Title: Laramie County Bd. of Equalization v. Wyoming State Bd. of Equalization

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Laramie County Bd. of Equalization v. Wyoming State Bd. of Equalization1996 WY 61915 P.2d 1184Case Number: 95-134, 95-96Decided: 04/30/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming

LARAMIE COUNTY BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION,  

Appellant (Petitioner), 

 

v. 

 

WYOMING STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION; and FRONTIER 
REFINING, INC.,  

Appellees (Respondents).  

(Two Cases.)

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County 

The 
Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge

 

Kathy Karpan, Acting Laramie 
County Attorney; Margy White, Acting Laramie County Attorney, Cheyenne; Theodore 
E. Lauer, Director, and David C. Holtz, Student Intern, Prosecution Assistance 
Program, Laramie, for appellant.

Lawrence J. Wolfe, P.C., and 
Susan E. Laser-Bair of Holland & Hart, Cheyenne, for appellee Frontier 
Refining Inc. 

William U. Hill, Attorney 
General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; Cheyenne, for appellee 
Wyoming State Board of Equalization. 

Wade E. Waldrip and Thomas 
A. Thompson of Williams, Kelly & Waldrip, Rawlins, for Wyoming County 
Commissioners Association as Amicus Curiae. 

Mark R. Stewart of Hickey, 
Mackey, Evans, Walker & Stewart, Cheyenne, for Laramie County School 
District No. One as Amicus Curiae.

 

Before GOLDEN, C.J., 
THOMAS, MACY and TAYLOR, JJ., and VOIGT, District 
Judge.

GOLDEN, Chief 
Justice. 

[¶1]      The Laramie 
County Board of Equalization appeals two Wyoming State Board of Equalization 
decisions concerning the desulfurization equipment recently added to Frontier 
Refining, Inc.'s refinery. Reversing the Laramie County Board of Equalization, 
the Wyoming State Board of Equalization determined the equipment was primarily 
installed for pollution control purposes and is exempt from ad valorem taxes 
pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 35-11-1103.

 

[¶2]      We 
reverse.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      Appellant Laramie 
County Board of Equalization (County Board) presents the following 
issues:

 

I. Whether this Court should accord any deference, in 
fact or law, to the State Board of Equalization's decision or whether it should 
treat it as an intermediate level of review and focus on the decision of the 
Laramie County Board of Equalization as if on appeal for the first 
time.

II. Whether there is a well-founded doubt that the 
exemption applies to Frontier Refinery's desulfuring equipment and thus any 
ambiguity is resolved in favor of taxation.

III. Whether the county board's denial of a tax 
exemption for Frontier Refinery's desulfuring equipment is supported by 
substantial evidence and is not contrary to law.

 

[¶4]      Appellee Frontier 
Refining, Inc. (Frontier) presents only one issue:

 

1. Whether the State Board of Equalization correctly 
concluded that equipment at Frontier's refinery is exempt from ad valorem tax as 
pollution control equipment under W.S. 35-11-1103.

 

[¶5]      Appellee State 
Board of Equalization (State Board) presents the issue as:

 

Did the State Board of Equalization correctly 
conclude that the equipment was entitled to pollution control exemption under 
W.S. 35-11-1103 and therefore properly order remand to the county for 
determination of marketable by-product exclusion?

 

[¶6]      The Wyoming 
County Commissioners Association filed an amicus curiae brief supporting the 
County Board's position and presented the following issue:

 

Whether this Court should adopt an objective test or 
a subjective test in determining whether property is "primarily designed, 
installed and utilized" for pollution control?

 

[¶7]      Finally, Laramie 
County School District Number One also filed an amicus curiae brief supporting 
the County Board's position and presenting the following 
issues:

 

A. Did the State Board of Equalization fail to give 
appropriate deference to the decision of the Laramie County Board of 
Equalization's decision denying the tax exemptions sought by Frontier Refining 
for pollution control equipment?

B. Did the State Board of Equalization fail to apply 
the presumption against tax exemptions in overturning the decision of the 
Laramie County Board of Equalization which denied the pollution control tax 
exemptions sought by Frontier Refining?

