Title: State v. Sutton

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2012 WI 23 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP1391-CRNM 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Jeffery G. Sutton, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 8, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 12, 2012 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Dominic S. Amato  
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Kaitlin A. Lamb, Colleen Ball, assistant state public defenders 
and oral argument by Colleen Ball. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief filed by 
James M. Freimuth, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was J.B. Van Hollen. The cause was argued by Christine A. 
Remington, assistant attorney general.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Robert R. Henak and 
Henak Law Office, S.C., Milwaukee, for Counsel for Wisconsin 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.  
 
 
2012 WI 23
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
No.   2010AP1391-CRNM 
(L.C. No. 
2008CM4879) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Jeffery G. Sutton, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 8, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of an opinion and order of the Court of Appeals.  
Reversed and cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished opinion and order of the court of appeals1 issued by 
one judge pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 752.31(2) and (3) (2009-10).2   
                                                 
1 State v. Sutton, No. 2010AP1391-CRNM, unpublished opinion 
& order (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2011). 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2010AP1391-CRNM   
 
2 
 
¶2 
Jeffery G. Sutton, the defendant, was convicted (at a 
bench trial) of misdemeanor retail theft pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 943.50(1m)(b) and (4)(a) in the circuit court for Milwaukee 
County, Dominic S. Amato, Judge.  The court of appeals affirmed 
the misdemeanor conviction.  The court of appeals accepted the 
no-merit 
report, 
relieved 
defendant's 
counsel 
of 
further 
representation, and denied the defendant's request to remand the 
cause to the circuit court to determine whether the defendant 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to a 
jury trial.  The court of appeals stated that the defendant may 
pursue relief under Wis. Stat. § 974.06.   
¶3 
The question posed is whether under the following 
three salient facts (in the complex procedural posture of the 
present case, which we will set forth below), the court of 
appeals erred in concluding that the defendant may raise the 
issue of postconviction counsel's ineffective assistance of 
counsel in a Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion and erred in failing to 
remand the matter to the circuit court to allow the defendant to 
pursue a new or amended postconviction motion.3 
¶4 
First:  The circuit court conducted a deficient 
personal colloquy with the defendant relating to the defendant's 
waiver of his right to a jury trial.   
                                                 
3 The State Public Defender's brief on behalf of the 
defendant asserts that had the court of appeals remanded the 
matter to the circuit court, the State Public Defender would 
have appointed a new attorney at the defendant's request. 
No. 
2010AP1391-CRNM   
 
3 
 
¶5 
Second:  The defendant was sentenced to only a single 
day, time served, and therefore was not in custody when he 
sought postconviction relief in the circuit court or when he 
appealed his conviction in the court of appeals.      
¶6 
Third:  Postconviction counsel filed a defective 
postconviction 
motion 
and 
thus 
failed 
to 
preserve 
the 
defendant's challenge to the validity of his waiver of his right 
to a jury trial.  Postconviction counsel knew that the defendant 
claimed unawareness of his right to a unanimous verdict at the 
time of the jury waiver, but she neglected to allege that 
unawareness in the motion.   
¶7 
We conclude that the court of appeals erred as a 
matter of law in ruling that the defendant had an avenue of 
relief through Wis. Stat. § 974.06.  The defendant could not 
pursue a § 974.06 motion, which is available only to "a prisoner 
in custody under sentence of a court or a person convicted and 
placed with a volunteers in probation program under s. 973.11."4  
The defendant fit neither of these categories.     
¶8 
The court of appeals' error of law deprived the 
defendant of any opportunity for review of an on-its-face 
deficient jury trial waiver colloquy or the clear error by 
postconviction counsel in filing a defective postconviction 
motion.  In their briefs and at oral argument, the State and the 
defendant agreed that although he was not in custody, the 
                                                 
4 Wis. Stat. § 974.06(1). 
No. 
2010AP1391-CRNM   
 
4 
 
defendant should be afforded some forum in which he may seek 
relief.  The parties disagreed about the forum.5   
¶9 
Because the court of appeals' opinion and order was 
based on an error of law and had the unintended effect of 
denying the defendant any opportunity to be heard despite a 
colloquy that was deficient on its face and clear error by 
postconviction counsel, we reverse the opinion and order of the 
court of appeals and remand the matter to the court of appeals 
                                                 
5 The defendant proposed the matter be returned to the 
circuit court where he could have an opportunity to amend the 
postconviction motion to correct the allegations or at least 
seek the circuit court's reconsideration of the order denying 
the postconviction motion.  Under these circumstances, the 
defendant would have counsel and the burden of proof would be on 
the State to prove that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial.  Unless the 
matter is remanded to the circuit court, the defendant contends, 
he will have no remedy.  
The State's brief proposed that the defendant use habeas 
corpus and raise the issue of ineffective assistance of 
postconviction counsel.  Under this remedy the burden of proof 
would be on the defendant, and the defendant would not 
necessarily have appointed counsel.  
For the requirements of habeas relief, the State cited 
State ex rel. Fuentes v. Wisconsin Court of Appeals, 225 
Wis. 2d 446, 451, 593 N.W.2d 48 (1999), in which the court 
noted: 
Habeas corpus provides extraordinary relief and is 
available only where specific factual circumstances 
are present.  First, the party seeking habeas corpus 
relief must be restrained of his or her liberty.   
At oral argument the State withdrew its suggestion that 
affording habeas relief to the defendant was reasonable and that 
an exception to the "restrained of liberty" requirement be 
recognized when no channel of review is actually available to 
the defendant due to no fault of his own.    
No. 
2010AP1391-CRNM   
 
5 
 
to reject the no-merit report, reinstate the defendant's direct 
appeal rights, and remand the matter to the circuit court to 
allow counsel to file a new or amended motion for postconviction 
relief.  See Wis. Stat. §§ (Rules) 809.30, 809.32, 809.82(2).  
I 
 
¶10 The specific facts underlying the defendant's crime 
are not relevant to this appeal.  The facts relating to the 
defendant's maneuvers before the circuit court and court of 
appeals to obtain review of the validity of the defendant's 
waiver of his right to a jury trial are relevant to this review.  
¶11 The relevant procedural facts began before trial when 
the defendant waived his right to a jury trial.  On the day of 
trial, the defendant filed a signed form waiving his right to a 
jury trial.  To determine whether the defendant's waiver of the 
jury trial was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary so that the 
circuit court could accept the waiver, the circuit court 
conducted a personal colloquy with the defendant.  In State v. 
Anderson, 2002 WI 7, ¶¶22-23, 249 Wis. 2d 586, 638 N.W.2d 301, 
the court held that such a personal colloquy is required even 
when the accused files a signed waiver. 
¶12 The circuit court's personal colloquy on the record 
with the defendant on his right to a jury trial reads as 
follows: 
The Court:  You wanna waive your right to a jury 
trial, Jeffrey?   
The Defendant:  Yes, Your Honor. 
No. 
2010AP1391-CRNM   
 
6 
 
The Court:  You understand you're entitled to a 12-
person fair and impartial jury trial? 
The Defendant:  Yes, Your Honor. 
The Court:  No one's forcing you or threatening you to 
do it? 
The Defendant:  No. 
The 
Court: 
 
Counsel, 
is 
he 
making 
a 
knowing, 
intelligent, voluntary decision without coercion? 
Mr. Plaisted:  I believe so. 
The Court:  All right.  I'll find the waiver. 
¶13 The defendant, the State, the court of appeals, and 
this court all agree that the circuit court's colloquy with the 
defendant relating to the waiver of the jury trial was on its 
face deficient under State v. Anderson, 2002 WI 7, ¶24, 249 
Wis. 2d 586, 638 N.W.2d 301.  The colloquy failed to inform the 
defendant that at a jury trial, a 12-person jury would have to 
agree on all elements of the crime charged.6  Neither party made 
note of the deficient colloquy at the time. 
                                                 
