Title: GGV v. JLR

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

GGV v. JLR2002 WY 1939 P.3d 1066Case Number: C-01-1Decided: 02/07/2002

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                
   

 

GGV, 

Appellant(Respondent),

 

v.

 

JLR, 
individually and on

behalf 
of RR, a minor child, 

Appellee(Petitioner).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Albany County

The 
Honorable Jeffrey Donnell, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
JoAnn Fulton of Fulton Law Office, P.C., Laramie, Wyoming

 Representing 
Appellee:

Mary 
Elizabeth Galvan of Mary Elizabeth Galvan, P.C., Laramie, 
Wyoming

 Guardian 
Ad Litem:

            
Mary Chinnock Petroski of Mary Chinnock Petroski, P.C., Laramie, 
Wyoming

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

            
HILL, Justice. 

[¶1]      Appellant, GGV 
(hereafter Mother), solicits review of the district court's order, issued in the 
context of a paternity action, which concluded that a material change of 
circumstances warranted modification of a prior custody order.  The result of that order was that RR 
(hereafter Child) continued to be in the primary custody of Appellee, JLR 
(hereafter Father).  Mother and 
Father lived together for several years but were never married to one 
another.  Mother contends:  that the district court erroneously 
admitted evidence which established her responsibility for life-threatening 
injuries that were inflicted on Child when he was just over three years of 
age;1 that the district court failed to 
follow proper procedures in modifying the parties' child support obligations; 
that the district court further failed to take into account Mother's ability to 
pay for a portion of the cost of treatment and therapy for Child, as well as for 
extensive guardian ad litem and evaluation fees incurred in this custody 
dispute; and that the fees charged by the guardian ad litem and by evaluators 
were unreasonable.  Father contends 
that there was no reasonable cause for Mother's appeal and seeks monetary 
sanctions under W.R.A.P. 10.05.

 

[¶2]      We will affirm 
and impose sanction against Mother for this appeal.

 

 

[¶3]      Mother states 
these issues:

 

            
1.  Did the trial court err 
in allowing Rule 609 evidence to be presented in this modification of paternity 
action?

 

            
2.  Did the trial court err 
in failing to follow proper procedure in modifying the child support 
retroactively and when it failed to abate Appellee's child support and offset 
the abatement by amounts owed by Appellant?

 

            
3.  Did the trial court err 
in failing to acknowledge Appellant's ability to pay for ongoing and extensive 
treatment and counseling for R.R.?

 

            
4.  Did the trial court err 
in ordering Appellant to pay exorbitant Guardian ad litem fees and professional 
custody evaluation fees for which she had no ability to 
pay?

 

Father 
contends these are the issues we must decide:

 

            
A.  Did the district court 
err in admitting evidence of child abuse of the minor child by the Appellant as 
evidence of a material change of circumstances for purposes of modification 
proceedings?

 

            
B.  Did the district court 
err in enforcing the child support provisions of an existing juvenile court 
order?

 

            
C.  Did the district court 
err in ordering Appellant to contribute to the expenses of court ordered 
counseling for the minor child in the absence of evidence supporting a finding 
that Appellant is unable to contribute to those expenses and the absence of any 
objection thereto by Appellant?

 

            
D.  Did the district court 
err in ordering the Appellant to contribute to the fees of the Guardian Ad Litem 
and for the fees associated with a custody evaluation, in the absence of any 
objection thereto by the Appellant or evidence of her inability to pay such 
fees?

 

            
E.  Is the Appellee entitled 
to sanctions against the Appellant and her attorney[?]

 

[¶4]      The guardian ad 
litem (GAL) also filed a brief in which it is contended that, in the absence of 
a transcript of the proceeding conducted below, there is no basis for a finding 
that the district court abused its discretion.  The GAL also asks that sanctions be 
imposed in her favor pursuant to W.R.A.P. 10.05.

