Title: Houston v. Briggs

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Affirmed March 29, 1967.
*440 George O. Tamblyn, Portland, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Gordon H. Keane and Keane, Haessler, Bauman and Harper, Portland.
Carlton R. Reiter, Portland, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were George M. Joseph, and Reiter, Day, Anderson & Wall, Portland.
*441 Before PERRY, Chief Justice, and O'CONNELL, DENECKE and FORT, Justices.
AFFIRMED.
FORT, J. (Pro Tempore).
In July of 1964 plaintiff was transferred by his employer from Seattle to Portland. Wishing to purchase a home, he contacted defendants, who were duly licensed real estate brokers, and asked them to locate a suitable house for him and his family. On August 24, 1964, plaintiff executed an earnest money agreement and deposited $1,000 with defendants toward purchase of a house in the "Wilcox Estates," a platted subdivision. This agreement provided that "The property is to be conveyed free and clear of all liens and encumbrances to date except zoning ordinances, building restrictions, reservations in federal patents and no other." The italicized words were supplied by one of the defendants.
As provided in the contract a title insurance report was ordered. Plaintiff examined it and on September 4, through his attorneys, wrote the sellers with a copy mailed to the defendants calling attention to several pages of covenants and restrictions contained therein relating generally to all property in the "Wilcox Estates." This letter was received by the vendors September 8. The letter concluded: "The preliminary title report demonstrates that you cannot supply Mr. Houston with a good and marketable title, free from encumbrances, as provided in the earnest money agreement. In behalf of Mr. Houston, we request the immediate return of the $1,000 earnest money."
Thereafter the defendants on behalf of the vendors obtained on September 11 removal of one of the many restrictions. Defendants refused to return the $1,000. *442 On September 24 another demand upon the defendants for return of the earnest money was made. Defendants on September 29 again refused. On October 2, 1964, plaintiff filed this complaint for money had and received against the brokers. He did not join the vendors as defendants. No objection, however, has been raised thereto, and they have not appeared herein. The earnest money contract was set forth in full as a part of the complaint. On October 8, 1964, defendants filed their amended answer admitting the receipt of the $1,000 pursuant to the contract, denying liability and asserting an affirmative defense of waiver of the covenants and restrictions in question. The reply traversed the affirmative defense. The case was tried upon those pleadings to the court without a jury.
1. Testimony was received at trial in support of the defense of waiver over plaintiff's objection as to its relevancy, establishing that plaintiff had ultimately purchased a home in the Wilcox Estates subject to the same covenants and restrictions as the property involved here. The trial court, however, relying on the rule announced in Crahane et al v. Swan, 212 Or 143, 154, 318 P2d 942 (1957):
found that there had been no waiver of the aforesaid covenants and restrictions by the plaintiff.
Although defendants neither demurred to the complaint nor filed a plea in abatement in the trial court, *443 they did, after the evidence was concluded, move the court for a judgment "on the pleadings and on the evidence" and counsel urged in behalf thereof:
He then called attention to the following provision of the contract:
The existence of the condition thus appears on the face of the complaint. The court did not rule directly on this motion.
However, in its opinion the court concluded that the plaintiff had filed the action prematurely and therefore could not recover. On the basis of its written opinion the court made a general finding of fact and conclusion of law in favor of the defendants and entered judgment accordingly without costs to either party.
Plaintiff appeals urging that prematurity of filing must be raised by plea of abatement, and if not so raised is waived. He also urges that on the basis of the trial court's findings as a matter of law, judgment should be entered for the plaintiff.
2-4. In Fay v. McConnell et al, 229 Or 128 at 131, 366 P 2d 327 (1961), we stated:
We have also held:
That case involved a building contract which provided:
The defendant did not file a plea of abatement nor demur to the complaint prior to trial. The court stated at page 23:
Plaintiff's contention that the objection of prematurity of filing must be raised by a plea in abatement is therefore without merit.
5, 6. Furthermore, in connection with the sufficiency of pleadings relative to conditions precedent, ORS 16.480 provides:
The complaint here does not allege either "generally" or in any other manner that the plaintiff has "duly performed all the conditions on his part." Allegation of "such performance" of or compliance with a condition precedent is necessary to state a cause of action. Clerin v. Eccles, 98 Or 345, 193 P 1045 (1920).
7. ORS 16.130 provides in part:
In Owen et al v. Leber et al, 112 Or 136, 228 P 927 (1924), the court stated at page 142:
See also Milton v. Hare et al., 130 Or 590, 280 P 511 (1929).
8, 9. Here the trial court in its memorandum opinion correctly found:
It follows that since the complaint failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the motion of the defendants for judgment on the pleadings should have been allowed. However, a general finding of fact in favor of the defendants and judgment thereon were thereafter entered. Whether here, the error was harmless depends upon whether the judgment entered pursuant thereto in favor of the defendants is a bar to a further action. Plaintiff suggests that it is.
Restatement 211, Judgments § 54, provides:
Comment b. thereunder states:
See also Fay v. McConnell, supra.
In Owen et al v. Leber et al, supra, the court stated at page 140:
It follows then that the judgment entered here is not a bar to a timely action.
The second contention of the appellant that since the trial court also found there had been no waiver by the plaintiff of the covenants and restrictions above referred to, this court should enter judgment in his favor, is in the light of the foregoing obviously without merit.
A final contention of the plaintiff is that the court erred in refusing to receive testimony relating to the prematurity of the filing of the complaint and the possible waiver of the notice requirement. In view of our holding that the complaint failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, it is unnecessary to consider this.
Since the error here of entering findings of fact was harmless, the judgment, pursuant to ORS 19.125 (2), is affirmed.