Title: Andrews v. Ring

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
RUTH S. ANDREWS 
 
 
 
 OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 022434 
    JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
   September 12, 2003 
WILLIAM DALE RING AND 
JIMMY DON BOLT 
 
WILLIAM COX 
 
v.  Record No. 022243 
 
WILLIAM DALE RING AND 
JIMMY DON BOLT 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GRAYSON COUNTY 
Barnard F. Jennings, Judge Designate 
 
 
In this consolidated appeal involving two separate suits 
alleging malicious prosecution and statutory conspiracy to cause 
injury to “reputation, trade, business or profession” against 
the Commonwealth’s Attorney of Grayson County and the Building 
Inspector of Grayson County, we consider whether the trial court 
erred by granting defendants’ motions for summary judgment. 
Because the trial court granted summary judgment pursuant to 
Rule 3:18, our review of the facts is limited to pleadings, 
orders, and admissions of the parties. 
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below
 
During all times relevant to this case, Ruth S. Andrews 
(“Andrews”) was the Chairperson of the Grayson County School 
Board; William Cox (“Cox”) was the Director of School 
Maintenance for Grayson County; Jimmy Don Bolt (“Bolt”) was the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney of Grayson County; and William Dale Ring 
(“Ring”) was the Building Inspector of Grayson County. 
 
On August 1, 2000, upon direction of Cox and on behalf of 
the Grayson County School Board, David G. Cornett, an employee 
of the Grayson County School Maintenance Department, applied for 
and received a building permit to install an above-ground 
storage tank on the premises of Grayson County High School.  On 
August 7, 2000, employees in the Maintenance Department, 
personally supervised and directed by Cox, poured a concrete pad 
designed to support the proposed above-ground storage tank.  At 
Cox’s direction, the site upon which the concrete pad was poured 
had been excavated July 31, 2000, the day prior to issuance of 
the building permit.  On August 28, 2000, Cox and Ring discussed 
the project, and Ring informed Cox that his office needed a 
letter from the project’s architect “stating that the concrete 
pad was adequate to support the weight of the proposed storage 
tank.”  On September 6, 2000, Cox delivered a letter from 
William W. Huber, the project architect, to Ring, which 
“confirmed that a structural engineer evaluated the slab 
thickness needed to support the . . . tank and determined that 
the . . . pad was structurally adequate for supporting the 
proposed tank.” 
 
On September 8, 2000, at the direction of Bolt, Ring 
appeared before a magistrate for Grayson County, and filed a 
 
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criminal complaint against Andrews, Cox, and Dr. Alvin C. 
Proffit1 (“Dr. Proffit”), the Superintendent of Grayson County 
Schools, alleging that they “[f]ailed to obtain a Building 
Permit before beginning work on a 10,000 Gallon Storage tank[]” 
and “[c]onceal[ed] work prior to the required inspection by 
pouring concrete slab.”  On September 11, 2000, Andrews, Cox, 
and Dr. Proffit were served with warrants requiring them to 
appear before the General District Court of Grayson County for 
arraignment and trial.  However, on the date set for trial, 
October 3, 2000, Bolt moved the court to nolle prosequi the 
charges against all three defendants.  Bolt and Ring claim that 
the decision to nolle prosequi the charges was the result of 
settlement negotiations.  Andrews and Cox deny that any 
agreement to settle the criminal charges was reached. 
 
On September 4, 2001, Andrews and Cox filed separate 
motions for judgment in the Circuit Court of Grayson County 
against Ring and Bolt alleging malicious prosecution and 
conspiracy to injure reputation, trade, business, and profession 
pursuant to Code §§ 18.2-499 and 18.2-500.  Ring and Bolt filed 
responsive pleadings which included several demurrers and 
special pleas of immunity.  On November 29, 2001, the parties 
                     
 
1 Dr. Profitt, now a resident of North Carolina, filed an 
action similar to the present Virginia litigation against Ring 
and Bolt in the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Virginia, Abingdon Division. 
 
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appeared before the trial court to present argument on the 
demurrers and special pleas filed by Ring and Bolt.  By order 
dated January 11, 2002, the trial court overruled Ring’s and 
Bolt’s special pleas of immunity without prejudice and overruled 
each demurrer.  The trial court ordered Ring and Bolt to file 
grounds of defense. 
 
