Title: Gillespie v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
ROBERT LEWIS GILLESPIE, 
a/k/a ROBERT LEWIS GILLISPIE             OPINION BY 
 
 
 
SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL 
v.  Record No. 060034  
          November 3, 2006 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
This appeal requires us to construe the language of Code 
§ 19.2-295.1 concerning bifurcated trials in criminal cases. 
It presents the question whether the Commonwealth may, at the 
sentencing stage of a bifurcated trial, present evidence of 
the sentences imposed upon the defendant as a part of his 
record of prior convictions. 
Facts and Proceedings 
 
In a jury trial, Robert Lewis Gillispie1 was found guilty 
of statutory burglary.  The jury fixed his punishment at five 
years imprisonment.  After considering a pre-sentence report, 
the trial court imposed that sentence, to be followed by three 
years of post-release probation supervision. 
                     
1 The defendant was indicted as "Robert Lewis Gillespie 
AKA Robert Lewis Gillispi."  He was sentenced by the trial 
court as "Robert Lewis Gillespie a/k/a Robert Lewis Gillispie" 
and that style was used in all subsequent proceedings in the 
Court of Appeals and in this Court.  The defendant, in his 
petitions for appeal in both courts, as well as in his briefs 
on appeal, has stated that the correct spelling of his name is 
"Gillispie." 
 
At the sentencing stage of the trial, the Commonwealth 
offered an authenticated copy of a “Conviction and Sentencing 
Order” entered in the same court, dated December 8, 1998, 
showing that Gillispie had been convicted of grand larceny and 
sentenced to five years imprisonment, with three years and 
four months suspended upon the condition that Gillispie be of 
good behavior and submit to drug treatment.  The order also 
showed that Gillispie had been charged with robbery but found 
not guilty of that offense. 
 
Defense counsel objected to the exhibit as offered and 
moved the trial court to redact any reference to the robbery 
charge.  The Commonwealth agreed and the trial court redacted 
that portion of the order.  The defense also moved the court 
to redact the sentencing information relating to the grand 
larceny charge, as well as any reference to drug treatment, on 
the ground that both were “prejudicial to this case and could 
inflame the jury.”  The Commonwealth opposed the motion and 
the court denied it.  The 1998 order was admitted in evidence 
without change except for the redaction of the reference to 
the robbery charge. 
 
After this evidence was received, the jury retired to 
consider sentencing.  During its deliberations, the jury sent 
written questions to the trial court, inquiring whether the 
judge could reduce the sentence the jury fixed, whether the 
 
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defendant had been on probation when the crime occurred, and 
in what facility the defendant would be confined if 
imprisoned.  The jury explained, in the last question, “We 
don’t want this defendant to spend time in penitentiary 
w/murderers & rapists.”  The court answered these questions 
properly, by replying that the jurors should fix a sentence 
they considered appropriate and not concern themselves with 
future events, that they should not consider the defendant’s 
probation status, and that the Department of Corrections, not 
the court or the jury, determines where prisoners are housed. 
 
After the jury reported that it had reached a verdict and 
returned to the courtroom, a juror asked the judge whether 
suspension and parole were different, and if the judge made 
the decision whether to suspend a sentence.  The court 
answered both these questions in the affirmative, and asked 
all jurors whether, in the light of those answers, they were 
satisfied with the verdict they had reached or whether they 
wished to retire to the jury room for further deliberations.  
The jurors unanimously stated that they were satisfied and 
presented their verdict. 
 
Gillispie appealed his conviction and sentence to the 
Court of Appeals, which affirmed by a per curiam opinion.  We 
awarded him an appeal, limited to his assignment of error 
 
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relating to the trial court’s refusal to redact sentencing 
information from his record of prior convictions. 
Analysis 
 
Code § 19.2-295.1 provides, in pertinent part: 
In cases of trial by jury, upon a finding that the 
defendant is guilty of a felony or a Class 1 
misdemeanor . . . a separate proceeding limited to 
the ascertainment of punishment shall be held as 
soon as practicable before the same jury.  At such 
proceeding, the Commonwealth shall present the 
defendant’s prior criminal convictions by certified, 
attested or exemplified copies of the record of 
conviction. . . . After the Commonwealth has 
introduced such evidence of prior convictions, or if 
no such evidence is introduced, the defendant may 
introduce relevant, admissible evidence related to 
punishment.  Nothing in this section shall prevent 
the Commonwealth or the defendant from introducing 
relevant, admissible evidence in rebuttal. 
 
 
In denying Gillispie’s appeal on this issue, the Court of 
Appeals followed its prior decisions in Gilliam v. 
Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 519, 465 S.E.2d 592 (1996), and 
Mosby v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 284, 482 S.E.2d 72 (1997), 
wherein it held that “Code § 19.2-295.1 allows the 
Commonwealth to present evidence of the defendant’s prior 
criminal convictions, which includes the conviction orders 
that show length of prior sentences.”  Mosby, 24 Va. App. at 
291, 482 S.E.2d at 75.  The Court of Appeals reasoned that the 
purpose of the statute was to enable the jury to determine an 
appropriate sentence and that previous efforts to punish and 
 
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rehabilitate the defendant were indispensable to that purpose. 
Gilliam, 21 Va. App. at 524, 465 S.E.2d at 595. 
 
Our duty is to interpret the intent of the General 
Assembly in adopting the language it chose.  If the language 
is plain and unambiguous, there is no need for judicial 
construction; the language will be applied as written.  Tiller 
v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 418, 420, 69 S.E.2d 441, 442 (1952).  
Language is ambiguous if it admits of being understood in more 
than one way, refers to two or more things simultaneously, is 
difficult to comprehend, is of doubtful import, or lacks 
clearness and definiteness.  Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316, 
321, 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985). 
 
The Court of Appeals, in Gilliam, found the language of 
the statute in question here to be ambiguous because it was 
susceptible of more than one interpretation, and therefore 
appropriate for judicial construction.  21 Va. App. at 522, 
465 S.E.2d at 594.  We agree that an ambiguity exists, as 
illustrated by the positions of the parties here:  The 
defendant contends that “record of conviction” means a 
document showing only the fact of conviction; the Commonwealth 
contends that the term refers to the final order entered by 
the trial court, typically showing both conviction and 
sentence.  Nevertheless, we reach a different conclusion from 
 
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that reached by the Court of Appeals as to the intent of the 
General Assembly in enacting Code § 19.2-295.1. 
 
The General Assembly adopted Code § 19.2-295.1 in its 
original form in 1994.  At that time, bifurcated trials in 
capital murder cases were provided for by Code §§ 19.2-264.2, 
et seq., which had been in effect in varying forms since 1977.  
The General Assembly clearly had those laws in contemplation 
in 1994, when considering the extension of bifurcated trials 
to non-capital felonies for the first time in our history.  
Code § 19.2-264.2 provided then, as it does now, that the 
jury, at the penalty phase of a capital murder case, shall not 
impose the death penalty unless it finds either the “future 
dangerousness” predicate or the “vileness” predicate to exist 
“after consideration of the past criminal record of 
convictions of the defendant.”  Code § 19.2-264.4(C) provided 
then, as it does now, that in the penalty phase of a capital 
murder trial, evidence may be admissible, subject to the rules 
of evidence, that includes the “prior history” of the 
defendant.2
                     
2 In LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 593-94, 304 
S.E.2d 644, 660 (1983), we held that these two provisions, 
read together, were not unconstitutionally vague, despite 
their differing language. 
 
 
 
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In ascertaining legislative intent, we presume that the 
General Assembly, when enacting new laws, is fully aware of 
the state of existing law relating to the same general subject 
matter.  United Masonry, Inc. v. Riggs National Bank, 233 Va. 
476, 480, 357 S.E.2d 509, 512 (1987); Cape Henry v. Natl. 
Gypsum, 229 Va. 596, 600, 331 S.E.2d 476, 479 (1985).  The 
General Assembly is not only presumed to have been aware of 
the capital murder statutes in effect in 1994, but is also 
presumed to have been aware of our decisions construing them.  
Charles v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 14, 19, 613 S.E.2d 432, 434 
(2005) (citing Waterman v. Halverson, 261 Va. 203, 207, 540 
S.E.2d 867, 869 (2001)). 
In Bassett v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 844, 858, 284 S.E.2d 
844, 853 (1981), we were presented with the precise question 
presented by this appeal, but in the context of a capital 
murder case.  There, we held that the sentences imposed as a 
result of the defendant’s prior convictions might properly be 
admitted at the penalty phase of a capital murder trial, 
observing:  “The sentence reflects the gravity of the offense 
and the offender’s propensity for violence.”  Id. 
 
In the light of our interpretation of the capital murder 
statutes in Bassett, the General Assembly, if it had desired 
the same result in non-capital felony trials, could simply 
have mirrored the capital murder laws when enacting Code 
 
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§ 19.2-295.1.  Instead, it employed more restrictive language 
than it had used in the capital murder laws, limiting the 
Commonwealth to the introduction of “the defendant’s prior 
criminal convictions” by presenting copies of the “record of 
conviction.” (Emphasis added.)  Section 19.2-295.1 was enacted 
without any provisions permitting the introduction of evidence 
of prior sentences as a part of the defendant’s “history and 
background” in the Commonwealth’s case in chief at the penalty 
phase.  By contrast, the Commonwealth may do just that in 
capital murder cases, relying on our interpretation in 
Bassett.  The General Assembly had an opportunity to make 
bifurcated trials in non-capital cases similar to those in 
capital cases, but chose a different course. 
We consider the General Assembly’s departure from the 
language it had used in enacting the capital murder laws to be 
a significant demonstration of a legislative intent to 
accomplish a different result with respect to non-capital 
cases.  We therefore construe the words “prior criminal 
convictions” and “record of conviction,” as employed in Code 
§ 19.2-295.1 to mean exactly what they say, and no more. 
Thus, in the Commonwealth’s case in chief at the penalty 
phase of the trial of a non-capital felony or a Class 1 
misdemeanor, the Commonwealth is required to introduce 
evidence, as prescribed by the statute, of records showing 
 
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only the fact of conviction of a criminal offense, including 
the name of the crime, the date of the conviction and the 
court in which the conviction occurred.  If the record 
contains information concerning proceedings subsequent to 
conviction, such as sentence, suspension, probation or other 
rehabilitative efforts, such information should be redacted 
before the record is received in evidence. 
In the present appeal, the Commonwealth relies on our 
language in Commonwealth v. Shifflett, 257 Va. 34, 43, 510 
S.E.2d 232, 236 (1999): 
We perceive no sound reason why the factors that may 
be considered by a jury in capital murder cases 
should not likewise be available for consideration 
by a jury in noncapital cases under § 19.2-295.1. 
The goal of having an informed jury assess 
appropriate punishment should be no less essential 
merely because a noncapital offense is involved. 
 
The Commonwealth’s reliance on Shifflett is misplaced.  That 
case dealt with the obverse aspect of Code § 19.2-295.1, the 
question of what evidence the defendant may introduce at the 
penalty phase of a bifurcated non-capital felony trial.  In 
§ 19.2-295.1, the General Assembly imposed no such limitations 
on the defendant’s evidence as it had placed upon the 
Commonwealth.  While limiting the Commonwealth to “prior 
criminal convictions,” the statute expressly provides that the 
defendant “may introduce relevant, admissible evidence related 
to punishment.”  It was that language that we construed in 
 
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Shifflett,3 when we held that the trial court’s decision as to 
relevancy would only be set aside for a clear abuse of 
discretion.  Id. at 44, 510 S.E.2d at 237.  For that reason, 
nothing we decide here is inconsistent with our holding in 
Shifflett. 
 
It is conceivable that a defendant may, for his own 
purposes, wish to offer sentencing information at the penalty 
phase, and in our view of the statute, he would be free to do 
so.  Further, as we observed in Shifflett, the statute is a 
two-way street.  The Commonwealth as well as the defendant may 
introduce “relevant, admissible evidence in rebuttal.”  Id. at 
43-44, 510 S.E.2d at 236.  Thus, the Commonwealth may 
introduce evidence of sentencing and prior efforts to 
rehabilitate if the court, in its discretion, deems it 
relevant and admissible to rebut evidence the defendant has 
introduced at the penalty phase. 
Conclusion 
 
Because the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the 
sentencing information was properly admitted in the 
                     
 
3 As originally enacted in 1994, the defendant could only 
introduce such evidence if the Commonwealth had first 
introduced evidence of prior convictions.  The following year, 
however, the General Assembly amended the statute to provide 
that the defendant might introduce his “evidence related to 
punishment” whether the Commonwealth had introduced a record 
of prior convictions or not.  1995 Acts, ch. 567. 
 
