Title: Falik v. Hornage

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Falik v. Hornage, No. 60, September Term, 2009; Falik v. Holthus, No. 90, September Term
2009
CIVIL PROCEDURE – DISCOVERY– EXPERT WITNESSES – TRIAL COURT DID
NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHERE IT ORDERED A PROPOSED NON-
TREATING MEDICAL EXPERT OPINION WITNESS TO PRODUCE FINANCIAL
RECORDS REFLECTING ANY PAYMENTS MADE TO THE WITNESS IN
CONNECTION WITH MEDICAL-LEGAL SERVICES AND PAYMENTS RECEIVED
FROM A SPECIFIC INSURANCE CARRIER. 
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County
 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
Case No. C-07-125585
Circuit Court for Montgomery County
  OF MARYLAND
Case No. 291296
                                                                             
No. 60
September Term, 2009
                                                                             
JOEL FALIK, et al.
v.
JAMES HORNAGE, et al.
                                                                             
No. 90
September Term, 2009
                                                                             
JOEL FALIK, et al.
v.
CLINT HOLTHUS, et ux.
                                                                             
 
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Murphy
Greene
Adkins
Barbera,
JJ.
                                                                             
Opinion by Harrell, J.
                                                                             
Filed:   April 5, 2010
1The first complaint was filed solely against Britt.  The amended complaint included
as a defendant USAA Casualty Insurance, the plaintiffs’ insurance carrier.  
The two cases in this consolidated appeal arise from unrelated automobile negligence
actions presenting a common procedural background birthing significant discovery disputes.
In each case, the respective defendants designated, in pre-trial discovery, Dr. Joel Falik, M.D.
(“Dr. Falik” or “Appellant”), a neurosurgeon, as a non-treating medical expert witness.  The
plaintiffs in each case each noted two-fold depositions of Dr. Falik: a “records deposition
duces tecum” to be followed at a later date by a testimonial deposition.  The notices of
records deposition duces tecum requested the physician to produce certain documents
regarding his past services as a medical forensic expert witness.  Dr. Falik filed motions for
protective orders.  The trial courts in each case issued orders directing Dr. Falik to produce
at least some of the records sought.  Dr. Falik sought immediate appellate review in both
cases. 
Falik v. Hornage
On 4 February 2008, James Hornage and Lora Ard Hornage (collectively, “Hornage”)
filed an amended complaint in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County alleging that they
and their minor son were injured in an automobile accident caused by Heather Britt’s alleged
negligence.1  The defense designated Dr. Falik to conduct an independent medical
examination of Ms. Hornage.  Hornage thereafter issued a notice of a “records deposition
duces tecum.”  The notice sought information regarding the physician’s prior provision of
forensic services.  Dr. Falik filed a motion for a protective order in which he objected to
several of the plaintiffs’ requests.  Specifically, he objected to the requests for the following
-2-
documents: 
•
Copies of all of Dr. Falik’s 1099s received from Law
Firms and Insurance Companies for providing medical
examinations and expert witness testimony on behalf of
Plaintiffs and Defendants for the last five (5) years.
•
An up-to-date list of all cases Dr. Falik has provided
expert testimony for on behalf [sic] of either Plaintiffs or
Defendants by way of trial, video, or deposition over the
last five years.  This list is to include the name of the
Plaintiff, name of the Defendant, the Plaintiff’s
attorney’s name and address, the defendant’s attorney’s
name, address and phone number, the court location, case
number, and the date of said testimony
•
Dr. Falik’s personal Federal and State Income Tax
Returns for the past five (5) years.
•
Dr. Falik’s business Federal and State Income Tax
Returns for the past five (5) years.
•
A list of all cases wherein Dr. Falik was retained by the
defendant’s law firm within the last three years to
perform medical examinations. 
•
A copy of Dr. Falik’s calender that reflects appointments
for defense related medical examinations, defense video
tapped [sic] depositions, and occasions where the doctor
testified live in any court for any defendant in a personal
injury and workers compensation matter.
The Circuit Court held a hearing on the motion, ultimately granting the motion in part
and denying it in part.  Memorializing its decision, the trial court issued the following order
on 28 August 2008: 
•
Doctor Falik will provide Plaintiff’s counsel all of his
income tax records from the last three (3) years to
include all 1099 forms and W-2 forms that are related to
medical employment, and any other attachments, and all
other income tax records which pertain to any medically
related employment and ownership interest Doctor Falik
has which receives monies from insurance companies or
law firms for the purpose of conducting medical
-3-
examination on injured persons who are pursuing claims
for personal injuries.  
•
Doctor Falik will provide Plaintiff with a list of any and
all depositions Doctor Falik has attended and any and all
times he has testified at trial within the last three (3)
years to include the name of the case, case number, name
of the patient examined, name, address, and phone
number of the attorneys involved, and the amount of
compensation Doctor Falik was paid, and by whom. 
•
Doctor Falik will provide Plaintiff with any lecture
materials or other materials he has provided to any group
that he has lectured to within the last three (3) years that
relate to the medical condition(s) in issue. 
•
Doctor Falik will provide Plaintiff with a list containing
the total number of persons Doctor Falik has examined
at the request of any defense attorneys or insurance
company in any personal injury litigation case for the last
two (2) years. 
•
Doctor Falik will provide Plaintiff with copies of any and
all advertisement materials and promotional materials
which reflect the services Doctor Falik has offered to any
attorney or insurance company.
