Title: GRANT v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

GRANT v. STATE2004 WY 4588 P.3d 1016Case Number: 02-217Decided: 04/27/2004
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                            

 

DELROY 
M. GRANT,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Tina N. 
Kerin, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel, Cheyenne, Wyoming.  Argument by Ms. 
Kerin.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Daniel M. Fetsco, Assistant 
Attorney General, Cheyenne, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Fetsco.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]           
Delroy 
M. Grant (appellant) entered a conditional plea of no contest to a charge of 
felony possession of marijuana, reserving the right to appeal the district 
court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop 
on Interstate 80 in Laramie County.  
Appellant claims he was illegally seized when a highway patrol officer 
ordered appellant, a passenger in and owner of the vehicle stopped, to exit the 
vehicle during the stop.  Appellant 
also claims he did not consent to the search of his vehicle and, even if he did, 
the consent was not voluntary.  We 
affirm.

 

 

ISSUE

 

 

[¶2]           
Appellant 
and the State agree on one issue:

 

Whether 
the trial court erred in failing to suppress the evidence obtained from the 
illegal seizure of appellant's person and search of appellant's 
vehicle?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]           
At 
3:44 p.m. on December 20, 2001, Wyoming Highway Patrol Trooper Benjamin Peech 
stopped an eastbound van on Interstate 80 in Laramie County for speeding 91 in a 
75 mile per hour zone. The van bore expired Wisconsin license plates and a 
Minnesota temporary registration.  
The van was driven by Miles Warren.  
Appellant, the owner of the van, was a passenger in the van at the time 
of the stop.  Claudia Brown, 
appellant's sister, occupied the front passenger seat.   

 

[¶4]           
Upon 
approaching the van, Trooper Peech asked Warren for his driver's license, for 
proof of insurance, and for the vehicle registration.   After Warren handed over some 
paperwork, Trooper Peech asked Warren to come back to the patrol car while the 
trooper issued a speeding citation.  
A close examination of Warren's Minnesota driver's license revealed that 
the license had been altered:  the 
top right hand corner had been cut off.  
Trooper Peech testified that, in his experience, such an alteration of a 
driver's license might indicate that the license had been voided.  Trooper Peech further testified that the 
National Law Enforcement Telecommunication System was not working that day, so 
he asked dispatch to contact the Minnesota State Patrol to check the status of 
Warren's driver's license.  Trooper 
Peech also reviewed the paperwork that indicated appellant was the owner of the 
van.  Within ten minutes of making 
the traffic stop, Trooper Peech called for the canine patrol unit.  

 

[¶5]           
While 
waiting for a response from dispatch regarding the status of Warren's Minnesota 
driver's license, Trooper Peech walked back to the van to speak with 
appellant.  The trooper wanted to 
confirm the owner of the vehicle was, in fact, appellant and that appellant was 
in the vehicle.  Trooper Peech asked 
appellant to step out of the vehicle, and appellant did so.  Appellant confirmed he was the owner of 
the vehicle and handed the trooper a Minnesota driver's license.  As the trooper verified the driver's 
license against the vehicle paperwork, the trooper spoke with appellant about 
the group's travel itinerary.  Upon 
completing that conversation, appellant stepped back into the van.  Trooper Peech then spoke with the female 
passenger, Ms. Brown.  After 
completing that conversation, Trooper Peech returned to his patrol car. 

 

[¶6]           
At 
4:06 p.m., dispatch informed Trooper Peech that Warren's driver's license had 
been revoked.  Trooper Peech then 
explained to Warren he would be cited for driving under suspension.  As Trooper Peech was completing the 
process of issuing a citation to Warren, Trooper David Chatfield arrived with 
his canine unit at 4:11 p.m. 

 

[¶7]           
Trooper 
Chatfield approached the van, asked appellant and Ms. Brown to step out of the 
van, and advised them that he was going to have his dog perform a sniff of the 
perimeter of the vehicle. According to Trooper Chatfield's testimony, as the two 
passengers (appellant and Ms. Brown) stepped out of the van, they stated that 
Chatfield could "go ahead and search the whole vehicle if you want."  Trooper Chatfield subsequently confirmed 
appellant was the owner of the van, and, according to Chatfield, appellant 
consented to Chatfield and his dog entering the vehicle.  Trooper Chatfield testified that 
appellant volunteered his consent before Chatfield asked for the same.  

 

[¶8]           
After 
leading the dog around the van twice, Trooper Chatfield allowed the dog to enter 
the van through the front passenger door.  
When the dog entered the van, Trooper Chatfield tried to open the van's 
sliding side door to observe the dog.  
When the trooper was unable to open the door, appellant assisted in 
opening it.    The drug 
dog subsequently twice "alerted," indicating there were drugs in the van.  Trooper Chatfield then informed the 
occupants that the dog had alerted and that Trooper Chatfield was going to 
search the van.  Trooper Peech 
joined the search, and the officers discovered marijuana in the frame rails of 
the van.  The vehicle was then 
impounded, and law enforcement eventually seized forty-two pounds of marijuana 
from the van.  

 

[¶9]           
Appellant 
was initially charged with two crimes:  
possession of marijuana with intent to deliver and conspiracy to possess 
marijuana with intent to deliver.  
After the public defender was appointed to represent appellant, he filed 
a motion to suppress the marijuana.  
The district court held a hearing and later denied appellant's 
motion.  Thereafter, pursuant to a 
plea agreement, appellant pled no contest to one count of felony possession of 
marijuana.   In accord with 
W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2), appellant reserved the right to appeal the denial of the 
motion to suppress.  The district 
court sentenced appellant to two to five years in prison.  

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶10]      Our 
standard of review is:

 

Findings 
on factual issues made by the district court considering a motion to suppress 
are not disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous.  Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 
218 (Wyo.1994).  Since the district 
court conducts the hearing on the motion to suppress and has the opportunity to 
assess the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make the 
necessary inferences, deductions, and conclusions, evidence is viewed in the 
light most favorable to the district court's determination.  Id. The issue of law, whether an 
unreasonable search or seizure has occurred in violation of constitutional 
rights, is reviewed de novo.  
Id.; Brown v. State, 944 P.2d 1168, 1170-71 
(Wyo.1997).

 

McChesney 
v. State, 
988 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Wyo. 1999).

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶11]      
Appellant 
divides his one issue into three distinct arguments.  First, he contends Trooper Peech had no 
reason to require appellant to exit the vehicle and the trooper therefore 
illegally seized appellant.  Second, 
appellant asserts he did not give consent to search the van.  Finally, appellant contends that, even 
if he did consent to the search of the van, such consent was not given 
voluntarily.   

 

 

A.  Requiring Appellant to Exit the 
Vehicle

 

[¶12]      
Appellant 
argues that Trooper Peech committed an unlawful seizure when he ordered 
appellant to exit the van for questioning.1  Appellant contends that Trooper Peech 
was required to have either a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or an 
articulable officer safety justification before he could order appellant, a 
passenger, to exit the vehicle.  The 
State responds that the law does not require such a reasonable suspicion and 
that, when Trooper Peech questioned appellant, the trooper was acting reasonably 
in confirming ownership of the van.  
We reject appellant's argument.

 

[¶13]      
In 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 n.6, 98 S. Ct. 330, 333 n.6, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1977), the United States Supreme Court held that "once a motor 
vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police officers 
may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth 
Amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures."  In Maryland 
v. Wilson, 
519 U.S. 408, 117 S. Ct. 882, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1997), the Court was presented with 
the question whether the rule from Pennsylvania v. Mimms should be 
extended to passengers as well.  
After finding that "the same weighty interest in officer safety is 
present regardless of whether the occupant of the stopped car is a driver or 
passenger," id. at 413, 117 S. Ct.  at 885, the Court held that the rule of 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms should be extended to passengers.  Id. at 415, 117 S. Ct.  at 
886.  See Fender v. 
State, 2003 WY 96, ¶16, 74 P.3d 1220, ¶16 (Wyo. 2003) ("An officer making a 
traffic stop may order passengers to get out of the car pending completion of 
the stop.'  Maryland v. 
Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415, 117 S. Ct. 882, 886, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1997)"); 
see also Houghton v. State, 956 P.2d 363, 372 (Wyo. 1998), 
rev'd, 526 U.S. 295, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 143 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1999) (Golden, J., dissenting) ("It is reasonable for a law officer as a 
matter of course to order the passengers of a lawfully stopped motor vehicle to 
exit the vehicle.  Maryland v. 
Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S. Ct. 882, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1997)").  

 

[¶14]      While 
appellant acknowledges Maryland v. Wilson, he contends its reasoning 
requires that, before an officer can lawfully order a passenger to exit a 
vehicle, the officer must have either a reasonable suspicion the passenger was 
involved in some criminal activity or the officer must have an articulable 
officer safety justification.  
Building on that interpretation, appellant asserts that Trooper Peech had 
neither of the prerequisites and, therefore, the trooper illegally seized 
appellant when the trooper ordered appellant out of the van to conduct what 
appellant characterizes as a "fishing expedition." 

