Title: Huber v. City of Casper

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Huber v. City of Casper1986 WY 197727 P.2d 1002Case Number: 86-13Decided: 11/05/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
Emerick M. HUBER, 
Appellant (Defendant),

v.

The CITY OF 
CASPER, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Harry E. Leimback, 
J.

Ronald L. Brown 
and Burton W. Guetz of Burke and Brown, Casper, for appellant.

Richard H. Peek, 
Casper, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Emerick Huber appeals 
convictions, affirmed by a district court acting as an intermediate appellate 
court, of violating a Casper city ordinance enjoining leaving the 
scene of an accident and failing to report an accident. Based on ordinance 
interpretation, we reverse.

[¶2.]     In the early hours of 
Easter morning, 1985, appellant Huber, Sharon Hedges, and off-duty Highway 
Patrol Officer Brad Ward were returning in appellant's van from a Casper nightclub, bound 
for appellant's office. Near the cemetery they spotted a young woman in the 
darkness who "looked like she was in trouble." Huber, the driver of the van, 
stopped to offer assistance. The girl "looked like she had been hit a couple of 
times," and "her face was pretty messed up. She had been crying and looked a 
little bit shaky." She explained that her boyfriend had beaten her up and left 
her at the cemetery, and asked for a ride to her mother's house. Since the young 
passenger did not know her mother's address, Huber slowly drove the streets of 
North Casper until she spotted the house. As 
established by the undisputed testimony of Huber, Hedges and Ward, Huber pulled 
the van onto the sidewalk, turned off the engine, and placed the keys in his 
pocket.

[¶3.]     Ward, who had been 
seated on the passenger side of the vehicle, testified at trial that he and 
Huber supposed the abusive boyfriend belonged to a motorcycle gang because, on 
the girl's arm, there was a "one percent" tattoo. He explained this curious 
emblem:

"[A] 1 percent is a 
tattoo that motorcycle riders wear which * * * goes back to * * when the 
American Motorcycle Association came out with a statement regarding 
motorcyclists and said that 99 percent of all motorcyclists are good, honest, 
upstanding citizens and only 1 percent of the motorcyclists are the outlaw gang 
type members * * * that give [¶4.]      motorcyclists a 
bad name."

[¶5.]     Ward got out to help 
their bruised passenger alight. Suddenly, out of the quiet night, there came a 
mechanized roar, and Ward looked up to see four motorcycles heading toward the 
van. Assuming that the lead motorcyclist was the boyfriend, and possibly a 
member of a "one percent" outlaw gang, with potentiality for violence, Ward 
pushed the girl back inside the van, jumped in beside her, and yelled to Huber 
to drive away. Huber started the motor but not until after the lead motorcyclist 
had slid into and hit the rear of the still parked van. The reason for the 
motorcyclist driving into the van is conjectural, although evidence revealed 
that his blood alcohol content, measured after the accident, was .25 per cent. 
This condition and the circumstance of the van parked in a narrow street were 
likely factors precipitating the collision.

[¶6.]     Huber, Ward, Hedges, 
and the young girl, unsure whether or not there had been an accident or 
injuries, drove to the police station and, they claim, there reported the 
possible accident and deposited their guest.

[¶7.]     Huber was charged with 
three criminal offenses: leaving the scene of an accident; failure to report an 
accident; and illegal parking. He was convicted in a trial to the court and 
fined a total of $1,530, and the convictions were affirmed on appeal by the 
district court. The appeal was pursuant to Rule 1.03, W.R.A.P., providing for 
appeal to the district court from decisions of municipal, justice of the peace, 
and county courts. The present appeal results from that intermediate court 
affirmance.

[¶8.]     On appeal here, Huber 
contests only the City of Casper 
Ordinance 18-81 convictions, and not the illegal parking 
charge. In relevant part, Ordinance 18-81 states:

"Section 1. Becoming Involved in an Accident 
and Leaving the Scene Without Giving Name and Address - 
Prohibited.

"(a) It shall be unlawful 
and punishable as hereinafter provided, for any person to operate a motor vehicle within the 
corporate limits of the City of Casper, Wyoming * * * and become involved in an 
accident with another vehicle * * * and fail to take reasonable steps to locate 
and notify the driver * * * of his name and his address * * 
*.

