Title: State v. Worley

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Worley, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-2207.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2021-OHIO-2207 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. WORLEY, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Worley, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-2207.] 
Criminal law—Aggravated murder—Findings of guilt and death sentence affirmed. 
(No. 2018-0757—Submitted January 12, 2021—Decided July 1, 2021.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Common Pleas of Fulton County, 
No. 16CR000106. 
_________________ 
DONNELLY, J. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, James Worley, murdered Sierah Joughin in July 2016.  
After a trial, a Fulton County jury convicted him of aggravated murder with an 
escaping-detection specification, kidnapping, felonious assault, possessing 
criminal tools, tampering with evidence, and having weapons while under a 
disability.  Following the jury’s recommendation of a death sentence, the trial court 
sentenced Worley to death. 
{¶ 2} We now review Worley’s direct appeal of right and, for the following 
reasons, we affirm his convictions and sentence of death. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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I.  TRIAL EVIDENCE 
{¶ 3} Evidence adduced at trial showed that Worley kidnapped, restrained, 
and killed 20-year-old Joughin between July 19 and 22, 2016, in Fulton County.  
He attacked Joughin as she was riding her bike home one evening.  He then struck 
her on the head with his motorcycle helmet and dragged her into a cornfield.  
Worley handcuffed Joughin, left her in the cornfield, and drove his motorcycle 
home.  He returned to the cornfield after dark in his pickup truck and took her to a 
barn on his property.  He dressed Joughin in lingerie, bound her, and shoved a 
rubber dog toy into her mouth and tied it in place, causing her death by suffocation.  
He then buried her body in a nearby cornfield. 
A.  Joughin goes missing 
{¶ 4} In July 2016, Joughin was living on County Road 6 in a rural area in 
Fulton County.  Her boyfriend, Joshuah Kolasinski, lived nearby on County Road 
12. 
{¶ 5} On July 19, around 4:00 or 5:00 p.m., Joughin rode her bike to 
Kolasinski’s house.  She left to ride back home around 6:45 p.m., with Kolasinski 
riding alongside her on his motorcycle part of the way.  Kolasinski recorded two 
videos of Joughin on her bike during the ride.  She was wearing sunglasses, athletic 
shoes, shorts, and a tank top, and she sat on a checkered dishtowel draped over her 
bike seat. 
{¶ 6} After Kolasinski headed back to his home, Joughin continued riding 
toward her home.  Around 7:20 p.m., a motorist named Mary Stine was driving 
south on County Road 6 when she noticed a bike lying beside the west side of the 
road in an open area before the rows of corn began.  As Stine passed by, she saw a 
man bent over at the waist about two or three rows deep into the cornfield.  She 
later told police that the man was Caucasian and was wearing red shorts and 
possibly a white shirt. 
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{¶ 7} Kolasinski spent the next couple of hours at his house with a friend.  
Around 8:00 or 9:00 p.m., Kolasinski texted Joughin, but he did not receive a reply.  
Kolasinski called Joughin’s mother, Sheila Vaculik, around 9:30 p.m., who told 
him that Joughin’s bike was not at the family’s home.  The two of them drove 
around in Vaculik’s car looking for Joughin, but they did not find her.  They stopped 
at the fire department, where Vaculik spotted a police officer sitting in a police 
vehicle.  Vaculik spoke to the officer and explained that she was looking for 
Joughin and asked for help.  Later in the evening, police informed Vaculik that 
there was police activity on County Road 6. 
{¶ 8} Sometime after 7:00 p.m. on July 19, a local farmer named Troy 
Vandenbusche was driving south on County Road 6 when he noticed a helmet 
beside the east side of the road.  On his way home, Vandenbusche stopped, picked 
up the helmet, and tossed it into the bed of his truck.  The next morning, when 
Vandenbusche heard that there had been police activity on County Road 6 the 
previous evening, he turned the helmet over to law enforcement.  The helmet had 
reddish-brown stains on the exterior and also on the inside lining.  Subsequent 
testing indicated that the stains were blood. 
B.  The likely abduction site is found 
{¶ 9} Jeremy Simon, an officer with the Fulton County Sheriff’s Office, and 
his K-9 partner searched for Joughin’s bike in the late evening hours of July 19 into 
the early morning hours of July 20.  Shortly after midnight, while traveling north 
on County Road 6, Simon saw a small section of the cornfield on the east side of 
the road where, upon inspection, he noticed many disturbed cornstalks, a “strong 
smell of gasoline,” a motorcycle tire track, and a box of fuses.  He saw a pair of 
women’s sunglasses lying on the road near the painted white fog line on the west 
side of County Road 6.  He also found a purple mountain bike in the cornfield on 
the west side of the road. 
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{¶ 10} The bike was collected and upon inspection, officers observed 
reddish-brown stains on its handlebars and seat.  Subsequent testing confirmed that 
the stains were blood.  Joughin’s mother and boyfriend identified the bike as 
Joughin’s.  Investigators also found a checkered dishtowel with a reddish-brown 
stain approximately 1,000 feet north of the County Road 6 abduction site. 
{¶ 11} Later that morning, agents from the Ohio Bureau of Criminal 
Investigation (“BCI”) arrived and assisted in the search for Joughin.  BCI crime-
scene specialist Megan Roberts noticed two areas in the cornfield on the west side 
of County Road 6 that were “consistent with paths or point[s] of entry or exit.” 
{¶ 12} In the west cornfield, agents found broken cornstalks, reddish-brown 
stains on some corn leaves, and pattern impressions in the loose dirt.  About 20 feet 
into the same cornfield, Roberts found a green sock with reddish-brown stains on 
it.  Approximately 35 feet south of that location, Roberts found a pair of men’s 
sunglasses and an orange-handled screwdriver. 
C.  Worley is interviewed 
{¶ 13} On July 21, Dan Van Vorhis, an employee of the Ohio Adult Parole 
Authority who was assigned to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (“FBI”) 
violent-crimes task force, Major Matt Smithmyer of the Fulton County Sheriff’s 
Office, and FBI Special Agent Devon Lossic went to Worley’s property at 10627 
County Road 6, which is near where Joughin disappeared, to ask whether Worley 
knew Joughin or whether he had any information regarding her disappearance.  Van 
Vorhis testified that Worley was “very friendly” at first, and that he invited the 
group into his living room.  For approximately 90 minutes, Worley described his 
activities on the evening of July 19.  Van Vorhis recorded part of that interview. 
{¶ 14} Worley gave the following account.  Around 5:45 or 6:00 p.m. on 
July 19, he departed his property on his motorcycle, but the motorcycle stalled when 
he was driving on County Road U.  He got the motorcycle running again, but it 
stalled once more when he was driving on County Road 6.  He stopped near a 
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cornfield that abutted a wheat field, where he saw a blue bike and a light gray bike 
lying on the ground.  He pulled his motorcycle into the cornfield out of view from 
the road because he planned on riding one of the bikes home.  But he changed his 
mind and alternated between getting his motorcycle to start and riding it and 
pushing it home.  He did not see anyone on his trip and got home around 10:00 p.m. 
{¶ 15} Worley told the investigators that he lost some belongings when his 
motorcycle broke down.  He volunteered that his helmet, fuses, a screwdriver, and 
sunglasses were missing.  Worley asserted his innocence multiple times during the 
interview, but also asked whether the police had any evidence against him, such as 
fingerprints. 
{¶ 16} Later on July 21, BCI Special Agent Thomas Brokamp was at the 
police command center when he “overheard a conversation regarding a guy wanting 
his helmet back.”  After hearing this, Brokamp and other FBI and BCI agents went 
back to Worley’s house that day.  The group talked with Worley on his property for 
the next 14 hours, off and on.  This second interview was recorded by Brokamp and 
Van Vorhis. 
{¶ 17} On the investigators’ arrival, Worley was told that a black helmet 
had been found.  Worley immediately stated that he wanted it back.  When 
Brokamp said that the helmet looked like it had blood on it, Worley told the 
investigators that that was impossible.  Later during the interview, Worley said that 
he still did not understand “this deal with [his] helmet * * * that [his] helmet [has] 
this lady’s blood on it.” 
{¶ 18} Worley allowed the investigators to walk around his property, which 
consisted of a residence, two barns, a machine shop, and a trailer.  BCI Special 
Agent Dave Hammond testified that when investigators walked into the north barn, 
Worley’s “reaction to [them] being in there was a little unsettling or a little 
alarming.”  When another investigator approached a green crate in the barn and 
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lifted its lid, Worley “got very upset with him, * * * told him to close that, and then 
made [the investigators] all get out rather quickly.” 
{¶ 19} Van Vorhis testified that when they entered the north barn, Worley’s 
body language and demeanor indicated his anxiety over where the investigators 
were looking.  Before leaving the barn, investigators were able to see that the green 
crate contained many clear plastic bags filled with women’s lingerie.  Worley told 
the investigators that the bags contained lingerie that he would give to women he 
was dating. 
{¶ 20} The sand floor in the north barn had been recently raked.  Worley 
said that he had just cleaned it up in preparation to raise rabbits.  Investigators found 
an inflated air mattress behind stacked straw bales.  Worley told the investigators 
that the only DNA they would find on the mattress would be his mother’s. 
{¶ 21} Agent Brokamp informed Worley that a security video from the 
Evergreen High School complex—located on County Road 6 in between Worley’s 
property and the site where he likely kidnapped Joughin—showed a motorcycle 
traveling north on County Road 6 on July 19.  Despite this video, Worley initially 
stuck with his original story that he had returned home on his motorcycle around 
10:00 p.m., that he had not driven it north on County Road 6, and that did not leave 
his property again that evening.  He eventually admitted, however, that he had not 
told the truth because he felt that “ammo [was] being stacked against [him].” 
{¶ 22} Throughout both interviews, Worley consistently denied having 
anything to do with Joughin’s disappearance.  At that time, Joughin’s body had not 
yet been discovered. 
D.  Worley’s property is searched 
{¶ 23} While investigators were speaking with Worley at his property, a 
search warrant was secured and executed on the property. 
 