•
Doctor Falik will provide Plaintiff with a list containing
the total number of persons he has examined at the
request of any defense attorneys or insurance company in
any personal injury litigation in the last two (2) years. 
•
Doctor Falik will provide Plaintiff with copies of any and
all documents that reflect the amount of money that
Doctor Falik has been paid for defense medical
examinations in the years 2006, 2007, and 2008. 
•
Doctor Falik will provide Plaintiff with a list of all cases
Doctor Falik was retained by any insurance carrier and
by any of Defendant’s attorneys and their respective law
offices.  
The order provided also that the “discovered material may only be used by counsel
in this matter or in other legally related circumstances.”  In a footnote, the trial court noted
that, although Dr. Falik did not supply the court with “specific details of the requested
2On 1 November 2008, Britt withdrew before trial Dr. Falik as an expert witness in
the underlying Circuit Court case.  It appears that Dr. Falik did not inform clearly the Court
of Special Appeals that the defense withdrew him as an expert witness.  He, however, did
include in the Record Extract in the Court of Special Appeals the lines filed in the Circuit
Court by Britt and United Services Automobile Association (Britt’s insurance carrier) and
the docket entries related to his withdrawal as a potential defense witness.  
Hornage, in his brief, filed with this Court on 20 July 2009 (after the issuance of our
writ of certiorari), informed us that the defense had withdrawn Dr. Falik as an expert witness.
-4-
protective order for limitation on the discovered material, this Court is persuaded that the use
of the discovered material should not be vulnerable to wide-spread public dissemination.”
On 29 September 2008, before the initial deposition could be taken, Dr. Falik filed a notice
of appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.2  In his brief filed 20 May 2009, Dr. Falik
complained that the trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion when it
ordered him to produce the financial records it ordered.  This Court, on its own motion,
issued a writ of certiorari on 17 June 2009, prior to decision of the appeal by the intermediate
appellate court.  409 Md. 46, 972 A.2d 861 (2009).  
Falik v. Holthus
On 18 January 2008, Clint and Julia R. Collins-Holthus (collectively, “Holthus”) filed
in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County a complaint against Gilberto Martinez alleging
that they were injured in an automobile accident that occurred allegedly as a result of
Martinez’s negligence.  Martinez designated Dr. Falik, the same expert that the defendant in
Hornage designated, as a non-treating medical expert witness.  Holthus filed a “notice of
records deposition duces tecum,” to be followed by a testimonial deposition, seeking
information relating to Dr. Falik’s prior services as a forensic expert  witness.  Dr. Falik filed
3At the hearing before the trial court, Holthus’s counsel indicated that this request
contained a typographical error.  He stated that the request should have asked for any
documents showing the amounts paid to Dr. Falik for independent medical examinations in
the years 2008 and 2007.  
4At the hearing before the trial court, counsel for Dr. Falik indicated that Holthus had
withdrawn request #17 and, as such, it was no longer in contention.  The parties also
indicated at the hearing that they had reached an agreement as to requests #19 and #20.  
-5-
a motion for protective order in which he objected to the following duces tecum requests: 
10.
Copies of all 1099 forms and/or those portions of the
deponent’s income tax returns for the last 2 years
referencing any payments made to the depoponent(s)
[sic] in connection with medical-legal services.  (Other
portions of the tax returns relating to professional
expenses, other earned or unearned income and
deductions are not requested)
*              *                 *
13.
Any documents showing the amounts paid to Joel Falik,
M.D. for independent medical examinations performed
by Joel Falik, M.D. in 2006 and 2007.[3]
*              *                 *
17.
All 1099s for the past two years for work done by
deponent(s) at the request of or paid by [defense
counsel’s law firm] or any lawyer in that office
including, but not limited to, [defense counsel].[4]
18.
All 1099s for the past two years for work done by the
deponent(s) at the request of or which was paid by any
State Farm Insurance Company. 
19.
A list of all cases on which the deponent(s) has worked
for the past two years for [defense counsel’s law firm] or
any lawyer in that office including, but not limited to,
[defense counsel].
20.
A list of all cases on which the deponent has worked for
the past two (2) years for State Farm Insurance
5It is unclear from the record why the court denied the motion with respect to #17
when counsel for Dr. Falik stated at the hearing that Holthus had withdrawn this request.  
-6-
Company. 
Holthus filed an opposition to the motion, but indicated that they would consent to a
confidentiality order for the protection of Dr. Falik’s privacy.  The trial court held a hearing
on 28 April 2009 and thereafter issued an order in which it granted in part and denied in part
the physician’s motion.  The order directed Dr. Falik to produce the items listed in requests
#10 and #18, but limited the requests to the years 2007 and 2008.  The court denied the
motion with respect to requests #13 and #17.5  The order also contained the following
limitations that addressed Dr. Falik’s privacy concerns: 
1.
Dr. Falik may redact all identifying information from the
documents produced, such as social security numbers
and tax identification numbers. 
2.
Dr. Falik may mark/stamp all produced financial
documents “CONFIDENTIAL.”
3.
For purposes of this case only, all confidential financial
documents pertaining to Dr. Falik provided to Plaintiff’s
counsel may be reviewed only by counsel, counsel’s
staff, the parties, and any expert in this case. 
4.
Any and all confidential financial documents produced
by Dr. Falik shall not be photocopied, scanned,
reproduced or disseminated in any way to anyone, other
than counsel in this case, the parties or any expert, and
may not be utilized outside of this case.  These
confidential financial documents and all copies thereof
will be returned to Dr. Falik’s counsel by Plaintiff’s
counsel within thirty (30) days of a final judgment or
settlement of this case.  Any expert or party who receives
or views confidential financial documents regarding Dr.
Falik shall agree in writing before receiving or reviewing
same to abide by this Order and an executed copy of each
6Dr. Falik’s successful petition contained the following question for our review: 
Did the trial court err as a matter of law and abuse its
discretion by ordering Joel Falik, M.D., a designated expert
witness, to produce financial records for years 2007 and 2008,
as follows:
Copies of all 1099 forms and/or those portions of the
deponent’s income tax returns for the last 2 years referencing
any payments made to the deponent(s) in connection with
medical-legal services.  (Other portions of the tax returns
relating to professional expenses, other earned or unearned
income and deductions are not requested.)  
-7-
such agreement shall be provided to counsel for Dr. Falik
by counsel for Plaintiffs promptly upon the execution
thereof.
5.
Any confidential documents produced pertaining to Dr.
Falik shall not be posted on the Internet, emailed,
disseminated or communicated to any person or to any
email list-serve or any similar such group or
organization.
Dr. Falik and Martinez, apparently aggrieved by the trial court’s only qualified favor
found in the motion for protective order, filed timely separate notices of immediate appeal
to the Court of Special Appeals.  They complained in their briefs that the trial court erred as
a matter of law and abused its discretion when it ordered Dr. Falik to produce the limited
financial records it did.  While that case was pending in the intermediate appellate court, but
before arguments could be held, Dr. Falik filed in this Court a petition for a writ of
certiorari,6 pointing out the common issue assumedly presented in Hornage, for which we
had issued already a writ of certiorari.  We granted the petition, 410 Md. 559, 979 A.2d 707
(2009), and consolidated Holthus with Hornage.  
Discussion 
7Maryland Rule 2-602 provides:
(a) Generally.  Except as provided in section (b) of this Rule, an
order or other form of decision, however designated, that
adjudicates fewer than all of the claims in an action (whether
raised by original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-
party claim), or that adjudicates less than an entire claim, or that
adjudicates the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties
to the action: 
(1) is not a final judgment;
(continued...)
-8-
I.
Martinez’s Right to Appeal 
At the outset, we address Holthus’s contention that Martinez, the defendant in
Holthus, may not be an appellant in this matter.  Holthus argues that the trial court’s order
was not a final judgment with regard to Martinez as a defendant and, because it does not fall
within any exceptions to the final judgment rule, Martinez must wait for a final judgment
before he may appeal the order.  Generally, “‘a party may appeal only from a final
judgment.’”  St. Joseph Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Cardiac Surgery Assocs., 392 Md. 75, 84, 896 A.2d
304, 309 (2006) (quoting Nnoli v. Nnoli, 389 Md. 315, 323, 884 A.2d 1215, 1219 (2005)).
See also Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 12-301 (1974 & 2006 Repl. Vol.) (“[A] party may
appeal from a final judgment entered in a civil or criminal case by the circuit court.”).  There
are, however, three well-identified, but infrequently sanctioned, limited exceptions to the
final judgment rule which permit appellate review before a final judgment has been rendered.
St. Joseph, 392 Md. at 84, 896 A.2d at 309.  The exceptions are: “‘appeals from interlocutory
orders specifically allowed by statute; immediate appeals permitted under Maryland Rule 2-
602;[7] and appeals from interlocutory orders allowed under the common law collateral order
7(...continued)
(2) does not terminate the action as to any of the claims
or any of the parties; and
(3) is subject to revision at any time before the entry of
a judgment that adjudicates all of the claims by and
against all of the parties.
(b) When allowed.  If the court expressly determines in a written
order that there is no just reason for delay, it may direct in the
order the entry of a final judgment:
(1) as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or
parties; or 
(2) pursuant to Rule 2-501(f)(3), for some but less than
all of the amount requested in a claim seeking money
relief only.
-9-
doctrine.’” 392 Md. at 84, 896 A.2d at 309 (quoting Salvagno v. Frew, 388 Md. 605, 615,
881 A.2d 660, 666 (2005)).  Martinez does not contend that his appeal fits within any of the
exceptions to the final judgment rule.  Rather, he argues that Dr. Falik is the real party in
interest in this case and, thus, the issue is not whether Martinez has the right to maintain his
own appeal pursuant to the final judgment rule or its exceptions, but, whether Martinez has
the right to join in the appeal maintained by Dr. Falik by virtue of Martinez’s abundant
interest in the outcome of the appeal.  
In St. Joseph, a non-party to the underlying suit filed an interlocutory appeal from the
trial court’s refusal to grant a protective order from discovery in favor of the non-party.  We
held that the order was appealable, not under any of the exceptions to the final judgment rule,
but because the order was a final judgment as to the non-party.  392 Md. at 88-89, 896 A.2d
at 312.  We reasoned that because the third person was not a party to the case, it would not
have standing “to challenge the discovery order by appealing from a final judgment in that
-10-
case.”  Id. at 88, 896 A.2d at 312.  Thus, “analytically, it is a final judgment with respect to
that appellant.”  Id. at 90, 896 A.2d at 313.  Therefore, it is pellucid that, all other things
being equal, Dr. Falik possessed a right to appeal from the orders entered in the present cases.