"(b) Driver of a vehicle involved in an 
accident resulting in injury to or death of any person, * * * shall as soon as practical thereafter give 
notice of such accident to the Casper Police Department and provide his name, 
address and the location of said accident." (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶9.]     The three factors 
involved in the convictions and appeal are "operate," "driver," and notice "as 
soon as practical thereafter."

[¶10.]  Ordinance 18-81 is similar to §§ 
31-5-1101 through 31-5-1105, W.S. 1977 (1984 Replacement). The elements of § 
31-5-1101, which statute prohibits leaving the scene of an accident without 
furnishing identification and rendering aid to injured persons, are: (1) driving 
a vehicle, (2) involvement of the vehicle in an accident with another vehicle, 
and (3) failing to stop at the scene of the accident, furnish identification and 
render assistance. See Wood v. City of 
Casper, Wyo., 683 P.2d 1147 (1984).

LEAVING THE SCENE OF AN 
ACCIDENT

[¶11.]  The first appeal question, whether 
appellant was operating a motor 
vehicle when the motorcycle impact occurred, will be answered by this court in 
the negative. 

[¶12.]  When construing a legislative enactment, 
we look at the specific language of the statute to discern legislative intent. 
Wyoming State Department of Education v. Barber, Wyo., 649 P.2d 681 (1982). The same rules 
which govern the construction of statutes apply also to the construction of 
ordinances. Town of Torrington v. Taylor, 59 
Wyo. 109, 137 P.2d 621 (1943).

[¶13.]  There is a "general rule that words of a 
statute are to be interpreted in their ordinary, everyday sense unless a 
contrary interpretation is indicated in the specific statute." Adams v. State, 
Wyo., 697 P.2d 622, 624 (1985). Another precept of construction is that a penal statute will 
not be extended by implication or construction to embrace persons not expressly 
subject to its application, and corollary to this precept is that "ambiguity 
concerning the application of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of 
lenity." Capwell v. State, Wyo., 686 P.2d 1148, 1153 (1984). See 
Attletweedt v. State, Wyo., 684 P.2d 812 
(1984), and Horn v. State, Wyo., 556 P.2d 925 
(1976).

[¶14.]  We examine, then, how, if at all, this 
ordinance applies to appellant. If he was operating the van when the collision 
occurred, in the sense contemplated by the language of the ordinance, then the 
judgment of the trial court may be correct if an insufficient report was made to 
the Casper 
police. The facts adduced at trial established that Huber pulled the van 
partially up onto the sidewalk, shut off the engine, and put the keys into his 
pocket before the vehicle impact occurred.

[¶15.]  Plainly, the word "operate" is 
susceptible of several quite different meanings. "Operate" might have been used 
by the Casper City Council in a narrow sense, as a synonym for the word "drive," 
or it might have been used in the broadest sense, as an alternative for the 
phrase "in actual physical control of." See Adams v. State, supra.1 It is impossible to finitely assess 
the intent of the City Council from the language of the ordinance because 
"operate" is multifaceted in linguistic application.2

[¶16.]  The meaning of "operate" has not been 
previously addressed by this court, and we will therefore invoke authoritative 
guidance in our analysis. Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) defines 
"operate" as: "To perform a function, or operation, or produce an effect." 
"Operate" is described in 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 6(2), p. 
159:

"The word `operate' may 
denote a personal act in working the mechanism of the car and refer to the 
physical handling of the controls of the vehicle; the physical act of working 
the mechanism of the car; and the term is defined as meaning to regulate and 
control the management or operation of the car, that is, to have charge of it as 
the driver."

The Annotation 
at 93 A.L.R.3d 7, § 3[b] addresses the meaning of "operate" when not in the 
context of driving while intoxicated:

"[Two] definitions of 
`operate' that have appeared in a significant number of cases are the following: 
(1) `operate' includes not only the motion of the vehicle but also acts which 
engage the machinery of the vehicle that, alone or in sequence, will set in 
motion the motive power of the vehicle; (2) a person operates a motor vehicle 
when he intentionally does any act that makes use of any mechanical or 
electrical agency which alone or in sequence will set in motion the motive power 
of that vehicle * * *."

