Title: People v. Lucas

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 89458-Agenda 5-September 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
 								ROOSEVELT LUCAS, Appellant.
	A jury found defendant, Roosevelt Lucas, guilty of first
degree murder. The same jury found defendant eligible for death
on the ground that the victim was a correctional officer and
concluded that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to
preclude imposition of the death penalty. The trial court sentenced
defendant to death, and this court affirmed defendant's conviction
and sentence on direct appeal. See People v. Lucas, 151 Ill. 2d 461
(1992). Pursuant to the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act,
defendant petitioned the circuit court for post-conviction relief.
725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 1996). Following a hearing on the
State's motion to dismiss, the circuit court dismissed defendant's
petition without an evidentiary hearing. Defendant appeals directly
to this court (134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a)), and we now affirm the
judgment of the circuit court.

BACKGROUND
	On September 3, 1987, Robert Taylor, a superintendent at the
Pontiac Correctional Center, was attacked while he worked in his
office and died as a result of multiple stab wounds to his heart and
multiple lacerations to his scalp caused by a blunt instrument. In
our opinion on direct appeal we detailed the evidence presented
against defendant at trial. Lucas, 151 Ill. 2d  at 468-76. In the
instant appeal, we will only discuss the facts necessary to address
the claims raised by defendant in his post-conviction petition.
	At trial, the State presented several witnesses to prove that
defendant and another inmate killed Taylor. Two inmates gave
eyewitness testimony at trial. Inmate Lawrence Spillar testified
that he was in Taylor's office discussing his assignment to a
painting detail when the attack began. Spillar testified that while
he spoke with Taylor, inmate Ike Easley ran into Taylor's office,
jumped onto Taylor's desk and began to hit and stab Taylor in the
chest with a knife. Spillar attempted to flee the office, but was
prevented from leaving when he collided with defendant at the
door. Defendant and Spillar briefly struggled at the door until
defendant pushed Spillar aside; Spillar then observed defendant
rush towards Taylor and beat Taylor several times in the head with
a pipe. Spillar stood at the door of Taylor's office and watched as
defendant and Easley discarded their weapons and ran. Inmate
Demetre Brown testified that on the morning of the murder he saw
Easley and defendant approach Taylor's office prior to the attack;
both wore hats and gloves. Brown testified that he watched Easley
and defendant rush into Taylor's office, and saw Easley stab
Taylor repeatedly in the torso while defendant struck him
repeatedly in the head with a metal pipe. After the attack, Brown
also observed Easley and defendant run from the office, discarding
their weapons as they ran. Defendant cross-examined each
eyewitness regarding their prior convictions and gang affiliations.
Spillar was the leader of the Stones, while Brown was a Vice
Lord, an ally gang of the Stones. Defendant belonged to the
Stones' and Vice Lords' rival gang, the Black Gangster Disciples
(BGD), and conceded his membership in the gang at trial.
	Another State witness, Officer Don Lyons, testified that
immediately after the attack all inmates were secured in their cells.
During his patrol of the cell-block one-half hour after the attack,
he observed defendant inside his cell, naked waist-up, washing his
arms, torso and hands. Lyons testified that this behavior was
unusual because defendant's cell-block had been given the
opportunity to shower earlier that morning. Further, Lyons
testified that unlike other inmates who stood at the front of their
cells shouting to one another to learn about the attack, defendant
asked no questions and seemed disinterested.
	The State argued that Taylor's murder was a retaliation killing
by gang members of the BGD for the death of a fellow gang
member, Billy "Zodiac" Jones, three months earlier at Pontiac.
The State presented witnesses to show that defendant's affiliation
and leadership position within the BGD led to his participation in
the killing. Further, the State offered witnesses to support its
theory that the killing was retaliatory. Deputy Director Donald
Long testified that his investigation confirmed that "the motive, as
shown through the investigation, was that the murder of [Taylor]
was a direct result of the death of inmate [Jones]." Inmate Harry
Martin, a former BGD member, testified about the motive for the
killing and discussed defendant's participation in the killing.
Martin first outlined the structure of the BGD and its activities,
including extortion, gambling, prostitution, tax fraud, armed
robbery and credit card fraud. Martin testified that he had gained
information concerning the BGD's structure and activities because
he was previously a board member and financial advisor to Larry
Hoover, the BGD's chairman of the board. He explained, however,
that in 1987 he began to cooperate with the Department of
Corrections (DOC) because he learned that BGD gang members
were planning to assassinate him:
			"I was Larry's financial adviser from 1984 until 1987.
During that time we established policies for the
institutions, throughout the state and all the states. One of
the policies was no heroin inside of the institutions. No
guns, no violence, etcetera, things that would stunt the
financial growth of the organization. After Larry Hoover
left in February or March [1987], the majority of the
board were disgruntled by the policies that were
established when he was there saw me as the stepping
stone between what they wanted to do and what was
going on at the time, so they put together a conspiracy to
assinate [sic] me.
* * *
			[The warden told me of the conspiracy to assassinate
me.] When he told me this I didn't believe it. I'd been a
member of the B.O.S [BGD] all my life. I'd given my life
to the organization. I was a Board member. I was-it made
me mad, so I wouldn't believe him. *** I went back and
talked to a couple of board members who were my allies
at the time, and they confirmed the conspiracy.
 * * *
			I had a dilemma. I was in between assasinating [sic]
seven members of the board or throwing away thirteen
years of my life. So rather than become what they were, I
threw away thirteen years and left the institution."
	Martin testified that only after he learned of the assassination
plans against him did he begin to cooperate with the DOC. Martin
further testified that he was introduced to Pontiac BGD members
when he was transferred to that facility in 1987. He first met gang
members in the cafeteria, including the BGD's facility "co-chairman," Corwyn "Ketchup" Brown. Martin testified that during
this meeting with Ketchup defendant was present, and based upon
defendant's conduct he believed defendant was a member of the
BGD's security group called the United Front Organization
(UFO). Specifically, he stated that he observed defendant
"trailing" Ketchup and other board members, and observed
defendant take orders from Ketchup. UFO members were
protectors and responsible for security, making certain that
members had weapons or body guards. Additionally, UFO
members carried out attacks or murders against other inmates or
prison staff. Martin testified that during this same meeting in the
cafeteria, Ketchup conveyed the BGD's outrage and hostility
towards the administration for Jones' death. Specifically, while the
defendant was present, Martin was told by Ketchup that the BGD
wanted to "retaliate against the administration." On cross-examination, Martin admitted that his statement that defendant
was a member of the UFO was an assumption based on his
knowledge and experience of the gang structure and defendant's
conduct which fit the stereotypical characteristics of a UFO
member. Defense counsel further cross-examined Martin
regarding his motive to testify and asked specifically whether
Martin received anything in exchange for his cooperation. Martin
testified that he did not receive immunity for his testimony and
was not offered anything in exchange for his testimony by either
the prosecution or the DOC. Martin responded that the only thing
he "received" for his testimony was "solitary confinement, a dead
son, and my wife in exile."
	Two inmates, Darryl Knighten and Louis Roberson, testified
for the defense. Knighten testified that he observed Taylor's body
lying on the ground in front of his office. He then saw an inmate
called "Iron Man" enter Taylor's office and stand by Taylor's
body. Knighten testified that he watched Iron Man reach for an
object and eventually return to his cell. Next, Roberson testified
that on his way to get a cup of coffee he passed defendant's cell,
where he saw defendant sitting. After he returned to his own cell,
Roberson testified, he heard noises and stepped outside the cell to
see what was causing the commotion. According to his testimony,
he saw Taylor lying on the ground outside his office and, at the
same time, saw defendant standing at the front of his own cell.
However, on cross-examination Roberson admitted that he only
saw defendant standing at the front of his cell after he heard the
noise, and that he did not know if the noise he heard was the attack
upon Taylor or instead the guards rushing to Taylor's office after
the attack.
	The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and at
a subsequent sentencing hearing found defendant eligible for the
death sentence. After hearing evidence in aggravation and
mitigation, the jury concluded there were no mitigating factors
sufficient to preclude the death penalty and the trial court imposed
the death penalty. On direct appeal, this court affirmed defendant's
conviction and sentence (Lucas, 151 Ill. 2d at 497-98). We now
consider the circuit court's dismissal of defendant's post-conviction petition without an evidentiary hearing.

ANALYSIS
	The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) provides a
procedural mechanism by which criminal defendants can assert
that "in the proceedings which resulted in his or her conviction
there was a substantial denial of his rights under the Constitution
of the United States or of the State of Illinois or both." 725 ILCS
5/122-1(a) (West 1996). The purpose of the post-conviction
proceeding is to permit inquiry into constitutional issues involved
in the original conviction and sentence that were not, nor could
have been, adjudicated previously on direct appeal. People v.
Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500, 528 (1999). Therefore, a post-conviction
petition is a collateral proceeding and does not relitigate a
defendant's innocence or guilt. People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 89
(1999). Any issues considered by the court on direct appeal are
barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and issues which could have
been raised on direct appeal are deemed waived. People v. West,
187 Ill. 2d 418, 425 (1999).
	A defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his
claims as a matter of right. Rather, a defendant is only entitled to
an evidentiary hearing where the allegations contained in the
petition, supported by the trial record and any accompanying
affidavits, make a substantial showing of a constitutional
violation. People v. Orange, 195 Ill. 2d 437, 448 (2001). A trial
court must examine the legal sufficiency of the defendant's
allegations taking all well-pleaded facts as true. People v. Towns,
182 Ill. 2d 491, 503 (1998). A trial court's ruling on the
sufficiency of defendant's allegations is a legal determination and,
therefore, we review de novo a trial court's decision to dismiss the
petition without an evidentiary hearing. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 388 (1998). Defendant raises three claims for our
review.


I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel-Mitigation


	Defendant first alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective
because he failed to investigate and call numerous witnesses in
mitigation. An appellate issue is moot when it is abstract or
presents no controversy. People v. Blaylock, 202 Ill. 2d 319
(2002). An issue can become moot if circumstances change during
the pendency of an appeal that prevent the reviewing court from
being able to render effectual relief. People v. Jackson, 199 Ill. 2d 286, 294 (2002). We observe that subsequent to the filing of his
appeal, the Governor commuted his death sentence to natural life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole or mandatory
supervised release. Commutation removes the judicially imposed
sentence and replaces it with a lesser, executively imposed
sentence. People ex rel. Johnson v. Murphy, 257 Ill. 564, 566
(1913); Black's Law Dictionary 274 (7th ed. 1999). Thus, the
commutation has rendered this issue moot. See, e.g., Lewis v.
Commonwealth, 218 Va. 31, 38, 235 S.E.2d 320, 325 (1977); State
v. Mitchell, 239 Or. 87, 88, 396 P.2d 572, 573 (1964). We,
therefore, address only the viable, nonsentencing issues.

II. State Witness Harry Martin-Brady Violation
	Defendant claims that his constitutional right to due process
of law was violated at his trial when the State allowed its witness,
Martin, to proffer perjured testimony. In his petition, defendant
requests we grant him an evidentiary hearing on this claim. At
trial, Martin testified that he had no cooperation agreement with
the State in exchange for his testimony. Defendant contradicts this
assertion with Martin's affidavit, dated September 5, 1997. In the
affidavit, originally filed in the case against defendant's
codefendant, Martin explains that he was compensated by the
State for his cooperation in Taylor's murder investigation:
		"A day or two after I arrived at Pontiac, my wife visited
me and told me that the word 'in the street' was that the
BGDs were planning to assassinate me in prison. After
visiting me, my wife went to Warden James Chrans'
office and told him the same thing. Chrans called me into
his office that evening and said that he was not going to
have me killed on his watch. He then transferred me to
Logan Correctional Center. All of this happened within
three days of my being sent to Pontiac.
			*** Within a day or two after the murder of Robert
Taylor on September 3, 1987, Russ Nelson [an
investigator for the DOC] telephoned me at Logan. I took
the call in an office there. Nelson asked me to help in their
investigation of the murder. I refused.
			*** The very next morning Warden Chrans telephoned
me-I was again brought to an office to take the call-and
reminded me that he had saved my life by sending me to
Logan and I owed him a favor. I said I would listen to
what the State had to say.
			*** The next day, Gerald Long, a Deputy Director of
DOC, and Jerry Donovan, a DOC investigator, came to
Logan to see me. They said they needed my help ***.
			*** At that same meeting, which took place at an office
at Logan within a week of Taylor's murder, we ironed out
a deal, whereby Long and Donovan promised me the
following benefits in return for my cooperation:
				a. they would immediately move my wife and three
children downstate so that they could be near me.
				b. I would be allowed to make 'home visits' or
furloughs, beginning immediately. Home visits
consisted of leaving Logan once or twice a week to visit
my wife and children. During these day and night visits,
I was free to do whatever I wanted to do and go
wherever I wanted to go.
				c. I would get paid generously. They stressed that
there was lots of different ways of paying me, including
cash, commissary goods, witness funds, federal money
and 'O.A.F.' funds (they did not say what that stood
for).
				d. All of the state officials with whom I cooperated,
including Long, Donovan, McKinney, and Livingston
County State's Attorney's lawyers Bernardi, Brown,
and Wasson, would vouch for me in court or through
clemency petitions to get me released from
incarceration once the investigation and trials were
completed. (At the time of this meeting, I had served
about six years of two sentences totaling 45 years-10
from a Cook County conviction and 35 from a Du Page
County conviction).
				e. Long and Donovan said that the DOC Director
would bring a clemency petition to the Governor to sign
to make sure I was released, if the courts did not
commute my sentences. (In fact, in October of 1990,
Deputy Director Klemm took a clemency petition to the
Governor, but I was out by the time the petition was
decided.)
			*** This 'deal' was set out on that first day I met with
Long and Donovan at Logan. In subsequent meetings,
details were ironed out, such as where the money would
come from. (For example, Long gave me a DOC phone
card number issued to Stu Erickson, by DOC, in
September, 1987.) But the basic outline as set forth above
was laid out before [September 17, 1987] ***."
Additionally, defendant attaches the following exhibits to his post-conviction petition: a transcript of hearings held before the
Honorable James F. Holderman of the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, wherein Martin testified that
his 1981 Du Page County sentences were reduced from 35 to 21
years because of his cooperation with the State; an October 1,
1991, order signed by a Du Page County circuit court judge
reducing Martin's time from 35 to 21 years, time considered
served; a transcript of hearings held in the Cook County circuit
court on February 17, 1994, wherein Martin testified about his
cooperation with the State in order to reduce a 10-year sentence
that was to run consecutively with the 35-year Du Page County
sentence; and statements made by Martin's attorney at the
February 17, 1994, hearing providing that Martin's cooperation
agreement began with the State in 1987 and that "there was an
agreement made if in fact [Martin] continued to cooperate with the
Prosecuting authorities, we would be able to come before the
sentencing Judge and there would be minimal or no opposition to
relief requested. In fact, that was accomplished in Du Page
County." Thus, defendant claims that his right to due process of
law was violated because this information was not tendered to him
before his trial, nor did the State correct Martin's testimony at trial
that he had no cooperation agreement.
	The State moved to dismiss defendant's petition, and,
therefore, we must take as true defendant's allegations that Martin
testified falsely about his cooperation agreement, and that the State
knew that the testimony was perjured. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 390-91 ("By seeking to dismiss the post-conviction petition, the State
assumed the truth of the factually supported allegations contained
in that petition, at least for purposes of the motion. Therefore, the
State, as the movant, has eliminated all factual issues from the
inquiry"). A conviction obtained through the use of false testimony
implicates due process concerns and is subject to reversal. Giglio
v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54, 31 L. Ed. 2d 104, 108, 92 S. Ct. 763, 766 (1972); Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 391. We have held
that where the State's case includes perjured testimony, and the
State knew, a " 'strict standard of materiality' " applies, and a
court of review must overturn the conviction "if there is any
reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected
the judgment of the jury." Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 392, citing
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342, 349-50, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 2397 (1976). "This standard is equivalent to
the harmless error standard ***." Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d  at 349, citing
People v. McNeal, 175 Ill. 2d 335, 354-55 (1997). The strict
standard of materiality applies even if the State did not solicit the
false testimony, but rather left it to go uncorrected. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d  at 345.
