Title: Fotinopoulos v. Dept. of Corrections

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Fotinopoulos v. Department of Corrections (2001-435); 174 Vt. 510;
811 A.2d 1227

[Filed 19-Aug-2002]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2001-435

                               JUNE TERM, 2002


  George Fotinopoulos	               }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
       v.	                       }	Commissioner of Labor & Industry
                                       }	
  Department of Corrections	       }
                                       }	DOCKET NO. M-17402


             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Plaintiff George Fotinopoulos appeals the Labor and Industry
  Commissioner's dismissal of his claim for Workers' Compensation.  Plaintiff
  argues on appeal that the Commissioner erred in finding that he was exempt
  from coverage under the Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"), pursuant to
  21 V.S.A. § 601(12)(O)(iv), because he was engaged by the State of Vermont
  Department of Corrections (DOC) under a "special agreement."  We hold that
  plaintiff was an employee of the State for the purposes of the Act, and
  accordingly, reverse and remand.

       The DOC employed plaintiff under a 6-month contract to provide mental
  health services for inmates at the Northwest State Correctional Facility. 
  The DOC later extended the contract for an additional year.  In February
  1999, plaintiff, while performing regular contractual duties, sustained a
  fractured cheek bone when an inmate struck him with his fist.  Following
  this injury, plaintiff filed a Workers' Compensation claim.

       The State filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
  and/or motion for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff was excluded
  from workers' compensation coverage by § 601(12)(O)(iv) as a person hired
  under a "special agreement."  In May 2000, the Commissioner issued an order
  denying plaintiff's coverage.  Plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider, and
  in December 2000, the Commissioner vacated its dismissal order and granted
  plaintiff's request for a hearing on the factual issues.  In March 2001,
  plaintiff filed with the Commissioner a proposed set of findings of fact,
  which the State denied but did not oppose for the purpose of reconsidering
  the State's motion to dismiss and/or motion for summary judgment.  Both
  parties then agreed that a formal hearing was not necessary.

       In September 2001, the Commissioner again granted the State's motion
  and dismissed the claim.  For the purpose of ruling on the motion, the
  Commissioner accepted the facts alleged by plaintiff in his proposed
  findings of fact.  These findings included the following: (1) the State
  supervised plaintiff's daily activities, times of work, and means and
  methods of job performance; (2) plaintiff performed activities that were
  "categorically typical of those provided by" the State;  (3) plaintiff did
  not engage in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or
  business;  (4) the State paid plaintiff an hourly wage through the State
  Payroll system and withheld state and federal taxes and FICA contributions;
  (5) the State required plaintiff to work 40 hours a week.  Following the
  Commissioner's ruling, plaintiff filed this appeal.

 
          
       Plaintiff argues that the Commissioner erred in finding that he was
  exempt from workers' compensation coverage because of the "special
  agreement" exception to Workers' Compensation  pursuant to § 601(12)(O)(iv)
  of the Act.  Plaintiff contends that, for the purpose of the Act, "special
  agreement" means "independent contractor," and, plaintiff argues, because
  the State exercised control over his activities and treated him similar to
  the way it treated regular employees, he was essentially an employee of the
  State, not an independent contractor.

       The sole issue in this appeal is the proper interpretation of "special
  agreement" in 21 V.S.A. § 601(12)(O)(iv) of the Act.  An administrative
  agency's interpretation of a statute within its area of expertise is
  presumed to be correct, valid and reasonable.  In re Prof'l Nurses Serv.
  Inc., 164 Vt. 529, 532,