Title: Kara Horst v. Deere & Company

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2009 WI 75 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP2933 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Kara Horst and Jonathan Horst, by his Guardian 
ad Litem, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Deere & Company, a Delaware Corporation, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2008 WI App 65 
Reported at: 312 Wis. 2d 421, 752 N.W.2d 406 
(Ct. App. 2008-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 14, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 3, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Washington   
 
JUDGE: 
Annette K. Ziegler   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
CROOKS, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
GABLEMAN, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
PROSSER and ROGGENSACK, JJ., join the 
concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ZIEGLER, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioners there were briefs 
filed by John C. Cabaniss and Cabaniss Law, Mequon, and oral 
argument by John C. Cabaniss. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by Michael 
L. Zaleski and Quarles & Brady LLP, Madison; Lars E. Gulbrandsen 
and Quarles & Brady LLP, Milwaukee; and James Brogan, Nancy 
Rappaport, and DLA Piper US LLP, Philadelphia, Pa., and oral 
argument by Michael L. Zaleski. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by William C. Gleisner, 
III and the Law Offices William C. Gleiser, Milwaukee, on behalf 
of the Wisconsin Association for Justice. 
 
 
2 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Colleen D. Ball, 
Wauwatosa; Stephanie A. Scharf, Deborah H. Bornstein, and 
Schoeman, Updike, Kaufman & Scharf, Chicago, Ill.; and Hugh F. 
Young, Jr., Reston, Va., on behalf of the Product Liability 
Advisory Council, Inc. 
 
 
2009 WI 75
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP2933  
(L.C. No. 
2004CV618) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Kara Horst and Jonathan Horst, by his Guardian 
ad litem, 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
 
v. 
 
Deere & Company, A Delaware Corporation, 
 
 
Defendant-Respondent 
FILED 
 
JUL 14, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.  This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals affirming the 
judgment of the Washington County Circuit Court, Annette K. 
Ziegler, Judge.1  After a jury trial, the circuit court rejected 
Plaintiffs' negligence and strict products liability personal 
injury claims.  Plaintiffs moved for a new trial, challenging 
the accuracy of the jury instructions on the strict products 
liability claim.  The circuit court concluded that the jury was 
                                                 
1 Horst v. Deere & Co., 2008 WI App 65, 312 Wis. 2d 421, 752 
N.W.2d 406. 
No. 
2006AP2933   
 
2 
 
properly instructed and denied the motion for a new trial.  The 
court of appeals affirmed. 
¶2 
The jury instructions were based on Wisconsin Jury 
Instruction——Civil 3260 with a supplemental statement regarding 
bystander claims.  The jury was informed that a bystander 
personal injury claim in strict products liability is only 
available if the product is unreasonably dangerous based on the 
expectations of an ordinary user or consumer (the "consumer 
contemplation 
test"). 
 
Plaintiffs 
claim 
that 
this 
jury 
instruction was an incorrect statement of the law.  They contend 
that when a product is dangerous only to a bystander and not to 
a 
user 
or 
consumer, 
the 
consumer 
contemplation 
test 
is 
inappropriate.  Rather, the jury should be instructed that a 
product is unreasonably dangerous based on the contemplation and 
expectations of an ordinary bystander.  They call this a 
"bystander contemplation test," and assert that this is and 
should be the law in Wisconsin. 
¶3 
Thus, the main question before us is whether Wisconsin 
has adopted or should adopt a "bystander contemplation test."  
If the bystander contemplation test is the law, we must 
determine whether the circuit court's jury instructions were a 
misstatement of the law, and if so, whether the error was 
prejudicial. 
¶4 
We hold that the consumer contemplation test, and not 
a bystander contemplation test, governs all strict products 
liability claims in Wisconsin, including cases where a bystander 
is injured.  While bystanders may recover when injured by an 
No. 
2006AP2933   
 
3 
 
unreasonably dangerous product, the determination of whether the 
product is unreasonably dangerous is based on the expectations 
of the ordinary consumer.2  Therefore, the jury was properly 
instructed, and the decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
¶5 
The facts of this case are horrific.  On the afternoon 
of May 2, 2004, the Horst family returned home from an overnight 
trip to Wisconsin Dells.  Two-year-old Jonathan and his older 
brother went to play outside in the yard.  Jonathan's mother, 
Kara, was planning to watch Jonathan as she hung laundry on an 
outdoor clothesline, but stopped to use the restroom first.  
Before Kara arrived outside, Jonathan's father Michael decided 
to mow the lawn using their John Deere LT160 riding lawn mower.  
As Michael began to cut the lawn, he decided to mow in reverse 
along the rear of the house, looking over his right shoulder.  
Jonathan, however, had moved behind the lawn mower to Michael's 
left, out of Michael's line of sight.  As Michael proceeded 
backwards, he saw Jonathan's shoe come out the other side.  
Michael screamed, realizing that he had severed both of 
Jonathan's feet.  Kara called 911, and Jonathan was flown to 
                                                 
2 The dissent confuses and muddles the issue and our holding 
in this case.  It begins: "I agree with the majority that 
bystanders can recover in strict liability for a product that is 
unreasonably dangerous to bystanders . . . ."  Our holding is 
more precise.  The issue is not who is the product unreasonably 
dangerous to, but whether the product is unreasonably dangerous.  
This distinction is subtle, but important.   
No. 
2006AP2933   
 
4 
 
Children's Hospital.  There he received multiple surgeries, and 
now wears prosthetics on both legs. 
¶6 
The John Deere LT160 mower Michael was using came 
equipped with a no-mow-in-reverse safety feature that stops both 
the engine and mower blades when an operator begins to travel in 
reverse while the mower blades are engaged.  However, the lawn 
mower also had what amounts to an override feature, the Reverse 
Implement Option ("RIO"), which allows an operator to mow in 
reverse with the mower blades in operation. 
¶7 
To implement the RIO feature, an operator must depress 
the brake pedal and press the RIO switch.  Once engaged, the RIO 
system allows an operator to mow in reverse without stalling 
either the engine or the mowing device.  When reverse mowing is 
complete, the operator can continue to mow forward without 
shutting off the mowing device.  When the operator begins mowing 
forward again, the lawn mower returns to its default position, 
which requires the operator to manually engage the RIO device 
again to mow in reverse. 
¶8 
Michael Horst engaged the RIO device twice before the 
accident in this case.  He first engaged the RIO to mow toward 
the Horst home along his gravel driveway.  He then moved forward 
along the back of the house.  He engaged the RIO device again to 
mow in reverse along the back of the house.  That is when 
Jonathan was injured. 
¶9 
The LT160 lawn mower operator's manual contained 
numerous warnings relating to mowing in reverse and mowing in 
No. 
2006AP2933   
 
5 
 
the presence of children or bystanders.  The warnings included 
the following: 
• Before 
backing 
up, 
stop 
mower 
blades 
or 
attachments and look down and behind the machine 
carefully, especially for children.   
• CAUTION: Avoid injury!  Children or bystanders 
may be injured by runover [sic] and rotating 
blades.  Before backing up, carefully check the 
area around the machine.   
• NOTE: Backing up while the mower is engaged is 
strongly discouraged.   
• The Reverse Implement Option should be used only 
when operating another implement (attachment) or 
when 
the 
operator 
deems 
it 
necessary 
to 
reposition the machine with the mower engaged.   
The parties agree that Michael read but disregarded these 
warnings, choosing to mow in reverse in the presence of his 
young children. 
¶10 Following the accident, the Horsts filed a lawsuit 
against Deere & Company ("Deere") in Washington County Circuit 
Court, bringing negligence and strict products liability claims.  
On the strict products liability claim, the Horsts argued that 
designing a mower to operate in reverse is unreasonably 
dangerous and that the mower should have had an alternative 
design.  The Horsts asserted that the lawn mower should not have 
been equipped with the RIO, thus preventing an operator from 
ever mowing in reverse.  The Horsts also sought punitive 
damages, alleging that the design demonstrated a deliberate 
disregard for safety. 
No. 
2006AP2933   
 
6 
 
¶11 Deere moved for summary judgment on the grounds that 
the "consumer contemplation test" barred Jonathan's strict 
products liability claim.  The circuit court denied the motion 
for summary judgment.  It concluded that while bystanders 
injured by unreasonably dangerous products may recover under 
Howes v. Hansen, 56 Wis. 2d 247, 201 N.W.2d 825 (1972) 
(hereafter "Howes I"), the question of whether the product was 
unreasonably dangerous and whether punitive damages should be 
awarded were issues of fact for the jury. 
¶12 At trial, the Horsts requested that Wisconsin Jury 
Instruction——Civil 3260, which does not mention bystanders, be 
supplemented to reflect the availability of recovery for 
bystanders.  They specifically proposed that the instruction 
include the phrase "or bystander" following most occurrences of 
"user" and "consumer" in the standard instruction.  The circuit 
court denied the Horsts' proposed instructions, choosing to give 
the 
standard 
instructions supplemented with the following 
statement: 
"The 
law 
in 
Wisconsin 
imposes 
a 
duty 
on 
a 
manufacturer to a bystander, if the bystander is injured by a 
defective product, which is unreasonably dangerous to the 
ordinary user or consumer." 
¶13 The Horsts also requested a special verdict question 
asking the jury: "Do you find from the evidence that the subject 
lawn tractor, when it left the hands of Defendant, Deere & 
Company, was in a defective condition so as to be unreasonably 
dangerous to a prospective user/consumer or bystander?"  The 
No. 
2006AP2933   
 
7 
 
circuit court denied this request and submitted the question to 
the jury without the "or bystander" language.3 
                                                 
3 The 
trial 
court's 
instruction 
to 
the 
jury 
was 
substantially identical to Wis JI——Civil 3260.  The instruction, 
as given, is here reproduced in its entirety: 
A manufacturer of a product who places on the market a 
defective product which is unreasonably dangerous to 
the ordinary user or consumer and which is expected 
and does reach the consumer without substantial change 
in the condition in which it is sold, is regarded by 
law as responsible for harm caused by the product even 
though he or she has exercised all possible care in 
preparation and sale of the product, provided the 
product was being used for the purpose for which it 
was designed and intended to be used. 
There is no claim in this case that the subject lawn 
tractor failed to perform its intended purpose of 
mowing the lawn.  You may find the subject lawn 
tractor 
was 
dangerous 
beyond 
the 
reasonable 
contemplation by an ordinary user or consumer even if 
it served its intended purpose. 
A product is said to be defective when it is in a 
condition not contemplated by the ordinary user or 
consumer, which is unusually dangerous to the ordinary 
user or consumer and the defect arose out of design, 
manufacture or inspection while the article was in the 
control of the manufacturer. 
A defective product is unreasonably dangerous to the 
ordinary user or consumer when it is dangerous to an 
extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the 
ordinary consumer possessing the knowledge of the 
products' characteristics which were common to the 
community.  A product is not defective if it is safe 
for normal use. 
A manufacturer is not under a duty to manufacture a 
product which is absolutely free from all possible 
harm to every individual.  It is the duty of the 
manufacturer not to place upon the market a defective 
product, 
which 
is unreasonably dangerous to the 
ordinary consumer. 
No. 
2006AP2933   
 
8 
 
¶14 The jury ultimately found both Michael and Kara Horst, 
but not Deere, negligent in the injury to their son, Jonathan.  
The jury also found that the lawn mower in question was not in a 
defective condition so as to be unreasonably dangerous to a 
prospective user or consumer.  Accordingly, Deere was not 
strictly liable for Jonathan's injuries. 
¶15 After the jury verdict, the Horsts moved for a new 
trial on the grounds that the jury was improperly instructed.  
The circuit court concluded that the instruction was in accord 
with the facts and existing case law, and thus was not 
prejudicial.  The circuit court therefore denied the motion for 
a new trial and dismissed the Horsts' claims with prejudice. 
¶16 The Horsts filed a notice of appeal with the court of 
appeals, and also filed a petition to bypass with this court, 
                                                                                                                                                             
The law in Wisconsin imposes a duty on a manufacturer 
to a bystander if the bystander is injured by a 
defective product which is unreasonably dangerous to 
the ordinary user or consumer. 
Question 1 in the verdict form asks, when the subject 
lawn mower left the possession of——Question Number 1 
asks, do you find from the evidence that the subject 
lawn mower, when it left the hands of Defendant Deere 
and Company, was in a defective condition so as to be 
unreasonably dangerous to a prospective user/consumer? 
Before you can answer Question 1 yes, you must be 
satisfied that; one, the product was in a defective 
condition.  Two, the defective condition made the 
product unreasonably dangerous to people.  Three, the 
defective condition of the product existed when the 
product was under the control of the manufacturer.  
And four, the product reached the consumer without 
substantial change in the condition in which it was 
sold. 
No. 
2006AP2933   
 
