Title: State v. Hoffman

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Hoffman, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-4795.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-4795 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. HOFFMAN, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Hoffman, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-4795.] 
Arrests—Warrants—Neutral 
and 
detached 
magistrate—Probable 
cause-
determination—Affidavit that merely concludes that suspect committed a 
particular crime does not support finding of probable cause—
Exclusionary rule does not apply when police act in objectively 
reasonable reliance on binding appellate predecent. 
(No. 2013-0688—Submitted April 8, 2014—Decided November 4, 2014.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lucas County,  
No. L-12-1262, 2013-Ohio-1082. 
_____________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  A neutral and detached magistrate or other person authorized under Crim.R. 
4(A)(1) must make a probable-cause determination before an arrest 
warrant can be issued. 
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2.  A complaint or affidavit, offered as a basis for the issuance of an arrest 
warrant, does not support a finding of probable cause when it merely 
concludes that the person whose arrest is sought has committed a 
particular crime. 
3.  When the police conduct a search in objectively reasonable, good-faith 
reliance upon binding appellate precedent, the exclusionary rule does not 
apply. 
____________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case, defendant-appellant, Brandon Hoffman, challenges the 
use of evidence obtained as the result of his arrest pursuant to three misdemeanor 
arrest warrants.  We agree with the trial court and court of appeals that the arrest 
warrants were issued improperly because there was no determination of probable 
cause.  However, we also agree that the remedy of suppression of the evidence 
obtained pursuant to these defective warrants is not available in this instance, 
because the officers relied in good faith upon a procedure that had been validated 
by the Sixth District Court of Appeals.  We therefore affirm the judgment of the 
court of appeals. 
Case Background 
{¶ 2} On November 11, 2011, in Toledo Municipal Court, a Toledo 
Police detective filed three criminal complaints and requests for warrants to arrest, 
charging Brandon Hoffman with theft, criminal damaging, and “house stripping 
prohibited,” all first-degree misdemeanors.  Each complaint cited the relevant 
statute, recited the statutory elements for the offense charged, and, in a brief 
narrative statement, identified the victim, the location of the offense, and the 
property taken or removed.  Based on the statements in the complaint, the deputy 
clerk issued the warrants.  Hoffman was notified by letter that he could avoid 
arrest by scheduling a court appearance before November 29. 
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{¶ 3} On November 26, 2011, Toledo police responded to a “call for 
service” to a residential address.  Inside the residence, they found the dead body 
of Scott Holzhauer.  A gun safe in an adjacent area was open.  Neighbors stated 
that someone named Brandon had recently visited Holzhauer and had been 
interested in purchasing guns from him.  When further information identified this 
Brandon as Brandon Hoffman, a computer check revealed that he had active 
misdemeanor arrest warrants. 
{¶ 4} The police decided to execute the arrest warrants.  At the address 
listed in the warrants, officers looked through a window and observed Hoffman 
lying on the floor inside, apparently sleeping.  They knocked on the front door, 
and a man let them in.  When they arrested Hoffman, they discovered a .45 caliber 
Ruger semi-automatic on the floor where Hoffman was lying.  The gun was later 
identified as belonging to Holzhauer.  Two cell phones were nearby, in plain 
view, and when an officer used her own phone to call Holzhauer’s cell-phone 
number, one of the phones immediately rang.  Based on this information, an 
affidavit for a search warrant was prepared and later executed, resulting in the 
collection of additional evidence. 
{¶ 5} Hoffman was charged in a two-count indictment with aggravated 
murder in violation of R.C. 2903.01(B) and aggravated robbery in violation of 
R.C. 2911.01(A)(3), a felony of the first degree.  Hoffman challenged the legality 
of his arrest and filed a motion to suppress all evidence collected as a result of that 
arrest.  Specifically, he contended that officers lacked a valid warrant to arrest 
him.  In a supplement to his motion to suppress, he clarified that the arrest 
warrants were invalid because no probable-cause determination was made by 
anyone before the warrants were issued and because the criminal complaints on 
which the warrants were based contained on their face no information that would 
support a finding of probable cause. 
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{¶ 6} A suppression hearing was held.  The trial court found that the 
officer who had obtained the three misdemeanor arrest warrants, Detective Kim 
Violanti, failed to submit any information from which the deputy clerk could have 
found the existence of probable cause on the three misdemeanor charges.  The 
court also found that the Toledo Municipal Court’s internal guidelines for 
handling complaints and warrants violated the United States and Ohio 
Constitutions.  Nevertheless, the court concluded that it was bound by the 
precedent established in State v. Overton, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-99-1317, 2000 
WL 1232422 (Sept. 1, 2000).  In Overton, the Sixth District Court of Appeals had 
established that a warrant, almost identical in form and substance to the ones at 
issue, complied with the requirements of Crim.R. 4(A)(1) and the Fourth 
Amendment.  Because the officers who arrested Hoffman could not reasonably be 
expected to question this authority, the trial court determined that they did not 
deliberately, recklessly, or with gross negligence violate Hoffman’s rights and 
that suppression would have no deterrent effect in this instance.  The motion to 
suppress was denied. 
{¶ 7} Nine days later, Hoffman withdrew his not-guilty plea and entered 
a plea of no contest to the two felony offenses charged in the indictment.  The 
trial court found him guilty and sentenced Hoffman to life without parole for the 
aggravated murder and to 11 years’ imprisonment for the aggravated robbery, to 
be served concurrently. 
{¶ 8} Hoffman appealed to the Sixth District Court of Appeals.  He 
argued that the trial court committed reversible error when it denied his motion to 
suppress, despite recognizing the obvious Fourth Amendment violation.  He urged 
the appellate court to overrule its decision in Overton. 
{¶ 9} The Sixth District Court of Appeals agreed with Hoffman that the 
“mere recitation of the statutory elements of the crime is not sufficient to support 
a finding that probable cause exists.”  6th Dist. Lucas No. L-12-1262, 2013-Ohio-
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1082, 989 N.E.2d 156, ¶ 17.  It concluded that the misdemeanor arrest warrants 
were invalid due to the deputy clerk’s admission that they were issued without 
any probable-cause determination.  Id. at ¶ 16.  The court of appeals recognized 
that its holding was inconsistent with Overton and overruled it to that extent.  Id. 
at ¶ 19.  Nevertheless, the Sixth District affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny 
suppression because the officers acted in good-faith reliance on the validity of the 
warrants based on the information available to them at the time. 
{¶ 10} Hoffman appealed to this court, and we accepted jurisdiction on 
the sole proposition of law: “There can be no good faith reliance on the validity of 
an arrest warrant issued without a magisterial finding of probable cause.”  136 
Ohio St.3d 1472, 2013-Ohio-3790, 993 N.E.2d 777. 
Analysis 
No warrant shall issue but upon probable cause 
{¶ 11} Hoffman argues that his rights under the United States and Ohio 
Constitutions were violated.  The Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides: 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
 
