Title: State v. David J. Roberson

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2006 WI 80 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP2802-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
David J. Roberson, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2005 WI App 195 
Reported at: 287 Wis. 2d 403, 704 N.W.2d 302 
(Ct. App. 2005–Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 30, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 21, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Elsa C. Lamelas 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
and oral argument by Richard D. Martin, assistant state public 
defender, Milwaukee. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Daniel J. O’Brien, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2006 WI 80
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP2802-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2002CF6763) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
David J. Roberson, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 30, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   David J. Roberson 
("Roberson") seeks review of a published decision by the court 
of appeals affirming both his judgment of conviction for 
delivery of a controlled substance (cocaine), in violation of 
Wis. Stat. §§ 961.16(2)(b)(1), 961.41(1)(cm)(1) and 939.05, and 
a decision denying his postconviction motion by the Honorable 
Elsa C. Lamelas, Milwaukee County.  State v. Roberson, 2005 WI 
App 195, 287 Wis. 2d 403, 704 N.W.2d 302.  Roberson contends 
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a 
motion to suppress two out-of-court identifications of Roberson 
No. 2003AP2802-CR 
 
2 
 
 
by police officers when the identifications immediately followed 
a warrantless entry into Roberson's home, which Roberson asserts 
was illegal.  Roberson asks this court to reverse the court of 
appeals and remand the matter for an evidentiary hearing, in 
accordance with State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 
(Ct. App. 1979), to address whether his trial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance.   
¶2 
The State asserts that Roberson failed to allege 
sufficient facts that would have satisfied Roberson's burden of 
making a specific offer of proof that the suppression motion 
would have succeeded, and therefore failed to establish that his 
counsel provided ineffective assistance.  According to the 
State, the record conclusively shows that a suppression motion 
would have failed because the police had probable cause to 
arrest Roberson before they entered his home and because the 
identifications made of him thereafter outside the home were 
admissible.  In the alternative, the State contends that the 
warrantless entry was lawful because Roberson's mother consented 
to the entry, and because there were exigent circumstances to 
justify a warrantless entry.  Finally, the State argues that 
Roberson could not prove prejudice, which is necessary to prove 
ineffective 
assistance 
of 
counsel, 
because 
the 
record 
conclusively shows that the subsequent in-court identifications 
were admissible. 
¶3 
We conclude that the in-court identifications of 
Roberson were properly admitted into evidence, regardless of 
No. 2003AP2802-CR 
 
3 
 
 
whether the warrantless entry was illegal and regardless of 
whether the out-of-court identifications were inadmissible.  We 
therefore conclude that Roberson's counsel's failure to move to 
suppress the out-of-court identifications did not prejudice his 
defense.  We decline to address Roberson's challenge to the 
warrantless entry and out-of-court identifications immediately 
following the warrantless entry because exclusion of the out-of-
court identifications would not alter the outcome of our 
analysis.1  We therefore affirm the court of appeals. 
I 
¶4 
The following facts are relevant to the in-court 
identification.  At the time of trial, Detective Mark Wagner was 
a police officer with the City of Milwaukee for over ten years 
and was assigned to the Vice Control Division, Narcotics Unit, 
Rapid Enforcement Drug Offense (REDO) team.  Wagner testified 
that at approximately noon on December 1, 2002, he was 
conducting a follow-up narcotics investigation in front of a 
liquor store on the northwest corner of 19th Street and State 
Street in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.  While seated alone in a vehicle 
approximately one block from the liquor store, Wagner observed 
through his binoculars individuals entering and exiting the 
liquor store.  He watched as two males left the side of a gray 
vehicle, approached other individuals entering and exiting the 
liquor store, and engaged in hand-to-hand transactions of some 
                                                 
1 See State v. Manuel, 2005 WI 75, ¶25 n.4, 281 Wis. 2d 554, 
697 N.W.2d 811 (citing Gross v. Hoffman, 227 Wis. 296, 300, 277 
N.W. 663 (1938)) (only dispositive issues need be addressed).   
No. 2003AP2802-CR 
 
4 
 
 
sort with those individuals.  Wagner suspected the two men were 
selling drugs, and continued to observe their activities for 
approximately 20 minutes.   
¶5 
Wagner contacted Officer Michael Terrell, who was 
working undercover as part of the same REDO team, and informed 
him that there were two males that were possibly dealing 
narcotics and that he would like Terrell to attempt to purchase 
narcotics from them.  He informed Terrell that the two 
individuals were black males and were wearing dark jeans and 
black jackets with gray stripes down the sleeves, and that one 
subject had longer wavy black hair with a headband around his 
ears, while the other one's hair was braided.  Wagner directed 
Terrell to attempt to buy drugs from the two men.   
¶6 
After Wagner radioed Terrell, the two men entered the 
gray vehicle, which was parked on State Street facing westbound.  
The vehicle backed onto 19th Street and Wagner lost sight of the 
vehicle.  When Terrell arrived on the scene, the two men had 
already left.  According to Terrell, he approached a male, later 
identified as Lindsey Edwards, and indicated that he was looking 
to purchase cocaine.2  Edwards walked Terrell to a gray vehicle.  
The passenger side door of the gray vehicle opened as Terrell 
approached the vehicle.  He saw a black male with wavy black 
hair and wearing a black jacket, matching the description that 
Wagner had given him, sitting on the passenger side of the 
vehicle.  Edwards initiated contact with the man in the 
                                                 
2 Roberson and Edwards were tried together as co-defendants.   
No. 2003AP2802-CR 
 
5 
 
 
passenger seat of the vehicle, and then walked away.  Terrell 
told the man in the passenger seat he had $25, and the man 
agreed to sell him three corner cuts of cocaine.  Terrell gave 
him the $253 and Terrell was given the cocaine.  According to 
Terrell's testimony, the exchange took approximately 20 seconds.   
¶7 
Upon leaving the scene of the buy, Terrell radioed 
Wagner, informing him that he bought cocaine from a man in the 
passenger side of a gray vehicle, that the man seated in the 
passenger seat had black wavy hair and was wearing a black and 
gray jacket, and that the car was parked between 18th and 19th 
Streets in a parking lot.  This radio communication occurred 
approximately five minutes after Wagner had lost sight of the 
vehicle.  Wagner notified the other officers in the area that 
Terrell had purchased narcotics from the suspects, who were in a 
gray, two-door vehicle between 18th and 19th Streets.   
¶8 
Shortly thereafter, 
the vehicle again 
came 
into 
Wagner's sight and he observed it make a series of turns, 
eventually parking in front of a residence approximately two 
blocks from where Wagner was parked.  Wagner watched two males 
exit the vehicle and run onto the porch of the house located at 
1011 North 21st Street.  Wagner testified that he observed the 
men look around as they went up the porch, as if they had 
spotted the police.  However, he testified that he did not know 
if they had seen the police.  Wagner directed several officers 
                                                 
3 The Milwaukee Police Department had recorded the serial 
numbers of the money used to purchase the cocaine. 
No. 2003AP2802-CR 
 
6 
 
 
involved in the investigation to establish a perimeter around 
the house.  Wagner watched the front of the house and Terrell 
watched the back.  Officers Mitchell Ward and Bodo Gajevic 
approached the front door and knocked on it.  Roberson's mother, 
Cecilia Roberson, who also resided at the home, answered the 
door.   
¶9 
The officers entered Ms. Roberson's home and brought 
five men out of the house and onto the porch for Wagner to 
attempt to make an identification.  It is unclear whether Ms. 
Roberson granted the police permission to enter her home.  
Wagner recognized one of the individuals as the driver of the 
car, but did not see the man who had been in the passenger seat 
among the five men on the porch.  Terrell was also asked to view 
the five individuals brought outside the home to make an 
identification.  Terrell did not recognize any of the several 
individuals originally brought to the porch.   
¶10 According to Ward, Ms. Roberson then consented to a 
search of her house for more subjects.  Ms. Roberson testified 
that she did not give the police permission to enter her home,4 
and that the officers entered her home when she turned her back 
to them to see if there was anyone else in the house.   
                                                 
4 According to Cecilia Roberson's testimony, she did not 
give the police permission to enter her home, and she felt 
harassed and threatened by the police: "And they was sitting 
here actually bullying us around.  And I thought that I could 
call the police on the police.  So I dialed 911 on them."  We do 
not address whether the officers' entry was illegal because it 
is immaterial to our analysis of the in-court identifications. 
No. 2003AP2802-CR 
 
7 
 
 
¶11 Several police officers reentered the home, found an 
individual, later identified as Roberson, in an upstairs bedroom 
and brought him onto the porch.  On the porch, Detective Wagner 
positively identified Roberson as the man in the gray vehicle 
who he suspected of selling drugs outside the liquor store.  
Terrell also identified Roberson as the person from whom he had 
purchased 
the 
three 
corner 
cuts 
of 
cocaine. 
 
