Title: City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket Nos. 95243, 95253, 95256, 95280 cons.-Agenda
							10-September 2003.
THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Appellees, v. BERETTA U.S.A. 							CORPORATION et al., Appellants.
Opinion filed November 18, 2004.
	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	The tragic personal consequences of gun violence are inestimable.
The burdens imposed upon society as a whole in the costs of law
enforcement and medical services are immense. In the present case,
the City of Chicago and Cook County, in an effort to stem the rising
tide of gun violence and to recoup some of the expenses that flow
from gun crimes, have sued 18 manufacturers, 4 distributors, and 11
dealers of handguns that have been illegally possessed and used in the
city. For various reasons, 13 manufacturers, 2 distributors, and 8
dealers remain as defendants in this case. The theory of liability is
public nuisance. The relief sought by the City includes compensation
for the costs of emergency medical services, law enforcement efforts,
the prosecution of violations of gun control ordinances, and other
related expenses. The County seeks compensation for the costs of
treatment of victims of gun violence and the costs of prosecutions for
criminal use of firearms, including the expenses associated with
providing defense counsel to those accused of gun crimes. Both
plaintiffs seek punitive damages and permanent injunctive relief to
abate the alleged public nuisance.
	In the circuit court of Cook County, defendants sought dismissal
of the lawsuit under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure
(Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2000)), on the basis that plaintiffs
failed to state a cause of action for public nuisance. The circuit court
granted the motion to dismiss.
	The appellate court, construing the facts in a light most favorable
to the plaintiffs, found that based on the specific acts alleged in the
complaint, plaintiffs had sufficiently stated a cause of action for public
nuisance against all three classes of defendants, reversed the trial
court, and remanded for further proceedings. 337 Ill. App. 3d 1, 18.
	We granted defendants' petitions for leave to appeal pursuant to
Rule 315(a) (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)). Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule
345 (155 Ill. 2d R. 345), we have permitted the National Association
of Manufacturers and the Product Liability Advisory Council to file
briefs amici curiae on behalf of the defendants. We have also
permitted the Attorney General of the State of Illinois and the
National League of Cities, along with the U.S. Conference of Mayors
and the International Municipal Lawyers Association, to file briefs
amici curiae on behalf of the plaintiffs.
I. BACKGROUND
	Plaintiffs filed this suit in November 1998 and their first amended
complaint in April 1999. On February 10, 2000, the trial court granted
defendants' motion to dismiss with respect to count II, negligent
entrustment, and reserved ruling on count I, public nuisance. In March
2000, plaintiffs were permitted to file a second amended complaint.
On September 15, 2000, the trial court granted defendants' motion to
dismiss both counts, with prejudice. On appeal, plaintiffs raised only
the dismissal of the public nuisance count of the second amended
complaint.
	All of the defendants-manufacturers, distributors, and dealers-are
federally licensed to engage in their respective businesses. None of the
manufacturer defendants have their principal places of business in
Illinois. Several are incorporated in other states for the purpose of
importing firearms manufactured abroad. Only one of the distributor
defendants is based in Illinois. The dealer defendants are located in
Illinois, but outside the city of Chicago.
	In the second amended complaint, plaintiffs offer dramatic
statistics, both for the city and the nation, regarding the number of
homicides and other crimes involving handguns. Relying on these
statistics, they assert that the "widespread availability and use of
firearms is a national problem." They claim, further, that "[a]bsent
effective enforcement and prosecution of gun control laws, firearms
are readily available to anyone who wishes to use them." The ready
availability of guns also contributes to suicides and accidental
shootings, particularly of children. These dangers, according to the
plaintiffs, "were long ago, are today, and will continue to be
specifically known to defendants."
	Plaintiffs also cite provisions of the city's Municipal Code that
place strict requirements and prohibitions on the possession, use, and
transfer of firearms in Chicago and assert that such ordinances can be
effective only if the "residents of the jurisdiction imposing the
restriction cannot legally purchase those firearms elsewhere and bring
them back into the jurisdiction." The State of Illinois also regulates the
possession, use, and transfer of firearms. However, according to the
complaint, "data from recovered firearms and the undercover work of
the Chicago Police Department reflect numerous and systematic
violations" of these ordinances and statutes. Despite strict gun control
laws intended to protect the citizens of Chicago, there are "thousands
of illegal firearms" in the city and more are brought into the city every
year. Thus, plaintiffs assert, the "existence of illegal firearms in the
City of Chicago constitutes a public nuisance because it violates
ordinances and laws designed to protect the public from a threat to its
health, welfare and safety," and because the existence of readily
available firearms "creates an unreasonable and significant
interference" with public safety.
	The second amended complaint further alleges that all three
categories of defendants are put on notice of the "crime-facilitating
consequences of their conduct," by virtue of the process used by the
United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) to
trace firearms recovered by federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies. According to the complaint, defendants "know that only
firearms that have been used in connection with crimes can be the
subject of traces." On the basis of trace data from March 26, 1988, to
December 31, 1998, involving 858,902 guns traced nationwide, 20 of
the 22 manufacturer defendants "account for approximately 48.3% of
those crime guns, even though they comprise only 2.8% of the 716
manufacturers listed in the national trace database." The data
provided, however, do not reveal the market shares of these
manufacturers.
	With regard to gun dealers, plaintiffs offer more recent data from
the ATF revealing that 1.2% of dealers nationwide account for 57%
of traced firearms. Plaintiffs also rely on a congressional study of ATF
data released in December 1999, which found that "an extraordinary
proportion of crime guns bought from 'high crime' gun dealers were
probably straw purchased" and that "one-third of these crime guns
were recovered in connection with a crime within just one year of its
purchase, and half were traced to crimes within two years of their
purchase."
	Plaintiffs' specific allegation against the named dealer defendants
is that they "sell firearms even when they know or should know that
the firearms will be used or possessed illegally in Chicago." This
allegation is supported by assertions that dealers know some of their
customers are residents of Chicago and that it is illegal for those
customers to use or possess these weapons in the city; that dealers
make sales even when the words or behavior of the buyers indicate an
intention to use the weapon illegally; that dealers sell handguns
designed to be carried as concealed weapons, even though state law
prohibits the carrying of concealed weapons; and that dealers make
multiple sales to individuals whom they know or should know intend
to resell the guns in the city. The second amended complaint identifies
the dealer defendants as part of a "core group of irresponsible dealers"
who attract the business of gunrunners and other criminals, as
reflected by ATF trace data. The complaint also includes factual
assertions regarding numerous undercover "sting" operations carried
out by police officers at the various dealer defendants' stores.
Plaintiffs further assert that the dealers' practices "have caused a large
underground market for illegal firearms to flourish in the City of
Chicago," and that they "know that many of the firearms they sell are
used or possessed illegally, and put into the underground market."
Finally, the complaint states that the dealers' "actions and omissions
in selling firearms to Chicago residents that are illegal in the City of
Chicago unreasonably facilitate violations of City ordinances, and
contribute to physical harm, fear and inconvenience to Chicago
residents, and are injurious to the public health and safety of Chicago
residents."
	With regard to the defendant manufacturers and distributors, the
second amended complaint alleges that they produce and distribute
firearms that are regularly recovered by the Chicago police
department. For each of the manufacturer defendants, the complaint
lists the total number of firearms recovered by the police department
from 1992 until the date of the filing of the complaint.
	The tracing data offered by plaintiffs also contain a "time to
crime" measurement, which reflects the number of days between the
initial sale of a traced gun and its use in a crime. According to the
complaint, the median "time to crime" for guns traced to distributor
defendants is 834 days, while the median "time to crime" for guns
traced to nondefendant distributors is 1,386 days.
	In addition, the second amended complaint alleges that the
defendant manufacturers and distributors knowingly oversupply or
"saturate the market" with their products in areas where gun-control
laws are less restrictive, knowing that persons will illegally bring them
into jurisdictions where they are illegal and then possess or illegally
resell them. Further, the complaint alleges that these defendants do not
discourage the dealer defendants from selling their firearms
irresponsibly, even though they are on notice as a result of the ATF
traces that certain dealers are "responsible for a vastly
disproportionate number" of the traced weapons. The defendant
manufacturers and distributors "know that there is an absence of
meaningful regulations of dealers" and know that "almost anyone can
become a federally licensed firearms dealer." Despite this knowledge,
these defendants "fail to supervise, regulate or set standards for
dealers' conduct, instead relying on the mere fact that the dealers are
licensed by the federal government."
	Finally, plaintiffs allege that the manufacturer defendants design
and market their products to appeal to those who intend to use them
for criminal purposes. Specifically, features such as ease of
concealment, resistance to fingerprints, and the ability to fire many
rounds from a single ammunition clip make certain firearms
particularly attractive to criminals. These types of weapons, according
to the complaint, "serve no legitimate sport or hunting purpose and
are designed to appeal to criminals who wish to be better armed than
other criminals or law enforcement officers." The complaint identifies
individual models manufactured by each of the manufacturer
defendants as evidence of this marketing strategy, which "intentionally
and recklessly causes thousands of illegal firearms to end up in
Chicago."
	Based on these allegations, the second amended complaint states
in "Count I: Public Nuisance" that the residents of Chicago "have a
common right to be free from conduct that creates an unreasonable
jeopardy to the public's health, welfare and safety, and to be free from
conduct that creates a disturbance and unreasonable apprehension of
danger to person and property." The defendants' conduct of
"intentionally and recklessly" designing, marketing, distributing, and
selling firearms that they "should know" will be taken to Chicago
causes "thousands of firearms to be possessed and used in Chicago
illegally" and causes "a significant and unreasonable interference" with
the rights of the public. Further, the complaint alleges that the conduct
is of a continuing nature and has created an on-going nuisance.
	The complaint also alleges that defendants "owe a duty of care to
the City of Chicago and its residents and the County of Cook and its
residents living within Chicago to exercise reasonable care to prevent
their firearms from ending up in the hands of persons who use and
possess them illegally" in the city. In addition to this allegation, which
sounds in negligence, the complaint alleges that defendants' conduct
is "outrageous" and is "committed with a reckless and wanton
indifference to the rights and safety of others."
	With regard to the remedy sought, the complaint states that the
defendants' conduct causes increased expenditures by the city and
county that should be compensated by money damages. In addition,
because money damages "will not adequately compensate" plaintiffs
for the harm suffered, they do not have an adequate remedy at law.
Injunctive relief is proper, plaintiffs claim, because they and the
residents of the city will continue to suffer irreparable harm in the
absence of an injunction.
	In sum, plaintiffs' theory is that the defendants' conduct in
designing, manufacturing, distributing, and selling certain models of
handguns is done with the knowledge, if not the intent, that a
significant number of the guns will ultimately find their way into an
illegal secondary gun market and then into hands of persons who
cannot legally possess those guns within the city of Chicago. Further,
the plaintiffs allege that this conduct is unreasonable, even if it may be
generally in compliance with applicable state and federal laws
governing the sale of firearms, because the presence and use of these
guns by the people who possess them illegally, with the substantial
participation of the defendants, violates the right of the general public
to be free from the threat of gun violence and from jeopardy to health
and safety. Finally, plaintiffs allege that the defendants' unreasonable
conduct is the proximate cause of a substantial interference with the
ability of Chicago residents to live in the city without fear,
inconvenience, or undue risk of physical injury, and of the resulting
demand on the plaintiffs' limited resources.
II. ISSUES PRESENTED
	Before this court, the manufacturer defendants argue that the trial
court properly dismissed the second amended complaint because: (1)
plaintiffs' complaint alleges conclusions, not specific underlying facts,
and thus does not conform to the fact-pleading standard; (2) the
lawful sale of a nondefective product cannot, as a matter of law,
constitute a public nuisance; (3) their conduct is so remote from the
alleged injury that, as a matter of law, the plaintiffs cannot establish
proximate cause; (4) they are not liable under public nuisance law for
a situation over which they have no control, specifically, the criminal
acts of others after the firearms have left their possession; (5) plaintiffs
are barred from any recovery of damages in this case based on the
economic loss doctrine and the doctrine prohibiting a municipality
from recovering the expenses of local governmental services from
alleged tortfeasors in the absence of statutory authority; and (6) the
state and federal constitutions forbid the imposition of civil liability for
the purpose of regulating extraterritorial commercial conduct.
	The distributor defendants adopt these arguments and, with
respect to (4) above, make the related argument that the claim against
them sounds in negligent entrustment, not public nuisance, and
because they provide firearms only to licensed dealers, not to
individual consumers, they cannot be held liable for the actions of the
ultimate purchaser based on negligent entrustment.
	The dealer defendants make the additional argument, related to
(2) above, that their practices cannot be deemed unreasonable if they
are in compliance with all applicable state and federal regulations.
III. ANALYSIS
	A motion to dismiss under section 2-615 of the Code (735 ILCS
5/2-615 (West 2000)) challenges the legal sufficiency of the complaint
by alleging defects on its face. We, therefore, review de novo an order
granting or denying a section 2-615 motion. Wakulich v. Mraz, 203 Ill. 2d 223, 228 (2003). In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint,
we accept as true all well-pleaded facts and all reasonable inferences
that may be drawn from those facts. Jarvis v. South Oak Dodge, Inc.,
201 Ill. 2d 81, 86 (2002). In addition, we construe the allegations in
the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Wakulich,
203 Ill. 2d  at 228. When the plaintiff's theory of liability is public
nuisance, the pleading requirements are not exacting because the
"concept of common law public nuisance *** elude[s] precise
definition." City of Chicago v. Festival Theatre Corp., 91 Ill. 2d 295,
306 (1982). The existence of a nuisance " 'depends on the peculiar
facts presented by each case.' " Donaldson v. Central Illinois Public
Service Co., 199 Ill. 2d 63, 101 (2002), quoting City of Chicago v.
Commonwealth Edison Co., 24 Ill. App. 3d 624, 631-32 (1974).
A. The Common Law of Public Nuisance
	Because the concept "elude[s] precise definition," public nuisance
has been " 'negatively defined' " by distinguishing it from other tort
actions, such as trespass. Festival Theatre, 91 Ill. 2d  at 306, quoting
O. Reynolds, Public Nuisance: A Crime in Tort Law, 31 Okla. L.
Rev. 318, 318 (1978). As one learned treatise notes:
			"There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the
entire law than that which surrounds the word 'nuisance.' It
has meant all things to all people, and has been applied
indiscriminately to everything from an alarming advertisement
to a cockroach baked in a pie. There is general agreement
that it is incapable of any exact or comprehensive definition."
W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts §86, at 616 (5th ed.
1984).
It is well settled, however, that public nuisance encompasses:
			"that class of wrongs that arise from the unreasonable,
unwarrantable or unlawful use by a person of his own
property, real or personal, or from his own improper,
indecent or unlawful personal conduct, working an
obstruction of, or injury to, a right of another or of the
public. *** It is a part of the great social compact to which
every person is a party, a fundamental and essential principle
in every civilized community, that every person yields a
portion of his right of absolute dominion ***." H. Wood, A
Practical Treatise on the Law of Nuisances §1, at 1-3 (3d ed.
1893).
	The promulgation of the Restatement of Torts in 1939 was the
first "significant attempt to determine some limits to the types of tort
liability" associated with nuisance. W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on
Torts §86, at 617 (5th ed. 1984). Two lines of development in the
case law were noted, one "narrowly restricted to the invasion of
interests in the use or enjoyment of land," which has come to be
known as private nuisance; the other "extending to virtually any form
of annoyance or inconvenience interfering with common public
rights," which is known as public nuisance. W. Keeton, Prosser &
Keeton on Torts §86, at 618 (5th ed. 1984). While private nuisance
is "a civil wrong, based on a disturbance of rights in land," public
nuisance is "a species of catch-all criminal offense, consisting of an
interference with the rights of the community at large." W. Keeton,
Prosser & Keeton on Torts §86, at 618 (5th ed. 1984).
