Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Jeffrey A. Reitz

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2005 WI 39 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP2518-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Jeffrey A. Reitz, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation,  
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
Jeffrey A. Reitz,  
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST REITZ 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 14, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 8, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant there was a brief by Jeffrey 
A. Reitz, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Jeffrey A. Reitz. 
 
For the complainant-respondent there was a brief by Gregg 
Herman, Matthew J. Price and Loeb & Herman, S.C., Milwaukee, and 
oral argument by Gregg M. Herman. 
 
 
2005 WI 39 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP2518-D  
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Jeffrey A. Reitz, Attorney at  
Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation,  
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Jeffrey A. Reitz,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 14, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding.    Attorney's license 
suspended.     
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Attorney Jeffrey A. Reitz (hereafter 
Reitz or respondent) has appealed from the referee's report 
including findings of fact and conclusions of law filed in this 
court on June 14, 2004.  After a public hearing, the referee, 
Rose 
Marie 
Baron, 
determined 
that 
the 
Office 
of 
Lawyer 
Regulation 
(OLR) 
had 
presented 
clear, 
satisfactory, 
and 
convincing evidence to establish all 13 counts of professional 
misconduct arising from Reitz's representation of six different 
No. 
2003AP2518-D   
 
2 
 
clients as alleged in a complaint OLR filed in this court 
against Reitz on September 24, 2003.  The referee recommended 
that Reitz's license to practice law in this state be suspended 
for six months for this professional misconduct and that he pay 
the costs of this proceeding now totaling $7735.62.   
¶2 
Reitz's appeal challenged the referee's findings with 
regard to only four of the counts relating to three clients; 
then at oral argument before this court, Reitz conceded one of 
those counts.  Consequently, he now challenges the referee's 
findings and conclusions with respect to only three of the 
misconduct counts.  However, Reitz also challenges the referee's 
recommendation that his license to practice law should be 
suspended for a period of six months.  Reitz contends that a 
more appropriate sanction would be a license suspension for a 
period of two to four months.     
¶3 
The referee's findings of fact are to be affirmed 
unless 
they 
are 
clearly 
erroneous. 
 
In 
re 
Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Sosnay, 209 Wis. 2d 241, 243, 562 N.W.2d 137 
(1997).  However, no deference is granted to the referee's 
conclusions of law which we review de novo.  In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Carroll, 2001 WI 130, ¶29, 248 Wis. 2d 662, 
636 N.W.2d 718.  After our review of the record in this matter, 
we conclude that the referee's findings of fact are not clearly 
erroneous; accordingly we affirm and adopt them.  However, we 
disagree with the referee's legal conclusion that Reitz's 
conduct as alleged in Count II of the complaint amounted to a 
violation of a rule of conduct for lawyers.  Therefore, we adopt 
No. 
2003AP2518-D   
 
3 
 
the referee's findings of fact and all of her conclusions of law 
except for Count II.  And we determine that an appropriate 
sanction for his 12 counts of misconduct is a suspension of 
Reitz's license to practice in this state for a period of five 
months.  But we agree with the referee's recommendation that 
Reitz be required to pay all the costs of these disciplinary 
proceedings.   
¶4 
Jeffrey A. Reitz was admitted to practice law in this 
state in 1981 and currently practices in Milwaukee.  He has 
never before been the subject of a disciplinary action.   
¶5 
The six separate client matters which gave rise to the 
13 counts of misconduct as alleged by the OLR in its complaint 
will be briefly summarized and discussed.1 
CLIENT N.C.——COUNTS I, II AND III 
¶6 
In March 1998, N.C. retained Attorney Michael D. 
Mandelman to represent her in a legal malpractice action against 
the attorney who had previously represented her in a child 
custody proceeding.  In June 1998, Mandelman filed a lawsuit 
against that attorney in Walworth County circuit court. 
                                                 
1 
Effective 
October 
1, 
2000 
Wisconsin's 
attorney 
disciplinary process was substantially restructured.  The name 
of the body responsible for investigating and prosecuting cases 
involving attorney misconduct was changed from the Board of 
Attorneys Professional Responsibility (BAPR) to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation (OLR), and the supreme court rules applicable 
to lawyer regulation were also revised in part.  Some of the 
conduct underlying this case arose prior to October 1, 2000.  
However, all references to supreme court rules will be to the 
current version of the rules unless otherwise noted.   
No. 
2003AP2518-D   
 
4 
 
¶7 
On March 1, 1999, Mandelman and Reitz formed a law 
partnership, Reitz & Mandelman, LLC.  Reitz had extensive 
experience preparing cases for trial but had limited trial 
experience; consequently, his role in the new firm was to 
prepare cases for trial and Mandelman was to handle settlement 
negotiations, depositions, and trials.   
¶8 
On March 22, 1999, N.C. wrote to Mandelman seeking 
information about the status of her malpractice action.  N.C. 
noted that she had not heard from Mandelman and wrote that she 
wanted to be kept up-to-date.  N.C. also reminded Mandelman that 
he had earlier informed her that depositions were soon to start, 
but she complained that so far nothing had been done. 
¶9 
On April 15, 1999, Reitz wrote to N.C. advising her 
that he would now be her attorney; Reitz explained that he would 
consult with Mandelman who would still handle court appearances 
and litigation. 
¶10 On May 11, 1999, the attorney representing the 
defendant in the malpractice action forwarded interrogatories 
and a request for production of documents to Reitz to be 
completed within 30 days.   
¶11 After three months elapsed without complete responses 
to 
the 
interrogatories, 
the 
attorney 
representing 
the 
malpractice defendant moved to dismiss the action.  After a 
hearing, the circuit court denied that motion to dismiss but 
sanctioned N.C. for discovery violations and ordered her to pay 
$300 to the defendant's attorney.  The circuit court also 
ordered N.C. to provide the defense attorney with full and fair 
No. 
2003AP2518-D   
 
