Title: Jose DeJesus Fuentes v. Wisconsin Court of Appeals, District IV

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-1534-W 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Jose DeJesus Fuentes,  
 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Wisconsin Court of Appeals, District IV,  
 
Respondent.  
 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
May 14, 1999  
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
February 12, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Columbia 
 
JUDGE: 
Lewis W. Charles 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the petitioner there were briefs by Robert T. 
Ruth and Ruth Law Office, Madison and oral argument by Robert T. 
Ruth. 
 
 
For the respondent the cause was argued by Monica 
A. Burkert-Brist, assistant attorney general with whom on the 
brief was James H. McDermott, assistant attorney general, and 
James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
No. 
98-1534-W 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-1534-W 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Jose DeJesus  
Fuentes,  
 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Court of Appeals, District IV,  
 
          Respondent.  
FILED 
 
MAY 14, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
PETITION for writ of habeas corpus.  Writ granted; rights 
declared. 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   Jose DeJesus Fuentes petitions 
this court for a writ of habeas corpus following the court of 
appeals’ conclusion that it was powerless to afford Fuentes 
relief from the effects of its clerical error.  Fuentes contends 
that the court of appeals’ clerical error violated his statutory 
right to petition this court for review of his conviction, 
depriving him of the effective assistance of counsel.  Because 
Fuentes has demonstrated that his liberty is restrained, that he 
has a legally cognizable right violated by the court of appeals’ 
error, and that no remedy is available to him other than habeas 
corpus, we grant his petition for a writ of habeas corpus and 
allow him to seek review of his conviction. 
¶2 
The unfortunate facts of this case fortunately occur 
infrequently.  Fuentes was tried and convicted of first degree 
No. 
98-1534-W 
 
2 
reckless homicide and sentenced to 40 years in prison.  He filed 
notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief and the State 
Public Defender appointed Attorney Teresa M. Elguezabal as his 
appellate counsel.  Elguezabal filed an appeal on behalf of 
Fuentes in the court of appeals.  After she filed the briefs but 
before any decision was rendered, Elguezabal left private 
practice and withdrew as Fuentes' counsel.  Shortly thereafter, 
the State Public Defender appointed Attorney Robert T. Ruth as 
Fuentes' counsel. 
¶3 
Two months later, on March 12, 1998, the court of 
appeals affirmed Fuentes' conviction.  In the course of 
notifying the parties of the decision, the clerk of the court of 
appeals inadvertently mailed the decision to Elguezabal's former 
firm rather than to Ruth's firm.  The errant mailing was never 
forwarded to Ruth and he did not have any other notice that the 
court of appeals had affirmed Fuentes' conviction.  On April 16, 
1998, the clerk of the court of appeals remitted the record to 
the circuit court clerk.  Although he did not receive the 
court’s written decision, Ruth received the notification that 
remittitur had occurred.  Wis. Stat. § 809.26(1) (1997-98).1  
However, by the time Ruth received such notification, the 30-day 
period to petition this court for review had expired and 
remittitur had occurred.  Wis. Stat. § 809.62.   
                     
1 All references are to the 1997-98 version of the statutes 
unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
98-1534-W 
 
3 
¶4 
Ruth moved the court of appeals for an order vacating 
and reissuing its decision, an act that would have in effect 
provided Fuentes with another 30-day period in which to file a 
petition for review in this court.  In an unpublished order, the 
court of appeals denied his motion.  It expressed regret and 
noted that the court of appeals was entirely at fault for the 
error of mailing the decision to the incorrect attorney.  
However, the court concluded that under the rules of appellate 
procedure, it was without power to vacate and reissue a decision 
after remittitur had occurred.  Fuentes then petitioned this 
court for a writ of habeas corpus and seeks relief that would 
allow him to petition this court for review of the court of 
appeals’ decision on the merits of his conviction. 
¶5 
The parties are in agreement, and this court concurs, 
that Ruth's actions or inactions are not the root of Fuentes' 
appellate misfortune.  That responsibility, however inadvertent, 
lies solely at the feet of the court of appeals.  As a result, 
by the time of oral argument, any disagreement between the court 
of appeals and Fuentes centered on the appropriate nature of the 
remedy rather than on the necessity for a remedy.   
No. 
98-1534-W 
 
