Title: Crotteau v. Irvine

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Crotteau v. Irvine1983 WY 4656 P.2d 1166Case Number: 5735Case Number: 5735Decided: 01/11/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
R.F. CROTTEAU, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT), LAWRENCE BURZYNSKI, AND PARK DEVELOPMENTS, 
LTD., A WYOMING LIMITED CORPORATION, (DEFENDANTS),

v.

LINDA SUE IRVINE, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF). No. 5735

Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

James Richard 
McCarty, Casper, 
for appellant.

Richard H. Peek, 
Casper, for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and RAPER, THOMAS, ROSE and 
BROWN, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellee Irvine filed a complaint 
in district court on January 28, 1982, against numerous defendants, one of whom 
was appellant, R.F. Crotteau. The sheriff of NatronaCounty made service on appellant by leaving a copy of 
the summons and complaint with Lawrence Burzynski, at 3521 East 24th, Casper, Wyoming. A default judgment against appellant 
was entered on March 26, 1982. Appellant filed a motion to set aside the default 
judgment, alleging that she had not been properly served with process. After 
hearing, the district court entered an order denying the motion to set aside 
default judgment. Appellant has appealed from that order.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Rule 4(d)(1), Wyoming 
Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

"(d) Personal service. - The summons and 
complaint shall be served together. The plaintiff shall furnish the person 
making service with such copies as are necessary. Service shall be made as 
follows:

"(1) Upon an individual 
other than an infant under 14 years of age or an incompetent person, by delivery 
of a copy of the summons and of the complaint to him personally, or by leaving 
copies thereof at his dwelling house or usual place of abode with some member of 
his family or person in his employ over the age of 14 years, or at the 
defendant's usual place of business with any employee then in charge of such 
place of business, or by delivery thereof to an agent authorized by appointment 
or by law to receive service of process."

[¶4.]     The sheriff's return of 
process stated that he served a copy of the summons and complaint by delivering 
a copy of them on February 19, 1982,

"* * * to R.F. Crotteau 
by leaving a copy with Lawrence Burzinski, [sic] at 3521 East 24th, Casper, 
Wyoming, personally and in person, a person over the age of 14 years, residing 
at 3521 East 24th, Casper, Natrona County, Wyoming at 9:05 
p.m."

[¶5.]     Appellant was not 
present at the hearing on the motion to set aside the default judgment. Instead, 
she relied on her affidavit attached to the motion. The affidavit stated that 
she was a defendant over the age of fourteen years and competent on February 19, 
1982, and that the complaint was not delivered to her personally. The affidavit 
also stated:

"5. That a copy of the 
complaint was not left at my house or usual place of abode with some member of 
my family or person in my employ over the age of 14 years.

"6. That a copy of the 
complaint was not left at my usual place of business or delivered to an agent 
authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of 
process.

"7. That I did not live 
at or reside in the residence at 3521 East 24th, Casper, Wyoming on February 19, 
1982.

"8. That Lawrence Burzynski has 
never been appointed by me or my agent for accepting [¶6.]            
service of process."

            
 

[¶7.]     Rule 4(d)(1), W.R.C.P., 
is similar to Rule 4(d)(1), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the federal 
cases, the burden of proof to establish the validity of the service is on the 
party on whose behalf the service is accomplished. See 4 Wright and Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1083, p. 384 (1969), and cases cited therein. 
Normally, however, the process server's return will provide a prima facie case 
as to the facts of service, and the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the 
proof. San Rafael Compania Naviera, S.A. 
v. American Smelting & Refining Company, 327 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1964). 
The defendant has to overcome the proof by strong and convincing evidence. Hicklin v. Edwards, 226 F.2d 410 (8th 
Cir. 1955).

[¶8.]     The law in state courts 
appears to be mostly in accord. In some states, courts have interpreted the 
service of process rules to mean that compliance with the prescribed procedure 
establishes a presumption of validity. See Caudle v. Ellison, Ala., 401 So. 2d 38 
(1981); and Trammel v. National Bank of 
Georgia, 159 Ga. App. 850, 285 S.E.2d 590 (1981). Other courts have held the 
same, although this court could not discern whether a rule actually established 
the presumption, or whether the appellate courts had interpreted a rule of 
procedure or a statute to establish the presumption. See: Plonski v. Halloran, 36 Conn. Sup.er. 
335, 420 A.2d 117 (1980); Tropic 
Builders, Ltd. v. Naval Ammunition Depot Lualualei Quarters, Inc., 48 Haw. 
306, 402 P.2d 440 (1965); Wilson v. 
Upton, Okla., 373 P.2d 229 (1962).

[¶9.]     Other states have held 
or have rules which say that the presumption of service which normally arises 
does not arise when an individual defendant is not served in person, or where a 
direct attack is made on a default judgment. People v. Mickow, 58 Ill. App.3d 780, 16 
Ill.Dec. 306, 374 N.E.2d 1081 (1978); and Gerland's Food Fair, Inc. v. Hare, 
Tex.Civ.App., 611 S.W.2d 113 (1980). Yet other courts have held that although a 
presumption is rebuttable, the uncorroborated testimony of a defendant alone is 
not sufficient to impeach the return. Goldfarb v. Roeger, 54 N.J. Super. 85, 
148 A.2d 189 (1959); and Ashe v. 
Spears, 263 Md. 622, 284 A.2d 207 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958, 92 S. Ct. 2061, 32 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1972). A minority of states hold that a sheriff's 
return is conclusive and cannot be attacked extrinsically absent a showing of 
fraud. This rule finds its basis in the presumption that the sheriff properly 
executes those duties authorized by law. See Schwarz v. Schwarz, 252 Pa. Super. 95, 
380 A.2d 1299 (1977).

