Title: John W. Torgerson v. Journal/Sentinel, Inc.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
95-1098 and 95-1857 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
95-1098 
John W. Torgerson, 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Journal/Sentinel, Inc., 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
-------------- 
95-1857 
John W. Torgerson, 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Journal/Sentinel, Inc. 
 
Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  200 Wis. 2d 492, 546 N.W.2d 886 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1996) 
 
 
UNPUBLISHED 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 11, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
March 5, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Eau Claire 
 
JUDGE: 
Paul J. Lenz 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For plaintiff-respondent/appellant-petitioner 
there were briefs by Brian E. Butler, Meg Vergeront and Stafford, 
Rosenbaum, Rieser & Hansen, Madison and oral argument by Brian E. 
Butler. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant/respondent there was 
a brief by Robert J. Dreps, Brady C. Williamson and La Follette & 
Sinykin, Madison and oral argument by Robert J. Dreps. 
 
 
 
Nos. 95-1098 & 95-1857 
 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
Nos. 95-1098 & 95-1857 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
John W. Torgerson, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
Journal/Sentinel Inc., 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
---------------- 
John W. Torgerson, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
Journal/Sentinel Inc., 
 
 
Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 11, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This is a 
review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals,
1 
affirming in part and reversing in part a judgment and order of 
the Circuit Court for Eau Claire County, Paul J. Lenz, Judge. 
The circuit court denied the motion for summary judgment of 
                     
1 Torgerson v. Journal/Sentinel Inc., Nos. 95-1098 and 95-
1857, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 1996). 
 
 
Nos. 95-1098 & 95-1857 
 
 
2 
Journal/Sentinel, Inc. (the newspaper) in the first defamation 
action of John W. Torgerson (the plaintiff) and, in a separate 
proceeding, granted the newspaper's motion to dismiss the 
plaintiff's second action, which alleged defamation in other 
papers' republications of the originally challenged article.
2  
¶2 
The court of appeals granted the newspaper leave to 
appeal the circuit court's denial of the newspaper's motion for 
a summary judgment in the first action, and the plaintiff 
appealed the circuit court's grant of the newspaper's motion to 
dismiss the second action. The court of appeals consolidated the 
appeals. It concluded that the plaintiff failed to provide 
sufficient evidence of actual malice to go to trial, reversing 
the circuit court's denial of the newspaper's motion for summary 
judgment in the first action and affirming, on other grounds, 
the circuit court's dismissal of the second action.  
¶3 
The newspaper urges several grounds on which it is 
entitled to summary judgment: the articles are protected by a 
common law fair comment privilege, the articles make no 
actionable statements, the articles are not false and the 
                     
2 In the second action, the circuit court held that the 
plaintiff failed to comply with Wis. Stat. § 895.05(2)(1995-96), 
the libel action retraction notice provision, in regard to the 
republications because § 895.05(2) required a plaintiff in a 
libel action to give a retraction notice for all related 
publications for which it sought relief prior to filing a claim 
based on any of the publications.  
The 
plaintiff 
sought 
review 
of 
the 
circuit 
court's 
construction of the retraction notice statute. Because we 
conclude, as did the court of appeals, that the plaintiff's 
republication action fails for the same reasons as does his 
first action, we do not reach this issue. Hereafter we do not 
distinguish the two actions.  
 
 
Nos. 95-1098 & 95-1857 
 
 
3 
articles were not published with actual malice. The plaintiff 
disputes each of these grounds.  
¶4 
We conclude, as did the court of appeals, that the 
motion for summary judgment must be granted because, as a matter 
of law, there was not sufficient evidence of actual malice. Were 
the fact finder to accept the plaintiff's version of the facts, 
it could not conclude that the newspaper had published with 
actual malice, that is, with knowledge of falsity or with 
reckless disregard for the truth in making the assertions in 
question. We therefore affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
¶5 
We will discuss in turn: (1) the factual basis of the 
action; (2) the elements of a defamation action brought by a 
public figure against a media defendant; (3) the standard of 
appellate 
review 
and 
the 
appropriate 
summary 
judgment 
methodology in a public figure defamation action; and (4) the 
element of actual malice.  
I. 
¶6 
The following recitation of facts is drawn from the 
extensive depositions and exhibits supporting the motion for, 
and brief opposing, summary judgment.  
¶7 
The 
plaintiff 
served 
as 
Wisconsin's 
Deputy 
Commissioner of Insurance from January 1991 until December 1992 
and then as acting Commissioner through March 1993. While 
serving in the Office of Commissioner of Insurance (OCI), the 
plaintiff held a 50% ownership interest in and was secretary-
treasurer of a title insurance agency regulated by the OCI.  
 
 
Nos. 95-1098 & 95-1857 
 
 
4 
¶8 
In April 1991, at the plaintiff's request, Jonathan 
Becker, legal counsel for the State of Wisconsin Ethics Board, 
wrote a letter advising the plaintiff of conflicts of interest 
that might arise because of his concurrent business and 
government positions, and how to avoid them. The letter 
summarized the relevant statutes and opinions of the Ethics 
Board. It opined that the plaintiff's ownership and employment 
by a title insurer "raise[d] issues under the Ethics Code," but 
that "the Ethics Code 'does not prevent any state public 
official from accepting other employment or following any 
pursuit which in no way interferes with the full and faithful 
discharge of his or her duties to the state.'"
3 R. 21 at 10-11. 
Becker's letter provided further advice and guidance for a 
public official to avoid situations of potential conflict as 
follows: 
 
[T]he Ethics Board has recognized that if a state 
public official has a sizable investment in a business 
that the official's agency regulates, the official's 
personal interest in the performance of that business 
may 
conflict 
impermissibly 
with 
the 
official's 
regulatory responsibilities.  
 
