Title: State v. Pariag

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Pariag, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-4010.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-4010 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. PARIAG, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Pariag, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-4010.] 
Criminal law—R.C. 2953.61—Sealing of records—A trial court is precluded, 
pursuant to R.C. 2953.61, from sealing the record of a dismissed charge if 
the dismissed charge arises “as the result of or in connection with the 
same act” that supports a conviction, when the records of the conviction 
are not sealable under R.C. 2953.36, regardless of whether the charges 
are filed under separate case numbers. 
(No. 2012-0819—Submitted April 9, 2013—Decided September 19, 2013.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 11AP-569, 
2012-Ohio-1376. 
____________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
A trial court is precluded, pursuant to R.C. 2953.61, from sealing the record of a 
dismissed charge if the dismissed charge arises “as the result of or in 
connection with the same act” that supports a conviction when the records 
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of the conviction are not sealable under R.C. 2953.36, regardless of 
whether the charges are filed under separate case numbers. 
____________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} We are asked to determine whether records of a dismissed charge 
may be sealed if the offense arises from or is in connection with the same act that 
led to a conviction on an unsealable charge. The Tenth District Court of Appeals 
affirmed the trial court’s decision to seal the record of the dismissed charges in 
this case.  Because we conclude that the Tenth District Court of Appeals erred in 
its analysis, we reverse its judgment and remand this case to the trial court for 
further proceedings. 
I.  Introduction 
Background Facts  
{¶ 2} Appellee, Marlon Pariag, was stopped by the Ohio State Highway 
Patrol on December 31, 2010.  He was charged with a traffic offense and also 
with possession of drugs of abuse, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(C)(3), a minor 
misdemeanor, and possession of drug paraphernalia, in violation of R.C. 
2925.14(C)(1), a fourth-degree misdemeanor.  The traffic offense and the criminal 
drug charges were assigned separate case numbers as required by Sup.R. 
37(A)(4)(c) and 43(B)(2).  Both charges were filed in Franklin County Municipal 
Court.  The traffic charge was filed in case No. 2011 TRD 100861, while the drug 
charges were filed in case No. 2011 CRB 239.  The drug charges were dismissed 
when Pariag entered a plea in the traffic case. 
{¶ 3} On March 10, 2011, Pariag applied to seal the records pertaining to 
the drug charges that had been dismissed.  The state objected and argued that 
because the record of a traffic conviction could not be sealed under R.C. 2953.36, 
the record of the companion case—the drug charges—could not be sealed.  
According to the state, because the drug-related charges arose from the same 
January Term, 2013 
3 
incident as the traffic conviction, R.C. 2953.61 permanently precluded Pariag 
from applying for sealing of the dismissed drug charges. 
{¶ 4} The trial court ordered the records of the dismissed drug charges 
sealed, concluding that the conviction in the traffic case did not prevent sealing of 
records in the criminal case involving the dismissed drug offenses. 
{¶ 5} A divided panel of the Tenth District Court of Appeals held that 
R.C. 2953.61 addresses only the timing of an application to seal a record, not the 
applicant’s eligibility to have those records sealed.  10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-
569, 2012-Ohio-1376, ¶ 2.  The  court of appeals distinguished Pariag’s case from 
other cases in which applicants were prevented from sealing their convictions by 
emphasizing that Pariag’s dismissed drug charges and traffic conviction were 
filed under separate case numbers.  Id. at ¶ 14. The court of appeals held that R.C. 
2953.61 does not prohibit courts from sealing records of dismissed charges in one 
case when the record of conviction in another case may not be sealed, even if the 
charges arose out of the same act, because the statute governs merely the timing 
of the application to seal.  Id. at ¶ 21. 
Issues Presented 
{¶ 6} We accepted the state’s discretionary appeal.  132 Ohio St.3d 
1513, 2012-Ohio-4021, 974 N.E.2d 111.  In the first proposition of law, the state 
argues that under R.C. 2953.61, the record of dismissed charges cannot be sealed 
when the charges arise out of the same set of facts as a charge filed in a separate 
case that resulted in an unsealable conviction.  In the second proposition of law, 
the state argues that R.C. 2953.61 does not address the timing of an application to 
seal, but instead prevents partial sealing of a record. 
{¶ 7} We now hold that a trial court is precluded, pursuant to R.C. 
2953.61, from sealing the record of a dismissed charge if the dismissed charge 
arises “as a result of or in connection with the same act” that supports a 
conviction when the records are not sealable under R.C. 2953.36, regardless of 
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whether the dismissed charge and conviction are filed under separate case 
numbers. 
{¶ 8} We therefore reverse the judgment of the Tenth District Court of 
Appeals and remand this case to the trial court to determine whether the dismissed 
drug charges arose as the result of or in connection with the same act that led to 
Pariag’s driving-under-suspension offense. 
II.  Law and Analysis 
Standard of Review 
{¶ 9} Because the propositions involve the interpretation of a statute, 
which is a question of law, we review the court of appeals’ judgment de novo.  
Med. Mut. of Ohio v. Schlotterer, 122 Ohio St.3d 181, 2009-Ohio-2496, 909 
N.E.2d 1237, ¶ 13. 
{¶ 10} When construing a statute, a court’s objective is to determine and 
give effect to the legislative intent.  State ex rel. Solomon v. Police & Firemen’s 
Disability & Pension Fund Bd. of Trustees, 72 Ohio St.3d 623, 65, 647 N.E.2d 
486 (1995).  To determine legislative intent, a court must first consider the words 
used in a statute.  State v. Maxwell, 95 Ohio St.3d 254, 2002-Ohio-212, 767 
N.E.2d 242, ¶ 10.  When a statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, a court 
must apply it as written.  Zumwalde v. Madeira & Indian Hill Joint Fire Dist., 
128 Ohio St.3d 492, 2011-Ohio-1603, 946 N.E.2d 748, ¶ 23.  Further construction 
is required only when a statute is unclear and ambiguous.  State v. Chappell, 127 
Ohio St.3d 376, 2010-Ohio-5991, 939 N.E.2d 1234, ¶ 16. 
The privilege of sealing a record 
{¶ 11} In this case, the words “expungement” and “sealing” have been 
interchanged.  “Expungement” is a legislative construct with no universally 
applied definition.  Although the word “expungement” was used in R.C. 2953.32, 
Ohio’s first-time-offender statute, “expungement” was described as a court-
ordered “seal[ing]” of official records and “delet[ing]” of index references 
pertaining to a criminal conviction.  Am.Sub.S.B. No. 5, 135 Ohio Laws, Part I, 
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5 
70, 70-71.  In 1979, the General Assembly amended R.C. 2953.32, changing the 
word “expungement” to “sealing,” Am.Sub.H.B. No. 105, 138 Ohio Laws, Part I, 
1638; however “expungement” remains a common colloquialism used1 to 
describe the process.  Pepper Pike v. Doe, 66 Ohio St.2d 374, 378, 421 N.E.2d 
1303 (1981) (referring to R.C. 2953.32 as “Ohio’s criminal expungement 
statute”); State v. LaSalle, 96 Ohio St.3d 178, 2002-Ohio-4009, 772 N.E.2d 1172, 
¶ 3, fn. 2. 
{¶ 12} Expungement of a criminal record is an “act of grace created by 
the state.”  State v. Hamilton, 75 Ohio St.3d 636, 639, 665 N.E.2d 669 (1996).  It 
should be granted only when all requirements for eligibility are met, because it is 
a “privilege, not a right.”  State v. Futrall, 123 Ohio St.3d 498, 2009-Ohio-5590, 
918 N.E.2d 497, ¶ 6.  R.C. 2953.32 et seq. set out the limits of the trial court’s 
jurisdiction to grant a request to seal the record of convictions or charges that 
have been dismissed. 
Statutory application 
{¶ 13} Because Pariag did not seek to seal the record of a conviction, R.C. 
2953.52(A)(1), which applies when charges did not result in a conviction, applies. 
It stated: 
 
Any person who is found not guilty of an offense by a jury 
or a court or who is the defendant named in a dismissed complaint, 
                                          
 
1 The term “expungement” continues to appear in R.C. 2151.358 relating to juveniles and in 
contrast to sealing means that no record exists. R.C. 2151.358(F) (“the person who is the subject 
of the expunged records properly may, and the court shall, reply that no record exists with respect 
to the person upon any inquiry in the matter”). 
 
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indictment, or information, may apply to the court for an order to 
seal his official records in the case.  Except as provided in section 
2953.61 of the Revised Code, the application may be filed at any 
time after the finding of not guilty or the dismissal of the 
complaint, indictment, or information is entered upon the minutes 
of the court of the journal, whichever entry comes first. 
 
Former R.C. 2953.52(A)(1), Am.Sub.H.B. No. 17, 149 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 8186, 
8192. 
{¶ 14} R.C. 2953.52 allows for application to seal the records of a 
dismissed complaint, indictment, or information “at any time” after dismissal; 
however, the statute expressly states that this timeframe is subject to the 
mandatory waiting period in R.C. 2953.61, which governs the sealing of records 
in  multiple charges with differing dispositions. 
{¶ 15} R.C. 2953.61 states:   
 
When a person is charged with two or more offenses as a 
result of or in connection with the same act and at least one of the 
charges has a final disposition that is different than the final 
disposition of the other charges, the person may not apply to the 
court for the sealing of his record in any of the cases until such 
time as he would be able to apply to the court and have all of the 
records in all of the cases pertaining to those charges sealed * * *. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 16} The statute applies when a person is charged with multiple 
offenses that arise “as a result of or in connection with the same act.”  Although 
the Tenth District Court of Appeals held that R.C. 2953.61 was unclear with 
respect to the meaning of the phrase “the same act” and the state misreads these 
January Term, 2013 
7 
words to mean a conviction, we do not agree that the statute is ambiguous.  The 
“same act” plainly refers to the “same conduct.” 
{¶ 17} The Tenth District also held that R.C. 2953.61 merely governs the 
time for applying to seal a record.  But a person cannot apply to have the record of 
a charge sealed until the records of all the charges can be sealed, and the charge 
must be one for which the record can be sealed.  R.C. 2953.61 states, “[T]he 
person may not apply * * * in any of the cases until such time as he would be able 
to apply * * * and have all of the records in all of the cases pertaining to those 
charges sealed.”  In other words, when multiple offenses have different 
dispositions, an application to seal a record may be filed only when the applicant 
is able to apply to have the records of all the offenses sealed.  Thus, if the record 
of one charge cannot be sealed, any charges filed as a result of or in connection 
with the act that resulted in the unsealable charge cannot be sealed.  Because R.C. 
2953.61 refers to “all of the records in all of the cases,” our holding is not affected 
by the fact that the different charges were assigned different case numbers. 
Relevance of State v. Futrall 
{¶ 18} We have already determined that an applicant with multiple 
convictions in one case may not partially seal his or her record pursuant to R.C. 
2953.32 when one of the convictions is statutorily exempt from being sealed 
under R.C. 2953.36. Futrall, 123 Ohio St.3d 498, 2009-Ohio-5590, 918 N.E.2d 
497, ¶ 21.  In Futrall, multiple charges were filed in a single case, but we 
determined that R.C. 2953.61 did not apply.  We did, however, recognize the 
inherent difficulty of partially sealing records.  Id. at ¶ 20. 
{¶ 19} Pariag’s charges in two separate cases resulted in different 
dispositions—one conviction and two dismissals—and thus R.C. 2953.61 is 
applicable.  But because the trial court did not determine whether the charges all 
arose as a result of or in connection with the same act, it is not clear whether his 
traffic conviction prevents him from applying to seal the record of the drug 
charges.  Under R.C. 2953.36(B), a traffic conviction cannot be sealed. 
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{¶ 20} Pariag is ineligible to have the records of the dismissed drug 
charges sealed that otherwise would be sealable under R.C. 2953.52(A) and 
2953.61 if  all charges  arose as the result of or in connection with the same act.  
R.C. 2953.61 thus focuses not on when separate offenses occurred, but on 
whether they arose from the same conduct of the applicant.  Upon remand, the 
trial court must decide whether the dismissed drug charges stemmed from the 
same act as Pariag’s traffic violation.  If the court finds the same conduct 
generated both charges, the conviction for the unsealable traffic offense will 
prevent records from the otherwise sealable dismissed drug charges from being 
sealed. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 21} R.C. 2953.61 is unambiguous.  A trial court is precluded from 
sealing the record of a dismissed charge pursuant to R.C. 2953.61 if the dismissed 
charge arises “as  the result of or in connection with the same act” that supports a 
conviction which is exempt from sealing under R.C. 2953.36, regardless of 
whether the charges are filed under separate case numbers. 
{¶ 22} Pariag filed an application to seal the records of his drug charges 
that were dismissed in Franklin County Municipal Court case No. 2011 CRB 239.  
The trial court, on remand, must determine if those charges arise “as the result of 
or in connection with the same act” as his traffic conviction in case No. 2011 
TRD 100861. 
{¶ 23} Accordingly, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed, and 
the cause is remanded to the trial court. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY and FRENCH, JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, and O’NEILL, JJ., dissent. 
____________________ 
 
 
January Term, 2013 
9 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 24} There were two charges in the underlying case.  One, a traffic 
offense, is not sealable.  One of the reasons traffic offenses are not sealable is that 
they do not materially affect a person’s life.  The other charge, which was 
dismissed, was possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia and is sealable.  That 
makes sense.  Drug offenses can materially affect a person’s life, and the General 
Assembly allows them to be sealed.  Today this court determines that a material 
offense that was dismissed and that is ordinarily sealable cannot be sealed because 
an immaterial traffic offense cannot be sealed.  That doesn’t make sense. 
{¶ 25} This case does not merit the attention of this court.  We should 
never have accepted jurisdiction, and we should now dismiss the case as having 
been improvidently allowed.  Barring that, we ought to affirm the not 
unreasonable judgment of the court of appeals.  I dissent. 
____________________ 
 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 26} Respectfully, I dissent. 
{¶ 27} The issue in this case is whether R.C. 2953.61, which is referred to 
in R.C. 2953.52, precludes a trial court from sealing the record of dismissed drug 
charges that arose from the same traffic stop that resulted in a conviction for 
driving under suspension, a statutorily unsealable traffic offense.  My analysis of 
this case differs from the majority in three respects: determining legislative intent, 
analyzing the elements of the crimes at issue, and interpreting R.C. 2953.36. 
{¶ 28} The role of the judiciary is to interpret statutes and to determine the 
intent of the General Assembly in passing legislation.  The intent of the General 
Assembly in enacting R.C. 2953.52 and 2953.61 was to address the time to file an 
application to seal records of dismissed criminal charges.  In addition, the 
elements of the offense of driving under suspension differ from and are 
independent of the drug charges, which were dismissed, and therefore, the drug 
charges are not “a result of or in connection with the same act” as required by 
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R.C. 2953.61.  Hence, a pivotal requirement of R.C. 2953.61 cannot be 
established in this case.  And finally, a plain reading of R.C. 2953.36 reveals that 
it does not preclude the sealing of records relating to dismissed charges because it 
only precludes the sealing of records of certain convictions.  Here, the drug 
charges did not result in convictions.  For these reasons, I would affirm the 
judgment of the court of appeals, and therefore I dissent from the decision of the 
majority to reverse its judgment in this case. 
Timing Statutes 
{¶ 29} Pursuant to R.C. 2953.52(A)(1), those charged with but not 
convicted of a crime may apply to have records relating to those charges sealed.  
This provision also specifically addresses the time when such applications may be 
filed.  It provides: 
 
Any person, who is found not guilty of an offense by a jury 
or a court or who is the defendant named in a dismissed complaint, 
indictment, or information, may apply to the court for an order to 
seal the person’s official records in the case. Except as provided in 
section 2953.61 of the Revised Code, the application may be filed 
at any time after the finding of not guilty or the dismissal of the 
complaint, indictment, or information is entered upon the minutes 
of the court or the journal, whichever entry occurs first. 
 
{¶ 30} Also at issue in this case is R.C. 2953.61, which provides:  
 
When a person is charged with two or more offenses as a 
result of or in connection with the same act and at least one of the 
charges has a final disposition that is different than the final 
disposition of the other charges, the person may not apply to the 
court for the sealing of his record in any of the cases until such 
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11 
time as he would be able to apply to the court and have all of the 
records in all of the cases pertaining to those charges sealed 
pursuant to divisions (A)(1) and (2) of section 2953.32 and 
divisions (A)(1) and (2) of section 2953.52 of the Revised Code. 
 
