Title: Loghry v. Loghry

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Loghry v. Loghry1996 WY 96920 P.2d 664Case Number: 95-207Decided: 07/03/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming
Lynda 
L. LOGHRY,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

David A. 
LOGHRY,

 Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from The District 
Court, Laramie County, Edward L. Grant, J.

Billie Ruth 
Edwards of Edwards & Johnson, Cheyenne, for Appellant.

Vincent P. 
Foley, Cheyenne, for Appellee.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1]      The single issue 
for resolution is whether a trial setting notice in a divorce action served upon 
a party, but not upon the party's attorney, satisfies the requirements of 
constitutional due process. After counsel appeared for the defendant in the 
divorce action, a notice of trial setting allegedly was served by mail upon the 
defendant, but was not served upon her counsel. When a party is represented by 
an attorney, WYO.R.CIV.P. 5(b) requires that service be made upon the attorney, 
unless the court orders otherwise. We hold, under the circumstances of this 
case, the notice of trial setting did not satisfy the constitutional 
requirements of due process of law. The Order Denying Motion to Set Aside Final 
Decree of Divorce is reversed, and the case is remanded for trial on all issues 
that could have been heard at the initial trial of this case.

[¶2]      The single issue 
presented for review in the Brief of Appellant Lynda L. Loghry (wife) 
is:

1.         
Whether the lower court erred in denying defendant's motion to set aside, 
in part, final decree of divorce and to reinstate trial date.

That issue is 
similarly stated in the Brief of Appellee David A. Loghry (husband):

1.         
Whether lack of notice to Appellant's attorney, though Appellant had 
notice and opportunity to be heard and defend is sufficient error to set aside 
final decree of divorce and remand for trial.

[¶3]      The husband filed 
a complaint for divorce against the wife on November 30, 1994. Service of the 
summons and complaint was accomplished, and the wife filed an answer pro se, 
which she failed to sign although it was acknowledged by a notary public. She 
also failed to include her address and telephone number. The answer was served 
upon counsel for the husband. In a General Order Setting Cases for Various 
Purposes and Order Dismissing Cases, the case was set for trial along with four 
other cases at 1:30 p.m. on February 8, 1995.

[¶4]      On January 9, 
1995, the husband filed a Motion to Find Defendant in Default, asserting as 
justification the wife's failure to declare she was filing an answer pro 
se, her failure to sign the document, and her failure to include any form of 
address or telephone number in violation of WYO.R.CIV.P. 11. This motion also 
asserted the time for filing a proper answer had expired. An Order Finding 
Defendant in Default tracking the husband's motion was entered, and that was 
followed by the husband's Affidavit for Divorce filed January 31, 1995. In a 
pleading styled "Letter to Judge Grant," filed February 6, 1995, the wife, 
continuing to act pro se, endeavored to explain and cure the deficiencies 
in the answer. At the same time, she endeavored to comply with the pretrial 
order of the court. On March 1, pursuant to another general order, the case was 
set for trial with four other cases at 9:00 a.m. on May 2, 1995. A new Order for 
Pretrial Conference was attached to the setting order.

[¶5]      At that juncture, 
the critical fact occurred when an Entry of Appearance was filed by counsel for 
the wife on March 22, 1995. By a General Order Vacating and Resetting Trial 
entered on March 29, 1995, this case was moved to April 11, 1995 at 9:00 a.m. 
along with four other cases. That order still reflected the wife as appearing 
pro se. It also included an additional Order for Pretrial Conference. On 
April 11, the date set for trial, a Final Decree of Divorce was entered at the 
behest of the husband.

[¶6]      On April 13, 
1995, counsel for the wife filed a Motion to Set Aside, in Part, Final Decree of 
Divorce and to Reinstate Trial Date of May 2, 1995. The motion states counsel 
had no notice of the change of trial date from May 2, 1995 and did not, 
therefore, attend the trial. The brief of the husband states the wife was not 
present either. The motion was noticed for hearing on April 28, 1995 and, 
apparently, the hearing was held because, in a letter filed on May 19, 1995, the 
district judge alluded to a recent hearing on the motion. In the letter, the 
judge stated the records of the clerk of the district court indicated a copy of 
the amended order was mailed to the wife at her address on March 31, 1995. The 
judge admitted, however, that this was not a matter of record in the court and 
suggested the record be supplemented by an affidavit of a deputy clerk in charge 
of the records.

