Title: Agnes E. Maciolek v. City of Milwaukee Employes' Retirement System Annuity and Pension Board

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2006 WI 10 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP1254 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Agnes E. Maciolek, and Agnes E. Maciolek, 
Trustee Under the Gerald B. Maciolek and Agnes 
E. Maciolek Revocable Trust Dated January 21, 
1997, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
     v. 
City of Milwaukee Employes' Retirement System 
Annuity and Pension Board, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2005 WI App 74 
Reported at: 280 Wis. 2d 585, 695 N.W.2d 875 
(Ct. App. 2005 – Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 31, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 2, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael Guolee   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiffs-respondents-petitioners 
there 
were 
briefs by James J. Winiarski and James Winiarski Law Office, 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by James J. Winiarski. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by Kathy L. 
Nusslock, Daniel J. Borowski, and Davis & Kuelthau, s.c., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Kathy L. Nusslock. 
 
 
2006 WI 10
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP1254  
(L.C. No. 
2003CV5926) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Agnes E. Maciolek, and Agnes E. Maciolek, 
Trustee Under the Gerald B. Maciolek and Agnes 
E. Maciolek Revocable Trust Dated January 21, 
1997, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
City of Milwaukee Employes' Retirement System 
Annuity and Pension Board, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 31, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   Agnes E. Maciolek (Maciolek) 
appeals a decision of the court of appeals,1 reversing the 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court grant of summary judgment in her 
favor.  The issue before this court is whether the City of 
Milwaukee Employees' Retirement System Annuity and Pension Board 
                                                 
1 Maciolek v. Milwaukee Employes' Retire. Sys. Annuity, 2005 
WI App 74, 280 Wis. 2d 585, 695 N.W.2d 875.   
 
No. 
2004AP1254   
 
2 
 
(MERS) can require Maciolek to follow the procedures outlined in 
Wis. Stat. § 867.046(1m) (2003-04)2 before MERS is required to 
make payment on an asset due to her.3   
¶2 
We affirm the decision of the court of appeals.  We 
conclude that, in the absence of an agreement between a holder 
of the property, such as MERS, and the person seeking its 
transfer, such as Maciolek, a holder may require compliance with 
the statutory provisions outlined in Wis. Stat. § 867.046(1m) to 
effect a 
transfer 
of 
this 
type 
of 
property, 
despite a 
"Washington Will" provision in a marital property agreement.  On 
the issue of whether or not any of these Global Pension 
Settlement (GPS) benefits were marital property, since it was 
not argued before, nor reached by, either the circuit court or 
the court of appeals, we decline to address the issue here. 
I 
¶3 
The pertinent facts are not in dispute.  In January 
1997, Maciolek and her husband, Gerald Maciolek (Gerald) 
executed 
a 
marital 
property 
agreement, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 766.58 (1997-98), and created a revocable trust.  
The marital property agreement contained a "Washington Will" 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 As 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
noted, 
although 
Wis. Stat. § 766.58 
has 
been 
amended 
since 
the 
Macioleks 
executed their marital property agreement, Maciolek does not 
argue that this court consider the 1997 version of the statute.  
Therefore, like the court of appeals, we will consider only the 
current version of the statute.  See Maciolek, 280 Wis. 2d 585, 
¶3 n.2. 
No. 
2004AP1254   
 
3 
 
provision.4  The provision was intended to provide for the direct 
transfer of property that would otherwise require probate, to 
the transferee, without any probate proceeding.  It stated, in 
relevant part: 
     1. Upon the death of either of the parties 
hereto, all of the decedent's ownership interests in 
any and all property which would otherwise be subject 
to probate administration, shall immediately pass to 
and vest in the Trustee of the "GERALD B. MACIOLEK AND 
AGNES E. MACIOLEK REVOCABLE TRUST DATED JANUARY 21, 
1997" 
without 
probate 
and 
by 
nontestamentary 
disposition.  UPON DEMAND AND UPON RECEIPT OF A COPY 
OF THIS AGREEMENT, ANYONE HAVING POSSESSION OF SUCH 
PROPERTY SHALL IMMEDIATELY TRANSFER SAID PROPERTY TO 
THE SAID TRUSTEE.  THE TRANSFER SHALL OCCUR WITHOUT 
FURTHER PROOF OF AUTHORITY OR OWNERSHIP OF SAID 
PROPERTY, AND WITHOUT ANY KIND OF COURT PROCEEDING OR 
COURT ORDER.  
. . . . 
     21. DIRECTIONS TO ANYONE HOLDING PROPERTY UPON 
OUR RESPECTIVE DEATHS.  UPON THE FIRST SPOUSE'S DEATH, 
PLEASE IMMEDIATELY PAY OR RE-TITLE ALL ASSETS IN MY 
NAME, AND WHICH WOULD OTHERWISE BE SUBJECT TO PROBATE, 
TO THE TRUSTEE OF THE "GERALD B. MACIOLEK AND AGNES E. 
MACIOLEK REVOCABLE TRUST DATED JANUARY 21, 1997."  
FOLLOW HIS OR HER INSTRUCTIONS.  PLEASE DO NOT REQUIRE 
ANY KIND OF COURT APPROVAL OR DOMICILIARY LETTERS.  
¶4 
Gerald was employed by the City of Milwaukee until his 
retirement on June 1, 1981.  As a retired employee, Gerald was a 
beneficiary of certain funds under GPS, managed by MERS.  The 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 766.58(3)(f) is commonly referred to as 
the "Washington Will" statute.  It provides that, pursuant to a 
marital property agreement, spouses may agree to "[p]rovid[e] 
that upon the death of either spouse any of either or both 
spouses' property, including after-acquired property, passes 
without probate to a designated person, trust or other entity by 
nontestamentary disposition."  Wis. Stat. § 766.58(3)(f). 
No. 
2004AP1254   
 
4 
 
GPS constituted the settlement of various lawsuits relating, in 
part, to pension benefits payable by MERS to City of Milwaukee 
employees.  Under the terms of the settlement agreement, Gerald 
was entitled to $27,422.24 in benefits.  The GPS benefits were 
titled exclusively in Gerald's name, and the consent to the GPS 
settlement did not provide for the designation of a beneficiary.  
¶5 
Gerald died on May 28, 2001, before his GPS benefits 
could be distributed.  Following his death, MERS notified 
Maciolek that it held benefits in Gerald's name and requested 
the identification of the person legally entitled to receive the 
funds.  Maciolek sent MERS a "Claim and Proof of Death" claiming 
she was legally entitled to receive the benefits.  On January 
21, 2002, Maciolek notified MERS she was the representative for 
Gerald's estate.   
¶6 
On April 12, 2002, MERS wrote Maciolek advising her of 
the procedures she could use to facilitate payment of Gerald's 
GPS benefits.  On April 24, 2002, Maciolek responded advising 
MERS that she would not be opening an estate and that she 
intended to rely on the "Washington Will" provision in the 
marital property agreement.  Pursuant to the procedures outlined 
in Wis. Stat. § 867.046(2), she subsequently submitted a Form 
HT-110 and a certified copy of the marital property agreement. 
¶7 
On July 21, 2002, MERS advised Maciolek that it could 
not accept the Form HT-110 as evidence of her ownership of the 
GPS benefit because the GPS benefits did not qualify for 
transfer under Form HT-110 pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 867.046(2).  
MERS then presented two statutory options to transfer ownership 
No. 
2004AP1254   
 
