Title: In the Matter of Hayes

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13388 
IN THE MATTER OF JAMES HAYES. 
 
 
November 10, 2023. 
 
 
Attorney at Law, Disciplinary proceeding, Disbarment.  Fraud. 
 
 
The respondent attorney, James Hayes, appeals from an order 
of a single justice of this court disbarring him from the 
practice of law.  We affirm. 
 
1.  Background.  On June 30, 2020, bar counsel filed a 
four-count petition for discipline with the Board of Bar 
Overseers (board) against the respondent, alleging violations of 
the rules of professional conduct then in effect.1  Count one 
alleged that the respondent advised and assisted a client in 
using improper, meritless, and fraudulent strategies to conceal 
lottery winnings from the Probate and Family Court (probate 
court) and the mother of the client's children,2 including by 
 
1 In instances where the current versions of the rules of 
professional conduct contain substantially the same language as 
those in effect during the events at issue, we cite to the 
current versions for the sake of simplicity.  See Matter of 
Ablitt, 486 Mass. 1011, 1013 n.5 (2021). 
 
2 This was alleged to involve violations of Mass. R. Prof. 
C. 1.2 (a), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1313 (2015) (failing to 
accomplish lawful objectives by reasonably available means); 
rule 1.2 (d) (assisting or counselling client to engage in 
conduct known to be fraudulent); Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4 (a), as 
appearing in 471 Mass. 1425 (2015) (unlawfully obstructing 
another party's access to evidence or unlawfully altering, 
destroying, or concealing document having potential evidentiary 
value); rule 3.4 (c) (knowingly disobeying obligation under 
rules of tribunal); Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (a), as appearing in 
2 
 
filing a frivolous bankruptcy petition,3 and making knowing 
misrepresentations in court proceedings.4  Count one also alleged 
that the respondent failed to adequately explain the matter so 
as to permit the client to make informed decisions about 
representation, failed to communicate in writing the scope of 
his representation and the basis of the fees to be charged,5 and 
improperly required the client to waive enforcement of ethical 
rules in signing the fee agreement.6 
 
Count two alleged that the respondent assisted his client 
in engaging in fraudulent conduct, unlawfully obstructed another 
party's access to evidence and information, and knowingly 
disobeyed court orders.7 
 
Count three alleged that the respondent failed to maintain 
accounting records for three trust accounts,8 failed to provide 
 
471 Mass. 1483 (2015) (violation of rules of professional 
conduct); rule 8.4 (c) (dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation); rule 8.4 (d) (conduct prejudicial to 
administration of justice); and rule 8.4 (h) (fitness to 
practice law). 
 
3 This was alleged to be a violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 
3.1, as appearing in 471 Mass. 1414 (2015) (meritorious claims 
and contentions), and rule 8.4 (a), (c), (d), and (h). 
 
4 This was alleged to be a violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 
3.3 (a) (1) and (2), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1416 (2015) 
(candor toward tribunal); and rule 8.4 (c) and (d). 
 
5 This was alleged to be a violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 
1.4 (b), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1319 (2015) (communication 
with clients) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5 (b) (1), as appearing in 
463 Mass. 1302 (2012) (communication about fees). 
 
6 This was alleged to be a violation of rule 1.2(a), rule 
1.4(b), and rule 8.4(c), (d), and (h). 
 
7 Count two alleges violations of rule 1.2 (d); rule 3.4 (a) 
and (c); and rule 8.4(a), (c), (d), and (h). 
 
8 This was alleged to be a violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 
1.15 (f) (1), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1380 (2015) (trust 
account documentation). 
3 
 
the client with itemized billing or notice of withdrawals,9 made 
misrepresentations to the client's successor counsel that he had 
provided an accounting to the client and to bar counsel,10 and 
failed to provide the client with his file upon request or 
promptly render a full accounting of trust funds upon final 
distribution.11  Additionally, count three alleged that the 
respondent intentionally misused client funds with intent to 
deprive and resulting deprivation,12 or, in the alternative, 
charged and collected clearly excessive fees;13 and that the 
respondent knowingly charged the client for unnecessary and 
meritless work for the sole purpose of extracting money.14 
 
Finally, count four alleged that the respondent engaged in 
additional dishonest conduct by causing the client to withdraw 
his first bar complaint in exchange for a small refund and by 
drafting the withdrawal letter to bar counsel.15 
 
After a five-day evidentiary hearing, at which the 
respondent was represented by counsel, the hearing committee 
issued a report finding that bar counsel had proved all of the 
charged violations and recommending that the respondent be 
disbarred.  The board voted to adopt the hearing committee's 
factual findings and legal conclusions, as well as its 
recommendation of disbarment.16  Two members of the board wrote a 
 
9 This was alleged to be a violation of rule 1.15 (d) (2) 
(accounting). 
 
10 This was alleged to be a violation of rule 8.4 (c). 
 
11 This was alleged to be a violation of rule 1.15 (d) (1) 
(accounting) and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16 (e), as appearing in 471 
Mass. 1395 (2015) (terminating representation). 
 