9 
 
which was denied.  On its review, the court of appeals agreed 
with 
the 
circuit 
court, 
concluding 
that 
the 
consumer 
contemplation test is the proper test for unreasonably dangerous 
products, and that the jury instructions constituted an accurate 
statement of the law.  Horst v. Deere & Co., 2008 WI App 65, 
¶20, 312 Wis. 2d 421, 752 N.W.2d 406.  The Horsts then 
petitioned this court for review. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶17 This case asks us to evaluate the sufficiency of the 
circuit court's jury instructions.  Generally, "a trial court 
has broad discretion when instructing a jury."  White v. Leeder, 
149 Wis. 2d 948, 954, 440 N.W.2d 557 (1989).  If the jury 
instructions fully and fairly explain the relevant law, there 
are no grounds for reversal.  Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 
2001 WI 109, ¶25, 245 Wis. 2d 772, 629 N.W.2d 727.  The question 
of whether the jury instructions accurately state the law is a 
question of law, which we review de novo.  Id. 
¶18 If the jury instructions were an erroneous statement 
of the law, a new trial will be ordered only if the court's 
error "affected the substantial rights of the party."  Wis. 
Stat. § 805.18(2) (2007-08).  An error affects the substantial 
rights of the party if it undermines confidence in the outcome.  
State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 544-45, 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985).  
An error undermines confidence in the outcome if there is a 
No. 
2006AP2933   
 
10 
 
reasonable probability4 the outcome would have been different but 
for the error.  Id. at 544. 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶19 This case is a dispute over both what the law is——that 
is, what Wisconsin courts have said——and over what the law 
should be.  The parties here dispute the meaning and relevance 
of several cases, and underlying this, disagree about the proper 
scope of strict products liability law in Wisconsin. 
¶20 To address these questions, we first, in subsection A 
(¶¶21-31), briefly introduce the development of and theory 
behind strict products liability and the consumer contemplation 
test.  In subsection B (¶¶32-35), we explain the proposed 
bystander contemplation test as proffered by the Horsts.  In 
subsection C (¶¶36-67), we review the significant cases relied 
on by the parties.  Finally, in subsection D (¶¶68-81), we 
analyze and answer the ultimate question before us——whether the 
consumer 
contemplation 
test 
is 
the 
proper 
standard 
for 
determining whether a product is unreasonably dangerous when a 
bystander is injured. 
                                                 
4 Some 
of 
our 
prior 
decisions 
have 
used 
the 
term 
"possibility" 
instead 
of 
"probability." 
 
We 
believe 
"probability" is a better statement of the test.  See Green v. 
Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 2001 WI 109, ¶¶114-19, 245 Wis. 2d 
772, 629 N.W.2d 727 (Crooks, J., concurring). 
No. 
2006AP2933   
 
11 
 
 
A. 
Strict Products Liability and The Consumer Contemplation   
     Test 
¶21 Historically, with the exception of the sale of food, 
a supplier of a product was generally not liable for injuries 
caused by that product without a showing of negligence or 
privity of contract.  See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A 
(hereafter "§ 402A") cmt. b (1965).5  This began to change in the 
1950s and 1960s as courts developed theories of liability, often 
based on warranty-like concepts, to hold manufacturers or 
sellers liable for injuries even without negligence or privity 
of contract.  See id. (describing some of the early decisions as 
displaying "considerable ingenuity in evolving more or less 
fictitious theories of liability to fit the case").  There was, 
                                                 
5 Section 402A provides as follows: 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition 
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to 
his property is subject to liability for physical harm 
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to 
his property, if 
 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of 
selling such a product, and  
 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or 
consumer without substantial change in the condition 
in which it is sold. 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although  
 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in 
the preparation and sale of his product, and  
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the 
product from or entered into any contractual relation 
with the seller. 
No. 
2006AP2933   
 
12 
 
in short, a growing recognition that consumers needed protection 
from defective products that caused harm to consumers or their 
property.  See id. 
¶22 In the early 1960s, during this same time, the 
American Law Institute was drafting what became the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts.  The Restatement (Second) attempted to 
capture this emerging line of cases by creating a new category 
of tort claims——strict products liability——which it set forth in 
the newly created § 402A.  Although strict products liability 
was still in its intellectual infancy, § 402A was remarkably 
influential in speeding the adoption of this emerging area of 
law in courts around the country.  See Douglas A. Kysar, The 
Expectations of Consumers, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1700, 1711 (2003); 
George W. Conk, Punctuated Equilibrium: Why Section 402A 
Flourished and the Third Restatement Languished, 26 Rev. Litig. 
799, 808-09 (2007).  We joined this trend and adopted § 402A in 
1967 in Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).6 
                                                 
6 Dippel v. Sciano announced a five-part test to prove 
strict liability under § 402A:   
(1) that the product was in defective condition when 
it left the possession or control of the seller, 
(2) that it was unreasonably dangerous to the user or 
consumer, 
(3) that the defect was a cause (a substantial factor) 
of the plaintiff's injuries or damages, 
(4) that the seller engaged in the business of selling 
such product or, put negatively, that this is not an 
isolated or infrequent transaction not related to the 
principal business of the seller, and 
No. 
2006AP2933   
 
13 
 
¶23 This strict products liability structure, whereby a 
manufacturer bears the costs for injuries resulting from product 
use, even when the manufacturer was not negligent, arose for at 
least three important policy reasons. 
¶24 First, strict products liability serves as a cost 
shifter.  See § 402A cmt. c.  It takes the usually overwhelming 
cost of injury off of the injured person and places it on the 
manufacturer.  The manufacturer generally passes the costs for 
injuries and preventative safety measures on to all consumers 
through higher product prices.  This liability system, then, 
spreads the cost of the injury risk to all consumers.  Id.  The 
justification relied upon by courts is that companies have the 
capacity to bear the costs and the ability to assume them more 
efficiently than individuals. 
¶25 A 
second 
rationale 
underpinning 
strict 
products 
liability is fundamental fairness to the injured person.  Id.  
If manufacturers can reasonably design a safer product or a 
product that better accords with the safety expectations of 
consumers but choose not to do so, they should be held liable 
for the resultant injuries. 
¶26 Finally, a third reason for strict products liability 
is 
that 
it 
provides 
a 
strong 
incentive 
for 
deterrence.  
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability (hereafter 
                                                                                                                                                             
(5) that the product was one which the seller expected 
to and did reach the user or consumer without 
substantial change in the condition it was when he 
sold it.  37 Wis. 2d 443, 460, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). 
No. 
2006AP2933   
 
14 
 
"Restatement (Third)") § 2 cmt. a (1998).  When a manufacturer 
can reasonably prevent an injury, strict products liability 
gives them a strong incentive to do so.  This litigation threat 
promotes manufacturer investment in safer designs, quality 
control, and the furnishing of adequate warnings to the 
purchasers and users of products.  Id.; § 402A cmt. j. 
¶27 Strict products liability is not, however, absolute 
liability.  Howes I, 56 Wis. 2d at 253.  We do not want to hold 
businesses liable for every injury involving their products.  
Such an approach would eliminate some useful products from the 
market that cannot possibly be made completely safe (such as 
knives, guns, medicine, and even sugar in the case of a 
diabetic).  § 402A cmts. i, k.  Hence, all of the strict 
products liability analytical frameworks——including a risk-
utility analysis7 and our own focus on consumer expectations——
have at least a partial grounding in the necessity of guarding 
against absolute liability. 
¶28 Section 402A describes what has been called the 
"consumer contemplation test" for determining whether a product 
is 
unreasonably 
dangerous. 
 
Comment 
g 
explains 
that 
a 
manufacturer is strictly liable "only where the product is, at 
the time it leaves the seller's hands, in a condition not 
contemplated 
by 
the 
ultimate 
consumer, 
which 
will 
be 
                                                 
7 A risk-utility analysis requires a balancing of the risks 
and benefits of a product design "in light of the knowledge of 
risks and risk-avoidance techniques reasonably attainable at the 
time of distribution."  Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products 
Liability § 2 cmt. a (1998). 
No. 
2006AP2933   
 
15 
 
unreasonably dangerous to him."  § 402A cmt. g.  Similarly, 
comment i states that the product "must be dangerous to an 
extent beyond which would be contemplated by the ordinary 
consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to 
the community as to its characteristics."  Id. cmt. i.  This 
standard requires manufacturers to anticipate what consumers 
will expect, and to take safety precautions in accordance with 
those expectations.  Those safety precautions might include 
giving adequate instructions and warnings (see id. cmts. h and 
j) and/or implementing reasonably available safety features. 
¶29 One of the implications of the consumer contemplation 
test is that consumers can and do contemplate open and obvious 
dangers, and are not protected when injured by such dangers.  
See id. cmt. j (warnings are not required "when the danger, or 
potentiality of danger, is generally known and recognized"); 
Tanner v. Shoupe, 228 Wis. 2d 357, 367, 596 N.W.2d 805 (Ct. App. 
1999) ("In order for a defective design to render a product 
unreasonably dangerous, the defect must be hidden from the 
ordinary consumer, that is, not an open and obvious defect.").  
Consumers are also not protected if they proceed in the face of 
a known, though not open and obvious, danger.  See § 402A cmt. n 
("If the user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of 
the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use 
of the product and is injured by it, he is barred from 
recovery.").  Thus a manufacturer may be able to avoid liability 
under § 402A by making consumers aware of dangers through 
No. 
2006AP2933   
 
16 
 
warnings or simply by virtue of selling a product with open and 
obvious dangers. 
¶30 Section 402A is explicitly neutral as to whether 
persons other than users or consumers should be able to recover 
under strict products liability.  Id. Caveat (1).  Comment o 
explains: 
Thus 
far 
the 
courts . . . have 
not 
gone 
beyond 
allowing 
recovery 
to 
users 
and 
consumers . . . . 
Casual bystanders, and others who may come in contact 
with the product, as in the case of employees of the 
retailer, or a passer-by injured by an exploding 
bottle, or a pedestrian hit by an automobile, have 
been denied recovery.  There may be no essential 
reason why such plaintiffs should not be brought 
within the scope of the protection afforded, other 
than that they do not have the same reasons for 
expecting such protection as the consumer who buys a 
marketed product. 
In relatively short order, however, courts around the country 
did extend protection to injured bystanders.  See Peter 
Zablotsky, Eliminating Proximate Cause As An Element of the 
Prima Facie Case For Strict Products Liability, 45 Cath. U. L. 
Rev. 31, n.79 (1995).  This court extended such protection in 
Howes I, which is discussed below. 
¶31 No one in the case at bar disputes that bystanders may 
recover if a product is unreasonably dangerous.  The issue in 
this case is the proper legal standard for determining whether a 
product is unreasonably dangerous when a bystander is injured. 
B. 
The Proposed Bystander Expectations Test 
¶32 The Horsts argue that the jury instructions in this 
case, which asked whether the lawn mower was unreasonably 
No. 
2006AP2933   
 
17 
 
dangerous based on the expectations of the ordinary user or 
consumer, were incorrect as a matter of law.  They maintain that 
the law in Wisconsin is, or should be, what they call a 
"bystander contemplation test." 
¶33 The bystander contemplation test asks exactly the same 
question as the consumer contemplation test, but replaces the 
expectations of the user or consumer with the expectations of an 
ordinary bystander.  Accordingly, the Horsts assert that "when a 
bystander is injured by a product, the question is whether the 
product was as reasonably safe as an ordinary bystander would 
contemplate or expect, not whether the user or consumer 
understood and appreciated the risk."  Like the consumer 
contemplation test, the bystander contemplation test is an 
objective 
test 
and 
not 
dependent 
on 
an 
injured 
party's 
knowledge. 
¶34 The bystander contemplation test, according to the 
Horsts, applies when a bystander is injured and "where a 
manufacturer designs and sells a product that poses a unique 
risk of bodily harm to bystanders alone."  They submit that the 
consumer contemplation test is still proper when a bystander is 
injured and when the danger is present for both the user or 
consumer and the bystander. 
¶35 The 
Horsts 
further 
contend 
that 
the 
bystander 
contemplation test is not only the law, but that it is necessary 
to provide meaningful protection to bystanders.  They argue that 
bystanders need greater protections than users and consumers 
because they have less information about the product, and less 
No. 
2006AP2933   
 
18 
 
access to warnings and instructions.  They also point to the 
language in Howes I (which extended protection to bystanders 
injured by unreasonably dangerous products), stating that 
"[t]here is no essential difference between the injured user or 
consumer and the injured bystander."  56 Wis. 2d at 255. 
C. 
Prior Wisconsin Case Law 
¶36 The Horsts argue that the bystander contemplation test 
is the law in Wisconsin even though it has not been formally 
announced in any of the cases as such.  They point in particular 
to Howes I, Howes v. Deere, 71 Wis. 2d 268, 238 N.W.2d 76 (1976) 
(hereafter "Howes II"), and Komanekin v. Inland Truck Parts, 819 
F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Wis. 1993), asserting these cases show that 
when a bystander is injured, and when the threat of danger is to 
the bystander alone, the determination of the unreasonableness 
No. 
2006AP2933   
 
19 
 
of the danger is based on an ordinary bystander's expectations, 
not a user or consumer's expectations.8 
¶37 Deere, on the other hand, points to the standard jury 
instructions as well as our prior decisions in Vincer v. Esther 
Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d 326, 230 
N.W.2d 794 (1975) and Green to argue that, while bystanders may 
recover if injured by an unreasonably dangerous product, the 
                                                 
8 The Horsts also suggest that our decision in Sumnicht v. 
Toyota Motor Sales, 121 Wis. 2d 338, 360 N.W.2d 2 (1984) is 
relevant.  Sumnicht concerned a passenger in a car seat who was 
injured in an accident, and claimed the car seat was defectively 
designed and unreasonably dangerous.  The Horsts point to the 
language used in the special verdict question in Sumnicht asking 
whether the defect in the seat system design was "unreasonably 
dangerous to a prospective passenger in the rear seat of the 
automobile."  Id. at 370.  However, the court actually affirmed 
that Wisconsin follows the consumer contemplation test, quoting 
comment i from § 402A.  The court correctly noted that an 
unreasonably dangerous product "must contain a dangerous defect 
whose presence an ordinary consumer would not reasonably 
expect." 
 