5 
 
of the GPS benefits based upon Maciolek's reliance on the 
"Washington Will" provision.  She could either provide a 
certificate of summary confirmation of interest in property 
pursuant to § 867.046(1m), or provide a verified statement from 
the personal representative of Gerald's estate filed with the 
probate court under Wis. Stat. § 865.201.   
¶8 
Maciolek responded, on July 7, 2003, by filing suit 
against MERS for payment of Gerald's GPS benefits.  MERS moved 
for summary judgment requesting dismissal of the suit on the 
grounds that Maciolek was required to obtain a certificate 
issued under Wis. Stat. § 867.046(1m), in order for MERS to 
legally transfer the GPS benefits to the trust under the 
"Washington Will" provision.  The Milwaukee County Circuit 
Court, Judge Michael D. Guolee, denied the summary judgment 
motion of MERS, and instead granted summary judgment to 
Maciolek.  The court indicated that the nonprobate transfer 
agreement in the Macioleks' marital property agreement complied 
with the law, and that use of Form HT-110 was the proper 
procedure to use to transfer this asset.  MERS appealed. 
¶9 
The court of appeals reversed the decision of the 
circuit court.  The court of appeals held that MERS could 
require Maciolek to comply with the confirmation procedures in 
§ 867.046(1m).  Maciolek petitioned this court for review.   
II 
¶10 Statutory interpretation presents an issue of law 
which we review de novo.  While the review is de novo, this 
court benefits from the analyses of the circuit court and the 
No. 
2004AP1254   
 
6 
 
court of appeals.  State v. Anderson, 2005 WI 54, ¶23, 280 
Wis. 2d 104, 695 N.W.2d 731 (citing State v. Waushara County Bd. 
of 
Adjustment, 
2004 
WI 
56, 
¶14, 
271 
Wis. 2d 547, 
679 
N.W.2d 514). 
III 
¶11 Before we begin our analysis of whether MERS had the 
right to insist upon compliance with Wis. Stat. § 867.046(1m), 
it is helpful to outline the statutory scheme.  Wisconsin Stat. 
ch. 766 governs marital property agreements.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 766.58(3)(f) authorizes "Washington Will" provisions in such 
agreements.  As noted previously, the statute provides, in 
relevant part, that in a marital property agreement spouses may 
"[p]rovid[e] that upon the death of either spouse any of either 
or both spouses' property, including after-acquired property, 
passes without probate to a designated person, trust or other 
entity 
by 
nontestamentary 
disposition."  
Wis. Stat. § 766.58(3)(f).  Such a provision allows married 
couples to specify the nontestamentary disbursement of property 
without probate.  Id.  In addition, Chapter 766 expressly 
provides that "Chapter 854 applies to transfers at death under a 
marital property agreement."  Wis. Stat. § 766.58(3m). 
¶12 Wisconsin Stat. § 705.20 governs nonprobate transfers 
at death in regard to, among other things, a marital property 
agreement.5  It provides that "[m]oney or other benefits due, 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 705.20 Nonprobate transfers at death 
provides, in relevant part:   
 
No. 
2004AP1254   
 
7 
 
controlled by or owned by a decedent before death must be paid 
after the decedent's death to a person whom the decedent 
designates either in the instrument or in a separate writing. . 
. ."  Wis. Stat. § 705.20(1)(a).  It also references the 
applicability 
of 
Chapter 
854 
to 
the 
statute.  
Wis. Stat. § 705.20(3). 
¶13 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 854 establishes general rules for 
transfers 
at 
death. 
 
Included 
are 
governing 
rules 
for 
nontestamentary transfers resulting from provisions in various 
written instruments, including marital property agreements, when 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1) A provision for a nonprobate transfer on death in 
an insurance policy, contract of employment, bond, 
mortgage, 
promissory 
note, 
certificated 
or 
uncertificated security, account agreement, custodial 
agreement, 
deposit 
agreement, 
compensation 
plan, 
pension plan, individual retirement plan, employee 
benefit plan, trust, conveyance, deed of gift, marital 
property agreement, or other written instrument of a 
similar nature is nontestamentary. This subsection 
governs 
a 
written 
provision 
that: 
 
     (a) Money or other benefits due, controlled by or 
owned by a decedent before death must be paid after 
the decedent's death to a person whom the decedent 
designates either in the instrument or in a separate 
writing, including a will executed either before or at 
the 
same 
time 
as 
the 
instrument, 
or 
later; 
 
. . . . 
     (3) Chapter 854 applies to transfers at death 
under this section. 
Wis. Stat. § 705.20 (emphasis added).   
No. 
2004AP1254   
 
