Title: Ford v. Antwerpen Motorcars Ltd.

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Willie Mae Ford, et al. v. Antwerpen Motorcars Ltd., et al., No. 68, September Term 2014,
Opinion by Greene, J.
CODE OF MARYLAND REGULATIONS (“COMAR”) 11.12.01.15A — VEHICLE
SALES CONTRACT
COMAR 11.12.01.15A provides that “[e]very vehicle sales contract or agreement shall be
evinced by an instrument in writing containing all of the agreements of the parties.”  The
adoption of this regulation has not supplanted our longstanding common law contract
principles permitting the construction or reading of multiple documents together to comprise
the entire agreement between the parties.  Rourke v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 384 Md. 329, 354,
863 A.2d 926, 941 (2004); Rocks v. Brosius, 241 Md. 612, 637, 217 A.2d 531, 545 (1966). 
The two documents before this Court, the Buyer’s Order and the Retail Installment Sales
Contract (“RISC”), reviewed and signed by Petitioners on the same day during the purchase
and finance of a vehicle, indicate an intention that the documents be construed together as
part of the same transaction, i.e., the purchase and finance of an automobile.  Thus, the
arbitration clause in the Buyer’s Order controls a dispute over an alleged breach of the RISC.
Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
Case No. 24-C-13-002548
Argued: April 1, 2015
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 68
September Term, 2014
WILLIE MAE FORD, et al.
v.
ANTWERPEN MOTORCARS LTD., et al.
 
Barbera, C.J.
*Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins
McDonald
**Watts,
JJ.
Opinion by Greene, J.
 Battaglia and McDonald, JJ., concur in the
judgment.
Filed: June 29, 2015
*Harrell, J., participated in the hearing of the case,
in the conference in regard to its decision and in
the adoption of the opinion but he retired from the
Court prior to the filing of the opinion.
**Watts, J., participated in the hearing of this case
but recused herself prior to conferencing and
adoption of this opinion.
In the instant case we are asked to consider the extent to which multiple documents
executed on the same day during the course of the purchase and financing of an automobile
may be read together as constituting the entire agreement between the parties.  In particular,
we address whether the Code of Maryland Regulations (“COMAR”) 11.12.01.15A,  which
1
Petitioners have referred to as the “Single Document Rule,”  prevents an automobile dealer
2
from relying on an arbitration provision found in a Buyer’s Order,  but not explicitly within
3
the four corners of the Retail Installment Sales Contract (“RISC”).  We conclude that
COMAR 11.12.01.15A does not, as Petitioners suggest, displace our common law contract
principles permitting multiple documents from being construed together as evincing the
entire agreement of the parties.  Rourke v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 384 Md. 329, 354, 863 A.2d
926, 941 (2004); Rocks v. Brosius, 241 Md. 612, 637, 217 A.2d 531, 545 (1966).
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case arises from Petitioners’, Willie Mae Ford and Rashad Earle Beale,  purchase
 Under COMAR 11.12.01.15A “[e]very vehicle sales contract or agreement shall be
1
evinced by an instrument in writing containing all of the agreements of the parties.”
 Although Petitioners refer to COMAR 11.12.01.15A as the “Single Document Rule,”
2
we have not been provided with, nor are we aware of, any Maryland judicial opinion on point
or other persuasive authority using this label.
 The Buyer’s Order form sets forth, among other things, the parties to the vehicle
3
sale, the identity of the vehicle purchased, its purchase price, any down payment or trade-in
value credited towards the vehicle’s price, and the balance owed to the automobile dealership
upon delivery. 
and finance of an automobile from Respondent, Antwerpen Motorcars Ltd. (“Antwerpen”),
on April 24, 2010.  Petitioners aver that Antwerpen failed to properly disclose the vehicle’s
history, including its involvement in a collision and use as a short-term rental.  The gravamen
of Petitioners’ dispute before this Court concerns not the vehicle’s history, but rather the
existence, or lack thereof, of an agreement to arbitrate disputes under the terms of the vehicle
sales contract.  In determining whether Petitioners’ claims against Antwerpen are subject to
a mandatory arbitration provision, we consider two documents executed by the parties during
the transaction.  On the same day, Petitioners executed both a Buyer’s Order—which sets
forth the purchase price—and a Retail Installment Sales Contract (“RISC”)—which contains
the financing terms of the purchase.  
   In relevant part, the Buyer’s Order provides: 
AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE DISPUTES
Buyer(s) (also referred to as “You”) and Dealer agree that if any
Dispute arises, the Dispute will be resolved by binding arbitration[.]
* * * *
A Dispute is any question as to whether something must be mediated
and the terms and procedures of the mediation, as well as any allegation
concerning a violation of a sales state or federal statute that may be subject of
mediation, any monetary claim whether contract, tort, or other, arising from the
negotiation of and terms of the Buyer’s Order, any service contract or
insurance product, or any retail installment sale contract or lease (but this
mediation agreement does not apply to and shall not be binding on any
assignee thereof).
* * * *
2
The parties understand that they are waiving their rights to jury a trial 
and class consideration of all claims and disputes between them not
specifically exempted from arbitration in this Agreement.
The front and back of this buyer’s order, along with other documents
signed by You in connection with this order, comprise the entire agreement
between the parties affecting this purchase.
Petitioners’ signatures appear directly below the language contained in the Agreement to
Arbitrate.
The RISC, which sets forth the terms of the financing agreement between Petitioners
and Antwerpen, does not include an agreement to arbitrate.  Specifically, the RISC provides
that “You, the Buyer (and Co-Buyer, if any), may buy the vehicle below for cash or on credit. 
By signing this contract, you choose to buy the vehicle on credit under the agreements on the
front and back of this contract.”  Following the various financing terms contained in the
agreement, the RISC provides, in relevant part, that “[t]his contract along with all other
documents signed by you in connection with the purchase of this vehicle, comprise the
entire agreement between you and us affecting this purchase.”  (Emphasis added). 
Petitioners’ signatures are located two sentences after this provision.  The RISC further
provides that it is governed by the Creditor Grantor Closed End Credit Provisions (“CLEC”),
Md. Code (1975, 2013 Repl. Vol., 2014 Supp.), § 12-1001 et seq. of the Commercial Law
Article (“Com. Law”).   
Petitioners filed their Complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on April 29,
2013, after discovering the vehicle’s alleged incident history.  In their Complaint, Petitioners
3
asserted the following causes of action against Antwerpen: Breach of Implied Warranty of
Merchantability (Count I); violation of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (Count II);
Deceit by Non-Disclosure or Concealment of Prior Rental and Accident (Counts III-IV);
Negligent Misrepresentation (Count V); and Contract (Count VI).  Antwerpen moved to
compel arbitration on the basis of the Agreement to Arbitrate contained in the Buyer’s Order. 
Petitioners opposed Antwerpen’s motion on the grounds that the language of the Buyer’s
Order was superseded by the RISC, which contained no arbitration agreement.  Following
a hearing on Antwerpen’s motion on October 21, 2013, the Circuit Court entered an order
granting Antwerpen’s Motion to Compel Arbitration.
On November 18, 2013, Petitioners appealed to the Court of Special Appeals seeking
a reversal of the judgment entered in the Circuit Court.  Prior to any proceedings in the Court
of Special Appeals, we granted Petitioners’ certiorari petition, Ford v. Antwerpen Motorcars
Ltd, 440 Md. 114, 99 A.3d 778 (2014), to consider the following question: 
(1)
Under Maryland contract law, is an arbitration provision not contained
in a vehicle sales contract, but found in a Buyer’s Order executed on
the same day, enforceable where the applicable Maryland regulations
require vehicle sales contracts to “contain[] all agreements of the
parties”?
As explained in greater detail below, we shall answer that question in the affirmative and
hold that, for the purposes of the instant case, the Buyer’s Order may be construed together
with the RISC as evincing the entire agreement between the parties.  Accordingly, we affirm
the judgment of the Circuit Court.
4
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
An order compelling arbitration is a final and appealable judgment of the trial court. 
Holloman v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 391 Md. 580, 588, 894 A.2d 547, 551 (2006).  “The
trial court’s conclusion as to whether a particular dispute is subject to arbitration is a
conclusion of law,” which we review for legal correctness.  Walther v. Sovereign Bank, 386
Md. 412, 422, 872 A.2d 735, 741 (2005); Holloman, 391 Md. at 588, 894 A.2d at 551.  When
reviewing a trial court’s decision compelling arbitration, our role “‘extends only to a
determination of the existence of an arbitration agreement.’”  Walther, 386 Md. at 422, 872
A.2d at 741 (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Stinebaugh, 374 Md. 631, 645, 824 A.2d 87, 95
(2003)).
III. DISCUSSION