Id. 
at 
369 
(quoting 
Arbet 
v. 
Gussarson, 66 
Wis. 2d 551, 557, 225 N.W.2d 431 (1975)).  The Horsts also 
ignore that § 402A explicitly includes automobile passengers 
within the definition of a "user": "'User' includes those who 
are passively enjoying the benefit of the product, as in the 
case of passengers in automobiles."  § 402A cmt. l. 
No. 
2006AP2933   
 
20 
 
consumer contemplation test applies in all strict products 
liability cases.9 
¶38 Therefore, we will briefly discuss the principal cases 
cited by the parties and the arguments offered for each. 
1. 
Howes I10  
¶39 Two-year-old Richard Howes II11 ("Richard") lived with 
his parents in Lake Geneva, Wisconsin in a two-family dwelling 
owned by neighbor Naomi Schatzman.  Howes I, 56 Wis. 2d at 250.  
Ms. Schatzman delegated lawn care for the dwelling to her adult 
son, who in turn hired a twelve-year-old boy to mow the lawn.  
Id.  One day, while the twelve-year-old boy was mowing with a 
Deere riding lawn mower, Richard came into contact with the 
mower blades and suffered serious injuries, including the loss 
of his right foot.  Id.  The Howes sued Deere (among others) for 
the child's injuries, one claim of which sounded in strict 
                                                 
9 Deere also cites several other Wisconsin and non-Wisconsin 
cases to bolster its case that we will not discuss here in 
detail.  Of note, in Adamany v. Cub Cadet Corp., 04-C-224-C, 
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9612 (W.D. Wis. May 16, 2005), the Western 
District of Wisconsin applied the consumer contemplation test, 
and not a bystander contemplation test, to a strict liability 
claim arising from an injury to a five-year-old child bystander.  
Deere also cites Anderson v. Alfa-Laval Agri, Inc., 209 
Wis. 2d 337, 564 N.W.2d 788 (Ct. App. 1997), which affirmed the 
use of Wis JI——Civil 3260 for the strict liability claim arising 
from an injury to a two-year-old child bystander. 
10 Howes v. Hansen, 56 Wis. 2d 247, 201 N.W.2d 825 (1972). 
11 The injured child in this case is Richard Howes II.  
However, because this case came before us twice, the naming 
convention we will use to describe the two cases is Howes I for 
the 1972 decision and Howes II for the 1976 decision. 
No. 
2006AP2933   
 
21 
 
products liability.  Id.  Because the child was an injured 
bystander (i.e., not a user or consumer), the main issue in the 
case was whether an injured bystander can maintain a strict 
products liability claim against a manufacturer, or whether 
strict products liability claims may only be advanced by injured 
users and consumers. 
¶40 After acknowledging that our prior decision in Dippel 
only allowed users and consumers to recover, the court chose to 
extend coverage to bystanders, holding that a manufacturer is 
strictly liable "when he places a defective article on the 
market 'that causes injury to a human being.'"  Id. at 260 
(quoting Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 
(Cal. 1963)). 
¶41 The court extended protection because the rationale 
supporting protection for users and consumers was equally 
applicable to bystanders.  See Howes I, 56 Wis. 2d at 255.  The 
court noted the reasons articulated in Dippel for protecting 
users and consumers, including the fairness of compensating for 
injury, the cost and risk-distribution effects of strict 
products liability, and the deterrent effect on manufacturers.  
Id.  These policy goals support the extension of recovery to 
bystanders, the court reasoned, because there is "no essential 
difference between the injured user or consumer and the injured 
bystander."12  Id.  However, plaintiff bystanders still needed to 
                                                 
12 The opinion noted that some courts suggested bystanders 
should have more protection than consumers because of their 
disadvantaged position.  Id. at 260.  This dicta, however, was 
neither adopted by the court nor made part of the holding. 
No. 
2006AP2933   
 
22 
 
prove the product was unreasonably dangerous in order to 
recover.  Id. at 258. 
¶42 The Horsts claim that Howes I is dispositive, and 
suggest that we cannot legitimately reconcile a rejection of 
their proposed bystander contemplation test with this case. 
¶43 Deere, on the other hand, concedes that Howes I allows 
an injured bystander to pursue a strict products liability 
claim, but disputes that it creates or adopts a bystander 
contemplation test.  Deere points out that the case contains no 
language indicating that the question of whether a product is 
unreasonably dangerous in bystander cases is evaluated from the 
perspective of the ordinary bystander.  Howes I merely holds, 
according to Deere, that a manufacturer may be strictly liable 
in tort when he places a defective article on the market that 
causes an injury to any human being, including bystanders.  The 
case did not, Deere contends, modify the test for whether the 
product was defective/unreasonably dangerous. 
¶44 We acknowledge the broad language Howes I occasionally 
uses, especially the statement that there is "no essential 
difference between the injured user or consumer and the injured 
bystander."  Id. at 260.  But this statement cannot be pulled 
out of its issue-sensitive context and used to support an 
entirely different legal proposition.  With respect to who may 
recover, there truly are no good reasons to limit recovery to 
injured users and consumers.  But with respect to determining 
whether 
a 
product 
is 
unreasonably 
dangerous, 
there 
are 
significant differences (outlined more fully below) between a 
No. 
2006AP2933   
 
23 
 
standard based on the expectations of an ordinary consumer and a 
standard based on the expectations of an ordinary bystander. 
¶45 In short, Howes I did not purport to address a 
proposition greater than the legal question before that court.  
Our holding today, rejecting a bystander contemplation test, 
leaves intact and indeed reaffirms the basic holding of Howes I: 
Bystanders injured by an unreasonably dangerous product may 
assert 
a 
strict 
products 
liability 
claim 
against 
the 
manufacturer or seller. 
2. 
Howes II13  
¶46 Following 
the 
decision 
in 
Howes 
I, 
all 
other 
defendants except Deere settled out of court.  Howes II, 71 Wis. 
2d at 270.  The claims against Deere went to trial.  At the end 
of trial, the circuit court directed the plaintiffs to elect 
between one of the two theories of liability for submission to 
the jury——either negligence or strict products liability.  Id. 
at 271.  While indicating a preference for strict products 
liability, the plaintiffs submitted a proposed special verdict 
covering both theories.  Id.  The circuit court rejected the 
dual theory verdict form, and instead submitted a final special 
verdict question regarding liability, which read as follows: 
"Was the John Deere mower in question, when it left the 
possession of the manufacturer, Deere & Company, defective in 
design so as to be unreasonably dangerous to a bystander?"  Id.  
The jury found that Deere was not liable, and the Howes 
                                                 
13 Howes v. Deere, 71 Wis. 2d 268, 238 N.W.2d 76 (1976). 
No. 
2006AP2933   
 
24 
 
appealed.  Id. at 272.  After review, we reversed and remanded 
for a new trial, holding that plaintiffs were incorrectly forced 
to choose between alternative theories.  Id. at 272-75. 
¶47 The Horsts find this case especially pertinent because 
of the language used in the special verdict question, asking 
whether the product was "defective in design so as to be 
unreasonably dangerous to a bystander?"  This special verdict 
question was nearly identical to the Horsts' proposed special 
verdict question that was denied by the trial court. 
¶48 Deere counters that the court in Howes II did not 
consider or analyze the propriety of the special verdict 
question.  Rather, the case was reversed because of the trial 
court's erroneous 
decision requiring plaintiffs to choose 
between strict products liability and negligence theories of 
liability. 
¶49 In 
Howes 
II, 
the 
special 
verdict 
question 
was 
admittedly almost identical to the Horsts' proposed special 
verdict question.  But the special verdict question was not 
affirmed or intentionally addressed by the court.  We also do 
not know how the trial court instructed the jury to determine 
whether the product was unreasonably dangerous.14  On this point, 
which is the central question we address today, Howes II is no 
more helpful or determinative than Howes I. 
                                                 
14 We note here and further address in footnote 23 below 
that, because bystanders may recover, it does not matter who a 
product is dangerous to (i.e.——a bystander versus a user or 
consumer).  What matters is whether the product is unreasonably 
dangerous as an objective matter.  Today we address the proper 
test for making that determination when bystanders are injured. 
No. 
2006AP2933   
 
25 
 
3. 
Vincer15  
¶50 In July of 1970, two-year-old Curt Vincer was visiting 
his grandparents' house when he fell into the unsupervised 
swimming pool in their backyard.  Vincer, 69 Wis. 2d at 327.  As 
a result, Curt was severely brain damaged and became totally 
disabled.  Id.  The above-ground swimming pool had a retractable 
ladder that was allegedly left in the down position.  Id.  This 
allowed Curt to climb the ladder and fall into the pool.  Id. 
¶51 Curt (through his guardian ad litem) and his parents 
sued the swimming pool company and the company that sold and 
installed the pool.  Id.  They claimed that the swimming pool's 
design was defective because there was no self-latching gate 
preventing entry into the pool.  Id. at 331.  The legal issue 
before the court was whether the complaint stated a cause of 
action against the two defendants.  Id. at 329.  The court's 
opinion was primarily focused on the determination of when a 
product is unreasonably dangerous.  This court affirmed that the 
consumer contemplation test was the proper framework for 
analyzing design defect cases: 
Thus, the test in Wisconsin of whether a product 
contains an unreasonably dangerous defect depends upon 
the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer 
concerning 
the 
characteristics 
of 
this 
type 
of 
product.  If the average consumer would reasonably 
anticipate the dangerous condition of the product and 
fully appreciate the attendant risk of injury, it 
would not be unreasonably dangerous and defective.  
This is an objective test and is not dependent upon 
                                                 
15 Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 
69 Wis. 2d 326, 230 N.W.2d 794 (1975). 
No. 
2006AP2933   
 
26 
 
the knowledge of the particular injured consumer.  Id. 
at 332. 
¶52 This court ultimately found that the dangers inherent 
in a swimming pool were obvious, and that the average consumer 
would be completely aware of the risk of harm to unsupervised 
small children when a ladder for the pool is left in a down 
position.  Id. at 333.  The court concluded that the pool was as 
safe as it could reasonably be, that it was not defective as a 
matter of law, and that the complaint therefore did not state a 
cause of action.  Id. at 331. 
¶53 The Horsts contend that Vincer does not stand for the 
proposition that the consumer contemplation test is applicable 
in all § 402A cases.  They argue that Vincer is not a bystander 
injury case at all, much less one where the product poses a risk 
of harm to bystanders alone.  Rather, the danger in Vincer was 
the same for everyone, and therefore the consumer contemplation 
test was appropriate.  In any event, the Horsts contend use of 
the bystander contemplation test would have yielded the same 
result. 
¶54 Deere argues that this case is far weightier than the 
Horsts would like to admit.  They submit that this is a 
bystander injury case in which this court explicitly adopted and 
applied the consumer contemplation test, decisively confirming 
it as the proper standard for Wisconsin products liability 
actions.  Deere maintains that the court correctly focused on 
the risk of harm to a child bystander from the perspective of 
the "average consumer."  Deere also notes that the Standard Jury 
No. 
2006AP2933   
 
