Title: Poole v. General Motors Corporation et al.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL:09/13/2013
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2013
_________________________
1120629
_________________________
Ex parte General Motors of Canada Limited
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  Gerardo Poole
v.
General Motors Corporation et al.)
(Choctaw Circuit Court, CV-09-900019)
SHAW, Justice.
General Motors of Canada Limited ("GM Canada") petitions
this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Choctaw
1120629
Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in its favor on the
ground that the plaintiff's substitution of GM Canada for a
fictitiously named defendant was made after the expiration of
the applicable statute of limitations and does not relate back
to the filing of the original petition.  We grant the petition
and issue the writ.
Facts and Procedural History
The complaint in the underlying action was filed on April
6, 2009.  It alleged that the plaintiff, Gerardo Poole, was
injured in a motor-vehicle accident that occurred on April 11,
2007.  Poole sought damages on a products-liability claim
against General Motors Corporation n/k/a Motors Liquidation
Company 
("MLC"),  the company that allegedly designed, tested,
made parts of, and distributed the 2004 Chevrolet Impala
automobile that Poole was operating at the time of the
accident, and Stewart Motor Company, the dealership that sold
2
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the vehicle to Poole's mother.   Poole's complaint also
1
included fictitiously named defendants.     
2
On June 10, 2009 –- two months after the expiration of
the two-year statutory limitations period –- Poole sought
leave from the trial court to amend his original complaint to
substitute GM Canada for the fictitiously named defendants. 
General Motors and, thus, MLC filed for bankruptcy
1
protection on June 1, 2009.  In conjunction with that
bankruptcy proceeding, Poole ultimately settled his claim
against MLC.  Nothing in the record before us suggests that GM
Canada participated in that bankruptcy filing.
More specifically, Poole's complaint identified the
2
following fictitiously named defendants:
"Fictitious 
Defendant 
'A' 
[is] 
that 
person,
corporation or other legal entity who or which
designed, 
engineered, 
tested, 
manufactured, 
marketed
and distributed the 2004 Chevrolet Impala or any
components thereof which is the subject matter of
this lawsuit; Fictitious Defendant 'B' [is] that
person, corporation or other legal entity who or
which designed, manufactured, engineered, sold or
otherwise placed into the stream of commerce any
component parts of the 2004 Chevrolet Impala which
is the subject matter of this lawsuit; Fictitious
Defendant 'C' [is] that person, corporation or other
legal entity who tested and developed the warnings
for or developed the manual for the 2004 Chevrolet
Impala which is the subject matter of this lawsuit;
Fictitious 
Defendant 
'D' 
[is] 
that 
person,
corporation or other legal entity whose negligence,
wantonness or other wrongful conduct combined and
concurred with the conduct of the defendants herein
to cause the injuries as alleged herein ...."
3
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In support of that request, Poole's counsel submitted
affidavit testimony indicating that he had been diligently
investigating 
in 
order 
to 
identify 
all 
potentially 
responsible
parties and had, on June 10, 2009, learned for the first time
that the vehicle had been manufactured by GM Canada.   The
3
trial court granted Poole's motion, and, on June 15, 2009,
Poole filed an amendment substituting GM Canada for the
fictitiously named defendants.
GM Canada filed an answer and raised as an affirmative
defense that Poole's claims were barred by the applicable
statute of limitations.  Thereafter, GM Canada sought a
summary judgment in its favor on that ground.  Specifically,
it argued that it was added as a party after the two-year
statute of limitations had expired and that its substitution
as a party did not "relate back" to the date the original
complaint was filed.  Following a hearing, the trial court
denied GM Canada's motion.  GM Canada then petitioned this
Court for a writ of mandamus.
Standard of Review
Poole's counsel stated that he discovered GM Canada's
3
identity by means of an Internet resource.
4
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This Court will issue a writ of mandamus when the
petitioner demonstrates: "(1) a clear legal right to the order
sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform,
accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another
adequate remedy; and (4) the properly invoked jurisdiction of
the court."  Ex parte BOC Group, Inc., 823 So. 2d 1270, 1272
(Ala. 2001).  This Court generally does not review by writ of
mandamus a trial court's decision denying a motion for a
summary judgment; however, an exception exists in situations
like the one before us:
"'... In a narrow class of cases
involving 
fictitious 
parties 
and 
the
relation-back doctrine, this Court has
reviewed the merits of a trial court's
denial of a summary-judgment motion in
which 
a 
defendant 
argued 
that 
the
plaintiff's claim was barred by the
applicable statute of limitations.  See Ex
parte Snow, 764 So. 2d 531 (Ala. 1999)
(issuing the writ and directing the trial
court to enter a summary judgment in favor
of the defendant); Ex parte Stover, 663 So.
