Title: Baycol Cases I and II

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

Filed 2/28/11 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
In re BAYCOL CASES I and II. 
) 
S178320 
 
 
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Ct.App. 2/7 B204943 
 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
 
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Super. Ct. No. JCCP 4217 
 
____________________________________) 
 
The right to appeal in California is generally governed by the ―one final 
judgment‖ rule, under which most interlocutory orders are not appealable.  (See 
Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1.)1  In Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695 
(Daar), however, concerned that orders dismissing all class action claims might in 
some instances escape review, we adopted a ―death knell‖ doctrine that allowed a 
party to appeal such orders immediately.  Here, we address uncertainty over the 
scope of the death knell doctrine:  does it extend to orders that simultaneously 
terminate individual claims as well, or does it apply only where, as was the case in 
Daar itself, individual claims survive? 
We conclude the preservation of individual claims is an essential 
prerequisite to application of the death knell doctrine:  the doctrine renders 
appealable only those orders that effectively terminate class claims but permit 
individual claims to continue.  When instead an order terminates both class and 
                                              
1  
All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Code of Civil 
Procedure. 
 
2 
individual claims, there is no need to apply any special exception to the usual one 
final judgment rule to ensure appellate review of class claims.  Instead, routine 
application of that rule suffices to ensure review while also avoiding a multiplicity 
of appeals.  Because the Court of Appeal misapplied these principles in dismissing 
an appeal from the sustaining of a demurrer to class claims here, we reverse. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In 1997, defendant Bayer Corporation (Bayer) gained United States Food 
and Drug Administration approval for, and shortly thereafter began marketing, the 
drug Baycol.  (In re Baycol Products Litigation (D.Minn. 2003) 218 F.R.D. 197, 
201.)  Baycol, generically known as cerivastatin sodium, is part of a class of 
cholesterol lowering drugs commonly referred to as statins.  (Ibid.)  In 2001, 
Bayer withdrew Baycol from the market after concerns arose about links between 
the use of Baycol and several acute, and sometimes fatal, muscle tissue diseases.  
(Ibid.) 
Following Bayer‘s withdrawal of Baycol from the market, thousands of 
plaintiffs filed suit against Bayer.  (In re Baycol Products Litigation, supra, 218 
F.R.D. at p. 201.)  Plaintiff Douglas Shaw filed this case as a class action, alleging 
claims for violation of the unfair competition law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, 
§ 17200 et seq.) and for unjust enrichment.  The complaint alleged Bayer had 
engaged in false and misleading advertising regarding Baycol. 
In 2007, after consolidation with other actions in a Judicial Council 
Coordinated Proceeding, Shaw filed a first amended complaint, adding to the UCL 
and unjust enrichment claims a claim under the Consumers Legal Remedies Act 
(Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq.).  The amended complaint sought to certify a class of 
―[a]ll persons or entities who purchased or paid for the drug Baycol between 
February 18, 1998 and August 8, 2001 . . . , to be used by California Consumers, 
and not for resale.‖ 
 
3 
Bayer demurred to both the class allegations and each substantive claim.  
On April 27, 2007, the trial court sustained the demurrer in its entirety without 
leave to amend.  It thereafter denied Shaw‘s motion for reconsideration on both 
class and individual claims and entered a judgment of dismissal.  Bayer served a 
notice of entry of judgment on October 29, 2007, and Shaw filed his notice of 
appeal on December 20, 2007. 
The Court of Appeal reversed dismissal of Shaw‘s individual UCL claim, 
concluding he should have been granted leave to amend.  However, it declined to 
consider on the merits the appeal of the class claims dismissal and instead 
dismissed that portion of the appeal.  Relying on cases that have held death knell 
orders terminating class claims are immediately appealable, the Court of Appeal 
reasoned that, upon entry of the April 27, 2007, order sustaining Bayer‘s demurrer, 
the class claims dismissal, unlike the individual claims dismissal, was appealable.  
Consequently, the December 20, 2007, notice of appeal was, as to the class claims, 
untimely.  (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.104, 8.108(e).) 
We granted review to resolve uncertainty over the timing of appeals in 
cases involving class claims. 
DISCUSSION 
Under the one final judgment rule, ― ‗an appeal may be taken only from the 
final judgment in an entire action.‘ ‖  (Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals 
(1980) 27 Cal.3d 916, 921, quoting Tenhet v. Boswell (1976) 18 Cal.3d 150, 153.)  
― ‗The theory [behind the rule] is that piecemeal disposition and multiple appeals 
in a single action would be oppressive and costly, and that a review of 
intermediate rulings should await the final disposition of the case.‘ ‖  (Griset v. 
Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 697; see also Flanagan v. 
United States (1984) 465 U.S. 259, 264 [the one final judgment rule ―reduces the 
ability of litigants to harass opponents and to clog the courts through a succession 
 
