Title: LOUISE HURST, Executrix of the Estate of IVAN BARNETT, Deceased, and Executrix of the Estate of MARIE BARNETT, Deceased; and as Administratrix of the Estate of CLIFF BARNETT, Deceased v. THE STATE OF WYOMING; THE STATE BOARD OF PAROLE OF WYOMING; JOHN LANG, Chief Parole Officer; and unknown parole officers and employees of the State Board of Parole of Wyoming

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

LOUISE HURST, Executrix of the Estate of IVAN BARNETT, Deceased, and Executrix of the Estate of MARIE BARNETT, Deceased; and as Administratrix of the Estate of CLIFF BARNETT, Deceased v. THE STATE OF WYOMING; THE STATE BOARD OF PAROLE OF WYOMING; JOHN LANG, Chief Parole Officer; and unknown parole officers and employees of the State Board of Parole of Wyoming1985 WY 49698 P.2d 1130Case Number: 84-159Decided: 04/09/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
LOUISE HURST, EXECUTRIX 
OF THE ESTATE OF IVAN BARNETT, DECEASED, AND EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF MARIE 
BARNETT, DECEASED; AND AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF CLIFF BARNETT, 
DECEASED, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF), 

v. 

THE STATE OF WYOMING; THE 
STATE BOARD OF PAROLE OF WYOMING; JOHN LANG, CHIEF PAROLE OFFICER; AND UNKNOWN 
PAROLE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE STATE BOARD OF PAROLE OF WYOMING, APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Alan B. Johnson, 
J.

 
 
Bert T. 
Ahlstrom, Jr., Cheyenne, for appellant 
(plaintiff).

Bruce A. 
Salzburg, Freudenthal Law Offices, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellees 
(defendants).

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

CARDINE, Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
a summary judgment granted in a case sounding in negligence. We 
affirm.

[¶2.]     Appellant raises the 
following issue:

"Whether the district 
court judge erred in granting the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment under 
the facts and circumstances of this case."

[¶3.]     Robert Dale Henderson, 
a convicted felon, was granted parole by the Wyoming State Board of Parole on 
July 31, 1981. His parole was to end on February 25, 1982. After his marriage to 
Donna Barnett Holcomb, he was, in December 1981, granted permission to leave the 
state of Wyoming. It was disputed whether his trip to 
Ohio was a permanent move with permission and instructions to mail in his final 
two monthly reports to his probation officer or whether he left on a ten-day 
travel permit which would have expired December 10, 1981. Regardless, he moved 
to Adams County, Ohio where, on January 21, 1982, he murdered 
Marie, Ivan, and Cliff Barnett, the mother, father and brother of his new wife. 
He pled guilty to the aggravated murder of these three people on August 5, 1983. 
He also admitted to committing a total of nine other murders in several states 
between January 21 and February 5, 1982. Appellant filed suit against the state 
of Wyoming and 
various state board of parole employees alleging that:

"* * * [T]he Defendants 
are liable for damages to the Plaintiff for the tortious conduct of the 
Defendant and Defendant's employees while in the scope of their employment, said 
negligent conduct being as follows:

"A. In authorizing and 
permitting Robert Dale Henderson to leave the State of Wyoming and travel to 
Ohio without obtaining the prior permission of the State of Ohio, pursuant to 
Section 7-13-401, et seq. of the Wyoming Statutes, 1977, and in violation of the 
Interstate Compact for Supervision of Parolees and Probationers as ratified by 
Chapter 34, Session Laws of Wyoming, 1939, Section 11-411, Wyoming Compiled 
Statutes, 1945.

"B. In failing to notify 
or contact officials in the State of Ohio and in particular, Adams County, Ohio, 
when the said Robert Dale Henderson failed to return to the State of Wyoming on 
December 10, 1981, pursuant to the authorization given to him by his Parole 
Officer."

Both sides 
submitted affidavits in support of their position; these affidavits referred to 
reports and other documents which were not attached nor submitted to the 
court.1 The district court granted summary 
judgment for the defendants, holding that although neither the claim of judicial 
immunity nor sovereign immunity barred appellant's claim, nevertheless, summary 
judgment should be granted the State on the theory that the acts of the State 
and its employees were a remote and not the proximate cause of the murders as a 
matter of law.

[¶4.]     Summary judgment is 
only appropriate upon a dual finding that there is not a genuine issue as to a 
material fact and that the prevailing party, as a matter of law, is entitled to 
judgment. Seamster v. Rumph, 
Wyo., 698 P.2d 103 
(1985).

[¶5.]     If a judgment is 
sustainable on any legal ground appearing in the record, it must be sustained. 
37 Gambling Devices (Cheyenne Elks Club and Cheyenne Music and Vending, Inc.) v. State, Wyo., 694 P.2d 711 (1985); Valentine v. Ormsbee Exploration Corp., 
Wyo., 665 P.2d 452 (1983); Agar v. Kysar, Wyo., 628 P.2d 1350 (1981). We, therefore, affirm the 
grant of summary judgment in this case, not upon the grounds stated by the trial 
court, but because governmental immunity is a bar to appellant's cause of action 
or claim.

[¶6.]     Governmental immunity 
has long been accorded agencies granting parole, releasing prisoners or 
supervising them on parole, we suspect out of necessity more than any other 
reason. The numbers of prisoners these agencies must move through the prison 
system to parole or release is substantial. And, in the vast majority of cases, 
we know there will always come a time when prisoners have served their sentences 
and must be released. To place liability upon an agency charged with this duty 
has long been held unacceptable, it being said that:

"Governmental immunity 
from liability for injuries caused by negligently released individuals has been 
based on state constitutions and the Eleventh Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, on state statutes providing for immunity in connection with the 
release of a prisoner * * * and on the common-law doctrine of sovereign 
immunity." (Footnotes omitted.) Anno., Governmental Tort Liability for Injuries 
Caused by Negligently Released Individual, 6 A.L.R.4th 1155, 1159 
(1981).

[¶7.]     This court was asked to 
abolish the doctrine of governmental immunity still available to the state of 
Wyoming in Worthington v. State, Wyo., 598 P.2d 796 
(1979). The court made one of its latest pronouncements concerning the 
substantial policy reasons for leaving the matter to the legislature when it 
stated:

"* * * [T]his matter can 
be far better handled by a legislature to carve out and classify those areas in 
which the doctrine of immunity shall be abolished and those areas in which it 
should be retained. If this is not left in the hands of the legislature, this 
court would be forced to settle the possible areas in which the doctrine should 
not apply on a case-by-case basis with unnecessary confusion and expense to 
claimants and to the State." At p. 805.

[¶8.]     About the time of 
publication of the Worthington opinion, the Wyoming legislature had determined 
those areas in which governmental immunity should be abolished by the adoption 
of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, § 1-39-101, et seq., W.S. 1977, 
Cum.Supp. 1984. The Wyoming Governmental Claims Act reaffirmed and 
retained immunity from claims in tort against governmental entities and their 
employees. Unless that immunity was expressly waived2, immunity was to be the rule; 
liability was to be the exception and then only when expressly provided for 
within the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act.

[¶9.]     In this case, the 
parole board granted parole to Henderson. While free on parole, and two months 
before his total release, he was granted permission by his parole officer to 
leave the state of Wyoming. Suit against the parole board and the 
parole officers was based upon granting permission to leave the state of 
Wyoming and failing to notify the authorities 
in Ohio. Such 
suit is barred by the doctrine of governmental immunity unless that immunity is 
waived by the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, § 1-39-101, et seq., supra. We 
have searched the act and found one statute that might be claimed to grant an 
exception to that immunity. That statute, § 1-39-112, W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1984, 
provides:

"A governmental entity is 
liable for damages resulting from tortious conduct of law enforcement officers 
while acting within the scope of their duties."

With respect to 
the effect of § 1-39-112, supra, upon the doctrine of governmental immunity, it 
was stated:

"This section exposes the 
governmental entity to broader liability than the other exceptions. The section 
permits the government to be liable for assault, battery, false arrest, 
malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, defamation and perhaps 
deprivation of civil rights, to name a few. While such broad liability is 
probably desirable in order to adequately protect the public against police 
tyranny, the statute has some troubling aspects. Note the term `law enforcement 
officer' is undefined." Comments, Wyoming's Governmental Claims Act: Sovereign 
Immunity With Exceptions - A Statutory Analysis, XV Land and Water L.Rev. 619, 
629 (1980).

