Title: In re the termination of parental rights to Gwenevere T.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2011 WI 30 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP2973 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In re the termination of parental rights to  
 
Gwenevere T., a person under the age of 18: 
 
Tammy W-G., 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
Jacob T., 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 17, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 1, 2010 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Grant 
 
JUDGE: 
Michael Kirchman 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. (Opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J. and ABRAHAMSON, C.J. (Opinion 
filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant there were briefs and oral 
argument by Eileen A. Hirsch, assistant state public defender. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent there were briefs and oral 
argument by Nathaniel W. Curry, Kopp McKichan, LLP, Platteville. 
 
A guardian ad-litem brief was filed by Ryan K. Dalton, 
McNamara, Reinicke, & Vogelsberg LLP, Lancaster, and oral 
argument by Ryan K. Dalton. 
 
 
 
2
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Winn Collins, Green 
Lake County District Attorney, Green Lake, and Elisabeth A. 
Mueller, assistant Milwaukee County district attorney, Wauwatosa 
for Wisconsin District Attorneys Association. 
 
 
 
2011 WI 30
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2009AP2973 
(L.C. No. 
09-TP-6) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the termination of parental rights to 
Gwenevere T., a person under the age of 18: 
 
Tammy W-G., 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Jacob T., 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
MAY 17, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Grant County, 
Michael Kirchman, Judge.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   This case comes before 
us by certification from the court of appeals.  Certification 
was recommended to "resolve the ambiguities and uncertainties 
regarding the use of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) as a ground to 
terminate parental rights."  Tammy W-G. v. Jacob T., No. 
2009AP2973, unpublished slip op., at 11 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 22, 
2010).  The certified questions are:  
(1) Whether 
"once 
a 
'substantial 
parental 
relationship' is established, the relevant time period 
No. 
2009AP2973   
 
2 
 
ends and subsequent events are not relevant to the 
issue of a substantial parental relationship";  
(2) "whether a fact-finder may determine that, 
despite significant parenting, poor quality parenting 
is a reason to find that a 'substantial parental 
relationship' has not been established"; and  
(3) Whether our interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(6) as it relates to the preceding two issues 
"comports with the constitutional protections afforded 
parents."   
¶2 
In addition, Jacob argues that:  (1) the circuit court 
erred when it denied his motion for a directed verdict, and (2) 
he should be granted a new trial in the interest of justice 
because the jury instruction was incomplete and inaccurate. 
¶3 
We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) (2007-08)1 
prescribes a totality-of-the-circumstances test.  When applying 
this test, the fact-finder should consider any support or care, 
or lack thereof, the parent provided the child throughout the 
child's entire life.  This analysis may include the reasons why 
a parent was not caring for or supporting her child and exposure 
of the child to a hazardous living environment.  We further 
conclude that the statute was not unconstitutional as applied to 
Jacob.  Finally, the circuit court did not err when it denied 
Jacob's motion for a directed verdict and Jacob waived his 
argument that the jury instruction was improper.  Accordingly, 
Jacob's parental rights were lawfully terminated; we affirm the 
judgment of the circuit court.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2009AP2973   
 
3 
 
¶4 
Gwenevere was born to Tammy W-G. (Tammy) and Jacob T. 
(Jacob) in mid-January of 2005.  Tammy and Jacob lived together 
for approximately a year before Gwenevere was born.  During 
Tammy's pregnancy, Jacob left his job to take care of Tammy who 
was on "extreme bed rest."  Moreover, he accompanied Tammy to 
doctor appointments, was at Gwenevere's delivery, and was 
excited about the baby. 
¶5 
For the first two months of Gwenevere's life, Tammy 
and Jacob were both home full-time, but then Tammy returned to 
work.  In the following two months (approximately months three 
and four of Gwenevere's life), Jacob was, as Tammy phrased it, a 
"stay at home dad."  During the first four months of her life, 
Jacob participated in feeding, changing, and otherwise caring 
for Gwenevere.  In addition, both he and Tammy took Gwenevere to 
her doctor's appointments.  However, Tammy testified that when 
she came home from work, she would take Gwenevere to the bedroom 
for the night because the house was a mess, there was mildew 
covering the dishes, and beer cans in the living room.  In 2005, 
Jacob and Tammy agreed to move from Minnesota to Illinois.  
However, in May 2005, only Jacob moved to Illinois.  Tammy moved 
into the home of Douglas G. (Douglas), whom she subsequently 
married.   
¶6 
At the time of their separation, Jacob and Tammy 
agreed to a custody plan in which Gwenevere would spend two 
months with Tammy, followed by two months with Jacob.  However, 
Tammy testified that she refused to go through with the plan 
because of concerns about Jacob's alcohol abuse and "drug 
No. 
2009AP2973   
 
4 
 
paraphernalia"2 and the effect this could have on Gwenevere's 
safety. 
¶7 
Following Jacob's May 2005 relocation to Illinois, he 
had little contact with Gwenevere.  He drove from his home in 
Illinois to Minnesota to visit Gwenevere either two or three 
times3 between 2005 and 2006.  The first visit was in either July 
or August of 2005.  The visit lasted approximately one-and-a-
half hours. 
¶8 
Tammy testified that Jacob's second visit was in July 
of 2006.  Tammy could not recall how long that visitation 
lasted.  Jacob, however, did not mention this visit in his 
testimony and asserted that there have been only two visits 
since he moved to Illinois.  Jacob and Tammy both testified that 
there was a final visit with Gwenevere in November of 2006.  
There is no evidence that the second and third visits were of 
any substantial length.  Jacob has not had in-person contact 
with Gwenevere since that time. 
¶9 
Between July of 2005 and November of 2006, Jacob 
testified that he called Tammy with regard to Gwenevere, but 
that his calls were "random."  Specifically, Jacob said he 
"didn't do it like every week or every two weeks."  Moreover, 
Jacob testified that he spoke with Gwenevere on the phone two to 
                                                 
2 Tammy's concerns regarding Jacob's drug abuse related to 
his use of marijuana.  There is no evidence Jacob used other, 
"harder" drugs.  
3 As discussed below, there is conflict in the trial 
testimony about whether there were two or three visits. 
No. 
2009AP2973   
 
5 
 
three times between 2007 and 2008; however, Tammy did not recall 
any contact, via phone or otherwise, between Jacob and Gwenevere 
in 2007.  Throughout this time, Tammy updated Jacob when her 
contact information changed.  Of note, in 2006, Tammy, Douglas, 
Gwenevere, and the couple's other two daughters moved to a city 
in southwest Wisconsin only two hours from Jacob's Illinois 
residence.  Jacob was aware of their relocation. 
¶10 Jacob 
explained 
that 
his 
lack 
of 
contact 
with 
Gwenevere from the summer of 2005 up until trial was not the 
result of Tammy's refusal to let him see Gwenevere, but rather 
her condition that these visits be supervised.  Specifically, 
Tammy required that Jacob's visits with Gwenevere be supervised 
by Tammy, Douglas, or someone that Jacob hired.4 
¶11 Since Jacob's move to Illinois in 2005, he has not 
provided any financial or material support for Gwenevere.  He 
has never paid child support to Tammy for Gwenevere's care or 
taken steps to set up child support.  Jacob did testify that he 
offered money to Tammy for Gwenevere's care after the two split, 
but that she refused his offer.5  Jacob admitted that he did not 
                                                 
4 At trial, Jacob asserted that instead of abiding by 
Tammy's conditions in order to see his daughter, his plan was to 
save up enough money to hire an attorney to take Tammy to court 
and challenge her conditions.   
5 When first asked at trial if Jacob or his cousin offered 
to pay child support during Jacob's first visit with Gwenevere, 
Tammy testified that someone "might have said something, but I 
can't remember."  She later acknowledged that Jacob might have 
offered her $150.  Ivan, Jacob's cousin, who witnessed this 
visit, testified that Jacob offered her $200 and also offered to 
buy diapers and clothes, but Tammy refused. 
No. 
2009AP2973   
 
6 
 
know who Gwenevere's pediatrician was, what school she was 
attending or her teacher's name.  Additionally, he has never 
sought assistance from the courts to have contact or placement.  
Except during the first four months of Gwenevere's life when 
Tammy and Jacob lived together, Jacob has never taken Gwenevere 
to her doctor appointments.   
¶12 Jacob's final contact with Gwenevere before the August 
2009 fact-finding hearing was a call in mid-January 2009 on 
Gwenevere's fourth birthday.  During this call, Tammy and Jacob 
discussed a potential visit in February that never took place.  
Tammy also told Jacob she wanted to have Jacob's rights 
terminated so that Douglas could adopt Gwenevere. 
¶13 On April 8, 2009, Tammy filed a petition in Grant 
County Circuit Court to terminate Jacob's parental rights.  The 
petition was amended on May 20, 2009.  It claimed Jacob's rights 
should be terminated because he had failed to assume parental 
responsibility as defined in Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6).  A fact-
finding hearing was heard by a jury on August 13 and 14 of 2009. 
¶14 At the close of the fact-finding hearing, the circuit 
court denied motions from each party for a directed verdict and, 
instead, instructed the jury to determine if Jacob assumed 
parental responsibility for Gwenevere.  Neither party objected 
to the jury instructions, which instructed the jury to answer a 
special verdict question:  "Has Jacob [] failed to assume 
parental responsibility for Gwenevere []?"  The jury answered 
"yes" 
by 
a 
vote 
of 
eleven 
to 
one. 
 
Subsequently, 
on 
No. 
2009AP2973   
 
7 
 
September 10, 2009, at the dispositional hearing, the circuit 
court terminated Jacob's parental rights.  
¶15 Jacob appealed the termination of his parental rights 
to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.  The court of appeals 
determined that its holding in State v. Quinsanna D., 2002 WI 
App 318, 259 Wis. 2d 429, 655 N.W.2d 752, prevented it "from 
interpreting Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) in a manner that is 
consistent 
both 
with 
the 
language 
of 
the 
statute 
and 
constitutional protections accorded parental rights."  Tammy W-
G., No. 2009AP2973, at 2.  Therefore, the court of appeals 
certified the appeal, which we accepted pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 808.05.6  We now affirm the decision of the circuit court. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶16 The interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) and the 
application of that statute to a given set of facts are 
questions of law that we review independently.  Marder v. Bd. of 
Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 2005 WI 159, ¶19, 286 Wis. 2d 
252, 706 N.W.2d 110.  Whether a statute and the application of a 
statute are constitutional are also questions of law that we 
review independently.  Dane Cnty. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Ponn 
P., 2005 WI 32, ¶14, 279 Wis. 2d 169, 694 N.W.2d 344.   
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 808.05(2) provides in relevant part:  
"The supreme court may take jurisdiction of an appeal or any 
other proceeding pending in the court of appeals if:  . . . [i]t 
grants direct review upon certification from the court of 
appeals prior to the court of appeals hearing and deciding the 
matter ...." 
No. 
2009AP2973   
 
8 
 
¶17 We examine as a question of law whether the circuit 
court properly refused to grant a directed verdict.  See Bubb v. 
Brusky, 2009 WI 91, ¶30, 321 Wis. 2d 1, 768 N.W.2d 903.  We 
independently review, as a question of law, whether the evidence 
is sufficient to support the jury's verdict.  State v. 
Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 501, 451 N.W. 752 (1990).  
B.  Wisconsin Stat. § 48.415(6): 
Failure to Assume Parental Responsibility 
a.  Termination of parental rights proceedings 
¶18 A brief overview of termination of parental rights 
proceedings 
in 
Wisconsin 
is 
a 
helpful 
starting 
point.  
Termination of parental rights proceedings involve a two-step 
process that begins when the petitioner pleads one of the ten 
grounds for involuntary termination under Wis. Stat. § 48.415.  
The first step of the proceeding is the fact-finding hearing.  
"The purpose of the fact-finding hearing is to determine whether 
grounds exist for the termination of parental rights in those 
cases where the termination [is] contested . . . ."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.424(1).  "If the jury or court determines that the facts 
alleged in the petition have not been proven, the court 
dismisses the petition.  Conversely, '[i]f grounds for the 
termination of parental rights are found by the court or jury, 
the court shall find the parent unfit.'"  Sheboygan Cnty. Dep't 
of Health & Human Servs. v. Julie A.B., 2002 WI 95, ¶26, 255 
Wis. 2d 170, 648 N.W.2d 402 (citing § 48.424(4)).  The focus of 
this step is whether the § 48.415 ground has been met, not the 
child's best interest.  
No. 
2009AP2973   
 
9 
 
¶19 The second-step, the dispositional hearing, occurs 
only after the fact-finder finds a Wis. Stat. § 48.415 ground 
has been proved and the court has made a finding of unfitness.  
Id., ¶28.  In this step, the best interest of the child is the 
"prevailing factor."  Id.  See also, Wis. Stat. § 48.426(2).  If 
the court finds a termination of parental rights is in the 
child's best interest, termination should be ordered.  Julie 
A.B., 255 Wis. 2d 170, ¶38.  
b.  Statutory interpretation 
¶20 "[S]tatutory interpretation begins with the language 
of the statute.  If the meaning of the statute is plain, we 
ordinarily stop the inquiry." State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110 (internal quotation and citation omitted).  Moreover, 
"statutory language is interpreted in the context in which it is 
used; not in isolation but as part of a whole . . . and 
reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Id., ¶46.  
"Where statutory language is unambiguous, there is no need to 
consult extrinsic sources of interpretation, such as legislative 
history."  Id.  
¶21 This case requires us to interpret subsec. (6) of Wis. 
Stat. § 48.415, "Grounds for involuntary termination of parental 
rights."  Subsection (6) provides: 
Failure to assume parental responsibility.  (a) 
Failure to assume parental responsibility, which shall 
be established by proving that the parent or the 
person or persons who may be the parent of the child 
have not had a substantial parental relationship with 
the child. 
No. 
2009AP2973   
 
10 
 
(b) In this subsection, "substantial parental 
relationship" means the acceptance and exercise of 
significant responsibility for the daily supervision, 
education, protection and care of the child.  In 
evaluating whether the person has had a substantial 
parental relationship with the child, the court may 
consider such factors, including, but not limited to, 
whether the person has expressed concern for or 
interest in the support, care or well-being of the 
child, whether the person has neglected or refused to 
provide care or support for the child and whether, 
with respect to a person who is or may be the father 
of the child, the person has expressed concern for or 
interest in the support, care or well-being of the 
mother during her pregnancy.  
(emphasis added). 
¶22 The language of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6), specifically 
the underscored language, indicates that under § 48.415(6), a 
fact-finder must look to the totality-of-the-circumstances to 
determine if a parent has assumed parental responsibility.  With 
regard to the relevant time period, the fact-finder should 
consider the circumstances that have occurred over the entirety 
of the child's life.7  The fact-finder may also consider whether 
a parent exposed her child to a hazardous living environment.  
1.  Relevant time period 
¶23 The first certified question is whether "once a 
'substantial parental relationship' is established, the relevant 
time period ends and subsequent events are not relevant to the 
                                                 
7 Per 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.415(6), 
the 
fact-finder 
should 
consider whether a father expressed concern and support for the 
mother during pregnancy and therefore, the relevant time period 
should include the time the child was in utero.  Hereinafter, we 
will refer to the child's time in utero and after birth, 
collectively, as the "child's life."  This is for the ease of 
reading.   
No. 
2009AP2973   
 
11 
 
issue of a substantial parental relationship."  Tammy W-G., No. 
2009AP2973, at 5.  We conclude that a fact-finder should 
consider a parent's actions throughout the entirety of the 
child's life when determining whether he has assumed parental 
responsibility.   
¶24 Looking first to para. (a) of the statute, the 
language, "have not had," does not direct the fact-finder to 
consider only a limited time period.  For example, it does not 
say "have not had for at least several months."  Rather, the 
statute gives latitude to the fact-finder to consider the 
entirety of the child's life and determine if the parent's 
actions have been sufficient to find that he has assumed 
parental responsibility.   
¶25 The accuracy of this interpretation is supported by 
para. (b) of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6).  In defining "substantial 
parental 
relationship," 
para. 
(b) 
speaks 
of 
"significant 
responsibility for the daily supervision, education, protection 
and 
care 
of 
the 
child." 
(Emphasis 
added.) 
 
The 
words 
"significant" and "daily" do not indicate that the assumption of 
parental responsibility is established when the parent has cared 
for the child for only a short portion of the child's life.   
¶26 Paragraph (b) goes on to explain that in deciding 
whether there is a "substantial parental relationship," the 
fact-finder may consider, among other things, whether the parent 
"has expressed concern for or interest in the support, care or 
well-being of the child," and whether the parent "has neglected 
or refused to provide care or support for the child."  Similar 
No. 
2009AP2973   
 
12 
 
to the "has not had" language discussed above, the use of "has" 
in Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6)(b) demonstrates that the legislature 
did not intend the fact-finder to consider a specific point in 
time.  Again, the legislature did not say "has at one point" or 
"has for several months."  Rather, the fact-finder can consider 
all the facts up until the time of the fact-finding hearing to 
decide if the parent has engaged in the requisite behavior.   
¶27 While we employ a plain language meaning to interpret 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6), we note that the legislative history of 
§ 48.415(6) 
supports 
a 
totality-of-the-circumstances 
test.  
Subsequent to the enactment of § 48.415(6) in 1979,8 there have 
                                                 
8 When Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) was first enacted, it read:  
Failure to assume parental responsibility.  (a) 
Failure to assume parental responsibility may be 
established by a showing that a child has been born 
out 
of wedlock, not subsequently legitimated or 
adopted, that paternity was not adjudicated prior to 
the filing of the petition for termination of parental 
rights and: 
1. 
The person or persons who may be the father 
of the child have been given notice under s. 48.42 but 
have failed to appear or otherwise submit to the 
jurisdiction of the court and that such person or 
persons 
have 
never 
had 
a 
substantial 
parental 
relationship with the child; or 
2. 
That although paternity to the child has 
been adjudicated under s. 48.423, the father did not 
establish a substantial parental relationship with the 
child prior to the adjudication of paternity although 
the father had reason to believe that he was the 
father of the child and had an opportunity to 
establish a substantial parental relationship with the 
child. 
No. 
2009AP2973   
 
13 
 
been efforts to change the language in § 48.415(6) that concern 
the relevant time period.  In 1995, an amendment was proposed to 
"[s]pecify the pertinent time period during which the parent 
must have failed to assume parental responsibility, for example, 
in the year prior to the time the [termination of parental 
rights] petition was filed."  State v. Bobby G., 2007 WI 77, 
¶84, 301 Wis. 2d 531, 734 N.W.2d 81 (quoting the Note of the 
Joint Legislative Council's Special Committee that drafted 
amendments to § 48.415(6)(a), 1995 Wis. Act. 275).  There was a 
handwritten "No" next to the recommendation.  Id.  This proposal 
shows the legislature considered whether to narrow the fact-
finder's analysis to a specific time period.  The rejection of 
this change shows the legislature refused to require a fact-
finder to consider a specified time period (e.g., the time of 
the fact-finding hearing or, similarly, the first four months of 
the child's life as in Jacob's case).  Instead, the legislature 
kept the relevant time period broad, allowing the fact-finder to 
                                                                                                                                                             
(b) In this subsection, "substantial parental 
relationship" means the acceptance and exercise of 
significant responsibility for the daily supervision, 
education, protection and care of the child.  In 
evaluating whether the person has had a substantial 
parental relationship with the child, the court may 
consider such factors, including, but not limited to, 
whether the person has ever expressed concern for or 
interest in the support, care or well-being of the 
child or the mother during her pregnancy and whether 
the person has neglected or refused to provide care or 
support even though the person had the opportunity and 
ability to do so.  
(Emphasis added.) 
No. 
2009AP2973   
 
14 
 
consider the child's entire life and decide if, based on all the 
facts, a parent has assumed parental responsibility for his or 
her child.  
¶28 The statutory history of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) also 
supports a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.  In 2005, the 
legislature changed the language in what was formerly para. 
(6)(a) so that a fact-finder no longer had to find that parents 
"have never had a substantial parental relationship," but rather 
it must find they "have not had a substantial parental 
relationship." 
 
(Emphasis 
added.) 
 
The 
amendments 
also 
eliminated the word "ever" in para. (b).  Id., ¶87 n.38.  
¶29 According to the Special Committee on Adoption and 
Termination of Parental Rights Law, this change was recommended 
because "requiring a showing that the person has never had a 
substantial relationship with the child can be difficult if the 
parent ever showed any interest or had any contact with the 
child."9 In a memorandum to the committee, Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court Judge Christopher Foley recommended the change.  
Based on his experience, 
[t]he use of the term "never" in this statute is 
troublesome and dramatically misleading.  The fact 
that a parent may have been June Cleaver or Doctor 
[Huxtable] for a week or even a month of a child's 
two-year existence should not defeat a claim made 
under 
the 
statute. 
 
The 
relationship 
is 
not 
substantial because it is so insignificant in length.  
Yet we hear over and over again defense lawyers 
                                                 
9 Wis. Legis. Council, Rep. to the Leg.:  Special Committee 
on Adoption and Termination of Parental Rights Law, at 11 
(July 25, 2005).   
No. 
2009AP2973   
 
15 
 
arguing:  "never means never".  The term is misleading 
and unnecessary.10 
¶30 The elimination of the words "never" and "ever" from 
the statute afford the fact-finder flexibility with regard to 
the time period it may consider.  Therefore, the elimination of 
words supports our conclusion that the statute does not direct a 
fact-finder to a limited time period. 
¶31 In addition, examining the entirety of a child's life 
is the logical interpretation given the diverse fact situations 
that fall under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6).  For example, if, as 
counsel for Jacob argued in oral arguments, 100 days is the 
threshold time period that will always be enough to prove one 
had assumed parental responsibility, this could lead to absurd 
results.  Under that interpretation, the parent of a six-month-
old child who cared for the child 90 of the first 180 days, 
i.e., 50%, of the child's life would be at risk of a termination 
of 
parental 
rights 
for 
failure 
to 
assume 
parental 
responsibility.  Contrarily, the parent of a 16-year-old, who 
cared for the child the first 110 days, i.e., roughly 1.9%, of 
the child's life, but had no parental involvement after that, 
would be immune from a determination that the parent "failed to 
assume parental responsibility."  It would be absurd to provide 
the latter parent more protections under the statute than the 
former. 
                                                 
10 Chris Foley, Mem. re:  Declarations of Parental Interest; 
Abandonment and Failure to Assume Parental Responsibility, 
Sept. 22, 2004. 
No. 
2009AP2973   
 