On April 8, 2002, Ring and Bolt filed separate motions for 
summary judgment.  On April 30, 2002, the trial court heard 
argument from the parties on the motions for summary judgment.  
With regard to the malicious prosecution allegation, the trial 
court held that there was sufficient probable cause justifying 
the issuance of the warrants.  Additionally, the trial court 
held that Andrews and Cox could not recover damages for injury 
to their personal reputations under Code §§ 18.2-499 and -500.  
The trial court granted both motions for summary judgment.  In 
its final order in each case, the trial court stated that 
“Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment are GRANTED for the 
reasons and on the grounds stated on the record at the hearing 
of Defendants’ motions and for the reasons and on the grounds 
stated in the Defendants’ memoranda in support thereof.”  
Andrews and Cox appeal the adverse judgments of the trial court. 
II.  Analysis 
 
 
Summary judgment upon all or any part of a claim may be 
granted to a party entitled to such judgment when no genuine 
 
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issue of material fact remains in dispute, and the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Rule 3:18; Renner 
v. Stafford, 245 Va. 351, 353, 429 S.E.2d 218, 220 (1993).  A 
grant of summary judgment must be based upon undisputed facts 
established by pleadings, admissions in pleadings, and 
admissions made in answers to requests for admissions.2  
Additionally, the trial court must consider inferences from the 
facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, 
unless the inferences are strained, forced or contrary to 
reason.  Carson v. LeBlanc, 245 Va. 135, 139-40, 427 S.E.2d 189, 
192 (1993). 
 
Andrews and Cox present identical assignments of error. 
They assert that the trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment to Bolt and Ring on the statutory conspiracy count and 
on the malicious prosecution count of their respective motions 
for judgment, and they further assert that summary judgment 
should not have been granted before discovery was concluded. 
A.  Statutory Conspiracy under Code §§ 18.2-499 and –500
 
 
Andrews and Cox each allege that “Ring and Bolt acted in 
concert to willfully and maliciously injure [them] in [their] 
business, trade, and reputation” and seek damages from Bolt and 
Ring under the statutory conspiracy provisions of Code §§ 18.2-
                     
 
2 Of course, the trial court may consider the stipulations 
of the parties, answers to interrogatories and deposition 
 
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499 and –500.  A violation of Code § 18.2-499 is punished as a 
Class 1 misdemeanor.  Additionally, Code § 18.2-500 provides a 
civil remedy for a violation of Code § 18.2-499.  Bolt and Ring 
argue that the scope of the conspiracy statute is limited to 
injury to business interests and does not extend to injury to 
personal reputation even in the context of employment. 
 
The conspiracy statute was once codified as part of the 
antitrust laws of the Commonwealth.  See Code § 59-21.1 (Cum. 
Supp. 1962) (superseded).  In 1964, the General Assembly removed 
the conspiracy provisions from the antitrust statutes and placed 
them in the criminal code with much greater sanctions.  See Code 
§ 18.1-74.1:1 (superseded) (Chapter 623, 1964 Acts of Assembly).  
We conclude that the origin of Code §§ 18.2-499 and –500 
establishes that they apply to business and property interests, 
not to personal or employment interests. 
 
Traditional statutory construction requires the same 
conclusion.  Code § 18.2-499 proscribes conspiracy to 
“willfully, and maliciously injur[e] another in his reputation, 
trade, business or profession.”  The maxim of noscitur a sociis 
provides that the meaning of doubtful words in a statute may be 
determined by reference to their association with related words 
and phrases.  When general words and specific words are grouped 
together, the general words are limited and qualified by the 
                                                                  
testimony if the parties agree. 
 
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specific words and will be construed to embrace only objects 
similar in nature to those objects identified by the specific 
words.  Commonwealth v. United Airlines, Inc., 219 Va. 374, 389, 
248 S.E.2d 124, 132-33 (1978).  Here the word “reputation” is at 
issue.  Within the statute, its association with “trade, 
business or profession” requires the exclusion of personal 
reputation and interest in employment from the scope of the 
statute’s coverage.  We note that federal courts in Virginia 
have reached similar holdings.  See Buschi v. Kirven, 775 F.2d 
1240, 1259 (4th Cir. 1985), Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Jones, 577 F.Supp. 968, 970 (W.D. Va. 1984). 
 
