Title: Boyd v. Wilson

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

153 S.E.2d 484 (1967) 269 N.C. 728 Annie E. BOYD, Administratrix of the Estate of James M. Boyd, Deceased v. James T. WILSON. No. 199. Supreme Court of North Carolina. March 29, 1967. *486 Burney & Burney and Rountree & Clark, Wilmington, for plaintiff. W. G. Smith, Wilmington, for defendant. BRANCH, Justice. The sole question presented by this appeal is whether there was sufficient evidence to warrant the submission of the issue of contributory negligence to the jury. "In passing on the question, we must take the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, disregarding that which is favorable to the plaintiff. `If different inferences may be drawn from the evidence on the issue of contributory negligence, some favorable to plaintiff and others to the defendant, it is a case for the jury to determine.'" Wilson v. Camp, 249 N.C. 754, 107 S.E.2d 743. "`The right of trial by jury should be carefully preserved, and if there is any evidence, more than a scintilla, it is a matter for the jury and not the court.'" Absher v. Raleigh, 211 N.C. 567, 190 S.E. 897. In the case of Beam v. Parham, 263 N.C. 417, 139 S.E.2d 712, the evidence tended to show that when an automobile operated by the defendant was about five miles from the home of plaintiff's intestate, the owner of the car insisted that he drive and changed seats for that purpose; all persons in the car had drunk beer in the afternoon before going to a dance. The evidence tended to show that plaintiff's intestate did not know that the owner had drunk more beer at the dance hall, and although she knew he had been drinking, the defendant did not appear to be intoxicated. Plaintiff's intestate and other occupants of the car repeatedly remonstrated with the owner concerning the manner in which he operated the car and asked him to stop and let them get out. The question presented was whether plaintiff's intestate, a 40-year old woman, was guilty of contributory negligence in remaining in the automobile rather than facing the possibility of being left late at night on a rural road when the defendant took over the driving. Holding that this was a question for the jury, the Court stated: Another leading case in North Carolina on this point is Dinkins v. Carlton, 255 N.C. 137, 120 S.E.2d 543, where the evidence tends to show that three teen-age boys at about 3:30 A.M. agreed to ride with defendant, a man 29 years of age, with the understanding that one of the boys would drive. En route, defendant objected to the slow speed and took over the operation of the car. There was no evidence that the boys cautioned, warned or objected to the manner in which he operated the car. The court recognized that the boys could have remained in a country churchyard at 4:00 o'clock A.M., but suggested that the matter should be considered as to how things reasonably appeared to the boys when they were in the churchyard. Holding that the evidence did not show contributory negligence as a matter of law, but did require submission of the issue of contributory negligence to the jury, the Court, in part, said: The rules recognized by this Court for determining whether a guest passenger who voluntarily enters or remains in an automobile operated by a driver he knows to have been drinking intoxicants or who has been driving in a reckless manner, are clearly set out in many applicable cases reviewed by Parker, J. (now C. J.) in Bell v. Maxwell, 246 N.C. 257, 98 S.E.2d 33. In the instant case the evidence discloses that plaintiff's intestate was engaged in a tour of night spots with defendant and others for several hours. The only witness who had been "sharing the cups" with plaintiff's intestate was in such a state that he "didn't care what time it was" and in his condition was able to form an opinion that Wilson had been drinking by "the way he acted, drove, and reacted." The evidence does not reveal that Boyd had been drinking. Certainly he was in better position to observe and know Wilson's condition than witness Miller. The evidence reveals that Boyd had at least two opportunities to leave the automobile which defendant was operating without danger or even inconvenience. Applying the rules of evidence recognized and enunciated by this Court, there is ample evidence to require the submission of the question of plaintiff intestate's contributory negligence to the jury. The finding of negligence against the defendant and contributory negligence against plaintiff, under a proper charge by the trial judge, settled this controversy. We find No error.