Title: State v. Tory L. Rachel

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2002 WI 81 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-0467 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the Commitment of Tory L. Rachel: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Tory L. Rachel,  
 
Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 1, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 6, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha   
 
JUDGE: 
Wilbur W. Warren   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BABLITCH, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: PROSSER, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant there were briefs by Richard 
H. Hart and Hart Law Offices, Milwaukee, and oral argument by 
Richard H. Hart. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent the cause was argued by 
Warren D. Weinstein, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2002 WI 81 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  00-0467  
(L.C. No. 
94 CF 469) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Commitment of Tory L. Rachel: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Tory L. Rachel,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 1, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Kenosha 
County, Honorable Wilbur W. Warren, III, Judge.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
JON 
P. 
WILCOX, 
J.   This 
case 
involves 
a 
constitutional challenge to Wis. Stat. ch. 980 (1999-2000), the 
state's sexually violent person commitment law.  The challenge 
is brought by respondent Tory L. Rachel, who was involuntarily 
committed to institutional care under ch. 980.  Between the time 
that the State's petition for commitment was filed and the 
beginning of Rachel's trial, the legislature passed several 
amendments to ch. 980, which primarily served to limit a ch. 980 
respondent's ability to seek supervised release.  Rachel alleges 
No. 
00-0467   
 
2 
 
 
that these amendments render ch. 980 unconstitutional on its 
face. 
¶2 
Prior to trial, Rachel filed a motion to dismiss, 
claiming that ch. 980, as amended, violates the double jeopardy, 
due process, and ex post facto provisions of the Wisconsin and 
United States Constitutions.  The Kenosha County Circuit Court, 
Wilbur W. Warren, III, Judge, denied the motion and held that 
ch. 980 was constitutional as amended.  After a trial, the 
circuit court found Rachel to be a sexually violent person under 
ch. 980 and ordered him committed to institutional care.  Rachel 
appealed, and the court of appeals certified the case to this 
court.  We accepted the certification, and we now uphold the 
decision of the circuit court. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A 
¶3 
On August 9, 1994, the Kenosha County District 
Attorney filed a petition with the circuit court seeking the 
involuntary 
commitment 
of 
Tory 
L. Rachel. 
 
Pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 980.02(2)(ag) (1993-94), when the petition was 
filed, Rachel was within 90 days of his release on a prison 
sentence 
for 
second-degree 
sexual 
assault 
and 
false 
imprisonment.  The Kenosha County Circuit Court held a probable 
cause hearing, found probable cause to believe that Rachel was a 
sexually violent person, and bound him over for trial. 
¶4 
Chapter 980 had just taken effect on June 2, 1994——
about two months prior to the filing of the petition.  See 1993 
No. 
00-0467   
 
3 
 
 
Wis. Act 479, § 40.  Unsurprisingly, Rachel challenged the new 
statute on a number of constitutional grounds, including that 
the statute was an ex post facto law; that it constituted double 
jeopardy; that it violated procedural and substantive due 
process; that it violated equal protection; that it was overly 
vague; and that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment.  
The circuit court denied Rachel's motions to dismiss, and the 
court of appeals granted Rachel leave to appeal the nonfinal 
order. 
¶5 
The court of appeals held Rachel's appeal in abeyance 
until December 8, 1995, when this court decided State v. Post, 
197 Wis. 2d 279, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995), and State v. Carpenter, 
197 Wis. 2d 252, 541 N.W.2d 105 (1995), which together comprised 
the first constitutional assessment of ch. 980 made by this 
court.  In Post, we held that ch. 980 did not violate the Due 
Process or Equal Protection Clauses of the state or federal 
constitution.  Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 316-17, 330-31.  Similarly, 
in Carpenter, we held that ch. 980 did not violate the state or 
federal Double Jeopardy or Ex Post Facto Clauses.  Carpenter, 
197 Wis. 2d at 271-72, 274.  As a result of our decisions in 
Post and Carptenter, on January 11, 1996, the court of appeals 
summarily upheld the circuit court's decision in Rachel's case 
and remanded the case to the circuit court for further 
proceedings. 
¶6 
Over the next several years, Rachel's case underwent a 
number of procedural delays, including two changes of counsel 
No. 
00-0467   
 
4 
 
 
for Rachel and several adjournments, including one to await the 
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 
U.S. 346 (1997), where the Court held that Kansas's sexually 
violent person law was nonpunitive, and therefore did not 
violate the Double Jeopardy or Ex Post Facto Clauses of the U.S. 
Constitution.  Additionally, Rachel was denied interlocutory 
appeal on a timeliness issue (eventually deemed waived), and was 
granted interlocutory appeal on a discovery issue.  See State v. 
Rachel, 224 Wis. 2d 571, 591 Wis. 2d 920 (Ct. App. 1999).  After 
remittitur from that appeal, the matter was scheduled for a jury 
trial on November 8, 1999. 
¶7 
On the day that the trial was supposed to commence, 
Rachel filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that several 
amendments to the statute, enacted just two weeks prior, 
rendered ch. 980 unconstitutional.  See 1999 Wis. Act 9, 
§§ 3216d-3239d (published Oct. 28, 1999).  The primary thrust of 
these amendments was to limit a ch. 980 respondent's ability to 
seek supervised release as an alternative to institutional 
commitment under ch. 980.  We now examine these amendments in 
some detail. 
B 
¶8 
In Wisconsin Act 9 of 1999 ("the Act"), sections 3216d 
through 3239d, the legislature made a number of amendments to 
Wisconsin's 
sexually 
violent 
person 
law, 
ch. 980 
of 
the 
Wisconsin Statutes.  The most notable of these were made to 
Wis. Stat. § 980.06, the statutory section dealing with the 
No. 
00-0467   
 
5 
 
 
physical commitment of sexually violent persons.  Under the 
prior statutes, § 980.06(1) (1997-98) stated: 
If a court or jury determines that the person who is 
the subject of a petition under s. 980.02 is a 
sexually violent person, the court shall order the 
person 
to 
be 
committed 
to 
the 
custody 
of 
the 
department 
[of 
Health 
and 
Family 
Services] 
for 
control, care and treatment until such time as the 
person is no longer a sexually violent person. 
The Act amended this section to include the requirement that 
"A commitment order under this section shall specify that the 
person be placed in institutional care."  See 1999 Wis. Act 9, 
§ 3223h 
(emphasis 
added). 
 
Accordingly, 
§ 980.06(2)(a)-(c) 
(1997-98) was repealed.  See 1999 Wis. Act 9, § 3223i-3223k.  
Those sections had laid out the procedure by which the court 
could enter an initial order for a sexually violent person to be 
committed to supervised release, rather than institutional care, 
and described the methods for developing a supervised release 
plan. 
¶9 
Additionally, 
Wis. Stat. § 980.065(1m) 
(1997-98), 
which dealt with institutional care for sexually violent 
persons, was changed from: 
The department may place a person committed to 
institutional care under s. 980.06(2)(b) at a mental 
health unit or facility, including a secure mental 
health unit or facility at the Wisconsin resource 
center established under s. 46.056 or a secure mental 
health unit or facility provided by the department of 
corrections under sub. (2). 
to read: 
The department shall place a person committed under 
s. 980.06 
at 
the 
secure 
mental 
health 
facility 
No. 
00-0467   
 
6 
 
 
established under s. 46.055, the Wisconsin resource 
center established under s. 46.056 or a secure mental 
health unit or facility provided by the department of 
corrections under sub. (2). 
Wis. Stat. § 980.065(1m) (1999-2000); 1999 Wis. Act 9, § 3230m. 
¶10 Section 
980.06(d) 
(1997-98), 
which 
discussed 
the 
conditions, violation, and revocation of supervised release, was 
moved 
from 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 980.06 
(1997-98) 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 980.08(6m) 
(1999-2000), 
the 
section 
detailing 
petitions for supervised release.  That section was also amended 
to include the language: 
The department shall arrange for control, care and 
treatment of the person in the least restrictive 
manner consistent with the requirements of the person 
and in accordance with the plan for supervised release 
approved by the court under sub. (5). 
1999 Wis. Act 9, § 3223L. 
¶11 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.07(1) 
(1997-98), 
covering 
periodic reexaminations of sexually violent persons, originally 
read, in pertinent part: 
If a person has been committed under s. 980.06 and has 
not been discharged under s. 980.09, the department 
shall conduct an examination of his or her mental 
condition within 6 months after an initial commitment 
under s. 980.06 and again thereafter at least once 
each 12 months for the purpose of determining whether 
the person has made sufficient progress to be entitled 
to transfer to a less restrictive facility, to 
supervised release or to discharge. 
The language "whether the person has made sufficient progress to 
be entitled to transfer to a less restrictive facility, to 
supervised release or to discharge" was changed to "whether the 
person has made sufficient progress for the court to consider 
No. 
00-0467   
 
