Title: Carroll v. Robinson

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

454 S.W.2d 329 (1970) Thomas W. CARROLL, Appellant, v. A. C. ROBINSON, Executor, McIlroy Bank of Fayetteville, Ark., Trustee, Appellees. No. 5-5255. Supreme Court of Arkansas. June 1, 1970. Little & Lawrence, Bentonville, for appellant. Wade, McAllister, Wade & Burke, by David R. Malone, Fayetteville, for appellees. HOLT, Justice. Appellant is the sole heir of his father. He brought this action to have his father's testamentary trust declared invalid and to have the estate distributed as intestate property, contending that the trust violates the rule against perpetuities and unduly restrains the alienation of property. The probate court found that the trust does neither and ordered the executor of the testator's estate to deliver to the trustee, the appellee McIlroy Bank, the estate's assets. From that order appellant brings this appeal, and for reversal, reasserts his contentions. The pertinent provisions of the testator's will are: Subsequent to his father's death, appellant married; and from that union a daughter was born. Appellant contends that the trust corpus vests in interest at the birth of any children he may have, subject to complete divestment if the youngest of his children fails to reach the age of twenty-one. As we understand his position, appellant argues that "youngest" child means "last born" child and from this concludes that if the youngest child should in fact die prior to attaining majority, the rules against perpetuities and the suspension of the power of alienation are both violated since the vesting of the trust corpus could thereby be delayed until the death of all his (appellant's) surviving children. In other words, the right to the future possession of the trust corpus in this instance would revert to the testator's estate and there remain in abeyance until the death of all of appellant's children (an event which may occur far beyond the limit prescribed by the rule against perpetuities), at which time the trust corpus would then descend by way of intestate distribution. We do not agree with appellant's reasoning. It is well settled that a will should be given that construction which accomplishes the purposes and objectives of the testator and, further, that consideration must be given to every part of the will in ascertaining the testator's intentions. Walt v. Bevis, 242 Ark. 644, 414 S.W.2d 863 (1967). In Cross v. Manning, 211 Ark. 803, 202 S.W.2d 584 (1947), we enumerated certain rules to be followed in construing a will, among which are the following: The testator began subsection (b) of his will with the qualifying clause: "When the youngest child * * * shall have *331 reached his or her twenty-first birthday * * *." [emphasis added] Use of the definite term "when" rather than a conditional "if" indicates to us that the testator intended this provision to be effective in the event that appellant should have any child or children attaining majority. This is made perfectly clear by subsection (c) which provides that if the appellant dies and "has no children," then the remainder vests in certain named charities. This dispels any ambiguity, if any exists, as to the testator's intent. Manifestly, the latest time the future interest created by the trust will vest is when the youngest living child of appellant reaches twenty-one years of age. This period of time does not violate the rule against perpetuities and does not unduly restrain the alienation of property. Affirmed.