2d 948 (Ala. 1995) (reviewing the merits of
the trial court's order denying the
defendant's motion for a summary judgment,
but denying the defendant's petition for a
writ of mandamus); Ex parte FMC Corp., 599
So. 2d 592 (Ala. 1992) (same); Ex parte
Klemawesch, 549 So. 2d 62, 65 (Ala. 1989)
(issuing the writ and directing the trial
court "to set aside its order denying [the
defendant's] motion to quash service or, in
5
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the alternative, to dismiss, and to enter
an order granting the motion")....' 
"Ex parte Jackson, 780 So. 2d 681, [684] (Ala.
2000)."
Ex parte Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 74 So. 3d 424, 427-28 (Ala.
2011).  
Discussion
The parties do not dispute that Poole's claims are
covered by the two-year statute of limitations found in Ala.
Code 1975, § 6-2-38(l).   Poole was injured on April 11, 2007,
4
and his original complaint was timely filed on April 6, 2009. 
It is undisputed that on June 10, 2009, when Poole sought
leave to add GM Canada, the two-year limitations period had
expired.
Rule 9(h), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides a mechanism by which
a party who is "ignorant of the name of an opposing party" may
designate that party by a fictitious name.  When the opposing
party's true name is later discovered, the party may amend the
Although the motor-vehicle accident made the subject of
4
the underlying action actually occurred in Mississippi, the
parties appear to agree that Alabama's statute-of-limitations
provision applies.
6
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pleadings to substitute that true name.   Under Rule 15(c)(4),
5
Ala. R. Civ. P., such an amendment "relates back to the date
of the original pleading when ... relation back is permitted
by 
principles 
applicable 
to 
fictitious 
party 
practice 
pursuant
to Rule 9(h)."  However, the relation-back principle applies
only when the plaintiff "is ignorant of the name of an
opposing party."  Rule 9(h); Harmon v. Blackwood, 623 So. 2d
726, 727 (Ala. 1993) ("In order to invoke the relation-back
principles of Rule 9(h) and Rule 15(c), a plaintiff must ...
be ignorant of the identity of that defendant ...."); Marsh v.
Wenzel, 732 So. 2d 985 (Ala. 1998).
"'The requirement that the plaintiff
be ignorant of the identity of the
fictitiously 
named 
party 
has 
been 
generally
explained as follows: "The correct test is
whether the plaintiff knew, or should have
known, 
or 
was 
on 
notice, 
that 
the
substituted defendants were in fact the
parties described fictitiously." Davis v.
Mims, 510 So. 2d 227, 229 (Ala. 1987)....'
Rule 9(h), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides: 
5
"When a party is ignorant of the name of an opposing
party and so alleges in the party's pleading, the
opposing party may be designated by any name, and
when that party's true name is discovered, the
process and all pleadings and proceedings in the
action may be amended by substituting the true
name."
7
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"Crawford v. Sundback, 678 So. 2d 1057, 1060 (Ala.
1996)."
Mobile Infirmary, 74 So. 3d at 429 (emphasis added).  Thus,
"'[i]f the plaintiff knows the identity of
the 
fictitiously 
named 
parties 
or 
possesses
sufficient facts to lead to the discovery
of their identity at the time of the filing
of the complaint, relation back under
fictitious party practice is not permitted
and the running of the limitations period
is not tolled.'"
74 So. 3d at 430 (quoting Clay v. Walden Joint Venture, 611
So. 2d 254, 256 (Ala. 1992) (emphasis added)).
GM Canada contends that Poole did not act with due
diligence in attempting to discover its identity because, it
argues, Poole and/or his counsel of record should have known
that GM Canada manufactured and/or assembled, at least in
part, the subject vehicle.   Specifically, GM Canada notes
that, pursuant to the Code of Federal Regulations, see 49
C.F.R. § 567 (2000), it was required to affix a label to the
driver's door area of the Impala stating its name as the 
manufacturer of the vehicle.  In its summary-judgment filings
below, GM Canada provided a photograph of the door of the
vehicle depicting a clearly legible label that indicated that
the motor vehicle was "MFD BY GENERAL MOTORS OF CANADA LTD." 
8
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GM Canada thus argues that Poole had sufficient and readily
available facts--via the door label--to lead to the discovery
of its identity.  We agree.   
In Ex parte Mobile Infirmary, supra, the plaintiff, Shaw,
attempted to file a wrongful-death action against several
hospitals who had treated the decedent.  Shaw filed the action
against an entity called Infirmary Health System, Inc.  Later,
after the statutory limitations period had 
run, Shaw attempted
to substitute Mobile Infirmary Association d/b/a Mobile
Infirmary 
Medical 
Center 
("Mobile 
Infirmary") 
for 
a
fictitiously named defendant.  In addressing whether this
substitution related back to the filing of the original
complaint, we stated: 
"As this Court said in Ex parte Snow, 764 So. 2d
531, 537 (Ala. 1999), an amendment substituting a
new defendant in place of a fictitiously named
defendant will relate back to the filing of the
original complaint only if the plaintiff acted with
'due diligence in identifying the fictitiously named
defendant as the party the plaintiff intended to
sue.' Ignorance of the new defendant's identity is
no excuse if the plaintiff should have known the
identity of that defendant when the complaint was
filed....
"....
"The evidence attached to Mobile Infirmary's
summary-judgment motion indicates that Shaw did not
9
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act with due diligence.  When he filed the original
complaint, [the decedent's] family had possessed her
medical records for 20 months, and Shaw had
possessed [the decedent's] medical records for at
least 3 months, including various paperwork from
Mobile 
Infirmary, 
which 
indicated 
that 
[the
decedent] had been admitted to the Medical Center,
had undergone surgery there, and had been treated
there following her surgery.  A reasonably diligent
plaintiff possessing that information should have at
least attempted to identify the corporation doing
business as Mobile Infirmary Medical Center and
include it as a defendant. See  Fulmer v. Clark
Equip. Co., 654 So. 2d 45, 46 (Ala. 1995) (holding
that where plaintiff knew the allegedly defective
forklift was manufactured by 'Clark' and possessed
forklift manuals providing Clark's name but did not
attempt to amend the complaint until after the
limitations period had run, the plaintiff 'did not
act diligently in attempting to learn Clark
Equipment's identity'). As this Court has said,
"'[i]f the plaintiff knows the identity of
the 
fictitiously 
named 
parties 
or 
possesses
sufficient facts to lead to the discovery
of their identity at the time of the filing
of the complaint, relation back under
fictitious party practice is not permitted
and the running of the limitations period
is not tolled.'
"Clay v. Walden Joint Venture, 611 So. 2d 254, 256
(Ala. 1992)."
74 So. 3d at 429-30 (emphasis added).  See also Ex parte
Nationwide Ins. Co., 991 So. 2d 1287, 1291 (Ala. 2008)
(finding that a substitution of a party for a fictitiously
named party did not relate back where the plaintiff could have
10
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discovered an insurer's identity by, among other things,
examining her policy or reviewing an accident report), and
Marsh v. Wenzel, 732 So. 2d 985, 990 (Ala. 1998) (holding that
one could not reasonably conclude that a plaintiff was
ignorant of the name of a pathologist when the pathologist's 
name was set forth in her medical records).
Like the plaintiff in Mobile Infirmary, Poole had a
source of information that would have led him to the identity
of the manufacturer of the Impala--that vehicle's legally
required manufacturer's identification label.  Poole argues,
however, that he nevertheless acted with due diligence in
investigating 
and 
discovering 
GM 
Canada's 
identity. 
Specifically, he argues that his counsel of record had assumed
representation approximately one month before the filing of
the original complaint, and that counsel did not have access
to the vehicle, which, he says, was in the possession of his
prior counsel.    
6
The location of the Impala for the nearly two-year period
6
preceding the filing of the complaint is unclear.  However,
the materials before us suggest that the vehicle was owned by
Poole's mother and that, for a period before and after the
complaint was filed, the vehicle was in the possession of
attorneys retained by Poole.  
11
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The purported lack of possession of an allegedly
defective product that is the subject of a products-liability 
action, this Court has previously held, does not necessarily
excuse the failure to examine it to learn its manufacturer. 
In Jones v. Resorcon, Inc., 604 So. 2d 370 (Ala. 1992), the
plaintiff, Jones, was injured at his place of employment, USX,
by a blower fan.  He attempted to initiate a products-
liability action against the manufacturer of the fan; after
the statute of limitations had run, Jones discovered the name
of, and attempted to substitute, the actual manufacturer of
the fan, Resorcon, Inc., as a party for a fictitiously named
defendant.  
This Court held that Jones had failed to exercise due
diligence in discovering Resorcon's identity.  Specifically,
the blower fan in question was marked with an identification
plate indicating that Resorcon was the manufacturer.  Jones's
counsel had requested from USX the opportunity to inspect the
fan to determine the manufacturer, but his request had been
denied.  We held that the failure of Jones's counsel to do
more to inspect the fan to discover the name of the
manufacturer indicated a lack of due diligence:
12
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"It is relevant to the question of due diligence
that an inspection of the fan would almost certainly
be necessary to maintain the product liability
action against any defendant. If Jones's assertions
that USX refused access are true, then due diligence
would have required an attempt to obtain a
court-ordered inspection."
Jones, 604 So. 2d at 373.  Thus, despite the fact that the
information in question--the identity of the manufacturer of
the fan as disclosed on the identification plate--was held in
the hands of a noncooperative third party, due diligence
required that Jones act to inspect the allegedly defective
product and to discover that information.  See also Fulmer v.
Clark Equip. Co., 654 So. 2d 45, 46 (Ala. 1995) (holding that
the plaintiff failed to exercise due diligence to learn the
identity of a forklift manufacturer because, among other
things, "Clark Equipment forklifts have their names clearly
listed on the nameplate ....").  
In the instant case, unlike Jones, the information needed
by Poole--the identification of the manufacturer of the motor
vehicle as stated on the vehicle--was actually in the
possession of his own agents or his family.  There is no
allegation that either Poole or his subsequent counsel was
denied access to the motor vehicle; instead, Poole's counsel
13
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stated in an affidavit that no one acted to "physically
inspect the vehicle prior to filing the lawsuit."  Further, if
Poole had been denied access to the Impala, under Jones, due
diligence would have required him to seek a court order to
inspect it.
Poole contends that MLC's answer "misled Plaintiff's
Counsel to believe [MLC] was in fact the primary manufacturer
...."  Poole's brief, at 18.   However, we see nothing
7
misleading in MLC's answer, in which it "admit[ted] that it
designed, tested, engineered, in part, manufactured, in part,
marketed and sold to authorized distributors the subject 2004
Chevrolet Impala."  MLC's answer was filed after the
expiration of the applicable limitations period and, as the
emphasized portions above indicate, suggests that MLC
acknowledged only that it was partially responsible for the
vehicle's manufacture.  It does not support the belief that
MLC accepted full –- or even primary -- responsibility for the
manufacture of the alleged defective vehicle, as it appears to
We note that, in the trial court, the affidavit of
7
Poole's counsel stated not that he had been misled, but that
it was his "interpretation" of MLC's answer that "led" him "to
believe" that MLC had manufactured the vehicle.
14
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explicitly state that some additional party was responsible
for other parts of the design, testing, manufacturing, and
marketing process.8
Poole, citing Ex parte Nail, 111 So. 3d 125 (Ala. 2012),
appears to contend that an inspection of the vehicle for
manufacturing information before filing the complaint would
have amounted to more than due diligence.   However, this case
9
presents none of the legibility issues requiring extensive
formal discovery and/or "'detective work'" as was the case in
Nail or in Oliver v. Woodward, 824 So. 2d 693, 699 (Ala.
2001).  Instead, as GM Canada argues, Poole "could have
Poole's counsel also testified that, prior to filing the
8
request to substitute GM Canada for the fictitiously named
defendants, he collected certain evidence regarding the
vehicle, such as an accident report and photographs, and
argues that "all of these documents and 
photographs identified
[MLC] as the proper product liability defendant."  Poole's
brief, at 17.  However, we note that in the trial court it was
asserted that these items did not "reveal[] [GM] Canada as the
manufacturer of the subject vehicle," not that they indicated
that GM Canada was the manufacturer.  We have examined the
evidence cited for this assertion, "'Ex. B' to Def.'s Attach.
7," which appears to be photographs of the Impala; none of
those photographs seems to indicate either MCL or GM Canada as
the manufacturer.
See Ex parte Nail, 111 So. 3d 125, 131 (Ala. 2012) ("'Due
9
diligence 
means 
ordinary, 
rather 
than 
extraordinary,
diligence.'" (quoting United States v. Walker, 546 F. Supp.
805, 811 (D.C. Haw. 1982))). 
15
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discovered 
[GM Canada's] identity ... simply by examining [the
vehicle]."  Ex parte Nationwide Ins. Co., 991 So. 2d 1287,
1291 (2008).  Here, nothing prevented Poole's identification
of GM Canada as a defendant other than his failure to conduct
an inspection of the allegedly defective vehicle.
Because the label on the vehicle, which was required by
law, was conspicuous, legible, and in the possession of
Poole's agents or his family, he should have readily
discovered it, and his failure to do so amounted to a failure 
to act with due diligence.  The "'"undisputed evidence shows
that the plaintiff failed to act with due diligence in
identifying the fictitiously named defendant as the party the
plaintiff intended to sue,"'" Ex parte Mobile Infirmary, 74
So. 3d at 428 (quoting Ex parte Jackson, 780 So. 2d 681, 684
(Ala. 2000), quoting in turn Snow, 764 So. 2d at 537); thus,
the trial court had no discretion to do anything other than to
grant GM Canada's motion seeking a summary judgment in its
favor on 
the 
statute-of-limitations ground.  For the foregoing
reasons, we grant GM Canada's petition and issue a writ of
mandamus directing the Choctaw Circuit Court to enter an order
granting GM Canada's motion for a summary judgment. 
16
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PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Murdock, Main, Wise, and Bryan,
JJ., concur.  
Moore, C.J., dissents.
17
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MOORE, Chief Justice (dissenting). 
I respectfully dissent because General Motors of Canada
Limited ("GM Canada") has not demonstrated that it is entitled
to the writ of mandamus. GM Canada focuses on Gerardo Poole's
burden of demonstrating that he acted with due diligence to
ascertain GM Canada's identity. However, GM Canada has its own
burden "to show that each element required for issuance of the
writ [of mandamus] has been satisfied." Ex parte Patterson,
853 So. 2d 260, 263 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002). GM Canada has not
pleaded the required elements for the issuance of the writ,
let alone demonstrated that each element has been satisfied. 
I. Standard of Review
Our standard for mandamus relief is as follows: 
"A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy,
and one petitioning for it must show: (1) a clear
legal right in the petitioner to the order sought;
(2) an imperative duty on the respondent to perform,
accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly
invoked jurisdiction of the court."
Ex parte Jackson, 780 So. 2d 681, 683 (Ala. 2000). "The
general rule is that '"a writ of mandamus will not issue to
review the merits of an order denying a motion for a summary
judgment."' In all but the most extraordinary cases, an appeal
18
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is an adequate remedy; however, there are exceptions ...." 780
So. 2d at 684 (citation omitted). 
One exception involves fictitiously named parties and the
relation-back doctrine: 
"'[T]he fact that a statute of limitations defense
is applicable is not a proper basis for issuing a
writ of mandamus, due to the availability of a
remedy by appeal.' Subject to a narrow exception,
that statement remains true. In a narrow class of
cases 
involving 
fictitious 
parties 
and 
the
relation-back doctrine, this Court has reviewed the
merits 
of 
a 
trial 
court's 
denial 
of 
a
summary-judgment motion in which a defendant argued
that the plaintiff's claim was barred by the
applicable statute of limitations."
780 So. 2d at 684 (quoting Ex parte Southland Bank, 504 So. 2d
954, 955 (Ala. 1987) (citation omitted)). "'[A] writ of
mandamus is proper ... if the undisputed evidence shows that
the plaintiff failed to act with due diligence in identifying
the fictitiously named defendant as the party the plaintiff
intended to sue.'"•Id. (quoting Ex parte Snow, 764 So. 2d 531,
537 (Ala. 1999)).
GM Canada, however, presents the writ-of-mandamus
standard of review in an extremely truncated fashion. GM
Canada's standard of review and argument omit entirely any
19
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reference to the four elements a petitioner must show in order
for mandamus to lie. 
I also note that it is not enough that GM Canada
demonstrates that this case is one of the "narrow class of
cases involving fictitious parties and the relation-back
doctrine." Ex parte Jackson, 780 So. 2d at 684. Rather, GM
Canada must also demonstrate it satisfies the four elements
necessary for mandamus relief.
II. GM Canada Cannot Show That it is Entitled to Mandamus
Relief
Even if GM Canada carried its burden by properly pleading
its entitlement to the writ of mandamus in this case, I
believe mandamus would not lie. First, GM Canada lacks a clear
legal right to the order sought. The clear legal right must be
an "indisputable right to a particular result." Ex parte
Rudolph, 515 So. 2d 704, 706 (Ala. 1987) (emphasis added).
"[T]he right to the relief sought [must be] clear and certain,
with no reasonable basis for controversy." Ex parte Nissei
Sangyo America, Ltd., 577 So. 2d 912, 914 (Ala. 1991)
(emphasis added). "In a case involving fictitiously named
defendants, the answer to [the] question [whether the
20
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amendment relates back to the filing of the original
complaint] depends upon the plaintiff's conduct."  Ex parte
Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 74 So. 3d 424, 428 (Ala. 2011)
(emphasis added). 
A petitioner can hardly show a clear legal right to a
summary judgment where relevant facts are disputed in the
trial court. "A writ of mandamus is proper ... if the
undisputed evidence shows that the plaintiff failed to act
with due diligence in identifying the fictitiously named
defendant ...." Ex parte Snow, 764 So. 2d 531, 537 (Ala. 1999)
(emphasis added). The main opinion even recognizes the
uncertainty of an important fact in this case: whether Poole
had sufficient and readily available facts to lead to the
discovery of GM Canada's identity. ___ So. 3d at ___.
Specifically, as to who 
possessed the Chevrolet Impala vehicle
at issue, the opinion equivocates, stating on one hand it was
"in the possession of Poole's agents or his family," ___ So.
3d at ___ (emphasis added), while conceding that "[t]he
location of the Impala for the nearly two-year period
preceding the filing of the complaint is unclear. However, the
materials before us suggest that the vehicle was owned by
21
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Poole's mother and that, for a period before and after the
complaint was filed, the vehicle was in the possession of
attorneys retained by Poole." ___So. 3d at ___ n.6.    
According to the record, when Poole's attorney filed the
complaint on April 6, 2009, he was not aware of the location
of the Impala, nor was he aware who had possession of the
vehicle. Poole's attorney also stated that neither "[Poole]
nor anyone acting on [Poole's] behalf had possession of the
vehicle." Indeed, it was not until after the June 10, 2009,
motion to amend the complaint that Poole's attorney learned
that the Impala was in the possession of one of Poole's prior
attorneys. The facts do not indicate whether Poole's prior
attorney acted as the "referring attorney" to Poole's current
attorney or was twice removed from the attorney-client
relationship. Further, the facts do not indicate whether
Poole's prior attorney undertook representation on this
matter, which would make his prior attorney his agent for this
matter. 
With such a significant fact still in dispute, I fail to
see how the main opinion glosses over the question in order to
issue the writ of mandamus here. When there is no clear
22
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factual record on the past possession and location of the
Impala and the label that indicates its manufacturer, there
can be no clear legal right to a summary judgment. 
The main opinion relies primarily upon Jones v. Resorcon,
Inc., 604 So. 2d 370 (Ala. 1992) (concerning a label on a
blower fan), and Fulmer v. Clark Equipment Co., 654 So. 2d 45
(Ala. 1995) (concerning a label on a forklift). In both of
those cases, the presence of a manufacturer's label was only
one aspect of the due-diligence inquiry. In Jones, the
plaintiff went to an industrial plant and visually inspected
a label that identified the fan manufacturer, but read the
label incorrectly. 604 So. 2d at 373. We observed: "When Jones
did begin efforts to determine the true manufacturer, his
efforts were sporadic and ineffectual, and he did not amend to
state a claim against the true manufacturer until September
17, 1991." 604 So. 2d at 374. In Jones, the plaintiff filed a
motion to substitute Resorcon for a fictitiously named
defendant about 14 months after filing his initial complaint
and after he had received the codefendant's answer denying
that it had manufactured the fan. Id. at 372.
23
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In Fulmer, "although Mr. Fulmer talked with three
witnesses concerning the accident, he did not inquire as to
the identity of the manufacturer of the forklift; and ...
[later] learned that the forklift was a 'Clark' model, but
still did nothing calculated to determine the full name of the
manufacturer." 654 So. 2d at 46. The plaintiff in Fulmer
attempted to amend his complaint and substitute Clark
Equipment for a fictitiously named defendant nearly a year
after he had filed his initial complaint. 654 So. 2d at 45. 
