Title: Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Heisler

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Heisler, 113 Ohio St.3d 447, 2007-Ohio-2338.] 
 
 
CINCINNATI BAR ASSOCIATION v. HEISLER. 
[Cite as Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Heisler, 113 Ohio St.3d 447, 2007-Ohio-2338.] 
Attorneys at law—Misconduct—Practicing under a trade name—Improperly 
requesting others to recommend a lawyer’s services—Aiding the 
unauthorized practice of law—Sharing fees with a nonlawyer—Stayed 
suspension. 
(No.  2006-2309 – Submitted February 14, 2007 — Decided May 30, 2007.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 06-032. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, D. Daniel Heisler of Bowling Green, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0029005, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1981.1  
The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline recommends that we 
suspend respondent’s license to practice for six months, staying the entire 
suspension on conditions, because respondent committed professional misconduct 
while associated with a company that sold living trusts and financial services to 
his clients.  On review, we find that a stayed six-month suspension is appropriate 
for respondent’s violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 
{¶ 2} Relator, Cincinnati Bar Association, charged that respondent’s 
affiliation with Senior Estate Planning Services, Inc. (“SEPS”) and its 
predecessor, Mid-South Estate Planning (“MSEP”), a Louisiana-based company 
in business to market and sell estate-planning services, violated DR 2-102(B) 
(prohibiting lawyers from practicing under a trade name), 2-103(C) (prohibiting a 
                                                 
