Title: Dale v. King Lincoln-Mercury, Inc.

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

234 Kan. 840 (1984)
676 P.2d 744
LAVERNE L. DALE, Appellee,
v.
KING LINCOLN-MERCURY, INC., Appellant.
No. 54,801

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed February 18, 1984.
Everett C. Fettis, of Fettis & McClure, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.
David H.M. Gray, of Gragert, Hiebert & Gray, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MILLER, J.:
This is an appeal by the defendant, King Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. (King), from a judgment entered against it in the district court of Sedgwick County for breach of implied warranty of merchantability in the sale of a used car. Plaintiff, LaVerne L. Dale, was the used car purchaser. The single issue raised by appellant is that the trial court erred in awarding judgment based upon breach of implied warranty of merchantability.
On April 7, 1981, Dale bought a 1978 Buick LeSabre Custom with 32,795 miles on it from King Lincoln-Mercury in Wichita, Kansas. Dale paid almost $5,000 for the car, which was described as a "cream puff," meaning that it was excellent and in tip-top condition. The following express warranty is handwritten on the face of the sales contract:
Twenty-two days after purchase, the car's transmission failed, and the $468 repair bill was paid by King under the express warranty. About thirty days later, during a Memorial Day weekend trip to Nebraska, the car's motor failed. Dale rented a car and drove home to Wichita so that he could be at work the next week. The dealer in Lincoln, Nebraska, to whom Dale had taken the car, said he could not repair it for about a month, so Dale returned to Nebraska, rented a tow-bar and hitch, towed the car *841 to Marion, Kansas, and had it repaired by Webster Auto Service of that city. The engine block was replaced at a cost of $1,213.28.
There was no evidence of misuse of the vehicle by Dale. Also, it developed that there had been major repair to the car before it was acquired by King Lincoln-Mercury. The engine had been repaired five times in 1979; repairs included replacement of the engine block, the camshaft, a cylinder head, and other miscellaneous parts. King, however, was not aware of those repairs and had no knowledge of any defect in the engine when it sold the vehicle to Dale.
Appellant's primary argument is that the express warranty, written on the face of the sales contract, limits the implied warranty of merchantability. We do not agree.
This was a consumer transaction, and it is governed by the provisions of the Kansas Consumer Protection Act, K.S.A. 50-623 et seq. Under the act, a consumer is defined as an individual who acquires property for personal or family purposes. K.S.A. 50-624(b). A consumer transaction means a sale, for value, of property within this state to a consumer by a supplier. K.S.A. 50-624(c). A supplier is a dealer or seller who, in the ordinary course of business, solicits or engages in consumer transactions. K.S.A. 50-624(i). Dale falls within the definition of a consumer; King Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., falls within the definition of a supplier; and the sale by King, in the ordinary course of its business, was a consumer transaction.
K.S.A. 50-639, a part of the Kansas Consumer Protection Act, deals with warranties. Insofar as it is here applicable, that statute says:
....
K.S.A. 84-2-314, referred to in K.S.A. 50-639, is a part of the Kansas Uniform Commercial Code. It provides in substance that a warranty that goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. For goods to be merchantable, they must be at least such as pass without objection in the trade under the contract description, and they must be fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.
The first section of the Kansas Consumer Protection Act provides:
....
In the case of J & W Equipment, Inc. v. Weingartner, 5 Kan. App.2d 466, 469, 618 P.2d 862 (1980), the court observed that:
Appellant argues that K.S.A. 50-639(f) permits the making of limited express warranties, and that when there is a limited express warranty, the implied warranty of merchantability is eliminated. In other words, appellant contends that a supplier or dealer may exclude, modify or otherwise limit the implied warranty of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose by simply extending to the consumer a limited and narrowly drawn express warranty. We do not agree.
The statute, in clear terms, states that an implied warranty of merchantability may be limited only if the supplier establishes that the consumer had knowledge of the defect or defects. Such was not the case here; Dale had no knowledge that the car's *843 motor and transmission were faulty. Subsection (d) provides that the implied warranty shall not be expanded "to involve obligations in excess of those which are appropriate to the property." Again, appellant does not argue that the obligation here involved is excessive or inappropriate to the property.
In the recent case of Stair v. Gaylord, 232 Kan. 765, 659 P.2d 178 (1983), we faced the same argument appellant makes here. We said:
....
The limited express warranty given by the seller in this case is authorized by law, but it cannot limit the implied warranties of merchantability, and it cannot insulate the dealer from the requirement that the car it sold be fit for the ordinary purposes for which automobiles are ordinarily used. A "cream puff," a relatively low mileage General Motors full-size automobile, represented by the dealer as being in excellent condition when sold, certainly can be expected to contain a motor and transmission which will give the new purchaser more than a few days' service. Such a vehicle, with defective major components, is patently unmerchantable. The fact that the seller in this case was unaware of the true condition of the car is immaterial, for the act imposes no requirement of intent or prior knowledge on the part of a supplier. Bell v. Kent-Brown Chevrolet Co., 1 Kan. App.2d 131, 133, 561 P.2d 907 (1977).
*844 The sale of used cars by dealers in Kansas is no longer governed by the maxim caveat emptor  let the buyer beware. The consumer protection act now places the responsibility upon the seller, not the purchaser, to determine the quality and condition of the goods. Still, the implied warranty of merchantability varies with the particular car. A late model, low mileage car, sold at a premium price, is expected to be in far better condition and to last longer than an old, high mileage, "rough" car that is sold for little above its scrap value. However, as noted above, there is no contention in this case that the implied warranty of merchantability had "expired."
Counsel have argued various provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, K.S.A. 84-1-101 et seq., and the Magnuson-Moss Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq., but a discussion of those laws would only prolong this opinion and would not change the result.
We hold that the trial court did not err in awarding judgment to the plaintiff, LaVerne L. Dale, and against the defendant, King Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. We therefore affirm the judgment.