Title: Martha M. Topps v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
____________
No. SC02-1085
____________
MARTHA M. TOPPS,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[January 22, 2004]
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner Martha M. Topps petitions this Court for writ of mandamus.  We
have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(8), Fla. Const.
As further discussed below, we deny the petition based on the application of
the doctrine of res judicata but hold that henceforth, for purposes of uniformity,
unelaborated denials entered in connection with all extraordinary writ petitions filed
in any Florida court shall not be considered decisions on the merits which would
bar the litigant from presenting the same or a substantially similar issue on appeal or
by a subsequent writ petition, or by other means, in the same or a different Florida
1. We subsequently addressed the Stop Turning Out Prisoners Act and held
that it did not violate the single subject requirement of Florida's Constitution.  See
Comer v. Moore, 817 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 2002).
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court.  
FACTS
On June 12, 2001, Martha M. Topps filed a petition for writ of mandamus in
this Court challenging the Stop Turning Out Prisoners Act, which amended various
statutes to require that inmates serve eighty-five percent of their criminal sentences
in prison.  This was accomplished, for the most part, by limiting the amount of gain
time that could be applied to an inmate's sentence to reduce the amount of time the
inmate would actually remain in prison.  See § 944.275(4)(b)3, Fla. Stat. (2001); ch.
95-294, § 2, at 2717-18, Laws of Fla.  Topps alleged in her petition, inter alia, that
the Florida Legislature should not have been permitted to pass a law reducing the
amount of gain time an inmate could receive because, as she argued, the Legislature
should have accomplished the result through the mechanism of a constitutional
amendment.  At that time, we considered all of the arguments presented in Topps'
petition and deemed them to be without merit.  However, we denied the petition by
simply issuing an unelaborated order denying relief.  See Topps v. State, 800 So.
2d 617 (Fla. 2001) (table).1  Topps has now filed another petition for writ of
2.  At times some courts have erroneously used the term "res judicata" and
"law of the case" interchangeably.  The correct term for writ petitions is "res
judicata."  This distinction was pointed out in Public Employees Relations
Commission v. District School Board of DeSoto County, 374 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1979).  The Second District Court of Appeal stated:
Although the school board speaks in terms of the
law of the case having been established on the
jurisdictional point by these previous denials of writ of
prohibition, the applicable doctrine is res judicata since
proceedings for writs of prohibition are original
proceedings before this court and thus the denials in
those proceedings do not constitute prior rulings by this
court in the same case now before us for review.  The
doctrines of "law of the case" and res judicata are
somewhat similar, but the latter has a more binding effect
and the distinction is a significant one. 
Id. at 1010 n.1. 
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mandamus asserting the identical issue.
ANALYSIS
 The term "procedural bar" is a very broad term essentially meaning that the
case, claim, or issue is precluded in some manner from being considered on the
merits.   The notion that a claim or an issue can be procedurally barred or
"precluded" by a prior adjudication is commonly expressed in the concepts of res
judicata and collateral estoppel. 
Res judicata (or claim preclusion) is one type of procedural bar.2  Translated
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from the Latin, it means "a thing adjudicated."  See Black’s Law Dictionary 1312
(7th ed. 1999).  The doctrine of res judicata bars relitigation in a subsequent cause
of action not only of claims raised, but also claims that could have been raised. 
See Florida Dep’t of Transp. v. Juliano, 801 So. 2d 101, 107 (Fla. 2001).   The
idea underlying res judicata is that if a matter has already been decided, the
petitioner has already had his or her day in court, and for purposes of judicial
economy, that matter generally will not be reexamined again in any court (except, of
course, for appeals by right).  See Denson v. State, 775 So. 2d 288, 290 n.3 (Fla.
2000).  The doctrine of res judicata applies when four identities are present: (1)
identity of the thing sued for; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of
persons and parties to the action; and (4) identity of the quality of the persons for
or against whom the claim is made.  See McGregor v. Provident Trust Co. of
Philadelphia, 162 So. 323, 328 (Fla. 1935); Palm AFC Holdings, Inc. v. Palm
Beach County, 807 So. 2d 703, 704 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). 
The doctrine of collateral estoppel (or issue preclusion), also referred to as
estoppel by judgment, is a related but different concept.  In Florida, the doctrine of
collateral estoppel bars relitigation of the same issues between the same parties in
connection with a different cause of action.  See Clean Water, Inc. v. State Dep’t
of Envtl. Reg., 402 So. 2d 456, 458 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (citing Gordon v.
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Gordon, 59 So. 2d 40, 44 (Fla. 1952) (finding that "the principle of estoppel by
judgment is applicable where the two causes of action are different, in which case
the judgment in the first action only estops the parties from litigating in the second
action issues--that is to say points and questions--common to both causes of
action and which were actually adjudicated in the prior litigation")).
This Court and other Florida courts have held that a ruling must be "on the
merits" for an issue to have truly been "decided" and thus preclude the
consideration of an issue on the basis of res judicata.  See Kent v. Sutker, 40 So.
2d 145, 147 (Fla. 1949) (noting that "a judgment rendered on any grounds which do
not involve the merits of the action may not be used as a basis for the operation of
the doctrine of res judicata"), cited in Cabinet Craft, Inc. v. A.G. Spanos Enters.,
Inc., 348 So. 2d 920, 922 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); Weit v. Rhodes, 691 So. 2d 1108,
1109 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).  Florida courts have set forth similar holdings with
regard to specific writ petitions.  See Barone v. Scandinavian World Cruises
(Bahamas), Ltd., 531 So. 2d 1036, 1039 n.3 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (petitions for writ
of certiorari); Pub. Employees Relations Comm'n v. Dist. Sch. Bd. of DeSoto
County, 374 So. 2d 1005, 1010 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) (petitions for writ of
prohibition); State Dep’t of Envtl. Reg. v. Falls Chase Special Taxing Dist., 424
So. 2d 787, 790 n.8 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (prohibition petitions).   Therefore,
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consistent with our prior decision in Kent, we conclude that for a matter to have res
judicata effect, the disposition of a writ petition must be on the merits. 
Although it is clear that a decision on the merits must have been made before
res judicata becomes applicable, Florida case law is totally unclear and in conflict
as to whether an unelaborated denial of relief related to extraordinary writ petitions
should be considered a decision on the merits.  For example, in Florida, the First,
Second, and Fifth District Courts of Appeal have held that with one type of writ
petition (petitions for writ of prohibition), an unelaborated denial will not be deemed
a ruling on the merits and will not preclude the petitioner from presenting or
asserting the issue again on direct appeal.  See Smith v. State, 738 So. 2d 410 (Fla.
5th DCA 1999); Sumner v. Sumner, 707 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); State
Dep’t of Envtl. Reg. v. Falls Chase Special Taxing Dist., 424 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1982).
In contrast, the Third and Fourth District Courts of Appeal have addressed
this uncertainty by specifically holding that an unelaborated denial of a petition for a
writ of prohibition entered in such courts will be deemed a ruling on the merits.  See
Hobbs v. State, 689 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Obanion v. State, 496 So.
2d 977 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).  The conflict and lack of uniformity is clear. Further,
in Norman v. Singletary, 698 So. 2d 614, 615 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), the First
3.  The proposed rule did more than simply set forth that an unelaborated
denial would be deemed a denial on the merits.  It also set forth guidelines for when
a dismissal (as opposed to a denial) would be more appropriate, as well as setting
forth options for transferring writ petitions to other courts.
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District Court of Appeal concluded that this Court’s denial of a petition for a writ
of mandamus in an order which did not set forth the basis for the denial did not bar
the appellant from subsequently presenting an identical claim for relief on appeal
from the denial of a habeas petition by the trial court.  
This instant case is not the first time that we have considered addressing the
lack of uniformity among the district courts on the issue of whether an unelaborated
denial of an extraordinary writ petition should be considered a denial on the merits. 
In 1998, we addressed the matter through a proposed amendment of Florida Rule
of Appellate Procedure 9.100, which is the rule that establishes the procedures for
the processing of writ petitions filed in the appellate courts.  At that time, we
proposed a new subdivision 9.100(l), Disposition of Writ Petitions.  Under the
proposed subdivision at that time, an unelaborated denial would have been
considered a decision on the merits.3  The proposed amendments were submitted
to The Florida Bar's Appellate Court Rules Committee (committee) for
consideration.  The committee subsequently presented this Court with a petition to
amend the rules but, contrary to the proposal as submitted by this Court, the
4.  On December 22, 1999, we issued an order declining to adopt our
proposed amendments to rule 9.100.  See In re Amendment to the Florida Rules of
Appellate Procedure Rule 9.100, 751 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1999) (table).  
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committee's proposed amendments totally reversed the approach and provided that
an unelaborated denial of an extraordinary writ petition would not be a decision on
the merits.  This Court at that time denied the committee's petition, rejected the
committee's proposal, and directed publication of the Court's proposed
amendments as originally drafted in The Florida Bar News.  The records reflect
that, after reviewing the proposals and the comments received related to the Court's
proposed amendments, none of which were in support of the Court's proposed
amendments, this Court determined that it would be better to approach a remedy
for the lack of uniformity in the district courts with regard to the effect of an
unelaborated denial of a writ petition by opinion when the appropriate case was
presented to this Court for consideration.4
The unique procedural posture of the instant case now presents the
appropriate case for us to address the issues for clarification of the law. 
Historically, in most cases, when we have denied an extraordinary writ petition on
the merits we have either included information in the order indicating the basis of
our decision, or we have specifically stated that the denial is "on the merits" or
5. Relief may not be granted for a number of reasons: the relief sought is
either premature or moot, or the appellate court may deem it more appropriate to
review the allegations on direct appeal later.  While in this Court if we do not grant
relief due to prematurity or mootness, we generally dismiss the petition indicating
the basis, we have noticed that some courts simply deny the petition. 
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"with prejudice," or "without prejudice."  Although the order issued in Topps’
previous case was unelaborated, this Court intended its denial to be on the merits. 
Because the four identities set forth in MacGregor are now present in the instant
case and in Topps' prior case, we deny the instant petition upon application of the
doctrine of res judicata.  Nevertheless, we write this opinion today to clarify the
future legal effect of an unelaborated denial in extraordinary writ petition cases and
to provide uniformity in Florida law. 
As with denials of relief entered in connection with petitions for certiorari in
both the civil and criminal context, other types of extraordinary writ petitions such
as petitions for mandamus, prohibition, all writs, habeas corpus, and quo warranto
could certainly have relief denied based on a number of reasons other than the
actual merits of the claim.5  Decisions made in connection with extraordinary writ
petitions filed by both represented and pro se litigants follow this rule because
litigants often present a large number of issues, not all of which may be ripe for
consideration at the time the petition is filed.  Often extraordinary writ petitions are
filed with the appellate court before the trial court has entered a judgment in the
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proceeding below, and it is not at all clear whether the appellate court has
considered the petition on the merits.  See, e.g., Dist. Sch. Bd. of DeSoto County,
374 So. 2d at 1010 (where district court previously issued unelaborated denials of
two prohibition petitions, court noted on appeal that "[i]t would be pure speculation
to attribute any particular reasoning to the majority of the two prior panels of this
court which decided that PERC's suggestions for writ of prohibition should be
denied” and that “those denials could have rested on reasons other than the merits
of the jurisdictional question posed in those prior proceedings”).  Since the nature
of an extraordinary writ is not of absolute right, the granting of such writ lies within
the discretion of the court.  Therefore, extraordinary writs may be denied for
numerous and a variety of reasons, some of which may not be based upon the
merits of the petition.  
Thus, we do not intend to foreclose a litigant from possible relief in another
court if a matter has not been determined on the merits and if it is more appropriate
for that later court to determine the merits of the issue.  See generally Bared & Co.,
Inc. v. McGuire, 670 So. 2d 153, 156-58 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (noting that
certiorari is a discretionary writ and not grantable unless the harm cannot be
corrected on final appeal and, therefore, a simple denial of the petition has a
"nonpreclusive effect"); Keay v. City of Coral Gables, 236 So. 2d 133, 135 (Fla.
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3d DCA 1970) ("A denial of a petition for certiorari cannot be construed as passing
upon any of the issues in the litigation . . . .").  To ensure that all issues are
uniformly given due consideration, henceforth unelaborated orders denying relief in
connection with all extraordinary writ petitions issued by Florida courts shall not be
deemed to be decisions on the merits which would later bar the litigant from
presenting the issue under the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel unless
there is a citation to authority or other statement that clearly shows that the issue
was considered by the court on the merits and relief was denied.  
We emphasize that our holding today will operate only prospectively for we
do not wish to impose on the lower tribunals a burden of potentially having to
reconsider the claims presented in any prior extraordinary writ petition that was
previously disposed of by an unelaborated denial.  Further, our holding certainly
does not require the lower tribunals to issue an opinion in every writ case.  When a
court intends to deny an extraordinary writ petition on the merits, the court need
only include in its order a simple phrase such as "with prejudice" or "on the merits"
to indicate that the merits of the case have been considered and determined and that
the denial is on the merits.  The simple addition of such a phrase to any order
which denies a writ petition will ensure that litigants' substantive rights will not be
extinguished by an unelaborated denial of an extraordinary writ petition when the
6.  Our decision today is in accord with that portion of our decision in 
Barwick v. State, 660 So. 2d 685, 691 (Fla. 1995), in which we held that an
unelaborated denial in a prohibition petition filed in this Court seeking review of a
trial court's refusal to grant a motion to disqualify would not constitute a denial on
the merits unless the order stated that it was "with prejudice."  For purposes of
uniformity, we recede from that portion of our decision in Barwick in which we
approved the Third District's practice of considering unelaborated denials in
prohibition cases to be decisions on the merits.  See id.  To ensure that litigants and
courts alike are clear as to the legal effect of unelaborated denial orders, henceforth,
if a Florida court denies a writ petition with the intent that the denial be on the
merits, language to that effect must be included in the order. 
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merits have not been the basis of the court's ruling. 
Thus, henceforth, in this State, unelaborated denials in extraordinary writ
cases shall not be deemed denials on the merits.6  We conclude that it is not
unreasonable nor does it impose an unnecessary burden upon courts to require that
we all enter orders that can be clearly understood in terms of scope and impact of
the determination upon the parties and to be uniform in our application of Florida
law.
It is so ordered.  
ANSTEAD, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and
BELL, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Original Proceeding - Mandamus
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Martha M. Topps, pro se, North Lauderdale, Florida,
for Petitioner
No appearance,
for Respondent