A public officer owes an undivided duty to the public 
whom he serves and should avoid placing himself in a 
position in which a conflict of interest might 
arise. . . . Thus, in determining when and how to 
avoid situations of potential conflict I advise erring 
on the  
side of caution.  
R. 21 at 11 (citations omitted).  
¶9 
Becker's letter offered three additional pieces of 
guidance. First, it stated that, "at a minimum, it would be 
                     
3 The Code of Ethics for Public Officials and Employes is 
set forth at Wis. Stat. ch. 19, subch. III (1995-96). 
 
 
Nos. 95-1098 & 95-1857 
 
 
5 
inappropriate for you to place yourself in a position in which 
you or your business would benefit directly from a decision or 
action you took specifically in respect to your business;" 
second, "you should refrain from similar action involving the 
business of any competitors;" third, with regard to rule making, 
the plaintiff should be guided as follows: 
 
[I]n instances in which your agency is called upon to 
promulgate rules . . . you should participate only if: 
(1) your action affects the whole class of similarly 
situated businesses; (2) your business's presence in 
the class is insignificant when compared to the total 
number of members in the class; and (3) the action's 
effect on your business is neither significantly 
greater nor less than upon other members of the class. 
R. 21 at 11.  
¶10 Early in 1992 an acquaintance of the plaintiff in the 
title insurance industry suggested to the plaintiff that the OCI 
amend an administrative rule so that title insurance companies 
would be exempt from filing reports of discounted title 
insurance rates with the OCI. The plaintiff asked OCI staff 
members to draft such a rule change if they found it advisable, 
good public policy and good for the agency. The amended rule was 
drafted and, in January 1993, approved by the plaintiff.  
¶11 Also in January 1993 the Ethics Board provided a 
second letter advisory opinion at the plaintiff's request. The 
second letter, written by Ethics Board Executive Director R. 
Roth Judd, reaffirmed the January 1991 advice. Judd's letter 
characterized the 1991 letter as follows: 
 
[W]e noted that state law would forbid you to use your 
position as deputy to obtain a substantial benefit for 
the title insurance company or to participate in 
matters in which you have a substantial financial 
interest. After noting that "a public officer owes an 
undivided loyalty to the public whom it serves and 
 
 
Nos. 95-1098 & 95-1857 
 
 
6 
should avoid placing himself in a position in which a 
conflict of interest might arise," we advised erring 
on the side of caution. 
R. 21 at 15. Judd's letter then repeated the three pieces of 
guidance given in the 1991 letter.
4 
¶12 Later in January 1993 the newspaper published three 
related articles by staff writer James Rowen discussing the 
plaintiff's title insurance business and regulatory position and 
the Ethics Board letters.
5 The articles do not mention the rule 
change. The plaintiff does not claim that these articles were 
defamatory. 
¶13 In October 1993 
the 
newspaper published another 
article by Rowen discussing the plaintiff's concurrent business 
and government positions and the Ethics Board letters in the 
context of the rule change.
6 Under the headline "Torgerson cut 
rule despite ethics warning," the article stated that the 
plaintiff's concurrent positions had led "to two warnings by the 
state Ethics Board to avoid a conflict of interest by staying 
out of title insurance regulation," but that the plaintiff had 
helped to eliminate the discount rate filing rule.  
¶14 The article discussed the effect of the rule change 
and reported the views of several persons, including the 
                     
4 Judd also opined that the statute relating to eligibility 
for office prevented the plaintiff from serving as Commissioner 
of 
Insurance 
while 
retaining 
his 
financial 
interest 
and 
remaining active in a title insurance company.  
5 Two articles appeared before the second Ethics Board 
letter was written; only the third article discussed the second 
Ethics Board letter. 
6 The newspaper published articles on October 14 and October 
15. The two articles are substantially the same and we consider 
them as one, as do the parties.  
 
 
Nos. 95-1098 & 95-1857 
 
 
7 
plaintiff 
and 
Becker. 
The 
article 
described 
Becker 
as 
"disappointed to learn that Torgerson had been involved in 
changing the rules governing title insurance regulation." Becker 
was quoted as follows: "'Quite honestly, I'm just very surprised 
given what he said publicly and privately to us that he was 
uninvolved.'" Becker was also reported as saying that the 
"Ethics Board advice was meant to suggest caution in potential 
conflicts of interest because state laws did not absolutely 
prohibit officials from acting on matters in which they have 
personal interests." 
¶15 The article reported the plaintiff's position as 
follows: 
 
Torgerson told The Journal earlier this year, after it 
had disclosed his dual role as insurance regulator and 
insurance company co-owner, that he had stayed out of 
title insurance matters. 
 
But he said in an interview Wednesday that he had 
initiated and approved the change in the rate filing 
rule because he thought it would cut the cost of 
writing policies and did not benefit him personally. 
¶16 On November 3, 1993, counsel for the plaintiff wrote 
to the newspaper, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 895.05(2)(1991-92), 
claiming that the October article was false and defamatory and 
asking the newspaper to print a retraction. The newspaper did 
not do so.  
¶17 Rowen was informed of the request for retraction and 
understood 
its 
significance 
as 
a 
possible 
prelude 
to 
a 
defamation lawsuit. Rowen had also been informed by a reporter 
for another newspaper that the plaintiff intended to sue Rowen 
for defamation. Nonetheless, Rowen destroyed documents related 
to his investigation of the plaintiff and the title insurance 
 
 
Nos. 95-1098 & 95-1857 
 
 
8 
industry, including his notes from interviews with Becker and 
others.
7 A few months later the plaintiff commenced this action. 
¶18 The plaintiff asserts that the article was defamatory, 
falsely charging him with acting contrary to "warnings" issued 
by the Ethics Board about the ethics of his conduct and falsely 
implying that he had abused his public position to advance his 
own business interests to the detriment of consumers of title 
insurance. The plaintiff further asserts that the article was 
published with knowledge of the falsehood or reckless disregard 
for the truth. 
II. 
¶19 The sole issue under review is whether the plaintiff's 
action survives the newspaper's motion for summary judgment. We 
first examine the elements of a defamation action brought by a 
public figure
8 against a media defendant.  
The elements of a common law action for defamation are:  
(1) a false statement; (2) communicated by speech, 
conduct or in writing to a person other than the 
person 
defamed; 
and, 
(3) 
the 
communication 
is 
unprivileged and tends to harm one's reputation so as 
to lower him or her in the estimation of the community 
or to deter third persons from associating or dealing 
with him or her. 
                     
7 Because this case is before us on review of a circuit 
court's decision on a motion for summary judgment, we adopt the 
plaintiff's 
characterization, 
"destroyed," 
rather 
than 
the 
newspaper's term, "discarded." Rowen testified on deposition 
that he had been assigned to a new office and his filing space 
was drastically reduced and thus he discarded dozens of files of 
notes, relating to this and other articles, while retaining 
documents that would require expense to reacquire. 
8 The parties do not dispute that the plaintiff's burden is 
the same whether he is considered a public figure or a public 
official. We use "public figure" because it is the more general 
term.  
 
 
Nos. 95-1098 & 95-1857 
 
 
9 
Stoll v. Adriansen, 122 Wis. 2d 503, 517, 362 N.W.2d 182 (Ct. 
App. 1984); Wis JICivil 2500 (1993).
9 If the challenged 
statements as a whole are not capable of a false and defamatory 
meaning, or are substantially true, a libel action will fail. 
Meier v. Meurer, 8 Wis. 2d 24, 29, 98 N.W.2d 411 (1959).  
¶20 The parties agree that there was a communication to 
third persons and that the communication was unprivileged. The 
parties further agree, at least for purposes of this review, 
that defamatory implications might be drawn from the article. 
According to the plaintiff, the article implied that he had 
exploited his position of public trust for personal gain and 
that he had disregarded the advice he got, which the newspaper 
falsely characterized as Ethics Board "warnings" that he stay 
out of title insurance matters coming before the OCI.  
¶21 Thus, with respect to the common law elements of 
defamation, the parties' disagreement focuses on the issue of 
falsity, which is related to the question of actual malice. 
Where the defamation plaintiff is a public figure, the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution mandate that 
                     
9 More recent court of appeals decisions state, without 
discussion, four elements derived from Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 558 (1977) (a false and defamatory statement; an 
unprivileged publication to a third party; fault amounting at 
least to negligence by the publisher; and either actionability 
of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence 
of special harm caused by the publication). See, e.g., Bay View 
Packing Co. v. Taff, 198 Wis. 2d 653, 673, 543 N.W.2d 522 (Ct. 
App. 1995).  
For present purposes the distinctions between the two sets 
of elements, if any, are unimportant. 
 
 
Nos. 95-1098 & 95-1857 
 
 
10
the plaintiff prove actual malice by clear and convincing 
evidence.
10  
¶22 The First Amendment imposes a constitutional privilege 
on the publication of statements about public figures, even when 
those statements are false and defamatory. The privilege, 
however, is conditional, and the condition is the absence of 
actual malice. The requirement that actual malice be proven is a 
minimal accommodation of the reputational interests of public 
figures and the community's interest in unfettered public 
debate.
11 
¶23 Actual malice is a term of art; it is not used in its 
ordinary meaning of evil intent.
12 Proof of actual malice 
requires a showing that the defamatory falsehood was published 
with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for its 
truth. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 
(1964); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). Falsity 
and malice are thus intertwined.  
                     
10 Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc. 501 U.S. 496, 510 
(1991) (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
279-80 (1964)). 
11 "Neither lies nor false communications serve the ends of 
the First Amendment and no one suggests their desirability or 
further proliferation. But to insure the ascertainment and 
publication of the truth about public affairs, it is essential 
that the First Amendment protect some erroneous publications as 
well as true ones.” St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 
(1968).  
12 Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 
657, 666-67 and n.7 (1989). 
 
 
Nos. 95-1098 & 95-1857 
 
 
11
¶24 Because the parties disagree about whether the article 
was published with actual malice, actual malice is the focus of 
this review. 
III. 
¶25 We turn now to the standard of appellate review of the 
denial of a motion for summary judgment and the appropriate 
summary judgment methodology in a public figure defamation 
action.  
¶26 Appellate courts review a grant or denial of summary 
judgment independently of the circuit court or court of appeals, 
Burkes v. Klauser, 185 Wis. 2d 308, 327, 517 N.W.2d 503 (1994), 
applying the same methodology as the circuit court. Grams v. 
Boss, 97 Wis. 2d 332, 338-39, 294 N.W.2d 473 (1980). A party's 
motion for summary judgment shall be granted when the pleadings 
and supporting papers show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as 
a 
matter 
of 
law. 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 802.08(2) 
(1995-96). 
Justifiable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving 
party. Grams, 97 Wis. 2d at 338-39. "Where facts, even if 
material, are disputed, those facts become irrelevant if, in 
giving full benefit to the party against whom summary judgment 
is sought, the claim nevertheless is barred as a matter of law." 
Byrne v. Bercker, 176 Wis. 2d 1037, 1045, 501 N.W.2d 402 (1993). 
The summary judgment materials are viewed most favorably to the 
nonmoving party, the plaintiff here. 
¶27 The summary judgment analysis is further affected by 
First Amendment considerations. In New York Times the Supreme 
Court concluded that the First Amendment requires an appellate 
 
 
Nos. 95-1098 & 95-1857 
 
 
12
court to "'make an independent examination of the whole record' 
so as to assure [itself] that the judgment does not constitute a 
forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression." New York 
Times, 376 U.S. at 285 (quoting Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 
U.S. 229, 235 (1963)). In so doing, appellate judges must 
"'examine for [them]selves the statements in issue and the 
circumstances under which they were made.'" New York Times, 376 
U.S. at 285 (quoting Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 
(1946). The rule of independent review assigns to judges a 
constitutional responsibility that cannot be delegated to the 
trier of fact. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 
U.S. 485, 501 (1984).  
¶28 New York Times and Bose involved appeals after trial. 
In recent years debate has focused on how this rule of 
independent examination is to be applied by a court on a motion 
for summary judgment.
13  
¶29 Since New York Times summary judgment has played a key 
role in protecting First Amendment values. Indeed, it has been 
said that in public figure defamation cases, "because of the 
importance of free speech, summary judgment is the 'rule,' and 
not the exception." Guitar v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 396 F. 
Supp. 1042, 1053 (S.D.N.Y 1975), aff'd mem. 538 F.2d 309 (2d 
                     
13 For a colloquy discussing the meaning of independent 
appellate review and the application of Bose, see the majority 
opinion of Judges Starr and Wright and the concurrence of Judge 
Wald in Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), 
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 (1987). 
 
 
Nos. 95-1098 & 95-1857 
 
 
13
Cir. 1976).
14 The Wisconsin court of appeals has said that 
"[s]ummary 
judgment 
may 
be 
particularly 
appropriate 
in 
defamation actions in order to mitigate the potential 'chilling 
effect' on free speech and the press that might result from 
lengthy and expensive litigation." Bay View Packing Co. v. Taff, 
198 Wis. 2d 653, 672, 543 N.W.2d 522 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing 
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 401-02 (1967) (Douglas, J., 
concurring)). 
¶30 On the other hand, courts have found public figure 
defamation actions to be ill suited to summary judgment. Because 
the actual malice inquiry, the heart of the constitutional 
privilege which courts must guard, turns on the defendant's 
                     
14 See Bruce W. Sanford, Libel and Privacy, 653 n.158, 
§ 13.3 
(1996-1 
Supp.) 
(collecting 
cases 
supporting 
the 
proposition that "summary judgment is the preferred way to 
dispose of libel actions"); Rodney A. Smolla, Law of Defamation, 
§ 12.07[3][a](11/96) at p. 12-38.7 (declaring that "the actual 
malice standard is sufficiently difficult to meet to make 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants relatively common in 
public figure cases simply as a matter of substantive law"). 
See also Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 968 
(D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1967). Although 
recognizing that "the right to a trial by jury is at stake," 
Judge Wright stated: 
In the First Amendment area, summary procedures are 
even more essential. For the stake here, if harassment 
succeeds, is free debate. One of the purposes of the 
Times principle, in addition to protecting persons 
from being cast in damages in libel suits filed by 
public officials, is to prevent persons from being 
discouraged in the full and free exercise of their 
First Amendment rights with respect to the conduct of 
their government. The threat of being put to the 
defense of a lawsuit brought by a popular public 
official may be as chilling to the exercise of First 
Amendment freedoms as fear of the outcome of the 
lawsuit itself, especially to advocates of unpopular 
causes. 
  
 
 
Nos. 95-1098 & 95-1857 
 
 
14
state of mind, it is thought particularly difficult to resolve 
without a full weighing of the competing evidence.
15 
¶31 We conclude that because courts have a duty to review 
the record independently in public figure libel actions and this 
duty entails a "constitutional responsibility that cannot be 
delegated to the trier of fact," Bose, 466 U.S. at 501, summary 
judgment is an important and favored method for adjudicating 
public figure defamation actions. 
¶32 A 
final 
question 
then 
is 
whether 
and 
how 
the 
heightened evidentiary burden of proof of actual malice, proof 
by clear and convincing evidence, is to be incorporated in the 
summary judgment analysis. Although in Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), the Supreme Court addressed 
whether the heightened evidentiary burden for proof of actual 
malice must be incorporated in the summary judgment analysis, it 
is not clear what answer was given. The court mandated 
application of the heightened evidentiary burden in the summary 
judgment analysis but did not clearly state whether it was 
required by the First Amendment or by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), 
                     
15 The United States Supreme Court, without ruling on the 
matter, stated this concern in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 
111, 120 n.9 (1979) (proof of actual malice "does not readily 
lend itself to summary disposition").  
The Court has clarified that the Hutchinson statement "was 
simply an acknowledgment of our general reluctance 'to grant 
special procedural protections to defendants in libel and 
defamation actions in addition to the constitutional protections 
embodied in the substantive laws.'" Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 n.7 (1986)(quoting Calder v. Jones, 465 
U.S. 783, 790-91 (1984).  
 
 
Nos. 95-1098 & 95-1857 
 
 
15
applicable to summary judgment motions in federal court actions. 
The Supreme Court held as follows:  
 
In sum, a court ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment must be guided by the New York Times "clear 
and convincing" evidentiary standard in determining 
whether a genuine issue of actual malice existsthat 
is, whether the evidence presented is such that a 
reasonable jury might find that actual malice had been 
shown with convincing clarity. 
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257.
16  
                     
See Yiamouyiannis v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 619 
F.2d 932, 939-40 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980) 
(discussing evolution of courts' views on the proper use of 
summary judgment). 
16 It is arguable that the Anderson court rested its holding 
not on the First Amendment but on Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) and on 
prior cases interpreting federal summary judgment methodology 
generally. Thus, one dissenting opinion stated at the outset: 
"The Court's holding today is not, of course, confined in its 
application to First Amendment cases . . . It changes summary 
judgment 
procedure 
for 
all 
litigants, 
regardless 
of 
the 
substantive nature of the underlying litigation." Anderson, 477 
U.S. at 257 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
State courts have struggled to determine whether Anderson 
set out a constitutional mandate. Some courts have concluded 
that Anderson requires state courts ruling on summary judgment 
in public figure defamation cases to apply the clear and 
convincing evidentiary burden. See, e.g., Janklow v. Viking 
Press, 459 N.W.2d 415, 419 (S.D. 1990); Ruebke v. Globe 
Communications Corp., 738 P.2d 1246, 1252 (Kan. 1987). In 
Wisconsin, two decisions of the court of appeals have, without 
analysis, applied Anderson as a constitutional mandate. Van 
Straten v. Milwaukee Journal Newspaper-Publisher, 151 Wis. 2d 
905, 917, 447 N.W.2d 105 (Ct. App. 1989); Wiegel v. Capital 
Times Co., 145 Wis. 2d 71, 76, 426 N.W.2d 43 (Ct. App. 1988). 
Other courts have concluded that Anderson sets out a 
mandate of federal procedural law only. These courts have 
declined to adopt the Anderson approach as a matter of state 
law. Moffatt v. Brown, 751 P.2d 939, 942-44 (Alaska 1988); Casso 
v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 555-58 (Tex. 1989). 
For a discussion of Anderson and the cases interpreting 
Anderson, see also Robert D. Sack & Sandra S. Baron, Libel, 
Slander, and Related Problems (2d ed. 1994) 791-92. 
 
 
Nos. 95-1098 & 95-1857 
 
 
16
¶33 We need not decide whether the evidentiary burden for 
actual malice applies in the summary judgment analysis, and if 
so whether it is mandated by the First Amendment or by the state 
summary judgment law. The parties agree with the court of 
appeals that to survive a motion for summary judgment a 
plaintiff in a public figure defamation action must present 
sufficient evidence for a court to conclude that a reasonable 
jury could find actual malice by clear and convincing evidence.
17 
Therefore the parties did not brief this issue. Accordingly, for 
purposes of this review and without deciding the correctness of 
the parties' position, we will incorporate the clear and 
convincing 
evidentiary 
burden 
in 
our 
summary 
judgment 
methodology. We further note, however, that the outcome would 
not be different under a traditional summary judgment analysis. 
IV. 
¶34 The core of the dispute between the parties is the 
issue of actual malice. The plaintiff must present facts from 
which a reasonable jury could find, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that the newspaper published a false and defamatory 
statement with actual malice, that is, knowing the statement was 
false or with reckless disregard for its truth.  
¶35 Actual 
malice 
is 
not 
determined 
by 
whether 
a 
reasonably prudent person would have published the challenged 
statements. The test is subjective. The complainant must show 
that the media defendant knew the statement was false, "in fact 
entertained serious doubts as to the truth" of the publication, 
                     
17 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255-56; Yiamouyiannis, 619 F.2d at 
940.  
 
 
Nos. 95-1098 & 95-1857 
 
 
17
St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731, or had a high degree of awareness of 
probable falsity. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964). 
The media defendant, on the other hand, cannot prevail simply by 
proclaiming a belief in the truth of its publication. St. Amant, 
390 U.S. at 732. 
¶36 Some examples will help reveal the boundaries of 
actual malice. Mere failure to investigate adequately does not 
constitute actual malice. Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 
130, 153-54 (1967) (opinion of Harlan, J.). Nor can actual 
malice be imputed from the mere fact that a published statement 
proves to be an erroneous interpretation of an ambiguous set of 
facts. Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 290-92 (1971). Actual 
malice may be shown by proof that the publisher had "obvious 
reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy 
of his reports." St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732. 
¶37 Falsity and actual malice are thus intertwined, and 
the plaintiff must prove falsity.
18 In this case, the plaintiff 
asserts that the newspaper published the following two false 
statements:
19 (1) the Ethics Board letters warned the plaintiff 
                     
18 Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 
(1986), held that the First Amendment requires a plaintiff in a 
private figure defamation case to bear the burden of proving 
falsity. We see no reason why a plaintiff in a public figure 
defamation case should not bear the same burden. 
19 The parties dispute whether the October article contained 
false statements or false implications. 
 
 
Nos. 95-1098 & 95-1857 
 
 
18
that he was absolutely prohibited from involvement in title 
insurance regulation,
20 and (2) the plaintiff had told Rowen that 
he had stayed out of, and told Becker that he had been 
uninvolved with, title insurance regulation. We assume for 
purposes of our analysis that these statements are false.
21 
¶38 The plaintiff asserts two bases for inferring that the 
newspaper published these statements in the October article with 
actual malice. First, according to the plaintiff, Rowen's 
                                                                  
We assume, without deciding, that a false and defamatory 
implication is actionable to the same extent as a false and 
defamatory statement. For a suggestion of heightened protections 
for implication, see David M. Cohn, Comment, The Problem of 
Indirect Defamation: Omission of Material Facts, Implication, 
and Innuendo, 1993 U. Chi. Legal F. 233. Hereafter we will refer 
to 
the 
statements 
and 
implications 
therefrom 
simply 
as 
statements.  
20 The 
plaintiff 
contends 
that 
the 
letters 
provided 
guidelines for avoiding conflicts of interest but did not 
indicate an absolute prohibition by warning him to stay out of 
title insurance matters.  
 
The newspaper article provided several interpretations of 
the letters, including the plaintiff's own explanation that the 
letters simply admonished him to stay out of regulatory matters 
from which he could personally benefit and did not require him 
to 
totally 
disassociate 
himself 
from 
some 
general 
title 
insurance matters. 
 
The article also presented the views of Becker, the author 
of 
the 
principal 
Ethics 
Board 
letter, 
about 
the 
advice 
proffered. The article paraphrased Becker as stating that 
"Ethics Board advice was meant to suggest caution in potential 
conflicts of interest because state laws did not absolutely 
prohibit officials from acting on matters in which they have 
personal 
interests." 
Becker's 
views, 
as 
published, 
thus 
supported the plaintiff's interpretation quoted in the article. 
21 A statement is false if it “would have a different effect 
on the mind of the reader from that which the pleaded truth 
would have produced.” Masson, 501 U.S. at 517 (citations 
omitted).  
 
 
Nos. 95-1098 & 95-1857 
 
 
19
characterization of the Ethics Board letters in the January 
articles demonstrates that Rowen was aware when writing the 
October article that the letters did not constitute a warning to 
stay out of title insurance matters and that the plaintiff had 
not said that he had stayed out of title insurance matters.  
¶39 Second, 
the 
plaintiff 
contends 
that 
Rowen's 
intentional destruction of the notes of his interview with 
Becker, while retaining other material collected for the 
articles, leads to an inference that the notes contained 
information probative of actual malice. We discuss each of these 
contentions in turn. 
¶40 The January articles describe the Ethics Board letters 
in terms somewhat different from those employed in the October 
article. The January articles refer to the letters as setting 
forth "guidelines and limitations" which would "limit [the 
plaintiff's] contact with the issuing of rules," rather than as 
containing "warnings" to "stay out" of title insurance matters. 
The tone of the January articles does not convey the sense that 
the plaintiff had been absolutely prohibited from involvement 
with title insurance matters.  
¶41 Furthermore, the January articles paraphrase and quote 
the plaintiff concerning his involvement with title insurance 
regulation as follows:  
 
Torgerson said in an interview on Friday that the 
ethics guidelines were easy to follow because "the 
amount of effort that this agency expends on the title 
insurance industry is extremely limited." 
 
"There is an appearance of conflict which must be 
avoided." he said. "That appearance is extremely easy 
to avoid."  
 
 
 
Nos. 95-1098 & 95-1857 
 
 
20
¶42 In the October article, the newspaper characterized 
the plaintiff as having told the newspaper
22 that "he had stayed 
out of title insurance matters."  
¶43 The plaintiff thus contends that the January articles 
are probative of actual malice because they give context to 
Rowen's choice of words in the October article. We conclude, 
however, as did the court of appeals, that no inference of 
actual malice can be raised from Rowen's word choice in these 
circumstances even if the words chosen convey a provably false 
statement.  
¶44 Rowen's October characterization of the Ethics Board's 
letters is a rational interpretation of ambiguous statements 
contained in those letters. Similarly, the characterization of 
the plaintiff's statement that he was staying out of title 
insurance regulation is a rational interpretation of the 
plaintiff's quoted, and undisputed, comments that he had avoided 
conflicts of interest in title insurance matters. 
¶45 The United States Supreme Court has said that a court 
cannot infer actual malice sufficient to raise a jury issue from 
the deliberate choice of a rational interpretation of ambiguous 
materials. The article at issue in Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 
279, concerned police lawlessness. The article quoted summaries 
of an unproven civil complaint described in a government report, 
                     
22 The article reported that the plaintiff had told this to 
the newspaper after the newspaper had disclosed the plaintiff's 
dual role as insurance regulator and insurance company co-owner. 
It is not clear if the newspaper was relying on different 
conversations with the plaintiff than had been relied on in the 
January articles. For purposes of summary judgment we assume 
not. 
 
 
Nos. 95-1098 & 95-1857 
 
 
21
without indicating either that the quotes came from a complaint 
or that the events described were as yet unproven. Noting that 
the government report, taken as a whole, "bristled with 
ambiguities," the Court held that under such circumstances the 
deliberate choice of one interpretation from a number of 
possible rational interpretations was not enough to create a 
jury issue of actual malice. Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. at 
289-90. The Court reasoned as follows: "Where the document 
reported on is so ambiguous as this one was, it is hard to 
imagine a test of 'truth' that would not put the publisher 
virtually at the mercy of the unguided discretion of a jury." 
Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. at 291. 
¶46 Twenty years later, in Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 
Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991), the Court reaffirmed the importance 
of the holding in Time, Inc. v. Pape. "The protection for 
rational interpretation serves First Amendment principles by 
allowing the author the interpretive license that is necessary 
when relying upon ambiguous sources." Masson, 501 U.S. at 519.  
¶47 We agree with the court of appeals that "[t]he 
rationale underlying Pape resonates in the present lawsuit." 
Torgerson v. Journal/Sentinel Inc., Nos. 95-1098 and 95-1857, 
unpublished slip op. at 12 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 1996). The 
statements at issue in the letters from the Ethics Board are 
ambiguous. 
The 
letters 
urge 
caution, 
describe 
certain 
improprieties that must be avoided, urge the plaintiff to 
participate in rule making only if specific conditions prevail, 
and explain a statutory prohibition barring the plaintiff "from 
taking any official action" under certain circumstances. The 
 
 
Nos. 95-1098 & 95-1857 
 
 
22
newspaper's characterization of the letters as warnings to stay 
out of title insurance matters is one of several rational 
interpretations of the letters.  
¶48 The newspaper's characterization of the plaintiff's 
statements 
is 
similarly 
a 
rational 
interpretation. 
The 
plaintiff's unchallenged statements reported in the January 
articles are reasonably capable of being interpreted as having 
"stayed out of" title insurance matters. 
¶49 While evidence may demonstrate in some cases that a 
rational interpretation was nonetheless chosen with actual 
malice, this is not such a case. The distinctions between the 
January and October articles are not of such import that a 
reasonable jury could infer that Rowen published the October 
article knowing of its falsity or with reckless disregard for 
the truth. In sum, a fact finder is not entitled to draw an 
inference of actual malice from either the October article alone 
or in conjunction with the January articles.  
¶50 The plaintiff's most significant evidence to support 
an allegation of actual malice is the inference of knowing 
falsity that might be drawn from Rowen's intentional destruction 
of the notes from his interview with Becker, while retaining 
other materials in the file. We agree with the plaintiff that a 
media defendant's intentional destruction of selected materials 
relevant to likely litigation is inherently suspicious, allowing 
an inference that the materials destroyed would have provided 
evidence of actual malice.  
¶51 According to the plaintiff, the notes might have shown 
that the plaintiff had not told Becker that he was uninvolved 
 
 
Nos. 95-1098 & 95-1857 
 
 
23
with title insurance matters and that Becker might have given 
Rowen an interpretation of the Ethics Board letters different 
from that which Rowen ultimately put to paper. The plaintiff 
contends, therefore, that a fact finder may infer from the 
intentional destruction of the notes that they contained this 
information and that this inference must be drawn in the 
plaintiff's favor on summary judgment.  
¶52 The court expresses its censure of the reporter's 
intentional destruction of materials potentially relevant to a 
threatened lawsuit. Indeed we are surprised that the newspaper 
allowed Rowen to retain possession of and to destroy materials 
potentially relevant to a threatened lawsuit. We agree with the 
plaintiff that the destruction of notes is ordinarily sufficient 
evidence to support a jury verdict of actual malice and will 
ordinarily defeat a news media defendant's motion for summary 
judgment. 
¶53 Nevertheless, we conclude that the inferences the 
plaintiff urges cannot reasonably be drawn by a fact finder in 
this case: the notes were not relevant to show an inconsistency 
between what Becker told Rowen and what Rowen reported. 
¶54 We are guided to this conclusion by two cases in which 
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the question of 
the proper approach to note destruction as proof of actual 
malice.  
¶55 In Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 827 
F.2d 1119, 1134-36 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 993 
(1988), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that an 
inference of actual malice could be drawn from the intentional 
 
 
Nos. 95-1098 & 95-1857 
 
 
24
destruction of a reporter's documents when the destruction was 
in bad faith. Bad faith was found on the following bases: the 
destruction took place between trial and an appeal; the 
documents were removed from a reporter's desk by a research 
assistant; 
the destruction 
was selective; 
the 
destruction 
violated 
the 
news 
company's 
retention 
policy; 
and 
the 
explanation for the destruction was not believable as a matter 
of law. On this "overwhelming" showing of bad faith, the court 
concluded: "A court and a jury are entitled to presume that 
documents destroyed in bad faith while litigation is pending 
would be unfavorable to the party that has destroyed the 
documents." Brown & Williamson, 827 F.2d at 1134. 
¶56 In Chang v. Michiana Telecasting Corp., 900 F.2d 1085 
(7th Cir. 1990), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed a 
grant of summary judgment where the complainant sought to raise 
an 
inference 
of 
actual 
malice 
from 
note 
destruction 
in 
circumstances similar to the present case. A television station 
broadcast a story suggesting that the complainant had planned to 
sell trade secrets to a competitor. The story relied heavily on 
an informant whom the reporter had interviewed, but the 
reporter's notes of her conversation with the informant had 
disappeared without explanation. The informant testified in 
deposition, however, that the story's characterization of the 
conversations was accurate. Given that all agreed on what was 
said, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that actual 
malice could not be inferred from the missing notes unless the 
reporter's notes included a statement of disbelief in the 
source's statements. The court pointed out that a reporter's 
 
 
Nos. 95-1098 & 95-1857 
 
 
25
writing about her disbelief in the truth of what she was 
reporting was so remote a possibility that it could not defeat a 
motion for summary judgment.
23 Under these circumstances the 
court held that the note destruction did not raise the inference 
of actual malice described in Brown & Williamson.  
¶57 Viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, 
the intentional and selective destruction of the notes in the 
present case shares some disturbing parallels with the facts in 
Brown & Williamson. Rowen destroyed interview notes but retained 
other documents; he destroyed the notes after learning that a 
defamation action was likely.  Rowen, a veteran journalist, 
should have known that destroying notes which might be relevant 
to litigation was improper.  
¶58 While we are troubled by the destruction of the notes, 
Chang, rather than Brown & Williamson, provides the more 
appropriate analogy for determining the significance of the note 
destruction in this case.  
¶59 The plaintiff contends that the interview notes might 
show that the plaintiff had not told Becker that he had been 
uninvolved in title insurance matters. Becker's deposition, 
                     
23 The court reasoned as follows: 
Given 
the 
concord 
of 
the 
parties 
to 
these 
conversations on what was said, any inference from the 
missing notes could not supply clear and convincing 
evidence 
of 
malice 
unless 
[the 
reporter] 
wrote 
something like: "Tipster says X, but because I have 
not verified it I know X is untrue." Reporters do not 
write such notes to themselves.  
 
Chang v. Michiana Telecasting Corp., 900 F.2d 1085, 1090 (7th 
Cir. 1990).  
 
 
Nos. 95-1098 & 95-1857 
 
 
26
however, affirms the accuracy of the article's quotation drawn 
from Becker's interview:  
 
Q. Returning to the article, it quotes you. "'Quite 
honestly, I'm just very surprised given what he 
[Torgerson, the plaintiff] said publicly and privately 
to us that he was uninvolved,' Becker said." Is that 
an accurate quotation? 
 
A [Becker]. I believe so, yes. 
R. 22 at 118.  
¶60 The plaintiff further contends that the interview 
notes 
might 
show 
that 
Becker 
provided 
Rowen 
with 
an 
interpretation of the Ethics Board letters different from that 
which the newspaper ultimately published and that such an 
interpretation would be evidence of actual malice if different 
from the characterization reported in the article. Becker's 
testimony, however, affirmed the article's characterization of 
what Becker told Rowen he intended the Ethics Board letters to 
mean. R. 22 at 119-20, 124-26. While it is possible that Becker 
told Rowen something to indicate that the Ethics Board letters 
were not warnings to stay out of title insurance matters, such a 
statement would be inconsistent with Becker's testimony in this 
record.  
¶61 To find sufficient evidence of actual malice to 
support a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff in this case 
would require the court to ignore Becker's deposition testimony 
and to accept the plaintiff's bare allegation of actual malice 
supported only by an inference from the destruction of the 
notes. Such an inference, however, is of little or no weight 
when 
the 
uncontroverted 
deposition 
testimony 
makes 
the 
plaintiff's assertion no more than a remote possibility. A 
 
 
Nos. 95-1098 & 95-1857 
 
 
27
motion for summary judgment cannot be denied on such a remote 
possibility, whether or not the clear and convincing evidentiary 
standard is applied. The plaintiff has not raised a jury issue 
of actual malice and the newspaper is entitled to summary 
judgment as a matter of law. 
¶62 A court's role is to interpret and apply the law, not 
to enforce standards of journalistic accuracy or ethics. The 
United States Supreme Court has explained that its decisions in 
media defamation cases are "premised on a recognition that, as 
Madison put it, 'Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the 
proper use of every thing; and in no instance is this more true 
than in that of the press.'" Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. at 290 
(citation omitted). As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has 
stated 
and 
as 
the 
Wisconsin 
court 
of 
appeals 
repeated: 
"[J]ournalism skills are not on trial in this case. The central 
issue is not whether [the article] measured up to the highest 
standards of reporting or even to a reasonable reporting 
standard, but whether the defendant[] published [the article] 
with actual malice." Woods v. Evansville Press Co., Inc., 791 
F.2d 480, 489 (7th Cir. 1986), quoted in Torgerson, unpublished 
slip op. at 18-19.  
¶63 Because we conclude as a matter of law that the 
plaintiff has not furnished sufficient evidence of actual malice 
to survive the newspaper's motion for summary judgment, we 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.  
 
 
Nos. 95-1098 & 95-1857 
 
 
28
 
1 
 
2