Title: Griffin v. Little

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

451 So. 2d 284 (1984)
J.C. GRIFFIN & Myrtie Griffin
v.
Charles LITTLE & Robert Ferguson.
83-407.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 25, 1984.
*285 Michael Miskowiec of Legal Services Corp. of Ala., Andalusia, for appellants.
Griffin Sikes of Sikes, Johnson, Stokes & Taylor, Andalusia, for appellees.
BEATTY, Justice.
J.C. and Myrtie Griffin filed an action to quiet title in themselves to a parcel of land. The trial court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment and the Griffins appealed.
The only issue presented by this case is whether the trial court erred in granting defendants' motions for summary judgment.
The Griffins allege in their complaint that they own the fee simple title to the land in question. That allegation is based upon two counts, the first of which is adverse possession of the land for more than twenty years. In the second count they allege that, in 1957, "Henry" Butler (later referred to in the record as N.O. Butler), the record owner of the land at that time, contracted to convey the land to the plaintiffs in consideration for services to be rendered by them to Butler for the rest of his life. The Griffins assert that from 1957 until the time of his death in 1979 they worked for Butler, and that, upon his death, they completed their performance under the contract. Therefore, they contend that they are entitled to specific performance from defendant Charles Little, Butler's successor in interest. The Griffins later joined Robert Ferguson, who also claimed an interest in the disputed property, as a defendant.
Defendant Charles Little submitted interrogatories to the plaintiffs. They filed answers to those interrogatories and submitted their own interrogatories to defendants Little and Ferguson. Both defendants filed answers to those interrogatories, filed answers to the plaintiffs' complaint, and then moved for summary judgment "based upon the pleadings, interrogatories and answers thereto."
The Griffins filed a motion in opposition to those of the defendants, stating that there were genuine issues of material fact. They attached supporting affidavits. In pertinent part, those affidavits are set out below.
Affidavits of J.C. and Myrtie Griffin:
Affidavit of Donald Jackson:
Evidence offered in response to a motion for summary judgment, in the form of affidavits or otherwise, must present facts which would be admissible at trial. Whatley v. Cardinal Pest Control, 388 So. 2d 529, 532 (Ala.1980). The appellees, Little and Ferguson, attack the admissibility of the Griffins' affidavits, stating:
The Dead Man's Statute, Code of 1975, § 12-21-163, provides:
In their brief, the Griffins concede the applicability of the statute to statements about the transaction with Butler, but they claim that their testimony regarding the length and hostility of their possession of the property is admissible under the "collateral facts rule." Under that rule, this Court has found that testimony relating to a collateral matter, and not dealing with any transaction or statement by the deceased, is admissible. Gilbreath v. Levi, 268 Ala. 148, 105 So. 2d 96 (1958). That rule is applicable here, and, therefore, the Griffins' statements concerning the length and hostility of their possession are admissible and, as such, they were properly before the trial court in its ruling on defendants' motions for summary judgment.
The appellees also attack the affidavits of Jackson and Frazier on the ground that neither of them "meets the requirements for such affidavits as spelled out in Rule 56, A.R.Civ.P." However, the appellees fail to specify in their argument in what way these affidavits fall short of the requirement of that rule. From reading the appellees' statement of the issues, it appears that their attack on these affidavits is based upon the rule against hearsay evidence.
The exception referred to in Lavett is applicable here, and, therefore, the testimony of Frazier and Jackson is admissible evidence.
Next, we turn to the propriety of the trial court's grant of defendants' motions for summary judgment based upon the admissible evidence which was before it.
Adverse possession by prescription requires actual, exclusive, open, notorious, and hostile possession under a claim of *287 right for twenty years. Kerlin v. Tensaw Land & Timber Company, Inc., 390 So. 2d 616 (Ala.1980). Appellants admit that from 1939 to 1957 they used the land permissively, but they claim that since 1957 they have occupied the land adversely in accord with the rule stated in Pendley v. Pendley, 338 So. 2d 405 (Ala.1976):
While appellants' testimony about the alleged transaction with Butler is inadmissible, there was admissible evidence before the trial court that Butler had given the property to the Griffins, which would have converted their permissible use into adverse use.
"When the factual allegations in pleadings of the party opposing the motion for summary judgment are supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material, they must be taken as true in ruling on the motion." Arata v. Martin-Prine Entertainment, Inc., 342 So. 2d 925, 926 (Ala.Civ. App.1977). Summary judgment is proper only in cases which present no genuine issues of material fact and in which the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. If the evidence or any reasonable inference therefrom contains the merest gleam, glimmer, spark, the least particle or the smallest trace in support of the theory of the nonmoving party, the trial court must allow the factual questions to go to the jury. Ex parte Bagby Elevator & Electric Co., 383 So. 2d 173, 176 (Ala.1980).
We hold in this case that at least a scintilla of evidence was presented in support of the Griffins' claim, and, therefore, the defendants' motions for summary judgment should not have been granted. Accordingly, the summary judgments are due to be reversed and the case remanded. It is so ordered.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, JONES and SHORES, JJ., concur.