Title: Gross v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Daniel Jay Gross v. State of Maryland, No. 32, September Term, 2021. Opinion by 
Biran, J. 
 
CRIMINAL LAW – HARMLESS ERROR – CUMULATIVENESS – The Court of 
Appeals reaffirmed that, when analyzing a trial court’s erroneous admission of evidence 
for harmlessness, the reviewing court’s harmless error analysis is governed by the 
framework established in Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638 (1976). Dorsey’s standard requires 
the State to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in no way influenced the verdict. 
When reviewing for harmlessness, a court examines the full trial record and, among other 
things, considers whether the erroneously admitted evidence was cumulative of properly 
admitted evidence. In this case, the jury heard the victim’s account of being abused by 
Petitioner five times, including once by way of a video of the victim describing the abuse, 
which was admitted as a prior consistent statement. Upon review of the entire trial record, 
including evidence introduced by the defense, the Court concluded beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the admission of the video did not contribute to the rendition of the guilty verdict 
and, therefore, was harmless. 
 
Circuit Court for Montgomery County 
Case No.: 128021C 
Argued: February 7, 2022 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
No. 32 
September Term, 2021 
 
 
DANIEL JAY GROSS 
v. 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
 
 
*Getty, C.J. 
*McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Booth 
Biran 
Gould, 
 
JJ. 
 
 
Opinion by Biran, J. 
Gould and McDonald, JJ., dissent. 
 
 
Filed: August 26, 2022 
 
*Getty, C.J. and McDonald, J., now Senior 
Judges, 
participated 
in 
the 
hearing 
and 
conference of this case while active members of 
this Court. After being recalled pursuant to 
Maryland Constitution, Art. IV, Section 3A, they 
also participated in the decision and adoption of 
this opinion.
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal 
Materials Act 
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 
 
 
 
 
 
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk 
2022-08-26 17:06-04:00
In 1976, this Court established the standard for harmless error review in Maryland 
criminal appeals, holding that, “unless a reviewing court, upon its own independent review 
of the record, is able to declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way 
influenced the verdict, such error cannot be deemed harmless and a reversal is mandated.” 
Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659 (1976). This standard, so far, has withstood the test of 
time. The Petitioner in this case, Daniel Jay Gross, asks us to reassess the standard for 
harmless error review, arguing that we must make the State’s burden to establish harmless 
error more onerous in order to avoid appellate courts usurping the role of the jury as the 
trier of fact.  
In April 2019, in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, a jury convicted 
Petitioner of two counts of second-degree sexual offense and one count of sexual abuse of 
a minor by a household or family member. The victim was Petitioner’s adopted daughter. 
At trial, the victim testified that, when she was in kindergarten and first grade, Petitioner 
made her perform oral sex on him on multiple occasions. In addition, the victim’s 
biological grandmother testified at trial about the victim’s initial disclosure of the abuse to 
her on June 27, 2015. The State also introduced a video recording of an interview the victim 
gave to a social worker on June 30, 2015, in which the victim reported the sexual abuse by 
Petitioner. Further, the State introduced the testimony of a child abuse pediatrician, who 
provided the jury with the account of the abuse that the victim gave her on July 8, 2015. 
Before us, Petitioner does not challenge the admission of the victim’s account of abuse 
through the victim’s live testimony and these other sources.   
2 
However, there was a fifth source of evidence introduced at trial through which the 
jury heard the victim’s allegations of sexual abuse. Over defense objection, the State 
introduced a video recording of a conversation the victim had with her biological 
grandmother on June 27, 2015, immediately after she first disclosed the abuse to her 
grandmother. The victim repeated her allegations of abuse in that recorded conversation. 
The recording showed the victim crying throughout the conversation with her grandmother, 
as she begged her grandmother not to put Petitioner in jail. The trial court ruled that the 
video recording containing the victim’s out-of-court statement to her grandmother was 
admissible as a prior consistent statement. 
The Court of Special Appeals held that it was error to admit the video recording of 
the victim’s disclosure to her grandmother, but concluded that the error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt because the video evidence was cumulative of other evidence 
through which the jury heard the victim’s account of sexual abuse. We agree. As discussed 
below, we reaffirm that the standard for harmless error analysis in Maryland is whether the 
reviewing court is convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way 
influenced the jury’s verdict. We also reaffirm this Court’s longstanding approach of 
considering the cumulative nature of an erroneously admitted piece of evidence when 
conducting harmless error analysis. After reviewing the complete trial record, we are 
convinced that the admission of the challenged video was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. 
3 
I 
Background 
A. A.M.’s Adoption and Subsequent Accusations of Abuse 
J.M. gave birth to her daughter A.M.1 in October 2007, when J.M. was 18 years old. 
J.M. is developmentally disabled. For this reason, J.M.’s mother, C.M., was A.M.’s 
primary caregiver for approximately the first 18 months of her life. Due to personal 
difficulties that C.M. was experiencing in approximately 2009, A.M. was placed in foster 
care at that time. Ultimately, J.M.’s parental rights were terminated, and A.M. was adopted 
by Petitioner and his wife, Emma Silvia Gross (“Ms. Gross”).  
A.M. was two years old when she began living with Petitioner, Ms. Gross, and their 
two minor sons. During the winter of A.M.’s first grade school year, she told a playmate 
that her father was “ticklish in the nuts.” The friend’s mother told Ms. Gross what A.M. 
had said. According to A.M., when Ms. Gross asked her about this statement, she told Ms. 
Gross (using children’s terminology) that she had performed oral sex on Petitioner. After 
speaking with A.M., Ms. Gross had a conversation with A.M. and Petitioner during which 
Petitioner denied that he had engaged in oral sex with A.M. According to A.M., she cried 
and “said he did.” Petitioner’s denial made A.M. feel “sad” because “he wasn’t telling the 
 
1 The victim in this case has had three different legal names during her childhood. 
We will refer to her as A.M., which are the initials of her current legal name. We will refer 
to A.M.’s biological mother as J.M. and to A.M.’s biological grandmother as C.M., to 
protect A.M.’s identity. 
4 
truth.” After this discussion, an “open door policy” was instituted in the Gross household 
and Petitioner no longer spent time alone with A.M. 
Before this open-door policy was put into effect, A.M. had supervised visits with 
her biological mother and grandmother (J.M. and C.M.) once or twice a year, and always 
in a public place. After implementing the open-door policy, Ms. Gross and Petitioner began 
to allow A.M. to spend more time with J.M. and C.M., including multiple unsupervised 
weekend stays at C.M.’s home in the spring of 2015. During this time, C.M. consulted an 
attorney about potentially adopting A.M., with the assistance of Ms. Gross. 
On June 27, 2015, while A.M. was spending the weekend at C.M.’s home (where 
J.M. also lived), A.M. disclosed Petitioner’s alleged sexual abuse to C.M. After A.M. told 
C.M. that she had performed oral sex on Petitioner, C.M. immediately called J.M. from her 
room and had J.M. record two videos on J.M.’s tablet device in which A.M. repeated her 
allegations to C.M. In addition to stating that Petitioner made her perform fellatio on him, 
A.M. said in one of the videos that Petitioner licked “[her] legs, [her] private.”  
On June 30, 2015, C.M. reported A.M.’s allegations to police.   
B. Investigation and Charges  
Later in the evening on June 30, 2015, Britney Colandreo, a social worker employed 
by Montgomery County Social Services, interviewed A.M. The interview was video 
recorded. During the interview, among other things, A.M. told Ms. Colandreo that she had 
sucked Petitioner’s “nuts” when he was putting her to bed in her bedroom. Ms. Colandreo 
did not ask A.M. if Petitioner ever performed cunnilingus on her, nor did A.M. say that 
Petitioner engaged in that conduct. 
5 
On July 8, 2015, A.M. met with Dr. Evelyn Shukat, a child abuse pediatrician and 
the medical director of The Learning Tree Advocacy Center. A.M. told Dr. Shukat that she 
performed oral sex on Petitioner, and that Petitioner also performed cunnilingus on her. 
Police subsequently obtained a warrant to search Petitioner’s home. They 
discovered a stain on the carpet next to A.M.’s bed that they believed might contain bodily 
fluid. Subsequent testing confirmed the presence of seminal fluid and spermatozoa in the 
stain, and revealed that the source of the semen had a DNA profile that was consistent with 
Petitioner’s DNA profile. 
Petitioner was subsequently charged with one count of sexual abuse of a minor by 
a household or family member, two counts of second-degree sexual offense (fellatio), and 
one count of second-degree sexual offense (cunnilingus). 
C. Trial  
Shortly before the start of his trial, Petitioner filed a motion in limine to preclude 
the State from introducing the video evidence containing A.M.’s statements to C.M. and 
J.M. (the “June video”2). Defense counsel asserted that the June video was neither 
admissible as a prior consistent statement nor as a prompt complaint of sexual abuse. The 
parties and the trial court briefly discussed this motion prior to the start of the evidence. 
The trial court did not rule on the motion at that time. 
 
2 J.M. made two separate video recordings in quick succession in which A.M. 
repeated her allegations to C.M. For ease of reference, and similar to how the parties and 
the Court of Special Appeals have referred to this evidence, we will refer to the two videos 
collectively as the “June video.” 
6 
The State’s first witness was A.M., who was 11 years old at the time of trial. A.M. 
testified that Petitioner would “ask me to put my mouth on his man part ... and suck it”; 
that “white goo” would come out of Petitioner’s “man part”; and that these incidents 
occurred while she was in her bed following bedtime prayers. A.M. also testified that 
Petitioner would reward these acts by letting A.M. stay up late to play with her toys. 
According to A.M., the abuse occurred throughout her kindergarten school year and into 
the winter of first grade. It stopped after she told Ms. Gross that Petitioner “was coming in 
my room and making me suck his man part.” Notably, when asked whether Petitioner “ever 
[did] anything with his mouth on your body,” A.M. answered “No.”  
The State next called Ms. Gross as a witness. She testified that she heard from a 
neighbor that A.M. had told the neighbor’s daughter that Petitioner was “ticklish in the 
nuts.” According to Ms. Gross, when she asked A.M. about this statement, A.M. said she 
was kidding. Later, Ms. Gross had a conversation with Petitioner and A.M. in which 
Petitioner denied having engaged in any sexual acts with A.M. Ms. Gross testified about 
the “open door policy” that was instituted in the home going forward, and stated that 
Petitioner subsequently did not spend time alone with A.M. Ms. Gross also acknowledged 
that, following this incident, she allowed C.M. and J.M. for the first time to have overnight 
unsupervised visits with A.M., and that she helped C.M. find a lawyer who could advise 
C.M. regarding possibly adopting A.M. 
C.M. then testified. She told the jury that on June 27, 2015, while A.M. was 
spending the weekend at her home, A.M. told her about Petitioner’s sexually abusive acts. 
According to C.M., she and A.M. were reading together when C.M. asked A.M. whether 
7 
“your dad and your mom usually do this.” At that point, A.M. became “really quiet.” Over 
the objection of defense counsel, C.M. recalled the next part of the conversation:3  
And she just you know, say well she say my dad usually is the one who comes 
you know to my room. I said really. And I was you know, like okay. And she 
say, yeah, he does. But the only thing that I don’t, she say, she say specifically 
like this, the only thing that I don’t like when my dad come to the room is 
that my dad takes his - at that time, you know, of course, she didn’t know 
what you know, what the private part for a man or woman was called. I don’t 
know. But she didn’t say specifically you know the penis. She say, she just, 
my daddy gets something from his boxer and he make me massage first that 
and … then she say that he make her, you know, that he put his thing in her 
mouth and she say that when she said that, that he finish in her mouth and 
she say that the only thing that I don’t like is that something sticky or gooey 
come from his part. But she say, that’s okay, she say you know, he just go to 
the bathroom and clean himself with paper towel, with paper, you know. 
 
C.M. testified that, after A.M. made these statements to her, she immediately called J.M. 
from her room and had J.M. make a video of her conversation with A.M. 
The State then offered the June video into evidence.  Consistent with the motion in 
limine the defense had filed previously, defense counsel objected on the grounds that the 
video was inadmissible hearsay not subject to the exceptions for a prior consistent 
statement or a prompt complaint of sexually assaultive behavior. After a lengthy argument 
outside the presence of the jury, the trial court admitted the June video under the hearsay 
exception for prior consistent statements. The State then played the June video for the jury. 
A.M. cried continuously during the recorded conversation. She told C.M. that Petitioner 
made her “suck his private parts” and that Petitioner licked her “[her] legs, [her] private.” 
A.M. repeatedly implored her grandmother not to tell anyone about Petitioner’s conduct, 
 
3 C.M. is not a native English speaker. We quote her statements as they appear in 
the transcript of Petitioner’s trial. 
8 
telling C.M.: “I just don’t want him to go to jail. I want him to be okay. Just please don’t 
put him in jail. I love him.” 
Next, the State called Ms. Colandreo to testify regarding her conversation with A.M. 
on June 30, 2015. Over Petitioner’s objection, the State entered the video recording of this 
interview into evidence and played it for the jury. In that conversation, A.M. told Ms. 
Colandreo that she sucked Petitioner’s “nuts” when he was putting her to bed in her 
bedroom. She told Ms. Colandreo that this happened “maybe 20” times, and that the last 
time was in the winter of her first grade year. A.M. also recounted to Ms. Colandreo that 
Petitioner did not “tell the truth” about what had happened when Petitioner, Ms. Gross, and 
A.M. talked about it. Ms. Colandreo did not ask A.M. if Petitioner ever performed oral sex 
on A.M., and A.M. did not mention such conduct in this interview. 
The State then called several law enforcement witnesses to establish the facts 
concerning the discovery and testing of the stain on the carpet next to A.M.’s bed. A crime 
lab forensic specialist explained that, using an alternate light source, he looked for 
substances that fluoresce, which indicates that they may contain certain bodily fluids. 
Using this method, he identified a spot of suspected bodily fluid on the carpet next to 
A.M.’s bed. He saw no other fluorescing spots in A.M.’s bedroom. The police removed the 
section of carpet that contained the suspected fluid and submitted it for testing. Crime lab 
personnel conducted serology testing on a sample taken from the stain and found that it 
contained seminal fluid and spermatozoa. From that sample, a single-source DNA profile 
was obtained. The analyst who recovered that profile then compared it with the DNA 
profile obtained from a buccal sample collected from Petitioner. The two profiles matched. 
9 
The defense conceded at trial that the carpet stain contained semen, and that Petitioner was 
the source of that semen.  
The State concluded its case-in-chief by calling Dr. Shukat to testify. Over 
Petitioner’s objection, Dr. Shukat explained that she met with A.M. on July 8, 2015. She 
first interviewed A.M. and then conducted a medical examination. During the interview, 
A.M. told Dr. Shukat that 
she and her father make deals. And the deals [are] that if, and using her 
language, if she sucks her father’s nuts she’ll be able to stay up, and I assume 
that means stay up later, and watch television. And she described that as oral 
sex and gooey stuff coming out of his nuts. And one time she said it went in 
her mouth. As well as her father licks her all over and indicated that she was 
licked in between her labia of her vagina. 
 
According to Dr. Shukat, A.M. told her that “the gooey stuff went either into toilet paper 
or a paper towel.” The abuse, as reported by A.M. to Dr. Shukat, began in kindergarten. 
A.M. told Dr. Shukat that Petitioner said “not to tell anybody.” According to Dr. Shukat, 
A.M. told her that she felt what her father did “was disgusting.” She also reported to Dr. 
Shukat that “she felt lonely” and “that she cried at night and she talked to her stuffed 
animals.”  
Petitioner called several witnesses in the defense case, including several experts. Dr. 
Karl Reich testified for the defense as an expert in the fields of forensic DNA and forensic 
biology. Dr. Reich opined that the semen on the carpet next to A.M.’s bed was transferred 
inadvertently to that location on the bottom of a sock or other footwear. Dr. Reich also 
opined that the absence of saliva and a second DNA contributor in the semen found on the 
carpet did not support A.M.’s allegation of fellatio. 
10 
The defense also called Dr. Leigh Hagan as an expert in forensic psychology. Dr. 
Hagen viewed the June video, as well as three other earlier videos made by C.M. in 
February and March 2015, during which A.M. made statements about how Petitioner and 
Ms. Gross disciplined her and otherwise discussed her life with the Gross family. The 
February and March videos contained no allegations of sexual abuse. With respect to the 
last of the pre-June videos, Dr. Hagan opined that C.M. was “directing the conversation to 
criticisms of the Grosses, and would ask the child a question, and then the child would 
answer, and then the grandmother’s restatement of what the child said, the grandmother 
added to it, that is made it worse criticism, and changed the child’s words.” Dr. Hagan 
further opined that the videos C.M. made with A.M. (including the June video) were 
“influential” in terms of “process” and “substance.” With respect to process, A.M. “was 
aware that the video was being made, that this was important to her grandmom to record 
these things.” With respect to “the substance of the conversations that took place across 
the … videos [from] February to June 27, the grandmom became more assertive, aggressive 
in her questioning, more directive, and [there was] more of a propensity to change the 
child’s answers in response to what the child had said to the grandmother.” 
After the defense rested, the State put on a brief rebuttal case, including expert 
testimony from Jennifer Breaux, the lead forensic scientist in the Forensic Biology Unit of 
the Montgomery County Police Crime Laboratory. Ms. Breaux testified that if Dr. Reich’s 
transference theory were correct, she would “expect to see more areas of florescence 
entering in that room, as opposed to one.” For Dr. Reich’s theory to make sense, Ms. 
Breaux continued, an individual with “a wet semen stain on the bottom of their shoe” would 
11 
need to “hop on one foot the entire way in, and then put both feet down, meaning the foot 
down that has the wet semen stain, then you could just have one stain in there[.]” 
In their closing arguments, both the prosecutor and defense counsel directed the 
jury’s attention to the June video.  
The prosecutor first quoted portions of A.M.’s trial testimony and her statement to 
Dr. Shukat and then told the jury: 
She told [Ms. Gross] what the defendant was doing to her. She and [Ms. 
Gross] then confronted the defendant, and he denied it. She then told [C.M.] 
six months later. She then told Britney Colandreo from Child Welfare 
Services. She then told Dr. Evelyn Shukat from The Tree House. And then 
she came here, and she sat in front of then 14 strangers, and told you exactly 
what was happening, and she was consistent in each and every one of those 
disclosures. There’s been no variation, there’s been no adding elements, none 
of that, consistent in what she told everybody.   
 
