Title: Jiovon Anonymous, a Minor by and Through his Father and Legal Guardian, Thomas Anonymous, & Thomas Anonymous, Individually v. City of Rochester, Robert Duffy, in his official capacity as Mayor of City of Rochester, and David Moore, in his official capacity as Chief of Police of City of Rochester

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 81  
Jiovon Anonymous, a Minor by and 
Through his Father and Legal 
Guardian, Thomas Anonymous, & 
Thomas Anonymous, Individually,
            Respondents, 
        v. 
City of Rochester, Robert Duffy, 
in his official capacity as Mayor 
of City of Rochester, and David 
Moore, in his official capacity 
as Chief of Police of City of 
Rochester, 
            Appellants.
Jeffrey Eichner, for appellants.
Michael Adam Burger, for respondents.
New York Civil Liberties Union; New York State
Conference of Mayors and Municipal Officials, amici curiae.
JONES, J.:
The issue before this Court is whether the juvenile
nighttime curfew adopted by the Rochester City Council violates
the Federal and New York State Constitutions.  We hold that it
does.
I
In 2006, the Rochester City Council (City Council)
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adopted chapter 45 of the Code of the City of Rochester (City
Code) which established a nighttime curfew for juveniles.  Under
the curfew:
"It is unlawful for minors to be in or upon
any public place within the City at any time
between 11:00 p.m. of one day and 5:00 a.m.
of the immediately following day, except that
on Friday and Saturday the hours shall be
between 12:00 midnight and 5:00 a.m. of the
immediately following day"
(Rochester City Code § 45-3).  A minor is defined as "[a] person
under the age of 17 [but] [t]he term does not include persons
under 17 who are married or have been legally emancipated"
(Rochester City Code § 45-2).  The curfew provides for certain
exceptions which make the prohibition under the curfew
inapplicable "if the minor can prove that:
A. The minor was accompanied by his or her
parent, guardian, or other responsible adult; 
B. The minor was engaged in a lawful
employment activity or was going to or
returning home from his or her place of
employment; 
C. The minor was involved in an emergency
situation; 
D. The minor was going to, attending, or
returning home from an official school,
religious or other recreational activity
sponsored and/or supervised by a public
entity or a civic organization; 
E. The minor was in the public place for the
specific purpose of exercising fundamental
rights such as freedom of speech or religion
or the right of assembly protected by the
First Amendment of the United States
Constitution or Article I of the Constitution
of the State of New York, as opposed to
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1 A responsible adult is defined as "[a] person 18 years of
age or older specifically authorized by law or by a parent or
guardian to have custody and control of a minor" (Rochester City
Code § 45-2).
2 Rochester Police Department General Order 425, titled
"Curfew Ordinance Enforcement," provides for actions a police
officer can take in his or her discretion (such as directing the
minor to proceed home with a warning, take the minor into
protective custody, or transport the minor to a parent, guardian,
or responsible adult or to a curfew facility) and procedures for
searching, transporting, and handcuffing minors taken into
custody for a violation of the curfew (56 AD3d at 143).
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generalized social association with others;
or 
F. The minor was engaged in interstate
travel"
(Rochester City Code § 45-4).1  
Under § 45-6 of the City Code, "a police officer may
approach a person who appears to be a minor in a public place
during prohibited hours to request information, including the
person's name and age and reason for being in the public place"
and "may detain a minor or take a minor into custody based on a
violation of [the curfew] if the police officer . . . reasonably
believes that the [curfew has been violated] and . . . that none
of the exceptions . . . apply" (Rochester City Code § 45-6 [A],
[B], [B][1], [B][2]).  "A police officer who takes a minor into
custody based on a violation of [the curfew] [must] take the
minor to a location designated by the Chief of Police" (Rochester
City Code § 45-6 [C]).2  Additionally, the ordinance states that
"a violation of [the curfew] shall constitute a 'violation' as
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. . . defined in the [] Penal Law" (Rochester City Code § 45-5).
The "Findings and purpose" with respect to the curfew
were set forth by the City Council in § 45-1.  They state that:
"A. A significant number of minors are
victims of crime and are suspects in crimes
committed during the nighttime hours, hours
during which minors should generally be off
the streets and getting the sleep necessary
for their overall health and quality of life.
Many of these victimizations and criminal
acts have occurred on the streets at night
and have involved violent crimes, including
the murders of teens and preteens.
B. While parents have the primary
responsibility to provide for the safety and
welfare of minors, the City also has a
substantial interest in the safety and
welfare of minors. Moreover, the City has an
interest in preventing crime by minors,
promoting parental supervision through the
establishment of reasonable standards, and in
providing for the well-being of the general
public.
C. A curfew will help reduce youth
victimization and crime and will advance the
public safety, health and general welfare of
the citizens of the City"
(Rochester City Code § 45-1).
Plaintiffs, father and son, commenced the instant
action challenging the validity of the curfew.  They seek a
declaration that the ordinance is unconstitutional and to enjoin
defendants, the City of Rochester (City) and other City
officials, from enforcing the ordinance on the grounds that the
curfew violated Jiovon's Federal and State constitutional rights
to freedom of movement, freedom of expression and association,
and equal protection under the law, and Thomas' due process
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3 The City's crime statistics showed that "minors [were]
substantially more likely to be involved in crime or to be
victims of crime during hours outside the curfew" and "the vast
majority of violent crime during curfew hours [are] committed by
persons over 18, and that adults are far more likely to be
victims of such crime during those hours" (56 AD3d at 148).
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rights under the Federal and State Constitutions to raise his
children without undue interference from the government.  In
addition, plaintiffs assert that the ordinance conflicts with,
among other statutes, § 305.2 of the Family Court Act (FCA) and §
30.00 of the Penal Law.  Supreme Court granted the City's motion
to dismiss finding that the curfew (1) was not inconsistent with
New York Statutes, (2) did not violate the constitutional rights
of the minor, (3) does not unreasonably interfere with the rights
of the parent, and (4) is not facially defective.
Declaring the ordinance unconstitutional, the Appellate
Division, with two Justices dissenting, reversed and enjoined its
enforcement.  The court determined that the curfew was
inconsistent with FCA § 305.2 and Penal Law § 30.00 because it
authorized what was indistinguishable from an arrest of a minor
under the age of 16 upon an alleged violation of the curfew and
created criminal responsibility for a "violation" as defined in
the Penal Law (56 AD3d 144-145).  The court further determined
that, as to minors between the ages of 16 and 17, the curfew
violated the constitutional rights of both the parent and child.  
The court held that neither the crime statistics for the City3
nor the statements and opinions from political officials and the
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chief of police provided the requisite nexus to withstand even
intermediate scrutiny; in other words, there was no demonstrated
substantial relationship between the ordinance and its stated
goals (id. at 147-149).  The court also determined that the
curfew impermissibly interfered with parents' fundamental
substantive due process right to direct and control the
upbringing of their children (id. at 150).
In arguing that the curfew should be upheld, the
dissenting Justices concluded that intermediate scrutiny was the
proper standard of review and that crime statistics from Dallas,
Texas, a City with a similar curfew, provided the necessary
substantial relationship because defendants "need not produce
evidence to a scientific certainty" (id. at 153 [Lunn, J.
dissenting]).  The dissent argued that the ordinance imposed no
unconstitutional burden on a minor's First Amendment Rights and
that its interference with a parent's due process rights was
minimal.  Additionally, the dissent found no inconsistency
between the ordinance and FCA § 305.2 because the ordinance only
authorized a "temporary detention" and not an arrest (id. at 156-
157 [Lunn, J. dissenting]).  Defendants appealed to this Court as
of right, and we now affirm on different grounds.
II
Plaintiffs challenge the curfew on multiple
constitutional and non-constitutional grounds.  Because
plaintiffs' non-constitutional arguments do not wholly dispose of
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4 We note that this case was not rendered moot when
plaintiff Jiovon turned seventeen because he may still be
detained under the curfew if, to an officer, he appears to be
under 17 and fails to offer proof of his age.
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this appeal, we address only their constitutional arguments here
(see generally Matter of Clara C. v William L., 96 NY2d 244, 250
[2001]); id. at 251 [Levine, J., concurring]).  Specifically, we
focus primarily on the substantive due process rights of minors
to enjoy freedom of movement and of parents to control the
upbringing of their children.4
Curfew ordinances have long been enacted in cities
around the country and numerous cases, both state and federal,
have addressed similar constitutional issues implicated by these
curfews (see e.g., State v J.P., 907 So2d 1101 [Fla 2005]; Treacy
v Municipality of Anchorage, 91 P3d 252 [Alaska 2004]; Ramos v
Town of Vernon, 353 F3d 171 [2d Cir 2003]; City of Sumner v
Walsh, 148 Wash2d 490 [2003]; Hutchins v District of Columbia,
188 F3d 531 [DC Cir 1999]; Schleifer v City of Charlottesville,
159 F3d 843 [4th Cir 1998];  Nunez v City of San Diego, 114 F3d
935 [9th Cir 1997]; Qutb v Strauss, 11 F3d 488 [5th Cir 1993];
Johnson v City of Opelousas, 658 F2d 1065 [5th Cir 1981]). 
Recent decisions analyzing the constitutionality of curfews have
differed as to the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply: some
courts have favored intermediate scrutiny (see e.g., Hodgkins,
355 F3d at 1057; Ramos, 353 F3d at 181; Hutchins, 188 F3d at 541;
Schleifer, 159 F3d at 847), while others have adopted strict
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scrutiny (see e.g., J.P., 907 So2d at 1116; Treacy, 91 P3d at
265-266; Nunez, 114 F3d at 946; Qutb, 11 F3d at 492).  Regardless
of the level of scrutiny ultimately applied, these cases
highlight a number of important factors relevant to
constitutional review of a curfew ordinance.  
Initially, we note that a municipality has general
police powers and, under the traditional powers of parens
patriae, a strong interest in preserving and promoting the
welfare of children (see Hutchins, 188 F3d at 539).  Plaintiffs
do not dispute that the City Council, pursuant to its broad
police powers, has the authority to enact a curfew ordinance. 
The issue, however, is whether that power was exercised in a
manner consistent with the Federal and State Constitutions (see
Ramos, 353 F3d at 172).  We first turn to how the curfew may
interfere with a minor's constitutional right to freely move
about in public.  
"[F]reedom of movement is the very essence of our free
society, setting us apart.  Like the right of assembly and the
right of association, it often makes all other rights meaningful
-- knowing, studying, arguing, exploring, conversing, observing
and even thinking" (Aptheker v Secretary of State, 378 US 500,
520 [1964] [Douglas, J., concurring]).  For an adult, there is no
doubt that this right is fundamental and an ordinance interfering
with the exercise of such a right would be subject to strict
scrutiny (see Chicago v Morales, 527 US 41, 54 [1999]).  The
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critical question, however, is whether a minor has a
corresponding right that is equally fundamental, and therefore
warrants the same restrictive level of scrutiny.  
In many situations, children do not possess the same
constitutional rights possessed by their adult counterparts; for
example, children are afforded lesser freedom of choice than
adults with respect to marriage, voting, alcohol consumption, and
labor.  On the other hand, a child's otherwise-criminal actions
do not carry the same consequences as those of adults (see e.g.,
Penal Law § 30.00).  The inherent differences between children
and adults -- specifically their immaturity, vulnerability, and
need for parental guidance -- have been recognized by the Supreme
Court as the basis to justify treating children differently than
adults under the Federal Constitution (see Bellotti v Baird, 443
US 622, 634-635 [1979]).  "So 'although children generally are
protected by the same constitutional guarantees . . . as are
adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to
account for children's vulnerability' by exercising broader
authority over their activities" (Hutchins, 188 F3d at 541
quoting Bellotti, 443 US at 635).
We find the rationale in Bellotti persuasive in the
context of a curfew because it is hard to imagine that, even
absent a curfew, the police may not take a vulnerable 5-year-old
child found alone at night on a city street into custody for the
child's own safety and well being.  Even if we assume that the
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police may not do the same to a 17-year-old under the parens
patriae function, an unemancipated minor still does not have the
right to freely "come and go at will" (Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v
Acton, 515 US 646, 654 [1995]).  Moreover, "juveniles, unlike
adults, are always in some form of custody" (Schall v Martin, 467
US 253, 265 [1984]) and their right to free movement is limited
by their parents' authority to consent or prohibit such movement
(see Ramos, 353 F3d at 182-183).  As one court observed, "it
would be inconsistent to find a fundamental right here, when the
[Supreme] Court has concluded that the state may intrude upon the
'freedom' of juveniles in a variety of similar circumstances
without implicating fundamental rights" (Hutchins, 188 F3d at 539
citing Prince v Massachusetts, 321 US 158, 166-167 [1944]
[prohibiting children from selling magazines on the street];
Flores, 507 US 292, 301-303 [1993] [detention of deportable
juveniles]; Schall, 467 US at 263-264 [pretrial detention of
juvenile delinquents]; Ginsberg v New York, 390 US 629, 637-643
[1968] [prohibiting sale of non-obscene material to minors]). 
Rather than categorically applying strict scrutiny to a
curfew which implicates a minor's right to free movement simply
because the same right, if possessed by an adult, would be
fundamental, courts have found that intermediate scrutiny is
better suited to address the complexities of curfew ordinances --
it is sufficiently skeptical and probing to provide rigorous
protection of constitutional rights yet flexible enough to
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accommodate legislation that is carefully drafted to address the
vulnerabilities particular to minors (see Ramos, 353 F3d 171; see
also Schleifer, 159 F3d at 847; Hutchins, 188 F3d at 541).  In
the context of juvenile curfews, we find persuasive the reasoning
which recognizes that although children have rights protected by
the Constitution, they can be subject to greater regulation and
control by the state than can adults (see Ramos, 353 F3d at 180-
181). 
Next, we turn to the constitutional right asserted by
the parents.  Our precedent has repeatedly emphasized the
"primacy of parental rights" to the care and custody of the child
absent abandonment, surrender, or unfitness (Matter of Bennett v
Jeffreys, 40 NY2d 543, 546-547 [1976]).  Although it is settled
that parents have a fundamental due process right, in certain
situations, to raise their children in a manner as they see fit
(see Wisconsin v Yoder, 406 US 205, 213-214 [1972]; see also
Ginsberg, 390 US at 639), this is not the end of the analysis. 
Were the ordinance directly aimed at curbing parental control
over their children, it might be that strict scrutiny would
apply.  However, that is not the case here.
Parental rights are not absolute and are subject to
reasonable regulation (see Runyon v McCrary, 428 US 160, 178
[1976]; Prince, 321 US at 166 ["[a]cting to guard the general
interest in youth's well being, the state as parens patriae may
restrict the parent's control by requiring school attendance,
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regulating or prohibiting the child's labor, or in many other
ways"]).  The Supreme Court has stated that "the state has a wide
range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in
things affecting the child's welfare" (Prince, 321 US at 167)
specifically when it concerns the government's interest in the
"moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor"
(Stanley, 405 US at 652 [internal quotations omitted]).  Because
the purpose of the juvenile curfew is, in part, to prevent
victimization of minors during nighttime hours, it easily falls
within the realm of the government's legitimate concern under
Stanley.  
Moreover, "[t]o the extent that the curfew is enforced
against minors moving about in public with no purpose or with an
improper purpose" (Treacy, 91 P3d at 269), how it impinges on a
parent's rights is surely less clear and more indirect.  Because
the curfew is aimed primarily at minors, only peripherally
burdening parents' rights, the reflexive labeling of a
fundamental right, and accompanying analysis under strict
scrutiny, is inadequate for taking into account the complexities
and governmental concerns of this kind of regulation.  As with
the minor's due process rights, we agree that a searching review
of the curfew is required but that a strict scrutiny analysis is
not.  We conclude that intermediate scrutiny, and the rationale
of Ramos, are persuasive and we agree with the Appellate Division
that the curfew is constitutionally infirm.
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III
Under intermediate scrutiny, defendants must show that
the ordinance is "substantially related" to the achievement of
"important" government interests (see Craig v Boren, 429 US 190,
197 [1976]).  Here, defendants assert that their governmental
interest is to prevent minors from perpetrating and becoming
victims of crime during nighttime hours.  While this is clearly
an important governmental interest, its expression does not end
the intermediate scrutiny analysis.  In addition to identifying
an important governmental interest, defendants must show a
substantial nexus between the burdens imposed by this curfew and
the goals of protecting minors and preventing juvenile crime. 
The Supreme Court has explained that although the government need
not produce evidence of this relationship to a scientific
certainty (see Ginsberg, 390 US at 642-643), the "purpose of
requiring [proof of] that close relationship is to assure that
the validity of a classification is determined through reasoned
analysis rather than through the mechanical application of
traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions" (Hogan, 458 US at
725-726).
Quite simply, the proof offered by the City fails to
support the aims of the curfew in this case.  As the Appellate
Division observed, "a common theme of the [affidavits of
political officials and affidavits and reports of police
officials] is that city officials perceived a pressing need to
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No. 81
5 Looking at the hourly breakdown of minors as crime
suspects and victims, more than three-quarters (75% to 86%) of
all crimes that minors commit and are victims of take place
during non-curfew hours.
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respond to the problem of juvenile victimization and crime as a
result of the . . . tragic deaths of three minors" (56 AD3d at
148).  These incidents would not have been prevented by the
curfew because two of the victims were killed during hours
outside the curfew and the third, as a result of being
adjudicated a person in need of supervision, was already subject
to an individualized curfew.  Thus, these incidents do not
provide the necessary nexus between the curfew and the
ordinance's stated purpose.
Further, we conclude that the crime statistics produced
by defendants do not support the objectives of Rochester's
nocturnal curfew.  Although the statistics show that minors are
suspects and victims in roughly 10% of violent crimes committed
between curfew hours (11:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m.), what they really
highlight is that minors are far more likely to commit or be
victims of crime outside curfew hours5 and that it is the adults,
rather than the minors, who commit and are victims of the vast
majority of violent crime (83.6% and 87.8% respectively) during
curfew hours.  The crime statistics are also organized by days of
the week and despite that minors are 64% to 160% more likely to
be a victim and up to 375% more likely to be a suspect of violent
crimes on Saturdays and Sundays as compared to a given weekday,
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6 For tallying the number of crimes committed by minors, the
statistics include minors from ages "0 - 17" notwithstanding that
the curfew does not apply to seventeen year olds.  Although the
curfew only applies to minors in public areas, the statistics
provide no indication of where the crimes counted took place
(i.e., whether on private or public property).
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surprisingly, the curfew is less prohibitive on weekends.  We
also note that the methodology and scope of the statistics are
plainly over-inclusive for purposes of studying the effectiveness
of the curfew.6  
To be sure, minors are affected by crime during curfew
hours but from the obvious disconnect between the crime
statistics and the nighttime curfew, it seems that "no effort
. . . [was] made by the [City] to ensure that the population
targeted by the ordinance represented that part of the population
causing trouble or that was being victimized" (Ramos, 353 F3d at
186).  If, as the dissent argues, it is enough that from 2000 to
2005 a number of juveniles were victimized at night, then the
same statistics would justify, perhaps even more strongly,
imposing a juvenile curfew during all hours outside of school
since far more victimization occur during those hours.
Nor can defendants simply rely on the studies and
statistics of other municipalities with juvenile curfews without
showing how the decrease in juvenile crime in those other cities
is pertinent to Rochester.  Without support from the City's own
empirical data, we conclude that the justifications made by the
Mayor and the Chief of Police for the nighttime curfew, based
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primarily on opinions, are insufficient since they do not show a
substantial relationship between the curfew and goals of reducing
juvenile crime and victimization during nighttime hours.
We also conclude that the curfew imposes an
unconstitutional burden on a parent's substantive due process
rights.  The City asserts that the ordinance promotes "parental
supervision" of minors (Rochester City Code § 45-1 [B]).  But the
curfew fails to offer parents enough flexibility or autonomy in
supervising their children (cf. Qutb, 11 F3d 495-496 [exception
for minor being on errand for parent]).  Indeed, an exception
allowing for parental consent to the activities of minors during
curfew hours is of paramount importance to the due process rights
of parents.  "The . . . notion that governmental power should
supersede the parental authority in all cases because some
parents abuse and neglect children is repugnant to the American
tradition" (Hodgson v Minnesota, 497 US 417, 446-447 [1990]).  If
a parental consent exception were included in this curfew, it
would be a closer case -- courts have upheld curfews having,
among other things, such an exception as only minimally intrusive
upon the parent's due process rights (see e.g., Treacy, 91 P3d at
258; Hutchins, 188 F3d at 535; Schleifer, 159 F3d at 851-852;
Qutb, 11 F3d at 490).  
It is puzzling that the City purported to rely on
curfews from other municipalities in the adoption of what was
claimed to be a "similar" curfew ordinance yet failed to include
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7 Many of the cases cited by defendants which upheld the
constitutionality of a curfew have three exceptions: (1) where
the minor is on an errand at the direction of the parent, (2)
where the minor is on the sidewalk that abuts the minor's or the
next-door-neighbor's residence, and (3) where the minor is
generally exercising First Amendment rights (as opposed to being
in public specifically for the exercise of such rights) (see
Treacy, 91 P3d at 258; Hutchins, 188 F3d at 535; Schleifer, 159
F3d at 851-852; Qutb, 11 F3d at 490).
