Title: Jones v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MICHAEL JONES, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 61, 2019 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below–Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  Cr. ID No. 9911016309 (N) 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: March 20, 2019 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
May 13, 2019 
 
Before VAUGHN, SEITZ, and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
ORDER 
 
 
After careful consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the State’s motion 
to affirm, and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Michael Jones, appeals the Superior Court’s summary 
dismissal of his third motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal 
Rule 61 (“Rule 61”).  We affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. 
(2) 
Following a jury trial in January of 2005, Jones was found guilty of 
three counts of first degree murder, one count of first degree robbery, one count of 
second degree arson, and related weapons and conspiracy charges.  The Superior 
Court sentenced Jones to life imprisonment for each of the murder convictions.  This 
 
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Court affirmed Jones’ convictions and sentence.1  Thereafter, Jones filed a motion 
for postconviction relief under Rule 61.  The Superior Court denied the motion2 and 
this Court affirmed on the basis of and for the reasons set forth in the Superior 
Court’s decision.3  Jones next filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United 
States District Court for the District of Delaware.  The District Court denied Jones’ 
petition4 and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the 
denial.5  Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. 
Alabama,6 Jones moved to be re-sentenced and requested the appointment of 
counsel.  The Superior Court appointed counsel (“Appointed Counsel”) and held a 
sentencing hearing on June 30, 2014.  The Superior Court re-sentenced Jones to three 
life sentences for his first degree murder convictions.  Through Appointed Counsel, 
Jones filed a second motion for postconviction relief.  After briefing and oral 
argument, the Superior Court denied Jones’ second motion for postconviction relief 
as procedurally barred.7  Jones appealed the Superior Court’s ruling and this Court 
affirmed on the basis of and for the reasons stated in the Superior Court’s decision.8 
                                                 
1 Jones v. State, 940 A.2d 1 (Del. 2007). 
2 State v. Jones, 2008 WL 4173816 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 2008).  
3 Jones v. State, 2009 WL 595574 (Del. Mar. 9, 2009). 
4 Jones v. Phelps, 2012 WL 4600639 (D. Del. Sept. 28, 2012). 
5 Jones v. Phelps, 599 F. App’x 433 (3rd Cir. 2015). 
6 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
7 State v. Jones, 2016 WL 7338591 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 16, 2016). 
8 Jones v. State, 2017 WL 4535974 (Del. Oct. 10, 2017). 
 
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(3) 
Proceeding pro se, Jones filed a third motion for postconviction relief 
on July 19, 2018, a fourth motion for postconviction relief on September 17, 2018, 
and a motion for appointment of counsel on October 1, 2018.  The Superior Court 
summarily dismissed the motions9 for postconviction relief and denied Jones’ 
motion for appointment of counsel.10 
(4) 
On appeal, Jones argues the Superior Court erred when it concluded his 
third motion for postconviction relief was untimely filed.  Jones contends that, 
because his motion alleged ineffective assistance of counsel on the part of Appointed 
Counsel in the re-sentencing proceedings and in the proceedings on Jones’ second 
motion for postconviction relief, it was timely filed within one year of this Court’s 
denial of his second motion for postconviction relief.  Jones is mistaken.  We have 
held that fairness dictates that a defendant may bring a claim of ineffective assistance 
of postconviction counsel within one year of the defendant’s appeal to this Court 
from the Superior Court’s denial of his first motion for postconviction relief.11  Jones 
is not entitled to bring a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel against 
postconviction counsel in subsequent postconviction proceedings.  The Court 
concludes the Superior Court did not err in its determination that Jones’ third motion 
for postconviction relief was procedurally barred and that Jones had failed to 
                                                 
9 Jones tells this Court that the “third” and “fourth” motions were copies of the same motion.  
10 State v. Jones, 2019 WL 626241 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 13, 2019). 
11 Guy v. State, 82 A.3d 710, 715 (Del. 2013). 
 
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overcome the procedural hurdles by pleading with particularity either that: (i) new 
evidence exists creating a strong inference that he is actually innocent; or (ii) a new, 
retroactively applicable rule of constitutional law renders his conviction invalid.  
Because Jones’ motion was properly summarily dismissed under Rule 61, the 
Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to appoint counsel to 
represent him in these proceedings.12 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
12 Super. Ct. Cr. R. 61(e)(5).