Title: Goldberg v. Maloney

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Goldberg v. Maloney, 111 Ohio St.3d 211, 2006-Ohio-5485.] 
 
 
GOLDBERG, APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT, v. MALONEY, JUDGE, 
APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Goldberg v. Maloney, 111 Ohio St.3d 211, 2006-Ohio-5485.] 
Probate courts—Concealment action under R.C. 2109.50 et seq.—Jurisdiction 
when assets allegedly taken before establishment of guardianship estate—
Bankruptcy stay—Writ of prohibition denied. 
(No. 2006-0250 ─ Submitted July 18, 2006 ─ Decided November 8, 2006.) 
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Mahoning County,  
No. 00 MA 55, 2005-Ohio-7110. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal and cross-appeal from a judgment granting a writ 
of prohibition to prevent a probate judge from proceeding in a concealment action 
instituted under R.C. 2109.50.  Because the probate judge does not patently and 
unambiguously lack jurisdiction to proceed in the concealment case, we reverse. 
Kish Concealment Action:  1999-2000 
{¶ 2} On October 29, 1999, James B. Dietz, in his capacity as guardian 
of the estate of Michael James Kish (“Kish”), filed a complaint pursuant to R.C. 
2109.50 in the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, for 
concealment of assets against appellee and cross-appellant, attorney Richard D. 
Goldberg.  In the complaint, the guardian alleged the following. 
{¶ 3} On October 30, 1970, the ward, Michael James Kish, was born.  
When Kish was still a minor, he suffered a football injury in the fall of 1987.  
Kish received treatment for the injury but developed an infection and ultimately 
experienced respiratory arrest, which resulted in anoxic encephalopathy.  Kish 
became physically and mentally disabled and legally incompetent. 
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{¶ 4} On January 13, 1989, Goldberg represented Kish and his father, 
Michael Joseph Kish, and filed a medical-malpractice case on their behalf against 
various physicians and health-care providers in the Mahoning County Court of 
Common Pleas.  No guardianship was established at the time of filing or during 
the case, although Kish had reached the age of majority.  The lawsuit was 
eventually settled for $1,773,917.  Of this amount, $773,917 was used to purchase 
annuities to be paid to Kish.  The defendants paid the remaining $1,000,000 in 
cash, and Goldberg retained the money except for $20,761.29 that he paid to the 
State Teachers Retirement System on behalf of Kish’s father.  Goldberg 
accounted for another $31,544.95 as reimbursement to him for costs and expenses 
that he had allegedly advanced. 
{¶ 5} The primary settlement agreement with the health-care providers 
was signed by Kish’s father even though Kish had already reached the age of 
majority.  Other settlement agreements purported to be between the health-care 
providers and Kish individually, but Kish did not sign the agreements and he 
lacked the cognitive capacity to understand them.  On these latter agreements, 
Kish’s signature was forged. 
{¶ 6} On October 7, 1999, Dietz was appointed as Kish’s guardian.  
Goldberg thereafter gave the guardian a copy of a July 12, 1998 fee agreement 
signed by Kish’s father providing for an attorney fee of 50 percent of any amount 
recovered by compromise or settlement. 
{¶ 7} In May 2000, appellant and cross-appellee, Judge Timothy P. 
Maloney of the probate court, received evidence in the concealment case and took 
the matter under advisement. 
Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings 
{¶ 8} On September 10, 1999, during certain criminal actions against 
Goldberg, we suspended his license to practice law in Ohio for an indefinite 
period.  In re Goldberg (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 1480, 716 N.E.2d 213.  On May 3, 
January Term, 2006 
3 
2000, we denied Goldberg’s motion to resign from the practice of law. In re 
Resignation of Goldberg (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 1504, 727 N.E.2d 926. 
{¶ 9} On 
February 
27, 
2002, 
we 
found 
that 
Goldberg 
had 
misappropriated over $742,000 in funds paid in a wrongful-death action, 
defrauded an estate of $400,000 when he represented the estate in a medical-
malpractice action, made false representations to a court in a criminal case arising 
from his illegal conduct, and failed to make restitution to all of the victims of his 
crimes.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Goldberg (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 337, 763 N.E.2d 
119.  We disbarred Goldberg from the practice of law in Ohio. 
Bankruptcy and Other Proceedings 
{¶ 10} On January 30, 2001, Goldberg filed for bankruptcy protection in 
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. 
