Title: State Ex Rel. Durham v. Marion Circuit Court

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

240 Ind. 132 (1959)
162 N.E.2d 505
STATE EX REL. DURHAM, ETC.
v.
MARION CIRCUIT COURT, NIBLACK, JUDGE.
No. 29,847.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed November 30, 1959.
*134 John M. Heeter and Owen M. Mullin, both of Indianapolis, for relator.
Edwin K. Steers, Attorney General, Frank E. Spencer, Deputy Attorney General, and Lloyd L. DeWester, Jr., of Indianapolis, for respondent.
ARTERBURN, C.J.
The relator has petitioned this court for a writ of prohibition and mandate against the above named respondent court to vacate and set aside a judgment entered by that court on August 31, 1959 in a proceeding entitled State of Indiana, Ex Rel., Davis M. Shryer, Relator, vs. Lester R. Durham, as a County Commissioner of Marion County, Cause No. C59-177 and a subsequent Cause No. X59-57. That was a cause of action in the trial court on an Information and Petition for the removal of Lester R. Durham as a member of the Board of Commissioners of Marion County.
The petitioner contends the trial court did not have jurisdiction for a number of reasons. The statute under which the special proceedings were brought for removal of the County Commissioner reads as follows:
The relator claims the necessary five days did not elapse "from the time the accusation was presented" to the day the relator herein was cited to appear. The citation to appear was issued on August 26, 1959 for Durham to appear on August 31, 1959.
Burns' § 2-4704 reads as follows:
Since the statute makes no reference to calculations of fractional parts of the day and there is no evidence here when, on August 26th "the accusation was presented," we have no grounds for holding that less than five days elapsed. The relator points to the record which shows that the citation was received in the sheriff's office at 1:41 p.m. on August 26th. This, however, is no evidence of when the accusation "was presented" in court and the point from which the time *136 begins to run. We hold there is no showing made that less than the statutory period of five days had run at the time the relator Durham was cited to appear.
The relator next urges that although there was a general appearance of an attorney, De Vaughn Hodges, for Lester R. Durham in the trial court, he thereafter withdrew his appearance, and the present attorneys entered a special appearance to contest the jurisdiction of the court; that without the issuance of a summons and no general appearance by the relator (defendant below), the trial court acquired no jurisdiction personally of the relator.
Such a contention results from a failure to distinguish between the withdrawal of an attorney's appearance in the case and the appearance of a party to the action. It is true that if a party withdraws his appearance with the permission of the court, the court loses jurisdiction of that party, and all pleadings of the party go out also, as stated in American Steel, etc., Co. v. Carbone (1915), 60 Ind. App. 484, 109 N.E. 220. However, the same result does not follow where an attorney merely withdraws his own appearance as representing a party, while the party still remains in the cause and for whom substitute attorneys appear. In such a case there is no loss by the court of jurisdiction over the party. A change in attorneys pending the litigation does not cause a loss of personal jurisdiction over a party. Likewise the withdrawal of an attorney for a party does not affect the jurisdiction over the party. In this case the record is clear that De Vaughn Hodges withdrew his personal appearance as an attorney and not the appearance of Durham as a party to the action. 5 Am. Jur., Attorneys at Law, §§ 83-85, pp. 310-312.
*137 Where an attorney appears there is a rebuttable presumption that he has authority to enter an appearance for a party and represent the party until his authority is challenged and evidence introduced to the contrary. There is no challenge made here so far as the record shows, as to the authority of De Vaughn Hodges to appear for Durham. There was no evidence introduced showing he had no authority to enter a general appearance. Neff v. City of Indianapolis (1935), 209 Ind. 203, 198 N.E. 328; Castle v. Bell et al. (1896), 145 Ind. 8, 44 N.E. 2; Gatewood v. Board of Comrs. of Hamilton Co. (1949), 119 Ind. App. 297, 86 N.E.2d 298; Vail v. Dept. of Financial Institutions (1938), 106 Ind. App. 39, 17 N.E.2d 854; Bush v. Bush et al. (1874), 46 Ind. 70; 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client, § 72, p. 874; Anno. 88 A.L.R. 12.
