Title: Sam Wyly v. Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman, LLP

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 62  
Sam Wyly, 
            Appellant, 
        v. 
Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman, 
LLP, et al., 
            Respondents.
Luke A. McGrath, for appellant.
Barry A. Weprin, for respondents.  
READ, J.:
Petitioner Sam Wyly was an absent class member in a
federal securities class action lawsuit; an absent class member
is a member of a putative or certified class who is not a named
party (see Hansberry v Lee, 311 US 32, 40-41 [1940]). 
Respondents Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman, LLP; Stull, Stull &
Brody; and Schiffrin & Barroway, LLP (collectively, the law
firms) served as class counsel in the litigation.  In this
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No. 62
1The company subsequently changed its name to CA, Inc.
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appeal, we are asked whether Wyly -- like a represented party in
traditional individual litigation -- enjoys a presumptive right
of access to the law firms' case files upon the representation's
termination (see Matter of Sage Realty Corp. v Proskauer Rose
Goetz & Mendelsohn, 91 NY2d 30 [1997]).  We hold  that Wyly does
not possess a presumptive right of access, and further conclude
that the Appellate Division did not abuse its discretion when it
denied Wyly access to the requested records.
I.
In April 2000, Wyly acquired 971,865 stock options in
Computer Associates International, Inc. (CA),1 a large, publicly
traded provider of information technology management software,
when he sold his software business to CA.  As a result of this
transaction, Wyly became a major shareholder in CA.    
Between 1998 and 2002, several federal securities class
actions were commenced against CA in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York.  The first 11
lawsuits, brought in 1998, were consolidated into a single class
action under the auspices of District Court Judge Thomas C.
Platt, who designated Milberg Weiss and Stull, Stull & Brody as
co-lead class counsel.  Thirteen additional class actions were
begun in 2002.  These lawsuits were consolidated into another
single class action by the same Judge, who designated Milberg
Weiss and Schiffrin & Barroway as co-lead counsel.  The lawsuits
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alleged generally that CA and certain of its officers and
directors had violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by
engaging in questionable accounting practices to improve the
appearance of CA's financial performance and condition.  
In December 2003, after a fairness hearing (see 
FRCP 23 [e] [2]), the District Court certified the 1998 and 2002
class actions for purposes of settlement "on behalf of all
persons or entities who purchased or transacted in common stock
of CA or common stock options during the period January 20, 1998
through and including February 25, 2002 and who sustained damages
as a result of such transactions," and approved the proposed
settlement.  Wyly was a member of the settlement class.  Pursuant
to the settlement's terms, CA made 5.7 million shares of its
common stock available to the settlement class and certain of its
officers and directors received broad releases of civil
liability.  The law firms were awarded 1,443,673 of these shares
in fees, and $3,181,486.94 (subject to a cap of 150,000 shares)
as reimbursement of expenses.  The District Court retained
"[e]xclusive jurisdiction . . . over the parties and the
Settlement Class Members for all matters relating to the
Actions."   
On October 18, 2004, P. Kent Correll of Bickel &
Brewer, representing Wyly, wrote to Barry A. Weprin of Milberg
Weiss, claiming that the class action settlement was "likely
procured by fraud upon shareholders, their counsel and the
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No. 62
2Rule 60 (b) states the grounds on which a District Court
may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final
judgment, order or proceeding, which include newly discovered
evidence and fraud.
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Court."  He noted that CA's former general counsel -- who pleaded
guilty to conspiracy to commit securities fraud and obstruction
of justice in September 2004 -- admitted that he had impeded the
government's investigation of CA's accounting practices.  Correll
also asserted that Weprin had told him on October 4, 2004 "that
neither you nor your firm knew" of the existence of 23 boxes of
"crucial" CA documents until September 2004, when an article in
the Wall Street Journal reported their sudden appearance at the
offices of the outside law firm retained by CA's Board of
Directors.  Stating that "we believe . . . a motion should be
filed with [the District Court Judge] pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60
(b) to relieve plaintiffs from the final judgment approving the
settlement," Correll asked Weprin what his position was regarding
this proposed action.2  On November 24, 2004, Weprin informed
Correll that the law firms would not move to reopen the judgment
of settlement; he also subsequently declined to provide Correl
with a requested affidavit.
