordeiro, 99 Hawai'i 390, 403-04, 56 P.34 692, 705-05
(2002).

 

TIT. DISCUSSION

In his application, Fetelee advances, essentially,

 

three errors committed by the ICA' that, in his view, have the

 

+ ae previously stated, retelee raises four argusente in his
application. However, inasmuch ae two Of him arguments relate to the
‘continued.

 

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“cumulative effect of depriving him of a fair trial under
article I, section 5 of the Hawai'i Constitution, as well as the
fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments to the United states

constitution. Specifically, Fetelee argues that the ICA

 

incorrectly determined that: (1) the apartment incident
constituted res gestae evidence and was, therefore, admissible as
an exception to HRE Rule 404(b), which rule generally prohibits
the admission of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts;

(2) the trial court properly granted the prosecution's request to

and (3) the failure of the trial court

 

reopen ite case-in-chie
to give a limiting inetruction to the jury prior to the testimony
concerning the apartment incident was not error. Fetelee’s first
contention is dispositive of his application.
A. Res Gestae Doctrine and Exception to BRE Rule 404(b)

As stated above, Fetelee maintains that the ICA
erroneously concluded that the apartment incident constituted res

admissible

 

gestac evidence and that, therefore, such evidence w
as an exception to HRE Rule 404(b). Before delving into the
correctness of the ICA’s conclusions, we first examine the
history and meaning of the rea gestae doctrine, including its
development and treatment in Hawai'i, as well as in the

jurdeprudence of other states.

*(.. continued)
‘the apartment incident under the reg aestag doctrine, they
2 single content ion.

 

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Law

 

1. Ree Geetae Doctrine and Hawai‘ Cc:
Historically, i.e., prior to the codification of the
rules of evidence,’ res gestae was understood as an evidentiary

principle, which was employed as one of the exceptions to the

 

hearsay rul

The term ree gestae seems to have cone into common
‘usage in discussions of admiseibility of statements
econpanying material acts or situations in the early 18008.

this tine, the theory of hesrssy wae not well develoned

andthe various exceptions to the hearsay rile ware not
clearly defined. In this context. che phrase res osstac

 

Hule in teo"brimun situations. First, 1t was used to
Explain the admissibility of scatenente that were not
hearsay at all. Second, it was used to justify the
soniseibility of statenents that today cone within the three
exceptions... + (1) seatenente of present sent
GSpreseione(s] (2) exeited utterances [7] and (3) statenente
of present bodily condition, mental states, and emotions
Ynitsally, the term reg geatee was employed to denote
words that accompanied the principal litigated fact, such ae
the murder, collision, or trespass. However, usage
Geveloped to the point vhere the phrase seened to exbody the
notion that evidence of any relevant
Biso Being in the words that accoupanied St. Ivo main
Policies or motives are discernible in hie recognition of
Fee sestae as a password for the admission of otherwise
Yesdnissible evidence. one is a desire to permit exch
witness to tell his or her story in a natural way by
Teciting sil that happened at the tine of the narra
[neident, including those detaile that give it life and
color. Events occir as a seamless web, and the naturalne!
with waich the details fit together gives confirmation to
The witness’ entire account. The other policy... is the
recognition of spontaneity as the source of special
Erustworthiness. This quality of spontaneity characterizes
fo sone degree nearly ail the types of statements which have
been labeled res gestae.

2 Kenneth S. Broun, et, al, McCormick on Evidence § 268 at 245-

46 (6th ed, 2006) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). Although

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

> the Hawai'i Rules of Evidence were codified in 1961. See 1960 Haw.
.b. Aet 164, § 19 at 274 ("This Act shall take effect on January 1,
set)

   

 

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the concept of res gestae generally has been associated with

 

spontaneous declarations,

(iin some states, cee gestae is given an even broader scope
fo Include not only a spontanesus utterance made before,
Guring, oF after the comission of a crime, but also real or
Senonstrative evidence relevant to the crime charged, euch

‘torn dress of a prosecutrix to show that che nad been
Taped; testimony by a police officer or other witness as to
hat he heard of cbserved before, during, or afcer the
Connission of the crime; all that occurred at the time and
place of the crime, or imediately before or after the crime
Ee causatly related thereto; a declaration of intent by the
Wictiny a statenent, confession, or admission by the
Gefendant; or a declaration or conduct of @ coconepirater or
accomplice.

State vy. Hansen, 989 P.24 338, 353 (Mont. 1999) (quoting 2

    

 

 

 

 

Charles 8. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 288 at 220 (14th
ed. 1986)), Stated differently, res gestae generally refers to
the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the
main fact and serve to illustrate its character and that are so
spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude
the idea of deliberation or fabrication. As one court succinctly
recited:

‘he ze asst rule was, originally evolved, no doubt, ts

jood faith and for a salutory purpose; being confined to

Eflnge done and atatenente nade, in fact spontaneous, so a8

to be, in truth as well as in fiction, an integra) pare of

the eranaction in litigation, or to be a necessary incident

of the crisina! ace iteel? involved or to form in

Conjunction with it one continous transaction.)

williams v. State, 188 So. 24 320, 323 (Pla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966)

 

 

 

(citations omitted) .
Consistent with the foregoing, this court has broadly
applied the rea gestae doctrine long before the 1961 codification

of the HRE as a basis for the admission of evidence

 

in most
instances, to overcome hearsay objections to contemporaneous

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statements. For example, in Nawelo v, Von Hanm-Youne Co., 21
Haw. 644 (1913), this court held that a statement made by the
chauffeur shortly after the subject accident was properly

admitted into evidence as a part of the res gestae. at 647.

 

‘The court reasoned that the statement

was mide at the spot where the accident occurred immediately
after it had happened and in the presence of the injured
party. A declaration to be pare of the zee gestae need not

 

 

tmade inmediately after and under the influence of the
Sccurrence ané go connected with it as to characterize or
explain ie
Id, at 647-48 (citations omitted); see also Anduha v. County of
Maui, Texcitory of Hawai'i, 30 Haw. 44, 50 (1927) (permitting the

plaintiff to testify to a statement made by the driver of the

 

defendant's car, which statement was made at the place of the
accident and shortly thereafter). similarly, in Territory vy.
Kinoshita, 38 Haw. 335 (1949), this court held that a child's
statenents to her mother, although made two and a half hours

after the event, were admii

 

ible as spontaneous declarations,

explaining that:

[t]he elenent relating to the time when such statements vere

‘but one of the factors entering into the
Getermination as to whether declarations were “spontaneous,”
“natural, simpulsive," "instinctive," "generated by an
excited feeling which extends without let or breakdown from
the moment of the event they Lilustrate.*

 

 

Ad, at 342 (footnote omitted). But see Territory v, Warren, 35
Haw. 232, 238-39 (1939) (in prosecuting for killing of a police
officer, evidence that the defendant was operating house of

prostitution admissible as res gestae); Territory v, Wilson, 26

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Haw. 360, 361 (1922) (evidence of similar crime committed at the

same tine and same place adnissible as res gestae); Republic v.
nikichi, 11 Haw. 341, 344 (1898) (evidence that the defendant

killed his child prior to killing his wife was admissible as res

gestae evidence of the charged offense, i.e,, the killing of

wife).
However, it was not until 1953 when this court, in
Territory v. Lewis, 39 Haw. 635 (1953), elaborated upon the term

“reg gestae,” defining it as

‘those circumstances which are the undesigned incidents of a
particular litigated act, and which are admissible vhen
Piustrative of such act, “These incidents nay be separated
from the act by # lapse of time nore or less appreciable
They may consist of speeches of any one concerned, whether
participant or bystanser) they say comprise thing left
Bhdone ae well as things done. ‘Their tole distinguishing
feature ie that they should be the necessary incidents of
the litigated act; necessary in thi chat they are
part of the imediate preparations ‘eeanations of such
het, snd are not produced by the calculating policy of
fctore. In other words, they must stand in immediate causal
felation to the act -- a relation not broken by the
[seerposition of voluntary individual wariness seeking to
manufacture evidence for itself. incidente that are thus
Unedsately snd unconsciously associated with an act,
whether such incidents are doings or declarations, becose in
this way evidence of the character of the act.

 

 

 

 

   
  

 

   

 

 

Id. at 639 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fetelee,
114 Hawai'i at 156-57, 157 P.3d at 595-96 (quoting Lewis’
definition of xee geetae). In Lewis, the defendant was charged
with the offenses of assault and battery with intent to diefigure
another for striking “the victim at intervals varying from thirty
minutes to one and one-half hours" over the course of eight
hours. Lewis, 29 Haw, at 636, 636. During trial, the trial

court admitted into evidence, under the theory of res gestae, a

 

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statement made by the defendant to a police officer immediately
after the police officer gained entry into the defendant's
apartment.*© Id, at 638-39. The defendant was convicted of the
charged offenses, and he appealed. Id. at 636. This court
affirmed the convictions, concluding, inter alia, that the
defendant's statements to the police officer were admissible as
part of the res gestae because such statements were “made under
the exciting influence of said events, reasonably contemporaneous
thereto and without prior opportunity for deliberation or
manufacture.” Id. at 640. In 0 concluding, the Lewis court

emphasized that

the close connection in tine between the statements or
Geclaration and the act of which it ie said to be a part ie
fan elenent for consideration; that being close in point of
Eine Se not, however, all of the basis for receiving euch
evidence, and that the ultimate test is spontaneity or
Snctinctiveness and logical relations to the main event [.)

 

Ad. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also
Fetelee, 114 Hawai'i at 157, 157 P.3d at 596. In other words,

the “sound rule," according to Lewis, is that,

 

specifically, the police officer testified that, after entering the
apartment,

or asked him{, dues, the defendant.) how cone (the victim)
was in the condition that she was, and ne said he only gave
her a couple of one twos, and he made his fier in s ewinging
renner. He said, “I also gave her a couple of these.” He
(wea standing -- i ean sitting in the chair -~ and he eald
he gave her a couple of these. He said, ‘Nobody will want
to look at her after thie.’ that was ail. T cold him
Smediacely then that he vae Under arrest."

  

 

 

 

Ids at 639.
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in order for statenents to be aduitted as part of the res

the etatenents must be reasonably contemporaneous
vith the event to which they relate, ie, they mst be such
fe to have been proximately caused by the exeiting influence
SF the event without opportunity for deliberation or
Sntlvence.

Lewis, 39 Haw. at 640 (citation omitted).
As previously noted, the HRE becane effective on
January 1, 1961 and codified several of the exceptions that had
Geveloped in our courts to the general prohibition against the
admission of evidence based on hearsay. See HRE Rule 100 cnt.
(2993) (*The purpose of this chapter is to codify the law of
evidence, to promote informed judicial rulings on evidence

pointe, and to achieve uniformity in the treatment of evidence

 

among the courts of this State.*). Consequently, the
codification of the hearsay exceptions nade possible more precise
analysis and terminology in decisions related to the
adniesibslity of evidence challenged as hearsay, Thus, the
question arises whether the xes gestae doctrine, post-
codification of the HRS, remains viable.

