Title: Hawaii Home Infusion Associates v. Befitel, Director, Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, State of Hawaii. Concurring Opinion by J. Acoba [pdf]. S.Ct. Order Denying Motion for Retention of Oral Argument, filed 04/16/2007 [pdf].

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

YOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S WAWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

 

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT‘T

-— 000 ---

 

HAWAII HOME INFUSION ASSOCIATES, Plaintiff-Appellant,
DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND

NELSON B. BEFITEL,
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, STATE OF HAWAI'I;
INC.; ADJUSTING SERVICES OF HAWAII, INC.

 

 

KUHIO MOTORS,
‘and MAJESTIC INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants-APpelppes,
gz
and =
z -
EDWARD SHEPHERD, Defendant. a =
= b
No. 27256 fe ©
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CrapurT —
(Civ. No. 04-1-0616-04) s

APRIL 16, 2007

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, AND DUFFY,
AND RCOBA, J., CONCURRING SEPARATELY

OPINION OF THE COURT BY LEVINSON, J.

‘The plaintiff-appellant Hawaii Home Infusion Associates

33.5

(HHIA) appeals from the first circuit court’s March 28, 2005
judgnent, the Honorable Karen S. S. Ahn presiding,’ awarding
summary judgment in favor of the defendants-appellees Nelson B.

director of the State of Hawaii's Department of Labor
“the director"),

Befitel,

and Industrial Relations (DLIR) [hereinafter,

Kuhio Motors, Inc. (KM), Adjusting Services of Hawaii, Inc.
(hereinafter,

 

(ASH), and Majestic Insurance Company (MIC)

Pollack presided through August 1, 2004,

 

the Honorable Richerd #
Ancluaing over the disposition of the notion to dismiss discussed antr.

 
‘04 FOR PUBLICATION IN WES:

 

TUWATT REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +
collectively, “the Appellees”] and against HHIA and dismissing
“[a}11 other claims and all other parties.”

On appeal, HHIA challenges the circuit court’s judgment
insofar as it effectively barred its appeal from the director's
decision to the Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board.

For the reasons discussed infra in section 111.B, we
hold that the first circuit court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over HHIA’s declaratory action and, accordingly,
vacate the judgnent below and remand with instructions to dismiss

HHIA‘s complaint.

1. BACKGROUND
On April 2, 2004, HNIA filed a “petition”? for
declaratory relief in the first circuit court, inter alia,
challenging, on “substantive due process” and separation-of-
powers grounds, the provision of Hawai'i Administrative Rules
(HAR) § 12-15-94(d) (2001) that bars appeals from certain billing

dispute resolution decisions.’ As bases for the first circuit

 

We will treat the petition as @ complaint because civil actions
are to be conmences by s complsint.” Inte Smith, 68 aw. ¢66, 468, 719 P.2d
4355, "399 (a9ee) (eiting Hawai's Rule of Civil Procedure 3) But gag Mawas'l
Revises statutes § 91-7(a) (1983). (referring to the party bringing the
declaratory actich ae “petitioner”).

 

> iam § 12-15-94(¢) provides in relevant part:
In the event a reascnsble disagreement relating to specific
charges cannct be resolved, the  . + Provider of service may
Fequest intervention by the director’.".- The director shall
Send the porties a notice and the parties shall negotiate during
the thirty-one celengar caye following the date of the
notice... . If the parties fail te cone to an agreement during
he thizty-cne colendar caye, then fourteen calendar daye
Eoliowing the thirty-one sey negotiating periea, either party may
Tfe'ehe director to review the dispute .
Send the parties # second notice requesting the
parties file position statements The sirecter shail
Feview the positions of : administrative
(continued...)

 

 

 

 

 

   
 

‘144 FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’ HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

 

court’s jurisdiction, HHIA invoked Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS)
§§ 91-7 (1993)* and 632-1 (1993) (concerning, inter alia, circuit
courts’ jurisdiction over declaratory actions). According to its
complaint, HRIA’s “principal offices” are located in Lihv'e, in
Kaua'i County, which is coextensive with the fifth judicial
circuit, see HRS § 603-1(4) (Supp. 1994). HIA “renders medical
care, medical services, and medical supplies . . . to home-bound
patients on the island of Kaua(‘]i” and, in particular, prepared
and monitored the delivery of a “specially formulated” medicinal
compound to a worker’s compensation claimant, the defendant
Edward Shepherd. A billing dispute among HHIA, ASH, and MIC
ensued, and the director “ordered the parties” into the billing
dispute process described in HAR § 12-15-94(d). BIA asserted
that the director’s resulting decision was adverse to it and that
HAR § 12-15-94(d) unconstitutionally deprived it of the right to
an appeal therefrom.

On June 21, 2004, the director moved to dismiss HHIA’s

complaint on the grounds that it “was filed in the wrong

 

 

2(.. .continued)
eclosion without hearing, ‘The decision of the director is
1a] and not sppealable.

 

 

 

«ass § dity of rules,”

provides in relev

7, entitled “Declaratory judgment on
part

 

 

   
 

ceclaration

(a) Any interested person may cbtein = Judicti
fection (b)

as to the valsaity of an soency Fule es proviged

      

font, or exceeds the
y of the agency, of was adopted without

Compliance with etaeutory ruleraking procedures.

(Emphases added.

 
FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAKA'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER **¢

 

circuit.” (Quoting HRS § 91-7(a).) (Citing HRS § 603-37.5
(concerning “[c]ure or waiver of [venue] defects”); Hawai'i Rules
of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rules 7 (concerning “form of notions”)
and 12.") See also KW’s, ASH's, and MIC’s Answer at 4 (*[HRIA)’s
claims are barred . . . because of . . . lack of jurisdiction.”).
HHIA responded that the director's motion amounted to a challenge
of venue rather than subject matter jurisdiction and was
therefore untimely inasmuch as the director did not object to

venue in his answer or in a pre-answer motion. (Quoting HRCP

 

Rule 12(b) and (h), see supra note S.) HHIA argued in the
alternative that, were the director to claim that his motion
asserted a challenge of jurisdiction rather than venue, he would

+ the tite of the director’s motion and the substance of his
accompanying memorandum seen to suggest transfer to the fifth circuit as an
aiternative renecy.

 

+ nce Rule 12, entitled “Defenses and objections -- when and how
presented -- by pleading or motion . ‘provides in relevane part:

 

(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for
relief in any pleading... shall be asserted in the responsive
leading thereto if one is fequlred, except that the following
Sefenses may at the opticn cf the plesder be made by motion? (1)
Sack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of
jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue .

aking any of these defensee shail be made before pil
further pleading is perni

 

     

 

0h) Waiver or preservation of certain defens
(2) Aefense of lack of jurisdiction over the persen{ or]
improper venue ie vatved .. . (8) if it is neither made
by notion under ‘this role nor included in a responesve
pleading or an amendment. thereof permitted by Role is(e) to be
mace ss a ratter of course.

| Wihenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise
that the court lacks jurieciction ef the subject matter, the
court shall dismiss the action

     

 

 

Inasmuch af the director cited HRCP Rule 12 generically, and based upon the
substance of his motion, his esserted grounds for dismissal could be improper
Venue, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or Both. In ary case,
the inprecision of the director's notion cannot blind oe to juriedictionel,
Sefects, which we correct, sua sponte if necessory, ae infsa secticn 11.4.

 

 

   

 

4
44+ FOR PUBLICATION I WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORES AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++
be mistaken inasmuch as “venue is generally not a jurisdictional
factor in Hawai(‘]i.” (Citing Life of the Land v. Land Use
Comm'n, $8 Haw, 292, 294-95, 298, 568 P.2d 1189, 1191-94 (1977).)
Construing ite argument generously, HHIA seems to have asserted
that, rather than creating a territorial limitation on subject
matter jurisdiction, HRS § 91-7(a) augments HRS § 603-36(5)
(1993), granting the plaintiff the option to litigate in the
plaintiff's own donicile notwithstanding the general venue rule

to the contrary.”

 

* obviously, thie merely begs the question whether the director

moved for dlamissal on jurisdictional or venue grounde- In any case, sesuming
there was s defect of cubject matter jurisdiction, the circuit court was
empowered to netice it and dismiss the complaint aus sosnte. See, e.g.) RCP
Rule 12th) (3), supga note 5.

 

 

+ RS § 603-36, entitled “Actions and proceedings, where to be
brought," provides in relevant part:

Actions and proceedings of civil nature within the
Jurisdiction of the circuit courts

isi <<. other than those specified above shall be
Erdugntl)] o's if there is nore than one defendant, an
fhe eircoit in unich the claim for relief ercee unless a
majority of the defendants are doniciled in another circuit,
Subereupen the action may be brought in the cireuit where the
majority of the defendants are domiciled

  

 

+ WHIA's argument reads

Pisinly, the phrase “by bringing an action against the
agency! in the cireuit court of the county in wnien [the]
petitioner resides of hae ite principsl place of tusinese(*)

 

  

 

Soul have fo purpose if... agencies hielid the right to waive
Senue as ether defendant] do... [T]he general vense
provision(,] . « - (HRS $] 603-3615) | . . establishes the circuit

Mbere the Cleim'of reilef arose or where the gefendant is
Soniciles ae the proper cireuit for filing. Recoraingiy, (the
Gjirecter . . - woule hold the power to waive venue were ie hot
for tne venve provision in [HRS] §[ ]91~7(a)- The right te fle
in the county in whieh [the pletitioner is domiciled plainly
protects (che pletitioner’s convenience. - + +

 

   

   

the Legislature intendes ERS § 91-7 to renove
not create then. The defendant |] in a(n HRS) §{ 192-7
is always a governmental agency... - If the concept
is applicable to state agencies, certeinly they must
Teontinued. «1

 
 

 
‘+ FOR PUBLICATION I WEST'S HAMAL'T REPORES AND FACIETC REPORTER #++
The director's July 2, 2004 reply countered “that HRS
§ 91-7 pertains to jurisdiction and is not a matter of venue.”
He cited this court's observation, in Life of the Land, that
“(t)he circuit court . . . has jurisdiction to render declaratory
judgments under HRS §[} 91-7," 58 Haw. at 295, $68 P.2d at 1192
(emphasis added)." The director further implied that, inasmuch
as BRS § 91-7 is distinct from HRS ch. 603, pt. IV (1993) and
§ 608-7 (Supp. 2002), concerning venue in the circuit and
district courts, respectively, “it should not be assumed that
[HRS] § 91-7 contains @ ‘venue’ provision.” Finally, the
director seems to have argued that a geographic reference in the
statute under scrutiny “does not automatically” preclude its
construction as a limitation on jurisdiction. (Quoting Hawaiian
Tel. Co. vs Agsalud, 67 Haw. 39, 40, 675 F.2d 777, 778 (1984).)
On July 9, 2004, the circuit court conducted a hearing
on the dizector’s motion to dismiss, the transcript of which is

not in the record, cf. Hawai'i Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(a)

 

 

 

“the record on appeal shall consist of ...: ... (4) the
transcripts prepared for the record on appeal . (enphasis
"1. seontinved)
Spe donsciled . . . in the seat of government in (the City
yet} Honeiviui, hence, in the firet circuit, see HRS
1954)]! The purpose underlying -
Thue suet have been the elimination of @ barrier te

 
  
   

       

ctions challenging the validity of agency rules.
jer of the venue provision would create barriers
hoceing the nest conventent cizeust for fling

(Emphasis in original.) (Footnote omitted,

“he decided Life of the Land on unrelated grounds, to wit, that
SIA), ag the ciresie coure smplieitly founs, there [ve]ze indispensable
parties,” tne circuit court should have enceavored to join such partiee,
Possible, before dismissing the action outright. Seg 58 How. at 298, 568 F.2¢
elise

 

 
 

‘#4 FOR PUBLICATION ZN WEST'S HAWAI'T REPORTS AND FACIFIC REPORTER ¢¥¢

added). In its July 21, 2004 order, the circuit court denied the
Sirector’s motion. The circuit court proceeded to the merits
and, on January 3, 2005, granted the director's December 2, 2004
motion for sunmary judgment, and denied HHIA‘s October 1, 2004
motion for sunmary judgment. Accordingly, on March 28, 2005,
after disposing of HHIA’s motion for reconsideration, the circuit
court entered final judgnent in favor of the Appellees and
against HHIA and dismissed all other claims and parties. on
April 26, 2005, HHIA filed its notice of appeal.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
AL Subject Matter durisdict

Inasmuch as we are guided by the principle that, “[i)¢
a court lacks jurizsiction over the subject apttor af’ a
Proceeding, any judgment rendered in thet procesding 1
¢ [and thet,) therefore, such a question 2 walle at
y stage of the case, . . «(we ss are) obliged to firet
[elnsure that (the carcult court) ‘hald subject steer)
Jurisdiction. [*]

Tamashiro v, Dep't of Human Servs., 112 Hawai" 368, 398-99, 146

P.3d 103, 113-14 (2006) (some brackets in original and some

added) (quoting Bush v. Hawaiian Homes Comm'n, 76 Hawai'i 128,

133, 670 P.24 1272, 1277 (1994).

B. Statutory Interpretation
Ic]The interpretation of a stetute is a question of
1a reviewable ge nov. (")" State ve grees. S4uawsil 3
30, 928 P.26 843, 852 (1596){ Linternal guctetion signels
omittea) |
Furthermore, car statutory construction is guided by
established’ rules:

    

hen construing # statute, our forenost
obligation is te ascertain snd give effect to
the ure, which Sa to be
obtained primarily from the language contained
in the statute itself. And we must read
statutory Language in’ the com

statute ena construe it ins
with ite purpose.

 

 

 

  
   

nner consistent
“tee pom PUBLICATION IN WEST'S IOWAS'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

men there is doubt, doubleness of
mesaing, or indistinetiveness or uncertainty of
wettxpseseion used in # statute, en ambiguity
ah Godetruing an ambiguous stetute, “[e]he
neoning of the enbsguous words nay be sought by
BeskiNiag the context, with which the ambiguous
Berber Dicoses, and sentences may be compared,
eee Ee Secertain thei true meaning.” HAS
SUSIE) Tclgss |. Moreover, the courts mey
Serort to extrinaie alge in determining
LeGilative intent. One avenve is the use of
TegLslative history ae an interpretive tool.

sat rf J, €4 Hawai's (138+)
EL Seas ieeo,} $50 (in9971) (quoting Skate ee

G0 wawes's &, 1€-19, 90¢ P.zé 693, 503-08
THEE crackete and eiipeis points in original)
[Eecthote omittes). this court may also consider
ESR Heaton end gpirit of the law, and the cause
CATR SSE05 fhe Tegisleture to enact ix... to
SEE GP UES eros meaning.” HRS $1-2812) 972. =
Sisto in gard materia, oF upon the sane subject
IICtEAEREH Ee Sonetrve wath reference to each
‘Siker.' whet se clear in one statote may be called
SEES Jn Mig'eo explain what is doubtful in another.”
RE § 2-16 (3993).

| 107 Hawei'i 215, 220, 112 F.3d 68, 74 (2005)

Fae EEL aaded and sone in criginel) (one ellipsis

LUSCH ES Ctne in cricinal)) (quoting state v. Kaua, 102

Wa 473,, 679-480 (20031) nt

Sof unjust result, see State v. Haugen, 106 Hawad's
{84 toe), this court is bound to give

Uiiest' te the plain meaning of Unenbiguovs stavutery

SESSSoeS se may cay sesort to the use of legislative

Navery when interpreting en ambiguous statu

Peseta "Se Rowell ses, 472, 24 Fe3d 662, 668 (2001)

Courbat v. Dahane Ranch, Inc,, 111 Hawai'l 254, 260-61, 141 P.3d
427, 433-34 (2006) (emphasis omitted) (some brackets and ellipses

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

     

 

 

 

added and some in original).

A, Introduction
tive issue before us is whether HRS

 

The dispo:
$ 91-7(a), se@ supra note 3 -- under which HHIA “may” challenge
an administrative rule through a declaratory action “in the

circuit court of the county in which [HHIA) . . - has its
‘t+ FOR PUBLICAPION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++

 

principal place of business,” i.e., the fifth circuit
court (hereinafter, “the county rule] -~ (1) endows the fifth
circuit court and only the fifth circuit court with subject
matter jurisdiction over HHIA's action, or (2) merely expands the
general venue rule set forth in HRS § 602-36(5), see supra

note 7. If the latter is true, the director's motion was
untimely ané, accordingly, any venue defect was waived. If, on
the other hand, the county rule is a restriction on subject
matter jurisdiction, we must notice the first circuit court’s
lack of subject matter jurisdiction aua sponte and vacate its
decision.

The uncertainty of the meaning of the county rule
springs from (1) its use of the word “may” rather than “shall”
and (2) its silence with respect to whether the petitioner's
domicile controls venue or jurisdiction. HRIA might argue that
HRS § 632-1 confers jurisdiction that is not conditioned upon any

geographic factor: “In cases of actual controversy, courts of

 

record, within the scope of their respective jurisdictions, shall
have power to make binding adjudications of right... . Relief
by declaratory judgnent may be granted in civil cases...”
However, the phrase “within the scope of [the courts’] respective
jurisdictions” simply begs the question of whether, in the case
of HRS § S7-I(a), @ given cixcuit court’s jurisdiction is
contingent upon the plaintiff's domicile in the corresponding
county.

Illustrative authority from Hawai'i sources is succinct
at best, but, in light of (1) the redundancy of the county rule

Af interpreted as a venue provision, (2) our interpretation of @
+ FOR PUBLICATION IN MEST’S HAWAI'I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +++
similar statute in Hawaiian Tel. Co., and (3) the fact that the
county rule accounts for only the convenience of the plaintiff,
contrary to the usual purpose of a venue statute, we hold that,
for purposes of declaratory actions brought pursuant to HRS
§ 91-7(a), the circuit court of the plaintiff’s domicile is the
only circuit court that may exercise jurisdiction over the
subject matter.

B.  Analveie

Admittedly, the legislature could have drafted the
county rule using the word “shall” rather than “nay,” so as to
make its mandatory jurisdictional effect clearer. Nevertheless,
we believe that “may,” in the context of the county rule, implies
that bringing a declaratory action in the plaintiff’s home forum
is an alternative to (1) seeking injunctive or monetary relief or
foregoing litigation altogether, not (2) seeking declaratory
judgment, but in another venue.

When it drafted the county rule, the House Judiciary

Committee took as its point of departure the Model State

 

Administrative Procedure Act of 1961, § 7 (superseded 1981), 15
U.L.A. 262 (2000 & Supp. 2006), which provided that “(t]he
validity or applicability of a rule may be determined in an
action for declaratory judgment in the [District Court of . . .
County]" (emphasis added) (some brackets added and some in
eriginal) (ellipsis in original), 15 U.L.A. 262. See Hse. Stand.
Comm. Rep. No. 8, in 1962 House Journal, at 654-55, 6587 Hse.

Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 83, in 1959 House Journal, Ist Spec. Sess.,

  

-26, 229. The committee report, which is itself ambiguous

 

ith respect to the significance of “may” and whether the

 

10
 

e+ POR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'T REFORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

designated county is an optional venue or a mandatory situs of

 

jurisdiction, reads in relevant part

[Slection 7{) of the . . . Model [APA] has been amended to
provide that an interested perecn may obtain a declaratory
Socgnent where the rule is invalid en the grounds [now set
forth in Wks § $1°7(b)]._ Ae to where a proceeding can be
inetituced, an interested person may bring an action where
he resides, or in the cese of 2 corporation where its
principal place of business is located

 

 

See Hse. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 8, in 1961 House Journal, at
654-55, 658. We do not believe that the legislature, which
retained the word “may” ae used in the Model APA, intended to
bestow an extra benefit upon HRS § 91-7 plaintiffs that they
“may” ignore if they prefer to sue outside of their own
doniciles.

Nevertheless, whether the county rule is “mandatory” or
not, in and of itself, does not settle the question whether the
plaintiff’s failure to file in the prescribed county is a fatal
jurisdictional defect or a venue defect capable of being waived.

