Title: Becky S. Torrey v. Leesburg Regional Medical Center

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC95841
____________
BECKY S. TORREY, etc., 
Petitioner,
vs.
LEESBURG REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, et al.,
Respondents.
[October 26, 2000]
SHAW, J.
We have for review Torrey v. Leesburg Regional Medical Center, 731 So. 2d
748 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), which expressly and directly conflicts with Szteinbaum v.
Kaes Inversiones y Valores, C.A., 476 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).  We have
jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  This case asks us to determine whether
a complaint filed and signed by an attorney not licensed to practice in Florida is a
nullity or an amendable defect.  We hold that it is the latter. 
On September 16, 1997, Becky Torrey, personal representative of the estate
-2-
of Helen Rose Woodard, filed a wrongful death complaint alleging medical
malpractice against Leesburg Regional Medical Center and Drs. Kenneth Kupke
and Robert Hux.  The complaint alleged that Woodward died on October 3, 1995,
from complications during the induction of anesthesia prior to surgery.
The complaint was prepared and signed by a Michigan attorney (plaintiff’s
attorney), not licensed to practice in Florida.  The attorney also signed the notice of
intent to file a medical malpractice claim required by section 766.106(2), Florida
Statutes (1999).  The notice of intent was dated February 7, 1997.
On November 4, 1997, defendant Kupke filed a motion to disqualify
plaintiff’s attorney pursuant to Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.060(b). 
However, the motion did not request dismissal of the complaint.  Rule 2.060(b)
provides:
(b) Foreign Attorneys.  Attorneys of other states
shall not engage in a general practice in Florida unless
they are members of The Florida Bar in good standing. 
Upon verified motion filed with a court showing that an
attorney is an active member in good standing of the bar
of another state, attorneys of other states may be
permitted to appear in particular cases in a Florida court. 
A motion for permission to appear shall be submitted
with or before the attorney’s initial personal appearance,
motion, or pleading.  The motion shall state all
jurisdictions in which the attorney is an active member in
good standing of the bar and shall state the number of
cases in which the attorney has filed a motion for
1  The statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions is two years.  See § 95.11(4)(b),
Fla. Stat. (1999).  However, the 90-day presuit period triggered by the filing of the notice of intent
required under section 766.102(6) tolls the limitations period.  Section 766.106(4), Florida Statutes
(1999),  provides:
(4)  The notice of intent to initiate litigation shall be served
within the time limits set forth in s. 95.11.  However, during the 90-day
period, the statute of limitations is tolled as to all potential defendants. 
Accordingly, in the instant case the petitioner’s filing of a notice of intent on February 7, 1997, tolled
the statute of limitations period so that it would have expired on or about January 5, 1998.  See Hankey
v. Yarian, 755 So. 2d 93, 97 (Fla. 2000) (“[W]e hold the two-year statute of limitations under section
-3-
permission to appear in Florida in the preceding 3 years.
Plaintiff’s attorney responded to the motion to disqualify on January 27,
1998, admitting that he was not licensed to practice in Florida but indicating that
others at his firm were members of The Florida Bar.  He requested that the court
deny the motion to disqualify, or enter an order allowing him to appear on behalf of
the plaintiff.  
The court held a hearing on January 29, 1998,  at the beginning of which the
trial court approved the appearance of Florida counsel as co-counsel for the
plaintiff.  Thereafter, defendant Kupke argued for dismissal of the complaint, not
disqualification of the plaintiff’s attorney, maintaining that the complaint signed by
the Michigan attorney was a nullity.  This argument was adopted by all of the
defendants but by this time the statute of limitations had expired on the plaintiff’s
medical malpractice claim.1  The trial court, concerned with the harshness of a
95.11(4)(b) is suspended (“tolled”) for ninety days under section 766.104(4) . . . .”).
-4-
dismissal, asked plaintiff’s attorney to submit evidence, if any, of excusable
neglect.  
In response, the attorney filed an affidavit stating that he prepared and signed
the complaint under the belief the statute of limitations would expire on October 3,
1997, rather than January 5, 1998, given the tolling of the statute during the ninety-
day presuit period. 
The court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice on June 22,
1998, relying on rule 2.060(b) and Lincoln American Life Insurance Co. v. Parris,
390 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).  In Lincoln, the First District reversed a trial
court’s denial of a motion to set aside a default where the trial court treated the
defendant’s answer to the plaintiff’s complaint as a nullity because it was signed by
a lawyer not admitted to practice in Florida although others at his firm were so
admitted.  The First District held the lawyer’s violation of rule 2.060(b) the product
of excusable neglect, concluding that the attorney’s misconduct was mitigated by
the shortness of time available to the out-of-state defendant “to serve a timely
answer, and by counsel’s apparent intention to secure Florida counsel for further
appearances.” Id. at 149.  In the instant case, the trial court emphasized that the
plaintiff’s attorney had not provided any evidence of excusable neglect as almost
-5-
one year expired between the filing of the notice of intent to initiate litigation and the
appearance of local counsel.