 
On December 7, 2004, Bickel & Brewer filed a Rule 60
(b) motion in the District Court on behalf of Wyly, Cheryl Wyly
and other entities connected with Wyly (collectively, the Wyly
movants), who were all members of the settlement class.  The Wyly
movants sought to vacate the final judgment as to them on the
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No. 62
3Settlement shares were distributed to other class members
shortly after the Wyly movants sought Rule 60 (b) relief; their
shares were placed in the registry of the Court pursuant to Court
order. 
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grounds of new evidence, misconduct and fraud upon the Court. 
They also asked for expedited discovery in support of their
motion; CA objected to their discovery requests.  At the time the
Wyly movants made their motion, they estimated that they were
entitled to roughly 1% of the shares that were about to be
distributed to class members to carry out the settlement; these
shares, in total, were thought to be worth about $120 million in
December 2004.3
  
On January 24, 2005, while the Wyly movants' Rule 60
(b) motion was pending, William A. Brewer III of Bickel & Brewer
wrote to Melvyn I. Weiss of Milberg Weiss and requested 
"access to and a right to review documents reflective
of Class Counsel's pre-trial investigations related to
the Class Actions; all the discovery produced or taken
in the Class Actions; and all requests for discovery,
indices, summaries, or other materials created by Class
Counsel in relation to the Class Actions."
Brewer asserted that the Wyly movants were entitled to these
documents because the law firms "had an attorney-client
relationship with the Wyly Movants, as substantial members of the
Settlement Class, at least through the negotiation and execution
of the settlement documents, the fairness hearing, and the entry
of the final judgments in the Class Actions."
Weprin informed Brewer on January 28, 2005 that the law 
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firms would not respond to his request until the District Court
ruled on the "matters currently being briefed, including [the
Wyly movants'] application for discovery."  In a February 8, 2005
letter to Weprin, Brewer reiterated that he was seeking the
documents based on the Wyly movants' attorney-client relationship
with Milberg Weiss; therefore, he considered the District Court's
prospective ruling on discovery to be "irrelevant."  
In a February 28, 2005 letter to Weiss, Brewer again
pressed his case, asserting that the law firms' files were needed
to counter opposition to the Wyly movants' Rule 60 (b) motion and
related discovery requests.  Specifically, he claimed, the
opposing parties were arguing that the law firms had neglected to
pursue discovery diligently in the class actions, and that this
excused CA's nondisclosure of the 23 boxes "before, during, and
after the settlement negotiations."
By that time, the District Court Judge had already
referred the discovery issues related to the Rule 60 (b) motion
to a federal magistrate.  On June 14, 2005, the Judge ordered the
Wyly movants to serve CA with a notice of production making the
23 boxes of documents returnable to the Court on July 1, 2005. 
Wyly acknowledges that, as a consequence of this federal court
order, he "obtained some of the materials that he sought from
Class Counsel."  But he complains that the law firms still
"refused to produce the most critical category of documents
within [their] Class Action Files: Class Counsel's work product
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No. 62
4In late 2007, Wyly also commenced a malpractice action
against the law firms in Supreme Court.  Invoking the All Writs
Act, the law firms applied to the District Court for an
injunction barring Wyly from pursuing this action; the parties
ultimately agreed to stay the malpractice action pending the
Second Circuit's determination of the Wyly movants' appeal of the
District Court's August 2007 order denying their Rule 60 (b)
motion.  The Second Circuit heard this appeal in March 2009.
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and analysis."
On August 2, 2007, the District Court Judge denied the
Wyly movants' Rule 60 (b) motions and related discovery requests. 
In a subsequent order dated September 12, 2007, he reiterated
that they had 
"failed to set forth cause to permit further discovery
to be conducted in conjunction with their 60 (b)
motions.  This Court has repeatedly made clear that
additional discovery was to be confined to the 'fraud'
alleged to be within the '23 boxes.'  To date, . . .
