Title: JOHN COLEMAN V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

State: kentucky

Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court

Document:

IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C), THIS OPINION 1S NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION . JOHN COLEMAN V Supreme C~urf of 2008-SC-000072-MR ON APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE PATRICIA M . SUMME, JUDGE NO. 06-CR-00238 MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT REVERSING RENDERED : OCTOBER 29, 2009 APPELLANT COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE Appellant John Coleman was convicted of possession of a handgun by a convicted felon and being a second-degree persistent felony offender . On appeal, he raises several issues, including that he was denied his right to confront witnesses whose statements were introduced through a police officer. This Court agrees that his confrontation rights were violated by the admission of prejudicial, testimonial hearsay . Therefore, Appellant's conviction is reversed. I. Background Appellant was arrested at the apartment of William Chipman after police received a 911 call in which the caller alleged that an unidentified person was brandishing a gun. Two officers responded to the scene. They were greeted by Chipman, who urged them to hurry to the rear entrance, where they spotted Appellant through a window in the door and shouted at him to show his hands. Appellant delayed slightly, leaning partly out of sight, down and to his right, and then raised his hands . The officers testified that they had the impression that Appellant had dropped something when he leaned down . The officers entered the residence, handcuffed Appellant, and secured the four other people who were present. They then searched the area near the door and found a loaded gun in a plastic container located to the right of the door . One of the officers picked up the gun, and a few minutes later handed it to the other officer, who unloaded it with his bare hands . When asked to whom the gun belonged, Appellant denied any knowledge of it. He was charged with illegally possessing a gun, wanton endangerment, and being a persistent felony offender . The wanton endangerment charge was dismissed prior to trial. How Appellant arrived at Chipman's apartment was disputed at trial. Appellant testified that he had gone there to buy and use illegal drugs . He claimed to have bought and used an Oxycontin, and that one of the people at the apartment offered to sell him a gun. After taking the drug, he fell asleep on a couch and later awoke because he felt a person going through his pockets. As he opened his eyes, he saw a person running from him. Fearing that the person had taken his money, Appellant gave chase, but fell and lost track of the person . When he got to the outside door, he saw Chipman running down the stairs from the apartment. Appellant became irate and very vocal with the persons remaining in the apartment about his money. It was at this point that the police arrived . Appellant claimed never to have had a gun and that someone at the apartment had offered to sell him the one found at the scene. 2 Chipman gave a very different account. He claimed that no one had been using drugs at the apartment, though the officers testified that they had the "impression" that drugs were being used in the apartment, and that Appellant was a stranger who had shown up at the door and asked to use the bathroom . He alleged that when Appellant returned from the bathroom, he became loud and violent and was waving a gun around . Chipman claimed he escaped by jumping out a window onto the roof and then went to a neighbor's apartment to call 911 . Chipman also admitted that he was a convicted felon. Chipman was the only prosecution witness who had been present at the apartment before the police arrived, though the prosecution did subpoena the other witnesses. The prosecution, however, did present testimony from four police officers . The first officer simply testified that Appellant was a convicted felon. Two of the officers were the ones who responded to the 911 call . They both testified about arriving at the scene, seeing Appellant in the doorway, securing Appellant, recovering the gun, and interviewing the witnesses. One of these officers testified that the persons present in the apartment all told him, among other things, that Appellant had pointed a gun at them . The other officer worked in the crime lab and testified that the gun recovered at the apartment was in working condition and that no fingerprints had been recovered from it, that that was not unusual because it is actually difficult to recover fingerprints given the shape and texture of, and the materials that make up, most guns . In addition to himself, Appellant called one other witness, Billie Melton, who he claimed had gone to the apartment with him . Ms. Melton's testimony 3 was far from helpful, however. She repeatedly stated that she remembered very little about that night and did not remember Appellant . When asked about the gun on direct examination, she stated that she did not remember that Appellant had the gun, but on cross-examination she admitted that Appellant could have been the person with the gun because, though she was sure there was a gun, she could not remember who had it that night . The jury found Appellant guilty of possession of a handgun by a convicted felon and being a persistent felon. He was sentenced to twenty years in prison as a result. His appeal, therefore, is a matter of right. Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b) . II . Analysis A. Witnesses' Hearsay Statements Appellant claims that he was denied his right to confront witnesses against him by the presentation of various hearsay statements of persons present in the apartment through a police officer, in violation of the rule expounded in Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S. 36 (2004), which bars the "admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination." Id. at 53-54 . Specifically, Appellant complains of statements elicited during the testimony of Sergeant Kevin Sumner, one of the officers who responded to the 911 call . During the direct examination of Sergeant Sumner, the prosecutor asked, "Did anyone there make the same claim or sustain the same facts as the defendant was alleging?" Defense counsel objected to this question . The judge 4 stated it would be more appropriate for the officer to state what his investigation revealed and sustained the objection. The prosecutor then engaged in the following examination of Sergeant Sumner : Commonwealth : Officer, let me ask you this way. Was the defendant-were all the witnesses' statements consistent? Officer: Yes, they were . Commonwealth : Including the defendant's? Officer: No. The defendant's was different from everyone else . The prosecutor's direct examination ended there . On cross-examination, defense counsel and the officer engaged in the following exchange : Counsel : You were told that-in your investigation, you were told that Mr. Coleman ran out of the house to get a firearm. Isn't that correct? Officer: I don't recall anyone saying that he ran . There were some statements that said that he had passed out, woke up, was angry that his money was gone, left, and came back with the gun. That was one of the statements that I recall being made. Counsel: So all the statements weren't corr-the same, consistent, correct? Officer : They were all consistent, yes. Counsel : Another statement said he came out of the back room with a gun? Officer: Not that I-I didn't hear anyone tell me that he came out of the back room with a gun . The defense attorney then sought to play a tape of the officer's prior testimony to impeach this, seeking at first to play the whole recording. The judge required the attorney to play only the portion of the tape that would impeach the officer's testimony . The attorney had his co-counsel take the tape 5 outside the courtroom to cue it up, and continued to question the officer for a moment while co-counsel was doing so . Because the defense attorney finished his questioning before the tape was cued up,' the judge allowed the prosecutor to go ahead with his re-direct questioning, which proceeded as follows: Commonwealth : Sergeant Sumner, Mr. Schneider [defense counsel] referenced statements that you heard that night from, I assume, other witnesses to this occurrence, is that correct? Is that what you've been speaking of? Officer: I would believe they were other victims of this . Commonwealth : Okay, tell us what those other victims said . Officer: In general, they all said he was angry about his missing money and that he pointed a gun at each of them individually and demanded they give his money back . Commonwealth : Okay. Do you recall how many witnesses there were? Victims there were? Officer: Four, I believe . Commonwealth : Okay, of these four, well, first of all other than the defendant, did everyone state that the defendant pointed a gun at them? As the officer answered this last question (stating, "Yes, they did ."), defense counsel objected. The attorneys approached the bench, where the following discussion took place : Counsel : I am just objecting . This is not investigation . This is hearsay. Commonwealth : It is hearsay, judge. But he opened the door when he asked about inconsistencies among statements from the victims that he heard . All I 1 When the attorney eventually did play a snippet of the tape, it was of the officer's prior testimony about whether Appellant leaned over or stepped to the side when the officers arrived and told him to put his hands up . 