We agree with the director's implicit position thet
subject matter jurisdiction, not just venue, may be partitioned
along county lines. In Hawaiian Tel. Co., we construed similar
[plaintiff] may file X in the county in which ¥" syntax as
mandatory and jurisdictional. In that case, we considered the
first sentence of HRS § 363-38 (Supp. 1977), which provided that
an unemployment benefits claimant “gay file an appeal from [a]
determination or redetermination at the office of the department
of labor and industrial relations in the county in which the
claimant resides or in the county in which the claimant vas last
employed” (emphases added), and expressly held that filing a
notice of appeal in the wrong circuit wes @ defect of

jurisdiction and not venue. See 67 Haw. at 40, 678 P.2d at 778.

n
‘+44 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ++
Accordingly, we upheld the circuit court’s dismissal of the
appellant's appeals from decisions of the Department of Labor and

 

Industrial Relations. 1
We likewise agree with HRIA that HRS § 603-36(5)

 

delineates permissible venues and is not a geographic limitation
on jurisdiction, which befits its codification in HRS ch. 603,
pt. IV, concerning “venue” in the “circuit courte.” Kaus va
County of Kauai, 47 Haw. 271, 386 P.2d 860 (1963), illustrates
the distinction between HRS §§ 91-7(a), see supra note 3, and
603-36(5), see supra note 7. Kaui concerned 1957 Haw. Sess. L.
Act 194, 47 Haw. at 272, 386 P.2d at 882, which was @ forerunner
of HRS § 603-36(5). We construed Act 194 as a venue statute
and, accordingly, remanded for determination of the factual
question of whether the defendant county had waived its venue
objection. See id. at 274, 276, 386 P.2d at 662-83. We opined
that Act 194 “could not have been intended to go to jurisdiction
over the subject matter as it permits an action to be brought
where the defendant is domiciled without regard to the place
where the cause of action arose.” Id. at 276, 386 P.2d at 883
that

 

(emphasis added). The inverse is true of HRS § 91-7(a)
the eppropriate forum for litigation under HRS § 91-7(a) is
predicated solely upon the plaintiff's residence and without

 

* Act 194 provided én subst
ALL civil ection other than those specified (earlier in

Revised Laws of Hawai § 218-21) shail be brought in the circust
where the couse of ection arose or where the eft

Gonicileds provides, however, if there be more than one defendant,
then suen acticn shall be Brought in the cizesit in which the

cause of action arcee unlese @ majority of uch cefendante are
Goniciled in sncther circuit, whereupon such action ney be brought
En the circuit where such mejoriey of defencante are comiciles

 

ive part

 

      

 

     

 

 

1957 Baw. Sees. L. at 226 (emphasis omitted)

w
 

‘s+ YOR PUBLICATION IN MESI’S HAWAL'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
regard to either the agency’s convenience or the nature or
location of the parties’ interaction strongly suggests that the
county rule is one of jurisdiction and not venue, Cf. id. at
276, 386 P.2d at 884 (“Considering the sweeping nature of [Act
194,] no policy other than protection of defendants from
harassment can be discerned. . . . {ilJhat is for the protection
of a defendant may be waived by him.”), followed by Alamida vs
Wilson, $3 Haw. 398, 400-01, 495 P.2d 585, S88 (1972).

IV. CONCLUSION

In Light of the foregoing analysis, we hold that =
plaintiff seeking “a judicial declaration as to the validity of
an agency rule,” pursuant to HRS § 91-7, must “reside[] or halve]
its principal place of business” in the county in which the
adjudicating circuit court sits; initiating an HRS § 91-7 action
in the wrong cireuit is a defect of jurisdiction mandating
dismissal. Accordingly, we vacate the first circuit court's
judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss HHIA's

declaratory action.

On the briefs: Gorm —

Frank Yop, drs, and
Arleen b. Joutson and :
Rafael G. Del castillo Lem Pheer
of Jouxson-Meyers & Del *
fastiiic, for the Gane
plaintiff-appellant Ceveces Co (are.
Rawail Hone infusion Associates
Staci 1. Teruya and Frances Boome Paes
E. i, Lum, Deputy Attorneys
General, for the defendant
appellee Nelson 8. Befitel,
Director of the Department
of Labor end Industrial
Relations, State of Hawas's
 

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAMAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER +1

 

Sidney J.¥. Wong and
Darlene ¥. F. Itomura, of
Wiong & Oshima, for the
defendants-appellees
Kuhio Motors, Inc.,
Adjusting Services of Hawaii, Inc.,
and Majestic Insurance Company

1“