Title: Albrecht v. Zwaanshoek Holding En Financiering, B.V

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Albrecht v. Zwaanshoek Holding En Financiering, B.V1988 WY 122762 P.2d 1174Case Number: 87-136Decided: 09/30/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
DONALD H. ALBRECHT AND JO 
ANNE ALBRECHT, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS),

v.

ZWAANSHOEK HOLDING EN 
FINANCIERING, B.V., A NETHERLANDS CORPORATION; AND ZWAANSHOEK BOUW-EN 
EXPLOITATIEMAATSCHAPPIJ, B.V., A NETHERLANDS CORPORATION, APPELLEES 
(PLAINTIFFS).

Appeal from the District 
Court, TetonCounty, Robert B. Ranck, 
J.

Frank Hess of 
Dill & Hess, Jackson, and Richard H. Floum and Greg David Derin of Dern, 
Mason & Floum, Los 
Angeles, Cal., for appellants.

Charles G. 
Kepler of Simpson & Kepler, Cody, Leo P. Larkin, Jr. of Rogers & Wells, 
New York City, and John A. Karaczynski of Rogers & Wells, Los Angeles, Cal., 
for appellees.

Before THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT and MACY, JJ., 
and O'BRIEN, District Judge.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
a summary judgment foreclosing the mortgage on lands owned by 
defendants-appellants Donald H. Albrecht and Jo Anne Albrecht (Albrechts) given 
to secure the payment of a $2 million promissory note held by 
plaintiffs-appellees Zwaanshoek Holding En Financiering, B.V. (Zwaanshoek) and 
Zwaanshoek Bouw-En Exploitatiemaatschappij, B.V. (ZBE).

[¶2.]     We affirm in part, 
reverse in part, and remand.

[¶3.]     The Albrechts present 
the following issues on appeal:

A. Did the District Court 
commit reversible error in granting summary judgment to plaintiffs 
herein?

B. Did the District Court 
commit reversible error in vacating its order staying the underlying action to 
permit the trial of the antecedent California action?

C. Did the District Court 
commit reversible error in failing to grant defendants' motion to join MIG and 
its subsidiary MIG-USA as parties herein?

D. Is the $1,069,725.90, 
awarded by the District Court in its judgment purportedly as interest, truly 
interest or rather is it an impermissible penalty or 
forfeiture?

E. Was the record before 
the District Court sufficient to permit it to award plaintiffs $89,000 in 
attorneys' fees?

[¶4.]     Sometime in 1980, 
Donald H. Albrecht, through his involvement with two California limited partnerships, Continental Investors, 
Ltd. and Continental/Tarzana Development Co., became a promoter of the Tarzana 
project, a condominium development venture in Tarzana, California. In order to finance the 
development, Albrecht arranged for a $24 million loan from Citicorp Real Estate, 
Inc. and Citibank National Association (collectively Citibank). As a condition 
of the loan agreement, Citibank required Albrecht or the limited partnerships to 
contribute at least $3.5 million of their own funds toward the project. 
Albrecht, as a general partner for Continental Investors, Ltd., obtained an 
additional $3.5 million loan from Zwaanshoek and ZBE, which was evidenced by two 
non-recourse, interest bearing promissory notes - one for $3 million and the 
other for $500,000. Each of these promissory notes was secured by a deed of 
trust on the Tarzana project properties with Citibank, as the primary lender, 
holding a priority lien.

[¶5.]     Albrecht and the 
limited partnerships defaulted on the Citibank loan, and Citibank instituted 
foreclosure proceedings. However, on April 29, 1982, Albrecht entered into an 
agreement with Zwaanshoek and ZBE that restructured the debt obligations on the 
Tarzana project and enabled Albrecht and the limited partnerships to achieve a 
settlement with Citibank. Under that agreement, Zwaanshoek and ZBE assigned to 
Albrecht their $3.5 million promissory notes and related deeds of trust and 
loaned Albrecht an additional $1 million. In return, Albrecht provided 
Zwaanshoek and ZBE with a $1 million promissory note, which was secured by an 
irrevocable letter of credit issued by the Bank of America, and Donald H. 
Albrecht and Jo Anne Albrecht gave Zwaanshoek and ZBE a $2 million promissory 
note, which was secured by a mortgage on the Arbardee Ranch located in 
Teton County, Wyoming. The Albrechts also agreed, inter 
alia, that, during the month of October 1982, they would secure the release of a 
first mortgage on the Arbardee Ranch given to secure the payment of a promissory 
note they executed and delivered to W.B. Wells and Gladys H. 
Wells.

[¶6.]     On November 1, 1985, 
Zwaanshoek and ZBE, believing that a breach of the agreement had occurred on the 
part of the Albrechts, advised the Albrechts that they were in default in the 
performance of their obligations under the agreement and gave them thirty-one 
days in which to cure such default by paying off the promissory note secured by 
the Wells mortgage. The Albrechts failed to cure the default, and this action 
was commenced to foreclose the mortgage on the property securing the payment of 
the $2 million promissory note, which was accelerated pursuant to the terms of 
the agreement and promissory note. The Albrechts responded by filing a combined 
answer, counterclaim, and motion. The answer alleged numerous affirmative 
defenses, including lack of consideration, and that Zwaanshoek and ZBE were 
enjoined by a California court from proceeding with this 
action. The counterclaim in substance alleged that Zwaanshoek, ZBE, and others, 
collectively called the "Arab Group," made a fraudulent oral promise to invest 
several million dollars in the Albrechts' real estate projects to induce the 
Albrechts to deliver their $2 million promissory note to Zwaanshoek and ZBE. The 
motion alleged that Mediterranee Investors Group S.A. (MIG) and Mediterranee 
Investors Group-USA, Inc. (MIG-USA) are the parent companies of Zwaanshoek and 
ZBE and prayed that they be joined as indispensable parties under W.R.C.P. 13(h) 
and 19.

[¶7.]     Initially, the court 
stayed the present action because of the prior order of the Superior Court of 
California, County 
of Los Angeles, enjoining 
Zwaanshoek and ZBE from foreclosing the promissory note and mortgage. However, 
after argument was heard, the court lifted that stay. Zwaanshoek and ZBE filed a 
motion for summary judgment, which was supported by a brief, affidavits, and 
exhibits. The Albrechts responded with a brief in opposition to the motion for 
summary judgment, supporting exhibits, and affidavits. After consideration, the 
court granted Zwaanshoek's and ZBE's motion for summary judgment, and Zwaanshoek 
and ZBE thereafter moved the court to enter an order awarding costs and 
attorney's fees. On May 4, 1987, a final judgment was entered, and this appeal 
was taken.

SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT

[¶8.]     The Albrechts contend 
that the court committed reversible error in granting summary judgment to 
Zwaanshoek and ZBE because genuine issues of material fact did 
exist.