The prosecutor then brought up the June video: “The Defense wants you to believe that 
this videotaped disclosure by [C.M. and J.M.] was rehearsed, or staged, or whatever word 
you want to put there. I would submit to you that those disclosures are powerful, and they 
are heart-wrenching, and they’re very different from the other videos that were admitted 
into evidence. And I encourage you to watch all of them, but I would like to show you the 
disclosure again.” The prosecutor then played the June video for the jury, after which the 
prosecutor continued: “The Defense wants you to believe that that was staged…. This isn’t 
something that was said to this child to say. This is this child relaying the experience of 
what happened to her to her grandmother.” Later in her closing argument, the prosecutor 
asked the jurors to watch the video of the interview between A.M. and Ms. Colandreo and 
12 
suggested that they compare that disclosure “to the disclosure that you just watched,” 
meaning the June video, “and to what [A.M.] told you when she came to court.” 
 
In his closing argument, defense counsel first referred to the February and March 
2015 videos, which he argued were part of C.M.’s plan to try to adopt A.M. by getting 
A.M. to say negative things about Petitioner and Ms. Gross. Then, he discussed the June 
video, which he called “the final production”: 
Now comes June 27th, the video in which [A.M.], for the very first 
time, … 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, all in this period of time five years, 
five and a half years, now suddenly out of the [blue] here is [A.M.] saying 
he puts his penis in my mouth. Right then and there. Never one reference to 
anybody, other than [C.M.] at that time…. 
 
And we do know that [C.M.] wanted [A.M.] back. We know that from 
the videos, and we know that from the evidence. And if you look at the video 
that the State played for you, we kind of adopt that video as our own to a 
certain extent, because it comes in the middle of this enormously emotional 
interchange between [C.M.] and [A.M.] We don’t know what was happening 
before that period of time, what [C.M.] may have said to her. 
 
You saw her resisting, pushing back, oh, don’t put my daddy in jail, 
he loves me, he had the courage to adopt me. Well, who said anything about 
jail? Where did the concept of jail come from? She didn’t make that comment 
to Dr. Shukat. She didn’t make that comment to Britney Colandreo. What 
was [C.M.] telling her? Just look at the dynamics how she’s shaking and 
compare that demeanor in that video with what she says when she talks to 
Britney Colandreo…. Now, we have this June 27th video orchestrated and 
produced by [C.M.] 
 
…. This didn’t come spontaneously. If that had a been a spontaneous 
disclosure, [C.M.] would have picked up that phone, on June the 27th, and 
said, police, get over here right now, because my granddaughter’s in 
jeopardy. She didn’t do that. That’s not what the evidence shows happened. 
Where does [C.M.] go? She goes to go in to get a protective order, not on 
June the 27th, not on the 28th, not on the 29th, but on the 30th, three days 
later. What happens in that intervening three days? We know one thing that 
13 
didn’t happen, she never told the commissioner that she had a videotaped 
interview what [A.M.] purportedly told her. 
 
(Some paragraph breaks omitted.)  
Later in his argument, defense counsel returned to the June video, again contrasting 
it with what A.M. told Ms. Colandreo on June 30, and also noting its similarities to what 
A.M. told Dr. Shukat on July 8:  
And many of the details that are contained in the June 27th video production 
by [C.M.] are not said to Colandreo. There’s no talk about any ejaculation. 
There’s no talk about anything going in the mouth. There’s no talk about any 
gooey stuff. None of that is said. And compare her demeanor, compare how 
she’s acting when Colandreo’s talking to her…. And it’s just a completely 
different person. So, in my mind, I’m asking you to consider what was she 
exposed to when [C.M.] was talking to her on June the 27th. 
 
And then nine days later, [A.M.]’s statement to Shukat mimics what [A.M.] 
said to [C.M.]. And there’s no record, no evidence about what happened in 
those intervening nine days. Who did [A.M.] talk to? Where was she housed? 
Did she talk to the police? Did somebody confront her with her statements?  
Did somebody confront her with the video? 
 
In her rebuttal argument, the prosecutor argued that the jury should believe A.M.’s 
testimony that she told Ms. Gross that Petitioner made her perform oral sex on him. The 
prosecutor asked rhetorically, why else would Petitioner never again have alone time with 
A.M. and why else would Ms. Gross and Petitioner “reintroduce [C.M. and J.M.] back into 
their daughter’s life to such an extreme extent if it wasn’t exactly true what [A.M.] had told 
[Ms. Gross].” In the course of making this argument, the prosecutor said that family photos 
the defense had introduced into evidence showed that A.M. loved Petitioner and “tell you 
exactly why [A.M.] is telling the truth.” The prosecutor then added, “She loved him, and 
14 
if that raw, powerful heart-wrenching video doesn’t convince you of that fact, [the pictures] 
are another reason[.]” 
The jury convicted Petitioner of two counts of second-degree sexual offense based 
on fellatio and one count of sexual abuse of a minor. The jury acquitted Petitioner of the 
count charging him with second-degree sexual offense based on cunnilingus. The trial court 
subsequently sentenced Petitioner to concurrent terms of 17 years in prison, with a 
mandatory minimum of 15 years of imprisonment, for the two second-degree sexual 
offense convictions. The trial court also sentenced Petitioner to a consecutive term of 10 
years in prison, with all but five years suspended, for sexual abuse of a minor.   
D. Appeal 
Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentence to the Court of Special Appeals. In 
an unreported opinion, the intermediate appellate court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions 
but vacated his sentence. Gross v. State, No. 1413, Sept. Term, 2019, 2021 WL 1929292 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 13, 2021).  
The Court of Special Appeals first rejected Petitioner’s contention that the trial court 
erred in admitting A.M.’s out-of-court statements to Ms. Colandreo and Dr. Shukat under 
Maryland Code, Crim. Proc. (“CP”) (2001, 2018 Repl. Vol.) § 11-304.4 Id. at *4-*5. The 
 
4 Under CP § 11-304, a trial court in a criminal case may admit an out-of-court 
statement to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement made by a child under 
the age of 13 who is the alleged victim of child abuse or certain sex offenses. The child 
must have made the statement to a physician, psychologist, social worker, or another 
enumerated professional acting lawfully in the course of the person’s profession. To be 
admissible under § 11-304, the statement must not be admissible under any other hearsay 
exception, and the child victim must testify at trial.  
15 
Court then held that the trial court erred in admitting the June video, but that the error was 
harmless. Id. The Court agreed with Petitioner that the video contained hearsay evidence 
that was not subject to the exception for a prior consistent statement under Maryland Rule 
5-802.1(b)5: “Here, the defense’s theory at trial was that [C.M.] coerced [A.M.] into 
making the accusations against [Petitioner] and that [A.M.]’s motive to fabricate had arisen 
before [C.M.] made the June 2015 video. Because the charge of fabrication predated 
[A.M.]’s statements in the June 2015 video, those statements were inadmissible as prior 
consistent statements.” Id. at *5. In a footnote, the Court rejected the State’s alternative 
argument that the June video was admissible as a “prompt complaint” of sexual assault 
under Maryland Rule 5-802.1(d),6 stating that the Court was not persuaded that “statements 
[A.M.] made to her Grandmother several months after the abuse ended qualify as prompt.” 
Id. at *5 n.5. 
However, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that the error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at *6. The Court reasoned that, by the time the June video 
was admitted in Petitioner’s trial, 
[A.M.] had testified both on direct and cross that she told her Grandmother 
that [Petitioner] had abused her. In fact, during her direct testimony, [A.M.] 
stated specifically that she told her Grandmother that [Petitioner] wanted her 
“to suck his man part.” When the June 2015 video was admitted, the jury had 
 
5 Under Maryland Rule 5-802.1(b), a trial witness’s prior out-of-court statement is 
not excluded as inadmissible hearsay if it “is consistent with the declarant’s testimony, 
[and] if the statement is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant 
of fabrication, or improper influence or motive.”  
 
6 Maryland Rule 5-802.1(d) provides an exception to the hearsay rule for a 
“statement that is one of prompt complaint of sexually assaultive behavior to which the 
declarant was subjected if the statement is consistent with the declarant’s testimony.”  
16 
been exposed to the substance of the statements contained in the video. 
Moreover, the point that the statements tended to prove – that [Petitioner] 
made [A.M.] perform oral sex on him – was well-established by other 
evidence presented at trial, most notably [A.M.]’s testimony, her statements 
to Ms. Colandreo and Dr. Shukat, and the DNA evidence linking [Petitioner] 
to the semen stain found near [A.M.]’s bed. The marginal cumulative impact 
of admitting [A.M.]’s statements to her Grandmother in the June 2015 video 
was negligible, and the error harmless. 
 
Id. 
The Court of Special Appeals also rejected Petitioner’s arguments based on alleged 
errors in the voir dire process, id. at *8-*9, and on the trial court’s denial of his motion to 
suppress evidence. Id. at *11-*12. However, the Court agreed with Petitioner’s claim of 
error involving the two mandatory minimum sentences imposed for the second-degree 
sexual offense convictions. Id. at *9. Accordingly, the Court vacated Petitioner’s sentences 
and ordered a remand for resentencing. Id. 
Petitioner sought further review in this Court, challenging the Court of Special 
Appeals’ ruling that the admission of the June video was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The State filed a conditional cross-petition concerning the intermediate appellate 
court’s determination that the “prompt complaint” hearsay exception was inapplicable to 
A.M.’s statements to C.M. in the June video. On September 13, 2021, we granted both 
parties’ petitions. Gross v. State, 476 Md. 237 (2021).  
 
 
17 
Rephrased based on Petitioner’s briefing, the questions he asks us to resolve are:7 
1. To meet its burden to show that an error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt, must the State establish that, in addition to the 
erroneously admitted evidence, there was “other overwhelming 
and largely uncontroverted evidence properly before the trier of 
fact”?  
 
2. When an out-of-court statement is erroneously admitted as a prior 
consistent statement, should a court conducting harmless error 
review consider whether the information contained in the prior 
statement is cumulative of other properly admitted evidence? 
 
3. Based on a review of the full trial record, including evidence 
adduced by Petitioner in the defense case, was the admission of 
the June video harmless beyond a reasonable doubt? 
 
 
 
7 In his petition for certiorari, Petitioner asked us to decide: 
I. Under Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638 (1976), did the Court of Special 
Appeals err when it: 
a. reviewed for harmless error and only analyzed the evidence put forth 
by the state when the petitioner controverted the evidence at the trial 
through multiple witnesses, including experts? 
b. analyzed an improperly admitted prior consistent statement for its 
cumulativeness since, although prior consistent statements are 
cumulative, it is their consistency that is the very nature of the harm? 
Petitioner also included a second question challenging the Court of Special Appeals’ 
determination that the trial court properly admitted the testimony of Ms. Colandreo and Dr. 
Shukat under CP § 11-304. When we issued the writ of certiorari, we agreed to take up 
that question as well as the questions concerning harmless error relating to the June video. 
However, in his opening brief, Petitioner informed us that he was withdrawing his claim 
of error concerning the admission of Ms. Colandreo’s and Dr. Shukat’s testimony. As such, 
Petitioner has waived further review of that issue, and we assume for purposes of this 
opinion that the trial court properly admitted Ms. Colandreo’s and Dr. Shukat’s testimony.  
18 
In its cross-petition, the State asks us to decide this question: 
 
1. Did the Court of Special Appeals wrongly conclude the June 2015 
video was not admissible under the prompt complaint exception to 
the hearsay rule?[8]  
 
II 
Standard of Review 
In his briefing, Petitioner asks us to reassess the standard for harmless error review 
in Maryland criminal cases. What the correct standard for harmless error review should be 
is a question of law that we review de novo. See, e.g., State v. Robertson, 463 Md. 342, 358 
(2019).  
When an appellate court considers the State’s argument that an error is harmless, 
the court conducts “its own independent review of the record.” Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 
638, 659 (1976). Thus, we consider whether an error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 
without deference to the Court of Special Appeals’ prior determination of that question. 
III 
Discussion 
Petitioner argues that Maryland appellate courts have allowed the harmless error 
standard to become, in essence, a toothless tiger. According to Petitioner, this Court has 
long overlooked language in Younie v. State, 272 Md. 233 (1974), that makes the State’s 
burden to prove harmlessness more difficult to meet. Petitioner asks us to recognize Younie 
 
8 Because the State has not asked us to review the Court of Special Appeals’ 
determination that the June video did not qualify as a prior consistent statement under 
Maryland Rule 5-802.1(b), we assume that it was error to admit the June video under that 
hearsay exception. 
19 
as stating the standard for harmless error review in Maryland, and hold that the State must 
establish that, in addition to the erroneously admitted evidence, there was other 
overwhelming and largely uncontroverted evidence properly before the trier of fact. 
Petitioner contends that without the heightened burden purportedly set forth in Younie, 
harmless error review frequently leads appellate courts to usurp the jury’s role as the trier 
of fact. Further, Petitioner asserts that the current regime of harmless error review 
encourages prosecutors to knowingly seek the admission of inadmissible evidence because 
they can be confident that any error in admitting the evidence will be deemed harmless on 
appeal.  
In addition, Petitioner argues that, in considering the harmfulness of evidence that 
was erroneously admitted as a prior consistent statement, a reviewing court should not 
deem the evidence’s cumulativeness to be a factor in favor of determining that the error 
was harmless. According to Petitioner, it is the very cumulativeness of a prior consistent 
statement that makes the erroneous admission of such a statement harmful.  
Finally, Petitioner contends that the application of the correct standard for harmless 
error review, including consideration of the evidence he offered to contradict the State’s 
proof, compels the conclusion that the admission of the June video was not harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The State, in contrast, argues that Dorsey has been and should remain the lodestar 
for harmless error analysis in Maryland, and that Younie did not establish a different 
standard than that which has been applied by Maryland appellate courts for almost 50 years 
since this Court decided Dorsey. The State contends that cumulativeness is always a valid 
20 
consideration in harmless error analysis, and that in this case, A.M.’s statements in the June 
video were cumulative of information the jury received several other times through 
properly admitted evidence. The State concludes that, reviewing the trial record in full, the 
admission of the June video was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree with the 
State on all of these points.9   
A. Dorsey Provides the Standard for Harmless Error Review in Maryland. 
Petitioner argues that harmless error analysis in Maryland is, or should be, governed 
by language in this Court’s 1974 decision in Younie v. State that, according to Petitioner, 
imposes a higher burden on the State to prove harmlessness than this Court has required in 
the half century that has since passed. We disagree. The standard this Court announced in 
1976 in Dorsey remains the foundation of harmless error review in Maryland and is fully 
consistent with Younie. We reaffirm the Dorsey standard today. 
In Dorsey, this Court carefully considered, and formally adopted, the harmless-
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard for harmless error review in Maryland. The Court 
derived this standard from the Supreme Court’s standard for harmless error review of 
constitutional errors in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), as well as its own prior 
cases, including the then-recent case of Younie v. State. See Dorsey, 276 Md. at 657-59. 
Unlike the Supreme Court, this Court decided to apply the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt standard to all trial errors, not just constitutional errors. See id. at 659.  
 
9 Because we conclude that the admission of the June video was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt, we do not reach the State’s alternative argument that the June video was 
admissible as a prompt complaint of sexually assaultive behavior. 
21 
The Dorsey Court described the test it was adopting as follows:  
[W]hen an appellant, in a criminal case, establishes error, unless a reviewing 
court, upon its own independent review of the record, is able to declare a 
belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the 
verdict, such error cannot be deemed harmless and a reversal is mandated. 
Such reviewing court must thus be satisfied that there is no reasonable 
possibility that evidence complained of – whether erroneously admitted or 
excluded – may have contributed to the rendition of the guilty verdict. 
 
Id. (quotations omitted).  
Petitioner notes the Dorsey Court’s reference to Younie and calls attention to a 
particular passage in Younie that he claims is part of, or should be added to, the Dorsey 
standard for harmless error. Younie involved the erroneous admission of a pretrial 
statement in which the defendant exercised his right under the Fifth Amendment not to 
answer certain questions. 272 Md. at 236-38. After analyzing Chapman v. California and 
other Supreme Court cases, the Court in Younie distilled from them the standard of 
harmlessness review that applies to constitutional errors:  
What is of importance, from an examination of the cases which discuss 
harmless error, is the realization that if the error goes to a substantial 
constitutional right (e.g. … right not to self-incriminate – fifth amendment) 
then unless the State can prove beyond a reasonable doubt, as the prosecution 
did in Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 92 S. Ct. 2174, 22 L.Ed.2d 1 
(1972) (where an invalid confession accompanied three valid ones and other 
substantial evidence of guilt), that a tainted confession in no way influenced 
the verdict such that the defendant would undoubtedly have been found 
guilty even if that evidence had not been received, its employment will 
always be error. Conversely, if the State can show beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the violation was technical in nature, as well as that the erroneously 
admitted evidence was merely cumulative, and that there was other 
overwhelming and largely uncontroverted evidence properly before the trier 
of fact, then the error would be harmless.   
 
22 
Id. at 246-47 (emphasis adjusted). The passage we have italicized above contains the 
language that Petitioner argues is, or should be, a required part of the State’s showing of 
harmlessness.   
We do not believe that the Younie Court intended the italicized language to describe 
the State’s burden in every case where it seeks to establish that an error is harmless. After 
stating the federal standard as described in Chapman and other cases, the Younie Court 
went on to say that “if the state can show beyond a reasonable doubt that the violation was 
technical in nature, as well as that the erroneously admitted evidence was merely 
cumulative, and that there was other overwhelming and largely uncontroverted evidence 
properly before the trier of fact, then the error would be harmless.” Id. (emphasis added). 
The Court included this language to articulate and particularize some of the relevant 
considerations that a reviewing court should take into account and to provide an example 
in which an error would clearly be deemed harmless. As we read this passage in Younie, 
the Court did not establish a series of necessary prerequisites to a finding of harmlessness 
or an independent test that the State must meet in order to prevail.  
In the part of the opinion in which the Court decided the case before it, the Younie 
Court concluded that the “error committed ... was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” 
because “the good evidence standing alone must be sufficient to convict” and the Court 
was not “convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury was in no way influenced by 
the” erroneously admitted “bad” evidence. Id. at 248-49. The Court did not reference its 
earlier example regarding “overwhelming and largely uncontroverted evidence.” That is, 
the Court did not indicate that the State failed to show the error was harmless because it 
23 
did not establish that there was “overwhelming and largely uncontroverted evidence 
properly before the trier of fact.” 
In Dorsey, this Court cited Younie, including the language italicized above, in 
describing the case. See Dorsey, 276 Md. at 655-56. But when it came time to state the 
harmless error standard that would apply to all errors in Maryland, the Dorsey Court, while 
again mentioning Younie, did not repeat the language from Younie that Petitioner deems 
critical. See id. at 659. Rather, the Court held that “unless a reviewing court, upon its own 
independent review of the record, is able to declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that the error in no way influenced the verdict, such error cannot be deemed ‘harmless’ and 
a reversal is mandated.” Id. Putting it another way, the Court continued: “Such reviewing 
court must thus be satisfied that there is no reasonable possibility that the evidence 
complained of – whether erroneously admitted or excluded – may have contributed to the 
rendition of the guilty verdict.” Id. It is telling that neither of these formulations included 
the language from Younie that Petitioner highlights. 
Also telling is the absence of that part of Younie from all Maryland appellate cases 
that have described the harmless error standard ever since Dorsey was decided. This Court 
and the Court of Special Appeals have repeatedly cited Dorsey and its formulations of the 
harmless error standard. See, e.g., State v. Miller, 475 Md 263, 302 (2021) (holding that 
there was “no reasonable possibility that [the error] may have contributed to the rendition 
of the guilty verdict” and citing to Dorsey) (internal quotation marks omitted); Taylor v. 
State, 473 Md. 205, 235, 238 (2021) (citing to Dorsey’s harmless error standard and 
holding that the “record does not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the erroneous 
24 
instruction had no influence on the verdict”); Paydar v. State, 243 Md. App. 441, 457-58 
(2019) (citing Dorsey for the proposition that “[i]n a criminal case, an error by a trial court 
is harmless only when a reviewing court is able to declare a belief, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict”) (quotations removed); Cox v. State, 
51 Md. App. 271, 284 (1982) (citing to Dorsey extensively and concluding: “Applying the 
clear dictates of the harmless error test established in this State, upon our own independent 
review of the record we cannot declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error 
here in no way influenced the verdict.”).10 While we have occasionally used additional 
language to flesh out the Dorsey standard without changing its fundamental meaning, see, 
e.g., Bellamy v. State, 403 Md. 308, 332-33 (2008) (“To say that an error did not contribute 
to the verdict is … to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury 
considered on the issue in question, as revealed by the record.”) (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted), we have never cited Younie for the proposition that the State must 
show that “other overwhelming and largely uncontroverted evidence” supports the guilty 
verdict to meet its burden to establish harmlessness.  
Nor do we perceive any reason to incorporate that language from Younie into the 
standard for harmless error at this time. We disagree with Petitioner’s contention that the 
Dorsey standard is not sufficiently rigorous. The cases are legion in which this Court and 
the Court of Special Appeals, after applying the Dorsey standard, have held errors not to 
be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Taylor, 473 Md. at 238; Williams v. State, 
 
10 This Court and the Court of Special Appeals have cited Dorsey more than 800 
times. 
25 
462 Md. 335, 354-59 (2019); State v. Simms, 420 Md. 705, 738-40 (2011); Dove v. State, 
415 Md. 727, 750-52 (2010); Hutchinson v. State, 406 Md. 219, 227-29 (2008); Paydar, 
243 Md. App. at 463-64; Cox, 51 Md. App. at 284. Prosecutors who convince trial courts 
to admit what the prosecutors know to be inadmissible evidence, or to take some other 
action that is likely to be found to be erroneous on appeal, do so at their peril. Retrials are 
very likely to be part of their future.  
That said, we take issue with Petitioner’s characterization of the State’s introduction 
of the June video as “prosecutorial misconduct.” The State made its argument to the trial 
court, which agreed that the June video was admissible. The Court of Special Appeals 
disagreed. This is not an instance of a prosecutor withholding exculpatory evidence or 
otherwise acting unethically. Given the time constraints under which trial judges must 
make evidentiary rulings, those determinations are often very challenging, even for the 
most experienced trial judges. Not surprisingly, then, such matters are often also unclear 
to prosecutors and defense counsel. The inadmissibility of the June video, either as a prior 
consistent statement or as a prompt complaint of sexually assaultive behavior, was far from 
obvious.11  
Prosecutors do not know for sure which pieces of evidence a jury will find 
compelling and which items they will discount. And prosecutors (as well as trial judges) 
lack a crystal ball that tells them what an appellate court subsequently will find to have 
 
11 As noted above, we assume for purposes of the opinion that the June video was 
not properly admissible as a prior consistent statement. We do not make any assumption 
about its status as a “prompt complaint.”  
 
26 
been admitted erroneously. With the benefit of hindsight, it is tempting to say that a 
prosecutor should have known that they had enough evidence to convict without 
introducing a piece of evidence that they also should have known would be deemed 
inadmissible by an appellate court. In the real world of trials, these matters are seldom 
clear. The Dorsey standard safeguards a defendant’s right to a fair trial – not a perfect trial12 
– while at the same time allowing prosecutors appropriate leeway to make legitimate 
arguments. 
We also reject Petitioner’s argument that we must embrace the Younie language to 
ensure that Maryland appellate courts do not usurp the role of the jury. According to 
Petitioner, “[i]t is impossible to recreate the atmosphere of a trial at the appellate level. 
Appellate judges, nor appellate lawyers, can compare their knowledge to that of the 
commonsense experience of twelve members of the community.” To be sure, reading the 
cold record of a trial through its transcripts does not replicate the jury’s experience in seeing 
and hearing the witnesses live. For this reason, we do not make credibility determinations 
when conducting harmless error analysis or any other form of appellate review. However, 
we do not need to make credibility determinations to decide whether a defendant received 
a fair trial. Appellate courts around the country conduct harmless error analyses every day, 
applying the same standard that we use under Dorsey. Contrary to Petitioner’s claim, 
application of this standard does not “invade[] … an accused’s right to a trial by a jury.” 
 
12 See Dorsey, 276 Md. at 647 (noting that “it is firmly established that an accused 
has a constitutional right to a fair trial but not necessarily to that seldom experienced rarity, 
a perfect trial”) (cleaned up). 
27 
In 2008, this Court stated that Dorsey’s standard for harmless error “remains 
unchanged today.” Hutchinson, 406 Md. at 227. We reaffirm the Dorsey standard once 
again today and reiterate that, in order to establish that an error was harmless, the State 
must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the “evidence admitted in error in no way 
influenced the verdict.” Dorsey, 276 Md. at 659. No more, no less.13 
B. Evidentiary Cumulativeness Is a Relevant Factor in Harmless Error Analysis. 
The cumulative nature of erroneously admitted evidence has long been recognized 
as an important factor in considering whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial error at 
issue in no way influenced the verdict. Indeed, in Dorsey, this Court described several post-
Chapman Supreme Court harmless error cases as recognizing cumulativeness as one of 
two bases for concluding that an error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt: 
In Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969), Schneble v. Florida, 
405 U.S. 427 (1972), Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972) and Brown 
v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973), the Supreme Court invoked the 
Chapman test in finding “harmless error.” In each of these cases, that Court, 
upon an independent review of the record, found the properly admitted 
evidence to have been “so overwhelming,” and the prejudicial effect of the 
erroneously admitted evidence so insignificant by comparison, or to have 
been cumulative, that it was able to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that the erroneously admitted evidence – even though of constitutional 
import – constituted “harmless error.” 
 
 
13 Petitioner points us to no other jurisdictions that have made the State’s burden on 
harmless error review more onerous than Dorsey currently requires. Our own research 
reveals that Maryland is not an outlier in maintaining this standard of harmless error 
review. Rather, the Chapman standard (which is equivalent to the Dorsey standard) is 
seemingly the standard around the country with respect to constitutional errors. See Daniel 
Epps, Harmless Errors and Substantial Rights, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2117, 2133-42 (2018). 
Maryland has gone farther than the federal courts by applying the beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt standard to non-constitutional errors. We decline to make Maryland an outlier by 
adopting an even more rigorous standard for harmless error review. 
28 
Dorsey, 276 Md. at 649 (emphasis added). In Dorsey itself, the Court held that the trial 
court’s error in allowing a detective to testify to his record in obtaining convictions 
following arrests was not harmless, among other reasons, because it “was certainly not 
cumulative.” 276 Md. at 659 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
Since Dorsey was decided, cumulativeness has remained an important analytical 
consideration in this Court’s harmless error analysis. See, e.g., Dove, 415 Md. at 743-44 
(noting that “[i]n considering whether an error was harmless, we also consider whether the 
evidence presented in error was cumulative evidence.... [C]umulative evidence tends to 
prove the same point as other evidence presented during the trial or sentencing hearing. For 
example, witness testimony is cumulative when it repeats the testimony of other 
witnesses[.]”); see also Simms, 420 Md. at 739-40; Morris v. State, 418 Md. 194, 221-22 
(2011); Yates v. State, 429 Md. 112, 119-124 (2012); Hutchinson, 406 Md. at 227-28.  
In Hutchinson, a rape prosecution, a nurse gave an expert opinion about the 
complaining witness’s injuries; the State had failed to provide the required discovery 
concerning such expert testimony to the defense. 406 Md. at 225. This Court held that the 
error in admitting the expert testimony was not harmless because it was “not merely 
cumulative” as argued by the State. Id. at 227-28. As the nurse was the only examiner of 
the victim’s injuries and was the only witness who testified that the victim’s injuries were 
consistent with forced intercourse, we concluded that “[the nurse’s] testimony may well 
have been given significant weight” by the jury. Id.   
In Dove, we held that information regarding the defendant that was only available 
on an inadmissible fingerprint card (his weight, height, and other identifying 
29 
characteristics, as well as direct linkage to a prior conviction) was not cumulative, as much 
of this information was not present in any other properly admitted evidence. 415 Md. at 
749-51. We also recognized that, in its sentencing of the defendant, the trial court explicitly 
stated that it had relied on the fingerprint card. Id. at 749-50. Because the court explicitly 
relied on this erroneously admitted, prejudicial, and non-cumulative evidence, the error 
was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 749-51. 
In Simms, the Court also considered whether the cumulative nature of erroneous 
evidence can contribute to a finding that the error was harmless. 420 Md. at 739-40. In that 
case, the evidence admitted in error was an alibi notice. The defendant ultimately chose 
not to pursue an alibi defense. Id. at 738. The State used this alibi notice to build inferences 
of circumstantial “consciousness of guilt.” Id. at 739. While the State presented additional 
and separate evidence contributing to the overall inference of consciousness of guilt, the 
Court reasoned that the alibi notice was non-cumulative and presented unique information 
in the trial. Id. at 739-40. As such, its admission constituted harmful, reversible error. Id. 
at 740 (“In this case, we cannot say that the alibi notice was sufficiently cumulative so as 
to not impact the jury.”). 
In Morris, this Court again employed Dove’s articulation of an error’s cumulative 
nature as an important consideration in the Court’s overarching harmfulness analysis. 418 
Md. at 221-22. In that case, the evidence at issue was a taped statement by a co-defendant 
that violated the defendant’s right to confrontation. However, part of the statement was 
cumulative, as it was duplicative of testimony offered by officers who also testified. Id. at 
222. That being the case, we “consider[ed] it no further in our harm analysis.” Id. We cited 
30 
Dove for the proposition that “‘cumulative evidence,’ which ‘tends to prove the same point 
as other evidence presented during the trial or sentencing hearing,’ may render harmless 
otherwise reversible error.” Id. (quoting Dove, 415 Md. at 743-44).  
However, we determined that the other, non-cumulative information in the 
erroneously admitted statement was harmful because it was potentially misleading as to 
the defendant’s whereabouts at the time of the crime. Id. at 223. Where the case hinged on 
a defendant’s “unwitting participant” defense, the non-cumulative, erroneously admitted 
evidence regarding the defendant’s location likely affected the jury verdict. Id. Therefore, 
we could not find the error to be harmless. Id. at 223-24.  
In Yates, a felony-murder case, the defendant (Yates) allegedly chased and shot at a 
man (Kohler) who had tried to cheat him in a drug deal. 429 Md. at 117. The bullet struck 
and fatally wounded an innocent bystander. Id. Yates and Kohler were tried together for 
their roles in the drug transaction and shooting. Id. Two of Yates’s associates (Jagd and 
Griffin) testified that they saw Yates fire the weapon and that Yates admitted to them that 
he fired at Kohler, but said that he was not sure if had hit Kohler or anyone else. See id. In 
addition, a detective testified (over Yates’s objection) that Jagd said in a pretrial statement 
that Yates had told Jagd he had “popped that n---a,” meaning Kohler. See id. at 117-18. 
The State conceded that the double hearsay statement that was elicited through the 
detective should not have been admitted. See id. at 119 & n.1. However, this Court held 
that the error in admitting this testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because 
the detective’s testimony was cumulative of the trial testimony of Jagd and Griffin. Id. at 
122-23. In this regard, we rejected Yates’s argument that the detective’s testimony was 
31 
harmful because the associates’ testimony was “not of the same quality as the statement 
relayed by [the detective].” Id. at 122-23. Yates claimed that “his supposed admission to 
Jagd that he ‘popped that [n---a]’ was ‘far more powerful’ than the other statements 
admitted at trial because the statement was callous and made it seem as if [Yates] had 
‘coolly bragged’ about the crime.” Id.   
We rejected Yates’s contention that “it is not merely the content but also the manner 
in which that content is delivered that matters to whether the evidence is cumulative.” Id. 
at 122-23. Thus, it was immaterial to the Court’s analysis that a “boastful, unambiguous 
statement that [Yates] ‘popped’ someone … would have more of an impact on the jury than 
[Yates’s] statements that he was unsure if he hit anyone.” See id. at 123. As we explained:  
The substance of [the detective’s] statement is that [Yates] told Jagd that he 
fired a gun and shot someone. Jagd separately testified that [Yates] said “I 
don’t know if I got him” or “I think I got him,” even while he denied (to some 
extent) making the provocative statement to [the detective]. In addition, Jagd 
testified that he saw [Yates] run out of the house with a gun and saw [Yates] 
discharge it. Griffin testified similarly that [Yates] fired the gun and said to 
Griffin that he, [Yates], was not sure if he hit anyone. These statements, 
although using different words, reach the same conclusion: that [Yates] fired 
a gun shortly after chasing Kohler out of the house. 
 
[Yates] places too great an emphasis on the fact that the challenged hearsay 
statement came through [the detective]. It is conceivable that the jury found 
[the detective] more credible than Jagd and concluded that [the detective] 
correctly recalled what Jagd had said. But in order to convict [Yates], the 
jury would have had to believe not only that [the detective] was correct in 
remembering Jagd’s statement to him, but that Jagd himself was credible in 
relating to the detective what [Yates] told him. For the jury to believe that 
the statement was credible it would need to believe both [the detective] and 
Jagd. Ultimately, though, the jury would had to have focused on the 
credibility of Jagd and Griffin in connection with their statements implicating 
[Yates]. There were three such statements: two from Jagd (one relayed 
through [the detective]) and one from Griffin. Jagd testified that [Yates] ran 
out of the house with a gun and fired in the direction of Kohler. Both Jagd 
32 
and Griffin testified that [Yates] admitted that he fired his gun and thought 
he hit something or was unsure if he hit something…. [T]his testimony 
establishes the “essential contents” of the hearsay from Jagd that [the 
detective] repeated to the jury.  
 