	The Restatement definitions of public and private nuisance are
consistent with Illinois law. See Wheat v. Freeman Coal Mining
Corp., 23 Ill. App. 3d 14, 18 (1974) (citing Illinois cases from 1901
to support conclusion that Illinois courts have adopted the
Restatement definition of nuisance); Gilmore v. Stanmar, Inc., 261 Ill.
App. 3d 651, 660 (1994) (summarizing cases). See also Donaldson,
199 Ill. 2d  at 101 (adopting language contained in the then-draft of
section 821B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts), quoting
Commonwealth Edison, 24 Ill. App. 3d at 631.
	With regard to public nuisance, section 821B of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts states: "(1) A public nuisance is an unreasonable
interference with a right common to the general public." Restatement
(Second) of Torts §821B (1979). Thus, it is generally recognized that:
		"A public nuisance, unlike a private nuisance, does not
necessarily involve an interference with the use and
enjoyment of land, or an invasion of another's interest in the
private use and enjoyment of land, but encompasses any
unreasonable interference with a right common to the general
public. Thus, an action for public nuisance may lie even
though neither the plaintiff nor the defendant acts in the
exercise of private property rights." 58 Am. Jur. 2d
Nuisances §31, at 592 (2002).
See also Festival Theatre, 91 Ill. 2d  at 313-15 (equitable jurisdiction
to abate public nuisances exists even where such is not conferred by
statute, offender is amenable to criminal law, and no property right is
involved).
	We therefore reject plaintiffs' argument that their claim "squarely
attacks the manner in which the defendants use their property, namely,
the way in which they sell firearms from their various plants, offices,
and stores." The mere fact that defendants' conduct in their plants,
offices, and stores puts guns into the stream of commerce does not
state a claim for public nuisance based on their use of land. It is the
presence and use of the guns within the city of Chicago that
constitutes the alleged nuisance, not the activities at the defendants'
various places of business. However, because it is clear that neither
the use or misuse of land nor the invasion of property rights of another
is required for a public nuisance to be found, plaintiffs' theory of
liability is not absolutely foreclosed by the existing common law of
public nuisance. We, therefore, proceed to consider the legal adequacy
of the second amended complaint and to address the issues raised by
defendants.
B. Pleading Requirements
	The manufacturer defendants argue that the appellate court,
relying on the proposition that the pleading requirements in an action
for public nuisance are not exacting, failed to hold the plaintiffs to the
fact-pleading standard that this court has repeatedly stated is
applicable to civil cases in Illinois. See, e.g., Weiss v. Waterhouse
Securities, Inc., 208 Ill. 2d 439, 451 (2004) (noting that this court has
stated "time and again" that Illinois is a fact-pleading jurisdiction).
Specifically, these defendants claim that the only factual allegation
made regarding their conduct is that they lawfully sell firearms to
licensed distributors. In addition, they assert that the complaint offers
no facts to support its conclusory allegations regarding their
knowledge and intent. They contend that the complaint fails to plead
factual allegations sufficient to state a claim as to any of the individual
manufacturer defendants. In their reply brief, the distributor
defendants adopt these arguments.
	Further, these defendants suggest that the appellate court
improperly relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio in
City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 95 Ohio St. 3d 416, 768 N.E.2d 1136 (2002), when it found the Ohio court's decision to be
"an analogous and instructive case that permits this type of lawsuit to
go beyond the pleading stage." 337 Ill. App. 3d at 16. Ohio is a
notice-pleading state and, under the notice-pleading standard, a
plaintiff is not required to plead operative facts with particularity. City
of Cincinnati, 95 Ohio St. 3d at 423-24, 768 N.E.2d  at 1146. Rather,
the complaint need only contain a short and plain statement of the
claim which shows that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. If there is any
set of facts consistent with the plaintiff's complaint that would allow
recovery, the court in a notice-pleading jurisdiction may not grant a
defendant's motion to dismiss on the pleadings. City of Cincinnati, 95
Ohio St. 3d at 424, 768 N.E.2d  at 1146.
	When looking to cases from other jurisdictions to determine
whether the complaint should be dismissed on the pleadings, a court
must keep in mind that pleading standards vary. Fact pleading imposes
a heavier burden on the plaintiff, so that a complaint that would
survive a motion to dismiss in a notice-pleading jurisdiction might not
do so in a fact-pleading jurisdiction. See, e.g., People ex rel. Madigan
v. Tang, 346 Ill. App. 3d 277, 286 (2004) (noting that in action to
hold corporate officer personally liable for public nuisance, the burden
of pleading facts may be "heavier" than the burden on the plaintiffs in
the cited cases from other jurisdictions).
	Under our fact-pleading standard, the plaintiff must allege facts
sufficient to bring a claim within a legally recognized cause of action.
Vernon v. Schuster, 179 Ill. 2d 338, 344 (1997). "[T]he requirement
that a complaint set forth facts necessary for recovery under the
theory asserted is not satisfied, in the absence of the necessary
allegations, by the general policy favoring the liberal construction of
pleadings." Teter v. Clemens, 112 Ill. 2d 252, 256-57 (1986). Thus,
in considering a motion to dismiss, a court must disregard the
conclusions that are pleaded and look only to well-pleaded facts to
determine whether they are sufficient to state a cause of action against
the defendant. If not, the motion must be granted, "regardless of how
many conclusions the count may contain and regardless of whether or
not they inform the defendant in a general way of the nature of the
claim against him." Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 88 Ill. 2d 407, 426
(1981).
	However, despite the requirement that the complaint must
contain allegations of fact bringing the case within the cause of action,
"the plaintiff is not required to set out evidence; only the ultimate facts
to be proved should be alleged, not the evidentiary facts tending to
prove such ultimate facts." Chandler v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 207 Ill. 2d 331, 348 (2003). Plaintiffs contend that they have set out such
ultimate facts and suggest that if they are permitted to conduct
discovery, additional supporting facts will come to light. Plaintiffs rely
heavily on the facts underlying the trace data and the "time to crime"
statistics which, they claim, point to these defendants as contributing
to the problem of illegal guns to a degree that is not merely a function
of their sales volume.
	A sufficient pleading in a public nuisance cause of action will
allege a right common to the general public, the transgression of that
right by the defendant, and resulting injury. Feder v. Perry Coal Co.,
279 Ill. App. 314, 318 (1935). To be more precise, facts must be
alleged in support of four distinct elements of a public nuisance claim:
the existence of a public right, a substantial and unreasonable
interference with that right by the defendant, proximate cause, and
injury.
	A close examination of the second amended complaint reveals
that factual allegations are sparse, particularly with respect to the
individual manufacturer and distributor defendants. We note,
however, that factual allegations with regard to the individual dealer
defendants are somewhat more detailed. Although we have
reservations regarding the adequacy of the second amended complaint
under our fact-pleading standard, we decline to dispose of this case on
a procedural issue. The questions of law raised by this appeal are of
great importance, have been fully briefed and argued, and provide a
substantive basis for resolving this case.
	Turning to these substantive issues, we consider each of the
required elements of the public nuisance cause of action in turn,
beginning with the existence of a public right. Under the heading of
"Unreasonable Interference," we consider the argument that the lawful
sale of a nondefective product cannot, as a matter of law, constitute
a public nuisance and the related argument that defendants'
compliance with applicable state and federal laws precludes liability
for public nuisance. Under heading of "Proximate Cause," we address
the argument that defendants may not be held liable in public nuisance
when they have no control over the instrumentality at the time the
alleged harm results from the criminal acts of third parties, as well as
the argument that their conduct is too remote from the alleged injury
for liability to attach. After addressing each of the elements of the
claim, we consider the remedial issues raised by the defendants.
	We now turn to our examination of the elements of the public
nuisance cause of action to determine whether plaintiffs have stated a
cause of action in which, if they were to prevail, the remedies they
seek might be available.
C. Public Right
	A public nuisance has been defined as " 'the doing of or the
failure to do something that injuriously affects the safety, health or
morals of the public, or works some substantial annoyance,
inconvenience or injury to the public.' " Village of Wilsonville v. SCA
Services, Inc., 86 Ill. 2d 1, 21-22 (1981), quoting W. Prosser, Torts
§88, at 583 n.29 (4th ed. 1971). Thus, the first element that must be
alleged to state a claim for public nuisance is the existence of a right
common to the general public. Such rights include the rights of public
health, public safety, public peace, public comfort, and public
convenience. Restatement (Second) of Torts §821B(2)(a) (1979).
	In the second amended complaint, plaintiffs allege that the
residents of Chicago have "a common right to be free from conduct
that creates an unreasonable jeopardy to the public's health, welfare
and safety, and to be free from conduct that creates a disturbance and
reasonable apprehension of danger to person and property."
(Emphasis added.) Because none of the defendants are alleged to have
engaged in any conduct in the city of Chicago, we understand the
asserted public right to be the right to be free from unreasonable
jeopardy to health, welfare, and safety, and from unreasonable threats
of danger to person and property, caused by the presence of illegal
weapons in the city of Chicago, allegedly made possible by
defendants' action or inaction elsewhere.
	Defendant manufacturers and distributors do not argue that
plaintiffs have failed to identify a public right affected by the alleged
nuisance. Several dealer defendants, however, argue that plaintiffs
have failed to assert a recognized public right.
	We note that although other courts have dismissed public
nuisance suits against similar groups of defendants (see Spitzer v.
Sturm, Ruger & Co., 309 A.D.2d 91, 761 N.Y.S.2d 192 (2003);
Camden County Board of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A.
Corp., 273 F.3d 536 (3d Cir. 2001) (applying New Jersey law); City
of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415 (3d Cir. 2002)
(applying Pennsylvania law)), no such case has been dismissed for
failure to properly plead the existence of a public right affected by the
alleged nuisance.
	Nevertheless, we question whether there is a public right, as
opposed to an individual right, to be free from the threat of illegal
conduct by others. The case law is not helpful. Cases involving the
right of public safety have involved nuisances created by vicious dogs,
the storage of explosives, blasting, the storage or use of fireworks, or
the presence of unsafe buildings. See, e.g., Turpen v. City of St.
Francisville, 145 Ill. App. 3d 891 (1986) (dilapidated building);
Village of Northbrook v. Cannon, 61 Ill. App. 3d 315 (1978)
(allowing dogs to run free). The right of public peace has been
disrupted by disorderly houses, unruly taverns, and dance halls. See,
e.g., City of Chicago v. Cecola, 75 Ill. 2d 423 (1979) (house of
prostitution); City of Chicago v. Clark, 359 Ill. 374 (1935) (disorderly
house); People v. Sequoia Books, Inc., 149 Ill. App. 3d 383 (1986)
(lewd behavior in adult bookstore); Toushin v. City of Chicago, 23 Ill.
App. 3d 797 (1974) (massage parlor). Public comfort has been
affected by odors, fumes, dust, and other sources of pollution. See,
e.g., Gardner v. International Shoe Co., 319 Ill. App. 416 (1944)
(odors, noises, smoke); City of Chicago v. Latronica Asphalt &
Grading, Inc., 346 Ill. App. 3d 264 (2004) (illegal dumping of waste);
County of Cook v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., 152 Ill. App. 3d 726
(1987) (odor). Such nuisances have affected the public generally.
 	We have found no Illinois case recognizing a public right to be
free from the threat that members of the public may commit crimes
against individuals. Plaintiffs cite Cecola in support of their assertion
that "a violation of laws that protect public health, welfare, or safety
infringes a public right and hence may be remedied through a nuisance
action." Cecola, however, involved an action to abate the nuisance
created by the operation of a house of prostitution. The conduct itself
was illegal; a statute specifically permitted houses of prostitution to be
enjoined as public nuisances; and the operation of a house of
prostitution was considered a nuisance at common law. Cecola, 75 Ill. 2d  at 427. Cecola does not offer support for recognition of a public
right characterized in plaintiffs' reply brief as "the public's right to
enjoy the benefits of the laws governing the unlawful possession and
use of firearms."
		"The interference with a public right is the sine qua non of a
cause of action for public nuisance. However, not all
interferences with public rights are public nuisances. The
nuisance must affect an interest common to the general
public, must produce a common injury, or be dangerous or
injurious to the general public, or it must be harmful to the
public health, or prevent the public from a peaceful use of
their land and the public streets, or there must be some direct
encroachment on public property." 58 Am. Jur. 2d Nuisances
§39 (2002).
Further,
		"A public right is one common to all members of the general
public. It is collective in nature and not like the individual
right that everyone has not to be assaulted or defamed or
defrauded or negligently injured." Restatement (Second) of
Torts §821B, Comment g, at 92 (1979).
	In Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 258 Conn. 313, 780 A.2d 98
(2001), the Supreme Court of Connecticut resolved a case similar to
the present case on the threshold question of whether the plaintiff
mayor and city had standing to assert a claim of public nuisance.
Ganim, 258 Conn. at 343-44, 780 A.2d  at 117. The Connecticut court
also commented that:
		" 'Nuisances are public where they violate public rights, and
produce a common injury, and where they constitute an
obstruction to public rights, that is, the rights enjoyed by
citizens as part of the public. ... [I]f the annoyance is one that
is common to the public generally, then it is a public
nuisance. ... The test is not the number of persons annoyed,
but the possibility of annoyance to the public by the invasion
of its rights. A public nuisance is one that injures the citizens
generally who may be so circumstanced as to come within its
influence.' " Ganim, 258 Conn. at 369, 780 A.2d  at 131-32,
quoting Higgins v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 129
Conn. 606, 611, 30 A.2d 388, 391 (1943).
	The Connecticut court acknowledged that the definition of a
common law public nuisance might be "capacious enough" to
encompass the plaintiffs' complaint: "One might well say that the
harms alleged by the plaintiffs to have been caused by the defendants'
conduct are harms that injure the citizens of Bridgeport who may be
so circumstanced as to come within the influence of that conduct."
Ganim, 258 Conn. at 370, 780 A.2d  at 132. One might also say,
however, that the harm alleged was harm to individual members of the
public, not to the public generally.
	In the second amended complaint, plaintiffs describe the harms
that they allege result from the possession and use of illegal firearms
in the city of Chicago: "a higher level of crime, death and injuries to
Chicago citizens, a higher level of fear, discomfort and inconvenience
to the residents of Chicago, and increased costs to the plaintiffs to
investigate and prosecute crimes caused by the illegal possession and
use of the firearms brought into Chicago."
	Leaving aside for a moment the costs incurred by plaintiffs, which
we determine, below, are not recoverable as damages, we query
whether the public right asserted by plaintiffs is merely an assertion,
on behalf of the entire community, of the individual right not to be
assaulted. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts §821B, Comment
g, at 92 (1979) (a public right is "not like the individual right that
everyone has not to be assaulted"). We are also reluctant to recognize
a public right so broad and undefined that the presence of any
potentially dangerous instrumentality in the community could be
deemed to threaten it.
	By posing this question, we do not intend to minimize the very
real problem of violent crime and the difficult tasks facing law
enforcement and other public officials. Nor do we intend to dismiss
the concerns of citizens who live in areas where gun crimes are
particularly frequent. Rather, we are reluctant to state that there is a
public right to be free from the threat that some individuals may use
an otherwise legal product (be it a gun, liquor, a car, a cell phone, or
some other instrumentality) in a manner that may create a risk of harm
to another.
	For example, the purchase and consumption of alcohol by adults
is legal, while driving under the influence is a crime. If there is public
right to be free from the threat that others may use a lawful product
to break the law, that right would include the right to drive upon the
highways, free from the risk of injury posed by drunk drivers. This
public right to safe passage on the highways would provide the basis
for public nuisance claims against brewers and distillers, distributing
companies, and proprietors of bars, taverns, liquor stores, and
restaurants with liquor licenses, all of whom could be said to
contribute to an interference with the public right.