27 
 
Instructions 
post-Vincer 
(1975) 
and 
post-Howes 
II 
(1976) 
describe the consumer contemplation test, and do not describe a 
bystander contemplation test or contain any unique language for 
when the injured person is a bystander. 
¶55 We need not decide whether Vincer is a bystander case.  
It may be that the injured child in Vincer was a "user" of the 
pool by virtue of being in the pool when the injury occurred.  
On the other hand, § 402A explains that a user "includes those 
who are passively enjoying the benefit of the product" (§ 402A 
cmt. l), and it is self-evident that the drowning two-year-old 
was neither using the pool for its intended purpose nor enjoying 
the benefit of the pool.  However the Vincer case is construed, 
it is clear that it strongly supports the notion that even when 
the injured person is not an ordinary user or consumer (which 
the child surely is not), the consumer contemplation test, which 
looks at the expectations of the ordinary adult user or 
consumer, is the framework under which a product's defectiveness 
is to be governed.  We do not vary the test depending on the 
status of the injured person. 
4. 
Komanekin16  
¶56 In this case from the Eastern District of Wisconsin, 
five-year-old Jamie Komanekin was severely injured by a propane 
delivery truck that had come to his home.  Komanekin, 819 F. 
Supp. at 804-05.  While playing unsupervised, Jamie somehow 
snagged his clothing near the connection to the pump, getting 
                                                 
16 Komanekin v. Inland Truck Parts, 819 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. 
Wis. 1993). 
No. 
2006AP2933   
 
28 
 
his arms tangled in the rotating drive-shaft of the truck's 
pumping system.  Id. at 805.  The accident was not caused by any 
malfunction of the pumping system itself, which worked as 
intended.  Id. 
¶57 The Komanekins sued a number of companies involved in 
the manufacture and assembly of the pumping system device that 
was attached to the propane delivery truck.  Id. at 804.  They 
alleged that the defendants should be found strictly liable for 
selling defectively designed products, and liable for negligence 
in the design of those products.  Id. at 808.  The defendants 
then moved for summary judgment.  Id. at 811. 
¶58 In its opinion, the Eastern District of Wisconsin 
described the injured child as a bystander, and rightly stated 
that he may assert a strict products liability claim just like a 
user or consumer under Howes I.  Id. at 809.  After 
acknowledging Wisconsin's reliance on the consumer contemplation 
test, the court stated: 
In 
a 
bystander 
case, 
presumably, 
a 
product 
is 
unreasonably dangerous if it presents dangers not 
apparent to the ordinary bystander.  Thus, a product 
not unreasonably dangerous to the ordinary user or 
consumer might well be unreasonably dangerous to the 
ordinary bystander. 
Id. at 809.  The court ultimately denied defendants' motion for 
summary judgment because it believed there was a genuine issue 
of material fact as to whether an ordinary bystander would 
appreciate the danger posed by the truck's pumping system.  Id. 
at 809-11. 
No. 
2006AP2933   
 
29 
 
¶59 Though not a decision of this court, the Horsts 
highlight this case because the Komanekin court used a bystander 
contemplation test, concluding that it was the logical outgrowth 
of Howes I. 
¶60 Deere counters that the court's analysis was dicta, 
and in any event, the court's use of "presumably" shows a 
hesitance and lack of clarity regarding the proper test. 
¶61 The court in Komanekin clearly did apply a bystander 
contemplation test, but in our reading, did so without any 
analysis or consideration of the implications of such an 
approach.  The court erred in assuming that because bystanders 
can recover, the perspective of the ordinary bystander should 
control.  Howes I does not compel this conclusion, and we reject 
it. 
5. 
Green17  
¶62 Plaintiff Linda M. Green filed suit when she suffered 
injuries from allergic reactions to the proteins in latex 
medical gloves manufactured by Smith and Nephew AHP, Inc. 
("S & N").  Green alleged that S & N should be held strictly 
liable for her injuries.  Green, 245 Wis. 2d 772, ¶1.  After 
trial, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Green, finding that 
S & N's gloves were defective and unreasonably dangerous.  Id., 
¶19.  The court of appeals affirmed.  Id., ¶2. 
 
¶63 Our review addressed two evidentiary questions and, 
more importantly for our purposes here, whether the jury was 
                                                 
17 Green, 245 Wis. 2d 772. 
No. 
2006AP2933   
 
30 
 
properly instructed that the consumer contemplation test is (and 
should be) the law for strict products liability cases in 
Wisconsin.  We answered in the affirmative.  We rejected a move 
to the standard outlined in § 2(b) of the Restatement (Third), 
and reiterated that "Wisconsin strict products liability law 
applies the consumer-contemplation test and only the consumer-
contemplation test in all strict products liability cases."  
Id., ¶¶34-35. 
¶64 The 
Horsts 
acknowledge 
that 
Green 
reaffirmed 
Wisconsin's adherence to the consumer contemplation test, but 
point out that the issue in Green had nothing to do with 
bystanders.  The Horsts insist that the bystander contemplation 
test is simply a variation of the consumer contemplation test 
affirmed in Green. 
¶65 Deere 
counters 
that 
Green's 
broad 
holding 
is 
applicable here.  The court unambiguously stated that the 
consumer contemplation test "and only the consumer-contemplation 
test" applies "in all strict products liability cases." 
 
¶66 In our view, the analysis in Green is instructive, 
though not determinative.  The Horsts are correct that the facts 
in Green did not involve bystanders, and thus, we cannot say 
that Green answers the question before us today.  That said, we 
were well aware when we decided Green in 2001 that bystanders 
can recover in strict products liability.18  Yet, the opinion 
                                                 
18 It is indicative of the court's intent to adhere to the 
consumer contemplation test that the majority cited our opinion 
in Howes I on two occasions.  Green, 245 Wis. 2d 772, ¶¶56, 69. 
No. 
2006AP2933   
 
31 
 
made no concession and left no room for exceptions to the rule 
that the expectations of the consumer or user guide the 
determination of whether the product was defective/unreasonably 
dangerous. 
6. 
Case Law Conclusion 
¶67 This review leads us to the conclusion that while the 
language in these prior cases is suggestive, no Wisconsin 
Supreme Court case directly answers the question before us.19  
Our holding today clarifies the law related to the consumer 
contemplation test; it impinges on no precedent and does not 
require us to overturn or modify the holding of any prior cases. 
 
D. 
The 
Consumer 
Contemplation 
Test 
Governs 
All 
Strict 
 
Products Liability Cases. 
¶68 We reject the proposed bystander contemplation test 
and reiterate that the consumer contemplation test is the proper 
standard for all strict products liability cases. 
¶69 At its root, the bystander contemplation test is 
inherently unworkable.  While an ordinary consumer or user of a 
product can be said to have some objective expectations 
regarding a product, the same cannot be said of bystanders.  The 
consumer contemplation test was developed in recognition of the 
fact that it is reasonable for users and consumers of products 
                                                 
19 While Komanekin did answer the question, it was a federal 
case, not one of our precedents.  No prior Wisconsin state cases 
have addressed this question directly.  The Horsts admit as much 
in 
their 
brief, 
stating 
that 
"[n]o 
Wisconsin 
court 
has 
considered the § 402A liability standard to be applied where a 
product design creates a risk of harm to bystanders alone." 
No. 
2006AP2933   
 
32 
 
to hold certain expectations regarding the products they use and 
the products they buy.  See Rebecca Korzec, Dashing Consumer 
Hopes: Strict Products Liability and the Demise of the Consumer 
Expectations Test, 20 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 227, 232 (1997) 
("[T]he consumer expectations test is the natural, logical 
outgrowth of strict products liability as the extension of 
implied warranty law.").  Thus, the concept of an "ordinary 
consumer" has some reasonably objective content.  But bystanders 
may have no familiarity with a product.  This is especially so 
in complex design defect cases.  What does a bystander expect of 
the technical design and reasonably available safety features of 
a product he or she does not buy, does not use, and may not even 
be aware of? 
¶70 In addition, it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
discern who an "ordinary" bystander is and what they know.  To 
illustrate, if a bystander is injured by a combine on a farm, is 
the "ordinary" bystander a neighboring farmer or a life-long 
urbanite who cannot tell you what a combine does?20  In short, 
the notion of an "ordinary bystander" is a concept without 
content. 
¶71 One of the basic requirements of a coherent legal test 
is that it offer a framework for analyzing claims that provides 
some measure of predictability.  See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of 
Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1179 (1989) 
                                                 
20 A combine is a "power-operated harvesting machine that 
cuts, threshes, and cleans grain."  The American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language 377 (3d ed. 1992). 
No. 
2006AP2933   
 
33 
 
("Rudimentary justice requires that those subject to the law 
must 
have 
the 
means 
of 
knowing 
what 
it 
prescribes."). 
Predictability is important in the law because it allows 
citizens and businesses to shape their behavior accordingly. 
¶72 This is particularly important in strict products 
liability, where one of the main purposes is to incentivize 
manufacturers to research and implement safer designs.  If a 
manufacturer cannot predict with some degree of accuracy when 
its product is and is not unreasonably dangerous, it will not be 
able to efficiently adopt appropriate safety precautions.  This 
uncertainty may lead some manufacturers to needlessly remove 
useful products from the market.  The bystander contemplation 
test would move our state further away from the goal of an 
efficient 
deterrent 
effect 
on 
manufacturers 
by 
creating 
unpredictability.  Manufacturers and all members of the business 
community need the ability to anticipate how their choices will 
be adjudicated in a court of law.  Because it does not provide 
the requisite predictability, the bystander contemplation test 
fails this basic measure of a legal test. 
¶73 Although noted earlier, it is important to emphasize 
that strict products liability is not absolute liability.  And a 
bystander contemplation test comes dangerously close to absolute 
liability by adopting an amorphous, ambiguous, and standard-less 
test that effectively gives a jury the power to find a 
manufacturer liable under almost any conceivable fact situation.  
This would impose huge and unjustified burdens on businesses 
(and through businesses, consumers as well).  That is not what 
No. 
2006AP2933   
 
34 
 
strict products liability is about, and that is not where we 
will take it. 
¶74 Another problem with the bystander contemplation test 
is that it changes the focus from the product to the injured 
party, creating discordant results.  A bystander contemplation 
test would in effect create different levels of duty for strict 
products 
liability 
purposes, 
blurring 
the 
line 
between 
negligence and strict products liability.  Manufacturers would 
owe a certain level of duty to the user or consumer, and a 
different, likely higher level of duty to a bystander.  This is 
true because a jury could plausibly find a bystander to have 
higher expectations with respect to the safety and design 
features of a product than the user or consumer of that same 
product.  This opens the door to a jury finding the same product 
unreasonably dangerous under some circumstances, but not others, 
depending on who was injured.  Under the Horsts' scheme, a 
manufacturer could be strictly liable if its product causes 
injury to a bystander, but not be strictly liable if a consumer 
suffers the same injury from the same product.  Strict products 
liability, particularly design defect cases, should ensure that 
products are not unreasonably dangerous, not create different 
levels of duty and incongruous liability, depending on who is 
injured. 
¶75 The Horsts' suggested application of the bystander 
contemplation test is equally puzzling.  They argue it applies 
only when the threat of injury is to a bystander alone.  It is 
difficult to conceive of a situation where a product is 
No. 
2006AP2933   
 
35 
 
dangerous to a bystander, yet poses no danger to a user or 
consumer.  The Horsts say that is the case here, but surely 
there is some danger to the user of a riding lawn mower who is 
driving in reverse.  Undoubtedly, the risk of danger is much 
lower than the danger of running over an unsuspecting child, but 
it does exist.  This means that, under the Horsts' proposal, the 
bystander contemplation test would not be appropriate here, and 
may never be. 
¶76 Perhaps the Horsts do not mean to suggest a danger 
must be to bystanders "alone" for the bystander contemplation 
test to apply.  It may be that merely a greater risk of danger 
to the bystander should trigger application of the bystander 
contemplation test.  But this approach would likely require a 
legal and factual determination by the judge before instructing 
the jury as to whether the danger posed by a product is greater 
to bystanders than to users or consumers.21  It is not clear how 
a judge would make such a determination or what procedures he or 
she would use.  It seems that if a bystander contemplation test 
were adopted, it ought to govern whenever a bystander is 
injured, avoiding any sort of early judicial fact-finding as to 
                                                 
