Title: Matter of Pansé

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
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SJC-11846 
 
MATTER OF CHANDRAKANT SHRIDHAR PANSÉ. 
 
 
 
October 6, 2015. 
 
 
Attorney at Law, Admission to practice.  Supreme Judicial Court, 
Membership in the bar.  Practice, Civil, Membership in the 
bar. 
 
 
 
On May 13, 2008, Chandrakant Shridhar Pansé applied for 
admission to the Massachusetts bar.  He took and passed the 
written bar examination in July, 2008.  At first, the Board of 
Bar Examiners (board) received no objections to his admission 
and reported him qualified.  Before he could take the oath of 
attorney, however, three attorneys in good standing contacted 
the board, raising significant concerns about whether Pansé "is 
of good moral character and sufficient acquirements and 
qualifications" to warrant admission to the bar.  G. L. c. 221, 
§ 37.  See S.J.C. Rule 3:01, § 5.1, as appearing in 411 Mass. 
1321 (1992).  After two informal interviews with Pansé, an 
investigation by an attorney appointed as special counsel, and a 
formal hearing, the board determined that Pansé was not 
qualified for admission to the bar and recommended that his 
application be dismissed.  S.J.C. Rule 3:01, § 5.3, as appearing 
in 411 Mass. 1321 (1992).  Pansé filed a petition in the county 
court for a hearing on his application.  A single justice of 
this court reserved and reported the matter to the full court.  
We agree with the board. 
 
 
1.  Facts.  In its decision, the board made detailed 
findings of fact, which we summarize here. 
 
 
a.  Divorce and related proceedings.  Pansé and his ex-wife 
had three children.  When they divorced in 2008, Ms. Pansé was 
2 
 
determined to be the primary residential parent for the two 
children who were minors, including their son, M., who is 
intellectually disabled due to Down syndrome.  In the judgment 
of divorce nisi, a judge in the Probate and Family Court found 
Pansé "to be controlling, threatening and emotionally abusive to 
plaintiff/wife and two of their children . . . although he has 
no appreciation of such.  He is, from his perspective, devoted 
to his children . . . but his narcissism and myopic view of all 
relationships have resulted in his inability to note or 
appreciate the harm which he causes."  Pansé has filed numerous 
lawsuits against Ms. Pansé and others, and has filed 
professional complaints against numerous attorneys and judges 
involved in the divorce and related proceedings, each claimed by 
him to be founded in his concern over the care of M.  He has 
repeatedly accused his ex-wife of abusing and neglecting M.; he 
also has accused his ex-wife, her counsel, and a guardian ad 
litem appointed for M. of perjury and of fraudulent actions.  
None of those accusations has ever been substantiated. 
 
 
Pansé's conduct and demeanor during the divorce and related 
proceedings led the three attorneys, each of whom represented 
Ms. Pansé, to object to his admission to the bar.  We need not 
recite all of the details of their interactions with him here.  
According to the board, they described him as "a person of 
vengeance, control, and intimidation who misused the legal 
system at the expense of his family and others" and "not[ed] a 
belief that [he] would use his license to practice to harm 
others."  Based on their testimony at the formal hearing, the 
board found that Pansé "consistently relied on personal attacks 
to justify his actions and to defend perceived criticisms 
against him, additionally filing complaints against members of 
the bar who challenge his positions."  The record is replete 
with examples of his doing so.  Indeed, it became necessary to 
reschedule the formal hearing when Pansé filed professional 
complaints against the objecting attorneys and others; the Board 
of Bar Overseers closed those complaints without further action. 
 
 
Relatedly, Pansé's ex-wife obtained a temporary abuse 
prevention order against him pursuant to G. L. c. 209A.  When 
the matter was heard in the District Court, Pansé claimed that 
the temporary order had been obtained fraudulently.  Rather than 
substantiating that claim, however, Pansé pressed irrelevant 
arguments that his ex-wife was a poor mother to M., even after 
being admonished by the judge to focus on the issue at hand.  
One year later, at a hearing seeking an extension of the c. 209A 
order, Pansé again resorted to irrelevant personal attacks on 
her character and honesty. 
3 
 
 
 
In addition, after the c. 209A order was issued, Pansé 
commenced an action in the United States District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts, challenging the validity of the 
statute and claiming constitutional and civil rights violations.  
His complaint in the Federal court contained invective and 
personal attacks against his ex-wife, and the action failed on 
all counts, as did his appeal to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit.  The First Circuit found his 
appeal to be frivolous and ordered him to pay sanctions to his 
ex-wife and her counsel.  Pansé unsuccessfully petitioned in the 
United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.  He did 
not comply with the First Circuit's order until after the 
initiation of the board's investigation in this case of his 
qualifications for admission to the bar. 
 
 
b.  Other proceedings.  Apart from the divorce and other 
proceedings, Pansé has been involved in several other civil 
actions, some of which were not fully disclosed in his 
application for admission to the bar.  As the board found, Pansé 
repeatedly engaged in ad hominem attacks in those cases.  In a 
lawsuit he brought against his former employer, the 
Massachusetts Bay Community College, Pansé described the 
president of the college as a "reject from Montana."  He also 
accused several defendants of lying and filing "malicious and 
fraudulent" reports, described some defendants as "morally 
challenged," and stated that the office of the Attorney General 
was "unethical" and had engaged in "repeated misconduct."  He 
also accused the college's counsel of producing a witness "to 
lie wildly under oath."  The board found that his actions 
"demonstrate a repetitive pattern of abusive and litigious 
behavior against litigants, counsel, judges and others who 
assume a contrary position" and that "Pansé does not appear to 
be remorseful, or, for that matter, capable of reflecting on the 
consequences of his behavior." 
 
 
2.  Discussion.  "While deference is given to the decision 
of the board, this court retains ultimate authority to decide a 
person's fitness to practice law in the Commonwealth.  G. L. 
c. 221, § 37."  Strigler v. Board of Bar Examiners, 448 Mass. 
1027, 1029 (2007), quoting Matter of Prager, 422 Mass. 86, 91 
(1996).  "Any significant doubts about an applicant's character 
should be resolved in favor of protecting the public by denying 
admission to the applicant."  Strigler, supra, quoting Matter of 
an Application for Admission to the Bar, 444 Mass. 393, 397 
(2005).  The board found on several grounds that Pansé lacked 
the honesty and good moral character necessary to practice law.  
4 
 
It found that Pansé demonstrated a lack of candor by failing to 
disclose litigation to which he was a party or by failing to 
describe the circumstances fully; that he demonstrated a 
willingness to abuse the legal system for purposes of harassment 
and intimidation of individuals with whom he has a dispute; that 
his repeated reliance on personal attacks, as well as 
professional complaints against members of the bar who challenge 
his positions, further demonstrate a lack of civility and 
professionalism; and that despite his full awareness of the 
board's concerns about his fitness to practice law, he failed to 
express remorse or insight into his actions or to assure the 
board that he would have the ability to comport himself in a 
civil and professional manner.  The record amply supports this 
assessment.  Even in his brief to this court, Pansé continues to 
resort to personal attacks and invective, going so far as to 
accuse the board of aiding and abetting the alleged "felony 
endangerment and felony abuse" of M.1  This does nothing to 
assure us that Pansé possesses the good character necessary to 
practice law. 
 
 
In addition, Pansé argues that the proceedings were unduly 
delayed.  The board attributes any delay to the volume of 
records, the necessity of accommodating multiple attorneys' 
schedules, and Pansé's own actions.  Regardless of the reasons 
for the delay, Pansé has not shown that the delay was 
prejudicial to him in any way.  For example, he does not 
identify any evidence that was lost or any witnesses that have 
become unavailable.  Moreover, "[e]ven if the board's 
proceedings were defective in some way, [Pansé] would still have 
to convince this court that he possesses the moral character 
necessary to practice law in this Commonwealth."  Strigler, 448 
Mass. at 1030.  Despite having had ample opportunity, Pansé has 
not done so. 
 
 
A judgment shall enter in the county court affirming the 
determination of the board and denying Pansé's application for 
admission to the bar. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
Chandrakant Shridhar Pansé, pro se. 
 
Elizabeth H. Kelly for Board of Bar Examiners. 
 
                     
 
1 As noted, Pansé's claims that M. is suffering abuse or 
neglect have never been substantiated.