Title: In re J.J.

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 90539-Agenda 11-November 2001.
In re J.J. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois,
								Appellant, v. Phyllis J., Appellee).
Opinion filed June 20, 2002.
	 
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:
	The State filed a petition against the respondent, Phyllis J.
(mother), alleging that her minor children were abused or
neglected. It subsequently filed a petition in the circuit court of
Fulton County to terminate the mother's parental rights under the
Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1 et seq. (West 1998)). In part, the
petition alleged that the mother exhibited habitual drunkenness for
at least one year immediately prior to the commencement of the
unfitness proceedings (see 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(k) (West 1998)).
The circuit court found that the State proved the mother unfit by
clear and convincing evidence. The mother appealed, and the
appellate court reversed, holding that the finding of unfitness was
against the manifest weight of the evidence. 316 Ill. App. 3d 817,
823.
	This court is asked to clarify the proper time period for
admitting evidence of habitual drunkenness and to determine
whether the State met its burden of showing unfitness in this case
by clear and convincing evidence. We find that the circuit court
failed to apply the proper test for considering evidence of habitual
drunkenness; moreover, that if the proper test is applied, the State
failed to satisfy its burden of proof. Thus, we conclude that the
critical time period for presenting evidence of habitual
drunkenness is the one year just prior to the filing of the State's
termination petition and that the State failed to support its
allegation of habitual drunkenness in this case by clear and
convincing evidence.

BACKGROUND
	In April 1996, the State filed a neglect petition against the
mother and her husband, alleging that their minor children were
abused or neglected.(1) At the adjudicatory hearing held in June
1996, the mother admitted she had endangered the minors by the
excessive use of alcohol and by engaging in physical altercations
while under the influence of alcohol, as alleged in the State's
supplemental petition. The circuit court found the minors abused
or neglected and dismissed the other counts of the supplemental
petition. At the dispositional hearing, the circuit court noted that
the mother had made significant progress in improving her
housing conditions and in acknowledging her alcohol problem, but
transferred guardianship of the minors to the Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS). This order was filed on
October 23, 1996.
	Permanency review hearings were held on October 22, 1996,
and again in April 1997. During the latter hearing, the circuit court
agreed with the social worker assigned to the case, the guardian ad
litem, and the mother's attorney that the mother was "making
substantial progress."
	At the next permanency hearing in September 1997, the social
worker recommended that the children be returned home with
close monitoring for six months because the mother had
maintained an orderly house, dealt with her financial problems,
taken part in an aftercare alcohol treatment program, attended
parenting classes, and abstained from alcohol for eight months.
The circuit court adopted this recommendation and returned
physical custody of the children to the mother. In January 1998,
the children were again removed from the home after an
unidentified police officer reportedly found the mother intoxicated
while caring for them. At permanency review hearings in March
and November 1998, the mother was ordered to cooperate with
DCFS or risk losing her parental rights.
	On March 19, 1999, the State filed a petition to terminate the
mother's parental rights on three grounds: (1) habitual
drunkenness for at least one year immediately prior to the
commencement of the unfitness proceedings (750 ILCS
50/1(D)(k) (West 1998)); (2) failure to make reasonable efforts to
correct the conditions that resulted in the removal of the children
(750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 1998)); and (3) failure to make
reasonable progress toward the return of the children within nine
months of an adjudication of abuse or neglect (750 ILCS
50/1(D)(m) (West 1998)). The only ground raised in this appeal is
the mother's alleged habitual drunkenness (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(k)
(West 1998)).
	At the fitness hearing begun in August 1999, the State
presented the testimony of Kelly Rockwell, a Catholic Social
Services (CSS) worker recently assigned to the family. Her only
direct knowledge of the mother's alcohol use was the mother's
admission that she had consumed some unspecified amount of
alcohol the night before a court hearing in May 1999. Rockwell
offered no other specific evidence concerning that drinking
incident. Nonetheless, the State had suspected the mother of
intoxication and requested that she submit to a breath alcohol test.
At the fitness hearing, the State stipulated that the Breathalyzer
test given to the mother at that time resulted in a reading of zero.
	Rockwell also testified about the contents of the case file and
the mother's service plans, although the plans were never admitted
into evidence. She testified that one of the mother's visits with the
children was cancelled in July 1996, due to the mother's
intoxication, and that CSS records indicated the mother was
diagnosed as alcohol dependent in February 1997. Accordingly,
the mother was instructed to abstain from alcohol and to attend
Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings, counseling at the
Community Mental Health Center (CMHC), and parenting classes.
The mother's file indicated that she did not completely satisfy any
of these requirements.
	The State also presented testimony from Terry Boughan, the
mother's counselor at CMHC. He indicated that the mother had
completed an inpatient treatment program in February 1997, and
had been assigned to an outpatient aftercare program at CMHC
meeting once a week. She stopped attending the outpatient
sessions in November 1997, claiming first that she was ill and then
that she had no transportation. Due to her failure to participate in
the program, her treatment file was closed in February 1998.
Boughan stated that he did not believe she was ready for discharge
at that time. Boughan also testified that he believed the mother's
reasons for failing to attend the sessions were credible and that she
sincerely wanted treatment.
	The mother testified on her own behalf, acknowledging that
she drank some unspecified quantity of alcohol and missed weekly
alcohol treatment sessions between October 1998 and March 19,
1999, even though her service plans required her to abstain from
alcohol and to comply with the recommended treatment program.
She stated that due to transportation problems she had attended
only four or five AA meetings. She also testified that she did not
completely abstain from alcohol until three or four weeks before
her fitness hearing on September 23, 1999, but she did not specify
how often or how much she drank.
	The circuit court found the State proved habitual drunkenness
by clear and convincing evidence because it showed she "has had
an alcohol dependency and *** she still consumes alcohol or at
least until three weeks ago, and that addiction occurred for at least
one year prior to the commencement of this termination petition."
The court later concluded that it was in the best interests of the
children to terminate her parental rights.
	The mother appealed the unfitness finding, and the appellate
court reversed, with one judge dissenting. The majority of the
appellate court held that there was insufficient proof of the
frequency and extent of the mother's drinking between March 19,
1998, and March 19, 1999, to show habitual drunkenness by clear
and convincing evidence. 316 Ill. App. 3d at 823-24. The dissent
argued that there was a sufficient showing to support the circuit
court's finding because the mother continued to drink even after
being told that abstinence was "a prerequisite to regaining custody
of her children." 316 Ill. App. 3d at 827 (Homer, J., dissenting).
We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R.
315.

ANALYSIS
	In this case, we are asked to consider the proper time frame
for evidence of habitual drunkenness as well as whether the
appellate court erred by reversing as against the manifest weight
of the evidence the circuit court's finding that the mother was
proven unfit by clear and convincing evidence (316 Ill. App. 3d at
823). Simply stated, the key to the resolution of this case is the use
of the proper test, not the application of that test.

I. Proper Evidentiary Time Frame
	The parties disagree on the proper evidentiary time frame
considered in determining whether a parent is unfit due to habitual
drunkenness. Under the Adoption Act, parental "unfitness"
includes"[h]abitual drunkenness *** for at least one year
immediately prior to the commencement of the unfitness
proceeding." 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(k) (West 1998). The State argues
that the statute permits the circuit court to consider evidence from
both before and after this one-year period. The mother argues that
only evidence within one year immediately prior to the filing of
the State's petition may be considered.
	The resolution of this issue requires us to construe section
1(D)(k) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(k) (West 1998)).
Since statutory construction is a question of law, we will review
this issue de novo. In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 208 (2001).
	An unfitness proceeding begins when the State files a petition
seeking the termination of parental rights. In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d 405, 417 (2001). The statute requires proof of habitual
drunkenness for "at least one year immediately prior to" the filing.
(Emphases added.) 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(k) (West 1998). This
language permits consideration of evidence preceding the filing
date by more than one year. It does not, however, preclude the
consideration of evidence after the filing date in all cases.
