Title: John Wiese and Elizabeth Wiese v. Jamir D. Dedhia et als

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). The facts underlying this appeal are these. On September 10, 1997, John and Elizabeth Wiese, husband and wife, were injured in an automobile accident (collectively plaintiffs ). They sued James Dedhia, the driver of the vehicle; the car s owner; and the driver s insurer (collectively defendants ). Plaintiffs sought to recover for their personal injuries and for Elizabeth s loss of services and consortium. Plaintiffs claims were submitted to mandatory arbitration and the arbitrator awarded damages in the amount of $60,000 to John and $17,500 to Elizabeth. Defendants rejected the arbitration award and demanded a trial de novo. Prior to trial, plaintiffs submitted a joint offer of settlement for $75,000. Defendants rejected that offer. At trial, the parties stipulated to 5% negligence against John and 95% negligence against Jamir Dedhia. Following a ten-day trial, the jury awarded $83,814 to John, reduced by 5% to $79,243.30, and $20,336 to Elizabeth. Plaintiffs thereafter moved for counsel fees, costs, and interest pursuant to Rule 4:58-2. The trial court denied the motion. Plaintiffs appealed the decision of the trial court and the Appellate Division reversed, finding that the combined award of over $90,000 qualified as being in excess of 120% of the $75,000 joint offer. In reaching its conclusion, the appellate panel reasoned that the effectiveness of the offer of judgment rule would be undermined if it were construed to require spousal plaintiffs with interrelated claims to submit separate offers of judgment. On remand, the trial judge awarded plaintiffs counsel fees, costs, and prejudgment interest for the trial and for the appeal. Defendants appealed, challenging, among other things, the amount of fees and costs awarded. The Appellate Division affirmed and neither party appealed that decision. Plaintiffs later moved for counsel fees and costs incurred on the second appeal. The Appellate Division denied plaintiffs motion by order. The Supreme Court granted certification. HELD: All costs as a result of the rejection of an offer of settlement, including those incurred in Appellate Division and Supreme Court proceedings, fall within the scope of Rule 4:58-2. 1. The plain language of Rule 4:58-2 clearly provides that when a pre-trial offer is rejected and the money award exceeds 120% of the offer, the offeror is entitled to all reasonable litigation expenses incurred following non-acceptance. The rule further entitles the offeror to attorney s fees for such subsequent services as are compelled by the non-acceptance. The offer of judgment rule is mandatory and does not permit the judge discretion in determining whether or not to award attorney s fees and costs of suit in an offer of judgment case. (Pp. 4-7) 2. Rule 2:11-4 provides that counsel fees may be allowed by the Appellate Court, in its discretion. Nonetheless, Rule 2:11-4 does not trump the language of Rule 4:58-2. The offer of judgment rule was intended as a procedural mechanism to facilitate the settlement of cases. It was intended to penalize, through the imposition of financial consequences, a party who rejects a settlement offer that turns out to be more favorable than the ultimate judgment. Thus, it would thwart Rule 4:58-2 to allow a party who has rejected a settlement to escape mandatory payment for any portion of the costs incurred as a result of that decision. Although the discretionary provision of Rule 2:11-4 ordinarily governs counsel fees on appeal, it was not meant to take the place of Rule 4:58-2, which serves a unique and specific purpose of imposing financial consequences on parties who unwisely reject an offer of settlement and insist on a trial. (Pp. 7-9) Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED for calculation of fees and costs in accordance with this opinion. JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI, ALBIN, WALLACE, and RIVERA-SOTO join in JUSTICE LONG S opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 92 September Term 2005 JOHN WIESE and ELIZABETH WIESE, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JAMIR D. DEDHIA, DAMYANTI D. DEDHIA and RUTGERS CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants. Argued October 11, 2006 Decided December 13, 2006 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Rudolph C. Westmoreland argued the cause for appellants (Westmoreland Vesper & Quattrone, attorneys; Thomas J. Vesper, on the brief). JUSTICE LONG delivered the opinion of the Court. The offer of judgment rule provides that, where, as here, a defendant does not accept a plaintiff s pre-trial settlement offer and the ultimate verdict in the plaintiff s favor exceeds 120% of the offer, counsel fees and other trial costs are recoverable by the plaintiff. See footnote 1 R. 4:58. In this appeal, we have been asked to delimit the margins of that rule. In particular, we are faced with the question of whether Rule 4:58 covers counsel fees and costs incurred on appeal. We hold that it does, and that the consequences of non-acceptance under Rule 4:58 are mandatory not only for trial costs but for those incurred on appeal. [R. 4:58-1 (2005).] The rule further provided for the consequences of non-acceptance of the claimant s offer: If the offer of a claimant is not accepted and the claimant obtains a verdict or determination at least as favorable as the rejected offer or, if a money judgment, in an amount that is 120% of the offer or more, excluding allowable prejudgment interest and counsel fees, the claimant shall be allowed, in addition to costs of suit: (a) all reasonable litigation expenses incurred following non-acceptance; (b) prejudgment interest of eight percent on the amount of any money recovery from the date of the offer or the date of completion of discovery, whichever is later, but only to the extent that such prejudgment interest exceeds the interest prescribed by R. 4:42-11(b), which also shall be allowable; and (c) a reasonable attorney s fee, which shall belong to the client, for such subsequent services as are compelled by the non-acceptance, such fee to be applied for within 20 days following entry of final judgment and in accordance with R. 4:42-9(b). [R. 4:58-2 (2005)(emphasis added).] As noted, the question presented is whether the rule was intended to sweep in costs and attorney s fees incurred on appeal. When interpreting court rules, we ordinarily apply canons of statutory construction. E.g., First Resolution Inv. Corp. v. Seker, 171 N.J. 502, 511 (2002); Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 278 (1961) (applying canons of construction in interpreting court rule). Accordingly, as with a statute, the analysis must begin with the plain language of the rule. DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005). The Court must ascribe to the [words of the rule] their ordinary meaning and significance . . . and read them in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the [court rules] as a whole . . . . Id. at 492 (citations omitted). If the language of the rule is ambiguous such that it leads to more than one plausible interpretation, the Court may turn to extrinsic evidence. Id. at 493. Rule 4:58-2 clearly provides that when a pre-trial offer is rejected and the monetary award exceeds 120% of the offer, the offeror is entitled to all reasonable litigation expenses incurred following non-acceptance. R. 4:58-2(a) (emphasis added). The rule further entitles the offeror to attorney s fees for such subsequent services as are compelled by the non-acceptance. R. 4:58-2(c). The rule is cast in mandatory and not exhortatory terms, and, thus, accords judges no discretion regarding whether or not to award attorney s fees and costs of suit in an offer of judgment case. R. 4:58-2 (promulgating that such recovery shall be allowed ); see also, McMahon v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 364 N.J. Super. 188, 194 (App. Div. 2003) (stating that the consequences of non-acceptance of a plaintiff s offer under R. 4:58-2 are mandatory ) (emphasis added). Although defendants have not advanced an ambiguity argument on this appeal and the Appellate Division did not set forth any reasons for denying plaintiffs motion, we surmise that the rationale underlying the denial was that Rule 2:11-4, stating that appellate counsel fees may be allowed by the Appellate Court, in its discretion , trumps Rule 4:58-2. R. 2:11-4 (emphasis added). We disagree. Patterned after Fed. R. Civ. P. 68, the offer of judgment rule was intended as a procedural mechanism to facilitate the settlement of cases. Inducement to settlement has remained the fundamental purpose of the rule as it has evolved. Pressler, supra, cmt. 1 on R. 4:58. We have described the rule as being designed particularly as a mechanism to encourage, promote, and stimulate early out-of-court settlement of . . . claims that in justice and reason ought to be settled without trial. The rule was intended to penalize a party who rejects a settlement offer that turns out to be more favorable than the ultimate judgment. Gonzalez v. Safe & Sound Sec. Corp., 185 N.J. 100, 125 (2005) (citations omitted); see also, Crudup v. Marrero, 57 N.J. 353, 361 (1971) (explaining that the offer of judgment rule was designed particularly as a mechanism to encourage, promote, and stimulate early out-of-court settlement of . . . claims that in justice and reason ought to be settled without trial ). In essence, the rule imposes financial consequences on a party who rejects a settlement offer that turns out to be more favorable than the ultimate judgment. Schettino v. Roizman Dev., 158 N.J. 476, 482 (1999). Given those purposes, it would thwart the rule to allow a party who has rejected a settlement to escape mandatory payment for any portion of the costs incurred as a result of his decision. That reading of the Rule 4:58-2 can be reconciled with Rule 2:11-4 because the former is specific and the latter general. Kingsley v. Wes Outdoor Adver. Co., 55 N.J. 336, 339 (1970) (holding that when there is a conflict between a general and a specific act, the latter shall prevail ). Put another way, although the discretionary provision of Rule 2:11-4 ordinarily governs counsel fees on appeal, it was not meant to take the place of Rule 4:58-2, which serves the unique and particular purpose of imposing financial consequences on parties who unwisely reject an offer of settlement and insist on a trial. In sum, all costs as a result of the rejection of an offer of judgment, including those incurred in Appellate Division and Supreme Court proceedings, fall within the scope of Rule 4:58-2. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY NO. A-92 SEPTEMBER TERM 2005 ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court JOHN WIESE and ELIZABETH WIESE, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JAMIR D. DEDHIA, DAMYANTI D. DEDHIA and RUTGERS CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants. DECIDED December 13, 2006 Justice Long PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Long CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY DISSENTING OPINION BY