Title: Idaho Dept. of Trans. v. Van Camp

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 38958 
 
IN THE MATTER OF THE DRIVER’S  
LICENSE SUSPENSION OF JOHNATHAN  
PAUL VAN CAMP. 
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IDAHO TRANSPORTATION  
DEPARTMENT, 
 
       Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
JOHNATHAN PAUL VAN CAMP,  
 
       Respondent.                            
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Boise, August 2012 Term 
 
2012 Opinion No.  128  
 
Filed:  November 14, 2012 
 
Stephen Kenyon, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, Ada County.  Hon. Kathryn Sticklen, Senior Judge. 
 
The decision of the district court is reversed and the case is remanded. 
 
Michael Kane & Associates, PLLC, Boise, for appellant.  Michael J. Kane argued. 
 
Law Offices of Jacob D. Deaton, Boise, for respondent.  Jacob D. Deaton argued. 
 
                     _______________________________________________ 
 
HORTON, Justice 
This appeal arises from the district court’s reversal of the Idaho Transportation 
Department’s (Department) suspension of Johnathan Paul Van Camp’s driver’s license 
subsequent to a urine analysis that revealed the presence of cyclobenzaprine in his system. The 
district court held that the Department had not properly shown that cyclobenzaprine is 
intoxicating. The Department timely appealed, arguing that the arresting officer’s observations of 
impairment, in combination with an evidentiary test revealing a drug in Van Camp’s system, 
were sufficient to permit an administrative license suspension. The Department asks this Court to 
reverse the district court’s decision vacating the suspension. We reverse. 
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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Van Camp was pulled over after making an illegal U-turn and subsequently arrested on 
suspicion of driving under the influence. The officer observed several outward indicators of 
impairment in Van Camp: his speech was thick and slurred, his eyes were red and watery, his 
mouth appeared to be dry, and there was a visible white film in the corners of his mouth. 
According to the arresting officer, Van Camp also seemed confused and disoriented and was 
unable to find his wallet, registration, or proof of insurance. Van Camp told the officer that he 
recently had his wallet out to buy cigarettes and proceeded to look for the wallet for several 
minutes, repeatedly checking the empty glove box. When asked how much alcohol he had 
consumed, Van Camp replied “None.” The officer asked Van Camp to exit the vehicle and 
perform the standardized field sobriety tests. Van Camp failed the gaze nystagmus, walk and 
turn, and one-leg stand tests. After the tests, the officer placed Van Camp under arrest for 
suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Van Camp submitted to a breath 
test, which did not show the presence of alcohol. Van Camp admitted to taking two prescription-
only drugs, cyclobenzaprine and Seroquel. Van Camp provided a urine sample, which, upon 
testing, showed the presence of cyclobenzaprine. 
After receiving the urine test results, the Department issued a Notice of Suspension, 
which ordered the suspension of Van Camp’s driving privileges for ninety days. Van Camp then 
requested an administrative hearing pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-8002A. At the hearing, Van 
Camp argued that in order to violate § 18-8002A “[t]here needs to be some written certification 
or some other standard stating the drug is intoxicating.” The hearing officer sustained the 
administrative license suspension, stating in his findings of fact that the observations by the 
officer of Van Camp’s outward impairment coupled with the test that showed the presence of the 
drug cyclobenzaprine were enough to show a violation of § 18-8002A. The district court 
reversed the hearing officer’s ruling and vacated the suspension on May 3, 2010. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court and this Court granted the Department’s 
petition for review. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
“When a case comes before this Court on a petition for review from a Court of Appeals 
decision, serious consideration is given to the views of the Court of Appeals, but this Court 
reviews the decision of the lower court directly.” Hoffer v. City of Boise, 151 Idaho 400, 402, 
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257 P.3d 1226, 1228 (2011) (citing Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 521, 236 P.3d 1277, 1281 
(2010)). When we review a district court’s decision in an appeal from an agency action, “we 
review the decision of the district court to determine whether it correctly decided the issues 
presented to it.” Elias-Cruz v. Idaho Dept. of Transp., 153 Idaho 200, ___, 280 P.3d 703, 705 
(2012) (citing Wright v. Bd. of Psychological Examiners, 148 Idaho 542, 544–45, 224 P.3d 1131, 
1133–34 (2010)). The interpretation of a statute is an issue of law over which this court exercises 
free review. Idaho Fair Share v. Idaho Pub. Util. Comm’n, 113 Idaho 959, 961-62, 751 P.2d 
107, 109-10 (1988). 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Van Camp failed to provide evidence sufficient to vacate the suspension. 
Van Camp argues that when the Department suspends an individual’s driver’s license for 
operating a motor vehicle under the influence of drugs, it must first show that that the drug at 
issue is intoxicating. Van Camp thus contends that because the statute applies only after the 
Department meets this threshold burden, where the Department does not show that the drug is 
intoxicating, it may not suspend the individual’s license.  
Idaho Code § 18-8002A governs administrative driver’s license suspensions for operating 
a motor vehicle under the influence of drugs. The statute provides that the Department “shall 
suspend” a person’s license once it receives a peace officer’s sworn statement that: 
[T]here existed legal cause to believe a person had been driving or was in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs or 
other intoxicating substances and that the person submitted to a test and the test 
results indicated an alcohol concentration or the presence of drugs or other 
intoxicating substances . . . . 
I.C. § 18-8002A(4)(a). The “shall suspend” language indicates that the suspension is mandatory 
if those requirements are met. See Paolini v. Albertson’s Inc., 143 Idaho 547, 549, 149 P.3d 822, 
824 (2006) (quoting Goff v. H.J.H. Co., 95 Idaho 837, 839, 521 P.2d 661, 663 (1974)). 
An individual whose license has been suspended may request a hearing to contest the 
suspension, but that individual bears the burden of proof at that hearing. I.C. §18-8002A(7). The 
statute further provides that the hearing officer may vacate the suspension only if the licensee 
proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that:1  
                                                 
1 Under Idaho Code § 18-8002A(7),  “. . . [t]he hearing officer shall not vacate the suspension” unless one of the 
five listed grounds has been proven by a preponderance of the evidence. (emphasis added). We have held that the 
words “shall not,” when used in a statute, constitute a mandatory obligation not to act. See, e.g., Cafferty v. Dep’t of 
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(a) The peace officer did not have legal cause to stop the person; or 
(b) The officer did not have legal cause to believe the person had been driving or 
was in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, 
drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of the provisions of section 18-
8004, 18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code; or 
(c) The test results did not show an alcohol concentration or the presence of drugs 
or other intoxicating substances in violation of section 18-8004, 18-8004C or 18-
8006, Idaho Code; or 
(d) The tests for alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating substances 
administered at the direction of the peace officer were not conducted in accordance 
with the requirements of section 18-8004(4), Idaho Code, or the testing equipment 
was not functioning properly when the test was administered; or 
(e) The person was not informed of the consequences of submitting to evidentiary 
testing as required in subsection (2) of this section. 
 
I.C. § 18-8002A(7). Thus, once a party elects to challenge a suspension by requesting a hearing, 
there are only five grounds upon which the suspension may be successfully challenged, and the 
hearing officer cannot vacate the suspension unless the licensee establishes the existence of one 
of those grounds. 
 
Here, subsection (c) is the only ground upon which this Court could affirm the district 
court’s order vacating Van Camp’s administrative suspension.2 Under subsection (c), the hearing 
officer may vacate a suspension if the licensee demonstrates that “[t]he test results did not show 
an alcohol concentration or the presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances . . . .” I.C. § 
18-8002A(7)(c). However, Van Camp has presented no evidence that cyclobenzaprine is not an 
intoxicating drug. Instead, he argues that the Department bears a threshold burden of production 
at the hearing to show that cyclobenzaprine is an intoxicating drug. Essentially, he contends that 
the absence of evidence demonstrating that cyclobenzaprine is intoxicating is sufficient to prove 
that the drug is not intoxicating. This is inconsistent with the plain language of subsection 7(c), 
which requires the licensee to affirmatively prove that the drug was not intoxicating. 
In support of his position, Van Camp relies upon this Court’s decision in Reisenauer v. 
State Department of Transportation, 145 Idaho 948, 188 P.3d 890 (2008). In that case, the driver 
submitted to a urine analysis, and the results showed the presence of Carboxy-THC. Id. at 949, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Transp., Div. of Motor Vehicle Servs., 144 Idaho 324, 329, 160 P.3d 763, 768 (2007); Payette River Prop. Owners 
Ass’n v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Valley Cnty., 132 Idaho 551, 557, 976 P.2d 477, 483 (1999) overruled on other grounds 
by City of Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906, 277 P.3d 353 (2012). Thus, the hearing officer’s power to vacate a 
suspension is limited to cases where the licensee satisfactorily proves one of the five requirements. 
2 Subsection (c) is the only potential ground because, on appeal, Van Camp has not advanced any argument that 
another subsection applies. 
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188 P.3d at 891. This substance is not a drug; it is merely a metabolite of marijuana. Id. at 950-
51, 188 P.3d at 892-93. Consequently, we held that Reisenauer met his burden under subsection 
7(c) to show that the test did not reveal the presence of a drug or other intoxicating substance. Id. 
at 952, 188 P.3d at 894. While there was some discussion in Reisenauer related to the general 
applicability of Idaho Code § 18-8002A, the district court’s decision to vacate the suspension 
was affirmed based upon the application of section 18-8002A(7)(c). Id. While we can understand 
why Van Camp would want to interpret Reisenauer as requiring the Department to meet a 
threshold burden, the factual situation and the actual holding of the case, do not support his 
proposition. We hold that Reisenauer does not provide an additional basis, independent of 
section 18-8002A(7), for vacating a suspension at a hearing. Therefore, we reverse the district 
court and remand with instructions to enter a judgment affirming the hearing officer’s order 
sustaining the suspension. 
B.  Van Camp is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
 
Van Camp requests costs and attorney fees on appeal. He is not entitled to costs and fees 
because he did not prevail in this appeal. However, even if he had prevailed, we would not award 
attorney fees because Van Camp cited no statute or authority in support of his request, but 
merely asked for an award of fees, asserting the Department’s appeal “lacks a reasonable basis in 
fact and law . . . .” Because Van Camp failed to cite any authority for awarding attorney fees, we 
would not have addressed the issue. PHH Mortg. Services Corp. v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631, 641, 
200 P.3d 1180, 1190 (2009) (citing Athay v. Stacey, 142 Idaho 360, 371, 128 P.3d 897, 908 
(2005); Bream v. Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364, 369-70, 79 P.3d 723, 728-29 (2003)). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We reverse the district court’s order reinstating Van Camp’s driving privileges because 
he failed to establish a proper ground to support an order vacating the suspension. Costs to the 
Department. 
 
Chief Justice BURDICK and Justices EISMANN, J. JONES and W. JONES CONCUR.