Title: Commonwealth v. Duke

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-12047 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ASHAWNEE DUKE. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     January 10, 2022. - May 11, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Felony-Murder Rule.  Robbery.  Evidence, Accomplice, 
Intent, Scientific test.  Intent.  Practice, Criminal, 
Instructions to jury, Indictment, Assistance of counsel, 
Capital case.  Witness, Corroboration. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on February 4, 2013.   
 
 
The cases were tried before C. Jeffrey Kinder, J., and a 
motion for a new trial, filed on March 2, 2020, was heard by 
Mark D. Mason, J. 
 
 
 
Angela G. Lehman for the defendant. 
 
David L. Sheppard-Brick, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  On December 2, 2012, the defendant and two 
accomplices attempted to rob Keshawn Dancy at gunpoint.  Dancy 
fought back and got into a physical struggle with one of the 
robbers, Keogh Collins.  Gunfire erupted, and Collins was 
2 
 
fatally shot in the head; Dancy suffered a serious wound to the 
leg.  At the defendant's trial in August of 2015 on charges of 
murder in the first degree and related offenses, the 
Commonwealth proceeded on the theory that the defendant had 
fired the rounds that struck Collins and Dancy.  This contention 
was based, in large part, on the testimony of a third 
accomplice, getaway driver Julien Holly, who testified for the 
Commonwealth after entering into a cooperation agreement.  
 
A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant of felony-
murder in the first degree for the shooting death of Collins.1  
The defendant thereafter filed a motion for postconviction 
discovery, followed by a motion for a new trial, based on the 
results of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing.  The motion for 
a new trial was denied.  In this consolidated appeal from his 
convictions and from the denial of his motion for a new trial, 
the defendant argues, among other things, that the conviction of 
felony-murder cannot stand because Collins, the defendant's 
accomplice, was killed during a struggle with the intended 
robbery victim, and the theory of felony-murder thus is 
inapplicable.  See Commonwealth v. Tejeda, 473 Mass. 269, 279 
 
1 The defendant also was convicted of armed assault with 
intent to rob and assault and battery by means of a dangerous 
weapon causing serious bodily injury, with respect to the 
wounding of Dancy, as well as unlawful possession of a firearm 
and unlawful possession of ammunition.  
3 
 
(2015); Commonwealth v. Balliro, 349 Mass. 505, 515 (1965), 
S.C., 370 Mass. 585 (1976).   
 
Having carefully examined the record and considered the 
defendant's arguments, we conclude that the felony-murder rule 
was applicable, the evidence was sufficient to support the 
convictions, and there was no error that would necessitate a new 
trial.  Nor do we discern any reason to exercise our authority 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a new trial or to reduce the 
conviction of murder to a lesser degree of guilt. 
1.  Facts.  We summarize the facts that the jury could have 
found, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 
see Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979), and 
drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom, see Commonwealth v. 
Lao, 443 Mass. 770, 779 (2005), S.C., 450 Mass. 215 (2007) and 
460 Mass. 12 (2011).  
a.  Day of the shooting.  On the afternoon of December 2, 
2012, "best friends" Holly and Collins were driving around 
Chicopee and Springfield in Collins's 1999 green Nissan Altima.  
They, along with other individuals (not including the 
defendant), decided to rob a drug dealer known as "Biz."  
Collins was armed with a silver .380 caliber semiautomatic 
weapon.  Due to defects in the feeding mechanism, the handgun 
had to be manually reloaded after each shot.  Holly was armed 
with a .357 caliber revolver. 
4 
 
Holly lured Biz to the scene of the robbery under the guise 
of making a purchase of phencyclidine (PCP).  When Biz got into 
the Altima, Holly pointed a gun at him, demanded he turn over 
drugs and a jacket, and then ordered him to get out of the 
vehicle.  Intending to head back to Chicopee, Holly left his 
weapon at his house in Springfield because there was no longer 
any "need for [the] gun."  Holly and Collins then drove around 
in the Altima, drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana mixed with 
the pilfered PCP. 
A few hours after robbing Biz, Holly received a telephone 
call from the defendant.  Holly knew the defendant from the 
neighborhood where they both lived and had seen him nearly every 
day during the preceding six months.  The defendant generally 
called Holly using one of three different telephones:  a 
landline, a cellular telephone registered to the defendant's 
mother, and the defendant's own cellular telephone.2  The 
defendant asked Holly about the robbery of Biz.  He also asked 
Holly to find out whether Collins would be willing to drive to 
another robbery in exchange for money to buy gasoline and 
marijuana.  Collins agreed to give the defendant a ride. 
 
2 The contacts list in Holly's cellular telephone included 
entries for "Ashawni" and "Ashawnee mom."  According to Holly's 
telephone records, Holly and "Ashawni" exchanged a series of ten 
brief calls on December 2, 2012, between 11:30 A.M. and 
5:34 P.M.  
   
5 
 
Collins picked up the defendant in his Altima and drove to 
a fast food restaurant.  There, the defendant got out of the 
vehicle and placed a telephone call to the target of the 
robbery.3  The defendant also loaded a bullet into the chamber of 
a gun, which resembled a larger version of Collins's .380 
caliber firearm.  The defendant then got back into the Altima 
and instructed Collins to drive to a housing development in 
Springfield.   
Collins parked the Altima near the entrance to the housing 
development, out of sight of the apartment where the intended 
robbery victim was visiting a relative.  The defendant twice 
asked Holly to get out of the vehicle and join him in the 
robbery.  Holly refused; he testified that he thought the extent 
of his role was to bring the others to the scene.  The defendant 
then asked Collins for help in conducting the robbery.  After 
some hesitation, Collins agreed.  As instructed, Holly got into 
the driver's seat of the Altima to wait for the defendant and 
Collins, who walked away. 
The two reappeared within ten to fifteen minutes.  They 
told Holly to drive around the block and to back into a parking 
space with a view of one of the apartments.  That apartment had 
 
3 On December 2, between 11:20 A.M. and 5:48 P.M., Dancy 
exchanged telephone calls with the number listed as "Ashawani."  
Dancy's telephone number did not call any of Holly's or 
Collins's numbers.  
6 
 
been rented by Dancy's sister, and Dancy generally stopped by to 
check on it while his sister was away.  While waiting for the 
defendant and Collins to "do whatever they [were] going to do," 
Holly smoked another cigarette and flicked the butt out the 
window.  Holly testified that he smoked Newport cigarettes, 
which have a green stripe around the filter.4   
At around 5:40 P.M., Collins approached Dancy, who was on 
the front porch.  Collins and the defendant spoke to Dancy, and 
Dancy passed an object to Collins, who smelled it.  The 
defendant also smelled the object, and then handed it back to 
Dancy.  At that point, Collins pulled out a firearm and pointed 
it at Dancy.  Dancy struck Collins, grabbing his gun hand and, 
as Dancy described it, "hit[ting] him with everything I had."  
The two engaged in a "tussle," continuing to "fight" on the 
porch so intensely that they both fell down.  Dancy heard shots 
and could not tell from where they were coming, but he assumed 
that the man he was fighting was the one who was shooting.  
Holly heard a loud pop.  He did not see a muzzle flash and could 
not tell whether Collins had fired the shot.  The defendant 
 
4 Police recovered a discarded Newport cigarette butt near 
the scene.  Although it was suitable for DNA testing, the 
Commonwealth choose not to test the cigarette butt to determine 
whether it contained DNA matching Holly's DNA profile.  
Postconviction forensic testing later revealed that DNA on the 
cigarette matched a profile from a third party and did not match 
Holly's DNA profile.  See discussion, infra.  
7 
 
stepped back and pulled out his gun.  Holly saw the defendant 
fire, and then saw Collins fall down the porch stairs.  
Dancy testified that, during the fight, he focused on 
Collins -- his immediate threat, with whom he was fighting.  The 
defendant moved around and, at one point, urged Collins, 
"[L]et's go, let's leave."  Dancy then heard gunshots and felt 
Collins go limp; Dancy fell off the porch, tried to get up, and 
discovered that he had been shot in the leg.  Dancy did not see 
the defendant produce a gun.  He did see a muzzle flash, leading 
him to believe that the defendant had fired at him.  Collins 
suffered a fatal gunshot wound to the head.  There was no 
stippling or residue gun powder on the wound, indicating that 
the shot had been fired from a distance of more than eighteen 
inches.  The shot to Dancy's leg resulted in a compound 
fracture.  
Upon hearing the first gunshot, Holly started the Altima 
and pulled out into the road to wait for Collins and the 
defendant.  The defendant got into the rear seat, and told Holly 
that Collins was dead.  Holly drove away.  A neighbor called 
911; police and emergency medical technicians arrived on scene 
at 5:55 P.M. 
Before police arrived, a witness who was inside a nearby 
apartment heard a loud crash, looked out the window, and saw a 
man collapse to the ground, try to get up, and fall again; 
8 
 
initially she thought he was drunk.  When the man started 
calling for help, the witness went outside and saw another man 
lying on the ground gasping for air; there was a small caliber, 
silver handgun on the ground next to him.  The witness kicked 
the gun across the street, and later pointed it out to one of 
the investigating officers.  When the officer secured the 
weapon, it had a live round in the chamber.  
b.  Investigation.  A spent projectile was located on the 
front porch of the apartment building where Collins had fallen, 
and two discharged nine millimeter cartridge casings were found 
on the street and in the lawn in front of the building.  A 
projectile also was recovered from Collins's head.   
A State police ballistician testified that Collins's .380 
pistol was found with a live round in the chamber.  The bullet 
bore impressions from the firing pin that could have been caused 
by the weapon having been dropped or kicked without discharging 
the round.  The projectile found on the front porch was 
consistent with .380 caliber ammunition.  The projectile, 
however, was too damaged to compare its tool markings to try to 
determine which gun had fired it.  The two nine millimeter 
cartridge casings found on the street and in the lawn had been 
fired from the same unknown weapon.  The projectile recovered 
from Collins's body was consistent with a nine millimeter 
9 
 
bullet.  It was too large to have been fired from a .380 caliber 
gun.   
Police questioned Holly on December 4, 2012, two days after 
the shootings.  He told the detectives "some things" that had 
happened.  To protect himself, he said that it was Collins's 
idea to commit the robbery, that he never saw the defendant with 
a firearm, and that he had been in the car waiting for Collins 
and the defendant, and he did not see the shootings.  Two days 
later, on December 6, 2012, Holly was arrested.  He then gave 
the officers a different version of events, this time saying 
that the defendant had set up the robbery; Holly continued to 
assert that he had not seen the actual shooting.  In April of 
2015, in conjunction with a cooperation agreement, Holly 
provided a third statement to police.  He gave a detailed 
account of the events and the defendant's role in planning the 
robbery.  At trial, however, Holly conceded that he had provided 
police this information only after having reviewed police 
reports and witness statements. 
The defendant also was arrested on December 6, 2012.  He 
denied having participated in the robbery and having killed 
Collins.  According to the defendant, he had stayed home all day 
on December 2, 2012, had been with his family, and only left the 
house to go to a nearby convenience store, once in the morning 
and once sometime around 7 or 8 P.M.  Police obtained 
10 
 