See also State 
v. Graves, 269 S.C. 356, 237 S.E.2d 584 
(1977).

[¶17.]  This court deems this reasoning and 
criteria persuasive. "Operation" means more than mere presence in a vehicle. We 
hold, then, that where a person is occupying the driver's seat of a motor 
vehicle and that vehicle is stationary in a designated parking zone or otherwise 
not occupying a traffic lane or impeding the flow of traffic, and the engine is 
switched off, that person is not operating the vehicle. This decision is in 
accord with precepts of statutory construction. We merely interpret "operate" in 
its "ordinary, everyday sense." Adams v. State, 
supra, 697 P.2d  at 624. All of this is only to say that, in defining phraseology 
of the nature of the Casper ordinance, for purposes of leaving the scene of an 
accident a parked vehicle is not being operated when hit while standing at the 
curb.3

FAILURE TO REPORT AN 
ACCIDENT

[¶18.]  The second aspect of this appeal is 
whether appellant was a "[d]river of a vehicle involved in an accident," and, if 
so, was Huber's report to the police sufficient to satisfy the notice 
requirements of subsection (b) of the city ordinance:

"Driver * * * shall as 
soon as practical * * * give notice * * * to the police and provide his name, 
address and the location of said accident."

Our examination 
of the record reveals that we can only speculate as to the sufficiency of the 
report given to the police, since no police blotter notation was made of the 
incident and the trial testimony of the dispatch officer was indefinite and 
conflicted with the testimony of other witnesses. Our discussion of "operate" is 
dispositive, and, as it is unlikely that a similar factual circumstance will 
reoccur, we will not address this subject further.

[¶19.]  A defense has been suggested under the 
facts of this case to be available if Huber realized that there had been an 
accident and then recognized that he could have been endangered by the 
motorcyclists if he did not expeditiously leave the north Casper location at 
that hour of the night. The test which applies is what a reasonable person would 
do under similar circumstances, and this defense could be raised if Huber's 
report immediately after the accident was consequently delayed. As an example, 
see Isom v. State, 37 Ala. App. 416, 69 So. 2d 716 (1954), where a black motorist 
involved in an accident with a white motorist was threatened with death, fled 
the scene, and was convicted of leaving the scene of an accident. The Court of 
Appeals of Alabama reversed on the basis of a refused 
instruction incorporating the reasonable-fear-as-justification defense. The 
court said:

"According to the 
testimony of the defendant he was confronted with danger to life or great bodily 
harm. It would be unjust and unreasonable to declare that, despite this, he was 
required to remain at the scene and go through the formality of complying with 
each and every requirement of the statute." 69 So. 2d  at 
718.

See also State 
v. Goff, 79 S.D. 138, 109 N.W.2d 256 (1961). For discussion of the "choice of 
evils" defense of necessity, see, among others, People v. Trujillo, 41 Colo. 
App. 223, 586 P.2d 235 (1978) (prison escape); People v. Robertson, 36 Colo. 
App. 367, 543 P.2d 533 (1975) (prison escape); Esquibel v. State, 91 N.M. 498, 
576 P.2d 1129 (1978) (prison escape); and State v. Diana, 24 Wn. App. 908, 604 P.2d 1312 (1979) (medical necessity).

[¶20.]  The defense was available; its 
sufficiency need not be judged in view of the criminal-law standards and the 
decision of the trial court since we otherwise determine this appeal on the 
first issue. Here, because appellant was not an "operator" of a motor vehicle, 
appellant's convictions for violating City of Casper Ordinance 18-81, §§ 1(a) 
and 1(b) are reversed, and the case is remanded for entry of a judgment in 
accord herewith.

[¶21.]  Reversed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Illustrative is 
Wyoming's 
all-inclusive definition of "driver" in § 31-5-102(a)(x), W.S. 1977 (1984 
Replacement):

"`Driver' means every 
person who drives or is in actual physical control of a 
vehicle."

2 In Burton's Legal Thesaurus 
(1980) there are 67 synonyms for "operate." In Webster's New International 
Dictionary, Unabridged (1971) there are likewise a dozen or more definitions for 
this verb.

3 Carefully, the decision 
of this court was determined on the uncontroverted status and undisputed fact 
that Huber was not in violation of the City ordinance as a matter of law, since 
he was not operating the van when it 
was hit by the intoxicated motorcyclist. Contrariwise, the comments of the 
dissent encompass an interesting discussion on social issues involving intimated 
behavior. This court does not create crimes for justification of prior 
conviction. Likewise, our decision today has no application to a person charged 
with violating laws proscribing operating or driving while under the influence 
of intoxicants, where a difference in statutory phraseology and construction is 
found. It does seem paradoxical that Huber was cited for both illegal parking 
and illegal operation of a motor vehicle, since ordinarily these are mutually 
exclusive offenses.

THOMAS, Chief Justice, 
concurring.

[¶22.]  I concur in the result of this case. It 
does seem to me that subsection (b) of City of Casper Ordinance 18-81 may intend a more 
passive role than that contemplated by subsection (a) of that ordinance. I agree 
with the majority opinion that Huber was not an operator of a vehicle at the 
time of the accident in question. I am not so sure that Huber was not a driver 
of a vehicle when it became involved in the collision.

[¶23.]  Nevertheless I would resolve the case in 
the same way because it is my opinion that the evidence before the court 
demonstrated that Huber, Hedges and Ward, singularly or collectively, had in 
fact given notice of the accident to the Casper Police Department, provided 
Huber's name and address, and advised of the location of the accident. The 
contrary testimony is at best equivocal, and the circumstances certainly 
indicate that somehow or other a response was made to the occurrence of this 
accident. Consequently, the evidence would not justify a conclusion of failure 
to report an accident beyond a reasonable doubt.

BROWN, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶24.]  All that is expected of Dr. Huber is that 
he obey the law the same as anyone else. If Dr. Huber had called an emergency 
vehicle and reported the accident, he likely would have been cited as the "hero 
next door," rather than cited for criminal offenses.

[¶25.]  For reasons of his own Dr. Huber fled the 
scene of the accident, then gave an evasive, incomplete and false account of 
what happened.

"Oh, what a tangled web 
we weave when first we practice to deceive." Sir Walter 
Scott

The Casper 
Police Department is to be complimented for not caving in to pressure and 
sweeping the Huber affair under the rug.

[¶26.]  Appellate courts must be ever vigilant 
and not succumb to the temptation of weighing and evaluating the evidence and 
substituting its judgment for that of the trier of fact. There are sound reasons 
for rules against retrying a case in an appellate court. These reasons are so 
well known that I need not restate them here.

[¶27.]  The easiest way to avoid the appearance 
of weighing and evaluating the evidence is to omit part of it. The majority has 
related the evidence and accepted inferences most favorable to Dr. Huber. This 
is contrary to the most fundamental appellate rules.

"* * * On appeal, we 
assume the evidence in favor of the successful party to be true, disregarding 
entirely the evidence of the unsuccessful party in conflict therewith, and give 
to the evidence of the successful party every favorable inference which may be 
reasonably and fairly drawn from it. [Citations.]" Lewis v. State, Wyo., 709 P.2d 1278, 1282 
(1985).

See also, Wood 
v. City of Casper, 
Wyo., 683 P.2d 1147 
(1984).

[¶28.]  In order to reach its verdict1 the majority turned around the 
basic appellate rule just referred to. For the purposes of this case the 
majority effectively rewrote a basic appellate rule to 
read:

On appeal, we assume the 
evidence in favor of the convicted defendant to be true, disregarding entirely 
the evidence of the prosecution in conflict therewith, and give to the evidence 
of the convicted defendant every favorable inference which may be reasonably and 
fairly drawn from it.

[¶29.]  If the proper appellate rule had been 
applied, the court would have accepted as true the following evidence. 

[¶30.]  After frolicking at the Moonlight Lounge 
for about two to two and one-half hours, appellant Dr. Emerick Huber, Sharon 
Hedges and Wyoming Highway Patrolman Brad Ward decided to quit the lounge and 
repair to Dr. Huber's office. As the threesome proceeded toward Dr. Huber's 
office they saw a person standing at the side of the road apparently in 
distress. This person was described by Patrolman Ward as a "young female girl." 
Good samaritan instincts welled up inside the trio, and Dr. Huber, who was 
driving his van, stopped to talk to the girl. I refer to this mystery woman as 
"the girl" because no one seems to know who she was.

[¶31.]  The girl appeared to have sustained an 
injury, but did not want to go to the hospital or police station, but rather, 
wanted to be taken to her mother's home. A minor problem was that the girl did 
not know for sure where her mother lived. She told the occupants of Dr. Huber's 
van that if they took her to north Casper she could find her mother's 
house.

[¶32.]  In any event, the girl got in the van and 
Dr. Huber drove to north Casper to a point near the intersection of Beech and H 
Streets where he parked half way on the sidewalk. Ms. Hedges was in the front 
passenger seat and Patrolman Ward in the back seat behind Ms. Hedges. What 
happened thereafter is slightly in dispute. In their testimony Sharon Hedges 
hedged, and Dr. Huber and Officer Ward were evasive.

[¶33.]  According to the correct standard of 
review, the trial court was entitled to believe that Officer Ward and the young 
female girl started to get out of the van. At this juncture the occupants heard 
what they thought to be motorcycles coming up behind side them. Dr. Huber at no 
time got out of the van, and Officer Ward told him to leave. With respect to the 
scene of the accident Dr. Huber testified:

"Q. So you were the only 
one that had control of the vehicle.

"A. Correct, at all 
times."

[¶34.]  A loud noise or a clattering sound was 
heard and a riderless motorcycle was seen sliding across the street, going past 
the van. At this time Ms. Hedges thought the loud noise was a collision. The 
motorcyclist, Mathew Keck, who hit the van, testified that as he approached it 
he didn't see anyone outside the van. At one time Keck told the police that "it 
[the van] was probably just barely moving." Keck also testified that his bike 
slid a little past or underneath the vehicle he struck, and when he came to rest 
he was about four feet from his bike. The motorcycle came to rest across the 
street, ahead of the van. Neither Dr. Huber nor Officer Ward checked the area 
nor the motorcycle. Dr. Huber drove the van away from the scene just described. 
Later, Dr. Huber told Ms. Hedges that "[T]he guy on the motorcycle must have hit 
the back of the van."

[¶35.]  After leaving the accident scene the 
injured girl was deposited at the police station. While the trio was at the 
police station they inspected the van and saw that it had been damaged, and 
suspected that it had been involved in a collision with the 
motorcycle.

[¶36.]  Dr. Huber and Officer Ward told Patrolman 
Sergeant Lowe at the police station that a woman with them had been assaulted. 
In connection with this visit to the police station, Sergeant Lowe was 
asked:

"Q. Did either Officer 
Ward or Doctor Huber tell you that they had been involved in a collision with a 
motorcycle?

"A. I believe Mr. Ward 
stated - during the time of our walk from the police station outside he 
mentioned that a biker had wiped out. And I asked, `Well, what do you mean by 
wiped out?' And he simply said that he tipped his bike over. And I asked if he 
knew if the biker was hurt. And he said he did not think so. And then one of the 
gentlemen - I don't know which one - added that he may have hit the van. I said, 
`Was there any damage, anyone hurt?' And the response was, `We don't think so.' 
And I replied that if there is, please let us know if there is any problem with 
regard to damage or injury.

* * * * * 
*

"Q. You [Sergeant Lowe] 
were not shown any damage to the van?

"A. No, 
sir.

"Q. And it was just in 
passing that they said that they think the van may have been 
hit?

"A. That was the 
statement that I heard, yes.

"Q. At any time did they 
come back and talk to you about the van actually being involved in the 
accident?

"A. No, sir. The only 
added statement was after they stated the van may have been hit is that they 
thought the biker may have been after the girl that they had picked up and they 
did not stay to find out what was going on.

"Q. At the time the van 
left, did you know the license plate number or the name of the driver of the 
van?

