Title: Sankey v. Ivey

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 49592 
 
 
TAMMY M. SANKEY and THOMAS A. 
SANKEY, husband and wife, 
 
     Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
v. 
 
JOSH IVEY, HOMETOWN PROPERTY 
MANAGEMENT, LLC; NICOLE PERRY, 
MIDTOWN TRAILER PARK, and 
ANTELOPE LOOP, LLC, 
 
     Defendants-Respondents. 
_______________________________________ 
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Boise, April 2023 Term 
 
Opinion Filed: August 30, 2023 
 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Kootenai County. Lamont C. Berecz, District Judge. Anna M. Eckhart, Magistrate 
Judge. 
 
The decision of the district court is affirmed. 
 
Kirkpatrick & Startzel, P.S., Spokane, Washington, for Appellants. Luke W. 
O’Bannan submitted argument on the briefs. 
 
Ramsden, Marfice, Ealy & De Smet, LLP, Coeur d’Alene, for Respondents Nicole 
Perry and Midtown Trailer Park. Marcus E. Johnson submitted argument on the 
briefs. 
 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP, Boise, for Respondents Josh Ivey, 
Hometown Property Management, LLC and Antelope Loop, LLC. David W. 
Knotts submitted argument on the briefs. 
 
_____________________ 
 
BRODY, Justice.  
This appeal addresses the business records exception to the hearsay rule and the 
admissibility of non-owner testimony concerning the location of a real property boundary line. It 
also addresses whether, pursuant to Idaho Code section 6-320(a)(3) (action for damages and 
 
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specific performance by tenant), a subtenant can maintain an action for damages against the lessors 
of property where there is no contractual relationship between the subtenant and the lessors. 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
A large, dead tree near a mobile home rented by the Sankeys fell and damaged the Sankeys’ 
vehicles, killed one of their cats and traumatized the other, and caused Tammy Sankey to 
experience emotional distress. Proceeding pro se, the Sankeys filed a small claims action against 
the owner of the mobile home park where they lived and the owner and managers of their mobile 
home. 
After losing in small claims court because they failed to prove on whose land the offending 
tree was located, the Sankeys filed for a trial de novo in magistrate court and paid for a land survey. 
The surveyor created two documents: a “Record of Survey” and an “Exhibit” (hereafter referred 
to as “Tree Exhibit”). The Sankeys submitted both documents attached to a joint declaration from 
them in opposition to motions for summary judgment filed by the owners and managers, along 
with a declaration from the Sankeys’ neighbor setting forth the neighbor’s  lay testimony that the 
tree was located on the lot occupied by the Sankeys.  
The owners and managers of the mobile home and the mobile home park filed motions to 
strike the declaration from the neighbor as well as portions of the Sankeys’ declaration and the 
attached Record of Survey and Tree Exhibit. The magistrate court granted the motions, holding 
that no foundation had been laid for the Record of Survey and Tree Exhibit and that they were 
inadmissible hearsay. The magistrate court also struck the declaration of the neighbor because her 
testimony about the location of the fallen tree was not based on her personal knowledge. Without 
admissible evidence of who owned the land where the fallen tree was located, the magistrate court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the owners and managers. The magistrate court also held 
that the Sankeys had no cause of action under Idaho Code section 6-320 (action for damages and 
specific performance by tenant) because there was no contractual relationship between the Sankeys 
and the owners and managers. The magistrate court denied the Sankeys’ motion for 
reconsideration. The district court, sitting in its appellate capacity, affirmed the magistrate court’s 
decision. We affirm the decision of the district court.   
II. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND  
Tammy and Tom Sankey (“the Sankeys”) lived in a mobile home in Midtown Trailer Park 
in Hayden, Idaho, with their two cats, Ben and Mittens. Nicole Perry (“Perry”) owned Midtown 
 
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Trailer Park. Antelope Loop, LLC (“Antelope Loop”), owned the mobile home the Sankeys 
occupied. Hometown Property Management, LLC (“Hometown Property”), managed the mobile 
home for Antelope Loop, and Josh Ivey (“Ivey”) was a manager of Hometown Property (Perry, 
Antelope Loop, Hometown Property and Ivey are collectively referred to as “Owners and 
Managers”). St. Vincent de Paul CDA leased the mobile home from Hometown Property. The 
Sankeys subleased the mobile home from St. Vincent de Paul.  
Between the lot occupied by the Sankeys and a neighboring property, owned by Mr. 
Gordon, there was a large, standing, dead tree. The Sankeys took issue with the tree shortly after 
they moved in as evidenced by an email sent by St. Vincent de Paul to Ivey on September 10, 
2018, asking if he knew anything about it: “Also, do you know anything about the trees outside of 
this unit? The tenants are concerned that in the winter or during a bad storm, the trees will be 
knocked over onto their unit or one of their neighbors, since they are dead.” There is also an email 
from Ivey to Perry dated October 5, 2016, three years before the incident at issue, about the hazard: 
Hi Nicole, 
 
Hope you are doing well! 
 
Attached is a photo of a dead tree that is alongside the home at 290 Mid `
 
Town. The tenant is concerned that it might blow over this winter  . . . . 
 
Just wanted to make you aware of it so it can be addressed. Thanks so much! 
    
