Title: People v. Morales

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
ALFONSO IGNACIO MORALES, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S136800 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
VA-071974 
 
 
August 10, 2020 
 
Justice Kruger authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, 
Cuéllar, and Groban concurred. 
 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
S136800 
 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
A jury convicted defendant Alfonso Ignacio Morales of four 
counts of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187) and other 
crimes.  For each murder, it found true the special 
circumstances that Morales committed multiple murders and 
murder in the commission of a burglary.  (Id., § 190.2, subd. 
(a)(3), (17).)1  The jury returned a verdict of death.  This appeal 
is automatic.  (Id., § 1239, subd. (b).)  We affirm. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On July 13, 2002, the bodies of Miguel Ruiz (who was 
known as Mike), Maritza Trejo, Ana Martinez, and Jasmine 
Ruiz were discovered in the home they shared.2  Mike, Maritza, 
and Ana had been fatally stabbed.  Jasmine, who was then eight 
years old, had been sexually assaulted and died from 
asphyxiation.  Morales was linked to the murders through 
physical evidence, including shoe prints and a palm print found 
at the home, fingerprints found on goods stolen from the home, 
                                               
 
1  
For one of the four murders, the jury also found true the 
special circumstances of murder involving torture, a lewd act on 
a child under the age of 14, and sexual penetration by force.  
(Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(17), (18).) 
2  
Because several of the victims and witnesses shared the 
same last names, we will occasionally refer to them by their first 
names.  We intend no disrespect to any of the individuals in 
question. 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
2 
DNA found on Jasmine’s body, and bloody clothes and knives 
located on Morales’s property.  Morales also admitted to law 
enforcement officers that he had been in the house at the time 
of the murders, though he denied committing them. 
Morales was charged with four counts of first degree 
murder (counts 1–4; Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)); one count of 
first degree robbery (count 5; id., § 211); one count of first degree 
burglary (count 6; id., § 459); one count of a forcible lewd act 
upon a child (count 7; id., § 288, subd. (b)(1)); and one count of 
sexual penetration by a foreign object (count 8; id., § 289, subd. 
(a)(1)).  Morales was also charged with the following special 
circumstances:  multiple murders (counts 1–4; id., § 190.2, subd. 
(a)(3)); murder in the commission of a robbery (counts 1–4; id., 
§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)); murder in the commission of a 
burglary (counts 1–4; id., § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(G)); murder by 
torture (count 4; id., § 190.2, subd. (a)(18)); murder in the 
commission of a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 (count 
4; id., § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(E)); and murder in the commission 
of sexual penetration by a foreign object, force, and violence 
(count 4; id., § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(K)).  Finally, Morales was 
charged with the following enhancements:  personal use of a 
deadly and dangerous weapon in commission of a felony (counts 
1–3, 5, and 6; id., § 12022, subd. (b)(1)); great bodily injury on a 
person 70 years of age or older (count 3; id., § 12022.7, subd. (c)); 
use of force, violence, duress, menace, and fear of immediate and 
unlawful bodily injury (count 7; id., § 1203.066, subd. (a)(1)); 
substantial sexual contact with a victim who is under 14 years 
of age (count 7; id., § 1203.066, subd. (a)(8)); and great bodily 
injury (counts 7–8; id., § 12022.8). 
The jury convicted on all counts and found true the special 
circumstances of multiple murders and murder in the 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
3 
commission of a burglary on all four murder counts.  With 
respect to count 4, concerning Jasmine’s murder, the jury also 
found true the special circumstances of murder by torture, 
murder in the commission of a lewd act upon a child under the 
age of 14, and murder in the commission of sexual penetration 
by a foreign object, force, and violence.  In addition, the jury 
found true several enhancement allegations:  personal use of a 
deadly and dangerous weapon in commission of a felony (on 
counts 1, 2, 3, and 6); use of force, violence, duress, menace, and 
fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury (count 7); 
substantial sexual contact with a victim who is under 14 years 
of age (count 7); and great bodily injury (counts 7 and 8).  At the 
penalty phase, the jury returned a verdict of death.  The 
superior court sentenced Morales to death. 
A. Guilt Phase Evidence 
In 2002, Mike lived with his common law wife Maritza, his 
grandmother Ana, his stepdaughter Maritza Raquel Trejo (who 
was known as Raquel), and his and Maritza’s eight-year-old 
daughter Jasmine in a three-bedroom home in Whittier.  
Jasmine and Raquel shared a bedroom.  Morales, who was in his 
mid-20’s at the time, lived around the corner from the family.  
Morales and Mike were friends; Morales would visit the family’s 
home almost every day to hang out with Mike. 
On his visits, Morales sometimes briefly interacted with 
Raquel and Jasmine, usually sharing just quick hellos.  But on 
one occasion Morales made Raquel uncomfortable by standing 
in the backyard, staring at her through her bedroom window, 
and asking her to come outside.  After the encounter, Morales 
apologized to Mike and Maritza and bought the whole family 
dinner.  Morales also once asked Raquel on a date, and she said 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
4 
“maybe,” though she did not want to go out with him, so she 
avoided him on the night of their date.  Thereafter, she felt 
uncomfortable around him and began staying in her room 
whenever he came over to the family’s house. 
Sometimes when Morales visited Mike at home, he would 
drive his car (a green Mustang), though he lived just down the 
street.  Hector Alvarez, a neighbor of the family, would see 
Morales’s Mustang at the house approximately four days a 
week.  About two months before the murders, Alvarez stopped 
seeing Morales’s car in front of the family’s house, and about a 
month before the murders, he stopped seeing Morales at the 
house.  Raquel also realized about a week before the murders 
that Morales had stopped coming to the house. 
The murders occurred sometime after 9:00 p.m. on 
Thursday, July 11, 2002, and before 8:30 a.m. on Friday, July 
12, 2002.  Mike and Maritza were last seen alive between 8:30 
and 9:30 p.m. on Thursday night, when one of Mike’s friends 
visited them at their home for 15 to 30 minutes.  Raquel spent 
the night at her uncle’s house that night.  The family’s back-door 
neighbor, Doris Morris, saw a step stool against the wall of her 
property that abutted the family’s property on either Thursday 
or Friday morning:  At trial in 2005, Morris testified she saw the 
stool on Thursday morning at around 8:00 a.m. and moved it at 
about noon, but in an interview with law enforcement officers 
on Saturday, July 13, 2002, Morris said she had seen the stool 
on Friday morning at around 6:00 a.m. and moved it at about 
11:00 a.m.  Morris’s backyard was not enclosed, so someone 
could walk directly from Morris’s backyard to Morales’s house 
down the street. 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
5 
Between 8:00 and 8:30 a.m. on Friday, Mike’s father and 
his father’s wife stopped by the family’s house.  They knocked 
on the front door and on Ana’s bedroom window, but no one 
answered, so they left after about five to 10 minutes.  It was 
unusual for everyone to be asleep so late.  Mike did not show up 
to work at 9:00 a.m., even though he had a scheduled meeting 
at that time with Harold Suarez, a distant relative and 
customer, and was usually very punctual.  At around 9:15 a.m., 
Suarez called Mike’s cell phone; someone answered the phone, 
waited for a few seconds without speaking, and then hung up.  
Suarez called again five to 10 minutes later and the same thing 
happened.  At various times throughout the rest of the day, 
Raquel and Mike’s sister-in-law, Kenelly Zeledon, attempted to 
call Mike, but they could not reach him.  At about 9:00 p.m., 
Raquel went to her house with her uncle.  Her parents’ cars were 
in the driveway, but all of the house doors were closed, and the 
curtains were shut.  She knocked on the doors, but no one 
answered.  She left the home between 10:00 and 10:30 p.m. to 
stay at Zeledon’s house. 
At 11:00 p.m. on Friday, Leopoldo Salgado, a local bar 
manager, saw Morales at the bar.  Morales, who visited the bar 
frequently but did not drink, asked to talk to Salgado.  Salgado 
asked Morales to wait until closing, after which Morales left the 
bar.  At around 2:00 a.m., Salgado saw Morales sitting in his car 
in the bar parking lot, but Salgado did not have time to talk at 
length with Morales. 
On Saturday, July 13, 2002, at around 6:00 a.m., Doris 
Morris saw a large trash barrel and step stool against her wall 
abutting the family’s property.  The step stool was different than 
the one she had seen previously.  When she went outside at 6:15 
a.m., both the stool and the barrel were gone. 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
6 
On Saturday morning, around 11:00 a.m., after failing to 
reach Maritza by phone, Raquel and Zeledon returned to 
Raquel’s house.  No one responded when Raquel knocked, so she 
jumped over the fence and entered the home through the 
unlocked kitchen door at the back of the house.  She found the 
house in complete disarray, with blood and food items on the 
walls and floors, towels on the floors, furniture moved, and items 
missing from Mike’s office.  Raquel went outside and told her 
aunt about the state of the home.  Zeledon entered the home and 
noted the disorder.  In Mike’s office, she found blood all over, 
items moved around, and a pair of pants on the floor, which was 
strange because Mike was usually tidy.  In the master bedroom, 
she noticed furniture had been moved.  And in Jasmine and 
Raquel’s room, there was honey all over the furniture.  She then 
walked into Raquel and Jasmine’s bathroom and saw Jasmine’s 
lifeless body in the bathtub.  On top of Jasmine was a large 
statue that covered almost the entire length of her body.  She 
also had blood running down her leg.  Zeledon then entered 
Ana’s bedroom, where she found the bodies of Mike, Maritza, 
and Ana.  Mike was wearing only underwear (which Raquel 
testified was unusual), Maritza was wearing a tank top and 
shorts, and Ana was wearing a nightgown.  Zeledon exited the 
house, told Raquel what she had found, and asked a neighbor to 
call 911. 
The police arrived and began documenting and collecting 
evidence.  They found blood all over the house.  In the entryway, 
the walls and door had blood spatter and smears.  In the living 
room, they found blood spatter and pooled blood on the floor, as 
well as potential handprints on the sofa, which was smeared 
with blood.  There also was a trail of blood with drag marks 
leading out of the living room toward the bedrooms.  It appeared 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
7 
as if someone had tried to clean up some of the blood; there were 
diluted blood smears, towels on the floor, and a bucket of liquid 
and a mop.  In the office, there were multiple blood stains on the 
walls.  Police found a bloody hoop earring under the desk, which 
matched an earring Maritza was found wearing.  In a hamper 
in the bathroom by the office, the police found a shirt and shorts 
with blood stains.  In the bathroom where Jasmine’s body was 
found, there were bloodstains on the floor and sink and in the 
bathtub.  The tub also had a soap scum ring around its interior, 
indicating it had been drained. 
The police also documented several pieces of physical 
evidence.  Tomato paste, barbeque sauce, and honey had been 
poured all over the walls and on the bed linens.  The police 
discovered a six-to-eight-inch-long purple sex toy in the bathtub, 
between Jasmine’s legs.  In the closet of Mike’s office, the police 
found an empty package that might have contained the sex toy.  
They found pieces of orange cord on the bathroom floor, on the 
bed in the master bedroom, and underneath Ana’s body.  On the 
bodies of Mike and Maritza, they found a bottle and cleaner-like 
substance.  The police also took shoe impressions from multiple 
locations in the home, including from a wooden chair found in 
the girls’ bedroom. 
In addition to documenting and collecting evidence at the 
scene, officers began investigating potential leads.  This effort 
led them to Morales’s home.  One officer noticed shoe prints near 
Morales’s front door that appeared similar to the impression 
discovered on the wooden chair in the girls’ bedroom.  During 
their conversation with Morales, the officers asked to see the 
bottom of Morales’s boots.  Believing the shoes might match the 
impression from the chair, the officers asked Morales to come to 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
8 
the station for an interview.  Morales agreed.  This interview 
was the first of three interviews of Morales. 
In this first interview, Morales denied knowing anything 
about the murders.  During the course of the interview, he 
mentioned that he was not allowed in the girls’ bedroom.  He 
agreed to give the officers his boots and consented to a search of 
his house.  After the interview, while officers transported him to 
a different police station, Morales admitted that he was in the 
victims’ house when they were murdered. 
Morales was then interviewed a second time.  He told the 
officers he went to the family’s house on Wednesday night (later, 
he said he was not sure of the day) around 8:00 p.m. and saw 
through the office window two men with guns talking to Mike.  
The men called Morales inside, taped his hands, and put him in 
the living room.  Then they began killing the family.  The men 
started in the office with Mike, who then came into the living 
room with his throat bleeding.  They then attacked Maritza, who 
had been in the kitchen making coffee, and she died in the living 
room.  They then killed Ana, who had been in her bedroom.  And 
they finished by assaulting and killing Jasmine in the back of 
the house.  The men directed Morales to make a mess in the 
house and told him to take Mike’s computer equipment.  
Morales put the stolen items into a large trash barrel and 
dragged it to his house. 
In his third interview, Morales mostly repeated the same 
story, but this time he stated that the events took place on 
Thursday night at 8:00 p.m., and he said Ana was in the living 
room when the men killed her and that they dragged her, Mike, 
and Maritza to the back of the house.  He also told officers that 
he went to Mike’s home that night to repay him $50 of a $100 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
9 
debt.  He mentioned that Mike had asked him not to ask Raquel 
on a date again after the window incident and that he complied 
with this request.  Morales said that after the men finished 
killing the victims, they threatened to kill him if he told anyone 
what had happened, but they allowed him to leave.  Morales 
continued to deny having participated in the killings. 
Significant physical evidence connected Morales to the 
crime.  The police conducted a sexual assault examination of 
Jasmine, and sperm found in Jasmine’s anus conclusively 
matched Morales’s DNA profile; sperm found in her vagina was 
consistent with Morales’s DNA.  Morales’s palm print was found 
on the handle of the mop located in the entryway.  Morales’s 
shoe matched the impression found on the wooden chair in the 
girls’ bedroom.  Blood from the tip of Morales’s shoelace matched 
Maritza’s profile, and Mike was a possible contributor.  In 
Morales’s shed, they found the trash barrel with electronics from 
the family’s home.  Morales’s fingerprints were on many of the 
items in the barrel.  And in Morales’s bedroom, officers found a 
model car and watches that belonged to Mike, jewelry, and a 
little girl’s wristwatch. 
Later that year, in October 2002, Morales’s stepfather 
found two ammunition boxes underneath a woodpile in 
Morales’s backyard.  One of the boxes contained, among other 
things, bloody clothes, including boxers, and a six-inch Vaquero 
folding knife.  The other box contained similar items, including 
a black jacket, a dagger in a sheath, a five-inch United knife in 
a sheath, and two bloody fingerless gloves.  Morales’s stepfather 
identified several of these items (but not the knives) as 
belonging to Morales.  Blood on the United knife handle 
matched Maritza’s DNA profile, with Morales as a possible 
contributor; blood on the Vaquero knife matched Mike’s profile, 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
10 
with Maritza as a possible contributor.  The base of the third 
knife tested negative for blood, but the wooden handle yielded 
weak positive results.  Blood on the jacket matched Maritza’s 
profile, with Morales as a possible contributor.  Sperm cells on 
the boxers matched Morales’s profile, while blood and an 
epithelial cell were consistent with both Jasmine’s and 
Morales’s profiles. 
Medical examiners conducted autopsies of each of the four 
victims.  Mike had multiple sharp-force injuries on his body, 
including on his neck and back.  The cause of death was a slicing 
wound to the front of his neck, which severed his jugular veins.  
Such a wound is not immediately fatal and could have given 
Mike time to stagger a few feet before collapsing.  The wound to 
his neck was consistent with an attack from behind.  One of his 
wounds was consistent with a double-edged knife and another 
was consistent with a single-edged knife, indicating that the 
attacker had used two different knives.  Mike had no defensive 
wounds.  A postmortem injury to his right wrist was consistent 
with being dragged with a cord after death.  
Maritza was stabbed 31 times and cut 14 times; some 
injuries were consistent with a single-edged knife while others 
were consistent with a double-edged knife.  She had at least five 
fatal wounds — on her neck, chest, and back — and the injuries 
were consistent with someone who had struggled with and fled 
her attacker.  Some of the wounds were clustered on various 
parts of her body, including her neck and back. 
Ana suffered two fatal sharp-force wounds to her neck; the 
wounds were consistent with an attacker holding two different 
weapons.  Ana also had a blunt-force injury to her scalp and 
other minor injuries, but no defensive wounds. 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
11 
Jasmine died from asphyxiation, either by body 
compression or drowning.  Dried foam found around her nose 
and mouth suggested she had been drowned.  She also had small 
petechiae (tiny hemorrhages on the skin) all over her neck and 
face, suggesting body compression on the upper chest.  
Extensive injuries to her genitalia and anus, including severe 
tearing, stretching of the skin, hemorrhaging, and bruising, 
suggested the use of extreme force by a blunt object.  She also 
suffered other minor injuries, including fingernail marks on her 
ankle and genitals, scratches on her thighs, and small abrasions 
on her left buttock and foot.  She likely suffered these injuries 
while alive, but she may or may not have been conscious. 
The prosecution called Sheriff’s Deputy Paul Delhauer to 
testify as a crime scene reconstruction expert.  Delhauer had 
examined between 800 and 900 cases in his career and had 
frequently analyzed blood spatter, knife wounds, and blood 
stains.  Delhauer testified to the potential relative locations and 
sequence of the murders, as well as the manner of the killings, 
