Title: Seburt Nelson Connor v. State Of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC04-1283 
____________ 
 
SEBURT NELSON CONNOR,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[November 15, 2007] 
REVISED OPINION 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Seburt Nelson Connor appeals an order of the circuit court denying his 
motion to vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death filed 
under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, and he petitions this Court for a 
writ of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the denial of postconviction relief and deny 
habeas relief. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
After separating from her husband Lawrence in 1988, Margaret Goodine 
renewed a previous relationship with Seburt Connor, but she finally terminated the 
 
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relationship in 1992.  Connor then allegedly began to harass Margaret.  He was 
believed to have committed a number of burglaries in which the burglar took bed 
sheets, towels, and linens from the Goodine home, and he was suspected of having 
called a neighbor of the family and threatened Margaret and her daughter Karen.  
One neighbor stated that she once witnessed Connor shoot at the home as he drove 
by.  In September 1992, Lawrence Goodine rejoined Margaret and his daughters 
Karen and Jessica in the family home.  In October, Connor was seen driving 
slowly through the neighborhood in a vehicle he had purchased that was apparently 
identical to Margaret‟s car.  Goodine obtained a permanent injunction against 
Connor. 
Karen Goodine arrived home from school on November 19, 1992, and called 
her mother to tell her that it appeared that someone had been inside the home.  
Neither Lawrence nor her younger sister Jessica could be located.  Margaret told 
her daughter to call the police.  When Margaret arrived home, she told the police 
that she believed Connor might be involved in the disappearance of her husband 
and daughter.  Her husband‟s body was discovered in a wooded area near the Fort 
Lauderdale airport late the next afternoon; he had been dead for approximately 
twenty-four hours.  When officers arrived to report the discovery of the body, they 
noticed blood stains at the Goodine home.  Soon thereafter, the police visited 
Connor, who gave consent for the officers to search his vehicle and agreed to 
 
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accompany the officers to the station.  The officers noticed blood stains on the rear 
seat of the car.  Connor‟s wife consented to a search of the cottage behind the main 
home but the officers observed nothing strange. 
At the police station, Connor was advised of his rights under Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and signed a standard waiver form.  In response to 
questioning about blood on his socks and shoes, Connor showed the officers a 
small cut on his leg.  He had no response when asked how so much blood was 
produced by the relatively minor cut.  He signed a consent form allowing the 
officers to take his socks and shoes for testing.  DNA test results later showed the 
blood to be that of Lawrence Goodine.  Police obtained signed consent forms from 
both Connor and his wife permitting a search of his home and cottage.  Jessica‟s 
body was found in the cottage wrapped in a comforter and wedged between the 
bed and wall. 
The jury convicted Connor of two counts of first-degree murder, kidnapping, 
and burglary.  On the jury‟s recommendations, the trial court imposed a life 
sentence for the murder of Lawrence Goodine and a sentence of death for the 
murder of Jessica.  The trial judge found five aggravators for the death of Jessica:  
(1) previous capital felony; (2) murder committed while engaged in the 
commission of a kidnapping; (3) murder committed to avoid arrest; (4) the murder 
was heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC); and (5) the murder was cold, calculated, 
 
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and premeditated (CCP).  Four nonstatutory mitigators were found:  (1) Connor is 
a good father, (2) Connor will die in prison if given a life sentence, (3) Connor was 
not a disciplinary problem while in prison, and (4) Connor suffered from a mental 
illness at the time of the murder.  The first three mitigators were given little weight, 
but the fourth mitigator was given substantial weight.   
On direct appeal, we struck the avoid arrest aggravator but affirmed the 
convictions and sentences.  Connor v. State, 803 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 2001).  In 2003, 
Connor filed a rule 3.851 postconviction motion raising fifteen grounds concerning 
the trial or performance of his defense counsel.1  The trial court held an evidentiary 
                                          
 
1.  Connor raised the following postconviction claims:  (1) appellate counsel 
failed to raise the issue that there were only five African-Americans on the jury; 
(2) trial counsel failed to object to the prosecutor‟s suggestion that Connor had a 
criminal history, and appellate counsel failed to raise the error; (3) trial counsel 
failed to move to strike the panel after the jury heard a highly inflammatory remark 
about Fidel Castro, and appellate counsel failed to raise the error; (4) trial counsel 
failed to object when the prosecutor told the jury that they could vote for death or 
life in prison, and appellate counsel failed to raise the error; (5) the trial court 
improperly used an example involving a mercy killing during voir dire, appellate 
counsel failed to raise the error; (6) the prosecutor made highly inflammatory and 
false remarks concerning the victim, and appellate counsel failed to raise the issue; 
(7) Connor‟s right to be present at all stages of the trial was violated, and appellate 
counsel failed to raise the issue; (8) Connor‟s Confrontation Clause rights were 
violated, and appellate counsel failed to raise the issue; (9) Connor‟s right to 
remain silent was violated; (10) one crime scene fingerprint was never identified; 
(11) there were per se conflicts of interest, and appellate counsel failed to raise the 
error; (12) ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase; (13) ineffective 
assistance of counsel during the penalty phase; (14) Florida‟s sentencing scheme is 
in violation of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); and (15) Connor‟s death 
sentence violates the Florida and U.S. Constitutions because he is mentally 
retarded. 
 
