Title: Serra Chevrolet, Inc. v. Edwards Chevrolet

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

850 So. 2d 259 (2002)
SERRA CHEVROLET, INC.
v.
EDWARDS CHEVROLET, INC.
General Motors Corporation
v.
Serra Chevrolet, Inc.
1010340 and 1010341.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 13, 2002.
Rehearing Denied December 20, 2002.
*261 Thomas E. Baddley and Jeffrey P. Mauro of Baddley & Mauro, L.L.C., Birmingham, for appellant/cross-appellee Serra Chevrolet, Inc.
Warren B. Lightfoot, Jere F. White, and Ivan B. Cooper of Lightfoot, Franklin & White, L.L.C., Birmingham; Charles L. Robinson of Johnston, Barton, Proctor & Powell, L.L.P., Birmingham; and Eileen Penner of Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw, Washington, D.C., for appellant General Motors Corporation.
John Martin Galese and Jeffrey L. Ingram of Galese & Ingram, P.C., Birmingham; and Jack E. Held and Anthony R. Smith of Sirote & Permutt, P.C., Birmingham, for appellee Edwards Chevrolet, Inc.
HARWOOD, Justice.
In these consolidated appeals, Serra Chevrolet, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Serra"), appeals from a summary judgment in favor of Edwards Chevrolet, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Edwards"); General Motors Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "GM") appeals from the trial court's denial of its motion for a judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial following the trial court's entry of judgment on a $9,096,000 jury verdict and the trial court's award of $2,830,000 in attorney fees and expenses to Serra. We affirm as to Serra's appeal, and we reverse and remand as to GM's appeal.
On April 6, 1998, Serra sued Edwards, claiming that Edwards had tortiously interfered with its business relationship with GM.[1] On April 17, 1998, Edwards filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, a motion for a more definite statement. On May 26, 1998, Edwards filed an answer to Serra's complaint. On June 4, 1998, Serra filed an amended complaint that set forth an additional claim that Edwards had acted in concert with other named defendants in violation of the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act (hereinafter referred to as "the MVFA"), § 8-20-1 et seq., Ala.Code 1975, "by engaging in a course of conduct which intentionally, willfully and maliciously attempted to harm [Serra] by denying it a full service dealership, and restricting the distribution of new motor vehicles to [Serra]." Serra's amended complaint also sought to name two GM "representatives," within the meaning of the MVFA, as defendants.
*262 On October 30, 1998, GM filed a motion to intervene as a defendant and filed an answer to Serra's complaint that also contained a counterclaim for a declaratory judgment.[2] On December 4, 1998, Serra filed materials in opposition to GM's motion to intervene and a motion to strike GM's answer. On December 8, 1998, the trial court granted GM's motion to intervene. On December 14, 1998, Serra amended its complaint to add GM as a defendant, claiming that GM had acted in concert with other named defendants in violation of the MVFA, and to state additional claims against GM alleging fraud, negligence, willfulness and wantonness, and negligent and wanton supervision. On May 3, 1999, GM filed an answer to Serra's amended complaint. On January 20, 2000, Edwards amended its answer to assert defenses of justification and competitor's privilege. On January 27, 2000, Serra filed a motion to strike Edwards's amended answer. The record contains no ruling on Serra's motion to strike.
On February 7, 2000, GM and Edwards filed separate motions for a summary judgment, with attached exhibits, as to all claims that Serra had asserted against them, respectively. On February 16, 2000, Serra filed oppositions to GM's and Edwards's motions for a summary judgment, with attached exhibits; Serra filed a supplement to its oppositions, with attached exhibits, on March 3, 2000. On May 25, 2000, GM filed a reply, with attached exhibits, to Serra's supplement. On June 7, 2000, the trial court entered an order on its case action summary; that order stated, in pertinent part:
Thereafter, sequentially, Serra filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the trial court's summary judgment for GM; Serra filed a memorandum in support of its motion, with attached exhibits; GM filed a response to Serra's postjudgment motion; Edwards filed a supplemental motion for a summary judgment with attached exhibits; Serra filed an opposition to Edwards's supplemental motion; and Edwards filed a response, with attached exhibits. While the trial court's June 7, 2000, order appeared to enter a summary judgment for GM as to all issues except Serra's claims that GM had violated the MVFA, the trial court entered another order on October 20, 2000, stating, in pertinent part:
"3. The Court further finds there is no genuine issue of material fact as to fraud claims stated by Plaintiff and against General Motors and that General Motors is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on those claims.
The trial court certified the October 20, 2000, order as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.
