Title: In re Application of Ohio Power Co.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In 
re Application of Ohio Power Co., Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-143.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-143 
IN RE APPLICATION OF OHIO POWER COMPANY FOR AUTHORITY TO 
ESTABLISH A STANDARD SERVICE OFFER PURSUANT TO R.C. 4928.143 IN THE 
FORM OF AN ELECTRIC SECURITY PLAN; OFFICE OF OHIO CONSUMERS’ 
COUNSEL, APPELLANT; PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, APPELLEE; OHIO 
POWER COMPANY, INTERVENING APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as In re Application of Ohio Power Co.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-143.] 
Public utilities—Electric-security plan—Public Utilities Commission had subject-
matter jurisdiction to approve power-purchase-agreement rider—Public 
Utilities Commission’s approval of smart-city rider upheld because R.C. 
4928.143(B)(2)(H) permits an electric-security plan to include certain 
provisions that might otherwise violate a different statute in R.C. Title 49—
Public Utilities Commission’s approval of renewable-generation rider on a 
placeholder basis upheld because no harm or prejudice to ratepayers has 
been shown—Order affirmed. 
(No. 2018-1396—Submitted October 22, 2019—Decided January 22, 2020.) 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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APPEAL from the Public Utilities Commission, Nos. 16-1852-EL-SSO  
and 16-1853-EL-AAM. 
__________________ 
KENNEDY, J. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal as of right from the order of appellee, the Public 
Utilities Commission of Ohio (“PUCO”), approving and modifying a previously 
approved electric-security plan of intervening appellee, Ohio Power Company.  
Appellant, the Office of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel (“OCC”) challenges three 
riders authorized by that order.  Those riders are referred to as the Power Purchase 
Agreement Rider, the Smart City Rider, and the Renewable Generation Rider. 
{¶ 2} However, this court lacks jurisdiction to review the OCC’s challenge 
to the Power Purchase Agreement Rider because the OCC did not include the 
challenge in an application for rehearing.  Further, because the OCC has failed to 
show that the PUCO lacked statutory authority to approve the Smart City Rider 
pursuant to R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(h) and because the OCC has not established that 
approving the Renewable Generation Rider on a placeholder basis will harm or 
prejudice ratepayers, the OCC has failed to satisfy its burden to demonstrate that 
the PUCO acted unreasonably or unlawfully in this case. 
{¶ 3} For these reasons, we affirm the order of the PUCO. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 4} Electric-distribution utilities such as Ohio Power must provide 
consumers within their certified territories a “standard service offer of all 
competitive retail electric services necessary to maintain essential electric service 
* * *, including a firm supply of electric generation service.”  R.C. 4928.141(A).  
The offer may take the form of a market-rate offer under R.C. 4928.142 or an 
electric-security plan under R.C. 4928.143. 
{¶ 5} In May 2016, Ohio Power applied for the PUCO’s approval to, among 
other things, extend its third electric-security plan through May 31, 2024.  An  
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attorney examiner issued an order directing Ohio Power to refile its application 
under a new case number, and Ohio Power filed its amended application in 
November 2016.  Ohio Power later filed a stipulation seeking resolution of the 
issues in the case, which the OCC opposed.  After conducting a hearing, the PUCO 
modified and approved the stipulation, authorizing Ohio Power to extend its 
electric-security plan through May 31, 2024, and allowing Ohio Power to continue 
implementing, or begin implementing, the three riders that are at issue in this 
appeal.  In its opinion and order, the PUCO designated Ohio Power’s amended 
application as Ohio Power’s proposed fourth electric-security plan. 
{¶ 6} First, the PUCO authorized Ohio Power to continue the Power 
Purchase Agreement Rider through the extended term of the electric-security plan.  
The Power Purchase Agreement Rider permits Ohio Power to recover costs 
associated with its contractual entitlement to the power generated by the Ohio 
Valley Electric Corporation (“OVEC”).  As we previously explained in In re 
Application of Ohio Power Co., 155 Ohio St.3d 320, 2018-Ohio-4697, 121 N.E.3d 
315, ¶ 3, the PUCO intended the Power Purchase Agreement Rider “to provide a 
financial hedge against fluctuating prices in the wholesale-power market in order 
to stabilize retail customer rates,” providing a credit to ratepayers when the costs of 
power purchased from OVEC are cheaper than the wholesale-power market price 
and imposing a surcharge on ratepayers when Ohio Power’s purchase of OVEC’s 
power is more expensive than the wholesale price. 
{¶ 7} Second, the PUCO authorized Ohio Power to implement the Smart 
City Rider, capped at a total of $21.1 million over four years, to recover the costs 
associated with two technology-demonstration projects: a rebate program to 
encourage the construction of electric-vehicle charging stations and a program for 
the development of microgrids, which are small-scale power grids that can operate 
independently or in conjunction with the overall electric grid and which may 
include small-scale-generation and battery-storage systems. 
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{¶ 8} Third, the PUCO authorized Ohio Power to implement the Renewable 
Generation Rider on a placeholder basis (i.e., with a zero rate), permitting Ohio 
Power to recover costs from future renewable-generation projects to be approved 
by the PUCO at a later time. 
{¶ 9} After the PUCO issued its order, the OCC applied for a rehearing, 
asserting eight assignments of error challenging Ohio Power’s electric-security 
plan, the Smart City Rider, the Renewable Generation Rider (and other riders 
approved as placeholders), a procedural ruling regarding a rider that is not at issue 
in this case, and various other aspects of the propriety of the PUCO’s decision to 
approve the stipulation.  The PUCO denied the OCC’s application for rehearing, 
and the OCC appealed to this court, asserting three propositions of law. 
Law and Analysis 
Standard of Review 
{¶ 10} R.C. 4903.13 empowers this court to reverse, vacate, or modify a 
final order of the PUCO if it is unlawful or unreasonable.  This court “will not 
reverse or modify a PUCO decision as to questions of fact when the record contains 
sufficient probative evidence to show that” the decision “was not manifestly against 
the weight of the evidence and was not so clearly unsupported by the record as to 
show misapprehension, mistake, or willful disregard of duty.”  In re Application of 
Ohio Edison Co., 157 Ohio St.3d 73, 2019-Ohio-2401, 131 N.E.3d 906, ¶ 8.  
However, this court has “complete and independent power of review as to questions 
of law.”  MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 38 Ohio St.3d 266, 
268, 527 N.E.2d 777 (1988). 
The Power Purchase Agreement Rider 
{¶ 11} The OCC challenges the Power Purchase Agreement Rider by 
arguing that the PUCO lacked jurisdiction to approve it because the Federal Power 
Act, 16 U.S.C. 791a et seq., vests in the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(“FERC”) exclusive jurisdiction over wholesale sales of electricity in the interstate 
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market.  According to the OCC, the Power Purchase Agreement Rider intrudes on 
FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction by allowing Ohio Power to charge ratepayers more 
for the OVEC power sold in the interstate market than the wholesale rate 
established in the federally regulated, competitive wholesale market.  The OCC 
relies on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hughes v. Talen Energy 
Marketing, L.L.C., which held that a state’s utility-regulating commission had 
“invade[d] FERC’s regulatory turf” by guaranteeing a rate to a wholesale-power-
market participant that differed from the rate that FERC had deemed just and 
reasonable under the Federal Power Act.  ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 1288, 1297, 194 
L.Ed.2d 414 (2016).  However, the OCC failed to preserve this argument in its 
application for a rehearing. 
{¶ 12} Our jurisdiction to review decisions of the PUCO emanates from 
Article IV, Section 2(B)(2)(d) of the Ohio Constitution, which grants us “[s]uch 
revisory jurisdiction of the proceedings of administrative officers or agencies as 
may be conferred by law.”  This provision permits the General Assembly to 
establish and limit the court’s power of appellate review over decisions from 
administrative agencies such as the PUCO.  See generally Polaris Amphitheater 
Concerts, Inc. v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Revision, 118 Ohio St.3d 330, 2008-Ohio-
2454, 889 N.E.2d 103, ¶ 13 (discussing this court’s appellate jurisdiction to review 
decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals). 
{¶ 13} R.C. 4903.13 confers appellate jurisdiction on this court to review 
the final orders of the PUCO, providing that any party to a proceeding may file a 
notice of appeal with the PUCO “setting forth the order appealed from and the 
errors complained of.”  Another statute—R.C. 4903.10—permits a party to file an 
application for the PUCO to rehear any matter determined in the proceeding after 
the PUCO has issued its initial order.  That statute provides that the “application 
shall be in writing and shall set forth specifically the ground or grounds on which 
the applicant considers the order to be unreasonable or unlawful.  No party shall in 
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any court urge or rely on any ground for reversal, vacation, or modification not so 
set forth in the application.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 4903.10(B). 
{¶ 14} “We have ‘long held that setting forth specific grounds for rehearing 
is a jurisdictional prerequisite for our review’ ” of an order of the PUCO.  In re 
Complaint of Harris Design Servs. v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., 154 Ohio St.3d 
140, 2018-Ohio-2395, 112 N.E.3d 858, ¶ 20, quoting In re Complaint of Cameron 
Creek Apts. v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., 136 Ohio St.3d 333, 2013-Ohio-3705, 
995 N.E.2d 1160, ¶ 23.  We have therefore explained that a party’s failure to present 
a claim to the PUCO on rehearing “jurisdictionally bars” this court’s consideration 
of that claim on appeal.  In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co., 138 Ohio 
St.3d 448, 2014-Ohio-462, 8 N.E.3d 863, ¶ 55. 
{¶ 15} The OCC does not question this caselaw; rather, the OCC maintains 
that those concerns do not apply in this case because the OCC has challenged the 
PUCO’s subject-matter jurisdiction to approve the rider, urging that Congress has 
vested FERC with exclusive jurisdiction over wholesale rates. 
{¶ 16} In In re Complaint of Pilkington N. Am., Inc., we indicated that a 
party appealing from a PUCO order can attack the subject-matter jurisdiction of the 
PUCO notwithstanding the failure to raise that argument in an application for 
rehearing.  145 Ohio St.3d 125, 2015-Ohio-4797, 47 N.E.3d 786, ¶ 21-22.  We 
distinguished between the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and an error in the 
exercise of that jurisdiction: 
 
When an administrative agency renders a decision without subject-
matter jurisdiction, the order is void and subject to challenge at any 
time.  * * * In contrast, a wrong decision made by an agency with 
subject-matter jurisdiction is not void, but merely voidable.  That is, 
errors in the exercise of jurisdiction can be waived and must be 
challenged on appeal. 
January Term, 2020 
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Id. at ¶ 22. 
{¶ 17} R.C. 4905.04 vests the PUCO generally “with the power and 
jurisdiction to supervise and regulate public utilities,” and R.C. 4928.143(A) 
specifically authorizes the PUCO to review an electric-distribution utility’s 
application for an electric-security plan.  And we have stated that the PUCO’s 
“jurisdiction over rates and rate-related matters is unquestionable and exclusive.”  
In re Complaint of Pilkington N. Am. at ¶ 23. 
{¶ 18} The OCC relies on Internatl. Longshoremen’s Assn., AFL-CIO v. 
Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 388, 106 S.Ct. 1904, 90 L.Ed.2d 389 (1986), for the 
proposition that Congress has the power to establish an exclusive federal forum to 
adjudicate questions of federal law, thereby preempting a state tribunal’s 
concurrent jurisdiction over that subject matter.  In Internatl. Longshoremen’s 
Assn., the United States Supreme Court held that in cases in which state law is 
completely preempted by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq., 
“the state courts lack the very power to adjudicate the claims that trigger pre-
emption” and cannot decline to address a claim of preemption based on 
noncompliance with state procedural rules regarding waiver.  Id. at 398-399.  Based 
upon this authority, the OCC maintains that it “did not waive, and could not have 
waived, its preemption argument because it challenges the PUCO’s jurisdiction—
the PUCO’s very authority to adjudicate [Ohio Power’s] wholesale rates.” 