6 Officer: Yes, they were . Officer : That's correct, yes. am doing is clearing up exactly, were there inconsistencies? If so, what were they? Judge: I think you've done that so I will overrule as to what you've already asked, but continuing on, because the objection is on the floor and I need to sustain it because it is hearsay, although you [defense counsel] did open the door because you had [1-3 words inaudible] about what somebody said about how they escaped. So I think this should be your last question to conclude what he opened the door to . Commonwealth : Just so we're clear, he also talked about the difference between the defendant coming from the rear or leaving to go get the gun . Judge : You may ask several questions about that . Again, it is hearsay and I have an objection now and I didn't before . I need to allow you to deal with this and deal with that and then get off it, not exploit it too much. The prosecutor then resumed his redirect examination : Commonwealth : Sergeant Sumner, again, referring to what Mr. Schneider was asking you about in terms of differences in statements, I believe he asked you about where the victims said the defendant was coming from, whether or not he left the apartment . Were all of the victims consistent in the defendant's conduct? Commonwealth : Were all the victims consistent in the fact that the defendant was pointing that gun right there at them? Thus it is clear that Sergeant Sumner repeated several hearsay statements during the course of his testimony: that Appellant had a gun, that Appellant pointed that gun at multiple people, that Appellant was angry and shouting. The most prejudicial of these-that Appellant pointed a loaded gun directly at several individuals-was repeated multiple times. 7 The rule from Crawford, as recently restated, is simple : "A witness's testimony against a defendant is . . . inadmissible unless the witness appears at trial or, if the witness is unavailable, the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination." Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2531 (2009) (citing Crawford , 541 U.S . at 54) . Under this rule, the statements admitted against Appellant are paradigmatic violations of the Confrontation Clause . First, the witnesses did not testify at trial. Second, there is no indication that the witnesses were unavailable ; in fact, it appears from the record (according to the Commonwealth's brief) that the witnesses were present in the courthouse under the prosecution's subpoena, but simply were not called to testify. Third, the statements were untested by cross-examination. The only question then is whether the statements were testimonial . The statements in this case clearly were . Statements made in response to police questioning following a crime are testimonial in nature : "Statements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations are also testimonial under even a narrow standard ." Crawford , 541 U.S . at 52 . This includes statements made by a witness to a past crime, not just those made by a suspect interrogated while in custody. See id . at 53 n.4 ("We use the term `interrogation' in its colloquial, rather than any technical legal, sense . Just as various definitions of `testimonial' exist, one can imagine various definitions of `interrogation,' and we need not select among them in this case. Sylvia's recorded statement, knowingly given in response to structured police questioning, qualifies under any conceivable definition ." (citation omitted, emphasis added)) ; Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S . 813, 822 (2006) ("Statements are nontestimonial when 8 made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency . They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.") . The statements made by the witnesses to the officer fall squarely within the category of "testimonial" for purposes of the Sixth Amendment. The only possible conclusion, then, is that Appellant's rights were violated . "In this case, the State admitted [witnesses'] testimonial statement[s] against [Appellant], despite the fact that he had no opportunity to cross examine [them] . That alone is sufficient to make out a violation of the Sixth Amendment ." Crawford , 541 U.S . at 68 . Thus, this Court must conclude that Sergeant Sumner's repetition of the statements of the non-testifying witnesses violated Appellant's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him. The Commonwealth does not really contest this point. 2 But it is important to emphasize that there was a constitutional violation in this case because "[t]he Confrontation Clause . . . is binding, and we may not disregard it at our convenience," Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2540, no matter how appealing it may be to do so. The Commonwealth instead attempts to avoid the effect of the error by arguing that Appellant should have called the witnesses 2 For example, though the prosecutor argued at trial that all of the statements now at issue were admitted because defense counsel "opened the door" to them, the Commonwealth has not continued to make that claim on appeal . 9 himself as they were "available," being present under the prosecution's subpoena, and that any error was harmless . This first claim is simple to dispose of, largely because the burden of proof is on the prosecution, not the defendant, and any evidence it presents must be proper . In fact, the U.S . Supreme Court has recently rejected the Commonwealth's position : Respondent asserts that we should find no Confrontation Clause violation in this case because petitioner had the ability to subpoena the analysts . But that power-whether pursuant to state law or the Compulsory Process Clause-is no substitute for the right of confrontation . Unlike the Confrontation Clause, those provisions are of no use to the defendant when the witness is unavailable or simply refuses to appear . Converting the prosecution's duty under the Confrontation Clause into the defendant's privilege under state law or the Compulsory Process Clause shifts the consequences of adverse-witness no-shows from the State to the accused. More fundamentally, the Confrontation Clause imposes a burden on the prosecution to present its witnesses, not on the defendant to bring those adverse witnesses into court. Its value to the defendant is not replaced by a system in which the prosecution presents its evidence via ex parte affidavits and waits for the defendant to subpoena the affiants if he chooses. 3 On this point, the Commonwealth's briefstates : A review of the record, however, shows that the prosecutor indicated, during the discussion between Coleman and the court regarding the confrontation of certain witnesses who were present in William[ Chipman's] apartment . The prosecutor stated that two of the witnesses were in the hall and not called . The prosecutor pointed out that of the two witnesses that testified, the prosecutor called one (William Chipman) and trial defense counsel had called another (Billie Melton) . Thus, it appears that the witnesses were available for Coleman to confront . Trial defense counsel simply chose not to. (Citation to the record omitted .) Though normally this Court would independently review the record to confirm that this was the case, the Court will in this case rely on the Commonwealth's recitation of the facts because of the difficulty in reviewing the recording in this case . Unfortunately, the video record did not record properly on the second day of trial, including the portion discussed here, so that the video is blank and only the voices can be heard. Because the video is blank, there is no timestamp to assist in finding conversations in that part of the record. 10 Id. The defendant is not required to call witnesses to testify against him so that he may have an opportunity to challenge their claims . The very point of Crawford is that confrontation bars the introduction of a witness's statements through other witnesses in lieu of direct testimony. Shifting the burden to the defense would effectively neuter the Confrontation Clause . If the witnesses are available, the prosecution must call them to the stand and directly elicit their testimony. If anything, the ready availability of the witnesses in this case multiplies the error, because the failure to call them demonstrates a clear attempt to shift the burden to the defense . As for the claim of harmless error, the Commonwealth is correct that even Confrontation Clause errors are subject to review for harmlessness . Heard v. Commonwealth, 217 S.W.3d 240, 244 (Ky. 2007) ; cf. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2542 n.14 (recognizing implicitly that harmless error review can occur but "express[ing] no view as to whether the error was harmless" in that case) . However, confrontation violations are constitutional errors, and "before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the [reviewing] court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Chapman v. California , 386 U.S . 18, 24 (1967) . This standard "require[s] the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Id. The Commonwealth, as the beneficiary of the error in this case, has failed to do so . Aside from the statements repeated by Sergeant Sumner, the evidence against Appellant was scant, with what little was introduced being either circumstantial or impeached. Without the hearsay statements, both officers 11 could testify only that they saw Appellant lean down toward an area where the gun was eventually found; neither actually saw Appellant with the gun. William Chipman, the only eyewitness who testified that he actually saw Appellant with the gun, had a substantial motive to lie because he too was a convicted felon and the gun was found in his residence, meaning he could have been charged with the same felony of which Appellant was convicted if it was thought that the gun belonged to him . Though this evidence alone would have been sufficient to overcome a motion for a directed verdict and to support a guilty verdict on appeal, there is no guarantee that a jury would have returned a guilty verdict based on it alone. And the inquiry is not whether the other evidence was sufficient (or even overwhelming), but whether the improper evidence contributed to the verdict that was obtained. The uncontested statements of at least two other witnesses placing the gun in Appellant's hand added substance to the circumstantial proof that was properly admitted. Though the declarants were not identified, they also were not impeached and did not suffer from the credibility problems of William Chipman. Thus, far from being cumulative of Chipman's testimony, those witnesses' statements served to bolster it. The hearsay statements thus substantially buttressed an otherwise weak case. This case, then, is similar to Heard v . Commonwealth, in that the statements from the officer were "the most detrimental evidence," 217 S.W.3d at 244, and "the most damning against Appellant," id . at 245 . That this is the case is demonstrated by the trial judge's own comments at the end of trial when defense counsel asked for a directed verdict . Defense 12 counsel argued that only one witness (Chapman) testified that he saw Appellant with a gun in his hand and that he was wholly lacking in credibility, to which the prosecutor responded, "Judge, I think the testimony stands for itself." The judge then stated, "And the court will agree because everyone else who's testified has testified through police officers . So they really only had one guy who said he did and one guy who said he didn't, so I think that's sufficient for that to go to the jury." In this one statement, the judge recognized both that there was little evidence against Appellant and that most of what was presented was testimonial hearsay. Thus, having reviewed the other evidence at trial as described above, this Court cannot say that the Commonwealth showed "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained ." Chapman, 386 U.S . at 24 . In fact, given the weakness of the other evidence, it is highly likely that in this case, the officer's recurring repetition of the non- testifying witnesses' statements actually did contribute to this verdict. Thus, the violation of Appellant's Sixth Amendment right requires that his conviction be reversed . B. Other Claims of Error Appellant raised two other issues on appeal : that the trial court failed to engage in a sufficient colloquy to determine whether his decision to proceed pro se for his closing argument was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; and that the prosecution engaged in improper argument during his opening statement. When a judgment is reversed, this Court "address[es] only those additional assignments of error that are likely to recur upon retrial ." Bell v . 13 Commonwealth , 245 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Ky . 2008) overruled in part on other grounds by Harp v . Commonwealth , 266 S.W.3d 813, 821 . (Ky. 2008) ; Terry Commonwealth , 153 S.W .3d 794, 797 (Ky. 2005) ; Springer v. Commonwealth , 998 S.W .2d 439, 445 (Ky. 1999) . It is unlikely that either of Appellant's other claimed errors will recur on retrial. Given Appellant's displeasure with his attorney in this case, however, should he seek to proceed pro se on retrial, this Court points the trial judge to the following cases : Faretta v . California , 422 U.S . 806 (1975), which imposes several requirements on a trial judge to assure that a defendant's decision to proceed pro se is made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily; Depp v. Commonwealth , 278 S.W .3d 615, 617 (Ky. 2009), which noted that "the constitutional minimum for determining whether a waiver [of the right to counsel] was `knowing and intelligent' is that the accused be made sufficiently aware of his right to have counsel present and of the possible consequences of a decision to forgo the aid of counsel," id. at 618 ; and Commonwealth v. Terry, No . 2007-SC-000796-MR, S.W.3d (Ky. Aug. 27, 2009), which laid out a model Faretta colloquy for trial judges stuck in the tough position of the judge in this case . It must be noted, however, that Terry's model colloquy alone is not necessarily sufficient to excise that judge from a difficult position, because any colloquy designed to protect a defendant's right to counsel runs the risk of infringing on the right to proceed pro se, which many attorneys and judges forget was the right actually at issue in Faretta. By way of warning, this Court notes that "going into sufficient detail about the perils of self-representation" 14 itself can be error, as has been noted by the Seventh Circuit, "because if [a judge] . . .dwelled on those perils in truly loving detail [s]he would stand accused of having infringed [the defendant's] right to self-representation ." United States v. Oreve, 263 F.3d 669, 672 (7th Cir . 2001) (Posner, J .) . The judge placed in [such a] position is on the razor's edge in assisting a defendant to make an informed choice between representation by counsel with whom the defendant is irrationally dissatisfied and self-representation . If the judge exaggerates either the advantages of being represented or the disadvantages of self- representation, [s]he will be accused of having put h[er] thumb on the scale and prevented the defendant from making an informed choice . . . . All ajudge can do as a practical matter-all ajudge need do as a legal matter-is ensure that the defendant knows his rights and avoids hasty decisions. . ..That right [to self-representation] is not honored if judges must depict seIf-representation in such unremittingly scary terms that any reasonable person would refuse. Id . (citations and quotation marks omitted) . III. Conclusion Appellant's right to confront witnesses against him having been violated by the presentation of testimonial hearsay through a police officer, the judgment of the Kenton Circuit Court is reversed . Minton, CA. ; Abramson, Noble, Schroder and Scott, JJ ., concur . Cunningham, J ., dissents by separate opinion in which Venters, J ., joins. CUNNINGHAM, J ., DISSENTING : I respectfully dissent. It has long been the law of this Commonwealth that a defendant cannot "open the door" to what would have been inadmissible evidence and then cry foul when such evidence comes in. Purcell v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 382, 399 (Ky. 2004) ; Norris v . Commonwealth , 89 S.W.3d 411, 414-15 (Ky. 2002) ; Blair v. Commonwealth , 144 S.W.3d 801, 806 (Ky. 2004) . That is precisely what happened in this case . Someone called 911 from the home of William Chipman, stating that an unidentified person was brandishing a gun. The officers arrived and were greeted by a frantic Chipman, urging them to hurry to the rear entrance. From there, the officers saw Appellant through a window and shouted at him to show his hands . He hesitated, leaned over, and dropped the weapon . The fact that the officers never actually saw the weapon until after discovering it exactly where it had been dropped is somewhat equivalent to the witness who, in an ancient mayhem case, did not see the defendant bite off the ear, but saw him spit it out. At trial, the testimony of the officers was supported by that of Chipman who testified that Appellant waved the gun around . Upon direct questioning by the Commonwealth, the officer only said that the statement given by Appellant was not consistent with that given by other witnesses . Defense counsel then proceeded to go into detail about the witnesses' statements. COUNSEL: You were told that - in your investigation, you were told that Mr. Coleman ran out of the house to get a firearm . Isn't that correct? OFFICER: I don't recall anyone saying that he ran . There were some statements that said that he had passed out, woke up, was angry that his money was gone, left, and came back 16 with the gun . That was one of the statements that I recall being made . COUNSEL : So all the statements weren't corr - the same, consistent, correct? OFFICER : They were all consistent, yes. COUNSEL: Another statement said he came out of the back room with a gun? OFFICER : Not that I - I didn't hear anyone tell me that he came out of the back room with a gun. Counsel for Appellant then sought to play the entire tape of the officer's prior testimony which included the very statements he complains of now. The judge only allowed the playing of that portion of the tape recording that impeached the officer's testimony. This portion of the tape apparently had nothing to do with the statements of witnesses . In other words, the defense used the risky strategy of impeaching the officer's testimony by attempting to show that his previous statements about what witnesses said were different from how he was testifying in court. It was, after all, during the Commonwealth's attempt to rehabilitate the officer that the more damning statements came into evidence. But for defense counsel's "opening the door," these hearsay statements would not have come into evidence . Undoubtedly, defense counsel felt no risk in opening this door since those very witnesses had been subpoenaed and were present to testify. Furthermore, I respectfully take issue with the statement of the majority that without the hearsay statements of the officer, "the evidence against Appellant was scant . . . ." This supposition is based upon this Court passing 1 7 judgment upon the credibility of the main witness, William Chipman . However, Chipman's testimony was sufficiently corroborated when the officers testified that it appeared Appellant dropped something exactly where the gun was found . Appellant's fortunes at trial turned even worse when his own star witness, Billie Melton, failed to deliver for him . She even admitted on cross- examination that the gun could have been Appellant's . Any error of the hearsay testimony of the officer was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt . Therefore, I would affirm . Venters, J ., joins this dissent . COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Shannon Renee Dupree Assistant Public Advocate Department of Public Advocacy Suite 301, 100 Fair Oaks Lane Frankfort, Kentucky 40601 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE : Jack Conway Attorney General Susan Roncarti Lenz Assistant Attorney General Office of Attorney General Criminal Appellate Division 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-8204