Title: TANNER v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

TANNER v. STATE2002 WY 17057 P.3d 1242Case Number: 01-53Decided: 11/20/2002
October Term, A.D. 2002

 

RONALD 
ARBIE TANNER,

Appellant(Defendant) ,

 
 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee(Plaintiff) .

 
 

The Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

 
 
    

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender, and Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. Domonkos.

 
   

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Georgia L. Tibbetts, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; Theodore Lauer, Director, Prosecution Assistance 
Program; and Hugh J. Linnehan, Student Intern.  Argument by Mr. 
Linnehan.

 
   

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN,* KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 
 
        

*Chief Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 
     

LEHMAN, Justice.

 
 

[¶1]      Appellant 
Ronald A. Tanner (Tanner) seeks reversal of his conviction for one count of 
burglary arising from his entry into a Casper bar, through an unlocked door, 
during business hours.  Having 
determined that the record discloses insufficient evidence to support the 
conviction as instructed to the jury:  
we reverse the 
conviction, vacate the judgment and sentence entered by the district court, and 
remand with instruction that a judgment of acquittal be entered.

 
           
             
 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Tanner presents the 
following issues for review:
  
    

I.  Whether there was sufficient evidence to support 
Tanner's burglary conviction?

II.  Whether the prosecutor committed prosecutorial 
misconduct when she argued facts not in evidence and used inadmissible hearsay 
evidence during the closing argument?

III.  Whether the trial court erred when it denied Tanner's 
request for a jury instruction on petit larceny as a lesser-included offense of 
burglary?

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      
Tanner was convicted of one count of burglary in violation of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-3-301(a) (LexisNexis 2001) following a two-day jury trial in Natrona 
County.   The evidence adduced 
at trial indicated that on Friday, July 14, 2000, he and two female companions 
went to the Sandbar Lounge located at 100 N. Ash Street in Casper intending to 
buy some drinks.  At approximately 
10:30 p.m., Tanner, his girlfriend Char-Lee Brown, and Kathy Davis, parked in 
the parking area by the Sandbar's drive up window, but soon discovered that the 
glass doors facing First Street were locked.  However, when the trio proceeded to the 
Ash Street entrance, they found the wooden door unlocked and entered the 
lounge.  Tanner and Brown were new 
to Casper; but Davis testified at trial that, on the other occasion that she had 
been to the Sandbar Lounge, she had found the same conditions:  the glass door was locked, the wooden 
door was unlocked, the lights were dim, and the bar was open for business.  

 

[¶4]      
Upon entry, Davis and Brown went directly to the ladies restroom while 
Tanner approached the bar.  While 
the women were in the restroom, Tanner called in, "come on, there's no one here, 
let's go."1  Before leaving the Sandbar, Tanner urged 
the women to take several bottles of beer and a bottle of bourbon that had been 
placed beside the door.2  He also asked Davis what she drank, and 
then went behind the bar.  Davis and 
Brown left the establishment with the liquor and were immediately confronted by 
the Sandbar's manager, Roger Hessler.  
He and his girlfriend, Michelle Bouzis, had returned to the Sandbar 
Lounge after being alerted by another customer to the unlocked door.  

 

[¶5]      
Brown and Davis unsuccessfully attempted to flee from Hessler, who 
subsequently flagged down Officer Eulberg.  
Meanwhile, Bouzis entered the tavern through the glass doors and 
confronted Tanner behind the bar near the register.  Upon asking what he was doing there, 
Tanner replied he was "waiting for somebody to get him a drink."  When Bouzis expressed skepticism at this 
statement, Tanner responded, "I just want to leave, I don't want any 
hassles."  Instead, he and Bouzis 
went outside to join Hessler, Brown, and Davis in being questioned by Officer 
Eulberg.  Tanner was subsequently 
arrested for burglary.   

 

[¶6]      
Following Tanner's conviction for burglary, the district court entered 
its judgment and sentence on March 2, 2001, sentencing Tanner to a prison term 
of eighteen to eighty-four months.  
This timely appeal followed.    
  

