Title: Saade v. Wilmington Trust, National Association

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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SJC-13459 
 
JACQUES SAADE  vs.  WILMINGTON TRUST, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, 
trustee,1 & another.2 
 
 
May 16, 2024. 
 
 
Res Judicata.  Judgment, Relief from judgment.  Practice, Civil, 
Relief from judgment, Motion to amend.  Supreme Judicial 
Court, Appeal from order of single justice. 
 
 
 
The plaintiff, Jacques Saade, appeals from an order of a 
single justice of this court denying his motion pursuant to 
Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b) (6) , 365 Mass. 828 (1974), to vacate the 
judgment in this case, denying his motion to amend the 
complaint, and denying his motion for sanctions against the 
defendants and their counsel.  We affirm.   
 
Background.  This case originated in December 2019 with a 
complaint filed by Saade in the county court.  The complaint was 
brought pursuant to this court's equitable jurisdiction, see 
G. L. c. 214, § 1, and it asserted claims that the defendants 
had violated G. L. c. 244, §§ 35A and 35B.  Specifically, 
Saade's complaint alleged (a) that the defendants failed to 
comply with the notice requirements of G. L. c. 244, §§ 35A and 
35B, as to an August 2, 2018, notice of acceleration regarding 
the mortgage on Saade's property at 300 Commercial Street, Unit 
611, in Boston, and (b) that the defendants did not provide 
 
 
1 Of MFRA Trust 2014-2. 
 
2 Fay Servicing, LLC.  In his complaint, Saade also named 
unknown "Does" as defendants.  He represented that "Does could 
be future defendants that may be joined in this action as events 
unfold."  
2 
 
 
 
notice of entitlement to modification, as required by § 35B.  As 
relief, Saade sought modification of the mortgage and to place 
modified monthly payments in escrow until an alleged question as 
to the identity of the mortgagee could be determined.  In 
January 2020, the defendants moved to dismiss.  In February 
2020, the single justice dismissed Saade's complaint without a 
hearing, noting that Saade had "filed cases in the Land Court 
and United States District Court requesting similar relief" and 
that Saade was "restrained in those courts from filing any 
future complaints, unless certain criteria ha[d] been 
satisfied."  Saade did not appeal this decision. 
 
Three years later, Saade filed a motion pursuant to Mass. 
R. Civ. P. 60 (b) (6) seeking to vacate the judgment of the 
single justice.  As the basis for his motion, Saade pointed to 
an August 2022 settlement agreement between the Attorney 
General's office and Fay Servicing, LLC, which purported to 
result from an investigation and allegations that the latter 
failed to comply with G. L. c. 244, § 35B, and certain related 
statutes in its role as a mortgage servicer.  Saade's motion 
represented that while his claims were limited to violations of 
G. L. c. 244, §§ 35A and 35B, "the main contention [wa]s the 
validity of the subject mortgage."   
 
Along with his motion to vacate, Saade filed a motion to 
amend his complaint.  His proposed amendments were based on the 
same alleged conduct, and he sought to add a claim for relief 
pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  Additionally, Saade moved that 
the defendants be sanctioned for moving to dismiss his claims.  
In May 2023, the single justice denied without a hearing Saade's 
motion to vacate the judgment, his motion to amend, and his 
motion for sanctions.  It is from this order that Saade now 
appeals. 
 
Prior to filing his complaint in this case, Saade had filed 
numerous suits against these same defendants challenging the 
validity of his mortgage, and we note certain relevant examples.  
On September 27, 2018, the Land Court dismissed Saade's case 
against the defendants seeking rescission of his mortgage and 
requesting an order compelling compliance with G. L. c. 244, 
§ 35A.  On May 13, 2019, the United States District Court for 
the District of Massachusetts dismissed with prejudice two 
consolidated cases brought by Saade against the defendants, 
which lawsuits alleged invalid assignments and violations of 
G. L. c. 244, § 35A, and G. L. c. 93A in connection with the 
mortgage.  On February 8, 2019, Saade brought another complaint 
against these defendants in the Land Court, where he contested 
3 
 
 
 
the validity of the mortgage as a result of alleged fraudulent 
assignments, and where he further alleged defects in a May 31, 
2018, notice of default.  On July 31, 2019, the Land Court 
dismissed with prejudice the claims against the defendants, 
concluding that they were barred by the doctrine of res 
judicata.  By court orders, Saade is now subject to filing 
restrictions in the Federal District Court and in any trial 
court of the Commonwealth. 
 
