Title: Safaris Unlimited v. Jones

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
No. 42614 
 
SAFARIS UNLIMITED, LLC, a Georgia 
limited liability company, 
 
       Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
MIKE VON JONES, 
 
       Defendant-Appellant. 
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Twin Falls, June 2015 Term 
 
2015 Opinion No. 70 
 
Filed:  July 17, 2017 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
    
 
    
 
 
 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State 
 
 
of Idaho, Twin Falls County.  Hon. Randy J. Stoker, District Judge. 
 
 
The judgment of the district court is vacated and this case is remanded  
for further proceedings. Costs on appeal, but not attorney’s fees, are  
awarded to appellant.  
 
 
 
Jeffrey E. Rolig P.C., Twin Falls, attorney for appellant. 
 
 
 
Worst, Fitzgerald & Stover, PLLC, Twin Falls, attorneys for respondent. 
 
 
Louis V. Spiker argued. 
______________________________________ 
W. JONES, Justice 
I.  NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant Mike Von Jones arranged to hunt big game in Zimbabwe, Africa, with HHK 
Safaris (Pvt) Ltd (“HHK”). Jones went on the hunt and received an invoice for $26,040.00 from 
Respondent Safaris Unlimited LLC (“Safaris Unlimited”). Jones then refused to pay Safaris 
Unlimited for the hunt. As a result, Safaris Unlimited filed a suit for breach of contract. Jones 
responded that he arranged and engaged in the hunt with HHK, not Safaris Unlimited, and 
therefore he had no contractual relationship with Safaris Unlimited for payment. He further 
alleged that he was entitled to offset any amount owed for the hunt with the value of certain 
trophy items from the hunt and an earlier hunt. Safaris Unlimited moved for summary judgment. 
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The district court granted its motion and entered judgment in favor of Safaris Unlimited. Jones 
appeals to this Court. We vacate and remand.  
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Safaris Unlimited is a Georgia limited liability company. HHK is a private limited 
corporation organized under the laws of Zimbabwe. The chain of ownership is as follows: (1) 
Safaris Unlimited is owned entirely by C. Martin Wood, III; (2) Wood owns fifty percent of 
Bulawayo Trading Company (Pvt) Limited (also a private limited corporation organized under 
the laws of Zimbabwe); and (3) Bulawayo Trading Company owns forty percent of HHK. 
Jennifer Ryan is the general manager of Safaris Unlimited, and Graham Hingeston is one of the 
owners and the day-to-day manager of HHK.  
Safaris Unlimited operates as a broker or booking agent for HHK. Other than the actual 
hunting services provided by HHK, Safaris Unlimited coordinates and assists on all details of the 
hunt, such as accommodations, transportation, and permits. According to Hingeston, HHK 
requires that the client pay Safaris Unlimited for the services provided by HHK in all instances. 
In exchange for the client’s agreement to pay Safaris Unlimited, HHK provides the hunting 
services. HHK does not provide hunting services except with Safaris Unlimited, and Safaris 
Unlimited only conducts business with HHK. As explained by Ryan, “In the normal course of 
business, Safaris Unlimited is entitled to the difference between HHK’s cost to provide safari 
and big game hunting services and the price charged the client by Safaris Unlimited.” Ryan 
attached to her affidavit the service agreement between Safaris Unlimited and HHK. Particularly 
relevant here, the financial management agreement of the parties provides:  
Whereas HHK is in the hunting safari business and agrees to engage SU 
[Safaris Unlimited] as a financial service agent for the sole purpose of 
coordinating safari bookings and payments from booking agents, companies and 
individuals worldwide. . . . SU shall be fully responsible for collection of all 
deposits, remaining balances and trophy fees. Deposits shall be collected for 
confirmation of a safari. Remaining balances of daily rates shall be collected prior 
to commencement of the safari and trophy fees shall be collected within 10 days 
of the completion of the safari. All funds collected on behalf of HHK shall be 
forwarded timely on request.  
 