In 1996, this court reexamined Lewis in the context of
excited utterance, Specifically, this court recited that

Iclhe rule formulated in Lenia requires that the ceent and

be scatesent be *reasanab

Elaccters not a- Sright-tine tiee Tinie, lst in-Semme-of

ith the evant it it wen a spontaneous taaction tothe

Gxciting event rather than by deliberation or other
ineiuence

 

 

 

Skate v. Moore, 62 Hawai'i 202, 220, 921 P.2d 122, 140 (2996)

(emphases added). The Moore court observed that the evolution of

 

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the excited utterance exception essentially began with the Lewis

 

rule. This court recognized that, through the years, the Lewis
rule had been “misunderstooé” and eventually utilized as
authority for the proposition that “the time span between the
event and the making of the statenent [must be] short -- very
short." Id. (quoting State v, Messamore, 2 Haw. App. 643, 649,
639 P.2d 423, 428 (1962) (internal quotation marks omitted) .
The Moore court further acknowledged that this court, three years
after the Messanore case was decided, transformed the observation
in Messamore “into a foundational requirement for the
applicability of the excited utterance exception.” Moore, &2
Hawai'i at 220, 921 P.2d at 140 (citing shea v. City & County of
Honolulu, 67 Haw. 499, 692 P.24 1158 (1985)). Eventually, in
3988, this court, in In re Doe, born on Novenber 23, 1970
hereinafter, ine Dos], 70 Haw. 32, 761 P.24 299 (1988),
conbined the original rule in Lewig with the Shea time span
requirenent into factors for the excited utterance exception.
Moore, 62 Hawai'i at 220, 921 P.2d at 140. The Moore court,
however, abrogated in xe Doe and concluded that ‘a ‘very short’
time interval between a startling event and an excited utterance,
although a factor in the determination, is not a foundational
prerequisite to the admissibility of the statement under HRE Rule
803(b) (2)." Moore, 82 Hawai't at 221, 921 P.2d at 141.
Consequently, it appears that the zes gestae doctrine -- as more
aptly stated by one court -- *has been subsumed within the

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ey

exceptions to the hearsay rule found in Rule 803, such as excited
utterances, statements describing mental or physical conditions,
and statemente for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.”
Horton v, State, 764 P.2d 674, 677 (Wyo. 1986) (citation
omitted); see also Jano v. State, 510 So, 2d 615, 616 (Fla. Dist.
cr. App. 1987) (observing that the spontaneous statement and
excited utterance exceptions contained in the Florida’s rules of
evidence “encompass evidence frequently considered under what was
referred to as the res gestas exception” prior to the adoption of
the rules of evidence) (citations omitted), approved, 524 So. 2d
660, 661 (Fla. 1988) (*The excited utterance exception is not a
new theory of Florida evidence but rather one of a group of
exceptions subsumed under the old term of res gestae.” (Internal
quotation marks and citations omitted.)); Dawson v. Commonwealth,
867 8.W.2d 493, 495 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993) (the excited utterance
exception “grew out of the doctrine of ‘xes geatae’*).

tion whether the res gestae doctrine

 

Nevertheless, the qu
maintains any viability in the wake of the rules of evidence has
been the subject of much controversy, as demonstrated below.
2, Recognition of the Res Gestae Doctrine in other states
Initially, we observe that commentators have repeatedly
urged that the res gestae doctrine be abandoned because of its
vagueness and imprecision. Indeed, as the ICA in an earlier

opinion noted:

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(Clomentators and, with ever greater frequency, courts have
criticized the use of the phrase res ggstan for ite

Vaguenees, inprecision, and limited application. Mccormick
{on Evidence) notes that {,] although, historically, the
phrase hae served ite purpose, “the iaw has now reached a
Stage where expanding admissibility will be best
‘accomplished by other means.”

State v. Connally, 7 Hawai'i 123, 126 n.5, 899 P.2d 406, 409 n.5

(app. 1995) (original brackets and internal citations onitted)

(quoting 2 John W. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 268 at 196

(4th ed. 1992) (also stating that the ‘ancient phrase can be

 

 

 

 

jettisoned, with due acknowledgment that it served an era in the
evolution of evidence law*)). Specifically, commentators

criticized that the res gestae doctrine’s

vagueness and imprecision are apparent... . [T]raditional
Uimitations on the doctrine, such as the requirement that S¢
be used cnly in regard to the principal litigated fact and
the frequent inelstence of concurrence (oF at i

relationship in tine) between the words and the
situation, have restricted ite usefuiness az a tool for
voiding unjustified application of the hearsay rule,
However, the vagueness of the phrase also nade it easier for
courte to broaden its coverage and thus permitted the
Sanieeibinity of .
snelent phrase thus played role in the evolution of
evidence lav and the expansion of the admission of
Contesporaneoutly made hearsay statenente.

2 Broun, McCormick on Evidence § 268 at 246. Another commentator

observed that rea gestae “has had various uses. But it is

 

 

   

the

 

   

 

ble in all of them. The doctrines to

 

ambiguous and unmana:

 

which it has been applied possess, all of them, a right of
existence under well-recognized preexisting principles and can be
explained without a resort to thie phrase.” 6 John Henry
Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1767 at 253,

(Chadbourn rev. 1976). Moreover,

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[t]he phrase ree gestae has long been not only entirely
But even positively bermful. Tt is useless

every rule of evidence to which it has ever been
applied exists ae part of some other well-established
principh Terms of that
Principle

‘ces the confusion of one rule with another and this.
Uncertainty ae to the imieations of both. Tt ought
re wholly to be Yepudiated as 2 vicious elesent in
Our legal phras¢ology. No rule of evidence can be created
Sr oppiied by the ere mittering of a shibboleth. There are
fords enough to describe the rules of evidence. Bven if
There were no sccepted nane for one or another doctrine, any
ame would be preferable to an empty phrase s0 encouraging
fo looseness of thinking and uncertainty of decision.

     
    
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Id, at 255 (footnote omitted) .

Numerous court!

 

adopting the approach suggested by
commentators, began to abolish the reg gestae doctrine as an
independent basis for admieeibility of evidence. See, #.0.,

Stephens v. Miller, 13 F.3d 998, 1003 (7th Cir. 1994) (cbserving

that, for purposes of Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE), the use of

 

the term re# gestae “ie essentially obsolete” and citing to
federal court cases that described the phrase res gestae as
vuseless, harmful, and almost inescapable [sic] of a
definition"); Beople v, Dennis, 692 N.B.2d 325 (111. 1998)
(*ILlinois has abandoned the concept of res gestae as amorphous,
having been applied indiscriminately and inhibiting any
reasonable analysis." (Citations onitted.)); State v. Gunby, 144
P.3d 647, 663 (Kan. 2006) (holding that the doctrine of res
gestae is no longer a basis for admission of evidence); State v.
Hafford, 410 A.2d 219, 220-21 (Me. 1980) (continued use of the
term res gestae inappropriate under Maine law); Bynote v, Nat’)

Supex Marketa, Inc., 891 $.W.2d 117, 121 (Mo. 1995) (holding

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Miggouri “will no longer recognize the phrase ‘xes cestae’ as
carrying sufficient meaning to support either the admission of or
an objection to proffered testimony"); State v. Hansen, 989 P.2d
338, 354 (Mont. 1999) ("The better practice is to abandon the use
of the phrase altogether and to, instead, use the specific rule
of evidence or statute that applies to the particular factual

situation presented,

 

; Hoxton v. State, 764 P.2d 674, 677 (Wyo.
1988) (Although acknowledging that “the concepts that
traditionally were labeled as ‘res gestae’ are still present in
the law of evidence, the phrase itself no longer is present under
the Wyoming Rules of Evidence. Given the adoption of the Wyoming
Rules of Evidence, it probably is more helpful for courts and
counsel to address evidentiary issues in the language of those
rules.*); gee also State v. Long, 601 A.2d 221, 239-40 (N.J.
2002) (stein, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(collecting federal and state cases that have expressed
Gieapproval of the continued reference to reg gestae in evidence
law) «

Res gestae, however, has continued to be utilized by

 

other courts as a viable concept, descriptive of the continuous
nature of & criminal offense and an exception to Rule 404 (b).
see United states v, Hardy, 226 F.3d 745, 748 (6th Cir. 2000)
(explaining that rea geatae evidence “does not inplicate Rule

404(b)"); United States v. Daly, 974 F.2d 1215, 1217 (9th cir.
and

 

1992) ("A jury is entitled to know the circumstance:

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background of a criminal charge. 1t cannot be expected to make
ite decision in a void -- without knowledge of the time, place,
and circumstances of the acts which form the basis of the
charge." (Citations omitted.)); United States v, McDaniel, 574
F.2d 1224, 1227 (Sth Cir. 1978) ("Evidence of other crines,
closely related in both time and nature to the crime charged, may
be admitted to establish the ree gestae, that is, the conmon
scheme or history of the crime, of which the other crimes
constitute a part.‘ (Internal quotation marks and citation
onitted.)); Collins v. State, 604 $.W.24 680, 682 (Ark. 1991);
People v. Rollins, 892 P.2d 866, 872-73 (Colo. 1995); People v.
Quintana, 882 P.2d 1366, 1373-74 (Colo. 1994); People v.
Robinson, 340 N.W.2d 303, 304 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983); State v.
Pasek, 691 N.W.2d 301, 309 (S.D. 2004); State v. Elmore, 985 P.2d
269, 312 (Wash. 1999).

To further complicate matters and as correctly pointed
out by the prosecution in ite supplemental brief, courts that
have not expressly recognized the res gestae doctrine implicitly
acknowledged its continued viability via the application of its
underlying concept -- though the terminology employed my differ.
In United States v, Green, 175 F.3d 822 (10th Cir. 1999), the
united states Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit explained

® ag Giacussed sore fully infra, the TCA relied upon Quintana,
Robinson, pase, and Elmore to support ite conclusion that ree gestae is an
Greepeion £0 HRE Rule 404(b). See Feteles, 114 Hawai'i at 187-59, 157 P.3d at

 

   

 

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that Rule 404(b) applies only to evidence of acte extrinsic to
the crime charged: “Direct or intrineic evidence of the crime
charged does not fall within the ambit of the rule.” Id, at 631
(citation omitted). Most courte have denominated evidence as

intrinsic

 

AE At Je an uncharged offense which arose out of the sane
transaction or series of transaction as the charges
Te fe was

  

vnited states v. leeks, 726 F.2d 630, 632 (11th Cir. 1983) (per
curian) (citations omitted) ; United States vi Johnson, 463 F.3é
803, 808 (@th Cir. 2006) (holding that *[elvidence of other

wrongful conduct is conaidered intrinsic when it ie offered for
the purpose of providing the context in which the charged crime
ocourred{,1* ists, that “the other crimes evidence completes the

story or provides a total picture of the charged crime”)

 

% An examination of the cases reveals that the so-called "intrinsiet
evidence is usually introduced in conspiracy cases

Im a conspiracy case, “acts committed in furtherance of the
charged conspiracy are themselves part of the act charged."
eal F.3d 142, 275 (sth cir
$358). Evidence of such acts is therefore intrineie ena
Simply does not implicate che requirements of (Rule) 408 (b)-
See 4d.; United States v.Badru, 97 F.3d 1471, 1478 (D.C.
Gir. 2596) (quoting 22 charies A. wright & Kenneth
Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedures § 5238, at 450
(i378)) (sin canes where the Incident offered ie a part of
the conspiracy alleged in the indicenent, the evidence is
adnineible under Rule 404 (b) ae direct evidence of the fact
Circumstantial evidence requiring an
"@ 25 to the character of the accused.)
Atates v. Sasser, 971 F-24470, 475 (lon Cir. 1992)
(atfimsing chet direct evidence of the charged conspiracy
tb) evidence and therefore did not require &
ruction on evidence of "other acts")

 

 

    

 

    

Green, 175 ¥.34 at 631 (original brackets and ellipsis omitted).

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SSS
(internal quotation marke and citation omitted); United States v.
Williams, 900 F.2d 623, 825 (Sth Cir. 1990) (same); see

also United States v. Krezdorn, 639 F.2d 1327, 1332 (Sth Cir.
1981) (observing that evidence that completes the story or that
ie inextricably intertwined with the charged offense is sometimes

labeled res gestae, "an appellation that tends merely to obscure

 

the analysis underlying the admissibility of the evidence") .”

Nevertheless, 2 nunber of courts have raised concerns
regarding the application of the intrinsic/extrinsic analysis to
bypass the prohibition against allowing other “bad acts” to prove
character. As one court observed:

ie note that there (are) no significant costs to requiring =
mute 4oe(b) analyeiay
eetablish 2 not-for-ch
and give pretrial notice(.] Mor does avoiding
ip) absolve the (elourt of the duty, upon request,
to provide a limiting instruction. Therefore, we suggest
that Rule 404(b) should apply to all specific bad acts
proffered by the prosecution, unless such acts occurred in
the tine period covered by the indictment and are
substantively related to the charges.

 

 

 

Ameri, 297 F. Supp. 2d at 1169 (quoting Stephen A. Slazburs,
Michael M. Martin, & Daniel J. Capra, Federal & nce
Manual § 404.02 (eth ed. 2002)) (format altered). The Ameri
court, thus, stated that “courte should be very chary of
admitting ‘bad act’ evidence if it does not pass muster under

Rule 404(b)." Id.

 

‘the United states District Court for the Eastern District of
D. AFR: 2008),

  
 
   

Geextricably intertwined test.”
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Another court has gone even further, questioning the

notion that there should even be an exception to Rule 404(b) for

 

acts that are "inextricably intertwined" with charged offens
In United States v. Bowie, 232 7.34 923 (D.C. cir. 2000),
counterfeit money that led to the charges was discovered on May
16, 1997, when a joint Federal Bureau of Investigation/
Metropolitan Police Department narcotic tasks force executed a
search warrant at a Washington, D.C. apartment where the
defendant resided. 1d, at 925. An officer outside the apartment
noticed a man sitting in the passenger seat of a parked vehicle:
the officer engaged in a conversation with the man, who consented
to a search of the car and indicated that the car belonged to the
defendant. Id. The defendant denied owning the car. Id. A
search of the car revealed more than $3,000 of counterfeit twenty
and fifty dollar bills and a traffic ticket issued ten days
earlier with the defendant's name and license nunber of the car
on it. Id. Because none of the defendant's fingerprints were
found on the bills, the prosecution sought to introduce evidence
of the defendant's earlier arrest (on April 17, 1997) for
possession of counterfeit money. Id, at 926. The trial court
overruled the defendant's Rule 404(b) objection to the

introduction of the April 17, 1997 evidence, holding that Rule

 

404(b) did not apply because the acts were inextricably
intertwined with the charged crime. Id, at 926-27. The United
States Court of Appeals for the District Court of Columbia,

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ee
however, criticized the “inextricably intertwined" analysis as an

unnecessary limitation on the exclusionary language of Rule

404 (b)

 

As a practical matter, it is hard to see what function this
interpretation of Rule 404(b) performs. If the so-called
SIntrineie: act 1e indeed part of the crime charged,
Gvidence of it will, By definition, always satiety Fule
Goeth). The rule bare bad acte evidence only when the
Evidence fs offered solely to “prove the character of
person in créer to show action in conformity therexith
(ean) Rule 40%(b), Bvidence that constitutes the very crime
Being prosecuted ie not of that sore. So far as we can
tell, the only consequences of labeling evidence "intrinsic
are to relieve the prosecution of Rule 404(B)'s notice
Fequirenent and the court of its obligation to give an
Apsropsiate initiag instruction upon defense counsel's
Fequect, See [PRE Rule] 404 (b) advisory committee's note on
the 1991 amendsent (indicating that the notice requirenent
Goes not epply to “intrinsic’ evidence); [FRE Rule) 105
(mandat ings upon request, limiting instruction for sulti-
purpose evidence) (-]

 

 

 

 

  

Id. at 927. The court also questioned whether the distinction
between intrinsic and extrinsic facts was workable:

Bifureating the universe into intrinsic and extrinsic
fvidence has proven difficult in practice. Which of a
Ekfengant's acts shoula be considered the charged crime and
Which should not is often uncertain. In order to brighten
the line separating intrinele and extrinaic evidence, many
Courts have focused on the connection between a given crime
Gr act and the charged crime. when evidence is
Sinesericebly intertwined” with the charges crime, courts
typically treat it aa the sane cine. avery circuit now
applies fone formilation of the inextricably intertwined

 

 

 

 

 

1d, at 927-28 (collection of cases from other circuits and
internal footnotes omitted). The court concluded that, not only
is the line between intrinsic and extrinsic evidence difficult to
Geaw, but that there is a danger when trial courts seek to find

the line:

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(tl reating evidence as inextricably intertwined not only
bypasses fule 404(b) and its attendant notice requirenent,
ut also carries the implicit finding that the evidence a
admissible for all purposes notwithstanding its bearing on
Character, thus eliminating the defense’s ent itlenent, upon
Fequest, toa jury instruction. There ie, as well, a danger
that finding evidence “inextricably intertwined" may too

ty slip from analysis to were conclusion, what does the
“inextricably intertwined" concept entail? When is 3
defendant's crime oF act no indistinguiehabie. from the
charged crime that an item of evidence is entirely removed
from ule 404 (0)?

We have sot defined “inextricably intertwined" in the
few Rule 404(b) cases in which ve used those terms. Our
sister circuits have attempted various formilations. The
Seventh Circuit, for instance, cxamines “whether the
evidence is properly admitted to provide the Jury with @
Complete ctory of the crime on trial, wnether ite absence
would creste # chronological or conceptual void in the story
Of the crine or whether ie
it incigentatty involves, explains the circumstances
surrounding, oF tends to’ prove any element of, the charged
crine.- Unites States v. fughes, 23 F.3d 323, 328 (7tn
Gir 2000).

We do fot find these formations particularly
he1pful. Sone are circular: inextricably intertwined
evidence ie Intrinsic, and evidence is intrinsic if st is
Inextricably intertwined. Others are over-broed. The
“complete the story” definition of “inextricably
Lntertwines" chresvens to override Rale 404(b)- A
Gefendant’'s bad act may be only tangentially related to the
Charged crime, but it nevertheless could “complete the
Story" of vincidentally involve" the charged offense, or
explain the circumstances.” If the proseestion's evidence
aia not "explains or “incidentally savelve" the charged
crine, it is difficult to see how it could pase the minimal
requirenent for admissibility that evidence be relevant
eg (PRE Rules) 403 and 402.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Id, at 928 (citations omitted). The court further observed that

the fact that omitting some evidence would render a story
Slightly less complete cannot justity circusventing mule
40e(b) altogether. Moreover, evidence necessary to complete
4a story’-~ for instance by furnishing a sotive or
Gctabliching identity -- typically nae a non-propensity
Purpose and ie admissible under Rule 40¢(b)

 

Ids at 929.
‘The Bowie court ultimately concluded that

there is no general ‘complete the story or ‘explain the
circumstances" exception to Rule 404(b) in thie [e] szcuse.

Such broad exclusions have no discernible grounding in the

Nother crimes, wrongs, or acts” language of the rive.” Rule
408 (b}, and particularly ite notice requirenent, should not
be disregarded on euch a flimsy basse

 

 

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Id, at 929. To demonstrate ite concerns, the court turned to
the Bowie facte and concluded that the trial court was incorrect
in concluding that the April 17, 1997 evidence was inextricably
intertwined with the May 16, 1997 charged offense, reasoning that
swe do not see how [the defendant's) acts on April 17 constituted
the sane crime aa that charged in the indictment. The
authorities seized the counterfeit bills he had in possession on
April 17, 60 the bills he possessed on May 16 could not have been
the same ones." 1d, Nevertheless, the Bowie court concluded
that the trial court properly adnitted the evidence of the April

17, 1997 incident to show the defendant's intent and knowledge:

‘to convict (the defendant) under 18 U.S.C. § 472, the
prosecution) had to prove three elencnts: possession of
counterfeit notes, intent to defraud, and knowledge the
hotes were counterfeit. Invent and knowledge ere therefore
Tects of consequence to the case. Evidence that. (the
Gefendant] possessed and passed counterfeit notes on a prior
Gecasion was relevant becuse it decreased the Likelihood

 

    

 

“the Bowie court, nonetheless, legitimately recognized that, in a
cnarrow range” of cases, a bad act can be so close in tine and space as to be
part of the charged crine.

 

mule 406(b), for instance, would not have barred testimony
From e witness who saw’ (the defendant) put the counterfeit
Currency in the [vehicle] 's console. Although such
Eeetincty relates to one of defendant's acts, the act is the
Charged crime of possessing counterfeit currency. In other
Nord, Af the evisence ip of an act that is part of the
Charged offence, it 1s properly considered intrinsic. | In
Sadition, some ncharged acte performes.contenporanesusly
ith the’ charged crime nay be termed intrinsic if they
[eciiitate the comission of the charged crine,

 

 

interestingly, it appeare that the United states Court of Appeals
Fe he District court of Columbia continues to acknowledge the adniseicn of
[ntrinsie evidence as falling outeide of Rule 404(b). indeed, in United

fia P. Supp. €1,(D-0.C. 2007), the court stated, "Bows
SEatiEacial to recognize that unchargea bad acts may be ‘intrinsic’ and
Enereby adniseible without a Rule 404 (b) analysis if the acts were ‘part of
Eke"ehirged offense’ or if they were. ‘contemporaneous’ and ‘they facilitated
Exe commission of the charged crime.” 1d, at 69-70 (citation omitted)

 

 

 

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that (the defendant] accidentally or innocently possessed
the counterfeit notes on may 16.” Intent and knowledge are
Also well-established on-propensity purposes for admiteing
Gvidence of prior crines or acts

da at 930."
Similarly, in United States v. cross, 308 F.3d 308 (34
Cir. 2002), the United states Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit (the Third Circuit) declined the prosecution’s invitation
to adopt either the ‘inextricably intertwined" doctrine or the
“complete the story" doctrine, calling them, respectively, “a
definition that elucidates little” and ‘a definition so broad
that it renders 404(b) meaningless.” Id, at 320. Instead, the
‘Third Circuit insisted on a significantly closer connection for
exemption from Rule 404(b) -- rather than “intertwined,” evidence
mist “directly prove the charged [offense]* to escape the rule.

; the defendants, who were state

 

Id. Cross was a conspiracy casi

* tn United States v. Senftser, 260 F-34755 (7th Cir. 2002), the
United Staten Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit declined to follow
Bowie's conclusion that there ie no general “complete the story" or “explain
the circumstances” exception to Rule 404(B), reasoning that

 

Evidence of acts that are joined with the crime iteelf
‘occupy a different stature by nature. That these acts a
a relationship with and connection to the crime (even i 2
broad sense) significantly restricts the ability of the
governnent to offer bad acts by the defendant, which
consistent vith the historical and legislative purpose of
ule 404(b). Zt also eufficiently removes those acts fzom
the language of the per ge proscription in Rule 404 (B),
waich only prohibits sother” bad acti

 

 

   

 

260 F.3d at 764-65 (citations omitted). The court further observed that

the doctrine itself is already @ narrow one, and any
perceived over-inclusiveness in the doctrine ae we define it
is inconsequential, because Rule 402 (like Rule 204 (2) )
protects against the unnecessarily prejudicial presentation
Of barely probative evidence.