The language of Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution is virtually 
identical to the language in the Fourth Amendment, and we have interpreted 
Article I, Section 14 as affording the same protection as the Fourth Amendment.  
State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 238-239, 685 N.E.2d 762 (1997). 
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{¶ 12} The Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 14 require probable 
cause to search or seize.  And the Fourth Amendment has been interpreted to 
mean that probable cause must be determined by a neutral and detached 
magistrate rather than by an official of the executive branch whose duty is to 
enforce the law, to investigate, and to prosecute.  See Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 450, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).  This 
requirement reflects “our basic constitutional doctrine that individual freedoms 
will best be preserved through a separation of powers and division of functions 
among the different branches and levels of Government.”  United States v. United 
States Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Michigan, S. Div., 407 U.S. 297, 317, 92 S.Ct. 
2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972), citing Harlan, Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping 
the Judicial Function in Balance, 49 A.B.A.J. 943, 944 (1963). 
{¶ 13} We have recently addressed the importance of a neutral and 
detached magistrate in a case in which a detective from the Summit County 
Sheriff’s Department submitted a complaint, request for an arrest warrant, and 
affidavit to a deputy clerk at Barberton Municipal Court who was also employed 
by the sheriff’s department.  State v. Hobbs, 133 Ohio St.3d 43, 2012-Ohio-3886, 
975 N.E.2d 965.  The deputy clerk reviewed the documents, determined that 
probable cause existed, and issued an arrest warrant.  The trial court denied the 
defendant’s motion to suppress.  The appellate court affirmed, finding that no 
evidence had been obtained as a result of the warrant while conceding that the 
warrant had been improperly issued.  We agreed with the court of appeals that the 
warrant was invalid, stating: 
 
[T]he deputy clerk’s dual position as a sergeant in the 
sheriff’s department located in the same county served by the 
Barberton Municipal Court creates an inappropriate tension 
between the executive function of law enforcement and the judicial 
January Term, 2014 
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function of determining probable cause.  The deputy clerk’s dual-
capacity position blurs the separation and threatens the 
independence of the executive and judicial functions.  Further, the 
dual-capacity position places the deputy clerk at risk of divided 
loyalties and conflicting duties * * *.  The result is that the deputy 
clerk lacks the requisite neutrality and detachment to make the 
probable-cause determination necessary for issuing a valid warrant 
pursuant to Crim.R. 4(A)(1). 
 
Id. at ¶ 19.  We held that “[a] person acting in a dual capacity as deputy sheriff for 
a county and deputy clerk for a municipal court located in that same county is not 
a neutral and detached magistrate for purposes of determining whether probable 
cause exists for issuing an arrest warrant.”  Id. at syllabus.  We were not called 
upon to opine on the validity of the probable-cause determination itself. 
{¶ 14} The issuance of an arrest warrant is governed by Crim.R. 4(A)(1), 
which states: 
 
If it appears from the complaint, or from an affidavit or 
affidavits filed with the complaint, that there is probable cause to 
believe that an offense has been committed, and that the defendant 
has committed it, a warrant for the arrest of the defendant, or a 
summons in lieu of a warrant, shall be issued by a judge, 
magistrate, clerk of court, or officer of the court designated by the 
judge, to any law enforcement officer authorized by law to execute 
or serve it. 
The finding of probable cause may be based upon hearsay 
in whole or in part, provided there is a substantial basis for 
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believing the source of the hearsay to be credible and for believing 
that there is a factual basis for the information furnished. 
 
Thus, the purpose of a complaint or affidavit is to set forth sufficient information 
to enable the decisionmaker to personally determine from the facts whether it is 
likely that an offense has been committed by the named individual.  A mere 
conclusory statement that the person whose arrest is sought has committed a 
crime is insufficient to justify a finding of probable cause.  It is also not enough 
that probable cause may later be determined to exist.  A neutral and detached 
magistrate or other person authorized under Crim.R. 4(A)(1) must make a 
probable-cause determination before an arrest warrant can be issued.  See 
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 450-451, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564. 
The Procedure Used in Obtaining Hoffman’s Arrest Warrants 
{¶ 15} At the hearing on Hoffman’s motion to suppress, evidence was 
presented on the procedure that Toledo police used to obtain an arrest warrant.  
According to Detective Violanti, Hoffman’s arrest warrants were obtained in the 
usual way.  On a form provided by the municipal court, the officer seeking a 
warrant would record the offender’s name, address, and other identifiers, cite the 
statute that was violated, the name of the offense, its classification, and the date of 
the offense.  A space was provided, beginning with the printed words, “TO WIT,” 
in which the officer would type a description of the particular incident giving rise 
to the charge.  The officer would sign the form and present it to the clerk, who 
would “look [it] over,” take the officer’s oath, and sign the form. In this case, 
along with the complaints for the warrant, the officer filed praecipes, which 
contained the victim’s name and the names of the two witnesses. 
 
 
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{¶ 16} Hoffman’s first warrant alleged theft:  
 
The defendant did take, without the consent of the owner 
Lamar Pittmon, take [sic] siding, downspouts and gutters from the 
victims [sic] rental property at 337 Chapin Toledo, Ohio 43609 
City of Toledo, Lucas County.  [See Appendix A.] 
 
