Title: Matter of TLB

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Matter of TLB1989 WY 85771 P.2d 811Case Number: C-88-8Decided: 04/04/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
In the Matter 
of the Parental Rights of TLB. KAC, Appellant 
(Plaintiff/Petitioner)

 
 
v.

 
 
SR, Appellee 
(Defendant/Respondent)

 
 

Dallas J. Laird, Casper, for 
Appellant.

 
 
No appearance for Appellee. 

 
 
Cardine, C.J., and Thomas, Urbigkit, 
Macy, and Golden, JJ. 

 
 
MACY, Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This appeal is from an 
order dismissing appellant's petition to terminate child support decreed in a 
paternity action on the basis of the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel.

 
 

[¶2.]     We vacate and 
remand.

 
 

[¶3.]     Appellant phrases the 
issue as:

 
 
WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLANT IS 
JUDICIALLY ESTOPPED FROM HAVING A COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION REVIEW HIS 
PETITION TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT HE SHOULD HAVE TO PAY CHILD 
SUPPORT?

 
 

[¶4.]     On May 21, 1985, a 
child was born out of wedlock in Gillette, Wyoming, to appellant KAC (father) and 
appellee SR (mother). On July 18, 1986, of his own volition, the father filed a 
complaint in the district court pursuant to Wyo. Stat. §§ 14-2-101 to -120 
(1977),1 seeking to have his paternity 
established and the obligation of child support imposed upon him. The mother 
answered and counterclaimed, praying for the same relief in addition to 
permanent primary care, custody, and control of their child. The mother also 
requested that a guardian ad litem be appointed by the court to represent 
the child in the paternity proceeding; however, the record on appeal fails to 
reflect that one was appointed or that anyone in any capacity ever represented 
the child.

 
 

[¶5.]     On September 12, 1986, 
the father responded and requested a hearing on the matter. Before the hearing 
was held, the father and mother negotiated and entered into a written agreement 
concerning their child. In the agreement, the parties waived their rights to the 
scheduled hearing and stipulated, among other things, 
that:

 
 
1. The father was the natural father 
of the child;

 
 
2. The mother would have primary 
care, custody, and control over the child;

 
 
3. The father would have no rights 
of visitation;

 
 
4. The father would pay child 
support in the amount of $ 175 per month;

 
 
5. The mother could claim the child 
as a federal income tax exemption;

 
 
6. The father would never make 
personal contact with the mother or the child regarding the agreement or the 
child's welfare;

 
 
7. The child's birth certificate 
would not be changed to reflect the father's paternity; 
and

 
 
8. The father, by separate written 
agreement incorporated into the general agreement, relinquished all parental 
rights to the child.

 
 
The relinquishment, which consented 
to the dismissal of the father's complaint, also stated:

 
 
I relinquish all my parental rights 
to the child and will permanently and without the possibility of revocation be 
without any rights to the child including any right to custody of the child at 
any time, any right to visitation with the child, and any right to be notified 
of the whereabouts or welfare of the child.

 
 

[¶6.]     Finding that the 
parties entered into the agreement freely and voluntarily and deeming it to be 
in the best interests of the child, on March 5, 1987, the district court entered 
its "DECREE OF PATERNITY AND ORDER FOR CUSTODY AND SUPPORT" without a hearing. 
The order, in pertinent part, provided that the father was the natural father, 
that the mother would have permanent primary care, custody, and control over 
their child, that the father would not be entitled to exercise visitation rights 
with the child, and that the father would pay child support in the amount of $ 
175 per month.

 
 

[¶7.]     The father paid the 
first month's child support payment but thereafter failed to comply with the 
order. As a result, the mother filed and served a notice of delinquency upon the 
father on April 16, 1987. The father responded with a petition to stay service 
of order for withholding and notice to payor, stating:

 
 
I feel that it has not been proven 
that I am the father of the child. I feel that I am not and I feel very strongly 
about this. She has been seeing other people since we 
me[]t.

 
 
Relying upon the father's earlier 
admission of paternity contained in his complaint, the district court denied the 
petition and ordered the father's employer to withhold income for the child 
support payments from the father's wages.

 
 

[¶8.]     On November 24, 1987, 
the father filed a petition to terminate his child support obligation, arguing 
that, since his parental rights had "in essence" been terminated by the district 
court's March 5, 1987, order, he was no longer obligated to pay child support 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 14-2-317 (1977).2 The mother responded with an 
answer, a counterclaim, a motion to dismiss, and an accompanying memorandum, 
asserting that the petition should be dismissed on the grounds of res 
judicata, waiver, and judicial estoppel.

 
 

 [¶9.]    The district court, after a 
hearing, dismissed the father's petition on February 22, 1988, relying upon the 
doctrine of judicial estoppel. This appeal followed.

 
 

[¶10.]  When a paternity action is filed, § 
14-2-107 requires, in part, that:

 
 
The child shall be made a 
party to the action. If he is a minor he shall be represented by his 
guardian or a guardian ad litem appointed by the court. The child's mother or 
father may not represent the child as guardian or 
otherwise.

 
 
(Emphasis added.) Section 
14-2-108(a) further requires, in part, that:

 
 
As soon as practicable after an 
action is brought to declare the existence or nonexistence of the father and 
child relationship, an informal hearing shall be 
held.

 
 
(Emphasis added.) Section 14-2-111 
provides in substance that, on the basis of an evaluation of the information 
provided at the informal hearing, the court or referee conducting the hearing 
shall make a recommendation to the parties. This recommendation may 
include, inter alia, either that the action be dismissed as not being in 
the best interests of the child to have a judicial declaration of paternity or 
that the alleged father acknowledge his paternity of the child. This statute 
further provides that, if the parties accept the recommendation, judgment 
shall be entered accordingly or that, if a party refuses to accept the 
recommendation, the matter shall be set for trial.

 
 

[¶11.]  Notwithstanding the directives of the 
above-mentioned statutes, the child was not made a party to the action nor was a 
guardian ad litem appointed to represent the child's best interests in 
the proceeding or in negotiating the agreement which the court adopted in its 
paternity decree. Further, the agreement was not the product of the required 
informal hearing or the recommendation of the court. The mandates of the 
statutes were clearly ignored. These statutes, being in derogation of the common 
law, must be strictly construed and carefully adhered to, and the failure to do 
so renders the "DECREE OF PATERNITY AND ORDER FOR CUSTODY AND SUPPORT" entered 
in this matter void and of no force or effect. JHL v. BMG, 665 P.2d 491 
(Wyo. 
1983).

 
 

[¶12.]  It is not necessary to take any steps to 
have a void judgment vacated. Id. This Court has the inherent power 
to vacate a void judgment. Emery v. Emery, 404 P.2d 745 (Wyo. 
1965).

 
 

[¶13.]  The issue raised on appeal is moot as a 
void judgment leaves the parties in the same position as they were in before it 
was entered. JHL, 665 P.2d 491. Accordingly, the void decree of paternity 
and order for custody and support is vacated, and we remand for further 
proceedings pursuant to and in compliance with §§ 14-2-101 to -120. 

 
 

[¶14.]  Vacated and 
remanded.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Section 
14-2-104(c) provides:

 
 
An action to 
determine the existence of the father and child relationship with respect to a 
child who has no presumed father under W.S. 14-2-102 may be brought by the 
child, the department of health and social services, the mother or personal 
representative of the child, the personal representative or a parent of the 
mother if the mother has died or is a minor, a man alleged or alleging 
himself to be the father, or the personal representative or a parent of the 
alleged father if the alleged father has died or is a 
minor.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 

2Section 
14-2-317 provides in pertinent part:

 
 
An order 
terminating the parent-child legal relationship divests the parent and the child 
of all legal rights, privileges, duties and support obligations with 
respect to each other except the right of the child to inherit from the parent 
shall not be affected by the order.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)