Title: STATE v SANDERSON

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

TJo. 83-3558 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1 9 8 4 STATE OF MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t , -vs- KENT ALLEN SATJDERSON I D e f e n d a n t and A p p e l l a n t . APPEAL FROM: D i s t r i c t C o u r t of the T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and for t h e C o u n t y of C a r b o n , T h e H o n o r a b l e D i a n e G. B a r z , Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: For A p p e l l a n t : K i n n a r d & W o o d w a r d ; V e r n W o o d w a r d argued, B i l l i n g s , M o n t a n a F o r R e s p o n d e n t : M a r k M u r p h y argued, Special D e p u t y C o u n t y A t t y . for C a r b o n C o u n t y & A s s t . A t t y . G e n e r a l , H e l e n a C l a y S m i t h argued, A s s t . A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana ON REHEARING F i l e d : 3kII 4 S u b m i t t e d : N o v e m b e r 21, 1 9 8 4 Decided: January 4 , 198& -- - C l e r k : I . J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of t h e C o u r t . A p p e l l a n t , K e n t A l l e n S a n d e r s o n , a p p e a l s f r o m a judgment on a j u r y v e r d i c t of g u i l t y of s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t c o n s e n t . The T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t C o u r t , Carbon County, s e n t e n c e d him t o t e n y e a r s on t h e o n e c o u n t . Ide a f f i r m . W e handed down t h e o r i g i n a l O p i n i o n i n t h i s c a u s e on November 9, 1984. S u b s e q u e n t l y a p e t i t i o n f o r r e h e a r i n g and r e s p o n s e t o t h a t p e t i t i o n were f i l e d w i t h t h i s C o u r t . A f t e r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n , w e have c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e O p i n i o n s h o u l d b e r e v i s e d . A s a r e s u l t w e now w i t h d r a w t h e o r i g i n a l Opinion which was d e c i d e d November 8, 1984, and s u b s t i t u t e t h e r e f o r t h e f o l l o w i n g O p i n i o n . T h e r e a r e e s s e n t i a l l y t h r e e p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d i n t h i s c a s e : t h e d e f e n d a n t , t h e v i c t i m and t h e v i c t i m ' s b e s t f r i e n d . Because t h e v i c t i m and h e r f r i e n d were j u s t s i x t e e n y e a r s of a g e a t t h e t i m e o f t h e i n c i d e n t we s h a l l r e f e r t o them by t h e i r i n i t i a l s : K.D. and D . J . r e s p e c t i v e l y . K.D. began h e r morning on March 29, 1982, b y d r i v i n g h e r mother t o work and h e r younger s i s t e r t o s c h o o l . She t h e n met h e r b e s t f r i e n d , D.J., and t h e two o f them d e c i d e d n o t t o a t t e n d c l a s s e s t h a t d a y . They w e r e b o t h j u n i o r s a t a B i L l i n g s h i g h s c h o o l . A d e c i s i o n was made t o d r i v e t o Red Lodge where t h e y e x p e c t e d t o meet w i t h some f r i e n d s who had gone s k i i n g f o r t h e day. Around 10:0GI a.m. t h e two g i r l s l e f t B i l l i n g s and p r o c e e d e d e a s t t o L a u r e l on t h e f r e e w a y and t h e n s o u t h toward Red Lodge. About f i v e m i l e s s o u t h o f L a u r e l , t h e c a r b r o k e down and e v e n t u a l l y a van d r i v e n by a p p e l l a n t S a n d e r s o n s t o p p e d . A f t e r examining t h e c a r and t r y i n g u n s u c c e s s f u l l y t o s t a r t i t , S a n d e r s o n o f f e r e d t h e g i r l s a r i d e i n t o L a u r e l . T h e r e , h e s a i d , h e would a t t e m p t t o l o c a t e a tow c h a i n s o t h e y c o u l d tow t h e c a r i n t o town. S a n d e r s o n had o r i g i n a l l y i n t e n d e d t o c a s h a c h e c k i n L a u r e l s o t h e t r i o ' s f i r s t s t o p was a t a bank. From t h e r e t h e y d r o v e t o A d e l i n e ' s C a f e where S a n d e r s o n met a f r i e n d whom h e t h o u g h t m i g h t e i t h e r h a v e a c c e s s t o a tow c h a i n o r know where one m i g h t be found. According t o S a n d e r s o n ' s t e s t i m o n y i t was h e r e t h e g i r l s i n d i c a t e d t h e y were s t u d e n t s a t E a s t e r n Montana C o l l e g e . The p a r t y s t o p p e d a t t h e Suds Iiut, a l o c a l t a v e r n , where S a n d e r s o n bought a p i t c h e r of b e e r . K.D. t e s t i f i e d t h a t S a n d e r s o n t o l d h e r and D . J . i f anyone a s k e d them f o r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n b e c a u s e o f t h e b e e r t h e y s h o u l d s a y t h e y were c o l l e g e s t u d e n t s b u t d i d n o t h a v e a n y i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h them. I t was K . D . ' s c o n t e n t i o n a t t r i a l t h a t S a n d e r s o n knew s h e and U . J . were h i g h s c h o o l s t u d e n t s . S a n d e r s o n , on t h e o t h e r hand, r e i t e r a t e d h i s b e l i e f t h a t t h e y were e i g h t e e n o r n i n e t e e n y e a r s o l d and were c o l l e g e s t u d e n t s . E v e r y o n e a g r e e d t h a t w h i l e a t t h e S u d s H u t t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n t u r n e d t o d r u g s . K.D. t e s t i f i e d t h a t a f a i r l y l i v e l y c o n v e r s a t i o n o c c u r r e d between D . J . and S a n d e r s o n c o n c e r n i n g t h e s a l e of m a r i j u a n a . K.D. d e n i e d t a k i n g p a r t i n t h a t c o n v e r s a t i o n . D . J . , however, s a i d b o t h s h e and K.D. c o n v e r s e d w i t h S a n d e r s o n a b o u t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f s e l l i n g d r u g s . S a n d e r s o n ' s s t o r y is a b i t d i f f e r e n t . According t o h i s t e s t i m o n y , K.D. t o l d him t h e y were n o t r e a l l y g o i n g t o Red Lodge t o s k i b u t were g o i n g t o p i c k up some m e s c a l i n e . S a n d e r s o n s a i d h e t o l d t h e g i r l s h e c o u l d g e t some m a r i j u a n a f o r them t o s e l l and t h e y t o l d him t h e y c o u l d s e l l a pound. Prom t h e Suds Nut t h e t r i o went a c r o s s the s t r e e t t o a c o n v e n i e n c e s t o r e where S a n d e r s o n b o u g h t b e e r and wine. They d r o v e from t h e r e t o t h e Pa11n Beach Supper C l u b a n d , a c c o r d i n g t o S a n d e r s o n , t h e y smoked two m a r i j u a n a c i g a r e t t e s , o r j o i n t s , on t h e way. The p u r p o s e o f t h e s t o p a t t h e s u p p e r c l u b was f o r S a n d e r s o n t o make a t e l e p h o n e c a l l t o s e t up a d e a l t o o b t a i n a q u a n t i t y of m a r i j u a n a f o r t h e g i r l s t o s e l l . The c o n t a c t , who worked a t a r a n c h , s a i d h e had a s m a l l sample on hand. S a n d e r s o n t e s t i f i e d t h a t a f t e r o b t a i n i n g a c h a i n a t a s e r v i c e s t a t i o n , t h e y d r o v e t o t h e r a n c h where t h e y were g i v e n a o n e - h a l f o u n c e bag o f m a r i j u a n a t o sample. Then, S a n d e r s o n s a i d , t h e y d r o v e t o t h e g i r l ' s p a r k e d c a r . Everyone a g r e e d t h a t o n c e t h e y r e a c h e d t h e p a r k e d c a r t h e y c o u l d n o t f i n d a p l a c e t o hook t h e c h a i n . They were a b l e t o s t a r t t h e c a r , however, and d r o v e i t a s h o r t d i s t a n c e b e f o r e i t q u i t a g a i n . They d e c i d e d t o l e a v e it p a r k e d a l o n g s i d e t h e r o a d . According t o S a n d e r s o n ' s t e s t i m o n y , a f t e r l e a v i n g t h e s t a l l e d c a r t h e second t i m e t h e y r e t u r n e d t o t h e Palm Beach s u p p e r c l u b . S i n c e i t was a p p r o x i m a t e l y 3:00 p.m., t h e time t h e y n o r m a l l y would r e t u r n home from s c h o o l , t h e g i r l s t h o u g h t t h e y s h o u l d c a l l home. S a n d e r s o n l o a n e d them money t o c a l l . Now, S a n d e r s o n s a i d , t h e y d r o v e t o t h e r a n c h and o b t a i n e d t h e pound o f m a r i j u a n a f o r t h e g i r l s t o s e l l . S a n d e r s o n a l s o s t a t e d t h a t i t seemed t o him t h e g i r l s were more i n t e r e s t e d i n g e t t i n g t h e pound o f m a r i j u a n a t h a n t h e y were i n g e t t i n g t h e i r c a r home. Once t h e y had t h e m a r i j u a n a i n hand t h e t h r e e p a r t i e s began t h e t r i p back t o L a u r e l . S a n d e r s o n t e s t i f i e d t h a t o n t h e way t o Laurel. he p u l l e d o f f t h e road a t a b r i c k house, l a t e r i d e n t i f i e d a s t h e Donald Blackburn r e s i d e n c e . He t e s t i f i e d he stopped t o t a l k t o t h e g i r l s about when and where he could pick up t h e money t h e g i r l s would ul.timately r e a l i z e from t h e s a l e of t h e marijuana. Sanderson s a i d h e emphasized t h e f a c t t o t h e g i r l s t h a t he r e a l l y wanted t o t r u s t them t o g e t t h e money f o r him s i n c e he was g i v i n g t h e marijuana t o them on c r e d i t . He a l s o admitted t e l l i n g them i f he d i d n o t g e t t h e money back from them t h e n somebody e l s e would, a statement t h e g i r l s s a i d t h e y perceived a s a t h r e a t . H e f u r t h e r admitted a t t r i a l t h a t he may have been s u g g e s t i v e a t t h i s p o i n t i n t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n . Sanderson i n s l s t s a t t h i s p o i n t K.D. asked him i f sex would h e l p him t r u s t her f o r t h e pound of marijuana. He t e s t i f i e d s h e t h e n took h e r p a n t s o f f and had i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h him i n t h e back of t h e van, b u t o n l y once. He s a i d D . J . was i n t h e f r o n t o f t h e van d u r i n g t h e a c t . F i n a l l y , Sanderson t e s t i f i e d t h a t he took t h e g i r l s t o Laurel and l e f t them a t t h e Safeway s t o r e . Tracing t h e g i r l s ' testimony from t h e p o i n t where t h e second a t t e m p t t o s t a r t t h e c a r was made, a somewhat d i f f e r e n t account of e v e n t s unfolds. K.D. t e s t i f i e d t h a t a f t e r s h e and D.J. abandoned t h e c a r f o r t h e second t i m e , t h e y r e t u r n e d t o t h e Palm Beach supper c l u b w i t h Sanderson. Both g i r l s c a l l e d t h e i r mothers with money borrowed from Sanderson. Sanderson t o l d them h i s f a t h e r had a f i f t h - w h e e l t r a i l e r t h a t he might be a b l e t o borrow t o use t o h a u l t h e c a r i n t o town. The t r i o drove from t h e supper c l u b t o a s p o t along t h e r i v e r where t h e y a l l smoked some m a r i j u a n a b e f o r e proceeding t o t h e E l Rancho Inn. K.D. saw a c l o c k a t t h a t l o c a t i o n and n o t i c e d i t was 5330 p.m. Prom t h e r e t h e t h r e e d r o v e t o t h e r a n c h and were u n s u c c e s s f u l i n o b t a i n i n g t h e t r a i l e r . R e t u r n i n g from t h e r a n c h , K.D. s a i d S a n d e r s o n p a r k e d t h e van i n a d r i v e w a y n e a r a b r i c k h o u s e and j u s t s a t t h e r e f o r s e v e r a l m i n u t e s w i t h o u t t a l k i n g . H e t h e n g o t i n t o t h e back o f t h e van w i t h t h e g i r l s and t o l d t h e g i r l s t h e y were g o i n g t o s e l l t h e m a r i j u a n a f o r him. They r e f u s e d , and S a n d e r s o n g r a b b e d D . J . and pushed h e r t o t h e back o f t h e v a n . K.D. t r i e d t o g e t o u t o f t h e v a n b u t was p r e v e n t e d from d o i n g s o when S a n d e r s o n g r a b b e d h e r arm and t w i s t e d i t b e h i n d h e r back. K.D. s a i d s h e c o n t i n u e d t o t r y t o e s c a p e b u t D . J . t o l d h e r t o s t o p f o r f e a r t h a t S a n d e r s o n would h u r t them. D . J . a l s o t e s t i f i e d S a n d e r s o n k e p t s a y i n g h e was d o i n g t h i s t o see i f h e c o u l d t r u s t them. K.D. s a i d S a n d e r s o n pushed b o t h o f them t o t h e f l o o r of t h e v a n and l a i d on t o p o f b o t h o f them s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . H e began k i s s i n g and f o n d l i n g D.J., b u t s t o p p e d when s h e t o l d him s h e was m e n s t r u a t i n g . S a n d e r s o n t h e n t u r n e d h i s a t t e n t i o n t o K.. According t o K.D. I s a c c o u n t , S a n d e r s o n t o o k h e r p a n t s o f f and had s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h h e r and t h e n g o t o f f o f h e r , b e g a n k i s s i n g D.J. a g a i n a n d t h e n h a d s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h K.D. f o r a second time. A f t e r t h e s e c o n d a c t o f s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e , S a n d e r s o n d r o v e t h e g i r l s t o B i l l i n g s and dropped them o f f a t t h e H o l i d a y I n n . I n t h e i r s t a t e m e n t s t o a u t h o r i t i e s , t h e two g i r l s a t f i r s t g a v e c o n f l i c t i n g s t o r i e s . K . D . ' s s t o r y was b a s i c a l l y a s r e l a t e d above. D . J . , on t h e o t h e r h a n d , i n i t i a l l y t o l d l a w e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i c e r s t h a t a t h i r d g i r l had accompanied them t o L a u r e l . She l a t e r a d m i t t e d t h a t was a l i e d e s i g n e d f o r t h e b e n e f i t o f h e r p a r e n t s . She had s a i d t h e r e a s o n t h e y went t o Laurel was t o g i v e t h e g i r l a r i d e home. Appellant Sanderson p r e s e n t s t h e following i s s u e s on appeal : (1) Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d by d e n y i n g a p p e l l a n t ' s motion t o d i s m i s s f o r l a c k of a speedy t r i a l . ( 2 ) Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d . by d e n y i n g a p p e l l a n t ' s motion t o p r o v i d e f o r a t t e n d a n c e o f a w i t n e s s . ( 3 ) Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court committed r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r by f a i l i n g t o g i v e a p p e l l a n t ' s o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n No. 8 concerning p r i o r i n c o n s i s t e n t s t a t e m e n t s . ( 4 ) Whether t h e v e r d i c t s rendered and t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d a r e s o i n c o n s i s t e n t a s t o i n v a l i d a t e t h e v e r d i c t of g u i l t y on count one of t h e i n f o r m a t i o n . ( 5 ) Whether t h e c l o s i n g argument of t h e S t a t e v i o l a t e d a p p e l l a n t ' s r i g h t t o a f a i r t r i a l . ( 6 ) Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court committed r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r by f a i l i n g t o g i v e a p p e l l a n t ' s o f f e r e d i n s t u r c t i o n No. 11 s e t t i n g E o r t h t h e m a t e r i a l a l l e g a t i o n s o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n . ( 7 ) Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court committed r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r by denying a p p e l l a n t ' s motion t o s u p p r e s s evidence. I Appellant a r g u e s t h a t because of t h e 391 day d e l a y from t h e time of a r r e s t on March 3 8 , 1982, u n t i l t h e commencement of t r i a l on A p r i l 2 5 , 1983, he was denied