21 In fact, this legal/factual determination by the judge 
would probably be required even under the Horsts' suggested 
application of the test.  Under their approach, a determination 
must be made before instructing the jury that the danger is to 
bystanders alone, and not to users or consumers. 
No. 
2006AP2933   
 
36 
 
the potential danger posed by a product.22  This, however, is not 
what the Horsts propose. 
¶77 The Horsts also argue in their brief that if we reject 
their proposed test, we "completely eliminate[] any duty owed by 
manufacturers to bystanders in cases where the risk of bodily 
injury is unique to bystanders."  It is true that under our 
holding today, where a product is not unreasonably dangerous 
based on the expectations of the ordinary user or consumer, the 
bystander does not receive additional protections.  But if a 
product is unreasonably dangerous in light of the expectations 
of the ordinary user or consumer and a bystander is injured, a 
strict products liability claim remains available.  In addition, 
the Horsts ignore the availability of recovery under negligence.  
They are understandably dissatisfied with that avenue of 
recovery because the jury considered it in this case, and found 
that Jonathan's parents, and not John Deere, were negligent in 
the tragic injury to Jonathan. 
¶78 Additionally, 
a 
user 
or 
consumer's 
expectations 
regarding a product will often include safety expectations 
relating to bystanders.  That is, users and consumers do not 
just have expectations regarding their own safety; they expect 
that a product will be reasonably safe for bystanders as well.  
Juries 
can 
certainly 
take 
this 
into 
account 
in 
their 
                                                 
22 To be clear, we reject the bystander contemplation test.  
Our point is to show that the Horsts' more limited suggested 
application of this test has many practical problems. 
No. 
2006AP2933   
 
37 
 
deliberations 
and 
evaluation 
of 
whether 
a 
product 
is 
unreasonably dangerous.23 
                                                 
23 The special verdict question in this case asked: "Do you 
find from the evidence that the subject lawn mower, when it left 
the hands of Defendant Deere & Company, was in a defective 
condition so as to be unreasonably dangerous to a prospective 
user/consumer?"  The trial court rejected a plea by the Horsts 
to add "or bystander" to the end of the special verdict 
question.  The jury was further instructed that to answer "yes" 
to the special verdict question, they were required to find, 
among other things, that "the defective condition made the 
product unreasonably dangerous to people." 
We think a better special verdict question need not query 
to whom the product is unreasonably dangerous.  The question is 
not whether a product is unreasonably dangerous to a user or 
consumer versus unreasonably dangerous to a bystander.  The 
question is simply whether a product is unreasonably dangerous.  
And the determination of whether a product is unreasonably 
dangerous is an objective inquiry based on the expectations of 
an ordinary user or consumer.  Any injured person, whether a 
bystander or user or consumer, may recover if injured by an 
unreasonably dangerous product. 
The dissent asserts that the jury instructions in Wis JI——
Civil 3260, even with the trial court's insertion making clear 
the availability of recovery for bystanders, were wrong and 
misleading.  Dissent, ¶¶120-128.  Though the standard jury 
instructions are not as clear as we would prefer, when viewed as 
a whole, the jury instructions given here sufficiently conveyed 
that a bystander may recover if the product was unreasonably 
dangerous, and that such a determination is based on the 
expectations of the ordinary user or consumer. 
No. 
2006AP2933   
 
38 
 
¶79 The 
Horsts 
also 
argue 
that 
our 
holding 
today 
impermissibly delegates the duty to make a product safe to the 
user or consumer.  But this is begging the question; it assumes 
a product is unreasonably dangerous.  If a product is not 
unreasonably dangerous (based on consumer expectations), the 
user or consumer has no duty to make the product safe for 
bystanders because, by definition, it is sufficiently safe for 
strict products liability purposes.  Users and consumers simply 
have a duty to use the potentially, but not unreasonably 
dangerous product with the appropriate standard of care toward 
their fellow citizens, as they do in all of life. 
¶80 Finally, even if we accept the Horsts' proposed test, 
we 
have 
difficulty 
seeing 
how 
an 
ordinary 
bystander's 
contemplation (to the extent it exists) would be significantly 
different than a consumer's contemplation in this case.24  
                                                                                                                                                             
The dissent fails to acknowledge that the jury instructions 
themselves define when a product is "unreasonably dangerous to 
the ordinary user or consumer," and that is "when it is 
dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated 
by the ordinary consumer possessing the knowledge of the 
products' characteristics which were common to the community."  
In other words, the instructions define the phrase that so 
troubles the dissent and do so by reference to the consumer 
contemplation test.  Moreover, the inconsistency between the 
instruction's 
dual 
statements 
that 
the 
product 
must 
be 
unreasonably dangerous to "a prospective user/consumer" and 
later to "people" is harmless. 
24 In other courts around the country, plaintiffs proceeding 
in strict liability upon the injury to a child have argued that 
it is the expectations of an ordinary child that should govern.  
Courts have resoundingly rejected this argument, in large part 
because children do not have expectations regarding the dangers 
of certain products.  Courts have thus held that it is the 
ordinary consumer or user's expectations that govern.  See 
No. 
2006AP2933   
 
39 
 
Everyone is aware that a lawn mower is very dangerous.  While a 
bystander may or may not be aware or expect a lawn mower to go 
in reverse, a bystander would certainly know that it is 
dangerous to allow an unsupervised two-year-old child to play in 
the yard while it is being mowed.25  The risks here are known to 
                                                                                                                                                             
Kelley v. Rival Mfg. Co., 704 F. Supp. 1039, 1043 (W.D. Okla. 
1989) (in a case involving a small child who was injured by 
pulling a crock-pot onto himself, the question of whether the 
crock-pot was unreasonably dangerous is determined by the 
perspective of the parent consumer who purchased the product, 
not the perspective of the minor child) (applying Oklahoma law); 
Curtis v. Universal Match Corp., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 1421, 
1425 (E.D. Tenn. 1991) (in a case involving a two-year-old child 
whose diaper was set on fire by his three year old brother, the 
question of whether the lighter was unreasonably dangerous is 
determined by the contemplation of the ordinary adult consumer, 
not the viewpoint of the minor child) (applying Tennessee law); 
Welch v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 651 N.E.2d 810, 814-15 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1995) (in a case involving a child who suffered injuries 
after lighting his pajamas on fire when playing with a lighter, 
the question of whether the lighter was unreasonably dangerous 
is determined by the perspective of the ordinary adult consumer, 
not the perspective of the minor child) Bellotte v. Zayre Corp., 
352 A.2d 723, 725-26 (N.H. 1976) (in a certified question from 
the First Circuit Court of Appeals involving a five-year-old 
whose pajamas were set on fire when playing with matches, the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court stated that the question of whether 
the pajamas were unreasonably dangerous should be based on the 
expectations of consumer parents) (note, New Hampshire has moved 
away from the consumer contemplation test and now engages in a 
risk-utility balancing test). 
25 The Horsts state the question as follows: "[I]f the 
ordinary bystander would have expected Deere to design its mower 
so that it would be incapable of mowing in reverse, instead of 
simply instructing operators not to do so, Deere breached its 
§ 402A duty to bystanders."  But the issue is not whether a 
bystander (or consumer) would expect the lawn mower to go in 
reverse, but whether a bystander (or consumer) would appreciate 
the danger posed by the RIO-equipped lawn mower to a two-year-
old child. 
No. 
2006AP2933   
 
40 
 
all people, including bystanders.  The jury confirmed this in 
finding that Jonathan's parents were the negligent actors.  To 
argue that a bystander is less aware of the very real dangers 
present here strains credulity. 
¶81 This truly was a tragic injury, but we cannot simply 
invent legal theories to make the manufacturer pay for the 
injuries.  This was a horrible accident caused by the negligent 
use of the lawn mower and negligent supervision of the boy by 
his parents.  At the end of the day, as has been noted elsewhere 
in a case involving almost precisely the same legal claims, a 
lawn mower is a lawn mower26——it is dangerous, and accidents 
happen.  A bystander contemplation test is a creative, but 
ultimately unsupported, unwise, and unfair attempt to create 
liability where none exists. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
¶82 We hold that the consumer contemplation test, and not 
a bystander contemplation test, governs all strict products 
liability claims in Wisconsin, including cases where a bystander 
is injured.  While bystanders may recover when injured by an 
unreasonably dangerous product, the determination of whether the 
product is unreasonably dangerous is based on the expectations 
of the ordinary consumer.  Therefore, the jury was properly 
instructed and the decision of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
                                                 
26 Transcript of Record at 4, Brown v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
328 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2003) No. 01-4226 ("A lawn mower is a 
lawn mower."). 
No. 
2006AP2933   
 
41 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
¶83 ANNETTE K. ZIEGLER, J. did not participate. 
 
No.  2006AP2933.npc 
 
1 
 
¶84 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (concurring).  I join the 
majority opinion, but I write separately in response to Justice 
Gableman's concurrence, in which he urges the adoption of 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2(b) in 
design defect cases.  Justice Gableman's concurrence, ¶104.  In 
the briefing that was provided for this case, references to 
§ 2(b) were made in passing in three places.  There are two 
footnotes in the petitioners' reply brief, one of which refers 
to the rationale underlying § 2(b), cmt. 1. and suggests that it 
supports a bystander contemplation test, and one of which 
suggests that the risk-utility test would be appropriate in 
bystander cases, though inappropriate in consumer cases.  (At 
oral argument, the Horsts' attorney stated, "I didn't argue for 
the adoption of a risk-utility test."  See Justice Bradley's 
dissent, ¶130 n.1.)  There is also a paragraph in a non-party 
brief where amicus argues that as to the bystander question the 
case would come out the same under either the Restatement 
(Second) or Restatement (Third) because neither treats the 
bystander's 
expectations 
differently 
from 
the 
ordinary 
consumer's expectations.  
¶85 These 
glancing 
references 
to 
Restatement 
(Third) 
provide an exceedingly flimsy basis for reaching the question of 
whether the court should adopt § 2(b) in design defect cases.  
Because any consideration of such a fundamental change in 
Wisconsin law should not be done without a full and thorough 
briefing followed by oral arguments before this court, I believe 
we should decline to reach beyond the controversy the parties 
No.  2006AP2933.npc 
 
2 
 
ask us to resolve, which in this case is whether Wisconsin law 
recognizes a bystander contemplation test.  It does not.  That 
is as far as we should go.  As I state in my concurrence in 
Godoy v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,1 released today, we need 
briefing and oral arguments before deciding to make a sea change 
in Wisconsin law——one that could result in throwing out forty-
two years of precedent beginning with Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 
2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). 
¶86 I therefore respectfully concur. 
 
                                                 
1 Godoy v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 2009 WI 78, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___. 
No.  2006AP2933.mjg 
 
1 
 
¶87 MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   (concurring).  I write 
separately because this case highlights some of the serious 
deficiencies with our current approach, the "nearly universally 
reviled"1 consumer contemplation test, to determining whether a 
product is unreasonably dangerous in design defect products 
liability cases.  As the majority opinion makes clear, a 
bystander contemplation test is not the answer.  Rather, I 
believe it is time for this court to adopt the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability (hereafter "Restatement 
(Third)") § 2(b) (1998) in design defect cases.  My purpose here 
is not to make a comprehensive case for the adoption of the 
Restatement (Third).2  My goal instead is to examine some of the 
numerous reasons I believe this court should reconsider its 
adherence to the consumer contemplation test, reasons that this 
case brings to the fore.  
¶88 The Restatement (Third) is simply a more appropriate 
framework 
for 
meeting 
the 
needs 
of 
Wisconsin 
consumers, 
businesses, and all those whose lives are affected by commerce 
in this state.  It is better for consumers and users of products 
because it holds manufacturers and sellers accountable for all 
foreseeable injuries that can be prevented with a reasonable 
alternative design.  The Restatement (Third) is better for 
                                                 
1 Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 
Colum. L. Rev. 1700, 1701 (2003). 
2 I joined Justice Prosser's excellent concurrence in Godoy 
v. DuPont, 2009 WI 78, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, which 
ably makes a fuller case for the Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability ("Restatement (Third)") § 2(b) (1998). 
No.  2006AP2933.mjg 
 
2 
 
manufacturers and sellers because it provides clear direction 
and a predictable standard.  It is also better for bystanders 
because it places them on a level playing field with consumers 
and users.  By focusing the inquiry on foreseeable injuries and 
thus providing a greater degree of coherence, consistency, and 
predictability, the Restatement (Third) requires manufacturers 
to be aware of the dangers unique to bystanders and plan 
accordingly. 
 
The 
Restatement 
(Third), 
then, 
provides 
a 
framework that is fairer to manufacturers and injured persons, 
especially bystanders, and Wisconsin should adopt it. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
¶89 The 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965) 
(hereafter "§ 402A"), which Wisconsin adopted in Dippel v. 
Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967), sets forth the 
basic parameters of a strict liability claim.3  Comment i 
                                                 
3 The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965) (hereafter 
"§ 402A") provides as follows: 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition 
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to 
his property is subject to liability for physical harm 
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to 
his property, if 
 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of 
selling such a product, and  
 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or 
consumer without substantial change in the condition 
in which it is sold. 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although  
 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in 
the preparation and sale of his product, and  
No.  2006AP2933.mjg 
 
3 
 
outlines 
the 
test 
for 
determining 
whether 
a 
product 
is 
unreasonably dangerous, providing that the product "must be 
dangerous to an extent beyond which would be contemplated by the 
ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge 
common to the community as to its characteristics."  § 402A cmt. 
i.  This test is called the consumer contemplation or consumer 
expectations test.   
¶90 Section 402A was not drafted to address the design 
defect line of cases.  See Introduction to Restatement (Third).  
It was instead written to address what came to be classified as 
manufacturing 
defect 
cases. 
 
See 
Douglas 
A. 
Kysar, 
The 
Expectations of Consumers, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1700, 1713-14 
(2003).  The consumer contemplation test in § 402A was therefore 
formulated to respond to manufacturing defect cases——where, 
despite quality control mechanisms in place, a product was not 
made or did not function according to its design specifications. 
¶91 It was not until after § 402A was published in 1965 
that litigation over defects in design was addressed by experts 
and commentators.  See Richard L. Cupp, Jr. & Danielle Polage, 
The Rhetoric of Strict Products Liability Versus Negligence: An 
Empirical Analysis, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 874, 890-91 (2002) 
("[C]ases involving conscious design decisions did not become 
common until the early 1970s.").  Courts soon realized that the 
consumer contemplation test, which followed naturally from 
                                                                                                                                                             
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the 
product from or entered into any contractual relation 
with the seller. 
No.  2006AP2933.mjg 
 
4 
 
manufacturing defect cases, did not work as well for design 
defect cases.  Id. at 891 ("[M]any courts quickly realized that 
using a consumer expectations test in design defect cases 
presents 
implications 
significantly 
different 
from 
those 
involved in applying the test to manufacturing-defect cases."); 
Restatement (Third) § 1 cmt. a. 
¶92 Hence, courts began to move away from the consumer 
contemplation test in design defect cases and adopt some form of 
a risk-utility test.  The Restatement (Third) § 2(b), published 
in 1998, identified and captured this shift in approach.  It 
provides that a product is defective in design when the 
"foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been 
reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative 
design . . . and the omission of the alternative design renders 
the product not reasonably safe."  Assessing whether a product 
is reasonably safe and whether a reasonable alternative design 
should have been adopted requires a "risk-utility" test that 
balances the costs and benefits of various design alternatives.4  
Id. at cmt. d. 
II. 
A NEW FRAMEWORK IS NEEDED 
¶93 The consumer contemplation test as an independent test 
in design defect cases has been roundly, consistently, and 
justifiably criticized by commentators.  Restatement (Third) 
                                                 
4 Factors to be considered include the nature and strength 
of consumer expectations, the degree of the foreseeable risks of 
harm, the instructions and warnings accompanying the product, 
and the advantages and disadvantages of the original product and 
alternative design.  Restatement (Third) § 2(b) cmt. f. 
No.  2006AP2933.mjg 
 
5 
 
§ 2(b) cmt. d.  One scholar, Douglas Kysar, calls the consumer 
contemplation test "a doctrine nearly universally reviled but 
stubbornly and inexplicably persistent."  Kysar, supra, at 1701.  
By the 1980s, he explains, "a consensus view among products 
liability scholars emerged that the consumer expectations test 
was both indefensible in theory and unworkable in practice."  
Id.  Citing our decision in Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc.5 as 
an example, Kysar calls judicial allegiance to the consumer 
contemplation test "puzzling in light of the aforementioned 
consensus view among commentators that the consumer expectations 
test is in one way or another harmful to plaintiffs, defendants, 
and the judicial process itself."  Kysar, supra, at 1703. 
¶94 Wisconsin, however, has stubbornly stuck with the 
anachronistic consumer contemplation test despite voluminous 
ongoing and unanswered criticism.  This adherence is akin to 
insistence upon a horse-and-buggy approach in a space-age era.  
The two reporters for the American Law Institute who drafted the 
Restatement (Third) have called Wisconsin "the lone star state" 
and a "rogue" and "renegade" jurisdiction that, within the 
context of products liability cases, marches to its "own, 
sometimes quite peculiar, drummer."  James A. Henderson, Jr. & 
Aaron D. Twerski, A Fictional Tale of Unintended Consequences: A 
                                                 
5 Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 2001 WI 109, 245 Wis. 
2d 772, 629 N.W.2d 727. 
No.  2006AP2933.mjg 
 
6 
 
Response to Professor Wertheimer, 70 Brook. L. Rev. 939, 940-41, 
946 (2005).6   
¶95 One 
of 
the 
major 
criticisms 
of 
the 
consumer 
contemplation test is that it is an exceedingly vague standard 
for design defect cases.7  See W. Page Keeton, Prosser & Keeton 
on Torts § 99, 699 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing how the consumer 
contemplation test "can be utilized to explain most any result 
that a court or jury chooses to reach").  As one treatise 
explains: 
                                                 
6 See also Victor E. Schwartz & Rochelle M. Tedesco, The Re-
Emergence of "Super Strict" Liability: Slaying the Dragon Again, 
71 U. Cin. L. Rev. 917, 918 (2003): 
Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 2001 WI 109, ¶122, 
245 Wis. 2d 772, 629 N.W.2d 727, takes the development 
of product liability in Wisconsin in an aberrant 
direction.  The Wisconsin Supreme Court advanced in 
that direction by clinging to an almost universally 
criticized version of the "consumer expectations" 
test.  Both liberal and conservative courts have 
recognized that the consumer expectations test used by 
the Wisconsin Court is not an appropriate standard for 
judging design defects.  In addition to clinging to 
the consumer expectation test, the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court refused to adopt the more modern and coherent 
standard for liability set forth in the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability.  Finally, after 
adhering 
to 
the 
consumer 
expectations 
test 
and 
refusing to adopt the Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability, the Wisconsin Supreme Court took 
an additional step and joined the small, highly 
criticized minority of state courts that have imposed 
super strict liability in products liability cases. 
(Emphasis added.) 
7 This criticism holds true in even greater measure for a 
bystander contemplation test as well.  See majority op., ¶¶71-
73. 
No.  2006AP2933.mjg 
 
7 
 
A[n] . . . especially 
problematic 
aspect 
of 
the 
consumer contemplation test lies in the vagueness of 
consumer expectations in many contexts.  Particularly 
in considering the design adequacy of a complex 
product——such as an automobile, a pharmaceutical drug, 
or other chemical product——consumers often have no 
meaningful idea how safely the product really ought to 
perform in various situations.  How can an ordinary 
consumer possibly know the extent of crash protection 
or injury fairly to expect when an automobile crashes 
into a tree at 10, 20, or even 40 miles per hour?  
Lurking at the very heart of the consumer expectations 
test, the vagueness problem undermines the test in the 
most complex cases where a reliable standard of 
liability is needed most. 
David G. Owen, Owen's Hornbook on Products Liability § 5.6 (2d 
ed. 2008).  When a standard is vague, it is less useful, and 
less legitimate as a rule of law because citizens cannot 
anticipate the lawfulness of their actions and adjust their 
behavior accordingly.  See majority op., ¶¶71-73; see also 
Kysar, supra, at 1715 (discussing the widely held view that 
"consumer 
expectations 
provide 
only 
the 
most 
meager 
and 
insufficient guidance to factfinders charged with the difficult 
task of assessing the adequacy of a product design," making the 
test "'so vague as to be lawless'") (quoting James A. Henderson, 
Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus on Defective Product 
Design, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 867, 882 (1998)); see also id. at 
n.60 (citing additional authorities who criticize the vague 
nature of the consumer contemplation test).   
¶96 The Restatement (Third), however, offers coherence, 
consistency, and predictability because it is based on a more 
objective standard.  Manufacturers are aware of alternative 
designs that may be available for their products, as well as the 
costs and benefits of those designs.  A jury's determination, on 
No.  2006AP2933.mjg 
 
8 
 
the other hand, of an "ordinary" consumer's expectations about 
design and safety features is guesswork, with potentially 
disastrous consequences for the manufacturer if wrong.  The more 
predictable standards in the Restatement (Third) will promote 
the efficient implementation of safety precautions better than 
the less predictable consumer contemplation test because the 
risks 
are, 
by 
definition, 
foreseeable 
and 
reasonably 
preventable.   
¶97 Another problem with the consumer contemplation test 
is the practical reality that consumer/user expectations might 
be determined by a jury to be either unrealistically and 
unreasonably high or unacceptably low when compared with the 
optimum level of safety.   
¶98 Consumer 
expectations 
may 
be 
unrealistically 
and 
unreasonably high in that a manufacturer might be held liable 
for injuries it did not or should not have reasonably foreseen, 
or when alternative designs were not reasonably available——for 
instance, expectations that a knife should not be able to cut 
off fingers or a car should not be able to rollover.  This is 
the danger of absolute liability——holding manufacturers liable 
for all injuries resulting from their products.  No court openly 
desires such a system.  The Restatement (Third) helps avoid 
unreasonably 
high 
expectations 
with 
its 
negligence-style 
evaluation of the costs and benefits, imposing liability for 
only reasonably foreseeable injuries or injured persons.  See 
Restatement (Third) 2(b) cmt. a; Owen's, supra, § 8.8. 
No.  2006AP2933.mjg 
 
9 
 
¶99 Alternatively, 
consumer 
expectations 
may 
be 
unacceptably low.  One example is the open and obvious danger 
doctrine, which precludes recovery when a product is manifestly 
dangerous.  Because consumers and users know of the danger, the 
level of danger is in accord with their expectations, and they 
are unprotected.  But this result may neither be fair nor 
adequate to compensate injured persons where an open and obvious 
danger can be eliminated with the implementation of a simple, 
relatively low-cost safety feature.  Owen's, supra, § 8.3 ("[A] 
dire consequence of the consumer expectations test . . . is that 
it effectively rewards manufacturers for failing to adopt cost-
effective measures to remedy obviously unnecessary dangers to 
human life and limb.").  The Restatement (Third) rejects the 
open and obvious danger doctrine, providing greater protection 
to injured persons and greater accountability for product 
manufacturers.  See Restatement (Third) § 2(b) cmt. d. ("The 
fact that a danger is open and obvious is relevant to the issue 
of defectiveness, but does not necessarily preclude a plaintiff 
from establishing that a reasonable alternative design should 
have been adopted that would have reduced or prevented injury to 
the plaintiff."). 
¶100 The Horsts argue that our rejection of a bystander 
contemplation test leaves bystanders unprotected.  While this 
contention is plainly wrong (see majority op., ¶77), the Horsts 
are 
correct 
that 
the 
consumer 
contemplation 
test 
leaves 
bystanders less protected than they arguably should be.  The 
facts of this case——where a bystander is injured by an allegedly 
No.  2006AP2933.mjg 
 
10 
 
defectively 
designed 
and 
therefore 
unreasonably 
dangerous 
product——serve to underscore and highlight the deficiencies in 
our current approach.   
¶101 Bystanders face several inequities when compared with 
users and consumers under the current system.  First, bystanders 
are less protected when a product poses a greater danger to a 
bystander than to the user or consumer.  The instant case is a 
perfect example; a riding lawn mower is clearly more dangerous 
to bystanders than to the person driving the tractor.  Second, 
bystanders do not have access to the instructions and warnings 
that assist and protect users and consumers.  Third, bystanders 
are, to some extent, dependent for their safety on the care 
exercised by users of dangerous products.  Finally, bystanders 
may not be aware of open and obvious dangers that a user or 
consumer perceives.  In all these circumstances, bystanders are 
stuck with less protection and less control over their own 
safety, and, under the current system, with less access to 
compensation in the event of injury. 
¶102 The Restatement (Third) levels this playing field by  
focusing the inquiry on the product itself, not the status of 
the 
injured 
person. 
 
