Title: Gorham v. Thompson

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED:  October 18, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

A. KENT GORHAM,
		Petitioner on Review,
	v.
S. FRANK THOMPSON,
Superintendent,
Oregon State Penitentiary,
	Respondent on Review.
(CC 96C-12929; CA A100889; SC S46642)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.* 
	Argued and submitted November 3, 2000.
	Marc D. Blackman, Ransom Blackman, Portland, argued the
cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review.  With him on
the briefs was Kendra M. Matthews.
	Katherine H. Waldo, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for respondent on review. 
With her on the briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and
Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
and Riggs, Justices.**  
	LEESON, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the
circuit court are affirmed.
	*Appeal from Marion County Circuit Court, Rodney M. Miller, Judge. 159 Or App 570, 978 P2d 443 (1999).
	**Van Hoomissen, J., retired December 31, 2000, and did not
participate in the decision of this case.  Kulongoski, J.,
resigned June 14, 2001, and did not participate in the decision
of this case.  De Muniz and Balmer, JJ., did not participate in
the consideration or decision of this case.
In this post-conviction proceeding, petitioner contends
that his convictions for sex abuse and rape must be set aside
because he received inadequate assistance of trial counsel in
violation of Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution,
and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. (1)  The post-conviction court held that, by not
investigating experts regarding impeachment and credibility
issues for petitioner's third trial before deciding not to use
them, petitioner's trial counsel had not exercised reasonable
professional skill and judgment.  Nonetheless, that court denied
relief on the ground that petitioner had not shown prejudice. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed.  Gorham v. Thompson, 159 Or App
570, 978 P2d 443 (1999).  We allowed petitioner's petition for
review and now affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and
the judgment of the post-conviction court on a different ground.
The relevant events giving rise to petitioner's post-conviction challenge in this proceeding are as follows.  In 1991,
a grand jury indicted petitioner on three counts of first-degree
rape and three counts of first-degree sexual abuse against his
daughter L, (2) in 1989 and 1991, when she was five and seven years
old.  Petitioner was tried three times.  The first trial, in July
1992, ended in a mistrial.  Thereafter, petitioner retained
Morrow, the lawyer whose conduct is at issue in this proceeding,
to represent him at the second trial.  
Petitioner's second trial began in October 1992.  At
that trial, Morrow cross-examined prosecution witnesses and
presented defense witnesses to undermine the reliability of L's
reports of petitioner's sexual acts.  Morrow also offered the
testimony of two expert witnesses, a physician, Dr. Moore, and a
child psychiatrist, Dr. Boverman.  The purpose of Moore's
testimony was to challenge the physical examination methodology
that a pediatrician, Dr. Young, had used when she had examined
L's genitalia in 1990 and 1991, and had reported "nonspecific"
findings of sexual abuse, based in part on "bumps" and "dips" in
L's hymen.  The purpose of Boverman's testimony was to establish
that children of L's age are susceptible to suggestion, that
inappropriate questioning can lead children to make false
disclosures of sexual abuse, that the inconsistencies in L's
accounts of what had occurred were the result of improper
questioning and "contamination" through play therapy with a
psychologist, Gregory-Mull, and that Gregory-Mull inappropriately
had used anatomically correct dolls with L before L had made a
clear disclosure of sexual abuse. 
During its deliberations in the second trial, the jury
informed the trial court that it had seen an exhibit that it did
not believe had been introduced as evidence.  The court had the
exhibit removed, instructed the jury to disregard it, and told
the jury to continue its deliberations.  The jury convicted
petitioner on all counts.  
After the verdict, Morrow talked to one of the jurors. 
He learned that, before seeing the exhibit, five of the twelve
jurors had voted to acquit petitioner.  However, after seeing the
exhibit, at least three of the five jurors who had voted to
acquit changed their votes.  Morrow also learned that, in the
jury's view, the prosecution's cross-examination had discredited
both Moore's and Boverman's testimony.  Morrow then wrote a
letter to petitioner explaining that the information that he had
obtained from the juror meant that the trial court probably would
grant a motion for mistrial, that petitioner had a chance of
prevailing in a third trial, and that "[t]here are things we can
do better next time."  The trial court subsequently granted
petitioner's motion for a mistrial.
Petitioner's third trial began in May 1993,
approximately seven months after the second trial had begun. 
Before trial, Morrow learned that the prosecution's case at the
third trial would be a replay of the second trial and that the
prosecution would call the same witnesses.  According to Morrow's
affidavit in this proceeding, he decided that it would be "a
better tactic at the third trial not to call expert witnesses,
subjecting them to cross-examination by the prosecutor."  The
accused testified on his own behalf at the third trial, as he had
previously.  He denied having had any sexual contact with L. 
After hearing all the evidence, the jury returned guilty verdicts
on all counts, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions. 
State v. Gorham, 131 Or App 267, 884 P2d 1230, rev den 320 Or 493
(1994).
As noted, petitioner brought this post-conviction
proceeding, alleging that he had received inadequate assistance
of counsel at his third trial.  See ORS 138.530(1)(a) (post-conviction relief available for substantial denial of rights
under state and federal constitutions). (3)  To prevail on his claim
of inadequate assistance of counsel, petitioner had to make two
showings.  First, petitioner had to demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that Morrow had failed to exercise
reasonable professional skill and judgment.  See Trujillo v.
Maass, 312 Or 431, 435, 822 P2d 703 (1991) (identifying two-pronged test for post-conviction relief).  Second, even if Morrow
had failed to exercise reasonable professional skill and
judgment, petitioner had to demonstrate that that failure would
have had a tendency to affect the result.  Id.
As relevant to the issue on review in this proceeding,
petitioner alleged that Morrow had failed to exercise reasonable
professional skill and judgment in failing to present expert
opinion evidence on credibility and impeachment matters.
Petitioner submitted an affidavit from Dr. Bruck, a developmental
psychologist, stating that, in Bruck's opinion, L's trial
testimony
"* * * is characterized by so many poor investigative
techniques as to render the reports unreliable.  Their
reports appear to be products of coercive and
pressurized interview techniques conducted over a
period of 18 months.  As well there are a number of
milder suggestive influences that could interact with
these more coercive techniques to produce her
testimony."
The petition also averred that a "behavior pediatrician," Dr.
Sabin, would testify that the manner in which Young had conducted
her examination and obtained L's medical history did not meet
minimum professional standards, and that Young's interpretation
of her findings conflicted with medically accepted standards.
At the post-conviction hearing, petitioner submitted
Bruck's affidavit as well as the testimony of a defense lawyer,
Matasar.  Matasar expressed the opinion that, to provide adequate
assistance of counsel, Morrow had to present expert testimony to
the jury at petitioner's third trial, that it was unreasonable
not to present such testimony, that there was no tactical reason
not to present expert testimony if it were available, and that
he, Matasar, had found no evidence that Morrow had investigated
the use of expert witnesses at petitioner's third trial.  Matasar
expressed no opinion about Morrow's investigation and use of
experts at petitioner's second trial.
Following the hearing, the post-conviction court found
that Morrow had presented expert testimony from Moore and
Boverman at petitioner's second trial; that Boverman had
testified about circumstances that could create a risk that
children would make false accusations of sexual abuse; that the
prosecution had discredited both Moore and Boverman on cross-
examination; that Morrow had chosen not to use expert witnesses
in the third trial; and that Morrow instead had "extensively
cross-examined the complaining witness and the prosecution's
witnesses, including experts."  Those findings are not contested. 
The post-conviction court then held: 
"1.  Trial counsel, in failing to investigate
experts on the impeachment and credibility issues,
failed to exercise reasonable professional skill and
judgment in defending petitioner.
"2.  Petitioner did not establish that the trial
counsel's decision to rely on extensive cross-examination of the complaining witness and the
prosecution witnesses had a tendency to affect the
result of the prosecution.
"3.  Trial counsel's omissions cannot be regarded
as of a constitutional magnitude.
"4.  In the underlying criminal proceedings
resulting in petitioner's conviction, petitioner was
not denied assistance of trial counsel as guaranteed by
either the United States Constitution or the
Constitution of the State of Oregon."
(Emphasis added.)
In a letter to counsel that clarified its findings and
conclusions about Morrow's failure to investigate experts before
deciding not to use them at petitioner's third trial, the post-conviction court explained:
"The credibility and the impeachment of the
complaining witness issue was a major focus of defense
counsel. * * * A decision not to pursue expert
witnesses for possible impeachment of the child and to
preclude cross examination by the District Attorney
should logically be made after investigating what
experts had to say on the subject.  It does not seem
that 'a tactic' could be determined to be the 'better'
until the experts' input was known.  The same rationale
carries to defense counsel's decision to focus solely
on cross examination of the child witness.
"Trial counsel, in failing to investigate experts
on the impeachment and credibility issues, failed to
exercise reasonable professional skills and judgment in
defending petitioner.  
"* * * Petitioner must make a showing that the
omission of trial counsel prejudiced the defense."
(Emphasis added.) 
On appeal, petitioner assigned error to the post-
conviction court's holding that petitioner had failed to
establish prejudice.  The state cross-assigned error to the post-conviction court's holding that Morrow had failed to exercise
reasonable skill and judgment in deciding not to use experts at
the third trial without first investigating what they would say. 
The state argued that, having been through the second trial -- at
which he had both investigated and presented expert testimony -- 
Morrow already knew what experts would say.  Under those
circumstances, the state contended, Morrow's decision not to use
experts at the third trial was an informed tactical choice that
did not require additional investigation.  Petitioner asserted
that the post-conviction court had found that Morrow had provided
inadequate assistance of counsel by not presenting expert
testimony at the third trial. 
The Court of Appeals assumed, without discussion, that
"[Morrow's] decision not to call experts in the third trial after
his experts had been discredited in the second trial was not a
reasonable tactical decision."  Gorham, 159 Or App at 575. 
Nonetheless, that court affirmed the post-conviction court on the
ground that petitioner had failed to establish that Morrow's
decision to rely on extensive cross-examination of L and the
