Title: Brady v PPL Montana LLC

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

FILED

 

 

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{The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit filed with this Court on February

15, 2007, a certification order pursuant to M. R. App. P, 44. The issue of law submitted

 

 

by the Ninth Circuit for decision by this Court concerned whether § 39-71-413, MCA, as
amended, comports with five separate provisions of the 1972 Montana Constitution, We
accepted the certified question of the Ninth Circuit on March 21, 2007.

2 The

 

{nth Circuit's request represents far from our first experience with this issue.
‘The Honorable Richard F. Cebull, United States District Judge of the District of

‘Montana, Billings Di

 

ion, filed with this Court a similar certification order pursuant to
M.R. App. P. 44 on November 21, 2002. Judge Cebull’s order concerned the very same
‘ase at issue here. We accepted Judge Cebull’s certified question on November 26, 2002.
We set a briefing schedule and invited briefs amicus curiae

{3 The parties and amicus curiae filed briefs and we heard oral argument on

September 23, 2003. ‘Two days later, on September 25, 2003, we determined that we
improvidently had accepted the certification: “Simply put, we do not have sufficient facts
before us upon which we can render a precedential opinion on the substantial and
significant constitutional questions posed.” Brady v. PPL Montana, LLC, 2003 MT 262,
1.3, 317 Mont. 425, 4 3, 77 P.3d 523, § 3. We were unwilling to interpret these
constitutional issues in a vacuum. Brady, § 3

{4 We likewise set a briefing schedule and invited briefs to be filed by amicus curiae
following our acceptance of the Ninth Circuit's certified question. The parties and
amicus curiae filed briefs and we heard oral argument on this matter on March 5, 2008.
We remain constrained, pursuant to the Ninth Cireuit’s certification order and our
acceptance of that certification order, by the paucity of facts upon which we can render &
precedential opinion on the constitutional questions posed. In fact, the Ninth Circuit's
order declares that “the facts in this case are immaterial” to resolving the facial challenge
to the constitutionality of § 39-71-413, MCA.

{5 We remain unwilling to address these constitutional issues in a relative vacuum.
We once again reluctantly reach the conclusion that we improvidently accepted the Ninth

i factual vacuum in which to evaluate the

 

Circuit's certified question. We face a simi
importance of substantial constitutional questions presented similar to the one that we did
in Brady.

{6 We regret the significant time, effort, and money spent on this matter by the
parties, amicus curiae, and this Court. We deem it irresponsible, however, to start down

the path of addressing constitutional questions of this nature in a relative factual vacuum,

2
7 THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this matter is DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

{8 The Cletk of this Court is instructed to mail a true copy of this Order to all counsel
of record and to the Clerk of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

DATED this 20” day of May 2008.

  
Justice James C. Nelson, concurring,

 

{9 reluctantly join the Cours Opinion and Order dismissing this eause without
answering the questions certified to this Court by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit. See Brady v. PPL Montana, LLC, 478 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2007)

While nothing more is required, I feel obligated to provide some explanation for my vote

 

to the Court of Appeals, the Bradys, and counsel—particularly since this isthe third time
we are declining to answer a certifying court’s questions in this case. See Brady, 478
F.3d at 1017 (noting that the United States District Court for the District of Montana has

twice sought certification of the state constitutional issues raised in this case, but each,

 

time this Court declined to answer the question, citing a paucity of facts).

{10 My decision to join in dismissing this cause without prejudice to the merit

 

purely a pragmatic one. I entertain grave reservations about the constitutionality of

§39-71-413, MCA, for various reasons, not the least of which is whether it can withstand

  

 

scrutiny under Article II, Sections 16 and 17 of the Montana Const respectively,
Montana's fundamental guarantees of access to the courts and to due process of law.

mal issues would do so in

 

However, since those of us who would resolve these constt
conflicting ways, I believe it is more prudent to decline to answer the questions than it
‘would be to offer plurality opinions in the context of a facial challenge and thereby
possibly foreclose a later as-applied challenge based on different fact.

{11 With that, and my apologies to the Court of Appeals, the Bradys, and counsel, 1

concur.
  
 

Justice Patricia O. Cotter joins in the Concurrence of Justice,
Chief Justice Karla M. Gray, dissenting.

12. I dissent from the Court’s unwillingness to answer the question which is again
before us. We accepted the certified question from the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit on March 21, 2007. We knew then—as we had known previously—
that the question involved facial challenges to § 39-71-413, MCA, based on five separate
provisions ofthe 1972 Montana Constitution.

{13 Facial challenges, unlike as applied challenges, do not depend on the facts of a
particular case. See e.g. MEIC v. Dept. of Environmental Quality, 1999 MT 248, § 80,
296 Mont. 207, 80, 988 P.2d 1236, § 80; Associated Press, Ine. v. Department of
Revenue, 2000 MT 160, $f 27-28, 300 Mont. 233, $€ 27-28, 4 P.3d 5, $9 27-28; Roosevelt
¥, Montana Dept. of Revenue, 1999 MT 30, $f 51-52, 293 Mont. 240, $9 51-52, 975 P.2d
295, $9 51-52. Having agreed to resolve the facial challenges presented, it is my view
that we should do so without further delay.

{14 Had this case been commenced and remained in Montana’s state courts, rather
than going tothe federal courts on diversity grounds, this Court would be facing the same

five facial challenges to the statute. There can be no doubt that we would not—indeed,

 

‘we could not, given the extent of our jurisdiction—simply refuse to determine the facial
challenges. It is totally beyond my ken that this Court—after a delay of 14 months and a
significant outpouring of resources—now decides yet again that it will not decide the

question,
{15 The incident at issue in this case occurred in the summer of 2001. Nearly seven
‘years later, it remains unresolved and goes back to the Ninth Circuit for yet more delay
while that court resolves the question. ‘The blame for much of the delay in this case falls
squarely on this Court, and apologies cannot undo the damage. I concurred in our 2003
Brady decision to decline to resolve the question we had accepted which, as here, eame
after significant delay and cost to all concerned. I caninot in good conscience do so again.
{16 Given the availability of diversity jurisdiction, one can only wonder how many
questions of Montana constitutional law the federal courts will decide in the first instance
after the Court's decision here. One can only wonder why this Court, so committed 10
‘Montana's constitution and the development of Montana constitutional law, today shies
away from resolving facial challenges to a Montana statute under the 1972 Montana
Constitution.

417.1 dissent from the Cour’s opinion, Regardless of what the appropriate legal

resolution would be, I would resolve the certified question.

  
Justice John Wamer dissents.

18 1 agree with the dissent of Chief Justice Gray. There is no need for @ further

 

record at this stage of the proceedings—it is sufficient to determine the question of
whether § 39-71-413, MCA, can withstand the facial constitutional challenges by
to the right to full legal redress for an injury that is covered by the Workmen's
‘Compensation Laws. The legislature has provided the scope of such an exception in§
39-71-413, MCA. Brady makes facial challenges, not as applied challenges, to ‘the

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Circuit Court of Appeals.

Justice Jim Rice joins in the foregoing dissent.

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