Title: Andrus v. Dunbar

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Andrus v. Dunbar (2003-438); 178 Vt. 554; 878 A.2d 245

2005 VT  48

[Filed 13-Apr-2005]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                 2005 VT  48

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2003-438

                             NOVEMBER TERM, 2004

  William Andrus	               }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
       v.	                       }	Chittenden Superior Court
                                       }	
  Ken Dunbar	                       }
                                       }	DOCKET NO. S689-03 CnC

                                                Trial Judge: Matthew Katz

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶  1.  Tenant, Ken Dunbar, appeals a trial court order denying his
  motion to dismiss and granting judgment of eviction and damages to
  landlord, William Andrus.  On appeal, tenant claims that the court lacked
  jurisdiction to evict him because landlord's notices to vacate were
  defective, and the court erred in not ruling on his motion to dismiss
  before conducting a merits hearing and ruling on the substantive issues. 
  We reverse and enter judgment for tenant.  

       ¶  2.  Tenant resided with his son in a building owned by landlord
  pursuant to a written lease dated October 25, 2002 and beginning November
  1, 2002.  The contracted rent was $750 per month, to be paid on the first
  of each month.  Tenant paid the first month's rent and a security deposit
  equal to a month's rent.  After January 2003, tenant paid no further rent. 
  On May 1, 2003, landlord delivered a notice to tenant that read in part:

     In accordance with Section 4467 of title 9 of the Vermont Statutes
    Annotated and Section 8 of your lease agreement dated October 25,
    2002, with William Andrus; I am writing to notify You that William
    Andrus is terminating your tenancy at 12:00 Midnight on May 31,
    2003.

     . . . .

     Would you please call William Andrus and see if you can work out a
    payment plan before this action has to be taken. 

  Landlord, through his attorney, sent another letter to tenant on June 12,
  2003, specifying that the "tenancy . . . is terminated on July 5, 2003" and
  that the "tenancy is being terminated for nonpayment of rent."  It notified
  tenant that he could "prevent the termination of . . . [his] tenancy for
  nonpayment of rent" if he paid all the rent in arrears by the termination
  date.  It also added that the "notice is independent of any other notices
  to quit you may receive . . . . [and] does not extend or alter times or
  obligations stated in any other notices to quit." 

       ¶  3.  On June 17, 2003, landlord filed an eviction action, asking
  for a writ of possession and direct and consequential damages, including
  back rent and associated costs.  Tenant represented himself in the action,
  but consulted Legal Services Law Line.  Pursuant to their advice, he filed
  a V.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on July 7, 2003, claiming that the
  court had no jurisdiction over the matter due to insufficiency of the
  notices to quit.  Tenant argued that the first notice, dated May 1, was
  insufficient because it did not contain the reason for termination of the
  tenancy.  Tenant further argued that the June 12 notice could not provide
  jurisdiction because landlord filed for eviction before the termination
  date of July 5. 

       ¶  4.  Landlord filed a motion to escrow the monthly rent due from
  tenant during the court proceedings.  The court held a rent escrow hearing
  on July 8, 2003 and issued a rent escrow order.  At the hearing, tenant
  asked the court about his motion to dismiss.  The court read the motion for
  the first time at the hearing and orally stated "I'm not going to consider
  this today. . . . I think I'll rule on it at trial."  The entry order form
  from the hearing indicated that one motion was considered, "plaintiff's
  motion for payment of rent into court," and the result was that an "escrow
  order issued."  Neither it nor the docket sheet shows any entry regarding
  the motion to dismiss.

       ¶  5.  On July 17, the trial court set a one-hour merits hearing for
  July 25, 2003.  Tenant then filed a motion to continue, asserting that he
  was still waiting for the court to rule on his motion to dismiss and
  requesting a chance to do discovery to prepare his counterclaim regarding
  race discrimination.  An affidavit of defendant, attached to the motion,
  indicated that if the motion to dismiss was denied he was "planning to file
  an answer with counterclaims regarding racial discrimination."  Tenant is
  of African and Native American descent, and he claims that landlord
  harassed him during the tenancy because of his race and treated him
  differently from other tenants.  He also claims that the eviction was
  motivated by racial discrimination.

       ¶  6.  The court did not rule on the motion to continue, but the
  merits hearing was postponed until August 11, 2003 because a judge was not
  available.  Tenant again filed a motion to continue, requesting time to do
  discovery and again reiterating that he was waiting for a ruling on his
  motion to dismiss.  Tenant never filed an answer, counterclaims, or a jury
  demand.

       ¶  7.  The trial court considered the motions to continue for the
  first time at the merits hearing.  On August 19, 2003, the trial court
  issued a written order denying the motion to dismiss and granting judgment
  in landlord's favor for both possession and damages.  Tenant filed a motion
  for a new trial claiming that the merit's hearing took place before his
  answer was due, and therefore he never had the opportunity to raise his
  counterclaim or request a jury trial.  The trial court issued a writ of
  possession that was temporarily stayed, pending application to the Supreme
  Court.  This Court denied tenant's stay on October 21, 2003.  Subsequently,
  the superior court issued a writ of possession, and tenant was evicted
  pursuant to this writ.
   
       ¶  8.  On appeal, tenant argues that the eviction was improper
  because landlord failed to send a proper notice to terminate the tenancy
  and, in any event, the trial court abused its discretion by orally
  postponing the motion to dismiss, denying tenant time to pursue discovery
  and prematurely scheduling the merits hearing before the answer was due and
  before tenant could file a counterclaim. 

       ¶  9.  Tenant argues that the superior court has no jurisdiction
  over an eviction action unless proper notice is served in accordance with
  statutory requirements.  9 V.S.A. § 4467(a) (allowing termination for
  nonpayment of rent fourteen days after actual notice to tenant).  Landlord
  responds that the notice requirement is not jurisdictional, rather proper
  notice is a prerequisite to a landlord's ability to claim a possessory
  remedy.

       ¶  10.  We agree generally with tenant without resting our decision
  on jurisdictional grounds.  Although the legal relationship between
  landlords and tenants is governed by the Residential Rental Agreements Act,
  9 V.S.A. §§ 4451-4468, the action for possession must be brought pursuant
  to the ejectment statute in Chapter 169 of Title 12, normally 12 V.S.A. §
  4851.  See 9 V.S.A. § 4468 (granting landlords an action for possession
  under Title 12 if tenant remains in possession after termination of the
  lease).  The ejectment statute allows an action for possession where the
  former lessee "holds possession of the demised premises without right,
  after termination of the lease."  12 V.S.A. § 4851.  The nature of the
  action, and its elements, is described in detail in Sabourin v. Woish:

    It provides a summary remedy for a landlord whose tenant holds
    over without right after the determination of the lease.  It lies
    where common law ejectment would lie.  It is given for wrongful
    holding over of the demised premises, and thus has all the
    characteristics of ejectment.  The action sounds in tort.  All the
    provisions of the statutes creating and allowing justice ejectment
    . . . proceed upon the supposition that the lease is at an end. 
    It is only when the lessee holds without right after the
    determination of the lease that a plaintiff can resort to the
    remedy.

  116 Vt. 385, 387,