[the Wyly movants have not] produced any 'new' evidence
of fraud upon this Court and consequently, have failed
to establish that the contents of the '23 boxes'
allegedly withheld during discovery and prior to
settlement warranted granting further discovery and the
reopening of the 2003 Settlement" (Matter of Computer
Assoc. Class Action Sec. Litig., 2007 WL 2713336, *3,
2007 US Dist LEXIS 67928, *12-13 [ED NY 2007]).
The Wyly movants' subsequently appealed the Judge's order to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
On April 1, 2005 -- while the Rule 60 (b) motion was
pending in the District Court -- Wyly commenced this CPLR article
4 special proceeding in Supreme Court.4  He sought a judgment
directing the law firms to "turn over their class files (or
copies thereof)," including "all e-mails, attorneys' notes, 
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internal memoranda, document requests, indices, privilege logs,
drafts and research related to [the law firms'] representation of
[Wyly] and other class members in their prosecution of the Class
Actions."  Wyly contended that, as a member of the settlement
class, he "enjoy[ed] all privileges and rights pursuant to the
attorney-client relationship between [the law firms] and
Settlement Class members."  Thus, the law firms were, Wyly
argued, "obligated to . . . provide [him] with access to all
documents, discovery materials, and attorney work product that
was received, created, or maintained for the benefit of the
entire Settlement Class."  In answer to Wyly's petition, the law
firms asserted that his claims were barred by the attorney work-
product privilege.
Both parties recognized that the outcome of Wyly's
petition would likely turn on the lower court's understanding and
application of our decision in Sage Realty.  There, we joined the
"majority of courts and State legal ethics advisory bodies,"
which take the position that "upon termination of the attorney-
client relationship, where no claim for unpaid legal fees is
outstanding," a client is "presumptively accord[ed] . . . full
access to the entire attorney's file on a represented matter with
narrow exceptions" (Sage Realty, 91 NY2d at 34).
  
The petitioners in Sage Realty retained Proskauer to
represent them in a multi-million dollar mortgage financing and a
restructuring of ownership interests, all involving New York City
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No. 62
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properties.  After a falling out with Proskauer, the petitioners
retained a different firm to represent them in the transaction. 
Proskauer refused to turn over certain documents relating to its
representation of the petitioners, prompting them to commence a
special proceeding to recover the documents.  
"Barring a substantial showing by [former counsel] of
good cause to refuse client access," we stated, a client "should
be entitled to inspect and copy work product materials, for the
creation of which they paid during the course of the firm's
representation" (id. at 37).  We observed that, especially in
complex transactions, the "client's need for access to a
particular paper cannot be demonstrated except in the most
general terms, in the absence of prior disclosure of the content
of the very document to which access is sought" (id. at 36).  By
contrast, "[t]he attorney in possession of the contents of the
file is in a far better position to demonstrate that a particular
document would furnish no useful purpose in serving the client's
present needs for legal advice" (id.).   
In February 2007 -- prior to the District Court's
resolution of the Wyly movants' Rule 60 (b) motion -- Supreme
Court granted Wyly's petition and ordered the law firms "to turn
over their files in the consolidated class actions" to him within
45 days of the court's order (Wyly v Milberg Weiss Bershad &
Schulman, LLP, 15 Misc 3d 583, 592 [Sup Ct, NY County 2007]). 
The court specifically directed the law firms to make available
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"the withheld documents containing work product, except for those
documents for which they provide a privilege log in compliance
with CPLR 3122 (b)" (id. at 592-593).
In Supreme Court's view, Wyly's "relationship with [the
law firms was] sufficiently similar to a traditional attorney-
client relationship so as to create a presumption in favor of
affording him access to [the law firms'] files in accordance with
Sage Realty" (id. at 590 [emphasis added]).  The court noted
that, as a member of the settlement class, Wyly was "bound by the
judgment obtained as a result of the settlement unless he
obtain[ed] relief via his rule 60 (b) motion," and the law firms'
files were "not only potentially relevant to that motion but also
could provide a basis for a legal malpractice action against
[them]." (id. at 590-591).  Thus, Wyly had demonstrated "both a
legitimate need and a legal basis for obtaining the documents at
issue" (id. at 591).
On the law firms' subsequent appeal, the Appellate
Division reversed Supreme Court.  Sage Realty was
distinguishable, the court reasoned, because it "involved an
attorney-client relationship in the traditional sense, in that
the single voice of a client governs, among other things, the
lawyer's conduct; the direction of a case, including any decision
on when, if, and under what terms it should be settled; and the
attorney's continued employment," which "differs fundamentally"
from the relationship between class counsel and an absent class
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member (Wyly v Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman, LLP, 49 AD3d 85,
90 [1st Dept 2007]).