{¶ 11} On May 3, 2000, Judge Maloney issued contempt orders in four 
separate concealment cases and sentenced Goldberg to 21 months in jail.  
Following the exhaustion of his direct appeals, a federal district court granted 
Goldberg relief in habeas corpus.  On September 5, 2001, we granted Goldberg a 
writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Maloney and the probate court from issuing 
prejudgment attachment orders in certain concealment proceedings.  State ex rel. 
Goldberg v. Mahoning Cty. Probate Court (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 160, 753 N.E.2d 
192. 
{¶ 12} In February 2005, Goldberg entered into a plea agreement with the 
state of Ohio in a criminal case in which he agreed to make restitution.  As part of 
the agreement, the guardian in the Kish case agreed to the restitution amount of 
$60,733.26. 
Kish Concealment Action:  2005 
{¶ 13} As a result of the February 2005 plea agreement, Kish’s guardian 
notified Judge Maloney on March 16, 2005, of the agreement and asked the 
probate court to ratify it.  On March 25, 2005, however, Judge Maloney denied 
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the guardian’s application because of the pending concealment action involving 
Kish’s estate: 
{¶ 14} “There is yet a related concealment action pending in this Court * 
* *.  That complaint, brought by Attorney Dietz as Guardian of the Estate of 
Michael James Kish, is as yet unresolved.  It is unresolved principally as 
Goldberg invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege [against self-incrimination].  
However and based upon information supplied by the Applicant, Attorney Dietz, 
it would appear that Goldberg has since waived his Fifth Amendment privilege, as 
well as other rights, and entered a plea of guilty to the charges pertaining to the 
instant Ward, Michael James Kish.  This Court’s review of its records indicates 
that Richard Goldberg accepted $1 million dollars that he has yet to account for to 
this Court.  This Court is not, therefore, inclined to ratify his late offering of 
$60,733.26 in satisfaction of the outstanding sums which may be due in this 
case.” 
{¶ 15} Shortly thereafter, on March 29, 2005, in the Kish concealment 
case, Judge Maloney issued a citation ordering Goldberg to appear before the 
probate court on April 6, 2005, “to be examined under oath touching upon the 
matters set forth within the Complaint, and for such other proceedings and 
process as may be authorized by law or required in the premises.”  There had been 
no previous activity in the concealment case since Judge Maloney’s May 2000 
entry taking the case under advisement. 
Prohibition Case 
{¶ 16} On April 1, 2005, Goldberg filed a complaint in the Court of 
Appeals for Mahoning County for a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Maloney 
from proceeding with his examination on April 6, 2005, and to quash the citation.  
In his complaint, Goldberg claimed that Judge Maloney patently and 
unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to proceed in the underlying concealment 
action involving the Kish guardianship because (1) Judge Maloney lacked 
January Term, 2006 
5 
authority to approve or ratify the plea agreement between Goldberg and the state, 
(2) Judge Maloney had already closed the evidentiary record in May 2000, and (3) 
Goldberg’s filing of a bankruptcy petition automatically stayed the concealment 
case.  On April 5, 2005, the court of appeals granted an alternative writ, which 
prohibited Judge Maloney from conducting the hearing scheduled for April 6. 
{¶ 17} Judge Maloney moved to dismiss the prohibition case, in part 
based upon R.C. 2109.50 and 2109.52 as authorizing him to proceed in the 
concealment case.  In his memorandum in opposition, Goldberg reasserted the 
automatic bankruptcy stay as a basis for his prohibition claim, but also raised two 
new claims.  For his new claims, Goldberg argued that (1) because the disputed 
attorney fees were provided to him in 1992 pursuant to a fee agreement before the 
ward was adjudicated incompetent and the guardian was appointed, the 
concealment action was outside the scope of the probate court’s jurisdiction under 
R.C. 2109.50 et seq. and (2) proceeding with the concealment case after a 
sentence had been imposed in the related criminal matter violated the 
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.  Judge Maloney filed a reply 
challenging Goldberg’s claims. 