	Similarly, cell phones, DVD players, and other lawful products
may be misused by drivers, creating a risk of harm to others. In an
increasing number of jurisdictions, state legislatures have acted to ban
the use of these otherwise legal products while driving. A public right
to be free from the threat that other drivers may defy these laws would
permit nuisance liability to be imposed on an endless list of
manufacturers, distributors, and retailers of manufactured products
that are intended to be, or are likely to be, used by drivers, distracting
them and causing injury to others.
	We conclude that there is no authority for the unprecedented
expansion of the concept of public rights to encompass the right
asserted by plaintiffs. Further, because we conclude, below, that
plaintiffs' claim does not meet all of the required elements of a public
nuisance action, we need not decide whether to break new ground by
creating such precedent.
D. Unreasonable Interference
			"Circumstances that may sustain a holding that an
interference with a public right is unreasonable include the
following:
				(a) Whether the conduct involves a significant
interference with the public health, the public safety, the
public peace, the public comfort or the public
convenience, or
				(b) whether the conduct is proscribed by a statute,
ordinance or administrative regulation, or
				(c) whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or
has produced a permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as
the actor knows or has reason to know, has a significant
effect upon the public right." (Emphases added.)
Restatement (Second) of Torts §821B(2) (1979).
	We understand plaintiffs' claim of unreasonable interference to
be based on section 821B(2)(c), because their complaint alleges that
defendants' "conduct in designing, marketing, distributing, and selling
firearms to Chicago residents or to persons whom defendants know
will cause those firearms to end up in Chicago is of a continuing
nature." (Emphasis added.) The second amended complaint describes
the "significant effect" of defendants' conduct as: "a higher level of
crime, death and injuries to Chicago citizens, a higher level of fear,
discomfort and inconvenience to the residents of Chicago, and
increased costs to the plaintiffs." The complaint also avers that illegal
firearms "are used in the commission of crimes, including crimes in
which residents of Chicago are killed, maimed, or terrorized." In
addition, the complaint contains data regarding the number of
homicides, robberies, and other crimes involving handguns, both in the
city and nationwide. Data are offered regarding the ready availability
of handguns to those who are forbidden by law to possess them. The
significance of the problem is further demonstrated by citations to
numerous state statutes intended to curb gun violence.
	Defendants assert that in more than 2,500 reported cases in the
over-100-year history of public nuisance law in Illinois, a public
nuisance has been found to exist only when one of two circumstances
was present: either the defendant's conduct in creating the public
nuisance involved the defendant's use of land, or the conduct at issue
was in violation of a statute or ordinance. Thus, they argue, even
though an action for public nuisance may lie without allegations that
the nuisance emanates from the defendants' use of land, the law of
public nuisance does not encompass conditions that eventuate from
the lawful manufacture, distribution, and sale of a nondefective
product.
	Although we have not attempted to verify defendants' claim that
the body of law on this topic in state and federal courts applying
Illinois law exceeds 2,500 cases, we have found no Illinois case in
which a public nuisance was found in the absence of one of these two
conditions. While no case law in this jurisdiction expressly limits
application of the doctrine of public nuisance to these two
circumstances, no case law expressly authorizes its application in the
absence of either condition. To do so would be to expand the law of
nuisance to encompass a third circumstance-the effect of lawful
conduct that does not involve the use of land. We are reluctant to
allow such an expansion.
	 With this reluctance in mind, we turn to the two arguments made
by defendants challenging the appellate court's conclusion that
plaintiffs have properly pleaded the element of unreasonable
interference.
1. Lawful Sale of Nondefective Product
	Defendants argue that, as a matter of law, the lawful production
and sale of a nondefective product is per se reasonable and, thus,
cannot result in liability for creation of a public nuisance. The
appellate court responded to this argument by citing section 834 of the
Restatement: " 'One is subject to liability for a nuisance caused by an
activity, not only when he carries on the activity but also when he
participates to a substantial extent to carrying it on.' " 337 Ill. App. 3d
at 15, quoting City of Bloomington, Indiana v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp., 891 F.2d 611, 614 n.5 (7th Cir. 1989), citing Restatement
(Second) of Torts §834 (1979). The appellate court also noted that a
federal court deciding a case of first impression under Illinois law had
previously declined to impose public nuisance liability against a gun
manufacturer in the absence of state decisional law. 337 Ill. App. 3d
at 14, citing Bubalo v. Navegar, Inc., No. 96-C-3664 (N.D. Ill.
March 20, 1998). Then, relying on City of Cincinnati, the appellate
court rejected defendants' argument. The Supreme Court of Ohio, in
City of Cincinnati, allowed a public nuisance claim against a similar
group of defendants to stand, holding that, "under the Restatement's
broad definition, a public-nuisance action can be maintained for
injuries caused by a product if the facts establish that the design,
manufacturing, marketing, or sale of the product unreasonably
interfere[ ] with a right common to the general public." City of
Cincinnati, 95 Ohio St. 3d at 520, 768 N.E.2d  at 1142.
	Plaintiffs' novel application of the cause of action of public
nuisance renders authorities such as the Restatement less than helpful
in answering this question. Section 834, for example, focuses primarily
on private nuisance and its common law basis tied to a defendant's use
of land and the resulting invasion a plaintiff's property rights. The
"Scope Note" preceding section 834 states that the defendant's
activity "may be the direct cause of the invasion or it may create a
physical condition that ultimately results in the invasion." (Emphasis
added.) Restatement (Second) of Torts §834 (1979). All of the
illustrations that follow section 834 involve invasions of property
rights caused by the defendant's use of land and are clearly predicated
on a view of nuisance as a physical condition brought about by the
wrongful use of real property.
	Similarly, the assertion in manufacturer defendants' brief that a
" 'product which has caused injury cannot be classified as a nuisance
to hold liable the manufacturer or seller for the product's injurious
effects' " (quoting 63A Am. Jur. 2d Products Liability §927, at 105
(1997)) is not entirely helpful when a public nuisance is alleged. The
cited authority also states that:
		"Because a seller in a commercial transaction relinquishes
ownership and control of its products when they are sold, it
lacks the legal right to abate whatever hazards its products
may pose. Under these circumstances, the purchaser's proper
remedies are products liability actions for negligence or
breach of warranty rather than a nuisance action." 63A Am.
Jur. 2d Products Liability §927, at 106 (1997).
Clearly, this authority is considering whether the purchaser of a
product may state a nuisance claim for injuries caused by the product.
Neither the plaintiffs in the present case, nor the citizens injured by the
firearms that have been manufactured, distributed, and sold by the
defendants, are purchasers seeking to assert a public nuisance claim
when an action for products liability or breach of warranty would be
more appropriate.
	Plaintiffs concede that their public nuisance claim, based on the
alleged effects of defendants' lawful manufacture and sale of firearms
outside the city and the county, would extend public nuisance liability
further than it has been applied in the past. Nevertheless, they, and the
amici in support of their position, argue that extending the doctrine of
public nuisance in this manner is a proper exercise of this court's
inherent authority to develop the common law. Further, they claim,
the legislature has expressed no intent to foreclose common law
liability for marketing, distribution, and sales practices that create a
public nuisance.
	The Supreme Court of Indiana has agreed with this approach,
holding in City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222,
1234 (Ind. 2003), that "a nuisance claim may be predicated on a
lawful activity conducted in such a manner that it imposes costs on
others." We do not find City of Gary convincing, however, because
the authority cited for this statement, Yeager & Sullivan, Inc. v.
O'Neill, 163 Ind. App. 466, 474-75, 324 N.E.2d 846, 852 (1975),
involved a nuisance created by the keeping of hogs, a lawful
enterprise, in a manner that invaded the rights of others. Again, it was
the manner in which the defendant used his real property, and the
effect of his conduct on plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his real
property, that resulted in imposition of nuisance liability in Yeager &
Sullivan.
	The other authorities offered by plaintiffs do not directly address
defendants' contention that plaintiffs' claim is, in effect, a products
liability claim repackaged as public nuisance. Because a products
liability claim against one who lawfully manufactures and sells a
nondefective product must fail (see Riordan v. International
Armament Corp., 132 Ill. App. 3d 642 (1985); Linton v. Smith &
Wesson, 127 Ill. App. 3d 676 (1984)), defendants urge this court to
conclude that plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action in public
nuisance and to leave to the legislature the question of whether to
impose additional constraints on the marketing and sale of firearms.
	Cases from other jurisdictions in which reviewing courts have
rejected public nuisance claims against the gun industry offer more
analysis of this question. In Spitzer v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., a New
York appellate court observed:
		"[G]iving a green light to a common-law public nuisance
cause of action today will, in our judgment, likely open the
courthouse doors to a flood of limitless, similar theories of
public nuisance, not only against these defendants, but also
against a wide and varied array of other commercial and
manufacturing enterprises and activities.
			All a creative mind would need to do is construct a
scenario describing a known or perceived harm of a sort that
can somehow be said to relate back to the way a company or
an industry makes, markets, and/or sells its non-defective,
lawful product or service, and a public nuisance claim would
be conceived and a lawsuit born." Spitzer, 309 A.D.2d  at 96,
761 N.Y.S.2d  at 196.
	Citing an earlier case rejecting a theory of negligent marketing
against a gun manufacturer, the Spitzer court observed that " 'judicial
resistance to the expansion of duty grows out of practical concerns
both about potentially limitless liability and about the unfairness of
imposing liability for the acts of another.' " Spitzer, 309 A.D.2d  at 95-96, 761 N.Y.S.2d  at 196, quoting Hamilton v. Beretta USA Corp., 96 N.Y.2d 222, 233, 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1061, 727 N.Y.S.2d 7, 13
(2001). This concern, the court, noted, "is common to both negligent
marketing and public nuisance claims." Spitzer, 309 A.D.2d  at 95-96,
761 N.Y.S.2d  at 196.
	Similarly, a federal court of appeals, applying New Jersey law,
concluded that:
			"Whatever the precise scope of public nuisance law in
New Jersey may be, no New Jersey court has ever allowed a
public nuisance claim to proceed against manufacturers for
lawful products that are lawfully placed in the stream of
commerce. On the contrary, the courts have enforced the
boundary between the well-developed body of product
liability law and public nuisance law. Otherwise, if public
nuisance law were permitted to encompass product liability,
nuisance law 'would become a monster that would devour in
one gulp the entire law of tort,' [citation]. If defective
products are not a public nuisance as a matter of law, then
the non-defective, lawful products at issue in this case cannot
be a nuisance without straining the law to absurdity."
Camden County Board, 273 F.3d  at 540.
	In addition, a Florida appellate court affirmed the trial court's
dismissal of Miami-Dade County's action against firearms
manufacturers, trade associations, and retailers, saying:
			"The County's request that the trial court use its injunctive
powers to mandate the redesign of firearms and declare that
the appellees' business methods create a public nuisance, is
an attempt to regulate firearms and ammunition through the
medium of the judiciary." Penelas v. Arms Technology, Inc.,
778 So. 2d 1042, 1045 (Fla. App. 2001).
A Florida statute expressly reserves the field of regulation of firearms
and ammunition to the state legislature (Fla. Stat. §790.33 (1999)). In
Illinois, cities and counties are free to impose gun regulations within
certain limits (see 720 ILCS 5/47-5 (West 2002)). Nevertheless, we
agree with defendants that the Florida court's observation is worthy
of consideration.
	Defendants' position is that the legislative and executive branches
of state and federal government are better suited than this court to
address the societal costs that flow from the illegal use of handguns,
particularly given that the commercial activity at issue is already highly
regulated. Further, defendants argue that plaintiffs' "frustration" at
their inability to effectively regulate gun possession in the city cannot
be "alleviated through litigation as the judiciary is not empowered to
'enact' regulatory measures in the guise of injunctive relief. The
power to legislate belongs not to the judicial branch of government,
but to the legislative branch." Penelas, 778 So. 2d  at 1045.
	Our own research reveals that the Criminal Code contains a
nuisance provision listing 17 categories of conduct or uses of land that
are public nuisances. 720 ILCS 5/47-5 (West 2002). In addition, the
General Assembly has enacted numerous other statutes defining
certain conduct as constituting a public nuisance. See, e.g., 510 ILCS
5/15(c) (West 2002) (permitting a dangerous dog or other animal
from leaving the premises of the owner without a leash or other
method of control); 515 ILCS 5/1-215 (West 2002) (use of illegal
fishing device); 605 ILCS 5/9-108 (West 2002) (planting of willow
trees or hedges on the margin of a highway); 620 ILCS 25/11 (West
2002) (creation of a hazard that obstructs the airspace required for the
take-off or landing of aircraft); 625 ILCS 45/4-8 (West 2002) (use of
watercraft equipped with siren or flashing lights); 720 ILCS 5/28-2
(West 2002) (keeping a gambling place); 720 ILCS 5/37-1 (West
2002) (knowingly maintaining a building used in the commission of
certain enumerated criminal offenses).
	As these examples well illustrate, the legislature has the power to
declare something to be a nuisance that was not such at common law.
People v. Jones, 329 Ill. App. 503 (1946); Village of Gurnee v.
Depke, 114 Ill. App. 2d 162 (1969). However, the codification of
certain common law nuisances in the Criminal Code and the legislative
declaration that certain other conditions constitute nuisances does not
exclude common law nuisances not codified therein from being
classed as public nuisances. People ex rel. Dyer v. Clark, 268 Ill. 156
(1915). See also Gilmore, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 661 (public nuisance
statute does not displace common law actions; common law right to
action to abate public nuisance exists independently of any statutory
right). As this court observed in Festival Theatre:
		"[E]quitable jurisdiction to abate public nuisances is said to
be of 'ancient origin,' and it exists even where not conferred
by statute, where the offender is amenable to the criminal
law, and where no property rights are involved. [Citations.]
Too, in a common law action, the extent of the concept of
public nuisance is not limited to those activities the legislature
has declared public nuisances." Festival Theatre, 91 Ill. 2d  at
303.
On the other hand:
			"If a defendant's conduct in interfering with a public right
does not come within one of the traditional categories of the
common law crime of public nuisance or is not prohibited by
a legislative act, the court is acting without an established and
recognized standard." Restatement (Second) of Torts §821B,
Comment e, at 90 (1979).
In such cases, the Restatement warns, the analysis set forth in sections
826 to 831 becomes more significant. Restatement (Second) of Torts
§821B, Comment e, at 90 (1979). These sections define factors that
should be considered by a court when determining whether an
intentional invasion of another's interest in the use and enjoyment of
land is unreasonable. Restatement (Second) of Torts §826
(unreasonableness of intentional invasion), §827 (gravity of harm),
§828 (Utility of Conduct), §§829 through 831 (gravity versus utility)
(1979).
	Because these factors are intended to apply to intentional conduct
affecting the use and enjoyment of land, they are not directly
applicable to the novel claim made by plaintiffs. Thus, if we were to
engage in the balancing of harm versus utility that the plaintiffs urge,
we would be "acting without an established and recognized standard"
(Restatement (Second) of Torts §821B, Comment e, at 90 (1979)). In
addition, although courts frequently weigh such factors in other
contexts, an analysis of the harm caused by firearms versus their utility
is better suited to legislative fact-finding and policymaking than to
judicial assessment.
	Further, despite the existence of numerous statutes declaring
various practices and conditions to constitute public nuisances, we
have no indication from the legislature that it would be inclined to
impose public nuisance liability for the sale of a product that may be
possessed legally by some persons, in some parts of the state. It seems
that plaintiffs seek injunctive relief from this court because relief has
not been forthcoming from the General Assembly. We are reluctant to
interfere in the lawmaking process in the manner suggested by
plaintiffs, especially when the product at issue is already so heavily
regulated by both the state and federal governments.
