Title: State v. Board of Education of City of Santa Fe

State: new-mexico

Issuer: New Mexico Supreme Court

Document:

372 P.2d 832 (1962) 70 N.M. 261 STATE of New Mexico ex rel. Mildred Daniels ROBERSON, Relator-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF SANTA FE, New Mexico, Respondent-Appellant and Cross-Appellee. No. 6897. Supreme Court of New Mexico. May 18, 1962. Rehearing Denied July 12, 1962. *833 Standley & Kegel, Santa Fe, for appellant and cross-appellee. Charles S. Solomon, John T. Watson, Santa Fe, for appellee and cross-appellant. MOISE, Justice. Respondent, Board of Education of the City of Santa Fe, appeals from a peremptory writ of mandamus in the following words: issued after hearing on the petition of relator-appellee. Relator was a teacher in the school system of Santa Fe and had been so employed for more than twenty years and had more than sufficient time to have "tenure" rights under the provisions of § 73-12-13, N.M.S.A. 1953, Pocket Supp. On March 11, 1960, respondent delivered a letter to relator notifying her of her reemployment for the 1960-1961 school year, and requested that her acceptance be evidenced by return of the original copy of the letter duly signed by her, within fifteen days after the close of school on May 27, 1960. The relator signed and returned the letter on May 11, 1960, and on May 17, 1960, respondent acknowledged receipt of relator's acceptance. Thereafter, on May 26, 1960, being the day before the close of school, relator received a notice which stated that respondent had rescinded its previous actions with respect to relator's 1960-1961 contract, and that she was dismissed from her teaching position upon completion of her 1959-1960 contract. The notice stated that the causes for her dismissal were "(a) insubordination, (b) conduct unbecoming a teacher, (c) disloyalty, (d) improper teaching practices, (e) violation of the code of professional ethics of the National Educational Association," and advised of the time and place that a hearing would be held on the matter. In addition, the notice advised that at the same time and place a hearing would also be held upon the question of relator's "discharge from any contractual obligation" with respondent for the 1960-1961 school year, and stated that by providing for the *834 hearing respondent was not passing on whether a valid contract did or did not exist. On June 6, 1960, pursuant to the notice, a meeting was held at which relator was present. However, before the hearing was completed it was recessed and relator thereupon sought and obtained an alternative writ of mandamus preventing further proceedings on whether relator should be reemployed for the school year 1960-1961 pending determination of the issues presented in relator's petition. The peremptory writ quoted supra was issued after final hearing. Respondent presents for determination here the question of whether it had a right to hold hearings on the question of relator's discharge or dismissal which could not be prohibited by mandamus, regardless of whether relator had a contract of employment for the next school year. In additional points respondent argues that inasmuch as relator did not accept the offered employment within fifteen days from receipt of the notice of reemployment as provided by § 73-12-13(e), N.M.S.A. 1953, Pocket Supp., the offer was rescinded, and respondent had a right to dismiss relator, give notice thereof and hold hearings thereon. Respondent's third point raises a question of whether relator could seek relief in the courts without exhausting all administrative remedies provided in the statutes. The applicable sections of our statutes are §§ 73-12-13 and 73-12-15, N.M.S.A. 1953, Pocket Supp., the pertinent portions of which are as follows: It is clear from a reading of the quoted sections of the statute that § 73-12-13 provides the procedures for employing or terminating employment of teachers; whereas § 73-12-15 sets forth the procedure for discharging teachers holding contracts. It is also evident from a reading of the notice of hearing given relator, and respondent so concedes in its brief, that it was intended by the form of the notice to come within the requirements of either or both sections of the law. An examination of the transcript and briefs discloses that whereas relator contended in the court below that respondent had no right to proceed under either § 73-12-13 or § 73-12-15, she now claims that she does not question respondent's right to hold hearings under § 73-12-15 and that the order entered did not prevent it from doing so. On the other hand, respondent asserts that the peremptory writ, quoted supra, clearly prohibited its proceeding with any hearing whatsoever, and if it had undertaken to hold additional hearings it would have been subject to a contempt citation. Further, respondent states that if it can proceed to hold hearings under § 73-12-15, looking to the discharge of relator, nothing more will be required. In the light of the position of the parties as set forth above, we see no necessity for determining the very interesting problems raised by the appeal. It is a sufficient disposition of the appeal to remand the cause to the trial court with instructions to amend its peremptory writ to permit respondent to proceed, if it is so advised, as provided in § 73-12-15, N.M.S.A. 1953, Pocket Supp. The relator, by cross-appeal, complains that the trial court erred in refusing to allow attorney fees as a part of the damages sustained, or costs and disbursements. Her argument is based on § 22-12-12, N.M.S.A. 1953, which reads as follows: Relator asserts that although this court has never been called upon to pass on the question, it has been determined by the highest court of a number of states having substantially similar statutes that attorney fees are included within the term "damages." McClure v. Scates, 64 Kan. 282, 67 P. 856; Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Larrabee, 234 U.S. 459, 34 S. Ct. 979, 58 L. Ed. 1398, which applied the law of Kansas; State ex rel. O'Sullivan v. District Court, 127 Mont. 32, 256 P.2d 1076; Colorado Development Co. v. Creer, 96 Utah 1, 80 P.2d 914, are examples of such cases. On the other hand, relator concedes that a contrary result has been reached in Commodore Mining Co. v. People, 82 Colo. 77, 257 P. 259; Calmenson Clothing Co. v. Kruger, 66 S.D. 224, 281 N.W. 203; and State ex rel. Thompson v. Board of School Directors, 179 Wis. 284, 191 N.W. 746. A note on the subject may be found in 73 A.L.R.2d 903, 924. Relator calls our attention to a number of decisions of this court which she argues tend to indicate that this court would construe the statute as being intended to include attorney fees. Among these are Webb v. Beal, 20 N.M. 218, 148 P. 487 and Woods v. Fambrough, 24 N.M. 488, 174 *837 P. 996, allowing attorney fees in proceedings for dissolution of an injunction. In addition, Tatavich v. Pettine, 31 N.M. 479, 247 P. 840, and Dinkle v. Denton, 68 N.M. 108, 359 P.2d 345, are cited as indicating that this court recognizes that attorney fees may be granted in proper cases. Respondent, however, points out that the general rule in New Mexico is that in the absence of a statute or rule of court, attorney fees are not taxed as costs or considered as an item of damages. State ex rel. Stanley v. Lujan, 43 N.M. 348, 93 P.2d 1002; Keller v. Cavanaugh, 64 N.M. 86, 324 P.2d 783. He also argues that Webb v. Beal, supra; Woods v. Fambrough, supra; and Tatavich v. Pettine, supra, are within well-recognized exceptions to the general rule, being suits for recovery of attorney fees expended for the dissolution of injunctions. Respondent further contends that Dinkle v. Denton, supra, must be distinguished from the instant case in that the Dinkle case involved a claim by an indemnitor for attorney fees expended in defending the claim indemnified against. That an indemnitor may recover his attorney fees in such a case as damages in a suit against the one who caused the loss is also well recognized. Turner v. Zip Motors, Inc., 245 Iowa 1091, 65 N.W.2d 427, 45 A.L.R.2d 1174, and annotation following. We agree with respondent. This court has always limited recovery of attorney fees by the rule announced in Keller v. Cavanaugh, supra, and is not at this time disposed to depart from it. If the legislature had desired attorney fees to be reimbursed in this type of case, we feel that it would have expressly so provided. Calmenson Clothing Co. v. Kruger, supra. This is also a sufficient answer to relator's argument that "disbursements" include attorneys fees, for which no authority is cited. Although it is unnecessary to here decide, it is interesting to note that California has construed "costs and necessary disbursements" to be synonymous. Moss v. Underwriter's Report, Inc., 12 Cal. 2d 266, 83 P.2d 503; Gibson v. Thrifty Drug Co., 173 Cal. App. 2d 554, 343 P.2d 610. See, also, Dauntless Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 24 S.C. 536; United States v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry., D.C., 235 F. 951. In view of the disposition of cross-appellant's appeal, it is unnecessary to dispose of cross-appellee's counterpoints. The cause is remanded to the district court with direction that it proceed in accord herewith. IT IS SO ORDERED. CARMODY and CHAVEZ, JJ., concur. COMPTON, C.J., and NOBLE, J., not participating.