[¶9.]     In Fiedler v. Steger, 
713 P.2d 773, 774 (Wyo. 1986), quoted in 
Walters v. Michel, 745 P.2d 913, 915 (Wyo. 1987), we repeated our well-known general 
standards governing appellate review of summary judgments:

A succinct and conclusive 
critique of the Wyoming summary-judgment law is 
afforded by the court in Garner v. Hickman, 709 P.2d 407, 410 ([Wyo.] 
1985):

"When reviewing a summary 
judgment on appeal, we review the judgment in the same light as the district 
court, using the same information. A party moving for summary judgment has the 
burden of proving the nonexistence of a genuine issue of material fact. Material 
fact has been defined as one which, if proved, would have the effect of 
establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of action or defense 
asserted by the parties. Upon examination of a summary judgment, we view the 
record from the vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion, 
giving him all favorable inferences which may be drawn from the 
facts."

(Citations 
omitted.)

[¶10.]  The pleadings, affidavits, and exhibits 
of Zwaanshoek and ZBE clearly and unequivocally show that the Albrechts failed 
to timely secure the release of the Wells mortgage, that this failure triggered 
the acceleration of the payment of the $2 million promissory note pursuant to 
the terms of the promissory note and the agreement,1 that the Albrechts failed to pay 
the promissory note, and that there was no promise by anyone in the Arab Group 
to invest in any of the Albrechts' other real estate 
projects.

[¶11.]  The pleadings, affidavits, and exhibits 
presented by the Albrechts to oppose the motion for summary judgment on the 
theory that the $2 million promissory note was not supported by consideration 
because of fraudulent misrepresentations merely contain general allegations and 
conclusory statements of fraud. This Court has held that:

The initial burden is on 
the movant to show that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Once that 
showing is made, it is incumbent upon the party opposing the motion to come 
forward with specific facts to show that there is a genuine issue of material 
fact.

Stundon v. 
Sterling, 736 P.2d 317, 318 (Wyo. 1987), quoted in Pace v. Hadley, 742 P.2d 1283, 1285 
(Wyo. 1987) 
(citation omitted). General allegations and conclusory statements are not 
enough. JonesLand and Livestock Co. v. Federal Land Bank of 
Omaha, 733 P.2d 258 (Wyo. 1987). Fraud must be 
established by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence and will never be 
presumed. Duffy v. Brown, 708 P.2d 433 (Wyo. 1985).

[¶12.]  The trial court correctly determined that 
there was no genuine issue of material fact and properly granted Zwaanshoek and 
ZBE summary judgment as a matter of law.

VACATING 
STAY

[¶13.]  The Albrechts assert that the trial court 
abused its discretion and committed reversible error when it vacated its order 
staying this action and disregarded an injunction filed in a preexisting action 
in the State of California. They contend that, under the 
principles of comity and justice, the court should have stayed this case until 
the prior California case had been concluded. The 
Albrechts also allege that Zwaanshoek and ZBE are guilty of forum-shopping and 
misuse of jurisdictional resources.

[¶14.]  In the most recent case of Rivermeadows, 
Inc. v. Zwaanshoek Holding and Financiering, B.V., 761 P.2d 662, 668 (Wyo. 
1988), a case involving some of these same parties, we stated, quoting Beach v. 
Youngblood, 215 Iowa 979, 247 N.W. 545, 549 (1933):

"It is a well and 
universally established principle that the disposition of real estate, either by 
deed, descent, or any other method, must be governed by the law of the state 
where the same is situated."

In that case, we 
also discussed other case law which uniformly established that the courts of one 
state do not have authority to order a foreclosure on mortgaged property located 
in another state. We see no reason why the logic used in Rivermeadows, Inc. and 
the cases cited therein should not apply here.

[¶15.]  In this case, the property to be 
foreclosed is located in Teton 
County, Wyoming. The 
Wyoming court 
is the only forum where all the claims could be effectively litigated. The court 
did not abuse its discretion when it vacated its order staying the 
action.

JOINDER OF 
PARTIES

[¶16.]  The Albrechts allege that the court 
abused its discretion and committed reversible error when it denied their motion 
to join MIG and MIG-USA as parties to the action pursuant to W.R.C.P. 13(h) and 
19.2 They claim that the transactions 
between the Albrechts and Zwaanshoek/ZBE were all negotiated by Donald H. 
Albrecht with MIG and MIG-USA as the parent companies of Zwaanshoek and 
ZBE.

[¶17.]  W.R.C.P. 13(h) 
states:

Persons other than those 
made parties to the original action may be made parties to a counterclaim or 
cross-claim in accordance with the provisions of Rules 19 and 20.[3]

[¶18.]  W.R.C.P. 19(a) 
provides:

A person who is subject 
to service of process shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his 
absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) 
he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated 
that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter 
impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the 
persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, 
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed 
interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a 
party. If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a 
defendant. If the joined party objects to venue and his joinder would render the 
venue of the action improper, he shall be dismissed from the 
action.

[¶19.]  We stated in Rivermeadows, Inc., 761 P.2d 
at 668:

This Court has long 
recognized the traditional definition of an indispensable party with regard to 
W.R.C.P. 19(a). In American Beryllium & Oil Corporation v. Chase, 425 P.2d 66, 68 (Wyo. 1967) (quoting from Amerada 
Petroleum Corporation v. Rio Oil Co., 225 F. Supp. 907, 910 (D.C.Wyo. 1964)), 
quoted in Reilly v. Reilly, 671 P.2d 330, 332 (Wyo. 1983), we stated:

"An indispensable party 
has been defined as one without whose presence before the court a final decree 
could not be made without either affecting his interest or leaving the 
controversy in such a condition that its final determination might be wholly 
inconsistent with equity and good conscience. Whether or not a person is an 
indispensable party cannot be determined by a prescribed formula because the 
facts peculiar to each case are determinative of that 
question."

(Citations omitted.) See 
also Johnson v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. of Hartford, Conn., 608 P.2d 1299 (Wyo. 1980).

[¶20.]  MIG and MIG-USA are not indispensable 
parties to this action. Zwaanshoek's and ZBE's claims are solely on the bases of 
default on the $2 million promissory note and breach of the agreement to 
discharge the obligations of the promissory notes secured by the Wells and 
Murray mortgages. The Albrechts failed to show how either Zwaanshoek or ZBE 
defrauded them by its corporate makeup. The Albrechts apparently were aware that 
Zwaanshoek and ZBE were related and had the same parent companies. Although they 
were aware of these facts, the Albrechts chose to enter into transactions 
separately with Zwaanshoek and ZBE. MIG's and MIG-USA's participation was not 
required to resolve the claims, defenses, or counterclaim alleged in this case, 
and they are not indispensable parties. The court did not abuse its discretion 
in refusing the joinder of those parties.