 

[¶15]      First, 
contrary to appellant's characterization, Trooper Peech, in questioning 
appellant, was confirming ownership of the van.  In fact, the district court indicated 
that, under the circumstances (some question about vehicle ownership), 
appellant's rights were not violated when the trooper questioned appellant in 
order to "verify the vehicle."   
Appellant makes no specific challenge on this issue, nor does he provides 
us with authority suggesting that Trooper Peech acted unlawfully in questioning 
appellant about vehicle ownership.  
See Burgos-Seberos v. State, 969 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Wyo. 
1998) ("Generally, the driver must be allowed to proceed without further delay 
once the officer determines that the driver has a valid license and is entitled 
to operate the vehicle.")  
Therefore, without a specific challenge supported by authority, we will 
not discuss this issue further.

 

[¶16]      
Second, 
our close reading of Maryland v. Wilson leads us to the conclusion that 
the Supreme Court established a bright line rule that allows an officer, during 
a lawful traffic stop, to order passengers out of a vehicle as a matter of 
course.  In a footnote in the 
majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote:

            
Respondent argues that, because we have generally eschewed bright-line 
rules in the Fourth Amendment context . . ., we should not here 
conclude that passengers may constitutionally be ordered out of lawfully stopped 
vehicles.  But, that we typically 
avoid per se rules concerning searches and seizures does not mean that we 
have always done so; Mimms itself drew a bright line, and we believe the 
principles that underlay that decision apply to passengers as well.  

 

Maryland 
v. Wilson, 
519 U.S.  at 413 n.1, 117 S. Ct.  at 885 n.1.  
To further support the proposition that Maryland v. Wilson 
established a bright line rule, one need only look at the dissenting opinions 
from Justices Stevens and Kennedy.  
In those opinions, both justices challenged the bright line rule approach 
taken by the majority, an approach that, as stated by Justice Stevens, "applies 
equally to traffic stops in which there is not even a scintilla of evidence of 
any potential risk to the  police 
officer."  Id. at 416, 117 S. Ct.  at 887.  In addition, it 
should be noted that the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted 
Maryland v. Wilson to encompass a bright line rule that does not require 
a particularized suspicion of danger to the officer.  United 
States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1222 (10th Cir. 2001) ("An officer also may order the driver and 
passengers out of the vehicle in the interest of officer safety, even in the 
absence of any particularized suspicion of personal danger.  Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 
415, 117 S. Ct. 882, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1997).").  We 
thus conclude that appellant's constitutional rights were not violated when 
Trooper Peech ordered appellant to exit the van.

 

 

B.  Consent to 
Search

 

[¶17]      
Appellant 
also claims he did not give his consent to Trooper Chatfield to search his 
vehicle.  Alternatively, he argues 
that, even if he did give consent, the consent was not voluntary.  We reject both contentions.  

 

[¶18]      "The 
existence and voluntariness of a consent to search is a question of fact to be 
decided by the trial judge in the light of all attendant circumstances."  Stamper v. State, 662 P.2d 82, 87 
(Wyo. 1983); Parkhurst v. State, 628 P.2d 1369, 1378 (Wyo. 1981); 
Mares v. State, 500 P.2d 530, 534 n.1 (Wyo. 1972).  At the district court's hearing on the 
motion to suppress, Trooper Chatfield testified that appellant consented to the 
search.  Appellant also testified at 
that hearing, and he denied having consented to the search.  In addition to hearing this testimony, 
the district court reviewed the videotape from two highway patrol units.  Although the videotape did not include 
audio of the conversation between Trooper Chatfield, appellant, and Ms. Brown, 
it did capture appellant assisting Trooper Chatfield in opening the van's 
sliding door.  After a review of the 
testimony and the video, the district court made its finding on the record that 
"the circumstantial evidence supports Officer Chatfield's evidence and testimony 
that there was actual consent, and I so find."  

 

[¶19]      Appellant 
contends the district court's ruling is erroneous.  He first points out that the district 
court made no finding that appellant was not credible.  Appellant next asserts that the only 
articulated evidence for accepting the trooper's word over appellant's was the 
fact that appellant assisted in opening of the van door.  Because appellant opened the van door 
after the dog was already in the vehicle, appellant claims his assistance was of 
no moment in determining whether there was actual consent.  In sum, appellant contends the district 
court simply sided with law enforcement.  

