Title: Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2012 WI 26 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP355 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
Heritage Farms, Inc., Audrey Bunchkowski, Russell  
Bunchkowski, Ruth Dutcher, Howard Dutcher, Sally Freitag,  
Amy Holzwart, James Holzwart, Kathleen Khin, Glenwood  
Zellmer, Daryl Lloyd, Donald Lloyd, Judy Maas, Jeffrey  
Maas, Carolyn Mueller, Lois Rucich, George Rucich, Donna  
Semrow, Harland Semrow, Beverly Singer, Norman A. Singer  
Trust, Joan Singer, Gordon Singer, Singer Living Trust,  
Inga Stoellinger, Otto Stoellinger, Catherine Swanton,  
Swanton Family Trust, Christine Toliver, Alan Toliver,  
Krista Zimmer and Norman Zimmer, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
Hartford Insurance Company of the Midwest, Auto-Owners  
Insurance Company, Safeco Insurance Company of America and  
Acuity, a mutual insurance company, 
          Involuntary-Plaintiffs, 
     v. 
Markel Insurance Company, J.J.J. Recreation Corporation  
d/b/a Lake of the Woods Campground, American Family Mutual  
Insurance Company and Jeffrey Knaack, 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Ted Schwochert, Paul B. Schwochert, Helen Schwochert and  
Sue Schroeder, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Markel Insurance Company, J.J.J. Recreation Corporation  
d/b/a Lake of the Woods Campground, American Family Mutual  
Insurance Company and Jeffrey Knaack, 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2011 WI App 12 
Reported at: 331 Wis. 2d 64, 793 N.W.2d 896 
(Ct. App. 2010 – Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 16, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON 
BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 1, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF 
APPEAL: 
 
 COURT: 
Circuit   
 COUNTY: 
Waushara 
 JUDGE: 
John V. Finn 
 
 
2
  
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 CONCURRED: 
        
 DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J. dissents (Opinion filed).    
 NOT 
PARTICIPATING:         
  
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there were briefs 
filed by Mark L. Thomsen, Sarah F. Kaas and Cannon & Dunphy, 
S.C., Brookfield, Clay R. Dutcher and Dutcher Law Office, 
L.L.C., Wautoma and George W. Curtis, Brian P. Beisenstein and 
Curtis Law Office, Oshkosh and oral argument by Mark Thomsen. 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief filed by 
John V. McCoy, Brian D. Parish and McCoy Law Group, S.C., 
Waukesha, Mark S. Henkel and First Law Group, Stevens Point and 
oral argument by John V. McCoy. 
 
 
2012 WI 26
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2010AP355 
(L.C. No. 
2004CV131) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Heritage Farms, Inc., Audrey Bunchkowski, 
Russell Bunchkowski, Ruth Dutcher, Howard 
Dutcher, Sally Freitag, Amy Holzwart, James 
Holzwart, Kathleen Khin, Glenwood Zellmer, 
Daryl Lloyd, Donald Lloyd, Judy Maas, Jeffrey 
Maas, Carolyn Mueller, Lois Rucich, George 
Rucich, Donna Semrow, Harland Semrow, Beverly 
Singer, Norman A. Singer Trust, Joan Singer, 
Gordon Singer, Singer Living Trust, Inga 
Stoellinger, Otto Stoellinger, Catherine 
Swanton, Swanton Family Trust, Christine 
Toliver, Alan Toliver, Krista Zimmer and Norman 
Zimmer, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
Hartford Insurance Company of the Midwest, 
Auto-Owners Insurance Company, Safeco Insurance 
Company of America and Acuity, a mutual 
insurance company, 
 
          Involuntary-Plaintiffs, 
 
     v. 
 
Markel Insurance Company, J.J.J. Recreation 
Corporation d/b/a Lake of the Woods Campground, 
American Family Mutual Insurance Company and 
Jeffrey Knaack, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
----------------------------------------------- 
 
Ted Schwochert, Paul B. Schwochert, Helen 
Schwochert and Sue Schroeder, 
FILED 
 
MAR 16, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
2 
 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Markel Insurance Company, J.J.J. Recreation 
Corporation d/b/a Lake of the Woods Campground, 
American Family Mutual Insurance Company and 
Jeffrey Knaack, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded to the circuit court with instructions.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals, Heritage Farms, Inc. 
v. Markel Insurance Co., 2011 WI App 12, 331 Wis. 2d 64, 793 
N.W.2d 896, that affirmed an order by the Waushara County 
Circuit Court1 granting in part and denying in part the 
plaintiffs' motion for payment of double damages and reasonable 
costs for legal representation under Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) 
(2003-04)2 and for 12 percent interest thereon.   
                                                 
1 The Honorable John V. Finn presided. 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 26.21 (2003-04), "Civil liability for 
forest fires," states:  
(1) In addition to the penalties provided in 
s. 26.20, the United States, the state, the county or 
private owners, whose property is injured or destroyed 
by forest fires, may recover, in a civil action, 
double the amount of damages suffered, if the fires 
occurred through willfulness, malice or negligence.  
In a civil action, a court may award reasonable costs 
No. 
2010AP355   
 
3 
 
¶2 
The plaintiffs consist of Heritage Farms, Inc. and 
several other landowners (collectively, Heritage Farms) whose 
properties were extensively damaged as a result of a 2003 forest 
fire in Marquette and Waushara Counties, commonly referred to as 
the Crystal Lake Fire.  A jury determined that the fire was 
negligently caused by Jeffrey Knaack (Knaack), who ignited and 
failed to properly extinguish a burn pile at the Lake of the 
Woods Campground.  Post-verdict, Heritage Farms moved for 
judgment against Knaack, the campground, and their respective 
insurers 
(collectively, 
Markel)3 
for 
double 
damages 
and 
reasonable costs for legal representation pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 26.21(1). 
¶3 
This is the second time these parties have appeared 
before us.  See Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co. 
                                                                                                                                                             
for legal representation to provide owners recovering 
damages under this subsection.   
(2) Persons causing fires in violation of this 
chapter shall be liable to the state in an action for 
debt, to the full amount of all damages done to the 
state lands and for all expenses incurred by the towns 
fighting 
forest 
fires 
and 
shall 
be 
liable 
to 
municipalities in an action for debt, to the full 
amount of all damages to the municipal lands and for 
all expenses incurred by the municipalities fighting 
such fires. 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 Knaack was insured against personal liability by American 
Family Mutual Insurance Company, and the Lake of the Woods 
Campground was insured against commercial liability by Markel 
Insurance Company. 
No. 
2010AP355   
 
4 
 
(hereafter Heritage Farms I),4 2009 WI 27, 316 Wis. 2d 47, 762 
N.W.2d 652.  In Heritage Farms I, we held that civil liability 
for forest fires under Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) is not limited to a 
specific class of tortfeasor such as a railroad corporation and 
that a violation under Wis. Stat. § 26.205 is not a prerequisite 
to the application of Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1).  Id., ¶13.  We 
further concluded that § 26.21(1) does not require a showing of 
gross negligence.  Id., ¶37. 
¶4 
After our decision in Heritage Farms I, Heritage Farms 
again requested the circuit court to award double damages and 
reasonable costs for legal representation under Wis. Stat. 
§ 26.21(1).  The circuit court determined that the decision to 
award 
double 
damages 
and 
reasonable 
costs 
for 
legal 
representation under § 26.21(1) is subject to the court's 
discretion.  The circuit court awarded Heritage Farms its 
attorney fees and costs.  However, the court declined to 
exercise its discretion to double Heritage Farms' damages, 
reasoning that Knaack's conduct did not necessarily warrant 
punishment beyond the payment of compensatory damages.  The 
court of appeals affirmed. 
                                                 
4 We use the case name Heritage Farms I to identify this 
court's first published decision involving these same parties 
and to distinguish that first published decision from the 
decision at bar. 
5 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 26.20, 
"Fire 
protection 
devices," 
generally outlines the duties of those corporations that operate 
on or maintain a railway.  See Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel 
Ins. Co. (Heritage Farms I), 2009 WI 27, ¶11 & n.7, 316 
Wis. 2d 47, 762 N.W.2d 652. 
No. 
2010AP355   
 
5 
 
¶5 
Heritage Farms petitioned this court for review, which 
we granted.  We now reverse the decision of the court of appeals 
and remand to the circuit court with instructions to enter 
judgment in accordance with this opinion. 
¶6 
This case presents several issues for our review:  
(1) 
Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1), if it is determined 
that the owner's property was injured or destroyed by 
a forest fire that occurred through willfulness, 
malice, or negligence, is the property owner entitled 
to double damages as a matter of course, or is an 
award of double damages discretionary? 
(a) 
Assuming we conclude that the property owner is 
entitled to double damages under § 26.21(1) as a 
matter of course, should we apply our holding 
only prospectively? 
(b) 
Assuming we conclude that an award of double 
damages under § 26.21(1) is discretionary, is the 
decision to award double damages subject to the 
circuit court's discretion or reserved for the 
fact-finder?  Relatedly, does a party have a 
constitutional right to have a jury decide 
whether to award double damages under § 26.21(1)? 
(i) Assuming we conclude that the decision to award 
double damages under § 26.21(1) is subject to 
the circuit court's discretion, what standard, 
if any, should the court follow in making its 
determination? 
No. 
2010AP355   
 
