Title: Commonwealth v. Kaeppeler

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-11855 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DAVID J. KAEPPELER. 
 
 
 
Barnstable.     September 9, 2015. - December 30, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, & Hines, 
JJ. 
 
 
Search and Seizure, Emergency, Consent, Plain view.  Practice, 
Criminal, Instructions to jury, Request for jury 
instructions. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 15, 2011. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Gary A. 
Nickerson, J., and the cases were tried before him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Robert L. Sheketoff for the defendant. 
 
Julia K. Holler, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  After a jury trial in the Superior Court, the 
defendant, David J. Kaeppeler, was convicted of rape, G. L. 
c. 265, § 22 (b); drugging for sexual intercourse, G. L. c. 272, 
2 
 
§ 3; and drugging to confine, G. L. c. 265, § 26B.1  The 
convictions were based on events that occurred during a party at 
the defendant's home in the early morning hours of May 21, 2010.  
Two of the guests became seriously ill after ingesting tequila 
supplied by the defendant.  After learning that the defendant 
might also be ill, the police entered the defendant's home to 
perform a well-being check under the "emergency aid" exception 
to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights.  While there, the police seized two tequila bottles, 
one of which was later found to contain 1, 4-Butanediol, which 
when ingested is converted into gamma-hydroxy butyric acid 
(GHB), a so-called "date rape" drug. 
 
In this appeal, the defendant challenges the denial of a 
motion to suppress the two tequila bottles seized during the 
well-being check.  We conclude that the police had objectively 
reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant may have been 
injured or in need of immediate medical assistance but that the 
seizure of the evidence was unreasonable for two reasons:  (1) 
the seizure occurred after the defendant departed for the 
hospital in an ambulance and while the police remained in his 
                     
 
1 The grand jury also returned indictments for distribution 
of a class E substance, G. L. c. 94C, § 32D (a), and illegal 
possession of a class E substance, G. L. c. 94C, § 34.  The 
Commonwealth filed a request for nolle prosequi as to each of 
these indictments prior to trial. 
3 
 
home without his consent; and (2) the police retained the 
evidence for investigative purposes without verifying its 
relevance to the emergency justifying their entry into the 
defendant's home.  Therefore, the motion to suppress should have 
been allowed.  The defendant also claims error in the trial 
judge's failure to instruct the jury in accordance with 
Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472 (1980).  We reject the 
defendant's Bowden claim but remand for a new trial because of 
the error in the denial of the motion to suppress. 
 
Background.  We recite the facts the jury could have found, 
reserving certain details for the discussion of the judge's 
ruling on the motion to suppress.  On May 20, 2012, the 
defendant and the victims -- John Smith2 and Elana Thomas, both 
in their mid-twenties -- spent the evening drinking and dancing 
at a nightclub in Hyannis.  They were joined by Jerry Laramay, 
Daniel Bernard Cammerata, and Patricia S. Sweet.  That evening, 
the nightclub was inaugurating its first "gay and lesbian 
night," to which Cammerata had been invited to participate as 
the guest disc jockey.  Cammerata drove to Hyannis from Boston 
for the event with Sweet, his roommate.  His boy friend at the 
time, Laramay, and Laramay's roommate, Thomas, drove down 
separately from Boston.  At some point during the evening, 
Cammerata invited Smith, a local friend from Yarmouth, to come 
                     
 
2 A pseudonym. 
4 
 
to the nightclub.  Smith did so and performed as a dancer that 
night.  Cammerata was acquainted with the defendant as a regular 
customer at another bar where Cammerata had worked.  Smith had 
met the defendant twice before that night.  Neither Thomas nor 
Laramay had previously met the defendant.  Thomas and Smith 
danced together and appeared to "hit it off" with each other.  
The defendant made passes at Laramay, who rejected his advances 
and explained that he was in a dating relationship with 
Cammerata.  When the club closed, the group decided to continue 
the celebration.  The defendant offered his home, and the group 
accepted his invitation. 
 
When the group arrived at the defendant's home, he served 
shots of tequila to everyone.  After several hours, Cammerata, 
Sweet, and Laramay left to spend the night at Cammerata's 
mother's house.  Smith inquired whether he and Thomas could stay 
at the defendant's house.  The defendant agreed, and Cammerata, 
Laramay, and Sweet left, promising to return later that morning 
to pick up Smith and Thomas.  The defendant then served another 
shot of tequila for him, Smith, and Thomas. 
 
After 10 A.M. the following morning, Cammerata and Laramay 
returned to the defendant's house to pick up Thomas and Smith.  
They knocked at the door, but no one responded.  Eventually, 
they were able to let themselves into the house through a patio 
door.  When they entered, they observed Smith and Thomas 
5 
 
sleeping on sofas in the living room.  They managed to awaken 
Smith, but Thomas could not be roused.  Cammerata and Laramay 
carried Thomas to Laramay's vehicle with the intention of 
driving on to Boston.  Laramay became concerned, however, and 
decided instead to take Thomas to Cape Cod Hospital. 
 