other prosecution witnesses at the third trial had a tendency to
affect the result of the prosecution.  Id.
On review, petitioner contends that the Court of
Appeals misapplied the second, or "prejudice," prong of the post-
conviction relief test.  The state defends that court's analysis
of the prejudice prong.  However, the state contends that the
Court of Appeals erred in not addressing the first prong of the
post-conviction analysis.  It argues that Morrow was not required
to treat preparation for the third trial as though he were
writing on a "clean slate."  Rather, Morrow was entitled to rely
on his investigation and use of experts at petitioner's second
trial to inform his decision not to call such experts at
petitioner's third trial.  If the state's argument on that point
is well taken, then it is dispositive.  Accordingly, we turn to
the state's argument. 
It is well established that a reviewing court will not
second-guess a lawyer's tactical decisions in the name of the
constitution unless those decisions reflect an absence or
suspension of professional skill and judgment.  Krummacher, 290
Or at 875-76.  However, tactical decisions must be grounded on a
reasonable investigation.  Id. at 875; Stevens v. State of
Oregon, 322 Or 101, 108, 902 P2d 1137 (1995).  The question in
each case is whether trial counsel's investigation was legally
and factually appropriate to the case.  Stevens, 322 Or at 108.
In this case, by the time that Morrow began preparing
for petitioner's third trial, he had both investigated and used
expert witnesses only a few months earlier at petitioner's second
trial.  Nothing changed during the time between the two trials
that would have compelled Morrow to investigate anew expert
testimony; the facts, law, and theories that the experts had
relied on remained the same.  Morrow also had learned after the
second trial that the state intended to present the same case at
the third trial that it had presented at the second trial and
that it would call the same witnesses in its effort to prove
petitioner's guilt.  Based on his investigation and use of
experts on credibility and impeachment issues at the second
trial, Morrow believed that it would be a better strategy at the
third trial not to subject defense experts to the prosecution's
cross-examination.  Accordingly, he decided not to call experts
on those issues at petitioner's third trial. (4)  On those facts,
the post-conviction court erred in holding that Morrow failed to
exercise reasonable professional skill and judgment by not
investigating experts regarding impeachment and credibility
issues for petitioner's third trial before deciding whether to
present such experts. 
The facts of this case differ from the situation in
which a lawyer makes a tactical decision about how to conduct a
trial without ever having undertaken any investigation on which
to ground that decision.  In Stevens, for example, in preparing
for the petitioner's trial on charges of sexual abuse, trial
counsel did not interview potential witnesses whose testimony
might have had a bearing on the complaining witness's
credibility, and trial counsel did not investigate at all whether
any medical evidence supported the petitioner's claim that he was
sexually impotent.  322 Or at 105-06.  This court held that trial
counsel's investigation was not legally and factually appropriate
to the case, id. at 108-09, and that trial counsel had not
exercised reasonable professional skill and judgment, id. at 110. 
In this case, by contrast, Morrow recently had both investigated
and used experts on credibility and impeachment issues at
petitioner's second trial.  The second trial turned out to be a
"dry run" for the third trial a relatively short time later. 
Morrow's decision not to present expert testimony at the third
trial was grounded on his investigation and use of experts at
petitioner's second trial.
As we have explained, the post-conviction court and the
Court of Appeals denied relief in this proceeding on the ground
that petitioner had not satisfied the second -- or prejudice --
prong of the test for post-conviction relief.  Because we hold
that petitioner has not demonstrated that Morrow failed to
exercise reasonable professional skill and judgment under the
first prong of the post-conviction test, we do not address
petitioner's arguments under the prejudice prong of the post-conviction test. (5)
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment
of the circuit court are affirmed.



1. 	Article I, section 11, provides, in part:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
have the right * * * to be heard by himself and
counsel[.]"
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides,
in part:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right * * * to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defence."  
The Sixth Amendment is made applicable to the states through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US 335, 342-45,
83 S Ct 792, 9 L Ed 2d 799 (1963).

2. 	We refer to the minor child by her initial.

3. 	In this case, the inquiry under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution is the
same as the inquiry under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon
Constitution.  See Krummacher v. Gierloff, 290 Or 867, 871, 627
P2d 458 (1981) (determining that "[i]t is sufficient for the
purposes of this case to examine the right to counsel as if the
rights assured under each constitution are identical").

4. 	Petitioner does not challenge Morrow's preparation for
and conduct at the third trial in any other respect.

5. 	Petitioner also contends that the evidence that the
state presented against him at his third trial was so unreliable
that due-process principles precluded his conviction.  Petitioner
did not challenge the reliability of the state's evidence at
trial or on direct appeal.  See Palmer v. State of Oregon, 318 Or
352, 867 P2d 1368 (1994) (failure to raise issue at trial that
reasonably could have been raised at trial generally precludes
post-conviction relief on that ground).  We decline to address
petitioner's due-process argument on review.