Title: Beitel v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Beitel v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div1999 WY 162991 P.2d 1242Case Number: 99-88Decided: 12/07/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
IN 
THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF:

GARY L. BEITEL, Appellant 
(Employee/Petitioner),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING ex 
rel. WYOMING WORKERS' COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellee 
(Objector/Respondent).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court of Fremont County, The Honorable D. Terry Rogers, 
Judge.

F. Gaston Gosar 
of Nicholas Law Office, LLC, Riverton, Wyoming, representing 
Appellant.

Gay Woodhouse, 
Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Gerald W. Laska, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Bernard P. Haggerty, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General, representing Appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN & HILL, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Gary 
Beitel (the employee) applied for worker's compensation benefits, and the 
hearing examiner denied his claim. The employee petitioned the district court 
for a review of the hearing examiner's decision, and that court affirmed. The 
employee then perfected his appeal to the Wyoming Supreme 
Court.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]      The employee 
presents the following issues for our review:

1. Did the 
Hearing Examiner err when he found that Mr. Beitel was required to notify his 
employer and the Division about his back condition on the date of occurrence and 
not the day of diagnosis?

2. If the injury 
was apparent on the date of occurrence, did Mr. Beitel overcome the presumption 
of a late filing when his employer testified he knew of the injury and was not 
prejudiced by Mr. Beitel's filing for workers' compensation benefits after his 
doctor diagnosed a herniated disc?

3. Is the 
Division required to present evidence to support its claim of prejudice for a 
late filing after the Employee/Claimant demonstrates there are no facts to 
support prejudice?

FACTS

[¶4]      The employee was 
a heavy equipment operator for the Sweetwater County Road and Bridge Department 
in Rock Springs. He was attempting to change the steel blades on a motor grader 
on October 9, 1996, when he felt a pull in his back and pain in his right 
buttock. The employee told some of his co-employees that day about the incident, 
but he did not report the injury to his supervisor until October 17, 
1996.

[¶5]      In January and 
February of 1997, the employee received treatment from a chiropractor for pain 
in his right buttock and leg. His pain worsened, and he sought treatment from a 
medical doctor on March 14, 1997. Medical tests revealed that the employee had a 
herniated disc in his back, and he underwent surgery to repair the 
condition.

[¶6]      The employee 
filed his injury report with the Wyoming Workers' Safety & Compensation 
Division (the division) on March 18, 1997. The division denied the employee's 
claim for worker's compensation benefits on the ground that he did not file his 
injury report within the statutory time period. The employee objected to the 
division's determination, and the division referred the case to the Office of 
Administrative Hearings.

[¶7]      A hearing 
examiner held a contested case hearing and subsequently ruled that the 
employee's injury report was untimely and that he had not overcome the 
presumption that his claim should be denied. The employee petitioned the 
district court for a review of the hearing examiner's decision, and the district 
court affirmed. The employee appealed to this Court.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of 
Review

[¶8]      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
16-3-114(c) (LEXIS 1999) governs judicial review of administrative decisions. 
W.R.A.P. 12.09(a); Everheart v. S & L Industrial, 957 P.2d 847, 851 (Wyo. 
1998). We review an administrative agency's findings of fact by applying the 
substantial evidence standard. DeWall v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety 
and Compensation Division, 960 P.2d 502, 503 (Wyo. 1998). Substantial evidence 
is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the 
agency's conclusions. Id. In reviewing an agency's decision that a party did not 
meet his burden of proof, we determine whether the ruling was arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. 
Helm v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 982 P.2d 1236, 1240 (Wyo. 1999); Pederson v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Division, 939 P.2d 740, 742 (Wyo. 1997). We review an agency's 
conclusions of law de novo. US WEST Communications, Inc. v. Wyoming Public 
Service Commission, No. 98-82, slip op. at 2 (Wyo. Oct. 22, 
1999).

B. Timeliness of 
Injury Report

[¶9]      The employee 
contends that the hearing examiner erred when he found that the employee did not 
report his injury to the division within the statutory time period. Appellee 
State of Wyoming ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division (the state) 
argues that the hearing examiner correctly determined that the employee's injury 
report was not timely. We agree with the state.

[¶10]   An employee's claim for worker's 
compensation benefits is governed by the law that was in effect when the injury 
occurred. Clark v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation 
Division, 968 P.2d 436, 438 (Wyo. 1998). Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-502 (LEXIS 
1999) delineates the deadlines for reporting work-related injuries. The 
legislature amended § 27-14-502 in 1996, and the amendment became effective on 
January 1, 1997. The employee in this case was injured on October 9, 1996; 
therefore, the earlier version of § 27-14-502 applied to his claim. Nissen v. 
Cheyenne Frontier Days, Inc., 983 P.2d 722, 725 (Wyo. 1999); Clark, 968 P.2d  at 
438. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-502 (Michie 1991) (amended 1996) stated in 
pertinent part:

(a) As soon as 
is practical but not later than seventy-two (72) hours after the general nature 
of the injury became apparent, an injured employee shall report the occurrence 
and general nature of the accident to the employer and within ten (10) days 
after the injury became apparent, file the report in the office of the clerk of 
court of the county in which the accident occurred. . . .

