Title: State v. Jackson

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Jackson, 102 Ohio St.3d 380, 2004-Ohio-3206.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. JACKSON, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State v. Jackson, 102 Ohio St.3d 380, 2004-Ohio-3206.] 
Elections — Criminal law — Ballot tampering — Evidence — Ohio law does not 
preclude using ballots as evidence of ballot tampering. 
(No. 2003-0408—Submitted January 14, 2004—Decided July 14, 2004.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, Nos. 80937 and 81013, 
2003-Ohio-158. 
_________________ 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
I. Introduction 
{¶1} 
In this case, we must determine whether Ohio law precludes using 
ballots as evidence of ballot tampering.  The appellate court held that the “secret 
ballot rule” precluded use of the ballots as evidence.  We disagree and reverse the 
judgment of the court of appeals. 
II. Statement of the Case 
{¶2} 
Pursuant to R.C. 3509.08, which permits election board members 
to assist physically infirm electors in voting, the Cuyahoga County Board of 
Elections sent two board employees, Linda Weaver, a Democrat, and appellee 
John Jackson, a Republican, to help physically infirm residents at a Cleveland 
nursing home mark their ballots.  Weaver became suspicious that Jackson was 
marking the ballots contrary to some of the residents’ intentions.  For example, 
one resident allegedly intended to vote her entire ballot Democratic, but Weaver 
noticed that the ballot reflected a vote for George W. Bush, who was the 
Republican candidate for President of the United States. 
{¶3} 
Upon returning to work on Monday October 23, 2000, Weaver 
reported her suspicions to the board.  Following an investigation, the Cuyahoga 
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County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office secured a search warrant authorizing 
investigators to seize the allegedly tainted ballots. 
{¶2} 
Subsequently, a grand jury indicted Jackson on five counts of 
tampering with ballots in violation of R.C. 3599.26 and one count of misconduct 
of an employee of the board of elections in violation of R.C. 3599.16.  Jackson 
filed a motion to suppress the ballots.  Jackson’s motion relied on provisions in 
the Revised Code, Section 1, Article V of the Ohio Constitution (right to vote), 
and Section 2, Article V of the Ohio Constitution (all elections must be by ballot).  
After oral argument, the trial court granted Jackson’s motion to suppress the 
ballots. 
{¶3} 
The state appealed, and in a two-to-one decision, the court of 
appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment.  The majority ruled that the “secret 
ballot rule” precluded disclosure of ballots and that because it contained no 
exception to the secrecy requirement, there was no authority to permit the ballots 
to be used as evidence. 
{¶4} 
This cause is now before this court pursuant to the acceptance of 
the state’s discretionary appeal. 
III. Analysis 
A. Constitutional Claims 
1. Standing 
{¶5} 
The state argues that Jackson lacked standing to bring a Fourth 
Amendment claim because he has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
ballots.  Jackson counters that his constitutional claim for suppressing the ballots 
does not originate in the Fourth Amendment, and therefore standing is not an 
issue, because the expectation of privacy is not required outside the context of 
Fourth Amendment inquiries.  We agree with Jackson. 
{¶6} 
The Fourth Amendment protects persons from “unreasonable 
searches and seizures” by the government.  State ex rel. Rear Door Bookstore v. 
January Term, 2004 
3 
Tenth Dist. Court of Appeals (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 354, 364, 588 N.E.2d 116.  
Under the exclusionary rule, evidence seized in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment will result in its suppression.  State v. Jones (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 
430, 434, 727 N.E.2d 886.  In order to have standing to challenge a search or 
seizure, the defendant must have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
evidence seized.  See Alderman v. United States (1969), 394 U.S. 165, 171-172, 
89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176. 
{¶7} 
The ballots in this case were seized pursuant to a search warrant, 
and its validity was never seriously challenged by Jackson.  Instead, Jackson 
asserts that Sections 1 and 2 of Article V of the Ohio Constitution require ballot 
secrecy.  Thus, Jackson does not allege that the seizure was unreasonable but 
rather alleges that Sections 1 and 2 of Article V of the Ohio Constitution prohibit 
disclosure of the ballots and thus prohibit their use as evidence.  Accordingly, we 
reject the state’s argument that Jackson lacked standing under the Fourth 
Amendment to challenge admission of the ballots. 
