Title: Milwaukee Police Ass’n v. City of Milwaukee

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2016 WI 47 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2014AP400 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
James A. Black, Glen J. Podlesnik and Steven J. 
Van Erden, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
Milwaukee Professional Fire Fighters 
Association Local 215, 
          Intervenor-Plaintiff-Respondent-
Petitioner, 
Milwaukee Police Association and Michael V. 
Crivello, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross-
Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
City of Milwaukee, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 364 Wis. 2d 626, 869 N.W.2d 522) 
(Ct. App. 2015 – Published) 
PDC No: 2015 WI App 60 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 23, 2016 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 24, 2016 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Paul R. Van Grunsven 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BRADLEY, R. G., J. concurs (Opinion filed). 
 
CONCURRED/DISSENTED: BRADLEY, A. W., J. and ABRAHAMSON, J. concur  
and dissent (Opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiffs-respondents-petitioners, 
intervenor-
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, 
and 
plaintiffs-respondents-
cross-appellants-petitioners, there were briefs by Jonathan 
Cermele, Brendan P. Matthews, and Cermele & Matthews, S.C., 
Milwaukee, and John F. Fuchs, Rebecca Boyle, and Fuchs & Boyle 
 
 
2 
S.C., Milwaukee.  Oral argument by Jonathan Cermele and John F. 
Fuchs. 
 
For the defendant-appellant-cross-respondent, there was a 
brief by Grant F. Langley, Milwaukee City Attorney and Miriam R. 
Horwitz, Milwaukee Deputy City Attorney, and oral argument by 
Miriam R. Horwitz. 
 
There was an amicus curiae brief by Richard M. Esenberg, 
Thomas C. Kamenick, Kenneth Chesebro, Cambridge, MA (pro hac 
vice), and Wisconsin Institute for Law & Liberty, Milwaukee. 
 
There was an amicus curiae brief by Luke N. Berg, deputy 
solicitor general with whom on the brief was Brad D. Schimel, 
attorney general and  Misha Tseytlin, solicitor general. 
 
There was an amicus curiae brief by Claire Silverman and 
League of Wisconsin Municipalities.  
 
 
 
 
 
2016 WI 47
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2014AP400 
(L.C. No. 
2013CV5977) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
James A. Black, Glen J. Podlesnik and Steven J. 
Van Erden, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
Milwaukee Professional Fire Fighters 
Association Local 215, 
 
          Intervenor-Plaintiff-Respondent- 
          Petitioner, 
 
Milwaukee Police Association and Michael V. 
Crivello, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross- 
          Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
City of Milwaukee, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 23, 2016 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed in 
part and reversed in part.   
 
No. 
2014AP400   
 
2 
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals, which affirmed in 
part and reversed in part the Milwaukee County Circuit Court's1 
grant of summary judgment in favor of the Milwaukee Police 
Association 
("Police 
Association") 
and 
the 
Milwaukee 
Professional Fire Fighters Association Local 215 ("Fire Fighters 
Association"). Black v. City of Milwaukee, 2015 WI App 60, 364 
Wis. 2d 626, 869 N.W.2d 522. 
¶2 
This case requires us to interpret and apply Article 
XI, § 3(1) of the Wisconsin Constitution, better known as the 
home rule amendment. "Adopted in 1924, the home rule amendment 
was intended to provide cities and villages with greater 
autonomy 
over 
local 
affairs," 
while 
still 
retaining 
the 
Legislature's power to legislate. Madison Teachers, Inc. v. 
Walker, 
2014 
WI 
99, 
¶89, 
358 
Wis. 2d 1, 
851 
N.W.2d 337 
(footnotes omitted). Accordingly, the home rule amendment gives 
cities and villages the ability "to determine their local 
affairs and government, subject only to this constitution and to 
such enactments of the legislature of statewide concern as with 
uniformity shall affect every city or every village."2 Wis. 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Paul R. Van Grunsven presided. 
2 In Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, 2014 WI 99, 358 
Wis. 2d 1, 851 N.W.2d 337, we noted, "The home rule amendment 
does not apply to counties in Wisconsin. However, counties have 
home rule protection pursuant to statute, though it is more 
limited than the protection afforded by constitutional municipal 
home rule." 358 Wis. 2d 1, ¶89 n.26. 
No. 
2014AP400   
 
3 
 
Const. art. XI, § 3(1). In other words, a city or village may, 
under its home rule authority, create a law that deals with its 
local affairs, but the Legislature has the power to statutorily 
override the city's or village's law if the state statute 
touches upon a matter of statewide concern or if the state 
statute uniformly affects every city or village. See Madison 
Teachers, 358 Wis. 2d 1, ¶101. 
¶3 
In the present case, we interpret and apply the home 
rule amendment to determine whether a section in the City of 
Milwaukee's ("the City" or "Milwaukee") charter can trump a 
statute enacted by the Legislature. Since 1938, Milwaukee has 
required 
its 
city 
employees 
to 
comply 
with 
a 
residency 
requirement or face termination of their employment. Its 
residency requirement is set forth in section 5-02 of the City's 
charter. Put simply, it requires city employees to reside within 
city limits. In 2013, the Legislature enacted Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0502 
(2013-14).3 
Simply 
stated, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 66.0502 
prohibits 
cities, 
villages, 
towns, 
counties, 
and 
school 
districts4 from requiring their employees to reside within their 
jurisdictional limits. It is obvious the charter and the statute 
conflict: one imposes a residency requirement and one bans 
residency 
requirements. 
Despite 
enactment 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are 
the 2013-2014 version unless otherwise noted. 
4 As noted in an earlier footnote, the home rule amendment 
applies only to cities and villages. Wisconsin Stat. § 66.0502 
applies to any city, village, town, county, or school district. 
No. 
2014AP400   
 
4 
 
§ 66.0502, the City has continued to enforce its residency 
requirement.5 
¶4 
The City claims that it can continue to enforce its 
residency requirement pursuant to its home rule authority under 
Article XI, § 3(1) of the Wisconsin Constitution. The City 
contends that its residency requirement (contained in section 5-
02 of its charter) involves a matter of "local affairs" because 
(1) the City has an interest in maintaining a tax base from 
which to draw revenue; (2) the City has an interest in its 
employees sharing a common community investment as Milwaukee 
residents; and (3) the City has an interest in efficiently 
delivering city services. Moreover, the City argues that Wis. 
Stat. § 66.0502 cannot trump section 5-02 because it does not 
with uniformity affect every city or every village. It believes 
that "uniformity" must be understood as "actually affecting all 
municipalities in equal measure uniformly." According to the 
City, Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 fails to satisfy the home rule 
amendment's uniformity requirement because it does not impact 
all cities or villages in equal measure. 
¶5 
In contrast, the Police Association claims that the 
City can no longer enforce its residency requirement because 
Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 trumps section 5-02 of the City's charter. 
The 
Police 
Association 
contends, 
in 
relevant 
part, 
that 
                                                 
5 In their briefs, both the City and the Police Association 
state that the parties have agreed that the City will not act to 
enforce its residency requirement until our final decision on 
the merits. 
No. 
2014AP400   
 
5 
 
residency 
requirements 
constitute 
a 
matter 
primarily 
of 
statewide concern because (1) when the Legislature enacted Wis. 
Stat. § 66.0502, it found that "public employee residency 
requirements are a matter of statewide concern;" and (2) the 
Legislature may legislate on matters that concern public health, 
safety, and welfare, and here, it is reasonable to presume that 
the 
Legislature 
determined 
that 
residency 
requirements 
negatively impact the welfare of public employees. Additionally, 
the Police Association argues that Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 trumps 
section 5-02 of the City's charter because Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 
with uniformity affects every city or village. Unlike the City, 
it believes that "uniformity" must be understood as requiring 
"facial uniformity." According to the Police Association, Wis. 
Stat. § 66.0502 is facially uniform because, by its terms, it 
applies to all cities, villages, towns, counties, and school 
districts. Finally, the Police Association seeks relief and 
damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It claims that the City 
unconstitutionally deprived it of its "liberty interest in being 
free from 'residency' being required as a condition of municipal 
employment" when the City continued enforcement of its residency 
requirement after the Legislature enacted Wis. Stat. § 66.0502. 
¶6 
This case presents two issues for our review. The 
first is whether Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 precludes the City from 
enforcing its residency requirement. The second is whether the 
Police Association is entitled to relief and damages under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. 
No. 
2014AP400   
 
6 
 
¶7 
As to the first issue, we hold that Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0502 precludes the City from enforcing its residency 
requirement. The Legislature has the power to legislate on 
matters of local affairs when its enactment uniformly affects 
every city or every village, notwithstanding the home rule 
amendment. For purposes of the home rule amendment, an enactment 
is uniform when it is facially uniform. Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 66.0502 is facially uniform because it applies to "any city, 
village, town, county, or school district." Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 
(2) (emphasis added). Because Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 uniformly 
affects every city or village, it trumps section 5-02 of the 
City's charter. As a result, Milwaukee may no longer enforce its 
residency requirement. 
¶8 
As to the second issue, we hold that the Police 
Association is not entitled to relief or damages under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983. Its section 1983 claim fails because the Police 
Association has not met the requirements necessary to prevail on 
a section 1983 claim. Specifically, the Police Association has 
not shown a deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities 
protected by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.6 
 
                                                 
6 Stated otherwise, we affirm the court of appeals' 
determination that the Police Association is not entitled to 
relief and damages pursuant to section 1983. However, we reverse 
the court of appeals' conclusion that, under the home rule 
amendment, section 5-02 of the City's charter trumps Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0502. 
No. 
2014AP400   
 
7 
 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶9 
For many years, Milwaukee7 has required its city 
employees to reside within city limits as a condition of 
employment. Moreover, it has mandated discharge for any employee 
caught living outside its city limits. Section 5-02 of the City 
charter contains Milwaukee's residency rule: 
1. RESIDENCY REQUIRED. All employe[e]s of the city of 
Milwaukee are required to establish and maintain their 
actual bona fide residence within the boundaries of 
the city. Any employe[e] who does not reside within 
the city shall be ineligible for employment by the 
city and his employment shall be terminated in a 
manner hereinafter set forth. 
¶10 On June 20, 2013, the Legislature enacted 2013 
Wisconsin Act 20 ("Act 20").8 Section 1270 of Act 20 created Wis. 
Stat. § 66.0502, which prohibits any city, village, county, or 
school district from requiring an employee to live within a 
jurisdictional limit. Specifically, it states, 
                                                 
7 Milwaukee is certainly not the only city that had a 
residency requirement prior to the enactment of Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0502. The record shows that 114 municipalities have some 
type of restriction on where their employees reside. Moreover, 
13 municipalities required all their employees to live within 
the municipal limits. The record also shows that 20 counties 
have some type of residency restriction on where their employees 
reside. Further, 3 counties require all or most of their 
employees to live within the county. See Legis. Fiscal Bureau, 
No. 544, Local Government Employee Residency Requirements, at 3 
(May 9, 2013).  
8 The Governor signed Act 20 on June 30, 2013, and the Act 
took effect on July 2, 2013. 
No. 
2014AP400   
 
8 
 
(1) 
The 
legislature 
finds 
that 
public 
employee 
residency requirements are a matter of statewide 
concern. 
(2) In this section, "local governmental unit" means 
any city, village, town, county, or school district. 
(3)(a) Except as provided in sub. (4), no local 
governmental unit may require, as a condition of 
employment, that any employee or prospective employee 
reside within any jurisdictional unit. 
(b) If a local governmental unit has a residency 
requirement in effect on July 2, 2013, the residency 
requirement does not apply and may not be enforced.9 
                                                 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 66.0502 contains exceptions that permit 
a 15 mile residency requirement for law enforcement, fire, or 
emergency personnel: 
(4)(a) This statute does not affect any statute that 
requires residency within the jurisdictional limits of 
any local governmental unit or any provision of state 
or local law that requires residency in this state. 
(b) Subject to par. (c), a local governmental unit may 
impose a residency requirement on law enforcement, 
fire, or emergency personnel that requires such 
personnel 
to 
reside 
within 
15 
miles 
of 
the 
jurisdictional boundaries of the local governmental 
unit. 
(c) If the local governmental unit is a county, the 
county may impose a residency requirement on law 
enforcement, 
fire, 
or 
emergency 
personnel 
that 
requires such personnel to reside within 15 miles of 
the jurisdictional boundaries of the city, village, or 
town to which the personnel are assigned. 
(d) A residency requirement imposed by a local 
governmental unit under par. (b) or (c) does not apply 
to any volunteer law enforcement, fire, or emergency 
personnel who are employees of a local governmental 
unit. 
Wis. Stat. § 66.0502(4)(a)-(d). 
No. 
2014AP400   
 
9 
 
Wis. Stat. § 66.0502(1)-(3)(b). 
¶11 On the day Act 20 took effect, the City's Common 
Council passed a resolution titled, "Substitute resolution 
directing all City officials to continue enforcement of s. 5-02 
of the Milwaukee City charter relating to residency." It states, 
in pertinent part, 
This resolution directs all City officials to continue 
enforcement of s. 5-02 of the Milwaukee City Charter 
relating to residency of City employees. The Common 
Council 
finds 
that 
legislative 
action, 
and 
specifically the enactment of 2013 Wisconsin Act 20, 
s. 1270, violates the City's constitutional home rule 
authority under Article XI, Section 3(1), of the 
Wisconsin State Constitution. Section 1270 purports to 
prohibit 
most 
municipal 
laws 
requiring 
employee 
residency including provisions of the Milwaukee City 
Charter. 
The Common Council further finds that acquiescence to 
this unconstitutional exercise of state authority 
would significantly harm the interests of the City and 
its residents. 
 . . . . 
[] The issue of local residency is not a matter of 
state-wide concern but is instead clearly a matter of 
"local affairs and government" to be determined by 
local governments that are directly accountable to 
local voters; and 
[] In 1938, as an exercise of its Constitutional Home 
Rule authority, the City of Milwaukee enacted a 
charter ordinance, now City Charter s. 5-02, requiring 
that all employees reside within the boundaries of the 
City . . . . 
Furthermore, the resolution listed justifications for the Common 
Council's decision to pass the resolution, such as (1) "the need 
to ensure that sufficient staff are able to respond in a timely 
manner to" emergencies; (2) the need to "minimize[] the City's 
No. 
2014AP400   
 
10 
 
response time;" (3) the need for city employees to "contribut[e] 
to the City's economy; (4) and the desire for city employees to 
have 
"better 
knowledge 
of 
neighborhoods 
and 
enhanced 
relationships with residents." 
¶12 The City's Mayor signed the resolution on the same day 
the Common Council passed it. In addition, the Mayor publicly 
announced that the City would terminate the employment of any 
employee found to be in violation of its residency requirement. 
¶13 On July 10, 2013, the Police Association10 filed suit 
against the City in Milwaukee County Circuit Court. The Police 
Association sought a declaratory judgment, pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 806.04,11 
in 
order 
to 
determine 
the 
rights 
and 
obligations of the parties under Wis. Stat. § 66.0502, as well 
as a declaration that the City had violated Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0502.12 Additionally, the Police Association asked for 
                                                 
