Title: Stecker v. First Comm'l Trust Co.

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Rheeta STECKER, M.D. v. FIRST COMMERCIAL
TRUST COMPANY

97-260                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered February 18, 1998


1.   Appeal & error -- law of case -- general rule. -- The general rule
     regarding the doctrine of the law of the case is that where
     the pleadings and issues are substantially the same, all
     questions that were actually presented or that could have been
     presented in the first appeal are barred in the second appeal.

2.   Appeal & error -- law-of-case doctrine inapplicable -- no damages issue in
     first trial. -- Where appellant physician argued that the jury's
     failure to award damages at the first trial constituted law of
     the case, precluding the patient's estate from seeking damages
     upon retrial, the supreme court concluded that there could
     have been no damages issue in the first trial and appeal of
     the malpractice claim against appellant; the jury was not
     given an opportunity to consider the issue because a verdict
     had been directed in appellant's favor; the law-of-the-case
     doctrine did not apply. 
     
3.   Damages -- instruction meaningless where first jury had no occasion to
     consider damages. -- Where appellant physician contended that,
     under AMI 2216, damages for the wrongful death of a minor are
     the same whether the death is the result of intentional
     conduct, common-law negligence, or medical negligence, the
     supreme court concluded that the instruction was meaningless
     in this case because the first jury had no occasion to
     consider damages resulting from the medical malpractice claim
     against appellant.

4.   Negligence -- causation -- fact question. -- Causation is ordinarily
     a fact question for the jury to decide; the law requires more
     than a mere possibility that certain injuries resulted from
     negligence; a reasonable probability must be established; a
     plaintiff's proof on the issue of causation must be more than
     speculation and conjecture; it must be such that reasonable
     persons might conclude that it is more probable than not that
     an event was caused by the defendant.

5.   Negligence -- proximate cause -- may be shown from circumstantial evidence.
     -- Proximate cause may be shown from circumstantial evidence,
     and such evidence is sufficient to show proximate cause if the
     facts proved are of such a nature and are so connected and
     related to each other that the conclusion may be fairly
     inferred.

6.   Negligence -- intervening cause -- when not sufficient to relieve original
     actor of liability. -- The mere fact that other causes intervene
     between the original act of negligence and the injury for
     which recovery is sought is not sufficient to relieve the
     original actor of liability if the injury is the natural and
     probable consequence of the original negligent act or omission
     and is such as might reasonably have been foreseen as
     probable.

7.   Negligence -- proximate cause -- issue of fact for jury to decide --
     denial of directed-verdict motion not error. -- Although appellant
     physician argued that the trial court erred in denying her
     directed-verdict motion because there was no substantial
     evidence that her conduct was the proximate cause of the death
     of the minor patient, the supreme court concluded that the
     issue was one of fact for the jury to decide where, among
     other things, a physician witness for appellee testified that
     appellant should have reported evidence of physical abuse to
     the Department of Human Services, and a physician witness for
     appellant informed the jury that such a report could have
     saved the child's life by exposing the abuser; appellant had
     the opportunity to rebut that testimony and apparently failed
     to do so in the eyes of the jury.  

8.   Trial -- closing argument -- "send message" theme may be improper when
     punitive damages not sought. -- An argument having a send-a-
     message-to-the-community theme may be improper when punitive
     damages are not sought.

9.   Trial -- mistrial -- drastic remedy -- trial court's discretion. -- A
     mistrial is a drastic remedy that should only be used when
     there has been an error so prejudicial that justice cannot be
     served by continuing the trial or when fundamental fairness of
     the trial itself has been manifestly affected; the trial court
     has wide discretion in granting or denying a motion for
     mistrial, and absent an abuse the decision will not be
     disturbed.

10.  Trial -- closing argument -- references to "children" did not evidence
     "send message" theme when combined with other points made. -- The
     supreme court held that, viewing the closing argument in its
     entirety, the repeated references to protection of "the
     children" did not necessarily evidence a "send a message"
     theme when combined with the discussion of the standard of
     care and the other points made in the closing argument.


     Appeal from Garland Circuit Court; Walter Wright, Judge;
affirmed.
     Friday, Eldredge & Clark, by:  Tonia P. Jones, for appellant.
     Gary Eubanks & Associates, by: William Gary Holt and James
Gerard Schulze, for appellee.

     David Newbern, Justice.
     This is the second appeal concerning the liability of Dr.
Rheeta Stecker for the death of her patient, sixteen-month-old
Laura Fullbright.  First Commercial Trust Company ("First
Commercial"), as administrator of the child's estate, sued Dr.
Stecker for medical malpractice and for failure to report under the
child-abuse-reporting statute, Ark. Code Ann.  12-12-501 through
12-12-518 (Repl. 1995 and Supp. 1997).  In addition to the action
on behalf of the estate, First Commercial sued on behalf of several
of Laura Fullbright's relatives, individually.  It was alleged that
Dr. Stecker's failure to report evidence of physical abuse of the
child resulted in the child's death.  In addition to Dr. Stecker, 
Mary Ellen Robbins, the child's mother, and Joseph Rank who lived
with Ms. Robbins and her child and who was convicted of murdering
the child, see Rank v. State, 318 Ark. 109,