Title: Conn v. Ed Wederski Const. Co.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Conn v. Ed Wederski Const. Co.1983 WY 86668 P.2d 649Case Number: 83-13Case Number: 83-13Decided: 08/24/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
RANDY W. CONN, APPELLANT 
(EMPLOYEE-CLAIMANT),

v.

ED WEDERSKI CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, APPELLEE (EMPLOYER-DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Joseph F. Maier, 
J.

Bernard Q. 
Phelan, Cheyenne, for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Terry J. Harris, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and RAPER,* THOMAS, ROSE, and BROWN, 
JJ.

* Retired June 13, 1983, 
but continued to participate in the decision of the court in this case pursuant 
to order of the court entered June 13, 1983.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The question to be 
resolved by the court in this case is what does § 27-12-606, W.S. 1977, 
contemplate in providing that:

"* * * an application may 
be made to the clerk of district court by any party within four (4) years from 
the date of the last award, * * * for additional benefits of any type or nature 
or for a modification of the amount of the award * * * on the grounds of mistake 
* * *"?

The district 
court held that the appellant was not entitled to reopen his worker's 
compensation case on the ground of mistake to obtain an award for permanent 
total disability. The district court found, in addition, that there was not 
sufficient evidence to justify an award of total permanent disability if the 
case should be reopened. We agree with the district court as to the first ground 
of its disposition, and the judgment will be affirmed.

[¶2.]     The record discloses 
that on October 4, 1977, the appellant was injured in a job-related accident 
while in the employ of Ed Wederski Construction Company, a sole proprietorship. 
A plywood form used in the pouring of concrete for walls or footings of 
buildings was dropped by his employer, and it struck the appellant in the lower 
back. The Worker's Report of Accident or Occupational Disease was filed on 
October 11, 1977, and thereafter worker's compensation benefits for temporary 
total disability and medical expenses were applied for and paid without 
objection. This continued up until September of 1978. The clerk of the district 
court then received a letter from the specialist in Denver, Colorado, who was treating appellant, which 
outlined the diagnosis and treatment of the appellant. The letter then 
continued:

"The condition that we 
have mentioned is a congenital condition for which his treatment has been 
directed. Mr.Conn was last seen on August 14, 1978. At this 
time the patient was advised that he could return to work and the only 
restriction was that he should not lift any weight greater than 45 lbs. The 
probability is that this patient should have vocational rehabilitation and in 
addition, weight reduction and exercises should be 
instituted.

"It is doubtful that this 
patient has any permanent residual disability as a result of his industrial 
accident."

 

The diagnosis 
which was stated in this letter was spondylolysis with a probable 
spondylolisthesis of L-5 on S-1.1

[¶3.]     After the receipt of 
this letter no claims were presented for payment of benefits with respect to the 
appellant. While he asserts that he was denied further workers' compensation 
benefits as a result of the communication from the physician, this argument may 
overstate his position. His acquiescence in the cessation of benefits is 
evidenced by a receipt which shows a refund of overpayment of temporary total 
disability for the period from August 15, 1978, to August 21, 1978. The refund 
obviously dates from the August 14, 1978, date in the treating physician's 
letter.

[¶4.]     Nothing further 
occurred in connection with this file until June 17 of 1982, when appellant 
filed his Petition to Re-open. In presenting his petition the appellant alleged 
that:

"6. The denial of 
benefits to claimant was due to mistake pursuant to W.S. § 27-12-606 (Rep.Ed. 
1979), and this Petition is brought pursuant to that 
statute."

The Petition to 
Re-open was contested by the employer and a pretrial conference was set and 
held. Following the pretrial conference memoranda were filed by the appellant, 
the employer, and the Worker's Compensation Division of the Office of the State 
Treasurer of the State of Wyoming, and a hearing was held at which 
evidence was received in the form of testimony and various exhibits. The 
district court then entered its Judgment Denying Petition for Re-opening 
Workmen's Compensation Claim in which the following pertinent findings were 
made:

"FINDS that there was 
neither a mistake of fact nor fraud as envisioned under Section 27-12-606 of the 
Wyoming Statutes, 1977 Republished Edition, as a basis for re-opening the 
previous award;

"THE COURT FURTHER FINDS 
that the Employee-Claimant has failed to carry his burden of proof based upon a 
preponderance of the evidence at the hearing to show that he has any permanent 
disability as alleged.

"THE COURT FURTHER FINDS 
that the Claimant-Employee has failed to carry his burden of proof to show that 
he presently has a compensable claim under the Worker's Compensation 
Act."

In the judgment 
the Decision Letter of the court specifically was incorporated by reference as 
setting forth the Court's Findings, Opinions and Rulings. It is from this 
judgment that the appellant has taken his appeal.

[¶5.]     In the brief of 
appellant he identifies the issues to be determined in the appeal as follows: 

"1. Was there sufficient 
evidence of `mistake' to authorize a reopening of Worker's Compensation Claim 
pursuant to W.S. § 27-12-606 (Rep.Ed. 1977)?

"2. Is there a necessity 
for a petitioner under W.S. § 27-12-606 (Rep.Ed. 1977) to prove that a previous 
treating physician would testify differently at a hearing to 
reopen?

"3. What degree of 
evidence is required to prove disability?"

The only brief 
of appellee was filed by the Wyoming State Treasurer, ex rel. Worker's 
Compensation Division, and there the articulation of the issues in this appeal 
is as follows:

"I. WHETHER AN 
APPLICATION FOR MODIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 27-12-606, W.S. 1977, WAS THE 
PROPER PROCEDURE FOR APPELLANT-CLAIMANT TO HAVE UTILIZED IN PURSUING HIS CLAIM 
FOR WORKER'S COMPENSATION BENEFITS.

"II. EVEN ASSUMING 
ARGUENDO THAT IT WAS PROPER FOR APPELLANT-CLAIMANT TO PROCEED UNDER SECTION 
27-12-606, W.S. 1977, WAS THERE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDING OF NO MISTAKE."

[¶6.]     We turn first to the 
law that we conclude controls the disposition of this case. The pertinent 
statute, § 27-12-606, W.S. 1977, provides as follows:

"Where an award of 
compensation has been made in favor of or on behalf of an employee for any 
benefits under this act [§§ 27-12-101 to 27-12-804], an application may be made 
to the clerk of district court by any party within four (4) years from the date 
of the last award, or at any time during which monthly payments under an award 
are being made, for additional benefits of any type or nature or for a 
modification of the amount of the award on the ground of increase or decrease of 
incapacity due solely to the injury, or upon grounds of mistake or 
fraud."

[¶7.]     This court has adopted 
a policy of liberally construing statutes relating to worker's compensation in 
light of their beneficent purpose. Matter 
of Johner, Wyo., 643 P.2d 932 (1982); Matter of Barnes, Wyo., 587 P.2d 214 (1978); Baldwin v. Scullion, 50 
Wyo. 508, 62 P.2d 531, 108 A.L.R. 304 (1936); 
Sakamoto v. Kemmerer Coal Co., 36 
Wyo. 325, 255 P. 356 (1927). Such statutes will be construed, if rationally possible, so that 
the industry and not the injured worker will bear the burden of industrial 
accidents. We have held, however, that we cannot, under the guise of liberal 
construction, ignore clear statutory provisions and extend the beneficent 
purpose of the law to injuries which do not reasonably fall within the ambit of 
the language of the statute. Matter of 
Van Matre, Wyo., 657 P.2d 815 (1983); Alco of Wyoming v. Baker, Wyo., 651 P.2d 266 (1982); and Mor, Inc. v. Haverlock, Wyo., 
566 P.2d 219 (1977).

[¶8.]     According to 3 Larson, 
Workmen's Compensation Law, § 81.10, p. 15-470 (1983), all states have statutory 
provisions allowing the reopening and modification of worker's compensation 
awards. We have not discovered any other state which has a statute that is 
substantially identical to § 27-12-606, W.S. 1977. Our Wyoming statute appears 
to be unique to the extent that it not only provides a means whereby worker's 
compensation awards can be modified in amount upon application of any party 
within four years from the date of the last award, or at any time monthly 
payments under an award are being made, but it also permits application for "additional benefits of any type or 
nature." (Emphasis added.) We interpret the language of this statute to the end 
that a timely application for benefits may be made by an injured workman subject 
only to the requirement of showing an increase or decrease in incapacity due 
solely to the injury, or mistake, or fraud.

Section 
27-12-607, W.S. 1977, provides in part as follows:

"Every award within the 
meaning of this act [§§ 27-12-101 to 27-12-804] is a judicial determination of 
the rights of the employer, the employee and the disposition of money within the 
various accounts provided under this act as to all matters involved. * * 
*"

An award, being 
characterized as a judicial determination, is subject to the concept of 
finality. Given this proposition, § 27-12-606, W.S. 1977, represents an attempt 
by the legislature to balance the concept of finality as applied to worker's 
compensation awards with the need to assure that injured workmen receive the 
full amount of any benefits to which they are entitled under the law. The 
grounds, however, for reopening are limited. We are in accord with the analysis 
presented by Judge Maier in his Decision Letter in which he says in part as 
follows:

"First, in attempting to 
apply this statute to the facts of the instant case, it would appear that the 
petition to reopen has been filed within the statutory period, that is within 
four years of the last award which was made in August of 1978. Next, it would 
appear that the petition to reopen is an attempt to obtain for the claimant 
`additional benefits of any type or nature'. Finally, is the attempt to obtain 
additional benefits one based upon the grounds of `mistake or fraud'? The 
claimant has neither alleged nor attempted to prove fraud. He bases his claim 
upon mistake. In his memorandum, the claimant states `this petition is a 
petition to reopen the matter which was apparently closed in September, 1978. 
The basis upon which the petition is grounded is that in September, 1978, a 
"mistake of fact" was made by the Clerk of the District Court and by the 
treating physician with regard to the causal connection that Mr. Conn's 
disability had with the injury which occurred in November 
1977.'"

Appellant in the 
present case does not assert, nor does the record support any finding with 
respect to, change in his condition, i.e., an "increase or decrease of 
incapacity due solely to the injury." Appellant argues to this court, as he did 
to the district court, that he has met the requirements of § 27-12-606, W.S. 
1977, because his evidence demonstrates a mistake in the diagnosis of his 
condition as being congenitally related, and he points to the testimony of Dr. 
Stieg as establishing that the earlier diagnosis was erroneous. We do not agree, 
however, that the appellant has met his burden of proving a mistake as that term 
is used in § 27-12-606, W.S. 1977.

[¶9.]     Other jurisdictions 
having statutes which provide for the reopening of worker's compensation cases 
on the ground of mistake have limited relief under their statutes to those 
situations in which a mistake in the determination of a material fact has been 
made by a fact finder. Hughes v. Denny's Restaurant, Fla., 328 So. 2d 830 (1976); 
Gosek v. Garmer and Stiles Company, Iowa, 158 N.W.2d 731 (1968); Young v. 
Charles F. Trivette Coal Company, Ky., 459 S.W.2d 776 (1970); Twin City Fire 
Insurance Company v. Foster, Tex.Civ.App., 537 S.W.2d 760 (1976); 3 Larson, 
Workmen's Compensation Law, § 81.52, p. 15-542 (Dec. 1982 Supp.); 82 Am.Jur.2d 
Workmen's Compensation § 597, p. 313; and 101 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 
854(r), p. 230. In this case no mistake was made by a fact finder in the 
determination of any material fact. The cessation of application for and payment 
of benefits under the Worker's Compensation Act followed the advice from the 
Denver 
specialist quoted earlier.

[¶10.]  The evidence at the hearing in this case 
demonstrates the absence of the kind of mistake which must be shown under the 
statute. The appellant called a neurologist and medical director of the Boulder 
Pain Clinic, who testified that as a result of examination and the study of X 
rays which were taken he found the condition of spondylolysis which had been 
diagnosed previously. This doctor discussed the dichotomy of views in the 
medical profession with respect to the cause of this condition, but he stated 
that in light of the history which had been obtained from the appellant the 
question of a congenital defect causing the condition or some other source 
appeared to be a moot point. He testified that while he was unable to reach a 
conclusion as to the cause of the spondylolysis he did not agree with the 
previous opinion which diagnosed the appellant's condition as related to a 
congenital defect. He gave his opinion that the appellant was permanently 
partially disabled for any heavy-duty type work involving lifting, twisting and 
the like. He would not place a percentage upon the appellant's disability in 
terms of his whole bodily function, but preferred to state instead his views as 
to which physical activities the appellant could or could not perform. He did 
give his opinion that the appellant with the aid of professional help could be 
rehabilitated to perform sedentary sorts of work in the job 
market.

[¶11.]  The testimony of another physician was 
presented by the employer by deposition. This physician was an orthopedic 
surgeon who had initially treated the appellant's back shortly after the 1977 
accident. In his testimony he stated his diagnosis of the appellant's condition 
which was that he did have a pre-existing congenital condition, spondylolysis, 
which was aggravated as a result of the injury and he indicated the presence of 
spondylolisthesis. He testified that while he was treating the appellant the 
appellant complained of considerably more pain than that which would be expected 
from the injury that he had received. Because his treatment did not seem to be 
aiding the appellant, this physician referred him to the Denver specialist. The 
doctor gave his opinion that the appellant was not totally disabled and could 
return to work subject to a limitation that he not do any heavy 
lifting.

[¶12.]  The appellant himself testified at the 
hearing. He discussed his educational and work history. He stated that he never 
had any difficulty with his back prior to the injury and that he previously had 
been employed in other construction work and working on farms and ranches. He 
explained that he was injured in an accident while working in October of 1977, 
and that he had received temporary total disability benefits until September of 
1978. He testified that he had been advised by the clerk in the office of the 
clerk of the district court who was dealing with his file that he could not 
receive benefits after the letter from the Denver specialist. He stated that he 
had sought legal aid but had been informed that the Legal Aid Office did not 
pursue worker's compensation cases.

[¶13.]  During his testimony the appellant 
expressed his anger with the situation and his dissatisfaction with medical 
treatment which had not been able to relieve his pain. He explained that he had 
contacted the office of Vocational Rehabilitation which had afforded him 
assistance by helping him find a job in a local retail hardware outlet. This 
job, however, involved some lifting and the appellant testified that he would 
get help whenever he had to do heavy lifting. He was experiencing pain with his 
back in connection with this job, though, and he eventually quit that job 
because of pain and family duties. He testified about a series of other jobs, 
most of which involved somewhat strenuous physical activity, although not all of 
them did. He stated that he suffered continuing problems from his back which 
made it difficult for him to maintain steady employment. He did receive some 
assistance from Vocational Rehabilitation with respect to job training but he 
was unable to follow through on that because it conflicted with his long hours 
at the job he then held.

[¶14.]  A counselor from the State Vocational 
Rehabilitation Department testified about the efforts of that office to assist 
the appellant. It provided counseling and vocational guidance. It had arranged 
for one employment opportunity and on-the-job training. It had made other 
efforts at job placement and there even had been a referral to the Southeast 
Mental Health Center for assistance in helping the appellant deal with 
depression. In December of 1978, after a position had been obtained with a 
hardware store in Cheyenne, Wyoming, appellant's case was temporarily closed 
after a contact in March of 1979. The next contact with the appellant by the 
office of Vocational Rehabilitation occurred in the spring of 1981 when he was 
called in for an annual review of his situation. In August of that year he was 
enrolled in college to study electronics, and his tuition and books were paid 
for by the office of Vocational Rehabilitation. The appellant did not finish the 
semester at school, and he advised the department that he was quitting due to 
financial pressures in November of 1981. The office of Vocational Rehabilitation 
then sent the appellant to the Boulder Pain Clinic in December of 1981, and he 
was treated there. Other efforts at job placement and retraining were continued 
into June of 1982, but they all proved unsuccessful.

[¶15.]  The counselor for Vocational 
Rehabilitation did give an opinion that the appellant was vocationally disabled 
by a combination of things so that he could not be employed in the areas of his 
experience and training at the time of his injury. This evaluation was based 
upon a variety of information, including the medical reports which that 
department received from the Boulder Pain Clinic, the psychological evaluation 
of the appellant by the Southeast Mental Health Center, and the appellant's own 
statements to the department. The counselor could not say, however, whether the 
appellant's disability was a result of his injury or the other 
factors.

[¶16.]  While the evidence before the court has 
been stated briefly, it does not indicate in any way a mistake of fact on the 
part of the fact finder. At its best the evidence of the appellant would show 
that there is a divergence of medical views with respect to whether the 
condition of spondylolysis is acquired or is congenital in nature. All of the 
medical experts agreed upon the identification of the appellant's condition and 
his physical limitations. The situation of the appellant is quite like that of 
the claimant in Gosek v. Garmer and 
Stiles Company, supra, 158 N.W.2d  at 732, with the Iowa court 
stating:

"* * * [I]f a claimant 
sustained compensable injuries of which he was fully aware at time of prior 
settlement or award, but for some unexplainable reason failed to assert it, he 
cannot, for the first time on subsequent review proceedings, claim additional 
benefits. * * *"

It should be 
recalled that no claim was made by the appellant for compensation benefits 
subsequent to the receipt by the clerk of the district court of the letter from 
the Denver physician in 1978 up until the present petition was filed in June of 
1982.

[¶17.]  While our holding makes it unnecessary to 
reach the question of the sufficiency of the evidence, we do note that the 
appellant was not successful in presenting any opinion as to permanent 
disability nor any opinion with respect to a percentage of disability of his 
entire body. Under the circumstances, even had a mistake been shown which would 
have justified the district court in reopening this case, the evidence of record 
reflected the opinions of two physicians that there was no permanent total 
disability as compared with the views of another physician that there was a 
permanent disability with respect to which he would assign no percentage. Such a 
record either would be susceptible to a conclusion by the district court that 
there was no permanent disability or to a holding which the district court in 
fact did make that the claimant had failed to carry his burden of proof with 
respect to a presently compensable claim. See Cardin v. Morrison-Knudsen, Wyo., 603 P.2d 862 (1979), in which the history recited in the opinion demonstrates the 
necessity of some statement of total disability or if the disability is partial 
an opinion as to the percentage thereof.

[¶18.]  We hold that in this instance the record 
did not demonstrate a mistake as that word is used in § 27-12-606, W.S. 1977, 
and therefore the requirement for the presentation of the application to the 
clerk of the district has not been shown by the appellant. The order of the 
district court denying the appellant's petition to reopen his worker's 
compensation case is correct, and it is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Stedman's Medical 
Dictionary, Lawyer's Edition, p. 1402 (1961), provides the following 
definitions:

"Spondylolysis - 1. 
Breaking down or dissolution of the body of a vertebra. 2. A cleft formation in 
the vertebral body. 3. A loosening of the firm attachment of the contiguous 
vertebrae.

"Spondylolisthesis - 
Forward subluxation of the body of one of the lower lumbar vertebrae on the 
vertebra below it, or upon the sacrum."

IC Gray, 
Attorney's Textbook of Medicine, ¶¶ 17.72(3a) and (3b) (1983), provides the 
following:

"¶ 17.72(3a) Definitions 
and Distinctions - Spondylolysis (G. spondylos, vertebra + lysis, 
dissolution) is a condition, possibly due to a congenital anomaly, characterized 
by flattening of a vertebral body (platyspondylia) and incomplete development of 
the structures making up the neural arch, but without any displacement of the 
vertebrae. Spondylolisthesis (G. spondylos, vertebra + olisthanein, to 
slip) is a forward dislocation of one or more vertebrae on the one below. The 
term spondylolisthesis, in its literal meaning, could properly be applied to any 
forward dislocation of a vertebra irrespective of cause. It could, for example, 
be used to describe a forward dislocation produced by trauma which fractures the 
posterior elements of a normal vertebra. The term, however, is seldom, if ever, 
used in this broad sense. It is limited to forward displacement that occurs 
because of the defect in the neural arch found in 
spondylolysis.

"¶ 17.72(3b) Etiology - 
The etiology of spondylolysis is unknown, or at least unproved. Two theories of 
its origin have been advanced. According to the older theory it is a congenital 
condition; according to the newer theory it is acquired, the result of trauma 
early in life."