Title: BRYAN EDWARD HUMPHREY V. DEBRA KAY HUMPHREY

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BRYAN EDWARD HUMPHREY V. DEBRA KAY HUMPHREY2007 WY 72157 P.3d 451Case Number: 06-155Decided: 04/30/2007
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
BRYAN 
EDWARD HUMPHREY,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
DEBRA 
KAY HUMPHREY,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from theDistrictCourtofTetonCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

W. Keith 
Goody of Alpine, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Lea 
Kuvinka of Kuvinka & Kuvinka, P.C., Jackson, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Bryan Humphrey 
("Husband") challenges a division of property ordered by the district court in 
his divorce action against Debra Humphrey ("Wife").  Husband claims that the district court 
erred when it considered the value of Husband's interest in a family business 
for purposes of dividing property because it is only an expectancy interest that 
may not come into being.  In the 
alternative, Husband argues that if his interest in the business can be 
currently divided, it was still improper to do so because it is separate 
property transferred to him "as a consequence of his parents' estate 
plan."

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Husband provides 
the following issues for our review:

 
 
I.       Did the 
District Court err when it valued [Husband's] expectancy interest in the 
Humphrey Family Limited Partnership at $578,000.00 and found that the interest 
should be taken into consideration in the division of 
property?

 
 
II.      Did the District 
Court err when it found that the Humphrey Family Limited Partnership was marital 
property, even though the Partnership was organized by [Husband's] father as an 
estate planning device?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Husband and Wife 
were married in 1987.  Four children 
were born of the marriage, though custody and support are not issues in this 
appeal.  On November 12, 2003, 
Husband filed a complaint seeking a divorce, a property division, and an order 
regarding custody and care of the couple's children.  A bench trial was held November 28 and 
29, 2005.

 
 
[¶4]      A central issue 
at trial was Husband's interest in a family business, the Bar J Chuckwagon, and 
whether it could, or should, be considered part of the marital estate and be 
equitably divided in the divorce.  
Husband's father began the Chuckwagon in 1977 by leasing 20 acres of land 
in TetonCounty for a term of 20 
years.  At the same time, Husband's 
father also created the Bar J Wranglers, a singing and entertaining group.  A typical evening at the Chuckwagon 
involved a meal and after-dinner entertainment performed by the Wranglers.  Husband began working for the Chuckwagon 
at a young age and, after completing college, became a member of the 
Wranglers.

 
 
[¶5]      When Bar J's 
lease on its land ended in 1998, Husband's father decided to purchase the 
property instead of exercising his option to renew the lease.  He formed the Humphrey Limited Liability 
Company ("the LLC") to purchase the land and, because Husband's father "had no 
will or anything like that," Husband was given a 1/3 interest in the LLC as well 
as being appointed as assistant manager and secretary-treasurer thereof.  It appears that Husband also personally 
guaranteed the loan that the LLC obtained to buy the land.  In 2001, Husband's parents formed the 
Humphrey Family Limited Partnership ("the FLP"), in which Husband later became a 
limited partner by transferring his 1/3 interest in the LLC for a 25.55% 
interest in the FLP.  One of the 
stated purposes of the FLP was "to prevent the transfer of a family member's 
interest in the Partnership as a result of a failed marriage."[1]

 
 
[¶6]      The district 
court determined that Husband's interest in the FLP had a value of $578,000 and 
"should be taken into consideration in the division of property."  In the ultimate property division, 
Husband retained his interest in the FLP and in the Bar J Wranglers, but Wife 
was awarded, among other property, $300,000 to be paid over six years.  Husband now appeals the district court's 
order.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]                  
            
The division of marital property is within the trial court's sound 
discretion, and we will not disturb that division absent an abuse of 
discretion.  Carlton v. Carlton, 997 P.2d 1028, 1032 (Wyo. 
2000).  A just and equitable 
distribution is as likely as not to be unequal.  Id.  We evaluate whether the trial court's 
property division is, in fact, equitable from the perspective of the overall 
distribution of marital assets and liabilities rather than from a narrow focus 
on the effects of any particular disposition.  Id.  From that perspective, we afford the 
trial court considerable discretion to form a distributive scheme appropriate to 
the peculiar circumstances of each individual case, and we will not disturb such 
a scheme absent a showing that the trial court clearly abused its 
discretion.  Id.  The division of property in a divorce 
case should not be disturbed except on clear grounds as the trial court is 
usually in a better position than the appellate court to judge the parties' 
respective merits and needs.  
Metz v. Metz, 2003 WY 3, ¶ 6, 61 P.3d 383, ¶ 6 
(Wyo. 2003).  The trial court is 
also in the best position to assess the witnesses' credibility and weigh their 
testimony.  Raymond v. Raymond, 956 P.2d 329, 332 
(Wyo. 
1998).  We, therefore, give 
considerable deference to its findings.  
Id.  The ultimate question in determining 
whether an abuse of discretion occurred is whether the trial court could 
reasonably conclude as it did.  
Metz, 2003 WY 3, 
¶ 6.  In answering that question, we 
consider only the evidence of the successful party, ignore the evidence of the 
unsuccessful party, and grant the successful party every favorable inference 
that can be drawn from the record.  
Holland v. Holland, 2001 WY 113, ¶ 8, 35 P.3d 409, ¶ 8 
(Wyo. 2001).

 
 

Sweat v. 
Sweat, 2003 
WY 82, ¶ 6, 72 P.3d 276, 278 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶8]      Husband first 
argues that the district court erred when it valued his interest in the FLP and 
took that value into consideration when dividing the marital property.  Husband's argument relies heavily on our 
decisions in Dunham v. Dunham, 2006 
WY 1, 125 P.3d 1015 (Wyo. 2006), and Storm v. Storm, 470 P.2d 367 (Wyo. 1970), for the 
proposition that here, as in those cases, the property at issue is merely an 
expectancy that cannot be divided.

 
 
[¶9]      In Dunham, 2006 WY 1, ¶¶ 10-13, 125 P.3d  at 
1018, a husband had been receiving "deferred compensation" from a previous 
employer for several years, but the evidence showed that he had no guarantee of 
continuing to collect such income.  
We held that, because the income was "merely an expectancy," it could not 
be considered marital property subject to division in a divorce decree.  Id., ¶ 12, 125 P.3d  at 1018.  We explained that 
there is

 
 
a 
distinction between current rights to future assets, and mere expectancies.  [24 Am.Jur.2d Divorce and Separation § 515 
(1998).]  We have said, "[w]ith 
respect to future property, we think the rule must be that, when a court divides 
property incidental to the granting of a divorce, the court is limited by the 
amount of property in its hands for division and a mere expectancy is not 
subject to division."  Storm v. Storm, 470 P.2d 367, 370 
(Wyo. 
1970).  Referring specifically to 
our discussion in Storm, § 515 
clarifies that "[a]n expectancy is a future interest which cannot be distributed 
in a divorce proceeding since it may never come into being."  24 Am.Jur.2d, supra, §515; see also Kane v. Kane, 577 P.2d 172, 175 
(Wyo. 
1978).

 
 

Id., 2006 
WY 1, ¶ 12, 125 P.3d  at 1018.

 
 
[¶10]   Our decisions in Dunham and Storm have no bearing on the instant 
appeal.  In those cases, one spouse 
sought to include unvested future interests in the marital estate and we held 
that future property cannot be included if it may never come into being.  In this case, Husband has a current 
vested interest in the FLP, thus, there is no question regarding whether he will 
gain the interest in the future.  
Simply put, Husband currently owns the FLP interest that was considered 
by the district court.  His 
arguments regarding his parents' intent that the FLP and the LLC be considered 
estate planning devices also has no bearing on this issue because they made a 
current transfer of the property, not a future revocable bequest.  Similarly, Husband's claim that he "has 
absolutely nothing to do with the property" is not determinative, because his 
decision-making control over the FLP is not an issue here, rather, the only 
issue is whether he has a current interest in, or a mere expectancy of, future 
property.  Clearly, the district 
court did not err in determining that Husband's vested interest in the FLP was 
not a mere expectancy.

 
 
[¶11]   Having determined that Husband 
possessed a current interest in the FLP, we next consider whether the district 
court erred when it included the value of Husband's interest as marital 
property.2  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-114 (LexisNexis 
2005) guides a district court's distribution of property in conjunction with a 
divorce:

 
 
            
In granting a divorce, the court shall make such disposition of the 
property of the parties as appears just and equitable, having regard for the 
respective merits of the parties and the condition in which they will be left by 
the divorce, the party through whom the property was acquired and the burdens 
imposed upon the property for the benefit of either party and 
children.

 
 
[¶12]   Husband argues that the district 
court abused its discretion under § 20-2-114 because his interest in the LLC  
and subsequently the FLP  "was part of the estate plan of [Husband's] father 
and mother" and "was not a product of the marital union."  Wife responds that the district court 
did not divide Husband's interest in the FLP, it merely considered the value of 
Husband's interest in the overall distribution of property.  She further insists that the district 
court's distribution was equitable under § 20-2-114. 

 
 
[¶13]   "As this Court has consistently 
pointed out, under the statute all property of the parties is subject to 
distribution."  Hall v. Hall, 2005 WY 166, ¶ 8, 125 P.3d 284, 287 (Wyo. 2005).  

 
 
            
We have emphasized time and time again that when making marital property 
distributions upon divorce, a trial court must consider a number of 
factors.  Specifically, in rendering 
such a decision the trial court must have regard for 1) the respective merits of 
the parties, 2) the condition in which the parties will be left by the divorce, 
3) the party through whom the property was acquired, and 4) the burdens imposed 
upon the property for the benefit of either party and children.  Hall, at ¶¶11-12.  The trial court has the discretion to 
determine what weight should be given each of these individual 
factors.

 
 

Wallop 
v. Wallop, 2004 
WY 46, ¶ 26, 88 P.3d 1022, 1030 (Wyo. 2004).  

 
 
[¶14]   In the instant case, the district 
court acknowledged that Husband individually owned the interest in the FLP (and 
the LLC before that).  However, it 
also examined other facts and circumstances of the marriage and determined that 
the value of Husband's interest should be considered in formulating an equitable 
property distribution.  The district 
court did not abuse its discretion in reaching this 
conclusion.

 
 
[¶15]   In Breitenstine v. Breitenstine, 2003 WY 
16, 62 P.3d 587 (Wyo. 2003), we considered a husband's appeal wherein the 
district court had considered gifts and an inheritance received by the husband 
during marriage when determining an equitable division of property.  We said that § 
20-2-114

 
 
[i]ndicates 
that the party through whom the property was acquired is one of the multiple factors the 
trial court considers in determining the appropriate division of property.  In McCulloh [v. Drake, 2001 WY 56, 24 P.3d 1162 (Wyo. 
2001)], we made it clear that property inherited by one party can be awarded to the party by whom 
it was inherited or given.  McCulloh, at ¶ 15.  But we did not hold that property 
inherited by one spouse must always be awarded to the spouse that received 
it.  Before the McCulloh decision, we said no hard and 
fast rules govern property divisions. . . .   We continue to adhere to that 
principle.  We have never 
established bright line rules for the disposition of a gift or inheritance, and 
we do not do so now.  Instead, we 
review whether the trial court considered the appropriate factors in making the 
disposition.  The particular 
circumstances of the case dictate the property 
distribution.

 
 

Breitenstine, 2003 
WY 16, ¶ 9, 62 P.3d  at 590-91 (emphasis in original) (some citations 
omitted).  In the instant case, as 
in Breitenstine, the district court 
considered a variety of factors in making its final disposition.  The district court recognized that 
Husband's interest in the LLC and the subsequent FLP was created through 
Humphrey family transfers; however, the district court also considered the fact 
that Wife had served as the primary caregiver for the children during the 
marriage and, as such, had a lower earning capacity and fewer assets.  The district court also took into 
account the evidence presented that Husband's interest was not created solely as 
a gift, but had been earned during the marriage by his continued employment with 
the Chuckwagon and the Wranglers, and that the loans secured by the LLC for the 
purchase of the Bar J property were personally guaranteed by Husband.  The district court ultimately considered 
the value of the FLP interest when it divided the property, but allowed Husband 
to retain that interest, giving effect to the stated purposes of the FLP.  Under the facts and circumstances of 
this case, we cannot find that the district court erred in considering the value 
of Husband's interest in the FLP when it divided property in the 
divorce.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶16]   The district court did not abuse 
its discretion in considering the value of Husband's FLP interest when dividing 
the marital assets.

 
 
[¶17]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1It is 
also noteworthy that the district court found that Husband transferred his LLC 
interest into the FLP "approximately one month after the parties separated and 
about one month prior to [Husband] filing for divorce."

 
 

2Husband 
does not take issue with the $578,000 value placed on his partnership interest; 
instead, he only argues that, no matter the value, it should have been 
considered separate property.