4 
of costly and time-consuming appeals‖]; Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara 
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 725, 741, fn. 9 [the rule ensures a complete record for the 
reviewing court, allows it to better craft its directions to the trial court, and reduces 
trial court uncertainty and delay].) 
The one final judgment rule is ―a fundamental principle of appellate 
practice‖ (Walker v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority 
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 15, 21), recognized and enforced in this state since the 19th 
century (see, e.g., Ashley v. Olmstead (1880) 54 Cal. 616, 618; Agard v. Valencia 
(1870) 39 Cal. 292, 297; Hibberd v. Smith (1870) 39 Cal. 145, 146).2  The 
Legislature first codified the rule in the Practice Act of 1850 (Stats. 1850, ch. 142, 
§ 258, p. 451; see Howe v. Key System Transit Co. (1926) 198 Cal. 525, 531), later 
incorporated it as part of the original Code of Civil Procedure (see former § 963, 
enacted 1872), and has retained it in the Code of Civil Procedure to this day (see 
§ 904.1; Kinoshita v. Horio (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 959, 962-963 [§ 904.1 codifies 
the common law one final judgment rule]).3 
Given the one final judgment rule‘s deep common law and statutory roots 
and the substantial policy considerations underlying it, we are reluctant to depart 
                                              
2  
In the United States, the one final judgment rule was adopted as part of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 (1 Stat. 73, ch. 20, §§ 21, 22, 25), and its true origins date to 
―the dim and remote history of the appellate procedure of the English common 
law.‖  (Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal (1932) 41 Yale L.J. 539, 
544; see also id. at pp. 541-548 [discussing common law roots in depth]; McLish 
v. Roff (1891) 141 U.S. 661, 665 [the adoption of the one final judgment rule in 
the Judiciary Act of 1789 was ―declaratory of a well settled and ancient rule of 
English practice‖].) 
3  
Section 904.1 directs that an appeal may be taken ―[f]rom a judgment‖ 
(§ 904.1, subd. (a)(1)) and in its remaining subdivisions lists various specific 
additional appealable orders that stand as exceptions to the general rule.  None are 
relevant here. 
 
5 
from its principles and endorse broad exceptions that might entail multiple appeals 
absent compelling justification.  ―[E]very exception to the final judgment rule not 
only forges another weapon for the obstructive litigant but also requires a 
genuinely aggrieved party to choose between immediate appeal and the permanent 
loss of possibly meritorious objections.‖  (Kinoshita v. Horio, supra, 186 
Cal.App.3d at p. 967.)  Accordingly, ―exceptions to the one final judgment rule 
should not be allowed unless clearly mandated.‖  (Ibid.) 
We found compelling justifications for one such exception in Daar, supra, 
67 Cal.2d 695, embracing what is known in this and other jurisdictions as the 
―death knell‖ doctrine.4  In Daar, the plaintiff filed a putative class action.  The 
trial court sustained a demurrer, concluding the plaintiff could neither maintain a 
class action nor satisfy the jurisdictional minimum amount in controversy for 
superior court actions, and transferred the action to the municipal court.  On 
appeal, we considered as a threshold issue whether such an order, determining the 
plaintiff could not maintain his claims as a class action but could seek individual 
relief, was appealable, and we concluded it was.  What mattered was not the form 
of the order or judgment but its impact.  (Id. at pp. 698-699.)  Because the order 
effectively rang the death knell for the class claims, we treated it as in essence a 
final judgment on those claims, which was appealable immediately.  (Id. at p. 699; 
see also Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 435 [citing Daar with 
approval]; Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 470 [same].) 
Two procedural circumstances were critical to our decision in Daar, supra, 
67 Cal.2d 695:  first, that the appealed-from order was the practical equivalent of a 
                                              
