Title: City of Cleveland v. McCardle

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Cleveland v. McCardle, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-2140.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-2140 
THE CITY OF CLEVELAND, APPELLANT, v. MCCARDLE ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Cleveland v. McCardle, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-2140.] 
Constitutional law—Curfews—Freedom of speech—An ordinance establishing a 
curfew in a public park is constitutional under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution if it is content neutral, is 
narrowly tailored to advance a significant government interest, and allows 
alternative channels of speech. 
(No. 2013-0096—Submitted November 19, 2013—Decided May 28, 2014.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, Nos. 98230 and 98231, 
2012-Ohio-5749. 
____________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
An ordinance establishing a curfew in a public park is constitutional under the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution if it is 
content neutral, is narrowly tailored to advance a significant government 
interest, and allows alternative channels of speech. 
____________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} We accepted a discretionary appeal brought by the city of 
Cleveland seeking to uphold Cleveland Codified Ordinance 559.541 as 
constitutional.  The ordinance, which prevents any person from remaining in the 
Public Square area of downtown Cleveland between 10:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m. 
without a permit issued by the Cleveland Department of Parks, Recreation, and 
Properties, was challenged as an unconstitutional infringement of freedom of 
speech by protesters involved in the Occupy Cleveland movement. 
{¶ 2} We hold that an ordinance establishing a curfew in a public park is 
constitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution if it is content neutral, is narrowly tailored to advance a significant 
government interest, and allows alternative channels of speech. 
I.  Case Background 
{¶ 3} This case arose as an outgrowth of the Occupy Wall Street 
Movement in New York City in which hundreds demonstrated in Zuccotti Park 
from September to November 2011 to protest income disparity. The movement 
spread to other cities around the United States, including Cleveland. 
{¶ 4} Around 10:00 p.m. on October 21, 2011, a group known as 
Occupy Cleveland engaged in a demonstration in the Public Square area of 
Cleveland.  Police officers notified the group that they needed to leave the area 
because of the city’s curfew.  Several people, including appellees, Erin McCardle 
and Leatrice Tolls (“the protestors”), remained.  McCardle was arrested and 
charged with criminal trespass, resisting arrest, and a curfew violation, under 
Cleveland Codified Ordinances 623.04, 615.08, and 559.541.  Tolls was also 
arrested and charged with criminal trespass and a curfew violation.  Each 
defendant moved to dismiss the charges, contending that the city’s ordinance 
establishing a curfew in the Public Square was unconstitutional under the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  After a hearing, 
January Term, 2014 
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the Cleveland Municipal Court denied each defendant’s motion to dismiss.  Both 
women then pled no contest to the curfew violation, and the remaining charges 
were dismissed. 
{¶ 5} McCardle and Tolls filed separate notices of appeal, and the Eighth 
District Court of Appeals consolidated the cases for disposition. 
{¶ 6} The court of appeals reversed the municipal court’s judgment and 
remanded the cases, holding that the Cleveland ordinance violated the protestors’ 
First Amendment rights to free speech and assembly.  The court held that 
although the ordinance was content neutral, Cleveland’s interests were 
insufficient to justify its limit on speech and the ordinance was not narrowly 
tailored.  It concluded that the ordinance was void on its face. 
{¶ 7} We accepted Cleveland’s appeal on the following proposition of 
law:  
 
It is constitutionally permissible for a municipality to 
enforce a content-neutral time, place and manner restriction such 
as Cleveland Codified Ordinance 559.541, where the ordinance is 
narrowly-tailored to advance a significant government interest that 
leaves open alternative channels of communication. 
 
134 Ohio St.3d 1507, 2013-Ohio-1123, 984 N.E.2d 1101.  We agree with the city 
and therefore reverse the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals. 
II. Legal Analysis 
The Ordinance 
{¶ 8} The ordinance, “Prohibited Hours in Public Square,” Cleveland 
Codified Ordinance 559.541, became effective on August 16, 2007, and states: 
 
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No unauthorized person shall remain on or in any portion 
of the area known as the Public Square area between the hours of 
10:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. Persons may be authorized to remain in 
Public Square by obtaining a permit from the Director of Parks, 
Recreation and Properties. 
 
Such permits shall be issued when the Director finds: 
 
(a) That the proposed activity and use will not 
unreasonably interfere with or detract from the promotion of public 
health, welfare and safety; 
 
(b) That the proposed activity or use is not reasonably 
anticipated to incite violence, crime or disorderly conduct; 
 
(c) That the proposed activity will not entail unusual, 
extraordinary or burdensome expense or police operation by the 
City; 
 
(d) That the facilities desired have not been reserved for 
other use at the day and hour required in the application. 
 
