Title: State v. Beltran. ICA Opinion, filed 04/05/2007 [pdf], 114 Haw. 100. S.Ct. Order Accepting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 09/05/2007 [pdf], 115 Haw. 200.

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

LAW LIBRARY

‘*070R PUBLICATION IN WEST'S IDWAI'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER'S#

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

000:

 

 

STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee
. a
MARIE BELTRAN, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant!"/>
oS

No. 26096

 

91] AON coog

  

CERTIORARI 10 THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPI
(HPD NO. 54264940) ai

0016 hy

NOVEMBER 16, 2007
C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY ACOBA, J,

Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Marie

Moon,

tran

 

(Petitioner) filed an application for writ of certiorari on
July 31, 2007, requesting that this court review the judgment of
the Intermediate Court of Appeals (the ICA) filed on May 3, 2007,
pursuant to its April 5, 2007 published opinion’ vacating the
November 10, 2003 judgment of the district court of the first
circuit? (the court) convicting Petitioner of Camping Without a
Permit, and xemanding the case to the court to determine the

classification of the offense with which Petitioner was charged.

State v. Keavemauhili, 114 Hawai'i 100, 122, 157 P.3d 539, S61

+ the opinion was authored by Assoclate Judge Corinne K.A. Katanabe
and joined by Chief Judge Janes S. Burne and Associate Judge Craig

 

 

Rakainora.
ded.

 

+ The Honorable Clarence Facarro pre!

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(app. 2007). According to the ICA, the camping regulation
involved was not constitutionally overbroad or vague and the
offense is one of absolute or strict liability under Hawai'd
Revised Statutes (HRS) § 702-213 (1993). Id, at 118, 121, 122,
157 P.3d at 557, S60, 561. The ICA ordered that if the charge
against Petitioner did not allege a negligent state of mind
element, the court shall enter judgment for camping without a
permit as a civil violation under HRS § 702-213(1). Id, at 118,
157 P.3d at 557. If, however, the charge included a negligent or
higher state of mind, the court shall enter judgment as a
criminal petty misdemeanor offense of camping without a permit
under HRS § 702-213(2). Id, at 122, 157 P.3d at $61.? We hold
that the canping regulation involved is overbroad and vague and
with all due respect, reverse the ICA’s May 3, 2007 judgnent and
the November 10, 2003 judgment of the court.
I.

The following matters adduced, some verbatim, are from

the record and the submissions of the parties.

On May 29, 2003, LPatitioner] appeared before the
wemauhili [eeane 2

Bidna

 

strict Iispiliey. 7
He the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the parties
ved the na |. (Petitioner) and Lucas

orally joined in Keawenauhili's notion to dismiss which

Respondent/Plaintift-Appellee State of Hawai'i (Respondent) did
not file a memorandum in opposition:
 

 

challenged the cenping ordinence based on “Defendant's
Notion to Dismiss #2” and "Defendant's Anended Motion to
Dienise.* The declaration and the mexorendum in support of
Defendant’ s Hotion to Dismiss #2 alleged that Keavomsuhili
bas cited by Honsluly police officers st 10:00 e0m. on
Beach park in ofelation of “Hawai nes
L.3kQ) (sic].” In [Respondent's] Nenorandum in Opposition
£5 Defendant's Motion to Dississ, the prosecutor state:
Shevendent was sleeping ins van next toa pitched tent."

ny The prosecutor argued HRS § 702-204 spplied to
the ordinance designating a state of mind of intentional,
knowing or recklessness...

 

 
     

 

(Some emphases in original and sone added.)

Following argument on the motions to dismiss, the court

denied the motions.

 

‘THE COURT: ALI right, the court agrees with
[Respondent] that notwithstanding that the [ROM] does not
specifically reference the particular MR requirement that
the court can leak towarda 102-204 with respect to the
ental state as to shatter or not the defendants acted

find the the [ROH] Te A
Hates “go the court will deny the notions.

MR. KIM: Your Honor, I'm sorry to keep on dragging
this but the fact that there's two parts to the motion(el,
the’ seen as that it use too! overly bros

    

The ICA related that procedurally, after denial of the motions to
dismiss,

[tyke [court] then set all three cases for trial on the same
date. Arpellants thereafter entered conditional no-contest
rt

 

OLiohs co-cisnisg. The (court) accepted the pleas and
Gntered seperate Judgnente convicting Appellants as charged
and sentencing each of then to pay 2 $20 fine, payment of
Which was suspended pending appeal. Appellants. filed
Separate sppeals, which [tne ICA) consolidated pursuant to
an order entered on Decenber 2, 2008.

 

 

Id, at 105, 157 P.3d at 544 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
‘The Petition refers to ROH § 10-1.3 regarding camping

permits and Amended Camping Policy, Rules and Regulations

Governing Camping at City Parks § 3(5), City and County of

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Honolulu, Department of Parks and Recreation (1996) [hereinafter

Rule or the Rule]. The relevant ROH state:

 

Sec, 10-1,3 Permits.
(a), Required
areas and facilities under the control, saintenance,
starts soa Parseenel oy eter teen a
Fecreation irae at

 

te) sixccot to eromulgate Rules end Regulations. the
Sod’ ropnlations purse to
ieecter shal orcas

 

(e)_ conditions of Permit. permis 2

and regulations promulgated by the directors + >
(Emphases added.) Also, ROH § 10-1.6 § 5 Penalties Violations --
Penalty (d) (1), indicates that camping without a permit is a
criminal offense and provides that any person violating any
Provision of these rules shall be punished by a fine not
exceeding $500 or by imprisonment for not more than 30 days, or
by both such fine and imprisonment.