4  
The name is traceable to Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (2d Cir. 1966) 370 
F.2d 119, 121 (―Where the effect of a district court‘s order, if not reviewed, is the 
death knell of the action, review should be allowed.‖). 
 
6 
final judgment for some parties, and second, that in the absence of our treating the 
order as a de facto final judgment, any appeal likely would be foreclosed.  On the 
first point, the order ―virtually demolished the action as a class action‖ (id. at 
p. 699) and was in  ― ‗legal effect‘ . . . tantamount to a dismissal of the action as to 
all members of the class other than plaintiff‖ (ibid.).  In cases decided since Daar, 
we and the Courts of Appeal have emphasized that orders that only limit the scope 
of a class or the number of claims available to it are not similarly tantamount to 
dismissal and do not qualify for immediate appeal under the death knell doctrine; 
only an order that entirely terminates class claims is appealable.  (See Green v. 
Obledo (1981) 29 Cal.3d 126, 149, fn. 18 [an order partially decertifying a class is 
nonappealable where the decertified portion of the class and the remaining class 
significantly overlap]; Vasquez v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 800, 806-807 & 
fn. 4 [an order that terminates some but not all class claims is not an appealable 
order]; Shelley v. City of Los Angeles (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 692, 695-697 [an 
order partially certifying a class ordinarily is nonappealable]; General Motors 
Corp. v. Superior Court (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 247, 251-252 [same].) 
Equally important in Daar was the circumstance that the order appealed 
from was essentially a dismissal of everyone ―other than plaintiff.‖  (Daar, supra, 
67 Cal.2d at p. 699, italics added.)  We emphasized that permitting an appeal was 
necessary because ―[i]f the propriety of [a disposition terminating class claims] 
could not now be reviewed, it can never be reviewed‖ (ibid.), and we were 
understandably reluctant to recognize a category of orders effectively immunized 
by circumstance from appellate review.  This risk of immunity from review arose 
precisely, and only, because the individual claims lived while the class claims 
died.  As the United States Supreme Court has explained, ―[t]he ‗death knell‘ 
doctrine assumes that without the incentive of a possible group recovery the 
individual plaintiff may find it economically imprudent to pursue his lawsuit to a 
 
7 
final judgment and then seek appellate review of an adverse class determination.‖  
(Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay (1978) 437 U.S. 463, 469-470; see also General 
Motors Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 199 Cal.App.3d at p. 251; Eisen v. 
Carlisle & Jacquelin, supra, 370 F.2d at p. 120; Howard & Klafter, Appealability 
of a Class Action Dismissal:  The “Death Knell” Doctrine (1972) 39 U. Chi. 
L.Rev. 403, 406.)  This concern—that an individual plaintiff may lack incentive to 
pursue his individual claims to judgment, thereby foreclosing any possible 
appellate review of class issues—is present in cases such as Daar, where 
individual claims persist but remain unresolved, but is wholly absent in cases 
where a final judgment resolving all claims will follow as a matter of course 
without further action by the individual plaintiff.  Consistent with this 
understanding, decisions in other jurisdictions specially permitting appeal of 
orders terminating class claims routinely rely on the assumption that appeal is 
warranted because review otherwise would be foreclosed by the persistence of 
individual claims.  (See, e.g., Levine v. Empire Savings & Loan Association (Colo. 
1976) 557 P.2d 386, 387; Frost v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc. (N.C. 2000) 540 
S.E.2d 324, 327-328; Rogelstad v. Farmers Union Grain Term. Ass’n (N.D. 1974) 
224 N.W.2d 544, 546-548; Roemisch v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. (Ohio 
1974) 314 N.E.2d 386, 388-389; Bell v. Beneficial Consumer Discount Company 
(Pa. 1975) 348 A.2d 734, 736.) 
Thus understood as requiring an order that (1) amounts to a de facto final 
judgment for absent plaintiffs, under circumstances where (2) the persistence of 
viable but perhaps de minimis individual plaintiff claims creates a risk no formal 
final judgment will ever be entered, the death knell doctrine fits comfortably 
 
