Title: Matter of Estate of Zelikovitz

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Matter of Estate of Zelikovitz1996 WY 116923 P.2d 740Case Number: 95-265Decided: 09/12/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming
In 
the Matter of the ESTATE OF Joseph ZELIKOVITZ,

 Deceased.

Appeal from District 
Court, Teton County, D. Terry Rogers, J.

Henry C. Phibbs, 
II of Phibbs Law Office P.C., Jackson, for Appellant Melba 
Zelikovitz.

Floyd R. King of 
King & King, Jackson, for Appellees Susan Zelikovitz, Elaine Stein, and 
Steven Zelikovitz.

Before 
TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN* and LEHMAN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1]      The issue is what 
law governs the execution of the codicil of Joseph Zelikovitz (Zelikovitz), a 
Wyoming resident, who executed the codicil in Oklahoma, and who died in Teton 
County. We hold, contrary to the decision of the trial court, that the critical 
codicil was executed according to the law of Wyoming, and it should be admitted 
to probate. We reverse the Order Granting Petition to Revoke Probate of Second 
Codicil, and we remand the case to the probate court for further proceedings in 
accordance with this opinion.

[¶2]      In the Brief of 
Appellant Melba Zelikovitz (Melba), these are the asserted issues:

1.         
Whether the district court was in error in its ruling that since the 
adoption of the new Wyoming Probate Code in 1980, California law is neither 
controlling or persuasive authority in the determination of questions of first 
impression involving provisions of the Probate Code.

2.         
Whether under California precedent the district court was in error in 
ruling that a notary public who observed a decedent sign a codicil, knowing that 
it was a codicil, and signed the document as notary, should be considered to be 
a witness to the execution of the codicil under W.S. § 2-6-112.

3.         
Whether the district court erred in its choice of law when it ruled that 
Oklahoma law was controlling, as the Oklahoma precedent was based on different 
statutory language from Wyoming, and the use of such law resulted in the defeat 
of a testator's clear intention on the basis of a technicality not present in 
the Wyoming Probate Code.

The Brief of 
Appellees Susan Zelikovitz, Elaine Zelikovitz Stein and Steven Zelikovitz 
(Zelikovitz children) states the issues in this way:

There is one principal 
issue presented for review which the appellees would state as 
follows:

Was the attempted second 
codicil of the decedent, Joseph Zelikovitz, properly executed according to law 
and therefore entitled to be admitted to probate in the state of 
Wyoming?

[¶3]      The two 
sub-issues involve the choice of law and the statutory requirements in the State 
of Oklahoma where the codicil was prepared and executed. The appellees believe 
those issues should be stated as follows:

I.          
The probate court was correct in determining that since the adoption of 
the Wyoming Probate Code the California precedents have not been controlling or 
extremely persuasive and that the court would look to Oklahoma law to determine 
the codicil's validity.

II.          
The probate court was correct in determining that under Oklahoma law the 
codicil was invalid as not having been properly executed and was not entitled to 
be admitted to probate in the state of Wyoming.

[¶4]      Zelikovitz 
executed his Last Will and Testament (Will) on June 6, 1990, in which he 
bequeathed $25,000 to Steven Zelikovitz stating, "he has already benefited from 
my estate during his lifetime." The residue of the estate, except for certain 
described limited and specific bequests, was bequeathed to Susan Zelikovitz and 
Elaine Zelikovitz. The Will named Steven Zelikovitz, Elliot Levitan, and David 
Ross as executors and trustees. About six months later, Zelikovitz executed a 
first codicil in which he revoked the appointment of Levitan and Ross as 
executors and trustees and appointed Susan and Elaine in their 
stead.

[¶5]      By November 7, 
1994, a document entitled "Joseph's Last Will & Testament" (second codicil) 
had been prepared, which actually was in the handwriting of Zelikovitz' wife, 
Melba. That document is the focus of this case. The second codicil removed 
Steven Zelikovitz and David Ross as executors and trustees, removed Susan and 
Elaine as executors and trustees named in the first codicil, and appointed Jerry 
Owen and Bernie Greenblott as new executors and trustees. The second codicil, 
including interlineation, provided:

Joseph's Last Will & 
Testament

*           *           
*           
*           
*           
*

Last Will & 
Testament

Residuary Estate - I ca 
revoke all of this paragraph and in its place all my the residue of my estate 
shall go to my wife, Melba Zelikovitz, for her soul sole benefit.

Add all my personal 
papers, patents, patent pendings and all my development work, lab models plus 
all my personal property and effects, art, glass sculptures, etc. will become 
the sole undisputed property of my beloved wife, Melba Zelikovitz.

[¶6]      On November 7, 
1994, Zelikovitz and Melba went to the Grove Tag Agency (Agency)1 in Grove, Oklahoma. Activity at the 
Agency was tumultuous because it was open for the first day at a new location, 
was short the services of two employees, and was experiencing computer problems 
and a heavy volume of business transactions when the Zelikovitz couple arrived. 
Zelikovitz and Melba sought out Dee Lawson (Lawson), an acquaintance who was 
employed at the Agency. Zelikovitz explained to Lawson he was making some 
changes to his Will, and he asked that a notary public and two people witness 
the execution of the second codicil and a document addressed to his attorney in 
Jackson, Wyoming.

[¶7]      Lawson asked the 
owner of the Agency, Susie Nichols (Nichols), to serve as the notary public. 
Both Lawson and Nichols understood the document represented changes to 
Zelikovitz' Will, and they saw him sign the second codicil. After observing 
Zelikovitz sign the second codicil, Nichols wrote: "Signed before me this 7th 
day of Nov 1994 Susie Nichols 11-08-97 [expiration date of notary commission]" 
before Lawson or any other witness signed the document. Apparently Nichols then 
resumed her duties, and she did not observe anyone else sign the second codicil 
as a witness. At some point in time, the words "Witnessed by" were added at the 
bottom of the second codicil, to the left of Zelikovitz' signature, and Lawson 
signed her name below that, out of the presence of any other witness. Lawson 
asked Lisa Humble (Humble), another employee of the Agency, to be the second 
witness. Humble then signed her name below that of Lawson and under the words 
"Witnessed by." The execution at the end of the document reads:

Witnessed by:

Dee A. Lawson /s/ Joseph 
Zelikovitz Nov 7/1994 /s/ Lisa Humble /s/

Signed before me this 7th 
day of Nov 1994 Susie Nichols 11-08-97 /s/

[¶8]      Zelikovitz and 
Melba then returned to Jackson, Wyoming, where Zelikovitz died on December 3, 
1994. All parties are in accord that Zelikovitz was a resident of Teton County 
at the time of his death, and there appears to be no dispute he was a resident 
of Teton County at the time the second codicil was executed.

[¶9]      On January 3, 
1995, the personal representatives named in the second codicil filed a petition 
to admit the Will and the two codicils to probate in Teton County. An order was 
entered admitting the Will and the two codicils to probate and appointing the 
personal representatives named in the second codicil. Some three days following 
that order, the Zelikovitz children filed their petition for probate of the 1990 
Will and 1991 codicil without referring to the second codicil. After that 
petition for probate was presented, the court revoked its order of January 6, 
1995 and, on February 1, 1995, the court entered another order admitting the 
Zelikovitz Will and both codicils to probate. That order also appointed the 
personal representatives whom Zelikovitz had named in the second codicil, but 
expressly provided Letters Testamentary should not issue, and did not require 
the posting of any bond until the court could rule on any action to set aside 
the Will or any portion of it.

[¶10]   After that last order, the 
Zelikovitz children filed a Petition to Revoke the Probate of Second Codicil, on 
which a hearing was held April 20, 1995. The court received testimony from 
Lawson and Nichols. Humble, both by a deposition and an affidavit, admitted she 
did not see Zelikovitz, Lawson, or Nichols sign the second codicil, and she had 
not been informed the document was a codicil or a will. The testimony by Humble 
established Lawson's signature was already on the document at the time Humble 
signed it, and Lawson, not Zelikovitz, had asked her to sign the 
document.