{¶ 17} The second alleged criminal damaging:  
 
The defendant did remove, dismantled [sic] siding, gutters, 
downspouts to a house at 337 Chapin Toledo Ohio 43609, this act 
caused substantial damage to the property [sic]. This was without 
the authorization of the owner/victim Lamarr Pittmon.City [sic] of 
Toledo Lucas County.  [See Appendix B.] 
 
{¶ 18} The third alleged “house stripping prohibited”: 
 
The defendant did, without permission or authorization 
from victim/owner Lamar Pittmon, take/ [sic] remove siding, 
downspouts and gutters from 337 Chapin Toledo, Ohio 43609 on 
or about 10/25 1 City of Toledo Lucas County.  [See Appendix C.] 
 
{¶ 19} All three complaints fail to identify the source of their information.  
They do not state that Violanti witnessed the offense.  They do not explain how 
she came to believe that Hoffman had committed the misdemeanor offenses he 
was charged with.  They are not accompanied by supporting affidavits.  Rather, 
each complaint simply states that Hoffman violated every element of the 
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particular misdemeanor offense.  Violanti testified at the suppression hearing that 
no one asked her why she concluded that Hoffman had committed the offenses.1   
{¶ 20} The deputy clerk who signed and issued the three arrest warrants 
had been employed by the Toledo Municipal Court for 17 years.  She testified that 
when an officer came in for a warrant, she would verify that the complaint 
included the offender’s correct name and address, the violation codes, the charge, 
the offense classification, the date of the offense, a description of the offense, and 
the signature of the officer.  But she also stated that she never asked an officer any 
questions.  With regard to the warrants issued against Hoffman, the deputy clerk 
specifically testified that she did not make a probable-cause determination.  When 
asked if she knew what probable cause is, she said, “no, I don’t.”  She denied that 
it was part of her job responsibility to make a finding of probable cause.  She 
simply gave the officer the oath, issued the warrants, and placed them into the 
computer system. 
{¶ 21} Also admitted into evidence at the suppression hearing was an 
internal document used by Toledo Municipal Court deputy clerks as a guide for 
swearing in affidavits.  Deputy clerks are instructed as follows: 
 
1. When an officer or complainant brings an affidavit to the 
counter, you should quickly look over the affidavit for the 
following items: 
 Type of affidavit (In Custody, Open Warrant or 
Summons to Issue) 
                                          
 
1 The trial court commented in a footnote in its decision that it believed that “a determination of 
probable cause could have been found by the issuing authority had the Detective included in her 
affidavit or sworn statement the source of her conclusion to which she testified that Brandon 
Hoffman committed the offenses charged.”   
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 Name and address of the defendant 
 Code source is checked (TMC or ORC) 
 RB No. (mostly used by TPD) 
 Code No. (the violation number such as 537.19A, etc.) 
 Charge (violation description such as Domestic Violence) 
 Classification (such as M-2) 
 Offense Date 
 Description of the incident 
 Signature of the officer or complainant (the defendant’s 
copy also needs to be signed). 
If the officer or complainant is filing the affidavit at the 
counter, you may let him or her know if something is missing as a 
courtesy.  Once the affidavit is clerked in, it cannot be altered.  
This means you cannot call an officer to come back if something is 
missing.  You also must accept all affidavits even if they are not 
complete. 
2. Ask the Officer / Complainant to raise his or her right 
hand and say: 
“Do you swear that the statements made in this affidavit 
are true and is that your true and legal signature.” 
3. Sign the affidavit on the signature line at the bottom of 
the affidavit.  * * * 
4. Time Stamp and Seal the affidavit. 
 
(Italics sic.) 
{¶ 22} Nowhere in the guidelines are the clerks instructed about making a 
finding of probable cause.  The former supervisor responsible for creating these 
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guidelines also testified that during her 17 years of swearing in criminal 
complaints, she did not know what probable cause was and had never made a 
probable-cause determination. 
{¶ 23} A complaint or affidavit that merely concludes that the person 
whose arrest is sought has committed a crime is not sufficient to support a finding 
that probable cause exists for an arrest warrant.  Giordenello v. United States, 357 
U.S. 480, 486, 78 S.Ct. 1245, 2 L.Ed.2d 1503 (1958).  “Recital of some of the 
underlying circumstances in the affidavit is essential if the magistrate is to 
perform his detached function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the 
police.”  United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 
684 (1965).  It is clear from the testimony and documentary evidence offered at 
the suppression hearing that Hoffman’s misdemeanor warrants were issued 
without a probable-cause determination and therefore are invalid. 
Suppression of Evidence is Not an Automatic Remedy  
{¶ 24} Having concluded that Hoffman’s arrest warrants were issued 
without a probable-cause determination in violation of the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution, 
we must determine whether he is entitled to exclusion of the evidence obtained as 
a result of the service of the invalid warrants.  The United States Supreme Court 
has stated that “suppression is not an automatic consequence of a Fourth 
Amendment violation.”  Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137, 129 S.Ct. 
695, 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009).  “The Fourth Amendment contains no provision 
expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands 
* * *.”  United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 
(1984).  Instead, the exclusionary rule is “a judicially created remedy designed to 
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather 
than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.”  United States v. 
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974).  Whether the 
January Term, 2014 
13 
exclusionary rule’s remedy of suppression is appropriate in a particular context is 
a separate analysis from whether there has been a Fourth Amendment violation.  
Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10, 115 S.Ct. 1185, 131 L.Ed.2d 34 (1995), quoting 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). 
{¶ 25} When applying the exclusionary rule, a court must also consider 
the substantial social costs.  Leon at 907. 
 
Exclusion exacts a heavy toll on both the judicial system and 
society at large.  Stone [v. Powell], 428 U.S. [465, 490-491], 96 
S.Ct. 3037, [49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976)].  It almost always requires 
courts to ignore reliable, trustworthy evidence bearing on guilt or 
innocence.  Ibid. And its bottom-line effect, in many cases, is to 
suppress the truth and set the criminal loose in the community 
without punishment. See Herring, supra, at 141 * * *.  Our cases 
hold that society must swallow this bitter pill when necessary, but 
only as a “last resort.”  Hudson [v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591, 
126 S.Ct. 2159, 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006).]  For exclusion to be 
appropriate, the deterrence benefits of suppression must outweigh 
its heavy costs. See Herring, supra, at 141 * * *; Leon, supra, [468 
U.S.] at 910, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677. 
 