[¶7]      An Order Denying 
Motion to Set Aside Decree of Divorce was entered on June 13, 1995, but it was 
not until August 4, 1995, almost a month after the wife's notice of appeal was 
filed on July 13, 1995, that the suggested affidavit was placed in the court 
file. The thrust of the affidavit was simply that the mass setting was mailed to 
the defendant listed on the setting as pro se at her address on March 
6, 1995. The affidavit noted the documents had not been returned to the 
office of the clerk by the postal service. Nothing suggests any effort to notify 
counsel who had appeared on March 22, 1995. Furthermore, the affidavit does not 
even relate to the critical order entered on March 29, 1995. That order could 
not have been sent to the wife on March 6, 1995 because it was not even in 
existence at the earlier date. This leaves the record devoid of evidence of 
notice of the last trial setting even to the wife.

[¶8]      The Final Decree 
of Divorce makes several scurrilous allusions to the wife's conduct and 
character; awards custody of the minor children to the husband; requires the 
wife to pay $188 per month child support commencing more than two months prior 
to the date of the decree; and also divides the property of the parties. This 
record contains every indication of a pro forma divorce practice, which 
resulted in the presentation of a decree and an order to the district judge who, 
unfortunately, relied upon erroneous representations of counsel. The appeal is 
taken by the wife from the order denying her motion to set aside the decree in 
part.

[¶9]      The wife contends 
that, pursuant to WYO. R.CIV.P. 5(b), when a party is represented by an 
attorney, service of court orders is required to be made upon the attorney and 
not upon the party. The wife contends service of the March 29, 1995 order was 
insufficient because of the failure to comply with the rule. As noted above, the 
record fails to establish the critical order was sent even to the wife. She 
argues the result was that she was denied an opportunity to appear and be heard, 
that is, she received no notice of the hearing and, thus, was deprived of her 
opportunity to be heard. She concludes the product of this error is that the 
final decree of divorce was erroneously entered, and the trial court erred in 
denying her motion to set aside the final decree of divorce.

[¶10]   The husband's counterargument is 
that, in spite of the clerk of court's failure to serve the notice of 
rescheduling on the wife's attorney, the clerk did serve the document on the 
wife. We have pointed out that the record does not support this fact, because 
the affidavit by the deputy clerk of court supports only the service of an 
earlier order on the wife when she was representing herself. Nevertheless, the 
husband argues the wife was afforded due process; she declined, directly and 
indirectly, to respond to the notice of the trial setting; she failed to secure 
due process by not consulting with her attorney about the rescheduling; and she 
failed to appear to defend. The husband asserts the Order Denying Motion to Set 
Aside Final Decree of Divorce should be upheld. We re-emphasize that the record 
does not support notice of the last trial setting even to the wife, and the 
argument that the service upon her was sufficient, even though the provisions of 
WYO. R.CIV.P. 5(b) were not met, is inappropriate and misleading to the 
court.

[¶11]   The Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States, binding upon the states, provides "nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law." In Article 1, § 6 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming, a 
parallel provision appears, "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law." Our rule is that due process extends to 
and is required in divorce actions:

"`It is basic that, 
before a property interest can be terminated, except in emergency 
situations, due process must be afforded to litigants in the form of notice and 
a meaningful opportunity to be heard.'" Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, 880 P.2d 103, 106 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting Lawrence-Allison and Associates West, Inc. v. 
Archer, 767 P.2d 989, 997 (Wyo. 1989)) (emphasis in original).

Murray v. 
Murray, 894 P.2d 607, 608 (Wyo. 1995); see also Tageant v. Tageant, 909 P.2d 322, 323 (Wyo. 1996).

[¶12]   In Hall v. Hall, 708 P.2d 416, 421 
(Wyo. 1985), we addressed custody:

"The right to associate 
with one's immediate family is a fundamental liberty protected by the state and 
federal constitutions." DS v. Department of Public Assistance and Social 
Services, Wyo., 607 P.2d 911, 918 (1980). Resolution of which parent shall have 
custody necessarily implicates the fundamental right of family association. 
Accordingly, a court must afford a parent notice and a meaningful opportunity to 
be heard before it can deny the parent custody of his or her 
children.

In Michael v. 
Hertzler, 900 P.2d 1144, 1148 (Wyo. 1995), we identified that fundamental right 
as a liberty interest:

In fleshing out the 
concept of a liberty interest, the Supreme Court of the United States has said a 
liberty interest "denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the 
right of any individual to * * * establish a home and bring up children." Meyer 
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S. Ct. 625, 626, 67 L. Ed. 1042 (1923). In a 
local context, the United States district court has ruled that liberty under the 
due process clause is broader than freedom from bodily restraint. Moore v. 
Wyoming Medical Center, 825 F. Supp. 1531 (D.Wyo. 1993). This right of privacy 
is inherent in the concept of ordered liberty according to one author. Michael 
J. Minerva, Jr., Grandparent Visitation: The Parental Privacy Right to Raise 
Their "Bundle of Joy," 18 FLA.ST. U.L.REV. 533, 540-41 (1991). The right 
supports parents in making decisions regarding the care and company of their 
children with minimal government intervention, and we hold that Hertzler has 
presented a protected liberty interest in the context of his right of 
privacy.