INTEREST

[¶21.]  The Albrechts contend that the amount of 
$1,069,725.90 awarded as interest by the court in its judgment was not an award 
of interest but rather was an impermissible penalty or forfeiture. The Albrechts 
assert that their failure to discharge the obligations of the promissory notes 
secured by the Wells and Murray mortgages was only a "trival or technical" 
breach of the overall agreements made by the parties; therefore, the award of 
interest on the $2 million promissory note under the guise of equity amounts to 
an impermissible forfeiture or penalty. While we cannot agree with the 
Albrechts' reasoning, we agree that the trial court improperly awarded interest 
to Zwaanshoek and ZBE.

[¶22.]  In Marcam Mortgage Corporation v. Black, 
686 P.2d 575, 580 (Wyo. 1984), we stated:

"The disposition of this 
case is controlled by Younglove v. Graham&Hill, Wyo., 
526 P.2d 689 (1974), upon which Barker Brothers Company relies. In that opinion 
this court recognized the general proposition that forfeitures are not favored, 
as suggested by the Johnsons. The court concluded, however, that the general 
concept with respect to abhorrence of forfeitures does not justify a court of 
equity in disregarding and setting aside a valid contractual obligation of the 
parties in the absence of some particular equitable reason." Barker v. 
Johnson, Wyo., 591 P.2d 886, 889 
(1979).

And:

"If there is an express 
contract in connection with the damages, that contract, of course, must govern." 
Studer v. Rasmussen, 80 Wyo. 465, 344 P.2d 990, 998 
(1959).

We have also 
recognized that:

[T]he supreme court will 
not rewrite clear contracts. Nor will this court rewrite contracts under the 
guise of interpretation.

Wyoming 
Machinery Company v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, 614 P.2d 716, 
720 (Wyo. 
1980) (citation omitted). See also Wyoming Recreation Commission v. Hagar, 711 P.2d 402 (Wyo. 1985) (quoting Kuehne v. Samedan 
Oil Corporation, 626 P.2d 1035 (Wyo. 1981)). The $2 million promissory note 
provides in applicable part:

Any breach by Maker, or 
by any party constituting Maker, as defined herein, of the terms or provisions 
of the Note Purchase Agreement or of the Mortgage, shall be deemed to be a 
default by Maker [of] the terms of this Note.

* * * [A] default in the 
payment of any amount due hereunder may be cured within ten (10) days after the 
due date thereof by the payment of the amount so due. The outstanding principal 
balance hereof shall bear interest at the lesser of two (2) percent over the 
LIBOR Rate or the highest lawful rate per annum during the period in which this 
Note is in default. The LIBOR Rate shall be the six (6) month London Interbank Offered Rate as quoted to the London 
Branch of The Bank of America N.T. & S.A. at 11:00 A.M. London time on the date of 
default. The failure of Lender to exercise this option to accelerate the 
maturity of the principal sum hereof shall not constitute a waiver of such 
option, which option shall remain continuously in force.

[¶23.]  It continues with respect to default, 
acceleration, and interest as follows:

The whole of the 
principal sum of this Note shall immediately become due and payable, at the option of Lender, upon the failure of the Maker to pay any payment 
required hereunder within ten (10) days * * *. The failure of Lender to exercise this option to accelerate 
the maturity of the principal sum hereof shall not constitute a waiver of such 
option, which option shall remain continuously in force.

(Emphasis 
added.) It is clear from the plain and unambiguous language of the promissory 
note that, upon default, the lender had the option to accelerate payments and to 
declare the entire principal balance due and payable. Thus, the exercise of the 
option to accelerate payments would be the triggering event that would result in 
the promissory note bearing interest as provided.

[¶24.]  On November 1, 1985, the lender mailed a 
letter concerning default to the Albrechts, which stated:

Unless such default is 
cured by the payment in full to Mr. and Mrs. Wells, not later than thirty-one 
days after the date of your receipt of this letter, * * * Lenders intend to accelerate payment of the 
$2,000,000 promissory note * * *.

(Emphasis 
added.) However, the option to accelerate was never exercised. The letter of 
November 1, 1985, only expressed an "inten[t] to accelerate payment." 
Nevertheless, the trial court awarded summary judgment to Zwaanshoek and ZBE, 
including interest on the $2 million promissory note in the amount 
of

$1,057,363.01 computed at 
the rate of 11 7/8% per annum from November 2, 1982 (the date of default) 
through April 15, 1987 * * *.

[¶25.]  In Mortgage Trust Co. of Pennsylvania v. 
Bach, 69 Kan. 749, 77 P. 545, 545 (1904), a promissory note bearing interest at 
six and one-half percent per annum contained a provision that, upon default in 
payment, "the debt should immediately become due and payable, at the option of the legal holder 
thereof, and * * * should draw interest at the rate of 10 per cent." (Emphasis 
added.) The court stated:

There was a default on 
July 1, 1902, and if the trust company had then exercised its option, and 
elected to declare the entire debt due, it would have been entitled to the 
increased rate. The option, however, was not in fact exercised until this action 
was begun. * * * That circumstance afforded the holder ground for accelerating 
maturity, but until it in fact exercised its option, and declared the debt due 
by reason of the default, the note was not mature, and it was not entitled to 
the higher rate of interest.

Id. at 
546.

[¶26.]  A no-interest bearing note in Howell v. 
Ablah, 188 Kan. 244, 361 P.2d 872 (1961), provided for 
ten percent interest upon nonpayment of any installment. With respect to 
default, the note provided that "`all remaining installments shall at the option 
of the legal holder become immediately due and payable.'" Id. at 877. The court 
stated that "[p]laintiffs exercised their option to make payments under such 
note due and payable when they filed the instant action on February 10, 1958," 
id. at 877, and affirmed the decision of the trial court which 
was:

"When the holder 
exercised his option and declared the note due and payable on February 10, 1958 
by filing suit, the entire principal amount of the note became due and payable 
and should draw interest at the rate of 10% per annum from that 
date."

Id. at 877. See also 
Annotation, Validity and effect of anticipatory provision in contract in 
relation to rate of interest in the event of default, 12 A.L.R. 367 
(1921).

[¶27.]  We know of no reason why we should come 
to a different conclusion in this case than those conclusions drawn in the 
previously mentioned cases with essentially the same circumstances. We hold 
therefore that the trial court incorrectly awarded interest on the $2 million 
promissory note to Zwaanshoek and ZBE. Absent a declaration of acceleration, the 
interest did not begin to run until this action was commenced. Accordingly, we 
reverse the trial court's award of interest.