5 
 
responses to his discovery requests, and limited the documents 
upon which N.C. could rely or introduce as evidence at the 
malpractice trial.   
¶12 Subsequently, 
in 
October 
1999, 
after 
additional 
correspondence between Reitz and the defense attorney, Reitz 
suggested the names of five expert witnesses whom he might call 
on N.C.'s behalf at trial.  He asserted in his cover letter to 
the defense attorney that the list was "not as thorough in 
descriptions" as he would like, and that it would be narrowed 
within the next week.  Reitz subsequently told N.C. that the 
firm would pay the $300 sanction that had been imposed against 
her; he also informed her that one of the experts he had named 
was refusing to testify voluntarily.   
¶13 N.C. told Reitz that she did not want to settle her 
case and inquired about depositions of the experts.  She, along 
with the defense attorney, questioned the lack of clarity 
regarding the experts Reitz actually planned on calling.  On 
November 11, 1999, N.C. wrote to Reitz asking for a list of the 
experts he had named on her behalf.   
¶14 On November 15, 1999, Reitz filed a motion seeking to 
withdraw as N.C.'s counsel on the ground that N.C. had not paid 
some of his legal bills; he also asserted that there had been a 
communication breakdown between him and N.C.  The defense 
attorney objected to Reitz's late withdrawal request.  The 
circuit court subsequently denied Reitz's motion to withdraw as 
N.C.'s counsel.   
No. 
2003AP2518-D   
 
6 
 
¶15 Defense counsel thereafter wrote to Reitz setting a 
deadline for Reitz to provide a list of experts, the responses 
to the interrogatories, and the experts' reports which were then 
two months overdue.  Reitz did not respond to that letter.  The 
defense attorney then moved to dismiss N.C.'s legal malpractice 
action for failure to comply with discovery orders and to 
provide necessary expert opinions to support her malpractice 
claim.  The hearing on that motion to dismiss was scheduled for 
January 18, 2000.  
¶16 Reitz 
then 
scheduled 
the 
malpractice 
defendant's 
deposition for January 14, 2000 at the Reitz & Mandelman 
offices.  Immediately before that deposition was scheduled to 
begin, Reitz met with N.C. at his office and had her sign the 
following release he had just drafted: 
RELEASE OF MICHAEL MANDELMAN 
I, [N.C.], understand that Michael Mandelman has not 
recently 
been 
working 
on 
my 
case 
against 
[the 
defendant] and has agreed to do the deposition of [the 
defendant] January 14, 2000, only on condition that 
this release, waiver and authorization is executed.  I 
am providing Mr. Mandelman with information regarding 
my case this date and with questions that I wish him 
to ask of [the defendant] at the deposition.  I hereby 
authorize Mr. Mandelman to conduct this deposition and 
release Michael D. Mandelman from any claims that I 
may have against him for whatever reason relating to 
any matters that he has worked on for me, hereby 
waiving the same.  I have at this time no intention of 
filing any complaint, grievance, lawsuit or any other 
action with anybody against Michael D. Mandelman.  I 
wish 
for 
Michael 
D. 
Mandelman 
to 
conduct 
this 
deposition of [the defendant] understand [sic] that 
this statement is necessary so that he can proceed 
with my claim with the confidence necessary that he 
has my support in this matter.   
No. 
2003AP2518-D   
 
7 
 
¶17 At Reitz's disciplinary hearing before Referee Baron, 
N.C. testified that Reitz informed her that if she did not sign 
this release, the defendant's deposition would not take place 
and that she would lose her malpractice case.  N.C. further 
testified——and it is not now disputed——that she had not been 
advised by Reitz that she had a right to seek independent 
counsel before executing this release.  After N.C. signed the 
release, Mandelman conducted the defendant's deposition.   
¶18 Subsequently, at the January 18th hearing in circuit 
court, Reitz filed a brief in opposition to the defendant's 
motion to dismiss.  Reitz argued that N.C. should be allowed to 
proceed with her malpractice claim even without an expert 
witness.  The circuit court disagreed and dismissed N.C.'s case 
with prejudice and with costs, noting that N.C. could not prove 
her malpractice action without an expert witness, and that Reitz 
had failed to identify any expert who was willing to testify 
with respect to the defendant's alleged legal malpractice.2   
¶19 This course of conduct led to the first three counts 
of misconduct as alleged in OLR's complaint and as found by the 
referee.  Reitz concedes Counts I and III and only challenges 
Count II.   
• Count I——By failing to respond to discovery 
demands and by failing to obtain an expert 
witness, Reitz failed to act with reasonable 
                                                 
2 N.C. later reached a settlement agreement with that 
malpractice defendant.  She agreed to waive her right to appeal 
the dismissal and in return, that defendant agreed to waive his 
costs and any unpaid legal fees N.C. still owed him as a result 
of the early custody case.   
No. 
2003AP2518-D   
 
8 
 
diligence and promptness in representing N.C., in 
violation of SCR 20:1.3.3 
• Count II——By having N.C. sign a document entitled 
"Release of Michael Mandelman" Reitz made an 
agreement on behalf of his partner, Michael 
Mandelman, 
prospectively 
limiting 
Mandelman's 
liability for malpractice to N.C., who was not 
independently represented by counsel in making 
the agreements, in violation of SCR 20:1.8(h).4 
• Count III——By having N.C. sign a document that 
prospectively limited Mandelman's liability for 
malpractice to N.C., who was not independently 
represented by counsel in making the agreement, 
Reitz knowingly assisted another attorney in 
violating the Rules of Professional Conduct, in 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(a).5   
                                                 
3 SCR 20:1.3 states:  "Diligence.  A lawyer shall act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client."  
4 
SCR 
20:1.8(h) 
Conflict 
of 
 
interest: 
prohibited 
transactions.  
(h) A lawyer shall not make an agreement 
prospectively 
limiting 
the 
lawyer's 
liability to a client for malpractice unless 
permitted 
by 
law 
and 
the 
client 
is 
independently 
represented 
in 
making 
the 
agreement, 
or settle 
a 
claim for 
such 
liability with an unrepresented client or 
former client without first advising that 
person 
in 
writing 
that 
independent 
representation is appropriate in connection 
therewith.  
 
5 SCR 20:8.4(a)  states:  "Misconduct.  It is professional 
misconduct for a lawyer to: (a) violate or attempt to violate 
the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce 
another to do so, or do so through the acts of another."   
 
