Title: Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Rose

State: new-mexico

Issuer: New Mexico Supreme Court

Document:

591 P.2d 281 (1979) 92 N.M. 527 DAIRYLAND INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Stewart ROSE, as Administrator of the Estate of Thomas Kimbriel, Deceased, Defendant-Appellee. No. 12152. Supreme Court of New Mexico. February 28, 1979. *282 LeRoi Farlow, Sarah M. Bradley, Albuquerque, for plaintiff-appellant. William H. Carpenter, Albuquerque, for defendant-appellee. FEDERICI, Justice. On November 19, 1975, Thomas Kimbriel was involved in an automobile accident resulting in his death. At the time of the accident Kimbriel was covered by an insurance contract with Dairyland Insurance Company (appellant) providing for uninsured motorist protection. Following Kimbriel's death, Stewart Rose (appellee), administrator and personal representative of the estate of Thomas Kimbriel, made written demand for arbitration pursuant to the Dairyland policy. Appellant filed a reply to the demand for arbitration. A hearing was held before the appointed arbitrator and a decision was entered awarding damages to appellee. Appellant filed a complaint in district court pursuant to § 66-5-303, N.M.S.A. 1978 (formerly § 64-24-107, N.M.S.A. 1953), for an appeal de novo from the arbitration award. Appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal was granted and this appeal followed. The trial court held that (1) a provision in the insurance policy reflected an intention by the parties that arbitration be binding, and (2) that § 66-5-303, allowing an appeal de novo from an arbitration award, was superseded or repealed by implication by the enactment of the New Mexico Uniform Arbitration Act, § 44-7-1, et seq., N.M.S.A. 1978 (formerly § 22-3-9, et seq., N.M.S.A. 1953 (Supp. 1975)). As to the trial court's conclusion that the policy reflected an intention by the parties that arbitration be binding, appellant argues that when a policy provision is in conflict with the law, the policy provision must fall. The policy of insurance contains the following provision: We are aware of the case law in New Mexico which holds that where the provisions of a policy of insurance conflict with, or do not contain, the statutory requirement, the statute controls. Chavez v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 87 N.M. 327, 533 P.2d 100 (1975); Willey v. Farmers Insurance Group, 86 N.M. 325, 523 P.2d 1351 (1974); Sloan v. Dairyland Insurance Company, 86 N.M. 65, 519 P.2d 301 (1974). However, these cases do not control the result we reach here. Even if we were to apply the rules announced, we still must determine whether the uninsured motorist insurance law, § 66-5-303, or the New Mexico Uniform Arbitration Act, applies in this case. Appellant asserts that § 66-5-303 was not superseded or repealed by implication by the enactment of the New Mexico Uniform Arbitration Act as the trial court concluded. We disagree. Section 66-5-303 reads: We note that the above statute refers to "an insured motorist provision". In whatever context the term "insured" is taken, there is little doubt that the intent of the Legislature in enacting this section was to refer to "an uninsured motorist provision". We reach this conclusion in view of the inclusion of the term "uninsured motorist" in the title of the Act and the paragraph heading of § 66-5-303, quoted above. In any event, if the Legislature intended to refer to an "insured motorist provision", § 66-5-303 would not be applicable to this case and the issue of repeal by implication would be rendered moot. Section 44-7-12 of the Uniform Arbitration Act provides: We are committed to the following rules of statutory construction: Buresh v. City of Las Cruces, 81 N.M. 89, 90, 463 P.2d 513, 514 (1969). In Stokes v. New Mexico State Board of Education, 55 N.M. 213, 217, 230 P.2d 243, 245 (1951) the Court, quoting from Ellis v. New Mexico Construction Co., 27 N.M. 312, 319, 201 P. 487, 490 (1921), said: 55 N.M. at 217, 230 P.2d at 245. In this jurisdiction the Legislature and the courts have expressed a strong policy preference for resolution of disputes by arbitration. This policy is reflected in § 44-7-1, which provides: See also Bernalillo Cty. Med. Center Emp. v. Cancelosi, 92 N.M. 307, 587 P.2d 960 (1978). The legislative history of the two acts involved here lends support to the view that the New Mexico Uniform Arbitration Act was intended to supersede the de novo trial provision of the uninsured motorist insurance law. The arbitration provisions found in § 22-3-1, et seq., N.M.S.A. 1953 were enacted in 1859. This statute only authorized arbitration with respect to presently existing controversies. It was generally assumed that an arbitration clause in an uninsured motorist policy, similar to appellant's in this case, would be held unenforceable under this statute because the disputes which would arise would not be present or existing controversies at the time of the signing of the policy, but would instead be future disputes. *285 In 1969, with the purpose of making uninsured motorist arbitration provisions enforceable, the New Mexico Legislature passed the "de novo" appeal statute, now found in § 66-5-303. In 1971, the Legislature enacted the New Mexico Uniform Arbitration Act, § 44-7-1, et seq., which expressly authorizes agreements to submit future controversies to arbitration. This Act was patterned after the Uniform Arbitration Act as approved in 1955 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. It appears to the Court that the legislative intent in enacting the Uniform Arbitration Act, and the policy of the courts in enforcing it, is to reduce caseloads in the courts, not only by allowing arbitration, but also by requiring controversies to be resolved by arbitration where contracts or other documents so provide. Any other interpretation would render meaningless the intent that proceedings under the New Mexico Uniform Arbitration Act be final. The order of the trial court is affirmed. IT IS SO ORDERED. McMANUS, Senior Justice, and PAYNE, J., concur.