From November 22, 2012, to December 1, 2012, Jones engaged in a safari and hunt of 
big game with HHK in Zimbabwe. According to Jones’s interrogatory responses, he shot a 
trophy elephant, a tuskless elephant, and a buffalo on the 2012 hunt. Jones has engaged in two 
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earlier hunts with HHK, one in 2010 and one in 2011. For both of these earlier hunts, Jones paid 
Safaris Unlimited with a cashier’s check after receiving an invoice from Safaris Unlimited.  
To arrange the 2012 hunt, Jones directly contacted Hingeston with HHK. Jones testified, 
“Yes, I was aware that [HHK] used [Safaris Unlimited] for a booking agent . . . previously. But 
not on the 2012 hunt.” In his deposition, Jones explained that the 2012 hunt was “different” than 
the two earlier hunts because he “had no contact with [Safaris Unlimited] whatsoever.” In the 
two earlier hunts, Jones identified his contact with Safaris Unlimited as his payment to Safaris 
Unlimited for the hunts with HHK and possibly some contact with Ryan. Although Jones could 
not remember “for sure,” he testified in his deposition that Hingeston had him contact Ryan on at 
least one of the two previous hunts. According to Jones, this contact was probably an email about 
the invoice for the hunt.  
After the 2012 hunt, on December 6, 2012, Ryan emailed Jones an invoice in the amount 
of $26,550.00. In response via email, Jones disputed a charge on the invoice (for a cameraman) 
and also informed Ryan that he had “some serious issues with the quality of service” on the 2012 
hunt. Ryan then emailed Jones a new invoice for $26,040.00, removing the disputed charge. 
Over the next two months, Ryan sent Jones four emails asking him to pay the amount owed for 
the hunt. In Ryan’s last email, she informed Jones that she would be turning over his account to 
Safaris Unlimited’s attorneys for collection. Jones did not respond to these four emails. On May 
1, 2013, counsel for Safaris Unlimited sent a demand letter to Jones for payment.  
On June 28, 2013, Safaris Unlimited filed a complaint against Jones for breach of 
contract and sought $26,040.00 in damages plus interest.  
On January 6, 2014, Jones answered. Jones admitted that Safaris Unlimited sent an 
invoice. He also admitted that he had not paid the invoice. He denied, however, that he owed the 
invoiced amount to Safaris Unlimited. He alleged that Safaris Unlimited was not the real party in 
interest and that Safaris Unlimited was acting as the collection agency for the real party in 
interest, HHK, in violation of the Idaho Collection Agency Act (ICAA). As an affirmative 
defense, he asserted that he was entitled to offset the amount owed with (1) the value of trophy-
sized elephant tusks and a buffalo trophy from the 2012 hunt and (2) trophy animals and tusks 
from the earlier hunt in 2010. According to Jones, he did not receive these trophy items after the 
hunts.  
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On July 14, 2014, Safaris Unlimited moved for summary judgment. Along with other 
evidence, as discussed above, Safaris Unlimited presented another invoice for the 2012 hunt. 
This second invoice was issued by Safaris Unlimited for a total amount of $26,040.00, and it had 
a signature on the bottom from “M. Von Jones.” A licensed professional hunter employed by 
HHK stated in an affidavit that he presented Jones with this invoice at the end of the 2012 hunt. 
He also claimed that Jones signed the invoice in his presence. Relying on this invoice, Safaris 
Unlimited argued that Jones was contractually obligated to pay Safaris Unlimited for the hunt. 
Safaris Unlimited contended that HHK, as a third party, provided the consideration for Jones’s 
obligation to pay Safaris Unlimited. Safaris Unlimited also argued that it was not subject to the 
ICAA, but, even if it was, Safaris Unlimited qualified for an exemption. Finally, Safaris 
Unlimited argued that Jones was not entitled to any offset for the value of certain trophy items 
because federal and international regulations prohibited the use of the trophy items for 
commercial purposes.  
On August 18, 2014, Jones responded in opposition to Safaris Unlimited’s motion. Jones 
argued that he had a contract with HHK, not Safaris Unlimited. Citing to his deposition 
testimony, Jones denied that he viewed or signed the second invoice. He claimed that the second 
invoice did not create any contractual relationship with Safaris Unlimited. He also argued that 
Safaris Unlimited was acting as a collection agency and was not subject to an exemption to the 
ICAA. Lastly, Jones argued that he was entitled to substantial offsets. He contended that he was 
entitled to an offset for the 2012 hunt for the following reason:  
Unfortunately, contrary to what had been agreed, [Jones] was forced to share the 
camp with nine South Africans, who were extremely noisy, drunk and 
overbearing most of the time. The South Africans consumed all the food and 
drank all the Cokes and other drinks. The camp also ran out of diesel fuel. [Jones] 
left the site early.1 
                                                 
