Title: Taylor v. Estate of Taylor

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Taylor v. Estate of Taylor1986 WY 121719 P.2d 234Case Number: 85-64Decided: 05/23/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
Harry L. 
TAYLOR, Appellant (Petitioner),

 
 
v.

 
 
ESTATE OF 
Gilbert B. TAYLOR, Robert L. Morrison and Weston R. Barker, Executors and 
Individually; Reba Taylor, Ginger Walker, Gilbert Darin Taylor, Jolynne Hill, 
Gay Ann Perez, Melanie Jean Halford and Kimberly Kennedy, Appellees 
(Respondents).

 
 
Appeal 
from District Court, Uinta County, Robert B. Ranck, J.

 
 
Richard J. 
Mulligan, Jackson, for appellant 
(petitioner).

 
 
Timothy O. 
Beppler, Vehar, Beppler, Jacobson, Lavery & Rose, P.C., Evanston, for 
appellee (respondent), Weston R. Barker.

 
 
George S. 
Andrews, Andrews, Andrews & Boal, Evanston, for appellee (respondent), Reba 
Taylor.

 
 
Harry L. 
Harris, Harris & Harris, Evanston, for appellees (respondents), Ginger 
Walker, Gilbert Darin Taylor, Jolynne Hill, Gay Ann Perez, Melanie Jean Halford 
and Kimberly Kennedy.

 
 
Before THOMAS, C.J., BROWN, CARDINE and 
ROONEY,* JJ., and RAPER, J., 
Retired.

 
 

*Retired 
November 30, 1985.

 
 

THOMAS, Chief 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     The key issue upon 
which the resolution of this case depends is whether the appellees are estopped 
from asserting applicable statutes of limitations in defending against the 
appellant's claims. The basis for the asserted estoppel is fraud on the part of 
some of the appellees and the predecessors in interest of others. There are 
incidental issues with respect to the jurisdiction of the district court in a 
collateral attack upon a will; the applicability of particular statutes of 
limitations; the propriety of an order dismissing the appellant's case with 
prejudice; and the identity of proper parties in an action collaterally 
attacking a probate proceeding on the grounds of fraud. The district court 
properly dismissed the appellant's complaint with prejudice because his claims 
are barred by the statutes of limitations, and the asserted estoppel does not 
inhibit the reliance upon those statutes of limitations by the appellees. We 
affirm the order of the trial court dismissing this case with 
prejudice.

 
 

[¶2.]     We take as true the 
material facts alleged in the complaint in reviewing an order of dismissal. 
Lewis v. State Board of Control, Wyo., 699 P.2d 822 (1985); Carbon County School 
District No. 2 v. Wyoming State Hospital, Wyo., 680 P.2d 773 (1984); Moxley v. 
Laramie Builders, Inc., Wyo., 600 P.2d 733 (1979). It is alleged that Bertha L. 
Taylor, the mother of Harry L. Taylor, the appellant, and Gilbert B. Taylor, 
died in 1967.1 An instrument purporting to be the 
Last Will and Testament of Bertha L. Taylor was admitted to probate in April of 
1968, and the time has expired for appealing from that order. Gilbert B. Taylor 
was appointed to serve as executor of the Estate of Bertha L. Taylor; the estate 
has been closed; and the time for appealing the order of distribution from that 
estate has expired. The instrument purporting to be the Last Will and Testament 
of Bertha L. Taylor was a forged instrument drawn and executed by Gilbert B. 
Taylor or someone else after the death of Bertha L. Taylor. Gilbert B. Taylor 
received all of the property of the Estate of Bertha L. Taylor except for 
$20,000.

