Title: Matter of Goddard

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Matter of Goddard1996 WY 60914 P.2d 1233Case Number: 95-171Decided: 04/19/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming

In 
the Matter of the Worker's Compensation Claim of DARLENE GODDARD,

an Employee of Colonel Bozeman's Restaurant. 

DARLENE GODDARD,  

Appellant (Employee/Claimant), 

 

v. 

 

COLONEL BOZEMAN'S RESTAURANT, 

Appellee (Employer/Defendant), 

 

STATE OF WYOMING ex rel. Workers' Compensation 
Division, 

Appellee (Objector/Defendant).

 

Certification from the District Court of Johnson 
County 

The 
Honorable John C. Brackley, Judge.

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

Brian N. Beisher of Hart & Reiter, 
Sheridan. 

Representing 
Appellee: 

William U. Hill, Attorney General, John W. Renneisen, 
Deputy Attorney General, and Jennifer A. Evans, Assistant Attorney 
General.

 

Before THOMAS, MACY, 
TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ., and H. HUNTER PATRICK, District 
Judge.

MACY, Justice. 

[¶1]      The hearing 
examiner denied the application submitted by Appellant Darlene Goddard (the 
claimant) for worker's compensation benefits. The claimant filed a petition for 
review of the hearing examiner's decision with the district court, and that 
court certified the case to the Wyoming Supreme Court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
12.09(b).

 

[¶2]      We affirm the 
hearing examiner's decision.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      The claimant 
presents the following issues for our review:

 

A. The decision that [the claimant] was not injured 
at the work place is clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence 
on record.

 

B. The Office [of Administrative Hearings] improperly 
excluded evidence and improperly considered evidence contrary to the Wyoming 
Rules of Evidence. 

 

C. The decision that [the claimant] did not timely 
file her worker's compensation claim and as a result caused prejudice to the 
employer and the [Workers' Compensation] Division is clearly contrary to the 
overwhelming weight of the evidence on record.

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      The claimant 
began working for Appellee Colonel Bozeman's Restaurant (the restaurant) on 
August 3, 1994, as a part-time hostess. On August 8, 1994, the claimant worked a 
shift with another new employee, and the two women argued. The claimant contends 
that the other employee pushed or shoved her during this argument and that she 
fell to the ground and twisted her knee. The other employee claims that, 
although she did argue with the claimant, she did not push or shove the claimant 
and cause her to fall.

 

[¶5]      The claimant did 
not initially believe that her knee had been hurt badly even though she was 
experiencing immediate "excruciating pain." She finished working her shift on 
that day. The claimant maintains that she has had inflammation, swelling, and 
severe pain in her left knee ever since and that she has taken "Tylenol and/or 
Tylenol 3" for the pain. Within one day of her fall, the claimant told her 
daughter-in-law, her supervisor at the restaurant, and the general manager at 
the restaurant about the incident. She also asserts that she met with the 
general manager and showed her the swollen knee. The general manager, however, 
testified that, although she was informed about the argument soon after it 
occurred, she did not learn about the alleged injury before the claimant filed a 
worker's compensation claim. The claimant's supervisor testified that she had 
not been informed about the claimant's knee injury even though they discussed 
the incident.

 

[¶6]      The restaurant 
terminated the claimant's employment on or about August 9, 1994, because the 
claimant was not able to learn the restaurant's computer cash register system. 
On September 4, 1994, the claimant began working for the Crossroads Inn as a 
cashier/hostess. The Crossroads position was very similar to her position at the 
restaurant in that it required her to do a lot of standing and 
walking.

 

[¶7]      The claimant did 
not seek medical attention for her knee until October even though she visited 
the Buffalo Medical Clinic on August 16, 1994, and again on September 26, 1994, 
for other purposes. On October 4, 1994, the claimant told a doctor at the clinic 
that she was having pain in her left knee. Her x-rays did not show that she had 
any acute fractures but did show that the left knee had "marked degenerative 
changes." At that time, the doctor prescribed physical therapy for her knee. The 
doctor ultimately referred the claimant to an orthopaedic surgeon at the 
Gillette Bone & Joint Clinic.

 

[¶8]      The surgeon 
examined the claimant on October 25, 1994, and determined that she had a 
"lateral meniscus injury" to her knee. He testified that the claimant suffered 
from degenerative weakness in her left knee which was most likely caused by a 
previous serious injury and surgery. The claimant admitted that she had surgery 
on her left knee, but she was not sure when that had occurred. The surgeon 
opined that the August 8, 1994, fall caused the claimant's knee problem, 
conceding that his only source of information was the claimant 
herself.

 

[¶9]      The claimant's 
son was working for the restaurant as a bartender during and after the 
claimant's encounter with the other employee. On or about October 10, 1994, her 
son admitted that he had been drinking on the job, and the restaurant terminated 
his employment. The claimant was upset when she found out that her son had been 
fired. She subsequently wrote two letters to the restaurant, complaining that 
the general manager did not help her file a claim for her injury and that the 
restaurant wrongfully terminated her son's employment. On October 19, 1994, the 
claimant filed an application with the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 
requesting worker's compensation benefits for the alleged injury to her left 
knee.