h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l . W e d i s a g r e e . Appellant was a r r e s t e d on March 3fl, 1982, a r r a i g n e d on A p r i l 5, 1982 and then r e l e a s e d on b a i l . T r i a l was o r i g i n a l l y s e t f o r June 21, 1982 b u t on June 8 , 1982, appellant, through his original counsel, requested and received a continuance of the trial date until August 16, 1982. On July 13, 1982, appellant's bond was revoked and he was reincarcerated in the Carbon County Jail were he remained until being released on his own recognizance on August 2, 1982. On August 24, 1982, appellant asked for and received a second continuance of at least sixty days. Plea negotiations further delayed matters and on December 22, the trial judge received notice from Sanderson stating he did not want to accept the negotiated plea arrangement. In that same letter Sanderson's attorney stated his intention to withdraw as his attorney. Appointment as deputy county attorney for Carbon county was cited as the reason for the withdrawal. On January 12, 1983, Sanderson's new attorney was appointed. By order mailed January 31, 1983, the District Court set appellant's trial date for April 25, 1983. On March 17, 1983, appellant's counsel filed a motion to dismiss on the basis appellant had been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The District Court denied the motion on April 19, 1983, and trial commenced on April 25, 1983. The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by both the Sixth Amzndment to the United States Constitution and by Article 11, section 24 of the 1972 Montana Constitution. Yoreover, the federal provision has been imposed upon the several states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Klopfer v. North Carolina (1967), 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1. Having established appellant's right to a speedy t r i a l , w e now c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r t h a t r i g h t h a s been d e n i e d . Both a p p e l l a n t and r e s p o n d e n t a g r e e t h a t t h e t e s t t o he used i n d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r t h e r i g h t t o a s p e e d y t r i a l h a s been d e n i e d was e n u n c i a t e d more t h a n a d e c a d e ago b y t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i n B a r k e r v. Wingo ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 487 1J.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d l n l . I n t h a t d e c i s i o n t h e C o u r t s t a t e d : "The a p p r o a c h w e a c c e p t is a b a l a n c i n g test i n which t h e c o n d u c t o f b o t h t h e p r o s e c u t i o n and d e f e n d a n t a r e weighed. " A b a l a n c i n g t e s t n e c e s s a r i l y c o m p e l s c o u r t s t o a p p r o a c h s p e e d y t r i a l c a s e s on an ad hoc b a s i s , W e c a n do l i t t l e more t h a n i d e n t i f y some o f t h e f a c t o r s which c o u r t s s h o u l d a s s e s s i n d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r a p a r t i c u l a r d e f e n d a n t h a s been d e p r i v e d o f h i s r i g h t . Though some m i g h t e x p r e s s t h e m i n d i f f e r e n t w a y s , w e i d e n t i f y f o u r s u c h f a c t o r s : Length o f d e l a y , t h e r e a s o n f o r t h e d e l a y , t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s a s s e r t i o n o f h i s r i g h t , and p r e j u d i c e t o t h e d e f e n d a n t . " B a r k e r 4fl7 1J.S. a t 530. A f t e r some e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e f o u r f a c t o r s t h e C o u r t c o n t i n u e s : "We r e g a r d n o n e o f t h e f o u r f a c t o r s i d e n t i f i e d above a s e i t h e r a n e c e s s a r y o r s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n t o t h e f i n d i n g s o f a d e p r i v a t i o n o f t h e r i g h t o f s p e e d y t r i a l . R a t h e r , t h e y a r e r e l a t e d f a c t o r s and must be c o n s i d e r e d t o g e t h e r w i t h s u c h o t h e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s a s may b e r e l e v a n t . I n sum, t h e s e f a c t o r s h a v e no t a l i s m a n i c q u a l i t i e s ; c o u r t s must s t i l l e n g a g e i n a d i f f i c u l t a n d s e n s i t i v e b a l a n c i n g p r o c e s s . " B a r k e r , 487 U.S. a t 533. I n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e it is e s s e n t i a l t h a t we c a r e f u l l y e n g a g e i n t h e d i f f i c u l t and s e n s i t i v e b a l a n c i n g p r o c e s s which is d e s c r i b e d i n B a r k e r . W e n o t e t h a t t h i s C o u r t i n i t i a l l y r e l i e d on B a r k e r i n S t a t e v. S a n d e r s o n ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 163 Mont. 209, 516 P.2d 372, i n which we a d o p t e d t h e u s a g e o f t h e f o u r f a c t o r s a n d t h e b a l a n c i n g t e s t w h i c h i s n e c e s s a r y i n reaching a final conclusion. We note that the delay here was 390 days which is sufficient to trigger a speedy trial inquiry. State v. Kel-ly (Mont. 19831, 661 P.2d 26, 40 St.Rep. 364. We conclude