Title: Sicor, Inc. v. Hutchison

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

121 Nev, Advance Cpinion 82.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA.

SICOR, INC., A DELAWARE No. 59506
CORPORATION; TEVA PARENTERAL
MEDICINES, INC., FORMERLY FIL E D

KNOWN AS SICOR
PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., A 152011
DELAWARE CORPORATION; BAXTER bead
HEALTHCARE CORPORATION, A

DELAWARE CORPORATION; AND

MCKESSON MEDICAL-SURGICAL,

INC,, A DELAWARE CORPORATION,

Appellants,

vs.

STACY HUTCHISON; WILLIAM I.

BILGER, JR., INDIVIDUALLY;

JOANNE ALLEN AND KENNETH G.

ALLEN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS.

HUSBAND AND WIFE; JAMES M.

WILLIAMS AND HEIDI HAMILTON,

INDIVIDUALLY AND AS HUSBAND

AND WIFE; AND MARIA V. PAGAN,

Respondents. |

 

Appeal from a district court order denying a motion for a
change of venue in a tort action. Kighth Judicial District Court, Clark
County; Jerry A. Wiese, Judge.

Affirmed

Lewis & Roca LLP and Daniel F. Polsenberg and Joel D, Henriod, Las
Vegas,
for Appellants.

Matthew L. Sharp, Ltd., and Matthew L. Sharp, Reno; Gillock Markley &
Killebrew, PC, and Gerald I. Gillock and Nia C. Killebrew, Las Vegas;
Friedman Rubin and William S. Cummings, Anchorage, Alaska; Friedman
Rubin and Kenneth R. Friedman, Bremerton, Washington,

for Respondent Stacy Hutchison.

/- 38668

 

 
ne

 

Kemp, Jones & Coulthard LLP and Will Kemp, Las Vegas; Mainor Eglet
and Robert T. Eglet, Las Vegas,

for Respondents William I. Bilger, Jr; Joanne Allen; Kenneth G. Allen;
James M. Williams; Heidi Hamilton; and Maria V. Pagan.

BEFORE SAITTA, C.J., DOUGLAS and HARDESTY, Jd.
OPINION
By the Court, HARDESTY, J.:

In this appeal, appellants challenge the district court’s post-
voir dire denial of their motion for a change of venue in the underlying tort
action, Having recognized the propriety of deferring consideration of such
motions until after the completion of voir dire in our contemporancously
issued opinion in Sicor. Inc. v, Sacks, 127 Nev. _, _ P.3d __ (Adv. Op,
No. 81, December 15, 2011), we now enlarge the test to be applied when
evaluating post-voir dire motions for a change of venue based on pretrial
publicity in civil proceedings. Expanding upon this court's analysis in
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 113 Nev. 610, 939 P.2d
1049 (1997), we hold that the district court must apply a multifactor test
to determine whether there is a reason to believe that the party seeking a
change of venue will not receive a fair trial in the community where the
case originated. Because appellants have not demonstrated that the
circumstances presented here warrant a reasonable belief that a fair trial
of this case could not be had in Clark County, we conclude that the district
court did not manifestly abuse its discretion by denying appellants’ motion
for a change of venue.

 
UAL AND PR¢ CKGR

Appellants are manufacturers of an anesthetic drug, Propofol,
which was used in certain medical procedures by nonparties, the
Endoscopy Center of Southern Nevada and the Desert Shadow Endoscopy
Center. In 2008, the Southern Nevada Health District issued letters to
approximately 60,000 patients of these centers, warning the patients that
they might have been exposed to blood-borne infections, including
hepatitis B, hepatitis C, and HIV. ‘These events have resulted in criminal
investigations, bankruptey proceedings by the two centers and their
principal, Dipak Desai, and the filing of approximately 200 civil actions,
including the underlying district court case, which have been covered by
various media outlets, including newspapers, television stations, radio
broadeasts, and Internet sites.