As the ICA correctly notes, the camping ordinance does
not contain a definition for “camping” or any state of mind with
respect to the offense. A definition of “camping,” however, is
contained in the Rule:

Accommodation nurnoses auch as sleeping activities, or
ating preparations to sleep (including the laying’ down of
bedding for the purpose of sleeping), or storing personal
belongings, or making eny fire, oF using
shelter or other structure or vehicle for sleeping er doing
any digging or earth breaking or carrying on cooking
activities ih

Ene partic nguctin

 

 

 

  

 

 
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nt of the particioan

 

(Bnphas
qr.

‘The questions presented by Petitioner are “[w]hether
the ICA gravely erred in concluding [(1)] that the camping
ordinance and rule were not unconstitutionally overbroad and
vague, and [(2)] that HRS § 702-213(1) was applicable to a
camping charge.”

Viewing Petitioner's petition logically, Petitioner's
first objection is that “[t]he ICA gravely erred in concluding
‘[t]he record on appeal is absent of any facts surrounding the
circumstances for [Petitioner's] arrest(,]’ thus concluding they
[sic] were unable to determine if the ordinance and the rule
violated [Petitioner’s] and the co-defendants’ constitutional
rights." (Quoting Keawemauhili, 114 Hawai'i at 122, 187 P.3d at
S61.) Petitioner argues that

Lp) the record shows that the parties agreed to submit the
notion to dismiss on the (record,] which included the
Silegation in the declaration and the nenorendum in support
Of Defendants Motion to Dismiss #2 that Keswemauhili vas’
ited by Honolulu police officers at 10:00 p.m. on Gctober

ZL2002 For scmoine without a permit at Mokuiets peach natk

 

{sie},” "end [Responcent”s) Menorandus in Opposition to
Defendant's Hotion to Dismiss, wherein the prosecutor
alleges: " Jeebine ech
Eent") [(2)] "iReepondest] aid -not argue at any point below
thet the record was inadequate as the parties hed agreed
upon the state of the recora before submitting the
motion. <. " [(3)] Tenis (eloure may entertain « facse
overbreadth’ challenge to the extent that enforcenent of the
carping ordinance infringes on the constitutions) rights of
others who nay desire to engage in such activities but
Fefrain from doing so rather than risk prosecution.

M62 U.S. 352, 358 ney es (1983)
(held, facial cverbreacth and vagueness challenges permitted

     

 

   

 

 
 

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when the disputed law reaches 2 ‘eubstantial anount of
Constitutionally protected conduct’).

(Emphases in original.) Although Petitioner joined in
Keawemauhili's motion to dismiss, the facts giving rise to the
violation relate to Keawemauhili. Petitioner does not indicate

such facts were identical to the oné

 

leading to her arrest.
Accordingly, on the face of the record, the ICA did not gravely
err in deciding that the record is devoid of the facts
surrounding Petitioner's arrest. However, Petitioner did enter a
conditional plea of no contest to violation of the ordinance,
thereby incurring a conviction to that extent for purposes of
appellate review.

qr.

As to the second argument, Petitioner argues “the
overbroad definition of ‘camping’ infringes on the exercise of
the freedoms of movement and association . . . guaranteed by the
due process clauses of the federal and Hawai'i constitutions and
the right to privacy and freedom of movement under [a]rticle 1,
section 2 of the Hawai'i constitution.” According to Petitioner,
“freedom of movement and freedom of association . . . are
necessary foundations to our American way of life since their
absence or denial characterizes confinement and imprisonment [,]”
(quoting State v. Shicematsu, 52 Haw. 604, 609-10, 483 P.2d 997,
1000 (1971)), under the Hawai'i Constitution, “[£]zeedom would be
incomplete if it does not include the right of men to move from
Place to place, . . . to stand under open sky in a public park

‘
 

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and enjoy the fresh air, to lie down on a public beach and enjoy

sunbath, ani rt Jate with others in
enjoyment of an avocation or a vocation[,]” (quoting id. at 610,
483 P.2d at 1001 (emphasis added)), and “freedom of movement is
‘a vitel aspect of the right of privacy’ under [aJrticle 1,
[slection 2 of the Hawai'i Constitution(,]” (quoting State vw.
Abellano, 50 Haw. 384, 386-87, 441 P.2d 333, 335 (1968)
(Levinson, J., concurring, joined by Richardson, C.J.)).
Petitioner thus argues the Rule is overbroad in that it would
infringe on activities that “anount to spending a day at the
beach":

‘ameunk to Goending a day at the beach, People should be
able to bring tents, iteas for sleeping, cooking, and engage
in activities which’ certainly pay appear to amount te
setting up “living scccmodstions” under the camping
definition... « Requiring @ permit based on conduct
Which "reascnabiy'appeara” that one is “using the park ae a
Living accennodation,” without regard to the individual's
actual intent, *

sere based on the spoesrance tht their elaborate
Dicnickina activities =~ cooking oF sleeping under an awning
Sate ssetting up camp). - - (and) is an unressonsble
restraint on their constitutional rights. [Jn effect
Petitioner argues t]he overbroad definition of “camping”
mmnecessarily infringes on the freedons of association,
novenent and oxivacy(.1*

(Emphases added.)

 

 

 

Petitioner maintains that “the ICA avoided the need to
address the extent to which such activities are constitutionally

protected by concluding{,} in {a} completely circular fashion(,)

that the ordinance do

 

not prohibit such activities but ‘nerely
require[s) that a permit be obtained to engage in these

activities.’ (Quoting Keawenauhili, 114 Hawad'l at 120, 157
 

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P.3d at $59.) According to Petitioner “[tJhe ICA failed to
recognize that while requiring permits to regulate the use of
public parks is a legitimate exercise of the government's police
power, the sweeping definition of conduct that requires a permit,
es, comping, goes further than necessary to achieve the
governments purpose and unreasonably limits constitutionally
protected as well as unprotected conduct.”

The ICA did observe further that, as to her overbreadth
challenge, Petitioner must show how she was affected and, to
reiterate, the ICA stated that “[t]he record on appeal is absent
of any facts surrounding the circumstances for Appellants’

arrests.” Keawemauhili, 114 Hawai'i at 122, 157 P.3d at S61.

  

Gaulerg, 78 Haval's 12%, ez, 690 ec20 1167, nee TTS)
(gooting State vy Trigg, 71 Naw. 479, 483, 795 P24 260, 202
(2580) "(quotation warks omitted)). *a:pereon to whom a
statute may be constitutionally applied cannot challenge the
Statute on the ground that it say conceivably be applied
lunconstitutionally to others.” state v. Sturch, 02 Hawal'd
269, 274, 921 F.24 1170, 1178 (App, 1996). (quoting. (state
ul Kanebiua, 61 Haw. [136,] 144, 697 F.2d 1390,] 598
TU979)] (quotation marks omitted) ) (-)

 

‘Id, at 121-22, 157 P.3d at 560-61. In Sturch, the ICA said that

 

laws sre overbroad because they would punish innocent,
constitutionally protected behavior as well aa conduct which
may be validly regulated... (Otherw

Soctrine ie generally lintied to a i

Anendnent rights of those ast pres

Tacs, #55 0.5. 485, 50

  

  

T8¥2) tinste, v., concurring).
82 Hawai'i at 273-74, 921 P.2d at 1174-75 (other citations
omitted). Generally, then, “‘one who alleges that a statute is

unconstitutionally overbroad, other than a statute affecting the
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freedom of expression, must be directly affected by the clained
overbroad aspects." Id. at 274, 921 P.2d at 1175 (quoting
Tnipp, 71 Haw. at 483, 795 P.2d at 282 (citing Kaneakua, 61 Haw.
at 143-44, 597 P.2d at 594)) (brackets omitted). Because there
are no facts in the record as to the circunstances resulting in
Petitioner's arrest, it cannot be determined how Petitioner was
“directly affected” by the ordinance. Further, as in Sturch,
Petitioner here “did not claim that the statute infringed upon
(her] constitutional right to freedom of expression,” id, oF
privacy.

As mentioned before, Petitioner did enter a no-contest

 

plea to violation of the ordinanct

 

By her joinder in the motion
to dismiss, Petitioner concedes that, as was Sturch, she “is a

Person to whom (the ordinance] directly applies(.)” Id, Becaus

 

+, Aestated in Erietas v. adnin, Dir, of Courts, 104 Hawai'i 463,
406 n.6, 92 P.3d 993, 996 n-6 (2008

 

For example, this court has held that with regard to the
right to privacy ond first snencnent rights, 2 person whose
righte are not violated nay raise then for othe!

Kap, €9 law. 483, 06, 768 P.24 372, 375 (1993) (holding
thet “sellers of pornographic itens possess the standing to
assert the privacy rights of those persons sho wish to Buy
those itens to read of view in the privacy of the home”
Decause buyers of pornography will vaually never be subject,
to prosecution under the statute at issue); State v. Manzo,
58 Hiaw. 440, 465, 573 P.2d 945, 949 (2977) (explaining that
overbreath [sic] doctrine as applied to the first amendment
is an exception to “traditional rule that @ person may not
Challenge statute upon the ground that it aight be applied
onconststuticnaily in cireusstences other than those before
tthe court") (.]

 

 

 

 

 

(Brackets and cther citations omitted.) It may be noted that although freedom
of movenent was identified as # separate freedom in shisenatey, 52 Haw. at
609-10, 483 P.24 st 1000, st was ientified as an aepect of the right to
privacy in the concurring opinien in Abellano, $0 Hew. at 386-87, 441 P.2d at
335, to which Fetitioner cites. At its center, however, Petitioner's
‘argiments reat on freedom of movenent and association,

 

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her “expressive conduct is not at issue,” id., generally
Petitioner would “not have standing to challenge [the ordinance]
as overbroad{,]” id.

qv.

However, as related supra, Petitioner maintains that
“this court may entertain a facial overbreadth challenge to the
extent . . . the ordinance infringes on the constitutional rights
of others[.]” (Citing Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 n.8.) In
Kolender, the Court was faced primarily with “a facial
{vagueness} challenge to a criminal statute that requires persons
who loiter or wander on the streets to provide a ‘credible and
reliable’ identification and to account for their presence when
requested by a peace officer[.]" 461 U.S. at 353. The Court
indicated that “[u]nder the terms of the statute, failure of the
individual to provide ‘credible and reliable’ identification
permits the arrest.” Id. at 357 (footnote omitted).

