Title: Enbridge Energy Co. v. Dane County

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2019 WI 78 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP2503 & 2017AP13 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Enbridge Energy Company, Inc. and Enbridge 
Energy, Limited Partnership, 
          Petitioners-Respondents-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Dane County, 
          Respondent-Appellant, 
Dane County Board of Supervisors, Dane County 
Zoning and Land Regulation Committee and Roger 
Lane Dane County Zoning Administrator, 
          Respondents. 
 
------------------------------------------------ 
 
Robert Campbell, Heidi Campbell, Keith Reopelle, 
Trisha Reopelle, James Holmes, Jan Holmes and 
Tim Jensen, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
     v. 
Enbridge Energy Company, Inc., Enbridge Energy, 
Limited Partnership and Enbridge Energy Limited 
Partnership Wisconsin, 
          Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 382 Wis. 2d 830,917 N.W.2d 232 
 (2018 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 27, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 26, 2019 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Peter Anderson 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
A.W. BRADLEY, J. dissents. (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ABRAHAMSON, J. and DALLET, J. withdrew from 
participation.  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
 
2
For the defendants-respondents-petitioners (2016AP2503) and 
petitioners-respondents-petitioners 
(2017AP13), 
there 
were 
briefs filed by Eric M. McLeod, Jeffrey L. Vercauteren, Joseph 
S. Diedrich, and Husch Blackwell LLP, Madison. There was an oral 
argument by Eric M. McLeod. 
 
For the respondent-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
David Gault, assistant corporation counsel. There was an oral 
argument by David Gault. 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants, there was a brief filed by 
Patricia Hammel and Herrick & Kasdorf LLP, Madison; and Thomas 
R. Burney and Law Office of Thomas R. Burney LLC, Crystal Lake, 
Illinois. There was an oral argument by Patricia K. Hammel. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of State of 
Wisconsin by Sopen B. Shah, deputy solicitor general, with whom 
on the brief was Misha Tseytlin, solicitor general, and Brad D. 
Schimel, attorney general. 
 
An Amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Manufacturers & Commerce by Corydon J. Fish and Wisconsin 
Manufacturers and Commerce. 
 
 
 
2019 WI 78
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP2503 & 2017AP13 
(L.C. No. 
2016CV8 & 2016CV350) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Enbridge Energy Company, Inc. and Enbridge 
Energy, Limited Partnership, 
 
          Petitioners-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Dane County, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant, 
 
Dane County Board of Supervisors, Dane County 
Zoning and Land Regulation Committee and Roger 
Lane Dane County Zoning Administrator, 
 
          Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 27, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
Robert Campbell, Heidi Campbell, Keith 
Reopelle, Trisha Reopelle, James Holmes, Jan 
Holmes and Tim Jensen, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Enbridge Energy Company, Inc., Enbridge Energy, 
Limited Partnership and Enbridge Energy Limited 
Partnership Wisconsin, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
2016AP2503 & 2017AP13   
 
2 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   Enbridge Energy Company1 
operates an interstate pipeline transporting liquid petroleum.  
Dane County issued to Enbridge a conditional use permit ("CUP") 
including 
two 
conditions 
requiring 
Enbridge 
to 
procure 
additional insurance prior to expanding its pipeline pump 
station.  After Dane County initially approved the CUP with 
these insurance conditions, but pending Enbridge's appeal to the 
Dane County Board of Supervisors, the Wisconsin Legislature 
passed 2015 Wisconsin Act 55, which prohibits counties from 
requiring an interstate pipeline operator to obtain additional 
insurance 
when 
the 
pipeline 
operating 
company 
carries 
comprehensive general liability insurance with coverage for 
"sudden and accidental" pollution liability.  Although Dane 
County recognized the impact of Act 55 on the enforceability of 
the insurance conditions, it nevertheless issued the CUP with 
the invalid conditions.   
¶2 
In response, Enbridge filed a petition for writ of 
certiorari, which the Dane County Circuit Court granted.  The 
circuit court struck the two insurance conditions from the CUP 
as unenforceable under Act 55.  The court of appeals reversed, 
concluding that Enbridge failed to show it carried the requisite 
                                                 
1 The 
petitioners 
are 
Enbridge 
Energy 
Company, 
Inc., 
Enbridge Energy, Limited Partnership, and Enbridge Energy 
Limited Partnership Wisconsin.  For ease of reference, we will 
refer to them collectively as "Enbridge." 
No. 
2016AP2503 & 2017AP13   
 
3 
 
coverage triggering the statutory prohibition barring Dane 
County 
from 
imposing 
additional 
insurance 
procurement 
requirements.  Enbridge maintains that because it carries the 
requisite insurance, Act 55 rendered Dane County's extra 
insurance conditions unenforceable, and the proper remedy is to 
strike the illegal conditions, leaving the remainder of the 
permit in place.  We agree with Enbridge, reverse the court of 
appeals decision, and reinstate the circuit court's order. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
In 2014, Enbridge applied for a zoning permit to 
expand the pumping capacity at its Waterloo Pump Station ("Pump 
Station") in the Town of Medina.  The Pump Station is part of a 
pipeline that runs from Douglas County in northern Wisconsin, 
through Dane County, and into Illinois. The Dane County Zoning 
Administrator issued the permit on April 29, 2014, and Enbridge 
agreed to comply with all Dane County Ordinances.   
¶4 
On June 12, 2014, however, the Zoning Administrator 
revoked the zoning permit because the expansion and other 
improvements required a CUP.  Enbridge applied for a CUP on 
August 19, 2014, which the Town Board of Medina approved on 
October 1, 2014.  The Town Board attached two conditions 
requiring Enbridge to sign an agreement for the use of the 
Town's roads and to construct a spill basin, respectively.  
¶5 
On November 11, 2014, the CUP application came before 
the Dane County Zoning and Land Regulation Committee ("Zoning 
Committee"), which directed its staff to "pursue a condition 
requiring a surety bond for assurances of spill clean up due to 
No. 
2016AP2503 & 2017AP13   
 
4 
 
the increase[d] pressure that the pumping station will create on 
the 
existing 
line," 
and 
requested 
that 
Enbridge 
produce 
documentation of its insurance for catastrophic events.2  The 
Zoning Committee considered the CUP again on January 27, 2015, 
and voted to retain an insurance expert "for the purposes of 
determining the insurance needs of the proposal."  The insurance 
expert, David Dybdahl, prepared an insurance and risk management 
report for the Zoning Committee.  He recommended:  
• 
That 
Enbridge 
agree 
to 
indemnify 
and 
hold 
harmless Dane County for pollution losses Per the 
terms as outlined in Enbridge's proposal titled 
"CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT ("CUP") CONDITIONS"; 
• 
That Enbridge procures and maintains liability 
insurance, 
including 
Environmental 
Impairment 
Liability 
Insurance, 
making 
Dane 
County 
an 
Additional Insured to a level equal to 10% of the 
Line 6 B loss costs, $125,000,000;  
• 
As part of this overall liability insurance 
requirement, Enbridge should purchase $25,000,000 
of 
EIL 
[Environmental 
Impairment 
Liability] 
Insurance on the proposed pumping station in Dane 
County. 
¶6 
Dybdahl noted that in preparing his report, "Enbridge 
declined to provide the actual insurance policies (42 of them in 
total) to [him] for review, claiming that the documents contain 
trade secrets."  Instead, Enbridge gave him summaries of the 
policies.  Although he did not review the actual policies, 
Dybdahl "found [Enbridge's] summary of their insurance program 
                                                 
