Title: Johnson v. Garlock, Inc.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

682 So. 2d 25 (1996)
Willie L. JOHNSON, Melvin Jackson, Prince Johnson, and John R. Brown
v.
GARLOCK, INC.
1941913.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
July 12, 1996.
Rehearing Denied August 30, 1996.
Frederick T. Kuykendall III and Charlene P. Cullen of Cooper, Mitch, Crawford, Kuykendall & Whatley, Birmingham, and David D. Shelby of Shelby & Cartee, Birmingham, for Appellants.
Edward B. McDonough, Jr. and Kevin D. Graham of Edward B. McDonough, Jr., P.C., Mobile, for Appellee.
Allan R. Wheeler of Starnes & Atchison, Birmingham, Peggy A. Whipple and J. Ford Little of Woolf, McClane, Bright, Allen & Carpenter, P.L.L.C., Knoxville, TN, for Amici Curiae Owens-Illinois, Inc. and W. R. Grace & Co.-Conn.
MADDOX, Justice.
This is an asbestos exposure case. The four plaintiffs were employed by the steel industry, and they allege that they were exposed to asbestos during or before 1978. They subsequently sued Garlock, Inc., alleging negligence and/or wantonness, breach of warranty, and liability under the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine (AEMLD).
The plaintiff Willie Johnson alleges that he was exposed to asbestos or products containing asbestos while he was employed by United States Steel Corporation from 1946 to 1969. The plaintiff John R. Brown alleges that he was exposed to asbestos or products containing asbestos while he was employed by United States Pipe & Foundry Company from 1950 to September 6, 1978. Plaintiff *26 Melvin Jackson alleges that he was exposed to asbestos or products containing asbestos while he was employed by Woodward Iron Company from 1947 to 1977. The plaintiff Prince Johnson claims that he was exposed to asbestos or products containing asbestos while he was employed at United States Steel from 1929 to 1972.
None of the plaintiffs contends that he was exposed after 1979 to asbestos products manufactured by the defendant Garlock, Inc., or by anyone else. The plaintiffs allege that they were diagnosed with asbestos-related diseases in January and February 1992. They sued Garlock in April 1992.
Garlock moved for a summary judgment on the ground that the statutory limitations period had run. Garlock based its motion on this Court's holdings in Garrett v. Raytheon Co., 368 So. 2d 516 (Ala.1979), and Tyson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 399 So. 2d 263 (Ala.1981). The trial court granted the motion and entered a summary judgment. The plaintiffs appeal, arguing that the limitations period had not run and that if Alabama law is interpreted to mean that the limitations period has run, then that interpretation would be an unconstitutional deprivation of their rights.
In reviewing the disposition of a motion for summary judgment, we utilize the same standard as the trial court used in determining whether the evidence presented a genuine issue of material fact and whether the movant was "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So. 2d 860, 862 (Ala.1988); Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P. When the movant makes a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present substantial evidence creating such an issue. Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d 794, 797-98 (Ala.1989). Evidence is "substantial" if it is of "such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved." West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989). Our review is further subject to the caveat that this Court must review the record in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and must resolve all reasonable doubts against the movant. Hanners v. Balfour Guthrie, Inc., 564 So. 2d 412, 413 (Ala.1990).
The issue before the Court is not novel. It was thoroughly addressed in Garrett, where this Court held that in a radiation exposure action the "statute of limitations begins to run in favor of the party liable from the time the cause of action `accrues.'" 368 So. 2d  at 518-19. The Court said that it had "defined [the] `date of injury' for statute of limitations purposes to be the day on which the plaintiff was last exposed to the damages which injured her." 368 So. 2d  at 520.[1]
On May 19, 1980, after this Court's decision in Garrett, the Legislature adopted § 6-2-30, Ala. Code 1975, which provided:
In Tyson, this Court addressed the contention that this statute applied retroactively to persons exposed to asbestos-related products before the enactment of the law and who discovered after the enactment that they had been harmed by the exposure. The Court unanimously held that § 6-2-30 was constitutional only "insofar as it establishes a discovery rule for the accrual of asbestos injury actions in Alabama and allows one year after discovery for the commencement of actions," *27 but that § 95 of the Alabama Constitution "prevents its application to claims time barred under § 6-2-30, Alabama Code of 1975, and Garrett v. Raytheon, supra, at the time of passage of Act No. 80-566." 399 So. 2d  at 272. Article IV, § 95, of the Alabama Constitution states:
The Court stated that "[u]ntil May 19, 1980, § 6-2-30 of the Alabama Code 1975, and Garrett v. Raytheon, 368 So. 2d 516 (Ala. 1979), dictated the limitations period and date of accrual of causes of [action] for injury due to radiation and other insidious agents." 399 So. 2d  at 268.
51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 44 (1970) (footnotes omitted, emphasis added [in Tyson]). See also, Dobson v. Quinn Freight Lines, 415 A.2d 814 (Me.1980); Hockman, `The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation,' 73 Harv. L.Rev. 692, 696 (1960); Smith, `Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights,' 5 Texas L.Rev. 231, 242-244, 248 (1927).
"In the closely related area of ex post facto legislation, cases and authorities are `in agreement that if the statutory period of the statute has fully run and the bar has once attached so that the defendant could not be prosecuted under the existing statute, the law cannot be changed by future legislation so as to extend the period of limitation as to past offenses, already barred. Such a law would violate the ex post facto clause.' Black, `Statutes of Limitation and the Ex Post Facto Clauses,' 26 Kentucky Law Journal 41, 42 (1937); Moore v. State, 43 N.J.L. 203 (1881); Falter v. United States, 23 F.2d 420 (1928).
"Although this area of the law is concerned with criminal matters, it is analogous to the cases before us. Our own case law recognizes this similarity. In Henry v. Thorpe, 14 Ala. 103 [(1848),] we stated that `statutes of limitation, it has often been held, do not enter into the contracts of parties, or affect their rights, until the presumption is complete.' Id., [14 Ala. at 112]. Once an action is barred by a statute of limitations in existence at the time of commencement of the action, rights vest in the limitations defense which cannot be destroyed by subsequent legislative act because § 95 of the Constitution restricts the legislative power to do so.
399 So. 2d  at 268-70. The Court clearly held that § 6-2-30 cannot apply retroactively to actions already barred by the statute of limitations as interpreted and applied in Garrett. Thus, applying Garrett and Tyson to the facts of this case, we must hold that the plaintiffs' claims are time-barred.
Although the plaintiffs present the Court with the same fact situation it addressed in Tyson, they argue that the application of Tyson to their case violates their state and federal constitutional rights. We disagree. The holdings in Garrett and Tyson do not, as the plaintiffs suggest, eliminate a cause of action before it accrues. We, therefore, reaffirm our holdings in Garrett and Tyson.
AFFIRMED.
HOOPER, C.J., and ALMON, SHORES, HOUSTON, and COOK, JJ., concur.
INGRAM and BUTTS, JJ., dissent.
[1]  The plaintiffs argue that the Court recognized in Barron v. CNA Ins. Co., 678 So. 2d 735 (Ala. 1996), that the Rule in Garrett should not apply to asbestos cases. However, we note that the exposures to asbestos in Barron were subject to the statute of limitations set forth in § 6-2-30, Ala. Code 1975, and the Court was explaining the rationale of the legislature in adopting the statute. No language in Barron suggests that the Court would apply § 6-2-30 retroactively to defendants whose right to the statute of limitations defense has already vested.