 

 

[¶5]      The facts are a 
bit difficult to sort out, in part because the hearing transcript was not 
designated as a part of the record, and in part because there are discrepancies 
in the various versions of the often troubling and tragic events that have led 
to this juncture and to what we hope is a conclusion to the custody 
dispute.  The facts we set out below 
are those we deem necessary to an understanding of the current posture of this 
case and to the resolution of the issues brought to this Court by the 
parties.  In keeping with the 
applicable standard of review, portions of this factual summary are posed in a 
light most favorable to the determinations made by the district court and giving 
Father the benefit of all favorable inferences and leaving out of our 
consideration the evidence presented by Mother.  In many circumstances, both in the legal 
arena and in the counseling arena, Mother and her attorneys failed to give 
adequate recognition to the reality that the various trial courts acted as 
fact-finders, and Mother's subjective version, or viewpoint, of many of the 
pivotal factual sequences were no longer of pertinence to the resolution of the 
issues at hand.

 

[¶6]      In 1985, Mother 
and Father met in Laramie and began a lengthy, but ultimately unsuccessful, 
relationship.  During the course of 
that relationship, they lived in Laramie, Denver, and Jackson.  At times, Father worked for a company 
owned by Mother's father in both Denver and Jackson.  Child was born in Jackson on December 
26, 1989.  The couple separated 
permanently in 1990, and, from that time until Father assumed custody of Child, 
he paid support to Mother.  At first 
those support payments were voluntary, but eventually, on January 9, 1992, the 
district court issued an order establishing Child's paternity.  That order also provided for visitation 
by Father with Child, for the payment of child support by Father in the amount 
of $400.00 a month, for Father to pay various expenses associated with Child's 
birth and the paternity proceedings, as well as for Father and Mother to "seek 
and maintain counseling."  The 
record demonstrates that Father has always met his support obligations but did 
not meaningfully pursue the mandated counseling.  Mother did pursue counseling with more 
earnestness but ultimately with results that were largely contrary to the 
intended purpose of counseling.

 

[¶7]      Shortly after the 
termination of her relationship with Father, Mother began a second relationship 
with another man.  That relationship 
produced a second child, although she and the father of that child did not marry 
either.  In March of 1993, in part 
because of Child's misbehavior and in part because of postpartum depression 
suffered after the birth of her second child, Mother committed abusive acts on 
Child that resulted in life-threatening injuries, including a subdural hematoma 
(shaken baby syndrome) and severe genital bruising.  Child was hospitalized in Salt Lake City 
for about one week.2  At the conclusion of the hospital stay, 
Child was placed in foster care for about three months.  When Child was taken from Mother's care 
and placed in foster care, Mother fled to Las Vegas, Nevada, where she was 
eventually arrested and returned to Wyoming for the purpose of a criminal 
prosecution arising out of the abuse and neglect suffered by Child.  Beginning in June of 1993, and 
continuing to this day, Child has been in the primary custody of Father.  At the time Father assumed custody of 
Child, no determination was made with respect to child support (i.e., 
Mother was not ordered to pay child support, and Father was not specifically 
relieved of his court-mandated support obligation of $400.00 a month to 
Mother).  Mother has enjoyed 
visitation throughout most of this later time period, beginning with brief 
supervised visits and culminating in the liberal visitation that she now 
enjoys.

 

[¶8]      Mother was 
prosecuted for the abuse and neglect set out above.  As a sentence, she was placed on 
probation for three years under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-301 (LexisNexis 2001) 
(emphasis added).3  By order entered on May 16, 1996, Mother 
was discharged from probation, and under the terms of the governing statute, her 
criminal record would not reflect this incident as a conviction.  On December 13, 1993, the juvenile court 
found Child to be a neglected child and temporarily placed him in Father's 
custody.  By order entered on March 
24, 1995, that custody was formalized, and the juvenile court directed the 
parties to file financial affidavits so that the district court could determine 
how much support Mother should pay to Father.  By order entered on June 30, 1995, 
Mother was directed to pay Father child support in the amount of $50.00 a 
month.  By order entered on June 12, 
1996, the Department of Family Services was relieved of its supervisory 
responsibilities with respect to Mother's visitation with Child.  On July 8, 1997, counsel for the parties 
entered into a "Memorandum of Understanding" which purported to settle all 
issues between the parties with respect to visitation and child support (the 
parties themselves did not sign the Understanding, and the district court held 
that the parties were not contractually bound by it).  It was Mother's contention that she 
never did agree to that "Memorandum of Understanding," and she did not abide by 
it.

