Title: Com. v. Way

State: pennsylvania

Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Document:

342 Pa. Superior Ct. 341 (1985) 492 A.2d 1151 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Raymond Earl WAY, Appellant (Two Cases). Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued March 18, 1985. Filed May 17, 1985. *343 Theodore Simon, Philadelphia, for appellant. Charles Gutherie, Assistant District Attorney, Reading, for Com., appellee. Before OLSZEWSKI, MONTGOMERY and LEDERER[*], JJ. OLSZEWSKI, Judge: Appellant challenges the order entered December 30, 1983 and the judgment of sentence entered November 30, 1983. By this appeal, he seeks to withdraw pleas of guilty entered on counts of possession with intent to deliver marijuana, hashish and methamphetamine. Appellant argues that the pleas are the poisoned fruit of an illegal search. The matter comes before us couched as a question of assistance of counsel. Appellant asks us to decide that he was denied effective assistance by trial counsel's failure to move for suppression of physical evidence obtained in that allegedly illegal search. For the reasons below we agree. We therefore vacate the judgment of sentence and reverse the order denying appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. *344 The facts of this case are succinctly stated in the lower court's opinion: The issue was preserved for appeal by counsel representing appellant after entry of his guilty pleas. That counsel, citing trial counsel's ineffectiveness, filed a petition to withdraw appellant's pleas. See Commonwealth v. Dancer, 460 Pa. 95, 331 A.2d 435 (1975) (trial counsel's ineffectiveness must be raised at earliest opportunity where defendant is not represented by same counsel). To reach the question of effectiveness, we must first determine whether the physical evidence was seized in violation of appellant's rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Appellant contends that the search was conducted pursuant to an invalid warrant. Specifically, he alleges that there were "insufficient facts within the affidavit to believe that contraband was located on the premises to be searched." The probable cause portion of the affidavit provided: "It is well settled that for a search warrant to be constitutionally valid, the issuing authority must decide that probable cause exists at the time of its issuance." Commonwealth v. Stamps, 493 Pa. 530, 535, 427 A.2d 141, 143 (1980). The determination of probable cause must be based on facts described within the four corners of the supporting *347 affidavit. See Commonwealth v. Simmons, 450 Pa. 624, 626, 301 A.2d 819, 820 (1973); Pa.R.Crim.P., Rule 2003(a), 42 Pa.C.S.A. Within the four corners of the affidavit, we fail to find sufficient facts to permit an issuing authority reasonably to conclude that there was contraband at the premises to be searched. The facts fairly summarized are that the informant arranged a drug transaction by phone. The alleged transaction occurred in a blue van along a country road. After the alleged transaction, police followed the blue van to a driveway of a property at the corner of Douglas Dr. and Glendale Rd. The informant identified appellant as the driver of the blue van. A police source told the affiant that appellant lived at the intersection of Douglas Dr. and Glendale Rd. The affidavit did not contain sufficient facts to believe that drugs would be found on the premises to be searched. Probable cause to believe that a man has committed a crime does not necessarily give rise to probable cause to search his home. The instant case is controlled by this court's decision in Commonwealth v. Kline, 234 Pa.Super. 12, 335 A.2d 361 (1975). There Judge Spaeth, writing for the majority, affirmed an order suppressing evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant. The court reasoned that, even though the affidavit contained facts sufficient to establish an individual was dealing in drugs, it failed to establish that the individual kept the drugs in his apartment. In Kline, the informants stated "they (had) asked him for some L.S.D. and he went to his apartment at 9th and Robinson and returned a few minutes later with two `hits' of `blotter acid' (L.S.D. on small pieces of paper)." 234 Pa.Super. at 14, 335 A.2d at 362. The Kline court considered that statement: 234 Pa.Super. at 17, 335 A.2d at 364. The Court continued: Id. In the case at bar, the lack of a substantial nexus between the street crime and the premises to be searched renders the warrant facially invalid. We distinguish this case from Commonwealth v. Frye, 242 Pa.Super. 144, 363 A.2d 1201 (1976). In Frye, the confidential informant told police that he had seen Frye sell a kilo of marijuana to a third party. Frye had told the third party "if he needed anymore, to call him (Frye) after 10:30 P.M., 2-22-75 and no later than 1:30 A.M., 2-23-75 because this would be the best hours to catch him at home because he would be out taking care of business." Id., 242 Pa.Superior Ct. at 146, 363 A.2d at 1203. The Frye court acknowledged Kline but distinguished it. Judge Cercone, for the majority wrote "the nexus between the evidence to be seized and the place to be searched was provided by Frye's admission that he was conducting at least part of his unlawful operations from his home." Id., 242 Pa.Superior Ct. at 149, 363 A.2d at 1204. In the instant case, the mere recitation of a phone number ("215 3670372") absent even an averment to tie the number to the premises to be searched falls far short of the nexus required under Kline and Frye. The lower court conditioned withdrawal of the guilty pleas on a finding of no probable cause. Concluding that a clear nexus existed, that court denied appellant's motion to *349 withdraw his guilty pleas. For the reasons above, we find that the nexus was not established. The search conducted pursuant to an invalid warrant, we order the evidence seized as a result of the search suppressed. We vacate the judgment of sentence and allow appellant to withdraw his pleas. Case remanded for proceedings consistent with his opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished. [*] Judge William J. Lederer, Senior Judge, of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, is sitting by designation.