As stated by the Court, “the void-for-vagueness
doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal
offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does
Rot encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Id.
(citing Hoffman Estates, supra) (other citations omitted).
According to the Court, the statute “contain{ed] no standard for
determining what a suspect has to do in order to satisfy the

requirement to provide a ‘credible and reliable’ identification.

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As such, the statue vests virtually complete discretion in the
hands of the police to determine whether the suspect has
satisfied the statute[.]” Id. at 358.

Although its “concern . . . [was] based upon the
‘potential for arbitrarily suppressing First Anendnent
liberties{,]’” id, (quoting Shuttlesworth v, City of Birmingham,
362 U.S. 87, 91 (1965)), the Court declared that the statute
“[iln addition, . . . implicates consideration of the
constitutional right to freedom of movenent{,]” id. (citations
and footnote omitted) (emphasis added), and, thus, involved an
overbreadth violation. In footnote 8 to the foregoing statement
the Court said, “First, . . . we permit a facial challenge if a

law xi

 

ches ‘a substantial amount of constitutionally protected
conduct.’ [Hoffman Estates], 455 U.S. [at] 494. . . . Second,

where a statute imposes criminal penalties, the standard of

 

certainty is higher.” Id, at 358 n.8 (citation omitted). Thu:

 

the Court concluded, “[t]his concern has, at times, led us to

 

wi minal statute of ce even when it cot
sonceivably have had some valid application." Id. (emphasis

added) (citations onitted). Ultimately, the Court held “that the
statute . . . is unconstitutionally vague within the meaning of
the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Anendzent by failing to
clarity what is contemplated by the requirenent that a suspect

provide a ‘credible and reliable’ identification” Id. at 353-54.

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v.

Hoffman Estates, referred to in Kolender, involved a
“facial challenge to a drug paraphernalia ordinance on the ground
that it is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.” Hoffman
Estates, 455 U.S. at 491. That case stated that “[iJn a facial
challenge to the overbreadth and vagueness of a law, a court’s
first task is to determine whether the enactment reaches a
substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct.” Ida.
at 494 (footnote omitted). In determining whether a substantial
amount of protected activity was affected, “a court should

evaluate the ambiguous

 

18 well as the unambiguous scope of the
enactment. To this extent, the vagueness of a law affects
overbreadth analysis.” Id, at 495 n.6.

On its face the Rule in the instant ca

 

states that
certain conduct, according to the definition of camping,
constitutes camping “regardless of the intent of the participants
or the nature of any other activities in which they may also be
engaging.” (Emphasis added.) However, such “other activities”
conceivably may be activities as innocent as those described in
Shigematay relating to freedom of movement and association, or
that involve expressive conduct subjecting the camping regulation
to greater scrutiny. In sweeping activity into its ambit
“regardless” of its nature, the Rule by definition includes any

activity not specifically regulated by the camping ordinance.

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Such other activity, even if predominant in nature, is
not separable from, but ensnared by, the camping regulation. The
Limitless net cast by the Rule would seemingly reach “a
substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct, }”
Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494, under the Hawai'i Constitution,
as described in Shigematsu. Under these circumstances the
camping regulation would appear void because it would subject
“innocent, constitutionally protected behavior as well as conduct
which may be validly regulated[,]” Sturch, 82 Hawai'i at 273-74,
921 P.2d at 117

 

-75, to a criminal penalty.
vr.

If the camping regulation is overbroad, the vagueness
question need not be reached. However, for completeness, as to
the third argument, it is noted that Petitioner agrees with the
ICA's statement that

4 criminal statute is void for vagueness unless st:
Li gives the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to know what conduct ie prohibited so that he oF
she may act accordingly, and 2) provides explicit standards
for these who apply the statute, in order to avoid arbitrary
and discrininatory enforcenent and the de

policy matters to policenen, judges, and juries for
Fesolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis.

  

 

 

Keawenauhili, 114 Hawai'i at 119, 157 P.3d at 558 (citing State
Maates, 64 Hawai'i 211, 220-21, 933 P.2d 48, 57-58 (1997).
Petitioner argues (1) although the ICA stated the
“Camping Ordinance, in conjunction with the Camping Rules, is not
unconstitutionally vague[,]” id. at 121, 157 P.3d at 560, “the

number of areas which the director regulates is so varied and

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SS
numerous, that there is no way for an individual to know how,

whether or where to find a definition of camping”; (2) “the rule
itself is unconstitutionally vague” because (a) “sleeping,”
“sleep,” “sleeping activities” or “making preparations to sleep”

“are . . . amorphous and dependent on subjective interpretation";

 

(b) “the definitions of ‘storing personal belongings,’ ‘doing any
@igging or earth breaking,’ and ‘carrying on cooking activities’
suffer from the sane lack of specificity”; (c) “conduct from
which {t ‘reasonably appears’ that one is ‘using the park as a

living acconmodation,’ without regard to the individual's actual

intent, . . . based on a third-party’s perception . . . does not
Provide fair notice . . . to avoid arrest"; and (d) “[t}he rule
defines the prohibited uses . . . for ‘living accommodation’ as

those activitii

 

which ‘reasonably appear’ to be those where the
park ie being used as a ‘living acconmodation(]’ . . . [18 a]
circular definition[.1”

In Ate answering brief Respondent maintained that

(ene Role] . . . states camping “neans the use of public
Perk for living accommodation purposes." [The Rule) then
Aste the specific activities that could constitute camping,
but would only be considered comping if st reasonably,
appeared the participants were in fact using the park area
fer “living accommodation purposes." (Emphasis added.)
Such language is... . adequate notice ‘of what constitu
(camping] .". . ROW’S'10-1-3(a) (2) and Section 3(5) state
with reasonable clarity the act proscribed and provides
(sic) fixed standards for sdjudging guilt.