DISCUSSION

 

[¶7]      
Tanner asserts three claims of error on appeal.  Finding the first to be dispositive, we 
will confine our discussion to the issue of whether there was sufficient 
evidence to support, beyond a reasonable doubt, his conviction for burglary in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-301.3  We review this claim under our usual 
standard:

 

When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim in a criminal 
case, we must determine whether a rational trier of fact could find the 
essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  Jennings v. State, 806 P.2d 1299, 
1302 (Wyo. 1991) (quoting Munson v. State, 770 P.2d 1093, 1095 (Wyo. 
1989)).  We do not consider 
conflicting evidence presented by the unsuccessful party, and afford every 
favorable inference which may be reasonably and fairly drawn from the successful 
party's evidence.  Bloomquist v. 
State, 914 P.2d 812, 824 (Wyo. 1996).  
We have consistently held that it is the jury's responsibility to resolve 
conflicts in the evidence. Id. (citing Wetherelt v. State, 864 P.2d 449, 452 (Wyo. 1993)).  "We 
will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury, . . . our only 
duty is to determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals 
would, or even could, have come to the same result as the jury actually 
did."  Id. (citing Hodges 
v. State, 904 P.2d 334, 339 (Wyo. 1995)).

 

Williams 
v. State, 986 P.2d 855, 857 (Wyo. 1999).

 

[¶8]      
In asserting his claim that the evidence adduced at trial was 
insufficient to support his conviction, Tanner directs our attention to the 
Amended Information, the jury instructions, and the general verdict form signed 
by the presiding juror.  He contends 
the information and the jury instructions failed to particularize which portions 
of the burglary statute the State was relying upon for conviction.  He cites to the line of cases, including 
Bush v. State, 908 P.2d 963, 966 (Wyo. 1995), which addresses jury 
instruction in the alternative and holds that a "verdict must be set aside in 
cases where the verdict is supportable on one ground, but not on another, and it 
is impossible to tell which ground the jury selected."  (Citations omitted.)  We agree that those cases are 
controlling on the subject and generally accept Tanner's analysis of the 
issue.    

 

[¶9]      
The Amended Information, filed July 21, 2000, charged that:

 

Ronald Arbie Tanner III, late of the County aforesaid, on or about 
the 14th day of July, 2000, in the County of Natrona, in the State of 
Wyoming, did unlawfully, and without authority, enter or remain in a building, 
occupied structure, or vehicle, or separately secured or occupied portion 
thereof, with intent to commit larceny or a felony therein, in violation of W.S. 
1977, as amended, § 6-3-301 (a) and (b) contrary to the form of the statute in 
such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of 
Wyoming.  

 

As is 
obvious, the Amended Information was couched in the language of the statute 
itself with no indication of which of the foregoing circumstances was in fact 
being charged.  Next, we review the 
jury instructions, including jury instructions numbers 4 and 6.  Number 4 reads exactly the same as the 
Amended Information.  Instruction 
number 6 provided in pertinent part that:

 

The elements of the crime of Burglary, as charged in this case, 
are:

1.  On or about the 14th day of July, 2000

2.  In Natrona County, Wyoming 
3.  The Defendant, Ronald Arbie Tanner III
4.  Without authority
5.  Entered or remained in a building or occupied structure 
or vehicle, or separately secured or occupied portion of a building, occupied 
structure or vehicle
6.  With intent to commit larceny or a felony 
therein.

 

(Emphasis added.)  
Lastly, we note that the jury returned its guilty verdict on the general 
verdict form.  

 

[¶10]   Turning to 
the law, the rule Tanner relies on has been summarized by a Wyoming commentator 
in this fashion:  

 

Whenever a jury is permitted to return a general verdict of guilty to 
a charge which contains alternatives, either one of which will suffice, it is 
possible that all the jury will not have found the same alternative.  If all members of the jury have not 
agreed to find at least one of the alternatives necessary to convict, a 
unanimous verdict has not been returned.  

 

Lauer, Barbara L., Jury Agreement and the General Verdict in 
Criminal Cases, XIX Land & Water L.Rev. 207 (1984).  Early support for this proposition can 
also be found in the case of State v. Tobin, 31 Wyo. 355, 226 P. 681, 685 
(Wyo. 1924). 