Smith left in Cammerata's vehicle for a ride home, and 
during the ride, Smith told Cammerata that he had a dream in 
which the defendant was giving Smith a "blow job" while he 
slept.  Smith testified that he phrased the statement as having 
a dream because he "couldn't believe what had happened" and he 
"wanted someone to tell [him] that that couldn't have happened."  
Smith testified that he had "[n]o doubt" that it had happened, 
and that he had pushed the defendant off of him, said "no," and 
turned over and went back to sleep after he was woken by the 
defendant's actions.  After arriving at home, Smith became ill 
and was taken to Cape Cod Hospital at approximately 8 P.M. 
 
Medical staff at the hospital learned that Thomas and Smith 
had both been drinking at the defendant's house and recognized 
that both presented with similar symptoms -- unconsciousness and 
trouble breathing -- that could be associated with a drug 
overdose.  The hospital staff tested for several types of drugs 
but did not test for GHB because the results from the test could 
not be available in sufficient time to assist with medical care.  
The staff suspected, however, that GHB could be the cause after 
6 
 
ruling out a series of other possible causes.  The victims' 
condition deteriorated at the hospital and both were 
transported, at separate times, by helicopter to Boston for 
medical treatment.  The treating physicians in Boston conducted 
"everything that [was] possible" in terms of toxicology screens.  
Without positive results from any of those tests and with 
information provided by Laramay that he "tast[ed] something 
funny in the [tequila shared with the two patients]," the 
physicians concluded that the symptoms displayed by Thomas and 
Smith were caused by the ingestion of GHB and alcohol.3 
 
At or around 9:15 P.M. that evening, hospital staff 
requested the Barnstable police to perform a well-being check on 
the defendant at his home because he too might be at risk for 
illness after drinking tequila with the two patients.  At the 
defendant's home, the police obtained two bottles of tequila.  
One bottle was empty and in the garage; the other had liquid 
remaining and was on the kitchen counter.  Although the bottle 
from the garage tested negative for GHB, the bottle from the 
kitchen counter tested positive for 1, 4-Butanediol, a drug that 
is converted by the body into GHB. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Motion to suppress.  Prior to trial, the 
                     
 
3 The treating physician in Boston testified that the 
symptoms of severe coma, vomiting, inflammation in the lungs, 
and difficulty breathing, together with the negative results 
from the other tests, guided their conclusion. 
7 
 
defendant filed a motion to suppress the tequila bottles seized 
during the warrantless entry into his home.  The judge denied 
the motion, ruling that the seizure was reasonably related to 
the objective emergency of the undiagnosed illness of Smith and 
Thomas and the unknown status of the defendant's well-being.  
The defendant argues that the judge erred in denying the motion 
because the emergency justifying the warrantless entry, a check 
on his well-being, had ended by the time that the police seized 
the tequila bottles. 
 
We summarize the facts as found by the judge, supplementing 
them as necessary with evidence in the record that is 
uncontroverted and that was implicitly credited by the judge. 
See Commonwealth v. Isaiah I., 448 Mass. 334, 337 (2007), S.C., 
450 Mass. 818 (2008).  Shortly after 10 P.M., Officer Paul J. 
Everson and Sergeant Kevin Tynan of the Barnstable police 
department arrived at the defendant's home to perform the well-
being check.  The police learned from hospital staff that Thomas 
and Smith had suffered symptoms that could be the result of a 
drug overdose and had been drinking with the defendant at a 
nightclub and at the defendant's house.  The officers were also 
told that the defendant had not appeared at his workplace that 
day.  The police knocked repeatedly before the defendant 
appeared at the door, looking as if he had just been awakened 
from sleep.  After being told of the two individuals at the 
8 
 
hospital, the defendant invited the officers into the home.  
Officer Everson asked the defendant how he was feeling; the 
defendant responded that he was not feeling well and had been 
sleeping a lot.  Sergeant Tynan asked whether there was any GHB 
at the defendant's house or that could have been put in their 
drinks at the nightclub.  The defendant told the officers that 
he did not have any drugs in the home and did not think that GHB 
could have been put in their drinks.  He said that he was 
familiar with GHB and recognized the dangers of mixing it with 
alcohol. 
 
In response to the officers' urging, the defendant agreed 
to go to the hospital, and an ambulance transport was arranged.  
Sergeant Tynan asked the defendant where the tequila was 
located, and the defendant told him that they had been drinking 
from a tequila bottle that was on the kitchen counter.  The 
bottle was visible from the officers' location.  The defendant 
also alerted the officers to the second tequila bottle in the 
garage.  Sergeant Tynan confirmed the second tequila bottle was 
in the garage, but did not pick up either bottle at that time. 
 
When the ambulance arrived, Officer Everson accompanied the 
defendant to the hospital.  Sergeant Tynan remained in the 
house.  At Sergeant Tynan's request, an evidence collection 
officer from the Barnstable County sheriff's office arrived and 
photographed and collected the tequila bottles.  The bottles 
9 
 
were not tested until several months later, on September 6, 
2010, in connection with this pending criminal case. 
 
In reviewing the grant or denial of a motion to suppress, 
"we accept the judge's findings of fact and will not disturb 
them absent clear error."  Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 460 Mass. 
199, 205 (2011).  However, we undertake "an independent 
determination as to the correctness of the judge's application 
of constitutional principles to the facts as found."  Id.  We 
begin the analysis with the well-settled principle that a 
warrantless search or seizure is presumptively unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment and art. 14, and may be justified 
only by a few "specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions."  Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009), quoting 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).  See 
Commonwealth v. Tyree, 455 Mass. 676, 683 (2010).  Although the 
exceptions for exigent circumstances -- consent and plain 
view -- are implicated in the judge's findings of fact, the 
judge reviewed the search under the emergency exception to the 
warrant requirement.  We consider each exception and conclude 
that none justifies the seizure of the tequila bottles. 
 
a.  Emergency exception.  The well-established rule is that 
the presumption of unreasonableness of a warrantless search 
yields if "'the exigencies of the situation' make the needs of 
law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is 
10 
 
objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment" (citation 
omitted).  Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-394 (1978).  
"The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is 
[one such] justification for what would be otherwise illegal 
absent an exigency or emergency."  Id. at 392, quoting Wayne v. 
United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 
U.S. 860 (1963).  Under the "emergency aid" exception, the 
police may "enter a home without a warrant to render emergency 
assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from 
imminent injury."  Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 
(2006).  See Commonwealth v. Entwistle, 463 Mass. 205, 213 
(2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 945 (2013). 
 
A warrantless search or seizure undertaken on this basis 
passes constitutional muster, however, only if (1) the police 
had an objectively reasonable ground to believe that an 
emergency existed; and (2) the conduct of the police after the 
entry was reasonable under all the circumstances.  See Arizona 
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987); Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393-394; 
Commonwealth v. McDermott, 448 Mass. 750, 766-767, cert. denied, 
552 U.S. 910 (2007).  The Commonwealth bears the burden of 
demonstrating that, taking into account the totality of the 
circumstances, the search and seizure fit within this exception 
to the warrant requirement.  Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 
19-21 (1984); Commonwealth v. Peters, 453 Mass. 818, 823 (2009).  
11 
 
"[T]he standards as to exigency are strict."  Tyree, 455 Mass. 
at 684, quoting Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 800 
(1975). 
 
i.  Existence of objectively reasonable emergency.  As a 
threshold matter, we agree with the judge's ruling that the 
police were presented with an objective emergency justifying the 
warrantless entry into the defendant's home.  The police 
received reliable information from hospital staff that two 
individuals who had been with the defendant at a nightclub and 
at the defendant's home the prior evening were seriously ill and 
that, after being treated at the hospital, one victim was at 
that time being transported to a Boston hospital for further 
treatment.  The request from the hospital staff, together with a 
report from a concerned coworker that the defendant had not 
appeared at work that day, established the urgency regarding the 
defendant's safety and presented an emergency warranting police 
intervention for that purpose.  See Commonwealth v. Snell, 428 
Mass. 766, 773, cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1010 (1999) (urgency 
created by, among other things, information that victim not 
heard from in days).  In addition, except for the seizure of the 
tequila bottles, the police conduct after arriving at the 
defendant's home was focused entirely on the concern for the 
defendant's well-being.  As the judge found, the police, on 
arrival at the defendant's home, "strongly urged that [the 
12 
 
defendant] get checked out at the hospital."  The defendant 
agreed to do so and accepted the ambulance transport arranged by 
the police.  Accordingly, the actions of the police up to the 
point that the defendant was transported to the hospital were 
consistent with the emergency aid exception.4  See id. at 774, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Bates, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 217, 219 (1990) 
("purpose of the police entry [under emergency exception] is not 
to gather evidence of criminal activity but rather, because of 
an emergency, to respond to an immediate need for assistance for 
the protection of life or property"). 
 
ii.  Reasonableness of police conduct.  Having concluded 
that the police were justified in entering the defendant's home 
under the emergency aid exception, we turn to the second prong 
of the exception:  whether the conduct of the police following 
the warrantless entry was reasonable under the circumstances.  
The defendant challenges the seizure of the tequila bottles, 
arguing that it was not reasonably related to the purpose of a 
check on his well-being. 
 
"Reasonableness must be 'evaluated in relation to the scene 
as it could appear to the officers at the time, not as it may 
                     
 
4 This case does not present the question whether the police 
may make an emergency entry to provide assistance to a person 
not then present in the home.  Although we do not decide the 
issue, our ruling does not foreclose the possibility that police 
may make a warrantless entry for the purpose of providing 
emergency assistance to a person not actually present. 
13 
 
seem to a scholar after the event with the benefit of leisured 
retrospective analysis.'"  Commonwealth v. Townsend, 453 Mass. 
413, 425-426 (2009), quoting Commonwealth v. Young, 382 Mass. 
448, 456 (1981).  See Commonwealth v. Porter P., 456 Mass. 254, 
270 (2010) ("We evaluate the reasonableness of a police 
officer's conduct based on the information available to him at 
the time, not on what we later learn to be true").  
Reasonableness, in turn, is informed by the well-settled rule 
that a "warrantless search must be 'strictly circumscribed by 
the exigencies which justify its initiation.'"  Mincey, 437 U.S. 
at 393, quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1968). 
 
Applying this test to the police conduct at issue here, we 
conclude that the continued police presence in the defendant's 
home without his consent5 after he was transported to the 
hospital for medical treatment and the subsequent seizure of the 
tequila bottles was unreasonable.  First, the exigency 
justifying the warrantless entry to check on the defendant's 
well-being had ended before the seizure occurred.  As 
established by the judge's findings, the defendant presented 
himself to the police as having been awakened from sleep and 
perhaps tired, but not in any apparent distress.  In addition, 
he agreed to be transported to the hospital as a precaution.  
From that point on, the police had no further cause for concern 
                     
 
5 See part 1.b, infra. 
14 
 
about the defendant's well-being and no public safety 
justification to remain in his home.  See Peters, 453 Mass. at 
824-825 (no justification for protective sweep where emergency 
had ended). 
 
