Title: State v. Espiritu.

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

‘+++FOR PUELICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER**+

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T

 

 

o00--~

Respondent /Plaintiff-Appellee

ant

 

CHRISTOPHER K. ESPIRITU,
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant

OO! Kd 82 Nye.

 

No. 27354

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CR. NOS. 2-1-0666; 03-1-0635)

JANUARY 26, 2008

MOON, C.J, LEVINSON, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.z
BND NAKAYAMA, J., DISSENTING

OPINION OF THE COURT BY ACOBA, J.

Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Christopher K. Espiritu
(Petitioner) f1led an application for writ of certiorari on
october 3, 2007, seeking review of the judgment of the
Intermediate Court of Appeals (the ICA) filed on July 5, 2007,
pursuant to its May 31, 2007 Summary Disposition Order (S00)
affirming the May 18, 2005 judgment of the Circuit Court of the

Second Circuit? (the court) convicting Petitioner of attempted

 

murder in the second degree (Count 1), carrying or use of a

‘The sunnary disposition order wes issued by Chief Judge Mark
Recktenwale, and Arasciate Judges Corinne K.A. Watanabe and Oeniel R. Foley.

 

+ the Honorable Joel £. August presided.

1
‘+4F0R PUBLICATION IN WEST’ § HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTERS+#

 

firearm in the commission of a separate felony (Count 2) (Cr. No.
03-1-0635), and place to keep firearm (Count 3) (Cr. No. 02-1-
0666), and sentencing him to concurrent terms of life
imprisonment with the possibility of parole on Count 1, twenty
years on Count 2, and ten years on Count 3.? Respondent/
Plaintiff-Appellee State of Hawai'i (Respondent) did not file a
memorandum in opposition. For the reasons stated herein, we
affizm the ICA judgment in part, vacate the judgment in part,
vacate the court’s judgment in part, and remand for a new trial
as to Counts 1 and 2. See supra note 3.
1

‘The essential facts as set forth in the Application

stated:

At trial, the complaining witness, (ene
Complainant], cestified extensively regarding the events of
Decenber 4, 2002 and her relationship with Petitioner,
leading up'to that day. (The Complainant] testified thet she
Hest met [Petitioner] around dune or July of 2001 at the
Fish and Gane Sar on Maui. (The Complainant] estimated that
she was in a “dating relationship" or sexual relationship
itn" [eetitioner] for sbout two months. After the “dating
Felationship” ended, [the Complainant] continued to hat
Contact with (Petitioner)

 

 

 

 

On December 4, 2002, the Complainant finished work and met Derek

Liburd (Liburd) at the Fish and Game Bar. Thereafter the

> Petitioner does not expressly state what counts he challenges.

Instead, Petitioner refers to the entire S00 issued by the ICA that affirmed
all of his convictions. However, Petitioner’ arguments only address Count 1.
Because Petitioner presents no discernible argunent on count 3) wer
Petitioner's conviction on Count Sand renand the case for a new trial
Count 1, the charge of
charge of use of @ fire; te felony, inasmuch as
that count apparently refers to the seperate felony charged in Count 1

104 Hawaii 462, €64 1.2, 92 F.3d 471, 473 Ne? (2004) (atating
that the appellate courts have discretion to disregard claims for which no
discernable argunent was presented)

   

 

 

 
4s+4FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAKAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER*#*

Complainant and Liburd went to the Complainant's home and had
sex.

According to the Application,

winiie they were in the bedroom, the motion detector light
by (the Complainant's) window went off, so they looked
butside bur they dign't see anything. [The Complainant) and
Tiiburd) continued to have sex.

Not very long after the motion 1ight went off, [the
Complainant] saw [fetitioner] at the bottom of her stairs
Outside her besroom with e gun. [Liburd) struggled with
[Petitioner] and then (the Complainant] saw {Liburd) run up

 

the stair... «(The Complainant] stated that
[retitionez] had the gun next to the left cheek of her
face. ss + (the Complainant] testified that [Petitioner]
told her “yu are going to die tonight” and “we're both
going to die.” . «Then [Petitioner] shot [the
Complainant)

Foltgwing the shooting, Detective Chad Viela
Anterviewes [the Complainant}. [who] showed Detective
Viela four text mestages fron her Cell phone tht she had
allegedly received from (Petitioner] between Novenber 23,
2002Sna December 4, 2002. - =

Additionally, Anthony Manoukian [Dr. Manoukian],
forensic pathologist, testified regarding the projected
Gistence ef the gun fren [the Complainant] snd tne position
of the shooter based on the trajectory of the bullet, Over
Sefense objection, Dr. Manoukian performed e live
Senonstration as to the position of the gun at the tine of
he shooting end whether he (Or. Manoukian} could reach the
oun

 

 

Petitioner did not testify.
n.
In his Application, Petitioner lists the following
questions:

1, Whether the [ICA] gravely erred by failing to analyze

whether [the Complainant's) testimony violated the hearssy

find the best evidence rules?

IT. ‘Whether the [Ick] gravely erred by failing to spply

itauai's Rule[e] of Evidence [(HRE) Rule} 403 and whether the

{300} 42 inconsistent with Yap v. Co

Honoluls, Ine., 76 (Hawai'i) 248, €72 P.2a 1921 (1934) and
82 [Mawei't) 428, 922 P.2a

204T (TApp.} 1996)?

Tit, ‘shether the [ICA] gravely erred by determining that
the prosecutor's improper closing and rebuttal statements
here not prosecutorial sisconduct where the prosecutor
misstated the law cn at least two occasions?

 

 

 

 
 

‘S*9FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
We hold that (1) the ICA did not err in ruling that the

court acted in accordance with the HRE, including the hearsay and
best evidence rules, in allowing the Complainant to review a
police report describing the four text messages allegedly sent to
her by Petitioner and to testify about those messages, (2) the
results of the demonstration of Dr. Manoukian and its effect on
Petitioner's case are unclear, and (3) the ICA gravely erred in
determining that in closing argument the prosecutor did not
misstate the law regarding the extrene mental or emotion
disturbance (BED) defense and that there is a reasonable
possibility that these misstatements contributed to Petitioner's
conviction.‘
uu.
aA

The following facts are relevant to the first question.

After the shooting, Detective Viela interviewed the
Complainant. During the interview, the Complainant showed
Detective Viela four text messages that she saved on her cell
phone and alleged that Petitioner sent these messages to her
between Novenber 29, 2002, and Decenber 4, 2002. Petitioner's
defense counsel objected to the Complainant testifying about the
contents of the text messages.

Defense counsel contended that the Complainant’s

testimony regarding the text messages would be “double hearsay”

 

 

fe remand the case, we address ll the questions

raised by Petitioner as set forth in our nolsing

 
‘++4FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER!*#

 

because the messages were copied onto note paper that was
destroyed and the messages were copied by Detective Viele rather
than by the Complainant herself. Respondent argued that the
contents of the text message(s] were “not hearsay because [they
are] statement [s} from the [Petitioner)” and therefore fit within
the hearsay exception that allows the introduction into evidence
of “[a]ny statement by the party opponent.”

Respondent also argued that the Complainant was allowed
to testify on the messages after reviewing the police report
because “[w]hat was copied on the [report] is going to be used to
refresh her recollection.” Defense counsel countered
Respondent's points by maintaining that the hearsay exception was
inapplicable because “the messages may have cone from
[Petitioner's] cell phone, but that doesn’t prove who they are
from,” and, thus, the text messages were “still hearsay.”
Counsel also declared that the Complainant’s memory would not be
refreshed as to the contents of the messages when she received
them because “what she’s going to have @ memory of is reading the
report, which is still hearsay.”

The court stated that the Complainant’s testimony was
not the best evidence with regard to the text messages as “the
best evidence probably would have been photographs” of the actual
messages on the cell phone. Nonetheless, the court permitted the

Complainant to testify on the content of the text messages,
 

"FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAWAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTE:

reasoning that the issues raised by defense counsel would “go to

 

the weight” of the testimony.

