Title: State v. Chamberlain

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

234 Kan. 422 (1983)
672 P.2d 604
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee,
v.
JAMES L. CHAMBERLAIN, Appellant.
No. 55,365

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed December 2, 1983.
Camille Nohe, of Topeka, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.
Gene M. Olander, district attorney, argued the cause, and Robert T. Stephan, attorney general, was with him on the brief for appellee.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
APPEAL AND ERROR  Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Case  Trial Court Required to Rule on Issue before It Is Presented on Appeal.
Per Curiam:
James L. Chamberlain was convicted on April 1, 1980, by a jury in Shawnee County District Court of felony murder, K.S.A. 21-3401, and aggravated robbery, K.S.A. 21-3427. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder and fifteen years to life for the robbery, the sentences to be served consecutively.
No post-trial motions were filed. Trial counsel filed a notice of appeal and secured an order directing the preparation of a transcript at public expense, since defendant was indigent. The appeal was not docketed here within ten days, as was required by Rule 2.04, 228 Kan. xxxix. Defendant's attorney took no further action, and for reasons unrelated to this case was subsequently suspended indefinitely from the practice of law in this state. State v. Nelson, 233 Kan. 473, 663 P.2d 303 (1983).
In February 1983 present counsel filed a motion to docket the appeal out of time, and we granted leave to do so. Briefs were then filed and the matter was argued and submitted. Only one issue was raised: whether trial counsel was so ineffective that defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel.
The standards upon which a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be considered and determined were stated earlier this year by Justice McFarland in our unanimous opinion in State v. Kendig, 233 Kan. 890, 895-96, 666 P.2d 684 (1983):
The Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel was also discussed recently by the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, in United States v. King, 664 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir.1981):
Defendant's capable appellate counsel points out many errors and omissions by trial counsel, including his failure (1) to challenge the legality of defendant's warrantless arrest in his own home, absent exigent circumstances, (2) to move to suppress incriminating evidence seized "incident" to that arrest, (3) to request a Jackson v. Denno hearing prior to trial, (4) to move to suppress defendant's confession, and (5) to object to the introduction into evidence of various prejudicial exhibits. Present counsel also points to trial counsel's repeated elicitation of evidence which was prejudicial and incriminating, and to counsel's persistence in this practice even in the face of warnings from the prosecutor. Much evidence to support the suggested motions and objections is found within the trial record, and law to support appellant's position is both familiar and plentiful. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685, 89 S. Ct. 2034 (1969); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908, 84 S. Ct. 1774 (1964); State v. Platten, 225 Kan. 764, 594 P.2d 201 (1979); and ABA Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function and the Defense Function § 3.6, Approved Draft, 1971.
The chief purpose for defense counsel was succinctly stated by this court long ago in the case of State v. Clough, 70 Kan. 510, 512, 79 Pac. 117 (1905):
Appellant now argues that trial counsel failed to properly protect his client's interest. As we noted in Clough, however, supposed prejudicial error should be called to the attention of the trial court in order that it might have an opportunity to rule thereon.
In the case of State v. Porter, Green & Smith, 228 Kan. 345, *425 354, 615 P.2d 146 (1980), on direct appeal from a verdict finding three defendants each guilty of two counts of aggravated robbery, two of the defendants contended that they received ineffective assistance of counsel from their court-appointed attorney. We said:
In Roberts, as in Porter, Green & Smith, the defendant contended on direct appeal that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel. The claim was made on the basis of an affidavit attached to appellant's brief filed in this court. That affidavit had not been presented to the trial court, nor had the trial court otherwise been given an opportunity to consider the issue. Following the well-established rule that an issue will not be considered on appeal where it was not presented to or determined by the trial court and where the determination of the issue depends upon facts which do not appear in the record, we declined to reach the issue but held that the defendant's remedy, if any, lay under K.S.A. 60-1507. Roberts, 226 Kan. at 744-45.
As noted above, the trial record lends much support to appellant's view of the issue which he now seeks to have us determine. However, the prosecution has not had an opportunity to offer evidence in opposition to this view, and the trial court has not had an opportunity to consider and rule upon the issue. The trial judge heard the entire trial and did have the opportunity to observe and evaluate defense counsel's performance throughout, but the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel has never been presented to him. We will not consider this issue until the trial court has had an opportunity to consider and rule upon it.
This appeal is dismissed without prejudice to the defendant's right to raise this issue before the trial court in proceedings under K.S.A. 60-1507.