 
 

[¶3.]     In September of 1983 
Gilbert B. Taylor died, and his will was admitted to probate in October of 1983. 
Robert L. Morrison and Weston R. Barker were appointed to be and served as the 
personal representatives of the Estate of Gilbert B. Taylor. In that capacity 
Weston R. Barker, the survivor of the personal representatives, at the time of 
the filing of the complaint in this case, was about to make final distribution 
to the remainder of the appellees, Reba Taylor, Ginger Walker, Gilbert Darin 
Taylor, Jolynne Hill, Gay Ann Perez, Melanie Jean Halford and Kimberly Kennedy 
who were the heirs of Gilbert B. Taylor. The gravamen of the complaint in this 
case is that Gilbert B. Taylor committed a malicious and intentional act of 
fraud against the appellant by forging the instrument which was represented to 
be the Last Will and Testament of Bertha L. Taylor. This conduct is alleged to 
have prevented the appellant from receiving his share of the assets of the 
Estate of Bertha L. Taylor.

 
 

[¶4.]     The complaint was met 
by a battery of motions to dismiss. The first was filed by the appellee, Weston 
R. Barker, and it asserted failure to state a claim against the defendant upon 
which relief could be granted together with the bar of §§ 1-3-105(a)(iv)(D), 
2-6-301, 2-6-306, 2-7-706, and 2-7-718, W.S. 1977. This motion also asserted 
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter which was alleged to be exclusively 
within the probate court. In a separate motion Weston R. Barker moved for the 
dismissal of the action as to the Estate of Gilbert B. Taylor and as to Robert 
L. Morrison on the grounds that any action against the estate should be 
maintained by or against the personal representative and that Robert L. Morrison 
was deceased. Next the appellees who are the heirs of Gilbert B. Taylor other 
than Reba Taylor filed a motion to dismiss asserting lack of jurisdiction over 
the subject matter and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted. Finally, Reba Taylor moved for an order dismissing the action in which 
she asserted lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, failure to state a 
cause of action, and the bar of the statutes of limitations. It is clear from a 
brief filed in support of their motion to dismiss that the failure to state a 
claim asserted by the heirs other than Reba Taylor also was premised upon a 
reliance upon the appropriate statutes of limitations. After the motions to 
dismiss had been filed the appellant moved to substitute the personal 
representative of the Estate of Robert L. Morrison as a party to the 
proceedings. The court held a hearing on the motions to dismiss, and it 
ultimately entered an order of dismissal which found generally that all the 
motions to dismiss should be granted and ordered that the petition and complaint 
be dismissed with prejudice.

 
 

[¶5.]     This appeal is taken 
from that order. Against this factual background the appellant asserts the 
following issues to be resolved:

 
 
"THE 
DISTRICT COURT INCORRECTLY DISMISSED APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO STATE 
A CLAIM FOR FRAUD UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED.

 
 
"a. THE 
DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT DISMISSED APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT WITH 
PREJUDICE.

 
 
"b. THE 
PROPER RELIEF SHOULD HAVE BEEN TO ALLOW THE APPELLANT TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT 
PURSUANT TO RULE 15(a).

 
 
"2. THE 
APPELLEES ARE ESTOPPED, DUE TO FRAUDULENT CONDUCT, FROM ASSERTING THE STATUTES 
OF LIMITATION AS A DEFENSE TO THE ACTION.

 
 
"3. THE 
DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION OF THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS ACTION; TO WIT, AN 
ACTION CAN BE MAINTAINED ATTACKING A PROBATE PROCEEDING UNDER WHICH A FINAL 
DISTRIBUTION HAS BEEN MADE.

 
 
"4. 
APPELLEES, ESTATE OF GILBERT TAYLOR AND ESTATE OF ROBERT MORRISON, ARE PROPER 
PARTIES TO THIS ACTION IN THAT CAUSES OF ACTION FOR FRAUD AGAINST APPELLEES 
SURVIVE DEATH."

 
 

[¶6.]     The several appellees 
have differing statements of the issues. G.D. Taylor, Hill, Perez, Halford, 
Walker and Kennedy submit:

 
 
"I. DID 
APPELLANT EXERCISE REASONABLE DILIGENCE IN ASCERTAINING WHETHER HE HAD A CAUSE 
OF ACTION FOR FRAUD PRIOR TO EXPIRATION OF THE FOUR (4) YEAR PERIOD OF 
LIMITATION ALLOWED UNDER SECTION 1-3-105(a)(iv)(D).

