Title: Skidmore v. O'ROURKE

State: colorado

Issuer: Colorado Supreme Court

Document:

383 P.2d 473 (1963) Thomas H. SKIDMORE, Plaintiff in Error, v. Donald O'ROURKE, as Treasurer of San Miguel County, Colorado, Defendant in Error. No. 20551. Supreme Court of Colorado. En Banc. June 17, 1963. Guy B. Dyer, Jr., Cortez, for plaintiff in error. C. N. Fairlamb, Atty., for San Miguel County, Delta, J. Fred Schneider, Ronald Lee Cooke, Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Assoc. Counsel, Denver, for defendant in error. HALL, Justice. The parties are before this court in reverse order of their appearance in the trial court. We will refer to plaintiff in error as defendant or Skidmore, and to defendant in error as plaintiff or the treasurer. The action was commenced by the treasurer to obtain a judgment against Skidmore for $14,764.58, being the amount of taxes assessed and levied, for the years 1954-1961 inclusive, on certain uranium mining claims and producing mine in San Miguel County. The claims and mine were, during said years, operated by Skidmore under a lease agreement with the Atomic Energy Commission. The mine and claims were on unpatented United States lands and assessments of taxes were made annually in connection with said mining operations, all as provided by CRS '53, 137-5-4, from which we quote the following pertinent language: "(2) The assessor, when he receives such statement, shall determine the gross proceeds of any such producing mine or mining claim for said preceding *474 year * * * and for the purpose of assessment for taxation shall value such producing mine or mining claim at a sum equal to one fourth of the gross proceeds for said preceding year for any such mine or mining claims. * * * Trial was to the Court upon an agreed statement of facts showing: It was further stipulated that the operations conducted by Skidmore for each of the years in question resulted in the production of ores having a stipulated taxable gross value; that during the years in question taxes were levied for said years in the total amount of $14,764.58. It was further stipulated that Skidmore had not paid the taxes assessed and levied. The trial court entered the following conclusions of law and judgment: Skidmore is here by writ of error seeking reversal of that judgment. He contends that the county treasurer in seeking to collect taxes is limited to procedures set up by statute, and that such procedures are exclusive. It is the rule of law in most, if not all, states, including Colorado, that the taxing power of the state is exclusively a legislative function. In City and County of Denver v. Lewin, 106 Colo. 331, 105 P.2d 854, this court said: "`The taxing power of the state is exclusively a legislative function, and taxes can be imposed only in pursuance of legislative authority, there being no such thing as taxation by implication. Subject to the fundamental or organic limitations on the power of the state, the legislature has plenary power on the matter of taxation, and it alone has the right and discretion to determine all questions of time, method, nature, purpose, and extent in respect of the imposition of taxes, the subjects on which the power may be exercised, and all the incidents pertaining to the proceedings from the beginning to end; and the exercise of such discretion, within *475 constitutional limitations, is not subject to judicial control. * * *.' 61 C.J., pp. 81-83, § 10." The foregoing language was quoted with approval by this Court in No. 19841, Bartlett and Company v. Board of County Commissioners, Colo., 382 P.2d 193 (announced June 3, 1963). The general assembly, in seeking to raise revenue by ad valorem taxes, has, by statutory authority in great detail, delegated to county assessors, county treasurers, boards of county commissioners, the Colorado Tax Commission, and the State Board of Equalization, certain duties to perform in making assessments, levying taxes, collecting the same, and disposing of the moneys so collected. County treasurers are constitutional officers, but have no constitutional duties to perform or constitutional authority to do any particular act such as commencing this suit. Article XIV, Section 8, of the Colorado Constitution provides: In 43 Am.Jur. 68, Public Officers, § 249, we find the following general rule governing actions of county officers, a rule applicable to the treasurer in this case: In Farnik v. Board of County Commissioners, 139 Colo. 481, 341 P.2d 467, this court said: "The above quotes are repugnant to the well established rule of law that county commissioners are officers with only delegated powers; they possess only such powers as are expressly conferred on them either by the Constitution or statutes, and, in addition, such implied powers as are reasonably necessary to the proper execution of those *476 expressly conferred. Robbins v. Boulder County Commissioners, 50 Colo. 610, 115 P. 526. The parties to this litigaton do not contend, nor did the trial court find, that there is any express statutory authority for the treasurer to institute this action to recover a personal judgment for the amount of real estate taxes levied and not paid. The general assembly has over a period of nearly eighty years adopted legislation designed to assure the collection of taxes due, it has expanded and built up a body of statutory directives for the guidance of county treasurers, outlining