16 
 
¶32 Consistent with our past decisions, under a totality-
of-the-circumstances analysis, the fact-finder can and should 
consider the reasons why a parent has not supported or cared for 
her child.  See L.K. v. B.B. (Baby Girl K.), 113 Wis. 2d 429, 
442, 335 N.W.2d 846 (1983) ("A court cannot ignore the 
circumstances of why this father was not physically available 
from the fifth month of pregnancy.  He was convicted and 
sentenced for burglary.  This was not a case of being absent 
because of illness, military service or the demands of a job.  
His absence was due to incarceration from the wilful act of 
burglary.").  Ann M.M. v. Rob S., 176 Wis. 2d 673, 685, 500 
N.W.2d 649 (1993) ("[W]e cannot ignore the fact that any 
roadblock to establishing a relationship with SueAnn caused by 
[the father's] arrest, bond, and conviction was produced by [the 
father's] own conduct.").11   
¶33 Jacob argues that under the plain language of Wis. 
Stat. § 48.415(6), if a parent cares for his child for a 
distinct and relatively short period of time, he must be found 
to have "assumed parental responsibility."  Jacob contends that 
"assume" is an active verb, which means to "take up or in" and 
does 
not 
require 
a 
parent 
to 
"assume 
and 
maintain" 
a 
"substantial parental relationship."  Jacob's argument is 
misplaced for at least three reasons.  First, if all that was 
                                                 
11 Contrary to Jacob's assertion, our decision does not 
defeat the rights of parents whose military service or illness 
prevents them from caring for their children for extended 
periods of time. 
No. 
2009AP2973   
 
17 
 
meant by "assume" was that at one time the parent took on some 
parental responsibility, a single day or week of responsibility 
would be sufficient.  While a parent can "take up" parental 
responsibility for one day, the statute cannot easily be read to 
protect the rights of a parent who cared for and supported his 
child for this limited time period.   
¶34 Second, Jacob's interpretation ignores the definition 
of 
"substantial 
parental 
relationship" 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.415(6)(b) that calls for "significant responsibility" for 
"daily supervision, education, protection and care of the 
child."  (Emphasis added.)  Third, Jacob's interpretation 
ignores the statutory and legislative history discussed above.  
That 
history 
demonstrates that the legislature considered 
limiting the fact-finder in ways that would prevent it from 
finding a parent failed to assume parental responsibility if the 
parent was involved with the child for only a small portion of 
the child's life.  The legislature rejected such a limitation.  
¶35 Jacob also points to the phrase "have not had" in 
para. (a).  He argues that because the phrase is in the past-
tense, not the present tense equivalent, "do not have," the 
statute does not mean a parent must "assume and maintain" a 
"substantial parental relationship."  This, however, does not 
advance Jacob's case.  The fact-finder still is permitted to 
look at the child's life as a whole, and to decide whether, 
given all the facts, there has been an assumption of parental 
responsibility.   
No. 
2009AP2973   
 
18 
 
2.  Hazardous living environment 
¶36 The second certified question is "whether a fact-
finder may determine that, despite significant parenting, poor 
quality parenting is a reason to find that a 'substantial 
parental relationship' [as defined in Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6)] 
has not been established."  Tammy W-G., No. 2009AP2973, at 5.  
The certification of this question comes from the court of 
appeals decision in Quinsanna D., which held that it would have 
been acceptable for the jury to conclude that Quinsanna did not 
exercise significant responsibility for the twins because her 
"'daily supervision' of [the twins] included her daily exposure 
of them to her own drug use and drug house."  Quinsanna D., 259 
Wis. 2d 429, ¶32.12  Because the court in Quinsanna actually was 
deciding whether it was acceptable for the fact-finder to 
consider Quinsanna's exposure of her twins to a hazardous living 
environment, we interpret the second certified question to be 
whether the fact-finder may consider whether a parent exposed 
her child to a hazardous living environment, as opposed to the 
consideration of the amorphous term, "quality of parenting."  
¶37 We 
conclude 
that 
under 
the 
totality-of-the-
circumstances test, a fact-finder may consider whether, during 
the time the parent was caring for his child, he exposed the 
                                                 
12 In Quinsanna D., the State removed Quinsanna's two-year-
old twins from her care when Quinsanna was arrested following a 
police raid of her residence that she was using as a drug house. 
State v. Quinsanna D., 2002 WI App 318, ¶¶4-5, 259 Wis. 2d 429, 
655 N.W.2d 752.  Quinsanna was convicted of various drug charges 
as a result of the raid. Id., ¶5.   
No. 
2009AP2973   
 
19 
 
child 
to 
a 
hazardous 
living 
environment. 
 
Supervision, 
protection and care of a child, by definition, involve keeping 
that child out of harms way.  
¶38 In sum, when applying Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6), the 
fact-finder should consider the involvement of the parent over 
the entirety of the child's life.  The plain language and 
legislative history of § 48.415(6) support this interpretation, 
an interpretation that will avoid absurd results.  Moreover, 
although 
a 
parent's 
lack 
of 
opportunity 
to 
establish 
a 
substantial relationship is not a defense to failure to assume 
parental responsibility, the reasons for a parent's lack of 
involvement still may be considered in the totality-of-the-
circumstances analysis.  The fact-finder may also consider 
whether the parent, while caring for the child, exposed the 
child to a hazardous living environment.13 
                                                 
13 Jacob argues that this interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(6) renders other grounds for termination, specifically 
§ 48.415(1), "Abandonment," and § 48.415(2), "Continuing need of 
protection or services," superfluous.  However, both those 
grounds require a fact-finder to consider different factors than 
§ 48.415(6).  For example, under § 48.415(1), there are grounds 
for termination if a parent leaves a child without provisions 
for care and support, and the petitioner is unable to find 
either parent of the child for 60 days.  Under § 48.415(2), the 
grounds for termination are based largely on the child's 
placement outside the home.  Consequently, while there may be 
fact situations where there would be grounds for terminations 
under numerous subsections, there could also be fact patterns 
where § 48.415(1) and (2) would provide grounds for the 
termination of parental rights when § 48.415(6) does not.  
Therefore, our interpretation of § 48.415(6) does not render 
other subsections superfluous. 
No. 
2009AP2973   
 
20 
 
c.  Application 
¶39 The jury was asked, "Has Jacob [] failed to assume 
parental responsibility for Gwenevere []?"  The jury found that 
he failed to do so.14  When reviewing a jury's verdict, we 
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
verdict.  Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d at 501.  Here, we conclude 
that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's 
verdict.   
¶40 In the four-and-a-half years of Gwenevere's life 
leading up to the fact-finding hearing, Jacob had actual custody 
of Gwenevere for only the first four months.  He never had legal 
custody of her.  Moreover, after month four, he provided 
Gwenevere no financial or material support.  Consequently, Jacob 
supported Gwenevere, with regard to both care and finances, for 
only a small portion of her life. 
¶41 In addition, Jacob's contact with Gwenevere after his 
move to Illinois in May 2005 does not demonstrate that he had a 
"substantial parental relationship" with Gwenevere.  Since she 
was approximately five months old, Jacob has had in-person 
contact with Gwenevere, at most, three times, and each visit was 
                                                 
14 Chief Justice Abrahamson in her dissent attempts to re-
characterize the jury's factual finding into an assumption of 
the judicial task of determining whether Jacob had a protected 
liberty interest in his parentage of Gwenevere.  Chief Justice 
Abrahamson's dissent, ¶¶74-88.  In so doing, she ignores the 
majority's establishment of the standard of review we apply to 
Jacob's constitutional claims, see ¶16 supra, as well as our 
independent review of Jacob's claimed liberty interest, see 
¶¶69-70 infra. 
No. 
2009AP2973   
 
21 
 
of short duration.  Moreover, Jacob's calls to Tammy and 
Gwenevere were infrequent, and a jury could easily have found 
that there were extremely long periods of time, even a year's 
length, when Jacob did not contact Gwenevere.  Finally, there 
was no evidence Jacob sent Gwenevere cards, birthday or holiday 
gifts, however small, or had any other contact with her besides 
the few short visits and infrequent phone calls.  This is far 
from "daily" care.  
¶42 The reasons Jacob presented for why he had such little 
contact 
with 
his 
daughter——Tammy's 
supervised 
visit 
requirements——do not support Jacob's case.  While we acknowledge 
these requirements may have been frustrating for Jacob, they do 
not excuse him from his parental responsibilities to Gwenevere.  
Neither Jacob nor Tammy claimed at trial that Tammy would not 
let Gwenevere visit with Jacob, in fact the evidence suggested 
the opposite.  Tammy's efforts to constantly apprise Jacob of 
her whereabouts suggest she wanted Jacob and Gwenevere to have 
contact with one another.  This is not a case where Jacob, 
because of financial or other disabilities, was unable to travel 
to see Gwenevere, especially when she lived only a few hours' 
drive 
away. 
 
Moreover, 
Jacob's 
situation 
is 
drastically 
different from a military father or a parent with a profession 
that requires them to be away for long periods of time.  
Instead, Jacob neglected his daughter, perhaps in part because 
he was unable to accept the conditions her mother, and legal 
guardian, placed on his visitations.  Jacob never sought court 
assistance in establishing a relationship with Gwenevere, and 
No. 
2009AP2973   
 
22 
 
even if the fact-finder believed Jacob's assertion that he was 
saving to hire a lawyer to challenge Tammy's visitation 
conditions, Jacob does not get a "free pass" on his parental 
responsibilities.   
¶43 Of note, while we conclude that a fact-finder may 
consider the exposure of a child to hazardous environments under 
the totality-of-the-circumstances test, the jury could not have 
relied on a hazardous environment in this case, as there was 
none.  Jacob's messy housekeeping, drinking alcohol and smoking 
marijuana were not shown to be sufficient to create a hazardous 
environment for a four-month-old child, and there was no 
evidence presented of Jacob's habits subsequent to his move to 
Illinois in 2005.   
¶44 To summarize, the facts support the jury's finding 
that Jacob did not meet the requirements of Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(6):  he did not "accept[] and exercise" "significant 
responsibility for the daily supervision, education, protection 
and care" of Gwenevere, and/or he "neglected or refused to 
provide care or support for" Gwenevere.  Consequently, we 
conclude that the jury verdict should not be disturbed.  
C.  Constitutionality 
¶45 The third certified issue is whether the application 
of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6), "comports with the constitutional 
protections afforded parents."  Tammy W-G., No. 2009AP2973, at 
11.  This question turns on whether Jacob has a constitutionally 
protected interest in his parentage, i.e., a fundamental liberty 
No. 
2009AP2973   
 
23 
 
interest in his relationship with Gwenevere.15  Randy A.J. v. 
Norma I.J., 2004 WI 41, ¶20, 270 Wis. 2d 384, 677 N.W.2d 630. 
a.  Constitutional challenges 
¶46 The two major types of constitutional challenges are 
"facial" and "as-applied."  State v. Joseph E.G., 2001 WI App 
29, ¶5, 240 Wis. 2d 481, 623 N.W.2d 137.  Statutes are generally 
presumed constitutional.  Id.  "Because a facial constitutional 
challenge attacks the law itself as drafted by the legislature, 
claiming the law is void from its beginning to [] end and that 
it cannot be constitutionally enforced under any circumstances, 
the presumption of constitutionality is proper."  Society Ins. 
v. LIRC, 2010 WI 68, ¶26, 326 Wis. 2d 444, 786 N.W.2d 385.  
"This presumption is based on our respect for a co-equal branch 
of government and is meant to promote due deference to 
legislative acts."  Ponn P., 279 Wis. 2d 169, ¶16.  In a facial 
challenge, the challenger must persuade us that the "heavy 
burden" to overcome the presumption of constitutionality has 
been met, and that there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the statute is unconstitutional.  Id., ¶18.  
¶47 However, we interpret Jacob's challenge to Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(6) as a claim that § 48.415(6) is unconstitutional as 
                                                 
15 Jacob argues that Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) as applied to 
him does not meet strict scrutiny because he was not allowed to 
prove he is not unfit by showing that there was good cause for 
his lack of contact with Gwenevere.  Moreover, he argues that he 
should have been given an opportunity, with the help of 
reasonable services from the State, to regain custody of 
Gwenevere. 
No. 
2009AP2973   
 
24 
 
applied 
to 
him. 
 
In 
an 
as-applied 
challenge, 
the 
constitutionality of the statute itself is not attacked; 
accordingly, the presumption that the statute is constitutional 
applies, just as it does in a facial challenge.  State v. Wood, 
2010 WI 17, ¶15, 323 Wis. 2d 321, 780 N.W.2d 63 (concluding that 
Wood, who mounted both a facial and an as-applied constitutional 
challenge, 
"must 
prove 
that 
the 
challenged 
statute 
is 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . [and t]hat 
presumption [that the statute is constitutional] and burden [of 
persuasion] 
apply 
to 
facial 
as 
well 
as 
to 
as-applied 
constitutional challenges"); State v. Smith, 2010 WI 16, ¶8, 323 
Wis. 2d 377, 780 N.W.2d 90 (concluding that in a challenge based 
on an allegedly unconstitutional application of Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.45 
the 
"statute 
enjoys 
a 
presumption 
of 
constitutionality").   
¶48 However, in as-applied challenges, "[w]hile we presume 
a statute is constitutional, we do not presume that the State 
applies statutes in a constitutional manner."  Society Ins., 326 
Wis. 2d 444, ¶27.  Therefore, in an as-applied challenge, 
No. 
2009AP2973   
 
25 
 
neither 
party 
faces 
a 
presumption 
that 
the 
statute 
was 
constitutionally applied.16  Id.   
¶49 To explain further, the analysis that is employed for 
an as-applied challenge contains no presumption in regard to 
whether the statute was applied in a constitutionally sufficient 
manner.  Rather, the analysis of an as-applied challenge is 
determined by the constitutional right that is alleged to have 
been affected by the application of the statute.  Stated 
otherwise, the analysis differs from case to case, depending on 
the constitutional right at issue.   
¶50 For example, in State v. Miller, 202 Wis. 2d 56, 549 
N.W.2d 
235 
(1996), 
we 
considered 
whether 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 347.245(1), which required displaying a red and orange 
triangular 
emblem 
on 
slow-moving 
vehicles, 
was 
an 
unconstitutional burdening of the religious beliefs of Miller 
and others who were members of the Old Order Amish faith.  Id. 
at 59.  Miller had been ticketed for refusing to display the 
                                                 
16 The 
certified 
question, 
independent 
of 
Jacob's 
contentions, could be interpreted to mount a facial challenge to 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6).  However, when there is at least one 
interpretation 
and 
application 
of 
a 
statute 
that 
is 
constitutional, that statute is constitutional on its face.  See 
Dane Cnty. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Ponn P., 2005 WI 32, ¶33, 
279 Wis. 2d 169, 694 N.W.2d 344.  Because, as discussed below, 
we conclude the § 48.415(6) is constitutional as applied to 
Jacob, it is therefore facially constitutional.  Even more, "a 
'facial challenge should generally not be entertained when an 
'as-applied' challenge could resolve the case.'"  Society Ins. 
v. LIRC, 2010 WI 68, ¶27 n.8, 326 Wis. 2d 444, 786 N.W.2d 385 
(citing Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election 
Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 624 (1996)).   
No. 
2009AP2973   
 
26 
 
required emblem, based on his religious convictions.  Id. at 60.  
Because the challenge to the application of the statute involved 
an issue of freedom of conscience based on Miller's religious 
convictions, we applied the "compelling state interest/least 
restrictive 
alternative 
test" 
in 
determining 
whether 
§ 347.245(1) violated the Wisconsin Constitution when applied to 
Miller and others.  Id. at 66.  We concluded that § 347.245(1) 
was "unconstitutional as applied to the eight Amish defendants 
because the State failed to prove that the [slow-moving vehicle] 
symbol was the least restrictive alternative available that 
would satisfy the State's interest in traffic safety."  Id. at 
59.  Our analysis of the as-applied challenge to § 347.245(1) 
did not include a presumption that the statute had been 
constitutionally applied.   
¶51 In State v. Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 665 
N.W.2d 785, we considered whether Wisconsin's concealed carry 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 941.23 (1999-2000), was applied in 
violation of Hamdan's rights under Article I, Section 25 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.17  We concluded that "courts may limit 
the broad application of the [concealed carry] statute in those 
circumstances 
where 
limitation 
is 
necessary 
to 
narrowly 
accommodate the constitutional right to keep and bear arms for 
lawful purposes."  Id., ¶39.  The test we set out was "whether 
                                                 
17 In State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶¶12-18, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 
665 N.W.2d 328, decided the same day as State v. Hamdan, 2003 WI 
113, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785, we concluded that a facial 
challenge to Wis. Stat. § 941.23 did not lie. 
No. 
2009AP2973   
 
27 
 
the State may restrict the carrying of a concealed firearm in 
these circumstances without unreasonably infringing Hamdan's 
rights under Article I, Section 25."  Id., ¶43.  In this test of 
reasonableness, we balanced the "rights of an individual to keep 
and bear arms for lawful purposes against the authority of the 
State to exercise its police power to protect the health, 
safety, and welfare of its citizens."  Id., ¶45.  No presumption 
that the statute was constitutionally applied entered into our 
discussion.  Rather, we examined the facts that bore on the 
interests that were to be balanced.  
b.  Substantive due process 
¶52 Parents who have developed a relationship with their 
children have a fundamental liberty interest in the "care, 
custody, and control of their children."  Troxel v. Granville, 
530 U.S. 57, 57 (2000).  The Supreme Court has emphasized the 
magnitude of parents' rights:  
The rights to conceive and to raise one's children 
have been deemed essential, basic civil rights of man, 
and [r]ights far more precious . . . than property 
rights.  It is cardinal with us that the custody, care 
and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, 
whose primary function and freedom include preparation 
for obligations the state can neither supply nor 
hinder. 
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (internal 
citations and quotations omitted).  When a fundamental liberty 
interest is found, "any statute that impinges on that right must 
withstand strict scrutiny."  Ponn P., 279 Wis. 2d 169, ¶20.  
Strict scrutiny requires a showing that the statute, as applied, 
No. 
2009AP2973   
 
28 
 
is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest.  
Monroe Cnty. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Kelli B., 2004 WI 48, ¶17, 
271 Wis. 2d 51, 678 N.W.2d 831.   
¶53 If there is no fundamental interest, the statute's 
application must withstand only a rational basis review.  Id.  
Rational basis is satisfied if the application of the statute 
bears a rational relation to a legitimate legislative objective.  
Id.  Accordingly, one of our tasks is to identify the precise 
nature of Jacob's parental relationship with Gwenevere. 
¶54 In Stanley, the Court held that an unwed father who 
had "sired and raised" his children was entitled to a hearing on 
unfitness before his children could be taken from his care.18  
Stanley, 
405 
U.S. 
at 
650-51. 
 
That 
father 
had 
lived 
intermittently for 18 years with the mother of his children and 
participated actively in the children's upbringing.  Id. at 646. 
¶55 Several years later, the Court examined the rights of 
a father, Quilloin, who was less involved in the life of his 
child.  In Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), the mother 
sought termination of Quilloin's parental rights to their 11-
year-old son so he could be adopted by his step-father.  Id. at 
247.  The mother and Quilloin were never married and had never 
resided together.  Id.  Moreover, Quilloin never petitioned for 
legitimization of his son.  Id. at 249.  While the child always 
had been in the care and custody of his mother, his father 
                                                 
18 Stanley involved a challenge to an Illinois law that made 
children of unwed mothers wards of the state upon the death of 
their mother.  Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 646 (1972). 
No. 
2009AP2973   
 
29 
 
"provided support only on an irregular basis," visited with him 
on "many occasions" and gave him toys and gifts "from time to 
time."  Id. at 251.  Nevertheless, the Georgia trial court 
terminated the father's rights and granted the adoption.  Id. at 
247.  A finding of unfitness was never made.  Id.  On review, 
the Court found that Quilloin's due process rights were not 
violated.  Id. at 255.  The Court pointed out that Quilloin "has 
never exercised actual or legal custody over his child, and thus 
has never shouldered any significant responsibility with respect 
to the daily supervision, education, protection, or care of the 
child."19  Id. at 256.   
¶56 A year later in Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 
(1979), the Court held that the natural father, Caban, had 
manifested a significant parental interest for his two children 
so that their adoption by their step-father could not be granted 
without Caban's permission.20  Caban and the children's mother 
resided together for more than five years, during which time the 
children were born.  Id. at 382.  Caban lived with the children 
until they were two and four years-old and contributed to their 
support during this time.  Id.  After the couple separated, 
                                                 
19 This language is extremely similar to the language of 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6).  Because of this similarity and because 
§ 48.415(6) was passed a year after Quilloin was decided, the 
Wisconsin legislature may have considered Quilloin when it 
enacted § 48.415(6). 
20 The New York Statute in Caban required the permission of 
an unmarried mother before her children could be adopted, but 
not the permission of the unmarried father.  Caban v. Mohammed, 
441 U.S. 380, 386-87 (1979).   
No. 
2009AP2973   
 
30 
 
Caban continued to have contact with the children.  He visited 
with them each week until their maternal grandmother took them 
to Puerto Rico.  Id.  Despite their geographical distance, 
"Caban communicated with the children through his parents, who 
also resided in Puerto Rico."  Id. at 383.  Given these facts, 
the Court concluded that Caban had "established a substantial 
relationship" with the children and was therefore entitled to 
heightened procedural protections.  Id. at 391, 393.   
¶57 The 
Court 
synthesized 
the 
holdings 
in 
Stanley, 
Quilloin and Caban in Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).  
In Lehr, the father, Lehr, lived with the mother prior to his 
daughter's birth and visited the hospital when she was born.  
Nevertheless, he did not live with them after his daughter's 
birth and never provided his daughter any financial support.  
Id. at 252.  Lehr challenged, on due process grounds, the 
adoption of his daughter by her step-father, which adoption was 
granted without notice to or the permission of Lehr.  Id. at 
250. 
¶58 The Court stated that Justice Stewart was correct in 
his dissent in Caban when he observed that,  
"Even if it be assumed that each married parent 
after divorce has some substantive due process right 
to maintain his or her parental relationship, it by no 
means follows that each unwed parent has any such 
right.  Parental rights do not spring full-blown from 
the biological connection between parent and child.  
They require relationships more enduring." 
Id. at 260 (quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at 397 (J. Stewart, 
dissenting)) (internal citation omitted).  The Court went on: 
No. 
2009AP2973   
 
31 
 
The difference between the developed parent-child 
relationship that was implicated in Stanley and Caban, 
and the potential relationship involved in Quilloin 
and this case, is both clear and significant.  When an 
unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the 
responsibilities of parenthood by coming forward to 
participate in the rearing of his child, his interest 
in 
personal 
contact 
with 
his 
child 
acquires 
substantial 
protection 
under 
the 
Due 
Process 
Clause. . . . 
 