 

[¶11]   More direct 
support is found in a number of modern cases.  Beginning with Cloman v. State, 
574 P.2d 410, 412 (Wyo. 1978) (citing Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 312, 77 S. Ct. 1064, 1073, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1356 (1957)) this court has 
expressly recognized the rule set out above.  In Fife v. State, 676 P.2d 565 
(Wyo. 1984), we applied the proposition to a burglary case and reversed the 
defendant's conviction for aggravated burglary when the jury had been instructed 
in the alternative and we could not determine whether its general verdict was 
based upon the intent to steal or the intent to commit assault with a deadly 
weapon.  This 
court wrote:

   
 

If both theories of intent submitted to the jury were sufficiently 
supported by the evidence, we could uphold the general verdict on the aggravated 
burglary charge.  However, there was 
insufficient evidence as a matter of law to support the intent to assault 
element.  We cannot uphold a general 
jury verdict when one of the alternate theories upon which the jury could have 
relied is in error.  If one of the 
alternate theories submitted to the jury is unsupported by substantial evidence, 
the general verdict must be set aside unless the court can ascertain that the 
verdict was founded upon a theory supported by substantial evidence.   State v. Carothers, 84 Wash. 2d 256, 525 P.2d 731 (1974).4    

 

Fife, 
676 P.2d  at 568 (citations omitted).

 

[¶12]   Similarly, in 
Bush v. State, 908 P.2d 963 (Wyo. 1995), we reversed the defendant's 
conviction for burglary.  There, we 
reviewed the Information, the jury instruction listing the elements of the 
crime, and the general jury verdict form and stated:

 

Count I of the Information, Jury Instruction No. 10, and the general 
verdict form all fail to particularize the underlying crime that supports the 
burglary conviction.  It is 
impossible to tell whether the jury relied on the crime of felony accessory or 
the crime of larceny when it convicted Bush of burglary.  Therefore, the burglary conviction will 
stand, only if evidence in the record proves that Bush entered Schantz's 
apartment with the intent to commit both a felony and the crime of 
larceny.  Price v. State, 807 P.2d 909, 912 (Wyo. 1991).

 

Id. at 967 (emphasis in original).  With insufficient evidence to support 
the intent to commit a larceny, this court reversed Bush's burglary 
conviction.  Id. at 
968.
 

[¶13]   Just as in Bush, due to the 
general verdict, this court is left to speculate on which ground the jury found 
Tanner guilty of burglary.  Thus, 
Tanner's burglary conviction will stand only if evidence in the record 
establishes that he had the intent to commit both a felony and the 
crime of larceny.  However, the 
instructions in this case create more serious problems than the single problem 
in Bush.  This case compels 
reversal even more strongly than Bush due to the fifth element recited in 
Instruction Number 6, where the jury was instructed that the State must prove 
that Tanner:  "[e]ntered 
or remained in a building or occupied structure 
or vehicle, or separately secured or 
occupied portion of a building." (Emphasis supplied.)  Thus, as Tanner points out in his brief, 
it is also unclear whether the jury found that he entered the 
Sandbar without authority or whether he remained in the Sandbar 
without authority.  Further, it is 
unclear which sort of structure was intended in the charge.  Despite these additional problems, we 
will confine our discussion to the Bush issue, because that issue is 
dispositive.

 
      

[¶14]   The State 
attempts to avoid application of the simple rule recited above by asserting 
that, unlike Bush, it is clear in the instant case that the State 
proceeded upon only one "theory of guilt."  
It contends the prosecutor's opening and closing statements show there 
was only one State "theory" ever presented to the jury:  that of the intent to commit 
larceny.  Even assuming arguendo 
this were true, the State's reasoning is flawed because it inappropriately 
equates prosecutorial argument with the State's alternative theories of guilt as 
that term of art is used in cases on the subject such as Fife v. 
State, Yates v. United States, and Bush v. State.  As is clear from studying those opinions, 
courts determine the State's theories from its charging documents, its requested 
jury instructions, etceterafrom official record evidence, not from argument by 
counsel.  Indeed, this court has 
repeatedly held that prosecutorial argument is not evidence and consistently 
emphasized that jurors are so instructed, as was this jury.  See e.g., Christian v. State, 883 P.2d 376, 381 (Wyo. 1994); Talbott v. State, 902 P.2d 719, 722 (Wyo. 
1995).  We decline to reverse that 
view.  Instead of accepting the 
State's invitation to rely upon the prosecutor's oratory to determine precisely 
how the jury was charged with its task to find the defendant guilty or not 
guilty, we will continue to resolve this issue as we have consistently done in 
the past, i.e., by reviewing the information, the jury instructions, and the 
form of the jury's verdict.