Id. at 123-24 (citation omitted). We concluded that “the admission of the hearsay evidence 
did not ultimately affect the jury’s verdict given the cumulative nature of the similar 
statements offered at trial.” Id. at 124.   
 
We perceive no reason why the cumulativeness of a prior statement would be 
irrelevant to the harmlessness analysis when the statement was admitted erroneously as a 
prior consistent statement. The point of the harmless error inquiry is to determine whether 
the erroneously admitted evidence could have influenced the verdict. In some instances, a 
reviewing court will not be able to rule out the possibility that hearsay erroneously admitted 
as a prior consistent statement influenced the verdict. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 429 Md. 
85, 111 (2012) (erroneous admission of trial witness’s prior statement to police as a prior 
consistent statement was not harmless where the “State’s case depend[ed] virtually 
exclusively on the credibility of [the] witness”) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted); Newman v. State, 65 Md. App. 85, 97-98 (1985) (statement of complainant to her 
mother’s friend was erroneously admitted as a prior consistent statement; Court of Special 
Appeals held the error was not harmless because portions of the statement were not merely 
cumulative of the complainant’s trial testimony, but also included allegations of other 
uncharged criminal acts and of the defendant’s bad character; in addition, because the case 
depended “exclusively on the victim’s credibility,” the statement to the friend’s mother 
bolstered the complainant’s testimony and was not harmless); see also Muhammad v. State, 
33 
223 Md. App. 255, 272-73 (2015); McCray v. State, 122 Md. App. 598, 610-11 (1998). In 
other instances, a reviewing court will be able to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the information contained in the erroneously admitted statement did not influence the 
verdict because the jury heard the same information from multiple other sources. As 
discussed below, that was the case here. 
C. The Admission of the June Video Was Harmless Beyond a Reasonable Doubt. 
Based on our review of the full trial record,14 we conclude beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the admission of the June video was harmless. We have no doubt that, had the 
trial court excluded the June video, the verdict would have been the same.  
We reach this conclusion because, with respect to the allegations that Petitioner 
made A.M. perform oral sex on him, the substance of A.M.’s statements to C.M. in the 
June video is materially indistinguishable from the evidence the jury heard from other 
sources and that Petitioner does not challenge before us. First, the jury heard A.M.’s live 
testimony in which she described how, during her kindergarten and first grade years, 
Petitioner asked her “to put [her] mouth on his man part ... and suck it”; that “white goo” 
would come out of Petitioner’s “man part”; and that these sex acts occurred while she was 
in her bed following bedtime prayers.  
Second, the jury heard from C.M. that, prior to recording A.M. on June 27, 2015, 
A.M. told C.M. that “my daddy gets something from his boxer and he make me massage 
first that and … he make her … put his thing in her mouth” and “she say that … he finish 
 
14 We agree with Petitioner that harmless error analysis requires the reviewing court 
to consider the full trial record, including evidence adduced in the defense case.   
34 
in her mouth and … that the only thing that I don’t like is that something sticky or gooey 
come from his part. But she say, that’s okay, … he just go to the bathroom and clean 
himself with paper towel, with paper[.]”15  
Third, the State introduced the video recording of Ms. Colandreo’s interview of 
A.M. on June 30, 2015, in which A.M. stated that she sucked Petitioner’s “nuts” when he 
was putting her to bed in her bedroom. She told Ms. Colandreo that this happened “maybe 
20” times, and that the last time was in the winter of her first-grade year. A.M. also told 
Ms. Colandreo that Petitioner did not “tell the truth” about what had happened when 
Petitioner, Ms. Gross, and A.M. talked about it, which also mirrored A.M.’s testimony at 
trial.  
Fourth, Dr. Shukat recounted her interview of A.M. on July 8, 2015, in which A.M. 
told Dr. Shukat that “she and her father make deals. And the deals [are] that if, and using 
her language, if she sucks her father’s nuts she’ll be able to stay up, and I assume that 
means stay up later, and watch television.” Dr. Shukat explained that A.M. “described that 
as oral sex and gooey stuff coming out of his nuts. And one time she said it went in her 
 
15 When the State began questioning C.M. about her pre-video conversation with 
A.M., Petitioner’s counsel objected on the grounds that A.M.’s statements were not 
“spontaneous” or “prompt.” The trial court overruled the objection. As stated above, 
Petitioner does not challenge the admission of C.M.’s testimony about A.M.’s pre-video 
statements in this appeal. 
 
35 
mouth.” A.M. told Dr. Shukat that “the gooey stuff went either into toilet paper or a paper 
towel.” A.M. also told Dr. Shukat that the abuse began in kindergarten.16  
Thus, separate and apart from the June video, the jury heard several times over that 
A.M. performed oral sex repeatedly on Petitioner during her kindergarten and first-grade 
years. A.M.’s statements to C.M. in the June video describing the oral sex were cumulative 
of all of this evidence that Petitioner does not challenge before us.   
In addition, the DNA evidence introduced at trial was devastating to Petitioner. He 
conceded that he was the source of the semen found on the carpet next to A.M.’s bed. The 
presence of one spot of seminal fluid on the carpet corroborated A.M.’s live testimony and 
her earlier statements to Ms. Colandreo and Dr. Shukat. The jury easily could infer that, on 
one occasion, Petitioner failed to ensure that his ejaculate went completely “either into 
toilet paper or a paper towel.” It is not surprising that the jury rejected Dr. Reich’s 
transference theory, given that there were no other fluorescing spots discovered in A.M.’s 
bedroom.  
This case, thus, differs from Thomas, Newman, and other cases in which a trial court 
erroneously admitted an out-of-court statement as a prior consistent statement when the 
entire case hinged on the credibility of a witness’s trial testimony. In those cases, the 
erroneously admitted statement provided the only corroboration of the witness’s live 
testimony. See, e.g., Thomas, 429 Md. at 111; Newman, 65 Md. App. at 97-98. Here, in 
 
16 As discussed above, Petitioner objected at trial to the admission of A.M.’s 
statements to Ms. Colandreo and Dr. Shukat, and maintained that position in the Court of 
Special Appeals. However, Petitioner abandoned that claim of error before us.  
36 
addition to the June video, the State introduced the two other prior statements that A.M. 
made to Ms. Colandreo and Dr. Shukat, as well as the DNA evidence, all of which 
corroborated A.M.’s trial testimony. It is true that the June video differed from the video 
of Ms. Colandreo’s interview in that A.M. cried throughout the former and was composed 
during the latter. However, as this Court explained in Yates, 429 Md. at 122-24, it is the 
substance of the erroneously admitted statement, not its different manner of delivery 
compared with the properly admitted evidence, that matters in the cumulativeness 
analysis.17 
Also relevant is the defense’s affirmative use of the June video. The June video 
provided a tangible reference point for the defense to use in suggesting to the jury that C.M. 
manipulated A.M. into making false allegations against Petitioner. Indeed, defense counsel 
told the jury during his closing argument that “we kind of adopt that video as our own to a 
certain extent, because it comes in the middle of this enormously emotional interchange 
between [C.M.] and [A.M.].” The video allowed defense counsel to show C.M. directing 
the conversation with A.M. as C.M. saw fit. Using the testimony of Petitioner’s expert, Dr. 
Hagan, defense counsel walked the jury through the pre-June videos, which the defense 
 
17 In his Reply Brief, Petitioner inaccurately states: “The direct testimony of A.M. 
was on April 2, [Dr.] Shukat’s testimony about what A.M. told her was on April 9, and 
finally, the June 2015 video evidence was introduced on April 10.” The June video was 
introduced during C.M.’s direct examination on April 2, 2019, shortly after A.M. 
concluded her testimony that day. That was before the jury saw the video recording of Ms. 
Colandreo’s interview of A.M. and before Dr. Shukat testified about her interview of A.M. 
Thus, Petitioner is incorrect when he claims that, until the June video was played, “the jury 
only had heard the relatively dry trial testimony of A.M. followed by what a bunch of other 
people said A.M. said.” 
37 
claimed C.M. made to facilitate adopting A.M., and then discussed the June video at length, 
calling it “the final production.”  
Defense counsel also used the date of the June video – June 27, 2015 – as a reference 
point by which the jury should assess the events that came afterwards: 
You saw [A.M.] resisting, pushing back, oh, don’t put my daddy in 
jail, he loves me, he had the courage to adopt me. Well, who said anything 
about jail? Where did the concept of jail come from? She didn’t make that 
comment to Dr. Shukat. She didn’t make that comment to Britney Colandreo. 
What was [C.M.] telling her? Just look at the dynamics how she’s shaking 
and compare that demeanor in that video with what she says when she talks 
to Britney Colandreo…. Now, we have this June 27th video orchestrated and 
produced by [C.M.] 
 