These 
identifications took place approximately 10 to 15 minutes after 
Terrell had purchased the cocaine.   
¶12 Police officers searched the home but did not find any 
cocaine or the recorded bills used by Terrell for his drug 
purchase.  The police found numerous jackets that were similar 
to the jacket worn by the man observed by Wagner outside the 
liquor store and by the man from whom Terrell purchased the 
cocaine.  However, the police did not take any of these jackets 
into evidence.  In addition, the police did not search the gray 
vehicle parked outside the residence from where Roberson was 
detained.   
¶13 Roberson was arrested5 and charged with delivery of a 
controlled 
substance 
(cocaine), 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. Stat. §§ 961.16(2)(b)(1), 961.41(1)(cm)(1) and 939.05.6   
                                                 
5 The parties dispute whether Roberson was arrested inside 
his home or outside of his home after the officers identified 
him as the suspect.  We do not address this issue because it is 
immaterial to our analysis of the in-court identifications. 
6 Edwards was also charged with the same offense.   
No. 2003AP2802-CR 
 
8 
 
 
¶14 A jury trial was held on February 10-13, 2003.  The 
State presented no physical evidence linking Roberson to the 
crime and relied entirely on the identifications of Roberson by 
Wagner and Terrell.  Wagner identified Roberson as one of the 
two individuals he observed for approximately 20 minutes 
standing by the gray vehicle outside the liquor store, and as 
the person who entered the passenger side of the gray vehicle.7  
Wagner testified that he is trained to carefully watch someone 
who is under surveillance, both because of the danger involved 
and so that he will be able to identify the suspect at a later 
time.   
Q: And do you see either one of those – the two 
individuals you say who you noticed by the gray car 
who were approaching these people and appearing to 
shake their hands or provide something to them, do you 
see either one of those two people here in court right 
now? 
A: Yes, I do. 
Q: Could you please tell the jury, point out where 
that person is seated and what color clothing they are 
wearing. 
A: Sure.  He's seated at the defense table.  He's 
wearing an orange, green, dark green sweater; and he 
has his hair braided. 
Attorney Licata: May the record reflect that the 
witness has just identified Defendant David Roberson. 
The court: It shall. 
. . .  
                                                 
7 Wagner also testified that the other gentleman who had 
been with Roberson was not in the courtroom.   
No. 2003AP2802-CR 
 
9 
 
 
Q: Now there's another gentleman seated at the table 
with Mr. Roberson, the gentleman in the white sweater 
here next to his attorney, Ms. Stuller.  Was that 
person the other person who was with Roberson on the 
street corner by the gray car? 
A: No, it was not. 
. . .  
Q: . . . I will refer to Mr. Roberson and Mr. Wright 
are the two people on the street corner who you see 
going up and shaking people's hands or making these 
transactions, correct? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And about how long do you see them do this kind of 
behavior for? 
A: Approximately 20 minutes. 
Q: So if you got there about 12:20 and it was about 5 
minutes before you saw this behavior begin, is that 
what you testified to? 
A: Yes 
Q: And it goes on for about 20 minutes.  We're now at 
about 12:45, in there? 
A: Correct, somewhere in that area. 
Q: And at this point, what, if anything, did you do? 
A: I contacted Officer Michael Terrell, who already 
had known that I was going to go up in the area of 
19th and State.  And I notified him that there was two 
subjects that were possibly dealing narcotics and that 
I would like them to try to purchase narcotics from 
them. 
Q: Did you provide Officer Terrell a description of 
these two people, Mr. Roberson and Mr. Wright? 
A: Yes, I did. 
Q: Do you recall what they were wearing and what 
description you provided?  And if you need to refer to 
No. 2003AP2802-CR 
 
10 
 
 
your report at any point, just tell the judge you'd 
like to do that. 
A: Okay.  Both the subjects were wearing black 
jackets, pretty similar jackets, with gray stripes 
down both sleeves.  One subject had wavy hair.  Mr. 
Roberson had wavy, longer wavy black hair.  Mr. Wright 
had braided hair with some sort of design pattern it 
seemed like was in it.  Both were wearing dark blue 
jeans, and Mr. Roberson had some type of blue or black 
ear——it looked like a headband but that went around 
the ears. 
Q: Did you have any trouble——there was nothing 
concealing his face, was there? 
A: No. 
Q: And you were able to look at him for about 20 
minutes before you called Officer Terrell. 
A: Yes. 
Q: And are you trained when you're making this 
surveillance to be carefully watching someone in terms 
of being able to identify them? 
A: Yes, we are. 
. . .  
Q: And in this case that surveillance was, the 20 
minutes, was that continuous observation? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Mr. Roberson didn't leave your sight for 10 minutes 
and come back; he was out there the whole time? 
A: Yes, he was standing on the corner or walking in 
front of the store the whole time. 
 
¶15 During trial, Terrell similarly identified Roberson as 
the person in the passenger seat in the gray car from whom he 
purchased cocaine.   
No. 2003AP2802-CR 
 
11 
 
 
Q: Do you see either of those two people who were in 
that gray car as you approached with Mr. Edwards do 
you see either of those two people in this courtroom 
right now? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: Could you please tell the jury where that person is 
seated and what they're wearing now. 
A: He's sitting next to the gentleman with the tie, 
and he has on a green sweater with orange stripes.   
Mr. Licata: May the record reflect the witness just 
identified Defendant Roberson? 
The court: It will.  
¶16 Terrell also testified about his interaction with 
Roberson: 
Q: Now when you got to the gray car, what happened? 
A: As we got to, as we approached the car, the 
passenger door opened. 
Q: How many people were in that car that you saw? 
A: There were two people in the car. 
Q: Where were they sitting in the gray car? 
A: One was in the driver's seat, and one was in the 
passenger's seat. 
. . . 
Q: And at that point you see Mr. Roberson for the 
first time? 
A: Yes sir. 
Q: And did Mr. Roberson match the description that you 
had been given of one of the two people who, by 
Officer Wagner the people he had seen? 
A: Yes, sir. 
No. 2003AP2802-CR 
 
12 
 
 
Q: And you testified earlier the description had been 
wavy hair and the black jacket? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: And that's how Mr. Roberson looked. 
A: Yes, sir. 
. . .  
Q: When you saw Mr. Roberson and his physical 
description, what did you think? 
A: It, it matched the description. 
. . .  
Q: Do you speak to Roberson at this point, or does 
Roberson speak to you; what happens? 
A: I speak to him. 
Q: What do you say to Mr. Roberson? 
A: I told him I had $25. 
Q: And what did he say to you if anything? 
A: He said that was fine.  I don't remember his exact 
words, but he agreed that 25 was good for three. 
. . .  
Q: Now when you told Roberson, I have $25, and he 
said, That's fine, what happened then? 
A: I gave him the money. 
Q: And it was Roberson who took the money. 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: Not the guy in the driver's seat. 
A: No. 
Q: Did you get a look at the guy in the driver's seat 
at this point or not? 
No. 2003AP2802-CR 
 
13 
 
 
A: From an angle I could see that he was a black, a 
black male; and I could see his complexion and that he 
had on a black jacket, jeans.  But that's, that's 
about it.  I really couldn't – I wouldn't be able to 
identify him. 
Q: Do you recall if his complexion was light or dark? 
A: Yeah, it was a dark complexion. 
Q: And would you describe Mr. Roberson's complexion as 
light or dark? 
A: I would say he's light to medium complexion. 
¶17 Roberson's theory of defense was that the officers had 
misidentified him as the suspect.  He provided alibi witnesses 
that testified that he was inside his home when the drug 
transaction occurred.  Upon his conviction, Roberson stated that 
he had been "found guilty of something I didn't do."   
¶18 A unanimous jury convicted Roberson of one count of 
delivery of cocaine.8  Roberson was sentenced to imprisonment for 
60 months, including initial confinement for 30 months and 
extended supervision for 30 months. 
¶19 Roberson filed a postconviction motion, alleging that 
he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial 
counsel failed to challenge the warrantless entry into his home 
and the subsequent out-of-court identifications of Roberson by 
Wagner and Terrell.9  In his postconviction motion, Roberson 
                                                 
8 The jury was unable to reach a verdict in Edwards' case.  
Judge Lamelas granted the State's motion to dismiss.    
9 On re-direct, Wagner testified about his out-of-court 
identification.   
Q: The identification you made of Mr. Roberson when he 
was brought out of the house, came out of the house at 
No. 2003AP2802-CR 
 
14 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
1011 North 21st Street, that identification was made, 
if I'm adding up here the time schedule correctly, 
within minutes of you seeing Mr. Roberson and Wright 
run into that house. 
A: Yes. 
Q: And that all occurred shortly after you had 
finished the surveillance of Mr. Roberson and Wright 
as they were doing what they were doing in front of 
that liquor store that afternoon –  
A: Correct. 
Q: -- right?  So you were not simply identifying Mr. 
Roberson here today a couple of months later; you 
identified him right there minutes after the incident. 
A: Yes. 
Q: And that identification was made after you watched 
him 
for 
approximately 
25 
minutes 
through 
the 
binoculars very carefully, wasn't it? 
A: Yes. 
 
Officer Terrell similarly testified about his out-of-court 
identification of Roberson moments after the drug buy: 
Q: And when you went around and looked at the front, 
at people on the front porch, about how many people 
were out there that you were to view if you knew? 
A: It was several.  I don't know the exact number, but 
it was several individuals. 
Q: And did you recognize anybody who was out there? 
A: Originally, no. 
Q: The – Mr. Roberson, the person who sold you the 
drugs, you didn't see him out on that porch when you 
first went around? 
A: No, sir. 
No. 2003AP2802-CR 
 
15 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Q: And Mr. Edwards wasn't there, was he? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: Did there come a point where somebody else was 
brought or came out of that house who you did 
recognize? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: Who was that? 
A: It was the defendant, Mr. Roberson. 
Q: The gentleman who you have already identified here 
in the court -- 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: -- who sold you the drugs. 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: And about how long after you first went out there, 
looked at the people and said, not one of them, about 
how long was it before Mr. Roberson came out of that 
house? 
A: It was just a couple of minutes. 
Q: When you saw him, did you immediately recognize 
him? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: Was there any doubt in your mind then or today that 
he was the person who sold you the drugs as you've 
testified to? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: And this identification you made of him occurred 
about how many minutes after the actual drug buy was 
made between you and him? 
A: I would say maybe 10 to 15 minutes. 
No. 2003AP2802-CR 
 
16 
 
 
asserted that the out-of-court identifications were tainted by 
the illegal arrest.   
¶20 The circuit court denied Roberson's post-conviction 
motion without an evidentiary hearing.  The circuit court 
concluded that there was no need for an evidentiary hearing 
because it had already heard testimony from Ms. Roberson and the 
police officers and that an evidentiary hearing would provide no 
new evidence.  The circuit court judge reasoned that she would 
have found Ms. Roberson less credible given the inconsistencies 
between her testimony and Ward's testimony, as well as Ms. 
Roberson's "evident partiality towards her son."  The circuit 
court concluded that there was no reasonable probability that 
the failure of Roberson's counsel to file a suppression motion 
would have altered the result of the proceedings.   
¶21 The court of appeals initially reversed the circuit 
court, finding that the trial court erred by failing to hold a 
hearing in accordance with Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797.  State v. 
Roberson, No. 2003AP2802-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
Sept. 30, 2004).  However, the State filed a motion to 
                                                                                                                                                             
Q: Now, do you recall if he – did he still have the 
wavy hair? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: Did you recall if he was wearing the same black 
jacket that he had on when he sold you the drugs? 
A: No, sir, he did not have on a black jacket. 
 
No. 2003AP2802-CR 
 
17 
 
 
reconsider and the court of appeals withdrew its initial opinion 
and then affirmed the circuit court, finding that even if 
Roberson's arrest was illegal, the identifications of Roberson 
were admissible.  The court of appeals concluded that the police 
had probable cause to arrest Roberson, independent of the 
illegal 
entry. 
 
Roberson, 
287 
Wis. 2d 403, 
¶¶21-23.  
Accordingly, the court found that Roberson's counsel's alleged 
ineffectiveness did not prejudice the outcome of the case.  Id., 
¶24.   
¶22 Roberson petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted.   
II 
¶23 The present case requires us to determine whether 
Roberson's counsel was ineffective.   Under both the United 
States and Wisconsin Constitutions, criminal defendants are 
guaranteed the right to counsel.  U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; 
Wis. Const. art. I, § 7.  This right includes the right to 
effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 
(1970)); State v. Trawitzki, 2001 WI 77, ¶39, 244 Wis. 2d 523, 
628 N.W.2d 801.  The standard for determining whether counsel's 
assistance is effective under the Wisconsin Constitution is 
identical to that under the federal constitution. State v. 
Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶18 n.7, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305 
(citing State v. Sanchez, 201 Wis. 2d 219, 235-36, 548 N.W.2d 69 
(1996)).   
No. 2003AP2802-CR 
 
18 
 
 
¶24 To 
establish 
the 
denial 
of 
a 
defendant's 
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel at 
trial, the defendant bears the burden of proving that counsel's 
performance was deficient and that such performance prejudiced 
the defense. 
 Strickland, 
466 U.S. 
at 687; 
Thiel, 264 
Wis. 2d 571, ¶¶18-20.  In reviewing a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, "we grant deference only to the circuit 
court's findings of historical fact. We review de novo the legal 
questions of whether deficient performance has been established 
and whether it led to prejudice rising to a level undermining 
the reliability of the proceeding."  Thiel, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 
¶24.      
¶25 Whether an in-court identification has been tainted by 
prior illegal activity is a question of constitutional fact, 
which is a mixed question of fact and law and requires a two-
part inquiry.  See State v. McMorris, 213 Wis. 2d 156, 164-66, 
570 
N.W.2d 384 
(1997) 
(citing 
State 
v. 
Anderson, 
165 
Wis. 2d 441, 447-48, 477 N.W.2d 277 (1991)).  We first examine 
the circuit court's historical or evidentiary findings of fact, 
which we will not reverse unless clearly erroneous.  Id. at 165.  
We 
then 
examine 
whether 
the 
facts 
satisfy 
the 
relevant 
constitutional standard, which is reviewed independently from 
the circuit court's and court of appeals' analyses.  Id.   
¶26 Roberson's claims regarding the warrantless entry and 
the identification evidence must also be considered within his 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  See State v. 
No. 2003AP2802-CR 
 
