Title: People v. Henderson

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
PAUL NATHAN HENDERSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S098318 
 
Riverside County Superior Court 
INF027515 
 
 
July 30, 2020 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Liu, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred.   
 
1 
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
S098318 
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
Defendant Paul Nathan Henderson was convicted of the 
first degree murder of Reginald Baker, with special 
circumstances of commission during a robbery and burglary and 
an enhancement for personal use of a deadly weapon.  He was 
also convicted of attempted deliberate and premeditated murder 
of Peggy Baker, assault with force likely to produce great bodily 
injury, first degree robbery, first degree burglary, and other 
related offenses.1  Defendant separately admitted several prior 
convictions.2  The jury returned a verdict of death, and the court 
imposed that sentence along with a separate term of life with 
the possibility of parole for the attempted murder and a 
determinate term of 15 years on the remaining counts and 
enhancements.  This appeal is automatic.   
We conclude that defendant’s statements were improperly 
admitted in light of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 
(Miranda) and Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477 
(Edwards).  Reasonable doubt exists whether the jury would 
                                        
1  
Penal Code sections 187, 190.2, subdivision (a)(17)(A) and 
(G), 12022, subdivision (b), 187, 664, 245, subdivision (a)(1), 211, 
459; Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a).   
All subsequent undesignated statutory references are to 
the Penal Code.  To avoid potential confusion, we refer to the 
Bakers by their first names. 
2  
Sections 667, subdivisions (c) and (e), 1170.12, subdivision 
(c), 667.5, subdivisions (a) and (b).   
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
2 
have found him guilty had his statements been excluded.  
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment in its entirety and remand 
the case for further proceedings.       
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Guilt Phase 
1.  Prosecution 
Viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, the 
evidence presented at trial, including defendant’s statements, 
was as follows. 
a.  The Charged Crimes 
Late in the evening on June 22, 1997, 71-year-old Reginald 
and his wife Peggy were watching television in their Cathedral 
City mobile home.  Defendant entered and said, “ ‘Don’t yell or 
scream and no one will get hurt.’ ”  He held a knife to Reginald’s 
throat, demanded the car keys, and bound the victims.  Peggy 
pleaded that he remove Reginald’s gag, fearing he would be 
unable to breathe and suffer a heart attack.  Defendant refused 
and ordered Peggy to put a gag in her mouth.       
Defendant took the victims’ “bingo money” from a can on 
the dresser, looked through Peggy’s costume jewelry, and asked 
if they had any guns.  Peggy said that they did not and asked:  
“ ‘Why are you doing this?  We don’t have anything.’ ”  Defendant 
left Reginald kneeling on the floor and moved Peggy into the 
bathroom.  He rummaged around the home, went out to the 
victims’ car, then returned.  Peggy asked to leave the bathroom 
to check on her husband.  Defendant put his arm around her 
neck in a “strangle hold” and covered her nose with his hand.  
When Peggy struggled to break free, defendant “tried to crack” 
her neck.  He struck her on the head, knocking her to the 
ground.  Peggy lay still; when defendant lifted her arm, she let 
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
3 
it hang limply.  He covered Peggy with a sheet and left in the 
Bakers’ car, a maroon 1992 Chevrolet.   
Peggy went to Reginald, who appeared dead.  Unable to 
call 911 because defendant had disabled the telephone wires, 
Peggy went to the home of neighbor Morton Schuman.  She was 
so badly injured that Schuman did not recognize the “grotesque 
figure” in front of him.  Peggy was treated for a broken nose and 
multiple facial contusions. 
Responding officers found Reginald’s body in the 
ransacked residence.  There were two steak knives in the 
bedroom.  Reginald’s neck bore a four-inch cut about one-third 
of an inch deep.  The wound did not sever any major veins or 
arteries.  An autopsy revealed that Reginald’s severe heart 
disease, exacerbated by the stress of the attack, resulted in 
cardiac arrest.  
b.  Events Leading to Defendant’s Arrest   
Just after midnight on the night of the murder, Latesha 
Wasson and Dana Flowers were sitting in a car in Indio when 
defendant pulled up alongside them driving a large “burgundy” 
car.  Defendant said the car belonged to a woman who employed 
his mother.  Around 9:00 the next morning, a deputy sheriff 
patrolling in Desert Hot Springs spotted an African-American 
man driving a maroon Chevrolet similar to the Bakers’ stolen 
car.  The driver sped up, turned a corner, and spun out, hitting 
a street sign.  The deputy approached with his gun drawn, but 
the driver fled on foot.  The deputy was unable to identify the 
driver from a photographic lineup containing defendant’s 
picture.  The abandoned car belonged to the Bakers.   
Later that afternoon defendant appeared at the house of 
Tamara Elam and Michael White.  While defendant waited for 
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
4 
White to come home, he and Elam watched a news report about 
a local police chase.  Defendant admitted he was involved in the 
incident.   
In late June 1997, Gregory Clayton and defendant met at 
a homeless center in Los Angeles.  Clayton testified that 
defendant said several times he had killed someone.  He 
admitted entering a trailer home, cutting a man’s throat, 
beating his wife, and taking the victims’ maroon Chevrolet.  But, 
according to Clayton, defendant also said that two trained 
killers committed the crimes while he waited outside.  Clayton, 
who had been a police informant in the past, reported 
defendant’s admissions, describing him and giving his name as 
“Caylin Hawk.”  Police told Clayton the description he gave did 
not fit the person wanted for the crimes.  Clayton tried to get 
more details from defendant and then contacted the FBI, Crime 
Stoppers, a radio station, and a television outlet.  He inquired 
about the facts of the crimes, the description of the perpetrator, 
and whether there was a reward.  After defendant’s arrest, 
Clayton received a $1,000 reward. 
No fingerprint or biological evidence connected defendant 
to the murder scene or stolen car.   
c.  Defendant’s Statements to Police 
Defendant ultimately admitted the Baker crimes.  He 
initially claimed that he had used drugs that night and could 
not remember what happened.  He recalled seeing Reginald’s 
bloodied body and Peggy lying on the floor.  He admitted that he 
was the only one at the house. 
He eventually gave more details.  He had jumped a fence 
into the trailer park and tried to steal a car, but could not start 
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
5 
it.3  He saw the Bakers watching television, entered the home, 
and said he was there to rob them.  Peggy cried and said her 
husband had a heart condition.   
He ordered both victims into the bedroom and bound 
them.  Defendant took a small amount of money and tried to 
steal the television, but it was too heavy.  It appeared to him 
that Reginald was having a heart attack.  Finding that Reginald 
was not breathing, he covered him with a sheet.  He did not 
remember cutting Reginald’s throat.  Defendant saw blood on 
Peggy’s face but could not remember beating her.  He did recall 
seeing blood on his own gloved hands.  Peggy appeared to be 
dead, so he covered her with a sheet and fled in their car. 
Defendant could not explain why he had harmed the 
victims and insisted that it was not like him to be violent.  He 
expressed remorse and confirmed that he acted alone. 
d.  Peggy’s Description of Her Assailant 
During the assault Peggy got a clear look at the attacker’s 
face.  That night, Peggy told an officer that he had very pale, 
light skin, no facial hair, and no glasses.  The next morning she 
wrote the following description:  Black male, in his twenties, 
around five feet 10 inches tall, and clean shaven.  On June 25, 
1997, Peggy viewed a photographic lineup that did not include 
defendant.  The person in position four most resembled her 
assailant, but was not him.  On June 26, 1997, Peggy saw a 
second photographic lineup with defendant’s photograph in 
position five.  She excluded the first five people as her attacker.  
The man in position six bore the closest resemblance, but her 
                                        
3  
The ignition switch on another car in the trailer park had 
been tampered with, but the car was not stolen.    
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
6 
assailant had lighter skin and no facial hair.  At the preliminary 
hearing, Peggy testified that the intruder was “Caucasian,” but 
later described him as African American.  She did not identify 
defendant at the hearing.  She explained that her memory was 
poor due to chemotherapy treatments.  Peggy died before trial.  
A videotape of her preliminary hearing testimony was played for 
the jury. 
2. Defense Case 
Defendant testified on his own behalf in narrative form.4  
He claimed that two other men, Knuck and Leon, were the 
killers.  He had joined the two, believing they were going to a 
party.  They drove to the trailer park where Knuck entered one 
of the homes.  As Leon urged defendant to help him steal a car, 
Knuck approached and asked both men to help steal some 
property.  Defendant refused and said he wanted to leave.  
Knuck and Leon reentered the mobile home and defendant 
heard them hitting someone whose voice sounded like a 
woman’s.  Knuck and Leon emerged and stole the Bakers’ car.  
Defendant drove away in the car they had all arrived in. 
The three spent the rest of the evening together.  Knuck 
and Leon admitted what they had done in the mobile home.  
Knuck said Reginald escaped his bonds so Knuck beat him.  The 
next day defendant asked to borrow the Bakers’ car.  He 
encountered a police officer but evaded detection and drove in 
the other direction.  Based on Knuck and Leon’s story, defendant 
thought they had only committed auto theft and assault.  He 
saw no news coverage and decided to “be cool” and “keep [his] 
                                        
4  
See People v. Guzman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 915, 941–946; 
People v. Johnson (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 608, 629–630. 
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
7 
mouth shut.”  Two days later he went to Los Angeles and met 
Clayton.  By this time he had learned that Reginald was dead.  
He told Clayton about the crimes, but not that he had committed 
them. 
Defendant admitted that he had been convicted of robbery, 
several auto thefts, and being a felon in possession of a firearm.  
He had been released from prison just two weeks before the 
murder.  He acknowledged telling Detective Wolford that he was 
responsible for the Baker crimes, and agreed he did not mention 
Knuck.  At trial he refused to reveal Knuck’s last name. 
A photograph taken one week before the crimes showed 
defendant with a mustache and goatee.  Latesha Wasson 
recalled defendant had the same facial hair on the night of the 
murder, and Clayton confirmed that defendant wore a mustache 
and possibly a goatee when they met in late June 1997.   
B.  Penalty Phase 
1.  Prosecution 
The prosecution introduced evidence of defendant’s other 
crimes.  In January 1993, he stole a car and robbed a bank in 
Rancho Mirage.  A month later he stole a Mercedes at gunpoint.   
The prosecution also introduced evidence that, between 
1990 and 2000, defendant was involved in four fistfights with 
other inmates while incarcerated.  In 1992, defendant lunged at 
a prison doctor and required restraint. 
Reginald and Peggy’s son, Duane Baker, testified about 
the impact of the crimes.  Reginald married Peggy when Duane 
was five years old.  He was a wonderful husband, father, and 
grandfather, who was active in the community and volunteered 
at the fire department.  
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
8 
After Reginald’s death, Peggy was frightened to stay home 
alone, worried that defendant would return to kill her.  She lived 
with Duane for several weeks while he had her home cleaned 
and improved its security.  She returned home after defendant’s 
arrest.  Lonely without Reginald, she lost interest in 
volunteering, bingo, and her music group.  Peggy was diagnosed 
with cancer sometime in late 1998 or early 1999.  She had a 
difficult time dealing with her diagnosis without Reginald’s 
support.  Duane and his children also missed Reginald, 
particularly his smile.  According to Duane, Reginald “was a 
pretty happy guy most of the time and just that was a comfort.” 
2.  Defense 
Defendant represented himself at the penalty phase and 
presented no evidence. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
Defendant correctly argues that his statements were 
taken in violation of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel 
(Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436; Edwards, supra, 451 U.S. 477) 
because his unequivocal request for counsel was not honored. 
A. Background 
Defendant was arrested in the early morning of July 5, 
1997.  About five hours later, Detective Wolford and Officer 
Herrera of the Cathedral City Police Department interviewed 
him.  Defendant was read his Miranda rights and waived them 
both orally and in writing.  The officers said they were 
investigating crimes committed against the Bakers at The 
Canyon trailer park on June 22, 1997 and asked what he was 
doing that evening.  Defendant was reluctant to disclose his 
whereabouts.  After a series of questions, defendant admitted 
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
9 
being in Cathedral City.  When asked if he went to the trailer 
park, the following exchange occurred: 
“[Defendant:]  Uhm, there’s some things that I, uhm, want 
uh . . . 
“Det. Wolford:  Did you go into the trailer park, that night? 
“[Defendant:]  [Want,] uh, want to, speak to an attorney 
first, because I, I take responsibility for me, but there’s other 
people that . . . 
“Officer Herrera:  What do you . . . 
“[Defendant:]  . . . I need to find out . . . 
“Officer Herrera:  Paul. 
“[Defendant:]  . . . I need to find out. 
“Officer Herrera:  Paul, what do you accept responsibility 
for? 
“[Defendant:]  (No response) 
“Officer Herrera:  Do you accept responsibility for what 
happened inside that trailer park?  Is that what you[’re] talking 
about?  Do you accept responsibility . . . 
“[Defendant:]  I never 
“Officer Herrera:  You[’re] going to accept responsibility 
for what happened to that man?  And that woman?  We just 
talked about that, we just talked about that okay? 
“[Defendant:]  We just talked about. 
“Officer Herrera:  Then let’s just talk about that, okay?  We 
ain’t gonna talk about nothing else, but just that.  That’s the 
only thing that affects you, that’s all we can talk about.  This 
ain’t easy and we know this isn’t gonna be easy for you but, not 
everything, not every question here is going to be something 
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
10 
that you want to be asked, okay?  And they’re not going to be 
easy but this is what we got to do.”5    
The officers asked defendant several more times how he 
took responsibility.  They urged him to help himself and to think 
about his family.  They asked if the victims had angered him.  
They observed, “You are not taking any responsibility by saying 
you’re taking responsibility, that doesn’t do nothing.  It doesn’t 
do nothing man, you gotta tell us what happened.”  Eventually 
defendant admitted to committing the crimes, as recounted 
above.     
Defendant 
unsuccessfully 
moved 
to 
exclude 
his 
statements from evidence at the preliminary hearing and in a 
section 995 motion.  His renewed motion was denied at trial.  
The trial court found that defendant validly waived his Miranda 
rights and did not invoke his right to counsel later in the 
interview.  It explained:  “It may be also that [defendant] might 
have wanted an attorney before he said anything further to 
Detective Wolford and [Officer] Herrera, but that is not clear 
that that was his position.  It may also have been that he simply 
wanted to talk to an attorney about the issue of incriminating 
others at some point in time before he would answer any such of 
those questions.  [¶]  The bottom line to the court is that there 
are several reasonable interpretations that can be placed on Mr. 
                                        
5  
The next line of the transcript reflects Detective Wolford 
saying:  “Still want, help yourself, help, you gotta help yourself 
Paul.”  Our independent review of the audio recording raises a 
question whether the words “Still want” were in fact spoken by 
defendant, rather than Wolford.  But because the audiotape is 
of poor quality, and the issue was not litigated by the parties 
below, we will rely on the transcript as accepted by the trial 
court.  (People v. Molano (2019) 7 Cal.5th 620, 659.) 
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
11 
Henderson’s statement about an attorney, and that choice of 
reasonable interpretation suggests to me that his comment was 
not at all unambiguous or unequivocal as defined in the Davis 
[v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 452] case.”  The court further 
concluded that “I infer from the totality of circumstances in this 
transcript that the police did believe Mr. Henderson’s reluctance 
centered around incriminating others, and I further find that it 
was reasonable for them to believe that.” 
B. Invocation of the Right to Counsel 
Defendant does not challenge his initial Miranda waiver.  
He contends, however, that the officers violated Edwards, 
supra, 451 U.S. 477, by continuing to question him after he 
invoked his right to counsel.   
A defendant who has waived his Miranda rights may 
reinvoke them during the interrogation.  If he clearly and 
unequivocally does so, police must stop questioning.  (Edwards, 
supra, 451 U.S. at pp. 478–479, 482, 485; Miranda, supra, 384 
U.S. at pp. 473–474.)  Once a suspect has invoked his right to 
counsel, police may not resume questioning until counsel is 
provided or the suspect himself reinitiates contact.  (Edwards, 
at pp. 484–485; accord, People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 
384.)  “Edwards set forth a ‘bright-line rule’ that all questioning 
must cease after an accused requests counsel.  [Citation.]  In the 
absence of such a bright-line prohibition, the authorities 
through ‘badger[ing]’ or ‘overreaching’ — explicit or subtle, 
deliberate or unintentional — might otherwise wear down the 
accused 
and 
persuade 
him 
to 
incriminate 
himself 
notwithstanding his earlier request for counsel’s assistance.”  
(Smith v. Illinois (1984) 469 U.S. 91, 98.)   
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
12 
“In order to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege after it 
has been waived, and in order to halt police questioning after it 
has begun, the suspect ‘must unambiguously’ assert his right to 
silence or counsel.”  (People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 535, 
quoting Davis v. United States, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 459.)  
Ambiguous or equivocal references to an attorney are not 
sufficient.  (Davis, at pp. 459, 461–462.)  The suspect must 
express his desire for counsel with sufficient clarity “that a 
reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand 
the statement to be a request for an attorney.”  (Id. at p. 459.)  
“[T]his is an objective inquiry.”  (Ibid.)  “[A]fter a suspect makes 
a valid waiver of the Miranda rights, the need for effective law 
enforcement weighs in favor of a bright-line rule that allows 
officers to continue questioning unless the suspect clearly 
invokes the right to counsel or right to silence.”  (People v. Nelson 
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 367, 377.) 
On review, “ ‘we accept the trial court’s determination of 
disputed facts if supported by substantial evidence, but we 
independently decide whether the challenged statements were 
obtained in violation of Miranda.’ ”  (People v. Gonzales (2012) 
54 Cal.4th 1234, 1269; accord, People v. Gonzalez (2005) 34 
Cal.4th 1111, 1125.)  Here, the facts are undisputed.  The 
question is whether they established that defendant clearly 
invoked his right to an attorney.   
Various cases have held that a suspect’s use of equivocal 
words or phrases does not constitute a clear request for counsel’s 
assistance.  (See, e.g., Davis v. United States, supra, 512 U.S. at 
p. 462 [“ ‘Maybe I should talk to a lawyer’ ”]; People v. Sauceda-
Contreras (2012) 55 Cal.4th 203, 219 [“ ‘If you can bring me a 
lawyer’ ”]; People v. Bacon (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1082, 1105 [“ ‘I 
think it’d probably be a good idea for me to get an attorney’ ”]; 
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
13 
cf. People v. Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 535 [“ ‘I think it’s 
about time for me to stop talking’ ”].)  Defendant used no such 
equivocal language here.  He clearly stated, “[I] want to, speak 
to an attorney first,” and twice emphasized, “I need to find out.”  
He tried to speak further, but Officer Herrera spoke over him. 
The People argue that defendant’s comment, “because I, I 
take responsibility for me, but there’s other people that . . . ,” 
rendered his invocation ambiguous.  They urge a reasonable 
officer could understand defendant’s reference to taking 
responsibility as an indication that he was willing to continue 
speaking to the officers about his own liability notwithstanding 
his request for counsel.  To support this view, the People look to 
the content of the statement itself and the comments leading up 
to it.  They urge that the invocation question must be evaluated 
in light of the context in which the statements were made.   
“In certain situations, words that would be plain if taken 
literally actually may be equivocal under an objective standard, 
in the sense that in context it would not be clear to the 
reasonable listener what the defendant intends.”  (People v. 
Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 429 [discussing initial waiver of 
the right to counsel]; cf. Smith v. Illinois, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 98 
[“Where nothing about the request for counsel or the 
circumstances leading up to the request would render it 
ambiguous, all questioning must cease”].)    
Although context is relevant, the People’s interpretation 
of this record is untenable.  Defendant clearly said he wanted to 
talk to a lawyer.  Although not required, he went on to explain 
why he wanted counsel.  Further, his explanation did not create 
an ambiguity.  There is nothing inconsistent or ambiguous about 
wanting to speak to an attorney before taking responsibility, 
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
14 
and defendant made clear that he wanted to speak to an 
attorney “first.”  One can take responsibility in ways other than 
giving an uncounseled confession to the police. 
Circumstances preceding the invocation provide context 
that undermines the People’s argument.  Defendant was 
extremely hesitant to answer the officers’ questions.  Asked if he 
remembered what he was doing on the night of the murder, he 
gave no response.  Asked who he was with that night, he was 
reluctant to say.  Asked again if he remembered what he was 
doing, defendant said “I remember something, (Inaudible), but 
before I answer the question about (Inaudible) I’m not sure.”  
When asked if he was concerned about implicating another 
person and if he was interested in learning about what others 
had said to the police, defendant said, “I don’t know, I’m 
contemplating, I don’t want to (sigh).”  Encouraged to disclose 
his state of mind that night, he did not respond.  When officers 
asked if he was in Cathedral City, defendant initially did not 
answer, but ultimately said, “Yes.”  He did not respond when 
asked if he had walked to the trailer park.  Officer Herrera told 
defendant, “This ain’t easy,” and Detective Wolford urged him 
to “[c]ome on.”  Still, defendant did not respond.  After Officer 
Herrera cautioned defendant about “try[ing] to think one step 
ahead of us,” defendant invoked his right to counsel and twice 
insisted, “I need to find out.”  Speaking over him, Officer Herrera 
again asked what he took responsibility for.  Defendant was 
initially silent, and then said, “I never.”  This context does not 
bear out the People’s argument that a reasonable officer could 
believe defendant was willing to continue the interview 
notwithstanding his request for counsel. 
To be clear, after being admonished and waiving their 
rights, suspects may give halting or reluctant answers.  They 
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
15 
may give responses that the questioners suspect are false.  
Officers are permitted to encourage a subject to talk and to 
challenge statements as untrue.  What they cannot do is brush 
aside a clear invocation. 
The People’s attempt to contextualize defendant’s words is 
further undermined by the fact that defendant was precluded 
from fully articulating his request for counsel because Officer 
Herrera repeatedly spoke over him.  The People argue that 
defendant and the officer each talked over the other.  Certainly, 
that dynamic can take place during a contentious interrogation, 
but it is not what happened here.  When Detective Wolford 
asked if he had been to the trailer park, defendant directly said 
he wanted to speak to an attorney first and began to elaborate 
on that request.  Then Officer Herrera intervened, repeatedly 
asking what he took responsibility for.  Officer Herrera’s 
comments notwithstanding, defendant twice emphasized, “I 
need to find out,” further conveying he wished to speak with 
counsel before answering any questions.  “ ‘No authority, and no 
logic, permits the interrogator to proceed . . . on his own terms 
and as if the defendant had requested nothing, in the hope that 
the defendant might be induced to say something casting 
retrospective doubt on his initial statement that he wished to 
speak through an attorney or not at all.’ ”  (Smith v. Illinois, 
supra, 469 U.S. at p. 99.)  Fairly read, defendant’s request for 
counsel was clear and unequivocal.  
The circumstances differ from those addressed in People v. 
Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, on which the People rely.  Flores 
was advised of his Miranda rights and participated in a lengthy 
interview about homicides committed in San Bernardino 
County.  The following day, Lieutenant Kusch of the Los Angeles 
Police Department approached Flores to speak about a different 
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
16 
homicide committed in Los Angeles County.  Kusch restated the 
Miranda rights, and Flores indicated that he understood them.  
(Id. at p. 415.)  Kusch then said, “ ‘Basically what I’d like to do 
is talk about the the [sic] case that we investigated that we got 
called out on back on November 17th, 2000.  Uh I’ll tell you how 
we got called out on it in a minute but uh do you want to take a 
few minutes to talk a little bit about that?’ ”  (Ibid.)  Flores 
responded “ ‘No’ ” or “ ‘Nah.’ ”  (Ibid.)  Kusch attempted to clarify 
Flores’s response by explaining that he wanted to give Flores 
some details about the investigation and get some background 
information from him.  Kusch emphasized three times that 
Flores was not required to answer any questions.  He then asked 
“ ‘Do you want to take a few minutes and talk to me about that 
stuff?’ ” to which Flores replied, “ ‘Oh yeah, well whatever.’ ”  (Id. 
at p. 416.)  The interview continued, and eventually Flores 
admitted to killing the victim.  
We held that Flores’s “No” response was equivocal because 
it could have been understood either as an invocation of his 
rights or merely a negative response to Kusch’s offer to explain 
how the investigation started.  (People v. Flores, supra, 9 Cal.5th 
at p. 419.)  We noted that “the clarity of a suspect’s answer may 
depend in part on the clarity of the officer’s question.”  (Ibid.)  
Because Kusch’s question was imprecise and poorly framed, the 
defendant’s answer “could have meant either, ‘No, I do not want 
to talk to you at all,’ or ‘No, I do not want to hear about how the 
police got called out.’ ”  (Ibid.)  Flores may have been focused on 
the latter subject because his own mother had provided 
information that helped lead the police to him.  (Id. at pp. 419–
420.)  Flores smiled and gave a short laugh when he said, “No.”  
The dissonance between his demeanor, his cooperation the 
previous day in another homicide investigation, and his “No” 
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
17 
response was potentially confusing.  (Id. at p. 420.)  Given all of 
these circumstances, we concluded that Kusch properly asked a 
neutral follow-up question to clarify Flores’s intent.  (Id. at 
pp. 418–421, 424.)   
Here, Detective Wolford’s question prompting defendant’s 
invocation was neither imprecise nor poorly framed.  He asked 
directly, “Did you go into the trailer park, that night?”  In 
response, defendant said that he wanted to speak to an attorney 
first.  Nothing in the preinvocation context dilutes the plain 
import of defendant’s request for counsel.  Instead of honoring 
his unambiguous request, the officers repeatedly asked 
defendant what he took responsibility for and said, “[L]et’s just 
talk about that, okay?” emphasizing “this is what we got to do.”  
Certainly, context matters, but it cannot be used to cast a clear 
invocation in a different light.  In an interrogation officers 
frequently control the narrative.  They may do so, among other 
reasons, to keep the statement focused and coherent.  But they 
may not use otherwise legitimate control to obfuscate a suspect’s 
attempt to invoke his rights.     
The trial court concluded that a reasonable officer could 
understand defendant’s reference to “other people” as a limited 
invocation of the right to counsel only as to those questions that 
could potentially implicate others.  Upon independent review, 
the conclusion does not withstand scrutiny.  
Courts have recognized that an invocation can be limited 
to certain situations or topics.  In Connecticut v. Barrett (1987) 
479 U.S. 523, for example, the defendant said that he was 
willing to speak to police about a sexual assault but would not 
give a written statement unless his attorney was present.  (Id. 
at pp. 525–526.)  The high court found the statement admissible, 
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
18 
reasoning:  “Barrett’s limited requests for counsel . . . were 
accompanied by affirmative announcements of his willingness 
to speak with the authorities.  The fact that officials took the 
opportunity provided by Barrett to obtain an oral confession is 
quite consistent with the Fifth Amendment.  Miranda gives the 
defendant a right to choose between speech and silence, and 
Barrett chose to speak.”  (Id. at p. 529.)  The court rejected the 
view that defendant had requested an attorney for all purposes 
as contrary to the “ordinary meaning” of his words.  (Id. at 
p. 530.)   
In People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, the defendant 
said, “ ‘I think I should talk to a lawyer before I decide to take a 
polygraph.’ ”  (Id. at p. 952, italics added.)  We found that 
statement conditional.  The italicized phrase supported the 
conclusion that “defendant only wanted the assistance of 
counsel if he was taking a polygraph exam.”  (Ibid.)  Because no 
polygraph exam was administered, the detectives were not 
obligated to seek clarification either then or at a second 
interview the following morning.  (Ibid.; accord, People v. 
Gonzalez, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1126 [defendant’s statement 
that “he wanted a lawyer if he was going to be charged” was 
conditional].)   
In People v. Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, the defendant 
waived his Miranda rights and the detectives asked him 
“ ‘what’s your side of the story?  What happened?’ ”  (Id. at 
p. 509.)  The defendant responded, “ ‘I don’t know if I should 
without an attorney.’ ”  (Ibid., italics omitted.)  The detective 
then emphasized that “ ‘[i]f there’s any time that we ask you a 
question that you don’t want to answer, you can stop at any 
time,’ ” to which the defendant replied, “ ‘Okay, that one.’ ”  
(Ibid, some italics omitted.)  We held that the defendant’s 
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
19 
statement implied “a refusal to answer a particular question . . 
. .  Defendant did not assert a right to refuse to answer any 
questions, ask that the questioning come to a halt, or request 
counsel.  Instead, he was showing that he knew he could refuse 
to answer any or all questions and would exercise this right on 
a question-by-question basis.”  (Id. at p. 510; accord, People v. 
Silva (1988) 45 Cal.3d 604, 629–630 [“A defendant may indicate 
an 
unwillingness 
to 
discuss 
certain 
subjects 
without 
manifesting a desire to terminate ‘an interrogation already in 
progress’ ”].) 
Defendant’s statement, “because I, I take responsibility for 
me, but there’s other people that . . . ,” cannot reasonably be 
construed as a limited invocation of the right to counsel only as 
to those questions implicating others.  Defendant was not 
referring to certain topics he wished to avoid, but rather to the 
reason he wanted counsel’s advice.  Of course, defendant was not 
required to explain or justify his request for counsel.  The choice 
is his alone and for reasons of his own.  To the extent he did try 
to explain, his concern about the liability of others did not 
necessarily preclude a concern about his own liability.  On the 
contrary, the actions and intentions of accomplices may bear 
heavily on a defendant’s guilt of the crimes.   
It is true defendant said that he wanted to “speak to an 
attorney first.”  (Italics added.)  But the reference to “first” is 
most fairly understood to mean before making a statement.  This 
comment is different from that in Martinez, where the 
defendant indicated he wanted to speak to a lawyer “ ‘before I 
decide to take a polygraph.’ ”  (People v. Martinez, supra, 47 
Cal.4th at p. 952, second italics added.)   
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
20 
The trial court here looked to “the totality of 
circumstances in this transcript” to conclude that the officers 
reasonably believed defendant’s reluctance to speak centered 
around incriminating others.  The court observed, for example, 
that several times before the invocation, the officers assured 
defendant that they were not seeking to implicate others.  It 
inferred from this discussion that defendant’s reluctance to 
speak without an attorney likewise centered around this topic.  
Notably, however, the question that immediately preceded 
defendant’s invocation centered on his actions:  “Did you go into 
the trailer park, that night?”  Although the topic of 
incriminating others had been raised earlier in the interview, it 
was repeatedly interjected by the officers, not defendant.6  The 
                                        
6  
For example, at the outset of the interview, Officer 
Herrera said, “Remember what you were doing when it got 
dark?  [Where you were at?]  Now, let me, let me, ahead of time 
I’m going to say this okay?  Uhm, I’m not trying to fuck anybody 
else over here, okay we[’re] not trying to, you know, incriminate 
anybody else . . . .”  Detective Wolford then asked defendant if 
he was at someone’s house that night.  When defendant 
indicated he did not want to say, Officer Herrera responded, 
“You don’t want to get, you think that you can get incriminated 
or get somebody else all caught up in this mess or something or 
what?  You don’t want to drop no names, or you just, you don’t 
remember?  Huh?”  Defendant responded, “I remember 
something, but . . . it’s (Inaudible) I remember something, 
(Inaudible), but before I answer the question about (Inaudible) 
I’m not sure.”  Detective Wolford then asked, “[Y]ou were at 
somebody’s house that you don’t want to disclose, that night?”  
Defendant replied that he was with someone he respected and 
that he did not want her to be in trouble.  The officers then asked 
defendant, “You don’t want to talk about that person, is that 
what you’re talking about? . . . Or do you want [to] know if she 
said something to us?”  Defendant responded, “I don’t know, I’m 
 
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
21 
discussion therefore sheds little light on how to objectively 
construe defendant’s invocation.  If anything, his request for 
counsel in the face of the officers’ repeated assurances that they 
would not question him about others’ involvement suggests an 
invocation beyond that limited topic. 
The court also observed that, after the invocation, 
defendant asked to use the restroom.  Following an eight-minute 
break, he continued to speak with officers, prompting the court 
to infer that he did so freely.  But this approach has been 
criticized by the high court:  “The courts below were able to 
construe [the defendant’s] request for counsel as ‘ambiguous’ 
only by looking to [his] subsequent responses to continued police 
questioning and by concluding that, ‘considered in total,’ [the 
defendant’s] ‘statements’ were equivocal.  [Citations].  This line 
of analysis is unprecedented and untenable.  As Justice Simon 
emphasized below, ‘[a] statement either is such an assertion [of 
the right to counsel] or it is not.’  [Citation.]  Where nothing 
about the request for counsel or the circumstances leading up to 
the request would render it ambiguous, all questioning must 
cease.  In these circumstances, an accused’s subsequent 
statements are relevant only to the question whether the 
accused waived the right he had invoked.  Invocation and waiver 
are entirely distinct inquiries, and the two must not be blurred 
                                        
contemplating, I don’t want to (sigh).”  Officer Herrera replied, 
“This isn’t helping trying to think one step ahead of us here, 
okay?  We’re not trying to involve anybody else, drag anybody 
else down with you, or anything like that, okay?”  He explained, 
“[W]e know when it happened, we wanted to know what 
happened before then, the state of mind was what was going on 
with you, okay?  That’s what you said you were going to talk to 
us about, all right?”            
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
22 
by merging them together.”  (Smith v. Illinois, supra, 469 U.S. 
at pp. 97–98, fn. omitted.)  “Our decision is a narrow one. . . .  
We hold only that, under the clear logical force of settled 
precedent, an accused’s postrequest responses to further 
interrogation may not be used to cast retrospective doubt on the 
clarity of the initial request itself.  Such subsequent statements 
are relevant only to the distinct question of waiver.”  (Id. at pp. 
99–100.) 
Under Edwards, the officers were required to stop the 
interrogation once defendant unequivocally requested counsel.  
(Edwards, supra, 451 U.S. at pp. 484–485.)  They did not do so.  
Defendant’s postassertion statements in response to the 
officers’s continued questioning did not amount to a valid waiver 
of the right to counsel he had invoked.  (Id. at p. 487.)  
Accordingly, his statements were inadmissible as substantive 
evidence at trial.  (Ibid; accord, Maryland v. Shatzer (2010) 559 
U.S. 98, 111, fn. 7; Montejo v. Louisiana (2009) 556 U.S. 778, 
787; McNeil v. Wisconsin (1991) 501 U.S. 171, 177; Arizona v. 
Roberson (1988) 486 U.S. 675, 681–682.)     
C. Prejudice 
The erroneous admission of statements obtained in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment is reviewed under the 
Chapman standard (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 
24).  (People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523, 542.)  That test 
requires the People “to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”  
(Chapman, at p. 24.)  The standard is satisfied only if “[t]here is 
no reasonable possibility that the verdict would have been more 
favorable to defendant had [the] statements not been admitted.”  
(People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1314.)  Because 
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
23 
confessions “ ‘[a]lmost invariably’ will provide persuasive 
evidence of a defendant’s guilt . . . , the improper admission of a 
confession is much more likely to affect the outcome of a trial 
than are other categories of evidence, and thus is much more 
likely to be prejudicial under the traditional harmless-error 
standard.”  (People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478,  503 (Cahill).)  
Defendant’s admissions were the “centerpiece of the 
prosecution’s case,” offered to prove he was the assailant.  
(Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 505.)  Peggy could not identify her 
attacker.  Her descriptions of the perpetrator were internally 
inconsistent and differed from defendant in significant details.  
Nor could Deputy Elders identify defendant as the driver who 
evaded pursuit the morning after the murder.  No fingerprint or 
biological evidence linked defendant to either the Bakers’ car or 
residence.  No property belonging to them was found in his 
possession.   
Wasson saw defendant in a car similar to the Bakers’ just 
after midnight on the night of the crimes.  And Elam testified 
that defendant said he was involved in a police pursuit the next 
day.  This testimony had some tendency to connect defendant to 
the Bakers’ stolen car.  But his connection to the crimes 
committed at the Bakers’ home was attenuated.   
Clayton testified that defendant confessed to him, but his 
account was open to substantial attack.  At one point he said 
defendant admitted to acting alone.  But he also claimed that 
defendant told him the victims were dignitaries who were killed 
by two professional hit men and that Reginald had been stabbed 
repeatedly.  According to Clayton, defendant described the 
victims as prominent citizens with assets he could use to pay off 
a debt to the two men.  These claimed admissions were 
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
24 
inconsistent with the facts of the crimes.  Clayton’s credibility 
was further undermined by his lengthy criminal record, his 
inquiry to law enforcement officers and reporters about the facts 
of the crime, and his motivation to secure a reward.   
After defendant’s interview, an officer was standing in an 
open doorway of the interrogation room.  He testified he 
overheard defendant tell his aunt, “Yes, I’m sorry.  I didn’t mean 
to kill him.”  (Italics added.)  But that evidence was disputed.  
Defendant’s aunt, with whom he was speaking, denied under 
oath that defendant made such a statement.  On the audiotape 
of the conversation defendant is heard sobbing, and the tape is 
of such poor quality that the italicized words are unintelligible.  
The recording failed to resolve the dispute and, without his 
confession, it may have caused the jury to doubt the officer’s 
ability to discern defendant’s words.7  
In Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th 478, we acknowledged that 
erroneous admission of a confession “might be found harmless, 
for example, (1) when the defendant was apprehended by the 
police in the course of committing the crime, (2) when there are 
                                        
7  
Defendant’s own testimony at trial placed him at the 
scene, although he maintained that two other men, “Knuck and 
Leon,” committed the crimes.  On cross-examination he 
confirmed that he had answered affirmatively when his aunt 
asked him if he had “murder[ed] that man” and that he told her, 
“I didn’t mean to kill him.  I didn’t mean to kill him.  I’m so 
sorry.”  Defendant argues that his testimony should not be 
considered in evaluating prejudice because his decision to testify 
flowed from the erroneous introduction of his pretrial 
statements.  The People do not dispute this point in their 
briefing, nor do they rely on defendant’s testimony to establish 
that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Accordingly, we will discount that evidence as well.   
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
25 
numerous, disinterested reliable eyewitnesses to the crime 
whose testimony is confirmed by a wealth of uncontroverted 
physical evidence, or (3) in a case in which the prosecution 
introduced, in addition to the confession, a videotape of the 
commission of the crime . . . .”  (Id. at p. 505.)  Certainly, Cahill’s 
list of examples is not intended to be exhaustive.  But it does 
exemplify the kind of strong evidence required to satisfy the 
Chapman standard.   
Such compelling evidence is absent here.  Instead, this 
case is arguably weaker than that in People v. Neal (2003) 31 
Cal.4th 63, where we reversed a conviction due to the erroneous 
admission of the defendant’s confessions.  In that case, the 
victim, Collins, was strangled in the home he shared with Neal.  
After the murder, Neal left in Collins’s car.  A note, purportedly 
written by the victim’s foster son, took responsibility for the 
killing.  (Id. at pp. 69–70.)  A documents expert opined, however, 
that the note was in Neal’s handwriting.  (Id. at p. 87.)  After his 
arrest, Neal confessed to killing Collins.  (Id. at pp. 74–76.)  At 
trial, he testified that he strangled Collins after Collins tried to 
forcibly sodomize him.  (Id. at p. 71.)  We concluded that the 
erroneous admission of Neal’s confessions was not harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt, even though other evidence pointing 
to Neal was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.  (Id. at p. 87.)  
We explained:  “[T]he confessions, with their detail and general 
consistency with each other and with extrinsic facts, functioned 
as the veritable ‘centerpiece of the prosecution’s case in support 
of . . . conviction.’ ”  (Ibid., quoting Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th at 
p. 505.) 
The same is true here.  Without defendant’s statements, 
the case rested primarily on defendant’s connection to the 
Bakers’ car and on the testimony of Clayton, whose veracity was 
PEOPLE v. HENDERSON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
26 
susceptible to substantial attack.  On this record, we cannot 
conclude that erroneous admission of defendant’s statements 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to any of the jury’s 
findings.   
III.  DISPOSITION 
We reverse the judgment in its entirety and remand the 
case to the trial court for further proceedings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Henderson   
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted     
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S098318  
Date Filed:  July 30, 2020  
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior      
County:  Riverside      
Judge:  Thomas N. Douglass, Jr.      
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Martin H. Dodd, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette and Gerald A. Engler, Chief 
Assistant Attorneys General, Ronald S. Matthias and Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorneys General, Ronald 
A. Jakob, Holly D. Wilkens, Robin Urbanski and Jennifer A. Jadovitz, Deputy Attorneys General, for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Martin H. Dodd 
Futterman Dupree Dodd Croley Maier LLP 
601 Montgomery Street, Suite 333 
San Francisco, CA 94111 
(415) 399-3840 
 
Ronald A. Jakob 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 738-9213