Title: State v. Gilley

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

1 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 99,156 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
DEANNA GILLEY, 
Appellee. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
The interpretation of statutes is a question of law over which an appellate court exercises 
unlimited review.  When courts are called upon to interpret statutes, the fundamental rule 
governing that interpretation is that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be 
ascertained.  The legislature is presumed to have expressed its intent through the language of the 
statutory scheme it enacted.  For this reason, when the language of a statute is plain and 
unambiguous, courts need not resort to statutory construction.  Instead, an appellate court is 
bound to implement the legislature's expressed intent.  Only where the face of the statute leaves 
its construction uncertain may the court look to the historical background of the enactment, the 
circumstances attending its passage, the purpose to be accomplished, and the effect the statute 
may have under the various constructions suggested. 
 
2. 
K.S.A. 21-3710(b)(4) mandates 45 days' imprisonment when a defendant is convicted of 
a third or subsequent forgery offense.  By elevating the mandatory minimum sentence given in 
such cases, the legislature has enhanced the applicable penalties for the underlying forgery 
conviction. 
 
3. 
When a defendant's prior forgery convictions are used to increase the mandatory 
minimum sentence for the crime of conviction in the progressive sentencing scheme in K.S.A. 
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21-3710(b)(4), enhancing the applicable penalty for the primary forgery offense, the plain 
language of K.S.A. 21-4710(d)(11) precludes those prior convictions from being used to 
calculate the defendant's criminal history score in the same case. 
 
4. 
K.S.A. 21-3710(b) references the number of forgery convictions of a particular 
defendant; the statute makes no reference to prior forgery convictions.  Because K.S.A. 21-
3710(b) does not limit progressive sentencing to prior forgery convictions but rather focuses on 
the number of forgery convictions committed by a defendant, any forgery conviction can be used 
to heighten the defendant's conditions of probation. 
 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed December 19, 2008.  
Appeal from Reno district court; TIMOTHY J. CHAMBERS, judge.  Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the 
district court is reversed.  Judgment of the district court is affirmed.  Opinion filed January 22, 2010. 
 
Amanda G. Voth, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Thomas R. Stanton, deputy district 
attorney, Keith E. Schroeder, district attorney, and Steve Six, attorney general, were on the brief for appellant. 
 
Janine Cox, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
 
DAVIS, C.J.:  Deanna Gilley was convicted of three counts for forgery.  Relying on two 
prior forgery convictions, the district court sentenced her for a third forgery conviction under the 
progressive sentencing scheme set forth in K.S.A. 21-3710(b)(4), which requires 45 days' 
imprisonment as a condition of probation and a fine that is the lesser of the amount of the forged 
instrument or $2,500.  The defendant successfully objected to a criminal history being category 
E.  The court modified her criminal history to category G based upon the provisions of K.S.A. 
21-4710(d)(11), stating that "[p]rior convictions of any crime shall not be counted . . . if they 
enhance the . . . applicable penalties."  The Court of Appeals vacated her sentence and remanded 
the case for imposition of sentence with a criminal history of E. We granted defendant's petition 
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for review, reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, and affirm the judgment of the district 
court.  
 
FACTS 
 
 
Upon complaint filed in Reno County in case No. 07 CR 297, Gilley was charged with 
three  counts of forgery under the provisions of K.S.A. 21-3710(a)(1).  Pursuant to a plea 
agreement and on June 28, 2007, defendant entered a plea of no contest to Counts 1, 2, and 3.  
There is no mention in the charging document of K.S.A. 21-3710(b), which sets forth the 
progressive sentencing scheme for a first forgery conviction, a second forgery conviction, and a 
third or subsequent forgery conviction.  The record establishes that defendant did not object to 
the charges in the complaint.  Nor has the defendant raised any concern with the charging 
document, and we therefore do not address any issue dealing with the complaint filed. 
 
 
It is apparent from the record that the State, the defendant, and the district court treated 
each of the three counts in the complaint as a third forgery conviction, requiring the defendant 
"to serve at least 45 days' imprisonment as a condition of probation, and a fine the lesser of the 
amount of the forged instrument or $2,500."  K.S.A. 21-3710(b)(4).  The presentence 
investigation report reflects this fact, as well as the journal entry of sentence for the three counts 
of forgery.  In addition, the transcript of the sentencing hearing specifies that each count was 
considered as a third forgery conviction.  The sentence for each count was imposed to run 
concurrently.  
 
 
The defendant had three prior forgery convictions in case No. 06 CR 678 on December 1, 
2006.  Based upon her current forgery convictions and her three prior felony forgery convictions, 
the presentence investigation report identified her criminal history as category E based upon 
counting four nonperson felony forgery convictions.  The defendant objected, claiming that two 
of her 2006 forgery convictions were used to elevate Count 1 in her present case to a third 
forgery conviction under K.S.A. 21-3710(b)(4).  Thus, according to her argument, these two 
prior forgery convictions could not be counted in her criminal history under K.S.A. 21-
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4710(d)(11) because the two prior convictions served to enhance the penalty under Count 1 by 
requiring a mandatory 45 days in jail as a condition of her probation.  
 
 
The district court agreed and modified her criminal history from category E (three or 
more nonperson felonies) to category G (one nonperson felony).  The trial court rejected the 
State's argument that the mandatory 45 days in jail as a condition of probation did not enhance 
the penalty under Count 1 and also rejected the argument that her present three forgery 
convictions could serve as a justification for treating her convictions in the present case as third 
or subsequent convictions.   
 
 
On the State's appeal, the Court of Appeals determined that Gilley's three forgery 
convictions were sufficient to warrant the district court sentencing her as a person with a third 
forgery conviction, thereby making all three of her prior forgery convictions in case No. 06 CR 
678 available for use in computing her criminal history: 
  
"Here, a third conviction existed at the time Gilley was sentenced in No. 07CR297 
simply due to the three counts of forgery contained therein, to which Gilley pled guilty.  The 
district court, by virtue of those three convictions, was required to sentence Gilley to the 45-day 
imprisonment term as a condition of her probation.  Gilley's criminal history at the time of 
sentencing on No. 07CR297 should have included the three prior forgeries because none of those 
convictions were used to impose the mandatory jail term."  Gilley, slip op. at 4. 
 
Thus, the Court of Appeals vacated her sentence and remanded the case with directions 
that defendant be resentenced with a criminal history of E (three or more nonperson felonies).  
Gilley, slip op. at 4-5.  Because the Court of Appeals reversed on this issue, it found it 
unnecessary to consider the State's argument that the 45-day term of imprisonment as a condition 
of Gilley's probation did not constitute an enhancement of the penalty under K.S.A. 21-
4710(d)(11).  Gilley, slip op. at 5. 
 
We granted Gilley's petition for review wherein she claims that the trial court properly 
determined her criminal history was category G.  Her claim incorporates three questions:  (1)  
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Did Gilley's three current forgery convictions in case No. 07 CR 297 provide a basis for treating 
her forgery conviction in Count 1 as a third conviction; (2) did the use of a conviction for both 
the purposes of the progressive sentencing scheme under K.S.A. 21-3710(b) and the calculation 
of a defendant's criminal history violate K.S.A. 21-4710(d)(11); and (3) did the trial court err in 
setting defendant's criminal history as category G?  Gilley's case was heard concurrently with 
State v. Arnett, (No. 99,508, this day decided), because both cases raise the same questions for 
our review. 
 
(1) DID DEFENDANT'S THREE CURRENT FORGERY CONVICTIONS IN CASE NO. 07 CR 297 PROVIDE A 
BASIS FOR TREATING HER FORGERY CONVICTION IN COUNT 1 AS A THIRD CONVICTION? 
 