The 
importance 
of 
the 
familial 
relationship, to the individuals involved and to the 
society, stems from the emotional attachments that 
derive from the intimacy of daily association, and 
from the role it plays in promoting a way of life 
through the instruction of children . . . as well as 
from the fact of blood relationship.  
Id. at 261 (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted).  The Court specified when a father's constitutional 
rights attach: 
The significance of the biological connection is 
that it offers the natural father an opportunity that 
no other male possesses to develop a relationship with 
his offspring.  If he grasps that opportunity and 
accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's 
future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child 
relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions 
to the child's development.  If he fails to do so, the 
Federal Constitution will not automatically compel a 
State to listen to his opinion of where the child's 
best interests lie. 
Id. at 262 (emphasis added).  
¶59 The Court concluded that Lehr had "never had any 
significant custodial, personal, or financial relationship with 
[his daughter], and he did not seek to establish a legal tie 
until after she was two years old."  Id.  Therefore, the New 
York notice proceedings were sufficient to protect Lehr's 
"inchoate" interests under the Due Process Clause.  Id. at 265. 
No. 
2009AP2973   
 
32 
 
¶60 In sum, under Supreme Court jurisprudence, a liberty 
interest protected by the Due Process Clause arises only when 
biological parents have taken sufficient steps to establish and 
protect those rights.  
¶61 Similarly, we have acknowledged that when a parent has 
not taken advantage of the opportunity to develop a relationship 
with his offspring and accept responsibility for the child's 
future, no liberty interest protected by substantive due process 
arises.  Randy A.J., 270 Wis. 2d 384, ¶20. 
¶62 Whether 
a 
parent 
has 
shouldered 
her 
parental 
responsibilities was addressed in Mrs. R. v. Mr. and Mrs. B. 
(J.L.W.), 102 Wis. 2d 118, 306 N.W.2d 46 (1981).  In that case, 
prior to the child, J.L.W.'s, birth, the mother, Mrs. R., asked 
her sister and her brother-in-law, Mr. and Mrs. B., to adopt her 
illegitimate child.  Id. at 122-23.  J.L.W. lived with Mrs. R. 
during most of the first four months of his life.  Id. at 124-
25.  Mrs. R. then asked Mrs. B. to take J.L.W. because Mrs. R. 
was struggling to make ends meet as a single mother.  Id. at 
125.  J.L.W. lived with his aunt and uncle until he was one-and-
a-half when they petitioned for a termination of Mrs. R.'s 
parental rights and a guardianship appointment.  Throughout this 
year and a half, J.L.W.'s mother kept in contact with J.L.W.  
She traveled to Milwaukee from her home in Boston for visits, 
she wrote letters, and she called.  Id. at 126-30.   
¶63 In J.L.W., we disagreed with Mr. and Mrs. B.'s 
argument that Mrs. R. was like the father in Quilloin who had no 
fundamental right to "family integrity."  Id. at 134.  We first 
No. 
2009AP2973   
 
33 
 
distinguished Quilloin because the "existing 'family unit'" in 
Quilloin involved the child's natural mother.  Id. at 135.  We 
went on to hold that unless there were circumstances comparable 
to those presented in Quilloin where the father had no 
constitutionally 
protected 
liberty 
interest, 
due 
process 
prohibits the "termination of a natural parent's rights, unless 
the parent is unfit."  Id. at 136.  In J.L.W., the facts 
supported Mrs. R.'s claim that she had a fundamental liberty 
interest 
in 
her 
parental 
relationship 
with 
her 
son 
and 
therefore, we concluded that the termination of her parental 
rights was improper without first making a finding that Mrs. R. 
was unfit.  Id. at 137.  
¶64 In Baby Girl K., 113 Wis. 2d 429, we distinguished 
J.L.W.: 
Although in J.L.W., this court suggested that due 
process might require a finding of unfitness before 
any natural parent's parental rights are terminated, 
the specific holding related only to a parent who had 
physical custody of the child for the first four 
months of the child's life and whose every action 
"from the time she learned of her pregnancy showed a 
concern for the child she was to bear."  Unlike Lehr, 
J.L.W. was a case where the parent had already 
"demonstrated 
a 
full 
commitment 
to 
the 
responsibilities of parenthood." 
Id. at 446 (quoting J.L.W., 102 Wis. 2d at 137, Lehr, 463 U.S. 
at 261) (emphasis added).  We went on to say, 
A natural father's interest in personal contact 
with his child is protected under the due process 
clause because of this society's belief in the 
protection 
of 
the 
familial 
relationship. 
 
The 
significance of this relationship "to the individuals 
involved 
and 
to 
[the] 
society, 
stems 
from 
the 
No. 
2009AP2973   
 
34 
 
emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of 
daily association, and from the role it plays in 
promoting a way of life through the instruction of 
children 
as 
well 
as 
from 
the 
fact 
of 
blood 
relationship."  
Id. at 447 (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for 
Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977) (emphasis added). 
¶65 In Baby Girl K., Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) was at issue.  
We held that Baby Girl K.'s father had not established a 
substantial relationship with her and therefore, a finding of 
unfitness was not required before his parental rights were 
terminated.  Id. at 447-48.  Baby Girl K.'s father was 
incarcerated when she was born.  We explained that although the 
father could have established a relationship with his daughter 
by writing, calling or asking to see her, he chose instead to 
have no contact with her and the contact he had with the child's 
mother was harmful.  Id. at 447. 
¶66 We 
also 
have 
examined 
whether 
a 
substantial 
relationship has been established in several other cases.  In 
Ann M.M., we concluded that the child's father did not have a 
protected liberty interest.  Ann M.M., 176 Wis. 2d at 685-86.  
We held that although the father was incarcerated, he had the 
opportunity to develop a relationship with his child.  Id. at 
684.  We concluded that nothing prevented the father from 
financially supporting the child, yet he refused to do so.  Id. 
at 685.  Moreover, he made no attempts to have contact with his 
daughter and, in fact, had never seen her.  Id. at 685, 682.  
Finally, any roadblocks that contributed to his lack of contact 
were the product of his own wrongdoing.  Id. at 685.   
No. 
2009AP2973   
 
35 
 
¶67 Next in Kelli B., we held that the natural mother had 
a protected liberty interest.  In that case, the mother, Kelli, 
had lived with and had custody of her three children until they 
were three, two, and seven-months-old.21  Kelli B., 271 Wis. 2d 
51, ¶20.  We held that Kelli established a fundamental liberty 
interest in parenting the children based on the amount of time 
she lived with and had custody of her children.  Id., ¶24.  As 
such, it was a violation of due process to terminate Kelli's 
parental rights without a finding that she was unfit.  Id., ¶26. 
¶68 Finally, in Kenosha Cnty. Dep't of Human Servs. v. 
Jodie W., 2006 WI 93, 293 Wis. 2d 530, 716 N.W.2d 845, we held 
that the mother, Jodie, had a fundamental liberty interest in 
parenting her son, Max.  Jodie cared for Max for the first two 
years of his life.  However, when he was two-years-old, Jodie 
faced criminal convictions unrelated to her care of Max and was 
incarcerated for four years.  Id., ¶4.  The State petitioned for 
termination of Jodie's rights when Max was four.  Id., ¶8.  We 
held that Jodie had a protected liberty interest in parenting 
Max.  Id., ¶41.  We did not engage, however, in much factual 
discussion of why she had this interest, but assumedly it was 
based on the fact that she had care and custody for Max for the 
first two years of his life. 
¶69 Based on both the Supreme Court precedent and our own 
precedent, 
we 
conclude 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.415(6) 
was 
                                                 
21 The children were approximately five, four, and two when 
the State filed the petition to terminate Kelli's rights. 
No. 
2009AP2973   
 
36 
 
constitutionally applied to Jacob.  The fact-finder determined 
that 
Jacob 
failed 
to 
assume 
parental 
responsibility 
for 
Gwenevere.  Jacob did not assume, or take steps to assume, 
emotional or financial responsibility for Gwenevere.  He 
provided insufficient evidence to show that he had a protected 
liberty 
interest 
in 
his 
parental 
relationship 
with 
her.  
Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256; Randy A.J., 270 Wis. 2d 384, ¶20.  
Without a protected liberty interest, we consider whether, as 
applied to Jacob, the statute is rationally related to a 
legitimate legislative interest.  Kelli B., 271 Wis. 2d 51, ¶17. 
¶70 There is a legitimate legislative interest in keeping 
an existing family unit intact.  We note that one of the 
legislative purposes of the Children's Code is "to preserve the 
unity of the family."  Wis. Stat. § 48.01(1).  Gwenevere has 
been living in a family unit with Tammy, Douglas, and her half 
sisters for most of her life.22  By terminating Jacob's rights, 
Douglas will be able to adopt Gwenevere, therefore recognizing 
the existing family unit and the only family unit that Gwenevere 
knows.  There is also a legitimate legislative interest in 
providing stability for the child.  § 48.01(1).  Stability may 
be provided through the daily care and protection given to a 
child.  Jacob has had almost no contact with and has provided no 
support to Gwenevere for almost four years.  In contrast, 
Gwenevere's mother and step-father have provided her with a 
                                                 
22 Unlike the facts of J.L.W., the existing family unit 
includes Gwenevere's biological mother and two biological half-
sisters.   
No. 
2009AP2973   
 
37 
 
stable place to grow.  It is they who have promoted the 
legislative interest in stability for the child.  Accordingly, 
we conclude that Wis. Stat § 48.415(6) was constitutionally 
applied to Jacob because its application to Jacob is rationally 
related to legitimate legislative interests. 
D.  Directed Verdict 
¶71 In reviewing the denial of a motion for a directed 
verdict, we assess whether the record contains sufficient 
credible 
evidence, 
including the inferences therefrom, to 
sustain a finding in plaintiff's favor.  James v. Heintz, 165 
Wis. 2d 572, 576-77, 478 N.W.2d 31 (Ct. App. 1991).  Jacob's 
argument that the circuit court should have granted his motion 
for a directed verdict is driven by his argument that the fact-
finder should have considered only the first four months of 
Gwenevere's life when deciding whether he "assumed parental 
responsibility."  Because, as discussed above, the fact-finder 
is to consider the entirety of the child's life and to apply a 
totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, the circuit court did 
not err in denying Jacob's motion. 
E.  Jury Instructions 
¶72 Jacob argues that the jury instructions were improper 
because they did not specify that the jury should focus on a 
specific time period when determining if Jacob assumed parental 
responsibility for Gwenevere.  Jacob, however, waived this 
argument when he did not object to the jury instructions at 
trial and therefore, we choose not to exercise our discretionary 
power of review over whether the jury instructions were correct.  
No. 
2009AP2973   
 
38 
 
State v. Schumacher, 144 Wis. 2d 388, 410, 424 N.W.2d 672 
(1988). 
 
Furthermore, 
the 
totality-of-the-circumstances 
analysis, which is applicable to a determination of whether 
grounds for termination of parental rights under Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(6) has been proved, includes consideration of the 
child's entire life.  See ¶¶31-32 above.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶73 We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) prescribes a 
totality-of-the-circumstances test.  When applying this test, 
the fact-finder should consider any support or care, or lack 
thereof, the parent provided the child throughout the child's 
entire life.  This analysis may include the reasons why a parent 
was not caring for or supporting her child and any exposure of 
the child to a hazardous living environment.  We further 
conclude that the statute was not unconstitutional as applied to 
Jacob.  Finally, the circuit court did not error when it denied 
Jacob's motion for a directed verdict and Jacob waived his 
argument that the jury instruction was improper.  Accordingly, 
Jacob's parental rights were lawfully terminated; we affirm the 
judgment of the circuit court.  
By the Court.—The decision of the circuit court is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
No.  2009AP2973.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶74 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  I join 
Justice Ann Walsh Bradley's dissent.  I write separately to 
address a fundamental issue that the majority opinion assumes 
without analysis.  The majority opinion assumes that whether a 
substantial parental relationship exists under Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(6) is a question for the jury.  Majority op., ¶¶22, 23, 
24, 26, 32, 34, 35, 37, 38.  I disagree.  I conclude that the 
determination of whether a substantial parental relationship 
exists is a question of law for the court.  It is a threshold 
constitutional issue that needs to be decided in a termination 
of parental rights case.  I come to this conclusion on the basis 
of both the language of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6), as well as the 
usual 
standard 
of 
review 
for 
deciding 
questions 
of 
constitutional law.  
I 
¶75 With regard to the statutory interpretation.  The 
language of § 49.415(6) is explicit.  The court, not the fact-
finder, decides whether a parent has had a substantial parental 
relationship.   
¶76 The introductory language of Wisconsin Stat. § 48.415 
explicitly states that the court or jury determines whether 
grounds 
exist 
for 
termination 
of 
parental 
rights. 
 
