Title: State ex rel. Beavercreek Township Fiscal Officer v. Graff

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Beavercreek Twp. Fiscal Officer v. Graff, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-3749.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-3749 
THE STATE EX REL. BEAVERCREEK TOWNSHIP FISCAL OFFICER v. GRAFF ET 
AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Beavercreek Twp. Fiscal Officer v. Graff, Slip 
Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-3749.] 
Mandamus—R.C. 507.021(A) unambiguously requires township fiscal officer to 
obtain board of township trustees’ approval for salary offered to assistants 
hired under R.C. 507.021(A)—Fiscal officer failed to show board abused 
its discretion in rejecting her salary proposals—Board exceeded its 
authority under R.C. 507.021(A) in setting the assistants’ salaries—Writ 
granted in part and denied in part. 
(No. 2016-0747—Submitted January 23, 2018—Decided September 20, 2018.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
________________ 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} In this original action, relator, Beavercreek Township Fiscal Officer 
Christy L. Ahrens, seeks a writ of mandamus to compel respondents, the Board of 
Beavercreek Township Trustees and its members, Carol Graff, Jeffrey Roberts, and 
Thomas Kretz (collectively, “the board”), to approve and fund the salaries of two 
positions in the fiscal office in the amount she proposed. 
{¶ 2} We conclude that R.C. 507.021(A) authorizes Ahrens to hire two 
assistants to the fiscal officer and to set compensation for those positions, subject 
to prior approval by the board.  But because she has not demonstrated that the board 
abused its discretion when it denied her specific salary requests, we deny her 
request for a writ of mandamus compelling the board to approve and fund the two 
assistant positions at the specific salaries that she proposed.  In addition, we 
conclude that the board exceeded its authority when it adopted Resolutions 2016-
158 and 2016-159 setting the annual salaries for the two assistants to the fiscal 
officer.  Accordingly, we issue a writ of mandamus ordering the board to rescind 
Resolutions 2016-158 and 2016-159 and to consider a new compensation proposal 
submitted by Ahrens. 
Background 
{¶ 3} Ahrens has been the fiscal officer for Beavercreek Township since 
2006.  In 2006, the board hired Deb White as a full-time accounts-payable/payroll 
technician.  White reported to the assistant to the fiscal officer.  According to the 
job description submitted as evidence, her basic responsibilities included record-
keeping; reviewing the purchasing process “for proper account distribution, 
outdated purchase orders and reconciliation of vendor invoices;” and 
“[d]ocument[ing] and updat[ing] accounts payable procedures and accounting 
manuals.”  White’s annual salary was $53,872 in 2014 and $55,494.40 in 2015.  An 
annual salary of $57,158.40 was originally budgeted for 2016. 
January Term, 2018 
 
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{¶ 4} In 2007, Ahrens appointed James Barone to the full-time position of 
assistant to the fiscal officer.  Barone reported to Ahrens and, according to the job 
description submitted as evidence, was involved in “planning, organizing, 
coordinating and directing [the] activities of the Office of [the] Fiscal Officer,” and 
in addition to other duties, he was “[r]esponsible for monitoring, preparing, and 
posting all revenues; monitoring all fixed assets (purchasing, transfers, and 
disposal); and * * * preparing and filing financial statements and reports (monthly, 
quarterly, and yearly).”  In 2014, Barone’s annual salary was $76,507.60. 
{¶ 5} On November 14, 2014, Kretz and the township administrator, J. 
Alexander Zaharieff, met with Ahrens to discuss the creation of a township finance 
department that would be led by a finance director, who would report to the 
township administrator rather than to the fiscal officer.  According to Ahrens, Kretz 
informed her that Barone would be hired as the finance director at the same salary 
and with the same responsibilities as he currently had as her assistant and that if she 
did not agree to the change, the board could defund the position of assistant to the 
fiscal officer.  (Kretz denies threatening to defund the assistant position.)  The board 
discussed its power to fund and defund positions at a March 9, 2015 special 
meeting. 
{¶ 6} On March 16, 2015, the board created a finance department—whose 
employees would report to the township administrator—and it approved the 
proposed job description for the finance-director position.  The board also approved 
a new township organizational structure that gave the township administrator 
supervising authority over the accounts-payable/payroll technician, thus 
eliminating the fiscal officer’s supervising authority. 
{¶ 7} On March 30, 2015, the board appointed Barone the finance director 
at the same salary he was making as assistant to the fiscal officer, $78,080.88.  
Barone’s 2016 salary was budgeted at $81,167.06. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 8} R.C. 507.021(A) authorizes a fiscal officer to “hire and appoint one 
or more persons as the fiscal officer finds necessary to provide assistance to the 
township fiscal officer or deputy fiscal officer” and to “set the compensation of 
those persons subject to the prior approval of the board of township trustees.”  On 
February 12, 2016, Ahrens’s attorney contacted the board’s attorney with a 
proposal to hire two assistants to the fiscal officer pursuant to R.C. 507.021(A).  
The first assistant to the fiscal officer would earn an annual salary between $75,000 
and $92,000 (the parties herein refer to this position as the “lead assistant” position).  
The second assistant to the fiscal officer would earn an annual salary between 
$50,000 and $65,000 (the parties herein refer to this position as the accounts-
payable/payroll-assistant position).  The lead assistant would report directly to the 
fiscal officer, and the accounts payable/payroll assistant would report to the lead 
assistant.  According to Ahrens’s attorney, the lead assistant would perform the 
duties “formerly performed by the assistant to the fiscal officer position, prior to 
the creation of the finance director position” and the accounts-payable/payroll 
assistant would perform “most of the duties” of the accounts-payable/payroll-
technician position. 
{¶ 9} On March 28, 2016, the board discussed Ahrens’s proposal and 
adopted four resolutions: 
(1) 
Resolution 2016-160 eliminated the position of finance director, effective 
May 9, 2016. 
(2) 
Resolution 2016-161 eliminated the position of accounts-payable/payroll 
technician under the finance director and township administrator, effective 
May 9, 2016. 
(3) 
Resolution 2016-158 authorized the lead-assistant position at an annual 
salary of $40,515. 
(4) 
Resolution 2016-159 authorized the position of accounts-payable/payroll 
assistant under the fiscal officer at an annual salary of $28,200. 
January Term, 2018 
 
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In May 2016, the board approved a $5,000 salary increase for each of the 
new positions. 
{¶ 10} Ahrens alleges that under R.C. 507.021(A), the board must approve 
the fiscal officer’s proposed compensation for her assistants and allocate the 
necessary funds absent an abuse of discretion by the fiscal officer.  Ahrens requests 
a writ of mandamus directing the board to approve and fund the proposed salaries 
for the lead-assistant and accounts-payable/payroll-assistant positions. 
Analysis 
{¶ 11} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, Ahrens must establish (1) a 
clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a corresponding clear legal duty on the 
part of the board to provide it, and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary 
course of law.  State ex rel. Waters v. Spaeth, 131 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-69, 
960 N.E.2d 452, ¶ 6.  Ahrens must prove her entitlement to the writ by clear and 
convincing evidence.  State ex rel. Doner v. Zody, 130 Ohio St.3d 446, 2011-Ohio-
6117, 958 N.E.2d 1235, paragraph three of the syllabus. 
{¶ 12} Ahrens’s mandamus claim hinges on her authority and the board’s 
obligation under R.C. 507.021(A). 
R.C. 507.021(A) 
{¶ 13} The board argues in its brief that R.C. 507.021(A) grants it the 
“discretion to approve and appropriate amounts for the fiscal officer and, 
specifically, for amounts to be paid to any assistants.”  In its view, when a funding 
dispute arises, R.C. 507.021(A) places the burden on the township fiscal officer to 
prove that her request was reasonable and that the board of trustees abused its 
discretion in denying the request. 
{¶ 14} By contrast, Ahrens argues that R.C. 507.021(A) gives the township 
fiscal officer the primary authority to set the compensation of any assistants hired 
under that provision.  In her brief, she urges us to hold that under the current version 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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of R.C. 507.021(A), the “requested appropriation must be made, unless the trustees 
prove that the request is an abuse of discretion.” 
