Title: Chapman v. Sparta

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Chapman v. Sparta  (96-474); 167 Vt. 157; 702 A.2d 132

[Filed 19-Sep-1997]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                            No. 96-474

John Chapman                                 Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
    v.                                       Bennington Superior Court

Andrew Sparta, Green Mountain Tile           April Term, 1997
Distributors and Bennington House
of Tile, Inc.

John P. Wesley, J.

       John E. Brady and Timothy B. Richards of Richards and Brady, P.C.,
  Springfield, for plaintiff-appellant

       James B. Grussing of Eaton & Hayes, P.C., Woodstock, for
  defendants-appellees

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Gibson, Morse and Johnson, JJ., and Allen,
          C.J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned

       JOHNSON, J.   Plaintiff Chapman appeals the trial court's grant of
  summary judgment in favor of defendant Sparta.  He argues that the court
  erred by characterizing his indemnity action as an attempt to obtain
  contribution between joint tortfeasors.  We reverse and remand because
  material facts remain in dispute.

       Chapman laid floor tiles provided by defendant in the entryway of a
  building Chapman constructed and now owns.  In January 1992, Craig Smith
  slipped and fell on those tiles and was seriously injured.  He sued
  Chapman, who settled the claim.  Chapman then sued Sparta seeking
  indemnity, claiming that Sparta's tiles caused the accident.  Sparta moved
  for summary judgment.  He argued that Chapman had settled a negligence
  action and was therefore barred under Vermont law from seeking
  contribution.  The trial court agreed, noting that Smith's personal injury
  suit had alleged negligent conduct by Chapman, and granted summary judgment
  in favor of defendant.  Chapman appealed.

 

       We affirm a summary judgment ruling only where the record shows no
  genuine dispute of material fact and that some party is entitled to
  judgment as a matter of law.  V.R.C.P. 56(c). In deciding whether the
  parties dispute a material fact, we accept as true allegations presented in
  opposition to summary judgment if they are supported by affidavits or other
  evidentiary material.  We place the burden of proof on the moving party,
  and give the opposing party the benefit of all reasonable doubts and
  inferences in determining whether a material fact is at issue. Messier v.
  Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 154 Vt. 406, 409, 578 A.2d 98, 99-100 (1990).

       We begin by reviewing the law governing indemnity actions.  Vermont
  law ordinarily bars actions for contribution between joint tortfeasors,
  Howard v. Spafford, 132 Vt. 434, 435,