Title: Attorney Grievance v. Alison

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Attorney Grievance Commission v. Stuart L. Alison - Misc. No. AG 65, 1996 Term
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE — Attorney’s unjustified lawsuits and continued pattern of
harassing conduct warrants an indefinite suspension with right to reapply for admission after
two years.
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket
No.  AG 65
September Term, 1996
________________________________________
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
v.
STUART L. ALISON
________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
JJ.
________________________________________
 Opinion by Chasanow, J.
________________________________________
      Filed:    May 19, 1998                
In Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Alison, 317 Md. 523, 565 A.2d 660 (1989)(hereinafter
1
Alison I), we imposed a ninety-day suspension upon Respondent for engaging in misconduct
in violation of Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct 4.4 and 8.4(d).
Maryland Rule 16-701k defines “misconduct” as “an act or omission by an attorney,
2
individually or in concert with any other person or persons which violates the Maryland
Rules of Professional Conduct, as adopted by Rule 16-812, whether or not the act or
omission occurred in the course of an attorney-client relationship.”
We are once again called upon to discipline Stuart L. Alison  (Respondent) who was
1
admitted to the Maryland bar in 1978.  At the direction of the Review Board, the Attorney
Grievance Commission of Maryland (Petitioner) through Bar Counsel filed a petition for
disciplinary action against Respondent pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-709.  In the petition,
it is alleged that Respondent has engaged in misconduct, as defined by Maryland Rule 16-
701k,  with regard to three unrelated cases.  We ordered that this matter be transmitted to
2
Judge Alfred L. Brennan, Sr., of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County for a hearing.  A
hearing was held on October 27, 1997, and shortly thereafter Judge Brennan issued his
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Respondent subsequently filed a motion to dismiss
and also filed exceptions to Judge Brennan’s findings and conclusions.  We will address the
allegations against Respondent, Judge Brennan’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, and
Respondent’s exceptions as to each case separately. 
I. Danielle Lynn Koziol, et al. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.
The first complaint involved statements made by Respondent during the trial of a case
arising out of an automobile accident.  Respondent represented Danielle Lynn Koziol in her
claim against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) seeking
damages for personal injury to her son and property damage to her vehicle caused by a
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“phantom” driver.  On March 20, 1991, a jury trial began in the Circuit Court for Harford
County.  During Respondent’s opening remarks and direct examination of Ms. Koziol, he
referred to the phantom driver as an “idiot.”  In addition, during opening remarks,
Respondent made a comment that one can expect to be “jerked around” when dealing with
an insurance company.  Judge Brennan quoted the following from Respondent’s opening
statement:
“‘When you are involved in an automobile accident and
it is somebody else’s fault and you are dealing with their
insurance company, I guess one learns to expect to get jerked
around.’
[Defense Counsel]:  Objection.
The Court:  Sustain the objection.
[Respondent]:
* * *
‘Did Miss Koziol cause this accident or did this idiot
[emphasis added] who stopped in two lanes of rush hour traffic
and skidded to a stop, cause this accident?’”  (Emphasis
supplied by Judge Brennan).
Judge Brennan also wrote that, during Respondent’s direct examination of Ms. Koziol,
Respondent stated:  “‘You were going through the intersection at Allender Road.  Tell us
where you were and what this idiot ahead of you did.’” Defense counsel moved for a mistrial
which was granted by the trial court.  State Farm later filed a motion for sanctions against
-3-
The motion was later granted pursuant to Maryland Rule 1-341 (Bad faith --
3
Unjustified proceeding) which provides:
“In any civil action, if the court finds that the conduct of
any party in maintaining or defending any proceeding was in
bad faith or without substantial justification the court may
require the offending party or the attorney advising the conduct
or both of them to pay to the adverse party the costs of the
proceeding and the reasonable expenses, including reasonable
attorney’s fees, incurred by the adverse party in opposing it.”
Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4(e) (Fairness to opposing party and counsel)
4
provides that a lawyer shall not
“in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not
reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by
admissible evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue
except when testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion
as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the
culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an
accused.”
Respondent.  
