Title: State v. Rizal

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
 
No. 115,036 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
YAMUNA RIZAL, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
 
To convict a defendant of possession with intent to distribute a controlled 
substance under K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21-5705(a), the State must prove the defendant had 
knowledge of the nature of the controlled substance. This knowledge requirement can be 
established by proving the defendant either knew the identity of the substance or knew 
that the substance was controlled. A mistake of fact about the nature of a controlled 
substance can negate the knowledge requirement.  
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed February 17, 
2017. Appeal from Johnson District Court; THOMAS KELLY RYAN, judge. Opinion filed July 19, 2019. 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is affirmed. Judgment of the district court is 
affirmed. 
 
Jonathan Laurans, of Kansas City, Missouri, argued the cause, and Christopher Angles, of The 
Angles Law Firm, LLC, of Kansas City, Missouri, was with him on the briefs for appellant.  
 
Jacob M. Gontesky, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and James Crux, legal intern, 
Stephen J. Obermeier, senior deputy district attorney, Stephen M. Howe, district attorney, and Derek 
Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the briefs for appellee. 
 
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The opinion of the court was delivered by  
 
STEGALL, J.:  After a bench trial on stipulated facts, the Johnson County District 
Court convicted Yamuna Rizal of possessing a controlled substance with the intent to 
distribute it at a gas station she owned in Shawnee. On appeal, Rizal argues the evidence 
was insufficient to support her conviction because of a mistake of fact—that she believed 
the packets she sold contained lawful incense, not a controlled substance. We hold the 
State was required to prove that Rizal had knowledge of the nature of the controlled 
substance she possessed and that it proved this element through circumstantial evidence. 
As a result, we affirm.  
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
In April 2012, Detectives Shawn Miller and Steve Hahne with the Shawnee Police 
Department went to a Phillips 66 gas station to investigate a tip that the store was selling 
synthetic cannabinoids. When the detectives arrived, they found Rizal, a coowner of the 
store, working behind the counter. She agreed to let the detectives search behind the 
counter. They soon discovered packages that appeared to contain synthetic cannabinoids 
located under the counter, hidden from view. The packages later tested positive for 
naphthoylindole, a synthetic cannabinoid commonly called "K2." Rizal's gas station was 
located across the street from an elementary school.  
 
The State charged Rizal with possession with intent to distribute naphthoylindole, 
a controlled substance, within 1,000 feet of a school. See K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21-
5705(a)(7) (making it unlawful to "possess with the intent to distribute any of the 
following controlled substances . . . any substance designated in subsection (h) of K.S.A. 
65-4105"); K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 65-4105(h)(2) (listing naphthoylindoles as controlled 
substances); K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21-5705(c)(1)(A) (increasing the severity level for 
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possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance that occurs within 1,000 feet of 
school property). The State also charged her with a drug stamp violation.  
 
Rizal filed a motion to suppress, claiming her Miranda rights were violated and 
her consent to search was involuntary. The district court held a suppression hearing and 
denied the motion. Then the case went to a bench trial on stipulated facts: 
 
"1. On April 3, 2012, Det. Shawn Miller and Det. Steve Hahne of the Shawnee Police 
Department responded to the Phillips 66 located . . . in Shawnee, Johnson County, 
Kansas regarding a tip that the store was selling synthetic cannabinoids. This tip had 
come from the Johnson County Adult Residential Center which had located some 
synthetic cannabinoids at their facility which had purportedly come from the Phillips 66 
located in Shawnee. 
 
"2. Both officers were dressed in plain clothes with black vests marked 'Police' and police 
badges.  
 
. . . .  
 
"4. Upon entering the store Det. Miller introduces himself to the woman working behind the 
counter. She is later identified as the defendant, Yamuna Rizal, who is over the age of 18 
. . . .  
 
"5. Rizal is wearing a 'DARE to Resist Drugs' t-shirt during their contact and has a piece of 
fabric printed with marijuana leaves covering the stool behind the counter which is 
clearly visible to people purchasing items at the counter.  
 