The undisputed facts subject to proper consideration by the 
trial court upon motions for summary judgment on this issue 
clearly establish that Andrews and Cox seek damages for injury 
to personal reputation and employment interests.  As a matter of 
law, an action under the Code §§ 18.2-499 and –500 may not 
embrace such claims.  With causes of action based upon statutory 
conspiracy removed from consideration, we must now consider 
claims of malicious prosecution. 
B.  Immunity of the Prosecutor
 
 
Bolt, the Commonwealth’s Attorney of Grayson County, 
maintains that, upon the record of these cases, he is entitled 
to absolute immunity from suit.  The absolute immunity of 
prosecutors from civil liability for acts within the scope of 
 
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their duties and intimately associated with the judicial phase 
of the criminal process is derivative of judicial immunity.  As 
we have previously held, “[i]t is clear that judges enjoy 
absolute immunity from civil liability, even when they act 
maliciously or corruptly or in excess of their jurisdiction.  
Judges can be held liable only when they act in ‘clear absence 
of all jurisdiction.’ ”  Harlow v. Clatterbuck, 230 Va. 490, 
493, 339 S.E.2d 181, 184 (1986) (quoting Johnston v. Moorman, 80 
Va. 131, 142 (1885)).  “The common-law immunity of a prosecutor 
is based upon the same considerations that underlie the common-
law immunities of judges and grand jurors acting within the 
scope of their duties.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422-23 
(1976). 
In Imbler, the Supreme Court noted that the prosecutor’s 
actions “were intimately associated with the judicial phase of 
the criminal process, and thus were functions to which the 
reasons for absolute immunity apply with full force.”  Id. at 
430.  But the Court specifically reserved the question “whether 
like or similar reasons require immunity for those aspects of 
the prosecutor’s responsibility that cast him in the role of an 
administrator or investigative officer rather than that of 
advocate.”  Id. at 430-431. 
 
Later, in Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991) the Court held 
that absolute prosecutorial immunity from suit recognized in 
 
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Imbler did not extend to giving advice to police officers.  The 
Court observed that:  “Absolute immunity is designed to free the 
judicial process from the harassment and intimidation associated 
with litigation. . . .  That concern therefore justifies 
absolute prosecutorial immunity only for actions that are 
connected with the prosecutor’s role in judicial proceedings, 
not for every litigation-inducing conduct.”  Burns at 494.  In 
the case before us, Andrews and Cox argue that Bolt gave 
“advice” to Ring, and that pursuant to Burns, Bolt is not 
entitled to absolute immunity.  We disagree with Andrews and Cox 
because this Court is not compelled to follow Burns. 
 
The determination whether absolute prosecutorial immunity 
is extended to the prosecutor in this case is a matter of state 
common law not federal law.  The principle is well-established 
in the seminal case of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 
(1938), where the Court stated: 
Except in matters governed by the Federal 
Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law 
to be applied in any case is the law of the 
State.  And whether the law of the State 
shall be declared by its Legislature in a 
statute or by its highest court in a 
decision is not a matter of federal concern. 
There is no federal general common law. 
Congress has no power to declare substantive 
rules of common law applicable in a State 
whether they be local in their nature or 
“general,” be they commercial law or a part 
of the law of torts.  And no clause in the 
Constitution purports to confer such a power 
upon the federal courts. 
 
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This fundamental principle of federalism was expressed by 
the Supreme Court of North Carolina when it noted:  “The views 
of the Supreme Court of the United States . . . are not binding 
upon this Court with regard to questions of North Carolina 
common law – questions as to which this Court’s holding . . . is 
the final and controlling authority.”  Johnson v. Ruark 
Obstetrics & Gynecology Assoc., P.A., 395 S.E.2d 85, 92 (N.C. 
1990).  See also, Harter v. Vernon, 101 F.3d 334, 342 (4th Cir. 
1996)(“Our holdings on questions of state law do not bind state 
courts, nor do state court determinations on questions of 
federal law control us.”). 
 