8 
 
the transfer may impact a third party.  Wis. Stat. § 854.23.6  
Section 854.23(2) provides 
protection 
for payers 
who 
make 
payments pursuant to marital property agreements, who do not 
have notice of a competing claim.  This protection is dependent 
on the payer receiving a "governing instrument" defined in 
§ 854.23(1) as including any one of three options.  First, an 
individual appointed as personal representative in an informal 
administration may execute a filed verified statement under 
Wis. Stat. § 865.201, confirming the transfer of interest in 
property 
pursuant 
to 
a 
marital 
property 
agreement.  
Wis. Stat. § 854.23(1).  Second, a court may issue a certificate 
to an individual authorizing transfer of the property upon 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 854.23 Protection of payers and other 
3rd parties provides, in relevant part: 
 
(1) 
Definition. 
In 
this 
section, 
"governing 
instrument" includes a filed verified statement under 
s. 865.201, a certificate under s. 867.046 (1m) or a 
recorded application under s. 867.046 (5). 
     (2) Liability depends on notice. (a) A payer or 
other 3rd party is not liable for having transferred 
property to a beneficiary designated in a governing 
instrument who, under this chapter, is not entitled to 
the property, or for having taken any other action in 
good faith reliance on the beneficiary's apparent 
entitlement 
under 
the 
terms 
of 
the 
governing 
instrument, before the payer or other 3rd party 
received 
written 
notice 
of 
a 
claimed 
lack 
of 
entitlement under this chapter. However, a payer or 
other 3rd party is liable for a payment made or other 
action taken after the payer or other 3rd party 
received 
written 
notice 
of 
a 
claimed 
lack 
of 
entitlement under this chapter. 
Wis. Stat. § 854.23 (emphasis added). 
No. 
2004AP1254   
 
9 
 
presentation of specific identified documents to the court, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 867.046(1m). 
 
Third, 
a 
recorded 
application under § 867.046(5) allows any procedure in §§ 
867.046(1m), (2) or (3).  
¶14 Wisconsin Stat. § 867.046 
outlines 
procedures 
for 
summary confirmation of an interest in property.  The statute 
provides, in relevant part: 
(1m) Upon death; generally.  If a domiciliary of 
this state dies who immediately prior to death had an 
interest in property in this state, including an 
interest in survivorship marital property, or if a 
person not domiciled in this state dies having an 
interest in property in this state, including an 
interest 
in 
survivorship 
marital 
property, 
upon 
petition of the decedent's spouse or upon petition of 
a beneficiary of a marital property agreement to the 
court, of the county of domicile of the decedent or, 
if the decedent was not domiciled in this state, of 
any county where the property is situated, the court 
shall issue a certificate under the seal of the court. 
The certificate shall set forth the fact of the death 
of the decedent, the termination or transfer of the 
decedent's interest in the property, the interest of 
the petitioner in the property and any other facts 
essential to a determination of the rights of persons 
interested. The certificate is prima facie evidence of 
the facts recited, and if the certificate relates to 
an interest in real property or to a debt secured by 
an interest in real property, the petitioner shall 
record a certified copy or duplicate original of the 
certificate in the office of the register of deeds in 
each county in this state in which the real property 
is located. 
     (2) Upon death; interest in property. As an 
alternative to sub. (1m), upon the death of any person 
having an interest in any real property, a vendor's 
interest in a land contract, an interest in a savings 
or checking account, an interest in a security or a 
mortgagee's interest in a mortgage, including an 
interest 
in 
survivorship 
marital 
property, 
the 
No. 
2004AP1254   
 
10 
 
decedent's spouse or a beneficiary of a marital 
property 
agreement 
may 
obtain 
evidence 
of 
the 
termination of that interest of the decedent and 
confirmation of the petitioner's interest in the 
property by providing to the register of deeds of the 
county in which the property is located the certified 
death 
certificate 
for 
the 
decedent 
and, 
on 
applications supplied by the register of deeds for 
that purpose, all of the following information: 
     (a) The name, residence and post-office addresses 
of the decedent and the applicant. 
     (b) The date of decedent's death. 
Wis. Stat. § 867.046 (emphasis added). 
 