tial motion for a ‘venue

‘The plaintiffs in the underlying action asserted product
liability claims against appellants and various other claims against other
defendants.! Before the beginning of the trial, appellants filed in district
court a motion to change venue from Clark County, where the action was
pending in Las Vegas, to Washoe County, arguing that adverse pretrial
publicity reasonably prevented appellants from receiving a fair trial in
Clark County, Appellants asserted that news coverage related to this case

was pervs

 

jive and biased, vilifying the various defendants and

‘When this appeal was docketed, trial was scheduled to go forward
only as to appellants. ‘The other defendants have either settled or were
otherwise dismissed from the action.

 

 
engendering community sympathy for the former patients of the
endoscopy clinics. Additionally, appellants contended that media coverage
of one of the related civil actions, in which the jury had returned a $500
million punitive damages verdict against appellants, had further tainted
the jury pool.

In support of their motion, appellants submitted a 2010 report
discussing the results of a survey of the impact of media coverage on
prospective jurors, The survey, which included 408 jury-eligible residents
of Clark County and 392 jury-cligible residents of Washoe County,
indicated, among other things, that 83 percent of Clark County
participants acknowledged having heard of the endoscopy center
litigation, In contrast, 53 percent of Washoe County participants
indicated that they had heard of the litigation. This survey further
reflected that 33.8 percent of Clark County participants and 6.6 percent of
Washoe County participants had heard about a verdict against the
appellant drug manufacturers in a related civil case.

With regard to the media reports covering the endoscopy
center litigation, appellants listed 45 print articles published in the Las
Vegas Review-Journal between April 2009 and April 2010 that
purportedly mentioned the events at the endoscopy clinics. Appellants
also identified 33 print articles and 52 Internet articles apparently related
to the litigation published by the Las Vegas Sun during this period?

*Appellants submitted a 2005 list of the country’s top 100 daily
newspapers by circulation, indicating that the Review-Journal, combined
with the Sun, had a daily circulation of 167,586, and a Sunday cireul;
of 220,723.

 

 

 
Appellants did not, however, submit copies of these articles. For the
period between April 2010 and August 2011, appellants provided the
district court with more than 160 newspaper and Internet articles, with
the majority of the articles having been published between April and June
2010. These articles were taken primarily from six Las Vegas print and
Internet sources, including the Review-Journal and the Sun. The articles
largely included factual accounts of the progress of the first related civil
lawsuit to go to trial and of the criminal proceedings against Dipak Desai
and his staff. While the articles discussing the related civil trial identified
the general allegations of that lawsuit, which were similar to the
allegations in the instant case, statements asserting that appellants were
liable to the endoscopy centers’ former pationts were generally attributed
to respondents’ attorneys, and many of the articles included rebuttal
‘quotations from appellants’ attorneys explaining their bases for denying
liability. As to the articles discussing the criminal cases, to the extent
that they mentioned appellants at all, such references were limited to brief
statements noting the verdict in the related civil ease.

Respondents opposed the motion for a change of venue,
arguing that an attempt to seat a jury using questionnaires and proper
voir dire would reveal that a venue change was not warranted. In arguing
that the trial should be held in Clark County, respondents primarily noted
that it is the largest county in the state, and thus, it has the largest jury
pool. In support of this claim, they submitted data from the United States
Census Bureau indicating that, in 2009, Clark County’s population
exceeded 1.9 million people, while Washoe County, the state's next largest
county, had a population of approximately 414,800.

om

 
oo no ae

 

Upon consideration of the parties’ initial arguments and the

 

evidence presented, the di court concluded that a change of venue
was not warranted at that time, and thus, the court reserved ruling on the
‘motion until after an attempt to select a jury had been made,
The jury-selection process

‘The appellate record shows that at the initial stage of the jury-
selection process, the district court distributed approximately 500
questionnaires to potential jurors, asking, among other things, whether
they had been exposed to information from any source about the parties,
lawyers, or witnesses in this ease. According to appellants, approximately
215 jurors were eliminated on the basis of these questionnaires. It
appears, however, that a substantial portion—well over one-third—were
excluded for reasons other than exposure to pretrial publicity.

