Title: The Florida Bar v. Lijyasu Mahomet Kandekore

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC87538
____________
THE FLORIDA BAR,
Complainant,
vs.
LIJYASU MAHOMET KANDEKORE,
Respondent.
[June 1, 2000]
PER CURIAM.
We have for review the report of the referee recommending that disciplinary
measures be imposed upon respondent, Lijyasu M. Kandekore, for alleged ethical
breaches.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.
FACTS
On April 28, 1995, a New York trial court adjudicated Kandekore guilty of
three offenses: second-degree assault (assaulting a police officer), a felony in the
State of New York; resisting arrest; and driving with impaired ability.  Kandekore’s
felony conviction spawned the following two disciplinary actions by The Florida
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Bar.  
In the first action, case number 86,224, the Bar filed a Notice of
Determination of Guilt pursuant to Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-7.2 seeking
Kandekore’s automatic suspension based upon his New York felony conviction. 
Kandekore filed a Petition to Modify or Terminate Suspension.  On November 1,
1995, this Court stayed Kandekore’s suspension pending the disposition of his
criminal appeal in New York.  When a New York appellate court affirmed the
convictions, this Court lifted the stay and suspended Kandekore.  See Florida Bar v.
Kandekore, 729 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 1999).
The Bar’s second disciplinary action forms the basis of the instant case.  On
March 8, 1996, the Bar filed a complaint against Kandekore pursuant to Rule
Regulating The Florida Bar 3-7.2(j)(2) (providing that a final adjudication of
misconduct by a court in another jurisdiction “shall be sufficient basis for the filing
of a complaint by The Florida Bar . . . without a finding of probable cause under
these rules”).  The Bar asserted that Kandekore had been disbarred in the State of
New York as a result of his felony conviction.  Arguing that Kandekore had violated
Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 4-8.4(b) (prohibiting attorneys from committing
criminal acts which reflect adversely on honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a
lawyer in other respects), the Bar asked this Court to discipline him.  
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The Court appointed a referee to Kandekore’s case and a hearing was held. 
At the hearing, Kandekore presented no evidence.  He only made a request for a
continuance, which the referee denied.  The Bar presented evidence, including the
testimony given at Kandekore’s criminal trial by the law enforcement officer
Kandekore had been convicted of assaulting.  
On August 2, 1996, the referee issued his report.  The referee found that
Kandekore had been convicted of a felony in New York, but that an appeal was
pending.  In light of the fact that the stay imposed in case number 86,224 was still in
effect at the time of his report, the referee recommended that the instant case be
dismissed.  The referee also recommended that the Bar’s request for “reciprocal
discipline” be denied because (1) Kandekore received no hearing prior to his
disbarment in New York, and (2) Kandekore was entitled to the benefit of the
previous stay imposed by this Court.
On June 4, 1997, this Court declined to dismiss the instant case.  Instead, the
Court stayed proceedings against Kandekore pending the outcome of his criminal
appeal in New York as it had done in case number 86,224.  After Kandekore’s New
York convictions were affirmed, the Court lifted the stay in the instant case and
returned the record to the referee for a supplemental report.
In the supplemental report, the referee incorporated the findings of fact from
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his report of August 2, 1996.  The referee recommended that Kandekore be
disbarred and stated that “this recommendation is based on the testimony and
evidence taken on July 26, 1996, together with the affirmance of respondent’s
convictions in the State of New York.”  
Kandekore has petitioned for review.  He presents four arguments as to why
this Court should not adopt the referee’s recommendation.  First, Kandekore claims
that the referee erred in refusing to grant him a continuance.  Second, he argues that
the referee’s failure to grant him a continuance denied him due process. 
Kandekore’s third argument is not entirely clear; however, he appears to argue
either that his New York conviction should not serve as conclusive proof that he
committed a felony, or that his disbarment in New York based on his conviction
should not serve as conclusive proof of the misconduct charged (i.e., assault of a
law enforcement officer).  Fourth, Kandekore asserts that the referee’s
recommendation of disbarment is too severe.  We address each of Kandekore’s
arguments in turn.  
THE PROPRIETY OF THE REFEREE’S REFUSAL TO 
GRANT KANDEKORE A CONTINUANCE
This Court has held in the past that a referee may properly deny an “eleventh
hour” request for a delay in the proceedings.  See Florida Bar v. Pavlick, 504 So. 2d
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1231, 1234 (Fla. 1987); Florida Bar v. Lipman, 497 So. 2d 1165, 1167-68 (Fla.
1986) (finding that “[i]t is within the sound discretion of the referee . . . to grant or
deny a motion for continuance” and that “[s]uch a ruling will not be disturbed by
this Court absent a clear abuse of discretion”).  In Pavlick, The Florida Bar sought a
delay in the proceedings so that it could provide “a more complete version of the
facts.”  504 So. 2d at 1234.  This Court held that the referee did not err in denying
the request since the Bar failed to demonstrate that it could not have obtained this
evidence earlier.  Id.  
