Title: Daniel v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Lemons, and Agee, 
JJ. 
 
JOSEPH TILGHMAN DANIEL 
 
      OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 040116             JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
        November 5, 2004 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SUSSEX COUNTY 
Robert G. O’Hara, Jr., Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether under the specific 
facts of this case the Circuit Court of Sussex County, the trial 
court, properly denied a petition for expungement of the police 
and court records relating to a criminal charge under Code 
§ 19.2-392.2.  We also consider whether the trial court was 
required under Code § 19.2-392.2(F) to conduct an evidentiary 
hearing to determine the guilt or innocence of the petitioner. 
BACKGROUND 
The facts are not in dispute.  On August 8, 2001, Joseph 
Tilghman Daniel was tried in the trial court on a misdemeanor 
charge of assault and battery, pursuant to Code § 18.2-57.  
Daniel entered a plea of not guilty, and the trial was conducted 
without a jury.  After receiving evidence from two of the 
Commonwealth’s witnesses, the trial court recessed and permitted 
the Commonwealth and Daniel to negotiate an agreed disposition. 
By order entered on that date, the trial court found “the 
evidence sufficient for a finding of guilt” on the criminal 
 
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charge, but “[withheld] a finding in the case at [that] time.”  
The order then memorialized the parties’ agreement that required 
Daniel to pay $500 restitution to the victim and to perform 50 
hours of community service.  The order further provided that the 
case would be taken under advisement until September 10, 2002, 
and that if Daniel had committed no further offenses and had 
complied with the terms of the agreed disposition, the case 
would be dismissed.  Thereafter, on September 10, 2002, the 
trial court entered an order dismissing the charge against 
Daniel after expressly finding that Daniel had “successfully 
completed his probation pursuant to the order of this Court 
entered on 8 August 2001.” 
On October 23, 2002, Daniel filed a petition pursuant to 
Code § 19.2-392.2 in the trial court requesting the expungement 
of the police and court records relating to the misdemeanor 
assault and battery charge.  Daniel averred in the petition that 
he was “innocent of the charge filed against him,” and that he 
had no prior criminal record.  Daniel further averred that the 
existence and possible dissemination of the information relating 
to his arrest may cause circumstances that constitute a manifest 
injustice to him because he is an educator and the record of his 
arrest will hinder his employment opportunities in the future. 
The Commonwealth opposed Daniel’s petition.  The 
Commonwealth contended that it had not consented to expungement 
 
3
as part of the agreed disposition of the charge against Daniel, 
and that Daniel’s case did not fall within the category of cases 
specified in subsection (A) of Code § 19.2-392.2 as qualifying 
for expungement. 
On February 19, 2003, the trial court∗ conducted a hearing 
on the petition for expungement, receiving oral argument from 
both Daniel and the Commonwealth.  Daniel asserted that the 
September 10, 2002 dismissal of the assault and battery charge 
qualified as a charge “otherwise dismissed” under Code 
§ 19.2-392.2(A)(2), that he met all the other statutory criteria 
for expungement and, thus, that he was entitled to the 
expungement of the police and court records relating to that 
charge under Code § 19.2-392.2(F).  In the alternative, Daniel 
further asserted that the trial court’s August 8, 2001 finding 
that the evidence would justify a finding of guilt “doesn’t mean 
that an acquittal would not have occurred.”  Thus, Daniel 
contended that he was entitled to challenge that finding in an 
evidentiary hearing, which he maintained was required by Code 
§ 19.2-392.2(F). 
The Commonwealth, relying on Commonwealth v. Jackson, 255 
Va. 552, 499 S.E.2d 276 (1998), contended that the prior finding 
                     
∗ The circuit court judge who presided over the prior 
criminal proceedings in the trial court was not the circuit 
court judge who presided over the expungement proceedings. 
 
4
by the trial court that the evidence would justify a finding of 
guilt precluded a subsequent expungement of the records relating 
to the charge because a dismissal following a period of 
probation does not fall within the category of charges 
“otherwise dismissed” as contemplated by Code § 19.2-
392.2(A)(2).  The Commonwealth further contended that the 
hearing required by Code § 19.2-392.2(F) is limited to 
determining whether the denial of an otherwise valid expungement 
petition would cause a manifest injustice and does not include a 
challenge to the prior actions or findings of the trial court in 
the underlying criminal case. 
The hearing was continued to permit counsel to file briefs 
in support of their respective positions.  In an August 19, 2003 
letter opinion, the trial court adopted the view of the 
Commonwealth that Jackson was controlling and denied the 
petition for expungement.  Prior to the entry of a final order, 
Daniel filed a formal objection contending that he had not been 
afforded “a hearing for the determinations required to be made 
by Virginia Code § 19.2-392.2,” and a motion for an evidentiary 
hearing. 
On October 15, 2003, the trial court conducted a hearing on 
Daniel’s motion for an evidentiary hearing and his objection to 
the entry of an order denying his petition for expungement.  
Reiterating the position stated in his brief, Daniel maintained 
 
5
that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing “at which the 
[trial court] would make a determination as to whether or not” 
Daniel was actually innocent of the assault and battery charge.  
The Commonwealth responded that the expungement proceeding could 
not be used to collaterally attack the August 8, 2001 finding by 
the trial court.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial 
court entered an order denying Daniel’s petition for 
expungement, adopting by reference the rationale stated in the 
August 19, 2003 opinion letter.  We awarded Daniel this appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
In relevant part, Code § 19.2-392.2 provides that: 
A. If a person is charged with the commission of a 
crime and 
 
1. Is acquitted, or 
 
 
2. A nolle prosequi is taken or the charge is 
otherwise dismissed, including dismissal by accord and 
satisfaction pursuant to § 19.2-151, or 
 
 
3. Is granted an absolute pardon for the 
commission of a crime for which he has been unjustly 
convicted, he may file a petition setting forth the 
relevant facts and requesting expungement of the 
police records and the court records relating to the 
charge. 
 
. . . . 
 
F. . . . the court shall conduct a hearing on the 
petition.  If . . . the petitioner has no prior 
criminal record and the arrest was for a misdemeanor 
violation, the petitioner shall be entitled, in the 
absence of good cause shown to the contrary by the 
Commonwealth, to expungement of the police and court 
 
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records relating to the charge, and the court shall 
enter an order of expungement. 
 
Daniel concedes that his case does not qualify for 
expungement under subsections (A)(1) or (A)(3) of this statute.  
He maintains, however, as he did in the trial court, that the 
charge against him was “otherwise dismissed,” entitling him to 
petition for expungement under subsection (A)(2).  This is so, 
he contends, because a dismissal of a criminal charge following 
a period of probation in which the accused is required to comply 
with terms that include making restitution to the victim “is 
indistinguishable from an Accord and Satisfaction, which is a 
dismissal expressly within the purview” of Code § 19.2-
392.2(A)(2).  Upon this premise, Daniel further contends that 
the trial court abused its discretion in not granting his 
petition for expungement because the record on its face 
establishes that he has satisfied all the requirements of Code 
§ 19.2-392.2(F) for expungement of the police and court records 
relating to a misdemeanor charge.  We disagree. 
In Gregg v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 504, 316 S.E.2d 741 
(1984), we held that a defendant who pled guilty to a first 
offender charge of possession of marijuana, but had the judgment 
of guilty deferred and the charge subsequently dismissed after 
successfully completing a period of probation with terms and 
conditions, was not entitled to have the police and court 
 
7
records relating to that charge expunged.  We observed that 
“[t]he expungement statute applies to innocent persons.”  Id. at 
507, 316 S.E.2d at 742.  Thus, we concluded that “[o]ne who is 
‘guilty’ cannot occupy the status of ‘innocent’ so as to qualify 
under the expungement statute as a person whose charge has been 
‘otherwise dismissed.’ ”  Id. at 507, 316 S.E.2d at 743. 
In Jackson, the case relied upon by the trial court, the 
defendant had entered a plea of nolo contendere to a charge of 
misdemeanor concealment of merchandise.  The trial court 
expressly found that the evidence was sufficient to convict the 
defendant but refrained from entering a judgment of guilty and 
instead required the defendant to “be on ‘good behavior,’ pay 
court costs, and not return to the store where the act of 
concealment occurred for one year.”  When the Commonwealth 
subsequently stipulated that the defendant had complied with 
these terms, the trial court dismissed the charge.  255 Va. at 
554, 499 S.E.2d at 277. 
Later seeking an expungement of the police and court 
records related to the concealment charge, Jackson contended 
that her case could be distinguished from Gregg because she had 
not pled guilty and, thus, was an “innocent person” as 
contemplated by the expungement statutes.  In the alternative, 
Jackson contended that the requirement of demonstrating 
innocence as a prerequisite to obtaining an expungement had been 
 
8
abrogated by the amendment of Code § 19.2-392.2(A)(2) to include 
the reference to a dismissal “by accord and satisfaction 
pursuant to § 19.2-151.”  Id. at 554-55, 499 S.E.2d at 278 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The trial court granted the 
petition for expungement, finding that Jackson’s plea of nolo 
contendere distinguished the case from Gregg.  On appeal by the 
Commonwealth, we reversed the judgment of the trial court. 
While recognizing that a plea of nolo contendere is not an 
admission of guilt, we noted that neither is it “a declaration 
of innocence equivalent to a plea of not guilty.”  Id. at 555, 
499 S.E.2d at 278.  Moreover, we also noted that the trial court 
actually “determined that the evidence was sufficient to prove 
Jackson’s guilt of the offense and then ‘deferred’ judgment.”  
Id.  Because Jackson agreed to abide by the terms set by the 
trial court, we held that she was “precluded from maintaining 
her innocence in the expungement proceeding because, as in 
Gregg, the record that would be expunged affirmatively 
establishes her guilt of the offense.”  Id. at 555-56, 499 
S.E.2d at 278. 
We also rejected Jackson’s contention that the inclusion of 
language in Code § 19.2-392.2(A)(2) in an amendment enacted 
after Gregg permitting an expungement of a charge resolved by 
accord and satisfaction pursuant to Code § 19.2-151 called into 
question the continued viability of Gregg.  We reasoned that a 
 
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dismissal upon an accord and satisfaction “takes place without a 
determination of guilt just as in the case of a nolle prosequi 
or other procedural dismissal.  Accordingly . . . the dismissal 
occurs without any determination of guilt or imposition of 
penalty by judicial authority.”  Id. at 557, 499 S.E.2d at 279. 
Except that Daniel entered a plea of not guilty, rather 
than nolo contendere, the facts of the present case are 
virtually indistinguishable from those in Jackson.  Just as in 
Jackson, the trial court made an express finding that the 
evidence was sufficient for a finding of Daniel’s guilt for the 
offense charged.  Although neither Jackson nor Daniel admitted 
guilt, each agreed to accept and abide by the terms of probation 
imposed upon them while the trial court deferred entering a 
judgment of guilty.  “A person deferred from judgment following 
a determination that the evidence is sufficient to support a 
conviction is not ‘innocent’ of the offense regardless of the 
plea originally entered.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
We also do not agree with Daniel that where the terms 
imposed during a period of probation include making restitution 
to the victim, a dismissal following the period of probation “is 
indistinguishable” from a dismissal by an accord and 
satisfaction pursuant to Code § 19.2-151.  As we noted in 
Jackson, a dismissal of an assault charge following an accord 
and satisfaction occurs without any judicial determination of 
 
10
guilt.  Id.  Moreover, other than requiring the defendant to pay 
“cost accrued by the Commonwealth or any of its officers,” such 
dismissal may not include any additional terms, such as 
requiring the defendant to perform community service or to be on 
good behavior for a period of probation.  Code § 19.2-151.   
For these reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err 
in concluding that the assault and battery charge against Daniel 
was not “otherwise dismissed” as contemplated by Code 
§ 19.2-392.2(A)(2).  Accordingly, we further hold that the trial 
court properly denied Daniel’s petition for expungement on that 
ground. 
Although this holding resolves this particular case, we 
take this opportunity to address Daniel’s further contention 
that the trial court should have conducted an evidentiary 
hearing on his petition for expungement to determine whether 
Daniel was actually innocent of the assault and battery charge.  
We do so in order to provide guidance to the courts and the bar 
and to avoid unnecessary future appeals.  We begin by 
emphasizing that the threshold determination to be made by the 
trial court on considering any petition for expungement of the 
police and court records relating to a criminal charge is 
whether the petitioner has a right to seek expungement of those 
records under an applicable provision of Code § 19.2-392.2(A).  
See Jackson, 255 Va. at 556 n.2, 499 S.E.2d at 278 n.2. 
 
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To make such a determination, the trial court must 
necessarily review the records of the petitioner’s arrest and 
trial, which are to be included with the petition if at all 
possible.  Code § 19.2-392.2(C).  Where those records show that 
the charge the petitioner seeks to have expunged was not the 
subject of an acquittal, nolle prosequi, or absolute pardon, the 
trial court is limited by the stated basis for the dismissal in 
determining whether the case falls within the range of cases 
“otherwise dismissed” within the meaning of subsection (A)(2) of 
the statute. 
Upon determining that the petitioner has the right to seek 
expungement, the purpose of the hearing called for by Code 
§ 19.2-392.2(F), as the statute clearly contemplates, is to 
afford the trial court the opportunity to review the petition 
and supporting materials to determine whether “the continued 
existence and possible dissemination of information relating to 
the arrest of the petitioner causes or may cause circumstances 
which constitute a manifest injustice to the petitioner” and to 
provide the Commonwealth the opportunity to oppose the petition, 
if it so desires.  See also Code § 19.2-392.2(D) and (G) 
(requiring that the petition for expungement be served on the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney and that the Commonwealth be made a 
party to any expungement proceeding).  This statutory scheme 
 
12
does not contemplate a hearing to permit the petitioner to 
assert his innocence of the original criminal charge. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the trial 
court denying Daniel’s petition for expungement. 
Affirmed.