Title: DeRolph v. State

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as DeRolph v. State, 93 Ohio St.3d 628, 2001-Ohio-1896.] 
 
 
DEROLPH ET AL., APPELLEES, v. THE STATE OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as DeRolph v. State (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 628.] 
Constitutional law — Education — Schools — School-funding formula — 
Motion to reconsider DeRolph III — Motion to reconsider granted – 
Matter referred to settlement conference presided over by master 
commissioner pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. XIV(6)(A) before court’s ruling 
on merits of arguments in motion for reconsideration. 
(No. 99-570 — Submitted October 30, 2001 — Decided November 16, 2001.) 
ORDER on Motion for Reconsideration. 
 
MOYER, C.J.  This matter is before us on a motion for reconsideration 
filed by defendants-appellants, the state of Ohio, the Ohio Board of Education, the 
Ohio Superintendent of Public Instruction, and the Ohio Department of Education 
(collectively referred to as “the state”).  In its motion, the state first asserts that the 
changes to the base cost formula ordered by the court in DeRolph v. State (2001), 
93 Ohio St.3d 309, 754 N.E.2d 1184  (“DeRolph III”), “may have been based in 
part upon erroneous calculations and data.”  It urges the court to reconsider our 
holding that wealth screens may not be used in the state’s school-funding 
foundation formula, and argues that “[t]he use of wealth screens is standard 
practice throughout school finance and the discipline of statistics generally.”  The 
state further asks us to reconsider our order in DeRolph III that any funding 
increases implemented in compliance with that decision be made retroactive to 
July 1, 2001. 
 
We have granted the motion to reconsider our decision in DeRolph III.  
However, before ruling on the merits of the arguments presented in the motion for 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
reconsideration, we refer this matter to a settlement conference to be presided over 
by a master commissioner pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. XIV(6)(A).1 
 
This court has supported and promoted mediation since at least 1989, 
when the court formed the Committee on Dispute Resolution.  On July 7, 1999, 
we adopted S.Ct.Prac.R. XIV(6), which authorizes the court to refer cases to a 
settlement conference, at which a master commissioner presides.  In practice, the 
master commissioner often serves as a mediator. 
 
Adoption of S.Ct.Prac.R. XIV(6) was consistent with Ohio’s national 
reputation as a leader in promoting mediation and other forms of alternative 
                                            
1. 
S.Ct.Prac.R. XIV(6)(A) provides as follows: 
 
“(A) Referral of Cases for Settlement Conferences. 
 
“The Supreme Court may, sua sponte or on motion by a party, refer to a master 
commissioner for a settlement conference any case that originated in the court of appeals, any 
appeal from an administrative agency, any original action, or any non-felony case that the Supreme 
Court deems appropriate.  The master commissioner may conduct the settlement conference in 
person or by telephone.  At the settlement conference, the parties shall explore settling the case, 
simplifying the issues, and expediting the procedure, and may consider any other matter that might 
aid in resolving the case. 
 
“(B) Attendance. 
 
“If a case is referred for a settlement conference, each party to the case, or the representative 
of each party who has full settlement authority, and the attorney for each party shall attend the 
conference, unless excused, in writing, by the master commissioner to whom the case has been 
referred. If a party or an attorney fails to attend the conference without being excused, the Supreme 
Court may assess the party or the attorney reasonable expenses caused by the failure, including 
reasonable attorney fees or all or a part of the expenses of the other party.  The Supreme Court may 
also dismiss the action, strike documents filed by the offending party, or impose any other appropriate 
penalty. 
 
“(C) Extension of Time to File Briefs. 
 
“On motion by a party, the Supreme Court may, notwithstanding Section 3(B) of this rule, 
extend filing deadlines or stay the referred case if the extension or stay will facilitate settlement.  A 
request for an extension of time shall be filed with the Clerk within the time prescribed by the rules 
for filing the brief or other document that is the subject of the request. 
 
“(D) Confidentiality. 
 
“Unless disclosable by the order entered under Section 6(E) of this rule, statements 
uttered during the settlement conference are confidential.  Unless all participants consent to 
disclosure, no one, including the master commissioner, a party, or a party’s attorney, shall disclose 
any statement uttered in a settlement conference to the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court may 
impose penalties for any improper disclosure made in violation of this provision. 
 