6 We have stated that such a colloquy must ensure that the 
defendant  
(1) made a deliberate choice, absent threats or 
promises, to proceed without a jury trial; (2) was 
aware of the nature of a jury trial, such that it 
consists of a panel of 12 people that must agree on 
all elements of the crime charged; (3) was aware of 
the nature of a court trial, such that the judge will 
make a decision on whether or not he or she is guilty 
of the crime charged; and (4) had enough time to 
discuss this decision with his or her attorney.   
State v. Anderson, 2002 WI 7, ¶24, 249 Wis. 2d 586, 638 
N.W.2d 301 (citing 1 Wisconsin Judicial Benchbook CR22-3 through 
CR22-6 (2d ed. 2001)).  
No. 
2010AP1391-CRNM   
 
7 
 
¶14 Immediately following the conviction, postconviction 
counsel filed a no-merit report with the court of appeals.  The 
transcript of the waiver hearing was missing from the record, so 
the court of appeals ordered postconviction counsel to arrange 
for the transcript to be included and to file a supplemental no-
merit 
report. 
 
Upon 
retrieving 
the 
missing 
transcript, 
postconviction counsel evidently realized the colloquy presented 
an arguably meritorious issue and made note of the issue in the 
supplemental no-merit report.  The court of appeals agreed there 
was an arguably meritorious issue, rejected the no-merit report, 
voluntarily dismissed the appeal, and extended the deadline for 
counsel to file a motion for postconviction relief in the 
circuit court. 
¶15 The court of appeals' authority to extend the deadline 
is found in Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.82(2), which allows the 
court of appeals upon its own motion or upon good cause shown by 
motion to extend a Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.30 or 809.32 filing 
deadline.7     
                                                 
7 See State v. Evans, 2004 WI 84, ¶¶27, 28, 36-38, 273 
Wis. 2d 192, 682 N.W.2d 784 (overruled on other grounds by State 
ex rel. Coleman v. McCaughtry, 2006 WI 49, ¶29, 290 Wis. 2d 352, 
714 N.W.2d 900); State v. Harris, 149 Wis. 2d 943, 945-47, 440 
N.W.2d 364 (1989); Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1981, Wis. 
Stat. § 809.82 ("Sub. (2) is amended to permit the court of 
appeals to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal or 
cross-appeal in appeals under Rule[ ] 809.30 . . . ."); Michael 
S. Heffernan, Appellate Practice and Procedure in Wisconsin 
§ 18.7, at 9; § 19.29, at 39 (2011) ("The court of appeals has a 
generally lenient policy about granting extensions that will 
enable a criminal defendant to prosecute an appeal."). 
No. 
2010AP1391-CRNM   
 
8 
 
¶16 Postconviction counsel then filed a motion in the 
circuit court alleging that the defendant's waiver of the jury 
trial 
was 
deficient 
under 
Anderson. 
 
Unfortunately, 
the 
postconviction motion did not comply with the requirements set 
forth in State v. Grant, 230 Wis. 2d 90, 601 N.W.2d 8 (Ct. App. 
1999).  The postconviction motion failed to allege, as required 
by Grant, 230 Wis. 2d at 99, that the defendant was unaware of 
his right to a unanimous verdict when he waived his right to a 
jury trial.8     
¶17 Because of this defect in the allegations in the 
motion, the circuit court denied the defendant's postconviction 
motion.9  
 
¶18 Postconviction counsel then filed a motion in the 
court of appeals for an extension of the Wis. Stat. § 809.30 
deadline in order to go back to the circuit court and ask the 
circuit court to reconsider its denial of the postconviction 
                                                 
8 The 
requirements 
imposed 
in 
State 
v. 
Grant, 
230 
Wis. 2d 90, 601 N.W.2d 8 (Ct. App. 1999), were adopted from 
State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986), which 
created a procedural framework for determining whether a guilty 
plea was defective.  
The procedure to be followed to determine whether the 
defendant's waiver of the jury trial was knowing, intelligent, 
and voluntary is like the procedure set forth in Bangert 
relating to guilty pleas.  See Grant, 230 Wis. 2d at 93.  
9 See Grant, 230 Wis. 2d at 93 (a postconviction motion 
lacking the allegation that the accused did not know or 
understand the rights being waived is properly denied by the 
circuit court). 
No. 
2010AP1391-CRNM   
 
9 
 
motion and to allow the defendant to cure the defect in the 
postconviction motion by supplying the missing allegation. 
 