19 
 
 
Anderson, 2006 WI 77, ¶48, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___; 
State v. Cleveland, 118 Wis. 2d 615, 618 n.1, 348 N.W.2d 512 
(1984).     
III 
¶27 Roberson contends that his counsel was ineffective for 
failing to move to suppress the out-of-court identifications as 
the fruit of an illegal, warrantless entry.  Roberson also 
asserts that the circuit court erred in denying him a hearing to 
prove his counsel was ineffective, as required under Machner, 92 
Wis. 2d 797. 
¶28 Wisconsin applies the two-part test described in 
Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, for evaluating claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  State v. Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d 121, 126, 
449 N.W.2d 845 (1990). To prevail on an ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel claim, the defendant must prove that his or her 
counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficiency 
prejudiced his or her defense. Id. at 127.  In this analysis, 
courts may decide ineffective assistance claims based on 
prejudice without considering whether the counsel's performance 
was deficient.  Id. at 128 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
697).   
¶29 To establish prejudice, the defendant must show there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error(s), 
the result of the trial would have been different.  A reasonable 
probability is one sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.  Thiel, 264 Wis. 2d 571, ¶20; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
No. 2003AP2802-CR 
 
20 
 
 
694.  "The focus of this inquiry is not on the outcome of the 
trial, but on the reliability of the proceedings."  Thiel, 264 
Wis. 2d 571, ¶20 (citation omitted).  See also State v. Love, 
2005 WI 116, ¶30, 284 Wis. 2d 111, 700 N.W.2d 62. 
¶30 In 
the 
present 
case, 
Roberson 
claims 
that 
the 
warrantless entry was illegal, and his ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim is rooted in his counsel's failure to move to 
suppress the out-of-court identifications that arose out of the 
warrantless entry.10  Yet, this case actually involves two 
separate identifications: the officers' out-of-court and in-
court identifications.11  For there to exist a reasonable 
                                                 
10 We note that the State offered no physical evidence 
linking Roberson to the crime.  The State's case against 
Roberson was premised entirely upon the identifications by 
Wagner and Terrell.   
11 We note that Roberson only challenged the warrantless 
entry and the out-of-court identifications and did not raise the 
issue of the in-court identifications in his petition or briefs 
to this court.  In its response brief, the State asserted that 
the in-court identification was admissible.  The court of 
appeals did not address the in-court identification.  At oral 
argument, Roberson asserted that the State would have the 
opportunity to show that there existed an independent source for 
the 
in-court 
identification 
at 
the 
postconviction 
motion 
hearing.  The State asserted that the record sufficiently 
demonstrated that the State met this burden. 
No. 2003AP2802-CR 
 
21 
 
 
probability of a different outcome in this case, we would need 
to determine that the warrantless entry was illegal, and that 
both 
the 
out-of-court 
and 
in-court 
identifications 
were 
improperly admitted into evidence at trial.  
¶31 Assuming that the warrantless entry was illegal12 and 
the out-of-court identifications were inadmissible,13 we conclude 
                                                                                                                                                             
This court generally does not address issues that are 
inadequately briefed, Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage Dist. v. 
City of Milwaukee, 2005 WI 8, ¶87 n.30, 277 Wis. 2d 635, 691 
N.W.2d 658.  However, as we have previously recognized, under 
certain circumstances "additional briefs would simply delay the 
court's determination and increase legal fees without benefiting 
the 
decision-making 
process. 
We 
acknowledge 
the 
courts' 
abilities to identify correctly those matters calling for 
additional briefing and those within the authority of the court 
to correct without further assistance from the parties."  Bartus 
v. DHSS, 176 Wis. 2d 1063, 1072-1073, 501 N.W.2d 419 (1993). 
12 A nonconsensual, warrantless search of one's home is 
presumed to be illegal under the Fourth Amendment.  Payton v. 
New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).  Police may lawfully enter a home 
without a warrant, however, if they have probable cause and 
there exist exigent circumstances.  State v. Richter, 2000 WI 
58, ¶29, 235 Wis. 2d 524, 612 N.W.2d 29.  This State has 
recognized four categories of exigent circumstances:  
1) hot pursuit of a suspect,  
2) a threat to the safety of a suspect or others, 
3) a risk that evidence will be destroyed, and  
4) a likelihood that the suspect will flee.  
Id. (citation omitted). 
No. 2003AP2802-CR 
 
22 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
In addition, the Fourth Amendment is not violated by a 
warrantless search for which consent is freely and voluntarily 
given.  State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 196, 577 N.W.2d 794 
(1998).  Although the parties dispute whether Ms. Roberson gave 
consent to enter her home (she called the 911 police dispatcher 
to complain about the behavior of the officers at her home), the 
trial court determined that Ms. Roberson was less credible than 
the officers and, therefore, that she did, in fact, give 
consent.   
Because we assume for purposes of this analysis that the 
warrantless entry was illegal, we decline to decide whether the 
police had probable cause, nor whether any of the four 
recognized categories of exigent circumstances existed here, and 
we make no judgment as to whether the circuit court's factual 
finding regarding consent is supported by the record. 
13 Roberson contends that the out-of-court identification 
should be suppressed because it was the fruit of an illegal, 
warrantless entry.   
Because the admissibility of the in-court identification is 
determinative in this case, we assume for purposes of this 
analysis that the out-of-court identification was inadmissible, 
and 
therefore 
do 
not 
review 
whether 
the 
out-of-court 
identification was inadmissible as the fruit of an illegal 
warrantless entry. 
In addition, we recognize that in State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 
126, 
285 
Wis. 2d 143, 
699 
N.W.2d 582, 
we 
concluded 
that 
"evidence obtained from an out-of-court showup is inherently 
suggestive and will not be admissible unless, based on the 
totality of the circumstances, the procedure was necessary."  
Id., ¶33.  We further explained that a showup would not be 
deemed necessary "unless the police lacked probable cause to 
make an arrest or, as a result of other exigent circumstances, 
could not have conducted a lineup or photo array."  Id.  Because 
the 
admissibility 
of 
the 
in-court 
identification 
is 
determinative, and because this issue was neither briefed nor 
argued, we need not determine whether the Dubose decision should 
be applied retroactively to this case.  
No. 2003AP2802-CR 
 
23 
 
 
that Roberson cannot meet the prejudice prong of the Strickland 
test 
because 
the 
in-court 
identifications 
were 
properly 
admitted.   
¶32 The 
admissibility 
of 
an 
in-court 
identification 
depends upon whether that identification evidence has been 
tainted by illegal activity.  In general, evidence must be 
suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree, "if such evidence is 
obtained 'by exploitation of that illegality.'"  State v. Knapp, 
2005 WI 127, ¶24, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899 (citation 
omitted); New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 19 (1990).   
¶33 The remedy for an illegal warrantless search may be 
the suppression of any identification evidence that has been 
tainted.  However, an illegal search is irrelevant to the 
admissibility of any evidence that does not actually flow from 
that illegal activity.  United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 
475 (1980).  As the United States Supreme Court has concluded, 
"[t]he exclusionary rule enjoins the Government from benefiting 
from evidence it has unlawfully obtained; it does not reach 
backward to taint information that was in official hands prior 
to any illegality."  Id. (emphasis added). 
¶34 An in-court identification is admissible, therefore, 
if the court determines that the identification is based on an 
independent source.  McMorris, 213 Wis. 2d at 166-68 (citations 
omitted); State v. Walker, 154 Wis. 2d 158, 188, 453 N.W.2d 127 
(1990) (citing Crews, 445 U.S. 463).  See also Powell v. State, 
86 Wis. 2d 51, 65-66, 271 N.W.2d 610 (1978). The primary 
No. 2003AP2802-CR 
 
