Title: Granberry v. Gilbert

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

163 So. 2d 641 (1964)
Henry Vester GRANBERRY
v.
James P. GILBERT.
4 Div. 144.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
April 16, 1964.
*642 Carl S. Farmer, Abbeville, and J. Hubert Farmer, Dothan, for appellant.
Halstead & Whiddon, Headland, and Lee & McInish, Dothan, for appellee.
COLEMAN, Justice.
This is an appeal by defendant from judgment for plaintiff in an action for personal injury and property damage sustained by plaintiff in an automobile collision.
Defendant argues first his assignment of error 4 which recites as follows:
We copy that part of the examination of Dr. McDavid which defendant sets out in his brief, to wit:
*643 "MR. FARMER: He asked him if he had some kind of written report or something, and on the knowledge, did he change his idea about it.
Defendant argues that the court erred in permitting the witness to testify as to what were, in substance and effect, the findings and conclusions of another physician, contrary to the rule of Hussey v. State, 87 Ala. 121, 6 So. 420, and Clark v. Hudson, 265 Ala. 630, 93 So. 2d 138.
Plaintiff replies that, under Circuit Court Rule 33, the court, before ruling on any objection to testimony, may call on the objector to specify his grounds; and that, in reviewing the ruling on the objection, the appellate court "must consider only the grounds of objection which are shown to have been clearly specified." (Emphasis Supplied.)
In Dr. McDavid's testimony, defendant objected to two questions. As we understand defendant's argument, he says that, by the last question, plaintiff obtained from the witness an indirect statement that another doctor agreed with the witness, thus violating the rule against hearsay. The defendant, however, when called on by the court to state his grounds, did not clearly state as one of his grounds that the question called for hearsay.
At the most, defendant can be credited with interposing the so-called general grounds of objection to a question, that is, that the question calls for testimony which is not legal for any purpose and cannot be made legal by other evidence or by otherwise framing the inquiry. Louisville & Nashville R. Company v. Scott, 232 Ala. 284 [17], 167 So. 572; Harrison v. Baker, 260 Ala. 488, 71 So. 2d 284.
Defendant's objection and argument were directed to the last question, that is, whether the witness now has any finding or information that changed his diagnosis. We do not think that the question called for testimony that would be illegal for any purpose. Except for the implied reference to the report of the neuro-surgeon, defendant does not insist that it is illegal or incompetent for a physician to testify that he has no information to cause him to change his diagnosis.
Nowhere did defendant object to either question on the ground that it called for hearsay. Defendant now contends that the evidence was inadmissible because it was hearsay.
In C. C. Snyder Cigar & Tobacco Co. v. Stutts, 214 Ala. 132, 135, 107 So. 73, 75, this court held that an objection to evidence on the ground that it was "illegal, irrelevant, and immaterial, and because it called for a conclusion,'" operated as a waiver of the objection as for hearsay, although: "This testimony was undoubtedly objectionable, because it was but hearsay. ..."
In the case at bar, we hold that defendant did not specify the ground that the question called for hearsay, and so defendant waived that ground of objection. Having waived it on the trial, defendant cannot now raise the objection that the evidence complained of was hearsay, and, under Circuit Court Rule 33, we are forbidden to consider that ground. Assignment 4 is not sustained.
Defendant's second argument is that the court erred in refusing his requested Charge B, which recites:
To support this argument, defendant cites Louisville & Nashville R. Company v. Steverson, 220 Ala. 158, 124 So. 205, where the sole ground for reversal was refusal of the following charge:
Defendant cites also Nelson v. Lee, 249 Ala. 549, 32 So. 2d 22, where this court held it not error to give the following charge:
Charge B in the instant case, however, is not the same charge which was approved in either of the two last cited cases. The refused charge here appears to be the same as charge 9 which was refused to defendant in North Alabama Traction Co. v. Taylor, 3 Ala.App. 456, 57 So. 146. The Court of Appeals said:
We are of opinion that the reasoning of the Court of Appeals is correct and that defendant's Charge B was refused without error in the case at bar.
Since error has not been shown, the judgment is due to be affirmed.
Affirmed.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and GOODWYN and HARWOOD, JJ., concur.