“(E) Settlement Conference Order. 
 
“At the conclusion of the settlement conference, the Supreme Court will enter an 
January Term, 2001 
3 
dispute resolution.  Ohio’s leadership in recognizing the benefits of alternative 
dispute resolution has been evident throughout the state, particularly in the 
judicial branch.  Moreover, the General Assembly and Ohio governors have 
actively supported the adoption of mediation programs. 
 
For example, in 1989, the General Assembly established, by R.C. 179.02, 
the Commission on Dispute Resolution and Conflict Management to act as a 
resource for Ohioans for the development of “constructive, nonviolent forums, 
processes, and techniques for resolving disputes.”  Commission on Dispute 
Resolution and Conflict Management, .  The 
commission focuses on educational institutions, state and local government, 
courts, and communities, and provides conflict-management training, consultation 
and technical assistance in designing dispute-resolution programs, and facilitation 
and mediation services. Id.  In the public-policy arena, the commission has dealt 
with issues as varied as regulatory rulemaking, welfare reform, and environmental 
enforcement. 
 
Across the country, court-ordered mediation has been successful, in whole 
or in part, in resolving education and other public-policy disputes of a complex 
nature—including disputes that have been mired in litigation for years. 
 
In Minneapolis Branch of the NAACP v. Minnesota and Xiong v. 
Minnesota (2000), Hennepin Cty. Dist. Ct. Nos. 95-14800 and 98-2816, 
consolidated, unreported, the plaintiffs argued that Minnesota’s educational 
policies precluded children living in areas of concentrated poverty in Minneapolis 
from receiving an adequate education.  Anne O’Connor, NAACP, State Settle 
Lawsuit over Educational Quality for City Children, Minneapolis-St.Paul Star 
Tribune (Mar. 14, 2000), at .  See Appendix. 
                                                                                                                       
appropriate order.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
Through court-encouraged mediation, the parties and other necessary 
educational entities reached agreement, resolving the dispute by establishing a 
four-year program to give Minneapolis families more options for sending their 
students to public schools in suburban districts and by directing the state to 
implement a report card system for each school.  Id. 
 
Urban school districts in Baltimore County, Maryland; Dayton, Ohio; and 
Washington, D.C., have avoided litigation by bringing diverse groups of students, 
parents, and other citizens together to resolve issues relating to values education 
and school-change programs. Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Schools, 
Communities, and the Courts: A Dialogic Approach to Education Reform (1996), 
14 Yale L. & Policy Rev. 99, 117-118.  In addition, school districts in 
Harpersville, New York, and Bolivar-Richburg, New York, have used alternative 
dispute-resolution techniques to resolve controversies over sex education and 
consolidation of school districts.  Id. 
 
Complex environmental disputes have also been successfully mediated.  
For example, in an early case, the United States Army Corps of Engineers 
proposed building a dam on the Snoqualmie River in Washington to deal with 
devastating flooding in the region.  Mediation in 1974 resulted in an agreement 
that provided for a smaller dam at a different site and established a committee to 
coordinate planning for the region.  Michelle Ryan, Alternative Dispute 
Resolution in Environmental Cases: Friend or Foe? (1997), 10 Tul.Envtl.L.J. 397, 
399, fn. 4; Gail Bingham, ADR Procedures: Variations on the Negotiation Theme 
(1998), SC56 ALI-ABA 265, 294.  All parties hailed this as an important victory 
for mediation of environmental disputes.  Ryan, supra, 10 Tul.Envtl.L.J. at 399, 
fn. 4.  Similarly, mediation successfully resolved the seventeen-year Storm King 
Mountain dispute over the use of the Hudson River for power production.  Ryan, 
supra, 10 Tul.Envtl.L.J. at 400-401.  The utility company, Consolidated Edison 
January Term, 2001 
5 
Company of New York, agreed to forfeit its license and to transfer the site to an 
interstate park commission.  Id.  In addition, all utility companies in the region 
agreed to methods that would protect the river’s aquatic life.  Id.  In exchange, all 
proceedings among the parties ceased.  Id. 
 
Moreover, as this opinion is being written, long-lived antitrust litigation 
between the United States and Microsoft is being mediated pursuant to a court 
order. 
 