24 
 
 
question is whether "the evidence to which the instant objection 
is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or 
instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of 
the primary taint."  Walker, 154 Wis. 2d at 186 (quoting Wong 
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)). To be 
admissible, the in-court identification must be made "by means 
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint."  
McMorris, 213 Wis. 2d at 167 (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 
U.S. 218, 241 (1967); Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488).  In other 
words, the in-court identification must rest on an independent 
recollection of the witness's initial encounter with the 
suspect.  Walker, 154 Wis. 2d at 188. 
¶35 Ordinarily, an analysis of the admissibility of an in-
court identification shifts to the State the heavy burden of 
establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court 
identification was not tainted by the illegal activity.14  
                                                 
14 This court has previously concluded that the test 
established in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), is 
the appropriate test for reviewing the admissibility of an in-
court identification.  State v. McMorris, 213 Wis. 2d 156, 167, 
570 N.W.2d 384 (1997).   
The Wade test establishes seven factors for the court to 
consider in determining whether an in-court identification is 
sufficiently removed from the primary taint.  Id. at 168 
(citation 
omitted). 
Courts 
should 
consider 
the 
following 
factors: 
(1) the prior opportunity the witness had to observe 
the alleged criminal activity; (2) the existence of 
any discrepancy between pre-lineup description and the 
accused's actual description; (3) any identification 
of another person prior to the lineup; (4) any 
identification by picture of the accused prior to the 
No. 2003AP2802-CR 
 
25 
 
 
Walker, 154 Wis. 2d at 186; Powell, 86 Wis. 2d at 65; Holmes v. 
State, 59 Wis. 2d 488, 496, 208 N.W.2d 815 (1973).  However, the 
question of the admissibility of the in-court identifications in 
this case arises as part of an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim.  See Anderson, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶48.  In an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, Strickland "places the burden on 
the defendant to affirmatively prove prejudice."  Johnson, 153 
Wis. 2d at 129.  Compare Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 
(1967) with Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  See also State v. 
Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶41, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189 
("[O]rdinarily, the one who benefits from the error must prove 
harmlessness, but in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 
the defendant must prove prejudice.") (citation omitted).  In 
determining whether the defendant has met his or her burden of 
proving prejudice, the reviewing courts are required to consider 
the totality of the evidence before the trier of fact.  Johnson, 
153 Wis. 2d at 129-30.  
¶36 The in-court identifications by Wagner and Terrell 
were 
based 
on 
their 
independent 
recollections 
of 
their 
observations of and encounters with Roberson outside the liquor 
store prior to the drug transaction, as well as during the drug 
                                                                                                                                                             
lineup; (5) failure to identify the accused on a prior 
occasion; (6) the lapse of time between the alleged 
crime and the lineup identification; and (7) the facts 
disclosed concerning the conduct of the lineup. 
Id. (citing Wade, 388 U.S. at 241); Walker, 154 Wis. 2d at 
188; State v. Mosley, 102 Wis. 2d 636, 656, 307 N.W.2d 200 
(1981).   
No. 2003AP2802-CR 
 
26 
 
 
transaction, and were not related to the identification of 
Roberson outside of his home.  This determination finds ample 
support in the record.  Both Wagner and Terrell's in-court 
identifications 
followed 
their 
testimony 
regarding 
their 
observations of Roberson in full daylight outside the liquor 
store and during the drug buy.  Their in-court identifications 
were made prior to any testimony about the out-of-court 
identifications.  These in-court identifications occurred less 
than three months after the officers' observations of and 
interaction with Roberson.   
¶37 Both Terrell and Wagner worked for the City's Rapid 
Enforcement Drug Offense team and had been trained to carefully 
observe suspects' facial features in order to be able to 
identify suspects by their face.  Wagner had worked as a police 
officer with the City of Milwaukee for over ten years and 
Terrell had worked as a police officer with the City for over 
four years.  
¶38 Wagner's 
trial 
testimony 
reveals 
that 
he 
had 
sufficient opportunity to view Roberson.  Wagner observed two 
men, later identified as Roberson and Wright, outside the liquor 
store for over 20 minutes and watched the men get into a gray 
car.  Wagner testified that he used binoculars to view Roberson 
and that his view of Roberson outside the liquor store was 
unobstructed and continuous and that he had no trouble seeing 
the suspects' faces and clothing.  Although Wagner lost sight of 
the car for a brief amount of time, when Wagner regained sight 
No. 2003AP2802-CR 
 
27 
 
 
of the car, he watched the car make a series of turns and park 
in front of a house, later identified as Roberson's home.  He 
then observed Roberson and Wright exit the car and enter 
Roberson's home.  Moments later, Wagner was asked to view five 
individuals brought onto the porch of Roberson's home.  Wagner 
informed the officers that the suspect was not on the porch and 
instructed them to search the house because the main suspect was 
still inside the residence.   
¶39 Terrell's testimony reveals that he had sufficient 
opportunity to observe Roberson during the drug buy.  Terrell 
testified that when he approached the gray car to initiate the 
drug purchase, a man seated in the passenger seat, later 
identified as Roberson, matched the description he had been 
given by Wagner.  Terrell told Roberson that he had $25 and the 
suspect agreed to sell him three corner cuts of cocaine.  
Terrell handed the money directly to Roberson.  At trial, 
Terrell explained that although he had a clear view of Roberson 
in the passenger seat, he had been unable to view the driver and 
therefore could not identify the driver of the car.  In 
addition, like Wagner, Terrell testified that he did not 
recognize the person who had sold him the cocaine among the 
first five individuals who were brought onto the porch of 
Roberson's home.   
¶40 We conclude that the officers' capacity to identify 
Roberson during trial neither resulted from nor was biased by 
the alleged unlawful police conduct.  Even assuming that the 
No. 2003AP2802-CR 
 
28 
 
 
entry 
was 
illegal 
and 
the 
subsequent 
out-of-court 
identifications were inadmissible, the police acquired nothing 
from 
the 
illegal 
entry 
or 
the 
subsequent 
out-of-court 
identifications that was relevant to their ability to identify 
Roberson at trial, and there is no evidence to show that the 
subsequent 
in-court 
identification 
testimony 
was 
somehow 
tainted.   
¶41 Because the record in this case clearly reveals that 
neither the warrantless entry, nor the subsequent out-of-court 
identifications, contaminated the officers' ability to provide 
the jury with accurate identification testimony about the 
officers' previous observations of and encounters with Roberson, 
we conclude that the in-court identifications were not the 
proverbial "fruit of the poisonous tree." 
IV 
¶42 We next address whether the circuit court erred in 
denying Roberson a hearing on his ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim.  Under Machner, "a hearing may be held when a 
criminal defendant's trial counsel is challenged for allegedly 
providing ineffective assistance."  Thiel, 264 Wis. 2d 571, ¶2 
n.3.15   
¶43 However, the circuit court has the discretion to deny 
the postconviction motion without a Machner hearing "if the 
motion fails to allege sufficient facts to raise a question of 
                                                 
15 "At the hearing, trial counsel testifies as to his or her 
reasoning on challenged action or inaction."  State v. Thiel, 
2003 WI 111, ¶2 n.3, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305. 
No. 2003AP2802-CR 
 
