Title: State v. Gray

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in 
accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of 
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 NO. COA13-1352 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 5 August 2014 
 
 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Wake County 
Nos. 09 CRS 211758—60, 211765 
GREGORY ALDON PERKINS, 
Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 4 December 2012 
by Judge Paul G. Gessner in Wake County Superior Court.  Heard 
in the Court of Appeals 7 May 2014. 
 
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney 
General Anita LeVeaux, for the State. 
 
Glenn Gerding for defendant-appellant. 
 
 
BRYANT, Judge. 
 
 
Pursuant to Rule 609 of our Rules of Evidence, a defendant 
who testifies at trial may be impeached with evidence of a prior 
conviction.  Whether a defendant’s testimony at trial was 
chilled by the State’s use of Rule 609 depends on the particular 
facts of the case.  Where no authority exists in support of 
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defendant’s argument that the trial court erred by failing to 
intervene ex mero motu during the prosecutor’s sentencing 
argument before the trial court, defendant’s argument must be 
dismissed. 
On 4 December 2009, defendant Gregory Aldon Perkins was 
arrested on charges of first-degree sexual offense with a child, 
first-degree rape of a child, and incest.  Defendant was 
indicted and tried on those charges during the November 2010 
session of Wake County Superior Court, but after the jury failed 
to reach a verdict, a mistrial was declared.  
Defendant was tried a second time on twenty counts of 
various child sexual assault offenses.  Defendant was convicted 
of one count of indecent liberties with a child.  Because the 
jury failed to reach verdicts on the remaining counts, a 
mistrial was declared. Judgment was entered, and defendant was 
sentenced on 29 September 2011 for the indecent liberties 
conviction.  Defendant was sentenced to an active term of 
sixteen to twenty months, and ordered to register as a sex 
offender upon his release and to undergo a risk assessment for 
satellite-based monitoring.  
On 26 November 2012, defendant was retried and convicted by 
a jury on four charges: one count each of first-degree sexual 
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offense by digital vaginal penetration, first-degree sexual 
offense by cunnilingus, first-degree rape of a child, and 
incest. The State’s evidence at trial tended to show the 
following.  
In June 1998, defendant was hired by “Jane”1 to perform 
computer system work for the Town of Albemarle.  At that time, 
Jane was married with two girls, “Susan” and “Carrie”; defendant 
was also married but had no children.  Defendant and Jane 
separated from their spouses to begin dating each other.  They 
married in June 2001 and subsequently moved from Albemarle to 
Apex.  
Carrie testified that when she was in the third grade, 
defendant began to sexually abuse her.  Defendant would give 
Carrie a back rub before moving his hands beneath her clothes.  
The sexual abuse included defendant digitally penetrating her 
vagina and performing oral sex on her.  Defendant also taught 
Carrie how to perform oral sex on him.  According to Carrie, the 
abuse occurred as many as four times a week.  
In the summer before she began the sixth grade, defendant 
had vaginal intercourse with Carrie.  Defendant offered Carrie a 
                     
1 “Jane,” “Susan,” and “Carrie” are pseudonyms used to protect 
the identity of the victim. 
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“deal” by which she could receive things such as new clothes, no 
curfew restrictions, or spending more time with friends if she 
cooperated with his requests for sex.  When Carrie was in the 
ninth grade, defendant convinced Jane to let Carrie start taking 
birth control. Carrie reiterated that defendant would typically 
abuse her about four times a week.  
In 2008, defendant announced that he was unhappy with his 
marriage to Jane and wanted to move out of the house.  
Defendant’s last sexual encounter with Carrie occurred sometime 
between Christmas 2008 and January 2009 when he moved out.  
In October 2009, Carrie became upset while looking at 
pictures of accused sexual offenders in a newspaper and told her 
boyfriend that defendant had sexually abused her.  Carrie then 
told her sister, Susan, and her mother, Jane, that defendant had 
abused her “for a long time.”  Jane called the Apex Police 
Department.  
The Apex Police interviewed Carrie, Susan, Jane, and 
Carrie’s boyfriend.  They also interviewed two childhood friends 
of Carrie who, years before, had been told by Carrie that she 
was 
being 
sexually 
abused 
by 
defendant. 
 
Mental 
health 
counselors determined that Carrie was depressed and exhibited 
symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder associated with long-
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term child sexual abuse.  When interviewed by the Apex Police, 
defendant denied Carrie’s allegations and stated that Carrie 
created the allegations against him because she did not want 
defendant to reconcile with Jane.   
 After his conviction on all four counts, defendant 
stipulated to being a prior conviction level II.  The trial 
court found as a mitigating factor that defendant was honorably 
discharged from the military but that this factor did not 
warrant sentencing in the mitigated range.  Defendant was 
sentenced to three consecutive active sentences of 276 to 341 
months each for first-degree sexual offense by digital vaginal 
penetration (09 CRS 211758), first-degree sexual offense by 
cunnilingus (09 CRS 211759), and first-degree rape of a child 
under the age of thirteen (09 CRS 211760).  Defendant was 
further sentenced to 19 to 24 months for incest (09 CRS 211765) 
to run at the expiration of the judgment for first-degree rape 
of a child.  Defendant appeals. 
____________________________ 
Defendant raises three issues on appeal: whether the trial 
court erred (I) in ruling that defendant’s prior conviction was 
admissible; (II) in using defendant’s prior conviction to 
calculate his prior record level; and (III) by failing to 
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intervene ex mero motu during the prosecutor’s arguments during 
sentencing. 
I. 
Defendant argues the trial court erred in ruling that 
defendant’s 
prior 
conviction 
was 
admissible 
if 
defendant 
testified.  We disagree. 
North Carolina Rules of Evidence, Rule 609, holds that: 
“[f]or the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, 
evidence that the witness has been convicted of a felony, or of 
a Class A1, Class 1, or Class 2 misdemeanor, shall be admitted 
if elicited from the witness or established by public record 
during cross-examination or thereafter.”  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-
1, Rule 609(a) (2013).  “The language of Rule 609(a) (‘shall be 
admitted’) is mandatory[.]”  State v. Brown, 357 N.C. 382, 390, 
584 S.E.2d 278, 283 (2003).  
Defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of 
his prior conviction.  In response, at the pretrial hearing, the 
State argued that pursuant to Rule 609 it was permitted to 
question defendant about his prior conviction if defendant 
testified at trial.  The trial court, in denying defendant’s 
motion, held that the State could cross-examine defendant as to 
his prior conviction pursuant to Rule 609 but restricted the 
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State from mentioning the prior conviction unless and until 
defendant testified.  The trial court then reserved further 
consideration of the issue until defendant testified.  
Defendant contends the trial court’s ruling on his motion 
in limine “chilled his right to testify and present a defense.”  
Defendant’s argument is similar to those made based on an 
improper impeachment by prior conviction.  However, because of 
the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in Luce v. United 
States, 469 U.S. 38, 43 (1984) (holding that “to raise and 
preserve for review the claim of improper impeachment with a 
prior conviction, a defendant must testify”), defendant’s 
argument is not properly preserved for appeal.  See State v. 
Hunt, 123 N.C. App. 762, 770, 475 S.E.2d 722, 727 (1996) (“[I]n 
the absence of a defendant's testimony, any potential harm is 
purely speculative. . . .  We hold that in order to preserve 
rulings made under North Carolina Rule[s] of Evidence . . . for 
appeal, a defendant must testify.”); State v. Norris, 101 N.C. 
App. 144, 148—49, 398 S.E.2d 652, 654—55 (1990) (holding that 
where a defendant does not testify, defendant’s claims of harm 
via chilled speech are speculative).  Accordingly, this portion 
of defendant’s argument is dismissed. 
II. 
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 Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in using 
his prior conviction to calculate his prior record level.  We 
disagree. 
This Court reviews the trial court’s determination of a 
defendant’s prior record level de novo.  State v. Fraley, 182 
N.C. App. 683, 691, 643 S.E.2d 39, 44 (2007).  
Defendant contends the trial court’s use of his prior 
conviction to calculate his prior record level was prejudicial 
error.  However, defendant stipulated to his prior record level.  
Although the State must prove  
that a prior conviction exists and that the 
offender before the court is the same person 
as 
the 
offender 
named 
in 
the 
prior 
conviction. . . .  [D]efense counsel need 
not affirmatively state what a defendant's 
prior record level is for a stipulation with 
respect to that defendant's prior record 
level to occur.   
 
State v. Mack, 188 N.C. App. 365, 378, 656 S.E.2d 1, 11 (2008) 
(citations and quotations omitted).  Where a defendant indicates 
his agreement with the State’s calculation of his prior record 
level, such stipulation is binding.  Id. at 379, 656 S.E.2d at 
11.   
 
Here, the State presented the trial court with a prior 
record level worksheet for defendant.  When the trial court 
asked defendant if he wished to respond to the worksheet, 
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defendant responded: “I have stipulated to that, Your Honor.”  
As such, defendant’s stipulation as to his prior record level 
was binding.  Accordingly, the trial court did not err in 
calculating defendant’s prior record level. 
III. 
In his final assignment of error, defendant contends the 
trial court erred by failing to intervene ex mero motu during 
the 
prosecutor’s 
arguments 
during 
sentencing. 
 
However, 
defendant’s 
argument, 
while 
creative, 
is 
without 
merit.  
Defendant cites to no authority, and we are aware of none, in 
which an argument of counsel during a sentencing hearing before 
the trial judge, as opposed to a jury, is subject to review on 
appeal for error.  Moreover, “[f]ailure to cite authority is a 
violation of N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6) and subjects this argument 
to dismissal.”  Good Hope Health Sys., L.L.C. v. N.C. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 189 N.C. App. 534, 562, 659 S.E.2d 456, 
473 (2008) (citations omitted).   
Even assuming arguendo we reviewed defendant’s argument, it 
must fail.  Although defendant contends the State’s sentencing 
argument improperly influenced the trial court because defendant 
was sentenced to consecutive terms, this Court has held that 
there is “nothing inherent[ly prejudicial] in 
consecutive 
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sentencing” because "a criminal sentence must be proportionate 
to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted."  State 
v. Ysaguire, 309 N.C. 780, 785—86, 309 S.E.2d 436, 440 (1983) 
(citation omitted).  There is nothing inherently prejudicial in 
sentencing defendant to consecutive terms for four convictions 
involving 
long-term 
sexual 
abuse 
of 
his 
step-daughter.  
Defendant’s argument is therefore overruled. 
No error.  
 
 
 
 
 
      
Judges CALABRIA and GEER concur.  
Report per Rule 30(e).