 

 

 

 

(Citation omitted.)
vir.

With respect to Petitioner’s argument (1), it appears

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that ROH § 10-1.3(a) that concerns permits in general and
includes “camping” permits, in particular ROH § 10-1.3(a) (2),
also vests authority in the Director to promulgate rules, ROH §
10-1.3(b), and further mandates in relevant part that “permits
shall be issued pursuant to. . . rules . . . promulgated by the
director[,]” ROH § 10-1.3(c). As mentioned before, the Rule
contains a definition of camping.

‘The provision in ROH § 10-1.3(c), on its face, notifies
potential campers that a camping permit is issued “pursuant to

+ rules,” and thus, that a permit is subject to the rules
Promulgated by the director, In that situation, the reader is
“connect [ed]” from the ordinance to the rule ag Petitioner argues
should be the case.”

vant.

As to the definition of “camping,” referred to in
Petitioner's items (2) (a), (b), and (d), read in context, the
Phrase “for living accommodation purposes” is exemplified in
conduct “such as” “sleeping,” “preparations to sleep,” “storing
personal belongings,” or the use of “tents or shelter. . . for

sleeping” and “cooking activities

 

“Such as” refers to an

“adjectival clause[,]” Webster's Third New Int’) Dictionary 125

 

+ Although Petitioner's position at oral argument vacillated between
agreeing that the camping definition in the rule was sincorporated" in the
Camping ordinance and not sgreeing that it was, the letter position wes,
apparently with respect to its argunent (1) that there was no way an
Sndividual could know where to find the rule. Insofar a Petiticner argues
thet the ordinance, in conjunction with the rule, was overbroad and enbiguous,
At concedes the rule wes incorporated into the ofdinance.

  

 

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(1961), “of @ kind or character about to be indicated, suggested,

or exemplified{,]” id. at 2283, Inasmuch as the examples of the
Prohibited conduct are intended to “indicate[], suggest {], or
exemplify[]” what is meant by living accommodation, accommodation
in the Rule connotes lodging. The definition of “accommodation”
includes “lodging, food, and services (as at a hotel) [.]”
Hebster’s Third New Int’] Dictionary at 12. Use of the public
Park as @ living accommodation, then, is reasonably
distinguishable from recreational conduct such as “spending a day
at the beach.”

Howeve:

 

the foregoing is modified by a “reasonably
appears” standard in the definition of camping. To repeat, that
standard instructs that a violation occurs where “it reasonably
appears. in light of the circumstances, that the participants in
conducting these activities, are in fact using the area as a
living acconmodation regardless of the intent of the participants
or the nature of any activities in which they may also be

engaging.” (Emphases added.)

 

Arguably, the standard would seem internally
inconsistent and incomprehensible to “a person of ordinary
intelligence,” State v, Bul, 104 Hawai'i 462, 464, 92 P34 472,
473 (2004), and invites “delegation of basic policy matters to
policemen . . . for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective

basis,” Bates, @4 Hawai'i at 221, 933 P.2d at 58, in violation of

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the due process clause of the Hawai'i Constitution, article T,
section 5.

First, the stendard requires the actor to view his or
her conduct as a third person would, rather than informing the
actor as to how to avoid violating the regulation. Additionally,
the term “reasonably appears” is susceptible of subjective
application among persons enforcing the regulation and those who
must abide by it. The prepositional phrase “in light of the

circumstances,” does not instruct the actor on what is

 

permissible or impermissible, but is broadly all encompassing,
and again invites ad hoc and subjective resolution of the
regulation policy by the police officer.

Relatedly, the phrase “in fact,” meaning in common
parlance “actual” or “real,” Black's Law Dictionary 792 (#th ed.
2004), modifying “us[e] of the area as a living accommodation,”
is seemingly contradictory of the earlier directive that a
person’s conduct of activities “reasonably appear(]” to be of
Such use; connoting that the appearance, .e,, to “look{,] to
seem[,]” Webster's Third New Int'] Dictionary at 103, of such

utilization as a “living accommodation” need not be in actuality

‘article I, section 5 of the Hawai'i Constitution states as
follows:

[No person shail be deprived of life, liberty oF
property without due procese of law, nor be denied the equal
protection of the lave, nor be denied the enjoyment of the
Person's civil rights or be discriminated ageinet in the
exercise thereof because of race, religion, sex or ancestry.

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such use, so long as it reasonably, i.e., “to a fairly sufficient

extent[,]" id, at 1892, seems to be of such usage.

“In fact” seems also inconsistent with the
qualification that “use” is to be evaluated “regardless of
intent.” It would appear logical that the intent of the parties
would be a factor in determining whether “in fact,” the
Participants were utilizing the area as a “living accommodation”
or not. The phrase excluding consideration of “the nature of any
other activities in which they may also be engaging” is at the
least confusing in view of the prior directive that the
Prohibited activities are to be viewed “in the light of the
circumstances,” which would include an evaluation of the
activities in which the participants were engaged. in effect,
the standard vests virtually complete discretion in the hands of
the police to determine whether a person has violated the
regulation, See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358.

mx.