The 
Restatement 
(Third) 
requires 
manufacturers to implement reasonably available safety features 
with regard to all foreseeable injured persons.  This analytical 
framework provides more protection for injured persons than our 
current approach.  This is especially true for bystanders,8 many 
                                                 
8 The Horsts recognize this too, asserting the following in 
a footnote in their reply brief: 
No.  2006AP2933.mjg 
 
11 
 
injuries to whom are reasonably foreseeable, thereby putting 
manufacturers on notice.   
¶103 If the Restatement (Third) were the law in Wisconsin 
in this case, the Horsts would have had to prove that a 
reasonable alternative design was available at the time John 
Deere sold the 1999 LT160 riding lawn mower.  Restatement 
(Third) § 2(b) cmt. a.  The jury would have had to balance the 
costs and benefits and consider whether the risk of harm to 
Jonathan was foreseeable and could have been reduced or avoided 
if Deere had adopted a reasonably available alternative design 
to the RIO.  The status of the injured person would have played 
no part in this analysis.   
¶104 To conclude, Wisconsin's current approach in design 
defect cases is beset with serious deficiencies that the 
Restatement (Third) substantially rectifies.  The failure to 
adequately protect bystanders is one of those deficiencies that 
deserves redress.  In my opinion, the Restatement (Third) § 2(b) 
is a more coherent, consistent, and fair approach to products 
                                                                                                                                                             
If the Court were to conclude that a "bystander 
contemplation test" is too onerous on manufacturers, 
the Horsts submit that the risk/utility test adopted 
in Restatement (Third) of Torts, § 2, where the 
plaintiff 
must 
establish 
the 
viability 
of 
an 
alternative design, would be appropriate in bystander 
cases, even though inappropriate in consumer cases. 
I have difficulty understanding why we have a "flimsy basis" (as 
Justice Crooks' concurrence asserts) for addressing an issue the 
petitioners asked us to address if we found against them on 
their chief argument.  
No.  2006AP2933.mjg 
 
12 
 
liability design defect cases.  I would adopt it, and urge my 
colleagues to do the same.9 
                                                 
9 The dissent makes several bald, unsupported, and blatantly 
incorrect assertions in chastising this concurrence.  First, the 
dissent alleges that this concurrence raises the adoption of the 
Restatement (Third) sua sponte, and that neither party called 
upon the court to do so.  Dissent, ¶¶129-130.  The dissent is 
wrong.  As noted above, the Horsts did ask this court to adopt 
the Restatement (Third) for bystander claims in the event that 
we rejected their proposed bystander contemplation test, which 
we have. 
Second, the dissent claims that this concurrence reflects a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the role of appellate courts.  
Id., 
¶132. 
 
This 
baseless 
argument 
itself 
reflects 
a 
misunderstanding of the role of appellate courts.  As the 
dissent well knows, strict products liability law in Wisconsin 
is, at least at present, a function of the common law.  Unless 
and until the legislature intervenes, it is incumbent upon this 
court to decide our cases on the basis of sound legal 
principles.  Strict products liability itself and our adoption 
of § 402A 42 years ago were a departure from past precedent 
because this court determined that the past framework no longer 
made sense.  This concurrence is precisely within that common 
law tradition by responding to the plea by the Horsts, and 
pointing out that the facts of this case in particular 
illuminate the problems with our current approach, and call for 
a new, sounder framework. 
Third, the dissent clouds the issue by citing a lineage of 
cases that would purportedly be over ruled or modified by 
adoption of the Restatement (Third) § 2(b) in design defect 
cases.  The dissent goes too far.  Although § 2(b) sets forth an 
approach that is analytically distinct from the consumer 
contemplation test, there is no reason, beyond the dissent's 
bald assertions, to believe that adoption of § 2(b) would in any 
way affect, much less over rule, the results reached in those 
cases.  See also Godoy v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., 2009 
WI 78, ¶6 n.1, __ Wis. 2d __, __N.W.2d __ (Prosser, J., 
concurring). 
No.  2006AP2933.mjg 
 
13 
 
¶105 For the foregoing reasons I concur.   
¶106 I am authorized to state that Justice DAVID T. PROSSER 
and Justice PATIENCE D. ROGGENSACK join this concurrence. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Finally, the dissent cautions a wait-until-argued approach 
to this issue.  Id., ¶133.  However, this case brings the issues 
front-and-center, and exposes gaping holes in our design defect 
strict products liability jurisprudence.  To fail to address the 
issues staring us in the face, as the dissent urges, would be to 
abdicate our role.  That the dissent is unsure of its own view 
on these matters need not hamper the court's obligation to 
ensure our strict products liability law rests on a solid and 
workable and fair foundation. 
No.  2006AP2933.awb 
 
1 
 
¶107 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  I agree with 
the majority that bystanders can recover in strict liability for 
a product that is unreasonably dangerous to bystanders, and that 
the test for products liability in Wisconsin measures the 
expectations of the ordinary consumer.   
¶108 I write separately, however, because an improperly 
worded special verdict question asked the wrong question and the 
jury instruction which accompanied it misstated the law.   
¶109 The majority masks the problem by concluding that the 
special verdict question and jury instruction are not as clear 
as it would prefer but that any error is harmless.  Majority 
op., ¶78 n.23.  I instead call it what it is when a jury is not 
asked to answer the central question in the case and is given an 
erroneous instruction: prejudicial error. 
¶110 Additionally, I write separately to address Justice 
Gableman's concurrence, which sua sponte advocates for a sea 
change in the law of products liability, would discard over 
forty years of precedent, and would over rule scores of cases.   
¶111 For the reasons set forth below, I respectfully 
dissent. 
I 
¶112 The majority aptly sets forth the facts and relevant 
procedural history.  Two-year-old Jonathan was injured when his 
father, Michael, was mowing the lawn using a John Deere riding 
lawn mower.  The mower was equipped with a safety feature that 
stops both the engine and the blades when an operator begins to 
No.  2006AP2933.awb 
 
2 
 
travel in reverse with the blades engaged.  However, the lawn 
mower is designed with an override of this safety feature. 
¶113 Michael decided to mow in reverse along the rear of 
the house and disengaged the safety feature.  Unknown to him, 
Jonathan moved behind the mower, out of his father's line of 
sight.  As the mower proceeded in reverse, it struck the two-
year-old Jonathan, causing both of his feet to be severed. 
¶114 The John Deere operating manual warns of danger to 
young children when the safety feature is disengaged and the 
mower is operated in reverse.  The warnings provide: 
• Before 
backing 
up, 
stop 
mower 
blades 
or 
attachments and look down and behind the machine 
carefully, especially for children. 
• CAUTION: Avoid injury!  Rotating blades are 
dangerous.  Children or bystanders may be injured 
by runover and rotating blades.  Before backing 
up, carefully check the area around the machine. 
¶115 The Horsts filed a lawsuit against Deere & Company 
alleging that a mower which operates in reverse is unreasonably 
dangerous, and that the mower should not have been designed with 
a device that can override the safety feature.  At trial, the 
Horsts requested that the standard jury instruction, Wis JI——
Civil 3260, be modified consistent with the law to reflect the 
facts of this case——that the safety override feature presented a 
danger to Jonathan, a bystander.  They argued that the jury 
should not be asked whether the design presented a danger to the 
person using the machine.  It was obvious that because Michael 
was riding on the mower, it presented no back-up danger to him.  
No.  2006AP2933.awb 
 
3 
 
Rather, as the warnings noted, the danger presented was to the 
young child behind the mower. 
¶116 The circuit court declined the Horsts' request, and 
instead asked the jury:  
Question No. 1:  Answer this question: Do you find 
from the evidence that the subject law tractor when it 
left the hands of Defendant, Deere & Company, was in a 
defective condition so as to be unreasonably dangerous 
to a prospective user/consumer? 
(Emphasis added.)  The jury instructions explained: 
With respect to special verdict Questions #1 and #2, 
you are instructed as follows: 
A manufacturer of a product who places on the market a 
defective product which is unreasonably dangerous to 
the ordinary user or consumer, and which is expected 
and does reach the consumer without substantial change 
in the condition in which it is sold, is regarded by 
law 
as 
responsible 
for 
harm 
caused 
by 
the 
product . . . . 
. . . .  
A product is said to be defective when it is in a 
condition not contemplated by the ordinary user or 
consumer 
which 
is unreasonably dangerous to the 
ordinary user or consumer, and the defect arose out of 
design, manufacture, or inspection while the article 
was in the control of the manufacturer.  A defective 
product is unreasonably dangerous to the ordinary user 
or consumer when it is dangerous to an extent beyond 
that which would be contemplated by the ordinary 
consumer possessing the knowledge of the product's 
characteristics which were common to the community.  A 
product is not defective if it is safe for normal use. 
A manufacturer is not under a duty to manufacture a 
product which is absolutely free from all possible 
harm to every individual.  It is the duty of the 
manufacturer not to place upon the market a defective 
product 
which 
is 
unreasonably 
dangerous 
to 
the 
ordinary consumer.   The law in Wisconsin imposes a 
duty on a manufacturer to a bystander, if the 
No.  2006AP2933.awb 
 
4 
 
bystander is injured by a defective product, which is 
unreasonably 
dangerous 
to 
the 
ordinary 
user 
or 
consumer. 
Question One (1) on the verdict form asks: 
Do you find from the evidence that the subject lawn 
tractor when it left the hands of Defendant, Deere & 
Company, was in a defective condition so as to be 
unreasonably dangerous to a prospective user/consumer? 
Before you can answer question One "yes," you must be 
satisfied that: (1) the product was in a defective 
condition; 
(2) 
the defective condition made the 
product unreasonably dangerous to people; (3) the 
defective condition of the product existed when the 
product was under the control of the manufacturer; and 
(4) 
the 
product 
reached 
the 
consumer 
without 
substantial change in the condition in which it was 
sold. 
. . . .  
(Emphasis added.) 
¶117 The majority correctly states that since 1972, the law 
of Wisconsin has been that a manufacturer is strictly liable 
when it places a defective product on the market "that causes 
injury to a human being."  Majority op., ¶40 (quoting Howes v. 
Hansen (Howes I), 56 Wis. 2d 247, 260, 201 N.W.2d 825 (1972)).  
The rationale for extending protection to bystanders is the same 
as the rationale for protecting consumers and users.  Id., ¶41.  
It concludes that therefore, "there truly are no good reasons to 
limit recovery to injured users and consumers."  Id., ¶44. 
¶118 Accordingly, the majority determines that the special 
verdict question and jury instruction were not as clear as it 
would prefer and that the circuit court should not have limited 
the inquiry about whether the lawn mower was unreasonably 
dangerous to only "a prospective user/consumer."  Id., ¶78 n.23.  
No.  2006AP2933.awb 
 
5 
 
Instead, the majority recognizes that the special verdict 
question should allow for the inquiry to include danger to a 
bystander.  Id.   
¶119 The majority attempts to salvage the error here by 
pointing to the following explanation buried in the special 
verdict: In order to determine that the product was defective, 
the jury must first find that "the defective condition made the 
product unreasonably dangerous to people."  Id.; see also id. 
¶13, n.3.  Based on this sentence, the majority therefore 
concludes 
that 
any 
"inconsistency" 
between 
the 
incorrect 
question (whether the product is dangerous to a "user/consumer") 
and the correct question (whether the product is dangerous to 
"people") is "harmless."  Id., ¶78 n.23. 
¶120 As the majority acknowledges, the special verdict 
question was wrong.  It failed to ask the correct question.  The 
question is not whether the product posed a danger to the father 
riding on the lawn mower, but rather whether it posed a danger 
to Jonathan, the young child behind it.    
¶121 The problem with the special verdict question was 
exacerbated 
by 
the 
jury 
instruction. 
 