C. Did the State Board of Equalization err in 
granting the tax exemptions on the basis that the equipment was designed, 
installed and utilized primarily for pollution control?

 

FACTS

 

[¶8]      Frontier 
Refining, Inc. owns and operates a refining facility in Cheyenne, Laramie 
County, Wyoming, which processes crude oil primarily for the production of 
diesel fuel and gasoline. In 1990, Congress amended the Clean Air Act to reduce 
the amount of sulfur allowed in diesel fuel sold for on-road use, effective 
October 1, 1993. The amendment restricted the amount of sulfur allowed in 
Frontier's main product, on-road diesel. Frontier responded by making several 
modifications to its refining plant. The modifications included a new sulfur 
recovery unit, a sulfur recovery plant, which was built in 1984, but its 
capacity is augmented by the new sulfur recovery unit, an amine treater,1 a hydrogen plant and a diesel 
hydrotreater.2 For simplicity, we shall refer to 
all of the equipment at issue in this appeal as "desulfurization equipment" or 
the "sulfur management system."

 

[¶9]      In 1993 and 
1994,3 Frontier filed applications for 
exemptions from the county ad valorem tax. WYO. STAT. § 35-11-1103 (1994) allows 
ad valorem tax exemptions for equipment "designed, installed and utilized 
primarily for the elimination, control or prevention of air, water or land 
pollution." This exemption is commonly known as the "pollution control 
exemption." The Laramie County Assessor's office, upon advice from its expert, 
denied the pollution control exemption for Frontier's sulfur management system. 
After hearing evidence from Frontier and the Assessor, the County Board upheld 
the Assessor's denial of the pollution control exemption for Frontier's sulfur 
management system.

 

[¶10]   Frontier appealed the County 
Board's denial of the pollution control exemption to the State Board. The State 
Board vacated the County Board's decisions concerning the desulfurization 
equipment with orders dated October 6, 1994, and April 10, 1995. The County 
Board appealed to the District Court of the First Judicial District, filing 
petitions for writ of review pursuant to WYO.R.APP.P. 12.09. The district court 
certified the cases to this Court and on June 1, 1995, we signed an order 
consolidating both appeals.

 

Statutory framework

 

[¶11]   A brief review of the statutory 
framework may be helpful to understand the procedural posture in this case. 
"Generally, all property in Wyoming is subject to taxation based upon a system 
of uniform valuation." State Board of 
Equalization v. City of Lander, 882 P.2d 844, 847 (Wyo. 1994); WYO. CONST. 
Art. 15, § 11. The legislature affirmed its intent to make all property subject 
to taxation, unless prohibited by law or expressly exempted, when it passed WYO. 
STAT. § 39-1-102 (1994), which states:

 

All property within Wyoming is subject to taxation as 
provided by this act except as prohibited by the United States or Wyoming 
constitutions or expressly exempted by W.S. 39-1-201.

 

WYO. STAT. § 39-1-201(a)(xx) 
(1994) exempts from taxation "[p]roperty used for pollution control to the 
extent provided by W.S. 35-11-1103." WYO. STAT. § 35-11-1103 (1994) 
provides:

 

The following property is exempt from ad valorem 
taxation pursuant to the provisions of this act and includes facilities, 
installations, machinery or equipment attached or unattached to real property 
and designed, installed and utilized primarily for the elimination, control or 
prevention of air, water or land pollution, or in the event such facility, 
installation, equipment or machinery shall also serve other beneficial purposes 
and use, such portion of the assessed valuation thereof as may be reasonably 
calculated to be necessary for and devoted to elimination, control or prevention 
of air, water and land pollution. The department of revenue shall determine the 
exempt portion on all property assessed pursuant to W.S. 39-2-201 through 
39-2-213. The county assessor shall determine the exempt portion on all property 
assessed pursuant to W.S. 39-2-301 through 39-2-304. The determination shall not 
include as exempt any portion of any facilities which have value as the specific 
source of marketable byproducts.

