Title: Bedessem v. Cunningham

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

MARJORIE E. BEDESSEM, TRUSTEE OF THE MARJORIE E. BEDESSEM REVOCABLE TRUST AGREEMENT UTA DATED NOVEMBER 25, 2008, v. DAVID P. CUNNINGHAM and  SUSAN M. CUNNINGHAM2012 WY 36Case Number: S-11-0127Decided: 03/09/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.  
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2011
 
MARJORIE 
E. BEDESSEM, TRUSTEE OF THE MARJORIE E. BEDESSEM REVOCABLE TRUST AGREEMENT UTA 
DATED NOVEMBER 25, 2008,Appellant (Plaintiff),v.DAVID P. 
CUNNINGHAM and SUSAN M. CUNNINGHAM,Appellees 
(Defendants).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Albany County
The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
M. 
Gregory Weisz of Pence and MacMillan LLC, Laramie, Wyoming 

 
Representing 
Appellees:
Steven 
F. Freudenthal of Freudenthal & Bonds, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming 

 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
GOLDEN, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      Marjorie Bedessem 
(Bedessem), as trustee of her revocable trust, filed a complaint against David 
and Susan Cunningham (Cunninghams), seeking enforcement of an easement across 
the Cunningham property to access the Bedessem property.  Bedessem claimed an implied access 
easement or, in the alternative, access pursuant to the restrictive covenants 
applicable to both properties.  The 
district court found no evidence of an implied easement and that the restrictive 
covenants authorized only the Architectural Control Committee to sue for 
enforcement of the covenants.  On 
those grounds it granted Cunninghams’ summary judgment motion.  We affirm.
 
ISSUE
 
[¶2]      On appeal, 
Bedessem does not challenge the district court’s finding on the implied easement 
claim and presents only the following issue:
 
I.          
Whether the District Court erred when it ruled that Plaintiff did not 
have standing to enforce a restrictive covenant against 
Defendants.
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      In the early 
1990s, Red Butte Development Corporation (Red Butte) developed a 600-acre tract 
of land south of Laramie, Wyoming.  
The planned development included a two-phase residential subdivision of 
tracts under thirty-five acres in size.  
Phase I of the Buttes Subdivision was a 300-acre development that 
reserved to Red Butte the right to grant use of the subdivision’s roads for 
access from Highway 287 to lands east of the Phase I development.  
 
[¶4]      In conjunction 
with its original plan, Red Butte applied for a right-of-way across a Bureau of 
Land Management (BLM) tract of land east of Phase I of the Buttes Subdivision 
and between the Phase I area and what was proposed, at the time, to be Phase II 
of the Buttes Subdivision.  Red 
Butte sought to use this right-of-way as part of a looped connection to the 
Phase II development.  At some 
point, however, Red Butte abandoned the second phase of its proposed subdivision 
and instead opted to develop the easternmost lands as “the Large Tracts.”  The Large Tracts, designated Tracts I 
through IV, ranged in size from forty to one-hundred acres, and they are 
numbered from south to north, Tract I being the southernmost tract.  
 
[¶5]      In December 1993, 
Red Butte sold Tract II of the Large Tracts to Windy Perkins.  The Warranty Deed for Tract II granted 
an access easement to Tract II from the north across Tracts III and IV.  In December 1994, Red Butte sold Tract I 
to the Cunninghams.  The Warranty 
Deed for Tract I gave the Cunninghams access easements to their property that 
did not cross Tracts II, III or IV.  

 
[¶6]      In conjunction 
with the sale of Tract I to the Cunninghams, Red Butte applied to the BLM to 
revise the right-of-way across the BLM tract so as to eliminate the loop and 
terminate the right-of-way across the BLM land at Tract I’s western 
boundary.  In March/April 1995, the 
BLM approved and adopted the requested revision to the right-of-way to terminate 
Butte Loop as a loop road and to specify that Butte Loop, crossing the BLM 
tract, would terminate at the Tract I boundary.  On April 6, 1995, the BLM right-of way 
grant was assigned from Red Butte to the Cunninghams, effectively eliminating 
the southern portion of the so-call “Loop.”  
 