[¶13]   The due process right to notice is 
secured by WYO.R.CIV.P. 5 where we say, in pertinent part:

(a) Service; when 
required.

(1) Except as otherwise 
provided in these rules, every order required by its terms to be served, 
every pleading subsequent to the original complaint unless the court otherwise 
orders because of numerous defendants, every paper relating to discovery 
required to be served upon a party unless the court otherwise orders, every 
written motion other than one which may be heard ex parte, and every written 
notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment, designation of record on appeal, 
and similar paper shall be served upon each of the 
parties.

*           
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*           
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(b) Service; how 
made. - Whenever under these rules service is required or permitted to be 
made upon a party represented by an attorney the service shall be made upon the 
attorney unless service upon the party is ordered by the court. Service upon 
the attorney or upon a party shall be made by delivering a copy to the attorney 
or party or by transmitting it to the attorney or party at the attorney's or 
party's last known address by mail or by other equally reliable means, including 
facsimile transmission, or, if no address is known, by leaving it with the clerk 
of the court. (Emphasis added.)

[¶14]   As of the time of the last trial 
setting, no notice of which was given to the wife, the wife and both property 
and liberty interests present in the divorce proceeding. We think there is no 
question the requirements of WYO.R.CIV.P. 5(b) are mandatory. In addressing the 
connotation of "shall," as it was used, not in the rules of civil procedure, but 
as it was used in W.R.CR.P.J.C. 23(c), we said:

This court in a much 
earlier day observed that when the word "shall" was employed, it was usually 
legally accepted as mandatory, Mau v. Stoner, 14 Wyo. 
183, 83 P. 218, 219. Also, see Fear v. Crane [In re Crane], 344 Pa. 624, 26 A.2d 457, 459. In construing statutes, "Unless the context otherwise indicates the 
use of the word `shall' (except in its future tense) indicates a mandatory 
intent," 1A, Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 25.04, p. 301 (4th Ed. Sands); 
Ginnavan v. Silverstone, 246 Md. 500, 229 A.2d 124, 127.

Orderly judicial 
administration is dependent upon procedural rules, and in order to assure 
uniform and timely disposition of appeals they must be enforced and not relaxed 
or changed at the whim of any court. See United Mine Workers 
of America District No. 23 v. Morris, Ky., 307 S.W.2d 763, 765. Reasonable 
adherence to the rules of the court is necessary to the proper administration of 
justice. Zier v. City of Powell, Wyo., 526 P.2d 63.

Mayland v. 
State, 568 P.2d 897, 899 (Wyo. 1977) (emphasis added).

This language is 
pertinent, and it is as applicable to our rules of civil procedure as it is to 
the minor court criminal rules.

[¶15]   We previously have said, in 
requiring due process in civil litigation:

Due process of law 
includes notice and an opportunity to be heard. That notice and the opportunity 
to be heard are unquestionably incidental to affording due process of law. See 
Bjugan v. Bjugan, 710 P.2d 213 (Wyo. 1985); Tanner v. Tanner, 482 P.2d 443 (Wyo. 
1971); State ex rel. Blonder v. Goodbrod, 77 Wyo. 126, 307 P.2d 1073 (1957). Due 
process of law is guaranteed to a party who has a legitimate property interest 
at stake under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States 
and Article 1, Section 6 of the Constitution of the State of 
Wyoming.

Barker Bros., 
Inc. v. Barker-Taylor, 823 P.2d 1204, 1208 (Wyo. 1992) (footnotes 
omitted).

[¶16]   Rule 5(a), WYO.R.CIV.P., required 
service of the new trial scheduling order. The order required counsel contact 
district court chambers "within ten days of receipt of this order" and, by 
implication, its terms required it to be served on counsel. In mandatory terms, 
WYO.R.CIV.P. 5(b) requires service on the attorney for the party. Nothing in the 
record indicates that, in this instance, service on the party rather than 
counsel was ordered by the court, and service was not even made on the 
party. This requirement incorporated in our civil rules clearly intends to 
protect the constitutional right of parties to notice and an opportunity to be 
heard. Furthermore, the orderly administration of justice is dependent upon 
these rules, and it is important to enforce them for that purpose.

[¶17]   We hold the wife, Lynda L. Loghry, 
was deprived of her constitutional right to notice and an opportunity to be 
heard in this case. The district court erred in entering its Order Denying 
Motion to Set Aside Final Decree of Divorce, and that order is reversed. The 
case is remanded to the district court for trial.