The ICA found the ordinance was not vague, relying on
lark v. Cnty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 268 (1984),
and Beople v. Scott, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 179 (Cal. App. Dep't Super.
Ct. 1993), According to the ICA, “(t]he (Honolulu) definition is
almost identical to one contained in a National Park Service
regulation that was upheld [in Clark]” and in Scott where “a
California eppellate court upheld . . . a municipal ordinance

that was similar to the one upheld in Clark[.)" 114 Hawai'i at

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119-20, 187 P.3d at 558-59. The ICA concluded that “most
individuals have a conmon-sense understanding of what ‘camping’
iss... (The definition of ‘camping’ in [the Rule) provides
sufficiently definite guidelines and exnples . . . (and)
objective standards to law enforcenent officials . . . so as to
prevent arbitrary enforcement {.]" Id, at 121, 197 P.3d at 560.
Similarly Respondent, in its answering brief,
maintained that “{s]imilar camping ordinances have withstood
unconstitutional challenges due to vagueness in other

jurisdictions. In Scott, a camping ordinance, that had the same

 

definition of camping as Section 3(5) was upheld, despite a
constitutional challenge based on vagueness.” (Citing 26 cal.
Rptr. 2d. at 182-63.) (Other citations omitted.) However,
Respondent mischaracterizes the Scott ordinance as being the
“same.” In fact in Scott, the term living acconmodation was
expressly defined as “remaining for prolonged or repetitious
periods of time not associated with ordinary recreational use[.]”

Id. at 180 n.1. Scott d

 

scribed the ordinance as follows

est Hollywood Muntespal Code section 4902...
Subdivision 8(a). . . states: "No person’ shall within the
Limits of any public park or recreation area: - (a)
Canp at any time.” The ordinance slso provides the
following definition of camping:
‘"*Ganping’ shall mean residing in or using a park for
Living accommodation purposes, a5 exemplified by

 

 

Bot sesociated w restionsl use of
EAEE with one's personal possessions (including But
fot limited to clothing, sleeping bags, bearolis,
Blankets, sheets, luggage, backpacks, kitchen
Utensils, cookware, and similar materiel), sleeping oF
aking preparations to sleep, storing personal
Belongings ve defined, regularly cooking oF
consuning meals, of living ins parked vehicle. These
"8 constitute camping when it reasonably

 

 

 

 

    
 

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appears, in light of all the circumstances, that &
person(s) is using a park as living acconmodation
Fegardless of their intent or the nature of any other
activities in which they might also be engaging.”

 

Ad. (emphasis added). the California court said that “[alt
arraignment in each case, the defendants made oral motions to
dismiss the case . . . (and) also requested the court rule on the
constitutionality of the ordinance, specifically whether it was
vague as to the definition of camping.” Id, at 160. The court
noted that the ordinance was similar to a National Park Service

regulation:

  
  

The... ordinance at i
to, and possibly medeled
regulation prohibiting unauthorized camping (with
ban on sleeping) examined by the United States Suprene Court
in {Clark}. In that cese, the Suprene Court upheld ene
Fegulation’s ban on camping when it was challenged by
Gesonstrators who wished to camp in 3 park across frém the
mnie Bow

 

 

Id, at 181-82 (footnote omitted).

But as noted, the California ordinance, unlike the
Honolulu ordinance, specifically defined “living accormodation.”
Significantly, in determining that “(t]he ordinance also provides
adequate guidelin

 

for the police sufficient to prevent
arbitrary enforcement of the ordinance(,]” Scott relied, inter
alia, on the more definitive Liniting language that is not
included in Rule 3(5):

bevexenplified by their “retsining for erolenses oe

Kebetitiou: periods of tine not associated wich ordinary
Lectestions] use of a park with one's personal possessions”
hich include indicia of camping(.]

Id. at 182 (emphasis added) .

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Finally, Scott held in contradiction to Kolender, that
the defendants had to show the statute was vague in all of its
applications:

So long as 2 statute does not thresten to infringe on the
exercise of Firet Anendeent or other constitutional rightay
however, such asbiguities, even if numerous, do not justify
the invalidation of a statute on ite face. In order to
Succeed on # faclal vagueness challenge to a legislative
easure that does not threaten constitutionally protected
conduct .". . aparty mat do more than identity sone
Sngtances in’ vhieh he spplscation of the erature my be

ieperatsaTbly waa Soni

Scott, 26 Ca. Rptr. 2d at 183 (emphasis added) (internal
quotation marks, citations, and emphasis omitted) (ellipses in
original). As mentioned before, Kolender, however, indicated
that “[t}his concern has, at times, led us to invalidate a
eximing svably have
had_sone valid application.” 461 U.S. at 358 n.8 (emphasis
added) (citations omitted). In light of the foregoing and the
specific analysis regarding Rule 3(5) supra, Scott cannot be
considered persuasive.

In Clark, the cenping prohibition was similar to the
instant case but did not include the limiting language “remaining
for prolonged or repetitious periods . . . not associated with
ordinary recreational use” in Scott:

Comping is defined os

Behe se of perk land for Living accomodation
purposes Such a8 sleeping activities, or making
Preperations to sleep (including the’ Laying den of
Esdaing for the purpose of sleeping), oF storing
Personal belongings, oF aking any fire, of using any
Eines or - other structure." «for sleeping or

Going sny digging or earth breaking or carrying on
cooking activities,

 

 

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SSS

activities, the regulation provides, “constitute
camping when it reasonably spears, in light of all the
cizcunstances, that the participants, in conducting these
activities, are in fact Using the area ss a living
‘accommodation regardiess of the intent of the participants
oF the nature of any other activities 4n which they may iso
be engaging.”

