Title: JOSE LOREDO and YOLANDA LOREDO, and ALEXANDER LOREDO, a minor, by and through his next friend, YOLANDA LOREDO V. SOLVAY AMERICA, INC., a Delaware corporation; JOSE LOREDO and YOLANDA LOREDO, and ALEXANDER LOREDO, a minor, by and through his next friend, YOLANDA LOREDO V. GILBERT A. PACHECO; JOSE LOREDO and YOLAND LOREDO, and ALEXANDER LOREDO, a minor, by and through his next friend, YOLANDA LOREDO V. JOY TECHNOLOGIES, INC., a Delaware corporation

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JOSE LOREDO and YOLANDA LOREDO, and ALEXANDER LOREDO, a minor, by and through his next friend, YOLANDA LOREDO V. SOLVAY AMERICA, INC., a Delaware corporation; JOSE LOREDO and YOLANDA LOREDO, and ALEXANDER LOREDO, a minor, by and through his next friend, YOLANDA LOREDO V. GILBERT A. PACHECO; JOSE LOREDO and YOLAND LOREDO, and ALEXANDER LOREDO, a minor, by and through his next friend, YOLANDA LOREDO V. JOY TECHNOLOGIES, INC., a Delaware corporation2009 WY 93212 P.3d 614Case Number: S-08-0030, S-08-0031, S-08-003Decided: 07/28/2009Modified: 08/06/2009
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
JOSE 
LOREDO and YOLANDA LOREDO, and ALEXANDER LOREDO, a minor, by and through his 
next friend, YOLANDA 
LOREDO,Appellants(Plaintiffs),v.SOLVAY AMERICA, 
INC., a Delaware corporation,Appellee(Defendant)., JOSE LOREDO 
and YOLANDA LOREDO, and ALEXANDER LOREDO, a minor, by and through his next 
friend, YOLANDA 
LOREDO,Appellants(Plaintiffs),v.GILBERT A. 
PACHECO,Appellee(Defendant)., JOSE LOREDO and YOLAND LOREDO, and 
ALEXANDER LOREDO, a minor, by and through his next friend, YOLANDA 
LOREDO,Appellants(Plaintiffs),v.JOY TECHNOLOGIES, 
INC., a Delaware 
corporation,Appellee(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Sweetwater County

The 
Honorable Jere A. Ryckman, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellants:

P. 
Richard Meyer and Pamela T. Harvey, of Meyer & Williams, P.C.; and Heather 
Noble; Jackson, Wyoming.  Argument 
by Mr. Meyer.

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

Joe 
M. Tieg, Paula A. Fleck, and Susan L. Lyndrup of Holland & Hart, LLP, 
Jackson, Wyoming, for Appellees Solvay America, Inc. and Gilbert Pacheco; and 
Richard A. Mincer, Richard G. Schneebeck, and Lindsay A. Woznick of Hirst 
Applegate, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming, for Appellee Joy Technologies, Inc.  Argument by Messrs. Tieg and 
Mincer.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      In this appeal, 
we are called upon to consider three interrelated aspects of this case.  All three matters arise out of the same 
set of factual circumstances which, in brief, are that Jose Loredo was seriously 
injured on August 14, 2002, when tons of rock fell on him in a Sweetwater County 
trona mine.  At the time of the 
incident, Loredo was operating a roof bolting machine manufactured by Joy 
Technologies, Inc.  Such a machine 
is used to secure the roof/top of the mine so that miners would not be subjected 
to potential injury from falling rock as the mine shaft work-areas 
progressed.  During his work effort, 
the roof of the mine did collapse in the area in which he was operating (an area 
where the mine roof had not yet been bolted), and Loredo was rendered a 
quadriplegic by the injuries he suffered.

 
 
[¶2]      In Case No. 
S-08-0030, Appellants, Jose Loredo, Yolanda Loredo (wife of Jose) and Alexander 
Loredo (Jose's minor child) (collectively, Loredo), seek review of an order of 
the district court that granted summary judgment dismissing Loredo's claims 
against Solvay America, Inc. (Solvay America), the parent company of Jose 
Loredo's immediate employer, Solvay Chemicals, Inc. (Solvay Chemicals).1  The essence of Loredo's claim against 
Solvay America was that it exercised such a significant degree of control over 
safety at its subsidiary, Solvay Chemicals, as to be responsible for the lack of 
adequate safety in the trona mine.

 
 
[¶3]      In Case No. 
S-08-0031, Loredo seeks review of an order of the district court which granted 
summary judgment to his co-employee/supervisor, Gilbert Pacheco (Pacheco).  Loredo contended that Pacheco's 
supervision (or lack thereof) of safety at the work site just prior to the 
accident was willful, wanton and reckless (intentional) and ultimately led to 
Loredo's disabling injuries.

 
 
[¶4]      In Case No. 
S-08-0032, Loredo seeks review of an order of the district court granting 
summary judgment in favor of Joy Technologies, Inc. (Joy Technologies), the 
manufacturer of the piece of equipment that Loredo was using at the time of his 
injuries.  Loredo raised claims of 
product liability and negligent design against Joy Technologies.  These claims focused on the failure of 
Joy Technologies to equip the roof bolter with a protective canopy so as to 
eliminate or reduce the possibility of serious injury from falling rock, such as 
that which occurred in this case.

 
 
[¶5]      We will 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶6]      In Case No. 
S-08-0030, Loredo articulates this issue:

 
 
Did 
the district court err in granting summary judgment dismissing [Loredo's] 
personal injury and loss of consortium claims against Solvay America, Inc., the 
parent company of  Loredo's employer?

 
 
Solvay 
America responds thus:

 
 
            
Did Solvay America exercise sufficient control over the roof bolting 
operations of Solvay Chemicals such that it assumed a legal duty of care 
towardsLoredo, an employee of Solvay Chemicals?

 
 
In 
his reply brief, Loredo asserts that Solvay America broached these additional 
issues in its brief:

 
 
1.  Does 
a genuine issue of material fact exist as to whether Solvay America, Inc. 
exercised sufficient control over relevant safety issues at the mine operated by 
its corporate subsidiary, Solvay Chemicals, Inc. so that summary judgment for 
Solvay America must be denied?

 
 
2.  Does 
W.R.E. 407 bar considering evidence of Solvay America's involvement in 
subsequent remedial measures such as the purchase of new roof bolting machines 
equipped with canopies to show Solvay America's control over such 
decisions?

 
 
3.  Should 
this Court reach the issue of whether [Loredo's] expert's opinion is admissible 
when the district court did not rule on this issue, and the issue is not 
necessary in reviewing the district court's grant of summary 
judgment?

 
 
In 
Case No. S-08-0031, Loredo raises this issue:

 
 
            
Whether the district [court] erred in granting summary judgment 
dismissing Loredo's claim against his co-employee supervisor, Gilbert 
Pacheco.

 
 
Pacheco 
restates the issue like this:

 
 
            
Did the district court correctly hold that [Loredo] failed to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Pacheco intentionally or willfully 
and wantonly acted to cause Loredo harm or injury?

 
 
In 
his reply brief, Loredo asserts that Pacheco broached these additional issues in 
his brief:

 
 
1.  Should 
this Court disregard much of the evidence in [Pacheco's] Brief as improper under 
the standard of review applicable when reviewing a grant of summary 
judgment?

 
 
2.  How 
does this Court's recent decision in Hannifan v. American National Bank of 
Cheyenne, 2008 WY 65, 185 P.3d 679 (Wyo. 2008) impact this 
case?

 
 
3.  Is 
a co-employee defendant's violation of company policy, or the co-employee's 
absence from the scene prior to the accident, relevant in determining whether 
that co-employee acted in reckless disregard of the 
consequences?

 
 
4.  Under 
all the circumstances of this case, including that [Loredo's] co-employee 
supervisor knew that [Loredo] was not protected from rock fall by any canopy, 
knew that [Loredo] was operating his roof bolting machine in an area of the mine 
with unstable roof conditions, and knew that [Loredo] was having difficulties 
with the steering mechanism of his machine, but the supervisor failed to take 
any action, does a genuine issue of material fact exist as to whether [Pacheco] 
acted with willful and wanton misconduct, as that term is interpreted by Wyoming 
law?

 
 
In 
Case No. S-08-0032, Loredo raises these issues:

 
 
1.  When 
Loredo was severely injured in an underground trona mine by rock falling from 
the roof while [he] was operating a roof bolting machine designed and sold by 
Joy Technologies, Inc. that lacked a canopy to protect the operator from falling 
rocks, did the district court err in granting summary judgment dismissing 
[Loredo's] product liability and negligent design claims against Joy on the 
basis that [Loredo] was not injured by Joy's product?

 
 
2.  On 
the record in this case, could the district court have granted [Joy 
Technologies] summary judgment on the ground that the roof bolting machine was 
not unreasonably dangerous?

 
 
3.  On 
the record in this case, was a genuine issue of material fact presented as to 
whether the risk posed by [Joy Technologies'] roof bolting machine was open and 
obvious?

 
 
4.  Was 
[Joy Technologies] under a non-delegable duty to install safety features such as 
a canopy to protect miners from falling rock on its roof bolting 
machine?

 
 
Joy 
Technologies, Inc. responds with this terse capsule of the 
issues:

 
 
            
Is summary judgment in a products liability case appropriate where the 
undisputed facts show the product is not unreasonably 
dangerous?

 
 
 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
General 
Overview

 
 
[¶7]      The instant 
proceedings were initiated in the district court on October 17, 2005.  Loredo was employed by Solvay 
Chemicals.  Solvay America is the 
parent corporation of Solvay Chemicals, Inc.  As articulated by Solvay America's Chief 
Financial Officer:

 
 
            
Solvay America is a holding company that does not engage in business in 
its own name.  Instead, [it] 
administers, on behalf of its subsidiaries, certain company-wide functions, 
including benefits plans, national contracts, travel, use of the Solvay 
corporate logos, taxation, treasury, insurance, auditing, and health, safety and 
environmental reviews for manufacturing plants and other facilities. 
[Id.]

 
 
[¶8]      On the day of his 
injuries, August 14, 2002, Loredo was operating a "bolting machine," as he had 
done for many years.  The bolting 
machine was manufactured by Joy Technologies.  A roof bolter is a piece of mobile 
equipment used to install bolts in an underground mine to secure the roof of the 
mine and prevent collapse after ore is extracted by the mining process.  On August 9, 2002, the machine Loredo 
was using on the day of his injury had undergone repairs.  The bolting machine did not have a 
protective canopy to guard its users from falling rock and 
debris.

 
 
[¶9]      Loredo was 
injured when a slab of rock from an unbolted portion of the roof of the mine 
fell on him.  Loredo began his work 
shift on August 14, 2002, at 6:00 a.m., and the incident at issue here occurred 
at about 2:45 p.m.  Pacheco was 
Loredo's immediate supervisor that day.  
As Loredo was moving his roof bolter from one area of the mine to 
another, he noticed that the left tram of the vehicle was not spinning at the 
same speed as the right tram, making the machine difficult to steer.  Loredo detected it to be a hydraulic 
problem.  By adjusting the speed of 
one of the trams, to a different speed than the other, he was able to keep it 
running straight.  In addition to 
the steering difficulties, Loredo's path of progress was impeded by other 
operations and he drove his machine in reverse for a distance, in order to get 
to his desired location.  Then, as 
he attempted to turn his machine around and get to that desired location, he got 
stuck.  Loredo got off the machine 
and spent 10-15 minutes trying to get it unstuck.  Next he got back on his machine and 
resumed his efforts to get unstuck.  
It was then that a 4 foot by 15 foot piece of slab fell from the mine 
roof and hit him on the head.  That 
chunk of rock came from a portion of the roof that had not yet been bolted into 
place.  However, Loredo did not 
realize he was in an unbolted area.  
Although Pacheco, Loredo's supervisor, knew he was having trouble with 
his machine, Loredo was told to continue working and that repairs could be made 
during "down shift."  In addition, 
Loredo had informed Pacheco on many 
occasions preceding the accident that the sequence and method of mining being 
used required him to go into areas where the mine roof was not yet bolted.  Because of that situation, Loredo had 
asked to be transferred to a different job in a different part of the mine.  Loredo testified that he knew it was 
dangerous to put himself into an area that was not yet bolted and that he should 
not do it if it could be avoided.  
Furthermore, he indicated that he did not intend to, nor did he want to 
ever place himself into an unbolted area.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Claims 
Against Solvay America

 
 
[¶10]   Our general standard of review is 
well-known:

 
 
We 
evaluate the propriety of a summary judgment by employing the same standards and 
using the same materials as the district court.  Cook v. Shoshone First Bank, 2006 WY 13, 
¶ 11, 126 P.3d 886, 889 (Wyo.2006).  
Thus, our review is plenary.  
Birt v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 
Inc., 2003 WY 102, ¶ 7, 75 P.3d 640, 647 
(Wyo.2003).

 
 
Wyo. 
R. Civ. P. 56 governs summary judgments.  
A summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  W.R.C.P. 56(c).  When reviewing a summary judgment, we 
consider the record in the perspective most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion and give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may be 
fairly drawn from the record.  We 
review questions of law de novo 
without giving any deference to the district court's determinations.  

Cathcart 
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
2005 WY 154, ¶ 11, 123 P.3d 579, 586 (Wyo.2005), quoting Baker v. Ayres and Baker Pole and Post, 
Inc., 2005 WY 97, ¶ 14, 117 P.3d 1234, 1239 
(Wyo.2005).

 
 
            
"A genuine issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if it were 
proven, would establish or refute an essential element of a cause of action or a 
defense that the parties have asserted."  
Christensen v. Carbon County, 
2004 WY 135, ¶ 8, 100 P.3d 411, 413 (Wyo.2004) (quoting Metz Beverage Co. v. Wyoming Beverages, 
Inc., 2002 WY 21, ¶ 9, 39 P.3d 1051, 1055 (Wyo.2002)).  The party requesting a summary judgment 
bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case for summary 
judgment.  If he carries his burden, 
"the party who is opposing the motion for summary judgment must present specific 
facts to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists."  Id. We have explained the duties of the 
party opposing a motion for summary judgment as follows:

 
 
  "After a movant has adequately supported 
the motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must come forward with 
competent evidence admissible at trial showing there are genuine issues of 
material fact.  The opposing party 
must affirmatively set forth material, specific facts in opposition to a motion 
for summary judgment, and cannot rely only upon allegations and pleadings ..., 
and conclusory statements or mere opinions are insufficient to satisfy the 
opposing party's burden."

 
 
The 
evidence opposing a prima facie case on a motion for summary judgment "must be 
competent and admissible, lest the rule permitting summary judgments be entirely 
eviscerated by plaintiffs proceeding to trial on the basis of mere conjecture or 
wishful speculation."   
Speculation, conjecture, the suggestion of a possibility, guesses, or 
even probability, are insufficient to establish an issue of material 
fact.

 
 

Cook, 
¶ 12, 126 P.3d  at 890, quoting Jones 
v. Schabron, 2005 WY 65, ¶¶ 9-11, 113 P.3d 34, 37 
(Wyo.2005).

 
 

Hatton 
v. Energy Elec. Co., 
2006 WY 151, ¶¶ 8-9, 148 P.3d 8, 12-13 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
[¶11]   We have articulated a standard of 
review more directly applicable to claims such as the one at issue here, in 
somewhat more detail than our usual and more general standard of 
review:

 
 
In 
support of their claim of an independent duty on the part of ARCO, Appellants 
emphasize their record presentation of certain evidence which they assert 
demonstrates genuine issues of material facts.  They point to the Wyoming Workers 
Compensation Division record showing Sharon Fiscus to be an employee of ARCO and 
that the benefits she received came from ARCO's Wyoming workers' compensation 
account.  They rely upon the fact 
that ARCO retained a fifty percent (50%) overriding royalty interest in the 
mine, and they mark the fact that the Bureau of Land Management continues to 
refer to mining leases relating to the Thunder Basin's Black Thunder Mine as 
jointly held by ARCO and Thunder Basin.  
Appellants contend that ARCO pays all taxes on the mine.  More precisely, then, they show that 
ARCO officials paid visits to the mine which would average four times a day and 
that various ARCO officials did attend safety meetings conducted by Thunder 
Basin at the mine.  They place a 
great deal of importance upon the fact that the president of Anaconda Minerals, 
another corporate subsidiary of ARCO, had sent a memorandum to Thunder Basin 
recommending the use of seat belts by the employees of Thunder Basin.  Furthermore, Appellants contend that the 
record shows that ARCO reviewed the qualifications of, and interviewed all, 
safety directors before they were hired by Thunder Basin.  There also is reliance upon the fact 
that ARCO had two representatives at the Black Thunder Mine who worked on 
Thunder Basin's training program and set policy in regard to training at the 
mine.

 
 
We 
have adopted as the legal standard for the liability of a parent corporation the 
requirement that the parent assume some independent legal duty by retaining or 
exercising control over some aspect of the operation of a subsidiary corporation 
which was involved in the incident resulting in the plaintiff's injuries.  Wessel v. Mapco, Inc., 752 P.2d 1363 
(Wyo.1988); Fiscus, 742 P.2d 198.  
Essentially, this is the same test that is invoked in considering an 
owner's liability to the employee of a contractor.  Cf. Jones v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 718 P.2d 890 (Wyo.1986); Noonan v. Texaco, 
Inc., 713 P.2d 160 (Wyo.1986).  
We have rejected any doctrine of respondeat superior resulting in 
liability on the part of a parent corporation for acts of its subsidiary.  Fiscus.  Cf. Noonan.   The parent company is entitled to 
the same legal separation from its subsidiary, as well as the resulting 
protection from liability, that any individual shareholder enjoys with respect 
to a corporation in which stock is held.  
United States v. Van Diviner, 
822 F.2d 960 (10th Cir.1987).

 
 
            
In light of the legal standard and the actual contentions of Appellants, 
we must test this case against our summary judgment standards.  The essential purpose of the summary 
judgment procedure is to eliminate the expense and burden of a formal trial when 
only questions of law are involved.  
Johnson v. Soulis, 542 P.2d 867 (Wyo.1975); Vipont Mining Company v. 
Uranium Research and Development Company, 376 P.2d 868 (Wyo.1962).  We can approve and sustain a summary 
judgment only when persuaded that there is no genuine issue with respect to any 
material fact, and that the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.  Because summary judgment 
forecloses a trial on the merits, we do not lightly consider appeals from 
summary judgment.  Larsen; Kobielusz v. Wilson, 701 P.2d 559 
(Wyo.1985).  Conversely, however, we 
recognize that the beneficial purpose of summary judgment would be defeated if 
cases could be forced to trial simply by an assertion that a genuine issue of 
material fact exists.  Noonan; Johnson; Maxted v. Pacific Car & Foundry 
Company, 527 P.2d 832 (Wyo.1974).

 
 
            
The process for identifying genuine issues of material fact also is 
familiar.  The moving party has the 
burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and 
justifying its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.  Jones Land & Livestock Company v. 
Federal Land Bank of Omaha, 733 P.2d 258 (Wyo.1987).  This is a significant burden, 
particularly when we note that we examine the record from the perspective of the 
party opposing the motion and grant to that party the benefit of every favorable 
inference and reasonable doubt.  Wessel; England v. Simmons, 728 P.2d 1137 
(Wyo.1986); Jones; Roth v. First Security Bank of Rock 
Springs, 684 P.2d 93 (Wyo.1984).  
Once that showing is presented by the moving party, however, the burden 
then shifts to the party defending against the motion to present for the record 
facts in the form of admissible evidence which structure a genuine issue of 
material fact.  Dubus v. Dresser Industries, 649 P.2d 198 (Wyo.1982); Hyatt v. Big Horn School 
District No. 4, 636 P.2d 525 (Wyo.1981); Moore v. Kiljander, 604 P.2d 204 
(Wyo.1979); Rule 56(e), W.R.C.P.

 
 
            
It does not matter how genuine a factual issue is; if it does not relate 
to a material fact, it cannot prevent the entry of a summary judgment.  Johnson, 542 P.2d 867; Gladstone Hotel, Inc. v. Smith, 487 P.2d 329 (Wyo.1971).  In Johnson, 542 P.2d  at 871-72, this court 
defined a material fact as:

 
 
" 
* * * [O]ne having some legal significance, that is, under the law applicable to 
a given case, it would control in some way the legal relations of the 
parties;  as one upon which the 
outcome of litigation depends in whole or in part; as one on which the 
controversy may be determined;  as 
one which will affect the result or outcome of the case depending upon its 
resolution;  and one which 
constitutes a part of the plaintiff's cause of action or of the defendant's 
defense.  A fair summary of these 
definitions is that for purposes of ruling upon a motion for summary judgment a 
fact is material if proof of that fact would have the effect of establishing or 
refuting one of the essential elements of a cause of action or defense asserted 
by the parties."  (Footnotes 
omitted.)

 
 
Such 
a fact must in some way control, define, or modify the legal relations of the 
parties in some tangible manner and, thus, have the clear effect of establishing 
or refuting the essential element of a claim or defense asserted by the 
parties.  Baldwin v. Dube, 751 P.2d 388 
(Wyo.1988).

 
 
            
We also are mindful of our duty to examine the evidence in the same light 
as it was presented to the trial court.  
Connaghan v. Eighty-Eight Oil, 
750 P.2d 1321 (Wyo.1988).  In so 
doing, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to appellants and, as we 
have noted, give them the benefit of every reasonable inference and every 
doubt.

 
 
            
In this context, the facts which Appellants contend the record will 
support do not directly contravene the record showing made by ARCO that it did 
not retain the right to control or exercise control over the safety aspects of 
the Black Thunder Mine, over the mining operations, or over the scraper that 
Fiscus operated at the time of her injuries.  Appellants must rely upon inferences to 
be drawn from those facts in order to structure a genuine issue of material fact 
that will avoid the summary judgment.

 
 
            
This court has adjusted its position over the years with respect to the 
reliance upon inferences to structure a genuine issue of material fact in the 
context of a summary judgment.  In 
Blackmore v. Davis Oil Co., 671 P.2d 334, 337 (Wyo.1983), the court quoted from Forbes Company v. MacNeel, 382 P.2d 56 
(Wyo.1963), and said:

 
 
" 
* * * [T]hat an inference which is contrary to direct testimony is insufficient 
to support a finding that a genuine issue of material fact exists:  * * *."

 
 
The 
court went on to say that, even if it were to assume inferences favorable to the 
appellants in that case, those inferences could not stand against uncontroverted 
testimony to the contrary.  This 
concept was applied in Reed v. Getter 
Trucking, Inc., 735 P.2d 1370 (Wyo.1987).  It also had been invoked in Spurlock v. Ely, 707 P.2d 188 
(Wyo.1985).  In Kobielusz, 701 P.2d  at 560-61, the court 
recognized the Blackmore case, but 
appeared to temper it with the following language:

 
 
" 
* * * Although we have held inferences contrary to direct testimony may not 
ordinarily support a finding, Blackmore 
v. Davis Oil Company, Wyo., 671 P.2d 334 (1983); Forbes Company v. MacNeel, Wyo., 382 P.2d 56 (1963), that determination usually depends upon the quality of evidence 
creating the inference and the direct testimony."

 
 
In 
Matter of Estate of Roosa, 753 P.2d 1028 (Wyo.1988), the court attempted to resolve any apparent conflict between Blackmore and Kobielusz, noting the following 
additional language from Kobielusz, 
701 P.2d at 562-63:

 
 
" 
A reasonable inference is as truly evidence as the matter on which it is based, 
and is not a mere presumption or guess; appropriate inferences from proved facts 
are not a low order of evidence, but are just as valid as evidence as statements 
of eye-witnesses and are to be weighed by the jury along with the other evidence 
before it and may be strong enough to outweigh positive and direct oral 
statements.  Whether or not they 
should be permitted to overcome positive and direct testimony depends, in every 
case, on the relative strength of the one or the other.'   32A C.J.S. Evidence § 
1044."

 
 
            
In Roosa, the court considered 
the concept of sequential inferences in the context of summary judgment and 
adopted the Wigmore view (1A Wigmore, Evidence§ 41 (Tiller's rev. 1983)) to the 
effect that an inference may be drawn from a fact that itself was inferred when 
the circumstances demonstrate no other reasonable theory or alternative 
inference with respect to the initial fact.  Perhaps this is simply another way of 
comparing the quality of the inferred fact with the direct testimony.  Kobielusz.

 
 

Fiscus 
v. Atlantic Richfield, 
773 P.2d 158, 160-62 (Wyo. 1989).

 
 
[¶12]   The district court issued a 
detailed decision letter which we set out below2:

 
 
The 
above-entitled case is currently before the Court on Defendant Solvay America's 
motion for summary judgment.  Solvay 
America, Inc. asserts that, as a parent corporation to Solvay Chemicals, it owes 
Plaintiff Jose Loredo no legal duty for the alleged negligence that resulted in 
his injuries.  This Court finds that 
Solvay America did not exercise control over a particular aspect of the Solvay 
Chemicals operation to such an extent that Solvay Chemicals was not entirely 
free to do the work its own way and that was involved in the incident which 
resulted in Plaintiff's injuries.  
The motion for summary judgment is granted for the following reasons: 

 
 
            
I.          
BACKGROUND 

 
 
This 
case is a personal injury case resulting from a mining accident at the Solvay 
Chemicals, Inc. trona mine near Green River, Sweetwater County, Wyoming.  On August 14, 2002, while operating the 
mine roof bolter, Jose Loredo, Plaintiff, was rendered quadriplegic when he was 
struck by a slab of rock falling from the ceiling of the mine.  Defendant, Solvay America, is the parent 
company of Solvay Chemicals.  
Defendant asserts that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, as 
it did not control an aspect of the Solvay Chemicals operation that resulted in 
Plaintiff's injury. 

 
 
            
II.         
DISCUSSION 

 
 
Defendant 
Solvay America's motion for summary judgment focuses upon a single, main 
issue.  Defendant asserts that in 
light of Fiscus v. Atlantic 
Richfield, 773 P.2d 158 (Wyo. 1989), it did not exercise control over a 
particular aspect of Solvay Chemicals that was involved in the incident which 
resulted in Plaintiff's injuries.  
The Court agrees, Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, 
and summary judgment shall be granted.

 
 
The 
immediate question before the Court is whether Solvay America owed a legal duty 
to Plaintiff for the alleged negligence that resulted in Plaintiff's 
injury.  A negligence claim is built 
by four elements: duty, breach, causation, and damages. Franks v. Indep. Prod. Co., Inc., 2004 
WY 97, ¶ 9, 96 P.3d 484, 489 (Wyo. 2004).  The question of "duty" is whether, upon 
the facts in evidence "the interest of the plaintiff which has suffered invasion 
was entitled to legal protection at the hands of the defendant."  Hatton v. Energy Elec. Co., 2006 WY 151, 
¶ 10, 148 P.3d 8, 13 (Wyo. 2006) (citations omitted).  Summary judgment would be appropriate if 
the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits on file "show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law."  
W.R.C.P. 56(c) (LexisNexis 2007).  
Defendant, the moving party, bears the burden to justify "its entitlement 
to judgment as a matter of law." Id.  An award of summary judgment is rare in 
negligence cases, Franks, ¶ 9, 
96 P.3d  at 489; however, the "surest route to summary judgment in negligence 
actions" is the failure to "establish the existence of a duty on the part of the 
defendant," Hatton, ¶ 10, 148 P.3d  at 13 (citations omitted); Krier v. 
Safeway Stores 46, Inc., 943 P.2d 405,408 (Wyo. 1997).

 
 
Defendant 
Solvay America asserts it owes no duty to Plaintiff as the parent company of 
Plaintiff's employer, Solvay Chemicals.  
The "mere fact" that Solvay America is the parent company to Solvay 
Chemicals "neither immunizes nor automatically subjects" Solvay America to a 
negligence suit.  Horowitz v. Schneider Nat'l, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 1579, 1580 (D.Wyo. 1989).  
For a parent corporation to be liable for an injury to its subsidiary's 
employee, the parent corporation must have assumed "some independent legal duty 
by retaining or exercising control over some aspect of the operation of a 
subsidiary corporation which was involved in the incident resulting in the 
plaintiff's injuries."  Fiscus, 773 P.2d  at 160.  Whether the parent corporation has 
retained the right to control is ordinarily a question "of fact for the trier of 
fact, but becomes one of law when only one reasonable inference can be 
drawn."  Noonan v. Texaco, Inc., 713 P.2d 160, 
164 (Wyo. 1986). 

 
 
In 
Fiscus v. Atlantic Richfield, the 
court found that the parent corporation owed no duty to its subsidiary's 
employee who was injured while operating a piece of heavy equipment owned by the 
parent corporation.  773 P.2d  at 
158.  The employee asserted that the 
parent corporation owed her an independent duty because the parent corporation 
had "assumed affirmative duties with respect to safety" at the mine where the 
employee worked.  Id. at 159.  The court found no "inference of a 
retention of a right of control or the exercise of control over the activities" 
though the parent corporation retained an overriding royalty interest in the 
mine, paid all taxes on the mine, unified its accounting procedures with the 
subsidiary, and frequently sent its officials into the mine.  Id. at 162.  The court refused to infer that the mine 
visits were exclusively for the purpose of supervising operations as "there are 
many other valid purposes for those visits," id., or to infer control over safety 
operations by "the mere availability" of parent corporation representatives to 
assist with the subsidiary's training program, id. at 163.  The court upheld summary judgment and 
found that the circumstances relied upon by the employee failed to demonstrate a 
genuine issue of material fact with respect to the parent corporation's 
"assumption of some independent legal duty."  Id. 

 
 
Because 
"a parent corporation is analogized to an owner of a work site," Horowitz, 708 F. Supp.  at 1580, whether 
the parent corporation shall be shielded from liability, is essentially "the 
same test that is invoked in considering an owner's liability to the employee of 
a contractor," Fiscus, 773 P.2d  at 
160.  The court has held that an 
employer "who retains the right to direct the manner of an independent 
contractor's performance or assumes affirmative duties with respect to safety 
owes a duty of reasonable care to an employee of the independent contractor even 
if the employee is injured doing the very work the contractor was hired to 
perform."  Jones, 718 P.2d  at 896.  In order for there to be a demonstration 
of the employer's "assumption of affirmative duties with respect to safety" 
there must be "such a retention of a right of supervision that the contractor is 
not entirely free to do the work his own way."  Stockwell v. Parker Drilling Co., Inc., 
733 P.2d 1029, 1033 (Wyo. 1987) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 
414, cmt. c (1965)).  Where, for 
example, the owner of the work site requires safe equipment and workmanship or 
even disciplines employees for unsafe practices but does not direct the method 
of the contractor's work performance, it does not retain sufficient control over 
the details of safety to render it liable.  Jones, 718 P.2d  at 896; Noonan, 713 P.2d  at 167.  "It is not enough that [the work site 
owner] has merely a general right to order the work stopped or resumed, to 
inspect its progress or to receive reports, to make suggestions or 
recommendations which need not necessarily be followed, or to prescribe 
alterations and deviations."  Stockwell, 733 P.2d  at 1033 (quoting Rest[atement] 2d Torts § 414, 
cmt. c) (emphasis omitted).  
Reserving the "right to require safe equipment, material, and supplies to 
be used by the contractor," the owner of the work site can merely be assured 
that the work will be performed "efficiently, in a good workmanlike manner, at a 
reasonable cost, and that the final result is as good as possible."  Noonan, 713 P.2d  at 167.  In such a case, the owner of the work 
site owes no duty of reasonable care to an employee of the independent 
contractor.  Jones, 718 P.2d  at 896. 

 
 
The 
court found that the owner of the work site, Chevron, had retained "enough real 
control to raise a duty of reasonable care" for the injury of an employee of its 
independent contractor in Jones v. 
Chevron, 718 P.2d  at 897.  The 
employee had been injured while painting a metal platform between two power 
poles when electricity from nearby transformers arced through the employee and 
knocked him to the ground.  Id. at 892.  Chevron discouraged the de-energization 
of the electric line and made permission for de-energization difficult to 
obtain; consequently, the court found that Chevron retained control over 
energizing the power lines and that Chevron prohibited the independent 
contractor from controlling that safety aspect of its work.  Id. at 896-897.  As a result, Chevron had retained 
"enough real control to raise a duty of reasonable care" for the employee's 
injury.  Id. at 896.  In Jones, Chevron retained control directly 
over the element of safety that caused the employee's injuries. 

 
 
Similarly, 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the denial of summary judgment where 
inferences from the evidence raised a question as to whether a parent 
corporation retained responsibility for mine safety in a case in which a coal 
mine employee was injured by a piece of rock falling from the mine ceiling.  Smith v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 814 F.2d 1481, 1481 (10th Cir. 1987).  
The evidence suggested that the parent corporation may have retained 
control over some aspect of mine safety matters.  "[The employee] contended that roof 
control was, to some extent, left to the discretion of the mine foreman, but 
that there was evidence that various employees of [the parent corporation] were 
assigned to the Beaver Creek mine from time to time who were given 
responsibility for safety matters, including roof control problems."  Id. at 1483. The court found that an 
inference could be made from the evidence that the parent corporation was 
"providing safety advice and services;" consequently, whether the subsidiary had 
delegated responsibility for safety to the parent corporation and whether the 
parent corporation had negligently performed it, precluded summary 
judgment.  Id. at 1488-1489. 

 
 
The 
test in finding whether Solvay America assumed an affirmative duty is not 
whether it operated any control in 
the mine, but whether Solvay America controlled the aspect of the mining 
operation that was involved in the incident that resulted in Plaintiff's 
injuries to such a degree that it directed how that aspect should or should not 
be done.  Fiscus, 773 P.2d  at 160; Wayts v. Peter Kiewit Sons, Inc., 936 F.2d 584 (10th Cir. 1991), 1991 WL 114736, *1 (unpublished disposition).  Such a question of fact may be created 
by a reasonable inference drawn from the evidence, the relative strength of 
which has been weighed against "positive and direct testimony" and found strong 
enough to overcome direct testimony.  
Fiscus, 773 P.2d  at 162 
(citations omitted).  Plaintiff has 
placed much emphasis upon Solvay America's safety audits, safety 
recommendations, and other involvement at the Wyoming mine, however, the 
evidence does not raise an inference that Solvay America controlled an aspect of 
the mining operation that was involved in the incident that resulted in 
Plaintiff's injuries to such a degree that Solvay Chemicals was not free to 
operate as it saw fit. 

 
 
Plaintiff 
argues that Solvay America's safety audits and recommendations allow an 
inference that Defendant retained control over safety issues in the Solvay 
Chemicals mine.  The evidence 
demonstrates that Solvay America personnel regularly visited the Wyoming mine, 
performed safety audits, and made recommendations to correct mine safety 
deficiencies. (Hughes Dep. at 74, ll. 1-4, ll. 11-12; Vendetti Dep. at 33, ll. 
18-19.)  About every third year, 
Solvay America performed safety audits at the mine to ensure compliance with the 
established safety policies, to secure improved safety performance, and to 
examine whether the mine responded with corrective measures to any accident 
causing an injury.  (Neville Dep. at 
23, ll. 23-25; p. 43, ll. 4-15.)  
Ronald Hughes, Mine Manager at Solvay Chemicals, testified that Solvay 
Chemicals was obligated to either implement a safety recommendation or to 
"supply a good reason why [it] chose not to."  (Hughes Dep. at 72, ll. 3-17.)  Hughes could not recall a time in which 
Solvay Chemicals ignored a safety recommendation, but he assumed that there 
would be negative consequences for ignoring such a recommendation.  (Hughes Dep. at 75, ll. 4-7, ll. 14-16; 
p. 76, ll. 2-3.)  Although Solvay 
America discouraged unionization, David Birney, C.E.O. of Solvay America, 
testified that Solvay America merely opposed unionization to avoid the 
inflexibility of a collective bargaining agreement rather than for the purpose 
of depriving employees of safety negotiations.  (Birney Dep. at 74-76.)  The evidence demonstrates that Solvay 
America offered only general safety recommendations which could be rejected or 
applied by Solvay Chemicals in accordance with Solvay Chemicals' 
needs.

 
 
The 
evidence indicates that Solvay Chemicals had the last word on safety issues and 
procedures. When performing a safety audit, Solvay America personnel applied 
"general safety philosophies" and recommended general, generic corrections to 
safety deficiencies.  (Adamson Dep, 
at 135, 11. 15-19.)  Michael 
Neville, a former Health Safety and Environmental Advisor and a current 
consultant for Solvay America, testified that Solvay America expected its 
subsidiaries to develop individual 
safety policies in accordance with subsidiary needs under the direction of 
Solvay America's established procedural policies, generic guidance on how to 
write policies, and safety audits.  
(Neville Dep. at 22, ll. 23-25; p. 23, ll. 1-16.)  Solvay America's Corporate Safety and 
Security Manager, Randy Thompson, testified that Solvay Chemicals was free to 
implement or reject safety recommendations, which it often adopted, but that 
there was no specific method to achieve compliance with regulatory 
requirements.  (Thompson Dep. at 
121, 11.2-20.)  Thompson noted, "As 
long as they get there and it's improved safety and it's legal and ethical, 
that's acceptable."  (Thompson Dep. 
at 121, ll. 15-20.)  Robert Adamson, 
a former Solvay Chemicals Safety Training Advisor, testified that any safety 
deficiency was to be corrected; however, Solvay Chemicals viewed Solvay 
America's safety advice as "welcomed assistance" to be taken under advisement 
and used when applicable.  (Adamson 
Dep. at 134, 11. 12-16.)  In fact, 
in the event of an injury in the mine, Solvay Chemicals performed its own 
investigation to "determine [its] next course of action."  (Neville Dep., p. 42, 
11.8-12.)