that the reasons given for the delay were not sufficient to terminate our inquiry at that point. In addition the State agrees with the defendant's contention that he asserted his right within the appropriate time. This leaves as the only remaining Barker factor, the question of prejudice. The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Ewell (1966), 383 U.S. 116, @S.Ct. 773, 15 L.Ed.2d 627, set forth three interests which the Sixth Amendment was designed to protect in cases such as these. The first was the question of undue and oppressive incarceration. Here the defendant was incarcerated for twenty-seven days which the record does not disclose to be oppressive. The next factor is the presence of significant anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation. While defendant did testify as to his anxiety, there is substantial evidence in the record to allow the District Court to conclude that in fact his anxiety was very limited. However, we do not turn the case on this point. We do note that there was nothing in the record to justify the conclusion that the defense of the defendant was impaired. While defendant argued that there were diminished memories on the part of his witnesses and that a key witness moved out of the state, the prosecution showed that the key witness left the state in August, 1982, and his absence was not caused by any delay in trial. This was buttressed by the failure on the part of the defendant to attempt to depose or otherwise preserve testimony of witnesses. As a part of the balancing process required under Barker, we have reviewed the record with regard to the trial delay, and have concluded that there is substantial evidence to show that the defendant may not have wanted a speedy trial and that the defendant in fact was responsible for the delay in substantial part. As a result we have concluded that defendant is in a position similar to Mr. Barker in Barker - v. Wingo in that the record demonstrates that the defendant did not really desire a speedy trial. While this is a close and difficult question, applying the sensitive balancing process required under Barker, we conclude that the defendant in this case was not deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Appellant's second issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred by denying his motion to provide for attendance of a witness. On 21, four days before trial, counsel for appellant filed a motion to provide for the attendance of a defense witness, Stevenson, who was at that time residing in Massachusetts. The State resisted the motion on the grounds that another defense witness would testify to the same facts. Because of that redundancy, coupled with cost considerations, the motion was denied. The State contends the motion was properly denied for two reasons. First, appellant failed to compl-y with the procedure for subpoenaing out-of-state witnesses as set forth in section 46-15-113, MCA. Second, the out-of-state witness would have duplicated testimony already at hand and as such would not have qualified as a material witness under the statute. The appellant insists he was denied due process by the District Court's failure to provide for the attendance of the witness. According to appellant access to the witness was denied solely on the basis of county financial consideration, and cites a long line of United States Supreme Court cases to buttress his due process claim. According t o s e c t i o n 46-15-113, MCA, t h e d e c i s i o n whether t o compel t h e a t t e n d a n c e of an o u t - o f - s t a t e w i t n e s s r e s t s s o l e l y w i t h i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l c o u r t judge. T h i s Court has addressed s e c t i o n 46-15-113, MCA, o n l y once and t h e n i n a manner u n r e l a t e d t o t h e i s s u e b e f o r e us today. The Court of Appeals of New York, People v. NcCartney ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 38 N.Y.2d 618, 345 N.E.2d 326, 381 N.Y.S.2d 855, found i t s e l f f a c e t o f a c e w i t h a s t a t u t e almost i d e n t i c a l t o o u r s : "A r e q u e s t t h a t t h e T r i a l Judge i s s u e a c e r t i f i c a t e p u r s u a n t t o [ t h e s t a t u t e ] s e e k i n g t h e compulsory a t t e n d a n c e of a w i t n e s s i n a n o t h e r s t a t e is addressed t o t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l judge." T h a t Court f u r t h e r h e l d t h a t " . . . i n t h e absence of an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n w e may n o t o v e r t u r n [ t h e t r i a l j u d g e ' s ] d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f n o n m a t e r i a l i t y . " McCartney, 345 N.E.2d a t 33C). See a l s o S t a t e v. E t h e r i d g e ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 74 Wash.2d 1 0 2 , 443 P.2d 5 3 6 , ( I s s u a n c e o f c e r t i f i c a t e to compel a t t e n d a n c e of out-of - s t a t e w i t n e s s e s is n o t mandatory b u t l a r g e l y d i s c r e t i o n a r y ) ; and S t a t e v. Edwards ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 471 P.2d 843, 3 Or.App. 179, ( I s s u a