In addressing reasonableness, we attach significance to the 
judge's finding that "[n]o one from the hospital staff had 
requested the bottles be seized" and that the deputy sheriff 
maintained custody of the bottles for approximately four months 
before they were sent to a laboratory for analysis with respect 
to the pending criminal case.  Thus, the seizure of the tequila 
bottles, lacking any demonstrable relationship to the emergency, 
was more consistent with an investigative purpose.  As such, it 
crossed the reasonableness threshold and cannot be sustained as 
conduct properly within the scope of the emergency exception.  
Cf. McDermott, 448 Mass. at 767 (conduct reasonable in context 
of emergency entry to search for other possible murder victims 
where police "looked only in places where a person could be 
found, they did not pick up or remove any items, and they 
remained for only a short time"). 
 
If the police, after lawfully entering the defendant's 
home, had seized the bottles in order to determine if the 
tequila contained a chemical or other contaminant that made the 
three people ill, the seizure might have been reasonable under 
the emergency aid exception.  We need not, however, decide 
15 
 
whether those circumstances would have rendered the seizure 
reasonable, because no such intent was shown.  Sergeant Tynan 
testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress that the 
bottles were seized because the officers "didn't know the status 
of the two people at the hospital" and they had information that 
the tequila was "the only thing [the patients] had consumed in 
that house at that time the night before."  While the motion 
judge did not make any findings regarding the purpose of the 
seizure, he noted at the evidentiary hearing that Sergeant 
Tynan's statement about the purpose of the seizure was ambiguous 
and that the sergeant was never asked whether police took the 
bottles to aid in treatment or for proof of drugging.  It is 
undisputed that the bottles were not submitted for immediate 
testing to determine the cause of the illness, and the 
Commonwealth, bearing the burden to show that the emergency aid 
exception was satisfied, presented insufficient evidence to 
support a finding that the bottles were seized in order to 
determine the cause of the illness.  See Peters, 453 Mass. at 
823. 
 
When, as here, the police seize evidence after the exigency 
has ended, suppression of that evidence is proper.  In 
Commonwealth v. Lewin (No.1), 407 Mass. 617, 626-628 (1990), we 
held that evidence seized in the defendant's apartment after the 
protective sweep had been completed should have been suppressed 
16 
 
because the search was unconstitutional after the emergency had 
ended.  The same rationale applies here. 
 
The decision in Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 
591 (2008), on which the Commonwealth relies, does not dictate a 
contrary result.  While the defendant in McCarthy was 
unconscious in a restaurant and was being attended by emergency 
medical personnel, a police officer searched her open purse, 
which contained evidence that she possessed controlled 
substances.  The court validated the search.  Id. at 593.  We 
distinguish McCarthy on several grounds.  First, the warrantless 
search did not occur in a home; it occurred in a public place 
that is not accorded the broad presumption of unreasonableness 
that applies in the warrantless search of a home.  See  
Commonwealth v. Krisco Corp., 421 Mass. 37, 44-45 (1995).  
Second, the defendant was in obvious distress and in need of 
immediate medical attention.  The attending medical personnel 
expressed a specific concern that the defendant might be 
suffering a drug overdose that might possibly be verified by a 
search of the purse.  Considering these facts, the exigencies of 
the situation justified the police in searching the purse. 
 
We recognize that the role of a police officer responding 
to an emergency is not necessarily limited to rendering aid to 
an injured person.  "[T]he role of a [police] officer includes 
preventing violence and restoring order, not simply rendering 
17 
 
first aid to casualties."  Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 
(2009), quoting Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 406.  However, the 
seizure of the tequila bottles was not necessitated by the kind 
of compelling safety concerns confronting the police in Fisher, 
supra.  There, the police, responding to a report of a 
disturbance, confronted a chaotic scene with an injured person 
and an enraged defendant threatening further harm.  Id. at 48.  
The ongoing events at the scene justified a law enforcement 
response to prevent further injury.  Here, the police officers 
responding to the defendant's home for the well-being check 
faced no such threats to public safety.  Thus, although the 
facts of this case do not present the need to parse the limits 
of the police response to an ongoing emergency, we are satisfied 
that the limitation we now impose on police conduct during a 
warrantless entry into a home will not undermine the ability of 
the police to respond to an emergency where the risk of harm or 
injury is ongoing and apparent. 
 
b.  Other exceptions.  We address briefly the exceptions 
for consent and plain view.  Although the defendant consented to 
the police presence in his home for the purpose of a well-being 
check on his condition, the consent ended when the defendant 
left in an ambulance for the hospital.  "[A] search with consent 
is reasonable and legal only to the extent that the individual 
has consented."  Commonwealth v. Cantalupo, 380 Mass. 173, 178 
18 
 
