Title: Troy Merck, Jr. v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC91581
____________
TROY MERCK, JR.,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[July 13, 2000]
PER CURIAM.
Troy Merck, Jr. appeals the death sentence imposed upon him after a
remand for resentencing.  We have jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For
the reasons expressed herein, we reverse Merck’s sentence of death and remand
this case to the trial court for a new penalty-phase proceeding and a new sentencing
order in which the trial court is to provide detailed written findings as to aggravating
and statutory and nonstatutory mitigating evidence presented.
Merck was charged on November 14, 1991, in Pinellas County with first-
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degree murder.  The case went to trial in November 1992 and ended in a mistrial
because the jury was unable to reach a verdict.  After a trial in September 1993,
Merck was found guilty and sentenced to death.  The facts of this case are set forth
in detail in Merck v. State, 664 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 1995).  This Court affirmed the
conviction but reversed the death sentence based on our finding that juvenile
adjudication as to a North Carolina shooting incident was not a “conviction” within
the meaning of the statute making prior conviction of a violent felony an aggravating
factor and that the court’s finding of this aggravator was harmful error.  Id. at 944.
Merck’s resentencing took place in July 1997.  The jury unanimously
recommended a death sentence.  The trial court found three aggravators: Merck
was previously convicted of a felony and on felony probation (great weight); Merck
was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the
person (one robbery, four armed robberies) (great weight); and the murder was
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) (great weight).  As statutory
mitigators, the court found Merck’s age (nineteen) (very little weight) and that the
murder was committed while Merck was under the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance (little weight).  As nonstatutory mitigation, the court found
childhood abuse and deprivation (some weight); and learning disability, long-term
alcohol abuse, chemically dependent parents, lack of a parental role model, and
1Through counsel, Merck claims that:  (1) the trial court erred in its sentencing order in failing to
find and evaluate evidence of Merck’s history of alcohol abuse as a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance;
(2) the trial court erred in failing to find Merck’s excessive drinking on the night of the crime as a
nonstatutory mitigating circumstance; (3) Merck’s death sentence is not proportional; (4) the trial court
erred in finding as an aggravating factor that the crime was committed while Merck was on felony
probation; and (5) the trial court erred in excluding from the resentencing proceedings evidence as to
another suspect in the instant crime.
In his pro se supplemental brief, Merck raises the following issues:  (1) denial of assistance of
counsel during the guilt phase of Merck’s trial; (2) knowing use of perjured testimony of a police detective
by the prosecution during the guilt phase; (3) guilty verdict contrary to the law or weight of the evidence;
(4) improper penalty-phase comments by the prosecutor concerning religion; and (5) error in excluding
potential jurors who expressed reservations about imposing a death sentence. 
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capability of forming loving relationships (some weight).  After considering the
relevant factors, the trial court sentenced Merck to death.
In this appeal of his resentencing Merck raises five claims through counsel
and five additional claims in a supplemental pro se brief.1  We will discuss only the
dispositive first, second, and fourth claims that Merck raised through counsel and
find the remainder of Merck’s claims to be moot in light of our finding of reversible
error.
In his first two claims, Merck contends that the trial court did not comply
with this Court’s directions in Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415 (1990), in that the
court failed to properly find, evaluate, or weigh evidence of Merck’s alcohol abuse
within the list of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances in the sentencing order. 
First, Merck claims that the court erred in failing to find, evaluate, or weigh
evidence of Merck’s long-term alcohol abuse as to nonstatutory mitigation. 
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Second, Merck claims that the trial court erred in failing to find, evaluate, or weigh
evidence of Merck’s substantial alcohol intake on the night of the instant crime as a
nonstatutory mitigator.  We agree with both of Merck’s arguments as to the trial
court’s lack of findings concerning Merck’s use of alcohol the night of the murder
and his long-term alcohol abuse.
The trial court’s sentencing order states as to the statutory mitigator of
substantial impairment:
c.  The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was
substantially impaired.
Two experts testified that the defendant had a substance abuse
alcohol disorder.  Ron Bell, the defendant’s expert toxicologist,
testified that he estimated the defendant’s blood alcohol level of [sic]
to be in the range of 0.16 - 0.26 with an average level of 0.21 at the
time of this murder.  However, this information was not derived from a
blood test but rather was estimated based upon testimony of alcohol
consumption.  He acknowledged that long term use of alcohol can
increase tolerance levels.
The state’s expert found the defendant did appreciate the
criminality of his conduct and that the defendant’s [ability to conform
his] conduct to the requirements of the law was not impaired.  The
expert for the defense disagreed and testified that the defendant had no
emotional appreciation of the significance of the killing and she stated
that it was beyond his capacity to think or evaluate it.  She testified
that once the impulsiveness and aggression of the defendant began, it
would not stop.  She also testified that on the night of the homicide the
defendant had excessive alcohol use; consequently, the defendant
experienced emotional upheaval at the time of the homicide.
There was testimony from eyewitnesses which described the
defendant as not appearing intoxicated, walking very deliberately to his
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friend’s car, catching tossed keys in mid-air, unlocking and opening
the car door, retrieving the knife and hiding it from the on-lookers. 
One eye witness testified that when the defendant caught the keys in
mid-air, in response to his friend’s comment “nice catch Troy,” the
defendant replied “don’t use my real name.”  The defendant then
proceeded in a deliberate fashion and brutally stabbed the victim.  This
testimony compels this Court to believe that the alcohol use on the
night of the murder did not substantially impair the defendant.
State v. Merck, No. 91-16659 CFANO-M, sentencing order at 9-10 (Fla. 6th Cir.
Ct. order filed Sept. 12, 1997) (emphasis added).
As to nonstatutory mitigation, the trial judge wrote in her order:
2.  Non-statutory Mitigating Factors
The defendant asked the Court to consider these non-statutory
mitigating factors:
a.  The defendant was under the influence of alcohol.
The Court has addressed this factor under the defendant’s third
statutory mitigating factor regarding his capacity to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law.
. . . .
c.  Defendant lists as additional non-statutory factors his
learning disability, his long-term alcohol abuse, his chemically
dependent parents, his rejection by two father figures, his lack of a
parental role model, his lack of a male parent, and his capability to
form loving relationships.  Several of these factors have been
previously discussed.  As to the remaining factors; First, as to his
learning disability, the testimony showed that such disorder does not
impact on development.  Many children have learning disabilities and
grow up to be responsible citizens.  Second, as to his lack of a
parental role model, his sisters, aunts, and foster parents all testified
about helping him to grow up and exposing him to love.  Third, as to
defendant having the capacity to form a loving relationship, the Court
considered the testimony of his family members and his parents. 
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These factors have been considered by this Court and will be given
some weight.
State v. Merck, sentencing order at 11-12 (emphasis added).
The trial court, in considering mitigating evidence, must determine whether
the facts alleged in mitigation are supported by the evidence.  See Bonifay v. State,
680 So. 2d 413, 416 (Fla. 1996) (citing Rogers v. State, 511 So. 2d 526, 534 (Fla.
1987)).  A trial court is obligated to find and weigh all valid mitigating evidence
available in the record at the conclusion of the penalty phase.  See Cheshire v.
State, 568 So. 2d 908, 911 (Fla. 1990).  Evidence is mitigating if, in fairness or in
the totality of the defendant’s life or character, it may be considered as extenuating
or reducing the degree of moral culpability for the crime committed.  See Wickham
v. State, 593 So. 2d 191, 194 (Fla. 1991).
In Campbell, we held that a sentencing court must expressly evaluate in its
written order each mitigating circumstance proposed by the defendant to determine
whether it is supported by the evidence and whether, in the case of nonstatutory
factors, it is truly of a mitigating nature.  See 571 So. 2d at 419.  Here, we find that
the trial judge erred in that her explanation in the sentencing order of her evaluation
as to nonstatutory mitigation failed to include Merck’s drinking on the night of the
murder or Merck’s long-term alcohol abuse.
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In the sentencing order, the trial court correctly stated that Merck had urged
the court to find the two alcohol-related nonstatutory mitigators.  However, we find
the court’s reference back to a one-sentence discussion of evidence of Merck’s
long-term alcohol abuse in the statutory mitigation section of the order to be
insufficient as to our Campbell sentencing order requirement.  Likewise, although
the trial court did discuss in the sentencing order evidence of Merck’s drinking
alcohol the night of the murder, this discussion was only in the context of finding
that this evidence did not prove a statutory mitigator and is insufficient as to our
Campbell sentencing order requirement.  The sentencing order concludes that the
long-term alcohol abuse was considered together with nonstatutory factors of
Merck’s “learning disability, . . . his chemically dependent parents, his rejection by
two father figures, his lack of a parental role model, his lack of a male parent, and
his capability to form loving relationships.”  State v. Merck, sentencing order at 12. 
Merck alleges this analysis of nonstatutory mitigation does not evaluate the
evidence presented as nonstatutory mitigation or explain the reasoning for the trial
court’s weighing of nonstatutory mitigation.  This is a violation of the requirements
we set forth in Campbell.  See Hudson v. State, 708 So. 2d 256, 259-60 (Fla.
1998).  The nonstatutory mitigation section of the sentencing order for this
resentencing must deal directly with any evidence, including Merck’s alleged
2Article I, section 9 of the United States Constitution provides in relevant part:  "No bill of attainder
or ex post facto Law shall be passed."  Article I, section 10 of the Florida Constitution provides in relevant
part:  "No bill of attainder, ex post facto law or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed."
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alcohol abuse, that Merck presents to the court as nonstatutory mitigation.
In his fourth claim, which is also dispositive, Merck argues that the trial court
erred in instructing the jury upon and then finding as an aggravating circumstance
the fact that Merck had previously been convicted of a felony and was placed on
felony probation.  He asserts that the instruction upon and finding of the felony
probation aggravator, which did not exist at the time of the instant murder, violates
the ex post facto provisions of the United States and Florida Constitutions.2
The instant murder was committed on October 12, 1991, and Merck’s
resentencing proceeding began on July 15, 1997.  At the time of this crime, the first
aggravator listed in Florida’s death penalty statute provided in relevant part:
(5) AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.--Aggravating
circumstances shall be limited to the following:
(a) The capital felony was committed by a person under
sentence of imprisonment or placed on community control.
§ 921.141(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995).  At the time of the murder, the aggravator
provided in subsection (5)(a) did not apply to persons on probation.  See Ferguson
v. State, 417 So. 2d 631, 636 (Fla. 1982); Bolender v. State, 422 So. 2d 833, 837
(Fla. 1982); Peek v. State, 395 So. 2d 492, 499 (Fla. 1980).  Thereafter, the
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Legislature amended section 921.141(5)(a) to add "or on probation," ch. 96-290, §
5, Laws of Fla., and further revised subsection (5)(a) again to specify "felony
probation" and previous felony conviction.  Ch. 6-302, § 1, Laws of Fla.  Pursuant
to these amendments, probationary status did not become a statutory aggravator
until May 30, 1996.
In this case, the trial court instructed the jury that in deliberating its
sentencing recommendation it could consider as an aggravating circumstance the
fact that Merck was on felony probation.  In her sentencing order, the judge found
felony probation as one of three aggravating circumstances.  Merck contends that
the Legislature's amendment of section 921.141(5)(a) subsequent to the instant
crime to add probation to the list of statutory aggravators was a substantive change
in the law, not a mere refinement of the law as this Court found the "community
control" aggravating circumstance to be in Trotter v. State, 690 So. 2d 1234 (Fla.
1996).  In Trotter, this Court held that the trial court's use of the fact that the
murder was committed while the defendant was on community control did not
violate the defendant's ex post facto rights, even though the crime and sentencing
took place before the sentencing provision was amended to add the "community
control" aggravator.  Id. at 1237.  However, during the time that this case has been
under review, this Court has found ex post facto violations in two applications of
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the felony probation aggravator.  See Lukehart v. State, 25 Fla. L. Weekly S489
(Fla. June 22, 2000); Zack v. State, 753 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 2000).  On the basis of the
present record, we cannot find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
In view of our finding of error in the trial court’s sentencing order and our
striking of the felony probation aggravator, we find that this case must be remanded
for a resentencing.  Accordingly, we vacate the sentence of death and order a
complete new penalty-phase proceeding before a jury.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and HARDING, PARIENTE, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
SHAW and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur in result only.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Pinellas County,
Nelly N. Khouzam, Judge - Case No. CRC91-16659 CFANO
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Steven L. Bolotin, Assistant Public
Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida, and Troy Merck, pro se, Raiford,
Florida,
for Appellant
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Robert J. Landry, Assistant Attorney
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General, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellee