Title: State of New Jersey v. Kevin Sisler

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Acting on information that an unidentified male was using a public computer at a local library to view and print images of child pornography, an FBI agent went to the library to investigate. There, the agent observed the defendant, Kevin Sisler, access certain Internet web sites and use the library s printer to copy the prohibited images. Thereafter, the agent communicated with the county prosecutor s office regarding the incident and a joint investigation ensued. Ultimately, pursuant to a warrant authorizing a search of defendant s car and his residence, authorities discovered a large number of photographs of naked children printed from computer images. Defendant admitted to one of the county detectives that he possessed images of nude young boys at his home and that he used the images for his own personal gratification. The grand jury indicted defendant on two counts of child endangerment. The first count alleged that defendant knowingly used a computer to reproduce the image of a child in a prohibited sexual act, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(4), a second-degree offense that exposed him to a presumptive seven-year prison term. The second count charged defendant with possession of child pornography, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(5)(b), a fourth-degree offense that exposed him to a presumptive nine-month prison term. Before trial, defendant moved to dismiss the reproduction count. The trial count granted the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed in a reported opinion. The Appellate Division concluded that, as a matter of law, a person who prints a computer image for his or her sole personal use has not reproduced it within the meaning of the statute. More specifically, the panel determined that the Legislature did not intend that the simple act of clicking a mouse button to print a computer image would transform a lone viewer into a producer of child pornography subject to second-degree penalties. The Supreme Court granted the State s motion for leave to appeal. HELD : Defendant s printing of child pornography from an Internet-based site for his sole personal use, as a matter of law, does not constitute reproduction of prohibited material under New Jersey s child endangerment statute, and defendant thus cannot be charged as a second-degree offender, which would expose him to a presumptive seven-year prison term. 1. The history of New Jersey s child endangerment statute demonstrates how the Legislature meticulously denominated certain offenders and crimes in accordance with their perceived degrees of severity, producers of prohibited material being treated more severely than those who simply possess such material. (pp. 4-7) 2. From its enactment in 1977, the focus of the provision at issue was the creation of child pornography. A creator of child pornography (such as a person who initially photographs or films the child) is more culpable than a possessor because the creator sets in motion the objectionable industry the statute seeks to combat. Reading the subsection s text as a whole, it must be concluded that the Legislature similarly intended the companion term reproduce to require more than the printing of a preexisting image for personal use. Thus, defendant, who allegedly printed an already-created image for his sole use, does not fit within a category of second-degree offender. Rather, he is no more than a suspected fourth-degree possessor. Although the State may have presented a reasonable contrary construction of the statute, when a criminal statute is susceptible to two plausible interpretations, it must be construed in the light most favorable to the accused. (pp. 7-11) 3. One of the Code s hallmarks is its grading of offenses. Although a person who possesses child pornography helps to foster a pernicious industry, his or her offense is less severe than the person who creates an image that then can be sold, distributed, circulated, or simply viewed. Because the State s construction effectively treats all such individuals alike, it runs counter to the Code s basic philosophy of distinguishing among offenders by the severity of their offense. Because defendant s analysis is more faithful to the statute s history and to the Code s sentencing structure, it should govern this appeal. (pp. 11-12) 4. Defendant s alleged conduct does not fall within N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(4) as a matter of law since the prohibited image already was created when defendant allegedly printed it for his sole use. Thus, he should be exposed to a nine-month term as a fourth-degree offender and not to a seven-year prison term as a second-degree offender. Absent an explicit clarification by the Legislature, the statute must be construed in the light most favorable to defendant. (p. 12) Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA has filed a separate dissenting opinion in which JUSTICES COLEMAN and ALBIN join. Justice LaVecchia believed that the plain and unambiguous term reproduce should be accorded its fair meaning, as it would be understood by ordinary citizens. Thus, she would have concluded that printing Internet-based images of child pornography constitutes reproduction, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(4). CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES LONG and ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE VERNIERO s opinion. JUSTICE LaVECCHIA has filed a separate dissenting opinion in which JUSTICES COLEMAN and ALBIN join. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 39 September Term 2002 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KEVIN SISLER, Defendant-Respondent. Argued April 29, 2003 Decided July 24, 2003 On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 553 N.J. Super. 