2 The CUP application first came before the Zoning Committee 
on October 28, 2014.  Due to significant opposition, the Zoning 
Committee postponed action until the November 2014 meeting.  
No. 
2016AP2503 & 2017AP13   
 
5 
 
to be credible," and he additionally observed that reading the 
policies "was not necessary to evaluate the insurance coverage 
parameters of concern."   
¶7 
Dybdahl determined that Enbridge had $700,000,000 of 
general liability insurance coverage for bodily injury, property 
damage, personal injury, and defense costs.  His report noted 
that this coverage was "confirmed by a certificate of insurance 
prepared by [Enbridge's] insurance broker."  The policy period 
ran through May 1, 2015.  Dybdahl also wrote that Enbridge's 
general liability policy had an exception to the standard 
pollution exclusion:   
"Sudden and accidental pollution liability" is what 
Enbridge 
shows 
for 
insurance 
coverage 
in 
their 
financial statements today.  However, the pollution 
exclusion exemption in the Enbridge policy is not 
limited to sudden or quick events.  A Property Damage 
or Bodily Injury claim arising from a pollution event 
that begins and is discovered within 30 days and is 
reported to the insurance company within 90 days is 
not excluded by the Pollution Exclusion in the primary 
Enbridge General Liability insurance policy.  Hence 
the words "sudden and accidental" carry no weight in 
the current pollution exclusion.  A more accurate term 
to describe the limited coverage for pollution events 
within the current General Liability Insurance policy 
is "Time Element Pollution" coverage.  
(Emphasis added.)  Enbridge did not have separate environmental 
impairment 
liability 
insurance, 
also 
known 
as 
pollution 
insurance.  Dybdahl acknowledged that "it is very possible that 
Enbridge is already purchasing all of the General Liability 
insurance capacity available in the world for their operations.  
Therefore, I do not recommend the purchase of higher G[eneral] 
No. 
2016AP2503 & 2017AP13   
 
6 
 
L[iability] limits for the operation of the . . . Pumping 
Station."  
¶8 
Dybdahl appeared before the Zoning Committee on April 
14, 2015.  When asked by a Zoning Committee member to describe a 
"time element" exception, he explained:  
So the total pollution release from the time it begins 
to the time it is discovered, in the Enbridge policy 
must transpire in 30 days.  That's the time element, 
and then there's 90 days to report it to the insurance 
company.  It used to be referred to as sudden and 
accidental pollution insurance, but the words sudden 
and 
accidental 
were 
removed 
from 
the 
insurance 
coverage in 1986.  So it doesn't——no one really could 
define what sudden meant, so they went to we're not 
going to argue whether it's sudden, because nobody can 
figure out how darn quick that needs to be, so we'll 
just say [it] has to happen within 30 days start——
start to the time it's discovered.  That's the time 
element.  
(Emphasis added.) 
¶9 
After reviewing the report and hearing Dybdahl's 
testimony, the Zoning Committee considered the CUP with twelve 
conditions.  Two of those conditions imposed insurance coverage 
requirements and are the subject of this appeal:  
7. Enbridge shall procure and maintain liability 
insurance as follows:  $100,000,000 limits in General 
Liability Insurance with a time element exception to 
the pollution exclusion (currently in place), and 
$25,000,000 
of 
Environmental 
Impairment 
Liability 
insurance.  Enbridge shall list Dane County as an 
Additional Insured on the total of $125,000,000 of 
combined liability insurance.  
8. The required General Liability Insurance and 
Environmental Impairment Liability insurances shall 
meet the technical insurance specifications listed in 
Appendix A of the insurance consultant's report, which 
is incorporated herein by reference.  
No. 
2016AP2503 & 2017AP13   
 
7 
 
(Emphasis added.)  The Zoning Committee unanimously approved the 
CUP with the twelve conditions.  The Town of Medina then re-
approved the CUP with the additional requirements on April 20, 
2015.  On May 4, 2015 Enbridge appealed to the Dane County Board 
of Supervisors ("County Board"), challenging the two insurance 
requirements.  
¶10 Before the appeal was heard, however, the Legislature 
passed Act 55.  Two sections of the Act addressed CUPs and 
insurance, respectively.  First, § 1922am created Wis. Stat. 
§ 59.69(2)(bs) (2017-18),3 which states:  
As part of its approval process for granting a 
conditional use permit under this section, a county 
may not impose on a permit applicant a requirement 
that is expressly preempted by federal or state law. 
(Emphasis 
added.) 
 
Second, 
§ 1923e 
created 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 59.70(25), which states:  
A county may not require an operator of an interstate 
hazardous liquid pipeline to obtain insurance if the 
pipeline 
operating 
company 
carries 
comprehensive 
general liability insurance coverage that includes 
coverage 
for 
sudden 
and 
accidental 
pollution 
liability. 
¶11 Because "the county cannot enforce the insurance 
requirements of [the] CUP . . . that were the subject of the 
Enbridge appeal," the County Board removed the CUP appeal from 
its July agenda.  A few days later, the Dane County Assistant 
Corporation Counsel wrote to the Zoning Administrator:  
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2016AP2503 & 2017AP13   
 
8 
 
A recent enactment of the legislature that was 
included in the Budget Bill prohibits counties from 
requiring an operator of an interstate hazardous 
liquid pipeline to obtain insurance if the company 
carries comprehensive general liability coverage that 
includes sudden and accidental pollution liability. 
Since Enbridge has the required general liability 
coverage, 
the 
CUP 
condition 
requiring 
additional 
insurance is unenforceable by the county.  
. . . . 
[Wisconsin Stat. §] 59.70(25) expressly prohibits 
a county from requiring a pipeline operator to obtain 
insurance 
if 
they 
have 
the 
required 
coverage.  
Therefore, Dane County has no authority to require 
Enbridge to obtain additional insurance coverage.  
There is no issue of retroactive application of the 
statute.  By the express language of the statute, 
effective July 14, 2015 the county is prohibited from 
requiring the insurance coverage.  When the CUP was 
approved is irrelevant.  The insurance conditions are 
rendered unenforceable prospectively by the language 
of § 59.70(25).   
¶12 The Zoning Administrator then notified Enbridge by 
letter that the CUP "has been revised to reflect" new 
legislation prohibiting counties from "requiring additional 
insurance of an operator of an interstate hazardous liquid 
pipeline beyond" its CGL insurance.  On that basis, the Zoning 
Administrator removed conditions 7 and 8 from Enbridge's CUP.  
The Zoning Committee, however, concluded that the "Zoning 
Administrator 
did 
not 
have 
the 
authority 
to 
revise 
the 
conditions of approval."  On September 29, 2015, the Zoning 
Committee directed the Zoning Administrator to restore the 
insurance requirements in the CUP as originally approved by the 
Zoning Committee on April 14, 2015.  Instead of removing the 
requirements, the Zoning Committee commanded that "[a] note 
No. 
2016AP2503 & 2017AP13   
 