This forecloses any question as to jurisdiction, including such as pertains to the filing of a second paragraph of Information on the day of the hearing. No plea of abatement was filed. Any denial for a request for a continuance to prepare for trial would be a matter for an appeal  not a question of jurisdiction in a petition for a writ of prohibition in this Court. State ex rel. Bev. Shores H. Corp. v. Fleishbein, J. (1953), 232 Ind. 549, 114 N.E.2d 662; State ex rel. v. Brennan, Judge (1952), 231 Ind. 492, 109 N.E.2d 409.
The relator has had inserted in this record a statement certified to by the clerk that the Hon. John L. Linder, Judge pro tem, was presiding in vacation on August 31, 1959 and urges upon us that he was the duly qualified and acting Judge pro tem for the Marion Circuit Court on that day and that the regular judge, the respondent herein, had no authority to hold the hearing in question on the same day. Although *138 there may be some question as to the method by which it is attempted to raise this question through the record before us here, no question was raised as to his jurisdiction in that particular at the time. Under Rule 2-35 the record must show that such question has been specifically called to the attention of the trial court and such trial court been given an opportunity to rule thereon before it may be presented to this court. Practically the same question was before this Court in State ex rel. Crowmer et al. v. Sup. Ct., M. Co. et al. (1958), 237 Ind. 633, 146 N.E.2d 88, where it was decided adversely to relator. Book v. State Office Building Commission (1958), 238 Ind. 120, 149 N.E.2d 273; 22 I.L.E., Officers, § 5, p. 202.
For the same reason, we must ignore the contention that the prosecuting attorney is the only proper person to institute the proceedings for removal in the trial court below, since that point was not raised nor called to the attention of the trial court before it was presented to us.
There is one other unusual feature to this case which we should not overlook, namely, that the record shows there has been a final determination and judgment entered in the case below, and there is nothing further pending before the respondent court to restrain or prohibit.
Burns' § 49-833, 1951 Repl. provides for appeals from a judgment of removal to the Supreme Court after judgment. Writs of mandate and prohibition should not be confused with appeals on their merits.
In this original action the Supreme Court can do no more than decide whether the respondent court exceeded its lawful jurisdiction. We have no power to review any alleged errors of discretion or judgment in the trial court in the action before *139 it. Far too frequently writs of prohibition or mandate in this court are sought to be used as a short-cut to an appeal on the merits. This cannot be done. We can only determine here whether or not the trial court had the authority and jurisdiction to act  not whether it made a mistake in judgment. If the trial court erred in a ruling, it does not thereby lose jurisdiction. An appeal is the proper remedy for the correction or review of any such alleged error of the trial court, so long as it is acting within its general limits of jurisdiction. State ex rel. Allison v. Criminal Court of Marion County (1958), 238 Ind. 190, 149 N.E.2d 114; State ex rel. Sims v. Hendricks C.C. et al. (1956), 235 Ind. 444, 134 N.E.2d 211; State ex rel. Collins v. Lake Superior Ct., et al. (1954), 233 Ind. 536, 121 N.E.2d 731.
The special proceedings in a trial court provide for a summary action upon the issuance of the citation, and the rules of civil procedure have been held to be inapplicable to a proceeding of that nature. State v. Perry Circuit Court (1933), 204 Ind. 673, 185 N.E. 510; Beesley v. State (1941), 219 Ind. 239, 37 N.E.2d 540.
The trial court here had jurisdiction of the parties, the subject matter and the case.
The petition for writ of prohibition and mandate is denied.
Bobbitt and Landis, JJ., concur.
Achor, J., not participating in final opinion, because of illness.
Jackson, J., dissents with opinion.
JACKSON, J.
I dissent from the majority opinion for the following reasons.