7 
 
 
whether the person should be placed on supervised release or 
discharged."  See Wis. Stat. § 980.07(1) (1999-2000); 1999 Wis. 
Act 9, § 3232. 
¶12 Finally, 
Wis. Stat. § 980.08(1) 
(1997-98), 
which 
allowed a sexually violent person who was under institutional 
care to petition the committing court for supervised release 
after six months of institutional placement, was changed to 
extend the minimum time to 18 months before the individual 
committed under ch. 980 could petition for supervised release.  
See 1999 Wis. Act 9, § 3232p.  This subsection continues to 
allow the director of the institution to petition on the 
individual's behalf at any time.  
¶13 A number of smaller changes to the statutory language 
were also made throughout the chapter to give effect to these 
amendments.  The other sections that related to petitions for 
supervised 
release 
and 
discharge, 
Wis. Stat. §§ 980.09 
and 
980.10, remained fundamentally unchanged.1 
                                                 
1 Those sections state, in relevant part:  
980.09 Petition for discharge; procedure. 
(1) PETITION WITH SECRETARY'S APPROVAL. (a) If 
the secretary determines at any time that a person 
committed under this chapter is no longer a sexually 
violent person, the secretary shall authorize the 
person 
to 
petition 
the 
committing 
court 
for 
discharge. . . .  
. . . .  
(b) 
At 
a 
hearing 
under 
this 
subsection . . . [t]he state has the burden of 
No. 
00-0467   
 
8 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
proving by clear and convincing evidence that the 
petitioner is still a sexually violent person. 
(c) If the court is satisfied that the state 
has not met its burden of proof under par. (b), 
the petitioner shall be discharged from the 
custody or supervision of the department. If the 
court is satisfied that the state has met its 
burden of proof under par. (b), the court may 
proceed 
to 
determine, 
using 
the 
criterion 
specified in s. 980.08 (4), whether to modify the 
petitioner's 
existing 
commitment 
order 
by 
authorizing supervised release. 
(2) PETITION WITHOUT SECRETARY'S APPROVAL. (a) A 
person may petition the committing court for discharge 
from custody or supervision without the secretary's 
approval.  At the time of an examination under s. 
980.07 (1), the secretary shall provide the committed 
person with a written notice of the person's right to 
petition the court for discharge over the secretary's 
objection.  The notice shall contain a waiver of 
rights.  The secretary shall forward the notice and 
waiver form to the court with the report of the 
department's examination under s. 980.07.  If the 
person does not affirmatively waive the right to 
petition, the court shall set a probable cause hearing 
to determine whether facts exist that warrant a 
hearing on whether the person is still a sexually 
violent person. . . .  
 . . . . 
(b) If the court determines at the probable 
cause hearing under par. (a) that probable cause 
exists to believe that the committed person is no 
longer a sexually violent person, then the court 
shall set a hearing on the issue. . . . At the 
hearing, the state has the burden of proving by 
clear and convincing evidence that the committed 
person is still a sexually violent person. 
(c) If the court is satisfied that the state 
has not met its burden of proof under par. (b), 
the person shall be discharged from the custody 
or supervision of the department. If the court is 
satisfied that the state has met its burden of 
No. 
00-0467   
 
9 
 
 
¶14 As a whole, the consequence of these amendments was to 
limit the ch. 980 respondent's ability to obtain supervised 
release when the respondent is found to be a sexually violent 
person.  Under the old statutory scheme, the circuit court could 
order commitment to supervised release immediately after trial 
under Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2) (1997-98), and the individual could 
petition 
for 
supervised 
release 
after 
six 
months 
of 
institutional placement under Wis. Stat. § 980.08(1) (1997-98).  
Under the new formulation, the circuit court no longer has the 
                                                                                                                                                             
proof under par. (b), the court may proceed to 
determine, using the criterion specified in s. 
980.08 (4), whether 
to 
modify the 
person's 
existing 
commitment 
order 
by 
authorizing 
supervised release. 
980.10  Additional discharge petitions. 
In addition to the procedures under s. 980.09, a 
committed person may petition the committing court for 
discharge at any time, but if a person has previously 
filed a petition for discharge without the secretary's 
approval and the court determined, either upon review 
of the petition or following a hearing, that the 
person's petition was frivolous or that the person was 
still a sexually violent person, then the court shall 
deny 
any 
subsequent 
petition under this 
section 
without a hearing unless the petition contains facts 
upon which a court could find that the condition of 
the 
person 
had 
so 
changed 
that 
a 
hearing 
was 
warranted. If the court finds that a hearing is 
warranted, the court shall set a probable cause 
hearing in accordance with s. 980.09 (2) (a) and 
continue proceedings under s. 980.09 (2) (b), if 
appropriate. If the person has not previously filed a 
petition 
for 
discharge 
without 
the 
secretary's 
approval, the court shall set a probable cause hearing 
in accordance with s. 980.09 (2) (a) and continue 
proceedings under s. 980.09 (2) (b), if appropriate. 
No. 
00-0467   
 
10 
 
 
option to order commitment directly to supervised release after 
trial, Wis. Stat. § 980.06 (1999-2000); and the individual can 
only petition for supervised release after 18 months of 
institutional 
placement 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 980.08(1) 
(1999-
2000). 
¶15 Under both the old and the new schemes, however, the 
director of the institution at which the individual is placed 
may still petition on the individual's behalf for supervised 
release at any time under Wis. Stat. § 980.08(1); and the court 
can 
still 
order 
a 
reexamination 
at 
any 
time 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 980.07(3).  Additionally, under both schemes, the 
individual 
can 
petition 
for 
discharge 
under 
Wis. Stat. §§ 980.09(2) and 980.10; and the Wisconsin secretary 
of health and family services ("the Secretary") may authorize 
the person to petition for discharge at any time under 
Wis. Stat. § 980.09(1).2  Under both the old and new schemes, the 
individual is entitled to a periodic reexamination no later than 
six months after commitment, under Wis. Stat. § 980.07(1), and 
is entitled to subsequent periodic reexaminations at least once 
each 12 months thereafter. 
C 
¶16 In his motion to dismiss, Rachel claimed that these 
amendments render ch. 980 an ex post facto law, violate his 
                                                 
2 Each of these may result in a modified commitment order 
authorizing supervised release rather than complete discharge 
from supervision.  Wis. Stat. §§ 980.09(1)(c), (2)(c) (1999-
2000). 
No. 
00-0467   
 
11 
 
 
right against double jeopardy, and violate his right to due 
process.  The circuit court denied Rachel's motion and held that 
ch. 980 remained constitutional, despite the amendments.  Rachel 
proceeded to a bench trial.  On November 12, 1999, the circuit 
court held that Rachel was a sexually violent person under 
ch. 980, and ordered him committed to the custody, care, and 
treatment of the Department of Health and Family Services. 
¶17 Rachel appealed his commitment.  The court of appeals, 
recognizing the nature and scope of these issues, certified the 
appeal to this court.  We accepted the certification, and we now 
affirm the holding of the circuit court. 
II.  DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND EX POST FACTO CLAUSES 
A 
¶18 We begin our discussion with an analysis of the double 
jeopardy and ex post facto challenges.  When analyzing a claim 
under either the Ex Post Facto or the Double Jeopardy Clauses, 
the threshold question is whether the challenged action, in this 
case ch. 980, is a criminal or civil action.  Hendricks, 521 
U.S. at 369.  Here, we hold that the amended statute is not 
criminal or punitive in nature, and that, consequently, a 
commitment under ch. 980 does not violate either the Double 
Jeopardy or the Ex Post Facto Clauses. 
¶19 The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states, 
in part, "No person shall be . . . subject for the same offence 
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . ."  Similarly, 
Article I, Section 8, Paragraph 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
No. 
00-0467   
 
12 
 
 
states, in part, "[N]o person for the same offense may be put 
twice in jeopardy of punishment . . . ."  Because the provisions 
of the state and federal constitutions are the same in scope and 
purpose, we have routinely followed decisions of the U.S. 
Supreme Court as governing the double jeopardy provisions of 
both constitutions.  Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d at 263; State v. 
Killebrew, 115 Wis. 2d 243, 246 n.2, 340 N.W.2d 470 (1983). 
¶20 The Double Jeopardy Clauses protect a person against 
three types of action: (1) subsequent prosecution for the same 
offense after acquittal; (2) subsequent prosecution for the same 
offense after conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the 
same offense.  State v. Canon, 2001 WI 11, ¶8, 241 Wis. 2d 164, 
622 N.W.2d 270 (citing Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 
187-88 (1957); State v. Vassos, 218 Wis. 2d 330, 341, 579 
N.W.2d 35 (1998)).  In each of these scenarios, it has been our 
long-standing interpretation, as well as that of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against 
subsequent criminal prosecutions.  United States v. Halper, 490 
U.S. 435, 440 (1989); State v. Kramsvogel, 124 Wis. 2d 101, 109, 
369 N.W.2d 145 (1985).  Consequently, if we conclude that one of 
the actions in question is civil and does not impose a criminal 
punishment, our double jeopardy analysis ends there.  State v. 
Thierfelder, 174 Wis. 2d 213, 219, 495 N.W.2d 669 (1993). 
¶21 Similar reasoning applies to our ex post facto 
analysis.  Article I, Section 9 of the U.S. Constitution states, 
"No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed."  
No. 
00-0467   
 
13 
 
 
Article I, Section 12 of the Wisconsin Constitution states, "No 
bill of attainder, ex post facto law, nor any law impairing the 
obligation of contracts, shall ever be passed . . . ."  Again, 
because of their similarity in wording and scope, we have looked 
to interpretations of the federal Ex Post Facto Clause when 
interpreting 
the 
Ex 
Post 
Facto 
Clause 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.  Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d at 272; State v. Thiel, 
188 Wis. 2d 695, 699, 524 N.W.2d 641 (1994). 
¶22 It is well established that the Ex Post Facto Clauses 
of both the U.S. and Wisconsin Constitutions prohibit the state 
from enacting any law that imposes punishment for acts that were 
not punishable at the time they were committed.  Collins v. 
Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41 (1990); State v. Hobson, 218 
Wis. 2d 350, 381, 577 N.W.2d 825 (1998).  Thus, as with the 
Double Jeopardy Clause, to violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, a 
statute 
must 
be 
criminal 
rather 
than 
civil 
in 
nature.  
Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d at 272-73; Wis. Bingo Supply & Equip. Co. 
v. Bingo Control Bd., 88 Wis. 2d 293, 304-05, 276 N.W.2d 716 
(1979).  Our threshold question then, for both the ex post facto 
and double jeopardy challenges, is whether ch. 980, as amended, 
is a nonpunitive civil statute or a punitive criminal statute. 
¶23 We analyze this question in two steps.  Because of 
changes 
in 
the 
U.S. 
Supreme 
Court's 
double 
jeopardy 
jurisprudence since our holding in Carpenter, we focus the first 
part of our analysis on clarifying the standard by which this 
court determines whether or not a statute is punitive.  Second, 
No. 
00-0467   
 
14 
 
 
we apply that standard to the amended ch. 980.  Each of these 
questions involves questions of statutory construction and 
constitutional interpretation which this court reviews de novo.  
Reginald D. v. State, 193 Wis. 2d 299, 305-06, 533 N.W.2d 181 
(1995). 
B 
¶24 We begin by addressing the proper standard for 
determining whether or not a statute is punitive.  This analysis 
is necessary because of a series of cases decided by this court 
and the U.S. Supreme Court since this court first addressed the 
constitutionality of ch. 980 in Carpenter. 
¶25 We begin our analysis by looking at the U.S. Supreme 
Court's 1989 decision in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435.  
In Halper, the defendant was a laboratory manager who was 
prosecuted by the federal government for multiple violations of 
the criminal false claims statute, 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1982).  Id. 
at 437.  After Halper was convicted, the government then brought 
an action under the civil False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-
3731 (1982), in which Halper was found liable.  Halper, 490 U.S. 
at 438.  Halper challenged the civil action, claiming that it 
violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.  Id. 
¶26 The Court examined the civil sanction to determine 
whether 
it 
violated 
double 
jeopardy. 
 
In 
making 
its 
determination, the Court attempted to determine whether the 
civil sanction served "the twin aims of retribution and 
deterrence" necessary for a statute to be punitive.  Id. at 448.  
No. 
00-0467   
 
15 
 
 
The court stated, "a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said 
solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be 
explained as also serving retributive or deterrent purposes, is 
punishment, as we have come to understand the term."  Id.  
A unanimous 
Court 
subsequently 
held 
that 
the 
defendant's 
liability under the Civil False Claims Act was "sufficiently 
disproportionate" 
to 
the 
actual 
damages 
incurred 
by 
the 
government to constitute a second punishment, and thus violated 
the Double Jeopardy Clause.3  Id. at 452. 
¶27 Halper was a significant departure from past double 
jeopardy cases, and not long after it was decided, members of 
the Court began to voice doubts about the holding.  In 
Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994), the 
Court was asked whether Montana's tax for the storage and 
possession of marijuana, which was imposed in addition to other 
criminal drug prosecutions, violated double jeopardy.  Id. at 
769.  The Court held that the high tax rate, the deterrent 
purpose, the fact that the tax was conditioned on the commission 
of a crime, and the fact that the tax was exacted only after the 
taxpayer has been arrested for the conduct that gave rise to the 
tax obligation, taken together, rendered the tax a "punishment" 
and therefore violated double jeopardy.  Id. at 783-84.  The 
Court downplayed Halper, however, noting that Halper explicitly 
                                                 
3 As a result, the U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case to 
the District Court to allow the government the opportunity to 
demonstrate that the court's assessment of its injuries was 
erroneous.  United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 452 (1989). 
No. 
00-0467   
 
16 
 
 
applied to civil penalties, and not to taxes like the one at 
issue in the present case.  Id. at 778, 784. 
¶28 In dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, 
sharply questioned the Halper decision, to the point of 
advocating its abandonment.  Id. at 804-05 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting).  Scalia criticized the majority for implicitly 
holding that any proceeding that imposes "punishment" is a 
criminal 
prosecution——a conclusion 
that 
departed 
from the 
Court's traditional double jeopardy jurisprudence, and even, to 
an extent, from the Halper decision itself.  Id. at 805-06 
(Scalia, J., dissenting).  Scalia thought that the Court's 
traditional test to determine if a statute is punitive——laid out 
in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), and United 
States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980)——was more appropriate to 
determine whether the drug tax statutes constituted a second 
criminal prosecution.  Id. 
¶29 The Chief Justice, in a separate dissent, also noted 
that the Halper reasoning had no place in analyzing a tax 
statute.  Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 786-87 (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting).  Only Justice O'Connor seemed to be willing to 
fully apply Halper in this case.  Id. at 798 (O'Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
¶30 Over the next several years, the Court continued to 
back away from its Halper holding.  In United States v. Ursery, 
518 U.S. 267 (1996), the Court recognized the narrowness of the 
Halper rule, found it inapplicable to a double jeopardy 
No. 
00-0467   
 
17 
 
 
challenge of a "civil forfeiture," as opposed to a "civil 
penalty," and instead applied the Mendoza-Martinez factors.  Id. 
at 283.  In Kansas v. Hendricks——a holding of particular 
relevance to our present case——the majority opinion did not even 
cite Halper in deciding that Kansas's sexually violent person 
law did not violate the constitutional protection against double 
jeopardy.  Instead, the Court once again applied many of the 
Mendoza-Martinez factors.  Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361-64. 
¶31 In 1997, the Court finally abrogated the Halper rule 
explicitly.  In Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997), the 
Court redefined the basis for a double jeopardy challenge, and 
criticized the Halper test for spawning "a wide variety of novel 
double jeopardy claims."  Id. at 98 & n.4.  In its place, the 
Court reverted to the principles of Ward and Mendoza-Martinez in 
what is now called by some courts the "intent-effects test."  
See State v. Haskell, 784 A.2d 4, 8 (Me. 2001); State v. Cook, 
700 N.E.2d 570, 580 (Ohio 1998). 
¶32 In an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the 
Hudson Court held that whether a particular punishment is 
criminal or civil is, at least initially, a matter of statutory 
construction.  That is, a court must first decide whether the 
legislature either expressly or impliedly indicated a preference 
that the statute in question be considered civil or criminal.  
Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99. 
¶33 The Court also held that after making the initial 
determination of legislative intent, the statute must then be 
No. 
00-0467   
 
18 
 
 
scrutinized to determine whether it is "'so punitive either in 
purpose or effect' as to 'transfor[m] what was clearly intended 
as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.'" Id. (quoting Rex 
Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154 (1956)) 
(citations omitted).  The Court identified the factors from 
Mendoza-Martinez as those that should guide the analysis: 
(1) [w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative 
disability 
or 
restraint; 
(2) whether 
it 
has 
historically 
been 
regarded 
as 
a 
punishment; 
(3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of 
scienter; (4) whether its operation will promote the 
traditional 
aims 
of 
punishment-retribution 
and 
deterrence; (5) whether the behavior to which it 
applies is already a crime; (6) whether an alternative 
purpose to which it may rationally be connected is 
assignable 
for 
it; 
and 
(7) whether 
it 
appears 
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose 
assigned. 
Id. at 99-100 (citing Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69). 
¶34 The Court criticized the Halper analysis as having 
deviated significantly from the Court's traditional double 
jeopardy jurisprudence by applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to 
a sanction without first determining whether it was criminal or 
civil in nature.  Id. at 100.  In particular, the Court noted 
that the Halper decision (1) incorrectly focused on whether the 
sanction was so grossly disproportionate to the harm caused as 
to constitute "punishment," rather than addressing the threshold 
question 
of 
whether 
the 
sanction 
was 
"criminal;" 
and 
(2) assessed the character of the actual sanctions imposed, 
rather than evaluating the statute on its face to determine 
whether it provided for what amounted to a criminal sanction.  
No. 
00-0467   
 
19 
 
 
Id. at 100-02.  The Court concluded that the Halper test was 
"unworkable."  Id. at 101-02.  Last term, the Court reinforced 
its return to the pre-Halper jurisprudence in another review of 
a sexually violent person statute, Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 
250, 260-62 (2001). 
¶35 The concern in the present case arises because our 
1995 decision in Carpenter specifically cited the Halper 
decision in determining that ch. 980 did not violate the 
protection against double jeopardy.  In the relevant section of 
that case, we stated: 
We are unpersuaded that the indicia of punishment in 
ch. 980 . . . is so punitive in purpose or effect as 
to negate the statute's remedial purpose and transform 
the State's intent to treat into an intent to punish.  
Ward, 448 U.S. at 248.  As we have already stated, the 
relevant inquiry is directed towards the principal 
purposes served by the sanction, not the underlying 
nature of the proceedings giving rise to the sanction.  
Halper, 490 U.S. at 447 n.7. 
We conclude that the principal purposes of ch. 980 are 
the protection of the public and the treatment of 
convicted sex offenders who are at a high risk to 
reoffend in order to reduce the likelihood that they 
will engage in such conduct in the future.  These 
constitute 
significant 
nonpunitive 
and 
remedial 
purposes.  Chapter 980 cannot be characterized as only 
serving 
the 
punishment 
goals 
of 
deterrence 
or 
retribution.  See Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49.  It is 
undeniable that the statute is penal to a certain 
degree in that it potentially subjects individuals to 
an 
affirmative 
restraint. 
 
However, 
where 
the 
principal purpose of a civil sanction is nonpunitive, 
the fact that a punitive motive may also be present 
does not make the action punishment. . . . 
Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d at 271-72. 
No. 
00-0467   
 
20 
 
 
¶36 Rachel first asks this court to apply the broader rule 
of Carpenter and Halper when analyzing his case.  Rachel argues 
that the Wisconsin Constitution can and should afford more 
protection to defendants than the U.S. Constitution, and that 
this court should not be forced to take "a step backward" by the 
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Hudson.  Rachel notes that the 
claims considered "novel" by the Hudson Court may be those that 
give rise to the "mainstream ideas and rights" of the future. 
¶37 We do not find Rachel's argument persuasive.  As we 
have previously held, because of their similarities in wording 
and purpose, we have looked to interpretations of the federal Ex 
Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses when interpreting the 
analogous clauses of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Carpenter, 197 
Wis. 2d at 263, 272; Thiel, 188 Wis. 2d at 699; Killebrew, 115 
Wis. 2d at 246 n.2.  Thus, we afford very great weight to the 
U.S. Supreme Court's decisions on the federal versions of those 
clauses when we interpret our own.  This was even the case in 
Carpenter, when we applied a version of the Halper analysis to 
ch. 980.  Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d at 262-70.  We find no reason 
to depart from this practice for the present case. 
¶38 As the Court noted in Hudson, the intent-effects test 
was traditionally used to determine if a statute was punitive, 
and proved workable for many years.  Hudson, 522 U.S. at 101-02.  
The anomalous holdings in Halper and several subsequent cases 
were, as the Court said, "ill considered," and "unworkable."  
Id.  We see no reason to disagree.  Thus, we conclude that 
No. 
00-0467   
 
21 
 
 
Hudson's intent-effects test is appropriate for determining 
whether a statute violates the Ex Post Facto or Double Jeopardy 
Clauses of the Wisconsin Constitution as well as the federal 
constitution, and we will analyze Rachel's claims using that 
test. 
C 
¶39 We now turn to the question of whether ch. 980 
actually violates the constitutional protections against double 
jeopardy and ex post facto laws.  In doing so, we apply the 
Hudson intent-effects test. 
¶40 Under the first part of the test, we must determine 
the intent of the legislature in creating the statute in 
question.  Determining the intent of the legislature is 
primarily a matter of statutory construction, and we must ask 
whether 
the 
legislature, 
"in 
establishing 
the 
penalizing 
mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference 
for one label or the other."  Seling, 531 U.S. at 261; Hudson, 
522 U.S. at 99 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 248); Hendricks, 521 
U.S. at 361. 
¶41 Here, there is little question that the legislature 
intended that ch. 980 be a civil commitment statute, passed for 
the purposes of control and treatment of the individual.  As we 
noted in Carpenter: 
The emphasis on treatment in ch. 980 is evident from 
its plain language.  For example, the notice provision 
in Wis. Stat. § 980.015(3)(b) requires the agency with 
jurisdiction 
over 
the 
person 
to 
provide 
the 
appropriate district attorney and the Department of 
No. 
00-0467   
 
22 
 
 
Justice with documentation of any prior treatment that 
the subject received while in prison.  Under Wis. 
Stat. § 980.06(1), a person found to be sexually 
violent is committed to the custody of DHSS for 
control, care, and treatment, as opposed to the DOC 
for imprisonment.  Further, DHSS is required to 
"arrange for control, care and treatment of the person 
in the least restrictive manner consistent with the 
requirements of the person . . . ." 
197 Wis. 2d at 266 (citations omitted).  None of this statutory 
language was changed by the Act, and we can easily hold that 
under the first part of the Hudson test, the intent of the 
legislature 
in 
passing 
ch. 980 
was 
to 
create 
a 
civil, 
nonpunitive statute.  Rachel does not appear to dispute this 
point. 
¶42 Moving to the second part of the intent-effects test, 
then, we determine whether the sanctions imposed by ch. 980 are 
"'so punitive in form and effect as to render them criminal'" 
despite the legislature's intent to the contrary.  Hudson, 522 
U.S. at 104 (citing Ursery, 518 U.S. at 290).  In applying the 
second part of the test, we afford the legislative preference 
for the civil label great deference.  Only with "the clearest 
proof" will we find that what has been denominated a civil 
remedy is, in actuality, a criminal penalty.  Seling, 531 
U.S. at 261; Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100 (citing Ward, 448 U.S. at 
249). 
¶43 To 
determine 
whether 
the 
legislative 
intent 
is 
overcome by the form and effect of the statute, we examine 
ch. 980 with respect to the factors identified in Mendoza-
Martinez, and reiterated in Hudson: (1) whether ch. 980 involves 
No. 
00-0467   
 
