Title: State v. Ramirez

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

111 Ariz. 498 (1975) 533 P.2d 665 The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Manuel Robert RAMIREZ, Appellant. No. 2937. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. March 31, 1975. N. Warner Lee, Former Atty. Gen., Bruce E. Babbitt, Atty. Gen. by Frank T. Galati, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. Ross P. Lee, Maricopa County Public Defender by Anne Kappes, Deputy Public Defender, Phoenix, for appellant. CAMERON, Chief Justice. This is an appeal from a jury verdict and judgment of guilt to the charge of assault *499 with a deadly weapon, A.R.S. § 13-249 as amended, and a sentence thereon of not less than ten nor more than twenty years in the Arizona State Prison. We are asked to answer the following questions on appeal: The facts necessary for a determination of this matter on appeal are as follows. On the afternoon of 25 November 1972, Pauline Vigil, the sister of the defendant, and Anna Ramirez, defendant's wife, and the children of Pauline and Anna, numbering nine in all, spent the afternoon at defendant's house. About 5:00 in the evening they went to the home of defendant's mother. After Pauline, Anna and the children returned to defendant's house, defendant returned home. Someone came to the door to talk to him. This person and defendant then left. After dinner Pauline Vigil, Anna Ramirez and the children, went for a ride and visited another sister of defendant. As they returned to defendant's house, the defendant was standing outside. He walked over to the car and told Anna Ramirez "don't get down." Pauline asked "What's the matter?" and the defendant wouldn't speak to her. Anna opened the door but did not get out of the car. Anna said "Let's go, there's something wrong." The defendant stood there for awhile and according to the testimony his appearance was "funny." He went inside the house as Pauline was backing out of the driveway. Defendant came back out of the house with a rifle and two shots were fired, one hitting the ground under or near the car and one breaking the glass in the car and hitting 10 year old Jayne Vigil. She died in the hospital a few hours later. Defendant was arrested and charged with the murder of Jayne Vigil and assault with intent to commit murder upon Anna Ramirez, his wife. After a trial to the jury, the jury returned a verdict of guilt as to the charge of assault with a deadly weapon, but were unable to agree upon a verdict as to the charge of murder. The court upon its own motion declared a mistrial as to the murder charge, but entered judgment on the verdict of guilty of assault with a deadly weapon and imposed a sentence of not less than ten nor more than twenty years in the Arizona State Prison. COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL On 17 January 1973, the court appointed two psychiatrists to examine the defendant. The doctors were directed to file written reports with the court. The defendant was ordered committed to the Arizona State Hospital for observation and examination. On 26 February 1973, the court made a *500 minute entry order releasing the defendant from the hospital and reinstating his bond. The doctors' reports were not filed as part of the record. On 8 March 1973 the court entered another minute entry order as follows: The defendant having stipulated to this procedure did not protest the failure to hold a hearing, did not ask for one, and proceeded to trial without further complaint. He raised this issue for the first time on appeal. A.R.S. § 13-1621, subsection E, provided at that time: We have held that a hearing (meaning a judicial determination) is mandatory under A.R.S. § 13-1621; State v. Sanders, 110 Ariz. 503, 520 P.2d 1127 (1974). But we have also held that an oral hearing can be waived. State v. Meredith, 106 Ariz. 1, 469 P.2d 820 (1970). We believe the following is dispositive of this question: We find no error. TESTIMONY REBUTTING DEFENDANT'S EVIDENCE OF INSANITY The defendant next contends that there was evidence of defendant's insanity and that since the State did nothing to rebut this evidence, the defendant was entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal. This court, in a case wherein the defendant presented the testimony of two doctors which created a substantial and reasonable doubt as to the defendant's sanity and in which there was no competent evidence to support the trial court's rejection of the insanity defense, reversed the matter stating: In the instant case, even though the defendant entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, the only testimony presented at trial concerning the possible insanity of the defendant was that of Pauline Vigil, the defendant's sister, who claimed that he was insane at the time he shot and killed her daughter. Pauline testified: Even if we assume that Pauline Vigil's testimony raised a substantial and reasonable doubt as to the defendant's sanity, and we do not believe it did, there was sufficient testimony by other witnesses to rebut Pauline Vigil's testimony that defendant was insane. The testimony viewed as a whole was sufficient from which the jury could find that the defendant was not insane at the time of the shooting. We find no error. Defendant moved for a mistrial on the grounds that the prosecutor was guilty of misconduct in his alleged reference to matters not in evidence and to his comments that the defendant did not produce witnesses which he said he would produce. The defendant did not take the stand and testify himself. Defendant's counsel, in his opening statement, stated: Although the prosecutor had subpoenaed Anna Ramirez, defendant's wife, she was not called to testify by either the State or the defendant. The defendant did not call other witnesses he said he would call including his mother or the doctors. The prosecutor in making certain remarks as to witnesses the defendant did not call merely responded to defendant's opening statements. We find no error. Prior to the beginning of the jury's deliberations the court stated to the jury in the presence of counsel: *502 After the jury had deliberated for a period of time outside the presence of counsel and the defendant, the instructions previously recorded were played back to them. Later the record reflects: Quote: Rule 281 of the 1956 Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S., in effect at the time of the trial in this matter provided: Although we have stated that it is error to communicate to the jury out of the presence of counsel and the defendant, State v. Werring, 111 Ariz. 68, 523 P.2d 499 (1974), and that the defendant is not required to show prejudice, State v. Burnetts, 80 Ariz. 208, 295 P.2d 377 (1956), we have also stated that: Our decision in Bustamante, supra, however, was set aside by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals which stated: The matter will have to be remanded to the trial court for a hearing to determine what occurred and what was said in addition to the playing of the taped instructions. A record of said hearing will be made and the reporter's transcript certified to this court in order that we may determine whether the error of playing the instructions to the jury without the presence of the defendant or his counsel was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S. Ct. 1726, 23 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1969). SPEEDY TRIAL Defendant next contends that it was a denial of his right to speedy trial when there was an eight month period of time from conviction to imposition of sentence. Sentencing in the instant case was postponed in part until such time as the murder charged could be disposed of which itself was delayed because of the illness of the trial judge. The sentence herein was on 5 February 1974 and the defendant was not found guilty of the murder charge until 9 April 1974. After the defendant was found guilty, the judge, knowing that the defendant would have to stand trial on the murder charge declined to set a date for sentencing, announced "The defendant may remain free on his bond pending a new trial date in Cause 74108." Defendant did not object to this procedure and did not ask for an early sentencing. We do not find that after a verdict of guilty when the defendant is released on bond there is a violation of defendant's right to speedy trial by failure to speedily sentence the defendant. In the instant case there was no request for sentencing prior to the time that sentence was actually imposed and we find no prejudice. Neither do we find the case of State v. Rhodes, 104 Ariz. 451, 454 P.2d 993 (1969), cited by the defendant, as applicable to the facts in this case. We find no error. EXCESSIVE SENTENCE Lastly, the defendant contends the sentence was excessive and that he was entitled to probation because of the time he was free on bond without incident prior to the sentence. We disagree. The sentence being within the allowable limits there was no abuse of the trial court's discretion. State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297, 451 P.2d 878 (1969). Remanded. STRUCKMEYER, V.C.J., and LOCKWOOD, HAYS and HOLOHAN, JJ., concur.