Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Atkin

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. ATKIN. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Atkin (1999), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Permanent disbarment — Conviction of 
obstructing justice, interstate transportation of property obtained by fraud, 
engaging in monetary transaction in criminally derived property, income 
tax evasion, filing false tax returns, and criminal forfeiture. 
(No. 98-713 — Submitted July 15, 1998 — Decided January 13, 1999.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 96-08. 
 
On June 21, 1995, a jury found respondent, Sanford Irving Atkin of 
Bradford, Pennsylvania, Attorney Registration No. 0020746, guilty of two counts 
of obstructing justice, seven counts of interstate transportation of property 
obtained by fraud, eleven counts of engaging in a monetary transaction in 
criminally derived property, four counts of income tax evasion, four counts of 
filing false tax returns, and one count of criminal forfeiture.  The facts on which 
conviction was grounded were that respondent falsely represented to a client that 
he could bribe a federal judge, and by such representation obtained $550,000 from 
the client.  Respondent then appropriated these monies for his personal use and did 
not report them as income to the Internal Revenue Service.  In November 1995, 
based upon this conviction, we indefinitely suspended respondent from the 
practice of law in Ohio.  In re Atkin (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 1451, 656 N.E.2d 693.  
On March 4, 1997, respondent’s conviction was affirmed on appeal.  United States 
v. Atkin (C.A.6, 1997), 107 F.3d 1213. 
 
On February 5, 1996, relator, Office of Disciplinary Counsel, filed a 
complaint charging that respondent’s conduct that resulted in his conviction 
violated DR 1-102(A)(3) (engaging in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude), 
 
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1-102(A)(4) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation), and 7-102(A)(7) (counseling or assisting a client in conduct 
that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent).  Respondent asked for an 
indefinite stay of disciplinary proceedings during the pendency of his appeal, and 
a panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the 
Supreme Court (“board”) agreed to the stay.  After respondent’s conviction was 
affirmed, the panel set the matter for hearing.  The panel denied respondent’s 
motion for a further stay.  Respondent failed to answer the complaint or to appear 
at a scheduled video deposition at the federal correctional institute in which he 
was incarcerated. 
 
On March 5, 1998, relator presented evidence of respondent’s conviction to 
the panel, and the panel concluded that respondent had violated the Disciplinary 
Rules as charged.  The panel noted that respondent had previously been publicly 
reprimanded by the court in January 1986, and recommended that respondent be 
permanently disbarred from the practice of law.  The board adopted the findings, 
conclusions, and recommendation of the panel. 
__________________ 
 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
 
Sanford I. Atkin, pro se. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  We adopt the findings, conclusions, and recommendation of 
the board.  We are particularly disturbed by respondent’s suggestion that he could 
bribe United States District Judge George W. White, Jr.  Representations of this 
kind deserve the severest of sanctions.  First, such statements violate DR 9-101(C) 
(a lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence improperly or upon 
irrelevant grounds any tribunal, legislative body, or public official).  The rationale 
 
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for that rule is in EC 9-4, which states, “Because the very essence of the legal 
system is to provide procedures by which matters can be presented in an impartial 
manner so that they may be decided wholly upon the merits, any statement or 
suggestion by a lawyer that he can or would attempt to circumvent those 
procedures is detrimental to the legal system and tends to undermine public 
confidence.” (Emphasis added.)  Suggestions by an attorney, however untrue, that 
a judge might be bribed weaken the public’s respect for the judicial system and the 
faith of the people in a rule of law over men, and are intolerable. 
 
Second, in this particular case we cannot ignore that respondent’s conduct 
imposed serious inconvenience and great hardship upon Judge White.  
Respondent’s totally false implication gave rise to an investigation of the judge.  
Although he was found to have no involvement in or knowledge of respondent’s 
mendacity, Judge White was subjected to a compete analysis of his personal 
finances by the United States Attorney’s Office. 
 
Third, representations of the kind made by respondent not only reflect ill 
upon the judiciary, but also damage for a time, however long, the reputation of the 
judge involved.  “Reputation,” as Cassio said in Shakespeare’s Othello, is “the 
immortal part of myself.” (Act II, scene iii.) In State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Assn. v. 
Evans (Okla.1987), 747 P.2d 277, 280, the Oklahoma Supreme Court, confronted 
with a situation similar to ours, said, “[L]ittle comfort is found in the fact that the 
words spoken did not ripen into conduct.  The words were spoken by an attorney, 
an officer of the court.  The suggestion that justice is to be had for a price must, of 
necessity, foster apprehension and mistrust in the administration of justice. * * * 
When the conduct examined here is viewed from the perspective of the public 
officials who were said to be receptive to such a scheme, the personal harm done 
to their reputation in the community is self evident.” 
 
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We do not consider lightly representations that a judge can be bribed.  Even 
where there was no damage to the public official from a false statement of this 
kind, we have imposed the sanction of indefinite suspension.  Ohio State Bar 
Assn. v. Consoldane (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 337, 4 O.O.3d 477, 364 N.E.2d 279; 
Columbus Bar Assn. v. Benis (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 199, 5 OBR 415, 449 N.E.2d 
1305.  In those cases, as in Kentucky Bar Assn. v. White (Ky.1990), 783 S.W.2d 
883, where disbarment was deemed appropriate, the offending attorney’s lack of 
intent to carry out the bribe was not a mitigating factor. 
 
In this case, respondent is permanently disbarred from the practice of law in 
Ohio.  Costs taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.