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hearing only on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty 
phase and ultimately denied relief on all grounds.  In this appeal, Connor asserts 
error in the trial court‟s refusal to conduct an evidentiary hearing on numerous 
claims and in the court‟s denial of relief.  He also raises issues of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel that this Court deems a claim for habeas corpus 
relief. 
RULE 3.851 APPEAL 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
defendant must show that trial counsel‟s performance was deficient and that the 
deficient performance prejudiced the defendant so as to deprive the defendant of a 
fair trial.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); see also Wiggins v. 
Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (affirming the Strickland two-prong analysis for 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel).  As to the first prong, the defendant 
must establish that “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the „counsel‟ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see also Cherry v. State, 659 So. 2d 1069, 1072 (Fla. 
1995).  For the second prong, the reviewing court must determine whether there is 
a reasonable probability that, but for the deficiency, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  “A reasonable 
 
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probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Id. 
“Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or 
death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the 
result unreliable.”  Id. at 687. 
Generally, this Court‟s standard of review following a denial of a 
postconviction claim where the trial court has conducted an evidentiary hearing 
accords deference to the trial court‟s factual findings.  McLin v. State, 827 So. 2d 
948, 954 n.4 (Fla. 2002).  “As long as the trial court‟s findings are supported by 
competent substantial evidence, „this Court will not substitute its judgment for that 
of the trial court on questions of fact, likewise of the credibility of the witnesses as 
well as the weight to be given to the evidence by the trial court.‟”  Blanco v. State, 
702 So. 2d 1250, 1252 (Fla. 1997) (quoting Demps v. State, 462 So. 2d 1074, 1075 
(Fla. 1984)).  However, the circuit court‟s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.  
See Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 771-72 (Fla. 2004). 
Failure to Object to Prosecutor‟s Comment 
Connor asserts that reversal of his conviction for a new trial is required 
because during jury selection the prosecuting attorney made a statement that 
implied that the defendant had a criminal record that the jurors would not hear 
about.  Because it is undisputed that he had no prior criminal record, Connor 
argues that this statement was false and so prejudicial that it amounted to a denial 
 
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of his due process rights.  He asserts counsel was ineffective for failing to object 
and failing to move for a curative instruction.  We affirm the denial of relief on this 
claim because deficient performance and resulting prejudice have not been 
demonstrated.   
It is clear that the statement complained of by the defendant is only part of 
an explanation given in response to a juror‟s comment and has been taken out of 
context.  During jury selection, the prosecutor asked the panel members about their 
prior experiences as jurors.  One juror responded by saying that when she 
previously served as a juror she was troubled by learning, only after they had 
convicted the defendant of a lesser charge, that the defendant had a long criminal 
record.  The prosecutor immediately explained why jurors are not presented with 
such evidence during the guilt phase:  
Because as soon as people hear that people have a criminal record, 
their presumption of innocence is not worth a whole lot because then 
you will start to assume they probably did it because they did it 
before, and the object is that every person who comes into the 
courtroom is presumed innocent and, therefore, their prior record is 
irrelevant to the determination of guilty, and if I was [defense 
counsel], my concern would be if she doesn‟t hear about the prior 
record of the defendant in this case because you won‟t.2 
It is irrelevant to the determination, he may have none, you are 
just not going to know.   
 
                                          
 
 
2.  This underlined sentence is the portion of the statement that the defendant 
points to as error. 
 
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The transcript of the voir dire makes it apparent that the narrowly selected 
comment was at worst a poorly worded response to an issue wholly initiated by a 
prospective juror.  The prosecutor expressly informed the venire that Connor might 
have no record.  His statements immediately before and after the portion cropped 
by Connor further informed the jury that a prior record would in any event be 
irrelevant to the determination of guilt in the instant case.  These facts are not 
analogous to the more egregious cases warranting relief in which prosecutors have 
intentionally or repeatedly suggested false circumstances to the jury.  See Miller v. 
Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967); Knight v. State, 316 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975).  We 
therefore affirm the trial court‟s denial of relief on this claim because Connor has 
not satisfied the two-prong test outlined in Strickland. 
Failure to Strike the Jury Panel 
During jury selection the judge asked several prospective jurors if they felt 
capable of giving the death penalty to someone like Fidel Castro.  Connor blurted 
out, “Why Castro, he is a good man!”  The following day two prospective jurors 
independently advised the judge that they were disturbed by Connor‟s statement.  
Connor now contends that either the court on its own initiative or his trial counsel 
should have made a motion to strike the entire jury panel.  Because this contention 
is refuted by the record, we affirm the denial of 3.851 relief on this claim.   
 
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After Connor‟s statement, trial counsel immediately advised the judge that 
the comment might have been inflammatory enough to eliminate a prospective 
juror for cause.  The court agreed and asked the entire jury panel whether they had 
heard a comment made by Connor.  Four members stated they directly heard the 
comment, while three others admitted they heard of the comment through other 
members of the jury panel.  Those members of the venire who were aware of 
Connor‟s comment were individually asked, by the court and counsel, whether 
they could be fair and impartial in light of the comment.  Those members who 
indicated that they might be unable to render an impartial verdict based solely upon 
the evidence were excused for cause; thus, any motion for a mistrial on this basis 
would properly have been denied by the court.  Because the entire panel was 
questioned and no juror was empanelled who might have been disturbed by the 
comment, Connor‟s argument is without merit and must be denied.  Lusk v. State, 
446 So. 2d 1038, 1041 (Fla. 1984) (“The test for determining juror competency is 
whether the juror can lay aside any bias or prejudice and render his verdict solely 
upon the evidence presented and the law given to him by the court.”).   
The trial court took the proper action to preserve the defendant‟s rights.  In 
addition, trial counsel made the proper objection and participated in the process of 
questioning the jury panel.  Ineffective assistance of counsel under the Strickland 
standard has not been demonstrated. 
 