12 This was alleged to be a violation of rule 1.15 (b) 
(segregation of trust funds) and rule 8.4 (c). 
 
13 This was alleged to be a violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 
1.5 (a), as amended, 480 Mass. 1315 (2018) (clearly excessive 
fees). 
 
14 This was alleged to be a violation of rule 1.5 (a) and 
rule 8.4 (c). 
15 Count four alleged violations of S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 10, 
as appearing in 425 Mass. 1313 (1997), and rule 8.4(c) and (h). 
 
16 One member of the board recused herself. 
4 
 
separate concurring opinion to express disagreement with the 
majority's reasoning, but they agreed that disbarment was 
appropriate.17 
 
The board thereafter filed an information in the county 
court pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 8 (6), as appearing in 453 
Mass. 1310 (2009), recommending that the respondent be 
disbarred.  After a hearing, a single justice of this court 
concluded that the board's factual findings, with one minor 
exception, were "amply" supported by the record and agreed that 
the allegations of misconduct had been proved as charged.  The 
single justice imposed the recommended sanction of disbarment, 
and the respondent appealed, pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:23 (b), 
471 Mass. 1303 (2015).18 
 
2.  Discussion.  On appeal, the respondent does not raise 
challenges to most of the detailed factual findings made by the 
hearing committee or to the violations of the rules of 
professional conduct stemming therefrom.  See notes 2-15, supra.  
He instead focuses on one specific finding, which he believes 
undergirds the board's recommendation of disbarment, concerning 
whether he advised the client to engage in a fraudulent scheme.  
 
17 Specifically, the concurrence took issue with the 
majority's conclusion that the respondent's charging of clearly 
excessive fees constituted intentional misuse of client funds 
with deprivation. 
 
18 The respondent has filed a motion to supplement the 
record with (1) reformatted copies of the transcripts of the 
evidentiary hearing; and (2) additional materials outside the 
record below.  We grant the motion insofar as it concerns the 
hearing transcripts, but otherwise deny the motion.  The 
additional materials consist principally of documents that the 
respondent failed to offer as evidence at the hearing, as well 
as documents that were deemed irrelevant by the hearing 
committee.  See Matter of Diviacchi, 491 Mass. 1003, 1007 n.8 
(2022); Matter of Dragon, 440 Mass. 1023, 1024 (2003).  A 
portion of these materials was already the subject of a pro se 
filing seeking to expand the record before the single justice.  
Like the single justice, we decline to consider them.  See 
Matter of Gannett, 489 Mass. 1007, 1010 (2022).  Moreover, we 
note that many of the omitted materials are "cumulative of 
argument and evidence" that was considered by the hearing 
committee, and do not "detract[] from the conclusion that a 
sanction less than disbarment is not warranted."  See Matter of 
Dragon, supra. 
5 
 
He also takes issue with the determinations of misconduct 
related to his filing of a bankruptcy petition, and a petition 
for interlocutory relief filed in the Appeals Court. 
 
In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, "[t]he 
subsidiary findings of the hearing committee, as adopted by the 
board, shall be upheld if supported by substantial evidence" 
(quotations and citations omitted).  Matter of Diviacchi, 475 
Mass. 1013, 1019 (2016).  Within this context, "[t]he hearing 
committee . . . is the sole judge of credibility, and arguments 
hinging on such determinations generally fall outside our proper 
scope of review."  Id. at 1018-1019, quoting Matter of McBride, 
449 Mass. 154, 161-162 (2007).  After carefully reviewing the 
record, we agree with the single justice that the hearing 
committee's findings of misconduct are supported by substantial 
evidence. 
 
The misconduct at issue arises from the respondent's 
representation of a client who won the Massachusetts lottery in 
August 2013.  Shortly after the client received his winnings in 
a lump-sum payment, the client's ex-girlfriend filed a complaint 
in the probate court, seeking an increase in child support.  The 
probate court subsequently entered temporary orders prohibiting 
the client from spending or transferring his winnings (and 
later, certain automobiles), and appointed a receiver to hold 
the funds.  After the first such order issued, the client began 
consulting with the respondent about the probate court matter 
and his lottery winnings.  The hearing committee found, and the 
board accepted, that the respondent advised him on an (improper) 
strategy to conceal these assets from the probate court and the 
client's ex-girlfriend by falsely claiming that a prior verbal 
agreement existed between the client and his brother to split 
the lottery winnings on a fifty-fifty basis. 
 
The respondent contests this finding, intimating that such 
an agreement between the brothers did exist, or that, at the 
very least, the respondent believed as much.19  In so doing, he 
challenges testimony from the client that was explicitly 
 
19 It is worth noting the internal inconsistency of this 
particular argument.  As described infra, the respondent 
disbursed a substantial portion of the lottery winnings to 
himself as purported legal fees for services performed on behalf 
of the client.  If, as the respondent suggests, he genuinely 
believed these funds corresponded to a "share" owned by the 
client's brother, he intentionally misused the brother's funds 
to pay himself for services rendered to the client. 
6 
 
credited by the hearing committee.  That credibility 
determination, however, was not inconsistent with other findings 
or the over-all chronology of events.  See Matter of Murray, 455 
Mass. 872, 880 (2010) ("The hearing committee's credibility 
determinations will not be rejected unless it can be said with 
certainty that [a] finding was wholly inconsistent with another 
implicit finding" [quotations and citation omitted]).  The 
client first consulted with the respondent on or about September 
3, 2013, before any assertions were made that a portion of the 
lottery winnings belonged to the client's brother.  While the 
respondent argues that other portions of the client's testimony 
were not adopted by the hearing committee, the hearing committee 
was not required to take an all-or-nothing approach in assessing 
witness credibility.  See Matter of Saab, 406 Mass. 315, 328 
(1989).  Accordingly, there was no error in the single justice's 
determination that the respondent advised the client to engage 
in a fraudulent scheme. 
 
In furtherance of the goal of improperly concealing the 
client's lottery winnings, the respondent advised and assisted 
the client in pursuing a series of activities that the 
respondent knew to be fraudulent or in violation of court 
orders.  These activities included setting up trust accounts for 
the sole purpose of secreting the lottery funds in the 
respondent's interest on lawyers' trust account (and 
periodically disbursing portions those funds to himself) in 
violation of orders of the probate court, making intentional 
misrepresentations about the client's assets in court 
proceedings, and obstructing and filing a frivolous bankruptcy 
petition of behalf of the client for the sole purpose of staying 
enforcement of the probate court orders.  See Mass. R. Prof. C. 
1.2 (d), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1313 (2015) (assisting or 
counselling client to engage in conduct known to be fraudulent); 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4 (a), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1425 (2015) 
(unlawfully obstructing another party's access to evidence or 
unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document having potential 
evidentiary value); rule 3.4 (c) (knowingly disobeying 
obligation under rules of tribunal); Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (a), 
as appearing in 471 Mass. 1483 (2015) (violation of rules of 
professional conduct); rule 8.4 (c) (dishonesty, fraud, deceit, 
or misrepresentation); rule 8.4 (d) (conduct prejudicial to 
administration of justice); and rule 8.4 (h) (fitness to 
practice law). 
 
Of the many activities that the hearing committee found to 
be in furtherance of this scheme, the respondent takes issue 
with only two.  Specifically, he disputes that his filing of the 
7 
 
bankruptcy petition was improper, asserting that the filing of 
such petitions is recognized as "an ordinary and appropriate 
means of protecting property,"20 and similarly defends his 
subsequent filing of a petition for interlocutory relief in the 
Appeals Court relating to the probate court orders.  As an 
initial matter, "from a disciplinary perspective, [these 
arguments] are . . . largely beside the point because of the 
other very serious misconduct charged and found by the board."  
Matter of Moran, 479 Mass. 1016, 1018 (2018).  Regardless, they 
fail on the merits as well because, as the hearing committee 
found, the respondent did not have a nonfrivolous basis in law 
and fact for the bankruptcy petition.  See Mass. R. Prof. C. 
3.1, as appearing in 471 Mass. 1414 (2015).  The bankruptcy 
petition was "skeletal" by the respondent's own description, and 
it contained numerous falsehoods about the client's financial 
assets.  As the hearing committee found, it was filed for the 
sole, improper purpose of evading the client's child support 
obligations and preventing the client's ex-girlfriend and a 
court-appointed receiver from discovering and obtaining the 
client's assets, in contravention of court orders.  The single 
justice thus did not err in concluding that the bankruptcy 
petition was frivolous and filed in bad faith, as part of an 
improper strategy to conceal the lottery winnings.  See Matter 
of Laroche-St. Fleur, 490 Mass. 1020, 1020 & n.4, 1022-1023 
(2022) (untimely motion and subsequent appeals, which did not 
raise any issue that was not or could not have been raised 
previously, were frivolous and intended merely to delay).  
Indeed, according to the respondent's own testimony, even he did 
not believe he had an adequate legal basis for the bankruptcy 
petition when he filed it on October 9, 2013, and later sought 
interlocutory relief in the Appeals Court for that reason; that 
interlocutory petition was thus similarly improper because, as 
the single justice correctly noted, it was "[i]n furtherance of 
this scheme" to conceal the lottery winnings. 
 
 
20 Notably, this assertion is contrary to the respondent's 
own testimony at the hearing.  In reference to his negotiations 
with the receiver over the joint stipulation filed in the 
bankruptcy court, the respondent testified that he would not 
agree to the inclusion of language indicating that the client 
had filed the bankruptcy petition for the purpose of evading 
child support obligations.  He characterized this language as a 
"poison pill" because it would require the client to "basically 
. . . admit [to] bankruptcy irregularities." 
8 
 
In the course of representing the client, the respondent 
also directed the client to sign an "oppressive and predatory" 
fee agreement, without explaining its terms, and a durable power 
of attorney that gave the respondent "sole discretion" to decide 
what work to perform and what fees to charge, without notice to 
the client or authorization.  See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.15 (d) 
(2), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1380 (2015) (trust account 
documentation).  Pursuant to this fee agreement, the respondent 
withdrew over $78,000 of the client's lottery winnings as 
purported legal fees, without providing the client notice of the 
withdrawals or generating appropriate billing statements, time 
records, or contemporaneous accountings of any kind.  See rule 
1.15 (f) (1) (trust account documentation).  The billing records 
that were introduced in evidence at the hearing were ones that 
the respondent prepared in response to bar counsel's 
investigation.  See Matter of Zankowski, 487 Mass. 140, 147, 149 
(2021) (fraudulent billing supported by substantial evidence 
where, inter alia, attorney testified as to purported basis for 
adding hours to client bills, but failed to produce any 
contemporaneous records or notes to support her version of 
events); Matter of Strauss, 479 Mass. 294, 298 (2018) (declining 
to credit testimony where respondent "provided bar counsel with 
'reconstructed records' to conceal his misuse of the client's 
money"). 
 
Even taken at face value, and as the hearing committee 
found, those records reflect clearly excessive fees, charges for 
fees to which the respondent was not entitled, as well as double 
billing for the same legal work.  Apart from one specific 
instance of double billing, the respondent does not raise 
challenges to these findings on appeal and instead contends that 
imposing the sanction of disbarment is disproportionate for such 
misconduct.  Like the respondent's other claims, this claim 
lacks merit as discussed infra. 
 
In sum, we agree with the single justice that the board's 
findings of misconduct are supported by substantial evidence. 
 
3.  Appropriate sanction.  On appeal, "[w]e review de novo 
the disciplinary sanction imposed by the single justice to 
determine whether it is markedly disparate from judgments in 
comparable cases" (quotations and citation omitted).  Matter of 
Williams, 491 Mass. 1021, 1026 (2023).  In considering the 
appropriate sanction, "the board's recommendation is entitled to 
substantial deference."  Matter of Tobin, 417 Mass. 81, 88 
(1994).  "Our primary concern in bar discipline cases is the 
effect upon, and perception of, the public and the bar, . . . 
9 
 
and we must therefore consider, in reviewing the board's 
recommended sanction, what measure of discipline is necessary to 
protect the public and deter other attorneys from the same 
behavior" (citation omitted).  Matter of Laroche-St. Fleur, 490 
Mass. at 1023–1024. 
 
The respondent contends that the sanction of disbarment is 
disproportionate because the findings of fraud were not 
supported by substantial evidence, an argument that lacks merit 
for the reasons discussed supra.  The respondent also argues 
that it was improper to conclude that his misconduct amounted to 
intentional misuse of client funds with deprivation resulting, 
so as to warrant indefinite suspension or disbarment, without 
precisely quantifying the amount of unearned fees collected. 
 
As an initial matter, it is worth noting that we do not 
view this as an excessive fee case.  Rather, "[t]he entire 
engagement [between the respondent and the client] was imbued 
with fraud and greed."  The respondent "prey[ed] on his client's 
lack of education, mental health issues, and the stress induced 
by the [p]robate [c]ourt proceedings" to draft and have the 
client sign a "predatory" fee agreement and durable power of 
attorney.  That fee agreement gave the respondent sole 
discretion over what matters to pursue, how much to charge for 
each matter, and even how to define a "matter" for billing 
purposes -- all without need to inform the client.  All told, of 
$203,500 in client funds that the respondent held in trust, the 
respondent paid close to one-half of that amount to himself.  
For nearly all of these withdrawals, the client had no notice 
and thus no ability to understand or dispute the purported basis 
for the withdrawal.  Indeed, even the explanations that the 
respondent supplied to the hearing committee for the basis of 
his withdrawals reflect charges for fees to which the respondent 
was not entitled. 
 
The "[k]nowing submission of false or fraudulent bills 
. . . is not equivalent to charging an excessive fee."  Matter 
of Zankowski, 487 Mass. at 151 (dishonest nature of respondent's 
intentional overbilling differentiated her misconduct from cases 
involving charges of excessive fees).  See Matter of Goldstone, 
445 Mass. 551, 566 (2005) ("Where an attorney lacks a good faith 
belief that he has earned and is entitled to the monies, such 
conduct constitutes conversion and misappropriation of client 
funds").  As noted in Matter of Zankowski, supra, other cases 
involving intentional overbilling have resulted in terms of 
suspension.  See id. (listing cases of such misconduct that have 
resulted in one- to four-year suspensions).  In Matter of 
10 
 
Goldstone, supra, however, an attorney who intentionally 
overbilled a corporate client was disbarred because of the 
particularly egregious nature of his misconduct -- he not only 
overbilled in the amount of hundreds of thousands of dollars, 
but his misconduct was aggravated by threats to retain 
additional client funds unless he was paid and by his payment of 
only partial restitution, made after the initiation of 
disciplinary proceedings. 
 
Here, the respondent's misconduct relating to client funds 
was accompanied by independently egregious misconduct -- namely, 
a fraudulent scheme, across multiple courts, to improperly hide 
the client's assets, in violation of court orders.  As the board 
observed, this involved "advancing a blatant falsehood" that the 
client's brother was entitled to one-half of the lottery 
winnings, and "extended to filing fraudulent documents in the 
[p]robate [c]ourt and [b]ankruptcy [c]ourt such as [a] sham list 
of expenses," "intentionally misl[eading] the courts, the 
receiver, and [the client's ex-girlfriend]," and preventing the 
latter from "obtaining the true facts concerning the amount of 
funds available for child support."  Individual acts of 
misconduct contained within this scheme would, standing alone, 
warrant a term of suspension.  See, e.g., Matter of Moran, 479 
Mass. at 1021 ("An intentional misrepresentation to a court 
typically warrants a suspension of at least one year").  When 
considered in its entirety, however, the cumulative effect of 
the respondent's fraudulent scheme warrants a more severe 
sanction.  See Matter of Crossen, 450 Mass. 533, 581 (2008) 
(disbarring attorney who orchestrated elaborate and dishonest 
scheme to extract damaging information from former judicial law 
clerk in effort to discredit judge presiding over client's 
case); Matter of Zadworny, 26 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 722 
(2010) (accepting joint recommendation of indefinite suspension 
where attorney filed false statements in probate court, charged 
excessive fee, and intentionally misused funds held in trust).  
See generally Matter of Saab, 406 Mass. at 326-327 
(consideration of cumulative effect of multiple violations is 
proper). 
 
As the board observed, there are also multiple factors to 
be weighed in aggravation of the respondent's misconduct, and 
none to be weighed in mitigation.  The respondent not only 
orchestrated a fraudulent scheme in which he intentionally 
misled the courts, the receiver, and the mother of his client's 
children, but took advantage of an unsophisticated and 
vulnerable client with a limited education and mental health 
issues.  See Matter of Zak, 476 Mass. 1034, 1041 (2017) (taking 
11 
 
advantage of vulnerable clients serves as aggravating factor).  
This misconduct was further aggravated by the respondent's 
complete inability to recognize the wrongfulness of his conduct, 
see Matter of Bailey, 439 Mass. 134, 152 (2003), and cases 
cited, and his lack of candor before the hearing committee, see 
Matter of Eisenhauer, 426 Mass. 448, 455-456 (1998).21  In these 
circumstances, disbarment is appropriate.  See Matter of Zak, 
supra; Matter of Crossen, 450 Mass. at 581. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on the record, accompanied by a 
memorandum of law. 
 
Edward R. Wiest for the respondent. 
 
21 The hearing committee found that the respondent gave 
testimony that was intentionally false, including, inter alia, 
claiming he had minimal involvement in drafting the fee 
agreement, claiming he withdrew trust account funds at one point 
because someone was trying to levy on his interest on lawyers' 
trust account, claiming his records were lost in a computer 
backup failure, and claiming the bankruptcy petition was not 
frivolous or intended solely to delay the probate court 
proceedings.