{¶ 19} However, there is a difference “between pre-emption of a state’s 
substantive law and pre-emption of a state court’s power to adjudicate.”  Reithmiller 
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 824 F.2d 510, 512 (6th Cir.1987).  The 
United States Supreme Court has explained that unless Congress has provided a 
clear statement that a statutory limitation deprives a tribunal of subject-matter 
jurisdiction, the courts should treat that limitation as nonjurisdictional.  Gonzalez v. 
Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141-142, 132 S.Ct. 641, 181 L.Ed.2d 619 (2012).  And 
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federal courts have held that the Federal Power Act does not deprive state tribunals 
of the power to adjudicate claims that the act preempts state law.  Northeastern 
Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. Wabash Valley Power Assn., Inc., 707 F.3d 883, 
893, 895-896 (7th Cir.2013); Metro. Edison Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm., 
767 F.3d 335, 360, 364 (3d Cir.2014).  Rather, “ ‘when a state proceeding presents 
a federal issue, even a pre-emption issue, the proper course is to seek resolution of 
that issue by the state court.’ ”  Id. at 364, quoting Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 
486 U.S. 140, 149-150, 108 S.Ct. 1684, 100 L.Ed.2d 127 (1988). 
{¶ 20} As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
explained in Metro. Edison Co., although the Federal Power Act “grants FERC 
exclusive jurisdiction over certain matters,” id. at 360, including the authority to 
regulate wholesale sales of electricity in the interstate market, id. at 341, Congress 
has not “divested state utility agencies or state courts of jurisdiction to hear cases 
requiring an adjudication” regarding the scope of FERC’s regulatory authority, id. 
at 360.  The court stated, “The [Federal Power Act] plainly leaves a role for states 
in electricity regulation.”  Id.  Therefore, unlike the federal statutes that were at 
issue in Internatl. Longshoremen’s Assn., the Federal Power Act does not 
completely preempt state law.  See Metro Edison Co. at 363-364. 
{¶ 21} We also recognize that Congress granted federal courts “exclusive 
jurisdiction” over violations of the Federal Power Act and actions brought to 
enforce it.  16 U.S.C. 825p.  That language, however, does not provide federal 
courts with “broad jurisdiction over” actions brought under state law “that simply 
mention a duty established by the federal law.”  Pressl v. Appalachian Power Co., 
842 F.3d 299, 306 (4th Cir.2016).  The federal courts’ exclusive jurisdiction 
established by statutes such as 16 U.S.C. 825p attaches either “when federal law 
creates the cause of action asserted” or when a state-law proceeding “ ‘necessarily 
[involves] a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal 
forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance’ of 
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federal and state power.”  Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Manning, 
___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 1562, 1570, 194 L.Ed.2d 671 (2016) (construing the 
Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.), quoting Grable & Sons Metal 
Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng. & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314, 125 S.Ct. 2363, 162 L.Ed.2d 
257 (2005); see also id. at 1568 and at fn. 3 (explaining that the jurisdictional 
provisions of the Securities Exchange Act and the Federal Power Act share “[m]uch 
the same wording”). 
{¶ 22} Federal jurisdiction does not attach solely because a proceeding in a 
state tribunal may involve a defense grounded in federal law, such as preemption.  
Pressl at 302, 306.  Rather, claims premised on state law must be brought in federal 
court “only if their ‘very success depends on giving effect to a federal 
requirement.’ ”  Id. at 306, quoting Merrill Lynch at 1570. 
{¶ 23} Here, Ohio Power’s application for an extension of the Power 
Purchase Agreement Rider does not depend on federal law—it does not allege a 
violation of the Federal Power Act and has not been brought to enforce a duty or 
liability created by that act.  And although the OCC asserts federal preemption as a 
defense to the rider, the Federal Power Act does not divest the PUCO of subject-
matter jurisdiction.  (And, tellingly, the OCC’s argument that the PUCO lacked 
jurisdiction to approve the Power Purchase Agreement Rider is contradicted by the 
OCC’s insistence that federal law does not preempt this court’s power and 
jurisdiction to review that rider.) 
{¶ 24} The PUCO had subject-matter jurisdiction to approve the Power 
Purchase Agreement Rider, and pursuant to R.C. 4903.10, the OCC’s failure to 
raise a federal-preemption challenge in an application for rehearing deprives this 
court of jurisdiction to consider this issue in the first instance.  We therefore dismiss 
the OCC’s first proposition of law. 
 
 
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The Smart City Rider 
{¶ 25} The PUCO approved the new Smart City Rider to allow the recovery 
of costs associated with technology-demonstration projects to encourage the 
construction of electric-vehicle charging stations and the development of 
microgrids.  The PUCO found that R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(h) authorizes the rider, 
because the statute permits an electric-security plan to include incentive-
ratemaking provisions and distribution-infrastructure and modernization-incentive 
provisions. 
{¶ 26} R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(h) provides that an electric-security plan may 
include “[p]rovisions regarding the utility’s distribution service, including, without 
limitation and notwithstanding any provision of Title XLIX of the Revised Code to 
the contrary, provisions regarding * * * incentive ratemaking, and provisions 
regarding distribution infrastructure and modernization incentives for the electric 
distribution utility.” 
{¶ 27} The OCC contends that the Smart City Rider does not relate to 
distribution service under R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(h).  According to the OCC, this 
statute does not authorize a rider designed to foster a market for electric vehicles, 
to obtain data regarding the siting and charges for electric-charging stations, or to 
collect information for the future deployment of microgrids.  The OCC maintains 
that “1.4 million customers should not be asked to subsidize such activity when the 
vast majority of them will not even be participating [in] or benefitting from these 
non-distribution service investments.” 
{¶ 28} However, although the OCC argues that the Smart City Rider is not 
authorized by R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(h), the OCC “bears the burden of demonstrating 
that” the PUCO’s decision “is against the manifest weight of the evidence or is 
clearly unsupported by the record.”  In re Application of Ohio Power Co., 155 Ohio 
St.3d 326, 2018-Ohio-4698, 121 N.E.3d 320, ¶ 9.  Whether a rider is a provision 
January Term, 2020 
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regarding power distribution is a factual question, and the OCC fails to show, 
through citation to record evidence, that either the electric-charging-station 
program or the microgrid program is not, in fact, related to Ohio Power’s 
distribution service, infrastructure, or modernization. 
{¶ 29} We “ ‘are not obligated to search the record or formulate legal 
arguments on behalf of the parties.’ ”  Risner v. Ohio Dept. of Natural Resources, 
Ohio Div. of Wildlife, 144 Ohio St.3d 278, 2015-Ohio-3731, 42 N.E.3d 718, ¶ 28, 
quoting State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio-4034, 19 N.E.3d 900, 
¶ 19.  And without any reference to record evidence showing how these 
demonstration projects function and that they have no relation to distribution 
service, infrastructure, or modernization, we cannot say that the PUCO acted 
unreasonably or unlawfully in approving the rider.  See In re Application of Duke 
Energy Ohio, Inc., 131 Ohio St.3d 487, 2012-Ohio-1509, 967 N.E.2d 201, ¶ 18 
(rejecting an appellant’s argument because the appellant had failed “to support 
essential factual assertions with citations to the record”). 
{¶ 30} The OCC, quoting R.C. 4928.141(A), maintains that the rider is not 
“ ‘necessary to maintain essential electric service’ ” for customers, as that statute 
requires.  However, the OCC cites no case authority holding that R.C. 4928.141(A) 
limits the provisions in an electric-security plan to those that are necessary to 
maintain essential electric service, and “[u]nsupported legal conclusions do not 
demonstrate error,” In re Comm. Rev. of Capacity Charges of Ohio Power Co., 147 
Ohio St.3d 59, 2016-Ohio-1607, 60 N.E.3d 1221, ¶ 28.  Further, R.C. 
