Title: Robert J. Stoddard v. The Hagadone Corp. and Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund Disability claim(s)

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
Docket No.  34335 
 
ROBERT J. STODDARD, 
 
                          Claimant,                                                                                     
v.                                                       
                                                         
THE HAGADONE CORPORATION, 
Employer, and ROYAL INDEMNITY 
COMPANY, Surety, 
 
                                Defendants/Appellants/ 
                                Cross-Respondents, 
 
and  
 
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL 
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND, 
 
                                 Defendant/Respondent/ 
                                 Cross-Appellant 
 
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Boise, February 2009 Term 
 
2009 Opinion No. 55 
 
Filed:  April 14, 2009 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
 
 
 
Appeal from the Industrial Commission, State of Idaho. 
 
The decision of the Industrial Commission is affirmed. 
 
Bowen & Bailey, LLP, Boise, for appellants.  Scott Wigle argued 
 
Mallea Law offices, Meridian, for respondent.  Kenneth Mallea argued. 
____________________________________ 
 
W. JONES, Justice 
This appeal arises from the Industrial Commission‟s decision which did not assign 
responsibility to the Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF) for Claimant Robert 
Stoddard‟s total and permanent disability benefits.  The Industrial Commission found that ISIF 
was not liable for any portion of Stoddard‟s injury.  Royal Indemnity Company (Royal) appeals 
to this Court alleging that it was error for the Industrial Commission to find that Stoddard‟s total 
and permanent disability was not a product of his pre-existing impairments combined with his 
last industrial accident and that it was error to analyze Stoddard‟s disability status as of the date 
 
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of hearing rather than the date of accident.  ISIF cross-appeals contending that Royal‟s claim 
against ISIF is barred by collateral estoppel, res judicata or the doctrine of waiver because the 
Industrial Commission previously held Royal 80% liable for Stoddard‟s injury. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Stoddard filed three separate claims for benefits arising out of three industrial accidents.  
The claims were consolidated and litigated with an ultimate finding that Stoddard was totally and 
permanently disabled pursuant to the odd-lot doctrine.  Fault was apportioned between the 
sureties for the Hagadone Corporation (Hagadone), General Insurance Company of America 
(General) and Royal, with 20% liability being assigned to General and 60% liability being 
assigned to Royal.  Stoddard, General and Royal filed motions for reconsideration and 
clarification alleging error in the decision.  The Industrial Commission then apportioned the 
remaining 20% liability to Royal.  Royal filed a separate action against ISIF alleging liability for 
a proportionate share of disability benefits. 
Stoddard filed the original action in this case seeking compensation for three injuries that 
were the result of industrial accidents.  A hearing was held in March of 2001 with the following 
findings of facts.  Stoddard was employed by Hagadone as a groundskeeper at Duane 
Hagadone‟s summer home in Coeur d‟Alene, Idaho.  Stoddard suffered four injuries; three of 
which were found to be industrial accidents.  The first injury was a groin strain and hernia.  
Stoddard suffered the injury while standing with one foot on a dock and one foot in a boat while 
unloading flats of potted flowers from the boat.  The hernia required surgery, but Stoddard 
missed no work after the surgery or as a result of the hernia.  The second injury was the result of 
a motor vehicle accident and was not the result of an industrial accident.  Stoddard was involved 
in a rear-end collision and complained of pain in his neck, left shoulder and low back.  Stoddard 
missed no work as a result of this injury.  The third accident occurred while maneuvering a large 
flowerpot through a sliding glass door and was the result of an industrial accident.  The injury 
caused pain in Stoddard‟s lower back area.  The referee determined that the pain was in a 
different area of Stoddard‟s back than the pain felt after the motor-vehicle accident.  Stoddard 
did not miss any work as a result of the third accident.  Stoddard attended physical therapy for 
the shoulder and back injuries.  Stoddard discontinued physical therapy because the exercises 
caused too much pain and instead walked on a regular basis for exercise; walking “significantly 
improved” Stoddard‟s condition.  The fourth and final accident occurred while Stoddard was 
 