4 
¶6 
The availability of habeas corpus relief arises out of 
the common law and is guaranteed by both the state2 and federal3 
constitutions as well as by statute.4  Although a habeas corpus 
petition normally arises out of criminal proceedings, it is a 
separate civil action founded upon principles of equity.  State 
ex rel. Korne v. Wolke, 79 Wis. 2d 22, 26, 255 N.W.2d 446 
(1977); State ex rel. Durner v. Huegin, 110 Wis. 189, 220, 85 
N.W. 1046 (1901).  This foundation empowers a court of equity to 
tailor a fair and just remedy to the given factual circumstances 
provided 
that 
the 
remedy 
does 
not 
itself 
violate 
the 
constitution.  State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 520-21, 484 
N.W.2d 540 (1992); State ex rel. Memmel v. Mundy, 75 Wis. 2d 
276, 288, 249 N.W.2d 573 (1977).   
¶7 
Habeas corpus provides extraordinary relief and is 
available only where specific factual circumstances are present. 
 First, 
the 
party 
seeking 
habeas 
corpus 
relief 
must 
be 
restrained of his or her liberty.  See State ex rel. Hake v. 
Burke, 21 Wis. 2d 405, 124 N.W.2d 457 (1963); State ex rel. 
Wohlfahrt v. Bodette, 95 Wis. 2d 130, 132-33, 289 N.W.2d 366 
(Ct. App. 1980).  Second, the person's restraint must have been 
imposed by a tribunal without jurisdictional power over the 
person or subject matter, or the restraint must have occurred 
contrary to constitutional protections.  State ex rel. Warrender 
                     
2 Wis. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
3 U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9, cl. 2.  
4 Wis. Stat. § 782.03.  
No. 
98-1534-W 
 
5 
v. Kenosha County Court, 67 Wis. 2d 333, 339, 231 N.W.2d 193 
(1975); Wolke v. Fleming, 24 Wis. 2d 606, 613-14, 129 N.W.2d 841 
(1964); Edwin E. Bryant, 9 Wisconsin Pleading and Practice 
§ 84.03, p. 223-24 (3d ed. 1998).  Third, the person improperly 
restrained must have no other adequate remedy available in the 
law.  State ex rel. Dowe v. Waukesha County Circuit Court, 184 
Wis. 2d 724, 729, 516 N.W.2d 714 (1994) (collecting cases).  
¶8 
In the present petition, there is no doubt that 
Fuentes satisfies the first requirement.  He is restrained of 
his liberty as he is currently confined in a correctional 
facility serving the term of his sentence.  Similarly there is 
little doubt that Fuentes has satisfied the second requirement 
as well.  Fuentes has been deprived of a cognizable right with 
constitutional dimensionsthe right to effective assistance of 
counsel in the preparation of a petition for review when 
appellate counsel is statutorily required.  State ex rel. 
Schmelzer v. Murphy, 201 Wis. 2d 246, 253, 548 N.W.2d 45 (1996); 
State v. Mosley, 102 Wis. 2d 636, 668, 307 N.W.2d 200 (1981).  
It is the third requirement, the unavailability of other 
remedies, that is primarily at issue in this petition. 
¶9 
Fuentes has argued that one possible avenue of relief 
is through the court of appeals’ ability to vacate and reissue 
its decisions in limited circumstances.  He posits that the 
court of appeals inherently has, or at the very least should be 
expressly given, the authority to correct its own clerical 
errors by vacating and reissuing its decisions.   
No. 
98-1534-W 
 
