Title: Skolnick v. Altheimer & Gray

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Opinion filed March 23, 2000.
JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
After plaintiffs Kenneth and Julia Skolnick filed a multicount complaint in 
the circuit court of Cook County against defendants Terry Robin Horwitz Kass and 
Altheimer & Gray, the trial court entered an agreed protective order that 
forbade dissemination of designated materials produced during discovery. 
Subsequently, Kass sought modification of the protective order and leave to file 
a counterclaim against the plaintiffs. Kass alleged that documents produced as 
discoverable materials revealed fraudulent conduct by Kenneth Skolnick. Kass 
argued that the newly revealed information triggered her ethical obligation to 
report suspected attorney misconduct to the Illinois Attorney and Registration 
Disciplinary Commission (ARDC), and therefore, that the information should no 
longer be subject to the restrictions of the protective order. Kass asserted as 
well that these same documents gave rise to the allegations of her 
counterclaim.
The trial court granted leave to file the counterclaim, but simultaneously 
ordered that the counterclaim remain under seal. The court also refused to 
modify the protective order. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's 
order placing the counterclaim under seal, and reversed that part of the order 
refusing to modify the protective order. 303 Ill. App. 3d 27. In this 
consolidated appeal, which is before the court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 
315 (177 Ill. 2d R. 315), we affirm in part and reverse in part.
BACKGROUND
In 1993, plaintiff Kenneth Skolnick (Skolnick), a lawyer, was employed by the 
defendant law firm of Altheimer & Gray (Altheimer) as an equity partner. 
Defendant Terry Robin Horwitz Kass (Kass), also a lawyer, was employed by 
Altheimer as an associate. In June 1993, Altheimer and Kass sent separate 
letters to the ARDC. The ARDC is an agency of this court which, inter 
alia, receives, investigates and prosecutes allegations of professional 
misconduct by attorneys licensed to practice in Illinois. 134 Ill. 2d R. 751 
et seq. In their respective letters, Kass and Altheimer stated that the 
firm had inadvertently filed a forged document with the circuit court of Cook 
County and that an unknown person in the firm, possibly a lawyer, had created 
the bogus document. Neither letter asserted directly that Skolnick was 
responsible for the purported forgery, but each letter identified Skolnick as an 
individual who had been questioned concerning the creation of the forged 
document.
The Administrator of the ARDC filed a complaint against Skolnick, and charged 
him with several breaches of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (134 
Ill. 2d R. 1.1 et seq.). The Administrator alleged that Skolnick had, 
among other things, caused a forged document to be filed with the circuit court 
and had engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation; engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of 
justice; and in the course of representing a client, knowingly made a 
misstatement of material fact to a third party. 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 4.1(a), 
8.4(a)(4), (a)(5). The ARDC conducted an investigation regarding the allegations 
contained in the ARDC complaint, but later dismissed the action for lack of 
evidence.
On May 17, 1995, Skolnick and his wife, Julia Skolnick (collectively, 
plaintiffs), filed a nine-count complaint against Altheimer and Kass. Plaintiffs 
alleged that Kass and Altheimer accused Kenneth Skolnick of creating the forged 
document, and that defendants repeated these accusations to others within the 
firm, and to clients of the firm, even though Altheimer and Kass knew these 
accusations to be false. Kenneth Skolnick asserted that he lost present and 
future business as a result of the accusations, and that he was forced to leave 
the firm and accept a job paying a reduced salary and benefits. Skolnick pleaded 
claims for defamation, tortious interference with business relations, breach of 
fiduciary duty and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Julia Skolnick 
asserted a separate claim for loss of consortium and joined her husband in 
seeking damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The circuit court entered an "Agreed Protective Order" on February 1, 1996. 
The order applied to "all information supplied during discovery [in the lawsuit] 
that shall be designated by the party or person producing it as 
'confidential.' " Access to "confidential" information was restricted to 
the court, the parties, their attorneys, and experts retained for litigation. 
The order also allowed any party to "seek relief from the court *** from any of 
the provisions or restrictions" provided in the order, "upon good cause 
shown."
On February 19, 1998, Kass moved for modification of the protective order, 
and for leave to file a counterclaim. Kass maintained that, during the course of 
discovery, she received records generated by nonparty entities indicating that 
Kenneth Skolnick had engaged in fraudulent conduct. According to Kass, the 
content of the documents triggered her obligation, under the Illinois Code of 
Professional Conduct, to report Kenneth Skolnick's alleged misconduct to the 
ARDC. 134 Ill. 2d R. 8.3(a). She requested modification of the confidentiality 
provisions of the protective order so she could disclose the contents of the 
documents to the ARDC. Additionally, Kass argued that these same documents 
formed the basis for her counterclaim. After a hearing, the trial court denied 
Kass' motion to modify the protective order, and granted Kass leave to file the 
counterclaim, although the court directed Kass to file the pleading under 
seal.
Kass appealed the circuit court's order to the appellate court pursuant to 
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307(a).(1) 166 
Ill. 2d R. 307(a). The appellate court partially reversed and partially affirmed 
the circuit court order. 303 Ill. App. 3d 27. The appellate court held that 
Kass' obligation to report attorney misconduct to the appropriate authority was 
"absolute" and that this absolute duty "must be accompanied by the absolute 
right to report." 303 Ill. App. 3d at 30. Thus, the trial court's refusal to 
modify an agreed order to allow the attorneys to fulfill their ethical 
obligations constituted error. 303 Ill. App. 3d at 30.
The appellate court ruled also that merely reporting Skolnick's suspected 
attorney misconduct to the trial court did not relieve Kass of her obligation to 
report to the ARDC. Only the Illinois Supreme Court or its designated agent 
possesses the authority to punish attorneys for their ethical transgressions. 
Ipso facto, the supreme court is the only forum that can receive 
complaints of ethical wrongdoing. 303 Ill. App. 3d at 30.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's order placing Kass' 
counterclaim under seal. 303 Ill. App. 3d at 33. The appellate court held that, 
by agreeing to the protective order, Kass voluntarily relinquished her right to 
disseminate "confidential" information gathered in the course of discovery. 
Further, constitutional rights do not attach to information disclosed solely to 
try a lawsuit, and, given the breadth of discoverable material under our court 
rules, a trial court must retain authority to block the dissemination of 
information, as it deems necessary. The appellate court rejected too the 
contention that "the public" could claim access to the allegations contained in 
the counterclaim. The court concluded that Kass lacked standing to assert this 
argument. 303 Ill. App. 3d at 32.
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315 (177 Ill. 2d R. 315), this court granted 
Kass' petition for leave to appeal the appellate judgment affirming the trial 
court's order to file her counterclaim under seal. The court has consolidated 
Kass' appeal (Docket No. 87324) with the Skolnicks' separate appeal (Docket No. 
87320), also pursuant to Rule 315, from the appellate judgment reversing the 
trial court's order refusing to modify the protective order.
ANALYSIS
A. Appellate Court Jurisdiction
The Skolnicks contend that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to 
entertain Kass' interlocutory appeal. The Skolnicks argue that Supreme Court 
Rule 307(a)(1), which formed the basis for the appeal below, only permits 
interlocutory appeals from orders granting or denying injunctive relief. 166 
Ill. 2d R. 307(a)(1). The trial court's order denying the motion to modify the 
protective order was not in the nature of injunctive relief, Skolnick maintains, 
but rather a ministerial act "deriving from inherent authority of the [c]ircuit 
[c]ourt to control its proceedings."
Rule 307(a)(1) states:
A court looks to the substance, not the form, of an order to determine if it 
is injunctive in nature. In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d 247, 260 (1989). 
Illinois courts have construed the meaning of "injunction" in Rule 307(a)(1) 
broadly. In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d  at 262; 
Doe v. Doe, 282 Ill. App. 3d 1078, 1082 (1996). An injunction is "a 
'judicial process operating in personam and requiring [a] person to whom it is 
directed to do or refrain from doing a particular thing.' " In re A 
Minor, 127 Ill. 2d  at 261, quoting Black's Law Dictionary 705 (5th ed. 
1979). In particular, an interlocutory order circumscribing the publication of 
information is reviewable as an interlocutory injunctive order, pursuant to Rule 
307(a)(1). In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d  at 263; Doe, 282 Ill. 
App. 3d at 1082; Cummings v. Beaton & Associates, Inc., 192 Ill. 
App. 3d 792, 796 (1989).
In this case, the protective order entered by the circuit court allowed the 
parties to designate information disclosed in discovery as "confidential." Once 
so designated, the information could be disclosed only to persons expressly 
identified in the protective order. By its terms, therefore, the order forbade 
the publication of certain information, or, in other words, circumscribed the 
parties' opportunity to "do a particular thing."
Nonetheless, the Skolnicks maintain that the protective order was only a 
ministerial act, resulting from the trial court's inherent authority to control 
access to court records. Citing to JFS v. ABMJ, 120 Ill. App. 3d 261 
(1983), the Skolnicks contend that purely ministerial functions of the trial 
court, such as "impounding records," do not amount to injunctive relief under 
Rule 307(a)(1).
The Skolnicks' argument lacks merit. This court has explicitly overruled 
JFS to the extent that JFS suggests that court-ordered 
restraints upon publication of information are not appealable under Rule 
307(a)(1). See In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d  at 263. The order denying 
Kass' motion to modify the protective order and restricting public access to 
pleadings was in the nature of injunctive relief. The appellate court possessed 
the necessary jurisdiction to dispose of the parties' appeal.
Equally meritless is the Skolnicks' insistence that, if injunctive in nature, 
then the circuit court's order is a permanent injunction and thus is not subject 
to interlocutory appeal (citing Steel City Bank v. Village of Orland 
Hills, 224 Ill. App. 3d 412, 416-17 (1991)). The Skolnicks are correct that 
a permanent injunction is a final order, appealable only pursuant to Supreme 
Court Rules 301 or 304 (155 Ill. 2d Rs. 301, 304). Steel City Bank, 224 
Ill. App. 3d at 417. A permanent injunction is of unlimited duration and "alters 
the status quo," meaning that it adjudicates rights between the interested 
parties. Smith v. Goldstick, 110 Ill. App. 3d 431, 438 (1982). The 
Skolnicks attempt to compare the protective order to a permanent injunction by 
stating that the order established a "status quo" between the parties.
The Skolnick's argument is misplaced. The protective order is not a permanent 
injunction because it "concludes no rights" between the parties. Smith, 
110 Ill. App. 3d at 438. It follows, therefore, that nothing in Kass' appeal 
sought to alter permanent injunctive relief. The appellate court appropriately 
exercised its jurisdiction to entertain Kass' appeal.
B. Kass' Duty to Disclose Information Subject to the Protective 
Order
The Skolnicks assert that the appellate court erred by reversing the trial 
court's order denying Kass' motion to modify the protective order. The 
Skolnicks' attack on the appellate court judgment is threefold. First, the 
Skolnicks contend that "[t]he [a]ppellate [c]ourt improperly assumed that the 
mere claim of a reporting obligation by a lawyer for an adverse party strips the 
trial court of any authority or discretion regarding the protective order." 
Second, the Skolnicks question whether Kass bore any obligation under the Rules 
of Professional Conduct to report the alleged misconduct. Third, assuming Kass 
possessed a duty to report the purported misconduct, the duty was fulfilled by 
alerting the trial court to Skolnick's alleged wrongdoing. We dispose of each of 
these arguments seriatim.
Trial courts are invested with considerable discretion to supervise the 
course of discovery as the court deems appropriate. Atwood v. Warner 
Electric Brake & Clutch Co., 239 Ill. App. 3d 81, 88 (1992). The 
flexibility enjoyed by trial courts in directing discovery extends to the entry 
of protective orders. May Centers, Inc. v. S.G. Adams Printing & 
Stationery Co., 153 Ill. App. 3d 1018, 1021 (1987). Supreme Court Rule 
201(c)(1) states:
The parameters of protective orders are entrusted to the court's discretion. 
Statland v. Freeman, 112 Ill. 2d 494, 499 (1986). We will alter the 
terms of a protective order only if no reasonable person could adopt the view 
taken by the circuit court. Cleveringa v. J.I. Case Co., 230 Ill. App. 
3d 831, 848 (1992).
At bar, the protective order proposed by the parties and entered by the 
circuit court precluded the parties from disclosing information produced by a 
party during discovery, which the producing party designated as "confidential." 
Information originally obtained from nonparties also could not be disclosed if 
deemed confidential by a party. The order allowed any party to seek modification 
of the protective order for good cause.
Citing In re Himmel, 125 Ill. 2d 531 (1988), and Supreme Court Rule 
8.3(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 8.3(a)), Kass argued that the content of certain 
"confidential" documents obtained during discovery supposedly revealed 
misconduct by Kenneth Skolnick. Kass insisted that the knowledge of this 
misconduct necessitated modification of the protective order so that Kass could 
fulfill her ethical duty to report the purported misconduct to the ARDC.
In Himmel, 125 Ill. 2d 531, Tammy Forsberg retained attorney John 
Casey to represent her in a personal injury action. Pursuant to a contingency 
agreement executed between Forsberg and Casey, Casey was to receive one-third of 
any settlement or verdict he obtained in Forsberg's favor. Casey subsequently 
obtained a $35,000 settlement for Forsberg, but Casey converted the entire 
$35,000 for his own use and never forwarded any amount of the settlement to 
Forsberg. After unsuccessful attempts to get her money from Casey, Forsberg 
retained attorney James Himmel to help Forsberg recover her share of the 
personal injury settlement from Casey.
In the course of representing Forsberg, Himmel learned that Casey had 
illegally converted Forsberg's settlement funds. Forsberg, represented by 
Himmel, then entered into a settlement with Casey, whereby Casey promised to pay 
Forsberg $75,000 in return for Forsberg's pledge not to bring any legal action 
against Casey arising out of his conversion of Forsberg's money. Additionally, 
Forsberg instructed Himmel not to report Casey's professional misconduct to the 
ARDC.
Casey's unethical behavior was eventually revealed, and the ARDC prosecuted 
Himmel for violation of a prior version of Rule 8.3(a), Illinois Supreme Court 
Rule 1-103(a) (107 Ill. 2d R. 1-103(a)). Like Rule 8.3(a), Rule 1-103(a) imposed 
on Illinois lawyers an affirmative obligation to report unprivileged knowledge 
of another lawyer's fraudulent or deceitful conduct to the proper authorities. 
Himmel, 125 Ill. 2d  at 539; 107 Ill. 2d R. 1-103(a).
This court affirmed the ARDC's determination that Himmel should be publicly 
disciplined for failing to report Casey's misconduct to the ARDC. Regardless of 
Forsberg's direction that Himmel should not inform the ARDC of Casey's actions, 
Himmel was "duty-bound to uphold the rules in the Code [of Professional 
Responsibility]" (Himmel, 125 Ill. 2d at 539), including the rule that 
mandates reporting acts of fraud, deceit or misrepresentation by other lawyers. 
Himmel, 125 Ill. 2d  at 541.
Significantly, the court remarked that failure to report Casey's bad acts 
necessitated Himmel's suspension, regardless of the absence of a "dishonest 
motive" by Himmel. Himmel, 125 Ill. 2d  at 542. Himmel's knowledge of 
Casey's conduct "involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation," 
where that knowledge is otherwise not subject to the attorney/client privilege, 
was sufficient to impose on Himmel an obligation to report Casey to the ARDC. 
Failing in that obligation, Himmel was himself subject to punishment. 
Himmel, 125 Ill. 2d  at 543.
As stated in Himmel, the duty to report misconduct is absolute. See 
also Jacobson v. Knepper & Moga, P.C., 185 Ill. 2d 372, 377 (1998). 
Further, the duty, and the certain discipline that flows from a breach of that 
duty, is animated by a desire to: maintain the integrity of the legal 
profession, further the ends of justice, and protect the public from 
unscrupulous attorneys. Himmel, 125 Ill. 2d  at 544; In re 
Demuth, 126 Ill. 2d 1,13 (1988); In re Imming, 131 Ill. 2d 239, 
260 (1989). Although Rule 201(c)(1) permits courts to enter protective orders 
"as justice requires," the principles underlying a lawyer's Himmel 
obligation are so important that, in our opinion, only the weightiest 
considerations of "justice" (166 Ill. 2d R. 201(c)(1)) could excuse a trial 
court's refusal to modify a protective order so that counsel could fulfill its 
absolute, ethical duties.
In this case, the Skolnicks fail to identify any reason why Kass' ethical 
obligations should yield to the terms of the protective order. Further, the 
trial court neglected to explain why it denied Kass' motion to modify the 
protective order. The transcript of the hearing on the motion to modify the 
protective order indicates only that the court entertained argument of counsel 
and then ruled in the Skolnicks' favor. In the absence of any stated 
justification for refusing to modify the protective order, the interests of 
justice weigh decidedly in favor of allowing Kass to fulfill her ethical duty to 
disclose the alleged attorney misconduct.
The Skolnicks next contend that the circumstances of the present lawsuit do 
not trigger the reporting obligations stated in Rule 8.3(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 
8.3(a)). An attorney is obliged to report the misconduct of another attorney 
only under the following circumstances:
Rule 8.4(a)(3) forbids lawyers from committing criminal acts that reflect 
adversely on their trustworthiness, honesty or fitness as an attorney. 134 Ill. 
2d R. 8.4(a)(3). Rule 8.4(a)(4) bars lawyers from engaging in conduct involving 
fraud, dishonesty, deceit or misrepresentation. 134 Ill. 2d R. 8.4(a)(4).
The Skolnicks assert first that the information Kass sought to disclose is 
"protected as a confidence" and therefore expressly excepted from the obligation 
to report stated in Rule 8.3(a). The Skolnicks derive their interpretation of 
"confidence" from the documents that the Skolnicks tagged with the label 
"confidential" during discovery. Their interpretation of the meaning of 
"confidence" as it is used in Rule 8.3 is misguided. The Rules of Professional 
Conduct contain a "Terminology" section to define designated words used in the 
rules. According to the definition supplied by this court, "[c]onfidence" 
"denotes information protected by the lawyer- client privilege under applicable 
law." 134 Ill. 2d 472. The Skolnicks do not claim that the documents in question 
are subject to the attorney/client privilege. Accordingly, Kass is in no danger 
of improperly revealing a "confidence," as described in Rule 8.3.
The Skolnicks maintain that Kass cannot report any alleged misconduct to the 
ARDC because Kass does not possess "knowledge *** that another lawyer has 
committed a violation of *** Rule 8.4(a)(3) or (a)(4)." Apparently, the 
Skolnicks believe that "knowledge" means "absolute certainty" and, further, that 
Kass failed to demonstrate the alleged wrongdoing with a sufficient degree of 
certainty to justify any report to the ARDC. The Skolnicks offer no authority to 
support their interpretation. However, we note that the terminology section of 
the Code of Professional Conduct defines "[k]nowingly," "known" and "knows" as 
"actual knowledge" which "may be inferred from circumstances." 134 Ill. 2d 472; 
Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 555 (3d ed. 1996). Further, the 
"knowledge" requirement of our Rule 8.3 is similar to Model Rule 8.3 propounded 
by the American Bar Association (ABA). Annotated Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct 555 (3d ed. 1996). Upon review of ethical opinions from other states, 
the ABA has concluded that the "knowledge" requirement of Model Rule 8.3 
requires "more than a mere suspicion" but need not amount to "absolute 
certainty." Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 555 (3d ed. 1996).
We have examined the documents filed under seal in support of Kass' motion to 
modify the protective order. We will not divulge the contents of the documents, 
but we are satisfied that the information contained in the documents raises more 
than a mere suspicion of misconduct by Kenneth Skolnick. Kass could reasonably 
infer from the circumstances of the events revealed by the documents that 
conduct of the sort described in Rules 8.4(a)(3) and 8.4(a)(4) had occurred. 
Therefore, Kass possessed adequate knowledge to trigger the reporting 
responsibilities under Rule 8.3. We emphasize, however, that while we conclude 
that Kass had a duty to report the suspected misconduct to the ARDC, we do not 
render an opinion as to the merits of any charges that may or may not be filed 
against Kenneth Skolnick as a result of the information the ARDC receives in 
relation to this matter.
Lastly, the Skolnicks argue that Kass can discharge her ethical duty to 
report lawyer misconduct by informing the trial court of the alleged 
misbehavior, and that Kass need not alert the ARDC to her suspicions of 
Skolnick's supposed wrongdoing. In support of this argument, the Skolnicks quote 
Rule 8.3(a), which directs those reporting misconduct to do so "to a 
tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon such 
violation." (Emphasis added.) 134 Ill. 2d R. 8.3(a).
The Skolnicks misinterpret Rule 8.3(a). The word "tribunal" must be read in 
the context of the entire sentence in which it appears. M.I.G. Investments, 
Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 122 Ill. 2d 392, 400 (1988). The 
proper inquiry is not whether a "tribunal" means a "trial court," as the 
Skolnicks contend, but rather means what authority or authorities are 
"empowered" to act upon a charge of attorney misconduct. As stated in Rule 
8.3(a), only an authority granted such power may receive reports of misconduct. 
134 Ill. 2d R. 8.3(a). In Illinois, only this court possesses the "inherent 
power to discipline attorneys who have been admitted to practice before it." 
In re Harris, 93 Ill. 2d 285, 291 (1982). The court, in turn, has 
delegated the authority to investigate and prosecute claims of attorney 
misconduct to the ARDC. In re Mitan, 75 Ill. 2d 118, 123-24 (1979). 
Further, while a trial court bears an independent responsibility to report 
attorney misconduct to the ARDC (155 Ill. 2d R. 63(B)(3)), only this court may 
discipline an attorney found guilty of ethical misbehavior. In re 
Himmel, 125 Ill. 2d  at 544. Thus, Kass is correct in arguing that she was 
required to report the claimed misconduct to the ARDC. See also People v. 
Camden, 210 Ill. App. 3d 921, 926 (1991). Her duty to report cannot be 
discharged by reporting the suspected misconduct to the trial court. The trial 
court's refusal to modify the protective order prevented Kass from fulfilling 
her obligation to report attorney misconduct to the ARDC. We find that the trial 
court's refusal to modify the protective order was not a reasonable exercise of 
the trial court's discretion. We affirm the appellate court judgment to the 
extent it reversed the trial court's order denying Kass' motion to modify the 
protective order.
C. Whether the Trial Court Errantly Ordered That Kass' 
Counterclaim Be Filed Under Seal
In a separate appeal, Kass contends that the circuit court abused its 
discretion by ordering that Kass' counterclaim remain under seal. Kass asserts 
that the circuit court order violates the public's right, grounded in common law 
and in the United States Constitution, to access court files. U.S. Const., 
amend. I.
1. The Common Law Right to Review Court Files
In Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597, 55 L. Ed. 2d 570, 579, 98 S. Ct. 1306, 1312 (1978), the United States Supreme Court 
acknowledged the existence of a common law presumption that allows the public to 
"inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and 
documents." Nixon, 435 U.S.  at 597, 55 L. Ed. 2d  at 579, 98 S. Ct.  at 
1312. The common law right of access to court records is essential to the proper 
functioning of a democracy (Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. 
Schumacher, 392 N.W.2d 197, 202 (Minn. 1986)), in that citizens rely on 
information about our judicial system in order to form an educated and 
knowledgeable opinion of its functioning (Minneapolis Star & Tribune 
Co., 392 N.W.2d at 202). Too, the availability of court files for public 
scrutiny is essential to the public's right to "monitor the functioning of our 
courts, thereby insuring quality, honesty and respect for our legal system." 
In re Continental Illinois Securities Litigation, 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 
(7th Cir. 1984); see also Newell v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 91 Ill. 
App. 3d 735, 748 (1980) ("the common law right of access *** symbolizes the 
legislature's determination that the public interest is best served by 
increasing the public's knowledge about what is transpiring inside the judicial 
process").
In Illinois, the state legislature codified the public's right to review 
judicial records in section 16(6) of the Clerks of the Courts Act (705 ILCS 
105/16(6) (West 1998)):
In re Marriage of Johnson, 232 Ill. App. 3d 1068, 1072 (1992); see 
also Nixon, 435 U.S.  at 597 n.7, 55 L. Ed. 2d  at 579 n.7, 98 S. Ct.  at 
1312 n.7 (citing an earlier version of section 16(6)).
However, the right of access is not absolute. In Nixon, the Supreme 
Court stated that "[e]very court has supervisory power over its own records and 
files, and access [may be] denied where court files might[ ] become a 
vehicle for improper purposes." Nixon, 435 U.S.  at 598, 55 L. Ed. 2d  at 
580, 98 S. Ct.  at 1312. Thus, whether court records in a particular case are 
opened to public scrutiny rests with the trial court's discretion, which must 
take into consideration all facts and circumstances unique to that case. 
Nixon, 435 U.S.  at 599, 55 L. Ed. 2d  at 580, 98 S. Ct. at 1312-13; but 
see Johnson, 232 Ill. App. 3d at 1072-73 (to overcome presumption, the 
party opposing public access bears the burden of establishing: (1) a compelling 
interest that favors a closed file, and (2) that the protective order is drafted 
in the least restrictive manner possible); D. Lee, Sealed Documents, Closed 
Hearings, and the Public's Right to Know, 81 Ill. B.J. 456, 457 (1993).
2. The Constitutional Right to Inspect Court Files
There is a parallel right of access to court records embodied in the first 
amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. I). Grove 
Fresh Distributors, Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co., 24 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 
1994). The first amendment right presumes a right to inspect court records which 
have "historically been open to the public" and disclosure of which would 
further the court proceeding at issue. United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224, 228 (7th Cir. 1989). The presumption can be rebutted by demonstrating 
that suppression is "essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly 
tailored to serve that interest." Grove, 24 F.3d  at 897. Other courts 
have interpreted the first amendment right of access as requiring a showing of a 
"compelling" or similarly stringent interest to overcome the constitutional 
right to review court records. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. 
Schumacher, 392 N.W.2d 197, 203 (Minn. 1986); Johnson, 232 Ill. 
App. 3d at 1075; Sealed Documents, 81 Ill. B.J. at 457 nn.13, 14.(2)
Whether we proceed under the common law or constitutional standards, the 
counterclaim in this case became part of the court file once the trial court 
granted leave to file the pleading. In re Marriage of Johnson, 232 Ill. 
App. 3d 1068, 1074 (1992); 705 ILCS 105/16(6) (West 1998). At that point, the 
presumption of a right of public access to the counterclaim attached.
Moreover, under either the common law standard or the first amendment 
standard, the Skolnicks failed to make the necessary showing to rebut the 
presumption of a right of access to the court file. None of the reasons the 
Skolnicks articulated before the trial court in opposition to the motion to file 
a counterclaim amounted to a "compelling interest" (Minneapolis Star & 
Tribune Co., 392 N.W.2d at 203) or suggested an "improper purpose[ ]" 
(Nixon, 435 U.S.  at 598, 55 L. Ed. 2d  at 580, 98 S. Ct. at 1312) 
sufficient to justify a sealed court file. Further, the trial court neglected to 
state why it ordered the counterclaim under seal. Therefore, regardless of 
whether we proceed under a common law or a first amendment analysis, we reach 
the same conclusion: the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the 
counterclaim to be filed under seal.
For example, the Skolnicks' written response to the motion for leave to file 
a counterclaim attacked the timeliness of the proposed pleading. While pertinent 
to the threshold determination of whether the counterclaim may be filed 
(Hutchinson v. Brotman-Sherman Theatres, Inc., 94 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 
1073 (1981); 735 ILCS 5/2-608 (West 1998)), the timeliness of the pleading is 
irrelevant to the decision to place a document under seal.
Additionally, the Skolnicks challenged the merits of the counterclaim, 
including whether the purportedly "bad acts" of Kenneth Skolnick described in 
the counterclaim were alleged merely to "insulate [Kass] and her counsel in the 
subsequent publication of those 'bad acts' allegations." The Skolnicks argued 
that the counterclaim was subject to being stricken "as scandalous and 
irrelevant," pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 
5/2-615 (West 1998)).
We are not sure what the Skolnicks intended by their reference to Kass' 
alleged attempt to "insulate" herself and her attorney. In any event, the 
Skolnicks' attack on the legal sufficiency of the counterclaim, when Kass was 
merely seeking leave to file the pleading, was premature. As the Skolnicks 
conceded, the proper vehicle to challenge the merits of the counterclaim is a 
separate section 2-615 motion, properly filed after leave was given to file the 
counterclaim. 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 1998).
Next, the Skolnicks argued that Kass' motion to file a counterclaim was 
really an indirect threat to expose Kenneth Skolnick's alleged misbehavior and 
to report that behavior to the ARDC. In the Skolnicks' view, Kass was attempting 
to use the counterclaim to intimidate the Skolnicks and thereby gain an 
advantage over the Skolnicks in this lawsuit. The Skolnicks correctly observe 
that an attempt by a lawyer to blackmail an opponent through the threatened use 
of ARDC proceedings violates the Rules of Professional Conduct. 134 Ill. 2d R. 
1.2(e).
Perhaps the circuit court was persuaded that the counterclaim was filed 
solely to intimidate the Skolnicks. If so, the circuit court's ruling 
constituted an abuse of its discretion. Upon review of Kass' counterclaim, we 
find that, facially, the pleading appears to state cognizable causes of action. 
In any event, we do not find the pleading frivolous, or without any independent 
merit.
If the circuit court placed the counterclaim under seal in order to save the 
Skolnicks from embarrassment, then this, too, would constitute an abuse of 
discretion. The mere fact a person may suffer embarrassment or damage to his 
reputation as a result of allegations in a pleading does not justify sealing the 
court file. In Doe v. Doe, 282 Ill. App. 3d 1078 (1996), a minor 
plaintiff filed an action against her uncle, accusing him of sexually molesting 
the plaintiff. The defendant requested a court order that the lawsuit proceed 
with the use of pseudonyms for the parties. Pursuant to section 2-401(e) of the 
civil procedure code (735 ILCS 5/2-401(e) (West 1998)), defendant argued, 
fictitious names could be employed upon a showing of "good cause." The defendant 
further alleged that exposure of his true identity would damage his reputation 
and his family, and therefore, good cause existed to conceal the parties' 
names.
The appellate court ruled that the parties would not be allowed to use 
pseudonyms merely to save the reputation of defendant and his family from 
potential harm. Doe, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 1088. In pertinent part, the 
court observed that in many lawsuits, plaintiffs place a defendant's reputation 
at risk merely by alleging that the defendant is guilty of negligence or 
misconduct. In the broadest sense, any lawsuit could be viewed as "a bad-faith 
tactic to induce settlement and reap economic gain at the defendant's expense 
through baseless allegations." Doe, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 1088. 
Therefore, the alleged harm identified by the defendant was too commonplace to 
amount to a showing of "good cause."
We find the holding of Doe analogous to the instant appeal. 
Allegations of a complaint are, by their very nature, likely to be critical in 
some fashion of the defendant named in the pleading. The mere fact that 
allegations stated in a counterclaim might embarrass the counterdefendant do 
not, therefore, amount to an "improper purpose" in filing the pleading. See also 
Coe v. County of Cook, 162 F.3d 491, 498 (7th Cir. 1998).
Lastly, the appellate court held that the counterclaim was properly placed 
under seal because it references financial records belonging to the Skolnicks. 
303 Ill. App. 3d at 32. Relying on Statland v. Freeman, 112 Ill. 2d 494 
(1986), the appellate court stated that to prevent abuse of sensitive 
information, such as financial records, we should not lightly interfere with the 
trial court's decision to place those documents under seal. 303 Ill. App. 3d at 
32. We agree with the general proposition stated by the appellate court, yet we 
disagree with the proposition as applied in this case.
In Statland, a party sought leave to disclose confidential financial 
records released during discovery in one case as discovery in another lawsuit. 
