Title: Commonwealth v. Sandy

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
            OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.  Record No. 980460 
January 8, 1999 
 
E. CHRISTOPHER SANDY 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether a criminal defendant 
may enforce the terms of an agreement that he executed with a 
Commonwealth's Attorney. 
 
E. Christopher Sandy was indicted by a Westmoreland 
County grand jury for 32 charges of "intentionally and 
feloniously issu[ing] . . . fraudulent grain receipts" in 
violation of Code § 3.1-722.28.  Sandy's counsel and the 
Commonwealth's Attorney, Peggy E. Garland, held plea 
negotiations which culminated in the execution of an agreement 
signed by Sandy, Garland, and W. R. Sanford, a representative 
of the Virginia Department of Agriculture. 
 
Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, Sandy agreed to 
meet with, and answer fully any questions posed to him by the 
Commonwealth's Attorney.  The agreement provided that Sandy 
would receive "full and complete" transactional immunity for 
any and all acts related to the information that he provided 
the Commonwealth's Attorney during the meetings.  The 
agreement also contained the following paragraphs pertinent to 
this proceeding: 
 
"3.  That if after the meetings referenced in 
paragraph (1), Garland is reasonably satisfied that 
the information provided by Sandy is full and 
complete, Garland will move the Court to amend seven 
of the indictments . . . to petty larceny and that 
she will move the Court to nol pros or dismiss all 
of the other indictments. 
 
"4.  That Garland will recommend to the Court 
that Sandy be fined Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) 
on each of the no more than seven (7) misdemeanor 
charges for which he is convicted, and be sentenced 
to six (6) months in jail on each such charge, to 
run concurrently, all suspended on the condition 
that the fines be paid." 
 
 
After the agreement was signed, the Commonwealth's 
Attorney and her designees had four meetings with Sandy.  
After the meetings, Sandy's counsel asked the Commonwealth's 
Attorney whether Sandy had complied with the terms of the 
agreement.  She replied that she had not "made up [her] mind."  
A few days later, the Commonwealth's Attorney contacted 
Sandy's counsel by telephone and told him that she was 
"reluctantly going to go along with the plea agreement."  The 
next day, however, the Commonwealth's Attorney went to the 
office of Sandy's counsel and stated that she did not intend 
to honor the agreement. 
 
Subsequently, the Commonwealth's Attorney forwarded a 
letter to Sandy's counsel which stated in relevant part: 
"After I last talked to you, I received information 
that verifies that [Mr. Sandy] actually lied to me. 
 
"Please remember that the idea to talk to me came 
from [Mr. Sandy] in the first place, that the 
assumption was that he would tell me something of 
 
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value regarding other criminal offenses.  As I've 
said before, beyond the granary dealings, he 
actually told me less than I told him.  It was only 
when I told him what I knew that he gave any 
significant information.  That's why I hesitated.  
Now, I find that he was not even honest then. 
 
"I cannot abide by the agreement.  I know you may 
want to take the issue before the court and you 
certainly have that right.  You need to think about 
whether you want our arguments to be made in public.  
I must say that I feel sorry for [Mr. Sandy].  It 
appears he's trying to protect the people who have 
hurt him the most." 
 
 
Sandy filed a petition in the circuit court and requested 
that the court enforce the agreement that the Commonwealth had 
repudiated.  The Commonwealth's Attorney opposed the petition.  
The trial court conducted an ore tenus hearing and held that 
there was no agreement between the defendant and the 
Commonwealth that could be enforced by the court. 
 