For purposes of this section, the “Public Square area” 
includes the quadrants and all structures (including but not limited 
to walls, fountains, and flower planters) located within the 
quadrants known as Public Square and shown on the map below, 
but excludes the quadrant on which sits the Soldiers and Sailors 
Monument; the Public Square area also excludes all dedicated 
streets, public sidewalks adjacent to dedicated streets and RTA bus 
shelters within this area. 
 
Whoever violates this section is guilty of a minor 
misdemeanor on the first offense * * *. 
 
January Term, 2014 
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{¶ 9} Thus, the ordinance establishes a curfew for the Public Square and 
authorizes a permit process through the city’s Director of Parks, Recreation, and 
Properties. 
Level of Scrutiny 
{¶ 10} The First Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits 
Congress from “abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of 
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.”1  City ordinances are brought within the scope of this prohibition by 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  E.g., Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. 
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 792, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 
(1984), fn. 2.  A government entity cannot exclude speakers from a public forum 
without a compelling state interest.  Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & 
Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 
(1985).  But, “the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate 
one’s views at all times and places or in any manner that may be desired”; 
therefore, even expression “protected by the First Amendment [is] subject to 
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.”  Heffron v. Internatl. Soc. for 
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 
(1981). 
{¶ 11} A major criterion for a valid time, place, and manner restriction on 
activities protected by the First Amendment is that the restriction may not be 
based upon the content, or subject matter, of the speech. If a regulation limits 
speech based upon what is being said, the regulation is subject to strict scrutiny.  
That is, it will be upheld only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
government interest.  Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469, 
                                                 
1 Within Article I, Section 11 of the Ohio Constitution is the phrase “no law shall be passed to 
restrain or abridge the liberty of speech,” a similar provision that will not be considered because 
the state constitution was not relied upon. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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129 S.Ct. 1125, 172 L.Ed.2d 853 (2009).  But if a regulation is content neutral, 
meaning it does not regulate speech based on what is being said, the regulation is 
subject to the lesser standard of intermediate scrutiny.  Turner Broadcasting Sys., 
Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm., 512 U.S. 622, 661-662, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 
L.Ed.2d 497 (1994). 
{¶ 12} When evaluating whether an ordinance that regulates speech is 
content neutral, “[t]he government’s purpose is the controlling consideration.  A 
regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed 
neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not 
others.”  Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 
L.Ed.2d 661 (1989).  Cleveland’s ordinance prohibits persons from remaining in 
the Public Square between 10:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m. without a permit.  This 
prohibition applies to all persons regardless of their message or their activities.  It 
does not ban a specific message or a specific form of expression.  As a result, it is 
content neutral. 
{¶ 13} However, a content-neutral regulation may still be unconstitutional 
if it does not survive intermediate scrutiny.  Clark v. Community for Creative 
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984).  The 
intermediate-scrutiny test has three requirements:  the regulation must be 
narrowly tailored, it must serve a significant government interest, and it must 
leave open ample alternative avenues of communication.  United States v. 
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968). 
{¶ 14} We will now examine the ordinance in light of each of these 
requirements. 
Significant Government Interest 
{¶ 15} In its merit brief and at oral argument, the city stated that public 
safety, conservation of public property, and preservation of public resources are 
issues of paramount concern.  In analyzing the significance of the city’s interest, 
January Term, 2014 
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the Eighth District noted that Cleveland failed to “present any testimony 
regarding a specific interest” furthered by the ordinance.  2012-Ohio-5749, 989 
N.E.2d 73, ¶ 24.  The protestors argue that the city failed to present evidence in 
support of their alleged significant government interests and that the city’s stated 
interests are not actually furthered by the ordinance.  But Cleveland’s regulatory 
aims are presented on the face of the ordinance.  Specifically, the ordinance 
authorizes the issuance of a permit unless doing so would (1) unreasonably 
threaten public health, welfare, or safety, (2) be unreasonably likely to incite 
violence or other unlawful activity, (3) impose excessive financial or operational 
costs on the city, or (4) interfere with another reservation of the same facility.  
Cleveland Codified Ordinances 559.541.  These stated exceptions to the curfew 
explain the original reason for the curfew—to safeguard public health, to protect 
against violence and criminal activity, to conserve city resources, and to preserve 
property.  Furthermore, the First Amendment does not require the government to 
demonstrate the significance of its interest by presenting detailed evidence; it 
“ ‘ “is entitled to advance its interests by arguments based on appeals to common 
sense and logic.” ’ ”  Coalition for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v. 
Atlanta, 219 F.3d 1301, 1318 (11th Cir.2000), quoting Internatl. Caucus of Labor 
Comm. v. Montgomery, 111 F.3d 1548, 1551 (11th Cir.1997), quoting Multimedia 
Publishing Co. of South Carolina v. Greenville-Spartanburg Airport, 991 F.2d 
154, 160 (4th Cir.1993).  Speech restrictions may be justified “by reference to 
studies and anecdotes pertaining to different locales altogether * * * or even, in a 
case applying strict scrutiny, to justify restrictions based solely on history, 
consensus, and ‘simple common sense.’ ”  Florida Bar v. Went for It, 515 U.S. 
618, 628, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995), quoting Burson v. Freeman, 
504 U.S. 191, 211, 112 S.Ct. 1846, 119 L.Ed.2d 5 (1992). 
 