 
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1.  North barn 
{¶ 24} Investigators noticed recent tire impressions in the grass leading 
directly to the north barn on Worley’s property.  Inside the barn, investigators noted 
that a metal rake and a scoop shovel were leaning up against the north wall of the 
barn.  After removing stacked straw bales inside the barn, investigators found a roll 
of black duct tape, a piece of a white rope, and a trash bag containing adult diapers.  
Investigators also discovered a carpet-lined chest freezer that had been buried into 
the floor.  The floor of the freezer was wet and contained some straw.  Investigators 
also found a motorcycle visor and what appeared to be a drop of blood on the south 
wall of the barn, approximately 33 inches above the floor. 
{¶ 25} Inside the green crate, officers found more adult diapers, a bag 
containing bondage clothing and restraints, a roll of white clothesline, latex gloves, 
clear plastic bags containing women’s lingerie and clothing, a piece of duct tape 
with straw, hair, and other debris adhering to it, brown rope, white socks, a bag for 
storing the air mattress, and a pink sex toy.  The pink underwear had a reddish-
brown stain on it that tested presumptively positive for blood. 
2.  Machine shop 
{¶ 26} Inside a machine shop on the property, investigators found Worley’s 
motorcycle, which had pollen and weeds stuck to it, adult diapers, a tool board that 
had a compartment for ammunition, handcuff keys, two sets of handcuffs with keys 
tied to them, a zip tie, and a bottle of bleach. 
3.  Residence 
{¶ 27} While searching Worley’s residence, BCI agents found additional 
adult diapers in the kitchen, living room, and two bedrooms.  In the laundry room, 
Special Agent Roberts found a gray T-shirt, size XL, in the washing machine.  
Debris was present on the left sleeve, and the shirt was damp.  Investigators 
recovered a dirty pair of men’s black denim jeans from Worley’s bedroom.  
Investigators also found a computer tower and a pair of black boots caked with 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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mud.  Agent Roberts testified that Worley gave law enforcement the clothing he 
was wearing on July 19, which included a cream-colored XL shirt. 
4.  Worley’s vehicles 
{¶ 28} Worley’s vehicles—a red Chevrolet S-10 pickup truck and a green 
Dodge Dakota pickup truck—were searched on July 21.  Although it had not rained 
recently, the red pickup truck was wet and had standing water in its bed.  Officers 
recovered the following items from the red pickup truck: a can of pepper spray in 
the driver’s side door pocket, a black ski mask, work gloves, an ear warmer, a roll 
of duct tape, and seven 24-inch zip ties in the rear pocket of the passenger’s seat, 
three of which had already been connected. 
{¶ 29} From the green pickup truck, officers collected a white rope bundled 
with black electrical tape and zip ties under the driver’s side seat and under the floor 
mat of the driver’s seat. 
{¶ 30} Agents compared standard impressions from the tires on Worley’s 
red and green pickup trucks with cast-tire impressions from the County Road 6 
crime scene and determined that the cast-tire impressions were consistent with the 
make and model of two tires on Worley’s green pickup truck. 
E.  Joughin’s body is found 
{¶ 31} On July 22, a volunteer searcher named Scott Hudik was driving 
south on County Road 7 when he noticed an area of disturbance in a cornfield on 
the east side of the road.  Hudik noticed 18-inch-wide drag marks in the dirt.  He 
followed the drag marks for about 20 to 25 yards when he noticed that the dirt 
looked as if “someone took a shovel, dug a hole, and reburied it.”  This was not the 
burial site, but as he was looking around the area, Hudik saw a “yellowish latex 
glove” lying on the ground in between the road and the cornfield.  Subsequent DNA 
testing revealed that the glove contained a mixture of DNA profiles, with Joughin 
and Worley being included with an expected frequency of one in 6,000.  The one-
in-6,000-frequency statistic is considered a “lower frequency.”  The forensic 
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scientist who testified at trial explained that the frequency was lower due to the 
sample being a “partial profile.” 
{¶ 32} Later that day, investigators located the burial site on the west side 
of County Road 7.  They located the site after noticing a peculiar “section of corn” 
where “maybe 3, 4 feet, * * * was missing out of the field.”  As investigators began 
excavating the site, they could smell decomposing remains. 
{¶ 33} Joughin’s body was covered in dirt with her wrists handcuffed 
behind her back, her ankles bound together with duct tape, and her feet bound to 
her hands with a rope.  She was lying on her stomach with her head turned to the 
side.  A rubber cone-shaped dog toy, which was secured with a shoelace tied at the 
back of her head, had been used to gag her and there was straw in her hair.  She 
was dressed in a “lace colored brassiere, handcuffs, a rope, and an adult diaper.”  A 
key was attached to the handcuffs. 
F.  The autopsy 
{¶ 34} Dr. Cynthia Beisser from the Lucas County Coroner’s Office 
conducted the autopsy on July 25, 2016.  She testified that Joughin was 5 feet 4 
inches tall and weighed 122 pounds at the time of her death. 
{¶ 35} Dr. Beisser testified that Joughin had a head wound high on the right 
side of her forehead, which had caused significant bleeding.  There was a hairline 
fracture on Joughin’s skull at the left occipital bone, and several contusions along 
her outer left leg.  Dr. Beisser testified that the forehead wound and the skull 
fracture could have been caused by Joughin’s being struck with a motorcycle 
helmet.  She also testified that the fracture was recent and could also have been 
caused by Joughin’s head hitting the roadway. 
{¶ 36} Dr. Beisser measured Joughin’s oral cavity and the dog toy and 
found that they were the same size.  After removing the dog toy, Dr. Beisser noted 
that Joughin’s upper left medial incisor was broken, and she opined to a reasonable 
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degree of scientific certainty that Joughin’s tooth could have been broken by the 
dog toy when it was inserted into her mouth. 
{¶ 37} Dr. Beisser testified that because Joughin’s mouth was the same size 
as the dog toy, the dog toy filled her oral cavity completely and cut off her ability 
to breathe.  Dr. Beisser stated that there would have been visible or audible signs 
of Joughin’s distress while she struggled to breathe and that her death occurred 
within ten minutes from asphyxiation.  Dr. Beisser opined to a reasonable degree 
of medical certainty that Joughin’s death was caused by asphyxia due to the 
mechanical obstruction of her mouth. 
G.  Evidence collection and analysis 
1.  DNA testing 
{¶ 38} BCI agents conducted DNA testing on a number of items collected 
throughout the investigation.  BCI agents also tested fingernail clippings from 
Joughin’s left hand.  The BCI forensic scientist who testified at trial stated that 
Joughin “was included as the major contributor” and that Worley was excluded as 
a major contributor.  The BCI analyst further testified that “[t]here was additional 
data that included a male contributor that was not sufficient for comparison.”  
Bloodstains on the exterior of Worley’s motorcycle helmet yielded a DNA profile 
consistent with Joughin, with an expected frequency of one in one trillion.  This 
conclusion was significant because it means that over one trillion individuals would 
need to be tested to find that DNA profile.  The helmet’s unstained interior revealed 
a mixture of DNA profiles, and Joughin was included as the major contributor, with 
an expected frequency of one in one trillion.  Worley was included as the minor 
contributor, with an expected frequency of one in 30 million.  Bloodstained swabs 
from the checkered dishtowel that was recovered from the abduction site yielded a 
DNA profile consistent with Joughin, with an expected frequency of one in one 
trillion.  DNA testing of the interior and thumb tip of the latex glove that was 
recovered near the site where Joughin was buried yielded a mixture of DNA 
January Term, 2021 
 
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profiles, with Worley and Joughin being included with an expected frequency of 
one in 6,000. 
{¶ 39} BCI also tested some of the items collected from Worley’s north 
barn, including a swab of the bloodstain from the pink underwear, which yielded a 
DNA profile consistent with Joughin, with an expected frequency of one in one 
trillion.  Investigators also had a roll of paper towels tested for Joughin’s DNA.  
The paper towels also yielded a mixture of DNA profiles, with Joughin being 
included as the major contributor, with an expected frequency of rarer than one in 
one trillion.  The air mattress also contained a mixture of DNA profiles, with 
Joughin being included as the major contributor, with an expected frequency of one 
in one trillion.  The duct tape found in the green crate also contained a mixture of 
DNA profiles, with Joughin and Worley both being included in the mixture, with 
an expected frequency of one in 20 million. 
2.  Surveillance video and cellular-phone data 
{¶ 40} A video camera from the Evergreen Elementary School recorded a 
motorcycle traveling north on County Road 6 at 7:19 p.m. on July 19, 2016.  A 
video camera from the high school captured the same motorcycle heading south on 
County Road 6 around 10:00 p.m.  The same video showed a vehicle traveling north 
on County Road 6 about nine minutes later.  Testimony established that it takes 
approximately 4.5 minutes to drive the 3.5 miles from the school to Worley’s house. 
{¶ 41} Forensic cellular-phone evidence introduced at trial showed that 
Joughin’s and Worley’s cellular phones were in the area of the abduction site 
between 7:42 p.m. and 7:45 p.m. on July 19.  Worley made a call from that area at 
7:43 p.m.  FBI cellular-data analyst Joseph Jenson testified that the evidence 
showed that between 8:01 and 8:05 p.m. “there are arcs [for both phones] in the 
same general area.”  Jenson could not conclude that the two phones intersected at 
the same spot because the “measurements” were taken at different times.  Jenson 
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also determined that, at 9:13 p.m. on July 19, Worley’s phone was in the area of the 
abduction site. 
3.  Worley’s computer 
{¶ 42} Detective Dave Morford, from the computer-crimes unit at the 
Toledo Police Department, testified that a forensic analysis of Worley’s computer 
revealed that Worley visited a website called xvideos.com, which showed 
pornographic videos.  In 2015 and 2016, Worley searched for videos using 
keywords such as “hogtyed [sic] teen,” “bound,” “beaten down teens,” “forced 
teens,” “stranded and forced,” and “rough pick-ups.”  In one of the videos that 
Worley watched, the female participant was strangled with a tennis net. 
{¶ 43} On July 18 and 19, 2016, Worley accessed a website called 
AliExpress.com and searched for “camisole tanks,” “G string thongs,” “wholesale 
women’s bralette tops, underwear, women’s lace strap backless rack chest 
sleepwear, cropped tank tops,” and other lingerie. 
4.  Worley’s financial records 
{¶ 44} Bank statements showed that Worley’s personal checking account 
was used to purchase items from AliExpress.com in January and February 2016.  
In addition, a checking account in the name of Worley’s mother—which listed 
Worley as having a power of attorney regarding this mother—was used to purchase 
items from AliExpress.com in June 2015 and March 2016 and items from Wicked 
Temptations in May 2015. 
5.  Other evidence taken from Worley 
{¶ 45} After Worley was taken into custody, investigators photographed 
various scratches and bruises on Worley’s arms, shoulders, and neck and a cut on 
his finger.  Worley’s keychain contained a unique key that looked like the key to 
the handcuffs that had been found attached to Joughin’s wrists. 
 
 
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H.  Worley’s previous abduction attempt 
{¶ 46} At trial, the state introduced testimony from Robin Gardner about 
her encounter with Worley on July 4, 1990.  Gardner, who was 26 years old at the 
time, was riding her bike in a rural area around Lucas County.  Approximately one 
mile from her house, a pickup truck struck Gardner from behind, running her into 
a ditch.  When she saw the pickup truck, she realized that it was the same one that 
had passed by her just moments before traveling in the other direction. 
{¶ 47} When Gardner stood up, the driver of the pickup truck—later 
identified as Worley—asked her if she was all right.  Gardner testified that she “put 
her defenses down” and told him that she thought she was okay.  Worley then hit 
Gardner on the back of her head with a hammer and put her in a stranglehold.  He 
also held a screwdriver to her throat and threatened to kill her if she did not get into 
his truck.  Worley overpowered Gardner, got her into his truck, and then attempted 
to get both of her hands behind her back and handcuff her, but he succeeded in 
placing a handcuff only on her right wrist. 
{¶ 48} During the struggle, a motorcyclist saw the commotion and stopped 
to help Gardner.  She was able to get out of Worley’s pickup truck and run out into 
the street and up to the motorcyclist, who took her home.  Later that day, Gardner 
identified Worley as her attacker.  Law-enforcement officers were unable to unlock 
the handcuff attached to Gardner’s wrist with keys available to them.  Gardner 
suffered a skull fracture and a concussion from the hammer blow. 
I.  Defense case 
{¶ 49} Worley presented two witnesses in his defense.  Mark Fauble, a 
high-school friend of Worley’s, testified that they had remained in touch over the 
years.  Fauble testified that in 2011 or 2012, he knew that Worley needed a new 
helmet, so he picked one up for Worley at an automotive swap meet.  Fauble 
confirmed that the helmet recovered at the abduction site in this case looked like 
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the one he had given Worley.  On cross-examination, Fauble testified that the 
helmet was new when he gave it to Worley. 
{¶ 50} Jeffrey Whitaker, also Worley’s high-school friend, testified that 
from 2010 to 2016, he saw Worley “sometimes every week or a couple times a 
month.”  They rode motorcycles together, and Whitaker was aware that in the 
summer of 2016, Worley’s bike had some electrical or fuel issues.  Although 
Whitaker said that the motorcycle “occasionally stalled at corners,” he denied that 
it ever left them “stranded.”  On cross-examination, Whitaker said that he and 
Worley had watched pornography together, and that it seemed to him that Worley 
had “an idea” about creating a pornographic studio at his residence. 
II.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND SENTENCING 
{¶ 51} A grand jury indicted Worley on 19 felony counts, including two 
counts of aggravated murder.  The indictment charged Worley with two counts of 
abduction (Counts 1 and 2), four counts of kidnapping (Counts 3 through 6), two 
counts of felonious assault (Counts 7 and 8), two counts of murder (Counts 9 and 
10), two counts of aggravated robbery (Counts 13 and 14), one count of possessing 
criminal tools (Count 15), one count of gross abuse of a corpse (Count 16), one 
count of tampering with evidence (Count 17), and two counts of having a weapon 
while under a disability (Counts 18 and 19). 
{¶ 52} Count 11 charged Worley with aggravated murder with prior 
calculation and design, in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A).  Count 12 charged Worley 
with purposely causing Joughin’s death while “committing or attempting to 
commit” kidnapping, in violation of R.C. 2903.01(B).  Each aggravated-murder 
count included two death-penalty specifications: (1) that Worley committed the 
murder for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial, or punishment 
for another offense, in violation of R.C. 2929.04(A)(3), and (2) that Worley 
committed the murder in the course of committing the offense of kidnapping and 
that Worley was either the principal offender in the commission of the aggravated 
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murder or that he committed the aggravated murder with prior calculation and 
design, in violation of R.C. 2929.04(A)(7).  He pleaded not guilty to all the counts 
and specifications. 
{¶ 53} The state dismissed Counts 13 and 14 before the case was submitted 
to the jury.  The jury returned guilty verdicts on all the remaining counts, including 
both death-penalty specifications. 
{¶ 54} The trial court merged the prior-calculation-and-design-aggravated-
murder charge (Count 11) into the aggravated-murder-during-a-felony charge 
(Count 12), and merged the second specification (R.C. 2929.04(A)(7)) into the first 
specification (R.C. 2929.04(A)(3)) before the sentencing phase began.  The state 
elected to proceed to sentencing on Count 12 and the first specification to that 
count.  As such, for purposes of capital sentencing, the jury considered only Count 
12 (purposely causing the death of Joughin while committing or attempting to 
commit the crime of kidnapping, in violation of R.C. 2903.01(B)) and the sole 
aggravating factor associated with that count after merger (that Worley purposely 
caused the death of Joughin for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, 
trial, or punishment for another offense, in violation of R.C. 2929.04(A)(3)).  The 
jury recommended a sentence of death, and the trial court accepted that 
recommendation and imposed a death sentence. 
{¶ 55} On the noncapital convictions, the trial court merged Counts 1 
through 5 with Count 6 (kidnapping) and sentenced Worley to 11 years in prison 
on that count.  The court merged Count 7 with Count 8 (felonious assault) and 
sentenced Worley to 8 years in prison on that count.  The court merged Count 16 
with Count 17 (gross abuse of a corpse) and sentenced Worley to 36 months in 
prison on that count.  The court merged Count 18 with Count 19 (having weapons 
while under a disability) and sentenced Worley to 36 months in prison on that count.  
The court sentenced Worley to 11 months in prison for one count of possessing 
criminal tools (Count 15).  The court ordered that the sentences imposed for the 
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noncapital convictions be served consecutively, for an aggregate sentence of 25 
years and 11 months.  Worley appeals his convictions and sentence and raises 11 
propositions of law. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Sufficiency of the evidence 
{¶ 56} In his first proposition of law, Worley argues that the state failed to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the offenses of aggravated 
murder and kidnapping.  For the following reasons, we disagree. 
{¶ 57} The test for sufficiency of the evidence is “whether, after viewing 
the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”  State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two 
of the syllabus, superseded by constitutional amendment on other grounds as stated 
in State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 102, 684 N.E.2d 668 (1997), fn. 4, and following 
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).  “ ‘Proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt’ is proof of such character that an ordinary person would 
be willing to rely and act upon it in the most important of the person’s own affairs.”  
R.C. 2901.05(E).  A sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge asks whether the 
evidence adduced at trial “is legally sufficient to support the jury verdict as a matter 
of law.”  State v. Lang, 129 Ohio St.3d 512, 2011-Ohio-4215, 954 N.E.2d 596, 
¶ 219. 
{¶ 58} In Worley’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim pertaining to his 
kidnapping conviction, he contends that the evidence did not sufficiently prove that 
he “engaged in sexual activity with Joughin.”  And in Worley’s sufficiency-of-the-
evidence claim pertaining to his aggravated-murder conviction for which he was 
sentenced to death, he contends that the evidence did not sufficiently prove that he 
was the perpetrator of the crimes or that he acted with a purposeful mens rea.  His 
claims lack merit because when the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to 
January Term, 2021 
 
17 
the prosecution, it supports the jury’s conclusion that Worley committed the crimes 
and the conduct underlying the capital specifications. 
1.  The state presented overwhelming evidence that Worley committed 
kidnapping 
{¶ 59} Worley challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 
kidnapping conviction, arguing that the state failed to present sufficient evidence 
that he “engaged in sexual activity with Joughin.”  This claim fails for several 
reasons. 
{¶ 60} Worley’s claim is focused on Count 4 (kidnapping)—a count for 
which he was not sentenced to death and was merged with Count 6.  Count 4 alleged 
that Worley, by force, threat, or deception, restrained Joughin’s liberty “with the 
purpose to engage in sexual activity, as defined in Section 2907.01 of the Revised 
Code, with the other against the other’s will,” R.C. 2905.01(A)(4). 
{¶ 61} Even if Worley had been sentenced for a violation of R.C. 
2905.01(A)(4), Worley’s argument would still be unpersuasive.  Worley’s 
contention that there was insufficient evidence that he “engaged in sexual activity 
with Joughin” is based on a faulty reading of that statute.  R.C. 2905.01(A)(4) 
prohibits the removal or restraint of another for the purpose of engaging in sexual 
activity with the person and “requires only that the restraint or removal occur for 
the purposes of non-consensual sexual activity—not that sexual activity actually 
take place.”  (Emphasis added.)  State v. Powell, 49 Ohio St.3d 255, 262, 552 
N.E.2d 191 (1990), superseded by constitutional amendment on other grounds as 
stated in Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d at 102, 684 N.E.2d 668, fn. 4, and following Jackson, 
443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560. 
{¶ 62} Although Worley does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence 
for Count 6, which was the kidnapping count that supported the aggravated-murder 
conviction for which he was sentenced to death, the evidence supporting Worley’s 
conviction for Count 6 was overwhelming as well.  Count 6 required proof beyond 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
a reasonable doubt that Worley, “by force, threat, or deception,” knowingly 
restrained Joughin of her liberty “under circumstances that create[d] a substantial 
risk of serious physical harm.”  R.C. 2905.01(B)(2).  The evidence showed that 
Worley used force when he attacked Joughin as she was riding her bike, that he 
restrained her at his property using rope and handcuffs, and that he shoved a dog 
toy into her mouth and tied it in place causing her to suffocate.  Thus, we find ample 
evidence supporting Worley’s kidnapping conviction. 
2.  The state presented sufficient evidence to establish that Worley committed 
aggravated murder during a kidnapping 
{¶ 63} The jury found Worley guilty of purposely causing Joughin’s death 
while committing the crime of kidnapping (R.C. 2903.01(B)) so that he could 
escape detection, apprehension, trial, or punishment for the kidnapping (R.C. 
2929.04(A)(3)).  Worley argues that the state failed to produce legally sufficient 
evidence that he purposely killed Joughin or that he was her “actual killer.” 
a.  Worley purposely killed Joughin 
{¶ 64} “A person acts purposely when it is the person’s specific intention 
to cause a certain result, or, when the gist of the offense is a prohibition against 
conduct of a certain nature, regardless of what the offender intends to accomplish 
thereby, it is the offender’s specific intention to engage in conduct of that nature.”  
R.C. 2901.22(A).  A defendant’s purpose may be established by circumstantial 
evidence.  State v. Nicely, 39 Ohio St.3d 147, 151, 529 N.E.2d 1236 (1988).  “The 
law has long recognized that intent, lying as it does within the privacy of a person’s 
own thoughts, is not susceptible to objective proof.”  State v. Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d 
49, 60, 656 N.E.2d 623 (1995).  Therefore, intent may be established from the 
surrounding facts and circumstances in the case.  Id. 
{¶ 65} Worley maintains that there was no evidence submitted at trial that 
he purposely suffocated Joughin.  He argues that the jury could not infer his purpose 
in this case because (1) Joughin’s death was not caused by a gunshot or knife 
January Term, 2021 
 
19 
wound, (2) the state failed to prove an exact time of death, and (3) the state’s “main 
argument on purposefulness focused on Joughin’s broken front tooth.” 
{¶ 66} Worley’s claims lack merit.  First, Dr. Beisser concluded to a 
reasonable degree of medical certainty that the death in this case was caused by 
asphyxia due to mechanical obstruction of Joughin’s mouth.  During the autopsy, 
Dr. Beisser removed the dog toy used to gag Joughin and found that her upper left 
front tooth was broken.  Photographic and video evidence of Joughin’s last bike 
ride demonstrated that her teeth were intact prior to the abduction.  Furthermore, 
Dr. Beisser testified to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that the tooth 
could have been broken when the gag was inserted into her mouth. 
{¶ 67} The dog toy and Joughin’s oral cavity were the same size, and the 
gag was tied tightly in place with a shoelace.  Therefore, when the gag was inserted 
and then secured in place, it completely blocked both of Joughin’s airways and 
prevented her from breathing.  Although Worley owned gear that was specifically 
made for sexual bondage that he could have used, he instead chose to use a dog toy, 
which was larger and differently shaped.  He then secured that large dog toy with a 
shoelace.  “It is a fundamental principle that a person is presumed to intend the 
natural, reasonable and probable consequences of his voluntary acts.”  State v. 
Johnson, 56 Ohio St.2d 35, 39, 381 N.E.2d 637 (1978); see also State v. Carter, 64 
Ohio St.3d 218, 226, 594 N.E.2d 595 (1992). 
{¶ 68} The evidence also indicated that Joughin’s death was not 
instantaneous—it took up to ten minutes for her to asphyxiate from the time that 
Worley inserted the gag into her mouth.  Dr. Beisser opined that there would have 
been visible or audible signs of Joughin’s distress as she asphyxiated.  Indeed, Dr. 
Beisser’s testimony alone was sufficient for the jury to reasonably infer that when 
Worley pushed the gag into Joughin’s mouth, he intended to kill her. 
{¶ 69} Worley points out that no tooth fragment was found during the 
autopsy.  Therefore, he contends, “[t]he most reasonable inference that a rational 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
trier of fact could reach was that [Joughin’s] tooth was broken prior to the sex toy1 
entry, or after—as when she was buried—eliminating any reasonable probability 
that the toy was inserted into her mouth with the level of force showing a purpose 
to kill by suffocation.”  This assertion is meritless.  The issue in a challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence is “whether any reasonable trier of fact could have found 
the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Jenks, 61 
Ohio St.3d at 273, 574 N.E.2d 492.  The dispositive question is not, as Worley 
contends, whether there was a more reasonable inference the jury could have made.  
Moreover, the failure of the police to find a tooth fragment does not show that 
Worley did not intend to suffocate Joughin.  The autopsy report established that 
Joughin died from asphyxia due to the dog toy’s placement into her mouth. 
{¶ 70} Worley lied to the investigators when they first came to his property 
and he continued to mislead the police for days after that initial visit.  Although 
Joughin’s body had not yet been located, Worley lied about his whereabouts on 
July 19 and lied about whether Joughin had ever been on his property.  The state 
presented ample evidence showing that Worley made extensive efforts to escape 
detection, including lying, which also indicates that Worley purposely murdered 
Joughin.  See State v. Coleman, 37 Ohio St.3d 286, 290-291, 525 N.E.2d 792 
(1988). 
{¶ 71} We reject Worley’s arguments and hold that the state presented 
sufficient evidence that he purposely killed Joughin. 
b.  Evidence showing that Worley was the actual killer 
{¶ 72} Worley also argues that the state presented insufficient evidence to 
show that he actually killed Joughin.  He contends that the evidence was insufficient 
to allow the jury to conclude that he was the “principal offender,” an element of the 
                                                          
 
1.  Worley’s briefs persistently misidentify the object that suffocated Joughin as a “sex toy.”  In fact, 
it was a rubber dog toy with a conical structure. 
January Term, 2021 
 
21 
aggravating circumstance contained in the second specification attached to both 
counts of aggravated murder. 
{¶ 73} We find no merit to Worley’s argument.  After the court merged 
allied offenses and the state elected to proceed to the penalty phase with Count 12 
and the first specification attached to that count, Worley was sentenced to death 
solely on that first capital specification, not the second specification (which 
required, among other elements, that there be sufficient evidence that Worley was 
the “principal offender”).  See R.C. 2929.04(A)(7).  Under the first specification—
the only aggravating circumstance that the jury considered for sentencing 
purposes—Worley was found to have committed the aggravated murder for the 
purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial, or punishment for another 
offense that he had committed.  R.C. 2929.04(A)(3).  Thus, even if we were to hold 
that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Worley was the “principal 
offender,” the erroneous verdict would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 
because the error would not affect the sentence.  Powell, 49 Ohio St.3d at 263, 552 
N.E.2d 191. 
{¶ 74} We reject Worley’s argument because he was not sentenced to death 
based on the principal-offender specification contained in R.C. 2929.04(A)(7), and 
he has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the escaping-
detection specification. 
{¶ 75} Even so, there was overwhelming evidence that Worley was the 
perpetrator of these crimes and thus the “actual killer” and principal offender.  
Worley admitted to police that he was in the area of the abduction site on July 19, 
in the cornfield where a box of fuses belonging to Worley was found.  He placed a 
call at 7:43 p.m. from that location.  Joughin’s blood was on Worley’s helmet, 
which was found on the side of the road near the abduction site.  And although 
Worley strongly denied that Joughin was ever at his property, her DNA was on the 
air mattress in his barn.  The green crate contained a pair of pink underwear soaked 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
with Joughin’s blood and a roll of paper towels in that crate also contained her 
DNA.  All the DNA evidence found on Worley’s property belies his claim that he 
was not her actual killer.  His argument that a different perpetrator was likely 
involved because DNA analysis of Joughin’s fingernail clippings revealed an 
unknown male’s DNA profile is likewise meritless.  Joughin was handcuffed and 
bound in a way that made her utterly defenseless.  Thus, the fact that Worley’s 
DNA profile was not detected from the DNA taken from underneath her fingernails 
does not support his argument. 
{¶ 76} For the foregoing reasons, we reject Worley’s first proposition of 
law. 
B.  Denial of motion for new venire 
{¶ 77} In his second proposition of law, Worley argues that his right to a 
fair trial as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution and by Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution2 was 
infringed upon when the trial court denied his motion for a new venire after many 
prospective jurors were, as he describes it, exposed to “information harmful to 
[him] and positive toward the government.”  But Worley fails to demonstrate that 
the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion.  The court dismissed 
every prospective juror who either stated that he or she had prejudged Worley’s 
guilt or had unnecessarily commented on Worley’s character.  The trial court also 
issued timely and thorough admonishments and limiting instructions that the jurors 
swore they would follow. 
 
