Title: HALL v. HALL

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Hall v. Hall1985 WY 172708 P.2d 416Case Number: 85-38Decided: 10/18/1985KATHLEEN D. HALL, NOW KATHLEEN D. ROGERS, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF), 

v. 

DAVID C. HALL, APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
KATHLEEN D. HALL, NOW 
KATHLEEN D. ROGERS, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF), 

v. 

DAVID C. HALL, APPELLEE 
(DEFENDANT).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Paul T. Liamos, Jr., 
J.

 
 
Rodger McDaniel, 
Southeast Wyoming Law Offices of Rodger McDaniel, Cheyenne, for appellant.

Murlie C. 
Hanson, Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
an order modifying the custody provisions of a divorce decree. Appellant argues 
that the district court erred in cutting short the trial on the merits and in 
limiting her opportunity to present rebuttal evidence and argument. We agree 
that error occurred but can find no prejudice and thus 
affirm.

[¶2.]     On June 25, 1977, 
appellant and appellee were married in Cheyenne, Wyoming. On April 1, 1981, appellant gave 
birth to a daughter, Heather, and on January 12, 1983, she gave birth to a son, 
Christopher.

[¶3.]     Appellant filed for 
divorce on March 30, 1984, and appellee counterclaimed on April 17. Both parties 
sought custody of their two children. A hearing on the custody question was set 
for June 19, 1984. Just prior to the scheduled hearing, the parties entered into 
a Property Settlement Agreement which also covered custody of the children. 
Under the agreement the parties were to have joint custody on the following 
terms:

"a. From the period of 
the date of this Agreement through July 15, 1984, the husband shall have 
physical custody.

"b. From the period of 
July 15th, through August 15th the wife shall have physical 
custody.

"c. Beginning August 15, 
1984, and continuing for a period of six (6) months the husband shall have 
physical and primary custody of the minor children.

"d. Beginning February 
15, 1985, and extending through August 15, 1985, for a period of six (6) months, 
the husband shall have physical and primary custody.

"e. Such six (6) month 
alteration in physical and primary custody of the children shall continue on an 
alternating basis until August 15, 1986. At such time, such alternating primary 
and physical custody shall change to a school year of nine (9) months and summer 
month schedule so that parents alternate school years and divide equally the 
summer months, so that the parent who has not just ended school year custody 
will have the first 1/2 of the summer and the parent who has just ended school 
year custody shall have the last 1/2 of summer and then the beginning of the 
next school year shall be the other parent on an alternating 
basis.

"f. During such periods 
of time set forth above, the non-primary custodial parent shall have visitation 
with the children two (2) days per week with a split of each weekend with the 
other parent, or, if the parties mutually agree, an alteration of weekends with 
each parent having every other weekend. In addition, the parties will alternate 
holidays and birthdays of the children and the father shall have visitation with 
the children on Father's Day and the mother on Mother's Day and additional 
visitation shall be allowed as can be mutually discussed and agreed upon by the 
parties.

"4. The above visitation 
schedule is predicated upon the premise that both parents will continue to 
reside in Laramie County, Wyoming, and, in the event either party moves from 
LaramieCounty visitation shall be 
renegotiated."

The agreement 
also imposed upon appellee the obligation to pay $300 a month in child support 
when appellant had primary custody.

[¶4.]     On June 27, 1984, a 
Divorce Decree was entered by the court. It provided that custody would be in 
accordance with the Property Settlement Agreement. Shortly thereafter, the 
parties agreed to alter the custody provisions. The periods of primary custody 
were switched at appellant's suggestion. Also arrangements were made to switch 
two one-week periods in August of 1984 in order to accommodate appellant's 
vacation plans.

[¶5.]     On September 18, 1984, 
while she had custody of the children, appellant called and informed appellee of 
her decision to marry Lonnie Rogers and move to East Grand Forks, Minnesota. Appellant asked if appellee would 
permit primary custody to be vested in her. She indicated that she would be 
willing to transport the children back to Wyoming so that appellee could have them for 
one month in the winter and two months in the summer. She also stated that, if 
appellee was agreeable to this arrangement, she would no longer need any child 
support.

