Title: In re Z.O.G.-I

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 41A20  
Filed 11 December 2020 
 
IN THE MATTER OF: Z.O.G.-I. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 17 
October 2019 by Judge Angela C. Foster in District Court, Guilford County. This 
matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 23 November 2020 but 
determined on the records and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) 
of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Mercedes O. Chut for petitioner-appellee Guilford County Department of Health 
and Human Services. 
 
Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP, by Lawrence F. Matthews, for appellee 
Guardian ad Litem. 
 
Christopher M. Watford for respondent-appellant father.  
 
 
NEWBY, Justice. 
 
Respondent, the father of fifteen-year-old minor child Z.O.G.-I. (Zander),1 
appeals from the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights based on the 
grounds of neglect and willful failure to make reasonable progress to correct the 
conditions that led to the child’s removal from his care. Because the trial court 
determined that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in Zander’s best 
                                            
1 A pseudonym is used to protect the juvenile’s identity and for ease of reading.  
IN RE Z.O.G.-I. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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interests due in part to a misapprehension of the legal effects of the termination, we 
vacate the dispositional portion of the trial court’s order and remand for entry of a 
new dispositional order.  
On 14 October 2016, the Guilford County Department of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS) obtained nonsecure custody of Zander and filed a petition alleging 
that he was a neglected and dependent juvenile. The petition alleged that Zander’s 
mother had a history with Child Protective Services due to issues with mental health, 
substance abuse, and housing. In-home services had been provided to the mother on 
multiple occasions with the most recent case being closed in June 2016. The petition 
alleged that the mother had been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar 
disorder, and depression and that she was not complying with her mental health and 
substance abuse treatment. At the time of the filing of the petition, respondent was 
incarcerated and scheduled to be released in the Spring of 2017. DHHS spoke with 
respondent on 13 October 2016, and respondent requested that Zander be placed with 
his paternal grandmother, Ms. R., but she had already declined to care for Zander 
several months earlier. 
Following a 3 March 2017 hearing, the trial court entered an order on 11 April 
2017 adjudicating Zander to be a dependent juvenile. The trial court found that the 
mother consented to a finding of dependency based on stipulated facts regarding her 
noncompliance with her mental health and substance abuse treatment and found 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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that DHHS dismissed the neglect allegation. Respondent was incarcerated at the 
time of the hearing but was scheduled to be released a few months later.  
Respondent was released from incarceration on 15 June 2017. Due to 
scheduling conflicts, a Child and Family Team Meeting was not held until 10 October 
2017. Respondent entered into a case plan with DHHS on 11 October 2017 which 
required him to maintain suitable housing for himself and Zander and provide 
documentation of a lease or rental agreement and all utilities; complete a parenting/ 
psychological evaluation and follow all recommendations; participate in shared 
parenting with Zander’s caregivers; attend all scheduled visitations and demonstrate 
appropriate parenting skills; comply with child support requirements; obtain 
adequate income to meet the basic needs of his family through employment or 
disability, and provide DHHS with verification of his income; complete a substance 
abuse assessment and follow all recommendations; and submit to random drug 
screens within twenty-four hours of a request. A permanency-planning order was 
entered on 21 November 2017 setting the primary permanent plan as reunification 
with a concurrent secondary plan of adoption. The trial court ordered respondent to 
comply with the components of his case plan and allowed him four to five hours of 
supervised visits with Zander per month. 
Following a 2 March 2018 review hearing, the trial court changed the 
permanent plan to adoption with a concurrent secondary plan of reunification on 12 
April 2018 but stayed the filing of a petition for termination of parental rights until 
IN RE Z.O.G.-I. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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the next court hearing on 25 April 2018. The trial court found that respondent 
obtained housing with his girlfriend on 15 December 2017 and submitted a copy of a 
lease at the court hearing. The trial court found that he was employed but needed to 
provide documentation of his employment to DHHS. The trial court also found that 
respondent had not yet scheduled his parenting/psychological evaluation and was not 
participating in shared parenting. Respondent also tested positive for marijuana in 
August and October 2017. Respondent completed a substance abuse assessment on 
12 November 2017, and no substance abuse diagnosis was made. Respondent had 
been incarcerated from 25 January 2018 to 27 February 2018, but the charges were 
later dismissed. The trial court found that neither parent was making adequate 
progress on their case plans within a reasonable time period, but that respondent was 
making some progress. The trial court ordered respondent to comply with his case 
plan and cooperate with DHHS and allowed him one hour of supervised visits per 
week.  
The trial court entered another permanency planning order on 24 May 2018 
lifting the stay on the termination of parental rights and ordering DHHS to file a 
petition within sixty days. The trial court found that respondent was not 
participating in shared parenting, had not yet set up his visitation with Zander, was 
not complying with requested drug screens, and was unemployed due to an alleged 
medical injury. Although respondent had submitted a lease agreement at the 
previous hearing, he did not know his address, and a home study could not be 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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completed by DHHS. DHHS filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights 
on 18 July 2018 alleging the grounds of neglect and willful failure to make reasonable 
progress to correct the conditions that led to Zander’s removal from the home. See 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)–(2) (2019).  
A subsequent permanency planning order was entered on 7 August 2018. The 
trial court found that respondent had not scheduled his parenting/psychological 
evaluation, had not submitted to any drug screen, had not attended any visits with 
Zander, and was not participating in shared parenting. Respondent had also been 
unemployed since March 2018 due to a purported back injury but had not provided 
any documentation of the injury. A completed home study found the home to be 
appropriate, but DHHS did not approve the home study due to respondent’s lack of 
compliance with his case plan.  
The hearing on the petition to terminate parental rights began on 30 April 
2019 and, after multiple continuances, concluded on 17 September 2019. In an order 
entered on 17 October 2019, the trial court concluded that grounds existed to 
terminate respondent’s parental rights based on N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and (2). 
The trial court also concluded that termination of respondent’s parental rights was 
in Zander’s best interests. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2019). Accordingly, the trial 
court terminated respondent’s parental rights. Respondent appeals, challenging the 
trial court’s adjudication that grounds existed to terminate his parental rights and 
IN RE Z.O.G.-I. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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its dispositional determination under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) that termination of his 
parental rights was in Zander’s best interests. 
We review a trial court’s adjudication that grounds existed to terminate 
parental rights “to determine whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and 
convincing evidence and the findings support the conclusions of law.” In re E.H.P., 
372 N.C. 388, 392, 831 S.E.2d 49, 52 (2019) (quoting In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 
111, 316 S.E.2d 246, 253 (1984)). “Findings of fact not challenged by respondent are 
deemed supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal.” In re T.N.H., 
372 N.C. 403, 407, 831 S.E.2d 54, 58 (2019) (citing Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 
93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991)). “Moreover, we review only those findings 
necessary to support the trial court’s determination that grounds existed to terminate 
respondent’s parental rights.” Id. at 407, 831 S.E.2d at 58–59 (citing In re Moore, 306 
N.C. 394, 404, 293 S.E.2d 127, 133 (1982)). “The trial court’s conclusions of law are 
reviewable de novo on appeal.” In re C.B.C., 373 N.C. 16, 19, 832 S.E.2d 692, 695 
(2019). 
Under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2), a trial court may terminate parental rights if 
“[t]he parent has willfully left the juvenile in foster care or placement outside the 
home for more than 12 months without showing to the satisfaction of the trial court 
that reasonable progress under the circumstances has been made in correcting those 
conditions which led to the removal of the juvenile.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) (2019). 
“[A] finding that a parent acted ‘willfully’ for purposes of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) 
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‘does not require a showing of fault by the parent.’ ” In re J.S., 374 N.C. 811, 815, 845 
S.E.2d 66, 71 (2020) (quoting In re Oghenekevebe, 123 N.C. App. 434, 439, 473 S.E.2d 
393, 398 (1996)). “Willfulness is established when the respondent had the ability to 
show reasonable progress, but was unwilling to make the effort.” In re McMillon, 143 
N.C. App. 402, 410, 546 S.E.2d 169, 175, disc. review denied, 354 N.C. 218, 554 S.E.2d 
341 (2001). “ ‘[A] respondent’s prolonged inability to improve [his or] her situation, 
despite some efforts in that direction, will support a finding of willfulness “regardless 
of [his or] her good intentions,” ’ and will support a finding of lack of progress . . . 
sufficient to warrant termination of parental rights under section 7B-1111(a)(2).” In 
re J.S., 374 N.C. at 815, 845 S.E.2d at 71 (first and fourth alterations in original) 
(citations omitted).  
According to N.C.G.S. § 7B-904(d1)(3)[ (2019)], a trial judge 
has the authority to require the parent of a juvenile who 
has been adjudicated to be abused, neglected, or dependent 
to “[t]ake appropriate steps to remedy conditions in the 
home that led to or contributed to the juvenile’s 
adjudication or to the court’s decision to remove custody of 
the juvenile from the parent, guardian, custodian, or 
caretaker.”  
 