 
                                                          
 
2.  “Since 1887, this court has equated the Due Course of Law Clause in Article I, Section 16 of the 
Ohio Constitution with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.”  State v. Aalim, 150 Ohio St.3d 489, 2017-Ohio-2956, 83 N.E.3d 883, ¶ 15.  Because 
we have not held that Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution provides broader due-process 
protections than the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and because Worley 
has not actually provided this court with that argument, we decline to address that issue. 
January Term, 2021 
 
23 
1.  Facts 
{¶ 78} The trial court ordered an initial draw of 400 individuals for the 
prospective jury pool.  The court granted Worley’s request for individual voir dire 
on the topics of pretrial publicity and the death penalty.  The court dismissed about 
156 prospective jurors after holding pretrial hearings on statutory juror excusals.  
The trial court placed the remaining 242 prospective jurors into two groups.  
General voir dire took place over the course of two days, and individual voir dire 
followed on the next day. 
{¶ 79} On the first day of general voir dire, Worley’s name quickly came 
up as the cause of a number of prospective jurors’ inability to be fair and impartial.  
Prospective juror No. 96 said that he and Worley had attended the same high school, 
that he had spoken to a previous employer about this case, and that he could not be 
a fair and impartial juror despite the court’s instructions.  Defense counsel 
successfully challenged that juror for cause.  After prospective juror No. 96 was 
dismissed, other prospective jurors stated that they too had already decided that 
Worley was guilty and could not fairly consider the evidence.  Prospective juror 
No. 134 told the court that Worley used to come into the shop where she worked 
and that “we just kind of thought he was kind of different.” 
{¶ 80} When the court asked whether any of the prospective jurors had a 
“state of mind showing ill will, hatred, or bias” toward the state or Worley, 
prospective juror No. 60 raised her hand.  She said that she had been “in the same 
friend group” with Joughin and that that relationship would make it impossible for 
her to be fair and impartial.  The court dismissed that prospective juror for cause.  
Next, the court asked whether anyone had formed or expressed an opinion as to 
Worley’s guilt.  Prospective juror No. 18 stated that he had formed the opinion that 
Worley was guilty and that he would not be able to fairly and impartially consider 
the evidence.  Prospective juror No. 65 stated that he believed Worley was guilty, 
prospective juror No. 62 lived near where Joughin’s body was found and said she 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
24 
could not be impartial, prospective juror No. 52 said that she could not be unbiased 
because of her friendship with the Joughin, Vaculik, and Kolasinski families, and 
prospective juror No. 102 said that he already made up his mind.  The court 
dismissed all those prospective jurors for cause. 
{¶ 81} Addressing the remaining prospective jurors, the court requested 
those who had a preconceived opinion about Worley’s guilt to stand.  The court 
then asked the prospective jurors who stood up whether they could set aside any 
preconceived judgments as to Worley’s guilt and whether they could decide the 
case based only on the evidence that would be presented at trial.  Prospective juror 
No. 4 revealed that Joughin’s family had been to her wedding, and then said that 
“based on that he did this 30 years ago, it’s been—” before the court interrupted 
her.  The court instructed the prospective jurors to answer the specific question 
asked and to avoid making any additional statements. 
{¶ 82} Defense counsel moved to dismiss the entire panel.  After calling a 
recess, the court held a meeting in chambers.  Counsel argued that prospective juror 
No. 4’s allusion to Worley’s prior conviction had tainted the venire and that a new 
venire should be empaneled.  The state opposed the motion and pointed out that the 
parties had stipulated to the existence of Worley’s prior conviction and that a 
witness would testify about it.  The court then stated: “The Court is not going to 
dismiss this panel.  The Court instead is going to give a curative instruction.  * * * 
We will discuss with the jurors whether they can lay aside that comment and go 
forward from there.  If there’s an appearance that no one can lay it aside, then I will 
reconsider the defense’s motion.”  The court also indicated that the jury 
commissioner had informed the court that prospective juror No. 159 “claims that 
Mr. Worley assaulted her daughter.  She is convinced he committed this offense.” 
{¶ 83} The court dismissed prospective juror Nos. 4 and 159 and then 
instructed the jury as follows: 
 
January Term, 2021 
 
25 
Everyone must understand that every individual charged with an 
offense in the United States is presumed to be innocent.  That 
presumption carries to every defendant. 
 
Comments made during voir dire are not evidence because, 
as I’ve said before, the only evidence that a jury may consider is the 
evidence that comes from the witness stand, from the exhibits; and 
from other things, quite frankly, [that] the Court tells you [that] you 
may consider, and from nowhere else, certainly not during voir dire. 
So any comments you hear during voir dire related to 
something that someone supposedly did are just that.  It’s 
speculation, it’s gossip.  It’s the stuff you read on the internet. 
Because absent being present, none of you know for sure 
what occurred in this case.  No one.  And Mr. Worley is presumed 
innocent as any of you would be if you were accused of a crime.  So 
I’m instructing all of you to disregard any of the comments that 
you’ve heard, and we’re going to move forward. 
 
{¶ 84} After issuing the curative instruction, the court again asked whether 
any of the remaining prospective jurors had a preconceived notion about Worley’s 
guilt.  Twenty-three prospective jurors raised their hands.  The court conducted a 
brief colloquy with each prospective juror before dismissing each of them for cause. 
{¶ 85} At the end of that day, the court admonished the remaining 
prospective jurors to abstain from advertising their being a part of the case on social 
media.  Prospective juror No. 46 then raised a concern over a Facebook post she 
had made the previous day.  The prospective juror said that she “had put on 
yesterday, that ‘Oh, boy.’ ”  The court stopped her and responded, “That was 
yesterday.”  Without inquiring further, the court asked prospective juror No. 46 to 
delete the post.  She agreed to do so when she got home.  She was later dismissed 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
26 
without objection for having “made up [her] mind about [Worley’s] guilt or 
innocence.” 
{¶ 86} The next morning, the court told counsel that 68 prospective jurors 
remained.  During voir dire that morning, prospective juror No. 103 raised his hand 
and told the court that he did not think he “should be on the jury because [he] pretty 
much made up [his] mind about it.”  The court instructed the prospective juror to 
take his seat and told the prospective panel that the next step in voir dire would be 
focused on that issue.  Yet, the prospective jurors continued to volunteer that their 
minds were already made up. 
{¶ 87} In response, the court instructed the prospective jurors to consider 
two questions: “First, are you possessed of a state of mind showing ill will, hatred, 
or bias toward either the defendant or the State of Ohio?  And, secondarily, have 
you formed or expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of [Worley]?”  The 
court then explained: 
 
If you become a juror in this case, you’re going to take an oath.  And 
the oath indicates that you will follow the instructions of the Court 
as to what it is you can consider in this case and how you will weigh 
the evidence in this case. 
And basically, what I’m going to tell you is, you have to 
consider only the matters that you hear here in the courtroom from 
the witness stand, the exhibits that are admitted, and anything else 
that I instruct you to follow. 
So what I want to know at this point in time, is there anyone 
here who cannot follow the instructions of the Court with respect to 
how they’re to consider the evidence or who has already made up 
their mind with respect to the guilt or innocence of [Worley]? 
January Term, 2021 
 
27 
Now, in doing this, all you have to tell me is you’ve made 
up your mind.  I don’t need any other editorial comments.  We ran 
into some problems yesterday. 
So those of you who would answer that question in the 
affirmative, would you please raise your hand? 
 
In response, 20 prospective jurors told the court that they would not follow its 
instructions and had already made up their minds that Worley was guilty.  During 
this process, prospective juror No. 397 said that he “went to Evergreen High School 
and lived three miles from the guy’s house, and [Worley] attended our church after 
his first imprisonment 25 years ago.” 
{¶ 88} Defense counsel renewed their motion for a new venire after 
prospective juror No. 397’s statement.  The state opposed the motion, and the court 
took the motion under advisement.  Eleven more prospective jurors stated that they 
had already decided the question of Worley’s guilt.  Prospective juror No. 250 said 
that he could not be impartial because he had “two little girls at home.”  The court 
then stopped the proceedings again to instruct the jury on a defendant’s 
presumption of innocence, stating: 
 
Couple of comments before we proceed further with voir 
dire.  I’m certain that all of you understand that any individual 
accused of any offense has the presumption of innocence. 
I believe the expression I heard yesterday was that the 
individual is cloaked with innocence if they’re charged.  And that 
individual remains innocent of the offense unless the State has 
proven the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
And until that moment, the defendant is entitled to the 
Constitutional presumption of innocence.  Now some comments 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
28 
may have been made today or you may have overheard something.  
None of what any of these prospective jurors has said in the 
courtroom is evidence. 
The only matter that the jury can rely upon are those matters 
that are testified to in open court, the exhibits that will be received 
into evidence in this case, and your reliance on the Court’s 
instructions. 
You are all going to be placed under oath and promise to do 
those very things, promise to give that assurance to the defendant 
that he’s presumed to be innocent until he’s proven guilty by the 
State until and unless he is proven guilty by the State. 
So I want to make certain that there is no one here who feels 
that they have somehow been biased by any comments that may 
have been made during this particular part of voir dire. 
Is there any individual here who feels they cannot lay aside 
anything that they’ve heard here today and a [sic] render their 
verdict based on the instructions given to them by the Court, which 
is going to tell you you have to rely on the evidence you hear in the 
courtroom? 
If there is, I want you to raise your hand at this time. 
 
None of the prospective jurors raised their hand.  After some follow-up general voir 
dire, the court denied Worley’s motion for a new venire. 
{¶ 89} Individual voir dire began on March 7, 2016.  The court explained 
that individual voir dire was designed to ferret out the potential jurors’ views on the 
death penalty and whether the potential jurors could apply the law as given to them 
by the court without regard to their personal views on capital punishment. 
 
 
January Term, 2021 
 
29 
2.  Analysis 
{¶ 90} We will not presume that a venire is tainted when a prospective juror 
makes improper comments during voir dire.  State v. Sanders, 92 Ohio St.3d 245, 
248, 750 N.E.2d 90 (2001); State v. Yarbrough, 95 Ohio St.3d 227, 2002-Ohio-
2126, 767 N.E.2d 216, ¶ 98 (“Absent some * * * indication, we decline to speculate 
that hearing [a prospective juror’s] opinions must somehow have irretrievably 
tainted the other prospective jurors”).  “The party challenging the entire jury panel 
has the burden to show either that the jurors were unlawfully impaneled or that the 
jurors could not be fair and impartial.”  State v. Adams, 144 Ohio St.3d 429, 2015-
Ohio-3954, 45 N.E.3d 127, ¶ 150.  And the trial court retains wide discretion over 
the conduct and scope of voir dire, including whether to grant a party’s motion for 
a new venire.  See id. at ¶ 150-151.  An abuse of discretion implies that the court’s 
attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.  See State v. Jackson, 107 
Ohio St.3d 53, 2005-Ohio-5981, 836 N.E.2d 1173, ¶ 48. 
{¶ 91} The trial court provided limiting instructions to the prospective 
jurors more than once each day.  Whenever a prospective juror failed to heed the 
court’s instructions to answer “yes” or “no” to the questions and to refrain from any 
other commentary, the trial court stopped the proceedings and provided further 
instruction.  Moreover, each of the jurors who were ultimately empaneled was 
subjected to individual voir dire in sequestered sessions with the court and counsel 
present.  The court asked those jurors whether they had formed any fixed opinions 
regarding Worley’s guilt or innocence, whether they could decide the case solely 
on the evidence presented at trial, and whether they could follow the court’s 
instructions and deliberate in a fair and impartial manner.  Following thorough 
questioning, the trial court excused members of the venire who had formed fixed 
opinions about Worley’s guilt.  And none of the prospective jurors who referred to 
Worley’s prior conviction during general voir dire was seated on the jury. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
30 
{¶ 92} Citing Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 
L.Ed.2d 176 (1987), and Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 136, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 
20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), Worley argues in his reply brief that he has demonstrated 
an “overwhelming probability” that the venire could not have followed the court’s 
curative instructions and admonitions.  In support of his argument, he points to the 
inappropriate comments made by some prospective jurors concerning their 
preconceived notions of Worley’s guilt. 
{¶ 93} Worley’s reliance on Richardson and Bruton is misplaced.  Neither 
Supreme Court case involved a claim that prospective jurors’ inappropriate 
comments during voir dire demonstrated an “overwhelming probability” that the 
venire could not follow the court’s curative instructions.  Both Richardson and 
Bruton involved Confrontation Clause violations due to the admission of a 
nontestifying codefendant’s confession inculpating the defendant.  See Richardson 
at 201-202; Bruton at 124.  Here, there is no Confrontation Clause violation and no 
indication that the jurors could not follow the court’s instructions and admonitions.  
The trial court gained the necessary assurances from every juror who served on 
Worley’s jury.  We reject Worley’s claim that the trial court abused its discretion 
in denying his motion for a new venire. 
C.  Ineffective assistance of counsel 
1.  During voir dire 
{¶ 94} In his fourth proposition of law, Worley asserts that trial counsel 
provided ineffective assistance in violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights, as well as his rights under Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution.  He 
alleges that during voir dire, defense counsel did not (1) elicit prospective jurors’ 
“actual beliefs about imposing the death penalty” or (2) inform the prospective 
jurors of Joughin’s age or that a homemade gag had been used to kill her.  Worley 
also contends that the court’s use of a hypothetical during voir dire further confused 
the potential jurors and that defense counsel should have objected to it. 
January Term, 2021 
 
31 
{¶ 95} Reversal of a conviction on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 
claim requires the defendant to show that counsel’s performance was deficient and 
that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 
2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 
(1989), paragraph two of the syllabus.  The standard under the Ohio Constitution is 
“essentially the same as the one enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in 
Strickland.”  Id. at 142.  To succeed on his claim, Worley must overcome “the 
strong presumption that counsel’s conduct f[ell] within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance.”  Strickland at 689.  The issue regarding 
counsel’s performance for any ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is whether 
counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the relevant circumstances.  Id. 
at 688. 
{¶ 96} This court has long “recognized that counsel is in the best position 
to determine whether any potential juror should be questioned and to what extent.”  
State v. Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 539, 747 N.E.2d 765 (2001); see also State v. 
Mundt, 115 Ohio St.3d 22, 2007-Ohio-4836, 873 N.E.2d 828, ¶ 65 (in some cases, 
counsel may decide that the best tactic is to ask “few or no questions of a 
prospective juror”).  In fact, “ ‘[f]ew decisions at trial are as subjective or prone to 
individual attorney strategy as juror voir dire, where decisions are often made on 
the basis of intangible factors.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 64, quoting Miller v. Francis, 269 F.3d 
609, 620 (6th Cir.2001). 
a.  Failure to elicit prospective jurors’ actual beliefs about the death penalty 
{¶ 97} Worley contends that defense counsel were ineffective during voir 
dire for failing to meaningfully examine the prospective jurors’ views on the death 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
32 
penalty.  In support, he points to the voir dire of prospective juror Nos. 40, 42, 136, 
and 179.3    
{¶ 98} During voir dire, the trial court and counsel questioned prospective 
jurors individually about their views on the death penalty.  The court made the 
following statement to prospective juror No. 40: 
 
This case is what we call a capital case.  And that means 
because of the two counts of aggravated murder with which Mr. 
Worley is charged, there is the possibility and only a possibility of 
the imposition of the death penalty. 
That’s because each one of those counts of aggravated 
murder has attached to it certain specifications, and we call those 
specifications aggravating circumstances. 
 
