Title: Hopkinson v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Hopkinson v. State1984 WY 36679 P.2d 1008Case Number: 83-208Decided: 04/03/1984MARK A. HOPKINSON, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Supreme Court of Wyoming
MARK A. HOPKINSON, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, TetonCounty, Robert B. Ranck, 
J.

Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, and Muriel J. Smith, Nogalis, Ariz., for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., Allen C. Johnson, Senior Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Edward P. Moriarity, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before THOMAS, ROSE and CARDINE, JJ., RAPER, J., 
Retired, and SAWYER, District Judge.

RAPER, Justice, 
Retired.

[¶1.]     Appellant was tried by 
jury in 1979 and found guilty of four first-degree murders and two conspiracies 
as charged. He was sentenced, upon recommendation of the jury, to life 
imprisonment on three of the murders, but sentenced to death for the 
first-degree murder of Jeff Green. The court on its own, it not being a jury 
decision, sentenced appellant on the guilty verdicts with respect to the 
conspiracies. On appeal, in Hopkinson v. 
State, Wyo., 632 P.2d 79 (1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463 (1982) (Hopkinson I), this court affirmed the 
guilty verdicts and life sentences on three of the murders and the sentences for 
the conspiracies as well. While also affirming the guilty finding, this court 
reversed the death sentence and remanded the case for a new sentencing trial as 
to the murder of Jeff Green. The sentencing phase was accordingly retried, and a 
jury again recommended the death sentence for the first-degree murder of Jeff 
Green. Appellant was sentenced to be executed. This court affirmed the death 
sentence in Hopkinson v. State, 
Wyo., 664 P.2d 43 (1983), cert. denied ___ 
U.S. ___, 104 S. Ct. 262, 78 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1983) (Hopkinson 
II).

[¶2.]     The facts are 
thoroughly documented in Hopkinson I 
and Hopkinson II and need no 
reiteration. There was found to be no reasonable doubt as to appellant's guilt 
on all counts and the death penalty was justified as appropriate to all the 
circumstances, within the applicable law.

[¶3.]     On July 1, 1983, 
appellant filed in the district court a motion for new trial. A motion for new 
trial is provided for by Rule 34, W.R.Cr.P.1 Supplemental to the motion for new 
trial, various other motions were also filed. The trial judge denied all motions 
on September 14, 1983. Appellant appeals from the denial of the motion for new 
trial and here states as issues:

1. "Whether the Honorable 
Robert B. Ranck abused his discretion in not granting the Motion for a New 
Trial."

2. "Whether the Honorable 
Robert B. Ranck abused his discretion by not setting a hearing on the Motion for 
a New Trial."

3. "Whether the 
prosecution's intimidation, concealment and surprise tactics deprived Hopkinson 
of his right to a fair trial under both the federal and state 
constitutions."

4. "Whether the Honorable 
Robert B. Ranck abused his discretion when he failed to remove the special 
prosecutors from all phases of the Hopkinson case."

5. "Whether the Honorable 
Robert B. Ranck abused his discretion when he failed to recuse himself on all 
matters relating to the Motion for a New Trial."

We are now ready 
to discuss the current proceeding, which we will as required designate "Hopkinson III" for 
convenience.

[¶4.]     We will 
affirm.

I

[¶5.]     Appellant's motion for 
new trial filed with the district court states as reasons in support "1. New 
Evidence" and "2. Further Prosecution Tactics." The appellant agrees that in 
order to prevail where the motion is based on newly discovered evidence, the 
movant must satisfy the court:

"* * * (1) That the 
evidence has come to his knowledge since the trial; (2) that it was not owing to 
the want of due diligence that it did not come sooner; (3) that it is so 
material that it would probably produce a different verdict, if the new trial 
were granted; and (4) that it is not cumulative, viz., speaking to facts in 
relation to which there was evidence at the trial. [Citations.]" (Footnote 
omitted.) Opie v. State, Wyo., 422 P.2d 84, 85 (1967), followed in Salaz v. State, Wyo., 561 P.2d 238, 242 (1977), and approved most recently 
in Grable v. State, Wyo., 664 P.2d 531, 533 
(1983).

Those found 
guilty of crime and sentenced never grow weary in seeking new trials on the 
ground of newly discovered evidence, but motions founded on that ground are not 
favored by the courts and are viewed with great caution. 3 Wright, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d § 557 (1982), in discussing Rule 33, 
F.R.Cr.P., couched in the same pertinent language as Rule 34, W.R.Cr.P. Federal 
cases decided under the rule are, therefore, persuasive. Grable v. State, supra.

[¶6.]     Grable v. State, supra, and the 
precedent there cited stand for the established proposition that in Wyoming it is clearly 
within the sound discretion of the district court to either grant or deny a new 
trial based upon newly discovered evidence, and the district court does not 
abuse its discretion if it could reasonably conclude as it did. The burden is 
upon the movant to establish his right to a new trial. Salaz v. State, supra.

[¶7.]     With impressive 
citation of authority, this court in Grable v. State, supra at 533, has also 
approved the so-called "Berry rule":

"`* * * The newly 
discovered evidence must be more than impeaching or cumulative; it must be 
material to the issues involved; it must be such as would probably produce an 
acquittal; and a new trial is not warranted by evidence which, with reasonable 
diligence, could have been discovered and produced at trial. * * *' United States v. Allen, 554 F.2d 398, 
403 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 836, 98 S. Ct. 124, 54 L. Ed. 2d 97 
(1977)."

[¶8.]     With those general 
principles of law applying to new trials, we move along to a consideration of 
what the appellant presents to support his claim that a new trial should have 
been granted.

[¶9.]     First, the appellant 
asserts that while he knew about the existence of various tapes of recorded 
telephone conversations, he only learned of the possible location of some eight 
or nine tapes from reading this court's opinion in Hopkinson II. This is gross 
misrepresentation.

[¶10.]  By way of review with respect to the 
tapes, we will summarize from Hopkinson 
II, 664 P.2d  at 80-81. While the trial of the penalty phase was on appeal 
and following oral argument, appellant filed in this court a pro se "Motion of 
Proof, for Consideration in Showing Palin [sic] Error Existed, Which Was Not 
Properly Shown in Briefs or Argument." He complained that a taped telephone 
conversation should have been admitted into evidence. The question of the tape 
arose during an in-chambers conference. We have now again reviewed the 
transcript of proceedings in that regard. (Hopkinson II - Vol. X, pp. 787-799)2 At , it is disclosed that the trial 
judge for the record stated, "[n]ow, we're in chambers with counsel and the defendant and Mr. Bussart." 
(Emphasis added.) The tape was then in appellant's counsel's hands, who 
explained that it had been picked up by appellant's mother from his Salt Lake 
City room, turned over by her to appellant's brother, who turned it over to Mr. 
Van Sciver, appellant's trial counsel during the trial of Hopkinson I. From what appears in the 
transcript of the conference, the tape was of a recording made surreptitiously 
by appellant. It was of a conversation between the deceased, Jeff Green, and 
Green's attorney, Bussart. Appellant's 
counsel stated to the trial judge: "This is one of nine. The others were 
taken and were offered to be resold to Mark [Hopkinson]." (Emphasis added.) Mr. 
Moriarity, one of the prosecutors, asked, "[b]y whom? Can you say?" Appellant's 
counsel replied, "I can't say. I don't know. He [referring to appellant] doesn't 
know. He thinks it was possibly Taylor or possibly Green himself." Mr. Moriarity 
replied, "I got a copy of this tape 
from George Zunker." (Emphasis added.) George Zunker was appellant's counsel in 
United States v. Hopkinson, 
infra.

[¶11.]  There is nothing in the transcript which 
would indicate that the State had any knowledge of the existence or whereabouts 
of any of the tapes nor, according to its brief filed in this appeal, does it 
have any present knowledge of the whereabouts of any tapes, except the one that 
was the subject matter of the chambers conference. The only reference to there 
being other tapes was made by appellant's counsel and in appellant's presence. 
The knowledge of appellant's counsel that there were other tapes, if in fact 
there were, could only have come from appellant. An interesting observation is 
that the transcript of the tape recording attached to appellant's pro se motion 
in Hopkinson II and appellant's 
motion for new trial in the appeal now before us is entitled "Transcript of 
Million Sellers Vol. 4 (Side A)," which may indicate the existence of other 
tapes, of which the one produced in chambers in Hopkinson II is tape number four. That 
tape was found by appellant's mother in his room.

[¶12.]  In any event, it is obvious that if there 
are other tapes, they are not new evidence but old evidence of which only the 
appellant - not the State - had knowledge before the trial of Hopkinson I. He must produce them. The 
burden of establishing grounds for a new trial is upon appellant. Salaz v. State, supra. There is no 
showing that appellant has shown due diligence in locating the tape of which he 
had knowledge. United States v. 
Siviglia, 686 F.2d 832 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied ___ 
U.S. ___, 103 S. Ct. 1902, 77 L. Ed. 2d 289 (1983). Appellant's version is fanciful. United 
States v. Oliver, 683 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 
1982).

[¶13.]  Next, there are a number of affidavits 
attached to appellant's motion for new trial which appellant claims present new 
evidence.

[¶14.]  There are two James Harrison affidavits 
which infer that Mike Hickey, a State witness who had testified in Hopkinson I that he was hired by 
appellant to blow up the Vehar residence and did in fact throw dynamite into the 
basement causing the deaths of its three occupants, had as a friend discussed 
with Harrison, Hickey's part in the Vehar bombing, but Hickey "never indicated" 
Hopkinson had any part in it. Later on affiant Harrison declares that Hickey stated to him that Hopkinson 
was innocent of any charges. However, the affidavits refer to Hickey's temporary 
absence when Hickey was in federal court. This apparently refers to appellant's 
trial in the United States District Court for Wyoming when appellant and Hickey were 
indicted for various offenses related to an explosive bomb. Hopkinson was 
convicted and Hickey was acquitted. Affirmed in United States v. 
Hopkinson, 631 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 450 U.S. 969, 101 S. Ct. 1489, 67 L. Ed. 2d 620 (1981). This court refers to that case in Hopkinson I, 632 P.2d  at 95 and Hopkinson II, 664 P.2d  at 49. Anyway, 
affiant Harrison stated that it was before that trial that Hickey stated 
appellant had nothing to do with the bombing of the Vehar home. Nothing appears 
in the affidavit about Hickey's absence during the trial, Hopkinson I, for the murders of the 
three members of the Vehar family and Jeff Green. Hickey at that trial did 
definitely implicate appellant Hopkinson. Appellant presents no affidavit of 
Hickey that Hickey is recanting his testimony in Hopkinson I. Harrison's affidavits are not even recantation once 
removed. Hickey, at the time of the trial of Hopkinson I, was under the Federal 
Witness Protection Program and not in the Wyoming State Penitentiary, but in 
federal custody. (Hopkinson I - Tr. 
Vol. VI, p. 806) His address at the time of the retrial of Hopkinson II in 1982 (Hopkinson II - Vol. I, p. 77) was c/o 
United States Marshal. There is no showing by appellant that he was in contact 
with Harrison after the Hopkinson I trial.

[¶15.]  Because of their inconsistency and lack 
of any statements made by Hickey after the murder trial of Hopkinson, the 
affidavits are misleading and have no value as a recanting or impeachment of 
Hickey's testimony at that trial. It must be remembered (Hopkinson I, 632 P.2d at 94-95) that 
appellant, through perjured testimony, was protecting Hickey from being charged 
with the Wyckhuyse girl's murder until such time as Jeff Green at the trial of 
Hysell for the murder of the Wyckhuyse girl broke down and confessed that his 
statements incriminating Hysell were lies and that Hickey had killed her. Later, 
Hickey pled guilty to the murder of Kelly Wyckhuyse and, according to Hopkinson I, was granted immunity as to 
the Vehar murders in exchange for his testimony with respect to the 
latter.

[¶16.]  Under close scrutiny, the Harrison affidavits are not what they purport to be. At 
the most, they are no more than impeachment of Hickey's testimony but of little 
value there. Hickey's testimony was in minute detail taking up 476 pages of 
testimony. (Hopkinson I - Tr. Vols. 
VI, VII, VIII, pp. 765-1241) He was cross-examined at length by appellant's 
counsel who had Hickey's grand jury testimony and the testimony given at Jamey 
Hysell's trial along with other statements made by Hickey. It must be recalled 
that the vast array of prosecution testimony and other evidence, examined at 
length and in detail in Hopkinson I 
and Hopkinson II, corroborates 
Hickey's trial testimony that appellant hired him to blow up the Vehar home. In 
spite of Hickey's background, the jury believed him. It was a question for the 
jury. The rule is that any newly discovered evidence must be so material that it 
would produce a different verdict, if the new trial were granted, and must be 
more than impeaching. Opie, Salaz, and 
Grable, supra. The Harrison affidavits do 
not produce testimony within those concepts.

[¶17.]  The affidavits of Richard Weddle, a 
person in the Wyoming State Penitentiary at the time of making one affidavit and 
a prisoner in a Colorado county jail at the 
time of making another, generally state that he met Jeff Green in a park in 
Evanston at 2:00 
a.m. of the morning the Vehar home was blown up. Weddle then went on to state 
that Green was looking for explosives to blow up the Vehar home to scare him 
because he knew too much about Green's unlawful activities and was beginning to 
act like a "`one man police show.'" The information purportedly came about in 
that Green had hired Vehar to incorporate a business which would deal in stolen 
property. Weddle "thought" the person looking for explosives with Green was Jim 
Taylor, but it was dark and he could not clearly see. Weddle states that 
Hopkinson's name was not mentioned during that conversation. There are some 
immaterial references to thefts by Green from persons not in any way associated 
with the murder of any of the victims. Affiant then comes to the bare-faced 
conclusion: "I know that MARK HOPKINSON was not involved in any way with the 
bombing of the Vincent Vehar home or the death of JEFF GREEN."

[¶18.]  In his second affidavit, Weddle dwells 
predominantly on purported intimidation of him during continuing grand jury 
investigations by the prosecutors, Spence and Moriarity, as well as police 
officers. He asserts that he told the truth once to the grand jury but lied on a 
second appearance because of the intimidation. In the same affidavit, he asserts 
he was afraid to say anything important in his questioning because of a 
purported threat from Jim Taylor and he also worried about what effect it might 
have on his own trial in which, according to his first affidavit, he was being 
prosecuted for sexual assault.

[¶19.]  After his trial, affiant goes on to say, 
he made complete revelations of anything he knew about the Vehar bombing and 
Jeff Green to Hopkinson's attorneys, Van Sciver and Brass, and they visited him 
in a Utah 
prison. Upon his return to the Wyoming State Penitentiary, he asserts he was 
afforded an opportunity to talk with Hopkinson, but the conversation was taped 
by order of the warden, which prevented him from giving Hopkinson some of the 
information Hopkinson asked of him. The affidavit closed with a statement of 
Weddle's having personal knowledge of various crimes committed by Jeff Green; 
that he had seen Green with dynamite; that Green knew how to use it; and that he 
had seen Green explode it for fun. Scratched out of the affidavit and initialed 
"R.W." were the words "plus I gave Jeff Green some other explosives which was 
[sic] stolen from a guy I worked for in Evanston." 

[¶20.]  This court is aware of Weddle's trial for 
sexual assault. His conviction was appealed and affirmed in Weddle v. State, Wyo., 621 P.2d 231 
(1980). It is apparent that Weddle is unfamiliar with all the evidence which 
links appellant to the murders of the Vehars and Green. If the conversation with 
Green took place at 2:00 a.m. on the same morning that the Vehar home was 
dynamited, and Green got no explosives from Weddle, Green's time between then 
and 3:35 a.m., when the home exploded, is unaccounted for by Weddle's affidavit. 
See opinion in Hopkinson I, 632 P.2d  
at 95, and the testimony of Randy Hodson, an Evanston police officer dispatched to the scene 
(Hopkinson I - Tr. Vol. V, p. 427) to 
establish date and hour of the explosion. Hickey, the person who, by his own 
admission and whom extensive evidence shows, tossed the bomb into the basement, 
is accounted for during the morning hours before, during and after the explosion 
by corroborating evidence. His testimony included his manufacture of the bomb, 
and he directed officers to the dynamite box lid which they found and which 
carried identification markings. Weddle's view of the facts becomes unbelievable 
in light of all the evidence in the case. Even if Weddle were produced as a 
witness in a new trial, his testimony would not stand up under cross-examination 
nor is it probable that it would produce a different verdict. His statement that 
he "knows" Hopkinson to be innocent of the murders has no support in his 
affidavit and is valueless. Weddle's admission that he lied to the grand jury 
makes his story further suspect.3 His attempt to show Jeff Green to 
be a criminal is not new evidence. The evidence in Hopkinson I shows Green to have a 
criminal record. See Hopkinson I, 632 P.2d  at 94-95. Jim Taylor, who purportedly threatened Weddle, is not a new actor 
introduced by Weddle. He testified during the trial. See Hopkinson I, 632 P.2d  at 94. His full 
name is Harold James Taylor. His testimony showed that he was also a person with 
the type of background useful to appellant who hired him for a fee of $600 to 
shotgun Vehar, but Taylor spent the money which the evidence 
accounted for and backed out. Taylor also sold an "untraceable" handgun to 
Hopkinson. Appellant, as a convicted felon long before his conviction in Hopkinson I, could not lawfully acquire 
and possess a firearm. The handgun was given by appellant to Hickey, who 
directed officers to its whereabouts, and it is an exhibit in Hopkinson I. Weddle's charges of 
intimidation by the prosecutors are after the fact as to the guilt trial, and 
are, at the most, cumulative of accusations, made by the defense at the trial of 
Hopkinson I.

[¶21.]  The unsigned affidavit of Cindy Taylor 
Schrode, the former wife of Harold James Taylor, is of no value. There is no 
assurance that she would so testify, and, even if she would, there is not 
anything new set out because, for the most part, it recites dealings such as 
loans of money to her by appellant, and work she and her husband did for 
appellant at his trailer park, all of which the appellant as a party would have 
knowledge. Salaz v. State, supra. The 
unsigned affidavit tells that her husband and she bought a horse for $600 (the 
amount paid Taylor to shotgun Vehar), and appellant loaned 
them the money to make the purchase. The document also describes the 
circumstances under which appellant purchased the handgun: appellant, nervous 
and shaken at the time, wanted to and did buy the weapon because "some man named 
Hysell, I think, was threatening to shoot Mark A. Hopkinson." The paper ends 
with "[a]fter the bombing of the Vehar home in Evanston, Wyoming I heard rumors that Jeff Green had 
blown up that house." Rumors are not evidence.

[¶22.]  Even if the affidavit had been signed and 
notarized, appellant would have had personal knowledge of all these dealings 
since he was privy to them. He could have called Cindy Taylor Schrode at the 
time of the trial of Hopkinson I. He 
elected, however, to not call witnesses or put in any evidence on his behalf. He 
did that knowingly and intelligently, after being fully informed by the court 
and his own counsel of his rights in that connection, which we will mention in 
more detail in connection with the affidavits of Jeff Dunn, Hap Russell, Helen 
Russell, and Courtney Klekas, n. 6, infra.

[¶23.]  Hickey testified that the weapon 
purchased from Taylor was given to Hickey when appellant and 
Hickey were discussing ways to kill Vincent Vehar or William Roitz. Hickey was 
waiting in a pickup when appellant purchased the handgun. (Hopkinson I - Tr. Vol. VII, pp. 
935-961)

[¶24.]  The unsigned affidavit of Kristi King 
presented nothing new of a material nature and will be discussed further in 
Parts II and III of this opinion. The closing statement of the unsigned document 
states that she does not remember what her testimony was. She may not remember, 
but the record in this case does. The paper does not point to any change in her 
testimony, even if true. We will return later at various places to discuss the 
role of Kristi King.