[¶6.]     On September 25, 1984, 
appellee telephoned appellant and announced his decision. He also mailed to her 
the following letter:

"Tuesday, September 25, 
1984

"Dear 
Kathy:

"In light of recent 
conversations with you concerning your decision to move from Wyoming to another state, 
I have decided, on the advice of my attorneys, to exercise my right of primary 
custody of Heather and Christopher Hall during this six-month period, effective 
today. Also, I would like to have an additional month added to my primary 
custody period, extending it to March 15, 1984.

"According to my 
attorneys, our property settlement is still in force, and therefore I exercise 
my right to it at this time. Our original agreement was set up so that Heather 
Hall would start school during my nine-month custody period, and as you have 
indicated to me verbally that you do not [intend] to fulfill that agreement - 
i.e. taking the children to another state - I feel I must exercise my rights 
according to the agreement we signed.

"You may contact me when 
you wish about your visitation during this six month period. I am sure we can 
continue to cooperate fully within the spirit of the agreement and with the best 
interests of the children in mind.

"Sincerely,

"/s/ Dave 
Hall"

After notifying 
appellant of his intention, appellee picked up the children from the day care 
center and assumed primary custody.

[¶7.]     Appellant filed a 
Petition to Modify Divorce Decree on September 27, 1984. She alleged that her 
plans to remarry and relocate were a change in circumstances justifying a change 
in the previously-agreed-to custody provisions.

[¶8.]     Appellee filed a 
response to the modification request on October 12, 1984. Appellee denied that 
there had been "a substantial change in circumstances justifying a modification" 
of the custody provisions. He also requested that he be awarded primary custody 
if the court determined that a substantial change had 
occurred.

[¶9.]     The matter proceeded to 
be tried to the court on November 12, 1984. Appellant, bearing the burden of 
proof that a change in circumstances had occurred, presented her case first. She 
was the first witness called. She testified about her remarriage and her 
relocation plans. She also discussed her children and their special needs and 
was of the opinion that she was better equipped to respond to these 
needs.

[¶10.]  Next appellant's new husband, Lonnie 
Rogers, testified. He explained from his perspective the circumstances of his 
marriage to appellant. He outlined his financial resources and his expectations 
for his and appellant's relocation to Minnesota. He discussed his past, his family, 
his two previous marriages, and his relationship with his own children, as well 
as his feelings for the parties' two children.

[¶11.]  Appellant then called Dr. Patricia 
Fleming, a psychologist practicing in Cheyenne. She gave her expert opinion 
concerning appellant and Mr. Rogers and their relationship with appellant's 
children. She concluded that despite the nineteen-year-age difference between 
appellant and Mr. Rogers, the short duration of their courtship, and their prior 
marriages, they had a good relationship and a good chance of a successful 
marriage. Dr. Fleming also evaluated appellee's personality. She had available 
to her another psychologist's findings concerning appellee. Ultimately she 
recommended that "the children would be better placed with their 
mother."

[¶12.]  Appellant's final witness was Vendal 
Trefren. She was a friend and neighbor of appellant. She testified that, on the 
basis of her contact with appellant, she believed that appellant was a good 
mother.

[¶13.]  Appellee commenced his case in chief by 
calling Dr. Gale Giebler, a psychologist practicing in Greeley, Colorado. Dr. Giebler testified that he had 
evaluated appellant and appellee in June of 1984 and at that time had 
recommended to the court that joint custody be awarded to the parents. Since 
that time he indicated his only contact with the parties had been with appellee. 
That occurred on October 25 when appellee brought both children to Dr. Giebler's 
office for a two-hour period. Dr. Giebler had no new contact with appellant and 
had no contact at all with Mr. Rogers. Dr. Giebler concluded that appellee was a 
wonderful and remarkable father. On the basis of what he had been told about 
appellant and Mr. Rogers, he found "her showing a more selfish interest or more 
self-centered interest than [he saw] in Mr. Hall" because of her marriage and 
relocation plans. The suddenness of the marriage also concerned Dr. Giebler 
because it reflected instability, as did appellant's employment history and 
recent decision to quit working and stay home with the children. Dr. Giebler 
found cause for concern over Mr. Roger's finances. He stated, "I don't know if 
that is secure." He was also worried by the age difference between appellant and 
Mr. Rogers: "[I]t's uncommon to have that kind of an age span and more difficult 
for compatibility to be achieved with such an age span."

[¶14.]  After Dr. Giebler, appellee testified in 
his own behalf. Appellee related the difficulties he had with appellant over the 
custody issue. He accused Mr. Rogers of threatening him by stating that they 
were going to court and appellee should pull his pocket-book out. Appellee also 
accused appellant of being neglectful of the children from time to time. He 
expressed concerns over the religious training the children would receive from 
appellant and Mr. Rogers, as well as their use of television as a babysitter. 
Finally, he explained how close he was to the children and what he was doing to 
meet their special needs.

[¶15.]  At the conclusion of appellee's 
testimony, the following occurred:

"THE COURT: Thank you, 
sir, you may step down. Anything else you want to put on the record? I'm not 
going to hear any more testimony except some short rebuttal by the Plaintiff, 
and we are going to take a short break. We'll be in 
recess.

* * * * * 
*

"THE COURT: Mr. McDaniel, 
do you have any rebuttal?

"MR. McDANIEL: Your 
Honor, is it my understanding that you're ruling that rebuttal will be limited 
to one witness?

"THE COURT: Limited to 
one witness, right.

"MR. McDANIEL: For the 
record, I would like to note an objection.

"THE COURT: All right. 
You may, sir."

[¶16.]  Appellant then took the witness stand. 
She responded to the charges made against her by Dr. Giebler and appellee. When 
her testimony was concluded, appellee's attorney indicated she had an objection 
to make for the record.

"MS. HANSON: In lieu of 
the Court's decision not to allow Mr. Hall to offer any more testimony, Mr. Hall 
would like to inform the Court he had about one and one-half more hours of case 
left with six witnesses who had been outside. The names are Sally Baker Wade 
(phonetic), who would have refuted the intentions of the Plaintiff, Mrs. Rogers, 
who stated here regarding her plans to go to work and go back to school, 
statements which would have made sense, at the time of the divorce on or about 
September 21st, 1984. A Mary McHombry (phonetic) who would have testified to his 
devotion to the children in placing their interests prior to his own. A Nick 
Montpliss (phonetic) who would have testified concerning Mr. Hall actually 
refusing to take part in a play because of the time needed for the children. 
Jean Sykes (phonetic) would have testified regarding Mr. Sykes' allowing Mr. 
Hall to babysit for his children. A Mr. Hal Davis as to the children. A Mr. Mack 
Hall would have testified to Mr. Hall's ability regarding Mr. Hall's obligation 
and child rearing practices, and Christa Rader (phonetic) would have told the 
Court of the recommended treatment for Christopher regarding his speech 
development and the follow-up recommendations and the success of Mr. Hall and 
the treatment, and I also want to put in the record a notation the Plaintiff's 
case has taken longer than the Defendant's, and in our estimate of trial or 
hearing time before, we did not know how long it was going to take, that the 
Defendant has only had about two and a quarter hours up until this point, and 
Plaintiff has had about four hours.

"THE COURT: All right. 
Thank you, counsel.

"MS. HANSON: Thank 
you.

"THE COURT: Both sides 
have ten minutes to sum up. Mr. McDaniel, you're first, and do you wish your 
summations to be taken by the Court Reporter?

"MR. McDANIEL: No, Your 
Honor, that's not necessary. I would like the record to reflect an objection to 
your order denying rebuttal.

"THE COURT: All right. Do 
you have any particular witness you were going to call that you wish to put in 
the record?

