Title: DeSersa v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

DeSersa v. State1986 WY 212729 P.2d 662Case Number: 86-131Decided: 12/10/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
Hubert Charles DeSERSA, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

The 
STATE ofWyoming, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Harry E. Leimback, 
J.

William S. 
Edwards, Gillette, and Ramon A. Roubideaux, Rapid City, S.D., for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Senior Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Judith A. Patton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     A conviction of 
attempted burglary raises appeal claims of insufficiency of the evidence and 
impermissible prosecutorial comment, violating the constitutional right against 
self-incrimination. We affirm.

[¶2.]     Stated issues to be 
considered are:

1. Sufficiency of the 
evidence for conviction as a matter of law.

2. Comment of prosecutor 
in final argument violated defendant's constitutional rights and required a 
mistrial then and a reversal now.

FACTS

[¶3.]     As generally explained 
in the background statement in appellant's brief: 

"On July 30, 1985, [the 
City of] Casper was observing a yearly celebration called Parade Day and DeSersa 
[appellant herein] and others joined in the festivities which involved 
socializing and consumption of intoxicating beverages. That afternoon and 
through the events in question, he was dressed in a black pullover knit shirt, 
light blue striped jeans and blue and white tennis shoes. Eventually he came to 
the Downtowner Motel around midnight, having had five to six beers that 
afternoon and evening. He had ten or twelve beers the entire day. He then left 
and went to a friend's house for further socializing and drinking and finally 
left to go check on his car at the Downtowner."

[¶4.]     At 154 North Beech 
Street in downtown Casper stands a multi-story apartment facility 
with the Quick Cash Pawn Shop on the ground floor. William Brennaman, a resident 
in a second-story apartment, testified at trial that at about 3:45 on the 
morning of July 31 he heard glass breaking at a window into the pawn shop, 
directly below his apartment:

"I [saw] a man, Indian 
nationality kicking the window in."

Brennaman tried 
to go back to sleep, but the noise continued and he dialed 911 to alert the 
police. Twenty or twenty-five minutes later, during which period the activity at 
the downstairs window remained constant, he saw the police officers 
arrive.

[¶5.]     Officer Bachert was 
dispatched at about 4:20 a.m. from the police department. He testified that upon 
arriving at the pawn shop he saw the appellant using a knife to "hack away" at 
the plywood covering the window on the inside of the broken glass. According to 
his testimony, when appellant saw the police car he "placed the knife * * on the 
ground and began to walk west across the parking lot away from the scene." When 
he was apprehended, the appellant stated, "You can't charge me; I'm drunk and 
don't know what I did."

[¶6.]     The knife was recovered 
and marked for trial introduction. Both Brennaman and Officer Bachert positively 
identified appellant at trial, as did Officer Lord who arrived within minutes 
and saw Bachert and DeSersa at the scene. Other testimony indicated that the 
appellant had been a customer of the pawn shop on prior 
occasions.

[¶7.]     Appellant claims 
that

"[h]e was walking and cut 
across a parking lot behind the Quick Cash Pawn Shop on his way to the 
Downtowner when he observed the police car ahead and when he turned to go the 
other way he was boxed along the parking area side of the building by another 
police car."

[¶8.]     Among others, appellant 
called as witnesses Delbert Richards and Pete Blakely, who had been drinking 
with DeSersa on July 30, 1985. Richards and Blakely were called to testify about 
the clothes worn by DeSersa on that occasion, in order to challenge the 
identification testimony of Brennaman, Bachert and Lord.

[¶9.]     The State called 
rebuttal witness Lonnie Tebeest who testified about the condition of the 
plywood, and further about an oral statement made by appellant after he was 
given his Miranda warnings:

"I was asking him about 
the reason for his arrest earlier that morning. Mr. Desersa at that time advised 
me he had been drinking and that he blacked out, that he didn't recall anything 
about what had happened and he specifically did not recall what time it had 
happened."

Sufficiency of The 
Evidence

[¶10.]  In his sufficiency-of-the-evidence attack 
on his conviction, appellant asserts:

"This is a classic case 
where the police arrived and arrested the suspect before the crime was 
committed. They then attempted to make out a case of attempted burglary and 
possession of a burglary tool.

* * * * * 
*

"The prosecutor attempted 
to create the crime of attempted burglary by use of fabricated evidence, either 
carelessly handled or manipulated, unsatisfactory identification and insinuation 
and innuendo as to the necessary showing that defendant had made a substantial 
step toward the commission of the crime of burglary. The evidence shows no such 
substantial step in the form of an entry or even the possibility of an 
entry."

[¶11.]  In addition to the direct attack on the 
witness' identification and the officer's credibility, appellant's insufficiency 
claim includes (1) failure to disprove the defense of impossibility; (2) 
inadequate proof of a substantial step toward the commission of the crime; (3) 
failure to deny or negate abandonment of possible criminal effort; and (4) 
failure to prove specific intent. We examine each of appellant's claims in light 
of the evidence before the jury. Intoxication as a defense was not presented as 
a trial theory. Cf. Crozier v. State, Wyo., 723 P.2d 42 
(1986).

[¶12.]  Appellant is thoughtful and ingenious in 
his presentation. However, except for the last contention of failure to prove 
specific intent, each of the other claimed insufficiencies of the evidence is, 
in the factual stature of this case, properly within the province of the jury to 
determine by accepting or rejecting the trial evidence. Cheatham v. State, 
Wyo., 719 P.2d 612 (1986); Russell v. State, 
Wyo., 583 P.2d 690, 700 (1978), "[I]t is for 
the jury, not this court on appeal, to sort out any conflicts"; Fresquez v. 
State, Wyo., 
492 P.2d 197 (1971).

[¶13.]  Judging from the photograph in evidence, 
it would have taken considerable time to get past the broken glass windows and 
into the building by cutting a sufficient hole in the plywood. It was not 
impossible, although certainly time consuming. The broken glass and mutilated 
plywood was sufficient evidence that a substantial step toward the commission of 
the crime had been taken. Abandonment was clearly contradicted by the testimony 
of the arresting officer and Mr. Brennaman based on their actual observations. 
Appellant was positively identified, and his trial counsel failed to impeach the 
veracity of the police officer or the eyesight of the apartment 
dweller.

[¶14.]  In summary, there was believable evidence 
before the jury from which it was entitled to find that the crime was possible; 
the appellant took a substantial step toward its commission; the appellant did 
not abandon his criminal activity; and it was indeed appellant who committed the 
crime. Sufficiency of the evidence on these issues exists. United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346 (D.C. Cir. 
1986); Dangel v. State, Wyo., 724 P.2d 1145 
(1986); Cowell v. State, Wyo., 719 P.2d 211 
(1986); Lewis v. State, Wyo., 709 P.2d 1278 (1985). The Supreme Court 
of Minnesota recently restated general principles for appellate review in a 
rational and refined explication:

"In reviewing the 
sufficiency of evidence in a criminal case, this court makes a painstaking 
review of the record to determine if the evidence is sufficient to permit the 
jury to reach the conclusion that it did. [Citation.] The court will not disturb 
the verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence 
and for the necessity of overcoming it by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could 
reasonably conclude that a defendant was proven guilty of the offense charged. 
[Citation.] The court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
verdict and will assume that the jury disbelieved any testimony in conflict with 
the result it reached. [Citation.]" State v. Richardson, Minn., 393 N.W.2d 657, 661-662 
(1986).

[¶15.]  The only important remaining sufficiency 
issue is proof of intent to steal as an element of the criminal offense. See 
discussion of specific intent as recently restated by this court in State v. 
Crozier, supra, quoting from Dorador v. State, Wyo., 573 P.2d 839 (1978). Both 
appellant and appellee rely on the intent standard for the offense of burglary 
expressed in Mirich v. State, Wyo., 593 P.2d 590, 591 
(1979):

"* * * We approach this 
assertion of error in light of our long-established rule that, when a defendant 
charges a lack of sufficient evidence to sustain the jury verdict, it is the 
duty of the supreme court to decide whether there is sufficient evidence on 
which the jury could base its verdict and, in the discharge of that duty, this 
court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. * * * In 
determining the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, the test is not whether 
the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for members of the 
supreme court, but rather whether the evidence of record is sufficient to form a 
basis for reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to be drawn by 
the jury when the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the 
State."

[¶16.]  Elements urged by the State as 
evidentially sufficient for this conviction are:

1. time of 
day;

2. persistent effort to 
break out the plywood (20 to 25 minutes);

3. knowledge of contents 
of the pawn shop;

4. physical conduct when 
the police arrived;

5. position of the knife 
and proof of damage to the plywood covering; and

6. res-gestae statement 
at the scene and subsequent statement at the police 
station.

[¶17.]  Applying the rationale and reasoning of 
Mirich, this court concludes that there was evidence from which the jury was 
entitled to find that the specific intent to steal was properly inferable from 
the evidence.

"The charge against 
defendant was breaking and entering with intent to steal (burglary). It is 
indisputable that the intent to steal is just as essential for the prosecution 
to prove with competent evidence as is the breaking and entering. * * * It would 
not be possible or fruitful for us to exhaustively list all the circumstances 
from which a jury might properly have inferred the intent to steal. Suffice it 
to say they are numerous, various, and the quantum of proof required necessarily 
depends upon the totality of the circumstances presented." Mirich v. State, 
supra, 593 P.2d  at 593.

All the facts 
and circumstances of the case are proper to be taken into account by the jury. 
Broom v. State, Wyo., 695 P.2d 640 (1985); 
Young v. State, Wyo., 678 P.2d 880 (1984); 
Delmont v. State, 15 Wyo. 271, 88 P. 623, reh. denied, 15 
Wyo. 271, 88 P. 1102 (1907).

The Impermissible Comment 
During Closing Argument

[¶18.]  The following occurred in closing 
argument:

"MR. BLONIGEN: * * * The 
pants, they say dark blue. Is this dark blue or light blue? It is kind of a 
medium. Remember, it is about half light outside there. It is not like it is in 
here today. Not only that, these clothes have been in the possession of the 
Defendant since July 31st. That is a matter of common sense. We all know what 
happens to denim when we wash it; each time we wash it, it fades a little bit 
more. And where is that black shirt, that black shirt you heard about from his 
friends and from him and the one they want to quibble about whether it is blue 
or black? Well, it wasn't here.

* * * * * 
*

"MR. ROUBIDEAUX: Let the 
record show, Your Honor, that we are objecting to Counsel's remark about the 
black shirt having to do with anything in this case. He is leaving the jury with 
the idea that the Defendant has been unable to produce that 
shirt.

* * * * * 
*

"THE COURT: I'm going to 
overrule the Motion for Mistrial and I will instruct the jury that anything said 
to the contrary by Counsel here, the Defendant has no obligation to produce any 
evidence or any testimony.

* * * * * 
*

"MR. ROUBIDEAUX: Well, 
Your Honor, we don't think this is relief. It makes this all the more 
prejudicial because the whole tenor of this final argument has been passing the 
burden of the Defendant to prove this and prove that.

* * * * * 
*

"THE COURT: * * 
*

"Ladies and gentlemen of 
the jury, objection was made to remarks made in his argument, that being that 
there was a reference to the fact that the Defendant did not produce a shirt. 
Ladies and gentlemen, you are instructed that the Defendant need not do anything 
to prove his innocence. The burden never shifts. It is the State's burden to 
prove to you beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant is, in fact, guilty, 
but that is not the obligation of the Defendant to prove himself 
innocent.

"With that, 
proceed."

[¶19.]  During the trial, defendant closely and 
extensively cross-examined the State's witnesses on identification detail, 
including specifically the color of clothes worn by DeSersa that night. 
Thereafter, DeSersa testified in his own behalf and introduced into evidence the 
shoes and pants he had worn.