Individual interviews

After the exclusion of the approximately 215 potential jurors
based on the questionnaires, the jury-selection process moved forward.
Before proceeding to the next stage of the process, however, the district
court explained to the remaining potential jurors that they were required
to avoid all types of media in order to prevent themselves from being
exposed to outside information about the case. The district court then
examined how the pretrial publicity affected those who had already
learned some information about the case. Not wanting to risk
unnecessarily contaminating any veniremembers, the district court and
the attorneys conducted individual interviews, outside of the presence of
the jury pool, with each potential juror who had indicated, either in a

questionnaire or otherwise during the jury selection process, that he or

 
os

 

she had any prior awareness of the parties or the issues raised in this
case.)

During this process, the district court conducted
approximately 175 individual interviews, Tho potential jurors interviewed
indicated that they had a range of knowledge regarding the case, which

spanned from a very vague idea of the issues involved to a relatively

 

sophisticated understanding of the circumstances underlying the case.
‘The period in which they had most recently heard about the case also
varied widely. Many of the prospective jurors had heard information
about the related cases within a matter of days or weeks before voir dire,
while others had last heard about the cases a few months to more than a
year earlier.

A significant portion of the potential jurors, close to half, were
passed for cause during this phase of the proceeding because they
expressed that they had not formed any opinions that would affect their
ability to impartially consider the merits of the case based on the evidence
presented at trial. Conversely, approximately 90 potential jurors were
excluded during this stage of the jury selection process. Of these
prospective jurors dismissed at this stage, a few were released for reasons

unrelated to preconceived bias, such as personal involvement with the

‘Each day, the district court asked the prospective jurors to raise
their hands to indicate whether they had any pretrial exposure to the case.
It appears from the record and appellants’ assertions that, in addition to
the 145 potential jurors who expressed on their questionnaires that they
had been exposed to pretrial publicity, approximately 30 more prospective
jurors indicated during the individual voir dire process that they had
received out-of-court information regarding the case.

 

 
os

 

case, medical concerns, or a connection to one or more of the attorneys.
Nearly one-third of those excluded were released because they expressed
firm opinions that appellants should not be held liable in this case. Some
of the remaining prospective jurors were dismissed at this point because of
a preformed opinion, based on their media exposure, against appellants,
while others were released because of personal biases developed out of
circumstances other than pretrial publicity. Very few of the jurors
excluded at this stage were dismissed because they indicated that they
believed respondents’ cases had merit based on the fact that they had won
previous cases against appellants.

Only four of the jurors who were ultimately seated on the jury
were interviewed during the individual voir dire phase. As she had in her
questionnaire, Juror 78 informed the court that she had heard on the news
that doctors at a clinic were reusing needles. She also stated that she had
heard that five people were awarded judgments in the millions of dollars
in an earlier case, Juror 78 indicated that she may have a bias against
doctors who reused needles, but that she had no other biases with regard
to the case, She affirmed that she would be able to listen to the facts and
evidence presented before making a decision as to the appropriate outcome
of the trial, and she stated that she could be fair and impartial when
considering the evidence. Appellants did not ask Juror 78 any questions
or challenge her for cause.

Juror 190 acknowledged that his wife's uncle had been a
patient at one of the clinics involved in the case, but stated that the uncle
‘was not involved in any of the litigation. He further expressed that he had
limited media exposure to the case based on information that “came out
years ago.” Juror 190 affirmed that he would be able to listen to the

 
0

evidence and evaluate the facts presented before making a decision as to
the

 

jsues involved. Moreover, he stated that he did not believe that
either

 

ide would be starting with an advantage or disadvantage over the
other side, based on what he knew at that time. Appellants did not ask
Juror 190 any questions or challenge him for cause,

Juror 267 stated that he had read about a similar case
involving two of the appellants being prosecuted for Propofol
contamination, He denied that what he had read had caused him to form
any opinions or conclusions about who should win the case, He further
stated that nothing he had heard should affect his ability to be fair and
impartial and that he believed the parties would be starting from a
neutral position. Finally, Juror 267 told the court that he had not formed
any strong opinions about anything having to do with the case.
Appellants did not ask Juror 257 any questions or challenge him for cause.