¶19 Reconsideration serves an important function pending 
appeal in obviating the need for an appeal and honing the issues 
and analysis.10  "The law gives a judge the right to change his 
or her mind, so long as it is done in a timely fashion and the 
parties are given a fair chance to be heard. . . . A judge 
should not have to live with the consequences of a decision that 
he or she, upon reflection, believes to be wrong."11     
¶20 On reconsideration, the court may have relied on Wis. 
Stat. § 802.09 by analogy to allow liberal amendment of the 
motion.  Section 802.09 provides that leave to amend pleadings 
"shall be freely given at any stage of the action when justice 
so requires."12  Although a motion is not a pleading,13 the 
                                                 
10 Metro Greyhound Mgmt. Corp. v. Wis. Racing Bd., 157 
Wis. 2d 678, 698, 460 N.W.2d 802 (Wis. App. 1990). 
11 Village of Thiensville v. Olsen, 223 Wis. 2d 256, 262, 
588 N.W.2d 394 (Ct. App. 1998). 
12 Wis. Stat. § 802.09(1).  "[Wisconsin Stat. § 802.09] is 
intended to facilitate the disposition of litigation on the 
merits and to subordinate the importance of pleadings.  It 
provides maximum opportunity for each claim to be decided on its 
merits rather than on procedural technicalities."  3 Jay E. 
Grenig, Wisconsin Practice Series:  Civil Procedure § 209.1 (4th 
ed. 2010).  
See also Wis. Stat. § 972.11(1) (providing that with some 
exceptions, "rules of . . . practice in civil actions shall be 
applicable in all criminal proceedings unless the context of a 
section or rule manifestly requires a different construction"). 
13 See Wis. Stat. § 802.01. 
No. 
2010AP1391-CRNM   
 
10 
 
§ 802.09 directive to freely give leave to amend pleadings has 
been applied to § 974.06 motions.14        
¶21 The circuit court did not have the opportunity to 
reconsider its ruling because the court of appeals denied the 
defendant's motion to extend the Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.30 
deadline and remand the matter to the circuit court for 
reconsideration of the circuit court's order denying the 
defective postconviction motion.   
¶22 There 
may 
have 
been 
some 
confusion 
about 
what 
deadlines 
were 
applicable 
for 
certain 
actions 
and 
what 
postconviction counsel was actually requesting.  Postconviction 
counsel wanted to move the circuit court to reconsider its 
denial of the defendant's postconviction motion.  Postconviction 
counsel evidently believed an extension was needed in order to 
file this motion for reconsideration in the circuit court.  The 
court of appeals denied the defendant's motion to extend as 
unnecessary, declaring that the defendant still had time to file 
a notice of appeal in order to seek appellate review of the 
circuit court's decision.  Postconviction counsel apparently 
believed that an extension of time was necessary.   
                                                 
14 State v. Rohl, 104 Wis. 2d 77, 93, 310 N.W.2d 631 (1981) 
("It is within the discretion of the trial court whether to 
allow an amendment to the pleadings.  Stanhope v. Brown County, 
90 Wis. 2d 823, 834, 280 N.W.2d 711, 715 (1979).  The trial 
court's decision will not be reversed unless there has been a 
manifest abuse of discretion.  Id.  We believe it is also within 
the discretion of the trial court whether to allow an amendment 
to a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to sec. 974.06, 
Stats.").  See also Zuehl v. State, 69 Wis. 2d 355, 359, 230 
N.W.2d 673 (1975). 
No. 
2010AP1391-CRNM   
 
11 
 
¶23 Furthermore, the court of appeals mistakenly viewed 
postconviction counsel's motion as, in effect, a request to the 
court of appeals to conclude that postconviction counsel 
performed ineffectively.  The court of appeals denied the 
perceived ineffective assistance of counsel claim because it was 
not presented first to the circuit court and it did not make the 
two-part showing of deficiency and prejudice required by 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  
 
¶24 Thereafter, 
postconviction 
counsel 
filed 
numerous 
motions in both the circuit court and court of appeals in an 
understandably desperate attempt to correct her error, to 
preserve the defendant's right to direct appeal, and to return 
the case to the circuit court to litigate the defendant's claim 
that his waiver of a jury trial was not knowing, intelligent,  
and voluntary.15  The court of appeals repeatedly denied 
postconviction counsel's efforts to remand the case to the 
circuit court.  The court of appeals stressed that the defendant 
had already obtained a ruling on the postconviction motion that 
could be reviewed on direct appeal by the court of appeals.  
                                                 
15 Although the court of appeals had denied postconviction 
counsel's motion for an extension of the deadline to file a 
motion for reconsideration in the circuit court, the defendant 
filed such a motion for reconsideration anyway.  The defendant 
alleged he did not understand the rights he was giving up.  In 
response to this motion and an accompanying affidavit, the 
circuit court scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the defective 
waiver issue, but the circuit court later determined that it 
lacked jurisdiction to hold the evidentiary hearing because 
postconviction counsel had also filed a notice of appeal in the 
court of appeals.  
No. 
2010AP1391-CRNM   
 
12 
 
 
¶25 Postconviction counsel was persuaded that she could 
not proceed with a direct appeal challenging the defendant's 
waiver of a jury trial because the court of appeals would 
declare, as it did in footnote 2 of its opinion and order, that 
the circuit court properly denied the defective postconviction 
motion pursuant to Grant.16  To avoid this result, counsel filed 
a no-merit report in the court of appeals, see Wis. Stat. (Rule) 
§ 809.32, and urged the court of appeals to reject the no-merit 
report, to reinstate the defendant's direct appeal rights, and 
to remand the matter to the circuit court for a hearing on the 
jury trial waiver that counsel claims the circuit court had 
already scheduled.  In other words, this was not a typical no-
merit report.  Typically in a no-merit report, counsel truly 
believes no issues exist warranting an appeal and counsel wants 
to be relieved of further representation.  
                                                 
16 See ¶17 & n.9, supra.   
In Grant, unlike in the present case, the accused did not 
claim he was unaware of the jury unanimity requirement.   
No. 
2010AP1391-CRNM   
 
13 
 
¶26 Before this court, the defendant argues that the court 
of appeals erred, as a matter of law, in failing to reject the 
no-merit report on the basis of the jury trial waiver issue.17  
¶27 In contrast, the State argues that the no-merit report 
clearly shows that any challenge on appeal to the defendant's 
waiver of his right to a jury trial is meritless inasmuch as the 
circuit court 
properly rejected the defendant's defective 
postconviction motion.     
                                                 
17 The defendant points to a sentence from this court's 
recent decision in State v. Allen, 2010 WI 89, ¶88, 328 
Wis. 2d 1, 786 N.W.2d 124, which at first blush appears to 
support his argument that unpreserved issues must be revived by 
the court of appeals in a no-merit appeal.  In Allen, the court 
wrote that "the broad scope of review mandated by Anders 
suggests that the court of appeals in a no-merit appeal should 
identify issues of arguable merit even if those issues were not 
preserved in the circuit court, especially where the ineffective 
assistance of postconviction counsel was the reason those issues 
were not preserved for appeal."  We decline to read this 
statement as a categorical holding that the court of appeals 
must reject a no-merit report when there is an issue that may 
once have been meritorious but has been forfeited, waived, or 
otherwise unpreserved. 
The defendant also argues that the record and no-merit 
submissions reveal an arguably meritorious claim of ineffective 
assistance of postconviction counsel.   
The State agrees that postconviction counsel erred but 
argues that ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel may 
be raised only after the conclusion of the direct appeal.  The 
State stresses that until the direct appeal concludes, there is 
no way to know whether the defendant suffered prejudice as a 
result of postconviction counsel's error.  Under Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), a defendant must prove not 
only that counsel's performance was deficient, but also that the 
deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.  
No. 
2010AP1391-CRNM   
 
14 
 
 
¶28 We 
summarize 
the 
no-merit 
procedure 
to 
provide 
background for our discussion.   
¶29 The United States Supreme Court established a no-merit 
procedure in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).  The 
procedure 
was 
created 
to 
balance 
a 
criminal 
defendant's 
constitutional right to counsel on appeal18 with appellate 
counsel's ethical obligation not to pursue a frivolous appeal.  
The Supreme Court explained the no-merit procedure as follows: 
[I]f counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous, 
after a conscientious examination of it, he [or she] 
should so advise the court and request permission to 
withdraw.  That request must, however, be accompanied 
by a brief referring to anything in the record that 
might arguably support the appeal.  A copy of 
counsel's brief should be furnished the indigent and 
time allowed him [or her] to raise any points that he 
[or 
she] 
chooses; 
the 
court——not 
counsel——then 
proceeds, 
after 
a 
full 
examination 
of 
all 
the 
proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly 
frivolous.  If it so finds it may grant counsel's 
request to withdraw and dismiss the appeal insofar as 
federal requirements are concerned, or proceed to a 
decision on the merits, if state law so requires.  On 
the other hand, if it finds any of the legal points 
arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivolous) 
it must, prior to decision, afford the indigent the 
assistance of counsel to argue the appeal.   
Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. 
¶30 Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 809.32(1) codifies the Anders 
decision and imposes some additional requirements on counsel.  
The Rule explains that if appointed appellate counsel "concludes 
that a direct appeal on behalf of the [defendant] would be 
frivolous and without any arguable merit within the meaning of 
                                                 
18 See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963). 
No. 
2010AP1391-CRNM   
 
15 
 
[Anders],"19 counsel must discuss the merit of all potential 
appellate issues with the defendant and inform the defendant 
that he or she may (1) "have the attorney file a no-merit 
report;" (2) "have the attorney close the file without an 
appeal;" 
or 
(3) 
"have 
the 
attorney 
close 
the 
file 
and . . . proceed without an attorney or with another attorney 
retained at the person's expense."20   
¶31 If the defendant either requests that the no-merit 
report be filed or does not consent to counsel closing the file 
without further representation, counsel is instructed to file 
the no-merit report, which "shall identify anything in the 
record that might arguably support the appeal and discuss the 
reasons why each identified issue lacks merit."21 
¶32 The defendant is given an opportunity to respond to 
the no-merit report and argue that the appeal does, in fact, 
have merit.22  If counsel "is aware of facts outside the record 
that rebut allegations made in the [defendant]'s response," 
                                                 
19 Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.32(1)(a). 
20 Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.32(1)(b).  
21 Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.32(1)(a).  The United States 
Supreme Court has upheld Wisconsin's requirement that counsel 
discuss the reasons why the issues lack merit, rejecting an 
attorney's argument that the additional requirement violated his 
client's Sixth Amendment rights.  See McCoy v. Court of Appeals 
of Wis., 486 U.S. 429, 430-31 (1988). 
22 The defendant in the present case filed a response to the 
no-merit report in which he stated that there was merit to his 
case because he did not understand the rights he was giving up 
when he waived his right to a jury trial and he had so advised 
his counsel before she filed the motion. 
No. 
2010AP1391-CRNM   
 
16 
 
counsel may file a supplemental no-merit report replying to the 
defendant's response, supported by affidavits.23 
¶33 Especially significant is that upon receipt of the no-
merit submissions, the Wisconsin court of appeals "follows the 
requirement of Anders: it 'not only examines the no-merit report 
but also conducts its own scrutiny of the record to find out 
whether there are any potential appellate issues of arguable 
merit.'"24    
¶34 Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 809.32(3) provides that if 
"the 
court 
of 
appeals 
determines 
that 
further 
appellate 
proceedings would be frivolous and without any arguable merit, 
the court of appeals shall affirm the judgment of conviction or 
final adjudication and the denial of any postconviction or post-
disposition 
motion 
and 
relieve 
the 
attorney 
of 
further 
responsibility in the case."25 
¶35 In the present case, in an unpublished opinion and 
order,26 the court of appeals concluded that there were no issues 
of arguable merit for appeal and summarily affirmed the judgment 
of the circuit court.  The court of appeals further stated that 
                                                 
23 Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.32(1)(e), (f). 
24 Allen, 328 Wis. 2d 1, ¶21 (quoting State v. Fortier, 2006 
WI App 11, ¶21, 289 Wis. 2d 179, 709 N.W.2d 893). 
25 The parties disagreed about the applicability of Wis. 
Stat. § (Rule) 809.32(1)(g), which allows the court of appeals 
to remand to the circuit court for fact-finding in limited 
circumstances.  We do not address this issue. 
26 State v. Sutton, No. 2010AP1391-CRNM, unpublished opinion 
& order (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2011). 
No. 
2010AP1391-CRNM   
 
17 
 
"[t]o the extent counsel concedes she was ineffective when 
filing the initial postconviction motion, counsel is free to 
raise that issue in a Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion pursuant to 
State ex rel. Rothering v. McCaughtry."27     
 
¶36 We accepted the defendant's petition for review to 
determine 
whether 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
erred 
and, 
more 
specifically, 
whether 
and 
how 
the 
defendant 
under 
the 
circumstances of the present case may challenge his waiver of 
his right to trial by jury and claim ineffective assistance of 
postconviction counsel. 
II 
 
¶37 The defendant argues that the record and the no-merit 
submissions 
evidence 
an 
arguably 
meritorious 
claim 
of 
a 
defective waiver of a jury trial and error by postconviction 
counsel that should have led the court of appeals to reject the 
no-merit report and to remand the matter to the circuit court.  
The State, on the other hand, urges that no arguably meritorious 
claim appears in the no-merit report because the circuit court 
properly 
rejected 
the 
defendant's 
defective 
postconviction 
motion.  The State's brief concludes that habeas is the 
defendant's avenue of relief.  Although the defendant and the 
State disagree about the proper mechanism the defendant should 
have to use, both the State and defendant agree that the 
                                                 
27 State v. Sutton, No. 2010AP1391-CRNM, unpublished opinion 
& order at 3 n.2 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2011). 
No. 
2010AP1391-CRNM   
 
18 
 
defendant should have some opportunity to be heard on his 
claims.  
 
¶38 We agree with the State and the defendant that the 
defendant is entitled to have his claims heard.  He has been 
denied relief through a complex series of gaffes that are not of 
his own doing.  
¶39 The court of appeals did not have to accept the no-
merit report that outlined an unpreserved error at the circuit 
court. It is well-accepted appellate practice that an appellate 
court has discretion to reach the merits of an unpreserved 
issue.  
¶40 In a thoughtful opinion highlighting some of the 
complications 
in 
Wisconsin's 
appellate 
criminal 
procedure 
jurisprudence, the court of appeals in State ex rel. Panama v. 
Hepp, 2008 WI App 146, ¶27, 314 Wis. 2d 112, 758 N.W.2d 806, 
observed that an appellate court has the opportunity in a no-
merit proceeding to consider whether a failure to preserve an 
issue should be disregarded in the interests of justice: 
[A] 
no-merit 
proceeding 
also 
afforded 
appellate 
counsel the opportunity to explain why certain issues 
would lack arguable merit because they have been 
waived.  Such discussion, in turn, would have provided 
this court with an opportunity to consider whether the 
waiver might be one which should be excused in the 
interests of justice . . . .28  
                                                 
28 State ex rel. Panama v. Hepp, 2008 WI App 146, ¶27, 314 
Wis. 2d 112, 758 N.W.2d 806 (emphasis added). 
No. 
2010AP1391-CRNM   
 
19 
 
¶41 The Panama court touched on what we now explain 
further.  Although the Panama court referred specifically to the 
no-merit context, an appellate court's discretion to review an 
unpreserved issue in the interests of justice applies in 
traditional appeals as well.29 
¶42 The present case features compelling reasons why the 
court of appeals might have exercised its discretion to 
disregard the fact that the defendant had not properly preserved 
his claim that his waiver of his right to a jury trial was 
invalid and offered the defendant a forum to raise the issue.  
¶43 First and foremost, the court of appeals' decision 
denying the defendant's repeated requests to remand the cause to 
the circuit court was based on an error of law.  The court of 
appeals instructed the defendant to use a Wis. Stat. § 974.06 
motion to challenge the effectiveness of postconviction counsel 
and the validity of his waiver of his right to a jury trial. 
Since the defendant was not in custody, he could not use 
§ 974.06, and he was left with no opportunity to litigate his 
claim of a defective waiver of his right to a jury trial or his 
                                                                                                                                                             
Much of the complication described by the court of appeals 
in Panama, 314 Wis. 2d 112, ¶¶20-25, is not implicated by our 
resolution of the present case.  In Panama, 314 Wis. 2d 112, 
¶20, the court of appeals noted uncertainty about the proper 
forum 
for 
raising 
a 
claim 
that 
appointed 
appellate/postconviction counsel was ineffective for failure to 
raise an unpreserved issue in a no-merit report. 
29 See State v. Penigar, 139 Wis. 2d 569, 579, 408 N.W.2d 28 
(1987) ("[A]n appellate court may, in its discretion, reach the 
merits of a party's claimed error which cannot be asserted as a 
matter of right on appeal."). 
No. 
2010AP1391-CRNM   
 
20 
 
claim of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel (other 
than his petition for review in this court).      
¶44 Under these circumstances, the court of appeals might 
have concluded that the interests of justice compelled it to 
exercise its discretion to allow the defendant to have his 
underlying claim of a defective waiver of his right to a jury 
trial reviewed in the circuit court.  Because the defendant's 
claim is at its core an allegation that the defendant was 
unaware of his right to a unanimous jury, the circuit court 
would seem in the best position to evaluate the issues.  
¶45 That being said, we do not simply substitute our 
judgment for that of the court of appeals.  This court has been 
reluctant to interfere with the discretion of the court of 
appeals.  The general posture of this court is to decline to 
review discretionary decisions of the court of appeals as long 
as the discretion "is based upon a proper view of the law."30      
¶46 In the present case, the court of appeals did not have 
a proper view of the law.  The court of appeals apparently 
understood it had the power to grant the defendant's attempts to 
return the matter to the circuit court by remand or by extension 
of the time for filing but chose not to do so.31  The court of 
appeals instead focused on how the defendant might claim 
ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel.  
                                                 
30 State v. McConnohie, 113 Wis. 2d 362, 369, 334 N.W.2d 903 
(1983).  See also In re Smythe, 225 Wis. 2d 456, 462, 592 
N.W.2d 628 (1999) (quoting McConnohie). 
31 State v. Sutton, No. 2010AP1391-CRNM, unpublished opinion 
& order at 3 n.2 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2011). 
No. 
2010AP1391-CRNM   
 
21 
 
¶47 The court of appeals rested its refusal to exercise 
its discretion to act as the defendant requested on an error of 
law.  The court of appeals concluded that the defendant could 
pursue collateral relief by filing a Wis. Stat. § 974.06 
motion,32 but the defendant was not in custody so this motion was 
not available to him. 
¶48 In sum, the court of appeals did not intend to leave 
the defendant without a remedy.  The court of appeals had 
discretion to remand the matter to the circuit court for the 
defendant to file a new motion, an amended motion or a motion 
for reconsideration, despite the fact that the defendant's claim 
relating to the waiver of a jury trial was not properly 
preserved in the initial postconviction motion.33  The court of 
appeals chose not to so exercise its discretion, but the 
discretionary decision rested on a mistake of law.   
¶49 The court of appeals' error undermined its crucial 
assumption that the defendant would have some avenue available 
for possible relief.  The court of appeals' opinion and order 
had 
the 
unintended 
effect 
of 
denying 
the 
defendant 
any 
opportunity to be heard despite a trial court colloquy deficient 
on its face and an error by postconviction counsel.  
¶50 For these reasons, we reverse the opinion and order of 
the court of appeals and remand the matter to the court of 
appeals to reject the no-merit report, reinstate the defendant's 
                                                 
32 Id. 
33 See ¶17, supra. 
No. 
2010AP1391-CRNM   
 
22 
 
direct appeal rights, and remand the matter to the circuit court 
for counsel to file a new or amended motion for postconviction 
relief.  See Wis. Stat. §§ (Rules) 809.30, 809.32, 809.82(2). 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the court of appeals. 
 
No. 
2010AP1391-CRNM   
 
 
 
1