Title: State v. Cargile

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Cargile, Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-4939.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2009-OHIO-4939. 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. CARGILE, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Cargile, Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-4939.] 
A person who is taken to a detention facility after his arrest and who possesses a 
drug of abuse at the time he enters the facility meets the actus reus 
requirement for a violation of R.C. 2921.36(A)(2). 
(No. 2008-1452 — Submitted May 19, 2009 — Decided September 24, 2009.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 89964, 2008-Ohio-
2783. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
A person who is taken to a detention facility after his arrest and who possesses a 
drug of abuse at the time he enters the facility meets the actus reus 
requirement for a violation of R.C. 2921.36(A)(2). 
__________________ 
 
CUPP, J. 
{¶ 1} This case presents the question whether a person who is taken to a 
detention facility after his arrest and who at the time of entering the facility 
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possesses a drug of abuse has voluntarily conveyed a drug of abuse onto the 
grounds of a detention facility and can therefore be found guilty of violating R.C. 
2921.36(A)(2).  We answer the foregoing question in the affirmative and, 
therefore, reverse the court of appeals’ judgment. 
I 
{¶ 2} In March 2007, appellee, Cleveland Cargile, was arrested on 
charges of robbery.  At the time of the arrest, the arresting officer conducted a 
pat-down search of Cargile.  Another pat-down by the arresting officer was 
conducted before Cargile was placed into the police car for transport to the 
detention facility.  The officer did not discover any illegal weapons or drugs in 
Cargile’s possession as a result of these searches. 
{¶ 3} Prior to taking Cargile into the detention facility for processing, the 
arresting officer admonished Cargile twice that he should tell the officer if he had 
any drugs or weapons on him because bringing such items into the jail would 
likely cause him to be charged with a felony.  Cargile responded that he did not 
possess anything that the officer needed to be concerned about. 
{¶ 4} An officer conducted a search of Cargile in the detention facility 
before he was placed in a jail cell.  Suspicious of Cargile’s evasive leg 
movements during this search, the officer focused his search on Cargile’s legs and 
discovered marijuana hidden inside one of Cargile’s pants cuffs. 
{¶ 5} Cargile was indicted on two counts of robbery and one count of 
illegal conveyance of prohibited items onto the grounds of a detention facility.  
The jury found Cargile not guilty of both robbery counts but returned a guilty 
verdict on the illegal-conveyance count.  The trial court sentenced Cargile to two 
years in prison. 
{¶ 6} Cargile appealed, and the appellate court vacated the conviction.  
The court held that because Cargile had entered the detention facility only as a 
result of his arrest and not through his own affirmative conduct, his conveyance of 
January Term, 2009 
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drugs into that facility was not voluntary for the purposes of R.C. 2921.36(A)(2).  
State v. Cargile, Cuyahoga App. No., 89964, 2008-Ohio-2783, at ¶ 11. 
{¶ 7} The state appealed to this court, and we accepted review under our 
discretionary jurisdiction.  State v. Cargile, 120 Ohio St.3d 1415, 2008-Ohio-
6166, 897 N.E.2d 651. 
II 
{¶ 8} Under fundamental concepts of criminal law, a person is not guilty 
of an offense unless both of the following apply:  
{¶ 9} “(1) The person’s liability is based on conduct that includes either 
a voluntary act, or an omission to perform an act or duty that the person is capable 
of performing [i.e., the actus reus];  
{¶ 10} “(2) The person has the requisite degree of culpability for each 
element as to which a culpable mental state is specified by the section defining the 
offense [i.e., the mens rea].”  R.C. 2901.21(A). 
{¶ 11} In this case, Cargile was charged with violating R.C. 
2921.36(A)(2), which prohibits the knowing conveyance, or attempted 
conveyance, of any drug of abuse onto the grounds of a detention facility.  Cargile 
does not dispute that he knew that drugs were in his pants cuff, that he possessed 
the culpable mental state for a R.C. 2921.36(A)(2) violation, or that the jail is a 
detention center for purposes of R.C. 2921.36(A)(1).  The sole issue presented in 
this appeal is whether Cargile voluntarily conveyed drugs into the jail. 
III 
A 
{¶ 12} The court of appeals held that entering the detention facility with 
drugs in his pants cuff was not a voluntary act by Cargile, because at the time of 
his entry, he was under arrest.  Because his arrest and transport to the detention 
facility deprived him of the fundamental right to freedom, the court of appeals 
held, his presence in the facility was a wholly involuntary act on his part. 
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{¶ 13} We disagree with the court’s analysis and conclude that Cargile’s 
conduct constituted a voluntary act.  Although Cargile did not have any choice 
whether to go to jail following his arrest, the fact that his entry into the jail was 
not of his volition does not make his conveyance of drugs into the detention 
facility an involuntary act.  He was made to go into the detention facility, but he 
did not have to take the drugs with him. 
{¶ 14} Conscious and aware of the physical presence of the drugs hidden 
in his pants cuff, Cargile did not reveal his possession of the drugs during any of 
the searches.  Moreover, Cargile affirmatively concealed the drugs by stating to 
the arresting officer that he did not possess anything the officer needed to be 
concerned about, despite the warning Cargile received that if he brought drugs 
into the detention facility he would be committing a felony.  Cargile declined 
opportunities to end his possession of the drugs before entering the facility.  
Accordingly, Cargile’s possession of the drugs when he entered the detention 
facility was a voluntary act and thus, he was criminally liable under R.C. 
2921.36(A)(2). 
B 
{¶ 15} Cargile argues that once he was arrested, he had a constitutional 
right to remain silent and if he had admitted to possessing drugs, he would have 
incriminated himself.  However, there is no indication that Cargile invoked his 
constitutional privilege to remain silent and avoid self-incrimination at the time of 
the arrest, or that he argued a violation of this right before the trial court. Cargile 
failed to raise this claim and has, thereby, waived it.  State v. Awan (1986), 22 
Ohio St.3d 120; 489 N.E.2d 277, syllabus. 
{¶ 16} Moreover, this challenge lacks merit.  Cargile’s argument is based 
on a faulty premise: that the right to remain silent and avoid self-incrimination 
also includes the privilege of lying or providing false responses to direct 
questions.  Despite the several warnings the officer gave Cargile about bringing 
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drugs into a detention facility, Cargile actively denied possessing any drugs.  The 
constitutional right to remain silent does not confer upon a defendant the privilege 
to lie, Brogan v. United States (1998), 522 U.S. 398, 404, 118 S.Ct. 805, 139 
L.Ed.2d 830, or the right to be protected from having to make difficult choices 
regarding whether to invoke the right to remain silent, State v. Canas 
(Iowa,1999), 597 N.W.2d 488, 496, overruled on other grounds by State v. Turner 
(2001), 630 N.W.2d 601; State v. Carr (Sept. 26, 2008), Tenn.Crim.App. No. 
M2007-01759-CCA-R3-CD.  Thus, this constitutional protection does not apply 
to Cargile’s conduct. 
C 
{¶ 17} Cargile additionally asserts that R.C. 2921.36 is not aimed at 
prisoners.  He claims that the intent of R.C. 2921.36 is to prevent visitors, 
employees, or other nonprisoners from bringing drugs or other contraband into a 
detention facility and because he was not a visitor, employee, or other 
nonprisoner, R.C. 2921.36 does not apply to him. 
{¶ 18} In reviewing the statutory provisions, courts are constrained to 
look to the statutory language and the “purpose to be accomplished.” State ex rel. 
Richard v. Bd. of Trustees of the Police & Firemen’s Disability and Pension Fund 
(1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 409, 411, 632 N.E.2d 1292, quoting State v. S.R. (1992), 63 
Ohio St.3d 590, 594-595, 589 N.E.2d 1319.  “Words used in a statute must be 
taken in their usual, normal or customary meaning * * * [and i]t is the duty of the 
court to give effect to the words used and not to insert words not used.”  Id. at 
412. 
{¶ 19} We find no language within the statute to support Cargile’s 
interpretation.  R.C. 2921.36 applies uniformly to all persons and provides a 
blanket prohibition: “No person shall knowingly convey” weapons or drugs onto 
the grounds of a detention facility.  (Emphasis added.)  This statute is broadly 
written.  We reject Cargile’s interpretation, which would not only change the 
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language of the statute but would also limit the purposes to be accomplished by its 
proscriptions. 
IV 
{¶ 20} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that a person who is taken to a 
detention facility after his arrest and who possesses a drug of abuse at the time he 
enters the facility meets the actus reus requirement for a violation of R.C. 
2921.36(A)(2).  The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the cause is 
remanded to the appellate court to consider the assignments of error which it held 
were moot. 
Judgment reversed,  
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
_______________ 
 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kristen 
L. Sobieski, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
Jerome Emoff, for appellee. 
 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Melissa M. Prendergast, 
Assistant State Public Defender, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Public 
Defender. 
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