Eventually, the tree fell. In June 2019, the Sankeys were outside loading their two cats into 
the car. One cat, Ben, was in a crate next to the car while Tammy was retrieving Mittens, her 
service animal, from near the front door of the mobile home. The tree fell onto the Sankeys’ 
vehicles and Ben’s crate. Mittens ran and hid. Ben succumbed later that night to his injuries from 
the tree falling.  
Because of the trauma, Mittens is no longer able to be Tammy’s support animal. Further, 
Mittens has developed anxiety and now requires medication, has a different temperament, and 
needs both “a change of daily routine, and pheromone therapy.” Tammy has also suffered 
emotionally and physically since the tree fell.  
This case began in small claims court. The location of the tree and ownership of the 
property were the main issues. The Sankeys contended the tree was located on their lot and thus 
the Owners and Managers were responsible for the tree. The Owners and Managers argued the tree 
was on Mr. Gordon’s property, thus relieving them from any duty.  After the first day of trial, the 
 
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magistrate court, pursuant to Rule 11 of the Idaho Rules for Small Claims Actions, granted the 
Sankeys a continuance so that they could gather and present evidence to prove who owned the 
property on which the tree had been located. The magistrate court explained: “. . . you have to have 
some proof that that’s the property. There should be property lines. There should be a survey done 
at some point.”  
The magistrate court reconvened the small claims proceeding a few weeks later. After 
hearing from the parties again and viewing additional evidence, the magistrate court dismissed the 
small claims case because the Sankeys failed to prove who owned the tree. The magistrate court, 
in dismissing the case, explained to the Sankeys that if they were to appeal the decision, they would 
“start over from scratch” and that the Rules of Evidence, like the rule against hearsay, would 
apply: 
Now, in a small claims case either side can appeal, and when you appeal, 
what happens is you get what they call a trial de novo, which means you start over 
from scratch and – but the difference is that then the Rules of Evidence apply, and 
you can have an attorney to represent you to do that, so the Rules of Evidence apply 
so you can’t just hand documents out. You can’t have hearsay here like this letter 
from Mr. Whitt, for example. He would – you’d have to have actual witnesses who 
would come and testify and – but the burden would still be the same to prove who 
is responsible, but I can’t find based on this evidence who owns the tree, frankly. 
 
 (Emphasis added.)  
The Sankeys appealed the small claims judgment to the magistrate court for trial de novo. 
While the case was pending, the Owners and Managers filed motions for summary judgment, 
arguing that the Sankeys could not support a claim for premises liability or negligence because 
they could not show that the Owners and Managers owned or occupied the land where the tree had 
been located. They also argued  that the Sankeys could not support a claim arising out of a violation 
of Idaho Code section 6-320 (action for damages and specific performance by tenant) because the 
Sankeys were not tenants of the Owners or Managers.  
In response to the motions for summary judgment, the Sankeys, still representing 
themselves pro se, submitted a joint declaration attaching as an exhibit a recorded Record of 
Survey done by professional land surveyor and civil engineer, Matthew B. Mayberry, P.L.S. 
#8962, which showed the boundary line between the Midtown Trailer Park property and the 
neighboring parcel owned by Mr. Gordon.  
The Sankeys also attached the Tree Exhibit. The Tree Exhibit was a duplicate of the Record 
 
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of Survey, but also included an enlarged section that highlighted the boundary between the 
Midtown Trailer Park and the Gordon property, and, critically, marked the location of the fallen 
tree and set forth the name of the owner of the parcel where the tree had been located. The Tree 
Exhibit did not bear a recorder’s stamp. 
 
 
The Sankeys also submitted a declaration of their neighbor, Malissa Watts, who testified that she 
was “aware of the exact location of the former subject dead tree being within the Sankeys’ yard….”  
The Owners and Managers filed motions to strike portions of the Sankeys’ joint declaration 
for lack of personal knowledge and to strike the Record of Survey and Tree Exhibit on evidentiary 
grounds. The magistrate court granted the motions to strike and for summary judgment. The 
Sankeys, after obtaining legal counsel, filed a motion for reconsideration, requesting that the court 
reverse its prior rulings. Alternatively, they argued in their reply brief that the magistrate court 
should reserve ruling on the motion to reconsider and give the Sankeys additional time to obtain a 
declaration from Mr. Mayberry. In support of the motion for reconsideration, the Sankeys filed a 
declaration of Tom Sankey, setting forth his personal knowledge of the location of the property 
line and the fallen tree. The magistrate court denied the Sankeys’ motion for reconsideration 
 
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without allowing any additional time to obtain Mr. Mayberry’s declaration.   
The Sankeys subsequently appealed to the district court, contending the magistrate court 
erred when it granted the motions to strike and improperly granted the Owners and Managers’ 
motions for summary judgment. The Sankeys also contended the magistrate court abused its 
discretion when it did not allow the Sankeys more time to get a declaration from Mr. Mayberry. 
The district court affirmed the decisions of the magistrate court.  This appeal followed the district 
court’s decision.  
III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW  
When this Court reviews the decision of a district court sitting in its capacity as an appellate 
court, we do not review the magistrate court’s decision. Bailey v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526, 529, 284 
P.3d 970, 973 (2012). Rather, we are “procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the decisions of the 
district court.” State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 415 n.1, 224 P.3d 480, 482 n. 1 (2009).  
“[W]hen considering an appeal from the granting of a motion for summary judgment, this 
Court’s standard of review is the same as that used by the trial court in passing on the motion.” 
Pratt v. State Tax Comm’n, 128 Idaho 883, 884, 920 P.2d 400, 401 (1996). Summary judgment is 
appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law.” Lee v. Litster, 161 Idaho 546, 549, 388 P.3d 61, 64 (2017) 
(citation omitted). If the record reveals that there is no genuine issue of material fact, “then only a 
question of law remains, over which this Court exercises free review.” Id. (citation omitted). 
When reviewing evidentiary rulings made in connection with a motion for summary 
judgment, this Court reviews those decisions for an abuse of discretion. Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus 
Reg’l Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 163–64, 45 P.3d 816, 819-20 (2002) (citation omitted). To 
determine if a trial court abused its discretion, this Court considers whether the trial court (1) 
perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2) acted within the outer boundaries of that discretion, 
(3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it, and 
(4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 
421 P.3d 187, 195 (2018). 
IV. 
ANALYSIS  
A. The district court did not err in affirming the magistrate court’s grant of summary 
judgment and denial of the Sankeys’ motion for reconsideration.   
 
 
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The core of this appeal is the admissibility of evidence submitted by the Sankeys to show 
the location of the fallen tree. The Sankeys contend it is “outrageous to require a plaintiff to prove 
the location of a property boundary and then rule that the only person allowed to testify regarding 
the location of the line is the defendant – not even a certified survey by a licensed surveyor can be 
considered.” The Sankeys argue the Tree Exhibit “was conclusive evidence proving the location 
of the tree and it meets all the technical requirements of the Rules of Evidence for admissibility.” 
While we understand the Sankeys’ frustration with having to navigate the Idaho Rules of Evidence, 
we disagree with their legal argument.  
The magistrate court, when it dismissed the small claims case, carefully explained to the 
Sankeys that they had the right to a trial de novo in magistrate court, but that they would have to 
comply with the Idaho Rules of Evidence, including the rules pertaining to hearsay. This Court 
has long held that although litigants have the right to represent themselves, “[p]ro se litigants are 
held to the same standards and rules as those represented by an attorney.” Michalk v. Michalk, 148 
Idaho 224, 229, 220 P.3d 580, 585 (2009) (quoting Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 709, 117 P.3d 
120, 123 (2005)). “Pro se litigants are not accorded any special consideration simply because they 
are representing themselves and are not excused from adhering to procedural rules.” Id. 
(quoting Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 718, 170 P.3d 375, 383 (2007)); Greenfield v. Smith, 
162 Idaho 246, 253, 395 P.3d 1279, 1286 (2017). This includes the Idaho Rules of Evidence. 
Simply put, the evidence the Sankeys contend should have been considered in opposition 
to the Owners and Managers’ motions for summary judgment does not comply with the Idaho 
Rules of Evidence. We agree with the district court that the magistrate court did not abuse its 
discretion when it excluded the challenged evidence and granted summary judgment in favor of 
the Owners and Managers, or when it denied the Sankeys’ motion for reconsideration. Thus, we 
affirm the decision of the district court. 
1. The Tree Exhibit does not satisfy the requirements of the business records exception to 
the hearsay rule because the Sankeys failed to provide a certification from the record 
custodian or a qualified witness. 
 
The district court held the magistrate court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the 
Tree Exhibit because it was inadmissible hearsay and because it did not meet the requirements of 
the business records exception to the hearsay rule set forth in Idaho Rules of Evidence 803(6). The 
Sankeys contend the Tree Exhibit should not have been excluded because it meets the requirements 
 
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of Rule 803(6) and is a self-authenticating document under Idaho Rules of Evidence 902(7) and 
902(11). We disagree. 
Evidence submitted in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must 
be admissible under the Idaho Rules of Evidence. Hecla Mining Co. v. Star–Morning Mining Co., 
122 Idaho 778, 785, 839 P.2d 1192, 1199 (1992). Rule 56 sets forth the standard: 
An affidavit used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal 
knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the 
affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated. Sworn or certified 
copies of all papers or parts of papers referred to in an affidavit must be attached to 
or served with the affidavit. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or 
opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. 
 
I.R.C.P. 56(c)(4) (emphasis added). The admissibility of evidence is a threshold matter to be 
addressed before applying the liberal construction and reasonable inferences rule to determine 
whether the evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact for trial. See Gem State Ins. Co. v. 
Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10, 13, 175 P.3d 172, 175 (2007) (citing Carnell v. Barker Mgmt., Inc., 137 
Idaho 322, 327, 48 P.3d 651, 656 (2002)). This Court applies an abuse of discretion standard when 
reviewing a determination of the admissibility of evidence offered in connection with a motion for 
summary judgment. Id. at 15, 175 P.3d at 177 (citing McDaniel v. Inland Nw. Renal Care Grp.–
Idaho, LLC, 144 Idaho 219, 221, 159 P.3d 856, 858 (2007)). 
 The Sankeys submitted a joint declaration in opposition to the motions for summary 
judgment. The declaration contained several short paragraphs referencing the Tree Survey as an 
attachment: 
Defendants lack any tangible or real evidence to disprove the actual location 
of the subject dead tree or the identification of the EW property boundary dividing 
line between Midtown and neighboring parcel formerly owned by Craig Gordon to 
the West[.] 
Plaintiffs hereby provide an authenticated copy of Survey Exhibit Map to 
prove as prima facie evidence[.] 
See Survey Exhibit Map to show the actual former location of the fallen 
subject tree and area of disturbance illustrated clearly sat with the property owned 
by Nicole Perry as Midtown aka Hayden Storage. 
(Emphasis added.) The Sankeys mistakenly attached what they called the “Survey Exhibit Map” 
(here it is referred to as the Tree Exhibit) to the declaration of Malissa Watts, their neighbor. The 
parties stipulated at the hearing on the motions for summary judgment that the Tree Exhibit and 
 
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other documents attached to the Watts’ declaration would be deemed to be attached to the Sankeys’ 
joint declaration.  
 
