Title: Brown County Dept. of Human Services v. Brenda B.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2011 WI 6 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP321 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the termination of parental rights to 
Desmond F., a person under the age of 18: 
 
Brown County Department of Human Services, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
Brenda B., 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner, 
Brian K., 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 788 N.W.2d 385 
(Ct. App. 2010-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
        
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 1, 2010   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Brown   
 
JUDGE: 
Timothy A. Hinkfuss   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Leonard D. Kachinsky, Sisson & Kachinsky 
Law Office, Appleton. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent there was a brief and oral 
argument by Robert J. Collins, II, Brown County Corporation 
Counsel. 
 
 
 
 
2011 WI 6
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2010AP321 
(L.C. No. 
2009TP38) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the termination of parental rights to 
Desmond F., a person under the age of 18: 
 
 
Brown County Department of Human Services, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Brenda B., 
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
Brian K., 
 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 4, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.  Brenda B. seeks review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals that affirmed 
orders of the circuit court terminating Brenda's parental rights 
No. 
2010AP321   
 
2 
 
to her son, Desmond F.1  During the first phase of the 
proceedings, Brenda pled no contest to grounds for involuntary 
termination, which resulted in a finding of parental unfitness.  
After conducting a dispositional hearing, the circuit court 
terminated 
Brenda's 
parental 
rights 
upon 
finding 
that 
termination was in the best interests of the child.  It 
subsequently denied Brenda's motion to withdraw her no contest 
plea.   
¶2 
Brenda asserts that she presented a prima facie case 
that she did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently enter 
the no contest plea.  Specifically, she argues that the circuit 
court failed to inform her that by pleading no contest she was 
waiving her constitutional right to parent, and it failed to 
inform her of the full range of possible dispositions the court 
could enter. 
¶3 
Given that a finding of parental unfitness does not 
necessarily result in an involuntary termination of parental 
rights, we determine that the circuit court was not obligated to 
inform Brenda that by pleading no contest she was waiving her 
constitutional right to parent.  We additionally determine that 
the court need not explain that the right to parent is a 
constitutional right.  What is important is that the parent 
                                                 
1 Brown 
County 
D.H.S. 
v. 
Brenda 
B., 
No. 
2010AP321, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App., June 2, 2010), affirming 
orders of the circuit court for Brown County, Timothy A. 
Hinkfuss, J., presiding.  
No. 
2010AP321   
 
3 
 
understands the import of the rights at stake rather than the 
sources from which they are derived.            
¶4 
We further conclude that the parent must be informed 
of the two independent dispositions available to the circuit 
court.   That is, that the court may decide between dismissing 
the petition and terminating parental rights.   
¶5 
Finally, we determine that the colloquy in this case 
fulfilled the requirements set forth above and that Brenda has 
failed to present a prima facie case that her plea was not 
entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.  Accordingly, 
we affirm the court of appeals.                
I 
¶6 
In October 2008, Desmond was adjudged to be a child in 
need of protection or services.  He was placed outside the home, 
in the care of foster parents.  Nine months later, the Brown 
County Department of Human Services (the County) filed a 
petition 
for 
involuntary termination of Brenda's parental 
rights.2  As grounds, the County alleged that Desmond was in 
continuing need of protection or services and also that Brenda 
                                                 
2 The petition also requested termination of the rights of 
Brian K., the presumed father, as well as "Any and All Known or 
Unknown Fathers."        
No. 
2010AP321   
 
4 
 
failed to assume parental responsibility for Desmond.3  See Wis. 
Stat. §§ 48.415(2), 48.415(6).4    
¶7 
Through her attorney, Brenda opposed the petition, 
demanded a jury trial for the fact-finding hearing, and waived 
the statutory time limits.  Trial was scheduled for October 6, 
2009. 
¶8 
However, at a hearing that took place one day before 
the scheduled trial, Brenda's attorney advised the court that 
Brenda intended to plead no contest to the petition's allegation 
that there were grounds for termination.  He explained that 
Brenda still intended to contest the ultimate disposition: 
My client and I will talk some more but she [has] 
indicated to me that she understands the procedure 
'cuz I explained it to her. . . .  
I explained to her the purpose of a jury trial and the 
rights that go along with it.  We've talked. 
. . . .  
My client indicates to me that she is going to agree 
to waive her right to have a jury trial in this case 
and she [has] made it clear to me that she wishes to 
contest the ultimate disposition in this case where 
she would argue to the Court that it's not in the best 
interests of the child to terminate her parental 
rights. 
She's——she has clearly advised me that she does not 
want to give up her parental rights and she's made it 
                                                 
3 The factual details underlying the petition's allegations 
are not set forth in this opinion because the merits of the 
allegations are not at issue in this review.   
4 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2010AP321   
 
5 
 
clear to me after we further discussed this case that 
she does not wish to have a trial.   
The County agreed that if Brenda did not contest that Desmond 
was in continuing need of protection or services, the County 
would 
move 
to 
dismiss 
the 
remaining 
alleged 
ground 
for 
termination, failure to assume parental responsibility.    
¶9 On the following morning, the circuit court placed 
Brenda under oath and engaged her in a colloquy to determine 
whether she knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently intended 
to plead no contest to grounds for termination.  The court's 
colloquy was lengthy, occupying 20 pages of hearing transcript. 
Additionally, both Brenda's counsel and counsel for the County 
addressed Brenda and made extensive inquiries relating to her 
plea.     
¶10 The 
court 
began 
by 
ascertaining 
Brenda's 
age, 
educational level, mental state, satisfaction with her attorney, 
and ability to read, write, and understand English.  Brenda 
acknowledged that she had reviewed the petition and its 
attachment with her attorney, and she stated that she did not 
have any questions.  
¶11 Brenda informed the court that she wanted to plead no 
contest to grounds for termination.  The court inquired into 
whether Brenda understood the procedural rights she was waiving 
by entering the plea, including the right to call witnesses, the 
right to cross-examine witnesses, and the right to remain silent 
without having anyone comment upon her silence.  It inquired 
into whether Brenda understood that she was giving up the right 
No. 
2010AP321   
 
6 
 
to make the County prove the elements of continuing need of 
protection or services by clear and convincing evidence.    
¶12 The court explained that the question at the fact-
finding hearing would have been whether there were grounds to 
terminate her parental rights: 
[W]hat this whole hearing would be about is not 
whether you're terminate——your parental rights should 
be terminated.  That's ultimately my decision in the 
disposition hearing.  I can either grant the petition 
to terminate your parental rights or dismiss the 
petition to terminate your parental rights. 
What this is——what this trial would be is [to] see if 
there are facts to terminate your parental rights on.  
It's called a fact-finding hearing.  Do you understand 
that?  
Brenda responded that she understood.  The court outlined the 
jury instructions and the special verdict questions, and Brenda 
attested that she understood the findings a jury would have to 
make.    
¶13 Upon the court's questioning, Brenda indicated she 
understood that if the court accepted her plea, the court would 
be required to make a finding of parental unfitness.  The court 
inquired: 
[I]f you make a no contest plea and I accept your 
plea . . . I have to make a finding of parental 
unfitness.  Do you understand that?   
No. 
2010AP321   
 
7 
 
Brenda indicated that she understood.5  
¶14 The court informed Brenda that once grounds for 
termination were found, the next phase would consist of a 
dispositional hearing.  It explained that at the dispositional 
hearing, the court could either grant the petition or dismiss 
the petition, and that decision would be made based on the best 
interests of the child: 
I can grant the petition at a dispositional hearing or 
I can dismiss the petition at a dispositional hearing. 
Those are the two alternatives and by case law I have 
to explain to you that those are the alternatives.  
The standard that I use at the dispositional hearing 
is different than the standard at a fact-finding 
hearing.  The standard is the best interest of the 
child.    
¶15 The court outlined the factors that it would consider 
at disposition6 and explained: "I make my decisions based on the 
                                                 
5 The court agreed to delay making the unfitness finding 
until the beginning of the dispositional hearing "to allow you 
different alternatives."  According to Brenda's attorney's 
representations, the intention was to allow Brenda time to 
decide whether she wished to voluntarily consent to the 
termination 
of 
her 
parental 
rights. 
 
Brenda's 
attorney 
explained: "[I]f she decides to voluntarily terminate her 
parental rights, then there would be no need for a finding of 
unfitness."    
6 These factors include: the likelihood of the child's 
adoption after termination; the age and health of the child; 
whether the child has a substantial relationship with the parent 
or other family members and whether it would be harmful to the 
child to sever those relationships; the wishes of the child; the 
duration of the separation of the parent from the child; and 
whether the child will enter into a more stable and permanent 
family relationship as a result of the termination taking into 
account the condition of the current placement, the likelihood 
of future placements, and the results of prior placements.  
No. 
2010AP321   
 
8 
 
best interest of the child."  Brenda indicated that she 
understood the factors that would be considered by the court 
using the best interests of the child standard.    
¶16 After the court finished its colloquy with Brenda, 
counsel 
for 
the 
County 
questioned 
Brenda. 
 
Among 
other 
inquiries, he asked whether she understood that by pleading no 
contest, she was giving up her right to fight the County's 
allegation that Desmond was in continuing need of protection or 
services, and that by giving up her right to fight that 
allegation, she could lose her parental rights to Desmond at the 
dispositional hearing: 
Q: You understand that by pleading no contest you give 
up your right to fight the County's allegation that 
the child is in continuing need of protection or 
services? 
A: Yes. 
Q: . . . Do you understand that by giving up your 
right to fight that allegation you could lose your 
parental rights to Desmond [] at the dispositional 
hearing? 
A: Yes.    
¶17 Counsel for the County also inquired about Brenda's 
understanding of the specific rights she would lose if her 
parental rights were terminated at the dispositional hearing:   
Q: Do you understand that at the dispositional 
hearing, if the Court terminates your parental rights, 
you will lose the right to have visitation with your 
child? 
A: Yes. 
No. 
2010AP321   
 
9 
 
Q: You will lose the right to know any information 
about your child including where the child is going to 
school and information about the child's health? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Are——that you will lose the right to make any 
decisions for your child? 
A: Yes. 
Q: That the child will not have the right to inherit 
from you? 
A: Yes. 
Q: That you will not have the right to inherit from 
your child? 
A: Yes. 
Q: That you will no longer have the right to custody 
of the child? 
A: Yes.   
¶18 In response to further questioning by counsel for the 
County, Brenda acknowledged that she was aware that the County 
had identified Desmond's current foster mother as a proposed 
adoptive parent.  Likewise, she acknowledged that county 
employees had discussed various alternatives that might be 
available for Desmond's custody, including custody with the 
Department of Human Services, foster home placement, residential 
care, and institutionalization.     
¶19 In response to questioning from her own attorney, 
Brenda professed to understand how termination of parental 
rights proceedings operate.  She acknowledged that she was 
familiar with the evidence in the case, and she agreed that some 
No. 
2010AP321   
 
10 
 
of the evidence was positive and some of the evidence was 
negative. 
¶20 Before making any findings, the court asked Brenda 
whether she had any questions, and Brenda responded that she had 
none.  The court then accepted her no contest plea and concluded 
that it was tendered "freely, voluntarily and intelligently": 
After a discussion with [Brenda] here on the record I 
asked her a variety of questions, received a variety 
of responses and [the guardian ad litem] made a 
statement and [Brown County's counsel] made statements 
and he asked questions as——as well did [Brenda's 
counsel]. 
I 
am 
finding 
that 
she 
freely, 
voluntarily 
and 
intelligently tendered a plea of no contest to the 
petition and the supplement to.  I do find that 
there's a factual basis in the petition; in the 
supplement 
thereto 
for 
a 
fact-finding 
under 
48.415(2)(a).  So I will accept her no contest plea 
here today.   
The court indicated that Brenda was "very composed," that she 
"articulated well," and that she "appeared to be very confident 
of her responses" and "asked appropriate questions."  It 
scheduled the dispositional hearing for the following month. 
¶21 At the scheduled dispositional hearing, the court 
initially made the finding of unfitness that had been deferred 
from the grounds phase of the proceedings.  Brenda then 
testified, as did the proposed adoptive mother and the county 
social worker who had initiated the petition.        
¶22 In a memorandum decision issued several days later, 
the circuit court terminated Brenda's parental rights to 
Desmond.  It explained that the "ultimate decision whether to 
No. 
2010AP321   
 
11 
 
terminate parental rights is discretionary."  After discussing 
the statutory factors, it concluded that terminating Brenda's 
parental rights was in Desmond's best interests.  It transferred 
parental rights to the State Department of Children and Families 
pending adoption.     
¶23 Brenda filed a notice of appeal.  On Brenda's request, 
the court of appeals remanded the matter to the circuit court 
for further proceedings so that Brenda could file a motion to 
withdraw her no contest plea.  Brown County D.H.S. v. Brenda B., 
No. 2010AP321, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App., Feb. 18, 
2010).     
¶24 On remand in the circuit court, Brenda argued that the 
colloquy preceding her no contest plea7 was deficient in two 
respects.  She contended that the circuit court should have 
inquired into whether she understood that she was waiving her 
constitutionally protected right to act as a parent by pleading 
no contest.  Brenda also argued that the circuit court was 
required to ascertain whether she understood all of the 
                                                 
7 Throughout the motion, Brenda's counsel asserted that 
Brenda was seeking to withdraw her "admission."  The circuit 
court construed Brenda's motion as one to withdraw a plea rather 
than any "admission."  The court explained: "You are asking to 
have her plea withdrawn.  I think it's a plea.  I note in 
reviewing the transcript that she did not admit, that she was a 
no contest, there is a difference[.]"       
No. 
2010AP321   
 
