Title: Sanders v. State

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Christopher SANDERS v. STATE  of Arkansas

96-484                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered October 28, 1996


1.   Juveniles -- motion to transfer to juvenile court -- burden of
     proof and evidence required. --  The law regarding motions to
     transfer to juvenile court is well established; a defendant
     seeking a transfer has the burden of proof to show a transfer
     is warranted under Ark. Code Ann.  9-27-318(e); if he or she
     meets the burden, then the transfer is made unless there is
     clear and convincing countervailing evidence to support a
     finding that the juvenile should remain in circuit court;
     clear and convincing evidence is that degree of proof which
     will produce in the trier of fact a firm conviction as to the
     allegation sought to be established; the trial court is not
     required to give equal weight to each of the statutory
     factors; the serious and violent nature of an offense is a
     sufficient basis for denying a motion to transfer and trying
     a juvenile as an adult; no element of violence beyond that
     required to commit the crime is necessary under Ark. Code Ann.
      9-27-318(e)(1); however, that a crime is serious without the
     use of violence is not a factor sufficient in and of itself
     for a circuit court to retain jurisdiction of a juvenile.

2.   Criminal law -- information may be sufficient evidence to
     establish that defendant is charged with violent crime --
     review of denial of motion to transfer. -- An information can
     constitute sufficient evidence to establish that the defendant
     is charged with a serious and violent crime; the appellate
     court applies the clearly erroneous standard in reviewing the
     trial court's denial of a motion to transfer.  

3.   Evidence -- hearsay -- hearsay admitted without objection may
     constitute substantial evidence. -- Hearsay admitted without
     objection may constitute substantial evidence to support a
     ruling.

4.   Juveniles -- alleged offenses were serious and of violent
     nature -- no error in denying appellant's motion to transfer
     to juvenile court. -- Where the appellant was charged with
     aggravated assault and terroristic threatening, the trial
     court determined that the alleged offenses were serious and of
     a violent nature; it did not clearly err in making this
     determination. 

5.   Juveniles -- additional factor supported denial of appellant's
     motion -- appellant would be eighteen in four months. -- The
     court considered the fact that appellant was seventeen at the
     time of hearing but would be eighteen in approximately four
     months; commitment to a juvenile facility is not available for
     a young person older than eighteen; the chance for
     rehabilitation within the Division of Youth Services is
     nonexistent when a commitment cannot be had for a young person
     older than eighteen; Ark. Code Ann.  9-28-208(d) presupposes
     that the youth has already been committed at the time he or
     she turns eighteen and allows for that commitment to continue;
     that was not the situation in this case; under the
     circumstances, the decision of the trial court was not clearly
     erroneous in denying the transfer.


     Appeal from Greene Circuit Court; John Fogleman, Judge;
affirmed.
     Val P. Price, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Vada Berger, Asst. Att'y
Gen., for appellee.