In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. 372, 381, 831 S.E.2d 305, 311–12 (2019) (second alteration in 
original). This Court has consistently recognized  
that parental compliance with a judicially adopted case 
plan is relevant in determining whether grounds for 
termination exist pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) 
even when there is no direct and immediate relationship 
between the conditions addressed in the case plan and the 
circumstances that led to the initial governmental 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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intervention into the family’s life, as long as the objectives 
sought to be achieved by the case plan provision in question 
address issues that contributed to causing the problematic 
circumstances that led to the juvenile’s removal from the 
parental home.  
 
Id. at 384, 831 S.E.2d at 313–14.  
I. 
In determining that respondent failed to make reasonable progress, the trial 
court found respondent “had the opportunity to correct the conditions that led to the 
juvenile’s removal from the home, including but not limited to being offered a service 
agreement,” which he entered into on 11 October 2017. The trial court made the 
following findings of fact addressing respondent’s progress in complying with his 
service agreement:  
20. . . . [Respondent] agreed to address the following 
conditions: 
 
a. Housing – [Respondent] agreed to obtain suitable 
housing 
for 
himself, 
his 
child 
and 
provide 
documentation of his lease/rental agreement and 
utilities. [Respondent] provided what he reported was a 
copy of his lease to the [c]ourt and [DHHS] on March 2, 
2018 with sufficient address information. The assigned 
social worker made a referral to Catawba County to 
complete a home study on [respondent’s] home, which 
he reported was in Catawba County. The home study 
was denied because he was not taking drug screens. 
 
b. Income – [Respondent] agreed to have adequate income 
to meet the basic needs of his family through 
employment or disability, and provide proof of income 
to [DHHS]. [Respondent] remains unemployed. He 
reports that this is a result of a back injury, but he has 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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not provided any verification of the injury and is not 
receiving disability income. He has not filed for 
disability and does not have a doctor’s note stating he 
is unable to work. The source of [respondent’s] income 
is his girlfriend who pays the bills and provides for all 
of his needs. He stated that he is unemployed due to 
visits with the juvenile and that his girlfriend agreed 
he would take care of their kids while she worked. He 
does not know his girlfriend’s income and, therefore, the 
[c]ourt cannot determine if there is sufficient income in 
the home to support this juvenile in the home as he 
already has three other kids in the home. [Respondent] 
quit his job in 2018 and has applied to work at four or 
five temporary agencies but states he cannot take 
positions due to visits that occur one day per week. 
[Respondent] remains unemployed. 
 
c. Parenting – [Respondent] agreed to complete a 
parenting/psychological 
evaluation, 
to 
follow 
all 
recommendations, participate in shared parenting, and 
attend visits as scheduled. [Respondent] attended a 
parenting psychological on January 3, 2019, with Agape 
Psychological Consortium, LLC. [Respondent] agreed to 
take Parenting Assessment Training Education (PATE) 
Program classes and has met with Demetria Powell-
Harrison twice. [Respondent] completed his test and 
assessment received by [DHHS] on March 6, 2019. 
Social Worker discussed the results with [respondent] 
on March 8, 2019. [Respondent] is allowed supervised 
visits once a week for one hour per visit. [Respondent’s] 
visits were originally inconsistent, however, since 
September 21, 2018, [respondent] began being very 
consistent with his visits and is participating in shared 
parenting with the foster parents. He has participated 
in a meeting with Milicent Day and requested that the 
foster parents be included in those sessions. He has 
failed to obtain individual therapy which was 
recommended 
by Dr. 
Morris in 
his 
parenting 
psychological 
evaluation. 
[Respondent] 
thought 
therapy was only optional though the social worker had 
informed him he was required to attend individual 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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therapy.  
 