. . . 
.

(c) Failure of 
the injured employee . . . to report the accident to the employer and to file 
the report with the clerk of court in accordance with subsection (a) of this 
section is a presumption that the claim shall be denied. The presumption may be 
rebutted if the employee establishes by clear and convincing evidence a lack of 
prejudice to the employer or division in investigating the accident and in 
monitoring medical treatment.

[¶11]   Under § 27-14-502(a), an employee's 
duty to report a work-related injury commences when the general nature of his 
injury becomes apparent. We have stated that an injury is apparent when the 
employee knows A>that he has suffered an injury which can result in, or is 
likely to cause, a compensable disability.'" Zielinske v. Johnson County School 
District No. 1, 959 P.2d 706, 709 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting Curnow v. State ex rel. 
Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 899 P.2d 875, 878 (Wyo. 1995)). The 
determination of when an injury became apparent is a question of fact. Id. We, 
therefore, defer to the hearing examiner's decision if it is supported by 
substantial evidence. DeWall, 960 P.2d  at 503.

[¶12]   The employee contends that the 
general nature of his injury did not become apparent until he was told that he 
had a herniated disc. In Zielinske, we held that the duty to report an injury 
commenced when the doctor determined that Zielinske had a work-related 
respiratory condition. 959 P.2d  at 710. In that case, there initially was some 
question about the cause of Zielinske's respiratory symptoms. Id. The employee 
in the case at bar, however, was not faced with a situation like the one 
presented in Zielinske. He was aware that he was injured while changing the 
grader blades, and he related that information to his doctors. 

[¶13]   The record in this case reveals 
that the employee felt a pull in his back and a pain in his buttocks on October 
9, 1996, when he was changing the grader blades. He discontinued changing the 
grader blades and sat down to rest. He subsequently told his co-workers about 
the incident. The employee continued to experience pain in his right buttock, 
and that prompted him to verbally report the incident to his supervisor on 
October 17, 1996. The employee took time off work because of pain associated 
with the October 9, 1996, incident. He testified at the contested case hearing 
that he began to experience pain in his leg in December 1996 and that he 
received chiropractic treatments in January and February of 1997 for his 
symptoms.

[¶14]   The hearing examiner determined 
that the injury most likely became apparent to the employee when the injury 
occurred on October 9, 1996. The hearing examiner stated that, in any event, the 
injury was definitely apparent to the employee when he sought treatment from a 
chiropractor. We conclude that substantial evidence supported the hearing 
examiner's findings, and we will not substitute our judgment for his. It is 
undisputed that the employee did not report the injury to the division within 
ten days after he visited the chiropractor. Consequently, the hearing examiner 
properly concluded that the employee did not report his injury to the division 
within the time period set out in § 27-14-502(a).

C. Prejudice to 
Employer and Division

[¶15]   Pursuant to § 27-14-502(c), a late 
filing of an injury report raises a presumption that the claim should be denied. 
The presumption may, however, be rebutted "if the employee establishes by clear 
and convincing evidence a lack of prejudice to the employer or division in 
investigating the accident and in monitoring medical treatment." Section 
27-14-502(c). The employee argues that he effectively rebutted the presumption 
that his claim should be denied. He maintains that, under the plain language of 
§ 27-14-502(c), he was required to present clear and convincing evidence of a 
lack of prejudice to either his employer or the division, but not to both, to 
overcome the presumption. He maintains that the term "or" should be read in the 
disjunctive sense and that, because the evidence showed that his employer was 
not prejudiced by the late filing, he was not required to show that the division 
was not prejudiced. The state argues that the hearing examiner's interpretation 
of the statute and his conclusion that the employee did not rebut the 
presumption were correct. We agree with the state.

[¶16]   In order to resolve this issue, we 
must interpret § 27-14-502(c). This Court interprets statutes by giving effect 
to the legislature's intent. Clark, 968 P.2d  at 438; State Department of Revenue 
and Taxation v. Pacificorp, 872 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Wyo. 1994). We begin by making 
an A>inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words 
employed according to their arrangement and connection.'" Parker Land and Cattle 
Company v. Wyoming Game and Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993) 
(quoting Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 133, 50 P. 819, 823 (1897)). We 
construe the statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and 
sentence, and we construe together all parts of the statute in pari materia. 
Pacificorp, 872 P.2d  at 1166; see also Parker Land and Cattle Company, 845 P.2d  
at 1042.

