Title: Commonwealth v. Vallejo

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12399 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MARIEZEL VALLEJO. 
 
 
July 29, 2018. 
 
 
Restitution.  Practice, Criminal, Restitution, Probation, 
Findings by judge. 
 
 
 
 
The defendant, Mariezel Vallejo, admitted to facts 
sufficient for a finding of guilty of operating a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, in violation 
of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1).  Her operator's license was 
suspended, and she received a continuance without a finding for 
one year, with probationary conditions including payment of $140 
in restitution.  The defendant appealed, claiming (in part) that 
the judge erred in finding that she had an ability to pay 
restitution.  We allowed the defendant's application for direct 
appellate review.  Because we conclude that the judge failed to 
make adequate findings to support an order of restitution, we 
vacate so much of the order as required payment of restitution, 
and remand for further proceedings.1 
                                                          
 
 
1 The defendant additionally argues that the restitution 
order exceeded its permissible scope, because the restitution 
amount consisted of the wages the judge determined the victim 
had lost due to her appearance at the restitution hearing.  
Concluding, as we do, that the judge's findings were inadequate 
to support any order of restitution, we do not address that 
additional argument.  Nor do we attempt here to define the "full 
contours of restitution, or the differences between restitution 
and the damages that are compensable in a civil action."  
Commonwealth v. Casanova, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 750, 754 n.7 (2006).  
See Commonwealth v. Denehy, 466 Mass. 723, 739 (2014) (to be 
compensable for purposes of restitution, economic losses must be 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
A judge may order a defendant to pay restitution to a 
victim as a condition of his or her probation.  See Commonwealth 
v. McIntyre, 436 Mass. 829, 833-834 (2002).  Such an order has a 
dual purpose:  it serves not only "to compensate the victim for 
his or her economic loss tied to the defendant's conduct, but 
also to make the defendant pay for the damage [that] he or she 
caused as a punitive and rehabilitative sanction."  Commonwealth 
v. Williams, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 917, 918 (2003).  Before any such 
order may be entered, however,   
  
"the judge must determine the amount the defendant is able 
to pay.  See [Commonwealth v. Nawn, 394 Mass. 1, 8-9 
(1985)].  Where a defendant claims that he or she is unable 
to pay the full amount of the victim's economic loss, the 
defendant bears the burden of proving an inability to pay.  
See Commonwealth v. Porter, 462 Mass. 724, 732-733 (2012) 
(defendant bears burden of persuasion regarding indigency, 
in part because '[a] criminal defendant is the party in 
possession of all material facts regarding her own wealth 
and is asserting a negative').  Cf. United States 
v. Fuentes, 107 F.3d 1515, 1532 (11th Cir. 1997) (regarding 
restitution, 'the defendant must establish her financial 
resources and needs by a preponderance of the evidence')." 
 
Commonwealth v. Henry, 475 Mass. 117, 121, 122 (2016) ("imposing 
restitution that the defendant will be unable to pay violates 
the fundamental principle that a criminal defendant should not 
face additional punishment solely because of his or her 
poverty").  See Commonwealth v. Gomes, 407 Mass. 206, 212 
(1990), quoting Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398 (1971) 
("Generally, 'the Constitution prohibits the State from imposing 
a fine as a sentence and then automatically converting it into a 
jail term solely because the defendant is indigent and cannot 
forthwith pay the fine in full").   
 
 
In this case, the defendant testified that she lived in low 
income housing, that she was not currently working because of a 
back injury, and that she had no income.  Although the judge's 
findings referenced the back injury, they do not indicate that 
the judge sufficiently considered, as required, the matter of 
"the financial resources of the defendant, including income and 
net assets, and the defendant's financial obligations, including 
the amount necessary to meet minimum basic human needs such as 
                                                          
 
directly tied to facts surrounding crime and causally related to 
them).   
3 
 
 
 
food, shelter, and clothing for the defendant and . . . her 
dependents."  Henry, 475 Mass. at 126.  To be sure, the 
defendant bore the burden of persuasion, but the judge's 
findings were inadequate to support the conclusion that the 
defendant had an ability to pay restitution.   
 
 
We therefore vacate the order for restitution and remand 
the case to the trial court for reconsideration of the question 
of restitution consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
Rebecca Kiley, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
the defendant. 
 
John P. Zanini, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Oren Nimni, Jason D. Frank, A. Lauren Carpenter, & Michelle 
Andrighetto, for Committee for Civil Rights and Economic Justice 
& others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.