 

[¶15]   We also 
reject the State's contention that jury instructions 4 and 6 should be reviewed 
for plain error because Tanner did not object to those instructions.  This court has not held that it is 
"error" to instruct the jury in the alternative.  Rather, we have held that if 
a jury is instructed in the alternative, and if that jury 
returns a general verdict of guilty, then upon appellate review of the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction, the record must support 
each alternative beyond a reasonable doubt.  Having reiterated how we analyze the 
sufficiency issue, we now turn to the evidence adduced at trial to resolve 
whether, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the record 
sufficiently supports beyond a reasonable doubt that Tanner had the intent to 
commit larceny and a felony therein.5   

 

[¶16]   Upon review 
of the transcripts, we find that the State called six witnesses to testify at 
trial and entered exhibits of photographs of the interior and exterior of the 
Sandbar Lounge into evidence.  The 
State's first and lengthiest witness, Michelle Bouzis, testified generally to 
her knowledge of the Sandbar Lounge, the events that transpired which led her to 
confront Tanner within the Lounge, and his subsequent conduct, demeanor, and 
remarks made to her.  Nothing in her 
testimony allows the reasonable inference that Tanner had the intent to commit 
"a felony therein."  Likewise, 
neither does the testimony of bar manager Roger Hessler or Officer Tim 
Eulberg.  Nor does the testimony of 
Tammy Sue, "Sam" Hatcher, one of the bar employees who closed early that 
evening, give rise to such an inference.  
Neither still does the testimony of Tanner's co-defendant, Kathleen 
Davis, support even the reasonable inference that Tanner possessed the intent to 
commit "a felony therein."  Lastly, 
the brief testimony of Detective Karen Watson cannot support the alternative 
element charged.  The State 
essentially concedes as much in its appellate brief when it states, "the State 
proceeded on a single theory, that Appellant committed burglary by remaining in 
a building without authority with intent to commit larceny, and presented 
sufficient evidence relating to that theory from which the jury could find 
Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. No rational jury could have 
convicted Appellant on any other ground."   Accordingly, we conclude the 
record is insufficient to support Tanner's felony conviction for burglary with 
intent to commit a felony.  

 

[¶17]   We must now 
consider the appropriate disposition of the charge.  In Longstreth v. State, 890 P.2d 551, 553 (Wyo. 1995), we wrote that "Longstreth correctly argues that jeopardy 
attached when his conviction for burglary was reversed due to the State's 
failure to prove the unlawful entry element of the crime charged.  Edwards v. State, 815 P.2d 670, 
672 (Okla.Crim.App. 1991) (quoting Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 
18, 98 S. Ct. 2141, 2150, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1978)) (jeopardy attaches when a 
conviction is overturned due to insufficiency of the evidence)."  The United States Supreme Court in 
Burks wrote:

Since we hold today that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a 
second trial once the reviewing court has found the evidence legally 
insufficient, the only "just" remedy available for that court is the direction 
of a judgment of acquittal.  To the 
extent that our prior decisions suggest that by moving for a new trial, a 
defendant waives his right to a judgment of acquittal on the basis of 
evidentiary insufficiency, those cases are overruled.  

 

437 U.S.  at 
18, 98 S. Ct.  at 2150-51.  Based on 
this precedent, this court will direct the district court to enter a judgment of 
acquittal on the burglary charge against Tanner.

 

[¶18]   The court cannot leave this case 
without some comments and some (we hope) helpful guidance.  It is with a great deal of frustration 
that we reverse Tanner's conviction.  
Simply put, this error should almost never arise in Wyoming courts.  Avoiding the problem begins with a more 
carefully drafted charging document.  
In this case, it is clear Tanner did not enter a vehicle.  Yet, that portion of the burglary 
statute was included in the information (and later, the jury instruction).  Just as importantly, carefully crafted 
instructions to the jury are required.  
This court's precedent and the Wyoming Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions 
advise practitioners on how to instruct in the alternative.  In his article, Burglary in Wyoming, 
XXXII Land & Water L.Rev. 721, 
780-82 (1997), referencing the pattern instructions, Professor Theodore E. Lauer 
explains:

 
           
      

The appropriate terms within the brackets, which are charged in the 
information and supported by the evidence, should be included in the 
instruction.  Other terms which are 
not charged, or are not supported by the evidence should not be included in the 
instruction

. . .

