Title: People v. Smith

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

2016 IL 119659 
 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF 
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 
 
 
(Docket No. 119659) 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.  
MATTHEW SMITH, Appellee. 
 
 
Opinion filed December 30, 2016. 
 
 
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 
 
Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Kilbride, Garman, and Theis concurred in 
the judgment and opinion. 
 
Justice Freeman dissented, with opinion, joined by Justice Burke. 
 
OPINION 
 
¶ 1 
 
Defendant, Matthew Smith, was charged by indictment with aggravated battery 
of a corrections officer, a Class 2 felony (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(4)(i), (h) (West 
2010)). Following a jury trial in the Livingston County circuit court, defendant was 
found guilty. Defendant was sentenced as a Class X offender to six years in the 
 
 
 
 
 
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Department of Corrections. The appellate court affirmed defendant’s conviction 
but vacated defendant’s sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing, 
holding that defendant was not eligible for Class X sentencing. 2015 IL App (4th) 
130453-U. This court granted the State’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 
315 (eff. Jan. 1, 2015). 
 
¶ 2 
 
 
 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 3 
 
The indictment against defendant was filed on January 20, 2012. The 
indictment alleged that on September 2, 2011, defendant, in committing a battery, 
“knowingly made physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with 
Correctional Officer Jody Davis, in that the defendant threw an unknown liquid 
substance on Jody Davis striking him about the body, knowing Jody Davis to be a 
correctional institution employee of the State of Illinois Department of Corrections, 
who was engaged in the performance of his authorized duties.” On January 24, 
2012, the State filed its notice that defendant was eligible for mandatory Class X 
sentencing pursuant to 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b) (West 2010), should defendant be 
convicted of the Class 2 felony of aggravated battery.  
¶ 4 
 
In April 2012, following questioning and admonishment by the court, 
defendant waived his right to counsel and elected to proceed pro se. Defendant then 
filed several motions, including a motion to suppress an incriminating statement 
that he made to corrections officer Robert Snyder. Following a hearing on August 
22, 2012, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress. 
¶ 5 
 
A jury trial was held on April 19, 2013, where defendant continued to appear 
pro se. Although there are no issues before this court concerning defendant’s trial, 
we will briefly set forth some of the trial testimony in order to provide some 
background information.  
¶ 6 
 
Officer Jody Davis testified that on September 2, 2011, he was in uniform 
working as a correctional officer at Pontiac Correctional Center. Around 1:40 p.m. 
that day, Davis was doing shower duty for his gallery. Davis explained that once a 
week, the inmates in segregation are allowed to shower. Davis would go down the 
gallery, take the prisoners out and handcuff them, then take them to the showers. 
The doors of the cells on the gallery are perforated. Defendant was housed alone in 
 
 
 
 
 
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cell 305 on the gallery. While Davis was talking with the inmate in cell 304, next 
door to the defendant, Davis was hit with a liquid substance all over the side of his 
body. Davis testified that the liquid came from defendant’s cell. Davis could not tell 
what the substance was. After being hit with the liquid, Davis informed his cell 
house lieutenant, who directed Davis to go the health care unit to be evaluated.  
¶ 7 
 
Robert Snyder also testified at defendant’s trial that he was a correctional 
officer at Pontiac Correctional Center assigned to the Internal Affairs Unit. Officer 
Snyder investigated the incident between Davis and defendant. Officer Snyder 
interviewed defendant on September 9, 2011. Officer Snyder asked defendant if he 
threw a liquid substance on Davis. Defendant responded that he did. When Officer 
Snyder asked why he threw the liquid, defendant said he did it because Davis did 
not give defendant his weekly shower. Defendant never identified the liquid 
substance. As noted, a jury found defendant guilty.  
¶ 8 
 
Defendant then appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by (1) improperly 
admonishing him regarding his waiver of counsel, (2) denying his motion to 
suppress his confession, and (3) sentencing him as a Class X offender. The 
appellate court rejected defendant’s claim that the trial court’s admonishments 
regarding waiver of counsel were insufficient. 2015 IL App (4th) 130453-U, ¶ 32. 
The appellate court also found that the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s 
motion to suppress his statements to Officer Snyder. Id. ¶ 42. However, the 
appellate court found that the trial court erred in sentencing defendant as a Class X 
offender. Id. ¶ 44. The appellate court held that defendant was not eligible for Class 
X sentencing because he was not 21 at the time he was charged with the offense at 
issue. Id. The appellate court therefore vacated defendant’s sentence and remanded 
the case for a new sentencing hearing. 
¶ 9 
 
The State now appeals the appellate court’s finding that the trial court erred in 
sentencing defendant as a Class X offender. Defendant has requested cross-relief 
concerning the trial court’s order denying his motion to suppress. 
 
¶ 10 
 
 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
¶ 11 
 
We first address the issue raised in the State’s petition for leave to appeal: 
whether the appellate court erred in vacating defendant’s Class X sentence. Section 
 
 
 
 
 
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5-4.5-95(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code), the statute at issue, 
provides: 
 
“(b) When a defendant, over the age of 21 years, is convicted of a Class 1 or 
Class 2 felony, after having twice been convicted in any state or federal court of 
an offense that contains the same elements as an offense now (the date the Class 
1 or Class 2 felony was committed) classified in Illinois as a Class 2 or greater 
Class felony and those charges are separately brought and tried and arise out of 
different series of acts, that defendant shall be sentenced as a Class X offender. 
This subsection does not apply unless: 
 
(1) the first felony was committed after February 1, 1978 (the effective 
date of Public Act 80-1099); 
 
(2) the second felony was committed after conviction on the first; and 
 
(3) the third felony was committed after conviction on the second.” 730 
ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b) (West 2010). 
¶ 12 
 
The parties do not dispute that defendant had two prior qualifying convictions, 
including an October 2007 conviction for aggravated criminal sexual assault with a 
weapon, a Class X felony, and a June 2010 conviction for bringing a weapon into a 
penal institution, a Class 1 felony. The parties disagree concerning when a 
defendant must reach the age of 21 in order to be eligible for mandatory Class X 
sentencing. 
¶ 13 
 
Defendant was born on September 24, 1991, so he was 19 years old at the time 
the offense at issue was committed, was 20 years old when he was indicted, and 
was 21 years old at the time of trial and sentencing. The appellate court held that the 
relevant time period for purposes of section 5-4.5-95(b) was defendant’s age at the 
time he was charged with the offense at issue. Accordingly, because defendant in 
this case was 20 years old when he was indicted, he was not eligible for mandatory 
Class X sentencing pursuant to the statute.  
¶ 14 
 
The State argues that the appellate court erred in vacating defendant’s sentence, 
contending that the relevant time period for purposes of the statute is a defendant’s 
age at the time he is convicted. Because defendant was 21 years old when he was 
 
 
 
 
 
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convicted, the trial court properly sentenced defendant pursuant to section 
5-4.5-95(b).  
¶ 15 
 