surveillance video footage from the convenience store from 
12 P.M. to 8 P.M. on December 2, 2012, and learned that the 
defendant did not appear on the surveillance footage at any 
point during that time.    
2.  Prior proceedings.  On February 4, 2013, a grand jury 
returned indictments charging the defendant with murder in the 
first degree; armed assault with intent to rob Dancy; assault 
and battery by means of a dangerous weapon causing serious 
bodily injury to Dancy; unlawful possession of a firearm; and 
unlawful possession of ammunition.  Beginning on August 19, 
2015, the defendant was tried before a Superior Court jury.  The 
Commonwealth proceeded at trial on theories of deliberate 
premeditation and felony-murder, with armed robbery as the 
predicate felony.  At the close of the Commonwealth's case, and 
again at the close of all the evidence, the defendant moved for 
a required finding on so much of the indictment as charged 
felony-murder.  Both motions were denied.  On August 28, 2015, 
the jury convicted the defendant of all indictments.  Prior to 
sentencing, the defendant filed a renewed motion for a required 
finding; he argued that he could not be found liable for the 
death of an alleged accomplice.  The motion was denied.   
After the appeal entered in this court, the proceedings 
were stayed to enable the defendant to seek forensic testing 
pursuant to G. L. c. 278A.  The defendant subsequently filed a 
11 
 
motion for a new trial based on DNA results from the testing of 
the cigarette butt found in the parking lot where the getaway 
driver had waited.  A different Superior Court judge (the trial 
judge having been appointed to the Appeals Court) held a 
nonevidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion and then denied 
the defendant's motion for a new trial.  We consolidated the 
appeal from the denial of the motion for a new trial and the 
defendant's direct appeal.  
 
3.  Discussion.  The defendant argues that the trial judge 
erred in denying his motion for a required finding of not guilty 
on the charge of felony-murder.  The defendant maintains, first, 
that the doctrine of felony-murder is inapplicable here because 
Collins was killed "during the course of a struggle from an 
individual resisting a felony."  Even if the theory of felony-
murder is applicable, the defendant argues, the evidence was 
insufficient to allow a rational jury to have concluded, beyond 
a reasonable doubt, that he committed the predicate offense of 
armed robbery.  The defendant also contends that the trial judge 
erred by not, sua sponte, instructing the jury on felony-murder 
in the second degree.  In addition, the defendant argues that 
the motion judge abused his discretion in denying the motion for 
a new trial based on DNA evidence recovered from the cigarette 
butt during postconviction scientific testing.  Finally, the 
defendant asks us to exercise our extraordinary authority under 
12 
 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a new trial or to reduce the 
degree of guilt, due to the Commonwealth's use of uncorroborated 
accomplice testimony, the failure to secure an indictment for 
the predicate felony, and the asserted ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel.  We address each issue in turn. 
 
a.  Sufficiency of evidence of felony-murder.  
i.  Liability for felony-murder.  The defendant's argument that 
his conviction of felony-murder in the first degree was unlawful 
is premised on limitations in the theory of felony-murder 
concerning liability for the deaths of individuals killed by 
someone who is resisting the predicate felony.  The defendant 
contends that, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, the evidence as to who fired the fatal shot was 
unclear.  Relying on this court's holdings in Commonwealth v. 
Campbell, 7 Allen 541, 547 (1863), Balliro, 349 Mass. at 515, 
and Tejeda, 473 Mass. at 279, the defendant argues that he was 
entitled to a required finding because his accomplice, Collins, 
was fatally shot "as the underlying felony occurred and while 
the intended target of the felony -- [Dancy] -- resisted."      
To evaluate the defendant's argument, a review of our long-
standing jurisprudence on the scope of liability for felony-
murder, where the fatal act was committed by someone seeking to 
thwart or resist the predicate offense, is in order.  In 1863, 
we considered whether a participant in a riot against the Civil 
13 
 
War draft could be held liable for the death of a bystander, 
where it was unclear whether the victim was shot and killed by 
one of the rioters "with whom the [defendant] was acting in 
concert," or by a soldier inside an armory who was attempting to 
fend off the attack.  See Campbell, 7 Allen at 543-544.  The 
Commonwealth requested the jury be instructed that the defendant 
could be found guilty regardless of who fired the fatal shot.  
Id. at 543.  We rejected the Commonwealth's attempt to expand 
our "reasonable limitation" on vicarious liability.  Id. at 544.  
We held that "[n]o person can be held guilty of homicide unless 
the act is either actually or constructively his, and it cannot 
be his act in either sense unless committed by his own hand or 
by someone acting in concert with him or in furtherance of a 
common object or purpose."  Id. at 544.    
One hundred and two years later, in Balliro, 349 Mass. 
at 511, we considered whether an accomplice to a burglary was 
vicariously liable for the death of two of the occupants of an 
apartment, who were killed during a shootout between the 
burglars and police, after the burglars had broken into the 
apartment building.  During the gunfight, a mother and her son 
were caught in the crossfire and shot to death.  Id. at 508-510.  
The judge denied each of the defendants' requests for an 
instruction that he could not be found guilty of felony-murder 
unless the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that the bullet 
14 
 
that caused the death came from a gun that had been fired by one 
of the defendants.  Id. at 511.  Instead, the judge erroneously 
instructed the jury that the victims' deaths were "imputable to 
the[] defendants," even if the fatal shots had been fired by one 
of the police officers, so long as the "defendants entered and 
shot first."  Id.  Reaffirming its decision in Campbell, 7 Allen 
at 543-544, this court concluded that a felon cannot be held 
criminally liable for the death of an individual killed by 
someone who was resisting the commission of the felony.  
Balliro, supra at 515. 
Fifty years after that decision, we considered whether the 
limitations on felony-murder set forth in Campbell and Balliro 
extended to the death of an accomplice who was killed by the 
victim of an intended robbery.  See Tejeda, 473 Mass. at 269.  
The defendant in Tejeda, supra at 279-281, was a getaway driver 
who parked outside a residence while his accomplices, one of 
whom was armed, attempted to rob a drug dealer.  Id. at 270.  
The dealer pulled out his own weapon, shots were exchanged, and 
one of the robbers was fatally shot in the chest.  Id.  The 
Commonwealth asked this court to expand the scope of vicarious 
liability for felony-murder to include "every act that results 
in death that is proximately caused by the underlying felony."  
Id. at 274-275.  We rejected this proposal, which would have 
expanded "vicarious accomplice liability to acts that were not 
15 
 
committed by accomplices, and that were committed not to further 
the joint venture but to thwart it."  Id. at 277.  Once again, 
we held that a felon cannot be criminally liable for the death 
of a person who is killed by someone resisting the commission of 
a felony.  Id. 
In the present case, we agree with the trial judge's 
conclusion that there was sufficient evidence that the defendant 
shot and killed his accomplice.  See Commonwealth v. James, 424 
Mass. 770, 785 (1997) (evidence, including determinations of 
credibility, is viewed in light most favorable to Commonwealth).  
The jury heard sufficient evidence to have found that Collins 
was armed with a .380 caliber pistol and that the defendant had 
a slightly larger nine millimeter weapon.  The jury also could 
have found, based on the evidence before them, that Collins 
approached Dancy, and then pulled out a gun, and Collins and 
Dancy engaged in a fist fight.  Other evidence before the jury 
would have allowed them to find that the second robber, by 
inference the defendant, fired at Dancy.  The jury heard that 
police found two spent nine millimeter shell casings at the 
scene, which were not filed from Collins's .380, but which had 
been fired from the same gun.  There also was evidence that the 
shot that killed Collins was fired from more than eighteen 
inches away, and the projectile that was found imbedded in 
16 
 
Collins's head was consistent with having been fired by a nine 
millimeter firearm.  
Thus, the defendant's reliance on Campbell, Balliro, and 
Tejeda is inapposite.  Unlike the circumstances in those cases, 
here the Commonwealth did not seek to hold the defendant 
vicariously liable for a fatal blow delivered by someone -- 
whether the victim of a robbery, a soldier, or a police 
officer -- who was resisting the crime.  The premise of the 
felony-murder indictment against the defendant was that, during 
the robbery, the defendant shot at Dancy and ended up hitting 
both Dancy and Collins.  Accordingly, there was no error in the 
judge's determination that the limitations on the scope of 
felony-murder set forth in Campbell, 7 Allen at 547, Balliro, 
349 Mass. at 515, and Tejeda, 473 Mass. at 279, were 
inapplicable.  
 
ii.  Evidence of intent required to establish armed 
robbery.  "The effect of the felony-murder rule is to substitute 
the intent to commit the underlying felony for the malice 
aforethought required for murder.  Thus, the rule is one of 
constructive malice"5 (quotation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
 
5 The defendant was convicted prior to this court's decision 
in Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805, 807 (2017), cert. 
denied, 139 S. Ct. 54 (2018), where the court prospectively 
abolished the concept of constructive malice and the crime of 
felony-murder in the second degree.  
17 
 
Gunter, 427 Mass. 259, 271 (1998), S.C., 456 Mass. 1017 (2010) 
and 459 Mass. 480, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 868 (2011), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492, 502 (1982).  The 
element of the intent to steal is substituted for malice 
aforethought.  See Commonwealth v. Morin, 478 Mass. 415, 431 
(2017) ("It is the intent to do that conduct [here stealing from 
(the victim)] that serves as the substitute for the malice 
requirement of murder" [alterations in original; citation 
omitted]).  See also Commonwealth v. Holley, 478 Mass. 508, 520 
(2017). 
 
The defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence 
that he had had the "appropriate mental state" necessary to 
support the predicate felony of armed robbery.  The defendant 
points out that, before the shots were fired, Dancy heard the 
second robber (inferentially the defendant), tell Collins, 
"[L]et's go, let's leave."  Moreover, after Dancy was shot, the 
second robber "had a look of shock on his face," and did not 
seize the opportunity to steal Dancy's drugs or money.   
 