Do you understand that? 
 
Prospective juror No. 40 responded affirmatively, and the court continued with that 
line of explanation and questioning: 
 
It’s these aggravating circumstances, these specifications, 
which make Mr. Worley potentially, and only potentially, eligible 
for the penalty of death. 
 
Now, because of the possibility of the death penalty, it’s 
important we ask every juror questions regarding his or her views 
on the death penalty.  And it’s equally important to remember that 
Mr. Worley is presumed innocent. 
                                                          
 
3.  The portion of the transcript that Worley cites to reflects the individual voir dire of prospective 
juror No. 170, who sat as an alternate juror for Worley’s trial and was substituted onto the petit jury 
prior to trial-phase deliberations.  There was no juror No. 179 on the jury or who sat as an alternate 
juror.  
January Term, 2021 
 
33 
 
Do you understand that? 
 
Prospective juror No. 40 again responded affirmatively. 
{¶ 99} Prospective juror No. 40 indicated on her questionnaire that the 
death penalty is appropriate in all cases in which the defendant is convicted of 
aggravated murder.  In the blank lines left for explanation, she wrote: “Taking a life 
w[ith]out provocation should result in paying the penalty w[ith] their life.”  That 
being the case, the trial court explained that “the law does not necessarily—in fact, 
in many cases—does not state that to be the case.”  Prospective juror No. 40 
indicated that she understood the court’s statement and accepted it as true. 
{¶ 100} The court then asked prospective juror No. 40 whether she 
understood that “it would not be automatic that if the defendant was convicted of 
aggravated murder, that you would automatically say he needs to be sentenced to 
death.”  The trial court also posed a question based on a hypothetical situation 
involving a defendant who had been convicted of aggravated murder and whose 
counsel presented certain mitigating factors during sentencing—i.e., “[t]he IQ of 
the individual, the age of the individual, the social background of the individual.”  
When the court asked prospective juror No. 40 whether she could fairly consider 
mitigating factors in the event that Worley was convicted of aggravated murder, 
she stated that she “would be able to take those [mitigating factors] into 
consideration.” 
{¶ 101} Worley challenges defense counsel’s follow-up voir dire, claiming 
that “[d]efense counsel asked no substantive questions after [the trial court’s 
individual voir-dire] other than to repeat the [j]udge’s instruction on the burden of 
proof for the government at the penalty and mitigation phases of the trial.”  Defense 
counsel questioned prospective juror No. 40 as follows: 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
34 
Q.  If I could briefly follow up that was a great summation 
by the Judge.  Because in capital litigation, a capital murder case  
* * * [t]his is the only time in Ohio criminal law that the jury hears 
and gives a sentence.  It doesn’t happen in a drug case or DUI or 
something like that.  It’s the only time. 
And to get there, you first have to find the defendant guilty 
of aggravated murder.  And then after that and with the 
specifications, you go to the sentencing phase.  And then would you 
be able to follow the law and listen to everything and then make that 
weighing process. 
Has the State proven beyond a reasonable doubt [that] the 
aggravating circumstances outweighing [sic] the mitigating factors? 
Can you do that? 
A.  Yes. 
Q.  So you’re not going to be one to go, “Aggravated 
murder?  Death, check.” 
A.  No. 
Q.  Okay.  And, ma’am, you hold certain beliefs close to your 
heart.  I think I can see that. 
A.  Yes. 
Q.  Okay.  And if it’s 11 to 1 and you believe the State has 
not proven that, are you willing to tell everybody, “I’m standing for 
myself?” 
A.  Yes.  I can give you a back story about that if you like. 
Q.  That’s ok. 
A.  I’ve been given a very, very difficult time about having 
jury duty.  I had no idea what the case was.  And people keep telling 
me to get out of it, and I said that is our right as an American citizen.  
January Term, 2021 
 
35 
It just makes me angry that people think that they have to get out of 
it. 
Q.  There is only one greater service you can provide to this 
country, and that is military service.  And then possibly the only 
thing greater is giving your life on behalf of our nation.  And I thank 
you, ma’am.  Thank you, because you just showed me what you can 
do.  Everyone told you to leave.  Everyone told you to get out of 
this. 
 
And do you know what you said? 
A.  “No.  That’s my duty.” 
 
{¶ 102} Defense counsel’s voir dire was not deficient.  In addition to 
revealing her character trait of standing up for her decisions in the face of 
opposition from family and friends, counsel’s questioning of prospective juror No. 
40 elicited her unequivocal assurance that she would not automatically recommend 
a death sentence.  We have held that “not questioning certain members of the venire 
or asking too few questions of prospective jurors falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance.”  State v. Dixon, 101 Ohio St.3d 328, 2004-
Ohio-1585, 805 N.E.2d 1042, ¶ 45.  Moreover, the prospective jurors were subject 
to questioning from both the bench and the prosecutor.  Defense counsel has no 
duty to ask further questions during voir dire on topics that have already been 
sufficiently addressed.  Mundt, 115 Ohio St.3d 22, 2007-Ohio-4836, 873 N.E.2d 
828, at ¶ 65. 
{¶ 103} Reasonable professional assistance may also include a decision by 
defense counsel not to object to the court’s use of a hypothetical situation involving 
a capital sentencing hearing.  See State v. Jackson, 107 Ohio St.3d 300, 2006-Ohio-
1, 839 N.E.2d 362, ¶ 132; State v. Davis, 116 Ohio St.3d 404, 2008-Ohio-2, 880 
N.E.2d 31, ¶ 70.  The hypothetical question addressed a primary issue: whether a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
36 
juror would automatically sentence Worley to death if he were convicted of 
aggravated murder, regardless of any mitigation factors presented.  Even if the trial 
court’s use of a hypothetical question was error, defense counsel’s failure to object, 
without more, will not sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  See State 
v. Fears, 86 Ohio St.3d 329, 346-347, 715 N.E.2d 136 (1999); State v. Holloway, 
38 Ohio St.3d 239, 244, 527 N.E.2d 831 (1988). 
{¶ 104} Counsel’s and the court’s voir dire of prospective juror Nos. 42, 
136, and 170 was similar to the voir dire of prospective juror No. 40.  Prospective 
juror Nos. 42, 136, and 170 never indicated, either in voir dire or on their death-
penalty questionnaires, that they believed that the death penalty was appropriate in 
every case in which an individual is convicted of aggravated murder.  The court 
asked prospective juror No. 42 about an answer on his questionnaire that revealed 
the prospective juror’s belief that the death penalty is a proper punishment with 
exceptions: “Are you telling me that in each case of aggravated murder, you believe 
the individual should be sentenced to death?”  Prospective juror No. 42 
unequivocally denied that he believed this.  And when defense counsel questioned 
prospective juror No. 170, she maintained that “whatever the law prescribes that 
[she] do in [the] courthouse, [she] would follow the law.” 
{¶ 105} Defense counsel’s questioning in all three cases was brief.  But 
Worley fails to cite any authority to demonstrate that brevity in questioning 
prospective jurors is a basis on which to find deficient performance.  In addition, 
Worley cannot show that defense counsel’s voir dire prejudiced him in any way. 
b.  Failure to “lay the factual groundwork” 
{¶ 106} Worley contends that the specific facts of this case—that Joughin 
was “a young woman killed as she was entering adulthood” and that “[h]er death 
was caused by a sex toy”—should have been explored with the prospective jurors 
during voir dire and that counsel’s failure to do so was unreasonable and 
January Term, 2021 
 
37 
prejudicial.  He also asserts that defense counsel should have “objected to the 
absence of such questions.” 
{¶ 107} Here, Worley argues that defense counsel were ineffective because 
they did not request the court to allow specific questions regarding the facts of this 
case.  The law does not require defense counsel to ask particular questions of every 
prospective juror.  State v. Adams, 103 Ohio St.3d 508, 2004-Ohio-5845, 817 
N.E.2d 29, ¶ 61.  The jury-selection process is inherently subjective; it is based on 
intangible factors and the experience and intuition of trial counsel.  Mundt, 115 
Ohio St.3d 22, 2007-Ohio-4836, 873 N.E.2d 828, at ¶ 64.  Accordingly, “it is for 
[trial] counsel to determine what questions should be asked on voir dire.”  State v. 
Group, 98 Ohio St.3d 248, 2002-Ohio-7247, 781 N.E.2d 980, ¶ 139. 
{¶ 108} The trial court began the voir dire process by informing the venire 
of the charges that Worley faced, which included aggravated murder.  The 
prospective jurors knew that Joughin was the victim of the alleged crimes.  Because 
this ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is based on counsel’s failure to act, 
Worley can only speculate that informing the jurors of the specifics of the murder 
would have resulted in a different jury and that the different jury would not have 
sentenced him to death. 
{¶ 109} Worley has not shown that defense counsel were ineffective during 
voir dire.  Accordingly, we reject Worley’s fourth proposition of law. 
2.  During the state’s closing argument 
{¶ 110} In his third proposition of law, Worley argues that defense counsel 
were ineffective by failing to object to the prosecutor’s “material misstatements” 
about the evidence during the trial-phase closing arguments.  Worley contends that 
the state improperly argued that Worley’s intent to kill was proved by his insertion 
of the dog toy into Joughin’s mouth.  According to Worley, the state did not 
“present evidence that the [dog] toy caused the broken tooth, only that it could 
have.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
38 
{¶ 111} It is true that Dr. Beisser did not testify that Joughin’s front tooth 
was broken due to the insertion of the dog toy.  But Dr. Beisser did state to a 
reasonable degree of scientific certainty that Joughin’s tooth could have broken 
when the dog toy was inserted.  In his closing argument, the prosecutor addressed 
the element of purpose as follows: 
 
From the moment he took her on County Road 6, he was 
going to have to kill her if he was going to get away with it.  He 
could not let her go and avoid punishment.  But there’s more.  You 
heard Major Smithmyer talk about some of the videos that he 
watched.  There’s a movie called “Death of a Tennis Star” where the 
female character is choked on a tennis net, choked out on a tennis 
net. 
[Worley] was into that kind of pornography.  And he wanted 
to watch [Joughin] die.  He wanted to watch her die.  That’s why he 
didn’t use the ball gag that’s specifically designed for bondage 
activity.  That’s why he used a dog toy that’s tied in place. 
And you heard Dr. Beisser say it took minutes for [Joughin] 
to die, visible signs of distress, up to ten minutes.  But [Worley] 
wanted to watch that because that’s what got him excited. 
And that dog chew—right, you see the dog chew and the 
rope that was inserted into [Joughin’s] mouth, you can see how it 
was run through the dog toy and inserted into [Joughin’s] mouth to 
prepare for this type of activity, and how it was inserted with such 
force that it broke her tooth.  It requires that much force, yet he still 
ties it in place. 
So [Joughin] is killed by the insertion of that yellow dog 
chew because she still cannot breathe. 
January Term, 2021 
 
39 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Later, the prosecutor argued: 
 
 
The tying of that dog chew in place shows her death is 
purposeful.  Her death was purposely caused.  Again, same thing, 
more evidence of purpose, the videos he watched were of the female 
character being strangled to death as part of the video. 
 