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the critical exceptions which supported the constitutionality of
those other curfews.7  For example, in Hutchins, the court
reasoned that the District of Columbia curfew, with exceptions
for parental consent, actually enhanced parental authority rather
than challenged it (see Hutchins, 188 F3d at 545) and in Qutb,
the court found that the broad exceptions in a Dallas, Texas
curfew only minimally intruded into the parents' rights (see
Qutb, 11 F3d at 495-496).  But the Rochester curfew "does not
allow an adult to pre-approve even a specific activity after
curfew hours unless a custodial adult actually accompanies the
minor.  Thus, parents cannot allow their children to function
independently at night, which some parents may believe is part of
the process of growing up" (Nunez, 11 F3d at 952).  Consequently,
we conclude that the challenged curfew is not substantially
related to the stated goals of promoting parental supervision.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be affirmed without costs.
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Matter of Jiovon Anonymous et al. v City of Rochester et al.
No. 81 
GRAFFEO, J. (concurring):
I vote to affirm because I conclude that the City of
Rochester's juvenile curfew ordinance must be invalidated since
the law conflicts, in part, with the Family Court Act.  I further
believe that the objectionable portion of the curfew law cannot
be severed from the remainder of the ordinance and, consequently,
the ordinance is invalid in its entirety.
Rochester's juvenile curfew ordinance specifies that
children under the age of 17 cannot be in a public place between
11:00 P.M. and 5:00 A.M. Sunday through Thursday and from 12:00
A.M. to 5:00 A.M. on Friday and Saturday.  There are delineated
exceptions to the curfew, as set forth by the majority, where the
minor can demonstrate that his or her conduct was covered by an
exception.  In drafting the curfew statute, the City Council
decided that a minor who breaks curfew commits a violation as
defined in the Penal Law.  Under section 10.00 (3) of the Penal
Law, a violation is an offense punishable by up to 15 days in
jail.  The curfew ordinance authorizes a police officer to
"detain" or "take a minor into custody" if the officer reasonably
believes that the minor has violated curfew and that none of the
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enumerated exceptions to the curfew restrictions apply.
The State Constitution's "home rule" provision (article
IX, § 2) "confers broad police power upon local government
relating to the welfare of its citizens" (New York State Club
Assn. v City of New York, 69 NY2d 211, 217 [1987], affd 487 US 1
[1988]).  This grant of authority includes the ability of a
municipality to enact local laws regarding the "protection,
order, conduct, safety, health and well-being of persons or
property" within its borders (NY Const art IX, § 2 [c] [10]; see 
Municipal Home Rule Law § 10 [1] [a] [12]).  There are, however,
important limitations on municipal police powers (see New York
State Club Assn. v City of New York, 69 NY2d at 217).  First,
under the doctrine of conflict preemption, a "local government  
. . . may not exercise its police power by adopting a local law
inconsistent with constitutional or general law" (id.).  Second,
under the doctrine of field preemption, a municipality "may not
exercise its police power when the Legislature has restricted
such an exercise by preempting the area of regulation" (id.; see
e.g. Albany Area Bldrs. Assn. v Town of Guilderland, 74 NY2d 372,
377 [1989]).  Field preemption may occur by express legislative
direction or may be "implied from a declaration of State policy
by the Legislature . . . or from the fact that the Legislature
has enacted a comprehensive and detailed regulatory scheme in a
particular area" (Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v Town of Red
Hook, 60 NY2d 99, 105 [1983]).
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Nothing in the laws of this State indicate that the
Legislature intended to prohibit municipalities from enacting
juvenile curfews.  Through the exercise of its police powers, a
municipality may be able to justify the need for a juvenile
curfew as a matter of permissible local concern.  A curfew that
is designed to reduce juvenile crime and victimization has "some
fair, just and reasonable connection" to the promotion of the
safety and welfare of vulnerable minors  (People v Bunis, 9 NY2d
1, 4 [1961] [internal quotation marks omitted]).  Clearly, the
City of Rochester was motivated by laudable public safety
concerns in attempting to get children off the streets late at
night and into the safety of their homes.  
But the curfew ordinance in this case raises a conflict
preemption concern because the Family Court Act limits the
instances when police can take children into custody.  Section
305.2 (2) of the Family Court Act specifies that a police officer
"may take a child under the age of sixteen into custody without a
warrant in cases in which he may arrest a person for a crime
under article one hundred forty of the criminal procedure law"
(emphasis added).  The term "crime" includes only misdemeanors
and felonies, not violations (see Penal Law § 10.00 [6]).  An
infraction of the Rochester ordinance results in a "violation,"
punishable by up to 15 days in jail.  Because a violation is not
a "crime" for the purposes of section 305.2 (2), it necessarily
follows that the constraints of Family Court Act § 305.2 prohibit
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No. 81
* The dissent concludes that there is no preemption problem. 
But this ignores the fact that a curfew infraction is a
"violation" as that term is defined in the Penal Law, thereby
authorizing the possible imposition of a sentence of up to 15
days in jail for a minor who breaks curfew.
- 4 -
the City of Rochester from authorizing the custodial detention of
children aged 15 and under (see Matter of Victor M., 9 NY3d 84,
87 [2007]; Matter of Michael G., 99 Misc 2d 699, 701 [Family Ct,
Rockland County, 1979]).  Based on conflict preemption
principles, this provision of Rochester's curfew ordinance
contradicts the Family Court Act and is therefore invalid.*
The City of Rochester responds that its ordinance does
not violate State law because it merely authorizes the police to
engage in the "temporary detention" of a child, not to make an
arrest.  Semantics aside, the reality is that the ordinance
permits a police officer to take custody of a minor, perhaps
handcuff the offender, conduct a pat-down search (which could
lead to the discovery of illegal contraband or a weapon), place
the child in the back of a police car and transport the child to
a detention facility.  This, in my view, bears all of the
hallmarks of a traditional arrest, not some short-term custodial
intervention conducted solely for the safety and welfare of the
child detained.  And the punishment that can be inflicted for a
violation of Rochester's curfew ordinance makes it easily
distinguishable from Matter of Shannon B. (70 NY2d 458 [1987]),
which upheld the authority of a police officer to detain a truant
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student, because truancy, unlike a violation of Rochester's
curfew law, is not punishable by incarceration.
Nor is it possible to sever the offending provision of
the ordinance from the remainder of the law.  Under our
traditional severability analysis, the "'question is in every
case whether the legislature, if partial invalidity had been
foreseen, would have wished the statute to be enforced with the
invalid part exscinded, or rejected altogether.  The answer must
be reached pragmatically, by the exercise of good sense and sound
judgment, by considering how the statutory rule will function if
the knife is laid to the branch instead of at the roots'" (CWM
Chem. Servs., LLC v Roth, 6 NY3d 410, 423 [2006], quoting People
ex rel. Alpha Portland Cement Co. v Knapp, 230 NY 48, 60 [1920],
cert den 256 US 702 [1921]).  In conducting this review, we first
examine "the statute and its legislative history to determine the
legislative intent and what the purposes of the new law were, and
second, an evaluation of the courses of action available to the
court in light of that history to decide which measure would have
been enacted if partial invalidity had been foreseen" (CWM Chem
Servs., 6 NY3d at 423, quoting Matter of Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
v Tully, 63 NY2d 191, 196 [1984]).
Rochester's curfew ordinance does not contain a
severability provision and nothing in the record before us
indicates that the City Council considered this issue.  From a
practical perspective, severing the provision of the law that
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conflicts with the Family Court Act would make the curfew apply
only to persons who are 16 years old.  It is unlikely that the
City of Rochester was interested in such a limited curfew,
especially since the enactment of the ordinance was motivated in
significant part by the murders of three local children, all of
whom were under the age of 16.  And restricting the curfew only
to 16-year-olds would result in a law that covers a much smaller
percentage of the minors that the City Council was seeking to
protect.  I therefore conclude that the objectionable portion of
the ordinance cannot be severed and Rochester's curfew law is
void in its entirety.
- 1 -
Jiovon Anonymous, et al. v City of Rochester, et al.
No. 81
PIGOTT, J. (dissenting):
At community meetings addressing violent crime in the
City of Rochester in the mid-2000s, the Chairman of the City
Council's Public Safety Committee was frequently asked by members
of the public about the feasibility of a curfew in that city. 
The discussions occurred in the wake of three killings of
children in Rochester, all of which occurred late at night.  The
councilman traveled to Minneapolis, accompanied by two Rochester
police commanders, to investigate the curfew in place there.  The
Rochester Chief of Police concluded, after meetings with the 
police commanders and other staff, that a curfew ordinance such
as the one successful in Minneapolis would be an effective tool
for preventing juveniles from committing, or becoming the victims
of, nighttime crime.  Public hearings were held, and the City
Council received a large quantity of information concerning
curfews implemented in other U.S. cities.  The Mayor of
Rochester, a former Rochester Police Chief, strongly advocated
passage of a curfew ordinance.
In 2006, the Rochester City Council adopted a curfew
ordinance, codified as chapter 45 of the Municipal Code of the
City of Rochester, which took effect on September 5 of that year. 
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No. 81
* I cannot accept the concurring view that taking a minor to
the curfew center "bears all of the hallmarks of a traditional
arrest" (concurring opn at 4) and that the ordinance therefore
violates Family Court Act § 305.2 (providing that warrantless
arrest of a juvenile is authorized only in cases where an adult
could be arrested for a crime).  The temporary detention of a
juvenile until a responsible adult takes charge of him --
authorized by an ordinance enacted for the minor's protection,
rather than prosecution -- is within the scope of a
municipality's police power (see generally Matter of Shannon B.,
70 NY2d 458, 462-463 [1987]) and not prohibited by Family Court
Act § 305.2.  Moreover, I reject the idea that the City of
Rochester could make an invalid curfew valid simply by repealing
the language stating that breaking curfew is a "violation."
- 2 -
The curfew is applicable -- in "any public place" in the City of
Rochester -- to persons under the age of 17.  It applies between
the hours of 11 p.m. and 5 a.m., except that it does not apply
until midnight on Friday and Saturday nights.  First introduced
as a three-month pilot program, the Rochester curfew has been
extended several times, most recently to December 31, 2009.    
