Title: Harris v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
BRYCIE HARRIS, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 302, 2006 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Kent County 
§  Cr. ID 0601019334 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: October 3, 2006 
  Decided: December 5, 2006 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and BERGER, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 5th day of December 2006, upon consideration of the appellant's 
Supreme Court Rule 26(c) brief, his attorney's motion to withdraw, and the 
State's response thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Brycie Harris (Harris), pled guilty on 
May 10, 2006 to one count of Assault in the Second Degree.  The Superior 
Court sentenced Harris to eight years at Level V imprisonment, suspended 
immediately for time served and probation.  A special condition of his 
probation was to have no contact with the victim.  On May 12, 2006, a 
probation officer went to the victim’s home to inform her Harris had been 
released from prison.  Harris was in the victim’s home. He was taken into 
 
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custody, and a violation of probation (VOP) hearing was held on May 26, 
2006.  The Superior Court sentenced Harris on the VOP to eight years at 
Level V imprisonment, to be suspended after serving two years for one-year 
probation.  This is Harris’s direct appeal from those proceedings. 
(2) 
Harris's counsel on appeal has filed a brief and a motion to 
withdraw pursuant to Rule 26(c).  Harris's counsel asserts that, based upon a 
complete and careful examination of the record, there are no arguably 
appealable issues.  By letter, Harris's attorney informed him of the 
provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided Harris with a copy of the motion to 
withdraw and the accompanying brief.  Harris also was informed of his right 
to supplement his attorney's presentation.  Harris has raised several issues 
for this Court's consideration.  The State has responded to the position taken 
by Harris's counsel, as well as the arguments raised by Harris, and has 
moved to affirm the Superior Court's judgment. 
(3) 
The standard and scope of review applicable to the 
consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under 
Rule 26(c) is twofold:  (a) this Court must be satisfied that defense counsel 
has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable 
claims; and (b) this Court must conduct its own review of the record and 
 
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determine whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably 
appealable issues that it can be decided without an adversary presentation.1  
(4) 
Harris raises several points on appeal.  First, he alleges 
numerous violations of his procedural rights under Superior Court Criminal 
Rule 32.1.  Second, he asserts that there was insufficient proof to find him in 
violation for failing to report to the probation office because less than twelve 
hours had passed from the time he was released from prison to the time he 
was arrested for violating probation.  Third, he claims that, because he had 
not yet “signed up” at the probation office, the probation office did not have 
jurisdiction over him and he could not be in violation of probation that he 
had yet to begin serving.  Finally, Harris argues that his counsel at the VOP 
hearing was ineffective.  
(5) 
With respect to his procedural rights, Harris asserts that: (i) he 
was never notified in writing of the allegations against him; (ii) the State did 
not disclose the evidence against him; (iii) he was not given the opportunity 
to present evidence or call witnesses; (iv) he was not allowed to question 
adverse witnesses; (v) he was not brought before a magistrate to have bail 
set; and (vi) he was not informed of his right to counsel at the VOP 
                                                 
1Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of 
Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
 
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proceedings.  Harris did not present any of these objections to the Superior 
Court.  Accordingly, we review for plain error.2 
(6) 
We find no basis in the record for Harris’ claim that the VOP 
hearing did not comply with the procedural requirements of Rule 32.1.  As 
required by Rule 32.1, there was written notice of the allegations in the 
violation report and Harris was aware of the evidence against him 
sufficiently in advance of the hearing to respond to the allegations.  
Moreover, Harris had the opportunity to appear through legal counsel, to 
confront the witness against him, and to present evidence in his own behalf.  
It was defense counsel’s choice not to cross-examine or present other 
evidence.  Accordingly, we find no plain error in the conduct of the VOP 
proceedings. 
(7) 
Furthermore, we reject Harris’s claims that the evidence was 
insufficient to establish a violation of either the conditions of his probation 
for which he was found guilty.  The transcript of Harris’s guilty plea to the 
assault charge on May 10, 2006 reflects that Harris specifically questioned 
the judge about imposing the no contact order with the victim, whom Harris 
described as his “legal wife” and with whom Harris stated he wished to 
reunite.  The sentencing judge explained to Harris unequivocally that, 
                                                 
2 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8 (2006). 
 
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regardless of the victim’s purported desire to reunite with him,3 Harris was 
not to have contact with the victim for a period of two years.  Consequently, 
the record clearly establishes that Harris knew about the no-contact order.  
Had Harris reported to the probation office on May 12, 2006 instead of 
going to the victim’s house, he could have avoided violating either condition 
of his probation.  Under other circumstances, a short delay in reporting to the 
probation office may not result in a technical violation for failing to report 
“immediately.”  Under the circumstances of this case, however, Harris had 
the choice to report the probation office.  Instead, he chose to go to the 
victim’s house, in clear violation of a condition of his release on probation.  
We find sufficient evidence in the record to support the Superior Court’s 
VOP adjudication in this case. 
(8) 
With respect to Harris’s final claim regarding his counsel’s 
deficient performance, it is well-established that this Court will not consider 
ineffectiveness claims for the first time on direct appeal.4 
(9) 
This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded 
that Harris’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably 
appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that Harris's counsel has made a 
                                                 
3 The victim did not appear at Harris’s guilty plea and sentencing or at the VOP 
proceedings. 
4 Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 829 (Del. 1994). 
 
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conscientious effort to examine the record and the law and has properly 
determined that Harris could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State's motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
The motion to withdraw is moot. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice