Title: Hennessy v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2022 WI 2 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP1206 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Daniel J. Hennessy, Jr. and Jane E. Hennessy, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 394 Wis. 2d 357,950 N.W. Wis. 2d 357 
PDC No:2020 WI App 64 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 14, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 4, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
William S. Pocan   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous 
Court.  DALLET, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which 
HAGEDORN and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs filed by Daniel A. Manna, John Franke, Tamar B. Kelber, 
and Gass Weber Mullins LLC, Milwaukee. There was an oral 
argument by Daniel A. Manna. 
 
For defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by Nina 
G. Beck, Michael B. Apfeld, Daniel J. Blinka, and Godfery & 
Kahn, S.C., Milwaukee. There was an oral argument by Nina G. 
Beck. 
 
 
 
 
2022 WI 2 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2019AP1206 
(L.C. No. 
2016CV8617) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Daniel J. Hennessy, Jr. and Jane E. Hennessy, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 14, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous 
Court.  DALLET, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which 
HAGEDORN and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.   This is a review of 
a published decision of the court of appeals, Hennessy v. Wells 
Fargo Bank, N.A., 2020 WI App 64, 394 Wis. 2d 357, 950 
N.W.2d 877, affirming an order of the Milwaukee County circuit 
court1 that domesticated a Mexican judgment in favor of Wells 
Fargo Bank, N.A., and against Daniel and Jane Hennessy. 
                                                 
1 The Honorable William S. Pocan presided.  
No. 2019AP1206   
 
2 
 
¶2 
The Hennessys argue that the circuit court incorrectly 
held that, under Mexican law, the foreign judgment was valid and 
personally enforceable against them.  In the process, the 
Hennessys ask that this court alter the standard for reviewing 
issues of foreign law and consider such issues de novo as 
questions of law.  In addition, the Hennessys claim that the 
circuit court should not have domesticated the Mexican judgment 
under principles of comity.  
¶3 
In Wisconsin, a foreign country's law must be proven 
before a circuit court as a question of fact.  We reaffirm this 
principle and decline the Hennessys' invitation to consider 
foreign law de novo.  Upon a review of the record, the court 
cannot conclude that the circuit court's interpretation of 
Mexican law was clearly erroneous.  Further, the circuit court 
did not erroneously exercise its discretion by choosing to 
recognize the Mexican judgment in Wisconsin.  Thus, the court of 
appeals is affirmed, and Wells Fargo's judgment against the 
Hennessys was properly domesticated. 
 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶4 
The Hennessys took out a loan of $7.5 million owed to 
Wells Fargo to build a condominium in San Jose del Cabo, Mexico.  
As part of the transaction, the parties signed three separate 
agreements.  They executed a construction loan agreement, a 
promissory note, and an addendum to the note. These documents 
are governed by Wisconsin law and are written in English.  In 
addition, the parties entered into a trust agreement.  The trust 
No. 2019AP1206   
 
3 
 
held the property underlying the transaction as collateral in 
case of the Hennessys' default.  Mexican law governs the trust 
agreement, which is written in Spanish.  
¶5 
The agreements are closely interlinked and reference 
each other.  For instance, the loan agreement stated that the 
security 
is 
"granted . . . under 
the 
Guaranteed 
Trust 
Agreement."  The trust agreement, for its part, stated that the 
Hennessys must "comply with all obligations [they] assumed under 
the Loan Documents," and, in the case of default, the Hennessys 
were obligated to "immediately pay any and all amounts [they] 
owe[] under the Loan Documents."    
¶6 
The Hennessys defaulted under the agreements, and in 
May 2012, Wells Fargo initiated a foreclosure action in Mexico. 
Wells Fargo filed its lawsuit before the Eighth District Civil 
Court, a Mexican federal court located in Mexico City ("the 
Mexican district court").  Wells Fargo claimed it was entitled 
to payment for amounts owed under the transaction agreements 
and, if payments were not made, possession of the property as 
collateral.  As an exhibit to the complaint, Wells Fargo 
attached the loan agreement, the note and its addendum, and the 
trust agreement.   
¶7 
In March 2014, the Mexican district court issued a 
judgment in favor of Wells Fargo ("the Mexican judgment"), and 
both parties appealed the decision.  In October 2014, an 
appellate court, the Third Unitary Court of Mexico ("the Mexican 
appellate court"), affirmed in part the Mexican district court's 
decision and awarded a judgment in favor of Wells Fargo.  The 
No. 2019AP1206   
 
4 
 
Mexican appellate court amended the judgment issued by the 
district court.  It stated in relevant part:2 
 
The plaintiff partially proved its claim, and the 
defendants 
did 
not 
prove 
their 
counterarguments; 
consequently, the defendants are sentenced to pay the 
plaintiff the principal amount of US$ 7,500,000.00 
(seven million, five hundred thousand and 00/100 
United States dollars, legal tender in the United 
States of America), in its equivalent in national 
currency (pesos) at the time that payment is made. 
 
In addition, the defendants are sentenced to pay 
unpaid ordinary interest accrued both during and after 
the construction period, which may be quantified in 
enforcement of a judgment in accordance with what was 
stipulated in all of the loan documents admitted into 
court as evidence.  
 
The defendant is informed that if it does not pay 
the foregoing amounts, it will be ordered to deliver 
to the plaintiff the property with which it guaranteed 
the promissory note in the loan agreement, so that the 
property can be auctioned off according to the terms 
of the chapter that applies to this matter. 
 
. . . The defendants are sentenced to pay the 
claim identified in section (d) of the demand, 
consisting of payment of the delay fee and expenses 
and commissions caused, which may be quantified in 
enforcement of the judgment, in accordance with what 
was stipulated in all of the loan documents admitted 
into court as evidence. 
 
. . . The defendants are sentenced in trial court 
to pay court costs. 
¶8 
No further appeal was taken in the case, and the 
Mexican judgment, as amended by the Mexican appellate court, was 
                                                 
2 The judgment was written originally in Spanish.  However, 
the 
parties 
submitted 
into 
evidence 
a 
certified 
English 
translation of the document.  No party disputes the accuracy of 
the translation.  
No. 2019AP1206   
 
5 
 
indisputably final and binding upon the parties.  In the summer 
of 2017, the property was transferred from the Hennessys to 
Wells Fargo. 
¶9 
In November 2016, the Hennessys filed a complaint in 
the Milwaukee County circuit court.  They sought a declaratory 
judgment that Wells Fargo was barred under the applicable 
statute of limitations from bringing a breach of contract claim 
under Wisconsin law based on the Hennessys' failure to pay their 
loan obligations.  In May 2017, Wells Fargo filed a counterclaim 
seeking domestication of the Mexican judgment.  In August 2017, 
the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Hennessys for their declaratory judgment claim.  The circuit 
court held that any breach of contract action by Wells Fargo was 
time barred, but stated that the order did not affect Wells 
Fargo's action to enforce the Mexican judgment. 
¶10 To 
resolve 
Wells 
Fargo's 
remaining 
request 
for 
domestication, the circuit court divided the proceedings into 
two phases.  First, the circuit court heard arguments on the 
effect and meaning of the Mexican judgment under Mexican law.  
Second, the circuit court determined whether to recognize the 
Mexican judgment under principles of comity.  
¶11 For the first phase of the proceedings, the Hennessys 
claimed that the Mexican order was not a valid judgment 
enforceable against them personally.  Specifically, they claimed 
that the Mexican courts had resolved only in rem claims, and no 
No. 2019AP1206   
 
6 
 
in personam money judgment against the Hennessys had been 
entered.3  
¶12 The circuit court received briefing from the parties, 
including hundreds of pages of exhibits on Mexican law.  On 
June 11, 2018, and July 17, 2018, the circuit court held 
hearings at which the parties presented their arguments.  In 
addition, experts testified on the substance and meaning of 
Mexican law.  Wells Fargo presented Alejandro Osuna-Gonzalez, an 
attorney who taught law classes and practiced in Mexico.  He 
testified that the Mexican judgment was final and enforceable 
against the Hennessys.  In addition, Mr. Osuna explained that, 
under the Mexican judgment, Wells Fargo could seek monetary 
compensation for any difference between the value of the 
collateral and the amounts still owed to Wells Fargo.  In 
response, the Hennessys presented the testimony of Georgina 
Fabian, an attorney who practiced commercial law in Mexico.  
Ms. Fabian stated that under Mexican law a creditor cannot 
combine an in rem and an in personam action.  Thus, according to 
the Hennessys' expert, because Wells Fargo pursued foreclosure 
proceedings in Mexico, a form of in rem relief, the Mexican 
judgment could not extend to the Hennessys personally for any 
money judgment or deficiency.  
                                                 
3 The Hennessys argued that Wells Fargo sought an action for 
transfer of the property as collateral, thus making the nature 
of the lawsuit in rem.  By contrast, the Hennessys claimed that 
if Wells Fargo had sought a judgment for money, or for a 
deficiency after the collateral had been sold, the lawsuit would 
have been in personam.  
No. 2019AP1206   
 
7 
 
¶13 On October 16, 2018, the circuit court issued a 
written decision holding that the Mexican judgment was valid and 
could be enforced against the Hennessys personally.  The circuit 
court reasoned that the Mexican judgment mandated that the 
Hennessys either pay the amounts owed to Wells Fargo or 
surrender the property as collateral.  Under Mexican law, if the 
Hennessys failed to pay Wells Fargo, the bank could recover any 
deficiency remaining after the collateral was sold, and, by 
seeking a deficiency, Wells Fargo was enforcing the Mexican 
judgment.  Thus, the circuit court credited Wells Fargo's expert 
and rejected the Hennessys' argument that the Mexican judgment 
provided only in rem relief.   
¶14 After issuing its October 2018 decision, the circuit 
court continued to the second phase of the proceedings and 
considered whether to domesticate the Mexican judgment.  The 
circuit court again accepted briefing and exhibits, and on 
April 11, 2019, a hearing was held.  At the hearing, the circuit 
court concluded, under principles of comity, that Wells Fargo 
was entitled to recognition of the Mexican judgment.  
¶15 On May 20, 2019, the circuit court entered an order 
"recognizing" the Mexican judgment, and on June 20, 2019, the 
circuit court ordered the clerk of court to enter the judgment 
against the Hennessys.  In the June 20 order, the circuit court 
stated that Wells Fargo was entitled to $7.5 million, "plus 
unpaid ordinary interest accrued both during and after the 
construction period."  In addition, the circuit court awarded 
Wells Fargo "delay fees, expenses, and commissions in accordance 
No. 2019AP1206   
 
8 
 
with . . . the underlying loan documents," as well as "court 
costs incurred in Mexico."  Finally, the order allowed Wells 
Fargo to "foreclose on the underlying collateral . . . and to 
seek any resulting deficiency."  
¶16 The Hennessys appealed, and, on September 15, 2020, 
the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision. 
Hennessy, 394 Wis. 2d 357, ¶47.  The court of appeals first 
rejected the Hennessys' argument that the Mexican judgment was 
not valid and enforceable against them personally under Mexican 
law.  Id., ¶¶14-33.  It noted that, in Wisconsin, the substance 
of foreign laws is treated as a question of fact.  Id., ¶¶15-18.  
The court of appeals continued, holding that the circuit court's 
finding that the Mexican judgment provided both in rem and in 
personam relief was not clearly erroneous.  Id., ¶¶19-30.  
Further, the court of appeals found that it was not clearly 
erroneous for the circuit court to read the Mexican judgment as 
permitting monetary relief against the Hennessys, despite the 
fact that the loan agreement, note, and addendum were governed 
by Wisconsin law.  Id., ¶¶31-33.  Finally, the court of appeals 
rejected the Hennessys' argument that the circuit court had 
erroneously exercised its discretion by domesticating the 
Mexican judgment under principles of comity.  Id., ¶¶34-46.  In 
particular, the court of appeals did not agree with the 
Hennessys that the inclusion of unquantified interest, damages, 
fees, and costs in the Mexican judgment rendered domestication 
inappropriate.  Id., ¶¶43-45. 
No. 2019AP1206   
 
9 
 
¶17 The Hennessys petitioned for our review, and on 
February 24, 2021, we granted that petition. 
 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶18 The Hennessys ask this court to alter its current 
standard for reviewing questions of a foreign country's law.4  In 
addition, the Hennessys seek reversal of the circuit court and 
court of appeals based upon their interpretations of the Mexican 
judgment and on international comity.  We will first address the 
Hennessys' arguments on the proper standard of review.5 
A.  Interpretation Of Foreign Law 
¶19 For centuries, the common law established that, unlike 
the laws of the domestic jurisdiction, a foreign country's laws 
must be pleaded and proven as facts.  See Animal Sci. Prods., 
Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co. Ltd., 585 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 
1865, 1872-73 (2018); Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187, 
                                                 
4 The Hennessys admit that they did not challenge the 
standard of review for questions of foreign law in the courts 
below.  Generally, issues "will not be considered for the first 
time on appeal."  State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 604, 563 
N.W.2d 501 (1997).  But the rule "is not absolute."  Apex Elecs. 
Corp. v. Gee, 217 Wis. 2d 378, 384, 577 N.W.2d 23 (1998).  "When 
an issue involves a question of law rather than of fact, when 
the question of law has been briefed by both parties and when 
the question of law is of sufficient public interest to merit a 
decision, this court may exercise its discretion to address the 
issue."  Id.  The issue presented is a question of law, which 
has been thoroughly briefed by the parties and is of statewide 
significance.  Thus, we will consider the issue, despite the 
Hennessys forfeiting the argument in courts below. 
5 For an analysis on the merits of the Hennessys' claims, 
see infra, section III.  
No. 2019AP1206   
 
10 
 
236 (1804) (Marshall, C.J.) ("Foreign laws are well understood 
to be facts which must, like other facts, be proved to exist 
before they can be received in a court of justice."); 31A C.J.S. 
Evidence § 38 (2021) ("Unless authorized by statute . . . the 
law of other nations must be pleaded and proved.").6  
¶20 Over 150 years of jurisprudence, we have recognized 
this basic principle in Wisconsin.  Hull v. Augustine, 23 Wis. 
383, 386 (1868) (noting that a party may establish a defense 
under foreign law by "alleg[ing]" the defense in its pleadings 
and "sustain[ing] this averment by proof on the trial"); Hite v. 
Keene, 149 Wis. 207, 215, 134 N.W. 383 (1912) ("The question of 
what a foreign law is, is always a question of fact."); 
Milwaukee Cheese Co. v. Olafsson, 40 Wis. 2d 575, 580, 162 
N.W.2d 609 (1968) ("[T]he laws of foreign countries must be 
pleaded and proved as any other fact.").  Questions of a foreign 
country's law are "an issue for the court." Wis. Stat. 
§ 902.02(5) (2017-18).7  As questions of fact assigned to circuit 
courts in the first instance, appellate courts review questions 
of a foreign country's law under the "clearly erroneous" 
                                                 