Evidence of habitual drunkenness arising after the filing of the
initial petition may be considered if the State files an amended or
subsequent petition. An additional filing is necessary because the
termination of parental rights affects a fundamental liberty interest
and, thus, must comport with the requirements of due process. See
In re M.H., 196 Ill. 2d 356, 362-63 (2001). The notice required in
juvenile proceedings is the same as that constitutionally mandated
in criminal or civil cases. People v. R.D.S., 94 Ill. 2d 77, 81
(1983). "Notice, to comply with due process requirements, must
be given sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceedings so
that reasonable opportunity to prepare will be afforded, and it must
'set forth the alleged misconduct with particularity.' " In re
Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527, 549, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1446 (1967). Due to the serious nature of termination
proceedings, it would be improper to raise additional allegations
against a parent for the first time at the hearing. See Board of
Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 n.7, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548, 556 n.7, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2705 n.7 (1972) (" 'it is
fundamental that except in emergency situations *** due process
requires that when a State seeks to terminate [a protected] interest
..., it must afford "notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate
to the nature of the case" before the termination becomes
effective' " (emphasis in original)), quoting Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542, 29 L. Ed. 2d 90, 96, 91 S. Ct. 1586, 1591 (1971),
quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, 94 L. Ed. 865, 873, 70 S. Ct. 652, 656 (1950). Thus,
another filing alleging the additional factual claims being made by
the State would provide the parent with proper notice and allow
the preparation of an appropriate defense.
	We emphasize that while evidence of habitual drunkenness
outside the one year before the filing of the State's petition may be
considered, this option does not obviate the necessity of presenting
clear and convincing evidence of the parent's habitual
drunkenness during the one year immediately prior to that filing.
In other words, if the evidence is insufficient to support a finding
of habitual drunkenness during the critical one-year time period
immediately prior to the filing of the termination petition, no
amount of antecedent or subsequent evidence will sustain a
finding of unfitness. While this requirement may initially seem
onerous, it must be remembered that the State unilaterally
possesses the power to choose when to file its petition and, thus,
ultimately controls the critical evidentiary time frame.
	Hence, at a minimum, the State must have proven by clear
and convincing evidence that the mother in this case was
habitually drunk between March 19, 1998, and March 19, 1999,
when the petition was filed, without any reference to evidence
either before or after that period. If this initial burden is met, the
State may also present evidence showing that the parent was
habitually drunk prior to or after that period as well.

II. Evidentiary Basis for the Finding of Unfitness
	Next, the State contends that the circuit court's finding of
unfitness is supported by sufficient evidence in the record. To
support this contention, the State relies on the following facts: (1)
the mother was diagnosed as alcohol dependent in 1996; (2) she
knew that abstaining from alcohol and completing treatment were
prerequisites for regaining custody of her children; (3) despite this
knowledge, she drank alcohol as recently as three or four weeks
prior to the fitness hearing and failed to complete the required
treatment program; and (4) she lost custody of her children for the
second time in January 1998, after an unidentified police officer
reportedly found her intoxicated while supervising them.
	On its face, the State's factual allegations may seem
persuasive. Nevertheless, termination may only be justified when
there is factual certainty. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768,
71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 616, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1402 (1982). After
reviewing the record in this case, we find that only two points
arguably pertain to the critical time period in this case, March 19,
1998, to March 19, 1999: (1) the mother's admission that she
continued to drink some unknown quantity of alcohol at some
unspecified times; and (2) her failure to continue her treatment
program. Nonetheless, the State argues that, viewed together, the
evidence shows that the mother had an uncontrollable problem
with alcohol abuse for the requisite period of time. The State also
claims that it did not need to establish the precise frequency of the
mother's drinking because frequency is merely an indicator of her
inability to control her craving for alcohol.
	Conversely, the mother argues the appellate court properly
concluded that the circuit court's finding of unfitness was against
the manifest weight of the evidence because there was no evidence
of how often or how much the mother drank during the relevant
time period. Without any evidence showing that she was unable to
control her drinking, the State failed to meet its burden of proving
habitual drunkenness by clear and convincing evidence.
	To determine the propriety of the circuit court's finding of
unfitness in this case, we must construe section 1(D)(k) of the
Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(k) (West 1998)). The
construction of a statute involves a question of law and is
reviewed de novo. In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 208 (2001).
	The involuntary termination of a parent's rights is a drastic
step that permanently severs the parent-child relationship.
Santosky, 455 U.S.  at 758-59, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 610, 102 S. Ct.  at
1397; In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d  at 208; In re Adoption of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d 255, 274 (1990); 750 ILCS 50/17 (West 1998). Personal choice
in family matters affects a fundamental liberty interest protected
by the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution.
Santosky, 455 U.S.  at 753, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 606, 102 S. Ct.  at 1394.
Fundamentally fair judicial procedures are critical for those
parents facing the involuntary dissolution of their rights. Santosky,
455 U.S.  at 753-54, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 606, 102 S. Ct.  at 1395. The
standard of proof is crucial since a parent's fundamental liberty
interest cannot be protected if undue uncertainty is permitted in
determining the facts supporting a termination of parental rights.
Santosky, 455 U.S.  at 757 n.9, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 609 n.9, 102 S. Ct. 
at 1397 n.9. Thus, the State must demonstrate factual certainty
when terminating a parent's rights. Santosky, 455 U.S.  at 768, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 616, 102 S. Ct.  at 1402. For this reason, clear and
convincing evidence of unfitness is required before a court may
involuntarily terminate parental rights. In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d  at
208.
	In Illinois, unfitness may be proved by establishing a parent's
habitual drunkenness for the requisite period. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(k)
(West 1998). To prove habitual drunkenness, the State must
present evidence that the individual (1) had a fixed habit of
drinking to excess, and (2) used alcohol so frequently as to show
an inability to control the need or craving for it. In re D.M., 298
Ill. App. 3d 574, 580 (1998). Our review of the evidence in this
case during the critical period between March 19, 1998, and
March 19, 1999, reveals a complete dearth of evidence supporting
the first prong of this test and minimal support for the second
prong.
	Only two witnesses offered evidence regarding the critical
one-year period in this case. One was the mother herself. She
admitted that she drank alcohol during the five months prior to the
filing of the termination petition, but she provided no specific
evidence of her alcohol consumption during this period. She also
indicated that she did not attend alcohol treatment sessions as
required by her service plans due to a lack of transportation. She 
testified that she requested help from CSS with transportation, but
none was offered.
	The only other witness who presented testimony relevant to
this period was CSS worker Kelly Rockwell. Rockwell, only
assigned to the family's case since May 1999, possessed no
firsthand knowledge of the period between March 19, 1998, and
March 19, 1999. She testified that she did not even meet the
mother until April 1999. Due to her lack of direct knowledge,
Rockwell deferred to the contents of agency records authored by
other CSS workers. In relevant part, she testified that CSS was in
contact with the mother"[a]t least monthly" and that the mother
received two unsatisfactory service plan ratings during the critical
one-year period due to her failure to abstain from alcohol and to
continue her treatment program. The State offered no other
evidence of the mother's habitual drunkenness during this period.
	Before this court, the mother argues that the State offered no
competent evidence concerning the relevant time period. She
contends that Rockwell's testimony was inadmissible hearsay
because Rockwell had no firsthand knowledge of the service plans
or case file during this period and that none of these records were
ever admitted into evidence. See In re A.B., 308 Ill. App. 3d 227,
236-37 (1999).
	We reject the mother's hearsay argument because there was
no objection to Rockwell's testimony at trial. Thus, the issue was
first raised on appeal and, as such, it is waived. See Wagner v. City
of Chicago, 166 Ill. 2d 144, 147 (1995).
	Next, we note that the State requested the circuit court take
judicial notice of the service plans. The judge declined, noting that
only one plan was in the court file. Since the plans were never
admitted into evidence, Rockwell's testimony provided the only
evidence of the contents of the agency's case file or service plans.
	The record clearly shows, however, that the circuit court did
not rely on this testimony. Rather, the circuit court relied on the
mother's unspecified "alcohol dependency," her admitted failure
to continue alcohol treatment sessions, and her admission that she
drank some amount of alcohol as recently as three weeks prior to
the fitness hearing.
	Moreover, Rockwell's testimony concerning the relevant
period offered no evidence that the mother was ever under the
influence of alcohol during the year prior to the filing of the
State's termination petition. Rockwell merely indicated that CSS
was in monthly contact with the mother and rated two of her
service plans unsatisfactory because she continued to drink and did
not complete her treatment plans. We do not believe the former
statement could have had an adverse impact on the mother's case
because, if anything, it demonstrates her ongoing interest in
working with the agency to regain custody of her children. We
also believe that the latter statement, labeling the mother's lack of
compliance with CSS requirements "unsatisfactory," was not
unduly prejudicial. The basis for the unsatisfactory rating was the
mother's admitted lack of compliance with CSS requirements. It
was this lack of compliance, not the "unsatisfactory" label applied
to it, that formed the basis of the State's allegation of unfitness.
Under these circumstances, Rockwell's testimony did not affect
the outcome of the hearing and does not provide grounds for
reversing the circuit court's finding of unfitness. See People v.
Sims, 192 Ill. 2d 592, 629 (2000).

III. Propriety of the Unfitness Finding
	Next, we turn to the merits of the State's claim that the circuit
court's finding of unfitness in this case was supported by clear and
convincing evidence. When reviewing a finding of unfitness, we
must consider whether it is against the manifest weight of the
evidence. A decision concerning a parent's fitness is against the
manifest weight of the evidence if the opposite conclusion is
clearly apparent. In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d 405, 417 (2001).
	Here, the circuit court's finding of unfitness was based on the
mother's history of "alcohol dependency," her failure to continue
in the recommended aftercare program, and her acknowledgment
that she drank some unspecified amount of alcohol prior to a few
weeks before the fitness hearing. The circuit court failed to specify
the time period it employed in considering the mother's alcohol
dependency. Moreover, the record reveals that the last time the
mother was found to be "alcohol dependent" was 1997. Shortly
thereafter, the mother's condition improved significantly enough
for the case worker to recommend, and the circuit court to order,
that she regain custody of her children in September 1997. A stale
diagnosis of alcohol dependency such as this one cannot support
a termination petition.
	After reviewing the factors relied on by the circuit court in
this case, we find that vague references to a parent's alcohol
dependence during some unidentified period, particularly when
followed by a period of significant improvement, and a parent's
consumption of some unidentified amount of alcohol sometime 
prior to the fitness hearing constitute mere speculation.
Speculation is insufficient to support a finding of unfitness. A
finding of unfitness must be premised on clear and convincing
evidence proving that, at a minimum, the parent whose rights are
at issue was habitually drunk during the critical one-year time
period immediately prior to the filing of the State's termination
petition. That standard was not met in this case. The factors relied
on by the circuit court do not approach the degree of factual
certainty required to support a finding of unfitness. See Santosky,
455 U.S.  at 768, 71 L. Ed. 2d  at 616, 102 S. Ct.  at 1402.
	 While it is true that the precise amount and frequency of a
parent's drinking need not be established to demonstrate habitual
drunkenness (see 316 Ill. App. 3d at 827 (Homer, J., dissenting)),
there must be clear and convincing evidence showing both that
"the individual had a fixed habit of drinking to excess" (emphases
added) and that the individual used alcohol so frequently as to
show an inability to control the need or craving for it (see In re
D.M., 298 Ill. App. 3d at 580).
	Here, the record shows only that the mother admitted drinking
some unspecified amount of alcohol during the review period even
though she knew her service plan required abstinence. While this
admission may be relevant to an analysis of the second prong of
the test, requiring proof of the mother's inability to control her
craving for alcohol, it provides weak evidence of that prong and
no evidence of the first prong. The mother did not admit that she
habitually drank to excess.
	To prove the first prong of the test, the State must first show
that the mother drank alcohol "to excess." While the exact amount
of alcohol consumed in any specific instance need not be
established, there must be clear and convincing evidence showing
that she suffered significant impairment in her ability to supervise
and parent her children due to the consumption of alcohol. No
such showing was made in this case. In fact, the State's case
includes nothing showing how the mother's fitness to parent her
children was impaired by her drinking during the critical year.
	Moreover, we note that any evidence of even one incident
when the mother was observed to be under the influence of alcohol
during the entire year in question is conspicuously absent. The
only instance when the State suspected that the mother had used
alcohol and subjected her to testing was in May 1999. Although
this test was done after the critical period, it is noteworthy that the
testing resulted in a reading of zero.
	Even if the State had met its burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence that the mother drank alcohol to excess
during the critical year, to prove the first prong of the test it was
also required to present enough evidence to show that the mother
drank to excess frequently enough for her drinking to be deemed
"a fixed habit." Similarly, to prove the second prong of the test,
the State had to present clear and convincing evidence that the
mother drank frequently enough to demonstrate an inability to
control her craving for alcohol. While it is impossible to state the
requisite frequency with precision, it is clear that in this case the
State failed to meet its burden. The State did not present any
evidence of how often the mother drank any amount of alcohol
between March 19, 1998, and March 19, 1999. Her testimony
indicated that she drank some alcohol during the relevant period,
but it did not indicate that she drank frequently enough to
constitute a "fixed habit" or to exhibit an uncontrollable craving
for alcohol.
	Generally, a finding of unfitness is entitled to deference and
generally should be upheld. See In re T.B., 215 Ill. App. 3d 1059,
1062 (1991). Here, however, the utter absence of any evidence
during the critical one-year period showing both a pattern of
drinking sufficient to establish a "fixed habit" of alcohol
consumption and an inability to control the need or craving for
alcohol, combined with instances of the mother drinking to excess
precludes a finding of habitual drunkenness. Since the State failed
to meet its burden of proving habitual drunkenness by clear and
convincing evidence, the appellate court properly reversed the
judgment of the circuit court terminating the mother's parental
rights.

CONCLUSION
	We hold that to prove an allegation of unfitness due to
habitual drunkenness under section 1(D)(k) of the Adoption Act
(750 ILCS 50/1(D)(k) (West 1998)), the State must, at a
minimum, present clear and convincing evidence of habitual
drunkenness during the critical one-year period immediately
preceding the filing of its termination petition.  In this case, the
State failed to support its allegation of habitual drunkenness by
clear and convincing evidence.
	Accordingly, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

	JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting:
	I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the State did not
prove respondent unfit by clear and convincing evidence. Further,
I strongly disagree with the majority's construction of section
1(D)(k) of the Adoption Act-a construction that unnecessarily
hinders the State's ability to present relevant evidence of parental
unfitness.

I. Evidentiary Time Frame
	Section 1(D)(k) of the Adoption Act provides as a ground for
parental unfitness "[h]abitual drunkenness *** for at least one
year immediately prior to the commencement of the unfitness
proceeding." (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(k) (West
2000). I agree with the State's construction of this provision. That
is, the State can introduce all relevant evidence of habitual
drunkenness, but to meet its burden it must show that the problem
has been occurring for at least one year.
	The majority instead reads the one-year period in the statute
as a distinct "critical" evidentiary period rather than as a minimum
period. The majority makes several references to the "critical one-year time period" and requires the State to first present evidence
relating only to this one-year period. Thus, the interpretation the
majority settles on is that the State must first prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent was habitually drunk during
the one year immediately prior to the filing of the petition. Slip op.
at 6. Then, if the State meets that burden, it can introduce evidence
of habitual drunkenness before the one-year period. Slip op. at 6.
However, the State can introduce evidence of habitual
drunkenness occurring after the State filed its petition only if it
files a second petition for termination alleging habitual
drunkenness during a different time period. Slip op. at 5.
