Title: Johnson v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
WILLIAM T. JOHNSON, JR., 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 488, 2004 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID 9606009907  
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: April 25, 2005 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: May 31, 2005 
 
Before HOLLAND, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 31st day of May 2005, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief, the State’s motion to affirm, and the record below, it appears 
to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, William Johnson, filed this appeal 
from a Superior Court order, dated October 27, 2004, summarily dismissing 
his motion for postconviction relief.   The State has filed a motion to affirm 
the Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face 
of Johnson’s opening brief that his appeal is without merit.  We agree and 
affirm. 
 
2
 
(2) 
The record reflects that Johnson pled guilty in October 1996 to 
one count of felony theft.  He was sentenced to two years imprisonment, 
suspended entirely for one year of probation.1  In 1999, Johnson moved to 
withdraw his guilty plea.  The Superior Court docket reflects no disposition 
of this motion.  In July 2004, Johnson filed a petition for postconviction 
relief, arguing that his guilty plea was defective and his trial counsel was 
ineffective.  The Superior Court summarily dismissed Johnson’s motion as 
procedurally barred.2  This appeal followed. 
 
(3) 
In its motion to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment, the State 
asserts that Johnson’s 1999 motion to withdraw his guilty plea should have 
been considered as a motion for postconviction relief under Rule 61.3  
Because Johnson's first motion was timely filed under Rule 61(i)(1) but was 
never ruled upon, the State concedes that his second motion for 
postconviction relief should not have been barred on procedural grounds.4  
Nonetheless, the State contends that the Superior Court committed harmless 
error in holding that Johnson’s motion was procedurally barred because the 
                                                 
1 Given several subsequent arrests on other criminal charges, Johnson has never 
completed the probation associated with his 1996 felony theft conviction nor has he been 
discharged as unimproved from his 1996 probation.  Currently, Johnson is serving a 24-
year sentence imposed in 1998 following his conviction on robbery and related charges 
2 See DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i)(1),(3). 
3 See DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 32(d). 
4 See Manchester v. State, 1997 WL 398868 (Del. June 18, 1997). 
 
3
Superior Court also analyzed the merits of Johnson’s claims and properly 
rejected the motion as lacking substantive merit. 
 
(4) 
Having carefully considered the parties= respective positions, 
we find it manifest that the judgment of the Superior Court should be 
affirmed for the reason that Johnson’s petition lacked substantive merit.  
Johnson’s claim was based on his argument that the July 1996 amendment to 
the theft statute,5 which raised the threshold for a felony theft conviction 
from $500 to $1000, should have applied retroactively to his crimes 
committed in December 1995 and January 1996.  The Superior Court 
correctly concluded that the statutory amendment to 11 Del. C. § 841 did not 
apply retroactively.6  Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the 
Superior Court’s summary disposition of Johnson’s petition.7   
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
                                                 
5 See 70 Del. Laws ch. 364 (eff. July 10, 1996 amending 11 Del. C. § 841(c)(1)). 
6 See Williams v. State, 756 A.2d 349, 352 (Del. 2000). 
7 See Maxion v. State, 686 A.2d 148, 151 (Del. 1996).