Title: Armand Linzmeyer v. D.J. Forcey

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2002 WI 84 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-0197 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Armand Linzmeyer,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
D.J. Forcey,  
 
Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 2, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
May 2, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Winnebago   
 
JUDGE: 
Barbara H. Key   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there was a brief by Leonard D. 
Kachinsky and Kachinsky & Petit Law Offices, Neenah, and oral 
argument by Leonard D. Kachinsky. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief (in the 
court of appeals) by James B. Gunz, city attorney, Neenah. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Robert J. Dreps, 
Kendall W. Harrison and La Follette Godfrey & Kahn, Madison, on 
behalf of the Wisconsin Newspaper Association, the Wisconsin 
Broadcasters Association, the Wisconsin Freedom of Information 
Council, and the Post-Crescent, with oral argument by Kendall W. 
Harrison. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Gordon E. McQuillen, 
Madison, 
on 
behalf 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Professional 
Police 
Association. 
 
 
 
2
An amicus curiae brief was filed (in the court of appeals) 
by Bruce Meredith, Melissa A. Cherney, and Chris Galinat, 
Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin Education Association 
Council, with oral argument by Bruce Meredith. 
 
 
 
2002 WI 84 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-0197  
(L.C. No. 
00 CV 1098) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Armand Linzmeyer,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
D.J. Forcey,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 2, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Winnebago 
County, Barbara H. Key, Judge.  Affirmed and cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   In this case, we review a circuit 
court judgment that allowed the release of a Neenah Police 
Department (NPD) report under the Wisconsin Open Records Law, 
Wis. Stat. § 19.31-.39 (1999-2000).1  The police report was made 
pursuant to an investigation of Armand Linzmeyer, a teacher at 
Neenah High School (NHS).  The investigation on which the report 
was based did not lead either to Linzmeyer's arrest or his 
prosecution, and the Neenah Joint School District did not use 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1999-
2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
01-0197   
 
2 
 
the report to initiate any administrative disciplinary action 
against Linzmeyer.  The investigation was closed by the time the 
open records request was made. 
¶2 
The 
Appleton 
Post-Crescent 
newspaper 
("the 
Post-
Crescent") and the parents of two NHS students sought release of 
the investigation report.  The Neenah City Attorney planned to 
release the report in the absence of judicial action.  Linzmeyer 
then sought an injunction from the circuit court to prevent 
release of the report. 
¶3 
The Winnebago County Circuit Court, Barbara H. Key, 
Judge, concluded that the public's interest in the disclosure of 
the report outweighed the public's interest in the protection of 
Linzmeyer's reputation 
or 
privacy, 
and 
denied 
Linzmeyer's 
request for an injunction.  Linzmeyer appealed the decision, and 
the court of appeals certified the case to this court.  We 
accepted the certification, and we now affirm the circuit 
court's ruling and remand the case to the circuit court to 
assess what, if any, redaction is necessary. 
I 
¶4 
The essential facts of the case are not in dispute.  
Linzmeyer was a mathematics teacher and the girls' volleyball 
coach at NHS.  During November and December 2000, the NPD 
conducted an investigation into allegations that Linzmeyer had 
made 
inappropriate 
statements 
to, 
and 
had 
engaged 
in 
inappropriate conduct with, a number of his female students.2  
                                                 
2 However, none of the complaints against Linzmeyer alleged 
sexual assault or any other type of assaultive behavior. 
No. 
01-0197   
 
