Title: State v. Woodworth

State: north-dakota

Issuer: North Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

234 N.W.2d 243 (1975) STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Walter WOODWORTH, Defendant-Appellant. Crim. No. 503. Supreme Court of North Dakota. October 7, 1975. Rehearing Denied October 30, 1975. *245 Kent Higgins, Sp. Public Defender, Bismarck, for defendant-appellant. John M. Olson, State's Atty., for plaintiff-appellee. SAND, Judge. The appellant, Walter Woodworth, and his brother, Stewart Woodworth, were convicted on August 2, 1974, in the Burleigh County Court of Increased Jurisdiction of disturbing the peace under Section 5-01-05.3, North Dakota Century Code. Walter was sentenced to ten days in the county jail, to be given credit for eight days already served and the balance suspended during good behavior. Walter Woodworth appealed from this judgment. The facts of the case are not in dispute. At two o'clock in the morning of July 2, 1974, the police, in response to a call, came to the intersection of Ninth Street (an arterial street) and Avenue E in Bismarck, where defendant Walter Woodworth and his brother, Stewart, were sitting in the middle of the intersection, partially blocking the street, and making "a lot of noise." The intersection is in a residential area. A number of persons were present and five to ten cars passed through the partially blocked intersection. When asked by the police to leave, the Woodworths refused. After failing to persuade them to leave, the officers attempted to physically remove them, whereupon a scuffle broke out. The defendants were arrested and taken to the police station, where they were charged with violating Section 5-01-05.3, N.D.C.C., which provides as follows: The pertinent part of the complaint charged as follows: At the trial, the defendant questioned the constitutionality of the statute. The trial court noted that the statute sets forth two separate items, each of which constitutes a misdemeanor. The court declared that the portion which "constitutes disorderly conduct" was unconstitutional because of vagueness, but convicted the defendants of disturbing the peace. The defendant, Walter Woodworth, on appeal, now claims that the whole statute is void for vagueness and also void for overbreadth. The due process clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions require definiteness of criminal statutes so that the language, when measured by common understanding and practices, gives adequate warning of the conduct proscribed and marks boundaries sufficiently distinct for judges and juries to fairly administer the law. In determining whether adequate warning is given, the court should view the statute from the standpoint of the reasonable man who might be subject to its terms. State v. Julson, 202 N.W.2d 145 (N.D.1972); State v. Hagge, 211 N.W.2d 395 (N.D.1973); 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 17, page 99. The mere use of general language does not support a vagueness challenge. *246 In State v. Hagge, supra, this court had under consideration the constitutionality of Section 39-09-01, N.D.C.C., which read as follows at the time: The court pointed out that by requiring automobiles to be driven "in a careful and prudent manner, having due regard to the traffic, surface, and width of the highway and other conditions then existing. ." the statute prescribed ascertainable standards. The term of expression, "careful and prudent manner" over the years has acquired an understandable meaning, and as such constitutes a standard. Likewise, the term "disturb the public peace" has acquired a common meaning. In the instant case, the obstruction of traffic was both hazardous and dangerous, as well as an act prohibited by law. Any ordinary prudent person possessed with ordinary intelligence should have no difficulty realizing that the obstruction of traffic, coupled with boisterous noises, will disturb the public peace. From the testimony at the trial, it appears the defendants deliberately attempted to create a disturbance so as to cause a certain police officer to appear. They did succeed in creating the disturbance which they actually set out to do. They cannot now be heard to complain that they didn't know what constitutes a disturbance. The test of definitiveness of a statute is met if the meaning of the statute is fairly ascertainable by reference to similar statutes or to the dictionary, or if the questioned words have a common and generally accepted meaning. State v. Willis, 218 N.W.2d 921 (Iowa 1974). The requisite of definiteness demands no more than a reasonable degree of certainty. We agree specifically with the underscored statement. *247 Section 5-01-05.3, N.D.C.C., proscribes acts which disturb the public peace or constitute disorderly conduct. The trial court held unconstitutional that portion of the statute making "disorderly conduct" a crime, but upheld the "disturbs the public peace" portion under which the defendant was convicted. The striking down of one clause of a statute as unconstitutional does not affect the remainder of it. Section 1-02-20, N.D.C.C. Disturbing the peace is a common law offense which has acquired an accepted meaning defined as such a violation of the public order as amounts to a disturbance of the public tranquility, by act or conduct either directly having this effect, or by inciting or tending to incite such a disturbance of the public tranquility. 12 Am. Jur.2d, Breach of Peace, § 4, page 666. The application of common law in this state is pursuant to Sections 1-01-03, 1-01-04, 1-01-05 and 1-01-06, N.D.C.C., and case law, the net effect of which is that some statutes are a continuation of common law,[2] and where there is no express constitutional or statutory provision common law applies. We believe common law definitions of words and phrases in statutory offenses of common law derivation apply unless redefined by state law. This court, in State v. Laufenberg, 99 N.W.2d 331, 333 (N.D.1959), a case involving a statute on "grossly disturbing the peace" (Section 12-1901, N.D.R.C.1943)[3] defined "peace" as follows: The United States Supreme Court in Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 94 S. Ct. 190, 38 L. Ed. 2d 179, in effect concluded that where a statute has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of the State at the time of the commission of the act, even if the same Supreme Court later declared the act void for vagueness, the interpretation placed upon the statute by the Supreme Court would be given substantial consideration by the United States Supreme Court. Under this concept, the construction and interpretation placed upon Section 12-1901, N.D.R.C.1943, by the North Dakota Supreme Court in the Laufenberg case would still be valid and appropriate even though this section is no longer the law of the State but was the law at the time the act was committed. The distinction between the statutes in question, Section 5-01-05.3, N.D.C.C., and Section 12-1909, N.D.R.C.1943, is that in the latter the peace must be actually and grossly disturbed. The definition of "peace" otherwise applies to both statutes. It is the disturbance of the public peace as defined supra which constitutes a crime. The case of Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 107, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 2298, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1972), cited by the defendant, does not support his claim of vagueness. In the cited case an ordinance, referred to as an anti-noise ordinance, in pertinent part read as follows: The Court held that the ordinance in question was not unconstitutional for vagueness. The Court also observed: "Condemned to the use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language." It further observed that the words of the ordinance are marked by free and reasonable breadth rather than meticulous specificity. It concluded that the ordinance as a whole makes clear what is prohibited. The Court speculated that if it were left only with the words "tend to disturb" it may have some problems. But in our situation, we do not have the phrase "tend to disturb." Our statute states, "disturbs the public peace." In State v. Johnson, 282 Minn. 153, 163 N.W.2d 750 (1968), the Minnesota Supreme Court had under consideration a breach of peace ordinance, and on page 754, said: It further observed that: The ordinance contained the following, as is pertinent to our question here, ". . . or any other conduct which disturbs the peace and quiet of another save for participating in a recognized athletic contest." The court held the statute not invalid for vagueness. We conceive no legal distinction between "breach of the peace" and "disturb the public peace." In the case of People of Dearborn Heights v. Bellock, supra, the Michigan Supreme Court had under consideration an ordinance which stated: And it also said that: The statute was held valid in face of a challenge of being too vague. In State v. Coomes, 170 Neb. 298, 102 N.W.2d 454, 457 (1960), the Supreme Court of Nebraska said that: The statute in question read: The court held that the statute was not invalid because of vagueness. We further note that the term "disturbance of peace" is of such common usage that it is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951) as follows: *249 There is little, if any, difference between "disturbs the public peace" and "disturbance of the peace." Thus the term "disturb the public peace" has taken on a definite meaning so that any law-abiding person of reasonable intelligence would or should have no difficulty in understanding what conduct is prohibited. Basic law is concerned with constitutional rights of all people, not only the few. The right to peace and tranquility is also a constitutional right and is one of the purposes for which our constitution was adopted, as evidenced by the preamble, "to insure domestic tranquility." The defendant in the instant case was arrested for sitting in the middle of an intersection, partially blocking traffic, which in itself constituted a violation of law (Section 24-12-02, N.D.C.C.) at two o'clock in the morning, making loud noises, and fighting with the police who tried to remove him. He knew or should have known that these actions would disturb the neighborhood and the peace. He cannot claim that because the statute uses the general term of disturbing the peace that he was not forewarned that his conduct was in violation of the law. Where a common law offense statute is being challenged for vagueness, we rely upon the proven acts of the defendant rather than on speculative hypothetical facts or situations for the test. In this instance there is no doubt that the acts of the defendant disturbed the public peace. Defendant claims that the statute is overbroad because it could be applied to conduct protected by the First Amendment. Defendant claims he has the right to attack the statute even though his own conduct does not fall within a constitutionally protected area. The general rule is that a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied cannot challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others. United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 80 S. Ct. 519, 4 L. Ed. 2d 524 (1959); State v. Gamble Skogmo, Inc., 144 N.W.2d 749 (N.D.1966). A litigant may assert only his own constitutional rights, unless he can present "weighty countervailing policies." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 93 S. Ct. 2908, 37 L. Ed. 2d 830 (1973); City of Bismarck v. Materi, 177 N.W.2d 530 (N.D. 1970). One exception where sufficient countervailing policies have been found is in the area of First Amendment rights. If the statute purports to regulate First Amendment rights, one who does not come within constitutional protection may nevertheless attack it. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1116, 14 L. Ed. 2d 22 (1966). This exception has been applied in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate speech, Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 94 S. Ct. 970, 39 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 92 S. Ct. 1103, 31 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1972); and where rights of association might have been affected by the broad sweep of the statute, Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 87 S. Ct. 675, 17 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1967); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 88 S. Ct. 419, 19 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1967). The statute at issue here seeks only to proscribe conduct which "disturbs the peace," as defined by common law. It does not compete or contend with any First *250 Amendment rights. The language and intent of the statute are directed at regulating conduct and not speech. See State v. Hipp, Minn., 213 N.W.2d 610. The United States Supreme Court, in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, supra, 413 U.S. at 615, 93 S. Ct. at 2917, said: The facts in this case show that the defendant's acts were not protected by the First Amendment. The State had the power to proscribe the conduct with which defendant was charged. The statute under which defendant was charged did not purport to regulate speech, but was intended to regulate conduct which threatens the public peace. Defendant has failed to show that the statute may have a chilling effect on other's First Amendment expressions. The defendant has totally failed to establish how or in what manner his First Amendment constitutional rights have been violated or dampened by the statutes and therefore has no standing to raise the claim that the statute may be applied overbroadly to others. The judgment of the County Court of Increased Jurisdiction of Burleigh County is affirmed. ERICKSTAD, C. J., and PEDERSON, PAULSON and VOGEL, JJ., concur.). [1] This section has since been repealed (1 July 1975) [2] In Lembke v. Unke, 171 N.W.2d 837, 842 (N.D.1969), this court said: "In determining the common law of this state we are not restricted to the law as it has evolved over the centuries in England. The common law, which is based on reason and public policy, can best be determined by studying the decisions of our federal and state courts and the writings of past and present students of our country's law over all the years of American judicial history." [3] This section was superseded July 1, 1975.