Title: NORTHWEST BAIL BONDS, INC. v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

NORTHWEST BAIL BONDS, INC. v. STATE2002 WY 10250 P.3d 313Case Number: 01-56Decided: 07/10/2002

April Term, A.D. 2002

IN THE 
MATTER OF APPLICATION

OF 
NORTHWEST BAIL BONDS, INC.

TO SET 
ASIDE BOND FORFEITURE:

NORTHWEST 
BAIL BONDS, INC., 

Appellant(Respondent) 
,

v.

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING, 

Appellee(Petitioner) 
.

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

Representing 
Appellant:

John 
H. Robinson, Casper, WY.

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and P. Olen Snider, Jr., 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN*, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

LEHMAN, 
J., 
delivered the opinion of the court.  
VOIGT, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which KITE, J., 
joined.

*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

  

LEHMAN, 
Justice. 

[¶1]      This is 
an appeal from the partial forfeiture of a surety bond.  We reverse and remand. 

ISSUES

[¶2]      Appellant 
Northwest Bail Bond, Inc. (Northwest) states the issue as 
follows:

Whether 
the District Court's decision to forfeit $5,000.00 of the $7,500.00 surety bond 
. . . constituted an abuse of discretion.

Appellee 
State of Wyoming (State) phrases the issue in this manner:

Did the 
district court patently abuse its discretion in partially granting Northwest's 
motion to set aside the bail bond forfei­ture?

FACTS

[¶3]      Kristopher Bull 
(Bull) was scheduled to attend a probation revocation hearing in the district 
court at 8:30 a.m. on January 18, 2001.  
He overslept and failed to show up at the hearing.  The district court responded by issuing 
a bench warrant for Bull's arrest and by ordering the forfeiture of his 
appearance bond issued by Northwest.  
Bull, however, did appear at the district court before 1:30 p.m. on the 
same day where, upon the advice of coun­sel and Northwest, he turned himself 
in to the authorities.  

[¶4]      On February 1, 
2001, Northwest filed a Motion to Set Aside Forfeiture of Bond.  A hearing on that motion took place a 
month later.  Interestingly enough, 
no evidence was adduced at the hearing.  
The district court relied on the factual assertions of counsel made 
during argument.  The relevant 
factual assertions included:  (1) 
Bull was aware of the sched­uled hearing; (2) Bull missed the hearing 
because he "slept in"; (3) within an hour of missing the hearing, Bull contacted 
his attorney and Northwest, both of whom instructed him to turn himself in; (4) 
Bull and his attorney appeared at the district court later on the same day to 
attempt to have the hearing, but there was no time on the district court's 
schedule to do so; (5) Bull then turned himself in for arrest on the bench 
warrant; (6) there was no evidence of a specific pecuniary expense to the State 
occasioned by Bull's failure to appear; and (7) this was Bull's second failure 
to appear for a hearing in this case, his bond having been forfeited for the 
previous failure.  

[¶5]      In its oral 
summation before ordering partial remission of the forfeited bond, the district 
court noted (1) there was a previous failure to appear and consequent forfeiture 
of bond; (2) while there was no "big financial loss," the district attorney, the 
clerk of court, the court reporter, and defense counsel had all appeared for the 
scheduled hearing, and resched­uling the hearing was an involved process; 
(3) all this created quite an inconvenience for the district court; (4) 
Northwest had entered into an agreement to pay the district court if Bull failed 
to appear; and (5) Northwest "should have been aware" that the bond was set as 
high as it was because of Bull's previous failure to appear.  After considering these facts, the 
dis­trict court determined that $2,500.00 of the forfeited amount should be 
set aside.  

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

[¶6]      An appellate 
court will not interfere with a trial court's discretionary rulings absent a 
clear abuse of discretion.  
Semler v. Semler, 924 P.2d 422, 424 (Wyo. 1996).  This general rule applies to decisions 
on motions to set aside a bond forfeiture.  
"[T]he decision to grant or deny a remission is a discretionary one that 
will only be overturned on appeal for a patent abuse of discretion amounting to 
arbitrary and capricious action."  
Application of Allied Fidelity Ins. Co., 664 P.2d 1322, 1325 (Wyo. 
1983).  Assessing whether there has been an 
abuse of discretion involves determining whether the evidence was sufficient to 
support the district court's decision.  
Basolo v. Basolo, 907 P.2d 348, 353 (Wyo. 1995).  One factor in that assessment is whether 
the district court's "conclusions [were] drawn from objective criteria."  Mintle v. Mintle, 764 P.2d 255, 
257 (Wyo. 1988) (quoting Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986)).  The burden is upon the appellant to show 
an abuse of discre­tion.  
Blake v. State, 933 P.2d 474, 477 (Wyo. 1997).

DISCUSSION

[¶7]      Northwest 
contends that under the established law with respect to forfeiture of bonds, the 
district court abused its discretion when it refused to set aside the entire 
amount of the bond forfeiture.  In 
support of this position, Northwest points out:

1.  While 
Bull was aware of the hearing, his failure to appear was not willful; he simply 
overslept.

2.  Northwest 
urged Bull to turn himself in immediately.

3.  The 
State endured no direct financial cost as a result of Bull's failure to 
appear.

4.  There 
was little inconvenience to the State, since the other participants had to be in 
court for other cases, regardless of Bull's failure to 
appear.

5.  There 
was little inconvenience or delay in getting the matter 
rescheduled.

In 
response, the State emphasizes:

1.  This 
was Bull's second failure to appear in this case.

2.  Northwest 
should bear some liability as the "guarantor" of Bull's 
appearance.

[¶8]      It is important 
to note the procedural context of a contested bond forfeiture.  W.R.Cr.P. 46(f)(1) provides that "[i]f 
there is a breach of condition of a bond, the court shall declare 
a forfeiture of the bail."  
(Emphasis added.)  Use of the 
word "shall" indicates that this decision is mandatory rather than 
discretionary.  LePage v. State, 
Dep't of Health, 2001 WY 26, ¶¶11, 12, 18 P.3d 1177, ¶¶11, 12 (Wyo. 
2001).  The bail must be forfeited.  The discre­tion of the district 
court is exercised under W.R.Cr.P. 46(f)(2):

The 
court may direct that a forfeiture be set aside in whole or in part, upon such 
conditions as the court may impose, if a person released upon execution of an 
appearance bond with a surety is subsequently surrendered by the surety into 
custody or if it otherwise appears that justice does not require the 
forfeiture.

These 
rules being structured as they are, the issue comes to the district court not by 
way of a motion from the State to forfeit the bail, but by way of a motion from 
the appellant to set aside the forfeiture.  
The intent and effect of this structure is to place the burden on the 
surety to show why the forfeiture should be set aside.  State v. Martinez-Gonzales, 701 P.2d 8, 10 (Ariz.App. 1985); Bob 
Cole Bonding v. State, 13 S.W.3d 147, 149 (Ark. 2000); 
State v. Hedrick, 514 S.E.2d 397, 403 (W.Va. 1999).

[¶9]      Application of 
Allied Fidelity Ins. Co. recited both general principles and specific 
factors that a judge should consider when faced with a motion to set aside a 
bail bond for­feiture.  The 
general principles include:

The 
purpose of a bail bond is not punitive.  
Its object is not to enrich the government or punish the defendant.  Nor can it be "used as a balm to soothe 
the disappointment resulting from the inability to punish and 
rehabilitate."  . . .  "Neither frustration nor its kinsman 
vindictiveness should be of weight in tipping the scales by which the elements 
of the court's decision is weighed."

Application 
of Allied Fidelity Ins. Co., 664 
P.2d at 1325-26 (quoting United States v. Parr, 
594 F.2d 440, 444 (5th Cir. 1979)).  

[¶10]   Application of Allied Fidelity Ins. 
Co., at 1325-26 (citing 
United States v. Castaldo, 667 F.2d 20, 21 (9th Cir. 1981), cert denied 
456 U.S. 978, 102 S. Ct. 2245, 72 L. Ed. 2d 853 (1982), and United States v. 
Parr, at 444) also enunciated that the district court should 
specifically consider in making its determination:

1.  The 
willfulness of the defendant's breach of conditions; 

2.  The 
reasonable relationship between the forfeiture ordered and the cost and 
inconvenience to the government of regaining custody of the 
defendant;

3.  The 
participation of the surety in apprehending the 
defen­dant;

4.  The cost, inconvenience, and prejudice suffered by  the government as  
 
 a result of the defendant's breach; 

5.  The amount of delay caused by the defendant's default 
and the stage of the proceedings at the time of the disappearance; 

6.  The 
public interest and necessity of effectuating the appear­ance of the 
defendant; and 

7.  Any 
explanation or mitigating factors presented by the 
defendant.

[¶11]   In reviewing whether or not an 
abuse of discretion has occurred, we make an in depth review of the record 
before us.  If the record is not 
adequate, we may remand the matter back for further proceedings and the 
development of the bases used by the court for its determina­tion.  Frankel v. Board of County Comm'rs of 
Teton County, 2002 WY 13, ¶12, 39 P.3d 420, ¶12 (Wyo. 2002); Gillis v. F 
& A Enterprises, 813 P.2d 1304, 1308 (Wyo. 1991);  Board of County Comm'rs of Teton 
County v. Teton County Youth Servs., Inc., 652 P.2d 400, 411-14 (Wyo. 
1982).

