Title: Burdeshaw v. White

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

585 So. 2d 842 (1991)
Roy BURDESHAW
v.
James WHITE, et al.
1900615.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
July 26, 1991.
C. Knox McLaney III and J. Doyle Fuller, Montgomery, and William J. Baxley, Birmingham, for plaintiff.
Gary C. Sherrer and John Maddox of Carter, Hall & Sherrer, Dothan, for defendants.
HOUSTON, Justice.
The plaintiff, Roy Burdeshaw, individually and as the representative of a class composed of rural landowners in Houston County, Alabama, appeals from a summary judgment for the defendants, James Sizemore, in his official capacity as commissioner of revenue for the State of Alabama; John L. Napier, in his official capacity as revenue commissioner for Houston County; and Robert Crowder, in his official capacity as chairman of the Houston County Commission, in this action challenging the method used to determine the current use valuation of land for ad valorem tax purposes as being contrary to Act No. 135 of the Second Special Session of the Alabama Legislature of 1978, and further seeking a refund of excess taxes collected in the years 1979, 1980, and 1981. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Burdeshaw filed his complaint in the Houston Circuit Court on June 22, 1989. On October 2, 1989, Burdeshaw filed a motion for a summary judgment, supported by the deposition of defendant Napier, and on October 3, 1989, the trial court scheduled that motion for a hearing on October *843 24, 1989. On October 18, 1989, the defendants filed a motion for a summary judgment, a motion to consolidate both summary judgment motions for disposition, and a motion to schedule a later hearing date to allow for additional discovery. The trial court granted the defendants' motion on October 19, 1989, rescheduling the hearing for December 4, 1989. On November 22, 1989, the defendants filed a copy of the record in Hollis v. White, CV-84-5061, in support of their summary judgment motion. In Hollis, another rural landowner in Houston County had filed an action in Houston Circuit Court, substantially similar to the present one, on behalf of himself and seeking to represent a class composed of other rural landowners similarly situated. Two of the attorneys representing Burdeshaw in the present action also represented the plaintiff in Hollis. Hollis, which the parties stipulate in their respective briefs was never certified as a class action, resulted in the plaintiff's complaint being dismissed with prejudice under Rule 25(a), A.R.Civ.P. No appeal was taken from that dismissal.
Burdeshaw's attorneys, after receiving proper notice, did not appear at the December 4, 1989, hearing, and no further action was taken in this case until September 20, 1990, when Burdeshaw filed a motion to schedule another hearing date. On September 28, 1990, the trial court entered separate orders certifying this action as a class action, denying Burdeshaw's motion for a summary judgment, and entering a summary judgment for the defendants. In its order granting the defendants' motion for a summary judgment, the trial court stated as follows:
The following issues were presented for our review:
1. Whether the summary judgment was proper based on the affirmative defense of res judicata;
2. Whether the summary judgment was proper based on the affirmative defense of the applicable statute of limitations; and,
3. Whether the summary judgment was proper under Rule 41(b), A.R.Civ.P., for want of prosecution.
With regard to the first issue, the defendants contend that the previous dismissal *844 of Hollis barred the present action under the doctrine of res judicata. Burdeshaw contends, however, that the doctrine of res judicata was not applicable. He argues that because Hollis was never certified as a class action, the "identity of parties" criterion of res judicata was not satisfied. We agree.
In Whisman v. Alabama Power Co., 512 So. 2d 78, 80-82 (Ala.1987), this Court discussed in-depth the identity of parties criterion of res judicata:
"....
"....
"`Under the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars a second suit involving the same parties or their privies. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 99 S. Ct. 645, 58 L. Ed. 2d 552 (1979). Res judicata applies where the parties to both suits are "substantially identical." Wheeler v. First Alabama Bank of Birmingham, [364 So. 2d 1190 (Ala.1978)]; Astron Industrial Associates, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 405 F.2d 958, 961 (5th Cir.1968).
"`Judgments can bind persons not party (or privy) to the litigation in question where the nonparties' interests were represented adequately by a party in the original suit. Southwest Airlines Co. v. Texas International *845 Airlines, 546 F.2d 84, 94-95 (5th Cir. 1977). A person may be bound by a judgment even though not a party to a suit if one of the parties to the suit is so closely aligned with his interests as to be his virtual representative. Aerojet-General Corporation v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 719 (5th Cir.1975). Moreover, if a party has a "sufficient `laboring oar' in the conduct" of the litigation, then the principle of res judicata can be actuated. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 155, 99 S. Ct. 970, 974, 59 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1979).'
"401 So. 2d  at 770."
Burdeshaw was not a party in Hollis, and there is no evidence suggesting that he participated in any way in the prosecution of that case. Furthermore, Hollis was never certified as a class action; therefore, no judicial determination was ever made that the plaintiff in that case adequately represented the putative class of rural landowners in Houston County, of which Burdeshaw was a member. The constitutionally protected right to a remedy by due process of law that has been preserved inviolate to each of the citizens of this State, Art. I, §§ 13, 36, Alabama Constitution of 1901, prohibits this Court from holding that the doctrine of res judicata was a bar to Burdeshaw's action. We conclude, therefore, that the summary judgment for the defendants could not properly be based on the affirmative defense of res judicata.
As to the second issue, the defendants contend that the summary judgment was proper because, they argue, the two-year limitations period set out in Ala.Code 1975, § 40-10-160, had run at the time Burdeshaw filed his action. Burdeshaw contends that the statute was not a bar because, he says, the running of the two-year limitations period was tolled while the previous cases of Mangum v. Eagerton, CV-81-1592-G, and Hollis were pending in the Circuit Courts of Montgomery and Houston Counties respectively.
Section 40-10-160 provides:
Thus, the period for which refunds of ad valorem taxes may be recovered is the two-year period next preceding the filing of the action. See Thorn v. Jefferson County, 375 So. 2d 780 (Ala.1979).
In White v. Sims, 470 So. 2d 1191 (Ala. 1985), this Court held that, as a general principle of law, the commencement of a class action tolls the running of the applicable limitations period as to the putative class until such time as an independent action is filed, or until the denial of class certification, whichever may occur first. Of specific importance to the present case, the Court explained:
"After the Eagerton decision was rendered, the trial court on June 15, 1983, placed the Mangum case back on the active docket and an order was entered *846 certifying Mangum as a statewide plaintiffs' class.
"On June 7, 1984, the Covington County taxpayer class in Sims filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted on September 19, 1984. The trial court found that the tax assessor in Covington County did not utilize values consistent with those set forth by this Court in Eagerton v. Williams, supra.
"`The principal function of the class actionto avoid multiplicity in filing suits, motions and paperswill be defeated if the statute of limitations is not tolled in favor of the plaintiffs. A putative class member could protect his or her interests only by filing an individual action or intervening before the statute of limitations runs.'"
470 So. 2d  at 1192-93.
Burdeshaw alleged in his complaint that he, and the class he sought to represent, were entitled to recover for excess taxes that were paid in 1979, 1980, and 1981. The limitations period began to run when those taxes were paid; however, the running of the limitations period was tolled on November 25, 1981, when Mangum was filed. The period began to run again on May 2, 1984, when the Mangum class was decertified. The period ran for approximately 5 months and 3 days, until October 5, 1984, when it was again tolled by the filing of the action in Hollis. The period began to run again on April 11, 1989, when Hollis was dismissed, and it ran for approximately 2 months and 11 days, until the present action was filed on June 22, 1989. Thus, it is apparent that the statute was a bar to Burdeshaw's claim for a refund of any excess taxes that were paid in *847 1979. However, the statute was not a bar to Burdeshaw's claim for a refund of excess taxes that were paid in 1980 and 1981. Although the record is silent on the matter, payment for the taxable year 1979-80 would have been due on October 1, 1980, and payment would have been delinquent on January 1, 1981, see Ala.Code 1975, § 40-11-4; therefore, assuming that Burdeshaw, and the members of the class he sought to represent, paid their taxes on October 1, 1980, the earliest date on which they were legally obligated to pay them, only a little over 21 months of the limitations period would have run at the time this action was filed (i.e., October 1, 1980 (taxes paidlimitations period began to run), to November 25, 1981 (Mangum filedrunning of the limitations period tolled), equals 13 months and 24 days; May 2, 1984 (Mangum class decertifiedlimitations period began to run again), to October 5, 1984 (Hollis filedlimitations period tolled again), equals 5 months and 3 days; April 11, 1989 (Hollis dismissedlimitations period began to run again), to June 22, 1989 (present action filed), equals 2 months and 11 days).
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that although the summary judgment was proper as to Burdeshaw's claim for a refund of excess taxes that were paid in 1979, it was not proper as to his claim for a refund of excess taxes that were paid in 1980 and 1981.
Finally, with respect to the third issue, we find no merit in the defendants' contention that the summary judgment was proper under Rule 41(b) for want of prosecution. The entry of a judgment for a defendant as a matter of law for want of prosecution is a drastic sanction. The general rule, of course, is that a court has the inherent power to act sua sponte to dismiss an action for want of prosecution. However, because dismissal, or, as here, the entry of a summary judgment, is such a drastic sanction, it is to be used only in extreme situations. Accordingly, this Court carefully scrutinizes any order terminating an action for want of prosecution, and it does not hesitate to set one aside when an abuse of discretion is found. Selby v. Money, 403 So. 2d 218 (Ala. 1981); Smith v. Wilcox County Board of Education, 365 So. 2d 659 (Ala.1978). In Selby, this Court discussed the factors to be considered in reviewing the dismissal of an action for want of prosecution:
403 So. 2d  at 220-21. In Smith, this Court wrote:
"The controlling issue here is whether, pursuant to Rule 41(b), ARCP, the trial judge abused his discretion in dismissing *848 the action with prejudice. Because the Alabama and Federal rules are virtually verbatim, `a presumption arises that cases construing the Federal Rules are authority for construction of the Alabama Rules.' Assured Investors Life Insurance Co. v. National Union Associates, Inc., 362 So. 2d 228 (Ala.1978).
"....
365 So. 2d  at 661-62 (emphasis in original).
The record in the present case does not show that Burdeshaw's conduct warranted the entry of a summary judgment for the defendants. It does not appear that there was a "clear record of delay," a "serious showing of willful default," or "contumacious conduct," on the part of Burdeshaw. Shortly after filing this action, Burdeshaw filed a motion for a summary judgment, *849 supported by the deposition of one of the defendants. Shortly thereafter, the defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, and both motions were consolidated and scheduled for a hearing. Although, as the defendants point out, Burdeshaw's attorneys failed to appear at the December 4, 1989, hearing, and then waited approximately 10 months before attempting to have another hearing scheduled, we do not think that the drastic sanction imposed by the trial court was warranted. Under the rationale of Smith, supra, even though there was a lengthy period of inactivity in the present case, approximately 10 months, compared to approximately 7 years in Smith, that period of inactivity was not sufficient to support the entry of a judgment for the defendants. Here, as in Smith, there was activity on the part of the plaintiff within the approximately 11-month period prior to the entry of the judgment (during that period Burdeshaw filed a motion for a summary judgment and a motion to reschedule the hearing). Although we hasten to point out that we do not condone an attorney's unexcused failure to appear at a scheduled hearing, we do not think that the failure of Burdeshaw's attorneys to appear at the December 4, 1989, hearing, when considered with the other circumstances surrounding this case, was sufficient to show a failure to prosecute so as to warrant the entry of a judgment for the defendants as a matter of law. Furthermore, because the trial court certified this action as a class action, not only the vital interests of Burdeshaw but also those of the individual members of the class are at stake. As previously noted, the record shows that Burdeshaw moved to have another hearing scheduled to consider his motion for a summary judgment. Although there may come a point in an action when the interest of the court in controlling its calendar and the risk of prejudice to the defendant outweigh the interest in disposing of litigation on the merits, Selby, supra, that point was not reached in this case.
We note that we have fully considered Dillard v. Southern States Ford, Inc., 541 So. 2d 483 (Ala.1989), as well as other cases where judgments for the defendants were held to be proper on the ground of want of prosecution, and that we consider the plaintiffs' conduct in those cases to be distinguishable from the conduct exhibited by Burdeshaw in the present case.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the summary judgment, insofar as it relates to Burdeshaw's claim for a refund of excess taxes paid in 1979, was proper and, therefore, to that extent, it is due to be affirmed. We further hold, however, that insofar as the summary judgment relates to Burdeshaw's claim for a refund of excess taxes paid in 1980 and 1981 it was improper and, consequently, that it is due to be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, KENNEDY and INGRAM, JJ., concur.