*140 The statute under which the removal proceedings were instituted, reads as follows:
Acts 1897, ch. 182, § 35, p. 278, being Burns' 49-836, 1951 Replacement, is a penal statute, in derogation of the common law, and can not receive equitable construction. It must be strictly construed in favor of the relator. Nothing can be added to or taken from it by way of intendment, construction, addition or otherwise. There are no presumptions in its favor. An affidavit must bring a case within the spirit as well as the letter of the statute. State ex rel. Ayer v. Ewing (1952), 231 Ind. 1, 106 N.E.2d 441.
In order that a clear picture of this proceeding in the court below, be presented it is necessary to set forth chronologically such proceedings.
*141 On August 26, 1959, the petitioner, Davis M. Shryer, filed against Lester R. Durham, as a County Commissioner of Marion County, Indiana, an "INFORMATION AND PETITION FOR THE REMOVAL OF THE RESPONDENT AS A MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS." Which petition, omitting the formal parts thereof, reads as follows:
It is evident that the accusation attempts to charge the defendant with malfeasance or misfeasance in office, but the accusation does not fall within the purview of the removal statute for the reason that the only act of malfeasance recognized by the removal statute is *144 "charging and collecting illegal fees for services rendered, or to be rendered." (Emphasis supplied.) Hence the court acquired no jurisdiction in this case under the averments of this initial accusation.
On the filing of the accusation the court ordered a citation issued requiring the defendant, Lester R. Durham, to appear before said court on August 31, 1959, at 9:30 A.M. to answer and to show cause why he should not be removed from office and his term ended and said office declared vacant.
The sheriff's return on the back of the citation reads as follows: "and served this writ by leaving a true copy of the same at the last and usual place of residence of the within named Lester R. Durham (wife)."
On August 31, 1959, just prior to the hearing the petitioner filed "SECOND PARAGRAPH OF INFORMATION AND PETITION FOR THE REMOVAL OF THE RESPONDANT AS A MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS" which petition, omitting the formal parts thereof, reads as follows, to-wit:
The so called "Second Paragraph of Information ...," actually a second accusation, charged the defendant with nonfeasance in that he "refused and neglected to perform the official duties pertaining to his office," but the court did not at any time, at or after the filing thereof "cite the party charged to appear before the court at any time not more than ten [10] nor less than five [5] days from the time the accusation was presented." (Emphasis supplied.) The accusation was presented and the defendant tried on August 31, 1959. Therefore the court acquired no jurisdiction in this case under the removal statute.
After the filing of the second paragraph of information, counsel for defendant, Lester R. Durham, requested time to prepare a defense thereto which the court granted in the following words, "We will give you fifteen minutes, until 11:00."
On August 31, 1959, and prior to the introduction of evidence, the jurisdiction of the court to hear and determine the issues was raised by special appearance *147 and a continuance was requested, which continuance was by the court refused. The court in making such ruling stated as follows: "I see no particular reason for fooling around with the technicalities and hairsplitting in this case. I think some body should resolve this matter in the interest of the taxpayers and the people of Marion County."
The court thereupon proceeded to hear the matter, presumably on both the original and second accusations, and at the conclusion of whatever evidence was adduced, that not being before us at this time, entered judgment as follows:
The first paragraph of information (accusation) charged the defendant with misfeasance and malfeasance in office. The second paragraph of information (accusation) charged the defendant with nonfeasance in office. If there is to be any consistency in the cases deciding what are causes for removal for acts or omissions, it is necessary to keep clear the well recognized definitions of malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance. "Nonfeasance means the omission of an act which a person ought to do; misfeasance is the improper doing of an act which a person might lawfully do; and malfeasance is the doing of an act which a person ought not to do at all." Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed.) p. 1151. Malfeasance implies that the act was ultra vires the official powers or authorities of the officer, "while nonfeasance is an omission to perform a required duty at all or total neglect." State v. McRoberts (1934), 207 Ind. 293, 298, 192 N.E. 428. The cause for removal that the officer "has refused and neglected to perform the official duties pertaining to his office," must be construed under the constitutional limitations of §§ 7 and 8 of Article 6 of the Constitution, for under the authorities already considered, the legislature is without power to add to the causes for removal. The only cause for removal by neglect to perform official duties under § 35 of the Act must be a "negligent" neglect. It is negligent nonaction. State v. Beazley (1926), 77 Mont. 430, 250 Pac. 1114.
*150 The record discloses that for some time prior to and at the time of the hearing on August 31, 1959, the defendant Durham was ill and confined in a hospital. Without going into the question, in this paragraph, as to whether or not the defendant was deprived of his constitutional rights or due process in being granted only fifteen minutes to prepare a defense to the second accusation, we suggest that illness does not per se indicate that the defendant "refused or neglected to perform the official duties pertaining to his office."
It further appears that the order of the trial court in said cause goes far beyond the scope of the statute in that a portion of such order attempts to make an adjudication of the physical and mental competency of the defendant, and further said order attempts to fill the vacancy so created thereby. As we read the removal statute no authority is conferred thereby on the circuit court to adjudicate such matters. The removal statute provides only for the removal of the officer on proper proof that he has "refused or neglected" to perform the duties of his office.
The statutory authority for filling vacancies on the board of county commissioners is found in 1 R.S. 1852, ch. 20, § 1, p. 224; Acts 1929, ch. 186, § 1, p. 601; 1943, ch. 9, § 1, p. 18; 1945, ch. 261, § 1, p. 1189, being § 26-601 Burns' 1948 Replacement. The portion of said statute applicable reads as follows, "Whenever a vacancy shall occur in the office of commissioner; or whenever a commissioner who has qualified shall die or resign before the commencement of the term for which he was elected and no general election will occur between the time of such death or resignation and the beginning of such term, the commissioners in office at any time after the occurrence of such death or resignation so producing such vacancy ... in the office ..., shall elect some *151 qualified elector to fill such vacancy ...; provided, however, in case of a tie, the auditor of the county shall cast the deciding vote." (Emphasis supplied.)
No statutory authority exists, under either the removal statute, or the statute providing for the filling of vacancies on the board of county commissioners, conferring jurisdiction on the circuit or any other court, to fill such vacancy. Therefore so much of said order as pertains to the filling of such vacancy is a complete nullity.
The record in the instant case discloses an unseemly haste, inconsistent with the degree of judicial restraint required by the concurring opinion in State ex rel. Ayer v. Ewing, supra.
*152 The original information (accusation) did not contain the necessary averments to bring the action within the purview of the removal statute, consequently the trial court had no jurisdiction to try or remove the defendant commissioner.
The so called Second Paragraph of information was in effect such "an accusation" as required the defendant to be cited into court "not more than ten (10) nor less than five (5) days" from July 31, 1959, in conformity with the requirements of the removal statute. The failure to cite the defendant, coupled with the court's allowance of only fifteen minutes to prepare a defense to said accusation, only minutes after the alleged second paragraph of information was filed, certainly deprived the defendant of his constitutional rights, due process and violated the removal statute itself. The court had no jurisdiction to hear and determine any of the issues raised in said paragraph.
Finally, if the court had jurisdiction to hear both accusations, which it did not, and under the removal statute could not have had on August 31, 1959, it exceeded its jurisdiction by its findings that the defendant "is mentally and physically unable" to conduct the business of his office, and by its order directing the one surviving commissioner to fill two vacancies. The court's jurisdiction is limited to a strict letter of the statute in such proceedings.
The majority opinion states "In this original action the Supreme Court can do no more than decide whether the respondent court exceeded its lawful jurisdiction. We have no power to review any alleged errors of discretion or judgment of the trial court in the action before it." That generally is the rule, but in cases, such as this, where the trial court had no jurisdiction or where it exceeds its lawful jurisdiction then this court *153 has the power, the right and the duty sua sponte to direct the trial court to expunge its record and to prohibit said court from proceeding further in said cause. State ex rel. Ayer v. Ewing, supra.
A writ should have been issued mandating the trial court to expunge the order of August 31, 1959, and prohibiting said court from proceeding further in said cause.
NOTE.  Reported in 162 N.E.2d 505.