Rule 802 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence provides that “hearsay” is not admissible except 
as provided by the rules. I.R.E. 802. “ ‘Hearsay’ means a statement that: (1) the declarant does not 
make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” I.R.E. 801(c)(1)–(2). A “statement” includes a written 
assertion. I.R.E. 801(a).   
 
There does not appear to be any dispute that the Tree Exhibit constitutes hearsay. The 
document contains written assertions—the location of the tree and the name of the owner of the 
parcel upon which the tree was located—which were made outside the hearing on the motions for 
summary judgment and the Sankeys are using those assertions to prove the truth of what is 
asserted. This Court recently explained the difference between using a diagram for demonstrative 
purposes and, like the situation here, using the diagram for its truth as substantive evidence: 
In other words, when the drawing is admitted for demonstrative or illustrative 
purposes, “the witness’ testimony is the evidence and the map or diagram is merely 
an aid to its understanding.” 29A Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 981 (emphasis added). 
Thus, the drawing is not hearsay because it is not an out-of-court statement admitted 
to establish a particular fact. See id. 
 
Importantly, this “must be distinguished” from admitting an out-of-court drawing 
for its truth as substantive evidence without it being offered to aid the testimony of 
an in-court witness with personal knowledge of what it depicts. See id. When the 
out-of-court drawing is admitted for its substance, “the instrument possesses within 
itself evidential characteristics tending to establish a particular fact[.]” Id. And 
without an in-court witness who has personal knowledge of that fact—the declarant 
of that fact is out-of-court, not subject to cross examination. In that context, the out-
of-court drawing would meet the definition of hearsay to the extent it contains out-
of-court statements offered for their truth. 
 
State v. Roman-Lopez, 171 Idaho 585, 599, 524 P.3d 864, 878 (2023). 
 
The Sankeys contend the Tree Exhibit should have been considered when deciding the 
motions for summary judgment because it falls within the exception to the hearsay rule set forth 
in Rule 803(6)—the so-called “business records exception.” The exception provides:  
The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless of whether 
the declarant is available as a witness: 
. . . . 
(6) Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity. A record of an act, event, 
condition, opinion, or diagnosis if: 
 
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(A) the record was made at or near the time by – or from information 
transmitted by – someone with knowledge; 
(B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity 
of a business, organization, occupation, or calling, whether or not for 
profit; 
(C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity; 
(D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or 
another qualified witness, or by a certification that complies with Rule 
902(11) or (12); and 
(E) the opponent does not show that the source of information or the 
method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of 
trustworthiness. 
I.R.E. 803(6)(A)–(E) (emphasis added).  
The district court held that the Tree Exhibit did not fall within this exception because, 
among other reasons, the Sankeys did not comply with subsection (D)—which required the 
Sankeys to provide a certification from Mr. Mayberry or the custodian of his company’s records 
setting forth the conditions in subsections (A)–(C). The Sankeys contend  Mr. Mayberry “certified” 
the Tree Exhibit when he placed his surveyor’s seal on the document pursuant to Idaho Code 
section 54-1215, which requires that the final work product of a surveyor be “sealed, signed and 
dated as a final document if the document is intended to be relied upon to make policy decisions 
important to the life, health, property, or fiscal interest of the public.” I.C. § 54-1215 (3)(b). The 
Sankeys argue that to require any further extrinsic evidence of authenticity would undermine the 
“self” authenticating part of Idaho Rule of Evidence 902(11). The Sankeys also argue, for the first 
time on appeal, that Mr. Mayberry’s seal satisfies the authentication requirements of Rule 902(7)  
governing trade inscriptions. The Sankeys’ arguments are contrary to the plain language of Rules 
803(6)(D) and 902(11) and misapprehend authentication requirements. 
 Subsection (D) of the business records exception requires the custodian of the record or 
another qualified witness (for example, Mr. Mayberry) to testify to the conditions set forth in 
subsections (A)–(C) of Rule 803(6) or provide a “certification” that complies with Rule 902(11). 
Rule 902(11) provides: 
The following items of evidence are self-authenticating; they require no extrinsic 
evidence of authenticity in order to be admitted: 
. . . . 
 
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(11) Certified Domestic Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity. 
The original or a copy of a domestic record that meets the requirements of 
Rule 803(6)(A)-(C), as shown by a certification of the custodian or another 
qualified person. As used in this subsection, “certification” means a written 
declaration signed in a manner that, if falsely made, would subject the 
maker to a criminal penalty in the jurisdiction where the certification is 
signed. Before the trial or hearing, the proponent must give an adverse party 
reasonable written notice of the intent to offer the record – and must make 
the record and certification available for inspection – so that the party has a 
fair opportunity to challenge them. 
I.R.E. 902(11) (emphasis added). 
 
Critically, and a point the Sankeys appear to miss, the first sentence of Rule 902(11) 
requires that the certification show that the record at issue meets the requirements of subsections 
(A)–(C) of the business record exception. Under the rule a “certification” means a “written 
declaration[.]” I.R.E. 902(11). While Rule 902(11) does not go so far as to dictate the language 
that must be used in a written declaration, this Court’s recent decision in Department of Finance, 
Securities Bureau v. Zarinegar illustrates the type of language that will suffice. 167 Idaho 611, 
474 P.3d 683 (2020).  
 
