Title: Commonwealth v. Shakespeare

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12898 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  WILLIAM OMARI SHAKESPEARE. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 10, 2023. - November 30, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Cypher, Kafker, & Wendlandt, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Firearms.  Evidence, Testimony before grand jury, 
Testimony at prior proceeding, Previous testimony of 
unavailable witness, Relevancy and materiality, 
Identification, Third-party culprit, Consciousness of 
guilt, Opinion.  Error, Harmless.  Practice, Criminal, 
Harmless error, Hearsay, Assistance of counsel. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 28, 2016. 
 
The cases were tried before Christine M. Roach, J., and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on September 9, 2021, was 
considered by her. 
 
 
Amy M. Belger (James N. Greenberg also present) for the 
defendant. 
Sarah Montgomery Lewis, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  On the afternoon of June 14, 2016, Marcus Hall 
(victim) was shot and killed outside a barbershop (shop) where 
he brought his four year old son for a haircut.  A grand jury 
2 
 
indicted the defendant, William Omari Shakespeare, for the 
victim's murder and related firearms offenses.  At trial, the 
defendant argued that another person present in the shop at the 
time of the murder, Mark Edwards, was the shooter.  The jury 
convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree on 
theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or 
cruelty and of all firearms charges.1 
 
Appealing from his convictions and the denial of his motion 
for a new trial, the defendant argues that the evidence that the 
defendant committed the killing was insufficient; that the judge 
committed prejudicial error in failing to allow Edwards's grand 
jury testimony in evidence where Edwards was deceased and the 
evidence supported the defendant's third-party culprit defense; 
that Boston police Sergeant Detective Michael Stratton 
impermissibly testified about his observations of the video 
evidence; and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
object to Stratton's testimony and for pursuing a particular 
line of questioning with Stratton that the defendant alleges 
diminished counsel's credibility with the jury.  The defendant 
also asks us to reduce his verdict of murder in the first degree 
 
1 The defendant was convicted of unlawful carrying of a 
firearm without a firearm identification card, G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (a); unlawful possession of ammunition without a firearm 
identification card, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h) (1); and unlawful 
carrying of a loaded firearm without a license, G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (n). 
3 
 
or order a new trial pursuant to our power granted by G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E. 
 
We conclude that it was error to prohibit counsel from 
introducing Edwards's grand jury testimony and that such error 
was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  As a result, we 
must reverse all the defendant's convictions, as his convictions 
on the firearm charges were intertwined with his murder 
conviction.  Holding that the evidence was sufficient for the 
defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree, however, 
we reverse and remand the case for a new trial.  Pursuant to our 
decision in Commonwealth v. Guardado, 493 Mass. 1 (2023) 
(Guardado II), the defendant may also be retried on the firearms 
offenses.  Because the remainder of the issues raised by the 
defendant may recur at a new trial, we address them and hold 
that Stratton's testimony was admissible and counsel was not 
ineffective. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  "Because the defendant 
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to murder in the 
first degree," we recite the facts in detail in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, reserving certain details for 
later discussion.  Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 460 Mass. 409, 410 
(2011). 
4 
 
i.  The murder.  On Tuesday, June 14, 2016, at around 11:53 
A.M., the victim brought his four year old son Ryan2 to the shop 
in the Mattapan section of Boston for a haircut.  On that date, 
there were five barbers working at the shop:  Levi Preddie, 
Mattia Zagon, Raymond Menzie, Isaac Lewis, and Jodie Davis.  
Although Zagon was the victim's and Ryan's regular barber, Lewis 
cut Ryan's hair that day.  Zagon knew the victim as "smart, 
driven[,] . . . sociable," and as intent on "empowering us as 
[B]lack people."  The victim was not "easily agitated or 
angered." 
 
The shop, a social "hotspot" for those in the community, 
frequently had people from the neighborhood come in only to 
socialize.  When any barber did not have a client in his chair, 
the barbers passed the time by cleaning, entertaining other 
clients in the shop, and playing games and music.  On that day, 
the shop was not busy. 
The shop was small and narrow.  Behind a half wall at the 
back of the shop were sinks for hair washing, a supply closet on 
the left (the first door on the left), and a bathroom just 
before the back door (the second door on the left).  There were 
two doors allowing access to the shop:  a front door facing Blue 
Hill Avenue and a back door facing the parking lot behind the 
 
2 A pseudonym. 
5 
 
shop (rear lot).  The rear lot was covered in gravel.  A gate to 
the rear lot provided access and sometimes was open and 
sometimes locked.  On June 14, 2016, it was open.  Typically, 
individuals who worked at the shop and surrounding businesses 
would park in the rear lot, along with regular clients who 
occasionally would also park there.  The back door was open on 
that day to let in a breeze. 
The shop was situated between Blue Hill Avenue, Morton 
Street, and Landor Road, nearer to the corner of Blue Hill 
Avenue and Morton Street.  To access the rear lot, a driver 
would have to turn right from Blue Hill Avenue onto Landor Road 
and then turn left from Landor Road into the parking lot.  Once 
a driver turned left into the lot, he or she first would pass a 
smokehouse and a red trash barrel, and then turn left again into 
the rear lot.  Intersecting Landor Road and Morton Street behind 
the shop was Leston Street.  On the day of the murder, there 
were cameras posted in the shop, but not outside the shop in the 
rear lot. 
 
Earlier on that day, before the victim3 and his young son 
arrived, the defendant arrived at the shop at approximately 
 
3 The victim was wearing a green shirt and jeans on the day 
he was killed. 
 
6 
 
11:37 A.M.4  The defendant was wearing a light red shirt with a 
bear pictured on the front, and lighter colored pants.  At the 
time of the murder, the defendant had been going there to get 
his hair cut for a few years, and never had he caused a problem.  
The barbers knew the defendant as "brown man" and the "Jamaican 
guy." 
When the defendant arrived that day, he entered by the back 
door and brought food with him; he ate and chatted with the 
barbers about basketball.  From the video recording (video) of 
the activity inside the shop, as the defendant was speaking with 
the barbers, he appeared to be friendly and animated.5  When 
Zagon arrived that day at around 11 A.M. or noon, he saw 
Preddie's blue car parked in the rear lot, as well as a black 
Toyota that was unknown to him.  Zagon parked his own car, also 
blue, in the rear lot. 
 
As mentioned supra, at approximately 11:53 A.M., the victim 
and his son entered the shop.  Immediately after entering, the 
victim engaged in a discussion with the defendant.  Menzie noted 
 
4 Although Lewis testified that the victim arrived before 
the defendant, the video footage from the shop belies this 
testimony. 
 
5 The video of inside the shop was reviewed as a part of our 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, review.  The times depicted in the shop 
video were forty-three minutes behind real time, and the 
Commonwealth entered a time conversion sheet as an exhibit at 
trial. 
7 
 
that it seemed as if the defendant and victim knew each other.  
As shown in the video, the defendant's body language changed as 
he was speaking with the victim; neither he nor the victim 
appeared to be laughing or joking.  The victim told the 
defendant that he had been trying to get in touch with the 
defendant by telephone.  After approximately one minute of 
conversation, the victim walked toward the back of the shop and 
out the back door.  The defendant followed the victim within the 
minute, returned briefly to the back of the shop within ten 
seconds, and then left through the back door again.  Lewis had 
to close the back door to the shop because they were arguing and 
"it was loud."  Davis heard someone say "fuck" loudly, but did 
not know who was arguing in the rear lot.  After approximately 
two minutes, at around 11:57 A.M., the victim reappeared on the 
video and walked from the front to the back of the shop and out 
the door again.  The defendant did not reenter the shop for 
about twenty minutes. 
 
When the victim reentered the shop at around 11:59 A.M. 
through the back door, he appeared to be preoccupied.  He left 
the shop briefly but returned, and used his cell phone for a 
while, which struck Preddie as unusual.  At around 12:13 P.M., 
the victim walked to the back of the shop and seemed to look out 
the back door, and then walked to the front. 
8 
 
At 12:17 P.M., another man, later identified as Mark 
Edwards, entered the shop through the back door.  He was wearing 
a bright red shirt, dark jeans, a bulky gold chain, and 
sunglasses on top of his head, and he was carrying a small bag 
with straps around his chest.  He appeared to greet the barbers 
sitting at the back of the shop, look at the front where the 
victim was located, turn around, and walk out the back door 
while on his cell phone.6  Edwards was not a regular client, and 
the barbers who knew of him referred to him as "dreads" or 
"dreadlocks."  Menzie testified that Edwards was a "social" and 
"cool" person and that he never saw Edwards get into a fight at 
the shop. 
At approximately 12:19 P.M., the defendant reentered the 
shop by the back door.  The victim put down his cell phone and 
walked to the back of the shop toward the defendant.  Lewis 
heard the defendant say to the victim, "Let me talk to you."  
The defendant stepped out the back door first, with the victim 
close behind him.7  When they went outside, Davis did not see 
anyone else out in the rear lot.  Within five seconds, the 
 
6 When Preddie and Davis were entering the shop by the back 
door after playing cricket in the rear lot, they saw Edwards.  
Preddie testified that Edwards was walking outside from the 
shop's back door; Davis testified that Edwards was walking 
toward the back door of the shop. 
 