	We, therefore, conclude that there are strong public policy
reasons to defer to the legislature in the matter of regulating the
manufacture, distribution, and sale of firearms.
2. Compliance with Applicable Law
	Defendants argue further that their business practices cannot be
deemed unreasonable if they are in compliance with applicable state
and federal regulations. In a related argument, defendants suggest that
because the firearms industry is highly regulated at both the state and
federal levels, judicial restraint in further regulating their activities is
advisable.
	As to the argument that compliance with applicable laws
precludes a claim of common law public nuisance because it is, by
definition, reasonable, the appellate court concluded that "compliance
with the law is not dispositive of whether a public nuisance exists, but
merely serves as a 'guideline' in determining whether an unreasonable
interference has occurred." 337 Ill. App. 3d at 13. The authority cited
for this statement, however, was not persuasive. The appellate court
cited its own recent decision in Young v. Bryco Arms, 327 Ill. App. 3d
948 (2001), a case virtually identical to the present case except that it
was brought by private individuals, and a law review article by one of
plaintiffs' own attorneys (D. Kairys, The Governmental Handgun
Cases and the Elements and Underlying Policies of Public Nuisance
Law, 32 Conn. L. Rev. 1175, 1182 (2000)). The only other authority
cited by the appellate court for this proposition is Commonwealth
Edison, 24 Ill. App. 3d at 632-33, in which the court concluded that
although the defendant demonstrated that it was in compliance with
applicable standards, the court was "not bound by federal air-pollution
standards in deciding whether the facility's emissions constitute a
common law nuisance." Rather, the court stated, "those standards
offer us guidelines in the determination of the reasonableness of the
operation and the extent of any harm to the public." In
Commonwealth Edison, however, the appellate court affirmed the trial
court's dismissal of the city's public nuisance claim against an alleged
polluter on other grounds, specifically, lack of proof of both
substantial injury and causation. Commonwealth Edison, 24 Ill. App.
3d at 633. Thus, the commentary in Commonwealth Edison on the
relevance of defendant's compliance with federal regulations was
dicta and of little persuasive value to this court.
	As to the argument that comprehensive regulation of the firearms
industry cautions against judicial involvement, the appellate court
commented that defendant's alleged fostering of an underground
handgun market is "not [a] lawful action." 337 Ill. App. 3d at 13. The
appellate court acknowledged that "comprehensive legislation of a
certain activity causes courts to exercise judicial restraint in declaring
an activity to be a public nuisance if it complies with the regulations."
337 Ill. App. 3d at 13. However, the court found such restraint
unjustified in the present case because " ' "there is generally no
regulation of the quantity, frequency, or purpose of firearm purchases
or sales[,] nor is there any national registration of purchasers of
firearms. Multiple sales and even straw purchases are generally not
unlawful and are not significantly regulated." ' " 337 Ill. App. 3d at
13, quoting Young, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 967, quoting D. Kairys, The
Governmental Handgun Cases and the Elements and Underlying
Policies of Public Nuisance Law, 32 Conn. L. Rev. at 1183. Again,
this conclusion is taken from a law review article written by one of
plaintiffs' attorneys and, as such, is entitled to little, if any,
consideration by this court. In addition, we find the appellate court's
conclusion regarding the regulation of firearms purchases to be
inaccurate. State and federal regulation of handgun sales is extensive.
See 18 U.S.C. §921 et seq. (2000) (Gun Control Act); 430 ILCS
65/0.01 et seq. (West 2002) (Firearm Owners Identification Card
Act). Indeed, the second amended complaint acknowledges that the
"State of Illinois is a high regulation state."
	Plaintiffs respond that the federal Gun Control Act expressly
provides that it does not preempt state or local laws. 18 U.S.C. §927
(2000). They also call our attention to Kalodimos v. Village of
Morton Grove, 103 Ill. 2d 483 (1984), in which this court rejected the
argument that state laws regulating firearms are so comprehensive that
they evince a legislative intent to preclude municipalities from
imposing other restrictions of firearms.
	The Gun Control Act and Kalodimos, however, refer to state and
local laws and municipal ordinances and, as such, anticipate legislative
action, not judicial intervention. They offer support for defendants'
observation that a court should be reluctant to use its equitable
powers to impose an injunctive remedy on an activity that is already
highly regulated by statute. As the drafters of the Restatement
commented:
			"[I]f there has been established a comprehensive set of
legislative acts or administrative regulations governing the
details of a particular kind of conduct, the courts are slow to
declare an activity to be a public nuisance if it complies with
the regulations. *** The variety and complexity of a problem
and of the interests involved and the feeling that the particular
decision should be a part of an overall plan prepared with a
knowledge of matters not presented to the court and of
interests not represented before it, may also promote judicial
restraint and a readiness to leave the question to an
administrative agency if there is one capable of handling it
appropriately." Restatement (Second) of Torts §821B,
Comment f, at 91-92 (1979).
	Plaintiffs apparently would prefer other forms of regulation, as
demonstrated by the nature of the injunctive relief they seek.
Litigation should not be used to achieve legislative goals. Nonetheless,
we turn to the merits of defendants' argument that public nuisance
liability may not be imposed because their compliance with existing
statutory schemes renders their conduct, by definition, reasonable.
	Defendants point to Meyers v. Kissner, 149 Ill. 2d 1, 10 (1992),
as authority for their contention that a lawful act cannot constitute a
public nuisance. In Meyers, the plaintiff landowner sought injunctive
relief against adjacent landowners who constructed a levee that altered
the natural flow of water across his land, causing erosion. The
construction was not prohibited by law at the time. Indeed, a statute
specifically provided that a levee existing before a certain date could
be maintained and repaired without a permit. Meyers, 149 Ill. 2d  at
10. This court concluded that: "[I]t is by no means true that an act
constituting a nuisance must necessarily be in itself unlawful. While a
lawful act will not constitute a public nuisance, it can nonetheless
constitute a private nuisance." Meyers, 149 Ill. 2d  at 10.
	In addition, defendants call our attention to a comment to section
821B of the Restatement: "Although it would be a nuisance at
common law, conduct that is fully authorized by statute, ordinance or
administrative regulation does not subject the actor to tort liability."
Restatement (Second) of Torts §821B, Comment f, at 91 (1979).
	Finally, defendants offer Gilmore v. Stanmar for the proposition
that when the defendant's conduct is governed by comprehensive laws
and regulations, a public nuisance may be found only if the plaintiff
establishes that the defendant failed to comply with the law or was
otherwise negligent in carrying out the activity. The alleged nuisance
in Gilmore was a pedestrian canopy adjacent to a construction site,
which extended into the street, obstructing motorists' vision and their
ability to maneuver. Gilmore, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 653. The defendants
had obtained the proper permit for construction of the canopy and
argued that they, therefore, could not be held liable for a resulting
accident. Gilmore, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 654. The appellate court
concluded that plaintiffs' claims for negligence and common law
public nuisance were improperly dismissed by the trial court. Gilmore,
261 Ill. App. 3d at 659, 662. With regard to the nuisance claim, the
court said:
		"[T]he existence of an ordinance or other law purportedly
making a nuisance legal does not automatically destroy a
common law nuisance action where the defendant's conduct
was not in compliance with the law, where the defendant was
otherwise negligent, or where the law itself is invalid for
allowing a nuisance." Gilmore, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 661.
	We conclude that it is possible to create a public nuisance by
conducting a lawful enterprise in an unreasonable manner. If,
however, as in the present case, the enterprise is highly regulated by
state or federal law, the Gilmore rule provides the proper framework
for addressing the unreasonable interference element of a public
nuisance claim. Under the Gilmore rule, this element can be met only
by the plaintiff's pleading and proving that (1) the defendant violated
the applicable statutes or regulations, (2) the defendant was otherwise
negligent in carrying out the enterprise, or (3) the law regulating the
defendant's enterprise is invalid. Gilmore, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 661.
	As there is no suggestion that state and federal regulations
regarding firearms are invalid, we consider whether plaintiffs have
properly pleaded the unreasonable interference element under either
the first or second prongs of the Gilmore rule.
	The second amended complaint contains no specific factual
allegations of actual violations of applicable statutes and regulations
by any of the named defendants. The complaint asserts that "[a]bsent
effective enforcement and prosecution of gun control laws, firearms
are readily available to anyone who wishes to use them." We do not
question the accuracy of this statement, but it does not specifically
implicate these defendants. Plaintiffs also plead that "data from
recovered firearms and the undercover work of the Chicago Police
Department reflect numerous systemic violations of the
aforementioned statutes," but do not allege that these particular
defendants committed the violations. Further, plaintiffs claim that
"[d]espite strict gun control laws protecting the plaintiffs' citizens in
Chicago, there are thousands of illegal firearms in existence in the City
of Chicago." Again, the second amended complaint alleges
lawbreaking, but not by any of these defendants. Finally, the
allegations regarding specific sales transactions by the individual
dealer defendants stop short of alleging violations of applicable statues
and regulations. We conclude, therefore, that plaintiffs have not stated
a claim for public nuisance predicated on violations of applicable law.
	Plaintiffs argue that they have sufficiently alleged negligent
conduct that has caused unreasonable interference with public rights.
Under our application of the Gilmore rule in the context of a highly
regulated industry, a claim for public nuisance may stand if the
defendant was negligent in his operation of the enterprise.
	The appellate court did not consider whether plaintiffs had
properly pleaded a claim for public nuisance predicated on defendants'
negligently, and therefore unreasonably, creating a significant effect
on a public right. 337 Ill. App. 3d at 13 ("[P]laintiffs here do not
allege that defendants are liable under theories of negligence or strict
liability. Instead, their public nuisance claims allege defendants'
intentional and unreasonable conduct"). Plaintiffs' brief disputes this
conclusion, asserting that they have properly pleaded a public nuisance
claim predicated on negligence. We agree that the second amended
complaint does contain allegations that sound in negligence.
	Thus, we turn to the assertion of defendant manufacturers and
distributors that a claim based on negligence, whether the theory of
liability is nuisance or any other species of tort liability, may not lie in
the absence of a duty owed by the defendant. Washington v. City of
Chicago, 188 Ill. 2d 235, 239 (1999) (stating that, as a matter of law,
a plaintiff may not recover in a negligence action unless a duty is owed
to her by the defendant). Specifically, they rely on Riordan, 132 Ill.
App. 3d at 647 (manufacturers and distributors of handguns owed no
duty to plaintiffs in wrongful-death action to control the distribution
of their products), and Linton, 127 Ill. App. 3d at 678-79
(manufacturer of nondefective firearm has no duty to plaintiff in
personal injury action to control the distribution of its product to the
general public), which, they argue, preclude any reliance on
allegations of negligence as the underpinning of a public nuisance
claim.
	"Whether a duty of care exists is a question of law to be
determined by the court." Bajwa v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,
208 Ill. 2d 414, 422 (2004). The question turns largely on public
policy considerations, informed by consideration of four traditional
factors: (1) the reasonable foreseeability of the injury; (2) the
likelihood of the injury; (3) the magnitude of the burden of guarding
against the injury; and (4) the consequences of placing that burden on
the defendant. Bajwa, 208 Ill. 2d  at 427.
	Plaintiffs' second amended complaint asserts, in the section
headed "Nature of the Action," that defendants "have breached their
duty to not sell or supply firearms to Chicago residents who[m] they
know or have reason to know will illegally use, possess, transfer, or
resell the firearms in Chicago and have thus circumvented the Chicago
ordinances and other gun control laws governing use or possession of
firearms in Chicago." Under the heading "COUNT ONE: PUBLIC
NUISANCE," the second amended complaint alleges that:
			"Defendants owe a duty of care to the City of Chicago and
its residents and the County of Cook and its residents living
within Chicago to exercise reasonable care to prevent their
firearms from ending up in the hands of persons who use and
possess them illegally in the City of Chicago in light of the
direct, foreseeable, and serious consequences of their
actions."
With regard to the four traditional factors, the complaint further
alleges that: (1) "it is reasonably foreseeable to the defendants that
their conduct will cause deaths and injuries to Chicago residents and
otherwise significantly and unreasonably interfere with public health,
safety and welfare"; (2) defendants' conduct creates a "strong
likelihood that these illegal firearms will cause deaths and injuries to
Chicago residents"; (3) the burden of "taking measures to stem the
flow of illegal weapons into Chicago is not undue," consisting only of
the loss of sales to those likely to use or possess weapons illegally;
and (4) stemming the flow of illegal guns into the city will "save lives
and prevent injuries, and it will make the City of Chicago and County
of Cook safer places to live."
	Plaintiffs' brief to this court does not return to this factor-based
analysis of the existence of a duty, nor does it cite cases that have
applied this analysis to find that public policy weighs in favor of
judicial recognition of an heretofore unrecognized duty. See, e.g.,
Bajwa, 208 Ill. 2d  at 427-28 (placing a duty of due care upon an
insurance company to advise a proposed insured of a policy taken out
by another on his life). Instead, plaintiffs distinguish Riordan and
Linton on the basis that these are simply negligence cases, not public
nuisance cases, and that their nuisance claim is made "under a very
different duty than the duty at stake in these private negligence
actions." The duty asserted in the second amended complaint, they
argue, is a duty owed to the public at large, rather than to a specific
member of the public, as was the case in Riordan and Linton.
	Applying the four traditional factors (Bajwa, 208 Ill. 2d at 427),
in light of public policy, we find no duty owed to the public at large,
at least with respect to the manufacturer and distributor defendants.
It is reasonably foreseeable, in a nation that permits private ownership
of firearms, that criminals will obtain guns and it is not only likely, but
inevitable, that injuries and death will result. It is less foreseeable to
these defendants that the criminal conduct of individuals who illegally
take firearms into a particular community will result in the creation of
a public nuisance there. Further, despite plaintiffs' suggestion that the
only burden they would place on defendants is the loss of sales to
criminals, the magnitude of the burden that plaintiffs seek to impose
on the manufacturer and distributor defendants by altering their
business practices is immense. Finally, plaintiffs predict only positive
consequences if this duty is recognized-the city will be safer and lives
will be saved. Such positive consequences are speculative at best,
being based on the assumption that criminals will not be able to obtain
guns manufactured by other companies and sold by other dealers. The
negative consequence of judicially imposing a duty upon commercial
enterprises to guard against the criminal misuse of their products by
others will be an unprecedented expansion of the law of public
nuisance. See Spitzer, 309 A.D.2d  at 104-05, 761 N.Y.S.2d  at 202-03
(expanding the reach of common law public nuisance in the manner
urged by plaintiff would reach well beyond these defendants to
"countless other types of commercial enterprises, in order to address
a myriad of societal problems").
	We hold, therefore, that with respect to the defendant
manufacturers and distributors, plaintiffs have failed to state a cause
of action for public nuisance predicated on negligence, because these
defendants owe no duty to the city of Chicago or its residents to
prevent their firearms from "ending up in the hands of persons who
use and possess them illegally." This result is consistent with Riordan
and Linton, in which the theories of liability included, inter alia,
negligence, products liability, and negligent distribution, but did not
include public or private nuisance. The appellate court in these cases
held that the defendant firearms manufacturers and distributors owed
no duty to individual members of the public to control the distribution
of handguns. Riordan, 132 Ill. App. 3d at 647; Linton, 127 Ill. App.
3d at 679.
	The second amended complaint does contain specific factual
allegations regarding transactions engaged in by the dealer defendants
that, although not illegal, are suggestive of a willingness to serve
customers who may intend to circumvent the law. Thus, the first
factor, reasonable foreseeability of injury (Bajwa, 208 Ill. 2d at 427),
is arguably stronger with respect to the dealer defendants than with
respect to the other groups of defendants. In addition, the relief
sought against the dealer defendants is somewhat less burdensome.
Only the fourth factor, the consequences of placing that burden on the
defendant (Bajwa, 208 Ill. 2d at 427), weighs heavily against imposing
a duty upon the dealer defendants. The decisions in Riordan and
Linton are not relevant because neither case involved a defendant who
was a retailer of firearms. Because the question of foreseeability plays
a pivotal role not only in the question of the existence of a duty but
also in the determination of legal cause, we leave this question
unanswered for the moment and turn to the question of whether
plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded the element of proximate cause with
respect to the dealer defendants.
E. Proximate Cause
	Leaving aside the question of duty, the remaining element of the
public nuisance claim that must be present before injunctive relief
against the dealer defendants may be available is "resulting injury" (see
Gilmore, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 661), or, more precisely, proximate
cause. The term "proximate cause" encompasses two distinct
requirements: cause in fact and legal cause. Lee v. Chicago Transit
Authority, 152 Ill. 2d 432, 455 (1992). The first requirement, cause in
fact, is present "when there is a reasonable certainty that a defendant's
acts caused the injury or damage." Lee, 152 Ill. 2d  at 455. In deciding
this question, we first ask whether the injury would have occurred
absent the defendant's conduct. Lee, 152 Ill. 2d  at 455. In addition,
when, as here, there are multiple factors that may have combined to
cause the injury, we ask whether defendant's conduct was a material
element and a substantial factor in bringing about the injury. Lee, 152 Ill. 2d  at 455.
	The second requirement, legal cause, is established only if the
defendant's conduct is " 'so closely tied to the plaintiff's injury that he
should be held legally responsible for it.' " Simmons v. Garces, 198 Ill. 2d 541, 558 (2002), quoting McCraw v. Cegielski, 287 Ill. App. 3d
871, 873 (1996). The question is one of policy-How far should a
defendant's legal responsibility extend for conduct that did, in fact,
cause the harm? Simmons, 198 Ill. 2d  at 558. See W. Keeton, Prosser
& Keeton on Torts §41, at 264 (5th ed. 1984) ("As a practical matter,
legal responsibility must be limited to those causes which are so
closely connected with the result and of such significance that the law
is justified in imposing liability. Some boundary must be set to liability
for the consequences of any act, upon the basis of some social idea of
justice or policy"). The proper inquiry regarding legal cause involves
an assessment of foreseeability, in which we ask whether the injury is
of a type that a reasonable person would see as a likely result of his
conduct. Lee, 152 Ill. 2d  at 456.
	Although proximate cause is generally a question of fact (Lee,
152 Ill. 2d at 455), the lack of proximate cause may be determined by
the court as a matter of law where the facts alleged do not sufficiently
demonstrate both cause in fact and legal cause (Harrison v. Hardin
County Community Unit School District No. 1, 197 Ill. 2d 466, 476
(2001)).
	The appellate court briefly addressed the question of causation,
concluding that a "reasonable trier of fact could find that the criminal
misuse of guns to kill persons were occurrences that defendants knew
would result or were substantially certain to result from the
defendants' alleged conduct." 337 Ill. App. 3d at 18. It is unclear
whether this statement is intended to refer to cause in fact, or legal
cause, or to both. The mention of the trier of fact suggests that the
appellate court was considering the question of cause in fact, but the
appellate court did not determine whether plaintiffs had properly
pleaded cause in fact by alleging that defendants' conduct was a
material element and a substantial factor in bringing about the alleged
harm, or that the harm would not have occurred absent defendants'
conduct. On the other hand, the appellate court's mention of
defendants' ability to foresee certain results suggests that the appellate
court was engaging in the policy-based legal cause inquiry. However,
because this inquiry looks at what a reasonable person would foresee
as the result of his conduct, not at what this specific defendant knew
or should have known, the appellate court's conclusion does not
properly dispose of the question of legal cause.
	The dealer defendants make a number of arguments under the
general heading of causation. We consider two of them here. First,
they argue that Illinois law does not permit liability to be imposed for
public nuisance unless the defendant is in control of the instrumentality
causing the nuisance at the time of injury. Second, they argue that
their conduct is too remote from the alleged injury to be deemed a
legal cause. Because we are reviewing a dismissal pursuant to a
section 2-615 motion, our standard of review is de novo. Wakulich,
203 Ill. 2d  at 228.
1. Control
	Relying on the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court in City of
Cincinnati, the appellate court addressed the argument that
defendants cannot be held liable in public nuisance for the harms
alleged because they do not have control over the instrumentality at
the time of injury:
		"[I]t is not fatal to the public nuisance claim that defendants
did not control the actual firearms at the moment that harm
occurred. [Citation.] The Ohio Supreme Court stated:
'[A]ppellant alleged that appellees control the creation and
supply of this illegal secondary market for firearms, not the
actual use of the firearms that cause injury. *** Just as the
individuals who fire the guns are held accountable for the
injuries sustained, appellees can be held liable for creating the
alleged nuisance.' " 337 Ill. App. 3d at 17, quoting City of
Cincinnati, 95 Ohio St. 3d at 420, 768 N.E.2d  at 1143.
	Dealer defendants argue that the appellate court failed to apply
Illinois law precluding public nuisance liability where the defendant
does not control the alleged nuisance at the time of injury and,
therefore, cannot effectively abate it. Defendants insist that control
and proximate cause are distinct concepts and that Illinois courts have,
for many decades, required both to be proven in nuisance cases. The
control requirement, according to defendants, serves as a "boundary-setting limitation on liability."
	Plaintiffs acknowledge the general rule that when a defendant is
blameless for the subsequent misuse of its product, it bears no legal
responsibility for a nuisance subsequently created by those who have
purchased the product. See, e.g., Traube v. Freund, 333 Ill. App. 3d
198, 201-02 (2002) (holding that manufacturer of pesticide cannot be
held liable in public nuisance for contamination of lake resulting from
farmers' use of the pesticide on adjacent property; and noting that "the
absence of a manufacturer's control over a product at the time the
nuisance is created generally is fatal to any nuisance or negligence
claim"). Plaintiffs argue, however, that neither the case law nor the
Restatement imposes a control requirement in addition to the
causation requirement and, further, that when cause in fact is proven,
a defendant may be held liable if he substantially participated in the
creation or maintenance of the nuisance, even if he no longer
controlled the instrumentality. In effect, plaintiffs' contention is that
because defendants participate in transactions that eventually lead to
gun violence in the city of Chicago, they are not "blameless" for the
subsequent misuse of the firearms they sell.
	This court has discussed the question of control in the context of
a nuisance claim only once, in People v. Brockman, in which we
acknowledged the "oft-stated rule" that nuisance liability "requires
that the defendant be in control *** either through ownership or
control of the property." People v. Brockman, 143 Ill. 2d 351, 373
(1991) (citing cases from the appellate court and from other
jurisdictions). The public nuisance at issue in Brockman was pollution
caused by the illegal disposal of hazardous substances in a landfill. The
defendant landfill operator filed a third-party complaint against certain
of his customers who had been the source of the hazardous
substances, seeking contribution towards the costs of removal. We
concluded that although the customers' control argument was
compelling, "the differing policy interests attendant to our
contribution statute require that we not regard 'control' as the
dominant consideration in cases such as the one before us."
Brockman, 143 Ill. 2d  at 373. Thus, we concluded that:
			"[P]rinciples of equity support our conclusion that control
does not operate to bar a contribution claim based on
violations of the Act which create a public nuisance. Where
a proper claim for contribution may be stated, the fact that a
contributing polluter lacked control over the premises will
not defeat that claim. By our holding we do not advocate
total disregard of the issue of control, for it may properly be
a consideration in the apportioning of fault." Brockman, 143 Ill. 2d  at 374.
	In Brockman, we recognized control as a "consideration" and an
"issue," but not as a prerequisite to the imposition of nuisance liability.
Implicit in our holding, however, was a conclusion that although the
"contributing polluters" did not have control over the property at the
time abatement was to be undertaken, they did have control over the
polluting hazardous substances at the time they contributed to the
creation of the nuisance by depositing the substances in the landfill.
	Plaintiffs rely on Brockman for the proposition that control is not
a separate element of a public nuisance claim and, even if control is a
consideration in apportioning fault, it should not be the dominant
consideration when defendants had control over the instrumentality of
the nuisance when they sold the firearms that subsequently created the
alleged nuisance.
	We find the analogy between the defendants in this case and the
contributing polluters in Brockman unpersuasive. Our holding in
Brockman was based on equitable considerations, specifically, concern
about unjust enrichment:
		"So valued are principles of fairness and the avoidance of
unjust enrichment that even if a person who might otherwise
be immune has contributed as a cause to the injury he should
be liable in contribution. This is so even though he cannot be
directly liable to the plaintiff." Brockman, 143 Ill. 2d  at 373-74.
	Plaintiffs have not sought recovery from these defendants under
a theory of contribution. They do not suggest that fault be
apportioned between these defendants and the individuals in direct
control of the instrumentality-the lawbreakers who possessed and
used the firearms in the city. Defendants will not be unjustly enriched
if the lawbreakers are made to pay for their crimes without
defendants' contribution.
	Finding no support in Brockman for relaxing the control
requirement, if indeed such a requirement exists, we look to other
authorities to determine whether the appellate court properly
concluded that defendants' lack of control over the firearms after the
point of sale does not preclude imposition of liability for their
participation in the creation of the alleged public nuisance.
	Because the common law doctrine of nuisance has traditionally
been tied to harms resulting from the use of land, the question of
control has arisen most often when the defendant has "completely
divested himself from any connection with the property involved."
Maisenbach v. Buckner, 133 Ill. App. 2d 53, 55 (1971). In
Maisenbach, where a minor was injured by tripping over a fence, the
former owners of the property, who had not installed the fence but
had actively maintained it for 14 years, could not be held liable in
nuisance because: "Where a landowner clearly has no right to control
the property after he sells it to another, he likewise can have no duty
to third persons injured in connection with the property after the sale."
Maisenbach, 133 Ill. App. 2d at 56. This situation sits in contrast to
the case in which "an owner who creates a nuisance and then leases
the property with the nuisance attached." Maisenbach, 133 Ill. App.
2d at 54. Such an owner will be held responsible for injuries caused by
the nuisance even though he does not have possession and control at
the time of the injury. Maisenbach, 133 Ill. App. 2d at 54.
	A decade later, in City of Chicago v. Stern, 96 Ill. App. 3d 264
(1981), the city sought injunctive relief to abate the operation of a
"bawdy house" by several named defendants. However, the premises
were owned by a corporation, not by the named individuals. The
appellate court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the nuisance
claim: "In the absence of proof of ownership, operation, or control of
the premises by any defendant, the trial court properly found that
equity could not intervene to abate the alleged nuisance existing on
the premises," even though the named individuals formed the
corporation, owned it, and operated the "club" that featured nude
dancing and other erotic entertainment. Stern, 96 Ill. App. 3d at 267.
	In Brunsfeld v. Mineola Hotel & Restaurant, Inc., 119 Ill. App.
3d 337 (1983), the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action for public
nuisance against owners of property adjacent to the frozen lake upon
which he was injured while snowmobiling. Although the property
owners cooperated with individuals who constructed a motorcycle
race track on the lake, and even allowed them to use their equipment
to create and maintain the track, plaintiff pointed "to no act, structure,
or device within defendant's control which could constitute [a public]
nuisance." Brunsfeld, 119 Ill. App. 3d at 345. The court explained:
		"The creator of the nuisance is liable therefor [citation], as
may be a person who continues or maintains a nuisance
created by another [citation]; but where it is not shown that
a person created or continued a nuisance, or that he owned,
maintained, or controlled the premises on which it exists,
such person has no responsibility therefor." Brunsfeld, 119
Ill. App. 3d at 345.
	In each of these cases, the issue of control was inextricably linked
to the ownership of land and to the rights and duties of a property
owner. Control was relevant, not as an element of proximate cause,
but as a remedial issue. These cases stand for the unremarkable
proposition that an injunction will not issue, ordering a defendant to
abate a nuisance upon the land, if he has no authority, by reason of
ownership or possession, to enter upon the land. As such, these cases
offer scant support for the imposition of a separate control
requirement in public nuisance cases that are not predicated on the
defendant's use of land.
 	Defendants call our attention to City of Bloomington, Indiana v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp., 891 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1989), as an
example of a case in which nuisance liability was precluded because
the instrumentality of the nuisance was no longer in the control of the
defendant. In City of Bloomington, the court of appeals, applying
Indiana law, affirmed the trial court's dismissal of nuisance and other
claims against Monsanto, the manufacturer of polychlorinated
biphenyls (PCBs). Monsanto sold the PCBs to Westinghouse for use
in manufacturing capacitors. Westinghouse improperly disposed of the
toxic waste in various local landfills, and small amounts of PCBs were
also discharged in the plant's sewer effluent. City of Bloomington, 891 F.2d  at 613. The city sought damages and injunctive relief against
both Westinghouse and Monsanto, under various theories of liability
including public and private nuisance. City of Bloomington, 891 F.2d 
at 612. In affirming the dismissal of the nuisance counts against
Monsanto, the court observed that the city had not "been able to find
any cases holding manufacturers liable for public or private nuisance
claims arising from the use of their product subsequent to the point of
sale." City of Bloomington, 891 F.2d  at 614. Further, since the
pleadings did not "set forth facts from which it could be concluded
that Monsanto retained the right to control the PCBs beyond the point
of sale to Westinghouse," the court agreed with the district court's
conclusion that Monsanto could not be held liable on a nuisance
theory. City of Bloomington, 891 F.2d  at 614.
	We find City of Bloomington unpersuasive. Indeed, on similar
facts, an Illinois court following the precedent established by this court
in Brockman (143 Ill. 2d at 373-74) might have held that the city of
Bloomington had stated a claim against Monsanto. See also City of
Bloomington, 891 F.2d  at 619 (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (suggesting
that the majority had confused participation in the creation of the
nuisance with control over the instrumentality).
	Control is not a separate element of causation in nuisance cases
that must be pleaded and proven in addition to cause in fact and legal
cause. It is, rather, a relevant factor in both the proximate cause
inquiry and in the ability of the court to fashion appropriate injunctive
relief. When the nuisance results from a condition or conduct upon
land, control over the land is generally a necessary prerequisite to the
imposition of liability. See Brockman, 143 Ill. 2d  at 373. However,
when the nuisance results from the use or misuse of an object apart
from land, or from conduct unrelated to a defendant's use of land,
lack of control of the instrumentality at the time of injury is not an
absolute bar to liability.
	In the present case, the dealer defendants had ownership and
control of firearms at some point in the distribution chain. If a public
nuisance later results from the illegal use of the firearms by third
parties, liability in public nuisance is not necessarily precluded simply
because defendants no longer control the objects. The types of
injunctive relief sought (i.e., requiring these defendants to obtain proof
that a Chicago resident making a gun purchase has a place outside the
city in which he can legally maintain the firearm; prohibiting repeat
sales to the same customer within 30 days of a previous purchase) do
not require them to be able to exert control over the firearms that have
already left their possession.
	As for the question of cause in fact, the second amended
complaint contains detailed allegations regarding the dealer
defendants' participation in bringing about the alleged nuisance,
specifically their conduct leading up to and at the point of sale. Dealer
defendants remark that these allegations pertain only to police "sting"
operations and not to actual sales of firearms that were subsequently
used illegally in the city. The relevant inquiry is whether the harm
would have occurred absent the defendants' conduct or, in the
alternative, whether defendants' conduct was a material element and
a substantial factor in bringing about the harm. Lee, 152 Ill. 2d  at 455.
Where reasonable minds could differ, the question of whether the
defendant's conduct was a substantial factor or a material element is
for the jury to decide. Lee, 152 Ill. 2d  at 455. We are unwilling to
state as a matter of law that plaintiffs have failed to raise an issue of
material fact with regard to cause in fact.