In Zarinegar, the Department of Finance filed an action against a seller of securities and 
its principal, alleging they had engaged in securities fraud. 167 Idaho at 617, 474 P.3d at 689. The 
Department moved for summary judgment and submitted financial records from Wells Fargo Bank 
in support of that motion. Id. at 625, 474 P.3d at 697. Zarinegar moved to exclude those records, 
arguing they lacked foundation and constituted hearsay. The district court denied the motion to 
strike, and this Court affirmed the decision. Id. at 625–26, 474 P.3d at 697–98. In doing so, this 
Court quoted approvingly from the declaration of the Wells Fargo employee who certified that the 
requirements of Rule 803(6)(A)–(C) had been met: 
Exhibits N through Z contain the financial records of Zarinegar and PRM obtained 
from Wells Fargo Bank. To adhere to the requirements of I.R.E. 902(11), the 
Department submitted a “Business Records Declaration” of Krista Yu, an employee 
of Wells Fargo. Yu’s declaration provided that she was a “duly authorized and 
qualified witness to certify the authenticity” of the Wells Fargo financial records. 
The records “[w]ere prepared ... in the ordinary course of business at or near the 
time of the acts ... described in the records” and “[i]t was in the ordinary course 
of business for [Yu] ... with knowledge of the act ... to make the record or transmit 
the information therein to be included in such record.” The declaration was also 
signed by Yu under penalty of perjury under the laws of Idaho. Zarinegar also failed 
 
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to show that the documents’ method or circumstances of preparation were 
untrustworthy aside from conclusory statements attacking the computer system that 
generated the financial records. Thus, the exhibits containing financial records 
obtained from Wells Fargo were self-authenticating under I.R.E. 902(11). 
Adequate foundation was provided. The records were properly found admissible 
under I.R.E. 803(6). 
 
167 Idaho at 628, 474 P.3d at 700 (emphasis added) (alterations in original). 
 
The Sankeys did not provide a written declaration from a records custodian or a qualified 
witness (like Mr. Mayberry) attesting to the requirements of Rule 803(6)(A)–(C). Mr. Mayberry’s 
surveyor’s stamp certifies that the work was done by him or under his responsible charge. See I.C. 
§ 54-1215(3)(c) (“The application of the licensee’s seal and signature and the date shall constitute 
certification that the work thereon was done by him or under his responsible charge.”). However, 
the stamp does not attest to the elements of Rule 803(6)(A)–(C), which means that it does not 
satisfy the requirements of Rule 902(11). Because the requirements of Rule 803(6)(D) were not 
met, the Tree Exhibit does not qualify for the business records exception to the rule against hearsay. 
We need not address the district court’s rulings on how the other elements of Rule 803(6) were not 
met.  
For the first time on appeal, the Sankeys now argue that Mr. Mayberry’s stamp meets the 
authentication requirements of Rule 902(7) because it qualifies as a “sign” purporting to have been 
affixed in the course of business and indicating origin, ownership, or control. See I.R.E. 902(7). 
Setting aside the Sankeys’ failure to make this argument below, authentication of a document does 
not necessarily mean that it is admissible. The “authentication” of a document means producing 
evidence “sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” I.R.E. 
901(a). “Self-authenticating” simply means that there is no extrinsic evidence of authenticity 
required in order to be admitted. A “self-authenticating” document, however, is not necessarily an 
admissible document. In this case, the Tree Exhibit is also inadmissible because it is hearsay. The 
business records exception to the hearsay rule only allows for the admission of documents that are 
authenticated in accordance with Rules 902(11) and (12). Rule 902(7) is not part of the business 
records exception, and, as such, the Sankeys’ argument is without merit. 
Finally, the Sankeys contend the Tree Exhibit should have been admitted under the general 
exception to the hearsay rule found in Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(24). It provides that a hearsay 
statement not specifically covered by any of the other hearsay exceptions can be admissible if:  
 
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i. the statement has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. 
ii. it is offered as evidence of a material fact; 
iii. it is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence 
that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts; and 
iv. admitting it will best serve the purposes of these rules and the interests of justice. 
I.R.E. 803(24)(A). The decision to admit evidence under this rule is a discretionary call for the 
trial court. State v. Giles, 115 Idaho 984, 987, 772 P.2d 191, 194 (1989). As pointed out by the 
district court, the magistrate court considered all the elements of Rule 803(24) and held that the 
Tree Exhibit failed to meet the first, third, and fourth prongs of the Rule. On appeal, the Sankeys 
essentially make the same arguments they made to the magistrate court and ask us to second-guess 
the magistrate court’s decision. That is not our role. The Sankeys have not presented any argument 
as to how the magistrate court abused its discretion. As such, we affirm the district court’s 
conclusion that the magistrate court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to admit the Tree 
Exhibit under the catchall exception to the hearsay rule. 
2. The Sankeys’ and Watts’ declarations as to whose property the tree was on are not 
supported by personal knowledge. 
The Sankeys challenge the decision to exclude their testimony regarding on whose property 
the tree was located. In the Sankeys’ joint declaration supporting their objection to the defendants’ 
motion for summary judgment they state that the exhibit map shows that the tree “clearly sat with 
the property owned by Nicole Perry as Midtown . . . .” However, the magistrate court determined 
that the Sankeys’ statements regarding the accuracy of the survey were inadmissible because they 
were not based on the Sankeys’ personal knowledge. Mr. Sankey provided an additional 
declaration in support of the Sankeys’ motion for reconsideration. In that declaration, Mr. Sankey 
states that the tree was “on the same lot as the mobile home we were renting.” The magistrate court 
reiterated that the Sankeys did not have personal knowledge of the boundary line. 
The Sankeys also challenge the decision to exclude portions of the declaration of Malissa 
Watts, their neighbor who lived across the roadway from them for about a year. The magistrate 
court excluded two statements in Watts’ declaration:  
• “That I am aware of the exact location of the former subject dead tree being within the 
Sankeys’ yard at Midtown Mobile Home Park and the disturbed area remaining from 
uprooting on June 22nd, 2019.”  
 
