Title: State ex rel. Westlake v. Corrigan

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Westlake v. Corrigan, 112 Ohio St.3d 463, 2007-Ohio-375.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. CITY OF WESTLAKE, APPELLANT,  
v. CORRIGAN, JUDGE, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Westlake v. Corrigan,  
112 Ohio St.3d 463, 2007-Ohio-375.] 
Action to enforce arbitration agreement — Jurisdiction under R.C. 2711.03 after 
vacation of arbitration award — Writ of prohibition denied. 
(No. 2006-1278 ─ Submitted January 10, 2007 — Decided February 14, 2007.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County,  
No. 86575, 2006-Ohio-3323. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing an action for a writ 
of prohibition to prevent a common pleas court judge from proceeding in an 
action to enforce an arbitration agreement after arbitration has already been 
completed.  Because the judge does not patently and unambiguously lack 
jurisdiction to do so after the arbitration award has been vacated, we affirm the 
judgment of the court of appeals. 
{¶ 2} Charles D. Shimola owns certain property in appellant, city of 
Westlake, Ohio.  After disputes arose between Shimola and Westlake concerning 
Shimola’s property, they entered into an agreement incorporated in a judgment 
entry in 1993 to resolve litigation between them. 
{¶ 3} When further disputes arose concerning the development of 
Shimola’s property, three cases were filed concerning the 1993 agreed entry.  In 
1998, the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas consolidated the cases and 
declared the agreed entry valid.  Following a jury trial, the jury awarded Shimola 
$2.5 million dollars in damages for Westlake’s failure to comply with the 1993 
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agreed entry.  The trial court, however, granted the city a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict on the basis that Shimola had failed to demonstrate 
any legally cognizable damages.  The trial court granted Shimola $61,728.81 in 
attorney fees. 
{¶ 4} On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in 
part. Shimola v. Westlake (Sept. 14, 2000), Cuyahoga App. Nos. 75164, 75165, 
and 75204, 2000 WL 1297696.  The court of appeals held that although it 
disagreed with the trial court’s conclusion that Shimola did not establish any 
legally recognized damages, the damages awarded by the jury were excessive and 
required a retrial.  We did not allow Westlake’s discretionary appeal from the 
judgment.  Shimola v. Westlake (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 1419, 741 N.E.2d 145. 
{¶ 5} Before the retrial of these cases, Shimola and Westlake entered 
into an agreement to submit to binding arbitration an issue defined in part as 
follows:  “consideration and award of economic damages sustained by Chas. D. 
Shimola from breaches of the Agreed Judgment Entry.”  After hearing argument 
concerning the scope of the arbitration, the three-member arbitration panel issued 
an order indicating that the “arbitrators have unanimously agreed that the Plaintiff 
must show by appropriate evidence what damages were proximately caused by 
the Defendant’s conduct.” 
{¶ 6} Arbitration hearings commenced in April 2003 and ended in May 
2004 after 44 sessions over 15 months.  On September 2, 2004, the arbitration 
panel issued an award of $560,000 in damages to Shimola. 
{¶ 7} Shortly thereafter, Westlake filed a motion in the Cuyahoga 
County Court of Common Pleas to confirm the arbitration award.  Shimola later 
filed a motion to rescind the arbitration agreement, vacate the arbitration decision, 
set the case for a jury trial, and defer ruling on the remaining aspects of the 
motion pending a jury trial on his separate case for enforcement of the arbitration 
agreement under R.C. 2711.03. 
January Term, 2007 
3 
{¶ 8} On the same day, Shimola filed that action under R.C. 2711.03 
against Westlake in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas in case No. 
CV 04 548603.  Shimola requested that─if the court in the related cases did not 
rescind the arbitration agreement─a jury and court find that the arbitrators were 
constrained to accept certain facts as conclusively established, that the arbitrators 
were not permitted to consider certain issues pertaining to cognizable damages, 
and that the city and arbitration panel had breached the parties’ arbitration 
agreement.  Appellee, Judge Peter J. Corrigan of the common pleas court, denied 
the city’s motion to dismiss Shimola’s R.C. 2711.03 action. 
{¶ 9} In June 2005, Westlake filed a petition in the Court of Appeals for 
Cuyahoga County for a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Corrigan from 
proceeding further in the R.C. 2711.03 case and to compel him to dismiss the case 
for lack of jurisdiction.  Judge Corrigan filed a motion to dismiss. 
{¶ 10} Shimola’s R.C. 2711.03 action was consolidated with the other 
cases.  In January 2006, Judge Corrigan denied Westlake’s motion to confirm the 
arbitration award and granted Shimola’s motion and vacated the arbitration award 
pursuant to R.C. 2711.10(D).  Judge Corrigan vacated the arbitration award 
because “the arbitrators exceeded their authority when they considered proximate 
cause as an element of damages because the four corners of the arbitration 
agreement specifically excluded the parties’ intention to arbitrate this element.” 
{¶ 11} On June 27, 2006, the court of appeals granted Judge Corrigan’s 
motion in the prohibition case and dismissed Westlake’s petition. 
Prohibition 
{¶ 12} In this appeal as of right, Westlake asserts that the court of appeals 
erred in dismissing its prohibition claim.  In order to be entitled to the requested 
writ of prohibition, Westlake must establish that (1) Judge Corrigan is about to 
exercise judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power is unauthorized by law, and 
(3) denial of the writ will cause injury for which no other adequate remedy in the 
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ordinary course of law exists.  State ex rel. Brady v. Pianka, 106 Ohio St.3d 147, 
2005-Ohio-4105, 832 N.E.2d 1202, ¶ 7.  Judge Corrigan has exercised and 
continues to exercise judicial authority by proceeding in the R.C. 2711.03 case 
commenced by Shimola. 