(1980).  The police officers did not ask the defendant to 
consent to the seizure of the tequila bottles or to Sergeant 
Tynan remaining in the home after the defendant had left; nor 
did the defendant say or do anything that reasonably could be 
interpreted to constitute such consent.  Thus, we see no basis 
to validate the seizure as a product of the defendant's consent 
to the police entry into his home to perform a check on his 
well-being.  Similarly, the tequila bottles could not lawfully 
be seized under the plain view doctrine because, at that time, 
their "incriminating character" was not "immediately apparent."  
Commonwealth v. D'Amour, 428 Mass. 725, 730 (1999), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Santana, 420 Mass. 205, 211 (1995).  When the 
seizure occurred, the medical condition of the two victims was 
of unknown cause, there was no evidence that they had been 
victims of a crime, and it was not known that the contents of a 
tequila bottle would explain their medical condition.  With no 
more than a hunch that the tequila bottles contained the drug 
GHB, the police could not have seized the tequila bottles under 
the plain view doctrine for investigatory purposes.  See 
Commonwealth v. King, 389 Mass. 233, 243-244 (1983) (permissible 
investigatory inquiry terminated when emergency concern 
satisfied).  Cf. Commonwealth v. Marchione, 384 Mass. 8, 11-12 
(1981) (plain view seizure of gasoline near homemade incendiary 
device permissible after emergency entry with reasonable cause 
19 
 
to believe gasoline was evidence of crime). 
 
2.  Bowden instruction.  The defendant argues that the 
judge erred in declining to instruct the jury in accordance with 
Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 485-486 (1980).  Citing 
Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988), he claims that 
the decision whether to give the instruction cannot be a matter 
of discretion because it is required as a matter of due process 
when properly requested.  The defendant requested the 
instruction in the charge conference following the close of 
evidence; therefore, we review the claim for prejudicial error.  
See Commonwealth v. Prater, 431 Mass. 86, 97 (2000). 
 
We discern no error, let alone prejudicial error, in the 
judge's denial of the defendant's request for a Bowden 
instruction.  Our cases are consistent in interpreting Bowden to 
mean only that the defendant is entitled to offer in evidence 
facts tending to establish that "certain tests were not 
conducted or certain police procedures not followed [that] could 
raise a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt in the 
minds of the jurors."  Bowden, 379 Mass. at 486.  See 
Commonwealth v. Lao, 460 Mass. 12, 23 (2011) (no error in 
denying Bowden instruction where defendant permitted to argue 
faulty investigation); Williams, 439 Mass. at 687 ("the giving 
of [a Bowden] instruction is never required"). 
 
Accepting for the sake of argument the defendant's claim 
20 
 
that he is entitled, on due process grounds, to an instruction 
on his "defense" to the charge, there was no error here because 
lapses in the police investigation do not constitute a "defense" 
as that term is understood in our criminal jurisprudence.  We 
said as much in Lao, supra, where we stated that "Bowden does 
not create a 'defense' in the sense that it creates an element 
of proof that the Commonwealth must prove or disprove beyond a 
reasonable doubt." 
 
Conclusion.  The defendant's Bowden claim lacks merit.  
Therefore, we decline to grant relief on that ground.  As to the 
motion to suppress, the order denying the motion is reversed for 
the reasons explained above.  The judgments of conviction are 
vacated, and the defendant is to be granted a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
CORDY, J. (dissenting).  "We all see something different in 
the bottom of a tequila bottle.  Such is life."  The motion 
judge's erudite observations, made during the motion to suppress 
hearing about the Barnstable police officers' actions at the 
defendant's home, likewise ring true with regard to the 
emergency exception to the warrant requirement.  It is because 
the court sees the emergency exception too narrowly as a 
reprieve from the warrant requirement that I respectfully 
dissent. 
 
There are two particular points made by the court with 
which I disagree.  The first point is that the officers, on 
arriving at the defendant's home, were responding only to a 
potential emergency with regard to the defendant.  In my view, 
the motion judge was correct in concluding that the emergency 
also applied to the ongoing and life-threatening state of the 
two patients, one at Cape Cod Hospital and one being "med-
flighted" to Boston, and this case therefore does present the 
question whether the police may make an emergency entry to 
provide assistance to a person not in the home.  I would hold 
that they may, and were, in this case, justified in doing so.  
Second, I disagree that the exigency to which the officers 
responded ended as soon as the defendant left his home for the 
hospital.  Because I would hold that the emergency was ongoing, 
both for the defendant and the patients, the officers' 
2 
 
subsequent seizure of the tequila bottles was objectively 
reasonable under the circumstances.  It is for these reasons 
that I agree with the motion judge that the officers' actions 
fit squarely within the emergency exception, and I would hold 
that the motion to suppress was appropriately denied. 
 
1.  Discussion.  "When reviewing a motion to suppress, we 
accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear 
error, but independently review the judge's ultimate findings 
and conclusions of law" (quotations omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Jewett, 471 Mass. 624, 628 (2015).  Where there has been an 
evidentiary hearing, "we defer to the credibility findings of 
the judge, who had the opportunity to observe and evaluate the 
witnesses as they testified."  Commonwealth v. Peters, 453 Mass. 
818, 823 (2009). 
 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights provide that 
the right of individuals to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated.  Warrantless searches and seizures inside 
of a home are presumptively unreasonable.  See, e.g., Brigham 
City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006); Commonwealth v. 
Townsend, 453 Mass. 413, 425 (2009).  Such warrantless searches 
may only be justified in "specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions" (quotation omitted).  Arizona v. Gant, 
3 
 
556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009).  One such exception exists in 
circumstances where the police reasonably believe that a search 
is required to deal with a life-threatening emergency.  See 
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-394 (1978). 
 