Davis v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 2427, 180 L.Ed.2d 285 
(2011). 
{¶ 26} The issue therefore becomes whether suppression of the evidence 
in this case will create a sufficient deterrent effect to prevent future violations of 
the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 14. 
{¶ 27} Hoffman concedes that the exclusionary rule “is not an individual 
right,” Herring, 555 U.S. at 141, 129 S.Ct. 695, 172 L.Ed.2d 496, and that it 
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“applies only where it ‘ “ result[s] in appreciable deterrence,” ’ ” id., quoting Leon 
at 909.  He argues, however, that the Toledo Police Department’s 17-year pattern 
of submitting bare-bones complaints to be rubber-stamped by the Toledo 
Municipal Court without any probable-cause determination was so reckless and 
grossly negligent as to justify the exclusion of evidence in this case. 
{¶ 28} The state counters that the exclusionary rule was designed to 
exclude evidence obtained as the result of police misconduct and that it should not 
be applied to hold law enforcement responsible for the errors of judicial 
employees.  The state contends that the officers relied in good faith on the arrest 
warrants and could not have reasonably been expected to question their validity 
when the procedure followed in obtaining those warrants had been approved by 
the court of  appeals in the relevant jurisdiction. 
The Good-Faith Exception 
{¶ 29} The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule was officially 
recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 
3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677, and adopted in Ohio in State v. Wilmoth, 22 Ohio St.3d 
251, 490 N.E.2d 1236 (1986).  The exception provides that the exclusionary rule 
should not be applied to bar use of evidence obtained by officers acting in 
objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and 
neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause.  
Leon at 918-923, 926. 
{¶ 30} In Leon, a confidential informant of unproven reliability told police 
that he knew where a large drug-trafficking operation was located and that he had 
personally witnessed a drug sale at that location, a private residence.  Police 
launched an extensive investigation and eventually applied for a warrant to search 
several addresses and vehicles.  The application was reviewed by several deputy 
district attorneys, and a facially valid search warrant was issued by a state court 
judge.  Large quantities of drugs and other evidence were seized pursuant to the 
January Term, 2014 
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warrant, and the defendants filed motions to suppress.  Both the district court and 
circuit court concluded that the affidavit was insufficient to establish probable 
cause, but declined to adopt a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. 
{¶ 31} The United States Supreme Court was presented with the sole 
question of whether the exclusionary rule should be modified to create a good-
faith exception.  The court balanced the benefits and costs of suppressing 
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 907.  It noted that 
the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct.  Id. at 
916.  But where an officer’s actions are objectively reasonable, the court 
concluded that there is little value in excluding the evidence, because applying the 
exclusion will not affect how the officer acts: 
 
This is particularly true, we believe, when an officer acting 
with objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from a 
judge or magistrate and acted within its scope. In most such cases, 
there is no police illegality and thus nothing to deter. It is the 
magistrate’s responsibility to determine whether the officer’s 
allegations establish probable cause and, if so, to issue a warrant 
comporting in form with the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment. In the ordinary case, an officer cannot be expected to 
question the magistrate’s probable-cause determination or his 
judgment that the form of the warrant is technically sufficient. 
“[O]nce the warrant issues, there is literally nothing more the 
policeman can do in seeking to comply with the law.”  [Stone], 428 
U.S. at 498, 96 S.Ct. [3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067] (Burger, C.J., 
concurring). Penalizing the officer for the magistrate’s error, rather 
than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of 
Fourth Amendment violations. 
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(Footnotes omitted.) Leon, 468 U.S. at 920-921, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677. 
{¶ 32} Although the existence of a warrant normally signifies that a law-
enforcement officer has acted in good faith, this is not always the case.  In Leon, 
the United States Supreme Court cautioned that an officer’s reliance on the 
warrant must be objectively reasonable: 
 