The parties’ present dispute concerns the existence of an agreement to arbitrate
contained in the Buyer’s Order and, in particular, whether multiple documents signed during
the purchase and finance of the vehicle may be read together as constituting the entire
agreement between the parties to a vehicle sales contract.  “The issue of whether an
agreement to arbitrate exists is governed by contract principles.” Holloman, 391 Md. at 590,
894 A.2d at 552; Walther, 386 Md. at 425, 872 A.2d at 743 (citation omitted) (“Whether a
valid arbitration agreement exists . . . ‘depends on contract principles since arbitration is a
matter of contract.’”); Curtis G. Testerman Co. v. Buck, 340 Md. 569, 579, 667 A.2d 649,
5
654 (1995) (citation omitted) (“Arbitration is ‘consensual; a creature of contract. . . .  In the
absence of an express arbitration agreement, no party may be compelled to submit to
arbitration in contravention of its right to legal process.’”).  
“The fundamental rule in the construction and interpretation of contracts is that the
intention of the parties as expressed in the language of the contract controls the analysis.” 
Buck, 340 Md. at 580, 667 A.2d at 654.  “In construing contracts, Maryland follows the
objective interpretation principle.  If the language of the contract is unambiguous, we give
effect to its plain meaning and do not delve into what the parties may have subjectively
intended.”  Rourke v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 384 Md. 329, 354, 863 A.2d 926, 941 (2004). 
“‘[A] party who signs a contract is presumed to have read and understood its terms and as
such will be bound by its execution.’ . . .  ‘[W]e are loath to rescind a conspicuous agreement
that was signed by a party whom now, for whatever reason, does not desire to fulfill that
agreement.’”  Koons Ford of Balt., Inc. v. Lobach, 398 Md. 38, 46, 919 A.2d 722, 727 (2007)
(citations omitted).
Petitioners contend that the Circuit Court erred in granting Antwerpen’s motion by
construing the arbitration provision contained in the Buyer’s Order together with the RISC. 
In Petitioners’ view, the RISC constitutes the vehicle sales contract, and it does not contain
an arbitration clause.  Therefore, Petitioners contend that the RISC and the Buyer’s Order,
as a matter of law, are separate agreements that may not be read together.  In support of their
6
position, Petitioners rely substantially upon the language of COMAR 11.12.01.15A, which
Petitioners refer to as the “Single Document Rule.”  This regulation provides that “[e]very
vehicle sales contract or agreement shall be evinced by an instrument in writing containing
all of the agreements of the parties.”  Petitioners, directing this Court to the use of the
singular term “an instrument,” aver that “[t]his means that, even if a contract in other
situations might be comprised of several documents, in a car sale in Maryland COMAR
requires all the terms of the contract must be contained in one document, or ‘instrument’
[sic].” 
Where the vehicle is financed by the dealer, Petitioners assert that the RISC alone
serves as the “vehicle sales contract,” because the RISC contains both the principal amount
and interest charged.  See Md. Code (1977, 2012 Repl. Vol., 2014 Supp.), § 15-311 of the
Transportation Article (“A contract for the sale of a vehicle by a dealer shall contain . . . [t]he
principal amount charged for the vehicle; [and] any interest charged on the principal
amount[.]”).  Petitioners further maintain that the RISC, itself, purports to be the entire
agreement between the parties because it provides that “[b]y signing this contract, you choose
to buy the vehicle on credit under the agreements on the front and back of this contract.” 
Accordingly, the RISC, in Petitioners’ view, must include all of the agreements between the
parties within the four-corners of that document.  Hence, Petitioners conclude that the failure
of Antwerpen to include the arbitration provision within the RISC means that no such
agreement exists and arbitration may not be compelled.  This failure, they contend, renders
7
the RISC and the Buyer’s Order inconsistent and, as a result, the documents cannot be read
together as one agreement.
Antwerpen argues that, under well-established contract law, the Buyer’s Order and
RISC may be construed together as evincing the entire agreement of the parties.  See Rocks
v. Brosius, 241 Md. 612, 637, 217 A.2d 531, 545 (1966).  Antwerpen points out that, contrary
to Petitioners’ contention that the RISC contains an integration provision, the RISC
incorporates by reference the Buyer’s Order and its arbitration provision by providing that
“[t]his contract along with all other documents signed by you in connection with the
purchase of this vehicle, comprise the entire agreement.”  (Emphasis added).  Further,
Antwerpen contends that Petitioners have mis-characterized COMAR 11.12.01.15A as a
“Single Document Rule.”  Antwerpen notes that Petitioners have failed to provide any
authority using or creating the label “Single Document Rule” in reference to COMAR
11.12.01.15A.  This regulation, Antwerpen asserts, “simply does not state that all of the
agreements . . . must be in ‘a single document.’” Contrary to Petitioners’ interpretation, the
use of the phrase “an instrument” does not preclude incorporating other documents by
reference.  Accordingly, Antwerpen asks this Court to affirm the decision of the Circuit
Court compelling arbitration.
We disagree with Petitioners that COMAR 11.12.01.15A supplants our longstanding 
common law contract principles permitting the construction or reading of multiple documents
8
together as part of a single transaction.  As explained by this Court in Rocks, 241 Md. at 637,
217 A.2d at 545:
A contract need not be evidenced by a single instrument. Where several
instruments are made a part of a single transaction they will all be read and
construed together as evidencing the intention of the parties in regard to the
single transaction.  This is true even though the instruments were executed at
different times and do not in terms refer to each other.   
See also Rourke, 384 Md. at 354, 863 A.2d at 941 (“Where the contract comprises two or
more documents, the documents are to be construed together, harmoniously, so that, to the
extent possible, all of the provisions can be given effect.”). 
Since 1978, COMAR 11.12.01.15A has provided that “[e]very vehicle sales contract
or agreement shall be evinced by an instrument in writing containing all of the agreements
of the parties.”  See 5:12 Md. R. 981 (June 16, 1978); 5:17 Md. R. 1331 (August 25, 1978). 
Contrary to Petitioners’ labeling of this regulation as the “Single Document Rule,” the term
“single” is absent from the language.  Nor is there any indication in our jurisprudence that,
as a result of the use of the singular term “an instrument,” a vehicle sales contract may not,
as a matter of law, incorporate multiple documents by reference.  To the contrary, the mere
use of a singular term such as “an instrument” or “a contract,” does not prevent the
application of the principles in Rocks and Rourke.
Petitioners have provided this Court with several opinions, which in Petitioners’ view
have “consistently and repeatedly reenforced the requirement that all agreements . . . must
be contained in one instrument, and have recognized that only the financing agreement or
9
RISC contains all of the agreements of the parties.” Upon review, the authorities provided,
none of which are binding upon this Court,  offer little more than cursory, unpersuasive
4
assertions lacking support in our jurisprudence.  Indeed, these authorities either provide no
textual support or cite to one of the other unpersuasive opinions Petitioners rely upon to
present their case to this Court.  
To the extent the opinions Petitioners have provided this Court suggest that, in the
context of a vehicle sale financed by the dealer, a Buyer’s Order may not be construed
together with the RISC, such opinions appear already to have been called into question by
the Fourth Circuit’s recent opinion in Rota-McLarty v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 700
F.3d 690 (4th  Cir. 2012).  In Rota-McLarty, similar to the instant case, an individual
 