With respect to the cause now before us, we recognize that the complex 
legal, political, public-policy, and administrative issues in DeRolph v. State have 
presented perhaps the most difficult challenge to the Ohio judiciary, including this 
court, in the ten years since the case was filed, and to the General Assembly and 
the executive branch, including two Governors.  To the best of our knowledge, the 
parties to this protracted litigation have never met in an attempt to resolve its 
difficult issues.  A majority of this court believes that the time is ripe for the 
parties, who together represent a comprehensive cross-section of the interests 
affected by this litigation, to meet and attempt to reach settlement with the 
assistance of a mediator experienced in resolving public-policy disputes. 
 
We are fully aware that we cannot order the parties to settle: we can only 
order the parties to accept the opportunity that we are providing to facilitate 
serious, realistic efforts to finally resolve the issues that separate them.  If 
mediation does not produce settlement, we will assume our responsibility to 
finally resolve the matter. 
 
A motion for reconsideration has been granted by the court.  Both sides 
acknowledge in their memoranda in support of and opposition to the motion for 
reconsideration that the evidence and one of the briefs filed in DeRolph III 
contained inaccurate analysis regarding the cost of funding the base cost formula 
with wealth screens eliminated. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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It is clear from DeRolph III that the justices in the majority coalesced in a 
consensus to resolve this long-lived litigation, even while each justice acted with 
reservations.  No one, including the justices of this court, can predict the ultimate 
decision we might reach when reviewing the merits of DeRolph III on 
reconsideration.  As in so many cases, the parties may well find that mediation is 
the best hope for obtaining results acceptable to all while avoiding untold expense 
and the continued uncertainty of going forward. 
 
We order as follows: 
I 
Settlement Conference Ordered 
 
Pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. XIV(6), the court refers to a master commissioner 
the issues raised in defendants-appellants’ motion for reconsideration and any 
other issues that the parties and the mediator deem appropriate issues for 
mediation.  The parties identified below are ordered to appear, through their 
counsel, at settlement conferences as set forth below.  The cause is stayed pending 
completion of the settlement conferences. 
II 
Parties 
 
For purposes of S.Ct.Prac.R. XIV(6), the parties are identified in 
accordance with the amended complaint filed in this action in 1991 as follows: 
 
Plaintiffs-appellees: 
 
 
Dale R. DeRolph et al. 
 
Defendants-appellants: 
 
 
The state of Ohio (“through the Ohio General Assembly”),2 
                                            
2. 
The first amended complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, filed in the Court of 
Common Pleas of Perry County, case No. 22043, at 8, alleged, “Defendant State of Ohio, through 
the Ohio General Assembly, is required to provide for a system of public education in the State of 
Ohio in accordance with the Constitution and laws of the State of Ohio.” (Emphasis added.) 
 
By alleging the state of Ohio via the Ohio General Assembly, plaintiffs-appellees 
January Term, 2001 
7 
 
 
The Ohio Board of Education, 
 
 
The Ohio Superintendent of Education, 
 
 
The Ohio Department of Education. 
 
Although the complaint did not name the Governor of Ohio as a 
defendant, as a practical matter, statutory change is effected by the General 
Assembly with the active participation of the Governor.  Governor Bob Taft has 
appeared in this action and filed an amicus curiae brief.  Of course, legislation 
may be enacted without the concurrence of the Governor when the General 
Assembly overrides a Governor’s veto, or where a bill presented to the Governor 
for signature is neither signed nor returned to the General Assembly within ten 
days.  Section 16, Article II, Ohio Constitution.  However, Governor Bob Taft 
clearly has conducted himself as an interested party and may participate as if he 
were a named party for purposes of the settlement conference.  We therefore 
invite Governor Taft to participate as a party for purposes of the settlement 
conference. 
III 
Counsel 
 
For purposes of S.Ct.Prac.R. XIV(6), counsel for the parties are initially 
identified as follows: 
 
Plaintiffs-appellees: 
 
 
Nicholas A. Pittner, Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., counsel of record for 
the plaintiffs-appellees; 
                                                                                                                       
effectively made all members of the General Assembly defendants.  President of the Ohio Senate 
Richard H. Finan and Ohio Speaker of the House Larry Householder have appeared in this court in 
support of the state, and members of the minority party in the Ohio House of Representatives and 
the Ohio Senate have appeared collectively in support of plaintiffs-appellees. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
 
Ben E. Espy, Ben Espy Co., L.P.A., counsel for amici curiae 
members of the minority party of the Ohio House of Representatives and the Ohio 
Senate, collectively. 
 
