Title: Worker's Compensation Claim of Blood v. Grace Drilling Co

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Worker's Compensation Claim of Blood v. Grace Drilling Co1993 WY 141863 P.2d 147Case Number: 93-34Decided: 11/10/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
In the Matter of the 
WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF Wayne A. BLOOD,

 Appellant 
(Employee-Claimant),

v.

 GRACE DRILLING 
COMPANY,

 Appellee 
(Employer-Defendant).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Lincoln County, John D. Troughton, J.

Gregory A. 
Phillips of Phillips Law Offices, Evanston, for 
appellant.

Patrick Dixon of 
Dixon and Despain, Casper, for appellee.

Before MACY, 
C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ.

MACY, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Wayne 
A. Blood appeals from the district court's order which affirmed the hearing 
examiner's decision to deny and dismiss the worker's compensation claim for 
benefits filed by Blood because Blood failed to prove that his injury arose out 
of and in the course of his employment and because he failed to show that 
Appellee Grace Drilling Company was not prejudiced by the untimely filing of his 
injury report.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      Blood states 
these issues:

I. Is Wayne Blood's 
undisputed injury "work-related"?

II. Was Wayne Blood's 
report of injury "timely filed"?

[¶4]      In response, 
Grace Drilling Company argues:

     In addition to the 
issues raised by Blood, Grace Drilling Company suggests this third 
issue:

     If Blood in fact 
injured himself while putting on his sock, was there a ca[us]al nexus between 
the injury and the employment?

[¶5]      Blood worked as a 
driller on an oil and gas rig operated by Grace Drilling Company. The rig was 
located near Kemmerer in western Lincoln County. 

[¶6]      On July 13, 1991, 
Blood and a group of his friends and co-workers moved a refrigerator from the 
basement of Blood's house to a fellow worker's home. Blood did not experience 
any discomfort nor was he on the job while he was moving the refrigerator. Later 
that same day, he drove from his home to the drilling rig, a distance of about 
twenty-nine miles. Eighteen miles of that distance were paved road surface; the 
remaining eleven miles were dirt road with the last six miles of the dirt road 
being extremely rough. Blood did not experience any discomfort as he drove to 
work.

[¶7]      While Blood was 
in the "dog house" changing into his work clothes, he bent over and experienced 
severe pain in his lower back. At this juncture, Blood assumed that he had 
injured his back while he was delivering the refrigerator, and he stated this 
belief to several people, including his treating physicians. Blood was able to 
complete his work on July 13 and 14, 1991. However, by late in the day on July 
14th, he was in so much pain that he was not able to drive his car or get into 
bed without being assisted.

[¶8]      On July 15, 1991, 
Blood consulted a physician who prescribed conservative treatment. After being 
hospitalized for three days and resting for about a week, Blood was able to 
return to work for most of the remainder of July and August 1991. Blood's back 
pain continued during this period. On August 30, 1991, Grace Drilling Company 
discharged him from his employment. On September 4, 1991, Blood's treating 
physician informed him that he would be unable to return to doing heavy work or 
to running heavy equipment anytime soon. On that same day, Blood filed an injury 
report asserting that he had injured his back while he was changing into his 
work clothes on July 13, 1991.

[¶9]      The controlling 
standard of review in this case is:

"`"We examine the entire 
record to determine if there is substantial evidence to support an agency's 
findings. If the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence, we 
cannot properly substitute our judgment for that of the agency, and must uphold 
the findings on appeal. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which a 
reasonable mind might accept in support of the conclusions of the agency."' 
Dougherty v. J.W. Williams, Inc., 820 P.2d 553, 555 (Wyo. 1991) (quoting Trout 
v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, 721 P.2d 1047, 1050 (Wyo. 1986) 
(citation omitted))."

Baros v. State ex rel. 
Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 834 P.2d 1143, 1145 (Wyo. 
1992).

Farman v. State 
ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 841 P.2d 99, 102 (Wyo. 
1992).

[¶10]   Blood relies upon our decision in 
Dougherty v. J.W. Williams, Inc., 820 P.2d 553 (Wyo. 1991). In that case, we 
grounded our decision to reverse the hearing examiner's determination upon the 
basis that the hearing examiner incorrectly applied the statute which required 
"competent medical authority" to establish that an injury which occurred over a 
substantial period of time arose out of and in the course of Dougherty's 
employment. 820 P.2d  at 555-56. See WYO. STAT. § 27-14-603(a) (1991). That basis 
is not present in this case. The record in Dougherty contained no evidence which 
suggested that Dougherty was not a credible witness, nor did the other evidence 
presented contradict or undermine his testimony. The record in this case is 
replete with testimony wherein Blood admitted that he had exaggerated, 
contradicted, and, in some instances, perhaps prevaricated. The other testimony 
and evidence were as consistent with Blood's contradictions and exaggerations as 
they were with his claim that the injury occurred within the course and scope of 
his employment. In a circumstance such as this, where the hearing examiner's 
decision is significantly influenced by matters relating to the credibility of 
witnesses and where the facts supporting those credibility issues are clear from 
the record, we are compelled to apply the standard of review recited above. 
Farman, 841 P.2d at 102-03; Hansen v. Mr. D's Food Center, 827 P.2d 371, 373-74 
(Wyo. 1992).

[¶11]   The hearing examiner was correct in 
determining that Blood was not acting within the course and scope of his 
employment at the time his injury occurred. We, therefore, affirm the district 
court's order of affirmance. Because of this disposition, we do not need to be 
concerned with whether Blood timely filed his claim for worker's compensation 
benefits.

[¶12]   Affirmed.