Title: State v. Carter

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Carter, 89 Ohio St.3d 593, 2000-Ohio-172.] 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. CARTER, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Carter (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 593.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder — Death penalty upheld, when. 
(No. 98-921 — Submitted February 22, 2000 — Decided September 13, 2000.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Common Pleas of Trumbull County, No. 97-CR-558. 
 
Appellant, Sean Carter (“Carter”), was charged with aggravated murder 
committed during an aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and rape.  He was 
also charged with three felony-murder specifications, as well as separate counts of 
aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and rape. He was convicted of 
aggravated murder and two of the specifications, aggravated robbery, rape, and 
the lesser-included offense of criminal trespass.  The jury recommended that 
Carter be sentenced to death, and the trial court adopted the jury’s 
recommendation. 
 
Evely Prince Carter adopted Sean Carter when he was ten years old.  
Carter had been taken from his birth mother in 1981, due to neglect and abuse.  
Evely Carter lived in close proximity to her mother, Veader Prince (“Prince”), the 
victim in this case.  In February 1997, Carter had been thrown out of Evely 
Carter’s house and began living with Prince, his adoptive grandmother.  He stayed 
there until July 1997, when he was incarcerated at the Geauga County Jail for 
theft. 
 
On Saturday, September 13, 1997, Vernon Prince, Prince’s son, stopped 
by to see his mother and noticed Carter sleeping in her house.  Prince was not 
there.  As Vernon Prince was leaving, Prince pulled in the driveway and upon 
being questioned, told Vernon Prince that she did not know that Carter was there.  
Prince and Vernon Prince went inside the house and Prince talked to Carter.  
When she came out of the room where Carter had been sleeping, Prince asked 
 
 
2 
Vernon Prince to give Carter the keys and title to his car (blue 1984 Chevette) so 
that Carter could leave.  Vernon Prince complied with this request.  Vernon 
Prince also gave his mother some money ($250) before he left.  At that time, 
Carter was still in Prince’s house. 
 
That same day, Evely Carter worked from 2:00 p.m. until 10:00 p.m.  
During her shift, she received a telephone call from her husband, informing her 
that Carter had been released from jail.  She stopped at Prince’s house after she 
got off work, arriving at 10:45 p.m.  She tried to enter the door and found that it 
was locked, something her mother had never done.  She knocked on her mother’s 
window and then her mother opened the door. 
 
Prince explained to Evely Carter that the door was locked because she 
“told that boy [Carter] that he wasn’t allowed to come back here.”   When Evely 
Carter saw her mother that night, Prince was wearing a white turban with a long 
john top underneath a white T-shirt and long john bottoms. 
 
Evely Carter went to work the next day, Sunday, September 14, and did 
not get off work until 11:00 p.m.  Her husband called her at work and told her that 
she should check on her mother because no one could find her.  Evely Carter went 
to Prince’s house.  She entered and called out for her mother.  There was no 
answer.  She left Prince’s house to get her husband and returned with him to 
Prince’s house.  At that time it was midnight. 
 
Also on Sunday, another of Prince’s sons,  Travis Prince, had gone to 
Prince’s house around 10:00 a.m.  He had walked into her bedroom and heard  
water running in the bathroom.  Though the door to the bathroom was closed, he 
could tell the light was on.  He went into the kitchen of the house and saw chicken 
in a pot on the stove, simmering.  Travis Prince left the house. 
 
When he returned later in the day, he saw the same scene.  This time, he 
opened the bathroom door, and upon discovering that it was empty, he turned the 
water off.  He yelled for his mother and, getting no answer, became alarmed.  He 
 
 
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returned to the kitchen to turn off the stove and then began going through each 
room calling for his mother. 
 
After searching the house and yard, he returned to the kitchen and noticed 
a note on the table that said, “Took Sean to the hospital.”  At that point he had not 
noticed any blood in the house.  He did not think it was Carter, because he 
believed that Carter was still in the county jail.  Since he could not find her, her 
purse, or her keys, he decided that his mother must have given a ride to someone, 
and ceased being concerned.  Travis Prince left the house around 7:00 p.m., and 
returned to his apartment. 
 
When he arrived home, he called his brother-in-law, Jerry Carter (Evely 
Carter’s husband), and asked if he had seen Prince, but he had not.  Jerry Carter 
went to Prince’s house and could not find Prince.  He told Travis Prince that 
Evely Carter would check again at 11:00 p.m., after she got off work.  Travis 
Prince met the Carters at his mother’s house around 11:15 p.m., and talked to 
neighbors to see if they knew anything about Prince’s absence.  Jerry and Evely 
Carter and their nephew, James Shoper, began to search the area. 
 
They searched the garage and the cars in the driveway.  Evely Carter 
noticed a garbage bag with clothes in one of the vans.  They went back into the 
house, and then down into the basement.  Evely Carter noticed a chair that had 
blood on it.  As they continued searching the basement, they saw Prince’s feet 
sticking out of a pile of clothes on the basement floor.  They called the police 
immediately. 
 
Once the clothes were removed, Prince was found lying face down on the 
basement floor.  She was wearing only a white T-shirt, which was covered with 
blood and had holes.  Her glasses were pushed up on her head and one of the 
lenses was missing, found later on the floor of the basement.  Her dentures were 
discovered in the master bedroom.  Prince’s body appeared to have lacerations on 
her hands and face.  Police found significant bloodstains on the carpet in the 
 
 
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master bedroom, on a couch, and on the mattress.  They also found droplets and 
stains of blood  on the stairs and the walls leading to the basement. 
 
An autopsy revealed that Prince had suffered eighteen stab wounds, a 
subarachnoid hemorrhage caused by blunt trauma, abrasions, and contusions to 
her right thigh.  The left side of her face was swollen, indicating blunt trauma.  
One stab wound nicked the aorta, which was the immediate cause of death.  Other 
forensic testing revealed the presence of sperm, located on a swab taken from the 
rectum of the victim.  The swabs taken of the mouth and vagina were negative.  
DNA testing matched the rectal swab to Carter. 
 
After talking to the family during the investigation, the police placed a 
“pick-up and hold” order on Carter.  They learned that another of Prince’s sons 
had been in jail with Carter, and that Carter had made a remark to him about not 
getting along with his grandmother. 
 
On September 15, 1997, Daniel Hepler, a police officer with the Chippewa 
Township Police in Beaver County, Pennsylvania, was on patrol when he noticed 
a vehicle backed in among some small trees.  The car had Ohio plates and he 
called the dispatcher to run the plate number.  Hepler approached the vehicle and 
noticed a person (Carter) sleeping in the back seat.  He knocked on the window 
and asked Carter to get out of the car.  Carter had no identification or registration 
information for the vehicle.  Carter told Hepler his name was “Bill Carl” and gave 
him a date of birth; a computer search revealed that no such person existed.  The 
license plate information came back as registered to a Chrysler vehicle, even 
though the vehicle was a Chevrolet.  Because the name and date of birth provided 
by Carter were false and the car’s registration was fraudulent, Hepler told Carter 
that he was going to issue a citation and tow the car. 
 
While waiting for the tow truck to arrive, Hepler did a plain view 
inspection of the car for personal effects.  Carter stated he did not want anything 
from the car.  Hepler found two sets of keys and some money, which he gave to 
 
 
5 
Carter.  When the tow truck arrived, Hepler transported Carter to the police 
department.  Carter appeared confused and kept asking Hepler where he was. 
 
When the vehicle registration came back as not matching the vehicle, 
Hepler obtained the vehicle identification number (VIN) and ran it through the 
computer.  The car was registered to Vernon Prince.  Hepler obtained a phone 
number and telephoned the Prince residence.  The woman who answered the 
phone informed Hepler that the man he had in custody was wanted for murder. 
 
Hepler contacted the Trumbull County Sheriff’s Department and verified 
that Carter was wanted for questioning relating to a murder.  Carter was placed in 
a holding cell while detectives from the sheriff’s department traveled to 
Pennsylvania. 
 
Major James Phillips, Sergeant Hyde, and Lieutenant Borger traveled to 
Chippewa Township to question Carter.  After giving Carter his Miranda 
warnings and obtaining a waiver of his rights, Phillips and Hyde obtained an 
audio and video confession to the murder of Veader Prince. 
 
According to Carter’s confession, after he obtained the car keys from 
Vernon Prince, he left Prince’s house and drove around for a while.  He attempted 
to stay at his aunt’s house, but could not.  He returned to Prince’s house and, since 
the door was locked, climbed through the bedroom window.  He had called out to 
Prince, hoping to convince her to allow him to stay there for a week.  They got 
into an argument and Prince told him to leave.  He kept telling her that he had 
nowhere to go. 
 
She tried to push him out the door and he started to beat her.  At some 
point, he got a knife from the kitchen and started stabbing her.  He described it as 
just “going off” and could not provide exact details of what happened during the 
assault, although he did remember hitting her in the face and stabbing her in the 
neck. 
 
 
6 
 
The next thing Carter remembered was being in the kitchen and washing 
his hands and the knife.  He walked downstairs and saw Prince on the basement 
floor and then started to cover things up.  He covered her with some clothes, 
moved the couch in her bedroom to cover up blood on the carpet, turned the water 
on in her bathroom and closed the door, and put a chicken in a pot on the stove 
and turned the stove on.  He left a note on the kitchen table saying, “Took Sean to 
the hospital” in case someone saw blood in the house.  He changed his clothes, 
since they were bloody.  He then took about $150 from her purse and left. 
 
He originally took her keys, thinking he would take one of her vans, and 
actually put his bag of clothes in the van, but could not get the van started.  He got 
into Vernon Prince’s car and drove off.  Since he did not have a license plate,  he 
stopped to steal a plate from a car in Garrettsville.  To remove and transfer the 
plates to his car, he used the knife that he had stabbed his grandmother with. 
 
Upon direct questioning by the officers, Carter denied taking off his 
grandmother’s clothes or raping her, but admitted she was wearing only a T-shirt  
when he left her.  After Carter signed a waiver allowing his car to be searched, the 
knife was found in the car.  He waived extradition and was brought back to Ohio 
for prosecution. 
 
Carter was indicted for one count of aggravated murder (R.C. 2903.01[B]) 
with three capital specifications (R.C. 2929.04[A][7]), aggravated burglary, 
aggravated robbery, and rape.  He was also indicted on one count of aggravated 
burglary, one count of aggravated robbery, and one count of rape. 
 
After a jury trial, during which he absented himself from most of the 
proceedings, Carter was found guilty of aggravated murder and two of the capital 
specifications, aggravated robbery, and rape.  The jury also found Carter guilty of 
aggravated robbery, rape, and the lesser-included offense of criminal trespass on 
the aggravated burglary charge, and Carter was sentenced to prison on these 
charges. 
 
 
7 
 
After a penalty hearing, the jury recommended that the death sentence be 
imposed, and the trial court adopted the jury’s recommendation. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecuting Attorney, and LuWayne 
Annos, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Thomas E. Zena and John B. Juhasz, for appellant. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  In this appeal, Carter raises fourteen propositions of law.  
For the reasons that follow, we reject each of his propositions of law and affirm 
each conviction and the death sentence. 
Missing Element in Indictment 
 
In his first proposition of law, Carter argues that his death sentence is void 
because an element of the offense of rape was missing from the charge in the 
fourth count of the indictment.  The fourth count alleged as follows:  “THE 
JURORS OF THE GRAND JURY of the State of Ohio, within and for the body of 
the County aforesaid, on their oaths, in the name and by the authority of the State 
of Ohio, do find and present that on or about the 14th day of September 1997, at 
Trumbull County, Ohio, SEAN M. CARTER did by purposefully compelling 
Veader Prince to submit by force or threat of force, in violation of the Ohio 
Revised Code, Title 29, Section 2907.02(A)(2), and against the peace and dignity 
of the State of Ohio [sic].” 
 