In arguing for a continuance, Kandekore neither claimed that he failed to
receive notice of the hearing nor alleged that he was unable to receive the evidence
he wished to present prior to the hearing.  Rather, he appeared totally unprepared,
and failed to offer any explanation as to why, other than stating his belief that the
hearing was “supposed to be an inquiry” and that the Bar was supposed to provide
the referee with “all of the facts.”  In light of Kandekore’s lack of explanation for
his “eleventh hour” request, we conclude that the referee did not abuse his
discretion in denying Kandekore’s request for a continuance.   
THE DUE PROCESS CHALLENGE 
Kandekore next argues that he was denied due process because he was not
allowed to present evidence at the hearing challenging the fairness of the
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proceedings in New York.  He also argues that he was denied due process because
he was not given the opportunity to present evidence in support of mitigation.   See,
e.g., Florida Bar v. Carricarte, 733 So. 2d 975, 979 (Fla. 1999) (“[D]ue process
requires that the attorney be permitted to explain the circumstances of the alleged
offense and to offer testimony in mitigation of any penalty to be imposed."); Pavlick,
504 So. 2d at 1234 (“Due process . . . requires that the accused lawyer shall be
given full opportunity to explain the circumstances and otherwise offer testimony in
excuse or in mitigation of the penalty.”).  
However, contrary to Kandekore’s claims, a properly noticed hearing in this
case was held on July 26, 1996.  At this hearing, Kandekore could have, and should
have, presented mitigating evidence and challenged the fairness of the disciplinary
proceedings in New York.  Instead of doing so, he requested a continuance. 
Kandekore’s erroneous belief that the Bar was supposed to provide the referee with
all of the facts at the hearing does not elevate the referee’s refusal to grant a
continuance to a denial of due process.  Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-7.6(b)
expressly states that proceedings before a referee are adversarial and rule 3-4.1
charges every member of the Bar with notice of the Rules of Discipline.  Therefore,
Kandekore should have known that the Bar would not present “both sides” of his
case at the hearing.  Because Kandekore had the opportunity to present evidence,
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but in effect waived it by arriving at the hearing unprepared, we conclude that
Kandekore was not denied due process.
OUT-OF-STATE PROCEEDINGS SERVING AS CONCLUSIVE PROOF 
IN FLORIDA DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
It is not entirely clear whether Kandekore is arguing that his New York
conviction should not serve as conclusive proof that he committed a felony, or that
his disbarment in New York based on his conviction should not serve as conclusive
proof of the misconduct charged.  For the reasons expressed below, we conclude
that neither argument has merit.  Further, we find that the felony committed by
Kandekore, assault of a law enforcement officer, reflects adversely on his fitness as
a lawyer, thereby violating Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 4-8.4(b).
A.  Whether an out-of-state conviction may serve
 as conclusive proof of the criminal offense charged
Under Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-7.2(b), a conviction serves as
conclusive proof of guilt of the criminal offense charged.  See also R. Regulating
Fla. Bar 3-7.2(i)(3) (providing that “where the underlying criminal charges
constitute felony charges, determinations or judgments of guilt shall . . . constitute
conclusive proof of the criminal offense(s) charged”).  This Court has held that a
referee may not “go behind” a conviction to determine whether or not the attorney is
actually guilty of the offense.  The attorney may only testify as to facts which may
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be considered in mitigation of the sanctions to be imposed.  See Florida Bar v.
Vernell, 374 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1979); Florida Bar v. Horne, 527 So. 2d 816 (Fla.
1988).  Therefore, Kandekore’s felony conviction must be taken as conclusive proof
of the crime he is alleged to have committed, assault of a law enforcement officer,
and he may not challenge the validity of his New York conviction in the instant
proceedings.
B.  Whether an out-of-state disciplinary adjudication of guilt may serve 
as conclusive proof of the misconduct charged
Under Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-4.6, when an attorney is
adjudicated guilty of misconduct by the disciplinary agency of another jurisdiction,
the adjudication serves as conclusive proof of commission of the misconduct
charged.  However, in Florida Bar v. Wilkes, 179 So. 2d 193, 198 (Fla. 1965), this
Court noted that it is not automatically bound by an out-of-state determination of
guilt by a disciplinary agency, and provided the following standard for determining
whether a sister state’s adjudication should be accepted as conclusive:
[W]hen the accused attorney shows that the proceeding in
the foreign state was so deficient or lacking in notice or
opportunity to be heard, that there was such a paucity of
proof, or that there was some other grave reason which
would make it unjust to accept the foreign judgment as
conclusive proof of guilt of the misconduct involved
Florida can elect not to be bound thereby.  
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Id.  The Court expressly noted that “the burden of showing why a foreign judgment
should not operate as conclusive proof of guilt in a Florida disciplinary proceeding
is on the accused attorney.”  Id. (emphasis added).
The standard articulated in Wilkes was applied by this Court in Florida Bar v.