Discussion.  A judge's ruling on a motion for relief from 
final judgment pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b) (6) will be 
reviewed for abuse of discretion.  See Owens v. Mukendi, 448 
Mass. 66, 72 (2006).  Here, the single justice did not abuse his 
discretion because relief under rule 60 (b) (6) is appropriate 
only in "extraordinary circumstances" (citation omitted), id. at 
71, which Saade has not shown.  In support of his February 2023 
motion to vacate the February 2020 judgment of the single 
justice dismissing his complaint, Saade relied on the August 
2022 settlement agreement between the Attorney General's office 
and Fay Servicing, LLC.  But the settlement agreement only 
recounts an investigation and allegations, and in any event, 
Saade does not establish any specific new facts supplied by that 
settlement agreement as to his own mortgage that would 
supplement the facts he had already alleged.  Where there was no 
new basis for relief, the motion was also untimely because it 
was filed three years after the final judgment.  See id. at 76-
77.   
What is more, the settlement agreement would not have 
changed the fact that Saade's claims were barred by the doctrine 
of res judicata, and more specifically, the doctrine of claim 
preclusion.  The elements of claim preclusion are:  "(1) the 
identity or privity of the parties to the present and prior 
actions, (2) identity of the cause of action, and (3) prior 
final judgment on the merits" (citation omitted).  Kobrin v. 
Board of Registration in Med., 444 Mass. 837, 843 (2005).  
Between this case and the prior cases recounted above, there was 
identity of the parties and claims, which "arose from the same 
transaction or series of connected transactions."  Laramie v. 
Philip Morris USA Inc., 488 Mass. 399, 411 (2021).  And 
"dismissal for failure to state a claim . . . operates as a 
dismissal on the merits . . . with res judicata effect."  
Mestek, Inc. v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 40 Mass. App. Ct. 729, 731 
(1996), quoting Isaac v. Schwartz, 706 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 
1983).  See Mass. R. Civ. P. 41 (b) (3), as amended, 454 Mass. 
1403 (2009).  See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 41 (b).  In sum, "there 
[wa]s nothing in the complaint in the present case that was not, 
4 
 
 
 
or could not have been, brought in the [earlier] complaint[s]."  
Tynan v. Attorney Gen., 453 Mass. 1005, 1005 (2009).  The 
settlement agreement between the Attorney General's office and 
Fay Servicing, LLC would not have changed this analysis.  
For all the foregoing reasons, the single justice did not 
abuse his discretion in denying Saade's motion pursuant to Mass. 
R. Civ. P. 60 (b) (6).  Neither did the single justice abuse his 
discretion in denying Saade's motion to amend, as the proposed 
amendments were unduly delayed, coming three years after the 
final judgment, and were futile, being likewise barred by res 
judicata.  See Doherty v. Admiral's Flagship Condominium Trust, 
80 Mass. App. Ct. 104, 112 (2011).  Saade's attempt to add a 
claim pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, was also futile where, for 
the reasons stated above, he had adequate alternative remedies.  
See Commonwealth v. Fontanez, 482 Mass. 22, 24-25 (2019).  
Moreover, the single justice did not abuse his discretion in 
denying Saade's motion for sanctions.  See von Schönau-Riedweg 
v. Continuum Energy Techs., LLC, 98 Mass. App. Ct. 535, 538 
(2020).  The motion was untimely and sought to undermine "the 
reasonable expectation of [the] part[ies] to have a case 
efficiently adjudicated" (citation omitted).  Id.  Saade has 
shown no misconduct in the defendants and their counsel moving 
to dismiss his claims in this matter. 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the 
single justice denying Saade's motion to vacate the judgment, 
his motion to amend the complaint, and his motion for sanctions.  
In light of Saade's repeated attempts to relitigate claims 
already disposed, the clerk of this court for Suffolk County and 
the clerk for the Commonwealth are instructed not to accept for 
filing any new complaint, petition, motion, or other filing from 
Saade that names as a defendant Wilmington Trust, National 
Association (individually or as trustee of MFRA Trust 2014-2), 
or Fay Servicing, LLC, unless the filing is (a) accompanied by a 
copy of this rescript opinion and a motion for leave to file, 
and (b) the full court grants the motion for leave to file upon 
making a preliminary determination that the complaint, petition, 
motion, or other filing asserts an argument or claim that is not 
barred by the doctrine of res judicata or otherwise procedurally 
barred.     
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on briefs. 
 
Jacques Saade, pro se. 
 
Kevin P. Polansky & Peter M. Ayers for the defendants.