R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) provides that “No person shall engage in sexual 
conduct with another when the offender purposely compels the other person to 
submit by force or threat of force.” 
 
A comparison of the indictment and the statute reveals that the words 
“engage in sexual conduct” are missing from the indictment.  The state concedes  
that the indictment on the rape count is missing the “engaging in sexual conduct” 
 
 
8 
language, but argues that even if this court were to find this to be reversible error, 
only the fourth count of the indictment would be affected. 
 
In the bill of particulars, the state specified as follows:  “The defendant 
repeatedly beat the victim with his fists, stabbed her multiple times with a knife 
and he forcibly engaged in sexual conduct with the victim (specifically the 
defendant had anal intercourse with Mrs. Prince).”  Carter never objected to the 
indictment and there is no indication that Carter was unaware of the charges 
against him. 
 
Crim.R. 7 provides in pertinent part: 
 
“(B) Nature and contents 
 
“The statement may be made in ordinary and concise language without 
technical averments or allegations not essential to be proved. The statement may 
be in the words of the applicable section of the statute, provided the words of that 
statute charge an offense, or in words sufficient to give the defendant notice of all 
the elements of the offense with which the defendant is charged. It may be alleged 
in a single count that the means by which the defendant committed the offense are 
unknown or that the defendant committed it by one or more specified means. 
Each count of the indictment or information shall state the numerical designation 
of the statute that the defendant is alleged to have violated. Error in the numerical 
designation or omission of the numerical designation shall not be ground for 
dismissal of the indictment or information, or for reversal of a conviction, if the 
error or omission did not prejudicially mislead the defendant.” 
 
Carter argues now that he did not have notice of the charges against him 
and was unable to defend himself.  However, Carter never challenged the 
sufficiency of the indictment at any time before or during his trial.  An appellate 
court need not consider an error that was not called to the attention of the trial 
court at a time when such error could have been avoided or corrected by the trial 
court.  State v. Williams (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 117, 5 O.O.3d 98, 101, 364 
 
 
9 
N.E.2d 1364, 1367.  As a result, such error is waived absent plain error.  State v. 
Moreland (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 58, 62, 552 N.E.2d 894, 899.  Plain error does 
not exist unless, but for the error, the outcome at trial would have been different.  
Id. 
 
The record reveals that of all the charges against him, Carter vigorously 
defended against the charge of rape.  Carter challenged the state’s forensic experts 
on evidence that supported the charge of rape and even sought appointment of his 
own expert to testify concerning the evidence of rape.  His claim now that he did 
not have notice of the charges is without merit. 
 
Carter alleges that the error in the indictment is fatal error.  Were this true, 
it would be fatal only as it relates to count four, the rape count.  While Carter 
argues that this defect also affects the aggravated murder charge and the capital 
specification attached thereto, this argument lacks merit.  If the state seeks the 
death penalty for a defendant who commits aggravated murder, the indictment 
charging the offense must contain at least one of the specifications enumerated in 
R.C. 2929.04(A)(1) through (9).  R.C. 2929.04(A) provides:  “Imposition of the 
death penalty for aggravated murder is precluded unless one or more of the 
following is specified in the indictment or count in the indictment pursuant to 
section 2941.14 of the Revised Code and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
That section then sets out nine different aggravating circumstances.  See State v. 
Joseph (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 450, 456, 653 N.E.2d 285, 291-292. 
 
The form of the specification is governed by R.C. 2941.14(C), which 
requires that the aggravating circumstance “ ‘may be stated in the words of the 
subdivision in which it appears, or in words sufficient to give the accused notice 
of the same.’ ”  Thus, the language of the statute clearly provides that the 
specification is sufficient if the accused knows which subsection or which 
aggravating circumstance of the nine listed in R.C. 2929.04(A) has been alleged. 
 
 
10 
 
Here, the aggravated murder count specifies that the victim was 
purposefully killed during the course of a rape, and specification three charges 
Carter under R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) with committing the offense during the course of 
a rape.  Further, the trial court correctly instructed the jury as to all the elements 
constituting rape.  The capital offense remains unaffected by this defect in the 
indictment. 
 
Furthermore, even as it relates to the rape count, appellant has not shown 
that he was prejudiced in the defense of his case by this error or that he would 
have proceeded differently had this error been corrected.  Indeed, had the error 
been discovered, it was properly subject to amendment. Crim.R. 7(D); State v. 
O’Brien (1987), 30 Ohio St.3d 122, 30 OBR 436, 508 N.E.2d 144, paragraph two 
of the syllabus. 
 
Carter had sufficient notice that he was charged with raping Prince and he 
was not prejudiced by the error in the indictment.  Carter’s first proposition of law 
is overruled. 
Failure to Give Lesser-Included-Offense Instructions 
 
In his second proposition of law, Carter argues that the trial court erred by 
failing to give the jury lesser-included-offense instructions on aggravated murder 
(murder and manslaughter requested), aggravated robbery (theft requested), and 
rape (gross sexual imposition requested).  The trial court denied these requests.1   
In State v. Deem (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 205, 533 N.E.2d 294, paragraph three of 
the syllabus, this court set out the test used to determine whether one offense 
constitutes a lesser-included offense of another: 
 
“An offense may be a lesser included offense of another if (i) the offense 
carries a lesser penalty than the other; (ii) the greater offense cannot, as statutorily 
defined, ever be committed without the lesser offense, as statutorily defined, also 
being committed; and (iii) some element of the greater offense is not required to 
prove the commission of the lesser offense.” 
 