The many exceptions built into the curfew ordinance and
the methods of its application are described in the opinion above
(see maj opn at 2-3).  It is worth adding that a Rochester Police
Department General Order provides that the "location designated
by the Chief of Police" referred to in the ordinance (see
Rochester City Code § 45-6 [C]) is "a curfew facility designated
by the Chief of Police," where police will assist staff to notify
the minors's parent or guardian of the minor's location, with a
view to reuniting the two (see Rochester Police Department
General Order 425).  The designated curfew center is at Hillside
Children's Center, in Rochester.*
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No. 81
- 3 -
With this background in mind, I turn to the
constitutional due process challenges that are the basis for the
majority opinion.  The majority begins by discussing the
"substantive due process rights of minors to enjoy freedom of
movement" (maj opn at 7).  Initially, it is not clear whether the
majority is invoking the constitutional right to travel (see e.g.
Saenz v Roe, 526 US 489 [1999]; Shapiro v Thompson, 394 US 618
[1969]) or "the freedom to loiter for innocent purposes . . .
protected by the Due Process Clause" (City of Chicago v Morales,
527 US 41, 53 [1999]).  See Memorial Hospital v Maricopa County
(415 US 250, 255 [1974] [observing that the right to travel
cannot simply mean the right to movement and declining to decide
whether the right to interstate travel recognized in Shapiro has
an analogue in intrastate travel]).  But this distinction is of
no consequence here because, as the majority notes, the critical
question is whether the fundamental right of adults to free
movement extends to unsupervised minors.  
The majority appears to accept the arguments that
recently led the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit to conclude that children have no fundamental
right to free movement.  "[I]t would be inconsistent to find a
fundamental right here, when the [Supreme] Court has concluded
that the state may intrude upon the 'freedom' of juveniles in a
variety of similar circumstances without implicating fundamental
rights" (maj opn at 10, quoting Hutchins v District of Columbia,
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No. 81
- 4 -
188 F3d 531, 539 [DC Cir 1999]).  But instead of following this
principle to its logical conclusion and applying a rational basis
standard of review in assessing plaintiffs' free movement
challenge, the majority selects the intermediate scrutiny
standard for the question-begging reason that "courts have found
that intermediate scrutiny is better suited to address the
complexities of curfew ordinances" (maj opn at 10-11).
The Supreme Court has observed that "unemancipated
minors lack some of the most fundamental rights of
self-determination -- including even the right of liberty in its
narrow sense, i.e., the right to come and go at will" (Vernonia
Sch. Dist. 47J v Acton, 515 US 646, 654 [1995]).  Here the law
mirrors common sense.  "Our society recognizes that juveniles in
general are in the earlier stages of their emotional growth, that
their intellectual development is incomplete, that they have had
only limited practical experience, and that their value systems
have not yet been clearly identified or firmly adopted" (Schall v
Martin, 467 US 253, 266 n 15 [1984], quoting People ex rel
Wayburn v Schupf, 39 NY2d 682, 687 [1976]).  Because of the
immaturity and consequent vulnerability of children, "the power
of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond
the scope of its authority over adults," even where the freedom
that is curtailed is one that would be constitutionally protected
were the child an adult (Prince v Massachusetts, 321 US 158, 170
[1944]).  
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No. 81
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Even where constitutionally protected freedoms of
choice are implicated, "[s]tates validly may limit the freedom of
children to choose for themselves in the making of important,
affirmative choices with potentially serious consequences . . .
[because] during the formative years of childhood and
adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and
judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental
to them" (Bellotti v Baird, 443 US 622, 635 [1979]).  In other
words, because children often lack the capacity to make important
decisions for themselves, "[t]hey are assumed to be subject to
the control of their parents, and if parental control falters,
the State must play its part as parens patriae.  In this respect,
the juvenile's liberty interest may, in appropriate
circumstances, be subordinated to the State's parens patriae
interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child."
(Schall, 467 US at 265 [internal quotation marks and citations
omitted].)  All states limit children's freedom of movement by
requiring them to attend school for much of every weekday -- a
requirement never thought to call for either strict or
intermediate scrutiny.  As the Supreme Court has succinctly
expressed it, "juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form
of custody" (Reno v Flores, 507 US 292, 302 [1993], quoting
Schall, 467 US at 265).
These well-established premises of constitutional
jurisprudence lead to the conclusion that the fundamental right
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No. 81
- 6 -
to travel or movement does not extend to unsupervised minors. 
Because parents have the right to control or forbid children's
travel, there can be no such thing as a child's fundamental right
to free movement.  Quite simply, children do not have the right
to wander the streets freely at night.  Because the curfew
ordinance does not impinge on any cognizable constitutional right
of minors, its restriction of minors' movements should therefore
be subject to rational basis review (see Ramos v Town of Vernon,
353 F3d 171, 190-191 [2d Cir 2003] [Winter, J., dissenting]).
On the other hand, the majority's choice of
intermediate scrutiny to evaluate plaintiffs' assertion that the
curfew ordinance violates the substantive due process rights of
parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody and
control of their children makes sense (see maj opn at 11-13). 
The majority apparently does not dispute that preventing minors
from committing or becoming the victims of nighttime crime is an
important government interest (see maj opn at 13).  The only
remaining question then is whether the curfew ordinance is
substantially related to this important objective.  I believe it
is.
