Title: Dennis Moore v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton,1 Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, 
and Kinser, JJ. 
 
DENNIS JACKSON MOORE 
 
v.  Record No. 990776   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
 
March 3, 2000 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the 
provisions of Code § 16.1-269.1(E) cured a defect in felony 
proceedings in a juvenile and domestic relations district court 
caused by the Commonwealth's failure to notify the defendant's 
biological father of the proceedings pursuant to the 
requirements of former Code §§ 16.1-263 and -264.  Code § 16.1-
269.1(E) states, in material part:  "An indictment in the 
circuit court cures any error or defect in any proceeding held 
in the juvenile court except with respect to the juvenile's 
age."  In deciding this issue, we also consider the impact, if 
any, of Commonwealth v. Baker, 258 Va. 1, 516 S.E.2d 219 (1999) 
(per curiam), aff'g 28 Va. App. 306, 504 S.E.2d 394 (1998), on 
the present appeal. 
 
On July 27, 1996, Dennis Jackson Moore (the defendant) shot 
and killed Vance Michael Horne, Jr., in a parking lot at a 
                     
 
1Justice Compton participated in the hearing and decision of 
this case prior to the effective date of his retirement on 
February 2, 2000. 
recreational facility in Henrico County.  The shooting occurred 
after the defendant approached Horne's companion, Jonathan 
Bradley Cooper, held a gun to Cooper's back, and demanded a neck 
chain that Cooper was wearing.  Cooper gave the chain to the 
defendant, who nevertheless shot Horne in the head and fled from 
the scene. 
 
On October 15, 1996, the Commonwealth issued four juvenile 
petitions against the defendant, age 17, in the Henrico County 
Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court (the juvenile 
court).  The petitions charged the defendant with the murder of 
Horne, the robbery of Cooper, and two counts of use of a firearm 
in the commission of a felony.  The four petitions were served 
on the defendant, his mother, Darlene Moore, and his stepfather, 
Howard Moore.  The defendant had lived with his mother and 
stepfather for about 16 years, but had not been adopted by his 
stepfather.  The defendant's biological father, Dennis Fleming, 
was not given notice of the initiation of proceedings in the 
juvenile court. 
 
The defendant's mother and stepfather attended all the 
proceedings in the juvenile court.  The record does not show 
that the defendant's biological father was present at any of 
those proceedings.  The juvenile court held a preliminary 
hearing under Code §§ 16.1-269.1(B) and (C), and certified the 
 
2
four felony charges to the grand jury of the circuit court 
pursuant to Code § 16.1-269.1(D). 
 
The defendant was indicted by the grand jury on the four 
felony charges.  The defendant did not challenge the circuit 
court's jurisdiction or raise an objection to the proceedings 
based on the lack of notice to his biological father in the 
juvenile court.  The defendant was tried by a jury and convicted 
of all four offenses.  The circuit court sentenced the defendant 
to a term of 60 years' imprisonment for murder, with 20 years 
suspended, a term of 20 years' imprisonment for robbery, with 15 
years suspended, and a total of eight years' imprisonment on the 
two firearm convictions. 
 
The defendant appealed his convictions to the Court of 
Appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the 
admissibility of a statement he made to the police.  He did not 
argue that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to try his case 
or assert error based on the lack of notice to his biological 
father in the juvenile court.  A panel of the Court of Appeals 
affirmed the trial court's judgment in an unpublished opinion.  
Moore v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1088-97-2 (March 16, 1999). 
 
The defendant filed a petition for appeal in this Court, in 
which he alleged a purported jurisdictional defect in his 
convictions.  He argued that, under our decision in Baker, the 
circuit court's judgment was void because the Commonwealth 
 
3
failed to provide notice to his biological father of the 
proceedings in juvenile court.  We awarded the defendant this 
appeal on the sole issue whether the circuit court lacked 
jurisdiction to try him on the four charged offenses. 
 
The defendant contends that the Commonwealth's failure to 
comply with the notice requirements of former Code §§ 16.1-243 
and –264 deprived both the juvenile court and the circuit court 
of subject matter jurisdiction over his case.  He argues that 
Code § 16.1-269.1(E) applies only when the circuit court has 
obtained jurisdiction over the charges by virtue of "valid" 
proceedings in the juvenile court.  He asserts that the 
preliminary hearing in the juvenile court was invalid because of 
the Commonwealth's failure to comply with the statutory notice 
requirements and, thus, that the indictments in the circuit 
court were void and could not be cured by the provisions of Code 
§ 16.1-269.1(E).  We disagree with the defendant's arguments. 
 
The term "subject matter jurisdiction" refers to the power 
granted to the courts by constitution or statute to hear 
specified classes of cases.  Earley v. Landsidle, 257 Va. 365, 
371, 514 S.E.2d 153, 156 (1999); Humphreys v. Commonwealth, 186 
Va. 765, 772, 43 S.E.2d 890, 894 (1947).  Code § 16.1-241 grants 
the juvenile court "exclusive original jurisdiction" over "all 
cases, matters and proceedings" concerning a juvenile who is 
alleged to have been delinquent.  The classes of offenses 
 
4
committed by the defendant are included within this grant of 
jurisdiction. 
 
