Title: State ex rel. Pietrangelo v. City of Avon Lake

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Pietrangelo v. Avon Lake, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-2974.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-2974 
THE STATE OF OHIO EX REL. PIETRANGELO, APPELLANT, v. THE CITY OF  
AVON LAKE ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Pietrangelo v. Avon Lake, Slip Opinion  
No. 2016-Ohio-2974.] 
Public records—R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(v)—Exception from disclosure for records 
subject to attorney-client privilege—Dates, hours, and rates of legal 
services that are summarized in professional-fee-summary portions of 
itemized attorney-fee billing statements are inextricably intertwined with 
privileged narrative portions of the statements describing the services 
performed—Court of appeals’ judgment affirmed. 
(No. 2015-0495—Submitted January 5, 2016—Decided May 17, 2016.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lorain County, No. 14CA010571. 
_______________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} We affirm the judgment of the Ninth District Court of Appeals 
granting in part and denying in part a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by 
relator-appellant, James E. Pietrangelo II, an attorney acting pro se. 
{¶ 2} Pietrangelo made a public-records request of appellees, the city of 
Avon Lake and its law director, for invoices from a law firm for services rendered 
in connection with pending litigation between Pietrangelo and the city.  The city 
provided him with copies of invoices that set forth the name of the law firm, the 
general matter for which services were provided, the date of the invoice, the total 
fees billed for that period, and itemized expenses and disbursements.  Invoking the 
attorney-client privilege and attorney-work-product doctrine, the city redacted 
 
narrative descriptions of particular legal services rendered, the exact 
dates on which such services were rendered, the particular attorney 
rendering each service, the time spent by each particular attorney on 
a particular day, the billing rate of each particular attorney, the total 
number of hours billed by each particular attorney during the period 
covered by the invoice, and the total fees attributable to each 
particular attorney for the period covered by the invoice. 
 
{¶ 3} Pietrangelo filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Ninth 
District Court of Appeals, requesting an order compelling the city to provide 
unredacted invoices and awarding statutory damages and attorney fees in the event 
that he retained counsel. 
{¶ 4} Pietrangelo filed a motion to strike portions of the city’s answer and 
for sanctions.  The court denied the motion in a one-sentence entry.  Pietrangelo 
and the city filed cross-motions for summary judgment.  Unable to determine from 
the evidence whether either party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the 
January Term, 2016 
 
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court ordered the city to file unredacted copies of the attorney-fee billing statements 
under seal. 
{¶ 5} Following an in camera review, the appellate court determined that 
the city had disclosed the nonexempt portions of the records with the exception of 
the portion of each invoice entitled “Professional Fee Summary.”  Concluding that 
this portion—describing the hours, rate, and money charged for the services—was 
not exempt under R.C. 149.43, the court granted a writ of mandamus compelling 
the city to provide Pietrangelo with copies of the relevant billing statements with 
the professional-fee summary unredacted.  The court denied Pietrangelo’s petition 
in all other respects. 
{¶ 6} Appellees notified the court on March 19, 2015, that Pietrangelo had 
been provided with copies of the relevant invoices with the information contained 
in the professional-fee summary. 
{¶ 7} This matter is before the court on Pietrangelo’s appeal as of right. 
  
{¶ 8} “Mandamus is the appropriate remedy to compel compliance with 
R.C. 149.43, Ohio’s Public Records Act.”  State ex rel. Physicians Commt. for 
Responsible Medicine v. Ohio State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 108 Ohio St.3d 288, 
2006-Ohio-903, 843 N.E.2d 174, ¶ 6; R.C. 149.43(C)(1).  This court construes the 
Public Records Act liberally in favor of broad access and resolves any doubt in 
favor of disclosure of public records.  State ex rel. Rocker v. Guernsey Cty. Sheriff’s 
Office, 126 Ohio St.3d 224, 2010-Ohio-3288, 932 N.E.2d 327, ¶ 6. 
{¶ 9} R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(v) excludes “[r]ecords the release of which is 
prohibited by state or federal law” from the definition of “public record.”  Any 
exception to disclosure under the Public Records Act is strictly construed against 
the public-records custodian, and the custodian has the burden to establish the 
applicability of an exception.  State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Jones-Kelley, 118 
Ohio St.3d 81, 2008-Ohio-1770, 886 N.E.2d 206, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 10}  This court has held that the narrative portions of itemized attorney-
fee billing statements containing descriptions of legal services performed by 
counsel are protected by the attorney-client privilege.  State ex rel. Dawson v. 
Bloom-Carroll Local School Dist., 131 Ohio St.3d 10, 2011-Ohio-6009, 959 
N.E.2d 524, ¶ 28-29; see also State ex rel. McCaffrey v. Mahoning Cty. 
Prosecutor’s Office, 133 Ohio St.3d 139, 2012-Ohio-4246, 976 N.E.2d 877, ¶ 36.  
Other information on the billing statements—e.g., the general title of the matter 
being handled, the dates the services were performed, and the hours, rate, and 
money charged for the services—is considered nonexempt and must be disclosed.  
State ex rel. Anderson v. Vermilion, 134 Ohio St.3d 120, 2012-Ohio-5320, 980 
N.E.2d 975, ¶ 15. 
{¶ 11} Pietrangelo contends that the court of appeals erred in denying him 
mandamus relief that would require appellees to release all the dates of legal 
services performed and the hours and rates of services, not just the description of 
that information provided in the professional-fee summary on the invoice.  
Pietrangelo argues that he is entitled to this information based on Anderson, in 
which this court stated:  “Under the Public Records Act, insofar as these itemized 
attorney-billing statements contain nonexempt information, e.g., the general title of 
the matter being handled, the dates the services were performed, and the hours, rate, 
and money charged for the services, they should have been disclosed to Anderson.”  
Id. 
{¶ 12} In Anderson, the relator, a former mayor of the city of Vermilion, 
requested itemized billing statements for legal services rendered to the city at the 
beginning of the new mayor’s term in office.  Id. at ¶ 2-3.  The city denied the entire 
request on the basis that the requested information was exempt from disclosure 
under the attorney-client privilege.  Id. at ¶ 4. 
{¶ 13} Anderson filed a petition in the court of appeals for a writ of 
mandamus.  The court of appeals denied the writ.  This court reversed and 
January Term, 2016 
 
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remanded the case for further proceedings, id. at ¶ 27, stating that there may be 
nonexempt information on the itemized billing statements, “e.g., the general title of 
the matter being handled, the dates the services were performed, and the hours, rate, 
and money charged for the services,” that should have been disclosed to the relator, 
id. at ¶ 15.  If so, the relator was entitled to that portion of the billing statements 
after redaction of the narrative portions that were covered by the attorney-client 
privilege.  Id. at ¶ 23. 
{¶ 14} Appellees in this case distinguish Anderson and rely on Dawson, 131 
Ohio St.3d 10, 2011-Ohio-6009, 959 N.E.2d 524, in which the relator sought billing 
statements for legal services to the school district for pending litigation involving 
the relator and her children.  Id. at ¶ 1.  The district provided summaries of the 
invoices noting the attorney’s name, invoice total, and the matter involved but 
withheld the actual invoices because they contained what it considered to be 
confidential information.  Id. at ¶ 2. 
{¶ 15} Dawson filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking release of 
the actual itemized statements.  This court concluded that the school district 
properly responded to the relator’s request by providing her with summaries of the 
invoices.  Id. at ¶ 29.  We denied the writ, explaining that “[t]he withheld records 
[were] either covered by the attorney-client privilege or so inextricably intertwined 
with the privileged materials as to also be exempt from disclosure.”  Id. 
{¶ 16} Appellees maintain that the facts in this case resemble Dawson.  We 
agree.  Like Dawson, the records that Pietrangelo seeks relate to the pending 
litigation between the parties.  If disclosed, Pietrangelo may acquire information 
that would be useful in his litigation strategy against the city, whereas in Anderson, 
any harm from disclosure of attorney-client communication was remote or 
speculative. 
{¶ 17} Appellees in this case have disclosed all the nonexempt portions of 
the records, including the information summarized within the professional-fee 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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summary.  To the extent that Pietrangelo requests the dates, hours, and rates not 
identified in the professional-fee summary, they are inextricably intertwined with 
the narratives of services that are privileged materials.  Such information is exempt 
from disclosure.  Dawson, 131 Ohio St.3d 10, 2011-Ohio-6009, 959 N.E.2d 524, at 
¶ 29. 
{¶ 18} Pietrangelo also contends that the court of appeals erred in denying 
him statutory damages of $1,000.  We agree with the court of appeals that “a large 
portion of the billing statements at issue in this case w[as] exempt from disclosure 
and, given the interplay between Dawson and Anderson, a well-informed public 
office could reasonably have believed that the nonexempt portion of the billing 
statements could be withheld from disclosure.  Anderson at ¶ 26.”  9th Dist. Lorain 
No. 14CA010571, 4-5 (Mar. 11, 2015).  The appellate court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Pietrangelo’s request for statutory damages.  See R.C. 
149.43(C); see also State ex rel. Doe v. Smith, 123 Ohio St.3d 44, 2009-Ohio-4149, 
914 N.E.2d 159, ¶ 37 and 40. 
{¶ 19} Finally, Pietrangelo contends that the appellate court erred when it 
denied his motion seeking sanctions and to strike portions of appellees’ answer as 
frivolous.  We do not agree.  Pietrangelo failed to establish that he was entitled to 
the relief requested under Civ.R. 11 and 12(F).  The court of appeals did not abuse 
its discretion when it denied his motion.  State ex rel. Dreamer v. Mason, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 190, 2007-Ohio-4789, 874 N.E.2d 510, ¶ 18. 
{¶ 20} Pietrangelo failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to extraordinary 
relief in mandamus.  We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and O’NEILL, JJ., 
concur. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion that 
FRENCH, J., joins. 
January Term, 2016 
 