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Judge Brennan found that there was clear and convincing evidence that the “[v]arious
comments made and actions by the Respondent, Stuart Long Alison, on Tuesday, May 31,
1994, in the case of Danielle Koziol v. State Farm Insurance ... caused The Honorable Cypert
O. Whitfill to grant a mistrial in the case.”  Based upon these findings, Judge Brennan
concluded that Respondent violated Maryland Lawyers’ Rule of Professional Conduct
3.4(e).   In reaching this conclusion, Judge Brennan reasoned that:
4
“It certainly is not fair to the opposing party or to counsel
for an attorney to make statements to the jury that the opposing
party is an idiot, or that one can expect to be jerked around by
the insurance company.  In this particular case, the Defendant
-4-
Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4 (Misconduct) provides in pertinent part:
5
“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice.”
was an insurance company.  The purpose of an opening
statement is to tell the jury what you expect to prove at the trial.
These remarks were argumentative and only served to inflame
the jury.”
Judge Brennan also concluded that Respondent violated Rule of Professional Conduct
8.4(d).   Judge Brennan reasoned that Respondent’s statements “were the basis for Judge
5
Whitfill granting the mistrial.  [Judge Whitfill found that the actions of Stuart Alison were
intentional and inappropriate].”
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the Inquiry Panel unanimously
recommended the dismissal of the charges as to the Koziol matter and that its
recommendation should have become final.  Respondent also filed exceptions to Judge
Brennan’s findings, asserting that Respondent never referred to an opposing party as an idiot
and also never stated that one could expect to be “jerked around” by the Defendant insurance
company.  Petitioner filed an exception to what it called a factual misstatement that the
Inquiry Panel Chairman was dismissed as opposed to being replaced at his own request.
“To be sustained, the findings of fact of a hearing court must be supported by clear
and convincing evidence.”  Attorney Griev. Comm’n. v. Kemp, 335 Md. 1, 9, 641 A.2d 510,
514 (1994).  Because this Court has original jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings, we
will make an “independent, detailed review of the complete record with particular reference
-5-
to the evidence relating to the disputed factual finding.”  Bar Ass’n v. Marshall, 269 Md.
510, 516, 307 A.2d 677, 680-81 (1973).  In our independent review of the record, we note
that the findings made by the trial court are “prima facie correct and will not be disturbed
unless clearly erroneous.”  Attorney Griev. Comm. v. Glenn, 341 Md. 448, 470, 671 A.2d
463, 474 (1996).  
In the instant case, we need not address Petitioner’s exception and Respondent’s
arguments concerning the Inquiry Panel.  It is also unnecessary for us to determine whether
there is a distinction between calling the phantom driver an idiot and calling the opposing
party an idiot because the record before us does not provide clear and convincing evidence
that Respondent violated Rules of Professional Conduct 3.4(e) and 8.4(d).  From the official
transcript contained in the record, it appears that Respondent referred to the phantom driver
as an “idiot” once during his opening statement and once during the direct examination of
Ms. Koziol.  In addition, during his opening statement, Respondent stated that “one learns
to expect to get jerked around” when dealing with an insurance company.  Although we
previously suspended Respondent for violating Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(d) by using
profane and vulgar language in the courtroom and toward district court clerks, see Attorney
Griev. Comm’n v. Alison, 317 Md. 523, 565 A.2d 660 (1989)(hereinafter Alison I),
Respondent’s comments in the instant case do not rise to the level requiring discipline.  Even
though Respondent’s conduct does not warrant disciplinary action, we do suggest that
Respondent was rather overzealous in his advocacy for his client, and we hasten to add that
such remarks by Respondent during a jury trial are not approved by this Court.
-6-
At the time Respondent reviewed the complaint, he was still suspended from the
6
practice of law pursuant to Alison I, supra. Respondent’s suspension was terminated by this
Court on June 28, 1990.
II. Veta McAnulty v. First Virginia Bank-Central, Maryland et al.
The next complaint alleged that Respondent engaged in misconduct in a case arising
out of the repossession of an automobile.  As part of a marital settlement agreement, Edwin
McAnulty promised to purchase a vehicle for his wife, Veta McAnulty.  Ms. McAnulty thus
contracted with Harco Oldsmobile (Harco) for the sale of a vehicle, informing Harco that Mr.