[¶7]      In 1997-1998, 
Cunninghams built a home on Tract I, and Windy Perkins, along with her husband, 
Dr. James R. Smith, built a home on Tract II.  During this time, Cunninghams agreed 
that Perkins and Smith could access Tract II via Butte Loop across Tract I, and 
Perkins/Smith agreed to share the cost of substantial improvements to the 
road.  Eventually, Cunninghams and 
Perkins/Smith became close personal friends, and Cunninghams continued to allow 
them to access Tract II via Butte Loop and across Tract I.  That permission continued throughout the 
time the parties remained in their residences.  
 
[¶8]      In 2003, the 
owners of Tracts I through IV decided to amend the restrictive covenants that 
governed their properties, due to concerns about the absence of recorded 
covenants on Tract IV and inconsistencies in the recorded covenants for the 
other tracts.  On December 19, 2003, 
the revised covenants were recorded as Vacation of Existing Covenants, Conditions 
and Restrictions and Re-Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and 
Restrictions (Covenants).  

 
[¶9]      In 2007, Perkins 
listed Tract II for sale.  Perkins’ 
realtor, Dianne Van Pelt, visited with Cunninghams to obtain layout maps showing 
the relative locations of the four Large Tracts.  During that meeting, Cunninghams advised 
Ms. Van Pelt that they would no longer extend permission to access Tract II via 
Tract I.  They indicated that they 
expected the new owners to access Tract II from the north, along the express 
easement contained in the Tract II Warranty Deed.  Ms. Van Pelt thereafter had a title 
insurance company investigate access to Tract II and learned that the only 
insurable access was the access from the north across Tracts III and IV.    
 
[¶10]   In September 2008, Jack and 
Marjorie Bedessem purchased Tract II.1  They purchased the property subject to 
the original Tract II Warranty Deed, which granted an access easement to Tract 
II from the north across Tracts III and IV. The Buy Sell Agreement executed by 
Perkins and the Bedessems acknowledged that access to Tract II was from the 
north.  Before closing on the 
property, the Bedessems requested a meeting with the Cunninghams to discuss the 
possibility of access to Tract II through Tract I, but for various reasons, that 
meeting never occurred.  

 
[¶11]   After moving into the residence on 
Tract II, Bedessems accessed their property both from the north, using the 
easement across Tracts III and IV, and also from the south, across Tract I.  Cunninghams informed Bedessems that they 
did not want Bedessems crossing their property to access Tract II.  Eventually, frustrated at Bedessems’ 
continued access from the south, across Cunninghams’ property, Cunninghams 
locked the “Cunningham Ranch Gate” where the BLM right-of-way meets the western 
boundary of Tract I.  Despite 
initial efforts to resolve their dispute, including Cunninghams’ agreement that 
Bedessems could use the southern route across their property when snow made the 
northern route impassable and for a January 2009 party, the parties were unable 
to reach agreement concerning Bedessems’ continued access across Cunninghams’ 
property.  
 
[¶12]   In May 2010, Bedessem filed a 
complaint against Cunninghams seeking declaratory and injunctive relief as well 
as damages for past conduct, punitive damages and attorney fees.  Bedessem claimed an implied access 
easement or, in the alternative, access pursuant to the terms of the restrictive 
covenants applicable to both properties.  
Cunninghams moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted 
that motion in its entirety.  The 
court found that the expressly agreed upon access easement for Tract II from the 
north precluded an implied easement, and it further found that the restrictive 
covenants authorized only the Architectural Control Committee to sue for 
enforcement of the covenants and precluded Bedessem’s enforcement action.  On appeal, Bedessem has abandoned the 
implied easement claim.
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶13]   This Court has a well-established 
standard for reviewing a grant of summary judgment:
 
Summary 
judgment is appropriate when no 
genuine issue as to any material fact exists and the prevailing party is 
entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law. Eklund 
v. PRI Environmental, Inc., 
2001 WY 55, ¶ 10, 25 P.3d 511, [514-15] (Wyo. 
2001); 
see also W 
.R.C.P. 56(c). 
A genuine issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if it were proven, 
would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the 
cause of action or defense that has been asserted by the parties. Williams 
Gas Processing-Wamsutter Co. v. Union Pacific Resources Co., 
2001 WY 57, ¶ 11, 25 P.3d 1064, [1071] (Wyo. 
2001).
 