6 
 
(2) 
Assuming we conclude that Heritage Farms is entitled 
to double damages under Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) as a 
matter of course, is Heritage Farms entitled to 12 
percent interest on that amount from the date of the 
jury's verdict pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 814.04(4)?  Is 
Heritage Farms entitled to 12 percent interest on its 
award of attorney fees and costs from the date of the 
jury's verdict? 
(a) 
Is § 814.04(4) unconstitutional on its face or as 
applied to Markel? 
¶7 
We conclude that pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1), if 
it is determined that the owner's property was injured or 
destroyed by a forest fire that occurred through willfulness, 
malice, or negligence, then the property owner is entitled to 
double damages as a matter of course.  We apply this holding 
retrospectively.  Consequently, in this case, because the jury 
determined that Heritage Farms' property was damaged by a forest 
fire caused by Knaack's negligence, Heritage Farms is entitled 
to double damages as a matter of course.  
¶8 
We further conclude that pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 814.04(4), Heritage Farms is entitled to 12 percent interest 
on its double damages award from the date of the jury's verdict.  
At the same time, we determine that Heritage Farms is entitled 
to 12 percent interest on its award of attorney fees and costs 
only from the date of that award, not from the date of the 
jury's verdict.  Finally, we conclude that Markel has failed to 
No. 
2010AP355   
 
7 
 
prove 
beyond 
a 
reasonable 
doubt 
that 
§ 814.04(4) 
is 
unconstitutional on its face or as applied to Markel. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶9 
The facts and procedural history of this case were 
recited in Heritage Farms I and need not be repeated at length 
here.  See 316 Wis. 2d 47, ¶¶3-4.  It is sufficient to state 
that Heritage Farms' property was extensively damaged by the 
2003 Crystal Lake Fire.  The fire originated when a large burn 
pile, ignited lawfully by Knaack six weeks earlier, flared up 
and escaped the Lake of the Woods Campground.  The fire burned 
572 acres of land before it was finally contained. 
¶10 Heritage Farms filed a civil action against Markel, 
claiming negligence, trespass, and nuisance, and seeking double 
damages and reasonable costs for legal representation under Wis. 
Stat. § 26.21(1).  The negligence, trespass, and nuisance claims 
were submitted to a jury.  On October 13, 2006, the jury 
returned a verdict in favor of Heritage Farms on all three 
claims and awarded Heritage Farms $568,422 in compensatory 
damages. 
¶11 Post-verdict, 
Heritage 
Farms 
moved 
for 
judgment 
against Markel for double damages and reasonable costs for legal 
representation under Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1).  The circuit court 
denied the motion, concluding that § 26.21(1) applies only to 
defendants who are railroad corporations.  Accordingly, the 
circuit court entered judgment on the jury verdict.  On July 17, 
2007, Markel paid the entirety of that judgment plus interest. 
No. 
2010AP355   
 
8 
 
¶12 Heritage Farms appealed, and the court of appeals 
affirmed. 
¶13 In Heritage Farms I, we reversed that decision of the 
court of appeals.  316 Wis. 2d 47.  We held that Wis. Stat. 
§ 26.21(1) is not limited to a specific class of tortfeasor such 
as a railroad corporation and that a violation under Wis. Stat. 
§ 26.20 is not a prerequisite to the application of Wis. Stat. 
§ 26.21(1).  Id., ¶13.  We further concluded that § 26.21(1) 
does not require a showing of gross negligence.  Id., ¶37. 
¶14 Markel moved for reconsideration, which we denied on 
May 28, 2009.  Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., No. 
2007AP983, unpublished order (Wis. May 28, 2009). 
¶15 The issues before us today arose subsequent to our 
decision in Heritage Farms I.  On August 20, 2009, upon remand, 
Heritage Farms again moved the circuit court for payment of 
double damages and reasonable costs for legal representation 
under Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1).  Heritage Farms also requested 12 
percent interest on those amounts from the date of the jury's 
verdict, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 814.04(4).6 
¶16 Markel opposed Heritage Farms' motion, arguing that 
Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) does not mandate the payment of double 
damages and reasonable costs for legal representation.  Rather, 
Markel contended, the statute's plain language is permissive, 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 814.04(4), 
"Interest 
on 
verdict," 
provides, in relevant part: "[I]f the judgment is for the 
recovery of money, interest at the rate of 12% per year from the 
time of verdict, decision or report until judgment is entered 
shall be computed by the clerk and added to the costs." 
No. 
2010AP355   
 
9 
 
making clear that the determination of whether to impose double 
damages and costs for legal representation is left to the fact-
finder's discretion.  Markel maintained that double damages and 
costs for legal representation are inappropriate in this case, 
given the jury's finding that Knaack was "negligent, but no 
more." 
¶17 Markel further argued that even if the circuit court 
now awards Heritage Farms double damages and reasonable costs 
for legal representation, Heritage Farms is still not entitled 
to interest on those amounts from the date of the jury's verdict 
because, as of that date, such amounts were not known and 
determined.  In any case, Markel asserted, imposing 12 percent 
interest under Wis. Stat. § 814.04(4) is unconstitutional.  
Markel reasoned that a 12 percent interest rate is so severe 
that it tends to deter defendants from defending themselves on 
appeal. 
¶18 On November 19, 2009, the circuit court held a hearing 
on Heritage Farms' motion, ultimately granting it in part and 
denying it in part.  The circuit court determined that the 
decision to award double damages and reasonable costs for legal 
representation under Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) is subject to the 
court's discretion.  The circuit court awarded Heritage Farms 
its attorney fees and costs.  However, the court declined to 
impose interest on those amounts from the date of the jury's 
verdict, explaining that as of that date, the parties were still 
operating under the ruling that § 26.21(1) did not apply to 
Markel. 
No. 
2010AP355   
 
10 
 
¶19 The circuit court had a more difficult time deciding 
whether to award Heritage Farms double damages.  The court 
lamented the lack of guidance as to what standard it should 
apply in exercising its discretion: "[W]hat I'm struggling with 
is whether or not, in addition to paying the compensatory 
damages, the person who started the fire should be punished by 
having double damages, and without any criteria, it's really 
hard to do . . . ."  Ultimately, the circuit court was not 
persuaded that it should exercise its discretion to double 
Heritage Farms' damages.  The court reasoned that Knaack's 
conduct did not necessarily warrant punishment beyond the 
payment of compensatory damages. 
¶20 The circuit court entered judgment accordingly on 
December 23, 2009, granting Heritage Farms' motion for payment 
of attorney fees and costs but denying Heritage Farms' motion 
for payment of double damages and for 12 percent interest on any 
attorney fees, costs, or additional damages awarded from the 
date of the jury's verdict.  On February 12, 2010, Markel paid 
the judgment of attorney fees and costs, plus interest running 
from November 19, 2009. 
¶21 Heritage 
Farms 
moved 
the 
circuit 
court 
for 
reconsideration, which the court denied.  The circuit court 
reiterated its determination that an award of double damages 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 26.21(1) 
is 
discretionary. 
 
Because 
§ 26.21(1) uses the word "may," the circuit court construed the 
statute as "an invitation for the Court to consider whether or 
not the specific facts in a specific case are such that the 
No. 
2010AP355   
 
11 
 
defendant ought to be punished in addition to paying for his, 
his [sic] negligence . . . ." 
¶22 Heritage Farms appealed,7 maintaining that double 
damages under Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) are mandatory or, at the 
very least, presumed.  The court of appeals disagreed and 
affirmed.  Heritage Farms, 331 Wis. 2d 64.  The court of 
appeals, like the circuit court, concluded that the decision to 
award double damages under § 26.21(1) is subject to the circuit 
court's discretion.  Id., ¶11.  The court of appeals pointed out 
that 
the 
legislature 
used 
the 
permissive 
word 
"may" 
in 
§ 26.21(1) when describing a property owner's right to recover 
double damages in the event that a forest fire results from 
willfulness, malice, or negligence.  Id., ¶10.  In contrast, the 
court of appeals explained, the legislature used the mandatory 
word "shall" in § 26.21(2) when describing a person's liability 
to the State and to municipalities for damage done to state and 
municipal lands and for expenses incurred in fighting forest 
fires. 
 
Id. 
 
According 
to 
the 
court 
of 
appeals, 
the 
legislature's use of the words "may" in § 26.21(1) and "shall" 
in § 26.21(2) is evidence of its awareness that the words have 
distinct meanings.  Id., ¶11.  Consequently, the court of 
appeals concluded that § 26.21(1) should be interpreted as 
permissive, not mandatory.  Id.  The court of appeals further 
                                                 
7 Markel did not cross-appeal from the circuit court's order 
granting Heritage Farms' motion for payment of reasonable costs 
for 
legal 
representation 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 26.21(1).  
Accordingly, that portion of the circuit court's order is not 
before us. 
No. 
2010AP355   
 
12 
 
rejected Heritage Farm's argument that double damages under 
§ 26.21(1) are presumed.  Id., ¶13.  Finally, because the court 
of appeals affirmed the circuit court's denial of double damages 
under § 26.21(1), it declined to address whether Heritage Farms 
was entitled to 12 percent interest on such damages from the 
date of the jury's verdict.  Id., ¶15. 
¶23 Heritage Farms petitioned this court for review, which 
we granted on April 12, 2011.  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶24 This case presents two principal issues.  First, we 
must determine whether Heritage Farms is entitled to double 
damages under Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) as a matter of course, or 
whether an award of double damages is discretionary.  Second, 
assuming Heritage Farms is entitled to double damages under 
§ 26.21(1) as a matter of course, we must determine whether 
Heritage Farms is entitled to 12 percent interest on its award 
of double damages from the date of the jury's verdict, pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 814.04(4).  Relatedly, Heritage Farms requests 
12 percent interest on its award of attorney fees and costs from 
the date of the jury's verdict.  Both of these principal issues 
are questions of statutory interpretation and application.  The 
interpretation and application of a statute are questions of law 
that we review de novo while benefitting from the analyses of 
the court of appeals and circuit court.  Affeldt v. Green Lake 
Cnty., 2011 WI 56, ¶32, 335 Wis. 2d 104, 803 N.W.2d 56. 
¶25 In 
addition, 
Markel 
raises 
several 
derivative 
questions, including whether our interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
No. 
2010AP355   
 
13 
 
§ 26.21(1) should apply only prospectively, and whether Wis. 
Stat. § 814.04(4) is unconstitutional.  The first is a question 
of policy to be determined by this court.  See Jacque v. 
Steenberg Homes, Inc., 209 Wis. 2d 605, 613, 563 N.W.2d 154 
(1997); Kurtz v. City of Waukesha, 91 Wis. 2d 103, 108, 280 
N.W.2d 757 (1979).  The second is a question of law that we also 
review independently.  See State v. Smith, 2010 WI 16, ¶8, 323 
Wis. 2d 377, 780 N.W.2d 90. 
III. ANALYSIS 
¶26 "[T]he purpose of statutory interpretation is to 
determine what the statute means so that it may be given its 
full, proper, and intended effect."  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110.  Because we presume that the legislature "'says 
in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says 
there,'" id., ¶39 (quoting Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 
249, 253-54 (1992)), statutory interpretation begins with the 
language of the statute, id., ¶45.  Statutory language is given 
its common and ordinary meaning, "except that technical or 
specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or 
special definitional meaning."  Id.  If the meaning is plain, 
our inquiry ends.  Id. 
¶27 At the same time, statutory language cannot be 
interpreted in isolation but rather as part of a whole, in 
relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related 
statutes.  Id., ¶46.  In addition, we must construe statutory 
language reasonably, in order to avoid absurd results.  Id.  An 
No. 
2010AP355   
 
14 
 
unreasonable 
interpretation 
is 
one 
that 
contravenes 
the 
statute's manifest purpose.  See id., ¶49. 
¶28 Generally, we do not consult extrinsic sources of 
legislative intent, such as legislative history, unless the 
statute's language is ambiguous.  Id., ¶50.  Statutory language 
is ambiguous if it reasonably gives rise to more than one 
meaning.  Id., ¶47. 
¶29 To resolve the two principal issues in this case, we 
must apply the above canons of statutory interpretation to Wis. 
Stat. §§ 26.21(1) and 814.04(4).  We analyze the statutes in 
turn. 
A. Wisconsin Stat. § 26.21(1) 
1. Whether Heritage Farms is entitled to double damages 
under Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) as a matter of course, or 
whether an award of double damages is discretionary 
¶30 Wisconsin Stat. § 26.21(1) provides, in relevant part, 
that "private owners, whose property is injured or destroyed by 
forest fires, may recover, in a civil action, double the amount 
of damages suffered, if the fires occurred through willfulness, 
malice or negligence."  In this case, the jury found that 
Heritage Farm's property was injured or destroyed by a forest 
fire that occurred through Knaack's negligence.  Heritage Farms 
argues that, as a result, double damages under § 26.21(1) are 
mandatory, or at least presumed.  Markel, on the other hand, 
maintains that an award of double damages under § 26.21(1) is 
discretionary.   
¶31 We agree with Heritage Farms that it is entitled to 
double damages under Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1).  Our conclusion, 
No. 
2010AP355   
 
15 
 
however, is based on a slightly different rationale than that 
espoused by Heritage Farms.  We conclude that pursuant to 
§ 26.21(1), if it is determined that the owner's property was 
injured or destroyed by a forest fire that occurred through 
willfulness, malice, or negligence, then the property owner is 
entitled to double damages as a matter of course. 
¶32 We begin with the language of Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1).  
Again, § 26.21(1) states that a property owner, "whose property 
is injured or destroyed by forest fires, may recover, in a civil 
action, double the amount of damages suffered, if the fires 
occurred through willfulness, malice or negligence."  The 
parties focus their arguments on the meaning of the phrase "may 
recover."  The word "may" is ordinarily used to grant permission 
or 
to 
indicate 
possibility. 
 
See 
The 
American 
Heritage 
Dictionary 
of 
the 
English 
Language 
1112 
(3d 
ed. 
1992).  
Accordingly, when interpreting a statute, we generally construe 
the word "may" as permissive.  Hitchcock v. Hitchcock, 78 
Wis. 2d 214, 220, 254 N.W.2d 230 (1977); Schmidt v. Dep't. of 
Local Affairs & Dev., 39 Wis. 2d 46, 53, 158 N.W.2d 306 (1968); 
City of Wauwatosa v. Milwaukee Cnty., 22 Wis. 2d 184, 191, 125 
N.W.2d 386 (1963). By contrast, we presume that the word "shall" 
is mandatory.  Eby v. Kozarek, 153 Wis. 2d 75, 79, 450 
N.W.2d 249 (1990); Karow v. Milwaukee Cnty. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 
82 Wis. 2d 565, 570, 263 N.W.2d 214 (1978); State v. Rosen, 72 
Wis. 2d 200, 205, 240 N.W.2d 168 (1976).  The distinction is 
particularly significant when the words "may" and "shall" are 
used in the same statutory section, as they are in § 26.21.  
No. 
2010AP355   
 
16 
 
While § 26.21(1) provides that a property owner, whose property 
is injured or destroyed by a forest fire, "may" recover, in a 
civil action, double damages against the tortfeasor, § 26.21(2) 
directs that the tortfeasor "shall" be liable to the State and 
to municipalities for all damages done to state and municipal 
lands and for all expenses incurred in fighting the forest fire.  
When the words "may" and "shall" are used in the same statutory 
section, we "can infer that the legislature was aware of the 
different denotations and intended the words to have their 
precise meanings."  Karow, 82 Wis. 2d at 571.   
¶33 In light of the foregoing, Markel contends that the 
court of appeals properly construed the plain language of Wis. 
Stat. § 26.21(1) as merely permitting Heritage Farms to recover 
double damages, as opposed to mandating it.   
¶34 While recognizing that we generally construe the word 
"may" as permissive, Heritage Farms urges us to nevertheless 
read the phrase "may recover" in Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) as "shall 
recover," in order to carry out the statute's legislative 
intent.  
As 
Heritage Farms points out, this court has 
occasionally ruled that the word "may" in a statute can properly 
be construed as mandatory when such a construction is necessary 
to carry out the intent of the legislature.  See, e.g., Miller 
v. Smith, 100 Wis. 2d 609, 616-17, 302 N.W.2d 468 (1981); 
Klisurich v. DHSS, 98 Wis. 2d 274, 278-79, 296 N.W.2d 742 
(1980); Hitchcock, 78 Wis. 2d at 220; Schmidt, 39 Wis. 2d at 53; 
City of Wauwatosa, 22 Wis. 2d at 191-92.  Relying on our 
decision in Heritage Farms I, Heritage Farms contends that 
No. 
2010AP355   
 
17 
 
§ 26.21(1) expresses the legislature's intent to "severely 
punish" those responsible for starting forest fires.  See 316 
Wis. 2d 47, ¶¶29, 35.  According to Heritage Farms, severe 
punishment under § 26.21(1) is best carried out through a 
mandatory, as opposed to a merely discretionary, recovery of 
double damages. 
¶35 As their arguments make clear, the parties focus on 
the phrase "may recover" in Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) only as it 
relates to double damages.  However, in fact, § 26.21(1) states 
that a property owner "may recover, in a civil action, double 
the 
amount of damages suffered . . . ." (Emphasis added.)  
Accordingly, we must interpret the phrase "may recover" in 
relation to the entire clause that it precedes: "in a civil 
action, double the amount of damages suffered."   
¶36 With that in mind, we decline to rewrite Wis. Stat. 
§ 26.21(1), as Heritage Farms suggests, by replacing the word 
"may" with the word "shall."  The cases in which this court 
construed the word "may" in a statute as "shall," or vice-versa, 
must be understood in context.  In each case, the court was 
interpreting a statutory provision that imposed, usually upon 
No. 
2010AP355   
 
18 
 
the circuit court or a litigant, a power or duty to act.8  The 
issue 
then 
was 
whether 
the 
power 
or 
duty 
to 
act 
was 
discretionary or mandatory.  To make that determination, we 
considered such factors as the statute's objectives, the 
statute's history, the consequences that would follow from the 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., Eby v. Kozarek, 153 Wis. 2d 75, 79, 450 
N.W.2d 249 (1990) (interpreting Wis. Stat. § 655.445(1) (1987-
88), which provided that a claimant under chapter 655 (1987-88) 
"shall, within 15 days after the date of filing an action in 
court, file a request for mediation"); Miller v. Smith, 100 
Wis. 2d 609, 616, 302 N.W.2d 468 (1981) (interpreting Wis. Stat. 
§ 807.12(2) (1977-78), which provided that "[w]hen the name of 
such defendant [designated by a fictitious name] is ascertained 
the process, pleadings and all proceedings may be amended by an 
order directing the insertion of the true name instead of the 
designation employed"); Klisurich v. DHSS, 98 Wis. 2d 274, 277-
78, 296 N.W.2d 742 (1980) (interpreting Wis. Stat. § 46.10(2) 
(1975-76), which provided that the Department of Health and 
Social Services "may bring action for the enforcement of such 
liability" under § 46.10 (1975-76)); Karow v. Milwaukee Cnty. 
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 82 Wis. 2d 565, 570, 263 N.W.2d 214 (1978) 
(interpreting Wis. Stat. § 63.10(2) (1975-76), which provided 
that the county civil service commission "shall appoint a time 
and place for the hearing of said charges [allegedly meriting an 
employee's demotion or dismissal], the time to be within 3 weeks 
after the filing of the same"); Hitchcock v. Hitchcock, 78 
Wis. 2d 214, 219, 254 N.W.2d 230 (1977) (interpreting Wis. Stat. 
§ 247.101 (1971-72), which provided that the circuit court "may 
grant a judgment of divorce or legal separation to the party 
whose equities on the whole are found to be superior"); State v. 
Rosen, 
72 
Wis. 2d 200, 
202-03, 
240 
N.W.2d 168 
(1976) 
(interpreting 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 161.555(2)(b) 
(1973-74), 
which 
provided that "the action [brought to cause the forfeiture of 
property seized under Wis. Stat. § 161.55 (1973-74)] shall be 
set for hearing within 60 days of the service of the answer"); 
City of Wauwatosa v. Milwaukee Cnty., 22 Wis. 2d 184, 187-88, 
125 N.W.2d 386 (1963) (interpreting Wis. Stat. § 59.07(52)(a) 
(1959-60), which provided that the Milwaukee County Board "may 
pay to the municipality in which said [county] buildings are 
situated for the transmission and disposal of sewage, such 
proportion of the expense thereof"). 
No. 
2010AP355   
 
19 
 
alternative interpretation, and whether the statute imposed a 
penalty for the failure to exercise the power or duty.  See Eby, 
153 Wis. 2d at 80; Karow, 82 Wis. 2d at 571-72; Rosen, 72 
Wis. 2d at 207. 
¶37 Wisconsin Stat. § 26.21(1), however, does not impose 
upon a property owner any power or duty to act.  More 
specifically, § 26.21(1) does not impose upon a property owner, 
whose property is injured or destroyed by a forest fire, a power 
or duty to "recover, in a civil action, double the amount of 
damages suffered"; indeed, imposing such a duty would be 
unreasonable.  Certainly, the statute does not provide for a 
penalty if the property owner chooses not to take such action.  
Rather, § 26.21(1) provides for the opportunity, if the property 
owner so chooses, to "recover, in a civil action, double the 
amount of damages suffered."  Stated another way, pursuant to 
§ 26.21(1), a property owner, whose property is injured or 
destroyed by a forest fire, may bring a civil action against the 
tortfeasor to recover double damages.  See Heritage Farms I, 316 
Wis. 2d 47, ¶23 (explaining that § 26.21(1) is "drafted from the 
perspective of who may bring an action").  When § 26.21(1) is 
understood in that context, it makes sense for us to interpret 
the word "may" according to its common and ordinary meaning of 
granting permission.  By contrast, it would be unreasonable for 
us to interpret the word "may" as "shall," thereby effectively 
mandating that the property owner bring a civil action to 
recover double damages.  
No. 
2010AP355   
 
20 
 
¶38 Consequently, we agree with Markel that the word "may" 
in Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) is permissive.  Still, it does not 
follow, as Markel contends, that an award of double damages 
under § 26.21(1) is discretionary.  The language in § 26.21(1) 
that permits a property owner to "recover, in a civil action, 
double the amount of damages suffered" cannot be read in 
isolation.  Section 26.21(1) goes on to state that the property 
owner "may recover, in a civil action, double the amount of 
damages suffered, if the fires occurred through willfulness, 
malice or negligence." (Emphasis added.) 
¶39 The word "if" is a conjunction that ordinarily means 
"[i]n the event that," "[g]ranting that," or "[o]n the condition 
that."  The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 
897 (3d ed. 1992).  Therefore, we interpret Wis. Stat. 
§ 26.21(1) as providing that a property owner, whose property is 
injured or destroyed by a forest fire, is permitted to "recover, 
in a civil action, double the amount of damages suffered," in 
the event that or on the condition that "the fire[] occurred 
through willfulness, malice or negligence."  Stated another way, 
once it is determined that the forest fire occurred through 
willfulness, malice, or negligence, the property owner is 
entitled to double damages as a matter of course.   
¶40 Still, Markel asks us to conclude that an award of 
double damages under Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) is discretionary, 
even if it is determined that the forest fire occurred through 
willfulness, malice, or negligence.  To conclude otherwise, 
Markel argues, would lead to "blind punishment"——punishment for 
No. 
2010AP355   
 
21 
 
the sake of punishment, without regard to the particular conduct 
that gave rise to the forest fire.  While we appreciate Markel's 
policy argument, it is not supported by the language of 
§ 26.21(1).  The statute permits a property owner, whose 
property is injured or destroyed by a forest fire, to "recover, 
in a civil action, double the amount of damages suffered," 
contingent on only one requirement: the fire must have "occurred 
through 
willfulness, 
malice 
or 
negligence." 
 
Markel's 
interpretation, 
however, 
effectively 
places 
an 
additional 
condition on the property owner's recovery of double damages, 
namely, 
a 
showing 
that 
the 
tortfeasor's 
conduct——whether 
willful, malicious, or negligent——warrants the payment of double 
damages.  The legislature did not impose such a condition under 
§ 26.21(1), and this court is not permitted to create such a 
condition.  Rather, as noted in Heritage Farms I, we must 
presume that the legislature intended to "cast a wide net when 
punishing 
those 
who 
start 
forest 
fires," 
subjecting 
the 
tortfeasor to double damages regardless of whether the fire was 
set willfully, maliciously, or negligently.  316 Wis. 2d 47, 
¶41.  A discretionary award of double damages would thwart that 
purpose. 
¶41 Moreover, it is important to note that Wis. Stat. 
§ 26.21(1) does not state that the court may award double 
damages, if the fires occurred through willfulness, malice or 
negligence.  Using that type of language would have been a 
simple matter, had the legislature contemplated a discretionary 
award of double damages.  Instead, as previously explained, 
No. 
2010AP355   
 
22 
 
§ 26.21(1) is directed at the property owner, providing that the 
property owner "may recover," in a civil action, double damages, 
if the fires occurred through willfulness, malice or negligence.  
As such, "[i]t would certainly be odd" for us to interpret 
§ 26.21(1) as giving the circuit court the discretion to decline 
to award double damages even after it has been determined that 
the fire occurred through willfulness, malice, or negligence, 
see Kolupar v. Wilde Pontiac Cadillac, Inc., 2004 WI 112, ¶19, 
275 Wis. 2d 1, 683 N.W.2d 58, particularly when the statute is 
silent as to what standard the court ought to follow when 
exercising such discretion.   
¶42 Finally, 
Markel's 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 26.21(1) runs counter to the language of other statutory 
sections in Wis. Stat. ch. 26.  There can be no question that 
Chapter 26, entitled "Protection of Forest Lands and Forest 
Productivity," is aimed at safeguarding forests, one of our 
state's most valued natural resources.  Violations under Chapter 
26 are subject to severe consequences, both civilly and 
criminally.  Relevant to this case, Chapter 26 consistently 
imposes multiplied damages.  For example, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 26.06(3), any person who knowingly transports, receives, or 
conceals any forest products unlawfully severed from another's 
land "shall be liable to the owner for double the value 
thereof . . . ."  Likewise, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 26.09(3), 
any person who cuts, removes, or transports raw forest products 
without the owner's consent is liable for up to four times the 
stumpage value or two times the fair market value of the raw 
No. 
2010AP355   
 
23 
 
forest products, whichever is greater.  It is counter-intuitive 
that the legislature would have intended for a person who 
unlawfully cuts down another's tree to be liable for as much as 
quadruple damages, while intending for a person who sets a 
forest fire and destroys another's land——be it willfully, 
maliciously, or negligently——to be liable for double damages 
only at the circuit court or fact-finder's discretion.  Our 
canons of statutory interpretation preclude us from interpreting 
Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) in a manner that produces such an absurd 
result.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.   
¶43 In summary, we conclude that pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 26.21(1), if it is determined that the owner's property was 
injured or destroyed by a forest fire that occurred through 
willfulness, malice, or negligence, then the property owner is 
entitled to double damages as a matter of course.9  In this case, 
                                                 
9 Markel contends that the decision to award double damages 
under Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) is reserved for the fact-finder and 
cannot be submitted to the court without offending Markel's 
constitutional right to a jury trial.  Markel's contention is 
premised upon an argument that we have already rejected, namely, 
that an award of double damages under § 26.21(1) is subject to a 
discretionary 
determination 
based 
upon 
the 
defendant's 
particular conduct.  We conclude today that pursuant to 
§ 26.21(1), if it is determined that the owner's property was 
injured or destroyed by a forest fire that occurred through 
willfulness, malice, or negligence, then the property owner is 
entitled to double damages as a matter of course.  In other 
words, once it is determined that the owner's property was 
injured or destroyed by a forest fire that occurred through 
willfulness, malice, or negligence, the property owner's damages 
are doubled by operation of law.  See Hartlaub v. Coachmen 
Indus., Inc., 143 Wis. 2d 791, 804, 422 N.W.2d 869 (Ct. App. 
1988).  "Such a function is properly performed by the trial 
court——not the finder of fact."  Id. 
No. 
2010AP355   
 
24 
 
the jury determined that Heritage Farms' property was damaged by 
a forest fire caused by Knaack's negligence.  Accordingly, 
Heritage Farms is entitled to double damages as a matter of 
course.10 
 
2. Whether our interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) 
should apply only prospectively 
¶44 This court, like all courts, generally adheres to the 
doctrine that a new rule of law applies retroactively.  State ex 
rel. Buswell v. Tomah Area Sch. Dist., 2007 WI 71, ¶46, 301 
Wis. 2d 178, 732 N.W.2d 804.  The doctrine, referred to as the 
"Blackstonian doctrine," is traditionally implicated in cases in 
which the court decides to overrule or repudiate an earlier 
                                                 
10 Alternatively, Markel argues that Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) 
is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Markel.  More 
specifically, Markel maintains that § 26.21(1) is so ambiguous 
that it failed to provide notice to Markel that the statute is 
applicable to Markel.  At the outset, we note that Markel failed 
to raise an as-applied constitutional challenge to § 26.21(1) in 
Heritage Farms I.  In any event, we reject Markel's argument 
that § 26.21(1) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to 
Markel.  A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it does not 
give fair notice of the conduct prohibited by the legislation.  
City of Madison v. Baumann, 162 Wis. 2d 660, 672, 470 N.W.2d 296 
(1991); see also State ex rel. Kalt v. Bd. of Fire & Police 
Comm'rs, 145 Wis. 2d 504, 510, 427 N.W.2d 408 (Ct. App. 1988).  
At the same time, the challenged statute need not define the 
prohibited conduct with absolute clarity and precision.  State 
v. Pittman, 174 Wis. 2d 255, 276-77, 496 N.W.2d 74 (1993).  
Rather, a statute is unconstitutionally vague if it "either 
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that 
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning 
and differ as to its application . . . ."  Kalt, 145 Wis. 2d at 
510 
(internal 
quotations 
omitted). 
 
In 
this 
case, 
our 
interpretation and application of § 26.21(1) is based upon the 
statute's plain meaning.  By definition, therefore, the language 
in § 26.21(1) is not so vague as to compel Markel to guess at 
its meaning or question its application to Markel. 
No. 
2010AP355   
 
25 
 
decision.  See State v. Picotte, 2003 WI 42, ¶42, 261 
Wis. 2d 249, 661 N.W.2d 381.  "The Blackstonian doctrine is 
based on the jurisprudential theory that 'courts declare but do 
not make law.  In consequence, when a decision is overruled, it 
does not merely become bad law,——it never was the law, and the 
later pronouncement is regarded as the law from the beginning.'"  
Id. (quoting Laabs v. Tax Comm'n, 218 Wis. 414, 416-17, 261 
N.W. 404 (1935)). 
¶45 Still, on occasion, this court has departed from the 
general rule of retroactivity and chosen instead to apply a new 
rule of law only prospectively.  The decision to apply a new 
rule of law only prospectively, or to "sunburst"11 the new rule 
of law, is driven by our attempt to alleviate the unsettling 
effects of a party justifiably relying on a contrary view of the 
law. 
 
Buswell, 
301 
Wis. 2d 178, 
¶46. 
 
Accordingly, 
in 
determining whether to apply a new rule of law prospectively 
instead of retrospectively, we consider three factors: (1) 
whether our holding establishes a new rule of law, either by 
overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have 
                                                 
11 "Sunbursting," named after the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Great Northern Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil & 
Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932), is a technique in which the 
court applies a new rule of law prospectively.  See Thomas E. 
Fairchild, Limitation of New Judge-Made Law to Prospective 
Effect Only: "Prospective Overruling" or "Sunbursting", 51 Marq. 
L. Rev. 254, 255 (1968).  In Sunburst Oil, the Court made clear 
that "[a] state in defining the limits of adherence to precedent 
may make a choice for itself between the principle of forward 
operation and that of relation backward."  287 U.S. at 364; see 
also State ex rel. Buswell v. Tomah Area Sch. Dist., 2007 WI 71, 
¶46 n.12, 301 Wis. 2d 178, 732 N.W.2d 804. 
No. 
2010AP355   
 
26 
 
relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression, the 
resolution of which was not clearly foreshadowed; (2) whether 
retroactive application would further or impede the operation of 
the new rule; and (3) whether retroactive application could 
produce substantial inequitable results.  Id., ¶47; see also 
Kurtz, 91 Wis. 2d at 109. 
¶46 In this case, in the event that we interpret the word 
"may" in Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) as "shall," Markel requests that 
we "sunburst," or apply only prospectively, our holding so as to 
mitigate any hardship to Markel.  As a preliminary matter, for 
the reasons set forth above, we do not interpret the word "may" 
in § 26.21(1) as "shall."  Furthermore, we are not persuaded 
that 
our 
interpretation 
of 
§ 26.21(1) 
is 
subject 
to 
"sunbursting" in the first instance.  As explained above, the 
decision of whether to apply a new rule of law prospectively 
instead of retrospectively is traditionally implicated only in 
cases in which the court decides to overrule or repudiate an 
earlier decision.  Cf. Thomas E. Fairchild, Limitation of New 
Judge-Made 
Law 
to 
Prospective 
Effect 
Only: 
"Prospective 
Overruling" or "Sunbursting", 51 Marq. L. Rev. 254, 254-55 
(1968).  For example, in Buswell, we decided to apply our 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.84(2) 
(2003-04) 
only 
prospectively 
because 
our 
interpretation 
established 
a 
reasonableness standard which was a clear departure from the 
bright-line standard established by the court of appeals' 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 19.84(2) (1997-98) in an earlier 
decision.  See 301 Wis. 2d 178, ¶¶21, 48 (overruling State ex 
No. 
2010AP355   
 