8 
within the existing statutory framework.5  In Daar itself, we described the class 
certification denial order as ―in legal effect a final judgment‖ (Daar, supra, 67 
Cal.2d at p. 699) settling the respective rights of the absent class members vis-à-
vis the defendant, and thus within the settled rule that orders amounting to de facto 
judgments as to some but not all parties could be treated as final judgments and 
appealed under former section 963.  (See, e.g., McClearen v. Superior Court 
(1955) 45 Cal.2d 852, 855 [an order conclusively determining a lien claimant‘s 
rights, but not those of the original parties to the action, is immediately 
appealable]; Bowles v. Superior Court (1955) 44 Cal.2d 574, 582 [―Although 
[former] section 963 . . . does not specifically list an order denying a request for 
leave to file a complaint in intervention [as appealable], such an order has long 
been held appealable on the theory that the denial is a final determination of the 
litigation as to the party seeking to intervene.‖].) 
Underlying this original settled rule was the recognition that ―to hold the 
person [whose rights have been finally disposed of] bound to wait until the final 
judgment against the other party before taking an appeal from the judgment 
against the first party already rendered is wholly unreasonable and finds no 
warrant in any provision of the [Code of Civil Procedure].‖  (Rocca v. Steinmetz 
(1922) 189 Cal. 426, 428; see also Howe v. Key System Transit Co., supra, 198 
Cal. at pp. 531-533 [notwithstanding the express terms of former § 963, appeal 
                                              
5  
As it must.  Though the rules governing appealability have common law 
roots, they are now creatures of statute.  (Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com., 
supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 696; People v. Chi Ko Wong (1976) 18 Cal.3d 698, 709.)  
While we safely may assume the Legislature, in codifying the one final judgment 
rule, did not intend to alter materially the rule‘s existing common law contours, we 
likewise are not at liberty to modify those contours in ways at odds with the 
statutory language. 
 
9 
from an order is permitted where it amounts to a final decree disposing of a 
collateral party‘s claims, although the principal parties‘ claims remain 
unresolved]; Dollenmayer v. Pryor (1906) 150 Cal. 1, 3 [―So far as the intervener 
and his rights in that action were concerned, [the order appealed from] was final.  
We see no good end to be secured by requiring him to await judgment between the 
other parties after a trial in which he could not participate.  It ended the litigation 
as to him, and he should be allowed an immediate appeal.‖].)  The rule within 
which Daar, supra, 67 Cal.2d 695, was intended to fit thus applied when, and only 
when, other parties in the litigation had claims still unresolved.  Otherwise, there 
would be no wait to avoid and no need to treat the prejudgment order as itself a de 
facto judgment.  We see no basis for reading Daar as dispensing with that 
limitation and radically expanding the rule it purported to apply. 
Embracing this understanding of Daar, supra, 67 Cal.2d 695, the Court of 
Appeal in Farwell v. Sunset Mesa Property Owners Assn., Inc. (2008) 163 
Cal.App.4th 1545, 1547 correctly described the death knell doctrine as ―a tightly 
defined and narrow concept.‖  It properly recognized the doctrine‘s application 
depended on the contrast between the continuing viability of individual claims and 
the terminated status of absent class member claims:  ―[A]n appeal is allowed 
because the action has in fact and law come to an end, as far as the members of the 
alleged class are concerned.  Since, in theory, the individual plaintiff‘s action can 
go forward, the death knell doctrine fits comfortably into the exception to the ‗one 
final judgment‘ rule that arises when parties have separate and distinct interests; 
when this is true, there can be a final and appealable judgment for each such 
party.‖  (Ibid.)  In the absence of such a difference in claim status, where both 
class and individual claims have been resolved and a single judgment soon will 
follow, that exception is inapplicable and no justification for applying the death 
knell doctrine exists. 
 
10 
Here, a single order was entered dismissing both individual and class 
claims.  No divergence between individual and class interests was thereby created.  
(Cf. Farwell v. Sunset Mesa Property Owners Assn., Inc., supra, 163 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 1547.)  No risk arose that the named plaintiff, lacking incentive to pursue his 
individual claims, might fail to press on until the entry of an appealable final 
judgment.  (Cf. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, supra, 437 U.S. at pp. 469-470.)  
No need was present to treat the original order as immediately appealable, so as to 
prevent the trial court‘s class determinations from never being reviewable.  (Cf. 
Daar, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 699.)  The scope of the death knell doctrine is 
coextensive with its rationale.  The doctrine does not apply here.6 
The Court of Appeal below recognized that at least one other Court of 
Appeal had concluded, as we do, that where an order sustains a demurrer as to 
both class and individual claims, appeal lies from the subsequent entry of final 
judgment, not the order.  (See Los Altos Golf & Country Club v. County of Santa 
Clara (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 198, 202.)  But it treated Los Altos as carving out 
an exception to the death knell doctrine and, concerned about the need for bright 
lines in establishing rules of appealability, declined to embrace such an exception.  
Echoing this position, Bayer contends that treating the April 27, 2007, order as 
                                              
6  
We have previously said, in refusing to parse a single order into separate 
pieces each triggering its own deadline for appeal:  ―[A]n absurd situation would 
result if we were to hold that the portion of the ruling sustaining the demurrers is 
nonappealable and must be followed by a judgment of dismissal but that the 
portion of the ruling granting the motions [to dismiss] is final and immediately 
appealable.‖  (Lavine v. Jessup (1957) 48 Cal.2d 611, 615.)  The same rationale 
applies under these facts, where extension of the death knell doctrine would 
generate two timelines for appeal from the order in this case—one for the denial of 
the class claims and another for the denial of the individual claims. 
 
11 
nonappealable would carve out an unwarranted exception to Daar‘s death knell 
doctrine. 
We readily agree that bright lines are essential in this area, to avoid both 
inadvertent forfeiture of the right to appeal and excessive protective appeals by 
parties afraid they might suffer such a forfeiture.7  Properly understood, however, 
the principle that appeal lies only from the final judgment when an order 
terminates both class and individual claims is not an ill-defined, ad hoc exception 
to the death knell doctrine, but an appropriate recognition of the doctrine‘s limits.  
As Daar itself expressed, and as we have explained above, the doctrine comes into 
play for class claims only when an order ―is tantamount to a dismissal of the 
action as to all members of the class other than plaintiff.‖  (Daar, supra, 67 Cal.2d 
at p. 699, italics added.)  The rule that the death knell doctrine applies to render an 
order foreclosing class claims appealable when, and only when, individual claims 
survive is, we trust, sufficiently bright to guide future courts and litigants. 
Bayer‘s additional arguments on appeal do not persuade us otherwise.  
Bayer urges on us a wealth of cases applying the death knell doctrine to render 
orders dismissing class claims appealable.8  But none of them addressed the 
                                              