Because this issue involves a question of statutory interpretation, our review is 
de novo. People v. Chenoweth, 2015 IL 116898, ¶ 20.  
¶ 16 
 
As the State observes, at the time defendant was convicted and sentenced, the 
only decisions addressing when a defendant must reach the age of 21 for purposes 
of section 5-4.5-95(b) uniformly held that a defendant must be 21 at the time of 
conviction. These decisions were all from the first district of the appellate court. 
¶ 17 
 
In People v. Baaree, 315 Ill. App. 3d 1049 (2000), the defendant was 20 years 
old at the time of his arrest, and at the time his guilty verdict was rendered, but had 
turned 21 years old by the time of his sentencing. The trial court sentenced the 
defendant to mandatory Class X sentencing pursuant to section 5-5-3(c)(8) of the 
Code (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(c)(8) (West 1998) (now 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b) (West 
2010))). Baaree, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 1050. On appeal, the defendant argued that the 
term “convicted” in the statute could be construed as referring to the time the court 
determined his guilt rather than the time the sentence was imposed. 
¶ 18 
 
The Baaree court held that a plain reading of the statute indicated that a 
defendant’s age at the time of conviction is the deciding factor in determining 
whether the mandatory Class X sentencing statute would apply. Id. at 1050. The 
court then addressed what was meant by the term “convicted,” noting that it could 
mean the time sentenced is imposed or it could mean the time a defendant is found 
guilty. Id. at 1052. The court found the term “convicted” in section 5-5-3(c)(8) was 
ambiguous and therefore adopted a construction favoring the defendant, holding 
that the defendant was convicted for purposes of section 5-5-3(c)(8) when he was 
adjudicated guilty by the trial court. Id. at 1052-53. 
¶ 19 
 
Following Baaree, the appellate court in People v. Williams, 358 Ill. App. 3d 
363 (2005), addressed the defendant’s claim that the Baaree decision should be 
taken one step further to interpret section 5-5-3(c)(8) as being triggered when the 
defendant is over the age of 21 at the time the charged offense is committed. The 
defendant in that case claimed that the statute was ambiguous concerning whether 
the age requirement pertained to when the accused became a “defendant” or when 
the accused is “convicted.” Id. at 365. 
 
 
 
 
 
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¶ 20 
 
The Williams court rejected that claim, holding that Baaree resolved any 
ambiguity in section 5-5-3(c)(8) when it determined that “convicted” referred to the 
adjudication of guilt and not to sentencing. Id. at 366. The Williams court further 
found that “the Baaree court also impliedly resolved the issue that defendant” 
raised in the case before it, when Baaree held that a defendant’s age at the time of 
conviction is the deciding factor in determining whether the statute will apply. Id. 
Therefore, the statute’s reference to a defendant over the age of 21 refers to the time 
at which a defendant is convicted or adjudicated guilty and not to a time when the 
offense was committed. Id. 
¶ 21 
 
In People v. Stokes, 392 Ill. App. 3d 335 (2009), the defendant again argued that 
section 5-5-3(c)(8) applied only if a defendant is 21 or older at the time the offense 
is committed. Citing Baaree and Williams, the appellate court rejected that claim, 
holding that because the defendant turned 21 prior to the start of his trial and, thus, 
was 21 years old at the time he was convicted or adjudicated guilty, the defendant 
was subject to the mandatory Class X sentencing provisions of section 5-5-3(c)(8). 
Id. at 344. 
¶ 22 
 
While defendant’s appeal in the instant case was pending, the appellate court in 
People v. Douglas, 2014 IL App (4th) 120617, disagreed with the preceding cases 
and held that a defendant’s eligibility for Class X sentencing pursuant to section 
5-5-3(c)(8) depended upon his age at the time he is charged, rather than his age at 
the time of conviction. The Douglas court stated that the defendant in Baaree did 
not make the same argument as the defendants in Williams, Stokes, and the case 
before it. Id. ¶ 23. The defendant in Baaree had argued that the term “convicted” in 
section 5-5-3(c)(8) could refer to either the date he was found guilty or the date he 
was sentenced. Id. ¶ 25. In contrast, the defendants in Williams, Stokes, and 
Douglas had argued that section 5-5-3(c)(8) did not apply because they were under 
21 when the offense at issue was committed and charged. Id. ¶ 23. The Douglas 
court held that because the Baaree court did not address whether a defendant must 
be 21 years old at the time he committed the offense or was charged with the 
offense, the decisions in Baaree, Williams, and Stokes were not persuasive 
concerning the issue before it. Id. ¶ 26. 
¶ 23 
 
In its analysis, the Douglas court noted that the definition of “defendant” in the 
Code is “a person charged with an offense.” Id. ¶ 28 (quoting 730 ILCS 5/5-1-7 
 
 
 
 
 
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(West 2008)). The court then replaced the word “defendant” in the statute with its 
definition, so that the statute would read: “ ‘When a [person charged with an 
offense], over the age of 21 years, is convicted ***.’ ” Id. ¶ 29 (quoting 730 ILCS 
5/5-5-3(c)(8) (West 2008)). According to the court, when read in that manner, the 
key point in time was no longer the date of conviction but rather the date the 
individual is charged with an offense. Id. The court concluded that the statute was 
ambiguous and held that the rule of lenity required it to resolve any ambiguity in 
favor of the accused. Id. ¶ 30. Interpreting the statute in favor of the defendant 
would place the date for determining a defendant’s age for purposes of section 
5-5-3(c)(8) as the date on which he was charged, not the date on which he was 
convicted. Id. 
¶ 24 
 
In vacating defendant’s sentence in this case, the appellate court relied on the 
Douglas decision. 2015 IL App (4th) 130453-U, ¶ 25. The appellate court 
acknowledged the decisions in Baaree, Williams, and Stokes but was not persuaded 
to depart from the reasoning in Douglas. 
¶ 25 
 
Following Douglas, the first district of the appellate court again addressed 
whether a defendant must be over the age of 21 when he commits or is charged with 
an offense in order to be eligible for sentencing under section 5-4.5-95(b). People v. 
Brown, 2015 IL App (1st) 140508. The Brown court, with one justice dissenting, 
acknowledged the conflict between the decisions in Baaree, Williams, Stokes, and 
Douglas and found the reasoning of Douglas persuasive. Id. ¶ 13. Brown concluded 
that the statute was ambiguous regarding whether a defendant’s age should be 
considered at the time an offense is committed, at the time the offense is charged, or 
at the time the defendant is convicted. Id. ¶ 16. Therefore, the Brown court applied 
the rule of lenity and interpreted the statute in favor of the defendant, holding that 
because the defendant was under the age of 21 when he was charged with the 
offense at issue, he was ineligible for Class X sentencing under section 5-4.5-95(b). 
Id. 
¶ 26 
 
The dissent in Brown stated that the determination at issue was at which time a 
defendant must be over the age of 21, not the time at which an individual becomes a 
defendant. Id. ¶ 22 (Lavin, J., dissenting). Adding the definition of “defendant” into 
the statute, as the Douglas court did, was not inappropriate but did not support the 
Douglas court’s reading of the statute. Id. ¶ 27. The dissent noted: 
 
 
 
 
 
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“While a person must be charged with an offense in order to be a defendant, 
it does not follow that a defendant ceases to be a defendant the moment after he 
is charged. The defendant before us, as well as the defendant in Douglas, 
continued to be a defendant long after he was charged. Even at sentencing, a 
defendant is a person who has been charged with an offense. In short, the word 
‘defendant’ does not identify the time of an event; rather, it identifies a person’s 
status. Additionally, Douglas’s reading of the statute would render meaningless 
the word ‘convicted.’ In contrast, reading the statute as a whole, as we must, the 
statute clearly requires the defendant to be 21 years old when convicted. If the 
legislature had intended the statute to read, ‘when a defendant over the age of 
21 years, is charged,’ the legislature very well could have written the statute 
that way but it is not the appellate court’s place to rewrite it. Because the statute 
is not ambiguous in the specific manner that defendant suggests, we cannot 
misconstrue the statute in favor of the accused.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. 
¶ 27 
 
We find the Brown dissent to be well taken. It is well settled that this court’s 
primary objective in construing a statute is to give effect to the intent of the 
legislature. People v. Chenoweth, 2015 IL 116898, ¶ 21. The most reliable 
indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute, given its plain and 
ordinary meaning. Id. A court must view the statute as a whole, construing words 
and phrases in light of other relevant statutory provisions and not in isolation. Id. 
Each word, clause, and sentence of a statute must be given a reasonable meaning, if 
possible, and should not be rendered superfluous. Id. This court will not depart 
from a statute’s plain language by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or 
conditions that the legislature did not express. In re J.L., 236 Ill. 2d 329, 339 
(2010). Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it will be given 
effect as written, without resort to other aids of construction. Id. 
¶ 28 
 
We find the language of section 5-4.5-95(b) is clear and unambiguous with 
regard to the issue before us. The statute makes no reference to the defendant’s age 
at the time the offense is committed or the time that the offense is charged. The 
statute clearly provides that mandatory Class X sentencing applies when a 
defendant, over the age of 21, is convicted. As the State has argued, the appellate 
court’s interpretation of the statute would add additional language to the statute, 
providing that the statute applies when a defendant, over the age of 21 at the time 
the crime is charged, is convicted. No rule of construction authorizes this court to 
 
 
 
 
 
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declare that the legislature did not mean what the plain language of the statute 
imports, nor may we rewrite a statute to add provisions or limitations the legislature 
did not include. Illinois State Treasurer v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation 
Comm’n, 2015 IL 117418, ¶ 28. 
¶ 29 
 
Moreover, as the State points out, in other sentencing provisions under the 
Code, the legislature has specifically provided that a court should consider a 
defendant’s age at an earlier time than conviction. Thus, section 5-5-3.2(b)(7) of 
the Code provides that a court may consider imposing an extended term sentence 
“[w]hen a defendant who was at least 17 years of age at the time of the commission 
of the offense is convicted of a felony.” (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 
5/5-5-3.2(b)(7) (West 2010). Likewise, section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) of the Code states 
that a defendant shall be sentenced to a term of natural life imprisonment if the 
defendant “is a person who, at the time of the commission of the murder, had 
attained the age of 17 or more and is found guilty of murdering an individual under 
12 years of age; or irrespective of the defendant’s age at the time of the commission 
of the offense, is found guilty of murdering more than one victim.” (Emphases 
added.) 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 2010). 
¶ 30 
 
In contrast to the preceding sections of the Code, the legislature included no 
reference in section 5-4.5-95(b) to the defendant’s age at the time he committed the 
offense or at the time he is charged with the offense. It is well settled that where the 
legislature includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in 
another section of the same statute, courts will presume that the legislature acted 
intentionally in the exclusion or inclusion. In re C.C., 2011 IL 111795, ¶ 35. 
Therefore, absent an express reference to a defendant’s age at a time prior to 
conviction, it would be inappropriate for this court to infer that the legislature 
intended section 5-4.5-95(b) to also include a condition that the defendant must 
have attained the age of 21 at the time he committed the offense or at the time he is 
charged with the offense.  
¶ 31 
 
The plain language of the statute provides that a defendant must be 21 years old 
when he is convicted in order to be eligible for Class X sentencing under section 
5-4.5-95(b). Here, defendant was 21 years old when he was convicted, so the trial 
court properly sentenced defendant as a Class X offender pursuant to section 
5-4.5-95(b). We further note that defendant was 21 years old both when he was 
 
 
 
 
 
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found guilty and when he was sentenced, so we need not consider whether the 
Baaree court properly held that a defendant is convicted for purposes of section 
5-4.5-95(b) when he is found guilty. The appellate court erred in vacating 
defendant’s sentence and remanding for a new sentencing hearing. Accordingly, 
we reverse that portion of the appellate court’s order and affirm the trial court’s 
sentence. 
¶ 32 
 
We now turn to defendant’s request for cross-relief. In his request for 
cross-relief, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress. The facts concerning defendant’s motion to suppress are as follows. 
¶ 33 
 
Defendant’s pro se motion to suppress argued that his admission to assaulting 
Officer Davis should be suppressed because he was not read his Miranda rights 
prior to giving his statement. The State’s sole witness at the hearing on defendant’s 
motion to suppress was Robert Snyder. Officer Snyder testified that he is an 
investigator for the Internal Affairs Unit of Pontiac Correctional Center. Officer 
Snyder interviewed defendant on September 9, 2011, concerning the assault case. 
At the time, defendant was housed in the north segregation unit of the correctional 
center. The north segregation unit is the most restrictive place in the prison. 
Prisoners in the segregation unit are housed in single cells with solid or perforated 
doors. They are not allowed to go into the yard with other individuals. At the time 
Officer Snyder interviewed defendant, defendant was housed in cell 305, which 
had a perforated front, meaning that there were dime-sized holes through the cell 
door. 
¶ 34 
 
Officer Snyder testified that his interview with defendant took place in the 
counselor’s room in the north segregation unit, which is a small room with a desk, 
two chairs, and fluorescent lights. Officer Snyder was wearing a uniform when he 
interviewed defendant. No one else was in the room when the interview took place. 
Defendant was handcuffed when he was in the interview room. Officer Snyder 
explained that when a prisoner in the segregation unit is taken from their cell to any 
other place in the prison, such as to the shower or to the exercise area, the prisoner 
is in handcuffs. The interview with defendant was not very long and was closer to 
10 minutes than 30 minutes. Officer Snyder did not read defendant his Miranda 
rights before interviewing him.  
 
