Title: Seals v. City of Columbia

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

575 So. 2d 1061 (1991)
Robert Hence SEALS, individually and as administrator of the Estate of Misty Michelle Seals, deceased
v.
CITY OF COLUMBIA and Stanley E. Cook.
1900033.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
January 25, 1991.
*1062 Patrick M. Lavette of Hare, Wynn, Newell & Newton, Birmingham, for appellant.
Herman Cobb of Buntin, Cobb & Shealy, Dothan, for appellees.
HOUSTON, Justice.
Robert Hence Seals, individually and as the administrator of his daughter's estate, sued the City of Columbia and one of its police officers, Stanley E. Cook, alleging, in pertinent part, as follows:
The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on the ground that Seals's complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The pertinent portion of the trial court's order is as follows:
Seals appealed. We reverse and remand.
The standard of review applicable to motions to dismiss is well settled:
Fontenot v. Bramlett, 470 So. 2d 669, 671 (Ala.1985). (Emphasis in original.)
The defendants contend that the trial court correctly dismissed Seals's complaint. They argue that in order to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, Seals had to specifically allege that Officer Cook's vehicle came into contact with the vehicle in which his daughter was riding or that Officer Cook otherwise "directly" caused his daughter's death.
Seals contends that his complaint was sufficient to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. He argues that it was premature for the trial court to enter a judgment for the defendants as a matter of law. We agree.
In Madison v. Weldon, 446 So. 2d 21 (Ala.1984), this Court held that, in the absence of proof of a lack of due care on the part of a police officer in operating his vehicle, a causal connection between the officer's pursuit of an offender and the injuries sustained by, or the death of, a third party involved in a collision with the fleeing offender could not be established. The rule regarding the conduct of a police officer in pursuit of a fleeing offender was succinctly stated as follows:
446 So. 2d  at 28, quoting City of Miami v. Horne, 198 So. 2d 10 (Fla.1967). By its holding, this Court recognized that a lack of due care on the part of a police officer in operating his vehicle could be the proximate cause of the injuries sustained by, or the death of, a third party involved in a collision with the fleeing offender. In accord, see Blair v. City of Rainbow City, *1064 542 So. 2d 275 (Ala.1989), and Doran v. City of Madison, 519 So. 2d 1308 (Ala. 1988).[1]
Neither Madison v. Weldon, nor Blair v. City of Rainbow City, nor Doran v. City of Madison stands for the proposition that in order to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, Seals had to specifically allege that Officer Cook's vehicle came into contact with the vehicle in which his daughter was riding or that Officer Cook otherwise "directly" caused his daughter's death. Seals alleged that Officer Cook negligently or wantonly operated his police vehicle while in pursuit of Jimmy Watford and that Cook's negligence or wantonness was a proximate cause of his daughter's death. Seals also alleged that the City of Columbia had negligently or wantonly failed to train or supervise Officer Cook and that its negligence or wantonness in this regard caused his daughter's death. These allegations were sufficient under our rules of notice pleading to put the defendants on notice of the claims against them.[2] As this Court noted in Sanders v. Judson College, 514 So. 2d 890, 891-92 (Ala.1987), "[h]owever unlikely it may appear that [the] plaintiff can prove his case, the appropriate inquiry at this stage in the proceedings is the sufficiency of [the] plaintiff's allegations, not the sufficiency of his proof in support thereof." (Emphasis in original.)
We cannot say, as a matter of law, that Seals can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief; consequently, the judgment is due to be, and it is hereby, reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, SHORES and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.
[1]  In Blair v. City of Rainbow City and Doran v. City of Madison, the undisputed evidence showed that the police officers had exercised due care in pursuing the offenders; accordingly, the defendants in those cases were entitled to judgments as a matter of law.
[2]  Interestingly, the defendants made the following statements in their brief:

"It is true that, as [Seals] argues, a lack of a collision between Officer Cook and [Seals's daughter] does not negate proximate cause. However, [Seals] did not suggest or allege any other form of direct causation on the part of Officer Cook."
"A police officer's actions in pursuing an escaping offender could, under certain circumstances, be the direct cause of injury to a third party involved in a collision with the offender. For example, if an officer intentionally rammed or chased a fleeing offender's vehicle into a third party's vehicle to prevent the offender's escape, then the actions of the officer could be held the proximate cause of any resulting injury to the third party."