On March 12, 2001, GM filed a motion for a final summary judgment on Serra's MVFA claims. GM's motion stated, in pertinent part:
(Emphasis in original.) On that same day, Edwards filed a supplemental and renewed motion for a summary judgment. On March 20, 2001, Serra filed separate oppositions to GM's and Edwards's motions for a summary judgment. On March 21, 2001, GM filed a motion to dismiss Serra's MVFA claims "based upon Serra's spoilation [sic] of all of its distribution records." On that same day, GM filed an evidentiary supplement to its March 12, 2001, motion for a final summary judgment. On March 23, 2001, the trial court entered an order on the case action summary that stated, in pertinent part:
A jury trial on Serra's MVFA claims against GM began on April 2, 2001. On April 11, 2001, at the close of Serra's case-in-chief, GM filed a motion for a judgment as a matter of law, which the trial court denied. On April 13, 2001, the jury returned a verdict; that verdict stated:
The trial court entered a judgment on the jury's verdict on April 16, 2001. On May 11, 2001, Serra filed a petition seeking payment of attorney fees and expenses, with attached exhibits. On May 15, 2001, GM filed a renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, a motion for a new trial or a motion for a remittitur. On May 30, 2001, GM filed an answer to Serra's petition for attorney fees and expenses, to which Serra filed a response on May 31, 2001. On June 14, 2001, GM filed a brief in support of its renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, motion for *264 new trial.[3] On June 20, 2001, the trial court awarded Serra $2,500,000 in attorney fees and $330,000 in expenses.
On July 17, 2001, Edwards filed a motion seeking to have the summary judgment for it made final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. On July 18, 2001, Serra filed an opposition to GM's renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, motion for a new trial, to which GM filed a reply brief on August 1, 2001. Serra filed a response to GM's reply brief on August 3, 2001. On August 6, 2001, Serra and GM agreed to extend to September 12, 2001, the time in which the trial court could rule on all postjudgment motions. On August 21, 2001, Serra filed a motion for relief, grounded solely on Rule 60(a), Ala. R. Civ. P. ("Clerical Mistakes"), stating that the parties had not received notice of the trial court's March 23, 2001, order dismissing Edwards as a defendant and that they were unaware of it until August 2, 2001, and suggesting that the order "constitutes a clerical mistake which must be corrected." No attempt was made in the motion to reference or state any ground cognizable under Rule 60(b). On September 6, 2001, Serra and GM again agreed to extend the time in which the trial court could rule on all postjudgment motions; they agreed to extend the time to October 12, 2001. On September 24, 2001, Serra filed a response to Edwards's July 17 motion to have the summary judgment in its favor made final.
On September 25, 2001, the trial court entered an order denying GM's renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, motion for a new trial; on that same day, it entered an order on the case action summary overruling Serra's Rule 60(a) motion for relief. Serra filed a notice of appeal to this Court on November 2, 2001, and GM filed a notice of appeal to this Court on November 5, 2001. This Court consolidated these appeals for review pursuant to Rule 3(b), Ala. R.App. P.
In its notice of appeal from the trial court's summary judgment for Edwards, Serra lists the trial court's September 25, 2001, order overruling its Rule 60(a) motion as the order appealed from; in its brief to this Court, it sets out the following two issues:
"In reviewing the disposition of a motion for summary judgment, `we utilize the same standard as the trial court in determining whether the evidence before [it] made out a genuine issue of material fact,' Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So. 2d 860, 862 (Ala.1988), and whether the movant was `entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' Wright v. Wright, 654 So. 2d 542 (Ala.1995); Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P. When the movant makes a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the *265 burden shifts to the nonmovant to present substantial evidence creating such an issue. Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d 794, 797-98 (Ala.1989). Evidence is `substantial' if it is of `such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.' Wright, 654 So. 2d  at 543 (quoting West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989)). Our review is further subject to the caveat that this Court must review the record in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and must resolve all reasonable doubts against the movant. Wilma Corp. v. Fleming Foods of Alabama, Inc., 613 So. 2d 359 (Ala.1993); Hanners v. Balfour Guthrie, Inc., 564 So. 2d 412, 413 (Ala.1990)."
Hobson v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 690 So. 2d 341, 344 (Ala.1997).
Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Coleman, 428 So. 2d 593, 598 (Ala.1983)(emphasis added.) The trial court ruled on Edwards's motion for a summary judgment on March 23, 2001. Accordingly, in determining the propriety of the trial court's summary judgment for Edwards, we consider only the evidence and testimony of record as of that date; evidence and testimony placed in the record after this date, including that presented at trial, cannot be considered in this review. See Bean v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 591 So. 2d 17 (Ala.1991); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Coleman, supra.
"The elements of [a cause of action for tortious interference with a contract] are 1) the existence of a contract or business relation, 2) the defendant's knowledge of the contract or business relation, 3) intentional interference by the defendant with the contract or business, and 4) damage to the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's interference." Bama Budweiser of Montgomery, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 611 So. 2d 238, 246-47 (Ala.1992)(citing Century 21 Academy Realty, Inc. v. Breland, 571 So. 2d 296 (Ala. 1990)). In its brief to this Court, Edwards admits that the first two elements of a cause of action for tortious interference with a contract exist. However, Edwards argues that, at the time the trial court ruled on its motion for a summary judgment, Serra had offered only speculation as to Leon Edwards's alleged interference with Serra's contract with GM, that it had offered no evidence of damages, and that Serra's contract with GM in regard to its operation of a satellite sales facility in Gardendale had not been terminated.
In its reply brief to this Court, Serra states, in pertinent part:
"Edwards contends that even if the Plaintiff can demonstrate that Edwards tortiously interfered with its contractual relationship with GM, the Plaintiff has not suffered any damages. Edwards' Brief relies upon the fact that during discovery, the Plaintiff could not articulate any amount of damages caused by Edwards. However, during discovery, the Plaintiff's Satellite Agreement had not been terminated by GM. In fact, during this time, the Plaintiff's Satellite *266 dealership was conducting normal business operations. Accordingly, there was no reason for the Plaintiff's representatives to testify that Edwards' [tortious] conduct resulted in the termination of its Satellite dealership when said termination had not yet occurred.
The reference to page 2640 of the clerk's record is to an entry on the case action summary dated September 25, 2001. That case action summary stated:
By Serra's own account, it had not presented any evidence of damages nor had its contract with GM been terminated at the time the trial court ruled on Edwards's summary-judgment motion on March 23, 2001. Thus, Serra had presented no substantial evidence in support of its claim against Edwards of damages that would create a genuine issue of fact. Moreover, in regard to the first issue presented by Serra, we note that in Edwards's February 7, 2000, motion for a summary judgment, Edwards asserted that no Serra representative could state how Serra had been damaged and that Serra's claim was premature because Serra's contract with GM had not been terminated. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court's summary judgment for Edwards is due to be affirmed.
In its appeal from the trial court's denial of its motion for a judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, motion for a new trial following the entry of the judgment on the jury verdict and the award of attorney fees and expenses, GM sets out the following seven issues in its brief to this Court:
Ex parte Alfa Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 742 So. 2d 1237, 1240 (Ala.1999).
GM argues that Serra's claims against it under the MVFA are time-barred. Section 8-20-12, Ala.Code 1975, sets out the applicable limitations period for bringing a cause of action under the MVFA. That section provides:
"Except as otherwise provided in paragraph l. of subdivision (3) of Section 8-20-4, any civil action commenced under the provisions of this chapter must be brought within four years after the cause of action has accrued. The cause of action shall not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the fact or facts constituting a violation of the provisions of this chapter."
GM has maintained throughout this litigation that the limitations period in the MVFA barred Serra's claims against it. It asserted that defense in its answer to Serra's amended complaint, in its motion for a summary judgment, in its motion for a judgment as a matter of law, and in its postjudgment motions.
1. Before the testimony of Serra's expert witness, Dr. Michael Ileo, at trial, the following occurred:
*268 "[Serra's counsel]: Yes, sir. He's my next witness.
"THE COURT: Let's talk first about statute of limitations. [GM] filed a motion for summary judgment as to the statute of limitations. At that time, the motion was deferred because plaintiff, the plaintiff alleged under [§ ] 8-20-12, [GM] filed a motion for summary judgment as to all claims arising before April 8, 1994, pursuant to the four-year statute of limitations in [§ ] 8-20-12. The plaintiff said that and argued ... [that] the discovery provision of that code section saved the expiration of that statute. At this point now that we're at this point in the plaintiff's case, and I take it that there have been no otherit doesn't particularly matter what the other testimony is. At this point, I have the testimony of Mr. Serra who has testified that he knew of the problem, thought his SOP [standard of participation] was too high all the way back in the '80s. Then in '87 to '88 he was complaining about his AGSSA [Area of Geographic Sales and Service Advantage]. In the early `90s he was complaining about his problem that up through 1993 he was involved in distribution `through my managers' in his words. He talked earlier about how he would check the order banks and they would be full. He did say that he talked to Glenn Curlette [a former GM account manager]. He said, Glenn, my inventory is poor. And he would say, quote, `your order banks are not full and you have not earned them.' He did not say necessarily that he had legally relied on it. In fact, the contrary implication exists, but the determinative testimony was given on that subject by Mr. Gary Murphy [a former Serra general manager] who testified in reference to Mr. Curlette. Glenn would say, you were getting what you earned. Mr. Murphy answered him in reference to his 1993 comments, `but I never believed him.'
2. At the close of Serra's case-in-chief the following occurred:
"[GM's counsel]: That's correct. And the stream of damages, there is not any evidence of a series of additional bad acts that ... would support a claim for arbitrary distribution. All this case has been about is about what occurred in 1991. Now, this is not a continuing tort. It's a statutory action and there would *269 have to be some showing of an arbitrary distribution or some sort of basis for liability, not damage[s]. There is a claim for damage[s] but there is not a basis for liability after 1995 or in 1995 and after.
3. In its September 25, 2001, order ruling on GM's postjudgment motions the trial court stated, in pertinent part:
"Although the defendant continues to insist the ruling was that this was a `continuing tort' that was not and has never been the basis of the ruling. The defendant argues that Payton v. Monsanto, [801 So. 2d 829, 835 (Ala.2001) ], and Moon v. Harco Drugs, 435 So. 2d 218 (Ala.1983), determine the issue. Payton notes that `Alabama law does not recognize a continuing tort in instances where there has been a single act followed by multiple consequences.' Here, although GM undertakes to rely on a few out of context answers by one of Serra's witnesses, it was the conduct of GM each month during the period of *270 limitations which the court allowed the jury to consider. GM's own trial representative testified adversely that the method of allocation was applied (`implemented,' carried out, accomplished) each month and could have been altered at any time, and in fact was altered during the applicable time. At no time has Serra conceded otherwise. Further, GM claimed throughout that part of Serra's failure to receive vehicles was a result of its failure to keep its order bank full, yet the proof was that plaintiff's competitors frequently ordered no vehicles, but continued to receive ample allocation. On this subject, GM's representative, Mr. Barrick, testified that GM did not follow its own rules and procedures. In addition, plaintiff complained it was unreasonably discriminated against in GM's use of the `pref' and `pref guide' categories of the allocation system. The evidence was ample and virtually undisputed that these categories were administered arbitrarily and with wide discretion granted to GM's managers, unbeknownst to its dealers. The GM representative also testified the distribution manuals were not followed, or were wrong. In short, the testimony of GM's own company representatives, employees and retirees provided ample evidence to sustain a plaintiff's verdict.
Initially, we note that the trial court's ruling that Serra's cause of action accrued before April 8, 1994, has not been appealed to this Court. Further, this Court, when addressing the running of a limitations period when the occurrence of the injury, rather than the discovery of the injury, marked the accrual of a cause of action, has observed:
"In Garrett v. Raytheon Co., [368 So. 2d 516 (Ala.1979)] the Court stated the principal rule of law thusly:
"`....
"`"We have held that the statute begins to run whether or not the full amount of damages is apparent at the time [the cause of action accrues]. In Kelly v. Shropshire, 199 Ala. 602, 75 So. 291, 292 (Ala.1917), the rule was stated as follows:
"`"If the act of which the injury is the natural sequence is of itself a legal injury to plaintiff, a completed wrong, the cause of action accrues and the statute begins to run from the time the act is committed, be the actual damage (then apparent) however slight, and the statute will operate to bar a recovery not only for the present damages but for damages developing subsequently and not actionable at the time of the wrong *271 done; for in such a case the subsequent increase in the damages resulting gives no new cause of action...."'
Moon v. Harco Drugs, Inc., 435 So. 2d 218, 220 (Ala.1983)(emphasis added). We conclude that this rationale applies here, where Serra did not appeal the trial court's ruling that the limitations period in the MVFA bars any claim by Serra based on acts by GM that occurred before April 8, 1994. Accordingly, claims for any damage sustained by Serra as a result of any violation of the MVFA by GM before April 8, 1994, and any subsequent damage resulting from such a pre-April 8 violation, would be barred by the MVFA's statute of limitations.[4] Thus, it is necessary that we consider whether there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have reasonably inferred that GM violated the MVFA after April 8, 1994, i.e., within the limitations period.
B. Evidence of an MVFA Violation Within the Limitations Period
Serra's claims against GM are based upon alleged violations of §§ 8-20-4(2) and 8-20-4(3)(a). Those sections provide:
*272 The gist of the testimony of Serra's expert witness, Dr. Michael Ileo, was that GM's vehicle allocation system, known as the "turn and earn" system,[5] resulted in a misallocation of vehicles between Serra and Edwards in 1991. During direct examination by Serra's counsel, Dr. Ileo testified, in pertinent part:
"A. The rise in Edwards's sales follows a period of time in the summer and fall of 1991 when GM sharply changed its new vehicle distribution patterns with respect to what was then [termed] new Model Year N vehicles.[[7]] Those vehicles came out in the summer and fall of 1991, i.e., the new 1992 model years. In that period of time, [GM] delivered significantly more new Model Year N vehicles to Edwards and [a] relatively small number of new Model Year N vehicles *273 to Serra. As a result, Edwards's Model Year N sales rose radically while Serra's Model Year N sales essentially were flat.