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mowing the lawn at the residence and was the result of an industrial accident.  Stoddard fell 
while mowing the lawn on an incline and “[his] feet slipped out from under [him], and [he] came 
straight down on [his] buttocks.  And it changed [his] life.”  Stoddard has not been able to return 
to work since the fourth accident occurred in May of 1999. 
The referee held that Stoddard was permanently and totally disabled pursuant to the odd-
lot doctrine, holding General liable for 20% for the hernia and the flowerpot injury and Royal 
liable for 60% for the lawnmower injury.  All the parties filed motions for reconsideration and 
clarification.  The referee then held that “[under the facts of this case, the [Industrial] 
Commission has determined that the last accident caused [Stoddard] to suffer total and 
permanent disability[]” and that Royal should be fully liable for the total and permanent 
disability benefits.  General was held liable for 20% of the injuries as a result of the hernia and 
Royal was held liable for the permanent total disability or 80% of the injuries.1  No appeal was 
made by any party from this order. 
In 2006 Royal filed an action against ISIF and a hearing was conducted in July of 2006.  
Stoddard was not a party to the action because “this matter did not directly involve any pecuniary 
interests of Claimant.”  The second hearing presented two issues: “(1) [w]hether Claimant is 
totally and permanently disabled pursuant to the odd-lot doctrine and, if so, (2) [w]hether ISIF is 
liable for a proportionate share of disability benefits.”  The Industrial Commission found that 
“[n]either party herein questions that [Stoddard] is totally and permanently disabled, the present 
issue being ISIF‟s proportionate responsibility for payment of the benefits associated with that 
total disability.”  The Industrial Commission found that ISIF was not liable for a proportionate 
share of Stoddard‟s total permanent disability because Stoddard‟s “current total and permanent 
disability is due to the lack of transferable skills to the sedentary labor market and his advanced 
age, and not the result of any combination of [Stoddard‟s] pre-existing impairment and his last 
industrial accident.”  Royal appeals to this Court. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
 
The following issues are presented to this Court on appeal: 
1. 
Whether the Industrial Commission erred by failing to apply res judicata, collateral 
estoppel or the doctrine of waiver. 
                                                 
1 No party to this action joined ISIF even though it was obvious that a finding of total and permanent disability was 
being sought. 
 
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2. 
Whether the Industrial Commission erred when it found that Stoddard‟s permanent 
and total disability was not the result of any pre-existing impairments combined with 
his last industrial accident. 
3. 
Whether the Industrial Commission erred by holding that Stoddard‟s disability status 
should be analyzed as of the date of the second Industrial Commission hearing. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
The Supreme Court, upon review, may set aside the Industrial Commission‟s order upon 
the following grounds only: 
(1) The commission‟s findings of fact are not based on any substantial competent 
evidence; 
(2) The commission has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its powers; 
(3) The findings of fact, order or award were procured by fraud; 
(4) The findings of fact do not as a matter of law support the order or award. 
 
I.C. § 72-732.  This Court exercises free review over the Industrial Commission‟s legal 
conclusions but “will not disturb the [Industrial] Commission‟s factual findings if they are 
supported by substantial and competent evidence.”  Reiher v. Am. Fine Foods, 126 Idaho 58, 60, 
878 P.2d 757, 759 (1994).  “Substantial and competent evidence consists of such relevant 
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”  Id. (internal 
quotations omitted) (quoting Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho 257, 260, 715 P.2d 
927, 930 (1985)).  This Court reviews the Industrial Commission‟s factual findings in the light 
most favorable to the prevailing party.  Lethrud v. Indus. Special Indem. Fund, 126 Idaho 560, 
563, 887 P.2d 1067, 1070 (1995).  The Industrial Commission does not need to “„make detailed 
findings on every fragment of evidence presented to it.‟ . . . [but only] findings sufficient to 
enable meaningful appellate review.”  Davaz v. Priest River Glass Co., 125 Idaho 333, 338, 870 
P.2d 1292, 1297 (1994) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Madron v. Green Giant Co., 94 
Idaho 747, 751, 497 P.2d 1048, 1052 (1972)). 
ANALYSIS 
The Industrial Commission did not err by failing to apply res judicata, collateral 
estoppel or the doctrine of waiver. 
 
