Title: Commonwealth v. Maguire

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12013 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  LAWRENCE F. MAGUIRE. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 8, 2016. - January 3, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & 
Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Open and Gross Lewdness and Lascivious Behavior.  Practice, 
Criminal, Required finding. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Roxbury Division of 
the Boston Municipal Court Department on October 15, 2010. 
 
 
The case was tried before David B. Poole, J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Bradford R. Stanton for the defendant. 
 
Matthew T. Sears, Assistant District Attorney (Ashley E. 
Polin, Assistant District Attorney, with him) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  After a jury trial, the defendant, Lawrence F. 
Maguire, was convicted in the Boston Municipal Court of open and 
gross lewdness and lascivious behavior in violation of G. L. 
c. 272, § 16, and resisting arrest in violation of G. L. c. 268, 
2 
 
§ 32B.  The Appeals Court affirmed the convictions in a divided 
decision.  See Commonwealth v. Maguire, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 855 
(2015).  We granted the defendant's application for further 
appellate review.  After the case was entered in this court, the 
defendant requested and received leave to file a new brief.  See 
Mass. R. A. P. 27.1 (f), as amended, 441 Mass. 1601 (2004).  We 
consider the brief "in lieu of the Appeals Court brief."  Id.  
See Beal Bank, SSB v. Eurich, 448 Mass. 9, 12 (2006).  The brief 
filed in this court makes no argument bearing on the conviction 
of resisting arrest, and we do not, therefore, address the 
merits of that conviction.  See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (4), as 
amended, 367 Mass. 921 (1975).  See also Commonwealth v. Walsh, 
407 Mass. 740, 745 (1990).  We affirm the conviction of 
resisting arrest.  We reverse the conviction of open and gross 
lewdness and lascivious behavior because there was insufficient 
evidence that the defendant's conduct caused any person to 
experience "shock" or "alarm," as the statute requires.  We 
remand for entry of a conviction of the lesser included offense 
of indecent exposure.  We also clarify that the "shock" or 
"alarm" requirement has both a subjective and an objective 
component. 
 
Facts.  We summarize the facts in the light most favorable 
to the Commonwealth, focusing on those relevant to the 
defendant's claim of insufficiency of the evidence of open and 
3 
 
gross lewdness and lascivious behavior.  See Commonwealth v. 
Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979). 
 
On October 14, 2010, Detective Sean Conway of the 
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) transit police 
department observed the defendant on an MBTA train traveling 
toward the Park Street station.  At Park Street, the defendant 
transferred to another train, and sat across from a college-aged 
woman.  Detective Conway transferred onto the same train.  From 
a distance of approximately eight to ten feet, the detective 
observed the defendant rub his penis over his pants for thirty 
seconds to one minute.  When the defendant departed the train at 
the Hynes Convention Center station, Detective Conway continued 
to follow him. 
 
There were between fifteen and twenty-five people on the 
Hynes Convention Center station platform at that time.  From a 
distance of about thirty feet behind the defendant, while on the 
same side of the train tracks, Detective Conway saw the 
defendant lean against a pillar with his left shoulder, with his 
hands in front of him, facing a bench five or six feet away.  
Two or three females were sitting on the bench.  The defendant 
jerked his head up and down as if he were trying to attract the 
females' attention and he began to manipulate his hands in front 
of him, "consistent with someone who's about to urinate."  No 
4 
 
urine was observed on the ground.  Detective Conway demonstrated 
the defendant's movements to the jury. 
 
Detective Conway ascended a flight of stairs, crossed over 
a landing, and went down another flight of stairs to a different 
area of the same platform, so that he could see more clearly 
what the defendant was doing.  As he descended the stairs, the 
detective observed the defendant still facing the women seated 
on the bench.  He saw the defendant's exposed penis for one or 
two seconds.  Detective Conway testified that he was "disgusted" 
and "concerned" that the women on the bench were being 
"victimized" by the defendant's behavior.  Almost 
simultaneously, the detective made eye contact with the 
defendant, and the defendant tried to zip his pants and run 
away.  Detective Conway attempted to speak with the women on the 
bench but was unable to communicate with them, for reasons not 
apparent on the record.  The detective then pursued the 
defendant, who eventually was arrested. 
 
Discussion.  The statute criminalizing "open and gross 
lewdness and lascivious behavior," G. L. c. 272, § 16, has 
remained essentially unchanged for more than 200 years.  See 
Commonwealth v. Quinn, 439 Mass. 492, 495 & n.7 (2003), citing 
St. 1784, c. 40, § 3.  The elements of the crime, however, have 
evolved through our decisional law.  See Commonwealth v. Gray, 
5 
 
40 Mass. App. Ct. 901, 901 (1996), citing Commonwealth v. Fitta, 
391 Mass. 394, 395-397 (1984).  We recognize that 
"proof of five elements [is required] to support a 
conviction, i.e., that the defendant (1) exposed genitals, 
breasts, or buttocks; (2) intentionally; (3) openly or with 
reckless disregard of public exposure; (4) in a manner so 
'as to produce alarm or shock'; (5) thereby actually 
shocking or alarming one or more persons." 
 
Commonwealth v. Swan, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260-261 (2008), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Kessler, 442 Mass. 770, 773 & n.4 
(2004).  See Commonwealth v. Ora, 451 Mass. 125, 127 (2008).  It 
is established that proof of the fourth and fifth elements -- 
both of which require "shock" or "alarm" -- is what 
distinguishes "open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior," 
which is a felony, from the "closely similar" misdemeanor of 
indecent exposure under G. L. c. 272, § 53.  See Fitta, supra at 
396, quoting Commonwealth v. Sefranka, 382 Mass. 108, 116 
(1980).  In this case, the fifth distinguishing element is 
absent:  there was insufficient evidence that the police 
detective himself was "in fact" subjectively alarmed or shocked 
by the defendant's conduct.  See Commonwealth v. Botev, 79 Mass. 
App. Ct. 281, 287 (2011).  On the view we take of the evidence, 
we therefore need not address the objective reasonableness of 
the detective's subjective reaction, which is the focus of the 
fourth element.  In future cases, however, it will be incumbent 
on the Commonwealth to demonstrate not only subjective "shock" 
6 
 
or "alarm" on the part of a victim, but also that the victim's 
reaction was objectively reasonable. 
 
a.  Subjective component of "shock" or "alarm".  The fifth 
element of proof requires the Commonwealth to demonstrate that 
at least one person "in fact" was "alarmed or shocked" by the 
defendant's exposure.  See Botev, 79 Mass. App. Ct. at 287-288 
(requirement that "one or more persons in fact be shocked or 
alarmed . . . has remained unchanged since 1880").  This 
requires evidence of strong negative emotions -- a subjective 
inquiry -- most commonly corroborated by an immediate physical 
response.  See, e.g., Swan, 73 Mass. App. Ct. at 261 (where 
young student was "grossed out" and made "nervous" by exposure, 
and rushed from room, alarm sufficiently established); 
Commonwealth v. Guy G., 53 Mass. App. Ct. 271, 273-274 (2001) 
(evidence sufficient where student testified to being in shock, 
upset, angry, and sad; that she left after defendant's exposure; 
and that her failure to report instantly "was due . . . to her 
being 'too in shock'"); Commonwealth v. Poillucci, 46 Mass. App. 
Ct. 300, 303-304 (1999) (evidence sufficient where girl alerted 
her parents to defendant's conduct and testified that she felt 
"very uncomfortable and nervous"); Gray, 40 Mass. App. Ct. at 
901 (jury could find alarm where witness testified that he was 
"'disgust[ed]' by what he saw," and "acted swiftly and 
purposefully to stop and identify the perpetrators for the 
7 
 
police").  Contrast Kessler, 442 Mass. at 772-775 (where boys 
reacted to viewing masturbation with nervous giggling, and 
continued to watch, insufficient evidence of shock or alarm); 
Commonwealth v. Militello, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 325, 333-334 (2006) 
(where "boys did not experience a reaction so intense that they 
immediately sought to notify someone of the defendant's 
behavior," evidence insufficient to establish "serious negative 
emotional experience" [citation omitted]). 
 
In this case, the detective was the only eyewitness who 
testified to the defendant's conduct.  There was no evidence 
that the women seated on the bench or any other person noticed 
the defendant or his actions.  The detective's testimony was 
that he was "disgusted" after viewing the defendant's exposed 
penis, not for himself, but rather out of "concern" for the 
women seated on the bench.  While we do not discount the 
sincerity of the detective's concern, there is nothing to 
suggest that the women themselves experienced any strong 
negative emotion, such as fright or intimidation.  See Ora, 451 
Mass. at 128 ("central purpose of G. L. c. 272, § 16, [is] one 
of preventing fright and intimidation, particularly regarding 
children").  Indeed, the women remained seated while the 
detective traversed the station platform and stairs, and while 
the defendant's penis was exposed. 
8 
 
 
With respect to the detective, we agree with the dissenting 
judge of the Appeals Court, who described the detective's use of 
the term "'disgusted' to mean something analogous to 'offensive' 
under the indecent exposure statute.  See Commonwealth v. 
Cahill, 446 Mass. 778, 781 (2006) ('Offensive acts are those 
that [are] . . . repugnant to the prevailing sense of what is 
decent or moral')."  Maguire, 87 Mass. App. Ct. at 862 (Milkey, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  To be sure, 
special words neither prove nor disprove shock or alarm.  See 
Commonwealth v. Pereira, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 344, 347 (2012).  
What is required, however, is evidence that a witness personally 
sustained the type of "serious negative emotional experience" 
that is stronger that "mere nervousness and offense."  Ora, 451 
Mass. at 127, quoting Kessler, 442 Mass. at 774-775.  Vicarious 
concern for other people or even disgust does not "convert any 
ordinary indecent exposure case into one for open and gross 
lewdness."  Maguire, 87 Mass. App. Ct. at 863 (Milkey, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Someone must be 
personally and "in fact" "shocked or alarmed" by the conduct; it 
is not sufficient that someone merely might be.  See Pereira, 
supra at 346.1 
                                                          
 
 
1 In the Pereira case, a police officer viewed a public sex 
act (masturbation) and testified that he was "personally, angry" 
in addition to being "disgusted."  Pereira, 82 Mass. App. Ct. at 
345.  Although the Appeals Court concluded that the evidence was 
9 
 
 
In this case, the detective observed an exposed penis and 
testified that he was "disgusted" and concerned for others.  
Compare id. at 345.  Nothing about his testimony or his actions, 
however, would have permitted a rational jury to find that he 
(or anyone else) personally experienced shock or alarm.  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Mulvey, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 579, 584 (2003) 
("behavior that has an impact only upon members of the police 
force is significantly different from that affecting other 
citizens," for purposes of disorderly conduct charge under G. L. 
c. 272, § 53). 
 
b.  Objective component of "shock" or "alarm."  The fourth 
element, "shock" or "alarm" impact, requires the Commonwealth to 
demonstrate a "substantially more serious and negative impact" 
to prove conduct constituting "open and gross lewdness and 
lascivious behavior," under G. L. c. 272, § 16, as compared to 
conduct that violates the indecent exposure statute, G. L. 
c. 272, § 53.  Ora, 451 Mass. at 127.  The "process of judicial 
construction," id. at 128, now leads us to emphasize that this 
element includes an objective component.  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
sufficient to establish that the police officer "experienced a 
significant negative emotion," id. at 347, it did not address 
whether, as an objective matter, there was evidence to 
demonstrate that it was reasonable for an experienced police 
officer to be "shocked and alarmed" by the conduct.  Cf. Revere 
v. Aucella, 369 Mass. 138, 142-143 (1975) (G. L. c. 272, § 16, 
may not constitutionally apply where there is no imposition of 
"lewdness or nudity on an unsuspecting or unwilling person"). 
10 
 
Braica, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 244, 246 (2007) (criminal harassment 
statute expressly requires conduct or speech that both 
"seriously alarmed the victim" and would "cause a reasonable 
person to suffer substantial emotional distress," G. L. c. 265, 
§ 43A [a]).  Cf. also Commonwealth v. Johnson, 470 Mass. 300, 
308, 313 (2014) (construing element of "serious[] alarm[]" under 
criminal harassment statute), citing Kessler, 442 Mass. at 773-
774 (offense did not satisfy shock or alarm component of open 
and gross lewdness statute). 
 
The objective of G. L. c. 272, § 16, is to criminalize 
behavior that is shocking or alarming to society generally, "as 
distinct from punishing the defendant for the effect of that 
conduct on particular victims."  Botev, 79 Mass. App. Ct. at 
287.  The requirement that one or more persons was personally 
and in fact shocked or alarmed is the first step in "insur[ing] 
that the conduct in question indeed is of a character warranting 
a felony conviction under G. L. c. 272, § 16, as distinct from a 
misdemeanor conviction under G. L. c. 272, § 53."  Id. at 288.  
The requirement that the person's reaction be reasonable is the 
second step.  A person's particular reaction -- or the 
particular words used to characterize his or her emotional 
response -- to the misconduct will not suffice to support a 
conviction under § 16 if the reaction is not one that a fact 
finder finds reasonable.  See Braica, 68 Mass. App. Ct. at 246.  
11 
 
See also Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 469 Mass. 621, 624-629 (2014) 
(applying objective standard to charge of accosting or annoying 
person of opposite sex under G. L. c. 272, § 53).  Requiring the 
Commonwealth to demonstrate that "shock" or "alarm" was an 
objectively reasonable reaction in the circumstances of the 
conduct is consistent with the statutory objective. 
 
Conclusion.  The judgment of conviction of resisting arrest 
is affirmed.  The judgment of conviction of open and gross 
lewdness and lascivious behavior is reversed.  Because the 
defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence 
with respect to the first four elements of open and gross 
lewdness and lascivious behavior, including public exposure of 
his penis, see G. L. c. 277, § 79, the case is remanded for 
entry of a conviction on the lesser included offense of indecent 
exposure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.