Defendants-appellants: 
 
 
Assistant Attorney General Mary Lynn Readey, counsel of record 
for the state of Ohio, the Ohio Board of Education, the Ohio Superintendent of 
Public Instruction, and the Ohio Department of Education; 
 
 
N. Victor Goodman, Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff, 
counsel for Richard H. Finan, President of the Ohio Senate, and Larry 
Householder, Speaker of the Ohio House of Representatives; and 
 
 
John J. Chester, Chester, Wilcox & Saxbe, counsel for Ohio 
Governor Bob Taft. 
IV 
Appointment of Master Commissioner 
 
The court will select and appoint a master commissioner according to the 
following procedure: 
 
(A)  The following persons, none of whom lives or regularly does business 
in Ohio, are identified by the court as candidates for master commissioner: 
 
Howard S. Bellman, 123 East Main Street, Madison, WI 53703; 
 
Patrick Field, Consensus Building Institute, 131 Mt. Auburn Street, 
Cambridge, MA 02138; 
 
Professor Eric D. Green, Boston University School of Law and 
Resolutions, Inc., 765 Commonwealth Avenue, Boston, MA 02215; 
 
Michael K. Lewis, ADR Associates, LLC, 1666 Connecticut Avenue, NW, 
Washington, D.C. 20009; 
 
Judy Mares-Dixon, CDR Associates, 100 Arapahoe Avenue, Suite 12, 
Boulder, CO 80302; 
January Term, 2001 
9 
 
Professor Francis McGovern, Duke University School of Law, Durham, 
NC 27708; 
 
Roberta Cooper Ramo, Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, P.A., PO 
Box 2168, Albuquerque, NM 87103 
 
Linda R. Singer, ADR Associates, LLC, 1666 Connecticut Avenue, NW, 
Washington, D.C. 20009; 
 
Professor Lawrence Susskind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 77 
Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02139. 
 
Each of these persons has expressed an interest in being named master 
commissioner. 
 
(B)  The parties may, within ten days of this order, submit to the court a 
memorandum not to exceed five pages in length, containing comment on, or 
challenges for cause to, the appointment of any of these master commissioner 
candidates. 
 
(C)  Within ten days of this entry, and upon agreement of counsel for all 
parties, counsel may submit the name of any person to be considered for 
appointment in addition to the candidates designated in IV(A) of this entry. 
 
(D)  The court, upon due consideration of the qualifications of the 
candidates and the comments of the parties, will appoint the master commissioner, 
whose duty will be to facilitate serious, active settlement negotiations among the 
parties. 
V 
Settlement Conferences 
 
Upon appointment by the court, the master commissioner shall schedule 
and conduct the settlement conferences, which may continue from day to day in 
the discretion of the master commissioner. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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At the first meeting, the parties shall attempt to develop an agreement 
governing the mediation process. The agreement may include the following: the 
scope of the mediation, the process to be followed in the event of partial agreement 
or impasse, and whether additional discovery will be available as part of the 
mediation process. 
 
The master commissioner shall schedule additional meetings and thereafter 
file with the court an anticipated timeline for completion of the settlement 
conferences. 
 
The master commissioner shall have authority, with notice to the parties, to 
contact persons outside the mediation process to obtain information, including 
experts as needed. 
VI 
Reports to the Court 
 
The master commissioner shall report to the court no later than fifteen days 
from the first meeting with counsel regarding progress toward settlement. 
 
The master commissioner shall issue a final report to the court within six 
weeks from the filing of the initial report, unless the master commissioner has 
requested and received additional time from the court in which to file a final report. 
 
