Title: J.H. v. Commonwealth

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12395  
 
 
 
 
 
J.H.  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 7, 2017. - April 12, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Juvenile Court, Delinquent child.  Practice, Criminal, Juvenile 
delinquency proceeding, Transfer hearing, Lesser included 
offense, Delay in commencement of prosecution.  Due Process 
of Law, Notice.  Notice.  Rape. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on July 3, 2017.  
 
 
The case was reported by Lenk, J.  
 
 
 
 
Thomas A. Dougherty, III, for the juvenile. 
 
Stacey L. Gauthier, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Afton M. Templin, for Youth Advocacy Division of the 
Committee for Public Counsel Service, amicus curiae, submitted a 
brief. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  A single justice of the county court reserved 
and reported this case involving the transfer of certain charges 
from the Juvenile Court to adult court pursuant to G. L. c. 119, 
§ 72A.  In September, 2014, juvenile delinquency complaints were 
2 
 
 
issued against the defendant for the crime of rape of a child 
with force (three counts) arising out of incidents that occurred 
seven years earlier when the defendant was sixteen years old and 
the complainant was thirteen years old.  Because the defendant 
was not "apprehended" according to the statute until after his 
nineteenth birthday, he could not be tried in the Juvenile 
Court.  The judge was faced with discharging the defendant or 
transferring the charges to adult court.  After a hearing she 
dismissed the offenses charged for lack of probable cause but 
transferred the lesser included offenses, statutory rape.  The 
defendant filed a petition for relief in the county court 
pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  
 
In her reservation and report, the single justice posed two 
questions to the full court: 
 
"1.  Whether G. L. c. 119, § 72A, permits a Juvenile 
Court judge, who has dismissed an offense charged for lack 
of probable cause, to order a defendant to be tried in an 
adult court for lesser included offenses, where the lesser 
included offenses are supported by probable cause. 
 
 
"2.  Whether, if the statute so permits, its 
application against this defendant would be 
unconstitutional for failure to have provided him with 
proper notice of the charges pending against him or the 
possibility of such a transfer." 
 
 
We conclude that G. L. c. 119, § 72A, permits a Juvenile 
Court judge to transfer lesser included offenses where supported 
by probable cause even where lesser included offenses are not 
expressly charged.  In instances where a judge finds no probable 
3 
 
 
cause of the crime charged but does find probable cause of a 
lesser included offense, however, the judge must give a 
defendant a meaningful opportunity to present evidence and 
argument as to why discharge, rather than transfer, of the 
lesser included offense is consistent with protection of the 
public.  We also emphasize that where the charged offense is 
rape of a child with force and the lesser included offense is 
statutory rape involving consensual sexual relations between 
teenagers, the issues presented regarding transfer or discharge 
and the protection of the public are quite different.   
 
Here, where the judge did not inform the defendant of her 
probable cause rulings on the offenses charged or the lesser 
included offenses until her decision on the transfer itself, we 
conclude that the defendant was not given a meaningful 
opportunity to present evidence and argument why discharge and 
not transfer of the statutory rape charges was consistent with 
protection of the public.  The defendant is therefore entitled 
to reopen the transfer hearing in order to present such evidence 
and argument.  Lastly, we conclude that there is no merit to the 
defendant's contention in posthearing briefing that the seven-
year delay in prosecution was done in bad faith.1 
                     
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the youth 
advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services. 
4 
 
 
 
1.  Background and prior proceedings.  In June and July of 
2007, the defendant was sixteen years old and the complainant 
was thirteen years old.  As summarized by the Juvenile Court 
judge at the transfer hearing, the complainant described three 
incidents in detail, in which she alleged that she and the 
defendant engaged in sexual intercourse. 
 
In October, 2007, the investigation was referred to the 
Plymouth County district attorney's office.  The complainant's 
mother advised the district attorney's office that the 
complainant did not wish to participate in a prosecution at that 
time.  As a result, the investigation was closed. 
 
The investigation was reopened in April, 2009, when the 
complainant was fifteen years old.  At that time, the 
complainant agreed to participate in a sexual assault interview.  
The complainant again decided not to pursue the matter because 
she thought that the defendant "eventually wanted to be with 
[her], and at that time [that] is what [she] wanted" and "didn't 
want [the defendant] to be in any trouble." 
 
In 2014, the investigation was reopened for the third time, 
when the complainant, then twenty years old, presented herself 
at the Middleborough police department and indicated a desire to 
go forward with the case. 
 
The defendant was not apprehended, for the purposes of 
G. L. c. 119, § 72A, until 2014, when he was twenty-three years 
5 
 
 
old.  Complaints issued in the Plymouth County Division of the 
Juvenile Court Department against the defendant for three counts 
of rape of a child with force in violation of G. L. c. 265, 
§ 22A.  The defendant was subsequently arraigned on the 
complaints in the Juvenile Court. 
 
In 2016, pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 72A, a judge in the 
Juvenile Court held a transfer hearing.  The complainant 
testified as described above.  After the evidence had closed, 
the prosecution conceded that there was insufficient evidence of 
force on only one of the charges and sought, for the first time, 
a probable cause finding and transfer of the lesser included 
offense of rape of a child (statutory rape).  The defendant 
objected.   
In the defendant's argument against transfer, which was 
focused on disproving the element of force, defense counsel 
objected to the lesser included charge being considered where 
the Commonwealth had not charged him with statutory rape.  He 
argued: 
"I don't have a lesser included offense in front of me of 
the statutory rape, and this is a probable cause hearing. 
And I'm not sure that the [c]ourt can modify the complaints 
at this time to include a lesser included offense of 
statutory rape.  The Commonwealth could have [pleaded] that 
but didn't.  They could have amended over the last two 
years or actually since 2007 but didn't.  They elected to 
proceed, your Honor, with these particular charges, and I 
would argue I think the [c]ourt may be bound by what it has 
on the four corners before it." 
 
6 
 
 
 
At the conclusion of his argument, defense counsel returned 
briefly to the issue of statutory rape as a lesser included 
offense.  He argued that there was no probable cause to support 
a finding of statutory rape, and if the judge found that there 
was, the judge should nevertheless discharge the defendant and 
not cause a criminal complaint to issue, as the defendant and 
the complainant were both just teenagers "experimenting with 
their sexuality." 
 
Without addressing the objection or otherwise alerting the 
defendant that she intended to consider the lesser included 
offenses, the judge thereafter issued a decision in which she 
found insufficient evidence to establish probable cause for rape 
of a child with force on any of the charges but found sufficient 
evidence to establish probable cause for statutory rape on all 
three charges.  She also found that it was in the public 
interest that the defendant be tried for such offenses, 
concluding that "[t]he nature of a complaint for rape and abuse 
of a minor militates in favor of binding the [d]efendant over 
for trial as an adult".  She then dismissed the juvenile 
complaints and bound the defendant over for trial in adult court 
for the lesser included offenses of statutory rape. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Transfer of a lesser included offense 
not expressly charged.  General Laws c. 119, § 72A, provides: 
7 
 
 
"If a person commits an offense or violation prior to his 
eighteenth birthday, and is not apprehended until after his 
nineteenth birthday, the court, after a hearing, shall 
determine whether there is probable cause to believe that 
said person committed the offense charged, and shall, in 
its discretion, either order that the person be discharged, 
if satisfied that such discharge is consistent with the 
protection of the public; or, if the court is of the 
opinion that the interests of the public require that such 
person be tried for such offense or violation instead of 
being discharged, the court shall dismiss the delinquency 
complaint and cause a criminal complaint to be issued.  The 
case shall thereafter proceed according to the usual course 
of criminal proceedings and in accordance with the 
provisions of [G. L. c. 218, § 30,] and [G. L. c. 278, 
§ 18].  Said hearing shall be held prior to, and separate 
from, any trial on the merits of the charges alleged." 
 
The defendant argues that G. L. c. 119, § 72A, does not allow 
the transfer of a lesser included offense that was not charged 
in the complaint.  We disagree. 
 
It is well established that statutory rape is a lesser 
included offense of rape of a child with force.  See 
Commonwealth v. Thayer, 418 Mass. 130, 132 (1994) ("statutory 
rape in G. L. c. 265, § 23, is a lesser included offense within 
the forcible rape of a child under sixteen years of age within 
G. L. c. 265, § 22A" [footnote omitted]); Commonwealth v. 
Licciardi, 387 Mass. 670, 673 (1982) (jury "could return a 
verdict of guilty of statutory rape, a lesser included offense 
within the rape indictments"); Commonwealth v. Franks, 365 Mass. 
74, 78 (1974) ("crime of statutory rape . . . is a crime 
included within the crime of forcible rape . . . which was 
charged in the indictment"); Commonwealth v. Harris, 74 Mass. 
8 
 
 
App. Ct. 105, 110 (2009) ("the crime with which the defendant 
was charged was rape of a child by force, as to which rape of a 
child is a lesser included offense").  It is also well 
established that a defendant may be convicted of a lesser 
included offense even if the lesser included offense is not 
expressly charged.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Walker, 426 Mass. 
301, 303 (1997); Commonwealth v. Keane, 41 Mass App Ct. 656, 661 
(1996). 
 
