Title: STATE v FRY

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

81-399 I N THE SUPREME COURT O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1982 STATE O F MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, VS. STEVE A L L E N FRY, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of Missoula Honorable Jack Green, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: H i r s t , Dostal & Withrow, Missoula, Montana Lon Withrow argued, Missoula, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Robert L. Deschamps, 111, County Attorney, Missoula, Montana E. McLean argued, Deputy County Attorney, Missoula, Montana Submitted: February 22, 1982 ~ e c i d e d : March 25, 1982 Filed: MAR 2 5 29bZ Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea delivered the Opinion of the Court. The defendant appeals from an order of the Missoula County District Court revoking a ten year suspended sentence and ordering him to prison. At the hearing in which the ten year suspended sentence was imposed, the defendant neither had a lawyer nor waived his right to a lawyer. We therefore vacate the order imposing the ten year suspended sentence, and we order that the defendant be released from custody and from any restraints imposed as a result of his guilty plea and the subsequent judgment imposed on April 7, 1975. This situation arises after the defendant was first given a three year deferred sentence on April 7, 1975, for felony sale of marijuana and a concurrent one year deferred sentence for misdemeanor possession of marijuana. Defendant was again arrested on February 6, 1976, for possessing marijuana and was jailed for thirteen days in the Missoula County jail before he first appeared in court. The defendant alleges and the State does not deny that after his arrest, the arresting officers told him that "if he played his cards right and cooperated with the Region 1 Anti-Drug Team, he'd receive a lighter sentence." The defendant apparently agreed, and he was released on occasion during the next thirteen days apparently for the purpose of selling or buying drugs for the Anti-Drug Team. The record is silent on the extent of the defendant's cooperation during this thirteen day period, and we are unable to determine how often the defendant was released from jail, how closely he was supervised, and whether he had access to attorneys during this time. The only thing that is clear is that when he o b l i q u e l y admitted a probation v i o l a t i o n on March 4 , 1976, which r e s u l t e d i n a revocation of t h e t h r e e y e a r d e f e r r e d sentence and t h e s u b s t i t u t i o n of a t e n y e a r suspended sentence i n its s t e a d , he n e i t h e r had an a t t o r n e y nor waived h i s r i g h t t o an a t t o r n e y . The following e v e n t s l e d t o t h e imposition of t h e t e n year suspended sentence on March 4, 1976. On February 19, 1976, t h e defendant appeared before Judge Green pursuant t o t h e S t a t e ' s p e t i t i o n t o revoke h i s d e f e r r e d imposition of sentence. H e informed Judge Green t h a t he wished t o be represented by counsel, b u t t h a t he could n o t a f f o r d it because he had l o s t h i s job while i n j a i l . Judge Green allowed t h e defendant t i m e t o seek t h e a i d of a p u b l i c defender, b u t on February 23, 1976, t h e p u b l i c defender informed Judge Green t h a t t h e defendant was i n e l i g i b l e f o r a p u b l i c defender because he made t o o much money. On March 4 , 1976, t h e defendant appeared before Judge Brownlee without t h e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel. Judge Brownlee inquired whether t h e defendant w a s represented by counsel, and upon f i n d i n g o u t t h a t he was n o t , made no f u r t h e r inquiry. Judge Brownlee then noted t h a t p l e a bargaining had occurred, placed t h e defendant on probation, and gave t h e defendant a t e n year suspended sentence. More than f o u r y e a r s l a t e r , on May 4, 1981, t h e defendant, represented by r e t a i n e d counsel, appeared before Judge Henson pursuant t o a p e t i t i o n by t h e S t a t e t o revoke t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s suspension of t h e t e n y e a r sentence because he a l l e g e d l y v i o l a t e d t h e conditions of h i s probation. On June 1, 1981, t h e defendant moved Judge Green t o s t r i k e its p r i o r revocation of t h e d e f e r r e d imposition of sentence because he had been without t h e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel, b u t ~ u d g e Green denied t h i s motion on t h e b a s i s t h a t it appeared t h e defendant had been advised of his right to counsel, designated him a nondangerous offender, and sentenced him to ten years in prison. The defendant asks this Court to vacate the sentence because he was denied his right to counsel at the hearing before Judge Brownlee on the petition to revoke his deferred imposition of sentence. He further asks that we dismiss the case because by the time the petition to revoke the suspended ten year sentence was filed (May 4, 1981) he had already successfully completed the three year probation imposed under the April 7, 1975 judgment. Because we agree with defendant that the March 4, 1976 judgment imposing the ten year suspended sentence is void, we further agree that the proper action is to order the defendant released from custody and to declare that he has successfully completed the three year probation which began on April 7, 1975. The defendant also presents other issues which we find no need to consider since our decision on the right to counsel is dispositive of this case. A defendant is entitled to assistance of counsel, either retained or appointed, at a hearing on revocation of probation and resentencing. Unless the record reflects a valid waiver of the right to counsel, a lawyer must be afforded at a sentencing hearing regardless of whether the hearing is labeled a revocation of probation or a deferred sentencing. Petition of Brittingham (1970), 155 Mont. 525, 473 P.2d 830; Petition of Kelly (1969), 153 Mont. 448, 456 P.2d 57. The State argues that the defendant cannot properly raise the claim that he was denied the right to counsel, because he admitted violating the terms of his probation. The S t a t e argues t h a t such an admission has t h e s a m e e f f e c t as a g u i l t y p l e a which precludes t h e defendant from claiming a d e n i a l of h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s before e n t r y of h i s admission. The S t a t e erroneously cites s e v e r a l cases f o r t h i s proposition: T o l l e t t v. Henderson (1973), 4 1 1 U.S. 258, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235; Brady v. United S t a t e s (1970), 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747; McMann v. Richardson (1970), 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1 4 4 1 , 25 L.Ed.2d 763; Parker v. North Carolina (1970), 397 U.S. 790, 90 S.Ct. 1458, 25 L.Ed.2d 785; S t a t e v. ~ i l t o n (19791, - Mont . - , 597 P.2d 1171, 36 St.Rep. 1314; S t a t e v. Turcotte (1974), 164 Mont. 426, 524 P.2d 787. These cases a r e not c o n t r o l l i n g precedent, however, because they involved s i t u a t i o n s i n which t h e defendants pled g u i l t y -- on t h e advice of counsel - and w e r e t h e r e f o r e precluded from a s s e r t i n g t h a t t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s had been v i o l a t e d before they had entered t h e i r g u i l t y pleas. I n T o l l e t t v. Henderson, supra, 4 1 1 U.S. a t 267, t h e Court s t a t e d : "We t h u s r e a f f i r m t h e p r i n c i p l e recognized i n t h e Brady t r i l o g y : a g u i l t y p l e a r e p r e s e n t s a break i n t h e chain of events which has preceded it i n t h e criminal process. When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted i n open c o u r t t h a t he i s i n f a c t g u i l t y of t h e offense with which he i s charged, he may not t h e r e a f t e r r a i s e independent claims r e l a t i n g t o t h e deprivation of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i q h t s t h a t occurred p r i o r t o t h e e n t r y of t h e g u i l t y plea. - ~ e --- may only a t t a c k t h e voluntarv and i n t e l l i a e n t c h a r a c t e r of t h e - - - * - -- g u i l t y plea by showing -- t h a t t h e advice he received from c o u n s e l w a s -- n o t within t h e s t a n d a r d s s e t f o r t h i n McMann." (Emphasis added.) - H e r e , t h e defendant a t t a c k s t h e voluntary and i n t e l l i g e n t c h a r a c t e r of h i s admission t o t h e a l l e g e d probation v i o l a t i o n s by a showing t h a t he was forced t o a c t without t h e advice of counsel. This i s s u e is properly r a i s e d . The record r e f l e c t s t h a t on February 19, 1976, t h e defendant was t o receive t h e a s s i s t a n c e of a public defender, b u t on February 2 3 , 1976, t h e defendant reappeared i n Judge Green's c o u r t only t o l e a r n t h a t t h e p u b l i c defender d i d not consider him e l i g i b l e f o r court-appointed a s s i s t a n c e . The t r i a l c o u r t made no independent determination of t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s e l i g i b i l i t y , and t h e case w a s continued f o r a week s o t h a t t h e defendant could o b t a i n an a t t o r n e y . When t h e defendant returned t o Judge Brownlee's c o u r t on March 4 , 1976, without a n a t t o r n e y , t h e following exchange took p l a c e between t h e c o u r t , t h e prosecutor, and t h e defendant: "THE COURT: Cause 4501; Steve Allen Fry. "MR. McLEAN: Your Honor, i f it p l e a s e t h e Court, M r . Fry is p r e s e n t i n t h e courtroom here. I have been t a l k i n g w i t h N r . Anderson about t h i s case, and w e would l i k e an opportunity t o d i s c u s s t h e m a t t e r with you before w e hear h i s m a t t e r , i f w e could have it set f o r l a t e r today o r a t t h e end of t h i s morning's calendar. "THE COURT: Is M r . Fry represented by counsel? "MR. McLEAN: Not a t t h i s t i m e , Your Honor. "THE COURT: J u s t be s e a t e d , then." (45 minutes l a t e r . ) "THE COURT: Cause 4501; t h e Defendant i s Steve Allen Fry. "For t h e record, t h e Court has had some plea- bargaining c o n s u l t a t i o n with t h e Defendant, t h e County-Attorney, and t h e o f f i c e r from t h e Region I Anti-Drug Team, and it is m y understanding, M r . Fry, t h a t you have admitted t h e v i o l a t i o n s t h a t you have been accused of here; i s t h a t r i g h t ? "DEFENDANT FRY: Y e s , sir. "MR. McLEAN: Excuse m e , Your Honor. For t h e record, he has n o t admitted t o t h e v i o l a t i o n s a s of today. "DEFENDANT FRY: I never appeared before you. "THE COURT: I t h i n k I misstated myself. You have admitted them and you are admitting them now. "DEFENDANT FRY: Y e s , sir, I guess. "THE COURT: And, by doing that, you recognize that then it becomes my duty to impose some sentence on you. "DEFENDANT FRY: Yes, sir. This record provides no basis for concluding that the defendant waived his right to counsel. The State argues that the defendant, upon learning that he was ineligible for court-appointed assistance, refused to hire an attorney and chose to proceed pro se, but the record is silent on this -- issue. The defendant was not questioned in regard to his indigency, nor did the court receive any type of financial statement from him. Where a public defender refuses to represent a defendant, the District Court must inquire further. Sections 46-8-104, MCA (court may appoint counsel in any post-conviction proceeding), and 46-8-111, MCA (court shall receive a verified financial statement in order to determine indigency); Petition of Kelly, supra. We hold that the sentence imposed under these circum- stances is void because the defendant was deprived of counsel at a vital step in the criminal process, and that the defendant has successfully completed the probationary period that was imposed along with the deferred impositions of sentence. The judgment is vacated and the proceedings are ordered dismissed. W e Concur: Chief J u s t i c e 1 7 U s tices