 

1a. at 765

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court personnel (hereinafter, the appellants), were charged with
conspiring to violate Pennsylvania citizens’ right to a fair and
impartial trial in connection with a scheme to "fix" state-court
cases. id. at 310. There wae evidence that the appellants
engineered guilty verdicts; however, there was also evidence that
they conspired to fix sone cases in defendants’ favor, which
evidence the government argued should be exempt from Rule 404 (b)
on the grounds that the evidence “completed the story’ of the
appellants’ crimes. Id, at 311-12. The Third Circuit held that
this latter evidence did “not directly prove" the charged

offense, and, thus, Rule 404(b) applied:

 

the alppellante’ acts pertaining to the favorable
Go not directly prove their conspiracy to
nia citizens’ right co a fair and inpartial
hearing in the to be-found-guilty. ‘and thus by any
Getinition are not intrinsic to the [enarged) offense. in a
frial limited to the [violation of citizens’ civil rights],
{the alppeliante vould be charged only with conspiring to
engineer guilty verdicts, not with conspiring to fix cases
Generally. While the evidence pertaining to the favorable
Bispocicion cases helps prove [the a)ppellants” broader
Conspiracy to fix cases, it does not directly prove that
[the alppellante conspired to get defendants found guilty

   

   

 

 

Ad, at 320.
tn another case, People v. Agade, 964 P.24 565 (Colo.
ce. App. 1998), the defendant was charged and convicted of second
degree murder of his girlfriend's male friend. Id. at 566. The
court applied the ree gestae doctrine to admit evidence of an
argument between the defendant and his girlfriend on the night
before the murder. Id, at 567. Although concurring in the

result, Colorado appellate court judge Briggs wrote separately to

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express his concern and caution with excluding evidence
denominated as res gestae from the requirement of Rule 404(b):

The risk of surprise ie not ay only concern with
continuing to forego compliance with the requirenente of
Rule] 404(b) merely because evidence ie denominated as ree
gestae. For example, no limiting instruction i2 required
for evidence of other acts admitted ae Let gestae. However,
the importance of giving a limiting instruction,
particularly when the other acts were not substantially
Simultaneous in time and circumstances, ie no lees chan when
the evidence is admitted under [Rule] 40¢(8). while not
mentioned in more recent cases, the supreme court has noted
that, even with ree jence, it ie the better
practice to instruct the jury regarding the linited purpose
SE the evidence at the tine it ie admitted,

im addition, evidence of ancther act ie sonetines
admitted nerely because it falla within the definition of
ae castes, even though it could easily be excised. The
Timitation under [Rule] 403 that fee geetae evidence should
pot be acsitted if ite probative value ie seubecantially
Satweighea" by the risk of prejudice or confusion hae not
Sleays provided sufficient protection from misuse of the
Goctrine.

Finally, the very concept of res gestae can be
problematic. in Colorado, the tern hse not been
Consistently defined, and, more generally, the doctrine hae
Sonfounded Counsel and courte, often tending to create ae
‘mach confusion ae clarification. Even when the term ie
Uniformy defined, it is aifficult analytically to keep the
dstermination of thether evidence is relevant distinct tron
whether it is part of the ree gestae. For example, in thie
Case, the evidence in question had independent relevance to

how the intermediate inference of motive

Ultimate inference of intent, and we
under [Role] 404 (b), but that has no bearing on whether the
evidence was part of the ree gestae of the crime.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

    

 

Id. at 69-70 (internal quotation marks, citations, and original
brackets and ellipsis omitted). Judge Briggs further suggested a

resolution that

 

all evidence of other acts, including ‘intrinsict res gestae
Evidence as well as other “extrinsic” evidence, be subject
to the requirenents of (Rule) 404(b). “such an approach is
even sore appropriate now chat the "Clear and convincing"
Standard previously applies under the conmon lav for
aénitting evidence of sther acts has been replaced under our
rules of evidence by the lover “preponderance” standara

 

 

 

Id, at 570 (underscored emphasis in original) (bold emphasis

added) (citation omitted). However, in the meantime, Judge

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Briggs cautioned against the use of zee gestae such that “the
exception does not swallow the rule," urging the trial courts to
continue to apply Rule 403 balancing test. Id.

Against this historical backdrop upen which our rules
of evidence have arisen and upon which courts remain conflicted,
we turn now to the case at hand, examining: (1) the arguments
raised by Fetelee in his direct appeal, the ICA's opinion, and
Fetelee’s arguments on application, including the parties’
supplemental briefs, elaborating on the viability of the res
gestae doctrine; and (2) whether the application of the res
gestae doctrine renains viable in this jurisdiction in the wake
of the HRE.

3. The Instant cas

 

The Res Gestae Challenge

a. arguments before the ICA

As previously stated, Petelee was convicted of
attempted murder in the second degree, attempted assault in the
second degree, and theft in the fourth degree, which convictions
Fetelee appealed. on appeal, Fetelee essentially maintained that
the trial court erred in characterizing the apartment incident as
res gestae evidence and, therefore, “the incident [did] not
constitute a prior bad act’ under HRE 404(b). Fetelee

specifically argued that:

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[S]ince the codification of HRE in 1982, there ‘e 10
indication that Havai't courte have intended to expand the
Eek geatar doctrine, i.g., the codification of the common
Taw heareay exception, to include an exception to wrongs

crimes or other acts encompassed under HRE (Rule) 404. []

 

 

consequently, Fetelee believed that Rule 404(b) governed the

admissibility of the apartment incident, and, because the

 

apartment incident was “distinct” from the charged offenses, such
evidence constituted other bad act “propensity” evidence and was

inadmissible. Fetelee also maintained that, even if relevant,

 

the evidence of the apartment incident was not admissible under
HRE Rule 403 inasmuch as “any probative value wae substantially
outweighed by [the] danger of unfair prejudice and [was] likely
[to] rouse} the jury to overmastering hostility against [him].”

serted that the

 

In response, the prosecution
proffered evidence was properly admitted as part of the ree.
gestae of the charged offenses, observing that:

Waite no Hawai" appellate court may have recognized res
Sestae evidence to be an exception to HRE Rule 404(b)

Sz five federal circuite recognize such an exception to
tne fule’s federal counterpart. See United States +. Baker,
432 F.3a 1289, 1205 n.9 (ith cir. 2005) (ran
evidence falls outside scope of [the Federal Rules of
Evidence (FRE) Rule) 404 (b)); United States v. Marsinez, 420
Pid 317, 335 (6th Cir. 2008) (background or “zee gestae”
evidence'does not implicate FRE (Rule) 404(b)}; Unites
Heater v. foberte, 253 Pedd 1131, 2135 (beh Cir. 2001)
{aistrict court cid not abuse ite discretion in admitting
EeE gestae, non-PRE (Rule) 404(b) evidence);

Kisbali, 73 P.34 269, 272 (20th Cir. 1995) (evidence
admissible for one of the purposes specified in FRE (Rule)
04 (b) and ree gestae evidence not always separates by
Bright line) {J"- - - The (prosecution) submits that
Mawai't courte should follow the five federal circuite and
adopt 2 similar res gestae exception to HRE Rule 404 (b) -]

 

 

« Petelee also pointed out that, in Moore, this court “recently
construed rag gestag as a codified exception to the hearsay rule recognized
Under comon Jaw.

 

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The prosecution, alternatively, argued that, even assuming
arguendo that the apartment incident constituted HRE Rule 404 (b)
evidence, i.e., evidence of other bad acte, the trial court
properly admitted the evidence because the *{e]vidence that
[Petelee} was angry, drunk, and violent just before coming into
contact with Lincoln, Hartman, and Alik was relevant to show
[Fetelee] ‘# state of mind, motive, and intent.” The prosecution
further stated that the probative value of the apartment incident
was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice:

‘There . . . existed a significant need for the
evidence UElvidence of the incident war nec:
Provide context to the charged offenses and wae prob:
([Fetelee)"s state of mind, motive, and intent.
explained why [Fetelee) would attack two could
for no apparent reason and refute his clains of

fack of intent. Moreover, there was no effective
alternative of proving the incident other than by having
Freeman and Lopez testify.

irlhe probability of the evidence rousing the jury to

overmastering Hostility was not significant. Bost jurors
Could understand why (Petelee] became angry whea no one
moved the vehicle that was blocking his parking space.
Porthernore, any undue prejudice vas mitigated by the
(erial] court's limiting instruction as te the use of the
evidence.

b. the ICA's holding

As previously stated, the ICA issued its published

   

     

 

   

 

 

 

opinion on April 18, 2007, affirming Fetelee’s convictions
Fetelee, 114 Hawai'i at 152-53, 157 P.3d at 591-92. Therein, the

contentions and concluded that the trial

 

ICA rejected Fetele
court correctly categorized the apartment incident as part of the

ndering the

 

, thereby,

 

res geatae of the charged offense

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evidence admissible as an exception to HRE Rule 404(b). 1d. at
156-59, 157 P.3d at 595-98.

Jn concluding that the apartment incident constituted
zee costae evidence, the ICA relied upon the Lewis definition of
es gestae and ite rule that the ultimate test is “spontaneity or
instinctiveness and logical relation to the main event.” Id. at
157, 157 P.3d at 596 (quoting Lewis, 39 Haw. at 640) (internal
quotation marks omitted). As the Lewis court stated,

in order for statenente to be adnitted as part of the xt

aesian the statenenes me be

(Of the event without opportunity for deliberation oF
Entivence

  

   

Lewis, 39 Haw. at 640 (emphases added) (citation omitted). Based

upon the foregoing, the ICA explained that:

In the instant case, the [trial] court properly admitted the
evidence of the (apartment) incident... as part of the
Hes gestae of the incigent in question...”

Tn total, Petelee wae agitated wien he arrived hone to
find his parking stall blocked and Ale agitation, coupled
with nie Tntoxication, continued throughout the course of
the early sorning,

‘gichanse sith Lincoln, and the unprotoked saaault on the So
Micronesian non were reasonably contenseraneous with ene
another:

Fetelee, 114 Hawai'i

 

157, 157 P.3d at 596 (emphasis added).

 

Subsequently, the ICA, in concluding that ree gestae evidence was
adnissible es en exception to HRE Rule 404 (b), initially observed
that, “[blecause our appellate courts have not addressed a res
gestae exception to Rule 404(b), we look to other jurisdictions
for guidance." Id. at 157, 157 P.34 at 596. Specifically, the

ICA discussed four out-of-state cases, to wit: (1) State vi

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Blmore, 965 P.2d 269 (Wash. 1999); (2) Beople v. Robinson, 340
N.W.2d 303 (Mich. Ce. App. 1983); (3) State v. Pasek, 691 N.W.2d
301 (S.D. 2004); and (4) People v, Quintana, 882 P.24 1366 (Colo
1994). In so doing, the ICA stated.

im [Blmore,], Elmore pled guilty to rape and
aggravated first degree murder of a fourteen-year-old
Tein, {905 P.2d) ae 296 6299. ‘Elmore appealed,
Costending, inter alia, that the trial court erred in
Sanitting evidence that he had solested the victim when she
waa five yeare old. 1d... at 311. Me reasoned chat the
Prior solestation was a separate bad act and had to be
Evaluated under Rule 404(b) {id.] ae 311. ‘The Washington
Suprene Court disagrees and held that the pricr nolestation
wat part of the ren estas of the crines charged. id =. =
Re siti2, ‘The court reasoned that the victim's threatening
fo aleciose the prior molestation had served in part ap a
Catalyst for her murder and therefore the trial court
Ehought it was proper to allow the admission of the prior
molestation to “complete the picture" for the jury. Id.