"6. Det. Miller tells Rizal about the tip they have received, he asks her if she is selling 
'incense', 'flavored tobacco' or 'K2'. She says she is not and that those products are illegal. 
During this conversation a customer comes up and Det. Miller offers to stand aside so 
Rizal can assist the customer. Det. Miller then asks Rizal if [sic] 'just comes around the 
corner here and checks' and Rizal says 'no' (indicating she does not mind).  
 
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"7. Rizal initially says she does not know what Det. Miller means by 'K2' and he then 
describes the product. Det. Miller asks Rizal if she is the store owner and she states that 
she is.  
 
"8. During the entire course of their contact Rizal continues to wait on customers as they 
come into the store.  
 
"9. Det. Miller specifically asks a number of times if he can look in various areas and Rizal 
continually indicates he can search. While Det. Miller is behind the counter, Det. Hahne 
stays out of the way on the other side of the counter in the store.  
 
"10. Officers locate a number of product packages which they believe are synthetic 
cannabinoids under the counter of the store and out of sight. These packages are labeled 
with names such as 'Kush', 'Caution', 'Flame' and 'Barely Legal'.  
 
"11. Rizal offers to let the detectives go into the back of the store and take any additional 
packets of product which are also believed to be synthetic cannabinoids. Additional 
packages are located in the back room of the store and these are recovered.  
 
"12. Det. Miller asks Rizal what customers would ask for if they wanted to purchase the 
products he has located behind the counter and Rizal says they would ask for 'incense'. 
Rizal says the last time she has sold the product was a month ago but then later says it 
was a week ago and then indicates they have been continuing to sell the product when she 
is confronted with paperwork indicating the store has ordered hundreds of packets of the 
product from distributors over the past few weeks. Paperwork recovered by Det. Miller 
showed the Phillips 66 had ordered over 3,000 packages of synthetic cannabinoids over 
the previous 4 months from a distributor in Florida.  
 
"13. Rizal was able to tell Det. Miller the prices she was charging for some of the packages of 
product recovered. Rizal admitted she was selling 5 to 10 packages of synthetic 
cannabinoid per day.  
 
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"14. At the conclusion of their search and discussion with Rizal the officers exit the store. 
Rizal is not placed in handcuffs, physically restrained in any manner, touched or arrested 
during the officers contact with her.  
 
"15. The Phillips 66 is located . . . across the intersection from Shawanoe Elementary  
 
School. . . .  
 
"16. . . . The distance from the Phillips 66 to the Shawanoe Elementary School was 
determined to be 827 feet. 
 
"17. The packages of suspected synthetic cannabinoid are submitted to the Johnson County 
Crime Lab for testing. The Lab Report confirms the packets contain illegal synthetic 
cannabinoids (commonly called K2). See attached Lab Report, State's Exhibit 1. The total 
weight of the synthetic cannabinoids was in excess of 1 gram and there was not a Kansas 
Drug Tax Stamp affixed to the packages. 
 
 
The district court found Rizal guilty on both counts and sentenced her to 36 
months' probation and 60 days' jail time. Rizal timely appealed.  
 
 
 
In the Court of Appeals, Rizal argued the district court erred when it denied her 
motion to suppress and the evidence was insufficient to convict her of possession with 
intent to distribute a controlled substance. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district 
court on both grounds. State v. Rizal, No. 115,036, 2017 WL 658708 (Kan. App.) 
(unpublished opinion), rev. granted 306 Kan. 1329 (2017). The decision to deny Rizal's 
motion to suppress is not before us because Rizal did not petition for review of that issue. 
See Supreme Court Rule 8.03(b)(6)(C)(i) (2019 Kan. S. Ct. R. 53). 
 
 
As for sufficiency, Rizal argued the State did not prove she possessed the K2 with 
"knowledge," as that term is defined in McFadden v. United States, 576 U.S. __, 135 S. 
Ct. 2298, 192 L. Ed. 2d 260 (2015). In that case, the United States Supreme Court held 
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that a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012), which makes it unlawful to possess 
a controlled substance with the intent to distribute it, "requires the Government to 
establish that the defendant knew he was dealing with 'a controlled substance.'" 135 S. Ct. 
at 2302. The Court held that this "knowledge requirement" could be established two 
ways:  (1) "by showing that the defendant knew he possessed a substance listed on the 
schedules, even if he did not know which substance it was," and (2) "by showing that the 
defendant knew the identity of the substance he possessed." 135 S. Ct. at 2304. Rizal 
claimed the evidence fell short of McFadden because the State only proved that she 
knowingly sold what she thought was incense. Essentially, she argued a mistake of fact 
negated the requisite culpable mental state. 
 
The Court of Appeals declined to adopt the McFadden knowledge requirement. It 
reasoned that "[u]nlike in McFadden, nothing in the Kansas statutes suggests that Rizal 
needed knowledge of the specific drug she was distributing." Rizal, 2017 WL 658708, at 
*9. In the panel's view, the State only had to prove that Rizal knew she was exercising 
control over something—she did not have to know what that something was. 2017 WL 
658708, at *9. But in the alternative, the panel held that if McFadden applied, the State 
presented sufficient circumstantial evidence that Rizal knew the packages she possessed 
contained a controlled substance. 2017 WL 658708, at *10. 
 
 
There are now two issues before us:  (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred when 
it rejected McFadden's knowledge requirement and held that a conviction for possession 
with intent to distribute a controlled substance does not require proof that the defendant 
knew the nature of the substance possessed, and (2) whether the State presented sufficient 
evidence that Rizal knew she was selling a controlled substance. 
 
 
 
 
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ANALYSIS 
 
Rizal's new argument that she sold a controlled substance analog, instead of a controlled 
substance, is not preserved.  
 
As a preliminary matter, Rizal now claims for the first time on appeal that the 
substance she possessed was not actually a controlled substance, but a controlled 
substance analog. This distinction could make a difference because possession of an 
analog can be harder to prove. A substance is "controlled" in Kansas if it is listed in one 
of the schedules, like naphthoylindole. See K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21-5701(a) (defining 
"controlled substance" as "any drug, substance or immediate precursor included in any of 
the schedules"). In contrast, a "controlled substance analog" is defined as "a substance 
that is intended for human consumption" that (1) has a chemical structure "substantially 
similar" to that of a controlled substance; (2) has a "stimulant, depressant or 
hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system substantially similar" to that of a 
controlled substance; or (3) the defendant "represents or intends" to have the effects listed 
in (2). K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 65-4101(bb)(1); see K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 65-4101(bb)(2) 
("'Controlled substance analog' does not include:  (A) A controlled substance."). So, for 
example, an analog of naphthoylindole could be a substance with a substantially similar 
chemical structure, though it is not specifically listed in the schedules.  
 
The record shows that Rizal possessed naphthoylindole, a controlled substance. 
The lab report, which was attached to the stipulated facts, states that naphthoylindole was 
found in the packets Rizal sold. The district court found that she possessed 
naphthoylindole, a controlled substance, based on that lab report. And Rizal did not 
dispute that finding or the lab results before the district court.  
 
To sidestep the record, Rizal now argues—for the first time in a supplemental 
brief—that the substance she sold chemically differs from naphthoylindole based on her 
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lay analysis of the chemical compounds found in the packets. She invites us to use 
Wikipedia to decipher the chemical compounds listed in the lab report. But we decline to 
experiment with Wikipedia chemistry. See Peoples, The Citation of Wikipedia in Judicial 
Opinions, 12 Yale J. L. & Tech. 1, 29 (2010) (cautioning courts against "turning to 
Wikipedia to conduct . . . ex parte research into the facts of cases before them"); see 
generally Wilson, Proceed with Extreme Caution:  Citation to Wikipedia in Light of 
Contributor Demographics and Content Policies, 16 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 857 
(2014). And it is not our job to engage in fact-finding. See State v. Nelson, 291 Kan. 475, 
488, 243 P.3d 343 (2010) ("Fact-finding is simply not the role of appellate courts."). 
Thus, we conclude that Rizal's new analog argument is unpreserved, and we accept as an 
undisputed fact in the record before us that Rizal possessed the controlled substance 
naphthoylindole. See State v. Rizo, 304 Kan. 974, Syl. ¶ 1, 377 P.3d 419 (2016) ("The 
general rule is that issues not raised before the trial court cannot be raised for the first 
time on appeal."). 
 