7 Ryan was with Lewis then near the back of the shop. 
9 
 
victim appeared to lunge forward and then moved back to the 
doorway.8 
At this point, Preddie was at the sink, and as he was 
drying his hands, he heard a loud bang and saw the victim fall 
against the door.  The victim looked at the barbers in the shop, 
and then went back out the back door and was shot almost 
immediately.  Zagon said that the victim looked "scared" when he 
briefly moved back to the doorway of the shop.  Preddie heard "a 
lot" of gunshots, and Menzie heard more than one.  The barbers 
felt stones hitting their legs as they stood toward the back of 
the shop, and something hit Lewis's hat.  When the barbers heard 
gunshots, Preddie grabbed Ryan and brought him toward the front 
of the shop.  Zagon skated out in the in-line skates he was 
wearing when he heard the shots, but then returned, picked up 
Ryan, and brought him to the shop next door. 
Despite the argument that occurred between the victim and 
defendant in the rear lot earlier that day, Menzie testified 
that each had a "normal" and "flat" demeanor.  Davis stated that 
the defendant and victim were having a normal conversation in 
the shop.  Not one barber saw who shot the victim or was able to 
 
8 At trial, when Lewis testified that he did not know why 
the victim went out the back door and briefly stepped back in 
before again going out, the prosecutor impeached him with his 
grand jury testimony that the defendant pulled the victim out to 
the rear lot and that he then heard gunshots. 
10 
 
see anyone in the rear lot at the time of the gunshots or 
directly after. 
Immediately after the gunshots and after Preddie saw the 
victim on the ground in the rear lot, Preddie and Davis went to 
a nearby restaurant to call police.  After Zagon brought Ryan 
next door, he went to the rear lot and saw the victim on the 
ground.  He still was breathing; Davis and Lewis tilted the 
victim forward because they noticed that he was choking on his 
own blood.  They called 911, but the victim died before the 
ambulance arrived.  Lewis noticed gunshot wounds in the victim's 
head and his leg.9 
 
After the shooting, the barbers never again saw the 
defendant at the shop.  The black Toyota no longer was parked in 
the rear lot, and Zagon never again saw it. 
 
ii.  The investigation.  On June 14, 2016, Boston police 
Officer Patrick Conroy was working in the police station at the 
intersection of Blue Hill Avenue and Morton Street when he 
 
9 The medical examiner testified that the victim's cause of 
death was multiple gunshot wounds to the head, torso, and 
extremities.  He had an entrance gunshot wound on his left 
cheek, and an exit wound on his right cheek, which caused a 
hemorrhage within the soft tissue and fractured his facial 
bones.  He had an entrance gunshot wound to his left upper 
chest; the bullet associated with this wound traveled through 
the chest, lung, heart, liver, stomach, intestines, and left 
kidney before coming to rest in the soft tissue of his left 
buttock.  There were five gunshot wounds to the victim's legs 
and entrance and exit gunshot wounds on one of his fingers.  
There was no soot or stippling on the victim's body. 
11 
 
received a broadcast at 12:23 P.M. regarding a ShotSpotter10 
activation in the area of the shooting.  ShotSpotter detected 
five separate shots in this incident.  Several people directed 
police to the rear of the shop, where they observed the victim 
lying on his side in the rear lot.  He was unresponsive and 
unarmed.  Observers were congregated by a wall in the rear lot.  
Conroy observed one shell casing between the victim and the 
shop, and his partner, Officer Matthew Wyman, observed another 
shell casing.  They did not see anyone fleeing or leaving the 
scene. 
 
Officer Michael Connolly from the Boston police department 
crime scene response unit received a call to report to the shop 
at around 12:30 P.M.  He walked through the scene with Stratton 
and Sergeant Detective Dan Duff.  Police recovered five shell 
casings at the scene:  one was silver in color, and four were 
brass in color.  They took note of a tuft of hair and material 
on the ground, three beer cans,11 a lead fragment from a 
projectile, and a cigarette butt, and processed the scene for 
 
10 "A 'ShotSpotter' system 'identifies firearm discharges by 
sound and directs officers to the general location of the 
shots.'"  Commonwealth v. Cuffee, 492 Mass. 25, 27 n.2 (2023), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Evelyn, 485 Mass. 691, 694 (2020). 
 
11 A criminalist with the latent print unit in the Boston 
police department was able to match fingerprints on two of the 
beer cans to known individuals who either worked in or 
frequented the area. 
12 
 
latent fingerprints.  They returned the next day to look through 
some trash gathered by the barbers after police left.  They 
swabbed a bottle found in the trash for deoxyribonucleic acid 
(DNA). 
In June 2016, Stratton had three detectives reporting to 
him:  Vance Mills, Jose Teixeira, and Nicholas Moore.  On June 
14, he received a call at around 12:38 P.M. to investigate the 
victim's death.  Stratton directed Mills and Teixeira to remain 
at the station to conduct interviews while he and Moore went to 
the scene.  When they arrived, Blue Hill Avenue from Landor Road 
to Morton Street was barricaded by tape, along with the rear lot 
behind the shop.  Stratton recovered the victim's cell phone at 
the scene but was unable to attribute a telephone number to the 
defendant through the victim's cell phone.  The two cars 
Stratton observed in the rear lot on his arrival on scene were 
determined to belong to the barbers.  Police were unable to find 
any firearms or additional bullets. 
Police were able to recover video surveillance to assist in 
their investigation from cameras at several locations:  a bus 
operated by the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority 
(MBTA) traveling on Morton Street toward Blue Hill Avenue; a 
nearby ice cream shop and a nearby liquor store, both on Blue 
Hill Avenue; a private residence on Leston Street; and United 
States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) cameras for the 
13 
 
Boston police department mounted in the intersection of Morton 
Street and Blue Hill Avenue.  No exterior cameras depicted the 
shooting. 
From video discovered, Stratton was able to determine that 
at around 11:26 A.M., the defendant appeared at an ice cream 
shop a couple of blocks away from the barbershop.  He left the 
ice cream shop at around 11:34 A.M.  After the defendant left 
the ice cream shop, a black Toyota Camry was captured on the 
video being driven north on Blue Hill Avenue.  Traveling in that 
direction, as a driver approaches Landor Road, a liquor store is 
located on the right side of the street.  Video from a camera 
affixed to that store and facing Blue Hill Avenue depicted the 
car on which Stratton was focused turning onto Landor Street and 
heading toward the rear driveway leading to the rear lot of the 
shop.  Video from a private residence depicted a black car being 
driven into the smokehouse parking lot (which leads to rear of 
the shop) at 11:36 A.M.12 
On the recording captured by the shop camera, Stratton saw 
the defendant leave the shop at 11:56 A.M.  He also observed, on 
the recording captured by the camera at the private residence, 
the black car leaving the rear lot at noon and being driven from 
Leston Street left onto Morton Street.  The MBTA bus video 
 
12 As stated supra, the defendant entered the shop for the 
first time at 11:37 A.M. 
14 
 
captured the car driving toward Blue Hill Avenue on Morton 
Street, with the operator wearing a "light red burgundy type 
colored shirt."  The video depicts the car turning right to 
traverse Blue Hill Avenue. 
After watching the video footage from the shop, Stratton 
was aware that the defendant had reentered the shop at 
approximately 12:19 P.M.  He attempted to locate the car he 
believed the defendant had been driving on the recordings he was 
able to access in the surrounding area.  On the DHS video, 
Stratton saw what he believed to be the same car being driven on 
Blue Hill Avenue, stopping at a traffic light, and turning left 
onto Morton Street.  At around 12:16 P.M., he observed the car 
being pulled over to the right side of Morton Street and 
stopping there, then a U-turn being made, and the car being 
parked on the opposite side of the street.  After the car had 
been parked, at around 12:17 P.M., Stratton noted a man walking 
across the road, going toward the area of Morton Street where 
one can jump over a crushed fence behind a home and walk into 
the back of the shop.13  At approximately 12:20 P.M., an 
individual walked across Morton Street to the area where the car 
was parked, the car was driven from the spot, a U-turn was made 
 
13 The ShotSpotter notification was at about 12:19 P.M. 
15 
 
on Morton Street, and the car was driven away on Morton Street.  
The car then was driven through the parking lot of a pharmacy.14 
After watching the shop video many times, Stratton had the 
Boston regional intelligence center (BRIC) create an 
identification "wanted" flyer with photographs from the shop 
video of both Edwards and the defendant.15  By the end of June 
14, police knew the defendant's nickname, but not his true name.  
They did not know Edwards's name. 
Regarding his review of the shop video, Stratton testified 
on redirect examination that, in his opinion, when the victim 
and the defendant went out the back of the shop at 12:19 P.M., 
the victim punched the defendant, causing the defendant to go to 
the left out of view.  When the defendant reappeared in view, 
moving toward the victim, in Stratton's opinion he appeared to 
be holding a black item in his left hand.16  The video depicting 
this incident is blurry.  Stratton further thought that there 
 
14 Stratton testified that an individual walking from the 
parking lot onto Landor Road at around 12:22 P.M., in the 
direction of Blue Hill Avenue, and reentering the shop, in his 
opinion, was Lewis, concluding so based on his clothing and the 
shop video depicting his leaving the shop from the back and 
reentering by the front. 
 
15 Stratton stated that these men were not yet wanted for 
arrest, but only for identification purposes. 
 
16 Although Stratton was not aware whether the defendant was 
left- or right-handed, he found multiple photographs of the 
defendant on social media holding items in his left hand. 
16 
 
were two sets of feet to the right side of the doorway where the 
victim had been standing.  Stratton thought that one person wore 
clothing similar to Edwards.  Based on the placement of the 
shell casings found, Stratton did not think that those two 
people were involved in the shooting.  Stratton also opined that 
the victim was facing where the defendant was standing when he 
stepped out from the back door of the shop for the last time.  
Although Stratton stated his belief that Edwards was in the rear 
lot at the time of the shooting, and was one of the individuals 
captured on the right side in the video, he could not be sure. 
 
On June 20, 2016, Officer Stephen Puopolo was working at 
the front desk at the police station when Edwards arrived at the 
station with a woman named Lynette Taylor.  He presented himself 
because Taylor "told him he was wanted" after seeing the 
photograph of him on the BRIC flyer.  Edwards voluntarily 
accompanied two officers to the homicide unit for an interview 
with Stratton and Mills.  Edwards was "nervous and concerned" 
that he was wanted for identification in relation to the 
investigation.  Edwards voluntarily gave his cell phone to 
police, and told them that he sold marijuana, so he had erased 
or deleted a lot of the data on the cell phone.  Edwards told 
police that, on June 14, he received a call from a person named 
"Taj," which was why he left the shop.  Edwards was unable to 
produce a cell phone number for Taj, and police were unable to 
17 
 
identify him.  At the interview, Edwards was unable to provide 
police with his own cell phone number.  Police were unable to 
discover any connection between the cell phones of Edwards and 
the defendant or Edwards and the victim.  He was released after 
speaking with the officers. 
 
Amanda Holmes, who lived on Morton Street near the shop, 
testified at trial.  At the time of the shooting, Edwards lived 
on the third floor of her building.  On the left side of 
Holmes's building, there was an alley that abutted the rear of 
the shop.  The fence line behind the building bordered the 
wooded area behind the smokehouse, and the fence, which had been 
damaged, easily was traversed. 
Holmes knew that Edwards tended to wear "flashy" clothing 
and that he used the byname "Cancer."  When she returned home 
from work on June 14, 2016, at around 4:30 P.M. or 5 P.M., her 
father and Edwards were sitting on the porch.  Her father told 
her about the shooting, and Edwards, who was smoking, did not 
appear to be nervous and did not say anything.  Edwards was 
dressed plainly and was without sunglasses.  Edwards was shot 
and killed on May 13, 2017.  At the time of trial, there were no 
suspects for that murder. 
 