Juror 240 informed the court that she had heard about the
case in the media and from doctors at the hospital where she worked. In
particular, she had heard that patients had possibly been infected from a
Propofol injection. She denied that anything she had heard would make it
difficult for her to be fair and impartial, and she affirmed that she would
be able to listen to the evidence presented and make a decision solely
based on that evidence. Juror 240 stated that she had not formed any
strong opinions on any issues related to the case, and she confirmed that
the parties would be starting from the same position. Appellants did not
ask Juror 240 any questions or challenge her for cause.

Seating a jury

Following the completion of the one-on-one interviews, the

court proceeded to the group voir dire stage, during which jurors were

eliminated for reasons unrelated to media exposure. At the conclusion of

 

 
voir dire, the parties exercised their peremptory challenges. Appellants
used all of their peremptory challenges, but did not request any additional
peremptory challenges. The final jury was then seated. The district court
later noted that, when the jury was empaneled, approximately 30
additional potential jurors had been present in the courtroom, while 60
more had been available outside the courtroom.

Once the jury was empaneled, appellants renewed their
motion for a change of venue, arguing that the jury selection process had
revealed that the pretrial publicity had been pervasive, resulting in the
potential jurors having extensive pretrial knowledge of the details of the
case. Appellants also argued that the release of the verdict in a second
related civil trial just days before jury selection began in this case had
created a new wave of media that had influenced the jury pool. Therefore,
appellants contended that a change of venue was necessary because there
was reason to believe that an impartial trial could not be had in Clark
County. In support of their renewed motion, appellants submitted nine
articles published on various Las Vegas media outlets’ websites reporting
on the verdict in the related civil case and four additional articles related
to the criminal proceeding against Dipak Desai. As with the earlier news
reports, these were largely factual accounts of the proceedings in the
related cases.

Respondents opposed the renewed motion, mainly arguing
that anyone who acknowledged having a bias based on exposure to
negative publicity had been excused from the jury panel. The district
court found that the media exposure was not pervasive and prejudicial to
the extent that it was impossible, or even difficult, to seat a jury. Indeed,
the court stated that the jury, as seated, would not only be fair and

10
NE LA EAT ES

1 0 ae

 
impartial, but also was comprised of an appropriate cross section of the
community. Based on its ability to seat a satisfactory jury, the district
court denied appellants’ motion. ‘This appeal followed,
CUSSI

By statute, the district court may change the place of a civil
trial on motion of a party “[wJhen there is reason to believe that an
impartial trial cannot be had” in the county designated in the complaint.
NRS 13.050(2)(b). An order denying a change of venue motion “may only
be reviewed upon a timely direct appeal from the order and may not be
reviewed on appeal from the judgment in the action or proceeding or
otherwise.” NRAP 3A(b)(6)(A). Generally, such an appeal stands
submitted on the briefs and the record transmitted by the district court
without further briefing in this court, but this court may order otherwise if
it 80 chooses. NRAP 3A()(6)(B). This court will not overturn a trial
court's order denying a motion for a change of venue absent a manifest
abuse of discretion. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v, Tarkanian, 113 Nev.
610, 613, 939 P.2d 1049, 1051 (1997).

