Title: State v. Bartlett

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

NO. COA13-860 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 1 April 2014 
 
 
VINCENT BURLEY, 
 
Employee, Plaintiff, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
From the North Carolina  
Industrial Commission 
I.C. No. X52202 
U.S. FOODS, INC., Employer, 
and INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY 
OF NORTH AMERICA, Carrier, 
 
and 
 
 
GALLAGHER BASSETT SERVICES, INC., 
 
Third Party Administrator, 
 
Defendants. 
 
 
 
Appeal by plaintiff from opinion and award entered 28 June 
2013 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission.  Heard in the 
Court of Appeals 12 December 2013. 
 
The Sumwalt Law Firm, by Vernon Sumwalt, Mark T. Sumwalt, 
and Lauren Hester, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 
 
McAngus, Goudelock & Courie, P.L.L.C., by Raymond J. 
Williams, III, for Defendants-Appellees. 
 
 
HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge. 
 
 
Vincent Burley (“Plaintiff”) appeals from the 28 June 2013 
opinion and award of the Full Commission of the North Carolina 
-2- 
 
 
Industrial Commission (the “Commission”), which concluded that 
the Commission did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear 
Plaintiff’s claim.  Plaintiff argues the Commission had subject 
matter jurisdiction because a modification to his contract was 
approved by defendant U.S. Foods Inc. (“U.S. Foods”) in 
Charlotte.  We agree and reverse the Commission’s opinion and 
award. 
I. Facts & Procedural History 
On 8 July 2011, Plaintiff filed a claim for benefits with 
the Commission seeking compensation for a back injury suffered 
while working for U.S. Foods as a truck driver.  U.S. Foods 
denied that North Carolina has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s 
claim, but admitted liability under the Georgia Workers’ 
Compensation Act and is currently paying Plaintiff disability 
compensation under Georgia law.  The matter came on for a 
hearing before Deputy Commissioner Philip A. Baddour, III (“Dep. 
Comm. Baddour”) on 17 April 2012 and a written order was filed 
on 13 December 2012.  The evidence presented at the hearing 
tended to show the following facts. 
Plaintiff is a resident of Augusta, Georgia and was a 39-
year-old truck driver at the time of his 13 December 2012 
hearing before the Commission.  In 1993, Plaintiff graduated 
-3- 
 
 
from truck driving school in Charleston, South Carolina, and 
obtained his commercial driving license from this course of 
study.  Plaintiff has been a truck driver since graduating from 
this program. 
U.S. Foods supplies and delivers food to restaurants, 
schools, sports venues, hotels, and many other types of 
businesses.  U.S. Foods operates many distribution centers 
nationwide to supply “hundreds of thousands of customers” with 
its food products.  
Plaintiff testified that U.S. Foods hired him as a delivery 
truck driver in May 2000.  Plaintiff completed his initial 
hiring paperwork, including a driver’s application, medical 
exam, and written driving exam, in Fort Mill, South Carolina.  
Plaintiff completed additional pre-hiring paperwork, including a 
road-test in Columbia, South Carolina and a drug-screening in 
Georgia.  After completing his initial paperwork, U.S. Foods 
offered Plaintiff employment, and Plaintiff accepted the written 
offer.  Plaintiff signed this paperwork in Fort Mill, South 
Carolina and was employed at-will.  
Plaintiff drove a planned route as part of his employment.  
The route was concentrated around the Augusta area, with stops 
in Georgia and South Carolina.  Plaintiff’s truck and trailer 
-4- 
 
 
were stowed every day at a drop yard in Augusta.  Plaintiff’s 
route did not involve travel in North Carolina nor was his truck 
ever dropped in North Carolina.  
U.S. Foods merged with another company, PYA Monarch, and 
the Columbia drop yard, where Plaintiff was assigned, was 
dissolved in 2002.  Plaintiff testified that U.S. Foods offered 
to transfer supervision of his employment to either their 
Charlotte division or their Lexington, South Carolina division 
after the merger.  Plaintiff chose to work for the Charlotte 
division because U.S. Foods arranged for his loaded delivery 
truck to be delivered near his Augusta home.  Had Plaintiff 
chosen the Lexington division, he would have been required to 
drive his personal vehicle to retrieve his loaded truck in 
Lexington.  Plaintiff’s transfer to the Charlotte division was 
thereafter approved by U.S. Foods’s human resources department 
in Charlotte. 
Plaintiff’s job title and responsibilities did not change 
after he was transferred to the Charlotte division from the 
Columbia division.  Plaintiff stated that he was working the 
“same job, just a different division,” although Plaintiff made 
deliveries to different customers and drove a different route.  
Plaintiff was also switched from an hourly weight-based pay 
-5- 
 
 
system to a component pay system.  As a result, Plaintiff saw 
his pay increase from $400 to $500 a week under the weight-based 
system to between $900 and $1,400 per week under the component 
system.  Plaintiff worked continuously for U.S. Foods for nine 
years, was never terminated or laid off, and never completed re-
hiring paperwork during this period. 
Plaintiff injured his back on 23 September 2009 while 
lifting a case of liquid milk during a delivery to a Sonic 
Drive-In in Evans, Georgia.  U.S. Foods terminated Plaintiff’s 
employment on 1 October 2009.  
U.S. Foods’s Charlotte division Transportation Manager 
Alton Abernathy (“Mr. Abernathy”) also testified at the 17 April 
2012 hearing.  Mr. Abernathy stated that upon the merger of U.S. 
Foods and PYA Monarch, U.S. Foods “went to all the drivers [in 
the Columbia drop yard] that were being displaced . . . and 
offered them jobs” if they transferred branches.  If Plaintiff 
rejected the transfer, he would have received a severance 
package.  Mr. Abernathy further described the different pay 
systems 
between 
the 
Charlotte 
and 
Columbia 
divisions: 
Plaintiff’s component pay system paid his commission on “pieces 
and stops and miles with a base and safety pay” rather than 
Plaintiff’s prior pay system, which was based on weight carried.  
-6- 
 
 
Mr. 
 
Abernathy 
also 
described 
the 
Charlotte 
division’s 
accommodations for its drivers, noting that the branch delivered 
drivers’ loads to fifteen different sites, including Plaintiff’s 
drop site in Augusta. 
Plaintiff’s transfer was approved and signed by three 
individuals: Doug Jolly, U.S. Foods’s Transportation Manager at 
its Fort Mill division; Kim Dahl, a human resources officer at 
U.S. Foods; and Mel Smith, who provided final approval from the 
human resources department.  U.S. Food’s human resources 
department has been located in Charlotte since 4 December 2000, 
and both Kim Dahl and Mel Smith worked in the Charlotte office. 
Lastly, U.S. Foods’s Human Resources Coordinator, Rebecca 
Reed (“Ms. Reed”), testified at the hearing.  Ms. Reed discussed 
the terms of Plaintiff’s initial hiring contract, noting that 
U.S. Foods could modify the terms of Plaintiff’s employment 
under the contract. 
After hearing the foregoing evidence, Dep. Comm. Baddour 
concluded that the a modified contract does not constitute a 
contract “made” in North Carolina for purposes of the relevant 
jurisdiction granting statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-36 (2013).  
Dep. Comm. Baddour also concluded that the final act to create 
Plaintiff’s employment contract did not occur in North Carolina.  
-7- 
 
 
Accordingly, Dep. Comm. Baddour ordered that Plaintiff’s claim 
be denied for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Plaintiff 
appealed to the Commission on 13 December 2012.  The Commission 
heard the case on 22 May 2013 and issued an opinion and order on 
28 June 2013 affirming Dep. Comm. Baddour’s order.  Plaintiff 
timely filed written notice of appeal with this Court on 2 July 
2013.  
II. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review 
 
Plaintiff’s appeal from the Commission’s opinion and award 
lies of right to this Court pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A–
29(a) (2013).  Accord N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97–86 (2013). 
 
The only issue on appeal is whether the Industrial 
Commission had subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s 
claim.  At present, whether the Commission has subject matter 
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s case depends on whether a contract 
for employment was consummated in North Carolina pursuant to 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97–36.  See Parker v. Thompson–Arthur Paving 
Co., 100 N.C. App. 367, 369, 396 S.E.2d 626, 628 (1990) (“The 
jurisdiction 
of 
the 
Industrial 
Commission 
is 
limited 
by 
statute.”).  Plaintiff argues that (i) because U.S. Foods’s 
Charlotte division approved Plaintiff’s transfer to oversight by 
the Charlotte division from the Columbia division, Plaintiff’s 
-8- 
 
 
contract was modified and (ii) because the “last act” of 
approving the modification occurred in Charlotte, the contract 
of employment was made in North Carolina. 
“Appellate 
review 
of 
an 
award 
from 
the 
Industrial 
Commission is generally limited to two issues: (i) whether the 
findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, and (ii) 
whether the conclusions of law are justified by the findings of 
fact.”  Chambers v. Transit Mgmt., 360 N.C. 609, 611, 636 S.E.2d 
553, 555 (2006).  “However, as to a jurisdictional question, 
this Court is not bound by the findings of fact of the lower 
tribunal.  This Court has the duty to make its own independent 
facts as to jurisdiction.”  Lentz v. Phil’s Toy Store, ___ N.C. 
App. ___, ___, 747 S.E.2d 127, 130 (2013); see also Lucas v. 
Li’l Gen. Stores, 289 N.C. 212, 218, 221 S.E.2d 257, 261 (1976). 
The 
Commission 
concluded 
as 
a 
matter 
of 
law 
that 
Plaintiff’s contract was not modified and that the last act 
necessary to create Plaintiff’s original contract was made out 
of state, depriving the Industrial Commission of subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s case.  “Conclusions of law by 
the Industrial Commission are reviewable de novo by this Court.”  
Bond v. Foster Masonry, Inc., 139 N.C. App. 123, 127, 532 S.E.2d 
583, 585 (2000).  “Under a de novo review, the court considers 
-9- 
 
 
the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that 
of the lower tribunal.”  Craig v. New Hanover Cnty. Bd. of 
Educ., 363 N.C. 334, 337, 678 S.E.2d 351, 354 (2009) (quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  
III. Analysis 
a. Contract Modification Under Section 97-36 
A contract modification is not explicitly referenced in 
Section 97-36, which grants the Commission subject matter 
jurisdiction over certain accidents that occur out of state.  
N.C. Gen. § 97-36 provides 
[w]here 
an 
accident 
happens 
while 
the 
employee is employed elsewhere than in this 
State and the accident is one which would 
entitle him or his dependents or next of kin 
to compensation if it had happened in this 
State, then the employee or his dependents 
or 
next 
of 
kin 
shall 
be 
entitled 
to 
compensation 
(i) 
if 
the 
contract 
of 
employment was made in this State.1 
 
Plaintiff argues that common law rules concerning modifications 
of contract apply.  See Lineberry v. Town of Mebane, 219 N.C. 
257, 258, 13 S.E.2d 429, 430 (1941) (“The common law, to the 
extent therein provided, is modified.  Except as so modified it 
still prevails.”); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 4-1 (2013) (declaring 
                     
1 Plaintiff does not raise the other two provisions of the 
jurisdiction-granting 
statute, 
namely 
that 
U.S. 
Foods’s 
principal place of business is in North Carolina or that 
Plaintiff’s principal place of employment is in North Carolina. 
-10- 
 
 
portions of the common law not in conflict with the general 
statutes remain in full force).   
We agree with Plaintiff and have consistently applied 
common law rules of contract to claims filed under the Workers’ 
Compensation Act.  See, e.g., Hollowell v. N.C. Dep’t of 
Conservation & Devel., 206 N.C. 206, 208, 173 S.E. 603, 604 
(1934); Hojnacki v. Last Rebel Trucking, Inc., 201 N.C. App. 
726, 689 S.E.2d 601, 2010 WL 10963 at *3–4 (2010) (unpublished) 
(applying common law principles of contract law, such as offer 
and acceptance, to a claim filed under the Workers’ Compensation 
Act). 
This Court has held that a lapse in employment and 
subsequent re-hiring via a “last act” made in North Carolina 
created a contract that was “made” in North Carolina for 
jurisdictional purposes under Section 97-36.  Baker v. Chizek 
Transp., Inc., 210 N.C. App. 490, 711 S.E.2d 207, 2011 WL 904271 
at *4–5 (2011) (unpublished).  Similarly, under the common law 
of contracts, a modification to the terms of a contract may 
create a new underlying contract that was “made” in North 
Carolina.  See, e.g., Spartan Leasing Inc. v. Pollard, 101 N.C. 
App. 450, 457, 400 S.E.2d 476, 480 (1991) (holding that an 
-11- 
 
 
addendum letter was a new contract because it modified a prior 
lease agreement). 
Section 
97-36 
also 
employs 
the 
phrase 
“employment 
contract,” which encompasses a broader scope of employment than 
“contract of hire,” a phrase that covers only the initial hiring 
of an individual.  Compare N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-36 with N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 97-2(2) (2013) (using “contract of hire”).  This 
broader expanse includes a contract modification, providing a 
basis for a contract being “made” in North Carolina under 
Section 97-36. 
The dissent cites 
Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law 
§ 143.03(4) (2011) for the proposition that when “a contract has 
achieved an identifiable situs, that situs is not changed merely 
because the contract is modified in another state.”  While we 
acknowledge that Larson’s is a learned treatise in this field, 
we must construe Section 97-36 using the long-standing canons of 
construction in this state which require a plain language 
approach to interpreting Section 97-36. 
This Court’s precedent identifies that a modified contract 
containing the required formation elements is a new contract.  
See, e.g., NRC Golf Course, LLC v. JMR Golf, LLC, ___ N.C. App. 
___, ___, 731 S.E.2d 474, 480 (2012) (“Parties to a contract may 
-12- 
 
 
agree to change its terms; but the new agreement, to be 
effective, must contain the elements necessary to the formation 
of a contract.” (emphasis added)).  Like other newly formed 
contracts, a modified contract may be made in this state.   
The General Assembly crafted Section 97-36 with a full view 
that 
the 
phrase 
“employment 
contract” 
contemplated 
both 
contracts of hire as well as modifications of existing contracts 
which, by long-standing precedent, are new agreements.  See id.; 
compare N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-36 with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(2) 
(using “contract of hire”).  As such, we do not interject our 
own view of the legislature’s intended meaning and instead apply 
existing precedent and the plain language of Section 97-36 to 
this question of first impression.  See Correll v. Div. of Soc. 
Servs., 332 N.C. 141, 144, 418 S.E.2d 232, 235 (1992) (“The 
legislative purpose of a statute is first ascertained by 
examining the statute’s plain language.”). 
Further, while the Larson’s passage cites other state court 
decisions for the notion that a situs is not changed by contract 
modification, other jurisdictions have recognized explicitly 
that 
a 
contract 
modified 
within 
state 
borders 
confers 
jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Kilburn v. Grande Corp., 287 F.2d 371, 
373–74 (5th Cir. 1961) (holding that Louisiana had jurisdiction 
-13- 
 
 
over a modified contract of employment where the original 
employment 
contract 
was 
formed 
in 
Texas, 
but 
additional 
consideration for employment was negotiated in Louisiana); Kuzel 
v. Aetna Ins. Co., 650 S.W.2d 193, 195–96 (Tex. App. 1983) 
(holding Maryland had jurisdiction where the original contract 
of hire was formed in Texas, but a later contract modification 
was agreed to in Maryland). 
The Commission held that modification of an existing 
contract does not fall within the scope of a contract “made” in 
Section 97-36.  The lack of a bar against such use, this Court’s 
precedents recognizing common law contract principles, and use 
of the phrase “employment contract” in Section 97-36 require a 
different result.   Accordingly, a modification of an employment 
contract may be a proper basis to find a contract is “made” 
within North Carolina under Section 97-36.   
b. Whether Plaintiff’s Contract was Modified 
Our next inquiry is whether Plaintiff’s contract was 
actually modified under common law contract principles.  The 
same tests for formation of contract apply to whether a modified 
contract is enforceable.  NRC Golf Course, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 
731 S.E.2d at 480 (“Parties to a contract may agree to change 
its terms; but the new agreement, to be effective, must contain 
-14- 
 
 
the elements necessary to the formation of a contract.” 
(quotation marks and citation omitted)); Corbin v. Langdon, 23 
N.C. App. 21, 26, 208 S.E.2d 251, 254 (1974).  The three 
requisite elements to form an enforceable contract are offer, 
acceptance, and consideration.  Cap Care Grp., Inc. v. McDonald, 
149 
N.C. 
App. 
817, 
822, 
561 
S.E.2d 
578, 
582 
(2002).  
Consequently, we must consider whether each element exists to 
determine whether a modified employment contract was formed 
between Plaintiff and U.S. Foods. 
“It is essential to the formation of any contract that 
there be mutual assent of both parties to the terms of the 
agreement so as to establish a meeting of the minds.”  Harrison 
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 170 N.C. App. 545, 550, 613 S.E.2d 
322, 327 (2005) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also 
Wooten v. S.R. Biggs Drug Co., 169 N.C. 64, 68, 85 S.E. 140, 142 
(1915) (holding that “the one thing without which a contract 
cannot be made . . . is the assent of the parties to the 
agreement, 
the 
meeting 
of 
the 
minds 
upon 
a 
definite 
proposition”).  As such, a contract modification must also have 
an offer of modified terms and acceptance on those terms.  
Corbin, 23 N.C. App. at 26, 208 S.E.2d at 255.  At-will 
contracts may also be modified by the parties to form a new 
-15- 
 
 
contract.  Arndt v. First Union Nat. Bank, 170 N.C. App. 518, 
526, 613 S.E.2d 274, 280 (2005) (“The employer, in an at will 
relationship, can modify, unilaterally the future compensation 
to be paid to an employee.  If the employer modifies the terms 
of an [employee] at will; and, the employee knows of the change, 
the employee is deemed to have acquiesced to the modified terms, 
if he continues the employment relationship.”). 
Here, Mr. Abernathy testified that the company met with 
displaced drivers after its merger with PYA Monarch.  Mr. 
Abernathy said the company offered its displaced drivers jobs 
with the subsuming branches.  U.S. Foods extended its offer for 
its employees to transfer branches at a company safety meeting 
in Charlotte.  The alternative to transferring branches was to 
receive a severance package from U.S. Foods.  Thus, Plaintiff 
had a choice: he could accept a transfer or he could cease 
employment and receive a severance package.  This fundamental 
choice qualifies as a new offer under the traditional definition 
of a contract.   
Plaintiff accepted the offer.  At the Charlotte meeting 
where his new terms of employment were proposed, Plaintiff 
negotiated the details of his transfer with his supervisor.  
Specifically, Plaintiff requested that his trailers be dropped 
-16- 
 
 
near his home in Augusta.  Plaintiff also completed paperwork at 
the Charlotte safety meeting to accept the transfer, although 
U.S. Foods’s Charlotte human resources department had to approve 
the transfer before it was “official.”  From the foregoing, it 
is clear Plaintiff accepted a new offer modifying his existing 
at-will employment agreement. 
Finally, there must also be consideration in support of the 
modified contract.  Clifford v. River Bend Plantation, Inc., 312 
N.C. 460, 466, 323 S.E.2d 23, 27 (1984) (“It is established law 
that an agreement to modify the terms of a contract must be 
based on new consideration or on evidence that one party 
intentionally induced the other party’s detrimental reliance.” 
(citation 
and 
quotation 
marks 
omitted)). 
 
“Consideration 
sufficient enough to support a contract consists of any benefit, 
right, 
or 
interest 
bestowed 
upon 
the 
promisor, 
or 
any 
forbearance, detriment, or loss undertaken by the promisee.”  
Fairfield Harbour Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Midsouth Golf, 
LLC, 215 N.C. App. 66, 75, 715 S.E.2d 273, 282 (2011) (quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  This Court does not typically 
consider 
the 
adequacy 
of 
consideration, 
as 
“inadequate 
consideration, as opposed to the lack of consideration, is not 
sufficient grounds to invalidate a contract. In order to defeat 
-17- 
 
 
a contract for failure of consideration, the failure of 
consideration must be complete and total.”  Harllee v. Harllee, 
151 N.C. App. 40, 49, 565 S.E.2d 678, 683 (2002) (citations 
omitted).  Paying wages for labor constitutes consideration, and 
a change in the form of payment has been found to be sufficient 
consideration to form a contract.  Clyde Rudd & Associates, Inc. 
v. Taylor, 29 N.C. App. 679, 682, 225 S.E.2d 602, 604 (1976) 
(holding that a change in the method of compensation met the 
consideration requirement of contract formation). 
Here, when Plaintiff transferred to the Charlotte division, 
he transferred from a weight-based compensation system to a 
component pay system.  This was a change in the method of 
compensation and ultimately netted Plaintiff an increase in pay.  
After transferring, Plaintiff’s earnings increased.  As such, a 
valuable benefit was conferred between both sides: U.S. Foods 
retained Plaintiff as an employee, Plaintiff retained a position 
driving trucks for U.S. Foods, and Plaintiff received increased 
pay as a result of the transfer.   
As all three elements existed, a valid contract was formed 
between the parties via the modification of their previous 
employment contract.  As a result, we must now consider whether 
the contract was “made” in North Carolina for purposes of 
-18- 
 
 
Section 97-36.  For that inquiry, we turn to the “Last Act” 
analysis. 
c. “Last Act” Analysis 
Section 97-36 ultimately grants the Commission jurisdiction 
only if the contract was “made” in North Carolina.  To determine 
where a contract for employment was made, the Commission and 
North Carolina courts apply the “last act” test.  Murray v. 
Ahlstrom Indus. Holdings, Inc., 131 N.C. App. 294, 296, 506 
S.E.2d 724, 726 (1998).  The “last act” test provides that “for 
a contract to be made in North Carolina, the final act necessary 
to make it a binding obligation must be done here.”  Id. 
(citation and quotation marks omitted). 
In Murray, the plaintiff was initially hired at a plant in 
Tennessee, was laid off, and then was called at his North 
Carolina residence with an offer to work in Mississippi.  Id. at 
295, 506 S.E.2d at 725.  Negotiations took place via telephone 
and the plaintiff accepted the offer while in North Carolina.  
Id.  This Court held the last requisite act to form the binding 
employment contract occurred while the plaintiff was in North 
Carolina and that the Commission had jurisdiction to hear the 
plaintiff’s workers’ compensation claim.  Id. at 297, 506 S.E.2d 
at 726. 
-19- 
 
 
Similar facts exist here.  Plaintiff was offered and 
accepted a transfer with a different pay structure.  Plaintiff 
filled out paperwork to that effect at a safety meeting in 
Charlotte.  The transfer was explicitly described as not “final” 
or “official” unless approved by U.S. Foods’s human resources 
department in Charlotte.  Two signatures from human resources 
officers were provided in Charlotte to approve the transfer.  As 
such, the last act to make the transfer binding occurred in 
Charlotte, where Plaintiff completed his transfer paperwork and 
where final approval by U.S. Foods’s human resources department 
was provided. 
IV. Conclusion 
Because we hold that Plaintiff and U.S. Foods modified 
Plaintiff’s contract and that the final binding act occurred in 
North Carolina, we hold that Section 97–36 extends subject 
matter jurisdiction to Plaintiff’s claim.  As such, the opinion 
and award of the Industrial Commission is 
Reversed and remanded for rehearing. 
Judge STROUD concurs. 
Judge 
DILLON 
dissents 
in 
a 
separate 
opinion.
 
NO. COA13-860 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 1 April 2014 
 
 
VINCENT BURLEY 
 
Employee, Plaintiff 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
From the North Carolina 
Industrial Commission 
I.C. No. X52202 
U.S. FOODS, INC., Employer and 
INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
NORTH AMERICA, Carrier 
 
     And 
 
GALLAGHER BASSETT SERVICES, INC., 
Third Party Administrators, 
 
Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
DILLON, Judge, dissenting. 
 
 
In 2000, Plaintiff Vincent Burley (“Employee”), a Georgia 
resident, entered into a contract of employment in South 
Carolina with Defendant U.S. Foods, Inc., (“Employer”), an 
Illinois-based company, to work as a truck driver.  Employee was 
injured as the result of a work-related accident which occurred 
in Georgia in 2009.  Employee filed this action seeking workers’ 
compensation benefits in North Carolina; however, the Commission 
denied the claim, determining that it lacked jurisdiction to 
make an award.  The sole statutory basis which Employee argues 
-2- 
 
 
on appeal gives the Commission jurisdiction over his claim is 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-36(i), which provides jurisdiction for out-
of-state accidents where “the contract of employment was made in 
this State[.]”  Specifically, Employee argues he agreed to a 
modification to his contract of employment while attending a 
business 
meeting 
in 
Charlotte 
in 
2002, 
and 
that 
this 
modification constituted a “contract of employment . . . made in 
this State[.]”  See id.  However, I disagree that this 
modification was sufficient to change the contract’s situs from 
South Carolina to North Carolina; and, therefore, I would affirm 
the Commission’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction in this 
matter.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
Employee was initially assigned to Employer’s Columbia, 
South Carolina drop-yard.  In 2002, Employer merged with another 
company, which resulted in the closing of Employer’s Columbia 
drop-yard.  However, Employee’s employment was never severed.  
Rather, the parties came to an agreement during a meeting in 
Charlotte whereby oversight of his job was transferred to 
Employer’s 
Charlotte 
division 
and 
his 
compensation 
was 
increased.  As the majority points out, though, Employee’s “job 
title and responsibilities did not change.” 
-3- 
 
 
As the majority notes, whether an out-of-state employment 
contract modified in this State constitutes a “contract of 
employment . . . made in this State” for purposes of conferring 
jurisdiction in the Commission under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-36(i) 
for an out-of-state accident has never been directly addressed 
by a North Carolina appellate court. (Emphasis added.)  I 
believe that, for purposes of conferring jurisdiction for an 
out-of-state accident based on where the contract of employment 
was “made[,]” the General Assembly intended that only one state 
be considered an employment contract’s situs, namely, where the 
contract “was made[,]” and not also be every state where the 
contract might have been “modified” over the course of an 
employee’s tenure.2  I believe that if the General Assembly had 
intended to include states where contracts of employment were 
                     
2 The scope of my dissent is based on the facts of this 
case.  I recognize that there could be situations where a 
modification may be so significant that it could be deemed that 
a new contract of employment was “made[,]” thereby changing the 
situs of the employment contract.  For example, in this case had 
Employee accepted an offer to move to Employer’s Illinois 
headquarters to manage one of its divisions, it might be said 
that – for purposes of conferring jurisdiction under N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 97-36(i) - the parties “made” a new contract of 
employment.  However, I do not believe the changes that were 
actually made at the Charlotte meeting to Employee’s contract – 
where he remained employed and his role did not fundamentally 
change – rise to the level of making of new contract of 
employment. 
 
-4- 
 
 
also modified, and not simply made, within the jurisdictional 
reach of the Commission, it could have so provided by including 
the phrase “or modified” in the language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 
97-36(i).  “Once a contract has achieved an identifiable situs, 
that situs is not changed merely because the contract is 
modified in another state[.]”  Larson’s Workers’ Compensation 
Law § 143.03[4] (2013) (citing Crawford v. Trans World Airline, 
27 N.J. Super. 567, 99 A.2d 673 (1953); Tobin v. Rouse, 118 Vt. 
40, 
99 
A.2d 
617 
(1953); 
United 
Airlines 
v. 
Industrial 
Commission, 96 Ill. 2d 126, 449 N.E.2d 119 (1983)).3 
Following the majority’s reasoning, the Commission gains 
jurisdiction over an out-of-state contract of employment if the 
modification of any contract term is agreed to by one of the 
parties while that party happens to be in North Carolina; and, 
further, the Commission loses jurisdiction over a contract of 
employment made in North Carolina if the modification of any 
term of that North Carolina contract is agreed to by one of the 
parties while that party happens to be in another state.  I 
                     
3  
Though an opinion stated in Larsons’ is not binding 
authority on this Court, this treatise has been cited with 
approval by our courts on a number of occasions, see, e.g., Shaw 
v. U.S. Airways, 362 N.C. 457, 461, 665 S.E.2d 449, 452 (2008); 
Gore v. Myrtle/Mueller, 362 N.C. 27, 36, 683 S.E.2d 404, 406-07 
(2007); Taft v. Brinley’s, __ N.C. App. __, __, 738 S.E.2d 741, 
744-45 (2013); and I find the above-quoted statement contained 
in Larsons’ concerning the issue in this case to be persuasive. 
-5- 
 
 
disagree with this reasoning and do not believe that our General 
Assembly intended that - for purposes of conferring jurisdiction 
based on contracts of employment “made” - a contract of 
employment is deemed made, not where the employer-employee 
relationship is established, but rather where any term of the 
employment agreement is last modified.  Accordingly, I would 
vote to affirm the decision of the Commission that it lacked 
jurisdiction to award benefits to Employee.