 

[¶12]   The county assessor is responsible 
for assessing and determining the exemptions for the property involved in this 
case. WYO. STAT. §§ 39-2-301(c) and 39-2-201(a) (1994); WYO. STAT. § 35-11-1103 
(1994). WYO. STAT. § 39-2-301 (1994 and Cum.Supp. 1995) supplies the procedure 
for the taxpayer to submit a statement of all taxable property and for the 
county assessor to notify the taxpayer of its assessment. WYO. STAT. § 39-2-302 
(1994 and Cum.Supp. 1995) provides for protests of assessments to the County 
Board. WYO. STAT. § 39-1-304 (1994 and Cum.Supp. 1995) requires the State Board 
to hear appeals from the County Board and to decide all questions concerning the 
construction of any statute affecting the assessment of taxes. WYO. STAT. § 
39-1-306 (1994) allows the County Board to appeal a decision of the State Board 
which reverses or modifies a County Board decision.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶13]   Union Pacific Railroad v. Wyoming State Bd. 
of Equalization, 802 P.2d 856 (Wyo. 1990), appropriately described the 
standard of review for cases arising from a county board contested case 
proceeding, appealed to a state agency and finally arriving in this Court on 
appeal.

 

Since in this case the county board was the finder of 
the fact and the state board heard no additional testimony, we will treat the 
state board as an intermediate level of review and accord deference only to the 
county board's findings of fact. Thus, the primary focus of our review will be 
whether the county board's decision was lawful and supported by substantial 
evidence.

 

Union Pacific, 802 P.2d  at 859.

 

The party challenging the sufficiency of the evidence 
has the burden of demonstrating the agency's decision is not supported by 
substantial evidence. If the agency action is supported by substantial evidence, 
its decision should be reversed only for errors of law. If the agency did not 
apply the correct rule of law, or applied it incorrectly, this Court does not 
defer to the agency's conclusion. The agency's errors of law are corrected by 
this Court.

 

Butts v. Wyoming State Board of 
Architects, 911 P.2d 1062, 1065 
(Wyo. 1996) (citing Devous v. Board of 
Medical Examiners, 845 P.2d 408, 414 (Wyo. 1993)) (citations 
omitted).

 

[¶14]   The scope of appellate review of 
agency decisions is provided by statute:

 

(c) To the extent necessary to make a decision and 
when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, 
interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or 
applicability of the terms of an agency action. In making the following 
determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it 
cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error. The reviewing court shall:

 

(i) Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or 
unreasonably delayed; and 

ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, 
findings and conclusions found to be:

 

(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or 
otherwise not in accordance with law;

(B) Contrary to constitutional right, power, 
privilege or immunity;

(C) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or 
limitations or lacking statutory right;

(D) Without observance of procedure required by law; 
or

(E) 
Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an 
agency hearing provided by statute.

 

WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c) 
(1990).

 

[¶15]   In both of its decisions, the State 
Board correctly stated the standard of review for contested issues of 
fact.

 

We examine the entire record to determine if there is 
substantial evidence to support an agency's findings. If the agency's decision 
is supported by substantial evidence, we cannot properly substitute our judgment 
for that of the agency, and must uphold the findings on appeal. Substantial 
evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of 
the conclusions of the agency. It is more than a scintilla of 
evidence.

 

State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div. v. 
White, 837 P.2d 1095, 1098 (Wyo. 
1992) (quoting Trout v. Wyoming Oil & 
Gas Conservation Comm'n, 721 P.2d 1047, 1050 (Wyo. 
1986)).

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶16]   This case requires us to interpret 
the phrase "designed, installed and utilized primarily for the elimination, 
control or prevention of" pollution, found in WYO. STAT. § 35-11-1103 (1994), 
and to apply that interpretation to the facts in this case. The County Board 
urges us to interpret WYO. STAT. § 35-11-1103 narrowly, finding the primary use 
for Frontier's sulfur management system is production of a marketable product. 
Frontier and the State Board ask us to interpret WYO. STAT. § 35-11-1103 more 
broadly, finding the primary use for Frontier's sulfur management system is 
pollution control, because the integrated system is required to produce diesel 
fuel in compliance with the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act. In other 
words, Frontier and the State Board would allow the pollution control exemption 
when equipment is necessary to produce a product which pollutes 
less.

 

[¶17]   We summarized our rules of 
statutory construction in General 
Chemical Corp. v. Wyoming State Bd. of Equalization, 819 P.2d 418 (Wyo. 
1991):

 

[T]his court looks only to the intent of the 
legislature when enforcing or construing statutes. * * * Legislative intent must 
be ascertained initially and primarily from the words used in the statute. * * * 
If the language selected by the legislature is sufficiently definitive, that 
language establishes the rule of law. Any additional construction can be 
resorted to only if the wording is ambiguous or unclear to the point of 
demonstrating obscurity with respect to the legislative purpose or mandate. * * 
* We previously have articulated the proposition that a statute is ambiguous 
only if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying 
interpretations. The converse of this proposition is that the statute is 
unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree as 
to its meaning with consistency and predictability. The question of whether an 
ambiguity exists in a statute is a matter of law to be determined by the 
court.

 

General Chemical, 819 P.2d  at 420 (quoting Allied-Signal, Inc. v. State Board of 
Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 219-20 (Wyo. 1991)) (citations 
omitted).

 

Scope of Pollution Control 
Exemption

 

[¶18]   We must decide whether the County 
Board's interpretation of WYO. STAT. § 35-11-1103 reflects the intent and 
purpose of the legislature. In 1991, the legislature removed the responsibility 
for executing WYO. STAT. § 35-11-1103 for local property from the State Board 
and gave that responsibility to Wyoming's county assessors. 1991 Wyo. Sess. Laws 
Ch. 249, Sec. 1; Exxon Co., USA, 
Docket 

No. 92-185, p. 5 (State Bd. 
of Equalization 1993). The construction placed on a statute by the agency 
charged with its execution is entitled to deference as long as it does not 
conflict with the legislature's intent. General Chemical, 819 P.2d  at 422; State Bd. of Equalization v. Tenneco, 
694 P.2d 97, 99-100 (Wyo. 1985), and see 
Exxon Co., USA, Docket No. 92-185, p. 5 (State Bd. of Equalization 
1993).

 

[¶19]  We discussed the legislative intent or 
purpose behind WYO. STAT. § 35-11-1103 in Tenneco and General Chemical.

 

This exemption was obviously intended to provide a 
tax incentive that would encourage the design, installation and utilization of 
pollution control equipment and devices for the beneficial public purpose of 
reducing or eliminating environmental pollution to the extent 
practical.

 

Tenneco, 
694 P.2d  at 100. The Tenneco court 
then held "that pollution control equipment is exempt upon acquisition if of a 
type that is ordinarily designed, installed and utilized primarily for pollution 
control." Tenneco, 694 P.2d  at 100. 
In the cases before us, the County Board heard evidence that the equipment in 
question is ordinarily used to produce low sulfur diesel 
fuel.

 

[¶20]   We repeat our oft-stated rule 
applied to tax exemptions, and this tax exemption in particular. "When 
interpreting tax statutes, there is a presumption against granting exceptions 
and in favor of taxation." General 
Chemical, 819 P.2d  at 422. Although WYO. STAT. § 35-11-1103 exempts 
pollution control devices from taxation, we see no evidence of an intent by the 
legislature to exempt equipment which is necessary to produce a marketable final 
product, even if that final product pollutes less when consumed by an end-user 
and even if environmental regulations require the modification to the final 
product. Such a reading of the statute would lead to a windfall for the 
corporate taxpayer, requiring the citizen taxpayers to pick up the tab for 
modifying, modernizing, or possibly even erecting a plant which produces a final 
product which pollutes less or meets environmental standards. Frontier and the 
State Board attempt to broaden the meaning of "designed, installed and utilized 
primarily" for pollution control beyond the intent of the legislature. The 
County Board appropriately applied a narrow construction to the statute. 
Therefore, we reverse the determination of the State Board of Equalization and 
reinstate the decision of the Laramie County Board of 
Equalization.

 

Determination of the Primary Purpose - Findings of 
Fact

 

[¶21]   Determining whether a device is 
primarily for pollution control is not an easy matter. See Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. 
State, 512 So. 2d 115, 116-17 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987). The County Board must 
weigh the evidence presented to it and determine if, as between several stated 
purposes for the equipment, the primary purpose is pollution control. In its 
1994 decision, the County Board made the following findings of fact (transcript 
cites omitted):

 

7. The Assessor disallowed the pollution control 
exemption for the Sulfur Plant, Sulfur Plant Engineering SRU #2, Amine Unit, 
Hydrogen Plant, Hydrotreater and Upgraded Flare Knockout 
System.

8. The refining process at Frontier produces 
primarily diesel fuel and gasoline from crude oil. About half of Frontier's 
market is an on-road diesel market.

9. Sulfur is a naturally occurring contaminant in the 
crude petroleum oils used to make diesel fuel. The removal of sulfur from the 
petroleum oils is necessary for the manufacture of diesel 
fuel.

10. Frontier desulfurizes diesel fuel by taking the 
unhydrotreated, or high sulfur diesel, and mixing it with hydrogen manufactured 
at Frontier's hydrogen plant in a diesel hydrotreater. The diesel hydrotreater 
is a catalytic system which removes the sulfur from high sulfur diesel and 
combines it with hydrogen, forming the hydrogen sulfide. The hydrogen sulfide 
gas is then routed to an amine unit which separates the hydrogen sulfide gas 
from other gaseous materials and sends the hydrogen sulfide gas in a pure form 
to the sulfur recovery unit, which converts the hydrogen sulfide gas into 
elemental sulfur and burns the remainder in the incinerator. See Exhibit 3 
(F-5). 

11. Frontier constructed the hydrogen plant to supply 
hydrogen for the process of removing sulfur from the diesel fuel. The hydrogen 
plant reacts methane (natural gas purchased from Cheyenne Light) with a catalyst 
under high temperatures and pressures generating hydrogen and carbon dioxide. 
The hydrogen and carbon dioxide are then separated from each other through a 
diethanolamine ("DEA") system. The hydrogen is then routed to the diesel 
hydrotreater and the carbon dioxide is vented. See Exhibit 
3(F-6).

12. The diesel hydrotreater is actually the process 
unit that accomplishes the desulfurization of the diesel fuel. It is a reactor 
with a catalyst that allows removal of the sulfur from the high sulfur diesel, 
producing a desulfurized diesel fuel meeting the federal environmental 
requirements and leaving gaseous hydrogen sulfide known as H2S. See Exhibit 
3(F-7).

13. The H2S gas then goes to the DEA treater, known 
as Frontier's Amine Unit. The Amine Unit separates the hydrogen sulfide from 
carbon dioxide or other gases, including methane, ethane, and propane. This 
process creates a very high purity hydrogen sulfide stream that then goes to the 
sulfur plant. These gases, along with other gases, are burned in the refinery 
for heat recovery. See Exhibit 
3(F-8).

14. From the Amine Unit, the H2S goes to the sulfur 
recovery units to undergo a process that converts hydrogen sulfide gas, gaseous 
hydrogen sulfide into elemental sulfur, and sends the remaining gas to a tail 
gas treatment unit, which recovers a little bit more of the hydrogen sulfide, 
and then to the incinerator for combustion. See Exhibit 3 (F-9). There are two 
sulfur recovery units: the 35 ton-per-day unit that is called the sulfur plant 
and was constructed in 1984 and the sulfur recovery unit #2 which is the new 65 
ton-per-day unit that went into service in 1992.

 

[¶22]   Based on these findings of fact the 
County Board concluded:

 

4. The desulfurization equipment; to-wit: Sulfur 
Plant, Sulfur Plant Engineering SRU #2, Amine Unit, Hydrogen Plant, and 
Hydrotreater do not qualify for pollution control exemption under W.S. § 
35-11-1103 and W.S. § 39-1-201(a)(xx), as the same were not designed, installed 
and utilized primarily for the elimination, control or prevention of air, water 
or land pollution.

5. The County Assessor, through Pickett, stated that 
the equipment which was denied the pollution control exemption "because they're 
primary and essential parts of the plants . . ." and this Board agrees with that 
analysis. This appears to be an interpretation of the State Board of Rules which 
provide:

Other beneficial purposes "means uses of property 
which are a value to the taxpayer such as . . . [p]roperty which functions as an 
essential item in the . . . industrial process or facility. Rules, Chapter XXX, 
Sec. 9(c)(i), State Board of Equalization.

 

[¶23]   In its decisions the State Board 
declared the County Board's determinations that the equipment is used "for the 
purposes of manufacturing a better product" (1993) and that the equipment 
constitutes "primary and essential parts of the plants" (1994) are not supported 
by the record or its own findings of fact. The State Board then announced that 
"[i]t is only because of environmental concerns and requirements the diesel fuel 
and gaseous hydrogen sulfide must be treated. We conclude, therefore, the 
equipment at issue constitutes pollution control devices for purposes of 
exemption allowed by W.S. § 35-11-1103." However, the State Board improperly 
broadened the scope of the exemption statute when it focused on the purpose of 
the final product, low-sulfur diesel fuel, rather than on the purpose of the 
equipment.

 

Primary vs. Other Purposes

 

[¶24]   Appellees also appear to assert 
that the equipment used after the diesel has been processed, which processes the 
H2S gas, is "primarily pollution control equipment," because it is not necessary 
to produce the fuel, but is necessary to process the poisonous hydrogen sulfide 
gas by-product. However, the County Board heard testimony concerning several 
purposes for the sulfur plant, the sulfur recovery unit and the amine unit. The 
purposes included: to "manufacture diesel according to current standards for 
highway consumption," "for the purpose of product and by-product recovery 
essentially," that the entire system is an integrated system "to produce 
compliant fuel and also meet other environmental emission standards" and that 
the amine treater and sulfur recovery units are necessary for "safety and health 
and risk management and insurance." When the evidence presents more than one 
purpose for equipment, the County Board, as the finder of fact, is responsible 
for determining whether the primary purpose of the equipment is pollution 
control. See State Bd. Of Equalization v. 
City of Lander, 882 P.2d 844, 848 (Wyo. 1994); City of Cheyenne v. Sims, 521 P.2d 1347, 
1349 (Wyo. 1974) (concerning statute exempting property used primarily for a 
governmental purpose). The County Board determined pollution control is not the 
primary purpose of the equipment. In State Bd. of Equalization v. City of 
Lander, we held:

 

The term "primarily" has an ordinary and obvious 
meaning in the law. "Primarily" means "of first importance" or "principally." 
The term "primarily" may also be synonymous with "essentially" or 
"fundamentally" in some circumstances.

 

City of Lander, 882 P.2d  at 850 (citations 
omitted).

 

[¶25]   Substantial evidence in the record 
before the County Board supports its denial of the pollution control exemption 
in this case. We do not substitute our judgment for factual determinations 
supported by substantial evidence. White, 837 P.2d 1095, 
1098.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶26]   The Laramie County Board of 
Equalization appropriately interpreted WYO. STAT. § 35-11-1103 narrowly, 
refusing to exempt equipment necessary to produce a marketable product from 
taxation. The County Board's decision that Frontier's sulfur management system 
is not primarily for pollution control is supported by substantial evidence and 
not contrary to law. Therefore, the State Board of Equalization's orders 
reversing the County Board are reversed.

 

Footnotes

1 The 1993 assessment is the subject of 
Wyoming Supreme Court case number 95-96. At issue from the 1993 assessment are 
the sulfur plant, sulfur recovery unit, and amine 
unit.

2 The 1994 assessment is the subject of 
Wyoming Supreme Court case number 95-134. At issue from the 1994 assessment are 
the sulfur plant, sulfur recovery unit, amine unit, hydrogen plant, and 
hydrotreater unit. The hydrogen plant and hydrotreater were not completed until 
1993 and were not available for exemption until the 1994 
assessment.

3 The assessments, county board hearings 
and appeals to the state board involved two separate cases for 1993 and 1994. 
The two cases were not consolidated until they reached this Court. However, the 
parties have stipulated that the issues on appeal for both cases are 
identical.