1.  Respondent, as of April 16, 2007, is on interim suspension for default of a child support order.  
In re Heisler, 113 Ohio St.3d 1455, 2007-Ohio-401, 864 N.E.2d 643. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
lawyer from engaging a person or organization to promote the lawyer’s 
professional services, except to the extent permitted by a lawyer-referral service), 
3-101(A) (prohibiting a lawyer from aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized 
practice of law), and 3-102(A) (prohibiting a lawyer generally from sharing fees 
with a nonlawyer). 
{¶ 3} A three-member panel of board members heard the cause, 
including respondent’s stipulations that he committed the charged misconduct, 
and found violations of the cited Disciplinary Rules.  The panel recommended 
that respondent receive a six-month suspension, all stayed.  The board adopted the 
panel’s findings of misconduct and recommendation. 
{¶ 4} Neither party objects to the board’s report. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 5} Respondent’s role in the MSEP/SEPS marketing process bears 
some resemblance to that of other lawyers whom we have censured for losing 
sight of their professional duties to clients through similar affiliations.  See, e.g., 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Kramer, 113 Ohio St.3d 455, 2007-Ohio-2340, _____ 
N.E.2d _____; Disciplinary Counsel v. Wheatley, 107 Ohio St.3d 224, 2005-
Ohio-6266, 837 N.E.2d 1188; Columbus Bar Assn. v. Fishman, 98 Ohio St.3d 
172, 2002-Ohio-7086, 781 N.E.2d 204; Columbus Bar Assn. v. Moreland, 97 
Ohio St.3d 492, 2002-Ohio-6726, 780 N.E.2d 579; and Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. 
Kathman (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 92, 748 N.E.2d 1091. 
{¶ 6} Respondent began working for MSEP in June 2004 as part of its 
network to market living trusts and sell other estate-planning services, mainly to 
elderly customers.  MSEP sent mass mailings to its targeted demographic and 
referred sales leads to respondent.  Respondent contacted prospective customers 
to discuss their estate-planning needs, to acquaint them with the advantages of a 
living trust, to prepare documents to support the trust or whatever estate-planning 
tool suited the customer, and to arrange with MSEP for the clients to sign the 
January Term, 2007 
3 
necessary papers.  Initially during this affiliation, nonlawyer MSEP sales agents 
met with prospects before respondent did to promote the MSEP’s estate-planning 
services.  After two or three months and comparatively few sales contacts, 
however, respondent began doing his interviews without lay assistance. 
{¶ 7} In May or June 2005, SEPS acquired MSEP’s assets, and 
respondent continued to work for the successor company under essentially the 
same conditions. 
{¶ 8} While employed by MSEP/SEPS, respondent promoted its services 
to approximately 40 customers, seven of whom had been referred by a nonlawyer 
sales agent. Respondent usually, but not always, recommended the purchase of a 
living trust to these customers, whom he considered to be clients notwithstanding 
that he worked for MSEP/SEPS.  According to the stipulations, “[i]n some 
instances, respondent counseled potential clients/customers not to purchase the 
living trust and associated estate planning documents being marketed by 
MSEP/SEPS because they were not appropriate for their circumstances.” 
{¶ 9} Respondent typically interviewed sales prospects personally 
following an MSEP/SEPS referral, collecting personal and financial information.  
He offered prospects a business card describing his credentials as an estate-
planning attorney and living-trust consultant.  Respondent then reviewed with 
prospects various types of estate-planning tools that might serve their particular 
needs, including revocable living trusts, through verbal and visual presentations.  
If a prospect decided to purchase a living trust with supporting documentation 
from MSEP/SEPS, respondent collected a $2,395 fee, payable to MSEP/SEPS. 
{¶ 10} After the interview, respondent typically entered the client 
information into a computer program using software provided by MSEP/SEPS, 
revised portions of the generated documents as needed, and sent them 
electronically to MSEP/SEPS.  MSEP/SEPS compiled the documents in a binder 
format to return to the customer, and respondent reviewed the completed package.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
MSEP/SEPS then arranged for a notary public to pick up and deliver the final 
documents to the clients for signature and attestation.  Respondent did not meet 
again with the customer, but he did provide written instructions on his letterhead 
for executing the documents and transferring properties to the newly formed trust.  
He also invited questions from the customers. 
{¶ 11} MSEP/SEPS paid respondent a weekly salary of $1,000, 
underwrote his office expenses, and paid him a $500 commission from each 
$2,395 contract fee he collected. 
{¶ 12} Of respondent’s many customer-clients, only two formally 
complained that he had violated professional ethical standards.  Gerald and 
Audrey Day purchased a living trust and associated estate-planning documents 
from respondent and MSEP in September 2004, paying him the standard $2,395 
price.  Respondent considered the Days to be his clients and to be entitled to 
attorney-client confidentiality.  He thus advised the Days that he was an attorney 
and acknowledged that he was providing legal advice. 
{¶ 13} Respondent interviewed the Days and completed their paperwork 
in accordance with the usual process.  Unknown to respondent, however, a sales 
agent from Mid-South Financial Planning, an entity connected to MSEP, 
contacted the couple several months after they executed the living trust and 