	As for the question of legal cause, defendants' lack of control
over the firearms at the time of injury is related to their argument that
their conduct was so far removed from the eventual criminal acts that,
as a matter of policy, it would not be appropriate to hold them legally
responsible. We now turn to that argument.
2. Remoteness
	Dealer defendants argue that any nuisance resulting from the
possession and use of firearms in the city is caused not by their
conduct but by the independent, criminal acts of third parties.
Defendants assert that their selling of firearms merely furnishes a
condition by which the criminal acts of others are made possible and
is, thus, too remote to constitute legal cause of a nuisance that results
from the aggregate effect of many such acts. They further argue that
under Riordan and Linton, the criminal misuse of a firearm is not a
foreseeable consequence of the lawful sale of firearms to the general
public.
	In response to defendants' remoteness argument, the appellate
court ruled that plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded "resulting injury" by
alleging "facts that, notwithstanding actual knowledge that the guns
would be brought into Chicago and used in crimes, the manufacturers,
distributors, and dealers failed to alter their actions, thereby creating
a public nuisance." 337 Ill. App. 3d at 17-18. In reaching this
conclusion, the appellate court relied upon section 824 of the
Restatement and comment b thereto.
	Section 824, however, does not address the element of proximate
cause. Instead, it deals with the type of conduct essential to liability
for public or private nuisance. An actor will be held liable for a
nuisance if his conduct consists of: "(a) an act; or (b) a failure to act
under circumstances in which the actor is under a duty to take positive
action to prevent or abate the interference" that constitutes the
nuisance. Restatement (Second) of Torts §824 (1979). In the
"ordinary case," comment b instructs, liability for nuisance "arises
because one person's acts set in motion a force or chain of events
resulting in the invasion." Restatement (Second) of Torts §824,
Comment b (1979). Further, "[s]o far as the actor's liability is
concerned, it is immaterial whether he does the acts solely in the
pursuit of his own interests or whether he is acting for another,
gratuitously, under contract or as the other's servant or agent. It is
enough that his acts are a legal cause of the invasion." (Emphasis
added.) Restatement (Second) of Torts §824, Comment b (1979).
Thus, section 824 and comment b do not provide the answer to the
question of whether the alleged conduct of defendants constitutes a
legal cause of the claimed nuisance. Rather, comment b merely poses
the question-Is the conduct of these defendants a legal cause of the
alleged interference with a public right? The answer to this question
must be found elsewhere.
	In cases involving claims of negligence or nuisance, Illinois courts
draw a distinction between condition and cause. First Springfield
Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 257 (1999). If a defendant's
breach of duty furnishes a condition by which injury is made possible
and a third person, acting independently, subsequently causes the
injury, the defendant's creation of the condition is not a proximate
cause of the injury. Briske v. Village of Burnham, 379 Ill. 193, 199
(1942).
	In Galman, this court was urged to abandon this approach and to
apply the proximate cause standard of Lee to all cases involving a
question of proximate cause, even those in which the immediate cause
of the injury is the subsequent, independent act of a third person. See,
e.g., W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts §42, at 278 (" 'Cause'
and 'condition' still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the
distinction is now almost entirely discredited"). Rather than abandon
our long-standing framework for the analysis of proximate cause, we
instead harmonized our precedents with the proximate cause test
articulated in Lee. See Galman, 188 Ill. 2d  at 257-58. See also
Abrams v. City of Chicago, 211 Ill. 2d 251, 259 (2004) (restating the
applicability of cause versus condition analysis to a special subset of
proximate cause cases involving injuries caused by the intervening acts
of third parties).
	Under the Lee standard, as noted above, cause in fact exists if the
defendant's conduct is "a material element and a substantial factor in
bringing about the injury." Lee, 152 Ill. 2d  at 455. Legal cause,
however, is "essentially a question of foreseeability." Lee, 152 Ill. 2d 
at 456. The relevant inquiry is whether the injury is of a type that a
reasonable person would see as a likely result of his conduct. Lee, 152 Ill. 2d  at 456. This court has rejected the implication that the Lee test
is incompatible with earlier decisions involving a "particular subset of
cases," in which subsequent acts of third parties constituted an
intervening and efficient cause of the injury. See Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 
at 259, citing Briske, 379 Ill. 193 (village's placement of barricade
across vacated street was condition, not legal cause, of automobile's
collision with the barricade where intervening efficient cause was
driver's negligence); Merlo v. Public Service Co. of Northern Illinois,
381 Ill. 300 (1942) (height and condition of wires was condition, not
legal cause, of injury where efficient intervening cause was negligence
of crane operator who caused crane to come into contact with wires);
Thompson v. County of Cook, 154 Ill. 2d 374 (1993) (county's failure
to post warning sign at dangerous curve was condition, not legal
cause, of injury where efficient intervening cause of death of
passenger was recklessness of drunken driver); see also Abrams, 211 Ill. 2d  at 260. This court concluded in Galman that when, as in these
cases, plaintiff's injury directly results from the subsequent,
independent act of a third person, the "material and substantial
element" test of Lee is applied by asking "whether the intervening
efficient cause was of a type that a reasonable person would see as a
likely result of his or her conduct." Galman, 188 Ill. 2d  at 259. As the
Merlo court noted over 60 years ago:
		"If the act of a third party is the immediate cause of the injury
and is such as in the exercise of reasonable diligence would
not be anticipated and the third person is not under the
control of the one guilty of the original wrong, the
connection is broken and the first act or omission is not the
proximate cause of the injury. There may be more than one
proximate cause of an injury. But if two wholly independent
acts, by independent parties, neither bearing to the other any
relation or control, cause an injury by one creating the
occasion or condition upon which the other operates, the act
or omission which places the dangerous agency in operation
is the efficient intervening cause that breaks the casual
connection and makes the other act or omission the remote
and not the proximate cause of the injury." Merlo, 381 Ill.  at
317.
Applying this analysis, this court in Galman determined that an
illegally parked tanker truck was a cause in fact of the fatal injury of
plaintiff's decedent, but was not the legal cause. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 
at 259-60.
	Having assumed, arguendo, that the presence and use of illegal
firearms can constitute a public nuisance, we must determine whether
defendants' conduct in selling firearms that eventually are taken into
the city of Chicago is a legal cause of the nuisance. Legal cause will
be found if reasonable persons in the retail business of selling firearms
would have seen the creation of the nuisance in the city of Chicago as
a likely result of their conduct. See Galman, 188 Ill. 2d  at 259.
However, legal cause will not be found where the criminal acts of
third parties have broken the causal connection and the resulting
nuisance "is such as in the exercise of reasonable diligence would not
be anticipated and the third person is not under the control of the one
guilty of the original wrong." Merlo, 381 Ill.  at 317. Clearly, the
individuals who illegally possess and use firearms in the city of
Chicago are not under the control of the dealer defendants. The
question then becomes entirely one of foreseeability-Is the creation of
a public nuisance in the city of Chicago so clearly foreseeable that the
sales practices of these dealers should be deemed a legal cause of the
nuisance even though it results from the criminal acts of third parties?
	Dealer defendants argue that this question was resolved by the
appellate court in Riordan and Linton. Linton was a personal injury
case in which the court held that the manufacturer of a firearm had no
duty to the particular plaintiff who was shot by a third party. Linton,
127 Ill. App. 3d at 678-79. Riordan involved wrongful-death claims
against the manufacturers and distributors of guns used in fatal
shootings. The appellate court held that these defendants had no duty
to the victims of crimes committed by third parties. Riordan, 132 Ill.
App. 3d at 646. Neither case discussed the element of causation and
in neither case was the dealer who sold the gun a defendant, so we
find these cases informative, but not dispositive, of the present case.
	The City responds to the question of legal cause and the related
remoteness argument by stating that the "entire object of the scheme
alleged in the complaint is to exploit the demand for illegal firearms
within Chicago. The complaint pleads not only foreseeability, but that
defendants intend to market and distribute firearms in a manner than
facilitates their unlawful use and possession in Chicago." The city
acknowledges multiple links in the causal chain between defendants'
actions and the alleged nuisance, but claims that the complaint
"demonstrates exactly how each defendant has participated in
distribution channels that supply grossly disproportionate numbers of
guns to criminals in Chicago."
	The city also argues that Rowe v. State Bank of Lombard, 125 Ill. 2d 203 (1988), is dispositive of this case. In Rowe, this court stated
that a defendant may be held liable in negligence if he creates a
condition conducive to a foreseeable intervening criminal act. Rowe,
125 Ill. 2d  at 224. The condition at issue in Rowe was a criminal's
ability to gain entry to an office by using a master key that he had
obtained while working as a construction laborer on the site. Rowe,
125 Ill. 2d  at 225. Under the circumstances alleged, which included
previous crimes committed on the premises with no sign of forcible
entry, this court held that an assault and murder "were within the
scope of the foreseeable risk created by the inadequate control with
regard to the master and grandmaster keys." Rowe, 125 Ill. 2d  at 227.
Because the issue under discussion in Rowe was the existence of a
duty, not the existence of legal cause, Rowe is not dispositive of the
present case.
	A familiar treatise on torts warns that "[i]t must be remembered
that the mere fact that misconduct on the part of another might be
foreseen is not of itself sufficient to place the responsibility upon the
defendant." W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts §44, at 305 (5th
ed. 1984). Further, "[e]ven though the intervening cause may be
regarded as foreseeable, the defendant is not liable unless the
defendant's conduct has created or increased an unreasonable risk of
harm through its intervention." W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on
Torts §44, at 305 (5th ed. 1984). These comments, contained in the
section of the treatise discussing intervening causes, refer the reader
to the earlier discussion of the standard of conduct: "Under all
ordinary and normal circumstances, in the absence of any reason to
expect the contrary, the actor may reasonably proceed upon the
assumption that others will obey the criminal law. W. Keeton, Prosser
& Keeton on Torts §33, at 201 (5th ed. 1984). In "other situations,"
however, the actor may have a duty of care for the protection of
others. Such situations include situations in which the actor has a
special responsibility for the protection of the plaintiff, perhaps arising
by contract or founded upon a special relationship between the two,
and where there is "an especial temptation and opportunity for
criminal misconduct brought about by the defendant." W. Keeton,
Prosser & Keeton on Torts §33, at 201-03 (5th ed. 1984).
	These excerpts from the treatise illustrate the link between the
questions of the existence of a duty and the existence of legal cause.
Both depend on an analysis of foreseeability. In the present case, the
question is whether dealer defendants, given the nature of the product
they sell, their awareness of Chicago ordinances regarding firearms,
and their knowledge that some of their customers are Chicago
residents, could reasonably foresee that the guns they lawfully sell
would be illegally taken into the city in such numbers and used in such
a manner that they create a public nuisance.
	We conclude not. We agree with the conclusion of the appellate
division of the supreme court of New York in Spitzer: "defendants'
lawful commercial activity, having been followed by harm to person
and property caused directly and principally by the criminal activity of
intervening third parties, may not be considered a proximate cause of
such harm." Spitzer, 309 A.D.2d  at 103, 761 N.Y.S.2d  at 201.
	This result is consistent with other Illinois cases in which a
defendant's conduct was found to be so remote from the resulting
injury that legal cause was not established. See, e.g., Thompson, 154 Ill. 2d  at 383 (inadequate warning of curve in road was merely a
condition; injury was caused by intoxicated speeding driver). Although
we have found no reported cases in which a nuisance claim has been
dismissed at this stage for lack of legal cause, the case of Watson v.
Enterprise Leasing Co., 325 Ill. App. 3d 914 (2001), in which the
theory of liability was negligent entrustment, offers some interesting
parallels to the present case. The defendant was a merchant who
furnished a condition by which the injury was made possible.
Specifically, Enterprise leased a vehicle to one party with the
knowledge that it was likely to be driven by one or more third parties.
The lessee entrusted the vehicle to a friend, from whom it was taken
by yet another person. Eventually, an intoxicated minor took the keys
from that person and caused an accident resulting in the death of his
passenger. Watson, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 917-20. Affirming the trial
court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant, the appellate
court noted that the element of cause in fact had been satisfied. Absent
the leasing of a car to the first individual, the death would not have
occurred-at least not in an accident involving this particular vehicle.
Watson, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 924. The intoxicated driver would either
not have driven at all and there would have been no accident, or he
would have obtained the keys to another vehicle and the accident
would have occurred, but would not have involved the defendant's
vehicle. Thus, the appellate court concluded, the "crux of the issue"
was "legal cause, which revolves around foreseeability." Watson, 325
Ill. App. 3d at 924. The driver who caused the fatal injury, the court
noted, was at least two steps removed from the person to whom
Enterprise directly entrusted the car. In addition, the accident was
caused by the criminal act of a third party. These events were not
reasonably foreseeable. Watson, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 925. Although the
defendant furnished a condition that made the resulting injury possible,
the creation of this condition was not the legal cause of the fatal
accident because the defendant's conduct was too remote to
constitute legal cause. Watson, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 925. As the
appellate court observed, to "impose foresight on defendant under the
particular circumstances present in this case would render it liable for
anyone who drove the car, thus making it strictly liable." Watson, 325
Ill. App. 3d at 925.
	The parallels to the present case are obvious. Dealer defendants,
like the car rental company in Watson, are in the business of providing
a lawful product that may be used in unlawful ways, causing injury or
death. Both the possession and use of firearms and the driving of
motor vehicles are highly regulated by state law. In the present case,
the existence of the alleged nuisance in the city of Chicago is several
times removed from the initial sale of individual weapons by these
defendants, just as the intoxicated driver was at least twice-removed
from the defendant in Watson.
	The appellate court in Watson found it unreasonable to expect the
car rental company to foresee a single accident caused by an
intoxicated teenage driver who took the keys to the car without the
permission of the person who had rented the car. In the present case,
the claim of negligent entrustment has been dismissed and its dismissal
has not been appealed. Thus, we are not faced with the question of
whether a gun dealer might be held liable for negligently entrusting a
weapon to an individual buyer when it is foreseeable that the buyer
might allow a third party to possess or use the gun illegally. Instead,
plaintiffs argue that it is foreseeable to these defendants that the
aggregate effect of numerous sales transactions occurring over time
and in multiple different locations operated by businesses with no ties
to each other will result in the creation of a public nuisance in another
city.
	Finally, although these dealers' sales of weapons create a
condition that makes the eventual harm possible by putting these
weapons in private hands, it is not at all clear that the condition would
cease to exist even if these particular defendants entirely ceased selling
firearms. Just as in Watson, in which the intoxicated teenager managed
to gain access to a set of car keys, those who intend to illegally
possess and use firearms in the city of Chicago would still be able to
obtain them. The manufacture and sale of firearms is legal. There is a
market for these products that is served by thousands of dealers all
across the country. The sales that would otherwise have been made by
these dealers would be made by others. Ultimately, there would be a
shift in market share between these dealers and others and, perhaps,
an increase in the price of illegal weapons "on the street" as those
intent on illegal gun ownership had to go further afield in search of
weapons to buy.
	Public policy also supports a conclusion that neither duty nor
legal cause can be established with regard to these defendants. In
Evans v. Shannon, 201 Ill. 2d 424 (2002), we invoked public policy
when we declined to impose a duty on a car rental company to check
the drivers' licenses of employees of the entities to whom it leased
cars. We stated that a "duty so imposed would have far-reaching
consequences, logically extending to every person who takes his or
her vehicle for repair or servicing, and requiring that commercial and
private car owners alike police the hiring practices of businesses with
whom they deal." Evans, 201 Ill. 2d  at 438. In the present case, the
consequences of imposing a duty upon the dealer defendants to
prevent the creation of a public nuisance in the city of Chicago by
those intent on illegally possessing and using guns in the city are
equally far-reaching. The same concerns underlie our conclusion that
it is inadvisable as a matter of public policy to deem the dealer
defendants' actions a legal cause of the alleged nuisance.
	Based on the pleadings before us, we conclude that the alleged
public nuisance is not so foreseeable to the dealer defendants that their
conduct can be deemed a legal cause of a nuisance that is the result of
the aggregate of the criminal acts of many individuals over whom they
have no control. This is one of those " 'instances in which a party may
have contributed in some remote way [to the harm] and yet it is
inappropriate to subject that party to tort liability.' " Spitzer, 309 A.D.2d  at 104, 761 N.Y.S.2d  at 202 (quoting the lower court in the
same case). See also Abrams, 211 Ill. 2d  at 262 (noting that while all
traffic accidents are "to some extent remotely foreseeable," the city's
failure to send an ambulance was not the legal cause of an accident
that occurred while plaintiff was en route to the hospital in a private
vehicle).
	We turn, finally, to the remedial issues raised by defendants.
F. Remedies Sought by Plaintiffs
	"It is generally conceded that a nuisance is remediable by
injunction or a suit for damages." Village of Wilsonville, 86 Ill. 2d  at
22.
1. Damages
	Defendants' remoteness argument has two facets. We considered,
above, whether their conduct is too remote from the criminal acts of
third parties to be considered a legal cause of the resulting harm. The
second facet of defendants' remoteness argument is that because any
harm to the city and county is merely derivative of injuries to
individuals who have been directly affected by gun violence, plaintiffs
are too remote from the harm to seek monetary damages.
	An award of damages in an action for nuisance is "retroactive,
applying to past conduct," and is proper if "it is unreasonable to
engage in the conduct without paying for the harm done."
Restatement (Second) of Torts §821B, Comment i (1979). Under
section 821(C) of the Restatement, a plaintiff may recover damages
in an individual action for public nuisance only if he "suffered harm of
a kind different from that suffered by other members of the public
exercising the right common to the general public that was the subject
of interference." Restatement (Second) of Torts §821C(1) (1979).
The ability of an individual plaintiff to recover damages in a public
nuisance suit is the result of "a tort remedy [having] been engrafted
onto a crime," the tort remedy being damages for trespass and the
crime being the common law crime of public nuisance. Restatement
(Second) of Torts §821C, Comment a (1979). No mention is made in
section 821C or the comments that follow of the ability of a public
official or entity to recover damages in an action for public nuisance
brought on behalf of the general public.
	Plaintiffs claim more than $433 million in operating expenses
attributable to the alleged public nuisance during the years 1994-98.
This amount includes the expenses of emergency communications and
emergency response, health care provided to victims of gun violence,
police investigations, and the prosecution and defense of those
accused of crimes involving illegal possession and use of firearms.
Plaintiffs also seek punitive damages against each defendant. Although
acknowledging the difficulty of apportioning damages among the
individual defendants, plaintiffs insist that damages are neither
speculative nor particularly difficult to calculate. Plaintiffs also suggest
that it is premature to consider issues related to damages at the
pleading stage of this litigation. Plaintiffs assert that they may properly
seek money damages because their public nuisance claim "is not based
on economic losses flowing from damage to someone else's person or
property, but instead properly asserts the collective rights of the
public." "In short," plaintiffs state, "in a public nuisance action, the
government is never a remote or derivative plaintiff." Plaintiffs'
position is that because abatement of the alleged nuisance by
collecting unlawful firearms is not feasible, they are entitled to recover
damages "representing the cost of providing governmental services
made necessary by the widespread unlawful possession and use of
firearms."
a. Economic Loss Doctrine
	Defendants assert that the economic loss doctrine adopted by this
court in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69 (1982), and elaborated upon in In re Chicago Flood Litigation,
176 Ill. 2d 179 (1997), bars plaintiffs' claim for damages. In
Moorman, this court held that the plaintiff purchaser of a grain storage
tank could not recover in tort from the manufacturer for solely
economic loss due to defects in the tank. Moorman, 91 Ill. 2d  at 85-86. The theories of liability pleaded by the plaintiff in Moorman were
strict liability, negligence, and innocent misrepresentation. Moorman,
91 Ill. 2d  at 72.
	After citing the landmark case of Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965), this court adopted the reasoning
of Seely to conclude that claims regarding "qualitative defects" in
products "are best handled by contract, rather than tort," whether the
tort theory asserted is strict liability or negligence. Moorman, 91 Ill. 2d  at 75-76, 86. Further, allowing a manufacturer to be subjected to
liability in tort for solely economic losses occasioned by a malfunction
of its product "would, in effect, make a manufacturer a guarantor that
all of its products would continue to perform satisfactorily throughout
their reasonably productive life." Moorman, 91 Ill. 2d  at 91. This
would also encroach upon the prerogative of the legislature in
enacting the sales provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Moorman, 91 Ill. 2d  at 91.
	Plaintiffs argue that their claim is not based on the type of
commercial interests for which the Moorman doctrine bars recovery.
The damages they seek are not the type of economic losses associated
with "disappointed commercial expectations" (In re Chicago Flood,
176 Ill. 2d at 200), such as " 'damages for inadequate value, costs of
repair and replacement of the defective product, or consequent loss of
profits,' " and " 'the diminution in value of the product because it is
inferior in quality and does not work for the general purposes for
which it was manufactured and sold' [Citation.]" Moorman, 91 Ill. 2d 
at 82.
	The present case does not involve a claim by the purchaser of a
product against the manufacturer or seller of that product for losses
caused by a "qualitative defect." Indeed, the firearms manufactured,
distributed, and sold by defendants are alleged to have performed
properly. Moorman, therefore, does not provide the complete answer.
	This court revisited the economic loss doctrine in In re Chicago
Flood, a case in which there was no privity of contract between the
parties and no allegation that a product was defective. The plaintiffs
included a class of individuals and businesses affected by the flooding
of a tunnel beneath the Chicago River, allegedly caused by the
negligence of the city of Chicago and one of its contractors. In
addition, an insurance company, ITT Hartford, the subrogee of several
other claimants, brought a separate action in nuisance. In re Chicago
Flood, 176 Ill. 2d  at 183. Applying the Moorman doctrine, the trial
court dismissed the nuisance claim as to Hartford's subrogors who did
not incur both an invasion of their property by the flood waters and
resulting property damage. In re Chicago Flood, 176 Ill. 2d  at 187.
On appeal, the appellate court held that the Moorman doctrine did not
bar an otherwise proper nuisance claim. In re Chicago Flood, 176 Ill. 2d  at 188-89.
	This court held that a plaintiff in a private nuisance action may
recover all consequential damages flowing from an injury to the
plaintiff's person or property. In re Chicago Flood, 176 Ill. 2d  at 207.
However, because this court found no reason to treat nuisance
differently than any other tort, recovery of damages for solely
economic loss would not be permitted. In re Chicago Flood, 176 Ill. 2d  at 207. We based this holding on the policy underlying the
economic loss rule: that because "the economic consequences of any
single accident are virtually endless," a defendant who could be held
liable for every economic effect of its tortious conduct would face
virtually uninsurable risks, far out of proportion to its culpability. The
economic loss rule operates to prevent such open-ended tort liability.
In re Chicago Flood, 176 Ill. 2d  at 207 (referring to earlier discussion
in the opinion). The present case, however, is distinguishable from
Chicago Flood, in which the theory of liability was private nuisance
and the harm was the result of a single accident, rather than a course
of conduct.
	Plaintiffs cite Board of Education of City of Shepard v. A, C &
S, Inc., 131 Ill. 2d 428 (1989), as an example of a case in which this
court allowed a tort action to proceed, notwithstanding the fact that
the plaintiff school boards were seeking damages from the defendant
manufacturers and distributors of asbestos-containing materials.
Recovery of the costs of asbestos abatement would not have been
possible under a contract theory. After all, the defendants provided
and satisfactorily installed a product that adequately performed its
intended fireproofing and insulation functions. A, C & S, 131 Ill. 2d  at
451.
	Moorman directed that a court consider the "nature of the defect
and the manner in which the damage occurred" as a means of
distinguishing between property damage, which would support a claim
for economic damages, and purely economic loss, which would not.
Moorman, 91 Ill. 2d. at 82. Applying this two-part inquiry in A, C &
S, this court found that the nature of the defect was the presence of
carcinogenic asbestos fibers on school premises. A, C & S, 131 Ill. 2d 
at 445. The manner in which damage occurred was contamination,
which was deemed a type of property damage on which a claim for
economic damages could be based. A, C & S, 131 Ill. 2d  at 449. This
court, therefore, declined to dismiss the school boards' negligence and
strict liability claims as barred by the Moorman doctrine. A, C & S,
131 Ill. 2d  at 451.
			"Perhaps it is difficult, and may appear somewhat artificial,
to fit a claim for asbestos damage within the framework
which has been established for more traditional tort or
contract actions. Indeed, the nature of the 'defect' and the
'damage' caused by asbestos is unique *** . Nonetheless, we
do believe that this complaint has alleged sufficient facts to
establish a tort action under the principles established in
Moorman; however, the holding in this case should not be
construed as an invitation to bring economic loss contract
actions within the sphere of tort law through the use of some
fictional property damage." A, C & S, 131 Ill. 2d  at 445.
	Despite this warning, plaintiffs urge us to read A, C & S as
creating an exception to the Moorman doctrine whenever it is alleged
that a defendant's conduct "creates an unreasonable threat to public
health, safety, and welfare." A, C & S, however, does not represent an
exception to Moorman. Instead, A, C & S merely stands for the
proposition that because contamination is a form of property damage,
the cost of asbestos removal from a plaintiff's property does not
constitute a solely economic loss subject to the bar of Moorman. See
also Tioga Public School District #15 of Williams County, State of
North Dakota v. United States Gypsum Co., 984 F.2d 915 (8th Cir.
1993) (holding that the economic loss doctrine did not bar plaintiff's
claim for damages for the costs of asbestos abatement). In addition,
we note that A, C & S predates this court's decision in In re Chicago
Flood, in which the recognized exceptions to the Moorman doctrine
were listed. The exception urged by plaintiffs was not noted. In re
Chicago Flood, 176 Ill. 2d  at 199.
	Plaintiffs also cite several cases from other jurisdictions for the
proposition that the economic loss doctrine does not apply when the
defendant is alleged to have breached a duty to the general public. For
example, in In re One Meridian Plaza Fire Litigation, 820 F. Supp. 1460, 1480 (E.D. Pa. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 12 F.3d 1270
(3d Cir. 1993), the federal district court held that, under Pennsylvania
law, the economic loss doctrine was not applicable to a public
nuisance claim. One Meridian Plaza, however, is not inconsistent with
our result in In re Chicago Flood, although the federal district court
took a slightly different approach by linking the policy underlying the
economic loss doctrine to the standing requirements for public
nuisance claims. One Meridian Plaza, 820 F. Supp.  at 1480-81. The
special harm requirement, which must be met in order for an individual
to have standing to bring a public nuisance claim,
			"is intended to serve the same purpose as the economic
loss doctrine: to limit liability arising from an event. Public
nuisances, by definition, affect many people. If every person
or entity injured from a public nuisance could recover
economic or even property damages, liability could be
exorbitant; thus only those plaintiffs who suffer special harm
may recover." (Emphasis added.) One Meridian Plaza, 820 F. Supp.  at 1481.
	Plaintiffs in the present case can neither avail themselves of the
standing conferred upon individuals under section 821(C)(2) of the
Restatement on the basis of having suffered a particular harm, nor
escape the strictures of the Moorman doctrine, because they have
pleaded no injury to person or property.
	Plaintiffs' reliance on People Express Airlines, Inc. v.
Consolidated R. Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 495 A.2d 107 (1985), is
similarly misplaced. People Express, like One Meridian Plaza,
involved a single catastrophic accident, specifically, a tank car
accident in a rail yard that necessitated evacuation of nearby
businesses due to the threat of explosion. People Express, one of the
affected businesses, suffered no property damage, but did incur
economic losses from the shutdown. People Express, 100 N.J. at 248-49, 495 A.2d  at 108. The theories of liability pleaded were negligence,
nuisance, and strict liability. People Express, 100 N.J. at 250, 495 A.2d  at 109. The Supreme Court of New Jersey expressed concern
with the economic loss doctrine, which allowed some parties, but not
others, to recover economic losses based on "the fortuitous
occurrence of physical harm or property damage, however slight."
People Express, 100 N.J. at 251, 495 A.2d  at 109. On the other hand,
the court found:
			"It is understandable that courts, fearing that if even one
deserving plaintiff suffering purely economic loss were
allowed to recover, all such plaintiffs could recover, have
anchored their rulings to the physical harm requirement.
While the rationale is understandable, it supports only a
limitation on, not a denial of, liability." People Express, 100
N.J. at 254, 495 A.2d  at 111.
	The limiting principle adopted by the New Jersey court was that
of foreseeability. People Express, 100 N.J. at 256, 495, A.2d at 112.
Under the new rule, "a defendant who has breached his duty of care
to avoid the risk of economic injury to particularly foreseeable
plaintiffs may be held liable for actual economic losses that are
proximately caused by its breach of duty." People Express, 100 N.J.
at 267, 495 A.2d  at 118. With regard to the nuisance claim, the court
stated, the ability of an individual to recover solely economic losses
under the new rule would be dependent on his standing to bring an
action for public nuisance. People Express, 100 N.J. at 259-60, 495 A.2d  at 113-14.
	The foreseeability exception to the economic loss doctrine
formulated by the New Jersey court in People Express has not been
widely adopted. In addition, although People Express was decided
several years after Moorman, it was decided more than a decade
before In re Chicago Flood. When this court ruled in In re Chicago
Flood that the Moorman doctrine bars the recovery of solely
economic damages in private nuisance, it implicitly rejected the
approach taken in People Express. We are not persuaded to adopt it
now.
	Although the economic loss doctrine is rooted in the theory of
freedom of contract, it has grown beyond its original contract-based
policy justifications of maintaining the fundamental distinction
between contract and tort and protecting the freedom of parties to
allocate risk by contract. In re Starlink Corn Products Liability
Litigation, 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 842 (N.D. Ill. 2002). One of the
early expansions of the economic loss doctrine beyond cases involving
the parties to a contract was in the so-called "bridge" or "access
cases." Starlink, 212 F. Supp.  at 840. In these cases, the plaintiff
businesses sought damages for lost profits after access to their places
of business was prevented by the closure of a bridge or road. The
theories of liability were negligence or nuisance. In re Chicago Flood
was such a case. Starlink, 212 F. Supp.  at 840.
			"Although they are nominally under the same economic
loss rule, there are really some different policy issues driving
the doctrine in access cases. The usual concerns about
interfering with contract law and the parties' freedom to
allocate risks are not present because there is no contractual
relationship. The parties are typically strangers and, with no
foreknowledge of each other's activities, had no opportunity
to assess and allocate risks ex ante. What these cases share in
common with traditional economic loss doctrine
jurisprudence is the lack of property damage. Moreover,
because the only harms alleged were profits lost due to
customer's inability to access the premises, these damages fit
neatly within the rubric of 'disappointed commercial
expectations.' Courts also emphasize the speculativeness and
potential magnitude of damages in access cases. *** So,
although the original policy bases for the economic loss
doctrine are not present, because of the type of injury, these
cases seem to fit, at least linguistically, within the economic
loss doctrine." Starlink, 212 F. Supp.  at 840.
	The damages sought by the plaintiffs in the present case are not
lost profits and, thus, do not "fit neatly" within the rubric of the
economic loss doctrine as applied in the access cases. However, the
concerns regarding speculativeness and potential magnitude of
damages that are present in the access cases are present here. We
conclude that the damages sought by the plaintiffs are "solely
economic damages" in the sense that they represent costs incurred in
the absence of harm to a plaintiff's person or property. See Starlink,
212 F. Supp.  at 841 (plaintiff cannot rely on harm to property
belonging to others to demonstrate economic injury).