 

[¶9]      From 1993, 
through the present time, Father lived in Laramie and Mother lived in Jackson, 
Lander, or Denver.  At times Mother 
did not have a permanent address or phone number.  In August of 1999, Mother relocated to 
Laramie to attend school.  Because 
of Mother's refusal to abide by the "Memorandum of Understanding," especially 
with respect to visitation (but also with respect to paying child support and 
generally refusing to conform her conduct to that expected of parents in custody 
matters such as this one), an "Amended Petition to Enforce and/or Modify Custody 
and Visitation Provisions of Judgment and Order of Paternity" was filed in the 
district court in Albany County.4  Mother's initial efforts were addressed 
to frustrating the proceedings in Albany County.  She filed a motion to dismiss, which was 
denied by the district court.  She 
filed a motion to disqualify the guardian ad litem, which the district court 
denied.  The matter was finally 
heard on October 19 and 20, 2000, and the district court issued its decision 
letter on October 30, 2000.  Mother 
was unable to agree on the wording of a final order, and so the entry of the 
final order was delayed until December 14, 2000, at which time a final order was 
entered without Mother's approval.  
Briefing was completed on May 8, 2001, with the submission of Mother's 
reply brief.  The case was 
considered by this Court at its expedited case conference on July 17, 2001, and 
was then assigned for preparation of an opinion.

 

[¶10]   It is also important that we 
acknowledge that these proceedings were not initiated because Child was 
experiencing problems.  As the 
district court concluded in its decision letter:  "If nothing else, the parties agree and 
the evidence clearly shows that they have a well-behaved, well-adapted 
child.  [Child] is popular in 
school, academically successful, and otherwise thriving in his current living 
environment."

 

 

[¶11]   The district court acted under 
authority of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-113 (LexisNexis 2001)5:

 

§ 
14-2-118.  Effect and content of 
judgment or order; new birth certificate; determination of support; payments of 
support; continuing jurisdiction.

 

(a)  The judgment or order of the court 
determining the existence or nonexistence of the parent and child relationship 
is determinative for all purposes.

            
(b)  If the judgment or order 
of the court is at variance with the child's birth certificate, the court shall 
order that a new birth certificate be issued under W.S. 
14-2-120.

            
(c)  The judgment or order 
may contain any other provision directed against the appropriate party to the 
proceeding concerning the duty of support, the custody and guardianship of the 
child, visitation privileges with the child or any other matter in the best 
interest of the child.  The judgment 
or order may direct the father to pay reasonable medical expenses associated 
with the mother's pregnancy, confinement, the child's birth and on-going health 
care expenses incurred for the benefit of the child.

            
(d)  All child support 
payments shall be established, paid, enforced and modified pursuant to title 20 
of the Wyoming statutes.  In the 
best interest of the child, a lump sum payment or the purchase of an annuity may 
be ordered in lieu of periodic payments of support.

            
(e)  through (h) Repealed by 
Laws 2000, ch. 23, § 2.

 

[¶12]   The district court's actions with 
respect to custody and visitation are governed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 20-2-201 
through -204 (LexisNexis 2001)6:

 

§ 
20-2-201. Disposition and maintenance of children in decree or order; access to 
records.

 

            
(a) In granting a divorce, separation or annulment of a marriage or upon 
the establishment of paternity pursuant to  
W.S. 14-2-101 through  
14-2-120, the court may make by decree or order any disposition of the 
children that appears most expedient and in the best interests of the 
children.  In determining the best 
interests of the child, the court shall consider, but is not limited to, the 
following factors:

(i) The 
quality of the relationship each child has with each 
parent;

(ii) The 
ability of each parent to provide adequate care for each child throughout each 
period of responsibility, including arranging for each child's care by others as 
needed;

(iii) 
The relative competency and fitness of each parent;

(iv) 
Each parent's willingness to accept all responsibilities of parenting, including 
a willingness to accept care for each child at specified times and to relinquish 
care to the other parent at specified times;

(v) How 
the parents and each child can best maintain and strengthen a relationship with 
each other;

(vi) How 
the parents and each child interact and communicate with each other and how such 
interaction and communication may be improved;

(vii) 
The ability and willingness of each parent to allow the other to provide care 
without intrusion, respect the other parent's rights and responsibilities, 
including the right to privacy;

(viii) 
Geographic distance between the parents' residences;

(ix) The 
current physical and mental ability of each parent to care for each 
child;

(x) Any 
other factors the court deems necessary and relevant.

            
(b) In any proceeding in which the custody of a child is at issue the 
court shall not prefer one (1) parent as a custodian solely because of 
gender.

            
(c) The court shall consider evidence of spousal abuse or child abuse as 
being contrary to the best interest of the children.  If the court finds that family violence 
has occurred, the court shall make arrangements for visitation that best 
protects the children and the abused spouse from further 
harm.

            
(d) The court shall order custody in well defined terms to promote 
understanding and compliance by the parties.  Custody shall be crafted to promote the 
best interests of the children, and may include any combination of joint, shared 
or sole custody.

            
(e) Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the noncustodial parent shall 
have the same right of access as the parent awarded custody to any records 
relating to the child of the parties, including school records, activities, 
teachers and teachers' conferences as well as medical and dental treatment 
providers and mental health records.

            
(f) At any time the court may require parents to attend appropriate 
parenting classes, including but not limited to, parenting classes to lessen the 
effects of divorce on children.

 

§ 
20-2-202. Visitation.

            
(a) The court may order visitation it deems in the best interests of each 
child and the court shall:

(i) 
Order visitation in enough detail to promote understanding and 
compliance;

(ii) 
Provide for the allocation of the costs of transporting each child for purposes 
of visitation;

(iii) 
Require either parent who plans to change their home city or state of residence, 
to give written notice thirty (30) days prior to the move, both to the other 
parent and to the clerk of district court stating the date and destination of 
the move. 

 

§ 
20-2-203. Jurisdiction for enforcement and 
modification.

 

(a) A 
court in this state which enters a custody order under W.S. 20-2-201 has 
continuing subject matter jurisdiction to enforce or modify the decree 
concerning the care, custody and visitation of the children as the circumstances 
of the parents and needs of the child require, subject to the provisions of the 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.  
A court which has jurisdiction to enforce or modify an order under this 
section may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if it finds it is an 
inconvenient forum under the circumstances of the case and that the court which 
entered the original order is a more appropriate forum and has jurisdiction as 
set forth in the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.

              
(b) A court in any county in Wyoming in which the child has lived with 
his parents, a parent or a person acting as a parent for six (6) consecutive 
months immediately prior to commencement of the custody proceeding may assert 
subject matter jurisdiction and adjudicate any proceedings involving the 
child.  Periods of temporary absence 
of any of the named persons shall be included as part of the six (6) month 
period.

            
(c) Any party seeking to enforce or modify a custody order pursuant to 
this section shall attach a certified copy of the custody order to the petition 
to be enforced or modified.  A 
certified copy of an order entered by a Wyoming court providing for the care, 
custody or visitation of children may be filed in the office of the clerk of the 
district court of any county in this state in which either parent resides if 
neither parent resides in the county of original jurisdiction.  The district court for the county in 
which the order is filed has jurisdiction to enforce the order, 
provided:

(i) Upon 
request of the district court for the county in which a certified copy of the 
order has been filed, the court which originally entered the order shall forward 
certified copies of the transcript of the court record and pleadings, orders, 
decrees, records of hearings, social studies and other pertinent documents 
relating to the original proceeding; and

(ii) The 
district court for the county in which a certified copy of the order has been 
filed shall give due consideration to the transcript of the record and all other 
documents submitted to it in accordance with paragraph (i) of this 
subsection.

(d) In 
any proceeding to enforce or modify an order concerning the care, custody and 
visitation of children, any required notice or pleading shall be served as 
provided by the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure.

 

§ 
20-2-204. Enforcement and modification.

 

            
(a) Either parent may petition to enforce or modify any court order 
regarding custody and visitation.

            
(b) A court having jurisdiction under W.S. 20-2-203 may, upon appropriate 
motion of a party, require a parent to appear before the court and show just 
cause why the parent should not be held in contempt, upon a showing that the 
parent has willfully violated an order concerning the care, custody and 
visitation of the children.  In 
order to enforce and require future compliance with an order the court may find 
that the parent is in contempt of court, award attorney's fees, costs and any 
other relief as the court may deem necessary under the circumstances to the 
party aggrieved by the violation of an order.

            
(c) A court having jurisdiction may modify an order concerning the care, 
custody and visitation of the children if there is a showing by either parent of 
a material change in circumstances since the entry of the order in question and 
that the modification would be in the best interests of the children pursuant to 
W.S. 20-2-201(a).  In any proceeding 
in which a parent seeks to modify an order concerning child custody or 
visitation, proof of repeated, unreasonable failure by the custodial parent to 
allow visitation to the other parent in violation of an order may be considered 
as evidence of a material change of circumstances.

 

[¶13]   Child support is also governed by 
statute.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
20-2-301 through -315 (LexisNexis 2001).  
These statutes were also largely rewritten by year 2000 
amendments.

 

[¶14]   The prime judicial objective in 
dealing with visitation and support is to serve the best interests of the 
child.  In re Paternity of 
IC, 941 P.2d 46, 52-53 (Wyo. 1997).  
In custody and visitation matters, paramount consideration must be given 
to the needs of the child.  The 
determination of the best interest of the child is a question for the district 
court.  This Court will not overturn 
the district court's determination unless we are persuaded that there is an 
abuse of discretion.  The ultimate 
standard is whether the district court reasonably could have concluded as it 
did.  Under the abuse of discretion 
standard, this Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
determination that was made by the district court.  We give the prevailing party all 
favorable inferences and do not consider the evidence presented by the 
unsuccessful party.  In re 
Paternity of IC, 971 P.2d 603, 606 (Wyo. 1999).

 

 

Admission 
of Evidence in Violation of W.R.E. 6097

 

[¶15]   Mother contends that the district 
court erred in admitting evidence concerning her 1993 abuse of Child.  Mother correctly points out that the 
effect of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-301 was to erase from her personal criminal 
history the occurrence of the criminal child abuse.  However, it did not erase those events 
from the personal history of Child.  
The district court did not err in admitting evidence concerning that 
abuse, or in considering that evidence in weighing the best interests of 
Child.  The issue was the best 
interests of Child, not best interests of Mother.  Nothing more need be said about this 
issue.

 

 

[¶16]   Mother contends that the district 
court erred in retroactively modifying child support.  The essence of Mother's argument is that 
Father owed her child support for all months from March of 1993 (when the 
abusive acts were committed and Child taken from her custody) until June of 1996 
(when Father filed his first petition to modify support  Mother also succeeded 
in frustrating that petition).  
Indeed, Mother contends Father may owe even more child support than that 
(up to and including December of 2000) and, therefore, that issue must be 
remanded to the district court for further proceedings.  These contentions are wholly without 
merit.