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Improper Comments by the Trial Court 
The court repeatedly used the following to exemplify a case that does not 
deserve the death penalty: 
Do you remember a case, probably right around the time you moved 
here, an older gentleman who was about 70 years old, his wife was 
extremely ill.  He was convicted of killing his wife.  Some people 
[call it] mercy killing. 
Would you think that case, even if he was convicted of first 
degree murder, was that case appropriate for the death penalty? 
 
Trial counsel did not object to the example.  Connor contends that by using 
euthanasia as an example of a situation in which the death penalty might be 
inappropriate, the court was correspondingly instructing the jury that a life 
sentence was inappropriate in this case, since the facts of this case could not 
suggest a mercy killing.  He further contends counsel was ineffective for failing to 
object to the trial court‟s use of this example.    
An examination of the discourse between the court and the jury again shows 
that Connor removes this statement from its context.  The record demonstrates that 
after reciting the euthanasia example, the trial court expressly stated, “Mitigating 
circumstances is [sic] anything about the case, the defendant, his life or any other 
circumstances that might, in your mind, mitigate or lessen the penalty to tell you 
that the death penalty is not appropriate and that instead, that in this case, life in 
prison without the possibility of parole for 25 years is appropriate.”  In addition, 
the jury was expressly instructed that any aspect of the defendant‟s character or 
 
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record and any circumstance of the offense could be considered a mitigating 
circumstance by the jury.   
Because Connor makes a conclusory allegation of deficiency that is refuted 
by the record, we affirm the trial court‟s denial of relief.  Ineffective assistance of 
counsel has not been demonstrated. 
Failure to Object to a Comment on Silence 
Connor lists five instances during the direct examinations of two police 
detectives in which he alleges that a comment was improperly made on his Fifth 
Amendment right to remain silent.  He alleges trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to object to the comments because any comment which is fairly susceptible 
to interpretation as a comment on a defendant‟s right to remain silent will be 
deemed as such and may constitute an impermissible violation of constitutional 
rights.  See State v. Kinchen, 490 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1985).   
Connor freely and knowingly waived his Miranda rights before agreeing to 
speak with the detectives.  He does not contest the validity of the waiver.  Connor 
answered a number of questions but failed to respond to other more specific 
questions.  Under these circumstances, the comments made by these detectives are 
not susceptible to interpretation as comments on silence.  In Hutchinson v. State¸ 
882 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 2004), this Court reiterated, “The prohibition against 
commenting on a defendant‟s silence does not apply when the defendant does not 
 
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invoke his Fifth Amendment right.”  Id. at 955.  We agree with the trial court‟s 
finding that Connor did not invoke his right to remain silent.  Connor‟s allegation 
of deficiency on this ground is without merit.  Ineffective assistance of counsel has 
not been demonstrated.  Therefore, we affirm the denial of relief on this claim. 
Conflict of Interest 
Attorney Louis Jepeway was initially appointed to serve as Connor‟s 
counsel.  Jepeway then selected Eugene Zenobi as his co-counsel.  Connor filed a 
motion seeking to remove both attorneys due to alleged conflicts of interest.  
Connor also filed a bar complaint against Jepeway that was later dismissed.  
Connor makes two arguments alleging that the trial court erred in not discharging 
his counsel.  He contends that the court failed to protect his rights because conflict 
of interest attached at the moment he filed a bar complaint against Jepeway; thus, 
the attorney should not have been permitted to represent him at the competency 
hearing that was held prior to discharge.  He also alleges that the trial court erred 
because it failed to inquire into the allegations of a conflict of interest with Zenobi, 
who shared office space with Jepeway and succeeded him as trial counsel.   
After the competency hearing in which Jepeway represented the defendant, 
the trial court found that although Connor‟s bar complaint against Jepeway was 
dismissed as meritless, it was a factor creating a conflict of interest between the 
defendant and attorney.  Jepeway was removed as counsel and Zenobi became first 
 
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chair counsel.  Connor seems to argue that he is entitled to have his conviction 
automatically reversed because Jepeway acted as his counsel in the competency 
hearing.  In order to be entitled to relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel 
because of a conflict of interest, Connor must demonstrate that counsel labored 
under an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected counsel‟s performance.  
See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980); Wright v. State, 857 So. 2d 861 
(Fla. 2003).   
While Connor has alleged a conflict of interest based, in part, on the fact that 
he filed a Florida Bar grievance against Jepeway, Connor has neither alleged nor 
demonstrated how this alleged conflict impacted counsel‟s performance at the 
competency hearing.  The results of the hearing in question and the other 
competency hearings in this case show that Connor was found competent by the 
court based upon the testimony of mental health experts.  Connor does not argue 
here that he should have been found incompetent, and he fails to allege that the 
result of the proceeding was adverse as a result of his counsel‟s alleged conflict of 
interest.  See Wright v. State, 857 So. 2d at 871-72 (holding that in claims of 
ineffective assistance based on a conflict of interest the defendant must show that 
counsel actively represented conflicting interests and that an actual conflict of 
interest adversely affected his lawyer‟s performance); see also Mickens v. Taylor, 
 
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535 U.S. 162 (2002) (explaining the “actual conflict of interest” language from 
Cuyler v. Sullivan). 
Connor also contends that a conflict of interest was imputed to his next 
attorney because of an ongoing business arrangement the attorney had with 
Jepeway.  The arrangement between Zenobi and Jepeway consisted of shared 
office space, office expenses, and secretarial services.  The Florida Rules of 
Professional Conduct provide: “While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of 
them shall knowingly represent a client when any 1 of them practicing alone would 
be prohibited from doing so.”  R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.10(a).  The comment to 
the Preamble of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct also notes: “Whether 2 
or more lawyers constitute a firm . . . can depend on the specific facts.  For 
example, 2 practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist 
each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm.”  Without some 
further significant demonstration approaching the level of a partnership or 
professional association, shared office space and secretarial services will not 
permit imputation of conflict.  Connor fails to present any evidence upon which the 
trial court could have presumed conflict.  Moreover, the record reveals that, upon 
the discharge of Jepeway, the trial court expressly asked Connor whether he 
wished Zenobi to continue as his counsel.  Connor unequivocally answered in the 
 
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affirmative.  Connor waived any potential conflict of interest claim against Zenobi.  
Therefore, we affirm the trial court‟s denial of relief on this claim. 
Investigation and Preparation of Guilt Phase 
Connor cites several additional circumstances that occurred in support of his 
claim that trial counsel failed to prepare for trial and was otherwise constitutionally 
deficient.  His allegations suggest that trial counsel should have aggressively 
pursued a theory that Connor was framed for the murders of Lawrence and Jessica 
Goodine, possibly by Mrs. Goodine.  In each sub-claim of this issue Connor fails 
to demonstrate that the alleged error constitutes constitutionally deficient 
performance.  Additionally, he makes only conclusory allegations that the alleged 
error would have changed the outcome of the trial.  See Kennedy v. State, 547 So. 
2d 912, 913 (Fla. 1989) (holding that mere conclusory allegations are insufficient 
to support a claim of ineffective assistance). 
Connor first asserts that had trial counsel presented the initial police 
statement of Fasha Thomas to the jury, the outcome of the trial would have been 
different.  Fasha, the young playmate and next-door neighbor of Jessica Goodine, 
was the last person to see Jessica alive.  According to Connor, Fasha initially gave 
a statement in which she stated that Jessica was driven away by her father 
Lawrence Goodine in a black Cadillac at 5:30 p.m.  Connor contends that the 
child‟s statement demonstrates that Lawrence Goodine was not killed inside the 
 
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home as suggested by the State.  Connor stretches to reach this conclusion because 
in the statement he relies on Fasha saying she thought the car was driven by 
Jessica‟s father.  While she did say a specific time, at trial she could not say what 
time it was when the events occurred.3  As in most of these claims, Connor 
completely fails to argue how the failure to use the original statement is an error 
that falls below prevailing professional standards. Moreover, he fails to show how 
the alleged error would have changed the outcome of the trial or otherwise 
diminished confidence in the outcome.  The two-pronged test from Strickland has 
not been satisfied.  We therefore affirm the denial of 3.851 relief on this claim.  
Connor next argues that trial counsel erred in not highlighting the fact that 
the police failed to initially notice certain clues, including several bloodstains in 
the Goodine home and the body of Jessica in Connor‟s cottage.  However, the 
record shows that trial counsel mentioned during both opening and closing that the 
police could not have overlooked the girl‟s body during their initial search of the 
cottage.  Although counsel did not dwell on the fact that the bloodstains were not 
initially discovered at the victim‟s home, the matter of this oversight was fully 
discussed during the State‟s examination of the witness.  Connor does not point to 
anything specific that defense counsel could have done with this issue.  Relief on 
                                          
 
 
3.  Connor does not allege or demonstrate that the original statement would 
have been admissible as a prior inconsistent statement.  See State v. Hoggins, 718 
So. 2d 761, 770-71 (Fla. 1998) (holding that in order to be inconsistent the prior 
statement must either contradict or materially differ from the testimony at trial). 
 
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ineffective assistance of counsel claims must be based on more than speculation 
and conjecture.  
Connor also contends that trial counsel failed to present testimony that 
would contradict the suggestion that he had made an anonymous threatening phone 
call to the Goodines‟ neighbors.  During trial, Alice McLaughlin testified that she 
received certain anonymous phone calls.  Referring to her as “Miss Alice” on each 
occasion, the caller asked her to give a message to Margaret Goodine that he was 
going to kill her and her daughter Karen.  Connor now argues defense counsel 
should have called as witnesses Wendell McLaughlin, Alice McLaughlin‟s 
husband, and Officer Taylor.  Even if we accept as true Connor‟s assertion that 
Wendell McLaughlin knew Connor and could identify his voice, Connor has failed 
to make a connection between this fact and telephone calls that were made to 
another person.  In addition, Alice McLaughlin acknowledged that she did not 
know who made the calls to her.  The same lack of connection exists with the 
potential testimony of Officer Taylor.  Connor alleges that Taylor could have 
testified that in one of the telephone calls there was a possible threat to the 
defendant requiring him to appear at a notorious club.  There has been no showing 
 
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of how this testimony would have impeached the testimony of Alice McLaughlin 
or how the testimony was otherwise relevant.4    
Connor argues that trial counsel failed to request a court order to run through 
the criminal database one latent fingerprint found in the Goodine home and five 
prints found in his Cadillac.  Although no attempt was made by the defense to have 
these fingerprints examined, defense did in fact bring out in cross-examination the 
fact that the police did not do a check of the fingerprints in its database.  More 
importantly, Connor has failed to allege or demonstrate any specific prejudice from 
the failure to examine the fingerprints.  No information concerning the fingerprints 
was presented at the evidentiary hearing.  Further, in this Court, Connor merely 
alleges that “the unidentified fingerprints should have been made a focal point of 
Mr. Connor‟s defense.”    
Connor next asks a number of rhetorical questions regarding the 
whereabouts of Margaret Goodine on the day of the murders, about a handgun that 
was reported missing, and about the probating of the estates of the two murder 
victims.  He also asserts that trial counsel rendered deficient performance in failing 
to attack Margaret Goodine concerning her whereabouts after her daughter called 
her and on the fact that she commenced probate proceedings on the estates of her 
                                          
 
 
4.  Connor seems to put in this issue a number of telephone calls to different 
people over a lengthy period of time without making a real effort to connect these 
calls to any issue in the case.  He ends by merely saying that this other information 
would have demonstrated that he was framed. 
 
