Title: Ellis v. FALLERT

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Affirmed February 6, 1957.
*407 George M. Roberts, Medford, argued the cause for appellant. On the brief were Roberts, Kellington & Branchfield, of Medford.
Ray H. Lafky, Assistant Attorney General for Oregon, of Salem, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief was Robert Y. Thornton, Attorney General for Oregon.
Before TOOZE[*], Acting Chief Justice, and ROSSMAN, LUSK, BRAND, PERRY and McALLISTER, Justices.
AFFIRMED.
BRAND, J.
The plaintiff, Marianne Ellis, brings this action for damages against the defendants, alleging that they negligently injured her husband. She claims the right to recover because of the loss of consortium. The Attorney General of the State of Oregon, on the request of the State Industrial Accident Commission, filed an answer setting up the fact that the plaintiff's husband was an employee of the defendants, that defendants were engaged in a hazardous occupation, and that the defendants and the plaintiff's husband were all subject to the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law at the time of the injury. Motions were made to strike the answer and in the alternative to strike portions thereof. The motions were denied. Plaintiff filed a reply. The parties filed a stipulation of fact and the trial court entered judgment for the defendants. Plaintiff appeals.
We deem it unnecessary further to discuss the state of the pleadings or to separately consider the *408 numerous assignments of error. The agreed facts are that the plaintiff's husband and the defendants, as employers, were under the Workmen's Compensation Law, that plaintiff's husband was entitled to compensation under that law, that he applied for compensation, and that the State Industrial Accident Commission
For the purposes of this case we shall assume that if plaintiff's husband was not under the Workmen's Compensation Law, as stipulated, she would have a cause of action against the defendants for the negligent injury to her husband, resulting in loss of consortium, and that such right would be accorded to her under the provisions of ORS 108.010, which reads as follows:
See Smith v. Smith, 205 Or 286, 287 P2d 572.
The issue is stated in the plaintiff's brief, as follows:
In his argument before this court counsel for plaintiff affirmatively stated that there is only one question in the case, namely, whether under ORS 108.010, supra, a wife may sue for loss of consortium when the husband is an employee of an employer who is subject to the Workmen's Compensation Law. Counsel also said:
We agree with this analysis and will proceed to consider whether plaintiff had a right to sue her husband's employer for loss of consortium under the conditions existing in this case.
We must first determine the nature and extent of the rights granted to the plaintiff by ORS 108.010 supra. Prior to its amendment by the Laws of 1941, ch 228, the statute provided, in part:
Concerning that law, this court said:
ORS 108.010 which grants to a wife the right to sue for loss of consortium was considered in Smith v. Smith, supra, where we said:
*411 1. Having found that the right of a wife to sue for loss of consortium is measured by the right which a husband has to sue for loss of consortium when his wife is wrongfully injured, our next duty is to determine whether a husband would have the right to sue a negligent third party for loss of consortium if his wife was an injured employee entitled to benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Law. The statute provides:
2. In Bigby v. Pelican Bay Lumber Co., 173 Or 682, 147 P2d 199, the plaintiff sought to recover damages for the death of her son which resulted from injuries suffered by him while employed by the defendant, due to its negligence in failing to comply with the provisions of the Employer's Liability Act, and this court considered the question of "whether or not an employer who is subject to the Workmen's Compensation Act * * * and has fully complied with its provisions, is relieved from all personal liability on account of the death or injury of an employee subject to the act, arising out of and in the course of the latter's employment." Plaintiff's contention was that no one *412 is precluded from maintaining an action against such an employer except the injured workman, or, in case of his death, his beneficiaries specified in the act, a point also urged by the plaintiff at bar. This court stated, at pages 690, 692:
3. The reasoning of the Bigby case leads to the conclusion that a husband does not have a right to sue for the loss of consortium of his wife when she is an injured employee covered by the act, and therefore to the further conclusion that the wife cannot sue for loss of consortium in the pending case.
Hartman v. Cold Spring Granite Company, 247 Minn 515, 77 NW 2d 651, comes very close to the law and the facts in the case at bar. Hartman was an injured workman receiving compensation from the Industrial Accident Commission. His wife sued the defendant company for loss of consortium. The Minnesota statute imposed upon the employer the duty to *413 compensate the injured workman "according to the schedules of the Workmen's Compensation Act." It then provided:
It was held that "`When the Compensation Act applies, as it does here, it is exclusive of all other remedies.'"
In the following cases it has been held that a spouse cannot recover for loss of consortium when his or her husband or wife suffers an injury which is compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Guse v. A.O. Smith Corp., 260 Wis 403, 51 NW2d 24; Stainbrook v. Johnson County Farm Bureau Co-op Ass'n, 125 Ind App 487, 122 NE2d 884; Bevis v. Armco Steel Corp., 156 Ohio St 293, 102 NE2d 444; Napier v. Martin, 194 Tenn 105, 250 SW2d 35; Garrett v. Reno Oil Co., Tex Civ App (1954), 271 SW2d 764; Ash v. S.S. Mullen, Inc., 43 Wash 2d 345, 261 P2d 118; Josewski v. Midland Constructors Inc., 117 F Supp 681.
Although, in the cases cited, the relevant statutory provisions differ from the wording of ORS 656.152(2), they do not differ in substance from the Oregon statute as construed in Bigby v. Pelican Bay Lumber Co., supra. We adhere to that decision.
The Oregon Workmen's Compensation Act offers compensation to workmen who are within its purview for negligent and for non-negligent injuries and provides *414 that such compensation is "in lieu of all claims against his employer" except as provided, and in the Bigby case we said that an employer who complies with the act is not liable "to a workman * * * or to any one else." In other words, the remedy under the act is exclusive. The cases cited from other jurisdictions are based on statutes which in one form or another also provide that the remedy under the act is exclusive. A review of many decisions clearly demonstrates that the legislative intent was to make the statutory remedy exclusive.
The plaintiff relies upon Cooney v. Mommaw, 109 F Supp 448, and Brown v. Georgia Tennessee Coaches, Inc., 88 Ga App 519, 77 SE2d 24. In neither case was a Workmen's Compensation Act involved. Those decisions go no further than ORS 108.010 which confers the right of action for loss of consortium upon a wife living with her husband. They are not in point.
Plaintiff strongly relies upon Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F2d 811. That case was decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The greater portion of the opinion is directed to the establishment of a right of action by a wife for loss of consortium, a matter which is established in this state by statute. The Federal Court then considered the effect upon that right of the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act "which provides exclusive liability for employers." That act was in part, as follows:
Concerning this provision the court said:
Nevertheless the court went on to hold that the wife could sue in her own right for loss of consortium even though her husband had received compensation under the act. In this respect the case is contrary to our holding in Bigby v. Pelican Bay Lumber Co., supra.
The Hitaffer case is distinguishable from the case at bar in the following respect: Under the federal act no distinction is made as between the amount of compensation payable to married and unmarried male claimants. The court argued that where the husband has failed to recover for his inability to support his wife, and where impairment of his ability so to do was a compensable element of damage, the right to sue therefor belonged to the wife.
Under the Oregon statute an unmarried man who has suffered temporary total disability receives compensation equal to 50 per cent of wages but not more than $115 per month. If such a workman has a wife and child under 18 years of age he receives 66-2/3 per cent of wages but not more than $165 per month. ORS 656.210. In the case at bar the court found that the plaintiff's husband was entitled to and was receiving the maximum compensation provided by law for temporary total disability of a workman having wife and infant child. Thus it is apparent that the intent of the Oregon legislature was to take into consideration the *416 welfare of wife and child as well as that of the injured workman in awarding compensation.
4. A comment by the Supreme Court of Washington is pertinent at this point:
The Hitaffer case has not received the approval of the state courts. The Supreme Court of Ohio said:
From the Supreme Court of Minnesota comes the following comment:
In Brown v. Curtin & Johnson, Inc., 221 F2d 106, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia refused to extend the doctrine of Hitaffer to cases of fatal injury, and said:
Other cases rejecting the Hitaffer decision are: Josewski v. Midland Constructors, Inc.; Garrett v. Reno Oil Co., both supra; and see, 36 Cornell Quarterly, pp 148 to 156; 2 Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law 144, § 66.20.
The parties have stipulated that the court may try the defense raised by the answer of the Attorney General. Under the stipulation we deem it unnecessary to pass upon the right of the Attorney General to file the answer in this case or to determine whether the plaintiff is a "beneficiary" as that term is used in ORS 656.582(1) or in ORS 656.002(1). But see, ORS 656.228.
5. Our decision rests squarely upon the proposition that the benefits extended to the workman for himself, his wife and child, are "in lieu of all claims against his employer" (ORS 656.152) by the workman or by his wife. Bigby v. Pelican Bay Lumber Co., supra.
*418 6. The constitutionality of the statute thus construed is not seriously challenged here nor have any of the courts whose decisions we have cited and which support our conclusion considered it necessary even to consider the constitutional question. We are of the opinion that the act as construed is valid. The cause has been ably presented by both parties.
The judgment of the learned circuit judge is affirmed.
[*]  Died December 21, 1956.