27 
 
rel. H.D. Enters. II, LLC v. City of Stoughton, 230 Wis. 2d 480, 
602 N.W.2d 72 (Ct. App. 1999)).  By contrast, in this case, we 
are 
not 
overruling 
any 
past 
precedent; 
rather, 
we 
are 
interpreting the plain language of § 26.21(1) as it has existed 
since 1905.  See § 18, ch. 264, Laws of 1905.  Accordingly, 
here, the policy concern that typically supports a decision to 
"sunburst" a new rule of law is simply not present; we are not 
overruling a contrary rule of law on which Markel could have 
justifiably relied.   
¶47 Nevertheless, even if we were to agree with Markel 
that our interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) is subject to 
"sunbursting," we would still decline to apply our holding only 
prospectively.  Applying the above three factors to the instant 
case, we conclude that our interpretation of § 26.21(1) is 
properly applied retroactively.  First and foremost, as already 
mentioned, our interpretation of § 26.21(1) is not a clearly new 
rule of law.  We are not overruling any past precedent.  
Instead, we are interpreting statutory language that has existed 
in its present form since 1905.  See § 18, ch. 264, Laws of 
1905.  Indeed, Markel's only argument that our interpretation of 
§ 26.21(1) was not clearly foreshadowed rests on Markel's 
assumption that we would construe the word "may" as "shall," an 
interpretation we do not adopt today.  Second, retroactive 
application furthers, rather than impedes, the operation of 
§ 26.21(1) as we have interpreted it.  Our interpretation is 
based in part on the legislature's intent to severely punish 
those who set forest fires, regardless of whether the conduct 
No. 
2010AP355   
 
28 
 
was willful, malicious, or negligent.  Applying our holding to 
Markel, who was found by a jury to have negligently set a forest 
fire that damaged Heritage Farms' property, carries out that 
legislative intent.  Finally, we are not persuaded that 
retroactive application would produce substantially inequitable 
results.  Even under Markel's theory that an award of double 
damages under § 26.21(1) is discretionary, Markel still faced 
the prospect of being liable for double damages.  Therefore, 
consistent with our general practice, we conclude that our 
holding today applies retroactively. 
¶48 We turn now to the second principal issue before us: 
whether Heritage Farms is entitled to 12 percent interest on its 
award of double damages and its award of attorney fees and costs 
from the date of the jury's verdict, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 814.04(4).   
B. Wisconsin Stat. § 814.04(4) 
¶49 This court has long recognized the "basic principle 
that prejudgment interest cannot be awarded on an unliquidated 
amount or one which is not capable of determination by 
application of some fixed standard."  Nelson v. Travelers Ins. 
Co., 102 Wis. 2d 159, 167, 306 N.W.2d 71 (1981); see also Smith 
v. Atco Co., 6 Wis. 2d 371, 395, 94 N.W.2d 697 (1959) ("'In 
order to recover interest there must be a fixed and determinate 
amount which could have been tendered and interest thereby 
stopped; the amount of the claim must be known and determined, 
or readily determinable.'" (quoting Maslow Cooperage Corp. v. 
No. 
2010AP355   
 
29 
 
Weeks Pickle Co., 270 Wis. 179, 192-93, 70 N.W.2d 577 (1955))).  
Wisconsin 
Stat. § 814.04(4) applies that basic principle, 
employing an interest rate of 12 percent per year.12  Section 
814.04(4), "Interest on verdict," provides, in relevant part: 
"[I]f the judgment is for the recovery of money, interest at the 
rate of 12% per year from the time of verdict, decision or 
report until judgment is entered shall be computed by the clerk 
and added to the costs."13  In other words, § 814.04(4) 
"designates the date of the verdict as the point at which 
interest is payable."  Nelson, 102 Wis. 2d at 170.  At that 
point, the plaintiff's nonmonetary claims are converted into 
dollars, "the parameters of the [defendant's] debt have been 
established and the case no longer involves damages which are 
wholly at large."  Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
                                                 
12 On November 16, 2011, the legislature amended Wis. Stat. 
§ 814.04(4), replacing the annual 12 percent interest rate with 
an annual rate "equal to 1 percent plus the prime rate in effect 
on January 1 of the year in which the judgment is entered if the 
judgment is entered on or before June 30 of that year or in 
effect on July 1 of the year in which the judgment is entered if 
the judgment is entered after June 30 of that year, as reported 
by the federal reserve board in federal reserve statistical 
release H. 15 . . . ."  See 2011 Wis. Act 69, § 2.  The new 
interest rate applies to judgments entered on or after December 
2, 2011.  See id., § 4. 
13 Wisconsin Stat. § 815.05(8) imposes the same interest 
rate on the amount recovered "from the date of the entry of the 
judgment until it is paid."  Like Wis. Stat. § 814.04(4), see 
supra note 12, Wis. Stat. § 815.05(8) was amended by 2011 Wis. 
Act 69.  See id., § 3. 
No. 
2010AP355   
 
30 
 
¶50 Relying on Wis. Stat. § 814.04(4), Heritage Farms 
argues that it is entitled to 12 percent interest on its award 
of double damages and its award of attorney fees and costs from 
the date of the jury's verdict, October 13, 2006.  Markel 
disagrees, maintaining that neither of those amounts was known 
or capable of determination as of the date of the jury's 
verdict.  In the alternative, Markel contends that § 814.04(4) 
is unconstitutional.  We consider the parties' arguments in 
turn. 
1. Whether Heritage Farms is entitled to 12 percent 
interest on its award of double damages from the date of 
the jury's verdict 
¶51 Heritage Farms argues that it is entitled to 12 
percent interest on its award of double damages from the date of 
the jury's verdict, October 13, 2006.14  We agree. 
¶52 In Campenni v. Walrath, 180 Wis. 2d 548, 560, 513 
N.W.2d 602 (1994) (per curiam), in a nearly identical context, 
this court concluded that interest under Wis. Stat. § 814.04(4) 
shall be calculated on the total award of double damages from 
the date of the jury's verdict, even though the defendant's 
liability for double damages was not established until the case 
was appealed.  In that case, the plaintiff filed suit against 
                                                 
14 Markel has already paid the judgment, plus interest, on 
the jury's $568,422 compensatory damages award.  Heritage Farms 
does not seek any more interest on that award.  Rather, Heritage 
Farms seeks 12 percent interest on its $568,422 double damages 
award from the date of the jury's verdict to the date of 
payment. 
No. 
2010AP355   
 
31 
 
the defendant after the defendant's dog twice attacked the 
plaintiff 
and 
her 
two dogs.  Campenni v. Walrath, 180 
Wis. 2d 548, 552-53, 509 N.W.2d 725 (1994).  The jury awarded 
the plaintiff $18 for the first incident and over $75,000 for 
the second.  Id. at 553.  The plaintiff then moved the circuit 
court for double damages under Wis. Stat. § 174.02(1)(b) (1991-
92).15  Id.  The circuit court denied the plaintiff's motion by 
operation of law when it failed to act on the motion within 90 
days after the verdict was rendered, as required by Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.16(3) (1991-92).  Id.  The court of appeals affirmed.  Id.  
The 
plaintiff 
appealed 
to 
this 
court, 
and 
we 
reversed, 
concluding that the defendant was liable for double the full 
amount of damages awarded by the jury.  Id. at 560a. 
¶53 The defendant moved this court for reconsideration, 
which we denied.  Campenni, 180 Wis. 2d 548, 513 N.W.2d 602 (per 
curiam).  However, in response to the defendant's motion, we 
supplemented our decision by, inter alia, clarifying that the 
plaintiff was entitled to 12 percent interest under Wis. Stat. 
§ 804.14(4) on the total doubled damages from the date of the 
jury's verdict.  Id. at 560c.  In so concluding, we drew support 
from 
this 
court's 
decision 
in 
Nelson, 
102 
Wis. 2d 
159.  
Campenni, 180 Wis. 2d 548, 560c, 513 N.W.2d 602 (per curiam). 
                                                 
15 Wisconsin Stat. § 174.02(1)(b) (1991-92) provided, in 
relevant part, that "the owner of a dog is liable for 2 times 
the full amount of damages caused by the dog injuring or causing 
injury to a person . . . if the owner was notified or knew that 
the dog previously injured or caused injury to a person . . . ." 
No. 
2010AP355   
 
