Title: People v. Ollo

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
TREYVON LOVE OLLO, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S260130 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Two 
B290948 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
KA115677 
 
 
June 21, 2021 
 
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 
Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, Groban, and Jenkins concurred. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. OLLO 
S260130 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (a) provides that 
a defendant who personally inflicts great bodily injury on any 
person other than an accomplice in the commission of a felony 
shall receive an additional three-year term of imprisonment 
following the prison term imposed for the underlying offense.  In 
2018, a Los Angeles County jury convicted defendant Treyvon 
Love Ollo of furnishing or giving a controlled substance to a 
minor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11353) and found true the 
allegation that Ollo had personally inflicted great bodily injury 
upon the minor in the commission of the offense.  The trial court 
imposed a nine-year prison sentence for the furnishing count, 
plus an additional three years for the great bodily injury 
enhancement.  The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding as a 
matter of law that furnishing drugs to a victim who later 
overdoses is sufficient for a great bodily injury enhancement.  
(People v. Ollo (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1152, 1158 (Ollo).) 
We granted review to determine whether a defendant who 
furnishes a controlled substance “personally inflicts” great 
bodily injury whenever the person furnished with the drugs 
suffers such injury from using the drugs.  (Pen. Code, § 12022.7; 
all undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.)  In 
other words, is a conviction for furnishing or giving a controlled 
substance sufficient as a matter of law to establish personal 
infliction of great bodily injury under section 12022.7?  We hold 
that the act of furnishing is not by itself sufficient to establish 
PEOPLE v. OLLO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
personal infliction.  Whether a defendant who furnishes drugs 
personally inflicts such injury depends on the facts of the 
particular case.  To determine whether a defendant personally 
inflicts an injury, factfinders and courts must examine the 
circumstances of the underlying offense and the defendant’s role 
in causing the injury that followed.   
I. 
On June 29, 2017, 18-year-old Ollo sent his 16-year-old 
girlfriend, Reina, a text message telling her that he had cocaine.  
Reina arrived at Ollo’s house around 5:00 p.m.  Reina used an 
identification card to separate two lines of white powder, and 
she then snorted one line.  Ollo did not partake.  He later told 
the police that the powder “smell[ed] like gasoline” and was less 
white than the cocaine he usually purchased.  Around 7:30 or 
8:00 p.m., 30 minutes after snorting the substance, Reina fell 
asleep.  At 9:00 p.m., Ollo checked to make sure Reina was still 
breathing.  Ollo then fell asleep next to Reina. 
Ollo woke up the next morning between 8:00 and 9:00 a.m.  
When he tried to rouse Reina, she was nonresponsive, cold, and 
stiff.  Ollo sent text messages to a friend asking for help putting 
Reina in a car to take her to the hospital, but the friend said he 
did not want to get involved.  Ollo then called 911.  Reina was 
pronounced dead at the scene. 
A white powdery substance collected from the dresser near 
Reina’s body tested positive for fentanyl.  Toxicology samples 
collected during Reina’s autopsy also tested positive for 
fentanyl.  The medical examiner determined that Reina died 
from fentanyl intoxication. 
Ollo was charged with furnishing, giving, or offering to 
furnish or give a controlled substance to a minor.  (Health & Saf. 
PEOPLE v. OLLO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
3 
Code, § 11353.)  The prosecutor further alleged that in the 
commission of this crime, Ollo personally inflicted great bodily 
injury upon Reina.  (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).)  After the prosecutor 
presented her case-in-chief, Ollo moved to dismiss the allegation 
of great bodily injury.  The court denied the motion.  Defense 
counsel then requested clarification of the court’s order and 
asserted that he “should be able to argue whether the facts meet 
the elements” of the great bodily injury enhancement.  The 
court, relying on People v. Martinez (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1169 
(Martinez), responded, “He wants to argue she’s responsible for 
her own death, she took the drugs on her own volition, right?  
And according to these cases I don’t think you can argue that.”  
Defense counsel objected, arguing that the case law cited by the 
court was “very distinguishable as to the acts” and that “it would 
be a complete violation of Mr. Ollo’s Sixth Amendment right to 
prevent [defense counsel] from arguing whether or not facts 
from the stand meet the elements.”  The court concluded this 
exchange by stating, “If your argument is going to be [Ollo] gave 
[Reina] the drugs — if you believe he gave her the drugs, he’s 
not responsible because she voluntarily took them, I don’t think 
that can be done because I think it’s in contravention to 
[Martinez].” 