With certain exceptions that are not pertinent here, Code 
§ 19.2-239 grants the circuit court "exclusive original 
jurisdiction for the trial of all . . . indictments . . . for 
offenses committed within their respective circuits."  
Indictments for murder, robbery, and use of a firearm are 
encompassed within this statutory grant of authority.  Thus, the 
circuit court also had subject matter jurisdiction over the 
classes of offenses committed by the defendant. 
 
A court's authority to exercise its subject matter 
jurisdiction over a case may be restricted by a failure to 
comply with statutory requirements that are mandatory in nature 
and, thus, are prerequisite to a court's lawful exercise of that 
jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Jones v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 425, 
428, 192 S.E.2d 775, 777 (1972); Gregory v. Peyton, 208 Va. 157, 
159-60, 156 S.E.2d 624, 626 (1967); Peyton v. French, 207 Va. 
73, 80, 147 S.E.2d 739, 743 (1966).  In Baker, for the reasons 
stated by the Court of Appeals, we affirmed the Court of 
Appeals' judgment voiding circuit court convictions of a 
juvenile because the Commonwealth had failed to comply with the 
mandatory notice requirements of former Code §§ 16.1-263 and –
264.  258 Va. at 2, 516 S.E.2d at 220.  The Court of Appeals 
held that a "plain reading of Code §§ 16.1-263 and 16.1-264 
 
5
manifests legislative intent that both parents be notified and 
dispenses with this requirement only when the trial judge has 
certified on the record that the identity of a parent is not 
reasonably ascertainable."  Baker v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 
at 312, 504 S.E.2d at 397. 
 
The trial court's judgment in Baker was void because the 
notice of initiation of juvenile proceedings was not served on a 
required party, the juvenile's biological father.  Id.  Thus, 
although the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
the felony indictments before it, the court lacked authority to 
exercise its subject matter jurisdiction over those offenses 
because the Commonwealth failed to comply with the mandatory 
notice requirements of former Code §§ 16.1-263 and –264. 
 
Although the juvenile proceedings in the present case 
suffered from the same type of notice defect that occurred in 
Baker, we conclude that Baker is inapposite to a resolution of 
the present appeal.  The offenses at issue in Baker were 
committed before July 1, 1996.  See 28 Va. App. at 308-09, 504 
S.E.2d at 395.  Thus, the provisions of Code § 16.1-269.1(E), 
which apply only to offenses committed on or after July 1, 1996, 
were not before us in Baker.2  See 1996 Va. Acts ch. 755, cl. 7, 
and ch. 914, cl. 7. 
                     
 
2We also note that in Moore v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. ___, 
___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (2000) (decided today), which did not 
 
6
 
Since the defendant committed the four charged offenses 
after July 1, 1996, the provisions of Code § 16.1-269.1(E) are 
applicable to the resolution of his case.  As previously noted, 
that section provides in relevant part:  "An indictment in the 
circuit court cures any error or defect in any proceeding held 
in the juvenile court except with respect to the juvenile's 
age."  Under the plain language of this statute, an indictment 
by a grand jury cures any defect or error, except one regarding 
a juvenile's age, which has occurred in any juvenile court 
proceeding. 
 
The Commonwealth's failure to notify the defendant's 
biological father of the initiation of juvenile court 
proceedings, as required by former Code §§ 16.1-263 and –264, 
created a defect in those proceedings.  Baker, 28 Va. App. at 
313, 504 S.E.2d at 398.  However, under Code § 16.1-269.1(E), 
that defect was cured when the grand jury returned indictments 
against the defendant on the offenses certified to it by the 
juvenile court.  This curative statutory provision permitted the 
                                                                  
involve the defendant here, the offenses at issue were committed 
before July 1, 1996.  We held that the Commonwealth's failure to 
give notice of the initiation of juvenile court proceedings to 
the juvenile's father, as required by former Code §§ 16.1-263 
and -264, was not subject to waiver by the juvenile's failure to 
object to this defect in the proceedings.  Id. at ___, ___ 
S.E.2d at ___.  We also held that the provisions of Code § 16.1-
269.6(E) did not effect a waiver of this defect.  Id. at ___, 
___ S.E.2d at ___. 
 
 
7
circuit court to exercise its subject matter jurisdiction and to 
try the defendant on the offenses set forth in the indictments.3
 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals.4
Affirmed.
JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE LACY joins, concurring. 
 
I concur in the result reached by the majority in this 
case.  However, I write separately to reiterate my belief that 
the notice requirement at issue is not a prerequisite for the 
juvenile court’s exercise of its subject matter jurisdiction.  
Moore v. Commonwealth, Record No. 990665, 259 Va. ___, ___ 
S.E.2d ___ (2000) (this day decided) (Kinser, J., dissenting); 
see also Turner v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 666, 667, 222 S.E.2d 
517, 518 (1976) (holding that mandatory requirement of written 
notice was not jurisdictional). 
                     
 
3Since Baker is inapposite to the present case, we reject 
the defendant's additional contention that the Court of Appeals 
was required to reverse his convictions, sua sponte, after the 
Court's decision in Baker. 
 
 
4We do not address the defendant's contention that the 
Commonwealth's failure to comply with the notice requirements of 
former Code §§ 16.1-263 and -264 denied him due process, because 
the defendant failed to raise this objection in the trial court.  
Rule 5:25; see Sheppard v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 379, 393, 464 
S.E.2d 131, 139 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1110 (1996). 
 
8