[¶10.]  This court has not ruled upon any 
presumption concerning the sheriff's return. It has ruled that the trial court 
may take evidence to supplement the return of service when the return filed with 
the court is insufficient to show proper service. L.C. Jones Trucking Co. v. Superior Oil Co., 
68 Wyo. 384, 234 P.2d 802 (1951). In that case, a Mr. Shaw was one of the 
defendants. The return stated that the sheriff had delivered the summons at 
defendant's usual place of residence by leaving it with Mrs. Shaw, a party over 
the age of 16. This court held that where the return of service showed the 
service was defective, the trial court could find as a matter of fact that 
service was made upon the defendant by serving a member of the defendant's 
family at his usual place of abode.

[¶11.]  In Bryant v. Wybro Federal Credit Union, Wyo., 544 P.2d 1010 (1976), the certificate of the sheriff stated that the person who was 
served claimed to be the agent for the defendant. The trial court heard evidence 
in a motion to set aside a default judgment, and found that there was no 
evidence produced that Henderson, the person served, had ever been authorized as 
agent for service. This court looked at the record and accepted the trial 
court's finding that there was an absence of agency or authorization. It would 
appear that this court implictly held that the party asserting the validity of 
the service had the burden of proof, and that no presumption of validity 
attached to the sheriff's certificate. We quoted the trial 
court:

"* * * There is no 
testimony of agency here, or of authorization. * * *" 544 P.2d  at 
1011.

 

[¶12.]  In view of the implicit finding in Bryant v. Wybro Federal Credit Union, 
supra, we hold that the party asserting the validity of the service bears the 
burden of proof, and that no presumption attaches, in the case of substituted 
service, to shift the burden.

[¶13.]  If service is made in a manner not 
authorized by law, the judgment is void because the trial court is without 
jurisdiction. Such a judgment is subject to direct or collateral attack. Bryant v. Wybro Federal Credit Union, 
Wyo., supra; and Pease Brothers, Inc. v. 
American Pipe & Supply Co., Wyo., 522 P.2d 996 (1974). Although the 
question whether the trial court had jurisdiction is one of law, certain of the 
determinations which were made by the trial court here were determinations of 
fact. The trial court found that on February 19, 1982, the date of service, the 
dwelling house or usual place of abode of appellant was at 3521 East 24th 
Street in Casper. The trial court also found that 
Lawrence Burzynski was a member of appellant's family and was residing at 
3521 East 24th 
Street in Casper on February 19, 1982. We will use the 
usual standard for reviewing these findings of fact made by the trial court, and 
will thus assume that the evidence in favor of the successful party below was 
true and will leave out of consideration the evidence of the unsuccessful party 
that conflicts with it.1 We will also give the successful 
party's evidence every favorable inference that may be fairly and reasonably 
drawn from it. Madrid v. Norton, Wyo., 
596 P.2d 1108 (1979).

[¶14.]  On the factual issues of place of 
residence and the relationship between appellant and Mr. Burzynski, appellee 
Irvine presented 
evidence that Mr. Burzynski was appellant's stepfather. She also presented 
evidence that the residence at 3521 East 24th in Casper had been turned over to the appellant, 
her mother, and Lawrence Burzynski on January 20, 1982, before service, under a 
lease and option to purchase agreement executed by appellant and her mother. An 
employee of the telephone company testified that there was a transfer to install 
service on January 18, 1982, at 3521 East 24th in Casper to a Larry Burzynski. Appellee's Exhibit 
6 then showed a record order made on February 2, 1982, to change the service 
billing from Larry Burzynski to appellant. Exhibit 8 was another transfer of 
service on March 30, 1982, where service was stopped at the residence on 
24th 
Street and moved to another residence. The lease 
signed by appellant showed appellant as a tenant and showed that rent had been 
paid through the month of February, 1982. Based on this evidence, we agree with 
the trial court's factual findings that Mr. Burzynski was a member of 
appellant's family over the age of fourteen, and that both Mr. Burzynski and 
appellant resided at 3521 East 24th, Casper, when the summons for appellant was 
served on Mr. Burzynski.

[¶15.]  Based on those factual findings which 
were supported by the evidence, we find that service of process was properly 
made on appellant. We therefore hold that the trial court had jurisdiction to 
enter the default judgment against appellant.

[¶16.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 The question of whether 
the trial court improperly considered the affidavit as evidence was not raised 
and does not need to be decided for the purpose of this appeal. We do not know 
whether the trial court considered the affidavit at all. Whether it did or did 
not, it is obvious that the trial court believed appellee's evidence, and that 
appellee's evidence was sufficient to support the 
findings.