7  
See Dickinson v. Petroleum Corp. (1950) 338 U.S. 507, 517 (dis. opn. of 
Black, J.) (ruing the ―jungle of doubt‖ litigants must hazard in guessing whether 
certain orders are appealable); Mid-Wilshire Associates v. O’Leary (1992) 7 
Cal.App.4th 1450, 1455-1456 (the interests of all ―are best served by maintaining 
. . . bright-line rules which distinguish between appealable and nonappealable 
orders‖); Kinoshita v. Horio, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at p. 968 (in matters of 
appealability, ―[a] definite rule is necessary to reduce both the temptation to file 
dilatory appeals and the compulsion to file protective ones.‖). 
8  
California follows a ―one shot‖ rule under which, if an order is appealable, 
appeal must be taken or the right to appellate review is forfeited.  (See § 906 [the 
powers of a reviewing court do not include the power to ―review any decision or 
order from which an appeal might have been taken‖ but was not]; Alch v. Superior 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
12 
appealability of an order that also terminated individual claims.  In the aftermath 
of Daar, we have repeatedly reaffirmed that an order that denies class certification 
or otherwise extinguishes class claims in their entirety is appealable, but only in 
cases in which individual claims survived.  (See, e.g., In re Tobacco II Cases 
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 298, 306; Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co., supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 435; 
Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc., supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 470.)  Likewise, until the 
Court of Appeal‘s decision in this case, in every previous instance in which the 
death knell doctrine had been applied, permitting appeal of a dismissal order, the 
appealed-from order had extinguished only class claims (see, e.g., Alvarez v. May 
Dept. Stores Co. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1223, 1228; Alch v. Superior Court, 
supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 360; Kennedy v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. (1996) 43 
Cal.App.4th 799, 806-807), and where appeal was barred, the appellant was 
seeking, after entry of final judgment, to obtain review of an earlier order 
extinguishing only class claims (see, e.g., Stephen v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car 
(1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 806, 811; Guenter v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (1983) 140 
Cal.App.3d 460, 465; Morrissey v. City and County of San Francisco (1977) 75 
Cal.App.3d 903, 908).  The precedent Bayer cites is thus unhelpful and 
unpersuasive. 
As well, Bayer contends Daar, supra, 67 Cal.2d 695, itself is on all fours 
with this case and requires us to treat the order here as appealable because in 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
Court (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 339, 361 [―Under any circumstances, a plaintiff 
will have one, and only one, opportunity to appeal an order that has the legal effect 
of disposing of all class claims.‖]; Kinoshita v. Horio, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at 
p. 967 [―If [a] ruling is appealable, the aggrieved party must appeal or the right to 
contest it is lost.‖].)  If the April 27, 2007, order was appealable, it follows that it 
had to be timely appealed or the right to challenge its particulars be forever lost. 
 
13 
Daar, as here, the trial court entered an order sustaining a demurrer as to both 
class and individual claims.  This argument elevates form over substance.  As 
noted above, while the Daar trial court sustained a demurrer to the individual 
claims, it did so because, once class claims were removed, the individual claims 
failed to satisfy the superior court jurisdictional minimum.  It therefore transferred 
the individual claims to the municipal court.  Accordingly, in Daar, unlike here, 
individual claims survived the order terminating class claims. 
Finally, Bayer expresses concern that departing from the ―rule‖ that orders 
terminating class claims are always appealable, no matter the disposition of 
individual claims, would create uncertainty and confusion, requiring courts on a 
case-by-case basis to assess the degree of ―divergence‖ between the interests of 
would-be class members and individual named plaintiffs.  But as Daar did not 
declare any such rule, no departure is involved here.  In any event, no case-by-case 
assessment of divergence is needed.  If an order terminates class claims, but 
individual claims persist, the order terminating class claims is immediately 
appealable under Daar‘s death knell doctrine.  If an order terminates class claims 
and individual claims as well, it is not.  Because the order here fell in the latter 
category, it was nonappealable, and it was error to treat the subsequent appeal 
from a final judgment as untimely. 
 
14 
 
DISPOSITION 
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the Court of Appeal‘s judgment and 
remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re Baycol Cases I and II 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 10/20/09 – 2d Dist., Div. 7 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S178320 
Date Filed: February 28, 2011 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Wendell Mortimer, Jr. 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Shaun P. Martin; Green Welling, Robert S. Green, Jenelle Welling, Charles D. Marshall and Brian S. 
Umpierre for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Sidley Austin, Catherine Valerio Barrad, Steven A. Ellis and Brendan P. Sheehey for Defendant and 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Shaun P. Martin 
University of San Diego School of Law 
5998 Alcala Park, Warren Hall 
San Diego, CA  92110 
(619) 260-2347 
 
Catherine Valerio Barrad 
Sidley Austin 
555 West Fifth Street, Suite 4000 
Los Angeles, CA  90013-1010 
(213) 896-6000