Dr. Ileo's ensuing damage calculations were also based upon the effect of the turn and earn system after the 1991 misallocation. In regard to the methodology of his damage calculation, he testified, in pertinent part, as follows:
During cross-examination by GM's counsel, Dr. Ileo testified, in pertinent part:
During redirect examination by Serra's counsel, Dr. Ileo further testified:
Based on the foregoing testimony of Dr. Ileo, we conclude that there was no evidence presented to the jury indicating that GM failed to follow its distribution system after 1991, which the jury could have reasonably inferred to be a violation of the MVFA. As Dr. Ileo testified, the misallocation by GM between Serra and Edwards in the summer and fall of 1991 was a "radical" or "sharp" change in its distribution system that did not occur again. What did occur thereafter, however, were less sales by Serra, because of the lower allocation flowing from proper and objective application of the turn-and-earn program, due to the initial drop in 1991 of new vehicle allocation. That event occurred before April 8, 1994, and any damage sought by Serra based upon that event through the application of the turn-and-earn system are barred by the MVFA's statute of limitations. Moon, supra.
The record also contains evidence to support an inference that GM had failed to adhere strictly to policies stated in its distribution manual, which was provided to dealers, by providing vehicles to Edwards that Edwards had not ordered. On this point, Dr. Ileo testified, on direct examination by Serra's counsel, as follows:
Thereafter, Serra introduced as a trial exhibit a compilation by Dr. Ileo of instances where Edwards had received vehicles in excess of the number it had ordered. A review of that exhibit, not taking into account any allocations of vehicles before April 8, 1994, and using the subtotals calculated *277 by Dr. Ileo, shows that during that periodApril 8, 1994, through October 19, 1998Edwards was allocated 210 vehicles from GM for which it had not placed orders.
Serra's counsel also questioned Henry Barrick, an administrative manager in GM's distribution department and GM's designated corporate representative, about numerous instances where the 832 reports showed that GM had allocated vehicles to Edwards that Edwards had not ordered. When questioned about the apparent inconsistency between this practice and the terms included in the distribution manual, Barrick stated that the manual was "not worded correctly."[8] The specific text of the distribution manual referred to by Serra to show the inconsistency appeared in a section captioned "`CPG' [Chevrolet Preference Guide] and Preferencable Orders." It stated, in pertinent part, that if a dealer entered "no orders" for vehicles with GM, then there would be "no orders preferenced," "no preference guide" (also referred to as "pref guide" in the 832 report, see footnote 6 to this opinion), and no carryover from one week to the next. Counsel for Serra questioned Barrick as to this aspect of the manual as follows:
Barrick also stated that when a dealer was due an allotment and had not ordered any vehicles, GM agents would often telephone other dealers in an effort to move its product.[9] Barrick further testified, in pertinent part, as follows:
(Emphasis added.) Thus, after Serra's counsel had set out the several instances in which Edwards had received additional vehicles, Barrick testified that after similarly conducting a study of Serra, he concluded that it had also received additional vehicles.
Although this, and other, evidence arguably could provide the basis for an inference that GM had an opportunity to favor one dealer, such as Edwards, over another, such as Serra, in providing a dealership with vehicles the dealership had not ordered, no specifics sufficient to support an award of compensatory damages were ever developed to show the actual impact of any truly discriminatory allocations as between Edwards and Serra. Moreover, and more importantly, Dr. Ileo's damage calculations, as explained by him, relied solely on *279 the allocation aberration that occurred in 1991 and the "extrapolated" subsequent fallout from that skewed allocation, because it served as base data in the otherwise objective and equitable turn-and-earn program. Thus, the $9,096,000 verdict cannot be upheld as attributable, in whole or part, to possibly discriminatory assignments to Edwards of vehicles not ordered by it. Based upon the evidence, limited to GM's conduct after April 8, 1994, we conclude there was no basis to support a verdict determining that GM's conduct was arbitrary, in bad faith, unconscionable, capricious, or unreasonably discriminatory, as is required for liability under the MVFA. Accordingly, because there was no evidence before the jury from which it could have reasonably inferred that GM violated the MVFA after April 8, 1994, GM was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
In summary, we conclude that the trial court's summary judgment for Edwards is due to be affirmed and that the judgment against GM is due to be reversed and the cause remanded for the trial court to proceed in a manner consistent with this opinion.
1010340AFFIRMED.
1010341REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HOUSTON, SEE, LYONS, BROWN, WOODALL, and STUART, JJ., concur.
MOORE, C.J., and JOHNSTONE, J., concur in part and dissent in part.
MOORE, Chief Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur in the Court's conclusion that the summary judgment for Edwards Chevrolet is due to be affirmed. However, I must dissent from the Court's decision to reverse the judgment entered on the jury verdict against GM on the basis that GM is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law based upon the statute of limitations in the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act ("MVFA").
As the Court's opinion explains, the applicable limitations period for bringing a cause of action under the MVFA is found in § 8-20-12, Ala.Code.1975. That section states that a cause of action must be brought "within four years after the cause of action accrues. The cause of action shall not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the fact or facts constituting a violation of the provisions of this chapter." (Emphasis added.) Thus, even if the only violations of the MVFA committed by GM occurred in 1991, the central question concerning the statute of limitations in this case is when did Serra discover the facts constituting the violation?
In this case, Serra alleged that GM violated the MVFA by failing to provide Serra with the number of new vehicles for its inventory that it had earned based on Serra's monthly sales. Former GM account manager Glenn Curlette told Tony Serra, the president of Serra Chevrolet, in 1991 that Serra's order banks (the number of new vehicles a dealership orders based on inventory need) were not full and that the dealership was not selling enough vehicles to earn more new vehicles. The record reflects that Tony Serra regularly checked with his general manager to see if his order banks for new vehicles were full in order to verify Curlette's claim, but found each time that its sales were steady and its order banks were full. Mr. Serra never testified that he did not believe Curlette's statements about earning new inventory. In fact, Mr. Serra testified that he had "no way to judge how I was treated in my distribution [of vehicles]." In contrast to Mr. Serra's actual testimony in the record, the trial court recalled that Mr. Serra had testified that he did not believe Curlette's claims about new vehicle inventory.
*280 The trial court also recalled that former Serra Chevrolet general manager Gary Murphy had testified that he "never believed" Curlette when Curlette told him in a 1993 conversation that Serra was getting the inventory it earnedno more, no less. The trial court considered Murphy's statement "determinative testimony" that Serra Chevrolet knew about the MVFA violation before 1994.
However, the record reflects that what Murphy did not believe were Curlette's statements that he did not have anything to do with the allocation of vehicles to dealerships. In one portion of his testimony, commenting on his conversations with Curlette, Murphy stated: "He sometimes would say allocation is done by the allocation department. Well, I didn't really believe that, but that waswhen it got to that point, somebody else, Mr. Serra or somebody else, called and talked to the other departments." In another portion of his testimony, in answer to a question about whether Curlette ever claimed he had nothing to do with distribution, Murphy observed: "First of all, I never believed him [Curlette]. I always believed that he still had some kind of direct effect on what we got." Nowhere in Murphy's testimony did he state that he did not believe Curlette or anyone else at GM concerning the inventory reductions.
Yet, based on this erroneous recollection of testimony, the trial court concluded that "Mr. Serra and his managers were aware of the facts that constituted the violation.... They affirmatively testified they did not believe [GM]." Despite this claim, there is a very good reason why both Mr. Serra and Mr. Murphy could not be sure whether GM was telling them the truth about how much inventory Serra was entitled to based on sales: that information could be found only in what were called 832 reports, reports available only to GM, not to the dealerships.
There was repeated testimony, by witnesses called by both GM and Serra, that the 832 reports were the only documents that showed, according to GM's formula, how many vehicles Serra Chevrolet was entitled to receive based on its sales versus how many vehicles it actually received. Curlette, GM's district sales manager, testified that he knew of no way Serra could have known whether it was receiving what it had earned under GM's distribution formula and that the 832 reports were the sole source document that contained this information. GM's corporate representative, Bud Black, also testified that the 832 reports were the sole source of the necessary information and that the dealers did not have access to those reports. Likewise, Serra's damage expert, Dr. Ileo testified that without the 832 reports Serra never would have known if it had received its fair share of vehicles, and, moreover, that without the reports it could not have pinned down when any violations had occurred.
When all of this testimony is added to the fact that Curlette repeatedly kept telling Serra that it was receiving the number of vehicles it had earned, the unequivocal conclusion must be drawn from the evidence adduced at trial that Serra did not know in 1991 or even in 1994 about the violations committed by GM. The violations were discovered only by scrutinizing the 832 reports obtained in discovery after this action was filed.
The specific information provided in the 832 reports is key to the statute-of-limitations question in this case because § 8-20-12 stipulates that the cause of action accrues upon discovery of "the fact or facts constituting a violation." The violation of the MVFA in this case was GM's use of an arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory *281 misallocation of new vehicles in contravention of GM's stated distribution system. In order for Serra to discover that there had been a misallocation, and that the misallocation was arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory in comparison to its usual practice, Serra had to have access to the information that could be found only in the 832 reports. Thus, Serra could not have discovered the "facts constituting a violation" without the 832 reports. This means that the statute-of-limitations provision of the MVFA could not bar Serra's action.
GM argues that a finding that Serra could not have discovered the violations without the 832 reports, which were available upon discovery only after Serra filed its action, renders the statute-of-limitations provision of the MVFA moot. It argues that such a finding would, in effect, mean that Serra could have brought its action at any time. GM is correct; however, in this case I do not find such a result disturbing because of the unique factual situation. The 832 reports were the only documents that provided the information necessary to discover a violation of the MVFA. Those reports were never available to the dealers; GM alone had access to the inventory records. In such a situation, I do not see any way around finding that the violations were not discoverable until Serra had access to the records. The factual situation presented here is unique enough that I have no fear that a decision holding that the action is not barred by the statute-of-limitation provision of the MVFA would destroy statute-of-limitations provisions in general, or the provision of the MVFA in particular. However, because GM has put itself in this situation, its argument that a decision for Serra would render the statute of limitations moot does not operate to undo the MVFA.
The Court's opinion dismisses any quibbles over the trial court's determination of when Serra discovered the violations by noting that "Serra did not appeal the trial court's ruling that the limitations period in the MVFA bars any claim by Serra based on acts by GM that occurred before April 8, 1994." 850 So. 2d  at 271. It is true that Serra did not appeal that ruling, though it did object to it at trial and argues against it when answering the arguments GM advances in its brief on appeal. Yet, there is a very good reason Serra did not appeal the trial court's ruling: it prevailed on its claim against GM; thus, it was not permitted to appeal rulings pertaining to that claim.
Ex parte Weyerhaeuser Co., 702 So. 2d 1227, 1228 (Ala.1996). "However, that rule does not bar an argument that `amounts to a challenge to the adequacy of the jury verdict.'" Bergob v. Scrushy, [Ms. 2001252, Sept. 6, 2002] ___ So.2d ___, ___ (Ala.Civ.App.2002) (quoting Ex parte Vincent, 770 So. 2d 92, 93 (Ala.1999)).
Appealing the trial court's ruling as to when Serra discovered the wrong committed by GM would not have amounted to a challenge to the adequacy of the jury's verdict. It is true that the trial court's ruling may have limited the amount the jury could award, but the ruling encompasses much more than that, as is clear from this Court's decision. The trial court ruled:
"So, the statute of limitations defense will be allowed as a matter of law. And I think rather than a judgment as a *282 matter of law flowing to the jury there simply will be no charge to the jury except as to damages calculated after 1990, that date in 1994. And objection to any calculations prior to that date would be sustained."
One clear implication of the Court's opinion is that this determination by the trial court was erroneous. The Court's opinion demonstrates that if it is assumed that Serra knew about the violations of the MVFA before 1994, then a ruling in favor of GM's statute-of-limitations defense bars Serra's entire claim against GM. But I cannot agree that Serra knew about or could have known about the violations in 1991 or 1994. Serra had to have access to the 832 reports to discover "the fact or facts constituting a violation of the provisions of [the MVFA]." § 8-20-12, Ala.Code 1975. Thus, contrary to the trial court's ruling on this issue, the determination as to when Serra discovered the violations affects Serra's entire claim against GM, not just the amount of damages recoverable. Consequently, Alabama law explicitly forbade Serra from appealing that issue directly. Instead, it had to respond to GM's arguments on appeal of the issue in its appellee's brief, as it did.
At trial, Serra objected to the trial court's ruling on this issue by arguing that the question of when Serra knew of the violations is a factual question properly left to the jury.
Regardless whether the trial court submitted the statute-of-limitations question to the jury, the bottom line in this case is that the trial court made its ruling on the discovery issue based on its erroneous recollection of trial testimony; it is clear from the record that Serra could not have known about the violations committed by GM at the time the trial court said that it knew about them, and Serra did everything within its power to protest the trial court's ruling on this issue. Given all of this, I am of the opinion that the jury verdict should not be overturned on the basis of the statute-of-limitations defense.
I am mindful of the fact that in arriving at this conclusion, I am in essence saying that the verdict was correct despite the trial court's error in its ruling on the statute-of-limitations issue. But because "`we can affirm a judgment if we disagree with the reasoning of the trial court in entering the judgment, as long as the judgment itself is proper,'" Progressive Specialty Ins. Co. v. Hammonds, 551 So. 2d 333, 337 (Ala.1989) (quoting Smith v. Equifax Services, Inc., 537 So. 2d 463, 465 (Ala.1988)), such a result is the correct result. I must therefore dissent from the Court's reversal *283 of the judgment entered on the jury verdict.
JOHNSTONE, J., concurs.
[1]  Serra also named Leon Edwards (Edwards's president); the National Automobile Dealers Association ("NADA"); and other fictitiously named parties as defendants. Leon Edwards and the NADA are not parties to this appeal; other defendants, also not pertinent to this appeal, were subsequently named in this action. Hereinafter we will refer only to the parties and filings pertinent to these appeals.
[2]  GM's counterclaim for a declaratory judgment sought, in part, to have the trial court declare that a "letter agreement" between GM and Serra in regard to Serra's operation of a Chevrolet satellite sales facility in Gardendale was to terminate by its own terms on October 31, 1998. GM filed a motion for a summary judgment on its counterclaim for a declaratory judgment on February 7, 2000; that motion was granted by the trial court on October 20, 2000. On November 28, 2000, Serra filed a notice of appeal to this Court based upon the trial court's October 20, 2000, order. This Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, without an opinion. Serra Chevrolet v. General Motors Corp., 824 So. 2d 86 (Ala.2001)(table).
[3]  GM made no mention in this brief of its previous alternative motion for a remittitur.
[4]  We acknowledge the general rule, pointed out in the Chief Justice's special writing concurring in part and dissenting in part, that a party who prevails in the trial court can appeal only the adequacy of damages. DeBardeleben v. Tynes, 290 Ala. 263, 276 So. 2d 126 (1973). However, such an appeal would have been appropriate for Serra under the circumstances of this case because it would have directly challenged the trial court's ruling that excluded any evidence of damages relating to claims that occurred before April 8, 1994. The trial judge in this case did not apply the statute of limitations as a complete bar to the clause under the MVFA, but rather as a bar to all damages accrued outside of the four-year period immediately preceding the filing of the action. See Ex parte Vincent, 770 So. 2d 92 (Ala.2000)(holding that a plaintiff who prevailed at trial could appeal the trial court's exclusion of evidence that could have affected the amount of damages that the jury awarded); Hicks v. Westbrook, 537 So. 2d 482, 483 (Ala.Civ.App.1987), reversed in part on other grounds, 537 So. 2d 486 (Ala.1988)(holding that an appellate court will consider an argument alleging evidentiary error at trial when it amounts to a challenge to the adequacy of the jury verdict). See also Hicks v. Dunn, 819 So. 2d 22 (Ala.2001)(holding that the plaintiffs, who prevailed on their claim of negligence, and were awarded compensatory damages, could appeal the trial court's judgment as a matter of law eliminating their wantonness claim because that claim could have allowed a recovery of punitive damages).
[5]  As explained by various testimony elicited from several different witnesses, under the "turn and earn" system, the number of a specific vehicle model, e.g., Camaro, Corsica, Corvette, Suburban, etc., a dealer was allocated by GM corresponded to the number of that particular model that the dealer had previously sold.
[6]  An "832 report" is an internal GM document, issued weekly and not available to dealers, used for vehicle allocation purposes. Three categories of information contained in the 832 reports were heavily relied on in this case: (1) "pref guide"the number of vehicles a dealer was entitled to receive pursuant to the turn and earn system; (2) "total selectable orders"the number of vehicles the dealer had requested; and (3) "preference" the number of vehicles GM actually allocated to the dealer.
[7]  GM assigned an alphabetical designation to its vehicles' different model years. Dr. Ileo explained these designations as follows:

"Q. Now, we have talked about model years, and just very briefly again remind us what Model Year L means, what M means and what N means.
"A. 1990 Model Year L was introduced in 1989. 1991 Model Year M was introduced in, again, the summer or fall of 1990. And 1992 Model Year N was introduced in the summer or fall of 1991."
[8]  There were two distribution manuals referred to at trialone issued in 1988 and a second in 1993. Several portions of the 1988 manual were offered by Serra's counsel and admitted into evidence. Although Barrick's testimony that the wording of the manual was incorrect referred to the 1988 manual, he testified that the 1993 contained very few, if any, changes. Those changes were never identified, but they were apparently not pertinent to the issues in this case, because both sides treated the sections from the 1988 manual as applicable to the case.
[9]  Barrick used the term "open allocation" to describe the process in which GM would provide vehicles to dealers in this manner. Barrick testified, in pertinent part, as follows:

"Q. All right. Is it your testimony that [GM] never uses its discretion for any reason in allocating vehicles to dealers?
"A. Well, we use discretion on open allocation, that is, allocation that dealers do not want. And they tell us they don't want it by not putting orders in or they tell their area sales managers I do not want this allocation. That's the discretion that we use.
"Q. No other discretion?
"A. Well, as far as the allocation of product, the system allocatesthe system generates an allocation to every dealer nationally, all right. If the dealer elects not to take the allocation, they don't give us an order or if they have an order they say take it away, I don't want it. That's when we have discretionary or if you would like to call it discretionary, that's when we have to use our discretion of where to put that additional product."