 
{¶ 112} Worley cannot establish that defense counsel’s failure to object to 
the prosecutor’s trial-phase closing argument was constitutionally deficient.  The 
prosecutor’s remarks were based on a reasonable inference from Dr. Beisser’s 
testimony.  Dr. Beisser testified that the dog toy was the same size as Joughin’s 
mouth and that it had been inserted far enough to fill her entire oral cavity, and yet, 
it was also firmly tied in place.  She also testified that as Joughin asphyxiated, there 
would have been visible or audible signs of distress as Joughin struggled to breathe 
and that she ultimately died within ten minutes.  When asked, Dr. Beisser testified 
that the dog toy could have been inserted into Joughin’s mouth forcefully enough 
to have broken her front tooth.  The prosecutor’s argument represented a reasonable 
inference from Dr. Beisser’s testimony. 
{¶ 113} Worley has not shown that defense counsel performed deficiently 
by failing to object during the prosecutor’s closing argument.  Accordingly, we 
reject Worley’s third proposition of law. 
D.  Admission of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts 
{¶ 114} In his fifth proposition of law, Worley challenges the state’s 
introduction of evidence of Worley’s abduction of Robin Gardner in 1990.4  He 
claims that the evidence was inadmissible under Evid.R. 404 and 403. 
                                                          
 
4.  The jury was not told that the incident about which Gardner testified resulted in Worley’s 
conviction for abduction.  Because Worley’s conviction for abduction was relevant to the having-a-
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
40 
{¶ 115} Before trial, the state gave notice that it intended to call Gardner as 
a witness.  Worley filed a pretrial motion in limine arguing that Gardner’s testimony 
was inadmissible character evidence.  The court denied Worley’s motion. 
{¶ 116} The state called Gardner as its final witness in the trial phase, and 
defense counsel renewed their objection.  Before Gardner testified, the trial court 
instructed the jury regarding the limited purposes for which it could consider her 
testimony. 
{¶ 117} The admissibility of other-acts evidence under Evid.R. 404(B) is a 
question of law that we review de novo.  State v. Hartman, 161 Ohio St.3d 214, 
2020-Ohio-4440, 161 N.E.3d 651, ¶ 22.  But the trial court’s weighing of the 
probative value of admissible evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice to the 
defendant pursuant to Evid.R. 403(A) involves an exercise of judgment and will be 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Hartman at ¶ 30. 
1.  Evid.R. 404(B) 
{¶ 118} Evidence of other acts may not be used to prove by inference that 
the accused acted in conformity with those other acts or that he has a propensity to 
act in that way.  Evid.R. 404(B).  Other-acts evidence may be admissible for 
nonpropensity purposes—i.e., as “proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”  Id.  To justify the 
admission of other-acts evidence for a nonpropensity purpose, the evidence must 
pertain to a “ ‘material’ issue that is actually in dispute.”  Hartman at ¶ 27, quoting 
Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 686, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 
(1988).  Worley disputed that he was the perpetrator in this case, so his identity was 
squarely at issue. 
{¶ 119} The state asserts that Gardner’s testimony demonstrated Worley’s 
particular modus operandi and thus his identity as Joughin’s murderer.  It is well 
                                                          
 
weapon-under-a-disability count in the indictment, the parties stipulated that the court would 
instruct the jury that Worley had been convicted of a felony offense of violence. 
January Term, 2021 
 
41 
established that other-acts evidence may be admitted to establish modus operandi.  
State v. Lowe, 69 Ohio St.3d 527, 530, 634 N.E.2d 616 (1994).  Modus operandi 
evidence is evidence of “signature, fingerprint-like characteristics unique enough 
‘to show that the crimes were committed by the same person.’ ”  Hartman at ¶ 37, 
quoting Weissenberger, Federal Evidence, Section 404.17 (7th Ed.2019).  Slight 
differences between the current and other acts will not affect the admissibility of 
the other-acts evidence as long as it establishes “a modus operandi identifiable with 
the defendant.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Lowe at 531. 
{¶ 120} The evidence of Worley’s abduction of Gardner established a 
modus operandi tending to prove Worley’s identity as the person who kidnapped 
and killed Joughin.  In both cases, Worley assaulted a young woman (Gardner was 
26 and Joughin was 20) who was riding a bicycle in a rural area surrounded by 
cornfields.  Worley attacked each woman by hitting her on the back of the head, 
causing each of them to sustain a skull fracture.  In the course of committing both 
crimes, Worley used a distinctive kind of handcuff on his victims that could not be 
removed with any keys that had been available to law enforcement.  And Worley 
used a pickup truck in both cases with the apparent intent of using the truck to 
transport each of the victims back to his property. 
{¶ 121} The most powerful evidence of a modus operandi, however, was 
Worley’s use of a screwdriver during the abductions.  Worley argues that although 
a screwdriver was found in both cases, the screwdriver in this case was not located 
near the abduction site and that DNA testing of the handle failed to yield a result.  
But Worley is incorrect that the screwdriver in this case was not near the abduction 
site.  His screwdriver was found in the western cornfield on County Road 6 in an 
area where agents found broken cornstalks and blood stains on leaves.  And more 
importantly, at bottom, this argument is a challenge to the weight and credibility of 
the evidence, which is not relevant in deciding whether the evidence was 
admissible.  “Admissibility is not adversely affected simply because the other 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
42 
[crimes] differed in some details.  * * * The weight to be given to this evidence is 
for the jury to determine.”  State v. Jamison, 49 Ohio St.3d 182, 187, 552 N.E.2d 
180 (1990). 
{¶ 122} Worley further contends that Gardner’s testimony failed to 
“provide the jurors with information about the purposefulness of the killing of 
Joughin with the [dog] toy.”  But this argument misses the point—Gardner’s 
testimony was not introduced to provide the jury with information about the 
purposefulness of Joughin’s murder.  The facts surrounding Gardner’s abduction 
establish “a similar method of operation” to that in this case, making the other-acts 
evidence probative of identity.  State v. Bey, 85 Ohio St.3d 487, 491, 709 N.E.2d 
484 (1999). 
{¶ 123} The similarities between Worley’s abduction of Gardner and the 
evidence of his kidnapping and assault of Joughin are striking.  Indeed, the trial 
court correctly determined that Gardner’s testimony was offered for a proper 
purpose—i.e., to prove the identity of Joughin’s killer. 
2.  Evidence Rule 403(A) 
{¶ 124} Worley argues that even if Gardner’s testimony was admissible 
under Evid.R. 404(B), it was inadmissible under Evid.R. 403(A), which requires a 
trial court to exclude relevant evidence if “its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” 
{¶ 125} The exclusion of relevant evidence under Evid.R. 403(A) requires 
more than mere prejudice, because anything adverse to a party’s case could be 
deemed prejudicial to that party.  State v. Crotts, 104 Ohio St.3d 432, 2004-Ohio-
6550, 820 N.E.2d 302, ¶ 23 (Evid.R. 403(A) requires exclusion only of “evidence 
that is unfairly prejudicial” [emphasis sic]).  We have held:  
 
“Unfair prejudice is that quality of evidence which might result in 
an improper basis for a jury decision.  Consequently, if the evidence 
January Term, 2021 
 
43 
arouses the jury’s emotional sympathies, evokes a sense of horror, 
or appeals to an instinct to punish, the evidence may be unfairly 
prejudicial.  Usually, although not always, unfairly prejudicial 
evidence appeals to the jury’s emotions rather than intellect.” 
 
Oberlin v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr., 91 Ohio St.3d 169, 172, 743 N.E.2d 890 (2001), 
quoting Weissenberger, Ohio Evidence, Section 403.3, at 85-87 (2000). 
{¶ 126} Given the considerable similarity between the two incidents, the 
probative value of Gardner’s testimony was high.  Worley has not shown that the 
testimony unfairly prejudiced him or appealed to the jury’s emotions.  The evidence 
was directly probative of a material issue in dispute—namely, the assailant’s 
identity.  See Hartman, 161 Ohio St.3d 214, 2020-Ohio-4440, 161 N.E.3d 651, at 
¶ 31.  Although the state referred to Gardner’s testimony during closing argument, 
the reference was not prolonged—in an argument that covers 59 transcript pages, 
the Gardner incident occupies less than two. 
{¶ 127} We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing 
Gardner’s testimony and find no merit in Worley’s fifth proposition of law. 
E.  Sentencing opinion 
1.  Reliance on facts not in evidence 
{¶ 128} Worley argues in his ninth proposition of law that the trial court’s 
sentencing opinion inappropriately relied on facts not in evidence “to find beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factor in a capital prosecution outweighed 
the mitigating circumstances in order to sentence a defendant to death.”  In 
particular, Worley points to the trial court’s finding that “[t]he gag was placed with 
enough force to break Ms. Joughin’s tooth.”  Worley reasons that because “[t]he 
jurors did not formally state the facts they relied on to conclude that Worley acted 
purposely,” the trial court’s reliance on that particular fact was erroneous. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
44 
{¶ 129} R.C. 2929.03(F) sets forth the findings a trial court must make 
when imposing a death sentence.  The statute requires that the court state: 
 
[S]pecific findings as to the existence of any of the mitigating factors 
set forth in division (B) of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code, the 
existence of any other mitigating factors, the aggravating 
circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing, and the 
reasons why the aggravating circumstances the offender was found 
guilty of committing were sufficient to outweigh the mitigating 
factors. 
 
{¶ 130} In the sentencing opinion, the trial court recited the underlying facts 
in the case before setting out the mitigating factors and engaging in the analysis of 
why the aggravating circumstances sufficiently outweighed the mitigating factors.  
The basis of Worley’s argument is that there was no evidence to support the trial 
court’s statement that he inserted the dog toy into Joughin’s mouth with enough 
force to break her tooth.  Although the coroner did not testify that the forceful 
insertion of the dog toy did, in fact, break Joughin’s tooth, she did testify to a 
reasonable degree of scientific certainty that “that foreign body could have broken 
her tooth.”  Photographic and video evidence showed that Joughin’s front teeth 
were fully intact prior to the abduction.  The coroner’s testimony, along with the 
other evidence, was sufficient for the trial court to infer that Worley broke 
Joughin’s tooth by forcefully shoving the dog toy in her mouth.  See State v. Simko, 
71 Ohio St.3d 483, 494, 644 N.E.2d 345 (1994) (the trial court did not misstate the 
evidence in its sentencing opinion by referring to a reasonable inference based on 
the evidence presented at trial). 
{¶ 131} Accordingly, we reject Worley’s ninth proposition of law. 
 
 
January Term, 2021 
 
45 
2.  Failure to give proper weight to mitigating facts 
{¶ 132} In his tenth proposition of law, Worley argues that in the sentencing 
opinion, the trial court violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution when it gave “no or minimal weight to, or unreasonably 
discount[ed], accepted mitigation evidence.”  Worley claims that the court gave 
“little weight” to his (1) history, character, and background, (2) history of 
concussions, and (3) cannabis-use disorder.  He also argues that the trial court 
violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
and Article I, Sections 9 and 16 of the Ohio Constitution when it “avoided giving 
any weight to nine of Worley’s twelve mental illness diagnoses.” 
{¶ 133} The court considered the evidence submitted by Dr. John Fabian, a 
forensic and clinical psychologist, that Worley seemed to have genuinely cared for 
his family and, as diagnosed by Dr. Fabian, that he suffered from mental illnesses 
and personality disorders.  Accordingly, the court assigned “some weight due to the 
cumulative nature of these mitigating factors.”  Although the court failed to address 
Worley’s adaptability to prison, Dr. Fabian’s report discusses that factor.  And the 
trial court mentioned the remaining mitigating evidence that had been presented by 
Dr. Fabian. Worley’s argument rests on his assertion that the trial court 
“unreasonably discounted” his mitigating evidence. 
{¶ 134} Quoting Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 42, 130 S.Ct. 447, 175 
L.Ed.2d 398 (2009), Worley argues that the case “is instructive here” because the 
United States Supreme Court “held [in that case] that the Florida Supreme Court 
‘either did not consider or unreasonably discounted the mitigation evidence’ 
adduced in a state postconviction hearing.”  He is incorrect.  We have previously 
rejected this argument, observing that “[t]he Porter court was not directly 
reviewing a trial court’s weighing of aggravation against mitigation in the penalty 
phase; it was reviewing a state court’s analysis of an ineffective-assistance claim 
on collateral review.”  State v. Davis, 139 Ohio St.3d 122, 2014-Ohio-1615, 9 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
46 
N.E.3d 1031, ¶ 65.  Finding this procedural difference to be dispositive, we held 
that “Porter does not stand for the proposition that the Eighth Amendment forbids 
a sentence to ‘discount’ mitigating evidence introduced at the penalty phase of the 
trial.”  Id. 
{¶ 135} Moreover, the record does not support Worley’s claim that the trial 
court erred in how it assigned weight to his mitigating evidence or in weighing the 
mitigating factors.  It is true that despite the fact that Dr. Fabian’s report contained 
a section detailing Worley’s institutional adjustment, the trial court’s opinion did 
not mention Worley’s ability to adapt to prison life.  The history in Dr. Fabian’s 
report reveals that Worley generally adjusted well to prison life, in that he 
completed educational programs and while he was incarcerated for this case, he 
received only one ticket for yelling at another inmate. 
{¶ 136} But a trial court is not required to individually discuss each 
mitigating factor in its sentencing opinion.  See State v. Phillips, 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 
104, 656 N.E.2d 643 (1995).  Moreover, any error in assigning weight to any of the 
mitigating factors may be cured during our independent analysis of Worley’s death 
sentence.  See State v. Gapen, 104 Ohio St.3d 358, 2004-Ohio-6548, 819 N.E.2d 
1047, ¶ 143; State v. Montgomery, 148 Ohio St.3d 347, 2016-Ohio-5487, 71 N.E.3d 
180, ¶ 155. 
{¶ 137} Accordingly, we reject Worley’s tenth proposition of law. 
F.  Settled issues 
1.  Hurst v. Florida challenge 
{¶ 138} In his sixth proposition of law, Worley argues that Ohio’s death-
penalty statutes violate the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial as construed in 
Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016).  We overrule 
this proposition of law on the authority of State v. Mason, 153 Ohio St.3d 476, 
2018-Ohio-1462, 108 N.E.3d 56. 
 
