Title: State ex rel. Beane v. Dayton

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Beane v. Dayton, 112 Ohio St.3d 553, 2007-Ohio-811.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. BEANE ET AL. v. CITY OF DAYTON ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Beane v. Dayton, 112 Ohio St.3d 553, 2007-Ohio-811.] 
Original actions — Mandamus — Complaint seeks prohibitory injunction to 
enjoin enforcement of R.C. 9.481 — Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction in 
injunction — Cause dismissed. 
(No. 2006-1929 ─ Submitted January 9, 2007 ─ Decided March 14, 2007.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an original action for a writ of mandamus filed by relators, 
Captain John C. Post Lodge No. 44 of the Fraternal Order of Police and Randy 
Beane, a member, to compel respondents, the city of Dayton, the Dayton City 
Commission, the Dayton Civil Service Board, and various city officials, to 
comply with R.C. 9.481, a recently enacted statute prohibiting political 
subdivisions from requiring their employees, as a condition of employment, to 
reside in any specific area of the state.  For the following reasons, we grant 
respondents’ motion and dismiss the cause. 
Dayton Charter 
{¶ 2} Effective March 24, 1987, the electorate of respondent city of 
Dayton adopted an amendment to Section 102, Article X of the Dayton Charter 
that provides a residency requirement for city employees: 
{¶ 3} “(A) All employees in the Civil Service of the City of Dayton, 
appointed after the effective date of this Charter section, must and shall be actual 
residents of and physically live in the City of Dayton at the time of their 
appointment, and shall continue to be actual residents and physically live in the 
City of Dayton during the term of their employment. 
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{¶ 4} “(B) All employees in the Civil Service of the City of Dayton, 
required by Ordinance No. 25558, dated June 28, 1978, and/or personnel 
regulations, including, but not specifically limited to, Personnel Policies and 
Procedures Manual § 2.01, originally adopted June 28, 1978, as § 9.10 and 
revisions thereof, to have actual residence and physically live in the City of 
Dayton at the time of the effective date of this Charter section shall and must 
continue to be actual residents of and physically live in the City of Dayton during 
the term of their employment. 
{¶ 5} “(C) Irrespective and notwithstanding any other provision of this 
Charter, violation of the provisions of this section shall result in discharge. 
{¶ 6} “(D) The Commission may enact such ordinances as may be 
necessary and consistent with implementation of this section.” 
R.C. 9.481 
{¶ 7} In January 2006, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 9.481, which 
generally prohibits political subdivisions from imposing residency requirements 
on employees.  R.C. 9.481 provides: 
{¶ 8} “(B)(1)  Except as otherwise provided in division (B)(2) of this 
section, no political subdivision shall require any of its employees, as a condition 
of employment, to reside in any specific area of the state. 
{¶ 9} “(2)(a)  Division (B)(1) of this section does not apply to a 
volunteer. 
{¶ 10} “(b)  To ensure adequate response times by certain employees of 
political subdivisions to emergencies or disasters while ensuring that those 
employees generally are free to reside throughout the state, the electors of any 
political subdivision may file an initiative petition to submit a local law to the 
electorate, or the legislative authority of the political subdivision may adopt an 
ordinance or resolution, that requires any individual employed by that political 
January Term, 2007 
3 
subdivision, as a condition of employment, to reside either in the county where 
the political subdivision is located or in any adjacent county in this state.  * * * 
{¶ 11} “(c)  Except as otherwise provided in division (B)(2) of this 
section, employees of political subdivisions of this state have the right to reside 
any place they desire.” 
{¶ 12} In 2006 Sub.S.B. No. 82, which enacted the statute, the General 
Assembly made the following declaration and findings to support R.C. 9.481: 
{¶ 13} “SECTION 2.  In enacting section 9.481 of the Revised Code in 
this act, the General Assembly hereby declares its intent to recognize both of the 
following: 
{¶ 14} “(A)  The inalienable and fundamental right of an individual to 
choose where to live pursuant to Section 1 of Article I, Ohio Constitution. 
{¶ 15} “(B)  Section 34 of Article II, Ohio Constitution, specifies that 
laws may be passed providing for the comfort, health, safety, and general welfare 
of all employees, and that no other provision of the Ohio Constitution impairs or 
limits this power, including Section 3 or Article XVIII, Ohio Constitution. 
{¶ 16} “SECTION 3.  The General Assembly finds, in enacting section 
9.481 of the Revised Code in this act, that it is a matter of statewide concern to 
generally allow the employees of Ohio’s political subdivisions to choose where to 
live, and that it is necessary to generally prohibit political subdivisions from 
requiring their employees, as a condition of employment, to reside in any specific 
area of the state in order to provide for the comfort, health, safety, and general 
welfare of those public employees.” 
{¶ 17} The effective date of R.C. 9.481 is May 1, 2006.  See 2006 
Sub.S.B. No. 82. 
Refusal of Respondents to Comply with R.C. 9.481 
{¶ 18} After the passage of S.B. 82, respondent Dayton Mayor Rhine L. 
McLin issued a letter dated January 30, 2006, to city employees informing them 
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that the city would continue to enforce its charter residency requirement and that 
the city considered the enactment of R.C. 9.481 to be unconstitutional: 
{¶ 19} “As you may have read, the Ohio General Assembly recently 
passed, and the Governor signed, a state law purportedly prohibiting cities such as 
Dayton from requiring employees to live within the City as a condition of 
employment.  At some point in the future, we expect the constitutionality of this 
law will be determined by the Ohio Supreme Court. 
{¶ 20} “This letter is to inform you that the Dayton City Commission has 
passed an Informal Resolution opposing such action by the State.  In addition, the 
members of the City Commission are unanimous in their direction to the City 
Manager to continue enforcing and defending the requirements of Dayton’s 
Residency Rule.  This means there is no change in the City’s policy of hiring 
employees who are in compliance with the Rule and terminating all 
employees who violate the Rule. 
{¶ 21} “Dayton is granted ‘Home Rule’ powers under the State 
Constitution that allows [sic] the City to adopt its own Charter and enact local 
laws that meet the needs of the Dayton community.  The City Commission firmly 
believes the action by the State of Ohio violates our ‘Home Rule’ authority and 
conflicts with the State Constitution.  In addition, the residents of Dayton 
overwhelmingly voted in favor of the Residency requirement when the issue was 
put on the ballot in 1987.  They understood that the Residency Rule serves the 
best interest of all Dayton residents by providing timely and efficient employee 
service and maintaining neighborhood stability.  The action by uninformed and 
unaffected politicians at the State level is a slap in the face to the citizens of 
Dayton who clearly voiced their opinion on the issue.”  (Boldface and emphasis 
sic.)   
Mandamus Complaint 
January Term, 2007 
5 
{¶ 22} Relator Randy Beane is employed as a police lieutenant by the 
city.  Beane is the president of relator Captain John C. Post Lodge No. 44 of the 
Fraternal Order of Police (“FOP”), which is the certified bargaining representative 
of certain police officers employed by the city.  Beane currently resides within 
Dayton in accordance with Section 102, Article X of the Dayton Charter, but like 
many other officers represented by the FOP, he wishes to live outside the city and 
still retain his job. 
{¶ 23} Almost nine months after R.C. 9.481 was enacted and over five 
months after the statute became effective, on October 17, 2006, Beane and the 
FOP filed this action for extraordinary relief against respondents, Dayton, its 
mayor, its law director, its commission and the commissioners, and its civil 
service board and board members.  Relators requested a writ of mandamus to 
compel respondents to implement S.B. 82 and R.C. 9.481 and to permit Beane, 
FOP members, and similarly situated city emergency/safety-force employees to 
live outside the city and be entitled to continued employment with the city.  On 
November 9, respondents filed a motion to dismiss.  Respondents raised several 
defenses, including that relators’ complaint failed to comply with the personal-
knowledge affidavit requirement of S.Ct.Prac.R. X(4)(B).  Relators’ response to 
the motion to dismiss was due on November 20, but none was filed. 
{¶ 24} On December 19, 2006, relators filed a motion to amend their 
complaint to include an amended affidavit to attest to personal knowledge of the 
allegations contained in the complaint. 
{¶ 25} This cause is now before this court for our S.Ct.Prac.R. X(5) 
determination. 
S.Ct.Prac.R. X(5) Standard 
{¶ 26} We must now determine whether dismissal, an alternative writ, or 
a peremptory writ is appropriate.  Dismissal is required if it appears beyond 
doubt, after presuming the truth of all material factual allegations of the complaint 
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and making all reasonable inferences in relators’ favor, that relators are not 
entitled to the requested extraordinary relief in mandamus.  State ex rel. Morenz v. 
Kerr, 104 Ohio St.3d 148, 2004-Ohio-6208, 818 N.E.2d 1162, ¶ 13.  If, however, 
after so construing relators’ complaint, it appears that their mandamus claim may 
have merit, an alternative writ should be granted and a schedule for the 
presentation of evidence and briefs should be issued.  State ex rel. Highlander v. 
Rudduck, 103 Ohio St.3d 370, 2004-Ohio-4952, 816 N.E.2d 213, ¶ 8. 
{¶ 27} With these standards in mind, relators’ mandamus claim is next 
considered. 