{¶ 15} When this court seeks to ascertain the meaning of a statute, the 
threshold question is whether it is ambiguous.  Jacobson v. Kaforey, 149 Ohio St.3d 
398, 2016-Ohio-8434, 75 N.E.3d 203, ¶ 8.  “It is a cardinal rule of statutory 
construction that where the terms of a statute are clear and unambiguous, the statute 
should be applied without interpretation.”  Wingate v. Hordge, 60 Ohio St.2d 55, 
58, 396 N.E.2d 770 (1979).  When a statute contains language that “ ‘is plain and 
unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, [this court] must rely on 
what the General Assembly has said’ * * * and give effect only to the words the 
legislature used, making neither additions to, nor deletions from, the statutory 
language.”  Wilson v. Lawrence, 150 Ohio St.3d 368, 2017-Ohio-1410, 81 N.E.3d 
1242, ¶ 11, quoting Jones v. Action Coupling & Equip., Inc., 98 Ohio St.3d 330, 
2003-Ohio-1099, 784 N.E.2d 1172, ¶ 12. 
{¶ 16} R.C. 507.021(A) is not ambiguous.  It expressly grants to a township 
fiscal officer the authority to decide whether assistants need to be hired and if so, 
whom to hire for those positions.  The second sentence of the statutory provision at 
issue grants the fiscal officer the authority to set the compensation for the assistants, 
“subject to the prior approval of the board of township trustees.”  (Emphasis added.)  
This language clearly indicates that the General Assembly intentionally constrained 
the fiscal officer’s ability to set her own assistants’ salary; it makes board approval 
a prerequisite to the determination of the salary of a fiscal-officer’s assistant. 
{¶ 17} On the other hand, the plain language also contains a limitation on 
the board’s authority; it may either grant or withhold its approval of a fiscal 
officer’s compensation proposal, but it may not, as it did here, withhold approval 
and set the compensation for the fiscal officer’s assistants.  Thus, the board lacked 
the authority to adopt Resolutions 2016-158 and 2016-159.  Thus, we hold that R.C. 
507.021(A) unambiguously requires a fiscal officer to obtain board approval for the 
January Term, 2018 
 
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salary offered to any assistant hired under this section and it allows the board to 
either approve or deny the salary proposal.  However, the board does not have 
authority under R.C. 507.021(A) to set the salaries for the fiscal officer’s assistants. 
{¶ 18} Ahrens points to the prior version of R.C. 507.021(A) as proof that 
the legislature enacted the current language to give the fiscal officer primary power 
over setting the salaries for fiscal-office employees.  In support of her argument, 
she invokes the rule of statutory interpretation that provides that “[a] legislative 
amendment must be presumed to change the effect and operation of the law.”  
Lynch v. Gallia Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 79 Ohio St.3d 251, 257-258, 680 N.E.2d 1222 
(1997).  Prior to 2004, R.C. 507.021 provided that “[t]he board of township trustees 
may employ such number of persons as it finds necessary to provide stenographic 
and clerical assistance to the township clerk or deputy clerk.”  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 
441, 133 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2193.  (The term “fiscal officer” was substituted for 
“clerk” in 2005.)  Sub.S.B. No. 107, 151 Ohio Laws, Part I, 406, 458.  In 2004, the 
General Assembly gave the clerk (fiscal officer) the power to decide whether to 
hire assistants and whom to hire as assistants and also the power to propose the 
salary for those assistants, subject to approval from the board.  Ahrens argues in 
her brief that “[i]f this change is to mean anything, then the current language of 
R.C. 507.021(A) places the power of setting compensation primarily with the 
township fiscal officer.” 
{¶ 19} But as explained above, the language of R.C. 507.021(A) is 
unambiguous.  Indeed, Ahrens’s interpretation of R.C. 507.021(A) would render 
the phrase “subject to the prior approval of the board of township trustees” 
meaningless and thus fails to give effect to the words the legislature used.  See 
Columbia Gas Transm. Corp. v. Levin, 117 Ohio St.3d 122, 2008-Ohio-511, 882 
N.E.2d 400, ¶ 19 (When interpreting statutes, “[c]ourts may not delete words used 
or insert words not used”).  The effect of the legislative change was clearly to give 
the fiscal officer some authority over her own budget, but in order to hold that she 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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has exclusive authority to set compensation, we would need to disregard the 
unambiguous statutory language, which we will not do.  R.C. 507.021(A) requires 
the fiscal officer to obtain the board’s approval before she sets the compensation 
for her assistants.  . 
{¶ 20} Because the statute does not grant the fiscal officer exclusive 
authority to set the compensation of her assistants, mandamus cannot be used to 
compel the board to approve her compensation request absent a showing that the 
board abused its discretion in denying the request.  State ex rel. Veterans Serv. 
Office of Pickaway Cty. v. Pickaway Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 61 Ohio St.3d 461, 463, 
575 N.E.2d 206 (1991).  In Veterans Serv. Office, a county veterans-service 
commission sought a writ of mandamus to compel a board of county commissioners 
to appropriate the full amount it requested.  In denying the writ, we noted that the 
relevant statute provided for “review and revision” by the board of the 
commission’s budget request and held that the commission was not automatically 
entitled to its full request and that it could not compel the board to grant the request 
absent a showing that its denial was an abuse of discretion.  Id. at 462-463. 
{¶ 21} Because R.C. 507.021(A) calls for the prior approval of the board of 
township trustees, we reach a conclusion here analogous to the conclusion in 
Veterans Serv. Office: the board’s decision whether to approve or reject the fiscal 
officer’s compensation proposal is entitled to a presumption of reasonableness.  In 
other words, R.C. 507.021(A) grants the fiscal officer the authority to propose to 
the board the compensation her assistants should receive, but if the board rejects 
that proposal, the burden is on the fiscal officer to show that the board abused its 
discretion in denying her request.  See also State ex rel. Trussell v. Meigs Cty. Bd. 
of Commrs., 155 Ohio App.3d 230, 2003-Ohio-6084, 800 N.E.2d 381 (4th Dist.) 
(statute does not grant sheriff final authority for appropriations to his office and 
therefore he is not entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel the board of 
January Term, 2018 
 
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commissioners to approve his full budget request absent a demonstration that the 
board abused its discretion in denying the request). 
{¶ 22} Accordingly, to be entitled to the requested writ of mandamus, 
Ahrens must demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that the board abused 
its discretion when it rejected her compensation proposal. 
Abuse of discretion 
{¶ 23} To demonstrate an abuse of discretion, Ahrens must show that the 
board acted arbitrarily, unreasonably, or unconscionably in rejecting the 
compensation request.  See State ex rel. Wilke v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 90 
Ohio St.3d 55, 61, 734 N.E.2d 811 (2000) (“ ‘abuse of discretion’ implies an 
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable attitude”). 
{¶ 24} Ahrens contends in her reply brief that the board used “bad math” in 
rejecting her proposal and awarding lower salaries for the two assistant positions.  
She criticizes the survey that was submitted as evidence by the board in support of 
its rejection of her proposal.  The survey shows the salaries paid to persons in 
similar positions in other Ohio townships, and it indicates various factors related to 
each position, including the title of the position, whether the position is full-time or 
part-time, the hourly rate/annual salary of the position, the population of the 
township, the 2013 general-fund revenues of the township, and the 2013 total 
revenues of the township.  The survey indicated an average annual salary of 
$39,801.82 for positions similar to the lead-assistant position and an average annual 
salary of $29,322.80 for positions similar to the accounts-payable/payroll-assistant 
position.  The board also compared and took into account the job descriptions for 
the new lead-assistant and accounts-payable/payroll-assistant positions that it 
created versus the job descriptions provided by many of the surveyed counties. 
{¶ 25} Ahrens argues that the salary survey was flawed because it included 
both full-time and part-time positions, resulting in a lower average salary.  She also 
argues that the survey included positions that were more comparable to the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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accounts-payable/payroll-assistant position in determining the average salary for 
the lead-assistant position.  To illustrate her point, Ahrens points to the job 
description for the position of “fiscal analyst II” in Sylvania Township that was 
included in the survey.  There is a handwritten notation at the top of the page that 
reads, “Comparable to: Account Payable $17.18 hr. 10 yr. service.”  In addition, 
the salary survey for the accounts-payable/payroll-assistant position includes 20 
allegedly comparable positions, only seven of which are full-time positions.  
Because the board approved two full-time positions, the fact that it relied on data 
from part-time positions in other counties does detract from the weight of that 
evidence. 
{¶ 26} Yet despite the shortcomings of the survey, Ahrens has not produced 
evidence to demonstrate that the board abused its discretion.  In fact, the survey of 
comparable township positions that she submitted as evidence is not without fault.  
Referring to her survey, Ahrens contends that the salary ranges she proposed for 
the lead-assistant and accounts-payable/payroll-assistant positions were “in line 
with * * * similar positions with other nearby townships.”  However, her salary 
survey lacks information about the townships, which is necessary to support 
comparison, and therefore is insufficient to satisfy her burden of proof. 
{¶ 27} She further argues that the unreasonableness of the board’s decision 
is demonstrated by the fact that “[t]he two Assistant positions are almost identical 
to the Finance Director and Accounts Payable/Payroll Technician positions” that 
were previously funded.  Although there are many overlaps in the duties of the prior 
positions and the new assistant positions, Ahrens fails to take into account 
noteworthy differences.  For example, the finance-director position included the 
duties of providing revenue forecasts and assisting the township administrator in 
preparing the township budget and five-year departmental financial forecasts.  The 
lead-assistant position that Ahrens proposed does not include these duties.  Because 
preparing the budget is a significant duty, this change supports the board’s claim 
January Term, 2018 
 
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that the lead-assistant position differs significantly from the finance-director 
position. 
{¶ 28} In addition, the board acted reasonably by taking into account the 
township’s financial condition when it considered Ahrens’s proposal.  The board 
emphasizes in its brief that it considered “the ongoing need to balance the general 
fund budget, and the years of the Township’s general fund expenditures that 
exceeded the revenues and caused a reduction in carryover funds.”  Moreover, 
evidence in the record demonstrates that Ahrens publicly commented on the poor 
financial condition facing the township, criticizing the board as engaging in deficit 
spending.  Therefore, it was not unreasonable or arbitrary for the board to consider 
the township’s financial condition when reviewing Ahrens’s proposed 
compensation for the two assistants, which, combined, would have cost the 
township over $100,000 in salary alone. 
{¶ 29} Nor does the evidence support Ahrens’s complaint that in rejecting 
her proposed salaries, the board was singling out her office to receive budget cuts.  
Ahrens argues that Trustee Graff conceded in a March 28, 2016 board meeting that 
the board was cutting the salaries of the fiscal-office employees in half while 
leaving all other office’s budgets intact.  But taken in context, Graff’s comments 
do not support Ahrens’s claim that no other office’s budget would be cut; the only 
salaries at issue at the March 28th meeting were those proposed by Ahrens.  Graff’s 
comments alone do not support Ahrens’s claim that the board acted arbitrarily and 
unreasonably in rejecting her proposed salaries. 
{¶ 30} In conclusion, Ahrens has not presented clear and convincing 
evidence that the board abused its discretion in rejecting her proposed salaries.  But 
we also hold that the board exceeded its authority under R.C. 507.021(A) when it 
set the salaries for Ahrens’s assistants.  Accordingly, we issue a writ of mandamus 
ordering the board of trustees to rescind Resolutions 2016-158 and 2016-159 and 
to consider a new compensation proposal from Ahrens. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Writ granted in part 
and denied in part. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, FISCHER, and 
DEWINE, JJ., concur. 
DEGENARO, J., not participating. 
_________________ 
 
Andrew P. Pickering, Special Assistant Greene County Prosecuting 
Attorney, for relator. 
 
Surdyk, Dowd & Turner Co., L.P.A. and Dawn M. Frick, for respondents. 
_________________