The reports to the court will not include substantive matters. 
VII 
Settlement Conference Order 
 
Pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. XIV(6)(E), the court will enter an appropriate order 
at the conclusion of the settlement conferences.  Upon failure of the parties to reach 
settlement within a reasonable period of time to be determined by the court, the 
court will proceed to dispose of the case on reconsideration. 
VIII 
Confidentiality 
January Term, 2001 
11 
 
Pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. XIV(6)(D), statements uttered during the settlement 
conferences are confidential.  In addition, the court finds that R.C. 2317.023,3 
governing nondisclosure of mediation communications, is applicable to the 
settlement conferences. 
IX 
Costs 
                                            
3. 
R.C. 2317.023 provides: 
 
“(A)  As used in this section: 
 
“(1)  ‘Mediation’ means a nonbinding process for the resolution of a dispute in which 
both of the following apply: 
 
“(a)  A person who is not a party to the dispute serves as mediator to assist the parties to 
the dispute in negotiating contested issues. 
 
“(b)  A court, administrative agency, not-for-profit community mediation provider, or 
other public body appoints the mediator or refers the dispute to the mediator, or the parties, engage 
the mediator. 
 
“(2) ‘Mediation communication’ means a communication made in the course of and 
relating to the subject matter of a mediation. 
 
“(B)  A mediation communication is confidential. Except as provided in division (C) of 
this section, no person shall disclose a mediation communication in a civil proceeding or in an 
administrative proceeding. 
 
“(C)  Division (B) of this section does not apply in the following circumstances: 
 
“(1)  Except as provided in division (H) of section 2317.02 and division (C) of section 
3109.052 of the Revised Code, to the disclosure by any person of a mediation communication 
made by a mediator if all parties to the mediation and the mediator consent to the disclosure; 
 
“(2) To the disclosure by a person other than the mediator of a mediation communication 
made by a person other than the mediator if all parties consent to the disclosure; 
 
“(3) To the disclosure of a mediation communication if disclosure is required pursuant to 
 section 2921.22 of the Revised Code; 
 
“(4) To the disclosure of a mediation communication if a court, after a hearing, 
determines that the disclosure does not circumvent Evidence Rule 408, that the disclosure is 
necessary in the particular case to prevent a manifest injustice, and that the necessity for disclosure 
is of sufficient magnitude to outweigh the importance of protecting the general requirement of 
confidentiality in mediation proceedings. 
 
“(D) This section does not prevent or inhibit the disclosure, discovery, or admission into 
evidence of a statement, document, or other matter that is a mediation communication but that, 
prior to its use in a mediation proceeding, was subject to discovery or admission under law or a 
rule of evidence or was subject to disclosure as a public record pursuant to section 149.43 of the 
Revised Code.  This section does not affect the admissibility of a written settlement agreement 
signed by the parties to a mediation or the status of a written settlement agreement as a public 
record under  section 149.43 of the Revised Code.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
 
Fees and expenses of the master commissioner, as authorized by the court, 
will be charged as costs to be divided equally by the parties. 
So ordered. 
 
DOUGLAS, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurs separately. 
 
RESNICK, J., dissents. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY, J., dissents. 
 
COOK, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurring.  I concur in the judgment of the majority.  I 
write to make just three points. 
I 
 
Justice Resnick’s dissent herein seems to preclude consideration in 
mediation of the issues of overreliance on local property taxes and a complete 
systematic overhaul of our state’s school-funding system.  I do not agree, and in 
fact I voted for reconsideration so that these very issues could be raised in yet 
another forum in an attempt to make right what has, for so long now, been wrong. 
 As the majority opinion makes clear, “the court refers to a master commissioner 
the issues raised in defendants-appellants’ motion for reconsideration and any 
other issues that the parties and the mediator deem appropriate issues for 
mediation.”  (Emphasis added.)  Neither side or their various supporters have been 
shy thus far in presenting and arguing their positions.  The plaintiffs have 
consistently argued, and I have agreed and continue to agree, that what is 
necessary is a complete overhaul of the funding system including an end to heavy 
reliance on local property taxes.  There is no reason to suspect that in mediation 
they would become any less forceful in seeking their goals. 
II 
January Term, 2001 
13 
 
There has been much discussion and reporting concerning the dollar figure 
that DeRolph III requires.  In the defendants’ motion for reconsideration they say: 
 “The State seeks reconsideration in the interests of using good numbers and good 
math.  As we have learned, the Court’s changes may have been based in part upon 
erroneous calculations and data.”  While this statement by the state may be at least 
partly accurate, it is now time for the whole story to be told on this issue. 
 