The process by which an accused may be charged with a 
criminal offense in Virginia includes indictment, presentment, 
information, arrest warrant, or summons.  When a prosecutor is 
involved in the initiation of the criminal process, it may take 
the form of preparation of an indictment for consideration by a 
Grand Jury, direction to a law enforcement officer to obtain a 
warrant or summons, or advice to a law enforcement officer that 
sufficient probable cause exists for the obtaining of a warrant 
or a summons.  For the purposes of determining a prosecutor’s 
absolute immunity from suit, these are distinctions without a 
material difference.  In each case where a prosecutor is 
involved in the charging process, under Virginia law, that 
 
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action is intimately connected with the prosecutor’s role in 
judicial proceedings and the prosecutor is entitled to absolute 
immunity from suit for such actions.  Consequently, Bolt is 
entitled to absolute immunity from suit on the counts in each 
motion for judgment alleging malicious prosecution. We do not 
decide in this case whether actions of a prosecutor in the role 
of investigator or administrator are entitled to absolute 
immunity. 
C.  Malicious Prosecution Claims Against Ring
 
We have recently restated the following principles: 
 
 
In an action for malicious prosecution, 
the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the 
prosecution was (1) malicious; (2) 
instituted by, or with the cooperation of, 
the defendant; (3) without probable cause; 
and (4) terminated in a manner not 
unfavorable to the plaintiff. . . . 
In the context of a malicious 
prosecution action, probable cause is 
defined as knowledge of such facts and 
circumstances to raise the belief in a 
reasonable mind, acting on those facts and 
circumstances, that the plaintiff is guilty 
of the crime of which he is suspected.  The 
determination whether a defendant had 
probable cause to believe that a crime was 
committed is judged with reference to the 
time the defendant took the action 
initiating the criminal charges.  When the 
facts relating to the question of probable 
cause are in dispute, the issue is one of 
fact to be resolved by the trier of fact.  
 
Stanley v. Webber, 260 Va. 90, 95-96, 531 S.E.2d 311, 314-15 
(2000) (internal citations omitted).  “[W]hat constitutes 
 
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probable cause is a question for the court; but where there is 
any conflict in the evidence it is for the jury to determine 
whether in the particular case such probable cause existed.”  
Brodie v. Huck, 187 Va. 485, 488, 47 S.E.2d 310, 312 (1948).  
Additionally, 
[w]hen a defendant, in initiating a 
prosecution, acts in good faith upon the 
advice of reputable counsel, after a full 
disclosure of all material facts, he has 
probable cause to support his action. 
Probable cause serves as a complete defense 
to an action for malicious prosecution, even 
if the advice given by the attorney is 
wrong.  The defendant must prove that he 
sought advice of counsel with an honest 
purpose of being informed of the law, that 
he made a full, correct and honest 
disclosure of all material facts known to 
him or which he should reasonably have 
known, and that he acted in good faith 
guided by the advice given by counsel.  This 
defense usually presents a jury question 
unless reasonable minds cannot differ that 
advice of counsel has been established. 
 
Pallas v. Zaharopoulos, 219 Va. 751, 755, 250 S.E.2d 357, 359-60 
(1979) (internal citations omitted). 
1.  Probable Cause
 
 
The issuance of a criminal warrant must be supported by 
probable cause that a crime was committed and probable cause 
that the person charged committed the crime.  Code § 36-106 
provides sanctions for violation of the Uniform Statewide 
Building Code (“USBC”).  Ring’s affidavits supporting the 
issuance of criminal warrants against Andrews and Cox state: 
 
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“Failed to obtain a Building Permit before beginning work on a 
10,000 Gallon Storage tank.  Concealing work prior to the 
required inspection by pouring concrete slab.”  USBC § 107.1 
provides that: 
[a]n application shall be submitted to the 
code official for the following activities, 
and these activities shall not commence 
without a permit being issued in accordance 
with Section 108.0[:] 
1. 
Construct or alter a structure. 
2. 
Construct an addition. 
3. 
Demolish or move a structure. 
4. 
Make a change of occupancy. 
5. 
Install or alter any equipment which is 
regulated by this code. 
6. 
Move a lot line which affects an 
existing structure. 
 
USBC § 113.2 provides that: 
[t]he permit holder shall assure that the 
following inspections have been conducted 
and approved by the code official . . . : 
1. 
Inspection of footing excavations and 
reinforcement material for concrete 
footings prior to the placement of 
concrete. 
2. 
Inspection of foundation systems during 
phases of construction necessary to 
assure compliance with this code. 
3. 
Inspection of preparatory work prior to 
the placement of concrete. 
4. 
Inspection of structural members and 
fasteners prior to concealment. 
 
 
Undisputed facts properly considered for resolution of a 
motion for summary judgment establish that excavation of the 
area for the tank occurred before the issuance of the building 
permit and that a concrete pad was poured without inspection. 
 
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Cox asserts that the building permit was issued to the School 
Board and not to him; consequently, he could not be held 
responsible for violations of the USBC.  But the undisputed 
facts establish that Cox was Director of School Maintenance, he 
was supervising the construction for the tank, he directed a 
construction company to excavate the site on the day before the 
permit was issued, he directed an employee to obtain the permit, 
and he and persons under his direction poured concrete before 
obtaining an inspection.  When a corporation or other entity 
acts through individuals and such action “involves a violation 
of the law, the correct rule is that all who participate in it 
are liable.” Crall v. Commonwealth, 103 Va. 855, 859, 49 S.E. 
638, 640 (1905). 
Andrews and Cox maintain that there is a factual dispute 
over whether a building permit was required for the excavation 
and whether an inspection was required before pouring concrete. 
The interpretation of the requirements of the USBC is a matter 
of law, implicitly resolved against them by the trial court’s 
ruling from the bench that “there was probable cause for the 
issuance of [the warrants].” 
The undisputed facts properly considered upon motion for 
summary judgment establish that probable cause existed for the 
issuance of the warrant against Cox.  But this record does not 
support a finding upon summary judgment that the warrant against 
 
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Andrews was issued with probable cause that Andrews participated 
in any acts in violation of the law.  Andrews was the 
Chairperson of the Grayson County School Board, an unlikely 
person to be directing on-site construction and pouring 
concrete.  At this stage in the proceeding there is no evidence 
of any act on her part that provided probable cause that she 
committed the building code violation in question, and her 
status as Chairperson of the School Board does not result in 
vicarious liability for the acts in question. 
2.  Advice of Counsel Defense
 
 
Reliance upon advice of reputable counsel after full 
disclosure of all material facts provides a complete defense to 
an action for malicious prosecution, even if the attorney’s 
advice is wrong.  Justified reliance suffices to establish 
probable cause to support the initial prosecution.  Noell v. 
Angle, 217 Va. 656, 660, 231 S.E.2d 330, 333 (1977).  In this 
case, it is unclear whether an accurate disclosure of all 
material facts was made.  Upon review of this record, we hold 
that the evidence properly considered for summary judgment 
purposes does not support a grant of summary judgment on this 
question. 
3.  Voluntary Compromise of Criminal Complaints
 
A voluntary compromise ending a criminal prosecution 
defeats a subsequent suit for malicious prosecution.  Orndorff 
 
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v. Bond, 185 Va. 497, 502, 39 S.E.2d 352, 354 (1946).  Ring 
alleges that such a compromise was reached in the General 
District Court of Grayson County when the nolle prosequi was 
entered in the underlying criminal matters.  Andrews and Cox say 
that no agreement was reached.  It is undisputed that a nolle 
prosequi was entered.  Why it was entered and whether it was the 
result of a compromise cannot be determined by summary judgment 
on this record. 
4.  Quasi-Judicial Immunity
 
Ring maintains that he is entitled to the absolute immunity 
provided by quasi-judicial immunity because he characterizes his 
actions as those of a prosecutor, involving functions intimately 
related to the judicial process.  As previously addressed, under 
defined circumstances, a prosecutor may have absolute immunity, 
in the nature of quasi-judicial immunity, from civil liability.  
Burns, 500 U.S. at 492; Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430.  We have 
recognized that quasi-judicial immunity may extend to certain 
non-judicial public officials acting within their jurisdiction, 
in good faith, and while performing judicial functions.  Harlow, 
230 Va. at 493, 339 S.E.2d at 184.  In conducting this analysis, 
we apply “the ‘functional comparability’ test established by the 
United States Supreme Court in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 
(1978).”  Harlow, 230 Va. at 494, 339 S.E.2d at 184.  We must 
examine whether the act in question shares enough of the 
 
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characteristics of the judicial process to justify immunity.  We 
conclude that Ring’s duties as a building inspector are more 
akin to those of a police officer in the enforcement of laws, 
rules and regulations, than a prosecutor in the judicial 
process.  As a matter of law, Ring is not entitled to the 
absolute immunity afforded by quasi-judicial immunity. 
5.  Qualified Immunity
 
 
In the alternative, Ring maintains that if he is not 
entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, he is, nonetheless, 
entitled to the same qualified immunity extended to police 
officers for actions taken in good faith and with probable 
cause.  See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967).  “A 
defendant who asserts the qualified immunity defense, not the 
plaintiff, must allege and prove the elements comprising this 
defense.”  Jordan v. Shands, 255 Va. 492, 499, 500 S.E.2d 215, 
219 (1998).  Ring argues that Andrews and Cox have “not 
presented any facts that support a claim of actual malice.”  On 
this question the burden of proof is on Ring, not Andrews and 
Cox.  Upon review of this record, we hold that the evidence 
properly considered for summary judgment purposes does not 
support a grant of summary judgment on this question. 
D.  Grant of Summary Judgment 
Before Conclusion of Discovery
 
 
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The pre-trial scheduling order entered in early February, 
2002, set the first day of trial in these cases for June 6, 
2002.  Andrews and Cox thereafter noticed depositions of an 
employee of the Maintenance Department of the School Board and 
the attorney for the School Board, for the afternoon of April 
30, 2002, the same day as the motions for summary judgment were 
to be heard before the trial court.  Andrews and Cox assert that 
the trial court erred in granting summary judgment from the 
bench on April 30 (memorialized later in the final orders in 
June and July, 2002), prior to the conclusion of discovery in 
the case.  This argument has no merit.  Pursuant to the pre-
trial order the deadline for serving written discovery was mid-
April, 2002.  No written discovery was pending response as of 
the latter half of April, 2002.  Without agreement of the 
parties, only answers to requests for admissions could further 
supplement the evidence properly considered by the trial court 
for the motions for summary judgment.  The noticed depositions 
could not, absent stipulation of the litigants, have been used 
as the basis for summary adjudication.  Simply stated, Andrews 
and Cox cannot show that the record upon which summary judgment 
was granted would have been any different if the trial court had 
delayed its ruling. 
III.  Conclusion
 
 
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The trial court did not err in its grant of summary 
judgment against Andrews and Cox upon their causes of action for 
statutory conspiracy under Code §§ 18.2-499 and -500.  On the 
remaining causes of action for malicious prosecution, the trial 
court did not err in its grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Bolt.  Because the undisputed facts properly considered upon 
motion for summary judgment demonstrate that there was probable 
cause for the issuance of the criminal warrant against Cox, the 
trial court did not err in granting summary judgment for Ring on 
Cox’s suit for malicious prosecution.  However, the evidence 
properly considered by the trial court upon summary judgment did 
not support a finding of probable cause for the issuance of a 
criminal warrant against Andrews.  Furthermore, Ring’s various 
remaining defenses either are not available to him as a matter 
of law or they are insufficient on this record to support a 
grant of summary judgment.  Accordingly, the trial court erred 
in granting summary judgment in favor of Ring and dismissing 
Andrews’ cause of action for malicious prosecution.  For the 
reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed 
in part, reversed in part and Andrews’ cause of action for 
malicious prosecution against Ring will be remanded for further 
proceedings. 
                        Record No. 022434 – Reversed in part, 
                                            affirmed in part, 
                                        and remanded. 
 
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                Record No. 022243 - Affirmed. 
 
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