 
 
Solvay 
Chemicals was not required to inform 
Solvay America when equipment needed to be replaced, as "the people that work 
the mine" were better experienced to make decisions to replace unsafe 
equipment.  (Thompson Dep. at 83, 
11. 23-24, p. 84, 11. 1-8.)  David 
Birney testified that Solvay America would occasionally guarantee its 
subsidiaries' leases of equipment and would, at times, guarantee the debts of 
its subsidiaries, but he did not suggest that Defendant retained control over 
the purchase of safe equipment.  
(Birney Dep. at 84-85.)  Kent 
Adamson testified that if new safety equipment were needed, cost would be 
considered, but there was no requirement or tradition of discussing the purchase 
or its cost with Solvay America.  
(Adamson at 109, 11. 10-24.)  
Michael Montoya, who coordinates and directs the Solvay Chemicals mine 
engineering group, testified that he was not required to contact Solvay America 
with information requiring day-to-day 
operational issues or with requests to remove unsafe equipment from 
operation.  (Montoya Dep., p. 45, 
11. 13-22.)  He testified, "If a 
piece of equipment is unsafe and needs to be replaced, we will take it out of 
service immediately."  (Montoya Dep. 
at 26, 11. 13- 15.)  The evidence 
does not leave an issue of material fact as to whether Solvay America retained 
control over safety at the Solvay Chemicals mine to such a degree that Solvay 
Chemicals was not entitled to manage safety according to its own 
methods.

 
 
In 
light of case law, these facts are not enough to create the inference of control 
by Solvay America.  To impose 
liability upon Solvay America, it is not enough that Solvay America exercised a 
general right to inspect the mine or to receive reports, to make suggestions or 
recommendations which were not necessary to follow, or to prescribe "alterations 
and deviations" to the work.  Stockwell, 733 P.2d  at 1033 (quoting Rest[atement] 2d Torts § 414, 
cmt. c) (emphasis omitted).  Control 
over Solvay Chemicals' safety issues cannot be inferred from Solvay America's 
safety training, provision of safe equipment, or even a threat of discipline for 
safety infractions.  Noonan, 713 P.2d  at 167. Case law 
precludes the inference of control by Solvay America where it operated in merely 
an "advisory role."  Wayts, 1991 WL 114736, * 
1.

 
 
The 
strength of direct testimony in this case outweighs any reasonable, contrary 
inference and leaves no issue of material fact.  Fiscus, 773 P.2d  at 162.  Unlike the evidence presented in Jones v. Chevron, 718 P.2d 890, or Smith v. Atlantic Richfield, 814 F.2d 1481, there remains no issue of fact as to whether the parent corporation, 
Solvay America, retained exclusive control over the aspect of safety that 
resulted in Plaintiff's injury.  
Unlike the Jones case where 
control was retained directly over the de-energization of power lines, which 
resulted in the employee's electrocution, 718 P.2d 896, Solvay America did not 
preclude Solvay Chemicals' independent control over safety issues in its work, 
id. at 897.  Similarly, unlike the Smith case where a question of fact 
remained as to whether the parent corporation retained responsibility for safety 
issues with the mine ceiling, the instrumentality causing the employee's injury, 
814 F.2d  at 1483, there is no question of fact as to whether Solvay America's 
safety advice amounts to the delegation of responsibility for Safety by Solvay 
Chemicals, id. at 1488-89.   The evidence and circumstances 
relied upon by Plaintiff fail to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as 
to whether Solvay America assumed some "independent legal duty."  Fiscus, 773 P.2d  at 163. 

 
 
[¶13]   We conclude that the district 
court's analysis is sound and that it was correct in concluding that Solvay 
America, as parent corporation of Solvay Chemicals, was not so involved in the 
day-to-day operations of Solvay Chemicals, as they related to the event that 
caused Loredo's injuries, so as to pose a genuine issue of material fact whether 
Solvay America assumed a independent legal duty vis- -vis Loredo.  See generally, Annotation, Workers' Compensation Immunity as Extending 
to One Owning Controlling Interest in Employer Corporation, 30 A.L.R. 4th 948 (1984 and Supp. 2008); 6 
Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, DIGEST: Ch. 112, § 112.01D 
(2007).

 
 
[¶14]   We briefly note that Solvay America 
contends that the affidavit of Loredo's expert, Lewis Barbe, is not admissible 
so as to defeat summary judgment in its favor.  In response, Loredo asserts that the 
admissibility of that affidavit was not considered in the district court and 
should not be considered in this appeal.  
Under the governing standard of review we consider only those papers that 
were considered by the district court.  
Hence, we will not consider Barbe's affidavit in our 
analysis.

 
 
[¶15]   Evidence was brought forward in the 
district court of remedial efforts made by Solvay America and Solvay Chemicals 
following Loredo's injuries.  Solvay 
America makes passing reference to the application of W.R.E. 407 which 
provides:

 
 
When, 
after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have made 
the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not 
admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the 
event.  This rule does not require 
the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another 
purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary 
measures, if controverted, or impeachment.

 

Our 
perusal of the record indicates that the district court did not consider such 
evidence below and we, likewise, will not consider it in this 
appeal.

 
 
Claims 
Against Co-employee Pacheco

            

[¶16]   Our usual standard of review for 
orders granting summary judgment applies here as well, and we will not repeat it 
in detail.  However, the matter of 
co-employee liability and the meaning conveyed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-104(a) 
(LexisNexis 2009) ("unless the employees intentionally act to cause physical 
harm or injury to the injured employee") have been before this Court on two 
recent occasions and we make reference to those cases because they do play a 
significant role in the resolution of the instant matter.  See Bertagnolli v. Louderback, 2003 WY 50, 
¶¶ 10-18, 67 P.3d 627, 630-33 (Wyo. 2003).  More recently, in Hannifan v. American National Bank of 
Cheyenne, 2008 WY 65, ¶¶ 33-35, 185 P.3d 679, 691-93 (Wyo. 2008), we 
applied our holding in Bertagnolli to 
a case wherein a properly instructed jury found that a co-employee had acted 
with the requisite "intent" so as to create co-employee 
liability.

 
 
[¶17]   With respect to this summary 
judgment motion the district court made these findings:

 
 
                        


 
 
The 
above-entitled case is currently before the Court on Defendant Gilbert Pacheco's 
motion for summary judgment.  
Defendant Pacheco asserts that he owes no liability to Plaintiff, a 
co-employee, because he had no knowledge, contribution, or negligence in the 
circumstances that resulted in Plaintiff's injury.  This Court finds that no issue of fact 
arises as to whether Defendant willfully and wantonly disregarded Plaintiff's 
safety concerns which resulted in Plaintiff's injuries; summary judgment is 
granted for the following reasons: 

 
 
I. 
         
Background

 
 
This 
case is a personal injury case resulting from a mining accident at the Solvay 
Chemicals, Inc. trona mine near Green River, Sweetwater County, Wyoming.  An experienced operator of Solvay's roof 
bolter, Plaintiff Jose Loredo was employed to drive metal bolts into the mine's 
rock ceiling to protect against collapse or falling rocks in freshly mined, 
underground rooms.  On August 14, 
2002, the left tram on Plaintiff's roof bolter had not been working properly, 
and Plaintiff was forced to adjust power to the left side of the bolter in order 
to maneuver it correctly.  
Plaintiff's awkward tramming drove one of the bolter's tires into a 
corner of the mine wall and caused Plaintiff to get stuck.  Working the roof bolter's levers, 
Plaintiff attempted to free the bolter by moving forward and backward.  While he worked to free the bolter, 
Plaintiff inadvertently drove under unbolted mine ceiling.  It was here that a slab of rock fell 
from the mine ceiling and rendered Plaintiff quadriplegic.  Plaintiff brought a cause of action 
against Defendant Gilbert Pacheco, Plaintiff's supervisor at the time of the 
accident, for the willful, wanton, and intentional disregard of safety concerns 
raised by the Plaintiff.  Defendant 
counters that no genuine issue of material fact arises as to whether he 
willfully and wantonly acted to cause Plaintiff's injury.

 
 
II. 
Discussion

 
 
.

 
 
The 
Wyoming court equated "the concept of willful and wanton misconduct" with the 
statutory language found in W.S. § 27-14-104(a) [FN1]. and found that a 
co-employee is liable for intentionally acting to cause physical harm or 
injury.  Bertagnolli, ¶ 15, 67 P.3d  at 
632.  A co-employee supervisor will 
be found to have intentionally caused physical harm to an employee and to have 
engaged in willful and wanton misconduct when the supervisor "had knowledge of 
[a] dangerous condition and demonstrated a disregard of the risks through 
intentional acts."  Id. ¶ 19, 67 P.3d  at 634.  The "aggravating factor" that 
distinguishes willful misconduct from ordinary negligence is the co-employee's 
"state of mind that approaches intent to do harm."  Smith v. Throckmartin, 893 P.2d 712, 714 
(Wyo. 1995) (citations omitted).  An 
act is "willful" if it "is done purposely, with knowledge--or misconduct of such 
a character as to evince a reckless disregard of consequences."  Case v. Goss, 776 P.2d 188, 191 (Wyo. 
1989).

 
 
FN 
1.  Wyoming Statute § 27-14-104(a) 
(LexisNexis 2007) states, "The rights and remedies provided in this act for an 
employee ... in extrahazardous employments are in lieu of all other rights and 
remedies against any employer ... [or] employees acting within the scope of 
their employment unless the employees intentionally act to cause physical harm 
or injury to the injured employee ...."