executed a Buyer’s Order—which contained an agreement to arbitrate—and a RISC—which
 Specifically, Petitioners have provided us with state and federal trial court opinions. 
4
See Ricks v. Wilson Powell Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., Case No. 1:10-cv-02342-WDQ (Cir. Ct.
Prince George’s Cnty., Mar. 28, 2011); Baker v. Antwerpen Motorcars Ltd., 807 F. Supp. 2d
386 (D. Md. 2011); Lambert v. Nat’l Motors, Inc., Civ. No. WMN-10-3522 (D. Md. May 4,
2011); Tokarski v. Castle Auto Outlet, LLC, Civ. No. RDB-09-509 (D. Md. Sept. 25, 2009);
Memo to Counsel, Houston v. Crown Motors, Civ. No. JFM-02-3859 (D. Md. July 8, 2003).
Petitioners also cite to two decisions from the intermediate appellate court, see Sabmd,
LLC v. Ross, No. 2277 (Ct. Spec. App. 2006), Smith v. Rosenthal Toyota, Inc., 83 Md. App.
55, 573 A.2d 418 (1990).  With respect to Smith, Petitioners rely on a single footnote which
(1) addresses an inapplicable act and (2) does not consider the possibility of incorporating
by reference an arbitration provision.
Lastly, Petitioners have provided this Court with a letter of advisement from an
assistant attorney general provided to the Motor Vehicle Administration which unequivocally
provides that it is “NOT AN OPINION OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL” (emphasis
in original) and opinions from other jurisdictions that interpret their own state statutes.  See,
e.g., Raceway Ford CasesLarkin v. New Century Auto Sales Inc., No. 12-13917 (E.D. Mich.
Jan. 3, 2014); Kroupa v. Sunrise Ford, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 42 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).       
10
contained no arbitration agreement—with the dealership during the purchase and financing
of an automobile.  Id. at 694-95.  
In determining whether the arbitration agreement in the Buyer’s Order was
enforceable, the court noted that:
Rota–McLarty does advance a novel theory in support of integration on appeal,
premised on Md. Code Regs. § 11.12.01.15, which provides that “every
vehicle sales contract or agreement shall be evidenced by an instrument in
writing containing all of the agreements of the parties.” See Appellee’s Br. at
19.  She seems to argue that the regulation requires one document by itself
to constitute the parties’ agreement, and thus we must read the Buyer’s
Order alone.  Even if this argument is not waived, Rota–McLarty fails to
provide any authority for her interpretation of the cited regulation, nor
for the proposition that this regulation supplants an entire established
body of Maryland law governing contract interpretation. 
Id. at 700 n.8 (emphasis added).  Despite the presence of an integration clause in the RISC,
the court concluded that “Rota-McLarty has failed to establish that the RISC’s integration
clause prevents reading both [the Buyer’s Order and the RISC] together as a single
agreement.”  Id. at 700.5
 Rota-McLarty is not the only opinion which casts doubt upon Petitioners’ assertion
5
that “Maryland courts . . . have consistently and repeatedly enforced the requirement that all
agreements of the parties, including arbitration agreements, must be contained in one
instrument in vehicle sales transactions, and . . . only the financing agreement or RISC
contains all of the agreements of the parties.”  For instance, following the Fourth Circuit’s
decision, an argument nearly identical to that of Petitioners’ was rejected by a Maryland state
trial court.  See Whitehead v. Driveline Auto., LLC, No. 12-36674 (Cir. Ct. Prince George’s
Cnty., April 18, 2013).  Interestingly, this opinion was issued by the same judge that
previously decided Ricks, which Petitioners cite to support their position.  See supra.
11
Petitioners aver that reliance upon the footnote in Rota-McLarty is inappropriate
because, in their view, the issue of the “Single Document Rule” had not been properly raised
before that court.  We need not resolve the present dispute on the basis of Rota-McLarty,
however.  As explained above, Petitioners have failed to provide this Court with any
persuasive or binding authority to support their proposition that only a single document by
itself may constitute the parties’ agreement.
Turning to the language of the documents before this Court, the Buyer’s Order and
the RISC, reviewed and signed by Petitioners on the same day, indicate an intention that the
documents be construed together as part of the same transaction.  Notably, the RISC
incorporates the Buyer’s Order by reference and provides that “[t]his contract along with
all other documents signed by you in connection with the purchase of this vehicle,
comprise the entire agreement.”  (Emphasis added).  Petitioners’ signatures were required
almost immediately following this statement.  
Similarly, the Buyer’s Order states that “[t]he front and back of this buyer’s order,
along with other documents signed by You in connection with this order, comprise the
entire agreement between the parties[.]” (Emphasis added).  Once again, Petitioners’
signatures follow this provision.  We also note that the Agreement to Arbitrate contained in
the Buyer’s Order refers directly to the RISC in its definition of “disputes.”  Indeed, the
arbitration provisions states, in part, that “[a] Dispute is . . . any monetary claim whether
12
contract, tort, or other, arising from the negotiation of and terms of the Buyer’s Order, any
service contract or insurance product, or any retail installment sale contract.”  (Emphasis
added).  In other words, the arbitration agreement signed and agreed to by Petitioners on the
same day as the RISC explicitly states that it applies to disputes arising out of the RISC.
We reject Petitioners’ contention that the language, “[b]y signing this contract, you
choose to buy the vehicle on credit under the agreements on the front and back of this
contract” means that the RISC purported to be the sole document considered for the purposes
of the agreement between the parties and necessarily superseded the Buyer’s Order.  Absent
from this language is any indication that any prior agreements, such as the Buyer’s Order
executed only moments prior to the RISC, were no longer of any force or effect as Petitioners
suggest.  As noted above, one of the agreements contained in the RISC requiring Petitioners’
signatures was that “[t]his contract along with all other documents signed by you in
connection with the purchase of this vehicle, comprise the entire agreement.”
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, under our long standing common law contract principles as expressed
in Rocks and Rourke, multiple documents may be construed together as evincing the entire
agreement of the parties to a vehicle sales contract.  The RISC and the Buyer’s Order in the
present case indicate an intention that they are to be read together as constituting one
transaction.
13
JUDGMENT 
OF 
THE 
CIRCUIT
COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY
AFFIRMED.  PETITIONERS TO PAY
THE COSTS IN THIS COURT.
14
Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
Case No. 24-C-13-002548
Argued: April 1, 2015
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 68
September Term, 2014
WILLIE MAE FORD, et al.
v.
ANTWERPEN MOTORCARS LTD., et al.
 
Barbera, C.J.
*Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins
McDonald
**Watts, J.,
JJ.
Opinion by McDonald, J., concurring in the
judgment, which Battaglia, J., joins
Filed: June 29, 2015
*Harrell, J., participated in the hearing of the case,
in the conference in regard to its decision and in
the adoption of the majority opinion but he retired
from the Court prior to the filing of the opinion.
**Watts, J., participated in the hearing of this case
but recused herself prior to conferencing and
adoption of this opinion.
In fantasy literature devoted to the battle between good and evil, the allegiance of
elves, orcs, dwarfs, and goblins is readily apparent.   In the battle between clarity and
1
obfuscation in legal instruments, it is sometimes uncertain which side attorneys will take.
This case turns on the drafting and placement of an arbitration agreement in one of several
legal documents concerning the sale of a used car.
I have attached to this opinion the “buyer’s order”  and Retail Installment Sales
2
Contract (“RISC”) as they appear, somewhat enlarged, in the materials provided to this
Court.  The Majority opinion – a model of clarity itself – is able to navigate these documents. 
But a lay person interested in buying a used car would be well advised to bring along a
lawyer, a magnifying glass, and perhaps an English major, to decipher their meaning.  
There are significant differences between these two documents.  Pertinent to this case,
the buyer’s order contains fine print in which the purchasers essentially waive future access
to the public justice system for any disputes arising out of the transaction in favor of an
alternative dispute process.   The RISC does not contain such a provision.  At issue is
3
J.R.R. Tolkien, The Lord of the Rings (1949).
1
The phrase “buyer’s order” is not actually the title of the document, but, as far as I
2
can tell, appears only in the fine print at the bottom of the front page of the document.
That provision is set out in considerably larger print and much more legible spacing
3
in the Majority opinion.  Majority slip op. at 2.  
whether the terms of the RISC supersede those of the buyer’s order.
The fine print at the bottom of the buyer’s order states that “[t]he front and back of
this buyer’s order, along with other documents signed by You in connection with this order,
comprise the entire agreement between the parties affecting this purchase...” The RISC
contains a similar reference to “all other documents signed by you.”  There is no indication
in either document, nor is the record clear, as to the universe of “other documents” signed
in connection with the purchase of this vehicle that are incorporated by reference.  In any
event, the universe of documents that comprise the transaction is apparently not confined to
signed documents.  The bottom of the rear side of the “buyer’s order” states that “The
information that you see on the window form for this vehicle is part of this contract.  The
information on the window form overrides any contrary provisions in the contract of sale.”  
4
Similar language appears in a paragraph 5 on the reverse side of the RISC.
In an apparent effort to improve the possibility that a consumer might be aware of all
of the terms affecting a purchase of a car, the Motor Vehicle Administration (“MVA”) has
adopted a regulation that indisputably applies to the transaction in this case.  That regulation
provides:
Every vehicle sales contract or agreement shall be evidenced by 
an instrument in writing containing all of the agreements of the
parties.  It shall be signed by all of the parties before the seller
delivers to the buyer the vehicle covered by the agreement.
The window form does not appear in the record in this case.
4
2
COMAR 11.12.01.15A (emphasis added).  The plain language of the regulation establishes
what might be called a “single instrument rule” for car sales.  Ms. Ford and Mr. Beale base
their appeal entirely on the notion that this means a single document and that the RISC,
which does not contain an arbitration provision, is that  document.  Antwerpen counters that
the requisite instrument may be comprised of multiple documents and here includes the
buyer’s order.  The Majority agrees with Antwerpen and concludes that arbitration clause in
the buyer’s order was not superseded by the RISC.  
I agree that a single instrument may be comprised of more than one document and, on
that narrow point, given the language of these documents,  I join in the judgment.  Whether
5
these documents – and whatever else was purportedly incorporated in them – actually comply
with the regulation is a question for another day. 
Judge Battaglia has advised that she joins this opinion.
 
Had the RISC here contained the language in the RISC analyzed in the 2012 letter
5
of the MVA’s counsel – i.e., that “[t]he terms of this contract set forth your entire and only
obligation to Seller” –  I would have deferred to the agency’s interpretation of its own
regulation set forth in that letter and concluded that the buyers had no obligation to arbitrate
the dispute.
3
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USTOWER ACCEPTS SALE PRICE ANO/ OA TRADE ALLOWANCE W LEW OF ANT
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2162.8

 

 

 

 

 

 
INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

u

DESORPTION OF TRADE

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
 

APX, 3

 

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acai je os ong we ae ceo

pik scorn
Arden os ao cnt at oh

amt aa tt pon we) etn Des ogy Besta nen he dons actin eens
es ace ot thse sae ae

Frog are Ones Seu sume kos te vehi a

ute ee
tt yt) Wa wee el eto eae (tae a a eau) a eps si csumaa,

  

oti ns tay agen an pt a constrain bt nt alert ssh ed mat seas ene et
oes sch sy cl sn sued ty a aa sc tcl bloat Yor trae sano
on: perenne ee en een a/c ny we a Po ea Reet soto,

Cae mat Agee No 8. sd Yb
‘asta of mpeatain by ot ol a oP (On cael de ay anes nage ore
‘an tay shat ba a Paap

‘wn naa or iy, wpa any hse eae ex or wht ao ees of Cede

yes imoncd by ry orca any wh ra tats ele pete Ue ley sas sos Ne ted
{28 ay ay ard a sc is, ya ote as expla ea as, pst on eye eaaion oe 9
te nc fhm ay x aly,

itanaaph spe ,h ee th Vie S Cntact monn ype ar gee os act etn Serna Sse
‘began ot mall ange ahs tes aged.

{Ms Used ae, Tu so ipo aca t bach nou rp Ss tae Yuet Done
snc sown ce ae tn ah anal ore by eo kn Vnancn Ysa en a

 

our Wants.
0 ure rma, Te Det 2s he cach et i ma ve see el
‘narrate You wi sh cf char sa. sola aed noe IN
‘tan estig ances warns armed yo ch arty

ADDITIONAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SALE

 

ei Sis -1 tv mais i ei pe ep dd wh nem cg
ep eet eet ene ot etd mtr sean

i it ae sa dma wc slo oer ee ena

ig ese a ein tr ses penny ea

   

"Jin Vai 1 09 Ged mola eb vih has bean Wadd In pit ta cesteaon ote te vei rdared heroundss I sot
sata sey oor i dm va my apd tty Das el

Set te ase sch nt rte tunnel ie’ pr
io cis ooh trans bn (ol ey Monga pa Setar ee
i si ea rr wn Be wae eke ements ew Semen ee
ay aa ero er ap nde sya os pot ono hea mas

 

deb wel fa ich ns, sa (1) Your hls wae wth pay ot) pansy

a tap yo mtr ws are earn, Dae Shab wig ts co ene
ed grey nr dg 1) eal ua ot 2) pss oc a a wc ss
amas rs) an gi aos yes oe are ody Yo, sani et et

ay acl Aeon) on vf a land oor 2)

an Brod nh’ Cael- asa tata se eb dyn eg mtv coe by er

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jeonns Yu se cope note a docu by Dd el las fhe Tak pros

‘ah Kano Bae ah asa oh rd voi Spot ts You ot etal ae et, eh,
stamourt ft Unpi Bc, Hover Dee ys cate sb ao bm nde pe et et sg
ed whi, 20 nr as aac Oa uma 3 mays eas One

Sy we You cy an Oss access nd ass, scaly eee mr wh, qj anaes
raed pal is pee ch ace ret shal ahh th ss es hae Sop a

Yoel ohn bts hn opr ee meas tg mal vay

le nat Wa alana ect homes, Manone Vac Ecos At
sires nt a ar sry MC eh tm oon i pa soe

 

          

 

 
INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

‘ula ni come tei tats mr‘ not se apt arte uy be vay pe ne
‘anor aa cag eh udp eave colony ey wlan st mato arom ated
Wa Btn act ete .

12, tie «yt mci eso is pnt td te Bs arson sit a ed ait
he wher Wo ema aad

8. CONTRACTUAL OSCLOSURE STIEMEN OR USED VEMCLE: THE BORMATION Yu SEN T= WACO
la roms eae OF TS COTA. TH ATEN CTH WOW TONES An CNRAN ROMSONS

 

once
ah tn come cc ue is ns ee ee asap ea oe at ct

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"coo nota i Teeth waa moran eee
eA Jor a cate ant nda tis crt. You 89°80 rwor = Bear (zomlimos Wwe” or “ual is cura)
Secale reveremeaninin nncuomcete Retna tes akin atest
basis; The Thullvin-Lending Disclosures Bold ae part of es contact, ree .