12 
 
potential dispositions available under Wis. Stat. § 48.427.8  
Brenda asserted that she had been unaware of the implications of 
her no contest plea with respect to these two matters.  
¶25 The court concluded that Brenda had not established 
any defect in the colloquy.  It denied Brenda's motion to 
withdraw her no contest plea without holding an evidentiary 
hearing.  The court of appeals affirmed in an unpublished 
opinion.  Brown County D.H.S. v. Brenda B., No. 2010AP321, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App., June 2, 2010).         
II 
¶26 This case raises the question of whether Brenda has 
presented a prima facie case that her plea was not entered 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.  To address Brenda's 
arguments, we are required to consider the requirements of due 
process and the interpretation of Wisconsin statutes.    
¶27 Whether Brenda has presented a prima facie case is a 
question of law.  Oneida County D.S.S. v. Therese S., 2008 WI 
App. 159, ¶7, 314 Wis. 2d 493, 762 N.W.2d 122.  Likewise, the 
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.422(3) provides that "[i]f the 
petition is not contested the court shall hear testimony in 
support of the allegations in the petition, including testimony 
as required in sub. (7)."  Wisconsin Stat. § 48.422(7)(a) 
provides that the court must "[a]ddress the parties present and 
determine 
that 
the 
admission 
is 
made 
voluntarily 
with 
understanding of the nature of the acts alleged in the petition 
and the potential dispositions."   
In this case, Brenda did not contest the allegation in the 
petition that grounds for termination existed.  Nevertheless, 
she did contest the termination of parental rights petition, 
arguing that the termination would not be in Desmond's best 
interest.   
No. 
2010AP321   
 
13 
 
requirements of due process and the interpretation of statutes 
present questions of law.  State v. McGuire, 2010 WI 91, ¶26, 
328 Wis. 2d 289, 786 N.W.2d 227; State v. Carter, 2010 WI 132, 
¶19, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __.  We review questions of law 
independently of the determinations rendered by the circuit 
court and the court of appeals.  State v. Vanmanivong, 2003 WI 
41, ¶17, 261 Wis. 2d 202, 661 N.W.2d 76.     
III 
¶28 To provide context to our discussion, we begin by 
setting forth the nature of parental rights as well as the 
procedures under Wisconsin statutes by which parental rights may 
be involuntarily terminated.  Then, we turn to address Brenda's 
arguments about the requirements of a plea colloquy.  Finally, 
we apply the requirements we set forth to the colloquy given in 
this case.    
¶29 "A parent's desire for and right to the companionship, 
care, custody, and management of his or her children is an 
important interest that undeniably warrants deference and, 
absent 
a 
powerful 
countervailing 
interest, 
protection."  
Sheboygan County D.H.H.S. v. Julie A.B., 2002 WI 95, ¶22, 255 
Wis. 2d 170, 648 N.W.2d 402; see also Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila S., 
2001 WI 110, ¶20, 246 Wis. 2d 1, 629 N.W.2d 768.  The parent-
child relationship is recognized as a fundamental liberty 
No. 
2010AP321   
 
14 
 
interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.9  Steven V. v. 
Kelley H., 2004 WI 47, ¶22, 271 Wis. 2d 1, 678 N.W.2d 856 
(citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)).         
¶30 Nevertheless, Wisconsin's Children's Code, Wis. Stat. 
ch. 48, provides that "under certain circumstances" a court "may 
determine that it is in the best interests of the child for the 
child to be removed from his or her parents, consistent with any 
applicable law relating to the rights of parents."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.01(1)(ag).  Termination of parental rights adjudications 
are "among the most consequential of judicial acts" because they 
involve the power of the State to "permanently extinguish[]" any 
legal recognition of the rights and obligations existing between 
parent and child.  Steven V., 271 Wis. 2d 1, ¶21.  "When the 
State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide 
the parents with fundamentally fair procedures."  Id., ¶23 
(quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753-54).   
¶31 Initially, the parental right is considered paramount 
"until there has been an appropriate judicial proceeding 
demonstrating that the state's power may be exercised to 
terminate that right."  M.W. v. Monroe County D.H.S., 116 
                                                 
9 In this case, there is no question that Brenda has a 
liberty interest in her relationship with Desmond that is 
protected under the Constitution.  We recognize that not all 
biological 
parental 
relationships 
warrant 
constitutional 
protection.  See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 
(1979) ("In those cases where the father never has come forward 
to participate in the rearing of his child, nothing in the Equal 
Protection Clause precludes the State from withholding from him 
the privilege of vetoing the adoption of that child.").   
No. 
2010AP321   
 
15 
 
Wis. 2d 432, 436-37, 342 N.W.2d 410 (1984).  A court may not 
terminate parental rights without first making an individualized 
determination that the parent is unfit.  Stanley v. Illinois, 
405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972).  Once an unfitness determination is 
made, however, it is the best interests of the child rather than 
the rights of the parent that is considered "paramount."  See 
Wis. Stat. § 48.01.  To accommodate the different and sometimes 
conflicting interests involved, termination of parental rights 
proceedings are bifurcated into two phases.  Julie A.B., 255 
Wis. 2d 170, ¶24.   
¶32 The first phase consists of a fact-finding hearing, 
where the purpose is to determine whether parental unfitness can 
be proven.  Wis. Stat. § 48.424(1).  During this first phase, 
the parent receives a full complement of procedural rights.  
Julie A.B., 255 Wis. 2d 170, ¶24.  The burden is on the 
petitioner to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that 
grounds for termination exist.10  Id.; Wis. Stat. § 48.31(1).  If 
the petitioner meets that burden, the court must find the parent 
to be unfit.  Wis. Stat. § 48.424(4). 
                                                 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.415 establishes 12 different grounds 
for termination.  Continuing need of protection or services is 
one of these grounds.  See Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2). 
The procedures outlined in Wis. Stat. ch. 48 are meant to 
ensure that parental rights will be terminated only "after a 
deliberative, well considered, fact-finding process utilizing 
all the protections afforded by the statutes unless there is a 
specific, knowledgeable, and voluntary waiver."  See M.W. v. 
Monroe County D.H.S., 116 Wis. 2d 432, 437, 342 N.W.2d 410 
(1984).      
No. 
2010AP321   
 
16 
 
¶33 An 
unfitness 
finding 
does 
not 
predetermine 
the 
ultimate 
outcome 
of 
the 
proceedings. 
 
Julie 
A.B., 
255 
Wis. 2d 170, ¶28.  Rather, a finding of unfitness permits the 
court to move on to the second phase of the proceedings, the 
dispositional phase.  During the dispositional phase, the court 
determines whether the parent's rights will be terminated and if 
so, what will happen to the child.  Steven V., 271 Wis. 2d 1, 
¶26.  It is the best interests of the child that is the 
"polestar" at the dispositional hearing.  Julie A.B., 255 
Wis. 2d 170, ¶30; Wis. Stat. § 48.426(2).   
IV 
¶34 Under the procedures outlined above, it is during the 
first phase of an involuntary termination of parental rights 
proceeding that the parent's interest in the parent-child 
relationship is most jealously protected.  A parent who chooses 
to enter a no contest plea during this phase is giving up 
valuable protections and must have knowledge of the rights being 
waived by making the plea.  Kenosha County D.H.S. v. Jodie W., 
2006 WI 93, ¶25, 293 Wis. 2d 530, 716 N.W.2d 845 (citing State 
v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 265-66, 389 N.W.2d 12(1986)).   
¶35 The 
principles 
and 
analysis 
of 
Bangert 
apply.  
Waukesha County v. Steven H., 2000 WI 28, ¶42, 233 Wis. 2d 344, 
607 N.W.2d 607; Jodie W., 293 Wis. 2d 530, ¶24 n.14.  The 
circuit court must engage the parent in a colloquy to ensure 
that the plea is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.  This 
colloquy 
is 
governed 
by 
the 
requirements 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
No. 
2010AP321   
 
17 
 
§ 48.422(7) and notions of due process.  Steven H., 233 
Wis. 2d 344, ¶¶25, 39.   
¶36 If the parent can later show that the colloquy was 
deficient and also alleges that he or she did not know or 
understand the information that should have been provided, that 
parent has made a prima facie case that the plea was not 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.  Id., ¶42.  At that point, 
the burden shifts to the petitioner to demonstrate by clear and 
convincing evidence that the parent knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently pled no contest.  Id. 
¶37 Here, Brenda alleges two deficiencies.  First, she 
asserts that the court failed to inform her that she was waiving 
her constitutional right to parent.  Second, she asserts that 
the 
court 
failed 
to 
inform 
her 
of 
the 
full 
range 
of 
dispositions.  We address these alleged deficiencies in turn.   
A 
¶38 According 
to 
Brenda's 
argument, 
the 
court 
was 
obligated to inform her that, upon the finding of unfitness, she 
would lose her constitutional right to parent Desmond.  She 
asserts that informing a parent that the plea will result in a 
finding of unfitness is insufficient because it does not fully 
inform 
the 
parent 
of 
the 
more 
solemn 
loss 
of 
the 
constitutionally protected right to parent his or her child.   
¶39 Under our statutory scheme, it is not accurate to say 
that a parent loses his or her constitutional right to parent if 
the court accepts a no contest plea during the grounds phase.  
Rather, the immediate consequence of the plea is that the parent 
No. 
2010AP321   
 
18 
 
will be found to be unfit.  Therese S., 314 Wis. 2d 493, ¶11; 
Wis. Stat. § 48.424(4).  Even after the parent is found to be 
unfit, however, the circuit court may in its discretion opt to 
dismiss the petition after the dispositional hearing, leaving 
all parental rights intact.  Wis. Stat. § 48.427(2).   
¶40 Therefore, the court was not obligated to inform 
Brenda that, upon acceptance of her plea, she would lose her 
constitutional right to parent Desmond.  As the court of appeals 
persuasively 
explained 
in 
a 
recent 
unpublished 
opinion, 
"[b]ecause Wisconsin statutory law does not permit a court to 
terminate parental rights upon a finding of unfitness without 
completing the dispositional phase, we see no rationale for 
requiring a court to inform a parent that a finding of unfitness 
results in the automatic loss of the constitutional right to 
parent."  Dane County D.H.S. v. James M., Nos. 2009AP2038 & 
2009AP2039, unpublished slip op., ¶24 (Wis. Ct. App., Mar. 18, 
2010).11 
¶41 Nevertheless, whenever a parent wishes to plead no 
contest to grounds for involuntary termination, the parent must 
be provided with sufficient information to evaluate the stakes 
involved.  Before a no contest plea can be accepted, a parent 
                                                 
11 An unpublished opinion has no precedential value and is 
not 
binding 
on 
any 
court 
of 
this 
state. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 809.23(3)(b) (as amended by Sup. Ct. Order No. 08-02, 2009 WI 
2, 311 Wis. 2d xxv).  Nevertheless, an unpublished opinion 
issued on or after July 1, 2009, that is authored by a member of 
a three-judge panel or by a single judge under Wis. Stat. 
§ 752.31(2) may be cited for its persuasive value.  Id. 
No. 
2010AP321   
 
19 
 
must understand that the power of the State may be employed to 
permanently extinguish any legal recognition of the rights and 
obligations existing between parent and child.  See Steven V., 
271 Wis. 2d 1, ¶21.  The parent must be given sufficient 
information to understand the rights that could be lost if, 
during the second phase of the proceedings, the court decides to 
terminate parental rights. 
¶42 It is likewise essential for parents to understand 
that they are agreeing to waive the protections which safeguard 
parental rights from permanent extinguishment by the State.  The 
parent must be informed that there are a number of procedural 
trial rights put in place to prevent parental rights from being 
terminated without cause,12 and that these rights are waived with 
the court's acceptance of the plea.   
¶43 It is important that the parent understand that by 
pleading no contest to a ground for termination, the parent is 
waiving the right to make the petitioner prove unfitness by 
clear and convincing evidence, and that acceptance of the plea 
will result in a finding that the parent is unfit.  Therese S., 
314 Wis. 2d 493, ¶¶10-11; James M., unpublished slip op., ¶24; 
see also Wis. Stat. § 48.424(4).       
¶44 Finally, the parent must be informed that by pleading 
no contest to grounds for termination, the parent has waived a 
                                                 
12 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 48.23(2) (providing for the right 
to counsel); Wis. Stat. § 48.31(2) (providing for a right to a 
jury trial); State v. Shirley E., 2006 WI 129, ¶49, 298 
Wis. 2d 1, 724 N.W.2d 623.  
No. 
2010AP321   
 
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fact-finding hearing during the phase of the proceedings in 
which the parent's rights receive the utmost protection under 
the Constitution.  Should a parent wish to contest termination 
after he or she is found to be unfit, that parent is left with 
the sole issue of whether termination of parental rights is in 
the best interests of the child.  Once the parent is found to be 
unfit, it is the court's determination about what is best for 
the child rather than any concern about protecting the parent's 
right that drives the outcome.  Therese S., 314 Wis. 2d 493, 
¶16; James M., unpublished slip op., ¶24.  
¶45 At oral argument, Brenda's counsel advanced that it 
was necessary for a court to explain that the right to parent 
derives from the Constitution.  We disagree that the word 
"constitutional" has the talismanic significance attributed to 
it by counsel.  What is essential is that a parent understands 
the nature and import of the rights involved——not necessarily 
the source of those rights.  
¶46 Accordingly, 
given 
that 
a 
finding 
of 
parental 
unfitness 
does 
not 
necessarily 
result 
in 
an 
involuntary 
termination of parental rights, we determine that the circuit 
court was not obligated to inform Brenda that by pleading no 
contest she was waiving her constitutional right to parent.  We 
additionally determine that the court need not explain that the 
right to parent is a constitutional right.  What is important is 
that the parent understands the import of the rights at stake 
rather than the sources from which they are derived.              
B 
No. 
2010AP321   
 
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¶47 We move next to the question of whether the colloquy 
was deficient because the court failed to inform Brenda of the 
full range of dispositions it could enter.  Before accepting an 
admission of the alleged facts in a petition (or in this case, a 
no contest plea to grounds for termination), a court must 
determine that it is made with understanding of "the potential 
dispositions." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.422(7); 
Therese 
S., 
314 
Wis. 2d 493, ¶14.     
¶48 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.427 is entitled "Dispositions."  
Subsection (1) mandates that "after receiving any evidence 
related to the disposition, the court shall enter one of the 
dispositions 
specified 
under 
subs. 
(2) 
to 
(4)." 
 