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_________________ 
KENNEDY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 21} Respectfully, I concur in part and dissent in part.  I agree with the 
majority that the Ninth District Court of Appeals did not err in denying appellant’s, 
James E. Pietrangelo II’s motion seeking sanctions and motion to strike portions of 
the answer of appellees, the city of Avon Lake and its law director.  I dissent, 
however, from the majority’s decision affirming the Ninth District’s determination 
as to the exempt portion of the attorney-fee billing statements and the denial of 
statutory damages.  Because the appellate court failed to order the disclosure of all 
nonexempt portions of the public records sought pursuant to R.C. 149.43(B)(1), I 
would reverse the decision of the appellate court, order the redaction of only the 
narrative services column of each statement, and order the release of the remaining 
portions of the statements.  Moreover, because Ohio law is settled that only the 
narrative services portion of an attorney-fee billing statement is privileged and 
therefore exempt pursuant to R.C. 149.43(B)(1), appellees failed to demonstrate 
that their redaction of the portions of the public record other than the narrative 
services column was in compliance with and served the underlying public policy of 
R.C. 149.43(B).  Therefore, I would award statutory damages pursuant to R.C. 
149.43(C). 
Facts 
Itemized Attorney-Fee Billing Statements 
{¶ 22} In this case, a review of the sealed records reveals that the itemized 
attorney-fee billing statements each contain numerous pages.  Following the cover 
page of each statement is a summary-invoice page (“summary”), which is the 
equivalent of a billing payment stub.  The summary contains the following: a header 
setting forth the name, address, and contact information of the law firm representing 
appellees (“header”); the name and address of appellee Abraham Lieberman, the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Avon Lake law director; the invoice date and number (“billing designation”); and 
boilerplate payment instructions. 
{¶ 23} Itemization begins on the third page of each statement, continues on 
subsequent pages, and contains the following: the header and billing designation, 
the date “legal services [were] rendered as of,” and a numerical client and matter 
designation.  Each attorney-fee billing statement is next divided into four separate 
categories in column form: date, name, services, and hours.  Each statement 
concludes with the total number of hours invoiced, a professional-fee summary, 
disbursements and expenses (if any), and a total invoice amount. 
Records Provided to Appellant 
{¶ 24} On March 19, 2014, in response to appellant’s public-records 
request, appellees provided him with a redacted copy of each itemized attorney-fee 
billing statement.  Appellees redacted all information except the header and billing 
designation, the date “legal services [were] rendered as of,” the numerical client 
and matter designation, the amount of total fees, the disbursements and expenses, 
and the total invoice amount. 
Analysis 
Mandamus and the Ohio Public Records Act 
{¶ 25} “Mandamus is the appropriate remedy to compel compliance 
with R.C. 149.43, Ohio’s Public Records Act.”  State ex rel. Physicians Commt. for 
Responsible Medicine v. Ohio State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 108 Ohio St.3d 288, 
2006-Ohio-903, 843 N.E.2d 174, ¶ 6.  “We construe the Public Records Act 
liberally in favor of broad access and resolve any doubt in favor of disclosure of 
public records.”  State ex rel. Rocker v. Guernsey Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 126 Ohio 
St.3d 224, 2010-Ohio-3288, 932 N.E.2d 327, ¶ 6. 
{¶ 26} For good reason, “[e]xceptions to disclosure under the Public 
Records Act, R.C. 149.43, are strictly construed against the public-records 
custodian, and the custodian has the burden to establish the applicability of an 
January Term, 2016 
 
