Title: Doe v. City of Lynn

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11822 
 
JOHN DOE1 & others2  vs.  CITY OF LYNN. 
 
 
 
Essex.     April 9, 2015. - August 28, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Sex Offender.  Municipal Corporations, By-laws and ordinances, 
Home rule.  Constitutional Law, Home Rule Amendment. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
April 12, 2012. 
 
 
The case was heard by Timothy Q. Feeley, J., on a motion 
for partial summary judgment, and entry of final judgment was 
ordered by him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
John A. Kiernan (Robert E. Koosa with him) for the 
defendant. 
 
John Reinstein (Benjamin H. Keehn, Committee for Public 
Counsel Services, & Jessie J. Rossman with him) for the 
plaintiffs. 
                     
 
1 A pseudonym. 
 
 
2 Charles Coe and Paul Poe, also pseudonyms.  The named 
plaintiffs are registered sex offenders suing on behalf of 
themselves and other persons similarly situated. 
2 
 
 
Amy M. Belger, Andrew S. Crouch, & Jennifer J. Cox, for 
Jacob Wetterling Resource Center & others, amici curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  In this appeal, we determine whether an 
ordinance imposing restrictions on the right of sex offenders to 
reside in the city of Lynn (city) is prohibited by the Home Rule 
Amendment, art. 89, § 6, of the Amendments to the Massachusetts 
Constitution, and the Home Rule Procedures Act, G. L. c. 43B, 
§ 13.  The plaintiffs, who represent a certified class of sex 
offenders subject to the ordinance, challenged the 
constitutionality of the ordinance on various grounds.3  A judge 
in the Superior Court invalidated the ordinance under the Home 
Rule Amendment.  The city appealed and we granted the 
plaintiffs' application for direct appellate review.  We affirm 
the Superior Court judgment based on our conclusion that the 
ordinance is inconsistent with the comprehensive statutory 
scheme governing the oversight of convicted sex offenders, and 
                     
 
3 The complaint alleged the following claims under the 
United States and Massachusetts Constitutions:  (1) violation of 
the Home Rule Amendment (Massachusetts Constitution); (2) 
violation of the clauses prohibiting ex post facto laws; (3) 
violation of the right to substantive due process; (4) violation 
of the right to familial association; (5) violation of the right 
to be protected from cruel and unusual punishment under the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and cruel or unusual punishment under art. 26 of 
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; and (6) violation of 
the right to travel. 
3 
 
therefore, it fails to pass muster under the Home Rule Amendment 
and the Home Rule Procedures Act.4 
 
Background.  We summarize the undisputed facts as drawn 
from the summary judgment record. 
 
1.  The ordinance.  The city adopted an "Ordinance 
Pertaining to Sex Offender Residency Restrictions in the [city]" 
(ordinance) on January 12, 2011.  The stated purpose of the 
ordinance is to "reduce the potential risk of harm to children 
of the community by impacting the ability of registered sex 
offenders to be in contact with unsuspecting children in 
locations that are primarily designed for use by, or are 
primarily used by children."  Observing that "[r]egistered sex 
offenders continue to reside in close proximity to public and 
private schools, parks and playgrounds," and that "registered 
sex offenders will continue to move to buildings, apartments, 
domiciles or residences in close proximity to schools, parks and 
playgrounds," the city council enacted the ordinance to "add 
location restrictions to such offenders where the [S]tate law is 
silent."  The ordinance imposes broad restrictions, with only 
narrow exceptions, on the ability of level two and level three 
                     
 
4 We acknowledge the amicus brief filed by Jacob Wetterling 
Resource Center, Association for the Treatment of Sexual 
Abusers, Massachusetts Association for the Treatment of Sexual 
Abusers, Inc., Reform Sex Offender Laws, Inc., and Florida 
Action Committee. 
4 
 
registered sex offenders to reside in the city.5  The ordinance 
establishes the area within 1,000 feet of a school or park as a 
residential exclusion zone for level two and level three sex 
offenders, and includes in its description of "school" all 
public, private, and church schools, and any other business 
permitted as a school.  The ordinance also applies to all 
temporary and permanent residences except a "residence at a 
hospital or other healthcare or medical facility for less than 
fourteen consecutive days or fourteen (14) days in the aggregate 
during any calendar year."  The geographical and temporal reach 
of the ordinance effectively prohibits all level two and level 
three sex offenders from establishing residence, or even 
spending the night in a shelter, in ninety-five per cent of the 
                     
