Title: State ex rel. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Indus. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 121 Ohio St.3d 341, 2009-Ohio-
1219.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, APPELLANT, v. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 
 121 Ohio St.3d 341, 2009-Ohio-1219.] 
Workers’ compensation — Compensation for temporary total disability — 
Permanent inability to return to former position of employment — 
Maximum medical improvement — R.C. 4123.56(A). 
(No. 2007-2020 — Submitted January 13, 2009 — Decided March 24, 2009.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,  
No. 06AP-968, 2007-Ohio-4799. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellee Kathleen E. Moran is receiving temporary total disability 
compensation.  All the medical evidence before us indicates that her allowed 
conditions have not reached maximum medical improvement (“MMI”), which 
would disqualify her from temporary total disability compensation.  But her 
attending physician has also stated that she can never return to her former position 
of employment.  Moran’s employer, DaimlerChrysler Corporation (now Chrysler 
L.L.C.), appellant, claims that this declaration justifies termination of Moran’s 
temporary total disability compensation.  Appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio 
rejected that argument, as did the Court of Appeals for Franklin County.  That 
issue is now before us on Chrysler’s appeal as of right. 
{¶ 2} R.C. 4123.56(A) bars temporary total disability compensation 
when “any employee has returned to work, when an employee’s treating 
physician has made a written statement that the employee is capable of returning 
to the employee’s former position of employment, when work within the physical 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
capabilities of the employee is made available by the employer or another 
employer, or when the employee has reached the maximum medical 
improvement.” 
{¶ 3} Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-32(A)(1), in turn, defines “maximum 
medical improvement” as “a treatment plateau (static or well-stabilized) at which 
no fundamental functional or physiological change can be expected within 
reasonable medical probability in spite of continuing medical or rehabilitative 
procedures.” Chrysler admits that Moran has not attained MMI and that none of 
the other disqualifying events listed in R.C. 4123.56(A) has occurred.  It urges 
termination nevertheless because, according to her doctor, Moran is permanently 
unable to return to her former position of employment.  In arguing that this, too, 
forecloses temporary total disability compensation, Chrysler relies on  language 
from State ex rel. Ramirez v. Indus. Comm. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 630, 632, 23 
O.O.3d 518, 433 N.E.2d 586, quoting the Court of Appeals for Franklin County: 
{¶ 4} “ ‘An employee is entitled to be paid temporary total disability 
when injured and unable to work until one of the following three things occur[s]: 
(1) he has returned to work, (2) his treating physician has made a written 
statement that he is capable of returning to his former position of employment, or 
(3) the temporary disability has become permanent.’ ” 
{¶ 5} Chrysler proposes that a temporary disability has “become 
permanent” when a claimant is permanently unable to return to the former 
position of employment.  Its position presumably rests on Ramirez’s reference to 
“disability” and the long-standing definition of that term as “ ‘the effect that the 
medical impairment has on the claimant’s ability to work.’ ” Meeks v. Ohio Brass 
Co. (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 147, 148, 10 OBR 482, 462 N.E.2d 389, quoting the 
Industrial Commission’s Medical Examination Manual.  Chrysler thus concludes 
that MMI and “Ramirez permanency” are distinct concepts, meaning that the 
permanency of either the underlying medical condition or the inability to return to 
January Term, 2009 
3 
the former position of employment warrants termination of temporary total 
disability compensation.  Appellees and their amici collectively offer four 
counterarguments.  Ultimately, analysis favors appellees. 
{¶ 6} Appellees initially accuse Chrysler of ignoring the history and 
meaning of R.C. 4123.56(A).  The statute was amended four years after Ramirez 
was decided but did not incorporate the Ramirez language cited by Chrysler.  
Am.Sub.S.B. No. 307, 141 Ohio Laws, Part I, 766.  Instead, the General 
Assembly elected to address the temporariness component of temporary total 
disability compensation in terms of MMI.  Moreover, in defining MMI in the 
Ohio Administrative Code, the Industrial Commission did not adopt Ramirez’s 
language and instead crafted a definition that referred specifically to the 
underlying medical condition.  According to appellees, these choices reflect a 
legislative and administrative desire to view permanency from a medical, not 
employment, perspective. 