The circuit court refused. This court affirmed the circuit court's order. The 
court held that Rule 201 invested the circuit court with discretion to set the 
parameters of a protective order, and that this court found no basis to conclude 
the circuit court abused that discretion. Statland, 112 Ill. 2d  at 
499.
In the instant appeal, however, the document at issue is a pleading, not 
information released during discovery for the sole purpose of discovery. As 
stated in Johnson, once filed with the court, a pleading becomes part 
of the public record. Johnson, 232 Ill. App. 3d at 1074. Further, 
discovery is distinct from documents that are filed with the court. By its 
nature, discovery is intentionally broad in scope: it is intended to reveal not 
only facts admissible at trial, but also facts that may lead to admissible 
evidence. Monier v. Chamberlain, 35 Ill. 2d 351, 357 (1966); see also 
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32-33, 81 L. Ed. 2d 17, 
26-27, 104 S. Ct. 2199, 2207-08 (1984) ("[Discovery is] not open to the public 
at common law [citation], and, in general, [it is] conducted in private as a 
matter of modern practice. [Citation.] Much of the information that surfaces 
during pretrial discovery may be unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the 
underlying cause of action. Therefore, restraints placed on discovered, but not 
yet admitted, information are not a restriction on a traditionally public source 
of information"). Thus, it is important that a trial court be permitted to 
shield sensitive information from public view, so that the parties can marshal 
evidence in support of their cases, and determine which issues should be 
pursued, and which should be abandoned.
By contrast, once filed, the pleadings, motions and other papers filed with 
the court assume the presumption of public access explained above. As the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated recently, "Litigation is a public 
exercise; it consumes public resources. It follows that in all but the most 
extraordinary cases-perhaps those involving matters of weighty national 
security-complaints must be public." Levenstein v. Salafsky, 164 F.3d 345, 348 (7th Cir. 1998).
More importantly, the Skolnicks' response to Kass' motion for leave to file a 
counterclaim never mentions the fact that the counterclaim relied on financial 
records as a reason to deny leave to file. While we are willing to speculate as 
to whether the trial court relied on arguments that the Skolnicks actually 
raised below, we will not assume that the trial court based its ruling on 
arguments that the Skolnicks never articulated before the trial court. 
Therefore, to the extent the Skolnicks now rely on a "financial records" 
argument to keep the counterclaim under seal, that argument has been waived.
We also conclude that the Skolnicks have waived any challenge to Kass' 
standing to pursue this appeal. The appellate court questioned Kass' standing to 
assert the common law right of access to court records (303 Ill. App. 3d at 32), 
although the appellate court cited no authority to support that conclusion. 
Regardless, standing is an affirmative defense (Glisson v. City of 
Marion, 188 Ill. 2d 211, 221 (1999)). The Skolnicks have not challenged 
Kass' alleged lack of standing-on any ground-before the trial court or this 
court, and we cannot discern whether the Skolnicks initiated the argument before 
the appellate court. We will not supply contentions not advanced by the parties 
and, accordingly, deem the argument waived.
In the absence of an "improper purpose" or "compelling interest" identified 
by the Skolnicks or the trial court, we conclude that the trial court abused its 
discretion by placing the counterclaim under seal. We vacate the trial court 
order barring public access to the counterclaim and remand the case for further 
proceedings.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court 
reversing the trial court's refusal to modify the protective order. We reverse 
that part of the appellate court judgment affirming the trial court's order to 
place the counterclaim under seal. We reverse the judgment of the circuit court 
and remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Appellate court reversed in part
and affirmed in part;
circuit court judgment reversed;
cause remanded.
1. 1Kass' counsel in this lawsuit, Sonnenschein 
Nath & Rosenthal (Sonnenschein), filed a separate notice of interlocutory 
appeal to the appellate court. 303 Ill. App. 3d 27. Kass and Sonnenschein 
asserted substantially similar arguments before the appellate court. 
Sonnenschein is an appellee to one (Docket No. 87320) of the two appeals 
consolidated before this court. In the interest of brevity, the arguments 
asserted below by Kass and Sonnenschein will be identified here as arguments by 
Kass, only. 

2. 2At least one commentator has remarked on the 
similarity between the common law and first amendment presumptions favoring 
public access to court records. Sealed Documents, 81 Ill. B.J. at 457. 
This writer suggests that the difference between the standards lies in their 
application: "First, a constitutional right of access, unlike the common law 
right, cannot be modified by legislation or court rule. Second, an appellate 
court must review a denial of the [f]irst [a]mendment right more closely than it 
does a denial of the common law right, which is subject only to the 'abuse of 
discretion' standard." Sealed Documents, 81 Ill. B.J. at 457-58.