The Appellate Division acknowledged that absent class
members are "entitled to some of the benefits of the attorney-
client relationship, such as the right to privileged
communications with class counsel and the prohibition against
attempts by defendants' counsel to communicate with [them]" (id.
at 91-92), but may not "direct the course of the litigation,
testify at trial, participate in discovery, or dismiss class
counsel" (id. at 92).  The court further noted that class members
could hire their own counsel if they "wish[] to employ a
traditional attorney-client relationship, although [their] input
into the litigation would . . . [be] curtailed," or could even
"opt out of the class action altogether" (id.).  The Appellate
Division therefore "reject[ed] a blanket extension of Sage
Realty's presumptive-entitlement right to absent class members,
and f[ound] that the better practice [was] to require absent
class members to establish their entitlement to class counsel's
file on a case-by-case basis" (id.).
The Appellate Division then concluded that, in light of
the facts in this case, Wyly had not established his entitlement
to the law firms' files; indeed, he was
"granted access, by the District Court, to the vast
majority of the material in [the law firms'] files,
including discovery materials, as well as the
mysterious 23 boxes previously withheld by CA.  [Wyly],
armed with those volumes of documents, still offers
nothing, other than mere speculation, that the work
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product he seeks will convince the District Court, or
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, that his rule 60 (b) motion should have been
granted, and we decline to countenance [Wyly's] use of
this article 4 proceeding as a vehicle to launch a
fishing expedition.  Moreover, as already noted, [the
District Court Judge], in his . . . orders denying
[Wyly's] 60 (b) motion, made it very clear that [his]
moving papers failed to set forth cause to permit
further discovery" (id. [quotation marks omitted]).
We granted Wyly's motion for permission to appeal, and now
affirm.
II.
A class action is an exception to the rule "that one is
not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he
is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a
party by service of process" (Hansberry, 311 US at 40).  The
class action "was an invention of equity to enable it to proceed
to a decree in suits where the number of those interested in the
subject of the litigation is so great that their joinder as
parties in conformity to the usual rules of procedure is
impracticable" (id. at 41).  The absent individuals "would be
bound by the decree so long as the named parties adequately
represented the absent class and the prosecution of the
litigation was within the common interest" (Phillips Petroleum
Co. v Shutts, 472 US 797, 808 [1985]).
Modern class actions serve several important purposes,
as explained by the United States Supreme Court in Phillips
Petroleum: they "permit[] litigation of a suit involving common
questions when there are too many plaintiffs for proper joinder"
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and "also may permit the plaintiffs to pool claims which would be
uneconomical to litigate individually" (id. at 809).  The
statutes governing class actions are designed to achieve these
goals while ensuring "proper representation of the absent
plaintiffs' interest" (id.).  
The Court further elaborated on the unique status of
absent class-action plaintiffs as follows:
"They need not hire counsel or appear.  They
are almost never subject to counterclaims or
cross-claims, or liability for fees or costs. 
Absent plaintiff class members are not
subject to coercive or punitive remedies. 
Nor will an adverse judgment typically bind
an absent plaintiff for any damages, although
a valid adverse judgment may extinguish any
of the plaintiff's claims which were
litigated.
". . . [A]n absent class-action
plaintiff is not required to do anything.  He
may sit back and allow the litigation to run
its course, content in knowing that there are
safeguards provided for his protection.  In
most class actions an absent plaintiff is
provided at least with an opportunity to 'opt
out' of the class, and if he takes advantage
of that opportunity he is removed from the
litigation entirely" (id. at 810-811).
In short, "[a]bsent class members occupy a special,
nontraditional status in litigation" (Newberg on Class Actions §
1:3, at 19 [4th ed]).  As the Restatement (Third) of The Law
Governing Lawyers § 14, comment f (2000), explains,
"[c]lass actions may pose difficult questions of
client identification.  For many purposes, the named
class representatives are the clients of the lawyer for
the class . . . Yet class members who are not named
representatives also have some characteristics of
clients.  For example, their confidential
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communications directly to the class lawyer may be
privileged . . ., and opposing counsel may not be free
to communicate with them directly . . .
"Lawyers in class actions must sometimes deal with
disagreements within the class and breaches by the
named parties of their duty to represent class members. 
Although class representatives must be approved by the
court, they are often initially self-selected, selected
by their lawyer, or even (when a plaintiff sues a class
of defendants) selected by their adversary.  Members of
the class often lack the incentive or knowledge to
monitor the performance of the class representatives. 
Although members may sometimes opt out of the class,
they may have no practical alternative other than
remaining in the class if they wish to enforce their
rights.  Lawyers in class actions thus have duties to
the class as well as to the class representatives.
"A class-action lawyer may therefore be privileged
or obliged to oppose the views of the class
representatives after having consulted with them.  The
lawyer may also propose that opposing positions within
the class be separately represented, that sub-classes
be created, or that other measures be taken to ensure
broader class participation.  Withdrawal may be an
option . . ., but one that is often undesirable because
it may leave the class without effective
representation.  The lawyer should act for the benefit
of the class as its members would reasonably define
that benefit."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit made similar observations in its 2002 Task Force Report
on Selection of Class Counsel:
"In class actions, the ordinary assumptions about the
attorney-client relationship do not apply.
". . .
"Counsel for a class is in a unique position. 
Absent class members are not individual clients.  Thus,
the ordinary attorney-client relationship does not
exist between each class member and class counsel. 
Yet, there clearly is a duty imposed upon class counsel
-- by the rules of professional conduct and by Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23 -- to protect the entire class fairly and
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adequately and to work diligently to maximize class
recovery" (Third Circuit Task Force Report on Selection
of Class Counsel, 208 FRD 340, 347-348 [Jan. 15,
2002]).
In Van Gemert v Boeing Co. (590 F2d 433, 440 n 15 [2d
Cir 1978], affd 444 US 472 [1980]), the Second Circuit rejected
the "argument that there is no attorney-client relationship
between the absentees and class counsel."  The court stated that
"[a] certification under Rule 23 (c) makes the Class the
attorney's client for all practical purposes . . . The judgment
in a class action is not secure from collateral attack unless the
absentees were adequately and vigorously represented" (id.,
citing Developments in the Law: Class Actions, 89 Harv L Rev
1318, 1592-1597 [1976]; Gonzales v Cassidy, 474 F2d 67, 75-76
[5th Cir 1973]).  Similarly, in Greenfield v Villager Indus.,
Inc. (483 F2d 824, 832 [3d Cir 1973]), the Third Circuit
emphasized that
"[r]esponsibility for compliance [with the procedural
rules governing class actions] is placed primarily upon
the active participants in the lawsuit, especially upon
counsel for the class, for, in addition to the normal
obligations of an officer of the court, and as counsel
to parties to the litigation, class action counsel
possess, in a very real sense, fiduciary obligations to
those not before the court" (emphasis added).
Thus, two general propositions emerge from the case
law: "class counsel do not possess a traditional attorney-client
relationship with absent class members" (Matter of Community Bank
of N. Va., 418 F3d 277, 313 [3d Cir 2005]); and they represent
the interests of and owe a fiduciary duty to the entire class
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(see Daniels v City of New York, 199 FRD 513, 515 [SD NY 2001];
Matter of Shell Oil Refinery, 152 FRD 526, 528 [ED La 1989]).  In
sum, while absent class members are clients of class counsel,
they are a unique species of client.  
In our view, the class counsel-absent class member
relationship is simply too unlike the traditional attorney-client
relationship to support extending the Sage Realty presumption to
absent class members.  We justified the Sage Realty presumption
in part because it "more closely conform[ed] to the position
taken by the courts of this State on the client's broad rights to
the contents of the file" when the attorney is dismissed on a
matter still pending (Sage Realty, 91 NY2d at 36).  In a class
action, however, an absent class member does not possess a "broad
right[]" of access to the files of a class counsel dismissed by
the trial court during the litigation's pendency.  Further, a
class action by its very nature may involve thousands of absent
parties who are geographically dispersed.  As a consequence, to
endorse the Sage Realty presumption in this context would create
"the potential for class counsel to be unduly burdened, even
after the end of litigation, by a multitude of requests from
absent class members for counsel's entire file" (Wyly, 49 AD3d at
92). 
We are especially mindful of the paramount role the
trial court plays in managing a class action and protecting the
rights of absent class members (see Greenfield, 483 F2d at 832
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["[U]ltimate responsibility of course is committed to the
district court in whom, as the guardian of the rights of the
absentees, is vested broad administrative, as well as
adjudicative, power"]).  Indeed, in appointing class counsel in
the first instance, a federal court must take into account
numerous factors bearing on the adequacy of the prospective
representation (see FRCP 23 [g]).  This unusually high degree of
judicial involvement and responsibility is another distinctive
feature of a class action, which sets it apart from traditional
litigation.  It both diminishes an absent class member's need for
access to class counsel's files, and provides an alternative
avenue to obtain them.
We therefore conclude that where an absent class member
brings a CPLR article 4 special proceeding seeking access to
class counsel's litigation files after termination of the
representation, Supreme Court must first consider how much the
absent class member has at stake.  If (as the parties do not
dispute here) the absent class member has a substantial financial
interest in the class action's outcome, the court must then
decide whether the absent class member has demonstrated a
legitimate need for the requested documents.    
In this case, the Appellate Division decided that Wyly
had not made an adequate showing to compel the law firms to
produce their files; in particular, the law firms' work product
and analysis relating to the class actions.  Wyly sought these
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documents to support the Wyly movants' Rule 60 (b) motion and his
malpractice action against the law firms, allegedly for settling
the class actions too cheaply.  As the Appellate Division
observed, however, the District Court long ago granted Wyly
access to the 23 boxes that apparently triggered his suspicions
of fraud in the first place.  When Wyly was unable to convince
the District Court that anything in the 23 boxes, in fact,
suggested fraud, the Judge declined to order further discovery or
to reopen the 2003 settlement.  The District Court, which
supervised the class actions and has retained jurisdiction, is
responsible for protecting the interests of absent class members,
which includes monitoring the adequacy of class counsel's
performance.  We cannot say that the Appellate Division abused
its discretion by, in effect, declining to second-guess the
District Court's judgments.  
 
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be affirmed, with costs.
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Sam Wyly v Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman, LLP, et al.
No. 62 
SMITH, J.(dissenting):
I would hold that Wyly is entitled, as was the client
in Matter of Sage Realty Corp. v Proskauer Rose Goetz &
Mendelsohn (91 NY2d 30 [1997]), to review the work product he has
paid a significant sum for.
I acknowledge that not every class member in a case
like this has a Sage Realty right to review counsel's file.  The
vast majority of class members have only a nominal interest in
the case, and their contributions to the lawyers' fees are
accordingly minuscule.  To allow all of them access to lawyers'
work product would be impractical, and would invite abuse.  But
here, class counsel received a fee consisting of CA stock worth
approximately $40 million.  Wyly had acquired 971,865 CA options;
his counsel estimated at oral argument that Wyly's interest
represented 1% of the class.  It is thus inferable that class
counsel got for its efforts $400,000 of Wyly's money.
It is true that the relationship between class counsel
and class members differs from the classic attorney-client
relationship at issue in Sage Realty.  Wyly, unlike Sage Realty
Corporation, had no right to select the lawyers who represented
him, to accept or veto a settlement or to negotiate the amount of
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the lawyers' fees; he had only a right to make his views on those
issues known to the court, which had the power to decide them. 
But I do not see why those differences should destroy Wyly's Sage
Realty rights; if anything, they are a reason to give Wyly
greater protection.
A recurrent danger in class action practice -- a danger
all too often realized -- is that the lawyers' interests and
those of the class members will not be well aligned.  Affording a
Sage Realty right to a class member who has paid more than a de
minimis amount of the lawyers' fees could help to overcome that
problem.  It would be a good thing, I think, if the lawyers for a
class were always aware that class members with weighty interests
were entitled to scrutinize their work. 
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   * 
Order affirmed, with costs.  Opinion by Judge Read.  Judges
Ciparick, Graffeo, Pigott and Jones concur.  Judge Smith dissents
in an opinion.  Chief Judge Lippman took no part.
Decided May 7, 2009