Title: City of Chattanooga v. McCoy

State: tennessee

Issuer: Tennessee Supreme Court

Document:

645 S.W.2d 400 (1983) CITY OF CHATTANOOGA, Appellant, v. Janet L. McCOY and Patricia Combs, Appellees. Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Knoxville. February 7, 1983. Eugene N. Collins, W. Lee Maddux, Chattanooga, for appellant. Larry G. Roddy, William C. Killian, Chattanooga, for appellees. FONES, Chief Justice. The issue before this Court is the constitutionality of an ordinance of the City of Chattanooga that prohibits nudity, the performance of a number of sex acts, actual or simulated, and the appearance of a female dressed so as "wholly or substantially" to expose to public view one or both breasts, in a public place. The ordinance was enforced in the trial court but the Court of Appeals held it to be overbroad and violative of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States. Defendants were dancers at the Night Haven Lounge in Chattanooga. The undisputed proof was that they performed a dance routine attired in a "g-string" covering their genital areas and "clear pasties," if anything, covering their breasts. After performing the dance each defendant went to a different table and each defendant was observed allowing a male patron to fondle her breasts. Chattanooga Ordinance Number 7420 reads in pertinent part as follows: Perhaps the only statement that can be made with some degree of certainty, considering the state of the law applicable to such ordinances, is that the conduct of which these two defendants were found guilty and convicted may be constitutionally prohibited. The "overbreadth" constitutional problem with this and similar laws is the possibility that the sweep of the prohibitions may bring within their ambit speech, performance, or expression protected by the First Amendment. The City relies upon State v. Baysinger, 397 N.E.2d 580 (Ind. 1979), appeal dismissed 446 U.S. 931, 100 S. Ct. 2146, 64 L. Ed. 2d 783 (1980), where in an analogous situation the Indiana Supreme Court in a three-two decision denied defendants standing to challenge the facial invalidity of an ordinance that defendants insisted was so broad that it would prohibit a wide-range of free expression protected by the First Amendment; that being a First Amendment claim, defendants may raise the rights of others, even though their conduct may constitutionally be prohibited. The State asserted that public nudity was conduct, not speech; that it was not protected by the First Amendment; and that defendants were not entitled to raise the issue of facial invalidity. The Indiana statute declared sexual acts and nudity, in terms similar to the Chattanooga Ordinance, to be "public indecency." The conduct of which defendants in Baysinger were charged and convicted was nude dancing and nude appearances in lounges and bars. In Baysinger, after reviewing a number of United States Supreme Court cases,[1] the Court drew these conclusions: (1) that certain public conduct which involves nudity may be regulated on a standard different from that provided for movies or books; (2) that states may prohibit public nudity without requiring proof of obscenity; and (3) that there is no First Amendment right to appear nude in public, only a constitutional requirement "to tolerate or to allow some nudity as a part of some larger form of expression meriting protection, when the communication of ideas is involved." 397 N.E.2d at 587. *402 Finally, in rejecting defendants' First Amendment claim and holding the statute constitutional as a valid exercise of the police powers, the Indiana Supreme Court said: In Gabriele v. Town of Old Orchard Beach, 420 A.2d 252 (Me. 1980), the Maine Supreme Court relied upon Baysinger and the significance of the United States Supreme Court's dismissing the appeal, in rejecting a constitutional attack on an ordinance similar to the one under consideration here. We quote the following from that decision: In People v. Garrison, 82 Ill. 2d 444, 45 Ill.Dec. 132, 412 N.E.2d 483 (1980), appeal dismissed 450 U.S. 961, 101 S. Ct. 1475, 67 L. Ed. 2d 610 (1981), a "public indecency" statute with a "public place" definition more expansive than the Chattanooga ordinance was upheld in the face of an overbreadth *403 attack. The Illinois court reasoned, in part, as follows: Grand Faloon Tavern, Inc. v. Wicker, 670 F.2d 943 (11th Cir.1982), and Kew v. Senter, 416 F. Supp. 1101 (N.D.Tex. 1976), reach the same result for reasons similar to those expressed in Baysinger, Gabriele and Garrison. We recognize that there are cases holding similar statutes to be overbroad, perhaps greater in number than those following the Baysinger approach. We agree with the comment of the Indiana Supreme Court that this area of the law "is confused by the consideration of overlapping concepts of nudity, public indecency, and obscenity in differing contexts." 397 N.E.2d at 585. In the instant case, defendants assert no claim that their conduct involved any speech or expression of ideas entitled to First Amendment protection. Their challenge is based upon an alleged facial invalidity, that in substance says, some other person or persons may be prohibited from presenting in a public place an artistic, socially redeeming expression of ideas that involves some nudity. The obvious thrust of the Chattanooga ordinance is to outlaw nudity and indecent sexual conduct in public without any express or implied intent to suppress or prohibit any legitimate speech or expression entitled to First Amendment protection. It is a travesty to allow nude and crude public exhibitors of the human body, the privilege of asserting the rights of persons who contribute to society's permanent values and are entitled to First Amendment protection, and to read into a public indecency statute an intent to suppress free speech and expression. This Court is not willing to follow those cases that would recognize defendants' First Amendment claim of overbreadth as valid. Any overbreadth in this ordinance is, in our opinion, minimal and insignificant. We understand Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 93 S. Ct. 2908, 37 L. Ed. 2d 830 (1973) to hold that where, as here, conduct, not speech, is sought to be regulated, the overbreadth must not only be real, but substantial as well, to violate the Federal Constitution. We hold the Chattanooga ordinance to be a valid exercise of the police powers of the State. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and that of the trial court affirmed. Remanded for entry of appropriate orders and enforcement of convictions. Costs are assessed against defendants. COOPER, BROCK, HARBISON and DROWOTA, JJ., concur. [1] Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 95 S. Ct. 2561, 45 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1975); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 95 S. Ct. 2268, 45 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1975); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 93 S. Ct. 2908, 37 L. Ed. 2d 830 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1973); reh. denied, 414 U.S. 881, 94 S. Ct. 26, 38 L. Ed. 2d 128 (1973); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 93 S. Ct. 390, 34 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1972), reh. denied, 410 U.S. 948, 93 S. Ct. 1351, 35 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1973).