 

[¶20]      In 
analyzing appellant's argument, we must view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the district court's determination.  Here, given Trooper Chatfield's 
testimony, there is obviously sufficient evidence to support the district 
court's determination.  As for the 
argument that the opening of the van door is irrelevant, we disagree.  The district court was free to find this 
to be circumstantial evidence, under the totality of the circumstances, to 
support the trooper's testimony.  
While it is true, according to Trooper Chatfield, that appellant had 
already given his consent to search when he assisted with the van door, the 
district court could rely on that assistance in determining whether there was 
actual consent.  In other words, the 
district court was free to believe that, if appellant had in fact consented to 
the search, it would be more likely that appellant would assist Trooper 
Chatfield with the search by opening the door.  We find no clear error in the district 
court's determination that appellant gave his consent to search the 
vehicle.  

 

[¶21]      
Appellant 
also argues that his consent was not voluntarily given.  He points to the following: (1) it was a 
cold and windy day, appellant was ordered out of the van twice, and he was 
wearing only jeans and a t-shirt; (2) appellant did not believe he could refuse 
the troopers' requests; and (3) he did not believe he was free to leave or walk 
away.

 

[¶22]      
In 
reviewing this issue, we have applied the following standards: 

 

In 
determining whether a warrantless search was justified by a valid consent, we 
inquire "into the voluntariness' of the consent in light of the totality of 
the circumstances'" of the particular case.  Amin v. State, 695 P.2d 1021, 
1024 (Wyo.1985).  See also 
[United States v.] Elliott, 107 F.3d [810] at 813-14 
[(10th Cir. 1997)].   
Some of the factors that a court may consider in determining whether the 
consent was voluntary include:  the 
way the law enforcement officer phrased the request for permission to search; 
whether the officer told the individual that he could refuse the request; and 
the presence of other coercive factors.  
Stamper v. State, 662 P.2d 82, 87 (Wyo. 1983).  We must consider all the circumstances 
surrounding the encounter to determine whether a reasonable person would have 
felt "free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the 
encounter."  [Florida v.] 
Bostick, 501 U.S. [429] at 436, 111 S. Ct. 2382 [115 L. Ed. 2d 389 
(1991)].   See also 
[United States v.] Sandoval, 29 F.3d [537] at 540 [(10th Cir. 1994)].   No single factor is determinative 
when we are ascertaining whether a seizure occurred.  Sandoval, 29 F.3d  at 
540.

 

Burgos-Seberos, 
969 P.2d  at 1134.  "The question of 
whether consent to search was voluntary is one of fact to be determined in light 
of all the circumstances."  Nixon 
v. State, 2001 WY 15, ¶16, 18 P.3d 631, ¶16 (Wyo. 
2001).

 

[¶23]      
Appellant 
emphasizes that he did not believe he could refuse any of the troopers' 
requests.  However,  "[w]hile knowledge of the right to 
refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account [in determining whether 
consent was voluntary], the government need not establish such knowledge as the 
sine qua non of an effective consent."  Parkhurst, 628 P.2d  at 1376-77 
(quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 
2045, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 859 (1973)).  
Moreover, in Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39-40, 117 S. Ct. 417, 
421, 136 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1996), the Supreme Court held that officers are not 
required to advise a lawfully detained motorist of the right to refuse to 
consent to an automobile search.  
Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 482 n.2 (Wyo. 1999).  Thus, appellant's lack of knowledge of 
his right to refuse to consent, although a factor to be considered, is not a 
controlling factor.  

 

[¶24]      
After 
a review of the record, we will uphold the district court's finding that consent 
was voluntarily given.  There are a 
number of factors that support the district court's finding.  First, Trooper Chatfield testified that 
he never threatened appellant in any way and that appellant essentially 
volunteered consent.  Second, it is 
clear that appellant was not handcuffed or otherwise restrained when he gave 
consent to the search.  In addition, 
contrary to appellant's assertion, it appears from the videotape that appellant 
was wearing a winter jacket.  It 
also appears from the videotape and from the officer's testimony that appellant 
was cooperative with the officers.  
Although the officers never informed appellant that he could refuse to 
consent to the search, that factor is not controlling.  Regardless, even weighing that factor in 
appellant's favor, it cannot be said the district court erred in concluding 
that, under the totality of the circumstances, the consent was voluntarily 
given.        

 

[¶25]      Affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1Appellant makes no claim that the Wyoming Constitution affords him more 
protection in this, or any other, particular area of search and seizure 
jurisprudence.  Therefore, our 
discussion is limited to federal constitutional principles.  Wilson, 874 P.2d  at 219; 
Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 484 (Wyo. 1999); Fender v. State, 
2003 WY 96, ¶12, 74 P.3d 1220, ¶12 (Wyo. 2003).