n c e of c e r t i f i c a t e s f o r o u t - o f - s t a t e w i t n e s s e s w i t h i n d i s c r e t i o n of t r i a l c o u r t ) . The o n l y procedure t o subpoena an o u t - o f - s t a t e w i t n e s s is s e t f o r t h i n s e c t i o n 46-15-113, MC.4, a p p l i e d t o t h e i n s t a n t c a s e . The a p p e l l a n t f a i l e d t o make t h e p r o c e d u r e set f o r t h i n t h e s t a t u t e , o r o t h e r w i s e Stevenson had, o r would b e , p r o p e r l y subpoenaed. A p p e l l a n t ' s motion was f a u l t y , and p r o p e r l y d e n i e d . I n a d d i t i o n , it is c l e a r from t h e r e c o r d t h a t t h e t e s t i m o n y of Mrs. Watson ( t h e e x - w i f e of t h e a b s e n t w i t n e s s ) , g i v e n by d e p o s i t i o n and read t o t h e j u r y , covered t h e e v e n t s t h a t o c c u r r e d i n A d e l i n e l s Cafe. T h e r e f o r e , w e f i n d no abuse of d i s c r e t i o n i n n o t b r i n g i n g Stevenson back from Massachusetts. I f a p p e l l a n t ' s c o n t e n t i o n was t r u e t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t judge had denied h i s motion s o l e l y on t h e b a s i s of county f i n a n c i a l s t a n d i n g , then an i n j u s t i c e would have been done. I n S t a t e v. Z a r r i s ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 47 Or. Rpp. 665, 615 P.2d 36.3, t h e Court of Appeals h e l d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t made a s u f f i c i e n t showing t h a t h i s proposed o u t - o f - s t a t e w i t n e s s e s were m a t e r i a l and t h e r e f o r e t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g t o p r o v i d e funds t o s e c u r e t h e i r a t t e n d a n c e . The c a s e a t bar is d i s s i m i l a r however. Here t h e t r i a l judge had ample reason t o conclude a p p e l l a n t ' s proposed w i t n e s s was nonmaterial. W e hold t h a t a t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g a s t o t h e m a t e r i a l i t y of a w i t n e s s when a p p l y i n g t h i s p a r t i c u l a r s t a t u t e w i l l n o t be d i s t u r b e d a b s e n t a c l e a r showing of abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . Accordingly we r e j e c t a p p e l l a n t ' s argument on t h i s i s s u e . TI1 Next a p p e l l a n t contends t h e D i s t r i c t Court committed r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r by f a i l i n g t o g i v e o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n N o . 8 concerning p r i o r i n c o n s i s t e n t s t a t e m e n t s . T h e r e is a d e a r t h o f c a s e l a w r e g a r d i n g j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s on p r i o r i n c o n s i s t e n t s t a t e m e n t s n o t o n l y i n gontana b u t elsewhere a s w e l l . The l o n e Montana c a s e , h e a v i l y r e l i e d upon by d e f e n d a n t , is S t a t e v. Taylor ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 163 Mont. 106, 515 P.2d 695. The d e f e n d a n t i n Taylor was charged w i t h second degree homicide a r i s i n g from t h e d e a t h of a two-year-old c h i l d . The c h i l d ' s mother gave t e s t i m o n y a t t r i a l which was i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h s t a t e m e n t s s h e had made prior to trial. The defendant appealed his conviction contending the trial court erred by not including in its jury instructions his request that prior inconsistent statements are one of the factors which the jury should consider as possibly repelling the presumption that a witness speaks the truth. This Court agreed with the defendant in that case and relied on section 93-1091-12, R.C.M. 1947, which specifically provided: "A witness may also be impeached by evidence that he has made, at other times, statements inconsistent with his present testimony. . . " We concluded: "Clearly, such an instruction would have been proper and in a case, such as this, when the State's principal witness had admittedly made a number of prior inconsistent statements, it would seem particularly appropriate. The giving of the instruction with the defendant's requested inclusion regarding prior inconsistent statements would better accord with the accepted principle of fully and clearly instructing the jury as to the specifics of the law applicable to the case." Taylor, 515 P.2d at 704. We must distinguish Taylor from the case at hand for several reasons. First in - Taylor, the inconsistent testimony went directly to the heart of the issue at bar: whether the defendant had, in fact, caused the death of the victim. In the instant case, the inconsistencies in the testimony of D.J. contain no probative value. We agree with respondent's conclusion that " . . .not only was [sic] none of her inconsistencies material to whether the defendant's intercourse with the victim was consensual, but they were also corrected in a later pretrial statement." Second, and most persuasively, the trial court instructed the jury more than sufficiently on the matter in its i n s t r u c t i o n No. 1. I n t h a t i n s t r u c t i o n t h e f o l l o w