 
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{¶ 16} Ordinances that relate to the interest of ensuring the safety of 
people using public forums have been consistently upheld.  Lakewood v. Plain 
Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 781-782, 108 S.Ct. 2138, 100 L.Ed.2d 771 
(1988) (White, J., dissenting); see Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715, 120 S.Ct. 
2480, 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000) (a traditional exercise of the state’s police powers 
is to protect the health and safety of its citizens).  The curfew and permit 
requirements in Cleveland Codified Ordinance 559.541 address these issues.  The 
ordinance itself protects the safety of those wishing to use the square after hours 
and protects the city’s investment in that property. 
{¶ 17} The ordinance also protects the city’s investment in the Public 
Square. Property preservation and aesthetic concerns have been held to be 
significant concerns when they concern urban spaces and public parks.  Taxpayers 
for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 816-817, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772.  A city’s 
interest in preserving the quality of urban life is one that must be given high 
respect.  Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50, 106 S.Ct. 925, 89 
L.Ed.2d 29 (1986). 
{¶ 18} Because the government interests that the city seeks to promote 
and protect through the ordinance have been consistently upheld as satisfying 
intermediate scrutiny, we hold that the significance of these interests is well 
settled and justifies the time, place, and manner restriction here.  We now turn to 
an analysis of the requirement that the ordinance be narrowly tailored. 
Narrowly Tailored 
{¶ 19} The Eighth District held that the ordinance was not sufficiently 
narrow and that the “permit’s requirement serves as an unreasonable ban and has 
the purpose of eliminating peaceful speech.”  2012-Ohio-5749, 989 N.E.2d 73, 
¶ 26.  The protestors argue that the city’s interests were not furthered by the 
ordinance, let alone furthered in a narrowly tailored way. 
January Term, 2014 
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{¶ 20} The city contends that the ordinance is not a complete ban on 
speech.  Instead, the ordinance simply prohibits any person from remaining in the 
Public Square between 10:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m., while allowing unfettered and 
unrestricted access at all other times of day.  Those seeking to remain in the 
square during the hours limited by the ordinance, regardless of whether they wish 
to engage in speech or any other type of activity, may do so by obtaining a permit.  
Cleveland Codified Ordinances 559.541. 
{¶ 21} A regulation of the time, place, or manner of speech or expression 
must be narrowly tailored to serve the government’s legitimate content-neutral 
interests, but it need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing 
so.  Ward, 491 U.S. at 798, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661.  The requirement to 
narrowly tailor the regulation of speech is satisfied “so long as the neutral 
regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less 
effectively absent the regulation.”  United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689, 
105 S.Ct. 2897, 86 L.Ed.2d 536 (1985); see also Community for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. at 297, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (a reasonable 
regulation of the manner of expression responds precisely to the substantive 
problems that legitimately concern the government).  We disagree with the Eighth 
District’s conclusion that Cleveland’s ordinance is not narrowly tailored.  The 
city’s interests in safeguarding public health, protecting against violence and 
criminal activity, and preserving the Public Square would be achieved less 
effectively without the enactment and enforcement of Cleveland Codified 
Ordinance 559.541.  The ordinance does not ban public expression within the 
square 24 hours a day.  The limitation is on any activity during the late night and 
early morning hours, unless granted a permit.  Cleveland Codified Ordinance 
559.541 is narrowly tailored to serve its significant government interests. 
 
 
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Alternative avenues of communication  
{¶ 22} The Eighth District did not address whether the ordinance leaves 
open alternative avenues of communication, because it struck down the ordinance 
before reaching this issue.  2012-Ohio-5749, 989 N.E. 2d 73, ¶ 31.  But a 
challenged restriction on speech or expression need leave open only a “reasonable 
opportunity” for the speaker to communicate his or her message.  Renton, 475 
U.S. at 54, 106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29; Menotti v. Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1138 
(9th Cir.2005), quoting Colacurcio v. Kent, 164 F.3d 545, 555 (9th Cir.1998) 
(“ ‘the Supreme Court generally will not strike down a governmental action for 
failure to leave open ample alternative channels of communication unless the 
government enactment will foreclose an entire medium of public expression 
across the landscape of particular community or setting’ ”). 
{¶ 23} The ordinance leaves open a reasonable opportunity for speech 
because it expressly excludes “all dedicated streets, public sidewalks adjacent to 
dedicated streets and RTA bus shelters within this area.”  Cleveland Codified 
Ordinances 550.541.  Consequently, the protestors could have simply moved off 
the grass and onto the public sidewalk surrounding the Public Square.  They had 
unrestricted access to the sidewalks adjacent to Public Square and had 17 hours in 
which they could have been in the square without a permit.  The ordinance 
permits alternative channels of communication and thus satisfies this portion of 
the intermediate-scrutiny test. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 24} Because Cleveland Codified Ordinance 559.541 passed the 
intermediate-scrutiny analysis set forth by the United States Supreme Court, that 
is, the ordinance is content-neutral, narrowly tailored to advance a significant 
government interest, and allows alternative channels of speech, we hold that it is 
constitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution. 
January Term, 2014 
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{¶ 25} The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed. 
Judgment reversed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., 
concur. 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
____________________ 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 26} After all these years, I remain confused when litigants assert a 
federal constitutional right in our state court system without also asserting similar 
rights under our state constitution.  As we stated in Arnold v. Cleveland, 67 Ohio 
St.3d 35, 616 N.E.2d 163 (1993), paragraph one of the syllabus: 
 
 
The Ohio Constitution is a document of independent force. 
In the areas of individual rights and civil liberties, the United 
States Constitution, where applicable to the states, provides a floor 
below which state court decisions may not fall. As long as state 
courts provide at least as much protection as the United States 
Supreme Court has provided in its interpretation of the federal Bill 
of Rights, state courts are unrestricted in according greater civil 
liberties and protections to individuals and groups. 
 
We will never know whether the outcome of the case would have been different 
had McCardle asserted protection under Article I, Section 11 of the Ohio 
Constitution. 
{¶ 27} Of course, the point should be moot.  It is quite clear that 
Cleveland Codified Ordinance 559.541 is unconstitutional under the federal 
constitution because it is not narrowly tailored to further a significant government 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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interest.  One obvious example is enough to put the lie to the majority’s 
conclusion to the contrary. 
{¶ 28} McCardle was arrested and charged with violating the ordinance 
because she remained in Public Square without a permit between the hours of 
10:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m.  The city asserts, and a majority of this court believes, 
that the ordinance is necessary to “safeguard public health, to protect against 
violence and criminal activity, to conserve city resources, and to preserve 
property.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 15.  And yet the ordinance would not prohibit 
1,000 Ohioans, or foreigners for that matter, from marching from one side of the 
public square to the other, over and over, all night, as long as they do not remain 
in Public Square.  How can an ordinance that prohibits one person from remaining 
in Public Square be considered narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
government interest when the same ordinance allows 1,000 people or 100 people 
or one person to walk back and forth through the park all night?  It defies logic. 
{¶ 29} Public Square has long been the quintessential public forum.  
Limiting access to it under Cleveland Codified Ordinance 559.541 restricts 
freedom of speech.  How ironic that ground zero of the predatory-lending crisis in 
Ohio should be considered off limits to the Occupy Cleveland movement, which 
was protesting, among other things, the financial meltdown that was precipitated 
in part by predatory lending. 
{¶ 30} Cleveland Codified Ordinance 559.541 is not narrowly tailored to 
further a significant government interest.  I dissent. 
____________________ 
Barbara Langhenry, City of Cleveland Director of Law, Victor Perez, 
Chief Prosecutor, and Connor P. Nathanson, Assistant City Prosecutor, for 
appellant. 
 
Berkman, Gordon, Murray & DeVan, J. Michael Murry, and Steven D. 
Shafron, for appellees. 
January Term, 2014 
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Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Eric E. Murphy, Solicitor General, 
Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor, and Samuel C. Peterson, Deputy 
Solicitor, urging reversal for amicus curiae State of Ohio. 
Ice Miller, L.L.P., Philip Hartmann, Rebecca K. Schaltenbrand, and 
Stephen J. Smith; and Ohio Municipal League, John Gotherman, urging reversal 
for amicus curiae Ohio Municipal League. 
_________________________