 

 

 

 

Glark, 468 U.S. at 290-91 (ellipses in original) (citations
omitted). However, in Clark, the majority of the Court did not
discuss the question of vagueness but focused on whether the

camping regulation was ar

 

sonable time, place and manner

restriction on expr.

 

ive activities:

‘The issue in this case ie whether @ National Park Service
regulation prohibiting camping in certain parks violates: the
Firat Anendnent when applied to prohibit denonetrators. from
sleeping in Lafayette Park and the Mall in connection With &
Genonstration intended to call attention to the plight of
the homeless, We hold that it does not.)

 

Ud, at 289. As the majority noted, “Petitioners submit, as they
@id in the Court of Appeals, that the regulation forbidding
sleeping is defensible either as a time, place, or manner
restriction or as a regulation of symbolic conduct. Me agree[.]”
Id, at 294. similarly, the dissent focused on the reasonableness
of the restriction as to time, place, and manner, stating,
“First, the majority is either unwilling or unable to take
Seriously the First Anendnent claims... . Second, the
majority misapplies the test for ascertaining whether a restraint
on speech qualifies as a reasonable time, place, and manner
regulation.” Id, at 301 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by

Brennan, 3.).

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only the concurrence briefly referenced the vagueness
question as being

aifticult to conceive of what “camping” means, if it does
ot include pitching a tent and building @ fire... With
Bll its frailties, the English language, as used in'this
Country for several centuries, and as used in the Fark
Service regulations, could hardly be plainer in informing
the public that camping in Lafayette Park was prohibite:

 

 

 

‘Id, at 300 (Burger, C.J., concurring). While arguably Clark may
have implicitly assumed the National Park Service regulation was
not vague, it did not analyze or contain any discussion of the
vagueness doctrine as applied to the regulation. Clark, then, is
not specifically instructive in this regard.

x.

Respondent cites the following other cases.’ However,
in these cases the language, noted supra, as seemingly rendering
‘the Honolulu Camping regulation vague was not employed, and
qualifying language in the applicable law removed ambiguity. In

Joel v, City of Orlande, 232 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2000), cert,

7 __aithough not cited in its Answering Brief, Respondent cited United

States v. thomas, G64 F.2d 188 (D.C. Cir. 1968), et oral argunent, where the
court there held that an anticasping regulation was not unconstitutionally
vague as epplied to defendants atteapting to maintain a “constant, «
expressive presence in Lafayette Park.” Id, at 190. There, the definition of
“camping” was nearly identical to the definition in'the instant case. Id.
Thomas ts distinguishs id not base sts holding on
Weether an ordinary person was provided with fair notice that contenplated
Conduct was prohibited by the statute, but on whether the specific defendants
Feceived such fair notice. Id, at 196. That court concluded that the
Gefendants, in attempting to achieve “continuous presence” in the park, had
Heir notice that their conduct, including “lying prone each night and early
norning in sleeping begs ond oh blenkets, motionless, with eyes shut, and
Surrounded by bags and (perhaps) clothingl,]” was prohibited by the
fanticanping regulation. Id, st 197

‘The D.C. circuit court did not inguire into whether the
could be unconstituticnally vague because “cases less clear than the
(Gefendants’) say exist” as such “review considers the overbreadth or facial
validity of the challenged enactuent.”" 1d, at 198. However, the defendants
Gia not allege that the regolation wan ovefbroad of facially invalid.

 

 

      

 

    

 

gulation

 

 

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denied, $32 U.S. 978 (2001), the federal court indicated that
additional indications of “actual camping” were required beyond
sleeping on city property.

Section 43.52 of the City Code provideld in part]:

Camping Prohibited; exceptions.

(a) For the purposes of this section, “camping”
is detinea

 

{2) Sleeping or otherwise being in @
temporary shelter out-of-doorey oF

(b} Sleeping out-of=doores oF

hg] cgeking over an open flame or fire

[in conginction with the Code}, the City promulgated a
handbook... [that in pertinent part] resd as follows:

‘cal court culinge have held that_in ofder to “camo.

ea ‘One oF more of the following should
‘exist Before an arrest unser this section ie
‘Sppropriate

(2) the property must be public property,
Ancluding highway overpass

 

(@) the sutpect te inside 9 tent or sleeping
inside sone form of temporary shelter;

T3) the suspect hos built # campfire,

(4) the suspect is asleep 2nd uhen svakened
yolunteers that be has no other place to live. «=
Simply being asleep in a poblic place during iate
‘night or early morning hours makes the camping case
stronger, but i not alone sufficient to justity an
arrest under this section unless there is sone indicle
Of true “camping” as noted above.

 

 

 

 

Ids at 1356 (emphases added). Unlike the instant case, that
court noted the parties stipulated that the conduct of the

defendant, Joel, fell within the definition of camping.

 

The affidavit supporting the first arrest stated that Joel
2 sb

tas eh ater ares The

affidavit supporting Joel's second arrest stated that he

“ned his head on his plastic shopping bag that contained

miscellaneous clothing.” ... Joel stated that he we

Using @ plastic bag with sone possessions asa pillou, . .
the partie: ed th ver at

 

 

 

‘canpina” ae “sleeping cut-of=doors(-]”
Ad. at 1360 n.4 (emphases added).