In his closing statement, defense counsel argued that 
there was no evidence Ollo gave the fentanyl to Reina.  He did 
not discuss whether the facts met the elements of the great 
bodily injury enhancement.  The jury convicted Ollo of offering 
a controlled substance to a minor and furnishing or giving away 
a controlled substance to a minor.  It also sustained the 
allegation that Ollo personally inflicted great bodily injury upon 
Reina within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a).  
PEOPLE v. OLLO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
4 
The court sentenced Ollo to nine years in prison, plus an 
additional three years for the great bodily injury enhancement. 
On appeal, Ollo argued that the trial court erred by 
limiting defense counsel’s closing argument.  The Court of 
Appeal affirmed.  (Ollo, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1158–
1159.)  It noted that “trial courts enjoy ‘ “great latitude” ’ in 
regulating the permissible scope of closing argument . . . , and 
on that basis may preclude any argument that is contrary to the 
law.”  (Id. at p. 1156, citation omitted.)  It then held that “a 
defendant’s act of furnishing drugs and the user’s voluntary act 
of ingesting them constitute concurrent direct causes, such that 
the defendant who so furnishes personally inflicts great bodily 
injury upon his victim when she subsequently dies from an 
overdose.”  (Id. at p. 1158.)  Acknowledging the breadth of its 
holding, the court said that “drug dealers are liable for 
additional prison time whenever the persons to whom they 
furnish drugs are subjected to great bodily injury due to their 
drug use.”  (Id. at p. 1159, italics added.)  We granted review. 
II. 
“California has many sentencing statutes that increase 
the prison term otherwise available for the charged offense.”  
(People v. Modiri (2006) 39 Cal.4th 481, 491 (Modiri).)  These 
sentence enhancements “ ‘typically focus on an element of the 
commission of the crime or the criminal history of the defendant 
which is not present for all such crimes and perpetrators and 
which justifies a higher penalty than that prescribed for the 
offenses themselves.’ ”  (People v. Ahmed (2011) 53 Cal.4th 156, 
161 (Ahmed).)  “[T]here are at least two types of sentence 
enhancements:  (1) those which go to the nature of the offender; 
and (2) those which go to the nature of the offense.”  (People v. 
PEOPLE v. OLLO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
5 
Coronado (1995) 12 Cal.4th 145, 156.)  The first category 
generally focuses on “the defendant’s status as a repeat 
offender.”  (Ibid.)  The second category “arise[s] from the 
circumstances of the crime and typically focus[es] on what the 
defendant did when the current offense was committed.”  (Id. at 
p. 157.)  Section 12022.7 belongs to the second category.  
(Ahmed, at p. 161.)  It provides:  “Any person who personally 
inflicts great bodily injury on any person other than an 
accomplice in the commission of a felony or attempted felony 
shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of 
imprisonment in the state prison for three years.”  (§ 12022.7, 
subd. (a).)   
The issue is whether a defendant who furnishes a 
controlled substance “personally inflicts” great bodily injury as 
a matter of law whenever a person to whom he or she provides 
drugs dies or suffers other great bodily injury from using the 
drugs.  (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).)  We review this question of 
statutory interpretation de novo.  (People v. Prunty (2015) 62 
Cal.4th 59, 71.)  Ollo does not raise a challenge to the sufficiency 
of the evidence to support a great bodily injury enhancement, so 
we express no view on whether the record here, viewed “in the 
light most favorable to the judgment,” contains substantial 
evidence 
in 
support 
of 
the 
enhancement — 
“that 
is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value — 
from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (People v. Albillar (2010) 51 
Cal.4th 47, 60.) 
Ollo and the Attorney General agree that “the act of 
providing drugs to a person who subsequently overdoses should 
not automatically result in a great bodily injury enhancement.”  
We agree as well.  As explained below, whether the furnishing 
PEOPLE v. OLLO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
6 
of drugs constitutes personal infliction within the meaning of 
section 12022.7 depends on the circumstances underlying the 
furnishing offense.  A fact-specific inquiry is required to 
determine whether a defendant personally inflicted great bodily 
injury where such injury resulted from ingestion of the 
furnished drugs.  