"A. No, sir. I had [no] 
information on that.2

"Q. Did have you [sic] 
the accident location?

"A. No, 
sir.

"Q. They didn't give you 
any of that information.

"A. No, 
sir."

[¶37.]  This casual conversation between Officer 
Lowe and Dr. Huber and/or Officer Ward is the accident report that the majority 
apparently deems sufficient to satisfy the ordinance.

[¶38.]  The so-called report is not only 
incomplete and equivocal, but is false. When Dr. Huber was at the police station 
he knew there had been damage to his van. Also, it is doubtful that he was 
completely honest when he said he did not think anyone was hurt. A loud clanging 
noise was heard at the rear of the van at the accident scene. This was followed 
by a riderless motorcycle sliding past the van across the street and coming to 
rest twenty or thirty feet in front of the van.

[¶39.]  Dr. Huber would have the trial court 
believe that some phantom driver drove this motorcycle into the rear of the van, 
then vanished unharmed. Under the circumstances described by the occupants of 
the van it is inconceivable that the operator of the motorcycle could have 
escaped injury, yet Dr. Huber and his people said they didn't think anyone was 
injured.3

[¶40.]  Ms. Hedges, Officer Ward and Dr. Huber 
left the police station and went to the latter's office. There the van was again 
examined by Dr. Huber and Officer Ward, and one or the other said, "* * * [T]hat 
guy had hit the back of the van on the motorcycle."

[¶41.]  The threesome then returned to the 
accident scene where they saw an ambulance and other emergency vehicles, but 
they did not stop. They returned to the accident scene in Officer Ward's vehicle 
because they did not want the van to be recognized.

[¶42.]  Officer Brian Sanborn of the Casper 
Police Department investigated the accident involving Dr. Huber. At the scene he 
found the driver within a foot or two of the motorcycle. The driver, Mathew 
Keck, was suffering from a broken arm and leg. The motorcycle driver said he 
suffered four broken bones. The day after the accident, April 7, 1985, at the 
request of Wyoming Highway Patrolman Ward, he and Officer Sanborn rendezvoused 
near a Casper hardware store. Patrolman Ward had a copy of Officer Sanborn's 
accident report. Ward said that he could give Sanborn more information about the 
accident. Officer Ward then asked Sanborn not to say anything about what he was 
going to tell him. Regarding the meeting, Sanborn 
testified:

"* * * [H]e [WHP Ward] 
started telling me that he had been out with a girl that night and that they had 
met with Emerick. And I didn't know who Emerick was. I asked him who Emerick 
was, and he said Emerick Huber. He told me that he was Judge Huber's brother and 
that they had picked this girl up on Conwell that had been beaten and that they 
were going to take the girl home down there on H Street and while they were 
parked there on H Street, that he had thought the right side handlebar of the 
motorcycle had hit their van and that they - the reason they left was that they 
believed that they were bikers.

"Q. Let me go back. What 
did you say about believing the motorcycle hit the van?

"A. He told me that he 
believed the right side handlebar of the motorcycle had hit the van, and that's 
where the body bondo had come from that we found at the scene. He told me about 
them thinking that they were bikers and that the girl they had taken down there, 
that she had a 1 percent tattoo mark on her hand and that he thought she was 
part of the motorcycle gang, that they was chasing them.

"He went on to say that 
they had taken the girl down to the police station and met with Sergeant Lowe 
and Sergeant Lowe took the girl and that they had told Sergeant Lowe about the 
accident itself.

"Q. Did he at any time 
tell you that he had showed Sergeant Lowe the damage to the 
van?

"A. He said that they had 
pointed out the damage to the van. He didn't say if it was him or if it was Mr. 
Huber.

"Q. At any point did you 
say anything to the officer about keeping this off the record or not saying 
anything to anyone?

"A. I told him that I was 
going to have to talk to Sergeant Lowe and see what he knew about the accident 
and I would have to complete reports on the information that he just give me and 
I would probably have to talk to the lieutenant, which was the watch commander, 
being as it involved another agency now.

"Q. What happened 
then?

