Title: Shipp v. State

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

406 S.W.2d 361 (1966) Johnny Paul SHIPP, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. No. 5158. Supreme Court of Arkansas. October 3, 1966. Rehearing Denied November 7, 1966. Jack L. Lessenberry, Little Rock, for appellant. Bruce Bennett, Atty. Gen., H. Clay Robinson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee. McFADDIN, Justice. Appellant, Johnny Paul Shipp, was charged, tried, and convicted of the offense of robbery (Ark.Stat.Ann. § 46-3601), and brings this appeal. His motion for new trial contains 25 assignments, which we will group and consider in suitable topic headings. I. Motion To Quash The Jury Panel. This was a two-point motion. The first point was that the jurors were not qualified because they had not complied with the recent Amendment No. 51. That point was completely answered in the cases of Coger v. City of Fayetteville, 239 Ark. 688, 393 S.W.2d 622; and Harris v. State, 239 Ark. 771, 394 S.W.2d 135; wherein we held that the Act No. 126 of 1965 was valid and was passed to eliminate just such a motion as was here made. The second point of the motion to quash was that Negroes had been excluded from the petit jury panel; *362 and that even though the appellant was a white man, still he was entitled to have Negroes on the jury panel. We see no need to discuss the merits, if any, of this point, because the record here fails to show that the appellant exhausted his peremptory challenges. In such a situation we have held that the appellant cannot complain of the composition of the jury. One such recent case so holding was Trotter and Harris v. State, 237 Ark. 820, 377 S.W.2d 14, cert. denied Harris v. Arkansas, 379 U.S. 890, 85 S. Ct. 163, 13 L. Ed. 2d 94, in which we said: II. Sufficiency Of The Evidence. The State offered evidence which showed that the appellant had persuaded Lee Edwin Goolsby to rob the Joiner branch of the First National Bank of Osceola, so that the appellant and Goolsby could use the money in a joint venture; that on Monday morning, February 8, 1965, Goolsby went alone to the bank and at the point of a loaded pistol took in excess of $9000.00; that Goolsby concealed the money at his home and it was subsequently recovered. Goolsby admitted all of this and said that the appellant had suggested the planned robbery. If the evidence of Goolsby, the accomplice, was corroborated to the extent required by law, then the evidence was sufficient to support the appellant's conviction; and that brings us to the issue of corroboration of the accomplice Goolsby. III. Corroboration. Our statute on corroboration is Ark.Stat.Ann. § 43-2116 (Repl.1964), which reads: We have many cases involving the sufficiency of the evidence to corroborate the accomplice. Some of these are: Knowles v. State, 113 Ark. 257, 168 S.W. 148, Ann. Cas.1916C, 568; Casteel v. State, 151 Ark. 69, 235 S.W. 368; Powell v. State, 177 Ark. 938, 9 S.W.2d 583; and Underwood v. State, 205 Ark. 864, 171 S.W.2d 304. In Underwood v. State, supra, we stated the rule: With this rule thus clearly stated, we come to the evidence in the case at bar. The only evidence to corroborate the accomplice Goolsby was that relating to the *363 rain suit and gloves which Goolsby wore at the time of the robbery.[1] Goolsby testified that appellant purchased a rain suit and gave it to Goolsby with instructions that he wear it in making the robbery; and Goolsby testified that after the robbery he threw the rain suit in a ditch along side the highway. The rain suit was found in the ditch and introduced into evidence. Don Rogers testified that he worked at Graber's Department Store and that on Monday morning, February 8, Johnny Paul Shipp came into the store about nine o'clock and purchased a two-piece rain suit; that Shipp tried on the rain suit; and that Shipp wanted to buy a rain suit with a hood. The witness said the rain suit he sold Johnny Shipp was like the one introduced in evidence; but he could not say that it was the identical one sold to Shipp. The other and far more substantial corroborative evidence was given by Sheriff William Berryman. He testified that Shipp was arrested and placed in jail; and the Sheriff sent for the witness Rogers, who had sold Shipp a rain suit, and the witness Prince, who had sold Shipp some gloves; that he warned the witnesses that they were to say nothing to the appellant; that the next day the appellant sent for the Sheriff, who went to the jail to see the appellant, and here is Sheriff Berryman's testimony: And again the Sheriff testified as to appellant: And on cross-examination Sheriff Berryman testified: Thus the evidence shows that the appellant admitted to Sheriff Berryman that the particular rain suit in evidence was the one he bought; but he claimed