i n g was read t o t h e j u r y : "Every w i t n e s s is presumed t o speak t h e t r u t h . T h i s presumption, however, may be r e p e l l e d by t h e manner i n which he t e s t i f i e d , by t h e c h a r a c t e r of h i s t e s t i m o n y , o r by e v i d e n c e a f f e c t i n g h i s r e p u t a t i o n f o r t r u t h h o n e s t y , i n t e g r i t y , o r h i s m o t i v e s o r by c o n t r a d i c t o r y e v i d e n c e . ( E m p h a s i s is o u r s . ) A p p e l l a n t ' s r e q u e s t e d i n s t r u c t i o n No. 8 would have been i d e n t i c a l t o t h e above i n s t r u c t i o n w i t h t h e f o l l o w i n g a d d i t i o n : "Furthermore, t h i s presumption may be r e b u t t e d by e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e w i t n e s s h a s made, a t o t h e r times, s t a t e m e n t s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s p r e s e n t testimony." W e f i n d t h a t no e r r o r was committed by t h e c o u r t below, r e v e r s i b l e o r o t h e r w i s e , by r e f u s i n g t o add t h i s redundant s e n t e n c e t o an a l r e a d y complete and competent i n s t r u c t i o n . IV A p p e l l a n t ' s f o u r t h i s s u e on a p p e a l d e a l s w i t h whether t h e r e was s u f f i c i e n t evidence b e f o r e t h e j u r y upon which t h e y based t h e i r v e r d i c t . More s p e c i f i c a l l y , a p p e l l a n t u r g e s us t o f i n d t h e v e r d i c t was s o i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e e v i d e n c e a s t o i n v a l i d a t e t h e j u r y ' s f i n d i n g s . A p p e l l a n t was c h a r g e d w i t h two c o u n t s o f s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t c o n s e n t . The v i c t i m t e s t i f i e d t h a t a p p e l l a n t had f o r c e d her t o have two s e p a r a t e a c t s of s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h him. The a p p e l l a n t i n s i s t s t h e r e was o n l y one a c t and t h a t a c t was c o n s e n s u a l . T h i s Court h a s p r e v i o u s l y f a c e d t h i s i s s u e i n r e c e n t c a s e s , S t a t e v. Thompson ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 176 Mont. 150, 576 P.2d 1105; S t a t e v. Doe ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 143 Mont. 141, 146, 388 P.2d 372, 375. In Thompson, supra, we noted in following - Boe, supra that "where separate acts are charged in an information, and each act is a separate offense, an acquittal or conviction of one or more counts does not affect the other counts. . ." The jury, after deliberating for approximately nine hours, found appellant guilty on count one and not guilty on count two. Appellant apparently feels that either the jury believed his story or it believed the victim's but could not have believed a little of each. Appellant argues if the jury believed his story, the verdict should have been not guilty on both charges. If the jury believed the victim's story, the verdict should have been guilty on both counts. The decision we are therefore called upon to make is whether the jury was within its province to believe the victim's testimony to the point of convicting appellant of sexual intercourse without consent, while at the same time disbelieving the victim's testimony as to how many acts were perpetrated. The question is well settled in Montana. A long line of cases state emphatically that this Court, when assessing the sufficiency of the evidence upon which a jury has based its verdict, must view that evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution. Most recently this Court held when ". . . assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must give it all of the probative effect toward conviction that it will support. State v . Fitzpatrick (1973), 163 Mont. 220, 227, 516 P.2d 605, 610." State v. Hammons (Mont. 1983), 664 P.2d 922, 926, 40 St.Rep. 884, 888. This Court will not substitute its judgment for that of t h e j u r y ; 3 j u r y which, i n t h i s c a s e , was a b l e t o view f i r s t h a n d t h e evidence p r e s e n t e d , observe t h e demeanor of t h e w i t n e s s e s and weigh t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of each p a r t y . T h e r e f o r e w e r e j e c t a p p e l l a n t ' s c o n t e n t i o n a s t o t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e v e r d i c t . Appellant contends t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g s t a t e m e n t s on c l o s i n g argument by t h e S t a t e were s o i n f l a m a t o r y and p r e j u d i c i a l a s t o deny him h i s r i g h t t o a f a i r t r i a l : " I n o r d e r t o f i n d t h e d e f e n d a n t n o t g u i l t y , you have t o t e l l K.D., f i r s t , t h a t s h e was a drug p u s h e r ; second t h a t s h e is a s l u t ; and t h i r d , t h a t s h e is a l i a r . You have g o t t o t e l l h e r t h a t you b e l i e v e t h e d e f e n d a n t when he s a y s s h e l a i d i n back of t h e c a r and took h e r p a n t s o f f and i n d i c a t e d f o r him t o come hack. And, i f you can b e l i e v e t h a t , l a d i e s and