Title: State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts., 96 Ohio St.3d 379, 2002-Ohio-4905.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. SHEMO ET AL. v. CITY OF MAYFIELD HEIGHTS ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts., 96 Ohio St.3d 379, 2002-Ohio-
4905.] 
Motion for reconsideration granted in part and judgment modified in part. 
(No. 2001-1325 — Submitted June 4, 2002 — Decided October 2, 2002.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
On April 10, 2002, we granted a writ of mandamus to relators, co-
owners as trustees of land located in the city of Mayfield Heights, Ohio, to 
compel respondents, the city and its mayor, city council, and planning 
commission, to commence appropriation proceedings to determine the amount of 
the city’s temporary taking of relators’ property.  State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield 
Hts. (2002), 95 Ohio St.3d 59, 765 N.E.2d 345.  We held that relators established 
a compensable taking of their property because the city’s application of U-1(1) 
and U-2-A single-family residential zoning classifications to their property was 
unconstitutional in that the application of these classifications did not 
substantially advance legitimate state interests.  Id. at 64, 765 N.E.2d 345.  We 
further held that relators had established the period of the compensable taking as 
being from March 19, 1992, the date they claimed as the beginning date of the 
taking, i.e., when they first filed a declaratory judgment action challenging the 
application of U-1(1) zoning, until April 2001, when the U-2-A zoning 
classification was invalidated.  Id. at 69, 765 N.E.2d 345. 
{¶2} 
On April 22, 2002, respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶3} 
On April 23, 2002, the United States Supreme Court decided 
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency 
(2002), 535 U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 1465, 152 L.Ed.2d 517.  In Tahoe-Sierra, the 
court held that moratoriums, totaling 32 months, on development in the Lake 
Tahoe Basin did not constitute a compensable taking although the moratoriums 
temporarily deprived affected landowners of all economically viable use of their 
property. 
{¶4} 
On April 29, 2002, relators filed a brief in opposition to 
respondents’ motion for reconsideration. 
Motion for Reconsideration 
{¶5} 
We have used our reconsideration authority under S.Ct.Prac.R. XI 
to “ ‘correct decisions which, upon reflection, are deemed to have been made in 
error.’ ”  Buckeye Community Hope Found. v. Cuyahoga Falls (1998), 82 Ohio 
St.3d 539, 541, 697 N.E.2d 181, quoting State ex rel. Huebner v. W. Jefferson 
Village Council (1995), 75 Ohio St.3d 381, 383, 662 N.E.2d 339.  For the 
following reasons, we grant respondents’ motion in part and shorten the period in 
which a compensable taking was found, but otherwise deny the motion. 
Compensation for Application of Invalid Zoning Ordinance 
{¶6} 
Respondents raise three claims in support of reconsideration.  In 
their first claim, they assert that Shemo sub silentio overruled established Ohio 
law, i.e., Superior Uptown, Inc. v. Cleveland (1974), 39 Ohio St.2d 36, 68 O.O.2d 
21, 313 N.E.2d 820.  In Superior Uptown, at the syllabus, we held, “A cause of 
action for money damages can not be maintained against a municipality for losses 
sustained as the result of the adoption of a rezoning ordinance which is 
subsequently declared invalid.” 
{¶7} 
Respondents’ claim lacks merit.  Shemo does not overrule Superior 
Uptown.  Superior Uptown involved a direct action for money damages against a 
municipality and was based upon the doctrine of sovereign immunity.  By 
January Term, 2002 
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contrast, this case involves a mandamus claim to compel public authorities to 
institute appropriation proceedings where an involuntary taking of private 
property was alleged and ultimately proven by relators. 
Takings Analysis 
{¶8} 
Respondents next contend that reconsideration is warranted 
because we did not apply in our takings determination the analysis set forth in 
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York (1978), 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 
L.Ed.2d 631.  In Penn Cent., the United States Supreme Court held that, in 
general, the determination of whether a land-use regulation constitutes a 
compensable taking is an ad hoc, factual inquiry that depends upon several 
factors, including the economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the 
regulation has interfered with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the 
character of the government action.  Id. at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631; 
see, also, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (2001), 533 U.S. 606, 617, 121 S.Ct. 2448, 
150 L.Ed.2d 592.  For the following reasons, respondents’ contention does not 
warrant reconsideration. 
{¶9} 
First, respondents’ attempted reargument of this contention is not 
authorized by our Rules of Practice.  “A motion for reconsideration shall be 
confined strictly to the grounds urged for reconsideration [and] shall not 
constitute a reargument of the case * * *.”  S.Ct.Prac.R. XI(2)(A).  Respondents 
previously asserted the applicability of the Penn Cent. inquiry in their merit brief. 
{¶10} Second, it is not evident that the Penn Cent./Palazzolo analysis 
applies to this case, in which the land-use regulations at issue were held to be 
unconstitutional as applied to the property, i.e., the U-1(1) and U-2-A zoning 
classifications did not substantially advance legitimate state interests.  Shemo, 95 
Ohio St.3d at 64, 765 N.E.2d 345.  Neither Penn Cent. nor Palazzolo involved a 
claim that the applicable legislation did not substantially advance legitimate state 
interests.  And in Penn Cent., the United States Supreme Court emphasized that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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the landowners did not contest that New York City’s objective in enacting the 
challenged landmark-preservation legislation was a permissible governmental 
goal or that the restrictions imposed on their land were appropriate means to 
secure that objective.  Id., 438 U.S. at 129, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631. 
{¶11} Third, even assuming that the Penn Cent./Palazzolo analysis 
applies, a finding of a compensable taking is still warranted.  Restricting relators’ 
land to residential use on property that was held to be unsuitable for residential 
use had an obvious adverse economic impact on relators, which necessarily 
interfered with their reasonable investment-backed expectations when they 
requested that the property be rezoned for retail development.  Further, the city’s 
application of  residential classifications to their property did not substantially 
advance any legitimate health, safety, or welfare concern of Mayfield Heights.  
Shemo, 95 Ohio St.3d at 64, 765 N.E.2d 345; cf. First English Evangelical 
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles (1989), 210 Cal.App.3d 1353, 1372, 
258 Cal.Rptr. 893, where a California appellate court, on remand from the United 
States Supreme Court, held that there was no compensable regulatory taking, 
while observing that “[t]he complaint does not allege * * * that it was 
unreasonable for the County to conclude these limitations would contribute 
substantially to the public safety.”  In addition, the duration of the challenged 
restrictions was much lengthier here than the challenged restrictions in Tahoe-
Sierra, which totaled 32 months.  Id. at ___, 122 S.Ct. 1465, 152 L.Ed.2d 517 
(“the duration of the restriction is one of the important factors that a court must 
consider in the appraisal of a regulatory takings claims”). 
{¶12} Therefore, respondents’ reliance on Penn Cent. and Palazzolo in 
support of reconsideration is misplaced. 
Tahoe-Sierra 
{¶13} Respondents’ reconsideration motion could not rely on Tahoe-
Sierra because that case was decided one day after their motion.  The court 
January Term, 2002 
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therefore sua sponte considers whether Tahoe-Sierra requires a modification of 
our decision in Shemo.  Upon consideration, Tahoe-Sierra does not warrant 
vacation of our April 10 judgment. 
{¶14} As relators correctly note, unlike this case, Tahoe-Sierra did not 
involve the first prong of the regulatory takings test set forth in Agins v. Tiburon 
(1980), 447 U.S. 255, 260, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 65 L.Ed.2d 106 (application of land-
use regulations to property constitutes a compensable taking “if the ordinance 
does not substantially advance legitimate state interests * * * or denies an owner 
economically viable use of his land”).  In fact, in Tahoe-Sierra, the United States 
Supreme Court emphasized that the landowners challenging the temporary 
environmental moratoriums did not argue, as relators did in this case, that the 
moratoriums did not substantially advance a legitimate state interest.  Id. at ___, 
122 S.Ct. 1465, 152 L.Ed.2d 517 (“recovery on * * * a theory that the state 
interests were insubstantial is foreclosed by the District Court’s unchallenged 
findings of fact”). 
{¶15} Moreover, to the extent that Tahoe-Sierra could be construed as an 
abandonment of most per se or categorical rules in regulatory takings cases, 
application of the Penn Cent./Palazzolo ad hoc, factual inquiry here does not, as 
previously discussed, require a different holding. 
{¶16} Therefore, Tahoe-Sierra does not demand a vacation of our 
judgment here. 
Period of the Taking 
{¶17} Respondents finally contend that we should reconsider the length 
of the period for the compensable taking. 
{¶18} In this case, relators requested that the period of the taking begin 
on March 19, 1992, when they first challenged the application of the U-1(1) 
single-family residential zoning classification to their property.  We granted their 
request.  Shemo, 95 Ohio St.3d at 69, 765 N.E.2d 345. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶19} The date of a regulatory taking may begin on the date the 
challenged regulation was either enacted or applied to the subject property.  See, 
generally, 8A Rohan & Reskin, Nichols on Eminent Domain (3d Ed.2001) 24-36, 
Section 24.04[3], fn. 34; First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale 
v. Los Angeles (1987), 482 U.S. 304, 319, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 L.Ed.2d 250. 
{¶20} The date that the first of the challenged zoning classifications was 
adopted and applied to relators’ property preceded the date that relators requested 
for the commencement of the taking, i.e., the date they first challenged the 
validity of the classification as applied to their property. 
{¶21} But upon reflection, we deem this period to start in June 1995, 
when relators refiled their action for declaratory judgment, and shorten the period 
of the temporary taking.  In this regard, although relators initially challenged the 
application of the U-1(1) classification to their property by a declaratory judgment 
action filed on March 19, 1992, they voluntarily dismissed this action in June 
1995.  Moreover, until they refiled their declaratory judgment action in that same 
month, they never requested that their property be rezoned to permit retail use, 
instead choosing to request that it be rezoned to permit multifamily residential 
development.  Therefore, they were not harmed by the application of the 
challenged regulations to their property, which was ultimately found unsuitable 
for residential use, during the period from March 1992 to June 1995 when they 
did not seek to use their property for a nonresidential use.  The appropriate 
starting date for the taking is consequently June 1995, when they specifically 
requested in their refiled declaratory judgment action that the property be rezoned 
to permit retail and warehouse development. 
{¶22} Respondents assert that the period of the taking should be further 
shortened because any delay was due to the court’s change in precedent, relators’ 
delay in preparing to build an access drive, the relatively late resolution of the 
issue concerning the paper streets that the city claimed it owned, and the R.C. 
January Term, 2002 
7 
2744.04 statute of limitations.  Respondents’ additional assertions lack merit for 
the following reasons. 
{¶23} Neither Gerijo, Inc. v. Fairfield (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 223, 638 
N.E.2d 533, nor Goldberg Cos., Inc. v. Richmond Hts. City Council (1998), 81 
Ohio St.3d 207, 690 N.E.2d 510, the two cases cited by respondents in their 
reconsideration motion, involved takings claims.  Hence, respondents could not 
justifiably rely on them to support their unconstitutional application of residential 
zoning classifications to relators’ property.  Shemo, 95 Ohio St.3d at 63-64, 765 
N.E.2d 345. 
{¶24} In addition, respondents’ arguments concerning relators’ alleged 
delay in preparing to make access road improvements and the further delay 
concerning the resolution of the paper-streets issue were both raised in their initial 
brief; they cannot reargue them now.  S.Ct.Prac.R. XI(2)(A).  And as we held in 
Shemo, 95 Ohio St.3d at 68, 765 N.E.2d 345, “Any delays by relators did not 
contribute to respondents’ delay in finally rezoning the property to U-4 [retail and 
wholesale use].”  Further, “relators owned the property consisting of the ‘paper 
streets’ at the time the temporary taking occurred because the city had abandoned 
the property.”  Id. 
{¶25} Finally, respondents waived their R.C. 2744.04 contention by 
failing to raise this affirmative defense in their pleadings.  See State ex rel. Tubbs 
Jones v. Suster (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 75, 701 N.E.2d 1002 (“A statute of 
limitations is an affirmative defense that is waived unless pled in a timely 
manner”). 
Conclusion 
{¶26} Based on the foregoing, we grant respondents’ motion for 
reconsideration in part and shorten the period of the temporary taking from March 
19, 1992 through April 2001 to June 1995 through April 2001.  In all other 
respects, we deny respondents’ motion for reconsideration. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶27} I would deny the motion for reconsideration in its entirety. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Berns, Ockner & Greenberger, L.L.C., Sheldon Berns, Benjamin J. 
Ockner and Jordan Berns, for relators. 
 
Leonard F. Carr and L. Bryan Carr; Mansour, Gavin, Gerlack & Manos 
Co., L.P.A., Anthony J. Coyne, Bruce G. Rinker and Eli Manos, for respondents. 
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