Title: Baker v. Long

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
TAMARA BAKER, 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   No. 222, 2009 
 
Respondent Below, 
 
§  
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§   Court Below – Family Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§   in and for  Sussex County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
TRENT LONG, 
 
 
 
§   File No.: CS06-03231 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   CPI No.: 08-19729 and 08-22252 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
Petitioner Below,  
 
§  
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
    Submitted:  September 9, 2009 
 
 
 
 
       Decided:  September 25, 2009 
 
Before HOLLAND, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Family Court.  AFFIRMED.   
 
Bruce A. Rogers, Esquire, Bruce A. Rogers, P.A., Georgetown, 
Delaware, for appellant. 
 
David C. Hutt, Esquire, Wilson, Halbrook & Bayard, P.A., 
Georgetown, Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
2
 
The respondent-appellant, Tamara Baker (the “Mother”), appeals 
from the Family Court’s decision to award joint custody of their child to the 
Mother and petitioner-appellee, Trent Long (the “Father”), primary 
placement to be with the Father during the school year.1  The Mother raises 
four arguments on appeal.  First, she contends that the Family Court abused 
its discretion by changing primary placement of the minor child to the 
Father’s home after making specific findings of domestic violence and 
finding the Father to be a perpetrator of domestic violence, in violation of 
title 13, ch. 7A of the Delaware Code.  Second, the Mother contends that the 
Family Court failed to make specific written findings in support of its 
decision to award custody or primary residence with the Father, in violation 
of title 13, section 706A of the Delaware Code.  Third, the Mother contends 
that the Family Court erred in failing to require the Father to complete 
counseling prior to awarding primary placement to the Father.  Fourth, she 
contends that the Family Court abused its discretion in changing the primary 
placement of the minor child to the Father’s home because the application of 
the evidence to the statutory factors set forth in title 13, section 722 of the 
Delaware Code does not support such a finding.   
                                          
 
1 Pseudonyms were assigned on appeal pursuant to Supr. Ct. R. 7(d). 
 
3
We have concluded that all of the Mother’s arguments are without 
merit.  Therefore, the judgment of the Family Court must be affirmed. 
Procedural History 
 
 
The parties to this action are the biological parents of a minor child, 
Tyler.  The parties were never married.  Following their separation, each 
filed cross petitions for custody. 
The parties first began litigating in December 2006 when the Mother 
filed a Petition for Order of Protection from Abuse against the Father, 
alleging physical, verbal, mental and emotional abuse, with actual physical 
injury.  A temporary Order of Protection from Abuse was issued on 
December 14, 2006.  The parties consented to the entry of an Order of 
Protection from Abuse (“Order”) on December 21, 2006.  No criminal 
charges were filed.  The Mother was granted custody of Tyler, and the 
Father was allowed standard visitation.  
On February 22, 2007, the Mother filed a motion to vacate the Order, 
because the order prohibited the Father from carrying a firearm as required 
by his employment with the Department of Corrections.  The court granted 
her motion.  In April 2007, the Father met his current wife, Nicole.  They 
married on October 25, 2008. 
 
4
On June 16, 2008, the Father filed a petition for custody with the 
Family Court.  Following unsuccessful mediation, the Family Court entered 
an interim order for Tyler to remain with the Mother for the remainder of the 
summer, but switched primary residence to the Father at the commencement 
of the new school year.  Trial on the merits occurred on December 22, 2008.  
The Family Court issued its final decision on April 1, 2009.   
Family Court Decision 
 
To determine the best interests of the child, section 722(a) provides a 
list of eight factors that must be considered by the Family Court: 
(1) 
The wishes of the child’s parent or parents as to his or 
her custody and residential arrangements; 
(2) 
The wishes of the child as to his or her custodian(s) and 
residential arrangements; 
(3) 
The interaction and interrelationship of the child with his 
or her parents, grandparents, siblings, person cohabiting in the 
relationship of husband and wife with a parent of the child, any 
other residents of the household or persons who may 
significantly affect the child’s best interests; 
(4) 
The child’s adjustment to his or her home, school and 
community; 
(5) 
The mental and physical health of all individuals 
involved; 
(6) 
Past and present compliance by both parents with their 
rights and responsibilities to their child under §701 of this title; 
(7) 
Evidence of domestic violence as provided for in Chapter 
7A of this title; and 
(8) 
The criminal history of any party or any other resident of 
the household including whether the criminal history contains 
 