On January 25, 2001, this court ordered that “the parties file any evidence 
they intend to present as early as practicable but no later than June 15, 2001.”  
DeRolph v. State (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 1225, 741 N.E.2d 533.  Implicit in that 
order was the notion of discovery pursuant to the Civil Rules.  Plaintiffs sought 
discovery, and the defendants refused to cooperate.  Plaintiffs filed a motion to 
compel, and it was necessary for this court to order the defendants to comply with 
the Rules—the same as any other parties involved in litigation.  That order was 
entered on May 11, 2001.  DeRolph v. State (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 1274, 747 
N.E.2d 823.  That date was just a few weeks before oral argument was scheduled 
to be heard on June 20.  DeRolph v. State (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 1225, 741 N.E.2d 
533. 
 
The record before us reveals that the Ohio Department of Education’s 
Office of Policy Research and Analysis generated, and apparently issued, a 
revised and more comprehensive document dated May 2, 2001, that contains all of 
the districts identified as model districts in the fiscal year 1999 with the per-pupil 
base cost deflated by factors ranging up to eighteen percent and alternately by 
factors only up to 7.5 percent.  Likewise, the Legislative Service Commission 
generated a document, also dated May 2, 2001, that contains additional 
information that is necessary to accurately determine the base cost of the one 
hundred twenty-seven model districts.  Had these documents or the underlying 
data upon which they are based been timely made available to the plaintiffs, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
Russell Harris, whose affidavit both parties now acknowledge contains errors, 
would have been advised and there would have been no confusion over the issue 
of which figures were accurate. 
 
The state, having thwarted the plaintiffs’ attempts at discovery of the 
information relied upon by the state in preparing the education budget, now wants 
to assert that we, the court, were given inaccurate information, that our math skills 
are poor, and that we were confused.  The state does not come with clean hands. 
 
As to the dollar figure involved in DeRolph III, I want to make clear that I 
knew that over the current and next biennium the additional funds required, 
including parity aid, would approach $2 billion and in our deliberations I so 
stated.  For anyone willing to do the math, my concurring opinion in DeRolph III 
bears this out.  Id., 93 Ohio St.3d at 332-334, 754 N.E.2d at 1206-1209 (Douglas, 
J., concurring). 
 
I also knew, however, that that amount, or even the $300 to $500 million 
that some seem to think was being ordered, was not within the reach of the 
General Assembly to allocate either because of the lack of funds or the 
unwillingness to do so.  It was my hope then that the order would instead move 
the General Assembly to bring about the systematic overhaul and restructuring 
required by DeRolph I and DeRolph II. 
III 
 
The state has filed, and we have granted, a motion to reconsider our 
decision in DeRolph III.  With the vote on reconsideration all members of the 
court have, at one time or another, now been in the majority on one or more 
phases of the case.  This in itself is curious, but I will leave it to others to 
speculate why, for each of the seven of us, that has occurred. 
 
It is also curious that one of the dissenters, who seems to say that DeRolph 
III is the worst case in the history of civil jurisprudence, votes not to reconsider or 
January Term, 2001 
15 
even to give the parties a chance to work out their differences.  This is also true of 
the plaintiffs, who, in their memorandum opposing reconsideration, say that “[t]he 
court’s ‘compromise’ leaves the overarching unconstitutionality of the funding 
system intact and the promise of DeRolph I and DeRolph II—and the Ohio 
Constitution—unfulfilled” and that “plaintiffs renew their request to the Court to 
condemn once and for all this irrational methodology and again require the State, 
as the Court did in DeRolph I and II, to develop a funding system that will assure 
all of Ohio’s public school students the resources and educational opportunities 
they need to compete and succeed in the twenty-first century.”  Having so 
eloquently stated their position, the plaintiffs then urge us not to reconsider.  At 
best, the message sent is utterly confusing. 
IV 
 
I concur in the order of mediation.  I fervently hope that such a procedure 
will resolve the issues.  If, however, that does not happen and the case is returned 
to our active docket it will, I believe, be up to those who say that DeRolph III is so 
bad to fashion a decision and opinion that can garner the four votes necessary to 
take the next step. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J., dissenting.  I am compelled to take a position 
adverse to that of today’s majority.  This is not because I oppose mediation of this 
dispute, but because I believe that the timing of the majority’s order is 
incongruous.  To be mediating this matter at this time signifies only that the 
schoolchildren of Ohio have suffered yet another loss.  Once again, the state’s 
educational system is faced with the prospect of further tweaking, while the 
fundamental changes to the overall system will be lacking. 
 