The 
subsections then state the grounds.   
¶77 Subsection (6), entitled "failure to assume parental 
responsibility," is at issue in the present case.  Failure to 
assume parental responsibility is established by proving that 
the parent has not had a substantial parental relationship with 
No.  2009AP2973.ssa 
 
2 
 
the child.  "Substantial parental relationship" is defined in 
§ 48.415(6)(b).  Moreover, in § 48.415(6)(b) the legislature has 
expressly 
stated 
that 
"the 
court" 
determines 
whether 
a 
substantial parental relationship with the child exists.  The 
legislature directs "the court" to consider a non-exhaustive 
list of factors:   
48.415 Grounds for involuntary termination of parental 
rights.  At the fact-finding hearing the court or jury 
shall 
determine 
whether 
grounds 
exist 
for 
the 
termination of parental rights. . . . Grounds for 
termination of parental rights shall be one of the 
following: 
. . . . 
(6) Failure to assume parental responsibility. 
(a) Failure to assume parental responsibility, which 
shall be established by proving that the parent or the 
person or persons who may be the parent of the child 
have not had a substantial parental relationship with 
the child. 
(b) 
In 
this 
subsection, 
"substantial 
parental 
relationship" means the acceptance and exercise of 
significant responsibility for the daily supervision, 
education, protection and care of the child. In 
evaluating whether the person has had a substantial 
parental relationship with the child, the court may 
consider such factors, including, but not limited to, 
whether the person has expressed concern for or 
interest in the support, care or well-being of the 
child, whether the person has neglected or refused to 
provide care or support for the child and whether, 
with respect to a person who is or may be the father 
of the child, the person has expressed concern for or 
interest in the support, care or well-being of the 
mother during her pregnancy. 
(Emphasis added.)   
¶78 The legislature's explicit declaration in Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(6)(b) that "the court," not the jury, determines 
No.  2009AP2973.ssa 
 
3 
 
whether a parent has had a substantial parental relationship is 
strikingly apparent when the language of § 48.415(6) is compared 
to the general introductory language of § 48.415, in which the 
legislature states: "At the fact-finding hearing the court or 
jury shall determine whether grounds exist for the termination 
of parental rights" (emphasis added). 
 
¶79 The majority opinion ignores the text of Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415.  It ignores the introductory language and the language 
of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6)(b).  The majority opinion effectively 
adds 
language 
to 
§ 48.415(6)(b), 
judicially 
amending 
§ 48.415(6)(b) to read as follows: "In evaluating whether the 
person has had a substantial parental relationship with the 
child, the court or the jury may consider such factors . . . ."   
 
¶80 The majority offers no explanation for deviating from 
the carefully crafted statute as promulgated by the legislature. 
¶81 The importance of faithfully adhering to the statutory 
language becomes clearer when the statute is examined in light 
of 
the 
fundamental 
constitutional 
rights 
affected 
in 
a 
termination of parental rights proceeding.    
II 
¶82 With regard to the standard of review to review a 
constitutional issue, I agree with Justice Bradley's analysis 
summing up the nature of the fundamental constitutional right at 
stake in termination of parental rights proceedings and the 
standard articulated by the United States Supreme Court in 
establishing the framework for a parent's constitutional right 
to parent.  Justice Bradley's dissent, ¶¶98-106.  I further 
No.  2009AP2973.ssa 
 
4 
 
agree with Justice Bradley that the apparent intent of the 
legislature in promulgating § 48.415(6) was to codify the 
standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court.  Justice 
Bradley's dissent, ¶105.   
¶83 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 48.415(6) 
differs 
from 
other 
subsections of § 48.415, as Justice Bradley explains.  Justice 
Bradley's dissent, ¶106.  Subsection (6) sets forth the 
threshold constitutional question to be determined, namely 
whether a parent has a constitutionally protected liberty 
interest in his or her relationship with the child.  Justice 
Bradley's dissent, ¶106.  The other subsections are fitness 
determinations.  Id. 
¶84 If there is a constitutionally protected liberty 
interest, then the parent's rights are protected by due process.  
Due process requires that a parent's parental rights may be 
terminated only after a determination that the parent is unfit 
under the other grounds for termination of parental rights in 
§ 48.415 (see, e.g., abandonment, Wis. Stat. § 48.415(1)).  If 
there is no protected liberty interest, then the standard for 
termination is the best interests of the child.  Justice 
Bradley's dissent, ¶101 & n.2.     
¶85 The question whether a parent has a substantial 
parental 
relationship 
requires 
the 
application 
of 
a 
constitutional standard to the facts.1  The court has denominated 
questions 
presenting 
the 
application 
of 
a 
constitutional 
standard to the facts as presenting a question of constitutional 
                                                 
1 Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 51-52 (1949). 
No.  2009AP2973.ssa 
 
5 
 
fact.  A constitutional fact is one which, though cast in the 
form of a determination of fact, is decisive of constitutional 
rights.2    
¶86 In this case the significant historical facts are not 
in dispute.3  Majority op., ¶¶4-13.  Therefore, the question that 
remains is the application of a constitutional standard to the 
facts, ordinarily a question of law.   
¶87 Nevertheless, the circuit court concluded without 
analysis that this application of a constitutional standard to 
the undisputed facts was for the jury.  In denying both parties' 
motions for a directed verdict, the circuit court concluded:  
"There are reasonable grounds which the jury may accept, to 
accept either argument of the parties, alternatively, depending 
upon the time period which they may choose to think is important 
more than another in determining substantial involvement of the 
father with his daughter."   
¶88 In the present case, in which there are no disputed 
facts, 
the 
application 
of 
a 
constitutional 
standard 
to 
                                                 
2 Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 51 (1949); State v. 
Hajicek, 2001 WI 3, ¶¶14-15, 240 Wis. 2d 349, 620 N.W.2d 781; 
State v. Martwick, 2000 WI 5, ¶17, 231 Wis. 2d 801, 604 
N.W.2d 552.  
3 In closing arguments, the mother's attorney acknowledged: 
"And those factors which we don't deny exist are that Jacob was 
supportive of Tammy during the pregnancy . . . . Jacob had 
provided care and supervision for the first five months of the 
child's life . . . ."  Based on the testimony of the father and 
mother counsel also conceded that "through June of 2005, he had 
maybe met that burden" of assuming a substantial parental 
relationship "but once he left, there's four and a half years in 
which he's been absent."  
No.  2009AP2973.ssa 
 
6 
 
undisputed facts is a question of law for the court, first the 
circuit court and then an appellate court. 
¶89 Furthermore, as a general rule, the application of a 
constitutional standard, here substantial parental relationship, 
to the facts, even if facts are disputed, is a question of law 
for the court, first the circuit court and then an appellate 
court. 
¶90 An appellate court often applies a two-step standard 
of review to constitutional inquiries.  An appellate court 
applies a deferential, clearly erroneous standard to the circuit 
court's findings of evidentiary or historical fact.  An 
appellate court then determines the question of constitutional 
fact, here whether a person has had a substantial parental 
relationship, independently of the circuit court and court of 
appeals.  The court has stated that applying a deferential 
standard of review to a circuit court's or jury's ultimate 
determination of a constitutional fact would lead to "varied 
results" that "would be inconsistent with the idea of a unitary 
system of law."4  
¶91 The majority opinion assumes, without analysis, that 
the question whether a person has had a substantial parental 
relationship with a child is a question for the jury.  The 
majority opinion reviews the jury determination that the 
defendant failed to assume parental responsibility under a 
sufficiency of the evidence standard, considering the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the jury verdict.  Majority op., 
                                                 
4 Hajicek, 240 Wis. 2d 349, ¶15. 
No.  2009AP2973.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶39.  My sense is that a circuit court and an appellate court 
have a more significant role in deciding this constitutional 
issue than the majority opinion allows.      
¶92 In sum, I conclude on the basis of the clear, 
unambiguous text of the introductory language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415 and the text of § 48.415(6)(b) that the determination 
of whether a parent has had a substantial parental relationship 
is a question of law for the court.  My statutory interpretation 
is supported by the standard of review generally applied when an 
appellate 
court 
is 
presented 
with 
a 
case 
in 
which 
a 
constitutional standard must be applied to the facts.     
¶93 For the reasons set forth, I join Justice Bradley's 
dissent and write separately. 
 
No.  2009AP2973.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶94 ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   (dissenting). 
This 
case 
presents the court with the question of whether a father's 
parental rights may be involuntarily terminated under Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(6) when that father provided support throughout the 
pregnancy and daily care and supervision when the child was an 
infant.     
¶95 Under the facts presented, I conclude that Jacob has 
had a substantial parental relationship with his child.  Once a 
parent has assumed a substantial parental relationship with the 
child, failure to maintain that parental relationship is not 
grounds for termination under sub. (6).  Due process requires 
that other grounds for termination (see, e.g., abandonment, Wis. 
Stat. § 48.415(1)), be proven before parental rights can be 
involuntarily terminated.     
¶96 The majority concludes otherwise.  In addressing the 
question, 
the 
majority transforms the statutory language.  
Rather than asking whether a parent "has had" a substantial 
parental relationship——as the statute directs——the majority asks 
whether there "is" a substantial parental relationship.  See 
majority op., ¶26.   
¶97 The majority's interpretation is contrary to the plain 
language of the statute, its context, and its legislative 
history.  Its analysis is flawed because it appears to conceive 
of the existence of a protected liberty interest that is in 
constant flux, depending upon the totality of the circumstances 
at any given moment.  As a result, the majority provides unclear 
No.  2009AP2973.awb 
 
2 
 
guidance 
to 
fact-finders 
and 
undermines 
constitutional 
protections.       
I 
¶98 To properly interpret Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6), it is 
essential 
to 
understand 
the 
nature 
of 
the 
fundamental 
constitutional 
rights 
at 
stake 
when 
parental 
rights 
are 
involuntarily terminated.  We have explained that "[t]ermination 
of 
parental 
rights 
adjudications 
are 
among 
the 
most 
consequential of judicial acts because they involve the power of 
the State to permanently extinguish any legal recognition of the 
rights and obligations existing between parent and child."  
Brown County DHS v. Brenda B., 2011 WI 6, ¶30, 331 Wis. 2d 310, 
795 N.W.2d 730.     
¶99 Under most circumstances, parents have "cognizable and 
substantial" liberty interests in their relationships with their 
children.  Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972); 
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 248 (1978).  When a parent 
has a liberty interest, "the relationship between parent and 
child is constitutionally protected" and the State cannot 
interfere with that relationship unless the parent is determined 
to be unfit.  Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255; Stanley, 405 U.S. at 
658.   
¶100 The 
standard 
for 
failure 
to 
assume 
parental 
responsibility arose in the 1970s, as the United States Supreme 
Court grappled with the circumstances under which an unmarried 
father 
has 
a 
constitutionally 
protected 
interest 
in 
his 
relationship with his children.  See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 650 
No.  2009AP2973.awb 
 
3 
 
(determining that an unmarried father had a liberty interest in 
"the children he has sired and raised" and that liberty interest 
warranted deference and protection); Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255 
(concluding that not all unmarried fathers have a liberty 
interest in their biological children); Caban v. Mohammad, 441 
U.S. 380, 393 (1979) ("[I]n cases such as this, where the father 
has established a substantial relationship with the child," the 
relationship is constitutionally protected.).1 
¶101 In Quilloin, the Court first articulated the standard 
under which it may be determined that a father's interest in his 
relationship 
with 
his 
biological 
child 
does 
not 
warrant 
constitutional protection.  The Quilloin Court acknowledged that 
an unmarried father may have a constitutionally protected 
interest in his relationship with his child.  434 U.S. at 247-48 
(citing Stanley).  Nevertheless, the Court concluded that 
Quilloin had no constitutionally protected interest because "he 
has never exercised actual or legal custody over his child, and 
thus has never shouldered any significant responsibility with 
respect to the daily supervision, education, protection, or care 
of the child."2  Id. at 256.   
                                                 
1 In dissent, Justice Stevens agreed that "if and when one 
develops, the relationship between a father and his natural 
child is entitled to protection against arbitrary state action 
as a matter of due process."  Caban v. Mohammad, 441 U.S. 380, 
414 (Stevens, J., dissenting).     
2 Accordingly, in such an instance the parent's unfitness 
need not be proven before parental rights may be terminated and 
a court need not "find anything more than that [terminating 
parental rights is] in the 'best interests of the child.'"  
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978). 
No.  2009AP2973.awb 
 
4 
 
¶102 The Quilloin Court contrasted parents who have never 
had any daily involvement in the child's life from those parents 
who no longer have daily involvement.  It explained that 
Quilloin's situation was "readily distinguishable" from that of 
"a father whose marriage has broken apart" because in the latter 
situation, the father "will have borne full responsibility for 
the rearing of his children during the period of the marriage."  
Id. at 256.  The Court implied that if a father has borne that 
responsibility at one point in the child's life, the father will 
have established a substantial parental relationship with his 
child and his rights cannot be terminated without a finding of 
unfitness. 
¶103 In Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), the Court 
summarized the holdings of these cases.  It explained that a 
"developed parent-child relationship" warrants constitutional 
protection, whereas a "potential relationship" based only on the 
"existence of a biological link" does not.  Id. at 261.  When a 
parent "accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's 
future" 
and 
"demonstrates 
a 
full 
commitment 
to 
the 
responsibilities of parenthood by coming forward to participate 
in the rearing of his child," the Court explained, the 
relationship is protected under the due process clause.  Id.     
¶104 Wisconsin courts have adhered to the constitutional 
framework set forth by the United States Supreme Court.  A 
parent can establish a constitutionally protected interest by 
"living with her children and having custody of them."  Monroe 
County DHS v. Kelli B., 2004 WI 48, ¶24, 271 Wis. 2d 51, 678 
No.  2009AP2973.awb 
 
5 
 
N.W.2d 831.  "[E]xcept under unusual circumstances like those 
presented in Quilloin," this court has explained, "the due 
process protections of the State and Federal Constitutions 
prohibit the termination of a natural parent's rights, unless 
the parent is unfit."  Mrs. R. v. Mr. & Mrs. B., 102 
Wis. 2d 118, 136, 306 N.W.2d 46 (1981). 
¶105 The constitutional framework set forth above should 
guide an interpretation of the statute.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 48.415(6) was originally enacted in 1979, shortly after 
Quilloin was decided.3  § 6, ch. 330, Laws of 1979.  Its 
definition 
of 
"substantial 
parental 
relationship" 
mirrored 
                                                 
3 When it was first enacted, the statute applied only to 
unmarried fathers.  See Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) (1979) ("Failure 
to assume parental responsibility may be established by a 
showing that a child has been born out of wedlock, not 
subsequently legitimized or adopted, that paternity was not 
adjudicated prior to the filing of the petition for termination 
of parental rights and: 1. The person or persons who may be the 
father of the child . . . have never had a substantial parental 
relationship with the child; or 2. That although paternity to 
the 
child 
has 
been 
adjudicated . . . the 
father 
did 
not 
establish a substantial parental relationship with the child 
prior to the adjudication of paternity[.]"). 
1995 Wis. Act 275, §§ 82-84 broadened the statute so that 
it could be applied to mothers as well as fathers, marital 
children as well as nonmarital children, and fathers for whom 
paternity was adjudicated prior to the filing of the TPR 
petition.  Note to 1995 Wis. Act 275, § 83, 1995 Laws of 
Wisconsin at 1891. 
No.  2009AP2973.awb 
 
6 
 
language from Quilloin.4  It appears that the legislature's 
intent was to codify the standard that was set forth in Quilloin 
and later clarified in Lehr. 
¶106 In 
addition 
to 
failure 
to 
assume 
parental 
responsibility, Wis. Stat. § 48.415 sets forth several other 
grounds for terminating parental rights.5  Subsection (6) is 
qualitatively different from the other statutory grounds because 
it guides the threshold determination of whether the parent has 
a 
liberty 
interest 
that 
is 
entitled 
to 
constitutional 
protection.  By contrast, the other grounds are unfitness 
determinations.  They set forth standards for determining 
whether the rights of a parent who has a protected liberty 
interest may be involuntarily terminated because the parent is 
unfit.  
II 
¶107 Although the majority acknowledges that Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(6) sets forth the standard for determining whether a 
                                                 
4 Compare Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256 ("[Quilloin] has never 
exercised actual or legal custody over his child, and thus has 
never shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to 
the daily supervision, education, protection, or care of the 
child.") with Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) (1979) ("'[S]ubstantial 
parental relationship' means the acceptance and exercise of 
significant responsibility for the daily supervision, education, 
protection and care of the child.").  
5 Those grounds are abandonment, relinquishment, continuing 
need of protection or services, continuing parental disability, 
child abuse, incestuous parenthood, homicide or solicitation to 
commit homicide of parent, parenthood as a result of sexual 
assault, commission of a serious felony against one of the 
person's children, and prior involuntary termination of parental 
rights to another child. 
No.  2009AP2973.awb 
 
7 
 
parent has a protected liberty interest in his relationship with 
his child, majority op., ¶69, its statutory interpretation 
undermines such an interest.  At times, it appears to recognize 
that the statutory language asks whether the parent "ha[s] not 
had" a substantial parental relationship.  Id., ¶¶24, 35.  
Nevertheless, 
it 
inexplicably 
converts 
the 
inquiry 
into  
"whether there is a substantial parental relationship."  Id., 
¶26 (emphasis added).  The majority concludes that "the statute 
gives latitude to the fact-finder to consider the entirety of 
the child's life and determine if the parent's actions have been 
sufficient to find" that he established a substantial parental 
relationship.  Id., ¶24.        
¶108 The majority's interpretation is contrary to the plain 
language of the statute, its context, and its legislative 
history.  As it has been amended through the years, the statute 
now provides that failure to assume parental responsibility 
"shall be established by proving that the parent or the person 
or persons who may be the parent of the child have not had a 
substantial parental relationship with the child."  48.415(6)(a) 
(emphasis 
added). 
 
Subsection (6)(b) defines "substantial 
parental relationship" as "the acceptance and exercise of 
significant responsibility for the daily supervision, education, 
protection and care of the child."  48.415(6)(b).6   
                                                 
6 In full, Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) provides: 
(a) Failure to assume parental responsibility, which 
shall be established by proving that the parent or the 
person or persons who may be the parent of the child 
have not had a substantial parental relationship with 
the child. 
No.  2009AP2973.awb 
 
8 
 
¶109 When the statutory text is cobbled together, it 
provides that failure to assume parental responsibility is 
established by proof that "the parent . . . ha[s] not had [the 
acceptance and exercise of significant responsibility for the 
daily supervision, education, protection and care of the 
child]."  There are no statutory defenses to failure to assume 
parental responsibility.  
¶110 The definition of "substantial parental relationship" 
includes "daily supervision, education, protection and care."  
Importantly, however, the statute does not ask whether the 
parent "does" exercise significant responsibility for the daily 
supervision, education, protection, and care of the child.  
Likewise, the statute does not ask whether there "is" a 
substantial parental relationship or whether the parent "has" a 
substantial parental relationship with the child.  Rather, the 
statute asks whether the parent "has had" a substantial parental 
relationship.  See Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6)(b).   
                                                                                                                                                             
(b) 
In 
this 
subsection, 
"substantial 
parental 
relationship means the acceptance and exercise of 
significant responsibility for the daily supervision, 
education, protection and care of the child.  In 
evaluating whether the person has had a substantial 
parental relationship with the child, the court may 
consider such factors, including, but not limited to, 
whether the person has expressed concern for or 
interest in the support, care or well-being of the 
child, whether the person has neglected or refused to 
provide care or support for the child and whether, 
with respect to a person who is or may be the father 
of the child, the person has expressed concern for or 
interest in the support, care or well-being of the 
mother during her pregnancy. 
No.  2009AP2973.awb 
 
9 
 
¶111 By using a verb in the past tense, the legislature set 
out the relevant inquiry: in the past, did the parent accept and 
exercise significant responsibility for the daily supervision, 
education, protection, and care of the child?  If the answer is 
yes, then the parent has had a substantial parental relationship 
with the child, and parental rights may not be involuntarily 
terminated under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6).  In such a case, due 
process requires that other grounds for termination be proven 
before parental rights can be involuntarily terminated. 
¶112 This plain language interpretation finds support in 
the title of the statutory subsection.  The title of sub. (6) 
indicates that the relevant inquiry is whether the parent failed 
to assume a parental relationship.  It does not indicate that 
the statutory requirements are met when a parent fails to 
maintain a relationship that was at one point assumed.  
¶113 Likewise, this interpretation finds support in context 
with the surrounding statutes and in the legislative history.  
Statutory language must be interpreted in relation to the 
language of surrounding or closely related statutes.  Sands v. 
Whitnall Sch. Dist., 2008 WI 89, ¶15, 312 Wis. 2d 1, 754 
N.W.2d 439.  Among other inquiries, courts look to whether a 
construction would render other statutory sections superfluous.  
"A basic rule of this court in constructing statutes is to avoid 
such constructions as would result in any portion of the statute 
being superfluous."  State v. Wachsmuth, 73 Wis. 2d 318, 324, 
243 N.W.2d 410 (1976).   
No.  2009AP2973.awb 
 
10 
 
¶114 As discussed above, Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) is part of 
a larger statutory framework which lists other grounds for 
involuntary termination of parental rights.  One of those 
grounds is abandonment.     
¶115 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 48.415(1)(a)3 
provides 
that 
abandonment may be established if the petitioner proves that 
"[t]he child has been left by the parent with any person, the 
parent knows or could discover the whereabouts of the child and 
the parent has failed to visit or communicate with the child for 
a period of 6 months or longer."  The jury instruction provides 
significant direction to jurors in order to guide their 
deliberation.  For example, it sets forth a definite time 
period——six months.  It also provides that incidental contact 
between the parent and child, defined as insignificant contact 
or contact that occurred merely by chance, does not prevent the 
jury from finding abandonment.  Wis. JI-Children 314.   
¶116 The jury instruction also sets forth a parent's 
defenses to abandonment, which protect parental rights from 
arbitrary termination.  The jury cannot find abandonment if the 
parent had good cause for having failed to visit or communicate 
with the child during that period, and the parent either 
communicated with the person who had physical custody of the 
child about the child during that period or the parent had good 
cause for failing to do so.  The jury is instructed that it may 
consider the legitimacy of the parent's reasons for failing to 
visit or communicate with the child or the person who had 
physical custody of the child.     
No.  2009AP2973.awb 
 