Those 
subsections provide:  
(2) The court may dismiss the petition if it finds 
that the evidence does not warrant the termination of 
parental rights. 
(3) The court may enter an order terminating the 
parental rights of one or both parents. 
(3m) If the rights of both parents or of the only 
living parent are terminated under sub. (3) and if a 
guardian has not been appointed under s. 48.977, the 
court shall [transfer guardianship and custody pending 
adoption to any one of a number of individuals or 
agencies enumerated in the statute, or appoint a 
guardian and transfer guardianship and custody to that 
guardian]. 
(3p) If the rights of both parents or of the only 
living parent are terminated under sub. (3) and if a 
guardian has been appointed under s. 48.977, the court 
may enter one of the orders specified in sub. (3m)(a) 
or (b).  If the court enters an order under this 
subsection, the court shall terminate the guardianship 
under s.48.977. 
No. 
2010AP321   
 
22 
 
(4) If the rights of one or both parents are 
terminated under sub. (3), the court may enter an 
order placing the child in sustaining care under s. 
48.428.13   
¶49 Brenda asserts the statute is unambiguous.  She 
contends that the colloquy was deficient because the court 
discussed only two of the potential dispositions——dismissing the 
petition and terminating parental rights.  Brenda argues that 
subs. (3m), (3p), and (4) are all "dispositions," and further, 
that the court was required to inform her of those dispositions 
prior to accepting her plea.   
¶50 At first glance, Brenda's argument that the statute is 
unambiguous appears to have merit.  Wisconsin Stat. § 48.427 
refers to "one of the dispositions specified under subs. (2) to 
(4)," which would appear to indicate that subs. (2), (3), (3m), 
(3p), and (4) are all "dispositions." 
¶51 Nevertheless, 
the 
plain 
meaning 
interpretation 
advanced 
by 
Brenda 
does 
not 
pass 
a 
closer 
examination.  
Subsection (1) provides that a court must enter "one of the 
dispositions specified under subs. (2) to (4)."  Nevertheless, 
the court cannot simply enter one of the "dispositions" set 
                                                 
13 It is appropriate for the court to order sustaining care 
if it finds that the child is unlikely to be adopted or that 
adoption is not in the best interest of the child.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.428(1).  When a child is placed in sustaining care, legal 
custody and guardianship is transferred to a department or 
agency, and physical placement is in the home of the sustaining 
parent.  Wis. Stat. § 48.429(2).  Subject to the authority of 
the guardian and legal custodian, a sustaining parent has 
certain rights and responsibilities necessary for the day-to-day 
care of the child.  Wis. Stat. § 48.428(3).  
No. 
2010AP321   
 
23 
 
forth in sub. (3m), sub. (3p), or sub. (4).  Rather, it must 
first enter a disposition terminating parental rights under sub. 
(3).  See Wis. Stat. § 48.427(3m) ("If the rights of both 
parents or of the only living parent are terminated under sub. 
(3) . . . ."); id. § 48.427(3p) ("If the rights of both parents 
or of the only living parent are terminated under sub. 
(3) . . . ."); id. § 48.427(4) ("If the rights of one or both 
parents are terminated under sub. (3) . . . .").   
¶52 Based on the statutory language, it is not accurate to 
say that there are five independent dispositions, and the court 
must choose one of them.  Rather, the court must first choose 
between the two independent dispositions set forth in sub. (2) 
and sub. (3)——it must dismiss the petition or terminate parental 
rights.  If the court terminates parental rights, the court may 
exercise 
several 
alternatives 
for 
designating 
custody, 
guardianship, and care of the child.  The availability of the 
alternatives set forth in sub. (3m), sub. (3p), and sub. (4) are 
contingent upon the court's determination that parental rights 
should be terminated under sub. (3).      
¶53 The purpose of the statutory requirement that the 
court inform the parent about the potential dispositions is to 
provide the parent with information relevant to the plea.  In a 
case such as this where the likely guardianship and custody of 
the child is known to all parties, it does not further the 
purpose underlying the colloquy to inform the parent about 
hypothetical but improbable outcomes.     
No. 
2010AP321   
 
24 
 
¶54 The court of appeals recently addressed a similar 
argument in Therese S., 314 Wis. 2d 493.  In that case, the 
mother decided not to contest the county's allegations that 
there were grounds to terminate her parental rights.  The court 
informed the mother that she was "admitting the grounds for 
termination but still leaving open the question as to what's 
gonna happen, the disposition."  Id., ¶14.  The court explained 
the concept of "disposition" as follows: "[I]t hasn't been 
decided yet what we're going to do.  Your termination is not 
actually entered today.  We have more work to do to decide what 
to do."  Id. 
¶55 The Therese S. court concluded that the colloquy was 
deficient.  "[A]t the very least," the court of appeals 
concluded, "a court must inform the parent that at the second 
step of the process, the court will hear evidence related to the 
disposition and then will either terminate the parent's rights 
or dismiss the petition if the evidence does not warrant 
termination."  Id., ¶16.  The court of appeals stopped short of 
"requiring courts to inform parents in detail of all potential 
outcomes."  Id., ¶17.   
¶56 We agree with the Therese S. court and determine that 
not only would such a requirement be "unduly burdensome," id., 
but more importantly, it has the potential to confuse or mislead 
rather than to inform.  To render a plea knowing, voluntary, and 
intelligent, we conclude that the parent must be informed of the 
two independent dispositions available to the circuit court.  
No. 
2010AP321   
 
25 
 
That is, the court may decide between dismissing the petition 
and terminating parental rights.14       
V 
¶57 In applying the principles discussed above, we do not 
provide a specific checklist.  The questions to be asked depend 
upon the circumstances of the case.  Under the facts presented 
here, we conclude that the colloquy provided Brenda with 
sufficient information to understand the import of the rights at 
stake.  Further, we determine that Brenda received sufficient 
information to understand the potential dispositions.       
¶58 During the plea, Brenda was informed that at the 
dispositional hearing, the power of the State could be employed 
to permanently extinguish legal recognition of the rights and 
obligations existing between her and Desmond.  Counsel for the 
County asked if Brenda understood that she "could lose [her] 
parental rights to Desmond [] at the dispositional hearing," and 
Brenda stated that she understood.  Supra, ¶16.      
¶59 Through questioning by counsel for the County, Brenda 
was provided with additional information to understand the 
consequences that termination of parental rights would have on 
her relationship with Desmond.  Counsel for the County confirmed 
her understanding that she could lose custody and the right to 
care for Desmond, the right to make decisions for Desmond, the 
                                                 
14 It is not inconsistent with this opinion, if the court 
deems it relevant in an individual case, to inform the parent of 
possible alternatives for designating custody, guardianship, and 
care of the child. 
No. 
2010AP321   
 
26 
 
right to receive information about Desmond, the right to inherit 
from Desmond, and the right to visit Desmond.  Id., ¶17. 
  
¶60 Additionally, Brenda was informed that she had a 
number of procedural rights, and that she was waiving those 
procedural rights if the court accepted her plea.  Specifically, 
the court informed Brenda that she was waiving the right to call 
witnesses, the right to cross-examine witnesses, and the right 
to remain silent without having anyone comment upon her silence.  
Id., ¶11.  
¶61 Brenda also was advised that her parental rights could 
not be terminated without the County proving unfitness, and that 
by pleading no contest, she was waiving the right to have the 
County prove by clear and convincing evidence that Desmond was 
in continuing need of protection or services.  Id., ¶11.  Brenda 
professed to understand that she was "giv[ing] up [her] right to 
fight the County's allegation" that Desmond was in continuing 
need of protection or services, and that acceptance of her plea 
would result in a finding of unfitness.  Id., ¶¶13, 16.   
¶62 Further, the court advised Brenda that the standard at 
the dispositional hearing differed from the standard at the 
fact-finding hearing.  Id., ¶14.  It explained that at the 
dispositional hearing, its decision would be made based on 
Desmond's best interests, and that the court could determine 
that it would be in Desmond's best interests to terminate her 
parental rights.  Id., ¶¶14-15.   
¶63 The 
court 
informed 
Brenda 
that 
during 
the 
dispositional phase of the proceedings, the court could dismiss 
No. 
2010AP321   
 
27 
 
the petition or terminate Brenda's parental rights.  Id., ¶14.  
Brenda acknowledged that she was aware of various alternatives 
that might be available for Desmond's custody, and that 
Desmond's current foster mother was considered by the County as 
a proposed adoptive mother.  Id., ¶18.   
¶64 Under these circumstances, we conclude that Brenda has 
failed to present a prima facie case that her plea was not 
entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.  For that 
reason, the circuit court did not err by denying Brenda's motion 
to withdraw her no contest plea. 
¶65 In sum, given that a finding of parental unfitness 
does not necessarily result in an involuntary termination of 
parental rights, we determine that the circuit court was not 
obligated to inform Brenda that by pleading no contest she was 
waiving her constitutional right to parent.  We additionally 
determine that the court need not explain that the right to 
parent is a constitutional right.  What is important is that the 
parent understands the import of the rights at stake rather than 
the sources from which they are derived.            
¶66 We further conclude that the parent must be informed 
of the independent dispositions available to the circuit court.  
That is, that the court may decide between dismissing the 
petition and terminating parental rights.   
¶67 Finally, we determine that the colloquy in this case 
fulfilled the requirements set forth above and that Brenda has 
failed to present a prima facie case that her plea was not 
No. 
2010AP321   
 
28 
 
entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.  Accordingly, 
we affirm the court of appeals.                
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
No. 
2010AP321   
 
 
 
1