1 An email exchange between Hingeston and Jones indicates that Hingeston informed him: “Also just to let you 
know we have some South Africans that are scheduled to hunt 23–29 there for Buff.” Jones responded: “I’m ok with 
South Africans as long as they are not a bunch of loud, arroga [sic] jackasses as I have unfortunately on occasion 
encountered in the past.” According Jones’s deposition, Jones verified with Hingeston either through email or on the 
phone that there would be two “decent” South Africans on the hunt for three days. Also according to Jones, “these 
South Africans have a reputation for being drunks and total a-holes if you’re in a camp with them.”  
 
On the hunt, Jones stated that the nine South Africans “were loud,” “took videos all day,” “got drunk at 
night,” and “consumed all the food.” Jones stated:  
 
I complained from day one. I said, what the hell is going on here? I was supposed to have two 
South Africans here, and we’ve got nine. And we’re up all night. I can’t sleep. I can’t do anything. 
I said, what’s going on? Well, somehow they found out that these guys were going to be there for 
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Jones also contended that “he has not received tens of thousands of dollars worth [sic] of ivory 
from the 2010 and 2012 hunts.” He argued that whether Safaris Unlimited or HHK could sell the 
trophies was irrelevant because he was deprived of the value and benefit of those items.  
On September 2, 2014, the district court heard oral argument on Safaris Unlimited’s 
motion for summary judgment. The district court then pronounced its decision on the record. The 
district court summarily found that the facts were undisputed. The district court then determined:  
Safari is owned by Mr. Wood, and Safari owns 50 percent of the Bulawayo 
Company, which owns 40 percent of the HHK Company, clearly related entities 
in this case, which I think satisfy the criteria under the Idaho Collection[ ] 
[Agency] Act which allows Safaris to bring this lawsuit in their name, albeit the 
hunting party, if you will, was HHK. 
 
In short, the district court ruled that Safaris Unlimited did not violate the ICAA by seeking 
payment from Jones for the hunting services provided by HHK.  
 
Next, the district court determined the amount owed by Jones:  
There seems to be no dispute as to the value of the hunt: The 26,000 and some 
odd dollars are set forth in the invoice. I come to that conclusion for two reasons. 
Number one, though I agree that the mere presentation of an invoice to a party 
with their responding signature doesn’t, in and itself, establish a contract, in this 
case that establishes a, I think, an acknowledgment that that is a reasonable and 
fair billing. And when you couple that with the emails that took place later 
between Mr. Jones and Ms. Ryan, the only dispute that Mr. Jones raises over that 
invoice really relates to the offset claims that he’s making. So I find that the 
$26,000 obligation is owed subject to any offset claim which I’m going to talk 
about here in a second. 
 