 
11 
 
An instruction on a lesser-included offense is required only where the 
evidence presented at trial would reasonably support both an acquittal on the 
crime charged and a conviction on the lesser-included offense.  State v. Thomas 
(1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 213, 533 N.E.2d 286, paragraph two of the syllabus; State 
v. Palmer (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 543, 562, 687 N.E.2d 685, 702. 
 
Aggravated Robbery.  Carter argues that the jury should have received a 
lesser-included-offense instruction because he did not take money until after 
Prince was dead.2  Carter argues that he did not form the intent to take the money 
until after his grandmother was dead, and even then, only when he realized that he 
needed money.  Carter supports his reasoning by noting that he took only one 
hundred and fifty dollars from Prince’s purse, even though the purse contained 
approximately four hundred and fifty dollars. 
 
Carter was indicted for aggravated robbery under R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) and 
2911.01(A)(3).  Those sections provide as follows: 
 
“(A) No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense, as defined in 
section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, or in fleeing immediately after the attempt 
or offense, shall do any of the following: 
 
“(1) Have a deadly weapon on or about the offender’s person or under the 
offender’s control and either display the weapon, brandish it, indicate that the 
offender possesses it, or use it; 
 
“ * * * 
 
“(3) Inflict, or attempt to inflict, serious physical harm on another.” 
 
A “theft offense” is defined in R.C. 2913.02 as follows: 
 
“(A) No person, with purpose to deprive the owner of property or services, 
shall knowingly obtain or exert control over either the property or services in any 
of the following ways: 
 
“(1) Without the consent of the owner or person authorized to give 
consent; 
 
 
12 
 
“(2) Beyond the scope of the express or implied consent of the owner or 
person authorized to give consent; 
 
“(3) By deception; 
 
“(4) By threat; 
 
“(5) By intimidation.” 
 
Theft carries a lesser penalty than aggravated robbery.  Further, one 
element of aggravated robbery, R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), having a deadly weapon on 
or about the accused’s person or under his or her control, is not required to prove 
theft.  Thus, the first and third elements of the Deem test are clearly satisfied. 
 
The issue becomes whether aggravated robbery, as statutorily defined 
above, can ever be committed without theft, as statutorily defined above, also 
being committed.  We answer that question in the affirmative because aggravated 
robbery can be committed in the course of an “attempted theft.” R.C. 2913.02; 
2923.02.  Theft requires the accused to actually obtain or exert control over the 
property or services of another; attempted theft does not.  Since theft is not a 
lesser-included offense of aggravated robbery, the trial court did not err by not 
providing a lesser-including-offense instruction. 
 
Rape.  Carter argues that there was no “sexual conduct,” i.e., penetration, 
to the anus of the victim.  Instead, Carter presented a theory at trial that the semen 
was deposited on the outside of the body and seeped into the anus.  The evidence 
in the record strongly supported the state’s theory that Carter’s sperm, found in 
the victim’s anus and positively identified through DNA testing, was placed there 
through the insertion of Carter’s penis into the victim’s anus.  The evidence did 
not support an acquittal on the charge of rape. 
 
Aggravated Murder.  The distinguishing element of aggravated murder 
and murder is the commission of a murder during a felony.  The felonies charged 
were rape and aggravated robbery.  Here the evidence clearly supported the 
commission of a rape; therefore, the trial court properly denied a lesser-included-
 
 
13 
offense instruction on murder.  See State v. Tyler (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 24, 36, 
553 N.E.2d 576, 591-592. 
 
Carter also argues that the theft of money from the victim did not occur 
“while” the offender was committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing 
immediately after committing or attempting to commit the aggravated murder.  
Appellant suggests that implicit in the meaning of the word “while,” as it appears 
in R.C. 2929.04(A)(7), is a requirement that there be evidence of some type of 
motivational nexus between the aggravated murder and the underlying felony, in 
this case the aggravated robbery. 
 
This court has previously held that the robbery need not take place prior to 
or simultaneously with the murder and that a defendant “cannot escape the effect 
of the felony-murder rule by claiming that the aggravated robbery was simply an 
afterthought.”  State v. Biros (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 426, 451, 678 N.E.2d 891, 
912; State v. Williams (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 569, 577-578, 660 N.E.2d 724, 732-
733.  Accordingly, it was not error to fail to instruct on the lesser-included offense 
of murder, as it related to the aggravated robbery offense. 
 
Carter’s request for a voluntary manslaughter instruction was properly 
denied, since the evidence, including that the victim was stabbed eighteen times, 
fully supported a purposeful killing.  State v. Palmer, 80 Ohio St.3d at 562, 687 
N.E.2d at 702; State v. Raglin (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 253, 257, 699 N.E.2d 482, 
487-488. 
 
Carter’s second proposition of law is overruled. 
Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 
Carter alleges in his third proposition of law that misconduct by the 
prosecuting attorney denied him a fair trial.  However, trial counsel did not object 
to any of the alleged misconduct.  “A claim of error in a criminal case cannot be 
predicated upon the improper remarks of counsel during his argument at trial, 
which were not objected to, unless such remarks serve to deny the defendant a fair 
 
 
14 
trial.”  State v. Wade (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 182, 7 O.O.3d 362, 373 N.E.2d 1244, 
paragraph one of the syllabus.  In our view, the comments by the prosecutor did 
not deny Carter a fair trial. 
 
In his closing argument the prosecutor said, “And when we began this trial 
during the questioning by both sides, you all indicated that you could be neutral 
and fair and open-minded and look at the facts and decide this case on the 
evidence and the law.  That’s all either side can ask for.  Obviously I represent a 
side, the State.  I believe in my side.  I believe the evidence that we have that this 
defendant is guilty of all the charges.  I wouldn’t be here.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Carter also alleges that the prosecutor erroneously characterized the 
defendant’s explanation as to why he went to Prince’s house on the night of the 
murder as “absolutely absurd.” 
 
Further, Carter argues that the prosecutor impermissibly bolstered the 
testimony of Dr. Cox (the pathologist) concerning the bleeding in the victim’s 
brain by stating, “I think Dr. Cox’s explanation is better than the other doctor’s, 
but you’ll decide that as to why she has hemorrhaging in her brain.”  (Emphasis 
added.) 
 
Finally, Carter alleges that the prosecutor committed misconduct when he 
asked Major James Phillips of the sheriff’s office questions concerning who 
issued the search warrants to obtain blood samples from Carter.  Carter argues 
that the fact that Judge McKay, the trial judge, had signed the warrant to obtain 
the samples would indicate to the jury that the trial judge believed Carter was 
guilty. 
 
The test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether the remarks are improper 
and, if so, whether they prejudicially affected substantial rights of the accused.  
Even if improper, the verdict will not be overturned unless the defendant was 
actually prejudiced by the impropriety.  State v. Lott (1990) 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 
165, 555 N.E.2d 293, 300.  See, also, State v. Smith (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14-
 
 
15 
15, 14 OBR 317, 318-319, 470 N.E.2d 883, 885-886.  Isolated comments by a 
prosecutor are not to be taken out of context and given their most damaging 
meaning.  Donnelly v. DeChristoforo (1974), 416 U.S. 637, 647, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 
1873, 40 L.Ed.2d 431, 439; State v. Hill (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 195, 204, 661 
N.E.2d 1068, 1078. 
 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the prosecutor’s comments were improper, 
they did not deny Carter a fair trial.  The comments during closing argument were 
isolated and tempered by other comments to the jury indicating that it was up to it 
to make the final determinations as to the facts.  As for the final allegation of 
misconduct, it would be speculation to believe that the jury would assume that the 
trial judge thought Carter was guilty because he signed a search warrant to obtain 
Carter’s blood samples.  Carter has failed to show that any actions by the 
prosecutor denied him a fair trial.  Carter’s third proposition of law is rejected. 
Incompetency to Stand Trial 
 
In his fourth proposition of law, Carter argues that he was incompetent to 
stand trial “because his paranoid personality did not permit him to trust his 
lawyers.”  The trial court appointed an expert to examine Carter, and a hearing on 
competency was held, after which the trial court determined that Carter was 
competent to stand trial. 
 
The standard for competency is set out in R.C. 2945.37(G), which 
provides:  “A defendant is presumed competent to stand trial.  If, after a hearing, 
the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that, because of the 
defendant’s present mental condition, the defendant is incapable of understanding 
the nature and objective of the proceedings against the defendant or of assisting in 
the defendant’s defense, the court shall find the defendant incompetent to stand 
trial * * *.” 
 
Carter does not argue that he was incapable of understanding the nature of 
the proceedings against him; instead, he focuses his argument on his inability to 
 
 
16 
assist his defense counsel.  During the first competency hearing, Dr. Stanley 
Palumbo opined, “With reasonable scientific certainty Mr. Carter is competent to 
stand trial.  Mr. Carter understands the nature of the proceedings against him and 
does not suffer from any gross mental disorder that would interfere with his 
ability to participate in his defense.  He does not suffer from any mood disorder 
such as depression, which would cause him to have trouble following a witness’s 
line of statements or have the energy and interest in participating in his own 
defense in his own best interest.” 
 
When questioned about Carter’s relationship with his attorneys, and his 
not wanting to listen to his attorneys’ advice, Dr. Palumbo commented, “It 
certainly sounds like he doesn’t want to, but that’s different from being able to.” 
 
The trial court found Carter competent and denied a defense request for 
further examination.  In his findings of fact, the court stated, “Dr. Palumbo 
testified that the Defendant does not trust his attorney, or any other attorney[;] 
however, Defendant’s distrust of his attorney does not exhibit paranoid behavior 
since he distrusts all attorneys and not specifically his attorney.” 
 
After the trial court found that Carter was competent, Carter entered a plea 
of not guilty by reason of insanity.  The court appointed three experts to examine 
Carter for sanity at the time of the offense—Dr. Steven A. King, Dr. Robert 
Alcorn, and Dr. Stanley Palumbo. 
 
During Dr. King’s interview with Carter, the doctor became concerned 
that Carter was not competent to stand trial.  This concern prompted an evaluation 
on that issue by the other two doctors, and a second competency hearing.  Carter 
waived his presence at the hearing. 
 
Dr. King testified that Carter exhibited bizarre behavior during his 
interview and indicated that he wanted to kill Tony Consoldane, his attorney.  
King further testified that Carter’s thoughts kept him from cooperating with 
counsel.  In Dr. King’s opinion, Carter was not able to assist in his own defense.  
 
 
17 
On cross-examination, King admitted that the question of competence was a close 
call. 
 
Dr. Palumbo did not change his prior opinion of competence after he re-
examined Carter.  He acknowledged that Carter expressed anger and irritability 
with his attorneys, but added that it was not unusual for defendants to be  upset 
with their attorneys. 
 
Dr. Alcorn also examined Carter concerning Carter’s relationship with his 
attorney.  Alcorn testified that Carter did not think his attorney was doing a very 
good job, and that that was not an uncommon reaction given the situation Carter 
was in.  He determined Carter to be competent to stand trial. 
 
At the conclusion of the second hearing, the trial court again found Carter 
competent to stand trial, stating, “I would indicate for the record that the distrust 
and/or hostility that a defendant has with an attorney, his own attorney, does not 
necessarily equate with competence.” 
 
Carter did not want to attend the court proceedings, indicating that he just 
wanted to enter a plea and get it over.  Some evidence indicates that while 
awaiting trial, Carter attempted suicide.  Otherwise, his unwillingness to attend 
the court proceedings and sometimes apparent disagreements with counsel were 
the only indications in the record that raised a question of competence to stand 
trial.3  Carter asks this court to disregard the opinions of the experts.  A review of 
the proceedings does not warrant that action. 
 
Carter also argues that trial counsel did not vigorously pursue the issue of 
competence, arguing that they should have testified at the competency hearing 
concerning Carter’s inability to cooperate with them.  Given the record, such a 
finding would be speculative. 
 
The trial court’s findings of fact fail to support Carter’s claim that the 
court’s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.  Accordingly, 
there was no abuse of discretion.  State v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 
 
 
18 
16 O.O.3d 169, 173, 404 N.E.2d 144, 149.  Carter’s fourth proposition of law is 
overruled. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
 
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Carter 
must show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and that prejudice arose from counsel’s performance.  See 
Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 
L.Ed.2d 674, 693; State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, 
paragraphs two and three of the syllabus.  Further, if it is easier to resolve the 
question by addressing the prejudice requirement, then the court is free to do so. 
 
Carter argues in his fifth proposition of law that counsel were ineffective 
because they failed to file a motion to dismiss, or a motion to correct the error in 
the fourth count of the indictment concerning the charge of rape.  While counsel 
should have noticed the error in the indictment, the error would have properly 
been subject to amendment.  Crim.R. 7(D); State v. O’Brien, supra, 30 Ohio St.3d 
122, 30 OBR 436, 508 N.E.2d 144, paragraph two of the syllabus.  Further, Carter 
cannot show prejudice.  The record reveals that of all the charges against him, 
Carter vigorously defended against the charge of rape.  Defense counsel 
challenged the state’s forensic experts on the evidence that supported the charge 
of rape and even requested appointment of his own medical expert.  Carter has 
failed to prove ineffective assistance of counsel on this allegation. 
 
Carter’s second allegation is that during the competency determination 
when the trial court offered to allow an MRI to be conducted on Carter, counsel 
should have pursued the testing for use in the penalty phase.  This argument is 
speculative, since we have no way of knowing what, if anything, would have been 
discovered had the MRI been pursued.  Carter has failed to prove prejudice.  
Establishing that would require proof outside the record, the report from the MRI.  
Such a claim is not appropriately considered on direct appeal.  See State v. Keith 
 
 
19 
(1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 514, 536-537, 684 N.E.2d 47, 67, citing State v. Scott 
(1989), 63 Ohio App.3d 304, 308, 578 N.E.2d 841, 844. 
 
Carter’s last allegation is that counsel failed to present argument 
concerning jury instructions on lesser-included offenses.  However, counsel did 
make a request for a lesser-included-offense instruction for all charges and 
presented argument as to each.  There is nothing in the record that would indicate 
that if counsel had presented additional arguments they would have been 
successful.  As set forth in the discussion of the second proposition of law, even if 
a lesser-included-offense instruction should have been given on aggravated 
murder (robbery), the remaining felony of rape still would have supported the 
aggravated murder count. 
 
This proposition of law is overruled. 
Inadequate Appellate Review 
 
Carter argues in his seventh proposition of law that his death sentence 
should be vacated because the appellate review process in Ohio is inadequate.  
Carter cites three reasons:  the jury is precluded from considering mercy, the lack 
of meaningful proportionality review, and inadequate independent weighing of 
aggravating circumstances and mitigating factors.  We have previously reviewed 
these issues and found them to be without merit.  State v. Lorraine (1993), 66 
Ohio St.3d 414, 417, 613 N.E.2d 212, 216; State v. Hicks (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 
72, 78, 538 N.E.2d 1030, 1037; State v. Steffen (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 31 
OBR 273, 509 N.E.2d 383, syllabus. 
 
The United States Supreme Court has held that appellate review is an 
integral part of a state’s capital punishment scheme.  Gregg v. Georgia (1976), 
428 U.S. 153, 198, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2937, 49 L.Ed.2d 859, 888.  Since Gregg, 
however, the court has not found a sentencing scheme unconstitutional due to the 
nature of the appellate review process engaged in by a state.  Nothing in Carter’s 
 
 
20 
argument warrants overturning the death penalty scheme based upon the appellate 
review process in Ohio. 
Constitutional Amendment 
 
In his eighth proposition of law, Carter challenges the constitutionality of 
limiting direct review of death penalty cases solely to this court.  These issues 
were decided by and are rejected on the authority of State v. Smith (1997), 80 
Ohio St.3d 89, 684 N.E.2d 668. 
Mercy 
 
In his tenth proposition of law, Carter argues that Ohio’s preclusion of the 
consideration of mercy in the death penalty process violates the state and federal 
Constitutions.  The court did not err by refusing to instruct on mercy.  This 
argument is rejected on the authority of Lorraine, 66 Ohio St.3d at 417, 613 
N.E.2d at 216, and Hicks, 43 Ohio St.3d at 78, 538 N.E.2d at 1037. 
Death Penalty Violates Ohio Constitution 
 
Carter argues that this court has never analyzed the death penalty statute 
under the Ohio Constitution.  However, in State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 
164, 179, 15 OBR 311, 324, 473 N.E.2d 264, 281, we specifically held that 
“Ohio’s statutory framework for imposition of capital punishment, as adopted by 
the General Assembly effective October 19, 1981, and in the context of the 
arguments raised herein, does not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution or any provision of the Ohio Constitution.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Propositions of law eleven and fourteen are rejected. 
Executions are Cruel; Request for a Moratorium 
 
In his twelfth proposition of law, Carter asks for a stay of his execution 
and a moratorium on executions in Ohio.  The basis for Carter’s request is that a  
number of persons were found to be wrongly convicted of capital offenses in 
Illinois, and that executions are irrevocable.  In Gregg, the United States Supreme 
 
 
21 
Court held that the death penalty does not violate the Eighth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishments. 
 
Carter has not pointed to anything specific concerning Ohio’s application 
of the death penalty.  Even if there are persons on death row in Ohio who may be 
innocent of the crimes they are charged with, Sean Carter is not one of them.  The 
record is replete with overwhelming evidence of Carter’s guilt and the concerns 
that may be present in Illinois are not present in this case.  This proposition of law 
is rejected. 
Methods of Execution 
 
In his thirteenth proposition of law, Carter argues that the death penalty is 
unconstitutional under the federal and Ohio Constitutions because the methods 
used to carry out the sentence, electrocution or lethal injection, are cruel and 
unusual punishment.  While Carter argues that electrocution is cruel, this court 
and the United States Supreme Court have previously held that execution by 
electrocution does not violate the federal and Ohio Constitutions.  In re Kemmler 
(1890), 136 U.S. 436, 443-444, 10 S.Ct. 930, 932, 34 L.Ed. 519, 522-523;  State 
v. Coleman (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 298, 308, 544 N.E.2d 622, 633.  The United 
States Supreme Court granted certiorari this term to a case that involved the issue 
of whether execution by electrocution violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause.  Bryan v. Moore (1999), ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 394, 145 L.Ed.2d 306.  
The court subsequently dismissed Bryan as improvidently granted after the 
Governor of Florida signed into law a bill allowing lethal injection as an option to 
the electric chair.  Bryan v. Moore, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 1003, 145 L.Ed.2d 
927.  Carter fails to cite any case in which lethal injection has been found to be 
cruel or unusual punishment.  This proposition of law is overruled. 
Constitutionality of the Death Penalty 
 
In his ninth proposition of law, Carter argues that Ohio’s capital 
sentencing scheme violates the federal and Ohio Constitutions.  We have 
 
 
22 
examined and disposed of the same issues presented here.  State v. Jenkins, supra; 
State v. Sowell (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 322, 336, 530 N.E.2d 1294, 1309; State v. 
Steffen, supra, 31 Ohio St.3d at 125, 31 OBR at 285, 509 N.E.2d at 396; State v. 
Grant (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 465, 483, 620 N.E.2d 50, 69; State v. Maurer (1984), 
15 Ohio St.3d 239, 15 OBR 379, 473 N.E.2d 768, paragraph six of the syllabus; 
State v. Lewis (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 200, 206, 616 N.E.2d 921, 926; State v. Buell 
(1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 124, 22 OBR 203, 489 N.E.2d 795; State v. Phillips (1995), 
74 Ohio St.3d 72, 656 N.E.2d 643; State v. Coleman, supra, 45 Ohio St.3d 298, 
308, 544 N.E.2d 622, 633.  This proposition of law is rejected. 
Scope of Proportionality Review 
 
In his sixth proposition of law, Carter asks us to revisit Steffen, 31 Ohio 
St.3d 111, 31 OBR 273, 509 N.E.2d 383, paragraph one of the syllabus, 
concerning the universe of cases to be considered by an appellate court when 
conducting the proportionality review required by R.C. 2929.05(A).  Carter 
presents no new arguments concerning this issue and, therefore, based on Steffen, 
this proposition of law is rejected.  State v. Poindexter (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 1, 
520 N.E.2d 568, syllabus. 
INDEPENDENT SENTENCE REVIEW 
 
Carter argues that his death sentence is neither appropriate nor 
proportionate.  His arguments will be considered in performing the independent 
sentence review. 
 
Carter was convicted of aggravated murder during the course of an 
aggravated robbery and rape.  The jury and the trial court considered two 
aggravating circumstances under R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) — one involving the rape 
and one involving the aggravated robbery.  The state proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Carter raped his adoptive grandmother, and we will consider the rape 
specification in the weighing process.  The state also proved beyond a reasonable 
 
 
23 
doubt that Carter committed aggravated robbery, and we will consider the 
aggravated robbery specification in the weighing process. 
 
The nature and circumstances of the offense offer nothing in mitigation for 
Carter.  R.C. 2929.04(B).  R.C. 2929.04(B) also requires us to consider seven 
potential mitigating factors.  Most are clearly inapplicable.  Prince did not induce 
or facilitate the crime, R.C. 2929.04(B)(1); Carter did not commit the offense 
while under duress or coercion, R.C. 2929.04(B)(2); Carter was not,  because of a 
mental disease or defect at the time of the offense, unable to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the law, R.C. 2929.04(B)(3);  
Carter does not lack a history of prior criminal convictions or delinquency 
adjudications, R.C. 2929.04(B)(5); and Carter was not a mere participant, he was 
the principal, the only, offender, R.C. 2929.04(B)(6).  Accordingly, the only 
statutory mitigating factors appropriate for our review are Carter’s youth, R.C. 
2929.04(B)(4), and other relevant factors, R.C. 2929.04(B)(7). 
 
Carter’s history, character, and background offer evidence in mitigation of 
the death sentence.  Carter’s biological father was never present in his life and his 
mother was psychotic.  Carter’s mother moved with her two children to Trumbull 
County to be near relatives; however, she was referred to the local children’s 
services agency.  When a caseworker investigated, she found Carter’s mother 
incoherent and carrying on a conversation with herself.  Carter and his siblings 
were dirty and had enlarged stomachs.  There were no signs of physical abuse, 
although Carter was observed with his ankle tied to the leg of a couch.  The 
children were removed from their mother and placed in foster care. 
 
Nancy Dorrian, a psychologist, had evaluated Carter between the years 
1983-1986.  Dorrian discussed that when she first examined Carter, he was 
withdrawn and his affect was flat.  He had no attachment to his biological mother, 
and very few verbal skills.  Dorrian explained that due to  insufficient stimuli in 
his first year of life, he had problems relating to people.  However, he showed 
 
 
24 
dramatic improvement after being placed with a foster mother, Ida Magee.  
Unfortunately, Magee was unable to provide a permanent home for Carter.  A 
permanent placement was attempted in 1987 with the Smith family, but the 
adoptive parents were critical towards Carter’s intellectual handicaps and 
emotionally abusive.  He was returned to Magee in 1988. 
 
