Title: STATE OF WYOMING v. ROGER ANTONICH

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

STATE OF WYOMING v. ROGER ANTONICH1985 WY 3694 P.2d 60Case Number: 84-35Decided: 01/10/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
STATE OF WYOMING, PLAINTIFF, 

v. 

ROGER ANTONICH, 
DEFENDANT.

 
 
A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Michael A. Blonigen, Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiff.

Daniel E. White, 
Cheyenne, for defendant.

Before THOMAS,* C.J., and ROSE, ROONEY,** BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

* Became Chief Justice 
January 1, 1985.

** Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

ROSE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     We granted the State of 
Wyoming's 
application to file a bill of exceptions in order to address a single 
issue:

"Does the Wyoming 
Preference for State Laborers Act, Section 16-6-201, et seq., W.S. 1977, violate 
the privileges and immunities clause of the United States 
Constitution?"

We will hold 
that the challenged Act is narrowly tailored to fit a particular problem 
identified by the State and, therefore, does not impermissibly infringe the 
privileges and immunities of the citizens of states other than Wyoming.1 Accordingly, we sustain the bill of 
exceptions filed by the State.

WYOMING PREFERENCE ACT OF 
1971

[¶2.]     In 1971, the 
legislature adopted the "Wyoming Preference Act," §§ 16-6-201 through 16-6-206, 
W.S. 1977, which requires contractors to employ available qualified Wyoming laborers for 
public-works projects in preference to nonresident laborers. Section 16-6-203, 
W.S. 1977, contains the key provision of the Act:

"Every person who is 
charged with the duty of construction, reconstructing, improving, enlarging, 
altering or repairing any public works project or improvement for the state or 
any political subdivision, municipal corporation, or other governmental unit, 
shall employ only Wyoming laborers on the project or 
improvement. Every contract let by any person shall contain a provision 
requiring that Wyoming labor be used except other laborers may be used when 
Wyoming laborers are not available for the employment from within the state or 
are not qualified to perform the work involved. The state employment office 
nearest the proposed contract or construction site shall maintain a list of 
laborers, classified by skills, who are residents and are available for 
employment. When the nearest state employment office is unable to provide the 
requested number of laborers from its own list, it shall immediately contact 
other state employment offices and request the names of other available 
laborers. Every person required to employ Wyoming laborers shall inform the nearest 
state employment office of his employment needs. If the state employment office 
certifies that the person's need for laborers cannot be filled from those listed 
as of the date the information is filed, then the person may employ other than 
Wyoming laborers."

[¶3.]     On September 22, 1983, 
the Converse County prosecuting attorney charged Roger Antonich, general 
superintendent of Westates Construction Company, with violating § 16-6-203, 
supra. The information alleged that Antonich fired a Wyoming worker from a 
public-school construction project in order to hire out-of-state workers. The 
county court judge dismissed the charge on the ground that § 16-6-203, supra, 
violates the privileges and immunities clause of the federal constitution. The 
court relied on Hicklin v. Orbeck, 
437 U.S. 518, 98 S. Ct. 2482, 57 L. Ed. 2d 397 (1978), and recent cases from other jurisdictions in which the courts have 
invalidated statutory preferences for local workers. After examining these and 
similar opinions, we conclude that certain distinguishing features in Wyoming's Preference Act 
sufficiently limit its scope so as to satisfy the demands of the 
privileges-and-immunities clause.

PRIVILEGES-AND-IMMUNITIES 
CLAUSE ANALYSIS

[¶4.]     An examination of a 
state enactment to determine its validity under the privileges-and-immunities 
clause involves a two-step analysis. First, the reviewing court must determine 
whether the statute burdens a fundamental right or activity, since only those 
"privileges" and "immunities" which bear upon the concept of interstate harmony 
fall within the scope and purpose of the clause. United Building and Construction Trades 
Council of Camden County and Vicinity v. Mayor and Council of the City of 
Camden, ___ U.S. ___, ___-___, 104 S. Ct. 1020, 1027, 79 L. Ed. 2d 249, 258-259 
(1984); Baldwin v. Fish and Game 
Commission of Montana, 436 U.S. 371, 383-388, 98 S. Ct. 1852, 1860-1862, 56 L. Ed. 2d 354 (1978); Toomer v. 
Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395-396, 68 S. Ct. 1156, 1161-1162, 92 L. Ed. 1460 
(1948). Second, the court must examine the reasons for the discriminatory 
treatment to determine their validity and their relation to the degree of 
discrimination imposed by the statute. This portion of the test was developed by 
the United States Supreme Court in Toomer 
v. Witsell, supra:

"Like many other 
constitutional provisions, the privileges and immunities clause is not an 
absolute. It does bar discrimination against citizens of other States where 
there is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that 
they are citizens of other States. But it does not preclude disparity of 
treatment in the many situations where there are perfectly valid independent 
reasons for it. Thus the inquiry in each 
case must be concerned with whether such reasons do exist and whether the degree 
of discrimination bears a close relation to them. The inquiry must also, of 
course, be conducted with due regard for the principle that the States should 
have consideration leeway in analyzing local evils and in prescribing 
appropriate cures." (Emphasis added.) 334 U.S.  at 396, 68 S. Ct.  at 1162.

The Toomer court 
established that classifications based on non-citizenship cannot 
stand

"* * * unless there is 
something to indicate that non-citizens constitute a peculiar source of the evil 
at which the statute is aimed." 334 U.S.  at 398, 68 S. Ct.  at 
1163

[¶5.]     The State concedes that 
the discrimination against nonresidents under the Wyoming Preference Act burdens 
a fundamental right. In an early case, the United States Supreme Court held that 
the privileges-and-immunities clause protects the right of a citizen of one 
state to travel to another state for purposes of employment. Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall) 418, 430, 20 L. Ed. 449 
(1870). The Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle in Hicklin v. Orbeck, supra, 437 U.S.  at 525, 98 S. Ct.  at 2487. Even 
more pertinent to the instant case, the Supreme Court recently held that an 
enactment preferring local workers for public construction projects burdens a 
fundamental right and, therefore, falls within the purview of the 
privileges-and-immunities clause. United 
Building and Construction Trades Council of CamdenCounty 
and Vicinity v. Mayor and Council of the City of Camden, supra, ___ U.S. at ___-___, 
104 S. Ct.  at 1027-1029, 79 L. Ed. 2d  at 258-261. Clearly, Wyoming's Preference Act 
offends the privileges-and-immunities clause unless a close link exists between 
valid reasons for the Act and the discrimination 
practiced.

[¶6.]     The State, in its 
brief, identifies the purpose of the Act as the reduction in unemployment among 
the labor force which makes possible government projects through contributions 
to the public treasury. Stated conversely, the evil which the Wyoming Preference 
Act combats is

"* * * a resident 
remaining unemployed while a nonresident takes a job on a Wyoming public works 
project." (State's brief.)

Thus, the 
Wyoming Preference Act attempts to insure that government-created jobs benefit 
the State's citizens.

[¶7.]     Without question, 
reduction in unemployment among Wyoming citizens constitutes a valid state 
goal. See United Building and 
Construction Trades Council of Camden County and Vicinity v. Mayor and Council 
of the City of Camden, supra; Hicklin 
v. Orbeck, supra. We turn, therefore, to an examination of the relationship 
between this legitimate reason underlying the Wyoming Preference Act and the 
discrimination mandated against nonresidents.

[¶8.]     Enactments to alleviate 
high unemployment levels through the hiring of residents in preference to 
nonresidents generally have swept too broadly to survive challenges brought 
under the privileges-and-immunities clause. The prime example of such 
legislation is the "Alaska Hire" Act at issue in Hicklin v. Orbeck, supra. That Act 
required the employment of qualified Alaska residents in preference to nonresidents 
for positions associated with

"* * * all oil and gas 
leases, easements or right-of-way permits for oil or gas pipeline purposes, 
unitization agreements, or any renegotiation of any of the preceding to which 
the state is a party * * *." 437 U.S.  at 520, n. 2, 98 S. Ct.  at 2485 
n. 2.

The United 
States Supreme Court cited three bases for holding that the discrimination 
imposed by this statute failed to bear a close relation to the problem of high 
unemployment in Alaska. First, the state had made no showing 
that nonresidents were a peculiar source of widespread unemployment. Rather than 
the influx of nonresidents looking for work, the major cause of unemployment 
appeared to be the inadequate education and training and the geographical 
remoteness of many jobless residents - particularly the Eskimo and Indian 
residents. 437 U.S.  at 526-527, 98 S. Ct.  at 
2487-2488. Secondly, the Court determined that Alaska Hire did not narrowly 
address the problem of unemployment, since the Act simply preferred all 
residents, regardless of their employment status, education or training. 437 U.S.  at 527, 98 S. Ct.  at 2488. 
Finally, the Supreme Court observed that the discriminatory effect of Alaska 
Hire extended well beyond those activities in which the state held a substantial 
proprietary interest:

"* * * In sum, the Act is 
an attempt to force virtually all businesses that benefit in some way from the 
economic ripple effect of Alaska's decision to develop its oil and gas resources 
to bias their employment practices in favor of the State's residents. We believe 
that Alaska's 
ownership of the oil and gas that is the subject matter of Alaska Hire simply 
constitutes insufficient justification for the pervasive discrimination against 
nonresidents that the Act mandates." 437 U.S.  at 531, 98 S. Ct.  at 2490.

[¶9.]     A number of state 
courts have adopted the foregoing rationale in invalidating enactments which 
grant an employment preference to local workers. Laborers Local Union No. 374 v. Felton 
Construction Company, 98 Wn.2d 121, 654 P.2d 67 (1982); Massachusetts Council of Construction 
Employers, Incorporated v. Mayor of Boston, 384 Mass. 466, 425 N.E.2d 346 
(1981), rev'd under the commerce clause, 460 U.S. 204, 103 S. Ct. 1042, 75 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1983); Salla v. County of 
Monroe, 48 N.Y.2d 514, 399 N.E.2d 909, 423 N.Y.S.2d 878, cert. denied 446 U.S. 909, 100 S. Ct. 1836, 64 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1979). We find, however, that 
Wyoming's 
Preference Act, unlike the enactments at issue in these cases and Alaska Hire, 
precisely fits the particular evil identified by the 
State.

[¶10.]  As noted above, the act seeks to prevent 
a qualified Wyoming worker's remaining unemployed while a 
nonresident goes to work on a government-funded construction project. The 
statute makes no attempt to eradicate the general unemployment in this state 
which may be due to factors unrelated to nonresidents. Accordingly, the Act 
directs its discriminatory treatment toward the nonresident applicants for jobs 
on public-works projects - those individuals who constitute the peculiar source 
of the evil identified by the State.

[¶11.]  Secondly, the Wyoming Preference Act 
specifically addresses the problem of unemployment among Wyoming construction 
workers. Section 16-6-203, supra, requires contractors to contact the local 
employment office to determine whether qualified resident workers are available. 
If the number of qualified residents listed with state employment offices is 
insufficient to meet employment needs, contractors are free to hire nonresident 
workers. An employer need not attempt to hire residents away from other jobs or 
to dismiss nonresidents and hire residents as they become available. Under the 
Act, an employer must deny nonresidents employment only when the state 
employment office provides a sufficient number of residents who are qualified 
and available to go to work.

[¶12.]  Finally, we attach significance to the 
fact that the Wyoming Preference Act confines its discriminatory effects to 
projects constructed from public funds. The government's proprietary interest in 
the subject matter of the discriminatory statute constitutes a crucial factor in 
support of the statute's validity:

"* * * The fact that [the 
city] is expending its own funds or funds it administers in accordance with the 
terms of a grant is certainly a factor - perhaps the crucial factor - to be 
considered in evaluating whether the statute's discrimination violates the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause. But it does not remove the [city] ordinance 
completely from the purview of the Clause." United Building and Construction Trades 
Council of CamdenCounty and Vicinity v. Mayor and Council of the City 
of Camden, supra, ___ U.S. at ___, 104 S. Ct.  at 1029, 79 L. Ed. 2d  at 260.

The Court 
elaborated in that case:

"Every inquiry under the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause `must . . . be conducted with due regard for 
the principle that the states should have considerable leeway in analyzing local 
evils and in prescribing appropriate cures.' Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396, 68 S. Ct. 1156, [1162], 
92 L. Ed. 1460 (1948). This caution is particularly appropriate when a government 
body is merely setting conditions on the expenditure of funds it controls." ___ 
U.S. at ___, 104 S. Ct.  at 1030, 79 L. Ed. 2d  at 261.

[¶13.]  The Wyoming statute at issue in the present case 
requires merely that governmental funds, allocated to public-works projects, be 
used to hire qualified, available residents in preference to nonresidents. The 
statute does not effect the sort of wide-ranging discriminatory treatment fatal 
to Alaska Hire in Hicklin v. Orbeck, 
supra. Since the Wyoming Preference Act limits its discriminatory effect to 
government-created jobs, it presents minimal affront to the privileges and 
immunities of noncitizens. United 
Building and Construction Trades Council of CamdenCounty 
and Vicinity v. Mayor and Council of the City of Camden, supra.

[¶14.]  We hold that the Wyoming Preference Act 
does not violate the privileges-and-immunities clause of the federal 
constitution, notwithstanding the Act's infringement upon a recognized 
fundamental right. The Act narrowly addresses the goal of reduced unemployment 
among the state's taxpayers by preferring available, qualified residents for 
government-funded positions. Since the degree of discrimination bears a close 
relation to the state's valid reasons for discriminatory treatment, we affirm 
the Act's validity under the test established in Toomer v. Witsell, supra, and refined in 
subsequent cases.

[¶15.]  Although not determinative of our 
decision here, we recently held in Galesburg Construction Company, Inc. of 
Wyoming v. Board of Trustees of Memorial Hospital of Converse County, Wyo., 
641 P.2d 745 (1982), that Wyoming's preference for resident bidders on 
public-works contracts, § 9-8-302, W.S. 1977, does not violate the 
equal-protection provisions of the state and federal constitutions. Our result 
in the instant case, upholding Wyoming's preference for resident workers on 
public-works projects, harmonizes with our decision in Galesburg Construction Company, Inc. of 
Wyoming v. Board of Trustees of Memorial Hospital of Converse County, 
supra.

[¶16.]  The bill of exceptions is 
sustained.

1 The United States 
Constitution, Art. IV, § 2, provides:

"The Citizens of each 
State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the 
several States."

THOMAS, Chief Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶17.]  I am in complete accord with the result 
reached by the majority in this case, but I have a concern about the adequacy of 
the record to support the nexus between the evil of "a qualified Wyoming 
worker's remaining unemployed while a nonresident goes to work on a 
government-funded construction project" and the statute in question. I agree 
that that is a possibility, but the record does not demonstrate it. The 
statutory language simply makes the state employment offices a repository of 
information, and does not limit the "list of laborers, classified by skills, who 
are residents" to the unemployed. It simply requires that they be "available for 
employment."

[¶18.]  I am satisfied that on the basis of 
existing precedent the role of the State in connection with "constructing, 
reconstructing, improving, enlarging, altering or repairing any public works 
project or improvement for the state or any political subdivision, municipal 
corporation or other governmental unit" is that of a market participant pursuing 
essentially a proprietary function. It is inappropriate to invoke the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause to inhibit the State in that regard. Both Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 98 S. Ct. 2482, 57 L. Ed. 2d 397 (1978), and United Building and Construction Trades 
Council of Camden County and Vicinity v. Mayor and Council of the City of 
Camden, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S. Ct. 1020, 79 L. Ed. 2d 249 (1984), recognize that 
the proprietary interest of the State in the property with which the statute 
deals is often a crucial factor in determining whether a discriminatory statute 
against non-citizens violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause. I perceive 
that, without articulating such a concept, the Supreme Court of the 
United States has preserved a 
delicate balance between the Reservation of Powers Clause found in Amendment X 
to the Constitution of the United States of America and the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause. The line that is drawn is that between the 
governmental function of the State and the right of the State to participate in 
the marketplace, satisfy its proprietary functions, and contract freely with 
those with whom it chooses to contract.

[¶19.]  In Hicklin v. Orbeck, supra, at 437 U.S. 531, 98 S. Ct.  at 2490, the 
Supreme Court recognized what it described as a mutually reinforcing 
relationship between the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, § 2, and 
the Commerce Clause, which it said stems from their origin in the Fourth Article 
of the Articles of Confederation. In Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 100 S. Ct. 2271, 65 L. Ed. 2d 244 (1980), the Court said:

"* * * The State's 
refusal to sell to buyers other than South Dakotans is `protectionist' only in 
the sense that it limits benefits generated by a state program to those who fund 
the state treasury and whom the State was created to serve. * * Such policies, 
while perhaps `protectionist' in a loose sense, reflect the essential and 
patently unobjectionable purpose of state government - to serve the citizens of 
the State."

Conceding that 
the Court there was dealing with the application of the Commerce Clause, because 
of the mutually reinforcing relationship between the two clauses I find that 
concept applicable in this instance with respect to the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause.

[¶20.]  It cannot be held objectionable for a 
sovereign state to adopt legislation which provides in essence that to the 
extent possible public works contracts benefit the citizens of the state whose 
contributions to the public treasury fund those projects. A state should not be 
foreclosed by the invocation of the Constitution of the United States of 
America from loyalty to interests of its own 
citizens. So long as a statute is narrowly drawn to protect only the right of 
the state to contract as it sees fit with respect to expenditures for public 
works projects which it owns and which it funds, I am satisfied that as a matter 
of law such a statute does not offend the Privileges and Immunities Clause found 
in Art. IV, § 2 of the Constitution of the United States of 
America. This, of course, makes it unnecessary 
for the court to pursue the remand technique invoked in United Building and Construction Trades 
Council of Camden County and Vicinity v. Mayor and Council of the City of 
Camden, supra.

[¶21.]  I would agree that the bill of exceptions 
should be sustained for the foregoing reasons.