 
The defendant was charged with three counts of forgery under K.S.A. 21-3710(a).  As 
noted above, there was no indication in the complaint whether the three counts were charged as 
third offenses under the progressive sentencing scheme set forth in K.S.A. 21-3710(b)(4).  
However, we are able to determine from the record as a whole that Count 1 in the complaint was 
treated as a third conviction based upon defendant's plea to the charge.  While not crystal clear, it 
appears that all three of the charges were treated as third convictions upon defendant's plea to all 
charges in the complaint.  
 
 
It is clear from the record that when the defendant entered her plea to Count 1 of the 
complaint, the two remaining counts were criminal charges, not criminal forgery convictions.  
Thus, the remaining two charges could not serve as a basis for making defendant's plea to Count 
1 a third conviction under K.S.A. 21-3710(b)(4).  We conclude that defendant's three forgery 
convictions in the present complaint under the facts of this case could not serve as a basis for her 
plea to Count 1 being a third conviction under K.SA. 21-3710(b)(4).  
 
(2) DID THE USE OF A CONVICTION FOR BOTH THE PURPOSES OF THE PROGRESSIVE 
SENTENCING SCHEME UNDER K.S.A. 21-3710(b) AND THE CALCULATION OF A 
DEFENDANT'S CRIMINAL HISTORY VIOLATE K.S.A. 21-4710(d)(11)? 
 
 
Based upon our resolution above, there existed three prior forgery convictions of the 
defendant that the court could use to sentence her for a third conviction under Count 1 in case 
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No. 07 CR 297 for a third forgery conviction under the provisions of K.S.A. 21-3710(b)(4).  The 
record clearly establishes that the trial court utilized two of her prior forgery convictions for the 
purpose of establishing that defendant's plea to Count 1 resulted in a third conviction under 
K.S.A. 21-3710(b)(4).  The question arises whether the two prior forgery convictions enhance 
the penalty for the defendant's conviction of Count 1 under K.S.A. 21-4710(d)(11) and therefore 
could not be included in defendant's criminal history.  
 
This case calls on us to interpret two statutes:  K.S.A. 21-3710(b) and K.S.A. 21-
4710(d)(11).  K.S.A. 21-3710 defines the crime of forgery under Kansas law.  K.S.A. 21-
3710(b)(1) states that "[f]orgery is a severity level 8, nonperson felony."  K.S.A. 21-3710(b)(2) 
through (b)(5) define a progressive sentencing scheme based on the number of forgery 
convictions that a particular person may have incurred.  Those sections provide: 
 
 
"(2)   On a first conviction of a violation of this section, in addition to any other sentence 
imposed, a person shall be fined the lesser of the amount of the forged instrument or $500.  
 
 
"(3)   On a second conviction of a violation of this section, a person shall be required to 
serve at least 30 days' imprisonment as a condition of probation, and fined the lesser of the amount 
of the forged instrument or $1,000.  
 
 
"(4)   On a third or subsequent conviction of a violation of this section, a person shall be 
required to serve at least 45 days' imprisonment as a condition of probation, and fined the lesser of 
the amount of the forged instrument or $2,500.  
 
 
"(5)   The person convicted shall not be eligible for release on probation, suspension or 
reduction of sentence or parole until the person has served the mandatory sentence as provided 
herein."  K.S.A. 21-3710(b)(2)-(5). 
 
Gilley was sentenced under K.S.A. 21-3710(b)(4), which requires as a condition of 
probation a minimum of 45 days in prison and a fine in the lesser amount of either the forged 
instrument or $2,500. 
 
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K.S.A. 21-4710, which defines a defendant's criminal history for purposes of the Kansas 
sentencing grid, provides in relevant part: 
 
 
"Prior convictions of any crime shall not be counted in determining the criminal history 
category if they enhance the severity level or applicable penalties . . . .  Except as otherwise 
provided, all other prior convictions will be considered and scored."  (Emphasis added.)  K.S.A. 
21-4710(d)(11). 
 
K.S.A. 21-4710(a) defines "prior convictions" as  
 
"any conviction, other than another count in the current case which was brought in the same 
information or complaint or which was joined for trial with other counts in the current case 
pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3203 and amendments thereto, which occurred prior to sentencing in the 
current case regardless of whether the offense that led to the prior conviction occurred before or 
after the current offense or the conviction in the current case."   
 
See State v. Ruiz-Reyes, 285 Kan. 650, 655-56, 175 P.3d 849 (2008) (discussing this provision 
and noting that it explicitly states that previous convictions finalized after a crime is committed 
but before sentencing for that crime may be used to determine criminal history).   
 
It is clear from these provisions that in both of the cases now subject to review, the three 
forgery convictions obtained in each of those cases cannot be used to calculate criminal history 
since they all constitute other "count[s] in the current case . . . brought in the same information or 
complaint."  K.S.A. 21-4710(a).  Likewise, K.S.A. 21-3710(b)(1) states that no matter how many 
forgeries a person commits, the crime of forgery is always a severity level 8 nonperson felony.  
Thus, the question before us today is whether the progressive sentencing scheme in K.S.A. 21-
3710(b) enhances the "applicable penalties" for the underlying forgery offense.  K.S.A. 21-
4710(d)(11).   
 
Standard of Review 
 
The question before us turns on our interpretation of statutes—a question of law over 
which an appellate court exercises unlimited review.  State v. Walker, 280 Kan. 513, 515, 124 
8 
P.3d 39 (2005).  When courts are called upon to interpret statutes, the fundamental rule 
governing that interpretation is that "the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be 
ascertained.  The legislature is presumed to have expressed its intent through the language of the 
statutory scheme it enacted."  State ex rel. Stovall v. Meneley, 271 Kan. 355, 378, 22 P.3d 124 
(2001).  For this reason, when the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, courts "need 
not resort to statutory construction."  In re K.M.H., 285 Kan. 53, 79, 169 P.3d 1025 (2007), cert. 
denied 172 L. Ed. 2d 239 (2008).  Instead, "an appellate court is bound to implement the 
[legislature's] expressed intent."  State v. Manbeck, 277 Kan. 224, Syl. ¶ 3, 83 P.3d 190 (2004).  
Only where "the face of the statute leaves its construction uncertain, [may] the court . . . look to 
the historical background of the enactment, the circumstances attending its passage, the purpose 
to be accomplished, and the effect the statute may have under the various constructions 
suggested.  [Citation omitted.]"  Robinett v. The Haskell Co., 270 Kan. 95, 100-01, 12 P.3d 411 
(2000).  
 
Analysis 
 
According to Gilley, the plain language of K.S.A. 21-4710(d)(11) requires this court to 
interpret the 45-day period of imprisonment required in the case of a third or subsequent felony 
by K.S.A. 21-3710(b)(4) as an enhancement of the applicable penalties for the forgery offense 
because it raises the minimum penalties that shall be given from no period of imprisonment to a 
45-day prison term. 
 
The State argues that the same conviction may be used to define a sentence under K.S.A. 
21-3710(b) and to calculate a defendant's criminal history score because the progressive 
sentences in K.S.A. 21-3710(b)(2)-(4) do not enhance applicable penalties.  In particular, the 
State argues that the 45-day period of imprisonment in K.S.A. 21-3710(b)(4) falls well within the 
range of probation conditions defined in K.S.A. 21-4602(c) and thus cannot enhance applicable 
penalties. 
 
K.S.A. 21-3710(b)(4) states that defendants convicted of a third or subsequent forgery 
violation "shall be required to serve at least 45 days' imprisonment as a condition of probation" 
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and "fined the lesser of the amount of the forged instrument or $2,500."  K.S.A. 21-4602(c) 
explains that "[i]n felony cases, the court may include confinement in a county jail not to exceed 
60 days, which need not be served consecutively, as a condition of an original probation 
sentence."  The State argues that because K.S.A. 21-4602(c) gives district courts discretion to 
include up to 60 days in jail as a condition of probation in any felony case and because forgery 
(as a severity level 8 nonperson felony) always involves presumptive probation, it cannot be said 
that K.S.A. 21-3710(b)(4)—which makes mandatory 45 days' imprisonment as a condition of 
probation—enhances the applicable penalties for the crime of forgery. 
 
We disagree.  While a district court has discretion to require up to 60 days in jail as a 
condition of a defendant's probation,  K.S.A. 21-3710(b)(4) mandates 45 days' imprisonment 
when a defendant is convicted of a third or subsequent forgery offense.  By elevating the 
mandatory minimum sentence given in such cases, the legislature has enhanced the applicable 
penalties for the underlying forgery conviction.  See State v. Luttig, 40 Kan. App. 2d 1095, 1098-
99, 199 P.3d 793 (2009); cf. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 267, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621, 125 
S. Ct. 738 (2005) (Breyer, J., writing for majority in a bifurcated opinion) (mandatory minimum 
sentences based on criminal history with no provision for durational departure elevate sentences 
beyond that authorized by a jury verdict). 
 
We hold that when a defendant's prior forgery convictions are used to increase the 
mandatory minimum sentence for the crime of conviction in the progressive sentencing scheme 
in K.S.A. 21-3710(b)(4), enhancing the applicable penalty for the primary forgery offense, the 
plain language of K.S.A. 21-4710(d)(11) precludes those prior convictions from being used to 
calculate the defendant's criminal history score in the same case. 
 
(3) DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN SETTING DEFENDANT'S CRIMINAL HISTORY AS CATEGORY G? 
 
 
In the case before us, Gilley was convicted of three counts of forgery based on the same 
complaint or information, and she had been convicted of forgery three previous times.  If Gilley's 
three current forgery convictions triggered the 45 days of imprisonment as a condition of her 
probation (as required by K.S.A. 21-3710[b][4]), then all of her previous forgery convictions 
10 
could be used to calculate her criminal history.  The Court of Appeals came to this conclusion in 
its decision in this case.  Gilley, slip op. at 4. 
 
The progressive sentencing scheme for forgery convictions does not make any reference 
to "prior convictions."  Compare K.S.A. 21-3710(b) (referencing a "first conviction," "second 
conviction," and "third or subsequent conviction") with K.S.A. 21-4710(a) (defining "prior 
conviction" as any conviction other than that included in the same information or complaint or 
joined for trial).  Instead, K.S.A. 21-3710(b) simply references the number of forgery convictions 
of a particular defendant. 
 
Because K.S.A. 21-3710(b) does not limit progressive sentencing to prior forgery 
convictions but rather focuses on the number of forgery convictions incurred by a defendant, any 
forgery conviction can be used to heighten the defendant's conditions of probation.  Had the 
district court treated Gilley's Count 1 as a first conviction, Count 2 as a second conviction, and 
Count 3 as a third conviction under the provisions of K.S.A. 21-3710(b), all three prior forgery 
convictions would have been available to be counted for criminal history purposes.  
 
Instead, as the record clearly establishes, Gilley's plea to Count 1 was treated as a third 
forgery conviction under K.S.A. 21-3710(b)(4).  At the time she entered her plea to Count 1, she 
was charged with two additional counts of forgery in the same complaint, but these charges were 
not convictions.  Thus, the district court could not rely upon such charges but only upon prior 
forgery convictions to establish a third conviction for Count 1 in the present case.  The district 
court properly relied upon two of Gilley's 2006 forgery convictions.  The plain language of 
K.S.A. 21-4710(d)(11) precludes those prior convictions from being used to calculate the 
defendant's criminal history score.   There was no error by the district court. 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the district court is reversed.  The 
judgment of the Reno County District Court is affirmed.