29 
 
 
fact, presents only conclusory allegations, or if the record 
conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to 
relief." State v. Curtis, 218 Wis. 2d 550, 555 n.3, 582 
N.W.2d 409 (Ct. App. 1998) (emphasis added) (citing State v. 
Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 313, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996)). 
¶44 Because we conclude that the record sufficiently 
establishes that Roberson was not prejudiced by his counsel's 
actions, we further conclude that the circuit court did not err 
in denying Roberson a hearing on his postconviction motion 
alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel in accordance 
with Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797.   
V 
¶45 We conclude that the in-court identifications of 
Roberson by Detective Wagner and Officer Terrell were properly 
admitted into evidence, regardless of whether the warrantless 
entry was illegal, and regardless of whether the out-of-court 
identifications were inadmissible.  We further conclude that 
Roberson's counsel's failure to move to suppress the out-of-
court identifications did not prejudice his defense.  We 
therefore affirm the court of appeals.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
 
 
No.  2003AP2802-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶46 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  The issue 
in the present case is whether the defendant should get a 
hearing (a Machner hearing)1 on his motion to vacate the judgment 
of conviction on the ground of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  He claims defense counsel was ineffective in failing 
to challenge the officers' testimony regarding the out-of-court 
identifications and in failing to object to the in-court 
identifications as tainted by the out-of-court identifications.2 
¶47 To get a Machner evidentiary hearing, an accused must 
make a sufficient showing on the two elements of ineffective 
assistance of counsel: (1) counsel's performance was deficient;3 
                                                 
1 See State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. 
App. 1979). 
2 This case comes to this court after the court of appeals, 
upon motion for reconsideration by the State, withdrew its 
original opinion in favor of the defendant and issued a new 
opinion upholding the denial of the defendant's request for a 
Machner hearing.  See State v. Roberson, 2005 WI App 195, 287 
Wis. 2d 403, 704 N.W.2d 302; State v. Roberson, No. 2003AP2802-
CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2004), 
(withdrawn by order of the court of appeals Oct. 21, 2004). 
3 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) 
("First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was 
deficient.  This requires showing that counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment."). 
No.  2003AP2802-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
and (2) counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial.4  The 
defendant need not prove either of these prongs at the motion 
stage of the proceeding.  The defendant need show only that he 
should get an evidentiary hearing on the issues. 
¶48 A circuit court determines as a matter of law "whether 
the motion on its face alleges sufficient material facts that, 
if true, would entitle the defendant to relief. . . . If the 
motion raises such facts, the circuit court must hold an 
evidentiary hearing.  However, if the motion does not raise 
facts sufficient to entitle the movant to relief, or presents 
only conclusory allegations, or if the record conclusively 
demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to relief, the 
circuit court has the discretion to grant or deny a hearing."5 
¶49 Whether the motion sufficiently alleges facts which, 
if true, would entitle an accused to relief is a question of law 
to be determined by this court independently of the circuit 
court or court of appeals.6    
                                                 
4 State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶20, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 
N.W.2d 305 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694) ("In order to 
demonstrate 
that 
counsel's 
deficient 
performance 
is 
constitutionally prejudicial, the defendant must show that 
'there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.  A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.'"). 
5 State v. Allen, 2004 WI 106, ¶9, 274 Wis. 2d 568, 682 
N.W.2d 433 (citing State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 309-10, 
548 N.W.2d 50 (1996) and Nelson v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 489, 497, 
195 N.W.2d 629 (1972)) (citations omitted). 
6 State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 309-11, 548 N.W.2d 50 
(1996). 
No.  2003AP2802-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶50 The majority opinion first decides whether defense 
counsel's performance (even if deficient in failing to object to 
the out-of-court identifications) prejudiced the defendant.  The 
majority opinion then declares that even if defense counsel 
erred in failing to challenge the out-of-court identifications, 
the error was harmless error and the court need not examine 
whether 
counsel 
fell 
below 
an 
objective 
standard 
of 
reasonableness for an attorney with regard to the out-of-court 
identifications.7  Under the majority opinion's assumptions, I 
conclude that the admission of the out-of-court identifications 
was prejudicial because at trial the State tied together the 
out-of-court and in-court identifications and used the out-of-
court identifications to bolster the in-court identifications. 
¶51 The majority opinion then concludes that the in-court 
identifications were properly admitted into evidence, regardless 
of whether the warrantless entry into the house was illegal and 
regardless of whether the out-of-court identifications were 
inadmissible.  I disagree and conclude that the defendant is 
entitled to a hearing on whether the in-court identifications 
were tainted. 
                                                 
7 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88.   
In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court explained 
the objective standard of reasonableness for an attorney in a 
bit more detail:  "[A] guilty plea cannot be attacked as based 
on inadequate legal advice unless counsel was not 'a reasonably 
competent attorney' and the advice was not 'within the range of 
competence 
demanded 
of 
attorneys 
in 
criminal 
cases.'"  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  
No.  2003AP2802-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶52 The 
majority opinion 
recognizes that 
if defense 
counsel 
erred 
in 
failing 
to 
challenge 
the 
in-court 
identifications, this deficient performance was prejudicial.  
The majority opinion treats the admissibility of the in-court 
identification as determinative of the case.8 
¶53 I shall first discuss whether the assumed deficient 
performance on the part of defense counsel in not challenging 
the out-of-court identifications was prejudicial error.  In 
contrast with the majority opinion, I conclude that it was.  I 
then turn to whether the defendant's motion alleges sufficient 
material facts regarding both the out-of-court identifications 
and the in-court identifications that, if true, would entitle 
the defendant to a Machner hearing on the deficient performance 
of defense counsel.  I conclude that the motion is sufficient to 
entitle the defendant to a Machner hearing. 
I 
¶54 The majority opinion assumes for the purposes of 
review, and I agree, that defense counsel erred by failing to 
object to the out-of-court identifications and that the out-of-
court identifications should have been suppressed.  The majority 
opinion then concludes that the record conclusively shows that 
the defendant was not prejudiced by defense counsel's failure to 
challenge the out-of-court identifications.9  Here is where I 
part with the majority opinion.  
                                                 
8 Majority op., ¶31 n.13. 
9 Majority op., ¶¶3, 40-41. 
No.  2003AP2802-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶55 If 
the 
out-of-court 
identifications 
had 
been 
suppressed, the only evidence supporting the conviction would 
have been the in-court identifications.  Because the State tried 
the case by bolstering the in-court identification with the out-
of-court identifications, I conclude (assuming as did the 
majority 
opinion 
that 
the 
in-court 
identifications 
were 
admissible 
and that the 
out-of-court 
identifications 
were 
erroneously 
admitted) 
that 
admission 
of 
the 
out-of-court 
identifications was prejudicial error.   
¶56 This 
case 
turns 
on 
the 
identifications 
of 
the 
defendant.  The identifications are the only evidence tying the 
defendant to the crime charged.  The defendant's defense was 
that he did not do it and was a victim of misidentification.  
The only evidence in the entire case tying the defendant to the 
drug offense was the officers' in-court and out-of-court 
identifications.10  No drugs or marked money were found on the 
defendant's person or in the house from which he was removed a 
short time after the drug transaction.     
¶57 The majority opinion treats the admissibility of the 
in-court identifications alone as determinative of the case.11  
Yet during trial the State tied the in-court identification to 
the out-of-court identifications to convince the jurors that the 
in-court identification was reliable and persuasive.   
                                                 