{¶ 7} Appellees next assert that Chrysler has misread Ramirez by 
focusing on language without regard to context.  Appellees emphasize that in 
Ramirez, no one ever alleged that the claimant’s condition was no longer 
temporary, so permanency was never at issue.  Instead, we were asked to decide 
whether a claimant who could not return to his former position of employment 
should be deemed to have a partial disability or a total one.  We found the latter 
and, in so doing, created the definition of totality still used today.  Appellees 
believe that because permanency was not at issue, there was no need for the 
decision to define the term. They are not convinced, therefore, that in referring to 
permanency in terms of a “disability,” this court was definitively stating that 
permanency referred to the status of the claimant’s inability to work and not to the 
underlying medical condition. 
{¶ 8} This argument ties into a second point.  Before 1987, the terms 
“disability” and “impairment” were often used interchangeably.  This practice 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
was, in fact, so prevalent that we felt compelled in 1987 to correct it.  State ex rel. 
Stephenson v. Indus. Comm. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 167, 171, 31 OBR 369, 509 
N.E.2d 946, stressed that employing the terms interchangeably was inappropriate 
because they were not synonymous.  “Impairment” was a medical term that 
referred to “ ‘the amount of the claimant’s anatomical and/or mental loss of 
function’ ” attributable to the industrial injury.  Ohio Brass, 10 Ohio St.3d at 148, 
10 OBR 482, 462 N.E.2d 389, quoting the Industrial Commission’s Medical 
Examination Manual.  “Disability” was a legal designation of the effect of the 
medical impairment on the ability to work.  Id. at 149.  Because Ramirez was 
written during this time frame, appellees again question the deliberateness with 
which the term “disability” was selected. 
{¶ 9} Appellees next assert that a large body of case law both before and 
after Ramirez contradicts the interpretation that Chrysler espouses.  As early as 
1944, this court articulated a definition of permanency that foreshadowed the 
definition of MMI now in the Administrative Code.  Logsdon v. Indus. Comm.  
(1944), 143 Ohio St. 508, 28 O.O. 429, 57 N.E.2d 75, held at paragraph two of 
the syllabus: 
{¶ 10} “The term ‘permanent’ as applied to disability under the 
workmen’s compensation law does not mean that such disability must necessarily 
continue for the life of a claimant, but that it will, with reasonable probability, 
continue for an indefinite period of time without any present indication of 
recovery therefrom.” 
{¶ 11} Common to both Logsdon and Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-32(A)(1) is 
a probable lack of improvement, which, in the context of the Administrative Code 
definition, clearly refers to the underlying medical condition. Logsdon does, of 
course, refer to “disability,” but it also preceded Stephenson, so it is not clear 
whether the term was employed purposefully or in a more generic sense. 
January Term, 2009 
5 
{¶ 12} Logsdon was not cited in Ramirez.  It was, however, cited four 
years after Ramirez in a case that squarely addressed the concept of permanency.  
In Vulcan Materials Co. v. Indus. Comm. (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 31, 33, 25 OBR 
26, 494 N.E.2d 1125, we held: 
{¶ 13} “[I]n the consideration of the permanency of a disability, the 
commission need not determine whether the claimant could return to his former 
position of employment.  The commission’s designation of a disability as 
permanent relates solely to the perceived longevity of the condition at issue.  It 
has absolutely no bearing upon the claimant’s ability to perform the tasks 
involved in his former position of employment.” 
{¶ 14} Vulcan was followed by State ex rel. Gen.  Am. Transp. Corp. v. 
Indus. Comm. (1990), 48 Ohio St.3d 25, 548 N.E.2d 928.  General American 
reaffirmed Vulcan’s definition, explaining that “[a] claimant’s permanent inability 
to return to his former position of employment does not mean the claimant’s 
medical condition will not improve.”  Id. at 26. 
{¶ 15} At approximately the same time, the Court of Appeals for Franklin 
County decided State ex rel. Matlack, Inc. v. Indus. Comm. (1991), 73 Ohio 
App.3d 648, 655, 598 N.E.2d 121, which ruled: 
{¶ 16} “[T]emporary total benefits will be paid during the healing and 
treatment period for the condition until the claimant has reached some certain 
level of stabilization.  When this stabilization has been reached and no further 
improvement is probable, then the condition is permanent * * *.” (Citation 
omitted.) 
{¶ 17} In State ex rel. Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Kohler (1990), 
55 Ohio St.3d 109, 110, 564 N.E.2d 76, we stated that “[p]ermanency relates to 
the perceived longevity of the condition” and treated “permanency” and “MMI” 
as synonymous.  State ex rel. Eberhardt v. Flxible Corp. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 
649, 653, 640 N.E.2d 815, added that “so long as the claimant’s condition has not 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
stabilized, and further medical improvement can be expected, TTD benefits are 
payable.” 
