Title: Morrissey v. Virginia State Bar (ORDER)

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

VIRGINIA: 
 
 
In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court Building in the 
City of Richmond on Thursday the 18th day of July, 2019. 
 
Present:  Chief Justice Lemons, Justice Goodwyn, Justice McClanahan, Justice Powell, Justice 
Kelsey, Justice McCullough, and Senior Justice Millette 
 
Joseph Dee Morrissey, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant, 
 
 against 
Record No. 181311 
 
 
Circuit Court Nos. CL17001040-00, CL17004695-00 
 
Virginia State Bar, ex rel. Third District Committee, 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
Upon an appeal of right from a 
judgment rendered by the Circuit Court of 
the City of Richmond. 
 
Upon consideration of the record, briefs, and argument, the Court is of opinion that there 
is no error in the memorandum order that is the subject of this appeal. 
A three-judge court found that Virginia attorney Joseph D. Morrissey violated Rules 
5.1(b), 5.5(c), and 8.4(b) of the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct.  The judges concluded 
that these violations warranted the revocation of his license to practice law.  Morrissey 
challenges this decision on a number of grounds. 
BACKGROUND 
After the Virginia State Bar alleged that Morrissey had violated the rules of professional 
conduct, Morrissey elected to proceed before a three-judge court.  See Code § 54.1-3935.  At the 
conclusion of a five-day hearing in the Circuit Court for the City of Richmond, most of the 
claims were either withdrawn by the Bar or stricken or rejected by the court.  The three-judge 
court concluded that Morrissey had violated Rules 5.1(b), 5.5(c), and 8.4(b).  The court then 
prepared a memorandum opinion reflecting its decision. 
I. 
RULES 5.1(B) AND 5.5(C). 
The charges related to Rules 5.1(b) and 5.5(c) stem from a court appearance by an 
associate of Morrissey’s law firm, Ericka Battle.  The three-judge court’s memorandum opinion 
contains the following factual summary from the parties’ stipulated facts.  We supplement this 
stipulation with additional facts, as bracketed: 
 
2 
1.  
During all times relevant hereto, Respondent has been an 
attorney licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth of Virginia. 
 
2. 
In 2013, David A. Jones (“Complainant”), hired 
Respondent to defend him against four criminal charges brought 
by his brother:  a felony charge of malicious wounding, and three 
misdemeanor charges of domestic assault, brandishing a firearm, 
and violation of a protective order. 
 
3. 
The matters were pending in the Juvenile and Domestic 
Relations District Court for King and Queen County. 
 
4.  
By letter to the court, dated October 15, 2013, Respondent 
noted his appearance, stating, “I have been retained to represent 
Mr. Jones in the above matter,” and provided his available dates. 
 
5. 
The preliminary hearing on the felony charge and trial of 
the misdemeanor charges were scheduled for December 2, 2013, 
one of the dates provided by Respondent. 
 
6. 
Respondent and one of his employees, Ericka Battle 
(“Battle”), a recent law school graduate, prepared the case, filed 
for discovery and corresponded with the prosecuting attorney. 
Respondent, Paul Gregorio, Esquire, and Ericka Battle, who was a 
first year Associate, all worked on the case including filing 
Discovery, corresponding with the Commonwealth’s Attorney, and 
meeting with the Complainant, David Jones.  Ericka Battle was a 
first year Associate who had previously handled by herself, 
numerous cases in the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s office.  
Further, Ms. Battle was not merely a law school graduate, but had 
passed the Bar, was licensed by the Virginia State Bar and was 
registered and listed with the Virginia State Bar as “Active, in 
Good Standing.” 
 
7. 
The prosecutor recalled corresponding with Respondent, 
and talking with Respondent and Battle about the matter.  It is 
possible that Paul Gregorio also spoke with the prosecutor. 
Following these discussions the prosecutor determined that the 
evidence was insufficient to support the charges and agreed to seek 
an order of nolle prosequi from the court. 
 
8. 
Upon learning that the Commonwealth had agreed to move 
for an order of nolle prosequi, Respondent sent Battle in his stead 
to represent Complainant at the December 2, 2013 hearing.  
[Morrissey could not attend due to a scheduling problem.  Battle 
testified that Morrissey directed her to appear to represent the 
 
3 
client at this hearing; Morrissey denied ordering her to appear, 
testifying he communicated through his office manager.] 
 
9. 
When Ms. Battle appeared in court on December 2, 2013, 
she had a very friendly and jovial exchange with the Court. 
 
Court:  “Hi Ms. Battle, I was hoping to see Mr. Morrissey.” 
Ms. Battle:  “No Your Honor, Mr. Morrissey is not here...You will 
only get me today.”  Both the Court and Ms. Battle laughed. 
 
10.  
The Commonwealth moved for an order of nolle prosequi 
as planned, and the court granted the motion and entered orders of 
nolle prosequi for all four charges. The court noted Battle as 
counsel for Complainant in its four orders, but other than standing 
in for Respondent, she took no other meaningful action on behalf 
of Mr. Jones. 
 
11. 
As of the date that she appeared in court for Complainant 
on December 2, 2013, Battle had passed the bar exam on July 30, 
2013, was licensed by the Virginia State Bar on October 31, 2013, 
and on November 8, 2013, was registered and listed with the 
Virginia State Bar as “Active, in Good Standing.”  She had not, 
however, been administered the oath of fidelity by the Supreme 
Court of Virginia or any court as required by Virginia Code 
Section 54.1-3903. The Supreme Court of Virginia administered 
her the oath at a ceremony two days later on December 4, 2013. 
 
12.  
Virginia Code Section 54.1-3903 provides that: 
 
Before an attorney may practice in any court in the 
Commonwealth, he shall make the oath of fidelity 
to the Commonwealth, stating that he will honestly 
demean himself in the practice of law and execute 
his office of attorney-at-law to the best of his 
ability.  An attorney who has qualified before the 
Supreme Court of Virginia shall be qualified to 
practice in all courts of the Commonwealth.  An 
attorney who has qualified before a court other than 
the Supreme Court shall be qualified to practice 
only in the court which administered his oath.  Each 
court in which an attorney intends to practice may 
require the attorney to produce satisfactory evidence 
of his licensure or authorization. 
 
(This section does not reference those 3rd-year law students and 
1st-year Associates who have third-year practice papers.  In the 
 
4 
instant case, Ms. Battle was a 1st-year Associate who had handled 
numerous cases pursuant to her 3rd-year practice 
certificate.) 
 
13.  
By letter to Complainant, dated December 2, 2013, Battle 
explained that after talking with the Commonwealth’s Attorney 
about inconsistencies in the victim’s statements to police, the 
Commonwealth agreed to seek an order of nolle prosequi, the 
effect of which she also explained to Complainant. 
 
14.  
By letter, dated March 20, 2015, Respondent submitted an 
answer to the bar complaint candidly acknowledging that his 
associate had not been sworn in when he sent her to court.  He 
noted that she had a third-year practice certificate, and that she had 
appeared in numerous criminal cases while serving as an intern at 
the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s office.  Battle had second chaired 
dozens of cases with Respondent in court matters ranging from 
DUI to 1st degree murder. 
 
15.  
Battle’s third-year practice certificate expired by operation 
of law when she passed the bar exam.  (Rules of Court, Part 6, 
Section IV, Paragraph 15.c.l) 
 
16.  
Respondent explained that Battle did research and worked 
as a second chair under his supervision. 
 
17.  
When asked why he sent Battle to the hearing by herself, 
Respondent said that it was because it was a routine nolle prosse. 
He could not recall sending her to court by herself at any other 
time. 
 
18.  
Battle provided the bar with a similar explanation of her 
role:  that she worked up cases for Respondent, interviewed 
witnesses, prepared documents for his review and went to court 
with him on occasion. When asked, she said that she could not 
recall examining witnesses or performing any other courtroom 
functions.  
 
II. 
RULE 8.4(B). 
The uncontested facts establish that Morrissey had sexual relations with a minor, Myrna 
Pride, who was seventeen years old at the time.  Morrissey was fifty-five years old.  The parties 
presented conflicting evidence concerning whether Morrissey knew Pride’s actual age.  
Morrissey and Pride later married.  Morrissey entered a guilty plea pursuant to North Carolina v. 
 
5 
Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).  He was convicted on December 12, 2014 of the crime of 
Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor, in violation of Code § 18.2-371.  He was sentenced 
to 12 months in jail with six months suspended for five years conditioned upon good behavior.  
The court gave him credit for time served and allowed him to serve his sentence on work release.  
Id. 
The memorandum order recites the following stipulated facts in connection with the 
violation of Rule 8.4: 
1. 
At all times referenced herein Respondent has been an 
attorney licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth of Virginia. 
 
2.  
In July 2014, Respondent was charged with possession of 
child pornography, distribution of child pornography, taking 
indecent liberties with a child by a person in a supervisory role, 
contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and use of a 
communications system to solicit certain offenses involving 
children. 
 
3.  
Prior to the scheduled trial in December 2014, Respondent 
entered an Alford Plea to one misdemeanor charge of contributing 
to the delinquency of a minor.  The recitation of the evidence that 
the Commonwealth would have presented to prove the charges is 
set forth in the Alford Plea (Exhibit A).  The Alford Plea included 
an attached exhibit titled “Text Timeline” that included explicit 
and sexually graphic text messages to and from Respondent and 
MP and nude photographs of MP requested by Respondent. 
 
4. 
The remaining charges against Respondent were dismissed. 
Respondent was sentenced to six months in jail, which was 
reduced to ninety days on work release pursuant to the plea 
agreement. 
 
5. 
The Morrissey II[1] charges were dismissed by the Henrico 
County Circuit Court pre-trial due to a clause in the Alford Plea 
                                                          
 
1 In the proceedings below, the Bar referred to the criminal charges brought against 
Morrissey in June 2014 as “Morrissey I.”  Those charges included a charge of indecent liberties, 
electronic solicitation of a minor between the age of 15 and 18, possession of child pornography, 
distribution of child pornography, and contributing to the delinquency of a minor.  In January 
2015, after the entry of Morrissey’s Alford plea, a special prosecutor brought additional charges 
of felony uttering a forged public record, felony conspiracy to utter a forged record, felony 
inducing perjury, and perjury.  The Bar referred to these charges as “Morrissey II.”  The charges 
stemmed from the allegation that Morrissey had employed a forged court order during the 
 
6 
agreement that stated that the Commonwealth agreed to “withhold 
any other potential criminal charges against the Defendant, such as 
conspiracy to suborn perjury, conspiracy to obstruct justice, etc.,” 
and because the Court determined that the double jeopardy rights 
of the Respondent were implicated. 
 
6. 
Following the dismissal of the Morrissey II charges, the 
Virginia State Bar (“VSB”) began its investigation and issued 
subpoenas duces tecum to four of Respondent’s criminal defense 
attorneys:  Amy Austin, Anthony Troy, James Maloney, and Ward 
Armstrong.  Mr. Troy, Mr. Maloney, and Mr. Armstrong filed 
Motions to Quash the subpoenas and Ms. Austin wrote a letter to 
the VSB objecting to the disclosure of Respondent’s file based on 
attorney-client privilege. 
 
7. 
On March 4, 2016, at a hearing before the Henrico County 
Circuit Court, Respondent agreed to turn over his attorneys’ files 
to the VSB, omitting nothing. 
 
8. 
Respondent filed a Motion to Quash the VSB’s subpoena 
duces tecum to Sensei Enterprises and, after a hearing in the 
Henrico County Circuit Court, the Honorable Lee A. Harris, Jr. 
denied the Motion to Quash and ordered Sensei Enterprises to 
comply with the VSB subpoena duces tecum. 
 
9. 
In the “Defendant’s Position” section of the Alford Plea, 
Respondent stated that 1) he and MP would have testified that they 
did not have sexual intercourse on August 20, 2013; 2) beginning 
“the evening of August 20, 2013 and continuing through the 
morning of August 21, 2013 and beyond, [Brittaney] McKinney 
could and did author and send the salacious text messages and 
nude photographs contained in the Commonwealth’s evidence”; 
and, 3) “[b]oth Mr. Morrissey and [MP] would have testified and 
denied sending the text messages and photographs to one another 
or third parties.” 
 
10.  
Respondent’s former legislative assistant, Carter Nichols, 
has testified that Respondent told Carter that he sent the sexually 
explicit text messages to MP, but he thought she was an adult.  Mr. 
                                                          
 
hearing on Morrissey’s Alford plea.  The circuit court dismissed the indictments in Morrissey II 
on the basis that the immunity provision of Morrissey’s plea agreement foreclosed this additional 
prosecution and because this new round of charges implicated Morrissey’s double jeopardy 
rights.  See Commonwealth v. Morrissey, Record No. 0559-15-2, 2015 WL 5554227 (Sept. 22, 
2015) (retracing the procedural history of the case and dismissing the Commonwealth’s appeal 
for lack of jurisdiction). 
 
7 
Nichols has also testified that Respondent told Mr. Nichols that he 
had nude photographs of MP on his phone and that he sent those to 
his friend, Abe Massad. 
 
The judges concluded that these violations, in conjunction with Morrissey’s disciplinary 
history, warranted the revocation of his license to practice law. 
ANALYSIS 
 
To prove that an attorney has violated the Rules of Professional Conduct, the State Bar 
must prove the violation by clear and convincing evidence.  Livingston v. Virginia State Bar, 286 
Va. 1, 10 (2013).  In reviewing a disciplinary decision, “we will make an independent 
examination of the whole record.”  Green v. Virginia State Bar, 274 Va. 775, 783 (2007).  
Although we do not accord the findings of the three-judge court “the weight of a jury verdict, 
[their] conclusions will be sustained unless it appears they are not justified by a reasonable view 
of the evidence or are contrary to law.”  Id. 
I. 
ASSUMING A THREE-JUDGE COURT MUST MAKE FACTUAL FINDINGS IN A 
MEMORANDUM OPINION, THE FINDINGS OF THE THREE-JUDGE COURT HERE SATISFY 
THE RULE. 
As a threshold matter, Morrissey contends that the three-judge court erred by failing to 
make factual findings.  By statute, an attorney facing discipline can elect to proceed either before 
the Disciplinary Board or before a three-judge court.  Code § 54.1-3935(A).  This statute broadly 
incorporates by reference “[t]he rules and procedures set forth in Part Six, Section IV, Paragraph 
13 of the Rules of Supreme Court of Virginia,” stating that they “shall govern any attorney 
disciplinary proceeding before a three-judge circuit court.”  Id.  Part Six, Section IV, Paragraph 
13 of our Rules (the “disciplinary procedures”) establishes the procedures employed for 
disciplining, suspending, and disbarring attorneys.  Paragraph 13-18(P) of the disciplinary 
procedures specifies that “[u]pon disposition of a matter, the Board shall issue the Summary 
Order.  Thereafter, the Board shall issue the Memorandum Order.  A Board member shall 
prepare the Summary Order and Memorandum Order for the signature of the Chair or the Chair’s 
designee.  Dissenting opinions may be filed.”  The definitions found in the disciplinary 
procedures define a “Memorandum Order” as “the opinion and order of the Board entered 
following a Disciplinary Proceeding that shall contain a brief statement of the findings of fact 
 
8 
[and] the nature of the Misconduct shown by such findings of fact . . . .”  Va. S. Ct. R., Part 6, 
§ IV, ¶ 13-1. 
Morrissey argues that the incorporation by reference of the disciplinary procedures in 
Code § 54.1-3935(A) means that the three-judge court must issue a memorandum opinion that 
includes factual findings.  In response, the Bar notes that the provision of the disciplinary 
procedures on which Morrissey relies applies to the Board exclusively, not to the three-judge 
court, and, moreover, judges generally are not required to issue written findings of fact.  When 
judges are required to make factual findings, it is by express directive,2 not by oblique reference. 
We will assume, without deciding, that the incorporation of the disciplinary procedures 
by reference in Code § 54.1-3935(A) requires factual findings in a memorandum opinion issued 
by a three-judge court.  However, as noted above, the memorandum opinion of the three judges 
does contain extensive factual findings.  Morrissey responds that these factual findings are not 
adequate.  We disagree.  Nothing in the statute or the rules requires the factfinder in a 
disciplinary hearing to resolve every factual point of disagreement with a corresponding factual 
finding.  To the contrary, the definition of a memorandum opinion requires “a brief statement of 
the findings of fact.”  Va. S. Ct. R., Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13-1.  Assuming for the purposes of this 
opinion that factual findings are required, the three-judge court’s memorandum opinion satisfies 
the requirements of the rule. 
II. 
RULES 5.1(B) AND 5.5(C). 
 
Morrissey argues that he was improperly convicted of violating Rule 5.1(b).  He takes the 
view that the rule is implicated only when a supervisor evinces an “‘ostrich-like’ lack of 
oversight over on-going undertakings or a blind eye toward continued improprieties.”  He 
contends that there was no evidence of “supervisor abdication.”  Instead, he notes, this was “a 
one-time incident brought about by unusual circumstances.”  Id. at 25.  In response, the Bar notes 
that the text of the rule does not require multiple violations or systemic deficiencies. 
 
                                                          
 
2 See, e.g., Code § 8.01-654(B)(5) (requiring a trial court reviewing habeas corpus 
petitions to set out in the final order its “findings of fact and conclusions of law”); Code 
§ 20-107.1(F) (“In contested cases in the circuit courts, any order granting, reserving or denying 
a request for spousal support shall be accompanied by written findings and conclusions of the 
court identifying the factors in subsection E which support the court’s order.”). 
 
9 
Rule 5.1(b) states: 
A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer 
shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer 
conforms to the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
 
 
Parsing the rule according to its plain text, it is undisputed that Morrissey had “direct 
supervisory authority” over Battle.  Battle was a recent law school graduate and Morrissey was 
one of the founders of the firm bearing his name.  He was her supervisor.  Battle testified that 
Morrissey directed her to appear in a circuit court case (a fact Morrissey denied).  When she 
appeared in court at Morrissey’s command (or prodding), Battle had passed the bar exam, but 
had not taken the oath of office.  The record does not reflect any efforts by Morrissey, much less 
the “reasonable efforts” the rule requires, to ensure that Battle could properly appear in court.  At 
no point did Morrissey inquire whether Battle had taken the oath of office.  Her appearance 
without having taken the oath of office was in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.  
See Code § 54.1-3903 (requiring attorneys to take the oath of office prior to practicing law) and 
Rule 5.5(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from practicing law in violation of the regulation of the legal 
profession).  Making sure a recent law school graduate has actually taken the oath of office 
before representing clients in court is hardly a burdensome requirement for supervising 
attorneys.  The evidence was sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that Morrissey 
violated the terms of Rule 5.1(b). 
 
Morrissey advances a number of additional arguments.  For example, he emphasizes that 
the problem was the absence of a simple oath-taking formality and that Battle was competent to 
handle the hearing.  Morrissey also observes that Battle did not remind him or his office manager 
that she had not yet taken the oath.  In addition, he notes that Battle had not made any other such 
appearances during her time with the firm.  Finally, he points to the fact that she had made 
statements suggesting she was now a lawyer, and that she took the oath a very short while after 
this hearing.  These arguments all go towards mitigation of the rule violation, not to the fact of 
the rule violation. 
 
With respect to Rule 5.5(c), Morrissey argues that the evidence does not support a finding 
that he knowingly or otherwise “assisted” a breach of the ethics rules.  The Bar responds that 
Morrissey told Battle to go to court to have a case “nolle prossed.”  Had he not taken this step, 
Battle would not have appeared in court. 
 