 
 
 
 
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¶ 35 
 
Officer Snyder testified that an interview like his interview of defendant is in 
the course of a normal investigation. The inmate is given a chance to give a 
statement and tell the inmate’s side of what happened. Officer Snyder said that he 
wanted to find out what had been thrown on Officer Davis, for the safety of officer 
Davis. At the time of the interview, Officer Snyder knew that defendant was going 
to receive an offender disciplinary report, or a “ticket,” but was not aware of any 
possible charges outside of prison. If an inmate commits a violation of the 
correctional center rules, the inmate is charged through the Illinois Department of 
Corrections with an offender disciplinary report. Officer Snyder said that he did not 
tell defendant that he could not leave unless he confessed, nor did he put any 
pressure on defendant to answer in a certain way. Officer Snyder said it was just an 
interview and defendant was free to leave at any time. 
¶ 36 
 
On cross-examination, Officer Snyder clarified that his interview with 
defendant took place at the health care holding tank. Defendant did not present any 
witnesses or testify in support of his motion to suppress.  
¶ 37 
 
The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress. The trial court found that 
the interaction between Officer Snyder and defendant was an investigation, not an 
interrogation. Defendant was not placed in a more restrictive setting, which would 
elevate the interview into some type of interrogation. In fact, the interview took 
place in a less restrictive setting than the segregation unit in which defendant was 
housed. The trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the interview 
was an investigation, so Miranda warnings were not required.  
¶ 38 
 
On appeal, the court noted that defendant had failed to preserve the issue by 
filing a posttrial motion. 2015 IL App (4th) 130453-U, ¶ 34. To preserve an alleged 
error for review, a defendant must raise a timely objection at trial and raise the error 
in a written posttrial motion. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). 
However, in a criminal case, an issue that is not properly preserved may be raised 
on appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(a), which provides: 
“Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial 
rights shall be disregarded. Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights 
may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial 
court.” 
 
 
 
 
 
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¶ 39 
 
Under the plain error doctrine, a reviewing court may address a forfeited claim 
in two circumstances. The court may address the claim “(1) where a clear or 
obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone 
threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the 
seriousness of the error and (2) where a clear or obvious error occurred and that 
error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant's trial and challenged 
the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.” 
People v. Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 48. In applying the plain error doctrine, it is 
first appropriate to determine whether error occurred, because absent reversible 
error, there can be no plain error. People v. Cosby, 231 Ill. 2d 262, 273 (2008). 
Accordingly, the appellate court first addressed whether error occurred in this case. 
¶ 40 
 
The appellate court noted that the need for Miranda warnings is triggered when 
the accused is both in custody and is subjected to interrogation. Although the trial 
court found that the interaction between Officer Snyder and defendant was an 
investigation, not an interrogation, the parties did not dispute that defendant was 
subject to interrogation when addressing the issue in the appellate court. 2015 IL 
App (4th) 130453-U, ¶ 36. Consequently, the issue before the appellate court was 
whether defendant was in custody when he made his statements to Officer Snyder. 
Id. The appellate court found, based upon the totality of circumstances, that 
defendant was not subject to a custodial interrogation that would otherwise require 
the constitutional safeguards of Miranda. Id. ¶ 42. 
¶ 41 
 
In support of its finding, the appellate court noted that defendant was housed in 
the most restrictive area of the prison—the segregation unit. Officer Snyder 
transferred defendant to the interview room in the health care unit, which contained 
a desk, two chairs, and fluorescent lighting. Defendant wore handcuffs, as he would 
if he were being transferred to the showers or for exercise, and defendant did not 
request the removal of the handcuffs. The interview was brief—10 minutes. The 
appellate court rejected defendant’s claim that Officer Snyder’s failure to remove 
his handcuffs demonstrated that defendant was in custody. The appellate court 
pointed out that Officer Snyder was alone in interviewing defendant regarding his 
alleged battery of another officer, so restraining defendant was reasonable in light 
of the safety risk to Officer Snyder. In addition, although defendant claimed his 
statement was obtained coercively because he would have faced disciplinary 
charges for failing to cooperate with Officer Snyder, Officer Snyder testified that 
 
 
 
 
 
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he would have permitted defendant to leave the interview at any time and had no 
interest or intent to coerce a statement from defendant. The appellate court found 
the reasoning in People v. Patterson, 146 Ill. 2d 445 (1992), applicable in this case 
and held that the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress 
his statements to Officer Snyder. 
¶ 42 
 
In this court, defendant again argues that he was subjected to a custodial 
interrogation without being given his Miranda rights, so that the trial court erred in 
denying his motion to suppress. Defendant claims that the Miranda issue can be 
raised on appeal even though he failed to raise the issue in a posttrial motion 
because the admission of the statement constitutes plain error. As the appellate 
court correctly pointed out, however, we first must determine whether any error 
occurred before we can consider whether the denial of defendant’s motion to 
suppress constituted plain error. 
¶ 43 
 
This court applies a two-part standard of review in reviewing a trial court’s 
ruling on a motion to suppress evidence. People v. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d 530, 542 
(2006). A reviewing court gives great deference to the trial court’s factual findings 
and will reverse those findings only if they are against the manifest weight of the 
evidence. Id. However, a reviewing court reviews de novo the trial court’s ultimate 
legal ruling as to whether suppression is warranted. Id. at 542-43. 
¶ 44 
 
With regard to inmates, the United States Supreme Court has held that 
imprisonment alone is not enough to create a custodial situation within the meaning 
of Miranda. Howe v. Fields, 565 U.S. ___, ___, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1190 (2012). 
There are at least three strong grounds for that conclusion. “First, questioning a 
person who is already serving a prison term does not generally involve the shock 
that very often accompanies arrest.” Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 1190. Second, unlike a 
person who has not been sentenced to a term of incarceration, a prisoner is unlikely 
to be lured into speaking by a longing for prompt release. Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 
1191. Third, in contrast to a person who has not been convicted and sentenced, a 
prisoner knows that the law enforcement officers who question him probably lack 
the authority to affect the duration of his sentence. Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 1191. 
Standard conditions of confinement and the associated restrictions on freedom will 
not necessarily implicate the same interests that the Miranda court sought to protect 
when it afforded special safeguards to persons subject to custodial interrogation. Id. 
 
