Title: Preston v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Preston v. State, No. 80, September Term, 2014.  Opinion by Harrell, J. 
 
Criminal Law—Jury Instructions—“Witness Promised Benefit” 
 
A witness provided by the State with reasonable protective housing before testifying at 
trial has not received a “benefit” within the meaning of Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury 
Instruction (2nd ed. 2012, 2013 Supp.) 3:13, “Witness Promised Benefit.” 
 
 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
Criminal Case No. 109113036 
Argued: 6 May 2015 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 
MARYLAND 
 
No. 80 
 
September Term, 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DONTAE PRESTON 
 
v.  
 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Barbera, C.J., 
 
 
*Harrell, 
Battaglia, 
 
 
Greene, 
 
 
Adkins, 
 
 
McDonald, 
 
 
Watts, 
 
 
 
 
JJ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opinion by Harrell, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Filed: July 27, 2015 
 
*Harrell, J., now retired, participated in the 
hearing and conference of this case while an 
active member of this Court; after being 
recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, 
Section 3A, he also participated in the decision 
and adoption of this opinion. 
 
 
Witnesses in criminal trials have typically a variety of interactions with the State 
prior to testifying under oath before a judge and/or jury.  Usually, a witness is 
interviewed initially by a police officer or detective after the commission of a crime.  
Witnesses might be offered a monetary reward in exchange for coming forward with 
information pertaining to a crime.  Witnesses “with a past” might exchange their 
testimony for a favorable plea deal arising from the case in which they are to testify or a 
related matter, or qualified or absolute immunity.  In some cases, a witness might fear for 
his or her life, or for the safety of an immediate family member, and be placed in some 
form of witness protection program prior to and/or after trial to ensure his or her safety.  
In the present case, a witness was placed in protective housing for several months leading 
up to a murder trial after she claimed that the defendant showed up on her doorstep, 
causing her to be in fear of retaliation for talking with the police.  We consider here 
whether her placement in reasonable protective housing constitutes a “benefit” that would 
compel the trial judge, upon request by the defendant, to give a particularized jury 
instruction pertaining to that witness’s credibility (Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury 
Instruction (2nd ed. 2012, 2013 Supp.) 3:13, “Witness Promised Benefit”).  We conclude 
that it does not. 
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
On the evening of 14 March 2009, Dontae Preston (“Preston”), Keon Barnes 
(“Barnes”), and Katrina Harrell (“Harrell”) (no kin to the author of this opinion) attended 
an ill-fated co-ed “pajama party” at the home of Nichelle Payton (“Payton”) at 1907 N. 
2 
 
Pulaski Street in Baltimore City.1  Shortly after the party got underway, Barnes was shot 
and killed on the premises.  Seven shell casings were recovered from the scene.  Sandra 
Bohlen, called at trial by the State as an expert in ballistics and firearms identification, 
testified that the bullets from all seven casings were fired from the same gun.  Dr. Carol 
Allen, a medical examiner called also by the prosecution, testified that Barnes died from 
multiple gunshot wounds.  No gun was recovered.  None of the casings tested positive for 
fingerprints.  Preston was charged with murder in the first degree, use of a handgun in the 
commission of a felony and crime of violence, and illegally carrying a handgun.   
Two of the partygoers testified as eyewitnesses at Preston’s trial in the Circuit 
Court for Baltimore City, which began on 21 May 2012.  Harrell, the first eyewitness 
called, testified that, at some point at the beginning of the evening, she exited Payton’s 
home and went to her car (parked two or three doors down from the home, on the same 
side of the street) in order to retrieve a CD.  On her way to her vehicle, Harrell passed 
between Preston and Barnes as they were talking to each other on the top step leading to 
the front door of Payton’s home.2  Harrell did not hear the substance of their 
conversation, but testified that they did not “appear to be arguing.”  After she entered her 
car, she turned the key in order to unlock the CD player and remove the CD.  As she 
pushed the eject button, she heard gunshots.  She looked “up towards 1907,” and saw 
                                              
1 Payton testified that, at the time of the party, she was renting 1907 N. Pulaski Street. 
 
2 Harrell testified that she consumed an alcoholic drink (a “whole glass” of “liquor”) prior 
to walking past the two men.  She stated that, after drinking the liquor, she recalled being 
able to see and think clearly.  She testified also that she “d[idn’t] recall” whether she was 
“intoxicated at that point.” 
3 
 
Barnes lying on the steps, with Preston standing over him holding a gun with “fire 
[coming] from it.”  She ducked “under the seat” on the passenger side for a few seconds, 
and then called 911.  After identifying Preston from a photo array weeks after the 
shooting, Harrell identified also Preston (who she referred to as “Beefie” or “Beefy”) in 
court as the individual that shot Barnes.   
Payton was the second eyewitness (of a sort) to testify at Preston’s trial.  Payton 
heard gunshots while she was inside her home preparing for the party.  As she walked 
downstairs, she heard initially “a pop.”  Payton assumed that one of the balloons she had 
inflated for the party popped, until she heard more “pops” and realized that they were 
gunshots.  She ran upstairs,3 screaming, and looked out her bedroom window.  She saw 
Barnes lying on the porch steps while Preston (who she referred to as “Beefie”/“Beefy” 
or “Donnie”) went to his car and left the scene.  She ran downstairs, opened the front 
door, and attempted to revive Barnes.  Payton did not testify to seeing a gun in anyone’s 
possession.   
Defense counsel attempted to establish through cross-examination that Payton 
cooperated fully with the State only because the police agreed to move her to free, 
protective housing for several months prior to trial, although she testified that her 
experience in temporary protective housing “d[id] not cause [her] to come in here and say 
                                              
3 Before running upstairs, Payton observed that another partygoer, “Butter” (otherwise 
known as “Shawn”), closed the front door to her home.  He had been “at th[e] door” to 
the residence outside as she came downstairs, but ran inside after the shots were fired.  
Payton testified that she did not see Butter holding a gun, but did see him run into the 
living room after closing the front door. 
4 
 
something [she] otherwise wouldn’t.”  Much time was spent determining what 
information she volunteered to investigating detectives prior to trial and when it was 
volunteered.  It was learned that, on the night of the murder, Payton accompanied 
homicide detectives to the police station, but told them simply that she hosted the party 
and named the guests in attendance.  No written statement was sought or taken from 
Payton that night or shortly thereafter as she claimed not to have seen the shooting.  
Payton was interviewed a second time, one or two days later, but no additional 
substantive information was given or obtained. 
Payton testified that, some number of days after the murder, Preston came to her 
house and knocked on the door.  She was home, looked out the window, and saw Preston, 
but did not answer the door because she was scared.  Preston did not threaten her verbally 
or communicate with her in any way, other than knocking on her door.  Sometime after 
this event,4 Payton called Detective Michael Moran, told him that she “was scared to stay 
there,” and asked to be moved.   
Payton identified Preston on 8 April 2009 in a photo array as having attended her 
party that night.  She reported that she saw him go to his car after Barnes was shot.  She 
gave also a taped statement to the police detailing what she saw on the evening of 
Barnes’s death.  Payton testified on direct examination that when she provided her 
statement to the police and identified Preston in the photo array, the police had not moved 
nor promised yet to move her into protective housing.  Later, on cross-examination, she 
                                              
4 Payton’s testimony suggested that Preston may have come to her home and knocked on 
her door twice before she moved into protective housing.   
5 
 
admitted that she did not tell the police initially that she witnessed a portion of the 
aftermath of the shooting.  Defense counsel and Payton had the following exchange: 
[Defense Counsel]: And, in fact, you didn’t cooperate or talk 
to the police or tell them anything about anything until after 
the point in time in which you say [Preston] came and 
knocked on your door?  Is that correct? 
 
[Payton]: Correct. 
 
[Defense Counsel]: And that’s when you then went and called 
the detectives and said I want to be moved, correct? 
 
[Payton]: He came to my house again. 
 
[Defense Counsel]: And you said that you wanted to be 
moved? 
 
[Payton]: Right. 
 
[Defense Counsel]: And on that day when they came to your 
house, you didn’t give them a statement saying anything 
about anybody going across the street, did you? 
 
[Payton]: No. 
 
[Defense Counsel]: It wasn’t until after you got assurances 
that they were going to move you, put you up and pay for you 
that you then gave a taped statement, isn’t that correct? 
 
[Payton]: Correct.  No.[5] 
 
Detective Moran testified at trial that he spoke to Payton several times during the 
course of his investigation because she was scared and volunteered only small amounts of 
information at each interview.  The detective explained that, on 3 April 2009, Payton 
                                              
5 Defense counsel did not ask follow-up questions to clarify this less-than-clear answer, 
moving instead to another line of questioning. 
6 
 
contacted him about how she was afraid for her life.6  Detective Moran advised Payton to 
come to his office that day, but she declined, saying that she had something pressing to 
do with her children.  Payton did not identify Preston from the photo array or give her 
taped statement to Detective Moran until five days later (on 8 April 2009).  Six days after 
that, on 14 April 2009, Moran requested of the State’s Attorney’s Office that Payton be 
moved to protective housing.   
Defense counsel questioned Detective Moran as follows: 
[Defense Counsel]: So, Detective, when you first got this 
phone call talking about how scared she was, why wouldn’t 
you make the request then? 
 
Detective Moran: At that time, she was not completely honest 
as to what she saw.  She was still really scared.  She knows— 
 
[Defense Counsel]: So it was not until she gave you— 
 
COURT: Counsel. 
 
[Defense Counsel]:—that you asked for it then?   
 
COURT: Counsel.  Counsel.  I’m not saying it again, okay?  
Continue answering your question.   
 
Detective Moran: Could you repeat the question, sir? 
 
[Defense Counsel]:  I’ll rephrase the question.  How come 
you waited until after she did a photographic array to put in 
that request to have her moved when she indicated that she 
was scared on April 3rd? 
 
Detective Moran: I actually believe it was under her request.  
It’s a lot for someone to move their life.  You know, you got 
                                              
6 Harrell identified Preston as the shooter in a photo array the day before, on 2 April 
2009.   
7 
 
kids.  She has a grandmother who was sick in the house.  
That’s her neighborhood.  That’s her life.  And that’s a lot to 
move somebody.  So I think it was under her request that she 
finally said, ok, I’m ready now. 
 
The Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office paid ultimately $13,530 to relocate 
Payton (with $400 of moving expenses facilitating the transition into—but not out of—
temporary housing)7 for a period of 7–8 months prior to trial.8  Payton did not contribute 
to the expenses of her temporary housing situation.  She was aware that the State’s 
Attorney’s Office paid for her protective housing, but did not know how much was paid.  
She testified further that she would not have asked the police or the State’s Attorney’s 
Office for assistance if she hadn’t been afraid to continue to live at 1907 N. Pulaski 
Street.   
Defense counsel requested that Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction (2nd 
ed. 2012, 2013 Supp.) (“MPJI-Cr”)9 3:13, “Witness Promised Benefit” (“Jury Instruction 
3:13”), be read to the jury.  The requested instruction reads as follows: 
You may consider the testimony of a witness who [testifies] 
[has provided evidence] for the State as a result of [a plea 
                                              
7 The record is unclear as to whether the total expenditures (temporary housing and 
relocation expenses) by the State amounted to $13,530 or $13,950.  As we discuss below, 
based on the unique facts of this case, the (relatively small) discrepancy makes no 
difference to our analysis.   
 
8 Payton testified that she was moved from 1907 N. Pulaski Street to a temporary 
residence “[t]oward the end of April/May” and remained in protective housing until 
November 2009.  The State clarified during a bench conference that it paid for Payton’s 
housing from July 2009 through February 2010.   
 
9 All references to the MPJI-Cr are to the Second Edition (with 2013 Supplement), unless 
otherwise noted. 
8 
 
agreement] [a promise that he will not be prosecuted] [a 
financial benefit] [a benefit] [an expectation of a benefit].[10]  
However, you should consider such testimony with caution, 
because the testimony may have been influenced by a desire 
to gain [leniency] [freedom] [a financial benefit] [a benefit] 
by testifying against the defendant. 
 
Defense counsel proposed initially, before Payton testified, that the court read Jury 
Instruction 3:13 to the jury at the end of the second day of trial.  The State objected, 
arguing that Payton’s free housing was not the sort of situation contemplated by Jury 
Instruction 3:13, but rather was a protective measure “as a result of [Preston] coming to 
her house after this incident, and [Payton] contact[ing] the detective to let him know she 
was—she was in fear.”  The State argued that Jury Instruction 3:13 was “geared more 
towards somebody who’s like a paid confidential or a paid informant, something of that 
sort that gives testimony, and knows how much compensation they’re going to get in 
return.”  The trial judge declined at that time to give the instruction, but indicated he 
would revisit the question at the end of the trial: 
I’m going to say no right now, but depending upon how she 
testifies and what she says and whatever the other officers 
may say, I may revisit it. 
 
But based on what you’ve proffered, I don’t believe 
it’s appropriate.  I believe it would be a situation where every 
time a witness is relocated or something along those lines, 
we’d need to read this.  I don’t think that’s what this is for. 
 
                                              
10 See infra note 19. 
9 
 
The trial judge told defense counsel, however, that he had “a right to ask about free 
housing, because that’s what she received,” including the $400 given for moving 
expenses.11   
After Payton’s testimony, during a break in the trial when the court and parties 
discussed jury instructions, defense counsel objected to the omission of the “Witness 
Promised Benefit” instruction.  The court denied the requested instruction, ruling as 
follows: 
All right.  I have, again, I don’t know what else is going to 
come out but, based on what has been presented so far, I still 
do not believe that it is an appropriate instruction given the 
fact that it was housing and I’m not sure, at least at this point, 
that it was an exchange for—let’s see. 
 
“You may consider the witness who either testifies[,”] 
and she has[,] [“]or provided evidence,” which she did for the 
State, “as a result of a plea agreement, a promise that he will 
not be prosecuted, a financial benefit, or benefit.” 
 
This Court is not satisfied that the testimony or 
evidence was [“]as a result of.[ . . .”]  So for those reasons, 
your request for that is denied over your objection. 
 
Before closing arguments, the trial judge gave the jury the following instruction 
regarding the credibility of non-expert witnesses: 
 
Now, you are the sole judge of whether a witness 
should be believed.  In making this decision, you may apply 
your own common sense and everyday experiences.  In 
determining whether a witness should be believed, you should 
carefully judge all of the testimony and evidence and the 
circumstances under which the witness testified. 
                                              
11 During closing arguments, defense counsel did not argue to the jury that Payton 
provided evidence for the State because she received free, protective housing in return, 
nor that her testimony might be less credible because of this “benefit.” 
10 
 
 
You should consider such factors as the witness’[s] 
behavior on the stand and manner of testifying, did the 
witness appear to be telling the truth, the witness’[s] 
opportunity to see or hear the things about which testimony 
was given, the accuracy of the witness’[s] memory, does the 
witness have a motive to not tell the truth, does the witness 
have an interest in the outcome of the case, was a witness’[s] 
testimony consistent, was a witness’[s] testimony supported 
or contradicted by evidence that you believe and whether and 
the extent to which the witness’[s] testimony in the court 
differed from the statements made by the witness on any 
previous occasion.[12] 
 
You need not believe any witness, even if the 
testimony is uncontradicted.  You may believe all, part, or 
none of the testimony of any witness.   
 
. . .  
 
You should also consider the witness’[s] certainty or lack of 
certainty, the accuracy of any prior description, and the 
witness’[s] credibility or lack of credibility, as well as any 
other factor surrounding the identification. 
 
 
The jury convicted Preston of first-degree murder, use of a handgun in the 
commission of a crime of violence, and wearing, carrying, and transporting a handgun.  
The court sentenced Preston to incarceration for life (for the murder), with a consecutive 
term of incarceration for twenty years (for the use of the handgun) and a concurrent term 
of incarceration for three years (for the carrying conviction).   
 
Preston appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed.  Preston v. 
State, 218 Md. App. 60, 96 A.3d 800 (2014).  The intermediate appellate court 
                                              
12 This portion of the jury instructions is almost verbatim a previous version of MPJI-Cr 
3:10, “Credibility of Witnesses” (“Jury Instruction 3:10”).  The Second Edition of the 
MPJI-Cr, published in 2012, added a tenth factor for consideration: “whether the witness 
has a bias or prejudice.” 
11 
 
considered whether the trial court abused its discretion in declining to give the “Witness 
Promised Benefit” jury instruction, concluding that it did not.  Preston, 218 Md. App. at 
62, 96 A.3d at 801–02.  That court began by recognizing that “the decision whether to 
give the jury a particularized credibility instruction is left to the sound discretion of the 
trial judge.”  Preston, 218 Md. App. at 73–74, 96 A.3d at 808.  Although the jury could 
have inferred, based on the unclear testimony adduced at trial, that Payton may have 
cooperated with the police because she expected to receive rent-free protective housing, 
the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in declining to give Jury Instruction 3:13 
because the standard credibility instructions covered concerns regarding Payton’s 
testimony, defense counsel cross-examined fully Payton regarding the protective housing, 
and defense counsel was free to argue in closing that Payton’s credibility was 
questionable (though defense counsel chose not to).  Preston, 218 Md. App. at 75, 96 
A.3d at 809.  The Court of Special Appeals concluded alternately that, even if the trial 
court abused its discretion, the error was harmless as Payton’s testimony was 
corroborated by the testimony of Harrell, who “saw everything [Payton] did, and more.”  
Preston, 218 Md. App. at 76, 96 A.3d at 810.  Finally, in a footnote, the intermediate 
appellate court declined to address the State’s alternative argument that Payton’s receipt 
of protective housing was not the type of “benefit” Jury Instruction 3:13 was intended to 
cover.  Id. n.4, 96 A.3d at 810 n.4.   
12 
 
Preston and the State filed petitions for writ of certiorari, which we granted, to 
consider the following consolidated and re-ordered questions13: 
1. Is protective housing provided to a witness in a first 
degree murder case the type of “benefit” contemplated by 
the “witness promised benefit” pattern instruction? 
2. Does the record show that there was a “promise” or 
“testimony” that was “as a result of” a promise?[14] 
3. Is the “witness promised benefit” jury instruction part of a 
special class of instructions, as the Court of Special 
Appeals held, such that it remains always discretionary 
even when it is supported by some evidence?[14] 
4. If so, did the trial court abuse its discretion in declining to 
give the instruction in this case, where an eye witness 
provided “some evidence” that she exchanged her 
cooperation with the State for free, protective housing?[14] 
5. If not, did the court err as a matter of law in declining to 
instruct the jury as defense counsel requested?[14] 
 
Preston v. State, 440 Md. 461, 103 A.3d 593 (2014).  Because of our answer to the first 
question, we do not reach the others. 
 
Regarding question 1, Preston argues that Payton received a “financial benefit” or 
“benefit” in the form of protective housing.  He maintains that there is no principled 
                                              
13 Preston posed questions 3–5 in his petition for writ of certiorari.  The State’s cross-
petition for writ of certiorari posed (in reverse order) questions 1–2. 
 
14 The bulk of the briefs filed by the parties concern questions 2–5 (as consolidated and 
re-ordered).  Preston argues that Jury Instruction 3:13 is not a “purely discretionary” jury 
instruction and the trial court erred in not communicating the instruction to Preston’s 
jury.  He argues also that if trial courts are to have discretion over the administration of 
Jury Instruction 3:13, the Court of Appeals should adopt what it calls the “qualified 
entitlement” standard rather than the “unqualified discretion” standard.  Preston argues 
further that the record reveals that Payton “exchanged her statement for the expectation 
of a benefit.”  The State, for its part, argues that the Court of Special Appeals applied 
properly an “abuse of discretion” standard of review and that the record does not show 
that there was a “promise” or “testimony” that was “as a result of” a promise.   
13 
 
distinction between the “indirect payment” of “rent-free housing” and a direct cash 
payment—both are “financial windfalls” that give a witness a motivation to lie on the 
State’s behalf.15  He alludes to cases from other jurisdictions in which enrollment in a 
witness protection program was viewed as a factor impacting potentially upon the 
credibility of a witness. 
The State argues that, considering the context, the protective housing Payton 
received was not a “benefit” within the meaning of Jury Instruction 3:13.  The State 
reasons that the “evident purpose” of the jury instruction implies a “fairly high threshold 
for what constitutes a ‘benefit’”; to view it otherwise, the results could become absurd.  
Because protective housing is not akin to a plea agreement or a large cash payment, it 
should not be considered a benefit.  The State highlights several points of contrast 
between a direct cash payment and protective housing valued in a similar amount: 
(1) Payton did not know the dollar value of the housing until trial, whereas paid 
informants know in advance the bargained-for value of their testimony; (2) the purpose of 
                                              
15 The record is silent regarding whether Payton was obligated, under the terms of her 
lease of 1907 N. Pulaski Street, to continue making monthly payments during her time 
spent elsewhere in protective housing, or whether she intended to return potentially to 
1907 N. Pulaski Street after Preston’s trial.  The record is silent also regarding whether 
Payton forfeited any security deposits she may have paid previously (regarding 1907 N. 
Pulaski Street) as a result of her move into temporary protective housing. 
Preston argues in his briefs that the protective housing provided by the State 
constitutes a “benefit” or “financial benefit.”  See infra note 18.  To the extent that 
Preston sought at oral argument to squeeze under the umbrella of that argument the 
notion that Payton received also a “benefit” in that she was relieved from having to pay 
rent during the same period of time at 1907 N. Pulaski Street, we decline to consider it.  
Preston failed utterly to create a factual record that might entice us to make such an 
assumption and engage in an analysis based on that assumption. 
14 
 
protective housing is to keep a witness safe, whereas the purpose of a cash payment is to 
reward or pay a fee; (3) witnesses who receive protective housing are afraid, whereas 
witnesses who receive cash payments “desire to be rewarded”; and (4) cash can be used 
for any purpose, whereas protective housing is not a liquid asset. 
Moreover, the State argues that Jury Instruction 3:13 is designed to address 
testimony from “jailhouse informants and persons from the criminal milieu” whose 
testimony should be viewed justifiably with some degree of suspicion, not citizens who 
are afraid of retaliation.  The State references jury instructions from federal and other 
state jurisdictions and various cases discussing those instructions, which we will address 
below.  Finally, the State concludes that any error committed by the trial court in not 
giving Jury Instruction 3:13 was harmless in light of defense counsel’s relatively 
thorough cross-examination of Payton and his foregoing the opportunity to argue 
Payton’s credibility during closing arguments.   
II. DISCUSSION 
 
Maryland Rule 4-325 governs jury instructions in criminal cases:  
The court may, and at the request of any party shall, instruct 
the jury as to the applicable law and the extent to which the 
instructions are binding.  The court may give its instructions 
orally or, with the consent of the parties, in writing instead of 
orally.  The court need not grant a requested instruction if the 
matter is fairly covered by instructions actually given. 
 
Maryland Rule 4-325(c).  As the Court of Special Appeals in this case recognized rightly, 
this Rule has been interpreted to require trial courts to give jury instructions requested by 
a party when a three-part test is met.  The instruction must state correctly the law, the 
15 
 
instruction must apply to the facts of the case (e.g., be generated by some evidence),16 
and the content of the jury instruction must not be covered fairly in a given instruction.  
See Derr v. State, 434 Md. 88, 133, 73 A.3d 254, 281 (2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
2723 (2014); Cost v. State, 417 Md. 360, 368–69, 10 A.3d 184, 189 (2010); Dickey v. 
State, 404 Md. 187, 197–98, 946 A.2d 444, 450 (2008); Roach v. State, 358 Md. 418, 
428–29, 749 A.2d 787, 792–93 (2000).  Nonetheless, the decision whether to give a jury 
instruction “is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge,” Gunning v. State, 347 
Md. 332, 348, 701 A.2d 374, 382 (1997), unless the refusal amounts to a clear error of 
law.  See Derr, 434 Md. at 133, 73 A.3d at 281; Cost, 417 Md. at 369, 10 A.3d at 189. 
 
The general purposes of jury instructions include: aiding the jury in understanding 
clearly the case, providing guidance for the jury’s deliberations, and helping the jury to 
arrive at a correct verdict.  See General v. State, 367 Md. 475, 485, 789 A.2d 102, 108 
(2002).  “Jury instructions direct the jury’s attention to the legal principles that apply to 
the facts of the case.”  Id.   
 
At Preston’s trial, defense counsel requested that the trial judge give Jury 
Instruction 3:13, which we reproduce again for ease of reference:  
You may consider the testimony of a witness who [testifies] 
[has provided evidence] for the State as a result of [a plea 
agreement] [a promise that he will not be prosecuted] [a 
financial benefit] [a benefit] [an expectation of a benefit].[17]  
                                              
16 For an instruction to be generated by the evidence, the defendant need show only that 
“some evidence” supports the giving of the instruction.  McMillan v. State, 428 Md. 333, 
355, 51 A.3d 623, 636 (2012). 
 
17 See infra note 19. 
16 
 
However, you should consider such testimony with caution, 
because the testimony may have been influenced by a desire 
to gain [leniency] [freedom] [a financial benefit] [a benefit] 
by testifying against the defendant. 
 
We agree with the trial judge that reasonable protective housing does not constitute a 
“benefit” within the meaning of Jury Instruction 3:13.   
A. Use and Interpretation of  
Jury Instruction 3:13 in Maryland 
Instructions, such as Jury Instruction 3:13, are premised on the supposition that 
undercover agents, jailhouse informants, accomplices, and other witnesses who testify for 
pay, immunity, or other forms of personal advantage may be motivated to lie or 
exaggerate in order to obtain a particular “benefit,” and that, accordingly, their testimony 
might be viewed with a degree of skepticism.  It is relatively easy to identify a plea 
agreement, a promise not to prosecute, or a financial benefit such as a reward.18  The 
meaning of the term “benefit,” however, is less clear. 
Jury Instruction 3:13 does not define the term “benefit,” nor is there any legislative 
history (or its equivalent) of which to speak.19  Nonetheless, to determine the meaning of 
                                              
18 As noted earlier, Preston argues that the reasonable protective housing provided to 
Payton by the State may be considered either a “benefit” or a “financial benefit” within 
the meaning of Jury Instruction 3:13.  We agree with the State that Payton received 
neither a “benefit” nor a “financial benefit” within the meaning of Jury Instruction 3:13.  
Although the reasonable protective housing provided to Payton can be assigned a 
monetary value (in this case, upwards of $13,000), that fact alone does not convert 
reasonable protective housing into a “financial benefit.”  See supra note 15. 
 
19 In the Second Edition of the MPJI-Cr, published in 2012, the optional clause “[an 
expectation of a benefit]” was added to the end of the first sentence of Jury Instruction 
3:13.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Continued…) 
17 
 
a term in the context of a non-legislative jury instruction, we import and apply common 
and well-established principles of statutory interpretation: 
We begin our analysis by first looking to the normal, plain 
meaning of the language of the statute, reading the statute as a 
whole to ensure that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is 
rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.  
If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we 
need not look beyond the statute’s provisions and our analysis 
ends. . . . [W]e may find useful the context of a statute, the 
overall statutory scheme, and archival legislative history of 
relevant enactments. 
 
Moore v. State, 424 Md. 118, 127–28, 34 A.3d 513, 518 (2011) (quoting Ray v. State, 
410 Md. 384, 404–05, 978 A.2d 736, 747–48 (2009) (internal citations and quotations 
omitted)).   
When conducting a “plain meaning analysis,” dictionary definitions “‘provide a 
useful starting point for discerning what the legislature could have meant in using a 
particular term.’”  Moore, 424 Md. at 129, 34 A.3d at 519 (quoting Ishola v. State, 404 
Md. 155, 161, 945 A.2d 1273, 1276 (2008)).  Black’s Law Dictionary defines the word 
“benefit” as “[t]he advantage or privilege something gives; the helpful or useful effect 
something has” or “[p]rofit or gain; esp., the consideration that moves to the promisee.”  
Black’s Law Dictionary 178 (10th ed. 2014).  For its part, Webster’s Dictionary defines 
the word “benefit” as “an act of kindness”; “something that promotes well-being”; or a 
                                                                                                                                                  
(…continued) 
As the MPJI-Cr are prepared by the Maryland State Bar Association, Inc., 
Standing Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions, they are not statutory in nature and 
there are no publicly-accessible minutes from the Committee’s meetings, “bills” 
containing suggested amendments, or any other formal “legislative” history. 
18 
 
“useful aid.”  Webster’s Tenth Collegiate Dictionary 106 (1993); see Benefit, Google, 
http://google.com (search “benefit definition”) (“an advantage or profit gained from 
something”).  These definitions are of little help to us here.  To understand the meaning 
of the term “benefit” in the relevant pattern instruction as defined in these two 
dictionaries would lead quickly to absurd results.  Such an understanding would be 
overbroad: if the prosecution paid for a witness’s lunch, gave him or her a ham sandwich 
on the day of trial, or gave a witness a ride to the courthouse, such actions might be 
argued to warrant the giving of Jury Instruction 3:13, as meals or rides are “useful aid[s]” 
in the strictest sense of the term.  Similarly, if the conscience of a witness would become 
unburdened by testifying truthfully at trial, would Jury Instruction 3:13 be warranted 
because of the “helpful or useful effect” the act of testifying would have for such a 
troubled witness? 
We noted in Moore, 424 Md. at 139, 34 A.3d at 525, that a word or phrase can 
have different meanings based on the context where it appears: 
There is no rule of construction which requires the same 
meaning always to be given to the same word, when used in 
different connections and in the same statute or in different 
statutes.  On the contrary, such is the flexibility of language 
and the want of fixity in many of our commonest expressions, 
that a word or phrase may bear very different meanings 
according to the connection in which it is found.  Hence the 
rule that the terms of a statute are always to be interpreted 
with references to the subject-matter of the enactment. 
 
Id. (quoting Henry C. Black, Handbook on the Construction and Interpretation of the 
Laws 171–72 (2d ed. 1911)); see Price v. State, 378 Md. 378, 388, 835 A.2d 1221, 1227 
(2003) (“We do not read the statute divorced from its textual context, for adherence to the 
19 
 
meaning of words does not require or permit isolation of words from their context.” 
(internal quotations omitted)).  As the term “benefit” appears at the end of a list of 
possible variants in Jury Instruction 3:13, we consider those variants as an aid in seeking 
the appropriate meaning of the term.  Jury Instruction 3:13 applies when a witness 
testifies as a result of “[a plea agreement] [a promise that he will not be prosecuted] [a 
financial benefit] [a benefit] [an expectation of a benefit].”20  We interpret the word 
“benefit,” in the context of Jury Instruction 3:13, to mean something akin to a plea 
agreement, a promise that a witness will not be prosecuted, or a monetary reward or other 
form of direct, quid pro quo compensation or inducement.  Reasonable protective 
services, such as those received by Payton, do not constitute a “benefit” within the 
meaning of Jury Instruction 3:13. 
In the MPJI-Cr, most (if not all) of the pattern jury instructions are accompanied 
by “Comments” meant to explain or give context to individual instructions.  The 
Comment to Jury Instruction 3:13 is quite short, and reads:  
Evidence that the State entered into an understanding or 
agreement with a testifying witness must be disclosed to the 
defendant, 
regardless 
of 
whether 
the 
agreement 
or 
understanding is formal or informal.  Harris v. State, 407 Md. 
503, 521, 966 A.2d 925, 935 (2009); Ware v. State, 348 Md. 
19, 41, 702 A.2d 699, 709 (1997). 
 
Neither case referenced in the Comment is helpful for present purposes.  In both Ware 
and Harris, the primary arguments of the petitioners were that the suppression or 
withholding of certain evidence violated the State’s constitutional obligations under 
                                              
20 See supra note 19. 
20 
 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and deprived them of fair trials.  Harris, 407 Md. 
at 506, 966 A.2d at 927; Ware, 348 Md. at 24, 702 A.2d at 701.  In both cases, testifying 
witnesses received the benefit of favorable plea deals and/or expected reductions in 
sentences at modification hearings in exchange for their testimony, but, in both cases, the 
prosecution did not disclose to defense counsel the full extent of the benefits before or 
during trial.  Harris, 407 Md. at 522, 966 A.2d at 936; Ware, 348 Md. at 36–37, 702 A.2d 
at 707.  These cases are inapposite because, in the case at bar, the jury was informed fully 
of Payton’s receipt of reasonable protective housing; the question is whether the jury 
should have been given also Jury Instruction 3:13.21 
 
There is a dearth of Maryland case law discussing Jury Instruction 3:13, despite 
the fact that some form of the instruction has been included in the Maryland Criminal 
Pattern Jury Instructions since at least 2001, see MPJI-Cr (1st ed. 1986, 2001 Supp.), if 
not before.  See Stouffer v. State, 118 Md. App. 590, 630, 703 A.2d 861, 880 (1997) 
(referring to a “witness promised leniency” jury instruction with similar wording to Jury 
                                              
21 In Harris, the opinion notes that an instruction resembling Jury Instruction 3:10 was 
given to the jury, Harris v. State, 407 Md. 503, 526, 966 A.2d 925, 938 (2009), but the 
main “takeaway” of the case was that material evidence pertaining to the witnesses’ 
credibility was withheld improperly from defense counsel and the jury, such that Harris 
was entitled to a new trial.  Id.  Jury instructions pertaining to credibility (such as Jury 
Instructions 3:10 and 3:13) were neither discussed nor at issue in Ware, which held 
simply that “[e]vidence of agreements or deals with witnesses often provides powerful 
impeachment evidence against a witness and enables a defendant to attack the motive or 
bias of a witness who might otherwise appear to have no motive to falsify or color his 
testimony.”  Ware v. State, 348 Md. 19, 50, 702 A.2d 699, 714 (1997); see id. at 41, 702 
A.2d at 709 (“Evidence that the State has entered into an agreement with a witness, 
whether formally or informally, is often powerful impeachment evidence and the 
existence of such a ‘deal’ must be disclosed to the accused.”).   
21 
 
Instruction 3:13), aff’d in part & rev’d in part, State v. Stouffer, 352 Md. 97, 721 A.2d 
207 (1998).  The few reported appellate Maryland cases in which Jury Instruction 3:13 
(or a similar instruction) was given did not involve protective housing or protective 
services.  See Dickey v. State, 404 Md. 187, 192, 194 n.3, 946 A.2d 444, 447, 448 n.3 
(2008) (giving Jury Instruction 3:13 where the witness testified as part of a deal to avoid 
charges following an arrest for possession of controlled dangerous substances); Riggins v. 
State, 155 Md. App. 181, 196, 198 n.16, 843 A.2d 115, 123, 124 n.16 (2004) (giving Jury 
Instruction 3:13 where the witness received, in exchange for testimony, assistance in 
obtaining a bond review, $200 to pay bills, and a ride to a halfway house).   
 
In Stouffer, 118 Md. App. at 595–96, 703 A.2d at 863–64, a defendant (convicted 
by a jury of first degree felony murder and kidnapping) argued, among other things, that 
the trial judge erred in refusing to give to the jury an instruction very similar to Jury 
Instruction 3:13.  At the time a witness gave her statement to the police, they promised 
her that they would give her $200 for rent.  Stouffer, 118 Md. App. at 603, 703 A.2d at 
867.  A detective testified that the $200 was given to the witness approximately a month 
or so after her statement was made, because she called and said that she was having 
trouble making her rent payment.  Id.  According to the detective, the money was not 
given in exchange for her statement.  Id.  The defendant requested a “witness promised 
leniency” instruction, which would have instructed the jury that it:  
may consider the testimony of a witness who testifies for the 
State as a result of a financial benefit.  However, [they] 
should consider such testimony with caution, because the 
testimony may have been colored by a desire to gain a 
financial benefit by testifying against [the defendant]. 
22 
 
 
Stouffer, 118 Md. App. at 630, 703 A.2d at 880.  The Court of Special Appeals held that 
the requested jury instruction was “not applicable under the facts and circumstances of 
the case” because “[t]here was no showing . . . that the witness was promised any 
financial benefit before the statement was made, nor was there evidence of a quid pro 
quo.”  Id., 703 A.2d at 880–81.  Finally, the intermediate appellate court concluded that 
the trial judge’s general credibility instructions fairly covered the issue.  Id., 703 A.2d at 
881.  The decision of the Court of Special Appeals in Stouffer was affirmed in part and 
reversed in part on other grounds by us.  Stouffer, 352 Md. 97, 721 A.2d 207 (discussing 
the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain Stouffer’s convictions, without mentioning any 
jury instructions pertaining to credibility of witnesses).  Accordingly, the intermediate 
appellate court’s decision is without precedential value.  Cf. Dep’t of Health & Mental 
Hygiene v. Kelly, 397 Md. 399, 446, 918 A.2d 470, 497–98 (2007) (Wilner, J., 
concurring) (characterizing a “decision” of the Court of Special Appeals “that this Court 
later vacated” as having “utterly no precedential value”).  Nonetheless, we take note of it 
here to demonstrate merely that our colleagues on the intermediate appellate court have 
taken a restrained view toward the applicability of Jury Instruction 3:13.   
B. Use and Interpretation of  
Similar Jury Instructions in Other Jurisdictions 
 
 
Given the sparse, on-point authorities in Maryland, we turn to the decisions of our 
sister states and federal courts to inform our consideration of whether reasonable 
protective housing should be seen as a “benefit” within the meaning of Jury Instruction 
3:13.  Jury instructions similar to Jury Instruction 3:13 are found in jury instruction 
23 
 
manuals and handbooks in state and federal jurisdictions nationwide.  Despite the 
ubiquity of these instructions, we found no reported case dealing squarely with the 
question of whether reasonable protective housing—and nothing more—constituted a 
benefit that warranted the giving of a particularized credibility instruction.22   
                                              
22 One unreported opinion from one district of California’s intermediate appellate court 
system considered a very similar question to that facing us today.  We do not include the 
case for any precedential or persuasive value, but to illustrate merely the paucity of 
opinions nationally as to this discrete issue.  See Burson v. Capps, 440 Md. 328, 350 
n.23, 102 A.3d 353, 367 n.23 (2014). 
 
In California v. Ali, No. D058357, 2013 WL 452901, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2013), 
Ali was convicted by a jury of murder, attempted murder, shooting at an inhabited 
structure or vehicle, being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, and unlawfully 
possessing a firearm.  Ali argued that reversal of the judgment in his case was warranted 
for a number of reasons, the most relevant of which for present purposes was the trial 
judge’s refusal to give a requested jury instruction on “benefits provided” to certain 
witnesses.  Ali, 2013 WL at *15.  Ali requested the jury instruction with regards to the 
testimony of four witnesses.  Id.  The jury heard evidence that the first witness received 
threats and was relocated by the district attorney to a different state, and received 
monthly payments for his living expenses.  Id.  The second witness (who was deceased at 
the time of trial) was relocated also to another state and received “benefits” totaling 
$2,409 before his death.  Id.  The final two witnesses were a boy and his mother, who 
received assistance from an investigator in the district attorney’s office when that 
individual “check[ed] on the status of a police investigation” concerning an immediate 
family member of the two.  Id.   
 
As California pattern jury instructions did not contain a specific instruction 
addressing how the jury might view witnesses who receive “benefits” from the 
prosecution, Ali requested that the trial judge give an instruction based on a model 
instruction from the federal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.  Id.  The requested jury 
instruction stated: 
 
You have heard testimony that [the witness] has received 
benefits, 
compensation, 
favored 
treatment, 
from 
the 
government in connection with this case.  You should 
examine [the witness’s] testimony with greater caution than 
that of other witnesses.  In evaluating that testimony, you 
should consider the extent to which it may have been 
influenced by the receipt of benefits from the government. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Continued…) 
24 
 
 
The reported case with the closest factual scenario to the present case emanates 
from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.  In United States v. Partin, 
552 F.2d 621, 643 (5th Cir. 1977), a witness testified during direct examination that he 
was in the federal witness security program and that, as part of the program, he was given 
a new name and social security number, as well as just over $1,000 per month in 
                                                                                                                                                  
(…continued) 
 
Id.  The trial judge declined to give the requested instruction, explaining that the 
substance of the requested instruction was covered fairly by other instructions, and as to 
the mother and son duo, there was no evidence of any “benefit” received.  Id.  The jury 
received the following general credibility instruction:  
 
In evaluating a witnesses [sic] testimony, you may consider 
anything that reasonably tends to prove or disprove the truth 
or accuracy of that testimony.  Among the factors you may 
consider are: . . . Was the witness’s testimony influenced by a 
factor such as bias or prejudice, a personal relationship with 
someone involved in the case, or a personal interest in how 
the case is decided. 
 
 
The California Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that there was no 
evidence that the mother and son received any benefits, as the district attorney 
investigator provided merely information about the status of an investigation, but did not 
influence the investigation in any way.  Id.  That reviewing court determined that the 
general credibility instruction “sufficiently instructed the jury to consider a witness’s bias 
and allowed defense counsel to argue that the witnesses were biased because of benefits 
they received from the prosecution.”  Id.   
 
Finally, the California intermediate appellate court concluded that the requested 
jury instruction was “improperly argumentative” as it required an inference not supported 
by law.  Ali, 2013 WL at *16.  Specifically, the requested instruction would have directed 
the jury that it “must” view the witness’s testimony “with greater caution,” but “no . . . 
authority exists for witnesses provided relocation services, just as no authority exists for 
an instruction requiring a juror to view the testimony of an immunized witness with 
greater caution.”  Id.  The court concluded that the trial judge did not err in declining to 
give the requested instruction, id., and determined ultimately that none of the errors 
raised by Ali warranted reversal of his conviction.  Ali, 2013 WL at *23.   
25 
 
subsistence payments for himself and his family.  Defense counsel did not object to the 
witness’s testimony, and also did not cross-examine the witness regarding his 
participation in the program.  Partin, 552 F.2d at 644–45.  Defense counsel did argue at 
closing, however, that the witness was not credible.  Partin, 552 F.2d at 645.  The trial 
judge gave the jury the following instruction: 
All evidence of a witness whose self-interest is shown 
from either benefits received, whether they be received in 
money, in protective custody afforded by the Government or 
any other benefit, or any detriments suffered, threats or 
promises made, or any attitude of the witness which might 
tend to prompt testimony either favorable or unfavorable to 
the accused should be considered with caution and weighed 
with care.   
The Attorney General of the United States is 
authorized by law to provide for the security of Government 
witnesses, potential Government witnesses, and the families 
of Government witnesses and potential witnesses.  The 
Attorney General is likewise authorized by law to provide for 
the health, safety and welfare of witnesses and their families.  
This may include the payment of money, providing a new 
identity and securing a job to minimize the physical and 
economic harm to the witnesses and their families. 
 
Partin, 552 F.2d at 644.  Defense counsel did not object to the instruction as given, and 
requested an additional instruction that the instruction recounted above did not imply 
“the Court’s acceptance or rejection of [the witness’s] expressed fear.”  Id.  The judge 
rejected the additional instruction.  Id.  On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit began by noting the uncontested point that the defense had a right to put on 
evidence that the witness participated in the protection program.  Partin, 552 F.2d at 645 
(“The defense has a right to show that a witness, while in the [witness protection] 
program, has received substantial benefits . . . .”).  The court mused that the first 
26 
 
paragraph of the given jury instruction “tends to cast doubt on [the witness’s] credibility 
because of his participation in the witness security program.”  Partin, 552 F.2d at 645 
n.31.  Nonetheless, that court concluded that the instruction as given did not imply that 
the trial judge believed or disbelieved the witness and so “the additional instruction was 
properly refused.”  Partin, 552 F.2d at 645.   
 
We assign little persuasive weight to Partin for several reasons.  First, based on 
our review of pattern jury instructions both in the federal Fifth Circuit and nationwide, 
the given instruction does not appear to have an origin in any compilation of pattern 
instructions we were able to find and we cannot discern its origin.23  It appears that jury 
instructions like the one administered in Partin are not given commonly, despite the 
frequency with which federal and state witnesses alike participate in various forms of 
witness protection programs.  Second, the propriety of the jury instruction as given was 
not under review by the Fifth Circuit, as the federal Court of Appeals considered only 
whether the trial judge erred in declining to give an additional, supplemental instruction.  
Partin, 552 F.2d at 644.24   
                                              
23 Our search for this jury instruction and similar variants exhausted the outer reaches of 
Westlaw’s legal research database and Google’s all-seeing search engine.   
 
24 To the extent that Partin contains a kernel of persuasive force, it suggests that the 
“benefits” the witness received pursuant to the federal government’s witness protection 
program would not have been covered fairly by any then-existing pattern jury instruction 
in the Fifth Circuit, some of which are similar to those found in the MPJI-Cr.  The oldest 
published volume of pattern jury instructions from the Fifth Circuit that we were able to 
locate was compiled in 1978 from then-existing commonly used jury instructions.  Fifth 
Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal Cases) (1978 pamph.).  Only one pattern 
instruction—No. 6—addressed the credibility of witnesses.  It resembles somewhat 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Continued…) 
27 
 
We turn now to a recent case from one of our sister states.  In Massachusetts, the 
Commonwealth’s highest court considered in dicta whether certain questions addressed 
by the judge to prospective jurors during vior dire necessitated a new trial.  
Massachusetts v. Connor, 467 N.E.2d 1340 (Mass. 1984).  Two witnesses in Connor’s 
trial were participants in the Federal witness protection program and “received substantial 
financial and other benefits thereunder” (although the opinion does not detail what 
specific “benefits” were received).  Connor, 467 N.E.2d at 1348.  One of those witnesses 
was a participant, who became an informer, in the criminal activities for which Connor 
was being tried; the other had criminal charges pending in an unrelated matter.  Connor, 
467 N.E.2d at 1344.  The judge asked the prospective jurors whether the fact that a 
                                                                                                                                                  
(…continued) 
Maryland’s Jury Instruction 3:10 in its suggestion that jurors consider, among other 
things, a witness’s “manner of testifying,” “his candor, fairness and intelligence,” and 
“his relationship to the Government or the Defendant,” as well as “his interest, if any, in 
the outcome of the case.”  The Fifth Circuit’s general credibility instruction is now 
numbered 1.08.  Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Pattern Jury Instructions: Fifth 
Circuit, Criminal Cases (2012) 1.08, “Credibility of Witnesses.”  Over the course of 
various amendments and additions, the Fifth Circuit has added particularized credibility 
instructions.  See 1.14 (Accomplice—Informer—Immunity) and 1.15 (Accomplice—Co-
Defendant—Plea Agreement), which together resemble fairly our Jury Instruction 3:13.   
 
The opinion in Partin is silent regarding whether that jury received the general 
credibility instruction referenced above or any other similar general jury instructions.  
United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1977).  Nonetheless, the trial judge found 
the available general credibility instructions inapplicable apparently to a situation where a 
witness received protective custody from the federal government, and administered 
instead the particularized instruction noted above. 
28 
 
witness had received “benefits” under the witness protection program would affect their 
assessment of the witness’s credibility.25  Connor, 467 N.E.2d at 1348.   
 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts concluded that such questioning 
“improperly invaded the province of the jury.”  Id.  Because a witness’s “receipt of 
benefits under the witness protection program” is “highly relevant to his credibility and 
entirely appropriate for the jury’s consideration,” the questioning improperly “conveyed a 
message to the jury that they should not consider matters that they were entitled to 
consider.”  Id.  The problem was “compounded” (according to that court) when the 
prosecutor misstated the law during closing arguments by telling the jury that they had 
sworn to treat the testimony of the witnesses “equally.”  Id.  Based on the particular 
circumstances of the case,26 the Massachusetts high court concluded that the error 
probably did not necessitate reversal in light of the trial judge’s “arguably . . . curative” 
instructions.  Connor, 467 N.E.2d at 1349.  The trial judge’s credibility instructions were 
as follows: 
Now, you may consider and give such weight, if any you see 
fit, that certain witnesses have received protection and 
financial and other benefits under the federal government's 
Witness Protection Program.  You’ve heard a considerable 
mass of evidence in regard to that.  It’s for you to determine 
                                              
25 The trial judge asked also whether the fact that a witness was a participant in the crime 
would affect the juror’s assessment of the witness’s credibility.  Massachusetts v. 
Connor, 467 N.E.2d 1340, 1348 (Mass. 1984).   
 
26 Defense counsel did not object to the court’s questioning, but did object to the 
prosecutor’s closing arguments and moved for a mistrial on that basis.  Connor, 467 
N.E.2d at 1348–49.   
29 
 
what effect, if any, what weight, if any, you will give to that 
situation in regard to any particular witness. 
 
. . .  
 
You remember in my early, early discussions with you over 
in the church hall and here in the court, we had what I thought 
was a rather extensive discussion over there about jury duty, 
and then an extensive voir dire when I asked you questions 
here.  It may be that in going into certain matters, such as the 
Witness Protection Program, that I emphasized one thing 
more than another. . . . [Y]ou will take the law in regard to 
these cases as I have just given it to you, and not discuss or be 
concerned with any questions that I asked you in regard to 
your qualifications to sit on the case or those preliminary 
instructions. 
 
Id. n.9.  The defendant requested a further instruction that the testimony of a witness who 
testifies “for personal advantage” must be received “with great caution,” but the trial 
judge declined to give that instruction.  Id.   
Curious procedural posture aside, this case we find unhelpful largely for many of 
the same reasons we eschew Partin.  Just as in Partin, the provenance of the trial judge’s 
“arguably . . . curative” instructions are unknown.  At the time, the Massachusetts District 
Court Criminal Model Jury Instructions (1979, 1985 ed.) Instruction 2.07, “Credibility of 
Witnesses” [“Massachusetts 2.07”] contained that state’s general credibility pattern 
instruction, which states that jurors may consider, among other things, a witness’s 
“motive for testifying,” “any bias he has shown in his or her testimony,” and “the interest 
or lack of interest the witness may have in the outcome of the case.”27  The instruction 
                                              
27 This jury instruction has since become Instruction 2.260, “Credibility of Witnesses.”  
Massachusetts Criminal Model Jury Instructions (3rd ed. 2009, 2nd Supp. 2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Continued…) 
30 
 
contains several “Supplemental Instructions,” including one on “Interested witnesses,” 
which provided, “[t]he fact that a witness may have some interest in the outcome of this 
case doesn’t mean that the witness isn’t trying to tell you the truth . . . . But the witness’s 
interest is a factor that you may consider along with all the other factors.”28  
Massachusetts 2.07 (1974, 1988 ed.).  Accordingly, Massachusetts 2.07 resembles 
Maryland’s Jury Instructions 3:10 and 3:13.  The Connor opinion is silent regarding 
which, if any, other instructions the jury received.  To the extent that Connor resembles 
the case at bar, we think that it suggests that the “benefits” the witness received pursuant 
to the federal government’s witness protection program would not have been covered 
fairly by the existing pattern jury instructions in Massachusetts. 
In another case from Massachusetts, a defendant was convicted of murder in the 
first degree of a clerk in a convenience store.  Massachusetts v. McGee, 4 N.E.3d 256, 
259 (Mass. 2014).  On appeal, McGee argued (among other things) that the trial judge 
erred in denying his request for a particularized credibility instruction for a witness that 
the defendant argued was paid to testify.  McGee, 4 N.E.3d at 266.  When the witness 
                                                                                                                                                  
(…continued) 
(providing that the jury may consider “his motive for testifying, whether he displays any 
bias in testifying, and whether or not he has any interest in the outcome of the case”).   
 
28 The current Instruction 2.260 contains an additional supplemental instruction on a 
“Prosecution witness with plea agreement contingent on truthful testimony.”  
Massachusetts Criminal Model Jury Instructions (3rd ed. 2009, 2nd Supp. 2013) 
Instruction 2.260, “Credibility of Witnesses.”  This supplemental instruction provides 
that jurors may consider the testimony of those who have reached plea agreements with 
the Commonwealth “with particular care,” and may consider also whether the witness’s 
testimony “has been affected by his interest in the outcome of the case and any benefits 
that he has received or hopes to receive.”  Id.   
31 
 
came forward with information that the defendant confessed his role in the murder to her, 
the prosecutor agreed to pay the cost of hotel accommodations for her and her children.  
Id.  The prosecutor assisted the witness in obtaining a “Section 8” housing certificate, 
and, when an apartment was located, paid the witness’s first month’s rent, security 
deposit, and broker’s fee.  McGee, 4 N.E.3d at 266–67.  The total cost of assistance was 
nearly $4,000.  McGee, 4 N.E.3d at 267.  The witness testified that she was aware that the 
convenience store employer of the victim offered a $25,000 reward for information 
leading to the arrest and conviction of the shooter, but denied having any expectation of 
collecting the reward.  Id. n.12.   
 
The defendant requested that the trial judge give the following jury instruction: 
The testimony of a cooperating witness who provides 
evidence against a Defendant to escape punishment or receive 
leniency from law enforcement authorities for his or her own 
misdeeds or crimes, or for other personal reason or advantage, 
must be examined and weighed by the jury with greater care 
and caution than the testimony of an ordinary witness. 
 
You, the jury, must determine whether a cooperating 
witness’s testimony has been affected by self-interest, or by 
an agreement, implicit or explicit, he or she has with the 
government, or his or her own interest in the outcome of the 
case, or by prejudice or bias against the Defendant and his 
family. 
 
McGee, 4 N.E.3d at 267.  The trial judge declined to give the requested instruction, but 
gave instead an instruction that the jury should consider, among other things, whether a 
witness “had a bias or motive which would have influenced [his or her] testimony,” “has 
any interest in the trial or any interest in its outcome,” or “has been influenced by any 
promises, rewards or any other inducements to testify.”  Id.  At trial, defense counsel 
32 
 
cross-examined the witness about the “inducements,” and argued in closing that the 
witness was motivated to lie by money and revenge.  Id.  He argued that she “was bought 
and paid for by the Commonwealth.  She is a witness who had a motive to lie[;] she is a 
witness who was well rewarded for her lies.”  Id.   
 
On appeal, the Massachusetts high court, without much explanation, concluded 
that the defendant was not entitled to the requested instruction as the trial judge’s 
instructions “adequately conveyed to the jury how they were to evaluate witness 
credibility, particularly in light of the fact that defense counsel vigorously cross-
examined [the witness] and vigorously argued to [the] jury her lack of credibility.”29  Id. 
(internal quotations omitted).  Although the impetus for the services provided to the 
witness in McGee is distinguishable from that of the services provided here to Payton, the 
modality of the services provided are somewhat similar.  McGee, 4 N.E.3d at 266–67.  
Just as the relocation and housing services in McGee did not constitute a “personal reason 
or advantage” sufficient to justify a particularized credibility instruction, so the 
reasonable protective housing offered to Payton do not constitute a “benefit” within the 
meaning of Jury Instruction 3:13. 
                                              
29 It is unclear, based on the Massachusetts high court’s decision, whether that court 
would have concluded that McGee was entitled to the requested instruction had his 
lawyer not argued in closing the issue of the witness’s credibility (as Preston’s lawyer 
refrained from doing here).  Massachusetts v. McGee, 4 N.E.3d 256, 267 (Mass. 2014).  
That court may have conceived of the actions of defense counsel as plus factors in the 
calculus of whether the trial judge abused her discretion, or the Massachusetts high court 
may have meant to insinuate that any error committed by the trial judge would have been 
harmless.  Because the Supreme Judicial Court did not expound fully enough its 
reasoning, the opinion is of limited persuasive force here. 
33 
 
 
An Illinois case of passing similarity was resolved along similar lines.  In Illinois 
v. McInnis, 411 N.E.2d 26, 39 (Ill. App. 1980), a witness testified that, in exchange for 
his testimony, he: (1) was “housed in witness quarters” while the case was pending; 
(2) received assistance from the state in relocating from his former neighborhood; 
(3) received rent payments in his new building paid by the State; and, (4) hoped to collect 
a $5,000 reward.  The witness admitted also that the State prosecutor promised to try to 
get his probation extended at an upcoming violation of probation hearing.  Id.  The jury 
received the following credibility instruction: 
You are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and 
of the weight to be given to the testimony of each of them.  In 
considering the testimony of any witness, you may take into 
account his ability and opportunity to observe, his memory, 
his manner while testifying, any interest, bias or prejudice he 
may have, and the reasonableness of his testimony considered 
in light of all the evidence in the case. 
 
McInnis, 411 N.E.2d at 38.  Defense counsel requested, but did not receive the benefit of, 
a particularized credibility instruction: 
The testimony of a witness who provides evidence against a 
defendant for pay, or for immunity from punishment, or for 
personal advantage or vindication, must be examined and 
weighed by the jury with greater care than the testimony of an 
ordinary witness.  The jury must determine whether the 
witness’[s] testimony has been affected by interest, or by 
prejudice against the defendant. 
 
McInnis, 411 N.E.2d at 39.  The intermediate appellate court of Illinois determined that 
the instructions as given covered adequately potential bias and prejudice concerns, and 
the trial court did not err in declining to give the particularized instruction sought by 
McInnis.  McInnis, 411 N.E.2d at 40.  We are sympathetic to the conclusion reached by 
34 
 
the trial and appellate courts in McInnis, just as in McGee, that the protective services 
provided to the witness did not constitute a “personal advantage or vindication” so as to 
warrant a particularized credibility instruction.30   
 
In considered dicta, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
considered the value of particularized credibility instructions for informants and 
participants in the federal witness protection program.  United States v. Adamo, 742 F.2d 
927, 944 (6th Cir. 1984).  That court observed that participation in a witness protection 
program may have mixed implications for a witness’s credibility: “[i]nformation that a 
witness is a participant in [the Witness Protection Program], and therefore is being paid 
and protected by the federal government, simultaneously enhances and undermines a 
witness’[s] credibility.”  Id.  The court drew a distinction in credibility concerns, 
however, between paid informants and protected citizens:  
A distinction must be made between government witnesses 
who are merely paid informants and those which are 
participants in the Witness Protection Program.  References to 
a witness being a paid informant undermine the credibility of 
the government’s witness without raising any negative 
inferences against a defendant. . . . A totally different concern 
arises when the government’s witness is protected, for this 
may in some cases raise negative inferences against the 
defendant if great care is not employed. 
 
                                              
30 We recognize that the witness in McInnis received also assistance in obtaining an 
extension of probation (despite a violation) and a potential $5,000 reward.  Illinois v. 
McInnis, 411 N.E.2d 26, 39 (Ill. App. 1980).  Such benefits would warrant likely in 
Maryland the administration of a particularized credibility instruction such as Jury 
Instruction 3:13. 
35 
 
Adamo, 742 F.2d at 945 n.25.  That court encouraged lower courts to instruct testifying 
witnesses not to refer to their participation in witness protection programs at all when 
testifying before a jury, Adamo, 742 F.2d at 945, and if the program must be referenced, 
attorneys should use the term “relocation” in lieu of “protection,” so as to avoid potential 
negative implications.  Id. n.25.  The court concluded by supposing that, in some 
situations: 
The better course is probably for counsel to ask the trial judge 
to contemporaneously instruct the jury that the protection 
afforded by the witness should neither enhance that 
witness’[s] credibility nor necessarily be construed to mean 
that the defendant has threatened the witness.  Jurors are quite 
capable of understanding that government informants are the 
objects of hostility of any general prison population and the 
“at large” criminal community. . . . On the other hand, unless 
abuse by the prosecutor is shown, we do not require the Court 
to handle the matter of protected witnesses itself. 
 
Id. n.27.  We find this dicta from the Sixth Circuit unhelpful, as, based on the above-
quoted text, it seems clear that that court has a different perspective on the impact of 
witness protection on the course of a trial than we do.  We see no reason to instruct 
testifying witnesses not to refer to their participation in such programs and are 
accordingly not inclined to follow that court’s suggestion that jurors receive a 
particularized jury instruction that encourages neutrality.    
 
The parties have not presented us with—and we were not able to find—any other 
cases on point.  Federal cases abound in which parties debate the admissibility at trial of 
the fact that a witness participated in the federal witness protection program.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Talley, 164 F.3d 989, 1003 (6th Cir. 1999) (determining that the trial 
36 
 
judge did not abuse his discretion in instructing the jury to disregard testimony regarding 
a witness’s relocation, and that such questioning did not warrant a mistrial where the 
defendant opened the door to the witness’s motivation to lie in opening statements and 
later cross-examined the witness); United States v. Caliendo, 910 F.2d 429, 436 n.5 (7th 
Cir. 1990) (citing decisions where other courts held that defense counsel may elicit 
testimony regarding participation in witness protection programs “when the information 
is sought to inform the jury of all of the benefits bestowed upon a witness in return for his 
cooperation”); United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1407 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 
(affirming the trial court’s decision to allow the defendant to cross-examine a witness, 
with certain limits, on “benefits” a witness received while in the federal witness 
protection program, but where the defendant chose not to employ such a line of 
questioning); Adamo, 742 F.2d at 944–46; United States v. Librach, 520 F.2d 550, 553 
(8th Cir. 1975) (concluding that the prosecution failed improperly to disclose to the 
defense that a witness had been in protective custody and received immunity and nearly 
$10,000).  Questions of admissibility do not concern us here, however, as defense 
counsel was able to cross-examine fully Payton on the relocation assistance and 
reasonable protective housing provided to her. 
Other courts have discussed the intersection between witness credibility and 
witness protection programs, but with no exploration of the appropriateness of jury 
instructions pertaining to credibility.  At least one state appellate court concluded that 
services (including protective housing and food) provided to a witness pursuant to a 
witness protection programs do not constitute a “fee” paid to a witness.  California v. 
37 
 
Jenkins, 997 P.2d 1044, 1121 (Cal. 2000), as modified (June 28, 2000) (concluding, in an 
automatic appeal from the imposition of the death penalty, that the defendant was not 
denied a fair trial because certain witnesses received “benefits . . . under the witness 
protection program” and were therefore “unreliable,” and where defense counsel chose 
not to cross-examine the witnesses on participation in the program); see also Minnesota 
v. Bowles, 530 N.W.2d 521, 534 (Minn. 1995) (allowing the defendant to expose 
potential biases of a witness on cross-examination where that witness received “benefits” 
in the form of witness protection and leniency in other criminal cases). 
Still others refer to services received pursuant to witness protection programs as 
“benefits,” but not in the context of whether particularized credibility jury instructions (or 
jury instructions at all, for that matter) are warranted.  See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Wong, 667 
F.3d 965, 1007 (2011) (discussing an investigation into abuses of a “benefits” program 
for jailhouse informants, where “benefits” included transfers to cells with a television 
and/or coffeepot, being taken outside of the jail for lunch, witness protection program 
money being paid to an informant’s wife, and having a girlfriend released with no bond 
while her trial was pending); Talley, 164 F.3d at 1003; Caliendo, 910 F.2d at 436 n.5; 
Tarantino, 846 F.2d at 1407; Connecticut v. McClain, 105 A.3d 924, 926–29 (Con. App. 
2014) (referring to the “benefits derived from the witness protection program” and the 
amount of time he was “receiving benefits from the State, and how much money he had 
received”); see also United States v. Pandozzi, 878 F.2d 1526, 1530 (1st Cir. 1989) 
(using the term “promises” to refer to a witness’s agreement to accept participation in a 
witness protection program, “favorable testimony” on his behalf at the witness’s sentence 
38 
 
reduction and parole hearings, transfer to a different prison, and “use” immunity, in 
exchange for testimony).   
In many cases, witnesses received a variety of discrete benefits in exchange for 
their testimony, and courts oftentimes used the term “benefits” to refer to an entire 
package, which include oftentimes some combination of witness protection, a plea deal, 
immunity from prosecution, early parole, and cash payments.  See, e.g., Arizona v. 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 300 (1991) (referring to “benefits” received, including a cash 
payment, immunity, and eventual placement in the witness protection program); Bond v. 
Procunier, 780 F.2d 461, 462 (4th Cir. 1986) (referring to “benefits” where a witness was 
granted immunity, as well as a new identity and a job under the federal witness protection 
program); United States v. Bufalino, 683 F.2d 639, 647 (2d Cir. 1982) (referring to 
“benefits” where one witness stood to receive a plea deal, immunity, and $200,000 as 
part of a witness protection program, and where another witness stood to receive early 
parole and participation in a protection program); Manning v. Buchan, 357 F.Supp.2d 
1036, 1055 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (referring to “benefits” received pursuant to the witness 
protection program, including cash payments); Bowles, 530 N.W.2d at 534; Illinois v. 
Cotton, 913 N.E.2d 578, 583, 592 (Ill. App. 2009) (referring to “benefits” received where 
a witness reached a plea agreement and was placed in the witness protection unit of the 
Cook County jail).  In many of these benefits-package cases, the juries received 
particularized credibility instructions relating to the “flagship” benefits received, and are 
accordingly of little help to us here as we determine whether the receipt of reasonable 
protective housing alone constitutes a “benefit” warranting Jury Instruction 3:13.   
39 
 
For example, in United States v. Holmes, 229 F.3d 782, 784 (9th Cir. 2000), a 
witness testified against a defendant in an armed bank robbery case.  Prior to the robbery, 
the witness had met Holmes, a friend of her husband, on a number of occasions.  Id.  
Approximately six weeks after the robbery, the witness approached the police “ask[ing] 
them about the possibility of getting money in exchange for the information.”  Id.  She 
identified Holmes as one of the robbers, but testified that, at the time she provided the 
information to police, she did not know “one way or the other” if she would receive 
compensation.  Id.  After a meeting with the FBI, she received $1,500.  Id.  After that 
point, the FBI placed her in its “informant program,” and following her grand jury 
testimony, she received an additional $4,500 “to help her relocate away from her 
husband.”  Id.  The witness testified at a pre-trial hearing, however, that the 
“compensation” she received from the FBI was not “related in any way to testimony [she] 
might provide in this case.”  Holmes, 229 F.3d at 786 n.2.  Holmes argued that the trial 
judge erred by not delivering the following jury instruction: 
You have heard testimony that ___, a witness, has received 
[benefits, compensation, favored treatment, etc.] from the 
government in connection with this case.  You should 
examine ___’s testimony with greater caution than that of 
ordinary witnesses.  In evaluating that testimony, you should 
consider the extent to which it may have been influenced by 
the receipt of [e.g., benefits] from the government. 
 
Holmes, 229 F.3d at 785.  Instead, the trial judge told the jury:  
In considering the testimony of a witness, you may take into 
account: . . . (4) the witness’[s] interest in the outcome of the 
case and any bias, prejudice, and whether the witness 
received money or benefits from the Government in 
40 
 
connection with the case; . . . and (7) any other factors that 
bear on believability. 
 
Holmes, 229 F.3d at 787 (emphasis in original).  The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit determined that the trial judge did not err in declining to give the 
particularized jury instruction in light of the more general instruction given, and, based 
on the witness’s testimony about the “circumstances surrounding her compensation,” the 
jury’s attention was drawn already to the fact that she was a “paid informant.”  Holmes, 
229 F.3d at 788.  In that case, it is unclear whether the witness received protective 
services at all, or just a reward and seed money to start a new life away from her husband. 
C. Final Considerations 
We leave for future reviewing courts to discern the outer boundaries of what else 
constitutes the contours of what fits within the phrase “reasonable protective housing.”  
We suggest that “reasonable” protective housing implies that there is some rough 
correlation between a witness’s ordinary living arrangements and those provided to a 
witness while they are in protective housing.  It likely would not have been reasonable, 
for example, for the State to put Payton in The Plaza Hotel31 for the entirety of her stay in 
protective housing.  In this case, the State paid less than $14,000 to house Payton (and, 
presumably, her immediate family) for approximately eight months.  Such an expense, in 
these circumstances, is not unreasonable. 
 
                                              
31 The Plaza Hotel is a historic New York luxury hotel on Central Park South in 
Manhattan, where Payton and her family could have been accommodated, with the same 
sum of money spent in the present case, for approximately three weeks. 
41 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
Payton’s experience with the State’s protective services is hardly the “financial 
windfall” that Preston claims it to be.  As Detective Moran observed at trial,  
It’s a lot for someone to move their life.  You know, you got 
kids.  She has a grandmother who was sick in the house.  
That’s her neighborhood.  That’s her life.  And that’s a lot to 
move somebody.   
 
Reasonable protective housing (such as the services provided to Payton) does not 
constitute a “benefit” within the meaning of Jury Instruction 3:13.   
 
 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF 
SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED; 
COSTS 
TO 
BE 
PAID 
BY 
PETITIONER.