{¶ 28} “ ‘In general, if the allegations of a complaint for a writ of 
mandamus indicate that the real objects sought are a declaratory judgment and a 
prohibitory injunction, the complaint does not state a cause of action in 
mandamus and must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.’ ”  State ex rel. Phillips 
v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 535, 537, 757 N.E.2d 319, 
quoting State ex rel. Grendell v. Davidson (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 629, 634, 716 
N.E.2d 704.  “[W]e must examine [relators’] complaint ‘to see whether it actually 
seeks to prevent, rather than to compel, official action.’ ”  State ex rel. 
Cunningham v. Amer Cunningham Co., L.P.A. (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 323, 324, 
762 N.E.2d 1012, quoting State ex rel. Stamps v. Montgomery Cty. Automatic 
Data Processing Bd. (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 164, 166, 538 N.E.2d 105. 
{¶ 29} Although couched in affirmative language, the manifest objectives 
of relators’ mandamus claim are (1) a declaratory judgment that R.C. 9.481 is 
constitutional and prevails over conflicting municipal charter residency 
requirements for municipal employees and (2) a prohibitory injunction preventing 
Dayton from applying the municipal residency requirements.  Therefore, we lack 
jurisdiction over relators’ mandamus claim.  See State ex rel. Mackey v. 
Blackwell, 106 Ohio St.3d 261, 2005-Ohio-4789, 834 N.E.2d 346, ¶ 14-16. 
January Term, 2007 
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{¶ 30} Similarly, in State ex rel. Sheppard v. Cleveland, 108 Ohio St.3d 
1506, 2006-Ohio-1329, 844 N.E.2d 852, we dismissed an original action for a 
writ of mandamus to compel the city of Cleveland and certain city officials to 
comply with R.C. 9.481 and permit city employees to continue working for the 
city even if they lived outside the city on and after the effective date of the statute.  
See Relators’ Petition and Verified Complaint for Writ of Mandamus, 2006 WL 
565043. 
{¶ 31} Moreover, mandamus is not appropriate if there is a plain and 
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. Vaughn Indus., 
L.L.C. v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 109 Ohio St.3d 482, 2006-Ohio-2994, 849 
N.E.2d 31, ¶ 18.  The alternate remedy must be complete, beneficial, and speedy 
in order to be an adequate remedy at law.  State ex rel. Ullmann v. Hayes, 103 
Ohio St.3d 405, 2004-Ohio-5469, 816 N.E.2d 245, ¶ 8.  Relators here have an 
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by an action for declaratory 
judgment and prohibitory injunction in the Montgomery County Court of 
Common Pleas, seeking (1) a judgment declaring that R.C. 9.481 is constitutional 
and supersedes Dayton’s conflicting charter residency requirement and (2) an 
injunction preventing Dayton from applying the city’s charter requirement 
conditioning municipal employment on city residency.  Relators have not 
sufficiently alleged why this alternative would not provide complete, beneficial, 
and speedy relief.  They could have brought such an action several months ago 
when R.C. 9.481 took effect. 
{¶ 32} Furthermore, “ ‘[c]onstitutional challenges to legislation are 
generally resolved in an action in a common pleas court rather than in an 
extraordinary writ action.’ ”  State ex rel. Satow v. Gausse-Milliken, 98 Ohio 
St.3d 479, 2003-Ohio-2074, 786 N.E.2d 1289, ¶ 18, quoting Rammage v. Saros, 
97 Ohio St.3d 430, 2002-Ohio-6669, 780 N.E.2d 278, ¶ 11. 
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{¶ 33} In addition, “ ‘[w]here parties to a mandamus action are also 
parties, or may be joined as parties, in a previously filed declaratory judgment 
action involving the same subject matter, a court, in the exercise of its discretion, 
may refuse to issue a writ of mandamus.’ ”  State ex rel. Gaydosh v. Twinsburg 
(2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 576, 579, 757 N.E.2d 357, quoting State ex rel. Bennett v. 
Lime (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 62, 9 O.O.3d 69, 378 N.E.2d 152, syllabus.  As noted 
by the respondents, relators could seek to intervene in an action for declaratory 
judgment and prohibitory injunction, currently pending in Montgomery County, 
which raises the same issues.  See Dayton v. State, Montgomery C.P. No. 06 CV 
3507. 
{¶ 34} Finally, relators failed to file a timely memorandum in opposition 
to respondents’ motion to dismiss. 
{¶ 35} Based on the foregoing, we grant respondents’ motion and dismiss 
the cause.  Because we lack jurisdiction, we cannot address the merits of relators’ 
claim.  Our disposition renders relators’ motion to amend their complaint moot. 
Cause dismissed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL and CUPP, 
JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER and LANZINGER, JJ., concur in judgment only. 
__________________ 
 
Doll, Jansen & Ford and Susan D. Jansen, for relators. 
 
Green & Green, Thomas M. Green, Jane M. Lynch, and Stacy M. Wall, 
for respondents. 
______________________