"MR. McDANIEL: Your 
Honor, I would have called such witnesses as were necessary to rebut the 
evidence which Ms. Hanson has reflected in her offer of proof. We would have 
called as well, Lonnie Rogers for rebuttal, so he could testify in rebuttal with 
respect to some of the issues raised by Mr. Hall in his 
testimony."

[¶17.]  Thereafter, closing arguments were 
delivered. These arguments were not reported. The court then rendered its 
decision.

"Now, there have been 
some changes, there has been a marriage of a short duration. There will be a 
move and joint custody, I would agree, it's no longer feasible and would be 
difficult in the best of situations, because you cannot expect these children to 
go to one school for nine months and next year go to another school. When they 
reach that age, that's certainly not in their best interest. People get divorced 
in this country and they remarry and they move. We are a moving nation. That's 
why joint custody is not a good thing. The Court finds that both mother and 
father are good people, are good parents that are trying their best in their own 
fashion to do the best thing for their children. Both think that in adopting a 
position that they have, that they are doing the best for their children. Now, 
in the eyes of many, that may - that may not be true, but it's something we 
can't be objective about when we're so vitally concerned, such as a mother and a 
father. We have a marriage, we don't know how long it's going to last, nobody 
does, regardless of the psychiatrist and psychologist. We have a move. We have 
plans to build a home. We have plans not to work. We have plans to do this and 
plans to do that. We have here in Cheyenne the status quo, we know what the 
situation is, we know where the children will live. We know who is here, the 
family, the parents, I feel that it is much less disruptive to these children to 
maintain this status quo as much as possible, and the Court finds it's in the 
best interest of these children to vest primary custody in their father. And the 
Court so orders."

[¶18.]  On December 20, 1984, the court's 
decision was reduced to writing and formally entered. On December 21, 1984, 
appellant filed a motion for a new trial. She claimed that the court's decision 
to limit her right to call rebuttal witnesses infringed upon her right to be 
heard and her right to a fair trial.

[¶19.]  A telephonic hearing on this motion was 
held on December 31, 1984. The court denied the motion saying, "I think that any 
rebuttal contemplated and even brought was just a further stirring on the same 
manure pile, to coin a phrase."

[¶20.]  On appeal, appellant challenges the trial 
court's decision - in the middle of the trial - to permit only one rebuttal 
witness. This issue requires a balancing of a trial court's ability to regulate 
and control courtroom proceedings against the litigants' due process right to be 
heard.

[¶21.]  It is well established in this country 
that all citizens enjoy the constitutional right to due process of law. 
Amendments V and XIV to the United States Constitution; Art. 1, § 6 of the 
Wyoming Constitution.

"[D]ue process requires, 
at a minimum, that absent a countervailing state interest of overriding 
significance, persons forced to settle their claims of right and duty through 
the judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 
377, 91 S. Ct. 780, 785, 28 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1971).

Any deprivation 
by the State of a fundamental right of one of its citizens must be "preceded by 
notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust 
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, 70 S. Ct. 652, 94 L. Ed. 865 
(1950).

"The formality and 
procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon the importance of 
the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings." Boddie v. Connecticut, supra, 401 U.S. 
at 378, 91 S. Ct.  at 786.

[¶22.]  There can be no doubt that a fundamental 
right of appellant was at stake in the proceedings below. As this court has 
previously stated: "The right to associate with one's immediate family is a 
fundamental liberty protected by the state and federal constitutions." DS v. Department of Public Assistance and 
Social Services, Wyo., 607 P.2d 911, 918 (1980). Resolution of which parent 
shall have custody necessarily implicates the fundamental right of family 
association. Accordingly, a court must afford a parent notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard before it can deny the parent custody of his or her 
children.

[¶23.]  There can be no doubt that notice was 
provided in this case. The issue here concerns whether appellant was afforded a 
meaningful opportunity to be heard. In Tanner v. Tanner, Wyo., 482 P.2d 443 
(1971), we reversed where the district court had modified custody provisions 
without a hearing. We stated: "[I]t is the general rule that in proceedings for 
modification of a divorce decree an opportunity to be heard is required." 482 P.2d  at 445. In Yates v. Yates, Wyo., 
702 P.2d 1252, 1255 (1985), we found no violation of Tanner v. Tanner, supra, where 
"appellant was not precluded in any way from producing what evidence she 
desired."