IV 
¶15 With the statutory scheme in mind, we now turn to the 
question of whether MERS may require Maciolek to comply with the 
procedures detailed in Wis. Stat. § 867.046(1m) before MERS 
makes payment on an asset due to her.  There are three parts to 
our discussion.  First, whether Maciolek, through her marital 
property agreement, can eliminate the requirement of any court 
proceeding before assets due her are transferred?  Second, what 
constitutes a "governing instrument" under Wis. Stat. § 854.23?  
Finally, if Maciolek is required to comply with procedures in 
Wis. Stat. § 867.046, may she use those outlined in subsection 
(2) rather than those in subsection (1m)?  We will discuss each 
in turn. 
¶16 When examining a statute, "we have repeatedly held 
that statutory interpretation 'begins with the language of the 
statute.  If the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily 
No. 
2004AP1254   
 
11 
 
stop the inquiry.'"  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court, 2004 
WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (citations omitted).  
Since we determine that the meaning of the statutes at issue is 
plain, we need not resort to extrinsic sources to assist in our 
analysis. 
¶17 Maciolek argues that Wis. Stat. § 705.20 expressly 
recognizes 
nonprobate 
transfers 
under 
a 
marital 
property 
agreement containing a "Washington Will" provision in accord 
with Wis. Stat. § 766.58(3)(f).7  She further submits that 
§ 705.20(1)(a) allows for provisions in written instruments, 
including marital property agreements, that require that money 
or other benefits due "must be paid after the decedent's death 
to a person whom the decedent designates either in the 
instrument 
or 
in 
a 
separate 
writing. 
. 
. 
." 
Wis. Stat. § 705.20(1)(a) (emphasis added).  It is Maciolek's 
position, therefore, that because her marital property agreement 
is consistent with Wis. Stat. § 766.058(3)(f), and because the 
agreement 
by 
its 
very 
terms 
specifically 
precludes 
the 
requirement of court confirmation, MERS cannot make her comply 
with the procedures outlined in Wis. Stat. § 867.046(1m).8   
                                                 
7 In her brief to this court, Maciolek correctly notes that 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
did 
not 
address 
the 
impact 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 705.20 on the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 854.23.  
While we agree with the court of appeals that § 705.20 has no 
effect on the issue at hand, we will discuss the parameters of 
the statute.   
8 Maciolek does not argue that Wis. Stat. § 867.046(1m) is 
inapplicable to this situation.  Instead, she argues that 
§ 867.046(1m) is not mandatory.   
No. 
2004AP1254   
 
12 
 
¶18 MERS's position is that Wis. Stat. § 867.046(1m) is 
the only means to effectuate a nonprobate transfer of pension 
benefits under a "Washington Will" provision.  MERS argues that 
while the procedures in § 867.046(1m) are not mandatory, per se, 
they are required for payers and other third parties to gain the 
protections afforded by Wis. Stat. § 854.23.   
¶19 We agree with Maciolek that the Wisconsin Legislature 
intended Wis. Stat. § 705.20 to allow individuals to avoid 
probate, and that Wis. Stat. § 766.58 allows "Washington Will" 
provisions.  See Reichel v. Jung, 2000 WI App 151, ¶¶21-22, 237 
Wis. 2d 853, 616 N.W.2d 118.  As the court of appeals noted in 
Jung, § 705.20(1) "is identical to the language presented by 
§ 101 of the Uniform Nonprobate Transfers on Death Act of the 
Uniform Laws Annotated (U.L.A.)."  Id., ¶21.  The comments of 
the U.L.A. discussing the scope and purpose of § 101 provide: 
This section is a revised version of former 
Section 6-201 of the original Uniform Probate Code, 
which authorized a variety of contractual arrangements 
that had sometimes been treated as testamentary in 
prior law.  . . .  
Because the modes of transfer authorized by an 
instrument under this section are declared to be 
nontestamentary, the instrument does not have to be 
executed in compliance with the formalities for wills; 
nor does the instrument have to be probated, nor does 
the personal representative have any power or duty 
with respect to the assets. 
The sole purpose of this section is to prevent 
the transfers authorized here from being treated as 
testamentary. 
No. 
2004AP1254   
 
13 
 
Id. (citing Unif. Nonprobate Transfers on Death Act § 101 
cmt., 8B U.L.A. 200 (1993)).  The Jung court concluded: 
In short, these comments explain how certain 
contractual 
arrangements 
have 
been 
treated 
as 
testamentary 
regardless 
of 
contractual 
language 
addressing the transfer of rights and ownership upon 
the death of the contract creditor.  The purpose of 
the Unif. Nonprobate Transfers on Death Act § 101 is 
to take such contractual arrangements out of the realm 
of probate and to permit the terms of the contract to 
be upheld. 
Jung, 237 Wis. 2d 853, ¶22. 
¶20 We cannot agree, however, with Maciolek's conclusion 
that her valid "Washington Will" provision should be effective 
to transfer the GPS funds without any sort of court action or 
proceeding, unless MERS agrees to such transfer.  The decision 
in Jung does not mean that there should be no court involvement, 
ever, in regard to the transfer of nonprobate property.  No 
provision of Wis. Stat. §§ 766.58(3) or 705.20 permits parties 
to ignore Chapter 854, or to agree to prohibit court involvement 
in implementing a marital property agreement.9  As the court of 
appeals noted, the fact that "Washington Will" provisions 
"permit transfer of property without probate.  . . . does not 
mean the legislature allowed parties to agree to no court 
involvement in implementing transfer of ownership and creating a 
                                                 
9 It was suggested by counsel for Maciolek at oral argument 
that if the legislature wished to amend the statutes to reflect 
Maciolek's interpretation of the effect of Wis. Stat. §§ 705.20 
and 766.58, it might add language to § 705.20 to the effect that 
no other summary procedures or probate procedures are mandatory 
to accomplish a nonprobate transfer.   
No. 
2004AP1254   
 
14 
 
reliable and public record of transfer."  Maciolek v. Milwaukee 
Employes' Retire. Sys. Annuity, 2005 WI App 74, ¶19, 280 Wis. 2d 
585, 695 N.W.2d 875.   
¶21 Furthermore, the confirmation procedure outlined in 
Wis. Stat. § 867.046(1m) is not probate.  Probate is "[t]he 
judicial 
procedure 
by 
which 
a 
testamentary 
document 
is 
established to be a valid will. . . ."  Black's Law Dictionary, 
1219 
(7th 
ed. 
1999). 
 
While 
§ 867.046(1m) 
does 
require 
involvement by a circuit court, and its confirmation procedure 
is sometimes employed in the probating of an estate, the 
procedure itself is not probate.  The requirement of a 
confirmation procedure in accordance with § 867.046(1m) is, 
therefore, not contrary to the legislative intent of allowing 
individuals to avoid probate.10   
¶22 We are further persuaded that Maciolek cannot contract 
around the confirmation requirements MERS may choose to require 
by the fact that MERS was not a party to the contract between 
Maciolek and Gerald.  Wisconsin courts have long recognized that 
one cannot enforce a contract against an entity that is not a 
party to it.  See Abramowski v. Wm. Kilps Sons Realty, Inc., 80 
                                                 
10 A full probate administration would have required that a 
person petition for administration of an estate, establish that 
the transferring document was executed consistent with the 
formality of a will, request the court to appoint a personal 
representative who would have control over the assets to be 
transferred, inventory the assets, pay all creditors and taxes 
due, distribute the remaining assets according to the governing 
document and account to the court for each of these actions.  
See Wis. Stat. ch. 856. 
No. 
2004AP1254   
 
15 
 
Wis. 2d 468, 472, 259 N.W.2d 306 (1977).  We are persuaded by 
MERS's argument that as a fiduciary of the pension benefits of 
City of Milwaukee employees and retirees, MERS has a duty to 
ensure that pension benefits, including GPS benefits, are 
distributed to an appropriate party or parties, in compliance 
with the appropriate statutes.  It is also significant that 
Maciolek was not designated, and could not be designated, as the 
beneficiary of Gerald's GPS funds, as the consent to the GPS 
settlement did not provide for the designation of a beneficiary.  
For these reason, MERS need not acquiesce to Maciolek's claim 
that her contract with Gerald supersedes any court proceeding 
that would prove her ownership of the pension benefits.         
¶23 We next turn to the issue of what constitutes a 
"governing instrument" for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 854.23.  We 
look at this issue in the context of a marital property 
agreement, since that is the instrument that is before us.  
Section 854.23(1) 
provides 
that 
a 
"'governing 
instrument' 
includes a filed verified statement under s. 865.201, a 
certificate under s. 867.046 (1m) or a recorded application 
under s. 867.046 (5)."  Wis. Stat. § 854.23(1) (emphasis added).  
Maciolek argues that the word "includes" is intended to convey 
an addition to, not a limitation of, the types of governing 
instruments already listed in the statute.  In other words, 
Maciolek suggests that anything listed in Wis. Stat. § 854.01 as 
falling within the definition of a "governing instrument," 
including 
a 
marital 
property 
agreement, 
should 
also 
be 
considered a governing instrument under § 854.23.   
No. 
2004AP1254   
 
16 
 
¶24 We disagree with this analysis under the circumstances 
presented to us in this case.  Wisconsin Stat. § 854.01 defines 
"governing instrument" in the chapter quite broadly.11  The 
chapter, as a whole, clearly intends a marital property 
agreement be considered a "governing instrument."  However, 
§ 854.23, the section concerning protection of payers and other 
third-parties, defines "governing instrument" for purposes of 
that 
section, 
as 
one 
of 
three 
specific 
alternatives.  
Wis. Stat. § 867.046(1). 
¶25 Although our analysis is limited to the circumstances 
of a marital property agreement, we find it necessary to 
conclude that if "governing instrument" were intended to 
encompass the broader definition set out for the chapter 
generally, there would be no reason for the legislature to have 
enumerated the three alternatives it did in this section.     
¶26 We conclude that, under the circumstances presented in 
this case, the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 854.23 allows MERS 
to require Maciolek to provide to it a governing instrument as 
                                                 
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 854.01 states: 
 
In this chapter, "governing instrument" means a will; 
a deed; a trust instrument; an insurance or annuity 
policy; 
a 
contract; 
a 
pension, 
profit-sharing, 
retirement or similar benefit plan; a marital property 
agreement 
under 
s. 
766.58(3)(f); 
a 
beneficiary 
designation under s. 40.02(8)(a); an instrument under 
ch. 705; an instrument that creates or exercises a 
power 
of 
appointment 
or 
any 
other 
dispositive, 
appointive or nominative instrument that transfers 
property at death.   
Wis. Stat. § 854.01.   
No. 
2004AP1254   
 
17 
 
defined in that section.  We note that MERS need not require 
compliance with that provision before it can legally transfer 
funds to a beneficiary.  However, to be afforded the protections 
under § 854.23, compliance with the statutory requirements is 
mandatory.12  Wis. Stat. § 854.23(2).  MERS may, therefore, 
choose to mandate compliance. 
¶27 Maciolek next argues that even if Wis. Stat. § 867.046 
applies to Gerald's GPS benefits, she should be allowed to use 
the procedures outlined in § 867.046(2) instead of (1m).  We 
cannot support this conclusion.  Section 867.046(1m) applies to 
transfers at death, and specifically includes transfers of 
assets to the beneficiary of a "Washington Will" provision in a 
marital property agreement.13  In contrast, § 867.046(2), which 
allows confirmation of the petitioner's interest in property by 
way of a Form HT-110, limits its applicability to five types of 
property:  "an interest in any real property, a vendor's 
interest in a land contract, an interest in a savings or 
checking account, an interest in a security or mortgagee's 
interest in a mortgage, including an interest in survivorship 
marital property. . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 867.046(2).   
                                                 
12 While there is no claim that MERS has received or expects 
to receive notice that Maciolek is not entitled to the GPS 
benefits, the issue in this case is not notice, but rather the 
lack of a "governing instrument." 
13 Wisconsin Stat. § 867.046(1)(a) defines "beneficiary of a 
marital property agreement" as a "designated person, trust or 
other 
entity 
having 
an 
interest 
in 
property 
passing 
by 
nontestamentary 
disposition 
under 
s. 
766.58(3)(f)."  
Wis. Stat. § 867.046(1)(a).   
No. 
2004AP1254   
 
18 
 
¶28 Maciolek urges this court to read the provisions of 
Wis. Stat. § 867.046(2) as "upon the death of any person . . . 
the decedent's spouse or a beneficiary of a marital property 
agreement may obtain evidence of the termination of that 
interest of the decedent and confirmation of the petitioner's 
interest in the property by providing to the register of deeds . 
. ." a Form HT-110.  In other words, Maciolek urges this court 
to completely ignore the language limiting the types of property 
to which this procedure may be applied.  Such a reading is not 
only illogical, it would render the description of eligible 
property a surplusage.  We reject this construction.  See Kelley 
Co. v. Marquardt, 172 Wis. 2d 234, 250, 493 N.W.2d 68 (1992).  
Therefore, because the GPS pension benefits do not fall within 
the classes of property specified in subsection 2 that allow for 
this 
alternate 
confirmation 
procedure, 
Maciolek 
may 
not 
substitute 
the 
procedures 
in 
§ 867.046(2) 
for 
those 
of 
§ 867.046(1m).   
¶29 The GPS benefits do not come within "survivorship 
marital property," as they are titled solely in Gerald's name, 
and were not reclassified as "survivorship marital property" in 
their marital property agreement.14  As noted earlier, it is also 
                                                 
14 Wisconsin Stat. § 766.60 provides, in relevant part: 
Optional 
forms 
of 
holding 
property; 
survivorship 
ownership. (1) Spouses may hold marital property in a 
form that designates the holders of it by the words 
"(name of one spouse) or (name of other spouse) as 
marital property". 
No. 
2004AP1254   
 
19 
 
significant that Maciolek was not designated, and could not be 
designated, as the beneficiary of Gerald's interest in the GPS 
settlement 
funds. 
 
Since 
the 
GPS 
benefits 
are 
neither 
survivorship marital property, nor any of the other types of 
property enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 867.046(2), Maciolek may not 
utilize the procedures in § 867.046(2) in place of those 
outlined in (1m). 
¶30 Although the issue was not previously briefed or 
argued, Maciolek maintains that she did preserve her claim that 
MERS ignored her marital property interest in the GPS benefits.  
"Whether [Maciolek] could have elected to receive half of the 
benefits, and the proof she would have been required to submit, 
                                                                                                                                                             
     (2) Spouses may hold marital property in a form 
that designates the holder of it by the words "(name 
of one spouse) and (name of other spouse) as marital 
property". 
 
. . . . 
     (5)(a) 
If 
the 
words 
"survivorship 
marital 
property" are used instead of the words "marital 
property" in the form described in sub. (1) or (2), 
the marital property so held is survivorship marital 
property. On the death of a spouse, the ownership 
rights of that spouse in the property vest solely in 
the surviving spouse by nontestamentary disposition at 
death. The first deceased spouse may not dispose at 
death 
of 
any 
interest 
in 
survivorship 
marital 
property. Holding marital property in a form described 
in 
sub. 
(1) 
or 
(2) 
does 
not 
alone 
establish 
survivorship 
ownership 
between 
the 
spouses 
with 
respect to the property held. 
Wis. Stat. § 766.60. 
 
No. 
2004AP1254   
 
20 
 
were not issues submitted to the trial court . . ." and the 
court of appeals held that such issues were not properly before 
it, therefore, such matters are not properly before this court 
either.  Maciolek, 280 Wis. 2d 585, ¶22.  We decline to address 
them further here. See Allen v. Allen, 78 Wis. 2d 263, 270, 254 
N.W.2d 244 (1977)(court will generally not consider issues 
raised for the first time on appeal). 
V 
¶31 We conclude that, in the absence of an agreement 
between a holder of the property, such as MERS, and the person 
seeking its transfer, such as Maciolek, a holder may require 
compliance 
with 
the 
statutory 
provisions 
outlined 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 867.046(1m) to effect a transfer of the type of 
property at issue here, despite a "Washington Will" provision in 
a marital property agreement.  On the issue of whether or not 
any of these GPS benefits were marital property, since it was 
not argued before, nor reached by, either the circuit court or 
the court of appeals, we decline to address the issue here.    
 
By the Court.  The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
 
 
 
No. 
2004AP1254   
 
 
 
1