 
January Term, 2021 
 
47 
2.  Other constitutional and international-law challenges 
{¶ 139} In his seventh proposition of law, Worley presents several 
frequently raised constitutional challenges to Ohio’s capital-punishment scheme.  
In his eighth proposition of law, he argues that Ohio’s death-penalty statutes violate 
international law “whether found in treaty or in custom.”  Because we have 
considered and rejected each of these claims previously, we summarily reject them 
now.  See, e.g., Thompson, 141 Ohio St.3d 254, 2014-Ohio-4751, 23 N.E.3d 1096, 
at ¶ 279-280; State v. Mammone, 139 Ohio St.3d 467, 2014-Ohio-1942, 13 N.E.3d 
1051, ¶ 184; State v. Kirkland, 140 Ohio St.3d 73, 2014-Ohio-1966, 15 N.E.3d 818, 
¶ 111, 113-115, 124; State v. Jackson, 141 Ohio St.3d 171, 2014-Ohio-3707, 23 
N.E.3d 1023, ¶ 239-240; State v. Ferguson, 108 Ohio St.3d 451, 2006-Ohio-1502, 
844 N.E.2d 806, ¶ 87, 88; State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 167-168, 178-179, 
473 N.E.2d 264 (1984); Davis, 116 Ohio St.3d 404, 2008-Ohio-2, 880 N.E.2d 31, 
at ¶ 211. 
3.  Proportionality 
{¶ 140} In the last section of his seventh proposition of law, Worley 
contends that our R.C. 2929.05(A) method of proportionality review is 
constitutionally infirm.  He argues that the “comparison method” of review, upheld 
in State v. Steffen, 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 509 N.E.2d 383 (1987), “prevents a fair 
proportionality review” because there is “no meaningful manner to distinguish 
capital defendants who deserve the death penalty from those who do not.”  He 
argues that R.C. 2929.021—which requires clerks of trial courts to notify this court 
of all capitally charged cases regardless of the sentencing outcome—creates 
“substantial doubts as to the adequacy of the information received after guilty pleas 
to lesser offenses or after charge reductions at trial.” 
{¶ 141} Because Ohio has determined that death should be an available 
penalty for certain crimes, it must administer that penalty in a way that rationally 
distinguishes individuals for whom death is an appropriate sanction from those for 
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48 
whom it is not.  Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 873-880, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 
L.Ed.2d 235 (1983); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 294, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 
L.Ed.2d 346 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).  In every death-penalty direct appeal, 
we are statutorily required to “consider whether the sentence is excessive or 
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases.”  R.C. 2929.05(A).  The 
statute continues by requiring us to “affirm a sentence of death only if [we are] 
persuaded from the record that the aggravating circumstances the offender was 
found guilty of committing outweigh the mitigating factors present in the case and 
that the sentence of death is the appropriate sentence in the case.”  Id. 
{¶ 142} That language means that in every capital direct appeal, before 
deciding whether a death sentence will stand, we must consider the record to 
determine whether the death sentence was correctly imposed (meaning that “the 
aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing outweigh 
the mitigating factors present in the case”) and to ensure that the death sentence is 
appropriate.  See R.C. 2929.05(A).  We have determined, with respect to the 
appropriateness inquiry, that the phrase “similar cases” as used in R.C. 2929.05(A) 
includes “those cases already decided by the reviewing court in which the death 
penalty has been imposed.”  Steffen at paragraph one of the syllabus; but see 
Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d at 209, 473 N.E.2d 264 (“R.C. 2929.05 does not require a 
comparison of sentences in non-capital murder cases for proportionality review”).5 
G.  Cumulative error 
{¶ 143} In his eleventh proposition of law, Worley argues that cumulative 
errors committed during his capital trial necessitate a reversal of his convictions 
                                                          
 
5.  The author of this opinion, speaking only for himself and not for this court, has previously 
expressed the view that our proportionality review should include factually comparable cases that 
did not result in the death penalty.  See State v. Graham, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2020-Ohio-6700, __ 
N.E.3d __, ¶ 220-229 (Donnelly, J., concurring).  The author of this opinion nevertheless agrees that 
the heinous facts of this case would not make the sentence imposed here disproportionate even if 
this court were to undertake such a review. 
January Term, 2021 
 
49 
and death sentence.  We have not identified a single error in Worley’s trial, so the 
cumulative-error doctrine does not apply.  See State v. Powell, 132 Ohio St.3d 233, 
2012-Ohio-2577, 971 N.E.2d 865, ¶ 223.  As such, we reject the eleventh 
proposition of law. 
IV.  INDEPENDENT-SENTENCE EVALUATION 
{¶ 144} We have a duty to independently review the death sentence for 
appropriateness and proportionality.  R.C. 2929.05(A).  In conducting this review, 
we must determine whether the evidence supports the jury’s finding of the 
aggravating circumstance, whether that aggravating circumstance outweighs the 
mitigating factors, and whether Worley’s death sentence is proportionate to those 
affirmed in similar cases.  Id.  We consider these issues de novo.  State v. Adams, 
144 Ohio St.3d 429, 2015-Ohio-3954, 45 N.E.3d 127, ¶ 272. 
A.  Aggravating circumstance 
{¶ 145} The only aggravating circumstance that the jury considered was 
that Worley committed aggravated murder “for the purpose of escaping detection, 
apprehension, trial, or punishment for another offense committed” by Worley—
namely, kidnapping.  See R.C. 2929.04(A)(3).  As we discussed in connection with 
proposition of law No. I, the evidence presented at trial supported the jury’s finding 
that Worley was guilty of purposely killing Joughin in order to escape detection for 
kidnapping her.  Accordingly, the evidence supports the capital specification that 
was found by the jury under R.C. 2929.04(A)(3). 
B.  Mitigating factors 
{¶ 146} We must weigh the above aggravating circumstance against any 
mitigating evidence about “the nature and circumstances of the offense” and 
Worley’s “history, character, and background.”  R.C. 2929.04(B).  In addition, we 
must consider and weigh any evidence of the mitigating factors specifically listed 
in R.C. 2929.04(B): 
 
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50 
(1)  Whether the victim of the offense induced or facilitated 
it; 
(2)  Whether it is unlikely that the offense would have been 
committed, but for the fact that the offender was under duress, 
coercion, or strong provocation; 
(3)  Whether, at the time of committing the offense, the 
offender, because of a mental disease or defect, lacked substantial 
capacity to appreciate the criminality of the offender’s conduct or to 
conform the offender’s conduct to the requirements of the law; 
(4)  The youth of the offender; 
(5)  The offender’s lack of a significant history of prior 
criminal convictions and delinquency adjudications; 
(6)  If the offender was a participant in the offense but not 
the principal offender, the degree of the offender’s participation in 
the offense and the degree of the offender’s participation in the acts 
that led to the death of the victim; 
(7)  Any other factors that are relevant to the issue of whether 
the offender should be sentenced to death. 
 
1.  Worley’s mitigation evidence 
{¶ 147} At Worley’s mitigation hearing, his counsel presented testimony 
from three lay witnesses who were friends or acquaintances of Worley (Thomas 
Mossing, Jack Roschmann, and William Gombash).  The defense also presented 
testimony from a mitigation investigator (Gary Ericson) and a forensic and clinical 
psychologist (Dr. Fabian).  Worley declined to make an unsworn statement. 
a.  Family history, childhood, and educational background 
{¶ 148} The evidence presented demonstrated that Worley’s childhood was 
difficult because his parental figures exposed him to physical abuse and alcoholism.  
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51 
Because no members of Worley’s family testified, his familial and childhood 
history was presented through the testimony of Ericson and Dr. Fabian. 
{¶ 149} Ericson interviewed Worley’s sister (Cynthia Barlow), a friend of 
Worley’s (Thomas Wilson), a former friend (Lorna Mangrum), and a former 
employer (Mr. Newlan).  He also interviewed Worley on several occasions.  
Defense counsel played for the jury a recording of Barlow’s interview in full.  The 
recording was also admitted into evidence.  Defense counsel chose not to offer 
Ericson’s written report into evidence because it contained information regarding 
other interviews that defense counsel did not want to present to the jury. 
{¶ 150} Worley’s parents (James Sr. and Florence) were married in 1941, 
and they later had three children: Cynthia, James, and Mark.  Worley was born in 
1959 in the state of Washington, approximately four years after his sister and two 
years before his brother.  The family later moved to Waukegan, Illinois, and then 
to Ohio, where the family ultimately settled in Fulton County.  According to 
Worley, he lived at the same property in Fulton County from third grade until the 
day of his arrest for Joughin’s murder.  His brother, Mark, also lived on the Fulton 
County property, but in a separate trailer near the residence. 
{¶ 151} Both Worley and his sister recalled that their father drank after 
work with his colleagues and, on returning home, James Sr. would become violent 
toward their mother.  Worley remembered one particular fight, during which his 
mother tried to pick up the telephone, but his father yanked the cord out of the wall.  
Barlow recalled the same episode, but added that she recalled her father having a 
butcher knife in his hand while he chased her mother, and that Barlow attempted to 
help her mother escape through a bedroom window. 
{¶ 152} When Worley was around five years old, his mother was granted a 
divorce based on James Sr.’s “gross neglect of duty and extreme cruelty.”  Worley 
and his siblings remained with their mother after the divorce.  The children “didn’t 
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52 
see [their father] for a long time,” but eventually began to see him “every six months 
for seven hours.”  Worley said that those visits “went on for a number of years.” 
{¶ 153} Around 1969, Worley’s mother married Graydon “Jack” Shepherd.  
According to Ericson, Worley respected his stepfather.  Ericson said that Worley 
did not make any “denigrating statements that [he could] ever recall” about 
Shepherd. Barlow told Ericson that Shepherd had been a drill sergeant in World 
War II and that he had a gruff demeanor.  According to Dr. Fabian, Worley 
previously told a presentence investigator that around the age of 16 or 17, he and 
his brother had moved in with their biological father “because of a strict upbringing 
with their step-father and mother, and [because] they were searching for some 
freedom.” 
{¶ 154} Barlow said that unlike James Sr., Shepherd did not have a 
penchant for physical violence toward their mother but, like James Sr., Shepherd 
drank heavily.  Dr. Fabian reported that Barlow told him that when she was about 
16 years old, Shepherd began trying to have sex with her.  She stated to Dr. Fabian: 
“He grabbed me and threw me down and tried to rape me.”  Barlow informed Dr. 
Fabian that on two occasions, Worley walked in on Shepherd raping her, but that 
she and Worley never discussed it. 
{¶ 155} According to Barlow, Worley never disrespected her or their 
mother.  In fact, Barlow stated that their mother spoke highly of Worley and how 
well he cared for her in her later years.  Worley informed Dr. Fabian that he had 
had a “[v]ery strong” emotional connection with his mother and that she never 
excessively disciplined him or his siblings.  According to Worley, his mother was 
“a genuinely awesome person.”  Worley described his emotional connection to 
James Sr. as “[g]ood, even though [he] had a hard time processing what [he] saw 
when [he] was little or when [he] was five years old.”  But as he aged, Worley 
began to view James Sr. as a “pretty good guy,” because in Worley’s view, “[o]ne 
bad day shouldn’t define someone.” 
January Term, 2021 
 
53 
{¶ 156} Barlow recalled that Worley struggled in school and that he may 
have been prescribed Ritalin when he was less than ten years old.  She recalled that 
when they were young, Worley was very social and liked to talk to people and play 
pranks.  According to Barlow, Worley had to repeat the third grade because he was 
inattentive during class.  Dr. Fabian reviewed Worley’s educational records and 
testified that Worley was an underachiever who had a 1.5 grade-point average upon 
graduating from high school.  Records show that Worley’s IQ early in life was 
determined to be around 97, which, according to Dr. Fabian, is “right at the 50th 
percentile.”  In his report, Dr. Fabian noted that Worley briefly attended Owens 
Community College in Toledo, but that he voluntarily withdrew in 2000 and lacked 
sufficient credits to complete a degree.  His final grade-point average at Owens 
Community College was 2.0. 
b.  Psychologist testimony 
{¶ 157} Dr. Fabian met with Worley twice, interviewed Barlow, reviewed 
a host of information regarding Worley’s life, and administered various 
psychological tests.  Dr. Fabian testified that three factors impeded his assessment: 
(1) Worley’s lack of openness about his childhood and prior offense history, 
(2) Worley’s denial of his role in and responsibility for the prior offense and the 
instant offense, and (3) Worley’s mental-health issues, including severe personality 
disorders, which likely exacerbated the first two factors. 
{¶ 158} Noting the episodes of physical and sexual violence that Worley 
reportedly had witnessed as a child, Dr. Fabian concluded that Worley “lack[ed] an 
emotional depth and insight into his relationships with his parents.”  Dr. Fabian 
stated that he had “concerns about a potentially incestuous relationship with 
[Worley and his] mother.”  Dr. Fabian acknowledged, however, that there was no 
evidence to support this conjecture. 
{¶ 159} Dr. Fabian opined that Worley “ha[d] a chronic cannabis-
dependence problem” exhibited by his “long history of cannabis use beginning 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
54 
around age 10 or 12 or 13.”  Dr. Fabian concluded that Worley “lack[ed] * * * 
insight or self-awareness or self-introspection” in terms of how his drug use 
negatively affected his life. 
{¶ 160} Because Ericson could not locate any mental-health records, Dr. 
Fabian used a presentence evaluation for purposes of reviewing Worley’s mental-
health history that had been done in connection with Worley’s 1990 abduction case.  
Those records indicated that Worley reported “some memory of trauma in his life, 
especially relating to Father to Mother, had used cannabis, some experimentation, 
not as regular, use of cocaine.”  Dr. Fabian agreed with the assessment by the 
presentence-evaluation psychologist that Worley had “a personality disorder with 
narcissistic, antisocial, and inadequate features.” 
{¶ 161} Dr. Fabian reviewed Worley’s records for a history of any head 
injuries to inform his neuropsychological assessment.  A medical record indicated 
that in 1994, Worley suffered a scalp laceration and a head contusion.  Worley told 
Dr. Fabian that in 1982, he was in a car accident and that he “went through the 
windshield.”  Worley said, however, that he did not lose consciousness, and no 
medical records were found relating to that incident.  Ultimately, Dr. Fabian stated, 
“[I]t’s likely he had a couple of concussions, you know, as an adult.” 
{¶ 162} Dr. Fabian also administered a battery of tests, including the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (“MMPI-2”) and the Millon 
Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-III (“MCMI-III”).  The MMPI-2 assesses for 
psychopathology, personality, and emotional functioning.  According to Dr. 
Fabian, Worley was shown to be “irritable, suspicious, very guarded, * * * [and] 
paranoid,” and he showed “antisocial behaviors, * * * a disconnect with people 
[and] * * * feelings of inadequacy, low self-esteem, [and] depressi[on.]”  Dr. 
Fabian also testified that Worley exaggerates his abilities and feels a sense of 
entitlement.  Worley’s performance on the MCMI-III demonstrated that he is 
“meticulous, perfectionistic, [and has] rigid moral beliefs.  * * * But underneath 
January Term, 2021 
 