No. 
2003AP2518-D   
 
9 
 
¶20 Referee Baron found that OLR had proven by "clear and 
satisfactory evidence"6 that Reitz had violated SCR 20:1.3 as 
alleged in Count I of OLR's complaint by failing to act with 
reasonable 
diligence 
and 
promptness 
in 
representing 
N.C.  
According to the referee, Reitz's inability to designate expert 
witnesses was an example of his lack of diligence and promptness 
because the record demonstrated that he had not followed the 
usual practice of obtaining a summary from the witnesses he had 
identified, nor had he even personally contacted them.  The 
referee also noted that it was not until after the defense 
counsel began pressuring Reitz about the experts' reports, that 
Reitz discovered that the experts he had listed were unwilling 
to testify voluntarily.  The referee also pointed out that Reitz 
acknowledged that he first became aware of the case law holding 
that expert witnesses cannot be made to testify involuntarily.  
Based on this, the referee concluded that Reitz had failed to 
live up to his professional responsibility for diligence and 
promptness in preparing N.C's case for trial.  Reitz does not 
now challenge the referee's findings and conclusions with 
respect to Count I.   
                                                 
6 In her report, the referee repeatedly states that OLR had 
proven the allegations by "clear and satisfactory" evidence.  
Pursuant to SCR 22.16(5), however, the OLR has the burden of 
demonstrating by "clear, satisfactory and convincing" evidence 
that the respondent has engaged in misconduct. Reitz raises no 
issue about the referee's truncated statements concerning OLR's 
burden of proof.  This court concludes that the referee's 
findings were not clearly erroneous and were thus all supported 
by the requisite burden of proof of clear, satisfactory, and 
convincing evidence.   
No. 
2003AP2518-D   
 
10 
 
¶21 In his brief filed in this court on appeal, Reitz 
challenged the referee's findings and conclusions with respect 
to both Counts II and III.  As noted, however, at oral argument 
before this court, he withdrew his challenge to the referee's 
findings and conclusions with respect to Count III.  Thus, he 
now only challenges the referee's conclusion that the facts 
establish that his conduct violated SCR 20:1.8(h) as alleged in 
Count II.     
¶22 According to Referee Baron, by preparing a release of 
liability for Mandelman for N.C.'s signature only moments before 
Mandelman was to take the deposition of the defendant in the 
legal malpractice action, and inducing N.C. to sign that release 
without first advising her that independent representation was 
appropriate, Reitz had violated SCR 20:1.8(h) as alleged in 
Count II, and SCR 20:8.4(a) as alleged in Count III.  The 
referee noted that there was no question that Reitz had not 
informed N.C. that she should or could have legal representation 
before signing the release he had prepared.  The referee also 
rejected, as not credible, Reitz's denial that he told N.C. that 
if she did not sign the release, then Mandelman would not 
proceed with the deposition.   
¶23 Similarly, the referee rejected Reitz's argument that 
although he had prepared the document at Mandelman's request, 
Reitz had mistakenly used the "Release of Liability" form 
language and that neither he nor Mandelman had sought a waiver 
of liability.  The referee wrote: 
No. 
2003AP2518-D   
 
11 
 
Reitz's 
contention 
that 
his 
preparation 
of 
the 
document 
for 
Mandelman 
contained 
errors 
and, in 
addition, he himself was not asking for a waiver of 
his own liability does not negate the fact that he 
assisted 
in 
a 
violation 
of 
SCR 
20:8.4 
by 
his 
participation.  He placed his client in a no-win 
situation:  either she signed the Release immediately 
or Mandelman would not take the deposition of the 
defendant in her case or if she refused, a vital part 
of trial preparation would be omitted and her case 
would be jeopardized.   
¶24 Reitz maintains on this appeal that OLR did not meet 
its burden establishing by clear, satisfactory, and convincing 
evidence that he violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as 
alleged in Count II.  He concedes that he prepared the release 
and that the language he used in that document attempts to limit 
Mandelman's liability.  However, Reitz contends that this was 
done by mistake; he insists that Mandelman had only requested 
him to prepare a document for N.C.'s signature indicating that 
she had been satisfied with the work Mandelman had done for her 
up to that time.     
¶25 Reitz further notes that Count II alleges a violation 
of SCR 20:1.8, the rule prohibiting a conflict of interest 
between a lawyer and client.  And, again, Reitz points out that 
the release he prepared was not a release of his own liability 
to N.C.; rather, it was only a release of Mandelman's potential 
liability.  Reitz suggests that if any rule was violated by this 
conduct, it was SCR 20:8.4——the violation alleged in Count III——
a violation that Reitz does not now challenge.  Reitz maintains 
that because he personally was not benefited in any way by the 
No. 
2003AP2518-D   
 
12 
 
violation as alleged in Count II, he cannot be found to have 
committed the misconduct as alleged in that count.   
¶26 Furthermore, Reitz claims that there is a logical 
inconsistency in finding that he committed the misconduct 
alleged in both Counts II and III; according to Reitz, either he 
obtained the release to benefit himself——which would have been a 
conflict of interest as alleged in Count II——or he assisted 
another attorney to violate SCR 20:1.8(h) which was the basis 
for the misconduct alleged in Count III.   
¶27 OLR rejects Reitz's narrow reading of these rules as 
well as his claim that he did not personally benefit from the 
release he drafted.  OLR notes that Reitz and Mandelman were law 
partners operating their law firm as a limited liability 
practice.  According to OLR, to the extent that one partner 
receives 
liability 
protection 
in 
any 
given 
matter, 
it 
necessarily inures to the benefit of all other partners.  OLR 
also points to the referee's rejection of Reitz's "hairsplitting 
reading" of SCR 20:1.8(h) and the referee's statement that Reitz 
"... cannot avoid responsibility for having placed his client in 
an untenable position by arguing that it was not a release of 
liability for himself but rather for his partner."   
¶28 While we agree that Reitz's actions placed his client 
in an untenable position, we are not persuaded that this 
constituted a violation of SCR 20:1.8 as alleged in Count II.  
We cannot conclude that Reitz's actions in preparing the 
release, 
which 
by 
its 
terms 
only 
applied 
to 
Mandelman, 
constituted a violation of SCR 20:1.8(h).  This release did not 
No. 
2003AP2518-D   
 