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loved ones.  He contends she had a pecuniary motive to murder her husband and 
one of her two daughters.  These claims are legally insufficient to establish a claim 
of ineffective assistance.  There was nothing beyond these bare assertions 
presented to the court that would demonstrate both deficient performance and 
resulting prejudice.  Again, ineffective assistance has not been demonstrated.   
Detective Tymes testified that she interrogated Connor and eventually 
advised him that Jessica Goodine‟s body had been found in his cottage.  Connor 
responded, “Well, why didn‟t they take her up to the airport?”  This response 
referred to the location of Lawrence Goodine‟s body, a significant fact of which 
Connor had not been made aware.  Connor alleges that counsel‟s failure to 
impeach the detective‟s testimony with allegedly inconsistent deposition 
statements indicates a lack of preparation for trial.  On the contrary, the record 
generally reveals significant preparation and highly professional representation by 
Connor‟s counsel.  Connor alleges harm by stating that Detective Tymes would 
have been discredited if she had been properly impeached with her deposition 
testimony, which stated that Connor did not admit to either murder.  Connor fails 
to demonstrate that the deposition statement and the officer‟s trial testimony are 
inconsistent.  Additionally, even assuming the two are inconsistent, he has not 
demonstrated a reasonable possibility that the outcome of the proceeding would 
have been different had defense counsel used the deposition at trial.  In other 
 
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words, our confidence in the proceeding has not been undermined even if the 
officer‟s testimony could have been impeached in this manner. 
Lastly, Connor asserts that trial counsel‟s questioning of him portrayed him 
as less than competent and was inconsistent with his trial strategy.  Trial counsel 
testified during postconviction that he has always maintained that Connor was 
incompetent and considered it as part of his trial strategy for both the guilt and 
penalty phases.  This was a reasonable strategy under the evidence and 
circumstances presented.  Furthermore, Connor‟s alleged incompetence is not 
inconsistent with a theory that Connor was not guilty of the crime.  Connor 
testified regarding his whereabouts during the time of the murder and testified 
concerning the planting of evidence against him.  Nothing has been presented by 
Connor to demonstrate that counsel‟s performance fell below the standard for 
effective assistance, and nothing has been presented to demonstrate that he was 
prejudiced by defense counsel‟s examination of him at trial. 
   Connor fails to argue how trial counsel‟s performance fell below 
prevailing professional standards on any of these guilt phase claims.  Moreover, 
evidence indicative of Connor‟s guilt included his recent purchase of a car 
identical to that of Mrs. Goodine, which was the type of car in which Jessica was 
last seen, the discovery of Jessica Goodine‟s body in the cottage behind his home, 
unique knowledge of the location of Lawrence Goodine‟s body, and blood 
 
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evidence found in his car and on the clothing that he wore during the interrogation 
which matched Lawrence Goodine.  Connor utterly fails to demonstrate deficient 
performance and resulting prejudice; therefore, we affirm the trial court‟s denial of 
postconviction relief based on Connor‟s claim that trial counsel was ineffective in 
the guilt phase of the trial. 
Ineffective Assistance During Penalty Phase 
Connor also argues ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty 
phase, asserting that trial counsel was ill-prepared to examine Dr. Eisenstein 
regarding Connor‟s criminal behavior, failed to present Dr. Jacobson as an expert 
witness, failed to present Kricenze Connor as a background witness, and otherwise 
failed to present evidence of childhood abuse suffered by Connor.  The record 
supports a finding of competent and professional performance. 
Strickland requires that the defendant show that counsel‟s performance was 
deficient and that the deficiency resulted in prejudice that deprived the defendant 
of a fair trial or penalty proceeding.  See 466 U.S. at 687.  Connor first alleges 
defense counsel was not prepared because he was caught off guard when the State 
questioned the mental health experts about the background materials they reviewed 
in forming their opinions, specifically when they were asked about Connor‟s prior 
criminal behavior.  This behavior involved multiple workplace incidents, including 
a bomb threat over a parking place dispute and an incident with a machete.  
 
- 22 - 
Connor also contends that trial counsel should have used the information 
offensively to show that he was not functioning in a normal manner, and to show 
as mitigation that Connor did not have a significant criminal history.5   
Connor is really arguing that the penalty phase of the trial could have been 
conducted differently.  Although penalty phases may in fact be handled in different 
ways, Connor has failed to demonstrate any serious deficiencies in the manner in 
which this penalty phase was handled.  Defense counsel attempted to exclude use 
of these workplace incidents, but when they were admitted he used the information 
by arguing in closing that these incidents were only accusations of criminal 
wrongdoing and that Connor had never been convicted as a result of any of these 
accusations. 
Connor also contends that trial counsel should have presented the testimony 
of Dr. Jacobson as mitigation.  Connor acknowledges that Dr. Jacobson found him 
competent but asserts that the doctor could have testified that Connor had always 
been paranoid, that the condition has slowly worsened due to vascular disease and 
hypertension, and that there was evidence of organic brain damage.  This evidence 
is cumulative to testimony elicited from Dr. Eisenstein and Dr. Mosman during the 
                                          
 
5.  In this claim, Connor contends that trial counsel was deficient in not 
presenting evidence that he was irrational and incapable of functioning normally.  
In his claim that counsel was ineffective while conducting his direct examination, 
he faults counsel for asking questions that made him appear irrational or 
incompetent. 
 
