Title: Ex Parte Williams

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

838 So. 2d 1028 (2002)
Ex parte Lawrence Paultic WILLIAMS.
(Re Lawrence Paultic Williams v. State of Alabama.)
1001054.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
June 14, 2002.
*1029 J.D. Quinlivan, Jr., Mobile, for petitioner.
Bill Pryor, atty. gen., and Andy S. Poole, asst. atty. gen., for respondent.
JOHNSTONE, Justice.
We granted Lawrence Paultic Williams's petition for a writ of certiorari to determine whether the Court of Criminal Appeals, in an unpublished memorandum affirming the denial of Williams's Rule 32, Ala.R.Crim.P., petition, violated "the law of the case" established by the opinion that court had already published in previously affirming Williams's conviction on direct appeal, Williams v. State, 736 So. 2d 1134 (Ala.Crim.App.1998), cert. denied, 736 So. 2d 1134 (Ala.1999). We conclude that the crucial statement of law in the published opinion on direct appeal is not a holding but is, rather, obiter dictum and therefore was not and is not the law of the case. We conclude moreover, that the dictum is mistaken. Therefore, we affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals in its denial of Williams's Rule 32 petition, and, to prevent confusion in future cases, we disapprove the mistaken dictum in the opinion on direct appeal.
Williams was convicted of reckless murder as defined by § 13A-6-2(a)(2), Ala. Code 1975, as was his codefendant Mark Antonio Thompkins. That subsection reads:
The dictum addresses whether the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of the mens rea essential to reckless murder. Several passages from the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals on direct appeal state the operative facts:
Williams, 736 So. 2d  at 1136-37.
Williams, 736 So. 2d  at 1144.
Williams, 736 So. 2d  at 1140.
The pertinent holding in the opinion on direct appeal is that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding on the essential element of causationthat Williams's conduct caused the death of the victim. This holding, among others, is the basis for the judgment by the Court of Criminal Appeals affirming Williams's conviction for reckless murder.
The opinion expressly recognizes that the issue of whether the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of the mens rea essential to reckless murder, was not before the Court of Criminal Appeals in the direct appeal. Nonetheless, the opinion states:
Williams, 736 So. 2d  at 1141-42. (Emphasis added.) While we, the Supreme Court, denied the respective petitions for a writ of certiorari filed not only by Williams but also by the State, our denials did not constitute any endorsement of any feature of the opinion by the Court of Criminal Appeals. See Ex parte Siebert, 778 So. 2d 857, 857 (Ala.2000) (Johnstone, J., concurring specially); Ex parte Terry, 540 So. 2d 785 (Ala.1989); Banks v. State, 358 So. 2d 480 (Ala.1978); and Hurst v. State, 293 Ala. 548, 307 So. 2d 73 (1975).
After Williams's conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, he pursued the suggestion in that opinion and filed a Rule 32 petition, the matter now before us, asserting that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of the mens rea essential to reckless murder and that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this aspect of insufficiency of the evidence on direct appeal. The trial court held that the statements by the Court of Criminal Appeals cited by Williams were not the law of the case but were only dictum which conflicted with the holding of Ex parte Simmons, 649 So. 2d 1282, 1285-86 (Ala. 1994). Therefore, the trial court held that the evidence was not insufficient to support a finding of the requisite mens rea and that Williams's appellate counsel was not ineffective for refraining from challenging this aspect of the sufficiency of the evidence on direct appeal. Upon these holdings, the trial court denied Williams's Rule 32 petition.
Likewise relying on Simmons, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial of Williams's Rule 32 petition. He has petitioned us for certiorari review. While we have granted his petition, we now affirm because the trial court was right in denying the Rule 32 petition and the Court of Criminal Appeals was right in affirming the denial.
Because obiter dictum is, by definition, not essential to the judgment of the court which states the dictum, it is not the law of the case established by that judgment. Gray v. Reynolds, 553 So. 2d 79, 81 (Ala.1989). Therefore, in addressing Williams's Rule 32 petition, neither the trial court nor the Court of Criminal Appeals was bound by the dictum in the opinion by the Court of Criminal Appeals on direct appeal. Rather, those courts were justified in relying on the holding of this Court in Simmons:
Simmons, 649 So. 2d  at 1285-86. This law, rather than the conflicting dictum in the Williams opinion, governs the corresponding issue in Williams's Rule 32 petition now before us.
The evidence of Williams's mens rea in the case now before us is analogous to and as strong as the evidence of mens rea Simmons held to be sufficient. Therefore the proof against Williams was sufficient.
A lawyer is not ineffective for declining to assert an invalid contention. Neelley v. State, 642 So. 2d 494, 509 (Ala. Crim.App.1993); Hubbard v. State, 584 So. 2d 895, 914 (Ala.Crim.App.1991); and Palmes v. Wainwright, 725 F.2d 1511, 1523 (11th Cir.1984). Therefore, Williams's appellate counsel was not ineffective for declining to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence of Williams's mens rea.
AFFIRMED.
MOORE, C.J., and HOUSTON, LYONS, and WOODALL, JJ., concur.