Five 
times, 
the 
instruction indicated that the product must be unusually or 
unreasonably "dangerous to the ordinary user or consumer."  See 
infra, ¶116. 
¶122 Further, in an attempt to cure the defect in the 
instruction, the circuit court added the following sentence: 
"The law in Wisconsin imposes a duty on a manufacturer to a 
bystander if the bystander is injured by a defective product 
No.  2006AP2933.awb 
 
6 
 
which is unreasonably dangerous to the ordinary user or 
consumer."  (Emphasis added.)  With this sentence, the court 
positively directed the jury to ignore any features that posed 
increased or unique risks to bystanders.  As such, the 
instructions and special verdict question do not conform to 
Wisconsin law.  
¶123 "The purpose of a jury instruction is to fully and 
fairly inform the jury of a rule or principle of law applicable 
to a particular case."  Nommensen v. Am. Continental Ins. Co., 
2001 WI 112, ¶36, 246 Wis. 2d 132, 629 N.W.2d 301.  The 
instruction should not only state the law accurately, but it 
should also "explain what the law means to persons who usually 
do not possess law degrees."  Id. (quoting Nowatske v. Osterloh, 
198 Wis. 2d 419, 428, 543 N.W.2d 265 (1996)).  "[A]n instruction 
that is an incorrect or misleading statement of the law is 
erroneous."  Nowatske, 198 Wis. 2d at 428.   
¶124 The instruction did not fully and fairly inform the 
jury of the applicable law.  Instead, it created the clear 
impression that a bystander could only recover if he was injured 
by a product that was also unreasonably dangerous to a user or 
consumer.  However, in Howes I, the court held that "there is no 
essential difference between the injured user or consumer and 
the injured bystander," and that an injured bystander could 
recover in strict liability for a product that is unreasonably 
dangerous to bystanders.  56 Wis. 2d at 255.  Further, in 
Komanekin v. Inland Truck Parts, the court recognized that "a 
product not unreasonably dangerous to the ordinary user or 
No.  2006AP2933.awb 
 
7 
 
consumer might well be unreasonably dangerous to the ordinary 
bystander."  819 F. Supp. 802, 809 (E.D. Wis. 1993) (applying 
Wisconsin law). 
¶125 Instead of accurately describing Wisconsin law, the 
instruction directed the jury to answer the wrong question.   
The jury was directed to determine whether the lawn mower was 
unreasonably dangerous to users and consumers, yet the plaintiff 
made no argument that the mower was unreasonably dangerous to 
users and consumers. 
¶126 Here, the majority appears to conclude that an 
otherwise defective instruction and special verdict question is 
cured 
because, 
after 
the 
jury 
was 
repeatedly 
told 
that 
defectiveness is determined by danger to "an ordinary user or 
consumer," 
the 
special 
verdict 
contained 
the 
following 
explanation:   
Before you can answer question One "yes," you must be 
satisfied that . . . the defective condition made the 
product unreasonably dangerous to people[.]"    
¶127 An error is harmless if the beneficiary of the error 
proves "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not 
contribute to the verdict obtained."  State v. Hale, 2005 WI 17, 
¶60, 277 Wis. 2d 593, 691 N.W.2d 637 (quoting Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)).   
¶128 Based on the evidence presented at trial, the jury was 
required to answer "no" to the special verdict question because 
there was no evidence presented that the lawn mower was 
unreasonably dangerous to Michael, its user.  Nevertheless, 
there was evidence from which a properly instructed jury could 
No.  2006AP2933.awb 
 
8 
 
have determined that the mower was unreasonably dangerous to 
Jonathan.  Because Deere & Company has not demonstrated that the 
errors did not contribute to the verdict obtained, I conclude 
that they were prejudicial.  
II 
¶129 This is the second case this term where members of 
this court, sua sponte and not responding to the parties' 
arguments, have advocated for the adoption of the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2(b).  See Justice 
Gableman's concurrence; see also Godoy v. E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours, 2009 WI 78, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __  (Prosser, J., 
concurring) (released today).  This would be a sea change in 
Wisconsin products liability law.   
¶130 The Restatement (Second) Torts § 402A and Dippel v. 
Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 551 (1967) are established 
law in Wisconsin.  Neither the parties in this case1 nor the 
                                                 
1 Justice Gableman's concurrence asserts that the Horsts 
advocated for the adoption of the Restatement (Third) in a 
footnote in their reply brief.  For a discussion of the "flimsy 
basis" upon which the concurrence reaches out to address the 
Restatement (Third), see Justice Crooks' concurrence, ¶84. 
Any doubt as to whether the Horsts are advocating adoption 
of the Restatement (Third) is erased by a review of the oral 
arguments.  No attorney uttered the words "Restatement (Third)" 
at oral argument.  In fact, the Horsts' attorney specifically 
disclaimed any reliance on a risk-utility test, which is one of 
the principles underlying the Restatement (Third).  He stated 
unequivocally: "I didn't argue for the adoption of a risk-
utility test[.]"  See Wisconsin Court System, Supreme Court Oral 
Arguments, 
http://wicourts.gov/opinions/soralarguments.htm 
(search "Party name" for "Horst"; then follow "Playback" link) 
at 26:35.  
 
No.  2006AP2933.awb 
 
9 
 
parties in Godoy have called upon the court to deviate from over 
40 years of case law and adopt the Restatement (Third) § 2(b). 
¶131 In advocating for this policy change, the concurrence 
in this case and the concurrence in Godoy fundamentally 
misunderstand the role of an appellate court.  Instead, they 
appear to act like legislators, advancing a policy initiative 
which they favor.  Typically, it is the role of the legislature 
to identify and enact policy initiatives.  Appellate courts, on 
the other hand, play a more restrained role.   
¶132 Courts decide cases and controversies.  A court 
depends upon the parties to identify and raise issues and to 
advocate for a position.  After considering the parties' briefs 
and arguments, the court renders a decision.   
¶133 Tossing stare decisis to the wind and without the 
benefit of briefing or argument by the parties, the concurrence 
would over rule or otherwise modify scores of cases because they 
set forth a test for products liability that would no longer be 
good law.2  Of course the court can and sometimes should over 
                                                 
2 See, for example: 
 
• Tatera v. FMC Corp., 2009 WI App 80, ___ Wis. 2d __, __ 
N.W.2d __ (publication decision pending); 
 
• Haase 
v. 
Badger 
Mining 
Corp., 
2004 
WI 
97, 
274 
Wis. 2d 143, 682 N.W.2d 389; 
 
• Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 2001 WI 109, 245 
Wis. 2d 772, 629 N.W.2d 727; 
 
• Insolia v. Philip Morris, Inc., 216 F.3d 596 (7th Cir. 
2000) (applying Wisconsin law); 
 
• Morden v. Continental AG, 2000 WI 51, 235 Wis. 2d 325, 
611 N.W.2d 659; 
 
No.  2006AP2933.awb 
 
10 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
• Sharp ex rel. Gordon v. Case Corp., 227 Wis. 2d 1, 595 
N.W.2d 380 (1999); 
 
• Bittner v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 194 Wis. 2d 
122, 533 N.W.2d 476 (1995); 
 
• Westphal v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 192 
Wis. 2d 347, 531 N.W.2d 386 (Ct. App. 1995);  
 
• Sedbrook v. Zimmerman Design Group, Ltd., 190 Wis. 2d 14, 
526 N.W.2d 758 (Ct. App. 1994);  
 
• Estate of Cook v. Gran-Aire, Inc., 182 Wis. 2d 330, 513 
N.W.2d 652 (Ct. App. 1994);  
 
• Rogers v. AAA Wire Prods., Inc., 182 Wis. 2d 263, 513 
N.W.2d 643 (Ct. App. 1994);  
 
• Beacon Bowl, Inc. v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 176 Wis. 
2d 740, 501 N.W.2d 788 (1993);  
 
• Glassey v. Continental Ins. Co., 176 Wis. 2d 587, 500 
N.W.2d 295 (1993);  
 
• Northridge Co. v. W.R. Grace and Co., 162 Wis. 2d 918, 
471 N.W.2d 179 (1991);  
 
• Kolpin v. Pioneer Power & Light Co., Inc., 162 Wis. 2d 1, 
469 N.W.2d 595 (1991); 
 
• Nelson v. Nelson Hardware, Inc., 160 Wis. 2d 689, 467 
N.W.2d 518 (1991);  
 
• Rolph v. EBI Cos., 159 Wis. 2d 518, 464 N.W.2d 667 
(1991);  
 
• Kemp v. Miller, 154 Wis. 2d 538, 453 N.W.2d 872 (1990); 
 
• Estate of Schilling v. Blount, Inc., 152 Wis. 2d 608, 449 
N.W.2d 56 (Ct. App. 1989);  
 
• Tony Spychalla Farms, Inc. v. Hopkins Agr. Chemical Co., 
151 Wis. 2d 431, 444 N.W.2d 743 (Ct. App. 1989); 
 
• St. Clare Hosp. of Monroe v. Schmidt, Garden, Erickson, 
Inc., 148 Wis. 2d 750, 437 N.W.2d 228 (Ct. App. 1989); 
 
• O'Brien v. Medtronic, Inc., 149 Wis. 2d 615, 439 N.W.2d 
151 (Ct. App. 1989);  
 
• Mulhern v. Outboard Marine Corp., 146 Wis. 2d 604, 432 
N.W.2d 130 (Ct. App. 1988);  
 
No.  2006AP2933.awb 
 
11 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
• Griffin v. Miller, No. 1986AP1562, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 1987); 
 
• Van's Realty & Const. of Appleton, Inc. v. Blount Heating 
and Air Conditioning, Inc., No. 1985AP1812, unpublished 
slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 1986);  
 
• Clarke v. Flad & Associates, 1984AP780, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 1988);  
 
• Gonzalez v. City of Franklin, 128 Wis. 2d 485, 383 N.W.2d 
907 (Ct. App. 1986);  
 
• Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 121 Wis. 2d 
338, 360 N.W.2d 2 (1984); 
 
• Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 
(1984);  
 
• Burrows v. Follett and Leach, Inc., 115 Wis. 2d 272, 340 
N.W.2d 485 (1983); 
 
• Giese v. Montgomery Ward, Inc., 111 Wis. 2d 392, 331 
N.W.2d 585 (1983);  
 
• Krueger v. Tappan Co., 104 Wis. 2d 199, 311 N.W.2d 219 
(Ct. App. 1981); 
 
• Wangen 
v. 
Ford 
Motor 
Corp., 
97 
Wis. 2d 260, 
294 
N.W.2d 437 (1980); 
 
• Shawver v. Roberts Corp., 90 Wis. 2d 672, 280 N.W.2d 226 
(1979);  
 
• Priske v. General Motors Corp., 89 Wis. 2d 642, 279 
N.W.2d 227 (1979);  
 
• Black v. General Elec. Co., 89 Wis. 2d 195, 278 N.W.2d 
224 (Ct. App. 1979);  
 
• Ransome v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 87 Wis. 2d 605, 275 
N.W.2d 641 (1979);  
 
• Kozlowski v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 87 Wis. 2d 882, 
275 N.W.2d 915 (1979);  
 
• Keller v. Welles Dept. Store of Racine, 88 Wis. 2d 24, 
276 N.W.2d 319 (Ct. App. 1979);  
 
• Austin v. Ford Motor Co., 86 Wis. 2d 628, 273 N.W.2d 233 
(1979);  
 
• Fonder v. AAA Mobile Homes, Inc., 80 Wis. 2d 3, 257 
N.W.2d 841 (1977);  
No.  2006AP2933.awb 
 
12 
 
rule prior cases.  See Justice Gableman's concurrence, ¶104 n.9.  
That is not the question here.  Rather, the question is whether 
the court here should overrule or modify these cases, creating a 
sea change in the law, without the benefit of briefing or 
arguments by the parties.  
                                                                                                                                                             
 
• Heldt v. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 72 Wis. 2d 110, 240 N.W.2d 
154 (1976);  
 
• Howes v. Deere & Co., 71 Wis. 2d 268, 238 N.W.2d 76 
1976);  
 
• Barter v. General Motors Corp., 70 Wis. 2d 796, 235 
N.W.2d 523 (1975); 
 
• Greiten v. LaDow, 70 Wis. 2d 589, 235 N.W.2d 677 (1975); 
 
• Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 
69 Wis. 2d 326, 230 N.W.2d 794 (1975); 
 
• Schuh v. Fox River Tractor Co., 63 Wis. 2d 728, 218 
N.W.2d 279 (1974); 
 
• Jagmin v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 61 Wis. 2d 60, 211 
N.W.2d 810 (1973); 
 
• City of Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 58 
Wis. 2d 641, 207 N.W.2d 866 (1973); 
 
• Air Prods. & Chemicals, Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58 
Wis. 2d 193, 206 N.W.2d 414 (1973); 
 
• Gies v. Nissen Corp., 57 Wis. 2d 371, 204 N.W.2d 519 
(1973); 
 
• Howes v. Hansen, 56 Wis. 2d 247, 201 N.W.2d 825 (1972); 
 
• Schnabl v. Ford Motor Co., 54 Wis. 2d 345, 195 N.W.2d 602 
(1972); 
 
• Netzel v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 51 Wis. 2d 1, 186 
N.W.2d 258 (1971). 
 
• Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967) 
(adopting the Restatement (Second) § 402A and strict 
products liability). 
No.  2006AP2933.awb 
 
13 
 
¶134 I am uncertain whether the Restatement (Third) should 
be adopted.  What I am certain of, however, is that rather than 
pushing a predetermined agenda, I would wait until the issue is 
raised by a party, and briefed and argued before this court. 
¶135 For 
a 
more 
thorough 
discussion 
of 
my 
concerns 
regarding the sua sponte discussion of the Restatement (Third), 
see my concurrence in Godoy, __ Wis. 2d __. 
¶136 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
 
No.  2006AP2933.awb 
 
1