That conclusion does not mean, however, that Martinez has a right to appeal the order
under his theory that he may “tag along” in Dr. Falik’s appeal.  There is no statutory
authority permitting an interlocutory appeal of a discovery order of this nature, nor is this
appeal permitted under Rule 2-602.  Thus, the only circumstance that would permit
Martinez’s appeal at this time is the collateral order doctrine.  The collateral order doctrine
treats as final and appealable interlocutory orders that (1)
conclusively determine the disputed question; (2) resolve an
important issue; (3) resolve an issue that is completely separate
from the merits of the action; and (4) would be effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.  The collateral
order doctrine is a very narrow exception to the final judgment
rule, and each of its four requirements is very strictly applied in
Maryland.  In particular, the fourth prong, unreviewability on
appeal, is not satisfied except in extraordinary situations.
St. Joseph, 392 Md. at 86, 896 A.2d at 310 (quoting Nnoli, 389 Md. at 329, 884 A.2d at
1223) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).  In the instant case, Martinez and Dr.
Falik are challenging an interlocutory discovery order.  It is well established in Maryland that
generally “interlocutory discovery orders do not meet the requirements of the collateral order
doctrine and are not appealable under that doctrine.”  Id. at 87, 896 A.2d at 311.
Interlocutory discovery orders are not appealable because most 
do not comply with the third requirement of the collateral order
8Holthus argues also that Martinez failed to preserve for appellate review his objection
to his trial court’s order.  Because we conclude that Martinez has no right to appeal, we shall
not reach the issue.  
-11-
doctrine, as they generally are not completely separate from the
merits of the lawsuit.  Instead, a typical discovery order is aimed
at ascertaining critical facts upon which the outcome of the . . .
controversy might depend.  In addition, discovery orders fail to
meet the collateral order doctrine’s fourth element, as they are
effectively reviewable on appeal from a final judgment.
Id. (citing In re Foley, 373 Md. 627, 635, 820 A.2d 587, 592 (2003) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted)).  The “singular circumstance” in which an interlocutory discovery
order is reviewable on appeal under the collateral order doctrine “involves trial court orders
permitting the depositions of high level governmental decision makers for the purpose of
‘extensively probing . . . their individual decisional thought processes.’” Id. at 88, 896 A.2d
at 311 (quoting Montgomery County v. Stevens, 337 Md. 471, 479, 654 A.2d 877, 881
(1995)).  The order in Holthus clearly does not fall within that category.  Thus, we dismiss
Martinez’s appeal.8
II.
Discovery of a Non-Treating Medical Expert’s Financial Records 
Obviously, a party has a strong interest in the fact-finder’s assessment of the
credibility of its expert witnesses.  For the opposing party it is equally important to have the
ability to search for legitimate evidence to impeach the credibility of those witnesses.  Bias
is one method of impeachment and “[i]t is well established that the bias, hostility or motives
of a witness are relevant and proper subjects for impeachment.”  Pantazes v. State, 376 Md.
661, 692, 831 A.2d 432, 450 (2003).  See also Md. Rule 5-616(a)(4) (“The credibility of a
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witness may be attacked through questions asked of the witness, including questions that are
directed at . . . [p]roving that the witness is biased, prejudiced, interested in the outcome of
the proceeding, or has a motive to testify falsely.”).  “Bias describes ‘the relationship
between a party and a witness which might lead the witness to slant, unconsciously or
otherwise, his testimony in favor of or against a party.’” Pantazes, 376 Md. at 692, 831 A.2d
at 450 (quoting United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52, 105 S.Ct. 465, 469, 83 L. Ed. 2d 450,
457 (1984)).  It is well established that the fact that an expert witness is being paid to testify
may bear on his or her credibility and may be revealed through cross-examination.  Goldberg
v. Boone, 396 Md. 94, 116,  912 A.2d 698, 711-12 (2006); Wrobleski v. de Lara, 353 Md.
509, 518, 727 A.2d 930, 934 (1999); Mezzanote Constr. Co. v. Gibons, 219 Md. 178, 181,
148 A.2d 399, 401-02 (1959).  Thus, “an expert witness may be questioned on cross-
examination about compensation received for testifying, as well as about the expert’s history
of employment as an expert witness, in order to reveal bias or interest in the outcome of the
proceeding.”  Goldberg, 396 Md. at 116, 912 A.2d at 710-11.  
“Expert opinion testimony can be powerful evidence.”  Wrobleski, 353 Md. at 517,
727 A.2d at 933.  An expert’s testimony “can have a compelling effect [on] a jury.”  Id.
“That is why, especially with expert witnesses, ‘wide latitude must be given a cross-examiner
in exploring a witness’s bias or motivation in testifying,’ [and,] in particular, ‘the cross-
examiner must be given latitude to cross-examine a witness concerning any bias or interest
the witness may have that would lead the witness to shade his testimony, whether,
consciously or not, in favor of or against a party.’” Id. (quoting Ware v. State, 348 Md. 19,
-13-
67, 702 A.2d 699, 722 (1997)).  
We described in Wrobleski the methods through which an erstwhile cross-examiner
may expose the potential bias of an expert witness:
Exposure of potential bias based on self-interest is often
attempted through cross-examination directed at how much the
witness is being paid for his or her services in the case at bar, the
frequency with which the witness testifies in similar kinds of
cases, whether the witness is frequently employed by a
particular type of party (usually plaintiff or defendant), whether
the witness is frequently employed by a particular party or
attorney and, if so, how much income the witness derives from
that employment, and, as in this case, the amount or the
percentage of the witness’s total income that is derived from
lawyer referrals or testimony in lawsuits.  Some forms of inquiry
seek to uncover a specific and enduring relationship between the
witness and the party or attorney, from which a direct bias may
be inferred.  Others are directed at exposing the more subtle
problem of the professional “hired gun,” who earns a significant
portion of his or her livelihood from testifying, and rather than
having a tie to a specific party or attorney, may have a general
economic interest in producing favorable results for the
employer of the moment.
Id. at 517-18, 727 A.2d at 933-34.  
We shall clarify and elaborate here our holding in Wrobleski.  In Wrobleski, we
considered the extent to which a professional medical witness may be questioned regarding
his or her professional services income stream.  Defense counsel, at trial, asked the plaintiff’s
medical expert witness how much income he earned in one year from testifying as an expert.
The witness refused to answer and the plaintiff objected in support of the witness.  The
plaintiff did not object to questioning the witness as to income earned from testifying in other
cases brought by plaintiff’s counsel, but asserted that any inquiry beyond that was irrelevant.
-14-
The trial court allowed the defense question.  Id. at 512, 727 A.2d at 931.  We held that it
was not error to do so and that it
is generally appropriate for a party to inquire whether a witness
offered as an expert in a particular field earns a significant
portion or amount of income from applying that expertise in a
forensic setting and is thus in the nature of a “professional
witness.” If there is a reasonable basis for a conclusion that the
witness may be a “professional witness,” the party may inquire
both into the amount of income earned in the recent past from
such services as an expert witness and into the approximate
portion of the witness’s total income derived from such services.
 
Id. at 526, 727 A.2d at 938.  In other words, “[t]he relevant question is not simply whether
the witness frequently appears in court but whether the witness has some personal or
financial incentive to produce a particular opinion.”  Id. at 527 n.5, 727 A.2d at 938 n.5.  We
highlighted two caveats to our holding, however.  We cautioned: 
First, we do not intend by our decision today to authorize the
harassment of expert witnesses through a wholesale rummaging
of their personal and financial records under the guise of seeking
impeachment evidence.  The allowance of the permitted inquiry,
both at the discovery and trial stages, should be tightly
controlled by the trial court and limited to its purpose, and not
permitted to expand into an unnecessary exposure of matters and
data that are personal to the witness and have no real relevance
to the credibility of his or her testimony.  Second, the fact that
an expert devotes a significant amount of time to forensic
activities or earns a significant portion of income from these
activities does not mean that the testimony given by the witness
is not honest, accurate, and credible.  It is simply a factor that is
proper for the trier of fact to know about and consider.
Id. at 526, 727 A.2d at 938.  
Dr. Falik argues here that the Wrobleski holding does not include within its scope the
-15-
production of an expert witness’s financial records.  He agrees that the trial court has wide
discretion in permitting cross-examination of an expert witness, but contends that the bounds
of that discretion were exceeded in the present cases.  He contends that Wrobleski held that
before a party may inquire into the amount of income earned by an expert witness in the
recent past from litigation services, the party first must establish that the witness is a
“professional witness.”  Appellant argues further that, assuming that he is a professional
witness (yet not conceding this fact), the trial court abused its discretion because it ordered
Dr. Falik to produce financial records.  That was error, as the argument continues, because
Wrobleski limited the inquiry to verbal inquiry only into the amount of income the witness
earned in the recent past from forensic services or the approximate portion of the witness’s
income derived from litigation services.  Moreover, he worries that it may be burdensome
for him to produce the information sought.  Dr. Falik rejoins finally that sustaining the order
of disclosure of the information sought in the present cases would precipitate a chilling effect
and discourage other qualified physicians from serving as expert witnesses.  
Holthus and Hornage argue that the documents ordered by the trial courts to be
produced were within the scope of inquiries that this Court has held to be proper.  Because
Wrobleski held that a party may inquire into the amount of money that an expert witness
earned from providing forensic services, Appellees believe that an opposing expert also may
be compelled to produce documents directed at discovering that bias.  In response to Dr.
Falik’s argument that the party seeking discovery must establish that the expert is a
“professional witness” before it may inquire into his income from litigation-related services,
-16-
Holthus and Hornage contend that Wrobleski does not mandate such a requirement.  They
argue further that the trial court’s orders do not authorize a wholesale rummaging through
Dr. Falik’s financial records, which Wrobleski prohibited.  In support of that contention,
Appellees allude to the extensive confidentiality provisions in the order of the Circuit Court
for Montgomery County and the limited scope of the information sought.  Appellees urge
that this is consistent with Wrobleski’s requirement that the allowance of the permitted
inquiry was controlled tightly by at least one of the trial courts involved here.
In Maryland, the rules of discovery “were deliberately designed to be broad and
comprehensive in scope.”  Ehrlich v. Grove, 396 Md. 550, 560, 914 A.2d 783, 790 (2007).
Accordingly, that broad scope of discovery is described as allowing “[a] party [to] obtain
discovery regarding any matter that is not privileged . . . if the matter sought is relevant to
the subject matter involved in the action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the
party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party.”  Md. Rule 2-402.
Trial courts “‘are vested with a reasonable, sound discretion in applying [the discovery rules],
which discretion will not be disturbed in the absence of a showing of its abuse.’” Ehrlich,
396 Md. at 560, 914 A.2d at 790 (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Forma-Pack,
Inc., 351 Md. 396, 405, 718 A.2d 1129, 1133-34 (1998)).  Therefore, we consider the trial
courts’ orders in the present cases under an abuse of discretion standard.  Id.  We explained
the “analytical paradigm by which we assess whether a trial court’s actions constitute an
abuse of discretion . . . ,” Aventis Pasteur, Inc. v. Skevofilax, 396 Md. 405, 418, 914 A.2d
113, 121 (2007), in Wilson v. John Crane, Inc., 385 Md. 185, 198-99, 867 A.2d 1077, 1084
-17-
(2005):
“There is an abuse of discretion ‘where no reasonable person
would take the view adopted by the [trial] court[]’ . . . or when
the court acts ‘without reference to any guiding rules or
principles.’  An abuse of discretion may also be found where the
ruling under consideration is ‘clearly against the logic and effect
of facts and inferences before the court[]’ . . . or when the ruling
is ‘violative of fact and logic.’
“Questions within the discretion of the trial court are ‘much
better decided by the trial judges than by appellate courts, and
the decisions of such judges should only be disturbed where it
is apparent that some serious error or abuse of discretion or
autocratic action has occurred.’  In sum, to be reversed ‘the
decision under consideration has to be well removed from any
center mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the
fringe of what that court deems minimally acceptable.’”
Id. (quoting In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. 295, 312-13, 701 A.2d 110,
118-19 (1997)). 
Several courts have considered the issue of whether a trial court may compel an expert
witness to produce potentially relevant income-stream financial records at the request of an
opposing party.  Although the courts and commentators may disagree on the outcome, many
agree that the evidence may be relevant to the expert witness’s bias.  See e.g., Sullivan v.
Metro North R.R. Co., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88938, at *4 (D. Conn. 3 Dec. 2007) (“There
is no question that the information sought by Sullivan is relevant to bias impeachment, and
therefore, falls within the scope of permissible discovery . . . .”); Behler v. Hanlon, 199
F.R.D. 553, 561 (D. Md. 2001) (“[N]o intellectually honest argument can be made that the
information sought by plaintiff regarding [the expert’s] activities as a defense expert witness
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is not relevant to bias/prejudice impeachment, and therefore within the scope of discovery
. . . .”); Cooper v. Schoffstall, 905 A.2d 482, 494 (Pa. 2006) (“[E]ven those jurisdictions that
have substantially limited discovery of financial information from expert witnesses, generally
recognize the relevance of the information . . . .”).  Contra Douglas R. Richmond, Expert
Witness Conflicts and Compensation, 67 Tenn. L. Rev. 909, 944 (2000) (“An expert’s
income, whether expressed as gross or limited to his litigation-related activities, is irrelevant
the overwhelmingly majority of the time.  A party is unlikely to be prejudiced by its inability
to obtain an expert’s tax returns or similar income information.”)
Some courts permit an opposing party’s compelled production of an expert’s financial
records, but only after the party seeking discovery first attempts to use a less intrusive
method of discovery or shows that the expert has been evasive, untruthful, or is unable to
provide an answer to the income question.  For example, in Cooper, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania was faced with an issue similar to the one we confront today.  The plaintiff,
seeking tax and other financial records, presented excerpts from the records of prior cases
in which the expert witness had conducted independent medical examinations on the request
of the defense and/or testified on behalf of a defendant.  These documents were offered to
show that the physician “derived substantial income from this work, and issued written
reports containing repetitive, predictable, defense-favored observations and conclusions.”
Id. at 485.  The expert sought a protective order, which the court denied.  The trial court
entered an order directing confidential treatment of the information.  
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, citing our Wrobleski, held that a party could obtain
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“supplemental discovery related to potential favoritism of a non-party expert witness retained
for trial preparation” if there are “reasonable grounds to believe that the witness may have
entered the professional witness category.  In other words, the proponent of the discovery
should demonstrate a significant pattern of compensation that would support a reasonable
inference that the witness might color, shade, or slant his testimony in light of the substantial
financial incentives.”  905 A.2d at 494-95.  The court determined that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it authorized discovery of the expert’s financial records.  Id. at 495.
The court was sympathetic, however, to the expert’s contention that it was burdensome to
find and produce the financial information sought.  Therefore, the court determined “that the
appropriate entry point, upon the showing of cause, is a deposition by written interrogatories
. . . .”  Id.  Through this, the court opined, the proponent of the discovery could inquire into,
among other areas of possible bias, “the approximate amount of income each year, for up to
the past three years, garnered from the performance of such services.”  Id.  At that point,
further discovery, such as obtaining financial records, might be warranted “if[,] [for
example,] there is a strong showing that the witness has been evasive or untruthful in the
written discovery.”  Id. at 496.  See also Behler, 199 F.R.D. at 562 (“[T]here is no need for
the expert to have to produce his or her tax returns, if the party seeking the discovery has
accurate information regarding the percentage of income earned as an expert.”); Am. Family
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Grant, 217 P.3d 1212, 1220 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (“[I]f an expert is
uncooperative or untruthful in responding to less demanding discovery requests, a trial court
has discretion to permit more comprehensive discovery.”); Allen v. Superior Court of Contra
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Costa County, 198 Cal. Rptr. 737, 741 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that the trial court
abused its discretion when it failed to require a less intrusive method of discovery); Elkins
v. Syken, 672 So.2d 517, 521-22 (Fla. 1996) (adopting the intermediate appellate court’s
holding that “the production of business records, files, form 1099’s may be only produced
upon the most unusual or compelling circumstances . . . .”); Primm v. Isaac, 127 S.W.3d 630,
639 (Ky. 2002) (quoting Elkins, 672 So.2d at 521) (“If, after taking the deposition, a party
can demonstrate that additional information is necessary to undertake reasonable bias
impeachment, it may seek leave of court to take additional discovery.  Further, should the
trial court determine that the witness has not provided complete and unevasive answers to
the deposition questions, or ‘has falsified, misrepresented, or obfuscated the required data,
the aggrieved party may move to exclude the witness from testifying or move to strike the
witness’s testimony . . . .”);  State ex rel Creighton v. Jackson, 879 S.W.2d 639, 643-44 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the
discovery of the expert’s financial records where the party seeking discovery presented the
trial court with evidence that in an unrelated deposition, the expert witness was unable to
estimate his annual earnings from litigation activities).  But see Ex Parte Morris, 530 So.2d
785, 789 (Ala. 1988) (holding that the prejudice to the non-party expert substantially
outweighed the “incremental value that such information would provide respondent for
purposes of showing bias . . . .”).  