 
 
 
 
- 14 - 
at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 1191. Consequently, the service of a term of imprisonment, 
without more, is not enough to constitute Miranda custody. Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 
1191.  
¶ 45 
 
Defendant notes that this court on two occasions has addressed the application 
of Miranda to inmates. In Patterson, 146 Ill. 2d 445, the court held that the inmate 
defendant was not “in custody” for purposes of Miranda and was not coerced into 
incriminating himself. In contrast, in People v. Easley, 148 Ill. 2d 281 (1992), the 
court held that an inmate was subjected to a custodial interrogation for which 
Miranda warnings were required. Defendant maintains that the determination of 
whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress turns on whether the 
circumstances of this case are more analogous to Patterson or to Easley. 
Consequently, we will examine each case in turn. 
¶ 46 
 
In Patterson, the defendant was placed in segregation after two “shanks” were 
found in his one-person cell during a routine shakedown. 146 Ill. 2d at 447. After 
defendant was placed in segregation, Richard C. Irvin, an internal investigator with 
the Department of Corrections, at the direction of his superiors, requested an 
interview with the defendant to discuss his possession of the shanks. Id. at 448. 
Irvin’s primary duty was to investigate incidents and prepare cases for prosecution. 
Id. Irvin could not have disciplined the defendant if the defendant had refused to 
speak with him, but a uniformed correctional officer may have given the defendant 
a ticket, or a disciplinary report. Id. Irvin knew that the defendant was in 
segregation, but did not know that the segregation was punishment for the 
possession of the shanks. Id. 
¶ 47 
 
The defendant was handcuffed and escorted to Irvin’s office, which contained a 
desk, three chairs, a credenza, and a filing cabinet. Id. The defendant’s handcuffs 
were not removed until he was returned to his cell. Id. Irvin’s name and title were 
on the door to his office, which was in a group of offices connected to the cell 
house. Id. Irvin was wearing civilian clothes and was wearing a tag that identified 
him as an internal affairs official. Id. No other prison personnel were present during 
Irvin’s 10-minute conversation with the defendant. Id.  
¶ 48 
 
The purpose of Irvin’s interview was to discover whether the defendant had 
possessed the shanks in order to protect himself and, if so, whether the defendant 
wanted to be placed in protective custody. Id. at 448-49. Irvin also wanted to 
 
 
 
 
 
- 15 - 
determine whether the defendant would have grounds for a “necessity” defense at a 
possible criminal trial. Id. at 449. No charges had been filed against the defendant at 
the time of the interview, and the defendant was not given Miranda warnings prior 
to the conversation. Id. It was a prison policy not to give Miranda warnings in 
interviews with prisoners that had been found with shanks. Id. The policy was put 
in place after a prisoner brought a successful necessity defense to a charge of 
possession of a weapon while in an institution. Id. In addition, Irvin had found that 
inmates became “terrorized” after receiving Miranda warnings and refused to 
speak of their safety concerns. Id. 
¶ 49 
 
During the interview, the defendant declined protective custody and stated that 
he had no enemies at the prison. Id. Irvin did not ask the defendant if he had a shank 
on the day of the shakedown, and the defendant did not comment on the events of 
the day. Id. Thereafter, the defendant was indicted for the offense of unlawful 
possession of a weapon by a person confined in a correctional facility, as well as 
possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. Id. at 449-50. The defendant moved to 
suppress the statements made to Irvin, contending that he should have received 
Miranda warnings prior to the interview. Id. at 450. The trial court granted the 
defendant’s motion to suppress, and the appellate court affirmed, with one justice 
dissenting. People v. Patterson, 207 Ill. App. 3d 104 (1990). The appellate court 
found that the defendant was interrogated while “in custody” for Miranda 
purposes. 
¶ 50 
 
In addressing the State’s appeal, the Patterson court noted that the 
determination of whether an interrogation is a custodial interrogation requires an 
examination of all the circumstances surrounding the questioning. 146 Ill. 2d at 
454. No single factor is determinative, but among the factors to be considered are 
“the location, length, mood and mode of the interrogation; the number of police 
officers present; any evidence of restraint; and the intentions of the officers and 
focus of their investigation.” Id. A trial court must examine and weigh those factors 
and then make an objective determination as to what a reasonable man would 
perceive if he were in the defendant’s position. Id. 
¶ 51 
 
Considering those factors based upon the facts of the case, the Patterson court 
noted that because the defendant was in segregation, his freedom of movement was 
increased rather than further limited when he was interviewed by Irvin. Id. at 455. 
 
 
 
 
 
- 16 - 
The defendant could have requested to leave Irvin’s office but could not have 
requested to leave his cell had the questioning taken place there. Id. That the 
defendant was escorted to the interview in restraints did not place any greater 
burden on his freedom than when he was taken in handcuffs to the shower or to 
exercise. Id. Therefore, the defendant’s freedom of movement was not more 
severely restricted during the interview than it had been previously. Id. 
¶ 52 
 
In addition, the purpose of Irvin’s questioning was to determine whether 
defendant was in fear of an attack by fellow inmates. Id. at 457. Irvin did not try to 
elicit an incriminating response from defendant. Id. Further, Irvin’s office was not 
inherently coercive, as no police officers were present during the interview and 
Irvin was not wearing a uniform. Id. at 457-58. Although the defendant could have 
received a ticket for refusing to speak with Irvin, Irvin himself had no power to 
impose such a disciplinary measure. Id. at 458. Irvin only spoke with defendant for 
10 minutes and put no physical or psychological pressure on the defendant to 
answer in one way or another. Id. A reasonable man in the defendant’s position 
would not have thought that his will was being subjected to that of his questioner. 
Id.  
¶ 53 
 
The Patterson court concluded, based upon all of those factors, that the 
defendant was not “in custody” and was not coerced into incriminating himself 
during his interview with Irvin. Id. Because there was no coercion, the concerns 
underlying Miranda were not present in the case, and the defendant’s statements 
should have been admitted at trial. Id. 
¶ 54 
 
In People v. Easley, 148 Ill. 2d 281 (1992), the defendant, a prison inmate, was 
convicted of the first degree murder of a superintendent at the Pontiac Correctional 
Center and was sentenced to death. Pursuant to the investigation of the murder, 
defendant was interviewed twice by Pontiac officials. The defendant was advised 
of his Miranda rights prior to the second interview. The defendant later filed a 
motion to suppress, claiming with regard to the second interview that, although he 
had been advised of his Miranda rights, his right to cut off questioning was not 
scrupulously honored by the investigators and his statement was obtained in 
violation of his fifth amendment rights. Id. at 296. The trial court denied the 
defendant’s motion to suppress. Because defendant was sentenced to death, his 
appeal came directly to this court. In his appeal before this court, the defendant 
 
 
 
 
 
- 17 - 
argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his second 
statement. Id. at 297. The State responded that the defendant was not in custody 
during the second interrogation, so he was not the rightful beneficiary of Miranda 
rights. Id.  
¶ 55 
 
The Easley court found that defendant was a rightful beneficiary of Miranda 
warnings during his second interview. With regard to the second interview, the 
defendant was handcuffed, removed from his cell, and taken to the warden’s office 
for questioning. Id. at 298. The defendant remained handcuffed throughout the 
interview. Id. Two investigators were in the office for the interview, and a third 
entered the office after questioning began. Id. One of the investigators told the 
defendant that he had information and considered the defendant a suspect. Id. The 
defendant then was given notice of his Miranda rights. Id. 
¶ 56 
 