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Commonwealth’s case in chief at the penalty phase of the 
trial, we will reverse the judgment appealed from and remand 
the case to the Court of Appeals for further remand to the 
trial court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion, limited to the issue of sentencing, pursuant to the 
provisions of Code § 19.2-295.1. 
Reversed and remanded. 
JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE AGEE joins, dissenting. 
 
 
I respectfully dissent because I cannot reconcile the 
majority’s conclusion with either the letter or the spirit of 
Virginia’s bifurcated scheme for the trial of non-capital 
felonies and Class 1 misdemeanors. 
 
The premise underlying the majority’s holding is that in 
Bassett v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 844, 284 S.E.2d 844 (1981), 
“we were presented with the precise question presented by this 
appeal.”  I disagree.  In that case, the defendant objected to 
the admission of information concerning his prior sentences on 
the basis that the evidence lacked probative value and was 
unduly prejudicial.  Brief of Appellant at 61, Bassett v. 
Commonwealth, 222 Va. 844, 284 S.E.2d 844 (1981) (Record No. 
810301).  Neither the litigants nor the Court discussed the 
meaning of the phrases “record of convictions” in Code § 19.2-
264.2 or “prior history” in Code § 19.2-264.4(C).  Instead, we 
 
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were concerned only with subsection B of Code § 19.2-264.4, 
which states, “[E]vidence may be presented as to any matter 
which the court deems relevant to sentence.”  The Court 
rejected the defendant’s argument, concluding that evidence of 
the sentences previously imposed on the defendant was relevant 
to “the gravity of the offense and [the defendant’s] 
propensity for violence” under Code § 19.2-264.4(B) and, 
therefore, admissible.  Bassett, 222 Va. at 858, 284 S.E.2d at 
853. 
 
That the Court in Bassett did not purport to ascribe 
definitions to the terms “record of convictions” and “prior 
history” undercuts the majority’s reasoning.  It is axiomatic 
that we cannot presume that the General Assembly, in enacting 
Code § 19.2-295.1, relied on our interpretation of statutory 
language in Bassett when we never undertook any such 
interpretation in the first place.  Consequently, I turn to 
other canons of statutory interpretation to ascertain the 
General Assembly’s intent in Code § 19.2-295.1. 
In my view, a proper analysis begins with an examination 
of the words the General Assembly used, rather than those it 
did not.  See Chase v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 266 Va. 544, 
547, 587 S.E.2d 521, 522 (2003).  The plain language of Code 
§ 19.2-295.1 requires the Commonwealth to present “the 
defendant’s prior criminal convictions by certified, attested 
 
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or exemplified copies of the record of conviction.”  Our 
decisions recognize the term “conviction” often embraces more 
than a jury’s verdict finding a defendant guilty.  Rather, in 
contexts such as this one, it entails a “[j]udgment . . . 
entered on [the] verdict.”  Ramdass v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 
518, 520, 450 S.E.2d 360, 361 (1994) (emphasis added).  In 
Smith v. Commonwealth, 134 Va. 589, 113 S.E. 707 (1922), this 
Court held: 
“[W]hen the context of the statute refers to the 
successive steps in a criminal case, or any 
particular stage of such a prosecution, as 
distinguished from others, th[e] words[, 
conviction or convicted,] apply simply and solely 
to the verdict of guilty; but where the reference 
is to the ascertainment of guilt in another 
proceeding, in its bearings upon the status or 
rights of the individual in a subsequent case, 
there a broader meaning attaches to the 
expressions, and a ‘conviction’ is not 
established, or a person deemed to have been 
‘convicted’ unless it is shown that a judgment 
has been pronounced upon the verdict.” 
Id. at 598, 113 S.E. at 710 (quoting People v. Fabian, 85 N.E. 
672, 675 (N.Y. 1908)); see also White v. Commonwealth, 79 Va. 
611, 615−16 (1884). 
 