gentlemen, from t h e testimony t h a t was p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s c a s e , you can a c q u i t him, and l e t him go." A t t h e t i m e of t r i a l , s e c t i o n 46-20-702, MCA, provided t h a t "Any e r r o r , d e f e c t , i r r e g u l a r i t y o r v a r i a n c e which does n o t a f f e c t s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s s h a l l be d i s r e g a r d e d . " T h i s h a s s u b s e q u e n t l y been modified. By h i s testimony and evidence, a p p e l l a n t attempted t o convince t h e j u r y t h a t K.D. was i n t e r e s t e d i n s e l l i n g d r u g s and was t h e r e f o r e a drug p u s h e r , t h a t s h e had v o l u n t a r i l y o f f e r e d h e r s e l f s e x u a l l y w i t h o u t any encouragement on t h e p a r t of t h e a p p e l l a n t , which c e r t a i n l y s u g g e s t s t h a t p a r t s of our s o c i e t y would c l a s s her a s a " s l u t " and l a s t a p p e l l a n t contended many t i m e s t h a t K.D. had l i e d t o t h e j u r y . The testimony of K.D. c o n t r a d i c t e d t h e s e c o n t e n t i o n s on t h e p a r t of t h e a p p e l l a n t . While it is n o t t r u e t h a t i n o r d e r t o f i n d t h e appellant not guilty, the jury would have to tell K.D. that she was a drug pusher, slut and liar this is a matter of argument to the jury and not legal instruction by the court. We certainly do not condone any such misstatement on the part of the prosecution as to the standard to be applied for conviction or aquittal. However, we do recognize that a comment of this nature upon the evidence submitted by the appellant would have been appropriate so far as the prosecution is concerned. In weighing the effect of the argument, we have examined the record and concluded that the error on the part of the prosection in making this argument i d not affect the substantial rights on the part of the appellant and, therefore, may be disregarded. VI Appellant next contends the District Court committed reversible error by failing to give his offered instruction No. 11 setting forth the material allegations of the information. He relies on section 46-11-401(l)(c)(iv), MCAI which reads: "Form of charge. (1) A charge shall: . . . (c) charge the commission of an offense by: . . . (iv) stating the time and place of the offense as definitely as can be done . . . " Because the information charging him stated the offense took place " . . . between Rockvale and Edgar . . . " appellant claims it was insufficient when held up to section 46-11-401(l)(c)(iv), MCA. The test of the sufficiency of an information is whether the defendant is apprised of the charges brought against him and whether he will be surprised. State v . Rogue (1963), 142 Mont. 459, 384 P.2d 749. The test of the sufficiency of an information is whether a person of common understanding would know what is intended to be changed. State v. Board (1959), 135 Mont. 139, 337 P.2d 924. It is clear from the record that appellant was adequately apprised of the charges brought against him, that a-ppellant was not surprised by the charges and that he possessed such common understanding as enabled him to know what the charges against him were intended to be. Indeed, the public policy underlying the technical requirements of the charging statute is to afford defendant due process of law; that is to fa.irly apprise them of what crime they are being charged with in order that they might fully defend against it. Here, appellant knew full well from the information what crime he had been charged with. His crime was not part of a common scheme involving many incidents over a long period of time. He had not committed so many similar crimes in the general vicinity that he was confused as to just which sexual intercourse without consent the prosecution was referring to. Accordingly we disagree with appellant's contention of error in this issue. VI I The District Court committed reversible error, appellant contends, by denying his motion to suppress evidence. Appellant moved to suppress evidence seized pursuant to the issuance of a search warrant he claims was defective on its face. However, we need not decide this issue since the only evidentiary significance of the property seized was to establish the physical presence of the victim in the van. Because appellant admitted her p r e s e n c e and t h e a c t of s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e , t h e p r o p e r t y s e i z e d had no e v i d e n t i a l l y p r e j u d i c i a l impact and d i d n o t c o n t r i b u t e i n any way t o t h e c o n v i c t i o n . T h e r e f o r e t h e q u e s t i o n is moot. The judgment o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t c o n v i c t i n g a p p e l l a n t of one c o u n t of s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t c o n s e n t is a f f i r m e d . W e concur: - - - - - -- - - - - Chief J u s t i c e Hongfdable John enson, on, D i t i c t Judge, s i t t i n g i n ? ? I %ojl of Mr. J u s t i c e L.C. Gulbrandson. Lqr. Chief Justice Prank I. H a s w e l l : I c o n c u r i n t h e r e s u l t .