The emergency exception "applies when the purpose of the 
police entry is not to gather evidence of criminal activity but 
rather, because of an emergency, to respond to an immediate need 
for assistance for the protection of life" (quotation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Snell, 428 Mass. 766, 774, cert. denied, 527 
U.S. 1010 (1999).  "The reason is plain:  People could well die 
in emergencies if police tried to act with the calm deliberation 
associated with the judicial process" (quotation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Ringgard, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 197, 201 (2008).  
Two strict requirements must be met before applying the 
exception:  (1) the officers must have had objectively 
reasonable grounds to believe that an emergency existed; and (2) 
the conduct of the police after the entry must have been 
reasonable under all the circumstances.  See Commonwealth v. 
McDermott, 448 Mass. 750, 766-767 (2007).  The exception allows 
the police, with an objectively reasonable basis for concluding 
that an emergency exists, to be proactive, as "an officer is not 
like a boxing . . . referee, poised to stop a bout only if it 
becomes too one-sided."  Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 406.  I fear 
that the court's reading of the emergency exception may, in many 
4 
 
life-threatening instances, relegate the Commonwealth to 
spectator status. 
 
a.  Scope of emergency exception.  The court limits the 
scope of its analysis of the emergency exception to its 
application to the defendant, ignoring, contrary to the findings 
of the motion judge, the plight (known to the responding 
officers) of the two patients at Cape Cod Hospital.  Our 
consideration of the emergency exception should apply in equal 
measure to the defendant and to the patients.  Despite the 
court's assertions to the contrary, the evidence presented 
throughout the motion to suppress hearing fully supports the 
motion judge's ultimate findings that the officers entered the 
defendant's home "out of concern for the well being of the 
defendant and the two hospitalized individuals." 
 
In its restricted view of the motion judge's findings, the 
court declines to address the emergency exception's application 
to warrantless entries for the purpose of providing emergency 
assistance to a person not actually present in the home.  I 
would hold that the patients' not being within the defendant's 
home does not vitiate the basis for a warrantless entry and 
seizure on their behalf.  Although the United States Supreme 
Court has not directly addressed the issue, its recent 
jurisprudence on the emergency exception to the warrant 
requirement is instructive. 
5 
 
 
The Supreme Court has had three instances to address the 
emergency exception to the warrant requirement:  Mincey, supra;1 
Brigham City, supra;2 and Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45 
(2009).3  In each of those opinions, the Supreme Court draws from 
Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1963), for 
the premise of the emergency exception that "[t]he need to 
                     
 
1 An undercover police officer was shot in an apartment.  
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 387 (1978).  Other officers 
rushed to his aid.  Id. at 387-388.  Minutes later, homicide 
detectives arrived and took charge of the investigation.  Id. at 
388-389.  They aided in the removal of the suspects, and then 
conducted a search that lasted four days.  Id.  The United 
States Supreme Court held that "the Fourth Amendment [to the 
United States Constitution] does not bar police officers from 
making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably 
believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid."  Id. 
at 392.  The Supreme Court, however, refused to apply the 
emergency exception to the homicide detectives' search and 
seizure because all dangerous suspects had been removed prior to 
the arrival of the homicide officers.  Id. at 393. 
 
 
2 Officers arrived at a home in response to a complaint of a 
loud party.  Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400-401 
(2006).  The police observed an altercation in the home between 
four adults and a juvenile.  Id. at 401.  The Supreme Court, in 
concluding that the subsequent warrantless entry into the home 
was reasonable, expanded the definition of the emergency 
exception, holding that the police officers' subjective intent 
upon entering the dwelling is irrelevant.  Id. at 404-405. 
 
 
3 A police officer, after responding to a report of a 
disturbance, encountered signs of recent injury.  Michigan v. 
Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 48 (2009).  The officer could see violence 
inside, including the defendant throwing projectiles at an 
unobserved target.  Id.  The Supreme Court held that it was 
objectively reasonable for the officer to enter the home, 
further expanding the exception by observing that it would be 
"error . . . to replace . . . objective inquiry into appearances 
with . . . hindsight determination that there was in fact no 
emergency."  Id. at 49. 
6 
 
protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is 
justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an 
exigency or emergency."  See Fisher, 558 U.S. at 47, quoting 
Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403; Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392.  Each of 
these cases presents a situation in which the purported 
emergency relates to an individual within the home to be 
searched by the police.  They are not, for that reason, 
factually analogous to our case.  However, the Court's reasoning 
allows for an interpretation of the emergency exception that 
would apply whenever officers have objectively reasonable 
grounds to believe an emergency resonates from otherwise 
protected private property, whether it be related to aiding an 
injured person, preventing a shooting, extinguishing a fire, 
defusing a bomb, or ascertaining the cause of a life-threatening 
illness.  See Wayne, supra.  See also 3 W.R. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 6.6(a), at 619 (5th ed. 2012) ("[e]ntry may be 
justified even though the endangered persons are not in the 
premises"). 
 
Case law around the country and within the Commonwealth 
supports this view, as victims and would be threats, be they 
attackers or latent poisons, are frequently not in the same 
place.4  It is an unnecessary requirement that they be so; a 
                     
 
4 See, e.g., Armijo ex rel. Armijo Sanchez v. Peterson, 601 
F.3d 1065, 1071 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1224 
7 
 
requirement that compromises public safety and hampers law 
enforcement in fulfilling the purpose for which the emergency 
exception exists.  See Fisher, 558 U.S. at 49, quoting Brigham 
City, 547 U.S. at 406 ("role of a peace officer includes 
preventing violence and restoring order, not simply rendering 
first aid to casualties").  Consequently, the motion judge did 
not err in concluding that the officers were seizing the bottles 
in response to an emergency that encompassed both the condition 
of the defendant who was being taken to the hospital and the 
condition of the patients who were already there. 
                                                                  
(2011) (holding that "the exigent circumstances exception 
permits warrantless home entries when officers reasonably 
believe that some actor or object in a house may immediately 
cause harm to persons or property not in or near the house" 
[emphasis in original]); Mora v. Gaithersburg, 519 F.3d 216, 
225-226 (4th Cir. 2008) (placing search of home of detained man 
who had threatened his coworkers squarely within emergency 
exception, despite his not being home, as "[t]he authority to 
defuse a threat in an emergency necessarily includes the 
authority to conduct searches aimed at uncovering the threat's 
scope"); United States v. Mayes, 670 F.2d 126, 127-128 (9th Cir. 
1982) (allowing search of home for object that had been blocking 
child's throat, though child was in hospital under care of 
doctor when search and seizure of object took place); United 
States v. Moskow, 588 F.2d 882, 892 (3d Cir. 1978) (entry into 
vacant building with strong odor of gasoline held to be legal, 
as of "primary concern to the police was the safety of the 
occupants of neighboring buildings"); Richardson v. State, 247 
So. 2d 296, 298 (Fla. 1971) (affirming denial of motion to 
suppress when police had been searching defendant's home with 
purpose of aiding doctors to save lives of six children then at 
hospital being treated for symptoms of ingested poison).  See 
also Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 591, 594-595 
(2008) (denying motion to suppress evidence found in defendant's 
handbag when officer believed it may have contained cause for 
her overdose). 
8 
 
 
b.  Reasonableness of the seizure.  The court again limits 
its analysis to whether the police were objectively reasonable 
in seizing the tequila bottles in response to only the 
defendant's emergency.  Because I agree with the motion judge 
that the emergency exception also applied to -- and likewise was 
triggered by -- the patients' emergency in the hospital, our 
analysis should consider both.  In any event, whether it be 
applied to the defendant, the patients, or both, the police 
acted objectively reasonably under the circumstances in seizing 
the bottles. 
 
In determining whether exigent circumstances exist, we 
"evaluate the circumstances as they would have appeared to 
prudent, cautious, and trained officers" (quotation omitted).  
Armijo ex rel. Armijo Sanchez v. Peterson, 601 F.3d 1065, 1071 
(10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1224 (2011).  See 
Commonwealth v. Hall, 366 Mass. 790, 803 n.16 (1975).  "An 
action is 'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of 
the individual officer's state of mind, 'as long as the 
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action. . . .  
The officer's subjective motivation is irrelevant" (emphasis in 
original; citation omitted).  Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 404.  
See Commonwealth v. Entwistle, 463 Mass. 205, 214 (2012), cert. 
denied, 133 S. Ct. 945 (2013).  Reasonableness is to be 
"evaluated in relation to the scene as it could appear to the 
9 
 
officers at the time, not as it may seem to a scholar after the 
event with the benefit of leisured retrospective analysis" 
(emphasis added; quotation omitted).  McDermott, 448 Mass. at 
766.  See Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 591, 594 
(2008) (indicating that reviewing court evaluates police action 
in its context and "not with twenty-twenty hindsight").  
"Officers do not need ironclad proof of 'a likely serious, life-
threatening' injury to invoke the emergency aid exception."  
Fisher, 558 U.S. at 49.  See Entwistle, supra at 214.  It is 
commonly accepted that a "drug overdose is a serious medical 
emergency, often resulting in death when the afflicted person is 
not given timely and proper treatment."  McCarthy, supra. 
 
According to the motion judge's findings, when the officers 
entered the defendant's home, their knowledge of the ongoing 
situation was minimal.  They were aware that two individuals 
were in critical condition under the care of emergency room 
staff, and that one of them had been "med-flighted" to a Boston 
hospital.  The defendant told them that he had been feeling ill 
all day, as well.  Finally, in speaking with the defendant, the 
officers ascertained that the only thing that all three ill 
individuals had potentially shared was the tequila. 
 