 
 
Willful 
and wanton misconduct consists of intentional actions which recklessly disregard 
the safety of an employee.  Bertagnolli, ¶ 15, 67 P.3d  at 
632.  "A situation in which a 
supervisory co-employee has knowledge of a hazardous condition and fails to 
correct it, although certainly sufficient to indicate ordinary negligence, is 
not sufficient to satisfy the much more stringent test of culpable 
negligence."  Cockburn v. Terra Res., Inc., 794 P.2d 1334, 1344 (Wyo. 1990).  A 
supervisor is liable where he has intentionally acted or intentionally failed to 
act "in reckless disregard of the consequences and under circumstances and 
conditions that a reasonable person would know, or have reason to know that such 
conduct would in a high degree of probability, result in harm to another."  Bertagnolli, ¶ 15, 67 P.3d  at 632 
(citations omitted).  Willful 
misconduct does not arise merely from "a thoughtless, heedless or inadvertent 
act, or an error in judgment," it is "more than mere mistake resulting from 
inexperience, excitement or confusion ... or simple inattention," but it is "an 
extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of 
danger is apparent."  Smith, 893 P .2d at 714 (citations and 
quotations omitted).

 
 
The 
Bertagnolli court reversed summary 
judgment and found material questions of fact existed as to whether the 
plaintiff's supervisors knew of the general risks surrounding the circumstances 
which resulted in plaintiff's injury.  
The supervisors had instructed the employee, under threat of termination, 
that he shovel ore rubble on a mine "shuttle belt," but they refused to lock the 
shuttle belt in spite of the employee's requests and concerns over his 
safety.  Id. ¶ 21, 67 P.3d  at 634.  As the employee worked, a sheave wheel 
caught and severed the back of his right foot; ultimately, the employee's leg 
had to be amputated below the knee. Id. ¶ 7, 67 P.3d  at 630.  The supervisors testified that they were 
unaware that the sheave wheel was unguarded, that company policies required the 
wheel to be locked, that the employee had requested a union steward, or that the 
employee had been threatened with termination if he did not work on the shuttle 
belt.  Id. ¶ 24, 67 P.3d  at 635.  The court found that a question of fact 
remained over whether the supervisors "knew of the broader dangers of the 
shuttle belt area" beyond the unguarded sheave wheel.  Id. ¶ 25, 67 P.3d  at 635.  The jury should have been permitted to 
determine whether the supervisors "intentionally acted to cause physical harm or 
injury" and whether their actions constituted willful and wanton misconduct. Id. 

 
 
Similarly, 
the court reversed summary judgment in a case in which the plaintiff had been 
injured in a fall on a known, but ignored, hidden grease spot on a metal 
surfaced boom.  Case v. Goss, 776 P.2d  at 194.  The court found an issue of fact over 
whether some of the plaintiff's supervisory co-employees had recklessly 
disregarded the consequences of their conduct that "a reasonable man would know, 
or have reason to know, that such conduct would, in a high degree of 
probability, result in substantial harm."  
Id. at 196 (citations 
omitted).  The mine safety 
coordinator "was uniquely aware of the dangerous condition of the boom" and had 
heard the plaintiff's complaints about it but had refused to act and even 
destroyed the plaintiff's written maintenance request to have the boom 
cleaned.  Id. at 196.  A maintenance supervisor for the mine 
knew about the boom's condition but he refused to act upon the plaintiff's 
suggestion to improve safety measures.  
Id. at 197.  Another maintenance supervisor had 
ignored the plaintiff's complaints about the condition of the boom and 
threatened to fire the plaintiff if he did not get on the boom to work or if he 
sought medical attention for his injuries.  
Id. at 197.  Whether these supervisors had engaged in 
a willful or reckless departure from ordinary care was a question of fact for 
the jury.

 
 
In 
contrast, the court granted summary judgment to the co-employees in McKennan v. Newman, 902 P.2d 1285, 1285 
(Wyo. 1995), where an employee was killed by a wood chip-augur that entangled 
him when he tried to unclog it.  The 
plaintiff had shown only ordinary negligence in producing evidence that 
co-employees had violated company safety policies and OSHA regulations.  Id. at 1288.  The plaintiff failed to demonstrate that 
the co-employees "acted with knowledge or that the high probability of harm 
presented by the chip-augur was obvious."  
Id.  Likewise, Plaintiff has not demonstrated 
a genuine issue of material fact is raised as to whether Defendant willfully, 
recklessly, and intentionally disregarded Plaintiff's 
safety.

 
 
The 
evidence does not demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of fact arises 
over whether Defendant thoughtlessly ignored Plaintiff's safety, made an extreme 
departure from ordinary care, and recklessly disregarded the dangerous condition 
presented by the roof bolter's problematic tramming function. Plaintiff 
testified that Defendant did not demand that Plaintiff should proceed with his 
work in an unreasonable or dangerous way.

 
 
            
Q.        Now, 
did Mr. Pacheco give you instructions on how to bolt the room? 

            
A.        No. 

            
Q.        He 
didn't need to do that, you knew? 

            
A.        Yes. 

Q.        You 
know how the bolting pattern is supposed to be? 

            
A.        Yes. 

            
Q.        One 
every four feet? 

            
A.        Every 
four feet. 

            
Q.        Do it 
from right to left? 

            
A.        From 
right to left.

            
Q.        Okay. 
You had been doing it that way for years? 

            
A.        Yes. 

 
 
(Loredo 
Dep. at 32, ll. 4-22.)  Plaintiff 
had suggested to his supervisor that additional roof bolts could improve safety 
in the mine crosscuts; however, Defendant adhered to the mine's bolting plan and 
asserted that additional bolting would take too much work time.  (Loredo Dep. at 79.)  Plaintiff eventually requested a 
transfer to a different roof bolting position, which was denied by 
Defendant.  (Loredo Dep. at 
86.)  The evidence indicates that 
Plaintiff informed Defendant of his 
concerns over the roof bolter's problematic tramming, but Defendant never 
threatened Plaintiff with a disciplinary action for notifying him of the 
defective roof bolter.  Plaintiff 
testified, "Mr. Pacheco told me that to go ahead and run the machine and they'll 
get it fixed in down shift."  
(Loredo Dep. at 74, 11. 23-24.)  
In fact, just prior to his accident, Plaintiff did not inform Defendant that the roof bolter was unsafe to 
operate because of the tramming problems.  
(Loredo Dep. at 34.)  At the 
moment of his injury, Plaintiff did not know where Defendant Pacheco was or what 
he was doing.  (Loredo Dep. at 39, 
11, 10-12.)  Although Plaintiff 
expressed concern for his safety, the evidence does not suggest Defendant 
intentionally or recklessly disregarded Plaintiff's 
safety.

 
 
The 
evidence presented does not raise an issue of fact over whether Defendant 
exercised an extreme departure from ordinary care and recklessly disregarded the 
dangerous condition presented by the roof bolter's problematic tramming 
function.  There is no indication  
of an "aggravating factor" suggesting that Defendant intended to do harm. Smith, 893 P.2d  at 
714.

 
 
Defendant's 
adherence to the roof bolting plan and assurance that the roof bolter would be 
fixed in the "down shift" do not rise to the level of purposeful and reckless 
disregard of consequences to Plaintiff's safety.  Case, 776 P.2d  at 191.  Defendant owes no liability for 
Plaintiff's injuries.

 
 
[¶18]   We conclude the district court 
correctly determined that there is no genuine issue of material fact apparent in 
the record on appeal that Pacheco acted willfully, wantonly, or intentionally so 
as to contribute to Loredo's injuries.  
Thus, as a co-employee, he remains immune from Loredo's action against 
him.

 
 
Claims 
Against Joy Technologies

 
 
[¶19]   We apply our usual standard of 
review to the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Joy 
Technologies.

 
 
[¶20]   The district court made these 
findings with respect to Joy Technologies:

 
 
The 
above-entitled case is currently before the Court on motion for summary judgment 
brought by Defendant Joy Technologies.  
The Court finds that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
on the issues of negligence, strict liability, and punitive damages.  Summary judgment is granted for the 
following reasons:

 
 
I.          
Background

 
 
This 
case is a personal injury case resulting from a mining accident at the Solvay 
Chemicals, Inc. trona mine near Green River, Sweetwater County, Wyoming.  During his career at Solvay Chemicals, 
Plaintiff Jose Loredo operated a mine roof bolter, a machine more than twenty 
years old designed to drive metal bolts into the rock ceiling to protect against 
collapse in previously mined, underground rooms.  On August 14, 2002, the left tram on 
Plaintiff's roof bolter had not been working properly, and Plaintiff was forced 
to adjust power to the left side of the bolter in order to maneuver it 
correctly.  Plaintiff's awkward 
tramming drove one of the bolter's tires into a corner of the mine wall and 
caused the bolter to get stuck.  
Working the roof bolter's levers, Plaintiff attempted to free the bolter 
by moving forward and backward.  
While he worked to free the bolter, Plaintiff drove under unbolted mine 
ceiling.  It was here that a slab of 
rock fell from the mine ceiling and rendered Plaintiff quadriplegic.  Plaintiff has brought claims of 
negligence, strict liability, and punitive damages against Defendant Joy 
Technologies, the manufacturer of the roof bolter.

 
 
II.         
Discussion

 
 
The 
Court must determine whether Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law against Plaintiff's claims of negligence, strict liability, and punitive 
damages.  Summary judgment shall be 
granted if the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits on file "show that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  W.R.C.P. 56(c) (LexisNexis 2007).  Summary judgment is granted 
infrequently, and, being a drastic remedy, it is generally not appropriate in 
negligence actions.  O'Donnell v. City of Casper, 696 P.2d 1278, 1280 (Wyo. 1985).  The 
Defendant bears the burden to demonstrate that it is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.  Id. at 1281.  This Court will consider the issues of 
negligence, strict liability, and punitive damages and will conclude that 
summary judgment is appropriate.

 
 
1. 
        
Defendant is Entitled to Summary Judgment on the Negligence 
Claim.

 
 
Defendant 
asserts it is entitled to summary judgment on the claim of negligence.  The essential elements of a negligence 
claim are duty, a breach of that duty, proximate causation, and an injury.  Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Donahue, 674 P.2d 1276, 1280 (Wyo. 1984).  "A 
determination of the standard of conduct or duty is a question to be decided as 
a matter of law."  O'Donnell, 696 P.2d  at 1285.  Usually, summary judgment is not 
appropriate in negligence actions, O'Donnell, 696 P.2d  at 1280; however, 
the "surest route to summary judgment in negligence actions" arises from the 
inability to "establish the existence of a duty on the part of the defendant," 
Hatton v. Energy Elec. Co., 2006 WY 
151, ¶ 10, 148 P.3d 8, 13 (Wyo. 2006) (citations omitted).  The Court will address whether Defendant 
owed a duty to manufacture the roof bolter in such a way as to protect Plaintiff 
from rocks falling from the mine ceiling, a duty to retrofit the roof bolter, or 
a duty to warn of dangers associated with falling rocks.  The Court will conclude that Defendant 
owed no such duties.

 
 
                        
a.         
Duty to Manufacture the Roof Bolter to Protect from Falling 
Rocks

 
 
Defendant 
owed no duty to manufacture its roof bolter to protect the operator from rocks 
falling from the mine ceiling.  In a 
products liability action based upon the theory of negligent design or 
manufacture of a product, there must be a demonstration of "fault on the part of 
the manufacturer, designer, or distributor."  McLaughlin v. Michelin Tire Corp., 778 P.2d 59, 64 (Wyo. 1989).  A 
manufacturer bears a duty of reasonable care to plan, design, and manufacture 
its product so that the product is "reasonably safe to use."  Caterpillar, 674 P.2d  at 1280.  A product that is "not reasonably safe" 
for the user "is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been 
reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the 
seller ... and the omission of the alternative design renders the product not 
reasonably safe."  Campbell v. Studer, Inc., 970 P.2d 389, 
392, n.1 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2(b) (1998)) (emphasis added) 
(other citations omitted).  The Campbell court affirmed summary judgment 
because there had been no showing that the asphalt compactor in question was 
"not reasonably safe for its intended or foreseeable use" at the time that it 
was manufactured.  Id. at 394-395.  Similarly, in the current case, there 
has been no showing that the roof bolter in and of itself, even without a 
chassis canopy, was not reasonably safe or posed a foreseeable risk of 
harm.  No duty existed for Defendant 
Joy Technologies to manufacture its product to protect operators from falling 
rocks.

 
 
Other 
courts have concluded that a purchaser is often in the best position to 
understand its need for specific safety features and a failure to purchase the 
safety feature does not represent an equipment defect.  The New York court in Biss v. Tenneco, Inc., 409 N.Y.S.2d 874, 
876, 64 A.D.2d 204, 207 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978), considered whether a loader that 
overturned, killing its operator, was defectively designed because a roll-over 
protection structure was not supplied by the manufacturer as a standard, rather 
than optional, feature.  The 
evidence demonstrated that a roll-over protection structure was available to the 
purchaser at the time the loader was purchased, and the court found the 
"defendants had fulfilled their duty to exercise reasonable skill and care in 
designing the product as a matter of law when they advised the purchaser that an 
appropriate safety structure for the loader was available."  Id.  Similarly, in Davis v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 719 P.2d 324, 325 (Colo. App. 1986), no defect was found in the design of a tractor 
where the purchaser had "decided against purchasing either a rollover protective 
structure (ROPS) or a falling object protective structure (FOPS)" for use on his 
"undeveloped mountain land."  
Because the tractor had been designed for numerous, different jobs in 
various locations with "some ninety different options designed to enhance the 
tractor's safety and utility within the specific context of the purchaser's 
needs," the court found that the omitted protective structures did not result in 
design defects.  Id. at 327.  The Biss and Davis courts considered the safety of 
equipment which malfunctioned when the equipment rolled over -- a problematic 
condition with the equipment itself.  
No similar malfunction has been shown in the roof bolter; consequently, 
even without the chassis canopy, the roof bolter was not defective.  Defendant owed no duty to manufacture 
the roof bolter with the canopy.

 
 
Defendant 
owed no duty to protect Plaintiff from anything but hidden defects in its 
product and owed no duty to warn Plaintiff of anything but concealed dangers in 
the use of its product.  Parker v. Heasler Plumbing & Heating 
Co., 388 P.2d 516, 518 (Wyo. 1964).  
"([T]he manufacturer or seller of a machine, dangerous because of the way 
in which it functions, and patently so, owes to those who use it a duty merely 
to make it free from latent defects and concealed dangers."  Id.  The Parker court upheld summary judgment, 
finding that the incinerator in question was patently dangerous and that the 
plaintiff had not demonstrated the existence of a latent defect or unknown 
danger.  Id. at 519.  The court said it could not require a 
manufacturer to produce a "knife that will not cut or a hammer that will not 
mash a thumb or a stove that will not burn a finger."  Id. at 518 (citation omitted).  Common knowledge should have warned the 
plaintiff that injury could result from overloading the incinerator with refuse 
and admitting oxygen through the open incinerator door; consequently, the 
manufacturer owed no duty to protect against the patently dangerous way in which 
the incinerator functioned.  Id.  Similarly, there is nothing latently 
dangerous about the use of the roof bolter, but driving the roof bolter under 
unbolted mine ceiling was a patently dangerous maneuver -- just like any venture 
under unbolted mine ceiling.

 
 
Common 
knowledge and years of experience should have warned Plaintiff that traveling 
under unbolted mine ceiling exposed him to sudden rock falls.  On the day of his injury Plaintiff 
struggled to maneuver the roof bolter and trammed the bolter past the last row 
of ceiling bolts and under a portion of unbolted ceiling.  This maneuver exposed him to the known 
danger of falling rock.  Joe 
Vendetti, the Mine Operations Superintendent at Solvay Chemicals, testified that 
falling rocks from an unbolted ceiling is almost inevitable. 

 
 
Q.  So is a fresher cut not as likely to 
fall, I guess, as one that's been sitting there for a 
while?

A.  I can't answer that one way or another 
either. Some of the cuts, of course, they fall right when you cut them, and they 
fall on the mining machine itself. But once it's cut and you've went past it and 
it hasn't fallen yet, we all look at it in this way: It is going to fall 
eventually. The soon[er] you can support it, the better. It's that minimizing 
exposure again. 

Q.  The longer you wait the greater the risk? 

A.  I believe so. 

 
 
(Vendetti 
Dep. at 84, ll. 12-21.)  Falling 
rock in an underground mine is a foreseeable risk; however, it is a circumstance 
outside of the control of the roof bolter manufacturer.  Although the mine bolter was not 
designed to be trammed backwards, this limitation did not represent a latent 
defect that caused the rock ceiling to fall.  It was the outside condition of falling 
rock that caused Plaintiff's injuries.  
Nothing in the manufacture or design of the roof bolter caused the 
ceiling to collapse.  Nothing about 
the roof bolter was defective by the mere omission of a canopy.  As a matter of law, Defendant owed no 
duty to manufacture its roof bolter with a chassis canopy.  Defendant is entitled to summary 
judgment.

 
 
            
b.         
Duty to Retrofit 

 
 
Defendant 
asserts that it owed no specific duty to retrofit its roof bolter with the 
safety feature of a chassis canopy.  
The majority rule is that "there is no duty to retrofit a product not 
defective when sold."  Ostendorf v. Clark Equip. Co., 122 S.W.3d 530, 534 (Ky. 2003).  There 
is no need to create an additional duty to retrofit where "traditional 
principles of negligence and strict products liability suffice."  Id. at 534 (citation 
omitted).

 
 
In 
the current case, Plaintiff argues that repeated injuries resulting from the 
collapse of the mine roof dictate the need to retrofit a chassis canopy to the 
controller portion of the roof bolter.  
Plaintiff's evidence is of injuries occurring on the separate, boom 
portion of the roof bolter.  Unlike 
the controller part of the roof bolter, the roof bolter boom had been designed 
to extend underneath unbolted mine ceiling.  The evidence does not support the 
argument that previous injuries raised a duty for Defendant to retrofit the roof 
bolter to include a canopy for the controller. Defendant owed no duty to 
retrofit.

 
 
            
c.         
Duty to Warn

 
 
Wyoming 
law indicates that even in cases where a product

has 
been flawlessly manufactured, if there is, nevertheless, the likelihood that the 
product could cause harm unless properly used, a duty to warn arises.  Rohde v. Smiths Medical, 2007 WY 134, 
¶ 31, 165 P.3d 433, 441 (Wyo. 2007).  
The jury must consider whether the product "is in a defective condition 
unreasonably dangerous by virtue of the absence of adequate warning or 
instruction." Id.  (quotations omitted).  The defect in the product must be shown 
to be the manufacturer's failure "to warn about the dangers associated with the 
product." Id., ¶ 32, 165 P.3d  at 
441.  Defendant owed no duty to 
manufacture the roof bolter with a chassis canopy and owed no duty to warn 
Plaintiff of his exposure to the outside danger of rock falls.  Summary judgment is 
appropriate.

 
 
2. 
        
Defendant is Entitled to Summary Judgment on the Claim of Strict 
Liability

 
 
Defendant 
asserts it is entitled to summary judgment on the claim of strict 
liability.  In a products liability 
action based upon the theory of strict liability, the focus is upon the product, 
itself, rather than upon the activities of the manufacturer.  McLaughlin, 778 P.2d  at 64.  A plaintiff may recover under a strict 
liability theory for his loss or injury "resulting from a defective product that 
entered the stream of commerce in the absence of fault by the manufacturer, 
designer, or distributor."  Id.  A product manufacturer who sells a 
product in a defective condition that is unreasonably dangerous may be liable 
for physical harm to a user if "the seller is engaged in the business of selling 
such a product, and it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer 
without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold."  Rohde, ¶ 17, 165 P.3d  at 437 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 
402A(l) (1965)) (other citation omitted).  
Accordingly, Wyoming had adopted five elements of strict liability for 
the sale of a defective product:

 
 
(1) 
that the sellers were engaged in the business of selling the product that caused 
the harm; 

(2) 
that the product was defective when sold; 

(3) 
that the product was unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer; 

(4) 
that the product was intended to and did reach the consumer without substantial 
change in the condition in which it was sold; and 

(5) 
that the product caused physical harm to the plaintiff/consumer. 

 
 

Rohde, 
¶ 18, 165 P.3d  at 437 (citation omitted).  An inference of defectiveness arises "if 
a prima facie case can be presented that there was no abnormal use of the 
product or that there were no reasonable secondary causes for the defect."  Id. ¶ 19, 165 P.3d  at 
437.

 
 
In 
the current case, there has been no showing of strict liability.  There has been no showing that the roof 
bolter was "not reasonably safe."  
Plaintiff's injuries were not caused by a defect in the roof bolter but 
were caused by rock falling from the unbolted mine ceiling.  Summary judgment is granted on the 
strict liability claim.

 
 
3.         
Defendant is Entitled to Summary Judgment on the Punitive Damages 
Claim

 
 
Punitive 
damages are not favored.  They are 
awarded only "to punish the defendant and deter others from such conduct in the 
future," rather than to compensate the plaintiff, and will be awarded only for 
conduct involving "some element of outrage" such as malice or "willful and 
wanton misconduct."  Alexander v. Meduna, 2002 WY 83, 
¶¶ 40-41, 47 P.3d 206, 218 (Wyo. 2002).  Plaintiff has made no showing that 
punitive damages are reasonably related to the harm that has occurred from 
Defendant's conduct, that there is a degree of reprehensibility in the 
Defendant's conduct such as concealment of a hazard, or that the wrongful 
conduct was profitable to the Defendants.  
Id. ¶ 42, 47 P.3d  at 
219.  Summary Judgment is granted on 
the punitive damages claim.

 
 
In 
a products liability case, the plaintiff must show that the manufacturer 
provided a defective product.  A 
defective product is one which is "not reasonably safe" or is "unreasonably 
dangerous" to the user or consumer.  
Campbell v. Studer, Inc., 970 P.2d 389, 392 (Wyo. 1998); McLaughlin v. Michelin Tire Corp., 778 P.2d 59, 64 (Wyo. 1989).  The corollary of that statement is if a 
product is safe for normal use, it is not defective.  Campbell, 970 P.2d  at 392.  In many products liability cases, the 
plaintiff will attempt to show a defect in the product from the fact that it 
malfunctioned.  In this case, Loredo 
made no showing that the product itself, the roof bolter, malfunctioned.  Instead, Loredo maintained that the roof 
bolter was defective, i.e., unreasonably dangerous, because a safety device, the 
chassis canopy, was not standard equipment or a recommended 
option.

 
 
[¶21]   The district court decided, in 
part, that Joy owed Loredo no duty because he was not injured by the roof bolter 
but by the falling rock.  That 
rationale begs the question of whether Joy had a duty to design the roof bolter 
with a chassis canopy to protect the user from a known danger associated with 
using the product (falling rock) or to, at least, recommend that such a safety 
option be incorporated.  Following 
the district court's analysis to its logical conclusion, there would not be any 
cases where products were found to be defective unless the product itself was 
the instrumentality of the injury.  
This position is not borne out in case law.  In Davis v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 719 P.2d 324 (Colo. 1985), a case that 
was cited by the district court in its decision letter, the plaintiff was 
injured when a tree fell on him while he was operating a tractor.  He claimed that the tractor was 
defective because the manufacturer did not attach a rollover protective device 
or a falling object protective device.  
Although the plaintiff in that case was not successful in establishing a 
defect, the decision did not state that he could not maintain his claim because 
he was injured by the falling tree rather than the tractor itself.  Other cases in which the plaintiffs were 
injured by outside hazards and claimed that the products were defective because 
they were not equipped with certain safety devices include Beron v. Kramer-Trenton Co., 402 F. Supp. 1268 (E.D. Pa 1975) 
(alleging defective forklift design for failing to protect against falling 
objects) and Braxton v. Georgia-Pacific 
Corp., 419 So. 2d 125 (La Ct. App 
1982) (alleging defective crane design for failing to protect against contact 
with electrical lines).

 
 
[¶22]   Nevertheless, we agree with the 
remainder of the district court's legal analysis and conclude that Joy 
Technologies did not owe a duty to Loredo to equip the roof bolter with a 
chassis canopy.  The question of 
whether a product is defective because a safety device was not standard 
equipment or a recommended option was discussed at length in Kristine Cordier 
Karnezis, Annotation, Products 
Liability:  Manufacturer's or 
Seller's Obligation to Supply or Recommend Available Safety Accessories in 
Connection with Industrial Machinery or Equipment, 99 A.L.R. 3d 693 (1980 
and 2009 Supp.).  Courts typically conduct a balancing 
test using various factors to determine whether the product's manufacturer or 
seller has a duty to recommend or supply available safety accessories.  Id. at § 2[a].  
 It is important to keep 
in mind that these factors all lead to an ultimate determination of whether the 
product is unreasonably dangerous for its intended use.

 
 
[¶23]   One factor that courts consider is 
the dangerousness of the product without the safety accessory.  Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation, supra, 99 A.L.R. 3d 693, § 2[a].  Consideration of this factor often 
includes weighing of matters such as:  
the obviousness/unreasonableness of the danger, relevant safety 
standards, the presence of a warning, and the effectiveness of the safety device 
to prevent the risks of injury.  Id.  
Another important factor is the relative positions of the 
manufacturer and buyer.  This factor 
includes such matters as industry custom, the buyer's awareness of the 
availability of safety accessories or of the danger of using the product without 
them, whether the manufacturer offered the safeguards and the buyer refused 
them, the feasibility of installing the safeguards, and/or the buyer's reliance 
on the manufacturer's expertise.  Id.

 
 
[¶24]   Applying these considerations to 
the case at bar, the undisputed facts establish that Joy Technologies did not 
owe Loredo a duty to equip the roof bolter with a canopy.  The danger of falling rocks in the 
unsupported area was open and obvious.  
Solvay's company policies and MSHA regulations prohibited use of the roof 
bolter in an unsupported area.  In 
fact, Solvay was cited by MSHA after Loredo's accident because he violated mine 
regulations by operating the roof bolter in an unsupported area.  Mine safety regulations did not require 
canopies under the circumstances of this case, and it was not industry practice 
to have canopies on the roof bolters.  
Evidence was presented showing that the roof bolters used in other trona 
mines in Sweetwater County were not equipped with chassis 
canopies.

 
 
[¶25]   The purchaser (Tennaco) was 
informed and knowledgeable about 
machinery.  Prior to purchasing the 
roof bolter, Tennaco issued a detailed request for bids from various 
manufacturers, including Joy Technologies.  
Tennaco's request for bids asked the manufacturers to provide technical 
information about the products so 
that Tennaco's engineering staff could make an informed decision about which product to 
purchase.  Although the request for 
bids did not seek specific safety recommendations, it did ask for a list of 
available options.  Joy 
Technologies' proposal included the chassis canopy as an option.  Tennaco made a conscious decision not to 
purchase the canopy because the roof bolter was not intended to be used in 
unsupported roof areas and did not elect to add the canopy when it took over the 
mine because it had a similar policy prohibiting use of the bolter in 
unsupported areas.

 
 
[¶26]   When presented with products 
liability cases where a safety option was offered to a buyer but was refused, 
courts have routinely "held that the manufacturer or seller had no duty of the 
kind."  Kristine Cordier Karnezis, 
Annotation, supra, 99 A.L.R. 3d 693, 
§ 2[a].  See also, Biss v. Tenneco, Inc., 409 N.Y.S.2d 874, 
876, 64 A.D.2d 204, 207 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978); Davis v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 719 P.2d 324, 325 (Colo. App. 1985) (holding manufacturers were not liable when 
purchasers elected not to purchase optional safety devices).  This is especially true when, as here, 
the buyer was sophisticated and knowledgeable about the product and the uses of 
the product.

 
 
[¶27]   In arguing that Joy had a duty to 
supply or recommend the chassis canopy, Loredo focuses upon data pertaining to 
mining accidents.  Much of that 
evidence is not relevant to the circumstances presented here.  Instead, it pertains to accidents in 
coal mines (where canopies are apparently required by MHSA regulations) and 
accidents occurring when the operator is working from the boom of the roof 
bolter.  Although the evidence could 
be interpreted as suggesting that canopies used in those situations may prevent 
injuries, it does not support a conclusion that Joy was required to supply a 
canopy to protect Loredo from falling rocks in a non-coal (trona) mine while 
working from the chassis rather than the boom.

 
 
[¶28]   The undisputed facts establish that 
Joy provided the roof bolter with the requested features to Tennaco, a 
knowledgeable buyer; the roof bolter, as ordered by Tennaco, did not have any 
defects and met with mine safety regulations; and Loredo was injured while using 
the bolter in a manner that was not anticipated or appropriate under applicable 
policies and regulations.  Under 
these circumstances, Loredo has failed to establish that Joy owed a duty to 
provide a product that protected him from falling rock.  The district court properly granted 
summary judgment in favor of Joy on all of Loredo's 
claims.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶29]   We conclude that the district court 
summary judgment orders were correct in all respects and they are 
affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Solvay Chemicals was, of course, immune from suit under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 27-14-101 and 27-14-404 (LexisNexis 2009).

 
 

2Parenthetical references 
to the record on appeal are from the district court's original decision 
letters.