in great detail steps to be taken by them calculated to obtain the amount of taxes levied. Statutes fix the times for treasurers to send notices of taxes due, notice of delinquencies, notice of proposed sales, notice of applications for treasurer's deed, etc. Such statutes are very comprehensive and detailed, even directing treasurers to make assessments under certain circumstances, CRS '53, 137-9-19, and directing treasurers to petition the district court for the appointment of a receiver to take possession of and operate public utilities, whose properties are being advertised for sale, and to foreclose the lien of unpaid taxes in cases where there is no bid for the properties at such sale. CRS '53, 137-4-29. It would seem that statutory directives to county treasurers are all inclusive. The general assembly in 1902 considered the advisability of empowering county treasurers to institute suits for the collection of taxes. A statute was adopted which set forth circumstances and conditions where personal property taxes were not paid, whereupon county treasurers were not only empowered to, but directed, to "sue the person so taxed." Laws 1902, page 112, CRS '53, 137-9-12. The Thirty-fifth General Assembly in 1945 gave further consideration to this problem of treasurers' suits and amended the 1902 law and expanded upon the conditions and circumstances under which county treasurers "may sue the person so taxed." Added was a much needed provision. The foregoing enactments of the general assembly negate any suggestion that county treasurers have inherent, implied or general powers to sue delinquent taxpayers. The general assembly having exclusive jurisdiction over tax matters, county treasurers may exercise only such powers as have been delegated to them. The general assembly having delegated to county treasurers the power to institute suits for the collection of personal property taxes; specified the conditions that must prevail as a condition precedent to the filing of suit; designated the courts where suits may be filed; provided for an attorney for the treasurer and stated how and by whom he shall be paid; and having said nothing about suits for the collection of real estate taxes, leads to the inescapable conclusion that it never intended that treasurers commence suits for the collection of real estate taxes. Procedures for collection of personal and real estate taxes are so different that one can readily understand legislative authorization of suits for collection of personal property taxes, and no such authorization concerning the collection of real estate taxes. Real estate cannot be removed from the county; it can always be found. Statutes provide that personal property can be *477 seized and sold during the year in which taxes become delinquent, whereas owners of real property cannot be dispossessed for more than three years after the taxes become delinquent. In Montezuma Valley Water Supply Co. v. Bell, etc., 20 Colo. 175, 36 P. 1102, this court expressly held that a personal judgment for real estate taxes was clearly erroneous; that express statutory procedures set up for collection of real estate taxes were exclusive; pointed out that though statutory procedures for collecting personal property taxes included the right of the treasurer under certain circumstances to sue and obtain a personal judgment for the amount of personal taxes due, such did not warrant a judgment for the amount of real estate taxes levied and unpaid. Therein the court said: The foregoing language was quoted with approval in Mitchell v. Minnequa Town Co., 41 Colo. 367, 92 P. 678. In Robinson v. Tubbs, 140 Colo. 471, 344 P.2d 1080, this court said: Counsel for the treasurer refer us to Pinnacle Gold Mining Co. v. People, 58 Colo. 86, 143 P. 837, as authority sustaining the position of the treasurer here. We find nothing in that case that sanctions the actions of the treasurer here or supports the judgment of the trial court. In Pinnacle we do not have a county treasurer seeking to exercise powers not delegated to him. There the People, the State, brought the action. No one would contend that the State lacks capacity to sue. There the State obtained a personal judgment where there was a personal obligation to pay. Laws 1902, Chapter 3, Section 65, provide: In Pinnacle we have an excise tax; and an express duty to pay such tax to the state auditor. County treasurers are only administrative agents of the state, their authority being limited to that expressly delegated by the legislature. The general assembly, in the exercise of its exclusive powers, has stated who, when and under what circumstances owners of *478 property subject to ad valorem taxes may be sued by county treasurers. We find nothing in any of the acts of the general assembly to sanction the actions of the treasurer in commencing this suit. It is not a proper function of the judiciary to add to, detract from or impose other conditions governing actions of treasurers. The holding of the trial court that: is completely out of harmony with Montezuma, Mitchell and Robinson, supra, and is an invasion by the judiciary of the exclusive legislative functions dealing with the assessment and collection of taxes, as stated in Denver v. Lewin, supra. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court with directions to dismiss the complaint. PRINGLE, J., dissents. DAY, J., does not participate.