In order to establish that a defendant is guilty of armed 
robbery, the Commonwealth most prove that the defendant (or a 
coventurer) (1) was "armed with a dangerous weapon; (2) either 
applied actual force or violence to the body of the person 
identified in the indictment, or by words or gestures put [that 
person] in fear; (3) took the money or the property of another; 
18 
 
and (4) did so with the intent (or sharing the intent) to steal 
it."  See Commonwealth v. Chesko, 486 Mass. 314, 320 (2020), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Benitez, 464 Mass. 686, 690 (2013).   
 
Here, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, the jury heard sufficient evidence of the 
defendant's intent to steal from Dancy.  There was evidence 
before the jury that the defendant telephoned Holly, seeking a 
ride from Collins in order to rob a "big," "husky" "guy" with a 
"scruffy beard" and dreadlocks.  The jury reasonably could have 
inferred that the defendant's telephone calls to Dancy, 
immediately prior to the robbery, were made to arrange the 
purported drug deal.  There was testimony from which the jury 
could have found that the defendant and Collins, both of whom 
were armed, approached Dancy for the purpose of stealing drugs 
or money from him.  That the robbery was unsuccessful is not 
relevant to a finding that the defendant had the intent to 
steal.  See Commonwealth v. Quiles, 488 Mass. 298, 304 (2021), 
cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1237 (2022) (for felony-murder, it is 
sufficient for defendant to have killed victim while attempting 
to commit underlying felony).  
 
b.  Instruction on felony-murder in second degree.  The 
defendant argues that the judge erred in not instructing the 
jury on felony-murder in the second degree because the evidence 
at trial did not support a conviction of the life felony of 
19 
 
armed robbery, but that "there were two indicted felonies upon 
which an allegation of second-degree felony-murder could have 
advanced":  armed assault with intent to rob, G. L. c. 265, 
§ 18 (b); and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon 
resulting in serious bodily injury, G. L. c. 265, § 15A (c) (i).   
The defendant also suggests here, as he develops further in his 
request for relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, that, 
regardless of the state of the evidence, he could not have been 
convicted of felony-murder in the first degree where he was not 
indicted for a life felony.  See part 3.d.ii, infra.   
 
The defendant did not request an instruction on felony-
murder in the second degree, and the judge did not give one sua 
sponte.  We review claims of unpreserved error in capital cases 
for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992), S.C., 469 
Mass. 447 (2014). 
A judge is required to instruct the jury on felony-murder 
in the second degree only where "there is a rational basis in 
the evidence to warrant the instruction."  See Commonwealth v. 
Christian, 430 Mass. 552, 558 (2000), overruled on other grounds 
by Commonwealth v. Paulding, 438 Mass. 1 (2002).  In determining 
whether an instruction on felony-murder in the second degree 
would be warranted, the judge looks to all the elements of 
murder in the second degree.  Christian, supra.  "A conviction 
20 
 
of felony-murder in the second degree requires the jury to find 
that (1) the defendant committed or attempted to commit a felony 
with a maximum sentence of less than imprisonment for life, 
(2) a killing occurred during the commission or attempted 
commission of that felony, and (3) the felony was inherently 
dangerous or the defendant acted with conscious disregard for 
the risk to human life."  Id.   
 
Here, the judge instructed the jury on murder in the first 
degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and felony-
murder, with attempted armed robbery as the predicate offense.  
The judge explained that the essence of the crime of attempt "is 
that a person has a specific intent to commit a crime, in this 
case armed robbery, and takes a specific step toward committing 
the crime."  The judge also instructed on murder in the second 
degree committed in the absence of deliberate premeditation, 
with malice, and involuntary manslaughter due to wanton and 
reckless conduct.   
There was no error in the judge's instructions on felony-
murder, and consequently no substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  As the defendant recognizes, depending 
on the facts, the offense of armed assault with intent to rob 
may be equivalent to an "attempted commission of armed robbery."  
See Benitez, 464 Mass. at 694 n.12, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Ladetto, 349 Mass. 237, 248-249 (1965).  "[I]n a theoretical 
21 
 
sense, armed assault to rob is a lesser included offense of 
every armed robbery. . . .  [T]he theoretical existence of a 
lesser included predicate offense, [however,] with a maximum 
sentence of less than life imprisonment by itself does not 
require that an instruction on felony-murder in the second 
degree be given."  Benitez, supra.  In determining whether to 
give such an instruction, a judge must decide whether the facts 
"reasonably would support a jury finding that the lesser 
predicate felony had been proved, and not the greater."  Id.   
Here, no rational view of the evidence would have supported 
a finding that the defendant was an accomplice in the armed 
assault with intent to rob Dancy, but was not an accomplice in 
the attempted armed robbery of Dancy.  See Chesko, 486 Mass. at 
321 (if jury did not believe defendant committed predicate 
felony of armed robbery, they would have found her not guilty, 
and "they could not have rationally concluded that she was 
guilty only of armed assault with intent to rob").  
As stated, the defendant maintains that the offense of 
assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon resulting in 
serious bodily injury to Dancy "could have supported a 
conviction for second-degree felony-murder."  Nonetheless, the 
judge had a reasonable basis upon which to forgo instructing the 
jury, sua sponte, on felony-murder in the second degree 
predicated on the defendant's nonfatal shooting of Dancy.  
22 
 
Certainly, "not every assault that results in a death will serve 
as a basis for murder in the first degree on the theory of 
felony-murder."  Commonwealth v. Scott, 472 Mass. 815, 819 
(2015).  The merger doctrine requires the Commonwealth to prove 
that "the conduct which constitutes the felony be separate from 
the acts of personal violence which constitute a necessary part 
of the homicide itself" (quotation omitted).  Morin, 478 Mass. 
at 430-431, quoting Gunter, 427 Mass. at 272.  Nonetheless, 
assuming, for the sake of argument, that Collins was killed 
during the assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon 
used against Dancy, this would do nothing to suggest that an 
instruction on felony-murder in the second degree was 
appropriate.  The violence of the assault and battery -- the 
shooting of Dancy -- was inextricably intertwined with the fatal 
shooting of Collins.  The merger doctrine, therefore, precluded 
the theory of felony-murder in the second degree. 
 
c.  Motion for a new trial.  Following the jury verdicts, 
the defendant sought postconviction scientific testing of the 
cigarette butt found on the ground near the car where Holly 
allegedly had been sitting waiting for the defendant and Collins 
to conduct their planned robbery of the drug dealer.  The 
defendant's motion, unopposed by the Commonwealth, was allowed.  
The testing revealed that the DNA profile on the cigarette butt 
did not match Holly's DNA profile, nor did it match the 
23 
 
defendant's or Collins's DNA profiles.  The DNA profile later 
was matched, through a government database, to a third party who 
played no role in the events of this case.  In his motion for a 
new trial, the defendant argued that the inadequate police 
investigation, including the failure to test the cigarette butt 
prior to trial, deprived him of a possible third-party culprit 
defense, and deprived both the Commonwealth and the defendant of 
a "potential eyewitness to the events."  He also emphasized the 
importance that the Commonwealth placed on the cigarette butt as 
corroboration of Holly's testimony. 
 
Pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as appearing in 435 
Mass. 1501 (2001), a judge may allow a motion for a new trial 
"if it appears that justice may not have been done."  Where an 
appeal from the denial of a motion for a new trial has been 
consolidated with a defendant's direct appeal from a conviction 
of murder in the first degree, we review the denial of the 
motion for a new trial under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  See 
Commonwealth v. Moore, 480 Mass. 799, 805 (2018).  Thus, we 
examine the motion judge's decision to determine whether there 
was error and, if so, whether the error created a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Commonwealth v. Vargas, 
475 Mass. 338, 355 (2016).6  
 
6 The defendant does not argue that the DNA test results 
were newly discovered or newly available evidence.  See 
24 
 
 
Here, the jury heard evidence that the neighbor was the one 
who initially brought the cigarette butt to the attention of one 
of the investigating officers.  Earlier that evening, she had 
heard "some banging noise" and went to her kitchen window to see 
what was going on.  She saw a dark vehicle with its lights off 
pull up behind her parked car and a "young man," moving at a 
"dead run," get into the front passenger seat.  After the 
vehicle sped away, the neighbor went outside to her own vehicle 
and noticed a cigarette butt on the ground behind her rear tire.  
This caught her attention because it was raining and the 
cigarette butt did not appear to be wet.   
 
On cross-examination, one of the Commonwealth's experts 
testified that the cigarette butt had been prepared for testing 
but had not been tested.  The expert agreed that proper DNA 
testing and analysis might have provided the identity of the 
individual who had smoked the discarded cigarette.  Both trial 
counsel and the prosecutor referenced the cigarette butt at some 
length in their closing arguments. 
 
In his closing, the defendant emphasized that the 
Commonwealth had failed to test the cigarette butt, which might 
 
Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 305-306 (1986) (discussing 
two-pronged standard of review for newly discovered or newly 
available evidence).  Indeed, he does not challenge the judge's 
finding that "the cigarette butt was available for testing at 
the time of trial had trial counsel elected to take the risk 
that the results would undermine [the] defense."  
25 
 
have revealed "who [was] in the vehicle."  The defendant argued 
that police had "tied their wagon" to Holly, and thereafter had 
not conducted much of an investigation, as they simply chose to 
believe every word he said.  Defense counsel pointed out that 
none of the forensic evidence connected the defendant to the 
scene.  Counsel emphasized the other items that the Commonwealth 
had tested for DNA and argued that the failure to test the 
cigarette butt was because the cigarette butt that Holly threw 
out the car window was not the same one police collected behind 
the tire of the neighbor's car.  Defense counsel discussed the 
relative positions of the vehicles, pointing out that Holly's 
car had been parked in a parking space where he waited, and had 
not been parked in the open behind the neighbor's vehicle.  
Counsel maintained that the cigarette butt had belonged to "the 
person who ran into the [getaway] car," and not Holly.  Counsel 
then again urged the jury to conclude that the absence of any 
investigation of the cigarette butt indicated how cursory the 
police investigation had been, because of the decision to rely 
largely upon the statements of the immunized witness.   
 
The prosecutor argued at several points in his closing that 
the cigarette butt corroborated Holly's testimony; the 
prosecutor summarized Holly's testimony that he "threw a 
cigarette butt on the ground and mentioned what brand of 
cigarettes he smoked on December 6th before he even knew a 
26 
 
cigarette butt was recovered at that area."  The prosecutor also 
pointed out that the defendant's argument that the cigarette 
might have been discarded by the man running back to the car was 
implausible, arguing, "If someone is running away from a 
shooting, are they going to light up a smoke after they shoot 
someone and before they run to a car and get in?"  Later in his 
argument, the prosecutor again emphasized the evidence of the 
cigarette butt and how it corroborated Holly's testimony:  
"Holly mentioned his brand of cigarettes back on December 6th 
and they find a cigarette butt right where he happens to say he 
was sitting and smoking a menthol before he flicked it out the 
window and they find it right there.  That's corroboration, 
ladies and gentlemen."   
 