13 
 
purport to release the law firm nor did it mention Reitz.  See 
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mandelman, 158 Wis. 2d 1, 
460 N.W.2d 749 (1990).  It only purported to release Mandelman 
from any liability to N.C.   
¶29 Moreover, we find no support for OLR's suggestion that 
because Mandelman and Reitz had structured their law firm as a 
limited liability organization, that the release operated to 
benefit Reitz personally.  SCR 20:1.8(h) precludes a lawyer from 
making an agreement "... prospectively limiting the lawyer's 
liability to a client for malpractice...."  (Emphasis added.)  
The document prepared by Reitz, which named only Mandelman as 
the beneficiary of N.C.'s release of any claim of liability she 
may have, does not fall within the prohibition of this rule.  It 
did not prospectively limit Reitz's liability to his client.  We 
do not accept OLR's broad reading of this rule because, among 
other reasons, lawyers are permitted under the statutes and our 
rules to practice law and render professional legal services 
through limited liability organizations.7  Furthermore, even if a 
lawyer 
structures 
a 
law 
firm 
as 
a 
limited 
liability 
organization, he or she is not relieved from personal liability 
                                                 
7 SCR 20:5.7 Limited liability legal practice. 
(a)(1) A lawyer may be a member of a law firm that is 
organized as a limited liability organization solely 
to render professional legal services under the laws 
of this state, including chs. 178 and 183 and subch 
XIX of ch. 180. The lawyer may practice in or as a 
limited liability 
organization if 
the 
lawyer is 
otherwise licensed to practice law in this state and 
the organization is registered under sub. (b).  
No. 
2003AP2518-D   
 
14 
 
for any 
acts, errors, or 
omissions 
arising 
out of the 
performance of professional services.  SCR 20:5.7(2).8  Limited 
liability organizations are primarily used for business or tax 
reasons; however, to the extent that that structure may affect a 
lawyer's professional liability, the use of a limited liability 
organization only protects the personal assets of non-negligent 
attorneys in the limited liability firm.  See Wis. Stat. § 
183.0403 (2003-04).  See also Melvin McCartney, Question and 
Answer:  Limited Liability Practice, Wisconsin Lawyer (May 
1997).  Structuring a law practice as a limited liability 
organization and practicing law via such organization does not 
change the personal liability of an attorney for that attorney's 
own negligence in providing professional legal services and even 
under a limited liability organizational structure, a lawyer's 
personal assets remain exposed for his or her negligence in 
providing professional services.   
¶30 In this case, the release of liability Reitz prepared 
for N.C.'s signature, which purportedly released any claim she 
may have had against Mandelman for his negligence, did not 
benefit Reitz.  Reitz remained liable for his own personal 
                                                 
8 SCR 20:5.7(2) Limited liability legal practice.   
(2) Nothing in this rule or the laws under which the 
lawyer or law firm is organized shall relieve a lawyer 
from personal liability for any acts, errors or 
omissions of the lawyer arising out of the performance 
of professional services. 
 
No. 
2003AP2518-D   
 
15 
 
negligence.  Consequently, Reitz's conduct did not fall within 
the proscription of SCR 20:1.8(h).  We conclude that Reitz's 
actions with respect to preparing this release for N.C.'s 
signature, while clearly ill-advised and not to be emulated or 
condoned, did not constitute a violation of SCR 20:1.8(h).  
Accordingly, we reject the referee's conclusion of law that 
Reitz engaged in the misconduct alleged in this court.   
CLIENT T.W.——COUNTS IV AND V 
¶31 Reitz does not now challenge the referee's findings 
and conclusions of law that he engaged in misconduct as alleged 
in Counts IV and V of OLR's complaint.  The facts supporting 
those 
counts 
as 
established 
by 
clear, 
satisfactory, 
and 
convincing evidence are these:  On October 7, 1999, T.W. 
retained Reitz to represent her on a workers compensation claim.  
Reitz, however, did little or nothing on that claim until a 
hearing application was filed with the Department of Workforce 
Development (DWFD) on March 17, 2001.  T.W. testified that after 
she retained Reitz, she had tried to contact him by telephone 
numerous times.  On June 26, 2001, T.W. wrote to Reitz 
complaining that he never returned her telephone calls and 
stating "I've had enough.  I've waited 2 years for nothing.  I 
will find a lawyer who wants to help me."   
¶32 T.W.'s claim was dismissed by DWFD on July 12, 2001 
because the required medical reports had not been filed with the 
claim.  It is not clear from the record if Reitz informed T.W. 
of that dismissal at that time.   After T.W. filed a grievance 
with OLR, Reitz contacted T.W. and then informed OLR that T.W. 
No. 
2003AP2518-D   
 
16 
 
had agreed to allow him to continue to represent her.  Reitz did 
not tell OLR, however, that T.W.'s claim had been dismissed by 
DWFD.   
¶33 OLR subsequently dismissed T.W.'s grievance against 
Reitz relying on his report that he was communicating with T.W. 
and working on her claim; at the time OLR dismissed T.W.'s 
grievance, it was unaware that T.W.'s claim had been dismissed 
by DWFD.  From August 13, 2001 to April 8, 2002, Reitz did not 
communicate with T.W. or perform any work on her workers 
compensation claim.   
¶34 T.W. called Reitz's partner, Mandelman, and complained 
that Reitz was not responding to her phone calls; she informed 
Mandelman that she did not want Reitz to handle her case any 
longer.  T.W. then again contacted OLR complaining that Reitz 
was failing to respond to her telephone calls and letters; and 
she reported that her workers compensation claim had been 
dismissed.  In response, OLR reopened its investigation of that 
grievance against Reitz. 
¶35 This course of conduct, which Reitz does not now 
challenge, led to the following two counts of misconduct as 
alleged by OLR in its complaint and as found by the referee in 
her report: 
• Count IV——By failing to pursue [T.W.'s] workers 
compensation claim in a timely manner, Reitz 
failed to act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in representing [T.W.], in violation 
of SCR 20:1.3.   
No. 
2003AP2518-D   
 
