Title: Brown et al. v. Division of Family Services et al.

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
CAROL 
LYNN 
BROWN 
and 
JOSEPH DEAN COOPER, 
 
Respondents Below- 
Appellants, 
 
v. 
 
DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES 
and CASA, 
 
Petitioners Below- 
Appellees. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 28, 2001 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Family Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  File No. 00-08-06TPR 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: July 22, 2002 
  Decided: August 8, 2002 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, HOLLAND, BERGER, and 
STEELE, Justices (constituting the Court en banc). 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 8th day of August 2002, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
Carol Lynn Brown (“Mother”) and Joseph Dean Cooper 
(“Father”) filed this appeal, pro se, from a Family Court judgment 
terminating their respective parental rights as to their two minor children.  
The Court appointed Margaret R. Cooper, Esquire to represent Mother and 
Father on appeal.  After full briefing and oral argument before the Court en 
banc, we reversed the Family Court judgment1 on the ground that the parents 
                                                 
1 Brown v. Division of Family Servs., 2002 WL 181252 (Del. Supr.). 
 
 
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were not given proper notice of their right to request court-appointed counsel 
and demonstrate their indigence in accordance with Lassiter v. Department 
of Social Services.2  Accordingly, we remanded the matter to the Family 
Court with directions to hold both the Lassiter hearing and the termination 
hearing on an expedited basis.  Jurisdiction was retained. 
 
(2) 
On February 13, 2002, the Family Court informed this Court 
that the Mother’s location was unknown and that, despite best efforts, the 
Family Court was unable to personally serve her with notice of the 
scheduled hearings.  The Family Court therefore requested additional time to 
return the matter from remand in order to comply with the statutory 
requirements for effectuating service of process on Mother by publication in 
the newspaper.3  We granted an additional sixty days to return the matter 
from remand while encouraging the Family Court to continue pursuing 
every reasonable avenue to locate Mother and personally serve her.  The 
record indicates that Mother ultimately was served personally with notice of 
the scheduled Family Court hearings on March 15, 2002. 
                                                 
2 452 U.S. 18, 33 (1981). 
3 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1107(c) (requiring notice by publication in the 
newspaper once per week for three successive weeks). 
 
 
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(3) 
The Family Court issued its report following remand on April 
25, 2002.  In its report, the Family Court states that Father, represented by 
court-appointed counsel,4 appeared at the termination hearing and presented 
a signed, sworn document reflecting his consent to the termination of his 
parental rights.  The Family Court reviewed with Father the provisions of the 
consent form and determined that Father had knowingly and voluntarily 
consented to the termination of his parental rights.  The Family Court 
accepted Father’s consent and ordered that his parental rights be terminated. 
 
(4) 
As to Mother, the Family Court determined that Mother had 
been personally served with notice of the termination hearing and with 
notice of her right to seek the appointment of counsel for purposes of the 
hearing.  The notice stated, among other things, that the Family Court would 
construe Mother’s failure to appear at the hearing as a waiver of the right to 
counsel and a waiver of the right to oppose termination of her parental 
rights.  Despite proper notice, Mother failed to appear at the hearing.  The 
Family Court considered evidence presented by the Division of Family 
Services (DFS) and the Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA).  The 
                                                 
4 The Family Court held a Lassiter hearing on February 13, 2002, at which Father 
appeared and requested appointment of counsel.  The Family Court found Father to be 
indigent and appointed counsel, Margaret Cooper, to represent him. 
 
 
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Family Court found by clear and convincing evidence that Mother had failed 
to plan adequately for her children’s physical needs or their mental and 
emotional health and development.  The Family Court further found that 
both children had been in the care of DFS for more than a year, that DFS’s 
efforts at reunification had been reasonable, and that it was in the children’s 
best interest that Mother’s parental rights be terminated for the purpose of 
adoption. 
 
(5) 
Upon receipt of the Family Court’s report following remand, 
the Clerk of this Court sent a letter, based upon the Family Court’s findings 
on remand, requesting that counsel either file a stipulation of dismissal of the 
appeal or file a statement of counsel’s position why the appeal should not be 
dismissed.  Margaret Cooper, who previously had been appointed by this 
Court to represent both Mother and Father on appeal, wrote to the Clerk 
indicating that she could sign a stipulation of dismissal as to Father but that 
she could not reach Mother in order to determine Mother’s position.  Ms. 
Cooper further stated that, even if she could reach Mother, Mother 
consistently had refused to communicate with her.  Ms. Cooper requested 
further direction from this Court. 
 
 
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(6) 
This Court directed Ms. Cooper to personally serve Mother 
with a letter notifying Mother that if she failed to respond within ten days, 
this Court would affirm the Family Court judgment given Mother’s failure to 
pursue the appeal.  Ms. Cooper wrote to the Court on June 26, 2002.  She 
enclosed a copy of her letter to Mother and an affidavit from the process 
server who personally served Mother with the letter.  Ms. Cooper stated that 
Mother had failed to respond to the letter.  Ms. Cooper further stated that, 
while Mother’s failure to respond appeared to reflect Mother’s affirmative 
decision not to pursue the appeal, Ms. Cooper could not sign a stipulation on 
Mother’s behalf agreeing to dismissal of the appeal.  Thereafter, the Clerk 
directed Ms. Cooper to file a stipulation of dismissal on behalf of Father by 
July 22, 2002, which she did.  The Clerk further indicated that this Court 
would take the matter under advisement as to Mother. 
 
(7) 
Having considered this matter very carefully, we find it 
manifest that this appeal must be dismissed as to both Mother and Father.  
The record reflects that Mother was personally served with notice of the 
termination hearing on remand below and was warned that her failure to 
appear would be construed as her consent to termination of her parental 
rights.  Mother failed to appear at the hearing.  Furthermore, Mother was 
 
 
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personally served with notice that her failure to pursue her appeal in this 
Court would result in affirmance of the Family Court’s order terminating her 
parental rights.  Despite this notice, Mother has failed to appear and 
prosecute her appeal.  Her failure to respond and to diligently prosecute this 
matter can only be construed as her acquiescence in the Family Court’s 
judgment terminating her parental rights. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Family Court following remand, dated April 25, 2002, is AFFIRMED.  This 
appeal is hereby DISMISSED.  The mandate shall issue immediately. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
Justice