Title: Ex parte Kristie Haynes. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Kristie Haynes v. Jason Williams et al.)

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 09/30/2010
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2010
____________________
1081257
____________________
Ex parte Kristie Haynes
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Kristie Haynes
v.
Jason Williams et al.)
(Shelby Circuit Court, CV-06-1375)
MURDOCK, Justice.
Kristie Haynes petitions this Court for a writ of
mandamus directing the trial court to set aside its order
1081257
The trial court's order entering a default judgment
1
indicates that Haynes also named as a defendant Ronald
English, but neither the briefs of the parties nor the
submissions in support of the mandamus petition explain
English's connection to the case.  In any event, Haynes
apparently stipulated that English should be dismissed as a
defendant in the case, and the trial court granted the
dismissal.  English is not involved in this petition.  
2
granting the defendants' motion to set aside the default
judgment entered against them on Haynes's complaint in an
action resulting from a vehicle collision and alleging
negligence and wantonness.  We grant the petition and issue
the writ.
I.  Facts and Procedural History
Though 
not 
stated 
directly, 
it 
appears 
from 
the
submissions filed in conjunction with Haynes's petition that
she was involved in a vehicle collision with a truck driven by
Jason Williams, who was apparently employed by and working in
the line and scope of his employment with Sam's Trucking, Inc.
("Sam's Trucking"), at the time of the accident.  Sam's
Trucking is a corporate affiliate of Casey Trucking, Inc.
("Casey Trucking"), and both operated out of the same premises
and are owned by defendant James Casey.  
Haynes sued Williams, Casey, Sam's Trucking, and Casey
Trucking on October 26, 2006,  alleging that she sustained
1
1081257
3
severe injuries to her spine and neck as a result of a vehicle
collision caused, she alleged, by the defendants' negligence
and wantonness.  Haynes stated that her medical expenses for
her injuries were $39,500.  She alleged that she sustained
pain and suffering, permanent physical impairment, loss of
employment, loss of income, and loss of quality of life and
that she suffered mental anguish as a result of the accident.
Haynes requested $350,000 in total damages for her injuries.
The complaint was served on the following dates: on Sam's
Trucking on November 28, 2006; on Williams on July 8, 2007;
on Casey on August 6, 2007; on Casey Trucking on September 10,
2007.  For reasons not explained in the submissions before us,
none of the defendants filed responsive pleadings to the
complaint.  Accordingly, Haynes filed for and received from
the trial court an entry of default judgment against all the
defendants on January 15, 2008.  The trial court awarded
Haynes her requested damages of $350,000.  
On February 14, 2008, the defendants filed a "Motion to
Set Aside Default Judgment," in which they requested "pursuant
to Rule 55(c), Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure" that the
trial court set aside its January 15, 2008, order of default
1081257
The Kirtland Court held that
2
"a trial court's broad discretionary authority under
Rule 55(c)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] should not be
exercised without considering the following three
4
judgment.  The motion provided the following explanation as
the sole ground for the requested relief:
"5. The undersigned is aware of and concedes
that no responsive pleading has been filed on behalf
of his clients, the Defendants in the instant case.
However, that failure to answer, plead or otherwise
defend is purely a matter of oversight on the part
of the attorney and is/was inadvertent.
"6. The Defendants should not be punished for
their attorney's excusable neglect.  They are
prepared to go forward with this litigation."  
The motion was not accompanied by any exhibits or a brief
containing an argument in support of the motion.  
Haynes filed a response to the defendants' motion to set
aside the default judgment in which she noted that the motion
"merely sets forth bare legal conclusions without factual
support."  In conjunction with this observation, she noted
that the defendants did not argue that they were entitled to
relief under any of the three factors for setting aside a
default judgment articulated by this Court in Kirtland v. Fort
Morgan Authority Sewer Service, Inc., 524 So. 2d 600 (Ala.
1988).2
1081257
factors: 1) whether the defendant has a meritorious
defense; 2) whether the plaintiff will be unfairly
prejudiced if the default judgment is set aside; and
3) whether the default judgment was a result of the
defendant's own culpable conduct."
Kirtland, 524 So. 2d at 605.
Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P., provides, in pertinent part:
3
"No postjudgment motion filed pursuant to Rules
50, 52, 55, or 59 shall remain pending in the trial
court for more than ninety (90) days, unless with
the express consent of all the parties, which
consent shall appear of record, or unless extended
by the appellate court to which an appeal of the
judgment would lie, and such time may be further
extended for good cause shown.  A failure by the
trial court to render an order disposing of any
pending 
postjudgment 
motion 
within 
the 
time
permitted hereunder, or any extension thereof, shall
constitute a denial of such motion as of the date of
the expiration of the period."