(Emphasis added.)   
{¶ 31} The role of the judiciary is to interpret legislation, and “[t]he 
primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of 
the legislature.”  State ex rel. Cordray v. Midway Motor Sales, Inc., 122 Ohio 
St.3d 234, 2009-Ohio-2610, 910 N.E.2d 432, ¶ 15.  To determine the General 
Assembly’s intent, “the court first looks to the language in the statute and the 
purpose to be accomplished.”  State v. S.R., 63 Ohio St.3d 590, 595, 589 N.E.2d 
1319 (1992), citing Henry v. Cent. Natl. Bank, 16 Ohio St.2d 16, 242 N.E.2d 342 
(1968), paragraph one of the syllabus.  “Where the meaning of the statute is clear 
and definite, it must be applied as written,” but “where the words are ambiguous 
and are subject to varying interpretations, further interpretation is necessary.”  
State v. Chappell, 127 Ohio St.3d 376, 2010-Ohio-5991, 939 N.E.2d 1234, ¶ 16, 
citing Bailey v. Republic Engineered Steels, Inc., 91 Ohio St.3d 38, 40, 741 
N.E.2d 121 (2001). 
{¶ 32} Moreover, when two statutes relate to the same subject, such as 
R.C. 2953.52(A)(1) and 2953.61, they should be read in pari materia.  See 
generally State ex rel. Gains v. Rossi, 86 Ohio St.3d 620, 622, 716 N.E.2d 204 
(1999).  “In reading statutes in pari materia and construing them together, this 
court must give a reasonable construction that provides the proper effect to each 
statute.  All provisions of the Revised Code bearing upon the same subject matter 
should be construed harmoniously unless they are irreconcilable.”  (Citations 
omitted.)  State ex rel. Cordray at ¶ 25. 
{¶ 33} Reading R.C. 2953.52(A)(1) and 2953.61 in pari materia reveals 
that the legislature intended to dictate the time when an application to seal records 
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could be filed.  They do not preclude the sealing of records.  R.C. 2953.52(A)(1) 
specifically provides that “any person” may apply to the court for an order to seal 
the records relating to a dismissed charge and refers to R.C. 2953.61 in specifying 
the time for filing an application to seal the records pertaining to the dismissed 
charge.  The language “until such time” contained in R.C. 2953.61 also indicates 
that R.C. 2953.61 pertains to the waiting period required before applying to seal 
rather than the eligibility to have records sealed. 
{¶ 34} The title of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 175, 142 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2554, 
the bill amending R.C. 2953.52 and codifying R.C. 2953.61, further clarifies the 
intent of the General Assembly in enacting this legislation: “to require a longer 
waiting period before sealing the records of a person who has multiple charges 
brought as a result of a single act if the charges have different dispositions.” 
(Emphasis added.)  See also Legislative Service Commission Bill Analysis of 
Sub.H.B. No. 175 (describing operation of R.C. 2953.61 as an extension of the 
waiting period).  Notably, the title contains no language suggesting any intent to 
preclude the sealing of records of dismissed charges associated with convictions 
that cannot be sealed. 
{¶ 35} Moreover, since R.C. 2953.51 et seq. are remedial in nature, they 
“must be liberally construed to promote their purposes.”  State ex rel. Gains, 86 
Ohio St.3d at 622, citing R.C. 1.11 and Barker v. State, 62 Ohio St.2d 35, 42, 402 
N.E.2d 550 (1980).  We have previously explained that “R.C. 2953.51 et seq. was 
enacted to protect the privacy of those found not guilty of a criminal offense.”  
S.R., 63 Ohio St.3d at 595, 589 N.E.2d 1319, citing State v. Grove, 29 Ohio 
App.3d 318, 320, 505 N.E.2d 297 (1986).  Construing an analogous statute, the 
Court of Appeals of New York recognized that the purpose of the statute was to 
ensure that  
 
one who is charged but not convicted of an offense suffers no 
stigma as a result of his having once been the object of an 
January Term, 2013 
13 
unsustained accusation.  That detriment to one’s reputation and 
employment prospects often flows from merely having been 
subjected to criminal process has long been recognized as a serious 
and unfortunate by-product of even unsuccessful criminal 
prosecutions. 
 
In re Hynes v. Karassik, 47 N.Y.2d 659, 662, 393 N.E.2d 1015 (1979). 
{¶ 36} Interpreting R.C. 2953.61 to preclude the sealing of records of 
dismissed criminal charges because they are associated with an unsealable 
conviction contravenes the intent of R.C. 2953.52, which is to protect the privacy 
of persons who had been charged with an offense but were successful in having 
those charges dismissed and to guard against the harmful and stigmatizing effects 
associated with arrest records.  See generally S.R. at 595 and Hynes at 662. 
{¶ 37} Moreover, in this case, R.C. 2953.61 does not preclude sealing of 
the two dismissed drug charges because they were not the result of nor were they 
committed in connection with the act of driving under a suspended license.  
Rather, the acts of possession of marihuana and possession of drug paraphernalia 
are separate from and independent of the offense of driving under a suspended 
license.  The offenses may have been committed simultaneously, but R.C. 
2953.61 requires that the offenses be “a result of or in connection with the same 
act.”  Here, they are not.  This case is distinguishable from other circumstances in 
which two offenses are part of the same conduct.  For example, the offenses of 
reckless operation or operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent could 
arise out of and in connection with a charge of driving under suspension, because 
it is the act of operating the motor vehicle that results in the commission of the 
other offense. 
{¶ 38} A comparison of the elements of the offenses charged in this case 
demonstrates that operating a motor vehicle is a necessary element for a 
conviction of driving under suspension, but is totally unrelated to the elements for 
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a conviction of possession of drugs or drug paraphernalia.  In order to establish 
the offense of driving under suspension as defined in R.C. 4510.11(A), the state 
must prove that a person whose license has been suspended operated a motor 
vehicle during the period of suspension.  In contrast, in order to establish the 
crime of possession of marihuana, a person must “knowingly obtain, possess, or 
use” marihuana.  R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(3).  Similarly, to establish possession 
of drug paraphernalia, a person must “knowingly use, or possess with purpose to 
use, drug paraphernalia.” R.C 2925.14(C)(1). Because operating a motor vehicle 
is a different act from possessing an item, these offenses arise out of different acts 
and are not the result of the same conduct, nor are they committed in connection 
with the same act.  Therefore, R.C. 2953.61 does not preclude a court from 
sealing these dismissed drug charges. 
Convictions Precluding Sealing 
{¶ 39} R.C. 2953.36 provides: “Sections 2953.31 to 2953.35 of the 
Revised Code do not apply to any of the following: * * * (B) Convictions under 
* * * Chapter 4510. * * * of the Revised Code * * *” (emphasis added) 
(addressing sealing of records of convictions).  By enacting R.C. 2953.36, the 
General Assembly created various exceptions to the sealing of some records of 
convictions, such as those involving mandatory prison terms and, notably, 
convictions arising under R.C. 4510—which includes convictions for driving 
under suspension.  The exceptions to the ability to seal a record pursuant to this 
code section all relate to criminal convictions, and there is no statutory reference 
to, or exclusion for, the sealing of a record of a dismissed charge that does not 
result in a conviction.  Had the legislature intended to preclude the sealing of a 
dismissed charge related to a traffic offense, it could have done so, but it chose 
not to include dismissed charges in the exceptions cataloged in R.C. 2953.36. 
{¶ 40} The majority relies on State v. Futrall, 123 Ohio St.3d 498, 2009-
Ohio-5590, 918 N.E.2d 497, in support of its holding.  Futrall, however, is 
factually distinguishable from this case because it did not consider dismissed 
January Term, 2013 
15 
charges.  In Futrall, we addressed whether a court could partially seal the records 
of an applicant with multiple convictions in one case when one of the convictions 
was statutorily exempt from sealing pursuant to R.C. 2953.36.  Id. at ¶ 15.  In 
contrast, this case involves a nonsealable traffic-offense conviction and two 
charges that did not result in convictions but rather were dismissed.  Thus, our 
holding in Futrall does not control the outcome of this case. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 41} The legislature provided that persons charged with but not 
convicted of offenses may apply to the court for an order to seal the record of 
dismissed charges, and it specifically set forth the time when such applications 
could be filed. 
{¶ 42} In addition, it specified that when a person is charged with two or 
more offenses as a result of or in connection with the same act and different 
dispositions result, an application may be filed to seal the dismissed charges.  In 
this case, however, that factual predicate has not been met, because the act of 
possessing the marihuana and possessing the drug paraphernalia did not result 
from the act of driving under suspension nor did it occur in connection with that 
conduct. 
{¶ 43} Finally, because R.C. 2953.36 relates only to precluding the 
sealing of records of offenses that result in convictions and does not refer to 
dismissed charges, this provision does not preclude the sealing of records relating 
to dismissed charges. 
{¶ 44} Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the appellate court. 
O’NEILL, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
____________________ 
 
Richard C. Pfeiffer Jr., Columbus City Attorney, Lara N. Baker-Moorish, 
City Prosecuting Attorney, and Melanie R. Tobias, Assistant City Prosecuting 
Attorney, for appellant. 
________________________