Thus, the district court determined that Jones was obligated to pay $26,040.00 for the hunt.  
Finally, the district court turned to the offset allegations. With regard to an offset for 
Jones’s dissatisfaction due to South Africans at the camp, the district court determined that there 
was no legal basis for that offset. The district court reasoned: “There’s no representation made in 
the record by Safaris or HHK or anybody else that this would be a quiet camp or that it would be 
a camp free of any of the things he’s complaining about . . . .” With regard to 2012 trophy items, 
the district court determined that Jones failed to raise an obligation on behalf of Safaris 
Unlimited or HHK to transport the trophy items. Specifically, the district court recognized that 
there was no affirmative allegation that Jones was promised shipment as a part of the invoice. 
                                                                                                                                                             
like seven days. And that is not what [Hingeston] indicated to me. So it was a miserable hunt. I got 
the animal. But it was a miserable hunt. Absolutely the worst hunt I’ve been on in my life. 
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The district court acknowledged that it did not know whether there was a separate contract for 
shipment, but it concluded that the burden was on Jones to present evidence for this affirmative 
defense. The district court clarified:  
[I]f I had before me a contractual provision or agreement that said Safari or HHK 
is obligated to ship these tusks back at their cost, and that didn’t occur, I would 
agree that that would certainly amount to an offset in this case. But that’s a 
separate contractual relationship, I think, beyond the offset. I think it’s a 
counterclaim issue. 
 
Similarly, with regard to the 2010 trophy items, the district court stated:  
[T]here is no counterclaim before the Court, there’s no third party claim before 
the Court. If there is a contractual dispute there, it’s just not raised in this case, 
and I have to decide this matter based upon the record that I have today. I find that 
there is no merit to that argument. 
 
In summary, the district court rejected Jones’s attempts to offset the amount he owed to Safaris 
Unlimited. The district court then orally granted summary judgment to Safaris Unlimited on all 
issues.  
 
On October 27, 2014, the district court entered an amended judgment providing that 
Safaris Unlimited would recover $26,040.00 plus interest and $20,285.99 in attorney’s fees for a 
total judgment of $52,005.37. Jones appeals to this Court. 
III.  ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. 
Whether the district court erred by granting Safaris Unlimited’s motion for summary 
judgment. 
2. 
Whether either party is entitled to attorney’s fees on appeal.  
IV.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
“On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court 
utilizes the same standard of review used by the district court originally ruling on 
the motion.” Arregui v. Gallegos-Main, 153 Idaho 801, 804, 291 P.3d 1000, 1003 
(2012). Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law.” [Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure] 56(c). “When considering whether the 
evidence in the record shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the trial 
court must liberally construe the facts, and draw all reasonable inferences, in favor 
of the nonmoving party.” Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 
163, 45 P.3d 816, 819 (2002). “If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of 
material fact, then only a question of law remains, over which this Court exercises 
free review.” Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 585, 51 P.3d 396, 399 (2002). 
 