9 
 
shall be added to the conditional use permit which identifies 
that [Dane] County's ability to enforce conditions 7 & 8 [is] 
affected by the State Budget Bill, 2015 Wisconsin Act 55."  On 
October 9, 2015, the Zoning Administrator sent a letter 
informing Enbridge that the Zoning Committee had instructed him 
to include the insurance conditions in the CUP exactly as 
initially approved.  The letter also notified Enbridge that 
"[a]s part of the Committee's direction, a note has been added 
to the conditional use permit which identifies that conditions 7 
& 8 are unenforceable by [Dane] County due to the State Budget 
Bill[.]"  
¶13 Enbridge appealed the Zoning Committee's decision to 
reinsert the insurance conditions with the added note to the 
County Board, which held a hearing on December 3, 2015.  After a 
summary of the CUP by the Zoning Administrator, Enbridge's 
counsel affirmed that at the time Dane County issued the CUP, 
"Enbridge had $700 million worth of general liability insurance 
which included sudden and accidental pollution coverage" that 
"has since been raised to $860 million."  Following questions 
from several supervisors, and numerous comments from the public, 
the County Board voted 27-2 to deny the appeal and keep the CUP 
with conditions 7 and 8 intact along with the note regarding 
their unenforceability.   
¶14 In January 2016, Enbridge filed a petition for a writ 
of certiorari under Wis. Stat. § 59.694(10) in Dane County 
Circuit Court.  Enbridge argued that the County Board's decision 
affirming the Zoning Committee should be reversed because the 
No. 
2016AP2503 & 2017AP13   
 
10 
 
insurance conditions were unenforceable under Act 55.  In 
February 2016, Robert and Heidi Campbell, Keith and Trisha 
Reopelle, James and Jan Holmes, and Tim Jensen——all of whom 
owned 
property 
near 
the 
Pump 
Station 
(collectively, 
"Landowners")——filed a complaint for injunctive relief pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 59.69(11), which allows an "owner of real estate 
within the district affected by the [zoning] regulation" to 
enforce a zoning ordinance.  The Landowners asked "the Court to 
exercise its injunctive powers to enforce and compel compliance 
with Condition 7 of the Conditional Use Permit."  
¶15 The circuit court consolidated the Landowners' case 
and Enbridge's certiorari action, and issued an oral ruling on 
July 11, 2016.  The circuit court concluded that Act 55 rendered 
the insurance conditions void and unenforceable and adjourned 
the matter for a later hearing on the appropriate remedy.  After 
the parties briefed the issue, the circuit court determined the 
appropriate 
remedy 
was 
to 
strike 
the 
two 
unenforceable 
conditions from the CUP:  
I don't think you can put conditional uses that will 
come into effect upon some contingency years in the 
future that we don't know whether or not it will 
occur.  We can't create contingent future conditions 
is my understanding of conditional use permits. You 
can't just do that.  
. . . . 
But in my view, those circumstances really, 
really 
counsel 
against 
authorizing 
the 
[Zoning 
Committee] or the county board to start again on the 
conditional use permit even independent of the vested 
rights issue, but the vested rights issue is not 
insubstantial.  Like I said, a lot of water has flowed 
No. 
2016AP2503 & 2017AP13   
 
11 
 
under the bridge or tar sands through the pipeline 
since the legislation a year ago, and the time for the 
county to have acted was last fall, and rather than 
take the action that they now want me to authorize 
them to do, they instead affirm the issuance of the 
conditional use permit as is with unenforceable 
provisions.   
(Emphasis added.)  The circuit court also dismissed the 
Landowners' injunction action under Wis. Stat. § 59.69(11) 
because the conditions the Landowners sought to enforce were 
unenforceable, and they "wouldn't be enforcing anything."   
¶16 Dane County and the Landowners appealed the circuit 
court's decision, and the court of appeals consolidated the 
appeals and reversed.  See Enbridge Energy Co. v. Dane Cty., 
Nos. 2016AP2503 & 2017AP13, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
May 24, 2018).  In part, the court of appeals held that 
"Enbridge failed to show to the zoning committee that, as 
required to trigger the Act 55 insurance limitation, it 
'carries' insurance that 'includes' any particular coverage, and 
also failed to show that it carries coverage 'for sudden and 
accidental pollution liability.'"  Id., ¶41.  The court of 
appeals construed Act 55 to mean "that the insurance limitation 
is triggered only after it is shown that an operator has the 
specified insurance, and it is not sufficient to show that the 
operator has carried this insurance in the past or might obtain 
it in the future."  Id., ¶71.  According to the court of 
appeals, "Enbridge failed to show to the zoning committee that 
it would maintain the coverage delineated in Act 55, but instead 
pointed only to coverage that was, at best, lapsing."  Id., ¶75.  
The court of appeals additionally concluded that "Enbridge 
No. 
2016AP2503 & 2017AP13   
 
12 
 
failed to demonstrate at any time that it carried sudden and 
accidental pollution liability insurance."  Id., ¶78.  Relying 
on Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 155 Wis. 2d 737, 456 
N.W.2d 570 (1990)——an insurance contract interpretation case——
the court of appeals interpreted "sudden and accidental" to 
include "pollution that causes either 'abrupt or immediate' or 
'unexpected and unintended damages.'"  Enbridge Energy Co., Nos. 
2016AP2503 & 2017AP13, unpublished slip op., ¶82 (quoting Just, 
155 Wis. 2d at 760; see also Just, 155 Wis. 2d at 741-42, 745-
46).  The court of appeals held that Enbridge failed to show 
that its policy covered "unexpected and unintended" pollution 
liability.  Enbridge Energy Co., Nos. 2016AP2503 & 2017AP13, 
unpublished slip op., ¶96. 
¶17 The court of appeals rejected Enbridge's proposed 
remedy 
to 
strike 
conditions 
7 
and 
8 
because 
it 
"would . . . improperly deprive the zoning committee of the 
opportunity to consider what valid permit conditions, insurance 
or otherwise, may be adequate to satisfy the permitting 
standards established by ordinance . . . with the benefit of a 
correct understanding of the Act 55 insurance limitation."  Id., 
¶98.  Instead, Dane County persuaded the court of appeals to 
apply a rule adopted by Connecticut, the District of Columbia, 
and Hawaii "that the appropriate judicial remedy, when a court 
holds permit conditions invalid and the conditions were integral 
to approval of the permit, is to reverse permit approval and not 
to sever the invalid conditions."  Id., ¶103.  Enbridge filed a 
petition for review with this court, which we granted. 
No. 
2016AP2503 & 2017AP13   
 
13 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶18 In this certiorari case, we review the decision of the 
County Board rather than the decisions of the lower courts.  See 
Oneida Seven Generations Corp. v. City of Green Bay, 2015 WI 50, 
¶¶41-42, 362 Wis. 2d 290, 865 N.W.2d 162.  Our inquiry is 
limited to determining:   
(1) 
whether 
the 
municipality 
kept 
within 
its 
jurisdiction; (2) whether it proceeded on a correct 
theory of law; (3) whether its action was arbitrary, 
oppressive, or unreasonable and represented its will 
and not its judgment; and (4) whether the evidence was 
such that it might reasonably make the order or 
determination in question.   
Ottman v. Town of Primrose, 2011 WI 18, ¶35, 332 Wis. 2d 3, 796 
N.W.2d 411.  The focus of this appeal is whether the County 
Board proceeded on a correct theory of law and whether Wis. 
Stat. §§ 59.69(2)(bs) and 59.70(25) render conditions 7 and 8 
unenforceable.  We must also decide whether the Landowners may 
enforce conditions 7 and 8, which requires us to interpret Wis. 
Stat. § 59.69(11).  Finally, we determine the proper remedy on 
certiorari, 
which 
requires 
us 
to 
interpret 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 59.694(10). 
¶19 Statutory interpretation is a question of law we 
review de novo.  CED Props., LLC v. City of Oshkosh, 2018 WI 24, 
¶20, 
380 
Wis. 2d 399, 
909 
N.W.2d 136. 
"[S]tatutory 
interpretation 'begins with the language of the statute,'" and 
"[i]f the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop 
the inquiry."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane 
No. 
2016AP2503 & 2017AP13   
 
