Title: Getz v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
CHARLES R. GETZ, JR.,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
           Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 172, 2013 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Kent County 
§  Cr. ID No. 88K00683DI 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
                                         Submitted: September 6, 2013 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: October 15, 2013 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 15th day of October 2013, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the record below,1 it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Charles R. Getz, Jr., filed an appeal 
from the Superior Court’s March 14, 2013 order denying his third motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  We find 
no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
                                                 
1 The State of Delaware’s motion for leave to file a motion to affirm or an answering 
brief out of time was denied on August 21, 2013.  On August 22, 2013, the Clerk notified 
the parties that the appeal would be decided on the basis of the opening brief and 
appendix and the record below. 
 
2
 
(2) 
The record before us reflects that, in 1989 following a retrial on 
remand from this Court,2 Getz was found guilty by a Superior Court jury of 
Rape in the First Degree.  He was sentenced to life in prison.  Getz’s 
conviction was affirmed by this Court on direct appeal.3  Getz subsequently 
filed two motions for postconviction relief.  This Court affirmed the 
Superior Court’s denial of both motions.4  Getz now appeals from the 
Superior Court’s denial of his third postconviction motion. 
 
(3) 
In his appeal, Getz asserts seven claims that may fairly be 
summarized as follows:  a) the Superior Court improperly failed to conduct 
an evidentiary hearing regarding his postconviction motion; b) the Superior 
Court judge was biased; c) the Superior Court improperly invoked the time 
and procedural bars of Rule 61; d) he was entitled to the assistance of 
counsel to prosecute his claims of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel 
in his first postconviction motion; and e) the public defender who 
represented him at trial had a conflict of interest because the Office of the 
Public Defender is linked to the Office of the Attorney General. 
 
(4) 
Getz’s first claim is that the Superior Court improperly failed to 
conduct an evidentiary hearing on his postconviction motion.  Rule 61(h) (1) 
                                                 
2 Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726 (Del. 1988). 
3 Getz v. State, 1990 WL 168288 (Del. Sept. 13, 1990). 
4 Getz v. State, 1994 WL 622022 (Del. Oct. 31, 1994); Getz v. State, 2011 WL 5868403 
(Del. Nov. 22, 2011). 
 
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provides that, in postconviction proceedings, the Superior Court in its 
discretion may schedule an evidentiary hearing after considering the 
postconviction motion, the State’s response, the record and any other 
materials the Superior Court deems to be relevant.  Rule 61 does not 
mandate the scheduling of an evidentiary hearing in every case, but, rather, 
leaves it to the Superior Court to determine whether an evidentiary hearing 
is needed.  Concluding in its discretion that the issues raised in Getz’s third 
postconviction motion did not require an evidentiary hearing, the Superior 
Court denied Getz’s motion for such a hearing.  Having reviewed Getz’s 
opening brief and the record below, we find that the Superior Court acted 
well within its discretion in denying Getz’s motion.  As such, we conclude 
that Getz’s first claim is without merit. 
 
(5) 
Getz’s second claim is that the Superior Court was biased 
against him.  He requests that the judge who denied his postconviction 
motion be disqualified and a new judge appointed.  Rule 2.11 of the 
Delaware Judges’ Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge should 
disqualify himself from deciding a case if he has a personal bias or prejudice 
concerning a party, if he served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, if 
he has a personal financial interest in the matter or if he or his spouse or a 
 
4
relative is a party to the proceeding or has an interest in the proceeding.5  In 
a situation not covered by the Rule, the judge must, first, satisfy himself that 
he can hear the matter free of bias and, second, objectively examine whether 
there is an appearance of bias sufficient to cast doubt on his impartiality.6 
Our review of Getz’s opening brief and the record below reflect no bias or 
impropriety of any kind on the part of the Superior Court judge who 
considered, and denied, Getz’s third postconviction motion.  There is, thus, 
no basis for his disqualification.  We, therefore, conclude that Getz’s second 
claim also is without merit. 
 
(6) 
Getz’s third claim is that the Superior Court improperly 
invoked the time and procedural bars of Rule 61 in denying his 
postconviction motion.  Delaware law requires the Superior Court to first 
ascertain whether any of the procedural bars of Rule 61 applies prior to 
considering the merits of a defendant’s postconviction claims.7  In this case, 
the Superior Court invoked Rule 61(i) (1), (2) and (4) in denying Getz’s 
postconviction motion as time-barred, repetitive and asserting claims that 
were previously adjudicated.  The record supports the Superior Court’s 
reliance on the mandated time and procedural bars to deny Getz’s third 
                                                 
5 Los v. Los, 595 A.2d 381, 384 (Del. 1991). 
6 Stevenson v. State, 782 A.2d 249, 255 (Del. 2001). 
7 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del.1990). 
 
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postconviction motion.  We, therefore, conclude that Getz’s third claim also 
is without merit. 
 
(7) 
Getz’s fourth claim is that he was entitled to the appointment of 
counsel to prosecute his claims of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel 
in his first postconviction motion.  The record reflects that Getz raised 10 
separate claims in his first postconviction motion, all of which related to his 
trial counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance.  In a 25-page decision, the 
Superior Court analyzed those claims and found them to be meritless.  This 
Court, in turn, reviewed all of Getz’s claims of ineffective assistance in 
detail and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment.  In the absence of any 
evidence that Getz’s allegations of ineffective assistance in his first 
postconviction motion were not fully and fairly considered, or that he 
experienced any prejudice in connection with the adjudication of those 
allegations, we conclude that his fourth claim is meritless. 
 
(8) 
Getz’s fifth, and final, claim is that the public defender who 
represented him at trial had a conflict of interest because the Office of the 
Public Defender is linked to the Office of the Attorney General.  
Specifically, Getz alleges that “a Public Defender has little to no concern at 
all with providing any actual, legitimate advocacy for a person” for the 
reason that “a Public Defender is a subordinate client to the Attorney 
 
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General, and therefore is subject to the demands of the Attorney General.”  
There is no factual support for any of Getz’s allegations concerning the 
Office of the Public Defender.  We, therefore, conclude that Getz’s fifth, and 
final, claim is likewise without merit. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice