Title: Baez v. Commonwealth

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-13467 
 
HAIRO BAEZ  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
April 26, 2024. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.  
District Court.  Practice, Criminal, Presence of defendant. 
 
 
 
 
The petitioner, Hairo Baez, appeals from a judgment of the 
county court denying his petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, 
§ 3.  We affirm.1 
 
 
In 2006, Baez, who was then a permanent resident of the 
United States, pleaded guilty to assault and battery by means of 
a dangerous weapon and other offenses.  As a result, he was 
deported to the Dominican Republic.  Several years later, he 
successfully moved to vacate his guilty plea on the ground of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  The charges, except one that 
was voluntarily dismissed by the Commonwealth, are now pending 
against him for a new trial in the District Court.  Baez, still 
located in the Dominican Republic, requested that he be 
permitted to appear virtually at trial, representing that he 
cannot lawfully enter the United States due to the pending 
charges.2  At first, the District Court judge allowed the request 
to appear virtually, but upon the Commonwealth's motion for 
 
 
1 We acknowledge the brief of amici curiae the American 
Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts and the Committee for 
Public Counsel Services. 
 
 
2 In an affidavit, Baez states that an immigration attorney 
so advised him, and we assume for purposes of this decision that 
he indeed cannot enter the country lawfully to attend his own 
trial in person. 
2 
 
reconsideration, she denied the request.  Baez's G. L. c. 211, 
§ 3, petition sought relief from that ruling.  The single 
justice denied relief on the ground that the District Court 
judge did not abuse her discretion by denying the request to 
appear virtually.3  Baez appeals from the single justice's 
decision. 
 
Relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, is extraordinary, and "[w]e 
will not disturb the single justice's denial of relief absent an 
abuse of discretion or other clear error of law."  Garcia v. 
Commonwealth, 486 Mass. 341, 343 (2020), quoting Care & 
Protection of Isabelle, 459 Mass. 1006, 1006 (2011).  The single 
justice neither erred nor abused his discretion by upholding the 
decision of the District Court judge.  Under a standing order in 
force in the District Court, "[a]ny . . . court event not 
specifically listed in [the] Order is presumptively to be held 
in-person."  Boston Municipal Court and District Court Joint 
Standing Order 2-22 § III (2022).  Although the standing order 
authorizes the judge to allow parties to appear virtually for 
certain pretrial hearings in criminal cases if "doing so would 
be consistent with constitutional rights and statutory 
requirements," it makes no such provision for criminal jury 
trials.  See id. § II.  Indeed, under the standing order, a 
criminal bench trial cannot proceed virtually without the 
consent of all parties and the judge.  Id. § II(k).  The 
standing order certainly does not obligate a judge to permit a 
virtual appearance at a jury trial over the Commonwealth's 
objection.  Given the clear language of the standing order, the 
 
 
3 Baez filed a memorandum and appendix pursuant to S.J.C. 
Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001), which requires a 
petitioner seeking relief from an interlocutory ruling of the 
trial court to "set forth the reasons why review of the trial 
court decision cannot adequately be obtained on appeal from any 
final adverse judgment in the trial court or by other available 
means."  On consideration thereof, we allowed his appeal to 
proceed to briefing and oral argument.  In doing so, we noted 
that the single justice had reached the merits of Baez's 
petition after finding that Baez lacked an adequate remedy in 
the ordinary process.  We further noted that our decision to 
allow the appeal to proceed was not dictated by the single 
justice's reaching the merits, but on our own determination that 
Baez lacked an adequate alternative remedy in the circumstances 
of this case.  We take this opportunity to remind litigants not 
to assume that, where the single justice reaches the merits of a 
petition, the requirements of rule 2:21 are necessarily 
satisfied. 
3 
 
District Court judge did not abuse her discretion by denying 
Baez's request to appear virtually for a jury trial over the 
Commonwealth's objection -- regardless whether, as Baez 
contends, such a virtual appearance by the defendant at a jury 
trial would be "consistent with constitutional rights and 
statutory requirements" (questions we need not and do not reach 
here).4  It follows that the single justice neither erred nor 
abused his discretion by denying extraordinary relief.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
Joseph B. Simons for the petitioner. 
 
Catherine Langevin Semel, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
Jessie Rossman, Daniel McFadden, Jennifer Klein, Michael T. 
Packard, & Alex H. Loomis, for American Civil Liberties Union of 
Massachusetts & another, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
4 Baez also argues to this court that he is entitled to 
waive his right to be present in person at trial.  The record 
indicates, however, that he did not make this argument in the 
District Court.  Although he offered to waive his right to 
physical presence, he raised no constitutional or other argument 
why the judge was obligated to allow him to waive his presence 
notwithstanding that the standing order did not provide for such 
a virtual appearance at a jury trial over the Commonwealth's 
objection.  In particular, to the extent that Baez suggests in 
his brief to this court that he has an affirmative entitlement 
to waive his presence at a jury trial on constitutional grounds, 
we see no indication in the record that he raised those issues 
in the District Court.  As the single justice correctly noted, 
therefore, these constitutional questions were not properly 
before him.  We accordingly decline to consider these issues at 
this time.