14 
 
Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (quoted 
source omitted).  We give statutory language "its common, 
ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or 
specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or 
special definitional meaning."  Id.  Context and structure are 
both 
important 
to 
meaning, 
and 
"statutory 
language 
is 
interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in isolation 
but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of 
surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to 
avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Id., ¶46.  "Statutory 
language is read where possible to give reasonable effect to 
every word, in order to avoid surplusage."  Id. 
B.  Analysis 
 
1.  The County Board's Decision 
¶20 The first issue is whether Wis. Stat. §§ 59.70(25) and 
59.69(2)(bs) (collectively, "Act 55") render conditions 7 and 8 
in the CUP unenforceable.  Section 59.70(25) provides that "[a] 
county may not require an operator of an interstate hazardous 
liquid pipeline to obtain insurance if the pipeline operating 
company carries comprehensive general liability [CGL] insurance 
coverage that includes coverage for sudden and accidental 
pollution liability."  Section 59.69(2)(bs) provides that "a 
county may not impose on a permit applicant a requirement that 
is expressly preempted by . . . state law."  The text of each 
statute is straightforward:  if an operator of an "interstate 
hazardous liquid pipeline" (the parties agree that Enbridge fits 
No. 
2016AP2503 & 2017AP13   
 
15 
 
this category) carries CGL insurance that includes coverage for 
"sudden and accidental pollution liability," then a county may 
not require the operator to obtain additional insurance.  
Therefore, if Enbridge carries CGL insurance for "sudden and 
accidental pollution liability," conditions 7 and 8 requiring 
Enbridge to obtain additional insurance are unenforceable. 
¶21 Dane County concedes that conditions 7 and 8 are 
unenforceable under Act 55.  The Landowners, however, contend 
that Wis. Stat. § 59.70(25) does not apply for two reasons:  (1) 
Enbridge failed to prove that it carried any insurance, and (2) 
Enbridge's "time element" pollution insurance, as Dybdahl 
characterized it, is not the same as "coverage for sudden and 
accidental pollution" under § 59.70(25).  The Landowners rely on 
Just, 155 Wis. 2d 737, to define "sudden and accidental" as 
including 
"coverage 
for 
both 
'abrupt 
or 
immediate' 
and 
'unexpected and unintended' casualty events."  Consistent with 
the court of appeals decision, the Landowners contend that 
§ 59.70(25) applies only if Enbridge provides coverage for all 
"unexpected and unintended" pollution events, regardless of when 
the pollution damage is discovered or reported to the insurer.  
We reject both arguments. 
¶22 The 
certiorari 
record 
contained 
ample 
and 
uncontroverted evidence that Enbridge carried the requisite 
insurance.  Dybdahl's report and testimony establish that 
Enbridge 
carried 
CGL 
insurance 
covering 
pollution 
events 
provided they are discovered within 30 days and reported to the 
insurance company within 90 days.  During the December 2015 
No. 
2016AP2503 & 2017AP13   
 
16 
 
hearing when the County Board issued its final decision on the 
CUP, Enbridge reaffirmed that it continued to carry insurance, 
with increased policy limits.  Nothing in the certiorari record 
contradicts Enbridge's summary of insurance coverage presented 
to Dybdahl, who found Enbridge's representations satisfactory 
and confirmed by the certificate of insurance furnished by 
Enbridge's insurance broker.  Nor did the Landowners introduce 
any contrary evidence as part of their injunction action.  
Therefore, we reject the Landowners' argument that Enbridge 
failed to show it carried insurance.4   
¶23 The Landowners assert that Enbridge must not only 
carry insurance but also must maintain it in perpetuity in order 
to be exempt from Dane County's imposition of additional 
insurance requirements.  Setting aside the unlikelihood that a 
hazardous liquid pipeline operator would go uninsured and expose 
itself to catastrophic liability, the statutory text does not 
require an operator to "maintain" the specified insurance 
coverage.  Wisconsin Stat. § 59.70(25) precludes a county from 
requiring additional insurance provided the operator "carries" 
CGL coverage for sudden and accidental pollution.  Nothing more 
is required of the operator in order to avail itself of the 
statutory exemption from additional, county-imposed insurance 
requirements.  We decline to add words to the statute, as the 
                                                 
4 The Landowners' insistence that we must remand so Dane 
County can verify Enbridge's insurance also fails because 
Enbridge did present evidence of its insurance.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 59.70(25) requires nothing more. 
No. 
2016AP2503 & 2017AP13   
 
17 
 
Landowner's argument would necessitate.  "Under the omitted-case 
canon of statutory interpretation, '[n]othing is to be added to 
what the text states or reasonably implies (casus omissus pro 
omisso habendus est).  That is, a matter not covered is to be 
treated as not covered.'"  State ex rel. Lopez-Quintero v. 
Dittman, 2019 WI 58, ¶18, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ 
(quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:  The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 93 (2012)); see also Wisconsin 
Ass'n of State Prosecutors v. WERC, 2018 WI 17, ¶45, 380 
Wis. 2d 1, 907 N.W.2d 425 ("Nothing is to be added to what the 
text states or reasonably implies" (quoting Scalia & Garner, 
Reading Law at 93)).  "One of the maxims of statutory 
construction is that courts should not add words to a statute to 
give it a certain meaning."  Fond du Lac Cty. v. Town of 
Rosendale, 149 Wis. 2d 326, 334, 440 N.W.2d 818 (Ct. App. 1989).   
¶24 We reject the Landowners' second argument as well.  
Enbridge's "time element" pollution insurance is congruent with 
the "sudden and accidental" coverage referenced in Wis. Stat. 
§ 59.70(25).  Contrary to the Landowners' construction of the 
statute, it does not require coverage for all unexpected and 
unintended pollution regardless of when the pollution event is 
discovered or reported to the insurer.  The text of § 59.70(25) 
requires only that the pipeline operator carry CGL insurance 
with coverage for "sudden and accidental" pollution liability.  
As Dybdahl confirmed, the term "sudden and accidental" is 
"commonly used" in reference to CGL policies covering pollution 
events that "happen in certain timeframes."  Indeed, Dybdahl 
No. 
2016AP2503 & 2017AP13   
 
18 
 
explained "because nobody can figure out how darn quick 
["sudden"] needs to be . . . we'll just say [it] has to happen 
within 30 days start . . . to the time it is discovered.  That's 
the time element."  The statute contains no language requiring 
the pollution coverage to apply regardless of when the pollution 
is discovered or when it is reported to the insurer in order for 
a county to be precluded from imposing additional insurance 
requirements on the pipeline operator.  According to Dybdahl, 
the meaning of "sudden" within this insurance context has 
morphed into a pollution event that is discovered within 30 
days. 
¶25 The statute does not define "sudden" or "accidental."  
According to Dybdahl, the insurance industry abandoned these 
terms nearly 30 years before the Legislature enacted Wis. Stat. 
§ 59.70(25) because "no one really could define what sudden 
meant."  Accordingly, we give these words their "common, 
ordinary, and accepted" meanings.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45.   
¶26 "Accidental" means something unexpected, unintended, 
or that happened by chance rather than intentionally.  Common 
dictionary definitions support this meaning.  See Accidental, 
Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining "accidental" as 
"[n]ot having occurred as a result of anyone's purposeful act; 
esp., resulting from an event that could not have been prevented 
by human skill or reasonable foresight"); Accidental, Shorter 
Oxford English Dictionary (6th ed. 2007) (defining "accidental" 
in 
part 
as 
"[h]appening 
by 
chance, 
undesignedly, 
or 
unexpectedly"); Accidental, American Heritage Dictionary (5th 
No. 
2016AP2503 & 2017AP13   
 