In his motion for a new trial, the defendant maintained 
that the only evidence that implicated him in the shooting was 
testimony by Holly, the immunized codefendant.  The defendant 
emphasized that Holly also had been at the scene of the shooting 
and remarked that Holly had "every reason to give the 
Commonwealth whatever it wanted" in exchange for favorable 
treatment.  At one point, the defendant remarked, "It is clear 
from how his story changed over time that [Holly] was willing to 
say anything to assist the Commonwealth."  Indeed, at times in 
his closing argument, counsel explicitly described Holly's 
testimony as that of an "admitted liar" that could never be 
27 
 
worthy of belief.  Relying on these and similar statements, the 
defendant argued in his motion for a new trial that "any 
evidence impugning Holly's credibility was paramount."   
 
In ruling on the defendant's motion for a new trial, the 
motion judge, who was not the trial judge, considered "the 
strength of the Commonwealth's evidence, particularly as 
to . . . Holly's credibility (or lack thereof), in order to 
assess whether, taken as a whole, the case against [the 
defendant] is significantly weaker for lack of the cigarette 
butt's corroboration."  The judge observed that "the 
Commonwealth's case against [the defendant] was not so 
overwhelming as to render the cigarette butt wholly 
unimportant."  Nonetheless, the judge decided that it was 
"unlikely" that the cigarette butt would have been central to 
the jury's assessment of Holly's creditability.  Considering the 
entirety of the record, the judge concluded that "the overall 
effects of the new DNA test do not render [the defendant's] 
trial fundamentally unfair."  
After a careful review of the record, we agree.  See 
Commonwealth v. Raymond, 450 Mass. 729, 733 (2008) (where motion 
judge was not trial judge, and ruling was based on documentary 
record and did not rest on credibility determinations, appellate 
court is in as good position as motion judge to assess trial 
record).  The extent to which both attorneys focused on the 
28 
 
cigarette butt in their closing arguments indicates they did not 
view it as insubstantial and did consider the issue of 
corroboration of the Commonwealth's key witness's (Holly's) 
statements as significant.  Nonetheless, contrary to the 
defendant's argument, the record clearly contains multiple other 
types of evidence, including testimony by the neighbor and the 
intended victim, as well as telephone records and ballistics 
evidence, that corroborate different portions of Holly's 
testimony.  Thus, the evidence that Holly's DNA was not on the 
cigarette butt found in the parking lot of an apartment building 
where the getaway driver was to wait for the robbers likely 
would have made little difference in the jury's thinking about 
Holly's credibility.  
In sum, the defendant has not shown that the results of the 
DNA testing cast doubt on the justice of the conviction, and 
accordingly he is not entitled to a new trial.  
 
d.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The defendant 
maintains that, even if the evidence was sufficient to support a 
verdict of murder in the first degree, such a verdict was 
against the weight of the evidence, and "justice requires" that 
the court direct entry of a verdict of not guilty, reduce the 
degree of guilt, or order a new trial, pursuant to its authority 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The defendant argues that relief 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, is warranted for three reasons:  
29 
 
(1) the Commonwealth's reliance on uncorroborated witness 
testimony; (2) the absence of an indictment for armed robbery or 
any other life felony that would have supported the theory of 
felony-murder in the first degree; and (3) the ineffective 
assistance of his trial counsel. 
 
i.  Uncorroborated accomplice testimony.  The defendant 
urges this court, in the exercise of its extraordinary 
authority, to extend the corroboration requirement for immunized 
testimony, mandated by G. L. c. 233, § 20I, to cooperating 
witnesses.  See G. L. c. 233, § 20I ("No defendant in any 
criminal proceeding shall be convicted solely on the testimony 
of, or the evidence produced by, a person granted 
immunity . . .").  The defendant acknowledges that we previously 
have rejected such a request on a number of occasions.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Thomas, 439 Mass. 362, 372-373 (2003); 
Commonwealth v. Watkins, 377 Mass. 385, 389-390, cert. denied, 
442 U.S. 932 (1979), citing Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 
470, 495 (1917) (no right to corroboration of testimony of 
accomplice).  He argues, however, that the instructions we have 
mandated, urging the jury to "scrutinize the testimony of 
accomplices with great care," Thomas, supra at 372, when 
assessing the credibility of cooperating witnesses, regardless 
of whether the accomplices' statements are corroborated, are 
wholly inadequate to address the fundamental issue.  Because 
30 
 
false informant testimony is "one of the leading factors in 
wrongful convictions," the defendant maintains, the court should 
further scrutinize its use, and should reconsider its prior 
determinations not to require corroborating evidence for 
witnesses who testify pursuant to a cooperation agreement.   
We decline the defendant's request to extend the 
corroboration requirement to testimony by cooperating witnesses.  
In Thomas, 439 Mass. at 372-373, we explained that a defendant's 
rights were adequately protected by the instruction that juries 
must "scrutinize the testimony of accomplices with great care, 
regardless of the presence of corroborative evidence."  We also 
concluded that juries must be informed that while the 
Commonwealth may enter into an agreement with a witness, it has 
no way of knowing whether the witness indeed is telling the 
truth when testifying.  Id., citing Commonwealth v. Ciampa, 406 
Mass. 257, 266 (1989).  We concluded that these instructions 
adequately would protect a defendant's right to due process, 
given that a testifying witness is subject to "one of the most 
rigorous tests of scrutiny:  cross-examination, which is beyond 
any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the 
discovery of truth" (quotation and citation omitted).  Thomas, 
supra at 372. 
The defendant argues that "[t]here may be no greater case 
[for imposing a corroboration requirement] than the one at bar 
31 
 