32 
 
¶54 In Nelson, this court held that pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 814.04(4), when a personal injury action results in a jury 
verdict in favor of the plaintiff, but, upon appeal, the 
liability portion of the verdict is set aside and the issue of 
contributory negligence is retried, again resulting in a verdict 
in favor of the plaintiff, interest must be calculated from the 
date of the first verdict when the damages were determined.  102 
Wis. 2d at 160-61.  The court made clear that interest under 
§ 814.04(4) runs from the date the damages are liquidated or 
determinable, regardless of outstanding legal issues concerning 
liability for those damages.  Id. at 170-71.  In Nelson, the 
damages were fixed by the first verdict, even though adjustment 
for the plaintiff's comparative negligence could not be made 
until after liability was established in the subsequent trial.  
Id. at 171.  Consequently, the court concluded that the 
plaintiff was entitled to statutory interest on the net damage 
award——the total damages established by the first verdict 
reduced by the plaintiff's contributory negligence established 
by the second——from the date of the first verdict.  Id. 
¶55 Turning back to the instant case, we conclude that 
this court's decisions in Campenni and Nelson are determinative.  
Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 814.04(4), Heritage Farms is entitled 
to 12 percent interest on its award of double damages from the 
date of the jury's verdict, October 13, 2006, even though 
Markel's liability for double damages was not firmly established 
until our decision today.  The damages were liquidated and 
determinable on October 13, 2006, when the jury awarded Heritage 
No. 
2010AP355   
 
33 
 
Farms compensatory damages of $568,422.  At that point, Heritage 
Farms' nonmonetary claims for negligence, trespass, and nuisance 
were converted into dollars, and the case no longer involved 
"damages which are wholly at large."  See id. at 170.  The only 
outstanding legal issue was whether Markel was liable for double 
the amount of $568,422.  Regardless of the outcome on appeal, 
Markel could have tendered the total doubled amount any time 
after the jury returned its verdict and thereby stopped the 
interest from running. 
2. Whether Heritage Farms is entitled to 12 percent 
interest on its award of attorney fees and costs from 
the date of the jury's verdict 
¶56 Heritage Farms argues that it is also entitled to 12 
percent interest on its award of attorney fees and costs from 
the date of the jury's verdict.  On this point, we disagree. 
¶57 The circuit court awarded Heritage Farms its attorney 
fees and costs on November 19, 2009.  On February 12, 2010, 
Markel paid the judgment of attorney fees and costs, plus 
interest running from November 19, 2009.  Heritage Farms now 
seeks 12 percent interest on its award of attorney fees and 
costs from the date of the jury's verdict, October 13, 2006, 
until November 19, 2009.   
¶58 We conclude that Heritage Farms is entitled to 12 
percent interest on its award of attorney fees and costs only 
from the date of that award, November 19, 2009, not from the 
date of the jury's verdict.  On the date of the jury's verdict, 
the amount of Heritage Farms' attorney fees and costs was not 
No. 
2010AP355   
 
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known or determinable.  By that time, Heritage Farms had merely 
asserted a claim for reasonable costs for legal representation 
under Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1).  That claim was not converted into 
dollars until November 19, 2009, when the circuit court awarded 
Heritage Farms its attorney fees and costs.  Markel has already 
paid that judgment and all interest running from November 19, 
2009.  No more could have been expected of Markel. 
3. Whether Wis. Stat. § 814.04(4) is unconstitutional on 
its face or as applied to Markel 
¶59 In 
any 
case, 
Markel 
contends 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 814.04(4) is unconstitutional.  According to Markel, the 12 
percent interest rate under § 814.04(4) is so severe and so far 
removed from the national prime lending rate that it tends to 
"chill" defendants from properly defending their claims on 
appeal, lest they may suffer "the catastrophic financial 
disaster that results in the event of loss."  In light of that 
chilling effect, Markel argues, § 814.04(4) violates Markel's 
rights to due process and equal protection as guaranteed by both 
the federal and state constitutions.  
¶60 Markel's 
constitutional 
argument 
is 
not 
entirely 
fleshed out, and it is unclear to us whether Markel is 
challenging Wis. Stat. § 814.04(4) on its face or as applied to 
Markel.  Nevertheless, in either case, we conclude that Markel 
has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that § 814.04(4) 
is unconstitutional. 
¶61 Statutes are presumed constitutional.  Smith, 323 
Wis. 2d 377, ¶8.  Accordingly, a party challenging a statute's 
No. 
2010AP355   
 
35 
 
constitutionality bears a heavy burden.  Id.  It is insufficient 
to establish merely that the statute's constitutionality is 
doubtful or that the statute is probably unconstitutional.  Id.  
"Instead, the party challenging a statute's constitutionality 
must 'prove that the statute is unconstitutional beyond a 
reasonable doubt.'"  Id. (quoting State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, 
¶11, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W. 2d 328). 
¶62 In this case, Markel merely objects to the 12 percent 
interest rate under Wis. Stat. § 814.04(4) without undertaking a 
bona fide constitutional analysis.  Markel does not attempt to 
argue that § 814.04(4) is irrational or that it unreasonably 
disadvantages one class over another.  See id., ¶12; State v. 
McManus, 
152 
Wis. 2d 113, 
130-31, 
447 
N.W.2d 654 
(1989).  
Rather, Markel's constitutional argument seems to hinge on 
Markel's contention that the interest rate under § 814.04(4) 
must correspond to the national prime lending rate.  However, 
there is no requirement that the interest rate under § 814.04(4) 
stay in "lock-step with every fluctuation in market conditions."  
Mgmt. Computer Servs., Inc. v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 224 
Wis. 2d 312, 326, 592 N.W.2d 279 (Ct. App. 1998) (internal 
quotations omitted).  Such a contention is more appropriately 
addressed to the legislature.16  Moreover, while Markel complains 
that the 12 percent interest rate is so severe that it tends to 
deter defendants from properly defending themselves on appeal, 
                                                 
16 Indeed, the legislature has recently amended Wis. Stat. 
§ 814.04(4) in a manner that may address Markel's concerns.  See 
supra note 12. 
No. 
2010AP355   
 
36 
 
Markel fails to explain why a defendant could not protect itself 
against such a financial burden by simply tendering payment 
ahead of appeal, before interest accrues.  For these reasons, we 
conclude that Markel has failed to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that § 814.04(4) is unconstitutional. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶63 We conclude that pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1), if 
it is determined that the owner's property was injured or 
destroyed by a forest fire that occurred through willfulness, 
malice, or negligence, then the property owner is entitled to 
double damages as a matter of course.  We apply this holding 
retrospectively.  Consequently, in this case, because the jury 
determined that Heritage Farms' property was damaged by a forest 
fire caused by Knaack's negligence, Heritage Farms is entitled 
to double damages as a matter of course. 
¶64 We further conclude that pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 814.04(4), Heritage Farms is entitled to 12 percent interest 
on its double damages award from the date of the jury's verdict.  
At the same time, we determine that Heritage Farms is entitled 
to 12 percent interest on its award of attorney fees and costs 
only from the date of that award, not from the date of the 
jury's verdict.  Finally, we conclude that Markel has failed to 
prove 
beyond 
a 
reasonable 
doubt 
that 
§ 814.04(4) 
is 
unconstitutional on its face or as applied to Markel. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause remanded to the circuit court with 
instructions to enter judgment in accordance with this opinion. 
No. 
2010AP355   
 
37 
 
 
No.  2010AP355.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶65 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  The question in 
this case is whether an award of double damages is mandatory, or 
whether it is within a circuit court's discretion. 
¶66 I agree with the majority's conclusion that the 
statutory term "may" should not be interpreted to mean the 
mandatory "shall."  I part ways with the majority, however, when 
it nevertheless concludes that the court has no discretion 
because the plain meaning of the statute makes the award of 
double damages mandatory. 
¶67 The plain meaning of the statute mandates no such 
result.  Rather than being supported by the plain language of 
the statute, the majority's interpretation instead rests upon a 
leap of logic. 
¶68 After examining the language and the history of the 
statute, I agree with the circuit court and a unanimous court of 
appeals that the legislature intended circuit courts to exercise 
discretion 
in 
awarding 
double 
damages. 
 
Accordingly, 
I 
respectfully dissent.   
I 
¶69 Wisconsin Stat. § 26.21(1) provides as follows: "In 
addition 
to 
the 
[forfeiture] 
penalties 
provided 
in 
s. 
26.20, . . . private 
owners, whose property is injured or 
destroyed by forest fires, may recover, in a civil action, 
double the amount of damages suffered, if the fires occurred 
through willfulness, malice or negligence."  Here, the jury 
determined that the fire was the result of negligence.     
No.  2010AP355.awb 
 
2 
 
¶70 In its examination of the statute, the majority 
concludes 
that 
the 
statutory 
term 
"may" 
should 
not 
be 
interpreted to mean "shall."  Majority op., ¶36.  It determines 
that the function of the phrase "may recover, in a civil action" 
is to permit the property owner to bring a civil action to 
recover double damages.  Id., ¶38.   
¶71 Nevertheless, the majority ultimately concludes that 
the statute mandates the award of double damages.  Id., ¶39.  It 
asserts that its interpretation is based on the "plain meaning" 
of the statute.  Id., ¶43 n.10.     
¶72 The majority's assertion about the statute's plain 
meaning is surprising.  Both the circuit court and the court of 
appeals, in well-reasoned decisions analyzing the statutory 
text, 
concluded 
that 
double 
damages 
are 
not 
mandatory.  
Additionally, 
although Heritage Farms concludes, like the 
majority, that an award of double damages is mandatory, the 
statutory interpretation advanced by Heritage Farms does not 
resemble the interpretation settled upon by the majority.  Id, 
¶31.   
¶73 The 
majority 
embraces 
its 
unique 
interpretation, 
proclaiming that it alone understands the plain meaning of the 
statute.  If the meaning of the statute were so plain, one would 
expect that of the circuit court, the court of appeals, and 
Heritage Farms, at least one would have advanced the same 
interpretation as the majority. 
  