5
pleas of guilty or no contest or a conviction of a criminal 
offense.2 
 
In its final decision, the Family Court reviewed all the evidence 
relevant to each statutory factor in order to perform a best interest analysis 
under this section.  After the Family Court summarized the testimony of all 
seven witnesses, and analyzed each of the eight factors, it found that five of 
the eight factors did not assist it in determining the issue of primary 
placement, two factors favored primary placement with the Father, and one 
factor favored primary placement with the Mother.   
Specifically, the Family Court found that factors three and four 
weighed in favor of the Father, and that factor seven weighed in favor of the 
Mother.  Factor three weighed “slightly” in favor of the Father because the 
Family Court found Tyler’s relationship with his maternal grandmother “is 
not as close as the relationship the child has with [F]ather’s extended 
family.”  Factor four weighed in favor of the Father because the Family 
Court found that the Father’s home provided Tyler with stability and a 
regular schedule, and that when Tyler was living with the Mother, she “did 
not have a stable residence.”  Factor seven weighed in favor of the Mother, 
because the Father and the Mother engaged in a verbal and physical 
                                          
 
2 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 722(a).  
 
6
confrontation in December 2006, in Tyler’s presence, and in which the 
Father was the primary aggressor. 
The rationale for the Family Court’s final decision was as follows: 
After considering the evidence in this case, in light of the 
best interests standard, and the factors contained in Section 722 
of Title 13 of the Delaware Code, it is the court’s finding by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Mother and Father shall 
share joint custody of Tyler.  Primary placement of the child 
shall be with Father.  Mother shall have visitation, as contained 
in the Family Court Standard Visitation Guidelines, as 
amended, attached hereto and incorporated herein reference. 
 
 
While the Court believes that both the Mother and the 
Father are good parents, and that they are concerned about the 
welfare of their son, the primary difference in this case is the 
stability that the Father is able to provide for Tyler in his home.  
Since Tyler has been with the Father, he has been able to enjoy 
that stability.  Tyler has lived in one home.  The Father has 
frequent contact with his extended family on Father’s side.  The 
Father has involved Tyler in appropriate community activities. 
 
The Mother has been unable to provide that stability.  
Once she and the Father separated, the Mother lived in several 
different locations.  She engaged in a relationship with Dean, 
and together they lost their housing.  Dean moved to Maryland, 
and the Mother attempted to continue the relationship, taking 
Tyler back and forth between two states.  The Mother was 
permitted to live in the home of the Father’s parents, but she 
was unable to comply with the rules, leaving Tyler in the home 
while she visited Dean in Maryland. 
 
While the Mother’s living situation now appears to be 
more stable, the Mother’s plans with respect to Tyler’s 
education are incomplete.  Placing Tyler with the Mother would 
involve still another move in this young child’s life, and could 
affect with his participation in community activities. 
 
 
7
The court is not pleased that the Father has engaged in 
acts of domestic violence with the Mother.  At least one of the 
acts occurred in the presence of Tyler.  Yet, the court does not 
believe that Tyler faces danger through this placement with the 
Father.  There is no indication that there have been any other 
acts of domestic violence involving the Father, either with 
respect to his relationship with Tyler, with the Mother, or with 
the Father’s current wife.  Because the court has found that the 
Father has engaged in acts of domestic violence, though, the 
court orders that the Father be required to complete a program 
of evaluation and counseling designed specifically for 
perpetrators of family violence and conducted by a public or 
private agency or certified mental health professional, as 
defined in Title 13, Section 707A of the Delaware Code.  The 
court does not determine that the Father needs to attend alcohol 
or drug abuse treatment or any other counseling. 
 
It is important that Tyler have extensive contact with the 
Mother.  The attached visitation schedule provides for 
significant contact, including spending the summers with the 
Mother. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
 
An appeal from a bench trial is upon both the law and the facts.3  
Questions of law will be reviewed on a de novo basis.4  Questions of fact 
must be affirmed if they are supported by substantial evidence on the record 
and are the product of an orderly and logically deductive process.5  If the 
                                          
 
3 Levitt v. Bouvier, 287 A.2d 671, 673 (Del. 1972); Powell v. Dep’t of Servs. for Children, 
Youth & their Families, 963 A.2d 724, 731 (Del. 2008). 
4 Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.W.V., Jr.), 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (Del. 1979); In re Heller, 
669 A.2d 25, 29 (1995). 
5 Levitt v. Bouvier, 287 A.2d 673. 
 
8
trial judge has correctly applied the law, the standard of review is abuse of 
discretion.6   
Domestic Violence Definitions 
 
The Mother contends that the Family Court erred as a matter of law 
by changing primary placement of the minor child to the Father’s home after 
making specific findings of domestic violence and finding the Father to be a 
perpetrator of domestic violence, in violation of title 13, chapter 7A.7  The 
record does not support that assertion at all.  The record reflects that, 
although the Father committed an act of domestic violence, he was not a 
“perpetrator of domestic violence.”   
The General Assembly specifically defined the term “perpetrator of 
domestic violence” in title 13, section 703A(b),8 as follows: 
. . .  any individual who has been convicted of committing any 
of the following criminal offenses in the State, or any 
comparable offense in another jurisdiction, against the child at 
issue in a custody of visitation proceeding, against the other 
parent of the child, or against any other adult or minor child 
living in the home: (1) Any felony level offense; (2) Assault in 
the third degree; (3) Reckless endangering in the second degree; 
(4) Reckless burning or exploding; (5) Unlawful imprisonment 
                                          
 
6 Powell v. Dep’t of Servs. for Children, 963 A.2d at 731; Solis v. Tea, 468 A.2d 1276, 
1279 (Del. 1983). 
7 Pursuant to title 13, section 722 of the Delaware Code, the Family Court is required to 
consider eight factors to determine the best interests of the child involved in the dispute.  
The seventh factor is evidence of domestic violence, as provided for in chapter 7A.  Thus, 
the determination of the best interests of Tyler and application of title 13, chapter 7A 
were issues before the Family Court throughout the entire course of the trial. 
8 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 703A(b). 
 
9
in the second degree; (6) Unlawful sexual contact in the third 
degree; or (7) Criminal contempt of Family Court protective 
order based on an assault or other physical abuse, threat of 
assault or other physical abuse or any other actions placing the 
petitioner in immediate risk or fear of bodily harm.9 
 
Title 13, section 705A provides, in part: 
(a) 
Notwithstanding other provisions of this title, there shall 
be a rebuttable presumption that no perpetrator of domestic 
violence shall be awarded sole or joint custody of any child. 
(b) 
Notwithstanding other provisions of this title, there shall 
be a rebuttable presumption that no child shall primarily reside 
with a perpetrator of domestic violence.10 
 
To properly apply section 705A, it is necessary to refer to the definitions 
provided by the General Assembly in title 13, section 703A, which 
distinguish between “domestic violence” and “perpetrator of domestic 
violence.”  “Domestic violence,” as defined in title 13, section 703A(a):  
“includes but is not limited to physical or sexual abuse or threats of physical 
or sexual abuse and any other offense against the person committed by 1 
parent against the other parent. . . .”11   
Contrary to the Mother’s argument, the Family Court did not find the 
Father to be a “perpetrator of domestic violence,” as that term has been 
defined by the General Assembly.  That determination would have required 
evidence of either a criminal conviction of one of the offenses enumerated in 
                                          
 
9 Id. 
10 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 705A (a)-(b). 
11 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 703A(a). 
 
10
the statute or a criminal contempt of a Family Court protective order based 
upon an assault or other physical abuse.12  A finding only of “domestic 
violence,” however, requires evidence of neither.13   
In this case, the record reflects only motor vehicle violations by the 
Father.14  The PFA Order was issued by consent and expressly stated that it 
was entered “without a finding of abuse.”  That Order was later vacated and 
there was never a finding of contempt.  With neither a criminal conviction 
nor a contempt proceeding to establish that the Father was a “perpetrator of 
domestic violence,” the rebuttable presumption of title 13, section 705A, 
preventing an award of custody or primary placement, did not apply to the 
Father.   
Specific Written Findings 
 
In a related argument, the Mother contends that the Family Court 
failed to make specific written findings in support of its decision to award 
custody or primary residence with the Father, in violation of title 13, section 
706A.  Section 706A(b) requires specific written findings by the Family 
Court when it places primary residence of a child with a party who has 
                                          
 
12 See Kuhn v. Danes, 821 A.2d 335, 338 (Del. Fam. 2001).  (holding that an act of 
offensive touching which constitutes an act of “domestic violence” does not rise to the 
level of defining the Father as a “perpetrator of domestic violence” as defined in Del. 
Code Ann. tit. 13, § 703A(b)). 
13 Kuhn v. Danes, 821 A.2d at 338. 
14 The trial judge stated, “The court has reviewed the criminal records of both the mother 
and the father.  The records consist of traffic offenses.”   
 
11
committed acts of domestic violence.15  The Family Court’s findings were 
reported in a sixteen-page, detailed opinion.  Consequently, the record 
reflects that the Family Court complied with the requirements of title 13, 
section 706A of the Delaware Code. 
Continued Counseling Permitted 
 
In another related argument, the Mother contends that the Family 
Court violated Delaware law by failing to “require the abuser to complete 
the counseling prior to placing the child in this environment.”  Section 707A 
provides: 
If the Court awards sole or joint custody or primary residence to 
a parent who has a history of committing acts of domestic 
violence, that parent shall be ordered to complete a program of 
evaluation and counseling designed specifically for perpetrators 
of family violence and conducted by a public or private agency 
or a certified mental health professional.16 
 
This provision unambiguously states that if the Family Court awards 
primary placement to a parent who has a history of committing acts of 
domestic violence, the parent “shall be ordered to complete a program . . . .”  
The Mother contends that statute requires the completion of counseling prior 
to placement.  In making that argument, the Mother has conflated the 
requirements of section 705A (individuals found to be “perpetrators of 
                                          
 
15 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 706A. 
16 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 707A. 
 
12
domestic violence”) and section 707A (individuals found to have a history of 
committing “acts of domestic violence.”).  Under section 705A, a rebuttable 
presumption exists that a person who is a perpetrator of domestic violence 
shall not be awarded sole or joint custody or primary residence.  To 
overcome that presumption, inter alia, there must “have been no further acts 
of domestic violence and the perpetrator of domestic violence has:  (1) 
successfully completed a program of evaluation and counseling designed 
specifically for perpetrators of family violence and conducted by a public or 
private agency or a certified mental health professional. . . .”17  Title 13, 
section 707A requires that, when the Family Court awards primary residence 
to an individual with a history of committing acts of domestic violence, “that 
parent shall be ordered to complete a program of evaluation and counseling 
designed specifically for perpetrators of family violence and conducted by a 
public or private agency or a certified mental health professional.”18   
Completed counseling is a condition precedent to rebutting the 
presumption found in section 705A, which applies to individuals found to be 
“perpetrators of domestic violence.”  On the other hand, section 707A, 
which instead applies to persons with a “history of committing acts of 
domestic violence,” does not require the counseling to be completed prior to 
                                          
 
17 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 705A(c). 
18 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 707A. 
 
13
placement.19  Therefore, the Family Court did not err as a matter of law in 
applying section 707A and awarding primary placement to the Father before 
he had completed the counseling program. 
Primary Placement 
 
Finally, the Mother contends that the Family Court abused its 
discretion in changing the primary placement of the minor child to the 
Father’s home because the application of the evidence to the statutory 
factors set forth in title 13, section 722 does not support that result.  In 
determining custody and primary placement of a minor child, title 13, 
section 722(a) requires the Family Court to find in accordance with the best 
interests of the child.20  We have previously held that “[t]he statute 
anticipates that the Family Court will weigh the amalgam of all of the listed 
best interest factors that favor one parent against the amalgam of factors that 
favor the opposing parent and all other relevant evidence and only then 
make an independent determination of the placement that will be in the best 
interest of the children.”21   
                                          
 
19 See Kuhn v. Danes, 821 A.2d 335, 345-46 (Del. Fam. 2001); Marriage of Jeffery O. 
and Dorothy B., 1998 WL 918822, at *8 (Del. Fam. Aug. 28, 1998). 
20 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 722(a). 
21 Russell v. Stevens, 2007 WL 3215667, at *2 (Del. Nov. 1, 2007) (quoting Holmes v. 
Wooley, 2002 WL 31355265, at *4 (Del. Oct. 17, 2002)). 
 
14
The Family Court must consider “each of the eight ‘best interest’ 
factors . . ., none of which is solely determinative.”22  The record 
demonstrates that the Family Court properly applied the factors to the 
evidence presented, and reached a logical conclusion.  The record reflects no 
abuse of discretion by the Family Court in awarding primary residential 
placement of Tyler to the Father. 
Conclusion 
 
The judgment of the Family Court is affirmed. 
                                          
 
22 Russell v. Stevens, 2007 WL 3215667, at *2 (citation omitted).