Suppression therefore remains an appropriate remedy if the 
magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was misled by information 
in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known 
was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth. Franks v. 
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978).  
The exception we recognize today will also not apply in cases 
where the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role in 
the manner condemned in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 
319, 99 S.Ct. 2319, 60 L.Ed.2d 920 (1979); in such circumstances, 
no reasonably well trained officer should rely on the warrant. Nor 
would an officer manifest objective good faith in relying on a 
warrant based on an affidavit “so lacking in indicia of probable 
cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely 
unreasonable.” Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. [590,] 610-611, 95 S.Ct. 
[2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975)] (Powell, J., concurring in part); see 
Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at 263-264, 103 S.Ct. [2317, 76 
L.Ed.2d 527] (White, J., concurring in the judgment). Finally, 
depending on the circumstances of the particular case, a warrant 
may be so facially deficient—i. e., in failing to particularize the 
place to be searched or the things to be seized—that the executing 
officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid. Cf. 
January Term, 2014 
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Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. [981,] at 988-991, 104 S.Ct. 
[3424, 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984)]. 
 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677. 
{¶ 33} The United States Supreme Court has extended the Leon good-
faith exception to the execution of invalid arrest warrants.  Herring, 555 U.S. 135, 
129 S.Ct. 695, 172 L.Ed.2d 496; Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 115 S.Ct. 1185, 131 L.Ed.2d 
34. 
{¶ 34} Hoffman asserts that there can be no good-faith reliance on the 
arrest warrants in this case because the deputy clerk had wholly abandoned her 
judicial role as a neutral and detached magistrate when she failed to make a 
probable-cause determination when issuing the arrest warrants.  We do not agree.  
There is no evidence in this case that the deputy clerk was anything other than a 
neutral and detached magistrate. 
{¶ 35} The facts of this case are not like those in Lo-Ji Sales, 442 U.S. 
319, 99 S.Ct. 2319, 60 L.Ed.2d 920, cited in Leon as an example of case falling 
outside of the good-faith exception because the issuing magistrate “wholly 
abandoned his judicial role” in such a manner that no reasonable officer could 
rely on the warrant.  Leon at 923.  In Lo-Ji Sales, a state police investigator 
purchased two films from an adult bookstore believing that they violated New 
York’s obscenity laws.  He submitted the films to a town justice, who viewed 
them and apparently concluded that they were obscene.  The investigator then 
swore out an affidavit in support of an application for a search warrant.  The 
application requested that the town justice accompany the investigator during the 
search to determine whether any other items in the store violated the law.  The 
town justice issued the warrant, which authorized the seizure of “[t]he following 
items that the Court independently [on examination] has determined to be 
[obscene].”  Id. at 322-323.  But the list of items was added to the warrant only 
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after they were seized in the ensuing search of the bookstore, with the town justice 
participating with numerous law-enforcement officers. 
{¶ 36} The United States Supreme Court concluded that the search 
warrant was invalid because the town justice “did not manifest the neutrality and 
detachment” required of a judicial officer under the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 
326.  “He allowed himself to become a member, if not the leader, of the search 
party which was essentially a police operation. Once in the store, he conducted a 
generalized search under authority of an invalid warrant; he was not acting as a 
judicial officer but as an adjunct law enforcement officer.”  Id. at 327. 
{¶ 37} In Hoffman’s case, the deputy clerk took none of the actions 
condemned in Lo-Ji Sales.  There is no evidence that the deputy clerk colluded 
with the detective or otherwise acted as an adjunct law-enforcement officer. 
{¶ 38} Hoffman also contends that the good-faith exception should not 
apply because the criminal complaints were so lacking in indicia of probable 
cause.  The state, however, maintains that because the detective’s conduct in 
applying for the arrest warrants was consistent with binding precedent, the good-
faith exception does apply.  In Davis, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 180 L.Ed.2d 
285, the United States Supreme Court extended the good-faith exception to 
circumstances in which the police conduct a search in objectively reasonable 
reliance on judicial precedent.  It stated: 
 
Under our exclusionary-rule precedents, this acknowledged 
absence of police culpability dooms Davis’s claim.  Police 
practices trigger the harsh sanction of exclusion only when they are 
deliberate enough to yield “meaningfu[l]” deterrence, and culpable 
enough to be “worth the price paid by the justice system.” Herring, 
555 U.S. at 144, 129 S.Ct. 695, [172 L.Ed.2d 496]. The conduct of 
the officers here was neither of these things. The officers who 
January Term, 2014 
19 
conducted the search did not violate Davis’s Fourth Amendment 
rights deliberately, recklessly, or with gross negligence. See ibid.  
Nor does this case involve any “recurring or systemic negligence” 
on the part of law enforcement. Ibid. The police acted in strict 
compliance with binding precedent, and their behavior was not 
wrongful. 
 
Id. at 2428-2429. 
The Effect of State v. Overton 
{¶ 39} The state argues that the officers acted in good faith, based on 
interpretation of Overton, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-99-1317, 2000 WL 1232422.  In 
Overton, the complaint in support of the arrest warrant merely recited the 
statutory elements of a crime and contained no information indicating that the 
officer had seen the crime committed or that the officer had been informed by 
someone else that the subject of the warrant committed the crime.  The Overton 
complaint in support of the warrant read: 
 
Complainant being duly sworn states that Desarie Overton 
defendant at Toledo, Lucas County, Ohio on or about July 10, 
1998 did violate ORC # 2925.13 constituting a charge of 
permitting drug abuse in that the defendant, being the owner, 
lessee, or occupant of certain premises, did knowingly permit such 
premises to be used for the commission of a felony drug abuse 
offense, to wit: Desarie Overton being the lessee, owner, or 
occupant of 620 Belmont, Toledo, Ohio 43607 knowingly 
permitted Cocaine, a schedule two controlled substance to be sold 
and possessed by the occupants, there, both being in violation of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
the Ohio Revised code, a felony drug abuse offense. This offense 
occurred in Toledo, Lucas County, Ohio. 
 
Id. at *2. 
 
The complaint was signed by a detective and was certified by a deputy municipal 
court clerk.  In a one-paragraph analysis, the appellate court held: 
 
The complaint in this case listed a specific code section and 
contained specific factual information sworn to by a fellow Toledo 
Police Detective. The complaint was certified by a clerk of court 
pursuant to Crim.R. 4. Detective Navarre [the arresting officer] 
testified that because he already knew appellant, he recognized her 
when she came to the door. Based on the foregoing we conclude 
that Detective Navarre had reasonable ground to believe that the 
offense was committed and reasonable ground to believe that the 
person alleged to have committed the offense is guilty of the 
violation. Therefore, the Court finds that Detective Navarre had 
probable cause to arrest appellant in this case. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Id. at *3. 
{¶ 40} We declined to accept jurisdiction of Overton’s appeal.  State v. 
Overton, 91 Ohio St.3d 1415, 741 N.E.2d 142 (2001).  The United States 
Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari.  Overton v. Ohio, 534 
U.S. 982, 122 S.Ct. 389, 151 L.Ed.2d 317 (2001).  In a separate statement joined 
by three other justices, Justice Breyer wrote:  
 
January Term, 2014 
21 
This “complaint” sets forth the relevant crime in general 
terms, it refers to Overton, and it says she committed the crime. 
But nowhere does it indicate how Detective Woodson [the officer 
who signed the complaint] knows, or why he believes, that Overton 
committed the crime. 
This Court has previously made clear that affidavits or 
complaints of this kind do not provide sufficient support for the 
issuance of an arrest warrant. * * * 
 
* * * 
I consequently conclude that the city of Toledo clearly 
violated the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. * * * I 
realize that we cannot act as a court of simple error correction and 
that the unpublished intermediate court decision below lacks 
significant value as precedent. Nonetheless, the matter has a 
general aspect. The highlighted print on the complaint [the 
defendant’s name and street address] offers some support for 
Overton’s claims that the “complaint” is a form that the police 
filled in with her name and address. And that fact, if true, helps to 
support her claim that her case is not unique. That possibility, 
along with the clarity of the constitutional error, convinces me that 
the appropriate disposition of this case is a summary reversal. 
 