     Robert H. Dudley, Justice. 
     This is an interlocutory appeal by Christopher Sanders from
the circuit court's denial of his motion to transfer the charges
against him to juvenile court.  Sanders was charged on May 1, 1995,
with aggravated assault and terroristic threatening in the first
degree.  The affidavits for warrants of arrest provide that Sanders
"put a knife to the throat of Michael Ray and threatened to kill
him.  Michael is nine years old, and his brother and sister
witnessed this.  Chris has also kicked Michael on different
occasions leaving bruises on his legs."  Sanders filed his motion
to transfer on September 15, 1995, in which he alleged that he was
born on February 12, 1978, was seventeen years old, and there were
no other charges pending against him.  The only witness at the
hearing on the motion to transfer was Sanders's mother, Becky
Sanders.  She testified that Sanders had been in juvenile court in
August 1994 for a problem on a school bus and pleaded guilty to
those charges.  She testified that Sanders was placed under house
arrest for six months, and the sentencing judge stated that if
Sanders stayed out of trouble, his record would be "clean" at the
conclusion of his sentence.    
     The trial judge asked whether the State had anything to offer
about the seriousness of the offense.  The deputy prosecuting
attorney responded that the victim was committed to Arkansas
Children's Hospital for an evaluation after the incident.  The
trial judge asked what type of knife was allegedly used.  The
deputy prosecuting attorney answered that she thought that the
knife used in the alleged crime was a kitchen knife, but she was
not sure why she thought that.  The deputy prosecuting attorney
stated that Sanders had a juvenile record, but she did not know
about the school bus incident.  She explained that an officer had
been trying to get the juvenile records but had been unable to do
so.  The deputy prosecuting attorney informed the trial court that
a possible rape charge against Sanders was being investigated.
     The trial judge denied the motion to transfer.  In ruling from
the bench, the trial judge stated that in making his decision he
was to consider the three factors set forth in Ark. Code Ann.  9-
27-318(e) (Supp. 1995).  He stated that he had only scant
information about Sanders's prior history, character traits, mental
maturity, and other relevant factors.  He then noted the incident
on the school bus, but stated that there was no evidence that this
offense was part of a repetitive pattern.    
     With regard to the seriousness of the offense and whether
violence was employed, the trial judge stated that the offense
itself was serious.  He stated that the charges dealt with creating
substantial danger of death or serious physical injury and
threatening to cause death or serious physical injury and,
therefore, were serious.  With regard to violence, the trial judge
stated that the court could only base its decision on the
information and the attached affidavits and that the information
and attached affidavits recited that Sanders employed violence by
placing a knife to the throat of the victim and threatening to kill
him.  The trial judge stated that he did not know what type of
knife was used, the circumstances, "or anything else related to the
seriousness of the offense."  He stated that the question came down
to whether the seriousness and violence established a need for this
case to be tried in circuit court.  The trial judge also considered
the fact that appellant was seventeen at the time of the hearing
and would be eighteen in approximately four months.  He concluded:
     The Court is going to deny the motion to transfer to
     Juvenile Court.  This is an extremely close case, and if
     not for the defendant's age and the proximity to turning
     eighteen, the Court likely would have transferred this to
     Juvenile Court without more information, but based on the
     defendant's age and the seriousness of the offenses, at
     least the alleged seriousness of the offenses, the Court
     will deny the motion to transfer to Juvenile Court.
     Sanders argues that the trial court erred in denying the
motion to transfer because the alleged weapon was not shown to be
inherently dangerous.  He further asserts that terroristic
threatening is not obviously violent.  He contends that the
incident on the bus for which he was placed under house arrest
should not be considered as an adjudicated offense and that the
State did not present evidence of prior offenses or convictions. 
He points out that the trial court specifically found that the
current offense is not part of a repetitive pattern.  Finally, he
asserts that the trial court erroneously considered his age in
denying the motion to transfer. 
     Sanders is charged with aggravated assault and terroristic
threatening in the first degree.  A person commits aggravated
assault if, "under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference
to the value of human life, he purposely engages in conduct that
creates a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to
another person."  Ark. Code Ann.  5-13-204(a) (Repl. 1993). 
Aggravated assault is a Class D felony.  Ark. Code Ann.  5-13-
204(b).  The applicable code section on terroristic threatening
provides that a person commits terroristic threatening in the first
degree if, "[w]ith the purpose of terrorizing another person, he
threatens to cause death or serious physical injury or substantial
property damage to another person."  Ark. Code Ann.  5-13-301
(Supp. 1995).  Terroristic threatening in the first degree is a
Class D felony.  Ark. Code Ann.  5-13-301(a)(2).  The State could
properly file the charges against appellant in circuit court
pursuant to Ark. Code Ann.  9-27-318(b)(1) (Supp. 1995) because
appellant was sixteen years old at the time of the alleged offense
and he was being charged with conduct that, "if committed by an
adult, would be [a] felony."  Ark. Code Ann.  9-27-318(b)(1).
     In determining whether to retain jurisdiction, the trial court
must consider: 
     (1)  The seriousness of the offense, and whether violence
     was employed by the juvenile in the commission of the
     offense;
     (2)  Whether the offense is part of a repetitive pattern
     of adjudicated offenses which would lead to the
     determination that the juvenile is beyond rehabilitation
     under existing rehabilitation programs, as evidenced by
     past efforts to treat and rehabilitate the juvenile and
     the response to such efforts; and
     (3)  The prior history, character traits, mental
     maturity, and any other factor which reflects upon the
     juvenile's prospects for rehabilitation.
Ark. Code Ann.  9-27-318(e)(1) -- (3) (Supp. 1995). 
     In Lammers v. State, 324 Ark. 222, 920 S.W.2d 7 (1996), we
wrote:  
         The law regarding motions to transfer to juvenile
     court is well established:
          A defendant seeking a transfer has the burden of
          proof to show a transfer is warranted under Ark.
          Code Ann.  9-27-318(e).  Ring v. State, 320 Ark.
          128,