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In City of Portland v, Johnson, 651 P.2d 1384 (Or. App.
1962), rev. denied, 660 P.2d 681 (1983), the ordinance

prohibit (ed) “camping
+ in oF upon any . . . public right-of-way or any

other’ place to which the general public has access, OF
Under any Bridgeway or viaduct. =

(and) providied) that "'to camp’ means to’ set up or to

yenain'in oF at, a campsite.” “Campsite” is defined
ws 0s any place where any bedding, sleeping bi
other’ sleeping matter, or any stove or fire, is
Placed, established of maintained, whether or not such
Place incorporates the use of any’ tent, lean-to, shack
Sr any other structure, oF any vehicle or part
theress.”

 

 

 

 

   

 

 

‘Ids at 1385, Johnson related that, in addition, the ordinance
stated:

Section 1. The Council finda:
2. “that from tine to tine persons establish

 

campsites, for the purmose of maintaining a temporary

place to lives ss

Id, at 1386 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in
original). Thus, unlike the instant case, that court decided
that camping involved using the site as “a temporary place to

Live” based on the expressed purpose in the ordinance itself.

Reading the defini

 

lon of campes|

 

toget!

 

sr with ©

 

   

= statenent of purpose... , it is apparent that the
Grdinance (does) not... ; prohibit... activities. . +
Such as picnicking on’a blanket ina park... Te da

clear that the type of canping that the ordinance prohibits

Gevthat «(of a) "purpose of saintaining @ tesporary
place to ive."

In Tobe v. City of Senta Ana, 892 P.2d 1145 (Cal.
1995), the ordinance stated:

Sec. 10-402, Unlawful Camping.
It shall be unlawfal for any person to camp, occupy
facilities ox use camp saranhernalie in the following
fea, except as otherwise Proviced?
(a) any strest

(S) Shy public parking lot or public area, improved or
unimproved.

 

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SSS

Sec. 10-403 Storage of Personal Property in Public
Places.

it shail be unlawful for any person to store cersona
= ‘ld ee raphe
in the following arcas, except a8 otherwise provided by
resolution of the City Council:

(a) any parks

(b) any Streets

(c) any public parking lot or public ares, improved or
unimproved.

Id. at 1150-51 (emphases added) (footnote omitted). The relevant

words were specifically defined:

 

Camp means to pitch or occupy conp facilitie:
amp paraphernalia,

(b) Sane facilities include, but are not linited to,
tents, nits, or tonporary shelters.

(C) Cine paraphernalia includes, but is not limited
£0, Earpaulins, cots, beds, sleeping bags, hammocks oF
non-eity designated cooking facilities and similar
equipment.

(a) Bark means the sane
this Code.

(e) Store means to put aside or accumulate for u
when needed, ‘to put’ for safekeeping, to place of
Ina Location.

(2) "Skreet means the sane
this Coss.

 

 

Getined in section 31-1 of

  

 

defined in section 1-2 of

Id. at 1151 n.2. In deciding the ordinances were not vague, Tobe
said, “The terms which the Court of Appeal considered vague are
not so when the purpose clause of the ordinance is considered and

the terms are read in that context[.]” Id. at 1167. That court
indicated:

Ihe stated purnose of the ordinance is to make public
airaats ad other areas readily accesible to the public and
evant iplie proserty “for am ses

sents 3 fous for wh wer

= “No reasonable person would believe that # picnic
+ would constitute camping in violation of the
Grdihenee. ss
Nor ia the term “store” vague... . When read

An Light of the express purpose of the ordinanee--ts
avoid interfering with use of thote areas for the
Purposes for which they are intended «

 

   

Ad. at 1168 (emphasis added). As to an overbreadth challenge,

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the California court indicated that “{nJeither the . .
plaintiffs nor the . . . petitioners have identified a
constitutionally protected right that is impermissibly restricted
by application or threatened application of the ordinance.” Id.
at 1169.

As discussed above, the aforementioned cases cited by
Respondent are distinguishable from the instant case.
Furthermore, “as the ultimate judicial tribunal with final,
unreviewable authority to interpret and enforce the Hawai'i

Constitution, we are fr

 

to give broader protection under the
Hawai'i Constitution than that given by the federal
constitution,” State v, Maganis, 109 Hawai'i 84, 67, 123 P.3d
679, 682 (2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
See also State v. Texeira, 50 Haw. 138, 142, 433 P.2d 593, 597
(1967) (stating that “federal decisions do not . . . prevent this
court from extending greater protection in interpreting the state
constitution where we determine it to be appropriate” (footnote
omitted)). Thus, this court is not bound by the decisions of
other courts insofar as greater protection may be afforded under
article 1, section § of the Hawai'i constitution.
xr.

Because the ordinance (in conjunction with the Rule) is
unconstitutional, we need not reach Petitioner’s fourth argunent
that the ICA was mistaken in treating the regulation as one

imposing absolute liability. Accordingly, the May 3, 2007

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WOWAL'T REPORTS AND PACIFIC REFORTERSS*

 

judgment of the ICA and the Novenber 10, 2003 judgment of the

court are reversed.

Theresa S, Marshall, Dp
Deputy Public Defender
(Deborah L. Kim, Deputy

Public Defender’ on the Riza nan

application and briefs),

for petitioner/ ea ON etsy 1
defendant-appellant. Raut a

Ryan Yeh, Deputy Cc
Prosecuting Attorney,

City and County of

Honolulu, for respondent/ |

plaintiff-appellee.

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