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penalty phase.  Furthermore, the evidence was presented to the trial court, and the 
trial judge expressly noted these symptoms and considered Dr. Jacobson‟s report  
and other evidence that was presented in the competency hearings in the original 
sentencing order.  Counsel is not ineffective for failing to present cumulative 
evidence.  See Gudinas v. State, 816 So. 2d 1095, 1106 (Fla. 2002).  
Connor argues that Kricenze Connor, a distant cousin, knew him as a child 
and would have been able to testify regarding his impoverished and abusive 
upbringing, lack of a father figure, and lack of schooling.   He also contends this 
testimony could have been buttressed by the testimony of family members to show 
that his abuse as a child resulted in him abusing his own children.  Counsel did not 
personally visit Honduras, but he testified that he had an investigator research the 
defendant‟s childhood in Honduras as well as his more current business dealing 
there involving a hotel.  Trial counsel also testified that he spoke with any potential 
local witness that was available.  More importantly, counsel indicated that he chose 
to focus on the mental health testimony and the defendant‟s positive relationship 
with his family. 
The evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing does not demonstrate that 
defense counsel‟s strategy concerning the penalty phase was in error.  Although 
Kricenze Connor testified about the defendant‟s background, including some 
abuse, Dr. Mosman also testified on the subject.  He indicated that he could not 
 
- 24 - 
take the defendant‟s childhood abuse out of context and use it to explain these 
crimes.  He further explained that the defendant had a relatively normal life with a 
family and a stable work history.  Despite the fact that there was evidence 
presented at the evidentiary hearing that Connor severely punished his own 
children, this was not the picture that these witnesses presented at the penalty 
phase.  His three children and wife testified that he was a loving and supportive 
father as well as a good provider.  The children said that Connor was a good 
influence on them growing up and that he continued to be a good influence despite 
the fact that he was incarcerated. 
Again, Connor is essentially arguing that a different strategy should have 
been used at the penalty phase.  However, he has failed to demonstrate that the 
strategy he now espouses was a better one or that the strategy presented deprived 
him of a fair penalty proceeding.  This case involved the vicious strangling of a 
ten-year-old girl.  Trial counsel specifically considered and rejected the 
presentation of debatable evidence suggesting that Connor committed the crime 
because he had been physically abused decades earlier.  Counsel undertook a 
deliberate and reasonable strategy to present positive family life mitigating 
evidence and mental health mitigating evidence, instead of a strategy that would 
have included abuse of the defendant and abuse by the defendant.  Based on the 
circumstances of this case, we cannot say that our confidence in this case is 
 
- 25 - 
undermined because counsel chose not to present evidence that was inconsistent 
with the evidence that was presented.  See, e.g., Rutherford v. State, 727 So. 2d 
216, 223 (Fla. 1998) (finding no error in defense counsel‟s decision to focus on 
mitigation evidence that humanized the defendant).  Accordingly, the trial court 
properly denied relief on this claim. 
Confrontation under Crawford v. Washington 
Connor argues that the admission of statements made by the Goodines‟ 
neighbor deprived him of his right to confrontation under Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36 (2004), which was decided after the filing of the postconviction 
motion.  These statements, which were admitted over the objection of trial counsel, 
regarded an alleged break-in by Connor of the Goodine home, the existence of an 
injunction against him, and a telephone call received by the neighbor from an 
unidentified caller threatening the life of Mrs. Goodine and her daughter Karen.  
He contends that the statements were testimonial and inadmissible under Crawford.   
This confrontation issue was not raised at the trial level and was not raised in 
the 3.851 motion.  Because the  issue may not be heard for the first time on appeal 
of a postconviction motion, we deny relief on this issue.  See, e.g., Doyle v. State, 
526 So. 2d 909, 911 (Fla. 1988).  Moreover, this Court held in Chandler v. Crosby, 
916 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 2005), that Crawford does not apply retroactively.  Connor‟s 
convictions and sentences were final prior to the court‟s Crawford decision. 
 
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Ex Parte Conduct by the Trial Court 
Connor claims the trial court violated his right to be present at all stages of 
his trial and in support of this claim lists several instances from the record in which 
“there is no notation that Appellant was present” at the proceeding.  He also argues 
the trial court improperly engaged in an ex parte communication with one of the 
jurors.  As to the first argument, this claim is procedurally barred because it could 
have been and should have been raised on direct appeal.  See Cook v. State, 792 
So. 2d 1197, 2000 (Fla. 2001); Hardwick v. Dugger, 648 So. 2d 100, 105 (Fla. 
1994).  In addition, this claim fails on its merits because the absence of a notation 
in the record is not sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the defendant was 
absent at any particular point.  This is especially true where, as here, there was a 
standing stipulation on the record that the defendant was present at all times. 
Connor also cites an instance where, after being advised that a juror had 
taken ill, the judge spoke with the juror, allegedly outside of the presence of 
counsel,6 decided to call fire rescue, excused the juror, and substituted one of the 
alternate jurors.  Defense counsel voiced an objection on the record.  Thus, the 
issue could have been and should have been raised on direct appeal, and is not 
                                          
 
 
6.  After the court was informed that a juror was ill, the court recessed the 
proceedings.  The next information on the record is the trial court explaining what 
occurred and indicating that she was excusing the ill juror.  At this point the 
defense attorney objected.  The record does not indicate whether the attorneys were 
or were not with the judge at the time she spoke to the juror. 
 