ISIF contends that Royal‟s claim against ISIF is barred by res judicata, collateral 
estoppel or the doctrine of waiver by virtue of the 2001 decision and I.C. § 72-718.  I.C. § 72-
718 states that, 
 
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[a] decision of the commission, in the absence of fraud, shall be final and 
conclusive as to all matters adjudicated by the commission upon filing the 
decision in the office of the commission; provided, within twenty (20) days from 
the date of filing the decision any party may move for reconsideration or 
rehearing of the decision . . . . Final decisions may be appealed to the Supreme 
Court. 
 
I.C. § 72-718.  Whether Royal‟s claim is barred by collateral estoppel or res judicata is a 
question of law over which this court exercises free review.  Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 
Idaho 119, 122, 157 P.3d 613, 616 (2007); Rodriguez v. Dep’t of Correction, 136 Idaho 90, 92, 
29 P.3d 401, 403 (2001). 
“Res judicata is comprised of claim preclusion (true res judicata) and issue preclusion 
(collateral estoppel).”  Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002).  Res 
judicata, or claim preclusion, “bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same 
claim or upon claims „relating to the same cause of action.‟”  Ticor Title Co., 144 Idaho at 123, 
157 P.3d at 617 (quoting Hindmarsh, 138 Idaho at 94, 57 P.3d at 805).  Therefore, res judicata, 
or claim preclusion, does not bar Royal‟s action against ISIF because ISIF was not a party to the 
2001 action. 
The doctrine of collateral estoppel exists to prevent the relitigation of an issue previously 
determined when: 
(1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in 
the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present action; (3) 
the issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) 
there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the party 
against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the 
litigation. 
 
Rodriguez, 136 Idaho at 92, 29 P.3d at 403.  This Court finds that collateral estoppel does not bar 
Royal‟s claim seeking apportionment of liability to ISIF for Stoddard‟s total and permanent 
disability because the issues are not identical in the two cases.  The issue in the first case 
determined whether Stoddard was totally and permanently disabled pursuant to the odd-lot 
doctrine.  However, the issue in the second case determined whether ISIF incurred any liability 
as a result of Stoddard‟s total and permanent disability. 
 
“Waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage.”  
Brand S Corp. v. King, 102 Idaho 731, 734, 639 P.2d 429, 432 (1981).  “It is a voluntary act and 
 
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implies election by a party to dispense with something of value or to forego some right or 
advantage which he might at his option have demanded and insisted upon.”  Crouch v. Bischoff, 
78 Idaho 364, 368, 304 P.2d 646, 649 (1956).  “A party asserting waiver must have acted in 
reliance upon the waiver and altered the party‟s position.”  Hecla Mining Co. v. Star-Morning 
Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778, 782, 839 P.2d 1192, 1196 (1992).  Waiver does not apply in this 
case.  ISIF, the party asserting waiver, did not rely on the previous apportionment of disability 
because ISIF was not a party to the previous action.  Therefore, this Court holds that Royal did 
not waive the right to seek apportionment from ISIF for Stoddard‟s total and permanent 
disability pursuant to the odd-lot doctrine. 
The Industrial Commission did not err when it found that Stoddard’s permanent 
and total disability was not the result of any pre-existing impairments combined with his 
last industrial accident. 
Substantial competent evidence exists to support the Industrial Commission‟s finding that 
Stoddard‟s permanent and total disability was not the result of any pre-existing impairments 
combined with his last industrial accident.  The Industrial Commission found that it was only the 
last accident which resulted in Stoddard being restricted to sedentary work.  It was the last 
accident that resulted in “significant standing, sitting, and walking restrictions” and not a 
combination of all Stoddard‟s industrial accidents.  This Court affirms that holding. 
I.C. § 72-332 requires ISIF to compensate the remainder of an injured worker‟s income 
benefits if “by reason of the combined effects of both the pre-existing impairment and the 
subsequent injury . . . [the worker] suffers total and permanent disability[.]”  I.C. § 72-332 
(emphasis added).  There are four elements for apportioning liability to ISIF pursuant to I.C. § 
72-332: (1) there must be a preexisting impairment; (2) the preexisting impairment must be 
manifest; (3) the preexisting impairment must have been a subjective hindrance; and (4) the 
preexisting impairment must combine to cause total permanent disability.  Dumaw v. J.L. Norton 
Logging, 118 Idaho 150, 155, 795 P.2d 312, 317 (1990) (emphasis added). 
“An odd-lot worker is one who, as a result of the injury, is impaired to an extent that his 
or her ability to perform services is so limited in quality, quantity, or dependability that no 
reasonable market for his or her services exists.”  Lethrud, 126 Idaho at 563, 887 P.2d at 1070 
(quoting Ragan v. Kenaston Corp., 126 Idaho 152, 155, 879 P.2d 1085, 1088 (1994)). 
 