55 
that veneer, there’s some dark sides to him.”  Dr. Fabian also said that Worley was 
likely experiencing mild chronic depressive disorder at the time of the offense. 
{¶ 163} Dr. Fabian reported that it was “very difficult to evaluate Mr. 
Worley due to his denial of not only his criminal offense history but also his 
psychiatric symptoms.  He also lacked the depth as to his emotional functioning 
and interconnectedness with other people.”  Dr. Fabian diagnosed Worley with 
“sexual sadism disorder; fetishistic disorder; other specified personality disorder 
with paranoid, antisocial, narcissistic and obsessive-compulsive traits; a persist[ent] 
depressive disorder; cannabis use disorder; attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 
[(“ADHD”)], combined type, [which would] would be inattention and impulsivity 
combination.”  Dr. Fabian also diagnosed Worley with a “Possible Mild 
Neurocognitive Disorder Due to Concussive History.” 
{¶ 164} Dr. Fabian testified that he viewed the applicable mitigating factors 
as “some dysfunction in childhood,” evidence of ADHD, depression, cannabis 
dependence, inadequate coping skills, isolation, and low self-esteem.  Dr. Fabian 
opined that Worley’s “emotional loneliness” fueled “a dark fantasy life that he had 
relevant to sadistic sexual acts and then in connection with a fetishistic disorder.”  
Dr. Fabian summed up his thoughts as to the applicable mitigating factors as 
follows: 
 
I’ve got a defendant here that won’t open up to me when it really 
counts, and had never really seen a therapist or opened up[,] and 
living in, I guess, this warped world taking care of his mother, who 
was the only female in his life, where he was quite detached, and I 
think looking at pornography with a friend of his, which is what 
maybe 17-year-olds do or 14-year-olds, but maybe not 55-year-olds. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
56 
{¶ 165} On cross-examination, Dr. Fabian admitted that Worley’s chronic 
depression was not so severe that it would lead to “difficulties in life function.” 
c.  Work history 
{¶ 166} Worley held numerous jobs for short periods of time throughout his 
adult life, and he had attempted to start multiple businesses, none of which were 
successful.  Dr. Fabian testified that Worley showed “motivation, but then there’s 
a lot of failure.  * * * So there are periods of unemployment and then also eventual 
caretaking of his mother full time.” 
d.  Worley’s relationships 
{¶ 167} Barlow indicated to Ericson and Dr. Fabian that Worley “liked to 
talk and goof around” and that “he had some friends outside of the family.”  The 
defense called three of Worley’s “friends” as mitigation witnesses.  Each of them 
had been interviewed by the FBI and gave those investigators different descriptions 
of Worley.  Mossing described Worley as talkative but peculiar.  Roschmann 
described Worley as “weird” and as having “a crazy side when they hung out back 
in the day.”  At trial, Roschmann further stated that Worley was “[w]ild, maybe 
aggressive.”  And Gombash described Worley as “severely unstable.” 
{¶ 168} There was ample evidence that Worley voluntarily took on the 
responsibility to care for his mother on a permanent basis.  He expressed to both 
Dr. Fabian and Ericson that he loved his mother and felt lucky that she was his 
mother. 
e.  Criminal history 
{¶ 169} Worley had previously been convicted of multiple felonies, 
including the 1990 abduction of Robin Gardner, and in 2000, he was convicted of 
illegally manufacturing drugs and possessing weapons while under a disability.  He 
served time in prison for both of the latter convictions. 
 
 
January Term, 2021 
 
57 
f.  Ability to adjust to incarceration 
{¶ 170} Dr. Fabian addressed in his report Worley’s adjustment to 
incarceration.  With respect to his 1990 abduction conviction, the Department of 
Rehabilitation and Correction’s records indicated that Worley had adjusted well to 
prison, that he completed various programs, and that he treated staff and fellow 
inmates well.  While in prison for his drug-manufacturing conviction, Worley 
worked as a “career technical school aid tutor, porter, and a student and food 
services worker.” 
{¶ 171} At the time of the mitigation hearing, Worley had been incarcerated 
at the Corrections Center of Northwest Ohio for about 15 months.  Dr. Fabian’s 
report indicates that jail records showed one infraction that resulted in him being 
placed in lock-down. 
2.  Sentence evaluation 
{¶ 172} At the close of the mitigation phase, defense counsel asked the jury 
to consider various mitigating factors, including Worley’s history, character, and 
background.  Notably, however, defense counsel did not ask the jury to consider 
Dr. Fabian’s finding that Worley had adjusted well to prison life.  Further, Worley 
does not argue that any additional statutory mitigating factors apply.  And the 
record does not provide evidence of other mitigating factors. 
{¶ 173} Nothing in the nature or the circumstances of this offense is 
mitigating.  Joughin was attacked while riding her bike in a rural area less than one 
mile from her home.  She was hit on the head, handcuffed, and taken to Worley’s 
property where he undressed her, placed her in risqué lingerie, bound her hands to 
her ankles, and suffocated her with a rubber dog toy.  He then buried her in a 
shallow grave in a cornfield. 
{¶ 174} Worley presented some evidence of his difficult childhood and 
family background.  Worley’s father was an alcoholic and had abused Worley’s 
mother in front of him.  Worley and his sister both recalled an incident when their 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
58 
drunken father chased their mother around the house and that their father yanked 
the telephone cord out of the wall when their mother tried to call the police.  
Worley’s parents divorced when he was four or five years old.  Worley’s biological 
father all but vanished immediately after the divorce, and it was several years before 
Worley even heard from James Sr. 
{¶ 175} Worley’s stepfather also drank heavily.  Barlow told Dr. Fabian 
that Shepherd started trying “to have sex with her with she was about 16,” and that 
she “experienced penetration which would meet the definition of rape.”  She also 
told Dr. Fabian that Worley, who would have been approximately 12 years old, 
walked in on her stepfather raping her “[b]oth of those times.”  The evidence of 
Worley’s childhood indicates that he was traumatized at an early age.  According 
to Dr. Fabian, this led to Worley being emotionally regressed, lacking appropriate 
interpersonal relationships, and having no impulse control. 
{¶ 176} We have not always given strong weight to a defendant’s unstable 
or troubled childhood even in cases in which such occurrences were extremely 
severe.  See, e.g., State v. Campbell, 95 Ohio St.3d 48, 51-53, 765 N.E.2d 334 
(2002) (an independent review of the evidence, which included Campbell’s family 
history indicating that he was one of six children in an unruly household in which 
both parents abused alcohol; that Campbell’s father forced the children to watch 
while he beat their mother, locked their mother outside in cold weather, and 
threatened to kill the children if they let her back in the house; and that Campbell 
was beaten, isolated, terrorized, and encouraged to commit crimes at a young age, 
still led to a decision by this court that the aggravating circumstances outweighed, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the mitigating factors that were present in the case); but 
see State v. Tenace, 109 Ohio St.3d 255, 2006-Ohio-2417, 847 N.E.2d 386, ¶ 101-
106 (an independent review of the evidence, which included testimony that the 
defendant’s parents were “abusive, neglectful, and pernicious influences on their 
children, who were schooled in crime from an early age” and other physical abuse, 
January Term, 2021 
 
59 
led to this court’s finding that the “aggravating factor [did] not outweigh the 
mitigating factors in evidence to support a sentence of death”); State v. Johnson, 
144 Ohio St.3d 518, 2015-Ohio-4903, 45 N.E.3d 208, ¶ 137-140 (this court vacated 
the defendant’s sentence of death because “the mitigation evidence militate[d] 
against imposing the death sentence”).  On the other hand, ample evidence was 
presented showing that Worley cared for his mother as she aged, cared for his 
mentally ill brother, and felt a deep sense of love for them.  Thus, his childhood and 
familial relationships are entitled to some weight. 
{¶ 177} Despite Worley’s demonstrated lack of candor in the evaluation, 
Dr. Fabian concluded that Worley likely did have a history of mental-health 
problems.  In connection with the 1990 abduction, Worley was diagnosed with a 
personality disorder with narcissistic, antisocial, and inadequate features.  Dr. 
Fabian concurred with that diagnosis and made additional diagnoses, some of 
which were severe: “The paraphiliac connection between sexual sadism and 
fetishistic disorder also is aggravated with the personality pathology of Mr. Worley, 
including evidence of antisocial, narcissistic, obsessive-compulsive, and paranoid 
personalities.”  Furthermore, Worley struggled with intimacy issues.  As reported 
by Dr. Fabian: “In my opinion, Mr. Worley was emotionally detached from society, 
lacked the ability and confidence to make good friends, had severe feelings and 
perceptions of self-inadequacy and then he would retreat into his own internal 
world due to fear of rejection.”  We have previously accorded significant weight to 
“personality disorders and other mental problems under the catch-all provision, 
R.C. 2929.04(B)(7).”  State v. Neyland, 139 Ohio St.3d 353, 2014-Ohio-1914, 12 
N.E.3d 1112, ¶ 300 (after evaluations by three psychologist experts, evidence that 
the defendant was paranoid and suffered from other personality disorders and 
“made bizarre comments that made little sense and exhibited other odd behavior 
during trial” was given significant weight).  Worley’s personality disorders were 
not strongly substantiated and we therefore give them only some weight. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
60 
{¶ 178} Worley was also diagnosed with cannabis disorder, which Dr. 
Fabian testified affected Worley’s self-reflection and insight into how his drug use 
affected his life.  Worley’s IQ of 97 falls within the average range, but he did not 
excel in school.  The evidence also demonstrated that Worley had untreated and 
likely lifelong mental-health issues, and that some family members have suffered 
from mental-health issues.  Thus, we give Worley’s mental-health disorders some 
weight under R.C. 2929.04(B)(7).  See State v. Clinton, 153 Ohio St.3d 422, 2017-
Ohio-9423, 108 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 296. 
{¶ 179} Although the issue was not explored at trial, Dr. Fabian addressed 
Worley’s adaptability to incarceration in his report.  Generally speaking, the 
evidence of his prior incarcerations and the 15 months or so that he spent in jail for 
the instant offenses show that, with very minimal infractions, he was a productive 
inmate and treated other inmates and staff with respect.  Therefore, we give his 
good behavior while incarcerated some weight. 
{¶ 180} Dr. Fabian testified that Worley denied “not only his criminal 
offense history but also his psychiatric symptoms,” thus making him difficult to 
evaluate.  Dr. Fabian gave Worley multiple mental-health diagnoses, some of which 
were severe, and found that his childhood was chaotic and difficult, but there was 
no evidence that these factors deprived Worley of the “substantial capacity to 
appreciate the criminality of his conduct.”  See R.C. 2929.04(B)(3).  Worley’s 
denial that he committed the offenses against Joughin resulted in his failing to show 
any remorse.  Moreover, this was not a crime of impulse; Worley spent significant 
time (prior to and including the day of the offense) watching pornographic videos 
showing young women being bound and strangled.  We hold that Worley’s resolve 
to murder Joughin to escape detection for kidnapping her far outweighs the 
mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
 
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61 
3.  Proportionality 
{¶ 181} When this case is compared to cases involving similar crimes, the 
imposition of the death penalty is appropriate and proportionate for the murder of 
Joughin, which Worley committed in order to escape detection, apprehension, trial, 
or punishment for kidnapping her.  R.C. 2929.05; see, e.g., State v. Lawson, 64 
Ohio St.3d 336, 353, 595 N.E.2d 902 (1992) (this court affirmed the defendant’s 
death sentence for the crimes of murder during a kidnapping and murder to escape 
detection); State v. Stumpf, 32 Ohio St.3d 95, 108, 512 N.E.2d 598 (1987) (this 
court affirmed the defendant’s death sentence for the crime of murder to escape 
detection). 
V.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 182} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Worley’s convictions and 
death sentence. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FISCHER, DEWINE, STEWART, and 
BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
Scott A. Haselman, Fulton County Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Gary W. Crim and Andrew P. Avellano, for appellant. 
_________________