We begin with the language of section 12022.7.  We have 
previously observed that the meaning of “personally inflict” is 
clear and unambiguous in the context of injuries resulting from 
the direct application of physical force.  (People v. Cole (1982) 31 
Cal.3d 568, 572 (Cole).)  Commonly understood, the term 
“personally” refers to “an act performed ‘in person,’ and 
involving ‘the actual or immediate presence or action of the 
individual person himself (as opposed to a substitute, deputy, 
messenger, etc.).’ ”  (Modiri, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 493, quoting 
9 Oxford English Dict. (2d ed.1989) p. 599.)  The verb “to inflict” 
means “ ‘to lay (a blow) on: cause (something damaging or 
painful) to be endured: impose.’ ”  (Modiri, at p. 493, quoting 
Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict. (2002) p. 1160.)  The meaning 
of the statutory requirement that a defendant personally inflict 
the victim’s injury does not differ from its nonlegal meaning.  
(People v. Cross (2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 68 (Cross).)  “[T]he phrase 
‘personally inflicts’ means that someone ‘in person’ . . . , that is, 
directly and not through an intermediary, ‘cause[s] something 
(damaging or painful) to be endured.’ ”  (Ibid., citation omitted.) 
The meaning of “personally inflict” is less clear in the 
context of a drug furnishing offense where the defendant 
provides a controlled substance and the injury arises only after 
the victim ingests the substance.  But nothing in the language 
of section 12022.7 suggests that all acts of providing a controlled 
substance subsume the personal infliction of injuries resulting 
PEOPLE v. OLLO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
7 
from consumption of the substance.  Our precedent has held that 
whether a defendant personally inflicts an injury depends on the 
facts of the particular case rather than the charged offense. 
In Ahmed, we reviewed a trial court’s imposition of 
enhancements for “personally inflict[ing] great bodily injury 
under circumstances involving domestic violence in the 
commission of a felony or attempted felony” (§ 12022.7, 
subd. (e)) and “personally us[ing] a firearm in the commission of 
a felony or attempted felony” (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)).  We 
explained that the sentence enhancements authorized under 
sections 12022.5 and 12022.7 “arise from the circumstances of 
the crime and typically focus on what the defendant did when 
the current offense was committed.”  (Ahmed, supra, 53 Cal.4th 
at p. 161.)  This indicates that the applicability of the 
enhancements depends on the circumstances underlying the 
offense and the defendant’s actions in committing the crime.   
In Modiri, we construed the identical phrase “personally 
inflicts great bodily injury” in section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8).  
(Modiri, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 493–494.)  We explained that 
in the context of an assault conviction, personal infliction “calls 
for the defendant to administer a blow or other force to the 
victim” and “for the defendant to do so directly rather than 
through an intermediary.”  (Id. at p. 493.)  “[T]he defendant’s 
role in both the physical attack and the infliction of great bodily 
injury cannot be minor, trivial, or insubstantial.”  (Id. at p. 494.)  
Such determinations regarding a defendant’s role in the 
physical attack and resulting injury cannot be made from a 
defendant’s assault conviction alone.  Instead, the factfinder 
must examine the circumstances underlying the conviction.  
(See People v. Corona (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 589, 594 
[examining “the conduct of [defendant] during the attack” to 
PEOPLE v. OLLO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
8 
determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support the 
finding that he personally inflicted the victim’s injury]; People v. 
Valenzuela (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 316, 323 (Valenzuela) 
[“Without additional facts regarding the crime,” defendant’s 
“bare plea” to reckless driving that proximately causes great 
bodily injury (Veh. Code, § 23104, subd. (b)) “does not prove he 
personally inflicted great bodily injury on his victims.”].)   
Legislative history also counsels against the broad 
application of section 12022.7, subdivision (a) to all defendants 
whose furnishing of drugs results in great bodily injury.  In 
1977, the Legislature amended section 12022.7 by adding the 
term “personally” before the word “inflicts.”  (Stats. 1977, 
ch. 165, § 94, eff. June 29, 1977; see Criminal Procedure (1978) 
9 Pacific L.J. 281, 472 [“Section 12022.7 now clearly requires 
that in order for the three year enhancement to apply, the ‘great 
bodily injury’ must be personally inflicted by the defendant.”].)  
“[T]he Legislature intended the designation ‘personally’ to limit 
the category of persons subject to the enhancement” such that 
an additional penalty for causing great bodily injury is imposed 
“only on those principals who perform the act that directly 
inflicts the injury.”  (Cole, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 571.)  “[O]ne 
who merely aids, abets, or directs another to inflict the physical 
injury is not subject to the enhanced penalty of section 12022.7.”  