 

The Complainant testified that the first text message
was received on Novenber 28, 2002, She stated, “The gist was
sonething like(,] ‘The true face shows, I guess, ali the brothers
and sisters were right.’ Respondent showed a copy of the police
report including the date, time, and message to refresh the
Complainant's recollection after she could not remenber the tine
at which she received the message. Respondent did not ask if the
Complainant's memory was refreshed before proceeding to question
the Complainant on the first text message. After looking at the
report, Complainant testified that the precise words of the first
message were, “The true face shows all the guys ond girls were
right.”

2.

The Complainant testified that she received the second
text message on Novenber 29 or Novenber 30, and although she
could not renenber the subject matter, she remembered that she
perceived it as having “a threatening nature” and had “to do with
the word going to the locals, or something like that.”

Respondent asked the Complainant if seeing the report
hich contained the date, time, and contents of the second

message would refresh her memory, to which the Complainant agreed
‘s++FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

that it would. After viewing the report, Respondent asked the
Complainant if her memory was refreshed and the Complainant
agreed that it was refreshed. The Complainant testified that she
received the second text message on November 30, and the words of
the message were, “I'm tired of being the sucker. What goes
around comes around.”
3.

The Complainant testified that the third message
informed her that the “word” was “going to go cut to the locals.”

Respondent asked the Complainant if seeing the report
which contained the date, time, and contents of the second
message would refresh her memory, to which the Complainant agreed
that it would. After viewing the report, Respondent asked the
Complainant if her menory was refreshed and the Complainant
agreed that it was refreshed. The Complainant testified that the
third text message stated, "You should have talked to me, but
you’ ze too pig-headed for our kind. There’s a new message going
out to the locals.”

‘a

‘The Complainant testified that she received the fourth
text on December 4, 2002, shortly before the shooting, and that
it said, “I have to say I’m so, so sorry.” The Complainant did
not review the police report to refresh her memory regarding the

fourth text message.
 

POR FUELICATION IN WEST’ S HAKAI'T REFORES AND PACIFIC REPORTER*

W.

As to the first question, Petitioner maintains that the
following precepts control: (1) “Iw]here the facts necessary to
admissibility are disputed, the offering party has the burden of
proof by a preponderance of the evidence(}” (quoting State vw.
West, 98 Hawai'i 452, 460, 24 P.3d 648, 656 (2001) (brackets

omitted)); (2) “[tJhe court must consider whether @ witness can

 

testify from personal knowledge and specifically whether the
witness perceived the event about which the witness testifies and
has a present recollection of that perception[]” (citing State v.
Dibenedette, 60 Hawai'i 138, 144-45, 906 P.2d 624, 630-31 (App.
1995); Commentary to HRE Rule 602); (3) “[a] witness may use a
writing to refresh his or her memory for the purpose of
testifying|]” (quoting HRE Rule 612 (1993) ; Dibenedetto, 80
Hawai'i at 144, 906 P.2d at 630) (brackets omitted), “[hlowever,
the witness must testify from her refreshed recollection, not
from a memory of the writing itself[]” (citing State v. Ferrer,
98 Hawai'i 409, 432-33, 23 P.3d 744, 767-68 (App. 2001).
A

Based on these premises, Petitioner asserts that
(2) the Complainant’s testimony about the text messages was
Gouble hearsay because the “text messages read by [the
Complainant] contained multiple hearsay statements and were
neither originals nor duplicates{,]” and (2) the Complainant's

testimony about the text messages was not admissible under HRE
/++FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HANAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER®*

 

Rule 612 because “(Respondent) failed to meet its burden of
proving that [the Complainant's] memory was refreshed by the
police report.” According to Petitioner, “{Respondent] failed to
show that [the Complainant} was testifying from her revived
memory rather than a menozy of the writing itself.” (Citing
Ferrer, 95 Hawai'l at 432-33, 23 P.3d at 767-68.)

5.

1

 

As to the first argument regarding hearsay, Petitioner
contends in his opening brief that the text messages are hearsay.
Hearsay is defined by HRE Rule 601 (2002) as “a statement, other
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.” “Hearsay is not admissible at trial unless it
qualifies as an exception to the rule against hearsay.” State v.
Zukevich, 84 Hawai'i 203, 205, 932 P.2d 340, 342 (App. 1997)
(internal citations omitted). “Hearsay included within hearsay
is not excluded under the hearsay rule if each part of the
combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay
rule” provided under the HRE. HRE Rule 805 (1993). Although
Petitioner and Respondent cite no cases, they are correct as to
their position that a text message is hearsay if offered to prove
the truth of the matter asserted. See State v. Franklin, 121

P.3d 447, 451-82. (Kan. 2005) (holding that a text message
 

}FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ § HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER’
constituted hearsay insofar as it was offered to prove the truth

of the statement asserted),

However, Petitioner concedes that the actual text
messages would arguably be admissible as an exception to the
hearsay rule as an admission by a party-opponent under HRE
803(2) (1). Thus, Petitioner and Respondent appear to agree that
the text messages themselves are hearsay but are admissible as 2
party admission. That exception provides that an admission by a
party-opponent is “[a] statement that is offered against a party
and is (A) the party's own statement, in either the party's
individual or representative capacity... .” HRE Rule
803 (a) (1).

‘The text messages qualify as statements offered by
Respondent against Petitioner to show Petitioner's history of
threats against the Complainant and, hence, were admissions by 2
Party-opponent under HRE Rule 803(a)(1).° Petitioner and
Respondent thus also sppear correct that the actual text messages
would be admissible as an exception to hearsay under HRE Rule

803(a) (1).

 

Next, inquiry must be made as to whether testimony

about the text messages constitutes hearsay and whether such

 

‘The HRE Rule £03(a) (1) exception for party admissions does not
require thet the statenent be against interest shen nade. commentary to ARE
Role 603, See algo Kets v. Keiser Found. Hosp, €1 Haw. 206) 216 003, 600,
P.23 366, 5 (1878) explaining that party sdnissicns, in contrast to
atatenents against interest, “need not have been against the decierent’s
Anterest when made, need not be based on the declarant’ personal. knowledge,
(and) may'be in the form of an opinion®)

 

  

10
‘s++FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’ HANAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER*##

testimony is admissible under an exception to the rule against
hearsay. Petitioner does not make any argument as to whether
testimony about the messages are hearsay or whether this
testimony would be admissible under an exception. Rather,
Petitioner focuses his discussion on the allegation that the
Complainant’s testimony was inadmissible hearsay because the
Complainant read aloud from an inadmissible police report about
the messages. Respondent also does not address whether the
testimony about the text messages is hearsay

Monentarily setting aside the issue of whether the
Complainant testified from her menory or from a verbatim reading
of the police report, in general, testimony about the text
messages is hearsay. If evidence is hearsay, then testimony
about the evidence is also hearsay. See Bueno v. State, 677
S.W.2d 261, 265 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that police
officer’s testimony about writing on a card given to him by the
motel manager was hearsay where it was offered to prove the motel
room was registered to the defendant). Correspondingly, if
evidence is hearsay admissible under an exception to the rule
against hearsay, then testimony about such evidence is
admissible. See People v, Tavlor 499 N.¥.S.2d 151 (App. Div. 2¢
Dept. 1986) (holding that victim's writing in his own blood of
attacker's name was hearsay admissible under the exceptions for
dying declarations and excited utterances and therefore,

testimony from witnesses regarding the writing was admissible).

n
 

}POR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS+*

Thus, the Complainant's testimony about the text messages is
admissible because the text messages themselves would be
admissible under the exception for party admissions.
c
1

Petitioner also argues that the court committed error
in allowing the Complainant to testify “because her testimony
neither constituted the original nor a duplicate of the text
message" as required by HRE Rule 1002 (1993). Petitioner
contends that the original text messages for purposes of HRE Rule
1002 “would have consisted of the cell phone itself with the
saved messages or @ printout of the messages.” Respondent
counters that (1) HRE 1002 is inapplicable in this case because a
text message does not qualify as a writing, recording, or
photograph; (2) there was no evidence that it was possible to
obtain 3 printout of the messages; (3) that no photographs were
taken of the messages does not preclude the admission of the
Complainant’s testimony about the messages; (4) even if HRE Rule
1002 is applicable here, HRE Rule 1004 (1993) allows the
admission of other evidence in place of the original where the
original is lost or destroyed: and (5) Petitioner failed to raise
an objection to the Complainant's testimony based on HRE Rule
1002 and, thus, waived the right to raise an argument based on

HRE Rule 1002.

32
 

‘s+4FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWA'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

HRE Rule 1002 provides that “[t]o prove the content of
a writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing,
recording, ox photograph is required, except as otherwise
provided in these rules or by statute.” A writing or recording
is defined in HRE 1001 (1993) as “consist(ing] of letters, words,
sounds, or numbers, or their equivalent, set down by handwriting,
typewriting, printing, photostating, photographing, magnetic
impulse, mechanical or electronic recording, or other form of
data compilation.” This definition is identical to FRE Rule
ool.

Contrary to Respondent's assertion, @ text message is a
writing because it consists of letters, words, or numbers set
down by mechanical or electronic recording, or other form of data
compilation. Although neither party makes this assertion, text
messages received on cell phones appear akin to messages received
on computers and email for purposes of HRE Rule 1002. See
Laughner v, State, 769 N.E.2d 1147, 1159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)
(holding that text messages sent between computers through an
internet chat room were subject to the original writing rule and
a printout of the messages was an original for purposes of the
rule), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1013 (2003), abrogated on other
grounds by Fajardo v. State, @59.N.E.2d 1201 (ind. 2007) . Thus,

HRE Rule 1002 which requires an original in order to prove the

 

+ ne Rute 1002 2 identical to Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE)
Rule 1002 except that the word “statute” in HAE Rule 1002 is substituted for
the phrase chet of Congress” found in FRE Rule 1002.

 

13
“**FOR PUBLICATION IM WEST’ § HAMAL'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS#*

content of a writing is applicable unless an exception under the
WRE or @ statute provides otherwise.
2.

Although HRE Rule 1002 would ordinarily preclude the
admission of testinony about the text messages because such
testimony is not an original, the testimony here is admissible
because HRE Rule 1004 applies to the text messages such that
other evidence may be admitted to prove the content of the text
Ressages. HRE Rule 1004 provides an exception to the original
weitings requirement of HRE Rule 1002 inasmuch as HRE Rule 1004

provides that:

We original or 2 duplicate is not required, and other
evidence of the contents of a writing, recording, or
photograph ig admissible $f
a ALL originale are
Tost or have been destroyed unless the
proponent lost er destroyed then in bad faith{.)

 

(Emphasis added.)

This Rule is identical to FRE Rule 1004 except that HRE
Rule 1004 eliminates the need for a duplicate 2s well if the
aforenenticned condition is net.

The Complainant no longer had the actual text messages
because the Complainant no longer had the cell phone or the cell
phone service from Verizon through which she received the
nessages. No other original version of the text messages appear

to have existed because there is no indication fron the record

 

that the text messages were ever printed out, nor is it clear

that it was possible for the messages to be printed from the

4
 

‘s++FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER:

 

phone. Thus, for purposes of HRE Rule 1004, the original text
messages were “lost or destroyed.”

Petitioner argues that “the original writing was lost
or destroyed due to the bad faith of the State of Hawai'i.”
However, there is no evidence that Respondent exercised bad faith
that led to the loss of the cell phone, which Petitioner contends
was the “original” for purposes of HRE Rule 1002. Bad faith
cannot reascnably be inferred because the Complainant failed to
preserve text messages for over two years on a cell phone for
which she discontinued service. Similarly, bad faith cannot be
inferred because the text messages were not printed out when
there is no indication that such a printout was even possible.

Indeed, courts agree that HRE Rule 1004(1) is
“particularly suited” to electronic evidence “{g]iven the myriad
ways that electronic records may be deleted, lost as a result of
system malfunctions, purged as a result of routine electronic
records management software (such as the automatic deletion of e-
mail after a set tine period) or otherwise unavailable . . . .”
Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 580 (D. Md.
2007). See also King v. Kirkland’s Stores, Inc., No. 2:04-cv-
+ 2006)

 

10S5-NEF, 2006 WL 2239203, at *5 (D. Ala. Aug.
(unpublished decision) (holding that plaintiff’s testimony
regarding the content of an e-mail from defendant was admissible
although plaintiff argued only that a copy of the e-mail, as

opposed to the original or sole copy, was in the possession of

as
   

"FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S RAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER!
the defendant); Bidbav.com, Inc. v, Spry, No. 8160126, 2003 WL

723297, at *7 (Cal. App. Mar. 4, 2003) (unpublished opinion)
(stating that the exception to the original writing rule
permitting the substitution of secondary evidence would apply in
Light of the “tenuous and ethereal nature of writings posted in
Internet chat roons and message boards").

Petitioner argues that Respondent “should not be
excused from producing the original or a duplicate of the text
messages, which are otherwise inadmissible under the best
evidence rule,” because Respondent “has not shown that it would
have been impossible or even difficult to download, photograph,
or print out the data from (the Complainant’ s) cell phone.” In
support of this argument, Petitioner cites United States v.
Eennstt, 363 F.3d 947, 953-54 (Sth Cir. 2004), wherein the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that in accordance with the
best evidence rule, the court could not admit secondary evidence
pertaining to a global positioning syste (GPS) reading as the
government failed to show that it would have been difficult or
impossible to download or print out the GPS data. That case is
distinguishable in that there was no evidence that the GPS data
had been lost or destroyed. Id, at 954. Rather, the witness
testifying about the data stated that he was not the GPS
custodian and it was not necessary to videotape or photograph the

GPS contents. Id.

16
 

‘s+PoR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'T REFORTS AND PACIPIC REPORTER

In contrast, here, it appears that the cell phone
containing the text messages is unavailable. The Complainant
testified that she changed cell phone service providers since the
time of the accident. Furthermore, Petitioner concedes that “the
original cell phone is no longer available and there is no
indication that any photograph exist of the text messages”
therefore, “neither the original nor any duplicates exist.”

In addition, this court is not bound by the holding in
Rennett. The plain language of HRE Rule 1004 states that an
original or duplicate is not required to prove the contents of 2
writing or recording so long as the originals are lost or
destroyed and such loss or destruction was not due to the bad
faith of the proponent of the evidence. There is no requirenent
that the proponent must show that it was impossible or difficult
to download or print out the writing at the time that it existed.

3.

Respondent contends that Petitioner may not argue
against the admission of the Complainant's testimony under HRE
Rule 1002 as Petitioner did not raise an objection under HRE Rule
1002 st trial. Petitioner counters that the court itself
acknowledged that the Complainant's testimony was not the best
evidence and that it had a “running objection” to the entire line
of questioning about the text messages.

Respondent correctly states the law that “failure to

properly object to the introduction of evidence in violation of

vv
‘*4FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER*#+
the original writing rule likely will result in a waiver of the

error on appeal.” Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 579 (citing Jack 8.

Weinstein & Margaret A. Berg

 

Weinstein's Federal Evidence
§ 1002.04(5) {a} (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed.
1997)). However, because the Conplainant’s testimony regarding
the text messages was admissible under HRE Rule 1004 as described
above, it is not necessary to resolve the question of whether
Petitioner did raise an objection under HRE Rule 1002.

b.

ra

‘The crux of Petitioner’s argument against the admission

 

of the Complainant’s testimony is that the Complainant
testimony was inadmissible because it consisted of the
Complainant reading excerpts fron a police report typed by @
clerk where the reports were based on notes copied by the police
officer who interviewed the Complainant and who examined the
actual text messages. Respondent does not make any argument that
the police report, typed by @ clerk from notes made by the
officer who observed the actual messages, was not hearsay or that
this report was hearsay adnissible under an exception to the rule
against hearsay.

Preliminarily, Petitioner is correct that the police
report was hearsay, The police report did not qualify under the

exception for past recollection recorded under HRE 902.1(4)

 

(2993). That Rule provid

18
‘+4FOR PUBLICATION IN KEST'S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERY##

 

 

‘Te following statements previously made by witnes
woo testify at the trial or hearing are fot excluded ay the

hearsay rule:

st recollection recorded. A memorandum oF
Fecord concerning a satter about which the

Sitness once had knowledge but now hes
Jneutficient recollection to enable the witness

zo testify folly and accurately, shown to have
been made or adinted by the witheas shen the

i

   

Tf aGni tte,
the memorandum or record nay be read into
Evidence but may not itself be received ss an
Guhibie unless offered by an adverse party.

 

(Emphasis added.) The police report is not a past recollection

recorded because the report was not “shown to have been made or

 

adopted by the [Complainant] when the matter was fresh in the

{Complainant’s] memory.”

Petitioner is also correct that the police report is
not an exception to hearsay as a public record or report under
HRE Rule 803(b) (8) (1993), That Rule states that the following

is admissible as an exception to the rule against hearsay:

‘the following are not excluded by the hearsay rule,
even though the declarant ie available ae a witness

inj’ Gener exceptions.

(ei ' Eubiic records and reports. Records, reports,
statements or data compilations, in any form, of
public offices cr agencies, setting forth (nl
fhe activities of the office or agency, or (2)
fateers cbserved pursuant to duty inposed by law
Ss to which asters there was a duty to report,

 

Sheerves ise officers and other lee
or (G) an civit

‘and against the government in

es, factual findings from an

Investigetion mace pursuant te authority granted

by law, unless the Sources of information or

Sther circumstances indicate lack of

trustworthiness.

 

Proceeaing
Erininal

 

 

(Emphasis added.) Because BRE Rule 603(b) (8) expressly excludes

“matters observed by police officers” from admission under the

19
‘**0F0R PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPCRES AND PACIFIC REPORTER**|

SS

exception for public records and reports, the police report in
this case is not admissible under this exception.

The police report describing the text messages is
hearsay and is inadmissible under the exceptions to the hearsay
rule for past recollections recorded under HRE 802.1(4) and
public records and reports under HRE 603(b) (8). Respondent has
not argued that the police report is not hearsay or is hearsay
admissible under an exception to the rule against hearsay. Thus,
the police report itself was inadmissible hearsay and recitation
of the report by the Complainant would therefore be inadmissible
hearsay.

2.

Although recitation of the police report by the
Complainant would be improper, Petitioner and Respondent both
agree that the Complainant could testify about the text messages
after viewing the police report if the report was used to refresh
her recollection about the text messages she allegedly received
from Petitioner. However, as noted before, Petitioner argues
that the Complainant “[did] not [use] the police report to
refresh her menory but instead [read] the contents of the police
report verbatim.” In contrast, Respondent maintains that “there
is sufficient evidence that [the Complainant] testified from her
present recollection regarding all four of the text messages{.]”

(Emphasis in original.)

20
   

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

HRE Rule 612 provides that 2 witness may use a writing
to refresh his memory for the purpose of testifying. Petitioner
and Respondent both cite Debenedetto, for the rule that when a
writing is used to refresh a witness's menozy, the witness’ s
testimony should be based on “a memory thus revived, resulting in
testimony from present recollection, not a menory of the writing
iteelf.” 80 Hawaii at 144, 906 P.2d at 630 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). If the writing does not refresh the
witness's menory, the witness may not testify regarding the
contents of the writing unless the writing is itself admitted
into evidence. Id, (internal citation omitted). “Thus, where 2
witness never perceived the matters described or where the
writing does not reawaken recollection of past perception, Rule
612 does not permit a witness to simply read into evidence the
contents of the writing.” Eerrer, 95 Hawai'l at 432, 23 P.3d at
767 (internal citation omitted).
be

Petitioner’s argument that the Complainant was not
using the report to refresh her memory but was inetead using the
report to recite verbatim the text messages is unpersuasive, As
described above in Sections I21.B.1. through 4., Petitioner
accurately recalled the gist or the general nature of each text
message prior to viewing the police report.

With respect to the first text message, the Complainant

stated that “[t]he gist was something like[,) ‘{t]he true face

2
‘S*+FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S KAMAS'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER*++

shows, I guess, ali the brothers and sisters were right./” After
viewing the report, the Complainant stated that the precise words
were, “[t]he true face shows all the guys and girls were right.”
‘The Complainant's testimony regarding the first message was
nearly identical both before and after viewing the report.

With respect to the second message, the Complainant
stated that although she could not remeber the wording of the
message, she renembered she “took it in a threatening nature.”
After viewing the report, the Complainant stated that the second
message stated, “I’m tired of being the sucker. What goes around
comes around.” The Complainant was correct in that the second
nessage could be construed as a threat.

Regarding the third message, the Complainant stated
that it “was the one where it was the word was going to go out to
the locals." The third message, the Complainant testified after
viewing the report stated, “You should have talked to me, but
you' re too pig-headed for our kind, There’s a new message going
out to the locals.” Although the Complainant omitted the insult
in the first sentence, the Conplainant’s description of the
second sentence was nearly identical before and after viewing the
report.

ith respect to the fourth meseage, the Complainant
stated that this message said, “I have to say I’m so, so sorry.”

Respondent correctly points out that “there is no indication in

22
‘*4FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTERS+#

this instance, that [the Complainant] even needed to have her

 

recollection refreshed with the police report.”

In light of the fact that the Complainant described the
key elements of the first and third messages prior to reading the
report, correctly identified the possible threatening
interpretation of the second message without reading the report,
and correctly recalled the wording of the fourth message without
referring to the report, it appears that the Complainant did
remember the text messages and that the Complainant used the
report to refresh her recollection. The evidence does not
suggest that the Complainant’s memory was not refreshed as to the
language of the messages or that the Complainant was merely
reading from the report.

Contrary to Petitioner's position, that the Complainant
recalled only the gist of sone of the messages and could not
recall the time and date of some of the nessages prior to
reviewing the report does not mean that the Complainant's
enhanced ability to describe the messages after reading the
report was the result of the Complainant reading directly from
the report. Rather, that the Conplainant could recall
substantial details about the messages prior to reading the
report suggests that the Complainant in fact possessed a menory
of the messages that only needed refreshment via the report.

Petitioner directs this court’s attention to various

23
 

/*FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS:
alleged mistakes made by Respondent that do not comport with

 

admission of testimony under HRE Rule 612, including: (2) that
the Complainant stated “[s}he was unable to ‘read’ the exact tine
because she didn’t understand military time"; (2) that {the
prosecutor] specifically asked [the Complainant) for the precise
words of the message and (the Complainant] improperly repeated
the message word for word from the police report”; (3) that “[the
prosecutor) started to ask (the Complainant] what the report said
but then changed the wording of his question to suggest that (the
Complainant's] memory was simply being refreshed”; (4) that (the
prosecutor] stated in a bench conference that he intended to have
the Complainant “come in and lay further foundation and read what
the messages were[]"; (5) that “[o]n one occasion, the prosecutor
never asked if [the Complainant's] memory was refreshed after
reviewing the police report |]; (6) that the Complainant stated
that she “recognized” rather than “remembered” the exact words of
the message when she viewed the police report; (7) that the
Complainant “could no longer recsll the exact words of the text
messages, even though her memory had allegedly been refreshed
only a short time before on direct examination”; and (8) that
“there is no showing in the record that the prosecutor renoved
the writing from (the Complainant] after she read the report.”

These arguments are not persuasive. None of these
alleged mistakes by Respondent are substantial enough to

effectively contravene the conclusion that may reasonably be

24
 

‘++6FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HANAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS

drawn in this case that the Complainant was testifying about the
messages from her refreshed recollection rather than her memory
of reading the report
v.
a
As to the second question, Respondent stated that, in
calling Dr. Manoukian to perform the demonstration, Respondent

was attempting to rebut (Petitioner's)
Gischarge” claim by having Dr. Nenouks

Ses"six foot tell person cogid-not reach the handgun from a
Gistance of 12-18 inches, then it is very unlikely that [the

  

   

Conpiainant], who ie (five feet and eix inches tail] could
reach it.

(Emphases in original.) At trial, “Dr. Manoukian . . . was

qualified as an expert in forensic pathology.” According to

Petitioner,

De. Manoukian testified that based on his exaninstion of
photographs and x-rays of (the Complainant] that in his
Spinign she was shot within a distance of 12-18 inches. from
Sh front of her face.

never examined (she Complainant personsily, aitheaah he

Lestified that che vas tive cect six inches tall. ie also
festified thet he binselt-mas-tin fect tell teespongant

Ehen hac Dr Mancukisn denonstrase wiether he hiseelt could
Hench o aun which waz within elahtesn inches of his face or

Exeive tnohes of Bie Zace

(Emphasis added.) Petitioner noted, inter alia, that as to
reliability of the demonstrative evidence, (1) “[als the [court]
initially recognized there was no foundation for Dr. Mancukian to
testify regarding whether (the Complainant] could reach the gun

» because Dr. Menoukian never met [the Complainant] .
[or] measured her arm length”; (2) “Dr. Manoukian conceded that
the distance that gun powder can travel will vary from gun to

gun"; (3) “[h]e . . . testified that it would be possible to test

25
‘*FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAWAI'I REPORTS NO PACIFIC REFORTER#+#

2 particular gun to determine the distance range for that

ular gun but he was never asked to test the gun used during

 

par
the instant shooting”; (4) thus “the basis for the demonstration
he performed wes unreliable and untrustworthy[,]” (citing state
wa Viiet, 95 Hawai'i 94, 111, 19 P.34 42, 59 (2002).

5.

On the other hand, Respondent argued (1) “br.

Nanoukian's . . . demonstration was[] [(a)] highly relevant to
the issue of whether . . . the shooting was an accident; and
[(b)] was. . . demonstrative evidence in the form of an

‘experiment’; (2) “demonstrative evidence is left to the
discretion of the trial court[,]” (citing Lau, 82 Hawai'i at 434,

922 P.2d at 1047);

 

“[L]ikewise, the admission of experimental
evidence ‘rests within the sound discretion of the trial
court!.]’" (quoting Monlux v, Gen, Motors Corp., 68 Haw. 356,
363, 714 P.2d 930, 933 (1986)); (3) “in opening statements,
[Petitioner] told the jury that the gun went off during an
apparent struggle between [Petitioner] and [the Complainant)":
(4) “De, Manoukian{’'s] demonstrat {ion} that{] if a six foot tall
Person could not reach the handgun from a distance of 12-18
inches, then it is very unlikely that [the Complainant], who is
516" could reach itl,) . .. [c]learly . . . had a tendency to
make [Petitioner’s] claim of an ‘accidental’ or ‘unintentional
shooting’ more or less probable” (emphases in original); (5) “the

fact that Dr. Manoukian’s arm reach may or may not have been the

26
 

‘++*FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER*

same as (the Complainant's) goes to the weight, not the
admissibility of the denonstrative evidence] . . . since the
Live demonstration was substantially similar to Dr. Manoukian’ s
prior unchallenged expert testimony regarding the distance and
Lralectory of the handgun” (emphases in original); (6) “the
record is unclear as to whether or not Dr. Manoukian could or
could not reach the firearm, [and Petitioner] bears the burden of
demonstrating error in the record[,]” (citing State v. Hoang, 93
Hawai'i 333, 336, 3 P.3d 498, 502 (2000)); (7) “during the cross~
examination of Dr. Mancukian, the [court] indicated the

demonstration ‘actually showed that he could grab the gun’”

 

(8) “the defense expressly abandoned the ‘accidental’ shooting
defense, and instead, adopted an EMED defense”; (9) “assuming
arquendo . . . error [based on the foregoing (7), (8), and (9),
such error] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt [,]" (citing
Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRP) Rule 52(a)).
c

We note that trial judges, in ruling upon the
admissibility of various types of demonstrative evidence that are
offered to reenact aspects of an alleged event, should insure, as
Respondent concedes, that the demonstration “is to be made under
conditions and circumstances similar to those prevailing at the
time of the occurrence involved in the controversy{,]” (citing
Monlux, 68 Haw, at 364, 714 P.2d at 934). We observe, however,

that Respondent argues “the record is unclear as to whether or

27
‘*4FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HANAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER:

$$

not Dr. Manoukian could or could not reach the firearm” and

 

“[Petitioner] bears the burden of demonstrating error in the
record.”

It is not possible to discern from the record whether
oF not Dr, Mancukian could reach the gun when it was placed at 2
distance of twelve to eighteen inches away from him. Petitioner
contends that the transcript of the direct examination of Dr.
Manoukian by Respondent “demonstrates that Dr. Manoukian could
‘ot reach the gun at either 18 inches or 12 inches.” (Emphasis
added.) Petitioner also implies that the demonstration was
harmful to his case because he posits that “the defense was
forced to ‘abandon’ the accidental shooting defense in light of
Dr. Manoukian’s improper demonstration.” However, Respondent
notes that the court stated during a bench conference after the
Tecross-examination of Dr. Manoukian, that the denonstration
“actually showed that [Or. Manoukian] could grab the gun.”

Based on Petitioners and Respondent's conflicting
account of the demonstration and the fact that the transcript of
Dr. Manoukian's testimony is not clear regarding the results of
the demonstration, this court cannot determine its effect on
Petitioner's case, Thus, it cannot be ascertained whether any
error was harmful inasmuch as the ultimate result of the
denonstration is unknown,

vi.

As to the third question, Petitioner asserts that

28
 

‘*++FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

[Respondent] made at least two misstatements of law during
closing argument and rebuttal: (1) (the prosecutor] told
the jury that they [ele] would have to decide what (the
Complainant] dig that entitied [petitioner] to murder her(’)
and (2) [the prosecutorl told the jury that LEMED| needed to
be\based-on 2 special relationship betacen Teo people ang
that Listitioner! mould have to act immediately in onder tox

this defense to apply.

(Emphasis added.) As to item (2) above, Petitioner argues that

the prosecutor misstated the law

during his rebuttal when he compared (Petitioner’s

7 fez /son re

 

scold not soply te [Petitioner Sid not

‘a-special relationship with ithe Comlainansl.

Subsdgiently, the prosecutor again told the jury to
Feject the MED defense: "Aight now there's no
Special relationship between the married man and a
single woman. It is undisputed that their
felationship wae dysfunctional.” Continsing to use

ine
Father than taking "five or ten
on

Binstes to gather hinot

   

(Emphases added.) According to Petitioner, “it was unnecessary
for the Jury to find [Petitioner] had a ‘special relationship’
with [the Complainant] or that he acted ‘immediately’ in order
for the EMED defense to apply.” (Citing HRS § 707-702.) Thus,

Petitioner asserts that “there is a reasonable possibility that

+ With respect to the first alleged misstatement, Petitioner
contends that "(t]he prosecutor aisstated the law when he told the Jury that
Ehey. [2ic] would have to consider wnat [the Complainant) dia to entitle
[Petitioner] to murder her, The complaining witness's conduct 1s entirely
irrelevant to the offense of attempted murder in the second degree or
ighter(, and) the prosecutar’s mi tof the law say have
jed the’ jury to reject finding of extrene enoticnal or mental
Siseress.” (Citing HRS §§ 707-701.5 (1993) & 707-702 (2993 « Supp. 2002).)
According to Petitioner, this ancunted to an instruction to
“jurors that they would have to decide what (the Complainant] did to deserve
baing shat in the face, even though this fact is irrelevant to the offense of
attempted murder in the second degree and manslaughter.” while the fact was
Gerelevant, this statement by the prosecstor does not appear to be
prejuaiciai. Arguably, as Respondent ciains, it as part of the prosecutor's
Grgunent “that there is nothing that [the Complainant) did that would entitle
[Petitioner] to get away with murder.”

 

     

23
 

}POR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER*#

SSS

these errors might have contributed te the conviction,” citing

State v. Maluia, 107 Hawai'i 20, 24, 108 P.3d 974, 978 (2005),

because “(Respondent) had the burden of disproving the EMED

defense beyond a reasonable doubt... .*
vir.

It is established that “[a]rguments of counsel which
misstate the law are subject to objection and to correction by
the court.” State v, Mshoe, 89 Hawai'i 284, 290, 972 P.2d 287,
293 (1998) (citing Bovde v, California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990))
(emphasis omitted). Improper statements by Respondent may serve
as grounds for vacating 2 judgment of conviction and remanding
the case for a new trial. See State v, Wakisaka, 102 Hawaii $04,
516, 7€ P.3d 317, 329 (2003) {holding that prosecutor's comment
on defendant's failure to testify constituted plain error
affecting the defendant's substantial rights); State v. Rogan, 91
Hawaii 405, 415, 984 P.2¢ 1231, 1240 (1999) (reversing the
defendant's conviction because “arguments by the prosecution
contrived to stimulate racial prejudice” might have contributed
to the conviction).

In order to “determine whether reversal is required
under (HRPP} Rule 52(a)[*] because of improper remarks by a
Prosecutor which could affect [a djefendant’s right to a fair

+ HREP Rule S2(a) provides ae follows:
t ror. Any error, defect, irregularity or

variance wich does not affect substantial rights shall be
Gleregerdes.

 

 

30
s++POR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS+*

 

trial, we apply the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard
of review.” State v. Sanchez, 82 Hawai'i 517, 528, 923 P.2d 934,
945 (App. 1996), cert, denied, 84 Hawai" 127, 930 P.2d 1015
(1996) (quoting State vs Suka, 79 Hawaii 293, 301, 901 P.2d 1272,
1280 (App. 1995), cert, denied, 79 Hawai'i 341, 902 P.2d 976
(1995), overruled on other grounds by State v, Holbron, 80 Hawaii
27, 32 n.12, 904 P.2d 912, 917 n.12 (1995) (other citation
omitted). See also Miller v. State, 712 So. 2d 451, 453 (Fle.
Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (reversing the defendant’s burglary and
theft convictions where the prosecutor made improper conments
pertaining te the defendant’s defense of voluntary intoxication
defense as “it [could not] be said that this error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt") (citation omitted). This standard
“requires an examination of the record and a determination of
whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error
complained of might have contributed to the conviction.” State
va Sawyer, 88 Hawai'i 325, 329 n.6, 966 P.2d 637, 641 n.6 (1998)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).”

 

18 the question.
‘prosecutorial

‘grounds fora new trial. In alleging
Prosecuterial misconduct, he argues a court must "consiger [(1}] the nature of
fhe alleged misconduct, {(2)] the promptness or lack of = curative
Instruction, ana [(3)) the strength or weakness of the evidence

Maluig, 107 Hawaii at 27, 108 P.3d at 961 (quoting
‘Aatabante, 73 New, 179, 196, 630 P.2d'492, $02 (1992), (other citation
omitted)” See gl20 Makisakd, 102 Hewail St 513, 78 P.3d at 326 (stating thet
sQliegations of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed under the harmless
beyond = reasonable doubt standard. [and fJactors consicert

(2) the nature of the conduct; (2) the promptness of a curative instruction:
ang (2) the strength of weakness of the evidence against the defendant”).

+ __aitnough unnecess
Petitioner ascere® that these
Misconduct and therefore ser

 

   

 

jainat [the]

      

 

 

a
‘***POR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S MAWAI'T REFORES AND PACIFIC REPORTER*#*

SS

vin
With respect to the “special relationship” and

“immediacy” arguments, the transcript excerpt containing the part

 

noted by Respondent in its answering brief is as follov:

(Proseevtor]: (Petitioner) or (Petitioner's) Lemyer
ode a big ~ or talked a lot about the extreme enationel
disturbance mental or the emotional disturbence Instruction
fend how he wants to apply it in this case te that man. Cove
At really apply to the. (Petitioner)?

Let me take you folks back. I guess this would have
been on Thursday, ednesday or Thursday when we were doing
Sury selection rit a it Ree

aoreeg, [Petitioner| sarsed. and you all aareed with an
sugenie tas (eeancadent piavided for vou Canard ial.

and then a-deunk driver copes scasdina £0 the school sone
Saris yelling atthe Cather blaming bis (or conashina, the

ae drunk.

‘YOu ell sgreed and [Respcndent] agreed and even
[Petitioner] agreed that that father may be justified under
the [EMED) law to go after that drunk dfiver. I canrt
inagine any of us who really aze fathers not going after
that drunk driver

2 is rel * is an
What doe

 

 

your connon sense tell you,

[Petitioner's Counsel)
bier sa siestatensni ig law ond was not for
Grieving fathers who have their child Tur over.

‘THE COURT? Sou a i

[Prosecutor]: Thenk you, your Honey. In the drunk
driver case, Ladies and gentlemen,

reas hae eds Sate, ry

71 Tan’
think enyone can argue that their son oF parent relationship
is special and ve are here to protect our children. The
a think fe Fe Re flipped cut. He lost
its He dicn't even have ive or ten minutes £0. gather
himself. He didn’t go get 2 loaded handgun. He just went
after that drunk driver right there. The father’s attack on
the driver, it wasn't planned.

lBetitioner’s Counsel]: Your Uonor, it doesn't nave to

sifterent os: er hav

THE COURT Hers
entitled to make hie argunent>

[Prosecutor]: No prior history between the drunk
driver and the father dign’t even know who the drunk driver
was and the father wasn't in a public place when he
attacked. "The drunk driver was in a school one were the
son wae surdered and run down by the drunk driver. fi
didn't go to the drunk driver's home, Lock through this

 

 

32
/++FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAT'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER***

window, go down the ataira and take @ loaded handgun and
Shoot the drunk driver. There was no stalking or tracking
Like » hunter would. le hit him face-to-face man-to-man
Eight’ there where his sen was killed. That king of man
[Respondent] would argue there is no question that the EMED,
Extreme mental enotional disturbance applies in this kind of
Situation.

Letis took at [Petitioner's] situation, and you decide
looking at [Petitioner's] situation the facts that are
ndiapsted in thia case. You decide whether these facts
neritr of are you going to reward the [Petitioner] with
‘extreme mental enotional defense ~ not defense, bot
reasonable explanatic

 

 

parried Man and a single woman, It is undisputed that their
Felationship wee dyefunctionsl. Based upon slcehol, drugs,
Gifts, ehrests, text messages, phone calisy it was
Gyetunctionsl.’ The [Petitsoner's) stack on (the
Complainant) wae planned.

Wien the (Petitioner) - I'm sorry ~ when the
[Petitioner's] lawyer told you that the [Petitioner] walked
Inte her unit end sou [the Complainant} and {Libura) in bed,
Se that whet heppenea? Did ne-as to walk

 

‘het happened, and (Liburd} corroborates this, and he
didn’ teven hear [the Complainant’ s} testimony. They both
fold you [the Complainant] noticed a motion Light going on
in nef window sna’ from the left side. You can see her bed
fron the Fight side. It is covered with the curtains.
Sombody set off that motion Light.

TE was the [Petitioner]. (Liburd) says maybe five or
ten minutes later ~ (the Complainant] says between two to
ten minutes later the [Petitioner is] not walking into the
Hoon. He's stalking nto the room with s leaded hanagun.

Tes hot his house he's going into, ie is (the
complainant’s} house. It i not his room he's going into.
Te ie [the Complainant's] room, and does e single woman have
a'cight to be with another nan? “In this case (Libura] is
Single. He's got children, But he's not married. Does she
have avcight to be with another san? Of course, she does.

We're not exactly sure when the 357 magnum revolver
cane into being, but the [Petitioner] did not walk to [the
Complainant’s] house. Just by common Sense it must have
been in his car, s0 he's already driving to (the
Conplainant’s} house with a loaded 357 magnum in his car.
Does that show some kind of planning?

 

 

 

 

Petitioner] wl »
he oic’not thine about it, that Ithe Complainant) was wisn
Sanat at Decause. two

Bartenders, as wll 29 [ene Complainant] and (Liburd), told
you they were together in the Outback Steakhouse and st the
Fisn ¢ Gane.” The [Petitioner] wes there also. Me saw them
earlier.

 

(Emphases added.) First, Respondent contends that “(Petitioner]
agreed that the . . . [second] statement was a ‘fair’ example of

EMED.” However, the transcript indicates that as to the “special

33
‘**FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER#*

relationship” and “inmediacy” argument, Petitioner did cbiect
twice but was overruled. Secondly, Respondent contends that “as
pert of his closing argument (the prosecutor] repeated the trial
court's proper instructions regarding EMED to the jury.”
According to Respondent, “[iJn utilizing the drunk driver
hypothetical, [the prosecutor) vas merely arguing that the nature
of a particular relationship should be seriously taken into
account in determining the ‘reasonableness’ of a defendant's
conduct .”

a.

We hold that the prosecutor's argument misstated the
law. Tt placed on Petitioner the burden of proving a special
relationship between the Complainant and Petitioner and an
inmediacy in the event that the law did not require. Although
the court did instruct the jury as to the elements of an
attenpted manslaughter defense, Respondent argued in effect that
such a special relationship and inmediacy were necessary to
establish an extreme mental or enotional disturbance for which
there was a reasonable explanation. Obviously such is not the
case, The jury was not disabused of this error. Because
Petitioner's counsel's objections to these arguments were
overruled, the jury would reasonably perceive that the
misstatement of the law was not incorrect.

Tf improper comments are made by a prosecutor, “harm or
prejudice to [a defendant) can be cured by the court's
instructions to the jury.” State v, Melear, 63 Haw. 488, 497,

38
‘++FOR PUELICATION IN WESH’S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER*#*

 

630 P.2d 619, 626 (1981). No curative instruction was given.
Correlatively, the failure to correct misstatements of law by a
prosecutor may result in reversal of a defendant's conviction.
State vs Gotcher, 759 P.2d 1216, 1219 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988)
(reversing the lower court's conviction because it failed to cure
the prosecutor's misstatement of the law regarding first degree
burglary when it Yoverrul[ed) the objection [by defense counsel)
and. . . [did] not clarify() the law to the jury”).

Gotcher is apposite to this case. The Gotcher court
reversed the conviction of the defendant because the lower court
did not correct the prosecutor's construction of the law
regarding first degree burglary. Gotcher explained that

had an opportunity to prevent confusion
a objected to the state's closing
argument. The [lower] court failed to cure the nisstatenent
By overruling the objection and by not clarifying the law to
the jury. in addition, the court's referring the Jury to
the instructions during deliterstione dia not correct the
error because the inatructions, although they are standard
Theshington Pattern Jury Instrdctions (WPIC)} instructions,
were confusing as to whether possession of a switchblade
Knife ie sufeicient co find the defendant arsed with a
deadly weapon.

   

 

Id. at 1219 (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted) .
Here, as in Gotcher, the court had an opportunity to
clarify the law regarding the EMED defense “when defense counsel
objected to the Respondent's closing argument . . . (but] failed
to cure the misstatement by overruling the objection and by not
clarifying the law to the jury.” Id. As Petitioner notes, this
court stated in Bogan, 91 Hawai'i at 413, 984 P.2d at 1239, that
a prosecutor's improper statements “in argument is a matter of
special concern because of the possibility that the jury will

35
‘s*#F0R PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND FACIFIC REFORTER‘*#

give special weight to the prosecutor's arguments, not only
because of the prestige associated with the prosecutor's office,
but also because of the fact-finding facilities presumably
available to the office."

The instructions that were given by the court did not
redress the harm caused by Respondent's misapplication of the
law. While the court here did properly instruct the jury on the
elements of the EMED defense in Jury Instruction No. 22, that
instruction could not cure Respondent's misstatements of the law,
where no specific curative instruction relating to the
nisstatenents was given.

Similarly, despite Respondents contention, the court's
instruction to the jury in Instruction No. 3 that “[s]tatements
or remarks made by counsel are not evidence” is inapposite
inasmuch as the specific misstatements in question have to do
with law and net evidence. Thus, contrary to the dissent’s
position, that instruction did not clarify to the jury that a
special relationship between parties and innediacy of action are
not required for application of the EMED defense.

Respondent also argues that the general instruction
regarding a “just verdict” would preclude prejudice.

Contrary to Respondent's argunent, the general instruction given
to the jury to “conscientiously and dispassionately consider and
Weigh all of the evidence and follow these instructions” was not

related to the prejudicial effects of the prosecutor's

36
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAKAI'Z REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER®

 

 

assertions. Hence, no curative instruction to specifically
address and correct the misstatements was given.
x.

Assuming, arquendo, that Respondent is correct in its
contention that “the evidence before the jury strongly indicated
that [Petitioner] was not acting under EMED or that
[Petitioner's] reason for the ENED was not reasonable,” it still
cannot be concluded in this case that multiple misstatements of
the law for which no specific curative instruction was given, was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. There exists, at the least,
“a reasonable possibility that the error complained of might have
contributed to [Petitioner's] conviction,” Sawyer, 88 Hawai'i at
329 n.6, 966 P.2d at 641 n.6 (emphases added), for attempted
murder in the second degree as opposed to attempted EMED
manslaughter.

‘The misconstruction of the law and the lack of curative
instruction bore directly on Petitioner’s EMED defense. Hence,
the reasonable “possibility” that the error “might” have
contributed to Petitioner's conviction for attempted murder
rather than attempted EMED manslaughter was plainly established.
Ig." However, because it cannot be said that the prosecutor's
conduct vas so egregious that viewed under an objective
standpoint, Petitioner was denied his or her right to a fair

“the analysis in Sections VI to X, supra, subsumes fectors of
prosecutorial misconduct claimed by Petitioner anasmuch as the majority of
Boch factors would weigh in favor of the Petitioner because the prosecuter

Risstated the law and no specific, curative instruction to correct the
Risstatenents was given to the Jury

 

 

 

3
‘**0FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ § HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERS#*

 

trial, reprosecution is not barred under the double jeopardy

 

clause. Rogan, 91 Haw, at 423, 984 P.2d at 1249 (holding that
“reprosecution is barred where, in the face of earegious.
prosecutorial misconduct, it cannot be said beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant received a fair trial”) (emphasis
added)

xr.

Respondent cites to State v. Kupihea, 80 Hawai'i 307,
909 P.2¢ 1122 (1996), where this court held that the prosecutor's
use of hypotheticals was not prejudicial to the defendant despite
the defendant's allegation that one hypothetical erroneously
implied that the EMED defense required = total loss of self
control. In Kupihea, this court recognized that several courts
considering this issue have ruled that hypothetical illustrations
are “arguably improper” but are not necessarily prejudicial. Id.
at 317, 909 P.2d at 1132 (citing People v. Pietrzvk, 369 N.E.2d
1299 (111. App. Ct. 1977); State v. Smith, 675 P.2d 521, 527
(Utah 1983); People v, Wharton, 809 P.2d. 290 (Cal. 1991), cert,
denied, 502 U.S. 1038 (1992)).

Kupiea is distinguishable on several grounds. First,
this court held that the prosecutor there did not misrepresent
the law as “[t]he prosecutor did not indicate that it was always
necessary for the loss of control to be complete” for an EMED
defense to apply “but rather that, in the circumstance of the
hypothetical, the loss happened to be complete.” Id, In
contrast, Respondent did not indicate that the special

38
‘+eFOR PUBLICATION IN EST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER**#
relationship and the immediate action were not necessary

conditions or that they were unique and limited to the
circumstances of that specific hypothetical, but in effect argued
otherwise.

‘The dissent argues that Kupihea does “not impose upon
the prosecution a requirement” that it indicate to the jury that
2 special relationship and immediate action are not necessary
elements of the EMED defense or that such conditions are limited
to the hypothetical. Dissent at 8. To the contrary, Kupihea
states that 2 prosecutorial misstatement “warrants a new trial or
the setting aside of a guilty verdict only where the actions of
the prosecutor have caused prejudice to the defendant's right to
a fair trial.” Id, at 316, 909 P.2d at 1131 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Thus, Kupihea prohibits
misstatements of the lew that are prejudicial to the defendant.
Here, unlike in Kupihea, the prosecutor's closing arguments
erroneously suggested to the jury that certain prerequisites were
necessary to the applicability of the defense, not just the
instance described in the hypothetical. This was manifestly
prejudicial to Petitioner.

Second, Kupihea is different in that the phrase
“complete loss of control” was only stated once by the
prosecution. In contrast, here, the prosecutor repeatedly used
the tezm “special relationship” and repeatedly referred to the

immediacy of the violent act throughout the rebuttal argument.

39
 

'*FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTERY#

SSS

Third, the prosecutor emphasized an alleged lack of a
“special relationship” between Petitioner and the Complainant and
the Petitioner's lack of an innediate violent reaction to
observing Complainant and Liburd together on earlier occasions.
This emphasis could reasonably have led the jury to erroneously
conclude that a special relationship and an inmediate violent
reaction to a triggering event were conditions of the ENED
defense. As noted before, this was @ distortion of the aw,
inasmuch as evidence of neither was required.

xm.

The crux of the dissent’s position is that the
Prosecutor's statements regarding the “special relationship” and
“immediacy” issues were not improper “because defense counsel

nvited such a response from the prosecutor.” Dissent at 11
(emphasis added). The dissent is incorrect. The dissent argues
that “[dlefense counsel's closing argument in this case clearly
and repeatedly emphasized the ‘relationship’ that [Petitioner]
and Complainant shared.” Dissent at 7. In addition, the dissent
maintains that “the prosecutor’s ‘immediacy’ argument thet ‘the
killing by the drunk driver happened so instantly the father had
no tine to think,’ was clearly made in response to the
(Petitioner’s] position that ‘because of [Petitioner's] state of
mind upon coming upon [Complainant and Liburd] having full-on
sex, he lost it.'” Dissent at 10 (brackets omitted).

Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, it was Respondent

that first raised the “:

 

cial relationship” and “immediacy”

40
‘+++F0R PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTERY*®

issues in voir dire and repeated them in final argument. During
voir dire, in explaining the EMED defense the prosecutor
introduced the hypothetical involving a father who experiences
EMED upon seeing his son killed by a drunk driver:

Now, you can inagine, those of ue vho are fathers, vou know,
bi i in-oan eight in tri

your eves

na Eather at that tine... ie under extreme mental
or emotional disturbance, which neans he flips cut.” He
Toses it. And he goes and he attacks the drunk driver.
mean, he just plows inte hin.

 

 

{te a11 foe that way don't we? I mean, se'e

gust -2-"atve"something thet happened instantaneously.

 

Gray! "That, Ledies and gentlemen, I woulé submit to
you, would be the’ example T have for the {ENED} oF flipping
Sut’ or losing it

« ite" Just dost te. Be

here's no waitin ss; there’ =
gather his thouchts or calm himself, ie iust reacts to an

(Bnphases added.)

Thus, the prosecutor introduced the issue of a “special
relationship” in the context of the EMED defense when he used a
father and son in his hypothetical during voir dire and asked the
fathers in the jury to imagine how they would feel if their son
was run down. Similarly, the prosecutor introduced the
proposition of “immediacy” when he stated that “there is no
waiting period” and that there is an imediate reaction to
witnessing @ stressful event.

During the prosecutor!s closing argument and before the
defense counsel gave his closing argument, the prosecutor
reintroduced the discussion of a close relationship as necessary

to the ENED defense. The prosecutor stated in closing argument,

a
‘*VFOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTERC#*

$A

“How many Jealous married husbands are there that’s going after
their ex-lovers and shooting them in the face? ts that a
reasoneble explanation? Is that reasonable to you?” Thus, the
prosecutor's closing argument asserted that the particular
relationship between Petitioner and Complainant, of a married man
and an ex-lover, could not give rise to the ENED defense.

The foregoing demonstrates that the prosecutor's
misstatements regarding the “special relationship” and
“immediacy” issues were not made upon invitation by Petitioner
during Petitioner's closing argument. Rather, the prosecutor's
misstatements pertaining to these issues were made before
Petitioner's closing argument as they were made during voir dire
‘end during the Respondent's closing argument. Furthernore,
contrary to the dissent’s assertion, Petitioners counsel
confined his argument to the facts and evidence presented, as it
exemplified the jealousy of a jilted lover that culminated in a
violent reaction.

In rebuttal the prosecutor again raised the “special
relationship” and “inmediacy” issues when he referred back to his
voir dire example of a father witnessing an accident in which his

son vas involved:

 

Let ne take you folke back thie would nave
been on Thursday, iiednesday or Thursday when we were doing
Jury Selection

st arsed wit

42

 

 
 

FOR FUELICATION IN WEST'S HAMAr'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTER***
You all. aget sspondent} agreed and even

(Petitioner's) defense agreed that that father my be
Justified under the [EEO] law to go after that drunk

     

 

driver. 1 can't dnagine any of us who really are fathers
not going after that dronk driver.

ee we going to-apoly that special father/son and

sbi ried iver?
Does that snbly or does that make sense to vou? What does

your ecamon sense tell 7ou~
(Emphases added.)

Accordingly, the dissent’s argument that “no curative
instruction was needed in light of defense counsel's portrayal of

the facts of this case in his closing argument” Dissent at 5, is

 

wrong in view of the fact that Respondent initiated these
propositions in voir dire and repeated them in its closing
argument. Hence, the dissent’s reliance on State v. Clark, 63
Hawai'i 289, 305, 926 P.2d 194, 210, xeconsideration denied, 63
Hawai'i 545, 928 P.2d 39 (1996), which held the prosecutor may
“respond to comments by defense counsel which invite or provoke a
response” and “denounce the activities of defendant and highlight
the inconsistencies in defendant's argument,” is not controlling.
Ae indicated previously, it was Respondent that
introduced the “special relationship” and the immediacy argunent

into the c; Second, the aforementioned holding in Clark does

 

not authorize a prosecutor to misapply the law. As related in
Section VIII, the prosecutor misstated the law by telling the
jury that a “special relationship" 1ike that between a father and
son must exist between Petitioner and Complainant in order for
the EMED defense to apply. The prosecutor also misstated the law

by asserting that Petitioner should have had an immediate violent

43
 

‘*YFOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’ S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND FACIFIC REPORTER

ree

8

Peter A. Hanano, Deputy Bt Horimeon
Somer of fant for Bo ne
reenae a

44