 
 
"II. 
WHETHER BY VIRTUE OF GILBERT B. TAYLOR'S FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP, EITHER HE OR 
HIS ESTATE IS PERMANENTLY ESTOPPED FROM PLEADING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS OR 
LACHES AS A DEFENSE.

 
 
"III. DOES 
THE DISTRICT COURT, THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR UINTA COUNTY, WYOMING, 
HAVE JURISDICTION OF THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS ACTION?"

 
 
Reba 
Taylor presents this proposition:

 
 
"APPELLANT'S 
CLAIM IS BARRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE APPELLANT FAILED TO COMMENCE AN 
ACTION WITHIN THIRTY DAYS AFTER RECEIVING NOTICE THAT HIS CLAIM AGAINST THE 
ESTATE HAD BEEN REJECTED, AS REQUIRED BY WYOMING STATUTE 2-7-718 
(1977)."

 
 
Weston R. 
Barker raises these questions:

 
 
"I. 
WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING APPELLANT'S PETITION AND 
COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE.

 
 
"II. 
WHETHER THE ESTATES OF GILBERT B. TAYLOR AND ROBERT L. MORRISON ARE PROPER 
PARTIES TO THIS ACTION."

 
 

[¶7.]     The trial court was 
correct in ordering the dismissal of the petition and complaint with prejudice 
if the appellant's action is barred by the statutes of limitations asserted by 
the appellees. We conclude that the appellant's action was barred by the 
statutes of limitations unless the appellees were estopped from raising them as 
a defense to the appellant's claims. Under Wyoming law the appellees were not 
estopped, and we therefore need not decide the questions relating to the 
identity of the parties and the jurisdiction of the district 
court.

 
 

[¶8.]     A summary of the 
requirements of the several statutes of limitations which have some application 
is appropriate. When Bertha L. Taylor's will was admitted to probate the 
statutes provided that any interested person could at any time within six months 
after such probate contest the same or the validity of the will, § 2-83, W.S. 
1957. Section 2-89, W.S. 1957, provided that if no person contested the probate 
or the validity of the will within six months the probate of the will would be 
conclusive. The concession of the appellant that the time had expired for him to 
attack the will of Bertha L. Taylor and the proceedings for the probate of her 
estate is accurate.

 
 

[¶9.]     In attempting to pursue 
recovery from the personal representatives of the Estate of Gilbert B. Taylor, 
the appellant had to confront the provisions of the statutes of limitations 
relating to fraud. In Wyoming a four-year statute of limitations is applicable 
for actions based on fraud, § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(D), W.S. 1977. A cause of action 
for fraud does not accrue until the fraud is discovered, § 1-3-106, W.S. 1977. 
Furthermore the cause of action for fraud does survive the death of the 
individual accused of fraud, § 1-4-101, W.S. 1977. These same statutes control a 
right to recover as to those claiming any interest through Gilbert B. 
Taylor.

 
 

[¶10.]  In addition the requirements of the 
probate code must be considered in connection with the action against the 
personal representatives of the Estate of Gilbert B. Taylor. Section 2-7-201, 
W.S. 1977, provides that the personal representative of a decedent shall cause 
notice to be published of the admission of a will or estate to probate, and the 
publication shall include a notice to creditors having claims against the 
decedent to file them with the requisite vouchers within three months from the 
date of the first publication of the notice. Claims are to be filed in duplicate 
within that time according to § 2-7-703, W.S. 1977, and are required to be 
supported by an affidavit that the account is justly due and no payments have 
been made thereon which have not been credited, § 2-7-704, W.S. 1977. If the 
claim is based on a cause of action which survives death, the appropriate 
statute of limitations will be tolled from the time the claim is filed until 
five days after the date of the mailing of a notice of rejection of the claim by 
the personal representative, § 2-7-706, W.S. 1977. Section 2-7-712, W.S. 1977, 
then requires the personal representative to allow or reject the claim in 
writing within 30 days after the expiration of the time for filing claims. With 
respect to claims which are barred by the statutes of limitations, § 2-7-714, 
W.S. 1977, provides they shall not be allowed. The holder of a claim against an 
estate is inhibited from maintaining any action thereon unless the claim is 
first rejected by the personal representative and that rejection filed with the 
clerk, § 2-7-717, W.S. 1977. Section 2-7-718, W.S. 1977, then 
provides:

 
 
"When a 
claim is rejected and notice given as required, the holder shall bring suit in 
the proper court against the personal representative within thirty (30) days 
after the date of mailing the notice, otherwise the claim is forever 
barred."

 
 

[¶11.]  The petition and complaint filed in this 
case do not allege either the filing of or the rejection of a claim against the 
Estate of Gilbert B. Taylor. The trial court, however, was apprised, by virtue 
of exhibits attached to a memorandum in opposition to motions to dismiss filed 
by the appellant, that on January 19, 1984 the appellant had filed a properly 
verified claim in the Estate of Gilbert B. Taylor, but which did not make any 
claim relating to the fraud asserted in the petition and complaint. Apparently 
on the same day the appellant prepared and purported to furnish to counsel for 
the Estate of Gilbert B. Taylor an unacknowledged document which essentially 
duplicated the information on the acknowledged claim. It further referred 
to:

 
 
"1/14 Inst 
granted in the said will of Edgar L. Taylor granted and ordered by Honorable 
Judge H.R. Christmas proscribed in said will of Edgar L. Taylor father of Harry 
L. Taylor."

 
 
and 
further:

 
 
"That heir 
Harry L. Taylor ask the honorable court to grant him and undivided 1/2 interest 
in all land owned by Gilbert B Taylor at the time of his death situated in Uinta 
County State of Wyoming."

 
 
Still no 
reference is made to any fraud.

 
 

[¶12.]  The file does not disclose whether those 
claims were furnished and filed within three months after the date of the first 
publication of the notice to creditors, but it is clear that the claim was 
rejected on January 26, 1984, and the petition and complaint was filed on 
November 5, 1984. It was not filed within 30 days after the date of mailing of 
the notice of rejection. This action against the estate through the personal 
representative who survives was barred by the provisions of § 2-7-718, W.S. 
1977, unless the appellant is protected by some doctrine of 
estoppel.

 
 

[¶13.]  With respect to the general statutes of 
limitations, the appellees in part rely upon the doctrine of res judicata as it 
pertains to the probate proceedings of the will of Bertha L. Taylor. Sections 
2-83 and 2-89, W.S. 1957, briefly described above, set forth a general rule that 
decrees of distribution are final. Matter of Kimball's Estate, Wyo., 583 P.2d 1274 (1978); Stevenson v. Hall, Wyo., 473 P.2d 581 (1970). For policy reasons 
this general rule is strictly applied, and the effect is that the decree of 
distribution is final and res judicata if it is not appealed, regardless of any 
errors in the decree. Pike v. Markman, Wyo., 633 P.2d 944 (1981); Stevenson v. 
Hall, supra; In re Stevenson's Estate, Wyo., 445 P.2d 753 (1968). The one 
exception to that general rule is that the decree of distribution is subject to 
collateral attack on the grounds of fraud. Pike v. Markman, supra; Stevenson v. 
Hall, supra.

 
 

[¶14.]  Even though we recognize a potential for 
collateral attack based upon grounds of fraud, the collateral attack must be 
brought within the time prescribed in the applicable statute of limitations 
which is four years, § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(D), W.S. 1977. According to § 1-3-106, 
W.S. 1977, however, the cause of action for fraud is not deemed to have accrued 
until the discovery of the fraud. Appellant urges that he did not discover the 
fraud until January of 1984.

 
 

[¶15.]  The difficulty in appellant's position is 
that the fraud which he alleges and relies upon in this case is the forgery of 
the will of Bertha L. Taylor. We do not know whether the appellant made any 
effort to determine the validity of Bertha L. Taylor's will at the time it was 
probated. It probably makes no difference. In Kortz v. American National Bank, 
Wyo., 571 P.2d 985 (1977), we rejected as without merit an argument that the 
conclusive language in the statutes did not apply if the purported defects in 
the will could only be discovered by an actual examination of the will as filed. 
The asserted forgery of Bertha L. Taylor's will was subject to discovery; it 
could have been raised in the proceedings for the probate of her estate; and it 
does not furnish any ground now to set aside her will or impair the finality of 
the decree of distribution. Furthermore with respect to the statute of 
limitations for bringing an action for fraud this court held in Mason v. Laramie 
Rivers Company, Wyo., 490 P.2d 1062, 1064 (1971):

 
 
"[T]he 
words `until the discovery of the fraud' appearing in § 1-18 [now § 1-3-106, 
W.S. 1977] mean from the time the fraud was known or could have been discovered 
in the exercise of reasonable diligence. They do not necessarily mean until the 
party complaining had actual notice of the fraud alleged to have been 
committed."

 
 
The 
appellant does not even urge the possibility that the forgery could not have 
been discovered in the exercise of reasonable diligence at the time that Bertha 
L. Taylor's will was probated, and like the corporate records involved in Davis 
v. Harrison, 25 Wn.2d 1, 167 P.2d 1015 (1946), relied upon by this court in 
Mason v. Laramie Rivers Company, supra, the will was filed in the public record 
and the means of knowledge was open to the appellant.

 
 

[¶16.]  Unless the appellees were foreclosed from 
asserting the bar of the statutes of limitations, the trial court correctly 
dismissed the appellant's complaint with prejudice. His claim is barred by the 
four-year statute of limitations applicable to causes of action premised on 
fraud. This defense would be available to all the appellees. With respect to the 
action against the Estate of Gilbert B. Taylor, brought against his personal 
representative, the claim also would be barred by the 30-day provision in the 
probate code.

 
 

[¶17.]  The appellant urges, however, that the 
appellees should be estopped from relying upon the bar of the statutes of 
limitations. The appellant relies upon both the essential fraudulent acts of 
forging and probating a forged will and also upon a promise by Gilbert B. Taylor 
that he would see that the appellant was fairly treated in the disposition of 
his own estate. Wyoming recognizes that equitable estoppel can foreclose the 
raising of statutes of limitations defenses. Bauer v. State, ex rel Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation Division, Wyo., 695 P.2d 1048 (1985); Olson v. A.H. Robins 
Company, Inc., Wyo., 696 P.2d 1294 (1985); Turner v. Turner, Wyo., 582 P.2d 600 
(1978). The alleged forgery of the will and its probate cannot estop the 
appellees from asserting the bar of the statutes of limitations because "[i]n 
order to subject a decree of final distribution or settlement to collateral 
attack the fraud alleged must be of a type which prevented the dissatisfied 
party from having had his or her day in court." Pike v. Markman, supra, 633 P.2d  
at 948, n. 1.

 
 

[¶18.]  In Pike v. Markman, supra, no claim was 
made that the defendant had fraudulently prevented the plaintiff from raising 
the objections before the final settlement decree was entered. In this case 
there is no claim that Gilbert B. Taylor did anything which prevented the 
appellant from discovering the forgery and raising the question in the probate 
proceedings. The appellant was not denied his day in court in connection with 
the probate proceedings by virtue of any extrinsic conduct of Gilbert B. Taylor 
or any other of the appellees. We hold that in asserting estoppel, as in 
asserting the exception for fraud to permit collateral attack of the decree of 
final distribution or settlement, "`[T]he fraud relied upon must be extrinsic or 
collateral to the issues tried in the original proceeding, that is to say, the 
fraud on the part of the prevailing party must have been such as deprived the 
unsuccessful party of a fair hearing upon the original controversy.'" Ryan v. 
Plath, 18 Wn.2d 839, 140 P.2d 968 (1943), quoting from Farley v. Davis, 10 Wn.2d 62, 116 P.2d 263 (1941), which in turn was quoted with approval in Pike v. 
Markman, supra, 633 P.2d  at 947, 948, n. 1. The appellant must demonstrate some 
conduct by the appellees other than the fraud asserted with respect to the will 
which was probated in order to raise an estoppel of the claim of the bar of the 
statutes of limitations.

 
 

[¶19.]  The only extrinsic conduct alleged here 
is Gilbert B. Taylor's premise to provide for the appellant through his will. In 
Turner v. Turner, supra, 582 P.2d  at 602, the elements required to establish the 
estoppel are set forth. The delay in filing the action must be induced by the 
defendant; the defendant must have misled the plaintiff; and the plaintiff must 
have acted on the misinformation in good faith to the extent that he failed to 
pursue his action in a timely manner. The question of whether the plaintiff has 
been lulled ordinarily is one of fact, but in certain cases it is one for the 
courts. Olson v. A.H. Robins Company, Inc., supra; Turner v. Turner, supra. In 
Turner v. Turner the court pointed out that the defendant made no 
representations that he would settle the court claim without action; the 
plaintiff did not rely on any offers of the defendant; there was no inducement 
to not bring the suit within the period of limitations; and there was no promise 
that the statutes of limitations would not be asserted.

 
 

[¶20.]  All of those things essentially are true 
in this instance. The contention is made by the appellant that Gilbert B. Taylor 
told him that he would provide in his will for the appellant to receive half of 
the property received from Bertha L. Taylor. Beyond that there is no hint in 
this record that there was a promise to the appellant that if he did not 
investigate and file an action the generous provision would be made. Gilbert B. 
Taylor did not promise not to assert the statutes of limitations, and indeed, in 
light of the statutory inhibition against the approval of a claim which is 
barred by the statutes of limitations, such a promise might not survive the 
death of Gilbert B. Taylor. There is no indication that the appellant made an 
inquiry about the validity of Bertha L. Taylor's will or about the provisions in 
the will of Gilbert B. Taylor. As the court said in Olson v. A.H. Robins 
Company, Inc., supra, 696 P.2d  at 1300, "There being no showing that information 
was concealed from appellant or that facts were misrepresented to [him] and 
relied upon to [his] detriment, [he] cannot prevail upon equitable 
estoppel."

 
 

[¶21.]  There is no indication in this instance 
of any mitigating factors such as those relied upon in Bauer v. State, ex rel. 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division, supra. In that case we relaxed general 
rules because the limitations period was in a worker's compensation statute 
which is liberally construed to protect the payment of workers' rightful claims. 
We permitted the appellant there to avoid the statute because of his reliance 
upon unintentionally misleading statements by the employer. In this instance 
there is no lulling conduct which has induced the appellant to postpone the 
bringing of his action to set aside the will of Bertha L. Taylor or to recover 
from Gilbert B. Taylor on the ground of fraud.

 
 

[¶22.]  The appellant assumes that the order 
dismissing his petition and complaint was premised upon his failure to plead 
fraud with sufficient specificity. The record equally supports the proposition 
that the trial court relied upon the bar of the statutes of limitations. Even if 
appellant is right, however, we can affirm a correct judgment of the district 
court for any reason which the law justifies. Litzenberger v. Merge, Wyo., 698 P.2d 1152 (1985); Hurst v. State, Wyo., 698 P.2d 1130 (1985). In this instance 
it is clear that the claims presented by the appellant in his complaint are 
barred by either the general or the probate statutes of limitations. The claim 
that the appellees are estopped from asserting the bar of the statutes of 
limitations is without merit. Under the circumstances the order dismissing the 
complaint with prejudice must be affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 Counsel 
for the appellant conceded at the time of hearing of the motions to dismiss that 
the correct date was 1968.