(Ibid.)  The 1977 amendment expresses a legislative intent to 
endorse a “restricted definition of the class of individuals subject 
to the enhanced penalty for the infliction of great bodily injury.”  
(Id. at p. 579.) 
Furnishing a controlled substance may take many 
different forms, and not all furnishers fall within the class of 
individuals who “perform the act that directly inflicts the 
injury.”  (Cole, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 571.)  Two cases illustrate 
PEOPLE v. OLLO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
this point and demonstrate why a fact-specific analysis accords 
with the Legislature’s intent.  In Martinez, the case on which 
the trial court here relied, the defendant was convicted of three 
counts of furnishing a controlled substance after supplying an 
individual with six to seven 10-milligram methadone pills and 
six to eight 10-milligram hydrocodone pills over the course of a 
night of drinking.  (Martinez, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 1178.)  
The defendant supplied the pills “knowing that the drugs were 
more dangerous when combined with alcohol” and continued to 
supply drugs to the individual while “watch[ing] her continue to 
consume alcohol and become intoxicated, so intoxicated that 
[the defendant] felt she was not in any condition to drive.”  (Id. 
at p. 1186.)  The individual overdosed due to her consumption of 
“a lethal quantity of drugs.”  (Ibid.)  On those facts, the court 
found substantial evidence that the defendant personally 
inflicted great bodily injury within the meaning of section 
12022.7.  (Martinez, at p. 1186.) 
In People v. Slough (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 419, 425 
(Slough), the defendant supplied heroin to an individual in 
exchange for money.  After this exchange, the defendant and the 
individual went their separate ways.  (Ibid.)  The individual 
returned home, injected the heroin, and overdosed.  (Id. at 
p. 422.)  Although the defendant supplied the heroin, he played 
no part in the individual’s ingestion of the drugs.  (Id. at p. 425.)  
The court concluded there was insufficient evidence to support 
a finding that the defendant personally inflicted great bodily 
injury.  (Id. at pp. 424–425.)  The court distinguished Martinez 
on the ground that there “the defendant repeatedly supplied 
drugs to the victim while observing her increasing intoxication; 
the furnishing was akin to administering.”  (Slough, at p. 425.) 
PEOPLE v. OLLO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
10 
In Martinez, the court reasonably characterized the 
defendant’s act of personally providing a lethal quantity of drugs 
to the victim while observing her increasing intoxication as a 
direct cause of her overdose.  (See Martinez, supra, 226 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1186.)  In Slough, by contrast, the defendant 
provided drugs but played no role in the victim’s ingestion.  The 
Slough court reasonably concluded that because the defendant 
“neither performed nor participated in the act that directly 
inflicted the injury,” the great bodily injury enhancement could 
not apply.  (Slough, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 425.)  If the 
enhancement were to apply to defendants like those in Slough, 
who play no part in the act that directly inflicts the injury, the 
term “personally” in the phrase “personally inflicts” would be 
read out of section 12022.7.  To effectuate the Legislature’s 
intent to impose the enhancement only on “those who directly 
perform the act that causes the physical injury to the victim” 
(Cole, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 579), we hold that the applicability 
of section 12022.7, subdivision (a) to cases where a victim suffers 
great bodily injury from using drugs unlawfully furnished by the 
defendant depends on the particular circumstances of each case. 
In 
determining 
whether 
the 
personal 
infliction 
requirement is satisfied, the key inquiry is whether “the 
furnishing was akin to administering.”  (Slough, supra, 11 
Cal.App.5th at p. 425.)  When a defendant administers the drugs 
without the victim’s consent, the defendant has participated in 
the injury-causing act and thus may be held liable for personal 
infliction of the overdose.  Where a defendant simply provides 
drugs to a user who subsequently overdoses, the defendant 
facilitates but does not personally inflict the overdose.  This 
distinction recognizes the importance of the voluntariness of a 
victim’s ingestion in the determination of whether a defendant 
PEOPLE v. OLLO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
11 
personally inflicts great bodily injury in the drug furnishing 
context.  To be eligible for the great bodily injury enhancement, 
a defendant’s participation in the act of ingestion must occur in 
circumstances in which the victim is not an independent 
“intermediary” capable of breaking the “personal[]” nexus 
between the defendant and the overdose injury.  (Cross, supra, 
45 Cal.4th at p. 68.)  Whereas a victim with full capacity who 
voluntarily chooses to ingest a controlled substance is an 
independent intermediary, a victim who ingests drugs as a 
result of coercion or with diminished capacity is not.  Because 
the victim’s intoxication in Martinez impaired her ability to stop 
consuming drugs, her consumption was not fully voluntary. 
