Title: In re E.C.

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12230 
 
IN THE MATTER OF E.C. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     November 9, 2017. - March 15, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Incompetent Person, Commitment.  Practice, Civil, Civil 
commitment. 
 
 
 
 
Petition for civil commitment filed in the Brockton 
Division of the District Court Department on March 4, 2013. 
 
 
The case was heard by Beverly J. Cannone, J., and a motion 
for reconsideration was also heard by her. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Beth L. Eisenberg for E.C. 
 
Edward J. O'Donnell for Bridgewater State Hospital. 
 
Lester D. Blumberg, for Department of Mental Health, amicus 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  In this appeal, we consider whether the 
dismissal of the criminal charge pending against the respondent, 
E.C., required his release from commitment to Bridgewater State 
Hospital (Bridgewater), where the charge was dismissed after the 
2 
 
 
 
period of commitment had expired, and a petition to extend the 
commitment had yet to be decided. 
 
E.C. was charged in the Boston Municipal Court Department 
with malicious destruction of property.  Following a hearing 
pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 16 (b), a judge of that court found 
E.C. not competent to stand trial and ordered him committed to 
Bridgewater for a period of six months.  After that period had 
expired, Bridgewater filed a petition in the District Court 
Department to extend the commitment for an additional period of 
one year, pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c).  While the 
petition for an extension was pending, the criminal charge 
against E.C. was dismissed.  Bridgewater moved to file an 
amended petition to modify its pending G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c), 
petition to a petition for civil commitment pursuant to G. L. 
c. 123, §§ 7 and 8.  E.C. opposed the motion and argued that 
Bridgewater was required to release him because the criminal 
charge had been dismissed.  A District Court judge concluded 
that Bridgewater had no authority to hold E.C. pursuant to G. L. 
c. 123, § 16 (c), after the criminal charge had been dismissed 
and his original commitment had expired; denied Bridgewater's 
petition to amend; and ordered E.C. discharged.1  The Appellate 
                     
 
1 Although the issues in this case are moot as to E.C., who 
was released before this case was argued, we consider the matter 
because the case involves an important question of statutory 
 
3 
 
 
 
Division of the District Court affirmed that judgment, and the 
Appeals Court reversed.  See Matter of E.C., 89 Mass. App. Ct. 
813 (2016).  We allowed E.C.'s application for further appellate 
review. 
 
We conclude that the dismissal of criminal charges does not 
require the immediate release from commitment of an incompetent 
defendant, and that Bridgewater retained the statutory authority 
to hold E.C. while the G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c), petition was 
pending.  See G. L. c. 123, § 6.2  We conclude also that the 
District Court judge abused her discretion in denying 
Bridgewater's request to amend its pending petition for an 
extension under G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c), to a petition for civil 
commitment under G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 8. 
                                                                  
interpretation and is "capable of repetition, yet evading 
review."  See Guardianship of Doe, 391 Mass. 614, 618 (1984) 
("issues which involve the rights of the mentally ill are 
classic examples of issues that are capable of repetition, yet 
evading review" [quotations omitted]); Hashimi v. Kalil, 388 
Mass. 607, 609 (1983). 
 
 
2 "No person shall be retained at a facility or at the 
Bridgewater [S]tate [H]ospital except under the provisions of 
[G. L. c. 123, §§ 10 (a), 12 (a), (b), and (c), 13, 16 (e), and 
35,] or except under a court order or except during the pendency 
of a petition for commitment or to the pendency of a request 
under section fourteen.  A court order of commitment to a 
facility or to the Bridgewater [S]tate [H]ospital shall be valid 
for the period stipulated in this chapter or, if no such period 
is so stipulated, for one year.  A petition for the commitment 
of a person may not be issued except as authorized under the 
provisions of this chapter."  G. L. c. 123, § 6 (a). 
4 
 
 
 
 
1.  Background.  The following facts are not disputed.  In 
May, 2012, E.C. was arraigned in the Boston Municipal Court on 
one count of malicious destruction of property over $250.00.  In 
July, 2012, a psychologist testified that E.C. was not competent 
to stand trial.  A Boston Municipal Court judge ordered E.C. 
transferred to Bridgewater for further evaluation of his 
competency, pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 15 (b).  In August, 
2012, Bridgewater reported that E.C. was not competent to stand 
trial; the Commonwealth stipulated to his incompetency.  The 
judge ordered E.C. returned to Bridgewater for a thirty-five day 
hospitalization, pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 16 (a).  
Bridgewater then petitioned the court to commit E.C. for a 
period of six months, pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 16 (b).  The 
petition was allowed, and E.C.'s commitment to Bridgewater was 
authorized until March, 2013. 
 
Shortly prior to the expiration of the six-month commitment 
period, Bridgewater filed a petition in the Brockton Division of 
the District Court Department to extend E.C.'s involuntary 
commitment for a period of one year, under G. L. c. 123, 
§ 16 (c).3  A hearing on that petition was scheduled for March, 
                     
 
3 The Brockton Division of the District Court Department is 
designated to hear all civil commitment proceedings involving a 
commitment to Bridgewater State Hospital (Bridgewater).  See 
G. L. c. 123, § 5; G. L. c. 218, § 43.  See also G. L. c. 123, 
§§ 8 (f), 13. 
5 
 
 
 
2013.  At a hearing in the Boston Municipal Court one week 
before the hearing scheduled on Bridgewater's petition for a 
renewed commitment, E.C. filed a motion to dismiss the criminal 
charge.  The Boston Municipal Court judge continued the hearing 
until the following day, and E.C. waived his right to be 
present.  The next day, the judge allowed E.C.'s motion to 
dismiss, over the Commonwealth's objection. 
 
One week later, the scheduled hearing was held in the 
District Court on Bridgewater's petition pursuant to G. L. 
c. 123, § 16 (c), to continue the commitment.  A judge of that 
court allowed E.C.'s motion for funds for an independent medical 
examiner and continued the hearing for approximately three 
weeks.  The day after the hearing, immediately after learning 
that E.C.'s criminal charge had been dismissed, Bridgewater 
filed a motion to amend the petition for an extension of 
commitment from a G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c), petition to a petition 
for civil commitment under G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 8.4  
Bridgewater told the District Court judge that it had not been 
informed that E.C.'s criminal charge had been dismissed until 
six days after the dismissal.  Bridgewater argued that the 
                     
 
4 Bridgewater also filed a new petition for commitment under 
G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 8, but withdrew that petition after its 
motion for amendment was denied. 
 
6 
 
 
 
amendment was authorized by G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c),5 which allows 
for a civil commitment proceeding after criminal charges have 
been dismissed.  E.C. opposed Bridgewater's motion, arguing that 
the dismissal of the criminal charge terminated his commitment 
under G. L. c. 123, § 16 (b).  The judge denied Bridgewater's 
motion, finding that G. L. c. 123, § 16, no longer served as a 
valid basis for detaining E.C. after the criminal charge had 
been dismissed and, therefore, that E.C. was not a "patient" of 
Bridgewater for purposes of a commitment petition under G. L. 
c. 123, §§ 7 and 8.  A few days later, still in March, 2013, 
E.C. was discharged. 
 
Bridgewater filed a motion for reconsideration of the 
denial of its motion to amend; the motion was denied in March, 
2013.  The Appellate Division of the District Court affirmed 
that decision in November, 2014.  In August, 2016, the Appeals 
                     
 
5 "After the expiration of a commitment under paragraph (b) 
of this section, a person may be committed for additional one 
year periods under the provisions of [§§ 7 and 8] of this 
chapter, but no untried defendant shall be so committed unless 
in addition to the findings required by [§§ 7 and 8] the court 
also finds said defendant is incompetent to stand trial.  If the 
person is not found incompetent, the court shall notify the 
court with jurisdiction of the criminal charges, which court 
shall thereupon order the defendant returned to its custody for 
the resumption of criminal proceedings.  All subsequent 
proceedings for the further commitment of a person committed 
under this section shall be in the court which has jurisdiction 
of the facility or hospital."  G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c). 
7 
 
 
 
Court reversed the decision of the Appellate Division.  We 
allowed E.C.'s petition for further appellate review. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Statutory background.  When a criminal 
defendant is suspected of being incompetent to stand trial, a 
court may order the defendant to be evaluated by a court-
appointed medical professional for an initial determination of 
competency.  See G. L. c. 123, § 15 (a).  If the initial 
determination is that the defendant appears to be incompetent 
and further examination is necessary, a judge may order the 
defendant committed to a mental health facility6 for a period of 
observation not to exceed twenty days.  See G. L. c. 123, 
§ 15 (b).  If he requires strict security, a male defendant may 
be hospitalized at Bridgewater for this twenty-day period.  See 
id. 
 
During the period of observation, or within sixty days of a 
determination that a defendant is not competent to stand trial, 
the district attorney or the medical director of Bridgewater may 
petition for the individual to be committed to Bridgewater for 
an initial treatment period of six months.  See G. L. c. 123, 
§ 16 (b).  The petition will be granted if the judge finds that 
                     
 
6 General Laws c. 123, § 1, defines "[f]acility," for 
purposes of G. L. c. 123, §§ 2 to 37, as "a public or private 
facility for the care and treatment of mentally ill persons, 
except for the Bridgewater State Hospital". 
8 
 
 
 
the standard for involuntary civil commitment under G. L. 
c. 123, § 8 (b), has been met:  "(1) such person is mentally 
ill; (2) such person is not a proper subject for commitment to 
any facility of the department; and (3) the failure to retain 
such person in strict custody would create a likelihood of 
serious harm."  If the criminal charges are dismissed after 
commitment, an untried defendant may continue to be held under 
G. L. c. 123, § 16 (b). 
 
At the end of the six-month period, the medical director of 
Bridgewater may file a petition under G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c), 
seeking to have the individual committed for an additional 
period of one year under the procedures of G. L. c. 123, § 7; as 
with the petition for an initial treatment period, the petition 
for this additional period may be allowed where there is a 
finding under G. L. c. 123, § 8 (b), that "(1) such person is 
mentally ill; (2) such person is not a proper subject for 
commitment to any facility of the department; and (3) the 
failure to retain such person in strict custody would create a 
likelihood of serious harm." 
 
b.  Analysis.  E.C. argues that, upon dismissal of the 
criminal charges, a petition for an extension of commitment 
under G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c), must be dismissed immediately, 
because the predicate for holding a former defendant -- to 
determine if the defendant may be returned to competency and 
9 
 
 
 
stand trial -- has evaporated.  Bridgewater contends that the 
over-all statutory scheme of G. L. c. 123 supports a conclusion 
that the authority to hold an untried former defendant, who has 
been found incompetent, does not evaporate when criminal charges 
are dismissed, and that it should have been allowed to amend its 
G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c), petition to a petition for commitment 
under G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 8. 
 
"Our primary duty in interpreting a statute is 'to 
effectuate the intent of the Legislature in enacting it.'"  
Sheehan v. Weaver, 467 Mass. 734, 737 (2014), quoting Water 
Dep't of Fairhaven v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 455 Mass. 
740, 744 (2010).  "We construe statutes according to the 
Legislature's intent as expressed in the words of the statute 
and read in light of the ordinary and approved usage of the 
language. . . .  At the same time, a statute should be read as a 
whole to produce an internal consistency" (citations and 
quotations omitted).  Felix F. v. Commonwealth, 471 Mass. 513, 
516 (2015). 
 
We begin with the statutory language.  "Ordinarily, where 
the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is 
conclusive as to legislative intent."  Malloch v. Hanover, 472 
Mass. 783, 788 (2015), quoting Thurdin v. SEI Boston, LLC, 452 
Mass. 436, 444 (2008).  If the words used are not otherwise 
defined in the statute, we afford them their plain and ordinary 
10 
 
 
 
meaning.  Commonwealth v. Keefner, 461 Mass. 507, 511 (2012).  
"To the extent there is any ambiguity in the statutory language, 
we turn to the legislative history" as a guide to legislative 
intent.  Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 478 Mass. 169, 182 (2017).  
Where, as here, the statutory language is ambiguous or "faulty 
or lacks precision, it is our duty to give the statute a 
reasonable construction."  Keefner, supra, quoting Capone v. 
Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Fitchburg, 389 Mass. 617, 622 (1983). 
 
To determine the Legislature's intent with respect to the 
specific provisions of G. L. c. 123, 16 (c), we consider more 
generally the legislative history of G. L. c. 123, which was 
enacted to protect individuals with mental illness.  "Prior to 
[c. 123's] enactment, it was not uncommon for incompetent 
defendants charged with minor crimes to be confined in maximum 
security facilities, such as Bridgewater . . . , for anywhere 
from a decade to a lifetime."  Foss v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 
584, 587-588 (2002).  See Kirk v. Commonwealth, 459 Mass. 67, 
70–71 (2011).  The reform of the Commonwealth's mental health 
system addressed the then often-lengthy pretrial commitment of 
incompetent defendants.  See Kirk, supra; Foss, supra at 587-
589.  General Laws c. 123, § 16 (b) and (c), "effectively 
eliminated the problem of the indefinite commitment of 
incompetent defendants, providing that '[a]n order of 
commitment . . . shall be valid for six months' and '[a]fter the 
11 
 
 
 
expiration of a commitment under [G. L. c. 123, § 16 (b)], a 
person may be committed for additional one year periods . . . 
but no untried defendant shall be so committed unless . . . the 
court also finds said defendant is incompetent to stand trial.'" 
Foss, supra at 589. 
 
An individual who is committed to Bridgewater as an 
incompetent defendant is guaranteed regular review of his 
status, "with the presumption favoring competence."  Id.  In the 
case of an incompetent defendant, the government has a 
compelling interest in determining whether an individual may be 
returned to competency and thereafter be tried as competent, and 
the individual, too, has a compelling interest in not being 
tried if incompetent.  When criminal charges are dismissed, the 
government's interest in protecting the individual and the 
public remains, but the calculus is different.  The provisions 
of G. L. c. 123 balance the rights of and protections for 
incompetent persons with the Commonwealth's interest in 
"protecting the public from potentially dangerous persons" who 
may be unable to control their actions because of their mental 
condition.  See Commonwealth v. Calvaire, 476 Mass. 242, 246 
(2017).  "[L]aws in derogation of liberty," however, must be 
narrowly tailored to further a compelling and legitimate 
government interest, and must be strictly construed, in order to 
comply with the requirements of substantive due process 
12 
 
 
 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Libby, 472 Mass. 93, 96 
(2015).  "The right of an individual to be free from physical 
restraint is a paradigmatic fundamental right."  Commonwealth v. 
Knapp, 441 Mass. 157, 164 (2004).  We evaluate E.C.'s claims 
against this backdrop, therefore, to ensure that the 
Commonwealth's actions are narrowly construed to protect both 
the individual and the public interest. 
 
We turn, first, to the denial of Bridgewater's motion to 
amend its petition for an extension of commitment, filed under 
G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c), to a petition for civil commitment under 
G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 8.  The judge's decision to deny 
Bridgewater's motion to amend is reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard.  See Castellucci v. United States Fid. & 
Guar. Co., 372 Mass. 288, 291 (1977).  The rules of civil 
procedure "eliminated the once broad discretionary authority of 
a judge to deny a motion to amend."  Id. at 289.  A judge abuses 
his or her discretion in denying a motion to amend where the 
denial reveals an error of law.  See Channel Fish Co. v. Boston 
Fish Mkt. Corp., 359 Mass. 185, 188 (1971). 
 
We conclude that, here, the judge abused her discretion in 
declining to allow Bridgewater to amend its petition for an 
extension of commitment to a petition under G. L. c. 123, 
§§ 7 and 8, a motion that Bridgewater filed immediately upon 
13 
 
 
 
learning that E.C.'s criminal charge had been dismissed.7  The 
judge denied the motion to amend because she concluded that the 
petition for an extension of commitment under G. L. c. 123, 
§ 16 (c), was void after the criminal charge had been dismissed, 
and thus that no motion to amend a petition that itself was void 
could be allowed.  The determination that the dismissal of the 
criminal charge against E.C. necessarily ended Bridgewater's 
authority to hold him under G. L. c. 123, § 6, and required both 
dismissal of a void petition for an extension of that commitment 
and E.C.'s immediate release, however, was an error of law. 
 
Once Bridgewater had filed its petition for an extension of 
commitment under G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c), Bridgewater had the 
statutory authority to hold E.C. under G. L. c. 123, § 6, which 
provides:  "No person shall be retained at a facility or at 
[Bridgewater] . . . except under a court order or except during 
the pendency of a petition for commitment . . ." (emphasis 
supplied).  In light of the entirety of the statutory scheme for 
commitment of untried defendants, we conclude that the dismissal 
of criminal charges does not require immediate release from 
commitment under G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c).  Therefore, Bridgewater 
                     
 
7 Had Bridgewater delayed in filing its motion to amend, due 
process might require a different result; we leave that question 
for another day, when the situation is before us. 
14 
 
 
 
retained authority to hold E.C. under G. L. c. 123, § 6, while 
its G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c), petition was pending. 
 
General Laws c. 123, § 7 (b), grants the medical director 
of Bridgewater the authority to "petition the [D]istrict 
[C]ourt . . . for the commitment to [Bridgewater] of any male 
patient at said . . . hospital when it is determined that the 
failure to hospitalize in strict security would create a 
likelihood of serious harm by reason of mental illness."  
Therefore, following the dismissal of the criminal charge 
against him, Bridgewater had the authority to hold E.C. under 
G. L. c. 123, § 6, while the G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c), petition 
was pending.  The medical director's authority to petition for 
E.C.'s commitment under G. L. c. 123, § 7, remained intact 
following the dismissal of the criminal charge. 
 
Another provision of G. L. c. 123, § 16, supports our 
reading that Bridgewater had authority to hold E.C. pending a 
hearing on its petition under G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 8.  General 
Laws c. 123, § 16 (f), requires that criminal charges against a 
committed person who is incompetent to stand trial be dismissed 
after the date when a competent defendant would have been 
eligible for parole; it does not state, however, that the person 
immediately must be released from commitment.  Similarly, G. L. 
c. 123, § 16 (e), envisions continuing commitment at a facility 
following the dismissal of criminal charges.  See id. ("Any 
15 
 
 
 
person committed to a facility under the provisions of this 
section may be restricted in his movements to the buildings and 
grounds of the facility at which he is committed by the court 
which ordered the commitment . . . .  This paragraph shall not 
apply to persons originally committed after a finding of 
incompetence to stand trial whose criminal charges have been 
dismissed"). 
 
This continuing authority of Bridgewater to hold E.C. 
briefly pending a hearing on its motion to amend did not, as 
E.C. contends, constitute a violation of due process.  
Significantly, the procedures that Bridgewater would be required 
to follow in pursuing a petition under G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c), 
to extend an incompetent defendant's commitment are the same as 
those that must be followed in pursuing a petition under G. L. 
c. 123, §§ 7 and 8.  Due process and the statutory provisions 
would require Bridgewater to provide an incompetent individual 
with notice and a hearing on a G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c), petition, 
just as it would for a petition under G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 8, 
and all of the same rights, such as the rights to an attorney, 
to cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence, are 
applicable at each of those hearings.  Cf. Coffin v. 
Superintendent, Mass. Treatment Ctr., 458 Mass. 186, 189 (2010). 
 
E.C. is correct that, in contrast to a petition for an 
extension of commitment under G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c), 
16 
 
 
 
incompetency to stand trial would no longer be an issue, or a 
necessary preliminary finding, in a petition pursuant to G. L. 
c. 123, §§ 7 and 8.  While the statutory protections of G. L. 
c. 123, § 16 (c), are not applicable where no criminal charges 
are pending, an individual's due process rights also are 
protected at a hearing under G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 8.  The 
Commonwealth is required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that (1) the individual has a mental disorder that grossly 
impairs the individual's "ability to meet the ordinary demands 
of life"; (2) failure to retain the individual in strict 
security at Bridgewater would create a likelihood of serious 
harm to the person or others; and (3) no less restrictive 
alternative than confinement at Bridgewater would be sufficient 
to protect the individual and others.  Commonwealth v. Nassar, 
380 Mass. 908, 912-913 & n.6, 916 (1980).  See, e.g., Hashimi v. 
Kalil, 388 Mass. 609, 609-610 (1983).  Cf. Coffin, 458 Mass. at 
189. 
 
None of the due process protections that G. L. c. 123 was 
adopted to protect is offended by Bridgewater's authority to 
pursue a petition for commitment under G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 8, 
of an individual who formerly had been committed under G. L. 
c. 123, §§ 15 and 16.  Here, E.C. was committed properly under 
G. L. c. 123, §§ 15 and 16 (a), his hospitalization was extended 
properly under G. L. c. 123, § 16 (b), and he was held 
17 
 
 
 
appropriately under G. L. c. 123, § 6 (a), after the criminal 
charge had been dismissed.  He could not have been held 
indefinitely; G. L. c. 123, § 7 (c), requires a hearing to be 
conducted within fourteen days of a petition being filed,8 and, 
as noted, the procedural protections of G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 
8, would apply at that hearing. 
 
E.C.'s argument that the dismissal of the criminal charge 
terminated Bridgewater's authority to hold him under G. L. 
c. 123, § 16, is unavailing.  Because G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c), 
does not address the procedure to follow if criminal charges are 
dismissed while a petition for recommitment is pending, we look 
to other provisions in the statute for guidance.  See Phillips 
v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 443 Mass. 110, 116-117 (2004).  
General Laws c. 123, § 16 (b), which governs the initial 
commitment to Bridgewater that a G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c), 
petition seeks to extend, provides that "the petition for the 
commitment of an untried defendant shall be heard only if the 
                     
 
8 We note that both G. L. c. 123, § 16, and G. L. c. 123, 
§ 7, impose strict limits on the time during which a petition 
may be pending before a hearing must be conducted, and any 
violation of those limits would risk running afoul of due 
process protections.  Here, Bridgewater timely filed its motion 
to amend within one day of receiving notice of dismissal of the 
charge.  Any delay in filing a motion to amend, regardless 
whether due to a delay of "notification" of the dismissal, would 
risk due process violations; Bridgewater, as custodian of an 
incompetent individual, bears the burden of prompt filing of a 
motion to amend a G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c), petition, or a motion 
for civil commitment. 
18 
 
 
 
defendant is found incompetent to stand trial, or if the 
criminal charges are dismissed after commitment" (emphasis 
added). 
 
Given this, E.C.'s suggestion that immediate release from 
commitment is mandated if criminal charges are dismissed during 
the pendency of a G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c), petition would be 
inconsistent with the Legislature's stated understanding, as 
evidenced in G. L. c. 123, § 16 (b), that untried criminal 
defendants whose charges are dismissed may require further 
treatment because they present a danger to the community.  
Moreover, E.C.'s proposed reading of the statute would create an 
absurd and inconsistent result; reading the statute under his 
view, if charges against a defendant are dismissed while the 
defendant is committed on a G. L. c. 123, § 16 (b), petition, 
Bridgewater could petition for an extended commitment under 
G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 8, while, if the charges were dismissed 
during a commitment pursuant to a G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c), 
petition, a defendant would have to be released immediately.  
Nothing in the structure or purposes of G. L. c. 123, § 16 (b) 
and (c), supports this conclusion; to the contrary, both 
provisions allow for commitment of incompetent defendants, under 
specific circumstances. 
 
Allowing amendment of a pending G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c), 
petition to a petition under G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 8, does not 
19 
 
 
 
offend an individual's fundamental right to due process.  Where 
a petition under G. L. c. 123, § 16 (c), is pending, that 
individual necessarily has been found incompetent to stand trial 
at a proceeding under G. L. c. 123, § 16 (a), where due process 
protections were provided. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The judgment of the District Court judge 
is reversed, and the matter is remanded for entry of an order 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.