Title: P. v. Michaels

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 7/18/02
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
)
)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
)
)
S016924
v.
)
)
KURT MICHAELS,
)
San Diego County
)
Super. Ct. No. CRN 14859
Defendant and Appellant.
)
__________________________________ )
A jury convicted defendant Kurt Michaels of the first degree murder of JoAnn
Clemons (Pen. Code, § 187),1 as well as robbery of Clemons (§ 211) and burglary
of her apartment (§ 459).  The jury found that defendant personally used a knife in all
three crimes (§ 12022, subd. (a)), and personally inflicted great bodily injury on
Clemons (§ 12022.7).  It also found four special circumstances:  (1) intentional
murder for financial gain (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(1)); (2) murder during the commission
of robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)); (3) murder during the commission of first
degree burglary (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(G)); and (4) murder while lying in wait
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)).  The jury fixed the punishment as death.  The trial court
denied defendant’s motions for new trial and modification of sentence.  It sentenced
defendant to death for the murder and to six years each for the robbery and the
burglary.  The sentence on the enhancements was stayed.
                                                
1 
Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
2
Defendant’s appeal is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).)  We affirm the judgment.
I.  GUILT PHASE EVIDENCE
A.  Introduction
Defendant did not dispute that he murdered JoAnn Clemons shortly after
midnight on October 3, 1988.  We therefore present only a condensed version of the
extensive prosecution evidence of defendant’s guilt.
Because defendant’s guilt of murder was not contested, the issues at the guilt
phase of the trial were the degree of the murder, defendant’s guilt of the charges of
burglary and robbery, and the truth of the alleged special circumstances.  The trial
centered on defendant’s motive for killing JoAnn Clemons.  Defendant claimed he
killed her to protect Christina, JoAnn’s 17-year-old daughter, who was defendant’s
girlfriend.  He said Christina told him that her mother had frequently abused her
sexually and physically, and that she would commit suicide if the abuse continued.
Christina said the only solution was for defendant to kill her mother, and defendant
did so.  The prosecution, on the other hand, contended that defendant killed JoAnn to
steal JoAnn’s property and to allow Christina, JoAnn’s daughter, to collect the
proceeds of JoAnn’s life insurance policy.
B.  Events Preceding the Murder
Defendant, known as “Moccasin Kurt” from the moccasins he wore, was 22
years old on the date of the murder.  After finishing high school he served for three
and one-half years in the Marines, receiving a psychiatric discharge in 1987.  Since
leaving the Marines defendant had not been employed, living on income from drug
sales and other illegal activities.
Defendant was married briefly in 1985-1986 and had one child.  In February
1987, he met 16-year-old Christina, who became his girlfriend.  On the date of the
murder Christina was confined at Broad Horizons, an adolescent rehabilitation
3
facility, where she had been sent after being arrested for illegal possession of a
concealed weapon.
JoAnn Clemons, Christina’s mother, had an apartment in Escondido.  Her life
was insured for $10,000, with an additional $10,000 for accidental death.  Under the
terms of the policy murder would be considered an accidental death.  Her daughter
Christina was the only beneficiary.
In September of 1988 Christina was released on a weekend pass from Broad
Horizons and stayed with her mother.  During that weekend Christina obtained a key
to the apartment from the building manager.  She was released again on a weekend
pass on September 29 and met with defendant.  She told him she wanted her mother
killed, and they discussed how to do it.
In the fall of 1988, defendant, Mark Herbert, Darrin Popik, and Kimberly Platt
were staying at the Oceanside apartment of Velinda Davis.  On September 30, four
days before the murder, Velinda Davis heard defendant tell Christina, “Now we can
knock off the old lady.”  Christina replied, “And then we can get the money.”  That
evening, defendant asked Mark Herbert if he wanted to go to Escondido to do a
“tax.”  (At trial, Herbert explained that a “tax” refers to collecting a debt plus
something extra – the “tax.”  The collection process usually involves force or the
threat of force.)  Defendant offered Herbert one-third of the proceeds, and Herbert
agreed to participate.  The same day defendant told Kimberly Platt he was going to
“tax” an old lady in Escondido who had been interfering too much in the lives of
defendant and Christina.
On October 1, Mark Herbert and Darrin Popik arranged for Joseph Paulk to
drive the getaway car.  Before they picked up defendant, however, Herbert decided
not to participate in the crime.  Defendant and Popik left, telling Velinda Davis they
were going to Escondido to tax someone.  After they left, Davis noticed that one of
her kitchen knives was missing.
4
C.  Prosecution Evidence of the Killing
Shortly after midnight on October 3, 1988, JoAnn’s neighbors, Annette Morton
and Laurie Roberts, heard sounds of a struggle and called the police.  When the
police arrived, another neighbor, Kimberly Anderson, described two men she had
seen in the hallway walking toward JoAnn’s apartment.  Neighbor Dennis Merling
saw a man, later identified as Popik, climbing over a balcony and walking across the
apartment building’s parking lot.
Police broke down the door of JoAnn’s apartment and discovered her body on
the bedroom floor.  An autopsy showed numerous stab wounds and blunt force
injuries to the head.  Two stab wounds to the neck were fatal.
D.  Prosecution Evidence of Actions After the Murder
Police caught Popik near the apartment complex and arrested him.  Kimberly
Anderson identified him as one of the persons she had earlier seen in the hallway of
the apartment building.
Defendant escaped and returned briefly to Velinda Davis’s apartment.  He then
went to the Marine barracks at Camp Pendleton to visit two acquaintances, Rodney
Hatch and Leon Madrid.  He told Hatch he had sliced a woman’s throat.  Madrid and
two other people present, Kimberly Buckhalter and Dennis Lucas, saw defendant
indicate by gesture that he had killed a woman by cutting her throat.
When Madrid saw defendant again a week later, defendant mentioned he was
working at a carnival in Oceanside.  On October 17, 1988, police arrested defendant
at the carnival.
E.  Defendant’s Confession
Defendant confessed immediately after his arrest.  He said he made a living by
collecting debts, gathering information, and “adjusting attitudes.”
Defendant said that Christina, his girlfriend, had just been released from Broad
Horizons, an adolescent rehabilitation facility.  She told him she would have to live
5
at home for six months and could not handle it, and would kill herself.  She said that
JoAnn, her mother, had frequently abused her, sometimes sexually.  Defendant
feared that if Christina had to return home she would resume using drugs and
alcohol.
Defendant said Christina told him she thought the only solution to her situation
was to kill JoAnn.  Defendant had tried many times to get Christina to consider
alternatives, but Christina was not willing to testify against her mother or describe
the sexual acts between her and her mother.  Defendant assured Christina he would
kill JoAnn.  He recruited Popik by promising that Popik could take whatever was in
JoAnn’s apartment.  He promised Paulk, the driver of the getaway car, $200.
Defendant told the police he had used one-quarter gram of methamphetamine
before the murder.  He and Popik waited for two to three hours outside the
apartment.  He said they were waiting for Paulk to arrive and for JoAnn to go to
sleep so the killing would be less noisy.  Defendant used Christina’s key to enter
JoAnn’s third floor apartment.  When he entered the bedroom defendant tripped,
waking JoAnn.  Popik “went ballistic.”  He tried to flee, but when defendant pushed
him back, Popik began hitting JoAnn in the face.  Defendant stabbed JoAnn in the
back but the knife broke.  Popik went into the kitchen and returned with another
knife, which he gave to defendant.  Defendant then cut JoAnn’s throat.
When police arrived and began knocking on the front door, defendant told
Popik to get out.  Defendant himself escaped by way of the apartment’s balcony.
Defendant went to Paulk’s car and they left.  During the trip defendant threw away a
knife and his moccasins.  He did not take anything from the apartment.
Before the killing, defendant had told Popik that JoAnn had $100,000 in
insurance coverage,2 and that the money would help him and Christina to get a start.
                                                
2  
JoAnn had a $100,000 insurance policy, but on the life of her ex-husband.
6
In his confession defendant said he actually did not know what insurance JoAnn had,
but he thought it would probably be about $100,000.  He promised Popik $2,000 to
$5,000 from the life insurance proceeds.
Defendant told the detectives that he killed JoAnn not for the insurance money,
but “so Christina would not have to go back with her mother.”  But later, in an
unrecorded conversation with the detectives, defendant acknowledged that the life
insurance proceeds were a secondary benefit of the killing because Christina wanted
to go to a mechanics school in Arizona and needed $9,000.
Defendant later prepared and signed a statement saying he killed JoAnn so that
Christina would not be forced to live with her mother and “revert to her old habits
and problems.”
F.  Defense Evidence
Christina was the only defense witness.  She described various incidents of
physical and sexual abuse by her mother.  She said her mother beat her with belts,
cords, and wood; kicked her in the face, knocking out her front teeth; and threw her
through a glass sliding door.  The sexual abuse included digital penetration,
beginning at a very early age, and oral copulation beginning at age nine.  Christina
reported the abuse to the social service department, but got no help.  She became
depressed, cut herself with knives, and attempted suicide several times.
When Christina was 16 she and defendant went to Texas.  After they ran out of
money they returned to San Diego.  There she was arrested for possession of a
concealed weapon and sent to Broad Horizons.  She told the therapists at Broad
Horizons that her mother had abused her, but her therapist wanted to reunite the
family and arranged for Christina to return home for overnight visits.
During a weekend visit early in September of 1988, JoAnn struck Christina
with a cast iron pan and engaged in digital penetration and oral copulation.  When
7
Christina came home on the weekend of September 15, JoAnn choked her until she
consented to sexual penetration.  The next day Christina told defendant that she
would have to live at home for the next six months.  (This was not true; she would be
living at Broad Horizons and only be home on occasional weekend passes, but she
said it to give defendant an incentive to kill JoAnn.  She said she had tried to poison
JoAnn but failed.)
On September 30, 1988, Christina again told defendant she wanted her mother
killed, and suggested cutting her mother’s throat.  She said if JoAnn were not killed,
she would commit suicide.
The prosecution attacked Christina’s credibility.  She admitted lying to JoAnn
in the past, and telling lies to the police.  She acknowledged lying to defendant when
she said she would be forced to live with her mother for six months.  She lied to her
therapist when she said she and defendant owed a large drug debt and were in
personal danger.  She liked to talk about violent acts, and to make up stories about
violent acts.  She had sold illegal drugs, was fond of knives, and had been arrested for
illegal possession of two knives.  She admitted manipulating defendant into doing
things.
Christina denied knowing that JoAnn had life insurance, or telling the police
that defendant had said JoAnn was insured.  She did not recall telling defendant that
“we can get the money,” as Velinda Davis had testified.
II.  PENALTY PHASE EVIDENCE
Defendant had no prior felony convictions.  The prosecution, however, put on
evidence of several prior incidents of threatened violence.
On August 30, 1988, Marine Sergeant Chad Fuller was in his apartment and
showed a pellet gun to a man known as Chuck.  Chuck left with the gun, but returned
a few minutes later without the gun, accompanied by defendant, Mickey Davis, and
Davis’s girlfriend.  Chuck then left the apartment.  Defendant pulled out a pistol and
8
pointed it at Fuller.  When Davis learned Fuller was a Marine, however, he
apologized and went out to retrieve the gun.  Meanwhile, defendant told Fuller that
defendant made a living by taking contracts to get people’s property back, and that he
was training Davis.  Davis returned with the pellet gun, and handed it to Fuller.
Defendant told Fuller not to call the police or he would cut Fuller in little pieces.
Defendant left a note for Chuck, and signed it “Moccasin Kurt.”  Defendant then left
with Davis and Davis’s girlfriend.
Two weeks later Fuller saw defendant, Chuck, and another man on his balcony.
Defendant said, “It’s tax time.”  He said it had cost Chuck $100 to get the pellet gun
back, so he wanted the gun.  All three men had knives; defendant also had a gun.  They
followed Fuller into the apartment, and took the pellet gun, two shotguns, and other
property.  The next day someone returned one of the shotguns to a neighbor, who
gave it to Fuller.  Several days later defendant returned some of the other property.
Oceanside Police Officer Peter Coppick testified that on August 31, 1988, he
arrested defendant for having a concealed and loaded handgun in a parked pickup
truck.  A few months later, on January 23, 1988, Officer Coppick arrested defendant
and Christina for illegal possession of knives.
Texas Police Officer Frederick Schroyer testified that on November 12, 1987,
he had detained defendant as a possible vandalism suspect and discovered that he had
two knives—a seven-inch doubled-edged blade and an eight-inch blade.  Both were
illegal in Texas.
Joseph Toy, a neighbor during defendant’s high school years, testified that
when defendant was 14 or 15 he went joyriding in defendant’s mother’s car and was
in an accident.  Defendant then broke into Toy’s house, took two guns, and stole a
1969 Mustang from the driveway.  Defendant later apologized and returned all the
property to Toy.  Defendant did yard work and other jobs to pay for the damage he
had caused to Toy’s car.
9
Michael Brohammer, a high school friend, testified that one day defendant
showed him a gun concealed under defendant’s pant leg.
The prosecution concluded its penalty phase case by playing the portion of the
recording of defendant’s confession that had not been presented at the guilt phase.
This portion involved defendant’s claim to have committed 10-15 contract killings.
Later in the interview, however, defendant said the murder of JoAnn was the first that
was premeditated and the first for other than self-defense.3  Dennis Lucas, who had
testified in the guilt phase to defendant’s statements at the Camp Pendleton Barracks
regarding the murder, returned to the stand to testify that at the time of the
conversation defendant had a “hit list.”
Defendant’s sister, Cheryl, and his mother, Barbara, described defendant’s
childhood.  Defendant’s father, Lynn Miller, was a violent alcoholic who beat
defendant and his mother, sexually abused Cheryl and who hated defendant.  Wilson
testified that Miller didn’t want another male in the house besides himself.  “I
couldn’t let him [Miller] be alone with the baby.”
When defendant was three years old, he and his mother saw Miller sexually
molest six-year-old Cheryl.  After Miller separated from Wilson, he continued to
harass the family, and they moved frequently to avoid him.  He tried to run over the
children with his car and to kidnap them.
Barbara said that after she left Miller, she had “slime boyfriends.”  Defendant
nevertheless became attached to one of them, Danny, who was a member of a
motorcycle gang.  Shortly after Barbara broke up with Danny, defendant’s maternal
grandmother died.  Defendant, then age 11, attempted suicide.
                                                
3 
The evidence was offered as proof of defendant’s mental state in connection
with the charged murder, not for the truth of his commission of other homicides.
No other evidence was presented to show that defendant had committed any other
homicide, whether or not premeditated or in self-defense.
10
In 1979, when defendant was 13 years old , his mother was raped.  Defendant
was devastated and felt he had failed to protect her.
The next year his sister Cheryl was raped.  Barbara described defendant’s
response:  “Just volatile.  He was so angry, he was close to insane.”  He considered
it his responsibility to protect his sister and mother, and any woman who was being
abused.
Both defendant’s mother and sister said defendant tended to brag about things
that had not happened to protect his image as a strong and dangerous person.  Cheryl
said, “I believe a lot of what he told the police was blown up so that he could be
tough.”  Michael Brohammer, defendant’s high school friend, also said that
defendant fantasized and tended to exaggerate.  Terri Cook described defendant’s
positive influence on her addicted son.  She believed defendant saved her son’s life
by getting him to leave the community where he had drug connections.
Carol Drukee, who was Christina’s foster mother for a time, gave positive
testimony as to defendant’s character.  She also testified that when JoAnn Clemons
would visit, she saw JoAnn engage in sexually inappropriate behavior with Christina.
Dr. Bruce Hubbard, a clinical psychiatrist at the University of California at San
Diego, examined defendant and Christina.  He described defendant as suffering from
a major depressive disorder, and mixed personality disorder with depressive,
dependent, antisocial, and borderline features.  Defendant’s attempted suicide at the
age of 11 was indicative of extreme emotional disturbance.  Defendant also had mild
or minimal brain dysfunction, probably from use of methamphetamine or from an
injury in an auto accident.
Dr. Hubbard testified that he did not believe defendant had an antisocial
personality disorder.  Defendant was able to relate closely to other persons and have
intense feelings for someone else, which is not possible for someone with an
antisocial personality.  Dr. Hubbard concluded that JoAnn’s sexual abuse of
11
Christina was the key motivating factor in defendant’s murder of JoAnn.  Defendant
saw himself as a protector of abused women and children.  When defendant met
Christina, he assumed responsibility for protecting her.
Dr. Hubbard also met with Christina and reviewed her psychological and
juvenile records, as well as the transcript of her murder trial.  He found Christina
suffered from both a major depressive disorder and severe borderline personality
disorder, the result of repeated sadistic abuse by her mother.  He explained that a
“borderline personality” is one that appears to be neurotic, but on deeper
examination has psychotic features.  Christina had a superior intelligence quotient
(IQ) of 138-141, in contrast to defendant’s IQ of 91, and in his view was able to
control and manipulate defendant.
Dr. Hubbard also reviewed JoAnn’s psychiatric records, which in his opinion
revealed manic-depressive illness, alcoholism, and a severe mixed personality
disorder with histrionic and sadistic features.  Combined, the personality disorders
of JoAnn, Christina, and defendant would result in “disaster, catastrophe, and chaos.”
The prosecution called Christina as a rebuttal witness.  She acknowledged that
she had told the psychiatrist who examined her in connection with her juvenile court
prosecution about incidents in which defendant had hurt her.  On cross-examination,
Christina said she and defendant enjoyed violent sex.  Some of the acts she had
described to the psychiatrist did not happen, and others were consensual.
III.  GUILT PHASE ISSUES
A.  Admissibility of Defendant’s Confession
1.  Background
Detectives Allen and Gaylor interrogated defendant at the Oceanside Police
Station shortly after defendant’s arrest:
ALLEN:“This is Kurt Michaels [defendant].  No middle name.
12
GAYLOR:
“Kurt, what’s your middle name?  None.
DEFENDANT:
“Legal [name is] changed for the third time.
GAYLOR: 
“Where does your family live, Kurt?
DEFENDANT:
“Who knows honestly?  I wish I knew or I’d be with them
now.  I’d be able to get the other pictures in my other coat.
GAYLOR:
“Well, I’ll tell you.  I’ve been doing this for about twelve
years.  John’s been doing this for about thirteen years, here.  And a couple of years
with the San Diego Police before that.  And a few years with the Highway Patrol
before that.  And if there’s one thing we know, it’s that there’s always more than one
side to every story.  So what we want to do is provide you with an opportunity to tell
your side of the story, because this last two weeks, we’ve been talking with a lot of
different people and have gotten a lot of different information from different people.
DEFENDANT:
“You found out I am a mental case.  (Laughter.)
GAYLOR:
“So, now it’s your turn to tell your side of the story.  Okay?
Also, if you have any questions, it will be your opportunity to ask them, all right?
Before we do that, though, I want to read you your rights.  [Reads standard Miranda
warnings.]  Do you understand each of these rights I’ve explained to you?
(Defendant nods his head yes.)  Is that yes?
DEFENDANT: 
“Yes.
GAYLOR:
“Okay.  Having in mind and understanding your rights as I’ve
told you, are you willing to talk with us?
DEFENDANT:
“Sure.  No problem.
GAYLOR:
“Do you know why you’re here?
DEFENDANT:
“Yes.
GAYLOR:
“Tell me, in your own words.
DEFENDANT:
“Murder.
GAYLOR: 
“Murder of who?
13
DEFENDANT:
“Murder of JoAnn Clemons.
GAYLOR:
“Well, what’s your side of the story?  What happened?
DEFENDANT:
“I don’t know if I should without an attorney.  (Laughter.)
It ain’t going to do me no . . . .  (Laughter.)
ALLEN: 
“Well, we need to know.  Let’s put it this way, Kurt.  He
just advised you of your rights.  And you said, that yeah, you wanted to talk to us.
There’s no problem.  If at any time that you do not want to talk with us, you can stop
at any particular time.  If there’s any time that we ask you a question that you don’t
want to answer, you can stop at any time.
DEFENDANT:
“Okay, that one.  (Laughter.)
ALLEN:
“Well, what I’m saying is that we just want to make sure you
understand all those things.
DEFENDANT:
“Okay, I appreciate it.
ALLEN:
“And the other thing that Chuck said was we have uh pretty
much understand what the story is and we like to going to give you your opportunity.
DEFENDANT:
“You’re one up on me.
ALLEN:
“To understand your side of the story.  How’s that?
DEFENDANT:
“I don’t know what stories you’ve been told, and how
accurate they are.
ALLEN:
“Would it help you if we told you what, uh . . .
DEFENDANT:  
“What information you got?  That would be a blast.”
(Italics added.)
Defendant here contends:  (1) the italicized language from his conversation
with Detectives Allen and Gaylor shows that he asserted his rights to counsel and to
remain silent; (2) the confession and its context showed that defendant was under the
influence of methamphetamine and lacked capacity to waive his rights; and (3) his
14
waiver of his rights was the result of impermissible “softening up” tactics by the
detectives.
2.  Assertions of the right to counsel and to remain silent
Defendant recognizes that under Davis v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 452,
456, 459 and People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 130-131, a request for
counsel must be unequivocal.  He acknowledges that defendant’s first statement – “I
don’t know if I should without a lawyer” – is at best an equivocal request for
representation.  He argues, however, that his statement—“Okay, that one” – made in
response to Detective Allen’s comment, makes the request for counsel unequivocal
and constitutes an unequivocal assertion of the right to silence.
We disagree.  Defendant’s statement, “Okay, that one” implies a refusal to
answer a particular question, perhaps Detective Gaylor’s question asking defendant:
“[W]hat’s your side of the story?  What happened?”  Defendant did not assert a right
to refuse to answer any questions, ask that the questioning come to a halt, or request
counsel.  Instead, he was showing that he knew he could refuse to answer any or all
questions and would exercise this right on a question-by-question basis.  From time
to time in the interrogation he did refuse to answer specific questions.  But the
words defendant used, and his subsequent conduct, do not show that he wanted to
stop the interrogation and bar all further questions.
The case is analogous to People v. Silva (1988) 45 Cal.3d 604.  There, the
defendant waived Miranda rights and answered several questions, then refused to
answer a question that might place him at the site where the murder victim was
kidnapped.  The interrogation continued, with the defendant answering some
questions and not others.  We concluded that the defendant’s constitutional rights
were not violated, because “[a] defendant may indicate an unwillingness to discuss
15
certain subjects without manifesting a desire to terminate ‘an interrogation already
in progress.’ ”  (45 Cal.3d at pp. 629-630.)  The same is true here.
3.  Capacity to waive Miranda rights
Describing himself as a habitual user of methamphetamine, defendant argues
that his responses during the interrogation suggest he was under the influence of that
substance.  Defendant, however, specifically denied being under the influence of
alcohol or narcotics at the time of the interview.  Contrary to counsel’s suggestion,
we cannot determine from defendant’s conversational pattern in a written transcript
whether he was under the influence of methamphetamine, and if so, to such an extent
that he was not competent to waive his rights.  Moreover, defendant’s failure to raise
this issue in the trial court bars him from asserting it on appeal.  (See People v. Kipp
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 1110, 1130; People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 339.)
4.  Police “softening-up” of defendant
Before advising defendant of his constitutional rights, Detective Gaylor
commented that there were two sides to every story.  According to defendant, that
comment was designed to soften him up and induce a confession.  In support, he
cites this passage from People v. Honeycutt (1977) 20 Cal.3d 150, 160-161:  “It
must be remembered that the purpose of Miranda is to preclude police
interrogation unless and until a suspect has voluntarily waived his rights or has his
attorney present.  When the waiver results from a clever softening-up of a defendant
through . . . ingratiating conversation, the subsequent decision to waive without a
Miranda warning must be deemed to be involuntary for the same reason that an
incriminating statement made under police interrogation without a Miranda warning
is deemed to be involuntary.”  The Attorney General in reply correctly observed that
the facts here are not at all like Honeycutt, which, as described in People v. Kelly,
involved “an unrecorded 30-minute, pre-Miranda conversation, discussing mutual
16
acquaintances, past events and finally the victim.”  (People v. Kelly (1990) 51
Cal.3d 931, 954.)
In the trial court, defendant unsuccessfully argued that his confession was
inadmissible because he did not waive his Miranda rights to counsel and to remain
silent.  The issue he now raises is different—he claims that even if he did waive his
Miranda rights, that waiver was involuntary.  The determination whether a waiver is
voluntary is one entrusted to the trial judge, based on the totality of the facts and
circumstances, including the background, experience and conduct of the accused.
(See People v. Kelly, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 950.)
Because defendant failed to raise the voluntariness issue at trial, he cannot
raise it now.  (People v. Ray, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 339.)  Defendant contends here
that the issue is preserved for appeal by his trial court objection to the admissibility
of the confession on the ground that he did not waive his Miranda rights.  Because
such an objection does not ordinarily lead to the presentation of evidence of
defendant’s background, experience, and conduct -- evidence essential to
determining whether a waiver was voluntary -- we reject that contention.
B.  Defendant’s Guilty Plea
1.  Background
On October 4, 1988, the prosecution filed a two-count complaint against
defendant, alleging one count of robbery and one count of murder, without
specifying the degree of the murder or adding special circumstance allegations.
Defendant pleaded not guilty.  At the bail review hearing on October 19, the
prosecution persuaded the court to deny bail on the ground that special circumstance
charges might be added to the complaint, a decision the prosecution said it would
make after the preliminary hearing.
17
At the start of the preliminary hearing on December 6, 1988, defense counsel
said his client would plead guilty to murder, and offered a fully executed change of
plea form to the court.  The prosecutor asked the court not to accept the plea, stating
that the prosecution would amend the complaint to add special circumstance
allegations.  After a recess, the prosecution offered an amended complaint.  The
magistrate then rejected the guilty plea and allowed the filing of the amended
complaint.
Defendant contends:  (1) the magistrate erred in refusing to accept his guilty
plea before the filing of an amended complaint charging special circumstances; and
(2) the filing of the amended complaint was a vindictive act, to penalize him for
attempting to exercise his statutory right to plead guilty to the face of the complaint,
and should have been rejected by the magistrate.
2.  The magistrate’s rejection of defendant’s guilty plea
Defendant argues that he had an absolute right to plead guilty to the murder
charge in the complaint.  He relies on section 859a and the cases interpreting that
statute.  Section 859a, subdivision (a), provides in pertinent part:  “While the charge
remains pending before the magistrate and when defendant’s counsel is present, the
defendant may plead guilty to the offense charged, or, with the consent of the
magistrate and the district attorney or other counsel for the people, . . . plead guilty
or nolo contendere to any other offense the commission of which is necessarily
included in that with which he is charged . . . .”
Defendant sought to plead guilty to the charge of murder, not to any lesser
included offense, so the consent of the magistrate and the district attorney was not
required.4  A defendant charged in more than one count has the right under section
                                                
4 
The magistrate erroneously reasoned that because the plea did not specify the
degree of the murder, it was a plea to second degree murder, and that under section
859(a), a plea to a lesser included offense required the consent of the prosecution.