	Defendant argues that our decisions in Olinger and Steidl
warrant an evidentiary hearing on his claim that, with the State's
knowledge, he was convicted on the basis of false testimony. In
Olinger, the defendant was convicted for the murder of three
individuals. At trial, a State witness testified that he had been
given immunity against prosecution for a burglary in exchange for
his testimony against the defendant. In his post-conviction
petition, the defendant attached evidence to show that the witness
falsely testified about other promises made to him in return for his
testimony, including a multijurisdictional deal and the dismissal
of several other pending charges. We held that the defendant was
entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d 
at 350-51.
	In Steidl, the defendant was convicted for the murder of two
individuals and subsequently sentenced to death. The State's case
included an eyewitness to the murders, who testified at trial that in
return for her testimony she pled guilty to concealment of a
homicidal death in exchange for a five-year sentence. However,
she testified that she did not know of or expect a reward in return
for her favorable testimony. Attached to the defendant's post-conviction petition was evidence that the witness failed to disclose
that she was to be paid $2,500 in relocation money after the trial.
We reversed the dismissal of the defendant's claim and held that
the State's knowing use of perjured testimony violated the
defendant's right to due process of law. Steidl, 177 Ill. 2d  at 261-62.
	Defendant argues that, similar to Olinger and Steidl, the
State's knowing use of perjured testimony prevented the jury from
assessing the witness' credibility or motive to testify falsely, such
that he was prejudiced. We disagree that Olinger and Steidl
control our decision in the instant matter. In Olinger, we
repeatedly observed that the State witness who testified falsely
"was critical to the State's case" and offered "[t]he most
significant evidence" to connect the defendant to the three
murders. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d  at 338, 350. Specifically, we stated
that the witness' credibility was crucial to the State's case because
his testimony was the only evidence to connect the murder weapon
to the defendant and the only evidence to supply motive. Olinger,
176 Ill. 2d  at 350. For this reason, the defendant was prejudiced.
Furthermore, in Steidl the witness who falsely testified about her
cooperation agreement was the State's only direct identification
witness. Steidl, 177 Ill. 2d  at 245-47. In fact, the witness
participated in the crime and testified about the intimate details of
the murder, including defendant's participation during the killing.
Steidl, 177 Ill. 2d  at 247. Conversely, in the instant case Martin did
not offer direct identification evidence against defendant and did
not connect defendant to the murder weapon. Rather, Martin
testified in support of the State's motive theory and notably did not
provide the only evidence of motive. Therefore, in this case, we
cannot equate the prejudice caused by the failure to disclose an
agreement with a nonoccurrence witness with the prejudice caused
by the State's failure to disclose evidence of a cooperation
agreement with a direct identification witness. That is, Martin's
testimony, although helpful, was not crucial to the State's case.
	Certainly, we do not condone the State's use of perjured
testimony, and in those cases where it is proven we condemn it.(1)
The State had an obligation to correct the falsity (Olinger, 176 Ill.
2d at 347); however, whether defendant is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing on his claim is a separate issue that requires us
to consider whether defendant has made a substantial showing of
a due process violation. That is, defendant is only entitled to an
evidentiary hearing if there is a substantial showing of a
reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected
the judgment of the jury. In this case, because the record contains
overwhelming evidence of guilt, in the form of two eyewitnesses
who offered identification testimony, we find that defendant does
not make the requisite substantial showing.
	Turning to the evidence, the State's case primarily rested upon
Spiller's and Brown's direct identification testimony. This direct
identification testimony was bolstered by Officer Lyon's
description of defendant's conduct following the killing and
Deputy Director Long's investigative findings, including his
finding that the killing was motivated by retaliation. Deputy
Director Long testified that: "The motive, as it was shown through
the investigation, was that the murder of Superintendent Taylor
was a direct result of the death of inmate Billy Jones."
	We also consider Martin's testimony in this case. Martin, a
motive witness, established that defendant was a member of the
BGD; that defendant was a member of the UFO security faction;
and that defendant was a party to a conversation concerning the
BGD's intent to retaliate against the administration for Jones'
death. This testimony was partially corroborated by defendant,
who admitted he was a member of the BGD, and Deputy Director
Long, who, as noted, testified that the killing was retaliatory.
Furthermore, Martin's statement that defendant was a UFO
member, although never corroborated, was weakened by a
successful cross-examination during which Martin admitted that
he only assumed defendant was a member of the UFO. Thus, the
only uncorroborated aspects of Martin's testimony were his
general descriptions of the gang structure and his placing
defendant within the UFO security faction and at a conversation
concerning the BGD's intent to retaliate.
	Importantly, the issue of whether Martin's uncorroborated
testimony was so crucial to the State's case that defendant was
prejudiced by Martin's false testimony is answered by our decision
on direct appeal. On direct appeal, we first discussed the evidence
under a harmless error analysis. Lucas, 151 Ill. 2d  at 478.
Specifically, we examined the admission of a correctional officer's
testimony that after Jones' death BGD members, other than the
defendant, frequently threatened him with physical harm. Like
Martin's testimony, the State presented the correctional officer's
testimony to show evidence of motive. Again, our review of
defendant's claim in the instant appeal is equivalent to the
harmless error standard we applied on direct review. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d  at 349. Therefore, our comments on direct appeal
concerning the overall evidence of guilt are instructive in this
matter:
		"[T]he admission [of Officer's Jarrett's testimony that he
was threatened] did not affect the outcome of the trial, and
we hold that the erroneous admission of the evidence was
harmless. *** [The improper testimony] did not go to the
heart of the case; *** [the jury] still had to decide whether
defendant had murdered Taylor. The proof of defendant's
guilt was overwhelming. There was direct identification
of defendant by two eyewitnesses as having seen
defendant in Taylor's office and beat him over the head
with a pipe. One defense witness testified that he saw an
inmate walking around Taylor's body after he had been
attacked and another testified that he saw defendant in his
cell around the time of the murder, although he did not
know when the attack took place. This evidence can
hardly be equated to the testimonies of two witnesses
present when the attack occurred." (Emphasis added.)
Lucas, 151 Ill. 2d  at 478.
A second time on direct appeal, we examined the balance of the
evidence within our discussion of the plain error rule. Lucas, 151 Ill. 2d  at 482. Specifically, we examined whether the admission of
hearsay evidence introduced to show motive, including Martin's
testimony that he was told the BGD planned to retaliate against the
administration for Jones' death, warranted our review. We held
that our review was not warranted under the plain error rule
because the overall evidence was neither closely balanced, nor was
the error so fundamental as to deny defendant a fair trial. Lucas,
151 Ill. 2d  at 482. We stated that the evidence in support of
defendant's conviction included the testimony of two
eyewitnesses, who identified defendant as the individual who beat
Taylor over the head with a pipe. Lucas, 151 Ill. 2d  at 482. Once
again we held that the evidence was "direct and overwhelming"
and "plainly not closely balanced" such that we refused to consider
the issues found waived under the plain error rule. Lucas, 151 Ill. 2d  at 482, 484. Further, we stated that the admission of the hearsay
evidence did not affect the outcome of the case: "[w]hile evidence
of motive may be helpful to understand the reason why a crime
was committed, it is not essential to conviction. Had this evidence
been excluded, the evidence in support of defendant's conviction
remains." Lucas, 151 Ill. 2d  at 482. Accordingly, defendant was
not denied a fair trial. Lucas, 151 Ill. 2d  at 482.
	While we considered different issues on direct appeal, our
characterization of the evidence in this case does not change.