d. Substance Abuse – [Respondent] agreed to participate 
in a substance abuse assessment and follow all 
recommendations, and submit to random drug screens 
in order to demonstrate his sobriety. [Respondent] has 
a significant substance abuse history. He was convicted 
of Felony Possession Controlled Substance with Intent 
to Sell (four counts) in 2016 and has a misdemeanor 
conviction of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia from 
2012. [Respondent] completed a substance abuse 
assessment on November 12, 2017 with Joe Fortin. Mr. 
Fortin did not make a substance abuse diagnosis at that 
time. [Respondent] had not been complying with drug 
screen requests and has not demonstrated his sobriety 
in 2017.  
 
On November 2, 2018, [respondent] completed a second 
assessment with Joe Fortin, and he was diagnosed with 
Cannabis Use Disorder, mild and he ruled out Cocaine 
Use Disorder. As of February 1, 2019, [respondent] has 
met with Joe Fortin six out of 8 times. However he 
missed a session on February 8, 2019. Social Worker 
inquired about this and [respondent] reported that he 
did not know the time his classes were being held. 
However, classes are the same each week and Social 
Worker again informed him of this. 
 
The trial court also found that respondent tested negative on at least twenty-three 
drug screens requested between April 2018 and April 2019. But, he tested positive 
for cocaine and marijuana on 10 October 2018 and tested positive for marijuana on 5 
March 2019. Additionally, the trial court found that DHHS requested a drug screen 
on 18 February 2019 and, although respondent tested negative, he did not comply 
with DHHS’s policy of completing the drug screen within twenty-four hours of the 
request. The trial court also found that respondent admitted to using marijuana twice 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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in the months before the termination hearing, including three weeks before the 17 
September 2019 hearing date, and that respondent’s substance abuse counseling had 
not been effective. Finally, the trial court found that respondent “made only minimal 
progress in demonstrating that he can provide adequate care and supervision and a 
safe home to [Zander].” Respondent does not challenge any of these findings, and they 
are binding on appeal. See In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 407, 831 S.E.2d at 58.  
Respondent first argues that “[t]he trial court never provided formal guidance 
on what was required of [respondent] to demonstrate a change of conditions” or the 
reasons for Zander’s removal. Respondent further claims he had made reasonable 
progress at the time of the termination hearing on 17 September 2019 because he had 
maintained a residence with his girlfriend and their children for over two years; he 
participated in substance abuse programs and produced multiple negative drug 
screens throughout the case; and he improved his parenting skills, was participating 
in co-parenting with the foster parents, and was consistently visiting with Zander.   
Respondent also asserts that he did not willfully leave Zander in foster care 
and that his progress was reasonable under the circumstances given his challenges 
with finances and transportation. Respondent argues that the trial court did not 
make a finding that he maintained the ability to comply with the case plan or that he 
was “unwilling to make the effort.” See In re McMillon, 143 N.C. App. at 410, 546 
S.E.2d at 175.  
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Here Zander was adjudicated to be a dependent juvenile based, in part, on 
respondent’s inability to care for Zander due to his incarceration and his lack of an 
appropriate alternative child care arrangement. Respondent’s case plan was designed 
to address his ability to appropriately care for Zander by obtaining a stable home and 
income, learning appropriate parenting skills, and addressing his substance abuse 
issues. Respondent was clearly put on notice of the conditions he needed to address 
when he entered into the service agreement. Indeed, the trial court consistently 
ordered him to comply with the requirements of his service agreement in each of its 
permanency planning orders. Therefore, respondent’s argument that he was never 
provided formal guidance on what he was required to do to demonstrate changed 
conditions is without merit. 
 
At the termination hearing, respondent testified that he was not able to start 
the parenting/psychological evaluation before January 2019 due to transportation 
issues. He also testified that he asked to take the evaluation in Catawba County, but 
he was told that he would have to pay for it himself, and that he did not have a job to 
earn money to pay the fee. Nonetheless, he acknowledged on cross-examination that 
he never inquired into what it would have cost to have the evaluation done in 
Catawba County. Respondent also testified that he quit his job in 2018 due to a 
reoccurring back injury; he also acknowledged that he did not apply for disability in 
order to obtain income. Respondent did not testify that his proposed issues with 
finances and transportation prevented him from participating in individual therapy, 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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applying for disability, providing DHHS with verification of his injury, or abstaining 
from drug use.  
The trial court found that respondent failed to obtain sufficient income to 
support Zander, failed to comply with the individual therapy recommendations of his 
parenting/psychological evaluation, and failed to address his substance abuse issues. 
The findings show that respondent did not obtain income through employment or 
disability. He quit his job in 2018 due to an alleged back injury and had not worked 
since. He did not provide verification of his injury and did not apply for disability 
benefits. Respondent instead relied on his girlfriend’s income but did not know how 
much money she made, leaving the trial court unable to determine if her income was 
sufficient to support the family.  
The unchallenged findings also show that although respondent was 
consistently visiting with Zander at the time of the termination hearing, he did not 
do so until over a year after he was released from incarceration and two months after 
the petition was filed. Respondent continued to use marijuana after the filing of the 
termination petition and after the termination hearing had started. Respondent 
admitted to using marijuana twice in the months leading up to the September 2019 
hearing date and as recently as three weeks before the hearing. Respondent has not 
specifically challenged any of the above findings, rendering them binding on appeal. 
See In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 407, 831 S.E.2d at 58.  These unchallenged findings 
support the trial court’s ultimate finding and conclusion that respondent failed to 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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make reasonable progress under the circumstances to correct the conditions that lead 
to removal.    
As the fact-finder, the trial court was entrusted with evaluating the credibility 
of respondent’s testimony and the weight it is afforded. See In re S.C.R., 198 N.C. 
App. 525, 531–32, 679 S.E.2d 905, 909 (2009). Although respondent made some 
progress on his case plan, the findings in the trial court’s order and unchallenged 
findings support the trial court’s ultimate finding and conclusion that respondent 
willfully failed to make reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to 
Zander’s removal. Here the trial court weighed the evidence and ultimately 
determined that respondent “made only minimal progress in demonstrating that he 
can provide adequate care and supervision and a safe home to [Zander],” and 
therefore he willfully failed to make reasonable progress under the circumstances to 
correct the conditions that led to Zander’s removal. Therefore, we affirm the trial 
court’s adjudication of grounds under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). As such, we need not 
address respondent’s arguments regarding the ground of neglect.  In re S.E., 373 N.C. 
360, 367, 838 S.E.2d 328, 333 (2020).  
II. 
Respondent also challenges the trial court’s dispositional determination under 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) that termination of his parental rights was in Zander’s best 
interests. Respondent does not contend that the trial court failed to consider and 
make findings on the relevant statutory factors. Instead, he argues the trial court 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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erred because the trial court’s decision to terminate respondent’s parental rights is 
inconsistent with its conclusion about Zander’s best interests.   
In determining whether termination of parental rights is in the juvenile’s best 
interests,  
the court shall consider the following criteria and make 
written findings regarding the following that are relevant: 
 
(1) The age of the juvenile. 
 
(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile. 
 
(3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid in 
the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the 
juvenile. 
 
(4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent. 
 
(5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and 
the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or 
other permanent placement. 
 
(6) Any relevant consideration. 
 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). “The trial court’s assessment of a juvenile’s best interests at 
the dispositional stage is reviewed solely for abuse of discretion.” In re A.U.D., 373 
N.C. 3, 6, 832 S.E.2d 698, 700 (2019). “[A]buse of discretion results where the court’s 
ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have 
been the result of a reasoned decision.” In re T.L.H., 368 N.C. 101, 107, 772 S.E.2d 
451, 455 (2015) (quoting State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 
(1988)).  
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Zander, who was approaching his fourteenth birthday at the time, testified 
that his placement with his foster parents was “wonderful[,]” but that he did not want 
to be adopted and wanted to live with respondent because he felt that he “need[ed] 
[respondent] in [his] life.” Zander also testified that he would “be devastated” if the 
court were to terminate respondent’s parental rights. In the termination order, the 
trial court found that there was a strong bond between Zander and respondent and 
that Zander had testified he wanted to live with respondent and did not want to be 
adopted. The trial court also found as follows: Zander was 13 years old; there was a 
high likelihood of adoption; the primary permanent plan was adoption; terminating 
respondent’s parental rights would aid in accomplishing that plan; the relationship 
between Zander and his foster parents was stable, and they wished to adopt him; and 
the foster parents had agreed to allow respondent to continue to contact Zander and 
to continue co-parenting. Respondent does not challenge these findings and, 
therefore, they are binding on appeal. In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 407, 831 S.E.2d at 58.  
In the order terminating respondent’s parental rights, the trial court also 
decreed that “[DHHS] shall ensure that [respondent] is allowed continued co-
parenting of [Zander]” and that it “hereby honors the request of [Zander] not [to] be 
adopted pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 48-3-603(b).” Respondent argues that this is “contrary 
to” the legal consequences of a termination of parental rights under section 7B-1112, 
which “call[s] for a complete and total severance” of the parent-child relationship. See 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1112 (2019). According to respondent, the trial court’s decree 
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“effectively frustrates the permanent plan of adoption and creates the prospect that 
Zander is now a ‘legal orphan.’ ” We agree the matter should be remanded for a proper 
best interests determination.   
 
Section 7B-1112 provides that  
[a]n order terminating parental rights completely and 
permanently terminates all rights and obligations of the 
parent to the juvenile and of the juvenile to the parent 
arising from the parental relationship, except that the 
juvenile’s right of inheritance from the juvenile’s parent 
shall not terminate until a final order of adoption is issued. 
 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1112; see also Owenby v. Young, 357 N.C. 142, 145, 579 S.E.2d 264, 
267 (2003) (“With the exception of a child’s right to inherit from a parent, a 
termination of parental rights order completely and permanently severs all rights 
and obligations of the parent to the child and the child to the parent.”). The 
“[t]ermination of parental rights makes a child available for adoption by another 
person, rendering the child a legal stranger to the biological parent.” Huml v. Huml, 
264 N.C. App. 376, 398, 826 S.E.2d 532, 547 (2019) (citing In re Estate of Edwards, 
316 N.C. 698, 706, 343 S.E.2d 913, 918 (1986)). A decree that a biological parent be 
allowed to continue to co-parent a minor child is at odds with the determination that 
the complete and permanent severance of parental rights and obligations is in the 
juvenile’s best interests. 
 
The trial court’s decision here to order both that respondent’s parental rights 
be terminated and that DHHS ensure respondent is allowed to continue co-parenting 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Zander suggests a misapprehension of the legal effects attendant to terminating 
parental rights. Perhaps the trial court had in mind a type of guardianship 
arrangement, which does not require termination of parental rights. In such a 
situation, the proper remedy is to remand for reconsideration. Cf. In re Estate of 
Skinner, 370 N.C. 126, 146, 804 S.E.2d 449, 462 (2017) (“It is well-established in this 
Court’s decisions that a misapprehension of the law is appropriately addressed by 
remanding the case to the appropriate lower forum in order to apply the correct legal 
standard.”). Therefore, we remand this case to the trial court for reconsideration of 
its decision that the termination of respondent’s parental rights was in Zander’s best 
interests.  
 
In conclusion, we affirm the trial court’s adjudication that grounds existed to 
terminate respondent’s parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2); however, we 
vacate the dispositional portion of the trial court’s order and remand the matter to 
the trial court for a new dispositional determination. The trial court may, in the 
exercise of its discretion, receive additional evidence on remand if it elects to do so. 
See In re K.N., 373 N.C 274, 285, 837 S.E.2d 861, 869 (2020). 
 
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.