In the context of a bifurcated trial under Code § 19.2-
295.1, the phrase “prior criminal convictions” refers to the 
“ascertainment of guilt in another proceeding” that will bear 
upon “the status or rights” of a defendant in a subsequent 
criminal adjudication.  Smith, 134 Va. at 598, 113 S.E. at 
 
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710.  In my view, it does not refer to the mere verdict of 
guilt or “fact of conviction.”  Thus, a defendant’s prior 
criminal convictions necessarily means the judgments 
pronounced upon verdicts of guilt.  Id.
In this case, the Commonwealth carried out its statutory 
duty by introducing a certified copy of the order of judgment 
pronounced upon a trial court’s verdict finding Gillispie 
guilty of grand larceny.  Neither the majority nor the parties 
argue that there is anything anomalous about the inclusion of 
sentencing information in a trial court’s judgment of 
conviction.  The majority concludes, however, that the 
Commonwealth can introduce “only the fact of conviction of a 
criminal offense, including the name of the crime, the date of 
the conviction and the court in which the conviction 
occurred.”  To comply with the majority’s holding, redaction 
of a significant portion of information set forth in judgments 
of conviction, which are the most common and reliable 
documentation of a defendant’s “record of conviction,” will be 
required as a matter of course.  I do not believe the General 
Assembly intended such an absurd result.  See, e.g., Cook v. 
Commonwealth, 268 Va. 111, 116, 594 S.E.2d 597, 87 (2004). 
 
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Nor is the majority’s conclusion in accord with the 
General Assembly’s purposes in enacting a bifurcated trial 
procedure for non-capital, felony cases. 
 
When we know the object of a statute and are 
called upon to construe a phrase or a sentence 
which, standing alone, may be susceptible of 
different interpretations, we know of no safer rule 
than to take the statute by its four corners and 
critically examine it as a whole to ascertain the 
legislative intent, as manifested by its different 
provisions. If, upon such an examination, an 
interpretation can be made, consistent with the 
language used, which will carry into effect the 
object sought to be accomplished by the statute, 
that interpretation should be adopted, in preference 
to one which would be equally consistent with the 
language used, standing alone, but which would 
defeat, or tend to defeat, the manifest intent of 
the legislature. 
 
Harris v. Commonwealth, 142 Va. 620, 625, 128 S.E. 578, 579 
(1925). 
Criminal punishment is the means by which an orderly 
state pursues the recognized ends of prevention, restraint, 
rehabilitation, deterrence, education, retribution, and 
restoration.  1.5 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law 
§ 1.5 (2d ed. 2003 & Supp. 2007); see also Byrd v. 
Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 371, 375, 517 S.E.2d 243, 245 (1999) 
(“the purposes underlying the punishment of criminal conduct 
include deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and 
retribution”).  With these goals in mind, a jury has the duty 
to fix “a specific term of confinement that it considers to be 
 
15
an appropriate punishment under all the circumstances revealed 
by the evidence in the case.”  Fishback v. Commonwealth, 260 
Va. 104, 113, 532 S.E.2d 629, 633 (2000).  We have held, “A 
jury should not be required to perform this critical and 
difficult responsibility without the benefit of all 
significant and appropriate information.”  Id.  That the 
effectiveness of previous attempts to rehabilitate, deter, or 
educate a particular defendant is “significant and appropriate 
information” for a jury to consider is beyond serious 
question.  See Bassett, 222 Va. at 858, 284 S.E.2d at 853.  
Thus, in my view, the General Assembly’s purpose in enacting 
Code § 19.2-295.1 was to advance “truth in sentencing.”  
Fishback, 260 Va. at 113, 532 S.E.2d at 632. 
 
The majority opinion, however, is not in accord with that 
purpose.  If the majority believes the General Assembly had 
another purpose in mind when it enacted Code § 19.2-295.1, its 
opinion does not disclose it. 
The better view is that the General Assembly did not 
intend to limit the evidence admissible in the Commonwealth’s 
case in chief in the penalty phase of a non-capital, felony 
trial to the mere fact of a defendant’s prior convictions.  I 
cannot ascribe a meaning to the provisions of Code § 19.2-
295.1 that would impede a jury’s ability to “fashion[] a 
sentence suitable both to [the] defendant and the offense.”  
 
16
Gilliam v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 519, 524, 465 S.E.2d 592, 
595 (1996).  For these reasons, I respectfully dissent and 
would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and find 
that the sentencing information at issue was properly admitted 
in the Commonwealth’s case in chief during the penalty phase 
of Gillispie’s trial. 
 
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