10 The Police Association filed on behalf of "itself and on 
behalf of its Members, Michael V. Crivello, James A. Black, 
Glenn J. Podlesnik, and Steven J. Van Erden." For readability 
purposes, we refer to this group collectively as the "Police 
Association." 
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 806.04(1) provides, in pertinent part, 
"Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall 
have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations 
whether or not further relief is or could be claimed." 
12 At one point, the Police Association also sought a writ 
of mandamus compelling the City to begin complying with Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 66.0502 
by 
ceasing 
enforcement 
of 
its 
residency 
requirement. However, as the circuit court noted in its decision 
and order, "[The Police Association] is no longer pursuing the 
writ of mandamus set forth as the third cause of action in the 
complaint . . . ." Accordingly, we do not consider whether the 
Police Association is entitled to a writ of mandamus. 
No. 
2014AP400   
 
11 
 
relief and damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It claimed that it 
was entitled to relief under section 1983 because the City 
violated its liberty interest to be free from residency 
requirements as a condition of employment when its Common 
Council passed, and the Mayor signed, the resolution. 
¶14 Some 
time 
later, 
the 
Fire 
Fighters 
Association 
intervened in the action. It sought an "adjudication of the 
constitutionality and enforceability of § 66.0502 of Wisconsin 
Statutes," and "a permanent injunction enjoining the City of 
Milwaukee from enforcing any ordinances, resolutions, policies, 
orders, or directives in any form, in contravention of the 
rights of the members of Local 215 under § 66.0502 of the 
Wisconsin Statutes."13 All parties moved for summary judgment. 
¶15 On January 27, 2014, the circuit court held a hearing 
on the parties' motions for summary judgment. That same day, the 
court issued a decision and order. Regarding the home rule 
amendment, the circuit court succinctly stated its findings in 
its concluding paragraph: 
This Court finds that Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 deals with 
a matter primarily of statewide concern and applies 
uniformly to all local government units in this state. 
The enactment of Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 withdrew from 
local governments the power to regulate the matter of 
residency requirements for municipal employees, and 
thereby removed the issue of residency from the scope 
of home rule authority under art. XI, sec. 3(1), Wis. 
Const. Consequently, the home rule amendment does not 
authorize the City to continue regulating residency 
                                                 
13 In addition, the Fire Fighters Association sought costs 
and disbursements. 
No. 
2014AP400   
 
12 
 
requirements by enforcing an ordinance which is 
directly contrary to the legislative mandates of Wis. 
Stat. § 66.0502. The City's residency ordinance and 
related [resolution] are unenforceable to the extent 
that they fail to comply with the legislative mandates 
of Wis. Stat. § 66.0502. 
Regarding the Police Association's section 1983 claim for 
damages, the circuit court concluded that "Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 
creates 
a 
liberty 
interest 
in 
freedom 
from 
residency 
requirements as a condition of municipal employment, except as 
provided by the statute." But the court did not award damages 
because "the City's actions thus far have not deprived any part 
of the liberty interest created by Wis. Stat. § 66.0502." 
¶16 The City appealed, and the Police Association14 cross-
appealed. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in 
part the circuit court's grant of summary judgment. Black v. 
City of Milwaukee, 2015 WI App 60, ¶3, 364 Wis. 2d 626, 869 
N.W.2d 522. With respect to the section 1983 claim, the court of 
appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision not to award 
relief or damages under section 1983. Id., ¶3. It did so on the 
grounds that Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 "did not create a protectable 
liberty interest." Id., ¶35. With respect to the home rule 
amendment, the court of appeals concluded, "because Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0502 does not involve a matter of statewide concern and 
does not affect all local government units uniformly, it does 
not trump the Milwaukee ordinance." Id., ¶3 (emphasis omitted). 
                                                 
14 Only the Police Association and Michael Crivello cross-
appealed. James Black, Glenn Podlesnik, and Steven Van Erden did 
not cross-appeal. 
No. 
2014AP400   
 
13 
 
¶17 In reaching its conclusion on the home rule amendment, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
expressed 
deep 
concern 
over 
the 
disproportionate "impact" it believed Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 could 
have on the City. See id., ¶¶5-8, 20-29, 33; see also id., ¶¶36-
37 (Kessler, J., concurring).  As a consequence of that concern, 
it determined that Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 primarily addressed a 
matter of local affairs and did not impact every city or village 
equally. To support its conclusions, the court of appeals relied 
on the Legislative Fiscal Bureau's Paper (#554), titled "Local 
Government and Employee Residency Requirements." According to 
the court of appeals, Paper #554 hypothesized that elimination 
of such requirements might adversely impact Milwaukee's "levels 
of 
employment, 
incomes, 
and 
home 
values 
in 
certain 
neighborhoods." Id. ¶6 (majority opinion). 
¶18 Further, the court of appeals feared that Milwaukee 
might 
become 
the 
next 
Detroit: 
"Significantly, . . . the 
Legislative Fiscal Bureau paper's analysis warns that abolishing 
residency requirements could result in Milwaukee's suffering the 
same economic decline recently experienced by the city of 
Detroit," and "The report surmised that Milwaukee could face the 
same 
fate 
as 
[Detroit], 
despite 
arguments 
to 
the 
contrary . . . ." Id., ¶7. The court of appeals felt so strongly 
about the impact Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 might have on the City, it 
went so far as to state, "Regardless of what the statute's 
language says, the facts in the record make clear that only one 
city——Milwaukee——will be deeply and broadly affected." Id., ¶33 
(emphasis added); see also id., ¶21 ("The facts in the record, 
No. 
2014AP400   
 
14 
 
exemplified by the Legislative Fiscal Bureau's paper, make clear 
that the goal of Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 was to target the City of 
Milwaukee." (emphasis added)). Consequently, the court of 
appeals ruled that section 5-02 of the City's ordinance was 
"still good law." Id., ¶35. 
¶19 The Police Association petitioned this court for 
review. We granted the petition on November 4, 2015. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶20 This case comes before the court as an action for 
declaratory judgment and on cross-motions for summary judgment. 
"When a circuit court's ruling on motions for declaratory 
judgment depends on a question of law, we review the ruling de 
novo." Gister v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2012 WI 86, ¶8, 342 
Wis. 2d 496, 818 N.W.2d 880. "We review the partial grant of 
summary judgment independently, applying the same methodology as 
the circuit court." In re Brianca M.W., 2007 WI 30, ¶8, 299 
Wis. 2d 637, 728 N.W.2d 652. "Summary judgment is appropriate 
when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. 
¶21 In this case, we must also interpret a provision of 
the Wisconsin Constitution as well as a state statute. "The 
interpretation of a constitutional provision is a question of 
law that we review de novo." Appling v. Walker, 2014 WI 96, ¶17, 
358 
Wis. 2d 132, 
853 
N.W.2d 888. 
"The 
interpretation 
and 
application of a statute present questions of law that this 
court reviews de novo while benefitting from the analyses of the 
No. 
2014AP400   
 
15 
 
court of appeals and circuit court." In re Commitment of Alger, 
2015 WI 3, ¶21, 360 Wis. 2d 193, 858 N.W.2d 346. 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶22 We 
first 
discuss 
whether 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 66.0502 
precludes the City from enforcing its residency requirement. We 
then consider whether the Police Association is entitled to 
relief and damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 
A. WHETHER WIS. STAT. § 66.0502 PRECLUDES THE CITY FROM 
ENFORCING ITS RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT 
¶23 "The legislative power in this state is lodged in the 
legislature. When it exerts that power, it exerts it on behalf 
of and in the name of the people of the State of Wisconsin." Van 
Gilder v. City of Madison, 222 Wis. 58, 67, 267 N.W. 25 (1936). 
Conversely, "cities are creatures of the state legislature 
[that] have no inherent right of self-government beyond the 
powers expressly granted to them." Madison Teachers, 358 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶89 (citing Van Gilder, 222 Wis. at 72-73 (citing 
City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923) ("A 
municipality is merely a department of the state, and the state 
may withhold, grant, or withdraw power and privileges as it sees 
fit. However great or small, its sphere of action, it remains 
the creature of the state exercising and holding powers and 
privileges subject to the sovereign will."))). 
¶24 Adopted in 1924, the "recognized purpose" of the home 
rule amendment "was to confer upon cities and villages a measure 
of self-government not theretofore possessed." State ex rel. v. 
Baxter, 195 Wis. 437, 445, 219 N.W. 858 (1928) ("Baxter"). 
No. 
2014AP400   
 
16 
 
Correspondingly, the home rule amendment permits "cities and 
villages to determine their local affairs and government, 
subject only to this constitution and to such enactments of the 
legislature of statewide concern as with uniformity shall affect 
every city or every village."15 Wis. Const. art. XI, § 3(1). 
¶25 Two years ago, we clarified the relevant analytical 
framework for the home rule amendment: 
[O]ur home rule case law instructs us that, when 
reviewing a legislative enactment under the home rule 
amendment, we apply a two-step analysis. First, as a 
threshold matter, the court determines whether the 
statute concerns a matter of primarily statewide or 
primarily local concern. If the statute concerns a 
matter of primarily statewide interest, the home rule 
amendment is not implicated and our analysis ends. If, 
however, the statute concerns a matter of primarily 
local affairs, the reviewing court then examines 
whether 
the 
statute 
satisfies 
the 
uniformity 
requirement. If the statute does not, it violates the 
home rule amendment. 
Madison Teachers, 358 Wis. 2d 1, ¶101. 
                                                 
15 In full, the home rule amendment states, "Cities and 
villages organized pursuant to state law may determine their 
local affairs and government, subject only to the constitution 
and to such enactments of the legislature of statewide concern 
as with uniformity shall affect every city or every village. The 
method of such determination shall be prescribed by the 
legislature." Wis. Const. art. XI, § 3(1) (amended 1981). 
An earlier version of the home rule amendment read, "Cities 
and villages organized pursuant to state law are hereby 
empowered, to determine their local affairs and government, 
subject only to the constitution and to such enactments of the 
legislature of state-wide concern as shall with uniformity 
affect every city or every village. The method of such 
determination shall be prescribed by the legislature." Wis. 
Const. art. XI, § 3(1) (1924). 
No. 
2014AP400   
 
17 
 
¶26  The City takes issue with our recent interpretation 
of the home rule amendment. It believes that pursuant to the 
home rule amendment, a legislative enactment can trump a city 
charter ordinance only when the enactment both (1) addresses a 
matter of statewide concern, and (2) with uniformity affects 
every city or village. In contrast, we have held that a 
legislative enactment can trump a city charter ordinance either 
(1) when the enactment addresses a matter of statewide concern, 
or (2) when the enactment with uniformity affects every city or 
village. See id., ¶99. 
¶27 We reached our determination after analyzing and 
applying firmly-rooted and long-established Wisconsin Supreme 
Court precedent. See id., ¶105 (highlighting "this court's long-
held rule that when a charter ordinance of a home rule city 
concerns a matter of local affairs, conflicting legislation must 
be uniformly applied statewide to satisfy the home rule 
amendment"); id., ¶109 n.32 (surveying the "ample scholarship on 
the topic of state constitutional home rule," and concluding 
that it aligned with this court's interpretation of the home 
rule amendment); State ex rel. Harbach v. City of Milwaukee, 189 
No. 
2014AP400   
 
18 
 
Wis. 84, 86, 206 N.W.2d 210 (1925)16 ("Harbach") ("It is obvious 
that the limitation placed upon the power of the legislature 
with reference to laws which 'shall with uniformity affect every 
city or every village' is confined to the 'local affairs and 
government' of cities and villages. With reference to all 
subjects that do not constitute 'local affairs,' or relate to 
the government of cities and villages, the legislature has the 
same power of classification that it had before the adoption of 
the home-rule amendment." (emphasis added)); Baxter, 195 Wis. at 
44917 ("The power of the legislature to legislate in the future 
as it has in the past has not been limited. But where the 
                                                 
16 The home rule amendment was adopted in 1924. While our 
current review of the home rule amendment may be temporally 
removed from its adoption, the court's review and interpretation 
in State ex rel. Harbach v. City of Milwaukee, 189 Wis. 84, 206 
N.W.2d 210 (1925) was almost simultaneous with the amendment's 
enactment, as that case was decided in 1925. At the time of 
adoption, our interpretation of the amendment (which mirrors the 
Harbach 
court's 
interpretation) 
was 
considered 
"obvious." 
Harbach, 189 Wis. at 86. 
17 State ex rel. v. Baxter, 195 Wis. 437, 219 N.W. 858 
(1928) examined the text, in particular the structure, of the 
home rule amendment, explaining, 
Power is granted to cities and villages "to determine 
their local affairs and government, subject only to 
the constitution and to such enactments of the 
legislature of state-wide concern as with uniformity 
shall affect every city or every village." The phrase 
"subject only to this Constitution," etc., is a phrase 
of limitation, but it is a limitation upon the power 
granted to cities and villages. Nowhere do we find 
words of limitation upon the power of the Legislature. 
195 Wis. at 445. 
No. 
2014AP400   
 
19 
 
legislation of a city enacted within the scope of its home-rule 
powers comes in conflict with state legislation, the legislation 
of the city prevails over the state legislation, unless the 
state legislation affects uniformly every city . . . ."); Van 
Gilder, 222 Wis. at 84 ("When the legislature deals with local 
affairs and government of a city, if its act is not to be 
subordinate to a charter ordinance, the act must be one which 
affects with uniformity every city. . . . [In contrast,] [w]hen 
the legislature deals with matters which are primarily matters 
of state-wide concern, it may deal with them free from any 
restriction contained in the home-rule amendment. The home-rule 
amendment did not withdraw from the legislature its power to 
deal with matters primarily of state-wide concern which it 
possessed before the adoption of the amendment."); Thompson v. 
Kenosha Cty., 64 Wis. 2d 673, 686, 221 N.W. 845 (1974) ("[A]s 
this court held in Van Gilder v. Madison and affirmed in West 
Allis v. Milwaukee County, this uniformity limitation applies 
only if the subject of the statute concerns primarily local 
affairs. If the subject of the legislation is of statewide 
concern, the uniformity restriction is inapplicable." (footnotes 
omitted)); State ex rel. Michalek v. LeGrand, 77 Wis. 2d 520, 
530 n.16, 253 N.W.2d 505 (1977) ("Michalek") (noting that the 
home rule amendment limits the legislature only in the "field of 
local affairs of cities and villages;" thus, the home rule 
amendment does not limit the legislature in the field of 
statewide affairs (emphasis added)). Adoption of the City's 
argument would require us to overturn precedent from this court 
No. 
2014AP400   
 
20 
 
dating back to 1925. We see no reason to toss out nearly a 
century's worth of precedent, and so we proceed under the 
framework set forth in Harbach, Baxter, Van Gilder, Thompson, 
Michalek, and Madison Teachers.18 
                                                 
18 Similar to the City, the concurrence and the dissent  
believe 
that 
"a 
legislative 
enactment 
prevails 
over 
a 
conflicting city charter ordinance under the home rule amendment 
when the enactment both concerns a matter of statewide concern 
and affects every city or village with uniformity." Concurrence, 
¶66; dissent, ¶121 ("A legislative act must be of statewide 
concern and then it must apply uniformly."). 
The dissent purports to reach its conclusion by reading the 
text of the amendment to "mean what it says." See dissent, ¶120. 
Its "textual" analysis consists of a regurgitation of the home 
rule amendment, followed by a conclusory statement that the text 
of 
the 
amendment 
requires 
both 
a 
statewide 
concern 
and 
uniformity. Dissent, ¶¶120-21. Nowhere does the dissent attempt 
to engage in a true analysis of the text by pulling apart, 
explaining, and defining the phrases and terms used in the home 
rule amendment. 
The bulk of the concurrence's analysis rests on an amicus 
brief from the Baxter case and some newspaper clippings. 
According to the concurrence, the amicus brief, written by the 
drafter of the home rule amendment, confirms that a legislative 
enactment must both involve a matter of statewide concern and 
with uniformity affect every city or every village. Concurrence, 
¶62; but see State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 
2004 WI 58, ¶52, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 ("Ours is a 
government of laws not men, and it is simply incompatible with 
democratic government, or indeed, even with fair government, to 
have the meaning of a law determined by what the lawgiver meant, 
rather than by what the lawgiver promulgated. It is the law that 
governs, not the intent of the lawgiver . . . Men may intend 
what they will; but it is only the laws that they enact which 
bind us." (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Antonin 
Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation, at 17 (Princeton University 
Press, 1997)). 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP400   
 
21 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
What the concurrence fails to note is that numerous amicus 
briefs in addition to the one cited by the concurrence were 
filed in Baxter and other home rule amendment cases. These 
briefs 
raised 
varying 
interpretations 
of 
the 
home 
rule 
amendment. See Harbach, 189 Wis. 84, Walter H. Bender on behalf 
of the Board of Trustees of Milwaukee Public School Teachers 
Annuity and Retirement Fund as Amicus Curiae, at 17-18 (1925) 
(noting that the phrase "subject to such enactments of the 
legislature of statewide concern as shall with uniformity affect 
every city or every village," "limit[s] the powers conferred 
upon 
the 
municipality 
by 
the 
grant" 
and 
"limit[s] 
the 
restrictive effect which the grant would otherwise have upon the 
powers of the legislature"); Baxter, 195 Wis. 437, William Ryan 
on behalf of Olin and Butler as Amicus Curiae, at 24 (1928) 
("This limitation . . . has been seized upon by the advocates of 
paramount authority of cities under the home rule amendment as a 
limitation upon the power of the legislature, rather than a 
limitation upon the power granted to cities and villages by the 
home rule amendment. Much of the uncertainty regarding the scope 
of the home rule amendment seems to have arisen from this 
confusion of the application of the limitation; treating it as a 
limitation upon the power of the legislature instead of treating 
it as it clearly is——a limitation upon the exercise of the grant 
of power under the home rule amendment."); Id., William F. 
Hannan as Amicus Curiae, at 5 (1928) ("If, by the ratification 
of the home rule amendment, any restriction has been placed upon 
the power of the legislature to legislate with respect to 
municipalities (such a restriction is not conceded), it is a 
restriction or limitation upon the legislative power to deal 
with 'the local affairs of government' of cities and villages. 
No contention is or can be made that the power of the 
legislature, with respect to matters that do not constitute 'the 
local affairs and government' of cities and villages, has been 
curtailed in any way."). 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP400   
 
22 
 
 
1. Whether Residency Requirements Are Primarily Of Statewide 
Concern Or Are Primarily Of Local Concern 
¶28 We have long recognized "that the terms 'local 
affairs' and 'statewide concern' in the home rule amendment are 
problematically vague." Id., ¶113 (citing Van Gilder, 222 
Wis. at 73). "Further, the terms 'local affairs' and 'statewide 
concern' carry the risk of oversimplifying reality [because] the 
'functions of state and local governments necessarily overlap,' 
and moreover, the nature of government functions can change over 
time." Id. (citation omitted) (citing Van Gilder, 222 Wis. at 
64). As a result, "home rule challenges are, by necessity, fact-
specific inquiries, and determinations are made on an ad hoc 
basis." Id. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Since 1925, many Justices have been called upon to 
interpret the home rule amendment. These Justices had ample 
briefing, 
with 
numerous 
parties 
presenting 
varying 
interpretations of the home rule amendment. See, e.g., Baxter, 
195 Wis. at 443-44 ("[W]e invited briefs amicus curiae [to 
address questions related to the home rule amendment.] The 
response to this invitation was most gratifying. We have been 
favored with excellent briefs on the part of able counsel, and 
we have been greatly assisted thereby in arriving definitely and 
clearly at the conclusions hereinafter announced."). The very 
first court to interpret the amendment unanimously declared that 
our reading of the home rule amendment was "obvious." Harbach, 
189 Wis. at 86. Additionally, subsequent courts interpreting the 
home rule amendment have found our reading "definite[] and 
clear[]." Baxter, 195 Wis. at 443-44. 
In short, the dissent and the concurrence may present one 
way 
to 
interpret 
the 
home 
rule 
amendment. 
But 
their 
interpretation has been outright rejected by informed Wisconsin 
Supreme Court Justices since 1925. 
No. 
2014AP400   
 
23 
 
¶29 As part of our statewide or local concern analysis, 
"we have outlined three areas of legislative enactment: those 
that are (1) exclusively a statewide concern; (2) exclusively a 
local concern; or (3) a 'mixed bag.'" Id., ¶96; see also 
Michalek, 77 Wis. 2d at 526-28. If a legislative enactment 
concerns a policy matter that is exclusively of statewide 
concern, then the home rule amendment grants no city or village 
the authority to regulate the matter. Madison Teachers, 358 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶97; see also Van Gilder, 222 Wis. at 84 ("When the 
legislature deals with matters which are primarily matters of 
state-wide concern, it may deal with them free from any 
restriction 
contained 
in 
the 
home-rule 
amendment."). 
In 
contrast, if a legislative enactment concerns a policy matter of 
"purely local affairs," then "home rule municipalities may 
regulate those local matters and, under the home rule amendment, 
state legislation that would preempt or make that municipal 
regulation unlawful, unless uniformly applied statewide, is 
prohibited." Madison Teachers, 358 Wis. 2d 1, ¶98 (citing 
Michalek, 77 Wis. 2d at 529). Finally, if a "legislative 
enactment touches on an issue that concerns both statewide and 
local government interests (a 'mixed bag')," then a court must 
determine whether the matter is "primarily" or "paramountly" a 
matter of statewide or local concern. Id., ¶100 (citing 
Michalek, 77 Wis. 2d at 528). 
¶30 Here, the Legislature specially included a public 
policy statement in Wis. Stat. § 66.0502: "The legislature finds 
that public employee residency requirements are a matter of 
No. 
2014AP400   
 
24 
 
statewide concern." Wis. Stat. § 66.0502(1). This court has 
previously 
held 
that 
legislative 
determinations 
regarding 
whether a policy matter constitutes a "statewide concern" or a 
matter of "local affairs," are "entitled to great weight." 
Madison Teachers, 358 Wis. 2d 1, ¶125 (citing Van Gilder, 222 
Wis. at 73-74 (noting that "[e]ven though the determination made 
[by the Legislature] should be held not to be absolutely 
controlling, nevertheless, it is entitled to great weight")). 
Deference is proper because "matters of public policy are 
primarily for the legislature." Van Gilder, 222 Wis. at 73-74;19 
see also Flynn v. Dep't of Admin., 216 Wis. 2d 521, ¶24, 576 
N.W.2d 245 (1988) ("This court has long held that it is the 
province of the legislature, not the court, to determine public 
policy" because as the "voice of the people," "[i]t is the best 
                                                 
19 In full, Van Gilder states, 
The home-rule amendment does not lodge the power to 
determine what is a "local affair" or what is a 
"matter 
of 
state-wide 
concern' 
either 
with 
the 
municipality or with the legislature or attempt to 
define those terms. In the event of a controversy 
between municipalities and the state therefore the 
court is required to make the ultimate determination. 
In the first instance, the determination of what is a 
"local affair" and what is a "matter of state-wide 
concern" would seem to be for the legislature for the 
reason that such a determination must involve large 
considerations of public policy. Even though the 
determination made by it should be held not to be 
absolutely controlling, nevertheless it is entitled to 
great weight because matters of public policy are 
primarily for the legislature. 
222 Wis. at 73-74. 
No. 
2014AP400   
 
25 
 
judge 
of 
what 
is 
necessary 
to 
meet 
the 
needs 
of 
the 
public . . . ."). While we give deference to a Legislature's 
determination, the ultimate decision "whether a legislative 
enactment is primarily a matter of local or statewide concern 
rests with this court and not the legislature." Madison 
Teachers, 359 Wis. 2d 1, ¶128.20 
                                                 
20 Despite articulating an understanding of the rule that 
the Legislature's determination is entitled to great weight, the 
court of appeals chose to dismiss the Legislature's specific 
determination here: 
The argument that residency requirements are a 
matter 
of 
statewide 
concern 
simply 
because 
the 
legislature said so is not persuasive because it is 
unsubstantiated. Neither the Police Association nor 
the trial court point to any facts supporting this 
claim; the Police Association merely argues on appeal 
that the Legislature can do what it wants. We 
disagree. . . . In this case, we cannot conclude that 
"because the legislature said so" is reason enough to 
affirm the trial court when there are no facts to 
support such a conclusion. The facts in the record, 
exemplified by the Legislative Fiscal Bureau Paper, 
make clear that the goal of Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 was 
to target the City of Milwaukee. Nearly every portion 
of the Legislative Fiscal Bureau paper's analysis 
explains in great detail how Milwaukee will be 
affected. The effect on the state, on the other hand, 
is never substantiated, and only given lip-service 
with broad policy arguments. 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP400   
 
26 
 
¶31 In this case, we are being asked to weigh a statewide 
policy-based concern against a local economic interest. On the 
one hand, the Legislature, through its enactment of Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0502, has determined that public employees should have the 
right to choose where they wish to live. On the other hand, the 
City has asserted an interest in maintaining its residency 
requirement in order to protect its tax base, its interest in 
its employees sharing a common community investment as city 
residents, and its interest in its efficient delivery of 
services.21 
¶32 Given the competing interests outlined above, we 
conclude that Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 constitutes a "mixed bag" 
because it concerns both statewide and local interests. At this 
point, we would ordinarily proceed to apply the test of 
paramountcy to determine whether the legislative enactment is 
"primarily" or "paramountly" a matter of local affairs or a 
                                                                                                                                                             
Black v. City of Milwaukee, 2015 WI App 60, ¶21, 364 
Wis. 2d 626, 869 N.W.2d 522. Our cases discussing deference to 
legislative determinations of whether a matter is primarily of 
local or statewide concern under the home rule amendment have 
never 
required 
the 
Legislature 
to 
substantiate 
such 
determinations. See, e.g., Madison Teachers, 358 Wis. 2d 1, 
¶¶125-128; Van Gilder, 222 Wis. at 73-74. The court of appeals 
was not bound by the Legislature's determination that "public 
employee residency requirements are a matter of statewide 
concern." However, the court of appeals should have at least 
attempted to follow the law it said it understood by giving 
great weight to that legislative determination. 
21 In its brief, the Police Association conceded that 
residency requirements at least partly involve matters of local 
concern. 
No. 
2014AP400   
 
27 
 
matter of statewide concern. However, in this case, we do not 
apply the test of paramountcy to determine which interest (state 
or local) is paramount. Instead, we give the City the benefit of 
the doubt: we assume, without deciding, that Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0502 is a matter of local affairs. Accordingly, we move on 
to consider the second step in the home rule analysis——whether 
Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 uniformly affects every city or village. 
 
2. Whether Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 With Uniformity Affects Every 
City Or Village 
¶33 We are instructed by our determination in Madison 
Teachers that if the statute concerns a matter of primarily 
local affairs, the reviewing court then examines whether the 
statute "with uniformity" "affects" "every city or every 
village." See 358 Wis. 2d 1, ¶101. This is not the first time we 
have examined the home rule amendment's uniformity requirement. 
We addressed the home rule amendment's uniformity requirement in 
Thompson v. Kenosha County, 64 Wis. 2d 673, 221 N.W.2d 845 
(1974), and Van Gilder v. City of Madison, 222 Wis. 58, 267 N.W. 
25 (1936). Both of these cases are constitutional home rule 
cases, interpreting and applying the same amendment we are 
currently interpreting and applying: Article XI, § 3(1) of the 
Wisconsin Constitution. With this precedent as our guide, we 
turn to the question of whether Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 affects 
with uniformity every city or village. 
¶34 In 
Thompson, 
the 
Legislature 
passed 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 70.99, which allowed any Wisconsin county to establish a 
county assessor system. 64 Wis. 2d at 676. The plaintiffs argued 
No. 
2014AP400   
 
28 
 
that Wis. Stat. § 70.99 violated the home rule amendment. Under 
the statute, if a county chose to establish a county assessor 
system, then the office of assessor in all cities, villages, and 
towns within the county was eliminated. Id. Kenosha County chose 
to adopt a county assessor system; thus, the office of assessor 
was eliminated in all cities, villages, and towns within Kenosha 
County. Relying on the home rule amendment, the plaintiffs 
argued that Wis. Stat. § 70.99 did not uniformly affect all 
cities and villages because the cities and villages in Kenosha 
County had no office of assessor, while cities and villages 
located in counties that chose to forego adoption of a county 
assessor system had an office of assessor. Id. at 683. This 
court dismissed their argument, commenting, 
Sec. 70.99 is, on its face, uniformly applicable 
throughout the state. The legislature did not enact a 
statute which could only apply to Kenosha county, or 
as is often the case, Milwaukee county. Each county in 
the state has an equal right to decide to adopt a 
countywide 
assessor 
system. . . . Where 
a 
statute 
confers equal legal powers, that would seem sufficient 
to satisfy the uniformity requirement. Thus, for 
example, two cities may have identical powers, yet the 
respective city councils may enact entirely different 
sets of ordinances. The state could hardly be held to 
have violated the uniformity requirement in such a 
situation. 
Id. at 687 (emphasis added). In short, since 1974 we have held 
that a statute satisfies the home rule amendment's uniformity 
requirement if it is, on its face, uniformly applicable to every 
city or village. Id. 
No. 
2014AP400   
 