based on his analysis of the reports and documents in the case, 
personal observations made at the scene, blood stains and 
spatter in the home, the autopsy reports, other physical 
evidence found in the home, and his own experiments.  He also 
testified that the crime scene appeared to have been staged to 
mislead investigators about what had occurred. 
The 
defense 
presented 
one 
guilt 
phase 
witness, 
investigator Richard Salazar.  Salazar testified that an object 
Delhauer had identified as a bidet hose, which Delhauer 
suggested might have been used to cleanse Jasmine’s vaginal 
and rectal areas, was actually a hose that attached to a hookah 
pipe, which was used for smoking tobacco and other substances. 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
12 
B.  Penalty Phase Evidence 
During the penalty phase, the People called several family 
members of the victims to provide victim impact evidence:  
Raquel, Zeledon, Mike Rodriguez, Sr. (Mike’s father and Ana’s 
son), Luz Ruiz (Rodriguez’s wife), and Olga Lizzette Ruiz (Mike’s 
sister).  These family members testified about their previous 
relationships with the victims, the personalities of the victims, 
and the impact of the murders on their lives.  The People also 
introduced several pictures of the victims and a one-minute 
video of Jasmine. 
The People introduced two prior criminal act allegations 
against Morales.  A law enforcement officer testified that while 
Morales was in jail in December 2002, the officer discovered in 
Morales’s cell a plastic spoon with one side sharpened and a 
thread wrapped around the handle.  The officer believed this 
item was a shank, though Morales had claimed he used it to 
transport written messages to other prisoners (i.e., as a “fishing 
line”).  Another officer testified that in February 2003, he found 
a contraband razor blade and what he believed to be a 
homemade handcuff key in Morales’s cell. 
Morales’s witnesses testified about his upbringing, his 
learning disability, and his record in school and at work.  
Morales grew up with his mother, his sister Yvonne, and his 
brother Emi.  When Morales was young, his father left the 
family.  After that, many of his mother’s subsequent partners 
were abusive toward Morales.  One partner physically abused 
Morales.  Another partner, who was an alcoholic, verbally 
abused Morales starting at the age of 10, mostly about Morales’s 
apparent lack of intelligence.  When Morales was in his teens, 
Emi died unexpectedly in a rockslide in Yosemite.  Morales was 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
13 
devastated and became isolated after Emi’s death.  Yvonne said 
she would not wish Morales’s childhood on anyone.  Morales’s 
mother described him as a child in a man’s body.  He often 
needed his mother’s help doing a variety of tasks, like filling out 
paperwork. 
Morales also struggled in school.  As early as the first 
grade, he was at the bottom of the class.  Throughout most of his 
education, he attended special education classes.  His fourth 
through sixth grade teacher testified that Morales seemed 
depressed and was not very social.  By the eighth grade, Morales 
was reading at only a first grade level, with a very limited 
vocabulary.  He was withdrawn and dejected and often picked 
on by other kids.  These trends continued in high school. 
Two experts testified that Morales had a severe learning 
disability.  While Morales’s IQ was average or just below 
average in certain subjects, he struggled in subjects that 
required him to express himself.  This discrepancy was 
consistent with someone with a learning disability, as opposed 
to someone with an intellectual disability.  One expert testified 
that Morales’s truancy was likely tied to his learning disability.  
The second expert confirmed these findings.  He concluded that 
Morales had suffered from long-standing brain damage and 
learning disabilities.  While Morales had an average IQ, he 
struggled expressing his thoughts.  Morales also tended to react 
impulsively, rather than after considered thought. 
On rebuttal, the People introduced evidence that Morales 
had been dismissed from a vocational program during high 
school.  As part of the program, Morales had tried various jobs 
and a remedial program.  He was fired from his job as a summer 
camp counselor because he dunked a seven-year-old camper’s 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
14 
head in the toilet.  And he was dismissed from the remedial 
program because he was not attending all of his classes.  
Because of these incidents and his refusal to abide by the 
vocational 
program’s 
requirements, 
he 
was 
eventually 
dismissed from the program. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Guilt Phase Issues   
1. Sufficiency of the Evidence of Premeditation and 
Deliberation 
Morales challenges his first degree murder convictions on 
the ground that the evidence was insufficient to show he 
committed the murders with premeditation and deliberation.  
We reject the challenge. 
“When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in 
the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether 
it contains substantial evidence — that is, evidence that is 
reasonable, credible, and of solid value — from which a 
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27.)  
We determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could 
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 
319.)  In so doing, a reviewing court “ ‘ “presumes in support of 
the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could 
reasonably deduce from the evidence.” ’  (People v. Edwards 
(2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 715 [161 Cal.Rptr.3d 191, 306 P.3d 
1049].)”  (People v. Beck and Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 626.) 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
15 
“Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a 
fetus, with malice aforethought.”  (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).)  
If the murder is “willful, deliberate, and premeditated,” it is first 
degree murder.  (Id., § 189, subd. (a).)  “ ‘ “In this context, 
‘premeditated’ means ‘considered beforehand,’ and ‘deliberate’ 
means ‘formed or arrived at or determined upon as a result of 
careful thought and weighing of considerations for and against 
the proposed course of action.’ ” ’  ([People v. Jurado (2006) 
38 Cal.4th 72, 118].)  ‘ “An intentional killing is premeditated 
and deliberate if it occurred as the result of preexisting thought 
and reflection rather than unconsidered or rash impulse.” ’  
(Ibid.; see also People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 24–34 [].)  
‘The true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the 
extent of the reflection.  Thoughts may follow each other with 
great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at 
quickly . . . .’  (People v. Thomas (1945) 25 Cal.2d 880, 900 
[156 P.2d 7].)”  (People v. Potts (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1012, 1027.) 
In People v. Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at page 26 
(Anderson), we identified “three basic categories” of evidence 
this court has generally found sufficient to sustain a finding of 
premeditation and deliberation:  (1) planning activity, or “facts 
about how and what defendant did prior to the actual killing 
which show that the defendant was engaged in activity directed 
toward, and explicable as intended to result in, the killing”; 
(2) motive, or “facts about the defendant’s prior relationship 
and/or conduct with the victim from which the jury could 
reasonably infer a ‘motive’ to kill the victim”; and (3) manner of 
killing, or “facts about the nature of the killing from which the 
jury could infer that the manner of killing was so particular and 
exacting that the defendant must have intentionally killed 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
16 
according to a ‘preconceived design’ to take his victim’s life in a 
particular way for a ‘reason’ . . . .”  (Id. at pp. 26–27.)   
In the years since Anderson, “ ‘we have emphasized that 
its guidelines are descriptive and neither normative nor 
exhaustive, and that reviewing courts need not accord them any 
particular weight.’ ”  (People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 324.)  
Anderson provides “a framework to aid in appellate review,” but 
it does not “define the elements of first degree murder or alter 
the substantive law of murder in any way.”  (People v. Perez 
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1125.)   
Here, focusing on the three Anderson categories, Morales 
argues that the prosecution failed to introduce evidence of 
planning activity, motive, or a manner of killing sufficient to 
find he committed the murders with premeditation and 
deliberation, as opposed to rash impulse.  We disagree; sufficient 
evidence supported a finding of premeditation and deliberation. 
As for planning activity, the People presented evidence 
that Morales surreptitiously entered the victims’ home and 
attacked Mike by surprise before killing the other victims.  
Specifically, a law enforcement officer testified that the family’s 
back-door neighbor, Doris Morris, had told him on Saturday, 
July 13, 2002, that she had seen a step stool by her back wall on 
Friday morning at around 6:00 a.m.  (Though Morris testified at 
trial that she saw the stool at 8:00 a.m. on Thursday, the jury 
could have believed Morris’s contemporaneous statement to be 
more reliable than her testimony in court several years later.)  
Further, Mike was wearing only his underwear when he was 
attacked; Raquel testified that Mike did not walk around the 
home in his underwear.  The fatal slicing wound to Mike’s neck 
was consistent with an attack from behind, and Mike did not 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
17 
have any defensive wounds.  And finally, the evidence showed 
that Mike was the first victim — indeed, Morales himself told 
officers as much in his own recounting of the sequence of the 
murders by unknown third parties.  Based on all this evidence, 
the jury could have inferred that Morales covertly entered the 
victims’ home with a plan to kill Mike before moving on to the 
other victims. 
Morales suggests that the evidence of planning activity 
was undermined by the fact that no evidence definitively showed 
he was armed when he entered the victims’ home.  Although 
knives used to commit the murders were later found in 
Morales’s backyard, no evidence established that the knives 
belonged to Morales, as opposed to the victims.  The same is true 
of the bloody fingerless gloves that were found along with the 
knives in Morales’s backyard.  But a jury might well consider 
the very fact that Morales used gloves and three different knives 
as supporting an inference that Morales did not spontaneously 
pick up these tools once inside the home, but instead arrived 
prepared to attack.  In any event, even assuming Morales found 
the knives in the residence rather than arming himself before 
entry, the evidence of the surprise attack on Mike makes it 
reasonable to infer that Morales sought out the knives to 
effectuate that surprise, and did not pick up the three knives out 
of spur-of-the-moment impulse.  (See People v. Perez, supra, 
2 Cal.4th at p. 1126; People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 
547.) 
The People also supplied evidence of a possible motive.  
The evidence suggested that a rift had grown between Morales 
and the victims.  Morales had previously made Raquel 
uncomfortable by standing at her window and staring at her.  
He also had asked her out, but she avoided him on the night of 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
18 
their date and then began avoiding him whenever he came over.  
During his interviews with the police, Morales told them he was 
not allowed in Raquel and Jasmine’s bedroom, and he said that 
Mike had asked him not to ask Raquel out again after the 
window incident.  Sometime thereafter, about a month before 
the murders, the family’s neighbor, Hector Alvarez, stopped 
seeing Morales at their home, even though Alvarez had 
previously seen Morales there about four times a week.  Raquel 
confirmed that about a week before the murders she realized 
Morales had stopped coming over.  Morales also admitted to 
owing Mike a small sum of money, which he said was the reason 
he went to the family’s house on the morning of the murders.  
Though there was evidence Morales had apologized for the 
window incident and had complied with Mike’s request to stop 
seeking to date Raquel, the jury could have inferred from this 
evidence that Morales and Mike had a falling out regarding 
Raquel or the money Morales owed Mike, such that Morales was 
no longer welcome at Mike’s home.  Based on this evidence, the 
jury could have determined that Morales had a motive for the 
murders. 
The jury might also have inferred from the evidence that 
Morales was motivated to kill Maritza, Ana, and Jasmine to 
“silence [them] as [] possible witness[es]” to the murder of Mike, 
and in Jasmine’s case “to silence her as a possible witness” to 
her own assault.  (People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 248.)  
And lastly, Morales stole several expensive items, including 
watches and computer equipment, from the home, suggesting an 
additional motive:  to steal from the family and then kill them 
to avoid identification.  (See People v. Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at 
pp. 1126–1127.) 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
19 
The manner of killing also supports the jury’s finding of 
premeditation and deliberation.  Evidence showed that Mike 
suffered a fatal slicing wound to his neck from behind, which 
severed both of his jugular veins.  The nature of this injury 
suggests that it was designed to kill Mike.  (See People v. Booker 
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 152, 173 [multiple stab and cut wounds 
to the neck that severed right carotid artery and jugular vein 
indicated victim was killed deliberately]; see also Anderson, 
supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 27 [“[D]irectly plunging a lethal weapon 
into the chest evidences a deliberate intention to kill . . . .”]; 
People v. Potts, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 1028 [multiple stab 
wounds to chest suggested killing was premeditated and 
deliberate].)  Likewise, the injuries to Ana and Maritza 
suggested a deliberate intent to kill.  Ana suffered two fatal 
wounds to her neck, and Maritza suffered 45 stab and cut 
wounds, some of which were clustered on her neck and back, and 
at least five of which were fatal wounds delivered to her neck, 
chest, and back, respectively.  (Cf. People v. San Nicolas (2004) 
34 Cal.4th 614, 658 [“The jury also fairly could have concluded 
that defendant was intent upon killing April due to the sheer 
number of wounds on April’s body, many of which individually 
would have been fatal.”]; People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th at 
p. 248 [“Over 40 of the 69 stab wounds were located on [the 
victim’s] chest and back.  They were ‘clustered’ — in some cases 
‘symmetrically’ — on the left side, near the heart.  Based on the 
number and placement of the wounds and the apparent fact that 
[she] was the second victim, the jury could infer her death was 
calculated and was not the product of an unconsidered explosion 
of violence.”].)  As to Jasmine, there was evidence that she died 
either from body compression or drowning.  From the evidence, 
the jury could have concluded that Morales put the large statue 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
20 
on Jasmine’s unconscious body in a filled bathtub in order to be 
certain she would drown, demonstrating a deliberate intent to 
kill. 
The killing of the victims was also prolonged, a fact that 
“supports an inference of deliberation.”  (People v. Sandoval 
(2015) 62 Cal.4th 394, 425.)  Morales’s attacks on both Maritza 
and Ana involved “multiple weapons” and “numerous stabs and 
slashes” suggesting the attacks were extended.  (People v. Potts, 
supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 1028.)  So too with the attack on Jasmine; 
the evidence tended to show she was assaulted while alive and 
then killed.  Moreover, the evidence showed the attacks 
“ ‘occurred in stages,’ ” as reflected by Morales’s own description 
of the events and demonstrated by the evidence that, after Mike 
was attacked, Maritza then struggled with his attacker before 
she, too, was killed.  (Ibid., quoting People v. Streeter (2012) 
54 Cal.4th 205, 244.)  And the jury could have interpreted the 
evidence as showing that Morales had to “travel through the 
house” to kill the victims.  (Potts, at p. 1028.)  Significant 
amounts of blood in the office, entryway, and living room 
suggested attacks occurred in each of those locations.  Moreover, 
Morales’s story to the police as well as the location of Jasmine’s 
body suggested Jasmine was killed in the back of the home, as 
opposed to in the front of the home where the evidence showed 
the other attacks occurred. 
Finally, Morales’s actions after the murder could have 
reasonably contributed to the jury’s finding that he committed 
the murders with premeditation and deliberation.  The jury 
could have reasonably inferred from the evidence that Morales 
stayed at the home after he murdered Mike to kill the other 
members of the family, and that, after killing the remaining 
family members, he stayed to steal items and to “stage” the 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
21 
crime scene by cleaning up some of the blood and making a mess.  
He also took the time to hide his bloody clothes, the bloody 
gloves, and the murder weapons in his backyard.  The jury 
reasonably could conclude these actions were inconsistent with 
impulsive and rash behavior.  (See People v. Perez, supra, 
2 Cal.4th at p. 1128 [“[T]he conduct of defendant after the 
stabbing, such as the search of dresser drawers, jewelry boxes, 
kitchen drawers and the changing of a Band-Aid on his bloody 
hand, would appear to be inconsistent with a state of mind that 
would have produced a rash, impulsive killing.  Here, defendant 
did not immediately flee the scene.”]; People v. Potts, supra, 
6 Cal.5th at p. 1028 [“Further, a jury could quite reasonably 
infer that a person who followed a horrific double homicide by 
opening a package of cookies was not surprised and dismayed by 
what he had done, as one who acted impulsively might be.”]; cf. 
People v. Famalaro (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1, 36 [holding that 
defendant’s choice to hide bloody gloves and murder weapons 
was an attempt to conceal evidence relevant to premeditation 
and deliberation of the killing].) 
In sum, the evidence of planning, motive, manner of 
killing, and Morales’s actions after the murder, taken together, 
was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the murders 
were premeditated and deliberate. 
2. Admission of Crime Scene Reconstruction Expert 
Testimony 
Morales argues that the trial court violated both state 
evidence law and his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights by admitting testimony of the People’s crime 
scene reconstruction expert.  We reject the argument. 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
22 
a. Background 
As noted, at trial, the People called Sheriff’s Deputy Paul 
Delhauer as a crime scene reconstruction expert.  At a pretrial 
hearing, defense counsel sought to exclude certain opinions 
included in Delhauer’s expert report.  In response, the 
prosecution signaled it did not intend to solicit Delhauer’s 
opinions on the challenged issues:  Delhauer would only testify 
about crime scene staging, as well as physical items at the scene 
and evidence of the manner and method of death.  Defense 
counsel noted he had not challenged the portions of the report 
regarding staging, subject to the prosecution setting a proper 
foundation for Delhauer’s training and experience.  The court 
agreed Delhauer would not be permitted to testify beyond his 
expertise but stated it would not exclude Delhauer’s 
observations about the crime scene. 
The People called Delhauer as their final witness at trial.  
Delhauer had been a criminal profiler and crime scene analyst 
(otherwise known as a crime reconstructionist) since 1999.  He 
had a bachelor of arts degree and had taken a college-level 
physics for health sciences course, but most of his training and 
experience had come through work.  He had worked in various 
departments of the sheriff’s office.  In 1995, he spent six months 
in the coroner’s office, where he conducted more than 200 death 
investigations and saw between 300 and 400 stab wounds.  He 
eventually landed in the homicide bureau, where he was trained 
in, among other topics, homicides, sexual assault investigations, 
blood spatter analysis, and crime scene reconstruction.  
Delhauer examined between 800 and 900 cases, including 70 
murder investigations, while in the homicide bureau.  Over the 
course of his career, he had been directly involved in or assisted 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
23 
in more than 6,000 criminal cases.  Since becoming a 
reconstructionist, he had consulted on more than 300 cases. 
Delhauer had also received specific training relevant to 
crime scene reconstruction, including blood spatter analysis.  In 
addition to training he received through his department, 
Delhauer took a 40-hour class in which he learned about the 
dynamics and composition of blood and conducted around 40 
experiments aimed at reproducing bloodshed.  In his trainings, 
he also learned about different blood stains and pattern stains.  
He had conducted nearly 200 of his own reconstruction 
experiments for his cases, which included experiments on 
bloodshed, blunt force trauma, and sharp force and stab wounds.  
Specifically as to knife wounds, he had conducted relevant 
examinations at the coroner’s office, interviewed the surviving 
victims of knife attacks, and conducted between 40 and 50 of his 
own experiments with various media, including meat and 
modeling clay, to reproduce knife wounds.  He also continually 
maintained his education on these issues.  He had previously 
qualified as an expert in Los Angeles County Superior Court 
eight or nine times. 
After describing his experience and training, Delhauer 
explained how he had prepared to testify as an expert in the 
case.  Before testifying, he had been to the crime scene for an 
hour and a half on the morning of Saturday, July 13, 2002; read 
all of the crime reports, interviews, forensic reports, and autopsy 
reports in the case; examined all of the photographs taken by 
law enforcement officers and the coroners; and conducted his 
own experiments. 
Delhauer then briefly shared his overarching conclusions 
about how he believed the murders had been committed.  He 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
24 
believed the victims were killed in the following order:  Mike, 
Maritza, Ana, then Jasmine.  Mike had been killed from behind, 
likely by surprise, as indicated by Mike’s lack of defensive 
wounds and the debilitating slice wound to the front of his neck, 
which Delhauer believed was Mike’s first injury.  He believed 
Mike was attacked in the office.  Maritza likely entered Mike’s 
office while or just after Mike was attacked.  She was attacked 
in the office and then chased to the house’s entryway, where she 
was eventually killed.  There was less evidence as to how Ana 
had been killed, but he believed she was the third person 
murdered.  She likely was in the back of the house when she 
heard sounds and came into the living room.  In the living room, 
blood stains close to a broken statue suggested the assailant 
might have used the statue to create the blunt force trauma on 
Ana’s head.  Finally, he testified that he believed Jasmine had 
been sexually assaulted and then drowned while unconscious.  
He based this conclusion on the lack of indicators of 
strangulation and the lack of evidence of splashing or attempts 
to escape from under the large statue that had been placed on 
top of her body in the bathtub. 
The rest of Delhauer’s testimony was aimed at supporting 
these conclusions.  Delhauer testified about the evidence in the 
house room by room, beginning with the house’s entryway.  He 
first described the blood spatter patterns in the entryway.  
Defense counsel objected on the grounds of speculation and lack 
of foundation, but the court overruled the objection.  Delhauer 
testified that the spatter showed that someone had been moving 
toward the front door and had attempted to open it, at which 
point the person was attacked and then fell to the ground.  
Defense counsel again objected, and the parties had a side bar 
with the court.  The court found that Delhauer qualified as an 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
25 
expert witness, and that he could testify about what he believed 
had happened, as long as it was based on the evidence (like the 
blood stains) and it was within his expertise.  At that point, the 
defense lodged a continuing objection for lack of foundation.  
Delhauer then continued with his analysis of the entryway blood 
spatter.  He concluded by saying he believed the murders had 
not started in the entryway.  He believed the blood was 
Maritza’s.  He opined that Maritza had entered the entryway 
already wounded, tried to open the front door, suffered a 
continued attack, and fell down to the floor, where she was 
continually stabbed.  She was then dragged away to the back 
rooms, as indicated by drag marks on the floors. 
Delhauer next testified about evidence in Mike’s office.  
Based on blood spatter on clothes on the floor of the office, 
Delhauer testified Mike had not been wearing the clothes when 
he was killed.  Over a defense objection, Delhauer testified that 
the blood spatter in the office showed that someone who was 
bleeding had moved from the office to the living room; he later 
testified that some of the spatter was consistent with Mike 
moving out of the room.  He concluded that some of the blood 
spatter in the office was consistent with Mike’s fatal neck injury, 
which he believed had been inflicted from behind.  He also 
testified that one of Morales’s knives was consistent with Mike’s 
neck wound.  Bloody clothes were found in a hamper in the office 
bathroom, along with a rubber hose.  Delhauer believed the hose 
was for use with a bidet, which is used to clean the vagina and 
anus, and that it had been wiped clean of blood.  He opined on 
cross-examination that the hose may have been used to clean 
Jasmine’s vaginal and rectal areas.  Maritza’s earring was also 
discovered under the office desk.  From this and some blood 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
26 
spatter on one of the walls, Delhauer concluded Maritza suffered 
the stab wound to her ear in the office. 
Turning to the living room, Delhauer identified certain 
blood stains as drag marks, which he concluded were made 
when the assailant dragged the bodies of Maritza and Mike to 
the back of the house, as also evidenced by the ligature marks 
on Mike’s arm.  He also identified one large blood stain and one 
smaller stain in that room.  The larger stain near the couch was 
consistent with Mike’s injury, while the smaller stain may have 
been made when Ana was killed or when Mike or Maritza was 
dragged through the area.  He testified that the elbow of a 
human-shaped statue in the living room was consistent with the 
pattern injury on Ana’s head.  Delhauer also described how the 
food items and other random objects strewn about the house 
suggested someone had staged the crime scene to create a false 
narrative about what had happened at the scene. 
After discussing pictures of Ana’s bedroom, where Mike’s, 
Maritza’s, and Ana’s bodies were discovered, Delhauer 
discussed pictures of Jasmine in the bathtub and her injuries, 
and then turned to pictures of Jasmine’s bedroom.  He opined 
that an herbal salad dressing stain on Jasmine’s bed was 
consistent in shape with the purple sex toy found in the bathtub 
between Jasmine’s legs.  Finally, Delhauer testified about some 
of the items found in the ammunition boxes in Morales’s 
backyard.  Delhauer concluded that two of the three knives 
found in the boxes had been used in the attack. 
On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited the 
following facts:  Delhauer had a liberal arts degree in 
communications, with no master’s degree and no degrees in 
criminal forensics or science.  He believed he had first received 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
27 
relevant training for his expert testimony in grammar school 
math and science classes, and then in high school.  He had only 
taken one college-level science course, in physics for health 
sciences.  And he never conducted any autopsies while working 
at the coroner’s office.  In preparing to be an expert for this case, 
he had not viewed the bodies firsthand, spoken to any medical 
examiners, or looked at any physical evidence other than during 
his single trip to the victims’ home right after the murders.  But 
at the time he visited the house, he was not there in his role as 
a reconstruction expert, and he did not take any notes. 
Delhauer also disagreed with several of the People’s 
medical examiner and criminalist witnesses on a few points.  
Contrary to the medical examiner’s testimony, he believed the 
attacker had cut Mike’s throat with his right hand, not his left.  
And he believed the wound margins of Mike’s wound were 
serrated, while the medical examiner testified they were clean.  
His initial conclusions were also contrary to several of the 
criminalists’ testimony, but he said he would be willing to 
change his opinion on those issues.  For example, though he 
believed there were blood stains in the girls’ bedroom and on the 
bed in the master bedroom, the criminalists testified otherwise. 
Finally, defense counsel challenged the bases of some of 
Delhauer’s conclusions.  Defense counsel questioned Delhauer’s 
conclusion that the salad dressing stain on Jasmine’s bed was 
made by the sex toy, asking whether the stain was not also 
consistent with a bottle of dressing found at the scene and 
exposing that Delhauer had no evidence that the sex toy had 
ever been placed in dressing.  Delhauer also admitted that the 
blood in the entryway had not been typed, so he could not say it 
was from only a single person.  As to Delhauer’s experiments, he 
had not used the knives in evidence, and he acknowledged that 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
28 
clay is different than skin and that motion changes the size and 
shape of wounds, such that he could not perfectly replicate the 
injuries.  Finally, defense counsel asked many questions about 
Delhauer’s conclusion that the hose found in the office bathroom 
was a bidet hose.  Delhauer acknowledged there was no 
accompanying bidet bag found in the home, no other apparent 
means of using the hose, and no direct photographs of the item.  
After the prosecution rested, defense counsel called a single 
witness, who had spent 13 years in the Los Angeles Police 
Department’s narcotics unit, to testify that tubes like the one 
found in the house are used with a hookah, a device for smoking 
tobacco and other substances. 
After both sides rested, the parties and the court further 
discussed Delhauer’s testimony.  The court again confirmed that 
Delhauer’s blood spatter testimony was probably “appropriate 
and accurate” and that Delhauer had “an awful lot of on-the-job 
training.”  The court noted, however, that Delhauer had “tended 
to overextend himself” when giving some of his opinions and had 
“basically [given] an overview of the entire case.”  But defense 
counsel had also “done a very effective job of discrediting” 
Delhauer, and the court told Morales he could argue as much in 
closing.  The court also believed that Delhauer’s testimony was 
“largely cumulative.”  For these reasons, the court admitted 
Delhauer’s testimony over Morales’s renewed objection for lack 
of foundation and speculation on state and federal constitutional 
grounds. 
b. Discussion 
Evidence Code section 720, subdivision (a) provides that a 
“person is qualified to testify as an expert if he has special 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education sufficient to 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
29 
qualify him as an expert on the subject to which his testimony 
relates.  Against the objection of a party, such special 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education must be 
shown before the witness may testify as an expert.”  The 
witness’s expertise “may be shown by any otherwise admissible 
evidence, including his own testimony.”  (Id., § 720, subd. (b).)  
Evidence Code section 801 provides that “[i]f a witness is 
testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of an opinion 
is limited to such an opinion as is:  [¶]  (a) Related to a subject 
that is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion 
of an expert would assist the trier of fact; and  [¶]  (b) Based on 
matter (including his special knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, and education) perceived by or personally known to the 
witness or made known to him at or before the hearing, whether 
or not admissible, that is of a type that reasonably may be relied 
upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject to 
which his testimony relates, unless an expert is precluded by 
law from using such matter as a basis for his opinion.” 
“ ‘The trial court’s determination of whether a witness 
qualifies as an expert is a matter of discretion and will not be 
disturbed absent a showing of manifest abuse.’ ”  (People v. 
Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 536.)  We find such abuse only 
where “ ‘ “ ‘the evidence shows that a witness clearly lacks 
qualification as an expert.’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Wallace (2008) 
44 Cal.4th 1032, 1063.)  “ ‘ “ ‘Where a witness has disclosed 
sufficient knowledge of the subject to entitle his opinion to go to 
the jury, the question of the degree of his knowledge goes more 
to the weight of the evidence than to its admissibility.’ ” ’ ”  
(Nelson, at p. 536, quoting People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 
321–322.)  As with expert qualifications, we review trial court 
decisions about the admissibility of evidence for abuse of 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
30 
discretion.  Specifically, we will not disturb a trial court’s 
admissibility ruling “ ‘except on a showing the trial court 
exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently 
absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of 
justice.’  (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9–10 
[82 Cal.Rptr.2d 413, 971 P.2d 618].)”  (People v. Goldsmith 
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 258, 266.) 
Morales seeks to challenge the admissibility of Delhauer’s 
testimony on two grounds.  First, he argues that Delhauer’s 
testimony regarding the sequence of the crimes was speculative 
and lacked foundation.  Second, he argues for the first time in 
his reply brief that Delhauer was not qualified to interpret blood 
spatter and that Delhauer’s testimony should have been 
excluded for that reason as well. 
As to the second argument, although Morales raised other 
objections to Delhauer’s testimony in the trial court, he did not 
object on the basis of Delhauer’s qualifications.  We have held 
that failure to specifically object to an expert’s qualifications 
forfeits the objection.  (See People v. Townsel (2016) 63 Cal.4th 
25, 45–46; People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 478.)  Morales 
has now doubly forfeited the objection by waiting until his reply 
brief to raise the issue.  (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler 
(2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 408.) 
But even had Morales not forfeited the claim, the claim 
would fail under the deferential abuse of discretion standard.  
Before becoming a crime scene analyst, Delhauer was trained 
on blood spatter and crime scene reconstruction in the homicide 
bureau and had examined between 800 and 900 cases.  He also 
trained for six months in the coroner’s office, where he examined 
hundreds of knife wounds.  And he had taken a college-level 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
31 
course in physics for health sciences.  At the time of trial, 
Delhauer had been working as a crime scene analyst for 
approximately six years.  In that role, he took a 40-hour course 
on blood spatter, during which he learned about blood stains and 
patterns and conducted around 40 bloodshed experiments.  
Since then, he had conducted over 200 of his own reconstruction 
experiments and consulted in over 300 cases.  This training and 
experience is comparable to that of blood spatter experts who 
have been found qualified to testify in other cases.  (See People 
v. Hoyos (2007) 41 Cal.4th 872, 910 [qualified expert had a 
bachelor’s degree in police science and management, and had 
taken courses in crime scene reconstruction and bloodstain 
patterns, given lectures on blood evidence, previously testified 
on blood spatter evidence, conducted blood spatter analysis, and 
visited homicide scenes], abrogated on other grounds in People 
v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610; People v. Wallace, supra, 
44 Cal.4th at p. 1062 [qualified expert had six years’ experience 
as a criminalist and a degree in biology, and had trained at a 
criminalists institute, received 40 hours of education on blood 
stains, read books and articles on the subject, and analyzed over 
20 crime scenes, but had never qualified as an expert on 
bloodstain interpretation]; People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 
1018–1019 [“witness had:  (1) attended lectures and training 
seminars on the subject of blood dynamics . . . ; (2) read relevant 
literature; (3) conducted relevant experiments; and (4) visited 
crime scenes where ‘blood-spatter’ tests were conducted” (fn. 
omitted)], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Doolin 
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 390.)  It is true that Delhauer’s qualifications 
were in some ways less extensive than comparable experts:  
Delhauer had no degree in criminal forensics or science, had 
taken only one college-level science course, and had never 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
32 
conducted an autopsy.  But given his relevant on-the-job 
training and experience, we cannot say Delhauer “ ‘ “ ‘clearly 
lack[ed]’ ” ’ ” the necessary qualifications, such that the trial 
court abused its discretion in finding him qualified to testify as 
an expert on blood spatter.  (Wallace, at p. 1063, italics 
omitted.)3 
We turn, then, to Morales’s primary argument, that 
Delhauer’s testimony as to the sequence of the murders should 
have been excluded as speculative and lacking in foundation.  
(See Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (b).)  Here again, we cannot say the 
trial court abused its substantial discretion in allowing the 
testimony.  (See People v. Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 266 
[“[W]e will not disturb the trial court’s ruling ‘except on a 
showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, 
capricious, or patently absurd manner . . . .’ ”].)  Though 
Delhauer’s initial overview of the sequence of events offered 
little in the way of specific evidence for his conclusions, 
particularly with respect to the sequence of Ana’s and Jasmine’s 
deaths, over the course of the rest of his testimony, he presented 
evidence that the trial court reasonably believed supported his 
conclusions.  Though Delhauer did not always tie this evidence 
directly to his sequencing conclusions, we cannot say the 
                                               
 
3  
We decline Morales’s invitation to reach a different 
conclusion based on a 2009 National Research Council Report 
suggesting that formal scientific training, as well as experience 
and experimentation, are important in conducting bloodstain 
pattern analysis.  This report, which was published long after 
the trial in this case, does not change our conclusion that the 
trial court acted within its discretion in finding Delhauer 
qualified to testify as an expert based on his training and 
experience. 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
33 
evidence laid no foundation for those conclusions.  And, in any 
event, even if the trial court erred in admitting the testimony, 
we conclude that any such error was harmless. 
Delhauer testified that the murderer first attacked Mike 
in the office by surprise.  To support this conclusion, Delhauer 
noted Mike was not wearing clothes when he was killed and that 
he was attacked from behind.  Delhauer concluded Maritza was 
attacked in the office just after Mike was attacked based on 
blood spatter on the office wall and the location of her earring 
under the office desk.  He testified she then ran to the entryway, 
where the murderer continued to attack her, based on the 
consistency between the spatter in the entryway and the 
numerous wounds she had suffered.  The evidence that Maritza 
exited the office and was attacked continuously in the entryway 
supports a conclusion that her attack did not occur before Mike 
was surprised.  And given that the evidence showed she was first 
attacked in the room in which Mike was attacked, it is at least 
consistent with the evidence to say she was attacked just after 
Mike. 
The evidence Delhauer offered to support the sequence of 
Ana’s and Jasmine’s killings is less substantial, but at least 
some evidence supported his conclusions.  He opined Ana had 
died in the living room based on the consistency between her 
head wound and a statue found on the living room floor, as well 
as the small blood stain found in the room.  The entryway where 
Maritza died was connected to the living room, so evidence that 
Ana died in that room could suggest she was killed just after 
Maritza was killed nearby.  And he concluded Jasmine had died 
last by being drowned in the bathtub, based on the location of 
her body, the foam around her mouth, and the lack of evidence 
of strangulation.  The evidence that Jasmine was first assaulted 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
34 
and then drowned in a different room of the house is consistent 
with an opinion that she died last, when no adults remained 
alive to help. 
In light of the evidence supporting Delhauer’s sequence 
conclusions, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by allowing Delhauer to testify as to this sequence.  It 
was not unreasonable to conclude that Delhauer’s opinions had 
an adequate foundation in the trial evidence and were based on 
his training and experience in crime scene reconstruction.  (Cf. 
People v. Robinson (2005) 37 Cal.4th 592, 631–632 [expert 
testimony concerning the relative positions of the shooter and 
the victims had adequate foundation where expert testified that 
other possible positions would have been awkward]; People v. 
Eubanks (2011) 53 Cal.4th 110, 148 [expert testimony at penalty 
phase was not speculative because, “[b]ased on his extensive 
training and experience, as well as on an examination of the 
premises and a thorough review of the police and medical 
reports in this case, [the expert] presented testimony regarding 
bullet trajectories, stippling, and the relative positions of the 
multiple victims and the shooter that was ‘sufficiently beyond 
common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist 
the trier of fact.’  (Evid. Code, § 801.)”]; People v. Nelson, supra, 
1 Cal.5th at p. 537 [expert testimony about which victim was 
shot first was admissible because expert relied on evidence in 
the record]; People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1223 
[“Experts on the subject of crime scene reconstruction, for 
example, ordinarily may be permitted to give opinion testimony 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
35 
concerning such matters as the probable location where the 
crime occurred . . . .”].)4 
Morales 
argues 
that 
Delhauer’s 
opinions 
were 
undermined by law enforcement’s failure to type the blood at 
each location in the home.  But contrary to Morales’s argument, 
the blood at each location need not have been typed for Delhauer 
to draw conclusions about the source of the blood; Delhauer 
testified that he reached his conclusions by comparing the 
spatter patterns to each victim’s wounds and by analyzing other 
physical evidence in the home, such as the location of Maritza’s 
earring.  Given his qualifications, he was permitted to interpret 
this evidence as he did.  Delhauer’s testimony certainly would 
have been strengthened by blood-typing evidence, but the 
absence of such evidence did not render his opinions 
impermissibly speculative and thus inadmissible. 
As Morales notes, cross-examination exposed several 
other weaknesses in Delhauer’s testimony, including that he 
expressly disagreed with some of the coroners; he never viewed 
the bodies of the victims firsthand; he conducted his testing 
without using the actual knives in evidence; he did not review 
any physical evidence; and he potentially misidentified the 
hookah hose.  But these weaknesses go to the weight to be given 
the evidence, not its admissibility.  What we have said in 
previous cases applies equally here:  “Defense counsel was 
                                               
 
4 
Delhauer did veer into unsupported speculation at various 
points during his testimony — for example, when he opined that 
Ana likely came out of the back of the house after hearing noises.  
But Delhauer’s opinions about the locations and sequence of the 
murders — which is the focus of Morales’s claim — did not 
depend on these embellishments.  Any error in admitting these 
minor embellishments was harmless. 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
36 
entitled to present his own expert as a defense witness on the 
issue of [crime scene reconstruction] but did not do so.  Defense 
counsel also was entitled to challenge the persuasive value of 
[the expert’s] opinion on [crime scene reconstruction] through 
cross-examination, which he did. . . .  [Q]uestions regarding the 
validity or the credibility of an expert’s knowledge are matters 
for the jury to decide [citation] but do not provide a basis for 
excluding the expert’s testimony in the first instance and did not 
do so in this case.”  (People v. Nelson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 537; 
accord, People v. Rodriguez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 587, 638.) 
In any event, even if the trial court erred in allowing 
Delhauer to opine on the sequence and locations of the murders, 
the error was harmless under any possible standard.  (People v. 
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836; Chapman v. California (1967) 
386 U.S. 18, 24.) 
Morales argues that Delhauer’s sequence testimony likely 
influenced the jury’s finding of premeditation and deliberation, 
because it imposed “reason, organization and order” on a 
“frenzied and chaotic” crime scene.  This argument gives 
Delhauer’s sequencing testimony too much credit.  Delhauer’s 
conclusions about the sequence of the murders formed only a 
small part of his testimony.  Though Delhauer gave a brief 
summary of his sequencing conclusions at the beginning of his 
testimony, his testimony mainly focused on an analysis of where 
and how each of the victims was killed.  Moreover, as the trial 
court itself noted, much of this testimony concerned matters 
already independently established by evidence in the record.  
Among other things, the trial evidence showed that Morales 
used a step stool to sneak into the victims’ home and that he 
attacked Mike in a state of undress, delivering the fatal wound 
to Mike’s neck from behind, and in a manner that resulted in no 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
37 
defensive wounds.  Other evidence also established the manner 
of killing — the adult victims suffered multiple fatal stab 
wounds to the neck or chest and Jasmine was drowned.  (See 
People v. Booker, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 152, 173.)  These were 
the facts that bore most directly on whether Morales acted with 
premeditation and deliberation.  And even absent Delhauer’s 
testimony, it was readily inferable that the victims were likely 
killed sequentially, so it is unlikely that Delhauer’s opinion as 
to the precise sequence of the murders had any effect on the 
jury’s evaluation of that question.  The jury did not need to know 
the exact sequence of the murders to conclude that the victims 
were killed one at a time, in a manner suggestive of 
premeditation and deliberation.  Finally, and in any event, 
Delhauer’s testimony was not the only source of sequencing 
information:  Morales himself had told law enforcement officers 
that the victims were killed in the very same sequence. 
In sum, Delhauer’s sequencing testimony did not add 
meaningfully to the picture already before the jury.  Any error 
in admitting the testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  (See People v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 296 [finding 
error admitting expert testimony harmless under both 
Chapman and Watson].)5  
                                               
 
5  
At oral argument, defense counsel argued that Delhauer’s 
sequencing testimony prejudiced him at the penalty phase as 
well as the guilt phase.  Specifically, counsel argued that 
Delhauer’s sequencing testimony overshadowed the psychiatric 
expert testimony presented at the penalty phase, which showed 
that Morales had a severe learning disability, was not 
malingering, and tended to react impulsively, instead of 
methodically.  Counsel argued that, absent Delhauer’s 
sequencing testimony, the jury would have more strongly 
weighed this psychiatric testimony as a “circumstance which 
 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
38 
3. Admission of Crime Scene and Autopsy Photographs 
Morales argues that the trial court abused its discretion 
and violated his constitutional rights to a fair trial and due 
process when it admitted certain crime scene and autopsy 
photographs of the victims.  We find no error. 
In a pretrial hearing, the trial court and the parties 
discussed the admissibility of color photographs of the victims.  
The trial judge first noted that the “primary concern has to be 
probative value versus prejudicial effect.”  He recognized that 
the photographs might be gruesome, but he signaled his intent 
to allow the People significant leeway to introduce photographs 
given the “incredible complexity of this case.”  Over the course 
of the hearing, Morales challenged the admissibility of many 
photographs, including pictures of the four victims’ faces from 
the autopsy table, which the People intended to use for 
identification purposes, though defense counsel offered to 
stipulate to the identities; a series of photographs of Jasmine’s 
body in the bathtub, with and without the large statue on top of 
her; photographs of Jasmine’s vaginal and anal injuries; 
photographs of Mike’s wounds, including severe injuries to his 
                                               