III. 
The Court of Appeal below warned that if a victim’s 
independent ingestion of drugs were to shield the drug furnisher 
from a finding of personal infliction, this would contravene the 
plain language of section 12022.7 by shielding an entire class of 
crimes from the enhancement.  (Ollo, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 1158.)  As the court observed, section 12022.7, subdivision (g) 
lists certain crimes that cannot support a great bodily injury 
enhancement.  (Ollo, at p. 1158.)  This list consists of murder, 
manslaughter, arson as defined in section 451, and unlawfully 
causing fire as defined in section 452; it does not include 
furnishing controlled substances.  (Ollo, at p. 1158.)  “Were we 
to conclude that a victim’s voluntary ingestion of a drug 
furnished by another breaks the causal chain as a matter of 
law,” the court reasoned, “we would effectively be adding the 
crime of furnishing controlled substances to [section 12022.7,] 
subdivision (g)’s list.”  (Ibid.)  This reasoning assumes that the 
only alternatives are to hold as a matter of law that the 
furnishing of drugs is either sufficient or insufficient to establish 
PEOPLE v. OLLO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
12 
personal infliction.  But, as Martinez and Slough suggest, we are 
not faced with an all-or-nothing choice.  Instead, the statute 
requires a fact-specific inquiry that focuses on whether the 
defendant’s actions in furnishing the drugs amounted to 
personal infliction of injury on the victim. 
The Court of Appeal also reasoned that applying the 
enhancement to “drug dealers . . . whenever the persons to 
whom they furnish drugs are subjected to great bodily injury 
due to their drug use” serves the deterrent goals of section 
12022.7.  (Ollo, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 1159.)  This 
reasoning is in tension with Modiri, where we said the great 
bodily injury enhancement aims to “deter[] and punish[] the 
infliction of gratuitous harm not inherent in the crime itself.”  
(Modiri, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 492; see Ahmed, supra, 53 
Cal.4th at p. 163 [“enhancement provisions . . . focus on aspects 
of the criminal act that are not always present and that warrant 
additional punishment”].)  A fact-based approach better serves 
the policy goals elucidated in Modiri.  As one example, a court 
might find that the particular way in which a defendant 
provided a controlled substance undermined the victim’s 
voluntary choice as to whether to consume the drug and thereby 
directly caused the victim to use the drug in a more dangerous 
manner than the mere act of selling drugs on the street.  (See, 
e.g., Martinez, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 1186 [defendant 
furnished drugs mixed with alcohol and continued to supply the 
drugs after observing the victim had become intoxicated].)  
Applying the enhancement in this circumstance would achieve 
a deterrent effect independent of the deterrent effect of the 
punishment for the underlying crime of furnishing drugs. 
Further, the Court of Appeal reasoned that “a defendant’s 
act of furnishing drugs and the user’s voluntary act of ingesting 
PEOPLE v. OLLO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
13 
them constitute concurrent direct causes. . . . [¶] . . . [A] 
defendant directly causes — and hence, personally inflicts — 
great bodily injury when his conduct, together with the victim’s, 
accidentally produces that injury.”  (Ollo, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th 
at p. 1158.)  The Court of Appeal is correct to recognize that 
more than one person may personally inflict a single injury.  In 
Modiri, we found that a defendant involved in a group beating 
need not have struck the injuring blow to support a great bodily 
injury enhancement, provided that the defendant’s personal 
application of force shows direct participation in the group 
beating.  (Modiri, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 493.)  In reaching this 
conclusion, we explained that “[t]he term ‘personally,’ which 
modifies ‘inflicts’ . . . , does not mean exclusive . . . .”  (Ibid., 
italics added.)  “[N]othing in the terms ‘personally’ or ‘inflicts,’ 
when used in conjunction with ‘great bodily injury’ . . . 
necessarily implies that the defendant must act alone in causing 
the victim’s injuries.”  (Ibid.; see People v. Dominick (1986) 
182 Cal.App.3d 1174, 1210–1211 [defendant who grabbed the 
victim’s hair and held the victim while a codefendant struck her 
was directly responsible for the injury the victim suffered when 
she fell while pulling away].) 