where even the Commonwealth admitted that the entire case rested 
on the shoulders of Julien Holly."  The defendant maintains that 
the absence of a corroboration requirement creates a 
disincentive for police to pursue an adequate investigation, 
rather than simply accepting the immunized accomplice's version 
of events.  This, in turn, disrupts the essential truth-seeking 
purpose and role of a trial, and "impermissibly shifts to the 
defendant" the burden "to prove not just that the accomplice is 
lying but that the defendant is innocent," in violation of the 
defendant's right to due process.   
As the defendant points out, G. L. c. 233, § 20I, requires 
the Commonwealth to introduce "some evidence in support of the 
testimony of an immunized witness on at least one element of 
proof essential to convict the defendant."  Commonwealth v. 
DeBrosky, 363 Mass. 718, 730 (1973).  See Commonwealth v. 
Resende, 476 Mass. 141, 152 (2017); Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 
425 Mass. 357, 359 (1997).   
Here, as discussed, other evidence at trial, including 
Dancy's testimony, the cellular telephone records, and the 
ballistics evidence, corroborated Holly's testimony concerning 
felony-murder predicated on attempted armed robbery, and the 
defendant's role in perpetuating the armed robbery during which 
Collins was shot.  Accordingly, the evidence before the jury 
provided the corroboration the defendant asserts was necessary 
32 
 
in order for Holly's testimony to be used to establish the 
defendant's guilt of felony-murder. 
ii.  Lack of indictment on charge of armed robbery or any 
other life felony.  While recognizing that, to date, this court 
has not established such a requirement, the defendant urges this 
court to order a new trial because he was not indicted on the 
life felony of armed robbery that served as the predicate for 
felony-murder.  The defendant contends that the language of 
G. L. c. 265, § 1, "seems" to require an indictment on a felony 
that serves as a predicate for felony-murder, "so that there is 
appropriate notice of the charges a defendant faces and 
sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to indict."  The 
defendant also points to Mass. R. Crim. P. 3, as appearing in 
442 Mass. 1502 (2004); arts. 1, 10, 11, 12, and 26 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; and the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution as mandating that, 
in order to be convicted of felony-murder in the first degree, a 
defendant must be indicted on the life felony asserted to be the 
predicate offense.  
The defendant's argument is unavailing.  In Commonwealth v. 
Stokes, 460 Mass. 311, 315 (2011), this court held that "the 
felony on which a charge of felony-murder is premised may be 
uncharged, so long as the evidence supports it."  See 
Commonwealth v. Phap Buth, 480 Mass. 113, 119, cert. denied, 139 
33 
 
S. Ct. 607 (2018); Gunter, 427 Mass. at 274.  The defendant 
offers no compelling reason to change course on this 
consistently asserted position over the past approximately 
twenty-five years.  Nothing in the record here suggests that the 
defendant was prejudiced by the lack of an indictment.  Nor do 
we find compelling the defendant's strained interpretation of 
G. L. c. 265, § 1, as requiring a separate indictment for the 
predicate offense.  See G. L. c. 265, § 1 ("Murder committed 
with deliberately premeditated malice aforethought, or with 
extreme atrocity or cruelty, or in the commission or attempted 
commission of a crime punishable with death or imprisonment for 
life, is murder in the first degree").  
iii.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  The defendant 
argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel 
failed to "grasp the nuances in the murder charge" and failed to 
"act as a zealous advocate to the point of upsetting the 
adversarial process."  See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 
374-375 (1986).  The defendant maintains that trial counsel 
provided ineffective assistance because he failed to "comprehend 
issues related to the charge of murder."  The asserted failures 
of comprehension; "acquiescence" to the Commonwealth's theory of 
felony-murder in the first degree with armed robbery as the 
predicate felony; failure to argue that felony-murder did not 
apply because this case was on all fours with Balliro, 349 Mass. 
34 
 
at 515; and failure to argue that the assault was much more like 
an armed assault with intent to rob than an attempted armed 
robbery (thus rendering this a case of felony-murder in the 
second degree), all relate to the defendant's argument, see 
part 3.a.i, supra, that the theory of felony-murder in the first 
degree was inapplicable on these facts.  For the reasons 
discussed in part 3.a.i, supra, we conclude that there was no 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice in trial 
counsel's asserted missteps.  See Commonwealth v. Carroll, 439 
Mass. 547, 557 (2003) (no ineffective assistance of counsel for 
failure to pursue claim that would have been futile). 
 
4.  Conclusion.  The convictions of murder in the first 
degree, assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon 
causing serious bodily injury, unlawful possession of a firearm, 
and unlawful possession of ammunition are affirmed.  The denial 
of the defendant's motion for a new trial is also affirmed.  The 
Commonwealth has agreed to the defendant's request that his 
conviction of armed assault with intent to rob be dismissed as a 
lesser included offense that is duplicative of the felony-murder 
conviction.  See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 445 Mass. 119, 132 
(2005).  Accordingly, the conviction of armed assault with 
intent to rob is vacated and set aside, and the matter is 
remanded to the Superior Court for dismissal of that conviction.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.