Title: Hall v. Gulledge

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

145 So. 2d 794 (1962)
Frances Day HALL et al.
v.
Evelyn Strickland GULLEDGE et al.
6 Div. 670.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
October 18, 1962.
*795 Rives, Peterson, Pettus & Conway, Birmingham, for appellants.
Smyer, White, Reid & Acker, Birmingham, for appellees.
SIMPSON, Justice.
This is an appeal from a decree sustaining demurrer to a bill for declaratory judgment brought before the enactment of Act #72, Special Session Ala.Legis., 1961, 1947, abolishing such appeals.
Appellants filed their bill alleging in substance the following:
That the complainants Pettus are the owners of Lot 14 and complainant Hall is the owner of Lots 27 and 28 of Block 3 of Redmont Park Subdivision in the City of Birmingham;
That Lots 25 and 26 were conveyed in 1950 by deed from Redmont Land Company, the developer of the subdivision, to Magic City Development Company. This deed imposed certain restrictions on the lots for the benefit of complainants and are enforceable by complainants against respondents who had actual or constructive notice thereof. On August 17, 1959, a deed was executed conveying to respondent Evelyn Strickland Gulledge Lot 26 and also in 1959, a deed was executed conveying Lot 25 to respondent Robbie A. Strickland. There is a common boundary line between Lot 27 and Lots 25 and 26. Complainant Hall has restrictions imposed upon her real property by virtue of deed from Redmont Land Company, Inc. to M. C. Stewart, dated December 1, 1924. Such restrictions preclude more than one dwelling being erected upon such land and prescribe the proximity of such a dwelling both to Lenox Road, the street on which the property faces, and to the side lines of the property, one of which is common to Lots 25 and 26. Complainants Pettus have restrictions placed upon the use of their property by virtue of a deed from Redmont Land Company, Inc., to E. L. Ford, dated January 7, 1926, which are similar to those placed upon complainant Hall's property and placed upon the respondents' property.
The reservations, limitations and restrictions involved, pertinent to decision, read:
The bill avers that violations of the restrictions set forth above are threatened by the respondents and that respondents contend that the side line restriction does not apply to the boundary line between the respondent's property and the Hall property for such line is not a side line but rather a rear line. It also avers that respondents contend that the single dwelling restriction does not prohibit building more than one dwelling on Lots 25-26, considered as an entirety.
The bill sought a declaratory judgment stating that the covenants of the deed mean that a dwellling cannot be built closer than 25 feet from the boundary between Lots 25-26 and Lot 27, and that the said boundary line is a side line of Lots 25-26. Further, that the covenant in the deed relative to a single dwelling means that only one dwelling can be constructed on Lots 25-26 as an entirety.
The respondents filed demurrers to the bill which were sustained by the trial court in a decree also dismissing that aspect of the bill seeking a declaration that respondents could not build a house within 25 feet of the common boundary line between Lot 27 and Lots 25-26. It is from this decree that complainants appeal.
If there was error in sustaining the demurrers, then the decree appealed from must be reversed. We have long been committed to the proposition that the only requirement for a bill for a declaratory judgment to withstand a demurrer is that it state a justiciable controversy. If a justiciable controversy is stated, the demurrer should be overruled. We recently stated the rule as follows:
The same rule has been applied in cases involving bills brought for declaratory judgment praying interpretation of deeds. McCall v. Nettles, 251 Ala. 349, 37 So. 2d 635; Pugh v. Whittle, 240 Ala. 503, 199 So. 851.
Appellees insist that the recognized exception to the general rule should be applied in this case, insisting that the demurrer was properly sustained since as a matter of law the bill showed that appellants had no standing to sue. We cannot agree.
*798 In Scheuer v. Britt, 218 Ala. 270, 118 So. 658, we quoted with approval the following from 4 Thompson on Real Prop., § 3398:
We further stated:
Quoting from the opinion in the same case on a former appeal it was noted:
See 60 A.L.R. 1228.
Again, in Virgin v. Garrett, 233 Ala. 34, 169 So. 711, we stated:
Quoting from an earlier case (McMahon v. Williams, 79 Ala. 288, p. 291) we again approved the above principal in the following language:
Appellees contend that the reservation by the grantor of the right to change or modify the restrictions as to any lot in Redmont Park negates any intention to benefit the lands of other owners. We cannot agree with this contention. To do so would be to construe this language as indicative of his intention to the exclusion of all other language in the deed and all surrounding circumstances. We have in the past given effect to restrictions contained in deeds at the instance of grantees of lots in subdivisions where the grantor had expressly reserved the right to waive, release or annul the restrictions contained in the plot and conveyance. Thrasher v. Bear, 239 Ala. 438, 195 So. 441. It seems to us that the power to change the restrictions is only one factor to be considered in determining the intention of the grantor to give the right of enforcement of the restrictions. All language of the deed should be considered in arriving at the grantor's intention. We believe when all the language of the deed under consideration is considered, it is apparent that these complainants (appellants) have a standing to bring this action. We are impelled to the conclusion that the learned trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer directed to the bill and the decree appealed from must be reversed.
This being our conclusion, we believe that we should not proceed to a determination of the meaning of the restrictions sought to be interpreted. This should be made by the trial court after a consideration of the evidence adduced at a hearing on the merits.
Reversed and remanded.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and MERRILL and HARWOOD, JJ., concur.