Title: Walker v. Shoprite Supermarket, et al.

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ELIZABETH M. WALKER and 
§  
JAMES WALKER, her husband, 
§   No. 541, 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
Plaintiffs Below,  
 
§   Court Below – Superior Court 
 
Appellants,  
 
 
§   of the State of Delaware, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   in and for New Castle County 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§   C.A. No. 00C-03-290 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
SHOPRITE SUPERMARKET, INC., §  
a/k/a SHOPRITE OF NEWARK, DE, §  
a/k/a NEWARK, DE, SHOPRITE, 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
Defendants Below, 
 
 
§  
 
Appellees.  
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
   Submitted:  July 14, 2004 
 
 
 
 
     Decided:  October 7, 2004 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
This 7th day of October 2004, upon consideration of the briefs of the 
parties and the contentions set forth therein, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The plaintiffs-appellants, Elizabeth and James Walker, filed an 
appeal with this Court challenging a Superior Court jury verdict in favor of 
the defendant-appellee, Shoprite.  In this slip and fall case, the jury found 
that both Mrs. Walker and Shoprite employees were negligent, but 
apportioned seventy percent of the (contributory) negligence to Mrs. Walker 
and thirty percent to Shoprite.  In this appeal, as in their motion for a new 
trial, the Walkers contend:  “The jury verdict that Mrs. Walker was 70% at 
 
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fault for causing her own slip and fall at the Shoprite store, that is twice as 
negligent as Shoprite, was against the great weight of the evidence.”  The 
trial judge denied the Walkers' motion for a new trial on the ground that the 
jury verdict was not against the weight of the evidence and the defendant, 
Shoprite, sustained its burden in proving contributory negligence.   
 
(2) 
The record reflects that on April 4, 1998, while the Walkers 
were shopping in a Shoprite store, Mrs. Walker slipped on grape jelly that 
had spilled on the floor.  Mrs. Walker fell, sustaining injuries, particularly to 
her shoulder.  The fall occurred as the Walkers were walking up and down 
aisles.  Mr. Walker was pushing the cart and Mrs. Walker was putting 
groceries into it.  Mrs. Walker testified that there was nothing between them 
and the spilled jelly as they rounded the end of an aisle and started up 
another.   
 
(3) 
Mrs. Walker testified that before she fell, she saw two young 
male store employees in the aisle ahead, but she did not see the jelly on the 
floor, or a warning sign.  After her fall, the store employees immediately 
asked Mrs. Walker if she was all right and offered assistance.    The two 
employees told Mrs. Walker they had just been called to clean up the spill of 
a five-pound jar of jelly.  They had picked up the large pieces of glass but 
were waiting for someone to bring a mop so they could finish cleaning up.  
 
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When she asked where the warning signs were, the employees responded 
that they were about to get one.  Mr. Walker's testimony was essentially 
identical to his wife’s, except that his recollection was that the spill was 
located slightly further down the aisle and that he did not see the employees 
before his wife fell.  
 
(4) 
The store manager testified that he had no specific recollection 
of the incident, but he did write a report shortly after the fall, which stated, 
in part:  “Customer slipped on a broken jar of jelly.  A porter was cleaning 
the area but the customer said the wet floor sign was off to the side of the 
clean up.”   
 
(5) 
During the trial, Shoprite notes that the Walkers both admitted 
that they did not see the jelly spill until after Mrs. Walker fell, but afterwards 
they could see that the spill was “all over” and occupied “a pretty good 
area.”  Mrs. Walker also testified she “never even looked” at the floor where 
she was walking.   
 
(6) 
During the trial, Shoprite raised several discrepancies in Mrs. 
Walker’s testimony relating to damages that could have undermined her 
credibility with the jury (i.e., the length of her absence from the senior 
center, an unreported episode of shoulder treatment following a 1995 
accident) and emphasized her lengthy delay in seeking treatment (i.e., that 
 
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the Walkers first sent a report to Shoprite in July 1999 that did not identify 
shoulder injuries, and she did not seek treatment for her shoulder for almost 
two years after the fall).  
(7) 
The parties agree that the jury’s verdict will be upheld unless it 
is against “the great weight of the evidence.”1  The standard for this Court’s 
review is set forth in the Delaware Constitution which provides “that on 
appeal from a verdict of a jury, the findings of the jury, if supported by the 
evidence, shall be conclusive.”2  Accordingly, great deference must be given 
to the jury verdict in deciding a motion for a new trial that is based upon 
insufficient evidence.3  The factual findings of a jury should not be disturbed 
if there is “‘any competent evidence upon which the verdict could 
reasonably be based.’”4  Upon review, this Court views the record from the 
perspective most favorable to the jury’s verdict.5  The verdict should not be 
set aside unless “a reasonable jury could not have reached the result.”6   
 
(8) 
A storekeeper owes a duty to the public to see that the portions 
of its premises ordinarily used by its customers are kept in a reasonably safe 
                                          
 
1 Storey v. Camper, 401 A.2d 458, 465 (Del. 1979). 
2 Del. Const. art. IV, § 11(1)(a).   
3 Young v. Frase, 702 A.2d 1234, 1236 (Del. 1997). 
4 Mercedes Benz of N. Am., Inc. v. Norman Gersham’s Things to Wear, Inc., 596 A.2d 
1358, 1362 (Del. 1991) (citations omitted). 
5 Storey v. Camper, 401 A.2d 458, 465 (Del. 1979). 
6 Id. 
 
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condition for their use.7  That duty includes taking reasonable steps to 
remove dangerous conditions.  Patrons, however, must also exercise 
reasonable care while walking in the store.  It is negligent for a patron not to 
see what is plainly visible when there is nothing to obscure his or her view.8  
“A person is under the affirmative obligation to watch where he or she is 
walking, to exercise the sense of sight in a careful and intelligent manner to 
observe what a reasonable person would see.”9  
 
(9) 
Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s 
verdict, we conclude there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that 
Shoprite had acted reasonably in discovering the broken jar of jelly, and that 
it had taken reasonable steps to clean up that spill.  The jury could have 
concluded that the two employees had promptly discovered the spill and had 
promptly begun cleaning it up (a fact which is undisputed).  The jury could 
also have found that those employees were negligent by failing to put out the 
"wet floor" sign, or, consistent with the manager’s report, by placing the sign 
in an ineffective location.  Such a finding would account for the relatively 
small percent of negligence apportioned to Shoprite.   
                                          
 
7 Howard v. Food Fair Stores, New Castle, Inc., 201 A.2d 638, 640 (Del. 1964). 
8 Winkler v. Delaware State Fair, Inc., No. 231, 1991, 1992 WL 53412 (Del. Feb. 20, 
1992) (order citing Franklin v. Salminen, 222 A.2d 261 (Del. 1966)).   
9 Id.  
 
 
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(10) We further conclude that a jury could also find that Mrs. 
Walker was negligent by not keeping a reasonable lookout while walking in 
the store.   That is particularly so if the jury believed her testimony that she 
never looked down, that there was nothing to obscure the view between the 
Walkers and the spill, and that they did not see the spill before the fall, even 
though the purple jelly was spread “all over” a large area.  A reasonable jury 
could conclude, under the circumstances, that a store customer who fails to 
see the remains of a large grape jelly spill and walks right into it, is primarily 
responsible for her fall.  
(11) The Walkers argue that Shoprite presented no affirmative 
evidence upon which a jury could find that Mrs. Walker was negligent, 
much less find that she was more that twice as negligent than Shoprite.  The 
Walkers’ own admissions were competent evidence of their contributory 
negligence.  The only testimony regarding the care taken by Ms. Walker 
came from Ms. Walker herself.  It was unequivocal.  She stated, “. . . I never 
even looked.  Because when I go shopping I look up at the shelves; I don’t 
watch on the floor.”  Although customers of a grocery store do not need to 
keep a constant lookout, they must keep a reasonable lookout, and exercise 
reasonable care.  Ms. Walker’s uncontroverted statement that she never 
looked at all, and does not do so when she shops, was sufficient, credible 
 
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evidence for the jury to find that Ms. Walker failed to keep a proper lookout, 
and failed to exercise reasonable care.   
 
(12) Ms. Walker’s testimony is similar to the plaintiff’s testimony in 
Winkler.10  In that case, the plaintiff stated “‘she was not looking at the 
ground; she was not looking at anything, but just walking without paying 
attention to where she was stepping.’”11  This Court affirmed the trial court’s 
determination that the plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law.  In this 
case, the jury found it as a matter of fact.   
 
(13) In Storey, this Court held: 
Thus, on the weight of the evidence [of] motions, we hold that a 
trial judge is only permitted to set aside a jury verdict when in 
his judgment it is at least against the great weight of the 
evidence.  In other words, barring exceptional circumstances, a 
trial judge should not set aside a jury verdict on such ground 
unless, on a review of all the evidence, the evidence 
preponderates so heavily against the jury verdict that a 
reasonable jury could not have reached the result.12 
 
The record reflects there was sufficient competent evidence for a reasonable 
jury to conclude that Mrs. Walker’s negligence exceeded that of Shoprite.  
Accordingly, we hold that the Superior Court properly denied the motion for 
a new trial. 
                                          
 
10 Winkler v. Delaware State Fair, Inc., No. 231, 1991, 1992 WL 53412 (Del. Feb. 20, 
1992). 
11 Id. 
12 Storey v. Camper, 401 A.2d 458, 465 (Del. 1979). 
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice