Title: Feltner v. Casey Family Program

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Feltner v. Casey Family Program1995 WY 147902 P.2d 206Case Number: 94-207Decided: 09/08/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming
Veronica 
FELTNER; Doniv Feltner; and Jason Feltner, 

Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

The 
CASEY FAMILY PROGRAM; Brenden McKinney; and Bev Lloyd, 

Appellees 
(Defendants).

Sue 
Davidson, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellants.

Paul 
J. Hickey and Richard D. Bush of Hickey, Mackey, Evans, Walker & Stewart, 
Cheyenne, for appellees.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1]      The issue 
presented in this case is whether Wyoming should recognize a cause of action for 
claims that are based upon the plaintiff's own illegal acts. The trial court 
granted a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint filed on behalf of The Casey 
Family Program, Brenden McKinney, and Bev Lloyd (Casey), pursuant to 
WYO.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6). In their Complaint, Jason Feltner, Veronica Feltner, and 
Doniv Feltner (Feltners) alleged claims for damages that evolved from Jason's 
plea of guilty to fourth-degree sexual assault arising out of his engaging in 
sexual intercourse with JR, a female child who had been placed with the Feltners 
as a foster child. We hold, on the grounds that public policy forecloses the 
recognition of such claims, that Wyoming will not recognize a claim for relief 
which is dependent upon a plaintiff's own illegal conduct, including any claims 
which are derivative of such claims. There is a collateral issue relating to the 
dismissal of a claim by Veronica Feltner of a breach of confidentiality and, for 
failure to brief the issue, we sustain the dismissal of that claim as well. The 
Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is affirmed.

[¶2]      The issues 
asserted by the Feltners in their Brief for the Appellants 
are:

I. 
Did the District Court abuse its discretion by granting Defendant's Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss with prejudice?

II. 
Did the District Court err, as a matter of law, in failing to adopt the rules of 
legal causation, as set out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts by granting 
Defendant's 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss with prejudice?

In 
the Brief of Appellees' The Casey Family Program, Brenden McKinney and Beverly 
Lloyd, the only issue is stated to be:

A. 
Did the District Court err in granting Appellees' motion to dismiss pursuant to 
W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) on the basis that Appellants' Complaint failed to state a 
cognizable cause of action?

[¶3]      In addressing on 
review a dismissal by the trial court pursuant to WYO.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6), we 
accept as true all of the facts alleged in the complaint, and we examine those 
facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. E.g., R.D. v. W.H., 875 P.2d 26 (Wyo. 1994); Osborn v. Emporium Videos, 870 P.2d 382 (Wyo. 1994); Herrig 
v. Herrig, 844 P.2d 487 (Wyo. 1992). In their complaint, the Feltners alleged 
Veronica and Doniv Feltner had served as foster parents for the Casey Family 
Program for about eight years. During this period of time, their son, Jason, 
became a teenager. The Feltners had advised Casey they would not accept female 
children exhibiting overt seductive behaviors for placement in their home. 
Subsequently, during April of 1992, JR and a sister were temporarily placed with 
the Feltners. The only advice furnished by Casey with respect to these children 
was that JR had been sexually molested by her father.

[¶4]      In August of 
1992, Jason, then only two days past his nineteenth birthday, engaged in sexual 
intercourse with JR, who had initiated the adventure. JR was not fifteen at that 
time. Jason was charged with sexual assault and entered a plea of guilty to 
fourth-degree sexual assault. He subsequently was sentenced to serve 155 days in 
jail with 150 days suspended upon the conditions he have no arrests for one year 
and have no contact with the victim for one year.

[¶5]      We are required 
to accept as true the following allegations set forth in the Feltners' 
complaint: 

11. 
On or about August 5, 1992, the Feltners reported to Defendant that Jason had 
had sexual intercourse with [JR] as said sexual contact had been initiated by 
[JR].

12. 
Jason, a virgin, had turned 19 years of age two days prior to having had sexual 
intercourse with [JR]. [JR] was fourteen at the time, two months short of her 
15th birthday.

* 
* * * * *

15. 
Thereafter, Jason was charged with sexual assault and pled guilty to fourth 
decree [sic] sexual assault.

The 
Feltners' complaint then continues to allege claims for recovery based upon 
Casey's negligence, gross negligence, breach of contract, and breach of 
confidentiality.

[¶6]  Casey filed its Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiff's Complaint, to which the Feltners filed a reply. The trial court 
entered an Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss ruling "Plaintiffs' 
complaint fails to state a cognizable cause of action and is therefore dismissed 
with prejudice." The Feltners appeal from that order.

[¶7]      We acknowledge 
dismissal is a drastic remedy to be granted sparingly. E.g., Coones v. F.D.I.C., 
848 P.2d 783 (Wyo. 1993); Osborn v. Emporium Videos, 848 P.2d 237 (Wyo. 1993); 
Harshfield v. Harshfield, 842 P.2d 535 (Wyo. 1992); Stalkup v. State Dep't of 
Envtl. Quality (DEQ), 838 P.2d 705 (Wyo. 1992); Mostert v. CBL & Associates, 
741 P.2d 1090 (Wyo. 1987). A complaint will be dismissed only when it shows on 
its face that the plaintiff cannot achieve relief under any state of facts. 
E.g., Coones; Osborn; Harshfield; Stalkup; Mostert; Johnson v. Aetna Casualty 
& Sur. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 608 P.2d 1299 (Wyo. 1980). Still, we have 
said, "A motion to dismiss, even though sparingly granted, is the proper method 
for testing the legal sufficiency of the allegations and will be sustained when 
the complaint shows on its face that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief." 
Mummery v. Polk, 770 P.2d 241, 243 (Wyo. 1989). The Feltners' complaint was 
dismissed properly under the application of these rules.

[¶8]      Initially, we 
consider the thrust of the order dismissing the complaint as it applies to 
Jason. The propositions we adopt are cogently stated in Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19, 479 N YS.2d 201, 203-05, 468 N.E.2d 39, 41-42 (1984) (footnote 
omitted):

When 
the plaintiff has engaged in activities prohibited, as opposed to merely 
regulated, by law, the courts will not entertain the suit if the plaintiff's 
conduct constituted a serious violation of the law and the injuries for which he 
seeks recovery were the direct result of that violation. In this latter instance 
recovery is denied, not because the plaintiff contributed to his injury, but 
because the public policy of this State generally denies judicial relief to 
those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act (Reno v. 
D'Javid, 42 N.Y.2d 1040, 399 N.Y.S.2d 210, 369 N.E.2d 766). * * * The rule is 
based on "the paramount public policy imperative that the law, whatever its 
content at a given time or for however limited a period, be obeyed." (Reno v. 
D'Javid, supra). It extends the basic principal that one may not profit from his 
own wrong (Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188; Carr v. Hoy, 2 N.Y.2d 185, 158 N.Y.S.2d 572, 139 N.E.2d 531) to tort actions seeking compensation for 
injuries resulting from the plaintiff's own criminal activities of a serious 
nature.

* 
* * * * *

When 
the plaintiff's injury is a direct result of his knowing and intentional 
participation in a criminal act he cannot seek compensation for the loss, if the 
criminal act is judged to be so serious an offense as to warrant denial of 
recovery (Reno v. D'Javid, supra). * * * As indicated the rule is grounded in 
public policy and holds that a claimant whose injuries are the direct result of 
his commission of what is judged to be serious criminal or illegal conduct is 
not entitled to recover. It involves preclusion of recovery at the very 
threshold of the plaintiff's application for judicial 
relief.

[¶9]      While, on 
occasion, courts have considered the proposition of duty, the public policy 
foreclosure of such causes of action is the prevailing rule in American 
jurisdictions. Another summary of the rule is articulated in Cole v. Taylor, 301 N.W.2d 766, 768 (Iowa 1981) (citing 1 C.J.S. Actions § 13, at 996-97)), where 
the court said:

The 
general rule is:

that 
a person cannot maintain an action if, in order to establish his cause of 
action, he must rely, in whole or in part, on an illegal or immoral act or 
transaction to which he is a party, or to maintain a claim for damages based on 
his own wrong or caused by his own neglect, * * * or where he must base his 
cause of action in whole or in part, on a violation by himself of the criminal 
or penal laws * * *.

Other 
cases of the same tenor are Oden v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. of Decatur, Inc., 
621 So. 2d 953 (Ala. 1993); Lord v. Fogcutter Bar, 813 P.2d 660 (Alaska 1991); 
Adkinson v. Rossi Arms Co., 659 P.2d 1236 (Alaska 1983); Cole; Pappas v. Clark, 
494 N.W.2d 245 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992); Glazier v. Lee, 171 Mich. App. 216, 429 N.W.2d 857 (1988).

[¶10]   We also affirm the dismissal of the 
Feltner parents' claims for relief which are derivative of Jason's claims based 
upon his criminal misconduct. While the Feltner parents assert their claims are 
independent of Jason's, we choose to adopt the rationale of the Supreme Court of 
Iowa in Cole, 301 N.W.2d at 768:

We 
believe that what we have said should also bar the suit brought by plaintiff 
husband. His loss of consortium claim is not derivative of his wife's claims. 
Fuller v. Buhrow, 292 N.W.2d 672, 675-76 (Iowa 1980). But we think it should 
nevertheless be barred on the same public policy grounds. Such a claim would 
also arise from a criminal act. In our view the policies should not allow 
indirectly for the husband what they disallowed directly for the 
wife.

We 
can ascertain, in this context, no viable distinction between claims based upon 
negligence, gross negligence, or breach of contract. We affirm the dismissal of 
the Feltners' complaint with respect to those claims evolving from Jason's 
criminal, sexual misconduct.

[¶11]   The Feltners invoke in their 
argument, and find comfort in, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 448 (1965). 
This section in the RESTATEMENT reads as follows:

§ 
448. Intentionally Tortious or Criminal Acts Done Under Opportunity Afforded by 
Actor's Negligence

The 
act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or crime is a 
superseding cause of harm to another resulting therefrom, although the actor's 
negligent conduct created a situation which afforded an opportunity to the third 
person to commit such a tort or crime, unless the actor at the time of his 
negligent conduct realized or should have realized the likelihood that such a 
situation might be created, and that a third person might avail himself of 
the opportunity to commit such a tort or crime. (Emphasis 
added.)

Our 
reading of this provision is entirely different from that of the Feltners. It is 
applicable and can be invoked when a third person, not the party seeking 
recovery, has committed a tort or a crime, and the opportunity to commit the 
tort or crime is attributable to negligence on the part of the defendant who 
realized or should have realized the likelihood such a situation might be 
created. Jason Feltner is not a third person within the context of this 
provision and, for purposes of this case, neither are his 
parents.

[¶12]   We turn briefly to an independent 
claim to the effect that Brenden McKinney, as an employee of Casey, disclosed 
Veronica Feltner's history of sexual abuse and, in doing so, breached a duty of 
confidentiality to her. The allegations of the Feltners' complaint in this 
regard are:

16. 
The Feltners filed a grievance with Defendant's employee, Brenden McKinney, who 
in responding to the Feltners' grievance, violated Veronica Feltner's 
confidentiality by disclosing her history of sexual abuse.

* 
* * * * *

25. 
The Defendant breached confidentiality due Plaintiff, Veronica Feltner, and 
should be liable for damages suffered by her.

 

[¶13]   The Feltners have not addressed 
their claim for breach of confidentiality in their Brief of the Appellants. Our 
rule is that we refuse to consider positions unsupported by cogent argument or 
pertinent authority. E.g., Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 219 (Wyo. 1994); 
Furman v. Rural Elec. Co., 869 P.2d 136, 141 (Wyo. 1994); Halliburton Co. v. 
Claypoole, 868 P.2d 252, 257 (Wyo. 1994); Amrein v. Wyoming Livestock Bd., 851 P.2d 769, 772 (Wyo. 1993); Triton Coal Co., Inc. v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 
800 P.2d 505, 512 (Wyo. 1990); Kipp v. Brown, 750 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Wyo. 1988). 
In view of the failure of the Feltners to either submit an argument or cite 
authorities relating to this issue, we affirm the dismissal of that claim as 
well.

[¶14]   We hold all claims of the Feltners 
were properly dismissed by the trial court. The Order Granting Motion to Dismiss 
Complaint is affirmed.