Title: Smith v. Osmun

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Smith v. Osmun  (94-527); 165 Vt 545; 676 A.2d 781

[Opinion Filed 08-Mar-1996]


                               ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 94-527

                             JANUARY TERM, 1996


Gregory and Patricia Smith           }     APPEALED FROM:
                                     }
                                     }
     v.                              }     Addison Superior Court
                                     }
John Osmun                           }
                                     }     DOCKET NO. S193-88Ac


       In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Defendant John Osmun appeals a decision of the Addison Superior Court
  enforcing an agreement to settle a specific performance action brought by
  plaintiffs Gregory and Patricia Smith.  Defendant claims that the court
  erred in finding that a settlement agreement existed, in finding that
  defendant's former lawyer had authority to enter into a settlement
  agreement, and in assessing damages and prejudgment interest.  We affirm in
  part and reverse in part.

       Plaintiffs were living in a camp they constructed on defendant's
  property in Starksboro. In November 1988, they brought an action to require
  defendant to specifically perform an alleged contract for sale of 3.2 acres
  on which the camp was constructed.  Defendant denied the existence of the
  contract for sale and responded that plaintiffs were tenants who failed to
  pay their rent and who were notified to vacate in October 1988.  Defendant
  sought a writ of possession by counterclaim.  The underlying actions were
  never tried.  Instead, plaintiffs moved to enforce a settlement agreement
  which they claimed was entered into between the parties. Eventually, after
  taking evidence, the court issued two decisions finding that a settlement
  agreement existed and enforcing it.

       In the first decision, the court found that through an exchange of
  letters of their lawyers, the parties had agreed to a settlement under
  which plaintiffs would relinquish claim to the real estate and pay $1,500
  in back rent and an amount for any damage to the real estate; defendant in
  turn would purchase the camp from plaintiffs for a price to be determined
  by an independent appraiser.  The appraiser set the value of the camp at
  $13,700.  The court found that defendant balked at complying with the
  settlement because he disagreed with the appraisal and not because he
  seriously disputed the existence of the settlement or the lawyer's
  authority to consummate it.

       In the second decision, the court again found the agreement valid and
  that defendant had breached it, specifically responding to defendant's
  renewed argument that no agreement existed because defendant's lawyer
  failed to include as a term that plaintiffs vacate immediately, as
  defendant instructed the lawyer to do; and that if an agreement existed, it
  necessarily included the term that plaintiffs vacate immediately, which
  they failed to do.  The court accepted the appraiser's value of the camp
  and awarded net damages of $11,450, plus interest on the amount running
  from December 1, 1989.

       Defendant first argues that a finding that a letter of February 20,
  1989 from plaintiffs' attorney contained the terms of the settlement is
  clearly erroneous.  Defendant misconstrues the finding, which states only
  that the letter of February 20 was "key" and ended the dispute.

 

  Elsewhere, the court found that the parties reached a resolution of the
  dispute in May of 1989, when the last letter was sent by defendant's
  lawyer.  Read in context, the finding about the key letter is not clearly
  erroneous.

       We reach a similar conclusion with respect to a finding that defendant
  did not convey to his lawyer his view that the appraisal of the camp should
  be based on salvage value.  The court found that defendant agreed to the
  appraisal, without tying the hands of the appraiser to a particular
  methodology, whatever he thought the outcome of the appraisal might or
  should be. The evidence supports this finding, and we will not overturn it. 
  See Pinewood Manor, Inc. v. Vermont Agency of Transp., 6 Vt. L.W. 245, 246
  (1995).

       Defendant next claims that the exchange of letters did not create a
  settlement agreement because there was never an agreement on a set of
  specific terms and the terms plaintiffs claimed were vague and
  unenforceable.  Specifically, defendant claims that there was no meeting of
  the minds on when plaintiffs would leave the property or, alternatively,
  the agreement was vague or incomplete on this point, and vague or
  incomplete on the question of whether plaintiffs would relinquish their
  claim to the land.  The trial court concluded that the terms were fully
  stated in the May 17, 1989 letter from defendant's attorney to plaintiffs'
  attorney, there was a meeting of the minds on these terms, and these terms
  were not vague or incomplete.

       There is no dispute about the law applicable to defendant's claims. 
  Before there is a contract, there must be initial assent to the terms. 
  Milot v. Calkins, 150 Vt. 537, 538,