17 
 
• Count 
V——By failing 
to 
respond to 
[T.W.'s] 
telephone calls seeking information about her 
case and by failing to inform [T.W.] that her 
case had been dismissed, Reitz failed to keep a 
client reasonably informed about the status of a 
matter 
and 
promptly 
comply 
with 
reasonable 
requests for information, in violation of SCR 
20:1.4(a).9 
CLIENT L.K.——COUNTS VI AND VII 
¶36 On this appeal, Reitz does not now challenge the 
referee's findings and conclusions with respect to Count VI of 
the complaint.  However, he does challenge the referee's 
findings and conclusions with respect to Count VII.  The facts 
presented to the referee relating to these two counts are these:  
On September 10, 1999, L.K. was involved in a five-car 
collision; shortly thereafter, L.K. retained Reitz & Mandelman, 
LLC to represent her in her personal injury claim arising from 
the accident.  After the accident, L.K. received chiropractic 
treatment which ended in January 2000.  Between February 2000 
and May 2000, Reitz gathered L.K.'s medical records, bills, and 
wage loss information.  Then, on May 16, 2000, he submitted 
those records to the insurer of one of the drivers involved in 
the accident and made a settlement demand on behalf of L.K.  
According to L.K.'s testimony at the disciplinary hearing, Reitz 
then took no further action on her case from May through October 
20, 2000.  Reitz, however, testified at the disciplinary hearing 
                                                 
9 SCR 20:1.4(a) states:  "Communication. (a) A lawyer shall 
keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter 
and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information."  
 
No. 
2003AP2518-D   
 
18 
 
that L.K. was aware that settlement negotiations were taking 
place during that period involving his partner, Mandelman, and 
the adverse insurance carrier.   
¶37 Between 
October 
21, 
2000 
and 
January 
4, 
2001, 
Mandelman 
continued 
to pursue 
settlement negotiations and 
obtained from the insurer an offer to settle L.K.'s claim for 
$17,000.  That offer was rejected, and Reitz told L.K. on 
January 4, 2001 that Reitz would "immediately" file a lawsuit on 
her behalf.   
¶38 L.K. subsequently testified at Reitz's disciplinary 
hearing that between January 4, 2001 and March 7, 2001, she 
called Reitz numerous times and left messages seeking a status 
report on her case.  Reitz, however, did not return her calls.  
L.K. further testified that she spoke with Reitz on March 7, 
2001 and during that conversation, she was led to believe that 
he was filing a lawsuit on her behalf and that she would soon 
get a copy of the documents by mail. 
¶39 On March 29, 2001, L.K. received a summons and 
complaint that had been signed by Reitz.  His cover letter 
stated "Please find enclosed a copy of the Summons and Complaint 
for your lawsuit.  We will keep you advised of any changes as 
they develop."  Nothing on those documents suggested that they 
were only drafts of a summons and complaint.  L.K. testified 
that based on that correspondence, she believed that Reitz had 
commenced a lawsuit on her behalf.  She further testified that 
after waiting for most of the 45-day period the defendants had 
to answer that summons and complaint, she called Reitz on May 2, 
No. 
2003AP2518-D   
 
19 
 
2001 to ask about the status of her case.  Reitz told L.K. that 
her claim had been denied and that he would schedule a 
conference with the court to try to resolve the matter.  L.K. 
thereafter made repeated inquiries about the court date.  She 
was told by Reitz that he was trying to settle the case and 
later he told her that he was having a consultant review her 
file and was awaiting a call from the court.   
¶40 On May 31, 2001, L.K. contacted Reitz for a status 
update.  Reitz told her that there were often delays when the 
insurance company refuses to pay; he promised that he would 
continue settlement talks and set a date with the judge.  Reitz 
instructed L.K. to call him the following Friday and when she 
did, Reitz told her that the court clerk would be calling him 
back in a few days with a court date.  On June 22, 2001, L.K. 
again spoke with Reitz who informed her that a consultant was 
then reviewing her file for completeness and that they were 
still waiting for a call from the court which Reitz expected 
would come by June 25; Reitz also told L.K. that he thought a 
court date would then be set for two to six weeks thereafter.  
In a subsequent in-person meeting with Reitz on July 9, 2001, 
L.K. reiterated her desire to litigate her claim and repeated 
her position that the earlier $17,000 settlement offer from the 
insurance company was inadequate.   
¶41 Between May and September, 2001, Reitz attempted 
mediation with the insurance company in lieu of filing a 
lawsuit.  On September 23, 2001, after it became apparent that 
the insurer would not increase its earlier settlement offer or 
No. 
2003AP2518-D   
 
20 
 
mediate 
the 
matter, 
Reitz 
prepared 
another 
summons 
and 
complaint, identical to the summons and complaint he had 
previously mailed to L.K.  Reitz, however, filed neither the 
first 
summons 
and 
complaint 
nor 
the 
second 
summons 
and 
complaint; consequently, no lawsuit had been commenced on L.K.'s 
behalf.   
¶42 This course of conduct led to the following two counts 
of misconduct as alleged in the OLR complaint: 
• Count VI——By failing to pursue [L.K.'s] personal 
injury claim in a timely manner, Reitz failed to 
act with reasonable diligence and promptness in 
representing [L.K.], in violation of SCR 20:1.3.   
• Count VII——By misrepresenting to [L.K.] that he 
had filed the lawsuit on her behalf, Reitz 
engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation in violation of SCR 
20:8.4(c).10 
¶43 The referee determined that the OLR had presented 
clear and satisfactory evidence that Reitz had committed both 
violations as alleged.  Reitz does not now challenge the 
referee's findings and conclusions with respect to Count VI.   
¶44 With respect to Count VII, the referee found that 
Reitz had engaged in deceit, misrepresentation or dishonesty by 
his behavior and the information he had given his client, L.K., 
concerning his preparation of a summons and complaint for her 
                                                 
10 SCR 20:8.4(c) states:  "Misconduct.  It is professional 
misconduct for a lawyer to: (c) engage in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation."   
 
No. 
2003AP2518-D   
 
21 
 
lawsuit.  According to the referee, the wording on Reitz's 
March 29, 2001 cover letter, which included a summons and 
complaint that he had signed, indicated to L.K. that Reitz had, 
in fact, initiated a lawsuit on her behalf.  The referee 
observed that there was nothing in that cover letter or on the 
summons and complaint to suggest that those documents were 
simply "drafts." 
¶45 Furthermore, 
the 
referee 
noted 
that 
Reitz 
had 
acknowledged that a lay person would think that a signed summons 
and 
complaint 
represented 
the 
initiation 
of 
a 
lawsuit.  
According to the referee, a prudent lawyer intending that such 
documents were to be merely drafts, would have explained that 
fact to his client or stamped "draft" on the documents.  Reitz, 
however, did neither.  Moreover, the referee pointed out that in 
subsequent conversations with L.K., Reitz did nothing to 
disabuse her of her belief that he had filed a lawsuit on her 
behalf.  According to the referee, Reitz's actions led L.K. to 
believe that progress was being made on her case when in 
reality, 
he 
was 
engaging 
in 
dishonesty, 
deceit, 
and 
misrepresentation. 
¶46 On this appeal, Reitz maintains that there is no clear 
and convincing evidence that he committed the ethical violation 
as alleged in Count VII.  He believes that the evidence only 
established poor communication skills on his part, but not 
deceitful or dishonest conduct as proscribed by SCR 20:8.4.  He 
characterizes this situation as being simply a "miscommunication 
between she [L.K.] and I [sic]...."  He insists that on the 
No. 
2003AP2518-D   
 
22 
 
evidence presented, the referee could not find that he had been 
deceptive, deceitful or had misrepresented anything to L.K.  
Although he acknowledges miscommunication, Reitz insists that 
there was nothing "more insidious" and therefore his behavior 
did not violate the rule.   
¶47 We reject Reitz's arguments.  We conclude that the 
referee's findings of fact were not clearly erroneous and that 
Reitz's behavior with respect to his client, L.K., constitutes 
dishonesty, deceit, and misrepresentation as proscribed by SCR 
20:8.4.  We agree with OLR that Reitz's March 29 cover letter to 
L.K. could only be interpreted by a lay person like L.K. as 
meaning 
that 
a 
lawsuit 
had 
been 
filed 
on 
her 
behalf.  
Furthermore, Reitz continued with that deception in all of his 
subsequent conversations with L.K. between May and September 
2001.  We note that SCR 20:8.4 is stated in the disjunctive and 
prohibits a lawyer from engaging in four specific types of 
misconduct:  "dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation."  
We conclude that Reitz's failure to inform his client that no 
lawsuit had in fact been commenced on her behalf amounted to a 
deceitful omission of relevant information.  Such omission 
constitutes dishonest conduct within the meaning of this rule.  
See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Knickmeier, 2004 WI 
115, ¶93, 275 Wis. 2d 69, 683 N.W.2d 445; see also In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Urban, 2002 WI 63, 253 Wis. 2d 
194, 645 N.W.2d 612.  Because the referee's findings on these 
two counts were not clearly erroneous, we adopt them and we 
No. 
2003AP2518-D   
 
23 
 
agree with the referee's conclusions that these actions violated 
the specific rules as alleged.   
CLLENT V.A.——COUNTS VIII, IX AND X 
¶48 Reitz does not now challenge the referee's findings 
and conclusions with respect to the three counts of misconduct 
involving client V.A.  The facts supporting these counts are 
these:  On June 15, 1998, V.A. was a passenger in a car stopped 
at a red light when that car was rear-ended by an unlicensed cab 
driver.  About a week later, both V.A. and the driver of the car 
retained Mandelman to represent them in personal injury actions.  
V.A. provided Mandelman with a copy of a police incident report.   
¶49 At Mandelman's direction, V.A. sought chiropractic 
treatment incurring a bill of $4000.  V.A. submitted that bill 
to her health insurance company but payment was refused.   
¶50 When Reitz became a partner with Mandelman in March 
1999, V.A.'s file was transferred to him.  On March 26, 1999, 
Reitz wrote to the cab company in an effort to determine the 
identity of the cab driver, but he received no response.  More 
than seven months later, Reitz sent a follow-up letter.  The cab 
company responded on November 18, 1999 asserting that the driver 
could not be located without more information.   
¶51 V.A. testified at Reitz's disciplinary hearing that 
during this time, Reitz would occasionally tell her that her 
case was going well, and on other occasions, would say it was 
not.  V.A. claimed that Reitz led her to believe that he was 
dealing with the cab company's insurer and that the insurance 
company was denying liability.  In addition, V.A. testified that 
No. 
2003AP2518-D   
 
24 
 
she would periodically call Reitz to check on the status of her 
case but she began to feel that he was ignoring it.  According 
to V.A., during this period, she made more than 20 calls to 
Reitz and even though she left messages for him, he never 
returned her calls.  V.A. further testified that for over a 
year, she had received no information from Reitz about the 
difficulties he claimed to be having with her case; nor did he 
ever tell her that he intended to drop her case because he could 
not identify the cab driver.  Reitz ultimately decided to drop 
V.A.'s case but then failed to send a disengagement letter to 
her.  Then the statute of limitations barring V.A.'s personal 
injury claim expired on June 15, 2001. 
¶52 V.A. later filed a grievance with OLR.  She and Reitz 
subsequently reached a financial settlement with Reitz agreeing 
to pay her $2,000 and to hold her harmless for the chiropractic 
fees she had incurred.   
¶53 This course of conduct led to Counts VIII, IX, and X 
of the OLR complaint.  As noted, Reitz does not dispute the 
referee's finding of misconduct regarding these three counts:   
• Count 
VIII———By 
failing 
to 
pursue 
[V.A.'s] 
personal injury case in a timely manner, Reitz 
failed to act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in his representation of [V.A.] in 
violation of 20:1.3.   
• Count IX——By failing to advise [V.A.] that Reitz 
was unable to identify the defendant in [V.A.'s] 
case 
and 
of 
the 
resulting 
difficulty 
in 
proceeding with the case, Reitz failed to explain 
a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to 
permit 
[V.A.] 
to 
make 
informed 
decisions 
No. 
2003AP2518-D   
 
25 
 
regarding the representation, in violation of SCR 
20:1.4(b).11 
• Count X———By failing to notify [V.A.] that Reitz 
was terminating the representation, Reitz failed 
to 
take 
steps 
to 
the 
extent 
reasonably 
practicable to protect [V.A.'s] interest, in 
violation of SCR 20:1.16(d).12 
CLIENT C.K.——COUNTS XI AND XII 
¶54 Reitz does not now challenge the referee's findings 
and conclusions with respect to Count XI; however, he does 
appeal from the referee's findings regarding Count XII.  The 
facts surrounding these two counts are these:  On July 18, 1998, 
C.K. was injured when his motorcycle was forced off the road by 
a pickup truck.  In January 1999, C.K. retained Mandelman to 
represent him in a claim against the insurer of the pickup.  
Later Reitz took over C.K.'s personal injury case when he and 
Mandelman became partners.  Reitz sent C.K.'s medical records, 
                                                 
11 SCR 20:1.4(b)  states:  "Communication. (b) A lawyer 
shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to 
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the 
representation." 
 
