Title: State v. Schwartzenberger

State: washington

Issuer: Washington Supreme Court

Document:

70 Wn.2d 103 (1966) 422 P.2d 323 THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. DANIEL SCHWARTZENBERGER, Appellant.[*] No. 38597. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department Two. December 29, 1966. Kroum & Bass and Gary F. Bass (Appointed counsel for appeal), for appellant. Charles O. Carroll and John S. Ludwigson, for respondent. BARNETT, J.[] The defendant Schwartzenberger and one Robert Crites were charged jointly with unlawful possession *104 of narcotics, namely, marijuana. They both pled not guilty, waived their right to a jury trial and were tried by the court sitting without a jury. Schwartzenberger was convicted as charged and the charge against Crites was dismissed. From the judgment of conviction Schwartzenberger appeals. The court made the following findings of fact: [1] No error is assigned to the trial court's findings of fact, hence they become established facts of the case. Seattle v. Reel, 69 Wn.2d 227, 418 P.2d 237 (1966); Obde v. Schlemeyer, 56 Wn.2d 449, 353 P.2d 672 (1960). The court found that both parties stipulated that the arrest was with probable cause. The only assignment of error relates to the admitting in evidence, over the timely motion of defendant to suppress, the material in the plastic bag found in the glove compartment,[1] which was later determined to be marijuana. In support of this assignment of error the defendant claims that the search and seizure *105 was not contemporaneous with, and incidental to the arrest. The evidence shows that the defendant, at the time of his arrest, was with Crites in the automobile. The two men were removed from the car and handcuffed. Their persons were searched, then they were placed in a patrol car and driven in the custody of officers to the Renton police station. Immediately after the arrest, at a time when the defendant and Crites were being taken away from the scene of the arrest, but prior to a search of the automobile, it was moved approximately 100 feet to an off-street parking spot due to heavy traffic conditions. The arresting officer then undertook a search of the vehicle. The defendant contends that because the car was moved 100 feet from the place of arrest coupled with the fact that the search was conducted while the defendant and Crites were handcuffed and on their way to the police station, the search was not incident to the arrest. The defendant asserts that there was no reason to search for weapons since both men were in custody, hence no threat to the safety of the officers. Furthermore, it is argued that there was no possibility of destruction by third parties of the fruits of the crime, therefore, concludes the defendant, there was no impediment to leisurely obtaining a search warrant. To buttress his contention the defendant relies heavily upon Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 11 L. Ed. 2d 777, 84 Sup. Ct. 881 (1964). The Supreme Court of Kansas has very well summarized the facts and holdings in Preston, supra, as follows: We find significant differences between Preston and the present case. In the instant case we are dealing with an arrest with probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed a robbery a few minutes prior to the arrest, and it would be reasonable to believe that the defendant still had the fruits of the crime in his possession. In Preston, supra, the arrest was only on a charge of vagrancy. Here the search was begun as soon as the car had been moved to a more convenient and less hazardous spot, not after the suspects had been booked and the car impounded and taken to a garage for safekeeping. We believe that Preston, supra, does not demand a ruling that the search in the present case was unreasonable. [2, 3] It is well accepted that the police may properly make a search without a search warrant of a person or *107 things under his immediate control as incident to a valid arrest of that person in order to find the fruits of the crime or to forestall attacks on the arresting officers with hidden weapons. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 94 L. Ed 653, 70 Sup. Ct. 430 (1950); State v. Taplin, 67 Wn.2d 610, 409 P.2d 169 (1965). The fact that the defendant was not present did not prevent the search from being incidental to the arrest. Crawford v. Bannan, 336 F.2d 505 (6th Cir.1964). The Kansas case, State v. Wood, 197 Kan. 241, 416 P.2d 729 (1966), (which was not cited in the briefs), held that the search of an automobile approximately 20 minutes following defendant's arrest in the automobile and after it had been moved to the county jail, was incidental to the arrest although the defendant was not present. The court said, p. 733: We approve of the reasoning of the Kansas court. The facts in the instant case show, without a doubt, that the search occurred substantially contemporaneous with and incidental to the arrest. It was not remote in time or place from the arrest. Certainly this was a reasonable search in the circumstances. [4] There is another prong to defendant's contention, although not expressly so stated. In connection with his argument that the search was not incidental to the arrest, he asserts there was ample time to procure a search warrant, implying that if the police could have reasonably gotten a search warrant a search without it was unreasonable. This contention is met in United States v. Rabinowitz, supra, pp. 65, 66: From the above we conclude that since the search of the car driven by Schwartzenberger has been found to have been reasonable as incident to a valid arrest, the fact that there was time to procure a search warrant before conducting the search does not render that search unreasonable on the factual pattern of the instant case. The judgment is affirmed. ROSELLINI, C.J., DONWORTH, FINLEY, and HAMILTON, JJ., concur. [*] Reported in 422 P.2d 323. [] Judge Barnett is serving as a judge pro tempore of the Supreme Court pursuant to Art. 4, § 2(a) (amendment 38), state constitution. [1] The trial court held that the material found in the trunk of the automobile should be suppressed. The propriety of that ruling is not before this court and we do not express an opinion.