…. This didn’t come spontaneously. If that had a been a spontaneous 
disclosure, [C.M.] would have picked up that phone, on June the 27th, and 
said, police, get over here right now, because my granddaughter’s in 
jeopardy. She didn’t do that. That’s not what the evidence shows happened. 
Where does [C.M.] go? She goes to go in to get a protective order, not on 
June the 27th, not on the 28th, not on the 29th, but on the 30th, three days 
later. What happens in that intervening three days? We know one thing that 
didn’t happen, she never told the commissioner that she had a videotaped 
interview what [A.M.] purportedly told her. 
 
(Some paragraph breaks omitted.)  
Later in his argument, defense counsel returned to the June video, again contrasting 
it with what A.M. told Ms. Colandreo on June 30, and also noting its similarities to what 
A.M. told Dr. Shukat on July 8:  
And many of the details that are contained in the June 27th video production 
by [C.M.] are not said to Colandreo. There’s no talk about any ejaculation. 
There’s no talk about anything going in the mouth. There’s no talk about any 
gooey stuff. None of that is said. And compare her demeanor, compare how 
she’s acting when Colandreo’s talking to her…. And it’s just a completely 
different person. So, in my mind, I’m asking you to consider what was she 
exposed to when [C.M.] was talking to her on June the 27th. 
 
38 
And then nine days later, [A.M.]’s statement to Shukat mimics what [A.M.] 
said to [C.M.]. And there’s no record, no evidence about what happened in 
those intervening nine days. Who did [A.M.] talk to? Where was she housed? 
Did she talk to the police? Did somebody confront her with her statements?  
Did somebody confront her with the video? 
 
 
Before us, Petitioner argues that the June video was “inflammatory,” “highly 
charged hearsay, an emotional interview of the minor child by her grandmother,” which 
“critically affected the fairness of the trial.” There is no doubt that the June video captured 
A.M. in a very distraught state. However, we find it telling that, at trial, the defense objected 
to the admission of the June video only on hearsay grounds. Defense counsel did not argue, 
under Maryland Rule 5-403, that the June video should be excluded because the probative 
value of this cumulative evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice.  
 
We acknowledge that the State replayed the June video in its closing argument and 
alluded to the June video again in its rebuttal argument. However, we have no doubt that, 
if the State had omitted all mention of the June video from its arguments (and the trial as a 
whole), the verdict would have been the same, given the other sources of the same 
information that the State also referenced.  
Finally, the jury’s acquittal of Petitioner on the sexual offense count based on the 
allegation of cunnilingus is significant. In the June video (and in her interview with Dr. 
Shukat), A.M. stated that Petitioner engaged in cunnilingus. In her interview with Ms. 
Colandreo, A.M. did not mention cunnilingus. And, at trial, A.M. answered “No” when 
asked if Petitioner “ever [did] anything with his mouth on your body.” The jury’s acquittal 
of Petitioner on the charge based on cunnilingus reflects that the jury did its job 
39 
dispassionately and was not swayed by the emotional nature of the June video. The jury 
considered and rejected Petitioner’s theory that C.M. pressured A.M. into falsely accusing 
Petitioner of sexual abuse in 2015, and that A.M. persisted in advancing such false claims 
at trial almost four years later. There is no reason to believe that, without the June video, 
the jury would have been any more receptive to the defense’s theory. Indeed, without the 
June video, which showed that C.M. was able to evoke an emotional response from A.M., 
we believe the defense’s theory would have gained less traction with the jury than it did 
with the June video in evidence. 
In sum, our review of the full trial record convinces us beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the admission of the June video was “unimportant in relation to everything else the 
jury considered on the issue in question.” Bellamy, 403 Md. at 332-33 (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted). In other words, the June video did not contribute to the 
verdict. Its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
IV 
Conclusion 
We reaffirm the analysis articulated in Dorsey as the standard for harmless error 
review in Maryland. In order for an error to be deemed harmless, the reviewing court must 
be convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict. 
Our review of the full trial record of this case convinces us beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the admission of the June 2015 video was harmless. It was cumulative of evidence that the 
jury heard from several other sources. In addition, the State introduced DNA evidence that 
40 
connected Petitioner to the crimes. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Special Appeals. 
JUDGMENT 
OF 
THE 
COURT 
OF 
SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. COSTS 
TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER. 
Circuit Court for Montgomery County 
 
Case No.: 128021C 
Argued: February 7, 2022 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
No. 32 
September Term, 2021 
 
 
DANIEL JAY GROSS 
v. 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
 
 
*Getty, C.J. 
*McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Booth 
Biran 
Gould, 
 
JJ. 
 
 
Dissenting Opinion by Gould, J., which 
McDonald, J., joins. 
 
 
Filed: August 26, 2022 
 
*Getty, C.J. and McDonald, J., now Senior 
Judges, 
participated 
in 
the 
hearing 
and 
conference of this case while active members of 
this Court. After being recalled pursuant to 
Maryland Constitution, Art. IV, Section 3A, they 
also participated in the decision and adoption of 
this opinion.
Although I agree with the Majority’s reaffirmation of Dorsey v. State, I respectfully 
dissent from the Majority’s holding that the admission of the June video constituted 
harmless error. 
As the Majority notes, this Court articulated the harmless error standard as follows: 
[W]hen an appellant, in a criminal case, establishes error, unless a reviewing 
court, upon its own independent review of the record, is able to declare a 
belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the 
verdict, such error cannot be deemed harmless and a reversal is mandated. 
Such reviewing court must thus be satisfied that there is no reasonable 
possibility that evidence complained of – whether erroneously admitted or 
excluded – may have contributed to the rendition of the guilty verdict. 
 
Dorsey, 276 Md. 638, 659 (1976) (quotations omitted).  Although the Majority reaffirms 
this standard in its opinion, it applies a different one - one that puts this Court in the position 
of speculating how the jury would have decided this case if the June video had not been 
admitted.  Gross v. State, No. 32, Sept. Term 2021, slip op. at 33 (Md. Aug. __, 2022) 
(“We have no doubt that, had the trial court excluded the June video, the verdict would 
have been the same.”); at 39 (“There is no reason to believe that, without the June video, 
the jury would have been any more receptive to the defense’s theory. Indeed, without the 
June video, which showed that C.M. was able to evoke an emotional response from A.M., 
we believe the defense’s theory would have gained less traction with the jury than it did 
with the June video in evidence.”).   
Whether the jury would have reached the same verdict without the June video in 
evidence is not the test.  As the Supreme Court stated in Sullivan v. Louisiana,  
The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that occurred without 
the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the 
guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the 
2 
error. That must be so, because to hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never 
in fact rendered—no matter how inescapable the findings to support that 
verdict might be—would violate the jury-trial guarantee. 
 
508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993).   
Having pocketed the conviction, it is easy and risk-free for the State to now insist 
that the video did not contribute to the guilty verdict.  But let’s look at it from the State’s 
perspective once the evidence was closed, just before closing arguments.  The State had to 
assess the strength of the evidence in the same way, and on the exact same information, as 
we do here, albeit without the benefit of hindsight.  The State had to make judgment calls 
about what to argue and which evidence to emphasize.  The State knew that the video’s 
admissibility was vigorously contested, and that the issue would likely be revisited on 
appeal.  The State had to have known, therefore, that the more it emphasized the video, the 
greater the chance a resulting conviction could be reversed on appeal if the appellate courts 
concluded that the video was inadmissible.    
With all that information, the State evidently concluded that the risk of reversal was 
outweighed by the value the jury would likely attach to the video.  And the State went all 
in, arguing at closing: 
The Defense wants you to believe that this videotaped disclosure by [C.M. 
and J.M.] was rehearsed, or staged, or whatever word you want to put there. 
I would submit to you that those disclosures are powerful, and they are heart-
wrenching, and they’re very different from the other videos that were 
admitted into evidence. And I encourage you to watch all of them, but I 
would like to show you the disclosure again. 
  
And then after playing the video, the State continued in its closing: “The Defense 
wants you to believe that that was staged . . . . This isn’t something that was said to this 
3 
child to say. This is this child relaying the experience of what happened to her to her 
grandmother.”  And then in rebuttal, the State returned to the video, this time arguing that 
the video and other pictures show that A.M. loved the petitioner: “She loved him, and if 
that raw, powerful heart-wrenching video doesn’t convince you of that fact, [the pictures] 
are another reason[.]”  
Thus, when the State did not have the benefit of hindsight and had to choose between 
emphasizing or omitting the June video in its closing, the State was not willing to risk an 
acquittal by doing the latter.  Clearly, the State hoped and intended that the video would 
contribute to a guilty verdict even though there was other evidence on which the jury could 
have convicted Mr. Gross.  Because I cannot fathom that the video did not have such an 
effect on at least one juror, I respectfully dissent.  
Judge McDonald has authorized me to represent that he joins this dissent.