Title: Com. v. Owens

State: pennsylvania

Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Document:

496 Pa. 16 (1981) 436 A.2d 129 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, v. Nathan OWENS, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted April 24, 1981. Decided October 27, 1981. *17 *18 Elias B. Landau, Philadelphia, for appellant. Robert B. Lawler, John Sikorski, Philadelphia, for appellee. Before O'BRIEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, NIX, LARSEN, FLAHERTY, KAUFFMAN and WILKINSON, JJ. ROBERTS, Justice. This is a direct appeal from judgments of sentence imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia upon three citations of criminal contempt entered against appellant during trial.[1] The court cited and sentenced appellant summarily as each of the contempts occurred. A sentence of six months' imprisonment was imposed upon each of the citations, and the sentences were ordered to run consecutively. Appellant challenges both the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the contempt convictions and the legality of the court's summary procedure. We reject appellant's contentions and, hence, affirm. Underlying each of the three contempt convictions was appellant's persistent insistence upon the right to dismiss his *19 court-appointed attorney. Appellant initiated his demand immediately before closing arguments were scheduled to begin. At that time the court dismissed the jury from the courtroom and conducted a colloquy with appellant. The colloquy revealed appellant's dissatisfaction with his counsel's strategy during trial, particularly the failure to call several witnesses and to ask certain questions. The court, however, denied appellant's request to dismiss his attorney and to obtain new counsel. After the court's ruling, the following ensued, resulting in the first contempt conviction: *21 The statements and conduct leading up to the second contempt conviction occurred immediately after the jury had returned to the courtroom: Notwithstanding this second contempt conviction, the defendant persisted in his defiance of the court's denial of his request to dismiss his attorney: Appellant asserts that the evidence of record does not satisfy the elements of criminal contempt. 42 Pa. C.S. § 4131, upon which the contempt judgments rest, provides: As this Court recently stated in Commonwealth v. Reid, 494 Pa. 201, 208, 431 A.2d 218, 222 (1981), "[s]ubsection III requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of (1) misconduct, (2) in the presence of the court, (3) committed with intent to obstruct the proceedings, which (4) obstructs the administration of justice. Commonwealth v. Garrison, 478 Pa. 356, 371, 386 A.2d 971, 979 (1978)." Appellant argues that the record is insufficient to support a finding of "misconduct" for the first contempt conviction. He also argues that all three contempt convictions are invalid because proof of the requisite element of intent is lacking. In attacking the first contempt conviction for want of evidence of misconduct, appellant claims that the only indication of misconduct is contained in the courtroom stenographer's notation, "the defendant caused a disturbance in the courtroom." We reject appellant's narrow view of the record. Apart from the stenographer's notation, there is ample *24 evidence of record to support the court's finding of misconduct at the time of the first contempt conviction. Not only had appellant repeatedly protested the court's denial of his request to dismiss his lawyer, but appellant had also stated his intention to disrupt the courtroom. When a disturbance took place between appellant and the sheriff, the court reported that disturbance on the record. Manifestly, the record sufficiently demonstrates misconduct. See Commonwealth v. Snyder, 443 Pa. 433, 275 A.2d 312 (1971) (defendant's interruption of closing arguments contemptuous). Appellant argues that all three contempt convictions should be set aside because "his intent was not to obstruct justice, but to be in his view an effective advocate for himself."[5] This argument, however, misconceives the element of intent required for summary conviction of criminal contempt. Commonwealth v. Reid, supra, like earlier cases, makes clear that a subjective intent to obstruct the administration of justice is not a requisite element of criminal contempt. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Africa, 466 Pa. 603, 353 A.2d 855 (1976) (plurality). The requisite element of intent is satisfied if the contemnor has the intent to obstruct the proceedings. When that intent manifests itself in misconduct in the presence of the court which, as on this record, in fact obstructs the administration of justice, criminal contempt has been committed.[6] Appellant challenges the summary nature of his criminal contempt convictions. Relying upon Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 94 S. Ct. 2687, 41 L. Ed. 2d 912 (1974), he argues that, because the aggregate of the sentences imposed exceeds six months' imprisonment, he should have been afforded the right to a jury trial. Appellant's reliance is misplaced. Codispoti holds that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial on multiple charges of direct criminal contempt when two conditions are satisfied: (1) the court postpones adjudication and sentence for contempt until the end of trial; and (2) the court imposes sentences which either alone, or when aggregated, exceed six months' imprisonment. The rationale underlying the rule enunciated in Codispoti is that, unlike during trial, at the end of trial there is "no overriding necessity for instant action to preserve order and no justification for dispensing with the ordinary rudiments of due process." Id., 418 U.S. at 515, 94 S. Ct. at 2692. Because on this record the charges of criminal contempt were adjudicated and punished during trial as the contemptuous conduct occurred, and because no individual sentence for contempt exceeded six months' imprisonment, appellant was not entitled to a jury trial. Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, supra; Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 88 S. Ct. 1477, 20 L. Ed. 2d 522 (1968). Appellant's remaining challenge, that the summary procedure denied him due process of law, is equally without merit. Contrary to appellant's assertion, it is clear that, prior to summarily citing and punishing appellant for contempt, the court gave appellant sufficient notice that his conduct was contemptuous and sufficient opportunity to desist. Nor does this case present, as appellant contends, a "running bitter controversy" between the judge and appellant which would have required the judge to recuse himself *26 and refer trial to another judge. Compare Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 91 S. Ct. 499, 27 L. Ed. 2d 532 (1971) with Commonwealth v. Patterson, 452 Pa. 457, 308 A.2d 90 (1973). As the American Bar Association Standards state, "[t]he only purpose of a criminal trial is to determine whether the prosecution has established the guilt of the accused as required by law, and the trial judge should not allow the proceedings to be used for any other purpose." ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to the Function of the Trial Judge § 1.1 (Approved Draft, 1972). Here, the trial judge properly used his power "to cite and, if necessary, punish summarily anyone who, in his presence in open court, willfully obstructs the course of criminal proceedings." Id. at § 7.1. Because the evidence of record satisfies each of the elements of criminal contempt, we affirm judgments of sentence. Judgments of sentence affirmed. [1] This appeal was filed under the former version of 42 Pa. C.S. § 722, which conferred jurisdiction upon this Court of appeals from sentences imposed upon citations of direct criminal contempt in the courts of common pleas. [2] Record at 5-9. [3] Record at 9-11. [4] Record at 11-12. [5] Appellant's brief at 16. [6] Appellant further suggests that the trial court induced his contemptuous behavior by failing to advise him that he could proceed pro se. Where the accused does not request to represent himself before trial, the constitutional right to self-representation recognized in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975), is not implicated. When, during the course of trial, an accused wishes to dismiss counsel and either represent himself or obtain new counsel, his request is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. See United States v. Dunlap, 577 F.2d 867, 868-69 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 858, 99 S. Ct. 174, 58 L. Ed. 2d 166 (1978); Sapienza v. Vincent, 534 F.2d 1007, 1010 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 408 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970, 93 S. Ct. 1443, 35 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1973); Smith v. United States, 353 F.2d 838, 845 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 910, 86 S. Ct. 1350, 16 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1966). See also ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Providing Defense Services § 5.3 (Approved Draft, 1968). Of course, as with any asserted trial court error, the proper procedure by which to seek relief from the denial of such a request is through the orderly process of appellate review, not through contemptuous behavior.