12 SCR 20:1.16(d)  Declining or terminating representation 
(d) Upon termination of representation, a 
lawyer shall take 
steps 
to 
the 
extent 
reasonably practicable to protect a client's 
interests, such as giving reasonable notice 
to the client, allowing time for employment 
of other counsel, surrendering papers and 
property to which the client is entitled and 
refunding any advance payment of fee that 
has not been earned....    
 
No. 
2003AP2518-D   
 
26 
 
bills, and wage loss verification data that had been collected 
by Mandelman, to the insurance company.   
¶55 C.K. testified at the disciplinary hearing that he 
told Reitz in July 1999 that he would not seek additional 
medical treatment; C.K. reported that he would instead undertake 
therapy and strengthening at home.  At that point, Reitz had 
sufficient information to submit a demand on C.K.'s behalf to 
the insurance company.  Nevertheless, from November 1999 through 
July 2000, Reitz requested additional health and wage loss 
records from C.K. to be submitted to the insurance company.  
During that time, he also attempted settlement negotiations with 
the insurer.  C.K. contacted Mandelman in July 2000 to express 
his dissatisfaction about the slow pace of his case.  C.K. 
stated that he wanted the case promptly moved along.  A 
settlement offer of $12,000 was finally received from the 
insurer four months later.  C.K. rejected that offer.   
¶56 Subsequently, a new adjuster for the insurance company 
took over C.K.'s claim and that adjuster reduced the settlement 
offer to $8000.  That offer was refused on February 7, 2001.   
¶57 During this same period, several healthcare providers 
contacted C.K. about unpaid accrued fees.  One clinic where C.K. 
had received treatment served C.K. with a summons to appear in 
court on January 16, 2001.  C.K. faxed that summons to Reitz who 
assured C.K. that he would take care of it. 
¶58 On January 15, 2001, Reitz spoke with the attorney 
representing that clinic; Reitz and the other lawyer agreed that 
the clinic would take a judgment against C.K. but delay 
No. 
2003AP2518-D   
 
27 
 
docketing it for 30 days so that C.K. could make arrangements to 
pay it.  Subsequently, after not hearing anything from Reitz for 
45 days, the clinic docketed the judgment and commenced a 
garnishment action against C.K.   
¶59 At the disciplinary hearing, Reitz denied that he had 
made no reasonable, substantive efforts between February and 
May, 2001 to advance C.K.'s case.  C.K., on the other hand, 
testified that he thought the clinic's claim would be taken care 
of by Reitz and he was later surprised to learn from his 
employer that his wages were being garnished.   
¶60 C.K. further testified that between February and May, 
2001, Reitz took no reasonable steps to advance C.K.'s personal 
injury case; then the day before the statute of limitations was 
to run on C.K.'s claim, Reitz commenced an action against the 
truck driver in Shawano County.  Thereafter, aside from 
responding to interrogatories from the defendants, Reitz did 
nothing on C.K.'s case for the remainder of the year 2001.   
¶61 In March 2002, C.K. called the clerk of court in 
Shawano County to ask about the status of his lawsuit.  C.K. was 
told that if a status conference was not arranged soon, his 
personal injury case would be dismissed.  C.K. called Reitz with 
that information and Reitz then secured a date for a status 
conference.  C.K.'s case was later settled before trial.   
¶62 This course of conduct led to Counts XI and XII as 
alleged in OLR's complaint.  As noted, Reitz does not challenge 
the referee's finding and conclusion that he committed the 
No. 
2003AP2518-D   
 
28 
 
misconduct as alleged in Count XI; however, Reitz does challenge 
the referee's finding and conclusion with respect to Count XII.   
• Count XI——By failing to pursue [C.K.'s] personal 
injury claim in a timely fashion, Reitz failed to 
act with reasonable diligence and promptness in 
his representation of C.K., in violation of SCR 
20:1.3.   
• Count XII——By failing to communicate with [C.K.], 
Reitz failed to keep [C.K.] reasonably informed 
about the status of a matter and promptly comply 
with 
reasonable 
requests 
for 
information 
in 
violation of SCR 20:1.4(a).   
¶63 Referee Barron found that OLR had established by clear 
and satisfactory evidence that Reitz had committed both counts 
of misconduct alleged in Counts XI and XII.  Regarding Count XI, 
the referee noted that despite the fact that C.K.'s case was not 
complex or difficult, Reitz did little to move the case forward 
from March of 1999 until its conclusion in February of 2003.  
According to the referee, it was only because C.K. had taken the 
initiative in contacting the circuit court to ask about the 
status of his case, that Reitz learned that the case was about 
to be dismissed because of his lack of action.  The referee 
asserted that a reasonably diligent lawyer would have taken the 
responsibility of monitoring the lawsuit without having to rely 
on his client's self-help measures. 
¶64 With respect to Count XII, Referee Baron noted that 
although C.K. testified that he had difficulty contacting Reitz 
at times, C.K. also acknowledged that on occasions, he had 
received calls from the firm.  However, according to the 
referee, it was C.K. who usually initiated the telephone calls 
No. 
2003AP2518-D   
 
29 
 
and then C.K. would speak to office staff about his case.  
Again, referring to the fact that C.K. had to call the circuit 
court to find out about his case, the referee concluded that 
Reitz had failed to keep C.K. reasonably informed about the 
status of his case as alleged in Count XII. 
¶65 On appeal, Reitz insists that the evidence and the 
referee's findings do not support the conclusion that Reitz had 
failed to communicate with C.K. as alleged in Count XII.  Reitz 
complains that the referee relied on the same underlying fact——
that C.K. had to contact the circuit court himself——to support 
the misconduct findings with respect to both Counts XI and XII.  
Reitz maintains that while that fact may be relevant to the 
allegation of his lack of diligence in Count XI, it is not 
relevant to the charge of lack of communication in Count XII.   
¶66 We are not persuaded by Reitz's argument that the lack 
of communication violation in Count XII is merely a repackaged 
allegation of lack of diligence as alleged in Count XI.  We 
note, as OLR points out, that C.K. testified before the referee 
that he had heard "very, very little" about the status of his 
case from Reitz.  Most of the information C.K. received came via 
his calls and discussions with the law firm's staff.  These 
facts, as found by the referee, support the conclusion that 
Reitz failed to communicate with his client, C.K.  We conclude 
that Reitz committed both violations as alleged in Counts XI and 
XII.   
 
 
No. 
2003AP2518-D   
 
30 
 
CLIENT T.O.——COUNT XIII 
¶67 Reitz does not now challenge the referee's findings 
and conclusion that he committed the misconduct as alleged in 
Count XIII in OLR's complaint.  The facts surrounding that count 
are these:  On October 21, 1999, T.O. was injured when he jumped 
off his motorcycle to avoid being hit by a truck that was 
backing toward him.  T.O. then retained an attorney to represent 
him in a personal injury action.  That attorney secured a $5000 
settlement offer from the truck driver and his insurer but T.O. 
rejected that offer.  That attorney then filed suit in Waushara 
County on September 26, 2000 against the truck driver, his 
employer, and the insurer.  The attorney, however, did not serve 
those defendants with the summons and complaint at that time.  
Shortly after that action was filed, in October 2000, T.O. 
retained Mandelman & Reitz to take over the case from the first 
attorney.   
¶68 Reitz, however, never prepared a formal substitution 
of attorneys to be signed by T.O. and filed in court.  He had 
prepared, but never filed in court, a formal notice of retainer.  
The first attorney turned over T.O.'s file to Reitz in November 
of 2000 but Reitz at that time delayed service of the summons 
and complaint in order to "come up to speed" on T.O.'s file.   
¶69 On December 27, 2000, the Waushara County circuit 
court sent the first attorney a letter warning that the matter 
would be dismissed with prejudice if certificates of service 
were not filed within 20 days.  Service was thereafter 
effectuated and Reitz filed the certificates on January 2, 2001.   
No. 
2003AP2518-D   
 
31 
 
¶70 On March 29, 2001, the circuit court, by letter, 
informed Reitz and T.O.'s first attorney that no substitution of 
attorneys on behalf of T.O. had been filed.  The first attorney 
responded that it was up to Reitz to prepare and file the 
substitution of attorneys, stipulation, and order.  Reitz, 
however, did not respond to the court's letter or the other 
attorney's assertion that it was Reitz's responsibility to 
prepare and file a substitution of attorneys.  On May 2, 2001, 
T.O.'s case was dismissed without prejudice for failure to 
prosecute. 
¶71 This course of conduct led to Count XIII in OLR's 
complaint.  As noted, Reitz does not challenge the referee's 
findings 
and 
conclusion 
that 
he 
committed 
the 
following 
misconduct as alleged: 
• Count XIII——By failing to timely respond to the 
court's correspondence regarding [T.O.'s] case, 
Reitz failed to act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in representing [T.O.] in violation of 
SCR 20:1.3. 
¶72 After making the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, Referee Baron then discussed the appropriate discipline to 
be recommended for Reitz's 13 violations of the Rules of 
Professional Responsibility.  The referee was not persuaded by 
Reitz's 
argument 
that 
because 
he 
had 
never 
before 
been 
disciplined, and because he had not engaged in theft or deceit 
that had caused harm to his clients, a public reprimand would be 
an appropriate sanction for the nine counts of misconduct which 
Reitz did not dispute.  Instead, the referee concluded that the 
No. 
2003AP2518-D   
 
32 
 
OLR had met its burden of proving by clear and convincing 
evidence that Reitz had committed all 13 counts of misconduct as 
alleged.  The referee reasoned that in order to impress upon 
Reitz, the public, the courts and the legal system, the 
seriousness of Reitz's disregard of his responsibilities as a 
lawyer, she would recommend a six-month suspension of his 
license, plus the requirement that he pay all the costs of these 
proceedings. 
¶73 Because the referee's findings of fact have not been 
shown to be clearly erroneous, we adopt them.  We also agree 
with the referee's conclusions of law except with respect to 
Count II.  As discussed above, with regard to that count, we 
reject the referee's conclusion that Reitz's actions violated 
SCR 20:1.8(h).   
¶74 Although this court takes into account the referee's 
recommendation regarding discipline, we do not accord such 
recommendation conclusive or great weight because ultimately, it 
is this court's responsibility to determine the appropriate 
discipline to be imposed for an attorney's misconduct.  In 
making that determination, this court is free to impose 
discipline that is more or less severe than that recommended by 
the referee.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 
2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686; In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Elliott, 133 Wis. 2d 110, 394 
N.W.2d 313 (1986). 
¶75 Although the 12 counts of misconduct committed by 
Reitz were serious infractions of the Rules of Professional 
No. 
2003AP2518-D   
 
33 
 
Responsibility, 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances, 
including the fact that he has never before been disciplined for 
professional misconduct and the fact a six-month suspension as 
recommended by the referee would require Reitz to petition for 
reinstatement, which would entail additional delay and costs, 
see SCR 22.28(3), we conclude that a five-month suspension of 
Jeffrey A. Reitz's license to practice law in this state is an 
appropriate discipline for his misconduct.  We also determine 
that he should pay all the costs of this disciplinary proceeding 
which now total $7735.62.  Accordingly, 
¶76 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Jeffrey A. Reitz to 
practice 
law 
in 
Wisconsin 
is 
suspended 
for 
five 
months 
commencing May 15, 2005, as discipline for his professional 
misconduct. 
¶77 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Jeffrey A. Reitz pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation all the costs of this proceeding.  If the costs are 
not paid within the time specified and absent a showing to this 
court of his inability to pay the costs within that time, the 
license of Jeffrey A. Reitz to practice law in Wisconsin shall 
remain suspended until further order of the court. 
¶78 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Jeffrey A. Reitz comply 
with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a 
person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
suspended.   
 
 
No. 
2003AP2518-D   
 
 
 
1