590 (2002). Charles Ouslander, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant (Peter C. Harvey, Acting Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). Michael S. Bubb argued the cause for respondent (Mr. Bubb, attorney; Maria L. Zarella, on the brief). The opinion of the Court was delivered by VERNIERO, J. This case requires us to interpret the child-pornography provisions of New Jersey s child-endangerment statute. Defendant allegedly printed a prohibited image from a computer for his sole personal use. The State charged defendant as a second-degree offender under N.J.S.A. 2C:24b(4), exposing him to a presumptive seven-year prison term. The narrow legal issue is whether the statute permits that charge as a matter of law. We hold that it does not. [N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(4).] Finally, the Legislature revised the provision regarding possession by adding explicit language in respect of the Internet. As amended, that provision states: Any person who knowingly possesses or knowingly views any photograph, film, videotape, computer program or file, video game or any other reproduction or reconstruction which depicts a child engaging in a prohibited sexual act or in the simulation of such an act, including on the Internet, is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree. [N.J.S.A. 2C:24-b(5)(b) (emphasis added).] The above history demonstrates how the Legislature meticulously denominated certain offenders and crimes in accordance with their perceived degrees of severity. Persons who cause or permit a child to engage in a prohibited sexual act (knowing or intending that pornography may be produced as a result) are second-degree offenders. The exception is when such persons are parents or guardians of the child, in which case they are treated as first-degree offenders. N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(3). Also considered second-degree offenders are individuals who photograph or film a child in a prohibited sexual act, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(4), or who generate such an image via a computer, ibid., and persons who sell, manufacture, distribute, circulate, disseminate, or present such images to other persons. N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(5)(a). In contrast, the person who knowingly possesses or knowingly views the prohibited image is guilty of a fourth-degree offense. N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(5)(b). The Code s grading pattern in respect of child pornography is similar to its provisions regarding drug offenses under which distribution offenses are treated more severely than possession offenses. Compare N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5b(4) (grading manufacture or distribution of one ounce or more of Schedule I or II drug as second-degree offense) with N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(2) (grading simple possession of Schedule V drug as fourth-degree offense). [Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. State Bd. of Tax Appeals, 131 N.J.L. 565, 567 (E. & A. 1944).] A creator of child pornography (e.g., a person who initially photographs or films the child) is more culpable than a possessor because the creator sets in motion the highly objectionable industry that this statute seeks to combat. Reading the subsection s text as a whole, we conclude that the Legislature similarly intended the companion term reproduce to require more than the printing of a preexisting image for personal use. We are not persuaded by the State s resort to a dictionary definition of the term that gives it a meaning uninformed by context. It is always an unsafe way of construing a statute . . . to divide it by a process of etymological dissection, and to separate words and then apply to each, thus separated from its context, some particular definition given by lexicographers and then reconstruct the instrument upon the basis of these definitions. An instrument must always be construed as a whole, and the particular meaning to be attached to any word or phrase is usually to be ascribed from the context, the nature of the subject matter treated of, and the purpose or intention of . . . the body which enacted or framed the statute or constitution. [2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction 46:05 at 167-68 (6th ed. 2000) (footnote omitted).] Defendant, who allegedly printed an already-created image for his sole use, does not fit within a category of second-degree offender. There is no allegation that defendant knowingly received the image for the purpose of selling it. Nor does the State allege that defendant sold, displayed, or distributed the prohibited image to other persons. Thus, he is no more than a suspected fourth-degree possessor. That the State has presented a reasonable contrary construction of the statute does not alter our conclusion. Indeed, when a criminal statute is susceptible to two plausible interpretations we are bound by our canons of construction to construe it in the light most favorable to the accused. State v. Livingston, 172 N.J. 209, 218 (2002). STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KEVIN SISLER, Defendant-Respondent. LaVECCHIA, J., dissenting. This case presents the question whether a defendant can be charged with second-degree reproduction of child pornography in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(4) for printing Internet-based child pornography images at a library computer station. The Court s role here is not to divine in the abstract the proper degree of punishment for the conduct with which defendant is charged. Our function is to interpret the language contained in the criminal statute proscribing activities associated with production, handling, and use of child pornographic materials. Upon review of that language, I would conclude that the Legislature intended that printing hard copies of Internet-based child pornography images, if proven, would support a conviction for reproducing images within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(4). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the view of my colleagues in the majority. (4) Any person who photographs or films a child in a prohibited sexual act or in the simulation of such an act or who uses any device, including a computer, to reproduce or reconstruct the image of a child in a prohibited sexual act or in the simulation of such an act is guilty of a crime of the second degree. (5) (a) Any person who knowingly receives for the purpose of selling or who knowingly sells, procures, manufactures, gives, provides, lends, trades, mails, delivers, transfers, publishes, distributes, circulates, disseminates, presents, exhibits, advertises, offers or agrees to offer, through any means, including the Internet, any photograph, film, videotape, computer program or file, video game or any other reproduction or reconstruction which depicts a child engaging in a prohibited sexual act or in the simulation of such an act, is guilty of a crime of the second degree. (b) Any person who knowingly possesses or knowingly views any photograph, film, videotape, computer program or file, video game or any other reproduction or reconstruction which depicts a child engaging in a prohibited sexual act or in the simulation of such an act, including on the Internet, is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree. [N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b (emphasis added).] The statute thus creates four classifications of offenders: (1) those who initiate or orchestrate child pornography; (2) those who manufacture or otherwise produce child pornography; (3) those who sell or otherwise distribute child pornography, or receive such material with an intent to sell it; and (4) those who possess or view child pornography. The most egregious violation, a first-degree offense, is reserved for a parent or one legally charged with caring for a child who permits or encourages that child to engage in a prohibited sexual act knowing or intending that it will be captured to create child pornographic materials. N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(3). The majority of child pornography offenses, however, including creating or reproducing such images, are punishable as second-degree offenses. Second-degree offenders include those who (1) have no legal relationship with a child but play a role in having the child participate in proscribed sexual conduct for purposes of the creation of child pornography; (2) create images of child pornography; (3) reproduce or reconstruct images of child pornography; (4) receive child pornography with the intent to distribute it; or (5) disseminate child pornography. Fourth-degree offenders include those who possess or view child pornography. This case concerns the subset of second-degree offenders who reproduce child pornography, as that action is criminalized in N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(4). That provision punishes [a]ny person . . . who uses any device, including a computer, to reproduce or reconstruct the image of a child in a prohibited sexual act or in the simulation of such an act. N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(4) (emphasis added). The verb reproduce as used in that provision is not complex, technical, or difficult to understand. The commonly understood meaning of the term is to make an image, copy, or other representation of. See footnote 1 Webster s Third New Int l Dictionary (1981); see also The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed. 2000) (defining reproduce as [t]o undergo copying ); Webster s Revised Unabridged Dictionary (1996) (defining reproduce as [t]o cause to exist again or [t]o make an image or other representation of; . . . to make a copy of ). A plain and unambiguous term such as reproduce should be accorded its fair meaning, as it would be understood by ordinary citizens. See Bigham, supra, 119 N.J. at 650-51; Bergen Commercial Bank, supra, 157 N.J. at 202. Accordingly, I construe N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(4) to mean that [a]ny person who . . . uses any device, including a computer, to [make a copy of] or reconstruct the image of a child in a prohibited sexual act or in the simulation of such an act is guilty of a crime of the second degree. Inasmuch as defendant allegedly used a device as identified in the statute -- specifically, a computer printer -- to reproduce or make a copy or image of Internet-based child pornography, he is within the reach of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(4). Accord State v. Roberts, 796 So. 2d 779, 784 (La. Ct. App. 2001), writ denied, 825 So. 2d 1163 (La. 2002) (interpreting reproduction in Louisiana child pornography statute according to its ordinary meaning). The Appellate Division reasoned that reproduce can be interpreted as commonly understood, or as connot[ing] the use of a computer to disseminate . . . an image as opposed to generating a copy for purposes of viewing or possessing the image in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(5)(b). Sisler, supra, 353 N.J. Super. at 595-96 (emphasis added). Perceiving an ambiguity, the panel resolved the conflicting interpretations in favor of lenity and concluded that the Legislature did not intend to punish the printing of images of child pornography for purposes of viewing solely for one s own sexual gratification more severely than simply viewing such material. Id. at 599. A majority of this Court concludes similarly, interpreting N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(4) as concerning the creation of child pornography that is later possessed or distributed. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 8-9). In my view, one s intent to disseminate child pornography, even without pecuniary motive, becomes relevant only under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(5)(a), which includes a prohibition on the knowing mailing, delivering, transferring, publishing, distributing, circulating, disseminating, presenting, exhibiting, or offering through any means, including the Internet, an image, including a computer program or file, or any other reproduction or reconstruction which depicts a child engaging in a prohibited sexual act. That section is not pertinent here because defendant is not charged with sending computerized child pornography. It is sufficient under N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(4) that by printing computerized images of child pornography, he made new copies of the images that appeared on the computer monitor. Had defendant made a duplicate of a videotape of child pornography for his own viewing, he equally would have violated N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(4). I assume that the Legislature incorporated a distribution element precisely where it meant such an element to apply. See GE Solid State, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 132 N.J. 298, 308 (1993) (stating that where the Legislature has carefully employed a term in one place and excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded ). There is no indication from the face of this statutory scheme that the Legislature intended to punish only those individuals who reproduced copies of child pornography for the purpose of disseminating them to others. To read such a requirement into the elements of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(4) creates a redundancy that is abhorrent to principles of statutory construction. Courts should avoid a construction that will render any part of a statute inoperative, superfluous, or meaningless. Strasenburgh v. Straubmuller, 146 N.J. 527, 539 (1996) (quoting State v. Reynolds, 124 N.J. 559, 564 (1991)). The majority echoes the Appellate Division s concern that the mere click of a computer mouse on a printer icon is sufficient to subject anyone to criminal charges in the second degree. That concern should not override a clearly expressed legislative judgment to the contrary. The ease with which child pornography can be reproduced, given modern technology, does not support lessening the criminal penalty that may attach for such conduct where the conduct is captured by the ordinary meaning of the language in the statute. The Legislature has chosen language that reaches broadly to punish the perpetuation of child pornography. It is not our function to sit in review of the Legislature s judgment in respect of punishment gradations, a point we were required to emphasize recently in respect of this same legislation when we disapproved of substituting judicial will for legislative intent. State v. Evers, 175 N.J. 355, 399-400 (2003) (commenting that [d]eciding the wisdom of the statute is not a judicial prerogative and [h]owever harsh the grading . . . may appear, that was the intent of the Legislature ). For purposes of completeness, I note that the legislative history of the child pornography statute does not support a different result. Its evolution evinces a legislative resolve to eliminate the proliferation of child pornography in every conceivable market and in respect of each new technological development. The child pornography statute, prior to 1983, prohibited (1) involving a child in the production of pornography; (2) photographing or filming a child engaged in sexually proscribed conduct (or a simulation thereof); and (3) selling child pornography. In 1983, the Legislature expanded the reach of the statute to include videotaping and any other reproduction or reconstruction depicting a child engaging in sexually prohibited conduct or a simulation thereof, rendering producers and reproducers equally culpable and subject to punishment. L. 1983, c. 494. The reproduce or reconstruct language was added to the subsection that previously prohibited only photographing or filming children engaged in prohibited sexual acts (that is, the prior version of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(4)) at a time when VCRs, videotapes, and other home video equipment were becoming more popular and less expensive. See Senate Judiciary Committee, Statement to Senate No. 1843 (Dec. 8, 1983) ( The adopted committee amendments also include video tapes and other types of reproductions and reconstructions within the purview of the child pornography statute. ). With the widespread growth of personal computers and the Internet in the 1990s, the Legislature twice amended the child pornography law to include those technologies as prohibited means of reproducing child pornography. Senate Judiciary Committee, Statement to Assembly No. 38 (Nov. 3, 1994); Senate Law and Public Safety Committee, Statement to Senate No. 1320 (Sept. 17, 1998). In both instances, the Legislature sought to expand the statute s reach. Although there have been numerous amendments over the years to the child pornography statute, the only additional amendment of substantive note for purposes of this appeal occurred in 1992. In response to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110 S. Ct. 1691, 109 L. Ed. 2d 98 (1990), the Legislature amended the statute to add the fourth-degree crime of possessing or viewing child pornography, addressing for the first time the demand side of this industry. L. 1992, c. 2 (codified as N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(5)(b)). That the Legislature eventually chose to criminalize passively possessing or viewing child pornography is not inconsistent with the conclusion that printing computer images of child pornography amounts to reproduction under the statute. The Legislature was addressing two separate actions, possession versus creation of more of the very items the Legislature was seeking to eradicate. The Legislature s efforts to strengthen the statute in order to deal with new technologies that not only facilitated the attainment and dissemination of child pornography, but also made it much easier and more efficient to reproduce child pornography, support a plain language interpretation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(4). See Alison R. Gladowsky, Note, Has the Computer Placed Our Children in Danger? A Closer Look at the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 8 Cardozo Women s L.J. 21, 21-22 (2001) (noting how less complex and expensive computer technology has made child pornography more prevalent and accessible). To insist, as the majority does, that the effortless tap of a mouse button should not instantaneously transform a fourth-degree offender into a second-degree offender, is to trap the statute in its pre-Internet, pre-VCR era and to ignore the Legislature s continuous efforts to reinforce the statute to address innovations that have made reproduction an instantaneous process. See William R. Graham, Comment, Uncovering and Eliminating Child Pornography Rings on the Internet: Issues Regarding and Avenues Facilitating Law Enforcement s Access to Wonderland , 2 000 L. Rev. Mich. State U. Det. C.L. 457, 465 (discussing advantages Internet offers child pornography rings that did not exist before); Marty Rimm, Marketing Pornography on the Information Superhighway: A Survey of 917,410 Images, Descriptions, Short Stories, and Animations Downloaded 8.5 Million Times by Consumers in Over 2000 Cities in Forty Countries, Provinces, and Territories, 83 Geo. L.J. 1849, 1851-52 (1995) (discussing how technological advancements in computer technology have given child pornographers unprecedented distribution channels and allowed them to penetrate previously restricted markets). I would conclude that printing Internet-based images of child pornography constitutes reproduction in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(4). Satisfied that the statute provides ample notice that creation of an additional image or copy of child pornography with a computer printer is punishable as a second-degree offense, I would hold that it was error to dismiss count one of the indictment against defendant. Justices Coleman and Albin join in this dissent. NO. A-39 SEPTEMBER TERM 2002 ON APPEAL FROM Appellate Division, Superior Court STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KEVIN SISLER, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED July 24, 2003 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Verniero CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice LaVecchia