Title: Evans v. Cote

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Evans v. Cote (2013-077)
 
2014 VT 104
 
[Filed 29-Aug-2014]
 
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject
to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before
publication in the Vermont Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the
Reporter of Decisions by email at: JUD.Reporter@state.vt.us or by mail at: Vermont
Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801, of any errors
in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.
 
 
2014 VT 104
 
No. 2013-077
 
Trevor Evans
Supreme Court
 
 
 
On Appeal from
     v.
Superior Court, Orleans Unit,
 
Civil Division
 
 
Gerard Cote
December Term, 2013
 
 
 
 
Robert
  P. Gerety, Jr., J.
 
Joslyn L. Wilschek of Primmer Piper Eggleston & Cramer
PC, Montpelier, for 
  Plaintiff-Appellee.
 
William L. Durrell and Nathan D. Rectanus of Bookchin &
Durrell, P.C., Montpelier, for
  Defendant-Appellant.
 
 
PRESENT:   Dooley, Skoglund, Robinson and Crawford, JJ.,[1]
and Zimmerman, Supr. J. (Ret.), 
                     Specially Assigned
 
 
¶ 1.            
DOOLEY, J.   Defendant appeals the superior court's order concluding
that defendant violated 13 V.S.A. § 3701(c) by intentionally knocking down
a tree belonging to plaintiff and trespassing on plaintiff's land, and granting
plaintiff $1 in damages plus attorney's fees and costs.  On appeal, defendant
argues that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that defendant violated the
statute, that nominal damages do not support an award of attorney's fees, and
that the court abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees of $22,406
based on $1 of actual damages.  We affirm.
¶ 2.            
The record reveals the following.  The parties have been neighbors since
1980.  They became embroiled in what was described by the trial court as a
"feud" based on a disagreement about the location of the boundary line dividing
their properties.  The deed defendant received from his predecessor in title
described the boundary as being located at the center of a discontinued town highway,
while plaintiff believed that the entire discontinued road was on his side of
the boundary line.  In response to disturbances plaintiff observed in the
disputed area, he began sending letters to defendant asserting that defendant
was trespassing on his property.  The matter remained unresolved, and in 1990
plaintiff had a survey prepared that showed the boundary line located where
plaintiff believed it should be.  Defendant did not agree with the location of
the boundary, and in December 2006, plaintiff filed a suit, seeking a
declaratory judgment that the land belonged to him.  A default judgment was
entered against defendant, and in March 2007 the court issued a declaratory judgment
establishing the boundary between the properties as set forth in plaintiff's
survey.  In December 2008, defendant moved to vacate the default judgment, and
the court denied the motion.  This Court affirmed on appeal.  See Evans v.
Cote, No. 2009-326, 2010 WL 712475 (Vt. Feb. 25, 2010) (unpub. mem.).
¶ 3.            
Meanwhile, plaintiff commenced a separate action in August 2008,
alleging that between 1984 and 2008 defendant had trespassed on plaintiff's
land, and damaged plaintiff's property by removing trees, topsoil, and a barbed
wire fence.  Plaintiff sought damages under various statutes, including treble damages
for trespass and conversion of trees, 13 V.S.A. § 3606, attorney's fees, id.
§ 3701, and a penalty and costs for removal of survey monuments, id.
§ 3834.  Plaintiff also sought an injunction precluding defendant from
entering plaintiff's land.  In response, defendant moved to dismiss, asserting
that the prior default judgment was ineffective.  The court denied the motion. 

¶ 4.            
The court held a bench trial in December 2011.  Following trial, the court
found that defendant had removed topsoil and portions of a wire fence, and
"cut, destroyed or otherwise removed significant numbers of trees located near
the boundary between the two parcels."  Based on its findings that defendant
had trespassed on plaintiff's property and that there was a substantial
probability that he would continue to do so, the court granted plaintiff's request
for a permanent injunction.  As to damages, the court concluded that the
statute of limitations barred any recovery for actions taken prior to August
2002, which was six years before the case was filed.[2] 
The court found that the sole damage occurring after August 2002 that was
supported by the evidence was that in 2008 defendant had "knocked down one dead
but standing softwood tree" on plaintiff's side of the boundary line.  The
court awarded damages of $1 for the felled tree, explaining that it could not
determine the replacement value of a single tree from the evidence presented.[3]
 