 
5 The "Ordinance Pertaining to Sex Offender Residency 
Restrictions in the City of Lynn" (ordinance) also creates 
"Child Safety Zones," wherein level two and level three sex 
offenders are prohibited from entering a school, park, or 
recreational facility except in certain circumstances and from 
"loiter[ing]" within 1,000 feet of such facilities.  The 
parties, however, focused their arguments on the residency 
provision of the ordinance.  The plaintiffs' motion for partial 
summary judgment sought invalidation of the entire ordinance.  
The city of Lynn (city) did not present any argument, and the 
court entered a judgment declaring that the "Residency 
Ordinance" violates the Home Rule Amendment.  Thus, we know of 
no compelling reason to uphold any provision of the ordinance in 
light of the comprehensive State law discussed herein.  
Accordingly, we affirm the grant of partial summary judgment in 
favor of the plaintiffs, which invalidated the entire ordinance. 
5 
 
residential properties in Lynn.6  The ordinance would affect, at 
least in some degree, all 212 registered level two and level 
three sex offenders residing in the city, as of April 22, 2014.  
A sex offender required by the ordinance to move from his or her 
residence could encounter similar restrictions in attempting to 
relocate to nearby cities and towns.  At least forty 
municipalities have adopted sex offender residency restrictions.7  
The expansive coverage of the ordinance is mitigated by narrow 
exceptions to the residency restrictions applicable to those who 
(1) have established, prior to the effective date of the 
ordinance, a permanent residence within a restricted area by 
purchasing real property or by being the lessee of an unexpired 
lease or rental agreement; (2) are a "minor"; (3) are "residing 
                     
 
6 We note here the undisputed record evidence that of the 
19,320 real estate parcels zoned as residential, 18,421 are 
located within 1,000 feet of a school or park. 
 
 
7 According to an affidavit dated February 20, 2014, 
submitted as part of the summary judgment record and not 
disputed by the city, the following list of forty municipalities 
have enacted residency restrictions on certain sex offenders:  
Ashland; Ayer; Barre; Barnstable; Braintree; Charlemont; 
Charlton; Chelsea; Colrain; Dedham; Dudley; Fall River; 
Fitchburg; Framingham; Hanover; Hanson; Hopkinton; Hubbardston; 
Leominster; Lynn; Marlborough; Mendon; Natick; Norwood; Oxford; 
Pembroke; Revere; Rockland; Shirley; Somerset; Southborough; 
Spencer; Springfield; Swansea; Townsend; Waltham; Warren; 
Webster; West Boylston; and Weymouth.  The plaintiffs note that 
the Attorney General's office has continued to approve similar 
regulations, citing a letter from the Attorney General to North 
Reading, sent under G. L. c. 40, § 32, which approved North 
Reading's residency restriction bylaw on January 20, 2015. 
 
6 
 
with a person related by blood or marriage within the first 
degree of kindred"; or (4) have been residing at a permanent 
residence before the school or park creating the applicable 
restricted area was established. 
 
Failure to comply with the ordinance results in a penalty 
of $300 for each day that a sex offender subject to the 
ordinance remains in a restricted area thirty days after 
receiving a notice to move from the city, or if such sex 
offender moves within the city into a restricted area.  
Additionally, if there is a "subsequent offense," the sex 
offender's "landlord, parole officer and/or probation officer, 
and the . . . Sex Offender Registry Board" (board) shall be 
notified that the offender has violated a municipal ordinance. 
 
2.  Procedural history.  The plaintiffs, who represent a 
certified class of "all registered [l]evel [two] and [l]evel 
[three] sex offenders who are now or who may in the future be 
prohibited from living at various places in the [city] by the 
city's ordinance pertaining to sex offender residency 
restrictions," commenced this action after receiving the notices 
to move, as authorized under the ordinance.  The city sent 
letters notifying each that he lives within a restricted area 
under the ordinance and that he has thirty days from the date of 
the letter "to relocate to another address which is in 
compliance with the [o]rdinance" or be subject to a fine of $300 
7 
 
for each day of residing in a restricted area.8  The plaintiffs 
filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the counts in the 
complaint asserting that the ordinance (1) violates the Home 
Rule Amendment; (2) is an ex post facto law under the Federal 
and State Constitutions; and (3) violates the plaintiffs' right 
to travel under the Massachusetts Constitution.9  The city 
defended the ordinance by arguing, with regard to the Home Rule 
Amendment, that the residency restriction is not inconsistent 
with State law, and that the shared purpose -- the protection of 
children from sexual predators -- supports and supplements the 
law governing the oversight of sex offenders. 
 
In a thorough and well-reasoned memorandum of decision, the 
judge granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs and 
invalidated the ordinance under the Home Rule Amendment, 
concluding that that "the totality of the circumstances support 
                     
 
8 The letters state that the city is "unaware of any 
statutory exceptions" that may apply. 
 
 
9 During the course of litigation, the parties argued 
repeatedly over the scope of discovery.  The judge limited the 
subjects allowed in discovery and impounded identification of 
the plaintiffs' names.  The judge also denied the city's motions 
to compel the criminal records and Sex Offender Registry Board 
(board) classification recommendation files for the members of 
the plaintiff class.  Although the city argues that there are 
numerous material disputes of fact deriving from the limited 
discovery, the information that was sought is not relevant to 
the issue of whether the ordinance violates the Home Rule 
provisions.  See art. 89, § 6, of the Amendments to the 
Massachusetts Constitution; G. L. c. 43B, § 13. 
 
8 
 
an express legislative intent to forbid local activity in the 
area of the civil regulation and management of the post-
incarceration lives of convicted sex offenders."  In particular, 
the judge determined that the ordinance is inconsistent with 
G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C-178Q, the Sex Offender Registry Law 
(registry law); and G. L. c. 123A, the law providing for the 
"Care, Treatment and Rehabilitation of Sexually Dangerous 
Persons" (SDP law).  In light of this disposition, however, the 
judge declined to review the remaining constitutional claims. 
 
Discussion.  The city argues on appeal that the ordinance 
was adopted as a valid exercise of its police power, that there 
is no evidence of legislative intent to occupy the field 
governing the management of postincarceration sex offenders, and 
the ordinance does not conflict with State law.  The plaintiffs 
counter that the judge correctly determined that the ordinance 
is unconstitutional and urges this court to affirm the judge on 
the broader constitutional grounds asserted in their motion for 
partial summary judgment.  We decline to reach the broader 
constitutional grounds but we agree that the judge properly 
invalidated the ordinance as unconstitutional under the Home 
Rule Amendment. 
 
A local regulation is unconstitutional under the Home Rule 
Amendment if it is "inconsistent" with the constitution or laws 
of the Commonwealth.  Connors v. Boston, 430 Mass. 31, 35 
9 
 
(1999).  This principle is derived from the language of the Home 
Rule Amendment that provides: 
 
"Any city or town may, by the adoption, amendment, or 
repeal of local ordinances or by-laws, exercise any power 
or function which the general court has power to confer 
upon it, which is not inconsistent with the constitution or 
laws enacted by the general court in conformity with powers 
reserved to the general court by section eight, and which 
is not denied, either expressly or by clear implication, to 
the city or town by its charter, whether or not it has 
adopted a charter pursuant to section three." 
 
Art. 89, § 6, of the Amendments to the Massachusetts 
Constitution.  "[T]he touchstone of the analysis [of whether a 
local ordinance is inconsistent with State law] is whether the 
State Legislature intended to preempt the city's authority to 
act."  Connors, supra, citing Bloom v. Worcester, 363 Mass. 136, 
155 (1973).  Review of a local ordinance is focused on the 
Legislature's preemption prerogative because, as the title 
suggests, the Home Rule Amendment was enacted to restore to 
municipalities the "right of self-government in local matters."  
Art. 89, § 1, of the Amendments to the Massachusetts 
Constitution.  The genesis of the Home Rule Amendment as a means 
to expand municipal legislative authority10 thus informs the 
                     
 
10 The Home Rule Amendment was approved by a convention of 
the House and Senate in 1963 and 1965, and adopted by the voters 
in 1966.  Massachusetts Legislative Research Council Report 
Relative to Revising the Municipal Home Rule Amendment, 1971 
Senate Doc. No. 1455, at 58-59.  It annulled art. 2 of the 
Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, id. at 58, which 
had established municipalities as "hierarchical subordinates to 
 
10 
 
analytical directive that in reviewing a local ordinance, the 
"question is not whether the Legislature intended to grant 
authority to municipalities to act . . . , but rather whether 
the Legislature intended to deny [a municipality] the right to 
legislate on the subject [in question]."  Wendell v. Attorney 
Gen., 394 Mass. 518, 524 (1985).  "Municipalities enjoy 
'considerable latitude' in this regard," and a local regulation 
will not be invalidated unless the court finds a "sharp 
conflict" between the local and State provisions.  Easthampton 
Sav. Bank v. Springfield, 470 Mass. 284, 289 (2014), quoting 
Bloom, 363 Mass. at 154.  A sharp "conflict 'appears when either 
the legislative intent to preclude local action is clear, or, 
absent plain expression of such intent, the purpose of the 
legislation cannot be achieved in the face of the local by-
law.'"  Easthampton Sav. Bank, supra, quoting Grace v. 
Brookline, 379 Mass. 43, 54 (1979).  Where, as here, the 
                                                                  
the state Legislature that could only enact local legislation 
after receiving an affirmative grant of power" from the 
Legislature.  See Jerison, Home Rule in Massachusetts, 67 Mass. 
L. Rev. 51, 51 (1982).  Article 89, § 1, of the Amendments to 
the Massachusetts Constitution declared:  "It is the intention 
of this article to reaffirm the customary and traditional 
liberties of the people with respect to the conduct of their 
local government, and to grant and confirm to the people of 
every city and town the right of self-government in local 
matters, subject to the provisions of this article and to such 
standards and requirements as the general court may establish by 
law in accordance with the provisions of this article." 
 
11 
 
Legislature is silent on the issue of local regulation, we also 
may infer an intent to forbid local regulation if "legislation 
on a subject is so comprehensive that an inference would be 
justified that the Legislature intended to preempt the field."  
Easthampton Sav. Bank, supra, quoting  Wendell, 394 Mass. at 
524.  The burden is on the challenger to establish that the 
local enactment is "inconsistent" with the Constitution or State 
law.  Springfield Preservation Trust, Inc. v. Springfield 
Library & Museums Ass'n, Inc., 447 Mass. 408, 418 (2006), citing 
Grace, supra at 49-50. 
 
We turn now to the application of these principles to the 
ordinance.  Based on our de novo review of the judge's decision, 
Twomey v. Middleborough, 468 Mass. 260, 267 (2014), citing 
Ritter v. Massachusetts Cas. Ins. Co., 439 Mass. 214, 215 
(2003), we conclude that the ordinance is inconsistent with the 
comprehensive scheme of legislation intended to protect the 
public from convicted sex offenders and, thereby, manifests the 
"sharp conflict" that renders it unconstitutional under the Home 
Rule Amendment.  Although the registry law and the other laws 
governing sex offenders do not expressly prohibit local 
regulation, we infer from the comprehensive nature of the 
statutory scheme for oversight of sex offenders and the negative 
effect that the ordinance may have on the monitoring and 
12 
 
tracking of sex offenders, that the Legislature intended to 
preclude local regulation of sex offender residency options. 
 
To provide context for our conclusion that the Legislature 
intended to preclude further regulation of sex offender 
residence options, we first recapitulate the depth and breadth 
of the legislation mandating oversight of sex offenders.  In 
1999, the Legislature enacted a comprehensive package of laws 
which effected a major overhaul of the statutory scheme 
governing the identification, treatment and postrelease 
management of convicted sex offenders.  St. 1999, c. 74.  That 
package of laws, described as "An Act improving the sex offender 
registry and establishing civil commitment and community parole 
supervision for life for sex offenders," includes the registry 
law, G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C-178Q.  St. 1999, c. 74, as amended by 
St. 2003, c. 26, § 12.  The stated purpose of the act is to 
"assist local law enforcement agencies' efforts to protect their 
communities by requiring sex offenders to register and to 
authorize the release of necessary and relevant information 
about certain sex offenders to the public as provided in this 
act."  St. 1999, c. 74, § 1.  It accomplishes that purpose 
through three primary mechanisms:  (1) compelling sex offenders 
to register and maintain current personal information with the 
board and local police, and distributing such information in 
accordance with the registry law, G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C-178Q, 
13 
 
inserted by St. 1999, C. 74, § 2, as amended by St. 2003, c. 26, 
§ 12; (2) civilly confining certain offenders deemed most likely 
to reoffend, G. L. c. 123A, inserted by St. 1999, c. 74, §§ 3-8; 
and (3) controlling certain aspects of the postincarceration 
lives of certain sex offenders, G. L. c. 127, § 133D, inserted 
by St. 1999, c. 74, § 9 (community parole supervision for life). 
 
The first mechanism in the 1999 registry law, as amended 
through St. 2013, c. 63, requires that sex offenders update 
their registration information annually and when they change 
residences, employment, or schooling; a sex offender who is 
homeless must also update their registration information every 
thirty days and wear a global positioning system (GPS) device.  
G. L. c. 6, §§ 178F, 178F 1/2, 178F 3/4.  The law defines who is 
considered a "sex offender"; creates the board; requires sex 
offenders to register with the board; requires the board to 
create a central computerized registry of sex offender 
information and transmit that data to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and to police departments in the municipalities 
where the offender intends to live and work; creates a 
classification system for offenders subject to judicial review; 
and, after classification, requires sex offenders to maintain 
current registration information with local police.  G. L. c. 6, 
§§ 178C, 178D, 178E, 178F, 178F 1/2, 178K, 178L, 178M.  The law 
creates criminal penalties for failing to register and provides 
14 
 
a mechanism for terminating the obligation to register.  G. L. 
c. 6, §§ 178F, 178G, 178H, 178K. 
 
The registry law further provides guidelines for 
determining the offender's classification level, which is based 
on the risk of reoffense and the public safety interest in 
making registration information available to the public.  See 
G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (a)-(c).  In that regard, the 
classification level assigned to each sex offender depends, in 
part, on the amount of personal information deemed necessary for 
public safety and appropriate for public availability.11  
Registration information for level one sex offenders is not 
provided to the public, information for level two and level 
three offenders is available to the public by request or on the 
Internet,12 and information for level three offenders may be 
disseminated actively to the public.  G. L. c. 6, §§ 178D, 178I, 
178J. 
                     
 
11  The classification levels are to be determined based on 
the risk of reoffense, the degree of dangerousness posed to the 
public, and whether a public safety interest is served by public 
availability of information about the sex offender.  G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178K. 
 
 
12 Initially, only registration information for level three 
sex offenders was publically available on the Internet.  St. 
2003, c. 140, § 5.  Level two sex offenders were added in 2013.  
St. 2013, c. 38, §§ 7-13.  See Moe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 
467 Mass. 598, 616 (2014) (declaring unconstitutional 
retroactive application of amendment regarding level two data). 
 
15 
 
 
This framework demonstrates the legislative priority 
attached to monitoring the residence, employment, and schooling 
locations of sex offenders as a means to protect the public from 
sex offenders.  That monitoring sex offenders is a priority is 
demonstrated clearly by the Legislature's choice to insert only 
a narrow residency restriction in the registry law.  That 
restriction only bars level three offenders from residing in 
rest homes or similar long-term care facilities.  G. L. c. 6, 
§ 178K (2) (e).  Although we concluded in Doe v. Police Comm'r 
of Boston, 460 Mass. 342, 343 (2011), that this restriction was 
unconstitutional without an individualized hearing to determine 
the risk posed by the petitioner to the vulnerable community 
sought to be protected, the restriction is instructive of 
legislative intent.  This provision demonstrates that the 
Legislature considered and addressed potential risks involved 
with sex offender residency in relation to a vulnerable 
population.  We note that the Legislature limited its 
restriction to those offenders seeking to reside in an 
integrated setting with a vulnerable population and did not 
include those seeking to reside geographically close to a 
vulnerable population.  We infer from the details of the rest 
home restriction that the Legislature intended to exercise 
control over any sex offender residency requirements at the 
State level and that the Legislature may not have considered it 
16 
 
appropriate to create a blanket prohibition on residency.  The 
ordinance, which restricts all level two and level three sex 
offenders from living in ninety-five per cent of the residential 
areas of the city, conflicts with the relatively narrow rest 
home restriction created by the Legislature and is thus 
inconsistent with State law. 
 
As a final observation on the legislative choice to define 
the sex offender residency restriction narrowly, we note the 
grave societal and constitutional implications of the de jure 
residential segregation of sex offenders.  Except for the 
incarceration of persons under the criminal law and the civil 
commitment of mentally ill or dangerous persons, the days are 
long since past when whole communities of persons, such Native 
Americans and Japanese-Americans may be lawfully banished from 
our midst.13  Also, because of the tension between a sex 
offender's liberty interest, Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 
460 Mass. 336, 338 (2011), and the imperatives of public safety, 
the Legislature has demonstrated a concern for careful crafting 
                     
 
13 For later-condemned examples of banishing communities of 
people in the United States, see Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 
U.S. 620, 622-627, 630-631 (1970) (early 1800s treaties forcing 
Indian tribes to migrate to new land uninhabited by settlers) 
and Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (1940s 
exile of persons of Japanese ancestry from west coast). 
 
17 
 
of laws in a field fraught with constitutional peril.14  See 
Opinion of the Justices, 423 Mass. 1201, 1202-1203 (1996) 
(providing guidance from this court in determining 
constitutionality of community notification provisions of 
registry law).  For this reason as well, the Legislature cannot 
have intended to permit local regulation of sex offender 
residency. 
 
Apart from the conflict with the registry law's narrowly 
defined residency restriction, the ordinance also is 
inconsistent with the registry law in that it would undermine 
the effectiveness of the law's classification system.  The 
Legislature set forth guidelines to be used by the board in 
classifying sex offenders and included consideration of whether 
the "sex offender is residing in a home situation that provides 
guidance and supervision."  G. L. c. 6, 178K (1) (c).  The board 
                     
 
14 Constitutional peril is demonstrated through several 
cases challenging the constitutionality of the sex offender 
statutes.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cole, 468 Mass. 294, 296 
n.4, 308 (2014) (community parole supervision for life [CPSL] 
violates separation of powers provision of Massachusetts 
Constitution); Moe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 467 Mass. 598, 
599 (2014) (retroactive community notification of level two 
offenders violates due process provision of Massachusetts 
Constitution); Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 459 Mass. 603, 
621 (2011) (challenging CPSL statute on ex post facto grounds); 
Opinion of the Justices, 423 Mass. 1201, 1202-1203 (1996) 
(advising Senate of implication of double jeopardy provision of 
Federal Constitution and due process, ex post facto, equal 
protection, and cruel and unusual punishment provisions of 
Federal and Massachusetts Constitutions on community 
notification). 
18 
 
expanded on that factor by requiring consideration of whether an 
offender's "living and work situation is stable."  803 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 1.40(12) (2013) (identifying supportive home 
environment as factor minimizing sex offender's risk to reoffend 
and degree of dangerousness).  By requiring level two and level 
three sex offenders to move from their residences or face a 
civil penalty of $300 per day, the ordinance disrupts the 
stability of the home situations of sex offenders.  As a 
supervised and stable home situation has been recognized as a 
factor that minimizes the sex offender's risk of reoffense,15 
this disruption is inconsistent with the Legislature's goal of 
protecting the public.  Insofar as the ordinance is intended to 
impose residency restrictions on those sex offenders who may 
pose a risk to public safety that cannot be accommodated by the 
                     
 
15 See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.40(12) (2013).  See 
generally In re Taylor, 60 Cal. 4th 1019, 1040-1041 (2015) 
(finding residency restrictions unconstitutional where 
restrictions increased homelessness and "hampered the 
surveillance and supervision" of offenders subject to 
restriction); Levenson & Cotter, The Impact of Sex Offender 
Residence Restrictions: 1,000 Feet from Danger or One Step from 
Absurd?, 49 Int'l J. Offender Therapy & Comp. Criminology 168, 
169, 175 (2005) (decreased housing options from residency 
restrictions result in homeless and transience, make monitoring 
and treatment more difficult, and exacerbate sex offender 
recidivism); Yung, Banishment by a Thousand Laws: Residency 
Restrictions on Sex Offenders, 85 Wash. U. L. Rev. 101, 141-142 
(2007) (potential of sex offender ghettos to provide networking 
opportunities for future offenses and create "environments in 
which sexual violence is the norm, not the exception"). 
 
19 
 
registry law, the second mechanism in the 1999 package of laws, 
the SDP law, serves that purpose. St. 1999, c. 74, §§ 3-8, 
amending G. L. c. 127A.  Through the civil commitment procedure 
under G. L. c. 123A, the Legislature already has provided a 
method to exclude those sex offenders determined to be most 
likely to reoffend from the general population, even after their 
incarceration has been completed.  G. L. c. 123A.  Before a sex 
offender is released from incarceration, confinement, or 
commitment (with a limited exception for an offender imprisoned 
for six months or less on a parole violation), a determination 
is made whether that offender is likely to be a sexually 
dangerous person.  G. L. c. 123A, §§ 12-13.  If a judge 
determines, in accordance with certain procedures and 
evidentiary standards, that an offender has been "convicted of a 
sexual offense, suffers from a mental abnormality or personality 
disorder that renders him a menace to the health and safety of 
others, and is likely to engage in sexual offenses if not 
confined," the Commonwealth may civilly confine the offender.16  
Commonwealth v. Fay, 467 Mass. 574, 580, cert. denied, 135 S. 
Ct. 150 (2014), citing G. L. c. 127A, §§ 1, 14.  See Fay, supra 
                     
 
16 A committed sex offender may be discharged after a 
hearing if the trier of fact does not find that the person 
remains a sexually dangerous person.  G. L. c. 123A, § 9.  If 
discharge is granted, notice is given to local police where the 
offender plans to reside and other applicable parties.  Id. 
 
20 
 
at 585, n.13.  Accordingly, the SDP law is the Legislature's 
chosen method to control sex offenders where it has been 
determined that maintaining and distributing the offender's 
registry information is insufficient to protect a community's 
public safety interest.  The SDP law, therefore, further 
demonstrates the intent of the Legislature to focus on 
maintaining and distributing sex offender information as a means 
to protect the public for offenders who are not deemed dangerous 
enough to confine and the ordinance conflicts with that purpose 
by intruding on the controls deemed appropriate by the 
Legislature. 
 
The third mechanism in the 1999 package of laws, the 
community parole supervision for life (CPSL) law,17 together with 
other parole and probation laws, was intended to allow the 
Commonwealth to control sex offenders' postincarceration lives 
by requiring certain conditions dependent on the offender's 
particular situation.  See G. L. c. 127, §§ 133A (parole), 133D 
(CPSL), and 133D 1/2 (parole and CPSL controls); G. L. c. 265, 
§ 47 (probation controls).  In addition to discretionary 
controls that may be assessed, the Legislature mandated that all 
                     
 
17 In Commonwealth v. Cole, 468 Mass. 294, 305-306 (2014), 
we held that the CPSL law, G. L. c. 127, § 133D, violated the 
constitutional mandate of separation of powers. 
 
 
21 
 
persons under such controls wear a GPS device and be subject to 
certain geographic exclusion zones, "in and around the victim's 
residence, place of employment and school and other areas 
defined to minimize the [offender's] contact with children, if 
applicable."  G. L. c. 127, § 133D 1/2.  G. L. c. 265, § 47.  
See Commonwealth v. Guzman, 469 Mass. 492, 493 (2014) (GPS 
monitoring mandatory where defendant sentenced to probationary 
term for enumerated offense).18  The targeted approach to 
controlling sex offenders based on their particular circumstance 
and the GPS requirements set forth by the Legislature 
demonstrates the intent to encourage sex offender monitoring 
with minimum disruption to the stability of a broad population 
of offenders. 
 
In addition to the three mechanisms contained in the 1999 
package of laws, other laws support the legislative goal of 
protecting communities through monitoring sex offenders and 
controlling only specific situations most likely to cause harm.  
First, the various methods used to encourage registration 
demonstrate that maintaining current sex offender information is 
                     
 
18 The city argues that parole and probation statutes may 
not be considered in our analysis because none of the named 
plaintiffs is subject to the controls contained therein.  The 
statutes, however, are instructive as to the Legislature's 
intent for controlling sex offenders after incarceration and, 
therefore, are relevant to our analysis even if they do not 
affect the named plaintiffs. 
 
22 
 
a primary goal.  In addition to the criminal penalties contained 
in the registry law, G. L. c. 6, § 178H, the Legislature 
mandates that transient benefits be withheld, G. L. c. 18, § 38, 
and motor vehicle licenses and registration be suspended, G. L. 
c. 90, § 22 (j), if a sex offender has not maintained current 
registration information.  The Legislature also has imposed 
narrow restrictions to protect certain vulnerable communities 
from interaction with sex offenders instead of broadly affecting 
housing options for sex offenders.  General Laws c. 6, § 178K 
(2) (e), inserted by St. 2006, c. 303, § 6, prohibits level 
three sex offenders from living a rest home or other regulated 
long-term care facility. 19  In addition to this restriction, the 
Legislature has limited a sex offender's ability to live with 
adopted or foster children, G. L. c. 119, § 26A, or to work as a 
child care provider, G. L. c. 15D, §§ 7, 8, a school bus 
operator, G. L. c. 90, §§ 8A, 8A 1/2, or an ice cream truck 
vendor, G. L. c. 265, § 48. 
 
Conclusion.  The totality of the 1999 statutory scheme, 
incorporating as it does a series of interdependent policies and 
practices specifically designed to protect the public from level 
                     
 
19 This court deemed this provision to be unconstitutional 
as applied where there was no individualized determination of 
the risk of danger to the facility residents intended to be 
protected by the provision.  Doe v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 460 
Mass. 342, 351 (2011). 
23 
 
two and level three sex offenders by monitoring and notification 
to the public, evinces the Legislature's intent to have the 
first and final word on the subject of residency of sex 
offenders.  In addition, insofar as the ordinance effects a 
wholesale displacement of sex offenders from their residences, 
it frustrates the purpose of the registry law and, therefore, is 
inconsistent and invalid under the home rule provisions.  
Wendell, 394 Mass. at 527-528, citing Bloom, 363 Mass. at 156.  
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court 
invalidating the "Residency Ordinance."  In light of this 
disposition, we need not reach the broader constitutional 
grounds asserted by the plaintiffs and the amici.  Commonwealth 
v. Raposo, 453 Mass. 739, 743 (2009), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Paasche, 391 Mass. 18, 21 (1984) ("We do not decide 
constitutional questions unless they must necessarily be 
reached"). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.