2. The Merits of Jackson’s Constitutional Claim – Ballot Secrecy 
{¶8} 
Jackson asserts that the Ohio Constitution substantively requires 
that a ballot must remain secret without qualification.  Jackson relies on Sections 
1 and 2, Article V of the Ohio Constitution.  Section 1, Article V provides: 
{¶9} 
“Every citizen of the United States, of the age of eighteen years, 
who has been a resident of the state, county, township, or ward, such time as may 
be provided by law, and has been registered to vote for thirty days, has the 
qualifications of an elector, and is entitled to vote at all elections.  Any elector 
who fails to vote in at least one election during any period of four consecutive 
years shall cease to be an elector unless he again registers to vote.” 
{¶10} Section 2, Article V provides: 
{¶11} “All elections shall be by ballot.” 
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{¶12} Generally speaking, in construing the Constitution, we apply the 
same rules of construction that we apply in construing statutes.  Miami Cty. v. 
Dayton (1915), 92 Ohio St. 215, 223, 110 N.E. 726.  Thus, the intent of the 
framers is controlling.  If the meaning of a provision cannot be ascertained by its 
plain language, a court may look to the purpose of the provision to determine its 
meaning.  Castleberry v. Evatt (1946), 147 Ohio St. 30, 33 O.O. 197, 67 N.E.2d 
861, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶13} Section 1, Article V of the Ohio Constitution merely indicates that 
every citizen who has certain qualifications has a right to vote.  Section 2, Article 
V merely requires that “[a]ll elections shall be by ballot.”  Clearly, Section 1 has 
nothing to do with this case.  Section 2 does not expressly provide that ballots 
must always remain secret.  Therefore, we must look beyond the language of 
Section 2 to determine its intent. 
{¶14} Although this court has never had occasion to answer the particular 
question that is before us today, there are several cases that we find instructive on 
the issue of ballot secrecy. 
{¶15} In 1896, this court, in interpreting Section 2, Article V of the Ohio 
Constitution, stated: “No form of ballot is prescribed by the constitution, and 
therefore the general assembly is free to adopt such form as in its judgment shall 
be for the best interests of the state.  The election must be by ballot, but the form 
of the ballot, so long as it is a ballot, is left to the sound discretion of the general 
assembly.”  State ex rel. Bateman v. Bode (1896), 55 Ohio St. 224, 229, 45 N.E. 
195.  This proclamation, however, begged the question “What does voting by 
‘ballot’ mean?” 
{¶16} In 1909, the state sought to purchase voting machines to tabulate 
the votes.  A Cleveland taxpayer filed suit, alleging that use of voting machines 
would violate the Constitution’s requirement that all elections be by ballot.  State 
ex rel. Karlinger v. Bd. of Deputy State Supervisors of Elections (1909), 80 Ohio 
January Term, 2004 
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St. 471, 89 N.E. 33.  The court in Karlinger recognized that there had been little 
doubt since the adoption of the Constitution in 1802 that ballot meant “printed or 
written expression of the voter’s choice upon some material capable of receiving 
and reasonably retaining it, prepared or adopted by each individual voter and 
passing by the act of voting from his exclusive control into that of the election 
officers, to be by them accepted as the expression of his choice.”  Id., 80 Ohio St. 
at 489-490, 89 N.E. 33.  Adopting this literal definition of “ballot,” the court held 
that use of voting machines violated the requirement to vote by ballot because the 
“card boards are attached to the machines bearing the names of candidates and the 
propositions and amendments upon which the electors are to express a choice.  
These remain attached to the machine for the information of all voters.  They do 
not pass into the control of any voter, nor by the act of voting into the control of 
the officers of the election.  To speak of such a card board as the ballot of the 
constitution is obviously paying but mock deference to that instrument.”  Id., 80 
Ohio St. at 490-491, 89 N.E. 33.   
{¶17} In 1929, the validity of voting machines came before this court 
again in State ex rel. Automatic Registering Machine Co. v. Green (1929), 121 
Ohio St. 301, 168 N.E. 131.  Again opponents of voting machines alleged that 
voting by machine contravened Section 2, Article V of the Ohio Constitution.  
However, the court declined to follow the literal definition of “ballot” adopted in 
Karlinger.  Citing numerous laws from foreign jurisdictions, the court in Green 
recognized that “ballot” “means secret voting in contradistinction to viva voce [by 
voice], or open voting.”  Id., 121 Ohio St. at 308, 168 N.E. 131.  Thus, the court 
in Green held: 
{¶18} “A constitutional requirement that all elections be by ballot does 
not invalidate an otherwise legal enactment providing for the use of voting 
machines in elections.  The term ‘ballot’ designates a method of conducting 
elections which will insure secrecy, as distinguished from open or viva-voce 
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voting.”  (Emphasis added.)  Green, 121 Ohio St. 301, 168 N.E. 131, paragraph 
one of the syllabus. 
{¶19} We believe that Section 2, Article V aspires to secrecy of voting.  
We find it implausible that the framers adopted this provision for the purpose of 
imposing for eternity the type of ballot used 1851.  Certainly, the framers had to 
foresee that the design and or implementation of the ballot would evolve over 
time.  That being so, the term “ballot” must still have some meaning.  We look to 
Green to answer this question.  We believe that “ballot” must mean “secret 
voting.”  Accordingly, pursuant to Green, we hold that Section 2, Article V 
aspires to “a method of conducting elections which will ensure secrecy.” 
{¶20} However, a constitutional provision alone has no force unless it is 
self-executing.  A constitutional provision is self-executing if it supplies a 
sufficient rule by which the protection that it affords can be enforced without 
legislative enactment.  State v. Williams (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 728 N.E.2d 
342.  Thus, “the words of a constitutional provision must be sufficiently precise in 
order to provide clear guidance to courts with respect to their application if the 
provision is to be deemed self-executing.”  Id.  “Likewise a constitutional 
provision is not self-executing if its language, duly construed, cannot provide for 
adequate and meaningful enforcement of its terms without other legislative 
enactment.”  Id., citing State ex rel. Russell v. Bliss (1951), 156 Ohio St. 147, 
151-152, 46 O.O. 3, 101 N.E.2d 289. 
{¶21} Section 2, Article V is silent in the scope of the privacy to which it 
aspires.  Moreover, beyond the aspiration of secrecy at the polls, the process of 
how the voting will be conducted remains within the sound discretion of the 
General Assembly.  Without such specifics regarding the voting process, it is 
impossible to determine whether a proposed election process would satisfy the 
Constitution’s aspiration of secrecy. 
January Term, 2004 
7 
{¶22} Accordingly, we hold that Section 2, Article V of the Ohio 
Constitution aspires to ballot secrecy, but it is not self-executing. 
B. The Statutory Requirement of Ballot Secrecy 
{¶23} We now examine the statutory law relied on by the appellate court 
that implements the constitutional aspiration of ballot secrecy.  The appellate 
court relied on R.C. 3599.20, 3509.08, and 3505.18 in holding that ballots must be 
kept secret irrespective of the reason for disclosure.  R.C. 3599.20 provides: 
{¶24} “No person shall attempt to induce an elector to show how the 
elector marked the elector’s ballot at an election; or, being an elector, allow the 
elector’s ballot to be seen by another, except as provided by section 3505.24 of 
the Revised Code, with the apparent intention of letting it be known how the 
elector is about to vote; or make a false statement as to the elector's ability to 
mark the ballot; or knowingly mark the ballot so it may be identified after it has 
been cast; or attempt to interfere with an elector in the voting booth when marking 
the elector's ballot; or knowingly destroy or mutilate a lawful ballot; or remove 
from the polling place or be found in unlawful possession of a lawful ballot 
outside the enclosure provided for voting; or knowingly hinder or delay the 
delivery of a lawful ballot to a person entitled to receive it; or give to an elector a 
ballot printed or written contrary to law; or forge or falsely make an official 
indorsement on a ballot.” 
{¶25} “Whoever violates this section is guilty of a felony of the fifth 
degree.” 
{¶26} R.C. 3509.08(A), which permits election board employees to assist 
electors in certain ways, provides: 
{¶27} “Any disabled or confined elector who declares to the two 
employees that the elector is unable to mark the elector's ballot by reason of 
physical infirmity, and such physical infirmity is apparent to the employees to be 
sufficient to incapacitate the voter from marking his ballot properly, may upon 
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request, receive the assistance of the two employees in marking the elector's 
ballot, and they shall thereafter give no information in regard to this matter. Such 
assistance shall not be rendered for any other cause.” 