[¶25.]  The affidavit of Jonathan Domonic Ceccia, 
also known as Jonathan Domonic Mauro, a Wyoming State Penitentiary inmate since 
May, 1981, contributes nothing to establish any innocence on the part of 
appellant. He asserts he was not let out on parole because of his friendliness 
with appellant. He, according to his affidavit, had written Spence complaining 
about what he believed to be his unconstitutional treatment by penitentiary 
personnel and wanted to sue. He was, according to his affidavit, called before 
the grand jury in connection with its continuing investigation of the murder of 
Jeff Green. Affiant says that Mr. Spence talked to him, in the lobby of the 
building in Evanston where the grand jury was meeting, 
advising that he had received affiant's letter and indicating he had a good 
case. He claims Spence became angry at him because he produced nothing 
incriminating against appellant. He further states that when he was returned to 
a holding cell, he was slapped and pushed around by the jailer and another 
officer. He also states that his statements to the grand jury were true and not 
made for any purpose except to respond truthfully to questions put to him. We 
find nothing in the record as to what his testimony was. There is nothing here 
to indicate a new trial is required.

[¶26.]  Another Wyoming State Penitentiary 
inmate, Bobby Barnes, in his affidavit asserts that he was told by jail 
officials in Evanston when he was taken there to testify 
before the grand jury that if he cooperated with Spence and Moriarity and gave 
the right kind of information about appellant, he could get out of prison. He 
goes on to say that when he told jail officials he had nothing to say about 
Hopkinson, he was threatened, pushed around, and denied basic sanitary equipment 
needed by one in jail. He had also prepared a list of grievances about county 
jail treatment to be read to the grand jury. There is nothing material here. 

[¶27.]  The affidavits of Jeff Dunn, Helen 
Russell, Alvin Russell, and Courtney Klekas will be considered together in that 
they are interrelated. Alvin Russell is also known as Hap Russell. He testified 
in Hopkinson I. (Hopkinson I - Tr. Vol. XI, p. 1334, et 
seq.) A summary of his testimony follows. The court reporter shows his name as 
Allen G. Russell, III. He was a bookie and became a close friend of appellant in 
Salt Lake City. 
He moved in with appellant in a condominium owned by the latter. Russell 
testified he shared the cost of carpet, drapes and wall covering and that was 
all. It was, according to Russell, later agreed between appellant and him that 
Russell's interest in the place was $6,500.

[¶28.]  They lived together some five months. 
After appellant was arrested and sentenced on the federal explosives charge, 
Russell continued to occupy the condominium. When appellant was sentenced to 
prison following his conviction on the explosives charge, and sent to the 
federal prison facility at Lompoc, California, appellant from there made a series 
of some 46 collect telephone calls to the condominium telephone number. See 
Hopkinson I, supra, 632 P.2d  at 96, n. 9, for chart showing dates of calls to 
Russell along with the many other telephone calls placed by appellant from 
Lompoc. 
Appellant's mother paid Russell's expenses (from appellant's money) to visit 
appellant at Lompoc, which he did.

[¶29.]  Before Russell was questioned about the 
purpose of his trip, the prosecutor requested that the court advise Russell of 
his right not to testify in that his testimony would incriminate him and he 
could not be compelled to be a witness against himself, a protection afforded by 
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In chambers the trial 
judge did advise him of those rights and recommended that he consult with his 
attorney before testifying in regard to his participating in the subornation of 
perjury. The defense counsel was anxious that the witness make his own decision 
without the necessity of other counsel's advice in that regard, because it was 
expected his testimony would be favorable to the appellant and even urged the 
prosecutor to grant immunity to the witness.4 The prosecutors in this case were 
special prosecutors and argued they had no authority to grant such immunity, or 
even authority to move for the granting of immunity. The court agreed and 
declared that only it could grant such authority but would only do so upon 
motion of the prosecution. The prosecutors were reluctant to obtain a clearance 
from the county attorney, whom they considered the only one who could move the 
court to grant immunity from prosecution. Russell had apparently been granted 
immunity from a federal prosecution for purchasing or attempting to purchase 
perjured testimony, through the United States District Attorney for the District 
of Wyoming, but it was not considered applicable to the state of Wyoming. Before the court 
recessed - it was late in the afternoon - it was left that Russell would confer 
further with his attorney,5 and a decision would be made the 
next morning. 

[¶30.]  When the court reconvened, the special 
prosecutor advised that the county and prosecuting attorney for UintaCounty had authorized him to move the 
granting of immunity from prosecution limited to perjury - not murder - and 
that, along with the advice of defense counsel that it was necessary for his 
case that Russell testify, he so moved. Mr. Russell agreed. The court granted 
the motion. After some preliminary questioning, Russell was interrogated as an 
adverse witness.

[¶31.]  Russell then testified that at Lompoc, appellant asked him to find someone reasonably 
"clean" who would testify to the fact that such person had been approached by 
Jeff Green to blow up another man's truck in Salt Lake City. He further testified that 
appellant was willing to pay $15,000 to $20,000 for an affidavit to that effect 
and such testimony. It was Russell's testimony that the appellant wanted the 
affidavit to seek a new trial in the federal case, United States v. Hopkinson, tried in the 
United States District Court for Wyoming in which he was convicted of various 
crimes related to the interstate transportation of explosives. The facts of that 
case are related in United States v. 
Hopkinson, supra. Jeff Green had testified in the federal trial that 
Hopkinson, Hickey and Green were present when a dynamite bomb was made at 
Hopkinson's residence. Hopkinson asked Green to take the bomb to Phoenix and blow up 
Mariscal's car. The plan failed because Green was apprehended in Coleville, Utah, for speeding and the bomb was discovered 
in Hopkinson's car, a Lincoln Continental which Green was driving. See also the 
testimony of Barry Strohbehn, special agent for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco 
and Firearms (Hopkinson I - Tr. Vol. 
VIII, pp. 1355, 1361-1362) set out in Hopkinson I, supra, 632 P.2d  at 117. 
Appellant posted a $2,000 bond for Green's release and from the $2,000, a $250 
fine was paid on the speeding violation.

[¶32.]  Appellant's mother delivered the first 
$4,000 in cash to Russell at appellant's request. (Hopkinson I - Tr. Vol. XII, pp. 
1440-1446) Russell then obtained a picture of Jeff Green from Jennifer Larchick, 
which she had cut from a high school yearbook. He delivered it to John Suesata, 
to whom he paid the $4,000 plus $500 from his own pocket. (Hopkinson I - Tr. Vol. XII, pp. 1452 
& 1485) Suesata was to find someone to furnish the perjured testimony. This 
was spoken to in Hopkinson I, supra, 
632 P.2d  at 141.

[¶33.]  This is where Jeff Dunn came into the 
scheme. John Suesata and Jeff Dunn, a land developer, were partners in running a 
gambling room in Salt Lake 
City. Russell was a friend of both. The $4,500 to Suesata 
plus another $9,000 of Hopkinson's money were transferred to Dunn. (Hopkinson I - Tr. Vol. XII, pp. 
1482-1486)

[¶34.]  However, at the time of the trial of 
Hopkinson I, prosecution counsel knew and immediately following the above 
testimony asked Russell, "[w]ell, actually your testimony will be that the money 
that you paid to Mr. Dunn was for a real estate transaction; isn't that right?" 
His answer was "yes," and his claim was that he borrowed the $9,000 from 
appellant. When asked if he had paid it back, he replied "yes and no" and 
explained $6,500 of that was what he had spent furnishing and decorating 
appellant's condominium and he still owed appellant $2,500. (Hopkinson I - Tr. Vol. XII, pp. 
1486-1493)

[¶35.]  At this point, Russell's mother, Helen, 
is brought into the investment contrivance. Russell testified that she also 
invested $5,000 with Dunn. (Hopkinson 
I - Tr. Vol. XII, p. 1495) It was the prosecution's theory and argument that 
this was a money laundering conspiracy to wash the money which was actually paid 
to murder Jeff Green.

[¶36.]  The sequel to those transactions was 
Russell's testimony that only $4,500 was paid to Suesata for the perjured 
testimony with the remainder of a total of $15,000 to be paid when the perjured 
testimony was found. A Todd Hall was to get $10,000 and Suesata was to get 
$5,000 of which the $4,500 had been paid when the affidavit was signed. (Hopkinson I - Tr. Vol. XII, pp. 
1496-1499) 

[¶37.]  Just prior to Jeff Green's murder, 
Green's picture, obtained from a high school yearbook by Jennifer Larchick at 
the instance of Russell, was delivered to Suesata. On the 16th day of May, 1979, 
Russell signed a note for $9,000; on May 17th Jeff Green 
disappeared.

[¶38.]  The purpose of all the foregoing review 
of Russell's testimony with respect to Russell, Jeff Dunn and Russell's mother 
is to point out that the material set out in the affidavits of Jeff Dunn, Helen 
Russell (Alvin Russell's mother) and Alvin Russell is not newly discovered 
evidence but was brought out in the trial in Hopkinson I. What appears in the 
affidavits of Jeff Dunn and Helen Russell could have been testified to at that 
trial, but appellant elected not to produce evidence on his own behalf.6 Into the same category can be 
placed the material contained in the affidavit of Courtney Klekas. It is at the 
most only corroborative of Russell's testimony with respect to the interests of 
appellant and Russell in the condominium. None of the events there set out could 
possibly result in a different outcome.

[¶39.]  The affidavit of Mark Hopkinson, 
appellant, is of no value. It is unsigned so he is apparently still exercising 
his privilege to not testify. It, therefore, adds nothing. He sets out matters 
of which he had knowledge at the time of the trials in Hopkinson I and Hopkinson II. He elected not to testify, 
which is a constitutional right he has. We are unaware of any authority for 
granting a new trial on that basis nor has appellant furnished us any assistance 
in that regard.

[¶40.]  We will, however, call particular 
attention to two statements in appellant's affidavits. The first is his 
statement in paragraph "7." where he sets out that the $15,000 sent to Kristi 
King and returned by her was sent to the "bank in Overton, Utah, as prosecution is 
well aware." That is not newly discovered evidence. The draft to the Overton 
bank in the sum of $15,004.75 was brought out in Hopkinson I evidence. (Hopkinson I - Tr. Vol. XII, pp. 
1527-1528) It was dated May 21, 1979, the day after Jeff Green's body was found. 
The jury was aware of it. This is not new evidence. The State's theory was that 
was only cover-up and another $15,000 was used to pay hired killers. The jury 
accepted that version.

[¶41.]  The second statement is that set out in 
paragraph "9." where appellant attempts to explain that there was no defense 
presented because his attorneys told him there were "so many errors in the case 
that he would get a new trial." After being informed at length by the trial 
judge of his right to put on a defense, he elected not to and personally advised 
the court that "I know Mr. Moriarity's and Mr. Spence's incredible capabilities 
of rebuttal and they can't rebutt [sic] something we haven't put on." See n. 6, 
supra. Appellant chose this strategy. A desire to change strategy or tactics 
after an unfavorable verdict is not new evidence, nor ground for a new trial. United States v. Beasley, 582 F.2d 337 
(5th Cir. 1978); United States v. 
Soblen, 203 F. Supp. 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd 301 F.2d 236 (2nd Cir. 
1962), cert. denied 370 U.S. 944, 82 S. Ct. 1585, 8 L. Ed. 2d 810.

[¶42.]  Appellant's counsel in this appeal also 
furnishes an affidavit which does no more than submit argument and furnishes 
nothing upon which to base a new trial. Her allegations of improper tactics by 
the prosecution find no support in the record, which this court combed from end 
to end during its consideration in Hopkinson I and Hopkinson II, and has reviewed in 
consideration of this appeal.

[¶43.]  When the trial judge has denied a motion 
for new trial without a hearing, he has, by examination of the affidavits and 
written argument, found that there was no new evidence offered that showed any 
witness who testified during the trial was any more than truthful. The Supreme 
Court in United States v. Johnson, 327 U.S. 106, 66 S. Ct. 464, 90 L. Ed. 562 (1946), has said that the findings of the trial court 
based on newly discovered evidence should remain undisturbed by appellate courts 
except for the most extraordinary circumstances. We cannot see that this view by 
the court has changed. The court went on to say that the judge who tried the 
case is exceptionally well qualified to make that decision because he watched 
the case unfold. As there emphasized, the determination of guilt or innocence as 
an outcome of a fair trial and prompt enforcement of sentences are objectives of 
the administration of the criminal justice system. Courts should not be parties 
to inordinate delay by attempting to try de novo motions for a new trial based 
on conflicting evidence and such motions on appeal should be dismissed as 
frivolous.

II

[¶44.]  Whether the district judge's refusal to 
set a hearing on the motion for new trial is an abuse of discretion is the next 
question. We have just concluded in this opinion an exercise in which various 
parts of the record of the trial, Hopkinson I, were exhumed. It must be 
realized that working from a written record is considerably different than 
having lived as presiding judge from voir dire to verdict in a trial that 
commenced on September 3, 1979, and ended with the discharge of the jury on 
September 27, 1979. We must give weight to the fact that the trial judge who 
presided at the trial denied the motion for new trial. United States v. Hersh, 415 F.2d 835 
(5th Cir. 1969); United States v. 
Garrison, 296 F.2d 461 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied 369 U.S. 804, 82 S. Ct. 643, 7 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1962). He was exposed to not only the words spoken, but also 
the appearance, demeanor and emotion of all the actors. To hear and watch all 
the detail unfold over such a period of time burns all its drama into the 
memory. That memory has been refreshed and sharpened by an additional trial in 
the penalty phase, Hopkinson II, 
which started at 9:00 a.m. on the 17th day of May, 1982, and ended at 9:00 p.m. 
on the 27th day of May, 1982. The trial judge intimately knew what is in the 
record, having had the responsibility of paying close attention to every little 
facet of what took place for the purpose of ruling and being alert to the 
possibility of error creeping in. He could easily see from the motion for new 
trial the futility and shallowness of the type of attack being made on the 
evidence and trial proceedings, without listening to an oral argument that would 
add nothing.

[¶45.]  There is no law which requires a hearing 
on a motion for new trial unless the motion and its supporting papers require 
confirmation. The law is clear that a motion may be disposed of without a 
hearing and it is within the sound discretion of the district judge to do so. United States v. Hedman, 655 F.2d 813 
(7th Cir. 1981); United States v. 
Metz, 652 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Nace, 561 F.2d 763 (9th 
Cir. 1977); United States v. Ward, 
544 F.2d 975 (8th Cir. 1976); United 
States v. Pitts, 508 F.2d 1237 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied 421 U.S. 967, 
95 S. Ct. 1958, 44 L. Ed. 2d 455 (1975). We have reached into the evidence produced 
at trial, and examined it in the light of what appellant asserts is something 
new and different that would probably demand or suggest a different outcome than 
guilt. Our review discloses nothing of the sort. There was no abuse of 
discretion.

[¶46.]  The appellant wanted to examine witnesses 
as a part of the hearing, namely Kristi King, Cindy Taylor Schrode, John 
Suesata, Mike Hickey, J.R. Goo and Donald Ray Hagerman. Kristi King and Cindy 
Taylor Schrode refused to sign affidavits prepared at appellant's instance which 
were presented to them. We have nevertheless reviewed them in Part I of this 
opinion to see if their testimony, as appellant represents it would be, is 
suitable justification to grant a new trial. (Some of the issues presented by 
appellant are overlapping as to some witnesses so their testimony must be 
considered in different parts of this opinion.) We found as to Kristi King 
nothing new was offered. She testified at the trial in Hopkinson I and was subjected to 
cross-examination. The court advised her at the trial of her right to talk with 
defense counsel, but she was not interviewed by counsel though they were present 
when she was so advised. If she had talked with them, they would have inquired 
into the matters set out in an affidavit apparently prepared by counsel for 
appellant, because at the trial appellant's counsel complained that the 
prosecution was frightening her to prevent her from talking with defense 
counsel. The trial judge talked to her, because he was concerned with her 
appearance on the stand. Their conversation was at once made available to 
counsel by having the court reporter read it back to them. Her concerns were not 
as represented by counsel. There were no objections. We cover this further in 
Part III of this opinion.

[¶47.]  As pointed out in Part I, the proposed 
testimony of Cindy Taylor Schrode is not new. It deals with contacts she had 
with appellant and of which appellant had knowledge at the time of trial so it 
is, therefore, not new evidence.

[¶48.]  As to John Suesata, the record discloses 
that he refused to testify in Hopkinson 
I, as a Fifth Amendment privilege. His attorney was present and at his side. 
(Hopkinson I - Tr. Vol. XII, pp. 
1595-1607) A few questions were asked in the presence of the jury. The jury was 
excused from the courtroom. He refused outside the hearing of the jury to answer 
many questions regarding the appellant, Mark Hopkinson, Scott Hopkinson, Hap 
Russell, and Mr. Dunn or even admit that he knew them. It must be realized that 
Hap Russell in his testimony heavily implicated Suesata in the suborning of 
perjury and perhaps as an accomplice to the murder of Jeff Green. We also note 
in the record of Hopkinson I that 
Suesata was subpoenaed to appear before a federal grand jury. He did not appear, 
was charged with contempt, and was arrested. An information was filed charging 
him with failure to respond to a subpoena. He entered a plea of not guilty. 
Ultimate disposition is not shown. (Hopkinson I - R. Vol. IV, p. 319) It 
would be an exercise in futility to persuade him to testify. The trial judge 
knew that, having been through the experience. Suesata would not talk to 
appellant's counsel. In the absence of any showing that he is ready to testify, 
the trial judge was correct in not allowing a hearing and not allowing him to be 
subpoenaed.

[¶49.]  J.R. Goo testified in Hopkinson I. (Hopkinson I - Tr. Vol. V, p. 327, et 
seq.) He was treasurer of the sewer board. He ran a cafe and bar, originally 
with his father and then alone. He was a good friend of the appellant. His 
testimony was directed toward the on-going dispute between appellant and the 
sewer board of which he had knowledge. Appellant urged him to take steps to 
remove from the board William Roitz, for whom the evidence showed appellant 
entertained an intense hatred which had been going for years before. Appellant 
curried the ego of Goo, flattered him, and lent him money without interest to 
keep the cafe afloat. However, appellant asked for and got some fancy liquors in 
lieu of interest on one occasion.

[¶50.]  Goo tried to persuade the board that 
appellant was getting a bad deal on the sewer hookups for appellant's trailer 
park but eventually changed his mind after the board commissioned him as 
treasurer to collect unpaid hookup fees from appellant. (Hopkinson I - Tr. Vol. V, p. 338) 
Appellant refused to pay; his attitude toward Goo became unpleasant and hostile. 
One evening an unknown person came into the cafe as Goo was closing up, pulled 
Goo's apron over his head and administered a vicious beating.

[¶51.]  When the board sued appellant, appellant 
was furious and shaking and told Goo, "`I'll get everyone [sic] of you 
son-of-a-bitches.' He says, `I'll get William, get all the Roitzes, Vince Vehar, 
Nancy, I'll get everybody even if I have to come back from my grave, I'll get 
all of you.'" Goo further testified that he was not only afraid because of his 
beating and the described threat, but on another occasion appellant said with 
reference to Goo's wife and children, "`Wouldn't it be a shame if they got beat 
up, cut or hurt?'"

[¶52.]  After Vincent Vehar was killed by the 
blowing up of his residence, appellant came into Goo's cafe and said, "`I am 
glad the old son-of-a-bitch is dead. If somebody wouldn't have done it,' he 
says, `I would have done it myself.'"

[¶53.]  Goo was thoroughly cross-examined, during 
which an attempt was made to discredit his testimony but, if anything, it was 
strengthened. Goo was firm, forthright, and consistent. The appellant now 
apparently seeks to cross-examine him further because Goo has refused to talk to 
his counsel, but Mrs. Goo had told appellant's counsel they had lost their home 
and the business, and were receiving threatening phone calls.

[¶54.]  We agree with the trial judge that no 
useful purpose would be served by recalling Goo. Appellant knew Goo, knew his 
connection with the sewer board, and could have produced evidence, if there was 
any, to refute his testimony. There is no element of surprise involved. There is 
no indication Goo's testimony was false. Goo was having financial problems, and, 
as he testified, he could not get a loan from anyone, except appellant. The 
State can hardly be blamed for Goo's losses, regardless of the compassion we may 
entertain for his unfortunate position.