"A. He emphasized again 
that he wished that I could keep it quiet and not say too much about it because 
he was in fear that the type of job that he had, it could mean repercussions for 
him and that if these bikers found out about - or this kid - after I told him it 
was a kid - found out that Emerick Huber was a doctor, that maybe they would 
want to sue him or something like that."

[¶43.]  Officer Sanborn testified that he had a 
conversation with Dr. Huber. Sanborn said:

"* * * I had told him 
[Dr. Huber] that Ward had told me that the reason he didn't want me to say 
anything was because that Ward had said that Mr. Huber was afraid of being sued 
civilly if this got out and that Ward was afraid for his job. And Mr. Huber was 
quiet for a few minutes and thought about it. And he said that they had talked 
to their attorney and they talked to his brother, Mike Huber, and that they all 
felt that they didn't have anything to worry about and for them just to keep 
their mouth shut and not to say anything about it."

[¶44.]  At trial Sharon Hedges 
testified:

"Q. Do you recall telling 
them during that conversation that Doctor Huber at no time got out of the 
van?

"A. 
Yes.

* * * * * 
*

"Q. At any time have you 
spoken with Brad Ward about this incident?

"A. 
Yes.

"Q. Do you recall when 
that was with respect to the incident?

"A. One time a couple of 
days after and a couple of times after I talked to the 
police.

"Q. Did he at any time 
tell you not to say anything to anyone about this 
incident?

"A. The first time, 
yes.

"Q. What did he tell 
you?

"A. He asked me if I had 
told anybody, and I said no, and he asked me not to mention 
it.

"Q. Was this the 
following Monday?

"A. I believe it was 
Tuesday."

[¶45.]  If the proper standard of review is 
employed, the trial court could properly believe that Dr. Huber drove his 
vehicle to the scene of the accident and that he temporarily parked it or slowed 
down; that he never got out of the vehicle and was always in control; that after 
being hit in the rear by the motorcycle he drove by the motorcycle, lying on its 
side, and that the motorcycle driver was within two to four feet of the 
motorcycle; that Dr. Huber saw damage to his van at the police station; that his 
account of the accident at the police station was evasive, incomplete, false and 
did not comply with the requirements of an accident 
report.

[¶46.]  The trial judge, Jerry A. Yaap, is an 
experienced, capable judge and lawyer, and it is small wonder that he did not 
believe Dr. Huber's incredible explanation. Dr. Huber would have the trial judge 
believe that a phantom motorcycle gang was pursuing him; that after he stopped, 
if he did, some force, not unlike the sinister force that erased the Nixon 
tapes, removed the vehicle from harm's way; that Dr. Huber was fearful of 
further pursuit by the mysterious motorcycle gang on the way to the police 
station, into the next day and perhaps even now. Because of his fear of the 
motorcycle gang, Dr. Huber didn't want anyone to find out about the accident or 
who he was? Dr. Huber's friend did not want the Casper police to do anything 
about the accident, again, because of the fear of the motorcycle gang and his 
job?

[¶47.]  Where is this phantom motorcycle gang? 
What "force" removed Dr. Huber's vehicle from the accident scene? There is not 
the slightest indication in the record that there was ever a motorcycle gang, 
except in Dr. Huber's head.4

"The wicked flee when no 
man pursueth: but the righteous are bold as a lion." Proverbs 
28:1.

[¶48.]  Dr. Huber can hardly be faulted for not 
wanting the Casper police to know a great deal about the 
phantom motorcycle gang or the sinister force that removed him from harm's way. 
It must be remembered what happened to Jimmy Carter when he reported that an 
amphibious rabbit attacked him.

[¶49.]  I would affirm the intermediate court of 
appeals in its affirming the trial court.

FOOTNOTES

1 I use the term "verdict" 
because the majority assumed the role as the trier of 
fact.

2 The word "no" was 
omitted from the written transcript, but is on the tape of the trial 
proceeding.

3 This story is about as 
incredible as that of the man who had been a piano player in the parlor of a 
bawdy house for thirty years and said he didn't know what was going on 
upstairs.

4 Perhaps Dr. Huber is the 
apocryphal football fan sitting in the stadium, who, upon seeing the team huddle 
to call signals, thought they were plotting against him.