¶ 5.            
In addition, the court awarded plaintiff attorney's fees and costs under
the unlawful mischief statute.  13 V.S.A. § 3701(f).  The court found that
the fees requested by plaintiff were reasonable, but that a downward departure
was warranted because plaintiff had obtained a poor outcome in comparison to
what was sought.  Thus, the court made a 75% reduction in the requested amount,
and awarded $22,406 in attorney's fees and costs.  Defendant moved to
reconsider, arguing that a nominal damage recovery of $1 did not support an
award of attorney's fees under the statute.  The court rejected defendant's
argument, concluding that recovery of attorney's fees is not dependent on
obtaining a certain monetary amount of damages.  
¶ 6.            
On appeal, defendant raises one main issue, that the court abused its
discretion in the attorney's fee award, but argues four rationales for his
position: (1) the court abused its discretion in awarding a permanent
injunction; (2) plaintiff failed to prove that defendant violated 13 V.S.A.
§ 3701(c); (3) the nominal damage award was not sufficient to support an
award of attorney's fees; and (4) the amount of attorney's fees awarded is out
of proportion to the damages received.  We address the first two of these
issues together because a deficiency in defendant's appeal answers both
arguments. 
¶ 7.            
Defendant has not ordered a transcript of the trial on the merits, and
therefore has waived any challenge to sufficiency of the court's findings. 
V.R.A.P. 10(b)(1) (explaining that it is appellant's responsibility to order
transcript and appellant "waives the right to raise any issue for which a
transcript is necessary for informed appellate review").  Without the
transcript, this Court assumes that the trial court's findings are supported by
the evidence.  In re S.B.L., 150 Vt. 294, 307, 553 A.2d 1078, 1087
(1988); see Hoiska v. Town of E. Montpelier, 2014 VT 80, ¶ 9 n.*,
___ Vt. ___, ___ A.3d ___ (explaining that without transcript this Court could
not review appellant's argument that findings were unsupported by evidence).  
¶ 8.            
Both of the first two issues involve whether the court's findings and
conclusions are supported by the evidence.  For the first, defendant argues
that the court abused its discretion in issuing a permanent injunction barring
defendant from entering the real property that was the subject of the prior declaratory
judgment action.  A permanent injunction may be awarded in response to a
continuing trespass because damages are inadequate to address the wrong.  Begin
v. Barone, 124 Vt. 421, 422, 207 A.2d 252, 254 (1965).  "Vermont law is
clear that even the threat of continuous trespass entitles a party to
injunctive relief."  State v. Presault, 163 Vt. 38, 43, 652 A.2d 1001, 1004 (1994).  We review the trial court's grant of an injunction under an
abuse-of-discretion standard, and will not reverse unless the findings are not
supported by the evidence and the court's decision lacks any legal grounds to
justify the result.  Alberino v. Balch, 2008 VT 130, ¶ 7, 185 Vt.
589, 969 A.2d 61 (mem.).
¶ 9.            
Here, the court found that defendant had trespassed on the disputed
property after August 19, 2002 "by making use of the disputed road from time to
time."  The court further found that there was a substantial probability that
defendant would continue to trespass on the property in the future.  
¶ 10.        
On appeal, defendant argues that the court abused its discretion because
there was no evidence to demonstrate that defendant has threatened to trespass
after the 2008 incident involving defendant's removal of the tree.  Given the
court's findings regarding defendant's past trespass and the threat of future
trespass, there was no abuse of discretion in granting a permanent injunction. 
In the absence of a transcript, we cannot go behind the findings and determine
what evidence supported them.
¶ 11.        
Our analysis of the second issue is similar.  The relevant statutory
section provides:
  A person who,
having no right to do so or any reasonable ground to believe that he or she has
such right, intentionally does any damage to property of any value not
exceeding $250.00 shall be imprisoned for not more than six months or fined not
more than $500.00 or both.
 