29 
 
¶35 We also considered the uniformity requirement in Van 
Gilder. There, we expressed skepticism toward the notion that a 
law could have a uniform impact on every city or village: 
Was 
it 
the 
intention 
of 
the 
people 
that 
the 
legislature should be without power to enact any law 
affecting a city of 2,500 people unless that law at 
the same time affected in the same way the City of 
Milwaukee, a metropolitan community having few if any 
interests akin to those of a small city of the fourth 
class? What was meant by uniformity? Was the law to be 
uniform in its application to the city of X with 2,500 
population and affect it in the same way it affects 
the city of Milwaukee, a metropolitan community having 
a population of 600,000? In that sense there could 
hardly be a law affecting with uniformity every city. 
A law uniform in its application might work out one 
way in one city and in another way in another city 
depending upon the local situation and the way in 
which it was in fact administered and so "affect" them 
differently. 
Van Gilder, 222 Wis. at 67 (emphasis added). We ultimately held, 
"[W]e can reach no other conclusion than that it was the 
intention of the people in the adoption of the [home rule] 
amendment to leave a large measure of control over municipal 
affairs with the legislature." Id. at 71. We went on, "To 
construe the amendment as meaning that every act of the 
legislature relating to cities is subject to a charter ordinance 
unless the act of the legislature affected with uniformity every 
city from smallest to the greatest, practically destroys 
legislative 
control 
over 
municipal 
affairs . . . ." 
Id. 
(emphasis added). 
¶36 In sum, our precedent——going back to at least 1936——
confirms that facial uniformity is sufficient to satisfy the 
No. 
2014AP400   
 
30 
 
home rule amendment's uniformity requirement. As long as the 
statute, on its face, uniformly affects cities or villages 
throughout the State, the home rule amendment's uniformity 
requirement is satisfied. 
¶37 The effect of the court of appeals' interpretation of 
uniformity is to ignore the holdings in Van Gilder and Thompson. 
That is, while Van Gilder and Thompson instruct that facial 
uniformity is sufficient, the court of appeals would hold that 
facial uniformity would "all but obliterate the home rule 
amendment." Black, 364 Wis. 2d 626, ¶32. The court of appeals 
misperceives the point of the home rule amendment. As stated 
previously, "The legislative power in this state is lodged in 
the legislature. When it exerts that power, it exerts it on 
behalf of and in the name of the people of the State of 
Wisconsin." Van Gilder, 222 Wis. at 67. The home rule amendment 
"confer[red] upon cities and villages a measure of self-
government not theretofore possessed;" however, the amendment 
did so via "a grant of power to cities and villages," not via an 
"express limitation upon the power of the Legislature."22  
                                                 
22 "In ascertaining the meaning of the home-rule amendment, 
we should also take into account the fact that the legislature 
was not hostile to a larger measure of local self-government by 
cities." Van Gilder, 222 Wis. 2d at 71. The Legislature was not 
adverse to the idea of cities having some control because, as 
noted by the Attorney General in the helpful amicus curiae brief 
prepared by the Solicitor General's office, 
At the time Wisconsin debated the Amendment, the 
problem of the day was the Legislature enacting city-
specific legislation, addressing purely local issues, 
because cities lacked sufficient legal power to 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP400   
 
31 
 
Baxter, 195 Wis. at 445. ("The [amendment] is a grant of power 
to cities and villages. . . . The phrase 'subject only to this 
constitution,' etc., is a phrase of limitation, but it is a 
limitation upon the power granted to cities and villages."). 
¶38 Thus, under the home rule amendment, a city or village 
"operates freed from legislative restriction" only in "a rather 
narrow field." Van Gilder, 222 Wis. at 80-81. We have explained, 
When the legislature deals with local affairs as 
distinguished from matters which are primarily of 
state-wide concern, it can only do so effectually by 
an act which affects with uniformity every city. It is 
true that this leaves a rather narrow field in which 
the 
home-rule 
amendment 
operates 
freed 
from 
legislative restriction, but there is no middle 
ground. Either the field within which the home-rule 
amendment operates must be narrowed or the field 
within 
which 
the 
legislature 
operates 
must 
be 
narrowed, and as was pointed out in the Baxter Case, 
the 
amendment 
clearly 
contemplates 
legislative 
regulation of municipal affairs and there was no 
intention on the part of the people in adopting the 
home rule amendment to create a state within a state, 
an imperium in imperio. 
Id. at 80-81. When the Legislature wants to legislate on a 
matter of local affairs, it may do so if the law, on its face, 
uniformly affects every city or village. 
¶39 In 
this 
case, 
the 
Legislature 
banned 
residency 
requirements 
throughout 
Wisconsin 
by 
enacting 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 66.0502. We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 (consistent 
                                                                                                                                                             
regulate their own affairs. The Amendment sought to 
cure this problem by giving cities general law-making 
authority so the Legislature would no longer have to 
pass such laws. 
No. 
2014AP400   
 
32 
 
with the home rule amendment) uniformly affects every city or 
village. We so conclude because the plain language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0502 demonstrates its uniform effect: Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 
says that "no local governmental unit" may have a residency 
requirement, and it goes on to define "local governmental unit" 
to mean "any city, village, town, county, or school district" in 
the State. Wis. Stat. § 66.0502(2)-(3) (emphasis added).23 
Consequently, Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 uniformly bans residency 
requirements, and in so doing, it satisfies the home rule 
amendment's uniformity requirement.24 
                                                 
23 Here, the Legislature ensured that Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 
would with uniformity affect every city or village by making 
Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 apply to any city, village, town, county, 
or school district in the state. While the Legislature can 
preempt a city ordinance under the home rule amendment by making 
a statute apply to all cities or villages, it is no small 
decision to make a statute applicable to every city or village 
in the State. The Legislature must still make an important 
trade-off when it is considering whether it should legislate on 
a matter of local concern. 
24 In its petition for review, the Police Association raised 
two additional issues: 
1. May a municipality disregard legislative prohibitions on 
certain conditions of municipal employment, by simply 
passing an ordinance disputing the legislature's policy 
determination and asserting [h]ome [r]ule authority to do 
so, without first seeking a declaration as to the rights 
and obligations of the parties? 
2. Should a municipality be required to prove "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" that a statute is an unconstitutional 
overreach of its authority under the [h]ome [r]ule 
[a]mendment? 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP400   
 
33 
 
 
B. WHETHER THE POLICE ASSOCIATION IS ENTITLED TO RELIEF AND 
DAMAGES UNDER SECTION 1983 
¶40 Finally, we address the Police Association's argument 
that it is entitled to relief and damages under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983. "Section 1983 provides a remedy against 'any person' 
who, under color of state law, deprives another of rights 
protected by the Constitution."25 Collins v. City of Harker 
Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120-21 (1992). "Section 1983, by 
itself, does not create any substantive constitutional rights;" 
rather, it "provides a remedy for a deprivation of such rights." 
Penterman v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 211 Wis. 2d 458, ¶22, 565 
N.W.2d 521 (1997) (citing Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights 
                                                                                                                                                             
We do not address these issues because they are not necessary to 
resolve this case. See State v. Cain, 2012 WI 68, ¶37 n.11, 342 
Wis. 2d 1, 816 N.W.2d 177 ("[A]n appellate court should decide 
cases on the narrowest possible grounds." (quoting Md. Arms Ltd. 
P'ship v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, ¶48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 
N.W.2d 15)); see also Hull v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 222 
Wis. 2d 627, 640 n.7, 586 N.W.2d 863 (1998) ("As a general rule, 
when our resolution of one issue disposes of a case, we will not 
address additional issues."). 
25 In full, section 1983 reads, 
Every 
person 
who, 
under 
color 
of 
any 
statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State 
or Territory of the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof 
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall 
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, 
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress. 
42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
No. 
2014AP400   
 
34 
 
Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1979)). Accordingly, in order to 
state a claim under section 1983, "a party must allege: (1) that 
a person acting under the color of state law committed the 
alleged conduct; and (2) that this conduct deprived the party of 
rights, privileges, or immunities protected by the Constitution 
or laws of the United States." Penterman, 211 Wis. 2d 458, ¶22. 
¶41 The Police Association bases its section 1983 claim on 
an alleged denial of due process. The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment "prohibits a state from depriving 'any 
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law.'" Id., ¶39. Both this court and the Supreme Court of the 
United States recognize that three types of section 1983 claims 
may be brought against a state under the Due Process Clause: 
(1) Plaintiffs may bring suit under sec. 1983 for 
state officials' violations of their rights under a 
specific provision in the Bill of Rights; (2) The Due 
Process Clause contains a substantive component that 
bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions 
(these are commonly known as substantive due process 
rights); and (3) An action may be brought under sec. 
1983 for a violation of procedural due process. 
Casteel v. McCaughtry, 176 Wis. 2d 571, 578, 500 N.W.2d 277 
(1993) (citing Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990)). In 
other words, a person bringing a section 1983 claim under the 
Due Process Clause can base this claim on an alleged violation 
of a specific provision in the bill of rights, on an alleged 
violation of substantive due process, or on an alleged violation 
of procedural due process. 
No. 
2014AP400   
 
35 
 
¶42 The Police Association makes no argument that its 
section 1983 claim is based on a specific provision in the Bill 
of Rights, nor does it argue a procedural due process violation; 
rather, throughout its briefing, it has referred exclusively to 
substantive due process. Accordingly, we turn to discuss whether 
the City violated the Police Association's substantive due 
process rights. 
 
1. Whether The City Violated The Police Association's 
Substantive Due Process Rights 
¶43 Substantive due process "protects individuals from 
'certain arbitrary, wrongful actions regardless of the fairness 
of the procedures used to implement them.'" Penterman, 211 
Wis. 2d 458, 
¶39 
(some 
quotation 
marks 
omitted) 
(quoting 
Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 125). "The test to determine if state 
conduct complained of violates substantive due process is if the 
conduct 'shocks the conscience . . . or interferes with rights 
implicit in the concept of ordered society.'" State ex rel. 
Greer, 353 Wis. 2d 307, ¶57 (quoting State v. Schulpius, 2006 WI 
1, ¶33, 287 Wis. 2d 44, 707 N.W.2d 495). The Police Association 
argues both that the City's actions shock the conscience and 
that its actions interfere with a liberty interest. We address 
each argument in turn. 
i. Whether The City's Actions Shock The Conscience 
¶44 Actions shock the conscience when they offend "even 
hardened sensibilities" or "the decencies of civilized conduct." 
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952); see also 
Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 574 (10th Cir.) ("[T]he 'shock 
No. 
2014AP400   
 
36 
 
the 
conscience' 
standard 
requires 
a 
high 
level 
of 
outrageousness . . . ." (citing Collins, 503 U.S. at 128)); 
Harron v. Town of Franklin, 660 F.3d 531, 536 (1st Cir. 2011) 
(describing acts that shock the conscience as "truly outrageous, 
uncivilized, and intolerable"). For example, in Rochin v. 
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), the case that first developed 
the shock the conscience test, police officers illegally broke 
into Rochin's home, jumped on him, handcuffed him, struggled to 
open his mouth, forced an emetic solution into his stomach, and 
made him vomit, so they could obtain evidence. 342 U.S. at 166. 
The Supreme Court of the United States held that these actions 
were "too close to the rack and the screw to permit . . . ." Id. 
at 172. 
¶45 In the present case, the Common Council passed, and 
the Mayor signed, a resolution, which affirmed the section of 
its City charter requiring city employee residency. Relying on 
the home rule amendment, the resolution claimed that the City 
could still enforce its residency requirement because its 
charter (section 5.02) trumped the state statute (Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0502). Because the City believed its charter prevailed over 
No. 
2014AP400   
 
37 
 
the state statute, the resolution stated that the City would 
continue to enforce its residency requirement.26 
¶46 Simply stated, these actions do not "shock the 
conscience"——they do not offend "even hardened sensibilities" or 
"the decencies of civilized conduct." Here, we had a genuine 
legal dispute as to which law, Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 or section 
5-02 of the City's charter, would prevail. The Common Council 
and the Mayor, by passing the resolution, merely provided the 
City's opinion that, pursuant to the home rule amendment, 
section 5-02 of the City's charter trumped Wis. Stat. § 66.0502. 
The City has not pointed to any case where factually similar 
conduct was held to shock the conscience. Therefore, we are not 
willing to conclude that a genuine legal dispute over the 
priority of two competing laws (one a statute and one a section 
of a city charter) rises to the level of conscience-shocking 
behavior. 
 
ii. Whether The City's Actions Deprived The Police Association 
Of A Fundamental Right Or Liberty 
¶47 The Supreme Court of the United States "has always 
been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process 
                                                 
26 In its brief, the Police Association applied the shocks 
the conscience test to both the Mayor's actions and the Common 
Council's actions: "Substantive due process is violated by 
executive action when it can properly be characterized as 
arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense," 
and "Substantive due process is violated by legislative action 
and can properly be recognized as arbitrary or conscience 
shocking, when its sweep is unnecessarily broad and invades a 
protected freedom." (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
No. 
2014AP400   
 
38 
 
because guideposts for reasonable decision making in this 
unchartered area are scarce and open-ended." Collins, 503 U.S. 
at 
126. 
This 
is 
because 
"[b]y 
extending 
constitutional 
protection to an asserted right or liberty interest, [the 
Court], to a great extent, place[s] the matter outside the arena 
of 
public 
debate 
and 
legislative 
action." 
Washington 
v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997). Accordingly, "[t]he 
doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires [a court] to 
exercise the utmost care whenever [a court] [is] asked to break 
new ground in this field," Collins, 503 U.S. at 126, "lest the 
liberty 
protected 
by 
the 
Due 
Process 
Clause 
be 
subtly 
transformed into the policy preferences of the [m]embers of [a 
court]," Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720. In determining whether an 
asserted right falls within the purview of substantive due 
process, the Supreme Court has "regularly observed that the Due 
Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and 
liberties which are, objectively, 'deeply rooted in this 
Nation's history and tradition.'" Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Oh., 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) 
(plurality opinion)). 
¶48 Here, the Police Association has not asserted a 
fundamental right or liberty that is deeply rooted in this 
Nation's history and tradition. Rather, the Police Association 
claims that Wis. Stat. § 66.0502——on the day it was enacted——
created a liberty interest in being free from residency 
requirements as a condition of employment. To make this 
No. 
2014AP400   
 
39 
 
argument, the Police Association pulls from procedural due 
process cases. 
¶49 For example, the Police Association relies on Hewitt 
v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983) for the proposition that a liberty 
interest may arise from two sources: the Due Process Clause or 
the laws of a state. 459 U.S. at 466. In Hewitt, the Supreme 
Court of the United States ultimately concluded that the 
"statutory framework governing the administration of state 
prisons gave rise to a liberty interest . . . , but . . . the 
procedures afforded [the] respondent were 'due process' under 
the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. (emphasis added). Throughout its 
opinion, the Court made reference to the state regulation giving 
rise 
to 
procedural 
due 
process 
protections: 
"procedural 
guidelines," "procedural rights," "procedural requirements," and 
"procedural safeguards." Id. at 471, 472, 473, 475. There, the 
"Due Process Clause require[d] only an informal nonadversary 
review of evidence . . . in order to confine an inmate feared to 
be 
a 
threat 
to 
institutional 
security 
to 
administrative 
segregation." Id. at 474 (emphasis added). 
¶50 We recognize that the Supreme Court, in cases like 
Hewitt, has "repeatedly held that state statutes may create 
liberty 
interests 
that 
are 
entitled 
to 
the 
procedural 
protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment." Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488 (1980) (emphasis 
added). However, the "Supreme Court has never held that such 
state-created 
interests 
constitute 
a 
fundamental 
liberty 
interest protected under a substantive due process theory. 
No. 
2014AP400   
 
40 
 
Rather, the Court has analyzed state-created liberties under a 
procedural due process theory." Krausharr v. Flanigan, 45 F.3d 
1040, 1047 (7th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added); see also Robinson 
v. Howell, 902 F. Supp. 836, 843 (S.D. Ind. 1995) ("A state 
cannot legislate or otherwise determine what constitutes a 
fundamental principle of justice and liberty so as to be worthy 
of protection under the federal constitution."). The Police 
Association has not pointed to any contrary authority. Because 
"[t]he doctrine of judicial restraint requires [a court] to 
exercise the utmost care" when determining whether a substantive 
due process right exists, we decline to create a new right or 
liberty interest in being free from residency requirements as a 
condition of employment. See Collins, 503 U.S. at 126. As a 
result, we conclude that the Police Association's substantive 
due process argument fails. Because the Police Association has 
not shown a deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities 
protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, it 
is not entitled to relief or damages under section 1983.27 
 
                                                 
27 The Police Association appears to argue (1) that the 
City's resolution deprived it of a non-fundamental liberty 
interest in being free from a residency requirement and (2) that 
this deprivation does not survive rational basis review. Even 
assuming that the first of these arguments is valid (which we do 
not decide), the resolution survives rational basis review. The 
resolution was rationally related to the City's legitimate 
interest in expressing its opinion on whether, pursuant to the 
home rule amendment, section 5-02 of the City's charter trumped 
Wis. Stat. § 66.0502. 
No. 
2014AP400   
 
41 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶51 To summarize, first, we hold that Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 
precludes the City from enforcing its residency requirement. The 
Legislature has the power to legislate on matters of local 
affairs when its enactment uniformly affects every city or every 
village, notwithstanding the home rule amendment. For purposes 
of the home rule amendment, an enactment is uniform when it is 
facially uniform. Wisconsin Stat. § 66.0502 is facially uniform 
because it applies to "any city, village, town, county, or 
school district." Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 (2) (emphasis added). 
Because Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 uniformly affects every city or 
village, it trumps section 5-02 of the City's charter. Milwaukee 
may no longer enforce its residency requirement. Second, we hold 
that the Police Association is not entitled to relief or damages 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Its section 1983 claim fails because the 
Police Association has not met the requirements necessary to 
prevail on a section 1983 claim. Specifically, the Police 
Association has not shown a deprivation of rights, privileges, 
or immunities protected by the Constitution or laws of the 
United States. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
 
No.  2014AP400.rgb 
 
1 
 
 
¶52 REBECCA G. BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I agree that 
Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 trumps Milwaukee's residency ordinance and 
therefore I join the majority opinion.  I write separately to 
point out that the original meaning of the home rule amendment 
to the Wisconsin Constitution decrees a different interpretation 
than this court gives.  The home rule amendment provides that: 
"Cities and villages . . . may determine their local affairs and 
government, subject only to this constitution and to such 
enactments of the legislature of statewide concern as with 
uniformity shall affect every city or every village. . . ."  
Wis. Const. art. XI, § 3(1).  The majority holds that the 
statute controls over any conflicting city charter ordinance 
"either (1) when the enactment addresses a matter of statewide 
concern, or (2) when the enactment with uniformity affects every 
city or village."  Majority op., ¶26.   
¶53 I cannot agree with this interpretation based on the 
text of the home rule amendment and its original meaning.  After 
examining the constitutional debates and practices surrounding 
the 
amendment's 
adoption, 
I 
conclude 
that 
a 
legislative 
enactment preempts a conflicting city charter ordinance under 
the home rule amendment only when the enactment both concerns a 
matter of statewide concern and with uniformity affects every 
city or village.  See Wis. Const. art. XI, § 3(1).  Here, Wis. 
Stat. § 66.0502 meets both the statewide concern and uniformity 
requirements; therefore, § 66.0502 prevails over the City of 
Milwaukee's residency requirement found in section 5-02 of the 
No.  2014AP400.rgb 
 
2 
 
City's charter.  As a result, although I disagree with the 
majority's interpretation and application of the home rule 
amendment, I agree with the end result: Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 
precludes the City of Milwaukee from enforcing its residency 
requirement. 
I. INTERPRETATION OF THE HOME RULE AMENDMENT 
 
¶54 The methodology used to interpret amendments to the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
is 
well 
established. 
 
See, 
e.g., 
Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 2006 WI 107, ¶19, 295 
Wis. 2d 1, 719 N.W.2d 408; id., ¶¶114-17 (Prosser, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part); Thompson v. Craney, 199 
Wis. 2d 674, 680, 546 N.W.2d 123 (1996).  We independently 
interpret the Wisconsin Constitution,1 "to give effect to the 
intent of the framers and of the people who adopted it; and it 
is a rule of construction applicable to all constitutions that 
they are to be construed so as to promote the objects for which 
they were framed and adopted."  State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶10, 
264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328 (quotation marks and citations 
omitted).  We may look to "three primary sources in determining 
the meaning of a constitutional provision: [1] the plain 
meaning, [2] the constitutional debates and practices of the 
time, and [3] the earliest interpretations of the provision by 
the legislature, as manifested through the first legislative 
action following adoption."  Dairyland Greyhound Park, 295 Wis. 
                                                 
1 Thompson v. Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674, 680, 546 N.W.2d 123 
(1996). 
No.  2014AP400.rgb 
 
3 
 
2d 1, ¶19.2  A focus on the first two sources shows the text of 
the home rule amendment authorizes cities and villages to 
"determine their local affairs and government" subject only to 
the Wisconsin Constitution and a legislative enactment both 
addressing a statewide concern and with uniformity affecting 
every city or every village.  See Wis. Const. art. XI, § 3(1).  
I give priority to the plain meaning of the words of the home 
rule amendment.  See Dairyland Greyhound Park, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 
¶117 (Prosser, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
A. Plain meaning  
¶55 To understand the original meaning of the home rule 
amendment, I begin with the text of the amendment.  The home 
rule amendment provides, in pertinent part: "Cities and villages 
organized pursuant to state law may determine their local 
affairs and government, subject only to this constitution and to 
such enactments of the legislature of statewide concern as with 
uniformity shall affect every city or every village."  Wis. 
                                                 
2 I do not address legislative interpretations to determine 
the meaning of the home rule amendment because 
In the performance of assigned constitutional 
duties each branch of the Government must initially 
interpret the Constitution, and the interpretation of 
its powers by any branch is due great respect from the 
others. . . . Many decisions of this Court, however, 
have unequivocally reaffirmed the holding of Marbury 
v. Madison that '(i)t is emphatically the province and 
duty of the judicial department to say what the law 
is.' 
 
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974)(quoting Marbury 
v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 
(1803))(internal citation omitted).   
No.  2014AP400.rgb 
 
4 
 
Const. art. XI, § 3(1).  The structure of this sentence reveals 
the meaning of the home rule amendment.  The first clause 
provides: "Cities and villages organized pursuant to state law 
may determine their local affairs and government."  See id.  
This independent clause grants power to cities and villages to 
govern "their local affairs and government."  See id.  The 
second clause, a dependent clause, modifies the preceding 
independent clause and places two limitations on the grant of 
power to cities and villages.  First, the constitution may limit 
city or village authority to determine its local affairs.  The 
second limitation subordinates the power of cities and villages 
to:  "such enactments of the legislature of statewide concern as 
with uniformity shall affect every city or every village."  See 
id.  This second limitation contains two requirements evidenced 
by its grammatical construction.3  The subject of this limitation 
is "enactments of the legislature," while the verb is "shall 
affect."  The phrase "of statewide concern" specifies the type 
of enactments that supersede local governance, and the phrase 
"as with uniformity" specifies how those enactments "shall 
affect" every city or every village.  Because one phrase 
modifies the subject and the other phrase modifies the verb, 
both 
modifiers 
are 
necessary, 
rather 
than 
unilaterally 
sufficient requirements.  In other words, the text of the home 
rule amendment authorizes cities and villages to "determine 
                                                 
3 "Words are to be given the meaning that proper grammar and 
usage would assign them."  Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, 
Reading Law:  The Interpretation of Legal Texts 140 (2012). 
No.  2014AP400.rgb 
 
5 
 
their local affairs and government" subject only to the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
and 
a 
legislative 
enactment 
both 
addressing a statewide concern and with uniformity affecting 
every city or every village.  The "subject to" phrase accords 
priority4 over local governance to both the constitution and 
enactments of the legislature of statewide concern, provided the 
uniformity requirement is met.  In the event of conflict between 
a local enactment and either the constitution or an enactment of 
the legislature (1) where the subject matter is of statewide 
concern and (2) that applies with uniformity to every city and 
village, the local enactment must give way.  The text of the 
home rule amendment cannot be reasonably or grammatically read 
in any other way.   
 
¶56 Much of this court's precedent, including our recent 
decision in Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, 2014 WI 99, ¶101, 
358 Wis. 2d 1, 851 N.W.2d 337, fails to apply the plain meaning 
of the home rule amendment.  Nevertheless, the majority relies 
entirely upon the home rule framework set forth in Madison 
Teachers without any attempt to explain how the text of the 
amendment supports that framework.  The majority states: 
[O]ur home rule case law instructs us that, when 
reviewing a legislative enactment under the home rule 
amendment, we apply a two-step analysis.  First, as a 
threshold matter, the court determines whether the 
statute concerns a matter of primarily statewide or 
primarily local concern.  If the statute concerns a 
matter of primarily statewide interest, the home rule 
amendment is not implicated and our analysis ends.  
If, 
however, 
the 
statute 
concerns 
a 
matter 
of 
                                                 
4 Id. at 127. 
No.  2014AP400.rgb 
 
6 
 
primarily local affairs, the reviewing court then 
examines whether the statute satisfies the uniformity 
requirement.  If the statute does not, it violates the 
home rule amendment. 
Majority op., ¶25 (quoting Madison Teachers, 358 Wis. 2d 1, 
¶101) (emphasis added).  To conclude as the majority does, that 
analysis of the home rule amendment stops if the legislative 
enactment at issue addresses an issue primarily of statewide 
concern and that the uniformity requirement applies only to 
legislation concerning issues primarily of local concern, simply 
does not comport with the text of the amendment. 
¶57 As emphasized above, Madison Teachers did not purport 
to rely on the text of the home rule amendment to craft the 
analytical framework employed by the majority opinion here.  
Instead, Madison Teachers relied on case law concerning the home 
rule amendment dating back to 1926.  Id., ¶¶96-101, 117 (citing 
State ex rel. Ekern v. City of Milwaukee, 190 Wis. 633, 640, 209 
N.W. 860 (1926)).  The problem with Madison Teachers' reliance 
on precedent and in turn the majority opinion's employment of 
the analytical framework from Madison Teachers is that no prior 
case reconciles the text of the home rule amendment with this 
judicially-created analytical framework.5 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Thompson v. Kenosha Cty., 64 Wis. 2d 673, 221 
N.W.2d 845 (1974); Van Gilder v. City of Madison, 222 Wis. 58, 
267 N.W. 25 (1936); State ex rel. Sleeman v. Baxter, 195 Wis. 
437, 219 N.W. 858 (1928); State ex rel. Ekern v. City of 
Milwaukee, 190 Wis. 633, 209 N.W. 860 (1926); State ex rel. 
Harbach v. City of Milwaukee, 189 Wis. 84, 86, 206 N.W. 210 
(1925).  
No.  2014AP400.rgb 
 
7 
 
¶58 Where even long-standing precedent contravenes the 
constitution, it is ripe for reconsideration.   
"Stare decisis is not . . . a universal, inexorable 
command," 
especially 
in 
cases 
involving 
the 
interpretation of the Federal Constitution.  Erroneous 
decisions in such constitutional cases are uniquely 
durable, 
because 
correction 
through 
legislative 
action, 
save 
for 
constitutional 
amendment, 
is 
impossible.  It is therefore our duty to reconsider 
constitutional interpretations that "depar[t] from a 
proper understanding" of the Constitution.  
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 954-55 
(1992)(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) 
(alteration in original)(internal citations omitted).  "The 
principle of stare decisis does not compel us to adhere to 
erroneous precedents or refuse to correct our own mistakes."  
State v. Outagamie Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 2001 WI 78, ¶31, 244 
Wis. 2d 613, 628 N.W.2d 376.  "Our constitutional watch does not 
cease merely because we have spoken before on an issue; when it 
becomes clear that a prior constitutional interpretation is 
unsound we are obliged to reexamine the question."  Casey, 505 
U.S. at 955 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part).  The durability of erroneous decisions interpreting the 
home rule amendment under the Wisconsin Constitution illustrates 
the danger of rigidly adhering to the doctrine of stare decisis 
at the expense of fidelity to the constitution.  It is this 
court's duty to reconsider interpretations of the home rule 
amendment that depart from a proper understanding of that 
constitutional provision.  This court should be "ready at all 
times to subordinate any possible, though unjustifiable, pride 
No.  2014AP400.rgb 
 
8 
 
of opinion to a justifiable pride in trying to decide rightly."  
Ekern, 190 Wis. at 635. 
B. Constitutional debates and practices 
¶59 The plain meaning interpretation of the home rule 
amendment explained above finds support in the historical 
context in which the home rule amendment was adopted, including 
relevant statements made by the framers of the amendment as well 
as public statements made by proponents of the amendment who 
communicated 
the 
meaning 
of 
the 
amendment 
to 
voters.  
Understanding the context in which the home rule amendment was 
proposed and ratified is essential because "[t]he meaning of the 
constitutional provision having been once firmly established as 
of the time of its adoption, such meaning continues forever, 
unless it is changed or modified by the Constitution."  State ex 
rel. Bare v. Schinz, 194 Wis. 397, 403, 216 N.W. 509 (1927).  
Unlike statutory interpretation where consultation of extrinsic 
sources 
is 
typically 
limited 
to 
resolving 
ambiguities,6 
examination of constitutional debates and historical practices 
from 
extrinsic 
sources 
is 
necessary 
in 
constitutional 
interpretation to ascertain original meaning: 
The reasons we employ a different methodology for 
constitutional 
interpretation 
are 
evident.  
Constitutional provisions do not become law until they 
are approved by the people. Voters do not have the 
same access to the "words" of a provision as the 
legislators who framed those words; and most voters 
are not familiar with the debates in the legislature. 
As a result, voters necessarily consider second-hand 
                                                 