10 
Rule 5.5(c) provides: 
 
A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the 
regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction, or assist 
another in doing so. 
 
 
Battle practiced law by appearing in court and representing a client of the firm in a 
criminal proceeding.  She did so in violation of the regulation of the legal profession by 
appearing prior to her having taken the required oath.  See Code § 54.1-3903.  Morrissey either 
knew or should have known that Battle had not yet taken the oath.  Battle testified that she told 
Morrissey that she needed to take time off to attend her swearing in on December 4, 2013.  
Without ensuring that she took the oath, he ordered her to appear in court on December 2, 2013.  
This evidence clearly and convincingly suffices to establish that Morrissey assisted another in 
appearing in court “in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction,” 
thereby violating Rule 5.5(c). 
III. 
RULE 8.4(B). 
 
As to the finding that Morrissey violated Rule 8.4(b), Morrissey’s arguments center on 
the contention that the Bar failed to establish a wrongful act “that reflects adversely on the 
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness to practice law.”  In his view, there is no “nexus” 
between his conviction for contributing to the delinquency of a minor and his fitness to practice 
law.  Rule 8.4(b) states that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . commit a criminal 
or deliberately wrongful act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or 
fitness to practice law.”  Morrissey entered an Alford plea to a charge of contributing to the 
delinquency of a minor.  A conviction for contributing to the delinquency of a minor certainly 
constitutes a “criminal act” and a “wrongful act” for purposes of Rule 8.4(b).  From that point of 
departure, two narratives emerge concerning whether this conviction reflects adversely on 
Morrissey’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness to practice law. 
Morrissey observes that in Tasker v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 1019, 1025 (1961), we 
concluded that contributing to the delinquency of a minor was not a crime of “moral turpitude” 
and, therefore, was not a conviction that could be used for impeachment purposes.  He further 
notes that contributing to the delinquency of a minor does not fall within the definition of a 
 
11 
“Crime,” as specified in Part 6, Section IV, Paragraph 13-1 of the disciplinary procedures.3  In 
addition, he points out that his relationship with the Myrna Pride was consensual, she is now his 
wife, and they are raising a family together.  He argues that the Bar did not establish his 
knowledge that she was below the age of consent.  In short, he argues that his conviction for 
contributing to the delinquency of a minor does not adversely reflect on his honesty, 
trustworthiness, or fitness to practice law. 
The Bar responds that the facts surrounding the crime, in addition to the crime itself, 
reflect poorly on Morrissey’s trustworthiness and fitness as a lawyer.  The Bar points out that 
Morrissey, in fact, knew Pride’s true age, Pride was an employee subject to his supervision, 
Morrissey engaged in sexual relations with her in his law office, and then he bragged about it.  
The Bar argues that Morrissey should have been “guiding associates and law firm staff in the 
ethical practice of law.  Instead, his misconduct shows a lack of judgment and clear disregard for 
the rule of law.” 
We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the party that prevailed below.  
Green, 274 Va. at 783.  Morrissey testified that he was not aware of Pride’s actual age.  At the 
hearing, he pointed to, among other things, the fact that she listed an incorrect birthdate on her 
job application.  The date she listed indicated she was 22 years old and a college student.  The 
Bar produced ample evidence that Morrissey actually knew Pride was a minor.  Morrissey first 
met Pride at the Foot and Ankle Center, where she worked.  As he was admiring Pride, another 
employee informed him that she was underage.  When Morrissey began talking with her, she told 
him that she was about to graduate from high school.  After Pride mentioned an interest in 
becoming a lawyer, Morrissey encouraged her to set up an interview with his law office.  Pride 
began working for Morrissey as a receptionist in August of 2013.  While working for Morrissey, 
                                                          
 
3 The chief significance of the definition of “Crime” with a capital “C” in the disciplinary 
procedures is that upon conviction of such a “Crime,” the Bar will summarily enter an order of 
suspension.  See Va. S. Ct. R., Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13-22(A).  “Crime” is defined to include, among 
other things, state and federal felonies, and offenses “involving theft, fraud, forgery, extortion, 
bribery, or perjury.”  Va. S. Ct. R., Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13-1.  As Morrissey acknowledges, 
Appellant’s Br. at 33, conviction of such a “Crime” is not necessary for a finding that an attorney 
violated Rule 8.4, which is more broadly written.  Rule 8.4(b) requires a “criminal or deliberately 
wrongful act.” 
 
12 
in order to visit clients at the jail, she completed a City Jail application in which she disclosed 
her true age.  Morrissey signed the application. 
Morrissey also sought to explain away sexually charged text messages and photographs 
he and Pride sent back and forth, positing it was a jealous former lover of Pride’s who hacked 
into her computer and manipulated her messages.  Forensic evidence established, however, that 
the salacious texts and photographs originated from Morrissey and Pride’s phones. 
The practice of law demands more than technical proficiency.  A lawyer is “an officer of 
the legal system” whose “conduct should conform to the requirements of the law, both in 
professional service to clients and in the lawyer’s business and personal affairs.”  Va. Sup. Ct. 
R., Part 6, § II, Preamble.  We acknowledge that conviction for a crime does not necessarily 
equate to a violation of Rule 8.4(b).  Here, the record indicates that Morrissey encouraged an 
underage girl to apply to his firm, knowing she was below the age of legal consent, and hired her 
as a receptionist.  In short order, he engaged in a sexual relationship with her that began in the 
law office conference room.  Despite his guilty plea, he tries to shift the blame to others.  The 
facts in the record justify a finding by clear and convincing evidence that Morrissey’s violation 
of a criminal statute and the attendant circumstances call into question his honesty, 
trustworthiness, and fitness to practice law. 
IV.  
MORRISSEY’S EXTENSIVE DISCIPLINARY RECORD FULLY JUSTIFIES THE SANCTION OF 
REVOCATION. 
 
Finally, Morrissey argues that the sanction imposed – revocation of his law license – “is 
unduly harsh in light of the nature of the violations.”  The Bar responds that the sanction 
imposed is entirely appropriate. 
 
“The penalty imposed by a three-judge court in a disciplinary proceeding is viewed on 
appeal as prima facie correct, and it will not be disturbed unless, upon [this Court’s] independent 
examination of the whole record, [this Court] conclude[s] that the court abused its discretion.”  
Morrissey v. Virginia State Bar, 260 Va. 472, 479 (2000).  The court’s sanction will not be 
disturbed unless an independent review of the record reveals the penalty was not justified or 
contrary to law.  Gay v. Virginia State Bar, 239 Va. 401, 407 (1990). 
Three points stand out with respect to an appropriate sanction.  First, rather than take 
responsibility, Morrissey tries to shift the blame for his actions to others:  to Battle, to Pride, to 
Pride’s former lover, and so on.  The fault, however, does not lie with others.  Second, these 
 
13 
infractions occurred barely one year after Morrissey regained his law license.  Third, and most 
significantly, we must weigh into the balance the long and notorious book of Morrissey’s 
disciplinary history - to which one more chapter has now been added.  His disciplinary history 
consists of eight actions:  three Dismissals with Terms, a Private Reprimand, a Public 
Reprimand, a Suspension of his license to practice law for six months, a Suspension of his 
license to practice law for three years, and the Revocation of his license to practice law in 2003.  
The three-judge court also admitted a Memorandum Opinion Order from the United States 
District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, which disbarred Morrissey from practicing law 
before that Court.  This voluminous history establishes Morrissey’s chronic unwillingness to 
practice law in conformity with the rules that govern our profession.  The sanction of revocation 
is fully justified. 
 
We affirm the decision of the three-judge panel. 
This order shall be published in the Virginia Reports and shall be certified to the Circuit 
Court of the City of Richmond. 
 
 
 
 
 
                A Copy, 
 
 
 
          
                    Teste: 
 
 
 
 
                        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Douglas B. Robelen, Clerk