	I disagree with the majority on both points. First, if, as the
majority concedes, the statute allows "consideration of evidence
preceding the filing date by more than one year," why do we
arbitrarily restrict the State's ability to present that evidence until
after it has proved what happened during the year immediately
prior to the filing of the petition? Indeed, the majority holds that
this evidence cannot be presented until after the State has proven
by clear and convincing evidence that the parent was habitually
drunk during the year prior to the filing of the petition. But, if the
State had met that burden, why would it present additional
evidence? At that point, it would have proved the parent unfit by
clear and convincing evidence. The majority has effectively turned
the one-year minimum time period into an absolute one-year
period. The statute does not, however, refer to habitual
drunkenness within a one-year period; it refers to habitual
drunkenness for at least one year. These terms are not
synonymous. When the legislature means "within" or "during" it
uses those terms. To see this, one only has to count down two
statutory subparts from the one at issue. See 750 ILCS
50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2000) ("to make reasonable progress toward
the return of the child to the parent within 9 months after an
adjudication of neglected or abused minor" (emphasis added));
750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(iii) (West 2000) ("to make reasonable
progress toward the return of the child to the parent during any 9-month period" (emphasis added)). The daunting task now facing
the legislature is how to fix the statute in light of the majority's
interpretation. The statute's meaning is already clear, and I cannot
imagine how the legislature can fix it if this court persists in
defining the phrase "for at least one year" as synonymous with
"during a discrete one-year period."
	Because the one-year period in the statute is merely a
minimum time period, we should not restrict the State's ability to
present its evidence in the manner it sees fit. In the normal case,
the most logical way for the State to present its evidence would be
chronologically, beginning with the earliest episodes of
drunkenness and any diagnosis of alcohol dependence. It might
often be the case (as it is here) that the episodes occurring during
the year immediately prior to the filing of the petition do not seem
as significant unless they are considered in the context of the
person's entire struggle with alcohol abuse.
	In my opinion, the one-year period is a safeguard for
respondents facing termination on this basis. It guarantees that
they will not lose their parental rights over a few isolated
incidents. Before the State may file its petition, it must have
evidence that the problem with habitual drunkenness has been
occurring for at least one year. It is not, however, a limitation on
the evidence that the State can introduce, and the majority errs by
characterizing it as such.
	Second, I also disagree with the majority's assertion that, if
the State wants to introduce evidence of the respondent's
drunkenness occurring after it files its petition to terminate, it must
file a new petition containing additional allegations. The majority
claims that a respondent's due process rights would be violated by
introduction of these "additional allegations." Slip op. at 6. But
these are not additional allegations. The phrase "habitual
drunkenness *** for at least one year immediately prior to the
commencement of the unfitness proceeding" has two distinct
components. The first is the alleged parental problem: habitual
drunkenness; the second is the minimum time the State must show
the problem has been occurring: at least one year immediately
prior to the commencement of the unfitness proceeding. Thus, all
evidence the State has of the person's habitual drunkenness is
relevant. If the State files a petition to terminate someone's
parental rights because of habitual drunkenness, that person is on
notice that any relevant evidence of his or her drinking problem is
going to be introduced. Does the majority seriously believe that a
person facing termination of his or her parental rights because of
habitual drunkenness is not on notice to stop drinking and, indeed,
would be unfairly surprised by the introduction of evidence of
drunkenness between the filing of the termination petition and the
hearing?
	In this case, the majority defines the "critical one-year period"
as March 19, 1998, to March 19, 1999. Under the majority's
analysis, if the State had evidence that the respondent was drunk
on March 20, 1999, the State could not introduce this evidence
unless it filed a new or amended petition alleging a new "critical
one-year time period." I see no reason to make the State meet this
additional procedural burden. If the State has a pending petition to
terminate someone's parental rights because that person has been
habitually drunk for at least one year, it should be able to introduce
all available evidence of the person's drinking problem so that the
trial court can make an informed decision.
	Again, the above problems arise because the majority has
taken a legislative requirement that the State have sufficient
evidence of habitual drunkenness before proceeding with a
termination petition and transformed it into an arbitrary limitation
on the amount of evidence the State can introduce. The majority
has turned the legislature's floor into a ceiling. I would hold that
the meaning of the statute is simply that the State can introduce all
relevant evidence of habitual drunkenness, but, to meet its burden,
it must show that the problem has been going on for at least one
year.


II. Propriety of the Unfitness Finding
	The majority's erroneous interpretation of section 1(D)(k) has
led it to conclude that the State failed to meet its burden of proving
that respondent was unfit because of habitual drunkenness. Both
parties approve of the two-part test for habitual drunkenness
adopted by the appellate court in In re D.M., 298 Ill. App. 3d 574,
580 (1998): there must be clear and convincing evidence that "the
individual had a fixed habit of drinking to excess and [that] his
usage was so frequent as to show an inability to control his need
or craving for alcohol."(2) When all of the relevant evidence is
considered, it is clear that the State established that respondent had
a fixed habit of drinking to excess and used alcohol so frequently
as to show an inability to control the need or craving for it.
	In 1996, respondent admitted at the adjudicatory hearing that
she had endangered her children by her excessive use of alcohol
and by engaging in physical altercations while under the influence
of alcohol. In August 1996, she was diagnosed as alcohol
dependent. The basis for the diagnosis was that she met five of the
seven DSM-IV factors for symptomatology of alcohol dependence.
Specifically: (1) she used alcohol in larger amounts and for a
longer period of time than intended; (2) she showed a persistent
desire for alcohol and was unsuccessful in controlling her alcohol
use; (3) she spent a significant amount of time and activity either
to use alcohol or to recover from its effects; (4) alcohol use had
negatively affected her major role obligations as a spouse and a
parent; and (5) she had developed a marked increase in tolerance
to the effects of alcohol. In September 1996, she was
recommended for inpatient treatment because she had been unable
to maintain abstinence in an outpatient setting. She successfully
completed an inpatient program at Riverside Robert Young Center
in Rock Island and then began group meetings at the Community
Mental Health Center of Fulton and McDonough Counties in
February 1997. Respondent abstained from alcohol and went to
treatment for eight months, following which her children were
returned to her in late 1997.
	In January 1998, the children were once again removed from
respondent's custody when a police officer observed that
respondent was intoxicated while caring for them. In February
1998, respondent was discharged from the mental health center
because she had withdrawn from treatment. The last group session
she attended was in November 1997. Significantly, when
respondent testified, she admitted that she did not abstain from
alcohol from October 1998 to April 1999, and, in fact, had only
quit drinking three to four weeks before the hearing that took
place on September 23, 1999. Further, in May 1999, she admitted
to Kelly Rockwell that she had been drinking the night before a
court hearing.
	When all of this evidence is considered, the majority's claim
that the State did not meet its burden must fail. Again, the majority
reaches this erroneous conclusion because it improperly limits
itself to considering only what happened between March 19, 1998,
and March 19, 1999. When the evidence of what happened in that
year is considered in light of respondent's entire history and
struggle with alcohol addiction, as it should be, it is clear that
respondent had been habitually drunk for at least one year.
	Indeed, any drinking that respondent engaged in after her
diagnosis of alcohol dependence is significant because she was
ordered to abstain from alcohol and to continue treatment as
requirements for keeping her children. As the dissenting justice in
the appellate court correctly pointed out,"[t]he refusal to abstain
from alcohol consumption and to attend required treatment-even
though such refusal would prevent respondent from regaining
custody of her children-supports a finding that respondent used
alcohol so frequently as to show an inability to control the need or
craving for it [citation]." 316 Ill. App. 3d at 827 (Homer, J.,
dissenting). The majority downplays the significance of the
respondent's admission that she had stopped drinking only a few
weeks before the hearing because respondent did not admit that
she habitually drank to excess. Again, the majority is refusing to
look at this evidence in the proper context. Respondent had been
diagnosed as alcohol dependent and had not been able to abstain
from alcohol even when it meant losing custody of her children.
Thus, the trial court was justified in placing significance on
respondent's admission and could fairly conclude that it did not
refer to an occasional glass of wine with dinner.

III. Conclusion
	Because the majority has improperly limited the evidence that
can be introduced in proceedings to declare a parent unfit because
of habitual drunkenness, and has erroneously concluded that the
State failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that
respondent had been habitually drunk for at least one year, I must
dissent.

	JUSTICES McMORROW and GARMAN join in this dissent.
1.      1The respondent's husband is not a party to this appeal.

2.      2Presumably, the majority is adopting this standard when it cites it
as controlling authority. Slip op. at 8. If we are going to adopt this two-part test as the standard for habitual drunkenness, I would prefer that the
opinion include some analysis and an explanation of why we believe
this test is appropriate. Instead, the majority seems to treat appellate
court law as binding on this court. That said, I have no particular quarrel
with the test the majority has adopted.