The Easley court noted that the necessity of advising a prison inmate of his 
Miranda warnings had recently been considered in Patterson. Therefore, with the 
considerations set forth in Patterson in mind, the court looked to the circumstances 
of the defendant’s second interrogation. Id. at 300. The court first found that the 
defendant was in custody during the second round of questioning. In support of that 
finding, the court observed that the handcuffs placed a greater burden on the 
defendant’s freedom than that typically imposed upon him as an inmate. Id. at 302. 
In addition, the defendant was not free to leave the interrogation and remained in 
handcuffs throughout the entire interrogation. Id. In contrast to the defendant in 
Patterson, the defendant was not in segregation at the time of the second interview, 
so his freedom of movement was not increased as a result of the interview. Id. Even 
the reading of the Miranda warnings indicated that the defendant was in custody. 
Id. 
¶ 57 
 
The court also found that the defendant was interrogated in the second 
interview and thus was entitled to Miranda warnings. The defendant was 
interrogated by two investigators, not a prison warden or counselor. Id. The 
defendant obviously was the focus of the Department’s energies and was 
questioned with the intent to elicit evidence to assist in the Department’s 
investigation and ultimate prosecution of the superintendent’s murder; the 
questions were not related to the defendant’s needs. Id. at 302-03. The defendant 
was the subject of intense scrutiny by the investigators and was told by one of the 
 
 
 
 
 
- 18 - 
investigators that he was considered a prime suspect. Id. at 303. Consequently, the 
defendant was properly given Miranda warnings prior to the second interview. 
¶ 58 
 
In this case, defendant argues that the circumstances surrounding his 
questioning by Officer Snyder are more analogous to those in Easley than in 
Patterson. Defendant claims that the factors identified by the Patterson court 
support a finding that he was in custody during the interrogation. 
¶ 59 
 
Upon review, we find defendant’s attempts to distinguish this case from 
Patterson to be unavailing. For example, defendant distinguishes the location of his 
interrogation—a small holding cell containing a desk and two chairs—from the 
“comfortable office setting in Patterson.” The testimony in Patterson was that the 
defendant was interviewed in Irvin’s office, which contained a desk, three chairs, a 
credenza, and a filing cabinet. 146 Ill. 2d at 448. We cannot say that the addition of 
another chair, a credenza, and a filing cabinet established that the office in 
Patterson was a “comfortable office setting” when compared with the health care 
holding tank in this case. There is no evidence concerning the “comfort” of either 
the interview setting in Patterson or in this case, and we decline to find the two 
locations significantly different in terms of “comfort” in the absence of some 
evidence supporting that characterization. 
¶ 60 
 
Defendant also points to the fact that, unlike the investigator in Patterson, 
Officer Snyder was dressed in uniform with his badge and patches on display. We 
attribute no significance to this difference, as being around an officer in a uniform, 
with a badge and patches on display, would be within the normal course of daily 
life for defendant. As the Court observed in Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. ___, ___, 
132 S. Ct. 1181, 1191 (2012), “[f]or a person serving a term of incarceration, *** 
the ordinary restrictions of prison life, while no doubt unpleasant, are expected and 
familiar and thus do not involve the same ‘inherently compelling pressures’ that are 
often present when a suspect is yanked from familiar surroundings in the outside 
world and subjected to interrogation in a police station. [Citation.]”  
¶ 61 
 
Defendant also claims that there was nothing voluntary about defendant’s 
questioning, as Officer Snyder personally went to defendant’s cell, placed him in 
handcuffs, and “marched” him to the health care unit.  
 
 
 
 
 
- 19 - 
¶ 62 
 
We first point out that this depiction of defendant’s interview is not borne out 
by the record. At the hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress, the assistant 
State’s Attorney asked Officer Snyder, “[w]hen you take somebody out of their 
regular cell to go to an interview room like this, are they in custody the entire 
time?” The assistant State’s Attorney also asked, “[w]hen you take somebody from 
their cell to anywhere else, say to the shower or to the exercise area, are they in 
cuffs as well?” Although the assistant State’s Attorney used the word “you” in her 
questions, it is not clear from the record whether the use of the word “you” was in a 
generic sense concerning prison procedure or was specifically referring to Officer 
Snyder in the context of his interview with defendant. Nor was it clear from Officer 
Snyder’s testimony whether he personally brought defendant to the health care 
holding tank.  
¶ 63 
 
In any event, we find nothing inherently coercive in the identity of the person 
bringing defendant to his interview with Officer Snyder. Moreover, there is no 
evidence or testimony that defendant was “marched” to the health care unit. In fact, 
there is no testimony concerning the circumstances surrounding defendant’s 
transfer from his cell to his interview with Officer Snyder other than the testimony 
that defendant was in handcuffs when he was taken out of his cell. 
¶ 64 
 
In addition, the fact that defendant was in handcuffs when he was brought to his 
interview with Officer Snyder does not establish that defendant was in custody. 
Like the defendant in Patterson, defendant in this case was housed in segregation, 
in the most restrictive place in prison, and was placed in handcuffs whenever he 
was taken from his cell to any other place in the prison, such as the shower or the 
exercise area. As in Patterson, the fact that defendant was escorted to the interview 
in handcuffs did not place any greater burden on his freedom than when defendant 
was taken anywhere else in the prison.  
¶ 65 
 
Defendant also maintains that in Patterson, the investigator could not discipline 
the defendant for refusing to answer questions, while defendant in this case could 
have been disciplined for failing to cooperate with Officer Snyder. Defendant 
claims that he would have been guilty of the offense of “impeding or interfering 
with an investigation” if he refused to answer Officer Snyder’s questions.  
¶ 66 
 
Here too, defendant’s attempts to distinguish Patterson must fail. In Patterson, 
the defendant also could have received a ticket for refusing to speak with Irvin, but 
 
 
 
 
 
- 20 - 
Irvin himself had no power to impose such a disciplinary measure. In this case, 
Officer Snyder testified that he knew “because of the situation” that defendant was 
going to receive an offender disciplinary report or ticket, but there was no 
testimony that Officer Snyder had any involvement in that discipline or had the 
power to issue a ticket. 
¶ 67 
 
Defendant also asserts that it is significant that Officer Snyder kept him 
handcuffed during the entire interview. Defendant claims that although this court 
initially discounted that consideration in Patterson, the court in Easley relied on 
that fact as evidence that the defendant was in custody. 
¶ 68 
 
Although the court in Easley considered the fact that the defendant was 
handcuffed during his interview as evidence that the defendant was in custody, 
Easley did not hold that fact to be dispositive, nor did Easley hold that fact to be per 
se evidence that an inmate is in custody. Rather, the Easley court considered the 
fact that the defendant was handcuffed, along with the other factual circumstances, 
in finding that the defendant was in custody. With regard to the handcuffs, the 
Easley court noted that in contrast to the defendant in Patterson, Easley was not in 
segregation at the time of his interview, so Easley’s freedom of movement was not 
increased as a result of his interview. Further, the Easley court observed that the 
defendant remained in handcuffs and was “neither physically capable of leaving the 
office nor permitted to leave until the officers had completed questioning him, both 
of which circumstances support a finding that defendant was in custody.” 148 Ill. 
2d at 302.  
¶ 69 
 
Here, in contrast, defendant was handcuffed whenever he was transported 
within the prison, and there was no testimony, nor did defendant allege, that he 
asked for his handcuffs to be removed during the interview. There also was no 
testimony or evidence that defendant was not permitted to leave until Officer 
Snyder had finished questioning him. In fact, Officer Snyder testified at the hearing 
on defendant’s motion to suppress that his questioning of defendant was “just an 
interview” and defendant was “free to leave at any time.” Moreover, as the 
appellate court observed, it was reasonable for Officer Snyder to restrain defendant 
during his interview in light of the safety risk Officer Snyder faced, given that 
Officer Snyder was alone in interviewing defendant concerning his alleged battery 
of another officer.  
 