 
extenuate[d] the gravity of the crime” under Penal Code section 
190.3, factor (k). 
 
Again assuming, for the sake of argument, that the trial 
court erred in allowing Delhauer’s sequencing testimony, we are 
not persuaded that Morales has established penalty-phase 
prejudice.  Delhauer’s sequencing conclusions were relatively 
insignificant in the context of the case, and his testimony largely 
duplicated other evidence, including Morales’s own report to 
police about the order of the murders.  We see no reasonable 
possibility that exclusion of Delhauer’s sequencing testimony 
would have altered the jury’s consideration of whether Morales’s 
psychiatric evidence sufficiently extenuated the gravity of the 
crime. 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
39 
neck; and photographs of Ana’s injuries.  Defense counsel 
objected to these photographs on a variety of grounds, including 
cumulativeness and undue gruesomeness, and argued that some 
of the injury photographs should be introduced in black and 
white.  The trial court ultimately admitted most of these 
photographs, but also excluded several.  The trial court also 
allowed the photographs to be shown in color. 
“Whether the trial court erred in admitting into evidence 
the challenged photographs of the murder victims depends upon 
two factors:  (1) whether the photographs were relevant, and 
(2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining 
that the probative value of each photograph outweighed its 
prejudicial effect.”  (People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 
453.)  We review the trial court’s decision to admit the 
photographs for abuse of discretion.  (People v. Mendez (2019) 
7 Cal.5th 680, 708.)  “ ‘The court’s exercise of that discretion will 
not be disturbed on appeal unless the probative value of the 
photographs clearly is outweighed by their prejudicial effect.’ ”  
(People v. Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 18.) 
Morales does not argue that the admitted photographs 
were irrelevant, nor could he do so successfully.  “[T]he 
photographs were highly relevant to show the manner in which 
the victims were killed and the severity of their injuries,” as well 
as to “clarif[y] the coroner’s testimony.”  (People v. Ramirez, 
supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 453; accord, People v. Box (2000) 
23 Cal.4th 1153, 1199.)  For example, the autopsy photographs 
provided detailed views of the victims’ injuries, including 
photographs of the petechiae on Jasmine’s hands and feet and 
the stab and slice wounds to various parts of Mike’s, Maritza’s, 
and Ana’s bodies.  The photographs also served to “illustrate and 
corroborate the testimony given by [witnesses] regarding the 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
40 
circumstances of the crime” and discovery of the victims.  (People 
v. Scheid, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 18.)  For example, the 
photographs of Jasmine in the bathtub and Ana, Mike, and 
Maritza laying prone in Ana’s bedroom displayed the state of the 
bodies when they were discovered.  And finally, the 
identification photographs were also relevant to identify the 
victims and provide context to the subsequent photographs of 
each victim’s body.  Contrary to Morales’s argument, the People 
were not required to stipulate to the identity of the victims.  We 
have previously rejected the argument that “photographs are 
irrelevant or inadmissible simply because they duplicate 
testimony, depict uncontested facts, or trigger an offer to 
stipulate.”  (People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 545; see also 
People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 243 [holding prosecution 
need not “accept antiseptic stipulations in lieu of photographic 
evidence”].) 
Morales argues instead that the trial court abused its 
discretion in admitting photographs because they were overly 
gruesome.  We disagree:  The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion when it found that the probative value of each of the 
admitted photographs outweighed its prejudicial effect, while 
excluding other photographs for failure to pass this threshold.  
(See Evid. Code, § 352.) 
Many of the photographs are undoubtedly graphic and 
disturbing, especially the photographs of the injuries Jasmine 
suffered when assaulted.  But “ ‘victim photographs and other 
graphic items of evidence in murder cases always are 
disturbing.’ ”  (People v. Scheid, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 19.)  A 
trial court may admit photographs of victims even when the 
photographs are “gruesome” if “the charged offenses were 
gruesome” and the photographs “[do] no more than accurately 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
41 
portray the shocking nature of the crimes.”  (People v. Ramirez, 
supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 454 [finding picture with victim’s 
eyeballs removed not overly graphic]; see, e.g., People v. Allen 
(1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1257–1258 [describing autopsy and crime 
scene photographs of victims as “not exceptionally gruesome” in 
part because the victims’ bodies were not depicted “in a badly 
decomposed condition [citation] or after they had been grossly 
disfigured during autopsy”].)  “The jury can, and must, be 
shielded from depictions that sensationalize an alleged crime, or 
are unnecessarily gruesome, but the jury cannot be shielded 
from an accurate depiction of the charged crimes that does not 
unnecessarily play upon the emotions of the jurors.”  (Ramirez, 
at p. 454.)  Here, each of the challenged photographs was highly 
relevant to the jury’s consideration of the issues, they were not 
cumulative, and they did not unnecessarily play on the jury’s 
emotions. 
Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing the 
defense’s request to publish the photographs in black and white 
instead of color.  As the trial court noted at the pretrial hearing, 
color photographs better depict the “reality” of the scene and the 
injuries to the victim.  The court did not err when it refused to 
“sanitiz[e] the crime scene by trying to disguise blood” through 
use of black and white photography.  (See People v. Mathis 
(1965) 63 Cal.2d 416, 423 [“It is difficult for a reviewing court to 
determine if black-and-white would be less inflammatory than 
color pictures, but considering the subject matter it appears 
unlikely that the difference would be significant.  Since the 
pictures unquestionably did have evidentiary value and since 
the trial court thoughtfully weighed the alternatives before 
ruling, we do not find an abuse of discretion in admitting the 
photographs into evidence.”].) 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
42 
In sum, the trial court 
carefully weighed each 
photograph’s probative value against its prejudicial impact, 
which led it to exclude several photographs and admit others.  
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in conducting this 
inquiry.  Morales’s Evidence Code challenge to the admission of 
the photographs thus fails, and his constitutional challenge fails 
for the same reasons.  (See, e.g., People v. Prince, supra, 
40 Cal.4th at p. 1230.) 
B.  Penalty Phase Issues 
1. Admission of Victim Impact Evidence 
Morales argues that the victim impact testimony of 
surviving family members was “so voluminous, inflammatory 
and unduly prejudicial” that it violated his rights to due process 
and a fair trial under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution, and contravened the Eighth 
Amendment’s mandate that the death penalty be rationally and 
reliably imposed.  Morales then argues that the trial court 
“compounded” this error by declining to give Morales’s proposed 
instruction on evaluating victim impact evidence — a modified 
version of a supplement to CALJIC No. 8.85.  He is wrong on 
both fronts. 
a. Background 
As noted above, at the penalty phase of trial, several of the 
victims’ surviving relatives testified.  Raquel Trejo (Maritza’s 
daughter, Mike’s stepdaughter, and Jasmine’s sister) testified 
first.  Raquel detailed the day she found the house in disarray 
and learned that her family had been killed; she was in shock 
and disbelief until she finally realized they were really dead.  
She then described her relationship with each of the victims.  
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
43 
She loved Jasmine, her “baby girl,” and she spent a lot of time 
with her.  Raquel, who had immigrated to the United States a 
few years earlier, said Jasmine was the only reason Raquel did 
not return to El Salvador.  Jasmine was very happy, smart, and 
active, and she used to emulate Raquel — a quality Raquel now 
missed.  Raquel discussed several pictures of Jasmine, as well 
as one of Jasmine’s drawings, on which Jasmine had written “I 
love my family.  My mom and dad are the best in the world.  And 
my sister she is the best in the world, to [sic].” 
Raquel was also very close to her mother, whom she 
considered a friend.  Since moving to the United States, Raquel 
had enjoyed her time with her mother, whom she described as 
always happy and very hardworking.  She lamented no longer 
having her mother to confide in.  As for Mike, Raquel testified 
he treated her like she was his daughter and he was always 
proud of her.  Now she no longer had his support or her family 
around to celebrate with her.  And Raquel described Ana as very 
sweet, someone who always made sure everyone in the family 
was okay.  Raquel then testified that she participated in therapy 
for two years before enrolling in college, and that recently she 
had restarted therapy and was taking medicine to help her 
concentration.  She testified she sometimes felt guilty for not 
being present when the murders occurred.  Lastly, she identified 
Jasmine in a one-minute video clip that showed Jasmine playing 
with a friend.  Raquel indicated that the clip reflected Jasmine’s 
happy demeanor. 
The next witness was Kenelly Zeledon, Maritza’s sister-in-
law.  Zeledon remembered the nightmare of finding the victims 
in the home.  She described Mike as a lovely, outgoing, and 
happy man; Maritza as outgoing, always laughing and joking, 
and an outstanding salesperson; and Ana as a very caring 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
44 
person.  Jasmine was very dear to Zeledon; Jasmine used to play 
with Zeledon’s son.  Since the murders, Zeledon would become 
anxious at night, always checking the windows and doors to 
make sure they were locked.  She could not go to the bathroom 
without checking the bathtub, and she constantly was reminded 
of Jasmine when she dealt with sexual abuse cases through her 
job as a social worker.  She would sometimes cry in her car at 
stoplights and lose track of time.  Because Maritza used to help 
Zeledon’s husband at one of his two stores, after Maritza’s death 
Zeledon’s husband had to close one of the stores.  For Zeledon, 
Christmas felt empty without Mike, Maritza, Ana, and Jasmine.  
She also identified a photo of Mike, Jasmine, and Maritza at an 
amusement park, and one of Maritza and Jasmine at Zeledon’s 
husband’s store. 
Miguel Rodriguez, Sr., also testified.  He was Mike’s father 
and Ana’s son.  When he found out about the murders, his life 
turned upside down.  Ana was Rodriguez’s best friend; he was 
her only son, so they were very close.  He identified a photo of 
Ana and himself on Mother’s Day.  He was also very close to his 
son Mike, whom he described as his best friend.  He got along 
with Maritza, who took care of the family, and he really loved 
Jasmine, whom he described as very intelligent.  After their 
deaths, everything changed for Rodriguez; he lost his job, he 
could no longer sleep, and he was nervous.  Rodriguez’s wife, Luz 
Ruiz, testified that she saw the family at least three times per 
week and had relied on Mike when they needed things.  She 
described Jasmine as a happy child.  She confirmed that the 
murders had significantly affected Rodriguez, saying he was no 
longer the same man and that he was now very depressed. 
Mike’s younger sister, Olga Lizzette Ruiz, testified that 
Mike was her mentor; he was very trusting and friendly, a great 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
45 
brother and son, and a dedicated father.  She and Mike had 
always talked about throwing a joint birthday party when they 
both turned 40, but now the party would never happen.  She said 
Mike treated Morales with open arms.  She described Maritza 
as very giving and loving; they drank coffee together almost 
every morning.  Ana had helped raise Olga and Mike; she was 
very nurturing.  At the time she was killed, Ana could no longer 
take care of herself.  Olga described Jasmine as her heart; they 
spoke every day.  Jasmine was intelligent and wanted to become 
a veterinarian or teacher.  When Olga found out about the 
murders, she was in total disbelief.  She was asked to identify 
the bodies at the morgue, and it was the most horrific experience 
of her life.  She was still waiting for someone to tell her the 
murders were a nightmare, but she knew the victims would 
never return and she missed them.  She had tried therapy 
because she was very angry.  For her, the worst part was not 
knowing how much her family had suffered or why someone 
would torture a young girl or kill an 81-year-old woman.  She 
felt helpless.  She identified a photo of Mike and Jasmine with 
their dog, as well as the family’s funeral invitation, which 
showed a few pictures of the family but did not have much text. 
b. Discussion 
Morales argues that the victim impact evidence in this 
case was so voluminous and inflammatory that it invited the 
jury to abandon its role as a neutral arbiter and instead to 
impose a penalty of death based on its “passionate, irrational, 
and purely subjective response to the sorrow of the surviving 
Ruiz family members.”  Morales’s argument does not focus on 
any specific testimony or pieces of evidence; his argument 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
46 
instead is that admission of the victim impact evidence, taken 
as a whole, violated his constitutional rights. 
Victim impact evidence is generally relevant and 
admissible as a circumstance of the crime under Penal Code 
section 190.3, factor (a), “so long as it is not ‘so unduly 
prejudicial’ that it renders the trial ‘fundamentally unfair.’ ”  
(People v. Russell (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1228, 1264, quoting Payne 
v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808, 825; accord, People v. Lewis 
and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1056.)  This court has 
consistently upheld as constitutional “[a]dmission of testimony 
presented by a few close friends or relatives of each victim, as 
well as images of the victim while he or she was alive.”  (Russell, 
at p. 1265.)  We have also upheld the introduction of videotapes, 
though we have cautioned trial courts not to admit videotapes 
that can overly rouse the jurors’ emotions.  (See People v. Bell 
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 127–128.)   
The victim impact evidence in this case falls within 
constitutional bounds.  The five victim impact witnesses 
testified “ ‘about their relationship with’ the victims, ‘how they 
learned about’ the victims’ deaths, and how the murders 
‘affected their lives.’ ”  (People v. Mendez, supra, 7 Cal.5th at 
p. 712.)  Their testimony “ ‘concerned the kinds of loss that loved 
ones commonly express in capital cases,’ ” such as “recounting 
basic facts about [the victims],” speaking “of their love of [the 
victims], special moments they shared with [them], their 
feelings upon learning of [their] death[s] . . . and how the 
manner in which [the victims] died affected them and various 
family members.”  (People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 70; see 
also People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 783 [finding 
permissible testimony “concerning the victim’s character”].)  
And “[t]he details of that testimony were not materially more 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
47 
emotionally 
inflammatory 
than 
that 
approved 
by 
our 
precedents.”  (Mendez, at p. 712; see Dykes, at p. 782.) 
Nor was the testimony excessive.  The prosecution called 
five witnesses to testify about four victims.  (Cf. People v. 
Mendez, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 712 [“[P]ermitting victim impact 
testimony from six witnesses regarding two victims — that is, 
three per victim — is comparable to what we have permitted in 
other cases.”].)  And each witness’s testimony was relatively 
brief, with the testimony of all five witnesses spanning just 52 
total pages of transcript.  (See People v. Dykes, supra, 46 Cal.4th 
at p. 782 [testimony not “too extensive” where it spanned 32 
pages of transcript for a single victim].) 
Admission of the eight photographs depicting the four 
victims likewise was constitutional.  A set of eight photographs 
depicting everyday events in the lives of the victims is not 
excessive.  (See People v. Mendez, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 712 
[“Admitting some 13 photos of [the first victim] and fewer of [the 
second victim] likewise was not excessive under our cases.”]; 
People v. Jones, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 69–70 [32 photographs 
for single victim not improper].)  The photographs here “of 
ordinary family events were factual, relevant, and not unduly 
emotional or sentimental.”  (Jones, at p. 71.)  The same is true 
of Jasmine’s drawing, in which she said she loved her family and 
her sister.  The drawing provided relevant information about the 
relationship between Jasmine and Raquel and did not invite the 
jury to rule based on emotion.  (Cf. Mendez, at pp. 713–714 
[finding victim’s poem bemoaning gang violence admissible].)  
We have also previously allowed trial courts to admit pictures of 
the victims as children where the victims were still young when 
they were killed.  (See id., at p. 712, fn. 3.)  Here, the 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
48 
photographs of Jasmine showed her close in age to her age at 
death and were not improper. 
Finally, we see no error in permitting the prosecution to 
introduce the minute-long video clip of Jasmine playing with a 
friend.  We have previously found relatively short home videos 
to be admissible victim impact evidence.  In People v. Dykes, 
supra, 46 Cal.4th 731, for example, we upheld the admissibility 
of an eight-minute videotape (without audio) that showed the 
child victim preparing for and taking a trip to Disneyland with 
his family.  (Id. at pp. 784–785.)  We found that “the material, 
which merely depicts ordinary activities and interactions 
between [the victim] and his family, was relevant to humanize 
the victim and provide some sense of the loss suffered by his 
family and society.”  (Id. at p. 785.)  And we noted that “[t]he 
videotape [was] an awkwardly shot ‘home movie.’ ”  (Ibid.)  It 
was not “a memorial, tribute, or eulogy”; it did not “contain 
staged or contrived elements, music, visual techniques designed 
to generate emotion, or background narration” or “convey any 
sense of outrage or call for vengeance or sympathy,” and it 
“last[ed] only eight minutes and [was] entirely devoid of 
drama” — it was merely “factual” and depicted “real events.”  
(Ibid.)  For these reasons, and because the evidence 
“supplemented but did not duplicate” the witness’s testimony, 
we held it admissible.  (Ibid.; see also People v. Bell, supra, 
7 Cal.5th at p. 128 [upholding admission of four-minute 
wedding video that resembled a home movie and was not 
enhanced in any way because it depicted “a real event in the 
victim’s life, shortly before his murder”]; People v. Mendez, 
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 713 [upholding admission of portions of 
home video showing young victim’s sixth grade graduation].)  
Like the video in People v. Dykes, the video of Jasmine was a 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
49 
short home movie that depicted real life events.  It was not 
enhanced in any way, and it did not invite vengeance or undue 
sympathy.  It simply “humanize[d]” Jasmine in a way that 
supplemented the testimony of the witnesses.  (Dykes, at p. 785.)  
In sum, the admission of the victim impact evidence did not 
violate Morales’s constitutional rights. 
Morales also argues the trial court erred by failing to give 
his proposed victim impact instruction.  In particular, after the 
conclusion of penalty phase testimony, the defense requested 
the trial court instruct the jury with a modified version of a 
supplemental instruction to CALJIC No. 8.85.  The unmodified 
instruction states:  “Evidence has been introduced for the 
purpose of showing the specific harm caused by the defendant’s 
crime.  Such evidence, if believed, was not received and may not 
be considered by you to divert your attention from your proper 
role of deciding whether defendant should live or die.  You must 
face this obligation soberly and rationally, and you may not 
impose the ultimate sanction as a result of an irrational, purely 
subjective response to emotional evidence and argument.  On 
the other hand, evidence and argument on emotional though 
relevant subjects may provide legitimate reasons to sway the 
jury to show mercy.”  Defense counsel requested the court give 
this instruction but delete the final sentence.  The court 
declined, explaining the final sentence was necessary to inform 
the jury that it could consider evidence on emotional subjects in 
making its final decision.  As a result, defense counsel withdrew 
the proposal, and the instruction was not given.  The trial court 
did, however, give CALJIC No. 8.85, which lists the factors the 
jury must consider in determining whether it should impose a 
penalty of death, and CALJIC No. 8.84.1, which tells the jury, 
in relevant part:  “You must neither be influenced by bias nor 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
50 
prejudice against the defendant, nor swayed by public opinion 
or public feelings.  Both the People and the defendant have a 
right to expect . . . that you will consider all of the evidence, 
follow the law, exercise your discretion conscientiously, and 
reach a just verdict.” 
Morales argues it was error to refuse to give the modified 
version of the supplemental instruction to CALJIC No. 8.85.  We 
have previously rejected this same argument about this exact 
modified instruction.  (See People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 
5 Cal.5th 442, 506–507, fn. 22.)  We have also repeatedly 
rejected similar arguments concerning proposed instructions 
similar to the full, unmodified supplemental instruction 
proposed in this case.  (People v. Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 771, 
825 [collecting cases].)  We have explained that the instruction 
is duplicative of CALJIC No. 8.84.1 and thus “ ‘would not have 
provided the jury with any information it had not otherwise 
learned.’ ”  (Thomas, at p. 825, quoting People v. Ochoa (2001) 
26 Cal.4th 398, 455.)  Further, we have noted the instruction is 
both confusing and “misleading to the extent it indicates that 
emotions may play no part in a juror’s decision to opt for the 
death penalty.”  (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 368, 
citing People v. Pollock (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1195; see 
Zamudio, at pp. 368–369; People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 
359 [finding proposed instruction “confusing” and “unclear as to 
whose emotional reaction it directed the jurors to consider with 
caution — that of the victim’s family or the jurors’ own”].)  As 
we have previously said, “[a]lthough jurors must never be 
influenced by passion or prejudice, at the penalty phase, they 
‘may properly consider in aggravation, as a circumstance of the 
crime, the impact of a capital defendant’s crimes on the victim’s 
family, and in so doing [they] may exercise sympathy for the 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
51 
defendant’s murder victims and . . . their bereaved family 
members.’ ”  (Zamudio, at pp. 368–369, quoting Pollock, at 
p. 1195, italics omitted, second brackets in original.)   
This reasoning applies with equal if not greater force to 
Morales’s request to instruct the jury with a modified version of 
the instruction that omitted its last sentence.  Deleting the 
instruction’s final sentence removes its only suggestion that 
jurors can consider emotions in reaching their decision.  Without 
that sentence, the instruction becomes even more misleading to 
the extent it more strongly suggests that “emotions may play no 
part in a juror’s decision to opt for the death penalty.”  (People 
v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 368.)  Because the proposed 
instruction would have been both duplicative and misleading, 
the trial court properly refused to give it. 
2. Instruction with CALJIC No. 8.88 
The court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 8.88, 
subject to minor modifications requested by the defense and not 
at issue here.  That instruction guides jurors in using 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances to arrive at a 
verdict.6  Morales objects to several aspects of the instruction.  
                                               