 

[¶17]   In making this argument, Mother 
relies on Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-311(d) (LexisNexis 2001) (emphasis 
added):

 

            
(d) An order for child support is not subject to retroactive modification 
except:

            
(i) Upon agreement of the parties; or

(ii) The 
order may be modified with respect to any period during which a petition for 
modification is pending, but only from the date notice of that petition was 
served upon the obligee as provided by the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, 
if the obligor or the department is the petitioner, or to the obligor, if the 
obligee or the department is the petitioner. 

 

[¶18]   The district court determined that 
Father did not owe child support to Mother for the time period during which 
Mother did not have custody of Child.  
On one occasion, we held that a district court could not retroactively 
ratify an oral modification of a child support agreement agreed to by the 
parties.  State, Department of 
Family Services v. Peterson, 957 P.2d 1307, 1310-12(Wyo. 1998); also 
see Bellamy v. Bellamy, 949 P.2d 875, 877 (Wyo. 1997).  It suffices here for us to note that the 
Peterson and Bellamy cases do not apply to the instant 
circumstances.  The district court 
relied on little more than common sense in deciding that Father did not owe 
Mother child support arrearages because she did not have custody of Child and 
Father did.  We hold that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in so deciding, and we rely on that 
same thread of common sense in reaching our decision, as well as the legal 
maxim, "Reason is the soul of the law, and when the reason of any particular law 
ceases, so does the law itself (Cessante ratione legis, cessant et ipsa 
lex)."  Kerper v. Kerper, 
780 P.2d 923, 937 (Wyo. 1989); Collins v. Memorial Hospital of Sheridan 
County, 521 P.2d 1339, 1341 (Wyo. 1974); Rodin v. State, 417 P.2d 180, 196 (Wyo. 1966); McKinney v. McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204, 135 P.2d 940, 
952 (1943); R.H. Kersley, Broom's Legal Maxims at 97 (10th ed. 
1939).  The governing law serves to 
ensure that funds intended for the support of a child are, indeed, directed to 
that purpose.  The reason for that 
governing law is fully met in this case.

 

 

[¶19]   Mother contends that the district 
court did not give adequate consideration to Mother's ability to pay for 
treatment and counseling for Child, as well as for guardian ad litem fees and 
custody evaluation fees.  The record 
fully supports a conclusion that the district court gave complete and thorough 
consideration to Mother's ability to pay.  
The record also reflects that, throughout the eight-year history of this 
case, Mother has attempted to frustrate the timely and just resolution of this 
matter.  In particular, she has 
attempted to frustrate an accurate calculation of her annual income, and/or she 
was underemployed by her own choice.  
The record generously supports a conclusion that Mother has the ability 
to pay all sums ordered.  Further, 
we find no abuse of discretion in the district court's order in this 
regard.

 

 

[¶20]   Mother contends that the fees 
charged by the guardian ad litem and other professionals who did evaluations of 
Child, Mother, and Father are not reasonable.  This contention is not supported by 
reference to any materials in the record, nor is it supported by cogent argument 
or citation of pertinent authority.  
For these reasons, we will not consider the issue.  McLoughlin v. McLoughlin, 996 P.2d 5, 8-9 (Wyo. 2000).

 

 