6 In the United States, the laws of other states were 
treated the same as the laws of foreign countries.  Both were 
considered questions of fact.  See Rape v. Heaton, 9 Wis. 328, 
341 (1859) ("When a question depends on the laws of a sister 
state, in our courts, such laws are a part of the evidence in 
the case, and like another fact must be proved by him who holds 
the affirmative." (quotations omitted)). As discussed below, we 
now consider other states' laws as questions of law.  
7 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated.   
No. 2019AP1206   
 
11 
 
standard, not de novo.  Royster-Clark, Inc. v. Olsen's Mill, 
Inc., 2006 WI 46, ¶¶11-12, 290 Wis. 2d 264, 714 N.W.2d 530 
("[T]his court defers to the circuit court's findings of fact 
unless they are unsupported by the record and are, therefore, 
clearly erroneous."); Griffin v. Mark Travel Corp., 2006 WI App 
213, ¶4, 296 Wis. 2d 642, 724 N.W.2d 900 ("A trial court's 
findings of fact [as to the content of a foreign country's laws] 
may not be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly 
erroneous." (quotations omitted)). 
¶21 The requirement that foreign laws be proven as facts 
has close ties to the doctrine of judicial notice.  As explained 
by McCormick on Evidence:  
 
In the ordinary process of finding the applicable law, 
the normal method then is by informal investigation of 
any sources satisfactory to the judge.  Thus, this 
process has been traditionally described in terms of 
the judge taking judicial notice of the law applicable 
to the case at hand.  Indeed, when the source-material 
was not easily accessible to the judge, as in the case 
of "foreign law" or city ordinances, law has been 
treated as a peculiar species of fact, requiring 
formal proof. 
2 McCormick on Evid. The Judge's Task as Law-Finder:  Judicial 
Notice of Law § 335 (8th ed. 2020).  
¶22 Thus, in Wisconsin, our courts by statute "take 
judicial notice of the common law and statutes of every state, 
territory and other jurisdiction of the United States."  Wis. 
Stat. § 902.02(1).  Because courts "may inform [themselves] of 
such 
laws 
in 
such 
manner 
as 
[they] 
may 
deem 
proper," 
§ 902.02(2), and do not rely purely on allegations and evidence 
No. 2019AP1206   
 
12 
 
offered by the parties, courts review questions of other states' 
laws independently.  See, e.g., Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cintas 
Corp. No. 2, 2018 WI 81, ¶¶20-34, 383 Wis. 2d 63, 914 N.W.2d 76 
(reviewing and applying the law of Ohio de novo).  
¶23 Notably, Wis. Stat. § 902.02 explicitly excludes the 
law of foreign countries from judicial notice: 
 
(5) Foreign country.  The law of a jurisdiction 
other 
than 
[the 
states, 
territories 
and 
other 
jurisdictions of the United States] shall be an issue 
for the court, but shall not be subject to the 
foregoing provisions concerning judicial notice. 
§ 902.02(5); see also Milwaukee Cheese, 40 Wis. 2d at 580 
(stating that the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act, 
now codified under § 902.02, "chang[ed] . . . the established 
law" for proving the law of other states but left in place the 
requirement that "the laws of foreign countries . . . be pleaded 
and proved as any other fact").  
¶24 Other states have altered the common law, and have 
allowed courts to decide questions of a foreign country's law 
independently, by permitting courts, whether through rule or 
statute, to take judicial notice of the foreign country's law.  
See, e.g., Mich. R. Evid. 202(a) (2018) ("A court may take 
judicial notice without request by a party of . . . the laws of 
foreign countries."); Harkness v. Harkness, 577 N.W.2d 116, 119 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1998) ("[A trial court's] interpretation of and 
conclusions about American, foreign, and international law are 
reviewed de novo."); In re Estate of Crane, No. 288654, 2010 WL 
935651, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2010) (explaining the 
No. 2019AP1206   
 
13 
 
background and history of Michigan's change in treatment of a 
foreign country's laws after allowing courts to take judicial 
notice of the law).   
¶25 The federal courts have followed a similar path.  In 
1966, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended to 
permit judicial notice of a foreign country's law.  Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 44.1 ("In determining foreign law, the court may consider any 
relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not 
submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.").  The federal rule states explicitly that issues of 
a foreign country's law are "question[s] of law."  Id.; see 
Animal Sci. Prods., 138 S. Ct. at 1873 ("Appellate review, as is 
true of domestic law determinations, is de novo.").  
¶26 Even though Wisconsin's standard of review has been 
long established, the standard has been reaffirmed by this court 
on 
numerous 
occasions, 
and 
Wisconsin's 
statutory 
notice 
provisions on foreign law have not been changed, the Hennessys 
ask that the court resolve issues of foreign countries' laws as 
questions of law.  Whether we treat this issue solely as a 
matter of stare decisis, statutory interpretation, or both, we 
decline to do so. 
¶27 "Any time this court is asked to overturn a prior 
case, we must thoroughly consider the doctrine of stare 
decisis."  Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. Romanshek, 2005 WI 67, 
¶41, 281 Wis. 2d 300, 697 N.W.2d 417.  "Fidelity to precedent 
ensures that existing law will not be abandoned lightly.  When 
existing law is open to revision in every case, deciding cases 
No. 2019AP1206   
 
14 
 
becomes a mere exercise of judicial will, with arbitrary and 
unpredictable results."  Hinrichs v. DOW Chem. Co., 2020 WI 2, 
¶67, 389 Wis. 2d 669, 937 N.W.2d 37 (quoting Schultz v. Natwick, 
2002 WI 125, ¶37, 257 Wis. 2d 19, 653 N.W.2d 266).  Thus, "any 
departure from stare decisis requires special justification."  
Id. (quotations omitted).  
¶28 When asked to overturn precedent, we consider whether 
several factors are present: 
 
(1) Changes or developments in the law have undermined 
the rationale behind a decision; (2) there is a need 
to make a decision correspond to newly ascertained 
facts; (3) there is a showing that the precedent has 
become detrimental to coherence and consistency in the 
law; (4) the prior decision is unsound in principle; 
or (5) the prior decision is unworkable in practice. 
State v. Robinson, 2019 WI 102, ¶50, 389 Wis. 2d 190, 935 
N.W.2d 813 (quotations omitted).  In addition, we frequently 
review "whether reliance interests are implicated" and "whether 
[the decision] has produced a settled body of law."  Johnson 
Controls, Inc. v. Emp'rs Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶99, 264 
Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257.  
¶29 There has been no "[c]hange[] or development in the 
law" that has "undermined the rationale behind" Wisconsin's 
current standard of review for questions of a foreign country's 
law.  Robinson, 389 Wis. 2d 190, ¶50.  The justifications 
underlying the question of fact standard remain valid today.  
Countries use different languages, and have distinct legal 
systems, cultural values, and societal expectations, all of 
which influence legal interpretation and analysis.  As was true 
No. 2019AP1206   
 