6 
¶10 In Edland v. Wisconsin Physicians Service Ins. Corp, 
210 Wis. 2d 638, 644-45, 563 N.W.2d 519 (1997), this court faced 
a situation strikingly similar to this case with one important 
variation:  the circuit court rather than the court of appeals 
committed the clerical error.  As the court of appeals 
recognized 
in 
denying 
Fuentes' 
order, 
this 
seemingly 
insignificant 
distinction 
carries 
with 
it 
a 
substantial 
difference.  Under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(a), a circuit court is 
authorized to "relieve a party . . . from a judgment" because of 
mistake or inadvertence.  Thus this court concluded that the 
circuit court's clerical failure to send either party a copy of 
a decision was a "mistake" covered by § 806.07(1)(a).  Edland, 
210 Wis. 2d at 648. 
¶11 There is no equivalent to Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(a) in 
the rules of appellate procedure for either the court of appeals 
or this court.  We agree with the court of appeals that as the 
rules of appellate procedure are currently constituted, an 
appellate 
court's 
jurisdiction 
over 
a 
cause 
ceases 
upon 
remittitur in the absence of inadvertence, fraud, or a void 
judgment.  Wis. Stat. § 809.26; State v. American TV and 
Appliance of Madison, Inc., 151 Wis. 2d 175, 178-80, 443 N.W.2d 
662 (1989).   
¶12 While Fuentes argues that "inadvertence" did occur in 
this case, namely the inadvertent mailing of the decision to the 
incorrect attorney, we decline his invitation to expand that 
exception to encompass general acts of inadvertence.  Rather, 
the language and context of this exception indicate that it is 
No. 
98-1534-W 
 
7 
the 
act 
of 
remitting 
the 
record 
itself 
which 
must 
be 
inadvertently done to fall within this exception.  Ott v. 
Boring, 131 Wis. 472, 487, 110 N.W. 824 (1907) ("[T]he 
jurisdiction 
of 
the 
appellate 
court 
over 
a 
given 
cause 
terminates whenever regularly, without inadvertence or fraud, it 
returns the record to the court of general jurisdiction."). 
¶13 We therefore conclude that since remittitur occurred 
in this case, the court of appeals correctly determined that it 
retained no jurisdiction over Fuentes' appeal.  Accordingly, we 
also conclude that Fuentes could be afforded no other remedy 
aside from the commencement of a petition for habeas corpus.   
¶14 Additionally, we observe that under the rule of State 
ex rel. Schmelzer v. Murphy, 195 Wis. 2d 1, 9-10, 535 N.W.2d 459 
(Ct. App. 1995) (Schmelzer I), Fuentes correctly filed his 
petition for habeas corpus in this court.  The Schmelzer I court 
accurately determined that the court of appeals is not in the 
constitutional position to grant habeas corpus relief when that 
relief has the effect of compelling this court to undertake some 
act.  Id.   
¶15 Finally, we note that our decision today comports with 
State ex rel. Schmelzer v. Murphy, 201 Wis. 2d 246, 255-56, 548 
N.W.2d 45 (1996) (Schmelzer II).  In that case, the defendant's 
attorney incorrectly calculated the 30-day period in which to 
file a petition for review and missed that date by three days.  
Id. at 250.  As in the present case, remittitur had already 
occurred, 
depriving 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
of 
appellate 
jurisdiction.  We concluded that in such cases where a defendant 
No. 
98-1534-W 
 
8 
is deprived of the effective assistance of counsel, this court 
was constitutionally empowered to fashion an appropriate remedy 
by way of its habeas corpus authority.  Id. at 255-56.  We today 
merely reassert the Schmelzer II rationale that a defendant's 
prejudicial deprivation of appellate counsel, be it the fault of 
the attorney or of the appellate court, is properly remedied by 
filing a petition for habeas corpus in this court. 
¶16 In sum, we conclude that Fuentes is entitled to habeas 
corpus relief from the court of appeals’ clerical error.  
Fuentes has demonstrated that his liberty is restrained, that he 
has a legally cognizable right that was violated, and that no 
other remedy is available to him.  Accordingly, we grant the 
writ for habeas corpus and afford Fuentes 30 days from the date 
of this opinion in which to file a petition for review in this 
court.5   
By the Court.—The petition for habeas corpus is granted; 
rights declared. 
                     
5 In its brief to this court, the court of appeals contends 
that Fuentes' petition for habeas corpus was not properly filed 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 782.04 because it was not verified at 
the time it was filed.  However, nineteen days after filing the 
petition and a month before this court accepted his petition for 
briefing and argument, Fuentes did file a separate verification. 
  
While we consider it much better practice to have a 
petition verified at the time that it is filed, we see no point 
in belaboring this issue.  As the court of appeals admitted at 
oral argument, even if we were to dismiss the petition on this 
procedural basis, Fuentes could immediately re-file the petition 
and we would again be faced with the larger and more substantive 
issues that have been addressed above.  
No. 
98-1534-W 
 
9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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