[¶10.]  The question here to be resolved is 
whether the members of the parole board and the parole officers, at the time of 
this incident and with respect to the activities complained of, were "law 
enforcement officers" within the meaning of § 1-39-112, 
supra.

[¶11.]  If possible, words contained in a statute 
must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. State Board of Equalization v. Tenneco Oil 
Company, Wyo., 694 P.2d 97 (1985). The fundamental rule 
of statutory construction is to determine legislative intent. State Board of Equalization v. Tenneco Oil 
Company, supra; State v. Stovall, 
Wyo., 648 P.2d 543 (1982). A statute must be viewed in terms of its objective 
and purpose. Wyoming State Treasurer v. City of Casper, Wyo., 551 P.2d 687 (1976). Although this act should be 
liberally construed,

"* * * a liberal 
construction does not require that words be accorded a forced, strained, or 
unnatural meaning, or warrant an extension of the statute to the suppression of 
supposed evils or the effectuation of conjectural objects and purposes not 
referred to, nor indicated in any of the terms used." Crawford, Construction of 
Statutes § 238 at 451-452 (1940).

[¶12.]  The legislature did not define law 
enforcement officer. Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) defines law 
enforcement officer as: "Those whose duty it is to preserve the peace." Peace 
officer is variously defined

"* * * by statute in the 
different states; but generally it includes sheriffs and their deputies, 
constables, marshals, members of the police force of cities, and other officers 
whose duty is to enforce and preserve the public peace. In general, any person 
who has been given general authority to make arrests. Generally a `peace 
officer' is a person designated by public authority to keep the peace and arrest 
persons guilty or suspected of crime and he is a conservator of the peace, which 
term is synonymous with the term `peace officer'." Black's Law Dictionary, 
supra. See also, Busbee v. Reserve 
Insurance Company, 147 Ga. App. 451, 249 S.E.2d 279 
(1978).

The legislature 
has defined peace officer in § 7-2-101, W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 
1984:

"As used in W.S. 
7-2-101 through 7-2-103 `peace officer' means any duly authorized member of a 
sheriff's office, municipal police force, college or university campus police 
force, the Wyoming highway patrol, game and fish law enforcement personnel 
qualified pursuant to W.S. 9-3-1901 through 9-3-1906 [§§ 9-1-701 through 
9-1-706] and when enforcing Wyoming felony statutes following observation or 
discovery of the commission of a felony, during the performance of their 
statutory duties, or while responding to requests to assist other peace officers 
performing their official duties, and special agents of the state of Wyoming 
charged with the enforcement of criminal statutes and 
ordinances."

Parole officers 
are not included in this definition nor within a later enactment.3

[¶13.]  Section 9-3-1901(iv), W.S. 1977, defines 
a law enforcement unit as:

"`Law enforcement unit' 
means any public agency having general police power and charged with making 
arrests in connection with enforcement of the criminal statutes and ordinances 
of this state or any county or city thereof."

Parole officers 
are granted authority to make arrests in the execution of their duties pursuant 
to § 7-13-408, W.S. 1977. They are not given other authority traditionally 
associated with peace officers.

[¶14.]  While authority from other states 
defining the groups considered to be law enforcement officers is not 
controlling, yet these cases are helpful in summarizing (1) whether the 
particular activity complained of was within a traditional definition of law 
enforcement officer, and (2) whether the classification was appropriate for the 
particular facts of this case and within the intent of the legislature in 
adopting § 1-39-112, W.S. 1977, supra. Thus, a campus policeman was held to fit 
within a statute defining law enforcement officers and could arrest for 
possession of marijuana. GLN v. 
State, Fla.App., 432 So. 2d 623 (1983). An airport security officer was held 
to the standards of a law enforcement officer in performing his duties for 
purposes of search and seizure. Bell v. State, Alaska, 519 P.2d 804 
(1974). A deputy United 
States marshal was considered a law enforcement 
officer for purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act. Lucas v. United States, 
443 F. Supp. 539 (D.C. Cir. 1977). A police officer, working as a store 
security guard was considered a law enforcement officer for purposes of a 
statute proscribing aggravated battery against law enforcement officers. State v. Coleman, 224 Kan. 447, 580 P.2d 1329 
(1978).