The defendant was subsequently tried by a jury and was 
found guilty of intentionally and feloniously issuing 
fraudulent grain receipts as charged in seven indictments and 
sentenced to serve time in jail and required to pay a fine for 
each conviction.  The trial court entered judgments on each 
conviction, and the defendant appealed the judgments to the 
Court of Appeals.  There, the defendant contended that he had 
a contractual relationship with the Commonwealth, that the 
Commonwealth's Attorney could not unilaterally withdraw her 
acceptance of the agreement, and that he was entitled to 
 
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specific performance of the agreement.  A panel of the Court 
of Appeals agreed with the defendant, reversed the judgments, 
and ordered specific performance of the agreement.  Sandy v. 
Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 1, 486 S.E.2d 102 (1997).  The Court 
of Appeals, upon a rehearing en banc, agreed with the panel, 
Sandy v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 724, 496 S.E.2d 167 (1998), 
and the Commonwealth appeals. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the Court of Appeals erred 
in holding that the Commonwealth's Attorney had breached the 
agreement with the defendant.  Continuing, the Commonwealth 
states that the agreement is without constitutional 
significance and is unenforceable because the trial court had 
not approved any plea agreement.  Responding, the defendant 
states that even though "there is no plea agreement and . . . 
one never existed," he executed a "cooperation agreement" with 
the Commonwealth, he fully complied with the so-called 
cooperation agreement and, hence, he is entitled to specific 
performance of that agreement. 
 
First, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred in 
concluding that the defendant and the Commonwealth's Attorney 
entered into a plea agreement in accordance with Rule 
3A:8(c)(1)(C)(2).  Sandy, 26 Va. App. at 725, 496 S.E.2d at 
168.  This Rule, which governs plea agreements in this 
Commonwealth in criminal proceedings, states in relevant part 
 
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that "[i]f a plea agreement has been reached by the parties, 
it shall, in every felony case, be reduced to writing, signed 
by the attorney for the Commonwealth, the defendant, and, in 
every case, his attorney, if any, and presented to the court."  
This Rule also requires that the circuit court approve the 
plea agreement.  The Commonwealth correctly points out, and 
the defendant concedes, that the agreement in this case was 
never approved by the circuit court as required by Rule 3A:8. 
 
In Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504 (1984), the United 
States Supreme Court considered whether a defendant, who had 
accepted a prosecutor's proposed plea bargain, has a 
constitutional right to have that plea bargain specifically 
enforced.  Answering that issue in the negative, the Supreme 
Court stated: 
"A plea bargain standing alone is without 
constitutional significance; in itself it is a mere 
executory agreement which, until embodied in the 
judgment of a court, does not deprive an accused of 
liberty or any other constitutionally protected 
interest.  It is the ensuing guilty plea that 
implicates the Constitution.  Only after [the 
defendant] pleaded guilty was he convicted, and it 
is that conviction which gave rise to the 
deprivation of [the defendant's] liberty at issue 
here."  Id. at 507-08 (footnotes omitted). 
 
Here, just as in Mabry, the agreement at issue has no 
constitutional significance because it was not embodied in the 
judgment of a court.   
 
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We hold that a Commonwealth's Attorney may withdraw from 
a proposed plea agreement at any time before the actual entry 
of a guilty plea by a defendant or any other change of 
position by the defendant resulting in prejudice to him 
because of reliance upon the agreement.  See Shields v. State, 
374 A.2d 816, 820 (Del.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 893 (1977); 
State v. Edwards, 279 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa 1979); State v. 
Collins, 265 S.E.2d 172, 176 (N.C. 1980); State v. Wheeler, 
631 P.2d 376, 378-79 (Wash. 1981).  Absent judicial approval 
or prejudice to a criminal defendant, a proposed plea 
agreement cannot be binding upon the Commonwealth because the 
defendant has suffered no harm, and the defendant is free to 
reject the proposed agreement before it is submitted to a 
court in spite of any prejudice that the Commonwealth may have 
incurred.  Applying this rule, we hold that the Commonwealth's 
Attorney was entitled to withdraw from the proposed plea 
agreement she had executed with Sandy because the evidence of 
record reveals that he was not prejudiced.  When asked by the 
circuit court to identify any prejudice that the defendant 
suffered because of the Commonwealth's Attorney's withdrawal 
from the proposed plea agreement, the defendant's counsel was 
unable to do so. 
 
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Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals, and we will reinstate the judgments of the circuit 
court. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
 
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