[¶11]   After the hearing, the court 
entered an Order Granting Petition to Revoke Probate of Second Codicil, stating 
the execution of the second codicil was governed by Oklahoma law. The court 
ruled the second codicil was not valid because it did not contain the signature 
of two subscribing witnesses and found, under Oklahoma law, the notary public 
would not qualify as a witness. After the court denied her motion to reconsider, 
Melba appealed from that order.

[¶12]   The parties vigorously debate the 
choice of foreign law, which they contend ought to be applied in this case. We 
have no reason to resolve that debate. The Will is to be proved in Teton County 
pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 2-2-102(a)(i) (1980). We hold we need to look only to 
the law of our state to determine the validity of the execution of the second 
codicil, unless the execution did not conform to the requirements of our 
statute. Only in that event would we be justified in turning to the law of the 
place where it was executed.

[¶13]   Under our statutes, "`[w]ill' 
includes the words `testament' and `codicil.'" WYO. STAT. § 8-1-102(a)(viii) 
(1993). The validity of the execution of a will is governed by WYO. STAT. § 
2-6-116 (1980), which states:

A written will is valid 
if executed in compliance with W.S. 2-6-112 or 2-6-113[2] or if its execution 
complies with the law at the time of execution of the place where the will is 
executed, or of the law of the place where at the time of execution or at the 
time of death the testator is domiciled, has a place of abode or is a national. 
(Emphasis added.)

The statute 
refers to WYO. STAT. § 2-6-112 (1980), which provides, in pertinent 
part:

Except as provided in the 
next section [§ 2-6-113], all wills to be valid shall be in writing, or 
typewritten, witnessed by two (2) competent witnesses and signed by the testator 
or by some person in his presence and by his express direction.

[¶14]   Our application of Wyoming law is 
supported by WYO. STAT. § 2-6-104 (1980), which offers this guidance concerning 
the choice of law as to the meaning and effect of wills:

The meaning and legal 
effect of a disposition in a will is determined by the law of the state in which 
the will was executed, unless the will otherwise provides or unless the 
application of that law is contrary to the public policy of this state otherwise 
applicable to the disposition.

This provision 
addresses the substantive effect of the language of the will. See Matter of 
Reed's Estate, 768 P.2d 566 (Wyo. 1989). Had the legislature intended to apply 
the law of the place of execution to the requirements for a valid execution, 
that direction would have been included in WYO. STAT. § 2-6-104. We would not 
have WYO. STAT. § 2-6-116 as a part of our statutory scheme.

[¶15]   We have said, "[i]t is the duty of 
the courts when construing legislation to attempt to effectuate the purposes and 
intent of the legislature." State ex rel. Albany County Weed and Pest Dist. v. 
Bd. of County Comm'rs of Albany County, 592 P.2d 1154, 1158 (Wyo. 1979). In this 
instance, the legislature was solid with respect to its intent. It provided, in 
WYO. STAT. § 2-1-102 (1980), with respect to the issue before us:

(a) This code shall be 
liberally construed and applied, to promote the following purposes and policies 
to:

*           
*           
*           
*           
*           
*

(ii) Discover and make 
effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of his property; * * 
*.

[¶16]   All the parties agree Humble would 
not qualify as a witness under WYO. STAT. § 2-6-112. The findings of the probate 
court confirm this by stating, "[t]he parties agree that Lisa Humble, the second 
attesting witness to the decedent's second codicil was not qualified as a 
witness because she did not actually witness the decedent sign the codicil." We 
accept that as a proper construction of WYO. STAT. § 2-6-112, but the focus of 
the issue then becomes whether Nichols, who intended to and did act as a notary 
public, qualifies as a witness to the second codicil under Wyoming 
law.

[¶17]   We hold the requirements of WYO. 
STAT. § 2-6-112 are met. The probate court, in its findings, described the 
second codicil as a "handwritten will," thus, the requirement that "all wills to 
be valid shall be in writing, or typewritten" was satisfied. The probate court 
also found Zelikovitz signed the codicil, and the requirement that it be "signed 
by the testator" was met. Finally, the probate court, in its findings, states, 
"Susie Nichols notarized Joseph Zelikovitz' signature and witnessed Zelikovitz 
sign the document." That is confirmed by another finding stating, "Joseph 
Zelikovitz signed the second codicil at the end thereof, * * *. He also signed 
it in the presence of the notary public, Susie Nichols."

[¶18]   There is no provision in the 
Wyoming statutes, nor any ruling in our cases, that would inhibit the notary 
public from serving as a witness, even if she intended to and did sign the 
document as a notary public. The second codicil was "witnessed by two (2) 
competent witnesses," in accordance with the statute. Nichols satisfied the 
construction given to WYO. STAT. § 2-6-112 by observing Zelikovitz sign the 
codicil and then signing herself. There is no requirement in our statutes that 
the witnesses sign in the presence of one another, although that does foreclose 
the prospect of having a self-proving will pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 2-6-114 
(1980).

[¶19]   We hold, under our law, Nichols 
qualified as the second witness, and the requirements of our statute for the 
execution of a valid will were satisfied. In In re Estate of Carey, 504 P.2d 793, 801 (Wyo. 1972), we repeated the proposition:

"It was signed by the 
testator and witnessed by two witnesses at his request. That was sufficient." In 
re Stringer's Estate, 80 Wyo. 389, [424], 343 P.2d 508, 522, rehearing denied 
and modified on other grounds 80 Wyo. 389, 345 P.2d 786 [(1959)].

The second 
codicil should have been admitted to probate.

[¶20]   Melba vigorously contends 
resolution of this case should be controlled by reference to California 
decisions. We readily acknowledge we have historically relied upon California 
decisions on the theory that our probate code was derived from the California 
Probate Code, and the decisions of the California courts construing parallel 
provisions were highly persuasive. Dainton v. Watson, 658 P.2d 79 (Wyo. 1983); 
Matter of Kimball's Estate, 583 P.2d 1274 (Wyo. 1978); Matter of Reed's Estate; 
In re Randall's Estate, 506 P.2d 432 (Wyo. 1973); Gaunt v. Kansas University 
Endowment Ass'n of Lawrence, Kansas, 379 P.2d 825 (Wyo. 1963); Wilson v. 
Martinez, 76 Wyo. 196, 301 P.2d 785 (1956); and Edelman v. Edelman, 65 Wyo. 271, 
199 P.2d 840 (Wyo. 1948). While this approach has been taken in the history of 
our probate law, we have recognized, in this instance, there is no need to turn 
to California law. We conclude adjustments in the probate code of our state and 
that of California cause us to no longer treat California precedent as having 
additional persuasive authority with respect to Wyoming probate statutes. 
California cases will hereafter be afforded the same persuasive weight as those 
of any other sister jurisdiction.

[¶21]   The Zelikovitz children, as they 
did in the probate court, rely heavily upon the application of Oklahoma law. For 
the reasons already articulated, we see no need to turn to the law of Oklahoma 
to resolve this case. Consequently, we do not do so.

[¶22]   Because the second codicil to the 
Will was executed in accordance with the appropriate laws of the State of 
Wyoming, we hold it should have been admitted to probate in Teton County. The 
Order Granting Petition to Revoke Probate of Second Codicil is reversed, and 
this case is remanded to the probate court in Teton County for further 
proceedings in the administration of the estate.

FOOTNOTES

1 The Grove Tag Agency, on 
behalf of the State of Oklahoma, issued car, boat, and motor vehicle 
registration as well as driver licenses.

2 WYO. STAT. § 2-6-113 
(1980) relates to holographic wills and is not relevant to this 
determination.