[¶12]   
Our review of the record evidences no adequate basis for the 
determination made by the district court that Northwest should forfeit $5,000.00 
of the bond posted.  As stated 
above, in making its decision the district court was apprised by counsel that 1) 
Bull was aware of the scheduled hearing; (2) Bull missed the hearing because he 
"slept in"; (3) within an hour of missing the hearing, Bull contacted his 
attorney and Northwest, both of whom instructed him to turn himself in; (4) Bull 
and his attorney appeared at the district court later on the same day to attempt 
to have the hearing, but there was no time on the district court's schedule to 
do so; (5) Bull then turned himself in for arrest on the bench warrant; and (6) 
this was Bull's second failure to appear for a hearing in this case, his bond 
having been forfeited for the previous failure.

[¶13]   Nevertheless, after being advised 
of this information, the district court solely focused on Bull's previous 
failure to appear for a hearing, on the inconvenience caused the district court 
and other participants by having to reset the hearing, and on Northwest's 
awareness of the previous failure to appear and awareness of the relatively high 
bond amount.1  Indeed, although the district court was 
appraised of 1) the unwillfulness of Bull's nonappearance; 2) the 
participation of Northwest which resulted in Bull immediately turning himself in 
with no cost incurred by the government in apprehending him; 3) the amount of 
minimal delay caused by Bull's default and the probation revocation stage of the 
proceedings at the time of the nonappearance; and 4) an explanation of the 
mitigating factors presented, the district court simply did not address these 
issues in making its determination as required by Applica­tion of Allied 
Fidelity Ins. Co., at 1325-26.  Therefore, it is virtually impossible 
for this court to determine whether these required and necessary elements were 
even considered by the district court. 

[¶14]   Moreover, we recognize that Bull's 
previous failure to appear for a hearing and Northwest's awareness of the 
previous failure to appear resulting in the relatively high bond amount were 
explicitly identified factors considered by the district court in making its 
ruling.  However, these factors are 
not elements to be considered by the court as enumerated in Application of 
Allied Fidelity Ins. Co., at 1325-26.

[¶15]   
Review of the hearing transcript also makes it clear that the district 
court did not consider the cost and prejudice suffered by the government as a 
result of the Bull's nonap­pearance.  
No evidence was presented of any specific pecuniary expense to the State 
occasioned by Bull's failure to appear.2  Hence, such consideration was arguably 
impossible as no evidence was presented to the district court on this 
issue.

[¶16]   
Finally, we note that a thorough basis for the ultimate conclusion of the 
court must be explained to avoid any inference that the court's motivation was 
punitive or based on frustration or vindictiveness as prohibited.3  Application of Allied Fidelity Ins. 
Co., at 1325-26 (quoting United States v. Parr, 
594 F.2d at 444).

  

CONCLUSION

[¶17]   
We remand to the district court for additional proceedings and 
development of facts as they relate to each of the factors set forth herein when 
a motion to set aside a bond forfei­ture is 
involved.

  

            
VOIGT, Justice, dissenting, with which 
KITE, Justice, joins. 

[¶18]   I respectfully dissent.  I believe the record is adequate for us 
to determine that the district court sufficiently considered the factors from 
Application of Allied Fidelity Ins. Co., 664 P.2d 1322 (Wyo. 1983).  A hearing was conducted and factors were 
considered.  In addition, there was 
a partial, yet substantial, remission, which indicates that the district court 
was not acting out of vindictiveness.  
Beyond that, I would add another factor to the Application of Allied 
Fidelity Ins. Co. list:  where 
the violation is not a mere technicality, the district court may decline to set 
aside a forfeiture for the purpose of deterring the defendant and others from 
future violations.  See 
Accredited Sur. & Cas. Co. v. United States, 723 F.2d 368, 370 (4th Cir. 1983) and State v. Hedrick, 204 
W.Va. 547, 514 S.E.2d 397, 407 (1999).  
If we narrowly focus on the actual pecuniary loss to the State, what is 
to deter the defendant, or others in similar circumstances, from failing to 
appear for court hearings?

FOOTNOTES

  1On appeal, Northwest asserts that 
there was little inconvenience to the State, since the other participants had to 
be in court for other cases, regardless of Bull's failure to appear and that 
there was little inconvenience or delay in getting the matter rescheduled to the 
following week.   

   2After the court's ruling, counsel 
for Northwest noted for the record that no evidence was presented by the State 
as to resultant expenditures incurred by the State and expressed his feelings 
that the court's order requiring $5,000.00 of the bond be forfeited appeared to 
be punitive in nature.  

   3See footnote 
2.