Defendant was convicted on the basis of overwhelming
evidence-the testimony of two eyewitnesses who observed
defendant participate in the killing. These two eyewitnesses
convincingly described the attack in great detail, including the
manner of the attack, the weapons used during the attack, and the
assailant's clothing. More importantly, the two eyewitnesses
identified defendant as one assailant. We cannot equate Martin's
uncorroborated testimony-testimony which did not place
defendant at the scene of the attack or with a weapon-to the
eyewitness' testimony. Accordingly, we find that the instant case
does not present facts which demonstrate that there is a reasonable
likelihood that the false testimony affected the judgment against
him. Because defendant does not establish materiality, the circuit
court correctly dismissed defendant's claim without an evidentiary
hearing.

III. Post-Conviction Discovery
	Defendant also argues that the circuit court improperly
vacated existing discovery orders and wrongly denied a later
request for discovery. Accordingly, defendant asks this court to
remand for discovery on his claim that Martin falsely testified
about his cooperation agreement and that the State knew his
testimony was perjured.
	After filing his post-conviction petition, defendant filed a
motion for discovery and a motion for subpoenas. In particular,
defendant requested information concerning State witness Martin,
including Martin's state and federal prison records, all documents,
notes, or oral transcripts of agreements between Martin and state
authorities, and copies of all documents concerning Du Page
County and federal court cases in which Martin was involved. On
February 2, 1994, the trial judge, Judge Glennon, ordered that the
Illinois DOC, the United States DOC, and the Du Page County
circuit court clerk tender to defense counsel all copies and master
files concerning Martin. These files were previously impounded
by the Du Page County circuit court in 1991. Several months later,
on June 8, 1994, Judge Glennon ordered both the Du Page County
court reporter and the county clerk for the second division to
transcribe and tender a complete record of all cases pertaining to
Martin for his in camera inspection. On January 29, 1996, Judge
Glennon reviewed portions of the files requested, copied and
furnished the material to the defense.
	On November 12, 1998, Judge Glennon, who had presided
over the trial, sentencing, and subsequent post-conviction
proceedings, retired. The case was reassigned. Upon reassignment,
the new trial judge, Judge Frobish, after reviewing the transcripts,
order, and file in the case, vacated all previously ordered discovery
in a written order. The written order concluded that defendant
failed to show good cause for the discovery sought. However, the
order granted defendant five weeks to resubmit "any discovery
request to the attention of the court." On December 17, 1998,
defendant resubmitted his previous request for the same material,
and following oral argument on March 11, 1999, the circuit court
denied defendant's request for further discovery. In his post-conviction petition, defendant claims that Judge Frobish abused
his discretion when he sua sponte vacated all previous discovery
orders and denied the later request for discovery.
	We have held that the circuit court has inherent authority to
order discovery in the context of post-conviction proceedings.
People ex rel. Daley v. Fitzgerald, 123 Ill. 2d 175, 183 (1988). A
circuit court may grant discovery, but only after a hearing for
"good cause shown." Daley, 123 Ill. 2d  at 183. However, because
there exists the potential for abuse of the discovery process in
post-conviction proceedings, courts must exercise discretion in
granting discovery requests. Daley, 123 Ill. 2d  at 183. In deciding
whether to grant discovery, courts may consider "the scope of the
discovery sought, the length of time between the conviction and
the post-conviction proceeding, the burden [of granting the
discovery] ***, and the availability of the desired evidence
through other sources." Daley, 123 Ill. 2d  at 183-84. A circuit
court's denial of a discovery request will not be disturbed absent
an abuse of this discretion. People v. Fair, 193 Ill. 2d 256, 264-65
(2000).
	We first turn to Judge Frobish's order vacating existing
discovery orders upon his assignment to the case. At the time this
case was reassigned, post-conviction proceedings were
approaching five years in duration. Judge Frobish examined
transcripts and prior discovery orders at length before he entered
a written order vacating the prior discovery order. The record
shows that Judge Frobish observed that some of the discovery
material requested dated back approximately 11 years and
included voluminous amounts of documents. Quoting Judge
Glennon, Judge Frobish stated in his written order: "The amount
of material here will consist of stacks of material, I don't know, 8
feet-10 feet high. I am not sure. I mean, it is a tremendous amount
of material," and "I reviewed thousands of pages of inmate files,
and I mean thousands of pages, over the course of a number of
months. *** We were running a copier for days in my office
furnishing material [to defense counsel]." Further quoting Judge
Glennon, Judge Frobish noted Judge Glennon's growing concerns
with the scope of discovery:
		"I think we are going to need to talk seriously about
discovery at this point. And hear some arguments on what
authority the defense has for much of their requests for
their requests for the type of discovery they are seeking.