Also on the day of the shooting, Leigha Fontaine, who lived 
on Leston Street near the shop, was on her porch when she heard 
gunshots from the area of the smokehouse.  With her dog, she 
18 
 
walked to the area.  She saw a person with a red shirt walking 
with a typical gait on Landor Street from the area of the shop's 
rear lot and then turning onto Blue Hill Avenue.  This 
individual was wearing a short-sleeved polo shirt, had dark 
skin, and appeared to be about six feet tall, with a slender 
build.17  She saw him about one minute after first hearing the 
gunshots. 
 
The day after the victim's murder, Sandy Johnson, a woman 
who approached and spoke with detectives regarding the 
investigation, pointed out a particular residence on Morton 
Street (not Edwards's residence) as pertinent to the murder.  As 
a result of her communications to detectives, they looked for a 
bloody shirt in a trash barrel by the residence and reviewed 
video of the residence from June 14.  Johnson told police about 
someone with the byname "Cancer" entering an apartment with a 
bloody shirt.  Nothing was found. 
Rebecca Boissaye, a criminalist in the DNA unit at the 
Boston police crime laboratory (lab) determined that the 
defendant was a possible source of the DNA on a bottle recovered 
from the trash at the shop, to which the defendant stipulated.  
The criminologist did not test the cigarette butt found at the 
scene because it appeared that it had been outside for a while, 
 
17 Leigha Fontaine testified that the shirt was not maroon 
and not a T-shirt. 
19 
 
and it did not look similar to the cigarette that the defendant 
was observed putting between his lips in the shop's video.  
Similarly, the hair and a small white fiber found at the scene 
were not tested.18  Six holes were found in the victim's pants, 
and two holes were found in his shirt, which had reddish-brown 
stains consistent with blood.  Because the firearm involved in 
the shooting never was recovered, the lab did not do gunshot 
residue distance determination testing.  There was no soot on or 
stippling to the victim's clothing. 
 
Christopher Finn, a criminalist from the Boston police 
department's firearms analysis unit, received the five shell 
casings found at the scene, as well as a ballistic fragment and 
a bullet recovered by a medical examiner.  All were consistent 
with .40 caliber Smith and Wesson ammunition.  The defendant 
stipulated that they all were from the same gun.  As far as Finn 
could recall, all Smith and Wesson .40 caliber firearms have a 
port hole to the right and eject casings to the right.  The 
medical examiner testified that it was possible that due to 
clothing, a person shot from six inches away may not have soot 
or stippling surrounding a wound, and he was unable to conclude 
whether the victim was shot from close range. 
 
18 The fabric was too small for Boissaye to consider testing 
for DNA.  The hair was not tested because it had no roots or 
follicles. 
20 
 
 
From the end of September 2016 until January 31, 2017, 
officers made attempts to locate the defendant.  At the time of 
the shooting, the defendant resided in Dedham.  On January 31, 
2017, after a four-month search, the defendant was located in 
New York City. 
 
b.  Procedural history.  On September 28, 2016, a grand 
jury indicted the defendant on charges of murder in the first 
degree, G. L. c. 265, § 1; unlawful possession of a firearm, 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a); unlawful possession of ammunition, G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (h); and unlawful carrying of a loaded firearm, 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n). 
 
At the grand jury, Edwards, still alive at the time, 
testified.  He told the grand jury that he was in the shop that 
day but between 9 A.M. and 9:30 A.M., which demonstrably was 
false as proved by the shop video.  Edwards stated that he 
"jumped" his fence and went to the shop from the back and 
"dapped . . . up" the barbers sitting in the back when he 
entered.  He testified that he left the shop from the back 
because he received a telephone call from his friend Taj; he 
remained there for about five minutes.  When he left he did not 
see anyone outside, nor did he hear any gunshots.  He knew the 
defendant as "brown man," but did not see him in the shop on 
that day. 
21 
 
 
Among other motions in limine, on July 10, 2018, the 
Commonwealth filed a motion in limine to exclude the defendant 
from admitting "[m]ulti-[l]evel [h]earsay" to bolster his third-
party culprit or Bowden defense specifically with respect to 
Johnson's statements.  See Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472 
(1980). 
The defendant filed a motion in limine seeking to admit 
evidence of third-party suspects with a motive to kill the 
victim, specifically, Edwards.  In this motion, the defendant 
requested that various pieces of evidence be admitted, including 
evidence that Edwards was present in the shop and departed from 
the back immediately before the shooting, the Johnson 
statements, hearsay statements from several other purported 
witnesses, and the BRIC flyer.  In his written motion, he did 
not specifically request that Edwards's grand jury testimony be 
admitted in evidence at trial. 
The trial began on July 30, 2018.  During the trial, on 
August 7, the judge allowed the Commonwealth's motion with 
respect to the independent admissibility of the statements 
themselves, but denied it insofar as the defendant was permitted 
to question investigators about their work with respect to a 
potential third-party culprit.  Also on August 7, the judge 
allowed the defendant's motion to the extent that Edwards's 
"identity as a person of interest in the barbershop on the 
22 
 
morning of the shooting [was] undisputed and the defense [could] 
cross-examine the lead investigators about their investigation 
of [him]."  The judge denied the motion with respect to the 
admissibility of "hearsay statements by unavailable witnesses," 
including Edwards's grand jury testimony, which the defendant 
requested to admit at trial.  The defendant argued that 
Edwards's grand jury testimony should be admitted as an 
exception to the rule against admitting hearsay, particularly as 
prior recorded testimony of an unavailable witness.  See Mass. 
G. Evid. § 804(b)(1) (2023).  Counsel argued that it was not 
hearsay because the defendant was offering it, "and it's prior 
recorded testimony."  He also argued that it should be admitted 
because Edwards "clearly lied about being at the barbershop," 
and because Edwards denied hearing gunshots, which he argued was 
relevant to Edwards's "consciousness of guilt."  The judge ruled 
that Edwards's grand jury testimony, 
"while potentially not hearsay pursuant to [Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 804(a)(4)], [was] nonetheless controlled by 
Comm[onwealth] v. Clemente, 452 Mass. 295, 313-315 (2008), 
and . . . the defendant [could not] meet his burden to 
demonstrate that the Comm[onwealth] had the opportunity and 
similar motive with respect to . . . Edwards'[s] testimony 
at grand jury as if he were alive today to take the stand 
at trial." 
 
 
At the close of the Commonwealth's evidence, the 
defendant's motion for a directed verdict was denied. Both 
parties' closing arguments addressed extensively Edwards's 
23 
 
presence at the shop on the day of the murder.  The defendant 
focused on the fact that ninety seconds before the victim was 
killed, Edwards walked into the shop, looked at the victim, 
turned around while using his cell phone, and walked out.  
Counsel argued that Edwards "jump[ed]" the fence at the back of 
his house to get to and from the rear lot where the victim was 
shot.  He focused on the report of the bloody shirt worn by 
"Cancer" on Morton Street and the fact that Edwards erased his 
cell phone before giving it to police.  He further told the jury 
that Edwards "sa[id] he wasn't there for the shooting," even 
though that was not introduced in evidence.  He called attention 
to the fact that Edwards since had been shot, a year after the 
murder, and told the jury that "[k]illers get killed." 
 
In response, the Commonwealth acknowledged that Edwards was 
there at the time of the victim's murder, but focused on the 
evidence pointing to the defendant rather than Edwards.  The 
prosecutor emphasized that the victim faced the defendant, not 
Edwards, when he was shot.  She focused on Edwards's clothing 
and argued that if he intended to kill someone, he would not 
have dressed in such a "flashy" manner, with a "man purse or bag 
. . . holding [his] firearm."  The Commonwealth argued that it 
was the defendant, not Edwards, who had been in an altercation 
with the victim, that the placement of the shell casings and the 
victim's injuries suggested that it could not have been Edwards 
24 
 
who shot the victim from where he was standing, and that it was 
unlikely that Edwards, who could enter the rear lot from behind 
his residence, would have walked along Morton Street with a 
bloody shirt. 
 
On August 10, 2018, the jury convicted the defendant on all 
counts and found him guilty of murder in the first degree on 
theories of both deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity 
or cruelty, after which the defendant timely filed a notice of 
appeal.  The defendant filed a motion for a new trial in this 
court on September 9, 2021; it was remanded the next day for 
disposition in the Superior Court.  The trial judge denied the 
motion without an evidentiary hearing.  Before this court is the 
consolidated appeal from the denial of the defendant's motion 
for a new trial and his direct appeal from his convictions. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Sufficiency of the evidence for murder 
in the first degree.  The defendant argues that the evidence 
presented at trial required the jury to engage in "impermissible 
conjecture or surmise" as to whether the defendant or Edwards 
shot the victim.  He also argues that the evidence was 
insufficient to support his conviction of murder in the first 
degree on a theory of either deliberate premeditation or extreme 
atrocity or cruelty.  The Commonwealth argues that the evidence 
"pointed more strongly in the direction" of the defendant being 
25 
 
the shooter and supported the defendant's conviction on both 
theories.  We conclude that the evidence was sufficient. 
i.  Standard of review.  "In reviewing the sufficiency of 
the evidence, '[w]e consider whether, after viewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, any rational 
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 
crimes beyond a reasonable doubt.'"  Commonwealth v. Watson, 487 
Mass. 156, 162 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Ayala, 481 Mass. 
46, 51 (2018).  Evidence relied on to support a verdict of 
guilty "may be entirely circumstantial."  Commonwealth v. 
Whitaker, 460 Mass. 409, 416 (2011).  "[T]he inferences a jury 
may draw from the evidence 'need only be reasonable and possible 
and need not be necessary or inescapable.'"  Id., quoting 
Commonwealth v. Lao, 443 Mass. 770, 779 (2005), S.C., 450 Mass. 
215 (2007) and 460 Mass. 12 (2011).  Where the defendant was 
found guilty of murder in the first degree on theories of both 
deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, 
"sufficient evidence for one would suffice to affirm the 
verdict."  Whitaker, supra at 416-417. 
 
ii.  Equal opportunity.  The Commonwealth need not "prove 
that no person other than the defendant could have committed the 
crime."  Commonwealth v. Morgan, 449 Mass. 343, 349 (2007).  If, 
however, after all evidence is submitted to the jury, "the 
question of the guilt of the defendant is left to conjecture or 
26 
 
surmise and has no solid foundation in established facts, a 
verdict of guilty cannot stand."  Commonwealth v. Salemme, 395 
Mass. 594, 599-600 (1985), quoting Commonwealth v. Fancy, 349 
Mass. 196, 200 (1965).  "The issue here, 'then, is whether the 
evidence pointing to [the] defendant as the actual perpetrator 
[is] in equipoise with the evidence pointing to [Edwards], or 
whether there [is] instead evidence pointing more strongly in 
the direction of the defendant such that the jury could 
rationally infer that he was the principal" beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Morgan, supra at 350, quoting Commonwealth v. Torres, 
442 Mass. 554, 564 (2004). 
 
One of the leading cases regarding the identity of a 
shooter when there may be another possible shooter is Salemme, 
395 Mass. at 595.  In Salemme, a man, Brian Halloran, entered a 
restaurant in the early hours of the morning and seated himself.  
Id.  Twenty minutes later, a second man entered the restaurant 
and sat across from Halloran at the same table.  Id.  Both men 
were served a can of soda.  Id. at 595-596.  Later, a third man, 
the victim, entered the restaurant and sat between Halloran and 
the second man, with Halloran to his left and the second man to 
his right.19  Id. at 596.  While the employees were in the 
kitchen, they heard a gunshot.  Id.  When police arrived, they 
 
19 Salemme does not further explain the placement of the 
three men. 
27 
 
observed that the victim was shot above his right eye.  Id.  At 
trial, the defendant stipulated that a thumb print on a soda can 
located to the right of the victim was his fingerprint.  Id. at 
597.  The medical examiner agreed that the victim's gunshot 
wound was "'consistent with a bullet being fired from the right 
side' of the victim."  He admitted, however, that it was 
possible that the bullet was fired from the left if the victim 
had turned his head such that the right side of his head faced 
left.  Id.  The Commonwealth also introduced "considerable 
evidence of the defendant's apparent flight."  Id. at 598.  The 
Commonwealth did not try the case on a joint venture theory.  
Id. 
 
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the "second 
man" in the restaurant, but not that the defendant, rather than 
Halloran, shot the victim.  Salemme, 395 Mass. at 599.  The 
three men were last seen together ten minutes before the 
shooting occurred.  Id.  In that period of time, the court 
ruled, whether the three men "changed positions, moved about, 
argued, remained as they were, or left the restaurant" was a 
matter of conjecture.  Id. at 600.  Even if the jury were 
permitted to infer that the defendant was seated on the right 
side of the victim, the evidence did not permit a jury to 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt in what direction the 
28 
 
victim's head was turned and, consequently, whether the shooter 
was to the right or the left.  Id.  "[I]n [that] case there were 
two persons, [the defendant] and Halloran, with apparently equal 
opportunity to commit the murder.  Given the Commonwealth's 
abandonment of a joint venture theory, it had to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that [the defendant] fired the fatal shot."  
Id. at 601. 
 
In contrast to Salemme, in Morgan, 449 Mass. at 350, the 
court held that although the victim was last seen with two 
individuals, the evidence pointed "more strongly in the 
direction of the defendant's culpability as the perpetrator" to 
support the defendant's conviction.  There, the victim was last 
seen getting into a car with the defendant and an alleged third-
party culprit, Floyd Johnson, who was driving.  Id. at 344.  The 
presence of human blood was later detected on the rear exterior 
door handle on the driver's side of the car.  Id. at 346.  
Initially, Johnson was also indicted for murder and conspiracy 
to commit murder.  Id. at 344 n.2.  Eventually, the Commonwealth 
entered a nolle prosequi on Johnson's murder indictment.  Id.  
The defendant told police that he and Johnson went to see the 
victim to "pick up money the victim owed."  Id. at 345.  A 
witness testified that before the victim's murder, the defendant 
and Johnson met with him and showed him a nine millimeter weapon 
in Johnson's possession, along with a weapon in the defendant's 
29 
 
possession.  Id. at 347.  When the victim's body was discovered, 
the projectile recovered "could have been fired from a .357 
Magnum or specific types of nine millimeter weapons."  Id. at 
345.  The "Commonwealth did not proceed on a theory of joint 
venture."  Id. at 348. 
 
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to uphold 
the defendant's conviction as the shooter, pointing to several 
incriminating statements the defendant made, including, among 
others, statements about the defendant's apartment being broken 
into, that the victim could not be trusted and would rob 
someone, and that the defendant "'was feeling real fucked up' 
because the victim 'died for the wrong reason' and that the 
victim was not the one who broke into the apartment."  Morgan, 
449 Mass. at 351.  The defendant was also seen in possession of 
a gun that could have been used to kill the victim, and he 
threatened to kill the victim.  Id.  The court called attention 
to the fact that "[t]here was no evidence that Johnson shared 
this hostility toward the victim."  Id. 
 
Here, similar to Morgan, a jury reasonably could infer 
based on the evidence that the defendant committed the shooting 
rather than Edwards.  The evidence inculpating Edwards, which 
admittedly supported a third-party culprit defense, paled in 
comparison to the evidence against the defendant.  The 
Commonwealth acknowledged that Edwards was in the rear lot 
30 
 
during the victim's murder and that there was evidence presented 
that may have implicated Edwards, including his brief entrance 
to the shop ninety seconds before the murder.  Such evidence 
included the following:  Edwards appeared to look toward the 
victim and leave while talking on a cell phone with a small bag 
around his chest; Edwards's deletion of data on his cell phone 
before he gave it to police; and the report of a bloody shirt 
for which police searched that allegedly belonged to someone 
with the same byname as Edwards.  The "bloody shirt" was not 
found by police, no connection was made between Edwards and the 
victim, and no interaction was observed between the two. 
The evidence inculpating the defendant, in comparison, was 
concrete.  Put another way, the defendant's guilt "has [a] solid 
foundation in established facts."  Salemme, 395 Mass. at 599, 
quoting Fancy, 349 Mass. at 200.  Right around the time that the 
defendant arrived at the shop, video from surrounding cameras 
depicted a black Toyota leaving an ice cream shop, being driven 
toward the shop, and entering the parking lot behind the 
smokehouse, which led to the shop's rear lot.  When the 
defendant first arrived at the shop, he appeared animated and in 
good spirits, and was eating as he chatted. 
Immediately on the victim's entrance to the shop, he spoke 
with the defendant in what appeared to be a serious discussion, 
and it appeared that they knew each other.  They went out the 
31 
 
back door of the shop, and one of the barbers had to close the 
door because the defendant and victim were arguing and "it was 
loud."  A few minutes later, the black Toyota was captured on 
surrounding cameras leaving the rear lot, and an MBTA camera on 
a passing bus depicted the operator to be wearing a shirt 
similar in color to that of the defendant.  After the defendant 
left, the victim was in and out of the shop and constantly on 
his cell phone, which one barber found to be unusual. 
 
Just over fifteen minutes later, on the DHS video Stratton 
noticed what he believed to be the same black Toyota being 
driven on one side of Morton Street, staying there, and then 
making a U-turn and parking on the other side of the street.  
Stratton noticed then that someone walked across the street 
toward the area allowing entrance into the rear lot of the shop.  
Two minutes later, the defendant reentered the shop from the 
back door as depicted in the shop video.  From this evidence, a 
jury reasonably could infer that the defendant chose to park his 
car in a spot farther away from the shop, despite his knowledge 
of and familiarity with the rear lot, to avoid detection after 
the shooting. 
 
The moment that the defendant reentered the shop, the 
victim put down his cell phone and walked toward the back of the 
shop where the defendant was standing.  The defendant said to 
the victim, "Let me talk to you."  Within seconds of the 
32 
 
defendant and the victim walking out the door, the victim lunged 
forward in the direction of the defendant and retreated to the 
door with a scared look on his face.  The victim reentered the 
lot, running in the direction of the defendant, and almost 
immediately shots were fired.  Stratton pointed out that, about 
one minute after the defendant left the shop for the last time 
and the gunshots went off, an individual, as observed on the DHS 
video, walked across Morton Street, got into the black car, made 
a U-turn, and drove outbound. 
 
The shop video's capture of the area just beyond the back 
door of the shop is blurry.  Nonetheless, the defendant can be 
observed as he walked out in front of the victim and moved to 
the left when the victim lunged toward him.  Immediately after 
the victim retreated and the defendant fell out of view of the 
camera to the left, the video depicted an individual approaching 
from the same direction, and wearing the same color as the 
defendant, jumping in the direction of the victim, and the 
victim went out of view of the camera toward that individual and 
was shot.  At that same time, two sets of legs, with one person 
wearing a shirt similar in color to that of Edwards, are visible 
to the right in the rear lot. 
A rational juror could conclude that the location of the 
victim's wounds and the shell casing between his body and the 
shop indicate that the shooter fired from the defendant's 
33 
 
vantage point.  Based on the direction in which he entered the 
rear lot, as viewed in the shop video, the defendant stood to 
the left of the victim.  The victim was facing the defendant's 
direction when he went to the rear lot for the last time.  The 
victim had entrance gunshot wounds to the left cheek, left upper 
chest, and front part of his thighs.  At least one shell casing 
was found between the victim and the shop, and Finn testified 
that a Smith and Wesson .40 caliber firearm would "kick out" the 
shell casings to the right when shot.  This evidence supports a 
reasonable inference that the shooter was standing where the 
defendant would have been, as the shell casings would be 
expected to land somewhere in the area between the victim's body 
and the shop if someone to his left fired the shots.  The 
individual alleged to be Edwards, to the contrary, was to the 
victim's right and farther away. 
Although consciousness of guilt alone could not support the 
defendant's conviction, "[e]vidence of flight indicates 
consciousness of guilt and is probative of the defendant's 
guilty state of mind."  Salemme, 395 Mass. at 601, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Booker, 386 Mass. 466, 469 (1982).  The fact 
that the defendant was found in New York City four months after 
police began looking for him, when he had a residence in Dedham, 
also supports the inference that the defendant was the shooter. 
34 
 
 
Taking together all the above evidence, a jury reasonably 
could infer beyond a reasonable doubt that it was the defendant 
who killed the victim, as supported by his interactions and 
argument with the victim indicating a prior relationship of some 
type, his proximate location in the rear lot as related to the 
placement of a shell casing and the victim's wounds, his 
movements during the relevant time, and the consciousness of 
guilt evidence.  Compare Morgan, 449 Mass. at 350-351 (evidence 
pointed more strongly toward defendant's culpability where 
defendant made inculpatory statements, there was no evidence 
that third party shared hostility toward victim, and defendant 
was seen in possession of potential murder weapons), with 
Commonwealth v. Mazza, 399 Mass. 395, 399 (1987) (insufficient 
evidence for murder conviction where there was no evidence that 
victim was killed while defendant was present at murder scene), 
and Salemme, 395 Mass. at 599-601. 
 
iii.  Premeditation.  "In order to prove deliberate 
premeditation, the Commonwealth must show that 'the plan to kill 
was formed after deliberation and reflection.'"  Commonwealth v. 
Fernandez, 480 Mass. 334, 344 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Bolling, 462 Mass. 440, 446 (2012).  Even so, "no particular 
period of reflection is required, and . . . a plan to murder may 
be formed in seconds."  Commonwealth v. Gambora, 457 Mass. 715, 
35 
 
733 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Coleman, 434 Mass. 165, 168 
(2001). 
 