McAnulty would pay for the vehicle.  Mr. McAnulty executed an installment sales contract
with Harco and financed the vehicle through Commercial Bank, now First Virginia Bank (the
Bank).  Mr. McAnulty granted the Bank a security interest in the vehicle as collateral for the
loan.  Shortly after the McAnultys’ divorce became final, Mr. McAnulty defaulted on the
loan, and the vehicle was repossessed by Harco and sold pursuant to the installment sales
contract.  
Ms. McAnulty retained Otto Major to represent her in this matter.  Mr. Major later
had Respondent review, as a paralegal,  Mr. Major’s draft of a complaint against the Bank,
6
Harco, Harco’s attorney, and a collection officer who completed paperwork regarding the
repossession.  Respondent redrafted the complaint which was filed in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City on June 13, 1990.  The plaintiff sought over $4,000,000 in damages, alleging
fraud, conversion, violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq., and conspiracy to commit each count. 
-7-
By that point, Respondent’s suspension had been terminated.
7
The case was subsequently removed to the United States District Court for the District
of Maryland.  In his findings of fact and conclusions of law, Judge Brennan noted that after
the district court indicated that “‘there would be a good reason presented for granting Rule
11 Sanctions in a case on which a frivolous RICO claim ... was brought’ if the case had
originally been brought in” federal court, the RICO claim was voluntarily dismissed by
Respondent.  Ms. McAnulty’s case was then returned to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
and later dismissed by the circuit court with leave to amend upon certain conditions.
Respondent drafted and filed an amended complaint omitting the fraud count on May 29,
1991.   Upon the defense’s motion to strike, the amended complaint was dismissed with
7
prejudice.  On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals in an unreported, per curiam opinion
held that the circuit court properly dismissed six of the eight counts of the amended
complaint.  The intermediate appellate court stated that the McAnulty case was an attempt
“to distort the unremarkable with allegations which are both incredible and outrageous in
light of what actually occurred.”  The intermediate appellate court noted: 
“We would be remiss if we did not question the pleadings
drafted by [Ms. McAnulty’s] counsel.  We are aware of, and
disturbed by, the numerous misstatements of fact throughout his
amended complaint.  We quote Judge [John Carroll] Byrnes,
who aptly stated, ‘[Y]ou obviously are quite indifferent to what
you say in pleadings, which I think puts you in a special
class....’”
The defense filed a motion for sanctions, pursuant to Md. Rule 1-341, which was
-8-
granted as to both Respondent and Mr. Major.  Judge Brennan noted that in granting the
motion, the circuit court found that Respondent “‘controlled the direction of activities in this
case’” and was without “‘a reasonable basis for believing that the claims would generate an
issue of fact for the fact finder and therefore lacks substantial justification.’”  In addition, the
circuit court found that Respondent “led the charge and Mr. Otto [Major] followed his lead.”
With regard to certain counts, the circuit court found that the attorneys “brought the RICO
and fraud counts vexatiously for the purpose of harassing the defendants which in [the
court’s] view amounts to bad faith under interpretations of Maryland Rule 1-341.”
Furthermore, the circuit court found that Respondent added the RICO claim “solely to take
advantage of the treble damages provision of the RICO statute in order to obtain an
exorbitant settlement from the defendants,” and the RICO count “amounts to a claim brought
in bad faith and without substantial legal or factual justification.”
In his written opinion, Judge Brennan stated:
“In assessing sanctions, Judge [Thomas E.] Noel noted that he
felt that Stuart L. Alison was more culpable and therefore, the
amount of sanctions were fashioned accordingly.  There have
been no less than four separate reviews by various judges
deciding adversely to the Respondent concerning his pursuing
this case.
* * *
 It is clear from an examination of this case that Stuart L. Alison
was the captain of the ship and directed its course from
beginning to end.  This case was never worth $4,000,000, but
could have been resolved by a Writ of Replevin.  Mr. Alison
went after deep pockets, hoping to get a settlement from either
a bank, an automobile agency, an attorney, or all of them.”
-9-
Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1 (Meritorious claims and contentions) provides:
8
“A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or
controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so
that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for
an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.  A lawyer
may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that
every element of the moving party’s case be established.”
Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4 (Respect for rights of third persons) provides:
9
“In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have
no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden
a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that the
lawyer knows violate the legal rights of such a person.”
