Title: State v. Messier

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Messier (2003-482); 178 Vt. 412; 885 A.2d 1193

2005 VT  98

[Filed 19-Aug-2005]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 2005 VT  98

                                No. 2003-482

  State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.	                                 District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 1, Windsor Circuit

  Christopher Messier	                         December Term, 2004

  Theresa S. DiMauro, J.

  Heidi H. Woessner, Windsor County Deputy State's Attorney, White River
    Junction, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

  Matthew F. Valerio, Defender General, Henry Hinton, Appellate Attorney, and
    Dawn Matthews, Montpelier, for Appellant.

  PRESENT:  Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and Reiber, JJ., and 
            Allen, C.J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned

        
       ¶  1.  SKOGLUND, J.  Defendant Christopher Messier appeals his
  conviction in the Windsor Circuit Court of reckless endangerment and
  disorderly conduct.  Defendant presents three issues on appeal: (1) whether
  13 V.S.A. § 1025 requires proof of a firearm's operability; (2) whether
  defendant was substantially prejudiced when a witness offered testimony at
  trial regarding defendant's admission to the witness, the content of which
  the State never disclosed to defense counsel; and (3) whether defendant was
  substantially prejudiced when the same witness referred to a prior plea
  agreement.  In sustaining defendant's conviction, we find that any
  prejudice arising from the witness's testimony was cured by the trial
  court's prompt curative instruction to the jury.  We further conclude that
  the State provided sufficient evidence of operability of the gun brandished
  by defendant.  Therefore, we affirm defendant's conviction. 

       ¶  2.  On the evening and early morning of October 5-6, 2002,
  defendant attended a benefit dance in the town of Sharon, Vermont, with his
  wife and a friend, Roberta Nason.  After four to five hours at the dance,
  the party of three and another friend, Fay-Ann Manning, returned to stay
  the night at Nason's home in South Royalton.  Nason went to bed between
  1:30 and 2:00 a.m., shortly after their return.  Manning stayed up to talk
  with defendant and his wife for about an hour until defendant, who had been
  drinking all night, abruptly became angry and went outside.  Manning could
  later hear defendant's voice among several people yelling outside.  The
  noise eventually woke Nason as well.

       ¶  3.  Meanwhile, Richard Whitham and David Slater were returning to
  their cars at Crossroads, a bar in South Royalton, located roughly 100
  yards downhill from Nason's trailer.  From the Crossroads parking lot,
  Whitham heard someone yelling that he wanted to kill Scott Durkee, the
  bar's owner.  Weeks earlier Durkee and defendant had exchanged words at the
  Tunbridge World's Fair; defendant apparently still harbored anger toward
  Durkee, who several years earlier had asked defendant not to return to
  Crossroads after repeated disturbances.

       ¶  4.  Whitham drove his truck up the hill to investigate and saw
  someone standing in the bushes with what looked like a gun pointed toward
  him, so he quickly returned to the bar to report what he had seen.  After
  calling the police, Durkee joined Whitham and Slater in the Crossroads
  parking lot, where they could see someone moving on the hill above and
  could hear a man shouting.  Whitham and Slater decided to confront the man,
  and charged up the hill toward Nason's trailer.
   
       ¶  5.  As they neared the trailer, both men recognized defendant,
  whom they had known for some years.  Both recalled that defendant was
  holding a shotgun, which Slater testified was pointed in his direction. 
  Slater knocked the gun away from defendant, and the men fought outside the
  trailer until someone from Crossroads yelled that the police were on their
  way.  Slater and Whitham left before the police arrived.  After speaking
  briefly with Durkee, the troopers drove to Nason's home, where they found
  defendant hiding under the trailer.  Once inside, they discovered a
  shotgun, which Manning and Nason identified as the firearm defendant had
  that night.

       ¶  6.  Defendant was convicted of disorderly conduct and reckless
  endangerment and acquitted of driving under the influence following a
  two-day jury trial.  On appeal, defendant contends that he was
  substantially prejudiced by two statements in Slater's testimony, and that
  the trial court erred when it failed to grant defendant's motion for a
  mistrial made in response to these statements.  Defendant also challenges
  the sufficiency of the State's evidence demonstrating that the firearm was
  operable. 

       ¶  7.  First, we reject defendant's argument that the State failed to
  demonstrate that the gun was operable, as required by 13 V.S.A. § 1025.  In
  2000, the Legislature amended § 1025 to add the emphasized language to the
  statute's last sentence:  

    A person who recklessly engages in conduct which places or may
    place another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury
    shall be imprisoned for not more than one year or fined not more
    than $1,000.00 or both. Recklessness and danger shall be presumed
    where a person knowingly points a firearm at or in the direction
    of another, whether or not  the actor believed the firearm to be
    loaded.  Recklessness and danger shall be presumed where a person
    knowingly points a firearm at or in the direction of another,
    whether or not the actor believed the firearm to be loaded, and
    whether or not the firearm actually was loaded.

  13 V.S.A. § 1025 (Cum. Supp. 2004) (emphasis added); see 1999, No. 149
  (Adj. Sess.), § 3 (adding underlined language). 
   
       ¶  8.  At this point, some background on our decisions concerning §
  1025 is instructive.  Under our original construction of § 1025, before the
  emphasized language above was inserted, whether a firearm pointed at
  another person was loaded or otherwise operational was irrelevant.  State
  v. Cushman, 133 Vt. 121, 124,