Title: Whited v. Holmes

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

816 So. 2d 20 (2001)
Sallie WHITED, as executrix of the estate of Glenn H. Holmes, deceased
v.
Laura Jean HOLMES.
1001002.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
October 5, 2001.
*21 William E. Bright, Jr., Birmingham, for appellant.
Wayman G. Sherrer, Oneonta, for appellee.
HARWOOD, Justice.
Sallie Whited, the executrix of the estate of Glenn H. Holmes, deceased, appeals *22 from a judgment awarding Laura Jean Holmes, the widow of Glenn H. Holmes, an elective share of his estate pursuant to § 43-8-70(a)(2), Ala.Code 1975. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Glenn H. Holmes and Laura Jean Holmes were married on August 9, 1980. They were divorced in the spring of 1991, but they remarried in October 1991. Glenn Holmes died on March 18, 1999, and on March 23, 1999, Whited, the decedent's daughter, filed his will in the probate court. On April 9, 1999, Whited was appointed the executrix of the decedent's estate. On April 27, 1999, Holmes filed a "Petition for Homestead Allowance," pursuant to § 43-8-110, Ala.Code 1975, and a "Petition for Exempt Property," pursuant to § 43-8-111, Ala.Code 1975. Both petitions were granted on June 10, 1999. At some point not specified in the record, Whited filed certain claims against the estate, including one for funeral expenses. As stated in her brief, she also petitioned the court "to include certain assets belonging to the decedent's wife [Holmes] in the estate of the deceased." On October 20, 1999, Whited had the action removed to the circuit court. On August 17, 2000, a hearing was held on Whited's claims. After receiving ore tenus evidence, the circuit court issued an order on November 13, 2000. In pertinent part, the circuit court's order stated:
Whited filed a notice of appeal in the Court of Civil Appeals on December 19, 2000. The Court of Civil Appeals transferred the case to this Court on March 6, 2001, because it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Whited's brief presents two general issues that question (1) the trial court's refusal to include certain real property in the estate and (2) the trial court's refusal to allow certain claims by Whited against the estate and to reduce the value of the estate by the value of items allegedly taken by Holmes. Based upon our review of the arguments presented, Whited actually presents four separate contentions on this appeal: (1) that the trial judge improperly excluded from the estate of the deceased real property owned by Holmes; (2) that the trial court erred in failing to deduct from the estate the funeral expenses before calculating Holmes's elective share; (3) that the trial court erred in failing to deduct certain items from the estate before calculating the elective share; and (4) that the trial court erred in failing to deduct certain sums from Holmes's elective share for items she received from the estate.
Whited's first argument is that the real property described by the trial court as that conveyed to Holmes by her father's heirs, subject to a life estate in her mother, should have been included in the decedent's estate because the property had been used jointly by Holmes and the decedent during their marriage. Whited contends that Beck v. Beck, 564 So. 2d 979 (Ala.Civ.App.1990)(holding that once an asset has been commingled during a marriage, the asset loses its identity and can be considered joint property); Wilson v. Wilson, 404 So. 2d 76 (Ala.Civ.App.1981); and Alston v. Alston, 555 So. 2d 1128 (Ala. Civ.App.1989)(both holding that when property is used for the benefit of the family during marriage, it becomes subject to the trial court's jurisdiction) apply to make the property in question part of the estate.
Whited's reliance on these cases is misplaced. All three cases concern property divisions as a result of a divorce. They do not govern the distribution of property in an estate. The distribution of property in *24 a divorce proceeding, requiring consideration of the separate estate of the spouse requesting alimony or a division of property, is governed by § 30-2-51(a), Ala.Code 1975.[1]See MacKenzie v. MacKenzie, 486 So. 2d 1289 (Ala.Civ.App.1986)(discussing the type of divorce case in which the judge must determine the separate estate of the spouse in order to calculate alimony and property division.) This Code section clearly does not apply to the distribution of property in a decedent's estate.
The deed conveying the property to Holmes contains the following language:
The deed conveys from the grantors, a group which includes the decedent, the grantors' entire interest in the property to Holmes's mother for life, with a remainder in Holmes. Any property interest the decedent may have had before this deed was clearly conveyed to Holmes and her mother, who continues to reside on the property. Therefore, after this conveyance the decedent had no interest in the property, and nothing in the record shows that he ever regained any interest in the property. Whited's arguments based on divorce jurisprudence cannot apply to change this result, and the trial court did not err in refusing to include the property in question in the decedent's estate.
Whited's second argument is that the amount she paid for funeral expenses, which she paid with funds from the estate, should have been deducted from the gross estate before any exemptions or exceptions were calculated. Holmes argues that Whited failed to make a claim for funeral expenses within the prescribed statutory *25 period. Section 43-2-350, Ala.Code 1975, governs the time and manner of filing claims against an estate:
(Emphasis added.) Payment of funeral expenses by a personal representative are debts of a decedent and are properly chargeable against the decedent's estate. See § 43-2-371(1), Ala.Code 1975. See also Gilbreath v. Levi, 270 Ala. 413, 119 So. 2d 210 (1959); Canada v. Canada, 243 Ala. 109, 8 So. 2d 846 (1942); and Wommock v. Davis, 228 Ala. 362, 153 So. 611 (1934).
The trial transcript contains the following exchange between Holmes's attorney and Whited concerning the proceeds of the estate property she sold:
The order of the trial court does not address the $5,324.36 payment made by Whited for funeral expenses. As noted, § 43-2-371(1) dictates that the funeral expenses are the first expenses that should be paid out of the estate prior to distribution, and § 43-2-350 states that the claims of an executor are not subject to the filing requirement of that section. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court should have deducted $5,324.36 from the estate, for funeral expenses, before calculating Holmes's elective share.
Whited's third argument is that the trial court erred in failing to reduce the decedent's estate by the amount of $4,000 for a mortgage she alleges the decedent paid off on the real property in which *26 Holmes's mother has a life estate and she has a remainder interest. However, Whited fails to cite any authority in support of this contention. Rule 28(a)(5), Ala.R.App. P., requires that arguments in briefs contain "citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record relied on." (Emphasis added.) Failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 28(a)(5) requiring citation of authority for arguments provides the Court with a basis for disregarding those arguments:
City of Birmingham v. Business Realty Inv. Co., 722 So. 2d 747, 752 (Ala.1998). See also McLemore v. Fleming, 604 So. 2d 353 (Ala.1992); Stover v. Alabama Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 467 So. 2d 251 (Ala.1985); and Ex parte Riley, 464 So. 2d 92 (Ala. 1985). We also note that the record indicates that the evidence concerning the payment of the $4,000 mortgage was in dispute. The presumption of correctness afforded by the ore tenus rule[3] is therefore applicable to this case. Thus, although the failure to cite authority provides a basis for not considering Whited's argument on this issue, we would also affirm the trial court because Whited has made no showing of palpable error.
Whited's fourth argument is that Holmes's elective share should be reduced by the value of certain items she received from the estate. Whited first claims that the proceeds of the sale of cattle listed in the trial court's order as part of the estate $2,068.49 and $5,340.76[4]should be subtracted from Holmes's elective share because, she says, Holmes has already received those proceeds. However, the record reflects that those cattle were sold before the decedent's death and the proceeds from the sale were deposited in a joint bank account maintained by Holmes and the decedent, subject to a right of survivorship. These funds were properly excluded from the estate as the separate property of Holmes, pursuant to § 5-5A-41, Ala.Code 1975 (governing joint accounts with the right of survivorship).[5] Whited also claims that the value of a bedroom suite, $2,500, a dining room suite, $2,500, and the value of a wood-burning fireplace insert, $900, should be deducted *27 from Holmes's elective share, because, she claims, Holmes is in possession of those items. The record contains sufficient evidence to show that those items were purchased by Holmes, that they are a part of her separate estate, and that they were properly excluded from the estate of the decedent.
Also, as with her third argument, Whited fails to cite authority for any of her claims presented as part of this fourth argument, in violation of Rule 28, Ala. R.App. P. Moreover, she challenges the trial court's findings, which are based on disputed evidence and therefore presumed correct. Nichols, supra. For these reasons also, we conclude that Whited's fourth argument is without merit.
The trial court's order is affirmed except as to its failure to deduct funeral expenses in the calculation of the elective share. Insofar as the judgment of the trail court made no deduction for the funeral expenses in calculating the value of the estate, the judgment must be reversed and the case remanded to the trial court to deduct the amount of the funeral expenses, $5,324.36, from the estate before it calculates Holmes's elective share.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
MOORE, C.J., and SEE, BROWN, and STUART, JJ., concur.
[1]  Section 30-2-51(a) reads as follows:

"(a) If either spouse has no separate estate or if it is insufficient for the maintenance of a spouse, the judge, upon granting a divorce, at his or her discretion, may order to a spouse an allowance out of the estate of the other spouse, taking into consideration the value thereof and the condition of the spouse's family. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the judge may not take into consideration any property acquired prior to the marriage of the parties or by inheritance or gift unless the judge finds from the evidence that the property, or income produced by the property, has been used regularly for the common benefit of the parties during their marriage."
[2]  This one-cent difference is reflected in the trial transcript; the cost of the funeral was $5,324.36.
[3]  "`When a trial court makes findings of fact based on evidence presented ore tenus, those findings of fact will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous or manifestly unjust, and this rule is especially applicable in cases in which the trial court makes its findings of fact after hearing conflicting evidence: every presumption will be indulged in favor of the court's findings, and those findings will not be disturbed unless palpably wrong." Nichols v. Barnette, 528 So. 2d 322, 323 (Ala. 1988), quoting Gulledge v. Frosty Land Foods Int'l, Inc., 414 So. 2d 60, 63 (Ala.1982).
[4]  Although Whited and Holmes, in their briefs before this Court, cite these figures, which total $7,409.25, the trial court's order includes in the estate a total of $6,800 for "Cattle (subsequently sold)." Neither the record nor the briefs explain the discrepancy in these amounts.
[5]  The following exchange took place at trial between Whited's attorney and Holmes:

"QI show you what I have marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 4 and ask you if that is the check you received for the sale of cattle that you sold nine days before [Glenn Holmes] died?
"AIt looks like it.
"QWhat account did that go into?
"ALaura Jean Holmes and Glenn Holmes.
"QWas that account a survivorship account?
"AYes it was."