As this court has emphatically pointed out several times, our state’s 
school-funding system has been plagued by an overreliance on local property 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
taxes throughout this litigation.  This dependence continues unabated and remains 
the key obstacle to the system being transformed into one that is thorough and 
efficient.  The situation is further exacerbated by the recent downturn of the 
economy.  The state is without additional funds to distribute to school districts 
unless it once again cuts funds for other much-needed and deserving programs, 
such as higher education. 
 
Today’s majority opinion reiterates that, as this court announced on 
November 2, 2001, a majority of this court has agreed to grant the state’s motion 
for reconsideration of the decision in DeRolph v. State (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 309, 
754 N.E.2d 1184 (“DeRolph III”).  The justices who composed the court’s 
majority in that decision, concluding that “no one is served by continued 
uncertainty and fractious debate,” openly acknowledged that they had united in 
consensus primarily to (ironically) terminate this court’s role in this ongoing 
dispute.  Id. at 311, 754 N.E.2d at 1190.  Thus, the majority decision in DeRolph 
III was more of a political compromise than a true judgment on the merits of the 
remedial legislation enacted by the state in response to our earlier decisions in this 
matter.  Instead of issuing a judgment in DeRolph III, the majority in effect forced 
a pragmatic compromise on the parties, even though the parties had sought no 
such compromise. 
 
In my dissent in DeRolph III, I questioned whether such a resolution of the 
case was within the scope of this court’s authority, and also questioned the 
wisdom of the majority’s mandated solution.  Id., 93 Ohio St.3d at 344-375, 754 
N.E.2d at 1216-1241.  As today’s pronouncement by the majority demonstrates, it 
is evident that the majority opinion in DeRolph III was just another chapter in the 
ongoing saga of this case, and was not the end-all of this litigation that the 
majority fervently had hoped it would be. 
January Term, 2001 
17 
 
Its own compromise solution apparently having failed, the majority now 
turns to mediation as the next hopeful alternative for resolution of this 
controversy.  I would join all members of this court in being pleased if mediation 
would indeed succeed, and I do not wish to be pessimistic about the prospects of 
mediation.  However, I must point out that there are characteristics of this case 
that raise serious questions regarding whether mediation presents a realistic 
prospect for a truly satisfactory conclusion to this dispute.  If there is no practical 
possibility that mediation can lead the parties to a settlement of this dispute, the 
majority’s order does little more than delay the inevitable return of this matter to 
the forefront of our attention. 
 
I do not disagree with the majority’s general statements on the value of 
mediation.  Mediation has been employed with great success in resolving a wide 
range of disputes, including leading parties in some extremely complex cases to 
settle their differences before litigation was resorted to.  It is possible that 
mediation could have been employed in the early years of this litigation, perhaps 
when this case first was filed in common pleas court in 1991.  Mediation may 
have even been useful when this case was first argued before this court.  However, 
as this litigation has proceeded, and as the various remedial plans have been 
enacted by the General Assembly and found to be deficient by this court, the 
parties have seemed to become less and less inclined to compromise.  Today the 
parties on each side are firmly entrenched in their positions.  The state is 
financially strapped and the plaintiffs are in need of greater expenditures if a 
remedy that satisfies our Constitution is to be obtained. 
 
While I do not oppose the concept of mediation, I do oppose the way the 
majority has, with its decision in DeRolph III and its order today, established the 
overall climate in which mediation will be conducted.  Throughout the entire 
course of this case, it has been clear to me that only a complete systematic 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
overhaul of our system of funding schools can bring our educational system in 
compliance with our constitutional mandate of a “thorough and efficient system of 
common schools,” Section 2, Article IV, and I have consistently held that 
position.  Absent a complete overhaul, even an injection of significantly more 
money into the system than the defendants have been willing to make, or the 
majority was willing to order in DeRolph III, will fail to satisfy our Constitution.  
The present and foreseeable future budgets do not contain the funds to comply 
with the original mandates of DeRolph v. State (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 193, 677 
N.E.2d 733 (“DeRolph I”), and DeRolph v. State (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 1, 728 
N.E.2d 993 (“DeRolph II”); therefore, only a revision of the entire funding system 
will suffice.  If a systematic overhaul is not an issue in the mediation, a permanent 
and lasting remedy will not be obtained.  Any mediated solution will only be 
transitory. 
 
