Title: Browning v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
KIM BROWNING, 
  
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
No. 173, 2021 
 
Plaintiff-Below, 
 
 
§  
 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§  
Court Below: Superior Court 
§  
of the State of Delaware 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Superior Court  
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
C.A. No. K20A-03-001  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
     
Defendant-Below,   
 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted:  November 3, 2021 
Decided:  
January 10, 2022 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, 
Justices. 
 
ORDER 
 
 
This 10th day of January, 2022, having considered the briefs and the record 
below, it appears to the Court that:    
 
(1) 
The Industrial Accident Board denied Kim Browning’s workers’ 
compensation claim for injuries sustained when she fell in a sinkhole on her way to 
work at the Kent County Courthouse.  The Superior Court affirmed the Board’s 
decision.  After careful review of the record, we agree with the Superior Court that 
there was substantial evidence that Browning was not acting within the course and 
scope of her employment when she fell, and she was not on the premises of her 
employer at the time of her fall.  Thus, we affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. 
 
2 
 
 
(2) 
Browning worked as a Judicial Assistant I, previously known as bailiff, 
in the Delaware Superior Court in Kent County.  She was officially employed by the 
State of Delaware.  On January 24, 2018, Browning parked her car on Federal Street 
in Dover ten minutes before her shift began.  She left her car, walked behind it, and 
stepped onto the grass between the sidewalk and the street.  Browning fell as a 
sinkhole opened beneath her.   
 
(3) 
On November 15, 2019, Browning filed a Petition to Determine 
Compensation Due at the Industrial Accident Board, seeking workers’ compensation 
benefits for the injuries she sustained in the fall.  The Board held an evidentiary 
hearing to determine whether Browning was acting in the course and scope of her 
employment when she fell and whether the injury occurred on the employer’s 
premises.   
(4) 
Although Federal Street is owned by the State, the Board found it was 
not part of the State’s premises for several reasons.  Browning was on her way to 
work when she parked on Federal Street and the City of Dover exercises authority 
over parking on Federal Street—not the State.  Browning had not yet crossed the 
threshold of the courthouse when she fell.  Therefore, the Board decided Browning 
was injured while traveling to work, but not on the State’s premises, and she was not 
entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. 
 
3 
 
 
(5) 
The Superior Court upheld the Board on May 3, 2021.1  Browning has 
appealed to this Court, making essentially the same arguments rejected by the 
Board—her injury occurred within the course and scope of her employment and the 
location of the fall was on her employer’s premises, entitling her to benefits under 
the premises exception.2  The State responds that the “going and coming” rule bars 
Browning’s recovery because Browning’s injury happened during her commute to 
work. 3  The State also argues that the area outside the Kent County Courthouse 
where Browning fell was not part of the employer’s premises. 
(6) 
The Superior Court received no evidence other than that presented to 
the Board.  As such, this Court directly examines the decision of the Board.4  Our 
review of the Board’s decision is “limited to a determination of whether there is 
substantial evidence to support the Board’s findings.”5  “Substantial evidence means 
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
 
1 Browning v. State, 2021 WL 1749757 (Del. Super. Ct. May 3, 2021). 
2 For the premises exception to apply, three requirements must be met: “1) the employee [was] on 
the ‘premises’ where the employee’s services are being performed; 2) the ‘premises’ [are] 
occupied by, or under the control of, the employer; and 3) the employee’s presence on the 
employer’s ‘premises’ [was] required by the nature of the employment.” Stevens v. State, 802 A.2d 
939, 945 (Del. Super. 2002) (citing 19 Del. C. § 2301(15)(a)). 
3 The “going and coming” rule holds that “injuries resulting from accidents during an employee’s 
regular travel to and from work are non-compensable.”  Spellman v. Christiana Care Health 
Servs., 74 A.3d 619, 623 (Del. 2013) (citing Histed v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 621 A.2d 
340, 343 (Del. 1993)). 
4 Pub. Water Supply Co. v. DiPasquale, 735 A.2d 378, 380 (Del. 1999) (citing Stoltz Mgmt Co., 
Inc. v. Consumer Affairs Bd., 616 A.2d 1205, 1208 (Del. 1992)). 
5 Betts v. Townsends, Inc., 765 A.2d 531, 533 (Del. 2000) (citing Johnson Controls Inc. v. Fields, 
758 A.2d 506, 509 (Del. 2000)).  
 
4 
 
 
conclusion.”6  If the Board decided legal issues, this Court reviews them de novo.7  
In reviewing an agency interpretation of a statute it regularly applies, the Court “may 
accord due weight, but not defer,” to the Board’s interpretation of this statute which 
it regularly administers.8  If there is no error of law and substantial evidence to 
support the Board’s findings, “the Board’s decision must be affirmed.”9   
(7) 
To receive workers’ compensation benefits, the claimant must prove 
the injury sustained was “by accident arising out of and in the course of 
employment.”10  These are factual determinations, judged by the totality of the 
circumstances.11  Arising out of employment depends on the origin and cause of 
injury, considering “the nature, conditions, obligations or incidents of the 
employment.”12  “[I]n the course of employment” is a question regarding the time, 
place, and circumstances of the injury, and “covers those things that an employee 
may reasonably do or be expected do to [sic] within a time during which he is 
employed, and at a place where he may reasonably be during that time.”13  However, 
 
6 Scheers v. Independent Newspapers, 832 A.2d 1244, 1246-47 (Del. 2003) (citing Olney v. Cooch, 
425 A.2d 610 (Del.1981)). 
7 Oceanport Indus., Inc. v. Wilm. Stevedores, Inc., 636 A.2d 892, 899 (Del. 1994) (citing Fiduciary 
Trust Co. v. Fiduciary Trust Co., 445 A.2d 927 (Del. 1982)). 
8 Pub. Water Supply Co., 735 A.2d at 382; see also Stevens, 802 A.2d at 944 (holding the court 
should accord due weight to the “going and coming” rule codified at Title 19, Section 2301(15)(a) 
of the Delaware Code, as the IAB regularly administers it). 
9 Stevens, 802 A.2d at 944 (citing Breeding v. Contractors-One-Inc., 549 A.2d 1102, 1104 (Del. 
1988)). 
10 19 Del. C. § 2304; Spellman, 74 A.3d at 623. 
11 Histed, 621 A.2d at 345. 
12 Dravo Corp. v. Strosnider, 45 A.2d 542, 544 (Del. Super. 1945). 
13 Id. at 543-44. 
 
5 
 
 
“the employee does not have to be injured during a job-related activity” if the injury 
occurred on the employer’s premises.14 
(8) 
Here, the Board found that the injury occurred while Browning was 
going to work but was not yet on the premises.  Other jurisdictions have considered 
similar situations that fall within this “gray area where the risks of street travel merge 
with the risks attendant with employment,” and found that they did not arise out of 
employment.15  Substantial evidence exists to support the Board’s decision.  
Browning was not instructed where to park, so she parked on Federal Street which 
is open to the public.  And the location where she fell was outside the courthouse 
property line.  Therefore, the Board correctly denied Browning’s workers’ 
compensation claim. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        Chief Justice 
 
14 Tickles v. PNC Bank, 703 A.2d 633, 637 (Del. 1997). 
15 Matter of Trotman v. New York State Courts, 117 A.D.3d 1164, 1165 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept., May 
1, 2014) (upholding the board’s denial of relief where court employee slipped and fell on ice on 
the public sidewalk near the place of employment); see also Littles v. New York State Dep’t of 
Corr., 61 A.D.3d 1266 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept., Apr. 23, 2009) (upholding the board’s denial of relief 
where the accident occurred in close proximity to the employer’s premises but no evidence was 
provided to show that the street was closed to the public or otherwise controlled by the employer).