Title: KING MANUFACTURING v. MEADOWS

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

KING MANUFACTURING v. MEADOWS  KING MANUFACTURING v. MEADOWS 2005 OK 78 127 P.3d 584 Case Number: 100725 Decided: 11/01/2005 As Corrected: November 22, 2005 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA KING MANUFACTURING, and COMPSOURCE OKLAHOMA, Petitioners, v. DARRELL MEADOWS, and THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION COURT, Respondents. CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION III Honorable Richard L. Blanchard, Workers' Compensation Judge ¶0 The respondent, Darrell Meadows (employee) was injured in 1992 and awarded permanent partial disability as a result of the work-related injury. By 1996, the employee's condition had deteriorated and he sought additional benefits due to the change in condition. The workers' compensation court initially denied benefits, determining that the total sum of permanent partial disability was limited to 100% under the law in effect when the change in condition was discovered. A three-judge panel reversed the workers' compensation court and ordered the trial court to apply the law in effect at the time of the initial injury, which did not impose a 100% limit. Subsequently, the trial judge, Honorable Richard L. Blanchard, awarded the employee additional compensation for his impairment based upon the change of condition. The employer appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals vacated and remanded. We hold that: 1) under the facts presented, an award of permanent disability for a change in condition is governed by the statutory language in effect at the time of the initial injury; and 2) appeal related attorney fees are not warranted. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED. Donald A. Bullard, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Petitioners. Joe Farnan, Purcell, Oklahoma, Barry K. Roberts, Norman, Oklahoma, for Respondents. KAUGER, J: ¶1 The primary issue presented is whether a workers compensation award for a change in condition is subject to statutory limits in effect at the time of the initial injury or when the change in condition is discovered. Title ¶2 We hold that: 1) an award of permanent disability for a change in condition is governed by the statutory language in effect at the time of the initial injury; and 2) appeal-related attorney fees are not warranted. UNDISPUTED ¶3 On May 8, 1992, the respondent, Darrell Meadows (employee) was injured in a work related accident while working for King Manufacturing (employer) in Duncan, Oklahoma. The employee injured his arm, shoulders, chest, neck, and leg, when he and two co-workers attempted to carry a 600 pound pipe. ¶4 On February 1, 1995, the workers compensation court determined that the employee had sustained a 57% permanent partial disability ¶5 By June 4, 1996, the employee became aware that his condition had deteriorated. Consequently, on September 13, 1996, he filed a motion, requesting additional benefits due to the change in condition. Various hearings and orders ¶6 On December 1, 2003, a three-judge panel of the workers' compensation court reversed the trial court and ordered it to apply the law in effect at the time of the original injury without regard to the 100% limit. On May 5, 2004, the workers' compensation court awarded the employee additional compensation for impairment based upon the change of condition. I. ¶7 AN AWARD OF PERMANENT DISABILITY FOR A CHANGE IN CONDITION IS GOVERNED BY THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE IN EFFECT AT THE TIME OF THE INITIAL INJURY. ¶8 The employer argues that the statutory limits in effect at the time the employee's change in condition is discovered apply, and that the permanent partial disability award must be limited to a total of 100%. It finds support in two non-precedential opinions ¶9 The employee insists that, because the amount of benefits to which he is entitled affects a substantive right, the statute in effect at the time of his original injury governs. He contends that Cable Vision and Wolfenbarger are factually distinguishable because they involve the procedural question of the timeliness of a motion to reopen, rather than the substantive question of the amount of benefits a claimant is entitled to receive. We agree. ¶10 Both Cable Vision of Muskogee v. Tracy, supra, and Wolfenbarger v. Safeway Stores, Inc., supra, involved the reopening of a workers' compensation claim based on a change of condition and a change in the applicable statute of limitations, ¶11 The general rule is that the law in effect at the time of an employee's injury controls in workers' compensation matters. ¶12 In Cole v. Silverado Foods, Inc., ¶13 The Court went on to recognize that after-enacted legislation that increases or diminishes the amount of recoverable compensation or alters the elements of the claim or defense by imposition of new conditions affects the parties' substantive rights and liabilities. Retroactive application of an amendment affecting such matured rights would materially abridge an employee's right to press for unrecovered elements of a claim. ¶14 Although Cole dealt with a different statute than the one at issue in the present cause, the same rationale applies where a change in the statute clearly affects employees' substantive rights regarding the amount of the recoverable compensation. This rationale is further illustrated in Rivas v. Parkland Manor, ¶15 The Rivas claimant had previous permanent partial disability adjudications which occurred prior to the 1995 change totaling 99.85%. In 1997, the claimant sustained a new work-related injury to his shoulder. The court recognized that §22(7) did not disturb any of the worker's existing or vested rights because his cause could not be maintained prior to the date of injury in 1997. Had the worker in Rivas been injured before the statutory amendment to §22(7), he would have been entitled to the remedy under the pre-1995 statute. ¶16 Here, the provisions of II. ¶17 APPEAL-RELATED ATTORNEY FEES ARE NOT WARRANTED. ¶18 The employee seeks appeal-related attorney fees, arguing that the employers' appeal was frivolous and without merit, citing TRW/Reda Pump v. Brewington, CONCLUSION ¶19 The terms of the Okla. Const., Art. 5, §5425 protect matured rights from the effects of after-enacted legislative change.26 After-enacted legislation that increases or diminishes the amount of recoverable compensation or alters the elements of the claim or defense by imposition of new conditions affects the parties' substantive rights and liabilities.27 The statute in effect at the time of the initial injury governs a claimant's award of permanent disability for a change in condition. Additionally, a patently frivolous appeal is one having no legitimate legal or factual basis and is so totally devoid of merit as to be regarded as facially unworthy of consideration.28 Because the appeal does not appear to be frivolous nor lacking in merit, an award of appeal-related attorney fees is not warranted. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED. WATT, C.J., WINCHESTER, V.C.J., LAVENDER, HARGRAVE, OPALA, KAUGER, EDMONDSON, COLBERT, JJ., concur. TAYLOR, J., dissents. 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