{¶28} Finally, R.C. 3505.18 provides:  
{¶29} “The elector shall then retire to one of the voting compartments to 
mark his ballot.  No mark shall be made on any ballot which would in any way 
enable any person to identify the person who voted the ballot.” 
{¶30} The appellate court reasoned, “If the legislature had intended an 
exception to the secrecy rule to enable prosecutions for the offense of tampering 
with ballots, it could have provided for the Board of Elections or the Prosecutor’s 
Office to examine ballots in such cases.  It did not do so.” 
{¶31} We hold that the statutory ballot secrecy applies only to election 
proceedings and not to the admission of evidence in a criminal trial.  Moreover, 
applying statutory ballot secrecy to preclude using a ballot as evidence of a crime 
conflicts with a board of elections’ duties to investigate and gather evidence of 
election irregularities. 
1. Ballot Secrecy Applies Only to Election Proceedings 
{¶32} R.C. 3599.20 is the primary source of the statutory ballot secrecy.  
Thus, we focus our analysis on that provision.  The paramount consideration in 
determining the meaning of a statute is legislative intent.  State ex rel. Asberry v. 
Payne (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 44, 47, 693 N.E.2d 794.  “In reviewing a statute, a 
court cannot pick out one sentence and disassociate it from the context, but must 
look to the four corners of the enactment to determine the intent of the enacting 
body.”  State v. Wilson (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 334, 336, 673 N.E.2d 1347; 
MacDonald v. Bernard (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 85, 89, 1 OBR 122, 438 N.E.2d 410.  
Finally, where a statute is ambiguous courts may look to the purpose of the statute 
in order to determine legislative intent.  Family Medicine Found., Inc. v. Bright, 
January Term, 2004 
9 
96 Ohio St.3d 183, 2002-Ohio-4034, 772 N.E.2d 1177, ¶ 9, citing Christe v. GMS 
Mgt. Co., Inc. (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 376, 377, 726 N.E.2d 497.   
{¶33} R.C. 3599.20 criminalizes numerous actions besides disclosure of 
a ballot, including to (1) allow one’s own ballot to be seen “with the  apparent 
intention of letting it be known how [one] is about to vote,” (2) “attempt to 
interfere with an elector in the voting booth,” (3) “willfully destroy or mutilate a 
lawful ballot,” (4) “remove from the polling place or be found in unlawful 
possession of a lawful ballot outside the enclosure provided for voting,” (5) 
“willfully hinder or delay the delivery of a lawful ballot to a person entitled to 
receive it,” (6) “give to an elector a ballot printed or written contrary to law,” or 
(7) “forge or falsely make an official indorsement on a ballot.” 
{¶34} R.C. 3599.20’s criminalization of numerous other activities 
pertaining to the disposition of ballots suggests that the intent of R.C. 3599.20 is 
not to impose ballot secrecy but is to serve the broader purpose of protecting 
electors from any treatment of the ballot inconsistent with the right to vote.  This 
conclusion is further supported when we examine the history and purpose of 
ballot secrecy in Ohio. 
{¶35} As early as 1891, the General Assembly adopted a method for 
conducting elections that incorporated the essential elements of the Australian 
ballot system.  88 Ohio Laws, 449, 460-461; see State v. Vause (1911), 84 Ohio 
St. 207, 95 N.E. 742.  Although the specifics may differ from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction, the Australian ballot system has two cardinal features: “(1) An 
arrangement for polling by which compulsory secrecy of voting is secured; and (2) 
an official ballot containing the names of all candidates, printed and distributed 
under state or municipal authority.” 26 American Jurisprudence 2d (1996), 
Elections, Section 299, citing Allen v. Glynn (1892), 17 Colo. 338, 29 P. 670; 
State v. Black (1892), 54 N.J.L. 446, 24 A. 489.  The purpose of ballot secrecy is 
to protect the electors from bribery and corruption.  Richwood v. Algower (1917), 
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95 Ohio St. 268, 271-272, 116 N.E. 462.  Ultimately, this secrecy requirement 
preserves the integrity of the election and its results, which is critical to our 
democratic form of government.  Although Ohio’s statutory law adopting ballot 
secrecy has been amended many times since its inception in 1891, it is evident 
from this long history that protecting voters from corruption was and continues to 
be the purpose behind ballot secrecy. 
{¶36} To permit the secret ballot rule to preclude the disclosure of ballots 
as evidence in a criminal matter conflicts with the purpose of ballot secrecy.  In 
holding that ballot secrecy does not preclude admitting ballots as evidence of 
election fraud, the Supreme Court of Louisiana in State ex rel. Cassidy v. Baker 
(1914), 135 La. 92, 103, 64 So. 993 reasoned: 
{¶37} “The secrecy of the ballot is desired simply as a means towards the 
purity of the election.  To violate that secrecy, therefore, for the purpose of 
punishing those who may have committed a fraud in the election, is not to go 
counter to that policy but strictly in line with it.  The secrecy is designed as a 
preventative measure; retributive punishment is a repressive measure; both to the 
same end.” 
{¶38} Other jurisdictions have also held that elections laws pertaining to 
the secrecy or preservation of ballots are limited in their scope to election matters 
and do not apply to preclude ballots as evidence in a criminal case.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Ryan (1892), 157 Mass. 403, 32 N.E. 349; People v. Harrison 
(1943), 384 Ill. 201, 51 N.E.2d 172.  We agree with this line of reasoning and 
hold that while ballot secrecy protects the election process, it has no bearing on 
the admissibility of ballots as evidence in a criminal matter. 
2. Excluding Ballots as Evidence Conflicts with a Board of Elections’ Duty to 
Investigate and Report Election Crimes 
{¶39} Excluding an otherwise lawfully seized ballot for use as evidence 
in a criminal ballot-tampering case pursuant to the secret ballot rule conflicts with 
January Term, 2004 
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a board of elections’ duty to investigate and report election crimes.  R.C. 
3501.11(J) provides that county boards of elections have a duty to “[i]nvestigate 
irregularities, nonperformance of duties, or violations of Title XXXV of the 
Revised Code by election officers and other persons; administer oaths, issue 
subpoenas, summon witnesses, and compel the production of books, papers, 
records, and other evidence in connection with any such investigation; and report 
the facts to the prosecuting attorney.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶40} Ballots could be probative to an election-tampering charge.  See, 
generally, Sinks v. Reese (1869), 19 Ohio St. 306, 1869 WL 58 (ballots are best 
evidence of election contest), reversed on other grounds.  Therefore, applying the 
secret ballot rule to exclude ballots as evidence of election crimes or irregularities 
conflicts with a board of elections’ duty to investigate and report these crimes or 
irregularities to the prosecutor. 
{¶41} Ultimately then, applying the secret ballot rule to exclude ballots as 
evidence of ballot tampering or election irregularities leads to the unreasonable 
and absurd result of hindering the prosecution of such crimes by precluding the 
use of probative evidence.  Accordingly, we harmonize the secret ballot rule and 
R.C. 3501.11(J) by holding that the secret ballot rule does not preclude the lawful 
seizure of a ballot for use as evidence of ballot tampering or other election-law 
violations. 
C. Conclusion 
{¶42} The purpose of the secret-ballot rule is to ensure that the elector 
exercises his or her right to suffrage free from corruption, thereby ensuring 
integrity of the election results.  However, the secret-ballot rule does not apply in 
determining whether a ballot can be used as evidence in a criminal proceeding.  
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, O’CONNOR and WALSH, JJ., concur. 
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MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER, J., concur in judgment only. 
 
JAMES E. WALSH, J., of the Twelfth Appellate District, sitting for 
O’DONNELL, J. 
_________________ 
 
William Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, Richard A. Bell 
and Matthew E. Meyer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant. 
 
McGinty, Gibbons, Hilow & Spellacy and Henry J. Hilow, for appellee. 
 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, Douglas R. Cole, State Solicitor, and 
Christopher D. Stock, Assistant State Solicitor, urging reversal for amicus curiae 
Ohio Attorney General. 
 
William F. Schenk, Greene County Prosecuting Attorney, and Andrew J. 
Hunt, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging reversal for amicus curiae Greene 
County Prosecuting Attorney. 
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