On appeal, the Fifth District affirmed the dismissal without prejudice, framing
the issue as “whether a complaint filed by an attorney not authorized to practice law
in Florida is a nullity and thus not correctable by amendment adding the name of an
authorized lawyer, or . . . merely an unauthorized filling that is validated upon entry
into the case of a lawyer authorized to practice in this state.”  Torrey v. Leesburg
Reg’l Med. Ctr., 731 So. 2d 748, 748 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999).  The Fifth District,
rather than undertake the excusable neglect approach undertaken by the trial court
under Lincoln, seemingly opted for a bright line rule in holding the complaint a
“nullity not subject to correction.”  Id. at 749.  In so holding, the court cited to the
established rule that corporations must be represented by counsel.  See Daytona
Migi Corp. v. Daytona Automotive Fiberglass, Inc., 417 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 5th DCA
1982) (holding a notice of appeal signed by a non-attorney corporate officer a
nullity); Quinn v. Housing Auth. of Orlando, 385 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
(reversing summary judgment in favor of corporate housing authority, holding its
complaint signed and filed by a non-attorney void); Nicholson Supply Co. v. First
Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 184 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1966) (affirming trial
court’s striking of plaintiff corporation’s complaint holding the complaint a nullity
2  The Fifth District also cited Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.060(d) in support of the
trial court’s dismissal, which provides in pertinent part:
(d) Pleadings to be Signed.  Every pleading and other paper
of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least 1
attorney of record in that attorney’s individual name whose address,
telephone number, including area code, and Florida Bar number shall
be stated, and who shall be duly licensed to practice law in Florida or
who shall have received permission to appear in the particular case as
provided in subdivision (b). . . . The signature of an attorney shall
constitute a certificate by the attorney that the attorney has read the
pleading or other paper; that to the best of the attorney’s knowledge,
information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is
not interposed for delay.  If a pleading is not signed or is signed with
intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be stricken and the
action may proceed as though the pleading or other paper had not been
served.  
3  Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.500(d) provides that a court may set aside a default in
accordance with rule 1.540(b).  Rule 1.540(b) provides in pertinent part:
-6-
where it was filed and signed by the corporation’s non-attorney president).2 
Lincoln’s Excusable Neglect Approach
While at first glance the Fifth District’s nullity holding may appear inapposite
to the First District’s excusable neglect approach, the different procedural postures
of the cases appear to account for the seemingly incongruous treatment.  
In Lincoln, as noted earlier,  the First District heard an appeal from the denial
of a motion to set aside a default.  Under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540, a
showing of excusable neglect is one of the grounds upon which an aggrieved party
can be relieved from a default judgment.  See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b).3  In the
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly
Discovered Evidence; Fraud; etc.  On motion and upon such terms
as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party’s legal
representative from a final judgment, decree, order or proceeding for
the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect . . . .
(Emphasis added.) 
-7-
present case, the Fifth District heard an appeal from the grant of a motion to
dismiss to which a showing of excusable neglect or any of the other enumerated
grounds under 1.540(b) would not appear relevant.  This procedural distinction is
further illustrated by the Fifth District’s approach in Moreno Construction, Inc. v.
Clancy & Theys Construction Co., 722 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999).   In
Moreno the defendant corporation appealed from the trial court’s denial of a
motion to set aside a default final judgment entered after the trial court found that
the corporation had filed no responsive pleading where its answer was filed by its
non-attorney corporate president.  The Fifth District reversed the trial court, finding
excusable neglect where the corporate president indicated that he was not aware
that a corporation required representation by counsel in circuit court and where the
corporation immediately hired counsel once the trial court dispelled its erroneous
belief.  In so holding, the court noted:
In reaching this conclusion we have considered
Florida’s common law rule that pleadings filed by a non-
-8-
lawyer on behalf of another are a nullity.  The rule is the
product of the policy against the unauthorized practice of
law.  However, under the facts of this case, to
mechanically apply the rule to prohibit a finding of
excusable neglect places form over substance and fails to
serve the underlying policy.  See Szteinbaum v. Kaes
Inversiones y Valores, C.A., 476 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1985).  In this case, Florida’s policy that cases
should be tried on their merits whenever possible prevails. 
 
Moreno, 722 So. 2d at 978.