11 
 
¶117 An 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) 
that 
allows the fact-finder to "consider the entirety of the child's 
life [to] determine if the parent's actions have been sufficient 
to 
find" 
that 
he 
established 
a 
substantial 
parental 
relationship, 
majority 
op., 
¶24, 
would 
appear 
to 
render 
superfluous the ground for termination established by sub. 
(1)(a)3.  Under that interpretation, failure to assume parental 
responsibility would amount to little more than a watered-down 
version of abandonment with no defenses.   
¶118 It is difficult to imagine that a petitioner would go 
through the trouble to allege and prove abandonment (a ground 
for termination that provides the parent with defenses) when it 
would be much easier to prove failure to assume parental 
responsibility (a ground for termination to which there is no 
defense).  The legislature could not have intended that failure 
to assume parental responsibility swallows the specific elements 
and defenses set forth in the abandonment statute.7   
                                                 
7 For the same reason, an interpretation that allows the 
fact-finder to consider whether the parent "exposed the child to 
a hazardous living environment," see majority op., ¶37, would  
appear to render another subsection of the statute superfluous.   
No.  2009AP2973.awb 
 
12 
 
¶119 I turn next to the legislative history.  Up until 
2005, Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) permitted the termination of 
parental rights if the parents "have never had a substantial 
parental relationship with the child[.]".  This language was 
reexamined by the Special Committee on Adoption & Termination of 
Parental Rights Laws.          
¶120 The majority's review of the legislative history is 
incomplete.  Over the course of many months, from August 2004 to 
December 2004, the special committee considered a number of 
different iterations in revising the standard for failure to 
assume parental responsibility.  The majority relies heavily 
upon a letter written by a member of the special committee.8  
                                                                                                                                                             
Continuing need of protection or services is another ground 
for involuntary termination of parental rights.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(2).  A child may be adjudged in need of protection or 
services when the child has been the victim of abuse or when the 
parent neglects, refuses, or is unable for reasons other than 
poverty to provide necessary care, food, clothing, medical or 
dental care or shelter so as to seriously endanger the physical 
health of the child.   Wis. Stat. § 48.13.  The court enters a 
dispositional order directing that specific services be provided 
to the child and family.  Wis. Stat. § 48.355(2)(b)1.  A parent 
has a defense to grounds for termination for continuing need of 
protection or services if the county failed to make a reasonable 
effort to provide the services to the child and family.  Wis. 
Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)2.b.  
If a fact-finder is permitted to conclude that a parent 
failed to establish a parental relationship because the parent 
exposed the child to a hazardous living environment, then 
counties would not be required to help parents develop the 
skills necessary to retain custody of their children.  Rather, 
they could avoid the trouble and expense by simply alleging 
failure to assume a parental relationship. 
8 See Attachment to the Memo from Judge Christopher Foley to 
Members of Legislative Committee on TPR and Adoption, September 
22, 
2004 
(on 
file 
with 
the 
Wisconsin 
State 
Legislature 
Legislative Council). 
No.  2009AP2973.awb 
 
13 
 
Majority op., ¶29.  This letter was submitted in September, 
early in the drafting process.  A review of the complete 
legislative 
history 
reveals 
that 
the 
special 
committee 
considered——and rejected——a standard that was based on its 
recommendation.   
¶121 At the meeting held on October 13, 2004, the special 
committee 
considered draft legislation that contained the 
following proposed change employing the present tense: "Failure 
to assume parental responsibility, which shall be established by 
proving that the parent or the person or persons who may be the 
parent of the child have never had do not have a substantial 
parental relationship with the child."9  Ultimately, the special 
committee declined to adopt it. 
¶122 At 
the 
December 
14 
meeting, 
a 
staff 
attorney 
introduced a revised draft and "explained that the draft bill 
requires proof that the parent has not had a substantial 
parental relationship with the child instead of proof that the 
parent does not have a substantial parental relationship with 
the child, as was required in the first version of the bill 
draft."10  This draft was approved unanimously.     
¶123 From this legislative history, it is apparent that the 
special 
committee 
considered 
and 
ultimately 
rejected 
an 
                                                 
9 See 
Wisconsin 
Legislative 
Council 
draft 
WLC:0015/1 
(September 
30, 
2004) 
(on 
file 
with 
the 
Wisconsin 
State 
Legislature Legislative Council) (emphasis in original). 
10 Minutes from the December 14, 2004 meeting of the Special 
Committee on Adoption and Termination of Parental Rights Law, at 
3 (discussing Wisconsin Legislative Council draft WLC:0015/2 
(October 18, 2004)) (emphasis in original).   
No.  2009AP2973.awb 
 
14 
 
amendment that would change the past-tense verb "have never had" 
to the present tense verb "do not have."  Rather, the committee 
intentionally selected the past-tense verb, "have not had," that 
appears in the statute today.  
¶124 Based on the constitutional concerns underlying the 
statute, the plain language of the statute, its context, and its 
legislative history, I conclude that a father's parental rights 
may not be involuntarily terminated under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6) 
when that father assumed parental responsibility by providing 
support throughout the pregnancy and daily care and supervision 
when the child was an infant.  Once a parent has assumed a 
substantial parental relationship with the child, failure to 
maintain 
that 
parental 
relationship 
is 
not 
grounds 
for 
termination under sub. (6).  Rather, due process requires that 
other grounds for termination, such as abandonment, be proven 
before parental rights can be involuntarily terminated.   
¶125 In this case, it is undisputed that Jacob had assumed 
a substantial parental relationship with his daughter throughout 
Tammy's 
pregnancy 
and 
for 
the 
first 
several 
months 
of 
Gwenevere's life.  According to Tammy's testimony, she and Jacob 
lived together for a year or a year-and-a-half before Gwenevere 
was born, and both parents were excited about the coming birth 
of their child.  Tammy testified that Jacob drove her to doctors 
appointments throughout the pregnancy and that he was present 
when Gwenevere was born.  She told the jury: "I cried, and 
[Jacob] shed tears."     
No.  2009AP2973.awb 
 
15 
 
¶126 Jacob and Tammy continued to live together for the 
first four months of Gwenevere's life.  Tammy testified that 
Jacob "was a stay at home dad at that time."  She testified that 
during the months they lived together as a family, Jacob "never 
ignored" Gwenevere, that he "took care of her," that he bathed 
her, and that "he changed her and fed her when I was, you know, 
in bed taking a nap, resting, or at work."       
¶127 Under the facts presented here, I conclude that Jacob 
has had a substantial parental relationship with his child.   
Accordingly, the circuit court should have entered a directed 
verdict in his favor.   
III 
¶128 The court of appeals recommended that we accept 
certification of this case to "resolve the ambiguities and 
uncertainties regarding the use of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6)[.]"  
Tammy W.G. v. Jacob T., No. 2009AP2973, certification memo at 1 
(Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2010).  Rather than resolving any 
ambiguities and uncertainties, I am concerned that the majority 
has compounded them.  It appears to conceive of the existence of 
a protected liberty interest that is in constant flux, depending 
upon the totality of the circumstances at any given moment.  
This analysis provides unclear guidance to fact-finders and 
undermines constitutional protections. 
¶129 According to the majority, the fact-finder should 
consider "all the facts up until the time of the fact-finding 
hearing to decide if the parent has engaged in the requisite 
behavior."  Majority op., ¶26 (emphasis omitted).  It should 
No.  2009AP2973.awb 
 
16 
 
consider the reasons why a parent has not supported the child.  
Id., ¶32.  Nevertheless, it should be mindful that a parent's 
lack of opportunity to establish a substantial relationship is 
not a defense to this ground for involuntary termination.  Id., 
¶38.   Finally, while the fact-finder may not consider the 
"amorphous" concept of the "quality of parenting," id., ¶36, it 
should consider whether the parent "exposed the child to a 
hazardous living environment."  Id., ¶37.  The fact-finder is 
left 
to 
determine 
whether 
circumstances 
such 
as 
smoking 
cigarettes or having guns in the house are sufficiently 
hazardous to factor into its determination of whether the parent 
failed to assume parental responsibility for the child.      
¶130 Based on these instructions, what is a conscientious 
fact-finder to do?  Under the majority's guidance, it appears 
that the fact-finder could easily base its determination on a 
recent period of absence or poor quality parenting——rather than 
on 
whether 
the 
parent 
"has 
had" 
a 
substantial 
parental 
relationship, as the statute directs.     
¶131 It may be that, based upon the totality of the 
circumstances up until the child's first birthday, the parent 
has established a liberty interest in the relationship with his 
child.  However, if that same parent fails to exercise 
significant responsibility for the daily supervision, education, 
protection, and care between ages one and two, can the parent be 
said to have lost that liberty interest?  And then, if the 
parent assumes more responsibility after the child's second 
birthday, is the parent's liberty interest revived?   
No.  2009AP2973.awb 
 
17 
 
¶132 The existence of a liberty interest protected by the 
state and federal constitutions cannot be so ephemeral.  The 
Quilloin Court contrasted parents who no longer have any daily 
involvement in the child's daily life from those parents who 
have never had daily involvement.  It concluded that a parent 
who has borne that responsibility at one point in the child's 
life has established a substantial parental relationship with 
his child, and that relationship is entitled to constitutional 
protection under the due process clause.      
¶133 "[W]here the constitutionality of a statute is at 
issue, courts [should] attempt to avoid an interpretation that 
creates constitutional infirmities."  Kenosha County DHS v. 
Jodie W., 2006 WI 93, ¶20, 293 Wis. 2d 530, 716 N.W.2d 845.  The 
majority takes the opposite tack.  By contorting the statutory 
language, the majority undermines the distinction made in 
Quilloin 
and 
subjects 
the 
statute 
to 
constitutional 
infirmities.11  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.   
                                                 
11 In 
addition, 
by 
asserting 
that 
"in 
an 
as-applied 
challenge, neither party faces a presumption that the statute 
was constitutionally applied," see majority op., ¶48, the 
majority 
needlessly 
engenders 
confusion 
about 
the 
proper 
standards for constitutional challenges.   
The majority's pronouncement is contrary to several recent 
opinions of this court.  See, e.g., State v. Wood, 2010 WI 17, 
¶15, 323 Wis. 2d 321, 780 N.W.2d 63 ("[W]e review a statute 
under the presumption that it is constitutional.  Accordingly, 
the party raising the constitutional claim . . . must prove that 
the challenged statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  That presumption and burden apply to facial as well as 
to as-applied constitutional challenges."); State v. Smith, 2010 
WI 16, ¶¶8-9, 323 Wis. 2d 377, 780 N.W.2d 90 ("A statute enjoys 
a presumption of constitutionality. . . . [In this as-applied 
challenge] Smith must prove that as applied to him, § 301.45 is 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt."). 
No.  2009AP2973.awb 
 
18 
 
¶134 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
The majority's assertion finds support in Society Insurance 
v. LIRC, 2010 WI 68, 326 Wis. 2d 444, 786 N.W.2d 385.  That case 
contained 
the 
following 
explanation: 
"In 
an 
as-applied 
challenge, our task is to determine whether the statute has been 
enforced 
in 
an 
unconstitutional 
manner. . . . Because 
the 
legislature plays no part in enforcing our statutes, 'deference 
to legislative acts' is not achieved by presuming that the 
statute has been constitutionally applied."  Society Ins., 386 
Wis. 2d 444, ¶27.   
The 
explanation 
from 
Society 
Insurance 
reveals 
a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the court's inquiry in an as-
applied challenge.  Twelve days after Society Insurance was 
mandated, a unanimous opinion of this court rejected any 
distinction between the presumption of constitutionality in 
facial and as-applied challenges.  See State v. McGuire, 2010 WI 
91, ¶25, 328 Wis. 2d 289, 786 N.W.2d 227 ("Statutes are presumed 
to be constitutional, and a party challenging a statute's 
constitutionality must demonstrate that it is unconstitutional 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  This presumption and burden apply to 
as-applied constitutional challenges to statutes as well as to 
facial challenges."). 
      
No.  2009AP2973.awb 
 
 
 
1