[¶55.]  Donald Ray Hagerman was not a witness at 
any of appellant's trials. He apparently gave testimony to the grand jury 
adverse to appellant. He has not furnished an affidavit to appellant, but two 
undated letters from Hagerman are attached to support the motion for new trial. 
He states there that he testified before the grand jury that appellant had asked 
him to kill Frank Roitz (brother of William Roitz, member of the sewer board), 
burn down his house and also set some mall on fire. The letters were addressed 
to Mr. Van Sciver, one of appellant's trial attorneys in Hopkinson I and for awhile afterward. 
Hagerman, by the letters, wants to withdraw his accusations and asserts they 
were lies; he was doing so only for revenge and because he was high on drugs. 
Hagerman also claims in one letter that Hickey told him he and Jeff Green blew 
up the house to scare Vehar from investigation of crimes they committed in the 
Valley, but they did not want to kill him. Vehar was not a prosecuting attorney 
or law enforcement officer.

[¶56.]  The tenor of the undated letters, along 
with an entry in the record, Hopkinson 
II, indicates that they were written to Mr. Van Sciver subsequent to 
appellant's trial, Hopkinson I. By 
appellant's brief here and the appellant's trial court brief in the record in 
this appeal, it is alleged that the indictment to which Hagerman's letters refer 
was dismissed. We do not know of the dismissal because that indictment must be 
one of three returned against appellant, which resulted from continuing grand 
jury investigation that went on following the trial in Hopkinson I. They do not appear in the 
record, Hopkinson II, though the fact 
of further grand jury indictments against appellant does.

[¶57.]  In Hopkinson II, the prosecution proposed 
using some of the evidence gathered in the investigation carried on after Hopkinson I was tried, before this 
court's decision was handed down as to that case and before the penalty phase, 
Hopkinson II, was tried. In the 
prosecutor's notice of evidence it would produce that was filed in Hopkinson II, it is set out that 
Hagerman was a prisoner in the Wyoming State Penitentiary. The notice relates 
that while there appellant promised Hagerman money "to kill and burn Frank Roitz 
and any of the Roitz family who were present; and that he (Hagerman) was to 
firebomb the shopping 
center of Charla Green 
Youngberg, Jeff Green's older sister." Additionally, 
it is related that Hopkinson told Hagerman he would have him tortured just like 
Jeff Green was. It was represented that exhibits would include writings between 
appellant and Hagerman. (Hopkinson II 
- Vol. III, p. 473)

[¶58.]  We do not set out the foregoing as 
establishing any guilt in that those additional indictments have not been tried, 
nor was Hagerman a witness in Hopkinson 
II, and it may be that the indictment was dismissed as represented by 
appellant's counsel, but we only include it for the purpose of showing that it 
is immaterial to the six charges upon which appellant was found guilty and 
sentenced in Hopkinson I and Hopkinson II. We would add that the 
original indictment filed in Hopkinson 
I contained 14 counts. All the six counts upon which appellant was tried, 
convicted and sentenced were severed and the other eight counts are undisposed 
of.

[¶59.]  Hagerman's testimony would not be 
pertinent for the purpose of considering whether a new trial should be granted. 
The trial judge from the record and his knowledge as trial judge knew all about 
the foregoing, so he did not need to hear any testimony Hagerman might 
furnish.

[¶60.]  The State filed in the district court a 
comprehensive response to the motion for new trial. Appellant's motion with 
argument and affidavits attached, and the trial judge's intimate knowledge 
gained from his presiding over lengthy trial proceedings, rendered superfluous 
any further hearing at which the same arguments would be repeated and the same 
lack of need to take testimony would be shown. We have no intention of stripping 
the trial judge of his discretion to practice common sense in refusing a hearing 
to take testimony when all that is necessary for disposition is already in the 
record. There may be occasions when a hearing may be advisable, but this is not 
one of them. We do not hold that in every case an oral hearing with appearances 
and the taking of testimony is not required. More explicitly stated, we also do 
not hold that discovery is not available in the disposition of a motion for new 
trial. Nor do we, in making that statement, intend to open the door to discovery 
in cases such as the one before us. In Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300, 89 S. Ct. 1082, 1091, 
22 L. Ed. 2d 281, 291 (1969), reh. denied 394 U.S. 1025, 89 S. Ct. 1623, 23 L. Ed. 2d 50, the court made the following statement:

"* * * We are aware that 
confinement sometimes induces fantasy which has its basis in the paranoia of 
prison rather than in fact. But where specific allegations before the court show 
reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed, be 
able to demonstrate that he is confined illegally and is therefore entitled to 
relief, it is the duty of the court to provide the necessary facilities and 
procedures for an adequate inquiry. Obviously, in exercising this power, the 
court may utilize familiar procedures, as appropriate, whether these are found 
in the civil or criminal rules or elsewhere in the `usages and principles of 
law.'" (Footnote omitted.)

The dissents in 
that case felt the statement too broad and feared it was a rule that extended 
beyond the habeas corpus proceeding the case was considering and other 
post-conviction procedures. Justice Harlan, joined by Justice White, observed 
that it might reach motions for a new trial not authorized by Rule 33, F.R.Cr.P. 
(Rule 34, W.R.Cr.P., supra, n. 1) and special rules were necessary. We mention 
this only to observe that if the case could be applicable, the appellant has not 
made a sufficient showing of reason to believe that even if an evidentiary 
hearing was held, he would be able to develop an entitlement to 
relief.

III

[¶61.]  What appellant refers to as "the 
prosecution's intimidation, concealment and surprise tactics deprived Hopkinson 
of his right to a fair trial under both the federal and state constitutions" is 
a different description of the same issue raised and disposed of in Hopkinson I and Hopkinson II. Under this issue, various 
assertions are made. While this is delineated as a separate issue, it is 
apparently the ultimate question arising from what appellant calls an issue, 
covered in Part IV of this opinion, claiming error for failure of the district 
judge to remove the special prosecutors. Various acts of purported misconduct by 
the special prosecutors are alleged, such as preventing prosecution witness 
Kristi King from being interviewed by defense counsel by frightening her; 
refusal of other State witnesses to discuss their knowledge with appellant's 
counsel and investigators; failure of the State to grant immunity to various 
witnesses; prejudice by the presence of large numbers of guards, references to 
witnesses being in protective custody, participants wearing bulletproof 
clothing, and the proximity of the prosecution team to the jury box so that 
jurors could overhear their comments.

[¶62.]  Then, apparently by way of corroborating 
this charge of pressure during trial, there is presented an array of affidavits 
by persons, mostly felons, claiming similar treatment by the prosecution at 
various times during continuing grand jury investigation following the trial, Hopkinson I.

[¶63.]  The question of refusal of the State's 
witnesses to discuss their testimony with appellant was covered by this court in 
Hopkinson I, 632 P.2d  at 144. The 
trial judge informed Jennifer Larchick of her right to talk to counsel as well 
as her right to refuse to do so. She only wanted to finish her testimony and go 
home. The trial judge ordered the prosecution to make her available to the 
defense for questioning. She was made available and defense counsel did not 
avail themselves of the opportunity but in open court expressed a desire to talk 
to her after the trial, though no objection was made to her being discharged 
from further attendance under her subpoena following her testimony during the 
State's case in chief. The witness Kristi King was advised by the trial judge 
she could talk to appellant's counsel if she would like to.

[¶64.]  The unsigned affidavit of Kristi King 
bears a date, "this ____ day of August, 1981." For over two years, she has 
apparently refused to sign it. It appears that Kristi King talked to appellant's 
present counsel, but there is nothing even in the unsigned affidavit, which 
purportedly represents what she told appellant's counsel, to indicate her 
testimony would be any different than during the original trial. Her apparent 
discomfiture on the witness stand at the time of the trial in Hopkinson I attracted the attention of 
the trial judge, and with notice to counsel that their verbatim transcribed 
conversation in chambers would be furnished, he discussed the matter with her. 
Immediately following the conversation, it was read back by the court reporter 
to counsel. The transcription appears in the record. (Hopkinson I - Tr. Vol. XII, p. 1636, et 
seq.) She stated she was more nervous than frightened and was acting upon the 
advice of her lawyer brother that when testifying, to do no more than answer the 
questions. She had never previously been a witness or in a courtroom. Nothing 
new with respect to Kristi King is presented to this court in this appeal. It 
has already been considered, and there is no indication that the outcome would 
be any different.

[¶65.]  The appellant repeats an old question 
anew when he raises the question of the presence of guards, references to 
witnesses being in protective custody and the wearing of bulletproof clothing, 
and the physical structure of the courtroom which placed the prosecution team 
adjacent to the jury box. This was raised in Hopkinson II, and in some detail this 
court discussed the allegation. 664 P.2d  at 85-86.

[¶66.]  The entire records of Hopkinson I and Hopkinson II are here for our use. The 
appellant has given us no record references nor do we find anything in the 
record of the guilt phase, Hopkinson 
I, that suggests the influence of the factors mentioned would prejudice the 
appellant. It is noted that the affidavits of Messers Van Sciver and Brass, 
counsel for appellant during the Hopkinson I trial, are guarded in their 
characterization of the atmosphere by prefacing their observations with the 
words, "[t]he defendant may also have been prejudiced by" (emphasis added) the 
presence of guards, etc.

[¶67.]  The jury was instructed at the beginning 
and at the close of the guilt part of the trial that it was to perform its duty 
uninfluenced by "passion or prejudice against any of the litigants in this case, 
or by public opinion or public feeling." (Hopkinson I - Tr. Vol. III, p. 680) At 
the close of the trial, Hopkinson I, 
the trial judge completed the "Questionnaire to and Report of the Trial Judge" 
prepared by this court as required by § 6-2-103(b), W.S. 1977. On October 19, 
1979, he submitted one such report followed by a slightly revised version dated 
February 15, 1980, which was filed with this court on March 5, 1980. In both, 
Part E.1., question 10 asked "[w]as there any evidence that the jury was 
influenced by passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor when imposing 
sentence." In both, the answer of the trial judge was "No." This question would 
have gone to the entire trial because the same jury in Hopkinson I sat on both the guilt and 
sentencing phases. Copies of both the completed questionnaires and reports were 
sent by the trial judge to counsel for their comments. The trial judge noted on 
the February, 1980, report that he had received no comments or responses from 
anyone with reference to the October, 1979, report, nor do we find in the record 
any response to the latter dated report.

[¶68.]  The matter of the presence of guards and 
security measures during the course of the trial was considered in the voir dire 
of the jury during the selection process. The questions in that regard were 
initiated by counsel for the appellant:

"* * * The mere fact that 
there are 8 matrons or 4 matrons and 4 guards and that there is 24 hour 
surveillance and some people have body guards, does that lead any of you to 
believe one way or the other with respect to guilt?" (Hopkinson I - Tr. Vol. I, p. 
196)

Immediately 
following that question, the trial judge explained that:

"* * * The reason there 
are 8 bailiffs is because it's very difficult for 2 bailiffs to handle a jury 24 
hours a day. Period. That's why. There will be shifts of bailiffs and somebody 
gets a day off. That's why there are 8 bailiffs and the only 
reason."

All jurors were 
excused who thought security measures taken related to the guilt of the 
defendant. Most responded that they considered it only a part of an important 
case and had nothing to do with guilt. The purpose of the voir dire was served 
and there can now be no complaint.

[¶69.]  It is normal and required that jurors be 
sequestered in capital cases, § 7-11-210, W.S. 1977, and this requirement should 
be rigidly enforced, State v. Radon, 
45 Wyo. 383, 19 P.2d 177 (1933).

[¶70.]  It must be realized, and we take judicial 
notice of the fact of life, that violence in the courtroom and its environs is 
not unique. The prosecutors were aware through their investigative efforts and 
that of law enforcement officers of the appellant's proclivities toward 
threatening or elimination of lawyers (Mariscal and Vehar) and witnesses 
standing in his way. Jeff Green was murdered just before he was to testify 
before the grand jury. There was a conspiracy to kill William Roitz, a witness. 
Hindsight unveils the justification for their fears. If there was fright in the 
atmosphere, it was induced by the proven lawless conduct of appellant. The trial 
judge has the responsibility of making appropriate arrangement for the security 
of the courtroom and trial participants. There is no prohibition against counsel 
and others wearing protective garments and using bodyguards as long as they are 
not dramatically displayed to purposely project a suggestion of guilt of the 
defendant. The record does not disclose abuse in that regard and shows great 
care by the court to prevent prejudicial soiling of the proceedings. There is no 
necessity for a new trial on these grounds. The judicial system if it is to 
survive must afford protection for its participants from criminal elements bent 
on its destruction.

[¶71.]  As to the matter of granting immunity to 
Mike Hickey, this court also addressed that at length in Hopkinson II, 664 P.2d  at 62-63. The 
reasons and legal justification for granting immunity as part of a plea bargain 
were explained and are a matter of prosecutorial discretion. No plea bargains 
are involved with the witnesses appellant suggests should be granted 
immunity.

[¶72.]  Appellant submits that all the persons he 
wishes to call, such as John Suesata, should be granted immunity. In the first 
place, it was never requested or even mentioned when the opportunity in Hopkinson I was present. At the urging 
of the defense, Hap Russell was granted partial immunity by the trial judge. The 
mere statement of the proposal, in the tone of all the circumstances of this 
case, provides the answer. It would be a great boon to the prison population and 
criminal fugitives in general. Immunity is not granted willy-nilly.

[¶73.]  We view with some amusement that 
appellant complains that the prosecution occupied the counsel table nearest the 
jury box, so that the jury could overhear comments amongst those so seated. 
Early on, before the trial started, Hopkinson I, appellant's counsel wanted 
that table. The trial judge explained that historically the prosecution occupied 
that location in his organization of the courtroom. Both sides could not sit 
there. Appellant shows us nowhere in the record that the jury overheard any 
comments from the prosecution or that to have been an influencing factor in any 
way. The seating arrangement and organization of the courtroom are within the 
discretion of the trial judge, adapted to the available facilities. We cannot 
decide on matters upon which the record is silent. Hopkinson II, 664 P.2d 43, 
85.

[¶74.]  We wish it made clear that we have 
considered the due process implications reflected in and raised by this issue as 
to a new trial and in the light of Brady 
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), wherein it 
was held that due process requires the State to disgorge exculpatory materials. 
We cannot find in the record that the prosecution denied appellant any 
exculpatory materials that it knew of. We further note that there were few, if 
any, to disclose. We also have considered United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1976), wherein failure to grant a new trial on the 
ground of new evidence was denied by the trial court and affirmed. The claim was 
made that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial under the rule of Brady v. Maryland, supra. The supreme 
court outlined three situations in which Brady applied: (1) demonstration that 
perjured testimony known, or which should have been known, to the prosecution 
was used; (2) suppression by the prosecution of requested material exculpatory 
evidence (Brady); and (3) a duty of the prosecution to without request turn over 
material exculpatory evidence to the accused; that does not include any duty to 
turn over the entire file, but only that the omitted evidence creates a 
reasonable doubt that otherwise did not exist. In other words, with respect to 
(3), if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise 
exist, constitutional error has been committed, but if there is no reasonable 
doubt about guilt, whether or not the additional evidence is considered, there 
is no justification for a new trial.

[¶75.]  We found no Brady or Agurs constitutional 
errors relative to a new trial when considering the conduct of the 
prosecutors.

IV

[¶76.]  The appellant argues as an issue that the 
special prosecutors should have been removed when it was so moved in connection 
with the motion for a new trial. Included in this argument were assertions that 
the special prosecutors were not skilled as prosecutors but were primarily 
criminal defense attorneys when engaged in the practice of the criminal law and 
thus apparently not properly equipped to be prosecutors and in addition 
frightened and used abusive methods with witnesses.

[¶77.]  On the matter of lack of experience is 
the innuendo that the prosecutors do not understand the necessity of protecting 
the constitutional rights of a defendant charged with a crime. To that, we say 
that as experienced criminal defense trial counsel, their awareness of those 
rights would be most acute because that is the stock in trade of the criminal 
defense bar. We would point out that Mr. Spence was county and prosecuting 
attorney for Fremont County, Wyoming, for two terms during the years 1954-1962. 
VI Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, p. 1085B (1984). Our detailed examination 
of the record discloses that both Mr. Spence and Mr. Moriarity are well versed 
in the art of trial advocacy and had an intimate knowledge of all the facts 
gathered from an exhaustive investigation which had left no stone unturned. 
There is no doubt but that meticulous preparation by the prosecution often 
leaves most frustrated a defendant charged with crime.

[¶78.]  We have heretofore in this opinion 
reviewed what occurred during the trial with respect to the witness Kristi King. 
She may have appeared fearful, not because of conduct by the prosecutors but was 
nervous and acting upon the advice of her lawyer brother to not "answer anything 
more than you have to say." Counsel in Hopkinson I complained to the trial 
court about the alleged attempts of the prosecution to prevent her from being 
interviewed by the defense. The trial judge advised her that she could be 
interviewed but was not required to submit to interview if she did not wish to 
do so. The appellant did not pursue the matter further. This court covered that 
in Hopkinson I, 632 P.2d  at 144-145, 
and held a witness may refuse to talk to counsel and pointed out that under Rule 
18(c), W.R.Cr.P., statements of witnesses may be demanded after testifying on 
direct examination. DeLuna v. State, 
Wyo., 501 P.2d 1021 (1972). No such demand was made, but the record also 
indicates the defense had her grand jury testimony before she testified. This 
court also in Hopkinson I considered the same complaint with regard to the 
witness Jennifer Larchick and found it had no merit. Hopkinson I, 632 P.2d  at 
144.

[¶79.]  The appellant urges that the affidavits 
of various penitentiary inmates relating to contacts with prosecution attorneys 
support allegations of misconduct by the prosecution. We find that they all 
related to purported occurrences during an ongoing grand jury investigation 
following the trial of Hopkinson I. 
Even if true, they are irrelevant and at most only corroborative. Grable v. State, supra. None of those 
furnishing affidavits were witnesses during the trial in either Hopkinson I or Hopkinson II, other than Hap Russell. 
Further, they are unworthy of belief.

[¶80.]  The affidavits of appellant's trial 
counsel, Hopkinson I, are no more 
than a reiteration of an issue made on appeal, Hopkinson I, and disposed of at that 
time by this court.

[¶81.]  There is no indication that evidence or 
witnesses favorable to appellant were being concealed. Prior to the trials in 
both cases, lists of witnesses were filed. In Hopkinson I, the witness list in the 
file contained the names of about 240 witnesses (Hopkinson I - R. Vol. II, pp. 108-120) 
and a list of 250 exhibits (Hopkinson 
I - R. Vol. II, pp. 121-136); notice of defendant's statements to Mike 
Hickey, Jennifer Larchick, Hap Russell, Kristi King, Harold James Taylor, 
William Roitz, J.R. Goo, Jr., and many others was also given to appellant. (Hopkinson I - R. Vol. II, pp. 158-167) 
The grand jury testimony of witnesses was turned over to appellant's counsel and 
a summary of their testimony was furnished in advance of trial. In Hopkinson II, the list of witnesses 
found in the files contained the names and addresses of 399 witnesses plus a 
supplemental list of 27 more.7 (Hopkinson II - Vol. I, pp. 66-95; Vol. 
III, pp. 455-463) There were 463 exhibits listed. (Hopkinson II - Vol. I, pp. 32-65) The 
names of all witnesses and exhibits used appear on the lists; none were 
concealed.

[¶82.]  The cases cited by appellant do not 
support any reason to even consider discharging counsel and barring their 
further representation of the State. The special prosecutors have been on the 
job for several years now. They are the best equipped because of their 
experience, understanding, and knowledge of the case to adequately deal with all 
post-conviction and sentencing procedures that are so consistently being 
inappropriately revived without support. It would be a form of obstruction of 
justice to remove them as prosecutors.

[¶83.]  An overview of the entire trial 
proceedings in Hopkinson I and Hopkinson II discloses a vigorous 
prosecution by competent counsel striking hard blows but not foul ones, Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 
88, 55 S. Ct. 629, 633, 79 L. Ed. 1314, 1321 (1935), and we find no valid reason 
presented why they should be removed from the case.

V

[¶84.]  The appellant complains that the trial 
judge, Robert B. Ranck, abused his discretion by failing to recuse himself upon 
the filing of Hopkinson's motion for change of judge pursuant to Rule 23(d) and 
(e), W.R.Cr.P.8 After amendment a trial judge may 
only be disqualified for cause. The motion for change of judge which we are now 
considering was filed on August 1, 1983, after the amendment of Rule 23(d), 
W.R.Cr.P. The appellant showed some minor concern about which rule applied, Rule 
23(e) before amendment or Rule 23(d) after amendment. It would make no 
difference. The time was long gone for a peremptory challenge under the old rule 
because the case had passed into the trial stage after which no peremptory 
change of judge was allowed under the old rule. Cause on the basis of bias or 
prejudice of the judge at that point is the only ground for change of judge 
either before or after amendment.

[¶85.]  The source of the for-cause provision of 
the rule is patterned after 28 U.S.C.A. § 144.9 This court has defined "`bias' and 
`prejudice'" under Rule 40.1(b)(2), W.R.C.P., which has identical pertinent 
language to Rule 23(d), W.R.Cr.P., supra n. 8:

"The words `bias' and 
`prejudice' are not synonymous. One cannot be prejudiced against another without 
being biased against him, but he can be biased without being prejudiced. 
Prejudice involves a prejudgment or forming of an opinion without sufficient 
knowledge or examination. Bias is a leaning of the mind or an inclination toward 
one person over another. The `bias' which is a ground for disqualification of a 
judge must be personal, and it must be such a condition of the mind which sways 
judgment and renders the judge unable to exercise his functions impartially in a 
given case or which is inconsistent with a state of mind fully open to the 
conviction which evidence might produce. [Citations.]" Cline v. Sawyer, Wyo., 600 P.2d 725, 
728-729 (1979).

This court went 
on to say:

"Without a valid reason 
for recusal, a judge has a duty not to recuse himself.

"`Recusal and 
reassignment is not a matter to be lightly undertaken by a district judge. 
While, in proper cases, we have a duty to recuse ourselves, in cases such as the 
one before us, we have concomitant obligation not to recuse ourselves; absent a 
valid reason for recusal, there remains what has sometimes been termed a "duty 
to sit". [Citations.]' Simonson v. 
General Motors Corporation, U.S.D.C.Pa., 425 F. Supp. 574, 578 (1976)." 
(Emphasis in original.) Id., at 729.

See also to the 
same effect United States v. Bray, 
546 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1976). The duty-to-sit obligation is especially 
strong in complex, long, drawn out cases, where the disqualification request is 
not made at the threshold of litigation but after the trial judge has gained a 
valuable background. Duplan Corporation 
v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 497 (D.C.S.C. 1975). We consider the 
case before us complex and many days of trial were involved.

[¶86.]  The trial judge in the appeal now being 
considered properly denied appellant's motion for change of judge. The affidavit 
supporting the motion does not state "sufficient facts to show the existence of 
such ground [bias or prejudice against the defendant]." The affidavit relied on 
was signed by Scott Hopkinson, brother of appellant:

"Scott Hopkinson, being 
first duly sworn, upon his oath deposes and says:

"1. My name is Scott 
Hopkinson.

"2. An [sic] or about 
October or November, 1980, Judge Robert Ranck of the Teton County District Court 
of Wyoming, stated to Scott Hopkinson, `You tell that family of yours that I 
have no intention of retrying that trial,' referring to the 1979 trial of Mark 
Hopkinson.

"3. Other witness [sic] 
that were present when the above statement was made were Roy Jacobson of 
Kemmerer, Wyoming, John Hursh of Riverton, Wyoming, and Lambertus Jansen of Salt 
Lake City, Utah.

"Further affiant sayeth 
not.

"Dated: 29 day of June, 
1983."

That affidavit 
was the only offered support for the change-of-judge motion, other than an 
affidavit of counsel for appellant that she had only recently learned of the 
purported statement. No affidavits of the others indicated as present at the 
time the statement was allegedly made were furnished.

[¶87.]  Hopkinson I was on appeal before this 
court in October or November, 1980, when the statement was professedly made. 
What actually happened after those dates was that this court in 1981 set aside 
the death penalty returned by the jury in Hopkinson I and remanded the case for 
retrial of the penalty phase as to the murder of Jeff Green. District Judge 
Robert B. Ranck did preside in the retrial of the penalty phase and the new jury 
also returned the death penalty as a sentence. We have reviewed all the 
post-conviction filings in Hopkinson 
I and discover that there was no motion for a new trial filed following the 
judgment and sentence. The appellant appealed at once. No motion for a new trial 
was pending in October or November, 1980.

[¶88.]  Without knowing the circumstances under 
which the statement was made, we are at a loss to view the statement as one made 
in the context of this case. The trial judge certainly would not and cannot even 
consider retrying the case unless he had before him a motion for new trial. The 
law is settled that a new trial cannot be granted on the court's own motion 
because it would raise serious questions of double jeopardy. United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469, 
474-475, 67 S. Ct. 1330, 1333, 91 L. Ed. 1610, 1613-1614 (1947). A new trial can 
only be granted on motion of the defendant. 3 Wright, Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Criminal 2d § 551 (1982). If the brother of appellant was asking for 
a new trial, he cannot do so.

[¶89.]  The applicable rule for change of judge 
is explicit in its requirement that the affidavit must state sufficient facts to 
show the existence of such ground. We are unable to ascertain from the affidavit 
whether Judge Ranck was expressing a personal view or a professional view gained 
from his several weeks' experience trying the case. A trial judge need only 
recuse himself if he determines that facts set out in the affidavit, taken as 
true, are such that they would convince a reasonable man that he harbored a 
personal as opposed to a judicial bias against appellant, United States v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40 
(3rd Cir. 1976), cert. denied 429 U.S. 1038, 97 S. Ct. 732, 50 L. Ed. 2d 748 
(1977), with knowledge of all the facts, Ronwin v. State Bar of Arizona, 686 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 103 S. Ct. 2110, 77 L. Ed. 2d 314 
(1983).

[¶90.]  On the basis of what the appellant 
presents, no reasonable person, acquainted with all the facts, could justify 
recusal of the trial judge in this case on either the ground of bias or 
prejudice and we so hold. The trial judge was correct in his denial of the 
motion for change of judge.

CONCLUSION

[¶91.]  We now conclude in this appeal, Hopkinson III, that appellant has not 
sustained his burden of convincing either the trial judge or this court that he 
is entitled to a new trial on the basis of what was presented. The trial judge, 
on the grounds of his knowledge found in the record and the inadequacy of 
support found in the motion for new trial, and all other motions considered in 
connection therewith, the written argument of appellant which accompanied the 
motion for new trial along with the written response of the State filed with 
him, could reasonably conclude as he did. Grable v. State, supra. The trial judge 
did not abuse his discretion. Appellant has received two fair trials. There must 
be some finality in the judicial process.

[¶92.]  Affirmed and remanded for execution of 
the death sentence as directed in Hopkinson II.

FOOTNOTES

1 Rule 34, 
W.R.Cr.P.:

"The court on motion of 
defendant may grant a new trial to him if required in the interests of justice. 
If trial was by the court without a jury, the court on motion of a defendant for 
new trial may vacate the judgment if entered, take additional testimony and 
direct the entry of a new judgment. A motion for new trial based on the ground 
of newly discovered evidence may be made only before or within two (2) years 
after final judgment, but if an appeal is pending the court may grant the motion 
only on remand of the case. A motion for a new trial based on any other grounds 
shall be made within ten (10) days after verdict or finding of guilty or within 
such further time as the court may fix during the ten-day period. The motion 
shall be determined and an order entered within ten (10) days after such motion 
is filed and if not so entered it shall be deemed denied, unless within such ten 
(10) days the determination shall be continued by order of the court, but a 
continuance shall not extend the time to a day more than 30 days from the date 
the verdict or the finding of guilty is returned."

2 Record references are 
included in this opinion as an aid to any further judicial consideration or 
review and the parties. "Hopkinson I," 
"Hopkinson II," and "Hopkinson 
III" are included in each reference, since there are three records. "R." 
refers to the record, and "Tr." refers to the transcript of trial proceedings 
when used with Hopkinson I 
references. It should be noted that in Hopkinson I, following the file volumes, 
the transcript is assigned separate volume numbers starting with "I." In Hopkinson II, following the file 
volumes, the transcript starts with the designation "Volume VII." There is no 
transcript in Hopkinson III.

3 While not controlling, 
we believe it worthy of mention since Weddle admitted lying once to the grand 
jury convened after Hopkinson I. The 
prosecution felt that Hopkinson's conduct even after conviction in Hopkinson I and while in prison was 
useful to the jury in its sentencing role in Hopkinson II when the sentencing phase 
was retried. This court in Hopkinson 
I, 632 P.2d  at 154, observed that society is entitled to protection from 
individuals who not only may but probably will kill again. The jury shall hear 
evidence relevant to a determination of the sentence but the prosecution must 
give notice to the defendant of what it proposes in that regard. Section 
6-2-102(c), W.S. 1977. In Hopkinson 
II, the prosecution served notice that it would call Richard Weddle. (Hopkinson II - Vol. III, p. 463, et 
seq.) A lengthy statement of what he would testify to is set out, though he was 
not called as a witness. It is related that appellant, while in the 
penitentiary, through outside contacts, told Weddle he had Jeff Green under 
surveillance. Further, appellant coached Weddle in perjured testimony involving 
a fictitious story of the bombing murders to implicate Jeff Green and Harold 
James Taylor. It was alleged that appellant stated, "`Hickey is a dead man,'" 
and that appellant had a contract out on him. He, appellant, told Weddle he 
would take care of him "`for life'" but at the same time threatened him and said 
he would get at families as well to accomplish his purpose. Appellant 
purportedly cross-examined Weddle to keep his story straight. It is unbelievable 
that the prosecution would make false representations of Weddle's proposed 
testimony, taken before a grand jury.