associated estate-planning documents.  The agent attempted to sell the Days 
various financial services.  The Days rejected all offers and demanded a refund. 
{¶ 14} The Days later retained legal counsel and filed a grievance, 
claiming that they had been charged excessively for respondent’s and MSEP’s 
services and had been sold services that the couple did not need.  After notice of 
their grievance, respondent delivered a complete refund from SEPS to repay the 
Days. 
{¶ 15} Respondent received fewer referrals from SEPS after the Day 
grievance, and in January 2006, he ended his affiliation with that company. 
January Term, 2007 
5 
{¶ 16} We accept respondent’s stipulations to the charged misconduct.  
We find that by helping MSEP/SEPS sell the preparation of living-trust 
agreements and associated documents to customers, respondent aided the 
unauthorized practice of law in violation of DR 3-101(A).  We find that by 
operating under the trade names “Mid-South Estate Planning” and “Senior Estate 
Planning Services,” respondent violated DR 2-102(B).  Because respondent 
shared his fees with MSEP/SEPS, we further find that respondent violated DR 3-
102(A).  And because respondent improperly used MSEP/SEPS to promote his 
professional services, we find that respondent violated DR 2-103(C). 
Sanction 
{¶ 17} We have repeatedly disapproved of an attorney’s affiliation with 
living-trust marketing ventures and have imposed sanctions ranging from a public 
reprimand to a one-year suspension from the practice of law for resulting ethical 
breaches.  See, e.g., Moreland, 97 Ohio St.3d 492, 2002-Ohio-6726, 780 N.E.2d 
579 (public reprimand); Kramer, 113 Ohio St.3d 455, 2007-Ohio-2340, _____ 
N.E.2d _____ (six-month suspension, all conditionally stayed); Wheatley, 107 
Ohio St.3d 224, 2005-Ohio-6266, 837 N.E.2d 1188 (six-month actual 
suspension); Kathman, 92 Ohio St.3d 92, 748 N.E.2d 1091 (six-month actual 
suspension); and Fishman, 98 Ohio St.3d 172, 2002-Ohio-7086, 781 N.E.2d 204 
(one-year suspension).  Respondent’s case most closely resembles Kramer and 
warrants a six-month stayed suspension. 
{¶ 18} Neither respondent nor the lawyer in Kramer completely 
surrendered his independent professional judgment for the sake of sales, instead 
meeting personally with clients and at times dissuading them from buying living 
trusts when the sale was not in the clients’ best interests.  Both attorneys 
personally performed all the work for their customer-clients.  These exercises of 
independent judgment distinguish the conduct in this case and Kramer from the 
wrongdoing in Kathman, 92 Ohio St.3d at 94, 748 N.E.2d 1091, and Fishman, 98 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
Ohio St.3d 172, 2002-Ohio-7086, 781 N.E.2d 204, ¶ 7, where the lawyers merely 
facilitated the sales process by having lay personnel fill in the blanks on 
boilerplate forms made available by the marketing company.  Moreover, unlike 
the lawyers in Fishman, id. at ¶ 20, and Wheatley, 107 Ohio St.3d 224, 2005-
Ohio-6266, 837 N.E.2d 1188, ¶ 39, respondent and the lawyer in Kramer 
eventually came to understand the dangers inherent in affiliations with living-trust 
sales enterprises. 
{¶ 19} Our discipline is also justified by the mitigating factors.  See 
Section 10(B)(2) of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on 
Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”). 
{¶ 20} Respondent has expressed sincere remorse, promising that he will 
not engage in similar activities again.  Respondent also cooperated completely in 
the disciplinary proceedings and established his good character and reputation 
apart from the underlying misconduct.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(d) and (e).  
Respondent referred to his many professional and civic achievements and 
presented letters from a local common pleas judge, attorney, and a retired high 
school teacher, commending his professional competence and personal integrity.  
The Days also received restitution.  Finally, respondent’s domestic difficulties, 
including caring for aging parents while unable to find sustained employment, are 
factors to weigh in favor of lenience. 
{¶ 21} For these reasons, we suspend respondent from the practice of law 
in Ohio for six months; however, the suspension is stayed on the condition that 
respondent commit no further misconduct.  If respondent violates the term of the 
stay, the stay will be lifted, and respondent shall serve the entire six-month 
suspension.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
January Term, 2007 
7 
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER and O’CONNOR, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J., dissenting 
{¶22} I respectfully dissent from the majority decision in regard to the 
sanction imposed on respondent.  As the majority states, we have repeatedly heard 
cases with facts similar to those in the present matter and have imposed sanctions 
ranging from a public reprimand to a one-year suspension.  The majority finds 
that this case is most similar to Disciplinary Counsel v. Kramer, 113 Ohio St.3d 
455, 2007-Ohio-2340, ____ N.E.2d ____, wherein we imposed a six-month 
suspension, all conditionally stayed. 
{¶23} However, I am unable to distinguish respondent’s misconduct from 
the actions discussed in Disciplinary Counsel v. Wheatley, 107 Ohio St.3d 224, 
2005-Ohio-6266, 837 N.E.2d 1188, and Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Kathman (2001), 
92 Ohio St.3d 92, 748 N.E.2d 1091.  I would therefore impose the same sanction 
as in those cases, a six-month suspension with no time stayed. 
 
PFEIFER and O’CONNOR, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Robert J. Gehring and Richard L. Creighton Jr., for relator. 
 
D. Daniel Heisler, pro se. 
______________________