At that moment, the police officers, in evaluating all the 
circumstances, were justified in seizing the bottles.  This is a 
situation in which there is more than just the mere existence of 
10 
 
a potentially harmful circumstance.  See Commonwealth v. 
Kirschner, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 836, 841-842 (2006).  A timely 
medical response, namely the defendant leaving in an ambulance 
and the patients already being present in the hospital, did not 
obviate the need for intervention, as the presence of -- and 
treatment by -- medical personnel does not necessarily render an 
emergency over.  See McCarthy, 71 Mass. App. Ct. at 594-595 
(denying motion to suppress evidence when officer searched bag 
of unconscious woman, despite presence of emergency medical 
technicians).5  Moreover, the information relayed from the 
                     
 
5 The court distinguishes McCarthy on two grounds.  In that 
case, an officer responded to reports of an unconscious woman.  
McCarthy, 71 Mass. App. Ct. at 592.  The officer called for the 
assistance of an emergency medical technician (EMT).  Id.  The 
EMT began to administer treatment, noted that the woman was 
suffering from an overdose, and asked the officer if he knew 
what the woman had taken.  Id.  The officer then searched the 
woman's handbag.  Id. at 593.  The court first asserts that the 
case is distinguishable because the defendant in McCarthy was in 
a public place, rendering her reasonable expectation of privacy 
less than if she had been in her home.  Ante at    .  I find 
this argument to be inapposite.  While it is true that an 
individual's expectation of privacy is less in public places, 
see Commonwealth v. Blood, 400 Mass. 61, 68-69 (1987), one's 
expectation of privacy remains paramount with regard to personal 
effects.  Had the officer in McCarthy been able to see the 
contents of the defendant's purse simply by looking, this would, 
of course, not offend the defendant's expectation of privacy.  
But when the officer searched the handbag, he was still 
searching her personal effects, and an exception to the warrant 
requirement was necessary.  In that case, as I would find in 
this one, the emergency exception provided grounds for that 
search.  Next, the court argues that McCarthy is different 
because "the defendant [in McCarthy] was in obvious distress and 
in need of immediate medical attention."  Ante at    .  
Moreover, the court finds, the "attending medical personnel 
11 
 
hospital tended to show that the emergency was getting worse; as 
the police knew it, there was reason to believe that the 
patients' situation may have been deteriorating.  It was 
objectively reasonable to believe that the defendant's health 
could also have deteriorated even after going to the hospital.  
The officers were therefore justified in seizing the tequila 
bottles pointed out to them by the defendant with the goal of 
aiding in either the patients' or the defendant's recovery. 
 
The court's focus on the treatment of the bottles after 
their seizure is misplaced.  Whether the testing of the contents 
of the bottles was subsequently necessary for the diagnosis and 
treatment of the patients is irrelevant, and based on decisions 
made by others rather than the responding officers who made the 
decision to seize the bottles.  Considering subsequent events as 
determinative of reasonableness is precisely the type of 
                                                                  
expressed a specific concern that the defendant might be 
suffering from a drug overdose that might possibly be verified 
by a search of the purse."  Id.  The record, though, shows only 
that the EMT asked the officer whether he knew what the 
defendant had taken.  McCarthy, supra at 594.  To distinguish 
these cases, and thus allow a search in McCarthy but not in the 
present case, would be to split hairs.  The officer in McCarthy 
and the officers in the present case knew overdose was a 
potential cause for the sickness.  They also knew that the 
attending medical personnel had been unable to ascertain the 
cause of such an overdose, and the officers in each scenario 
acted in what they believed was a reasonable response to the 
situation.  The only difference is that the EMT in McCarthy 
asked the officer if he knew what the defendant had taken.  That 
is not enough to distinguish these cases. 
12 
 
hindsight second-guessing that other courts have decried.6  It is 
equally baseless to obligate, as would the court, a request from 
medical staff before an officer can act in what might otherwise 
amount to a life-threatening emergency. 
 
2.  Conclusion.  When the officers arrived at the 
defendant's home, they had no reason to believe that the 
defendant was in any way criminally responsible for the 
patients' medical condition.  Further, there is no evidentiary 
basis upon which to conclude that the hospital was aware of 
circumstances that might lead to an arrest for the crime with 
which the defendant was ultimately charged.  This inquiry is, 
however, in the end, unimportant.  Even if the officers had 
reason to suspect the defendant was responsible for the 
patients' illnesses, the officers' subjective intent in 
                     
 
6 Attributing an investigative analysis to the officer's 
actions in seizing the bottles based on something that occurred 
after the seizure amounts exactly to the "leisured retrospective 
analysis" we aim to avoid.  See Commonwealth v. McDermott, 448 
Mass. 750, 766, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 910 (2007).  Indeed, I 
would hold that, even had the officers learned, just moments 
after the bottles were seized, that the patients and the 
defendant were cleared medically, the purpose in seizing and 
holding the bottles would still have been reasonably in response 
to the ongoing emergency.  Regardless, even if one were to 
attach importance to the eventual use of the bottles in the 
criminal prosecution of the defendant, the motion judge did "not 
infer an investigative motive on the part of [the officers] from 
the fact that [they] had an evidence collection officer 
summonsed to the scene.  Local police departments in Barnstable 
County routinely use the services of the [s]heriff's [o]ffice to 
assist in documenting all manner of police work, including non-
criminal events such as traffic accidents." 
13 
 
retrieving the tequila bottles is irrelevant.  Rather, the only 
important question is whether it was objectively reasonable to 
believe an emergency existed justifying the seizure of the 
tequila bottles.  I agree with the motion judge's findings and 
conclusion that there were sufficient grounds to believe that 
the bottles, from which all three ill individuals had been 
drinking the night before, were relevant in addressing what 
objectively appeared to be a life-threatening emergency, both as 
to the defendant, and as to the patients already at the 
hospital.  Such a seizure, therefore, was plainly reasonable 
under the circumstances. 
 
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.