 
- 27 - 
cognizable in this postconviction proceeding.  Therefore, we affirm the trial court‟s 
denial of relief on this claim. 
Mental Retardation Claim 
 
Connor makes several arguments under this mental retardation claim.7  He 
first asserts that he suffers from mental and psychological disorders, such as 
organic brain damage, frontal lobe damage, micrographia, paranoid schizophrenia, 
and stuttering, thus making it unconstitutional to execute him.  Secondly, he makes 
an alternative argument that this claim should be remanded to the trial court for a 
full determination of his mental state.  Lastly, Connor argues that Florida‟s statute 
concerning mental retardation, section 921.137, Florida Statutes (2005), is 
unconstitutional because it violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment.  To the extent that Connor is arguing that he cannot be executed 
because of mental conditions that are not insanity or mental retardation, the issue 
has been resolved adversely to his position.  See, e.g., Diaz v. State, 945 So. 2d 
1136, 1151 (Fla. 2006) (indicating that neither this Court nor the United States 
Supreme Court has recognized mental illness as a per se bar to execution).  To the 
extent Connor is claiming that he is mentally retarded, we deny this claim without 
prejudice to seeking any remedy he may still have available under Florida Rule of 
                                          
 
 
7.  Connor does not, in the briefs filed in this Court, clearly and 
unequivocally assert that he meets the criteria established for mental retardation. 
 
- 28 - 
Criminal Procedure 3.203.8  And to the extent Connor argues that the date in 
section 921.137 precludes some defendants from making a mental retardation 
claim, such an argument does not take into account the provisions of rule 3.203, 
which has effectively allowed all death row inmates with valid mental retardation 
claims to file a successive 3.851 motion pursuant to the rule.  See Phillips v. State, 
894 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 2004).      
 
 
Summary Denial of Postconviction Claims 
 
Connor asserts that the postconviction court erred by denying most of his 
postconviction claims without holding an evidentiary hearing.  However, beyond a 
reference to the issues that have already been addressed, he does not point to any 
specific issue that would have required an evidentiary hearing.  Postconviction 
claims may be summarily denied when they are legally insufficient, should have 
been brought on direct appeal, or are positively refuted by the record.  See, e.g., 
Roberts v. State, 568 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 1990).  All of the claims addressed in this 
Court fall into one of these categories; therefore, the trial court did not err in 
                                          
 
 
8.  Connor made a claim of mental retardation in his 3.851 motion.  The trial 
court summarily denied the claim finding that his IQ scores, between 81 and 84, 
indicate he is not retarded.  See Zack v. State, 911 So. 2d 1190, 1201 (Fla. 2005); 
Cherry v. State, 781 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 2000).  It is unclear from this record if the 
information relied on by the trial court was provided in the context of a 
competency determination, during the presentation of mental mitigation, or in the 
context of a claim of mental retardation. 
 
- 29 - 
summarily denying the claims.9  Accordingly, Connor is not entitled to relief on 
this claim. 
Cumulative Error 
As his last 3.851 issue Connor argues that cumulatively the errors alleged 
deprived him of the right to a fair trial.  Because each of his claims is without merit 
or procedurally barred, the claim of cumulative error also fails.  Downs v. State, 
740 So. 2d 506, 509 n.5 (Fla. 1999).  The trial court did not err in denying Connor 
relief on this claim. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS10 
Ring and Apprendi Claim 
Connor asserts that the imposition of the sentence of death in his case 
violates the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Ring v. Arizona, 536 
U.S. 584 (2002), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).  Connor‟s 
case became final on direct appeal in 2001.  This Court has held that Ring and 
Apprendi do not apply retroactively to defendants whose convictions were final 
                                          
 
 
9.  An evidentiary hearing was conducted on the claim that trial counsel was 
ineffective during the penalty phase. 
 
 
10.  Although counsel did not file a separate petition for writ of habeas 
corpus, he raised a number of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims in 
the 3.851 appeal brief.  While this is not the procedure contemplated, we 
nonetheless treat these issues as if they had been separately raised in a petition in 
the interest of judicial economy and efficiency. 
 
- 30 - 
when the decisions were rendered.  See Johnson v. State, 904 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 
2005); Hughes v. State, 901 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 2005).   
Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 
Connor claims that he is entitled to habeas relief because his appellate 
counsel was ineffective in failing to raise a number of issues during his direct 
appeal.  He asserts, abstractly and with an overly broad brush, that appellate 
counsel failed to raise each of the errors alleged in this postconviction motion 
during his appeal.11  Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are 
properly raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus addressed to the appellate 
court that heard the direct appeal.  See Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 
2000).  The standard for proving ineffective assistance of appellate counsel follows 
the same two-prong analysis established for an ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel claim under Strickland.  See Wilson v. Wainwright, 474 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 
1985).  Thus, when evaluating a claim for ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel, this Court must determine: (1) whether the alleged omission is of such 
magnitude as to constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency falling 
                                          
 
11.  Connor presented six claims on direct appeal in October 1999:  (1) the 
trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the physical evidence; (2) the 
trial court erred in finding the avoid arrest aggravator; (3) the trial court erred in 
finding CCP; (4) the trial court erred in rejecting the statutory mitigators of 
extreme emotional disturbance and impaired capacity to appreciate the criminality 
of his conduct; (5) the trial court erred in rejecting the statutory mitigator of no 
significant criminal history; and (6) the sentence of death is disproportionate. 
 