Here, the evidence was sufficient to show that the 
defendant had time to reflect on his decision to kill the 
victim, particularly because he left the shop and returned about 
twenty minutes later.  See Fernandez, 480 Mass. at 345 ("In 
addition to a period sufficient for the defendant to have 
'cooled off' and formed the intent to kill, the events here also 
show that the defendant left the scene of the altercation and 
returned with the weapon with the intent to kill the victim").  
The reasonable inference that he parked in a different location 
when he returned to the shop, possibly to avoid detection, and 
left by the back door with the victim seconds after he arrived 
further demonstrates that his "decision to kill was the product 
of 'cool reflection.'"  Gambora, 457 Mass. at 732, quoting 
Coleman, 434 Mass. at 167. 
In addition, although the victim appeared to lunge toward 
the defendant at the start of the altercation, leading Stratton 
to conclude that the victim punched the defendant, the victim 
was shot not only in his legs and his finger, but also in his 
head and chest.  In these circumstances, "the multiple shots 
fired at the victim were evidence of deliberate premeditation" 
and "[t]he placement of [a] fatal wound . . . in[] the victim's 
chest would also support a finding of deliberate premeditation."  
36 
 
Coleman, 434 Mass. at 168-169.  See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 435 
Mass. 113, 119 (2001), S.C., 486 Mass. 51 (2020), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Stewart, 398 Mass. 535, 541 (1986) (retrieving 
and utilizing weapon, particularly gun, "is 'sufficient 
generally to permit an inference of premeditation'").  There was 
no evidence that the victim was armed, or that the defendant may 
have shot him in self-defense.  See Coleman, supra at 169. 
 
iv.  Extreme atrocity or cruelty.  Although "sufficient 
evidence for [deliberate premeditation] would suffice to affirm 
the verdict," the evidence was also sufficient to support the 
jury's finding of extreme atrocity or cruelty.  Whitaker, 460 
Mass. at 416-417.  At the time of the defendant's trial, "the 
jury had to find evidence of at least one of the factors 
enunciated in [Commonwealth v. Cunneen, 389 Mass. 216, 227 
(1983)]."  Commonwealth v. Castillo, 485 Mass. 852, 858 (2020).  
These factors included "indifference to or taking pleasure in 
the victim's suffering, consciousness and degree of suffering of 
the victim, extent of physical injuries, number of blows, manner 
and force with which delivered, instrument employed, and 
disproportion between the means needed to cause death and those 
employed."  Cunneen, supra.  Since then, in Castillo, supra at 
865, we revised these factors to ensure that a jury do not "find 
extreme atrocity or cruelty based only on the degree of a 
victim's suffering, without considering whether the defendant's 
37 
 
conduct was extreme in either its brutality or its cruelty."20  
We noted in Castillo that our decision was to be applied "only 
in murder trials that commence after the date of issuance of 
[the] opinion," and did not apply it retroactively even in that 
case.  Id. at 866.  With that in mind, we analyze this case 
using the Cunneen factors, but also point out that the evidence 
was sufficient even under Castillo. 
 
The evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the 
means the defendant used to kill the victim "were excessive and 
out of proportion to what would be needed to kill a person."  
Castillo, 485 Mass. at 866.  See Cunneen, 389 Mass. at 227.  The 
defendant shot the victim six times:  once in the head, once in 
the chest, twice in the thighs and once in the knee, and once in 
the finger.  From this evidence, the jury could have found "that 
the victim saw that he was about to be shot" and "attempted to 
defend himself" as he was killed with his four year old son in 
the building directly behind him.  Commonwealth v. Robinson, 482 
 
20 The new factors are as follows:  "whether the defendant 
was indifferent to or took pleasure in the suffering of the 
deceased"; "whether the defendant's method or means of killing 
the deceased was reasonably likely to substantially increase or 
prolong the conscious suffering of the deceased"; and "whether 
the means used by the defendant were excessive and out of 
proportion to what would be needed to kill a person."  Castillo, 
485 Mass. at 865-866.  In considering the final factor, a jury 
may consider "the extent of injuries to the deceased; the number 
of blows delivered; the manner, degree, and severity of the 
force used; and the nature of the weapon, instrument, or method 
used."  Id. at 866. 
38 
 
Mass. 741, 746-747 (2019) (evidence that victim was struck by 
five bullets found in chair that tipped backward onto floor with 
gunshot wounds to head, chest, arm, hand, and leg at close range 
was sufficient to support finding of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty).  See Commonwealth v. Alicea, 464 Mass. 837, 853 (2013) 
(evidence was sufficient to support extreme atrocity or cruelty 
where defendant fired five shots at victim as victim tried to 
flee, including fatal wound to victim's head, and defendant 
smiled and then frowned after victim fell). 
 
Additionally, the evidence supported a finding of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty under Cunneen where there was evidence of 
the consciousness and degree of suffering of the victim.  When 
some of the barbers went to the rear parking lot after the 
gunfire, they saw that the victim was still breathing and tilted 
his body because they noticed that he was choking on his own 
blood.  See Castillo, 485 Mass. at 858-859 (evidence that victim 
was struggling to breathe after being shot, was gasping for 
breath, and was grasping for anything within reach was 
sufficient to support finding of extreme atrocity or cruelty 
under existing case law). 
 
b.  Exclusion of Edwards's grand jury testimony.  The 
defendant asserts that the judge erroneously excluded Edwards's 
grand jury testimony.  He argues that without knowing that 
Edwards lied in front of the grand jury, the jury had an 
39 
 
inaccurate and incomplete picture of Edwards as a potential 
third-party culprit, which resulted in reversible error.  The 
defendant posits that Edwards's testimony was admissible under 
the constitutionally based hearsay exception. 
 
The Commonwealth responds that the defendant did not meet 
the requirements to establish admissibility under the prior 
recorded testimony hearsay exception for an unavailable witness 
and that, even assuming the exclusion of Edwards's grand jury 
testimony was error, the error did not prejudice the defendant.  
The Commonwealth also argues that the testimony was not 
admissible under the constitutionally based hearsay exception 
because it was not "critical" to the defendant's case. 
 
In Commonwealth v. Clemente, 452 Mass. 295, 313 (2008), 
cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1181 (2009), the court discussed the 
issue whether grand jury testimony of a now unavailable witness 
may be admissible against the Commonwealth under the prior 
recorded testimony exception to the hearsay rule.  We 
"decline[d] to adopt a general rule that would allow the 
admission of prior recorded testimony from a grand jury 
proceeding of a now unavailable witness."  Id.  The prior 
recorded testimony exception to the hearsay rule only applies 
where it is testimony roughly equivalent to what a jury would 
have heard at trial were the witness available and where the 
party against whom the testimony is offered would "have had a 
40 
 
reasonable opportunity and similar motive to develop the 
testimony adequately, either by direct, cross-, or redirect 
examination."  Id.  "[T]he testimony provided to a grand jury is 
limited [to obtaining an indictment or preservation of testimony 
from an adverse witness], and [often] no attempt is made [by the 
Commonwealth] to corroborate or discredit the witness providing 
the testimony."  Id. at 314-315.  Occasionally, the Commonwealth 
may not yet possess sufficient evidence to confront and 
contradict an adverse witness.  Id. at 315. 
"If, however, the party seeking the admission of the grand 
jury testimony can establish that the Commonwealth had an 
opportunity and similar motive to develop fully a (now 
unavailable) witness's testimony at the grand jury, that earlier 
testimony would be admissible."  Clemente, 452 Mass. at 315.  It 
is likely that this burden will be very difficult for defendants 
to meet.  Id. 
Even if the defendant is unable to meet this burden, grand 
jury testimony amounting to hearsay may be admissible through 
the constitutionally based hearsay exception.  Such evidence may 
be admissible, "despite its failure to fall into any of our 
traditional hearsay exceptions, provided that the defendant 
establishes both that it '[i]s critical to [the defendant's] 
defense' and that it bears 'persuasive assurances of 
trustworthiness.'"  Commonwealth v. Drayton, 473 Mass. 23, 36 
41 
 
(2015), S.C., 479 Mass. 479 (2018), quoting Chambers v. 
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973).  See Chambers, supra 
(where excluded testimony "bore persuasive assurances of 
trustworthiness" and "was critical to [the defendant's] 
defense," "the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically 
to defeat the ends of justice").  Although this rule is not 
limited to third-party culprit evidence, see Drayton, supra at 
35, we have specifically permitted otherwise inadmissible 
hearsay in that context, Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 
Mass. 782, 801 (2009) ("because the evidence is offered for the 
truth of the matter asserted -- that a third party is the true 
culprit -- we have permitted hearsay evidence that does not fall 
within a hearsay exception only if, in the judge's discretion, 
'the evidence is otherwise relevant, [it] will not tend to 
prejudice or confuse the jury, and there are other "substantial 
connecting links" to the crime'"; and "the evidence, even if it 
is not hearsay, 'must have a rational tendency to prove the 
issue the defense raises, and the evidence cannot be too remote 
or speculative'" [citations omitted]). 
Both Clemente and Drayton discuss exceptions to the rule 
against hearsay.  The problem, however, with analyzing Edwards's 
grand jury testimony under this framework -- under which the 
defense, the Commonwealth, and the judge all proceeded -- is 
that the testimony the defendant sought to introduce was not 
42 
 
hearsay.21  "[H]earsay is an extrajudicial statement offered to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted."  Commonwealth v. 
Stewart, 454 Mass. 527, 535 (2009), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Keizer, 377 Mass. 264, 269 n.4 (1979).  The defendant sought to 
admit Edwards's grand jury testimony "not . . . to prove any 
fact contained" within it, Stewart, supra, but to prove that 
Edwards was lying about being at the shop at the time the murder 
occurred.  He wanted to offer Edwards's statements not for their 
truth, but for their falsity.  In counsel's words, Edwards's 
testimony was "complete lies" and should have been admitted to 
complete the picture of the defendant's theory of the case:  
that Edwards committed the murder.  The judge acknowledged that 
"there's a nexus of time and place and identification of a human 
being.  I mean, there's a lot more in this case about a 
potential second suspect than there is in many cases." 
The proper analysis, with this understanding in mind, is to 
decide whether the evidence should have been admitted for 
nonhearsay purposes.  "Arguing that a third party was the true 
culprit is, of course, 'a time-honored method of defending 
against a criminal charge.'"  Commonwealth v. Steadman, 489 
 
21 In her ruling on the admissibility of the grand jury 
testimony, although the judge mentioned that the testimony was 
potentially "not hearsay," she referred to Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 804(a)(4), the rule for hearsay exceptions when the declarant 
is unavailable. 
43 
 
Mass. 372, 382-383 (2022), quoting Commonwealth v. Rosa, 422 
Mass. 18, 22 (1996).  "[T]he exclusion of third-party culprit 
evidence is of constitutional dimension, and therefore examined 
independently," rather than for an abuse of discretion.  Silva-
Santiago, 453 Mass. at 804 n.26.  See Commonwealth v. Cassidy, 
470 Mass. 201, 215 (2014).  Historically we give "wide[, but not 
unbounded,] latitude to the admission of relevant evidence that 
a person other than the defendant may have committed the crime."  
Steadman, supra at 383, quoting Silva-Santiago, supra at 800.  
Where the evidence is not hearsay, it "must have a rational 
tendency to prove the issue the defense raises, and the evidence 
cannot be too remote or speculative."  Silva-Santiago, supra at 
801, quoting Rosa, supra.  "If the evidence is 'of substantial 
probative value, and will not tend to prejudice or confuse, all 
doubt should be resolved in favor of admissibility.'"  Silva-
Santiago, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Conkey, 443 Mass. 60, 
66 (2004), S.C., 452 Mass. 1022 (2008). 
It was error not to admit Edwards's grand jury statements, 
particularly his testimony that he was at the shop between 9 
A.M. and 9:30 A.M. and that he did not hear any gunshots when he 
left the shop.  As the judge herself put it, "Edwards being a 
third[-]party culprit [was] very much alive in the case."  The 
Commonwealth conceded that he was present in the rear lot when 
the victim was shot, at around 12:19 P.M., and the shop video 
44 
 
confirmed that he was in the shop just before the shooting 
occurred.  Therefore, his statements before the grand jury, 
which were contradicted by the shop video, could have been 
offered by the defendant as evidence of Edwards's consciousness 
of guilt.  It is of no matter, as was one of the judge's 
concerns, that one cannot be sure that Edwards was lying, rather 
than "get[ting] the facts wrong."22  Because this evidence fairly 
could support an inference that Edwards, the third-party 
culprit, lied about being present during the shooting, the 
defendant should have been able to introduce Edwards's 
testimony.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Phinney, 446 Mass. 155, 165 
(2006), S.C., 448 Mass. 621 (2007) (statements made by third-
party culprit admissible for nonhearsay purpose to show third-
party culprit's state of mind). 
We have not addressed squarely whether a defendant may 
admit statements of a third-party culprit in order to 
demonstrate the third party's consciousness of guilt.  "Evidence 
of flight, concealment, false statements to police, . . . or 
similar conduct generally is admissible as some evidence of 
 
22 The judge also stated, "[W]e can't draw reasonable 
inferences, it seems to me, about his state of mind.  All we can 
do is talk about what the investigation entailed with respect to 
him and, at the moment, I'm telling you you're going to be able 
to do that.  You're going to be able to essentially cross-
examine Stratton about Edwards. . . .  That's distinct from 
putting before the jury any of the text . . . of his [g]rand 
[j]ury statements." 
45 
 
consciousness of guilt."  Cassidy, 470 Mass. at 217.  See 
Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, 463 Mass. 581, 594 (2012) ("jury 
could have found that the defendant's statements to others, and 
to police, regarding his whereabouts on the morning of the 
shootings were wilfully false and consistent with consciousness 
of guilt").  In Conkey, 443 Mass. at 68-69, we recognized the 
defendant's showing that a third-party culprit "exhibited 
consciousness of guilt" in the particular statements that the 
third-party culprit made.  See, e.g., People v. Gonzales, 54 
Cal. 4th 1234, 1289 (2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1104 (2013) 
(codefendant's consciousness of guilt had "relevance to 
establish her participation in the crime, and to lend some 
support to defendant's claim that his participation was 
'relatively minor'"); State v. Jimenez, 175 N.J. 475, 489 (2003) 
(third party's anxious conduct is consciousness of guilt only 
where evidence links him or her to victim).  Contrast People v. 
Hartsch, 49 Cal. 4th 472, 500-501, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 985 
(2010) (defendant's proposed instruction that "false or 
misleading statements by a witness regarding the crimes charged 
against the defendant could be considered a circumstance tending 
to prove the witness's guilt" might lead to absurd results if 
untruthful testimony from any witness could be taken as 
indication of that witness's guilt); State v. Shannon, 212 Conn. 
387, 409, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 980 (1989) (abrogated on other 
46 
 
grounds) ("evidence demonstrating consciousness of guilt is only 
relevant where the act or statement is that of the defendant"). 
Considering our case law, we are convinced that, where the 
admissibility requirements for evidence regarding a potential 
third-party culprit are met, consciousness of guilt evidence 
relating to that third-party culprit may be admissible.  Here, 
for reasons stated supra, the grand jury testimony should have 
been admitted. 
We must determine whether the defendant preserved this 
argument, namely, that the testimony was admissible where he was 
not offering it for the truth of what Edwards asserted.  The 
vast majority of counsel's objections surrounding the exclusion 
of Edwards's grand jury testimony were focused solely on its 
admissibility under Clemente and as an exception to the hearsay 
rule for prior recorded testimony.23  On appeal, the defendant 
 
23 In arguing for admissibility of the grand jury testimony, 
counsel stated:  "[T]he Commonwealth called him as a witness in 
the [g]rand [j]ury.  They had full opportunity to question him.  
So, their rights were preserved, and I think Section B of prior 
recorded testimony goes right toward[] that"; by calling Edwards 
to the grand jury, it "was obvious [t]hat [the Commonwealth was] 
trying to . . . clear him as a suspect"; "I don't think it's 
hearsay because I'm offering it, and it's sworn testimony, and 
it's prior recorded testimony.  The other reason it comes in 
. . . , he clearly lied about being at the barbershop . . . , he 
denied hearing gunshots, and then he testifies about his phone 
that he wiped clean"; "I have studied Clemente.  I think my 
position is correct on this because he is a third[-]party 
culprit, and he testified, and the Commonwealth called him to 
try to clear him"; "in the opening , . . . [the prosecutor] 
indicated that . . . Edwards came to the police, that he went to 
47 
 
argues that the testimony falls under the Drayton 
constitutionally based hearsay exception and does not argue that 
the testimony was nonhearsay as not having been offered for its 
truth. 
If the argument was preserved, "[b]ecause the issue is of 
constitutional dimension, our review looks to whether the error 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."  Conkey, 443 Mass. at 
70.  If not, where the defendant was convicted of murder in the 
first degree, we review for a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Upton, 484 Mass. 
155, 160 (2020) (we "review raised or preserved issues according 
to their constitutional or common-law standard and analyze any 
unraised, unpreserved, or unargued errors, and other errors we 
discover after a comprehensive review of the entire record, for 
a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice"). 
 
"Only a timely and precise objection to . . . a judge's 
ruling . . . will preserve a claimed error for appellate 
review."  Commonwealth v. McDonagh, 480 Mass. 131, 137 (2018).  
"We have consistently interpreted Mass. R. Crim. P. 22, 378 
Mass. 892 (1979), to preserve appellate rights only when an 
 
the [g]rand [j]ury, . . . I think that is in a way to say to the 
jury that he had nothing to hide, you know, he didn't do 
anything wrong.  He cooperated."  The judge responded to this 
final comment:  "I am not disagreeing with you about the content 
of . . . Edwards's testimony . . . .  I'm not saying he's a 
stellar citizen who was being forthright." 
48 
 
objection is made in a form or context that reveals the 
objection's basis."  Commonwealth v. Bonds, 445 Mass. 821, 828 
(2006).  Where the basis for the defendant's objection differs 
from the basis asserted on appeal, in a direct appeal from a 
murder conviction, we review for a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  Id. at 828-829. 
 
Keeping in mind that "[p]erfection is not the standard by 
which we measure the adequacy of an objection," we think counsel 
adequately preserved the argument when he stated, "I think it's 
prior recorded testimony, and I think it also goes to 
consciousness of guilt of . . . Edwards.  So . . . I think it 
comes in for evidentiary value."  McDonagh, 480 Mass. at 138.  
Although counsel's objections heavily focused on the testimony 
being admissible as prior recorded testimony, he repeated his 
position that Edwards lied to the grand jury and that it was 
crucial for the jury to hear the testimony in order to assess 
Edwards's capacity as a potential third-party culprit.24  Id., 
quoting Commonwealth v. Fowler, 431 Mass. 30, 41 n.19 (2000) 
("An objection adequately preserves the claimed error so long as 
'counsel "makes known to the court the action which he desires 
the court to take or his objection to the action of the 
 
24 Similarly, appellate counsel emphasized that Edwards's 
grand jury testimony was "critical evidence" in support of the 
defendant's third-party culprit defense and that it called into 
question Edwards's credibility. 
49 
 
court"'").  Because that is the precise reason the failure to 
admit the evidence was error, the objection sufficiently was 
preserved.  We review to determine whether the error was 
"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."  Conkey, 443 Mass. at 70. 
 
"The 'essential question' in analyzing harmlessness beyond 
a reasonable doubt is 'whether the error had, or might have had, 
an effect on the [fact finder] and whether the error contributed 
to or might have contributed to the [findings of guilty].'"  
Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 456 Mass. 350, 360 (2010), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Perrot, 407 Mass. 539, 549 (1990).  As a 
reviewing appellate court, we must be satisfied, based on the 
totality of the record, "weighing the properly admitted and the 
improperly [un]admitted evidence together, . . . beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the [lack of admission of the evidence] 
did not have an effect on the [fact finder] and did not 
contribute to the [fact finder's findings].'"  Vasquez, supra, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Tyree, 455 Mass. 676, 701 (2010). 
In the context of improperly admitted evidence, we have 
said that relevant factors to consider in determining whether an 
error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt include "(1) the 
relationship between the evidence and the premise of the 
defense; (2) who introduced the issue at trial; (3) the weight 
or quantum of evidence of guilt; (4) the frequency of the 
reference; and (5) the availability or effect of curative 
50 
 
instructions."  Commonwealth v. McNulty, 458 Mass. 305, 320 
(2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Mahdi, 388 Mass. 679, 696-697 
(1983).  Although not all these factors are relevant for 
evidence offered by the defendant that wrongfully was excluded, 
rather than improperly admitted, the first, second, and third 
factors remain important to consider. 
In Conkey, 443 Mass. at 70, we held that the exclusion of 
evidence of a potential third-party culprit's prior incidents of 
sexual assault was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, 
"[g]iven the importance of the evidence to the defense's third-
party culprit theory."  In Commonwealth v. Gray, 463 Mass. 731, 
746-750 (2012), we concluded that precluding the defendant from 
impeaching a declarant's hearsay statement identifying the 
defendant with his grand jury testimony that he did not 
recognize the shooter was not harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  The declarant was unavailable at trial, and his 
statements prior to the grand jury identifying the defendant 
were admitted through other witnesses.  Id. at 747-748.  Where 
"[i]dentification of the shooter was the key issue at trial, and 
misidentification was the theory of the defense," the 
identification of the defendant as the shooter at trial "was 
somewhat uncertain," the prosecutor "relied heavily on [the 
declarant's] reported statement," and the jury asked a question 
about the declarant's reported statement during deliberations, a 
51 
 
new trial was required.  Id. at 749-750.  See Feaster v. United 
States, 631 A.2d 400, 410-411 (D.C. 1993) (error in excluding 
grand jury testimony of witness not harmless where it may have 
caused jury "which rejected or could not agree on some of the 
complainants' allegations" to reject more or all allegations). 
Similarly, here, that Edwards was the shooter rather than 
the defendant was the central claim of the defense.  Although 
the jury heard extensive testimony regarding Edwards's potential 
identification as a third-party culprit, they did not hear any 
evidence that something Edwards said in the context of the 
investigation, specifically regarding his presence at the scene 
of the crime, was demonstrably false.  Edwards incorrectly told 
the grand jury that he was at the shop between 9 A.M. and 9:30 
A.M.  As the shop video demonstrated, Edwards was actually 
present at 12:17 P.M., within two minutes before the victim was 
killed.  This would have strengthened the defendant's argument 
that Edwards was the shooter, by supporting an inference of 
Edwards's consciousness of guilt. 
We recognize that some evidence of Edwards's consciousness 
of guilt was presented to the jury, i.e., they heard that he 
deleted much of the data on his cell phone before relinquishing 
it to police.25  Further, there was no dispute that Edwards was 
 
25 The jury were free to reject Edwards's excuse for the 
deletion as his position as a marijuana dealer. 
52 
 
present at the scene of the murder.  The Commonwealth admitted 
in its opening statement that one set of feet in the corner of 
the video walking away from the crime scene belonged to Edwards.  
The jury heard from the barbers, and saw from the video, that 
Edwards was present in the shop just under two minutes before 
the victim was killed, briefly looked at the victim, and 
departed from the shop while using his cell phone.  It was 
established that Edwards lived right near the rear lot of the 
shop where one could access the parking lot by jumping over a 
damaged fence.  The jury heard that a person with a red shirt 
was walking from behind the shop onto Landor Road and then onto 
Blue Hill Avenue within a minute of the gunshots.  In addition 
to the consciousness of guilt evidence that Edwards deleted a 
significant amount of data on his cell phone before providing it 
to police, the jury heard that Edwards could not produce a 
telephone number for Taj, the person he allegedly was speaking 
to when he left the shop.  There was evidence presented that an 
individual with the same byname as Edwards attempted to discard 
a bloody shirt after the murder. 
In closing argument, counsel was able to marshal this 
evidence to argue forcefully that Edwards was the killer.  He 
argued that Edwards, who was not known to the barbers, went into 
the shop with the sole purpose of marking the victim to be 
killed, and departed through the woods back to his house.  He 
53 
 
asked the jury to consider why else Edwards would have deleted 
the data on his cell phone, and why else police were looking for 
a bloody shirt on Morton Street.  Despite the lack of evidence 
supporting it at trial, counsel even told the jury that Edwards 
said he was not there for the shooting. 
Nonetheless, it is impossible to determine whether evidence 
supporting an inference that Edwards was not forthcoming about 
his presence at the shop within two minutes of the victim's 
murder would have tipped the scales in favor of the defendant, 
particularly where his third-party culprit argument was so well 
presented.  The Commonwealth was able to present evidence that 
Edwards turned himself over to police in response to the BRIC 
flyer and willingly gave police his cell phone.  In turn, 
counsel should have been able to present evidence supporting an 
argument that Edwards may not have been as forthcoming as he 
appeared.  Where Edwards was at the center of the trial, we 
cannot say that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
Because the defendant's convictions of unlawful carrying of 
a firearm without a firearm identification card, unlawful 
possession of ammunition without a firearm identification card, 
and unlawful carrying of a loaded firearm without a license are 
intertwined with the conclusion that he shot the victim, as 
there was no separate evidence presented regarding the 
54 
 
defendant's possession of a firearm or ammunition, we must also 
reverse those convictions.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Dias, 405 Mass. 
131, 132 n.2 (1989) ("[s]ince the indictments for burglary and 
armed assault . . . were closely tied to the murder . . . and 
since the jury improperly were allowed to consider the 
statements of the other defendant in deciding each defendant's 
case, we conclude that the error related to both crimes and that 
there must be a new trial as to each"). 
In Commonwealth v. Guardado, 491 Mass. 666, 690, 693 (2023) 
(Guardado I), we held that to convict a defendant of unlawful 
possession of a firearm and unlawful possession of ammunition, 
"the Commonwealth must prove 'as an element of the crime 
charged' that the defendant in fact failed to comply with the 
licensing requirements" (citation omitted).  Although we did not 
reach the issue whether the absence of licensure is an essential 
element of the crime of unlawful possession of a large capacity 
feeding device, Guardado I, supra at 693 n.10, we think that our 
decision in Guardado I must be applied to G. L. c. 269, 
§ 10 (n), as charged here, where it is an extension of a crime 
under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a).  See G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n) 
("Whoever violates paragraph [a] . . . by means of a loaded 
firearm . . . shall be further punished by imprisonment in the 
house of correction for not more than [two and one-half] years, 
which sentence shall begin from and after the expiration of the 
55 
 
sentence for the violation of paragraph [a] . . .").  See also 
Guardado I, supra at 693 ("our holding applies prospectively and 
to those cases that were active or pending on direct review as 
of the date of the issuance of [New York State Rifle & Pistol 
Ass'n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022)]").  Consistent with our 
subsequent decision in Guardado II, 493 Mass. 1, the 
Commonwealth may retry the defendant on the firearms offenses, 
id. at 7, quoting Commonwealth v. Hebb, 477 Mass. 409, 413 
(2017) ("A new trial is warranted so that the Commonwealth may 
have 'one complete opportunity to convict' the defendant under 
the new law"). 
We reverse and remand for a new trial in which the 
defendant is permitted to introduce Edwards's grand jury 
testimony.  We address the remainder of the defendant's 
arguments as they may arise at a new trial. 
c.  Stratton testimony regarding video.  The defendant 
argues that Stratton's narration of what was happening in the 
videos and who he believed to be on the videos was inadmissible 
and prejudicial evidence.  The Commonwealth argues that 
Stratton's testimony about his personal observations of the 
videos was relevant and admissible evidence, not used to 
identify the defendant, and an appropriate response to the 
defendant's Bowden argument. 
56 
 
"Making a determination of the identity of a person from a 
photograph or video image is an expression of an opinion."  
Commonwealth v. Wardsworth, 482 Mass. 454, 475 (2019), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Pina, 481 Mass. 413, 429 (2019).  "A lay opinion 
. . . is admissible only where it is '(a) rationally based on 
the perception of the witness; (b) helpful to . . . the 
determination of a fact in issue; and (c) not based on 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.'"  
Commonwealth v. Grier, 490 Mass. 455, 476 (2022), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Canty, 466 Mass. 535, 541 (2013).  Where the 
jury are capable of viewing a video and drawing their own 
conclusions about the depictions within it, "a lay witness's 
testimony about the content of the video or photographs is 
admissible only if it would assist the jury in reaching more 
reliable conclusions."  Grier, supra.  Where a defendant raises 
a Bowden defense, the Commonwealth is permitted to elicit 
testimony explaining "why the investigators chose the particular 
investigative path they did."  Commonwealth v. Avila, 454 Mass. 
744, 754-755 (2009). 
Stratton testified about his observations of several 
videos.  He pointed out the movements of a particular car on 
which he focused in several videos, which he believed to be a 
57 
 
black Toyota Camry.26  Stratton stated that, on the video, he saw 
a man get out of the car, walk toward the area of the back of 
the shop minutes before the shooting, and return to the car and 
drive away after the shooting.  He testified at several points 
that one can observe the defendant walking in and out of view in 
the shop video.  He also testified that before he saw the 
defendant walk into the shop for the first time, he identified 
him on the ice cream shop video. 
The defendant objected when Stratton identified someone in 
the video as Menzie.27  Counsel stated, "[F]or the record, I do 
not believe this detective should be able to look at [the] video 
and say what he sees. . . .  [T]hat's for the jury to 
determine."  The judge agreed with counsel, sustained the 
objection, and instructed the jury: 
"[J]urors, let me just make clear for your purposes . . . 
[t]here's obviously a big difference between what you see 
on a video and what someone else tells you they saw on a 
video, right? 
 
"As for all evidence in a jury trial, it is for you to 
determine what you see and what significance, if any, what 
 
26 Counsel objected to Stratton's identification of the car 
as a black Toyota Camry, stating that the video "speaks for 
itself."  The judge instructed the Commonwealth to "separate his 
state of mind and his investigation from what's on the video 
itself, which is up to the jury to decide." 
 
27 Later in his testimony, Stratton explained why he 
believed another individual in a red shirt walking on Landor 
Street in the direction of Blue Hill Avenue was Lewis based on 
the clothing he was wearing and the timing of his exit in the 
shop video. 
58 
 
you see has to you.  The same way you listen to testimony 
of a witness and decide what significance, if any, that 
testimony has to you. 
 
"On the other hand, this witness conducted an 
investigation.  It's fair for the Commonwealth to ask him 
why he did what he did and what conclusions he drew from 
what he did, but that's the distinction.  Whether it's 
video or anything else, his state of mind, his decision 
making, his conclusions are fair game for him to tell you 
about.  It's for you to decide, as with everything else in 
this case, . . . whether you believe any of the testimony 
of any witness, whether you believe anything you see on a 
video, just like anything you see on a document, and if so, 
what weight or significance to give it in the context of 
all the evidence in the case. . . . 
 
"The Commonwealth is going to make an effort to distinguish 
better in the questions between what this witness is seeing 
or concluding and your part of the job, which is always the 
same, which is to decide what you see and what you 
conclude." 
 
On cross-examination, counsel asked Stratton whether he saw 
Edwards in the shop video and what he saw him doing.  Counsel 
played the shop video during his cross-examination, asked 
Stratton whether he saw the defendant and the victim walking out 
the door of the shop, and also asked him about his testimony 
before the grand jury that the victim and defendant were having 
a "tussle."  He also asked Stratton whether Stratton saw Edwards 
standing in the upper part of the screen, with "a black item in 
his hand."  On redirect examination, the Commonwealth elicited 
testimony from Stratton regarding the shop video that he 
believed he saw the victim punch the defendant, causing the 
defendant to go off screen, and then saw the victim retreating 
59 
 
back to the door.  He testified that, in his opinion, the 
defendant reappeared in the frame with his left hand down by his 
side and what appeared to be a black item in his left hand.  
When Stratton stated that the black item counsel suggested 
Edwards was holding was a milk crate, counsel objected, and his 
objection was overruled.  On recross-examination, counsel again 
asked Stratton if he saw the defendant walk out of the door to 
the shop with the victim, and where he saw Edwards standing in 
the video. 
Although counsel may not have objected to every statement 
by Stratton characterizing the video, and in fact elicited 
several, reviewing Stratton's opinion evidence for error, we 
find none.  See Grier, 490 Mass. at 476. 
Stratton's testimony regarding the movements of the black 
car was properly admitted to assist the jury in focusing their 
attention to relevant areas in the video, and to orient the jury 
to the streets and the areas in which the car was traveling.  
See Grier, 490 Mass. at 476 ("While the jurors could see for 
themselves that the still image depicted a scene with two 
individuals crossing a street, [officer] was providing context 
that would allow the jurors to better situate the scene and the 
individuals depicted in it").  Stratton's identification of the 
driver of the black car as wearing a red burgundy-type colored 
shirt "consistent in color to the one that [the defendant] was 
60 
 
wearing" was properly admitted to explain why police focused on 
the defendant in the investigation (as opposed to Edwards).  See 
Avila, 454 Mass. at 755 (in response to Bowden defense, officers 
permitted to testify why they acted on "information that the 
defendant was the person who shot the victim"). 
Stratton's repeated identification of the defendant in the 
shop video was not error in these circumstances.  First, 
although the identifications of the defendant were not brief, 
they became pervasive only once counsel began to ask Stratton on 
cross-examination what exactly he saw in the video.  Indeed, 
counsel himself acknowledged in his questioning that one of the 
individuals portrayed in the shop video was the defendant, and 
he elicited testimony about the physical altercation that 
Stratton believed occurred between the defendant and the victim.  
See Grier, 490 Mass. at 476 (no prejudice where counsel conceded 
defendant was walking in area of shooting moments before 
shooting).  Second, unlike in Wardsworth, the defendant 
meaningfully raised not only a Bowden argument, but also a 
third-party culprit argument.28  Stratton's testimony was 
 
28 Although the judge did not give a Bowden jury 
instruction, the defense forcefully argued that police made 
missteps during their investigation in closing. 
 
Before Stratton testified, the judge already had ruled 
that, where the defendant was raising a Bowden defense, counsel 
could cross-examine Stratton about Edwards being a third-party 
culprit and that the Commonwealth could "tell us everything 
61 
 
appropriate to explain why investigators focused on the 
defendant, rather than Edwards, whom Stratton also identified as 
being in the video.29  Contrast Wardsworth, 482 Mass. at 478 ("It 
is not clear that a Bowden defense was meaningfully raised.  In 
any event, the judge did not instruct the jury that the 
officers' identification testimony was admissible only for the 
limited purpose of rebutting a Bowden argument").  Third, the 
judge gave a forceful instruction to the jury during the 
testimony, which emphasized that Stratton's testimony was for 
the purpose of helping the jury understand why police made 
certain investigatory decisions and that it was the jury's job 
to decide what they saw in the video.  This was accentuated by 
both the prosecutor and counsel in closing when they both told 
the jury to watch the video, and that they "decide what 
happened," and when the judge instructed the jury that they were 
 
about the investigation."  Admitting that a Bowden defense "does 
not provide carte blanche to introduce all conceivable rebuttal 
evidence," the Commonwealth did not cross the line here.  
Commonwealth v. Wardsworth, 482 Mass. 454, 478 (2019). 
 
29 The prosecutor's question to Stratton, "[D]o you attempt 
to locate the vehicle that you believe the defendant was 
driving?" which elicited an affirmative response, also was not 
error.  See Commonwealth v. Chhoeut Chin, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 188, 
204-205 (2020) (not error to admit detectives' testimony 
identifying car in video as defendant's car where they recounted 
their personal observations of defendant's car with personal 
observations of what they saw in video).  This was permissible 
to explain further Stratton's focus on the car in the video in 
relation to his investigation. 
62 
 
the "sole and exclusive judges of the facts."30  See Commonwealth 
v. Chhoeut Chin, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 188, 205 (2020) (no error 
where, in addition to other factors, "judge properly instructed 
the jury that the officers' observations should not override the 
jurors' own observations if they were at odds"). 
d.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  In his motion for a 
new trial, the defendant argued that counsel was ineffective by 
(1) "diminishing his credibility" with the jury by erroneously 
suggesting that the video depicted Edwards with a firearm in his 
hand, and (2) failing to object when Stratton identified 
individuals and opined on activity depicted on the video.  He 
reiterates these claims on appeal. 
"Because the defendant has been convicted of murder in the 
first degree, we examine his claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel under the rubric of [§ 33E] 'to determine whether there 
exists a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice,'" a 
standard more favorable than the general constitutional standard 
for ineffective assistance.  Commonwealth v. Facella, 478 Mass. 
393, 409 (2017).  "[W]e determine whether there was an error in 
the course of the trial by defense counsel (or the prosecutor or 
 
30 The judge's seemingly mistaken failure to instruct the 
jury in her final charge with respect to factual determinations 
of what is depicted in a video does not alter our conclusion, 
particularly where counsel indicated that he was content with 
the jury instructions. 
63 
 
the judge) 'and, if there was, whether that error was likely to 
have influenced the jury's conclusion.'"  Commonwealth v. 
Kolenovic, 478 Mass. 189, 193 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Gulla, 476 Mass. 743, 746 (2017).  Strategic decisions made by 
trial counsel will not be deemed ineffective assistance unless 
they are "manifestly unreasonable" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 433 Mass. 93, 102 (2000).  Counsel made 
no such error here. 
First, with respect to counsel's suggestion that Edwards 
was holding a black item in his hand in the video, counsel 
properly was marshalling the evidence to point to his theory of 
the case that Edwards was the shooter.  On cross-examination, 
counsel showed Stratton a segment of the video depicting the 
individual alleged to be Edwards in the upper right part of the 
screen and asked Stratton if he saw that person holding a "black 
item in his hand, pointing it."  Stratton acknowledged the 
individual wearing a red shirt and likely jeans, but denied that 
the individual was holding a black item, and instead suggested 
that it was something in the foreground.  On redirect, the 
Commonwealth elicited that the black item may have been milk 
crates that were in the area before and after the shooting, and 
that the defendant appeared to be holding a black item to his 
side. 
64 
 
As mentioned supra, the quality of the shop video was less 
than clear -- particularly the portion depicting the rear of the 
shop.  The Commonwealth admitted in its opening that "at a first 
glance, it's going to be very difficult for you to see that 
video."  Each side, however, told the jury that the video was 
the key piece of evidence in the case and that the jury would 
have to study it carefully in order to decide what happened.  In 
fact, counsel stated in his opening that the video was "the most 
important part of this case."  Where what happened in the back 
of the shop from the vantage point of the video was somewhat 
open to interpretation due to its quality, counsel was wise to 
ask questions of Stratton that may have elicited evidence 
supporting his theory that Edwards could have been the shooter, 
because he might have been holding a gun.  That suggestion was 
not so far-fetched that it risked giving the jury "the 
impression that counsel was trying to trick them."  We agree 
with the motion judge, who also was the trial judge, that there 
was "no manifestly unreasonable mistake" in counsel's question 
to Stratton.  See Commonwealth v. Yat Fung Ng, 489 Mass. 242, 
252-253 (2022), S.C., 491 Mass. 247 (2023) ("any loss of 
credibility suffered as a result of trial counsel's [line of 
questioning] did not . . . deprive the defendant of an available 
ground of defense"); Facella, 478 Mass. at 412 ("typically we do 
65 
 
not characterize strategic decisions as ineffective assistance 
merely because they prove unsuccessful").31 
Second, with respect to Stratton's testimony regarding the 
video evidence, because the admission of such testimony was not 
prejudicial error, as discussed supra, any failure of counsel to 
object to any particular portion was not "likely to have 
influenced the jury's conclusion."  Kolenovic, 478 Mass. at 193, 
quoting Gulla, 476 Mass. at 746.  Counsel objected numerous 
times, once resulting in a thorough instruction from the judge 
that the jury were to determine on their own what was depicted 
in the video.  Again, there was no dispute as to the defendant's 
identity on the shop video -- he readily admitted that he was at 
the shop and interacting with the victim at the time of the 
shooting.  See Commonwealth v. Diaz, 448 Mass. 286, 293 (2007) 
("the mere fact that [counsel] interposed objections on grounds 
that were unsuccessful does not demonstrate ineffective 
assistance"). 
 
31 To the extent that counsel, in his affidavit, claimed 
lack of strategic reasons or lack of due diligence for his 
alleged errors, the judge "decline[d] to credit these 
assertions."  We see no abuse of discretion in this decision.  
See Commonwealth v. Moore, 489 Mass. 735, 744 (2022) ("Because 
the motion judge was also the trial judge, we extend '"special 
deference" to the judge's findings of fact and the ultimate 
decision on the motion' for a new trial" [citation omitted]); 
Commonwealth v. Vaughn, 471 Mass. 398, 405 (2015) ("the 
credibility, weight, and impact of the affidavits are entirely 
within the motion judge's discretion"). 
66 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we conclude 
that it was error to exclude Edwards's grand jury testimony and 
that such error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Because the firearms charges were intertwined with the 
defendant's murder conviction, those convictions also must be 
reversed.  We therefore reverse and remand for a new trial on 
all charges. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.