19 
 
ed. 2011) (defining "accidental" as something "[o]ccurring 
unexpectedly, unintentionally, or by chance").   
¶27 "Sudden" may be used both in this sense as well as in 
a temporal sense.  See Sudden, Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 
1990) (defining "sudden" as "[h]appening without previous notice 
or 
with 
very 
brief 
notice," 
"occurring 
unexpectedly," 
"unforeseen," or "unprepared for");5 Sudden, Shorter Oxford 
English Dictionary (6th ed. 2007) (defining "sudden" in both a 
temporal sense, as in "without delay," "speedy," or "immediate" 
and to describe the unexpected, unintended, or unforeseen nature 
of something); Sudden, American Heritage Dictionary (5th ed. 
2011) (defining "sudden" as both "[h]appening without warning" 
or "unforeseen" and "[h]appening without delay; hasty or 
immediate"); see also Just, 155 Wis. 2d at 745-46.   
¶28 While the court of appeals correctly deduced that 
"sudden" 
can 
signify 
something 
that 
is 
"unexpected 
and 
unintended" (as we confirmed in Just), the more reasonable 
interpretation of "sudden" in the context of Wis. Stat. 
§ 59.70(25) applies a temporal meaning, such as something 
happening quickly, abruptly, or immediately.  Interpreting 
"sudden" to mean "unexpected and unintended," as the court of 
                                                 
5 The Tenth Edition of Black's Law Dictionary does not 
define "sudden," but it does describe a "sudden-and-accidental 
[pollution] clause" as "contain[ing] an exception [to the 
pollution 
exclusion] 
under 
which 
the 
damages 
are 
covered . . . if the discharge or other release was sudden and 
accidental."  See Pollution Exclusion, Black's Law Dictionary 
(10th ed. 2014).   
No. 
2016AP2503 & 2017AP13   
 
20 
 
appeals did below,6 creates an avoidable surplusage problem:  it 
is redundant of the word "accidental," which also means 
unexpected or unintended.  Such an interpretation needlessly 
leaves "sudden" and "accidental" with the same meaning, which 
our rules of statutory interpretation counsel against.  "If 
possible, every word and every provision is to be given effect 
(verba cum effectu sunt accipienda).  None should be ignored.  
None should needlessly be given an interpretation that causes it 
to duplicate another provision or to have no consequence."  
Scalia & Garner, supra ¶23, at 174; see also Donaldson v. State, 
93 Wis. 2d 306, 315, 286 N.W.2d 817 (1980) ("A statute should be 
construed so that no word or clause shall be rendered surplusage 
and every word if possible should be given effect.").   
¶29 While the temporal sense of "sudden" can have "an 
elastic temporal connotation that varies with expectations[,]"7 
given 
the 
inclusion 
of 
"accidental"——which 
already 
means 
unexpected and unintended——in Wis. Stat. § 59.70(25), the 
temporal connotation is the most reasonable meaning for "sudden" 
within the context of this statute.  Whenever possible, "courts 
avoid a reading that renders some words altogether redundant."  
Scalia & Garner, supra ¶23, at 176.  Interpreting "sudden" in a 
                                                 
6 See Enbridge Energy Co. v. Dane Cty., Nos. 2016AP2503 & 
2017AP13, unpublished slip op., ¶82 (Wis. Ct. App. May 24, 
2018).  
7 Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 155 Wis. 2d 737, 745-46,  
456 N.W.2d 570 (1990) (quoting Claussen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. 
Co., 380 S.E.2d 686, 688 (Ga. 1989)). 
No. 
2016AP2503 & 2017AP13   
 
21 
 
temporal sense gives each word meaning, and is consistent with 
the absence of any statutory language limiting the qualifying 
coverage to only those CGL policies without time limits on the 
discovery and reporting of pollution events.   
¶30 Contrary to the Landowners' position, which the court 
of appeals adopted, Just did not hold that coverage for "sudden 
and 
accidental 
pollution 
liability" 
necessarily 
includes 
"pollution 
that 
causes 
either 
'abrupt 
or 
immediate' 
or 
'unexpected and unintended damages.'"  See Enbridge Energy Co., 
Nos. 2016AP2503 & 2017AP13, unpublished slip op., ¶82 (emphasis 
added; quoted source omitted).  In Just we observed that 
"recognized dictionaries differ on the meaning of the term 
'sudden,'" and we acknowledged that the term can mean either 
something that is "unexpected and unintended" or something that 
is "abrupt and immediate."  Just, 155 Wis. 2d at 745-46.  
Because the word has multiple meanings, and under insurance 
interpretation rules we "construe the ambiguity in favor of the 
insured and against the insurance company that drafted the 
ambiguous language," we gave the term a meaning favoring the 
insured——"unexpected 
and 
unintended." 
 
Id. 
at 
746-47.  
Significantly, Just interpreted an insurance contract, not a 
statute.  See id. at 744-45.  In this case, we interpret 
statutes, not an insurance contract.  Accordingly, we assign the 
most reasonable meaning given the statutory context, favoring 
neither party.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶54. 
¶31 According to Dybdahl, Enbridge's CGL insurance covered 
bodily injury or property damage resulting from pollution as 
No. 
2016AP2503 & 2017AP13   
 
22 
 
long as it "is discovered within 30 days and is reported to the 
insurance company within 90 days."  As Dybdahl explained, 
Enbridge's insurance coverage for pollution events "is not 
limited to sudden or quick events."  Enbridge's policy provides 
coverage for claims "arising from a pollution event that begins 
and is discovered within 30 days" after its occurrence "and is 
reported to the insurance company within 90 days."  In other 
words, Enbridge's policy includes coverage broader than the 
statutorily-described 
insurance. 
Therefore, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 59.70(25) applies and precludes Dane County from requiring 
Enbridge to obtain additional insurance. 
¶32 Conditions 7 and 8 of the CUP required Enbridge to 
obtain 
additional 
insurance 
that 
met 
certain 
technical 
specifications, which went beyond the statutorily-described 
insurance.8  Wisconsin Stat. § 59.69(2)(bs) prohibits counties 
                                                 
8 Condition 
8 
is 
not 
merely 
a 
proof-of-insurance 
requirement, as the Landowners maintain.  It provides "[t]he 
required 
General 
Liability 
Insurance 
and 
Environmental 
Impairment 
Liability 
insurances 
shall 
meet 
the 
technical 
insurance specifications listed in Appendix A."  It thereby 
dictates the specifics of the insurance coverage required by 
condition 7.  Therefore, it is unenforceable under Act 55. 
Furthermore, during oral argument, Enbridge repeatedly 
stated it would provide proof of insurance to Dane County, and 
the 
record 
supports 
that 
Enbridge 
carried 
the 
requisite 
insurance.  Accordingly, the Landowners' and Dane County's 
argument that Dane County could require proof of insurance as a 
condition in the CUP is a red herring.  Significantly, Dane 
County never included a CUP condition requiring Enbridge to 
prove it had a CGL policy that satisfied Wis. Stat. § 59.70(25) 
nor did it require anything more than the summary provided by 
Enbridge before it issued the CUP.  In fact, Dane County 
proceeded on the assumption that Enbridge carried insurance 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP2503 & 2017AP13   
 
