Title: Sossoman v. Board of County Comm'rs

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

230 Kan. 210 (1981)
630 P.2d 1154
JOHN W. SOSSOMAN, et al., Appellants,
v.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, et al., Appellees.
No. 52,851

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed July 17, 1981.
Robert D. Ochs, of Fisher, Ochs and Heck, P.A., of Topeka, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellants.
John R. Martin, Shawnee County Counselor, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
McFARLAND, J.:
This action is a challenge by plaintiff property owners to the power of the defendant board of county commissioners to assess the cost of a sewage treatment facility on the basis of assessed value of the land and improvements in the sewer districts served by the facility. The trial court held in favor of the county and the landowners appeal from said determination.
A sewage treatment plant was constructed which services Shawnee County Sewer Districts Nos. 3, 5, 9 and 33. On November *211 1, 1980, a levy of 48.59 mills was extended upon the assessed valuation of all real property, including improvements, located in said sewer districts. By virtue of the time factor involved, this levy represented the payment of the first two years' principal and interest on the bonds. The plaintiffs, as owners of improved real property, seek to enjoin the defendant board from proceeding, contending such a levy results in plaintiffs' property bearing a disproportionately high percentage of the cost of the sewage treatment facility. The trial court upheld the defendant board's authority herein and this appeal results.
The county is proceeding under K.S.A. 19-2712, which provides in pertinent part:
If applicable to Shawnee County, K.S.A. 19-2712, on its face, authorizes the actions of the defendant board. Accordingly, plaintiffs seek to have the statute (1) declared inapplicable to Shawnee County; (2) held invalid on constitutional grounds; or (3) judicially construed to achieve the result they desire.
The first question considered must of necessity be whether K.S.A. 19-2712 is applicable to Shawnee County. It is undisputed that (1) Clinton Reservoir (a federal reservoir) extends some three miles into Shawnee County; (2) ordinarily, only a relatively small amount of water is in the Shawnee County portion of the reservoir; and (3) only rarely will the reservoir be filled to capacity. Although the point is unclear, plaintiffs appear to assert that the location of the actual water level is somehow determinative of *212 whether part of the reservoir exists in Shawnee County. The point is without merit. The trial court found that a part of a federal reservoir existed in Shawnee County and, accordingly, held K.S.A. 19-2712 applicable. No error is shown in such determination.
Plaintiffs next contend K.S.A. 19-2712 is violative of Article 2, Section 17 of the Kansas Constitution, which provides:
Plaintiffs argue that K.S.A. 19-2712 is special legislation. As originally enacted, K.S.A. 19-2712 applied solely to counties designated as urban areas. This provision remains in the statute, but in 1973 the federal reservoir provision was added by amendment. Plaintiffs contend the 1973 amendment was for the benefit of Jefferson County, whose existing public services were being burdened by the building of Lake Perry. A cursory check indicates at least twenty-five Kansas counties have federal reservoirs in whole or in part within their boundaries.
The trial court held:
We agree with the trial court.
We turn now to the issues raised pertaining directly to the following provision of K.S.A. 19-2712:
Plaintiffs contend "a tax upon all taxable tangible property in the district" is an "ad valorem tax" and cannot therefore be a special assessment. In the alternative, plaintiffs contend K.S.A. *213 19-2712 should be construed to require the cost to be paid by special assessment, which plaintiffs aver can only be accomplished by separately determining the benefit to each tract without regard to value. Black's Law Dictionary 58 (4th ed rev. 1968) defines "ad valorem" as meaning "[a]ccording to value." Plaintiffs equate taxes imposed on an ad valorem basis with general taxes, and then distinguish such taxes from special assessments. General taxes are commonly levied on an ad valorem basis and such taxes are often called "ad valorem taxes." Plaintiffs further contend that if the statute (K.S.A. 19-2712) does in fact call for the levying of an ad valorem tax, then it is violative of Article 11, Section 1 of the Kansas Constitution for failing to be uniform and equal.
In Johnson County Comm'rs v. Robb, 161 Kan. 683, 171 P.2d 784 (1946), remarkably similar issues were raised. In Robb, this court was asked to construe G.S. 1945 Supp. 19-2731 to 19-2752, both inclusive. That statutory scheme provided for the creation of main sewer districts, for the construction of main and lateral sewers and disposal works, and for the issuance of bonds to pay the costs thereof. The projects were to be paid for by "a tax levy on the assessed valuation of lands and improvements within the main sewer district" (19-2735, now K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 19-2735). In upholding the act, the court reasoned at 690-692:
....
The term "ad valorem" does not appear in Robb, but the issue was raised concerning the validity of special assessments based on value. In Robb, the court stated at 692-694:
....
Interestingly, the argument was made in Robb that unimproved land received no benefit from a sewer system and should not be assessed therefor. In the case before us the opposite argument is made  improved land derives no greater benefit from a sewage treatment facility and all land should be assessed on an unimproved basis.
We adhere to Robb and conclude:
1. The tax authorized by K.S.A. 19-2712 is a special assessment and, accordingly, is not a tax within the purview of Article 11, Section 1 of the Kansas Constitution; and
2. It is within the power of the legislature to provide that the cost of a sewage treatment facility be paid by the districts it serves on the basis of a special assessment against the value of the land with improvements.
As their last point, plaintiffs contend the defendant board acted arbitrarily and capriciously in assessing the levy herein. Most of the claimed wrongful acts involve alleged misapplication and misconstruction of K.S.A. 19-2712. These contentions have been disposed of earlier in this opinion. However, one such matter needs to be addressed. The term "taxable tangible property" used *216 in K.S.A. 19-2712 includes personal property as well as land and improvements thereon. The defendant board did not levy against personal property located in the sewer districts. Plaintiffs assert that the board's failure to levy against personal property was both arbitrary and capricious. The trial court found and concluded as follows:
We agree with the trial court.
Before concluding this opinion, some additional comments are appropriate. The issues raised in this case basically involve raw power  the power of the board of county commissioners to act and the power of the legislature to enact the statute in question. Neither the wisdom of the legislature's enactment of the statute nor the wisdom of the defendant board's utilization of it are legitimate subjects for judicial review. The court can certainly understand the plaintiffs' concern over the major escalation in their tax burden arising from the construction of the sewage treatment facility, particularly in view of some of the aggravating factors shown to exist. However, no legal justification for the issuance of an injunction against the defendant board has been established.
The judgment is affirmed.