Turning to the orders issued in the present cases, we conclude that the trial court in
Holthus followed thoughtfully our guidance in Wrobleski to allow only a controlled inquiry
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into whether a witness offered as an expert earns a significant portion or amount of income
from applying his or her expertise in a forensic nature and is thus in the nature of a
“professional witness.”  Although the Circuit Court for Montgomery County ordered Dr.
Falik to produce portions of his tax returns and related 1099 forms, it tailored the scope of
the order to those portions which referenced any payment in connection with medical legal
services and to a narrow sweep of contemporary time, the two years prior to the inquiry.
Similarly, the ordered production of 1099 forms was limited in scope to the proffered
expert’s services as an expert witness or for work done at the request of the defendant’s
insurance carrier, State Farm Insurance Company.  As noted above, the trial court’s order
also contained very specific confidentiality provisions to ensure that the information would
not be disseminated to anyone beyond those individuals mentioned in the order. The
document production ordered cannot be characterized fairly as a “wholesale rummaging”
through Dr. Falik’s personal finances and financial records. 
With regard to Hornage, we note that the defendant withdrew Dr. Falik as an expert
in the case after the trial court issued its discovery order, but before the physician complied
with the ordered discovery, thus rendering the discovery dispute moot.  “A question is moot
if, at the time it is before the court, there is no longer an existing controversy between the
parties, so that there is no longer any effective remedy which the court can provide.”
Attorney Gen. v. Anne Arundel County School Bus Contractors Ass’n, Inc., 286 Md. 324,
327, 407 A.2d 749, 752 (1979).  There is some concern that the issue of this sort of discovery
dispute may evade appellate review as a result of a party requesting overly broad financial
-22-
information from an expert as a tactical approach to induce withdrawal of the expert from the
case.  We thus will comment on the order in Hornage for the limited purpose of  comparing
it with that in Holthus and illustrating what we otherwise would perceive to be an incorrect
application of the trial court’s responsibilities as set forth in Wrobleski.  Unlike the order in
Holthus, the trial court in Hornage did not control tightly the scope of the desired inquiry
consistent with what was allowed by Wrobleski.  The order directed Dr. Falik to produce all
income tax records from the previous three years, without limiting the records to those
related to forensic services.  Such an order more closely approximates a “wholesale
rummaging” through Dr. Falik’s personal finances and is impermissible.  Compliance with
such an order would require an expert to turn over a multitude of sensitive financial records.
Furthermore, if the expert was married, that could mean that records stating his or her
spouse’s joint income might be swept up in such broad discovery.  It is true that such
information could be redacted, as the trial court ordered in Holthus, but the trial court’s order
in Hornage did not so contemplate.  The order contained insufficient confidentiality
provisions.  It stated only that the “discovered material may only be used by counsel in this
matter or in other legally related circumstances” and that “the use of the discovered material
should not be vulnerable to wide-spread public dissemination.”  The court did not define
what a “legally related circumstance” might be nor did it define what constituted “wide-
spread public dissemination.”  Unlike the order in Holthus, the order in Hornage did not
prevent disclosure of the information and did not allow for redaction of sensitive or
identifying information. Such considerations are especially in play where such a broad
9There is no contention here that Dr. Falik was in any way suspected of being a “venal
expert witness.”  
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inquiry as sought in Hornage.  We thus conclude that the trial court in Hornage abused its
discretion by failing to control tightly the inquiry sought there.  
Dr. Falik contends, as noted earlier, that the “inquire into” language in Wrobleski
authorizes only verbal inquiries and does not contemplate the compellable production of
documents that support the verbal answers to the permitted verbal inquiries.  He is wrong.
The production of limited financial documents, from a contemporary and finite period of
time, that reflect payments made to the witness in connection with medical-legal services is
permitted because, if the inquiring party does not have access to such records, yet is
permitted to inquire orally into the witness’s income stream, the inquiring party will not be
able to cross-examine effectively the expert witness. Civil trial practice in this area is not
dependent on articles of faith; rather, corroboration is important.  As the Missouri Court of
Appeals noted, “a venal expert witness could not be expected to fully answer inquiries as to
which the witness is not required to produce documentation.”  State ex rel Lichtor v. Clark,
845 S.W.2d 55, 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).9  If an inquiring party’s counsel is not allowed to
view the records that purportedly support the expert’s answers to the permitted questions,
then it must accept the expert’s answer without the opportunity to verify.  We do not require
blind trust without verification.  A balancing of the expert witness’s privacy interests against
the inquiring party’s ability to verify for effective cross-examination undergirds our decision.
It is not meant to require the expert to produce every supporting paper.  The trial court’s
10In a medical malpractice action, by statute, a health care provider who is offered as
an expert witness, “may not devote annually more than 20 percent of the expert’s
professional activities to activities that directly involve testimony in personal injury claims.”
Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-2A-04(b)(4) (1974, 2006 Repl. Vol. & Supp. 2009).  Thus,
in a medical malpractice case, the amount of time that an expert spends testifying is
indicative of whether he or she is a “professional witness.”  Wrobleski established that
income earned from forensic testimonial activities also is an appropriate area of inquiry for
experts in other types of actions.  
-24-
order in Holthus is illustrative of the type of inquiry that is permitted.  
Appellant/Petitioner contends that Wrobleski established that the party seeking
discovery must make a prima facie showing that the witness offered as an expert is a
“professional witness” before it may demand the financial information allowed in Wrobleski.
As noted supra, we stated in Wrobleski that “[i]f there is a reasonable basis for a conclusion
that the witness may be a ‘professional witness,’ the party may inquire both into the amount
of income earned in the recent past from services as an expert witness and into the
approximate portion of the witness’s total income derived from such services.”  353 Md. at
526, 727 A.2d at 938.  In hindsight, that sentence does seem a bit circular in its expectation.
Being a professional witness ordinarily means being paid to give your opinion.  If an
individual is testifying as a non-treating medical expert, he or she, in the vast majority of
cases, presumably is being paid to do so.  More specifically to the instant cases, if a physician
is paid to testify about someone who is not that physician’s patient under treatment, that
witness is surely a “professional witness.”10  Following Dr. Falik’s theory, the party seeking
discovery first must establish (by undefined criteria) that the witness is a “professional
witness” before the party may be entitled to inquire into the witness’s income stream.  That
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is circuitous.  If the answers that the party is seeking constitute the prima facie showing, it
is unlikely that a party could ever establish that a witness is a “professional witness,” without
knowledge of the witness’s prior income from expert services gained from sources other than
through discovery in the immediate case.  Thus, there is here no separate prima facie burden
of proving that a proffered non-treating medical expert witness is a “professional witness.”
We are not unsympathetic to Dr. Falik’s concern that the discovery of the documents
at issue in the present case may be seem to him to be an unwarranted invasion into his
privacy.  As previously noted, our decision here is the result of balancing a party’s need to
discover reliable and relevant information in order to try properly its case and the witness’s
expectation of privacy.  We are confident, however, that leaving the implementation of our
decision in the first instance with the sound discretion of the trial courts to control tightly the
inquiry (with attendant confidentiality restrictions) will keep these sensitive records from
being disseminated publicly.  We note that attorneys, as officers of the court, have a duty to
keep such records private, unless a court orders otherwise.  See Maryland Rule of
Professional Conduct 3.4(c) (“A lawyer shall not . . . knowingly disobey an obligation under
the rules of the tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid
obligation exists.”).  We acknowledge also Dr. Falik’s argument that our holding in this
regard might create a chilling effect on the willingness of qualified professionals to serve as
expert witnesses in litigation-related contexts.  Any concern we might share in that regard,
however, is over-balanced by the need to create a context for effective cross-examination.
Moreover, we are confident that a  trial court’s tight control over the process will restore to
11We note that simply because the material is discoverable, that does not mean that the
evidence will necessarily be admissible at trial. The evidence will be admissible only upon
a showing by the proponent that it is relevant.  Md. Rule 5-402.  As the court noted in
Jackson, “[t]he information will be admissible only if it legitimately reflects on the
objectivity of the expert.”  879 S.W.2d at 644 n1.  Furthermore, it is within the court’s
discretion to exclude even relevant evidence if the court determines that “its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.”  Md. Rule 5-403.  
12In his brief, Holthus refers several times to various transcripts of depositions of Dr.
Falik in separate, unrelated cases.  Holthus apparently included these transcripts to show that
Dr. Falik has “given conflicting answers in sworn testimony as to the amounts he earns
serving as a professional witness.”  Holthus included the transcripts as an appendix to his
brief.  
Dr. Falik filed in this Court a motion to strike related portions of Holthus’s brief and
the Appendix that include and reference the transcripts on the ground that the deposition
transcripts were not filed in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, and, therefore, are
not part of the record on appeal.  Holthus concedes that the deposition transcripts are not part
of the record that is before this Court.  We grant Dr. Falik’s motion to strike those portions
of Appellees’ brief and appendix to Appellees’ brief and shall assign the related portion of
the costs to Holthus.  See Md. Rule 8-607(b) (“When unnecessary material has been included
in a record extract or appendix, the Court may order that the costs of reproduction be
withheld, apportioned, or assessed against the attorney or unrepresented party who caused
the unnecessary material to be included.”).  
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qualified professionals the confidence needed to encourage them to testify.11, 12   
ORDER OF 28 APRIL 2009 OF THE
CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY
COUNTY IN NO. 90 AFFIRMED.  APPEAL
IN NO. 60 DISMISSED.  COSTS TO BE PAID
BY APPELLANT IN BOTH CASES,
EXCEPT THAT IN NO. 90 APPELLEES TO
BEAR PRINTING COSTS OF MATERIALS
STRICKEN FROM THEIR BRIEF AND
APPENDIX.