ATTORNEYS' 
FEES

[¶28.]  The Albrechts contend that the award of 
attorneys' fees in the amount of $89,000 must be overturned because there was no 
competent evidence to support the number of hours claimed or the hourly charge 
for the legal services rendered.

[¶29.]  In JonesLand and Livestock Co., 733 P.2d  at 265, 
we acknowledged that:

[T]here must be some 
evidentiary showing in order to make a determination of reasonable attorney's 
fees.

We have also 
recognized that:

Reasonableness of an 
attorney's fee must always depend upon facts and circumstances of the litigation 
and there must be some proof or 
evidentiary basis for determination of a reasonable attorney fee. * * 
*

Evidence only of the 
amount of attorney fees normally awarded in cases involving the same type of 
claim is insufficient upon which to award attorney fees. A complete lack of 
evidence as to the value of attorney fees is likewise 
insufficient.

Anderson v. Meier, 641 P.2d 187, 192 (Wyo. 
1982) (emphasis added and citations omitted).

[¶30.]  The affidavit filed by Zwaanshoek's and 
ZBE's attorneys regarding their fees states as follows: 

Plaintiffs have been 
charged in connection with the captioned case legal fees as 
follows:

Charged by Simpson & 
Kepler:

Legal services                       
$780.00 

Out-of-pocket costs 35.50  
                        
$815.50

 _______

Billable hours charged by 
Rogers and Wells 

- 890 
hours

[¶31.]  Examination of the record discloses that 
no other evidence was presented showing the hourly charge for the legal services 
rendered or the hourly rate charged by, or normally awarded to, attorneys in 
cases involving this type of claim. Likewise, there was no showing that the 
attorneys' fees charged were reasonable. We hold that the trial court erred when 
it awarded attorneys' fees to Zwaanshoek and ZBE, and we reverse the trial 
court's order in that regard.

[¶32.]  Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded to the trial court for entry of judgment in accordance with this 
opinion.

CARDINE, J., and O'BRIEN, District Judge, filed opinions 
concurring in part and dissenting in part.

THOMAS and URBIGKIT, JJ., filed dissenting 
opinions.

FOOTNOTES

1 After their action was 
commenced, the Albrechts failed to timely make an installment payment on another 
promissory note secured by a second mortgage (Murray Mortgage) on the Arbardee 
Ranch. This default also accelerated the payment of the $2 million promissory 
note. The trial court entered an order granting a motion to permit an amendment 
of the complaint to allege the default and found this default to also be a basis 
for entry of the summary judgment.

2 We note that, while 
there is no written order in the record denying the joinder motion, it was de 
facto denied when the case was concluded by the entering of a final order and 
judgment without further discussion or appearance by those 
parties.

We also note that this 
issue is nearly identical to that argument asserted by Donald H. Albrecht and 
his Wyoming corporation, Rivermeadows, Inc., in the case of Rivermeadows, Inc., 
761 P.2d 662.

3 Pursuant to our firmly 
established rule of law that questions not asserted at the trial court level and 
on appeal are not properly before this Court, we decline to address W.R.C.P. 20 
as it relates to this issue.

CARDINE, Justice, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part.

[¶33.]  I dissent from the opinion of the court 
insofar as it reverses the award of attorney fees by the district court. The 
claimed attorney fees were never disputed. Appellees filed an affidavit setting 
forth the number of hours billed, and the court awarded attorney fees for those 
billable hours at the rate of $100 per hour. No counter affidavits were filed by 
appellants. The trial court had before it the record reflecting the very large 
amount of money involved in this case, the work performed, the manner in which 
it was done, the kind and complexity of the case, the skill required and the 
responsibility assumed, along with the affidavit of appellee. The hourly fee 
assessed by the court and ascribed to the hours for services rendered was 
reasonable. Where there is evidence to support the award and it is not disputed 
by the opposing party, we have said that this court should accord deference to 
the trial court's determination as to the amount of the fee. State Surety 
Company v. Lamb Construction Company, 625 P.2d 184, 189 (Wyo. 
1981).

[¶34.]  The attorney fees, as awarded, should be 
affirmed.

O'BRIEN, District Judge, 
concurring in part and dissenting in part.

[¶35.]  I concur in the opinion of the Court 
except for that section titled "INTEREST." The subject note bore no interest 
unless it was not timely paid, in which event the lenders could accelerate 
payment, and interest would accrue. The note was in default, but, instead of 
immediately declaring the default, the lenders gave an additional thirty-one 
days to cure. Although politely phrased, the intent of the November 1, 1985 
letter was entirely clear - if the default was not cured within the new grace 
period, the note would be accelerated. The default was not timely cured; 
consequently, the note was due and started to accrue interest. By conditioning 
acceleration upon a second notice, which could do no more than reiterate what 
was previously said, the majority opinion distorts the plain meaning of language 
and frustrates the agreement of the parties.

THOMAS, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶36.]  I agree with those aspects of the 
majority opinion which hold that the district court could vacate the stay and 
proceed with the litigation on the foreclosure action. I also am in accord with 
the disposition of the claim for attorney fees and the claim for interest. I 
would, however, reverse the summary judgment.

[¶37.]  I am not satisfied that the trial court 
properly entered summary judgment in view of the claims of the Albrechts with 
respect to fraud. I see the record much in the same way as Justice Urbigkit 
does. The affidavits submitted by the parties are conflicting and diametrically 
opposed on issues of fact which are material. The trial court appears to have 
ruled that corroborating evidence was required in addition to Donald Albrecht's 
personal testimony in order to satisfy the Albrechts' burden of establishing the 
claims of failure of consideration and fraudulent misrepresentation by clear and 
convincing evidence.

[¶38.]  Even though our rule of substantive law 
is that fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence (Duffy v. 
Brown, 708 P.2d 433 (Wyo. 1985)), that does not justify a trial court in ruling 
that evidence is not clear and convincing based upon its view of an affiant's or 
dependent's credibility. There appears to be no way that the trial court could 
have entered the summary judgment without making a determination as to 
Albrecht's credibility and without weighing the evidence. Those are processes 
which the trial court should eschew in addressing summary 
judgment.

[¶39.]  The correct approach is articulated in 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511, 
91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986), in which the Supreme Court said:

"Our prior decisions may 
not have uniformly recited the same language in describing genuine factual 
issues under Rule 56, but it is clear enough from our recent cases that at the 
summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence 
and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a 
genuine issue for trial."

The standard to 
be applied for that purpose is whether a reasonable juror could find the 
evidence sufficient to meet the clear and convincing standard; it is not the 
perception of the trial judge. I understand the decision of the trial court not 
only to incorrectly grant summary judgment, but also to bypass the directed 
verdict stage and to decide the case on its finding of fact without the benefit 
of testimony from witnesses, cross-examination, or the arguments of 
counsel.

[¶40.]  Absent some compelling constitutional 
interest that requires protection, which is not this case, I am satisfied that 
the trial court should not enter summary judgment, even if the substantive rule 
of proof requires clear and convincing evidence, when it is confronted with 
diametrically opposing affidavits that otherwise would be sufficient to 
structure a genuine issue of material fact. It should leave for the finder of 
fact the weighing of the evidence and the assessment of credibility. In this 
case, the district court ruled otherwise and, consequently, I would hold, like 
Justice Urbigkit, that the summary judgment was not properly 
entered.

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶41.]  This case is correlative to Rivermeadows, 
Inc. v. Zwaanshoek Holding and Financiering, B.V., 761 P.2d 662 (Wyo. 1988) (Zwaanshoek 
I), as that case was tried by a jury. With dissent in Zwaanshoek I, in part from 
court rejection of a portion of the jury verdict and decision, I again differ 
and dissent in this case (Zwaanshoek II), where the litigative resolution was 
denied total jury consideration.1 Issues now differ by virtue of the 
summary judgment conclusion, even though the same general scenario in business 
dealing is factually presented. I would find error in fact and precedent in 
entry of summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs' (appellees) complaint and 
against defendants' (appellants) similar, but differentiated, counterclaim 
issues.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE 
MERITS OF THE COMPLAINT AND COUNTERCLAIM

[¶42.]  In preclusively determining the adequacy 
of argued issues of fact to deny summary judgment, the trial court, with 
extensively developed factual record, considered factual conflicts at a Cordova 
v. Gosar, 719 P.2d 625 (Wyo. 1986) Stage Six. This is only to be done 
by considering movant's evidentiary burden of demonstrating no genuine issue of 
material fact exists, respondent's right to the benefit of reasonable doubt and 
to draw all favorable inferences form the record, and reflecting that 
credibility questions are to be resolved by trial. Cordova, 719 P.2d  at 639-40. 
Considering the actual but complex and interlaced contentions developed in 
appellants' counterclaim, I do not find justification to conclude that the 
record is sufficiently barren or factually consistent to justify any summary 
judgment. Those contested issues, including not only fraud but also presented, 
although poorly documented, disingenuous transactional arrangements, cannot 
easily be separated within the proper confines of summary judgment unless this 
court will now countenance trial by affidavit. The benefit of trial testimony or 
jury review is simply not permitted. The broad scope of issues presented by this 
case cried to be tried, not shunted aside by summary judgment. Greenwood v. Wierdsma, 741 P.2d 1079 (Wyo. 
1987).

[¶43.]  More justifiably, this court partially 
seems to apprehend the validity of its decision in generalized result - that it 
should affirm in the face of the heavily documented factual conflict by 
concluding that the real issue was failure of the pleadings to sufficiently 
state a claim. I cannot agree. This rationale accomplishes a juxtaposition of 
motion to dismiss, W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), with an examination of the sufficiency of 
fraud pleadings to be direct and concise required by W.R.C.P. 8(e)(1) and 9(b). 
However, summary judgment under W.R.C.P. 56 and not a decision based on a 
pleading inquiry was actually entered in the face of a very exhaustive and 
conflicting record. Once material beyond pleading is received and considered, 
regression to the motion to dismiss is improper unless support for the pleading 
is absent in evidentiary conflict. Respondent is entitled to the benefit of the 
evidentiary support for his pleaded allegations. This majority's stance only 
convolutes cases for conversion to summary judgment, where here, a summary 
judgment record was converted to a motion to dismiss. Torrey v. Twiford, 713 P.2d 1160 (Wyo. 1986). Previously and directly, the trial 
court considered this case on a summary judgment perspective by reviewing 
evidence and not pleadings; thus, the present affirmation by this court on any 
other basis is improper.

[¶44.]  In this suit responding to Zwaanshoek, as 
the named plaintiff within the Arab Group (appellees), Donald Albrecht and Jo 
Anne Albrecht (appellants), as individuals, filed a nine page answer and 
counterclaim. Appellees' response to the counterclaim constituted a general 
denial with affirmative defenses of (1) failure to state a claim; (2) failure to 
state a punitive damage claim; (3) estoppel; (4) laches; (5) doctrine of clean 
hands; (6) waiver; (7) lack of reliance; (8) statute of frauds; (9) separately 
stating that appellants were barred, precluded and estopped by (a) availability 
of benefits; (b) underlying agreement performance; (c) inability to rescind and 
then restore parties to pre-agreement position; and continued by additional 
affirmative defenses of (10) lack of standing of Jo Anne Albrecht; (11) 
knowledge of corporate entities; and finally (12) adequate remedy at 
law.

[¶45.]  No where in that thirteen page reply pleading document 
did appellees then, or by subsequent pleading later, contend that a failure of 
pleadings existed, and that 
appellants had not adequately presented their fraud allegations in the 
pleadings. Following complaint amendment, as not affecting appellants' nine page 
counterclaim or the appellees' thirteen page reply, the motion for summary 
judgment was pursued by appellees on its amended complaint and against the 
counterclaim based on "undisputed facts," which were then categorized and 
unitized within a thirty-three page trial 
court brief, of which twenty-three and one-half pages involved generally 
contested factual recitations and contentions.

[¶46.]  After review of the extended record of 
five volumes including the initially submitted affidavits, the essential fact 
issue is presented of an expected on-going business arrangement constituting the 
essence of the entire transaction. This was in the contemplation of appellants 
to be the "consideration for the execution of the bail-out of the prior failed 
transaction" with which the parties had been involved.

[¶47.]  In evidentiary support for summary 
judgment, the principal participant averred that he did not participate in, 
witness, nor did appellants tell him anything about an anticipated on-going 
arrangement. Likewise, stated in inquiry denial, Lebanese citizen Fuad Siniora 
and Teton Land Title Company president Larry Monk added nothing by affidavit and 
information on the subject. Other affidavits by Muhammad Baasiri of 
Lebanon and property owner Helen 
Murray did not address the subject. Consequently, the only actual offered 
evidence on the litigated issue intrinsic to defense and counterclaim was 
addressed in behalf of the movant only by the affidavit of Mustafa Razian, a 
citizen of Saudi 
Arabia. As a director in the intrinsic Arab 
Group companies, Razian spoke with first-person knowledge as 
follows:

4. I did not initiate any 
of the proposals for the restructuring transaction. I understand that Donald H. 
Albrecht ("Albrecht") made those proposals to Peter Hausmann and others 
representing Zwaanshoek Holding and Zwaanshoek Bouw in early 1982 before I 
became involved in the discussions. I further understand that those proposals 
were the subject of correspondence among Peter Hausmann, Klaus Naude, Joseph 
ElKhoury, Lina Naaman and Albrecht.

5. I first became 
involved in the discussions concerning the restructuring transaction in early 
1982. At that time I travelled to the United States to inspect the Tarzana 
project and to meet with Citibank representatives to discuss the steps that 
could be taken to preserve and protect the two notes aggregating $3.5 million 
held by Zwaanshoek Holding and Zwaanshoek Bouw. I met Albrecht for the first 
time during that trip.

* * * * * 
*

9. I never told or 
represented to Albrecht that, if he agreed to the restructuring transaction, 
Zwaanshoek Holding, Zwaanshoek Bouw or any other member of the MIG group would 
enter into any new or future business transactions in the United States or 
elsewhere with Albrecht or that one or more of these companies would invest 
monies in transactions in the United States or elsewhere through Albrecht or his 
companies. It was not the purpose of my trip to California to consider any new investment 
opportunities for Plaintiffs or any other member of the MIG group. Furthermore, 
Albrecht never made any proposals through me to Zwaanshoek Holding and 
Zwaanshoek Bouw or to any other MIG group company for new business transactions 
after the restructing transaction. To my knowledge, Albrecht never presented any 
such proposals to Zwaanshoek Holding and Zwaanshoek Bouw or any other member of 
the MIG group.

10. Since the closing of 
the restructuring transaction on April 29, 1982, Albrecht has never discussed 
with or mentioned to me or, to my knowledge, to Zwaanshoek Holding, Zwaanshoek 
Bouw or any other member of the MIG gr[o]up any alleged representations, 
statements or premises concerning future business or investments of the MIG 
gr[o]up to be conducted or made through Albrecht or his 
companies.

11. I have reviewed the 
allegations of Albrecht's Answer and Counterclaims in this action regarding 
statements and representations purportedly made by me in connection with the 
restructuring transaction. Those allegations are contained primarily in 
paragraphs 21-31 of Albrecht's Answer and Counterclaims. I never made any such 
statements or representations to Albrecht or to anyone else, and those 
allegations are absolutely false.

What then, for 
the summary judgment motion response, did appellants provide? Affiant Donald 
[¶48.]            
Albrecht stated:

18. As a result of our 
unsuccessful negotiations with Citibank and the imminent foreclosure, Mr. Razian 
met with me and advised that Mr. Hariri did not wish to recognize the loss of 
the defendants' $3,500,000.00 investment. Mr. Razian then asked me if I would be 
willing to allow the defendants to go forward with a plan which they had 
conceived which would allow them to escape the impact of the loss. Mr. Razian 
acknowledged that the two "promissory notes" reflecting the defendants' 
$3,500,000.00 investment were clearly of no value as a result of the pending 
Citibank foreclosure.

19. It was proposed that 
I "purchase" the two "promissory notes" and trust deeds. The purchase price 
would be $2,000,000.00 and would be reflected by my personal promissory note 
which would be secured by my interest in certain valuable real property and 
corporate securities, which were worth well in excess of $2,000,000.00. This 
would allow the defendants not to recognize the loss because on their books they 
would be able simply to recognize the "sale" of the "promissory notes." Such 
"purchase" was not only transparent due to the fact that the "promissory notes" 
were then valueless, but this entire transaction was contemporaneous with our 
agreeing to give the property to Citibank in lieu of foreclosure, part of which 
agreement required me in turn to transfer the two "promissory notes" and junior 
trust deeds which I had "purchased" to Citibank such that it obtained free and 
clear title unencumbered by the junior deeds of trust relating to the two 
"promissory notes." That this would be required was apparent, since my 
"purchase" was concurrent with the transfer to Citibank which would have to 
obtain precisely the same clear title which would result from 
foreclosure.

20. To induce me to go 
along with the defendants' plan, Mr. Razian made a number of representations. 
First was that the defendants would fulfill without question their obligations 
relating to the $1,000,000.00 financing of the Jackson Hole Project. I explained 
to Mr. Razian that the defendants were already so obligated. Mr. Razian then 
said that, in addition, and as the true consideration for my agreeing, was the 
defendants' promise (specifically Mr. Hariri or his controlled companies) that 
they would invest tens of millions of dollars in real estate projects in the 
United States through me. Mr. Razian said that Mr. Hariri was fabulously wealthy 
on a scale beyond that even dreamed of by the prior Arab owners. I was assured 
of continuing investments on such a huge scale and that such investments would 
generate the $2,000,000.00 necessary to satisfy my promissory note for my 
asserted "purchase" of the defendants' Tarzana Project "promissory notes," as 
well as at least an additional $1,000,000.00 to satisfy one last 
inducement.

* * * * * 
*

22. Simply stated, the 
only reason I participated in the defendants' scheme was as a result of Mr. 
Razian's promises to me that all of the defendants real estate investments in 
the United States would be only through me, that such investments would be in 
the magnitude of tens of millions of dollars, and would, at a minimum, be 
sufficient to generate net profits to me sufficient to pay back the 
$1,000,000.00 "loan" which would become due on May 1, 1985, so that the bank of 
America letter of credit would never be called upon, and also sufficient to pay 
back the $2,000,000.00 promissory note such that I would never have to pay it 
out of my other assets and such that my security would never be at 
risk.

23. However, and 
completely contrary to Mr. Razian's promises, the defendants never engaged in 
any additional investments with me, and they then breached their obligations to 
continue financing the Jackson Hole Project. This is detailed in Section 4, 
below.

Section 4: The 
Defendants' Breach

24. After inducing me to 
participate, the defendants never invested even a single additional dollar with 
me. Hence, all of the promised consideration never materialized, thus depriving 
me not only of such additional business, but also of the profits necessary to 
satisfy the $1,000,000.00 loan which becomes due on May 1, 1985, and the 
$2,000,000.00 promissory note which becomes due in 1990.

[¶49.]  Essentially, no other pre-summary 
judgment evidence addressed the subject of the contended fraud in the inception, 
since other participants in behalf of the Arab Group did not lend weight to 
presented affidavit information. Equally in conflict on the issue of the fraud 
in the inducement, is similar factual conflict of performance default by 
appellees in failure to advance the entire one million dollar commitment. There 
is no question in this record that the entire one million dollars to be loaned 
to appellants was not advanced. The record is in dispute as to nonpayment 
justification by appellees. If not justified, this was, as a matter of law, 
established to be a singularly significant default by appellees as a matter of 
fact. Sagebrush Development, Inc. v. Moehrke, 604 P.2d 198 Wyo. 1979); Quin Blair Enterprises, Inc. v. Julien Const. 
Co., 597 P.2d 945 (Wyo. 1979). See also Western Plains Service 
Corp. v. Ponderosa Development Corp., 769 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1985). 
Essentially, one concludes from close reading of the summary judgment order and 
present majority decision that existence of issues of fact cannot be and were 
not denied, as essentially conceded by the summary judgment conclusion of the 
trial court in the statement:

The consideration given 
by the plaintiff is adequate. The defendant has the burden of proving fraud by clear and 
convincing evidence and he has failed to satisfy this burden. Summary judgment 
should be granted and the plaintiff should be allowed to foreclose on the 
mortgage. [Emphasis added.]

This statement 
constitutes the most direct recognition of a weighed evidence disposition by 
summary judgment proceedings.

[¶50.]  In further discussion, the trial court 
said:

A fraud claim must be 
established by clear and convincing evidence. Duffy, [v. Brown, 708 P.2d 433, 
437 (Wyo. 
1985)] * * *. The party alleging fraud must do so clearly and distinctly and 
prove the same so as to satisfy the mind and conscience of its existence. Reed 
v. Owen, 523 P.2d 869 (Wyo. 1974). The only evidence submitted by 
Albrecht on the issue of fraud is his own declaration. This does not meet the 
clear and convincing evidentiary standard necessary to prove a claim of 
fraud.

The judgment of 
the trial court further stated:

17. Albrecht's fraud 
claim is governed by Wyoming law, which requires proof by clear and convincing 
evidence of each of the following five elements: 1) a false representation made 
by the defendant, 2) which is relied upon by the plaintiff, 3) to his damage, 4) 
the asserted false representation must be made to induce action, and 5) the 
plaintiff must reasonably believe the representation to be true. Under Wyoming law, the party alleging fraud must do 
so clearly and distinctly and must prove the same so as to satisfy the mind 
and conscience of its existence.

18. Albrecht failed to 
come forward with clear and convincing evidence to establish each of the 
elements of his fraud claim which, in essence, alleged that Plaintiffs induced 
Albrecht to enter into the April 29, 1982 Agreement by falsely promising to 
invest million[s] of dollars through Albrecht. Albrecht's fraud claim, which was 
premised solely upon an alleged vague oral promise not supported by a shred of 
documentary or other corroborative evidence, strains credulity.[2]

19. Plaintiffs and their 
affiliates (and their respective agents and representatives) did not make any 
misrepresentations of fact to Albrecht or his agents or representatives in order 
to induce Albrecht to enter into the April 29, 1982 Agreement. [Emphasis 
added.]

[¶51.]  The character of the findings of the 
trial court cannot be justified in summary judgment where variant direct 
testimony conflicts existed on critical issues. Obviously, the trial court tried 
a contested case in summary judgment decision by accepting one and rejecting 
another of two substantively detailed affidavits. This is a result that this 
court should not now countenance as unjustified by any past precedent or current 
logic. See W.R.C.P. 56 and a multitude of Wyoming cases. Parker v. Haller, 751 P.2d 372 
(Wyo. 
1988).

[¶52.]  With existence of issues of fact not 
really in doubt, this court now chooses to decide what was never considered by 
the trial court and is included here but not separately defined in the decision 
- the adequacy of the pleading to state a triable fraud case. Previously, I 
procedurally rejected this approach, and I also totally disagree substantively 
on this issue.

[¶53.]  After pleading the failed California 
Tarzana project, appellants alleged:

22. The Arab Group then 
represented to Albrecht that, for internal reasons, it was undesirable for them 
to "recognize" the loss of their $3,500,000.00 investment in the Tarzana 
Project. The Arab Group then asked Albrecht if he would allow them to go forward 
with a plan conceived by them and their counsel which would allow the Arab Group 
not to recognize the loss of their $3,500,000.00 investment (i.e., the Tarzana 
$3,500,000.00 Notes).

23. The plan proposed by 
the Arab Group required Alb[r]echt to "purchase" the illusory and valueless 
Tarzana $3,500,000.00 Notes. Albrecht's "purchase" of Plaintiff's illusory and 
valueless Tarzana $3,500,000.00 Notes would be by way of the $2,000,000.00 Note 
secured by Albrecht's interest in certain valuable real property and corporate 
securities. For such "purchase" and in consideration thereof, the Arab Group 
promised to invest tens of millions of dollars in real estate projects in the 
United 
States with Albrecht and/or his affiliated 
companies.

24. In reasonable and 
justifiable reliance upon representations by the Arab Group that they would 
engage in future multi-million dollar business transactions with Albrecht and/or 
his affiliated companies, Albrecht agreed to the Arab Group's proposition. The 
parties accordingly entered into a Memorandum of Agreement on or about April 29, 
1982 (the "Memorandum"). The terms of the Memorandum were effectuated by 
voluminous complex documentation. The Memorandum and the related documentation 
collectively constitute the agreement which the Arab Group induced Albrecht to 
enter into their plan (the "April 29, 1982 Agreement").

25. The only 
consideration for Albrecht to enter into the April 29, 1982 Agreement was the 
representation by the Arab Group that they would engage in future multi-million 
dollar projects with him and/or his affiliated companies. The "purchase" of 
Plaintiffs' illusory and valueless Tarzana $3,500,000.00 Notes reflecting the 
loss of their $3,500,000.00 investment in the Tarzana Project was devoid of 
substance, since the Tarzana $3,500,000.00 Notes were neither intended as nor 
were they in fact true promissory notes not did they have any 
value.

26. After inducing 
Albrecht to enter into the April 29, 1982 Agreement, the Arab Group failed to 
engage in any additional investment with Albrecht or his affiliated 
companies.

[¶54.]  The essential elements for determining 
whether fraud in the inducement was properly alleged are (1) false 
representation; (2) reliance; (3) asserted false representation made to induce 
action; and (4) belief of defrauded party that the representations were true. 
See Garner v. Hickman, 709 P.2d 407 (Wyo. 1985) 
and Duffy v. Brown, 708 P.2d 433 (Wyo. 1985).

[¶55.]  Accepting customary rules of pleading and 
evidentiary consideration, it cannot be logically questioned within a 
sufficiency-to-state-a-claim perspective, or for that matter summary judgment, 
that the pleading in evidence sufficiently stated the second, third and fourth 
fraud elements. The controlling inquiry is whether, in fraud cases, (a) an 
intent to defraud must exist when the representation of future action is made, 
Green Tree Acceptance, Inc. v. Doan, 529 So. 2d 201 (Ala. 1988), or (b) later 
conduct can be utilized as evidence of original intent. Conversely, this raises 
the "I didn't lie to you originally, since I only decided to cheat you later" 
defense. I do not accept this premise, either in morality, fraud pleading, or 
summary judgment inquiry. Wyoming has long recognized that intent can be 
inferred from subsequent action taken. Cullin v. State, 565 P.2d 445 (Wyo. 
1977).

[¶56.]  Appellants alleged that "[t]he Arab Group 
promised to invest tens of millions of dollars in real estate projects * * * 
with Albrecht," and that after inducing them by the incentive to enter into the 
agreement, the Arab Group subsequently failed to engage in any additional 
investment:

27. It was at all times 
reasonable and justifiable for Albrecht to rely upon the foregoing 
representations by the Arab Group and Albrecht had no reasonable means of 
ascertaining the Arab Group's true intent, which was that they never intended to 
honor their representations and only made them to induce Albrecht unwittingly to 
participate in their fraudulent scheme. The Arab Group's scheme was to transform 
their valueless lost equity investment in the Tarzana Project into either (a) 
the valuable $2,000,000.00 Note obtained from Albrecht, or (b) the valuable real 
estate and corporate securities securing said $2,000,000.00 Note, including the 
subject real property. In either case, Defendants would succeed in obtaining 
something valuable (e.g., valuable notes, real estate and/or corporate 
securities) for nothing (e.g., the valueless Tarzana $3,500,000.00 Notes), all 
as a result of defrauding Albrecht who would end up with 
nothing.

28. Public policy 
precludes allowing the Arab Group to succeed in their fraudulent scheme to 
victimize Albrecht by causing him to lose valuable assets to the Arab Group, 
thereby allowing the Arab Group fraudulently to convert their valueless lost 
investment in the Tarzana Project into valuable assets belonging to 
Albrecht.

* * * * * 
*

30. The Arab Group's 
representations were made with the intent to induce Albrecht to rely upon them 
and to enter into the April 29, 1982 Agreement and related transactions, 
notwithstanding the Arab Group's true undisclosed intent not to perform any such 
representations.

[¶57.]  It is a maxim that all evidence is to be 
weighed according to the proof which was within the power of one side to produce 
and in the power of the other to contradict. Mammoth Oil Co. v. 
United States, 275 U.S. 13, 51, 48 S. Ct. 1, 72 L. Ed. 137 
(1927). Certainly circumstantial evidence is appropriate to prove the fraud 
elements. United 
States v. Mammoth Oil Co., 14 F.2d 705 (8th 
Cir. 1926). It must be recognized that a logically connected train of 
circumstances may be as cogent to prove the existence of a fact as any direct 
evidence and, indeed, may at times outweigh opposing direct testimony. 
Tisthammer v. Union Pac. R. Co., 41 Wyo. 382, 286 P. 377 (1930). See Claus v. 
Farmers & Stockgrowers State Bank, 51 Wyo. 45, 63 P.2d 781 (1936). In discerning 
that issues of fact were to be tried by the jury, this court said in Broom v. 
State, 695 P.2d 640, 643 (Wyo. 1985):

Circumstantial evidence, 
with proper inferences to be drawn therefrom, may be sufficient to establish 
fraud. United States v. 
Mammoth Oil Co., 14 F.2d 705, 717 (8th Cir. 1926), affirmed 275 U.S. 13, 48 S. Ct. 1, 72 L. Ed. 137 
(1927).

Since it is impractical 
to look into a person's mind to ascertain his intention, it is Qnecessary to 
consider surrounding circumstances. Since it is most difficult to prove intent 
by direct evidence, circumstantial evidence is necessary. The issue of actual 
fraud is commonly determined by recognized indicia, demonstrated badges of 
fraud, which are circumstances so frequently attending fraud; a concurrence of 
several will make out a strong case and be the circumstantial evidence 
sufficient to sustain a court's finding.

Matter of Reed's 
Estate, 566 P.2d 587, 590-91 (Wyo. 1977).

[¶58.]  It is noteworthy by logical pursuit of 
what is found in pleading and the record that in the implicit counterclaim reply 
defense presented by the Arab Group of clean hands and high morality, the 
factual content of that defense was not a change in plans, but rather a direct 
dispute about the original understanding. Consequently, neither the trial court 
nor this court, as now by initial contemplation, can realistically examine this 
record without finding evidence of what actually occurred without considering 
the circumstantial proof which bears upon what initially was intended. Events 
provided more than a scintilla of confirming evidence of fraud. Reynolds v. 
Mitchell, 529 So. 2d 227 (Ala. 1988).

[¶59.]  Without allowing trial, or perhaps even 
if trial had been held lacking contribution and evidence by several other 
persons directly involved in the negotiations, this court and third parties will 
not be able to accurately or even persuasively determine what happened. With 
this caveat, but in application of reasoned probabilities and known facts within 
a universe of a real world business dealings, the abject denial of appellees in 
this case of any agreement incentive to be derived from future business lacks 
conceivable credibility. Whether such contribution of the ultimate result was a 
future promise, puffing, idle conversation, or misunderstood nonpromissory 
discussion, it cannot be rationally discerned between the minimal contribution 
of this record of the "I didn't - you did" construction of the only two 
informing affidavits available.

[¶60.]  Perhaps this ends in the recognition for 
jurists of what we know as laypersons, negotiators, and litigants who have been 
exposed with frequency to the syndrome and professional attitude sometimes 
otherwise ascribed as the "I never said anything that you can now prove unless I 
put it in writing" standard of business morality. On this record, I would leave 
resolution or determination of fact and extraction of falsity to the common 
composite good knowledge and commonplace wisdom of the trial jury. This is the 
most fundamental reason why trials by affidavit are not justified in our system 
of jurisprudence. By statement, the trial court chose not to believe Donald 
Albrecht and to believe Mustafa Razian. Reviewing exactly the same documents as 
the trial court, arriving at a singularly different conclusion in at least two 
regards, and perhaps factoring in a greater direct exposure to human conduct 
after business problems and failure, the record directs my conclusion that we 
should let the jury determine credibility as a matter of fact, and not do it as 
a matter of law through the judiciary.

[¶61.]  I would reverse and remand for trial on 
the merits.

FOOTNOTES

1 This is not the only 
litigation with which these developments have been involved. See Albrecht v. 
United 
States, 529 F. Supp. 135 (D.Wyo. 1981), rev'd 
831 F.2d 196 (10th Cir. 1987).

2 This statement is simply 
unsupported in this record. What the trial court actually says is that for 
whatever reason, in weighing the evidence, he chose to believe implicitly the 
Lebanese and Saudi Arabian witnesses and disbelieve the Albrechts, without 
listening to the actual testimony. A categorical, total, and actual weighing of 
the evidence was directly involved. Although at trial, absent jury 
participation, weighing of evidence is intrinsic to decision, weighing in 
summary judgment may occasion validation by source rather than substance which 
is the principal reason for trials. Thus, disposition by summary judgment 
affidavits was made where the actual speaker was the attorney who composed the 
text, and searching cross-examination was denied.