[¶15.]  A parole officer, however, was not 
considered a law enforcement officer within the spirit or the meaning of Miranda 
in State v. Johnson, 87 S.D. 43, 202 N.W.2d 132 (1972). And, a member of the public safety commission was not a law 
enforcement officer because his job did not involve criminal investigation but 
was primarily administrative. State v. 
McNair, 36 N.C. App. 196, 243 S.E.2d 805 (1978). A school teacher was not 
considered a law enforcement officer for purposes of federal constitutional 
limitations on search and seizure. DRC v. 
State, Alaska App., 646 P.2d 252 (1982). A director 
of corrections was not a law enforcement officer for purposes of a venue 
statute. Busbee v. Reserve Insurance 
Co., supra (reversed on other grounds). The 
cases seem to say that traditional police activities carried on by law 
enforcement officers involve the power of arrest, keeping the peace, and 
enforcement of criminal law among all of society.

[¶16.]  Looking at the mischief that the statute 
was designed to cure, the legislature must have intended that this statute 
create an exception from immunity only for activities which come within the 
province of traditional law enforcement. Police officers have tremendous power 
and authority to interfere with the rights of citizens. The logical inference is 
that the legislature intended this abrogation of the common-law immunity as a 
safeguard against misuse of this power by providing citizens a broad remedy for 
any tortious conduct causing damage.

[¶17.]  We hold, therefore, that this particular 
cause of action cannot be maintained because it does not fall within an 
exception provided by the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. The primary duties of 
the parole board or parole officer are confined to a small group of persons 
after arrest, conviction and often incarceration. They ordinarily are not 
involved in keeping the peace as that term is generally understood. The parole 
board and the parole officers are not law enforcement officers under the facts 
of this case and are not subject to claim or liability because of governmental 
immunity. The decision granting summary judgment to the State is, therefore, 
affirmed.

1 Rule 56(e), W.R.C.P., 
requires that "[s]worn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof 
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith." Both 
parties violated this provision. Due to our disposition of the case, however, 
these inadequacies are not relevant.

2 Section 1-39-104, W.S. 
1977, Cum.Supp. 1984, provides in pertinent part:

"A governmental entity 
and its public employees while acting within the scope of duties are granted 
immunity from liability for any tort except as provided by W.S. 1-39-105 through 
1-39-112."

3 Subsequent to this 
incident, the legislature again defined "peace officer" in § 6-1-104(a)(vi), 
W.S. 1977, as including the following officers:

"(vi) `Peace officer' 
includes the following officers assigned to duty in the state of Wyoming:

"(A) Any duly authorized 
sheriff, under sheriff or deputy sheriff;

"(B) Any duly authorized 
member of a municipal police force, a college or university campus police force 
or the Wyoming 
highway patrol;

"(C) Game and fish law 
enforcement personnel qualified pursuant to W.S. 7-2-101 and when enforcing 
Wyoming felony statutes following observation or discovery of the commission of 
a felony, during the performance of their statutory duties, or while responding 
to requests to assist other peace officers performing their official 
duties;

"(D) Agents of the 
division of criminal investigation appointed pursuant to W.S. 9-2-536 [§ 
9-1-613];

"(E) Any duly authorized 
arson investigator employed by the state fire marshal;

"(F) Inspectors of the 
Wyoming livestock board authorized under W.S. 11-20-201 who have qualified 
pursuant to W.S. 9-1-701 through 9-1-707 when enforcing W.S. 11-19-101 through 
11-24-115 and 11-29-101 through 11-30-113 and any laws prohibiting theft or 
mutilation of livestock or any part thereof; and

"(G) Federal law 
enforcement agents."

Again, parole 
officers are not included.