 
 
 
 
- 21 - 
¶ 70 
 
Defendant next claims that the intentions of the officer and the focus of the 
investigation also favor the conclusion that he was in custody. In contrast to 
Patterson, where the investigator was attempting to determine whether the 
defendant feared for his safety, Officer Snyder testified that the purpose of the 
interview was to determine whether defendant would admit or deny that he had 
assaulted Officer Davis. There were no other suspects, so defendant was the focus 
of the investigation.  
¶ 71 
 
While defendant was the focus of the investigation in this case, we do not find 
that factor requires a finding that defendant was in custody. Patterson explained 
that it is the element of coercion rather than the mere focus of an investigation that 
calls Miranda safeguards into play. 146 Ill. 2d at 458. 
¶ 72 
 
An example of coercion is set forth in Easley, where the defendant was 
questioned for a second time by two investigators, who were joined by a deputy 
director during the questioning. The Easley court noted that: 
 
“Defendant was the subject of intense scrutiny by the investigators. At the 
suppression hearing, [Investigator] Read testified that he told defendant that he 
was considered a prime suspect during the second interrogation and [Deputy 
Director] Long also indicated the same to defendant in the statement he made to 
him during the questioning ***.” Easley, 148 Ill. 2d at 303. 
Further, after Easley invoked his right to remain silent and refused to speak to 
investigators Read and Brubaker, Deputy Director Long nonetheless spoke with 
Easley and “not only told him that he had been identified as one of the murderers, 
but that if convicted of the crime, he was subject to being put to death.” (Emphases 
in original.) Id. at 305. The Easley court held that Long’s statement was made in an 
obvious effort to persuade the defendant to make a statement. Id. at 304-05. 
¶ 73 
 
Here, in contrast, the interview of defendant was not coercive. The interview 
with defendant was his first interview. There were no other officers present when 
defendant was interviewed. Officer Snyder testified that he put no pressure on 
defendant to answer in a certain way and did not tell defendant that he could not 
leave unless he confessed. There was no evidence that Officer Snyder made any 
statements in an attempt to persuade defendant to make a statement. There was no 
evidence that defendant refused to speak. When questioning defendant, Officer 
 
 
 
 
 
- 22 - 
Snyder was not aware of any charges against defendant outside of prison 
concerning the incident with Officer Davis.  
¶ 74 
 
Finally, defendant claims that the length of his questioning, 15 minutes, was 
longer than the 10-minute questioning of the defendant in Patterson.1 We find this 
time difference to be insignificant and insufficient to distinguish this case from 
Patterson.  
¶ 75 
 
Based upon our examination of all the circumstances surrounding Officer 
Snyder’s questioning of defendant, we find that defendant was not in custody and 
was not coerced into incriminating himself during his interview with Officer 
Snyder. A reasonable man in defendant’s position would not have thought that his 
will was being subjected to that of Officer Snyder. Because defendant was not in 
custody, the concerns underlying Miranda were not present in this case. 
¶ 76 
 
The trial court therefore did not err when it denied defendant’s motion to 
suppress. Absent any error, there could be no plain error requiring the appellate 
court to address defendant’s forfeited claim that he was entitled to Miranda 
warnings prior to his interview with Officer Snyder. Consequently, we deny 
defendant’s request for cross-relief and find that the appellate court properly 
affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress. 
¶ 77 
 
In sum, we find that defendant was properly sentenced as a Class X offender 
under section 5-4.5-95(b). For that reason, we reverse that portion of the appellate 
court’s order vacating defendant’s sentence and remanding for resentencing. We 
affirm the trial court’s sentence in this case. 
¶ 78 
 
With regard to defendant’s request for cross-relief, we affirm the appellate 
court’s order, which affirmed the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion to 
suppress. 
 
                                                 
 
1At the hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress, Officer Snyder could not recall the 
exact length of his interview with defendant, although he testified that it was closer to 10 
minutes than 30 minutes. Officer Snyder’s investigational review report indicated that the 
interview lasted 15 minutes. 
 
 
 
 
 
- 23 - 
¶ 79 
 
Appellate court judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part. 
¶ 80 
 
Circuit court judgment affirmed. 
 
¶ 81 
 
JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting: 
¶ 82 
 
Defendant’s principal argument for cross-relief is that the trial court erred in 
denying his motion to suppress his admission to assaulting an officer because he 
was subjected to a custodial interrogation without being given his Miranda rights. I 
agree and would grant the cross-relief defendant requests. The majority concludes 
that, under the circumstances of this case, Miranda warnings were not required and 
there was no error by the trial court. The majority reaches this conclusion by 
determining that defendant was not in custody. I believe this conclusion to be 
clearly erroneous. I would find reversible error in the trial court’s denial of 
defendant’s motion to suppress. For this reason, I cannot join that part of the 
majority opinion and, therefore, must respectfully dissent. 
¶ 83 
 
As I previously observed in my dissent in Patterson, the procedural safeguards 
of Miranda warnings did not develop in contemplation of the prison inmate being 
questioned concerning an offense during his incarceration. They developed, 
instead, in response to the need to protect the fifth amendment rights of persons 
previously at liberty, cut off from the outside world, and placed in a 
police-dominated environment. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
Thus, the traditional Miranda formulation does not lend itself to easy application in 
prisoner interrogation cases. Patterson, 146 Ill. 2d at 461 (Freeman, J., dissenting, 
joined by Clark, J.). 
¶ 84 
 
Although I recognize that Miranda clearly is not implicated in every prison 
inmate interrogation situation (see, e.g., Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990)), 
nevertheless, the inmate, like his unincarcerated counterpart, may be subjected to 
criminal penalty based upon his incriminating statements. Therefore, I remain firm 
in my conviction that the prison inmate’s fifth amendment rights should be no less 
vigorously protected.  
¶ 85 
 
In order for Miranda warnings to be required, the suspect must be in custody. 
Given the peculiar nature of the prison setting, every inmate is literally “in 
 
 
 
 
 
- 24 - 
custody.” Thus, it is apparent that the test for Miranda in the prison setting requires 
that some special attention be given to the particular circumstances of each case. 
The relevant inquiry is whether a reasonable person in the inmate’s position would 
have understood himself to be in custody. Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. ___, ___, 132 
S. Ct. 1181, 1189 (2012); Leviston v. Black, 843 F.2d 302, 304 (8th Cir. 1988). 
¶ 86 
 
Defendant states that this court has addressed the application of Miranda to 
inmates in Patterson, where the court held that the inmate defendant was not “in 
custody” for purposes of Miranda and was not coerced into incriminating himself, 
and in Easley, where the court held that an inmate was subjected to a custodial 
interrogation for which Miranda warnings were required. Defendant argues that his 
circumstances are more analogous to Easley than to Patterson. The majority 
disagrees and discusses at length the circumstances of Patterson and Easley. Supra 
¶¶ 46-59. 
¶ 87 
 
The majority recognizes that the determination of whether an interrogation is 
custodial requires an examination of all the circumstances surrounding the 
questioning. Patterson, 146 Ill. 2d at 454. No single factor is determinative, but 
among the factors to be considered are “the location, length, mood and mode of 
interrogation; the number of police officers present; any evidence of restraint; and 
intentions of the officers and the focus of their investigation.” Id. A trial court must 
examine and weigh those factors and then make an objective determination as to 
what a reasonable person would perceive if they were in the defendant’s position. 
Id.; supra ¶ 50. The majority then finds defendant’s argument that his case is more 
analogous to Easley than to Patterson unavailing. 
¶ 88 
 
The majority acknowledges that, unlike the investigator in Patterson who was 
dressed in civilian clothes, Officer Snyder was dressed in uniform with his badges 
and patches on display, but the majority finds this of no significance because being 
around an officer in uniform with a badge and patches on display would be the 
normal course of daily life for defendant. Supra ¶ 60. 
¶ 89 
 
The majority observes that defendant remained handcuffed during the 
interrogation and discounts the relevance of this fact on the basis that defendant did 
not ask to have the handcuffs removed. I believe that defendant was restricted as a 
result of the continued handcuffing. As I observed in Patterson, I do not believe 
that defendant’s perceived acquiescence in being so restricted negates the fact of 
 
 
 
 
 
- 25 - 
that restriction. I also note that there is no mention that Officer Snyder ever offered 
to remove the handcuffs. Additionally, although defendant was housed in 
segregation, defendant was further restricted in the interrogation than if he had 
remained in his cell where he was not handcuffed. Supra ¶ 68. 
¶ 90 
 
The majority finds it significant that there was no testimony or evidence that 
defendant was not permitted to leave until Officer Snyder had finished questioning 
him. In fact, the majority observes that Officer Snyder testified at the hearing on 
defendant’s motion to suppress that his questioning of defendant was “just an 
interview” and defendant was “free to leave at any time.” Again, I note that there is 
no mention that Officer Snyder ever relayed this to defendant. Supra ¶ 69. 
¶ 91 
 
Officer Snyder testified that he knew “because of the situation” that defendant 
was going to receive an offender disciplinary report or ticket. The majority places 
great stock in the fact that there was no testimony that Officer Snyder had any 
involvement in that discipline or had the power to issue a ticket. I do not believe 
that defendant felt any less compelled to cooperate because the investigating officer 
would not himself mete out the punishment for defendant’s uncooperative conduct. 
¶ 92 
 
Officer Snyder also testified that an interview like his interview with defendant 
occurs in the normal course of an investigation. He testified that the inmate is given 
a chance to tell his side of what happened. Officer Snyder stated that he wanted to 
find out what had been thrown on Officer Davis, for the safety of Officer Davis. I 
take this with some skepticism, as the incident took place seven days prior to the 
interrogation.  
¶ 93 
 
The majority finds that while defendant was the focus of the investigation, 
according to Patterson, it is the element of coercion rather than the mere focus of an 
investigation that calls Miranda safeguards into play. Supra ¶ 71. Even though 
Officer Snyder’s interview was framed in terms of safety concerns of an officer, it 
nonetheless elicited incriminating responses regarding the assault to an officer. 
Further, I note that subsequent to the interrogation, criminal charges were filed 
against defendant—charges, proven with the inclusion of defendant’s admission, 
that led to an enhanced sentence based on defendant’s prior convictions.  
¶ 94 
 
The majority observes that the interview with defendant was his first interview, 
there were no other officers present, Officer Snyder testified that he put no pressure 
 
 
 
 
 
- 26 - 
on defendant to answer in a certain way and did not tell defendant that he could not 
leave unless he confessed, there was no evidence that defendant refused to speak, 
and Officer Snyder was not aware of any charges against defendant outside of 
prison concerning the incident with Officer Davis. Supra ¶ 73. 
¶ 95 
 
The majority concludes that after examination of all the circumstances 
surrounding Officer Snyder’s questioning of defendant, defendant was not in 
custody and was not coerced into incriminating himself during the interview with 
Officer Snyder. The majority holds that because defendant was not in custody, the 
concerns underlying Miranda were not present. Supra ¶ 75. I disagree. 
¶ 96 
 
There are some facts that might tend to support a finding that Miranda was not 
implicated: the location of the interview (in a room with a desk, chairs, and 
credenza) and the length of the interview (somewhere closer to 10 minutes than 30 
minutes). However, the facts that support a finding that Miranda warnings were 
necessary are that (1) defendant was the focus of the interrogation, (2) Officer 
Snyder was in uniform, (3) the purpose included the questioning of defendant 
concerning the alleged battery of Officer Davis, (4) defendant was handcuffed 
during the interview and thus was restricted to a greater extent than he was while in 
his cell, (5) there is no evidence that defendant was aware that he could leave at any 
time, and (6) defendant could have been penalized for his failure to cooperate. 
Finally and most importantly, Officer Snyder specifically elicited an incriminating 
response, which the State used against defendant at trial. Unlike Patterson, where 
the investigator scrupulously limited his questioning to prisoner safety concerns 
and “the defendant did not comment on the events of the day,” Officer Snyder 
asked defendant “if he actually threw this liquid concoction *** on correctional 
officer Jody Davis.” Officer Snyder testified that defendant “said he did.” 
Furthermore, the State, during closing argument, emphasized that defendant 
confessed to the crime. 
¶ 97 
 
Armed with defendant’s confession, the State obtained a conviction for which 
defendant received a six-year sentence that runs consecutively with his current term 
of incarceration. I believe the erroneous admission of defendant’s confession 
deprived defendant of a substantial right, which affected the fairness of his trial and 
undermined the integrity of the judicial process. Consequently, the second prong of 
plain error review is satisfied. 
 
 
 
 
 
- 27 - 
¶ 98 
 
I would hold that the interrogation of defendant in a police-dominated 
atmosphere, focusing on defendant and inquiring about the incident giving rise to 
criminal charges, without informing him of his rights, dishonored the fifth 
amendment privilege Miranda was designed to safeguard. I believe a reasonable 
person in defendant’s position would have understood himself to be in custody. The 
fifth amendment guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination must be 
carefully guarded and must not be unnecessarily compromised. 
¶ 99 
 
For the reasons stated, I would reverse the trial court’s denial of defendant’s 
motion to suppress. 
¶ 100 
 
JUSTICE BURKE joins in this dissent.