The Third District’s approach in Szteinbaum, however, cannot be similarly
reconciled with the Fifth District’s decision in the present case.
Szteinbaum
In Szteinbaum, the Third District addressed the question of “whether a
complaint filed by a non-attorney on behalf of a corporation may be amended to
cure this deficiency.” Szteinbaum, 476 So. 2d  at 247.  The plaintiff in Szteinbaum,
a corporation, filed and served a complaint without the signature of an attorney. 
The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint and the trial court granted the
motion with leave to amend.  Thereafter, the corporate plaintiff filed an amended
complaint signed by an attorney and served it by mail on the defendant’s attorney. 
The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint contending that because the original
complaint filed by a non-attorney was a nullity, personal service of the amended
4  See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190(a) (“Leave of court [to amend] shall be given freely when justice
so requires”); see also North Am. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Bergeron Land Dev., Inc., 745 So. 2d 359,
362 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (“Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.190(a) provides that leave to amend
shall be liberally granted.  As a general rule, ‘[l]eave to amend should not be denied unless the privilege
has been abused, there is prejudice to the opposing party, or amendment would be futile.’”); Odom v.
Canal Ins. Co., 582 So. 2d 1203, 1205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (“A liberal  construction of [rule
1.190(a)] is particularly appropriate in cases like this one where the proposed amendment would not
change the basic issue in the case or materially vary the originally asserted grounds for relief.”).  
-9-
complaint was required.  The trial court denied the motion. 
On appeal, the Third District, citing the policy favoring the resolution of
cases on the merits and the liberal rules governing the amendment of pleadings,4
held the complaint defective but not a nullity and therefore correctable by
amendment.  Nevertheless, the Third District qualified this right to amend by
borrowing from the excusable neglect approach pertinent to motions to set aside
defaults:
As in the default cases, the decision of whether to
dismiss a complaint without leave to amend should be
controlled by considerations of the fault and diligence of
the plaintiff corporation and the prejudice to the
defendant as they appear in the individual case.  In the
present case, there is no indication that the errant
complaint prejudiced the defendant in any way or that the
plaintiff corporation acted with knowledge that it was
improper for it, without counsel, to prepare and file the
initial complaint.  On the other hand, there is a strong
indication that the plaintiff corporation acted with
diligence in immediately obtaining counsel after being
given leave to do so. 
-10-
Szteinbaum, 476 So. 2d at 252.  
The respondents argue that the Szteinbaum approach can be distinguished
and limited to the corporate setting because unlike a corporation, here the petitioner
as a natural person could have signed the complaint herself.  The policies guiding
the Szteinbaum decision, however, are not susceptible to such a limitation.
The respondents further argue that allowing a complaint signed by an
attorney not licensed to practice in the state to be amended would render the
prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law meaningless.  As noted by the
Szteinbaum court, however, the nullity rule is ill-suited to promote the policy served
by the rule against the unauthorized practice of law:
To be sure, the “protection of the public from
incompetent, unethical, or irresponsible representation,”
through the prevention of the unauthorized practice of law
is a compelling public policy.  We suggest, however, that
this latter policy is not served by a rule of law that
declares that a complaint filed by a non-attorney on behalf
of a corporation cannot be cured by the later appearance
of counsel to represent the corporation and, moreover,
that such a rule disserves the policy that cases should be
decided on their merits.
Id. at 249-50 (citation omitted); see also Telepower Communications, Inc. v. LTI
Vehicle Leasing Corp., 658 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (allowing the
appellant corporation an opportunity to amend its notice of appeal signed by a non-
5  In Fruin v. Northwestern Medical Faculty Foundation, Inc., 551 N.E. 2d 1010 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990), the court affirmed the dismissal with prejudice of the plaintiff’s medical malpractice complaint as
a nullity where it was signed and filed by an attorney not licensed to practice in Illinois: “Generally, a
pleading signed by a person not licensed to practice in Illinois is a nullity.” Id. at 1011.
-11-
attorney in accordance with Szteinbaum). 
As emphasized by the Third District in Szteinbaum, the nullity rule truly
places the burden on the unwary litigant, not the offending attorney:  “Indeed,
prohibiting amendment and dismissing as a nullity the complaint would yield the
ironic result of prejudicing the constituents of the corporation, the very people
sought to be protected by the rule against the unauthorized practice of law.” 