15 
 
in centuries past, applying a wholly independent standard of 
review 
to 
a 
foreign 
country's 
jurisprudence 
can 
create 
substantial difficulties for courts, and having a question of 
fact standard can relieve the pressure placed on the judicial 
system.8  The standard places the burden on the parties to 
present what evidence and expert testimony they believe are 
relevant on the issue of foreign law, and limits appellate 
review to clearly erroneous interpretations.  The process may 
serve to facilitate efficient and effective resolution of 
foreign law disputes.  These disputes may otherwise consume 
court resources without consequent development of Wisconsin law. 
¶30 Nonetheless, the Hennessys cite policy rationales in 
support of their position.  They argue that recrafting issues of 
a foreign country's laws as questions of law would allow courts 
to exercise independent judgment, and it would give courts the 
opportunity to fully analyze the substance of foreign law.  We 
explained over 50 years ago in Milwaukee Cheese that, while 
"[i]t is relatively easy to gain access to the laws of the 
states," "[a]ccess to the laws of foreign countries is far more 
difficult.  Even if the laws were readily available, language 
barriers, problems of interpretation, and unfamiliar legal 
                                                 
8 For instance, the instant dispute concerns interrelated 
legal documents that repeatedly cross-reference each other.  The 
loan agreement, the note, and the note's addendum are governed 
by Wisconsin law and are written in English, while the trust 
agreement is governed by Mexican law and is written in Spanish.  
Accurately interpreting the documents and the Mexican judgment 
at issue under a question of law standard could present 
significant linguistic and conceptual challenges.    
No. 2019AP1206   
 
16 
 
systems compound the difficulties involved in a search of the 
law."  40 Wis. 2d at 581; see also Bodum USA, Inc. v. La 
Cafetiere, Inc., 621 F.3d 624, 638-39 (7th Cir. 2010) (Wood, J., 
concurring) ("Exercises in comparative law are notoriously 
difficult, because the U.S. reader is likely to miss nuances in 
the foreign law, to fail to appreciate the way in which one 
branch of the other country's law interacts with another, or to 
assume erroneously that the foreign law mirrors U.S. law when it 
does not.").  The Hennessys fail to cite a single case where 
litigants, under the question of fact standard, were inhibited 
from presenting to the court a full and accurate body of a 
foreign country's law.  Although the Hennessys disagree with the 
circuit court's findings in this case, there is no indication 
that the record was incomplete or somehow inadequate. 
¶31 The Hennessys correctly identify jurisdictions that 
treat issues of foreign law as questions of law, but there are 
in fact other jurisdictions that, like Wisconsin, continue to 
follow the common law approach.  See, e.g., Ramsey County v. Yee 
Lee, 770 N.W.2d 572, 577-78 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) ("Foreign law 
is a matter of fact which the courts of this country cannot be 
presumed to be acquainted with or to take judicial notice of 
unless it is pleaded and proved." (quotations omitted)).  
Moreover, "[i]t is not a sufficient reason for this court to 
overrule 
its 
precedent 
that 
a 
large 
majority 
of 
other 
jurisdictions, with no binding authority on this court, have 
reached 
opposing 
conclusions." 
 
Johnson 
Controls, 
264 
Wis. 2d 60, ¶100.  Similarly, a policy disagreement with a prior 
No. 2019AP1206   
 
17 
 
decision does not, on its own, justify overturning precedent.  
Progressive N. Ins. Co., 281 Wis. 2d 300, ¶¶46, 50 ("[E]ven if 
this court were now persuaded by . . . policy arguments [that 
opposed a prior decision], that is not a sufficient reason to 
overturn the decision.").  
¶32 Further, subsequent review and development in the law 
have not undermined the validity of Wisconsin's standard of 
review.  Cf. Robinson, 389 Wis. 2d 190, ¶¶51-57 (overturning a 
decision from this court when it did not conform to U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent upon which the decision was based); Johnson 
Controls, 264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶105 (reasoning that a decision from 
this court could not be upheld under stare decisis principles 
where the decision could not "be reconciled [with other 
Wisconsin 
precedent] 
without 
generating . . . arbitrary 
and 
illogical distinctions").  On numerous occasions, this court has 
concluded that Wisconsin applies a question of fact standard for 
interpretation of foreign law.  See, e.g., Milwaukee Cheese, 40 
Wis. 2d at 580-81.  There is no indication that the prior 
decisions were wrongly decided, "unsound in principle," or 
subject to change due to "newly ascertained facts."  Robinson, 
389 Wis. 2d 190, ¶50.  The foundational common law principles 
that support Wisconsin's standard have not changed, and the 
challenges that underlie the interpretation of a foreign 
country's law remain.  
¶33 Most significantly, the question of fact standard has 
"produced a settled body of law" that has, over the course of 
many decades, been workable in practice.  Johnson Controls, 264 
No. 2019AP1206   
 
18 
 
Wis. 2d 60, ¶99; Robinson, 389 Wis. 2d 190, ¶50.  The court of 
appeals and this court have consistently relied on the question 
of fact standard for over 150 years.  Hull, 23 Wis. at 386; 
Milwaukee 
Cheese, 
40 
Wis. 2d 
at 
580-81; 
Griffin, 
296 
Wis. 2d 642, ¶4.  This is not a case where a decision, propped 
up on infirm legal grounds, fails "to provide suitable direction 
and consistency to [the] area of the law."  Johnson Controls, 
264 Wis. 2d 60, ¶106.  Quite the opposite.  Wisconsin courts, 
under current law, have a clearly established standard, and they 
have "regularly applied [it] . . . in a consistent manner."  
Progressive N. Ins. Co., 281 Wis. 2d 300, ¶51; see, e.g., 
Griffin, 296 Wis. 2d 642, ¶¶5-15 (applying the standard to 
interpretation of Mexican laws and treaties); Witt v. Realist, 
Inc., 18 Wis. 2d 282, 289-91, 118 N.W.2d 85 (1962) (using the 
question of fact standard to interpret the meaning of German 
law). 
¶34 Additionally, the question of fact standard for the 
law of foreign countries is supported by Wisconsin statutes.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 902.02(5) states that courts may not take 
judicial notice of a foreign country's law, and judicial notice 
is intimately tied to questions of law and de novo review. 
¶35 Wisconsin Stat. § 902.02(1) states explicitly that the 
laws of other states are subject to judicial notice.  Courts do 
not need to rely on the allegations and proofs offered by the 
parties, and thus, courts review questions of other states' laws 
independently.  See, 2 McCormick on Evid., supra ¶21,  § 335 
(explaining 
the 
connection 
between 
judicial 
notice 
and 
No. 2019AP1206   
 
19 
 
independent judicial review).  On appeal, the interpretation of 
other states' laws is a question of law reviewed de novo.  See, 
e.g., Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 383 Wis. 2d 63, ¶¶20-34.  Notably, 
other states have transitioned to a question of law standard for 
foreign countries' laws by allowing courts to take judicial 
notice of the law.  See, e.g., Mich. R. Evid. 202(a) (2018).  
Wisconsin has not done so. 
¶36 Unlike questions of other states' laws, Wis. Stat. 
§ 902.02(5) explicitly excludes the law of foreign countries 
from judicial notice.  See Milwaukee Cheese, 40 Wis. 2d at 580 
(explaining changes made by the legislature in the Uniform 
Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act to require judicial notice 
for other states' laws, while not altering the question of fact 
standard for foreign countries' laws).9  Nowhere in the statutory 
chapter on judicial notice does the legislature permit judicial 
                                                 
9 To the extent that this court, in prior cases, has cited 
the notice statute in support of the question of fact standard, 
this 
bolsters 
the 
argument 
against 
discarding 
our 
past 
decisions, as the Hennessys request.  See Witt v. Realist, Inc., 
18 Wis. 2d 282, 289, 118 N.W.2d 85 (1962) (citing the notice 
provisions in the context of explaining the question of fact 
standard); Milwaukee Cheese Co. v. Olafsson, 40 Wis. 2d 575, 
580, 
162 
N.W.2d 609 
(1968). 
 