{¶ 13} Regarding the remaining requirements, “[p]rohibition will not 
issue if the relator has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”  State 
ex rel. Peffer v. Russo, 110 Ohio St.3d 175, 2006-Ohio-4092, 852 N.E.2d 170, ¶ 
13.  “In the absence of a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court 
having general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and 
a party challenging that jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by appeal.”  State ex 
rel. Shimko v. McMonagle (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 426, 428-429, 751 N.E.2d 472. 
{¶ 14} For the following reasons, the court of appeals properly determined 
that Judge Corrigan did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to 
proceed in the underlying case. 
{¶ 15} First, Judge Corrigan has basic statutory jurisdiction under R.C. 
2711.16 to hear Shimola’s R.C. 2711.03 action.  See R.C. 2711.16 (“Jurisdiction 
of judicial proceedings provided for by sections 2711.01 to 2711.14, inclusive, of 
the Revised Code, is generally in the courts of common pleas”). 
{¶ 16} Second, under R.C. 2711.03, a party aggrieved by the failure of a 
person to perform under a written arbitration agreement may petition an 
appropriate common pleas court for an order directing the parties to proceed to 
arbitration in accordance with the agreement: 
{¶ 17} “(A) The party aggrieved by the alleged failure of another to 
perform under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any court of 
common pleas having jurisdiction of the party so failing to perform for an order 
directing that the arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in the written 
agreement.  * * * The court shall hear the parties, and, upon being satisfied that 
the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply with the 
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agreement is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to 
proceed to arbitration in accordance with the agreement. 
{¶ 18} “(B) If the making of the arbitration agreement or the failure to 
perform it is in issue in a petition filed under division (A) of this section, the court 
shall proceed summarily to the trial of that issue.  * * * Upon the party’s demand 
for a jury trial, the court shall make an order referring the issue to a jury * * *.  If 
the jury finds that no agreement in writing for arbitration was made or that there is 
no default in proceeding under the agreement, the proceeding shall be dismissed.  
If the jury finds that an agreement for arbitration was made in writing and that 
there is a default in proceeding under the agreement, the court shall make an order 
summarily directing the parties to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with 
that agreement.” 
{¶ 19} The text of R.C. 2711.03 is unclear whether it could apply to a 
completed arbitration award.  Read in isolation from other arbitration provisions, 
the statute could refer to a party aggrieved by the failure of an arbitration panel to 
perform in accordance with an arbitration agreement even though an award has 
already been made. 
{¶ 20} To be sure, because R.C. 2711.03 relates to the same subject 
matter as the other arbitration provisions in R.C. Chapter 2711, the statutes must 
be construed in pari materia and harmonized so as to give full effect to the 
statutes.  State ex rel. Choices for South-Western City Schools v. Anthony, 108 
Ohio St.3d 1, 2005-Ohio-5362, 840 N.E.2d 582, ¶ 46.  One of these other 
provisions is R.C. 2711.09, which specifies that after an arbitration award has 
been made and a party to the arbitration proceeding applies to the common pleas 
court for an order confirming the award, “the court shall grant such an order and 
enter judgment thereon, unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as 
prescribed in sections 2711.10 and 2711.11 of the Revised Code.”  (Emphasis 
added.) 
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{¶ 21} R.C. 2711.09 does not permit a party to use R.C. 2711.03 as an 
alternate means to vacate, modify, or correct a completed arbitration award that is 
the subject of a pending motion to confirm.  That is, “[o]nce an arbitration is 
completed, a court has no jurisdiction except to confirm and enter judgment (R.C. 
2711.09 and 2711.12), vacate (R.C. 2711.10 and 2711.13), modify (R.C. 2711.11 
and 2711.13), correct (R.C. 2711.11 and 2711.13), or enforce the judgment (R.C. 
2711.14).”  State ex rel. R.W. Sidley, Inc. v. Crawford, 100 Ohio St.3d 113, 2003-
Ohio-5101, 796 N.E.2d 929, ¶ 22. 
{¶ 22} Nevertheless, in this case, Judge Corrigan had vacated the 
arbitration award by the time the court of appeals dismissed Westlake’s 
prohibition claim.  Cf. State ex rel. Newton v. Court of Claims (1995), 73 Ohio 
St.3d 553, 557, 653 N.E.2d 366 (in a writ case, a court is not limited to facts at the 
time a proceeding is commenced, but should consider facts at the time it 
determines whether to issue a writ).  By vacating the award and denying 
Westlake’s motion to confirm, Judge Corrigan then did not patently and 
unambiguously lack jurisdiction over Shimola’s R.C. 2711.03 claim, because the 
award ceased to exist and R.C. 2711.03 could apply to direct the parties to 
proceed with arbitration in accordance with the agreement.  Therefore, in the 
absence of a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction on the part of Judge 
Corrigan, Westlake has or had an adequate remedy at law by appeal to raise its 
contentions. 
{¶ 23} Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals did not err in 
dismissing Westlake’s prohibition claim.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of 
the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR and CUPP, JJ., 
concur. 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
January Term, 2007 
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O’DONNELL, J., not participating. 
__________________ 
 
Roetzel & Andress, L.P.A., George W. Rooney Jr., and John J. Schriner; 
and John D. Wheeler, Westlake Director of Law, for appellant. 
 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Charles 
E. Hannan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
William T. Wuliger, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Charles D. 
Shimola. 
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