 

[¶10]   The Workers' Compensation Division 
denied the claimant's application, and the claimant objected to that 
determination. After holding a hearing, the hearing examiner entered his order 
in which he included findings of fact and conclusions of law, and he denied the 
claimant's application for benefits. He concluded that the claimant had failed 
to prove that her injury arose out of and in the course of her 
employment.

 

[¶11]   The claimant filed a petition for 
review of the hearing examiner's decision with the district court. The district 
court certified the case to the Wyoming Supreme Court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
12.09(b).

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶12]   W.R.A.P. 12.09 provides that a 
judicial review of administrative decisions is limited to a determination of the 
matters which are specified in WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c) (1990). Section 
16-3-114(c) provides in pertinent part:

 

(c) . . . [T]he reviewing court shall decide all 
relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, 
and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. In 
making the following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or 
those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of 
prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall:

. . . . .

(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, 
findings and conclusions found to be:

(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or 
otherwise not in accordance with law;

. . . . .

(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case 
reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by 
statute.

 

"[A]n agency's action is 
arbitrary and capricious and must be reversed if any essential finding is not 
supported by substantial evidence." Majority of Working Interest Owners in Buck 
Draw Field Area v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, 721 P.2d 1070, 1079 (Wyo. 1986).

 

DISCUSSION

 

A. Substantial Evidence

 

[¶13]   The claimant contends that the 
hearing examiner's conclusion that she did not sustain an injury which arose out 
of and in the course of her employment was contrary to the overwhelming weight 
of the evidence.

 

[¶14]   The claimant has the burden of 
proving every essential element of her claim by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Gilstrap v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Division, 875 P.2d 1272, 1273 (Wyo. 1994). Under the 
statutory definition of injury, she must prove that her injury arose out of and 
in the course of her employment. WYO. STAT. § 27-14-102(a)(xi) (Supp. 1995); Hepp v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Division, 881 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Wyo. 1994). Whether an 
employee's injury occurred in the course of her employment is a question of 
fact. 881 P.2d  at 1077. We review an administrative agency's findings of fact by 
applying the substantial evidence standard. Section 16-3-114(c)(ii)(E). Our task 
is to examine the entire record to determine whether substantial evidence 
supported the hearing examiner's findings. Romero v. Davy McKee Corporation, 854 P.2d 59, 61 (Wyo. 1993). We will not substitute our judgment for that of the 
hearing examiner when substantial evidence supports his decision. Bearden v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Division, 868 P.2d 268, 269 (Wyo. 1994). Substantial evidence 
is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the 
agency's conclusions. Jackson v. J.W. 
Williams, Inc., 886 P.2d 601, 603 (Wyo. 1994).

 

[¶15]   The hearing examiner's order 
provided in pertinent part:

 

A. After carefully listening to the testimony and 
reviewing the documents submitted at the hearing and through hearing 
depositions, this Office is left with a factual determination about the 
credibility of the Claimant's testimony versus the credibility of opposing 
witnesses' testimony. This Office finds that the inconsistency in [the 
claimant's] statements about the severity of pain and discomfort she alleges she 
felt in her left knee from August 8, 1994 to the present, contrasted with 
medical records showing three (3) visits by her to the Buffalo Clinic between 
August 8, 1994 and October 4, 1994 without any complaints about left knee pain, 
compromises her testimony. [The claimant's] testimony was not credible 
concerning numerous lengthy explanations she gave for not filing a Worker['s] 
Compensation claim sooner or more timely when she felt she had a severe left 
knee injury. [The claimant] certainly knew she had injured her left knee in the 
past, knew on August 8, 1994 and from that time forward that she suffered severe 
pain in that knee and did not actually file a Worker's Compensation claim until 
October 20, 1994, more than seven (7) full weeks after she alleged her injury 
occurred. This Office does not find [the claimant's] testimony about alleged 
repeated notifications of complaints to [the restaurant] about a left knee 
problem and Worker['s] Compensation claim in that regard to be credible. Had 
[the claimant] suffered from the extreme left knee pain and discomfort she now 
alleges beginning on August 8, 1994, and had she actually discussed that with 
[Dr.] Nolan or [Dr.] Gonzales at the Buffalo Clinic between August 8, 1994 and 
October 4, 1994, there most certainly would be some note of those discussions in 
the medical records. Since [the claimant] did not call [Dr.] Nolan or [Dr.] 
Gonzales as witnesses in her case in chief, this Office is left with no other 
evidence about her complaints to those doctors during August and September 1994 
other than what is in their notes which were introduced into 
evidence.

 

B. This Office further concludes as a factual matter 
that the testimony of [the general manager], [the other employee] and [the 
claimant's supervisor] is credible and entitled to the most weight in this 
matter. All of these witnesses testified candidly that [the claimant] had 
engaged [the other employee] in a verbal argument on August 8, 1994. They all 
indicated that [the claimant] had been offered a chance to report anything about 
that argument as a Worker['s] Compensation claim and she had not mentioned her 
left knee and had specifically declined to make a claim at that time. This 
Office is further persuaded by [the general manager's] testimony that [the 
claimant] did not ever report or seek a claim form for an August 8, 1994 left 
knee injury at [the restaurant] from [the general manager] prior to filing of 
her claim on October 20, 1994. [The general manager's] testimony was candid, 
straightforward and consistent with the testimony of [the other employee] and 
[the claimant's supervisor].