[¶24.]  Here there was a hearing, but during that 
hearing the court, without warning, announced that appellee could not call any 
more witnesses and that appellant could only call one rebuttal witness. Both 
parties objected to this ruling and asserted that they had additional evidence 
to present. Appellee, having been successful, does not now complain; and we must 
deal, therefore, only with the effect of the court's ruling upon appellant. When 
the motion for new trial was denied, the court indicated that its ruling was, in 
essence, that any additional evidence would have been 
cumulative.

[¶25.]  The right to be heard can be limited by 
"a state interest of overriding significance." Boddie v. Connecticut, supra, 401 U.S. 
at 377, 91 S. Ct.  at 785. We believe that the State has an overriding interest in 
the orderly and efficient administration of justice. McCabe v. R.A. Manning Construction Co., 
Wyo., 674 P.2d 699 (1983). Pursuant to this overriding interest, rules of 
procedure and evidence have been adopted. Courts may infringe upon the right to 
be heard to the extent permitted under these rules.

[¶26.]  Rule 403, W.R.E., permits a court to 
exclude evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed * * * by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence." The decision to exclude the evidence was made without 
inquiring as to whether there was anything new to present. Further, the court 
did not make allowance for the possibility that any of the evidence could be 
other than cumulative. It did not say that it would not permit a rehash of 
previous evidence; instead, it arbitrarily ruled that only one more witness 
could testify. Such a ruling had no basis and cannot be justified under Rule 
403, supra. The court's decision was simply not to hear anymore of what the 
parties had to present. This ruling was in error under the rules of evidence. It 
infringed upon appellant's constitutional right to be heard. 

[¶27.]  In reaching that conclusion, we are not 
saying that a judge has no power to stop needless repetition of evidence. Rule 
403, supra, can be employed to that end. The court can, pursuant to the rule, 
direct the parties away from material already covered. The court here did this 
several times in the present case. It can also explain to the parties that it is 
only interested in evidence concerning new matters. The court here also employed 
this technique. However, the court cannot simply cut off the evidence. To do so 
arbitrarily is an abuse of discretion. The court here abused its discretion; its 
ruling was not in conformity with the rules of evidence.

[¶28.]  Rule 61, W.R.C.P., 
provides:

"No error in either the 
admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or defect in any ruling or 
order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties is 
ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating, 
modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take 
such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The 
court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the 
proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the 
parties."

This rule 
applies on appeal. Where an error occurring at the trial level is harmless, we 
will not reverse. However, the seriousness of the error and of the right 
infringed upon must be considered in evaluating the error as harmless. Robertson v. State Highway Commission, 
Wyo., 450 P.2d 1003 (1969).

[¶29.]  In Tanner v. Tanner, supra, this court 
found error in the trial court's failure to hold a hearing on the request for 
modification. It did not, however, address the issue of the error's prejudice. 
Presumably this was because the court found the right to a hearing too 
substantial to permit a finding that the deprivation of that right was 
harmless.

[¶30.]  Here, however, there was a hearing. On 
appeal appellant contends that she was prejudiced because she could not recall 
Mr. Rogers to respond to various accusations made against him by Dr. Giebler and 
appellee. Mr. Rogers had already testified in appellant's case in chief. He 
testified fully concerning his future employment, the proposed move to 
Minnesota, the new home the parties would occupy, and the projected 
circumstances of their new life. Appellant failed to show the court what Mr. 
Rogers could say in rebuttal that he had not said when placed upon the stand 
initially. There is nothing, either in the record or briefs, which indicates 
that Mr. Rogers had anything new to say. Accordingly, we must conclude that the 
error in the proceedings was harmless.

[¶31.]  Affirmed.