In Sjeor, Inc. v, Sacks, 127 Nev. _, _ P.3d__ (Adv. Op. No.
81, December 15, 2011), which was decided contemporaneously with this
appeal, we acknowledged that the district court has the authority to defer
ruling on a pre-voir dire motion for a change of venue until after it has
attempted to seat a fair and impartial jury. Thus, we focus our discussion
in this opinion on the proper standard for evaluating the post-voir dire
renewal of a motion to change venue. In light of the novelty of this issue,

we directed the parties to provide supplemental briefing to assist in our

review,

 

 
 

1 ing posts motio: shange of v

Appellants argue that, regardle

 

of when a change of venue
motion in a civil case is considered, the standard for evaluating such a
motion is whether, under the five-factor test set forth in National

Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 113 Nev. 610, 939 P.2d 1049, there

is a reasonable likelihood that the party seeking to change venue will not

 

receive a fair trial. Appellants acknowledge that the empanelment process
may be used as evidence to evaluate the effect of pretrial publicity on the
jury pool, but assert that such evidence must be considered in the context
of the other Tarkanian factors. Additionally, appellants contend that,
applying the factors here, they were entitled to a change of venue because
the media coverage of this and related cases was pervasive and
prejudicial.

Respondents argue that the circumstances demonstrate that it
was possible to empanel an impartial jury in Clark County, noting that
two such juries have also been seated in cases closely related to this one.
Respondents further contend that, in this case, appellants were given
ample opportunity to fully explore any potential juror bias and that the
district court ultimately empaneled an impartial jury with little to no
problems in doing so. On appeal, respondents ask this court to look at the
jury that was actually seated to determine whether appellants were
entitled to a change of venue. They assert that a review of the voir dire
process shows that the seated jurors could, in fact, be fair and impartial,

In the civil context, this court has only addressed a motion to
change venue based on pretrial publicity brought prior to the selection of
the jury. Tarkanian, 113 Nev. 610, 939 P.2d 1049. In Tarkanian, the
court was confronted with an action filed by former University of Nevada
Las Vegas basketball coach Jerry Tarkanian against the National

12

 
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), asserting that the NCAA had
wrongfully attempted to force him out of college-level coaching. Id, at 611,
939 P.2d at 1050, Based on pretrial publicity in favor of Tarkanian, the
NCAA moved, prior to selection of the jury, for a change of venue, arguing
that there was not a reasonable likelihood that it could receive a fair trial
in Clark County, Id, at 611-12, 939 P.2d at 1050. The district court
denied the motion, and the NCAA appealed. Id, at 612, 939 P.2d at 1050-
51.

On appeal, the Tarkanian court relied on two California
opinions, Martinez. v. Superior Court of Placer County, 629 P.2d 502 (Cal.
1981), and People v. Hamilton, 74 P.2d 730 (Cal. 1989), for the
proposition that the trial court must grant a motion to change venue if
there is a “reasonable likelihood” that an impartial trial cannot be had in
the original venue. Tarkanian, 113 Nev. at 612, 939 P.2d at 1051, The
court referred to five factors used by the California courts in evaluating a
motion a for change of venue based on pretrial publicity: “(1) the nature
and extent of pretrial publicity; (2) the size of the community; (3) the
nature and gravity of the lawsuit; (4) the status of the plaintiff and
defendant in the community; and (5) the existence of political overtones in
the case.” Id. (citing Hamilton, 774 P.2d at 737-39). Without specifically
enumerating it as a separate factor, the Tarkanian court also considered
(6) the amount of time that separated the release of the publicity and the
trial. Tarkanian, 113 Nev. at 613-14, 939 P.2d at 1051-52. After

examining the situation in that case in light of certain of these six factors,
the Tarkanian court ultimately concluded that a change of venue was not
warranted. Id. at 614, 939 P.2d at 1052.