Trabing 
v. Kinko’s, Inc., 
2002 WY 171, ¶ 8, 57 P.3d 1248, 1252 (Wyo. 
2002).  
 
We 
review a district court’s summary judgment rulings de novo, using 
the same materials and following the same standards as the district court. The 
facts are reviewed from the vantage point most favorable to the party who 
opposed the motion, and we give that party the benefit of all favorable 
inferences that may fairly be drawn from the record. Cook 
v. Shoshone First Bank, 
2006 WY 13, ¶ 11, 126 P.3d 886, 889 (Wyo. 
2006).
 
Grynberg 
v. L & R Exploration Venture, 
2011 WY 134, ¶ 16, 261 P.3d 731, 736 (Wyo. 2011).  Interpretation of restrictive covenants 
is a matter of law we review de 
novo.  Vargas Ltd. P’ship v. Four “H” Ranches 
Architectural Control Comm., 2009 WY 26, ¶ 11, 202 P.3d 1045, 1050 (Wyo. 
2009).
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶14]   Bedessem seeks to enforce the 
following provision of the Covenants, which it contends the Cunninghams have 
violated by placing a gate across the entrance to their property: 

 
Gates 
and/or other entry control devices may be erected to control access to the large 
parcels or to provide for containment or exclusion of livestock.  Such gates and/or control devices shall 
not unduly interfere with the ingress or egress of other Large Parcel Area 
property owners, their invitees or their servants where such ingress or egress 
is guaranteed by established rights of way or customary use.  
 
[¶15]   Before the district court, 
Cunninghams argued that this provision does not and cannot by law provide an 
easement across their property, and furthermore, the Covenants are not subject 
to enforcement by individual property owners.  The district court agreed that Bedessem 
could not seek enforcement of the Covenants because the Covenants granted the 
sole right of enforcement to an architectural committee.  It did not address the alternative 
argument that the Covenants do not provide access across Cunninghams’ 
property.  We agree that the 
threshold issue is whether the Covenants allow an enforcement action by an 
individual property owner, and we likewise conclude that they do not.  
 
[¶16]   Because restrictive covenants are 
contractual in nature, this Court interprets them in accordance with the 
principles of contract law.  
Vargas, 
¶ 11, 202 P.3d  at 1050; Anderson 
v. Bommer, 
926 P.2d 959, 961 (Wyo. 
1996). 
 If the plain terms of the covenants 
are sufficiently clear, we interpret them without reference to any attendant 
facts and circumstances or extrinsic evidence.  Vargas, 
¶ 11, 202 P.3d  at 1050; Goglio v. Star 
Valley Ranch Ass’n, 2002 WY 
94, ¶ 23, 48 P.3d 1072, 1081 
(Wyo. 2002); McClain v. Anderson, 933 P.2d 468, 474 (Wyo. 1997).  We consider 
the document as a whole and interpret any clause or paragraph in harmony with 
the other provisions.  Omohundro v. Sullivan, 2009 WY 38, ¶ 9, 202 P.3d 1077, 1081 (Wyo. 2009); Stevens v. Elk Run Homeowners’ Ass’n, 
Inc., 2004 WY 63, ¶ 13, 90 P.3d 1162, 1166 (Wyo. 
2004).
 
[¶17]   The Covenants that govern the Large 
Tracts provide for an Architectural Control Committee  (ACC) that “shall consist of one Owner 
of record from each of Tracts I, II, III, and IV; provided that a dwelling unit 
is constructed upon and occupied by an owner of record upon that parcel.”  The Covenants require that the ACC 
approve any new structures or substantial alterations of existing structures, 
and they authorize the ACC to act on variances as follows:
 
            
The Architectural Control Committee shall have full power and authority 
to grant variances from these Covenants for cause shown to prevent undue 
hardship upon the owner.  Any 
variance granted shall not cause violation of the overall theme and appearance 
of the area affected by these Covenants. 
 
[¶18]   Article II, Section A of the 
Covenants addresses enforcement of its provisions.  It specifies:
 
            
The Architectural Control Committee shall have the sole 
right, but not the requirement, to enforce, by any applicable proceeding 
at law or in equity, all restrictions, conditions, covenants, reservations, 
liens and charges now or hereinafter imposed by the provisions of this 
document.  Failure to enforce any 
covenant or restriction herein contained shall in no event be deemed a waiver of 
the right to do so thereafter. (Emphasis added.)
 
We 
find the language of the Covenants to be clear and unambiguous in its grant of 
enforcement authority.  The 
Covenants grant the ACC the sole right to enforce the covenants through legal or 
other action.  Not only is this 
grant of authority clear from the Covenant’s plain language, it is consistent 
with the broad authority of the ACC generally.  The ACC has the authority to review and 
approve all construction on the Large Tracts and to grant variances from the 
Covenant’s requirements.  It is 
clear from the Covenants, that the ACC, rather than any individual landowner, 
was to have the discretion to interpret, apply and enforce the Covenants.  In the absence of a public policy 
violation, and none having been presented in this case, we will not disturb the 
clear intentions of the contracting parties.  See Goglio, ¶ 19, 48 P.3d  at 
1079.
 
[¶19]   We do not agree with Bedessem that 
this Court’s decisions in Vargas or 
McClain change this result.  In Vargas, an architectural control 
committee filed an action against a landowner for alleged violations of the 
applicable restrictive covenants, and the landowner challenged the authority of 
the committee to file the action.  
Vargas, ¶ 7, 202 P.3d  at 
1049.  The covenants in that case 
granted enforcement authority to the homeowners’ association without making that 
authority “sole” or “exclusive.”  Id., ¶ 15, 202 P.3d  at 1051.  We held that the architectural control 
committee could maintain its action, recognizing that 
 
“where 
lots in a subdivision are sold subject to common restrictive covenants such as 
to indicate a general plan or scheme, an express reservation of a right of 
enforcing such covenants does not conclusively negative an intent that such 
covenants were also for the benefit of and enforceable by other owners to whom 
such right of enforcement was not expressly granted.” Calvary 
Temple v. Taylor, 
288 S.W.2d 868, 873 (Tex. App. 1956).
 
 
Vargas, 
¶ 15, 202 P.3d  at 1051-52.  The 
instant case is plainly distinguishable in that the Covenants give the ACC the 
“sole right” to bring any enforcement action.
 
[¶20]   Our decision in McClain is also distinguishable.  In McClain, individual homeowners brought 
an enforcement action even though the applicable covenants granted the 
architectural control committee the “sole and exclusive right and authority to 
enforce compliance with the covenants.”  
McClain, 933 P.2d  at 473.  We affirmed the district court decision 
granting certain relief to the homeowners, but the question of authority to 
bring the action in the first place was not raised or addressed.  The issue was only tangentially raised 
in connection with the district court’s rejection of the homeowners’ demand for 
the monetary penalties provided by the covenants.  We affirmed, recognizing that the 
subdivision, acting through its architectural control committee, had the “sole 
and exclusive right and authority to enforce compliance with the covenants,” and 
holding that the continuing penalty “was not intended 
be available to benefit individual owners who sought enforcement of the 
covenant.”  Id. at 474.
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶21]   The Covenants applicable to the 
Large Tracts grant the Architectural Control Committee the sole right to enforce 
the Covenants, and we thus affirm the district court’s summary judgment order. 

 
FOOTNOTES
1The Bedessems later transferred Tract II to Marjorie E. Bedessem, Trustee 
of the Marjorie E. Bedessem Revocable Trust Agreement UTA dated November 25, 
2008.