13 V.S.A. § 3701(c).  The
statute creates a civil remedy for violations: "A person who suffers damages as
a result of a violation of this section may recover those damages together with
reasonable attorney's fees in a civil action under this section."  Id. §
3701(f).  The court concluded after making the needed findings that "Defendant
did violate 13 V.S.A. § 3701(c) by intentionally pushing a dead tree to the
ground when he had no right to do so and when he had no reasonable ground to
believe he had such a right and that the damage resulting did not exceed
$250."  
¶ 12.        
Defendant argues that there was no evidence to show that he
"intentionally" damaged property, claiming instead that he actually intended to
improve the real property.  As with the first issue, however, the court's
findings are adequate to show that all elements of the statute were satisfied,
including the intent element.  Without a transcript we cannot evaluate whether
there was sufficient evidence to support the court's findings, and we must
assume the findings were supported.
¶ 13.        
This brings us to the central issues, whether the statute allows the
award of any attorney's fees where the amount of damages is only nominal and,
if so, whether the fee amount is reasonable in light of the compensatory
damages award.  Plaintiff's entitlement to fees under the statute is a question
of law that we review de novo.  State v. Therrien, 2011 VT 120, ¶ 9,
191 Vt. 24, 38 A.3d 1129.  To ascertain the meaning of the statute, we look to
the plain language used as the primary indication of the Legislature's intent. 
Id.  "If the plain language is clear and unambiguous, we enforce the
statute according to its terms."  Id. (quotation omitted).
¶ 14.        
Here, the plain language indicates that attorney's fees may be awarded
even where actual damages are minimal.  The statute prohibits causing "any
damage to property of any value," 13 V.S.A. § 3701(c) (emphasis
added), and allows recovery of attorney's fees for a "person who suffers
damages as a result of a violation."  Id. § 3701(f).  The statute
contains no requirement that the actual damages reach a threshold minimum to trigger
the award of attorney's fees.  As long as there is credible evidence that
defendant's actions caused some damage, it is not necessary to demonstrate an
exact value of the damage done.  Id.  Our past cases construing use of
the word "any" have concluded that it indicates an intent not to include a
restriction.  See State v. Squiers, 2006 VT 26, ¶ 9, 179 Vt. 388,
896 A.2d 80 (concluding that words "any part or member thereof" indicated that
Legislature did not intend to limit to particular body parts); In re Verizon
New England Inc., 173 Vt. 327, 334, 795 A.2d 1196, 1202 (2002) (explaining
that general grant of authority to board for "operating and conducting any
business" contained no restriction on scope of board's authority over utility);
Nichols v. Agency of Envtl. Conservation, 160 Vt. 620, 621, 627 A.2d 858, 858-59 (1993) (mem.) (concluding that rule allowing court to appoint master to
convey land or "perform any other specific act" did not limit use to
conveyances of land).  If the Legislature had intended to limit recovery of
fees for violations to cases where a minimal amount of damage was caused, it
could have stated so specifically.  No such limitation is included.
¶ 15.        
Further, that attorney's fees may be awarded based on even a small
amount of damages is reinforced by the entire statutory scheme.  The statutory
violations and resulting criminal punishments are broken down according to the amount
of damage caused.[4] 
See 13 V.S.A. § 3701(a)-(c) (listing three types of unlawful mischief
violations depending on amount of damage caused, including damage exceeding
$1000, exceeding $250, and under $250).  The availability of the civil remedy,
including collection of attorney's fees under § 3701(f), does not, however,
depend on the amount of damage inflicted.  It is available where a person
"suffers damages."  This indicates that the Legislature intended to make
attorney's fees available even when the amount of actual damages was minimal.  
¶ 16.        
This conclusion is particularly apparent from the third categoryclaims
for damages under $250.  This category can exist only where there is cost
shifting.  For example, the superior court filing fee, at $250, is equal to or
greater than the most that can be claimed in this category.  See 32 V.S.A. § 1431(b)(1). 
Virtually any recovery in this category is nominal in relation to litigation
costs.
¶ 17.        
Finally, we note the purpose of nominal damages in this and similar
cases.  We defined that purpose in Clark v. Aqua Terra Corp., 133 Vt.
54, 58, 329 A.2d 666, 668 (1974):
 
Particularly in matters involving rights relating to real property, invasion of
those rights, when established, requires some recognition, even if only by way
of nominal damages. . . . [S]uits involving such rights
cannot fail as de minimus, since the invasion of those rights, if
repeated, may operate in derogation of them.  
 