• “I have had the opportunity to read the Declarations of Mike Whitt which is [sic] 
contradicts his handwritten statement on the Sankeys [sic] ‘lot’ and is perjurous [sic] 
and those of Nicole Perry’s [sic] and Josh Ivey’s [sic] which are untrue and should not 
 
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[be] considered when they were aware of the truth of the correct location of the dead 
tree being on the property leased to the Sankeys.”  
 
Only the underlined portion of the second statement was excluded. The magistrate court excluded 
these statements based on Rules 602 and 701 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence, reasoning that the 
statements were conclusory and without foundation for her personal knowledge. The district court 
held that the magistrate court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence. We agree. 
As a threshold matter, the Sankeys are correct that, under Hook v. Horner, “an accurate 
survey is not the only evidence which is admissible to prove a property boundary.” 95 Idaho 657, 
662, 517 P.2d 554, 559 (1973). However, all evidence, including declarations, must still be 
admissible. At issue here is Idaho Rule of Evidence 602, the “Need for Personal Knowledge.” It 
provides:   
A witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support 
a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove 
personal knowledge may consist of the witness’s own testimony.  This rule does 
not apply to a witness’s expert testimony under Rule 703. 
 
I.R.E. 602. Also at issue is Rule 701, which governs opinion testimony by lay witnesses: 
 
If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an opinion or 
inference is limited to one that is: 
(a) rationally based on the witness’s perception; 
(b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining a 
fact in issue; and 
(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the 
scope of Rule 702. 
 
I.R.E. 701. 
A trial court can strike specific portions of a declaration if those portions are not based on 
personal knowledge. Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276, 281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012). For 
example, in Mortensen v. Baker, we considered whether a declaration containing statements 
concerning a woman’s own health was admissible. 170 Idaho 744, 754, 516 P.3d 1015, 1025 
(2022). This Court determined that the statements regarding her own health were admissible, but 
the statements about what her doctor told her were inadmissible. Id. at 754–55; 516 P.3d at 1025–
26. We held, “[i]f the declaration contains inadmissible statements, the district court must strike 
those statements. Any portion of Mortensen’s declaration not based on her own personal 
observation were properly stricken.” Id. at 754, 516 P.3d at 1025 (citing Fragnella, 153 Idaho at 
 
15 
 
276, 281 P.3d at 113  (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in striking portions 
of an affidavit that lacked foundation)). 
The portions of the declarations challenged by the Owners and Managers were specific to 
the question of the location of the property line between Midtown Trailer Park and Mr. Gordon’s 
property. The Sankeys argue that tenants should be competent to testify regarding boundary lines 
without themselves being professional surveyors. However, the case the Sankeys rely on to support 
such a notion designates a landowner as a competent witness, not a tenant. See Hook v. Horner, 
95 Idaho 657, 663, 517 P.2d 554, 560 (1973). The Sankeys do not reference any authority in which 
that privilege is extended to tenants, and we decline to do so here. 
Additionally, there is no evidence that Watts had personal knowledge of the location of the 
property line. The Sankeys argue that Watts had “personal knowledge of the tree, its location, the 
lot rented by the Sankeys, and the use of the lot.” However, the portions of the declaration that 
were excluded are not about the tree—they were about ownership of the property.  
 
Beyond the facts that “Watts lived within sight of the tree and believed it was located on 
Perry’s land based on personal observations and understanding of the various lots,” the Sankeys 
did not provide any evidence to support their contention that Watts has personal knowledge of the 
boundary lines. Thus, we hold that the district court did not err in affirming the magistrate court’s 
decision to strike portions of the Watts declaration.  
B. The district court did not err in its analysis of the “inferences” drawn by the 
magistrate court and their impact on the grant of summary judgment.  
 
The Sankeys argue that, contrary to the standard of review for summary judgment claims, 
the magistrate court rendered credibility determinations and weighed evidence against the 
Sankeys. The Sankeys claim that the magistrate court inferred that, because Perry did not take 
action in response to the emails warning her about the dead trees, she did not own the trees. As 
such, the Sankeys argue the magistrate court violated the rule that “[w]hen deciding a motion for 
summary judgment, all facts are construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and 
all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-
moving party.”  Parks v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Illinois, 160 Idaho 556, 561, 376 P.3d 760, 765 (2016). 
This argument is not well taken, as the Sankeys misconstrue the magistrate court’s order. 
Regarding the emails, the magistrate court said, “the emails are nothing more than correspondence 
between these people, and do not contain any evidence sufficient to support the allegation that any 
 
16 
 
Defendant in this action is responsible for the damage caused to Mr. and Mrs. Sankey.” The 
magistrate court, in its own words, did not draw an inference; it simply found that the emails did 
not show what the Sankeys claimed them to show. 
 The district court affirmed, explaining “which inference ought to be drawn is unclear to 
this Court, but what is clear is that the magistrate court did not abuse its discretion in finding that 
these emails did not support the Plaintiffs’ claims.” Because no inferences were actually drawn, 
we affirm the finding of the district court that the magistrate court did not apply the wrong 
summary judgment standard by inferring facts in favor of the Owners and Managers.  
C. The district court did not err when it held that the magistrate court did not abuse its 
discretion when it denied the Sankeys’ request for more time to obtain a declaration 
from Mr. Mayberry.   
 