	In sum, this court has never before been asked to determine
whether the Moorman doctrine bars a claim for solely economic
damages incurred by a city when it brings a claim of public nuisance
on behalf of the general public, in the absence of physical harm to city
property or other direct injury. The Restatement appears to limit
recovery of economic damages in public nuisance suits to individual
plaintiffs so affected by the public nuisance that they have standing to
bring the action. Restatement (Second) of Torts §821(C)(1) (1979).
We need not decide in the present case whether we agree with this
approach, which has been adopted in other jurisdictions (One
Meridian Plaza, 820 F. Supp.  at 1481; Stop & Shop Cos. v. Fisher,
387 Mass. 889, 897, 444 N.E.2d 368, 373 (1983) (individual plaintiff
who suffered no damage to property may recover solely economic
damages in public nuisance claim for obstruction of public way by
demonstrating "special pecuniary harm," not common to the general
public)), because the plaintiffs here are public entities. In Chicago
Flood, this court concluded that there is no reason to treat claims of
private nuisance differently from other torts. In re Chicago Flood, 176 Ill. 2d  at 207. In the end, we see no reason to treat claims of public
nuisance differently than claims of private nuisance. The Moorman
doctrine does not permit an award of solely economic damages to the
plaintiff public entities in this public nuisance action.
b. Municipal Cost Recovery Rule
	The result we reach on the application of the economic loss
doctrine is consistent with the result mandated by the municipal cost
recovery rule, also called the "free public services doctrine," under
which public expenditures made in the performance of governmental
functions are not recoverable in tort. The rule, where it has been
adopted, is based, in part, on the constitutional doctrine of separation
of powers. See, e.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California,
332 U.S. 301, 314-15, 91 L. Ed. 2067, 2075, 67 S. Ct. 1604, 1611
(1947) (declining to recognize cause of action by federal government
to recover costs of injured soldier's hospitalization and pay resulting
from negligence of defendants; noting that Congress, not the Court,
"is the custodian of the national purse," and the "exclusive arbiter of
federal fiscal affairs").
	This court has not had occasion to consider adoption of the
municipal cost recovery rule. The single appellate court case to
employ the rule, County of Champaign v. Anthony, 33 Ill. App. 3d
466 (1975), held that the county could not recover from a criminal
defendant the cost of providing protection to a witness against him.
This court affirmed on other grounds. County of Champaign v.
Anthony, 64 Ill. 2d 532 (1976).
	The seminal case on this doctrine is City of Flagstaff v. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 719 F.2d 322, 324 (9th Cir. 1983), in
which the city attempted to recover from the railway the costs
associated with emergency response after the derailment of tank cars
carrying explosive gas. The city's theories of liability were negligence
and conduct of an ultrahazardous activity. City of Flagstaff, 719 F.3d 
at 323. Affirming the district court's dismissal of the complaint, the
court of appeals held that "the cost of public services for protection
from fire or safety hazards is to be borne by the public as a whole, not
assessed against the tortfeasor whose negligence creates the need for
the service." City of Flagstaff, 719 F.2d  at 323 (applying Arizona law
in a case of first impression). See also Koch v. Consolidated Edison
Co. of New York, Inc., 62 N.Y.2d 548, 468 N.E.2d 1, 479 N.Y.S.2d 163 (1984) (in absence of statutory authority, city cannot recover
wages, salaries, and overtime paid to police, fire, and other municipal
employees as a result of citywide blackout caused by defendant's
negligence).
	The decision in City of Flagstaff did not turn on the underlying
theory of tort liability, or on the question of proximate or legal cause
of the expenditures. Rather, the identity of the claimant and the nature
of the cost combined to deny recovery. City of Flagstaff, 719 F.2d  at
324. As the court explained:
		"Where such services are provided by the government and
the costs are spread by taxes, the tortfeasor does not expect
a demand for reimbursement. This is so even though the
tortfeasor is fully aware that private parties injured by its
conduct, who cannot spread their risk to the general public,
will have a cause of action against it for damages proximately
or legally caused." City of Flagstaff, 719 F.2d  at 323.
Thus, the expectations of potential defendants, both business entities
and individuals, and their insurers would be upset substantially if an
entirely new scheme of liability were imposed. City of Flagstaff, 719 F.2d  at 323. Settled expectations are often upset when new tort
doctrines emerge. Nevertheless, with regard to municipal services "a
fair and sensible system for spreading costs is already in place." City
of Flagstaff, 719 F.2d  at 323.
		"[G]overnmental entities themselves currently bear the cost
in question, and they have taken no action to shift it
elsewhere. If the government has chosen to bear the cost for
reasons of economic efficiency, or even as a subsidy to the
citizens and their business[es], the decision implicates fiscal
policy; the legislature and its public deliberative processes,
rather than the court, is the appropriate forum to address
such fiscal concerns." City of Flagstaff, 719 F.2d  at 324,
citing Standard Oil, 332 U.S.  at 314-17, 91 L. Ed.  at 2075-76, 67 S. Ct.  at 1611-12.
	We agree that where a system already exists for the rational
allocation of costs, and where society as a whole relies upon that
system, there is little reason for a court to impose an entirely new
system of allocation. This is particularly true where, as here, allowing
recovery of the costs of routine police and other emergency services
could have significant unintended consequences.
	In addition to stating that such recovery would be permitted if it
were authorized by statute or regulation, the court of appeals in City
of Flagstaff noted that recovery has been allowed "where the acts of
a private party create a public nuisance which the government seeks
to abate *** and where the government incurs expenses to protect its
own property." City of Flagstaff, 719 F.2d  at 324. "These cases fall
into distinct, well-defined categories unrelated to the normal provision
of police, fire, and emergency services, and none are applicable here."
City of Flagstaff, 719 F.2d  at 324.
	A, C & S, one of the cases cited by the plaintiffs, is such a case.
Plaintiffs suggest that this court approved the school boards' recovery
of costs as a consequence of a defendant's wrongdoing. However, the
plaintiff school boards in A, C& S were suing under ordinary tort
principles as owners of damaged property, not as governmental
entities seeking to recover the costs of the services they routinely
provide to the public. A, C & S, 131 Ill. 2d  at 450-51. See also People
ex rel. Department of Transportation v. City of Chicago, 36 Ill. App.
3d 712, 714 (1976) ("it is well established that when the State brings
an action to recover for damages to property, it stands in the same
position as to rights and remedies as any other litigant").
	Other cases cited by plaintiffs involve various forms of
environmental pollution, for which the costs of abatement are
recoverable; or damage to public property, in which the city sues in
tort as a property owner; and, thus, fall within one of the "distinct,
well-defined categories unrelated to the normal provision" of public
services described in City of Flagstaff. In Wyandotte Transportation
Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 19 L. Ed. 2d 407, 88 S. Ct. 379
(1967), for example, the government was permitted to recover the
costs of removing a sunken vessel from an inland waterway because
such recovery was consistent with a federal statute that contained
specific, but not exclusive, remedies for violations.
	In City & County of San Francisco v. Philip Morris, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1130 (N.D. Cal. 1997), plaintiffs were permitted to maintain an
action for fraud against tobacco defendants in effort to recover costs
of medical care provided to indigent residents for smoking-related
illness. This result, however, was not reached as an exception to the
municipal cost recovery rule. Rather, the court ruled that the
California law, which bars recovery by one who pays medical
expenses of another who has been negligently injured, does not apply
to intentional torts such as fraud. City & County of San Francisco,
957 F. Supp.  at 1141.
	Plaintiffs also rely on Ashcroft v. Kansas City Firefighters Local
No. 42, 672 S.W.2d 99 (Mo. App. 1984), in which the State of
Missouri was permitted to sue the firefighters' union in tort to recover
the cost of deploying the state militia during an illegal strike.
Authority for the award of damages was found in the state statute
making such strikes illegal, which "implicitly consign[ed]" the
recognition of a cause of action for violation of the statute and the
creation of the proper remedy to the courts. Ashcroft, 672 S.W.2d  at
109. The Missouri court, however, expressly disclaimed any liability
for damages under the theory of public nuisance on these facts.
Ashcroft, 672 S.W.2d  at 114.
	Plaintiffs also cite City of New York v. Taliaferrow, 144 Misc. 2d
649, 544 N.Y.S.2d 273 (1989), in which the trial court ruled the
operation of a house of prostitution a public nuisance and awarded $1
in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages to the
city, pursuant to a state statute authorizing the imposition of civil
penalties. No "municipal costs" were at issue because no
compensatory damages were demonstrated. Taliaferrow, 144 Misc.
2d at 653, 544 N.Y.S.2d  at 277.
	Plaintiffs also argue that the exception acknowledged in City of
Flagstaff, applicable to matters "unrelated to the normal provision of
police, fire, and emergency services" (City of Flagstaff, 719 F.2d at
324), should apply when ongoing misconduct is so pervasive that it
creates a public nuisance. They cite City of Cincinnati, in which the
Supreme Court of Ohio permitted the city to maintain an action for
damages in tort against a group of defendants similar to those in the
present case:
			"Although a municipality cannot reasonably expect to
recover the costs of city services whenever a tortfeasor
causes harm to the public, it should be allowed to argue that
it may recover such damages in this type of case. Unlike the
train derailment that occurred in the Flagstaff case, which
was a single, discrete incident requiring a single emergency
response, the misconduct alleged in this case is ongoing and
persistent. The continuing nature of the misconduct may
justify the recoupment of such governmental costs. ***
Moreover, even the Flagstaff court recognized that recovery
by a governmental entity is allowed 'where the acts of a
private party create a public nuisance which the government
seeks to abate.' " City of Cincinnati, 95 Ohio St. 3d at 428,
768 N.E.2d  at 1149-50, quoting City of Flagstaff, 719 F.2d 
at 324.
See also City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 199902590
(Mass. Super. July 13, 2000) (distinguishing City of Flagstaff on basis
that it involved a discrete emergency).
	In James v. Arms Technology, Inc., 359 N.J. Super. 291, 820 A.2d 27 (2003), a New Jersey appellate court offered several reasons
for declining to apply the municipal cost recovery rule to a public
nuisance claim against gun manufacturers, distributors, and dealers.
First, the case upon which the New Jersey rule was based had
subsequently been abrogated, at least in part, by statute. Second, the
ongoing course of conduct alleged against these defendants was
distinguishable from the single incident at issue in City of Flagstaff.
Third, the rule does not apply where a municipality seeks to recover
the costs of abatement of a nuisance. And, finally, the rule has been
"subject to recent criticism, given the economic realities faced by
cities." James, 359 N.J. Super. at 327, 820 A.2d  at 49-50.
	We do not find these reasons persuasive. Unlike New Jersey, no
Illinois statute authorizes the recovery sought by plaintiffs. Second,
we reject the distinction between single, discrete disasters, such as
fires and explosions, and the unfortunately frequent incidents of
handgun violence as a meaningful basis for abrogating the rule. If
anything, the need for emergency response to shootings is a day-to-day occurrence, well within the predictable need for law enforcement
and other municipal resources, while the risk of an explosion or other
disaster is unpredictable and may impose devastating costs on a local
government. Such a "single incident" does not result in a merely
"nominal expense" (James, 359 N.J. Super. at 326, 820 A.2d at 48)
that can be spread across the tax base without difficulty, as these cases
would suggest. Nevertheless, as a matter of public policy, the cost of
responding to such disasters is borne by the taxpayers, absent any
legislative authorization otherwise. It defies common sense to suggest
that the more predictable the expense, the greater the ability of the city
to recover its costs in tort. The potential unintended consequences of
such a rule are staggering. We agree with defendants that when the
need for emergency services in response to an alleged nuisance is
ongoing, the municipal cost recovery rule is stronger, not weaker,
because the legislature is better able to consider need for cost-recovery legislation than in cases of sudden disaster. If the legislature
concludes that the costs of a certain public service should be borne by
the parties whose conduct necessitates that service, rather than by the
taxpayers in general, it has the ability to enact a statute expressly
authorizing recovery of such costs. Third, since plaintiffs admit that
abatement is not feasible and that the damages they seek do not
represent the cost of abatement, the exception in City of Flagstaff for
such recovery does not apply. And, finally, we are not persuaded by
scholarly and judicial criticism of the rule, as reflected in plaintiffs'
argument that "[c]ompensatory damages may *** constitute the most
effective relief available for past misconduct, both to compensate the
City and the County and to establish a rule providing the firearms
industry with an economic incentive to utilize more responsible
marketing practices." They may be correct, but this is a question for
the legislature. We will not abandon the principles of Moorman and
its progeny, and the sound logic underlying the municipal cost
recovery rule, in order to create such an incentive.
	We conclude, therefore, that even if plaintiffs properly pleaded a
cause of action in public nuisance, money damages would not be
available because the claimed damages do not represent the actual
cost of abatement of the nuisance or compensation for actual harm to
the city's or county's property.
2. Injunctive Relief
	The issuance of an injunction is contingent on plaintiffs'
prevailing at trial on the merits of their claim. Concerns raised by
defendants about the availability of a remedy at law and breadth of the
injunctive relief sought are, therefore, merely speculative and we
decline to address them.
	Similarly, because this case has been resolved on other grounds,
we have not considered defendants' arguments that dismissal of this
action is warranted on the basis the injunctive relief sought by
plaintiffs would violate the commerce and due process clauses of the
United States Constitution (U.S. Const., art. I, §8, cl. 3; amends. V,
XIV) and the state constitutional provision addressing the powers of
home rule units (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, §6). Lyon v. Department
of Children & Family Services, 209 Ill. 2d 264, 271 (2004).
IV. CONCLUSION
	Plaintiffs and the amici supporting their position advocate
expansion of the common law of public nuisance to encompass their
novel claim. They anticipate our reluctance to expand nuisance liability
in an area highly regulated by both state and federal law and urge that
it is not only within our inherent authority, but it is also our duty, to
construe the common law to aid a local government's effort to protect
its citizens from gun violence.
	To do so, we would have had to decide each of the issues raised
in this appeal in plaintiffs' favor. In effect, we would have had to
resolve every "close call" in favor of creating an entirely new species
of public nuisance liability. Instead, after careful consideration, we
conclude that plaintiffs have not stated a claim for public nuisance.
Even granting, arguendo, that a public right has been infringed, we
conclude that their assertions of negligent conduct are not supported
by any recognized duty on the part of the manufacturer and distributor
defendants and that, under the Gilmore rule (Gilmore, 261 Ill. App.
3d at 661), their allegations of intentional conduct are insufficient for
public nuisance liability as a matter of law. In addition, we hold that
proximate cause cannot be established as to the dealer defendants
because the claimed harm is the aggregate result of numerous
unforeseeable intervening criminal acts by third parties not under
defendants' control. By implication, proximate cause is also lacking
as to the manufacturer and distributor defendants, who are even
further removed from the intervening criminal acts. Finally, we hold
that plaintiffs' action for damages is barred by the Moorman doctrine
and the municipal cost recovery rule.
 	Any change of this magnitude in the law affecting a highly
regulated industry must be the work of the legislature, brought about
by the political process, not the work of the courts. In response to the
suggestion of amici that we are abdicating our responsibility to
declare the common law, we point to the virtue of judicial restraint.
	We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the appellate court and
affirm the judgment of the circuit court, which properly granted
defendants' motion to dismiss.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring:
	For the reasons given in my special concurrence in Young v.
Bryco Arms, No. 93678 (November 18, 2004), I specially concur.
	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW and JUSTICES
FITZGERALD, KILBRIDE and RARICK join in this special
concurrence.