(Emphasis sic.)  Id. at 984-986. 
{¶ 41} Nevertheless, the Overton decision was not overruled or reversed 
by either a state or federal court and, therefore, it remained binding precedent in 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
the Sixth District.2  Although the clerk’s independent finding of probable cause 
was not examined in Overton, the holding in Overton sanctioned criminal 
complaints that merely recited the statutory elements as valid support for arrest 
warrants.  Unfortunately, it appears that the clerk’s office did not instruct its 
deputies on how to independently determine probable cause, and the omission of 
a probable-cause determination became the norm for at least 17 years and was 
unchallenged until now. 
{¶ 42} We have already recognized the good-faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule when officers act in good faith upon a search warrant ultimately 
found to be invalid.  Wilmoth, 22 Ohio St.3d 251, 490 N.E.2d 1236, at paragraph 
one of syllabus; State v. George, 45 Ohio St.3d 325, 544 N.E.2d 640 (1989), 
paragraph three of the syllabus.  Today we hold that when the police conduct a 
search in objectively reasonable, good-faith reliance upon binding appellate 
precedent, the exclusionary rule does not apply. 
{¶ 43} The dissent claims that this is not an ordinary case under Leon and 
that it is inconceivable that Toledo police officers did not realize that warrants 
were being issued without a probable-cause determination.  In so finding, the 
dissent ignores Davis and its holding that police conduct that is in strict 
compliance with binding judicial precedent satisfies the good-faith exception to 
the exclusionary rule.  See Davis, ___U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. at 2428-2429, 180 
L.Ed.2d 285.  The “ordinary” in Toledo was that arrest warrants were obtained by 
following a misguided practice approved in Overton, which now has been 
overruled by the Sixth District, to its credit.  In 2001, this court declined to accept 
                                          
 
2 It should be noted that one judge in the Overton case did consider the complaint to be defective.  
He dissented, noting that the officer making the complaint did not aver that he had observed the 
illegal activity and did not specify another source for his knowledge of the illegal activity.  
Overton, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-99-1317, 2000 WL 1232422, *3 (Sherck, J., dissenting).  
January Term, 2014 
23 
jurisdiction, and the United States Supreme Court also declined review by 
denying the petition for writ of certiorari.  Overton was thus binding precedent in 
the Sixth District when the instant warrants were issued and executed.  There is 
no evidence to suggest that Detective Violanti or other officers deliberately or 
willfully sought to violate Hoffman’s Fourth Amendment rights.  Under the 
circumstances, their actions were objectively reasonable. 
{¶ 44} Ultimately, the arrest warrants must be viewed as improperly 
issued because although deputy clerks had a checklist to follow, a probable-cause 
determination was never made, and the complaint was rubber-stamped with no 
questions asked.  The arresting officers themselves, however, had no reason to 
question or doubt the validity of Hoffman’s warrants, and they acted in good faith 
in relying on them.  Suppression of evidence here will not serve the purposes of 
the exclusionary rule. 
{¶ 45} But the facts in this case are seriously disturbing.  The uncontested 
evidence is that for at least 17 years, deputy clerks in the Toledo Municipal Court 
have not determined probable cause before issuing arrest warrants—a flagrant 
Fourth Amendment violation.  It is incumbent upon the Toledo Municipal Court 
to amend the process for issuing arrest warrants and to conform with the 
requirements of the Constitution, Crim.R. 4, and case precedent before issuing a 
warrant.  In addition, police officers, peace officers, sheriffs, and all those in law 
enforcement can no longer rely in good faith on any warrant issued by the Toledo 
Municipal Court without a neutral and detached magistrate making an 
independent determination of probable cause.  Today’s decision should be a 
catalyst for that court to seek new, constitutionally conforming warrants and will 
provide notice that any warrants that are similarly constitutionally defective can 
no longer be relied on or acted upon.  Whatever the circumstances, at a minimum, 
the public is entitled to have public officials conform their conduct to 
constitutional standards in discharging their official duties. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
Conclusion 
{¶ 46} The exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct that 
flagrantly, deliberately, or recklessly violates the Fourth Amendment.  When 
officers act in good-faith reliance on a warrant that is later determined to be 
invalid, suppressing that evidence does not serve the purpose of the exclusionary 
rule.  Good-faith reliance can be established when officers adhere to procedures 
established in binding precedent. 
{¶ 47} The judgment of the Lucas County Court of Appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs. 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
____________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., separately concurring. 
{¶ 48} I agree with the majority but write separately to emphasize a point 
touched on by the majority opinion that raises, in my view, a matter of serious 
constitutional concern. 
{¶ 49} For at least 17 years, citizens in Toledo have been subjected to an 
unconstitutional process for issuing arrest warrants unrecognized by those 
involved in the process of issuing those warrants.  Nonetheless, nothing in this 
record indicates that officers acted in bad faith in seeking the warrant for 
Hoffman’s arrest, and in accordance with the dictates of the United States 
Supreme Court, the exclusionary rule is not applicable in these circumstances. 
{¶ 50} In this instance, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
applies because the Toledo police relied in good faith on errant, but binding, 
precedent from the Sixth District Court of Appeals upholding an arrest warrant 
issued by the Toledo Municipal Court without any independent finding of 
probable cause. 
January Term, 2014 
25 
{¶ 51} I write separately to emphasize that the Toledo Municipal Court 
must amend its process for issuing arrest warrants and conform to constitutional 
requirements before issuing a warrant.  Members of law enforcement cannot in 
good faith rely on any warrant issued by the Toledo Municipal Court absent an 
independent determination of probable cause from a neutral and detached 
magistrate.  New and constitutionally conforming warrants must be obtained in 
order to conform with the Fourth Amendment, and the outstanding defective 
warrants can no longer be relied on or acted upon. 
____________________ 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 52} The arrest warrants in this case were unconstitutional because they 
were issued even though probable cause had not been determined.  See Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution (“no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause”); Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution (“no warrant shall 
issue, but upon probable cause”).  The critical issue in this case becomes, as the 
majority opinion well notes, whether evidence that was obtained using the 
constitutionally invalid arrest warrants should be suppressed. 
{¶ 53} The exclusionary rule, which suppresses evidence procured 
unconstitutionally, is a draconian measure potentially imbued with tremendous 
societal costs, including the loss of reliable evidence.  United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897, 907, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984).  For that reason, “ ‘the 
application of the [exclusionary] rule has been restricted to those areas where its 
remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.’ ”  Id. at 908, quoting 
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561.  
Accordingly, the rule is not to be applied to exclude evidence that was “ ‘obtained 
in the reasonable good-faith belief that a search or seizure was in accord with the 
Fourth Amendment.’ ”  Id. at 909, quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 255, 
103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (White, J., concurring in judgment). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
{¶ 54} These principles are based on the sound premise that the 
exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct and, therefore, if the 
police obtained a warrant in objective good faith and acted within its scope, then 
there is “nothing to deter.”  Id. at 921.  Once a magistrate issues a warrant that 
reasonably appears to be based on a determination of probable cause, the officer is 
entitled to rely on it, for “ ‘there is literally nothing more the policeman can do in 
seeking to comply with the law.’ ”  Id., quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 
498, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring).  And this 
is because “[i]n the ordinary case, an officer cannot be expected to question the 
magistrate’s probable-cause determination or his judgment that the form of the 
warrant is technically sufficient.”  Id.  Alas, this is not an ordinary case. 
{¶ 55} In an ordinary case, a magistrate does not testify that she has 
processed thousands of arrest warrants over a period of years and that just two 
months previously she became familiar with the term “probable cause.”  The 
following colloquy, between the defense attorney and the magistrate from the 
Toledo Municipal Court, is not something that occurs in an ordinary case: 
 
