Title: State v. Bradley

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

STATE_V_BRADLEY.94-582; 164 Vt 346; 670 A.2d 811

[Filed 03-Nov-1995]


  NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                No. 94-582


State of Vermont                            Supreme Court

                                            On Appeal from
     v.                                     
                                            District Court of Vermont,
                                            Unit No. 3, Lamoille Circuit

Keith Bradley, III                          October Term, 1995


Alan W. Cook, J.

  Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and David Tartter, Assistant
  Attorney General, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee

  Robert Appel, Defender General, and Henry Hinton, Appellate Defender,
  Montpelier, for defendant-appellant


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


       ALLEN, C.J.   Defendant Keith Bradley appeals his jury conviction for
  kidnapping and aggravated sexual assault on the grounds that the trial
  court did not sufficiently inquire into either his waiver of his right to
  be present at trial or his waiver of his right to represent himself.  We
  affirm.

       On May 19, 1993, defendant was arraigned on kidnapping and sexual
  assault charges.  The court held a competency hearing on June 28, 1993, at
  which the parties stipulated to defendant's competency based on the
  findings of a previously conducted competency examination.  Defendant
  discharged his attorneys at a November 15 status conference and entered
  into a plea agreement with the State's attorney.  After discussing the
  matter with defendant, the court granted his motion to proceed pro se. 
  Before accepting the plea, however, the court ordered a second competency
  examination and gave defendant an opportunity to consult with counsel.  At
  a February 7, 1994 status conference, counsel informed the court that
  defendant's mother had contacted counsel because defendant no longer wished
  to represent 

  

  himself.  During this status conference, defendant was not present
  because he did not want to see the victim; he remained in an anteroom.  On
  March 7, 1994, the court held a second competency hearing, at which it
  found defendant competent to stand trial.  Defendant abandoned the plea
  agreement and proceeded to trial.
  
       During the victim's testimony on the first day of trial, counsel
  approached the bench and requested the court's permission for defendant to
  return to the lawyer's room because defendant was experiencing discomfort
  watching the victim testify.  Counsel indicated to the court that defendant
  voluntarily chose to absent himself and that counsel would do his best to
  cross-examine the victim without the benefit of defendant's input.  The
  court addressed defendant directly, and defendant confirmed that he
  voluntarily waived his right to be present.  

       Defendant was present in the courthouse but not in the courtroom when
  the trial resumed the next morning.  Counsel told the court that defendant
  wished to be absent for the remainder of the victim's testimony.  After the
  victim concluded her testimony, the court inquired of counsel whether
  defendant would like to return.  Counsel told the court that he had invited
  defendant to return to the trial but that defendant had declined.  The
  court requested that counsel renew the invitation after each witness. 
  Defendant again declined the invitation when the next witness took the
  stand.  Defendant indicated a desire to be present for the following
  witness, who was an acquaintance of defendant.  Because that witness had
  already begun testifying, the court asked if the direct examination should
  start again for defendant's benefit.  Counsel told the court that defendant
  had notice that the witness was testifying and waived his right to be
  present.  The examination resumed.  

       After the direct examination was over, defendant again wished to leave
  the courtroom.  The court and counsel again discussed defendant's absences. 
  The court told counsel that despite defendant's sporadic attendance, the
  trial would continue.  Counsel assured the court that defendant did not
  wish that the trial stop.  The court told counsel that defendant's absences
  were harmful to his defense.  Counsel concurred and told the court that he
  had communicated that concern to defendant and that defendant understood. 
  Defendant repeatedly absented himself for 

  

  the remainder of the trial.  

       When defendant remained at the State Hospital (FN1) during jury
  deliberations, the court and counsel again discussed defendant's absence. 
  Counsel assured the court that defendant was still competent and that he
  made the choice to absent himself.  To bolster its conclusion that
  defendant remained competent, the court noted that defendant had been in
  control of his actions throughout the trial and that he had been selective
  about his absences.  Counsel told the court that he did not see any legal
  impediment to defendant's absence during the reading of the verdict.  After
  discussing with counsel the possibility that defendant may change his mind,
  the court said, "If he wants to be here, we'll get him here as soon as we
  possibly can."  

       We first note that, because defendant made no objection to the
  continuation of trial in his absence or to the renewed assistance of
  counsel, we review the trial court's actions for plain error.  State v.
  Veburst, 156 Vt. 133, 138, 589 A.2d 863, 866 (1991). For this Court to find
  plain error, the trial court's error must be so grave and serious as to
  strike to the very heart of defendant's constitutional rights or adversely
  affect the fair administration of justice.  Id.  It is against this high
  standard that we review defendant's arguments.

       Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred by failing to
  inquire sufficiently into whether he knowingly and voluntarily waived his
  right to be present at trial.(FN2)  The United States Constitution, the
  Vermont Constitution, and V.R.Cr.P. 43(a) give a criminal defendant the
  right to be present at his trial.  In re Cardinal, ___ Vt. ___, ___,