*** And I would express for the record that we seem to
have gone wildly beyond those general ground rules [for
post-conviction discovery]. And I have been doing some
thinking about that. And I think we are going to need to
talk about that in order to reach some resolution ***.
* * *
			*** Well, I think the record in this case is becoming
perhaps an example of what post-conviction proceedings
are not intended to do. Part of that has been through my
own fault.
* * *
			I am not going to extend in this case discovery in my
opinion that would take a 'quantum leap' beyond what the
law allows, or more fundamentally, what I feel is
appropriate, fair and just."
	After reviewing the record, including Judge Glennon's
comments, and the large scope of discovery requested, Judge
Frobish concluded that defendant did not establish the requisite
good cause for continued post-conviction discovery. It is clear that
Judge Frobish based his order on the appropriate considerations
outlined in Daley, such as the scope of discovery sought, the
continued burden of production on the parties, the availability of
the desired evidence, and the length of time between the
conviction and the post-conviction proceeding. Daley, 123 Ill. 2d 
at 183-84. Accordingly, we find no evidence to suggest Judge
Frobish abused his discretion in his November 12, 1998, written
order vacating the existing post-conviction discovery order.
	We further reject defendant's claim that Judge Frobish abused
his discretion by denying defendant's subsequent discovery
request. After four years of extensive discovery, Judge Frobish
granted defendant the opportunity to resubmit his discovery
requests. Defendant filed a request substantially similar to, and
equally extensive as, his initial discovery request. Defendant
argued that defendant needed "substantial discovery, because the
puzzle pieces *** are spread out over the years throughout the
different systems *** [a]nd that with depositions or possibly live
witness testimony, we can make the case that [defendant] was
deprived of the necessary information that he needed" to cast
doubt on Martin's credibility.
	On March 11, 1999, at the hearing to show good cause for the
discovery request, defendant explained that he sought the
information requested in order to amend his petition and stated
that he was "willing to defer [the discovery] request, obviously,
until after the petition is filed in its final form and the State has
responded with a motion to dismiss." The State agreed. The State
further argued, however, that it did not possess or have control
over the material requested, that the material requested was too
broad, and that the majority of material sought was not relevant to
defendant's claim. The circuit court held that "no discovery is
needed in order to put the defense in a position [to amend the
petition]," and further held that defendant failed to show good
cause because Martin's alleged bias was collateral and added little
additional value to the trial. Specifically, according to the circuit
court, whether Martin was truthful about his cooperation was
"irrelevant" based on defendant's admission during trial that he
was a member of the BGD, such that Martin's testimony about
defendant's gang membership only reaffirmed that fact.
	As an initial matter, we note that defendant now argues before
this court a position opposite of the one that he took before Judge
Frobish. At the hearing on his discovery request, defense counsel
readily admitted that he had sufficient information to amend the
petition and was willing to defer the request. Defendant did in fact
amend his petition. The State filed its motion to dismiss, which
was ultimately granted, and the discovery request was not
revisited. Nevertheless, we conclude that Judge Frobish did not
abuse his discretion in denying defendant's subsequent discovery
request. The record shows Judge Frobish considered appropriate
factors, such as the protracted discovery in the case, the wide
breadth of material sought in defendant's discovery request, the
great burden of production on the parties, and the likely
unavailability of the desired evidence a second time. Further, as
we have already held, the evidence against defendant was
overwhelming and defendant was not prejudiced by Martin's false
testimony.

CONCLUSION
	For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court
dismissing defendant's petition without an evidentiary hearing is
affirmed.
Affirmed.
 
 
1.      1Again, for purposes of this appeal, we only accept as true the
allegations that Martin testified falsely and that the State knew that the
testimony was perjured because the State moved to dismiss defendant's
petition. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 390-91.