Stare 
decisis 
has 
greater 
significance when our prior decisions involve the interpretation 
of statutes.  See Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. Romanshek, 2005 WI 
67, ¶52, 281 Wis. 2d 300, 697 N.W.2d 417 ("This court has long 
been committed to the principle that a construction given to a 
statute by the court becomes a part thereof, unless the 
legislature subsequently amends the statute to effect a change." 
(quotations omitted)); Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 
456 (2015) (explaining that stare decisis "carries enhanced 
force when a decision . . . interprets a statute" because 
"critics of [the] ruling can take their objections across the 
street, and [the legislature] can correct any mistake it sees").  
No. 2019AP1206   
 
20 
 
notice of foreign countries' laws.  In other states that, like 
Wisconsin, still prohibit judicial notice for foreign countries' 
laws, they too consider foreign countries' laws under a question 
of fact standard.  See Yee Lee, 770 N.W.2d at 577-78; Minn. 
Stat. §§ 599.01, 599.08 (2021) (stating that foreign countries 
laws must be proved as facts and are not subject to judicial 
notice).  Considering the statutory context of Wis. Stat. 
§ 902.02, our treatment of other states' law as questions of 
law, and how judicial notice statutes have impacted standards of 
review in other jurisdictions, Wisconsin courts cannot take 
judicial notice of foreign countries' laws, and instead, the 
parties must prove them as facts.   
¶37 In all, we do not accept the invitation to alter 
Wisconsin's standard for interpreting the law of foreign 
countries.  The substance of foreign law remains a question of 
fact that "must be pleaded and proved as any other fact."  
Milwaukee Cheese, 40 Wis. 2d at 580.  The meaning of a foreign 
country's law is an issue reserved in the first instance for the 
circuit court.  Wis. Stat. § 902.02(5).  On appeal, we review 
the circuit court's findings of fact under the clearly erroneous 
standard.   
¶38 When reviewing questions of fact, the standard "is 
highly deferential."  Royster-Clark, 290 Wis. 2d 264, ¶11.   
A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when it is 
against the great weight and clear preponderance of 
the evidence. Therefore, although evidence may have 
presented competing factual inferences, the circuit 
court's findings are to be sustained if they do not go 
No. 2019AP1206   
 
21 
 
against the great weight and clear preponderance of 
the evidence.   
Country Visions Coop. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 2021 WI 35, 
¶19, 396 Wis. 2d 470, 958 N.W.2d 511 (cleaned up).   
B.  International Comity 
¶39 Unlike many states, Wisconsin has not codified the 
manner in which judgments from foreign countries may be 
domesticated and enforced in the state.  For instance, Wisconsin 
has not adopted the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments 
Recognition Act.  Cf. 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12-644 (2021).  
Thus, when considering whether to enforce a foreign country's 
judgment, courts in this state look to the common law and 
traditional doctrines of comity. 
¶40 Under principles of comity, "courts will as a matter 
of discretion rather than obligation defer to the assertion of 
jurisdiction or give effect to the judgments of other states or 
sovereigns out of mutual respect, and for the purpose of 
furthering the orderly administration of justice."  Teague v. 
Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 2000 
WI 79, ¶35, 236 Wis. 2d 384, 612 N.W.2d 709.  "Comity, being a 
rule of practice and not a rule of law, rests upon the exercise 
of sound judicial discretion," and "[t]he scope of comity is 
determinable as a matter of judicial policy."  Sheridan v. 
Sheridan, 65 Wis. 2d 504, 510, 223 N.W.2d 557 (1974).  
¶41 Because comity is the product of sound judicial 
discretion and policy, the doctrine cannot readily be distilled 
into clearly defined rules.  See Disconto Gesellschaft v. 
No. 2019AP1206   
 
22 
 
Terlinden, 127 Wis. 651, 660, 106 N.W. 821 (1906) ("[T]here is 
no uniform and constant practice of nations as to taking 
cognizance of controversies between foreigners."); Hilton v. 
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895) (noting that "comity is, and 
ever must be, uncertain; that it must necessarily depend on a 
variety of circumstances which cannot be reduced to any certain 
rule" (quotations omitted)).  However, over the course of 
centuries, 
courts 
have 
recognized 
several 
well-established 
reasons for declining to recognize a foreign country's judgment.  
¶42 "[R]ights acquired under statute enacted or judgment 
rendered in one state will be given force and effect in another, 
unless, as said, against policy or laws of the state, 
prejudicial to interests of its citizens or against good morals 
and natural justice."  Estate of Steffke v. DOR, 65 Wis. 2d 199, 
203, 222 N.W.2d 628 (1974) (quoting Hughes v. Fetter, 257 Wis. 
35, 39, 42 N.W.2d 452 (1951), reversed on other grounds, 341 
U.S. 609 (1951)).  When considering whether to domesticate a 
foreign judgment, courts may also consider whether parties were 
"given notice and the opportunity to be heard," whether "the 
foreign court had original jurisdiction," and whether the 
foreign court "abided by fundamental standards of procedural 
fairness."  30 Am. Jur. 2d Executions Etc § 585 (2d ed. 2021); 
50 C.J.S. Judgments § 1329 (2021) ("The elements required to 
establish a prima facie case of entitlement to recognition of a 
foreign-country judgment are that the rendering court had 
jurisdiction over the person and subject matter; there was 
timely notice and an opportunity to present a defense; no fraud 
No. 2019AP1206   
 
23 
 
was involved; and the proceedings were according to a civilized 
jurisprudence."); Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law 
§ 482 (1987) (describing the grounds by which a court may refuse 
to recognize a judgment from a foreign country).   
¶43 What is clear is that, when deciding whether to 
recognize a foreign judgment, courts may not reopen the merits 
of the case and consider whether foreign courts accurately 
applied their own law.  See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 202 (explaining 
that comity is supported by the idea that "the whole merits of 
the case were open, at all events, to the parties, however much 
they may have failed to take advantage of them, or may have 
waived any of their rights, a final adjudication has been given 
that a debt or obligation exists which cannot thereafter in that 
[foreign] court be disputed, and can only be questioned in an 
appeal to a higher tribunal"); 30 Am. Jur. 2d, supra ¶42 ("[T]he 
merits of the case should not be tried anew upon the mere 
assertion by a party that the judgment was erroneous in law or 
in fact."); 50 C.J.S., supra ¶42, § 1333 ("It is no ground for 
impeaching a judgment in personam of a foreign court that it is 
erroneous in matter of law, or fact.").  
¶44 The decision to recognize a foreign country's judgment 
is ultimately subject to the circuit court's discretion, and we 
will not disturb the determination "unless there has been an 
erroneous exercise of discretion."  LeMere v. LeMere, 2003 WI 
67, ¶13, 262 Wis. 2d 426, 663 N.W.2d 789; see also Daniel-Nordin 
v. Nordin, 173 Wis. 2d 635, 651, 495 N.W.2d 318 (1993) (holding 
that, when reviewing the application of comity principles to a 
No. 2019AP1206   
 