 

 
om ae

 

While the Tarkanian case is instructive with regard to
evaluating pre-voir dire change of venue motions, nothing in that opinion
or the civil venue statute prevents a district court from attempting to seat
an impartial jury before finally deciding a change of venue motion. See
Sicor, Inc, v. Sacks, 127 Nev. _, _ P.3d__ (Adv. Op, No, 81, December
15, 2011); see also NRS 13.050; Tarkanian, 113 Nev. 610, 939 P.2d 1049.
Of course, once such an attempt has been made, neither the district court
nor this court may ignore the realities of the voir dire process, See
Hamilton, 774 P.2d at 737 (noting that a post-trial review of a change of
venue motion is retrospective and involves an examination of the voir dire

 

process). Indeed, if the court could ignore the jury selection proceedings,
there would be no reason to attempt to seat a jury before deciding a
motion for a change of venue,

Nevertheless, the jury selection process cannot be the only
criteria for evaluating a change of venue motion post-voir dire, Because,
in the civil context, the party seeking a change of venue will not be able to
have the denial of a venue motion reviewed on appeal from a final
judgment, compare NRAP 3A(b)(6)(A) (providing that review of a change
of venue motion in a civil action may only be had upon timely appeal from
the denial of the motion and not on appeal from a final judgment), with
RS 174.455(3) (explaining that a denial of a change of venue motion in a
criminal action may only be reviewed on appeal from a final judgment), it
is vital for a court addressing a post-voir dire change of venue motion to
give full consideration to the trial atmosphere to account for the possibility
of prejudice that could be hidden during the voir dire process or even
unrealized by the potential jurors themselves. Thus, the six factors
identified in Tarkanian remain relevant, even after an attempt to seat a

4

 
jury has been made, as they give due consideration to the environment in
which the trial is sot to be held. See Tarkanian, 113 Nev. at 612-13, 939
P.2d at 1051. After an attempt to seat a jury has been made, however, the
factors must be considered in light of any information received during the
voir dire process. See Hamilton, 774 P.2d at 737.

In addition to considering the six Tarkanian factors in light of
the jury selection process, however, a post-voir dire review of a change of
venue motion should also involve direct consideration of the voir dire
proceedings to the extent that they aro relevant to the motion. To this
extent, we believe that the following additional factors will be useful in
(7) the care
used and the difficulty encountered in selecting a jury, (8) the familiarity

considering future post-voir dire change of venue motion:

 

of potential jurors with pretrial publicity, (9) the effect of the publicity on
the jurors, and (10) the challenges exercised by the party seeking a change
of venue. See Unger v. Cauchon, 73 P.3d 1005, 1007-08 (Wash. Ct. App.
2003) (identifying the above factors as relevant to a change of venue
motion). We stress that, when applying this multifactor test, the issue is
not whether the potential jurors have learned information about the case
outside the courtroom, as “an ignorant jury is neither the hallmark nor the
sine qua non of a constitutionally qualified jury.” Ford v, State, 102 Nev.
126, 129, 717 P.2d 27, 29 (1986). The question instead is whether there is
4 reason to believe that the community in which the case has been brought

will not “yield a jury qualified to deliberate impartially and upon
competent trial evidence.” Id; NRS 13.050(2)(b) (providing that the
district court may change the place of trial “[wJhen there is reason to
believe that an impartial trial cannot be had” in the original venue).

 

 
 

Applying the standard

Having set forth the standard for addressing post-voir dire
venue motions, we turn to the voir dire proceedings in this case. For
continuity of our discussion, we take the applicable factors out of the order
in which they are identified in the above discussion.

Size of the community.

While the size of the community is not dispositive, it is
certainly significant that Clark County has, by far, the largest population,
and thus, the largest jury pool, of any county in the state. Indeed,
according to the 2009 data before us, Clark County's population of more
than 1.9 million people is more than 4 times that of Washoe County, the
next largest county in the state and the county to which appellants sought
to have the trial in this case transferred. Thus, the potential for dilution
of the information and for a greater number of untainted jurors is far
greater in Clark County than elsewhere in the state, and this factor does
‘not weigh in favor of a venue change. See Martinez v. Superior Court of
Placer County, 629 P.2d 502, 506 (Cal. 1981) (recognizing that courts are
more likely to deny a motion for a change of venue when the trial is
scheduled in a populous urban area).

‘Nature and gravity of the lawsuit

Without a doubt, the events underlying this case have
seriously impacted the lives of thousands of Clark County citizens. But
the record does not demonstrate that this is the kind of case that has
ignited the emotions of the community against appellants or otherwise
created an atmosphere that would prevent them from receiving a fair trial.
See Ford, 102 Nev. at 130, 717 P.2d at 30 (considering whether pretrial
publicity had so corrupted the trial atmosphere as to preclude a fair trial).
Instead, the jury selection process demonstrated that the potential jurors’

16

 
feelings did not run strongly either in favor of or against appellants based
‘on the nature of the case, but that their opinions varied from person to
person, Thus, appellants have not shown that the nature and gravity of
the lawsuit weighed in favor of transferring the place of trial.

‘Nature and extent of pretrial publicity

Appellants submitted a plethora of newspaper and Internet

  

articles regarding the initial incidents at the clinies, the first civil cases to
go to trial and reach a verdict, and the criminal investigation and
proceedings related to Dipak Desai and his staff. While some of these
articles expressed outrage over the actions of Desai and the clinic
employees, the same level of emotion was not found in the articles that
discussed the civil trials or appellants’ involvement in these cases. In fact,
contrary to appellants’ characterization of the pretrial publicity as
prejudicially vilifying them, much of the reporting with regard to
appellants was limited to factual accounts of their role in the litigation.
Additionally, any accusatory statements regarding appellants’ potential
liability were generally attributed clearly and directly to respondents, and
many such statements were countered with appellants’ own explanation of
their position in the case. Thus, our review of this evidence does not
reveal the kind of inflammatory or polarizing material associated with a
need for a change of venue. See id.

‘Time between the publicity and the trial

In this case, the bulk of the media reports submitted for
consideration with appellants’ motion to change the place of trial were
published just under a year and a half before the voir dire proceedings
began. ‘The publicity was renewed, however, in the days and weeks
leading up to jury selection, when a verdict in one of the related civil cases
was released. ‘Thus, these media reports were fresh in the minds of some

7
LAT ELL ET SE EA TES

 

 
ae

 

of the prospective jurors. ‘The jury selection process confirmed that a
number of potential jurors were aware of this recent media, stating in the
individual voir dire sessions that they had heard information about the
case in the preceding days and weeks before voir dire, Nevertheless, it
does not appear that this burst of media was as pervasive as the earlier
publicity, as other prospective jurors stated that they had last received
information about the case months or even years before the jury selection
process began. Under these circumstances, this factor does not weigh
strongly for or against a change of venue.

Potential jurors’ familiarity with the publicity

As to the potential jurors’ exposure to this media, just under
half of the potential jurors who filled out questionnaires denied having
any prior knowledge of the case. Although approximately 30 of those
prospective jurors later indicated, during the individual voir dire
proceedings, that they had received some outside information about the
case, a significant proportion of the jury pool remained free from any
awareness of pretrial exposure to the issues involved in this case.
Moreover, of the jurors who had learned something about the case through
the media, the levels of exposure varied greatly, with several potential
jurors having heard very little about the circumstances of the case, while
others had followed the events closely. Not surprisingly, most of the
potential jurors with some knowledge of the case fell somewhere in
between these two extremes, with many expressing that they had a
general idea about the allegations underlying the case but not a
significant understanding of the details. Considering that many of the
prospective jurors had limited knowledge or no knowledge of the publicity,
this factor weighs against a change of venue in this case.