{¶ 18} On December 23, 2005, the court of appeals granted a writ of 
prohibition to prevent Judge Maloney from proceeding in the concealment action. 
{¶ 19} This cause is now before the court upon Judge Maloney’s appeal 
as of right and Goldberg’s cross-appeal. 
{¶ 20} Judge Maloney asserts that the court of appeals erred in granting 
the writ of prohibition to prevent him from proceeding in the concealment action 
brought by Kish’s guardian.  In order to be entitled to the writ, Goldberg must 
establish that (1) Judge Maloney is about to exercise judicial power, (2) the 
exercise of that power is unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ will result 
in injury for which no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law.  
State ex rel. Douglas v. Burlew, 106 Ohio St.3d 180, 2005-Ohio-4382, 833 
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N.E.2d 293, ¶ 9.  It is uncontroverted that Judge Maloney is about to exercise 
judicial power because without the writ, he will conduct further proceedings in 
the underlying concealment case. 
{¶ 21} For the remaining requirements, “ ‘[i]n the absence of a patent and 
unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having general subject-matter 
jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party challenging that 
jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by appeal.’ ”  State ex rel. United States Steel 
Corp. v. Zaleski, 98 Ohio St.3d 395, 2003-Ohio-1630, 786 N.E.2d 39, ¶ 8, quoting 
State ex rel. Nalls v. Russo, 96 Ohio St.3d 410, 2002-Ohio-4907, 775 N.E.2d 522, 
¶ 18.  Therefore, without a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, there is 
generally no entitlement to a writ of prohibition to prevent a trial court’s exercise 
of jurisdiction.  State ex rel. Brady v. Pianka, 106 Ohio St.3d 147, 2005-Ohio-
4105, 832 N.E.2d 1202, ¶ 9-10. 
{¶ 22} In the proceedings below and in this appeal, Goldberg ultimately 
settled on the following grounds for his prohibition claim:  (1) the concealment 
action is outside the scope of the probate court’s jurisdiction because the attorney 
fees were given to Goldberg before the guardianship proceeding commenced and 
(2) the concealment action was automatically stayed by Goldberg’s filing of 
bankruptcy.  The first ground provided the basis for the court of appeals’ 
judgment granting the writ.  The second ground was relied upon by one of the 
court of appeals judges who concurred in the issuance of the writ and is also the 
basis for Goldberg’s cross-appeal.  These claims are next discussed. 
Preguardianship Transactions 
{¶ 23} Probate courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and probate 
proceedings are thus restricted to those actions permitted by statute and by the 
Ohio Constitution.  Corron v. Corron (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 75, 531 N.E.2d 708, 
paragraph one of the syllabus.  Judge Maloney is exercising jurisdiction over the 
concealment action pursuant to R.C. 2109.50 to 2109.56 and has plenary authority 
January Term, 2006 
7 
under R.C. 2101.24(C).  An R.C. 2109.50 proceeding for the discovery of 
concealed or embezzled assets of an estate is a special proceeding of a summary, 
inquisitorial character whose purpose is to facilitate the administration of estates 
by summarily retrieving assets that rightfully belong there.  In re Estate of Fife 
(1956), 164 Ohio St. 449, 58 O.O. 293, 132 N.E.2d 185, paragraphs one and two 
of the syllabus. 
{¶ 24} “In determining the scope of a concealment proceeding instituted 
under R.C. 2109.50, we must first look at its language, reading words and phrases 
used in context and construing them according to the rules of grammar and 
common usage.”  State ex rel. Goldberg v. Mahoning Cty. Probate Court (2001), 
93 Ohio St.3d 160, 163, 753 N.E.2d 192. 
{¶ 25} R.C. 2109.50 authorizes proceedings in a probate court proceeding 
against persons suspected of concealing, embezzling, or conveying away estate 
assets and permits an examination of persons on anything touching upon the 
matter of the concealment complaint: 
{¶ 26} “Upon complaint made to the probate court of the county having 
jurisdiction of the administration of a trust estate or of the county wherein a 
person resides against whom the complaint is made, by a person interested in such 
trust estate or by the creditor of a person interested in such trust estate against any 
person suspected of having concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away or of being 
or having been in the possession of any moneys, chattels, or choses in action of 
such estate, said court shall by citation, attachment or warrant, or, if 
circumstances require it, by warrant or attachment in the first instance, compel the 
person or persons so suspected to forthwith appear before it to be examined, on 
oath, touching the matter of the complaint.” 