¶74 In my estimation, the majority's interpretation is not 
based on the plain meaning of the statute at all.  Rather, it is 
No.  2010AP355.awb 
 
3 
 
based upon a leap of logic.  After determining that a property 
owner is permitted to recover double damages, the majority 
inexplicably leaps to the conclusion that the property owner is 
entitled to recover double damages as a matter of law.  Id., 
¶37.   
¶75 Permitted does not mean entitled.  Nothing in the 
plain language of the statute supports such a leap of logic.    
II 
¶76 Contrary to the majority, I conclude that the statute 
is ambiguous.  It may be that the legislature intended that the 
award of double damage be mandatory——as the majority contends.  
However, 
it 
is 
equally 
likely 
that 
the 
legislature, 
in 
permitting the recovery of double damages, intended that the 
decision be left to the circuit court's discretion——as both the 
circuit court and the court of appeals concluded.      
¶77 The history of the statute provides some useful clues.  
By comparing the history of Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) (forest fires) 
to the history of a neighboring and closely related statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 26.09 (forest trespass), I conclude that the 
legislature did not intend to mandate double damages for damage 
to property caused by forest fires.  
¶78 The text of what is now Wis. Stat. § 26.21 was 
originally enacted in 1905.  § 18, ch. 264, Laws of 1905.  That 
bill ushered in two parallel provisions, one addressing civil 
liability for forest fires, and another addressing civil 
liability for forest trespass.  When these two provisions were 
created, they contained nearly identical language providing that 
No.  2010AP355.awb 
 
4 
 
private owners "may recover in a civil action double the amount 
of damages suffered."   
¶79 When 
originally 
enacted 
in 
1905, 
the 
provision 
addressing civil liability for forest fires provided as follows:  
In addition to the penalties provided in [the previous 
section], . . . private 
owners, 
whose 
property 
is 
injured or destroyed by such fires, may recover, in a 
civil action, double the amount of damages suffered, 
if the fires occurred through wilfullness, malice or 
negligence . . . .  
Wis. Stat. § 1494-58 (Supp. 1906) (emphasis added).  With 
similar language, the provision addressing civil liability for 
forest trespass provided as follows: 
In addition to the penalties provided in [the previous 
section] 
for 
wilful 
trespass 
on 
forest 
lands, 
. . . private owners upon whose lands the wilful 
trespass was committed, may recover in a civil action 
double the amount of damages suffered. . . .   
Wis. Stat. § 1494-60 (Supp. 1906) (emphasis added).  As with the 
current version of Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1), neither of the 1905 
enactments explicitly mandated double damages. 
¶80 In 
the 
107 
years 
that 
followed 
their 
original 
enactment, these two civil liability provisions took divergent 
paths.  The provision regarding forest fires was renumbered as 
Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1), but otherwise, it remained largely 
unchanged.   
¶81 By contrast, during that same time period, the 
provision regarding forest trespass was renumbered as Wis. Stat. 
§ 26.09, 
and 
it 
underwent 
three 
significant 
substantive 
revisions.  As a result of the amendments to Wis. Stat. § 26.09, 
No.  2010AP355.awb 
 
5 
 
multiple damages for some instances of forest trespass are now 
clearly mandated by the legislature.     
¶82 As stated above, the original text of the forest 
trespass statute referenced the double damages penalty when it 
stated that a property owner "may recover in a civil action 
double the amount of damages suffered."  In 1949, this text was 
repealed and recreated as follows: 
Civil liability for unlawful cutting.  In addition to 
the penalties provided in sections 26.04 and 26.05, 
any person unlawfully cutting forest products shall be 
liable to the owner . . . to the land on which the 
unlawful cutting was done, in a civil action, for 
double the amount of damages suffered. . . .  
Wis. Stat. § 26.09 (1949) (emphasis added).   
¶83 Then, in 1981, the provision was again amended as 
follows:  
Civil liability for unlawful cutting, removal and 
transport.  In addition to the other penalties and 
costs, any person unlawfully cutting, removing or 
transporting raw forest products is liable to the 
owner . . . to the land on which the unlawful cutting 
was done or from which it was removed, in a civil 
action, for double the amount of damages suffered. 
. . .  
Wis. Stat. § 26.09 (1981-82) (emphasis added). 
¶84 Accordingly, in addressing civil liability for forest 
trespass, the legislature changed the language providing that 
private owners "may recover" double damages to mandatory 
language providing that a trespasser "shall be liable" for 
double damages.  It then changed the language again to mandate 
that the trespasser "is liable" for double damages.  The 
statutory history of § 26.09 evinces the legislature's clear 
No.  2010AP355.awb 
 
6 
 
intent to mandate double damages for unlawful cutting and 
removal of forest products.  
¶85 When the legislature changed the language of Wis. 
Stat. § 26.09 to mandate double damages for forest trespass, it 
did not make any parallel changes to the forest fire statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1).  The fact that the legislature chose to 
significantly amend Wis. Stat. § 26.09 (forest trespass) and, at 
the same time, declined to make the analogous amendments to the 
neighboring Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) (forest fires) signals that 
the legislature intended that these provisions be treated 
differently.   
¶86 The last significant substantive revision to the 
forest trespass statute occurred in 1999, when the legislature 
again repealed and recreated § 26.09. 1999 Wis. Act 190, § 15.  
In relevant part, the amendments provided that "an owner of raw 
forest products that were harvested without the consent of the 
owner may bring a civil action against the person who harvested 
the raw forest products to recover the damages caused by the 
harvesting." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 26.09(2)(a). 
 
As 
amended, 
§ 26.09(3)(a) provides that "[a] person against whom an action 
is brought . . . is liable for the applicable damages under par. 
(b) . . . ."  (Emphasis added.)  Paragraph (b) provides for 
single, double, or quadruple damages, depending upon the 
culpability of the tortfeasor.1   
                                                 
1 (2)(a) In addition to any other enforcement action 
that may be taken . . . an owner of raw forest 
products that were harvested without the consent of 
the owner may bring a civil action against the person 
No.  2010AP355.awb 
 
7 
 
¶87 The 1999 revision to the forest trespass statute 
underscores the legislative intent that multiple damages for 
forest trespass are, in some instances, mandatory.  Again, no 
analogous changes were made to the forest fire statute.   
¶88 The majority suggests that the legislature's manifest 
imposition of multiple damages for some instances of forest 
trespass must signal an intent to likewise mandate double 
damages for forest fires.  Majority op., ¶42.  I reach the 
opposite conclusion.   
¶89 The fact that the legislature clearly imposed multiple 
damages for some instances of forest trespass indicates that the 
                                                                                                                                                             
who harvested the raw forest products to recover the 
damages cause by the harvesting. . . .  
. . .  
(3)(a) A person against whom an action is brought as 
provided in sub. (2) is liable for the applicable 
damages under par. (b) or (c), . . .  
(b)1. A court shall award damages that equal the 
stumpage value of the raw forest products harvested if 
the person harvesting the raw forest products or the 
person giving consent for the harvesting reasonably 
relied upon a recorded survey . . .  
2. A court shall award damages that are equal to 2 
times the stumpage value of the raw forest products 
harvested if a recorded survey was not relied upon as 
specified in subd. 1. but the person harvesting the 
raw forest products took reasonable precautions in 
identifying harvesting boundaries. 
3. A court shall award damages that are equal to 4 
times the stumpage value or 2 times the fair market 
value of the raw forest products harvested, whichever 
is greater, if a recorded survey was not relied upon 
as provided in subd. 1. and the person harvesting the 
raw 
forest 
products 
did 
not 
take 
reasonable 
precautions in identifying the harvesting boundaries.   
No.  2010AP355.awb 
 
8 
 
legislature knows how to use language imposing multiple damages 
when it wants to do so.  Under these circumstances, the 
legislature's failure to amend the forest fire statute, Wis. 
Stat. § 26.21(1), by adding clear language mandating double 
damages signals its intent.  The legislature did not intend that 
the award of double damages be mandatory.  Rather, the decision 
of whether the facts of a particular case warrant the award of 
double damages under Wis. Stat. § 26.21(1) is left to the sound 
discretion of the circuit court.  
¶90 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.   
 
No.  2010AP355.awb 
 
 
 
1