However, a person who merely aids, abets, or directs 
another to inflict an injury is not subject to the enhanced penalty 
of section 12022.7.  In Cole, we held that the defendant did not 
personally inflict injury when he directed the attack and blocked 
the victim’s escape but did not himself inflict the injuries.  (Cole, 
supra, 31 Cal.3d at pp. 571–572.)  Applying Cole, the Courts of 
Appeal have held that “[t]o ‘personally inflict’ injury, the actor 
must do more than take some direct action which proximately 
causes injury.”  (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 341, 
349; see People v. Warwick (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 788, 793 
PEOPLE v. OLLO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
14 
[“[F]or the [great bodily injury] enhancement to apply, the 
defendant must be the direct, rather than proximate, cause of 
the victim’s injuries.”]; Valenzuela, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 321 [“[P]roof a defendant proximately caused great bodily 
injury does not constitute proof the defendant personally 
inflicted such injury.”].)  The distinction these courts have 
drawn between proximate causation and personal infliction is 
sound:  “Proximately causing and personally inflicting harm are 
two different things.  The Legislature is aware of the difference.  
When it wants to require personal infliction, it says so.”  (People 
v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 336.) 
The Legislature’s use of the term “personally inflict” in 
section 12022.7 signifies its intent to punish only actors who 
directly inflict harm.  In some circumstances, a defendant’s act 
of furnishing drugs and a user’s act of ingesting them constitute 
concurrent direct causes of a subsequent injury.  (E.g., Martinez, 
supra, 226 Cal.App.4th 1169.)  In others, the act of furnishing 
drugs is merely the proximate cause of injury suffered by the 
drug user.  (E.g., Slough, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th 419.)  
Distinguishing between such cases and applying section 12022.7 
only where the defendant causes injury “directly and not 
through an intermediary” (Cross, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 68) 
require a fact-specific analysis of the circumstances of the 
furnishing offense, including the role of the defendant and the 
victim in the events resulting in injury. 
IV. 
 
We conclude the trial court erred as a matter of law by 
precluding defense counsel from arguing that the facts of this 
case do not support a great bodily injury enhancement in light 
of Reina’s voluntary ingestion of the controlled substance.  When 
PEOPLE v. OLLO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
15 
defense counsel requested permission to argue that the facts of 
this case do not meet the elements of the great bodily injury 
enhancement, the court responded that it was “contrary to law” 
to argue that Reina “voluntarily took the drugs.”  The court told 
defense counsel that he was only permitted to argue that Ollo 
was not subject to the enhancement because he did not furnish 
the drugs, and Reina brought her own drugs.  The court then 
stated, “If your argument is going to be [Ollo] gave [Reina] the 
drugs” but “he’s not responsible because she voluntarily took 
them, I don’t think that can be done.” 
 
The trial court’s statement of the law contravenes our 
reasoning that the voluntariness of a victim’s ingestion is a key 
consideration in the determination of whether a defendant 
personally inflicts great bodily injury in the drug furnishing 
context.  The trial court erred by precluding defense counsel 
from making a legally valid argument that the facts of this case 
do not support a great bodily injury enhancement.  (See In re 
Charlisse C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 145, 159 [“a disposition that rests 
on an error of law constitutes an abuse of discretion”].) 
 
 
PEOPLE v. OLLO 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
16 
CONCLUSION 
We reverse the judgment and remand to the Court of 
Appeal to apply the holding herein and to consider any other 
issues raised but not resolved in the Court of Appeal’s original 
consideration. 
LIU, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Ollo   
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal   
Original Proceeding   
Review Granted (published) XX 42 Cal.App.5th 1152 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S260130  
Date Filed:  June 21, 2021 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior    
County:  Los Angeles    
Judge:  Steven D. Blades    
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Counsel: 
 
Rachel Lederman, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, 
Scott A. Taryle, Colleen M. Tiedemann and Michael R. Johnsen, 
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.  
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Rachel Lederman 
Attorney at Law 
558 Capp St. 
San Francisco, CA 94110 
(415) 282-9300 
 
Colleen M. Tiedemann 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 S. Spring St., Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA 90013 
(213) 269-6599