The record contains extensive affidavits of public
officials who were involved in the adoption of the curfew
ordinance, and the affidavits and reports of experienced police
officials responsible for its enforcement, which describe the
considerable amount of investigation and research that was
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No. 81
- 7 -
carried out before the City Council adopted the ordinance.  The
record also contains crime statistics for the City, and
information concerning the implementation of similar curfews in
other municipalities.  The decision to enact the curfew, while
based in part on objective data, was also based in substantial
part on the subjective judgment of experienced civic leaders, who
believed the ordinance to be the best way of dealing with a very
troubling problem.  Their judgment is, in my opinion, entitled to
considerable deference.  The majority gives it none. 
Instead, the majority focuses on the statistics, but
does so in a selective manner.  It does not mention the
statistics which demonstrate that between 2000 and 2005 most of
the 13 juvenile murder victims in Rochester would have been in
violation of the ordinance at the time of the murders.  Nor does
it mention that 45% of homicides in Rochester occurred during the
curfew hours, a surprisingly high percentage given that the
curfew hours make up less than 25% of the hours in a week.  
The majority casts a skeptical eye on the statistics,
writing that they show "that minors are far more likely to commit
or be victims of crime outside curfew hours and that it is the
adults, rather than the minors, who commit and are victims of the
vast majority of violent crime during curfew hours" (maj opn at
14).  Here, I respectfully suggest, the majority jumbles together
two platitudes.  Of course minors are more likely to commit or be
victims of crime outside curfew hours.  For one thing, the curfew
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No. 81
- 8 -
hours comprise only 40 out of the 168 hours in a week.  As to the
likelihood of becoming crime victims, most children are at home
during the curfew hours, as the defendant Mayor noted.  But it
certainly does not follow that a child who goes out at night is
less likely to become the victim of a crime than one who goes out
during the day.  Again, it is completely unsurprising that adults
commit and are victims of most crimes during curfew hours. 
Adults commit more crimes than children at all hours.  Indeed,
this may simply be an instance of the general truth that adults,
who make up some three-quarters of the population, are more
likely to do anything.
From these platitudes, the majority infers a
"disconnect between the crime statistics and the nighttime curfew
. . . no effort was made by the [City] to ensure that the
population targeted by the ordinance represented that part of the
population causing trouble or that was being victimized" (maj opn
at 15, quoting Ramos v Town of Vernon, 353 F3d 171, 186 [2d Cir
2003] [quotation marks omitted]).  But here, under the guise of
assessing whether the curfew ordinance is substantially related
to a government objective, the majority essentially withdraws its
earlier concession that protecting minors from becoming the
victims or perpetrators of crimes is an important government
interest.  In essence, the majority is asserting that if adults
commit and become victims of more crimes than children, then
protecting children from crime cannot be an important city
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No. 81
- 9 -
objective, and that if more crimes are committed during the day
than at night, then preventing nighttime crime cannot be an
important city objective.  The problem with that reasoning is
obvious.  
Putting aside the Rochester crime statistics, which
suggest that a significant proportion of violent crime victims in
that city are children, I do not believe that it is the
judiciary's place to decide that protecting even a small number
of minors from crime is an unimportant objective.  I would have
thought that protecting children from becoming the victims or
perpetrators of violent crime is one of the most important goals
a municipality could try to achieve, especially in the wake of a
series of nighttime murders of minors. 
Turning to plaintiffs' challenge based on parental
authority, the majority observes that this would be a closer case
if the curfew had included an exception for parental consent (maj
opn at 16), a critical "errand" exception present in curfew
ordinances upheld in Anchorage, Alaska (Treacy v Municipality of
Anchorage, 91 P3d 252 [Alaska 2004]), the District of Columbia
(Hutchins), Charlottesville, Virginia (Schleifer v City of
Charlottesville, 159 F3d 843 [4th Cir 1998]), and Dallas, Texas
(Qutb v Strauss, 11 F3d 488, 490 [5th Cir 1993]).  However, even
without that exception, I believe that the curfew ordinance in
Rochester is merely a minimal intrusion on parents' rights.  If
the standard of review in this regard were strict scrutiny, I
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No. 81
- 10 -
might conclude that the ordinance is not the least restrictive
alternative means of achieving the City's purpose.  But, applying
intermediate scrutiny as the majority professes to, I believe
that the curfew -- which contains exceptions for minors who are
accompanied by a parent, guardian or other responsible adult,
those engaged in lawful unemployment or en route to or from such
employment, those facing emergency circumstances, those who are
"going to, attending, or returning home from an official school,
religious or other recreational activity sponsored and/or
supervised by a public entity or a civic organization," those who
are in a public place "for the specific purpose of exercising
fundamental rights such as freedom of speech or religion or the
right of assembly protected by the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution or Article I of the Constitution of the State
of New York," and those engaged in interstate travel -- is
narrowly tailored to serve its important government purpose of
preventing juvenile crime.
I do not believe that the Rochester city ordinance --
replete as it is with exceptions guiding the conduct of police
officers taking minors into what the majority concedes is
protective custody (maj opn at 3 n 2) -- violates minors' rights
under the Federal or State constitutions.  Equipped with a
parental consent exception, I think it might have been a model
city curfew.  It is regrettable that a curfew was determined to 
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No. 81
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be necessary in Rochester; but it is equally regrettable if this
Court prevents Rochester from implementing a reasonable plan to
protect its youth.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order affirmed, without costs.  Opinion by Judge Jones.  Chief
Judge Lippman and Judges Ciparick and Read concur.  Judge Graffeo
concurs in result in an opinion.  Judge Pigott dissents in an
opinion in which Judge Smith concurs.
Decided June 9, 2009