4 Appellant's opening 
statement to the jury included that the evidence would show that appellant only 
"was suborning perjury" not arranging murder, that he was trying, through 
Russell, to find a person in Salt Lake City who would give false information 
that Jeff Green was in Salt Lake City trying to find someone who would blow up a 
vehicle, in Salt Lake City, and he was willing to pay as high as $15,000 to 
$20,000, to obtain a new trial in federal court where appellant had been found 
guilty of interstate transportation of explosives. (Hopkinson I - Tr. Vol. IV, p. 33) The 
evidence in the federal case showed the explosives were being transported by 
Green who would blow up the vehicle of an attorney by the name of Mariscal, in 
Arizona, to persuade Mariscal to pay money purportedly owed appellant. United States v. Hopkinson, 
supra.

5 When Russell first 
called his attorney, Russell reported back to the trial judge that the only 
response from his attorney was "bullshit," he would call back later because he 
was busy in court and when he called back, he wanted Moriarity (special 
prosecutor) on the phone. What further conversation, if any, Russell had with 
his own counsel does not appear.

6 The following colloquy 
(Hopkinson I - Tr. Vol. XIII, pp. 
1690-1695) took place in chambers with appellant present:

"THE COURT: * * * And 
defense counsel just came into chambers and told me that the defendant is not 
going to put on any testimony. And they have the absolute right to do that and 
for reasons, you know, I don't know about and it's a decision the defendant has 
to make. But let me tell you, this is not the case but I don't want to leave 
anything out.

"There are certain rights 
you give up if you plead guilty. Now, let's say you were in my court pleading 
guilty. This is what I would say that you give up.

"You give up: 1. The 
right to a presumption of innocence; 2. The right to a speedy and public trial; 
3. The right to a trial by jury; 4. The right to see, hear, and question all 
witnesses; 5. The right to present evidence in your favor; 6. The right to 
testify or to remain silent; 7. The right to have the Judge order into court all 
evidence and witnesses in your favor; 8. The right to have a competent lawyer 
defend you; 9. The right not to be convicted except by proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt; 10. The right to appeal if convicted.

"Now, of course, we are 
not in that posture but what you have said now is that you are not going to put 
on any evidence which means the trial is over except for instructions to the 
jury and closing argument; am I correct?

"MR. SPENCE: That's 
correct.

"THE COURT: Mr. Van 
Sciver?

"MR. VAN SCIVER: That's 
correct.

"THE COURT: All right. 
Now, you would be giving up, by not putting on your case, the right to present 
evidence in your favor; the right to testify or to remain silent; the right to 
have the Judge order into court all evidence and witnesses in your favor; the 
right to have a lawyer, who is obvious to me very competent, represent you in 
your phase of the case. And that would be all because the right of appeal is you 
have that if convicted in this case regardless. It's just automatic. But that's 
what you give up. The legal word for giving up is waiving. You waive those 
things. "And I need to know, Mr. Hopkinson, if you understand?

"MR. HOPKINSON: Yes. I'm 
very well aware of the situation, the rights I would give up and the rights I 
have and everything. I'm totally competent of my decision.

"THE COURT: Well, it's 
your decision and, of course, you have been in jail up here for some time and 
you have been thinking about it for some time. You have been sitting through the 
trial and you appear to me to be an intelligent person. You certainly appear to 
me to be competent. I have no hesitancy at all in just having watched you for 3 
weeks knowing that you really know what's going on from your responses in 
chambers and in the courtroom.

"And I would like to ask 
you if I could, and you don't have to answer me, but has anybody pressured you 
in any way to make this decision?

"MR. HOPKINSON: No. 
Absolutely not. I made it strictly as trying to put myself in the position of 
looking at this through a legal matter. My opinion is there is nothing here that 
makes sense to me and I think I'm of good sense and I don't think I'm nervous. 
All of this stuff to me doesn't make sense so, therefore, I'm trying to 
psychologically find where the jury is standing and I have to believe nothing 
makes sense to them either, and that's where my decisions come from. So it's 
totally competent with thoughts and not just out of the air.

"THE COURT: It's your own 
decision?

"MR. HOPKINSON: 
Yes.

"MR. SPENCE: Had you 
discussed it with your counsel?

"MR. HOPKINSON: Yes, I 
talked to Mr. Van Sciver about it.

"MR. SPENCE: You got his 
advice?

"MR. VAN SCIVER: We went 
through the witnesses and what it would open and I think it would open and I 
think he's aware, and I honestly can see some merit in what he's doing. Even 
though it's a case of this magnitude it scares me, but he wants to roll the dice 
and ultimately that decision is yours, right?

"MR. HOPKINSON: The 
reason I like to roll the dice in this case is because I know Mr. Moriarity's 
and Mr. Spence's incredible capabilities of rebuttal and they can't rebutt [sic] 
something we haven't put on.

"THE COURT: And that has 
to do with part of your reasoning, I guess?

"MR. HOPKINSON: That's 
correct.

"MR. VAN SCIVER: Now, I 
guess we got two witnesses we are going to put on. One is his exwife, Judy 
Hopkinson, to talk about the night in question in terms of the night of the 
bombing, and the other one I haven't told you about him. He's not on the list 
and it didn't develop because I didn't know about Arlene Sweat. He's the 
Mountain Fuel guy. I don't think it's that important to attack but it does 
demonstrate there is a different version. Is that what you want to do or do you 
want to do it the other way? I'm not deciding this alone.

"MR. HOPKINSON: Is 
rebuttal, the way I understand rebuttal is he can only rebutt [sic] what's put 
on the stand and not introducing another entire case?

"MR. VAN SCIVER: He can't 
commit himself on that he has to wait and see what happens, but that's 
right.

"THE COURT: That's 
basically correct.

"MR. HOPKINSON: Let's put 
on the two and close it.

"MR. VAN SCIVER: All 
right. Judge, can I have a minute and then let's go do it.

"THE COURT: 
Yes.

"(In court)

"THE COURT: Please be 
seated. The Court notes the presence of the jury, counsel and the 
defendant.

"Is the defendant ready 
to proceed?

"MR. VAN SCIVER: Defense 
is ready to proceed. We are ready to proceed, your Honor, but the defense 
rests." (No witnesses were actually called even though it had been previously 
indicated that some would testify.)

7 We note with interest 
that the State listed as witnesses J.R. Goo, Don Hagerman, Jeff Dunn, Courtney 
Klekas, Helen Russell, John Suesata, Richard Weddle, Mike Hickey, Kristi King, 
Cindy Taylor Schrode, Jonathan Mauro (Ceccia), and Bobby Barnes. All these 
persons except Kristi King, Cindy Taylor Schrode, John Suesata, Mike Hickey and 
J.R. Goo have furnished signed affidavits to appellant to support his motion for 
new trial and appellant wishes to examine or re-examine the latter named by way 
of discovery. We have herein discussed the inadequacy of the affidavits to 
establish any right to a new trial and the futility of calling those who 
testified at the trial, Hopkinson 
I.

8 Previous to June 13, 
1983, Rule 23(d) and (e), W.R.Cr.P., read:

"(d) Peremptory disqualification. - The state 
or the defendant may peremptorily disqualify a district judge by filing a motion 
for change of judge. Such motion shall be filed at least fifteen (15) days 
before the date set for the hearing on any motion filed pursuant to Rule 16, 
W.R.Cr.P., or if there be no such motion hearing set, at least fifteen (15) days 
before the date set for pretrial, and if there be no pretrial set, then at least 
fifteen (15) days before the date set for trial, or if the date is set within 
fifteen (15) days after the order of setting, within five (5) days after receipt 
of such order; provided, however, that no more than one (1) such motion shall be 
filed by the state or by any defendant. After the filing of such motion for 
change of judge, the presiding judge shall immediately call in another district 
judge to try the action.

"(e) Disqualification for cause. - After the 
time for filing a motion for peremptory disqualification of the presiding judge 
has expired, the state or the defendant may move for a change of district judge 
on the ground that the presiding judge is biased or prejudiced against the 
state, the prosecuting attorney, the defendant or his attorney. The motion shall 
be supported by an affidavit or affidavits of any person or persons stating 
sufficient facts to show the existence of such ground, together with an 
affidavit of the prosecuting or defense attorney showing that the facts stated 
were unknown to him and could not have been discovered by the exercise of 
reasonable diligence prior to expiration of the time for filing a motion for 
peremptory disqualification. Prior to a hearing on the motion any party may file 
counter-affidavits. The presiding judge shall rule on the motion, and if he 
grants the same shall immediately call in another district judge to try the 
action. A ruling on a motion for a change of district judge shall not be an 
appealable order, but the ruling shall be entered on the docket and made a part 
of the record, and may be assigned as error in an appeal of the 
case."

As a result of 
amendment, on and after June 13, 1983, Rule 23(d), W.R.Cr.P., reads:

"(d) Disqualification for cause. - Whenever 
the grounds for such motion become known, the state or the defendant may move 
for a change of district judge on the ground that the presiding judge is biased 
or prejudiced against the state, the prosecuting attorney, the defendant or his 
attorney. The motion shall be supported by an affidavit or affidavits of any 
person or persons stating sufficient facts to show the existence of such ground. 
Prior to a hearing on the motion any party may file counter-affidavits. The 
presiding judge shall rule on the motion, and if he grants the same shall 
immediately call in another district judge to try the action. A ruling on a 
motion for a change of district judge shall not be an appealable order, but the 
ruling shall be entered on the docket and made a part of the record, and may be 
assigned as error in an appeal of the case."

Rule 23(e), 
W.R.Cr.P., was deleted upon amendment of Rule 23(d). It became surplusage. The 
publisher of Wyoming court rules has failed to note in the 
supplement to the court rules that Rule 23(e) is no longer a part of the rule, 
even though the court's amending order showed the absorption of the cause 
provision into Rule 23(d).

9 28 U.S.C.A. § 
144:

"Whenever a party to any 
proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit 
that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or 
prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall 
proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such 
proceeding.

"The affidavit shall 
state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or prejudice exists, 
and shall be filed not less than ten days before the beginning of the term at 
which the proceeding is to be heard, or good cause shall be shown for failure to 
file it within such time. A party may file only one such affidavit in any case. 
It shall be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is 
made in good faith."