10 Majority op., ¶14. 
11 Majority op., ¶31 n.13. 
No.  2003AP2802-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶58 The State's direct examination of Detective Wagner 
emphasized the out-of-court identifications outside the mother's 
home and used them to bolster the in-court identification: 
Q:  . . . The identification you made of Mr. Roberson 
when he was brought out of the house . . . was made, 
if I'm adding up here the time schedule correctly, 
within minutes of you seeing Mr. Roberson . . . run 
into that house. 
A: Yes. 
Q: And that all occurred shortly after you had 
finished the surveillance of Mr. Roberson . . . in 
front of that liquor store that afternoon—— 
A: Correct. 
Q:——right?  So you were not simply identifying Mr. 
Roberson here today a couple of months later; you 
identified him right there minutes after the incident. 
A: Yes. 
Q: And that identification was made after you watched 
him 
for 
approximately 
25 
minutes 
through 
the 
binoculars very carefully, wasn't it? 
A: Yes. 
¶59 During opening and 
closing 
statements 
the 
State 
emphasized the out-of-court identifications (which the majority 
opinion assumes should have been suppressed), again to bolster 
the in-court identifications.   
¶60 In the opening 
argument, 
the assistant district 
attorney stressed that the two officers readily identified the 
defendant outside of his mother's house. 
¶61 The State placed similar emphasis on the out-of-court 
identifications outside the mother's home in closing arguments, 
underscoring for the jury the importance of these out-of-court 
No.  2003AP2802-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
identifications.  Specifically, the assistant district attorney 
stated that the issue in the case was not whether the in-court 
identification 
was 
reliable 
but, 
rather, 
whether 
the 
contemporaneous police report and out-of-court identifications 
were reliable.   
¶62 The assistant district attorney said:  "You write a 
report close in time, you make an ID and put it down in the 
report.  The issue is; did he identify correctly [the defendant] 
shortly after the incident based on what he saw and did." 
¶63 If the out-of-court identifications were inadmissible, 
the only remaining evidence was the in-court identifications, 
which the State at trial significantly entangled with the out-
of-court identifications that should have been suppressed.  
Considering 
all 
the 
factors 
in 
State 
v. 
Billings, 
110 
Wis. 2d 661, 
668-70, 
329 
N.W.2d 192 
(1983), 
such 
as 
the 
frequency of the error, the nature of the State's case, the 
defense presented at trial, whether the evidence was duplicative 
of other evidence, and any other factors that may help reveal 
whether the admission of evidence was prejudicial,12 it is clear 
                                                 
12 In 
State 
v. 
Billings, 
110 
Wis. 2d 661, 
668, 
329 
N.W.2d 192 (1983), this court warned of the problems with 
upholding a conviction based on the strength of untainted 
evidence when there is also tainted evidence presented at trial: 
The impact of the erroneously admitted evidence on the 
jurors cannot be assessed either by looking at the 
erroneously admitted evidence in isolation or by 
looking 
at 
the 
evidence 
unaffected 
by 
the 
error . . . in isolation to determine whether it is 
sufficient to support the conviction.  The court 
cannot, as the United States Supreme Court has 
admonished, give too much emphasis to "overwhelming 
evidence" of guilt.  Emphasizing the sufficiency of 
No.  2003AP2802-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
that the in-court identifications were chained at trial to the 
out-of-court identifications, which should have been suppressed.  
¶64 My conclusion, unlike that of the majority opinion, is 
that 
if 
there 
was 
error 
in 
admitting 
the 
out-of-court 
identifications, the error was prejudicial, even if the in-court 
identifications were admissible. 
II 
¶65 I now turn to whether the defendant's motion to vacate 
the conviction on the grounds of ineffective assistance of 
counsel makes a sufficient showing that counsel's performance 
was deficient (by failing to challenge the officers' testimony 
regarding the out-of-court identifications outside the mother's 
home and by failing to object to the in-court identifications as 
tainted by the out-of-court identifications), entitling him to 
an evidentiary hearing.  Our task is not to determine whether 
defense counsel's performance was deficient; it is to determine 
whether the motion is sufficient to entitle the defendant to an 
evidentiary hearing.   
¶66 An attorney's performance is not deficient for failing 
to pursue a suppression motion that lacks merit.  Conversely, an 
attorney's performance may be deficient for failing to pursue a 
suppression motion that has merit.  I conclude that the 
defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel justify 
                                                                                                                                                             
untainted evidence independently of the erroneously 
admitted evidence creates a danger of substituting the 
court's judgment for the jury's. 
(quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967)). 
No.  2003AP2802-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
an 
evidentiary 
Machner 
hearing 
to 
determine 
whether 
a 
suppression motion should have been made.  
¶67 One claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is 
counsel's failure to challenge the in-court identifications as 
tainted by the inadmissible out-of-court identifications.  The 
State's position is that the in-court identifications were not 
tainted by the out-of-court identifications but were based 
independently on the officers' observations of the defendant's 
drug dealing activities, which the officers had observed 
earlier. 
¶68 When an out-of-court identification of an accused is 
inadmissible, an in-court identification by the same individual 
nevertheless may be admissible "if the State carries the burden 
of showing 'by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court 
identifications 
were 
based 
upon 
observations 
of 
the 
suspect other than the [inadmissible identification].'"13  An in-
                                                 
13 State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, ¶38, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 
N.W.2d 582; State v. McMorris, 213 Wis. 2d 156, 167, 570 
N.W.2d 384 (1997) (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 
240 (1967)). 
In a similar case in which an undercover police officer 
identified a defendant both in court and out of court, and the 
out-of-court identification was inadmissible, the New York Court 
of Appeals concluded that the State had failed to show by clear 
and convincing evidence that the in-court identification was not 
tainted by the out-of-court identification.  People v. Gethers, 
654 N.E. 2d 102, 104-05 (N.Y. 1995) ("The causal link between 
the arrest and identification is obvious and unattenuated——the 
illegal seizure and detention of defendant not only made the 
identification possible, but was done for the purpose of 
displaying him to the undercover officer and thereby securing a 
pretrial identification to be used at the trial to bolster her 
in-court identification."). 
No.  2003AP2802-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
court 
identification 
is 
tainted 
if 
the 
out-of-court 
identification aided the officers in making the in-court 
identification.  
¶69 The majority opinion concludes that the in-court 
identifications 
are 
not 
tainted 
because 
the 
identifying 
officers, Detective Wagner and Officer Terrell, were experienced 
in 
law 
enforcement 
in 
general 
and 
drug 
enforcement 
in 
particular, they had ample opportunity to view the suspect and 
the drug buy, their views of the defendant were unobstructed, 
they were trained in how to later identify a suspect, they gave 
consistent descriptions, and less than three months elapsed 
between their observations of the alleged crime and the in-court 
identifications.14  
¶70 I disagree with this reasoning.  Because defense 
counsel 
did 
not 
move 
to 
suppress 
the 
out-of-court 
identifications, the circuit court never faced the question of 
whether the in-court identifications were tainted.  The record 
does 
not 
conclusively 
demonstrate 
that 
the 
in-court 
identifications 
were 
not 
tainted 
by 
the 
out-of-court 
identifications outside the mother's home. 
¶71 This court is making its determination of whether the 
in-court identifications were tainted on the basis of an 
incomplete record.  Defense counsel failed to move to suppress 
both 
the 
out-of-court 
and 
the 
in-court 
identifications.  
Therefore, defense counsel did not question any of the witnesses 
to show whether the in-court identifications were tainted, and 
                                                 
14 Majority op., ¶36. 
No.  2003AP2802-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
the defendant did not have an opportunity at trial to show a 
taint.  We do not know what the officers would have said on 
questioning 
about 
the 
relation 
between 
the 
in-court 
identification and the identification outside the mother's home.  
The State at trial tied the in-court identifications to the out-
of-court identifications.  The Machner hearing would give the 
defendant the opportunity to question the officers to show a 
taint.     
¶72 Notwithstanding the defense counsel's failure to move 
to suppress the identifications and to question the witnesses to 
show a taint, the smell of a taint pervades the record and 
entitles the defendant to a Machner hearing.  
¶73 A second claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in 
the instant case is defense counsel's failure to challenge the 
entry into the home of the defendant's mother to arrest the 
defendant as an illegal entry, thus making the out-of-court 
identifications at the mother's house inadmissible.  The 
defendant never consented to the entry.  If the defendant's 
mother consented to the police entering the home,15 the defendant 
might not have a constitutional challenge under the Fourth and 
                                                 