23 
 
from imposing on a permit applicant any requirement expressly 
preempted by state law.  Wisconsin Stat. § 59.70(25) preempts 
county-imposed insurance requirements for pipeline operators 
that carry CGL insurance policies including pollution liability 
coverage.  We therefore conclude that conditions 7 and 8 are 
unenforceable under Act 55. 
¶33 Our 
conclusion 
that 
conditions 
7 
and 
8 
are 
unenforceable disposes of the Landowners' attempt to enforce 
them under Wis. Stat. § 59.69(11) as well.  Under that statute, 
compliance with county zoning ordinances "may also be enforced 
by injunctional order at the suit of the county or an owner of 
real estate within the district affected by the regulation."  
§ 59.69(11).  Enbridge disputes the Landowners' characterization 
of a CUP or its conditions as "ordinances."  We need not resolve 
whether a CUP or its conditions constitute "ordinances" within 
the meaning of § 59.69(11) because Wis. Stat. § 59.70(25) 
renders 
these 
conditions 
unenforceable 
and 
nothing 
in 
§ 59.69(11) 
reanimates 
void 
conditions. 
 
The 
Landowners 
therefore enjoy no better footing than Dane County in their 
attempts to enforce the unlawful conditions 7 and 8 nor do they 
explain why they should be able to enforce conditions Dane 
County cannot. 
                                                                                                                                                             
consistent with its representations.  We therefore do not 
address what additional conditions——such as proof of insurance——
that counties may include in CUPs even if § 59.70(25) bars them 
from 
requiring 
a 
pipeline 
operator 
to 
obtain 
additional 
insurance. 
No. 
2016AP2503 & 2017AP13   
 
24 
 
2.  The Remedy 
¶34 We next consider whether the circuit court properly 
struck conditions 7 and 8 from the CUP as the appropriate 
remedy, as Enbridge maintains, or whether the CUP should be 
remanded to the Zoning Committee, as the Landowners and Dane 
County propose.  Dane County argues that the Zoning Committee 
"is the agency charged with making findings as to whether 
issuance of a CUP is in the public interest," and it "never 
considered issuing the [CUP] without the insurance conditions."  
Dane County maintains that striking the conditions usurps the 
Zoning Committee's authority to determine whether issuing a CUP 
is appropriate under Dane County's ordinances.  Dane County 
contends that "the function of the reviewing court ends when an 
error of law is laid bare."  See Federal Power Comm'n v. Idaho 
Power Co., 344 U.S. 17, 20 (1952). 
¶35 The Landowners also urge remand as the proper remedy 
because the Zoning Committee "never had the opportunity to 
determine whether Enbridge has Sudden and Accidental Insurance 
and 
if 
not, 
whether 
[it] 
would 
approve 
the 
CUP 
without . . . Conditions No 7 and 8."  Like Dane County, the 
Landowners insist the insurance conditions were integral to the 
CUP, and "[t]he Act 55 Insurance Limitations were clearly not 
anticipated" by the Zoning Committee.  In the Landowners' view, 
the Zoning Committee must be allowed to reconsider the CUP in 
order to confirm that Enbridge will maintain insurance coverage 
sufficient to protect the residents of Dane County or "craft 
additional conditions" to do so.  The Landowners are incorrect.  
No. 
2016AP2503 & 2017AP13   
 
25 
 
We reject remand as the remedy and conclude the circuit court 
properly struck the unlawful CUP conditions because Wis. Stat. 
§ 59.694(10) expressly permits such modification.   
¶36 The 
Zoning 
Committee 
had 
authority 
to 
attach 
conditions to the CUP to ensure compliance with Dane County's 
zoning ordinances and standards for issuing CUPs, but not 
conditions violative of Wisconsin law.  County ordinances may 
provide for "conditional uses by virtue of a special use or 
conditional use permit" in addition to permitted uses under the 
applicable zoning ordinances.  Town of Rhine v. Bizzell, 2008 WI 
76, ¶20, 311 Wis. 2d 1, 751 N.W.2d 780.  "A conditional use 
permit allows a property owner 'to put his property to a use 
which [an] ordinance expressly permits when certain conditions 
[or standards] have been met.'"  Id., ¶21 (quoted source 
omitted; second alteration in original).  Under Dane County's 
ordinances, the Zoning Committee must find that the standards 
set forth in Dane Cty. Or. § 10.255(2)(h)9 have been met prior to 
                                                 
9 Dane County Ordinance § 10.255(2)(h) provides: 
(h) Standards.  No application for a conditional use 
shall be granted by the town board or zoning committee 
unless such body shall find that all of the following 
conditions are present: 
1. 
That 
the 
establishment, 
maintenance 
or 
operation 
of 
the 
conditional 
use 
will 
not 
be 
detrimental to or endanger the public health, safety, 
comfort or general welfare; 
2. That the uses, values and enjoyment of other 
property in the neighborhood for purposes already 
permitted 
shall 
be 
in 
no 
foreseeable 
manner 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP2503 & 2017AP13   
 
26 
 
issuing a CUP.  See Dane Cty. Or. § 10.255(2)(b) ("No permit 
shall be granted when the zoning committee . . . determines that 
the standards are not met[.]").    
¶37 Neither the Zoning Committee's obligation to ensure 
the standards in Dane County Ordinance § 10.255 have been met, 
nor its authority to impose CUP conditions, however, precludes a 
reviewing court from modifying a CUP by striking unlawful 
conditions.  On certiorari review under Wis. Stat. § 59.694(10), 
"[t]he court may reverse or affirm, wholly or partly, or may 
modify, the decision brought up for review."  § 59.694(10) 
(emphasis added).  This statutory language expressly authorizes 
the reviewing court on certiorari to modify the decision under 
review.  In this case, the circuit court acted well within its 
statutory authority to modify the County Board's decision to 
                                                                                                                                                             
substantially impaired or diminished by establishment, 
maintenance or operation of the conditional use; 
3. That the establishment of the conditional use 
will not impede the normal and orderly development and 
improvement of the surrounding property for uses 
permitted in the district; 
4. 
That 
adequate 
utilities, 
access 
roads, 
drainage and other necessary site improvements have 
been or are being made; 
5. That adequate measures have been or will be 
taken to provide ingress and egress so designed as to 
minimize traffic congestion in the public streets; and 
6. That the conditional use shall conform to all 
applicable regulations of the district in which it is 
located. 
No. 
2016AP2503 & 2017AP13   
 
27 
 
issue the CUP with what the County Board knew were illegal 
insurance conditions.   
¶38 Our decision in Adams v. State Livestock Facilities 
Siting 
Review 
Board, 
2012 
WI 
85, 
342 
Wis. 2d 444, 
820 
N.W.2d 404, supports modifying a CUP by striking conditions as 
an appropriate remedy.  In that case, Wisconsin law allowed the 
Town of Magnolia to impose more stringent conditions on a CUP 
for a livestock facility than those prescribed by State law, but 
only if the Town made certain factual findings.  Id., ¶¶53-56.  
The Town failed to do so, rendering the challenged CUP 
conditions improper.  Id., ¶56.  Wisconsin Stat. § 93.90(5)(d) 
required the State Livestock Facilities Siting Review Board 
("Siting Board") to "reverse the decision of the political 
subdivision" if it determined that a challenge to permit 
conditions was valid.  Adams, 342 Wis. 2d 444, ¶61.  We held 
that the Siting Board properly modified the CUP by striking the 
invalid conditions rather than simply reversing the Town's 
decision to impose those conditions on the CUP and returning the 
applicant to the beginning of the permitting process.  Id., 
¶¶60, 64-65.  We concluded that § 93.90(5)(d) granted the Siting 
Board the "implied power" to modify the CUP by removing the 
invalid 
conditions. 
 
Adams, 
342 
Wis. 2d 444, 
¶62. 
 
Our 
conclusion was "compelled by the unusual circumstances of the 
case," including the "absurd[ity]" of requiring the permit 
applicant "to return to the beginning of the application 
process"——which had taken over four years——"because of the 
Town's mistake."  Id., ¶¶63-65.   
No. 
2016AP2503 & 2017AP13   
 
28 
 
¶39 The court of appeals, Dane County, and the Landowners 
all highlight the procedural and statutory differences between 
Adams and the present case.  These distinctions are irrelevant.  
Under Adams, striking CUP conditions——a statutorily-authorized 
remedy——does not encroach upon the authority of a municipality 
that chose to impose unlawful conditions.  In this case, a 
court's authority to strike unlawful conditions on certiorari 
review is even clearer than in Adams; the circuit court here had 
explicit authority under Wis. Stat. § 59.694(10) to "modify" the 
County Board's decision, in addition to the option of simply 
affirming or reversing.  The circuit court exercised that 
authority by striking conditions 7 and 8 from the CUP in order 
to conform it to the law.  Contrary to the court of appeals' 
characterization of the circuit court's action, by striking 
conditions 7 and 8, the circuit court did not "usurp[] the 
authority of the zoning committee."  See Enbridge Energy Co., 
Nos. 2016AP2503 & 2017AP13, unpublished slip op., ¶104.  Rather, 
the circuit court corrected the Zoning Committee's improper 
imposition of unlawful CUP conditions. 
¶40 There may be circumstances in which reversing a CUP 
and remanding to allow the municipal authority to reconsider its 
decision would be appropriate.  For example, in Lamar Central 
Outdoor, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 2005 WI 117, 284 
Wis. 2d 1, 700 N.W.2d 87, we remanded a decision denying a 
zoning variance because the law had changed, and the "Board 
should . . . have the opportunity to reevaluate the facts under" 
the new legal standard.  Id., ¶23.  In this case, Dane County 
No. 
2016AP2503 & 2017AP13   
 
29 
 
knew that Act 55 rendered the conditions unenforceable but it 
issued the CUP with those conditions anyway.  At oral argument, 
Dane County conceded the County Board could have sent the CUP 
back to the Zoning Committee to conduct "meaningful review" of 
the CUP without the invalid insurance conditions and to consider 
whether the CUP should be issued without them.  The County 
Board, however, decided not to send the CUP back to the Zoning 
Committee to reconsider the standards in Dane County Ordinance 
§ 10.255(2)(h) in light of Act 55.  Instead, the County Board 
affirmed the issuance of the CUP knowing that two of its 
conditions were unlawful and therefore unenforceable.  It would 
be senseless to give the Zoning Committee the opportunity to 
reevaluate its decision under these circumstances.  As the 
circuit court recognized, "the time for the County to have acted 
was last fall [2015], and . . . they instead affirm[ed] the 
issuance of the conditional use permit as is with unenforceable 
provisions."  In Lamar Central Outdoor, Inc., remand was the 
only available remedy because the zoning board denied the 
variance.  Id., ¶12.  As a result, unlike this case, there was 
nothing to modify.10 
                                                 
10 Dane County and the Landowners additionally rely on cases 
in Connecticut, the District of Columbia, and Hawaii holding 
that striking individual CUP conditions is inappropriate when 
those conditions were "essential" or "integral" to the decision 
to issue the permit.  See e.g., Vaszauskas v. Zoning Bd. of 
Appeals, 574 A.2d 212, 215-16 (Conn. 1990); President & Dirs. of 
Georgetown 
Coll. 
v. 
District 
of 
Columbia 
Bd. 
of 
Zoning 
Adjustment, 837 A.2d 58, 82 (D.C. 2003); Department of Envtl. 
Servs. v. Land Use Comm'n, 275 P.3d 809, 821-22 (Haw. 2012).  We 
decline to adopt the integral-to-the-permit analysis applied in 
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP2503 & 2017AP13   
 
30 
 
¶41 By affirming the issuance of the CUP, rather than 
remanding it to the Zoning Committee for reconsideration in 
light of Act 55, the County Board issued the CUP with two 
unenforceable insurance requirements——conditions 7 and 8.  As 
Dane County conceded at oral argument, the County Board 
effectively issued the CUP without conditions 7 and 8 by 
deciding to issue the permit after Act 55 invalidated them.  In 
Adams, we determined it would be absurd to force the permit 
applicant to repeat the permitting process due to the Town's 
mistake.  Adams, 342 Wis. 2d 444, ¶65.  In this case, it would 
be even more absurd to force Enbridge to repeat the permitting 
process when the County Board knowingly issued a CUP with 
unlawful conditions.  Remanding the case to the Zoning Committee 
would not remedy the County Board's inclusion of unlawful 
conditions so much as it would reward Dane County for imposing 
"impermissible, extra-legal conditions."  Id. at ¶63.  Because 
Dane County chose to condition the CUP in disregard of Act 55, 
the circuit court properly struck the invalid conditions in 
accordance 
with 
its 
express 
authority 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 59.694(10) to grant this remedy.   
III.   CONCLUSION 
¶42 The insurance conditions imposed by Dane County in the 
CUP issued to Enbridge were rendered unenforceable by Act 55.  
                                                                                                                                                             
three foreign jurisdictions and instead apply our analysis in 
Adams v. State Livestock Facilities Siting Review Board, 2012 WI 
85, 342 Wis. 2d 444, 820 N.W.2d 404. 
No. 
2016AP2503 & 2017AP13   
 
31 
 
Enbridge carried the requisite insurance under Wis. Stat. 
§ 59.70(25) including coverage for "sudden and accidental 
pollution liability."  The statute barred Dane County from 
requiring Enbridge to obtain additional insurance.  The circuit 
court properly remedied Dane County's imposition of unlawful 
insurance conditions by striking them from the CUP.  A remand 
would be inappropriate given that Dane County knew when it 
approved the CUP that Act 55 rendered the insurance conditions 
invalid. 
By the Court.——The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
¶43 SHIRLEY ABRAHAMSON and REBECCA DALLET, J.J., withdrew 
from participation.  
 
