Title: Lilya v. Greater Gulf State Fair, Inc.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

855 So. 2d 1049 (2003)
John LILYA
v.
The GREATER GULF STATE FAIR, INC.
1012313.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
February 21, 2003.
*1050 Scott E. Denson of McCleave & Denson, L.L.C., Mobile; and Robert Hedge and Brian Cigelske of Taylor, Martino & Hedge, P.C., Mobile, for appellant.
*1051 D. Brent Baker and Ross A. Frazer of Frazer, Greene, Upchurch & Baker, L.L.C., Mobile, for appellee.
HOUSTON, Justice.
John Lilya appeals the Mobile Circuit Court's summary judgment in favor of The Greater Gulf State Fair, Inc. ("Gulf State Fair"), on Lilya's tort and contract claims stemming from his fall off of a mechanical bull operated by a lessee on the premises of Gulf State Fair. We affirm.
City of Orange Beach v. Duggan, 788 So. 2d 146,149 (Ala.2000).
Viewed in the light most favorable to Lilya, the relevant facts of this case, most of which are undisputed, are as follows. While attending a fair on premises owned by Gulf State Fair in Mobile County, John Lilya came upon a mechanical bull ride owned and operated by Tracy Torres, who was doing business as "Rolling Thunder & Company." As Lilya approached the ride, which was enclosed in a small corral fence and was surrounded by a crowd of people, he could see a person riding the mechanical bull. Above the mechanical bull was a large banner that read "Rolling Thunder." As a friend of Lilya's walked up to a table located on one side of the corral area to pay for a ride on the mechanical bull, Lilya noticed that the rider who had been on the mechanical bull had fallen off. After Lilya's friend paid for his ride on the bull and walked into the corral, Lilya decided that he would also try to ride the mechanical bull.
After Lilya approached the table and paid the $5 admission fee to Torres, who was operating the mechanical bull, Lilya noticed that his friend had fallen off the bull. Torres told Lilya that Lilya had to sign a document before he would be allowed to ride the mechanical bull. That document provided, in pertinent part:
(Emphasis in original.)
After signing the document, Lilya stepped into the corral area, the floor of which was covered with a mat approximately 12 to 18 inches thick, which Lilya described as "soft and forgiving." Lilya's impression of the mat was that if he fell *1053 from the bull the mat would protect him from injury.
With Torres's help, Lilya got up on the mechanical bull and began to ride. However, after just a few seconds, and while the bull was still moving slowly, Lilya fell off. Torres then instructed Lilya on how to ride the bull and helped Lilya back onto the bull. The bull ride began again, and it became progressively faster, spinning and bucking to the left and to the right, until Lilya again fell off of the bull. Lilya claims that it was this second fall that caused his injury; he landed on his head and shoulders and suffered a fractured neck.
Lilya brought this action against, among others, Gulf State Fair, asserting 1) that Gulf State Fair negligently and/or wantonly operated its place of entertainment in that it breached its duty to keep and maintain the fairgrounds in a reasonably safe condition, and 2) that Gulf State Fair breached an implied-in-fact contract with Lilya to provide reasonably safe exhibits for Lilya's entertainment. Gulf State Fair filed a motion for a summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Following certification of the summary judgment as a final judgment under Ala. R. Civ. P. 54(b), Lilya filed this appeal.
The parties dispute the nature of the claim involved and, accordingly, whether the duty owed to Lilya by Gulf State Fair should be extracted from general principles of negligence or of premises liability. The key to this question is whether the injury was caused by some affirmative conduct of the landowner or by a condition of the premises. Baldwin v. Gartman, 604 So. 2d 347 (Ala.1992).
In Baldwin, we held that an injury to a landowner's friend, Baldwin, caused by a concrete slab that fell on Baldwin's leg after it was left upright on a dolly by the landowner, Gartman, was caused by a condition of the premises and was to be evaluated under premises-liability principles:
"535 So. 2d  at 151-54. In Orr the landowner injured a licensee when, while running with a pan of burning grease, she spilled some on the licensee. That conduct had nothing to do with the condition of the premises. Rather, the injury came from an affirmative act.
Baldwin, 604 So. 2d  at 348-49 (footnote omitted).
Just as it was the "dangerous condition" created by the unbalanced slab and not Gartman's act of leaving the slab unattended that caused the injury in Baldwin, it is clear here that, if anything, it was the allegedly dangerous condition created by the inherent risks of the mechanical bull ride itselfnot Gulf State Fair's conduct in allowing Torres to lease space and to operate the mechanical bull ridethat directly caused Lilya's injury. Therefore, any tort claim Lilya would maintain against Gulf State Fair would be governed by premises-liability principles and would be evaluated in light of the duty owed by a landowner to an invitee.[1]
As the landowner, Gulf State Fair would owe Lilya, its invitee, the duty to use reasonable care described in Tice v. Tice, 361 So. 2d 1051, 1052 (Ala.1978):
If there is a dangerous condition on the premises that is not "open and obvious," the premises owner has a duty "to give sufficient warning so that, by the use of ordinary care, the danger can be avoided." Armstrong v. Georgia Marble Co., 575 So. 2d 1051, 1053 (Ala.1991).
Here, the only evidence of danger stemming from the mechanical bull ride is the most open and obvious characteristic of the ride: the possibility of falling off the mechanical bull. Lilya was aware that the two riders who had ridden the mechanical bull immediately before he rode it had fallen off. He noticed the thick floor mat, and he knew that the mat was there to protect riders when they fell. Also, he signed a release that explicitly stated, among other things, 1) that riding the mechanical bull involved inherent risks, 2) that injury was a possibility, 3) that the risks included "falling off or being thrown from the bull which could result in musculoskeletal injuries including head, neck, and back injuries," and 4) that Lilya understood the risks and rode voluntarily.
Additionally, the very name of the ride"Rolling Thunder"hanging on a banner above the ride, gives a somewhat graphic indication of what is the very nature of bull riding: an extremely turbulent ride the challenge of which is to hang on and not fall off. The entertainment valueand, indeed, the conceptof bull riding becomes meaningless without the inherent possibility of falling off, an observation that parallels one Chief Justice Cardozo found compelling in Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 250 N.Y. 479, 480-83, 166 N.E. 173, 173-74 (1929), a similar case involving an injury to a rider on an attraction at an amusement park at Coney Island in New York:
(Citations omitted.)
We hold that the possibility of falling off the mechanical bull and, accordingly, the possibility of being injured as a result of falling off the mechanical bull were open and obvious dangers. Therefore, Gulf State Fair owed no duty to warn Lilya of the possible harm involved in riding the mechanical bull. Without the existence of a duty, Lilya's negligence and wantonness claims fail as a matter of law, and the trial court's summary judgment as to those claims was appropriate. Flagstar Enters., Inc. v. Davis, 709 So. 2d 1132, 1139 (Ala. 1997) (noting that one of the "essential elements to a right of recovery for negligence [is a] a duty owing from the defendant to the plaintiff"); Hobart Corp. v. Scoggins, 776 So. 2d 56, 58 (Ala.2000) ("Wantonness involves the `conscious doing of some act or the omission of some duty, while knowing of the existing conditions and being conscious that, from doing or omitting to do an act, injury will likely or probably result.'") (quoting Alfa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roush, 723 So. 2d 1250, 1256 (Ala. 1998)) (emphasis omitted).
Lilya also alleges that Gulf State Fair violated a duty it owed Lilya under an implied-in-fact contract. When a person purchases admission to a place of amusement, such as the fair that Lilya attended, an implied contract is created pursuant to which the seller "undertakes that the premises are reasonably safe for the purpose intended, and for which they are accordingly used by his patrons." Birmingham Amusement Co. v. Norris, 216 Ala. 138, 141, 112 So. 633, 635 (1927); see also Sims v. Etowah County Bd. of Educ., 337 So. 2d 1310, 1314 (Ala.1976) (stating that "a ticket to a place of public entertainment constitutes a contract between the proprietor and the purchaser of the ticket; whatever contractual duties grow out of that relation, it has been held, must be performed by the proprietor or he must respond in damages for breach of contract").
Norris, 216 Ala. at 141, 112 So.  at 635.
Here, there simply is no substantial evidence of a "causating defect." Lilya appears to be contending that a mechanical bull is unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law, a contention with which we cannot agree. There is no evidence indicating that the mechanical bull did not work exactly as it was supposed to work; therefore, there was no "defect" that Gulf State Fair should have discovered through inspection. In the words of Norris, there is no substantial evidence indicating that the mechanical bull ride was not "reasonably safe for the purpose intended." Therefore, because Lilya can show no breach of the implied contract between him and Gulf State Fair, the summary judgment in favor of Gulf State Fair on Lilya's contract claim was appropriate, and we affirm that judgment.
AFFIRMED.
MOORE, C.J., and LYONS and JOHNSTONE, JJ., concur.
WOODALL, J., concurs in the result.
[1]  Lilya contends that the duty owed by Gulf State Fair in this case is governed by Birmingham Amusement Co. v. Norris, 216 Ala. 138, 112 So. 633 (1927). However, as discussed below, the Norris duty rule is applicable to claims under an implied-contract theory of recovery based on a person's purchase of a ticket to obtain entry into a place of amusement. See Sims v. Etowah County Bd. of Educ., 337 So. 2d 1310, 1314 (Ala.1976) (citing Norris).
[2]  The maxim "volenti non fit injuria" means that "a person who knowingly and voluntarily risks danger cannot recover for any resulting injury." Black's Law Dictionary 1569 (7th ed.1999).