In their reply in support of their motion for reconsideration, the Sankeys requested that, if 
the magistrate court found a declaration from Mr. Mayberry to be “somehow crucial,” the court 
should reserve its ruling and grant them time to obtain and submit the declaration. The magistrate 
court issued its denial of the motion for reconsideration without providing the Sankeys time to get 
the declaration. On appeal, the district court held the magistrate court did not abuse its discretion 
when it denied the request, reasoning the Sankeys had ample time to cure the foundational defects 
that plagued their case. We agree. 
The Sankeys correctly point out that the magistrate court did not actually issue a ruling 
denying their request for additional time. If a trial court fails to rule on a motion, we presume it 
was denied. State v. Wolf, 158 Idaho 55, 61–62, 343 P.3d 497, 503–04 (2015). The standard of 
review on appeal remains the same. The denial of a discretionary motion is only reversed if there 
was an abuse of discretion.  
The circumstances in this case do not support the idea that denying more time for the 
Sankeys was an abuse of discretion. The primary reason presented to the magistrate court that the 
Sankeys needed more time was that they did not believe a declaration supporting the Tree Exhibit 
was necessary; they argued that belief instead of explaining why they did not get a declaration. 
The Sankeys imply for the first time on appeal that their ability to obtain a timely declaration was 
impeded by the fact that the judgment dismissing the claim was mailed directly to the Sankeys 
rather than counsel of record. However, that argument should have been made directly to the 
magistrate court in a motion properly filed in accordance with the requirements of Rule 7 of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.  
 
17 
 
The Sankeys have not shown that the denial of the motion to continue was an error on the 
part of the magistrate court or that affirming that decision was an error on the part of the district 
court. Thus, we affirm the decision of the district court. 
D. The district court did not err in affirming the summary dismissal of the Sankeys’ 
claim under Idaho Code section 6-320(a)(3). 
 
In addition to their premises liability claim, the Sankeys brought suit against the Owners 
and Managers under Idaho Code section 6-320(a)(3). The statute authorizes a tenant to bring suit 
against a landlord for damages and specific performance for “[m]aintaining the premises in a 
manner hazardous to the health or safety of the tenant:”  
(a) A tenant may file an action against a landlord for damages and specific 
performance for: 
 
. . . . 
 
(3) Maintaining the premises in a manner hazardous to the health or safety of 
the tenant. . . . 
I.C. § 6-320(a)(3) (emphasis added).  
The magistrate court dismissed the Sankeys’ claim under this statute, holding that the 
Sankeys were not a “tenant” of Owners or Managers; rather, they were a tenant of St. Vincent de 
Paul. The Sankeys filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the term “tenant” should include 
a “subtenant” since other provisions of the Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer statutes include 
subtenants.  The magistrate court disagreed and, based on the statutory construction principle of 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius (“the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another”), 
concluded there was a reason to distinguish between tenants and subtenants. The district court 
agreed with the magistrate court’s reasoning and affirmed the decision.  The Sankeys contend the 
district court’s decision was erroneous.  
“[T]he interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free 
review.” Insight LLC v. Gunter, 154 Idaho 779, 783, 302 P.3d 1052, 1056 (2013). The Legislature 
has not defined the term “tenant” as it is used in the Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer statutes. 
Invoking the principle of generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda (“general words are to be 
understood in a general sense”), the Sankeys contend “tenant” should be interpreted to include 
“subtenant” because that is how the term is generally understood. However, the other provisions 
of the Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer statutes, which the Sankeys pointed to when they 
addressed this issue with the magistrate court, expressly distinguish between tenants and 
 
18 
 
subtenants. For example, in defining what constitutes an unlawful detainer, section 6-303 provides 
that a tenant is guilty of an unlawful detainer if he continues in wrongful possession of the property 
or if his subtenant holds over:  
A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is guilty of an unlawful detainer:  
 
1. When he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, of the property 
or any part thereof, after the expiration of the term for which it is let to him, without 
the permission of his landlord, or the successor in estate of his landlord, if any there 
be; but in case of a tenancy at will, it must first be terminated by notice, as 
prescribed in the civil code. 
 
I.C. § 6-303(1) (emphasis added).  
Similarly, section 6-308 distinguishes between a tenant and a subtenant for purposes of 
identifying the parties to be named as defendants: 
No person other than the tenant of the premises, and subtenant, if there be one, in 
the actual occupation of the premises when the notice herein provided for was 
served, need be made parties defendant in the proceeding, nor shall any proceeding 
abate nor the plaintiff be nonsuited for the nonjoinder of any persons who might 
have been made parties defendant; but when it appears that any of the parties served 
with process or appearing in the proceeding are guilty of the offense charged, 
judgment must be rendered against them. Any person who shall become a subtenant 
of the premises or any part thereof after the service of notice as provided in this 
chapter shall be bound by the judgment. In case a married woman be a tenant or a 
subtenant, her coverture shall constitute no defense; but in case her husband be not 
joined, or unless she be doing business as a sole trader, an execution issued upon a 
personal judgment against her can only be enforced against property on the 
premises at the commencement of the action. 
 
I.C. § 6-308 (emphasis added). 
 
Section 6-316(1) expressly provides that both tenants and subtenants of larger parcels of 
land have the right to pay judgments for past due rent within a specified period of time and the 
tenant will be restored to his estate: 
When the proceeding is for an unlawful detainer after default in payment of rent 
where the tract of land is larger than five (5) acres, and the lease or agreement under 
which the rent is payable has not by its terms expired, execution upon the judgment 
shall not be issued until the expiration of five (5) days after the entry of the 
judgment, within which time the tenant, or any subtenant, or any mortgagee of the 
term, or other party interested in its continuance, may pay into court, for the 
landlord, the amount found due as rent, with interest thereon, and the amount of the 
damages found by the jury or the court for the unlawful detainer, and the costs of 
the proceeding, and thereupon the judgment shall be satisfied and the tenant be 
restored to his estate; but if payment as here provided be not made within the five 
 
19 
 
(5) days, the judgment may be enforced for its full amount, and for the possession 
of the premises. In all other cases the judgment may be enforced immediately. 
 
I.C. § 6-316(1) (emphasis added). 
 Our case law is clear that statutes that are “in pari materia” should be taken together and 
construed as one system: 
The rule that statutes in pari materia are to be construed together means that each 
legislative act is to be interpreted with other acts relating to the same matter or 
subject. Statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same subject. Such 
statutes are taken together and construed as one system, and the object is to carry 
into effect the intention. It is to be inferred that a code of statutes relating to one 
subject was governed by one spirit and policy, and was intended to be consistent 
and harmonious in its several parts and provisions. 
 
Grand Canyon Dories v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 124 Idaho 1, 4, 855 P.2d 462, 465 (1993) 
(quoting Meyers v. City of Idaho Falls, 52 Idaho 81, 89–90, 11 P.2d 626, 629 (1932)).  
 
This is also consistent with the law’s long history of making careful distinctions between 
a tenant and a subtenant:  
There is no privity of contract or estate between the original lessor and the sublessee 
because the lease does not pass to the subtenant, and there is no contractual relation 
between the subtenant and the lessor. Whatever rights a subtenant has are derived 
from the sublease and are subject to the terms of the original lease. The subtenant 
acquires against the original lessor no greater rights concerning the use and 
enjoyment of the premises than the original lessee had, and express restrictions 
contained in the original lease regarding the use that may be made of the premises 
are binding upon the sublessee. Thus, for example, a subtenant will not have a cause 
of action against a landlord to enforce a sublease provision that purportedly granted 
the subtenant the right to purchase the property, where the prime lease afforded the 
tenant no such right and there was no privity of contract between the subtenant and 
the landlord.  
Because of the lack of privity, the sublessee does not acquire, merely as a result of 
the sublease, any right to enforce the covenants or agreements of the lessor 
contained in the original lease. Sublessees may not maintain actions against the 
landlord on the original lease, but must seek redress against the sublessor. 
49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 969 (2023) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 
While the Sankeys express concerns about eviscerating protections for tenants and 
shielding irresponsible corporations, they miss the point. St. Vincent de Paul had a statutory right 
in September 2018 when they emailed Ivey about the dead tree to demand that Hometown Property 
remedy the problem. If Hometown Property refused to do anything after being given notice, St. 
 
20 
 
Vincent de Paul had the right to bring suit for damages and specific performance. See I.C. § 6-
320(d).  
And, while it is not likely to be a source of consolation for the Sankeys, there was another 
cause of action they could have pursued in the courts but did not. The Manufactured Home 
Residency Act authorizes a “resident” of a manufactured home community to file an action against 
a landlord for damages and specific performance for “[m]aintaining the premises in a manner 
hazardous to the health or safety of the resident[.]” See I.C. § 55-2014(1)(b). 
In short, we decline to read the word “tenant” in Idaho Code section 6-320(a)(3) as 
including all subtenants. This interpretation does not eviscerate protections for tenants; instead, it 
clarifies that a tenant has the statutory right to bring suit for damages and specific performance 
after giving a landlord notice. Thus, we affirm the district court’s decision affirming the magistrate 
court’s grant of summary judgment on the landlord-tenant claim under Idaho Code section 6-
320(a)(3).  
E. We award reasonable attorney fees and costs to Perry and Ivey.  
The Sankeys request costs under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1)(B) and reasonable 
attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code section 6-324. The Sankeys are not the prevailing party, 
so we do not award them fees or costs.  
The Owners and Managers likewise request reasonable attorney fees under Idaho Code 
section 12-120(1) and section 6-324 and costs under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1), (e)(1). 
Section 12-120(1) mandates an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in any action where 
the amount pleaded is $35,000 or less: 
Except as provided in subsections (3) and (4) of this section, in any action 
where the amount pleaded is thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000) or less, there 
shall be taxed and allowed to the prevailing party, as part of the costs of the action, 
a reasonable amount to be fixed by the court as attorney’s fees. For the plaintiff to 
be awarded attorney’s fees, for the prosecution of the action, written demand for 
the payment of such claim must have been made on the defendant not less than ten 
(10) days before the commencement of the action; provided, that no attorney’s fees 
shall be allowed to the plaintiff if the court finds that the defendant tendered to the 
plaintiff, prior to the commencement of the action, an amount at least equal to 
ninety-five percent (95%) of the amount awarded to the plaintiff. 
 
Idaho Code § 12-120(1).  
 
Here, the Sankeys pleaded damages in the amount of “$5,000 +” and filed a small claims 
action, thus limiting their recovery to no more than $5,000. Under the plain language of section 
 
21 
 
12-120(1), this Court shall award attorney fees to the prevailing party. Inasmuch as the Owners 
and Managers are the prevailing parties, they are entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees 
incurred on appeal. Likewise, they are entitled to recover costs; their recovery is not under Rule 
54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, but under Idaho Appellate Rule 40.  
V. 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the decisions of the district court. We award reasonable attorney fees incurred 
on appeal to Respondents pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-120(1). We also award Respondents 
costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 40.  
Chief Justice BEVAN, and Justices STEGNER, MOELLER and ZAHN, CONCUR.