Title: State v. Walker

State: new-mexico

Issuer: New Mexico Supreme Court

Document:

292 P.2d 329 (1956) 60 N.M. 459 STATE of New Mexico, ex rel. FOUR CORNERS EXPLORATION COMPANY a co-partnership composed of Irving Rapaport and F.O. Manol, Appellants, v. E.S. WALKER, Commissioner of Public Lands of the State of New Mexico, Appellee. No. 5975. Supreme Court of New Mexico. January 16, 1956. *330 Nordhaus & Moses, Albuquerque, for appellants. Richard H. Robinson, Atty. Gen., William O. Jordan, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. LUJAN, Justice. This is an appeal from a judgment of the district court of Santa Fe County quashing an alternative writ of mandamus theretofore issued. The proceeding involves the right of the petitioner to have the State Land Commissioner accept certain lode mining location notices tendered to him for filing in his office, and thereafter have him issue permits to said petitioner to prospect for ores or metals within the limits of said locations, pursuant to § 7-9-4 of the 1953 Compilation, which reads as follows: The petitioner will be hereafter referred to as the relator and the State Land Commissioner as the respondent. The alternative writ of mandamus alleges: The respondent's answer alleged, among numerous other matters, that: "(a) Respondent is an executive officer of the State of New Mexico, exercising a discretionary function with respect to the matters set out in the alternative writ." The trial court quashed the alternative writ on the single ground, "That the commissioner is an executive officer exercising a discretionary function and, therefore, the court is without jurisdiction in the premises and without authority to grant the requested relief." The main contention of relator on this appeal is, that the trial court erred holding, as a matter of law, that respondent was exercising a discretionary function with respect to accepting his notices of location for filing in the land office. This contention is meritorious. It is established law that the purpose of mandamus is to compel the performance of a ministerial duty which one charged with its performance has refused to perform. While mandamus will not lie to correct or control the judgment or discretion of a public officer in matters committed to his care in the ordinary discharge of his duties, Hart v. Walker, 40 N.M. 1, 52 P.2d 123; State ex rel. McElroy v. Vesely, 40 N.M. 19, 52 P.2d 1090, it is nevertheless well established that mandamus will lie to compel the performance of mere ministerial acts or duties imposed by law upon a public officer to do a particular act or thing upon the existence of certain facts or conditions being shown, even though the officer be required to exercise judgment before acting, State v. Marron, 18 N.M. 426, 137 P. 845, 50 L.R.A., N.S., 274; State ex *332 rel. Evans v. Field, 27 N.M. 384, 201 P. 1059; State v. Field, 31 N.M. 120, 241 P. 1027; State ex rel. Walker v. Hinkle, 37 N.M. 444, 23 P.2d 286. A ministerial act, as applied to a public officer, is an act or thing which he is required to perform by direction of law upon a given state of facts being shown to exist, regardless of his own opinion as to the propriety or impropriety of doing the act in the particular case. It is said in 27 C.J.S., Discretion, p. 134, that: In accordance with the letter and spirit of Section 7-9-4 supra, the respondent is bound to perform his duty in respect to accepting lode mining location notice tendered to him by locators, who have complied with the terms of the statute, for filing in his office, even though he does not perform simultaneously his duty of issuing a permit to the locator granting him the exclusive right to prospect for ores or metals within the limits of said locations for a period of ninety days from the date of said locations. In the case at bar the respondent was tendered copies of lode mining location notices by the relator which clearly and unequivocally met all requirements of the statute, and the accepting of the same for filing in the land office was mandatory and unqualified. We conclude that the fact that an application for placer prospecting permits covering the same land had been made by one Andre Senutovitch, and that a permit had been prepared in his name but not issued, and the further fact that a case was pending in this court involving an application filed in the respondent's office by one W.A. Greer, for a mining lease, and which application was denied by respondent, does not justify the respondent in refusing to perform his duty of accepting lode mining location notices tendered him by relator for filing in the land office, in view of the fact that all requirements of the statute governing locations upon state lands containing lode or deposit of metals or minerals in rock in place had been complied with by the relator. The accepting of lode mining location notices for the purpose of filing same in the land office sought by relator will not interfere with the right of Senutovitch, applicant for placer prospecting permits, to bring such action as he may think proper to have all questions as to any right, title, interest or priority of claim, in the lode location claims made by relator. The refusal by respondent to accept for filing purposes the location notices tendered him by relator as provided by law, precludes the relator of his right to institute a contest proceeding as is provided by Section 7-8-68 of the 1953 Compilation. Therefore, upon formal tender of lode mining location notices being made, it was the duty of the respondent to accept the same for filing purposes, for the statute simply imposes upon the respondent a ministerial duty in which he had no discretion. As our conclusion is that the judgment of the trial court must be reversed, it becomes unnecessary to determine the remaining questions presented in this appeal. The judgment is reversed with directions to the trial court to reinstate the case upon its docket and to proceed in accordance with the views herein expressed. It is so ordered. COMPTON, C.J., and SADLER, McGHEE and KIKER, JJ., concur.