Title: Estate of Ridley v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Estate of Ridley v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation & Developmental 
Disabilities, 102 Ohio St.3d 230, 2004-Ohio-2629.] 
 
 
ESTATE OF RIDLEY, APPELLANT, v. HAMILTON COUNTY BOARD OF MENTAL 
RETARDATION AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as Estate of Ridley v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation & 
Developmental Disabilities, 102 Ohio St.3d 230, 2004-Ohio-2629.] 
Torts — Wrongful-death and survival action against county board of mental 
retardation and developmental disabilities, its employees, and a city 
building department dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted, when. 
(No. 2003-0022 — Submitted December 2, 2003 —Decided June 9, 2004.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-010791, 150 
Ohio App.3d 383, 2002-Ohio-6344, 781 N.E.2d 1034. 
_______________ 
 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶1} The estate of Jerome Ridley commenced a wrongful-death and 
survival action against the Hamilton County Board of Mental Retardation and 
Developmental Disabilities, its employees Jerry Clark and Sonjua Day, in their 
individual capacities, and the city of Cincinnati Building Department. 
{¶2} In its complaint, the estate alleged that Ridley, a mentally retarded 
adult male, received assistance from the board beginning in February 1998.  
Initially, the board assigned to Jerry Clark the responsibility of coordinating all 
services to Ridley.  Clark arranged for Ridley to reside in an attic apartment 
located in Cincinnati, Ohio, and he visited Ridley several times each week to 
check on his well-being.  In October 1998, however, the board assigned Sonjua 
Day, another board caseworker, the responsibility of caring for and managing 
Ridley, including the obligation to visit him several times each week. 
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{¶3} According to the complaint, both Clark and Day knew that in hot 
weather, Ridley would dress wearing several layers of warm clothing, close the 
windows in his attic apartment, and confine himself there without the benefit of 
air-conditioning.  According to Day’s case management entries, she visited Ridley 
on July 15, 1999, at his apartment, which “was very hot.”  She further indicated 
that she tried “several times to wake up Jerome [Ridley] to come outside” and 
that, although he eventually went outside, he overdressed for the weather.  At that 
time, because Ridley would not work with the plan and because she “couldn’t get 
him to do anything,” Day “ ‘closed out’ her oversight and help” for Ridley.  
Additionally, according to the complaint filed in this case, there was no 
documentation that the board or any of its employees ever informed Ridley, his 
family, or other authorities that Day was “done with him.” 
{¶4} The complaint further alleged that from July 16 through July 28, 
1999, when a heat wave struck the Cincinnati area and resulted in several heat-
related deaths, neither Day nor Clark, nor any other board employee, checked on 
Ridley’s well-being.  On July 29, 1999, Clark went to check on Ridley because of 
the heat and found him dead from heatstroke in his apartment; Ridley had nailed 
the door shut and sealed his windows. 
{¶5} Based on the foregoing, the estate alleged that the board and its 
employees had breached both their statutory and common-law duties by 
abandoning Ridley during the heat wave, thereby proximately causing his death.  
It also alleged that the city had failed to inspect the apartment to ensure building 
code compliance regarding the ratio of window area to habitable floor space.  The 
board, its employees, and the city moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.  The trial court granted these 
motions. 
{¶6} On appeal, the court affirmed the trial court’s decision to dismiss 
the complaint against the city because the estate had not raised any arguments 
January Term, 2004 
3 
regarding the city.  See App.R. 12(A)(2) and 16(A)(7).  It also affirmed the trial 
court’s dismissal of the complaint against the board, concluding that the estate 
had failed to plead a viable negligence claim based upon R.C. 5123.61 (duty to 
report abuse or neglect of a mentally retarded or developmentally disabled adult), 
5123.62 (the Bill of Rights for persons with mental retardation or a developmental 
disability), and 5126.431 (the duty of the Department of Mental Retardation and 
Developmental Disabilities to adopt rules for certification of providers and 
establishing quality assurance standards regarding supported living for persons 
with mental retardation or developmental disabilities), on the basis that under 
those statutes, “either a duty was not imposed upon [the board] and its employees 
or that, if a duty was imposed, the allegations in the complaint were insufficient to 
indicate a breach of that duty.”  (Footnote omitted.)  Estate of Ridley v. Hamilton 
Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, 150 Ohio App.3d 
383, 2002-Ohio-6344, 781 N.E.2d 1034, ¶19.  The appellate court did not address 
whether the board was entitled to political subdivision tort liability immunity, 
pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2744, as to those claims. 
{¶7} However, regarding the estate’s negligence claims under R.C. 
5126.05 (the duty to provide supportive home services) and 5126.41 (the duty to 
develop an individual service plan and ensure that the individual receives the 
services for which he contracted), the court determined that the estate had pled 
sufficient facts to sustain an action but that the board nevertheless was immune 
from liability pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2744.  In reaching this holding, the court 
concluded that, because neither R.C. 5126.05 nor 5126.41 expressly imposed 
liability upon the board within the meaning of R.C. 2744.02(B)(5), the board’s 
immunity remained intact. 
{¶8} The appellate court, however, reversed the trial court’s decision to 
dismiss Day and Clark, holding that “[t]he facts alleged in the complaint, if they 
are proven true, tended to indicate reckless and wanton behavior on the part of 
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Clark and Day,” and, therefore, neither Day nor Clark was immune from liability 
under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6).  Ridley, supra, 150 Ohio App.3d 383, 2002-Ohio-
6344, 781 N.E.2d 1034, at ¶35. 
{¶9} Finally, the court, believing that the estate had failed to serve a 
copy of the second amended complaint upon the Ohio Attorney General pursuant 
to R.C. 2721.12, determined that the trial court had no jurisdiction to entertain the 
constitutional challenge to R.C. Chapter 2744. 
{¶10} The cause is now before this court pursuant to our acceptance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
I 
{¶11} In its first proposition of law, the estate asks this court to determine 
whether, within the meaning of R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) as in effect in 1999, see 1997 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 215, 147 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1150, R.C. 5123.61(C) expressly 
imposes liability for failure to report known or suspected neglect or abuse of a 
mentally retarded or developmentally disabled adult, thereby rendering a 
dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) improper. 
{¶12} As a preliminary matter, however, we must address whether the 
appellate court erred by determining that the estate failed to allege sufficient facts 
to state a negligence claim under R.C. 5123.61 because either that statute did not 
impose a duty upon the board and its employees, or, if it did, the “allegations in 
the complaint were insufficient to indicate a breach of that duty.”  Ridley, supra, 
150 Ohio App.3d 383, 2002-Ohio-6344, 781 N.E.2d 1034, at ¶19. 
{¶13} In order to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted, “it must appear beyond doubt from the complaint 
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to recovery.” O’Brien v. 
Univ. Comm. Tenants Union, Inc. (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 71 O.O.2d 223, 327 
N.E.2d 753, syllabus.  A court “must presume that all factual allegations of the 
complaint are true and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving 
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5 
party.”  Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192, 532 N.E.2d 
753. 
{¶14} “To maintain a wrongful death action on a theory of negligence, a 
plaintiff must show (1) the existence of a duty owing to plaintiff’s decedent, (2) a 
breach of that duty, and (3) proximate causation between the breach of duty and 
the death.”  Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hosp. & Health Ctr. (1988), 39 Ohio 
St.3d 86, 92, 529 N.E.2d 449, citing Bennison v. Stillpass Transit Co. (1966), 5 
Ohio St.2d 122, 34 O.O.2d 254, 214 N.E.2d 213, paragraph one of the syllabus.  
Here, the estate maintains that it pled a viable claim for negligence based upon 
violations of the duties imposed by R.C. 5123.61(C)(1) as amended by 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 606, effective March 9, 1999,1 which provided:  
{¶15} “Any person listed in division (C)(2) of this section, having reason 
to believe that a mentally retarded or developmentally disabled adult has suffered 
any wound, injury, disability, or condition of such a nature as to reasonably 
indicate abuse or neglect of that adult, shall immediately report or cause reports to 
be made of such information to a law enforcement agency or to the county board 
of mental retardation and developmental disabilities, except that if the report 
concerns a resident of a facility operated by the department of mental retardation 
and developmental disabilities the report shall be made either to a law 
enforcement agency or to the department.”  147 Ohio Laws, Part III, 4767. 
{¶16} Here, the board itself does not have a duty to report, as it is not a 
person listed in division (C)(2); however, Clark and Day, as employees of the 
board, had such a duty.  See R.C. 5123.61(C)(2)(c).  Although the estate cites 
R.C. 5123.61 in its complaint, it does not allege that either Clark or Day failed to 
make a report pursuant to division (C)(1).  Even if we were to infer that these 
                                          
 
1.  No relevant substantive changes have been made to the current version of the statute. 
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employees breached this duty, the estate has not alleged sufficient facts to 
demonstrate that the failure to report contributed to Ridley’s death; rather, the 
estate alleges that because the board and its employees knew or should have 
known about Ridley’s tendency to overdress in warm weather and confine himself 
to his apartment with the windows shut, their abandonment of Ridley during an 
extreme heat wave proximately caused his death. 
{¶17} Based on the foregoing, the estate failed to allege sufficient facts to 
state a prima facie negligence claim under R.C. 5123.61(C).  Therefore, we do not 
reach the issue of whether R.C. 5123.61(C) expressly imposes liability within the 
meaning of former R.C. 2744.02(B)(5). 
{¶18} The estate also contends that the appellate court erred by affirming 
the trial court’s judgment dismissing the city of Cincinnati Building Department.  
Specifically, the estate challenges the appellate court’s decision to affirm that 
judgment because the appellate brief did not contain any arguments regarding the 
city.  See App.R. 12(A)(2) and 16(A)(7).  However, the estate failed to raise this 
position or set forth any proposition of law regarding the city in its memorandum 
in support of jurisdiction before this court.  Accordingly, we decline to address it.  
See, generally, In re Timken Mercy Med. Ctr. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 81, 87, 572 
N.E.2d 673; S.Ct.Prac.R. III(1). 
{¶19} Therefore, the estate’s first proposition of law is overruled. 
II 
{¶20} In its second proposition of law, the estate asserts that R.C. 
5123.62, 5126.05, 5126.41, and 5126.431, combined with the Enforcement 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, expressly 
impose liability within the meaning of R.C. 2744.02(B)(5), and, therefore, the 
board is not immune from liability.  Without regard to immunity, the appellate 
court held that the estate failed to plead sufficient facts to state a viable claim for 
negligence based upon the duties imposed by R.C. 5123.62 and 5126.431.  Ridley, 
January Term, 2004 
7 
supra, 150 Ohio App.3d 383, 2002-Ohio-6344, 781 N.E.2d 1034, at ¶19.  
However, for the purposes of addressing this proposition of law, we will assume 
that the estate sufficiently pled these claims. 
{¶21} The estate concedes that the board is a political subdivision entitled 
to the general grant of immunity in R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) subject to the exceptions 
set forth in R.C. 2744.02(B).  As relevant here, former R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) as 
amended by Am.Sub.H.B. 215, effective June 30, 1997, provided:  
{¶22} “[A] political subdivision is liable for injury, death, or loss to 
person or property when liability is expressly imposed upon the political 
subdivision by a section of the Revised Code * * *.  Liability shall not be 
construed to exist under another section of the Revised Code merely because that 
section imposes a responsibility or mandatory duty upon a political subdivision, 
because of a general authorization in that section that a political subdivision may 
sue and be sued, or because that section uses the term ‘shall’ in a provision 
pertaining to a political subdivision.”  147 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1150. 
{¶23} In Campbell v. Burton (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 336, 750 N.E.2d 539, 
we interpreted an earlier version of R.C. 2744.02(B)(5), which contained the 
following language: “a political subdivision is liable for injury, death, or loss to 
person or property when liability is expressly imposed upon the political 
subdivision by a section of the Revised Code * * *.”2  We held there that the term 
“liability” referred to either civil or criminal liability.3  Id. at 341, 750 N.E.2d 539. 
                                          
 
2. {¶ a} Campbell was governed by R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) as amended by Am.Sub.S.B. No. 221, 145 
Ohio Laws, Part II, 2211, 2215-2217, effective September 28, 1994, which provided:  
{¶ b} “In addition to the circumstances described in divisions (B)(1) to (4) of this section, a 
political subdivision is liable for injury, death, or loss to persons or property when liability is 
expressly imposed upon the political subdivision by a section of the Revised Code * * *.  Liability 
shall not be construed to exist under another section of the Revised Code merely because a 
responsibility is imposed upon a political subdivision or because of a general authorization that a 
political subdivision may sue and be sued.” 
 
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{¶24} Here, the estate concedes that no section of the Revised Code 
expressly imposes liability for failure to perform the duties in R.C. 5123.62, 
5126.05, 5126.41, and 5126.431 and concedes that former R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) 
prohibits construing liability to exist solely because a statute imposes a 
responsibility or mandatory duty upon a political subdivision.  The estate 
nevertheless asserts that the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
satisfies R.C. 2744.02(B)(5). 
{¶25} Specifically, the estate contends that R.C. 5123.62, 5126.05, 
5126.41, and 5126.431 vested Ridley with certain property interests, which merit 
the protection of due process of law, and that the due process rights within these 
statutes trigger the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which in 
turn supplies the express imposition of liability required by R.C. 2744.02(B)(5). 
{¶26} Although the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
gives Congress the “power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of 
this article,” an act of Congress is not “a section of the Revised Code” pursuant to 
R.C. 2744.02(B)(5).  Furthermore, even if we treated it as such, the estate has not 
pointed to any legislative action taken by the United States Congress pursuant to 
the Enforcement Clause that would abrogate tort immunity or expressly impose a 
                                                                                                                   
3. {¶ a} Since Campbell, and since this case arose, the General Assembly has amended R.C. 
2744.02(B)(5) to permit a political subdivision to be sued under that subdivision only when the 
liability expressly imposed by a section of the Revised Code is civil liability:  
{¶ b} “In addition to the circumstances described in division (B)(1) to (B)(4) of this section, a 
political subdivision is liable for injury, death, or loss to person or property when civil liability is 
expressly imposed upon the political subdivision by a section of the Revised Code * * *.  Civil 
liability shall not be construed to exist under another section of the Revised Code merely because 
that section imposes a responsibility or mandatory duty upon a political subdivision, because that 
section provides for a criminal penalty, because of a general authorization in that section that a 
political subdivision may sue and be sued, or because that section uses the term ‘shall’ in a 
provision pertaining to a political subdivision.”  2002 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 106, effective April 9, 
2003. 
 
January Term, 2004 
9 
penalty for violations of the above statutes or the rights contained therein.  
Accordingly, none of these code sections—R.C. 5123.62, 5126.05, 5126.41, and 
5126.431—through the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
expressly imposes liability within the meaning of former R.C. 2744.02(B)(5). 
{¶27} In this proposition of law, the estate also argues that the appellate 
court erred by not addressing the merits of its constitutional challenge to R.C. 
Chapter 2744 and asks us to deem R.C. Chapter 2744 unconstitutional as violative 
of the right to a remedy, as guaranteed by Section 16, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution. The estate, however, neither raised the constitutionality of R.C. 
Chapter 2744 as a proposition of law in its memorandum in support of jurisdiction 
nor developed the constitutional argument in its brief beyond the bare assertion 
that R.C. Chapter 2744 is unconstitutional as violative of a right to a remedy.  
Accordingly, we decline to address this issue.  See, generally, In re Timken Mercy 
Med. Ctr., supra, 61 Ohio St.3d at 87, 572 N.E.2d 673. 
{¶28} The estate’s second proposition of law is overruled. 
III 
{¶29} Based on the foregoing, we overrule the estate’s first and second 
propositions of law and affirm the judgment of the Hamilton County Court of 
Appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’CONNOR, JJ., concur. 
 
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., dissent. 
_________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J., dissenting. 
{¶30} The primary issue in this appeal is whether appellee Hamilton 
County Board of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities may be held 
liable under R.C. 5123.61(C) for the failure of its employees, appellees Jerry 
Clark and Sonjua Day, to report each other’s neglect of Jerome Ridley.  
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Specifically, the estate of Jerome Ridley asks whether, for purposes of the 
immunity exception in former R.C. 2744.02(B)(5), 147 Ohio Laws, Part I, 909, 
1150, R.C. 5123.61(C) expressly imposes liability upon a county board of mental 
retardation and developmental disabilities for failure to report the abuse or neglect 
of a mentally retarded or developmentally disabled person. 
{¶31} This issue is easily resolved.  In Campbell v. Burton (2001), 92 
Ohio St.3d 336, 342-343, 750 N.E.2d 539, we held that pursuant to an earlier 
version of R.C. 2744.02(B)(5), see 1994 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 221, 145 Ohio Laws, 
Part II, 2211, 2215-2217, which contained the same operative language as the 
version of R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) now at issue, a board of education may be held 
liable when one of its employees fails to perform the duty to report known or 
suspected child abuse in violation of R.C. 2151.421.  Since there is no relevant 
distinction between R.C. 5123.61 and 2151.421 or between their corresponding 
penalty provisions, and because the situation in this case cannot be distinguished 
from the situation that produced our judgment in Campbell, the above question 
must be answered in the affirmative.4 
                                          
 
4. The board and amicus curiae, County Commissioners’ Association of Ohio, make several 
attempts to distinguish this case from Campbell.  Their supporting arguments, to a large extent, 
come to rest on the erroneous assumption that the board and its employees have the same legal 
identity or persona for purposes of R.C. 5123.61(C).  This assumption is most prominent, for 
example, in amicus curiae’s argument that this case differs from Campbell because it “deals with 
[board] employees who have a duty to report suspected abuse or neglect of a retarded individual to 
themselves. * * * For all intents and purposes, a report was made to [the board] in this case.  When 
the employees knew of the [neglect], it was known by the agency.”  The assumption is obviously 
false, however, since R.C. 5123.61(C) expressly requires an “employee of a county board of 
mental retardation and developmental disabilities” to report such information “to the county board 
of mental retardation and developmental disabilities.”  Under amicus’s reasoning, moreover, no 
board employee could ever be accused of failure to report under R.C. 5123.61(C), since the 
employee’s own knowledge of abuse or neglect simultaneously triggers and fulfills the duty to 
report.  In this semantical domain, compliance with the reporting requirements becomes a needless 
inquiry because the board employee who withholds information concerning abuse or neglect is 
nevertheless deemed to have imparted that information to the board. 
 
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11 
{¶32} The majority manages, however, to avoid this issue.  In addressing 
the validity of the various claims included within the estate’s second proposition 
of law, the majority is willing to “assume that the estate sufficiently pled these 
claims.”  But in addressing the validity of the estate’s failure-to-report claim, the 
majority concludes that “the estate failed to allege sufficient facts to state a prima 
facie negligence claim under R.C. 5123.61(C).” 
{¶33} In disposing of the estate’s first proposition of law on this 
alternative ground, the majority reasons: 
{¶34} “Here, the board itself does not have a duty to report, as it is not a 
person listed in division (C)(2); however, Clark and Day, as employees of the 
board, had such a duty.  See R.C. 5123.61(C)(2)(c).  Although the estate cites 
R.C. 5123.61 in its complaint, it does not allege that either Clark or Day failed to 
make a report pursuant to division (C)(1).  Even if we were to infer that these 
employees breached this duty, the estate has not alleged sufficient facts to 
demonstrate that the failure to report contributed to Ridley’s death; rather, the 
estate alleges that because the board and its employees knew or should have 
known about Ridley’s tendency to overdress in warm weather and confine himself 
to his apartment with the windows shut, their abandonment of Ridley during an 
extreme heat wave proximately caused his death.” 
{¶35} The majority’s insistence on pinpoint pleading is antithetical to the 
guiding principle that “[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial 
justice.”  Civ.R. 8(F).  Indeed, the majority essentially upholds the dismissal of 
this claim on the very basis that it is pled with “the simplicity and brevity of 
statement which the[ ] [civil] rules contemplate.”  Civ.R. 84. 
{¶36} To begin with, the majority intimates that the estate merely “cites 
R.C. 5123.61 in its complaint.”  This, however, is not the case.  In paragraph 
seven of its second amended complaint, the estate specifically alleges that 
“[u]nder ORC § 5123.61 * * *, [the board] and its employees had the statutory 
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duty to report any neglect or abuse of RIDLEY, as well as a duty to report any 
unusual circumstances or emergencies affecting RIDLEY’S health, safety, and 
well being.”5 
{¶37} The complaint further alleges that neither Clark nor Day “ever 
communicated to * * * interested health care authorities or departments that 
RIDLEY’S Service Assistant (Day) was ‘done with him,’ ” that “the duties owed 
to RIDLEY by [the board] and its employees” were breached, and that these 
employees “acted within the scope of their * * * employment in * * * breaching 
the statutory duty of care they owed to RIDLEY.”  Moreover, the complaint 
alleges that “RIDLEY’S death was proximately caused by [the board’s] breach of 
duty” and that, in the alternative, the board’s employees “failed to do an act which 
it was [their] duty to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would 
lead a reasonable man to realize that failure to so act created [a] gross and 
unreasonable risk of physical harm to RIDLEY.” 
{¶38} These latter allegations (going to the elements of breach of duty 
and proximate cause), although not specifically directed to the reporting duties in 
R.C. 5123.61(C), are of sufficient breadth to encompass the totality of duties 
claimed to be owed throughout the complaint.  The majority’s analysis, which 
basically treats these general allegations as being strictly limited to the estate’s 
abandonment claim, is unfair, especially since the complaint contains a separate 
allegation in which it specifically accuses the board of “proximately causing 
RIDLEY’S death by abandoning his care.” 
                                          
 
5. The majority’s opening remark that “the board itself does not have a duty to report, as it is not a 
person listed in division (c)(2),” is insignificant.  In Campbell, we found that “a political 
subdivision may be held liable for failure to perform a duty expressly imposed on its employee by 
R.C. 2151.421.”  Id., 92 Ohio ST.3d at 343, 750 N.E.2d 539. 
 
January Term, 2004 
13 
{¶39} Moreover, there is no rule that a complaint must set forth a specific 
set of facts to support its general allegations of negligence or, in the majority’s 
words, “to demonstrate” proximate cause.  Quite the contrary:  “In order for a 
court to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted (Civ.R. 12(B)(6)), it must appear beyond doubt from the complaint that 
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to recovery.”  O’Brien v. Univ. 
Community Tenants Union, Inc. (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 71 O.O.2d 223, 327 
N.E.2d 753, syllabus. 
{¶40} Indeed, the syllabus in O’Brien expressly follows Conley v. Gibson 
(1957), 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80.  In Conley, the United States 
Supreme Court explained: 
{¶41} “The respondents also argue that the complaint failed to set forth 
specific facts to support its general allegations of discrimination and that its 
dismissal is therefore proper. The decisive answer to this is that the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon 
which he bases his claim. To the contrary, all the Rules require is 'a short and 
plain statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the 
plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. The illustrative forms 
appended to the Rules plainly demonstrate this. Such simplified ‘notice pleading’ 
is made possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial 
procedures established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both 
claim and defense and to define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues.  
Following the simple guide of Rule 8(f) that ‘all pleadings shall be so construed 
as to do substantial justice,’ we have no doubt that petitioners' complaint 
adequately set forth a claim and gave the respondents fair notice of its basis. The 
Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one 
misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.”  
(Footnotes omitted.)  Id. at 47-48, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80. 
{¶42} In reality, the majority never considers the relevant issue under 
Civ.R. 12(B)(6), which is whether there is any provable set of facts that would 
entitle the estate to relief under R.C. 5123.61(C).  O’Brien, supra.  However, it is 
readily conceivable that the estate could “demonstrate that the failure to report 
contributed to Ridley’s death” by showing that an immediate report made by 
either Clark or Day would have resulted in protective action being taken before 
Ridley died.  Instead, requiring considerably more of the estate’s complaint than 
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the party is entitled to 
relief,” Civ.R. 8(A), the majority upholds the dismissal of the estate’s failure-to-
report claim on grounds that are suspiciously reminiscent of the very obdurate and 
antiquated “fact pleading” standards that the Civil Rules were designed to replace. 
{¶43} For all of the foregoing reasons, I must respectfully dissent. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissenting 
opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Sanders & Associates and Raymond L. Katz; and Robert L. Schwartz, for 
appellant. 
 
McCaslin, Imbus & McCaslin and Bernard W. Wharton; and David T. 
Stevenson, Hamilton County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees. 
 
Issac, Brant, Ledman & Teetor, L.L.P., and Mark Landes, urging 
affirmance for amici curiae County Commissioners’ Association of Ohio and the 
Public Children’s Services Association of Ohio. 
___________________