in his conversation with the Sheriff that he bought the rain suit for use in his business. When the appellant admitted the purchase of the identical rain suit used in the robbery, certainly the appellant admitted enough to corroborate the accomplice. The appellant seeks to leave the impression that Goolsby stole the rain suit from him; but that was a fact question to go to the jury. Without the testimony of Sheriff Berryman the corroboration in this case would be like that in Scott v. State, 63 Ark. 310, 38 S.W. 339; or Cook v. State, 75 Ark. 540, 87 S.W. 1176. But with the testimony of Sheriff Berryman, the evidence of corroboration went to the particular and identical rain suit introduced in evidence, and there was evidence from which the jury could have foundand evidently did findthat appellant bought the particular rain suit which Goolsby wore at the time of the robbery; and this certainly corroborates Goolsby's testimony to the effect that the appellant suggested and planned the robbery. IV. Argument Of The Prosecuting Attorney. The appellant claims that the judgment should be reversed because of the improper argument of the Prosecuting Attorney. In the course of his closing argument the Prosecuting Attorney, in commenting on the matter of corroboration, said: There was no objection made to that statement at the time it was made; but after the jury had retired[2] the appellant made an objection. The point is now urged that the Prosecuting Attorney was telling the jury that there were forty-seven different instances of corroboration which he knew about. The appellant insists that this is like the case of the Prosecuting Attorney making a remark about evidence which is not in the record. For instance, in Hughes v. State, 154 Ark. 621, 243 S.W. 70, the Prosecuting Attorney said: "I have examined the testimony and know so much about it, and know things that never get to anybody else." We held that such a remark by the Prosecuting Attorney in his argument to the jury was highly improper and reversed the judgment, saying: "Coming from a sworn official, the remark was calculated to make a deep impression upon the minds of the jurymen." Some other cases on improper argument are Todd v. State, 202 Ark. 287, 150 S.W.2d 46; and Simmons & Flippo v. State, 233 Ark. 616, 346 S.W.2d 197. In the case at bar, if the remark by the Prosecuting Attorney was intended to mean that the Prosecuting Attorney knew of forty-seven different instances of corroboration which might not have been shown in the evidence, then of course the remark was improper and most certainly the Court would have ordered it stricken, if objection had been made at the proper time. But if the remark of the Prosecuting Attorney merely meant that in the evidence as developed before the jury there were forty-seven different items of Goolsby's testimony which various witnesses had corroborated in the evidence, then of course the remark was not improper. If objection had been made at the proper time, clarification could have been ordered; but from the record as we have examined it and copied it, it appears that the appellant waited until after the jury had retired before he even made any objection on the point; and we hold that such objection came too late and the point cannot now be urged. IV. Other Points. Other assignments in the motion for new trial are urged for reversal of the judgment. We have examined all of them and find none to possess merit. Affirmed. [1] Goolsby testified that the appellant provided the rain suit and gloves and a silk stocking. The rain suit was introduced as an exhibit in the case and is before us on appeal. [2] Two pages after the foregoing quoted statement of the Prosecuting Attorney, the transcript shows that the Prosecuting Attorney had concluded his argument and the Court said: "Gentlemen, the reporter will prepare a form of verdict for you to use in this case. If you find the defendant guilty, your foreman, whom you will select, will sign the first form after inserting in the blank space provided the amount of punishment you agree upon not less than three nor more than twenty-one years. If you find him not guilty, your foreman will sign the second form. You may now retire to the jury room to consider your verdict. "(IN ABSENCE OF THE JURY): "MR. LESSENBERRY: I want to object to the remark of the prosecuting attorney stating he had personally checked several instances of corroborating Lee Goolsby's statement: that such a statement from the prosecuting attorney becomes so personal and very persuasive with the jury, is highly prejudicial; it cannot be overcome by an admonition of the Court. "MR. HARRISON: These are points I checked in the case as the evidence developed, your honor. He had the same opportunity to check them as I did. "COURT: Overruled. Exception noted."