  

 

 

Bs [aie 7 — ~
nots [oe [ ation aware aw
tap, caw BOR uaisterrsoors

 

 

 

 

 

 

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a
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ame ae
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Pererinerny
esto
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2 path Pa
1 on tg fea coe BS
{smraingpetanee
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fewer}

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
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‘owe na Chee
‘ito Gaal ge Oa : 15 10a rc 0 ore
1 befied evrmdon be ciei
eins oa Gems gaan teal troy oR a al wt
Pedeneaeiomectcencmestyt th core tose egirasin Sepsis pa
a ea rere iy debug apn | [eu alge tes ue
PUR ss cate Selection acesrtsttaesstsanes | | wht ate ene n
ae Sui senate tp oe

 

 

 

   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[PTENE Yygor ee ase che Fe feat Fi tom padlniaken obs] | gn = BB
OR Le aS. — eee
: aor ce
“ APx.6 * is.

 

 

[, ae Sanna ROOUING SEE PERIOD,
State law does ndty “ccoling of” ot cancaation pei rth cale Ate you san hs cree |

i
Youmay ony can ihe ar agree or faa enue au cant cnet ha const mp Dons
You chenge Your mind. This natiee does not apply to home eolation see
The Annual Poreentage Hate may be npgetlable with the Seller. The Seer may assign thls contact
and rotan its right to receive & part of the Findnee Charge. :

 

 

 

 

 

   
 
 
  

lat cvs ee pes tie
sod Phair enti. Bay Sm ‘eo Sa. ‘
yt alco mt be ay a oy ayn fon egy hb ec tig bn, Fr eae
iyonds eon ene pmetonat nd oc gone

‘Sen bickfr orion epee,

[NOTICE TO RETAJ/BUYER: Do not sign this contact I blank. Youre ented to

   

 

   
    
 

aimee ys conven
masiname smn
Buyor Signs | ‘pate22426/ 10 Co-Buyer Signs ont adBEN
ingen Knometemh ina neat oop nah
shmop as cee

      

     
 
  
 

ee pt. ate.

Seon SO RPER. NISSEN pup ARTO X

‘Biv eigamneonnav eat CROTTAL ORE ATO FIRE

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

uri nLeyowa dey

 

 

 

 

 

 
 

FINANCE CHARGE ANO PAYMENTS

‘Hew wo wl gu Finance Charge We vl ti
‘ho Fencg' Chagoo dl bass at to Anna
Pajeanage Pa onto Unpald eat of tho Acant
Faneos = ;

Haw wil aply payments may epey each
Faymentodhe ontad and url arto he France
hrgeote unpal prt of to Aur Fanced
Sid eho amounts you ove undo Ws contact

ardor we crese.

. Howlate pyrens or eal payments change what
{You must pay. Wo asod he Finance Charge, Tl
{ramen a Tel Sa ce shown onto Hot
‘on aseon tht you wl make evry payent
‘on to day is dv, Your nance Charge aa of
Praymena ans Tal Sale Plc wl Be mor you
ay ate ands you py oy Changes may tk
Thoterm of larger ost ta payment, a our
‘pt, mre or fave payments of ho same aman

(3h your ohne popront wha sar tal poy
Front Weil sond yous moles efing you about ese
‘henges teow he nl sched payments dus.

«4 Yotmay prepay You may pepay al or pat of the
‘ipa pat fe Amount need a any ee al
‘outpanaty youd so, you mst pay te earned and
Snpeid part of bo Fiance. Chargo andl tor
‘mount wlth dala. you pomont

 

°2, YOUR OTHER PROMISES TO US

{© Etheveblte I damaged destroyed, or mietng.
ou agree to pays af you ewe unr tis const
‘evant he vote dared, destood of issn.

1, Going the vetlel. You agre at orate to vet
a fom a US, of Canada, fo ol at asa, of
Irandler ary cot in to whl o tis conct
hou our ion prison. You agree not 12
‘xpoae etc suse, sla conecalon ot
Irveturny wert two pay any opal il, org
‘i tae, thes oF ehargos cn he vei, You egy
{oepay Do amount hen wo ak rR

Security Interest
‘You ga us ecu iro
"tha eb anda pars oF poo nt
4 Atmonay of goods received (oceeds fo the

vie
+ Alnsaranc,manthance enc, or othe ce
{esete we nanos fr you and
+ Ab pocoeds rom insures, manlonance, 2
> eo. ore eaiaca we tne for you Tis
Tle any lund of promis or hemes tom
tho ceniact,
“This secias payment ofa you oe on Mis contac
Nal cies your ahr aglorors ni eriaet.
‘You rake eur tha show o eae rest
(ier rte vee
«4 nsuranee you mst have on tho veh
‘You gree have pce! damage insurance cove
tng las ofr arago to tho vr for te tr ot
ths contact Th nstrance must cover ur erst
‘haehile ye do not ves nrc wo my,
chao, buy Pte damage Insure.

 

‘

 

[Wo aply the money Kom the eae, ess aon

 

oss mae asp ci
 ou'may have fo ay ol you ope a oes
> Stk ete Wont feet off Scand at You
oy alyoseweontiscoac tone, sta ay ht
Sal ges youts melas contac Du mean.
2 Yeu et pay ay pant ont
You ahe le, nga or gd aon
oes opps, "
+ Sou art ¢oerng i tarot net
Stat ape ge for propery
+ ubeak any aaron nts ons
“he ant jou wey bo the opal pa of be
Tour nance ps sane and upp the
France Carga aye hag or yan ce
Becaute you cote.

 

‘YoU my have to pry colston cost, yo Neo an
eroyt elec what youve, yo Wl gy Ioan
‘azar fo, the allows You wl so poy any

 

‘ay tke (posse) to voi ry you we co 60
Beacaily ante nv ow Wo ray opescess We
‘bl whe whout esr fo ea roses. your
‘whl has an ceric icing dco, young a we
‘nay ito the gach fe vei. I yo ako the
‘ll, any ascosttos, quot, ard ropacmert
Partai lay wih dn vehi I ry parol Nens ar

Thee, we may soe far or you a yor expanse
You donot ask frase ams bac, wo ay pec of
Thom ae ne aloe

1, How you can get the vohel Bac if we tako I we
ropostess the vl In any stuaons, he lav gs
Youth ight yt pat back Wow you what you
Fave fo do gal th vei back.

{Wo vl sl the vehicle it you do not got back. you

* doat o what ogited ogo he shi back, wo wt
fal tho voll Wo Wil won you a ween nto of ale
alr ain i vehi,

 

 

terpenes fo ho aman you one, Aled oxpanaes are
‘xpances wo py a0 a el roi of tan te vel,
tang propering Ireland ang sto at
‘le, Airy foes ea court cnt the a pore are
‘to alowed xgense. Hany mony at (eg), we
‘pay ht yu ules tho rqukos us to pay i To
Semone asa mony fom taco ne enough ay
‘hemcun you owe, yous poy herel ous nee he
law pros oerwss yous ot ny Maman won
weask, wom hare youre ataralénotenceadng
the hghost ate ul you pa.

(& What we may do about optional Insurance, mnt:
haneo, sere, er other contract. The contac may
ontaln ehages for spon svneea, mallrance,
eric, ea ort demand at yu py a
Youowbal nor weropossos fa yh, wemney cll
rns under tea coniacte and canst om bn
‘ond of unearned charges to rede wha you oe or
‘ep e vice votes fla ian cau Kis
rlseana, damage, ot soln, we may cm benef
Unda ea contact ard cane emo cba lands

een wa ou ove.

 

uy physica darsage ference, we may a
 

OGRE aa sas
oa ;
Beaeatueuoama
Srecutier atnpae
feces acer
Sereneeatee

     

le

   

et eu
crip hh in Deg
Yarranios of merchanoity or: ¥en or
‘k” What heppane fe cetired inurancs, mate. _._ Perle purpose. fot

‘ance sees, oF char const ehegos ta = Gul. The intrmalah jou es of
rand stan, manasa, sorven adovtom tertsrenee span haliesnat
he cones ches, we ay et fe ind

  

  

       
      

Information on the window form yf
1 tom inate. onary provislone Inthe contacto ale
4. IFYOU PAY LATE{OR BREAKYOUR OTHER PROMISES eae meet era roms,
 feekeainiwnicteany a eumman snot orm dotavertale pre sot tee ga:
‘ecelvedn ful within § doy ator Hi ut, youl rte del presente conta. La Iformacin
piyalntecharge f%0% ofthe part aft poymant——_ Pa lr ‘san oe
tla to pamont cre rncerge TSS. Aecoanes Gasol en conto conteiae coal ste

  

pamen' orl chage does ot cue your SED
Ilo ayes oc mean ha you may Keep mangle YOM
Payments. : ‘Apllsbie Lav Fodor law and Manan aw opi
‘hi congact. This coirac shal be subject fo th Cred
Grantor ied End Creat Provane fxbtte footie {
‘2b Conmorl Law Aree ct he Maryan God.

NOTICE TO BUYER(S) OF NEW VEHICLES: F_YOU ARE PURCHASING A NEW VEKICLE Winch 18 SuesECT To

WANUPACTURER'S EXPRESS WARRANTY AND THE VEHICLE DOES WOT CONFORM TO THAT WARRANTY DureNG oie

 

  

ETICE: ANY HOLDER OF TH CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT 18 GUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES wnicn |
{THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS OR SEAVICES OBTANEO PuNgoANr Weary ok
TIIURHE PROCEEDS HEREOR. RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY THE DEBTOR SHALL NOT EXCEED aMCUNTS eno oo
‘THE DEBTOR HEREUNDER, |

Tre preceding NOTICE woos only the "parent ary or housek bo nthe Pinay Use fr Wish Purchase econ
Stree act taco! thr casa, Bue wi tase apa ay begun Noe er eens ole contest
‘ls delenss to Buyer er ay hiv again Sta or apna he mandacuor ele vena satnrse each
‘ders eons

 

 

& APX.8 -