 
- 31 - 
measurably outside the range of professionally acceptable performance, and (2) 
whether the deficiency in performance compromised the appellate process to such 
a degree as to undermine confidence in the correctness of the result.  See Pope v. 
Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. 1986); accord Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 
1055, 1069 (Fla. 2000); Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 660 (Fla. 2000).   
In raising a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, “[t]he 
defendant has the burden of alleging a specific, serious omission or overt act upon 
which the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be based.”  Freeman, 761 
So. 2d at 1069; see also Knight v. State, 394 So. 2d 997, 1001 (Fla. 1981).  
Furthermore, a petitioner cannot prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel “[i]f a legal issue „would in all probability have been found to be 
without merit‟ had counsel raised the issue on direct appeal.”  Rutherford, 774 So. 
2d at 643 (quoting Williamson v. Dugger, 651 So. 2d 84, 86 (Fla. 1994)).  Nor can 
appellate counsel be deemed ineffective for failing to prevail on an issue raised and 
rejected on direct appeal.  See Spencer v. State, 842 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 2003).   
Improper Prosecutorial Comment during Jury Selection 
 
Connor argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for not arguing before 
this Court that during jury selection of his trial, the prosecutor made an improper 
comment that referred to his prior record.  However, as we said in Connor‟s 3.851 
claim alleging trial counsel‟s failure to object and failure to move for a jury 
 
- 32 - 
instruction, Connor takes the State‟s comment out of its proper context.  One of the 
prospective jurors made a comment during voir dire that she was concerned that 
after finding a defendant in a prior case guilty of a lesser included offense, the jury 
learned that the defendant had a lengthy prior record.  The comment Connor 
complains of was made by the prosecutor in the context of his explanation of why 
jurors generally are not told of the defendant‟s prior record, i.e., so the defendant 
will be judged on the facts presented and not based on prior conduct.  As a result, 
Connor failed to demonstrate deficiency and prejudice by trial counsel‟s failure to 
object to the prosecutor‟s comments.  Therefore, had appellate counsel raised this 
issue on appeal, the issue would in all probability have been found without merit.  
See Rutherford, 774 So. 2d at 643.  Accordingly, Connor is not entitled to habeas 
relief on this claim. 
Confrontation under Crawford v. Washington 
 
Connor argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue on 
appeal that his right to confrontation articulated in Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36 (2004), was violated during his trial.  No objection was made to the 
evidence at trial on this basis.  Therefore, appellate counsel cannot be deemed 
ineffective for failing to raise a claim that has not been preserved for appeal and 
that has not been shown to be fundamental error.  See Valle v. Moore, 837 So. 2d 
905 (Fla. 2002).  Accordingly, Connor is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 
 
- 33 - 
Failure to Strike the Entire Jury Panel 
 
Connor argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for not arguing before 
this Court that the trial court erred by not striking the entire jury panel based on a 
comment made during the jury selection process by Connor concerning Fidel 
Castro.  As we said in Connor‟s postconviction claim alleging trial court error and 
trial counsel error, Connor‟s claim is without merit because the entire panel was 
questioned and no juror was empanelled who might have been disturbed by the 
comment. Therefore, had appellate counsel raised this issue on appeal, the issue 
would in all probability have been found without merit.  See Rutherford.  Connor 
is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 
Improper Comments by the Trial Court During Jury Selection 
 
Connor also argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for not arguing 
that the trial court made improper comments during jury selection concerning a 
mercy killing as a possible example of a case with mitigation.  Again, there was no 
objection made at trial, and Connor takes the statement out of context and fails to 
discuss the other statements made on the issue.  Connor makes a conclusory 
allegation of deficiency that is refuted by the record.  Had appellate counsel raised 
this issue on appeal, the issue would in all probability have been found without 
merit.  Furthermore, Connor is also not entitled to habeas relief because trial 
counsel did not object to the comments, and thus did not preserve the claim.  This 
 
- 34 - 
Court has consistently held that appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for 
failing to raise an issue that was not properly preserved at trial and does not present 
a fundamental error.  See Valle v. Moore.  Habeas relief is accordingly denied on 
this claim. 
Comment on Right to Remain Silent 
 
Connor next claims appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise as 
an issue on appeal that police officers commented on his right to remain silent 
during their testimonies at trial.  As we indicated in his claim that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object to the same comments, the defendant did not 
exercise his right to remain silent in this case.  The defendant freely and voluntarily 
waived his right to remain silent and answered multiple questions propounded by 
the officers.  Under these circumstances, a claim that the officers commented on 
his right to remain silent would have failed on appeal.  See Hutchinson v. State, 
882 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 2004).  Appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for 
failing to raise a meritless issue. 
Improper Conduct by Trial Court 
 
Lastly, claims are being made that appellate counsel was ineffective for not 
arguing on appeal that the defendant was absent on several occasions during the 
trial and that the trial court had an ex parte communication with a sick juror.  
Connor makes the allegations of absence from the courtroom based on the fact that 
 
- 35 - 
there is no notation in the transcript that indicates his presence.  However, he fails 
to acknowledge that there is a stipulation in the record that indicates the defendant 
was present at all times.  Additionally, while defense counsel objected to the trial 
judge‟s excusal of a juror who became ill, there is no indication that the attorneys 
were not present during the questioning of the juror.  On these facts, ineffective 
assistance of counsel has not been demonstrated.  
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court‟s denial of 3.851 
relief, and we deny the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Dade County,  
Maxine Cohen Lando, Judge - Case No. F92-39548 
 
Israel J. Encinosa, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Margarita I. 
Cimadevilla, Assistant Attorney General, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee