Title: People v. Ellis

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 89649-Agenda 11-March 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
 								HARRY W. ELLIS, Appellee.
Opinion filed February 22, 2002.

	JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:
	In this case we are asked to decide whether Illinois will
recognize the "exculpatory no" doctrine as an exception to
criminal liability for obstruction of justice pursuant to section
31-4(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/31-4
(West 1996)). We answer that question in the negative.
	On October 25, 1996, the Lake County State's Attorney filed
an information against defendant, Harry W. Ellis, alleging
attempted obstruction of justice pursuant to section 31-4(a) of the
Code and unlawful display of vehicular registration pursuant to
section 4-104(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS
5/4-104(a) (West 1996)). Specifically, the State alleged that
defendant was operating a motor vehicle without proper
registration and, when detained by a police officer, provided false
information regarding his identity. The State also charged
defendant with driving on a revoked license.
	A jury convicted defendant of one count of attempted
obstruction of justice but acquitted him of unlawful display of
registration. 	Defendant was also convicted of driving on a
revoked license. Defendant appealed, arguing that he was denied
effective assistance of counsel and that the State improperly
bolstered the credibility of police witnesses at trial. The appellate
court did not reach the issues defendant raised and instead ruled
sua sponte that defendant's conviction must be overturned under
the "exculpatory no doctrine." No. 2-98-0832 (unpublished order
under Supreme Court Rule 23).
	 We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal. 166 Ill.
2d R. 315(a). We reverse and remand.

I. BACKGROUND
	Officer Tony Moran testified that he worked as a police
officer in Grayslake. He testified that, on October 4, 1996, he was
on patrol and noticed a car being driven with no rear registration
sticker. Moran stopped the car and asked the driver for
identification and proof of insurance. According to Moran, the
driver claimed that he did not have his license with him, that his
name was Gary Harris, and that his date of birth was September
14, 1954.
	Moran returned to his car and ran a computerized background
check. The background check revealed that Illinois databases
contained no record of a licensed driver with that name and date
of birth. When Moran returned and confronted the driver with this
information, the driver suggested that Moran try checking
Colorado. Similarly, a background check revealed that Colorado
databases contained no record of a licensed driver with that name
and date of birth. Moran again confronted the driver. The driver
maintained that his name was Gary Harris, but that his date of
birth was October 14, 1954. Moran still found no information in
either Illinois or Colorado databases. Moran wrote on his notepad
the name Gary Harris and both dates of birth that the driver had
given him. Moran showed the notepad to the driver and was told
that it was correct. Moran "knew [the driver] was lying *** or
obstructing a peace officer" and placed him under arrest.
	Moran subsequently searched the car's glove compartment
and found a driver's abstract containing the name Harry Ellis, born
October 14, 1956. The abstract contained a physical description
that matched that of the driver. Another background check
revealed that the Illinois Secretary of State had revoked Harry
Ellis' driver's license. Under Moran's questioning, the driver
admitted that his name was Harry Ellis and that his date of birth
was October 14, 1956.
	 The State also called Officer Randolph Heglund, who had
arrived on the scene as backup during the second background
check. His testimony corroborated Moran's.
	Defendant testified on his own behalf. Defendant testified that
he was stopped by Moran while driving a car belonging to a
gentleman named Gary Beckman. He claimed that, when Moran
asked his name, he replied "Harry Ellis." Defendant also testified
to a continuing error on his Illinois driver's license abstract,
misstating his birth date as October 4, 1956. He added that he
never had an opportunity to explain this problem to Moran.
	The defense also presented the testimony of Ricardo Javier
and Lucy Ora. Javier and Ora were passengers in the car at the
time of the stop. They both testified that defendant gave his correct
name and date of birth to Moran.
	Defendant was convicted of driving on a revoked license and
attempted obstruction of justice but acquitted of unlawful display
of registration. The trial court sentenced defendant to a six-month
jail term. The court stayed defendant's sentence pending the
successful completion of a one-year term of probation.
	Defendant appealed, arguing that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel and that the State improperly bolstered the
credibility of police witnesses at trial. The appellate court did not
reach these issues and instead ruled sua sponte that defendant's
conviction must be overturned under the "exculpatory no
doctrine." The appellate court found that defendant should not
have been prosecuted for attempted obstruction of justice when he
was the target of an officer's investigation and a truthful revelation
of his name would have been tantamount to an admission of
driving with a revoked license. 625 ILCS 5/6-303 (West 1996).
The appellate court reasoned that, despite the absence of briefing
or argument on the issue, justice required application of the
doctrine to avoid a grave error of law.
	We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d
R. 315.

II. ANALYSIS
	The issue of whether a defendant can rely upon the
exculpatory no doctrine to escape criminal liability pursuant to
section 31-4(a) of the Code is a question of law and therefore our
review is de novo. Department of Public Aid ex rel. Davis v.
Brewer, 183 Ill. 2d 540, 554 (1998).
	 Section 31-4(a) states in pertinent part as follows:
			"A person obstructs justice when, with intent to prevent
the apprehension or obstruct the prosecution or defense of
any person, he knowingly commits any of the following
acts:
			(a) *** furnishes false information." 720 ILCS 5/31-4
(West 1996).
	The exculpatory no doctrine originated in the federal courts as
an exception to section 1001 of title 18 United States Code (18
U.S.C. §1001 (1994)). This federal statute is similar to our
obstructing justice statute in that it forbids utterance of a false or
misleading statement. The federal doctrine essentially states that
a simple denial of guilt does not fall within the scope of section
1001. The doctrine is rooted in the legislative history of section
1001 and the additional theory that exception is necessary under
the fifth amendment because a truthful answer would have
incriminated the declarant. T. Thomas, Annotation, 102 A.L.R.
Fed. 742 (1991).
	Most federal courts of appeals have held that the exception
applies only to mere denials of criminal activity and not to
affirmative misrepresentations. United States v. Chevoor, 526 F.2d 178 (1st Cir. 1975); United States v. Adler, 380 F.2d 917 (2d Cir.
1967); United States v. Beer, 518 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Moore, 638 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Tabor, 788 F.2d 714 (11th Cir. 1986). See also United States v. North, 708 F. Supp. 364 (D.D.C. 1988).
	The United States Supreme Court, however, in Brogan v.
United States, 522 U.S. 398, 139 L. Ed. 2d 830, 118 S. Ct. 805
(1998), rejected the doctrine's application to section 1001. Section
1001 is similar to our obstructing justice statute and provides in
pertinent part as follows:
			"(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section,
whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the
executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the
Government of the United States, knowingly and
willfully-
				(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick,
scheme, or device a material fact;
				(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or
fraudulent statement or representation; or
				(3) makes or uses any false writing or document
knowing the same to contain any materially false,
fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry;
		shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
5 years, or both." (Emphasis added.) 18 U.S.C. §1001
(Supp. 1996).
The Court found that recognition of any type of exception for a
false statement, including a simple denial of wrongdoing,
constituted a "limitation that the text [of section 1001] would not
bear." Brogan, 522 U.S.  at 403, 139 L. Ed. 2d  at 837, 118 S. Ct. 
at 809. The Court held that section 1001, by its terms, covers
" 'any' " false statement " 'of whatever kind,' " including the use
of the word "no" in response to a question. Brogan, 522 U.S.  at
400, 139 L. Ed. 2d  at 835, 118 S. Ct.  at 808, quoting United States
v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5, 137 L. Ed. 2d 132, 138, 117 S. Ct. 1032, 1035 (1997).
	The exculpatory no doctrine also has historical roots in
Illinois law. Illinois courts first applied the doctrine to section
31-4(a) in People v. Brooks, 51 Ill. App. 3d 800, 805 (1977). In
Brooks, defendants were arrested following a shooting at a service
station. After receiving Miranda warnings and signing waivers,
defendants denied they were at the station on the date of the
occurrence or that they knew about a gun or a shooting.
Defendants were convicted of obstructing justice and other
charges.
	The appellate court reversed the obstruction convictions,
finding in part that defendants' answers formed the basis for their
convictions. Brooks, 51 Ill. App. 3d at 803. The court concluded
that, while section 31-4(a) contained no express exemption for
exculpatory denials of one's own guilt, the legislature did not
intend to include such statements within the obstructing justice
statute.
	The Brooks court indicated that its holding was limited to a
narrow factual scenario, noting specifically that defendants' false
statements exculpating their involvement in wrongdoing had been
made after they had been charged and that they were clearly the
targets of an investigation. Brooks, 51 Ill. App. 3d at 805. The
court further implied that it may have reached an opposite
conclusion under different circumstances. The court noted that
defendants' statements may have come within the ambit of the
obstructing justice statute had they gone "beyond the limits of his
own involvement in the crime charged *** and therefore beyond
his own denial of wrongdoing. Beyond those limits[,] a defendant
*** has no privilege to intentionally mislead the police or to
withhold information as to the crimes of others which are not
inextricably connected with the charge against him." Brooks, 51
Ill. App. 3d at 805.
	Thus, from its earliest introduction to Illinois law in Brooks,
the exculpatory no doctrine in this state has applied in situations
where (1) an obstructing justice defendant provided false answers
after being charged with a crime; (2) defendant was the target of
an investigation; (3) defendant's false answers were intended to
conceal his or her own wrongdoing; and (4) defendant's statement
did not go beyond a mere denial of wrongdoing. See Brooks, 51
Ill. App. 3d at 805.
	Our appellate court has reexamined the exculpatory no
doctrine in other cases and has generally adhered to these four
requirements. For example, in People v. Toolen, 116 Ill. App. 3d
632 (1983), the court elaborated on the distinction between a mere
denial of wrongdoing and an affirmatively false statement. Toolen
was charged with obstructing justice after he made false
statements to investigators and testified falsely at a grand jury
proceeding. On review, the appellate court rejected defendant's
reliance on the result reached in Brooks, deeming that case
distinguishable. Unlike Brooks, Toolen's actions went beyond
mere exculpatory denials of guilt and instead amounted
affirmatively to false and misleading statements. Toolen, 116 Ill.
App. 3d at 650-51. Thus, Toolen's statements were more akin to
the "different circumstances" that the Brooks court contemplated
(Brooks, 51 Ill. App. 3d at 805) and therefore the "exculpatory no"
doctrine did not apply. See Toolen, 116 Ill. App. 3d at 650-51. The
court elaborated and accepted the State's argument that "the
suspect of a criminal investigation has two permissible options: to
remain silent or to deny involvement in any crimes. If [a suspect
goes] beyond that[ ] and *** makes affirmatively false and
misleading statements, [the suspect] has come within the ambit of
the obstructing justice statute." Toolen, 116 Ill. App. 3d at 650.
Toolen's affirmative lies went beyond the two options.
	In People v. Jackiewicz, 163 Ill. App. 3d 1062 (1987),
Jackiewicz was charged with obstructing justice after he provided
false answers to investigators regarding an incident that involved
his brother. The appellate court distinguished Brooks and rejected
defendant's reliance on the exculpatory no doctrine because
Jackiewicz was not charged with a crime when he uttered the false
statements. Jackiewicz, 163 Ill. App. 3d at 1065. Additionally,
while the court did not specifically address these points, we note
that the discussion in Jackiewicz clearly indicates that defendant's
false statements were made in an attempt to conceal someone
else's wrongdoing and that they went beyond a mere denial of
guilt.
	In People v. Remias, 169 Ill. App. 3d 309 (1988), Remias was
charged with obstructing justice after offering false names to a
police officer. The appellate court rejected defendant's reliance on
the exculpatory no doctrine, finding it inapplicable under the
circumstances. The court found in part that, unlike the defendants
in Brooks, Remias had not been charged with a crime when he
uttered the false statements. Remias, 169 Ill. App. 3d at 311. The
court further distinguished Brooks by noting that the defendants in
that case were being questioned about their involvement in an
established offense and not merely being asked for identifying
information. The court rejected Remias' contention that he would
have effectively confessed his guilt by offering his correct name.
Remias, 169 Ill. App. 3d at 311.
	The sole Illinois case contradicting these principles is People
v. Alvarado, 301 Ill. App. 3d 1017 (1998). There, Alvarado was
charged with obstructing justice after he provided a false birth date
to a police officer. The appellate court found that defendant's
statement did not go "beyond the limits of his own direct
involvement" in wrongdoing and therefore the exculpatory no
doctrine applied. Alvarado, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 1024-25. This
conclusion is, however, contrary to the previously discussed
decisions of Illinois and federal courts considering the difference
between a mere exculpatory denial of wrongdoing and an
affirmative lie. E.g., Toolen, 116 Ill. App. 3d at 650-51
(distinguishing between a mere denial of wrongdoing and an
affirmative misrepresentation); Remias, 169 Ill. App. 3d at 311
(finding that defendant's act of providing false name to a police
officer went beyond a mere denial of wrongdoing). See also
Chevoor, 526 F.2d  at 183-84 (noting that defendant "did not even
go so far as to fabricate a misleading story in response to the
inquiries. He merely gave negative, oral responses to the
questioning"). Additionally, it appears that the Alvarado court did
not consider the fact that defendant had not been charged with a
crime when he misrepresented his birth date.
	This court has never considered whether the exculpatory no
doctrine can be used to shield a defendant from criminal liability
under section 31-4(a). We have also never commented on the
doctrine's breadth or elements. We need not address the latter
question because, for the reasons that follow, we answer the
former in the negative.
	In support of their respective positions favoring or opposing
adoption of the exculpatory no doctrine, the parties collectively
raise several arguments. Primarily, those arguments relate to the
following: (A) the plain language of section 31-4(a); (B) cases
from other jurisdictions considering the viability of the
exculpatory no doctrine; (C) constitutional concerns favoring
recognition of the exculpatory no doctrine; and (D) public policy
considerations. We address these issues in turn.

A. Plain Language of Section 31-4(a)
	The State first contends that the plain language of section
31-4(a) contradicts defendant's assertion of the exculpatory no
doctrine. Defendant counters that we should construe section
31-4(a) narrowly to preserve application of the exculpatory
doctrine, as the appellate court did in Brooks. We agree with the
State.
	The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and
give effect to the legislature's intent. Solich v. George & Anna
Portes Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76,
81 (1994). To determine the legislature's intent, a court first looks
to the statute's language, according that language its plain and
commonly understood meaning. If possible, the court must give
effect to every word, clause, and sentence; it must not read a
statute so as to render any part inoperative, superfluous, or
insignificant; and it must not depart from the statute's plain
language by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions
the legislature did not express. Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189 (1990).
	 As noted previously, a person obstructs justice pursuant to
section 31-4(a) of the Code when he or she knowingly furnishes
false information with intent to prevent the apprehension or
obstruct the prosecution of any person. 720 ILCS 5/31-4 (West
1996). In this case, the State alleged that defendant violated
section 31-4(a) when he furnished false information in an effort
to obstruct his own apprehension or prosecution. Before this court,
the State essentially argues that the phrase "any person" is
expansive and literally means any person, including situations
where the target of the apprehension or prosecution is also the
declarant of the false statement. Defendant counters that the
legislature could not have intended that the phrase "any person"
include the declarant of the false statement.
	We find that the phrase "any person" has a commonly
understood and ordinary meaning. It is broad and expansive and
therefore must include a person that makes false statements to
obstruct his or her own apprehension or prosecution. Any other
conclusion would depart from the well-settled rule that courts
must not depart from a statute's plain language by reading into it
exceptions that the legislature did not express. See Kraft, 138 Ill. 2d  at 189. If the legislature intended to exclude a declarant-suspect
from liability for false denials of information regarding his or her
true identity, it could have easily used alternate terms such as
"another person" or "of another" or "separate person." The
legislature did not use such language, and we are not in a position
to assume that the statute means something other than what it says.
We therefore reject defendant's argument on this point.
B. Other Jurisdictions Adopting the Exculpatory No Doctrine
	Defendant argues that we should follow the example set by
other jurisdictions that have adopted the exculpatory no doctrine
in analogous contexts, primarily State v. Pandozzi, 136 N.J. Super.
484, 347 A.2d 1 (1975), and its progeny. Initially, we note that
defendant's argument is less than compelling because other
jurisdictions have specifically rejected the exculpatory no doctrine.
E.g., People v. North, 964 P.2d 510, 512 (Colo. 1998). In any
event, for the reasons that follow, we necessarily reject
defendant's reliance on these cases.
	In Pandozzi, state investigators possessed substantial evidence
supporting a charge when they casually approached the suspect at
his business and asked him if he had received bribes. He denied it
and was subsequently charged with violating the "false
information" statute. N.J. Stat. Ann. §2A:148-2.21 (West 1969).
	The New Jersey Appellate Division traced the development
of the federal "exculpatory no" exception to liability under section
1001. Noting the parallel between the New Jersey "false
information" statute and section 1001, the Pandozzi court adopted
the exculpatory no doctrine and held that the New Jersey statute
excluded self-exculpating suspects from the phrase "any person."
Pandozzi, 136 N.J. Super. at 489, 347 A.2d  at 4-5. The court
reasoned that the prosecution is required to make its case without
relying on the accused to provide self-incriminating evidence.
Pandozzi, 136 N.J. Super. at 489, 347 A.2d  at 4, citing United
States v. Davey, 155 F. Supp. 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). The Pandozzi
court further reasoned that a literal reading of "any person" is
absurd where the unsworn statements were made without
procedural safeguards and in informal circumstances not likely to
provide the suspect actual notice of the danger that a false
utterance will result in its own criminal charge. Pandozzi, 136 N.J.
Super. at 489, 347 A.2d  at 3, citing United States v. Ehrlichmann,
379 F. Supp. 291 (D.D.C. 1974). Accord Friedman v. United
States, 374 F.2d 363, 367 (8th Cir. 1967). Finally, the court found
that a literal construction of the statute would have been extremely
unreasonable because it would render the concept of perjury
superfluous. Pandozzi, 136 N.J. Super. at 489, 347 A.2d  at 3. The
court did note, however, that when a defendant makes a false
statement that goes beyond a simple denial of wrongdoing, he
would run afoul of the false statements statute. Pandozzi, 136 N.J.
Super. at 491, 347 A.2d  at 5.
	Initially, we note that the facts of this case are distinguishable
from those of Pandozzi. Defendant here did not simply deny
breaking the law. Instead, he provided affirmatively false and
misleading answers to a police officer conducting an investigation.
Pandozzi specifically states that such conduct would not fall
within the ambit of the exculpatory no doctrine. Pandozzi, 136
N.J. Super. at 491, 347 A.2d  at 5.
	Further, we are unpersuaded by Pandozzi, its progeny, and its
predecessors. The exculpatory no doctrine's roots, as they existed
in these cases, were eviscerated by the United States Supreme
Court in Brogan. Given that the Supreme Court essentially
eliminated the exculpatory no doctrine from federal jurisprudence
in Brogan, we are necessarily inclined to find that cases preceding
Brogan, such as Pandozzi, are no longer persuasive precedent.

C. Constitutional Considerations 
Despite our finding that section 31-4(a)'s plain language
precludes reliance on the exculpatory no doctrine, defendant
nevertheless maintains that constitutional considerations require
its application. Specifically, defendant argues that the exculpatory
no doctrine is necessary to preserve his right to avoid self-incrimination. U.S. Const., amend. V; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §10.
We disagree.
	The Supreme Court rejected the same argument in Brogan.
Defendant in that case argued that "a literal reading of §1001
violate[d] the 'spirit' of the Fifth Amendment because it place[d]
a 'cornered suspect' in the 'cruel trilemma' of admitting guilt,
remaining silent, or falsely denying guilt." Brogan, 522 U.S.  at
404, 139 L. Ed. 2d  at 837, 118 S. Ct.  at 809-10. The Court found
that:
		"This 'trilemma' is wholly of the guilty suspect's own
making, of course. An innocent person will not find
himself in a similar quandary (as one commentator has
put it, the innocent person lacks even a 'lemma,' Allen,
The Simpson Affair, Reform of the Criminal Justice
Process, and Magic Bullets, 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 989,
1016 (1996)). And even the honest and contrite guilty
person will not regard the third prong of the 'trilemma'
(the blatant lie) as an available option. The bon mot 'cruel
trilemma' first appeared in Justice Goldberg's opinion for
the Court in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y.
Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), where it was used to explain
the importance of a suspect's Fifth Amendment right to
remain silent when subpoenaed to testify in an official
inquiry. Without that right, the opinion said, he would be
exposed 'to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury
or contempt.' [378 U.S.] at 55. In order to validate the
'exculpatory no,' the elements of this 'cruel trilemma'
have now been altered-ratcheted up, as it were, so that the
right to remain silent, which was the liberation from the
original trilemma, is now itself a cruelty. We are not
disposed to write into our law this species of compassion
inflation.
			Whether or not the predicament of the wrongdoer run
to ground tugs at the heartstrings, neither the text nor the
spirit of the Fifth Amendment confers a privilege to lie.
'[P]roper invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination allows a witness to
remain silent, but not to swear falsely.' United States v.
Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 117 (1980). See also United
States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174, 180 (1977); Bryson v.
United States, 396 U.S. 64, 72 (1969)." (Emphasis
omitted.) Brogan, 522 U.S.  at 404-05, 139 L. Ed. 2d  at
837-38, 118 S. Ct.  at 810.
We agree with the Supreme Court's finding that there is a
substantive difference between remaining silent and actively lying.
Neither the United States Constitution nor the Illinois Constitution
conveys a right to lie.
	We note that the absence of a right to lie did not leave
defendant without options. A suspect's entire right to remain silent
attaches regardless of whether the suspect is in custody or is the
focus of a criminal investigation and can be invoked before
custody. People v. Spivey, 209 Ill. App. 3d 584 (1991); People v.
Young, 201 Ill. App. 3d 521 (1990); People v. Christomos, 172 Ill.
App. 3d 585 (1988). A suspect may be silent without arrest or
other repercussion from the investigating officers or agencies.
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 99 S. Ct. 2637
(1979) (stating that a person cannot be stopped and required to
identify himself or herself absent reasonable suspicion of a crime);
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 431-38, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389, 397-401, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2384-88 (1991) (an individual can refuse to
cooperate with random investigatory approaches of officers).
Thus, defendant could have legally avoided prosecution for
attempted obstruction of justice by simply refusing to give his
name and date of birth. We therefore reject defendant's contention
on this point.

D. Public Policy Considerations
	Notwithstanding our finding that section 31-4(a)'s plain
language negates insulation of criminal liability under the
exculpatory no doctrine, defendant argues that the exculpatory no
doctrine is necessary to protect citizens from police and
prosecutorial overzealousness. Again, we disagree.
	The defendant in Brogan made an argument similar to
defendant's argument here. The Supreme Court was unpersuaded,
stating that:
		"The supposed danger is that overzealous prosecutors will
use this provision as a means of 'piling on'
offenses-sometimes punishing the denial of wrongdoing
more severely than the wrongdoing itself. The objectors'
principal grievance on this score, however, lies not with
the hypothetical prosecutors but with Congress itself,
which has decreed the obstruction of a legitimate
investigation to be a separate offense, and a serious one.
It is not for us to revise that judgment. Petitioner has been
unable to demonstrate, moreover, any history of
prosecutorial excess, either before or after widespread
judicial acceptance of the 'exculpatory no.' And finally,
if there is a problem of supposed 'overreaching' it is hard
to see how the doctrine of the 'exculpatory no' could
solve it. It is easy enough for an interrogator to press the
liar from the initial simple denial to a more detailed
fabrication that would not qualify for the exemption."
Brogan, 522 U.S.  at 405-06, 139 L. Ed. 2d  at 838-39, 118 S. Ct.  at 810.
	The Court did not, however, announce its rejection of an
"exculpatory no" exception in Brogan without lengthy discussion
of serious concerns arising from the misuse of "false statement"
statutes. See Brogan, 522 U.S.  at 408, 139 L. Ed. 2d  at 840, 118 S. Ct.  at 812 (Souter, J., concurring); 522 U.S.  at 408-18, 139 L. Ed. 2d  at 840-46, 118 S. Ct.  at 812-17 (Ginsburg, J., concurring,
joined by Souter, J.); 522 U.S.  at 418-21, 139 L. Ed. 2d  at 846-48,
118 S. Ct.  at 817-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Breyer, J.).
We share many of those concerns. For example, Justice Ginsburg
noted the Solicitor General's concession that, without the
exculpatory no doctrine, prosecutors or police officers could
" 'escalate completely innocent conduct into a felony.' " Brogan,
522 U.S.  at 411, 139 L. Ed. 2d  at 843, 118 S. Ct.  at 813 (Ginsburg,
J., concurring, joined by Souter, J.). She cited several cases where
government officials essentially visited suspects with the express
purpose of obtaining incriminating statements rather than
obtaining information. E.g., United States v. Dempsey, 740 F. Supp. 1299, 1306 (N.D. Ill. 1990); United States v. Tabor, 788 F.2d 714 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Goldfine, 538 F.2d 815, 820 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Stoffey, 279 F.2d 924,
927 (7th Cir. 1960). Additionally, because investigators often
expect a suspect to provide false answers, false statement statutes
could become a powerful tool to trap a potential defendant. Agents
need only informally approach the suspect and elicit a false
response and they are assured of a conviction with a harsh penalty
even if they are unable to prove the underlying substantive crime.
Brogan, 522 U.S.  at 409 n.1, 139 L. Ed. 2d  at 841 n.1, 118 S. Ct. 
at 812 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., concurring, joined by Souter, J.), citing
Note, Fairness in Criminal Investigations Under the Federal
False Statement Statute, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 316, 325-26 (1977).
Justice Ginsburg also cited another commentator's observation
that, if an investigator finds it difficult to prove some elements of
a crime, he or she can ask questions about other known and
provable elements. If the suspect answers falsely, the investigator
can then use the crime he or she has prompted as leverage or can
seek prosecution for the lie as a substitute for the crime he or she
cannot prove. Brogan, 522 U.S.  at 411, 139 L. Ed. 2d  at 842, 118 S. Ct.  at 813 (Ginsburg, J., concurring, joined by Souter, J.), citing
Comment, False Statements to Federal Agents: Induced Lies and
the Exculpatory No, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1273, 1278 (1990). While
these concerns are legitimate, we are not faced with a situation
where an officer had notice that defendant's license was revoked.
We are also not faced with a situation where the officer could not
charge defendant with something but for the false statement. We
also note that defendant clearly knew that he was driving illegally
and that, if caught, he would be subject to severe penalties.
	Additionally, as the Brogan majority noted, adoption of the
exculpatory no doctrine may not necessarily protect against
overreaching by police and prosecutors. The answer to this
problem lies primarily with the legislature. Our General Assembly
has the authority to amend section 31-4(a) in such a way that it
cannot be misused. We also acknowledge the existence of several
devices that can help prevent police and prosecutor
overzealousness, including rules of professional responsibility for
attorneys and existing judicial doctrines like the exclusionary rule.
Most importantly, a suspect can simply exercise his or her right to
remain silent. In sum, we simply cannot overlook section
31-4(a)'s clear language and adopt the exculpatory no doctrine
merely because its absence could expose liars to excessive
criminal sanctions. We find that public policy considerations,
while legitimate, do no necessitate adoption of the exculpatory no
doctrine in this context.

III. CONCLUSION
	We find that the plain language of section 31-4(a) of the Code
negates defendant's argument that the exculpatory no doctrine
insulates him from criminal liability. Section 31-4(a) clearly
makes it a crime to impede the apprehension or prosecution of
"any person" by making false statements. Section 31-4(a) contains
no express exception for situations where the declarant of the false
statement is also the target of the intended apprehension or
prosecution. We are not inclined to infer such an exception in this
case.
	We further find that cases from other jurisdictions adopting
the exculpatory no doctrine are undercut by the United States
Supreme Court's findings in Brogan. We also find that
constitutional considerations do not necessitate our adoption of the
exculpatory no doctrine in this context. Finally, we are
unpersuaded by defendant's argument that public policy
considerations require application of the exculpatory no doctrine
under these facts.
	Since the appellate court's entire rationale rested upon its
application of the exculpatory no doctrine in overturning
defendant's conviction for obstruction of justice, its judgment is
hereby reversed. We remand to the appellate court for
consideration of those issues that were properly raised and argued
by the parties.
Reversed and remanded
 with directions.