Title: State v. Fisher

State: washington

Issuer: Washington Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 
 
No. 13–1238 
 
Filed April 8, 2016 
 
 
STATE OF IOWA, 
 
 
Appellee, 
 
vs. 
 
KEVIN DUANE FISHER II, 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals. 
 
 
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Stephen 
Gerard II, Judge. 
 
 
A defendant challenges his guilty plea for failure to inform him of 
certain consequences of the plea.  DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE VACATED 
AND CASE REMANDED. 
 
 
Philip B. Mears of Mears Law Office, Iowa City, for appellant. 
 
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bridget A. Chambers, 
Assistant Attorney General, Janet Lyness, County Attorney, and 
Elizabeth A. Beglin, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
2 
MANSFIELD, Justice. 
 
This case requires us to determine whether a defendant pleading 
guilty to a controlled-substance offense has a right to be informed 
beforehand that, as a result of the conviction, his driver’s license will be 
revoked for 180 days.  We conclude that because revocation is automatic, 
immediate, punitive, and a part of the sentencing order, the defendant 
has a right to be informed of this consequence.  We further conclude that 
the defendant has a right to be informed of fine surcharges.  Accordingly, 
we vacate the defendant’s conviction and remand for further proceedings 
consistent herewith. 
I.  Background Facts and Prior Proceedings. 
According to the minutes of testimony, on April 11, 2013, Eric 
Seckel of the University of Iowa Police Department was performing a bar 
check in Iowa City.  As he walked toward the back of the bar, he could 
smell the odor of marijuana.  He made contact with Kevin Fisher and 
could smell a strong odor of burnt marijuana on his breath.  When 
Fisher was asked if he had any marijuana on him, he handed Officer 
Seckel a cigarette box that contained a partially used joint.  The joint 
contained marijuana. 
On April 25, Fisher was charged with possession of a controlled 
substance first offense, a serious misdemeanor, in violation of Iowa Code 
sections 124.401(5) and 124.204(4)(m) (2013).  Initially, Fisher pled not 
guilty and demanded a speedy trial.  However, on June 17, the scheduled 
date of his pretrial conference, Fisher’s counsel submitted a written 
guilty plea signed by Fisher.  Among other things, the plea set forth the 
maximum punishment—six months—and the basic range of fines—$315 
to $1875—for the offense.  Additionally, it disclosed the constitutional 
rights that Fisher was waiving by pleading and not going to trial. 
 
 
 
3 
The actual plea agreement was handwritten into the signed form.  
It consisted of two days in jail, a $315 fine, substance abuse evaluation 
and treatment, and urinalysis within ten days. 
In the plea form Fisher also acknowledged, in writing, as follows: 
I have been advised of my right to challenge this plea 
of guilty by filing a Motion in Arrest of Judgment at least five 
(5) days prior to the date that the Court sets for sentencing 
and within forty-five (45) days after the Court accepts my 
plea. 
Fisher’s counsel certified in the plea form that he had “carefully 
explained to the defendant the procedural steps of filing a Motion in 
Arrest of Judgment, the definition and grounds thereof and the time 
within which such Motion should be filed.” 
On that same day of June 17, the district court entered a written 
order accepting the plea and entering judgment and sentence.  The order 
stated that the defendant was advised of his right to file a motion in 
arrest of judgment pursuant to the provisions of Iowa Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 2.24(3) and that “[t]he Defendant waives the right to have time 
prior to sentencing, waives the right to be present for sentencing, and 
requests the Court proceed to immediate entry of judgment and 
sentencing.” 
The ensuing judgment and sentence were consistent with the 
terms of the plea agreement.  However, they also provided for several 
surcharges on top of the fine, including a thirty-five percent surcharge 
and a $125 law enforcement surcharge.  Furthermore, the judgment and 
sentence stated that “[t]he Department of Transportation shall impose 
any suspensions or revocations of Defendant’s driver’s license or motor 
vehicle operating privilege as required by Iowa Code Chapter 321J, Iowa 
Code Section 901.5(10), or other applicable statute or rule.” 
 
 
 
4 
 
On July 18, Fisher filed a notice of appeal.  The district court 
appointed appellate counsel on October 2.  This counsel subsequently 
filed a motion for leave to withdraw under Iowa Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 6.1005 on November 15.1  We denied the motion because it 
failed to provide sufficient detail regarding the plea and sentencing 
proceedings.  See Iowa R. App. P. 6.1005(2)(a).2  Appellate counsel filed 
two more rule 6.1005 motions, both of which we denied for similar 
reasons.  In our September 3, 2014 order denying appellate counsel’s 
third and final rule 6.1005 motion, we removed this counsel for his 
repeated failure to comply with rule 6.1005.  The counsel who is 
handling the present appeal was appointed on October 3.   
Following briefing, we transferred the case to the court of appeals.  
On appeal, Fisher argued his written plea was defective because it failed 
to disclose the statutory minimum sentence of two days in jail, the 
mandatory six months’ revocation of his driver’s license, and the 
surcharges that were later added to his fine.  See Iowa Code 
§ 124.401(5); id. § 901.5(10); id. §§ 911.1.–.3.  In addition, Fisher urged 
the court to bypass any error preservation concerns despite his failure to 
file a motion in arrest of judgment because the plea did not adequately 
1Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.1005 sets forth the procedures that “apply 
when court-appointed counsel moves to withdraw on the grounds that the appeal is 
frivolous.”  Iowa R. App. P. 6.1005(1). 
2Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.1005(2)(a) provides in part, 
If the appeal is from a guilty plea or sentence, the motion shall, at a 
minimum, address whether a factual basis existed for each and every 
element of the crime, whether the plea and sentencing proceedings 
substantially complied with the rules of criminal procedure, and whether 
the sentence was authorized by the Iowa Code, case law, or the rules of 
criminal procedure.  The brief shall also contain citations to the record 
establishing each of the elements of the crime and establishing 
compliance with the rules of criminal procedure and the Iowa Code. 
                                                 
 
 
 
5 
inform him that a failure to file a motion in arrest of judgment would 
foreclose his ability to challenge his guilty plea on direct appeal.  
Alternatively, Fisher argued that his counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance for failing file a motion in arrest of judgment. 
In a September 23, 2015 decision, the court of appeals concluded 
“there was substantial compliance with the requirement Fisher be 
informed of the necessity of filing a motion in arrest of judgment in order 
to challenge his guilty plea,” thus barring Fisher’s direct appeal.  The 
court also determined that Fisher’s counsel was not ineffective for failing 
to challenge the alleged defects in the written plea.  According to the 
court of appeals, Fisher “failed to show . . . he was unaware of the 
mandatory minimum sentence of two days in jail”; the surcharge did not 
“affect the range of Fisher’s punishment”; and, “[t]he suspension of 
Fisher’s driver’s license was also a collateral consequence of his guilty 
plea.”  The court thus affirmed Fisher’s plea and sentence. 
Fisher applied for further review.  We granted his application. 
II.  Standard of Review. 
We ordinarily review challenges to guilty pleas for correction of 
errors at law.  State v. Velez, 829 N.W.2d 572, 575 (Iowa 2013). 
III.  Analysis. 
A.  Error Preservation.  We must first address whether Fisher can 
appeal his guilty plea despite not having filed a timely motion in arrest of 
judgment.  Generally, “[a] defendant’s failure to challenge the adequacy 
of a guilty plea proceeding by motion in arrest of judgment shall preclude 
the defendant’s right to assert such challenge on appeal.”  Iowa R. Crim. 
P. 2.24(3)(a).  However, this rule does not apply to defendants who were 
not advised  
 
 
 
6 
during the plea proceedings, as required by rule 2.8(2)(d), 
that challenges to the plea must be made in a motion in 
arrest of judgment and that the failure to challenge the plea 
by filing the motion within the time provided prior to 
sentencing precludes a right to assert the challenge on appeal. 
State v. Meron, 675 N.W.2d 537, 540 (Iowa 2004) (emphasis added).  
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)(d) states, 
The court shall inform the defendant that any challenges to 
a plea of guilty based on alleged defects in the plea 
proceedings must be raised in a motion in arrest of judgment 
and that failure to so raise such challenges shall preclude 
the right to assert them on appeal. 
Substantial compliance with rule 2.8(2)(d) is mandatory and “[n]o 
defendant . . . should suffer the sanction of rule [2.24(3)(a)] unless the 
court has complied with rule [2.8(2)(d)] during the plea proceedings.”  
State v. Worley, 297 N.W.2d 368, 370 (Iowa 1980). 
Fisher pled guilty to a serious misdemeanor, and in such 
proceedings it is “unnecessary . . . for the trial court to actually engage in 
an in-court colloquy with a defendant so as to personally inform the 
defendant of the motion in arrest of judgment requirements.”  Meron, 675 
N.W.2d at 541.  Instead, a written waiver filed by the defendant can be 
sufficient.  Id.  A defendant’s written plea or waiver can foreclose an 
appeal when it complies with rule 2.8(2)(d).  See State v. Barnes, 652 
N.W.2d 466, 468 (Iowa 2002) (per curiam) (concluding that defendant 
failed to preserve error because he did not file a motion in arrest of 
judgment when his written plea clearly stated that a failure to file such a 
motion would bar any challenge to his plea on appeal).  Yet regardless of 
whether the information is imparted through a colloquy or a written plea, 
the defendant must be made aware of the substance of rule 2.24(3)(a). 
Fisher argues that the form he signed did not comply with this 
requirement.  It set forth the right to challenge the plea by filing a motion 
 
 
 
7 
in arrest of judgment and, on a separate page, provided that Fisher was 
waiving this right, but it did not indicate that all avenues for challenging 
the plea were being cut off or mention the word “appeal” at all.  See State 
v. Loye, 670 N.W.2d 141, 148 (Iowa 2003) (“The right to appeal is waived 
only if such a waiver is an express element of the particular agreement 
made by that defendant.”); State v. Hinners, 471 N.W.2d 841, 845 (Iowa 
1991) (“[T]he waiver of the right to appeal should be voluntary, knowing, 
and intelligent.  This presupposes the defendant knows about the right of 
appeal and intentionally relinquishes it.” (Citation omitted.)). 
We have found sufficient compliance with the rule when the 
defendant was told that, if he requested immediate sentencing, his right 
to “question the legality of his plea of guilty” would be “gone.”  State v. 
Taylor, 301 N.W.2d 692, 692 (Iowa 1981).  And in State v. Oldham, 515 
N.W.2d 44, 46–47 (Iowa 1994), we found that a colloquy and a written 
application to withdraw the not-guilty plea—when considered together—
sufficed “to notify Oldham of the consequences of his failure to file the 
motion [in arrest of judgment].”  There the colloquy advised the 
defendant that he had the right to file a motion in arrest of judgment “if 
[he] claim[ed] that these plea proceedings [were] illegal” but such a 
motion had to be filed “at least five days before the time set for 
sentencing.”  Id. at 46.  We viewed this advice alone as “equivocal with 
respect to the consequences of the defendant’s failure to file a motion in 
arrest of judgment.”  Id.  But the written application had added, 
I understand that if I wish to attack the validity of the 
procedures involved in the taking of my guilty plea, I must 
do so by a motion in arrest of judgment filed with this court.  
I understand that such motion must be filed at least five 
days before sentencing and also within 45 days of the date 
my plea of guilty is accepted by the court. 
 
 
 
8 
Id.  Oldham had read and signed the application and we decided that 
when the application and colloquy were “considered together,” he “was 
adequately informed of the necessity of filing a motion in arrest of 
judgment” and his failure to do so precluded his challenge to his plea on 
appeal.  Id. at 47. 
“We employ a substantial compliance standard in determining 
whether a trial court has discharged its duty under rule 2.8(2)(d).”  State 
v. Straw, 709 N.W.2d 128, 132 (Iowa 2006).  In Straw we found 
substantial compliance, noting, 
The court’s statement plainly indicated that if Straw wanted 
to appeal or challenge the guilty plea, he had to file a motion 
in arrest of judgment.  It also indicated this motion had to be 
filed not less than five days before sentencing.  In whole, it 
conveyed 
the 
pertinent 
information 
and 
substantially 
complied with the requirements of rule 2.8(2)(d). 
Id. 
This case falls short of Taylor and Oldham and well short of Straw.  
Absent from Fisher’s form was any statement that by signing it or 
proceeding to immediate sentencing, Fisher was giving up his ability to 
contest the plea in the future, even if the conviction resulted in 
consequences (as we discuss below) that Fisher may not have been told 
about before pleading guilty.  It is true that counsel for Fisher certified in 
the plea form that he had explained the procedure for filing a motion in 
arrest of judgment to the defendant.  However, “[e]ven considering the 
assurances that counsel for [the defendant] explained the right to file a 
motion in arrest of judgment, this guarantee would be insufficient to 
satisfy the second requirement of rule 2.8(2)(d).”  Meron, 675 N.W.2d at 
541. 
On these facts, we cannot conclude that there was substantial 
compliance with the court’s duty to inform Fisher that a failure to file a 
 
 
 
9 
timely motion in arrest of judgment would waive any challenge to his 
guilty plea on appeal.  Because Fisher’s written plea was deficient in this 
respect, he is not precluded from challenging his guilty plea on direct 
appeal.3 
B.  Is the Loss of a Driver’s License a Direct Consequence of 
Fisher’s Guilty Plea?  Fisher argues his written guilty plea was invalid 
because he was not informed of three consequences of that plea: (1) the 
mandatory suspension of his driver’s license for six months, (2) the fine 
surcharges, and (3) the mandatory minimum sentence of two days in jail.  
Rule 2.8(2)(b)(2) requires the court to  
address the defendant personally in open court and inform 
the defendant of, and determine that the defendant 
understands . . . [t]he mandatory minimum punishment, if 
any, and the maximum possible punishment provided by the 
statute defining the offense to which the plea is offered. 
Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)(b)(2); see also id. r. 2.8(2)(b) (providing further 
that the court may “with the approval of the defendant, waive the above 
procedures in a plea of guilty to a serious or aggravated misdemeanor”). 
As with rule 2.8(2)(d), we utilize a substantial compliance standard 
to determine whether a plea crosses the rule 2.8(2)(b)(2) threshold.  See 
State v. White, 587 N.W.2d 240, 242 (Iowa 1998).  Both parties agree for 
purposes of this appeal that Fisher needed to be informed of all direct 
consequences of the plea in the colloquy or in any written waiver thereof.  
As we have said, 
3Had the form substantially complied with rule 2.8(2)(d), Fisher would have to 
challenge his guilty plea under the rubric of ineffective assistance of counsel, which 
would require him, among other things, to demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel’s errors, he [or she] would not have pleaded guilty and would have 
insisted on going to trial.”  Straw, 709 N.W.2d at 138 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 
52, 59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203, 210 (1985)). 
                                                 
 
 
 
10 
To the extent defendant alleges the sentencing court failed to 
inform him fully of the consequences of his plea, he 
implicates the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  To adhere to 
the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment a sentencing 
court must insure the defendant understands the direct 
consequences of the plea including the possible maximum 
sentence, as well as any mandatory minimum punishment.  
However, the court is not required to inform the defendant of 
all indirect and collateral consequences of a guilty plea. 
State v. Carney, 584 N.W.2d 907, 908 (Iowa 1998) (per curiam) (citations 
omitted). 
We begin with Fisher’s assertion that the failure to inform him of 
the temporary revocation of his license rendered his plea defective.  Iowa 
Code section 901.5(10) requires the sentencing court to “order the 
department of transportation to revoke the defendant’s driver’s license or 
motor vehicle operating privilege for a period of one hundred eighty days” 
when pronouncing a sentence for certain specified offenses, including 
possession of a controlled substance under section 124.401.  We must 
determine whether this mandatory license suspension is a direct or a 
collateral consequence of a guilty plea for possession of a controlled 
substance. 
In affirming Fisher’s conviction and sentence, the court of appeals 
relied on our decision in Carney.  There we determined that license 
revocation was “not a direct consequence of a guilty plea” to operating 
while intoxicated (OWI).  Carney, 584 N.W.2d at 909.  We distinguished 
between direct and collateral consequences of a plea by approvingly 
quoting the following language: “The distinction between ‘direct’ and 
‘collateral’ consequences of a plea . . . turns on whether the result 
represents a definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the 
range of defendant’s punishment.”  Id. at 908 (quoting State v. Warner, 
229 N.W.2d 776, 782 (Iowa 1975)).  We reasoned that the purpose of 
 
 
 
11 
license revocation for those who had been convicted of OWI was “to 
protect the public by providing that drivers who have demonstrated a 
pattern of driving while intoxicated be removed from the highways.”  Id. 
at 909 (quoting State v. Moore, 569 N.W.2d 130, 132 (Iowa 1997)).  In 
addition, we had previously ruled that license revocation as a 
consequence of an OWI conviction was “not punishment for purposes of 
the double jeopardy clause.”  Id.; see State v. Krebs, 562 N.W.2d 423, 
424–25 (Iowa 1997) (per curiam).  Accordingly, we concluded that 
revoking the driver’s license of a person convicted of OWI was a collateral 
consequence because it was not intended as punishment.  Carney, 584 
N.W.2d at 909. 
 
However, unlike Carney, this case involves revocation of a driver’s 
license as a mandatory consequence of a drug possession conviction—not 
an OWI conviction.  In this regard, we believe several pre-Carney 
decisions are relevant.  In Hills v. Iowa Department of Transportation, 534 
N.W.2d 640, 640–41 (Iowa 1995), Hills was charged with possession of 
marijuana under Iowa Code section 124.401(3), and she pled guilty three 
months after her arrest.  During the time between Hills’s arrest and her 
plea, Iowa Code section 321.209(8)—the former version of Iowa Code 
section 901.5(10)—went into effect.  Id. at 641.4  After the department of 
4License revocation under the former Iowa Code section 321.209(8) was a 
separate administrative proceeding that took place after sentencing: 
The department shall upon twenty days’ notice and without 
preliminary hearing revoke the license or operating privilege of an 
operator upon receiving a record of the operator’s conviction for any of 
the following offenses, when such conviction has become final: 
. . . . 
8.  A controlled substance offense under section 124.401 . . . .  
Iowa Code § 321.209(8) (1995). 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
12 
transportation revoked her license, Hills argued on judicial review that 
the revocation of her license amounted to a violation of the ex post facto 
clauses of the Federal and Iowa Constitutions.  Id. 
In that case, we concluded that license revocation was an ex post 
facto violation because the sanction was punitive in nature.  Id. at 642.  
In reaching this conclusion, we examined the connection between the 
crime of possession of a controlled substance and the revocation of the 
offender’s drivers’ license—i.e., whether the license revocation amounted 
to a civil penalty or criminal punishment.  Id.  We noted that, unlike in 
the context of an OWI conviction, the aim of ensuring public safety on 
the highways did not apply: 
Persons who illegally possess drugs are of course subject to 
appropriate criminal punishment.  But many such persons 
choose not to drive.  When they do not, they do not affect 
highway safety.  Any connection between drugs, driving, and 
public safety is at most indirect.  The amended statute 
authorizing this license revocation was aimed essentially at 
enhancing punishment for controlled substance possession.  
As such it was quasi-criminal and not civil in nature.  Ex 
post facto principles therefore prohibit application of the 
amended statute. 
Id. 
After 
Hills, 
we 
decided 
Dressler 
v. 
Iowa 
Department 
of 
Transportation, 542 N.W.2d 563 (Iowa 1996).  In that case, Dressler had 
pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance under Iowa Code 
section 124.401(3).  Id. at 564.  Shortly after his plea, the department of 
transportation commenced proceedings to revoke his driver’s license for 
six months pursuant to former Iowa Code section 321.209(8).  Id.  
Challenging the latter action, Dressler argued that section 321.209(8) 
By contrast, Iowa Code section 901.5(10) (2013) provides that license revocation 
will be ordered by the court at the time of sentencing. 
_______________________ 
 
 
 
13 
was unconstitutional because it imposed a successive punishment for 
the same conduct in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.  Id. at 565.  We agreed with Dressler: 
Our conclusion in Hills that section 321.209(8) 
enhances punishment of a controlled substance possession 
dispenses with the State’s assertion that this section is not a 
penal statute.  Because section 321.209(8) twice punishes 
Dressler for the same offense—possession of a controlled 
substance—in a separate proceeding, we conclude it 
unconstitutionally contravenes Dressler’s double jeopardy 
guarantees. 
Id. 
 
Following the Hills and Dressler decisions, the general assembly 
amended the statute so it now provides that, as part of the criminal 
sentencing 
process, 
“the 
court 
shall 
order 
the 
department 
of 
transportation to revoke the defendant’s driver’s license or motor vehicle 
operating privilege for a period of one hundred eighty days . . . .”  1996 
Iowa Acts ch. 1218, § 68 (codified at Iowa Code § 901.5(10)(a)).  This 
takes care of the double jeopardy problem but does not alter our prior 
view that revoking the driver’s license of a person convicted of a drug 
possession offense is a punitive rather than a regulatory consequence.  
As we previously said, “Any connection between drugs, driving, and 
public safety is at most indirect.”  Hills, 534 N.W.2d at 642. 
Because revocation of the driver’s license of a person convicted of a 
drug possession offense is mandatory, immediate, and part of the 
punishment for that offense, the court must inform the defendant of this 
consequence before accepting his or her plea.  Here Fisher’s written plea 
did not advise him that a guilty plea would result in the suspension of 
his license.  We therefore find that the plea was involuntary and Fisher’s 
conviction and sentence must be set aside.  See also Barkley v. State, 
724 A.2d 558, 560–61 (Del. 1999) (holding that a revocation of driver’s 
 
 
 
14 
license based on a conviction for cocaine possession was “an immediate, 
automatic and mandatory penalty” that must be disclosed to the 
defendant before the defendant pleads guilty); but see Rowell v. 
Commonwealth, 647 A.2d 696, 698 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994) (finding that 
a license suspension based on a drug possession conviction was merely a 
“civil consequence” as opposed to a “criminal punishment” and therefore 
the trial judge did not have a duty to inform the defendant of this 
consequence before accepting a guilty plea). 
C.  Are Fine Surcharges a Form of Punishment That Must Be 
Disclosed During Plea Proceedings?  We turn now to Fisher’s assertion 
that the addition of surcharges to the fine for his conviction violated his 
right to be informed of the consequences of his guilty plea.  The plea 
agreement stated that upon pleading guilty Fisher would be “fined at 
least $315.00 and up to $1,875.00.”  Fisher received the $315 minimum 
fine, but several surcharges were tacked on: 
1. A thirty-five percent criminal penalty surcharge, 
2. A drug abuse resistance education surcharge of $10, and 
3. A law enforcement initiative surcharge of $125.   
See Iowa Code §§ 911.1–.3.  With these surcharges, the fine actually 
totaled $560.25. 
 
As noted above, rule 2.8(2)(b)(2) requires the court to inform the 
defendant of the “mandatory minimum punishment” and the “maximum 
possible punishment” before accepting a guilty plea.  These are 
considered direct consequences of the plea.  See Saadiq v. State, 387 
N.W.2d 315, 324–25 (Iowa 1986).  The State does not dispute that the 
fine itself is a form of punishment which must be disclosed.  See State v. 
Brady, 442 N.W.2d 57, 59 (Iowa 1989) (distinguishing fines and 
 
 
 
15 
restitution).5  However, it analogizes surcharges to court costs, which are 
not considered a form of punishment and do not need to be disclosed in 
advance of the plea.  See id. (holding that a failure to disclose mandatory 
payments that are compensatory rather than punitive did not vitiate a 
guilty plea). 
We disagree with the State.  According to the plain language of the 
statute, the surcharge of thirty-five percent is a mandatory “additional 
penalty.”  Iowa Code § 911.1(1).  Thus, it is punitive on its face.  The 
DARE surcharge of ten dollars lacks the same label but is nonetheless 
mandatory for controlled substance offenses.  Id. § 911.2(1).  The law 
enforcement initiative surcharge of one hundred twenty-five dollars is 
likewise mandatory for controlled substance offenses.  Id. 911.3(1)(a). 
All of these surcharges can be distinguished from other court-
ordered payments, such as restitution, court costs, and reimbursement 
for the cost of court-appointed counsel, which we regard as nonpunitive.  
See Brady, 442 N.W.2d at 59.  The latter items are compensatory and 
“do[] not fit the generally understood definition of punishment.”  Id.  By 
contrast, the surcharges do not serve as compensation but are simply 
what their title indicates—a “surcharge” on the fine.  For rule 2.8 
purposes, we see no meaningful difference between a fine and a built-in 
5Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 expressly requires disclosure of “any 
maximum possible penalty, including . . . fine” as part of the guilty plea colloquy.  See 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(H).  Other states also require fines to be disclosed.  See, e.g., 
Carter v. State, 812 So. 2d 391, 394–95 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001) (reversing guilty plea 
where the defendant was not advised of “all the mandatory fines that were due to be 
imposed upon entry of his guilty plea”); Kaiser v. State, 641 N.W.2d 900, 904 (Minn. 
2002) (“[D]irect consequences are those which flow definitely, immediately, and 
automatically from the guilty plea—the maximum sentence and any fine to be imposed.” 
(quoting Alanis v. State, 583 N.W.2d 573, 578 (Minn. 1998), abrogated in part on other 
grounds by Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365–66, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480–81, 176 
L. Ed. 2d 284, 292–94 (2014))); People v. Harnett, 945 N.E.2d 439, 441–42 (N.Y. 2011) 
(“The direct consequences of a plea—those whose omission from a plea colloquy makes 
the plea per se invalid—are essentially the core components of a defendant’s sentence: a 
term of probation or imprisonment, a term of post-release supervision, a fine.”). 
                                                 
 
 
 
16 
surcharge on a fine.  As the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit has put it, “Labels don’t control.  A fine is a fine even if 
called a fee . . . .”  Mueller v. Raemisch, 740 F.3d 1128, 1133–34 (7th Cir. 
2014) (upholding the annual registration fee for the sex offender 
database because it was “intended to compensate the state for the 
expense of maintaining the sex offender registry”). 
The State insisted at oral argument that surcharges cannot be 
characterized as punishment because the funds collected—or at least 
some of them—are used for “remedial” purposes, such as crime and drug 
abuse prevention.  But the funds collected through regular fines 
themselves are used for similarly beneficent purposes.  They are 
deposited into the general fund which supports various state priorities 
including medical assistance and education.  See Iowa Code § 602.1305; 
id. § 602.8108.  This does not make them any less punitive. 
 
As Fisher’s counsel pointed out during oral argument, the 
surcharges made it effectively impossible that Fisher could ever actually 
be fined $315, the mandatory minimum listed on the plea form.  In fact, 
the actual dollar minimum was $560.25.  We conclude that Fisher 
should have been informed of the mandatory minimum and maximum 
possible fines, including surcharges.6 
6Because we are vacating Fisher’s plea and sentence and remanding for further 
proceedings anyway based on failure to disclose the mandatory license suspension, we 
need not decide today whether failure to disclose the surcharges alone would have 
meant the plea did not substantially comply with rule 2.8(2)(b)(2).  Regardless, we hold 
that actual compliance with rule 2.8(2)(b)(2) requires disclosure of all applicable chapter 
911 surcharges. 
Fisher also argues that his guilty plea was defective because he was not 
informed of the mandatory minimum of two days in jail.  We note, however, that in his 
plea agreement, Fisher agreed to two days in jail. 
                                                 
 
 
 
17 
IV.  Conclusion. 
For reasons stated above, we vacate the decision of the court of 
appeals and the judgment and sentence imposed by the district court.  
We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT 
COURT 
JUDGMENT 
AND 
SENTENCE 
VACATED 
AND 
CASE 
REMANDED.