15 The house was the defendant's mother's home, which is why 
she could consent to search.  The defendant, however, lived at 
his mother's house, which is why he has standing to challenge 
the search.  Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) 
(family members residing with owner or tenant have same standing 
to challenge entry as owner or tenant).  
No.  2003AP2802-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution to law 
enforcement's entry into the home.16 
¶74 In denying the defendant's motion for a Machner 
hearing, the circuit court stated that the trial testimony it 
had already heard from the defendant's mother and the officer 
who confronted the defendant's mother provided "essentially the 
same testimony the court would have heard" in a Machner hearing 
or in a hearing on a suppression motion. 
¶75 I agree with the court of appeals that the testimony 
the circuit court heard at trial is not "essentially the same" 
as the testimony the circuit court might have heard at a Machner 
hearing.  The circuit court's explanation does not provide a 
satisfactory basis for denying the request for a Machner 
hearing.17  As the court of appeals observed, both the 
defendant's 
mother 
and 
the 
officer 
"were 
not 
questioned 
thoroughly at trial about whether [the defendant's mother] 
consented to the entry.  And other officers who witnessed the 
entry did not testify [at trial].  We do not know if their 
testimony would have supported [the officer's or the defendant's 
mother's] 
version 
of 
events."18 
 
Notably, 
however, 
the 
defendant's mother testified at trial that she did not provide 
consent to enter the home and that she called 9-1-1 to object to 
the police entry. 
                                                 
16 See Georgia v. Randolph, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 1515 
(2006) (holding warrantless search unreasonable as to defendant 
who expressly refused to consent to entry). 
17 Roberson, 287 Wis. 2d 403, ¶13.  
18 Roberson, 287 Wis. 2d 403, ¶13.   
No.  2003AP2802-CR.ssa 
 
13 
 
¶76 Because defense counsel did not challenge the entry 
into the home of the defendant's mother, the circuit court never 
took 
testimony 
about 
consent. 
 
Without 
a 
hearing 
or 
uncontroverted testimony, the record does not provide a basis 
upon which to make a determination of consent.  Thus, consent 
should be determined at an evidentiary Machner hearing.  
¶77 Without consent and without a warrant, generally law 
enforcement may not constitutionally enter a home to make an 
arrest.19  There are, however, exceptions, such as exigent 
circumstances, permitting the warrantless entry into a home to 
effect an arrest.  None of the exceptions are conclusively 
established at the motion stage in the instant case. 
¶78 The remedy for a warrantless arrest on a warrantless 
entry into a home ordinarily is suppression of the evidence 
obtained from the warrantless arrest.20  In the instant case, the 
evidence obtained from the warrantless entry into the home was 
the out-of-court identifications of the defendant outside the 
mother's home. 
¶79 Even if the entry into the home were illegal, the out-
of-court identifications were not necessarily subject to the 
exclusionary rule.  If the police had probable cause to arrest 
                                                 
19 In Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980), the 
Supreme Court stated that "[i]t is a basic principle of Fourth 
Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home without a 
warrant are presumptively unreasonable." (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
20 New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1990) ("[T]he 
indirect fruits of an illegal search or arrest should be 
suppressed when they bear a sufficiently close relationship to 
the underlying illegality."). 
No.  2003AP2802-CR.ssa 
 
14 
 
the 
defendant, 
the 
out-of-court 
identifications 
may 
be 
admissible under New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990).  In 
Harris, the United States Supreme Court held that a confession 
made by the accused outside the home after an illegal entry into 
the home was admissible when the police had probable cause 
(developed apart from the illegal entry) to arrest the accused 
in the home.21   
 
¶80 Harris involved a confession at the police station 
after an illegal arrest.  The Court reasoned that after Harris 
                                                 
21 Harris, 495 U.S. at 21 ("[W]here the police have probable 
cause to arrest a suspect, the exclusionary rule does not bar 
the State's use of a statement made by the defendant outside of 
his home, even though the statement is taken after an arrest 
made in the home in violation of Payton."). 
There is substantial dispute regarding the scope and 
validity of the Harris exception to the exclusionary rule.  See, 
e.g., State v. Luurtsema, 811 A.2d 223, 232-234 (Conn. 2002) 
(declining to follow Harris on state law grounds); Bryant v. 
United States, 599 A.2d 1107, 1112 (D.C. 1991) (declining to 
extend Harris exception to exclusionary rule to situation where 
police obtained probable cause only because they found defendant 
in house). 
The defendant contends that there was no probable cause to 
arrest him before he was removed from the house.  The defendant 
asserts that he was not arrested until after he was identified 
by the officers outside of the house.  The officers failed to 
maintain continuous visual contact with the person dealing 
drugs, casting doubt whether any person inside the home was the 
same person from whom the officer purchased the drugs.   
The 
defendant 
argues 
that 
he 
was 
subject 
to 
an 
investigative detention (a Terry stop) prior to being identified 
outside the home.  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968).  
If the defendant was removed from his home as part of a Terry 
stop, such action was unconstitutional even if the officers had 
the requisite reasonable suspicion.  Harris does not make an 
exception to the exclusionary rule for the fruits of an improper 
investigative detention. 
No.  2003AP2802-CR.ssa 
 
15 
 
had been removed from the home his continued custody was lawful, 
so his statement was not the product of the unlawful custody.  
This case differs from Harris in that in the instant case an 
identification was made after an illegal entry into a home after 
what is arguably a Terry detention.   
 
¶81 In any event, this court has never adopted the Harris 
exception to the exclusionary rule.  Furthermore, the defendant 
and State disagree whether the officers had probable cause to 
arrest the defendant before the officers entered the home.  The 
State's brief asserts that the defendant's arrest was based on 
probable cause obtained before the officers entered the home.  
The defendant argues that the officers seized and searched the 
defendant in the home, as well as five other men, but did not 
arrest the defendant (or any of the other men seized in the 
home) until after the officers identified only the defendant 
outside the home.  In other words, the officers in the home 
could not identify the defendant (or any of the other men) as 
the person the other officers saw in the drug deal until each 
man was brought outside the home and was identified by the 
officers.  The reason that the officers could not identify any 
of the men in the house as the perpetrator was that the 
officers' description of the perpetrator was too general.  
Numerous males in the area might have matched the description.  
An evidentiary Machner hearing would allow the circuit court to 
determine whether the officers had probable cause to arrest the 
defendant in the home, whether the defendant's identification 
No.  2003AP2802-CR.ssa 
 
16 
 
outside the home was the product of the illegal entry into the 
home, and whether the exclusionary rule applies.22     
¶82 I conclude that the motion was sufficient to justify a 
Machner evidentiary hearing on whether defense counsel's failure 
to challenge the entry into the home of the defendant's mother 
to arrest the defendant was deficient performance.   
¶83 The defendant has asked only for an evidentiary 
Machner 
hearing 
to 
determine 
whether 
defense 
counsel's 
performance was deficient.  Instead of granting a hearing, the 
majority opinion decides his claims of deficient performance as 
a matter of law on a record that is incomplete because defense 
counsel made no objections to any of the out-of-court or in-
court identifications.       
¶84 I conclude that because the defendant's motion alleged 
facts that would entitle the defendant to the relief requested, 
namely, a Machner hearing, the circuit court had no discretion 
but to hold an evidentiary hearing.  Accordingly, I dissent. 
¶85 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
 
                                                 
22 The court of appeals decision is unclear whether the 
officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant before the 
identification outside the home. 
No.  2003AP2802-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1