The concurring opinion contends that the issues of overreliance on local 
property taxes and a complete overhaul of the funding system will also be within 
the scope of the matters for consideration in mediation.  That may very well be the 
desire of the plaintiffs (and of the concurring justice), but it is questionable 
whether the defendants will be inclined to mediate issues that they have 
steadfastly refused to discuss for more than ten years.  The defendants have also 
disregarded the unmistakable rulings of this court on those issues that were 
entered in DeRolph I and II.  This issue of transforming the basic funding system, 
of necessity, requires the participation of the Governor and every member of the 
General Assembly, not simply a select group facilitated by an individual from 
outside the state of Ohio. 
 
Moreover, given that the majority in DeRolph III mandated a compromise 
that allowed the state to dispense with any overhaul of the system whatsoever in 
exchange for an unsatisfactory increase of state expenditures within the contours 
January Term, 2001 
19 
of the existing faulty system, some members of this court have sent a message that 
money is the only issue in this case.  Therefore, the dispute to be mediated may 
now be unduly limited to merely trying to compromise over how much additional 
money the state should be required to spend.  The state may only be willing to 
mediate a reduction in funding from the number the majority in DeRolph III has 
now apparently backed away from.  While the plaintiffs should continue to seek 
the systematic overhaul of the school-funding system, the current parameters of 
this court’s orders seem to preclude that as a realistic possibility.  Until an 
overhaul of the system is accomplished, there is no hope for adequacy of funding, 
since the state has no additional funds to appropriate to our schools from an 
already overburdened state budget. 
 
I fear that, as the Supreme Court of New Hampshire stated in response to a 
motion to compel mediation in that state’s school funding litigation in Claremont 
School Dist. v. Governor (1998), 143 N.H. 154, 159, 725 A.2d 648, 651, “the oral 
arguments before us in this matter made it clear that mediation is an impractical 
solution.”  It appears that many of the same concerns that caused the Claremont 
court to reach that conclusion are also present in this case. 
 
For all the foregoing reasons, I adhere to my original position, as 
expressed in my dissent in DeRolph III, that we should find that the state has 
fallen short in its recent efforts to rectify the school-funding dilemma.  We should 
return this matter to the General Assembly for further action by that body, giving 
them additional time to actually overhaul the entire system.  If the entire school-
funding system was overhauled, including the elimination of overreliance on local 
property taxes, there would be no need to make further cuts to other segments of 
state government.  Because the majority does not follow that course of action, I 
dissent. 
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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  I respectfully dissent from the majority’s order 
referring this cause to mediation. 
 
I voted to grant the motion for reconsideration based on my view that the 
court should have dismissed this case from the outset.  Our reconsideration 
procedures enable those members in the majority to rectify an error and afford those 
in dissent the means to support such action.  Today’s decision to refer this cause to 
court-ordered, court-supervised settlement proceedings continues to inject this court 
into matters beyond the scope of the judicial function, thereby ignoring the many 
errors that we could correct. 
 
My objections to this case and to the actions of this court are well 
documented.  See DeRolph v. State (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 309, 380-383, 754 N.E.2d 
1184, 1244-1247 (Cook, J., dissenting).  I continue to adhere to these objections.  
The political question doctrine ought to have steered this court away from becoming 
embroiled in the public policy debate regarding school funding and budgeting 
priorities.  See id. at 380-381, 754 N.E.2d at 1244-1245.  Instead, various majorities 
of this court have willfully encroached upon the functions of the legislature, 
expanded this court’s jurisdiction in contravention of the Ohio Constitution, and 
modified our rules of practice and well-established legal doctrines on an ad hoc 
basis.  This court’s continuing desire to use judicial power to achieve the public 
policy goals of a majority of its members lacks legitimacy. 
 
The only action that this court should take—because it is the only action 
legitimate under law—is to dismiss this case. 
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