Friedman, 646 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1994).  In Friedman, the State of New York
suspended an attorney for five years for numerous violations.  Id. at 189.  The
Florida Bar then filed a complaint against that attorney based upon the New York
Bar’s action.  Id.  In accepting the New York judgment as binding, and suspending
the attorney until his reinstatement in New York, this Court noted that 
the burden was on Friedman to demonstrate that New
York’s proceedings were deficient.  However, as
determined by the referee, Friedman failed to meet his
burden.  As the referee’s report indicates, Friedman was
given ample opportunity before and during his disciplinary
proceeding to demonstrate any inadequacies in the New
York forum . . . but [he] failed to do so. 
Id. at 190.
In the instant case, Kandekore presented no evidence whatsoever at the
hearing to challenge the fairness or the validity of the disciplinary proceedings in
New York.  Thus, as in Friedman, we conclude that Kandekore has failed to meet
his burden of demonstrating that New York’s disciplinary proceedings were
deficient.  Therefore, we accept New York’s disciplinary adjudication as conclusive
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proof of Kandekore’s commission of the misconduct charged; that is, assault of a
law enforcement officer.  See Wilkes, 179 So. 2d at 198. 
C.  Whether assault of a law enforcement officer violates Rule 4-8.4(b)
Accepting Kandekore’s assault of a law enforcement officer as conclusively
proven does not end our inquiry.  We must next decide whether such conduct
constitutes a criminal act that reflects adversely on Kandekore’s fitness as a lawyer. 
See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-8.4(b).  Generally speaking, the commission of a
violent crime violates rule 4-8.4(b).  For example, in Florida Bar v. Schreiber, 631
So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 1994), based on an attorney’s plea of no contest to charges that he
battered his girlfriend, the Bar charged the attorney with violating rule 4-8.4(b). 
From the testimony given at the evidentiary hearing, the Court concluded that the
Bar proved Schreiber had committed a crime of violence and that his conduct
violated rule 4-8.4(b) because it “affected the perception of the public that the
lawyers of this state do uphold the laws.”  Id. at 1082.  See also R. Regulating Fla.
Bar 4-8.4(b) cmt. (“Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire
criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for offenses that
indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice.  Offenses involving
violence . . . are in that category.”) (emphasis added.).
In this instant case, Kandekore was criminally convicted of assaulting a law
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enforcement officer.  Further, at Kandekore’s disciplinary hearing, the Bar read into
the record the following testimony given at Kandekore’s criminal trial by the officer
who was assaulted:
As I was punched in the chest and punched in the
head with a closed fist, I stepped back for a second and
then I pushed the driver backwards.  I pushed him down
to the ground and I advised him, “Sir, you’re under arrest. 
Stay on the ground.”
He ignored that.  He got up.  He attacked me a
second time and again, I was able to defend myself and
push him back down to the ground and again I reiterated,
“Sir, you’re under arrest.  Stay on the ground.”
He refused.  He got up.  This time he was able to
get lower being I was two steps above him.  He bent
down, grabbed me down around my legs like a football
tackle, and picked me up over his head and body-slammed
me head first into the pavement.
From this and other evidence presented at the Bar’s disciplinary hearing, we
conclude that the Bar has proven Kandekore’s assault of a New York police officer
was a crime of violence, and that Kandekore has violated rule 4-8.4(b).
DISCIPLINE
Under Florida Standard for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 5.11, disbarment is
appropriate when an attorney is “convicted of a felony under applicable law.” 
Kandekore was convicted of a felony in New York, and he bore the burden of
rebutting the presumption that disbarment is the appropriate sanction.  See Pavlick,
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504 So. 2d at 1234.  However, at the July 26, 1996, hearing, Kandekore presented
no evidence or testimony to rebut this presumption or to support his plea for
mitigation.  We therefore elect to impose the same discipline upon Kandekore as
was imposed in New York; that is, disbarment.
Accordingly, Lijyasu Mahomet Kandekore is hereby disbarred effective, nunc
pro tunc, March 10, 1999.  In this Court’s March 10, 1999, order suspending
Kandekore, this Court afforded Kandekore thirty days to close out his practice and
protect the interests of existing clients, and further ordered that Kandekore shall
accept no new business from the date the order was issued.  Accordingly,
Kandekore’s disbarment in the instant case shall take effect on the same date as his
suspension became effective in case number 86,224.  Having considered
Kandekore’s objection to the Bar’s affidavit of costs and the Bar’s response,
judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 650 Apalachee Parkway, Tallahassee,
Florida 32399, for recovery of costs from Kandekore in the amount of $2,186.19,
for which sum let execution issue. 
It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., and SHAW, WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE
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EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS DISBARMENT.
Original Proceeding - The Florida Bar
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, and John Anthony Boggs, Staff Counsel,
Tallahassee, Florida, and Randi Klayman Lazarus, Bar Counsel, Miami, Florida,
       for Complainant
Lijyasu Mahomet Kandekore, pro se, Miami, Florida,
       for Respondent