23 
 
 
an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether it has 
historically been regarded as a punishment; (3) whether it comes 
into play only on a finding of scienter; (4) whether its 
operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-
retribution and deterrence; (5) whether the behavior to which 
ch. 980 applies is already a crime; (6) whether an alternative 
purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable 
for it; and (7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the 
alternative purpose assigned.  Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99-100; 
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69. 
¶44 Because our analysis in Carpenter was guided by Halper 
rather than strictly by the intent-effects test of Hudson, we 
did not fully apply the Mendoza-Martinez factors in that case.  
As a result, we think it is necessary to look beyond the mere 
amendments in our analysis to the statute as a whole.  We do 
place emphasis on the effect of the amendments, however, as they 
were the impetus for this challenge.  Taking the Mendoza-
Martinez factors into account in this case, we do not think that 
Rachel has shown, by the clearest proof, that ch. 980, as 
amended, is so punitive as to counteract the legislature's 
intent to design a civil commitment statute. 
¶45 We 
acknowledge 
that 
ch. 980 
does 
involve 
an 
affirmative disability or restraint.  However, the mere fact of 
detention does not lead to the inexorable conclusion that the 
government has imposed punishment.  Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363 
(citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987)).  The 
No. 
00-0467   
 
24 
 
 
state may take measures to restrict the freedom of the 
dangerously mentally ill.  Id. at 363. 
¶46 With regard to the recent amendments, however, Rachel 
argues that by denying a ch. 980 respondent the ability to seek 
supervised release until 18 months after commitment, the statute 
necessarily imposes an "affirmative restraint" on a ch. 980 
respondent. 
¶47 Rachel's argument fails for several reasons.  First, 
as we just noted, not all forms of restraint are equivalent to 
punishment.  Second, the "affirmative restraint" complained of 
by Rachel can be lifted by a number of methods, both before and 
after the 18-month period, even if some of those methods are not 
under the direct control of the individual.  For instance, the 
committed 
individual 
can 
petition 
for 
discharge 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 980.10 (1999-2000)4.  Likewise, the Secretary can 
authorize the individual to petition for discharge at any time 
                                                 
4 Although a sexually violent person's first petition under 
Wis. Stat. § 980.10 may be brought at any time, subsequent 
petitions brought under this section may have restrictions.  The 
statute provides, in relevant part: 
[A] committed person may petition the committing court 
for discharge at any time, but if a person has 
previously filed a petition for discharge without the 
secretary's approval and the court determined . . . 
that the person's petition was frivolous or that the 
person was still a sexually violent person, then the 
court shall deny any subsequent petition under this 
section without a hearing unless the petition contains 
facts upon which a court could find that the condition 
of the person had so changed that a hearing was 
warranted. 
No. 
00-0467   
 
25 
 
 
under Wis. Stat. § 980.09(1) (1999-2000), and the director of 
the institution at which the person is committed may petition on 
the individual's behalf for supervised release at any time under 
Wis. Stat. § 980.08(1) 
(1999-2000). 
 
Additionally, 
the 
individual is entitled to a periodic reexamination within the 
first 
six 
months, 
and 
every 
12 
months 
thereafter.  
Wis. Stat. § 980.07(1) (1999-2000).  The committing court can 
also order reexamination of the individual at any time under 
Wis. Stat. § 980.07(3) (1999-2000). 
¶48 These 
procedures 
provide 
the 
individual 
with 
a 
periodic reevaluation of his or her mental status, a regular 
assessment of the efficacy of his or her treatment, and the 
ability to reduce the severity of the restriction, if such a 
reduction is appropriate.5  All of these results are consistent 
with the legislative intent of the statute to provide treatment 
to persons who have been deemed dangerously sexually violent, 
and to protect the public from these same individuals.  As the 
State 
also 
points 
out, 
many 
of 
these 
procedures 
can 
theoretically be initiated immediately upon commitment.  The 
fact that some of the procedures for seeking supervised release, 
                                                 
5 The dissent expresses particular doubt about the viability 
of the methods by which a committed person can gain supervised 
release or discharge, but which are out of the person's control.  
Justice Bablitch's dissent at ¶95.  Despite the dissent's 
predictions about porcine volitation, we think it is more 
appropriate that the agencies and individuals that are charged 
with monitoring the treatment progress of institutionalized 
sexually violent persons be given the benefit of the assumption 
that 
they 
will 
carry 
out 
their 
responsibilities 
as 
the 
legislature has directed. 
No. 
00-0467   
 
26 
 
 
reexamination, and discharge are not under the direct control of 
the individual does not, however, convert the statute into a 
punitive statute. 
¶49 We find it noteworthy that the Kansas sexually violent 
person statute reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hendricks 
contained no provision for immediate commitment to supervised 
release.  Kansas Probate Code Ann. § 59-29a07 (West 2001) 
provides: 
If the court or jury determines that the person is a 
sexually 
violent 
predator, 
the 
person 
shall 
be 
committed to the custody of the secretary of social 
and rehabilitation services for control, care and 
treatment until such time as the person's mental 
abnormality or personality disorder has so changed 
that the person is safe to be at large.  Such control, 
care and treatment shall be provided at a facility 
operated 
by 
the 
department 
of 
social 
and 
rehabilitation 
services. 
 
At all 
times, 
persons 
committed . . . shall 
be 
kept 
in 
a 
secure 
facility . . . . 
Additionally, the procedures by which sexually violent persons 
can seek a supervised release status are similar to those 
currently in place in Wisconsin.  See Kan. Prob. Code Ann. 
§§ 59-29a08 (West 2001) (providing for a mandatory annual review 
in which the court can consider transitional release); 59-29a10 
(providing circumstances under which the secretary of social and 
rehabilitation services can authorize a sexually violent person 
to petition for transitional release); 59-29a11 (providing that 
a sexually violent person may, at any time, petition for 
transitional release without the approval of the secretary, 
subject to certain limitations).  Thus, we find it hard to say 
No. 
00-0467   
 
27 
 
 
that the failure to provide for immediate supervised release or 
the limited ability of an individual to seek supervised release 
necessarily converts the statute into a punitive one. 
¶50 Historically, an involuntary commitment proceeding 
such as the one here has not been regarded as punishment, and 
the recent amendments do not influence this consideration.  
Confinement under ch. 980 is premised on a finding that the 
individual has a mental disorder,6 and that the disorder renders 
the individual dangerous to others because of the substantial 
likelihood that the individual will engage in acts of sexual 
violence.  Wis. Stat. § 980.02(2)(b)-(c) (1999-2000).  It is 
well-established that the State may take measures to restrict 
the freedom of the dangerously mentally ill.  Hendricks, 521 
U.S. at 363 (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746).  If it were 
otherwise, all involuntary civil commitments would be considered 
punitive.  Id.  As the U.S. Supreme Court has noted, the 
involuntary confinement of mentally unstable individuals who 
pose a threat to the public is a "classic example of nonpunitive 
detention."  Id.  Thus, the historical perception of such a 
commitment cannot reasonably be said to be punitive. 
¶51 Additionally, 
ch. 980 
does 
not 
have 
a 
scienter 
requirement, nor did it contain a scienter element before the 
statute was amended.  This characteristic distinguishes ch. 980 
                                                 
6 For the purposes of ch. 980, "mental disorder" is defined 
as "a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional 
or volitional capacity that predisposes a person to engage in 
acts of sexual violence."  Wis. Stat. § 980.01(2) (1999-2000). 
No. 
00-0467   
 
28 
 
 
from most criminal statutes and, as the U.S. Supreme Court has 
pointed out, the absence of a mental state requirement is 
evidence that confinement under the statute is not intended to 
be retributive.  Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 362.  Chapter 980, both 
pre- and post-amendment, required a finding of a mental 
disorder, and a finding of dangerousness based on that disorder, 
rather than any type of culpable criminal mental state.  
Wis. Stat. § 980.02(2) (1999-2000).  The absence of a scienter 
requirement thus indicates that ch. 980 is not punitive in 
nature. 
¶52 Furthermore, ch. 980 does not promote the traditional 
criminal goals of punishment, retribution, and deterrence.  Like 
the Kansas statute analyzed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Hendricks, the statute here seeks to confine persons with mental 
disorders that render those persons dangerous to the public.  
The subjects of ch. 980 are those who cannot control their 
actions, and who therefore would not likely be deterred by the 
threat of confinement. 
¶53 Furthermore, the statute does not attach culpability 
to a respondent's conduct.  Although evidence of prior acts may 
be admissible, it is admissible for the purposes of proving a 
mental disorder, or to predict future dangerousness.  Likewise, 
a criminal conviction is not always necessary as a prerequisite 
for commitment under ch. 980.  See Wis. Stat. § 980.02(2)(a) 
No. 
00-0467   
 
29 
 
 
(1999-2000).7  Thus, it is not evident that the State has created 
a statute that serves the purposes of retribution. 
¶54 Rachel argues that the amendments regarding supervised 
release have added a punitive effect to ch. 980.  Rachel points 
us to the passage in Carpenter, where we held that the primary 
purpose of ch. 980 was to provide treatment: 
Respondents rely heavily on the fact that those 
committed under ch. 980 face an indefinite period of 
confinement in a secure facility as evidence that the 
true intent of the statute is punishment.  However, 
ch. 980 expressly provides for supervised release 
either at the time of commitment, or upon the person's 
subsequent 
petition 
after 
receiving 
treatment. 
Further, the person is entitled to discharge as soon 
as his or her dangerousness or mental disorder abates. 
197 Wis. 2d at 268 (citations omitted).  Rachel suggests that, 
at the time, the procedures available for seeking supervised 
release or discharge by a person committed under ch. 980 were a 
primary reason that the statute was held constitutional in 
Carpenter.  Rachel suggests that confinement without the 
possibility of a lesser restriction must clearly have been done 
for the purpose of retribution and deterrence rather than 
treatment. 
¶55 We disagree.  The section from Carpenter cited by 
Rachel does not suggest that the constitutionality of the 
                                                 
7 We note, however, that if a person is not convicted of a 
sexually violent offense, he or she must still either be found 
delinquent of a sexually violent offense or be found not guilty 
of a sexually violent crime by reason of mental disease or 
defect 
in 
order 
to 
be 
committed 
under 
ch. 
980.  
Wis. Stat. § 980.02(2)(a) (1999-2000). 
No. 
00-0467   
 
30 
 
 
statute depended upon the fact that there was the immediate 
possibility for supervised release.  Rather, the passage focused 
on the fact that the "potentially indefinite" nature of the 
confinement was linked to the dangerousness of the individual, 
and that there were avenues for decreasing the severity of the 
restrictions on that individual if treatment is effective in 
lessening the individual's dangerousness.  Essentially, our 
discussion of supervised release in Carpenter boiled down to the 
fact that when a sexually violent person is no longer dangerous 
enough to be kept in an institutional setting, that person has 
the potential to be subjected to less stringent controls (such 
as supervised release), or when no longer dangerous, to be freed 
from custody completely. 
¶56 Under the new amendments, that potential is still 
present.  As we pointed out previously, a person committed under 
ch. 980 
has 
many 
avenues 
for 
seeking 
release 
or 
lesser 
restriction, even if they are not all under the person's direct 
control.  Thus, our fundamental reasoning in Carpenter still 
holds 
true——the 
"potentially 
indefinite" 
nature 
of 
the 
confinement depends on a determination of the individual's 
dangerousness, which is reassessed throughout the individual's 
confinement to determine if lesser restriction is appropriate. 
¶57 The behavior to which ch. 980 applies is also not 
itself a crime.  As stated previously, commitment under ch. 980 
requires a finding that the individual has a mental disorder, 
and that the disorder renders the individual dangerous to others 
No. 
00-0467   
 
31 
 
 
because of the substantial likelihood that the individual will 
engage in acts of sexual violence.  Wis. Stat. § 980.02(2)(b), 
(c) (1999-2000). 
¶58 Rachel argues that the behavior on which ch. 980 
relies is a crime, and the statute is therefore punitive.  
However, this reasoning has been rejected by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in its analysis of other involuntary commitment statutes 
that may be "triggered" by a crime.  Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 362; 
Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 371 (1986).  Here, ch. 980 does 
require that the individual either have been found guilty of a 
sexually violent offense, delinquent of a sexually violent 
offense, or not guilty of a sexually violent offense by reason 
of mental disease or defect.  Wis. Stat. § 980.02(2)(a) (1999-
2000).  However, a mere connection to criminal activity is not 
sufficient to render the statute punitive.  Ursery, 518 U.S. at 
292.  The fundamental nature of the statute is still focused on 
the treatment of the individual and the protection of the 
public, rather than punishment.  The amendments to the law 
involving supervised release have no bearing on this factor. 
¶59 Finally, the intent behind the ch. 980 sanction, 
involuntary commitment, is easily assigned to a nonpunitive 
purpose. 
 
As 
we 
have 
repeatedly 
noted, 
the 
involuntary 
commitment is imposed both for the treatment of the individual 
and for the protection of the public.  We do not find this 
sanction excessive, given the statute's purpose, because the 
confinement is linked to the individual's dangerousness. 
No. 
00-0467   
 
32 
 
 
¶60 Under 
the 
intent-effects 
test, we 
conclude 
that 
ch. 980, as amended, is not punitive in nature.  Because we hold 
that the intent of the legislature was to create a civil 
commitment statute, and Rachel has not shown "by the clearest 
proof" that the effects of the statute are otherwise, we 
conclude that ch. 980 is not a punitive criminal statute.  
Because whether a statute is punitive is a threshold question 
for both the double jeopardy and the ex post facto analysis, we 
must also conclude that neither of those clauses is violated by 
ch. 980. 
III.  DUE PROCESS 
¶61 We now turn to Rachel's argument that the amendments 
to ch. 980 violate his right to the due process of law.  Civil 
commitment, such is at issue here, constitutes a deprivation of 
liberty that is subject to due process protection.  Addington v. 
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).  Freedom from physical 
restraint is a fundamental right protected by the due process 
clause from wrongful, arbitrary governmental action.  Foucha v. 
Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992). 
¶62 We 
first 
addressed 
whether 
ch. 980 
violated 
substantive due process in State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279.  In 
Post, we looked at several characteristics of ch. 980 in 
determining whether 
substantive due 
process 
was 
violated.  
First, we held that the use and definition of the term "mental 
disorder" rendered the statute narrow enough to identify those 
No. 
00-0467   
 
33 
 
 
persons it encompasses with reasonable accuracy.  Id. at 303-04 
(citing O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975)). 
¶63 Next, we held that treatment was a bona fide goal of 
ch. 980, and we presumed that the legislature would proceed in 
good faith to fund the treatment programs described therein.  
Id. at 307-08 (citing State ex rel. Thomson v. Zimmerman, 264 
Wis. 644, 652, 60 N.W.2d 416 (1953)).  Third, we deemed 
ch. 980's 
method for the 
determination 
of 
"dangerousness" 
constitutionally sound.  Id. at 311-13. 
¶64 Finally, we looked at the duration and nature of the 
commitment, and determined that they were consistent with the 
purpose of ch. 980.  Id. at 313.  We noted that confinement 
under ch. 980 permissibly balances the individual's liberty 
interests with the public's right to be protected from the 
dangers posed by those who have been proven to have a propensity 
toward sexual violence.  Id. at 317.  We also noted that the 
U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a compelling state interest in 
protecting the community from dangerously mentally ill persons 
and in providing care and treatment for those persons with 
mental disorders who pose a danger to the community.  Id. at 
302-03 (citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 426; Salerno, 481 U.S. at 
748-49).  We concluded that ch. 980 did not violate substantive 
due process.  Id. at 303. 
¶65 In the present case, Rachel appears to limit his 
challenge to the "duration and nature" portion of the analysis.  
No. 
00-0467   
 
34 
 
 
In his argument, Rachel points to language from Post, where we 
stated: 
Individuals found to be sexually violent persons are 
committed to the custody of DHSS "for control, care 
and 
treatment" in 
"the 
least restrictive 
manner 
consistent with the requirements of the person and in 
accordance with the court's commitment order." 
197 Wis. 2d at 313 (quoting Wis. Stat. §§ 980.06(1) and (2)(b) 
(1993-94)).  Rachel argues that because we "strongly relied 
upon" that language to find that ch. 980 did not violate due 
process, the repeal of the language from the statute makes 
ch. 980 unconstitutional.  Rachel suggests that there is no 
longer even any pretext of treatment in the statute, and that 
ch. 980 clearly violates the requirements of due process set 
forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 
U.S. 71. 
¶66 We do not find Rachel's argument persuasive.  The mere 
limitation of a committed person's access to supervised release 
does not impose a restraint to the point where it violates due 
process.  As we noted in our double jeopardy analysis, supra 
¶¶54-56, our discussion of the "least restrictive environment" 
was not a holding that made a committed individual's personal 
ability to seek supervised release indispensable to the statute.  
Rather, we recognized that the statute passes constitutional 
muster because the physical confinement of the individual is 
linked to the dangerousness of the committed person.  Because 
there are methods in place for regularly determining the 
dangerousness of the person and reducing or removing the 
No. 
00-0467   
 
35 
 
 
physical restrictions when the person is less or no longer 
dangerous, the intent of the statute is met. 
¶67 This reasoning does not change merely because some 
methods 
of 
seeking 
supervised 
release 
or 
discharge 
from 
confinement are not under the committed person's direct control.  
The 
individual 
still 
can 
petition 
for 
discharge 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 980.10; the Secretary can authorize the individual 
to petition for discharge under Wis. Stat. § 980.09(1); and the 
director of the institution may petition for the individual's 
supervised release under Wis. Stat. § 980.08(1).  The individual 
is also entitled to regular periodic reexaminations under 
Wis. Stat. § 980.07(1), or reexaminations at the discretion of 
the court under Wis. Stat. § 980.07(3).  These procedures allow 
for consideration of any improvement in an individual's mental 
health, and allow the possibility of less restrictive measures 
or discharge from custody if the person is less dangerous or no 
longer dangerous. 
¶68 As amended, ch. 980 still serves the legitimate and 
compelling state interests of providing treatment to the 
dangerously mentally ill and protecting the public from the 
dangerously mentally ill, and the statute is still narrowly 
tailored to meet those interests.  Therefore, we conclude that 
ch. 980 does not violate substantive due process. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
¶69 In conclusion, we hold that Hudson's intent-effects 
test is the proper threshold test to determine if a statute is 
No. 
00-0467   
 
36 
 
 
punitive for the purposes of the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post 
Facto Clauses of the Wisconsin Constitution as well as the U.S. 
Constitution.  Applying the intent-effects test, we conclude 
that ch. 980, as amended by 1999 Wis. Act 9, is not a criminal, 
punitive statute.  Therefore, we must also hold that the statute 
does not violate the Double Jeopardy or Ex Post Facto Clauses of 
the Wisconsin or the U.S. Constitution. 
¶70 We also hold that the amendments do not put ch. 980 in 
violation of substantive due process guarantees.  The statute 
continues to serve the compelling state interests of treatment 
of the dangerously mentally ill and protection of the public, 
and is narrowly tailored to meet those interests.  Because we 
hold that the statute is constitutional, we affirm the decision 
of the circuit court and uphold the circuit court's decision to 
involuntarily commit Rachel as a sexually violent person under 
ch. 980.   
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed.  
DAVID T. PROSSER, J., did not participate. 
 
No.  00-0467.awb 
 
1 
 
¶71 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  The issue 
addressed by the majority is whether the amendments that limit a 
Wis. Stat. ch. 980 
respondent's 
ability 
to 
seek 
supervised 
release are constitutional.  Although I have reservations, 
ultimately I am persuaded that the respondent has not met the 
high burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
amendments——as written——transform a constitutional statute into 
an unconstitutional statutory scheme.  Nevertheless, I write 
separately to voice my concerns that the supervised release 
provisions——as applied——are on the brink of running afoul of the 
constitution. 
¶72 In State v. Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 252, 267, 541 
N.W.2d 105 (1995), which I authored, the court assumed that the 
State was "prepared to provide specific treatment to those 
committed under ch. 980 and not simply warehouse them." 
¶73 In State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 308, 541 N.W.2d 115 
(1995), where I joined the majority, the court assumed that "the 
legislature will proceed in good faith and fund the treatment 
programs necessary for those committed under chapter 980." 
¶74 In response to the skepticism expressed by the dissent 
as to whether supervised release is a viable option, the 
majority in this case once again relies on an assumption that 
the 
State 
will 
meet 
its 
statutory 
and 
constitutional 
obligations.  The majority writes:  "we think it is more 
appropriate that the agencies and individuals that are charged 
with monitoring the treatment progress of institutionalized 
sexually violent persons be given the benefit of the assumption 
No.  00-0467.awb 
 
2 
 
that 
they 
will 
carry 
out 
their 
responsibilities 
as 
the 
legislature has directed."  Majority op. at ¶48 n.5. 
¶75 The court's assumptions and the State's good faith are 
wearing thin. 
¶76 We continue to gain experience with the way that 
ch. 980 has played out in the real world.  Since Carpenter and 
Post, the case law has become rife with examples of the State's 
inability to provide appropriate placements for those committed 
under ch. 980. 
¶77 For instance, in State v. Sprosty, 227 Wis. 2d 316, 
322, 595 N.W.2d 692 (1999), the committed individual went 
unreleased solely because his county of residence "did not have 
the appropriate resources to address his treatment needs in a 
community setting."  Other counties with facilities were 
apparently "unwilling or unable to admit him."  Id. 
¶78 Likewise, in State v. Krueger, 2001 WI App 76, ¶2, 242 
Wis. 2d 793, 626 N.W.2d 83, "difficulties finding a residence 
for Krueger derailed the planned release."  Krueger was to live 
with his stepfather, but this plan failed after local media 
attention.  Id. at ¶¶28, 37. 
¶79  There was more of the same in State v. Castillo, 205 
Wis. 2d 599, 556 N.W.2d 425 (Ct. App. 1996).  In that case, the 
State was unable to locate a community placement that would 
accept the committed individual.  Id. at 610.  After other 
alternatives were rejected as impracticable, it settled on 
placement at a halfway house.  Id. at 605.  Soon after, however, 
the halfway house rejected the placement because of fear of 
No.  00-0467.awb 
 
3 
 
"public reaction" and that "the town would take zoning action 
against it."  Id.  A final alternative, placement in a private 
apartment under supervision of a private social worker also 
failed because of community pressure.  Id. 
¶80 And there is still more:  In State v. Keding, No. 00-
1700——one of the many ch. 980 cases that has reached this court 
in this term alone——even the State recognized the apparent 
futility of attempted supervised release placements for the 
respondent.  During the course of oral arguments, the State 
acknowledged that attempted placement in five different counties 
had failed.  When asked if there was any alternative in the 
community for the respondent, the State replied, "I don't know, 
and apparently [the circuit court judge] didn't believe there 
was."  The State also said:  "If you're asking me what should we 
do about it, I could come up with some things, but it's not for 
me to do it.  It's for the legislature to do it." 
¶81 One can only speculate as to how many additional cases 
there are that present similar facts. 
¶82 When an individual committed under ch. 980 cannot be 
appropriately placed, his treatment is severely hampered, if not 
undermined completely.  The viability and feasibility of 
treatment 
is 
a 
necessary 
predicate 
to 
ch. 
980's 
constitutionality.  Should the promise of treatment be proven an 
illusion, this necessary predicate to the constitutionality of 
ch. 980 is removed. 
¶83 Although the reality of supervised release and its 
implications for treatment is my primary concern in writing 
No.  00-0467.awb 
 
4 
 
today, it is not my only one.  The majority reasons that ch. 
980's constitutionality is also predicated on the various 
procedures available under the statute for the committed 
individual to secure review of his commitment.  Majority op. at 
¶48.  Whether these procedures are regularly followed by the 
State is also open to question.  In one recent case, it took the 
State nearly two years to provide the committed individual with 
the reexamination that the statute requires to occur within six 
months.  State ex rel. Marberry v. Macht, 2002 WI App 133, ¶28, 
___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, review granted June 11, 2002 
(No. 99-2446). 
¶84 Chapter 980 cannot continue to survive constitutional 
scrutiny if the predicates for its constitutionality prove to be 
false.  The State must take steps to ensure that proper 
placement and treatment actually happen.  When an individual 
committed under ch. 980 cannot be appropriately placed, or is 
not timely assessed, the viability and feasibility of treatment 
are called into question. 
¶85 Treatment 
is 
a 
necessary 
component 
to 
the 
constitutionality of the ch. 980 statutory scheme.  Without it, 
a 
purportedly 
civil 
commitment 
becomes 
a 
"mechanism 
for 
retribution or general deterrence——functions properly those of 
criminal law, not civil commitment."  Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 
407, ___, 122 S. Ct. 867, 870 (2002) (internal quotations 
omitted) (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 372-73 
(1997) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
No.  00-0467.awb 
 
5 
 
¶86 It is the oft-stated rule that a statute is presumed 
constitutional and must be proven unconstitutional "beyond a 
reasonable doubt."  See, e.g., State v. Hahn, 2000 WI 118, ¶30, 
238 Wis. 2d 889, 618 N.W.2d 528.  It is only this rule that 
leads me to join the mandate of the majority opinion.  What 
little doubt remains continues to slip away. 
¶87 Accordingly, I respectfully concur in the mandate. 
 
 
 
No.  00-0467.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶88 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (dissenting).  
Justice Bradley's concurrence is very persuasive.  In my opinion 
it leaves no doubt about the unconstitutionality of the statute.  
I therefore agree with the conclusion reached by Justice 
Bablitch in his dissent.   
 
No.  00-0467wab 
 
 
 
1
 
 
¶89 WILLIAM 
A. 
BABLITCH, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
I 
respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion that the 
present Wis. Stat. ch. 980 is constitutional.  After this court 
in State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995), and 
State v. Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 252, 541 N.W.2d 105 (1995), 
declared ch. 980 constitutional, the legislature passed several 
key amendments to ch. 980 that fundamentally altered the purpose 
of the statute from treatment and protection to punishment.  
This the legislature cannot constitutionally do.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent.   
¶90 Wisconsin's sexual predator law allows the government 
to do something quite contrary to all of our notions of 
individual freedom and the government's right to deprive its 
citizens of that freedom.  It allows the government to continue 
to deprive a person of his freedom after he has served his 
sentence.  The government can do that, but only under very 
narrowly prescribed circumstances.  A majority of this court, 
including this writer, upheld the constitutionality of that law 
in Post and Carpenter, concluding that treatment and protection 
of the public, not punishment, were its primary purposes.  See 
Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 313; Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d at 266. 
¶91 The majority based its conclusion that the primary 
purpose of the law was not punitive on two aspects of that law.  
First, the court's initial order must specify either supervised 
release or institutional care.  Id.  The statute set forth the 
considerations in determining if the commitment would be to a 
No.  00-0467wab 
 
 
 
2
secured facility or to supervised release.  Second, it also 
provided that a committed person could petition the court for 
supervised release six months after the initial commitment 
order.  Id. at 268. 
¶92 Both of these provisions have been fundamentally 
altered and accordingly have changed the very nature of the law 
from treatment and protection to punishment.   
¶93 First, the amended statutes eliminate the option of 
supervised 
release 
and 
now 
require 
mandatory 
involuntary 
commitment when a person is found to be a sexually violent 
person. 
 
Involuntary 
commitment 
is 
required 
without 
consideration as to the most appropriate and effective treatment 
while providing public safety.  The court no longer has 
discretion to order supervised release if warranted by an 
individual's condition.  Commitment is mandatory regardless of 
the particulars.   
¶94 Second, a person committed for institutional care must 
now wait three times longer (18 months instead of six months) to 
petition the committing court for supervised release.  A 
committed person can no longer request a timely review of his or 
her own condition, thereby ensuring departmental accountability.  
These changes significantly alter the prior law and collectively 
amount to punishment of, rather than treatment for, the mentally 
ill.   
¶95 The majority points out that there are several avenues 
for petitioning the court for discharge or supervised release.  
These are illusory.  One of the options is that the petition can 
No.  00-0467wab 
 
 
 
3
be initiated by the committing court, the secretary of health 
and family services, or the director of the facility where the 
person is institutionalized.  See majority op. at ¶47.  The 
reality, plain and simple, is that pigs will fly before any of 
these options are exercised.   
¶96 The second option is for the committed person to 
petition the court for discharge.  This too is illusory.  Why 
would a court allow an individual to be discharged without any 
supervision within that 18 months when the legislature will not 
even allow supervised release within that 18 months?  The 
reality is, this just won't happen.   
¶97 The majority also notes that Kansas's sexually violent 
person statutes reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Kansas v. 
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), do not provide for immediate 
supervised release upon commitment.  See majority op. at ¶49.  
However, unlike Wisconsin's amended Wis. Stat. ch. 980, the 
Kansas statutes do allow committed individuals to petition for 
transitional release at any time.  See Kan. Stat. § 59-29a11; 
see also Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 353. 
¶98 In 
essence, 
Wis. Stat. ch. 
980 
as 
amended 
involuntarily commits individuals found to be sexually violent 
persons regardless of what would be the most effective and 
appropriate treatment.  Involuntary civil commitment, without 
even the opportunity to petition for supervised release for 18 
months, cannot be described in any way except punitive.  If 
treatment and public safety were in fact the primary purposes of 
ch. 980, then the nature and duration of commitment would be 
No.  00-0467wab 
 
 
 
4
based 
on 
a 
person's 
particular 
condition 
rather 
than 
a 
requirement of a minimum term of confinement.  In fact, 
mandatory commitment may actually detract from the purported 
purposes of treatment and public safety.  It is possible that 
keeping an individual committed who is ready for supervised 
release 
could 
actually 
impede 
his 
or 
her 
successful 
reintegration into society.   
¶99 The majority claims that the amended Wis. Stat. ch. 
980 is not punitive under the 2-prong intent-effects test of 
Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997).  See majority op. 
at ¶60.  I disagree.  First, the legislature's amendments to ch. 
980 demonstrate a marked shift from treatment and public safety 
to punishment.  In Carpenter, this court reasoned that ch. 980 
emphasized treatment, which was evident from its plain language:   
Under Wis. Stat. § 980.06(1), a person found to be 
sexually violent is committed to the custody of DHSS 
for control, care, and treatment, as opposed to the 
DOC for imprisonment.  Further, DHSS is required to 
"arrange for control, care and treatment of the person  
in the least restrictive manner consistent with the 
requirements of the person . . . ."   
Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d  at 266 (emphases added).   
¶100 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.06 was fundamentally altered by 
requiring commitment to institutional care and eliminating the 
language that treatment and control are to be provided in the 
least restrictive manner.  The amended § 980.06 now states: "A 
commitment order under this section shall specify that the 
person be placed in institutional care."  Thus, this court's 
conclusion in Carpenter that the legislature's primary aim under 
Wis. Stat. ch. 980 is to treat sexually violent persons, rather 
No.  00-0467wab 
 
 
 
5
than punish them, rests on statutory language that has been 
eliminated.  Contrary to this court's assessment of the prior 
law in Carpenter, ch. 980 as amended does not "provide specific 
treatment to those committed . . . [but rather] simply 
warehouse[s] them" by foreclosing the option of supervised 
release regardless of an individual's condition.  Carpenter, 197 
Wis. 2d at 267. 
¶101 Second, in determining whether Congress, despite its 
intentions to the contrary, enacted a statutory scheme that was 
so punitive in purpose and effect to negate that intention, the 
U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 250-
51 (1980), used the seven considerations listed in Kennedy v. 
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 166-68 (1963).  These factors 
included: 
Whether 
the 
sanction 
involves 
an 
affirmative 
disability or restraint, whether it has historically 
been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into 
play only on a finding of scienter, whether its 
operation 
will 
promote 
the 
traditional 
aims 
of 
punishment--retribution and deterrence, whether the 
behavior to which it applies is already a crime, 
whether an alternative purpose to which it may 
rationally be connected is assignable for it, and 
whether it appears excessive in relation to the 
alternative purpose assigned . . . . 
Id. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted).  Here, applying those same 
guidelines 
leads 
to 
the 
following 
determinations: 
 
(1) 
Wis. Stat. ch. 980, as amended, requires affirmative restraint 
of an individual upon being found a sexually violent person; (2) 
institutional confinement has historically been regarded as a 
form of punishment; (3) individuals committed as sexually 
violent persons usually have knowledge of their offenses that 
No.  00-0467wab 
 
 
 
6
constitutes scienter; (4) as amended, ch. 980 promotes the aims 
of punishment – retribution and deterrence – by imposing a 
mandatory term of involuntary confinement; (5) the behavior to 
which ch. 980 applies, namely sexually violent offenses, is 
criminal; and (6-7) the mandatory commitment under ch. 980, 
without regard to an individual's particular condition, is 
excessive in relation to the alternative purposes of treatment 
and protection of the public.  Given these factors, the 
conclusion is inevitable:  the statute is punitive. 
¶102 I concurred in Carpenter because under the prior law 
there was a "rational connection between the affirmative 
restraint and treatment required by the statute and its purpose 
of protecting the public."  Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d at 278 
(Bablitch, J., concurring).   I cannot reach the same conclusion 
due to these two fundamental changes to Wis. Stat. ch. 980:  (1) 
the elimination of the option of supervised release at the time 
of commitment and (2) the tripling of the length of time an 
individual must wait to petition for supervised release.  These 
amendments transform the former civil statutory scheme of ch. 
980 to a punitive one and thereby violate the constitutional 
requirements of due process, double jeopardy, and in Rachel's 
case, ex post facto.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
 
No.  00-0467wab 
 
 
 
1