Judge Brennan then found by clear and convincing evidence that “the inclusion of a RICO
count in the McAnulty case was totally without merit. [The United States District Court] was
of the same opinion and would have imposed sanction under Rule 11, if allowed.” Based on
these findings of fact, Judge Brennan concluded that Respondent violated Rule of
Professional Conduct 3.1  stating that: “From a review of this case by the Judges who have
8
been asked to rule on the merits of the various counts, the evidence is overwhelming that
Stuart L. Alison engaged in filing these claims, after his actions were ruled upon by Judge
Byrnes and Judge Noel.” Judge Brennan also concluded that Respondent violated Rule of
Professional Conduct 4.4,  noting that Ms. McAnulty’s suit “was an attempt to get to some
9
deep pockets by using a shotgun approach[] and hoping to obtain a good settlement.”
Finally, Judge Brennan concluded that Respondent violated Rule of Professional Conduct
8.4(d) and that his action, “wherein he included a RICO count in a Complaint that had
-10-
absolutely no foundation of facts in the hopes of obtaining treble damages[,] is not to be
condoned as acceptable practice of law.”  
In Respondent’s motion to dismiss, he argues that the McAnulty charges are barred
by nonmutual collateral estoppel because similar charges were filed against Otto Major and
later dismissed.  Petitioner counters that the doctrine of nonmutual collateral estoppel does
not apply. We agree with Petitioner.
The doctrine of nonmutual collateral estoppel “can be invoked offensively or
defensively.”  Leeds Federal v. Metcalf, 332 Md. 107, 115-16 n.4, 630 A.2d 245, 249 n.4
(1993). Respondent attempts to invoke the doctrine defensively.  “Defensive use of
nonmutual collateral estoppel occurs when a defendant seeks to prevent a plaintiff from
relitigating an issue which the plaintiff previously litigated unsuccessfully in another action
against a different party.”  Id.  The four-part test for applying nonmutual collateral estoppel
is:
“‘1.  Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical
with the one presented in the action in question?
2.  Was there a final judgment on the merits?
3.  Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in
privity with a party to the prior adjudication?
4.  Was the party against whom the plea is asserted given a fair
opportunity to be heard on the issue?’”
Leeds Federal, 332 Md. at 117-18, 630 A.2d at 250 (quoting Wash. Sub. San. Comm’n v.
TKU Associates, 281 Md. 1, 18-19, 376 A.2d 505, 514 (1977)).  Here, the first element of
-11-
the four-part test has not been met:  the issue decided by the Inquiry Panel as to Mr. Major
was not identical to the issue presented in the instant case.  As we have previously explained,
“the proceedings conducted by the Inquiry Panel ... are similar to the proceedings conducted
by a grand jury in criminal cases.”  Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Stewart, 285 Md. 251, 259,
401 A.2d 1026, 1030 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 845, 100 S.Ct. 89, 62 L.Ed.2d 58 (1979).
The purpose of the Inquiry Panel is “to aid in determining whether to institute disciplinary
action.”  Id.  Major’s conduct was referring the matter to Alison to draft the pleadings and
direct the litigation.  Thus, the issue before the Inquiry Panel as to Mr. Major’s case may
have been whether disciplinary proceedings should be instituted against Mr. Major for not
giving proper review to pleadings prepared by Respondent, whereas the issue in the instant
case is whether Respondent violated Rules of Professional Conduct 3.1, 4.4, and 8.4(d) in
his preparation of the pleadings and his conduct in directing the McAnulty case.  As
Petitioner noted in its response to Respondent’s motion to dismiss, “[i]t certainly can be
concluded that the Inquiry Panel in the Major complaint sought not to hold Major
accountable for what were truly the actions of the Respondent herein.”  We therefore
conclude that the defense of nonmutual collateral estoppel does not apply in the instant case.
Respondent also filed exceptions arguing that the evidence was incompetent in that
Judge Brennan’s findings were based on the opinions of other judges. Respondent further
argues that even if such evidence were admissible, the Clerk of the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City was unable to locate the case file and thus the case file was not properly
before Judge Brennan.  We disagree.  In the instant case, it is apparent that Judge Brennan
-12-
considered the findings contained in Judge Noel’s Memorandum and Order, the transcript
of the proceedings before Judge Noel, and the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals in the
McAnulty case.  A certified copy of the docket sheet was also admitted into evidence.