 

C. This Office further finds and concludes that 
evidence was presented to substantiate the [Workers' Compensation] Division's 
theory that [the claimant] filed the Worker['s] Compensation claim against [the 
restaurant] over a month after she began working at the [Crossroads] Inn as a 
cashier/hostess because she was upset about the fact that her son . . . had been 
fired by [the restaurant]. [The claimant's] October 20, 1994 letter to the 
[Workers' Compensation] Division which was admitted into evidence . . . show[s] 
graphically [the claimant's] vehement feeling against [the restaurant] 
concerning her son's firing. This Office concludes that it is not coincidental 
that [the claimant] filled out her compensation claim form on October 15, 1994, 
only five (5) days after her son was fired and actually filed the claim on 
October 20, 1994, along with the aforementioned letter describing her 
displeasure with her son's firing.

 

[¶16]   The hearing examiner was in the 
best position to judge the credibility of the claimant and the other witnesses. 
Padilla v. Lovern's, Inc., 883 P.2d 351, 355 (Wyo. 1994). He noted in his order that he was concerned about the 
inconsistencies in the testimony which was given on how the claimant sustained 
her injury. The hearing examiner was also in the best position to judge the 
weight to be given to the medical evidence. Id. Sufficient ambiguities in the 
evidence existed to trigger the process of weighing the evidence and assessing 
the credibility of the witnesses. That task was for the hearing examiner, not 
for an appellate court, to perform.

 

"The testimony in this record may be subject to 
varying interpretations, but we will not usurp the function of the [trier of 
fact] in making factual findings with respect to this case. It is the duty of 
the trier of fact to weigh and evaluate the testimony of the witnesses, 
including that given by experts. . . . [The trier of fact] `was the sole judge 
of the credibility of the witnesses and was entitled to interpret the evidence.' 
Ward v. Yoder, Wyo., 355 P.2d 371, 
374 (1960)."

 

Hepp, 881 P.2d  at 1079 (quoting Creek v. Town of Hulett, 657 P.2d 353, 
357 (Wyo. 1983)). Substantial evidence supported the hearing examiner's 
conclusion that the claimant failed to prove that her claim arose out of and in 
the course of her employment. Section 27-14-102(a)(xi).

 

B. Evidentiary Rulings

 

[¶17]   The claimant asserts that the 
hearing examiner improperly excluded as evidence a letter signed "Barbara" and 
that he should not have admitted evidence with regard to the restaurant's 
termination of her son's employment.

 

[¶18]   Admissibility of evidence is 
committed to the discretion of the hearing examiner. See Romero, 854 P.2d  at 62 n. 2. A 
hearing examiner abuses his discretion when his decision shocks the conscience 
of the court and appears to be so unfair and inequitable that a reasonable 
person could not abide it. State ex rel. 
Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division v. Rivera, 796 P.2d 447, 451 (Wyo. 
1990).

 

[¶19]   WYO. STAT. § 16-3-108(a) (1990) 
controls evidentiary questions which arise in administrative proceedings. That 
section provides in pertinent part: "[I]rrelevant, immaterial or unduly 
repetitious evidence shall be excluded." Section 16-3-108(a). Hearsay evidence 
is admissible in an administrative proceeding when it satisfies the requirements 
of § 16-3-108(a) and is "probative, trustworthy and credible." Story v. Wyoming State Board of Medical 
Examiners, 721 P.2d 1013, 1018 (Wyo. 1986).

 

[¶20]   The letter was addressed to the 
claimant and was signed "Barbara." It was barely legible, and the declarant was 
never located. Since the hearing examiner did not have any way of knowing the 
declarant's identity or her motive for writing the letter, this hearsay evidence 
was unreliable. The hearing examiner did not abuse his discretion in excluding 
it.

 

[¶21]  The claimant asserts that the evidence 
with regard to the restaurant's termination of her son's employment was 
irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. The hearing examiner found that this 
evidence was relevant to the claimant's motive for filing her report of injury. 
The hearing examiner was justifiably suspect of the claimant's late filing and 
could have reasonably concluded that the reason she filed was to retaliate 
against the restaurant for firing her son. The hearing examiner, therefore, 
properly considered the evidence.

 

C. Late Filing

 

[¶22]   The claimant argues that the 
hearing examiner's finding that the late filing of her claim prejudiced the 
restaurant and the Workers' Compensation Division was clearly contrary to the 
overwhelming weight of the evidence. The decision in which the hearing examiner 
found that the claimant had failed to prove her injury arose out of and in the 
course of her employment was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 
discretion and was otherwise in accordance with law. Since that decision is 
dispositive, we do not need to discuss the claimant's challenge to the hearing 
examiner's finding that the appellees were prejudiced by the late filing of her 
claim.

 

[¶23]   The hearing examiner's decision is 
affirmed.