6 State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 
WI 58, ¶50, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. 
No.  2014AP400.rgb 
 
9 
 
explanations 
and 
discussion 
at 
the 
time 
of 
ratification. In addition, the meaning of words may 
evolve over time, obscuring the original meaning or 
purpose of a provision. The original meaning of a 
provision might be lost if courts could not resort to 
extrinsic 
sources. 
Finally, 
interpreting 
a 
constitutional provision is likely to have a more 
lasting effect than the interpretation of a statute, 
inasmuch as statutory language can be more easily 
changed than constitutional language. Thus, it is 
vital for court decisions to capture accurately the 
essence of a constitutional provision. 
Dairyland Greyhound Park, 295 Wis. 2d 1, ¶116 (Prosser, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part).  Consultation of the 
contemporaneous writings of the framer of a constitutional 
amendment may aid in ascertaining original meaning "not because 
they were Framers and therefore their intent is authoritative 
and must be the law; but rather because their writings, like 
those of other intelligent and informed people of the time, 
display how the text of the Constitution was originally 
understood."  Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 38 (Amy 
Gutmann ed., 1997).      
¶60 Accordingly, it is first essential to understand the 
context in which the home rule amendment was drafted and 
proposed.  The home rule amendment arose as a direct result of 
this court's decision in State ex rel. Mueller v. Thompson, 149 
Wis. 488, 137 N.W. 20 (1912).7  In Mueller, this court 
invalidated a 1911 statute, known as the "home rule act," which 
authorized cities to amend their city charters.  Id. at 490, 
493-94, 497.  The "home rule act" at issue in Mueller provided:  
                                                 
7 Daniel 
W. 
Hoan, 
Brief 
for 
Wisconsin 
League 
of 
Municipalities as Amicus Curiae at 2 (No. 252) in State ex rel. 
Sleeman v. Baxter, 195 Wis. 437, 219 N.W. 858 (1928).     
No.  2014AP400.rgb 
 
10 
 
"Every city, in addition to the powers now possessed, 
is hereby given authority to alter or amend its 
charter, or to adopt a new charter by convention, in 
the manner provided in this act, and for that purpose 
is hereby granted and declared to have all powers in 
relation to the form of its government, and to the 
conduct of its municipal affairs not in contravention 
of or withheld by the constitution or laws, operative 
generally throughout the state." 
Id. at 493-94.  Operating under the "home rule act," the City of 
Milwaukee's Common Council adopted a resolution to amend its 
charter to allow the City to operate an ice plant.  Id. at 498-
99 (Timlin, J., concurring).  After the resolution passed, the 
City Clerk refused to place the proposed amendment of the City's 
charter on the ballot.  Id. at 489.  The State pursued a 
mandamus action against the City Clerk that the circuit court 
granted.  Id. at 489.  This court reversed and held that the 
City Clerk had no duty to place the proposed amendment to the 
City's charter on the ballot because the "home rule act" that 
granted the authority to cities to amend their charters was an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.  Id. at 491-
92, 497.  The court then alluded to the possibility of a home 
rule amendment to our constitution:  
It is correctly claimed on the one side, and not 
effectually, if at all, denied upon the other, that in 
most cases where legislation of the nature of that in 
question has been adopted it was preceded by a 
constitutional amendment expressly authorizing it, 
while in those not so preceded the legislation was 
condemned as unconstitutional.   
Id. at 497-98.      
¶61 Following the invalidation of the "home rule act" in 
Mueller, work on a home rule amendment culminated in a joint 
resolution "[t]o amend section 3 of article XI of the 
No.  2014AP400.rgb 
 
11 
 
constitution, relating to powers of cities and villages"8 that 
passed both houses in 1921 and 1923 and was set for the 1924 
general election.  Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau, State 
of Wisconsin Blue Book 219 (2015-16).  A joint resolution set 
forth the amendment, in pertinent part: 
Resolved by the senate, the assembly concurring, 
That section 3 of article XI of the constitution be 
amended to read: (Article XI) Section 3: Cities and 
villages organized pursuant to state law It shall be 
the duty of the legislature, and they are hereby 
empowered, to determine their 
local affairs and 
government, subject only to this constitution and to 
such enactments of the legislature of state-wide 
concern as shall with uniformity affect every city or 
every village.  The method of such determination shall 
be prescribed by the legislature. to provide for the 
organization of cities and incorporated villages, and 
to restrict their power of taxation, assessment, 
borrowing money, contracting debts and loaning their 
credit, so as to prevent abuses in assessments and 
taxation, and in contracting debts by such municipal 
corporations. 
Jt. Res. 18-S (Wis. 1923)(italics and internal quotation marks 
omitted).9   
 
¶62 Not only was the home rule amendment an outgrowth of 
our decision in Mueller, but the attorney who represented the 
City Clerk in that case, Daniel W. Hoan, was a primary drafter 
of the home rule amendment.  See Daniel W. Hoan, Brief for  
Wisconsin League of Municipalities as Amicus Curiae at 2 (No. 
252) in Baxter, 195 Wis. 437.  Hoan, who served as mayor of 
                                                 
8 Jt. Res. 39-S (Wis. 1921); Jt. Res. 34 (Wis. 1923). 
9 A subsequent change in the home rule amendment from "are 
hereby empowered, to" to "may" is not pertinent to my analysis.   
No.  2014AP400.rgb 
 
12 
 
Milwaukee from 1916-1940,10 filed an amicus brief on behalf of 
the League of Municipalities in Baxter, in which he set forth a 
detailed account of his intent in drafting the home rule 
amendment.  Id.  Hoan first explained in his amicus brief in 
Baxter that he "drafted this Home Rule Amendment to overcome the 
difficulties pointed out in [Mueller]" and that he presented the 
amendment's wording and meaning to city attorneys around the 
state and to legislative committee members and that during those 
presentations "no other interpretation of this amendment was 
there offered except as outlined in this brief."  Id. at 2-3.  
He then explained that he determined that striking certain 
language from Article XI, Section 3, pertaining to legislative 
authority, to create the grant of authority to cities and 
villages, rather than adding a new section to the constitution, 
would provide greater clarity as to the purpose and meaning of 
the home rule amendment.  Id. at 8.  He stated that the home 
rule amendment makes "certain that cities and villages shall 
have a grant of power to determine their local affairs and 
government."  Id. at 12-13.  To ensure that cities and villages 
received this authority under the home rule amendment, the 
amendment 
contains 
only 
two 
limitations 
on 
local 
power: 
"'subject only to this constitution and to such enactments of 
the legislature of state-wide concern as shall with uniformity 
affect every city or every village.'"  Id. at 13 (quoting Wis. 
Const. art. XI, § 3(1)).  Hoan explains: 
                                                 
10 Edward S. Kerstein, 
Milwaukee's 
All-American 
Mayor: 
Portrait of Daniel Webster Hoan 82, 178 (1966). 
No.  2014AP400.rgb 
 
13 
 
We ask the court to particularly take note of the 
words "only" and "uniformity."  We ask the court 
likewise to note carefully the wording of this clause 
as leaving no doubt that all parts of it are 
descriptive of the type of legislative act that the 
local power is subject to.  We submit that this 
wording is not ambiguous as other constitutional Home 
Rule amendments may be.  It does not say——subject to 
state laws, subject to state laws of state-wide 
concern, or subject to laws uniformly affecting 
cities, but it does say——subject only to such state 
laws as are therein defined, and these laws must meet 
two tests: First——do they involve a subject of state-
wide concern, and second——do they with uniformity 
affect every city or village? 
Id. at 13-14 (emphasis added) (italics in original).  There 
could not be a clearer confirmation of the original meaning of 
the home rule amendment than this.  The person who drafted the 
home rule amendment specifically clarified that a legislative 
enactment must both involve a matter of statewide concern and 
with uniformity affect every city or every village.  
¶63 In addition to the framer's interpretation of the home 
rule amendment, between 1919 and 1924, newspapers from across 
the state published content addressing the need for a home rule 
amendment and providing voters with information regarding the 
meaning of home rule amendment.  For example, in 1919, Hoan, who 
was then Mayor of Milwaukee, wrote a letter to the editor in 
support of the home rule amendment, which had recently failed to 
pass the Senate by a single vote.  Daniel W. Hoan, Letter to the 
Editor, Voice of the People, The Capital Times, Apr. 22, 1919, 
at 4.  Mayor Hoan's letter strongly advocated for the passage of 
the home rule amendment to address the problem of the 
legislature having to review numerous proposed bills dealing 
with purely local matters.  Id.  He stated: "At this time when 
No.  2014AP400.rgb 
 
14 
 
everyone in the legislature is crying out about the long 
session, why should we continue a system which piles up hundreds 
of bills affecting cities to be considered by that body."  Id. 
 
¶64 The sentiment that a home rule amendment was necessary 
to not only free the legislature from addressing purely local 
matters, but also to grant authority to cities and villages to 
adopt amendments to their own charters to deal with such matters 
was repeated in several newspaper articles.  In 1921, The 
Capital Times reported:  
While the amendment was broad in its application 
covering other cities of the state, the principle 
purpose of passing it was to aid Milwaukee.  It is 
estimated that over 25 percent of the measures before 
the Wisconsin legislature directly affecting Milwaukee 
and a home rule [] could be passed upon locally if 
home rule were in force. 
Home Rule Amendment Is Nullified, The Capital Times, Jan. 27, 
1921, at 1.  Similarly, the Oshkosh Daily Northwestern reported 
that according to Mayor Hoan, "City legislation of only local 
interest takes up at least a month of the legislature's time 
each session."  Income Tax Bills Posted for Hearing, Oshkosh 
Daily Northwestern, Mar. 2, 1921, at 11.  The Appleton Post-
Crescent stated "one-third of state legislation has to do with 
matters pertaining to municipalities and state legislators have 
not the training and experience to deal efficiently with mere 
local problems."  Home Rule Bill is Indorsed By City Officers, 
Appleton Post-Crescent, June 8, 1922, at 1.  Newspapers cited 
examples of these problematic bills concerning purely local 
matters, which under the home rule amendment could be dealt with 
locally by cities and villages.  For example, one recently 
No.  2014AP400.rgb 
 
15 
 
enacted bill allowed a city office to install a telephone.  
Joseph P. Harris, Questions and Answers, The Capital Times, Jan. 
19, 1924, at 9.  Another recently introduced bill called for the 
insertion of a comma in one City's charter, which would clarify 
whether the mayor had the authority to veto a resolution.  Henry 
Noll, Home Rule Law Big Step Ahead, Urges M'Gregor, Wisconsin 
State Journal, July 20, 1924.  
 
¶65  Along with the need for the home rule amendment, 
newspaper content also confirms the preservation of state 
legislative 
power 
over 
cities 
and 
villages, 
which 
was 
communicated to voters prior to the 1924 general election.  
Mayor Hoan explained: "The state will not lose its power over 
cities . . . for it can prohibit them from doing anything by 
making state wide application to all measures passed.  Cities 
will be given a free hand in local affairs, without becoming 
free from state legislation . . . ."  Income Tax Bills Posted 
for Hearing, Oshkosh Daily Northwestern, Mar. 2, 1921, at 11 
(emphasis added).  In a question and answer column that appeared 
in The Capital Times, political science Professor Joseph P. 
Harris explained that "Home rule secures to cities and villages 
a larger share in the control over matters of purely local 
concern."  Joseph P. Harris, Questions and Answers, The Capital 
Times, Jan. 19, 1924, at 9.  The Secretary of the Wisconsin 
League of Municipalities, Ford H. MacGregor, stated "'The home 
rule amendment is intended to give cities and villages greater 
powers of local self-government. . . . The amendment will give 
municipalities of the state power to draft and adopt amendments 
No.  2014AP400.rgb 
 
16 
 
to their own charters without having to go to the legislature to 
get the general charters law amended.'"  Cities are Urged to 
Favor 'Home Rule,' Manitowoc Herald-Times, July 3, 1924, at 3.  
In 
a 
Wisconsin 
State 
Journal 
article, 
MacGreger 
also 
corroborates 
the 
priority 
accorded 
to 
state 
legislative 
enactments of general applicability to all cities and villages 
under the home rule amendment:  
While this home rule amendment gives cities and 
villages greater power of local self-government, it in 
no way ties the hands of the state legislature in 
matters of state-wide concern . . . .  It does prevent 
the legislature from interfering in purely local 
affairs but it does not prevent the state from passing 
any law in which the state as a whole is interested.  
Any general law relative to public health, education, 
the regulation of public utilities, the police power, 
fire protection, or any other subject of state-wide 
interest may be enacted by the legislature anytime 
provided it applies to all cities or villages.  Of 
course, any home rule charter conflicting with any of 
these general laws would be void. 
Henry Noll, Home Rule Law Big Step Ahead, Urges M'Gregor, 
Wisconsin State Journal, July 20, 1924. (emphasis added). 
¶66 Newspaper articles leading up to the 1924 general 
election reveal that proponents of the home rule amendment 
communicated two main points about the amendment to voters.  
First, the home rule amendment was necessary to grant authority 
to cities and villages to address matters of purely local 
concern, which in turn would free the legislature from the 
burden of considering large volumes of proposed legislation 
relating to purely local concerns.  Second, the home rule 
amendment would expand authority to cities and villages, but 
would not limit legislative authority over statewide matters as 
No.  2014AP400.rgb 
 
17 
 
long as the legislation relating to a statewide matter was with 
uniformity applied to all cities and villages.  The original 
meaning of the home rule amendment communicated to the voters 
who ratified the amendment, along with the interpretation 
detailed by the drafter of the amendment, reinforce the plain 
meaning 
analysis 
above 
and 
collectively 
support 
the 
interpretation that a legislative enactment prevails over a 
conflicting city charter ordinance under the home rule amendment 
when the enactment both concerns a matter of statewide concern 
and affects every city or village with uniformity.  Here, Wis. 
Stat. § 66.0502 meets both requirements.   
II.  WISCONSIN STAT. § 66.0502 
 
¶67 As 
the 
majority 
opinion 
describes, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 66.0502 "prohibits cities, villages, towns, counties, and 
school districts from requiring their employees to reside within 
their jurisdictional limits."  Majority op., ¶3 (footnote 
omitted). 
 
Section 
66.0502 
conflicts 
with 
the 
City 
of 
Milwaukee's residency requirement found in section 5-02 of the 
City's charter.  Id.  Under the original meaning of the home 
rule 
amendment, 
to 
prevail 
over 
the 
City's 
residency 
requirement, § 66.0502 must both (1) address a statewide concern 
and (2) with uniformity affect every city or every village.     
A. Statewide concern requirement 
¶68 In 
determining 
whether 
a 
legislative 
enactment 
pertains to a local or a statewide concern,  
our court has outlined three areas of legislative 
enactment: (1) Those that are "exclusively of state-
wide 
concern;" 
(2) 
those 
that 
"may 
be 
fairly 
classified as entirely of local character;" and (3) 
No.  2014AP400.rgb 
 
18 
 
those which "it is not possible to fit . . . 
exclusively into one or the other of these two 
categories."   
State ex rel. Michalek v. LeGrand, 77 Wis. 2d 520, 526-27, 253 
N.W.2d 505 (1977) (footnotes omitted).  As for this third 
category, referred to as a "mixed bag," courts have applied "the 
test 
of 
paramountcy" 
to 
determine 
whether 
"a 
challenged 
legislative enactment, state or local, possessing aspects of 
'state-wide concern' and of 'local affairs,' is primarily or 
paramountly a matter of 'local affairs and government' under the 
home rule amendment or of 'state-wide concern . . . .'"  Id. at 
527-28.   
 
¶69 However, applying the original meaning of the home 
rule 
amendment 
eliminates 
any 
need 
for 
the 
"test 
of 
paramountcy"——a judicial creation conspicuously absent from the 
text of the constitution.  This is because the purpose of the 
home rule amendment, as discussed in Part I, was to empower 
cities and villages to address matters of purely local concern 
rather than require legislative action to resolve these matters. 
When a legislative enactment involves any degree of statewide 
concern, it will not violate the home rule amendment so long as 
the enactment with uniformity affects every city or every 
village. 
 
¶70 Here, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 66.0502 
involves 
matters 
of 
statewide concern; therefore it does not address concerns that 
are 
purely 
local. 
 
First, 
§ 66.0502(1) 
provides: 
"The 
legislature finds that public employee residency requirements 
are a matter of statewide concern."  This legislative public 
policy statement must be given great weight even though the 
No.  2014AP400.rgb 
 
19 
 
court must make the ultimate determination.  Madison Teachers, 
358 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶125, 128; Van Gilder, 222 Wis. at 73-74.  
Second, the legislature's decision to apply § 66.0502 to all 
"local governmental units" meaning "any city, village, town, 
county, or school district" indicates that the legislative 
enactment involves issues of statewide concern.11  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0502(2)-(3). 
 
Finally, 
the 
prohibition 
on 
residency 
requirements under § 66.0502 addresses issues of public welfare, 
the free movement of citizens, and the recruitment of workers——
all matters of statewide concern.  In sum, because Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0502 addresses issues of statewide concern, it cannot be 
categorized as a legislative enactment addressing a purely local 
concern. 
B. Uniformity requirement 
¶71 As referenced above, Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 applies to 
any "city, village, town, county, or school district," and 
therefore, on its face, is uniform.  Majority op., ¶36.  
Accordingly, I agree with the majority that § 66.0502 satisfies 
the uniformity requirement of the home rule amendment.  See 
majority op., ¶¶34-39.  
III. CONCLUSION 
                                                 
11 This idea was contemplated by the drafter of the home 
rule amendment, who stated: "For example, if the legislature 
passes a bill uniformly affecting all cities . . . the fact that 
the legislature acted creates an assumption in legal minds that 
the subject matter must be of state-wide concern.  See Daniel W. 
Hoan, Brief for the Wisconsin League of Municipalities as Amicus 
Curiae at 19 (No. 252) in Baxter, 195 Wis. 437.      
No.  2014AP400.rgb 
 
20 
 
¶72 Under the home rule amendment, a legislative enactment 
prevails over a conflicting city charter ordinance when the 
enactment both concerns a matter of statewide concern and with 
uniformity affects every city or village.  See Wis. Const. art. 
XI, § 3(1).  This interpretation is based on the plain meaning 
of the home rule amendment as reflected in the history of the 
amendment and the constitutional debates and practices at the 
time the amendment was adopted.  Here, Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 
meets 
both 
the 
statewide 
concern 
and 
the 
uniformity 
requirements. 
¶73 Although I disagree with the majority's interpretation 
of the home rule amendment, I agree that Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 
precludes the City of Milwaukee from enforcing its residency 
requirement.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur. 
 
No. 2014AP400.awb  
 
1 
 
 
¶74 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (concurring and dissenting).  I 
agree with the majority that the Police Association is not 
entitled to relief or damages.  Majority op., ¶8.  Likewise, I 
agree that the purpose of the Home Rule Amendment is to grant 
power and self-governance to cities and villages, providing them 
with greater autonomy over local affairs.  Majority op., ¶2. 
¶75 I write separately, however, because the majority 
turns 
that 
purpose 
on 
its 
head. 
 
Instead 
of 
freeing 
municipalities from interference by the legislature when dealing 
with local affairs, the majority limits the power and restrains 
the ability of municipalities to self-govern. 
¶76 In reaching its conclusion that Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 
precludes the city of Milwaukee from enforcing its residency 
requirement, 
the 
majority 
grants 
extensive 
power 
to 
the 
legislature to interfere with matters that relate exclusively to 
the local affairs of Wisconsin's cities and villages.  It does 
this by contravening the well-recognized purpose of the Home 
Rule Amendment, ignoring the evidentiary record, and creating a 
heretofore unknown facial uniformity rule. 
¶77 Contrary to the majority, I conclude that the city of 
Milwaukee may enforce its residency requirement under the powers 
granted to local municipalities by the Wisconsin Constitution's 
Home Rule Amendment.  I would therefore affirm the court of 
appeals' 
determination 
that 
Wis. 
Const. 
art. 
XI, 
§ 3(1) 
precludes application of Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 to Milwaukee’s 
Charter Ordinance 5-02.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.  
No. 2014AP400.awb  
 
2 
 
I. 
¶78 At issue here is whether the Wisconsin Constitution's 
Home Rule Amendment grants Milwaukee, through its charter 
ordinance,  the power to enforce its local residency requirement 
despite the legislative enactment of Wis. Stat. § 66.0502.   
¶79 Municipalities may exercise constitutional home rule 
authority by charter ordinance.1  Wis. Stat. § 66.0101.  The home 
rule constitutional amendment, Wis. Const. art. XI § 3(1), 
provides that "[c]ities and villages organized pursuant to state 
law may determine their local affairs and government, subject 
only to this constitution and to such enactments of the 
legislature of statewide concern as with uniformity shall affect 
every city or every village."   
¶80 For over 75 years, pursuant to a charter ordinance, 
Milwaukee has required its employees to live within the city 
where they work.2  Under its constitutional home rule authority, 
Section 5-02(1) of Milwaukee's City Charter requires all 
employees "to establish and maintain their actual bona fide 
residence within the boundaries of the city."  Milwaukee asserts 
that its Charter Ordinance 5-02 has a number of local economic 
and societal benefits, such as protecting its tax base, housing 
values and local commerce, as well as improved safety through 
community policing and rapid response times in emergencies.   
                                                 
1 Wis. Stat. 66.0101 includes a detailed, time-consuming 
procedure for municipalities to enact a charter ordinance that 
overrides a state law as it relates to the local affairs and 
government of the city or village.  
2 See Milwaukee Charter 5-02. 
No. 2014AP400.awb  
 
3 
 
¶81 However, in 2013 the Wisconsin legislature enacted 
Wis. Stat. § 66.0502, which abolished all local residency 
requirements in the State of Wisconsin.  The new statute 
provides that "no local government unit may require, as a 
condition of employment, that any employee or prospective 
employee reside within any jurisdictional unit."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0502(3)(a).     
¶82 The legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 
demonstrates that the statute's aim was to eliminate Milwaukee's 
residency requirement.  As the court of appeals explained, 
"[t]he facts in the record, exemplified by the Legislative 
Fiscal Bureau paper, make clear that the goal of Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0502 was to target the City of Milwaukee."  Black v. City 
of Milwaukee, 2015 WI App 60, ¶21, 364 Wis. 2d 626, 869 N.W.2d 
522. 
¶83 Wisconsin municipalities have two distinct sources of 
home 
rule 
authority——constitutional 
and 
statutory. 
Constitutional home rule is expansive and statutory home rule is 
limited.  Contrary to "the direct and expansive delegation of 
power to municipalities under Wis. Const. art. XI, section 3," 
statutory home rule authority is limited.  State ex rel. Teunas 
v. Kenosha County, 142 Wis. 2d 498, 504, 418 N.W.2d 833 (1988).  
¶84 Only cities and villages are granted constitutional 
home rule authority.  Other units of local government, such as 
counties, towns and school districts, have administrative home 
rule authority pursuant to statute.   See, e.g., Wis. Stat. 
No. 2014AP400.awb  
 
4 
 
§ 59.03.3  A county’s statutory home rule authority is limited.  
Teunas, 142 Wis. 2d at 504 ("a county board has only such powers 
as are expressly conferred upon it or necessarily implied from 
the powers expressly given or from the nature of the grant of 
power."). 
¶85 Milwaukee's residency requirement was enacted under 
"the direct and expansive delegation of power to municipalities 
under Wis. Const. art. XI, section 3."  See id.  However, in 
reaching its conclusion that Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 precludes the 
city of Milwaukee from enforcing its residency requirement, the 
majority restricts the constitutional mandate and instead grants 
expansive power to the legislature to govern matters that relate 
exclusively to the local affairs of Wisconsin's cities and 
villages.     
II. 
¶86 The majority purports to follow the two-step analysis 
of the Home Rule Amendment set forth in Madison Teachers, Inc. 
v. Walker, 2014 WI 99, ¶101, 358 Wis. 2d 1, 851 N.W.2d 337.  In 
applying the first step, it explains that this court has 
outlined "three areas of legislative enactment:  those that are 
(1) exclusively a statewide concern; (2) exclusively a local 
concern; or (3) a 'mixed bag.'"  Majority op., ¶29 (citing 
Madison Teachers, 358 Wis. 2d 1, ¶96). 
                                                 
3 Wis. Stat. § 59.03(1) provides that "[e]very county may 
exercise any organizational or administrative power, subject 
only to the constitution and to any enactment of the legislature 
which is of statewide concern and which uniformly affects every 
county." 
No. 2014AP400.awb  
 
5 
 
¶87 Although 
the 
majority 
summarizes 
the 
parties' 
positions and identifies their interests, it reaches its initial 
conclusion without any analysis whatsoever of the law or the 
facts of record.  Initially, the majority concludes that Wis. 
Stat. § 66.0502 is a "mixed bag."  It acknowledges that this 
court should then apply the test of paramountcy to determine 
whether 
the 
legislative 
enactment 
is 
"primarily" 
or 
"paramountly" a matter of local affairs or a matter of statewide 
concern."  Majority op., ¶32.   
¶88 Remarkably, the majority declines to apply the test of 
paramountcy 
and 
again, 
without 
any 
analysis 
whatsoever, 
ultimately arrives at a contrary conclusion.  It "assume[s], 
without deciding, that Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 is a matter of local 
affairs."  Majority op., ¶32. 
¶89 In applying the second step of the analysis, the 
majority contends that "[f]or purposes of the home rule 
amendment, an enactment is uniform when it is facially uniform."  
Majority op., ¶7.  Without any consideration of how the 
legislative enactment "with uniformity shall affect," the 
majority summarily concludes that Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 is 
facially uniform because the text says that it applies to "any 
city, 
village, 
town, 
county 
or 
school 
district." 
 
Id.  
Accordingly, the majority concludes that "Milwaukee may no 
longer enforce its residence requirement."  Id.   
III. 
¶90 The 
majority's 
conclusion 
contravenes 
the 
well-
recognized purpose of the Home Rule Amendment, which is to grant 
No. 2014AP400.awb  
 
6 
 
power and self-government to municipalities, rather than the 
legislature.   
¶91 Adopted in 1924, "the home rule amendment was intended 
to provide cities and villages with greater autonomy over local 
affairs."  Madison Teachers, 358 Wis. 2d 1, ¶89; see also State 
ex rel. Sleeman v. Baxter, 195 Wis. 437, 445, 219 N.W. 858 
(1928) ("The recognized purpose of this amendment was to confer 
upon cities and villages a measure of self-government not 
theretofore possessed.  It is a grant of power to cities and 
villages.").4   
¶92 Significantly, this grant of local power was intended 
to free municipalities from legislative interference.  Sleeman, 
195 Wis. at 447.  This court explained that "[i]n ascertaining 
the meaning of the home-rule amendment we should also take into 
account the fact that the legislature was not hostile to a 
larger measure of local self-government by cities."  Van Gilder 
v. City of Madison, 222 Wis. 58, 71, 267 N.W. 25 (1936). 
                                                 
4 State ex rel. Sleeman v. Baxter, 195 Wis. 437, 445, 219 
N.W. 858 (1928), sets forth the parameters of this grant of 
power to cities and villages as follows: 
There is no express limitation upon the power of the 
legislature.  Such limitations as may be found therein 
are limitations upon the exercise of the power granted 
and not limitations upon the power of the legislature.  
Power is granted to cities and villages 'to determine 
their local affairs and government subject only to 
this constitution and to such enactments of the 
legislature of state-wide concerns as shall with 
uniformity affect every city or every village.'  The 
phrase 'subject only to this constitution,' etc., is a 
phrase of limitation, but it is a limitation upon the 
power granted to cities and villages. 
No. 2014AP400.awb  
 
7 
 
¶93 In order to effect the purpose of the Home Rule 
Amendment, the "constitutional expression of the will of the 
people is to be liberally construed."  State ex rel. Michalek v. 
LeGrand, 77 Wis. 2d 520, 526, 253 N.W.2d 505 (1977).  The 
majority pays only lip-service to the purpose of the Home Rule 
Amendment.  It then focuses exclusively on the power of the 
legislature, rather than the expansive powers granted to 
municipalities under the Home Rule Amendment.  Majority op., 
¶24.  As set forth below, the majority's analysis of the Home 
Rule Amendment threatens to give license to the legislature to 
invade any city it chooses with legislation targeted at matters 
of purely local concern. 
IV. 
¶94 Not only does the majority contravene the well-
recognized purpose of the Home Rule Amendment, it ignores the 
facts of record regarding statewide and local interest.  Without 
consideration of the evidence in the record, the majority 
"assume[s], without deciding, that Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 is a 
matter of local affairs."  Majority op., ¶32.   
¶95 In its discussion of the purported statewide interest 
behind Wis. Stat. § 66.0502, the majority gives great deference 
to 
the 
statute's 
legislative 
policy 
statement 
without 
acknowledging the complete dearth of evidence in support of a 
statewide interest.  The primary statewide interest identified 
by the majority is the fact that the "Legislature specially 
included a public policy statement in Wis. Stat. § 66.0502."  
Majority op., ¶30.  This statutory policy simply states:  "The 
No. 2014AP400.awb  
 
8 
 
legislature finds that public employee residency requirements 
are a matter of statewide concern."  Wis. Stat. § 66.0502(1).   
¶96 Rather than address the fact that there is no evidence 
in the record supporting a statewide interest, the majority 
repeatedly asserts that legislative enactments are "entitled to 
great weight."  Majority op., ¶30.  According to the majority, 
"it is the province of the legislature, not the court, to 
determine public policy because as the voice of the people it is 
the best judge of what is necessary to meet the needs of the 
public."  Majority op., ¶30 (citing Flynn v. Dep't of Admin, 216 
Wis. 2d 521, ¶24, 576 N.W.2d 245 (1988) (internal quotations 
omitted).   
¶97 Although the legislative declaration is due great 
weight deference, it is certainly not dispositive.  Van Gilder, 
222 Wis. at 73.  As the Van Gilder court explained, this court 
is required to make the ultimate determination when there is a 
controversy between municipalities and the state regarding 
whether a matter is of local or state-wide concern:  
The home–rule amendment does not lodge the power to 
determine what is a 'local affair' or what is a 
'matter 
of 
state–wide 
concern' 
either 
with 
the 
municipality or with the legislature or attempt to 
define those terms.  In the event of a controversy 
between municipalities and the state therefore the 
court is required to make the ultimate determination. 
Id.  
¶98 It is the unique role of the courts to determine the 
constitutionality of statutory provisions.  Marbury v. Madison, 
5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).  No legislative declaration can usurp 
this power or release us of this duty.  Consequently, as the 
No. 2014AP400.awb  
 
9 
 
court of appeals explained, "the argument that residency 
requirements are a matter of statewide concern simply because 
the legislature said so is not persuasive because it is 
unsubstantiated."  Black, 364 Wis. 2d 626, ¶21.   
¶99 In 
determining 
whether 
legislation 
addresses 
a 
statewide interest, it is necessary to examine whether the 
statutory policy expressed in Wis. Stat. § 66.0502(1) is 
supported by the evidence in the record.  As the court of 
appeals repeatedly observed, there is scant evidence in the 
record supporting a legitimate statewide interest:  
The effect on the state . . .  is never substantiated, 
and 
only 
given 
lip-service 
with 
broad 
policy 
arguments.  This complete dearth of evidence to 
support the legislature’s contention does not suffice 
under the law. 
 . . .  
The problem with the Police Association's argument, 
however, is that no evidence in the record allows us 
to conclude that § 66.0502 was drafted with the 
public's health, safety or welfare in mind. . . .  
Instead, the sole reason we can delineate for the 
statute's existence is the gutting of Milwaukee's 
long-standing residency requirement.   
 . . .  
More importantly, there is no evidence in this record 
supporting this assertion [that Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 
protects 
employees 
against 
'unfairly 
restrictive' 
conditions]. 
Id., ¶¶21, 22, 24.   
¶100 Not only does the majority ignore the dearth of 
evidence supporting a statewide interest, it fails to address 
the overwhelming evidence in support of the city of Milwaukee's 
local interest in enforcing its residency requirements.  The 
No. 2014AP400.awb  
 
10 
 
majority's "assume without deciding" approach allows it to avoid 
discussion of the dire consequences this legislation will 
inflict on the city of Milwaukee.   
¶101 Detroit's 
experience 
after 
similar 
residency 
requirements 
were 
abolished 
in 
Michigan 
foreshadows 
the 
impending consequences of the majority's decision in this case.  
As the unanimous court of appeals explained, "abolishing 
residency requirements could result in Milwaukee's suffering the 
same economic decline recently experienced by the city of 
Detroit."  Id., ¶7.  After Detroit's residency requirement was 
eliminated, fifty-three percent of the police force moved 
outside the city, contributing to a population decline that had 
significant economic consequences.5     
¶102 In this case, the Legislative Fiscal Bureau prepared a 
report detailing the expected impact of Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 on 
the city of Milwaukee, which employs over 7000 people, with 
approximately half of those employed as police officers or 
firefighters.  Milwaukee Mayor Tom Barret's affidavit attests 
that $366.8 million of Milwaukee’s budget is spent on city 
employees' salaries and wages.  Mayor Barret's affidavit further 
explains that nearly half of Milwaukee’s total operating costs 
go towards salaries for police officers and firefighters.   
¶103 The projected outflow of Milwaukee's city employees 
will cause a reduction in the tax base of $622 million in 
                                                 
5 Local 
Government 
Employee 
Residency 
Requirements, 
Legislative Fiscal Bureau, Joint Committee on Finance, Paper 
#554 at 6 (May 9, 2013). 
No. 2014AP400.awb  
 
11 
 
residential land values and $27 million in retail property 
values.  As Judge Kessler explained in her concurrence to the 
court of appeals decision, "[a] loss of $649 million from the 
Milwaukee tax base will obviously directly impact Milwaukee's 
ability to pay for necessary infrastructure, services and wages.  
There is no evidence in the record that any other municipality 
would likely be similarly affected."  Id., ¶42 (Kessler, J. 
concurring). 
¶104 Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 also interferes with Milwaukee's 
ability to promptly respond to emergencies.  Allowing city 
employees to live outside the city may result in slower service 
times during emergencies.6  Milwaukee police are expected to be 
responsible for any police matter that comes to their attention 
at any time.  See Milwaukee Police Department Rule 4 § 025.00 
(Rev. July 2008).  A police officer's ability to respond to 
local emergencies at any time is reduced when the officer no 
longer lives in the community in which he or she works.     
¶105 Additionally, the city of Milwaukee Police Chief's 
affidavit explains that having police officers live in the city 
is "critical to the police force's legitimacy and perceived 
integrity."  Black, 364 Wis. 2d 626, ¶29.  According to Police 
                                                 
6 The court of appeals aptly noted that "the fifteen-mile 
rule set by § 66.0502(4)(b,c), which allows local governments to 
impose requirements that employees live within fifteen miles of 
the city or county that employs them, implicitly recognizes that 
citizens are safer and better served when emergency responders 
live nearby."  Black v. City of Milwaukee, 2015 WI App 60, ¶28, 
364 Wis. 2d 626, 869 N.W.2d 522. 
No. 2014AP400.awb  
 
12 
 
Chief Flynn, community policing increases the effectiveness of 
the police force and the safety of the city: 
We have an ongoing struggle, as every urban police 
department does, to maintain our credibility in the 
community we police.  The residency requirement helps 
to prevent the perception . . . that officers are 
outsiders, without any empathy for those they are 
policing, 
because 
[they] 
invade 
residents' 
neighborhoods 
and 
later 
return 
to 
distant 
retreats . . .          
 . . .  
Police officers who live in the community they police 
have an increased motivation to maintain a safe 
environment for themselves, their families, their co-
officers, and the community as a whole. 
Id.  Commenters agree with this view, explaining that cities 
with residency requirements have experienced the benefit of 
improved neighborhoods and lower crime.  See, e.g., Joe 
Mulligan, Not in Your Backyard: Ohio's Prohibition on Residency 
Requirements for Police Officers, Firefighters, and Other 
Municipal Employees, 37 U. Dayton L. Rev. 351, 369 (2012). 
¶106 Given the overwhelming evidence of the effect that 
Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 will have on the city of Milwaukee, I 
conclude 
that 
the 
elimination 
of 
residency 
requirements 
addresses a matter primarily of local concern.   
V. 
¶107 The majority further avoids the damaging facts in the 
record by creating a heretofore unknown facial uniformity rule 
that essentially repeals the Home Rule Amendment.  As the 
Madison Teachers' court explained, "home rule challenges are, by 
No. 2014AP400.awb  
 
13 
 
necessity, fact-specific inquiries. . . ."  358 Wis. 2d 1, 
¶113.    
¶108 Avoiding discussion of the facts of this case, the 
majority contends that "[f]or the purposes of the home rule 
amendment, an enactment is uniform when it is facially uniform."  
Majority op., ¶7.  After making this pronouncement, the majority 
summarily concludes that because the text of Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0502 applies to "any city, village, town, county, or school 
district," it is facially uniform.  Id. 
¶109 This ipse dixit approach of the majority threatens the 
independence of the court.7  It appears to surrender to the 
legislature our constitutional role of renewing legislative 
enactments.  Instead of engaging in a constitutional analysis of 
whether the statute affects with uniformity, in essence it 
concludes "well . . . the text says it does." 
¶110 Relying on Thompson v. Kenosha County, 64 Wis. 2d 673, 
676, 221 N.W.2d 845 (1974), the majority asserts that "facial 
uniformity is sufficient to satisfy the home rule amendment's 
uniformity requirement."  Majority op., ¶36.  However, Thompson 
is distinguishable because it examined legislation that gave, 
rather than eliminated, municipalities' power to govern their 
local affairs.  64 Wis. 2d at 687.   
¶111 As the Thompson court explained, conferring equal 
power 
satisfies 
the 
uniformity 
requirement 
because 
                                                 
7 See, e.g., Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 930 
(9th 
Cir. 
2009) 
("This 
purported 
explanation 
is 
a 
non-
explanation——an ipse dixit or 'because I said so' edict."). 
No. 2014AP400.awb  
 
14 
 
municipalities retain the right to enact the ordinances they 
choose: 
Each county in the state has an equal right to decide 
to adopt a countywide assessor system.  The residents 
of all cites, villages, and towns have an equal right 
to participate in making that decision through their 
right to vote for and petition county board members.  
Where a statute confers equal legal powers, that would 
seem sufficient to satisfy the uniformity requirement.  
Thus, for example, two cities may have identical 
powers, yet the respective city councils may enact 
entirely different sets of ordinances. 
Id.  Thompson thus concluded that "[t]he state could hardly be 
held to have violated the uniformity requirement in such a 
situation."  Id. 
¶112 Granting municipalities power is distinguishable from 
the elimination of Milwaukee's residency requirement under Wis. 
Stat § 66.0502.  When the legislature grants every municipality 
power over an area of governance, each municipality is uniformly 
affected because it retains the discretionary authority to act 
under that power.   
¶113 In contrast, the elimination of residency requirements 
restricts, rather than expands a grant of local power.  Here, 
municipalities without an employee residency requirement will be 
unaffected by Wis. Stat. § 66.0502, but it will have an outsize 
effect on the city of Milwaukee which did have a residency 
requirement.    
¶114 Admittedly, Van Gilder presents a more challenging 
precedent. It sends mixed messages and ultimately lands on a 
constitutional interpretation that is at odds with the text of 
the constitutional Home Rule Amendment. 
No. 2014AP400.awb  
 
15 
 
¶115 Initially Van Gilder signals an interpretation that 
honors the language of the constitutional amendment.  "The 
power[] of municipalities . . . to enact an organic law dealing 
with local affairs and government is subject to such acts of the 
legislature relating thereto as are of state-wide concern and 
affect with uniformity all cities."  Van Gilder, 222 Wis. at 73.  
¶116 Later, however, Van Gilder lands on an interpretation 
that is at odds with the text of the Home Rule Amendment:  "when 
the legislature deals with local affairs as distinguished from 
matters which are primarily of state-wide concern, it can only 
do so effectually by an act which affects with uniformity every 
city."  Id. at 80-81. 
¶117 The 
latter 
misguided 
interpretation 
of 
the 
constitutional 
Home 
Rule 
Amendment 
has 
been 
adopted 
by 
subsequent courts, including recently by this court in Madison 
Teachers and by the majority today. 
¶118 In Madison Teachers, this court interpreted the Home 
Rule Amendment to mean that legislative enactments will trump 
local laws if they either address a statewide matter or 
uniformly affect every municipality.  358 Wis. 2d 1, ¶101.  If 
the matter is primarily a local concern, Madison Teachers 
instructs that the court must determine whether the statute 
uniformly affects every municipality.  Id.  If the statute 
satisfies the uniformity requirement, it does not violate the 
Home Rule Amendment.  Id.  I dissented in Madison Teachers. 
¶119 Contrary to the majority's interpretation, I agree 
with the amicus briefs of the League of Wisconsin Municipalities 
No. 2014AP400.awb  
 
16 
 
and the Wisconsin Institute for Law and Liberty, as well as the 
brief of the city of Milwaukee and the unanimous court of 
appeals' observation that "the test articulated in Madison 
Teachers is somewhat at odds with the plain language of the home 
rule amendment."   Black, 364 Wis. 2d 626, ¶15. 
¶120 The majority here continues this error.  I interpret 
the home rule constitutional amendment to mean what it says:  
the legislature can enact a law superseding a municipality's 
charter ordinance if the law is of "state wide concern as with 
uniformity shall affect every city or every village."8   
¶121 A legislative act must be of statewide concern and 
then it must apply uniformly.  The majority's interpretation 
provides otherwise.  It states that a legislative act can 
supersede a city’s charter ordinance dealing with solely local 
matters, with no statewide concern whatsoever, as long as it 
does so uniformly.  Thus, the majority simply ignores the 
requisite 
"statewide 
concern" 
language 
of 
the 
Home 
Rule 
Amendment. 
¶122 Additionally, the majority also ignores the lack of 
uniform effect.  Although Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 does not name any 
particular municipality, it will have an outsizes effect on the 
city of Milwaukee for the reasons set forth above, including a 
projected loss of $649 million from Milwaukee's tax base. 
                                                 
8 Because the textual analysis of the Home Rule Amendment is 
set forth in ¶4 of Justice Rebecca Bradley's concurrence, I need 
not repeat that analysis here. 
No. 2014AP400.awb  
 
17 
 
¶123 The effect on other Wisconsin municipalities is simply 
not addressed by the majority opinion.  As the court of appeals 
aptly states, "the notion that a statute purporting to gut the 
tax bases and compromise the neighborhood integrity of all 
municipalities would pass both houses of the legislature defies 
logic."  Id., ¶33.  The majority's newly created facial 
uniformity rule eliminates the requirement that courts review 
the factual particulars of a home rule challenge.    
¶124 Under the majority opinion, the only legislation that 
would not uniformly affect all municipalities is one that would 
overtly single out a particular city or village.  The 
legislature is now free to search for laws unique to Milwaukee, 
Madison, Green Bay, or any other municipality of its choosing 
and enact facially neutral legislation abrogating individual 
local laws.   
¶125 Ultimately, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
disregards 
the 
fundamental rule that "we interpret the home rule amendment with 
an eye toward preserving the constitution."  Id., ¶32 (citing 
State ex rel. Ekern v. City of Milwaukee, 190 Wis. 633, 639, 209 
N.W. 860 (1926)).  As the court of appeals warned, a facial 
uniformity standard "all but obliterate[s] the home rule 
amendment, which is not only illogical but also contrary to 
law."  Id. 
¶126 In sum, I conclude that the city of Milwaukee may 
enforce its residency requirement under the powers granted to 
local municipalities by the Wisconsin Constitution's Home Rule 
Amendment.  I would therefore affirm the court of appeals 
No. 2014AP400.awb  
 
18 
 
determination that Wis. Const. art. XI, § 3(1) precludes 
application of Wis. Stat. § 66.0502 to Milwaukee Ordinance 5-02.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.   
¶127 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON, J. joins this concurrence/dissent. 
 
No. 2014AP400.awb  
 
 
 
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