[¶21]   Father asks that Mother be 
sanctioned under W.R.A.P. 10.05.  
The GAL also seeks such sanctions.  
Rule 10.05 provides:  "If the 
court certifies there was no reasonable cause for the appeal, a reasonable 
amount for attorneys' fees and damages to the appellee shall be fixed by the 
appellate court and taxed as part of the costs in the case.  The amount for attorneys' fees shall not 
be less than one hundred dollars ($100.00) nor more than five thousand dollars 
($5,000.00).  The amount for damages 
to the appellee shall not exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000.00)."  In this instance, we find that there was 
no reasonable cause for Mother's appeal.  
The district court's ruling was discretionary.  However, even the incomplete record, 
brought to this Court by Mother, supports a conclusion that it would have been 
an abuse of discretion for the district court to have done anything other than 
that which it did, and that Mother's pursuit of this appeal was yet another 
example of her efforts to unnecessarily prolong the proceedings, as well as 
increase the cost of the proceedings.  
See Stadtfeld v. Stadtfeld, 920 P.2d 662, 664 (Wyo. 1996); 
Barnes v. Barnes, 998 P.2d 942, 946 (Wyo. 2000); and Basolo v. 
Gose, 994 P.2d 968 (Wyo. 2000).  
Further, the record supports a conclusion that Mother acted knowingly and 
with a fairly complete understanding of the delays and disruptions she could 
cause, to the stability of Child's life,8 to Father,9 and to the courts.  Within 15 days of the publication and 
filing of this opinion, Appellee Father will submit a statement of attorney's 
fees and damages to this Court for our review so that an appropriate award can 
be ordered.  W.R.A.P. 
10.06.

[¶22]   The GAL also seeks attorney's fees 
and damages.  The certification made 
above applies with equal force to the GAL.  
Although not designated as an appellee, under our precedents the GAL 
functions as an agent of this Court and in aid of this Court, and it is 
appropriate that her request also be considered under W.R.A.P. 10.05.  Pace v. Pace, 2001 WY 43, ¶¶ 
21-26, 22 P.3d 861, ¶¶ 21-26 (Wyo. 2001); Clark v. Alexander, 953 P.2d 145, 151-55 (Wyo. 1998).  Within 15 
days of the publication and filing of this opinion, the GAL shall submit a 
statement of attorney's fees and damages so that an appropriate award can be 
ordered.

 

 

[¶23]   The order of the district court is 
affirmed in all respects.  This 
appeal will remain on the Court's docket for the purpose of assessment of 
attorney's fees and damages.

FOOTNOTES

   
1Child was born 
on December 26, 1989.  At the 
conclusion of the instant proceedings, Child was 11 years old and is now over 12 
years old.

   2Mother initially 
admitted her role in the injuries suffered by Child.  Later, she recanted, or attempted to 
recant, at various times blaming Father, new boyfriend, and babysitter, although 
she could back that up only with suppositions (and no criminal action was 
instituted against anyone except Mother).  
She even expressed a view that the personnel at the Jackson hospital had 
overreacted, causing Child to be placed on a life-flight to Salt Lake City.  She also intimated in her deposition 
taken in 1997 that her role in Child's injuries were as an instrument of God in, 
more or less, visiting the sins of the Father on the Child.  A mental health professional involved in 
this case noted with alarm Mother's relapse into denial.  In addition, in her 1997 deposition, 
Mother expressed a view that she no longer considered the 1993 beating of Child 
to be "relevant" to a custody determination.  She also opined that she did not 
understand why Child was still in therapy, and that she was only willing to pay 
for a therapist if she chose the therapist.

   3                    
§ 7-13-301. Placing person found guilty, but not convicted, on 
probation.

 

            
(a) If a person who has not previously been convicted of any felony is 
charged with or is found guilty of or pleads guilty or no contest to any 
misdemeanor except any second or subsequent violation of W.S. 31-5-233 or any 
similar provision of law, or any second or subsequent violation of W.S. 
6-2-501(a) or (b) by a household member as defined by W.S. 35-21-102 against any 
other household member or any similar provision of law, or any felony except 
murder, sexual assault in the first or second degree, aggravated assault and 
battery or arson in the first or second degree, the court may, with the consent 
of the defendant and the state and without entering a judgment of guilt or 
conviction, defer further proceedings and place the person on probation for a 
term not to exceed five (5) years upon terms and conditions set by the 
court.  The terms of probation shall 
include that he:

(i) Report to the court not less than 
twice in each year at times and places fixed in the 
order;

            
(ii) Conduct himself in a law-abiding 
manner;

            
(iii) Not leave the state without the consent of the 
court;

            
(iv) Conform his conduct to any other terms of probation the court finds 
proper; and

(v) Pay restitution to each victim in 
accordance with W.S. 7-9-101 and 7-9-103 through 
7-9-112.