Dorrian recommended that Carter stay with Magee.  She was not able to 
economically support Carter, so she could not adopt him.  Therefore, in 1989, 
when Carter was nine years old, he was placed permanently with the Carters and 
adopted by them approximately one year later. 
 
Clinical psychologist Sandra B. McPherson evaluated Carter and testified 
in the penalty phase.  Dr. McPherson stated that she did not think the Carters had 
been fully informed about Carter’s problems or potential problems.  Dr. 
McPherson stated that the Carter home included a number of “danger zones” 
within it, “including some highly inappropriate sexual materials, the presence of 
an older male whose behavior was problematic and sexually tinged, and the 
presence of females with resulting sexual stimulation.”  Even so, Carter adjusted 
well to the Carter family, exhibiting no behavioral problems, and getting A’s and 
B’s in school during his first few years with the Carters. 
 
Dr. McPherson stated that given his birth mother’s history, Carter has the 
genetic potential for schizophrenia, although that does not usually manifest itself 
until the twenties, and Carter was eighteen when the crime was committed.  He 
began experimenting with drugs and alcohol in his early teens, which activity 
resulted in Carter’s early contact with the juvenile court. 
 
Dr. McPherson diagnosed Carter as having an antisocial personality 
disorder and borderline personality disorder with psychopathic features.  She 
indicated this was a very serious set of conditions.  She explained that Carter had 
an “attachment” disorder, which results when children are not loved, and 
 
 
25 
therefore do not develop the capacity to love.  Dr. McPherson stated that all areas 
of functioning were below par, even though Carter’s IQ was in the normal range. 
 
Dr. McPherson stated that Carter “does not have now and has never had 
any true capacity to relate to other human beings on an interdependent or mutual 
or self-enhancing fashion.  He does not understand how other people think or feel.  
He has the capacity for hatred, which at bottom is self-hatred of substantial 
proportion.  * * * Sean Carter was both born and made, and neither of those 
processes was under his control.”  Dr. McPherson also stated that Carter did not 
have a mental disease or defect that substantially affected his conduct. 
 
His history and background, including his psychological problems, are 
entitled to some weight in mitigation.  State v. Rojas (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 131, 
592 N.E.2d 1376; State v. Spivey (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 405, 424, 428, 692 N.E.2d 
151, 166, 169-170. 
 
Carter was eighteen at the time of the offense, which is a statutory 
consideration under R.C. 2929.04(B)(4), and entitled to some weight.  Raglin, 83 
Ohio St.3d at 273, 699 N.E.2d at 498. 
 
When each aggravating circumstance is weighed against these mitigating 
factors, it outweighs them, beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
A determination of whether the death sentence is appropriate includes a 
proportionality review of similar cases.  We have reviewed various cases, 
including two with the sole aggravating circumstance of rape.  In Phillips, 74 
Ohio St.3d at 104, 656 N.E.2d at 671, and in State v. Mason (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 
144, 170, 694 N.E.2d 932, 957, this court affirmed the death sentence even 
though both defendants were young, lacked significant criminal history, and had 
emotional and mental deficiencies.  Nothing in Carter’s case indicates that his 
death sentence is disproportionate to those in Phillips or Mason. 
 
 
26 
 
Finding the death penalty appropriate and proportionate, we affirm the 
sentence of death.  The judgment of the court of common pleas is hereby 
affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs separately. 
 
DOUGLAS and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur in judgment only. 
FOOTNOTES: 
 
1. 
The trial court did grant the defense request to instruct on criminal 
trespass as a lesser-included offense for aggravated burglary, and the jury did find 
Carter guilty of the lesser offense. 
 
2. 
Carter did not raise any issue relating to the sufficiency or weight 
of the evidence concerning the aggravated robbery count. 
 
3. 
The record indicates that Carter was not happy about being 
shackled for court proceedings.  Defense counsel waived Carter’s presence for 
some preliminary hearings, and Carter himself waived his right to be present at 
the second competency hearing.  Prior to the defense opening statement, Carter 
asked if he had to go through trial, or could he just plead guilty.  A hearing out of 
the jury’s presence was held and Carter stated he did not want to attend the trial.  
The trial court indicated some concerns about his waiving his presence at trial and 
Carter lunged at the judge in order to be removed from the courtroom.  Carter 
watched the remainder of the trial from another room by remote video.  
Throughout the remainder of the trial, defense counsel would report to the court 
each day that Carter still did not want to attend trial.  Carter wanted to be in court 
for the closing arguments in the trial phase, but only if he could be unshackled, 
which one of his attorneys refused to consent to.  Carter also absented himself 
from the penalty-phase proceedings. 
__________________ 
 
 
27 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurring.  We are charged to independently weigh each 
sentence of death.  Among the factors we consider are whether the death sentence 
is appropriate and proportionate.  When petty theft (for that is what taking $150 
is) elevates a murder to a felony-murder capital offense, I believe a death sentence 
is not appropriate.  See Rosen, Felony Murder and the Eighth Amendment 
Jurisprudence of Death (1990), 31 B.C.L.Rev. 1103; Ledewitz, The New Role of 
Statutory Aggravating Circumstances in American Death Penalty Law (1984), 22 
Duq.L.Rev. 317.  I could not with a good conscience have affirmed a death 
sentence based solely on the aggravated-robbery specification. 
 
Here, however, there is a second felony-murder specification, which was 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  Based on that specification, the death 
sentence imposed is both appropriate and proportionate.  Accordingly, I concur 
with the majority opinion, with respect to the convictions and the death sentence.