Q.  And during your 17 years of swearing in criminal 
complaints with  
requests for arrest warrants, did you know 
what probable cause was? 
A.  No. 
Q. Had you ever made a probable cause determination? 
A.  No. 
* * * 
Q. Did any of [your] training include making a probable 
cause  determination? 
A.  No, it did not. 
* * * 
January Term, 2014 
27 
Q.  As far as you know, as a supervisor, have any of the 
deputy  
clerks made a probable cause determination? 
A.  No.   
 
{¶ 56} In an ordinary case, the affidavit or complaint that an officer 
seeking a warrant presents to a magistrate contains information that allows the 
issuing magistrate to determine whether probable cause exists.  In this case, each 
of the three complaints does little more than restate the crime that is charged.  The 
officer who presented the complaints was questioned at the suppression hearing: 
 
 
Q. You don’t make any reference to what Mr. Pittmon told 
you other than that he was the victim? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q.  Okay.  You don’t make any reference to the potential 
existence of a video, right? 
A.  Correct. 
Q. * * * [Y]ou are just saying Mr. Hoffman committed the 
offense? 
A.  Yes. 
Q.You’re not telling anybody how you’ve come to learn 
that? 
A.  No, sir. 
* * * 
Q.  Nobody asked you what the basis of your information 
was for claiming Mr. Hoffman committed these offenses? 
A.  No, sir. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
Q.  And, in fact, when you go to execute these complaints, 
 
nobody at Toledo Municipal Court, nobody ever asks you 
that, do they? 
A.  Not that I recall anytime. 
* * * 
Q.  And nobody has ever said how do you know that this is 
true, right? 
A.  Right. 
* * * 
Q.  * * * And, again, nobody is asking you how you came 
to know these things? 
A.  No, sir. 
Q.  And the complaint itself does not reflect how you came 
to know these things, right? 
A.  Correct. 
 
{¶ 57} These transcripts are quite extraordinary.  Nothing about them 
strikes me as being part of an ordinary case.  According to Leon, in an ordinary 
case, a police officer is not expected to question a magistrate’s probable-cause 
determination.  But, in this case, there was ample reason for the police officer to 
question the magistrate’s ostensible probable-cause determination, because the 
officer presenting the complaints to obtain the warrants testified that she has never 
been asked to explain the basis for her belief that she had probable cause to make 
an arrest.  So, the police officer knew that the magistrates were not exactly 
fastidious in requiring support for arrest warrants. 
{¶ 58} The blame for these unfortunate facts should not be thrown at the 
magistrates.  They were only following orders.  Again, it is really quite 
extraordinary, sad really, to read the procedure that the magistrates are instructed 
January Term, 2014 
29 
to follow.  A memo dated March 3, 2009, instructs magistrates of their duties 
when “Swearing in Affidavits.”  It states: 
 
When an officer or complainant brings an affidavit to the 
counter, you should quickly look over the affidavit for the 
following items: 
* * * 
If the officer or complainant is filing the affidavit at the 
counter, you may let him or her know if something is missing as a 
courtesy.  Once the affidavit is clerked in, it cannot be altered.  
This means you cannot call an officer to come back if something is 
missing.  You also must accept all affidavits even if they are not 
complete. 
 
{¶ 59} Far from requiring magistrates to determine probable cause, the 
memo implicitly instructs the magistrates to ignore probable cause.  The memo 
instructs magistrates to “quickly look over the affidavit.”  Quickly?  Since when is 
it important to quickly determine whether the Constitutions of the United States 
and of Ohio have been complied with?  Even worse, though, is the last sentence 
quoted above.  Magistrates are instructed that they “must accept all affidavits.”  
No wonder they are not trained to determine probable cause.  That would truly be 
a waste of time given the mandate to accept all affidavits. 
{¶ 60} If these facts were to appear in a novel by Franz Kafka or a 
transcript of a trial from the totalitarian era of the Soviet Bloc, it would not be 
extraordinary.  It might even be considered a source of amusement.  But we are 
talking about the city of Toledo in the great state of Ohio in the United States of 
America.  Our country is considered to be governed by the rule of law, not as a 
police state.  But the facts of this case suggest that the residents of Lucas County 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
30 
have been the subject of innumerable warrants that were issued as if by the police 
department itself.  The warrants were issued virtually without scrutiny, and it is 
inconceivable that the officers did not realize this.  Certainly the officer who 
testified in this case was aware that her requests for warrants were not subject to 
questioning and that her affidavits did not need to inform the magistrate of facts 
that could support a finding of probable cause.  And in particular, in this case, the 
officer seeking the warrants knew that the supporting document contained nothing 
that would allow a magistrate to make a probable-cause determination. 
{¶ 61} There is no reason to conclude that the good-faith exception should 
apply to the warrants in this case.  The warrant requirement exists because “the 
detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate * * * is a more reliable safeguard against 
improper searches than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer * * *.”  
Leon, 468 U.S. at 913-914, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677.  Deference to 
magistrates, however, “is not boundless,” and it is particularly unwarranted when 
a magistrate “ ‘serve[s] merely as a rubber stamp for the police.’ ”  Id., quoting 
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964). 
{¶ 62} There can be no doubt about whether the magistrate in this case 
served as a rubber stamp.  She did.  She admitted it.  The police officer seeking 
the warrants admitted it.  And the instructions the magistrate followed require her 
to “accept all affadavits.”  It is difficult to conceive of a situation better described 
by the term “rubber stamp.” 
{¶ 63} The majority opinion rightly concludes that the warrants were 
issued unconstitutionally.  The only issue is whether the officers who acted on the 
warrants can be said to have acted in good faith.  Based on the facts of this case, it 
is abundantly clear that the officers did not so act, because the requests for 
warrants were “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief 
in its existence entirely unreasonable.”  Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 611, 95 
S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment).  There 
January Term, 2014 
31 
was nothing in the complaints except a restatement of the elements of the crime.  
The magistrate who issued the arrest warrants in this case was not neutral and 
detached.  And although the magistrate did not engage in the search and arrest 
herself (as in Lo-Ji Sales), it is quite clear that she “wholly abandoned [her] 
judicial role” by serving as a mere rubber stamp for the police officer seeking the 
warrant.  Leon at 923, discussing Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 99 
S.Ct. 2319, 60 L.Ed.2d 920 (1979). 
{¶ 64} The facts of this case, including the admission that a magistrate of 
the Toledo Municipal Court has issued thousands of arrest warrants without ever 
making a probable-cause determination, convince me that suppression of the 
evidence in this case is necessary to deter subsequent unconstitutional behavior.  
Toledo police have been relying on this flagrantly unconstitutional procedure for 
years now.  See  Overton v. Ohio, 534 U.S. 982, 122 S.Ct. 389, 151 L.Ed.2d 317 
(2001) (statement of Breyer, J.).  A forceful message needs to be sent to deter 
similar misconduct, and suppression in this case would send that message. 
{¶ 65} This analysis is largely based on decisions by the Supreme Court 
of the United States and on federal constitutional standards.  But this case also 
implicates Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution.  “The Ohio Constitution 
is a document of independent force.  In the areas of individual rights and civil 
liberties, the United States Constitution, where applicable to the states, provides a 
floor below which state court decisions may not fall.  As long as state courts 
provide at least as much protection as the United States Supreme Court has 
provided in its interpretation of the federal Bill of Rights, state courts are 
unrestricted in according greater civil liberties and protections to individuals and 
groups.”  Arnold v. Cleveland, 67 Ohio St.3d 35, 616 N.E.2d 163 (1993), 
paragraph one of the syllabus.  I have also independently analyzed the facts of this 
case pursuant to Article I, Section 14, and I conclude that the issuance of the 
warrants violated the Ohio Constitution.  Although I could be persuaded that the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
32 
Ohio Constitution provides greater protection than the federal Constitution in a 
case such as this, Hoffman has not made any such claim, and it is not necessary 
for this court to go beyond the Fourth Amendment to justify the result I espouse. 
{¶ 66} The analysis under the Ohio Constitution is similar to the analysis 
under the federal standards.  We have held that the protections provided by 
Article I, Section 14 are coextensive with those provided by the Fourth 
Amendment.  State v. Emerson, 134 Ohio St.3d 191, 2012-Ohio-5047, 981 
N.E.2d 787, ¶ 15.  The warrants were unconstitutionally issued; therefore, the 
Ohio Constitution prohibits the use of any evidence procured pursuant to the 
warrants unless the officer seeking the warrants had a good-faith belief that the 
warrant was valid. For the factual reasons stated above, I conclude that the officer 
involved did not have a good-faith reason to believe that the requests for warrants 
properly presented any basis for a finding of probable cause.  Accordingly, there 
could be no good-faith belief that the warrants were valid. 
{¶ 67} I am not unmindful of the fact that evidence procured using the 
unconstitutionally issued arrest warrants led to Hoffman’s conviction for a 
heinous murder and that suppression of the evidence would make it harder to 
prosecute him in a new trial.  But that is no reason to overlook the grave 
constitutional violations that occurred in this case.  Accordingly, I would suppress 
the evidence procured using the unconstitutionally issued warrants.  I would 
reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial.  I dissent. 
____________________ 
 
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Evy M. Jarrett 
and Frank H. Spryszak, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee. 
 
David Klucas, for appellant. 
 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Eric E. Murphy, State Solicitor, and 
Samuel C. Peterson, Deputy Solicitor, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio 
Attorney General Michael DeWine. 
January Term, 2014 
33 
 
Carol Hamilton O’Brien, Delaware County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Douglas N. Dumolt, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging affirmance for amicus 
curiae Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association. 
 
Timothy Young. Ohio Public Defender, Stephen P. Hardwick, Assistant 
Public Defender; and Robert L. Tobik, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and 
Jeff Gamso, Assistant Cuyahoga County Public Defender; and Matt Bangerter, 
urging reversal for amici curiae Office of the Ohio Public Defender, Cuyahoga 
County Public Defender’s Office, Ohio Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers, and Maumee Valley Criminal Defense Lawyers Association. 
____________________ 
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