We have specifically applied these principles in the 
transfer hearing and statutory rape context as well.  In 
Commonwealth v. Williams, 427 Mass. 59, 59 (1998), we held that 
a Superior Court judge could accept a guilty plea and impose a 
sentence on a lesser included offense of statutory rape where 
the defendant's case was transferred from the Juvenile Court 
only on the greater and more serious offense of forcible rape.  
We reasoned that even though the lesser included offense was not 
specifically charged, the "legislative intent that such lesser 
included offenses are part and parcel of the transfer hearing 
process may fairly be presumed."  Id. at 62.  We therefore 
conclude in answer to the first reported question that G. L. 
c. 119, § 72A, permits a Juvenile Court judge, who has dismissed 
offenses charged for lack of probable cause, to cause a criminal 
complaint to be issued for lesser included offenses, where the 
lesser included offenses are supported by probable cause and the 
9 
 
 
interests of the public require that the defendant be tried for 
the lesser included offenses.  
 
b.  Notice.  The second reported question asks us to 
address whether the transfer of lesser included offenses in this 
case was unconstitutional because this defendant was not 
provided with "proper notice."  As explained infra, we conclude 
that although the defendant had notice of the lesser included 
offenses, he did not have a meaningful opportunity to be heard 
before the transfer occurred. 
 
Individuals in the Juvenile Court have a constitutional due 
process right to "essential fairness."  Commonwealth v. Wayne 
W., 414 Mass. 218, 223 (1993).  Included in that right is 
adequate notice.  In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967); 
Commonwealth v. Olivo, 369 Mass. 62, 68 (1975) (form of notice 
provided must be reasonably calculated to give actual notice of 
proceedings and opportunity to be heard).  Here, the defendant 
was on notice, as a matter of law, that statutory rape was a 
lesser included offense of rape of a child with force, and that 
lesser included offenses are "part and parcel" of the transfer 
process, and thus there was a possibility of transfer of the 
statutory rape charges.  Williams, 427 Mass. at 62.  See Franks, 
365 Mass. at 78.  This, however, is not the end of the inquiry. 
 
As evidenced by this case, Juvenile Court judges must make 
difficult, discretionary decisions regarding whether to transfer 
10 
 
 
an offense or discharge a defendant.  These decisions require 
consideration of the specific crime and the particular 
defendant.  A thoughtful presentation by defense counsel 
directed at both issues is thus critical.  See J.D. Blitzman & 
K.J. King, Hearings Pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 72A:  "Aging 
Out" of the System, in 1 Massachusetts Juvenile Court Bench Book 
§ 12, at 12-11 (Mass. Cont. Legal Educ. 3d ed. 2011 & Supp. 
2014) ("[Advocates] must provide the court with adequate 
information to place the alleged offending behavior into a 
developmental context and to allow the court to understand how, 
if at all, the defendant's more mature development reduces the 
risk of reoffense.  A reliable determination of the significant 
issues that confront a judge in proceedings under this statute 
can be made only if all relevant developmental and contextual 
evidence is before the court").  Proper notice is essential to 
such a presentation.  See Commonwealth v. Bousquet, 407 Mass. 
854, 860 & n.3 (1990) (transfer proper where counsel on notice 
of nature of hearing and "had a sufficient basis to conclude 
that the interests of the public required transfer").  We 
therefore conclude that where a judge finds no probable cause to 
believe the defendant committed the crime charged, but does find 
probable cause to believe the defendant committed a lesser 
included offense, the judge must provide the defendant notice of 
that decision and give the defendant a meaningful opportunity to 
11 
 
 
present evidence and argument as to why discharge of the 
defendant is consistent with the protection of the public and 
thus transfer of the lesser included offenses is not required. 
 
 In the instant case, the issue of lesser included offenses 
was not raised by the prosecutor until after the close of 
evidence and only after conceding that there was insufficient 
evidence of force on one of the charges.  The defendant objected 
to this development, and the judge did not address the objection 
or state her view regarding whether she would consider 
transferring only the lesser included offenses until she issued 
her decision.  Consequently, when defense counsel made his 
argument regarding transfer, he was not informed that the judge 
had decided that there was not probable cause to support the 
rape of a child with force charges but that there was probable 
cause to support the lesser included offenses of statutory rape.  
As we conclude that the defendant is entitled to be so notified 
in order to be given a meaningful opportunity to present 
evidence and argument directed at why transfer of the lesser 
included offenses of statutory rape was not required, we reverse 
and remand.  
 
The specific facts and crimes at issue reveal the 
importance of such notice and opportunity to be heard.  The 
protection of the public "interests" analysis differs 
significantly for rape of a child with force and statutory rape 
12 
 
 
when considering teenage sexual activity.  A teenager who 
forcibly rapes another presents a greater public safety risk 
than a teenager engaged in consensual sexual activity with a 
peer.2  As sexual activity among teenagers is common, even the 
original decision to prosecute often depends on whether the 
sexual activity is consensual or coerced.3   
                     
 
2 Compare Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 631, 
631–632 (2011) (teenage victim forcibly raped by teenage 
codefendant while teenage defendant held victim down by her 
shoulders), with Doe v. Attorney General, 430 Mass. 155, 164 
(1999) (in cases involving consensual sexual activity between 
teenagers and requirement of sex offender registration, State's 
interest in protecting children not as great because risk of 
reoffense may be minimal and present danger not significant). 
 
 
3 See generally Commonwealth v. Bernardo B., 453 Mass. 158, 
161 (2009) (emphasizing in statutory rape case that 
"Commonwealth has broad discretion in deciding whether to 
prosecute a case").  See Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, Substance Use and Sexual Risk Behaviors Among Teens 
(2017), https://www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/substance-use/pdf/dash-
substance-use-fact-sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4H6-TL9P] 
("According to the 2015 National Youth Risk Behavior Survey 
. . . [forty-one per cent] of high school students have . . .  
had intercourse and [thirty per cent] of high school students 
are currently sexually active").  See also High, Good, Bad and 
Wrongful Juvenile Sex:  Rethinking the Use of Statutory Rape 
Laws Against the Protected Class, 69 Ark. L. Rev. 787, 808 
(2016) (describing common practice of "prosecutorial discretion 
. . . exercised to exclude sexual activity among adolescents 
from the reach of legal regulation unless it appears to be 
exploitative"); Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex with Minors:  
Defining a Role for Statutory Rape, 48 Buff. L. Rev. 703, 750 
(2000) (describing "an apparent consensus among prosecutors 
against enforcement of statutory rape laws in cases of 
'consensual sexual relationships' among peers"). 
13 
 
 
 
The judge's decision finding no probable cause of rape of a 
child with force, but probable cause of statutory rape, 
therefore fundamentally changed the protection of the public 
"interests" calculus.  Further complicating the public interest 
analysis in the context of consensual teenage sexual relations, 
the complainant's own decision to proceed expressly depended at 
least at one point on whether the defendant "eventually wanted 
to be with [her]."  Finally, if the defendant were tried as an 
adult seven years after the offense, the consequences of a 
statutory rape conviction would not be a finding of delinquency 
but the possibility of a life felony.  Both the defense counsel 
and the judge should have been carefully focused on all of these 
issues.  
 
Without having the benefit of the judge's decision on 
probable cause, however, defense counsel chose to focus his 
argument on the more serious charges of rape, for which he had a 
strong defense.4  Indeed, defense counsel addressed the lesser 
                     
 
4 For the defendant, the case also changed dramatically once 
the prosecutor sought to transfer statutory rape as well as rape 
of a child with force charges.  The defendant had not testified 
at the hearing.  On the issue of force, the defendant could rely 
on the complainant's testimony alone, which described none.  But 
once the prosecution expressed its intentions to proceed on 
statutory rape charges, the defendant was in an evidentiary 
bind.  With statutory rape charges being sought, the 
complainant's testimony was now sufficient and unrebutted.  That 
being said, the complainant's testimony alone provided probable 
cause to proceed on the statutory rape charges.  The difficult 
14 
 
 
included offenses of statutory rape only in passing, including 
the critical and complicated discretionary issue whether the 
court should discharge the defendant, even if there was probable 
cause to support the lesser included offenses. 
 
In sum, the defendant is entitled to reopen the transfer 
proceedings to present evidence and argument on whether 
discharge is consistent with the protection of the public. 
 
c.  Delay in apprehension.  In posthearing briefing 
requested by the parties and allowed by the judge, the defendant 
argued that the delay in prosecuting the case was "done in bad 
faith."  As we discern no indicia of bad faith from this record, 
and the timing of the prosecution appears directly connected to 
the complainant's willingness to proceed, we conclude that this 
argument has no merit.  See Commonwealth v. Mogelinski, 473 
Mass. 164, 171-172 (2015). 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For the reasons set forth above, we 
conclude that the judge did not err in determining that, lesser 
included offenses could be transferred under G. L. c. 119, 
§ 72A, and that the defendant was on notice as a matter of law 
that such a transfer was a possibility.  We conclude, however, 
that where a judge finds no probable cause of the crime charged, 
but does find probable cause of a lesser included offense, the 
                     
issue, requiring further proceedings, is not probable cause but 
the discretionary decision to transfer or discharge.  
15 
 
 
judge must give the defendant a meaningful opportunity to 
address why discharge rather than transfer of the lesser 
included offense is consistent with the protection of the 
public, and that such opportunity was not provided here.   
 
We remand the matter to the single justice of the county 
court where an order of remand to the Juvenile Court shall issue 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.