            
(b) If the court finds the person has fulfilled the terms of probation 
and that his rehabilitation has been attained to the satisfaction of the court, 
the court may at the end of five (5) years, or at any time after the expiration 
of one (1) year from the date of the original probation, discharge the person 
and dismiss the proceedings against him. 

            
(c) If the defendant violates a term or condition of probation at any 
time before final discharge, the court may:

(i) Enter an adjudication of guilt and 
conviction and proceed to impose sentence upon the defendant if he previously 
pled guilty to or was found guilty of the original charge for which probation 
was granted under this section; or

(ii) Order that the trial of the 
original charge proceed if the defendant has not previously pled or been found 
guilty.

            
(d) Discharge and dismissal under this section shall be without 
adjudication of guilt and is not a conviction for any 
purpose.

            
(e) There shall be only one (1) discharge and dismissal under this 
section or under any similar section of the probationary statutes of any other 
jurisdiction.

 

We have included in the above-quoted 
material a 2000 amendment to this statute which is not applicable to the instant 
matter, but which is included for the sake of a complete recitation of the 
statute as it now reads.

 

4   For the sake of brevity, we will 
merely note here that a similar action was filed in 1998 in Teton County, but 
Mother succeeded in frustrating those proceedings.  Since all the parties (Mother, Father, 
and Child), as well as many other witnesses, resided in Albany County, that 
court assumed jurisdiction over this matter.

 

   5This statute was 
substantially rewritten by the year 2000 amendments, but not in any manner that 
affects the outcome of this case.

   6These statutes 
were also revised by year 2000 amendments.

   7W.R.E. 609 
provides:

(a) General Rule. -- For the purpose of 
attacking the credibility of a witness,

(1) evidence that a witness other than 
an accused has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, 
if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under 
the law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence that an accused has 
been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that 
the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect 
to the accused; and

(2) evidence that any witness has been 
convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false 
statement, regardless of the punishment.

(b) Time Limit. -- Evidence of a 
conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than ten (10) 
years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the 
witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later 
date, unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the 
probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances 
substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.  However, evidence of a conviction more 
than ten years old as calculated herein, is not admissible unless the proponent 
gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written notice of intent to use 
such evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest 
the use of such evidence.

(c) Effect of pardon, annulment, or 
certificate of rehabilitation. ­ Evidence of a conviction is not admissible 
under this rule if (1) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, 
annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based on 
a finding of the rehabilitation of the person convicted, and that person has not 
been convicted of a subsequent crime which was punishable by death or 
imprisonment in excess of one (1) year, or (2) the conviction has been the 
subject of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding 
of innocence.

(d) Juvenile Adjudications. -- Evidence 
of juvenile adjudications is generally not admissible under this rule.  The court may, however, in a criminal 
case allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness (other than the 
accused) if conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the 
credibility of an adult and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence is 
necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or 
innocence.

            
(e) Pendency of appeal. -- The pendency of an appeal therefrom does not 
render evidence of a conviction inadmissible.  Evidence of the pendency of an appeal is 
admissible.

 

(Emphasis 
added.)

   8As an example, 
we note that one goal expressed by Mother as recently as October of 2000 was to 
obtain full custody of Child, complete her education, and then move away from 
Laramie so that she and Child could be free of the disruptions caused by 
Father.

 

9   As an example, Mother testified 
Father was involved in a life of crime.  
When pressed on that issue, she based that conclusion on the fact that, 
on one occasion, father left to drive to Boulder, Colorado, at ten o'clock at 
night (and that could only mean he was involved in crime), and that he owned a 
Range Rover vehicle through his construction business (and his financial 
statement indicated he could not afford such an expensive vehicle, unless he was 
involved in crime).