Although Judge Brennan quoted extensively from other judges’ opinions, Judge Brennan
made his own findings of fact and conclusions of law and did not merely adopt other judges’
opinions.  It was neither improper, nor prejudicial, for Judge Brennan to consider the facts
as found by Judge Noel where the case was finally adjudicated.  Furthermore, despite the
fact that the findings that support sanctions pursuant to Md. Rule 1-341 are determined by
a different standard of proof, i.e. preponderance of the evidence, than the standard used for
findings in support of disciplinary action, i.e., clear and convincing evidence, Respondent’s
actions were so onerous that there was sufficient evidence for Judge Brennan to find by clear
and convincing evidence that Respondent engaged in misconduct in violation of Rules of
Professional Conduct 3.1, 4.4, and 8.4(d).  This Court does not hold that the imposition of
sanctions conclusively establishes the fact of Respondent’s misconduct.  
In addition, Respondent contends that Judge Brennan failed to comment on Ms.
McAnulty’s testimony and also Respondent’s testimony regarding his investigation of the
facts and the RICO statute.  The hearing judge, however, “may pick and choose the evidence
on which to base his findings,” and Judge Brennan was free to disregard as not credible both
Respondent’s and Ms. McAnulty’s testimony.  Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Miller, 301 Md.
592, 603, 607, 483 A.2d 1281, 1287, 1289 (1984).  Furthermore, the fact that a witness’s
testimony was not discussed in the court’s findings “does not indicate a failure to consider
-13-
it.”  Miller, 301 Md. at 606, 483 A.2d at 1289. 
III.  Alison v. Toscani, Goodman & Close, et al.
The last complaint against Respondent arises out of a six-count complaint filed on
January 18, 1988 by Respondent against the law firm of Toscani, Goodman & Close (the
firm), John A. Goodman and James A. Close, individually, and Frank and Patricia Stacey.
Respondent asserted that the firm and Mr. Close were liable for malpractice, breach of
contract, tortious interference with contract, and slander, claiming $80,000 in compensatory
damages and $150,000 in punitive damages.  Respondent also claimed that the Staceys were
liable for breach of contract and in quantum meruit, alleging $6,000 in compensatory
damages.  Respondent, however, dismissed his complaint against the Staceys in October
1989.  According to the complaint, the Staceys retained Respondent to represent them
regarding an automobile accident which occurred in 1985.  Respondent claimed that he and
Mr. Close shared office space but were not partners, that he hired Mr. Close to assist him
with the Staceys’ representation, and that Mr. Close failed to represent them properly.   As
a result, Respondent lost them as clients.  
Prior to trial, Respondent filed an amended complaint against the law firm and Mr.
Goodman and Mr. Close individually, eliminating the slander count against the firm and
replacing it with a breach of fiduciary duty claim.  Contrary to what he had asserted in the
initial complaint, Respondent claimed that he and Mr. Close were partners with regard to the
representation of the Staceys.  The defendants moved for summary judgment and to strike
-14-
the amended complaint, and both were granted by the circuit court.  The defendants later
moved for sanctions against Respondent pursuant to Md. Rule 1-341.  Before the motion for
sanctions was ruled upon, Respondent filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Special
Appeals which reversed and remanded the case to the circuit court.  
On remand, the defendants filed a motion to compel discovery which was granted.
Respondent did not comply with the order compelling discovery, and the defendants then
filed a motion pursuant to Md. Rule 2-433 requesting that Respondent’s case be dismissed.
The circuit court dismissed Respondent’s amended complaint, but directed the clerk of the
court not to file the order until the defendants’ previous motion for sanctions could be ruled
upon.  Respondent filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, but later failed to appear
at the hearing held on that motion.  The circuit court denied Respondent’s motion.  
At the conclusion of a hearing held on the defendants’ motion for sanctions, the
circuit court delivered an oral opinion granting the motion.  Judge Brennan quoted the
following from the circuit court’s opinion:
“‘This is a bad faith case.  What I have to do is look to
see why you did all of this.  What was the reason you sued
Close?  Why? ....It was a get even....This is a vexatious case.
You are out to get Jimmy Close.  You wanted to harass him....
What you would like is to beat on him.  You take pleasure in
picking on him....
The whole case is without substantial justification....In
this case in my judgment this whole case was born of your anger
at Mr. Close and that you were going to get him.  It is
vexatious....you have enjoyed yourself the last couple of days.
I have looked out and watched you and you take great pleasure
in trying to make Mr. Close squirm.  No doubt about that.  None
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in my mind.  None....it was not the money that you were after.
It is his blood.  That is what you want.  Not the money.  You
want blood.
....
Alison says that Close was conspiring to take the client[s]
away from him.  I find [that] untrue and I do not think that he
[Alison] really thought that back then.  He was mad that he was
out of the case and he was going to get Close.  So he files this
lawsuit.  He files it in malpractice (Count I) which is as I said
earlier is a ridiculous document....He [Alison] was just a lawyer
on the case who had an agreement with a client and the clients
have not sued anybody.  He sues for breach of contract (Count
II).  It is true that Close in all probability could have pursued the
Staceys for some monies for the work he performed on the file.
He opted not to do that.  One of the main reasons he opted not
to do it is because Alison is running around saying I am going
to sue you.  So, he [Close] says I am out of here.  He [Alison]
sues [Close] for breach of fiduciary duty [Count IV] because he
says they were partners.  That is ludicrous.  They were not
partners.  They had an agreement.  As I said, the only thing that
may have had a [shred] of legitimacy to it would have been him
to ask Close for the monies from the fee that Close may have
been entitled to from the Staceys, but which Close [didn’t] get.
He [Alison] sues him for interference of contract [Count III].
[He] says that Close had actual knowledge of the contractual
relationship between Alison and the Staceys - - well, it was
Close that had the contractual relationship between the Staceys
and him.  He was part of that contract.  And to argue that he was
trying persuade the Staceys not to honor their contract with the
Plaintiff [Alison] was ridiculous.  Whatever Close was going to
get he had an agreement which he readily admits by which he
had to give Alison half of.  So he didn’t interfere with the
contract...there is no question in my mind that Mr. Alison was
going through then and may be going through now a period
when you were with him or getting him, you were going to be
harassed in some way....He did it in my judgment recklessly.
His overriding concern is to get Jimmy Close.
I find that the case was not only brought without
substantial justification, but it has been continued without
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substantial justification.  I believe that Mr. Close is entitled to
the fees that he has been charged by Mr. Karas’ law firm.  I also
believe that he is entitled to any costs...associated with this
lawsuit.
....
[T]he court finds that the case was brought without
substantial justification and continues without substantial
justification and in bad faith.
....
It seems to me that it was vexatious and I will state that
for the record.  The Court orders fees in the amount of $6,318
and costs in the amount of $443.91....[made] payable to Close.’”
(Emphasis added by Judge Brennan).
The Court of Special Appeals in an unreported, per curiam opinion affirmed the circuit
court’s judgment. 
Judge Brennan found by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent’s action in
“dragging the Staceys into this case ... was completely without merit or justification.  Mr.
Alison ultimately dismissed the Staceys as a party in the case with the comment that ‘he
didn’t want their money but wanted Jimmy.’”  
Judge Brennan also found by clear and convincing evidence that in a letter dated
August 14, 1995, Robert Burchett, the Panel Chaiman of the Attorney Grievance
Commission, requested that Respondent appear for a two-day hearing to be held sometime
between October 1 and  November 17, 1995.  Respondent did not respond to this request,
and on August 31, 1995 Mr. Burchett notified Respondent that the hearing was scheduled
for November 1 and 2, 1995.  On October 26, 1995, Respondent notified Mr. Burchett in
writing that he would not be able to appear on either November 1 or 2 because of eight
-17-
Rule of Professional Conduct 8.1 (Bar admission and disciplinary matters) provides
10
in pertinent part: “[A] lawyer in connection with ... a disciplinary matter, shall not:  * * *
(b) ...knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or
disciplinary authority....”
previously scheduled cases, but he did not attempt to obtain a postponement in any of those
cases.  Prior to November 1, Respondent sought an injunction to prevent the hearing, but this
request was denied.  Respondent failed to appear at the hearing.