4928.143(B)(2)(h) permits an electric-security plan to include certain provisions 
regarding a utility’s distribution service even if other statutes within R.C. Title 49 
would otherwise prohibit them.  See In re Application of Ohio Power Co., 155 Ohio 
St.3d 326, 2018-Ohio-4698, 121 N.E.3d 320, at ¶ 19. 
{¶ 31} The OCC also argues that the demonstration projects constitute an 
impermissible customer-funded subsidy that violates R.C. 4928.02, which 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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prescribes Ohio’s electric-energy policies.  As explained above, if the projects are 
permitted by R.C. 4928.143(B)(2)(h), they may be included even if they might 
otherwise violate another provision in R.C. Title 49.  Moreover, we held in In re 
Application of Ohio Power Co. that R.C. 4928.02 neither “impose[s] strict 
conditions” on the PUCO nor “require[s] anything.”  155 Ohio St.3d 326, 2018-
Ohio-4698, 121 N.E.3d 320, at ¶ 49.  Rather, the policy provisions are guidelines 
for the PUCO to weigh when it considers a utility proposal.  Id.  As in that case, 
here the PUCO “weighed these policy considerations in reviewing the stipulation” 
and “[t]hat alone is grounds to reject [the OCC’s] argument.”  Id. 
{¶ 32} The OCC’s second proposition of law is not well taken. 
Renewable Generation Rider 
{¶ 33} The PUCO authorized Ohio Power to implement the Renewable 
Generation Rider on a placeholder basis.  The OCC challenges this rider, urging 
that Ohio Power did not make a showing of “need” to justify it in the proceeding 
below.  The PUCO and Ohio Power contend that including the rider is not reversible 
error, because no one is prejudiced by a rider that does not collect revenue.  The 
OCC responds that “consumers are harmed and prejudiced by expending the time 
and resources necessary to litigate pending proceedings before the PUCO regarding 
a rider * * * that was unlawfully instituted in the first place.” 
{¶ 34} “It is well settled that this court will not reverse an order” of the 
PUCO “unless the party seeking reversal shows that it has been harmed or 
prejudiced by the order.”  In re Application of Ohio Power Co., 155 Ohio St.3d 
320, 2018-Ohio-4697, 121 N.E.3d 315, at ¶ 9.  And we have previously held that a 
different placeholder rider included in Ohio Power’s electric-security plan that 
similarly recovered no revenue from consumers did not harm or prejudice 
ratepayers.  Id. at ¶ 13.  The costs and alleged inefficiencies associated with the 
OCC’s strategy to litigate an issue prematurely are not harm or prejudice caused by 
January Term, 2020 
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or resulting from the order on appeal itself, and the OCC cites no authority to the 
contrary. 
{¶ 35} The OCC’s third proposition of law is not well taken. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 36} We lack jurisdiction to review the merits of the OCC’s challenge to 
the Power Purchase Agreement Rider, because the challenge was not presented in 
an application for rehearing.  Further, the OCC has failed to cite evidence in the 
record supporting its view that the Smart City Rider does not relate to distribution 
service, infrastructure, or modernization.  Finally, consumers have not been harmed 
or prejudiced by the PUCO’s decision to implement the Renewable Generation 
Rider on a placeholder basis. 
{¶ 37} Because the OCC has not satisfied its burden to demonstrate 
reversible error on the record, we affirm the order of the PUCO. 
Order affirmed. 
FRENCH, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., concurs in judgment only. 
__________________ 
 
Bruce J. Weston, Consumers’ Counsel, and Maureen R. Willis, William J. 
Michael, and Terry L. Etter, Assistant Consumers’ Counsel, for appellant. 
 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, and John H. Jones, Werner L. Margard III, 
and Robert A. Eubanks, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee. 
 
Steven T. Nourse and Christen M. Blend; and Porter, Wright, Morris & 
Arthur, L.L.P., Kathleen M. Trafford, L. Bradfield Hughes, and Eric B. Gallon, for 
intervening appellee. 
________________________