18

 
 

yublicity on potentis

 

‘As discussed above, the media reports regarding appellants
were generally factual reports, and the jury selection process did not
reveal that the publicity had an overwhelming effect on the opinions of the
veniremembers. In fact, of the potential jurors dismissed based on @
preconceived opinion, approximately one-third were excluded because they
held a strong bias in favor of appellants. A number of potential jurors
were also eliminated based on general biases developed from personal
experiences, rather than based on any pretrial publicity that they had
seen or read. Only a very small number of potential jurors indicated that
the fact that previous plaintiffs had won cases against appellants might
influence their consideration of this case; those potential jurors were
promptly excused from this case. While some jurors were dismissed
because they had formed strong opinions against respondents based on
media accounts of the case, the overalll jury selection process did not show
that the pretrial publicity had a substantial effect on the jury pool, and
thus, this factor also weighs against changing the venue.

Care used and difficu! challenges used

‘The district court took great care during the jury selection
process in this case, and thus, it was not quick, but our review of the
record also shows that it was not particularly difficult. By starting with a
large pool of potential jurors, the district court was able to liberally
dismiss any jurors who indicated that they had a bias coming into this
case. With the court routinely dismissing such jurors, appellants needed
to raise very few challenges for cause, and none of the few expressly
challenged jurors remained on the final panel. Additionally, appellants
exercised all of their peremptory challenges but did not request any
additional peremptory challenges to attempt to eliminate the few seated

19

 
jurors who had been exposed to pretrial publicity related to the case. ‘The
record further shows that appellants also did not try to challenge any of
the seated jurors for cause. And despite dismissing a number of jurors
throughout the process, a significant pool of available jurors remained
after the individual voir dire so

 

ions, as well as after the final jury was
seated. Indeod, following group voir dire and the seating of the jury, the
district court noted that some 30 potential jurors had remained in the
courtroom, while another 50 had been available outside the courtroom. As
‘a result, this factor does not weigh in favor of a change of venue.

‘Status of the parties; political overtones

Finally, none of the evidence presented in this case has
demonstrated that either the status of the parties or any political
overtones are factors that should have a significant impact on the
consideration of the change of venue motion in this case.

Having considered the relevant standard, we conclude that
each of the six Tarkanian factors and the four additional factors identified
herein either weighs against changing the venue from Clark County or
does not have a significant impact on the analysis of the change of venue
motion in this case. In summary, the record evidence demonstrated that,
although this case and the related cases received a fair amount of pretrial

publicity, some of which was viewed by potential jurors, it was not of a

kkind or to the extent that it tainted the jury pool, leading to a reasonable
belief that appellants could not receive a fair trial in Clark County.
‘Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the

 

 
  
  
 
  
    
 
 
   
  
  
   
    
   
    
    
   

‘otion for a change of venue, and we affirm the district court’s order

An wee, a

Hardesty

Ca. Legh J
Dougla:

4In light of this opinion, we vacate the stay of the district court
roceedings ordered by this court on October 27, 2011. We note that the
instant trial has been stayed for a relatively extended period of timo, with
¢he empaneled jurors having been instructed to avoid exposure to media
elated to this case. Appellants have suggested that a likelihood exists
at the jury will not be able to stand as seated once the trial is resumed
cause of exposure to publicity during the break. At this point, we have
1 reason to believe that the jurors are not following the instructions given
the court that they must avoid gaining any outside information about
this case. If, however, on the resumption of the trial, evidence were to
rise demonstrating that the jurors in this case were accessing media
hile the case was stayed, such a circumstance may raise an issue of juror
isconduct, but would not be relevant to the change of venue motion
tself.

lenying that motion.

 

‘To the extent that appellants seek review of the district court's
ienial of their motion for reconsideration, that order is not substantively
.ppealable. See Alvis v. State, Gaming Control Bd., 99 Nev. 184, 660 P.2d

}0 (1983), disapproved on other grounds by AA Prime Builders v.
126 Nev. __, 245 P.3d 1190 (2010). Additionally, under our
lecision in Sicor, Inc. v. Sacks, 127 Nev. _, __ P-3d ___ (Adv. Op. No.
11, December 15, 2011), we lack jurisdiction to consider appellants’ appeal
m the district court order deferring ruling on appellants’ motion to