Szteinbaum, 476 So. 2d at 250.  A similar observation was made by the Fourth
District Appellate Court of  Illinois in McEvers v. Stout, 578 N.E. 2d 321 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1991).  The McEvers court  allowed the plaintiffs to amend their medical
malpractice complaint after the expiration of the statute of limitations where the
original complaint was dismissed as a nullity because it was filed by an attorney not
licensed to practice in Illinois.  The court concluded that the nullity rule exacted too
harsh a penalty on litigants: “[W]e find the Fruin[5] rule provides a result that is too
harsh. . . .  Underlying our decision is the recognition that a nullity rule appears to
punish the litigant rather than the offending attorney.  This might be advisable, if we
could legitimately assume that litigants are aware of the rules relating to the practice
6  Rule 10-1.1 of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar provides that this Court has “inherent
jurisdiction to prohibit the unlicensed practice of law.”  Further, rule 10-2.1(b) defines a nonlawyer or
nonattorney for purposes of chapter 10 to include “lawyers admitted in other jurisdictions.”  Finally,
rules 10-7.1 and 10-7.2 allow for petitions to be filed seeking injunctive relief and indirect criminal
contempt respectively.  An offending attorney could also potentially be subject to criminal charges.  See
§ 454.23, Fla. Stat. (1999).
7  By way of illustration, in the instant case the Michigan attorney could be subject to discipline
in his home state.  See Mich. R. Prof. Cond. 5.5(a)(“A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction
where doing so violates the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction.”); Mich. State Bar R.
16 (“The State Bar of Michigan is hereby authorized and empowered to investigate matters pertaining
to the unauthorized practice of law and, with the authority of its Board of Commissioners, to file and
prosecute actions and proceedings with regard to such matters.”).
-12-
of law.  Assuming such would be unreasonable.”  Id. at 322.
We conclude that there are better suited mechanisms available to discourage
the unlicensed practice of law.  An attorney engaging in the unlicensed practice of
law is subject to injunctive relief and indirect criminal contempt under Chapter 10 of
the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, which governs the investigation and
prosecution of the unlicensed practice of law.6  Additionally, an offending attorney
would presumably be subject to disciplinary action in his or her home jurisdiction.7 
These mechanisms, unlike the nullity rule, appropriately focus on the misconduct of 
the offending attorney rather than unduly penalizing litigants with dismissal of their
complaints. 
Finally, the respondents argue that the petitioner is not entitled to relief under
Szteinbaum because, as the trial court concluded, the petitioner has not established
8  We note that allowing amendment of these pleadings does not run afoul of Florida Rule of
Judicial Administration 2.060(d), which provides that “[i]f a pleading is not signed or is signed with
intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be stricken and the action may proceed as though the
pleading or other paper had not been served.” (Emphasis added.)  As stated by the Third District in
Szteinbaum:
Thus, neither the current Florida Rule of Judicial Administration
2.060(d), nor the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure in effect at the time
of the Nicholson case mandate that complaints improperly filed by non-
attorneys be stricken.  The fact that the rules permit such errant
pleadings to stand demonstrates that the holding of Nicholson that such
an improper pleading should be stricken as a nullity necessarily is
bottomed on the common law proscription against corporations
representing themselves pro se rather than any governing rule or statute.
Szteinbaum, 476 So. 2d at 249 n. 4.
-13-
excusable neglect.  While the trial court determined that the petitioner did not
establish excusable neglect, the court does not appear to have considered the other
factors weighed by the Szteinbaum court of prejudice to the opposing parties and
the policy favoring resolution of cases on the merits.  Nevertheless, although we
agree with the Szteinbaum court’s rejection of the nullity rule, we believe that the
policy of allowing cases to be decided on the merits whenever possible and the
protection of litigants from the dangers associated with the unlicensed practice of
law are best served by a rule of law that allows amendment of these defective
pleadings without requiring the establishment of excusable neglect.  Accordingly,
consistent with the liberal rules regarding the amendment of pleadings,8 we
conclude that a trial court must allow litigants a reasonable amount of time to
-14-
amend their complaints with the appearance of authorized counsel.  A dismissal
should only be granted if the party fails to timely amend his or her pleading. 
Consistent with this approach, we quash Torrey and approve Szteinbaum to the
extent consistent with this decision and remand for proceedings consistent
therewith.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
QUINCE, J., concurs in result only.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Direct Conflict
Fifth District - Case No. 5D98-2024 
(Lake County)
Roger E. Craig of Roger E. Craig & Associates, Naples, Florida, 
for Petitioner
Larry D. Hall and William W. Large of Hill, Reis, Adams, Hall & Schieffelin, P.A.,
Orlando, Florida; Jeffrey S. Badgley, Rafael E. Martinez, and Ruth C. Osborne of
McEwan, Martinez, Luff, Dukes & Ruffier, P.A., Orlando, Florida; and G. Franklin
Bishop, III of Bussey, White, McDonough and Freeman, P.A., Orlando, Florida,
for Respondents
-15-