Unlike the plaintiff in Jones, Poole was unable to
investigate the vehicle label 
by 
himself, having been rendered
a quadriplegic in the automobile accident. Unlike the
plaintiff in Fulmer, Poole had not learned anything 
indicating
that the Impala was a "GM Canada" model. In contrast to the
plaintiffs' dilatory actions in Jones and Fulmer, Poole's
attorney diligently attempted to discover the manufacturer's
identity. Poole's complaint specifically included as a
fictitiously named defendant that "corporation ... which
designed, engineered, tested, manufactured ... the 2004
Chevrolet Impala." Poole's attorney served discovery with the
initial complaint on General Motors Corporation that sought
24
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the identity of the manufacturer of the Impala. Poole's
attorney later discovered the identity of GM Canada and
immediately filed the motion to substitute GM Canada for the
fictitiously named party. Unlike the 14-month delay in Jones
and the 12-month delay in Fulmer, the delay between Poole's 
filing the initial complaint and his filing the motion to
substitute GM Canada was only 2 months.  
Upon 
consideration 
of 
all 
the 
facts 
before 
us,
"reasonable people could differ as to whether [Poole]
proceeded in a reasonably diligent manner in identifying [GM
Canada]." Ex parte FMC Corp., 599 So. 2d 592, 595 (Ala. 1992).
There is a "reasonable basis for controversy" in the facts 
that renders GM Canada's right to relief unclear and
uncertain. Nissei Sangyo, 577 So. 2d at 914. A plaintiff's due
diligence 
in 
identifying 
a 
fictitiously 
named 
defendant 
should
not be reduced to a one-factor test of whether a car had a
manufacturer's label, and, indeed, in Jones and Fulmer the
Court did not so hold. Because reasonable people could dispute
whether Poole exercised due diligence here, GM Canada does not
have an indisputable or clear legal right to a summary
judgment.
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1120629
 
Second, where there is no "clear legal right" to the
order sought, there can be no imperative duty for the trial
court to act. "[W]here the right sought to be enforced is a
clear legal right, the allowance of which is a matter of
peremptory duty, and not of judicial discretion, there can be
but little doubt or difficulty in determining the propriety of
the remedy by mandamus." Bank of Heflin v. Miles, 294 Ala.
462, 466-67, 318 So. 2d 697, 701 (1975) (emphasis added). The
trial court denied GM Canada's motion for a summary judgment.
"After careful consideration of [GM Canada's] motion and
[Poole's] 
response 
in 
opposition 
and 
his 
supplemental 
report,"
the trial court found that Poole "exercised due diligence in
ascertaining the identity of [GM] Canada and amending the
Complaint to include that Defendant as a party to this
litigation." The trial court in carefully considering GM
Canada's motion did not clearly exceed 
its 
discretion; neither
did the trial court act in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
Here, the evidence simply does not indisputably show that
Poole failed to act with due diligence in identifying GM
Canada as the party to be sued. This Court should not second-
guess the reasonable judgment of the trial court. 
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1120629
Third, GM Canada has not demonstrated that it lacks
another adequate legal remedy. We have previously stated:
"The trial 
court's 
order 
denying 
Dr. 
Jackson 
and
Brookwood's motion for a summary judgment is the
kind of interlocutory order that is appropriate for
review under the procedure set forth in Rule 5, Ala.
R. App. P. Dr. Jackson and Brookwood did not attempt
to use that procedure. If they had asked the trial
court to give the certification required by that
rule and the trial court had refused, this might be
a different case. ... 
"This case is not within an exception to the
rule that a writ of mandamus will not issue to
review the merits of an order denying a motion for
a summary judgment. The petitioners could have
sought permission to appeal that order, but they did
not. Because another adequate remedy, i.e., an
appeal, was available, we deny the petition for the
writ of mandamus."
Ex parte Jackson, 780 So. 2d at 685. Because GM Canada could
have sought permission to appeal the trial court's order under
Rule 5, Ala. R. App. P., and did not, we should deny its
petition for a writ of mandamus. 
III. Conclusion
Because GM Canada completely failed to plead the required
elements for mandamus relief, the Court must deny the writ.
Moreover, if GM Canada had adequately pleaded the required
elements, GM Canada would still not be entitled to the writ.
GM Canada has not demonstrated that Poole indisputably failed
27
1120629
to exercise due diligence in discovering its identity. Thus,
GM Canada, even under the fictitious-party exception, is not
entitled to the writ. I therefore dissent. 
28