5
Despite Haynes's objections, the trial court entered an
order on June 5, 2008, purporting to set aside the default
judgment against the defendants.  The following day, Haynes
filed a "Motion to Rescind" the trial court's June 5, 2008,
order pursuant to Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P.   Haynes observed
3
that the trial court had entered its order more than 90 days
after the defendants had filed their motion to set aside the
default judgment, and that there had been no agreement between
the parties to extend the time under which the trial court
1081257
6
could rule on the motion.  Therefore, Haynes argued, the
defendants' motion to set aside the default judgment was
denied by operation of law on May 14, 2008.  
Five months later, on November 10, 2008, the trial court
entered an order granting Haynes's motion to rescind the
court's June 5, 2008, order purporting to set aside the
default judgment, and it reinstated its previous order of
default.  The order also provided that "the Court is
considering Defendants' Motion To Set Aside Default Judgment
as a 60(b)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] motion."  Haynes filed two
responses objecting to the trial court's construing the
defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment as a
Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion.  She again noted that the
motion failed to set forth substantive reasons why the
defendants were entitled to have the default motion set aside
under the Kirtland factors.  She also stated various reasons
why she believed the defendants were not entitled to relief
under Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. 
On December 24, 2008, the defendants filed what they
styled "Defendants' Argument and Citations to Authority in
Support of Defendants' Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment."
1081257
7
In this motion, the defendants contended, for the first time,
that they were entitled to have the default judgment set aside
under the Kirtland factors.  The defendants attached to this
filing an affidavit from an alleged eyewitness to the accident
as well as records from the Calera Fire and Rescue Department
indicating that Haynes had refused medical treatment and
transport to a hospital at the scene -- intending to show
their meritorious defense.  The filing also included arguments
and authorities for why the defendants believed that the trial
court possessed the authority to construe their original
motion to set aside the default judgment as a Rule 60(b)
motion.  
On June 11, 2009, the trial court entered an order
treating the defendants' motion as a Rule 60(b) motion and
granting that motion, i.e., setting aside the default
judgment.  Haynes petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus
directing the trial court to set aside that order.
II.  Standard of Review
"When considering a petition for a writ of mandamus
compelling a trial court to vacate an order setting aside a
default judgment, the standard this Court applies is whether,
1081257
8
in setting aside the default judgment, the trial court
exceeded its discretion."  Ex parte Bolen, 915 So. 2d 565, 568
(Ala. 2005).
III.  Analysis
Haynes contends that the trial court exceeded its
discretion in construing the defendants' Rule 55(c) motion as
a Rule 60(b) motion.  Haynes argues that once the defendants'
"Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment" was denied by operation
of law under Rule 59.1, on May 14, 2008, the defendants'
remedy was to appeal -- a remedy that the defendants failed to
pursue. 
The defendants contend that the trial court acted
appropriately because, they say, their "Motion to Set Aside
Default Judgment" was a Rule 55(c) motion or, alternatively,
a Rule 60(b) motion.  The defendants acknowledge that the
motion itself stated that it was being filed "pursuant to
Rule 55(c)," but they also note that the motion states that
the failure to file a responsive pleading was the result of
"oversight" and "their attorney's excusable neglect" and that
it was "inadvertent."  They argue that "these contentions are
clearly consistent with Rule 60(b)(1)" and that, after seeking
1081257
9
relief under Rule 55(c), the defendants sought relief in the
alternative under Rule 60(b)(1).  More specifically, the
defendants contend that when their Rule 55(c) motion was
denied by operation of law, it "quickened" the Rule 60(b)
aspect of the motion, allowing it to be considered by the
trial court.  For support, the defendants cite Ex parte Lang,
500 So. 2d 3, 4-5 (Ala. 1986), in which this Court stated, in
pertinent part:
"It is clear that under our Rules of Civil
Procedure the nomenclature of a motion is not
controlling.  Ex parte Hartford Ins. Co., 394 So. 2d
933 (Ala. 1981).  Notwithstanding the designation in
its title, the document filed on October 7, 1985,
was clearly a Rule 60(b) motion (albeit, prematurely
filed) seeking relief under grounds (1) and (6); the
trial court properly treated it as such.  The
Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure do not contemplate
the filing of a Rule 60(b) motion during the
pendency of a Rule 55(c) motion.  But while the
Rules do not contemplate it, they do not preclude
it, either.  Under Rule 59.1, the Rule 55(c) motion
was denied as a matter of law on November 26, 1985
(90 days after August 28, 1985); upon that denial,
the default judgment of August 12 became 'final'
within the contemplation of Rule 60(b) -- '[o]n
motion ... the court may relieve a party ... from a
final judgment' -- and the court was free to
consider the Rule 60(b) motion, which had been
theretofore premature.  We consider that the Rule
60(b) motion was quickened and became a pending
motion as of November 27, 1985, without the
necessity of a refiling.  Thus, the court had
1081257
In this manner, the defendants also seek to avoid any
4
difficulty with the timing of the filing of their purported
Rule 60(b) motion.  If the motion is construed as,
alternatively, both a Rule 55(c) motion and a motion for
relief under Rule 60(b)(1), then the defendants filed their
Rule 60(b) motion within four months after the initial
judgment, as permitted by Rule 60(b).  If, on the other hand,
the defendants' motion was not considered filed as a
Rule 60(b) motion until the trial court construed it as such
in its November 10, 2008, order, then it was not timely filed.
10
jurisdiction of that motion at the time of its order
granting the motion on December 3, 1985."4
Lang involved successive Rule 55(c) and Rule 60(b)
motions, 
but 
as 
the 
defendants 
observe, 
this 
Court
subsequently allowed an alternative Rule 55(c) and Rule 60(b)
motion in Ex parte Vaughan, 539 So. 2d 1060, 1061 (Ala. 1989).
As the Court of Civil Appeals has succinctly explained:
"[W]hile it frowns upon the practice, Alabama law
allows a party to join a request for relief from
judgment under Rule 60(b) with a request for a
post-judgment remedy affected by Rule 59.1's 90-day
'automatic denial.'  See Ex parte Vaughan, 539 So.
2d 1060 (Ala. 1989).  In Vaughan, our Supreme Court
considered the propriety of a motion seeking an
order pursuant to Rule 55(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.,
setting aside a default judgment and alternatively
seeking relief from the judgment pursuant to Rule
60(b).  Relying upon its earlier opinion in Ex parte
Lang, 500 So. 2d 3, 5 (Ala. 1986), the Vaughan court
concluded that such a motion seeking alternative
relief was not precluded by the Rules of Civil
Procedure, although 'the better practice is to file
a Rule 60(b) motion only when there is a final
judgment in the case.'  539 So. 2d at 1061."
1081257
11
Ex parte Gamble, 709 So. 2d 67, 70 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998).
The problem with the defendants' argument is that in the
motion filed here, no distinction is made between the grounds
for relief under Rule 55(c) and those for relief under
Rule 60(b).  The defendants' motion makes no mention of Rule
60(b), but, more importantly, in order plausibly to be
considered a viable Rule 60(b) motion it must ask for relief
on grounds that amount to more than a request for a mere
reconsideration of the denial of the defendants' original
Rule 55 motion.  Here, the sole ground for relief stated in
the motion was the defendants' attorney's "inadvertence" and
"excusable neglect."  Because there existed nothing in the
motion to distinguish the Rule 55(c) motion from the purported
Rule 60(b) motion, any Rule 60(b) aspect to the motion would
simply constitute a motion to "reconsider" the Rule 55(c)
motion.  
In McIntyre v. Satch Realty, Inc., 961 So. 2d 135, 138-39
(Ala. Civ. App. 2006), the Court of Civil Appeals stated:
"Although McIntyre and 4M's Rule 60(b) motion
provided more factual detail than their previously
denied Rule 55(c) motion had and although their Rule
60(b) 
motion 
actually explained the allegedly
meritorious defenses to which they had merely
alluded in their previous motion, 'the relief sought
1081257
12
reveals 
that 
[McIntyre 
and 
4M 
were] 
simply
attempting to have a second review of the [default]
judgment and to have the trial court reconsider its
previous denial of [their] post-judgment motion.'
Foster v. Foster, 636 So. 2d 467, 468 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1994).  Rule 60(b), however, cannot serve as a
basis for a motion that, in effect, seeks a
reconsideration of matters already considered by the
trial court in a previous postjudgment motion when
the facts alleged in the Rule 60(b) motion 'were
known by the moving party at the time of his
original [postjudgment] motion.'  Ex parte Dowling,
477 So. 2d 400, 403 (Ala. 1985).  Such a Rule 60(b)
motion, and a subsequent appeal of the denial of
such a motion, cannot be used as a substitute for an
appeal of the trial court's original judgment.  See,
e.g., Landers v. Landers, 812 So. 2d 1212, 1216
(Ala. Civ. App. 2001) ('Alabama precedent is clear
that a Rule 60(b) motion may not be used to seek
reconsideration of a trial court's denial of a
postjudgment motion, nor are Rule 60(b) motions
substitutes for appeal.'); and Pace v. Jordan, 348
So. 2d 1061 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977) (having failed to
obtain review by appeal following denial of his
postjudgment motion for a new trial, the plaintiff
may not obtain review pursuant to the filing of a
Rule 60(b) motion, because that rule does not
provide a substitute for an appeal)."
(Emphasis added.)  See also Ex parte Dowling, 477 So. 2d 400,
403 (Ala. 1985) (stating that "[w]here the facts alleged in
the motion to reconsider were known by the moving party at the
time of his original motion, Rule 60(b) does not authorize a
motion to reconsider"); Brown v. Martin, 394 So. 2d 375, 377
(Ala. Civ. App. 1980) (declining to treat appellant's motion
to reconsider an order denying his motion to set aside a
1081257
Compare Continental Grain Co. v. Smallwood, 669 So. 2d
5
995, 997 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995):
"We first note that the employer in the case sub
judice is not attempting to avoid the strictures of
Rule 59.1 by asking this court to treat a properly
filed Rule 55 motion as a Rule 60(b) motion. See,
for example, Sexton v. Prisock, 495 So. 2d 581 (Ala.
1986); Ex parte Adams, 534 So. 2d 626 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1988); Ex parte Colonial Life & Accident
Insurance Co., 410 So. 2d 73 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982);
and Carnes v. Carnes, 365 So. 2d 981 (Civ. App.
1978), cert. denied, 365 So. 2d 985 (Ala. 1979).
"The employer's motion specifically asked for
relief pursuant to Rule 55 or Rule 60, and
enumerated specific grounds for relief in each of
the alternative theories.  At most, the employer's
Rule 60 motion was filed prematurely, i.e., before
there was a final judgment."
(Some emphasis original; some emphasis added.)  As previously
noted, Lang involved separate and successive postjudgment
motions; the second motion expressly asserted grounds for
relief under Rules 60(b)(1) and (6) that, for all that appears
from the opinion of the Court, had not been raised in the
earlier motion.
13
default judgment as a motion for relief under either Rule
60(b)(1) or 60(b)(6) because the "motion was nothing more than
a motion for the trial court to reconsider its previous order.
Practically nothing different was presented by the motion to
reconsider than was presented by the motion to set aside the
default judgment.").   
5
1081257
14
Similar to the situation in McIntyre, the defendants in
their December 24, 2008, filing related information concerning
their alleged meritorious defense that could have been
presented in their initial February 14, 2008, motion.
(Specifically, the defendants explained that accident records
and eyewitness testimony indicated that Haynes was not injured
in the accident.)  In short, the substance of this subsequent
filing confirmed that the defendants were simply attempting,
through Rule 60(b), to obtain another review of the denial of
their postjudgment motion for relief from the default
judgment. 
The lack of any distinction in the grounds for relief
based on Rule 55(c) as opposed to Rule 60(b) in the
defendants' motion along with the fact that the defendants
presented information in their subsequent filing that could
have been presented in their original motion prohibits our
viewing the defendants' motion as, alternatively, both a Rule
55(c) motion and a Rule 60(b) motion; to do so would be to
permit a Rule 60(b) motion to be used as a substitute for an
appeal.  See Dowling, 477 So. 2d at 404 (noting that "[a]
1081257
15
motion to reconsider cannot be used as a substitute for an
appeal").
IV.  Conclusion
The defendants' motion to set aside the default judgment
cannot succeed as a motion seeking relief under both Rule
55(c) and Rule 60(b).  Even if it could be deemed a motion
asking in the alternative for relief under Rule 60(b), the
defendants' motion would in this respect add nothing to the
previously denied Rule 55(c) motion and thus would constitute
an improper attempt to use a Rule 60(b) motion as "a
substitute 
for 
an 
appeal 
of 
the 
original 
judgment."
Accordingly, the trial court erred in treating the defendants'
motion to set aside the default judgment as a Rule 60(b)
motion and in granting it.  We therefore grant Haynes's
mandamus petition and direct the trial court to set aside its
order granting the defendants' motion and to reinstate its
default judgment.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin,
Parker, and Shaw, JJ., concur.