It is very important that only those alternative bracketed terms in 
the foregoing instruction which are supported by the evidence in the case be 
included in the instruction given to the jury.  In too many instances, the elements 
instruction given to the jury simply restates the content of the information, 
setting forth, for example, that the defendant "entered or remained in a 
building, occupied structure or vehicle or separately secured or occupied 
portion thereof," and "with intent to commit larceny or a felony therein."  Such instructions are inadequate, and 
should lead to reversal of convictions.  
The instruction must conform to the crime as charged in the information, 
and must also conform to the evidence which has been introduced.  

. . .

Thus under Fife, an elements instruction in the general 
language of the burglary statute, stating "with intent to commit larceny or a 
felony therein" when there was no evidence to support a finding of intent to 
commit larceny, would be reversible error.  
Likewise, if the State is relying upon intent to commit some felony 
therein, that felony must be specifically stated.  Thus if intent to commit sexual assault 
is relied upon, the instruction must say so.  It is not proper to give the jury a 
roaming commission to pick out which undefined and unspecified felony it might 
think the evidence supports.  

 

CONCLUSION
 

[¶19]   Based on the foregoing, we 
reverse Tanner's conviction and vacate the Judgment and Sentence entered by the 
district court.  We 
remand this matter to the district court for entry of a judgment of acquittal on 
the burglary charge against Tanner.
   
              
   

FOOTNOTES

1Testimony 
introduced at trial disclosed that the Sandbar's employees had closed the bar 
early without authorization and left, inadvertently leaving the wooden door 
unlocked in the process.

2The 
missing liquor was later valued at about $16. 

3                       
§ 6-3-301. Burglary; aggravated burglary; 
penalties.

            
(a) A person is guilty of burglary if, without authority, he enters or 
remains in a building, occupied structure or vehicle, or separately secured or 
occupied portion thereof, with intent to commit larceny or a felony 
therein.

            
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, burglary is a 
felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of 
not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both.

4As 
the Washington Supreme Court later recognized in a subsequent alternative 
instruction case, State v. Green, 616 P.2d 628 (Wash. 1980), the 
substantial evidence test can no longer be applied to sufficiency of the 
evidence analysis following the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Jackson v. 
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979).  "Accordingly, the appropriate test for 
determining the sufficiency of the evidence of kidnapping is not that 
applied in Green I, i.e., whether, after viewing the evidence most 
favorable to the State, there is substantial evidence to support kidnapping. The 
issue, as framed in Jackson v. Virginia, supra, is whether, after viewing 
the evidence most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of kidnapping beyond a reasonable 
doubt."  State v. Green, 616 P.2d  at 632 (emphasis in original).

5Appellant 
argues that Tanner did not "without authority" enter or remain within the 
Sandbar Lounge because it was a place of business open during business 
hours.  He relies upon cases from 
several jurisdictions which do not allow such an inference.  As the South Dakota Supreme Court said 
in Matter of TJE, 426 N.W.2d 23, 24 (S.D. 1988):  "To interpret the word "remains" in [the 
statute] to hold a person commits second degree burglary whenever he is present 
in an occupied structure with the intent to commit a crime therein would make 
every shoplifter a burglar.  It 
would make the commission of any crime indoors, no matter how severe, subject to 
a felony burglary charge." (Citation omitted.)  We agree this argument has some merit 
especially following examination of Longstreth v. State, 832 P.2d 560, 
564 (Wyo. 1992), where this court wrote:

In 
order to review appellant's sufficiency of evidence claim, we first examine what 
the phrase without authority' means in Wyoming's burglary statute.  No Wyoming cases have directly addressed 
this element of the burglary statute.

In 
discussing burglary statutes in their treatise on criminal law, LaFave and Scott 
note,

[t]he 
most common statutory term is "unlawfully," but some jurisdictions use other 
language, such as "unauthorized," by "trespass," "without authority," "without 
consent," or "without privilege."

Though 
these statutory formulae are not in all respects identical, they generally 
require that the entry be unprivileged.  
A more precise way of describing this situation is by excluding those 
entries of premises when they are open to the public or by a person licensed 
or privileged to enter.

2 
W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 8.13 at pp. 466-67 (1986) 
(emphasis added and footnotes omitted).  

Nevertheless, 
we decline to address these contentions on their merits because our holding on 
other grounds is dispositive.