[¶17]   The employee correctly states that 
the term "or" is generally used in the disjunctive sense. Olsten Staffing 
Services, Inc. v. D.A. Stinger Services, Inc., 921 P.2d 596, 600 (Wyo. 1996). 
There are, however, instances where the term may be interpreted as a conjunction 
in order to harmonize the relevant statutory provisions. Id. We discussed the 
alternative uses of the term "or" in Olsten Staffing Services, 
Inc.:

"Webster defines 
>or' as a function word to indicate (1) an alternative between different or 
unlike things, states or actions; (2) choice between alternative things, states 
or courses. The word `or' is ordinarily used as a disjunctive generally 
corresponding to `either' as `either this or that.' Where two clauses or phrases 
are expressed in the disjunctive, they are coordinate and either is applicable 
to any situation to which its terms relate. Generally, use of the disjunctive 
indicates alternatives and requires separate treatment of those alternatives, 
hence a clause following a disjunction is considered inapplicable to the subject 
matter of the preceding clause. (Citations omitted.)"

[Voss v. Ralston 
(Adoption of Voss), 550 P.2d 481, 485 (Wyo. 1976).] We also have discussed using 
"or" as a conjunctive:

"The contention 
that the word `or' should be read as conjunctive rather than alternative in the 
context of this statute is contrary to the rule of statutory construction 
generally espoused by this court. The word `or' usually is used in a disjunctive 
sense and can be interchanged with the word `and' only when necessary to 
harmonize the provisions of a statute."

Amoco Production 
Co. v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Carbon County, 876 P.2d 989, 993 (Wyo. 
1994).

Id.

[¶18]   Pursuant to § 27-14-502(a), an 
injured employee is required to make a timely report of his injury to both his 
employer and the division. Clark, 968 P.2d  at 438. We remarked in Clark that it 
is important that both the employer and the division receive a timely injury 
report so that each party has an opportunity to investigate the accident and 
monitor the employee's medical treatment. Id. The fact that the employer and the 
division are entitled to separate reports strongly implies that, in a case where 
both the division and the employer have elected to participate in the contested 
case, the injured employee should be required to show that neither the employer 
nor the division was prejudiced by the late reports.

[¶19]   The district judge properly 
harmonized subsections (a) and (c) of § 27-14-502 in his order affirming the 
hearing examiner's decision:

The provisions 
for Workers' Compensation contested cases contemplate that three parties may be 
involved in a contested case: (1) the injured worker, (2) the employer, and (3) 
the division. See W.S. §27-14-602. If those three parties were involved in a 
contested case, as they were here, it would make no sense for the worker to meet 
his burden of showing a lack of prejudice for late filing under W.S. § 
27-14-502(c) with respect to only one of the adverse parties. That situation 
would allow a worker to succeed in his late-filed claim for benefits by showing 
a lack of prejudice with respect to one party to the dispute when the other 
party was prejudiced by the late filing. This result would defeat the purpose of 
W.S. § 27-14-502, preventing the receipt of benefits by a worker who prejudiced 
his employer or the division in investigating the injury by delaying in his 
notice of injury.

To harmonize the 
statutory scheme pursuant to Amoco [Production Company, 876 P.2d  at 993], the 
"or" in W.S. § 27-14-502(c) must be read in the disjunctive when only one party 
disputes a worker's claim for benefits. In that situation whichever party is 
disputing the worker's claim for benefits, either the division or the employer, 
must be shown by the worker [not] to have been prejudiced by the worker's late 
notice of injury. Conversely, if both the division and the employer are 
disputing a worker's claim, W.S. §27-14-502(c) must be read in the conjunctive. 
In that situation, the worker must show that neither the employer nor the 
division [was] prejudiced by the worker's late notice of 
injury.

We agree with 
the district court's interpretation of the statute and conclude that the hearing 
examiner properly determined that the employee was required to show that neither 
his employer nor the division was prejudiced by the late injury 
report.

[¶20]   The employee also argues that, 
after he demonstrated that there were no facts to support a finding of 
prejudice, the division was required to present evidence showing that it was 
prejudiced by the late filing. "Initially, we note that neither the employer nor 
the Division [was] required to show prejudice. The legislature squarely placed 
the burden on the claimant to show by clear and convincing evidence that no 
prejudice occurred." Zielinske, 959 P.2d  at 710. Contrary to the employee's 
assertion, evidence was presented to support a finding that the division was 
prejudiced by his late filing. The employee was treated by a chiropractor before 
he filed his injury report. The division did not receive information from the 
chiropractor about the employee's injury and medical treatment until several 
months after the employee was treated, and the information received from the 
chiropractor was, arguably, incomplete. The employee also indicated that he 
possibly reinjured his back or exacerbated the October 9, 1996, injury while he 
was changing the tires on his grader in December 1996. This evidence 
demonstrates that the division's ability to investigate the accident and monitor 
the employee's medical treatment was hampered by the late filing of the injury 
report. We conclude, therefore, that the hearing examiner's determination that 
the employee did not present clear and convincing evidence to demonstrate that 
the division was not prejudiced by his late injury report was correct. The 
hearing examiner's ruling that the employee did not meet his burden of proof was 
not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion and was otherwise in 
accordance with the law.

[¶21]   Affirmed.