Clark based this holding on
the explanation of the need for nominal damages in Bragg v. Larraway, 65
Vt. 673, 27 A. 492 (1893), which noted the application of the "maxim that there
is no wrong without a remedy, under which, when it is material to the
establishment or the preservation of the right itself that its invasion should
not pass with impunity."  Id. at 683, 27 A.  at 495. Thus, an action for
trespass "is maintainable for an entry upon the land of another, although there
is no real damage, because repeated acts of the kind might be used as evidence
of title, and thereby the right of the plaintiff might be injured."  Id.;
see John Larkin, Inc. v. Marceau, 2008 VT 61, ¶ 9, 184 Vt. 207, 959 A.2d 551 ("Plaintiffs showing a direct and tangible invasion of their property
may obtain injunctive relief and at least nominal damages without proof of any
other injury.").  In this context, it is not surprising that the Legislature
would shift the burden of attorney's fees from the recovering plaintiff to the
losing defendant, irrespective of the amount the plaintiff recovers.
¶ 18.        
The trial court found in this case that "Defendant's conduct did clearly
cause damage to Plaintiff in some amount."  It held that even though plaintiff
did not establish the amount of the damage, he should recover some amount and
awarded nominal damages.  We would undermine the Legislature's purpose in
establishing civil liability for damage to property from unlawful mischief, even
where the damage is small, if we did not authorize fee shifting in all unlawful
mischief cases.
¶ 19.        
Avoiding the unique nature and drafting of the statute, defendant
analogizes this to other attorney's fees statutes and claims that decisions
under those statutes support his position.  According to defendant, where a
plaintiff obtains a nominal damage award, attorney's fees may be awarded under
a fee-shifting statute only if the plaintiff has also accomplished some larger
public purpose or prevailed on a significant legal issue.  In support,
defendant cites Anderson v. Johnson, 2011 VT 17, 189 Vt. 603, 19 A.3d 86
(mem.), a case involving an award of attorney's fees under the Consumer Fraud
Act (CFA).  The CFA allows a consumer who "sustains damages or injury as a
result of any false or fraudulent representations or practices" to sue for,
among other things, damages and attorney's fees.  9 V.S.A. § 2461(b).  In Anderson,
the jury found that the defendant had violated the CFA, but that the plaintiffs
had suffered no damages.  Nonetheless, the trial court awarded attorney's
fees.  On appeal, this Court explained that the purpose of the CFA was to
encourage prosecution of consumer fraud and thus the award of attorney's fees
did not need to be proportionate to the actual damages.  2011 VT 17, ¶ 7. 
Further, we explained: 
[E]ven where no
damages or other relief is awarded, or merely nominal damages are awarded, the
purpose of a statutory fee-shifting provision may be served where the plaintiff
has prevailed on a significant legal issue or accomplished some broader "public
purpose" underlying the legislation by exposing, for example, "lawless conduct"
or deterring future misconduct.
 