Based on this evidence, Judge Brennan concluded that Respondent violated Rules of
Professional Conduct 3.1, 4.4, 8.4(d), and 8.1(b).   Regarding Respondent’s violation of
10
Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1, Judge Brennan reasoned that Respondent’s claim against
the law firm “was completely without foundation, since those attorneys never had a legal
relationship with Mr. Alison.”  In addition, Judge Brennan pointed to the findings by the
circuit court and the Court of Special Appeals noting that the remaining counts were found
to be “meritless” after Respondent failed to respond to the defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Judge Brennan further concluded that “[t]his entire case generated a lot of court time,
unnecessary pleadings and involvement of parties for the sole purpose of harassing Mr.
Close.” 
As for Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4, Judge Brennan concluded that Respondent
“included the Staceys as a party in this case and kept them as such until they offered $1,500
to settle.  At that time, he voluntarily agreed to dismiss them stating, ‘I don’t want your
money.  I want Jimmy’s.’  These actions by Respondent had no substantial purpose, other
than to unnecessarily burden the Staceys.” Judge Brennan also concluded with regard to the
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violation of Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(d):   “Mr. Alison’s use of the legal system and
the Baltimore County Circuit Court, in his efforts to obtain revenge against James Close,
lacked substantial justification.  He also unnecessarily involved the Staceys in this matter for
the sole purpose of carrying out this vendetta.”  Finally, regarding Respondent’s violation
of Rule of Professional Conduct 8.1(b), Judge Brennan concluded that Respondent’s conduct
in failing to respond to the Attorney Grievance Commission’s request for hearing dates was
“totally inexcusable” and that “[h]e chose not to reply until a few days before the hearing,
at which time he requested an injunction against having the hearing.  Such action is nothing
more than total arrogance on Respondent’s part.”
Respondent excepted to Judge Brennan’s findings, asserting that the petition for
disciplinary action did not complain that Respondent’s action against the Staceys was
frivolous or improper and thus it was improper for Judge Brennan to make such a finding.
 We find no merit in this contention.  Paragraph 21 of the petition for discipline alleged the
following:
“In October 1989, Respondent dismissed the complaint
against the Staceys.  He did so without compensation and after
rejecting a[n] offer to settle with the Staceys upon receipt of
$1,500 from them.  In rejecting their offer to settle he said he
didn’t want their money but rather ‘Jimmy’s money’, meaning
James Close.”
The petition further alleged that Respondent by his actions, as set forth in the petition,
violated Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1 which prohibits a lawyer from bringing a
proceeding “unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous.” We conclude that the
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charges set forth in the petition were “sufficiently clear and specific reasonably to inform
[Respondent] of any misconduct charged,” Md. Rule 16-709c, and that Judge Brennan did
not err in his findings  as to the Staceys.
In addition, as in the McAnulty case, Respondent asserts that Judge Brennan merely
adopted the findings of the circuit court, rather than conducting an independent
determination of the merits of the charges against Respondent. For the same reasons we
discussed earlier with regard to the McAnulty complaint, we find no merit in Respondent’s
assertion, and we therefore sustain Judge Brennan’s findings as to the Close complaint.
Respondent also claims that Judge Brennan “ignored the plain language of a letter
from Mr. Broderick to the Respondent which,” according to Respondent, “merely invited a
response,” and the Respondent “chose not to accept the invitation.” We find no merit to this
claim.  It is clear that Respondent knowingly failed to respond to a lawful demand for
information from a disciplinary authority.
Finally, Respondent made the following general exceptions to Judge Brennan’s
findings of fact and conclusions of law: 1)Petitioner’s proof was not restricted to his answers
to Respondent’s interrogatories; and 2) Respondent was not permitted to act as co-counsel
in the instant case.  We find no merit in either of Respondent’s claims.  Regarding the
interrogatories, Petitioner was asked to describe each act or omission upon which Petitioner
relied to support the petition for disciplinary action as to each complaint.  Petitioner
responded by describing the Respondent’s actions as they were described in the petition for
disciplinary action. It is apparent from the record that Respondent actually attempted to limit
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Petitioner’s proof to certain portions of Petitioner’s answers to interrogatories.  We find no
error.
Respondent’s final contention that he was not permitted to act as co-counsel in the
instant case is also without merit.  In Stewart, we noted that disciplinary proceedings are not
criminal proceedings and that the purpose of a disciplinary proceeding is “to protect the
public by determining a lawyer’s fitness to practice law.”  285 Md. at 258, 401 A.2d at 1029.
We further noted that “a lawyer charged with misconduct is not entitled, at any stage of
disciplinary proceedings, to all of the constitutional safeguards accorded an accused in a
criminal proceeding.”  Stewart, 285 Md. at 258, 401 A.2d at 1029-30.  Even a criminal
defendant “‘does not have an absolute right to both self-representation and the assistance of
counsel.’” Parren v. State, 309 Md. 260, 265, 523 A.2d 597, 599 (1987)(quoting United
States v. Halbert, 640 F.2d 1000, 1009 (9  Cir. 1981)). Thus, Judge Brennan did not err in
th
refusing to allow Respondent to proceed pro se as well as with counsel.
In sum, we find that Judge Brennan’s findings as to the Koziol case were clearly
erroneous.  As for the McAnulty and Close complaints, we sustain Judge Brennan’s findings
of fact and conclusions of law.
SANCTION
We must now determine the proper sanction for Respondent’s conduct.  It is well
settled that “[t]he purpose of disciplinary proceedings against an attorney is to protect the
public rather than to punish the erring attorney.”  Attorney Griev. Com’n v. Hamby, 322 Md.
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606, 611, 589 A.2d 52, 56 (1991).  The severity of the sanction depends upon the facts and
circumstances of the instant case.  Id.  Imposing a sanction protects the public interest
“because it demonstrates to members of the legal profession the type of conduct which will
not be tolerated.”  Id.
Petitioner recommends that Respondent be disbarred and states that 
“Respondent has not learned from his earlier exposure to
discipline and the Opinion of this Court in addressing his
conduct.  While the earlier Opinion attributed ‘the conduct with
which we are here concerned [to have] its roots in marital
discord ([Alison, 317 Md.] at 525, 562 A.2d at 661) there is no
excuse this time.  It would appear that Respondent’s character,
professional judgment, sense of ethics and fairness is
demonstrably lacking and is at the heart of this course of
conduct so abhorrent and intolerable in a member of a learned
profession.” 
We agree with Petitioner’s characterization of Respondent.  As previously mentioned, this
is not the first time Alison has been before this Court on a disciplinary matter.  See Alison
I, supra.  In Alison I, we suspended Alison noting:
“For about two years, respondent, an attorney in Harford
County, engaged in a course of professional and private conduct
that was inappropriate, rude, vulgar, insulting, occasionally
dangerous, and sometimes criminal.”
317 Md. at 525, 565 A.2d at 660.  Perhaps more relevant to the sanction in the instant case
was the trial judge’s findings in Respondent’s prior disciplinary matter.
“It is clear that each person who became involved in this dispute
was viewed by Alison as an enemy and became an object in
what appears to have been a campaign of disrespect, abuse and
intimidation....  Harassment was the order of the day.”
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Alison I, 317 Md. at 532, 565 A.2d at 664.  We further noted that “it is more than a little
disturbing to us that, even at this late date, respondent has little or no appreciation of the
seriousness of his transgressions.”  Id.  Respondent to this day has very little or no
appreciation of the seriousness of his misconduct and has continued to engage in a pattern
of harassing conduct.  Such a pattern of behavior demonstrates Respondent’s inability to
conform his conduct within the bounds of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional
Conduct.  This Court cannot tolerate Respondent’s behavior and his continued refusal to
accept responsibility for his actions, especially in light of the fact that this Court previously
imposed a ninety-day suspension for violations of Rules of Professional Conduct 4.4 and
8.4(d). 
For the violations found in the McAnulty and Close cases, and in light of
Respondent’s previous suspension, we therefore conclude that the appropriate sanction to
impose upon Respondent is an indefinite suspension from the practice of law.  Respondent
may reapply for admission after two years from the effective date of the suspension.  This
suspension shall begin thirty days from the filing of this opinion. 
IT IS SO ORDERED;  RESPONDENT
SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED
BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT,
INCLUDING THE COSTS OF ALL
TRANSCRIPTS, 
PURSUANT 
TO
MARYLAND RULE 16-715c, FOR
WHICH JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN
FAVOR 
OF 
THE 
ATTORNEY
GRIEVANCE 
COMMISSION 
OF
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MARYLAND AGAINST STUART L.
ALISON; 
SUSPENSION 
SHALL
COMMENCE 30 DAYS FROM THE
FILING OF THIS OPINION.