 
6  
In relevant part, the jury was instructed with CALJIC 
No. 8.88 as follows:   
 
“It is now your duty to determine which of the two 
penalties, death or imprisonment in the state prison for life 
without possibility of parole, shall be imposed on . . . defendant. 
 
“After having heard all of the evidence, and after having 
heard and considered the arguments of counsel, you shall 
consider, take into account and be guided by the applicable 
factors of aggravating and mitigating circumstances upon which 
you have been instructed.  
 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
52 
As Morales acknowledges, we have previously rejected each of 
the arguments he now raises.  He offers no persuasive reason 
for us to reconsider our prior cases. 
First, Morales takes issue with the portion of the 
instruction that provides, “To return a judgment of death, each 
of you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances 
are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating 
circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without 
parole.”  (CALJIC No. 8.88.)  He argues that this direction would 
permit a death sentence even if the jury determined that 
mitigating 
circumstances 
outweighed 
the 
aggravating 
circumstances.  But as we have previously explained, the 
instruction, taken as a whole, “clearly stated that the death 
penalty could be imposed only if the jury found that the 
aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating.  There was 
no need to additionally advise the jury of the converse (i.e., that 
if mitigating circumstances outweighed aggravating, then life 
                                               
 
 
“. . . . 
 
“The 
weighing 
of 
aggravating 
and 
mitigating 
circumstances does not mean a mere mechanical counting of 
factors on each side of an imaginary scale, or the arbitrary 
assignment of weights to any of them.  You are free to assign 
whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem appropriate to 
each and all of the various factors you are permitted to consider.  
In weighing the various circumstances you determine under the 
relevant evidence which penalty is justified and appropriate by 
considering the totality of the aggravating circumstances with 
the totality of the mitigating circumstances.  To return a 
judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the 
aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison 
with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death 
instead of life without parole.” 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
53 
without parole was the appropriate penalty).”  (People v. Duncan 
(1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 978; see People v. Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 
52, 122; People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler, supra, 60 Cal.4th 
at p. 457; People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1211; People 
v. Whalen (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1, 89.) 
Second, Morales argues the instruction is incomplete 
because it fails to advise the jurors that they could opt for a life 
sentence even in the absence of mitigating evidence.  (See People 
v. Duncan, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 979 [“The jury may decide, 
even in the absence of mitigating evidence, that the aggravating 
evidence is not comparatively substantial enough to warrant 
death.”].)  We have repeatedly rejected this claim, explaining the 
instruction already adequately conveys the point.  (E.g., People 
v. Anderson (2018) 5 Cal.5th 372, 424–425; People v. Bryant, 
Smith and Wheeler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 457; People v. Linton, 
supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1211.)   
Third, Morales argues that the use of “so substantial” to 
describe the necessary relationship between aggravation and 
mitigation is unconstitutionally vague.  This language did not 
render the instruction vague.  (People v. Landry, supra, 
2 Cal.5th at p. 123; People v. Thompson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1043, 
1128; People v. Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1211; People v. 
Whalen, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 89.) 
Finally, Morales complains that the jury was not told to 
determine whether death was the appropriate punishment, but 
rather to decide whether death was “warrant[ed].”  This is a 
distinction without a difference.  The entirety of the instruction 
left no doubt that the jury “could return a death verdict only if 
aggravating circumstances predominated and death is the 
appropriate verdict.”  (People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
54 
316.)  The use of “warrants” in place of “appropriate” does not 
undermine this message.  (People v. Landry, supra, 2 Cal.5th at 
p. 122; People v. Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1211; Breaux, at 
p. 316.)  To the contrary, “ ‘[b]y advising that a death verdict 
should be returned only if aggravation is “so substantial in 
comparison with” mitigation that death is “warranted,” the 
instruction clearly admonishes the jury to determine whether 
the balance of aggravation and mitigation makes death the 
appropriate penalty.’ ”  (People v. Perry (2006) 38 Cal.4th 302, 
320, quoting People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 171.) 
3. Challenges to California’s Death Penalty Scheme 
Morales 
raises 
a 
series 
of 
challenges 
to 
the 
constitutionality of California’s death penalty.  We have 
considered and rejected each before.  Because Morales offers no 
compelling arguments in favor of reconsidering these rulings, 
we again reject these arguments. 
California’s special circumstances (see Pen. Code, § 190.2) 
supply rational and objective criteria that adequately narrow 
the class of murderers eligible for the death penalty.  (People v. 
Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 114–115; People v. Delgado (2017) 
2 Cal.5th 544, 591; People v. Winbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 488.) 
Penal Code section 190.3, factor (a), which permits the 
jury to consider the circumstances of the crime in deciding the 
appropriate punishment, does not license the arbitrary and 
capricious imposition of the death penalty.  (Tuilaepa v. 
California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 975–976; People v. Henriquez 
(2017) 4 Cal.5th 1, 45; People v. Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at 
p. 489; People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 149.) 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
55 
The death penalty statute is not unconstitutional for not 
requiring “findings beyond a reasonable doubt that an 
aggravating circumstance (other than Pen. Code, § 190.3, factor 
(b) or factor (c) evidence) has been proved, that the aggravating 
factors outweighed the mitigating factors, or that death is the 
appropriate sentence.”  (People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 
1235.)  Nor does the federal Constitution require the jury to 
agree unanimously on any particular aggravating factor.  
(People v. Henriquez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 45; People v. 
Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 489.)  Apprendi v. New Jersey 
(2000) 530 U.S. 466, Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, and 
their progeny do not require reconsideration of these 
conclusions.  (Henriquez, at p. 45; Winbush, at p. 489; People v. 
Delgado, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 591; People v. Simon, supra, 1 
Cal.5th at p. 149.) 
The failure to impose a specific burden of proof on the 
ultimate question of life or death is not unconstitutional.  
(People v. Henriquez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 45; People v. Parker 
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1184, 1232; People v. Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th 
at pp. 489–490.) 
The federal Constitution does not require that the penalty 
jury issue written findings.  (People v. Henriquez, supra, 
4 Cal.5th at p. 46; People v. Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 490; 
People v. Thompson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1130.)  Nor does it 
require intercase proportionality review.  (Henriquez, at p. 46; 
Winbush, at p. 490; Thompson, at p. 1130; People v. Simon, 
supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 149.) 
The federal Constitution does not prohibit the use of prior 
unadjudicated criminal activity as an aggravating factor, nor 
does it require that such activity be found unanimously beyond 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
56 
a reasonable doubt.  (People v. Brooks, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 115; 
People v. Thompson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1130; People v. 
Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 150.)  Neither Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, supra, 530 U.S. 466, nor Ring v. Arizona, supra, 536 U.S. 
584, requires reappraisal of that conclusion.  (People v. Jones 
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 583, 619.) 
The use of the adjectives “extreme” and “substantial” in 
Penal Code section 190.3’s list of mitigating factors does not 
prevent the jury from giving full consideration to a defendant’s 
mitigating evidence.  (People v. Brooks, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 
p. 115; People v. Landry, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 122; People v. 
Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 150.) 
The jury need not be instructed that potential mitigating 
factors may be considered only as mitigation and their absence 
may not be treated as a factor in aggravation.  (People v. 
Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 490; People v. Contreras (2013) 
58 Cal.4th 123, 173.) 
The equal protection clause does not require California to 
include in its capital sentencing scheme every procedural 
protection provided to noncapital defendants.  The two groups 
are not similarly situated.  (People v. Henriquez, supra, 4 Cal.5th 
at p. 45; People v. Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 490; People v. 
Parker, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1234; People v. Williams (2013) 
58 Cal.4th 197, 295.) 
Morales contends California’s regular use of capital 
punishment violates international norms of human decency and 
thus the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution.  But “ ‘California does not employ capital 
punishment in such a manner.  The death penalty is available 
only for the crime of first degree murder, and only when a special 
PEOPLE v. MORALES 
Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. 
 
57 
circumstance is found true; furthermore, administration of the 
penalty is governed by constitutional and statutory provisions 
different from those applying to “regular punishment” for 
felonies.  (E.g., Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11; [Pen. Code,] §§ 190.1–
190.9, 1239, subd. (b).)’ ”  (People v. Trinh (2014) 59 Cal.4th 216, 
255, quoting People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 43–44; 
see People v. Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 490.) 
Finally, Morales argues these individual defects must be 
considered for their cumulative impact, rather than in isolation.  
He has identified no defects.  Moreover, even when considered 
in combination, the aspects of California’s scheme Morales 
highlights do not persuade us that California imposes capital 
punishment in a manner that violates the United States 
Constitution. 
III.  DISPOSITION 
 
We affirm the judgment. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
    KRUGER, J. 
 
We Concur:  
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Morales   
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted  
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S136800 
Date Filed:  August 10, 2020 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior    
County:  Los Angeles    
Judge:  Michael A. Cowell    
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Diane E. Berley, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, 
Keith H. Borjon, Joseph P. Lee and Nima Razfar, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Diane E. Berley 
Attorney at Law 
1440 Beaumont Avenue, Sutie A2-307 
Beaumont, CA 92223 
(818) 943-6457 
 
Nima Razfar 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA 90013 
(213) 269-6188