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Here, the Industrial Commission found that there were (1) preexisting impairments;2 (2) 
that were manifested both objectively and subjectively; and (3) the preexisting impairments 
constituted a hindrance.  The Industrial Commission then looked at “whether [Stoddard‟s] pre-
existing physical impairments combined with the last accident to render him totally and 
permanently disabled, or stated another way, whether [Stoddard] would have been totally and 
permanently disabled but for his last accident.”  The Industrial Commission cited to testimony 
that Stoddard had been working prior to the last accident and that but-for the last accident 
Stoddard would have continued to be employable.  That is, Stoddard was totally and permanently 
disabled solely by the final injury pursuant to the odd-lot doctrine, and it was that injury which 
combined with his age and skills to render him unemployable.  The Industrial Commission 
further found that the only conditions which rendered Stoddard totally and permanently disabled 
were his advanced age and lack of transferable skills combined with the last accident, which 
placed him into the sedentary market.  This finding was not in error because Stoddard‟s disability 
was not the result of any previous injury combined with his last injury; it was based solely on his 
last industrial accident.  This conclusion is supported by substantial and competent evidence 
from the 2006 hearing and from the 2001 hearing.  This Court affirms those findings. 
The Industrial Commission did not err in its analysis of Stoddard’s disability status 
when it found that as of the second hearing date Stoddard was still totally and permanently 
disabled. 
Royal argues that the Industrial Commission erred by evaluating Stoddard‟s disability 
status at the date of the second hearing.  Royal contends that the proper date for analysis is the 
date of the last industrial accident.  ISIF argues that the proper date for disability analysis is the 
date that ISIF is joined as a party, which would be the second hearing date in this case.  In this 
instance, neither party‟s argument is correct. 
A permanent impairment is evaluated at the date that “maximal medical rehabilitation has 
been achieved and which abnormality or loss, medically, is considered stable or nonprogressive.”  
I.C. § 72-422.  The Industrial Commission noted Stoddard‟s disability status as of the date of the 
                                                 
2 The preexisting impairments, as found by the Industrial Commission in 2001, were as follows: 
Hernia- 10% 
Left shoulder (rear-end collision)- 20% 
Low back (rear-end collision)- 5% 
Flowerpot incident low back- 0% 
Lawnmower incident- 5% 
 
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hearing where ISIF participated.  At the time of the first hearing Stoddard was 64-years-old and 
at the time of the second hearing Stoddard was 70-years-old.  The Industrial Commission held 
that as of the second hearing date “[Stoddard] was 70 years of age and was still totally and 
permanently disabled.”  (Emphasis added).  This finding was not in error.  The Industrial 
Commission found that at the age of 70 Stoddard was totally disabled by virtue of his age alone.  
However, the Industrial Commission further found Stoddard‟s disability stemmed solely from his 
last industrial accident, and not from any preexisting conditions.  Therefore, this Court finds no 
error in the Industrial Commission‟s analysis because the analysis would have been the same 
regardless of which date the Industrial Commission used.  We decline to find error in a simple 
statement that merely recognizes the age of the Claimant at the hearing date. 
This Court finds no error in the Industrial Commission‟s analysis.  Stoddard was 70 years 
of age at the date of the second hearing; a fact that is relevant to his disability status pursuant to 
the odd-lot doctrine.  However, the Industrial Commission‟s holding did not rest solely on 
Stoddard‟s age.  It merely stated that six years after the first hearing Stoddard was still 
permanently disabled.  In the present case, Stoddard would be disabled solely by his last 
industrial accident regardless of whether his age was 64 or 70.  The proper date for disability 
analysis is the date that maximum medical improvement has been reached.  I.C. § 72-422. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons this Court affirms the Industrial Commission‟s decision. 
 
Chief Justice EISMANN, Justices BURDICK, J. JONES and HORTON, CONCUR.