Title: State v. Calloway

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
 that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 90-220


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

      v.                                      On Appeal from
                                              District Court of Vermont,
 Donald O. Calloway, Jr.                      Unit No. 3, Orleans Circuit

                                              February Term, 1991


 Edward J. Cashman, J.

 Jane Woodruff, Orleans County State's Attorney, Newport, and Pamela Hall
   Johnson, Department of State's Attorneys, Montpelier, for plaintiff-
   appellee

 Charles S. Martin of Martin & Paolini, Barre, for defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      DOOLEY, J.    Defendant appeals from two convictions of lewd and
 lascivious conduct, 13 V.S.A. { 2602, on grounds that the court improperly
 excused five prospective jury panel members and that an expert witness
 improperly testified that in his opinion child sexual abuse victims
 generally tell the truth.  We affirm.
      Defendant was charged with one count of sexual assault on his juvenile
 nephew and two counts of lewd and lascivious conduct with the same child.
 Before trial, the state's attorney moved for an individual voir dire of
 prospective jurors to be held in the judge's chambers to ask them "whether
 they [had] had any personal experience with exposure to sexual assault,
 either [as] a victim, [or as a] close relative of the victim."   The motion
 concluded by requesting "a bifurcated voir dire, where less personal
 questions will be asked in open court and the individual voir dire [will] be
 directed specifically to sexual assault issues."  Defendant agreed with the
 State's request, but he did not move jointly with the State and did not file
 a similar motion.  The trial court denied the motion for an individual voir
 dire of prospective jurors, stating, "You are delving too far into personal
 lives . . . I don't think you have a right to ask people these questions as
 a prerequisite for serving on a jury panel."  Defendant objected, stating
 that he was "being deprived of the ability to properly make inquiries of the
 jurors."
      The court then started by describing the nature of the case to the
 initial twelve prospective jurors.  The court invited any of the prospective
 jurors to seek to be excused if "you . . . have such strong views on the
 issue that you may doubt your capabilities to be fair and impartial" or
 "it's the type of evidence that will trigger some emotional response in you
 that will cloud your judgment."  Five of the twelve then requested to be
 excused and the court excused them.  There was no objection to the court's
 action.  The parties then proceeded to a lengthy voir dire.
      Defendant raises a number of unfocused objections to the voir dire
 procedure and the action of the court in excusing the jurors.  We find that
 his position is best stated in his motion for a new trial:  "Defendant
 contends that the summary elimination of jurors from the pool by the court
 deprived him of possible competent jurors."  Defendant has two arguments in
 support of his objection:  (a) the procedure used by the court violated
 V.R.Cr.P. 24(a) because the court took over the jury voir dire; and (b) the
 rule does not authorize the court to excuse jurors without a request from
 the parties. (FN1)
      Defendant's objection at trial was solely to the ruling on the
 individual voir dire and not to the action of the court in excusing the
 potential jurors.  Defendant has failed to preserve the issue he now raises
 for appellate review by making an objection to the allegedly erroneous
 action.  See State v. Roberge, ___ Vt. ___, ___, 582 A.2d 142, 144 (1990).
 Thus, we will reverse only on a finding of plain error.
      Our review of defendant's arguments indicates there was no error at
 all.  As defendant argues, voir dire examination in criminal cases is
 conducted by the "parties or their attorneys."  V.R.Cr.P. 24(a).  However,
 the court "may ask additional questions to supplement the inquiry."  Id.
 Both the State and the defendant conducted an extensive voir dire in this
 case.  Although the questions that led the court to excuse the five
 potential jurors preceded the parties' voir dire, they were clearly
 supplemental.  We find nothing in the rule that requires the court's
 questions to follow those of the parties.  There was no violation of Rule
 24(a).
      We are also unpersuaded by defendant's second argument.  Essentially,
 he argues that he had a right to the twelve persons first drawn for the
 jury, absent challenges by him or the State, and that the court had no power
 to excuse any of these potential jurors.  We conclude, however, that the
 court has the power on its own to excuse persons drawn pursuant to V.R.Cr.P.
 24(a), and it is an area of trial court discretion aimed at giving both
 sides a fair trial. (FN2) See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 459 F.2d 983,
 984 (9th Cir. 1972) ("trial judge has broad discretion in excusing veniremen
 whom he has reason to believe may not be able to give both sides a fair
 trial").  The court acted well within its discretion here.  It excused only
 those persons who indicated they could not be fair and impartial.
      There is a second reason why defendant's attack on the court's actions
 must fail.  Plaintiff's right to challenge potential jurors "is a right of
 rejection, not one of a selection of a juror."  Lattrell v. Swain, 127 Vt.
 33, 36,