Conner v. Hodges, 157 Idaho 19, 23, 333 P.3d 130, 134 (2014). 
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V.  ANALYSIS 
A. 
The district court improperly granted summary judgment to Safaris Unlimited. 
Jones contends that the district court erred by granting summary judgment to Safaris 
Unlimited. He submits three arguments in support of his position. First, Jones argues that he had 
a contract with HHK, not Safaris Unlimited. Second, Jones argues that the district court 
erroneously determined that he was not entitled to offset any amount owed with the value of 
trophy items from the 2010 and 2012 hunts. Third, Jones argues that Safaris Unlimited is acting 
as a debt collection agency subject to the ICAA.  
In response to Jones’s first argument, Safaris Unlimited contends that the invoice 
presented by the professional hunter and signed by Jones establishes a contract between Jones 
and Safaris Unlimited. In response to Jones’s second argument, Safaris Unlimited contends that 
Jones failed to properly assert his offset claims because he failed to establish any obligation on 
behalf of Safaris Unlimited to deliver the trophy items. Finally, in response to Jones’s third 
argument, Safaris Unlimited asserts that it is not attempting to collect the debt of another and, 
even if it was, it qualifies for an exemption to the ICAA. 
“The elements for a claim for breach of contract are: (a) the existence of the contract, (b) 
the breach of the contract, (c) the breach caused damages, and (d) the amount of those damages.” 
Mosell Equities, LLC v. Berryhill & Co., 154 Idaho 269, 278, 297 P.3d 232, 241 (2013). Here, 
Safaris Unlimited’s complaint unequivocally stated that it had an express or implied contract 
with Jones for the 2012 hunt. Safaris Unlimited made similar assertions in its memorandum in 
support of its motion for summary judgment. Neither the complaint nor summary judgment 
memorandum alleged that Safaris Unlimited had an agreement with HHK or an assignment of 
debt to enforce a contract between Jones and HHK. Instead, Safaris Unlimited contended 
throughout these proceedings that it sought payment for the 2012 hunt because it had an 
enforceable contract with Jones. 
The existence of a contract is a genuine issue of material fact. “As to contract disputes at 
summary judgment, ‘[w]hen the existence of a contract is in issue, and the evidence is 
conflicting or admits of more than one inference, it is for the jury to decide whether a contract in 
fact exists.’” Nix v. Elmore Cnty., 158 Idaho 310, 314, 346 P.3d 1045, 1049 (2015) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Johnson v. Allied Stores Corp., 106 Idaho 363, 368, 679 P.2d 640, 645 
(1984)). “‘Formation of a valid contract requires that there be a meeting of the minds as 
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evidenced by a manifestation of mutual intent to contract.’ Whether a contract has been formed 
‘is generally a question of fact for the trier of fact to resolve.’” Bettwieser v. N.Y. Irrigation Dist., 
154 Idaho 317, 323, 297 P.3d 1134, 1140 (2013) (quoting Thomas v. Thomas, 150 Idaho 636, 
645, 249 P.3d 829, 838 (2011)). In this case, contrary to Safaris Unlimited’s argument on appeal, 
the purported signature of Jones at the bottom of an invoice is not sufficient to show any kind of 
contract between Jones and Safaris Unlimited for the 2012 hunt. Based upon the record at the 
time of summary judgment, Safaris Unlimited failed to prove the existence of a contract with 
Jones for the 2012 hunt. Due to the lack of evidence in the record, the district court erred by 
granting summary judgment to Safaris Unlimited for its breach of contract claim. The district 
court also erred by granting Safaris Unlimited’s motion for summary judgment as to Jones’s 
offset claims for the trophy items from the 2010 and 2012 hunts. An offset does not need to be 
pled as a counterclaim. We vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Safaris 
Unlimited and remand for further proceedings. 
B. 
We decline to award attorney’s fees on appeal at this time. 
Both parties request attorney’s fees on appeal. Jones contends that he is entitled to 
attorney’s fees under Idaho Code section 12-120(3). Safaris Unlimited contends that it is entitled 
to attorney’s fees under Idaho Code sections 12-120(1) and 12-120(3). Idaho Code sections 12-
120(1) and 12-120(3) both mandate an award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party. Med. 
Recovery Servs., LLC v. Bonneville Billing & Collections, Inc., 157 Idaho 395, 401, 336 P.3d 
802, 808 (2014); Pinnacle Eng’rs, Inc. v. Heron Brook, LLC, 139 Idaho 756, 761, 86 P.3d 470, 
475 (2004). In this case, any determination of the prevailing party is “premature” because the 
Court does “not yet know who will prevail in this action.” Spokane Structures, Inc. v. Equitable 
Inv., LLC, 148 Idaho 616, 621, 226 P.3d 1263, 1268 (2010). Therefore, we vacate the district 
court’s award of attorney’s fees to Safaris Unlimited. At the conclusion of this litigation in 
district court, the court may in its discretion award attorney’s fees to the eventual prevailing 
party and may consider, to the extent it deems proper in its discretion, an award attorney’s fees 
for this appeal. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
We vacate the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings. Costs, 
but not attorney’s fees, to Jones on appeal.  
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Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices EISMANN, J. JONES and HORTON 
CONCUR.