3 
 
The investigation was triggered by allegations from two of 
Linzmeyer's students and involved interviews of more than 20 
students.  As a result of the investigation, NPD created Report 
No. 00-11938 
("the 
Report"), 
which 
was 
a 
compilation 
of 
information obtained by the NPD during its investigation of 
Linzmeyer.  Respondent D.J. Forcey, as the chief of police, was 
the custodian of the Report. 
¶5 
Linzmeyer was neither arrested nor prosecuted based on 
any information contained in the Report.  Additionally, the 
Neenah Joint School District did not take any administrative 
disciplinary action against Linzmeyer as a result of the Report 
or as a result of any information contained therein.  The school 
district reassigned Linzmeyer to other duties and Linzmeyer 
agreed to resign his position at the end of the school year. 
¶6 
The parents of the two students whose allegations had 
initiated the investigation, along with the Post-Crescent, 
requested release of the Report under the open records law.  
Linzmeyer subsequently filed suit in the Winnebago County 
Circuit Court, seeking an injunction to block the release of the 
Report. 
¶7 
At a hearing on January 11, 2001, the Neenah City 
Attorney, James Gunz, confirmed that no enforcement action was 
contemplated against Linzmeyer as a result of the Report.  Gunz 
also stated that the City intended to release the report in a 
redacted form, based on the policy favoring the release of 
public records.  After reviewing the report independently, the 
circuit court denied Linzmeyer's request for an injunction. 
No. 
01-0197   
 
4 
 
¶8 
The circuit court held that, as a public record, the 
Report carried the presumption of complete access, which could 
only be overcome by an overriding public interest in keeping the 
records confidential.  The court noted that, as a public school 
teacher, Linzmeyer was in a position of public trust.  Thus, the 
public had an interest in knowing the circumstances surrounding 
the accusation that Linzmeyer had made inappropriate remarks 
toward students.  The circuit court noted that, although the 
information 
was 
embarrassing 
and 
might 
harm 
Linzmeyer's 
reputation, the statements Linzmeyer was accused of having made 
were spoken in open class in front of large groups of students, 
and many were corroborated by other students or later admitted 
by Linzmeyer 
himself, 
thus 
countering 
Linzmeyer's privacy 
argument.  The circuit court concluded that the public's 
interest in disclosure outweighed the public's interest in 
Linzmeyer's reputation or privacy, and denied the injunction. 
¶9 
The circuit court then granted Linzmeyer a temporary 
injunction so he could seek an appeal.  The court of appeals 
granted Linzmeyer leave to appeal the circuit court's order, and 
certified 
the 
appeal 
to 
this 
court. 
 
We 
accepted 
the 
certification and we now affirm the circuit court's order.  We 
hold that the open records law applies to the Report in this 
case and there is thus a strong presumption in favor of release.  
Additionally, we hold that the presumption was not overridden in 
this case by the public interest in protecting Linzmeyer's 
privacy and reputation. 
No. 
01-0197   
 
5 
 
II 
¶10 We address the issues presented here in two steps.  
First, we determine whether the open records law applies to the 
record in question here——the report of a police investigation 
where 
the 
investigation 
has 
been 
closed, 
and 
where 
no 
enforcement action has been taken or is contemplated.  In 
determining whether the open records law applies, we look at the 
statutory language of that law, along with its statutory and 
common law exceptions.  If the basic open records law applies, 
there are no blanket exceptions from release, other than those 
provided by the common law or statute.  Woznicki v. Erickson, 
202 Wis. 2d 178, 183, 549 N.W.2d 699 (1996).  Here, we hold that 
the open records law applies, and that no statutory or common 
law exceptions exempt the Report from release. 
¶11 Because we hold that the open records law applies to 
the Report, our second issue is whether the presumption of 
openness under the open records law is overcome by any other 
public policy.  We have recognized that the policy toward 
openness, although strong, is not absolute.  Milwaukee Teachers' 
Educ. Ass'n v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 227 Wis. 2d 779, 787, 596 
N.W.2d 403 (1999).  In the absence of a statutory or common law 
exception, the presumption favoring release can only be overcome 
when there is a public policy interest in keeping the records 
confidential.  Wis. Newspress v. Sheboygan Falls Sch. Dist., 199 
Wis. 2d 768, 776, 546 N.W.2d 143 (1996) (citing Hathaway v. 
Green Bay Sch. Dist., 116 Wis. 2d 388, 397, 342 N.W.2d 682 
No. 
01-0197   
 
6 
 
(1984)).  Thus, our second step is to determine if there is a 
public policy that overrides the presumption of openness. 
¶12 To determine whether the presumption of openness is 
overcome by another public policy concern, we apply the 
balancing test articulated by this court in Woznicki v. 
Erickson, 202 Wis. 2d 178, and Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 89 
Wis. 2d 417, 279 N.W.2d 179 (1979).  That is, we must weigh the 
public policies not in favor of release against the strong 
public policy that public records should be open for review.  In 
weighing the public policies for and against release in this 
case, we also take the opportunity to provide some guidance on 
dealing with the open records law as it relates to police 
records, and we attempt to identify factors that should be taken 
into consideration by records custodians before law enforcement 
records are publicly released.  In this case, however, we 
ultimately conclude that the presumption for openness is not 
overcome by any other public policy, and we thus affirm the 
order of the circuit court. 
A 
¶13 Our first issue is whether the open records law 
applies to the Report in this case.  To decide this question, we 
apply the open records law to an undisputed set of facts.  This 
is a matter of statutory interpretation, which we review 
independently of the lower courts, but benefiting from their 
analyses.  Milwaukee Teachers, 227 Wis. 2d at 788. 
No. 
01-0197   
 
7 
 
¶14 The legislature has clearly articulated the policy 
regarding 
the 
release 
of 
government 
records 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 19.31.  In that section, the legislature stated: 
. . . [I]t is declared to be the public policy of 
this state that all persons are entitled to the 
greatest possible information regarding the affairs of 
government and the official acts of those officers and 
employees who represent them.  Further, providing 
persons with such information is declared to be an 
essential function of a representative government and 
an integral part of the routine duties of officers and 
employees whose responsibility it is to provide such 
information.  To that end, ss. 19.32 to 19.37 shall be 
construed in every instance with a presumption of 
complete public access, consistent with the conduct of 
governmental business.  The denial of public access 
generally is contrary to the public interest, and only 
in an exceptional case may access be denied. 
Additionally, Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a) provides that: 
Except as otherwise provided by law, any requester has 
a right to inspect any record.  Substantive common law 
principles construing the right to inspect, copy or 
receive 
copies 
of 
records 
shall 
remain 
in 
effect. . . .  
¶15 As we have consistently 
recognized, 
the clearly 
stated, general presumption of our law is that all public 
records shall be open to the public.  Wis. Newspress, 199 
Wis. 2d at 776.  This presumption reflects the basic principle 
that the people must be informed about the workings of their 
government and that openness in government is essential to 
maintain the strength of our democratic society.  Breier, 89 
Wis. 2d at 433-34.  Here, the parties do not dispute the fact 
that 
the 
Report 
is 
a 
public 
record, 
as 
defined 
by 
No. 
01-0197   
 
8 
 
Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2).3  So as with other public records, we 
begin with the strong presumption favoring release of the 
Report. 
¶16 Given that the open records law generally applies, we 
next examine several relevant statutory exceptions that could 
arguably exempt the Report from release under the open records 
law.  Upon review, however, we hold that none of them prevent 
the open records law from applying to the present case. 
¶17 We first look at Wisconsin Stat. § 19.35(1)(am).  That 
section provides, in relevant part: 
. . . [A]ny requester who is an individual or person 
authorized by the individual, has a right to inspect 
any 
record 
containing 
personally 
identifiable 
information pertaining to the individual that is 
maintained by an authority and to make or receive a 
copy of any such information.  The right to inspect or 
copy a record under this paragraph does not apply 
to . . . 
. . . . 
1. Any record containing personally identifiable 
information 
that 
is 
collected 
or 
maintained 
in 
connection with a complaint, investigation or other 
circumstances that may lead to an enforcement action, 
administrative proceeding, arbitration proceeding or 
court proceeding, or any such record that is collected 
or maintained in connection with such an action or 
proceeding. . . . 
                                                 
3 "Record" is defined as "any material on which written, 
drawn, printed, spoken, visual or electromagnetic information is 
recorded 
or 
preserved, 
regardless 
of 
physical 
form 
or 
characteristics, which has been created or is being kept by an 
authority . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 19.32(2). 
No. 
01-0197   
 
9 
 
2. Any record containing personally identifiable 
information that, if disclosed, would do any of the 
following: 
a. Endanger an individual's life or safety. 
b. Identify a confidential informant. 
c. Endanger the security, including the 
security of the population or staff, of any state 
prison . . . secured correctional facility, . . . 
secured child caring institution, . . . secured 
group home, . . . mental health institute, . . . 
or center for the developmentally disabled. . . . 
d. Compromise the rehabilitation of a person 
in the custody of the department of corrections 
or detained in a jail or facility identified in 
subd. 2. c. 
These sections clearly prevent the release of law enforcement 
records under some circumstances.  However, they do not apply to 
the Report in this case.4  Section 19.35(1)(am)1 exempts records 
from 
release 
when 
they 
are 
collected 
or 
maintained 
"in 
connection 
with 
a 
complaint, 
investigation 
or 
other 
circumstances 
that 
may 
lead 
to 
an 
enforcement 
action, 
administrative 
proceeding, 
arbitration 
proceeding 
or 
court 
proceeding" (emphasis added).  This is not the situation here, 
where the investigation has been closed and where it has been 
                                                 
4 Because Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(am) only applies to "[A]ny 
requester who is an individual or person authorized by the 
individual" who requests the release of "any record containing 
personally 
identifiable 
information 
pertaining 
to 
the 
individual," this section does not apply to the request made by 
the Post-Crescent in this case.  Our analysis of sub. (1)(am) is 
only as the section applies to the families of the two students 
who requested release of the report, assuming that they are 
"authorized" by the students identified in the Report. 
No. 
01-0197   
 
10 
 
confirmed that there is no chance that the Report will "lead to 
an enforcement action." 
¶18 The exception under subparagraph (am)1 would most 
likely apply to a police investigation that was still on-going, 
an investigation where the government was still contemplating 
prosecution, or an investigation that overlapped with other on-
going cases.  Here, however, the Report is a closed police file, 
where no enforcement action was ever taken against the subject, 
where it has been confirmed that no enforcement will be taken in 
the future, and where the investigation was not related to any 
other on-going investigations.  Thus, Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(am)1 
does not exempt the Report from release under the open records 
law. 
¶19 The exception in subparagraph 2 of that same section 
also does not apply.  No correctional institution or other 
confinement facility was involved, there is no evidence of 
anyone's life or safety being at risk, and none of the students 
interviewed was a confidential informant. 
¶20 Likewise, Wis. Stat. § 19.36(8)(b) does not exempt the 
Report from disclosure.  At most, that section might require the 
redaction of the identities of the persons interviewed by the 
NPD during the course of the investigation.  Section 19.36(8)(b) 
provides: 
If an authority that is a law enforcement agency 
receives a request to inspect or copy a record or 
portion of a record under s. 19.35(1)(a) that contains 
specific information including but not limited to a 
name, address, telephone number, voice recording or 
handwriting sample which, if disclosed, would identify 
No. 
01-0197   
 
11 
 
an informant, the authority shall delete the portion 
of the record in which the information is contained 
or, if no portion of the record can be inspected or 
copied 
without 
identifying 
the 
informant, 
shall 
withhold the record unless the legal custodian of the 
record, 
designated 
under 
s. 
19.33, 
makes 
a 
determination, at the time that the request is made, 
that the public interest in allowing a person to 
inspect, copy or receive a copy of such identifying 
information outweighs the harm done to the public 
interest by providing such access. 
Wis. Stat. § 19.36(8)(b).  An informant, under the statute is: 
an individual who requests confidentiality from a law 
enforcement 
agency 
in 
conjunction 
with 
providing 
information to that agency or, pursuant to an express 
promise of confidentiality by a law enforcement agency 
or 
under 
circumstances 
in 
which 
a 
promise 
of 
confidentiality would reasonably be implied, provides 
information to a law enforcement agency or, is working 
with a law enforcement agency to obtain information, 
related in any case to any of the following: 
a. Another person who the individual or the law 
enforcement agency suspects has violated, is violating 
or will violate a federal law, a law of any state or 
an ordinance of any local government. 
b. Past, present or future activities that the 
individual or law enforcement agency believes may 
violate a federal law, a law of any state or an 
ordinance of any local government. 
Wis. Stat. § 19.36(8)(a)1.  Although the complainants and a 
number of other students cooperated with the NPD during the 
investigation, none apparently did so in exchange for a promise 
of confidentiality.  Although it is arguable that some of the 
students may have acted under circumstances that reasonably 
implied a promise of confidentiality, this court is not in a 
position to determine whether that was the case.  If any 
redaction of personal information is necessary, it is more 
No. 
01-0197   
 
12 
 
appropriate 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
assess 
what 
specific 
information must be redacted.5  Even if redaction is necessary, 
however, this section does not bar the release of the Report as 
a whole. 
¶21 Section 19.36(2) 
could 
also 
potentially 
apply 
to 
exclude a law enforcement report from release under the open 
records law.  That section provides: 
Except as otherwise provided by law, whenever federal 
law or regulations require or as a condition to 
receipt of aids by this state require that any record 
relating to investigative information obtained for law 
enforcement purposes be withheld from public access, 
then that information is exempt from disclosure under 
s. 19.35(1)(am). 
Linzmeyer, however, does not show us any federal laws or 
regulations of the type required that would mandate withholding 
of the record in this case.  Thus, we conclude that this section 
does not prevent the application of the open records law to the 
Report. 
¶22 Finally, we consider Wis. Stat. § 19.85(1).  That 
section states: 
Any meeting of a governmental body, . . . may be 
convened in closed session under one or more of the 
exemptions provided in this section. . . . A closed 
session may be held for any of the following purposes: 
. . . . 
                                                 
5 Although we do not make an explicit ruling on redaction 
here, we anticipate that redaction will likely be necessary.  In 
a January 2, 2001, letter to Linzmeyer's attorney, Neenah City 
Attorney James Gunz expressed that the City's original intention 
was to release the Report in a redacted form. 
No. 
01-0197   
 
13 
 
(b) 
Considering 
dismissal, 
demotion, 
licensing or discipline of any public employee or 
person licensed by a board or commission or the 
investigation of charges against such person, or 
considering the grant or denial of tenure for a 
university faculty member, and the taking of 
formal action on any such matter; . . .  
. . . . 
(f) Considering financial, medical, social 
or personal histories or disciplinary data of 
specific persons, preliminary consideration of 
specific personnel problems or the investigation 
of charges against specific persons except where 
par. (b) applies which, if discussed in public, 
would be likely to have a substantial adverse 
effect upon the reputation of any person referred 
to in such histories or data, or involved in such 
problems or investigations. 
This statutory section certainly indicates a policy toward 
protecting information involved in disciplinary actions against 
public officials.  However, to hold that the Report is exempted 
from the open records law under this section is quite a stretch.  
First, 
this 
section 
specifically 
applies 
to 
meetings 
of 
government bodies, of which the Report is not part.  Second, 
even if we held that the Report did qualify under this section, 
this statute, like Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(am)1, contemplates the 
potential for disciplinary action.  As a closed investigation 
with no potential for future action, the Report clearly falls 
outside of the scope of this exemption. 
¶23 Finally, Linzmeyer does not show us any common law 
exception to the open records law that would exempt the Report 
in this case from release.  Thus, because the Report is a public 
record under the open records law, and there is no statutory or 
No. 
01-0197   
 
14 
 
common law exception, we conclude that the open records law 
applies, and that the presumption of openness attaches to the 
Report. 
B 
¶24 Because we hold that the presumption of openness 
applies to the Report, we must next decide whether that 
presumption can be overcome by a public policy favoring non-
disclosure of the Report.  The fundamental question we must ask 
is whether there is harm to a public interest that outweighs the 
public interest in inspection of the Report.  Breier, 89 
Wis. 2d at 433.  This is a question of law, which we review de 
novo.  Id. at 427. 
¶25 In determining whether a public policy exists to 
overcome the presumption of openness, we apply a balancing test 
on 
a 
case-by-case 
basis 
to 
determine 
whether 
permitting 
inspection of the records would result in harm to a public 
interest which outweighs the public interest in opening the 
records to inspection.  Woznicki, 202 Wis. 2d at 183-84.  If the 
harm to the public interest caused by release overrides the 
public interest in release, the inspection of the public records 
may be prevented in spite of the general policy of openness.  
Id. 
¶26 In this case, we are dealing with the record of a 
police investigation, so we take special care as we balance the 
public policies.  Reports of police investigations, despite 
being public records, can be particularly sensitive regardless 
of whether or not the underlying investigations are on-going.  
No. 
01-0197   
 
15 
 
Custodians 
of 
police 
records 
thus 
have 
the 
difficult 
responsibility of weighing the public policies for and against 
release.  Because of the sensitivity of law enforcement records, 
we take particular note of several important public policies 
that weigh for and against their release.  In doing so, however, 
we ultimately disagree with Linzmeyer's argument, and hold that 
the public policy favoring release has not been overcome in this 
particular case. 
¶27 There are a number of matters of public interest that 
support the release of the Report.  First, the process of police 
investigation is one where public oversight is important.  The 
ability of police to investigate suspected crimes is an official 
responsibility of an executive government agency, and much like 
the ability to arrest, it represents a significant use of 
government personnel, time, and resources.  See Breier, 89 
Wis. 2d at 436.  The investigative process is one that, when 
used 
inappropriately, 
can 
be 
harassing 
or 
worse. 
 
The 
investigating agency's decisions regarding whom to interview, 
which leads to follow, and when to recommend further action to 
prosecuting 
authorities 
are 
also 
discretionary, 
and 
are 
generally matters of public interest that support public release 
of the Report. 
¶28 Additionally, as a public school teacher, Linzmeyer is 
a public employee in a position of some visibility.  This 
likewise supports public scrutiny of potential misconduct, 
particularly if it occurs in the school and classroom settings.  
As the court of appeals noted in Journal/Sentinel v. Shorewood 
No. 
01-0197   
 
16 
 
School Board, 186 Wis. 2d 443, 459, 521 N.W.2d 165 (Ct. App. 
1994), 
"[a]ll 
officers 
and 
employees 
of 
government 
are, 
ultimately, responsible to the citizens, and those citizens have 
a right to hold their employees accountable for the job they 
do."  See also State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 28 Wis. 2d 672, 
685, 137 N.W.2d 470 (1965).  Here, the misconduct allegedly 
occurred in the location where the public has entrusted him to 
work and during the performance of his public duties, and 
therefore should be more subject to scrutiny. 
¶29 Understandably, the mere fact that Linzmeyer is a 
public employee does not weigh as strongly for release of the 
Report as it might if Linzmeyer were an elected official, or if 
he were a more senior policy-making official within the school 
district.  Still, as a teacher, Linzmeyer is in the public eye, 
and is charged with the important societal responsibility of 
educating children.  Thus, Linzmeyer's position is one where the 
public should be able to expect some increased accountability. 
¶30 Still, despite the factors that support opening the 
record to the public, the Report is a record of a law 
enforcement investigation which, as we have noted, can be 
particularly sensitive.  Law enforcement records are generally 
more likely than most types of public records to have an adverse 
effect on other public interests if they are released.  First 
and foremost, there is a strong public interest in investigating 
and prosecuting criminal activity, and when the release of a 
police record would interfere with an on-going prosecution or 
investigation, the general presumption of openness will likely 
No. 
01-0197   
 
17 
 
be overcome.  Similarly, the release of some police records 
might endanger the safety of persons involved in that report——
another strong public policy reason which would work against 
release. 
¶31 As we have found in other cases, the public interest 
in protecting the reputation and privacy of citizens may also be 
a factor that favors nonrelease.  Woznicki, 202 Wis. 2d at 187; 
Breier, 89 Wis. 2d at 430; Youmans, 28 Wis. 2d at 685.  This 
public interest is not equivalent to an individual's personal 
interest in protecting his or her own character and reputation.  
For instance, we have recognized that the disclosure of certain 
public records might result in fewer qualified applicants for 
public positions where their privacy would be regularly intruded 
upon.  Vill. of Butler v. Cohen, 163 Wis. 2d 819, 831, 472 
N.W.2d 579 (Ct. App. 1991).  Similarly, some personnel files 
might not be releaseable because the persons whose records are 
released might be less willing to testify in court when faced 
with the potential that they would be cross-examined on the 
contents of their personnel file.  Id.  Thus, the public 
interest in protecting individuals' privacy and reputation 
arises from the public effects of the failure to honor the 
individual's privacy interests, and not the individual's concern 
about embarrassment. 
¶32 We note that the federal Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552 (2000), quite concisely lists factors that 
support these public policies.  Under 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(7), the 
No. 
01-0197   
 
18 
 
FOIA exempts law enforcement records from public disclosure 
under the following circumstances: 
[when] the production of such law enforcement records 
or information (A) could reasonably be expected to 
interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would 
deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an 
impartial 
adjudication, 
(C) 
could 
reasonably 
be 
expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of 
personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to 
disclose 
the 
identity 
of 
a 
confidential 
source, 
 . . . , (E) would disclose techniques and procedures 
for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or 
would 
disclose 
guidelines 
for 
law 
enforcement 
investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure 
could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of 
the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to 
endanger 
the 
life 
or 
physical 
safety 
of 
any 
individual. 
¶33 Admittedly, there is some overlap between the FOIA 
policies, the statutory exemptions in the Wisconsin open records 
law, and the public policies that we have already identified.  
However, when coupled with our prior caselaw, these factors 
provide a framework that records custodians can use to determine 
whether the presumption of openness in law enforcement records 
is overcome by another public policy.  Applying this framework 
to the present case, we conclude that the public interests in 
preventing disclosure do not outweigh the public interest in 
release of the information. 
¶34 Linzmeyer relies heavily on our stated public policy 
of protection of privacy to argue that the circuit court 
incorrectly weighed this public interest against the public 
interest in open records, and that the public interest in 
No. 
01-0197   
 
19 
 
protecting Linzmeyer's reputation and privacy outweigh the 
public interest in release of the Report.  We disagree. 
¶35 Having reviewed the Report, we admit that release of 
the Report could cause some embarrassment to Linzmeyer and that 
it could possibly cause some damage to his reputation.  However, 
as 
we 
have 
mentioned, 
it 
is 
not 
Linzmeyer's 
personal 
embarrassment that we are concerned about in applying this test.  
Rather, we must ask whether releasing the Report under the 
present circumstances would affect any public interest. 
¶36 Linzmeyer fails to show us how this embarrassment 
would give rise to a public interest in protecting his 
reputation.  This is a police report, which details information 
surrounding allegations of misconduct by Linzmeyer that occurred 
at school and in the classroom.  Its release will not dissuade 
qualified persons from applying to be teachers, as the release 
of their personnel files might.  See Vill. of Butler, 163 
Wis. 2d at 831.  Similarly, it will not impede the ability of 
the vast majority of teachers to perform their jobs.  If there 
is any negative effect from the release of the Report, it will 
be on Linzmeyer as an individual, and not on the public 
interest. 
¶37 To the contrary, a number of the characteristics of 
this specific case actually undercut the notion that a public 
interest would be damaged by the release of the Report.  First, 
the 
allegations 
against 
Linzmeyer 
involved 
possible 
inappropriate interactions with his students.  The statements in 
question were made publicly, and many were corroborated by other 
No. 
01-0197   
 
20 
 
students, or even admitted by Linzmeyer himself.  As the court 
of appeals has previously recognized, information that is 
already known to the public is germane to the balancing test.  
Kailin v. Rainwater, 226 Wis. 2d 134, 148, 593 N.W.2d 865 (Ct. 
App. 1999).  The fact that much of the activity was already 
public, and could be corroborated, mitigates, to some extent, 
any embarrassment that might be caused by the release of the 
Report, and tends to even weigh in favor of release. 
¶38 We caution, however, that this is not an attribute of 
many police reports.  Police reports regularly contain raw 
investigative data, which is gathered from witnesses of varying 
degrees of reliability.  It would not be unusual to find 
statements in a police report involving rumor, multiple levels 
of hearsay, or other characteristics that make the veracity of 
the statements questionable.  Likewise, witnesses who have a 
bias against the subject of the investigation may have been 
interviewed.  The release of this type of information——unlike 
here, where the actions in question were public and well-
corroborated——would weigh more greatly in favor of the public 
policy of protecting a person's reputation interests, and would 
likely support nondisclosure of the record. 
¶39 Additionally, the release of the Report will not 
impede the public policy of investigating and prosecuting 
criminal activity.  First, there is no way that release could 
reasonably be expected to interfere with on-going enforcement 
proceedings. 
 
This 
is 
particularly 
true 
because 
the 
investigation has been closed and no further enforcement or 
No. 
01-0197   
 
21 
 
disciplinary 
proceedings 
based 
on 
the 
investigation 
are 
contemplated.  For similar reasons, release of the Report would 
not deprive anyone of a right to a fair trial or an impartial 
adjudication.  In sum, we see no way that the release of the 
Report would affect on-going enforcement proceedings. 
¶40 Furthermore, for reasons we discussed above, the 
release of the Report could not reasonably be expected to 
disclose the identity of a confidential source, primarily 
because there was no confidential informant.  Understandably, 
the students who were interviewed may have some privacy interest 
in 
protecting 
their 
own 
identities, 
both 
because 
they 
participated with the investigation and because they are minors.  
However, to the extent that those privacy interests are 
implicated, they could be protected by a redaction of the Report 
in accordance with Wis. Stat. § 19.36(6). 
¶41 There is also no threat that techniques and procedures 
for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions would be 
revealed if the Report is disclosed.  The investigation here 
consisted of a series of interviews——a well known and widely 
practiced police investigation technique.  This was not a sting 
operation or undercover operation that would require secrecy to 
protect the identity of particular sources and techniques.  We 
also note that there is very little chance that the release of 
the Report would reasonably be expected to endanger the life or 
physical safety of any individual. 
¶42 In sum, we hold that there is no public policy which, 
in this case, would overcome the presumption of openness.  We 
No. 
01-0197   
 
22 
 
caution, however, that this does not mean that all police 
records are immediately open to complete public disclosure, 
simply because there is a decision not to charge.  We emphasize 
again that the balancing test must be done on a case-by-case 
basis, to ensure that the public policies for and against 
release are assessed. 
III 
¶43 We conclude that the open records law does apply to 
the Report in this case.  Linzmeyer is unable to show us any 
statutory or common-law exceptions that would take the Report 
out of the purview of the open records law.  Additionally, 
Linzmeyer has not shown a public policy that would override the 
general public policy, which requires public records to be open 
to public disclosure.  Thus, we affirm the decision of the 
circuit court and remand the case for appropriate redaction, if 
necessary. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed 
and the cause is remanded. 
 
No.  01-0197.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶44 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (concurring).  
I join the opinion.  I write to express my concern whether all 
the persons have been notified or will be notified of the 
release of the records as required by Woznicki v. Erickson, 202 
Wis. 2d 178, 549 N.W.2d 699 (1996) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) 
and Milwaukee Teachers' Educ. Ass'n v. Milwaukee Bd. of School 
Directors, 
227 
Wis. 2d 779, 
596 
N.W.2d 403 
(1999).  
Unfortunately I must accept Woznicki as binding precedent.   
 
 
No.  01-0197.ssa 
 
1