{¶ 27} R.C. 2109.52 empowers the probate court to conduct a hearing in 
the concealment proceeding at which the court may determine questions of title 
concerning the allegedly concealed, embezzled, or conveyed estate assets, to 
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determine whether the person accused is guilty and, if so, to enter judgment 
against the person found guilty for the amount of the money or value of assets 
with a ten percent penalty: 
{¶ 28} “When passing on a complaint made under section 2109.50 of the 
Revised Code, the probate court shall determine, by the verdict of a jury if either 
party requires it or without if not required, whether the person accused is guilty of 
having concealed, embezzled, conveyed away, or been in the possession of 
moneys, chattels, or choses in action of the trust estate.  If such person is found 
guilty, the probate court shall assess the amount of damages to be recovered or the 
court may order the return of the specific thing concealed or embezzled or may 
order restoration in kind.  The probate court may issue a citation into any county 
in this state, which citation shall be served and returned as provided in section 
2109.50, requiring any person to appear before it who claims any interest in the 
assets alleged to have been concealed, embezzled, conveyed, or held in possession 
and at such hearing may hear and determine questions of title relating to such 
assets.  In all cases, except when the person found guilty is the fiduciary, the 
probate court shall forthwith render judgment in favor of the fiduciary or if there 
is no fiduciary in this state, the probate court shall render judgment in favor of the 
state, against the person found guilty, for the amount of the moneys or the value 
of the chattels or choses in action concealed, embezzled, conveyed away, or held 
in possession, together with ten per cent penalty and all costs of such proceedings 
or complaint * * *.”  (Emphasis added.)   
{¶ 29} In addition, pursuant to R.C. 2101.24(C), “[t]he probate court has 
plenary power at law and in equity to dispose fully of any matter that is properly 
before the court, unless the power is expressly otherwise limited or denied by a 
section of the Revised Code.” 
{¶ 30} The court of appeals held that Judge Maloney patently and 
unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over the Kish concealment action because “if a 
January Term, 2006 
9 
defendant takes a person’s money before death or before institution of a 
guardianship, then a concealment action is not the appropriate remedy because the 
money was not taken from the estate” and “any money taken by Goldberg in 
exchange for his legal services would not constitute estate funds as they were 
never passed through an estate.”  2005-Ohio-7110 at ¶ 9 and 13.  The court of 
appeals concluded that the Kish concealment action was improper and that Judge 
Maloney could not “adjudicate rights under a private contract more appropriately 
brought in a common pleas court.”  Id. at ¶ 13. 
{¶ 31} The court of appeals erred in so holding.  In Fecteau v. Cleveland 
Trust Co. (1960), 171 Ohio St. 121, 12 O.O.2d 139, 167 N.E.2d 890, we held that 
a concealment action pursuant to R.C. 2109.50 and 2109.52 is appropriate to 
determine the allegation that a person had, without authorization, withdrawn 
funds belonging to another person before his death although the dispute arose out 
of a contractual matter ─ the creation of a bank account: 
{¶ 32} “In the instant case, the petition and complaint flatly alleges that 
the savings and checking accounts were the exclusive property of Peter E. 
Fecteau, and that only for convenience was the name of June A. Larkin added 
with the provision that ‘either may draw—balance at death of either, payable to 
survivor.’  The allegation is further made that, while Peter E. Fecteau was still 
alive and helpless, June A. Larkin unauthorizedly withdrew these funds belonging 
wholly to Peter E. Fecteau from the accounts and deposited them in an account in 
her own name where such moneys remain.  In our opinion, these allegations state 
a case within the quoted provisions of Section 2109.50, Revised Code.  Whether 
plaintiff can prove her charges is another matter of no present concern.”  Id., 171 
Ohio St. at 125, 12 O.O.2d 139, 167 N.E.2d 890. 
{¶ 33} In Fecteau, we recognized that concealment actions under R.C. 
2109.50 and 2109.52 could be applicable to recover certain assets wrongfully 
concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away before the creation of the estate. 
