Title: Norcisa v. Dept. of Health & Social Services

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
GRACE L. NORCISA, 
 
 
Appellant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 
SOCIAL SERVICES, and THE MERIT 
EMPLOYEE RELATIONS BOARD, 
 
Appellees Below, 
Appellees. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 579, 2013 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Kent County 
§  C.A. No. K13A-03-001  
§ 
§  
§ 
§   
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: February 28, 2014 
 
 
 
 
    Decided: March 25, 2014 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 25th day of March 2014, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs 
and the record below,1 it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1)  
The appellant, Grace Norcisa, filed this appeal from a Superior 
Court order affirming the decision of the Merit Employee Relations Board 
(“MERB” or “the Board”), which upheld the decision of Norcisa’s 
                                                        
1 The appellee also filed a motion to strike arguments and documents filed by appellant in 
conjunction with her reply brief.  Appellant did not respond to the motion to strike.  It is 
clear that appellant raises arguments and includes documents not considered by the 
MERB or the Superior Court. This Court will not consider arguments and evidence that 
were not considered by the trial court or administrative tribunal in the first instance. 
Turner v. State, 5 A.3d 612, 615 (Del. 2010). Accordingly, the Court does not consider 
appellee’s new arguments or documents in this appeal. 
 
2
employer, the Department of Health and Social Services (“DHSS”), to 
terminate Norcisa’s employment.  Among other things, Norcisa claims that 
the MERB erred by denying her request to continue the hearing and by 
rejecting certain documents from inclusion in evidence.  Norcisa further 
claims that the MERB’s decision is not based on substantial evidence.  We 
find no merit to the appeal. Accordingly, we affirm. 
 
(2) 
From 2006 until her termination on January 15, 2010, Norcisa 
was employed as a lab technician at the Stockley Center in Georgetown, 
Delaware. The Stockley Center is operated by a division of DHSS and 
provides rehabilitative training, healthcare, and residential services for 
patients with developmental disabilities. As a lab technician, Norcisa’s 
responsibilities included drawing blood from patients and submitting the 
blood samples, along with requests for testing, to an outside facility where 
the tests would be conducted on the samples. Tests could only be authorized 
by a physician or nurse; Norcisa could not authorize any tests herself. After 
an initial test was ordered, a physician could later authorize “add-on tests” to 
be conducted on the previously submitted blood sample. Add-on tests also 
required prior authorization from a physician or a nurse before Norcisa could 
request them. At the time of the event in question, the Stockley Center had 
no disseminated policy for recording the authorization of add-on tests, 
 
3
however, it was common practice to authorized the add-on tests in writing. If 
verbal authorization was given for add-on tests, the authorization would be 
reduced to writing at a later time. 
 
(3) 
In July of 2009, one of the facility’s patients was SR,2 who had 
severe developmental disabilities, suffered from a variety of physical 
ailments, and was considered medically fragile. SR received treatment from 
several of the facility’s physicians, including Dr. Kelly and Dr. Shoukry. On 
July 2, 2009, Dr. Shoukry ordered initial testing on blood drawn from SR.  
On July 13, 2009, Norcisa signed a request for several add-on tests. There 
was no written record of who authorized the add-on tests, the results of 
which were negative. On July 13, 2009, Dr. Shoukry ordered that a second 
round of blood be drawn from SR for further testing. On July 21, 2009, 
Norcisa signed a request for further add-on testing. These add-on tests could 
not be conducted because the second blood sample was not large enough. 
Again, there was no record of who authorized the add-on tests.  
 
(4) 
In August of 2009, Norcisa had a conversation with Carlene 
Bond (“Bond”), a registered nurse employed at the Stockley Center, 
regarding SR’s medical treatment.  During the conversation, Norcisa 
allegedly told Bond, “[t]he doctors are missing something with [SR] . . . I 
                                                        
2 This pseudonym was used by the MERB to protect the patient’s privacy. 
 
4
can’t believe they are not being more aggressive in finding out what it is. On 
the last blood drawn from her, I even added more tests . . . just to check on 
my own.”3  A few weeks later, Bond reported the alleged conversation to 
Marie Hitchens, the Nursing Supervisor at the Stockley Center.  
 
(5) 
Based on Bond’s report to Hitchens, DHSS initiated an 
investigation to determine whether Norcisa in fact had requested 
unauthorized add-on tests. Norcisa denied the allegations.  On December 8, 
2009, DHSS sent Norcisa a pre-termination letter informing her that DHSS 
intended to terminate her employment on the basis of requesting 
unauthorized add-on tests, which DHSS claimed amounted to misconduct, 
fraud, misappropriation of Medicare and Medicaid funds, and the practice of 
medicine without a license. On January 15, 2010, DHSS terminated 
Norcisa’s employment at the Stockley Center.  
 
(6) 
On January 26, 2010, Norcisa filed a Merit Appeal with the 
MERB and requested a hearing before the Board as well as a hearing before 
Human Resources Management (“HRM”) in the office of Management and 
Budget. On April 21, 2010, the HRM officer upheld Norcisa’s dismissal, 
finding just cause for her termination. Norcisa’s MERB hearing was 
                                                        
3 Norcisa v. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 2013 WL 5785209 (Del. Super. Sept. 23, 
2013).  
 
5
originally scheduled for November 18, 2010, but was continued numerous 
times based on requests from both Norcisa and DHSS.  
(7) 
Norcisa’s MERB hearing ultimately was held on January 30, 
2013.  The MERB excluded three of Norcisa’s seventeen proffered exhibits.  
Those documents—a written reprimand for Norcisa’s unexcused absences, 
Norcisa’s pre-termination statement, and physician order sheets pertaining to 
a patient other than SR—were excluded as irrelevant.  One of Norcisa’s 
intended witnesses, Dr. Judith Bailey, failed to appear for the hearing despite 
the issuance of a subpoena. Norcisa’s counsel requested another continuance 
of the hearing.  The Board requested a proffer of the witness’ testimony.  
Norcisa’s counsel proffered that Dr. Bailey would have testified that verbal 
orders for add-on tests were not always recorded on physicians’ order sheets, 
and, in her opinion, some of the add-on tests performed on SR’s blood 
samples were appropriate given the patient’s medical conditions. Norcisa’s 
counsel further explained that Dr. Bailey would not have testified that she 
was the physician who authorized the add-on tests. The Board, by a vote of 
3-2, denied Norcisa’s request for a continuance.  
(8) 
DHSS introduced testimony from both Dr. Kelly and Dr. 
Shoukry, SR’s treating physicians.  Each testified he did not authorize the 
add-on tests and would not have authorized the add-on tests because the tests 
 
6
were not appropriate given SR’s medical condition. DHSS also called Nurse 
Bond who testified about Norcisa’s comments that she had requested the 
add-on tests on her own because she thought the doctors were missing 
something.   
(9) 
Norcisa testified that she had been verbally authorized to 
request the add-on tests via telephone but had not written down the verbal 
authorization because she was never trained to do so. Norcisa also testified 
that a nurse and a doctor authorized the tests, but she could not recall their 
names. On cross-examination, counsel for DHSS pointed out that Norcisa’s 
testimony contradicted all of her various earlier statements, which had 
indicated, alternatively, that she had no idea who authorized the tests, that 
Dr. Shoukry had authorized the tests, and that Dr. Shoukry and Dr. Kelly 
had authorized the tests.  
(10) Following the hearing, the Board issued its decision holding 
that Norcisa had not met her burden of proving that DHSS did not have just 
cause to terminate her employment.  A majority of the Board also concluded 
that termination was appropriate to the circumstances. 4   Norcisa then 
appealed to the Superior Court.  The Superior Court found no error of law or 
abuse of discretion. The Superior Court also found substantial evidence to 
                                                        
4 One member of the MERB dissented on the ground that the penalty of termination was 
not appropriate under the circumstances. 
 
7
support the Board’s conclusion that Norcisa had failed to establish that 
DHSS lacked just cause to terminate her.  This appeal followed.  
(11) Norcisa raises three reviewable arguments in her opening brief 
on appeal.  First, she contends that the MERB erred by excluding three of 
her proffered exhibits.  Next, she contends the MERB erred in denying her 
request for a continuance.  Finally, she contends that there is no substantial 
evidence in the record to support the MERB’s decision.  
(12) In reviewing decisions of the MERB, our role is limited.5  We 
review the record “‘to determine whether [the MERB] acted within its 
statutory authority, whether it properly interpreted and applied the applicable 
law, whether it conducted a fair hearing and whether its decision is based on 
sufficient substantial evidence and is not arbitrary.’”6  Substantial evidence 
is “’such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
support a conclusion.’”7  We review questions of law de novo.8  We do not, 
however, reweigh the evidence, determine issues of credibility, or draw our 
own factual conclusions.9  Moreover, we give deference to an administrative 
                                                        
5 Ward v. Dep’t of Elections, 2009 WL 2244413 (Del. July 27, 2009). 
6 Avallone v. State, 14 A.3d 566, 570 (Del. 2011) (quoting Hopson v. McGinnes, 391 
A.2d 187, 189 (Del. 1978)). 
7 Id. (citations omitted). 
8 Id.  
9 Ward v. Dep’t of Elections, 2009 WL 2244413, at *1. 
 
8
agency’s interpretation of its own rules “in recognition of its expertise in a 
given field.”10 
(13) When the State terminates a person’s employment, the MERB 
presumes that the State did so properly. 11   Therefore, the discharged 
employee has the burden of proving that the termination was improper.12  In 
this case, Norcisa thus was required to prove that DHSS lacked “just cause” 
to terminate her employment, as that term is defined in Merit Rule 12.1.13  
Under Rule 12.1 of the Board’s Merit Rules, “just cause” requires a showing 
that (1) the employee has committed the charged offense; (2) the employee 
has been afforded the due process specified in the Merit Rules; and (3) the 
penalty is appropriate to the circumstances.14   
(14)  We have carefully reviewed the parties’ briefs and the record 
below. We find that the MERB acted within its statutory authority, properly 
interpreted and applied the applicable law, and conducted a fair hearing. 
Moreover, its decision upholding Norcisa’s termination is based on 
sufficient substantial evidence.  We also find no error in the MERB’s 
decisions excluding Norcisa’s irrelevant exhibits from evidence and denying 
                                                        
10 Id. 
11 Avallone v. State, 14 A.3d at 572. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 569. 
14 Id. 
 
9
her request for a further continuance.  We find it manifest that the judgment 
of the Superior Court should be affirmed on the basis of, and for the reasons 
set forth in, the Superior Court’s well-reasoned decision dated September 
23, 2013.  
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
Justice