No.  2016AP2503 & 2017AP13.awb 
 
1 
 
¶44 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  In 2010 an 
Enbridge oil spill in Michigan cost $1.2 billion and has 
resulted in "ongoing insurance coverage litigation." 
¶45 The Dane County Board of Supervisors was mindful that 
running an oil pipeline is a dangerous business and sought to 
avoid such a result.  Accordingly, to ensure that Enbridge 
provides adequate coverage in the event of a catastrophe, it 
included certain insurance conditions in Enbridge's conditional 
use permit for expansion of a pipeline through the County. 
¶46 However, the legislature stepped in and passed Wis. 
Stat. §§ 59.69(2)(bs) and 59.70(25).  These new provisions have 
preemptive effect on county action.  They prohibit a county from 
requiring that an oil pipeline operator obtain additional 
insurance 
if 
the 
operator 
"carries 
comprehensive 
general 
liability insurance coverage that includes coverage for sudden 
and accidental pollution liability."  § 59.70(25). 
¶47 The majority determines that Enbridge maintains the 
requisite insurance, and that therefore Dane County can require 
of it no more.  Majority op., ¶2.  In doing so, the majority 
endorses an unreasonable result through its interpretation of 
the word "carries" and departs from this court's precedent that 
defined "sudden and accidental." 
¶48 I agree with the unanimous court of appeals that 
"Enbridge failed to demonstrate at any time that it carried 
sudden and accidental pollution liability insurance."   Enbridge 
Energy Co., Inc. v. Dane Cty., No. 2016AP2503 & 2017AP13, 
No.  2016AP2503 & 2017AP13.awb 
 
2 
 
unpublished slip op., ¶78 (Wis. Ct. App. May 24, 2018).  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶49 The majority errs in its interpretation of two key 
statutory 
terms——"carries" 
and 
"sudden 
and 
accidental."  
Accordingly, its determination that Enbridge "carries" the 
requisite insurance to trigger Act 55's preemption provisions is 
in error.  As the court of appeals unanimously determined, 
Enbridge made no such showing. 
¶50 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 59.70(25), "[a] county may 
not require an operator of an interstate hazardous liquid 
pipeline to obtain insurance if the pipeline operating company 
carries comprehensive general liability insurance coverage that 
includes 
coverage 
for 
sudden 
and 
accidental 
pollution 
liability."  In other words, if the pipeline operating company 
carries CGL insurance that includes coverage for "sudden and 
accidental" pollution liability, then a county may not require 
it to "obtain" additional insurance.1 
¶51 Our essential task in this case is therefore to 
determine if Enbridge "carries" such insurance.  To answer this 
question, we must look to the words of the statute.  State ex 
rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 
                                                 
1 See also Wis. Stat. § 59.69(2)(bs) ("As part of its 
approval process for granting a conditional use permit . . . , a 
county may not impose on a permit applicant a requirement that 
is expressly preempted by federal or state law."). 
No.  2016AP2503 & 2017AP13.awb 
 
3 
 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  If the meaning is plain, we need 
not inquire further.  Id. 
¶52 Two statutory terms are of particular note:  "carries" 
and "sudden and accidental."  With regard to the term "carries," 
the 
majority 
draws 
a 
distinction 
between 
"carrying" 
and 
"maintaining" insurance.  Majority op., ¶23.  In the majority's 
view, "the statutory text does not require an operator to 
'maintain' 
the 
specified 
insurance 
coverage[,]" 
and 
thus 
Enbridge need not demonstrate that it "carries" the requisite 
insurance at any time other than the discrete point in time at 
which the conditional use permit was issued.  Id. 
¶53 Such an interpretation leads to an absurd result.  
Interpreting "carries" to indicate a discrete moment in time 
appears to allow Enbridge to have no insurance at all provided 
that 
it 
previously 
carried 
insurance 
at 
the 
moment 
the 
conditional use permit was granted.  Unlike the majority, I 
agree with the court of appeals that "when as here a county 
issues a conditional use permit that includes a produce-proof-
on-demand requirement, then the operator must produce, on 
demand, proof of the insurance that triggers the insurance 
limitation."  Enbridge Energy Co., Inc., unpublished slip op., 
¶73. 
¶54 Here, Enbridge has made no showing that it "carries" 
the requisite insurance.  As the court of appeals wrote, 
Enbridge "pointed only to coverage that was, at best, lapsing."  
Id., ¶75. 
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¶55 Turning to the phrase "sudden and accidental," the 
majority determines that "'sudden' in the context of Wis. Stat. 
§ 59.70(25) applies a temporal meaning, such as something 
happening quickly, abruptly, or immediately."  Majority op., 
¶28.  Applying this definition, it concludes that Enbridge's 
"time element" policy fulfills this requirement because its 
policy "provides coverage for claims 'arising from a pollution 
event that begins and is discovered within 30 days' after its 
occurrence 'and is reported to the insurance company within 90 
days.'"  Id., ¶31.  In the majority's view, such coverage "is 
not limited to sudden or quick events" and is therefore "broader 
than the statutorily-described insurance."  Id. 
¶56 This case, however, is not the court's first go-round 
with the term "sudden and accidental."  In Just v. Land 
Reclamation, Ltd., 155 Wis. 2d 737, 456 N.W.2d 570 (1990), this 
court exhaustively examined the term in the context of an 
insurance policy.  The Just court determined that "sudden and 
accidental" can reasonably be interpreted to mean both "abrupt 
or immediate" and "unexpected and unintended."  Id. at 741-42, 
745-46. 
¶57 The legislature is presumed to act with full knowledge 
of existing case law when it enacts a statute.  Strenke v. 
Hogner, 2005 WI 25, ¶28, 279 Wis. 2d 52, 694 N.W.2d 296.  
Accordingly, the legislature presumably enacted Act 55 with the 
knowledge that this court had previously interpreted the phrase 
"sudden and accidental" in Just. 
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¶58 However, the majority departs from the definition we 
provided in Just, reasoning that the term has a different 
meaning in the context of a statute than it does in an insurance 
policy.  Majority op., ¶30.  But why should this be the case 
when the court has provided a clear and workable definition of 
which the legislature is presumed to have full knowledge? 
¶59 Why is the plain language of an insurance policy to be 
defined differently than the plain language of a statute?  When 
we encounter undefined terms in both a statute and an insurance 
policy, we apply the plain language of the term.  See Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶45 (explaining that "statutory interpretation 
'begins with the language of the statute.  If the meaning of the 
statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry.'") (citations 
omitted); Acuity v. Bagadia, 2008 WI 62, ¶13, 310 Wis. 2d 197, 
750 N.W.2d 817 (setting forth that unambiguous policy language 
is interpreted "in accordance with the plain meaning of its 
provisions") (citation omitted). 
¶60 Again, I would follow the lead of the unanimous court 
of appeals and apply the plain meaning definition of "sudden and 
accidental" we set forth in Just, 155 Wis. 2d 737.  See Enbridge 
Energy Co., Inc., unpublished slip op., ¶92. 
¶61 Applying Just, Enbridge must demonstrate that the 
insurance it carries covers pollution events that are both 
"abrupt 
or 
immediate" 
and 
"unexpected 
and 
unintended."  
Enbridge's policy does not cover all events of these types.  The 
"time element" nature of the policy means that pollution is only 
covered if it is discovered within 30 days and reported to the 
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insurer within 90 days.  Pollution discovered on the 31st day 
after it happened would not be covered, even if the pollution 
was "abrupt or immediate" or "unexpected and unintended."  The 
statute requires that all "sudden and accidental" events be 
covered, yet Enbridge's "time element" policy constrains covered 
events based on when they are discovered and reported. 
¶62 In sum, I determine that Enbridge did not demonstrate 
that 
it 
"carries" 
insurance 
that 
includes 
"sudden 
and 
accidental" coverage.  The condition precedent to trigger the 
preemptive 
provisions 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 59.69(2)(bs) 
and 
59.70(25) are therefore not fulfilled.  Accordingly, I would 
affirm the court of appeals. 
¶63 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
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