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{¶ 34} Similarly, other courts have acknowledged that “although property 
that passed by inter vivos gift or transaction is not property of the estate 
retrievable by an executor under R.C. 2109.50, the probate court can determine 
that the inter vivos gift or transaction was invalid, in which case the property is an 
asset of the estate retrievable by R.C. 2109.50.”  Harrison v. Faseyitan, 159 Ohio 
App.3d 325, 2004-Ohio-6808, 823 N.E.2d 925, ¶ 36, citing Rudloff v. 
Efstathiadis, Trumbull App. No. 2002-T-0119, 2003-Ohio-6686, 2003 WL 
22931382 (concealment action was appropriate to recover funds passed to a third 
party by inter vivos transaction where the validity of the underlying transfer is 
challenged); see, also, In re Estate of Kelsey, 165 Ohio App.3d 680, 2006-Ohio-
1171, 847 N.E.2d 1277, ¶ 33, citing Rudloff (“Where, as here, a dispute exists 
regarding title, the probate court is not deprived of jurisdiction to resolve the 
dispute * * *”). 
{¶ 35} “[A] plaintiff has stated an actionable cause under R.C. 2109.50 if 
he alleges that the asset is the exclusive property of the estate and that the 
defendant has unauthorized possession of the asset or in some way has 
impermissibly disposed of it.”  Wozniak v. Wozniak (1993), 90 Ohio App.3d 400, 
407, 629 N.E.2d 500.  Courts have consequently held that a probate court “may 
properly investigate and adjudicate all matters substantially related to the 
guardianship,” including transactions occurring before the guardianship 
proceedings began.  In re Guardianship of Alberts (Apr. 26, 1989), Summit App. 
No. 13780, 1989 WL 41523, *2; see, also, Grannen v. Ey (1974), 44 Ohio App.2d 
55, 73 O.O.2d 52, 335 N.E.2d 735 (probate court had jurisdiction in a 
concealment action to inquire into an incompetent’s financial transactions before 
the appointment of a guardian where the incompetent’s mental capacity at the 
time of the transactions is questioned by the guardian). 
{¶ 36} As noted previously, R.C. 2109.52 expressly authorizes probate 
courts in concealment proceedings to resolve “questions of title” for allegedly 
January Term, 2006 
11 
concealed, embezzled, or conveyed assets.  See, also, State ex rel. Lipinski v. 
Cuyahoga Cty. Common Pleas Court, Probate Div. (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 19, 22, 
655 N.E.2d 1303 (“a declaratory judgment action may be brought in the probate 
court to determine the validity of inter vivos transfers where the property 
transferred would revert to the estate if the transfers are invalidated”).  The cases 
permitting probate courts to determine the validity of preguardianship or predeath 
transactions have been held to be “consonant with the modern and prevailing view 
that the ends of justice are expedited and best served by the disposition of as 
many issues as is possible in a single proceeding.”  Grannen, 44 Ohio App.2d at 
60, 73 O.O.2d 52, 335 N.E.2d 735; see, also, Alberts, at *2. 
{¶ 37} Although other courts have at times held otherwise, see, e.g., 
Harpster v. Castle (June 28, 1993), Ashland App. No. CA 1022, 1993 WL 
274296, *1, the existence of the cases previously cited establishes at least that 
Judge Maloney did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to determine 
whether the preguardianship transactions in the Kish case, including settlement 
agreements that the guardian alleged Kish never signed, wrongfully transferred 
assets that would revert to the estate if invalidated.  See State ex rel. Lewis v. 
Moser (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 25, 28, 647 N.E.2d 155 (court not persuaded that 
probate court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction so as to warrant 
issuance of extraordinary writ where “parties cite competent authority on both 
sides of this issue”). 
{¶ 38} Nor do the cases cited by the court of appeals warrant a different 
result.  The court of appeals cited In re Estate of Black (1945), 145 Ohio St. 405, 
31 O.O. 31, 62 N.E.2d 90, In re Estate of Leiby (1952), 157 Ohio St. 374, 47 O.O. 
265, 105 N.E.2d 583, and Harrison, 159 Ohio App.3d 325, 2004-Ohio-6808, 823 
N.E.2d 925, in support of its holding that Judge Maloney patently and 
unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over the Kish concealment action because it 
involved preguardianship transactions.  In Black, at paragraph four of the 
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syllabus, we emphasized that a concealment action “may not be successfully 
pursued where it appears from the evidence that title to such property had been 
transferred by the ward, pursuant to a valid agreement, prior to the guardianship.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Unlike the concealment case in Black, the underlying 
concealment action here alleges that there was no valid agreement transferring 
Kish’s assets to Goldberg.  In Leiby, there was no evidence that the decedent 
owned the funds in question.  157 Ohio St. at 383, 47 O.O. 265, 105 N.E.2d 583.  
And Harrison recognized that a probate court could determine the validity of a 
transaction before the creation of the estate.  Harrison, 159 Ohio App.3d 325, 
2004-Ohio-6808, 823 N.E.2d 925, ¶ 36. 
{¶ 39} Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals erred in holding that 
the probate court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to proceed in the 
underlying concealment action and that a writ of prohibition was therefore 
warranted. 
Cross-Appeal:  Automatic Stay 
{¶ 40} Goldberg argues in his cross-appeal that even if the court of 
appeals erred in granting the writ of prohibition on the specified basis that the 
probate court lacked jurisdiction over the concealment action because no estate 
assets were involved, the writ was appropriate on the alternate basis that his 
bankruptcy action stayed the probate court from proceeding in the concealment 
action. 
{¶ 41} Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code, Section 362(a), Title 11, 
U.S.Code, provides a general automatic stay for certain proceedings against the 
debtor who files a bankruptcy petition.  Section 362(b)(1), however, provides an 
exception to the general stay for “the commencement or continuation of a 
criminal action or proceeding against the debtor.” 
{¶ 42} A concealment action under R.C. 2109.50 is “quasi criminal in 
nature.”  Estate of Fife, 164 Ohio St. 449, 58 O.O. 293, 132 N.E.2d 185, 
January Term, 2006 
13 
paragraph one of the syllabus; Goldberg, 93 Ohio St.3d at 164, 753 N.E.2d 192 
(“A concealment action under R.C. 2109.50, however, is, as appellants concede, 
not a civil action.  Instead, it is a quasi-criminal proceeding * * *”  [emphasis 
sic]). 
{¶ 43} Several bankruptcy courts have held that the automatic-stay 
exception for criminal actions and proceedings encompasses quasi-criminal 
actions.  Se, e.g., In re Nelson (Bankr.D.Kan.2005), 335 B.R. 740, 750-752; In re 
Cuevas (Bankr.D.N.J.1997), 205 B.R. 457, 460; In re 1820-1838 Amsterdam 
Equities, Inc. (S.D.N.Y.1996), 191 B.R. 18, 21; In re Davis (D.Del.1982), 18 B.R. 
701, 703.  The bankruptcy court is a better forum for determining whether the stay 
applies.  See, e.g., In re Batt (Bankr.N.D.Ohio, 2005), 322 B.R. 776, 780 (in 
determining whether the Section 362(b)(1) exception applies, the burden is upon 
the debtor to prove the inapplicability of the exception). 
{¶ 44} Based on the foregoing precedent, extraordinary relief in 
prohibition is not warranted on this basis because the automatic-stay provision of 
Section 362(a) does not patently and unambiguously divest Judge Maloney of 
jurisdiction to proceed in the underlying concealment action.  Therefore, 
Goldberg’s cross-appeal lacks merit. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 45} Based on the foregoing, Judge Maloney and the probate court do 
not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to proceed in the concealment 
action, and Goldberg has an adequate remedy by way of appeal to raise his 
claims.  “We need not rule on the merits of [these jurisdictional claims], because 
our duty is limited to determining whether jurisdiction is patently and 
unambiguously lacking.”  State ex rel. Florence v. Zitter, 106 Ohio St.3d 87, 
2005-Ohio-3804, 831 N.E.2d 1003, ¶ 28.  Therefore, the court of appeals erred in 
granting the requested extraordinary relief in prohibition.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
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Judgment reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Maguire and Schneider, L.L.P., Karl H. Schneider, and Brian E. 
Dickerson; and Martin Yavorcik, for appellee and cross-appellant. 
Montgomery, Rennie & Jonson, Ralph E. Burnham, and Hope A. Smith, 
for appellant and cross-appellee. 
______________________