Title: Spradley v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

293 So. 2d 697 (1974)
Billy Fletcher SPRADLEY, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 43938.

Supreme Court of Florida.
March 13, 1974.
Rehearing Denied May 21, 1974.
*698 Roy E. Dezern, Jacksonville, for petitioner.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Richard W. Prospect, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
CARLTON, Justice (Retired).
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari, petitioner seeks review of a per curiam affirmance by the District Court of Appeal, First District, of his conviction for murder in the first degree. Spradley v. State, 276 So. 2d 511 (1st DCA Fla. 1973). After issuance of the writ, and oral argument by the parties, we have concluded, for the reasons outlined below, that we do not have certiorari jurisdiction to review this case; we therefore discharge the writ having been improvidently granted.
Petitioner was tried upon an indictment signed by one Jerry E. Stillson, as assistant state attorney. Petitioner's motion to dismiss the indictment was denied by the trial court.
On July 8, 1971, the trial court, pursuant to the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, granted certain pre-trial discovery motions and required the State to furnish to petitioner, inter alia, the exact names and addresses of each person who had allegedly participated in the crime charged and the names and addresses of any persons who had been given any form of immunity for furnishing information relating to the crime charged. On July 15, 1971, the State served petitioner with answers to the granted discovery motions, indicating that one Jean Brooks was the only person who had been granted immunity and listing the alleged participants in the crime.
On July 27, 1971, less than one full day before the start of petitioner's trial, the State served amended answers to the discovery motions, giving petitioner the first notice that one Melvin White had been granted immunity on June 23, 1971, and the first notice that one Benny Hunnicut and one Donald Higgins were allegedly involved in the crime. At the start of petitioner's trial, his counsel orally moved for a continuance for the purpose of taking the deposition of Melvin White or for the exclusion of any testimony by White, Hunnicut, and Higgins, and the exclusion of any evidence implicating Hunnicut and Higgins in the crime. After a hearing on the motions, they were denied by the trial court except to the extent that evidence of the involvement in the crime of Hunnicut and Higgins was excluded.
On appeal, petitioner assigned as error, inter alia, the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment, the denial of his motion for a continuance, and the denial of his motion to exclude the testimony of *699 Melvin White. As stated above, petitioner's conviction was affirmed, per curiam.
Petitioner has argued that this Court's jurisdiction vests because of a conflict between the instant decision and this Court's decision in Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971). Florida Constitution, Article V, § 3(b)(3), F.S.A. Richardson involved the failure of a prosecutor to comply with a different discovery rule than those involved here  Rule 3.220(e), 33 F.S.A., which requires a prosecutor, upon being served a list of witnesses the defense expects to call, to serve upon the defense "a list of all witnesses known to the prosecuting attorney to have information which may be relevant to the offense charged, and to any defense of the person charged with respect thereto". In Richardson, a co-defendant was granted immunity on the day before the trial, and his name was given that day as a state witness to the defendant's counsel. During the first day of trial, through interviewing the co-defendant, defense counsel learned the name of one Dick Davis who was allegedly involved in the crime. The co-defendant testified that Dick Davis was involved and that he had given the name of Dick Davis to the state attorney in a statement made by him well before the trial. We viewed the case as follows:
......
We also stated in Richardson that:
......
We are of the opinion that the law as we stated it in Richardson was adequately complied with in the instant case. True, the trial court and the District Court of Appeal, sub judice, reached a conclusion opposite to ours in Richardson, but we feel that there are material factual differences in the two cases which justify that result.
First of all, different rules of procedure were involved in the two cases. In the instant case, petitioner did not initiate any reciprocal exchange of witness lists as provided for in Rule 3.220(e); and it does not appear from the record that the State failed to disclose any relevant evidence which may have been beneficial to the petitioner. The State did fail to disclose the alleged participation in the crime by Hunnicut and Higgins, but this error was cured by the trial court's refusal to accept any evidence of such participation. That leaves only the State's failure to inform petitioner, until the day before the trial, that a co-defendant had been granted immunity one month prior. The record reveals, however, that the trial court made an adequate inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding this late disclosure, which the court in Richardson did not do. The trial court in the instant case found that the late compliance with the order granting the discovery motions did not result in prejudice or harm to the defendant, and the circumstances upon which he based this decision affirmatively appear in the record of the hearing held prior to the trial. From that record, it appears that the State inadvertently failed to disclose the immunity granted to White; that the disclosure was made as soon as the State became aware of its error; that petitioner's counsel had spoken with White the day before the trial, as well as on another occasion some two to three weeks prior to trial; and that the trial court allowed defense counsel to again interview White for at least thirty minutes prior to the State's presentation of its case and again, if it was desired, prior to White's testifying. Finally, the record in this case does not disclose that petitioner's counsel made any further motion for continuance or mistrial subsequent to his interview of White based on new information learned in that interview, as was the case in Richardson.
Therefore, the law as stated in Richardson was adequately applied in this case, and the different result reached in this case was justified by substantially different facts. There is thus no conflict.
Petitioner has also argued that this Court has jurisdiction, via certiorari, because the case affects a class of constitutional or state officers. Florida Constitution, Article V, Section 3(b)(3). This is the same basis upon which we reviewed Richardson. In Richardson, we held:
To like effect is State v. Robinson, Fla., 132 So. 2d 156.
This jurisdictional holding of Richardson, however, if literally followed, would mean that this Court had jurisdiction to review nearly all cases, both civil and criminal, because nearly all decisions which review the actions or rulings of trial judges impose upon other trial judges a requirement to follow the law as stated therein in similar situations. Likewise, any decision concerning the propriety of the actions of a prosecuting attorney imposes upon all prosecuting attorneys the duty to henceforth follow the law as therein decided. We are of the opinion that our jurisdictional holding in Richardson was, therefore, much too broad and inconsistent with the often-stated philosophy behind the formation of our District Courts of Appeal  that these courts are to be courts of final appellate jurisdiction except in a limited number of specific situations enumerated in the Constitution. We therefore recede from our jurisdictional holding in Richardson.
A decision which "affects a class of constitutional or state officers" must be one which does more than simply modify or construe or add to the case law which comprises much of the substantive and procedural law of this state. Such cases naturally affect all classes of constitutional or state officers, in that the members of these classes are bound by the law the same as any other citizen. To vest this Court with certiorari jurisdiction, a decision must directly and, in some way, exclusively affect the duties, powers, validity, formation, termination or regulation of a particular class of constitutional or state officers. This may be a decision in a case in which the class, or some of its members, is directly involved as a party. It may also be in a case in which no member of the class is a party if the decision generally affects the entire class in some way unrelated to the specific facts of that case.
In the instant case, no member of any class of constitutional or state officers was a party, and any decision as to possible non-compliance with discovery rules by the state attorney did not affect any class of constitutional or state officers in any *702 general way unrelated to the specific facts of this case. The decision affected only the rights of the parties directly involved and the body of our State law as it applies to each and every citizen alike.
Petitioner has also urged this Court that its certiorari jurisdiction attaches because the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment, and the District Court's affirmance of that denial, affects a class of constitutional or state officers, to wit: the class of assistant state attorneys. The basis for the motion to dismiss was petitioner's contention that the indictment was not signed by a properly appointed assistant state attorney, as required by Rule 3.140(f), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. Fla. Stat. § 27.181(2), F.S.A. provides that no person appointed as assistant state attorney may perform the duties of that office until he takes and subscribes to a written oath and causes the same "to be recorded in the office of the Clerk of the Circuit of the county in which the appointing state attorney resides." The record of this case reveals that, as of the time he signed the indictment, assistant state attorney Jerry E. Stillson had failed to have recorded, as required by statute, his oath of office.
We make no decision as to the merits of this contention because, again, any decision on that issue made by the trial court or by the District Court in its per curiam affirmance does not affect a class of constitutional or state officers so as to invoke our jurisdiction. A decision on that issue affects only the substantive and procedural law regarding the sufficiency of indictments in general, the rights of petitioner, and the authority of one particular assistant state attorney in relation to the specific facts of this case. At most, any decision on this issue could be said to affect only a sub-class of a class of constitutional or state officers, specifically, those assistant state attorneys who have failed to record their oaths of office.
Therefore, having held that this Court does not have jurisdiction, on any basis, to review this case, the writ of certiorari heretofore issued is discharged as having been improvidently granted.
It is so ordered.
ADKINS, C.J., and ROBERTS, BOYD, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
ERVIN, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion.
ERVIN, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I agree to the majority opinion except the portion which recedes from the holding in Richardson v. State (Fla. 1971), 246 So. 2d 771, relative this Court's jurisdiction to review by certiorari any decision of a district court of appeal that "affects a class of constitutional or state officers." This Court has the duty to see to it that the rules it promulgates are faithfully executed, otherwise they are vacuous gestures.
In a particularly aggravated case where it ostensibly appears that a constitutional or state officer has refused to comply with a rule of practice or procedure of this Court, we should not by the precedent herein render the Court impotent to review the case to determine if the officer's non-compliance as sanctioned below by the District Court has the effect as precedent of justifying all constitutional or state officers of the same class to likewise refuse to comply with the Court rules. This glossing over stance or abstinence from taking jurisdiction of a case ostensibly affecting in its overall application the general duties of a class of officers required by a rule of court is contrary not only to our review jurisdiction but to this Court's supervisory jurisdiction to administer the state court system which includes as prominent part, adoption of "rules for the practice and procedure in all courts." Section 2(a), Article V, State Constitution.
*703 In the recent case of State v. Lott, 286 So. 2d 565 (Fla. Opinion filed December 5, 1973), we made it clear that such rules are binding and are not to be nullified by interpretation. However, if we emasculate our ability to enforce them, great opportunity is afforded public officers to nullify them by their administrative interpretations.
This Court should not seek out technical ways to establish threshold precedents to render itself impotent to the exercise of its constitutional review jurisdiction. Cases of grave importance arise from time to time which demand for the public good the review attention of this Court. It should not be self-shackled from hearing them.
This is yet another of a series of recent cases where this Court is establishing precedents withdrawing from the performance of its constitutional appellate jurisdiction.