Id. ¶ 11.  We held,
however, that because the plaintiffs' suit had "vindicated no significant legal
rights, and advanced no broader public goals," the plaintiffs were not entitled
to attorney's fees.  Id. ¶ 12.
¶ 20.        
According to defendant, plaintiff's success in this case did not
vindicate any significant legal right or accomplish a larger public goal, and
therefore there was no basis to award attorney's fees.  Defendant's argument is
not supported by Anderson or the language of the statute.  Anderson
is distinguishable on the facts because in that case, although the jury found
that the defendant had violated the CFA, it found no damage resulted.  The
resulting discussion about requiring some showing that the plaintiff had
vindicated a larger public goal is based on a situation where there are no
damages.
¶ 21.        
Here, the court found that damage resulted from defendant's conduct. 
While the trial court was unable to determine an exact amount of that damage
and thus awarded only $1, the court was clear that defendant's actions caused
plaintiff damage.    
¶ 22.        
Defendant's fourth claim is that, even if an award of fees is
permissible under the statute, the court abused its discretion in awarding
plaintiff attorney's fees of $22,406 where the actual damages were only $1. 
According to defendant, this amounts to a windfall for plaintiff.  
¶ 23.        
When attorney's fees are awarded pursuant to a statute, the amount of
the fee award, which depends on the facts of the case, is within the court's
discretion.  Kwon v. Eaton, 2010 VT 73, ¶ 13, 188 Vt. 623, 8 A.3d 1043
(mem.).  To determine the reasonableness of a fee award, a court must begin
with the "lodestar figure" and then adjust the amount "depending on the
circumstances of the case, including, among other factors, the novelty of the
legal issue, the experience of the attorney, and the results obtained in the
litigation."  Id. ¶ 21 (quotation omitted); see L'Esperance v.
Benware, 2003 VT 43, ¶ 22, 175 Vt. 292, 830 A.2d 675 (defining "lodestar
figure" as "the number of hours reasonably expended on the case multiplied by a
reasonable hourly rate").
¶ 24.        
Here, the court found that the total fees of $84,081 represented a
lodestar figure.  The court explained that the total time expended on the case was
reasonable "given the scope of the litigation and the complexity associated
with proving the numbers of trees damaged and other damage on Plaintiff's side
of the boundary, as well as the need to establish the date the damage was done
and the fact that the damage was done by Defendant."  Nonetheless, the court
found that a downward departure to 25% of the lodestar amount was reasonable
given that the fees related solely to the claim for damages and the result was
"poor."  The court noted that it could not separate out the fees associated
with the request for injunctive relief from those related to damages because
the two claims involved a common core of facts.
¶ 25.        
Although it is somewhat unclear, it appears that defendant essentially
agrees that $84,081 represented a reasonable lodestar figure, but argues that a
larger reduction was warranted because of the extremely poor result on
plaintiff's damages claim, and because the court improperly considered
plaintiff's success in obtaining a permanent injunction in awarding fees.
¶ 26.        
Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the award was an abuse of
discretion.  We have explained in the past that it is not whether the
attorney's fee award is proportional to the damages, but "whether the fee award
is reasonable given the demands of the case."  Kwon, 2010 VT 73, ¶ 20. 
The proportionality argument is particularly difficult here since the
Legislature has explicitly authorized civil unlawful mischief claims for very
small amounts of money where the attorney's fees and costs are almost certain
to greatly exceed the amount of damages recovered.  
¶ 27.        
In any event, the required reasonableness is present.  The court's decision
does not support defendant's claim that the court improperly considered
plaintiff's success in obtaining a permanent injunction in its analysis of how
much to reduce the lodestar amount.  The court acknowledged that the fee award
was related solely to the damages claim.  Further, the court provided an
adequate explanation for its decision to reduce the lodestar figure by 75%.  As
the court explained, plaintiff had a poor outcome on his damages claim, and
thus a reduction of fees was appropriate.  Defendant claims that the result was
so poor that a further reduction was warranted given that plaintiff failed to
prove an essential element of his claim for monetary reliefthat any damage
occurred within the limitations periodfor all but the cutting down of a single
tree.  We reiterate that our review of the court's decision on the amount of
fees is a limited one.  "[A]bsent strong evidence of excessiveness," this Court
defers to the trial court's judgment as to the amount of fees.  Human Rights
Comm'n v. LaBrie, Inc., 164 Vt. 237, 252, 668 A.2d 659, 670 (1995).  Defendant
has failed to demonstrate that a 75% reduction was an abuse of the court's
discretion.
Affirmed.
 
 
FOR THE COURT:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Associate
  Justice
 

[1] 
Justice Crawford was present for oral argument, but did not participate in this
decision.
[2] 
The court rejected plaintiff's arguments seeking to extend the limitations
period.
 
[3] 
Initially, the court awarded $500 to plaintiff based on the civil penalty
provisions of 13 V.S.A. § 3602.  Following defendant's motion to
reconsider arguing that reliance on the statute was improper because it was not
in effect until 2010 and was punitive in nature, the court amended the judgment
to award $1.  
[4] 
We have construed the reference in § 3701(c) to "value" as applying to "the
amount of damage inflicted, so that an offender will be subject to punishment
proportionate with the quantum of damage inflicted as opposed to the value of
the property damaged."  State v. Breznick, 134 Vt. 261, 266, 356 A.2d 540, 543 (1976).