[¶20.]  Appellant challenges the prosecutor's 
comment as violative of his right against self-incrimination under Art. 1, § 11 
of the Wyoming Constitution and the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, and further raises the issue of improper allocation of the burden 
of proof under Art. 1, §§ 9 and 10 of the Wyoming Constitution and due process 
within the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.

[¶21.]  The identification of his clothing was an 
issue raised by DeSersa in defense, both by cross-examining the State's 
witnesses, see Crozier v. State, supra, and in presenting affirmative evidence. 
We see no self-incrimination problem with the prosecutor's comment where, as in 
this case, the defendant testified about the color of his shirt, and defendant's 
counsel attempted to impeach the state's witnesses by cross-examination on that 
subject. The defendant's credibility may be tested and his testimony impeached 
like that of any other witness. "When he testifies in his own behalf he has no 
right to set forth to the jury facts favorable to him without laying himself 
open to cross-examination upon those facts." MacLaird v. State, Wyo., 718 P.2d 41, 47 
(1986).

[¶22.]  The final-argument statement is not a 
comment against self-incrimination as the issue arose in Westmark v. State, 
Wyo., 693 P.2d 220 (1984), and thereafter in 
Crozier v. State, supra; Cheatham v. State, supra; Schmunk v. State, Wyo., 714 P.2d 724 (1986); and Brewster v. State, 
Wyo., 712 P.2d 338 (1985). See also as the foundation of Wyoming law on prosecutorial comment 
on failure to testify, Anderson v. State, 27 Wyo. 345, 196 P. 1047 
(1921).

[¶23.]  This case does not present us with the 
additionally complex issue of the application of the privilege against 
self-incrimination, where a defendant elects to testify and then seeks to 
confine cross-examination or comment under the Constitutional privilege. It is 
noteworthy in this case that the objection taken at trial was not the 
self-incrimination question, but rather an argument reaching the due-process 
question of whether the prosecution's beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden of proof 
was retained.

[¶24.]  The prosecutor's comments may have 
improperly attempted to place the burden of proving defendant's innocence on the 
defendant by suggesting that he was required to produce the exculpatory "blue" 
shirt, contrary to the due-process constraints of Art. 1, §§ 10 and 11 of the 
Wyoming Constitution and the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
Upon objection, the trial court recognized the due-process/burden-of-proof 
problems, and gave a cautionary instruction which appropriately set forth the 
State's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We hold that the comment, if 
improper, was corrected by the cautionary instruction when recognized as 
potentially problemsome by the trial court. The instruction and refusal to grant 
a mistrial constitute a proper exercise of the trial court's discretion. United 
States v. Mostella, 802 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1986); Noetzelmann v. State, Wyo., 
721 P.2d 579 (1986); Martin v. State, Wyo., 720 P.2d 894 
(1986).

[¶25.]  The Seventh Circuit recently considered a 
similar issue in United States v. Wheeler, 800 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1986). The 
closing-argument comment involved a potential witness from the gun manufacturer 
who was subpoenaed by neither party. The prosecutor had responded to defense 
counsel's closing statement that the prosecution had failed to call a witness to 
testify about the gun by stating that the defense could have produced the 
witness if desired. In responding to the claimed appeal error, the government 
argued invited response and harmless error.

[¶26.]  The Court of Appeals noted that the 
comments impermissibly shifted the burden of proof in that the government is 
required to prove each and every element of its case beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Encompassed within this burden is the requirement that the government, not the 
defendant, produce the witnesses who support the case. Noting that the statement 
had been made only once, and that after an objection by the defendant the trial 
court immediately instructed the jury to disregard the statement and struck it 
from the record, the Court of Appeals held that the prompt intervention and 
admonition on the part of the judge rendered the error 
harmless.

[¶27.]  The weight of the evidence in that case 
involving the origin of the purchased gun, was certainly more significant than 
the color of a shirt (blue, black, or light in the dark of the night) in the 
context of the trial evidence in this case.

[¶28.]  Finding neither impermissive comment on 
the exercise of the right against self-incrimination, nor prejudicial error 
diminishing the State's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, with a 
sufficiency-of-the-evidence decision properly before the jury which was 
adversely determined, this court now affirms the 
conviction.