Title: CLC v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CLC v. STATE2004 WY 282 P.3d 1235Case Number: 03-37Decided: 01/21/2004
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                
   

 

CLC,

 

Appellant(Defendant) 
,

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff) 
.

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Tina 
N. Kerin, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument presented by Ms. 
Kerin.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; and Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney 
General.  Argument presented by Ms. 
Cooley.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 

[¶1]      Appellant, CLC, 
seeks review of an order of the district court that denied an application for 
conditional discharge from the Wyoming State Hospital (WSH).  By order entered on September 14, 1998, 
CLC was found not guilty by reason of mental illness of the crime of 
interference with a police officer.  
Initially, CLC was placed in outpatient supervision in the community, but 
when he failed to abide by his prescribed treatment regimen, he was sent to WSH 
for confinement and treatment.  On 
July 15, 2002, WSH filed an application for conditional discharge in the 
district court.  However, WSH 
subsequently amended its application, asking the district court to continue 
CLC's hospitalization in order to augment his treatment.  The district court denied the 
application for conditional discharge, and CLC appeals from that 
order.

 

[¶2]      After careful 
review of the record, we conclude that the district court's order denying the 
application for conditional discharge is not contrary to the evidence brought to 
the district court's attention, nor is it otherwise an abuse of discretion.  There is no other action of the district 
court that can constitute a basis for this appeal, as the earlier orders of the 
district court were not timely appealed.  
Thus, the appeal will be affirmed in part, dismissed in part, and the 
matter remanded to the district court to consider such other proceedings as may 
be initiated by it of its own motion, by the prosecutor, by WSH, or by 
CLC.

 

 

[¶3]      CLC raises these 
issues:

 

            
I.          
Whether the order denying application for conditional discharge is 
invalid when [CLC] is unlawfully confined, without due process of law, at the 
Wyoming State Hospital?

            
II.          
Whether [CLC] received ineffective assistance of 
counsel?

            
III.         
Whether the trial court erred in refusing [CLC's] conditional discharge 
from the Wyoming State Hospital?

 

The 
State rephrases those issues:

 

            
I.          
Whether [CLC] is lawfully confined in the Wyoming State 
Hospital?

            
II.          
Whether [CLC] received effective assistance of 
counsel?

            
III.         
Whether the district court properly denied [CLC's] application for 
discharge from the Wyoming State Hospital?

 

 

[¶4]      In an information 
filed in the county court (now circuit court) on January 26, 1998, CLC was 
charged with the crime of interference with a police officer in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(a) (LexisNexis 2003), a misdemeanor.1  By order entered on January 28, 1998, 
the circuit court suspended the proceedings in this case and sent CLC to WSH for 
a mental evaluation.  The record is 
not entirely clear as to what transpired over the next several months, but on 
June 12, 1998, the district attorney filed a demand for a preliminary hearing 
for CLC.  In that demand, this 
summary of events was provided to the district court:  CLC was sent to WSH on January 28, 1998; 
on March 3, 1998, the State received a report from WSH indicating that CLC had 
medical conditions that required treatment and that WSH could not make a 
determination regarding sanity or fitness to proceed unless and until those 
conditions were treated; CLC was then involuntarily committed to WSH;2 on May 28, 1998, the State received 
a report from WSH indicating that CLC's behavior was "appropriate" and his 
thinking "clear."

 

[¶5]      On July 13, 1998, 
CLC entered a plea of not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency.  By order entered on July 20, 1998, CLC 
was ordered to go to WSH for an evaluation.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 7-11-303(b) (LexisNexis 2003).  
By order entered on September 14, 1998, CLC was found not guilty by 
reason of mental illness and placed on supervision.  In that order the district court placed 
CLC under the supervision of the Department of Probation and Parole, to ensure 
that CLC "take all medications that are appropriate and pursue any and all 
mental health care counseling and treatment as deemed necessary and appropriate 
by his supervising agent."  In this 
regard, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-306(c) (LexisNexis 2003) 
provides:

 

(c)  If 
the court finds that the person is affected by mental illness or deficiency and 
presents a substantial risk of danger to himself or others, but can be 
controlled adequately and given proper care, supervision and treatment if 
released on supervision, the court shall order him released subject to the 
supervisory orders of the court as are appropriate in the interests of justice 
and the welfare of the defendant.  
The court may appoint any person or state, county or local agency 
which the court considers capable of supervising the person upon 
release.  Upon receipt of an 
order issued under this subsection, the person or agency appointed shall assume 
the supervision of the person pursuant to the direction of the court.  Conditions of release in the order of 
the court may be modified from time to time and supervision may be terminated by 
order of the court.  If upon a 
hearing the state shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the person 
released on supervision under this subsection can no longer be controlled 
adequately by supervision, the court may order the person committed to the 
Wyoming state hospital or other designated facility for custody, care and 
treatment.  [Emphasis 
added.]

 

[¶6]      CLC was placed 
under the supervision of the Department of Probation and Parole, and on April 
11, 2000, a pleading styled "Petition for Revocation of Probation" was filed in 
the district court.  CLC was 
arrested on April 15, 2000, and confined in the Laramie County Detention 
Center.  The basis for the 
revocation was CLC's failure to follow prescribed treatment while under 
supervision in the community.  In an 
order entered on May 30, 2000, CLC was committed to WSH for confinement and 
treatment.  In that order the 
district court commissioner acknowledged that CLC violated the terms of his 
community "supervision" and that he presented a danger to himself and 
others.  The order did not revoke an 
imposition of a term of probation.

 

[¶7]      CLC remained at 
WSH in the interim, and on July 15, 2002, WSH filed an application in the 
district court for an order of conditional discharge for CLC.  That application was supported by a 
report prepared by WSH that indicated CLC was "probably safe" for discharge but 
recommended that he be closely followed in community supervision.  The district court scheduled a hearing 
for October 31, 2002, to consider the application for discharge.  In a letter dated October 30, 2002, WSH 
modified its recommendation, opining that it would be best if CLC remained at 
WSH for further treatment for a period of at least 90 days.  At the hearing, counsel, who was located 
in Cheyenne, represented CLC and CLC participated by telephone from WSH and was 
not present in Cheyenne.  CLC was 
able to visit privately with his attorney during the proceedings.  By order entered on December 6, 2002, 
the district court denied the application for conditional discharge and CLC 
remained at WSH.  In this regard, 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-306(g) provides:
  

(g) 
If the court, after a hearing upon any application for discharge, or application 
for modification or termination of release on supervision, under subsections (c) 
through (f) of this section, finds that the person is no longer affected by 
mental illness or deficiency, or that he no longer presents a substantial risk 
of danger to himself or others, the court shall order him discharged from 
custody or from supervision.  If the 
court finds that the person is still affected by a mental illness or deficiency 
and presents a substantial risk of danger to himself or others, but can be 
controlled adequately if he is released on supervision, the court shall order 
him released on supervision as provided in subsection (c) of this section.  If the court finds that the person 
has not recovered from his mental illness or deficiency and presents a 
substantial risk of danger to himself or others and cannot adequately be 
controlled if he is released on supervision, the court shall order him remanded 
for continued care and treatment.  
[Emphasis added.]

 

[¶8]      On December 12, 
2002, CLC filed a pro se notice of appeal seeking review of that order in this 
Court.  By order entered on March 
27, 2003, this Court appointed the Public Defender to represent CLC in this 
appeal.  In a letter dated April 16, 
2003, WSH reported to the district court that CLC could not be recommended for 
discharge "conditionally or otherwise" as he refused offered treatment and 
medication and could not safely be released into the community and that "his 
risk of dangerous relapse in the community is high."  (Emphasis in original.)  WSH also noted a potential need for CLC 
to have a surrogate decision-maker appointed because his mental illnesses were a 
significant factor in his refusal to take the medication that would likely be of 
benefit to him and, perhaps, hasten his ability to safely function in a 
community setting.  No more current 
information is available to this Court as to CLC's 
condition.

 

 

 

[¶9]      As our point of 
embarkation, we note that the determination that CLC was not guilty by reason of 
mental illness appears to have been reached in a manner consistent with Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 7-11-301 through 307 (LexisNexis 2003).  Those statutes provided a full range of 
due process protections to CLC.  
See generally, ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards, Part 
VII (1984); and 2 Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses, § 173(g) (1984 
and 2001-2002 Pocket Part).  Of 
central importance here, however, CLC did not appeal from the order that revoked 
the district court's initial determination that CLC could remain in the 
community under supervision.  
Although styled a revocation of probation, we view that as an issue of 
form rather than substance, and it is clear the district court acted in a manner 
consistent with the statutes that govern in these circumstances.  In any event, because CLC did not timely 
file an appeal from that order, we are without jurisdiction to consider the 
issue framed by this portion of his brief.  
W.R.A.P. 1.03.

 

 

[¶10]   To the extent CLC contends that his 
counsel was ineffective in the proceedings prior to the filing of the 
application for conditional discharge, we cannot consider that issue because a 
timely appeal was not taken from the district court's earlier order.  W.R.A.P. 1.03.

 

[¶11]   To the extent CLC contends that his 
counsel was ineffective leading up to and during the hearing on WSH's 
application for conditional discharge, we employ the following standard of 
review:

 

In 
reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, our paramount 
consideration is whether, in light of all the circumstances, trial counsels' 
acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance.  Gleason v. 
State, 2002 WY 161, ¶44, 57 P.3d 332, ¶44 (Wyo.2002).  An appellant claiming ineffective 
assistance of counsel must demonstrate on the record that counsel's performance 
was deficient.  Id. (citing 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 
(1984)).  Ordinarily, he must also 
demonstrate that prejudice resulted.  
Under this test, the inquiry is whether or not counsel rendered the 
assistance a reasonably competent attorney would have offered and, if not, 
whether his failure to do so prejudiced the defense of the case.  Id. This two-part test, the 
Strickland test, is the test we normally apply in reviewing 
ineffectiveness claims, and it is this test that applies to Mr. Sincock's first 
claim of ineffectiveness.

 

            
We 
examine the conduct of defense counsel in light of all the circumstances in 
determining whether the identified acts or omissions fall outside the ambit of 
professionally competent assistance, bearing in mind the function of counsel is 
to make the adversarial testing process work in every case.  Dickeson v. State, 843 P.2d 606, 
609 (Wyo.1992).  The benchmark for 
judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so 
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial 
cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result.  Gleason, 2002 WY 161, 57 P.3d 332.   We do not evaluate the 
efforts of counsel from a perspective of hindsight but endeavor to reconstruct 
the circumstances surrounding the challenged conduct and evaluate the 
professional efforts from the perspective of counsel at the time.  Dickeson, 843 P.2d  at 609.   We invoke a strong presumption 
that counsel rendered adequate and reasonable assistance making all decisions 
within the bounds of reasonable professional judgment.  Id. The burden is on the 
defendant to overcome this presumption that, in light of the circumstances, the 
challenged action or failure of the attorney might be considered sound trial 
strategy.  
Id.

 

Sincock 
v. State, 
2003 WY 115, ¶¶34-35, 76 P.3d 323, ¶¶34-35 (Wyo. 2003).

 

[¶12]   We have carefully reviewed the 
record on appeal, and we conclude CLC's counsel was not 
ineffective.

 

 

[¶13]   It is apparent that WSH decided to 
withdraw, or at least modify, its application for conditional discharge.  Its papers make clear that it still 
considered CLC to be a danger to himself or others.  CLC presented no evidence to the 
contrary.  For these reasons we are 
compelled to conclude that the district court's order denying the motion for 
conditional discharge was not contrary to the evidence presented to it and was 
not otherwise an abuse of discretion.

 

 

[¶14]   For the reasons set out above, the 
order of the district court denying the application for conditional discharge is 
affirmed.  CLC's counsel was not 
ineffective in those proceedings.  
The appeal is dismissed with respect to the other issues raised by 
CLC.  This matter is remanded to the 
district court, and the parties are returned to the positions they were in prior 
to the district court's December 6, 2002 order denying the application for 
conditional discharge.  Furthermore, 
this matter is remanded to the district court for such further proceedings as 
may be initiated by the district court of its own motion, or by the State acting 
through the prosecutor or WSH, or by CLC.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

   1An amended 
information was filed on March 3, 1998, charging CLC with interference with a 
police officer in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(b), a 
felony.

 

   2See Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 25-10-110, -112, -116, -118, and -123 (LexisNexis 
2003).