24 
 
deferral of jurisdiction, we determine whether the circuit court 
"erroneously exercised its discretionary power"); Teague v. Bad 
River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 2003 WI 
118, 
¶69, 
265 
Wis. 2d 64, 
665 
N.W.2d 
899 
("Comity 
is 
discretionary, highly fact specific, and reviewable on appeal 
for erroneous exercise of discretion.").  "We will sustain a 
discretionary act if we find the trial court examined the 
relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, and using a 
demonstrative rational process, reached a conclusion that a 
reasonable judge could reach."  Lane v. Sharp Packaging Sys., 
Inc., 2002 WI 28, ¶19, 251 Wis. 2d 68, 640 N.W.2d 788. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶45 The Hennessys argue that the circuit court incorrectly 
interpreted 
Mexican 
law 
to 
allow 
recovery 
against 
them 
personally under the Mexican judgment.  In addition, the 
Hennessys claim that the circuit court misapplied the doctrine 
of comity.  Wells Fargo disputes both these assertions.  It 
argues that the circuit court accurately interpreted Mexican law 
and properly applied its discretion to domesticate the Mexican 
judgment.  We will address the two issues in turn. 
No. 2019AP1206   
 
25 
 
A.  Interpretation Of Mexican Law 
¶46 The Hennessys argue that, under Mexican law, Wells 
Fargo did not possess a money judgment to domesticate against 
the Hennessys personally.  They claim that because the loan 
agreement and note are governed by Wisconsin law, the Mexican 
courts could not have permitted Wells Fargo to collect any 
deficiency remaining after sale of the property.  We disagree. 
¶47 The circuit court was provided briefing, accepted 
hundreds of pages of exhibits on Mexican law, and listened for 
two days of hearings to two qualified experts on Mexican law.  
Mr. Osuna, the expert Wells Fargo presented, testified in detail 
that the Mexican judgment included both in rem and in personam 
relief.  According to Mr. Osuna, Wells Fargo could both obtain 
the property as collateral and use the Mexican judgment to seek 
any deficiency remaining after the property is sold.  Notably, 
the Mexican judgment on its face states that Wells Fargo is owed 
"the principal amount of US$ 7,500,000.00," as well as interest, 
fees, expenses, and court costs.  Although the judgment states 
that if payment is not made the Hennessys must "deliver to 
[Wells Fargo] the property," the provision does not explicitly 
exclude the possibility that Wells Fargo is entitled to a 
deficiency in its money award after the property is sold.  
¶48 The Hennessys argue that only the loan document and 
note allowed Wells Fargo to collect a deficiency; however, those 
documents are closely tied with the trust agreement.  The 
contracts repeatedly reference each other.  For instance, the 
trust agreement stated that the Hennessys must "comply with all 
No. 2019AP1206   
 
26 
 
obligations [they] assumed under the Loan Documents," and, in 
the 
case 
of 
default, 
the 
Hennessys 
were 
obligated 
to 
"immediately pay any and all amounts [they] owe[] under the Loan 
Documents."  Wells Fargo attached the loan agreement, the note, 
and the trust agreement as attachments to its complaint in 
Mexico, and the Mexican judgment explicitly references amounts 
owed under the other contracts.  Specifically, Wells Fargo is 
entitled to interest, fees, and expenses "in accordance with 
what was stipulated in all of the loan documents admitted into 
court as evidence."  To the extent that the Hennessys believe 
that the Mexican court did not apply its own law correctly or 
improperly awarded relief under the Mexican judgment, they must 
address their complaints to Mexican authorities.  Hilton, 159 
U.S. at 202; 30 Am. Jur. 2d, supra ¶42; 50 C.J.S., supra ¶42, 
§ 1333.  We will not sit as a court of review for the judicial 
systems of other countries.    
¶49 While the Hennessys presented an expert with different 
views on Mexican law, the court cannot conclude that the circuit 
court's decision to credit Wells Fargo and its expert "is 
against the great weight and clear preponderance of the 
evidence."  Country Visions Coop., 396 Wis. 2d 470, ¶19.  While 
the Hennessys may have presented "competing factual inferences," 
that alone does not justify reversal of the circuit court's 
decision.  Id. 
¶50 Consequently, 
we 
affirm 
the 
circuit 
court's 
interpretation of Mexican law.  The circuit court properly 
determined that the Mexican judgment allowed Wells Fargo to 
No. 2019AP1206   
 
27 
 
collect a money judgment from the Hennessys personally and seek 
any deficiency after foreclosure on the property is complete.    
B.  International Comity 
¶51 The Hennessys argue that the circuit court should not 
have 
domesticated 
the 
Mexican 
judgment 
because 
it 
was 
insufficiently specific as to the amounts the Hennessys owed.  
They argue that the judgment does not contain a "sum certain" 
and 
leaves 
open 
additional 
calculations 
of 
deficiencies, 
interest, fees, and expenses owed to Wells Fargo.  Thus, 
according to the Hennessys, the Mexican judgment is not final.  
¶52 The Hennessys do not contend that the Mexican judgment 
is "against [the] policy or laws of [this] state," nor do they 
claim that the Mexican courts lacked jurisdiction.  Estate of 
Steffke, 65 Wis. 2d at 203.  In addition, they do not assert 
that the Mexican proceedings lacked basic procedural guarantees, 
such as notice and the opportunity to be heard.   
¶53 The circuit court found that the Mexican judgment 
permitted Wells Fargo to collect the amounts owed to the bank 
and receive the property as collateral.  According to the 
circuit court, "[a]n attempt to recover a difference in 
value . . . is not a new action that seeks a new judgment; 
rather it is an action that simply seeks to enforce the previous 
judgment."  Thus, "the Mexican [j]udgment is a valid and 
enforceable personal judgment against the Hennessys under the 
laws of Mexico."  No further appeals can be taken regarding the 
Mexican 
judgment, 
and 
for 
all 
intents 
and 
purposes, 
it 
No. 2019AP1206   
 
28 
 
represents the final resolution of the claims brought by Wells 
Fargo against the Hennessys in Mexico. 
¶54 These findings were well supported by the record.  
Mr. Osuna testified explicitly that the Mexican judgment was 
final, and actions undertaken by Wells Fargo to calculate and 
collect deficiencies, interest, expenses, and fees were simply 
procedures to enforce the preexisting judgment.  The judgment 
itself identifies amounts owed to Wells Fargo, namely $7.5 
million, and the property subject to forfeiture.  As explained 
above, the circuit court's findings of fact as to Mexican law 
were not clearly erroneous.  
¶55 Nonetheless, the Hennessys argue that the Mexican 
judgment 
was 
not 
final 
enough, 
citing 
the 
Restatement's 
discussion on the meaning of "final judgment." Restatement 
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law, supra ¶42, § 481 cmt. e ("A 
final judgment [subject to domestication] is one that is not 
subject to additional proceedings in the rendering court other 
than execution.").  
¶56 In its reasoning supporting recognition of the Mexican 
judgment, the circuit court accurately described the facts of 
the case.  It cited the Restatement's definition of a final 
judgment and thoroughly described the Hennessy's arguments 
against domestication.  Point by point, the circuit court 
rejected 
the 
Hennessys' 
contentions. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
explained that the Mexican judgment must be given due respect 
under principles of comity because the judgment definitively 
established personal liability for a sum of money against the 
No. 2019AP1206   
 
29 
 
Hennessys and in favor of Wells Fargo, even though "certain sums 
must still be determined through the process of executing the 
[j]udgment."  The circuit court cited persuasive authority in 
support of its decision.  See Societe d'Amenagement et de 
Gestion de l'Abri Nautique v. Marine Travelift Inc., 324 
F. Supp. 3d 1004, 1012 (E.D. Wis. 2018) (applying Wisconsin law 
and recognizing a French judgment despite the fact that the 
final amount owed "is subject to further computation"); see also 
Ingersoll Mill. Mach. Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d 680, 686 (7th 
Cir. 1987) (holding, in the analogous Uniform Foreign Money 
Judgment Recognition Act context, that a judgment was "final" 
and granted "recovery of a sum of money" despite the fact that 
additional calculations of interest and exchange rates were 
necessary); Nat'l Aluminum Co., Ltd. v. Peak Chem. Corp., 132 F. 
Supp. 3d 990, 998-1000 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (applying Illinois' 
Uniform Foreign Country Money Judgment Recognition Act and 
rejecting an argument that "further calculations, such as any 
applicable interest due," prevented the court from recognizing a 
foreign judgment).  
¶57 Upon a review of the record, this court cannot 
conclude that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion in domesticating the Mexican judgment.  The circuit 
court 
accurately 
examined 
the 
facts, 
recognized 
the 
applicability of the comity doctrine, "us[ed] a demonstrative 
rational process" in applying the doctrine, and came to a 
reasonable conclusion.  Lane, 251 Wis. 2d 68, ¶19.  We affirm 
the circuit court's judgment in favor of Wells Fargo.  
No. 2019AP1206   
 
30 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶58 The Hennessys argue that the circuit court incorrectly 
held that, under Mexican law, the foreign judgment was valid and 
personally enforceable against them.  In the process, the 
Hennessys ask that this court alter the standard for reviewing 
issues of a foreign country's law and consider such issues de 
novo as questions of law.  In addition, the Hennessys claim that 
the circuit court should not have domesticated the Mexican 
judgment under principles of comity.  
¶59 In Wisconsin, a foreign country's law must be proven 
before a circuit court as a question of fact.  We reaffirm this 
principle and decline the Hennessys' invitation to consider 
foreign law de novo.  Upon a review of the record, the court 
cannot conclude that the circuit court's interpretation of 
Mexican law was clearly erroneous.  Further, the circuit court 
did not erroneously exercise its discretion by choosing to 
recognize the Mexican judgment in Wisconsin.  Thus, the court of 
appeals is affirmed, and Wells Fargo's judgment against the 
Hennessys was properly domesticated. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2019AP1206.rfd 
1 
 
 
¶60 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (concurring).  I join the 
majority opinion but write separately only because I would focus 
on Wis. Stat. § 902.02(5), which requires Wisconsin courts to 
treat foreign countries' laws as questions of fact that must be 
proven to the circuit court.  Therefore, I respectfully concur.   
¶61 From statehood through the early 1920s, Wisconsin 
consistently treated all other jurisdictions' laws as questions 
of fact that needed to be pleaded and proven.  See Wis. Stat. 
ch. 98, § 56 (1849) ("The existence and the tenor or effect of 
all foreign laws may be proved as facts by parol evidence."); 
Rape v. Heaton, 9 Wis. 328, 337-41 (1859); Hite v. Keene, 149 
Wis. 207, 217, 134 N.W. 383 (1912).  This rule applied equally 
to the laws of other states and foreign countries and was, at 
the time, the majority (if not universal) approach in other 
states and in the federal courts.  See Heaton, 9 Wis. at 337-41; 
Hite, 149 Wis. at 217; see also, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Federal 
Rule 44.1 and the "Fact" Approach to Determining Foreign Law: 
Death 
Knell 
for 
a 
Die-Hard 
Doctrine, 
65 
Mich. 
L. 
Rev. 613, 621-22 (1967).  Beginning in the early 1920s, however, 
the legislature mandated that Wisconsin courts use a question-
of-law approach, but only as to other states' laws; foreign 
countries' laws remained questions of fact.  The legislature 
accomplished this change by directing Wisconsin courts to "take 
judicial notice" of other states' laws.  See Wis. Stat. 
ch. 176, § 4135m 
(1921) 
(other 
states' 
statutes); 
Wis. 
Stat. § 328.01(1) 
(1947) 
(other 
states' 
common 
law 
and 
statutes).   
No.  2019AP1206.rfd 
2 
 
¶62 To the modern reader, it might seem strange that 
"judicial notice" in this context indicated that courts should 
treat other states' laws as questions of law, not fact.  That's 
because in contemporary usage, "judicial notice" almost always 
refers to judicial notice of facts (sometimes called "judicial 
notice of adjudicative facts").  See Wis. Stat. § 902.01(1)-(2) 
(allowing courts to forgo the rules of evidence for facts that 
are beyond reasonable dispute, generally known, and can be 
easily 
ascertained 
from 
sources 
"whose 
accuracy 
cannot 
reasonably be questioned").  But historically, "judicial notice" 
has also referred to judicial notice of law.  Although "judicial 
notice of law" is a phrase seldom used today, the concept is 
part of everyday legal practice.  It refers to the unremarkable 
fact that the rules of evidence do not apply to judges' 
citations to statutes or judicial opinions.  Judges may simply 
research and cite the applicable law, and the parties are not 
required to prove that law like a fact.  See Getty Petroleum 
Mktg., Inc. v. Cap. Terminal Co., 391 F.3d 312, 324 (1st 
Cir. 2004) (Lipez, C.J., concurring) ("Without acknowledging it 
(and perhaps without even thinking about it) courts take 
judicial notice of law every time they cite a statute or 
judicial decision."); see also 2 McCormick on Evidence § 335 
(8th ed. 2020). 
¶63 Judicial notice remains the norm when it comes to 
other states' laws.  Indeed, Wis. Stat. § 902.02(1) requires 
that approach.  And when a circuit court takes judicial notice 
of another state's law, appellate courts treat the circuit 
court's resulting conclusions like other legal conclusions, 
No.  2019AP1206.rfd 
3 
 
reviewing them independently (or de novo).  See, e.g., Wis. 
Pharmacal Co., LLC v. Neb. Cultures of Cal., Inc., 2016 WI 14, 
¶¶12-13, 16, 57-84, 367 Wis. 2d 221, 876 N.W.2d 72. 
¶64 Foreign 
countries' 
laws, 
however, 
are 
treated 
differently.  In Wis. Stat. § 902.02, which adopted the Uniform 
Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act, the legislature explicitly 
excluded foreign countries' laws from the judicial-notice 
provisions: 
(5) Foreign country. The law of a jurisdiction other 
than those referred to in sub. (1) shall be an 
issue for the court, but shall not be subject to 
the 
foregoing 
provisions 
concerning 
judicial 
notice. 
§ 902.02(5).  On its face, § 902.02(5) might appear to require 
no particular approach to foreign countries' laws.  After all, 
just because foreign countries' laws are not subject to the same 
rules as other states' laws does not necessarily prohibit courts 
from taking judicial notice of foreign countries' laws in all 
circumstances. 
¶65 But the broader statutory context tells a different 
story.  See State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 
WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  Chapter 902 sets 
forth the exhaustive rules for when Wisconsin courts may take 
judicial 
notice 
of 
either 
facts 
or 
law. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. § 902.01 deals with judicial notice of facts, including 
when taking such notice is within a court's discretion and when 
it is mandatory.  The other two provisions in Chapter 902 
discuss judicial of notice of law.  Section 902.03 specifies 
when circuit courts may and when they shall take judicial notice 
of Wisconsin county and municipal ordinances and rules and 
No.  2019AP1206.rfd 
4 
 
orders of Wisconsin and federal agencies.  Section 902.02, 
Wisconsin's version of the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign 
Law Act, directs Wisconsin courts to "take judicial notice of 
the common law and statutes of every state, territory and other 
jurisdiction of the United States."  § 902.02(1).  Contrast that 
with the explicit exclusion of foreign countries' laws from the 
judicial notice provisions in § 902.02(5).  Nowhere in Chapter 
902 does the legislature provide for judicial notice of foreign 
countries' laws.  This context leads to a single conclusion: 
Wisconsin 
courts 
cannot 
take 
judicial 
notice 
of 
foreign 
countries laws; the parties must prove them as facts.1  Cf. 
Switzer v. Weiner, 230 Wis. 599, 601-02, 280 N.W. 509 (1939).   
¶66 This conclusion is bolstered by the Wisconsin cases 
addressing Wis. Stat. § 902.02 and is consistent with the 
practice in other states that have identical statutes.  This 
court 
first 
mentioned 
§ 902.02(5) 
(then 
numbered 
Wis. 
Stat. § 328.01 
(1961-62)) 
in 
Witt 
v. 
Realist, 
Inc., 
18 
Wis. 2d 282, 289 & n.5, 118 N.W.2d 85 (1962), citing it as a 
reason why we could not take judicial notice of German law.  
Although the court did not analyze in depth the meaning 
of § 902.02(5), its holding reinforces the view that § 902.02 
requires foreign countries' laws to be treated as questions of 
fact.  A few years later in Milwaukee Cheese Co. v. Olafsson, 40 
Wis. 
2d 
575, 
579-80, 
162 
N.W.2d 609 
(1968), 
we 
held 
                                                 
1 This 
reading 
also 
makes 
sense 
in 
light 
of 
the 
legislature's practice, unbroken since statehood, of specifying 
how various types of laws may be proven.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. 
ch. 98, § 56 (1849); Wis. Stat. §§ 327.05-.06 (1925-26); Wis. 
Stat. § 328.01 (1927-28); Wis. Stat. § 889.06.   
No.  2019AP1206.rfd 
5 
 
that § 902.02 (then numbered § 891.01 (1967-68)) did not alter 
the rule that "the laws of foreign countries must be pleaded and 
proved as any other fact."  Id.  The court of appeals has been 
even more explicit, explaining that under § 902.02(5) "a court 
may not take judicial notice of foreign country's law" and that, 
as a result, "the issue of what the law of a foreign country 
requires is one of pure fact that must be proved."  Griffin v. 
Mark Travel Corp., 2006 WI App 213, ¶4, 296 Wis. 2d 642, 724 
N.W.2d 900.  Moreover, other states that retain the Uniform 
Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act also treat foreign countries' 
laws as questions of fact, not subject to judicial notice.  See 
DeLima v. Tsevi, 921 N.W.2d 89, 95 (Neb. 2018); Ramsey County v. 
Yee Lee, 770 N.W.2d 572, 577-78 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009); Bianchi 
v. 
Savino 
Del 
Bene 
Int'l 
Freight 
Forwarders, 
Inc., 
770 
N.E.2d 684, 695 (Ill. Ct. App. 2002); James v. James, 45 
S.W.3d 458, 462 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001).    
¶67 Because 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 902.02(5) 
requires 
foreign 
countries' laws be treated as questions of fact, any change to 
that standard must come through legislation.  In fact, the 
states that now allow judicial notice of foreign countries' laws 
have done so either by repealing the Uniform Act or by adding 
additional 
statutes 
or 
rules. 
 
See, 
e.g., 
Fla. 
Stat. 
Ann. § 90.202(4); Cal. Evid. Code §§ 450-52; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3016, 
4511.  In making neither change, Wisconsin is an outlier——by a 
No.  2019AP1206.rfd 
6 
 
wide margin.2  Nevertheless, we are bound by § 902.02(5), and the 
analysis in this case should be rooted in that statute.   
¶68 I am authorized to state that Justices BRIAN HAGEDORN 
and JILL J. KAROFSKY join this concurrence. 
 
                                                 
2 Exact numbers are hard to come by, but it appears that at 
least 41 states have adopted statutes or rules that either 
explicitly allow judicial notice of foreign countries' laws, or 
specify that rulings based on foreign countries' laws are to be 
treated as rulings on questions of law, or both.  Ala. R. Civ. 
P. 44.1; Alaska R. Evid. 202(c)(4); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 44.1; Ark. 
R. Civ. P. 44.1(c); Cal. Evid. Code §§ 450-52; Colo. R. Civ. 
P. 44.1; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-163a; Del. Ch. R. 44.1; Fla. 
Stat. Ann. § 90.202(4); Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-43; Haw. R. Civ. 
P. 44.1; Ind. Tr. P.R. 44.1; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-409(b); La. 
Code Evid. Ann. art. 202; Me. R. Civ. P. 44A; Md. Code § 10-501; 
Mass. R. Civ. P. 44.1; Mich. R. Evid. 202; Miss. Code 
§ 13-1-149; Mont. R. Civ. P. 44.1; Nev. R. Civ. P. 44.1; N.J. R. 
Evid. 201(a); N.M. R. Ann. 1-044; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3016, 4511; N.C. 
R. Civ. P. § 1A-1, R. 44.1; N.D. R. Civ. P. 44.1; Ohio Civ. 
R. 44.1; Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 2201; Or. Rev. Stat. § 40.090(6); 
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5327; R.I. R. Civ. P. 44.1; S.C. R. Civ. P. 
44; S.D. Codified Laws § 19-8-2; Tenn. R. Evid. 202(b); Tex. R. 
Evid. 203; Utah R. Civ. P. 44(f); Vt. R. Civ. P. 44.1(a); Va. 
Stat. § 8.01-386; Wash. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 44.1; W. Va. R. Civ. 
P. 44.1; Wyo. R. Civ. P. 44.  The federal courts have done the 
same.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1.   
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