The crime of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance requires proof 
that the defendant had knowledge of the nature of the controlled substance.  
 
 
Moving to the merits, Rizal asks us to adopt a McFadden-like approach and hold 
that the crime of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance requires proof 
that the defendant either knew the identity of the substance or knew the substance was 
controlled. This means a mistake of fact—such as Rizal's alleged belief that the packets 
she sold contained ordinary incense—could negate the required knowing culpable mental 
state. See K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5207(a) (generally, a mistake of fact "is a defense if it 
negates the existence of the culpable mental state which the statute prescribes with 
respect to an element of the crime"). The State claims the Court of Appeals was correct, 
so it only had to prove that Rizal knowingly exercised control over the packets—a fact 
nobody disputes. From the State's perspective, a mistake of fact as to the nature of the 
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item possessed—i.e., whether the item is an ordinary brownie dessert or a brownie laced 
with a controlled substance—is no defense to this crime.  
 
 
Rizal admits that McFadden—a federal decision interpreting a federal statute—is 
not controlling here. But she argues McFadden is persuasive because the Kansas crime of 
possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance bears a strong resemblance to 
its federal counterpart and the two share the same knowledge requirement. But, as Rizal 
implicitly recognizes, the root question is still one of Kansas statutory law. 
 
 
"[S]tatutory interpretation is a question of law subject to unlimited review." State 
v. Buell, 307 Kan. 604, 606, 412 P.3d 1004 (2018). The traditional principles of statutory 
interpretation guide our analysis:  
 
"'The most fundamental rule is that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can 
be ascertained. An appellate court must first attempt to ascertain legislative intent through 
the statutory language enacted, giving common words their ordinary meanings. When a 
statute is plain and unambiguous, an appellate court does not speculate as to the 
legislative intent behind it and will not read into the statute something not readily found 
in it. Where there is no ambiguity, the court need not resort to statutory construction. 
Only if the statute's language or text is unclear or ambiguous does the court use canons of 
construction or legislative history or other background considerations to construe the 
legislature's intent.' [Citations omitted.]" City of Dodge City v. Webb, 305 Kan. 351, 356, 
381 P.3d 464 (2016).  
 
 
In McFadden, the United States Supreme Court interpreted 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 
which states that "it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally . . . to 
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or 
dispense, a controlled substance." (Emphasis added.) The Court determined that the 
knowledge requirement could be satisfied two ways:   
 
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"That knowledge requirement may be met by showing that the defendant knew 
he possessed a substance listed on the schedules, even if he did not know which 
substance it was. Take, for example, a defendant whose role in a larger drug organization 
is to distribute a white powder to customers. The defendant may know that the white 
powder is listed on the schedules even if he does not know precisely what substance it is. 
And if so, he would be guilty of knowingly distributing 'a controlled substance.' 
 
"The knowledge requirement may also be met by showing that the defendant 
knew the identity of the substance he possessed. Take, for example, a defendant who 
knows he is distributing heroin but does not know that heroin is listed on the schedules, 
21 CFR § 1308.11 (2014). Because ignorance of the law is typically no defense to 
criminal prosecution, Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 196, 118 S. Ct. 1939, 141 L. 
Ed. 2d 197 (1998), this defendant would also be guilty of knowingly distributing 'a 
controlled substance.'" McFadden, 135 S. Ct. at 2304. 
 
 
In contrast, the relevant Kansas statute does not mention a knowledge requirement 
on its face. K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21-5705(a) states:  "It shall be unlawful for any person to 
cultivate, distribute or possess with the intent to distribute" any controlled substance, 
including naphthoylindoles. See K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21-5705(a)(7); K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 
65-4105(h)(2). The Court of Appeals noticed this discrepancy and concluded that "[t]he 
Kansas statute does not contain 'knowing' language because it is silent as to mens rea." 
Rizal, 2017 WL 658708, at *9.  
 
 
We disagree with the Court of Appeals on this point. The plain language of K.S.A. 
2011 Supp. 21-5705(a) contains two mental states, one on its face and the other imbedded 
in the definition of the word "possession," which applies to crimes involving controlled 
substances. See K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21-5701(q) (defining the term "possession"). First, 
K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21-5705(a) requires possession to be committed "with the intent to 
distribute" any controlled substance. Second, K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21-5701(q) defines 
"possession" as "having joint or exclusive control over an item with knowledge of and 
intent to have such control or knowingly keeping some item in a place where the person 
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has some measure of access and right of control." The possessed item here is a 
"controlled substance," which is defined as "any drug, substance or immediate precursor 
included in any of the schedules," like napthoylindole. K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21-5701(a).  
 
 
Harmonizing these provisions, the crime of possession with intent to distribute a 
controlled substance requires proof that the defendant possessed—meaning knowingly 
exercised control—over any controlled substance with the intent to distribute it. But what 
does it mean to "knowingly" exercise control over a controlled substance? The State 
argues that "knowingly" applies only to the act of exercising control over the packets. But 
Rizal claims "knowingly" also extends to the nature of the substance itself—meaning 
knowledge of its identity (a napthoylindole) or its controlled status, as in McFadden. 
 
 
To resolve this question, we turn to the plain language of the term "knowingly." 
As defined by statute:  "A person acts 'knowingly,' or 'with knowledge,' with respect to 
the nature of such person's conduct or to circumstances surrounding such person's 
conduct when such person is aware of the nature of such person's conduct or that the 
circumstances exist." (Emphases added.) K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21-5202(i); see PIK Crim. 
4th 52.010 (2015 Supp.). In this context, the term "nature" commonly means "[a] 
fundamental quality that distinguishes one thing from another; the essence of something." 
Black's Law Dictionary 1238 (11th ed. 2019); see Webster's New World College 
Dictionary 974 (5th ed. 2014) (defining "nature" as:  "the essential character of a thing; 
quality or qualities that make something what it is; essence"). Taken together, this means 
a person must know the essence of the substance possessed; the fundamental quality that 
distinguishes that substance from another one.  
 
 
Kansas caselaw has long supported this interpretation. For decades, we have 
required the State to prove that a defendant knew about the nature of the substance 
possessed to sustain a conviction for possession of a controlled substance. See State v. 
Keel, 302 Kan. 560, Syl. ¶ 1, 357 P.3d 251 (2015) ("Possession of a controlled substance 
12 
requires specific intent to exercise control over the substance, with knowledge of the 
nature of the substance."); State v. Washington, 244 Kan. 652, 654, 772 P.2d 768 (1989) 
(same); see also State v. Faulkner, 220 Kan. 153, 156, 551 P.2d 1247 (1976) 
("Knowledge signifies awareness and is a requirement for 'possession.' 'Knowledge of the 
presence of a narcotic or dangerous drug as embraced within the concept of physical 
control with the intent to exercise such control is essential.'").  
 
 
We also discussed the type of knowledge required for possession of a controlled 
substance—and how a mistake of fact may negate that knowledge—in the context of a 
challenge to the admissibility of prior drug crime evidence under K.S.A. 60-455. In State 
v. Rosa, 304 Kan. 429, 437, 371 P.3d 915 (2016), we held that evidence of a defendant's 
prior acquaintance with drugs is admissible under K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 60-455(b) when the 
defendant puts his or her knowledge in dispute by providing an innocent explanation for 
the presence of the drugs. As we explained, "Possible 'innocent explanations' would 
include the claims that the defendant either was unaware of the presence of the drugs or 
was under the mistaken belief that the drugs were not illegal drugs but were some other 
lawful substance." (Emphasis added.) 304 Kan. at 437. In either scenario, "evidence of 
prior drug use by the defendant is relevant and probative to prove a disputed material 
fact—viz., the truth or falsity of the defendant's 'innocent explanation.'" 304 Kan. at 437; 
see State v. Graham, 244 Kan. 194, 196-97, 768 P.2d 259 (1989).  
 
 
Today, we hold that to convict a defendant of possession with intent to distribute a 
controlled substance under K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21-5705(a), the State must prove that the 
defendant had knowledge of the nature of the controlled substance—meaning, that the 
defendant either knew the identity of the substance or knew that the substance was 
controlled. This tracks longstanding caselaw and the plain language of K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 
21-5705(a) (possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance); K.S.A. 2011 
Supp. 21-5701(q) ("possession"); and K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21-5202(i) ("knowingly"). We 
agree with Rizal that a mistake of fact about the nature of a controlled substance—
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meaning the actual belief that it is "some other lawful substance" that is not controlled, 
Rosa, 304 Kan. at 437—could negate the knowledge requirement. Thus, the plain 
language of the relevant Kansas statutes dictates a result much like McFadden. 
 
The State presented sufficient evidence that Rizal knowingly possessed a controlled 
substance.  
 
 
The final question is whether the State presented sufficient evidence that Rizal 
either knew the substance was a naphthoylindole or knew the substance was controlled. 
In the stipulated facts, Rizal told the officers that customers would ask for "incense" to 
buy the packets. Rizal claims she used that term innocently and believed she was selling 
lawful incense; she did not know what the substance was or that it was controlled. She 
does not dispute that she intended to distribute the packets.  
 
 
The State argues that Rizal knew the substance in the packets was illegal, though 
she used the euphemism "incense" to describe it. For example, the State points out that 
one detective asked if Rizal was selling "incense," "flavored tobacco," or "K2,"—street 
names for synthetic cannabinoids—and she said no and explained that those products are 
illegal. The State also argues that Rizal's contradictory statements about when she last 
sold the packets suggest that she knew she was selling something illegal.  
 
 
"When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, we review 
the evidence in a light most favorable to the State to determine whether a rational 
factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. 
Potts, 304 Kan. 687, 694, 374 P.3d 639 (2016). We do not reweigh evidence, resolve 
conflicting evidence, or pass on the credibility of witnesses. 304 Kan. at 694. 
Furthermore, "there is no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence in terms 
of probative value" because "'[a] conviction of even the gravest offense can be based 
entirely on circumstantial evidence and the inferences fairly deducible therefrom. If an 
14 
inference is a reasonable one, the jury has the right to make the inference.'" 304 Kan. at 
694 (quoting State v. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, Syl. ¶ 9, 245 P.3d 1030 [2011]).  
 
 
In short, we agree with the Court of Appeals that there is sufficient "circumstantial 
evidence that the Rizal knew she was distributing a substance listed on the schedules, 
even if she did not know which substance it was." Rizal, 2017 WL 658708, at *10. The 
packets were hidden below the counter, out of public view. Rizal acknowledged that so-
called "incense" is illegal to sell; admitted that customers would ask for "incense" to buy 
the packets; was evasive about when she last sold the packets; and eventually admitted 
that she sold 5-10 packets per day. See 2017 WL 658708, at *10. Rizal's comments and 
behavior suggest that she did not, in fact, believe she was selling lawful incense but 
rather an illegal substance with the same street name. Viewed in the light most favorable 
to the State, a rationale fact-finder could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Rizal 
knowingly possessed a controlled substance on these facts. 
 
 
In sum, we conclude the Court of Appeals erred in its interpretation of K.S.A. 
2011 Supp. 21-5705(a)'s knowledge requirement. But we affirm the Court of Appeals' 
alternative holding that the State presented sufficient evidence that Rizal knew the 
substance was controlled. For that reason, we affirm.  
 
 
Affirmed.  
 
JOHNSON, J., not participating. 
GLENN R. BRAUN, District Judge, assigned.1 
                                                          
 
 
1REPORTER'S NOTE:  District Judge Braun was appointed to hear case No. 115,036 
vice Justice Johnson under the authority vested in the Supreme Court by art. 3, § 6(f) of 
the Kansas Constitution.