{¶ 18} In contrast to these cases, Chrysler points to State ex rel. 
Advantage Tank Lines v. Indus. Comm., 107 Ohio St.3d 16, 2005-Ohio-5829, 836 
N.E.2d 550.  At issue was the claimant’s ability to concurrently receive 
permanent partial and temporary total compensation for the same condition.  The 
employer argued that it was incongruous to simultaneously pay compensation for 
both permanent and a temporary disability for the same condition. 
{¶ 19} We affirmed the ability to receive dual payment under the right 
circumstances.  We explained that the two forms of compensation focused on 
completely different things: while temporary total disability compensation 
centered on the claimant’s ability to return to the former position of employment, 
permanent partial disability compensation was unconcerned with a claimant’s 
ability to work.  We also noted that “permanency” had a different meaning as 
applied to each form of compensation.  In describing permanency in the context 
of temporary total disability, we wrote: 
{¶ 20} “TTC awards are based exclusively on a claimant’s ability to 
return to his or her former position of employment.  In this context, a 
determination that a disability is permanent means that the condition will never 
improve to the point where the claimant can resume his or her former job.  Thus, 
when this determination is made, the disability is no longer considered temporary, 
so TTC is terminated.”  (Emphasis sic; citations omitted.)  Advantage Tank Lines, 
107 Ohio St.3d 16, 2005-Ohio-5829, 836 N.E.2d 550, ¶ 8. 
{¶ 21} Chrysler cites this passage as proof that “permanency” and “MMI” 
remain distinct and that temporary total disability compensation must cease if 
either of those conditions is met.  The court of appeals rejected that contention: 
{¶ 22} “Although Advantage does contain dicta that seems to support 
relator’s argument, Advantage did not directly address the issue presented here.  
January Term, 2009 
7 
We agree with the magistrate that the issue before us was directly addressed in 
Vulcan wherein the court expressly held that ‘[t]he commission’s designation of a 
disability as permanent relates solely to the perceived longevity of the condition at 
issue.  It has absolutely no bearing upon the claimant’s ability to perform the tasks 
involved in his former position of employment.’  Vulcan [25 Ohio St.3d] at 33 [25 
OBR 26, 494 N.E.2d 1125].  Although Advantage was decided after Vulcan, the 
court in Advantage did not discuss, let alone overrule, Vulcan.  Moreover, as 
previously noted, the language relator relies on in Advantage is dicta.  The 
holding in Vulcan is controlling.”  Franklin App. No. 06AP-968, 2007-Ohio-
4799, at ¶ 4. 
{¶ 23} The court of appeals’ observations are compelling.  It is perhaps 
telling that the only case on temporary total disability compensation cited in the 
entire Advantage opinion is Ramirez.  There is no mention of Logsdon, Vulcan, 
Matlack, or any of the cases previously discussed that both expressly defined 
permanency and called into question the significance of Ramirez’s reference to 
that concept.  Given the amount of case law that has addressed permanency in 
terms of the underlying medical condition, the court of appeals’ reasoning has 
substantial merit. 
{¶ 24} Ultimately, appellees and their amici offer a stronger argument 
than Chrysler does.  For the reasons set forth above, we continue to declare MMI 
to be the only standard by which temporary total disability compensation can be 
terminated on a basis of permanency. 
{¶ 25} The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
LANZINGER, J., not participating. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
Eastman & Smith, Ltd., Thomas J. Gibney, and A. Brooke Phelps, for 
appellant. 
Richard A. Cordray, Attorney General, and Andrew J. Alatis, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
Polofka & Van Berkom and John R. Polofka, for appellee Kathleen E. 
Moran. 
Garvin & Hickey, L.L.C., Preston J. Garvin, and Michael J. Hickey, 
urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Chamber of Commerce. 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., and Robert A. Minor, urging 
reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Self-Insurers’ Association. 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., and Thomas R. Sant, urging reversal for amicus 
curiae Ohio Chapter of the National Federation of Independent Business. 
Stewart Jaffy & Associates Co., L.P.A., Stewart R. Jaffy, and Marc J. 
Jaffy, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio AFL-CIO. 
Philip J. Fulton Law Office and Philip J. Fulton, urging affirmance for 
amicus curiae Ohio Association for Justice. 
______________________