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exception.”  State ex. rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Jones-Kelley, 118 Ohio St.3d 81, 
2008-Ohio-1770, 886 N.E.2d 206, paragraph two of the syllabus.  “A custodian 
does not meet this burden if it has not proven that the requested records fall squarely 
within the exception.”  Id. 
Attorney-Client Privilege Generally 
{¶ 27} The Ohio General Assembly has mandated that “[i]f a public record 
contains information that is exempt * * *, the public office * * * shall make 
available all of the information within the public record that is not exempt.”  R.C. 
149.43(B)(1).  The definition of “public record” for purposes of the Public Records 
Act excludes “[r]ecords the release of which is prohibited by state or federal law.”  
R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(v). 
{¶ 28} We have long recognized that state law prohibits the release of the 
records of communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, State ex rel. 
Besser v. Ohio State Univ., 87 Ohio St.3d 535, 542, 721 N.E.2d 1044 (2000), and 
that portions of an itemized attorney-fee billing statement are “covered by the 
attorney-client privilege,” State ex rel. Taxpayers Coalition v. Lakewood, 86 Ohio 
St.3d 385, 392, 715 N.E.2d 179 (1999). 
{¶ 29} Relying on appellees’ argument, the majority seemingly concludes 
that the relevant distinction between State ex rel. Dawson v. Bloom-Carroll Local 
School Dist., 131 Ohio St.3d 10, 2011-Ohio-6009, 959 N.E.2d 524, and State ex 
rel. Anderson v. Vermilion, 134 Ohio St.3d 120, 2012-Ohio-5320, 980 N.E.2d 975, 
regarding what information is subject to disclosure under the Public Records Act is 
whether litigation is pending between the requestor and the government entity.  
Relying on this distinction, the majority then concludes that all “nonexempt 
portions of the records” that appellant requested in this case have been disclosed.  
Majority opinion at ¶ 17.  I disagree. 
{¶ 30} Whether a public-records requestor and a government entity are 
engaged in litigation is irrelevant to the question whether information in an itemized 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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attorney-fee billing statement is privileged and exempt from disclosure.  Instead, 
our case law mandates that the proper focus is on the information sought and 
whether that information is privileged. 
{¶ 31} The relevant distinction between Dawson and Anderson is that in 
Dawson, the school board, in lieu of releasing the itemized attorney-fee billing 
statements, reduced the nonexempt information to a summary.  Dawson at ¶ 2.  
After independent review of the summary and the itemized attorney-fee billing 
statements, we agreed with the school board that “[n]o further access to the detailed 
narratives * * * was warranted.”  Id. at ¶ 29.  In Anderson, the city of Vermilion 
failed to provide Anderson with any alternative record and denied his public-
records request for the itemized attorney-fee billing statement on the basis that the 
record was exempt from disclosure.  Id. at ¶ 4. 
Only the Services Column is Privileged and Subject To Redaction 
{¶ 32} We have recognized that “the narrative portions of itemized 
attorney-billing statements containing descriptions of legal services performed by 
counsel for a client are protected by the attorney-client privilege.” Anderson, 134 
Ohio St.3d 120, 2012-Ohio-5320, 980 N.E.2d 975, at ¶ 13, citing Dawson, 131 
Ohio St.3d 10, 2011-Ohio-6009, 959 N.E.2d 524, at ¶ 28-29, and State ex rel. 
McCaffrey v. Mahoning Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 133 Ohio St.3d 139, 2012-Ohio-
4246, 976 N.E.2d 877, ¶ 36.  We have instructed appellate courts to conduct an in 
camera review to determine what information in an itemized attorney-fee billing 
statement is protected by the attorney-client privilege.  Id. at ¶ 16.  Thereafter,  
“ ‘[i]f the court finds that these records contain excepted information, this 
information must be redacted and any remaining information must be released.’ ”  
Id. (emphasis sic), quoting State ex rel. Master v. Cleveland, 75 Ohio St.3d 23, 31, 
661 N.E.2d 180 (1996), quoting State ex rel. Natl. Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. 
Cleveland, 38 Ohio St.3d 79, 526 N.E.2d 786 (1988), paragraph four of the 
syllabus. 
January Term, 2016 
 
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{¶ 33} After appellant filed his mandamus action, the Ninth District Court 
of Appeals conducted an in camera review of the itemized attorney-fee billing 
statements filed under seal.  9th Dist. Lorain No. 14CA01057, 3 (Mar. 11, 2015).  
Thereafter, the appellate court ordered the additional disclosure of the professional-
fee summary of each statement reflecting the total number of hours each attorney 
billed in the matter, the attorneys’ billing rates, and the amounts billed.  Id.  The 
appellate court then concluded that since the “billing information that correlates to 
the narratives”—i.e., the date, attorney name, description, and number of hours for 
each service—“is summarized within the ‘Professional Fee Summary,’ * * * those 
items need not be disclosed.”  Id. at 3-4.  In affirming the decision of the appellate 
court, this court, without explanation, creates a redundancy exception that is beyond 
the scope of the public policy established by the General Assembly and undermines 
our precedent. 
{¶ 34} The General Assembly is the ultimate arbiter of public policy 
relevant to our public-records laws.  Kish v. Akron, 109 Ohio St.3d 162, 2006-Ohio-
1244, 846 N.E.2d 811, ¶ 44.  To that end, the legislature has decided that “all of the 
information within the public record that is not exempt” must be disclosed.  
(Emphasis added.)  R.C. 149.43(B)(1).  The General Assembly has not authorized 
any public entity to make a value judgment on the information contained in the 
public record sought and withhold nonexempt information that in its view is 
redundant.  Nor has the General Assembly authorized the third branch of 
government to order that nonexempt information it deems redundant be withheld.  
And until now, we have never authorized the exercise of such raw judicial power 
either. 
{¶ 35} In the past, we have “construe[d] the Public Records Act liberally in 
favor of broad access and resolve[d] any doubt in favor of disclosure of public 
records.”  Rocker, 126 Ohio St.3d 224, 2010-Ohio-3288, 932 N.E.2d 327, at ¶ 6.  
Exceptions to disclosure have been “strictly construed against the public-records 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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custodian.”  Cincinnati Enquirer, 118 Ohio St.3d 81, 2008-Ohio-1770, 886 N.E.2d 
206, at paragraph two of the syllabus.  Even if the appellate court’s determination 
that redundant material is exempt makes good sense, “[a] judicially created ‘good 
sense’ rule” cannot override our precedent that only the General Assembly 
determines public policy as to public-records access.  Id. at ¶ 44, citing State ex rel. 
WBNS TV, Inc. v. Dues, 101 Ohio St.3d 406, 2004-Ohio-1497, 805 N.E.2d 1116, 
¶ 36-37.  As we noted in Anderson in rejecting the city’s argument that the 
remainder of a redacted document would be “meaningless,” there is no “exception 
to the explicit duty in R.C. 149.43(B)(1) for public offices to make available all 
information that is not exempt after redacting the information that is exempt.”  134 
Ohio St.3d 120, 2012-Ohio-5320, 980 N.E.2d 975, at ¶ 19. 
{¶ 36} Moreover, the majority relies on Dawson in support of its conclusion 
that “the dates, hours, and rates not identified in the professional-fee summary” that 
appellant has requested “are inextricably intertwined with the narratives of services 
that are privileged materials.  Such information is exempt from disclosure.”  
Majority opinion at ¶ 17.  However, there is little discussion of how the itemized 
attorney-fee billing statements in Dawson were constituted.  The majority’s 
extrapolation of our analysis in Dawson to the public records at issue today is 
disingenuous. 
{¶ 37} The itemized portions of the attorney-fee billing statements 
requested by appellant are not oriented in paragraph form.  The date of service, the 
name of the attorney providing each service, and the hours billed are indicated in 
separate, independent columns and are not intertwined with the narrative services 
column.  As explained above, the records filed under seal establish four separate, 
independent columns within the itemized portion of each attorney-fee billing 
statement.  The narrative services column is readily capable of redaction without 
disturbing the other, nonexempt information. 
January Term, 2016 
 
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{¶ 38} Because appellees failed to meet their burden to prove that all “the 
requested records fall squarely within the exception,” Cincinnati Enquirer, 118 
Ohio St.3d 81, 2008-Ohio-1770, 886 N.E.2d 206, at paragraph two of the syllabus, 
I would order the redaction of only the narrative services column in each itemized 
attorney-fee billing statement and order all remaining portions released. 
Award of Statutory Damages 
{¶ 39} In affirming the appellate court’s denial of statutory damages, this 
court adopted the holding of the appellate court that “ ‘a large portion of the billing 
statements at issue in this case w[as] exempt from disclosure and, given the 
interplay between Dawson and Anderson, a well-informed public office could 
reasonably have believed that the nonexempt portion of the billing statements could 
be withheld from disclosure.’ ”  (Brackets sic.)  Majority opinion at ¶ 18, quoting 
9th Dist. Lorain No. 14CA010571, at 4-5.  I disagree. 
{¶ 40} As explained above, only the narrative services column of each 
itemized attorney-fee billing statement is subject to redaction. 
{¶ 41} Moreover, there is no “interplay” between Dawson and Anderson.  
In Dawson, this court recognized the existence of the law regarding the 
confidentiality of communications shared within the attorney-client relationship 
and then examined the exemption contained in R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(v).  Dawson, 131 
Ohio St.3d 10, 2011-Ohio-6009, 959 N.E.2d 524, at ¶ 26-27.  After considering 
Ohio and federal appellate decisions stating that the attorney-client privilege 
extends to the narrative portions of an itemized attorney-fee billing statement 
describing the services performed, we held that the school board’s decision to 
provide a summary of the information in lieu of the itemized attorney-fee statement 
was proper.  Id. at ¶ 28-29. 
{¶ 42} One year later, in Anderson, we cited Dawson as holding that “the 
narrative portions of itemized attorney-billing statements containing descriptions 
of legal services performed by counsel for a client are protected by the attorney-
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client privilege.”  Anderson, 134 Ohio St.3d 120, 2012-Ohio-5320, 980 N.E.2d 975, 
at ¶ 13, citing Dawson at ¶ 28-29 and McCaffrey, 133 Ohio St.3d 139, 2012-Ohio-
4246, 976 N.E.2d 877, at ¶ 36.  We found, however, that there was a “crucial fact” 
that distinguished Anderson from Dawson.  Id. at ¶ 23.  Specifically, we held that 
the city of Vermilion had denied Anderson’s request and did not provide an 
alternate record, id., whereas in Dawson, the claim for the itemized attorney-fee 
billing statement was moot because the school board had already provided that 
information in a summary, Dawson at ¶ 29. 
{¶ 43} The General Assembly has mandated that a person aggrieved by the 
failure of a public office to provide a public record may bring a mandamus action 
to obtain the record.  R.C. 149.43(C)(1).  If the requestor makes the request in 
writing and the request fairly describes the record or records sought, then the 
requestor “shall be entitled to recover” statutory damages.  Id. 
{¶ 44} A court may reduce or deny an award of statutory damages if two 
findings are made.  Id.  First, the court must find that based on “statutory law and 
case law as it existed at the time * * * a well-informed public office * * * reasonably 
would believe that [its] conduct * * * did not constitute a failure to comply with 
[R.C. 149.43(B)].”  R.C. 149.43(C)(1)(a).  Second, the court must find that “a well-
informed public office * * * would believe that the conduct * * * would serve the 
public policy that underlies the authority that is asserted as permitting that conduct.”  
R.C. 149(C)(1)(b). 
{¶ 45} In affirming the appellate court’s denial of statutory damages and 
attorney fees in Anderson, we held that “a well-informed public office could have 
reasonably believed, based on our decision in Dawson * * *, that the nonexempt 
portions of the attorney-billing statements could be withheld from disclosure.”  134 
Ohio St.3d 120, 2012-Ohio-5320, 980 N.E.2d 975, at ¶ 26.  However, after 
Anderson, the issue of what information is privileged and thereby exempt from 
disclosure in an attorney-fee billing statement became settled law.  Subsequently, 
January Term, 2016 
 
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no well-informed public office could reasonably believe that any portion of an 
attorney-fee billing statement, other than the narrative description of the legal 
services performed, is subject to redaction. 
{¶ 46} As the finding required by R.C. 149.43(C)(1)(a) has not been made, 
the appellate court was without authority to deny appellant an award of statutory 
damages.  Therefore, as appellees impermissibly redacted information in excess of 
the narrative services column of each itemized attorney-fee billing statement, I 
would reverse the appellate court and award appellant statutory damages pursuant 
to R.C. 149.43(C). 
{¶ 47} For all the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the denial of the motion 
for sanctions and the motion to strike and would reverse the appellate court’s 
exemption determination, order the redaction of the narrative services column of 
each itemized attorney-fee billing statement, order the release of all remaining 
information contained in the itemized attorney-fee billing statements, and award 
statutory damages. 
{¶ 48} Accordingly, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. 
FRENCH, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
James E. Pietrangelo II, pro se. 
Abraham Lieberman, Avon Lake Law Director, for appellees. 
_________________