Sgt 311-12. The court concluded that such admission
wad proper under the res geatae or “sane transact ion*
Cheeption to Role 404(B). [Ids] at 312. “thie exception
permite the adniveion of evidence of other crimes or
Risconduct where it ie link in the chain of an unbroken
Sequence of evente surrounding the charged offense in order
that a complete picture be depicted for the jury." state v.
Acosta. Se'p.ad S03, $12 (2004) (internal quotation
marks, citation, and ellipsis omitted)

‘the fe2 aéetae exception co the general Rule 404(b) is
aiso recognizes in Michigan. (in Robingon,] Robinson was
Gonvicted of carrying a concealed weapon... 340 H.W2d
Se uoe. at trial, the victim testified that Robinson hea
Fobbed her of $60'eo that he could replace the soney he had
previously stolen from his employer. ‘The court of
Kppeals of Michigan held the victim's testinony
SEednieeible. Id... - The court reasoned that(,] while
the portion of the victim's testimony involving het robbery
by Robinson could have been properly admitted under the ree

exception to the general rule (404(b)), the portion
Sfther cestinony as to Robinson's motive for robbing her was
ihelly irrelevant as Robinson had been charged with carrying
Mconceales weapon, not robbery. (Jd) at 304-05, Michigan
Courts have defined the res gestae exception co Rule 406 (b)
fie that "evidence of prior bad acts (that) is aduissible
Where those acta are so blended or connected with the
charged offense thet proof of one incidentally involves the
Sther or explains the circumstances of the crime.” (Jd) at
Soe. (internal quotation marks, citation, and parentheses
omitted; bracketed taterial added).

Likewise, in (Pages.] the Supreme Court of south
pakota stated chat “evidence of ‘other acts’ may be
Senlaeible 25 zee gestae evidence, an exception to South
Dakota Codified Lave (S5CL) 19-225 or Federal Rule 404 (b).*

e*es) MiWead at 209 n-7.” On June 25, 2003, Pasek

 

  

   

   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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‘aped from jail in Montana, stole a car, and drove it to
South Dakota.” Id. at 304. On June 30, 2003, Pasek robbed a
bank in South Dakota, stole a second vehicle, and proceeded
fo Indians, where the authorities later apprehended him

Ja. A jury convicted Pasek of one count of roboery in the
Hitec degree and three counte of grand theft Id.” On
appeal, Pasek contended the trial court hed erred in
Samiteing statenente that Parek mage to hie friend while
they were in the first stolen vehicle sbout Pasek's plans to
rob the bank. Id, at 309. According to Pasek, these
Statenents constituted "upermissible other acts evidence.”
4G, st 307 (brackets omitted) The South Dakota Supreme
Gourt disagreed, setersining that Pasek's complete criminal
transaction Degen with his escape and auto theft on June 25
land ended with the bank robbery and second auto theft ob
Sune 30, and concluding that (,] because Pasek's statenents
were impediately antecedent to the main transaction and were
Helpful in understanding the bank robbery and vehicle
thefts, the statenents were properly admitted ss res gestae.
Ad. at’ 309,

‘The ies gestae embraces matters and statenents
immediately antecedent to, and having a causal
connection vith, the main transaction. The zea
Sentae as applied to a crime, includes the
Complete criminal traneactioa from its beginning
or starting point in the act of accused until
the end ia reached. Continuing acte or a seri
of evente, transpiring before the commission of
the crine, snd which lead up to and are
necessary or helpful to an understanding of the
main event, and tend to explain the conduct and
Purposes of the parties are admissible as pare
of the res gestae

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1a

and, in... Quintana, . . . a jury convicted
Quintana St, diter alia, firet degree murder, (862 P.24) at
$570. pricr'co trial, Quintana moves to suppress three
statenente he had sade either during or inmediacely,
Subsequent to the murder =~ all of which expressed his
Gesire to kill other persons not involved in the instant
murder. 16, at 1370 61373. ‘The Supreme Court of Colorado
Concluded that the statemente could have been properly
adnitted as ren gestae evidence of the crime:

Evidence of other offenses or acts that ie not

extrinsic to the offense charged, but rather, ie

part of the criminal episode or transaction with

“hich the defendant is charged, is adsiseible to

provide the fact-finder with a full and complete

Understanding of the events surrounding the

rine and the context in which the charged crime

Sccurred. Such evidence is generally linked in

Eine and circunstances with the charged crime,

or forms an integral and natural part of ax

account of the crime, or is necessary to

Complete the story of the erine for the Jury.

‘This type of evicence is considered part of the

KOE geutas of the offense and it is hot subject

fOithe general rule that excludes evicence of

prior criminality. Reg gestae evidence inclu

 

 

 

 

 

 

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the circumstances, facts and declarations which
Stice from the nain event and serve to
THeserace fee character. Tt also includes
evidence that is closely related in both time
Gnd nature to the charged offen
Ad. at'1375" (internal quotation marks, citations, and
Footnote omitted). The court further emphasized that res
eatae evidence tis the antithesis of . --- Colorado Rules
SE Bvidence [(CRE)] 40¢(b) evidence. were CRE 408(b)
Gvidence is independent from the charged offense, rea geatac
evidence is linkes to the offense."[" id.) at 1373 a.22-
‘The court added that res geatae evidence is adnissibi
Lest is relevant and ite probative value is not
substantisily outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”
Hana 1376

 

    

 

 

‘only

 

Id. at 158-59, 157 P.3d at 597-98 (original brackets and ellipsia

omitted)." Based upon the recognition of the admission of res

 

© me Quintana court observed that

other act” evidence . . . generally occurs at ai ferent
Cises and under different ‘circumstances from the charged
offense. = (CLE, =, 764-28
$455, 1496 (xien cir. 1968) (Evidence of en uncharged
Gtfenee arising from the sane series of transactions 22 that
Gharges is not an extrinsic offense within mule 404(b) .°)
United Staten v. Meeks, 716 P.20 830, 632 (Lith Cir. 1983)
(other act evidence docs not fall within the proscription of
Rule 404(b) if the evidence ip inextricably intertwined with
the evidence regarding the cherged offense). Indeed,
Sother" is defined aa vdifferent or distinct from that or
referred to or inplied; different in nature or kind.*
‘New World Dictionary 1007 (24 College ed. 1974)

 

 

    

se2 P.2@ at 1572 (other citation omitted) .

% on application, Feteles argues that the ICA “glossed over the
aforementioned four cases reised upon by the ICA) and misapplied their
holdings." specifically, Fetelee argues that:

ut is unclear which rationale -- that set out in Quintana or
that set out in Elmore, Robinson, and Pagek -- the ICA
adopted and why it did so. Thut, the Zch's decision does
hot provide any guidance on how to apply the exception =
Adopted. Fetelee’s case ic, moreover, unlike Elaore, where
the detenaant's prior molestation was the catalyst for ene
Crime, and Robinson, woere the defendant's prior robbery,
explained how the crime occurred, and Paseks where the
Gefendant's monologue recounted the beginning of his crine
Spree and hie intent to comit the crises charged, and

where the defendant’s staenents compel ied the
Stee of a covdetendant and directly countered the
Sefendant’s lack of intent defense. It is clear, however,
regardless of whether the ICA employed the rationale of

(Continued

 

 

 

 

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gestae evidence as an exception to Rule 404(b) described by the
courts in the aforementioned cases, the ICA again summarized the
apartment incident as res gestae evidence and admissible under

the exception to HRE Rule 404(b):

(Fhe incident in Lopes’s apartment is Linked to the crimes
charged. Purthersore, the incident is relevant to provide
the Jury with an explanation as to why Fetelee was so angry
and agitated. Fetelee wae intoxicated. Petelee acted
Mlotently and irrationally in barging into Lopes’ «
apertsent, throwing « fan, punching Freeman, ané pursuing
Tony. Petelee's actions vere due to the fact that someone:
had perked and blocked his parking stall. “And all this
after Lope: had relayed to Fetelee that none of her gueste’
Care vere blocking his parking

conguse sleohol and

money. These actions are not wholly independent or
Syrelevant to Petelee's subsequent unprovoked assault on the
te Microneaian men. It is evidence that was necessary to
complete the story for the Jury.

 
 

 

 

Id, at 159, 157 P.3d at 598.°"
argumente before this court

on application, Fetelee argues, inter alia, that “the

ICA's definition of res gestae and its application of the res

 

gestae exception clearly swallowed HRE 404(b)."** Fetelee
6 (,.,eotinued)
‘Elmore, Robinson, Zasek, or that of Quintana, the prior

 

incident at the aparcnent was irrelevant, unvelated,
prejudicial, and lacked a legitimate link to the charged
offenst

 

© The ICA made no mention of Fetelee's azgunent that the apartnent
sneident vas, severtheless, inadmisaible under WRE Rule 403 because the
probstive value of the evidence vas substantially outweighed by the danger of
Unfair prejudice.

 

algo saintaing that the apartment incident cannot be
‘aestae of the charged offenses. Specifically, Petelee
argues that the apartment incident fails the Levie test inasmuch as there was
Fo Mesua between the charged offenses and the epartwent incident:

 

‘The... incidents were separate, unrelated, and lacked any

nexus to'each other. the sncigente occurred at different

locations =- the firet in Lopes's apartment, the second on
(Continued...)

 

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further asserts, in his eupplenental brief, that the plain
language and legislative history of the HRE confirm that the HRE
superseded the common law res gestae doctrine. According to
Fetelee, “the res gestae doctrine itself is obsolete to the
extent that the various rules comprising the doctrine have not
been subsumed in the ERE, and the use of res gestae to admit
evidence independent of the HRE is unnecessary, harmful, and
unconstitutional.”

‘to further support his position that the xes gestae
doctrine should be abandoned, Fetelee points out that, in an
analogous situation involving the Hawai'i Penal Code (the Code) ,

both this court and the ICA have held that legislative enactments

 

supersede common law doctrines. Specifically, Fetelee asserts

that:

Im State v. Rnerson, 110 Hawai'i 138, 240, 129 P.3¢ 2167,
[lee App 2006). didge Lim, writing for ‘the ICA, elucidated
that the legislature's intent in enacting the Code, similar
tothe legislature's intent in enacting che MRE, was to
“being uniformity" to the law, and, thus, the legislative
ehactnent overrode a non-Code statute. id. at 143, 129 P.3d
Sint “cikewise, in State v. Maumslanga, 90 Maval't 58, 976
P.zd’372 (1999) (*Maunalanga i"), this court held chat
there are no common lev "considerations* in HRS § 703-302 as

 

 

 

 

 

the adoption of the’ (Code)
Hawaii 96, 976 P.24 $10 (pp.
(acoba, J. concurring ané dil
adopted by'this court in Maumalanas £2)

  

 

(continued)
‘fhe etrect. The parties that were involved were completely
Gitterent —- Lopes, her parents, Freeman and Tony were in
the apartnent, whereas Lincoln, ‘Wartman, and Alik were on
the street. feither group ad any relation or connection to
the other. The Lasues involved in each incident were
substantively aistince.

 

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Fetelee further contends that:

Hawaii case lav pre-Code and pre-WRE also supports treating
codified statutes as having superseded the common 1a
doctrines. “In Territory v. Alford, 39 Maw. 460, *4 (1952),
tthe Suprene Court of the Territory of Hawaii held that ene
etatutory law of the territory superseded s common Law
Goctrine: In fact, where there ie no ambiguity in the
statute, ‘the statutory text should alvaye control over other
Sources ‘of authority, such as the conmen law. ee Weigh ve
Campbell, 41 aw. 106 (1985) (look to the conmcn law only ta
instances vhere there are *ho governing provisions of th
written lav"); Territory v. Gora, 3? Haws 2 (13¢4) (no need
fo draw on comon law shen there’ ie no ambiguity in the
statute or in the legislative intent); cf, Territory

Scully, 22 Haw. 616 (1925) (when definition of statute
Tacking, say look £0 common lav for guidance). ff the
statute is expressed and the legislative intent ie
Gefinitive, there ia no need to resort to the common Law.

 

 

  

   

 

Thus, according to Fetelee, because HRE Rule 404(b) is
unambiguous, resort to the common law doctrine of reg geatae to
expand or contract the rule’s scope is improper. In essence,

Fetelee maintains:

Zn enact ng che HRE, che Tegieature, codified the canired
fon the (FRE), common

and beneficial principles
(nd Hawaii case law.
3980 Senate Journal, at

     

8. Stand. Comm Rep. No spate Journal, at
The legislature inteadea that this single source of
iary rules would "promote informed judicial rulings.”
‘Stand. Com. Rep. No, 721-60, in 1980 House Journals
fat 1608. Further, the legiclature envisioned that the ERE
Would result in ‘uniformity of evidentiary rulings." fen.
Stand. Com. Rep. No. 22-80, in 1960 Senate Journal, at
1029," In'eum, the legislature "eoatt{ied) the law of
evidence, to promote inforaed Judicial rulings on evidence
points, and to achieve uniformity in the treatment of
evidence among the coures of this State." House stand.

Coan. Rep. No. 712-80, in 1960 House Journal, at 1608[.]

 

 

(First brackets in original.)
In contrast to Fetelee, the prosecution argues, in its
supplemental brief, that res gestae evidence is “relevant

evidence" under HRE Rule 402 and is, therefore, admissible. Rule

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402 provides that *[aJl1 relevant evidence is admissible, excey

 

 

as otherwise provided by (law]." In the prosecution’s view:

Res aeatee evidence is relevant evidence under the
une. Reg seater evidence “is generally linked in time and
circumstances with the charged crime, or forms an integral
fand natural part of an account of a crine, or ie necessary
fo complete the story of the crime for the jury.”

Quintana, £62 P.26 1366, 1373 (Colo. 1994) (citation and
Gneernal quotation marks omitted). suck evidence "provides
the fact-finder with a full and complete understanding of
the evente surrounding the crine and the context in which
the charged crime occurred." 1d. (citations omitted). "A
jury ie entitled to know the clrcunstances and background of
a criminal charge. Te cannot be expected to make ite
decision ina void -- vithout knowledge of the time, place,
nd circumstances of the acts which form the basie of the
Charge.” United states v_ aly, 97 F.2d 1215, 1217 (3th
Giz. 1992)" (citations omitted)

‘Therefore, rea gestae evidence is probative of a
witness’ credibility. see State v. Hockines, 562 P.24 $87,
592 (Or. App. 1977). (othe believability of « witness Je
2 Shs much an iegue 26 the elements of the crime. .
ackgrouna information is relevant to the issue of the
Delievability of the witness’ estinony.*); gee aleo state
ye-Murphy, 59 Haw. 1, 9-10, 575 7.24 468, 455 (1978) (ened
Yor revealing the background cireuratancen surrounding the
witnese'2 asgocistion with the defendant was deened to be
Crucial in order to eatablish the witness's believabilicy").
Ag tthe credibility of a witness is always relevant,” State

99 Hawai'i 390, 422, 96 .34 692, 724 (2002),
fog aestas evidence may be properly admitted under MRE Rule
02

 

 

      

 

 

 

 

(original brackets omitted.)
Furthermore, the prosecution asserts that, although
some statements made ae part of the res gestae may have been
subsuned by the “excited utterance" exception to the hearsay rule
found in BRE Rule 603(b) (2) (1983), the ICA correctly concluded
that there is a reg geatae exception to HRE Rule 404(b). The

prosecution cites to a number of federal and state cases that

 

expressly recognized that Rule 404(b) does not apply to

res geatae evidence. For example,

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Inited States v. axdy, 220 F.3d 745, 748 (6th cir. 2000)
(Zee aietae evidence doce not implicate FRE Rule 404(b) 7
432 F.3d 1109, 2208 n.9 (ith Cir.
2005) (res aeatae evicence fails outeide scope of FRE [Rule]
404(b); United States v, Biebold, 135 F.3d 1226, 1229 (eth
Cir. 2598) (wen evidence is sdmitted under the ree gestae.
FRE Rule 404(b) not implicated) (;) . . . State v. Acouta,
Pld $03, 512 (Wash. Ce. App, 2004) (zea Sestaa exception te
(mule) 404(b) permite admission of other crimes or
‘misconduct where it is a link in the chain of an unbroken
Sequence of evente surrounding the charged offense, State
Eaek, 691 N.w.24 301, 308 n.7 (8.0. 2004) (evidence of
Sother acts” may be admissible as rea cesta evidence) =

 

 

 

 

 

(Original brackets and sone internal quotation marks omitted.)
‘The prosecution further observes that other federal courts have
similarly acknowledged the viability of the res gestae doctrine
in holding that FRE Rule 404(b) does not apply to uncharged
criminal activity that “arose out of the sane transaction or
series of transactions as the charged offense, if it is
inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged
offense, or if it is necessary to complete the story of the crime
on trial." (Quoting United State v. Gonzales, 110 F.2d 936, 942
(24 cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted.))

a t's x x is

The foregoing discussion underscores the need for this
court to settle the question whether the rea gestae doctrine can
co-exist with the HRE. We begin with the examination of the
purposes underlying the codification of the HRE.

As previously stated, the conmentary to Rule 100
provides that “[t]he purpose of this chapter is to codify the law
of evidence, to promote informed judicial rulings on evidence

points, and to achieve uniformity in the treatment of evidence

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ee
among the courts of this State." Consistent with this

 

commentary, the legislature expressly recognized -- through the

adoption of a standing committee report by the Senate Judiciary

Committee -- that:

‘the present need to codity evidentiary rules has come
about Because of the realization that traditional
Gevelopment of these roles on the case-by-case basis has
een found woefully inadequate. Too often, the direction of
evidentiary rulings in any given ©

Semantic propensities of individual jusaes.
Evigentiary rulings have not been uniform, and
Gifticalt to preaict.

‘The concept of justice presunes that principles of
reasoning subslet, which when discovered and uniformly
applied, vill 1ead to fair and satisfactory resulte in
Fenolving different and contending elaine of Tight. By such
premise, che fact that im practice sone judges will admit
Eertain types of evidence to influence the outcove of trial,
while other judges do cthersise, can only erode public
Confidence in the judicial process. The (SRE) is a
Goncerted effect to correct that flaw.

 

 

     
 

  

 

sen. Stand. Comm, Rep. No. 22-80, in 1980 Senate Journal, at 1030
(internal quotation marke and ellipses omitted). Furthermore,

the legislature explained that:

[rine (RE) ie... a very comprehensive compendium of
ules that apply to eituations in litigation waich
hecessitate evidentiary considerations. It will, as such,
Bifora to practitioners and Jay public alike a singular and
Brimary source where all evidentiary rules are rationally
Srganized and discussed as they apply to cases litigated in
Hawai'i

 

 

1d, at 1031 (emphasis added). Given the legislature's
articulated intent that the ERE be “a singular and primary source
where ali evidentiary rules are rationally organized[,]* ise,
that it cover the whole subject on the admissibility of evidence,
the legislature has clearly spoken that the HRE supersedes the
aE mule 102.1 (1993) provides that *[eThe comentary to these rules

wen published may De used ae an aid in Understanding the rules, but not ae
Geidence of legislative intent”

 

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commen law res gestae doctrine. See Kienker v. Bauer, 110
Hawai'i 97, 109, 129 P.3d 1125, 1137 (2006) (*[WJhen a statute is
in derogation of the common law, the intention of the legislature
will not be presumed to repeal the common law or a prior statute

es he leaislature intended to cover

 

u le subject.*) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) .
Analogously, the United States Supreme Court (the
court), in Daubert v, Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579
(2993), held that the FRE, enacted in 1975, superseded the common
law of evidence which, by implication, included "the Frye test.”

Id, at 587. The Daubert Court stated:

‘The Exve test hae ite origin in a short and citation-free

i923 decision|, Prve-v, United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.
3523), ] concerning the admissibility of evidence derived

from & systolic biood pressure deception test, a crude
precursor to the polygraph machine.” In what had become a
famous (perhaps infamous) passage, the then Court of Appt
for the District of Columbia described the device and its
operation and declared

 

 

 

 

    

wnen a scientific principle or discovery
fe the line between the experimental and
able stages is difficult to define.
re in thie twilight zone the evidential
the principle must be recognizes, and
hile courte will go a long way in adnitesne
Gupert testisony deduced from 4 well-recognized
Scientific principle or discovery, the thing

 

Butfieiestly saesbliened co have ners

Eelonag’({hereinetter, known as the Frve
“general acceptance test].

= 293 F, at 1014 (emphasis added).
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585-86 (internal quotation marks omitted) .
stated differently, novel scientific evidence, under Exye, was

admiesible only if it was based on a method or theory that had

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a

sgained general acceptance’ within the field. However, the Court
in Daubert -- like this court here -- was faced with the specific
challenge as to the continuing authority of the Exye "general
acceptance” test in the wake of the FRE, which contained the
standard for admitting expert testimony in federal trials. Id.
at 587

In rejecting Fxve and holding that the Exye "general
acceptance” test was superseded by the adoption of the FRE, the
court observed that, although the common law may serve as an aid
in interpreting the FRE, nothing in the drafting history of Rule
702, which governed expert testimony, gave any indication that
sgeneral acceptance’ is the “absolute prerequisite’ for the
admission of scientific evidence.” Id, at 587-88. The Court
further explained that:

‘The drafting history makes no mention of Prve, and a rigid
Tpeneral acceptance requirement would be at Odda with the
iiberal thrust of the (FRE) and [Jes] general approach of
Felaxing the traditional barriers to opinion testimony.
Given the [FRE's] permigeive Beckdrop and (ite) inclusion of
2 specific rule on expert testimony that does not mention
“general acceptance,” the assertion that the (FRE) sonehow
Assimilated Prve is unconvincing. Exye sade “general
fceptance" the exclusive test for admitting expert
Sehtitie testimony. That austere standard, absent fron,
land incompatible with, the (PRE), should not’ be applied in
federal trials

 

 

aE Rule 702 provides that:

If scientitic, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will aselet the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified a an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
stleatson, ay Sestity ehereto in the form of a opinion or

 

 

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Id. at 588-89 (citations, other internal quotation marks, and
footnote omitted). The Court, nevertheless, stated that:

‘That the Brve (~general acceptance] test was displaced by
the [FRE] doce not mesn, However, that the [FRE itself)
Place[s} no limite on the admissibility of purportedly
Eclentific evidence. Nor is the trial judge dseabled from
Bereening such evidence. To the contrary, under the (FRE, ]
the trial judge” must eneure that any and’ all sciencizic
Eestinony oF evidence admitted is not only relevant but
reliable.

 

 

 

Id. at 589 (footnote omitted) .””
In the instant case, we believe that the principles
that historically have comprised the res gestae doctrine have
been codified, but without the use of the words “res gestae,”
within the HRE. As previously stated, certain concepts contained
in the doctrine have been subsuned within the exceptions to the
hearsay rules found in HRE Rule 803, such as present sense
impressions, excited utterance, and the then-existing mental,
emotional, or physical condition. More importantly, there is a
specific HRE rule that speaks to the evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts. As quoted earlier, Rule 404(b) provides that:

‘opiove the character of a perach in order to-ahew-actaen
Eon =
sbere auch evidence in arebative of-another fact that is of

Droof of motive. cmmortunity. intent. preparation, lan.

 

© The Court summarized its holding as follows:

soeneral acceptance’ ie not a necessary precondition to the
acsiecibélicy of scientific evidence under the (FRE), but
the [FRE] -- especially Rule 702 -- do assign to the trial
judge the task of enguring chat an expert's testimony both
fests cna reliable foundation and ie relevant to the task
at hand. ‘Pertinent evidence bared on scientifically valid
principles will satisfy those denancs.

   

 

14. at 597.

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eee

Seiiccideit. in criminal cases, tbe proponent of evidence
Sore offered under this eubsection shall provide reasonable
Rotice in advance of trial, of during trial if the court
Cnevees pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the date,
{Ceation; and general nature of any such evidence it intends
to introduce at trial

 

 

(suphasis added.) By ite plain language, Rule 404 (b) generally
prohibits the adnission of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, which
negatively impacts a defendant's character or shows propensity to
commit a crime. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may,
however, be admissible for other purposes when relevant to an
jesue in a case, £.g., to show “notive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, modus operandi, or
absence of mistake or accident." HRE Rule 404(b). In other
words, because the legislative history and HRE Rule 404(b) iteelf
make no mention of evidence of other criminal activity that
pecones part of the history of the event on trial, ive., the res
gestae evidence, the admission of such evidence ‘would be at
cade," Daubert, 509 U.S, at 568, with the legislative purpose of
establishing the HRE as “a singular and primary source where all

jen. Stand. Comm.

 

evidentiary rules are rationally organized{.*

 

Rep. No. 22-80, in 19860 Senate Journal, at 1031. We, therefore,
conclude that the reg gestae doctrine is no longer a legitinate
independent ground for admissibility of evidence in Hawai'i
inasmuch as the it is auperseded by the adoption of the HRE.

Accordingly, we are in accord with courts that have retired the

term “res gestae” from the language of the law of evidence

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because it is no longer useful and tends only to confuse the
reasoning with respect to why a given evidence should be

admissible.* We are convinced by the rationale of other courte

 

and commentators, suggesting that the better practice is to
analyze admissibility under the specific rule of evidence that
applies to the particular factual situation presented.”

We are not persuaded by other courts that have
implicitly recognized the doctrine under the guise of
intvinsic/extrinsic evidence and the “inextricably intertwined"
factor. In our view, these expressions are troublesome in that
they essentially nullify Rule 404 (b)‘e restrictions on “bad act"
evidence. Indeed, as previously quoted and worth repeating here,
the Bowie court criticized the aforementioned formulation,

stating:

% we note that the prosecution's argument that x25 gestae evidence is
srelevant evidence’ under HRE Rule 402 and, thus, is admissible ie without
merit. In Gusby, the Kansas Suprene Court specifically explained thats

ere relevi on to
seh. KoS-A. 60-407 states that "all relevant
evidence is adnissibie except ehat evidence which is

excluded under a statute. The doctrine of res gestae ie not
galv_an_imroser basis for circumventing the exclusion of

hearsay evidencer for
Sixcumventing KSA, 60-455 [(coverning the admissibilicy of
other crimes or civil wrongall=

144 P.3d at 662 (emphases added). As such, the Gumby court declared that
s[eyhe concept of res gestae is dead as an’ independent basis for admissibility
of evidence in Kansas.

"Tas at 663 (enphacia added)

 

 

= we note, however, that compliance with Rule 40¢(b) does not itself
assure admission of the other crimes evidence, evidence may Se excluded on the
Basie that ‘ice probative value ie substantially outweighed by the danger of
Untair prejudice(.]" RE Rule 403.

 

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sone are circular: inextricably intertwined evidence is
Enerinsic, and evidence is intrinsic if itis inextricably
[ntertwined, others are over-broad. The “complete the
story" derinition of “inextricably intertwined" threatens to
Gvertide Fale 404 (b). A defendant's bed act may be only
Cangencially related to the charged crime, but it
nevertheless could "complete the story" of “incidentally
Tavelver the charged offense, or "explain the
cizcustances.” If the prosecution's evidence id not
Sexplain’ or “incidentally involve" the charged crime, it ie
Gleficule fo see how it could pass the mininal requirenent
for admineibsisty shat evidence be relevant. See FRE
Roles) 401 and 402.

 

 

    

232 F.3d at 928.
In Light of the above discussion, we hold that the res
gestae doctrine is no longer viable in this jurisdiction and
shall not be used or recognized as an independent basis for the
admission of evidence. As euch, we must now determine whether
the apartment incident in this case would nevertheless have been
admissible under HRE Rule 404(b), thereby rendering the ICA's
ultimate conclusion to uphold the trial court’s August 3, 2005

Judgment of conviction and sentence proper.

 

e. ics

As previously stated, Rule 404(b) prohibits the use of
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts “to prove the character
of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith.” In excluding character evidence under Rule 404,

the legislature recognized the inherent danger of such

evidences = Character evidence is of slight probative value

Sud may be very prejudicial. It tends to distract the trier

Of fact from the main question of what actually happened on

Eke particular eceasion.'"  HRE (Rule) 404, Comentary
(quoting {FRE Fule] 404 advisory comittee’s note)

 

 

 

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Im enacting subsection (b), the legislature
specifically sought to preclude the aduission of evidence of
specific instances of conduct “when the only relevance is ia
the two-step inference from ‘other’ conduct to general
character and then ‘to show that he acted in conforsity,
Eherevith’ on the cession in question.” HRR [Rule] 404,
Conmentary.

State v. Pemberton, 71 Haw. 466, 471-72, 796 P.24 80, 83 (2990).

under subsection (b), however, evidence of other crimes, wrongs,

 

 

 

or acts may be admissible for other purposes, such as to show
‘motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, modus operandi, or absence of mistake or accident.”
See State v. Clark, 83 Hawai'i 289, 300, $26 P.2d 194, 205 (1996)
("The list of permissible purposes in Rule 404(b) is not intended
to be exhaustive for the range of relevancy outside the ban is
almost infinite.” (Internal quotation marks and citation
omitted.)).* Evidence deemed admissible under Rule 404(b) would

nevertheless be excluded

 

Af ite probative value se substantially outweighed by the
Ganger Of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, oF
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of tine, or Heediess presentation of cumlative
evidence.

 

 

% indeed, as this court stated:

Rule 404(b) was intended not to define the set of
Permissible purposes for which bad-acte evidence may be
AGnitted but rather to define the one impermissible purpose
for such evidence. Only one series of evidential hypoth

is forbidden in criminal cases by Rule 404: a person who
connite a crine probably had a defect of character) a person
with a defect of character is nore likely than people
‘eneraily to have committed the act in question. in othe
words, under Rule 404(b), any purpose for which bad-acte
Evidence is introduced io & proper purpose to long a= the
evidence is not offered aolely to prove character

Clark, 62 Hawes"l at 206, 926 P.24 at 301 (original brackets, internal
Gotation marks, and citation omitted) (emphases in original)

 

      

 

 

 

 

 

 

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OO
RE Rule 403. In other words, the trial court must

first determine if the evidence of other crimes, wrongs or
‘cte ie relevant and sprobative of any other fact that is of
EGnsequence te the determination of the action, such ae
fotive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
Teentity, modus operandi, or absence of mistake or
accidens* HRE [Rule] 404(b)-(° If such evidence is
Getersined to be relevant, the court must then balance the
probative value of the evidence ageinst ite prejudicial
Tepact. HR (Rule) 403.

 

state v. Renon, 73 Haw. 23, 32, 828 P.2d 1266, 1270 (1992)
(footnote omitted) .

Here, the trial court, in addition to finding that the
apartment incident constituted xes gestae evidence, also ruled

that:

‘ough the [apartment] incident does not constitute @ prior
Bad act, ie de noted that its relevance dors incluge an

5 ne
seSe. Loset"e apartment’ Sith respect to [HR] Rule 403,

while the evidence in admittedly prejudicial, it is of
Significant probative value to core matters Of proof
required by the prosecution.

 

Fetelee, 114 Hawai'i at 154, 157 P.3d at 593 (emphases added).
tn his application, Fetelee asserts -- as he did before the ICA
<- that evidence relating to the apartnent incident was neither
relevant nor probative to the underlying charges. Specifically,

Fetelee argues that the apartment incident

1% Relevant evidence se “evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that Ls of consequence to the determination of the
SUISSE "Sco probable or legs probable chan it would be without the evidence.”
Ian mute 401" Moreover, *{a) il relevant evidence is adziesible, except
iheneise provides by... these rules{.)" BRE Rule 402 (1983).

  

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did not illustrate Fetelee’s intent, did not counter
Fetelee’s defense, and was not necessary for the jury to
Feach a determination of the theft or ageauit charges, "The
only purpose of the evidence was to improperly convey that
Fetelee was a person prone to violent bursts of anger, which
is specifically prohibited under MRE (mule) 404(D) and alee.
under BRE 403)

 

 

The prosecution, however, maintained in its answering brief that:

Evidence that [Feteleel was angry, drunk, and violent just
Defore coming into contact with Lincoln, Hartman, and Allk
was relevant to show (Fetelee]'s state of mind, motive” and
Antent. Evidence of the incident was also necessary to aid
the jury to understana the context in which the crime
occurred and to refute [Feteles)'s claine of self-defense
and lack of intent. The evidence explained why (Fetelee)
would pick Fight with two complete strangers for no

rent reason, knocking one of them unconscious and
‘king him in the head while he lay on the ground before
Funning to his apartnent to get a knife to stab the other.
As such, the evidence wae relevant to show that [Petelee]
had intentionally engaged in conduct which was a eubetantial

sp in a course of conduct which was intended or know to
Cause the Geach of Alik and substantial bodily injury of

 

   

 

 

(amphases added.)
‘This court has previously declared that *[i]ntent
refers to the state of mind with which an act is done or omitted,
Black's Law Dictionary 610 (6th ed. 1990), and differs from most
of the other [Rule] 404(b) exceptions because it is an ultimate
issue in the case.* enon, 73 Haw. at 36, 828 P.2d at 1272
(other citation omitted). Consequently, we review the
prosecution's contention regarding the admissibility of the

not three -- grounds, ive,

 

apartment incident evidence on two
intent (which is the state of mind) and motive.
i. dntent
*(P)roof of the required mental elenent of the offenses

charged|, i.¢., intent,] is admissible because it does not

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require an inference as to the character of the accused or as to
his conduct." Id. at 26-37, 626 P.2d at 1272-73 (internal
quotation marke, citation, and original footnote omitted). In
this case, the prosecution -- having charged Fetelee with
attempted murder in the second degree, attempted assault in the

second degree, and theft in the second degree

 

had the burden
to prove that Fetelee intentionally attempted to murder Alik,
intentionally attempted to assault Hartman, and intentionally
obtained or exerted unauthorized control over Lincoln's ten
Gollare. Fetelee testified that Alik was stabbed with his own
knife during Fetelee’s struggle with Alik and that he punched
Hartman because he believed that Hartman was going to punch him.

In other words, Fetelee maintained that he acted in self-defense,

ag previously stated, Fetelee was charged with attempted murder in

 

 

 

the second degree, attempted assault in the second degree, and theft in the
Second degree. Pursuant to HRS §705-500(2),
fa} person ie guilty of an attempt to commit « crine
Af the person:
(a) dnkentionally engages in conduct which would
Constitute the crise if the attendant
Cireurstances were as the person believes then
to bey oF
() intentionally engages in conduct, which, under
the circumstances as the person believes them to
be, constitutes @ substantial step in s course
of conduct intended to culminate in the person's
Commission of the crime
(emphases added.) Moreover, “(a] person commits the offense of thett in the

wend decree if the person conmite theft,” inter alia, “[olf property from
ree°CSeaes of another’ or (elf property or services the value of which
Gxcesds $300." HRS § 708-031(2) (a)-(b)- in turn, a person commits theft if
Eke Gervce *clbeaine or exerte unauthorized control over property. person
SSLESS?°S. Gherts control over, the property of another wich inteat to

the other of the property." HRS § 708-830(1) (emphasis adced)

SEEELEE (NS Convicted of the first two offenses, as charged; however, he was
Convicted of theft in the fourth degree ~- rather than second degree. Theft
Sethe fourth degree requires that "the person comiti
‘uvites of any value sot in excess of 5100." HRS § 70)

 

   

 

    

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thereby placing his intent in issue, Fetelee also denied taking

 

any money from Lincoln, despite Lincoln's account.

‘The prosecution -- as permitted by the trial court --
adduced testimony from Lopez and Freeman regarding the apartment
incident, including Fetelee’s argument with Lopez, the damage to
Lopez's property, and Fetelee’s actions toward Freeman and Tony
Inasmuch as Fetelee was not charged with any criminal offense
arising from the apartment incident, the evidence of his conduct
related thereto constitutes “other crimes, wrongs, or acts." HRE
Rule 404(b). Thus, under a Rule 404(b) analysis, the question is
whether evidence of the apartment incident was relevant to
demonstrate Fetelee’s intent to commit the charged offenses. we
answer in the negative.

Federal courts have announced that, if other crines,
wrongs, or acts are used to prove intent, “the prior act must be
similar to the offense charged." United States v. Hadley, 918
F.2d 848, 851 (9th Cir, 1990) (citation omitted); see also United
States v. Plancarte-Alvarez, 366 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 2004)
(holding that the prior incident of importing and possessing
marijuana was relevant to show that defendant “engaged in
purposeful and repetitive criminal behavior and was not... an
innocent victim who was forced to smuggle drugs the first time
and tricked into smuggling drugs the second time"); United states
Ya Basinger, 60 F.3d 1400, 1408 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that

 

éefendant's “previous possession of red phosphorous, especially

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in conjunction with his possession of methamphetamine, bears a
sufficient factual similarity to the instant charges
(nanufacturing and maintaining a place to manufacture
methanphetamine using the red phosphorous nethod)* to show that
defendant intended to manufacture methamphetamine and intended to
use the site for such purpose). But gee State v. Binero, 70 Haw.
509, 517-18, 776 P.2d 704, 710-11 (1989) (in a case where a
police officer wae shot and killed during 2 struggle with
defendant who had grabbed the officer’s gun, this court held that
the admission of evidence regarding a prior incident involving
defendant's attenpt to grab a police officer's revolver was an
abuse of discretion because the need for the evidence of the
prior event was not great where other evidence in the case at bar
established that defendant had the officer's gun in his hand and
where the probability of the jury's hostile reaction against
defendant outweighed any probative value) .

Here, the event that transpired in Lopez's apartment
regarding the parking stall was completely separate and distinct
from the incidente leading up to Fetelee’s attenpted murder,
attempted assault, and theft charges. At the apartment, Fetelee

and Lopez argued about a van in the parking lot blocking his

 

parking space. In contrast, Fetelee initially approached Lincoln
for a cigarette and, thereafter, approached the two Micronesian

men because he believed they had harassed his then-girlfriend.

 

It de inconceivable how the apartment incident would be relevant

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to Fetelee’s intent in attempting to murder Alik and assault
Hartman, or his intent to deprive Lincoln of her money. The
similarities between Fetelee’s conduct in Lopez's apartment and
his conduct as it relates to the attempted murder of Alik,
attempted assault of Hartman, and theft against Lincoln are
lacking. See State v. Alsanea, 69 P.3d 153, 159-60 (Idaho ct.
app. 2003) (holding that the defendant’s prior bad acts of
stalking and harassing his girlfriend were not relevant to the
defendant's intent to commit the aggravated assaults against the
police officers inasmich a8 these two acts were not similar).
Accordingly, we believe that evidence of the apartment incident
was not sufficiently similar to be probative of Fetelee’s intent
to commit the charged offenses.
ii. motive

wunlike intent, motive is not an ultimate issue.
However, evidence of motive ie admissible to prove the state of
mind that prompts @ person to act in a particular way; an
incentive for certain volitional activity. Thus, proof of motive
may be relevant in tending to refute or support the presumption
of innocence.” Renan, 73 Haw. at 37, 628 P.2d at 1273 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). In Renon, one defendant
(Efren Renon) was charged with and convicted of attempted murder
in the firet degree, murder in the second degree, and carrying a

firearm on his person without a license; the second defendant

 

(Renato Paet) was convicted of the offen:

 

of accomplice to

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murder in the second degree. 1d, at 24-25, 626 P.2d at 1267
the charges and convictions against the defendants arose out of a
shooting incident in the parking lot of Farrington High School,
resulting in the death of Gilbert Asuncion. “Escalating
hostilities between two rival youth gangs, the Hawaii Brothers
and the Judas, was allegedly the reason for the shooting.” id.
the defendants were menbers of the Hawaii Brothers gang; Asuncion
was a menber of the Judas gang. Id. at 25-26, 928 P.2d at 1267.
on appeal, the defendants contended that a prior
shooting incident, which had occurred twenty-four hours before
the Farrington shooting, should not have been presented to the

jury. Id, at 25, 626 P.2d at 1267. The prior incident involved

 

several menbers of the Judas gang, including Asuncion, (whol
Sere playing basketball at Mokauea Mini Park in Kalihi.
Pact and cther Hawaii Brothers gang menbers . . . Grove by
the Mini Park. (One of the Havaii Brothers gang menbers]
Elfed a ence at a Judas gang menber who was in che park.
[The] shot missed the gang menber, but hit and wounded an
Gideriy woean [{hereinatter, the Mini Park shooting]

 

  

 

 

1d, at 26, 628 P.2d at 1267-68. Thie court held that “evidence
of the Mini Park shooting was relevant to show that [the
defendants) were knowing participants in an uncharged conspiracy
to kill Judas gang menbers, @ plan which was motivated by a
desize for revenge due to ongoing hostilities between the two
gangs.” Id. at 36, 628 P.2d at 1272. In so holding, this court
explained that:

‘The Geseriptions of the Mini Park and Farrington shootings
were sinilar in that participante were fron the sane two

Gange and the came wespon wae used in both incidents. Also,
the Mint Park shooting incident occurred within twenty-four
houre of the Parringten shooting. Evidence of the Mini Park

   

 

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shooting wae necessary and crucial to bridge the... mini
Park. = = decident{} with the Fareington shooting to’<how
the wichargea conspiracy and the intent and motive of the
Gefendanes Botive is oral ncentive
‘Hie preludiciad eftect

Id. at 36, 626 P.2d at 1273-74 (internal quotation marks,

 

brackets, and citation omitted) (emphasis added).
‘The instant case, however, is clearly distinguishable.
Unlike Renon, the apartment incident evidence could not have
illustrated Fetelee’s motive in comitting the charged offenses
when such evidence was separate and distinct from the charged
offenses, as discussed above. the apartment incident and the
incidents giving rise to the charged offenses were unrelated and
lacked any nexus to each other. The parties involved were

Lopez, Freeman, and Tony were involved in

 

completely different
the apartment incident, whereas Lincoln, Hartman, and Alik were
involved in the incidents that resulted in the charges against
Fetelee. Neither group had any relation or connection to the
other; the issues involved in each incident were substantively
distinct. Accordingly, we believe that the apartment incident
was not relevant to prove Fetelee’s motive to comit the charged
offenses

However, the prosecution submite that the apartment
incident evidence was relevant to show, inter alia, Fetelee’s
motive inasmuch as Fetelee “was angry, drunk, and violent just
before coming into contact with Lincoln, Hartman, and Alik.*

Clearly, the prosecution premises its argunent solely upon the

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belief that Fetel

 

‘@ emotional state remained the same from the
apartment until hie confrontation with Lincoln and the
Micronesian men, thereby establishing the requisite nexus to
render the evidence of the apartment incident relevant. This
premise, however, is questionable inasmuch as Lopez testified
that Fetelee returned about ten minutes after the incident at the
apartment and appeared calm and apologetic. Further, under its
argument, the prosecution clearly attempted to admit the
apartment incident evidence to demonstrate Fetelee’s propensity
towards anger and provoking fights. We agree with Fetelee that
the apartment incident evidence “not only had the possibility,
but there was a likelihood, of the jury inferring that Fetelee
was a violent person of bad character.”

In an analogous situation, this court, in State
Pemberton, 71 Haw. 466, 796, P.2d 80 (1990), held that it was
error to admit character evidence purportedly probative of the
defendant's state of mind. Id, at 473, 796 P.2d at 63. In that
case, the defendant and two men were involved in an altercation
outside a nightclub, during which altercation the defendant
pulled out a knife and stabbed both men. Id, at 467-68, 796 P.24
at 62. Consequently, the defendant was charged and convicted of
two counts of assault in the second degree and one count of
carrying a deadly weapon. Id, at 467, 796 P.2d at 61. The
defendant appealed his conviction, specifically challenging the
trial court’s decision to allow testimony concerning a prior

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incident in which the defendant allegedly use a knife. Id, ‘The
prosecution, however, contended that the evidence was “highly
probative of [the dJefendant’s state of mind and rebut (ted the
Glefendant‘s claim of self-defense.” Id. at 472, 796 P.2d at 83.
This court concluded that:

[)nder ure (Rules) 4

 

tb) and 403, [the evidence] that [the
Glefendant had previously provoked'a fight using a knife
was clearly inadmissible as it vas not relevant for any
Purpose permissible under (Rule) 404 (b) ang could only
Prejudice (the defendant by showing [the d)efendant's
Propensity towards provoking fighte with « knife: the very
Enterence Rule 40¢ war meant to pronibic

   

 

 

 

Id, at 473, 796 P.2d at 63, Likewise, the apartment incident
evidence clearly would not fall within the permissible purposes
of Rule 404(b) and would merely demonstrate Fetelee’s propensity
towards anger and provoking fights. Accordingly, we believe that
nothing that occurred in Lopez’s apartment had any tendency to
make the existence of any fact of consequence to the
determination of the underlying criminal charges more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.”

In Light of the aforementioned conclusion and the fact
that this case turns on credibility of Fetelee, Clark, Hartman,
and Alik, we cannct say the trial court’s admission of the
evidence was harmless beyond 2 reasonable doubt. State v
Mattiello, 90 Hawai'i 255, 259, 978 P.24 693, 697 (1999) ("It is

well-settled that an appellate court will not pass upon issues

 

% tm Light of our conclusion that the apartment incident evidence is
not relevant te the charged offenses, ve need not conduct a Rule 403 balancing

 

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a

dependent upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the
evidence; this is the province of the trier of fact." (Internal
quotation marks, citation, and original brackets omitted.))-
B. lee's cont ns

Fetelee also challenges the ICA’s holdings that (1) the
trial court properly allowed the prosecution to reopen its case-
in-chief to present evidence of the apartment incident and (2)
the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury with 2 limiting
instruction “prior to Lopez's or Freeman's testimony regarding
the [apartment incident] " did not constitute error. However, in
light of our holdings that the xes gestae doctrine should not be
used or recognized ae an independent basis for the admission of
evidence and that the apartment incident was not relevant to the
underlying charges and, therefore, was inadmissible under HRE
Rule 404(b), we need not address the instant issues.

TV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the use of “res

gestae” as an independent basis for the admission of evidence

 

should be abandoned in the wake of Hawaii‘s well-developed and
long-standing rules of evidence. MWe further hold that, under the
RE Rule 404(b) analysie, the apartment incident evidence does
not fall within the permissible purposes of Rule 404(b) to render
the evidence relevant and admissible. Accordingly, in light of
our holdings, we are compelled to vacate the ICA's May 17, 2007
judgnent on appeal and the trial court's August 3, 2005 judgment

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of conviction and sentence, and remand the case to the trial

court for a new trial consistent with this opinion.

Ronette Kawakami (Taryn R. Gee
‘Tonaea, on the application) , .
Deputy Public Defenders, Baca Rlecrinston——

for petitioner/defendant-

appellant Pane
Daniel H. Shimizu, Deputy

Grseccuting Actorney, Bone bale
for seapondent /pleincate-
appellee

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