18
859a to plead to an individual count.  (See People v. Reza (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d
647, 653-654.)
The Attorney General points out that section 1009, after providing that a
prosecutor may amend a complaint without leave of court before a defendant enters
a plea, states that after a defendant has pleaded or demurred to the charges “[t]he
court in which an action is pending may order or permit an amendment of an
indictment, accusation or information, or the filing of an amended complaint, for any
defect or insufficiency, at any stage of the proceedings . . . .”  Certain amendments
are prohibited – those which change the offenses charged, or alter an information to
add charges not supported by the evidence at the preliminary hearing.  (Ibid.)  But the
statute does not prohibit the prosecution from amending a complaint, indictment, or
information after a defendant offers to plead guilty.
Another statute, section 969.5, specifically authorizes amendment of a
complaint after a plea of guilty to charge prior felony convictions.  In People v.
Superior Court (Alvarado) (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 464, the Court of Appeal held
that a trial court had abused its discretion by refusing to allow an amendment after a
guilty plea adding a prior felony conviction that made the defendant ineligible for
probation.  Rejecting the defendant’s contention that section 969.5 was inconsistent
with section 1009, the Court of Appeal said that section 969.5 was simply an
example of the general rule that with leave of court charges could be amended after a
guilty plea.  (Alvarado, at p. 476.)  We conclude that the magistrate here had
discretion to permit the prosecution to amend the complaint against defendant.
The question remains whether the magistrate abused his discretion in granting
the prosecutor leave to amend after defendant stated his desire to plead guilty to
                                                                                                                                                
A defendant, however, may plead guilty to murder without specifying the degree
(People v. Atchley (1955) 132 Cal.App.2d 444, 446), leaving it to the court to
decide the degree of the crime.  (§ 1192.)
19
murder.  On this subject, both parties call our attention to Cronk v. Municipal Court
(1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 351.  In that case a murder defendant, scheduled to enter a
plea on July 24, 1981, made an ex parte motion to advance that date to July 21.  On
July 21, he appeared and offered to plead guilty.  The prosecutor objected, asserting
that he intended to add special circumstance charges but had not yet prepared an
amended complaint.  The Court of Appeal in Cronk rejected the defendant’s
contention that the magistrate erred in rejecting the plea.  It stated that “ ‘[i]f the
defense, without notice to the other side, accelerated a hearing date so as to cut off a
legitimate right to amend [citation], the magistrate has the inherent power to restore
that right to the prosecution by refusing to accept the plea . . . .’ ”  (Id. at p. 354.)
Defendant here points out that he did not manipulate the court’s calendar, but
offered his plea on the date scheduled.  Defendant, however, knew of the
prosecution’s express intention to decide whether to charge special circumstances
after the preliminary hearing, yet defendant gave no advance notice of his intent to
enter a guilty plea before the preliminary hearing.  Under these circumstances, the
magistrate was within his discretion in refusing to accept the plea and allowing the
prosecution to amend the complaint.
Because we conclude that defendant was not deprived of any right under state
law, we necessarily reject his contention that the magistrate’s order deprived
defendant of a state-created due process right protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the federal Constitution.
3.  Allegedly vindictive prosecution
After the prosecution amended the complaint to charge special circumstances,
defendant moved to strike the special circumstances.  He contended that the
amendment was a vindictive response to his attempt to exercise his right to plead
guilty.  The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion.
20
There is no doubt that the timing of the amendment was occasioned by the
defendant’s attempt to plead guilty to the charge of murder.  But there is nothing in
the record to show the amendment was a vindictive response.  The prosecution had
already made clear, before defendant’s plea, that it was considering special
circumstance allegations.  There is nothing suspicious in its failure to file them with
the initial charges.  “ ‘ “[A] prosecutor should remain free before trial to exercise
the broad discretion entrusted to him to determine the extent of the societal interest
in prosecution.  An initial decision should not freeze future conduct [because] the
initial charges filed by a prosecutor may not reflect the extent to which an individual
is legitimately subject to prosecution.” ’ ”  (People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d
787, 828, quoting In re Bower (1985) 38 Cal.3d 865, 874.)
Here, defendant was not yet in jeopardy.  The United States Supreme Court has
refused to apply a presumption of vindictiveness in a pretrial setting.  (United States
v. Goodwin (1982) 457 U.S. 368, 384.)  In Edwards we noted that the attachment of
jeopardy was an “important factor” in determining vindictiveness (People v.
Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 828), and although Edwards did not absolutely
prohibit a court from presuming vindictiveness in a pretrial setting, neither Edwards
nor any other California case has done so.  (See People v. Bracey (1994) 21
Cal.App.4th 1532, 1544, and cases there cited.)  The circumstances here do not
present a “reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness” (In re Bower, supra, 38 Cal.3d
865, 877) that would shift the burden of proof to the prosecution to show that the
amendment “was justified by some objective change in circumstances or in the state
of the evidence.”  (Id. at p. 879.)
Because vindictiveness is not presumed, the defense must present evidence
showing that the “ ‘prosecutor’s charging decision was motivated by a desire to
punish [the defendant] for doing something the law plainly allows him to do.’ ”
(People v. Bracey, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 1549, quoting United States v.
21
Goodwin, supra, 457 U.S. at p. 384.)  Defendant here failed to present such
evidence.
C.  Sufficiency of the Evidence of Special Circumstances
1.  Standard of review
In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence on appeal, the court must review the
“entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it
contains substantial evidence – that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value – that would support a rational trier of fact in finding the [defendant
guilty] beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 642;
see People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.)  This standard also applies to a
finding of special circumstances.  (People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 790-
791.)
2.  The special circumstance of lying in wait
The jury found that defendant “intentionally killed the victim while lying in
wait.”  (§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(15), added by Prop. 7, § 6, as approved by voters,
Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1978).)  The voters passed an initiative measure that
subsequently amended subdivision (a)(15) by changing “while” lying in wait to “by
means of” lying in wait.  (Stats. 1998, ch. 629, enacted as Prop. 18, approved by
voters, Prim. Elec. (Mar. 7, 2000) eff. Mar. 8, 2000.)  This special circumstance
requires proof of “an intentional murder, committed under circumstances which
include (1) a concealment of purpose, (2) a substantial period of watching and
waiting for an opportune time to act, and (3) immediately thereafter, a surprise
attack on an unsuspecting victim from a position of advantage.”  (People v. Morales
(1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 557; see People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 432.)  Here,
defendant and Popik waited outside JoAnn Clemons’s apartment for two to three
hours, concealed from view by bushes that separated their hiding place from the
22
building’s parking lot.  They were waiting for two reasons.  One was to delay their
entry until JoAnn’s apartment lights went out, when she would presumably be asleep.
As defendant explained in his confession, “[w]e wanted her asleep” because then the
killing would be a “little less noisy.”  The other reason for waiting was that Paulk had
not yet arrived in the getaway car.  When defendant and Popik saw the apartment
lights go out, they continued to wait for Paulk.  After Paulk arrived a half-hour to an
hour later, defendant and Popik set out for JoAnn’s apartment.  Waiting and watching
until a victim falls asleep before attacking is a typical scenario of a murder by means
of lying in wait.  (See People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 163-164; People v.
Ruiz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 589, 615; People v. McDermand (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d
770, 784.)
Defendant distinguishes the cited cases by noting that they concern lying in
wait as proof of first degree murder, not as proof of a special circumstance.
According to defendant, the special circumstance of lying in wait has an immediacy
requirement.  (See Houston v. Roe (9th Cir. 1999) 177 F.3d 901, 907; Domino v.
Superior Court (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 1000, 1011.)  That requirement is set out in
CALJIC No. 8.81.15, which was given to the jury in this case:  “For a killing to be
perpetrated while lying in wait, both the concealment and watchful waiting as well as
the killing must occur in the same time period, or in an uninterrupted attack
commencing no later than the moment concealment ends.  If there is a clear
interruption separating the period of lying in wait from the period during which the
killing takes place, so that there is neither an immediate killing nor a continuous
flow of uninterrupted lethal events, the special circumstance is not proved.”5
                                                
5
The instruction is based on People v. Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pages
554-559.  After section 190.2, subdivision (a)(15) was amended, the Committee on
Standard Jury Instructions replaced CALJIC No. 8.81.15 with a new instruction.  The
Use Note to the new instruction states that CALJIC No. 8.81.15 should still be used
for murders that occurred before March 7, 2000.
23
Defendant maintains that the facts here show a “cognizable interruption” (People v.
Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 558) between the period of concealment and
watchful waiting and the killing.
If the only interruption was the time required for defendant and Popik to
emerge from their hiding place, cross the apartment building’s parking lot, and enter
the victim’s apartment, that interruption would not preclude application of the
special circumstance of lying in wait.  The victim’s death would have followed in a
continuous flow from the concealment and watchful waiting.  The special
circumstance of lying in wait does not require that the defendant strike his blow
from the place of concealment.  (People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th 86, 164.)
That defendant and Popik waited a half-hour or more after the victim’s
apartment lights went out, until Paulk arrived in the getaway car, does not preclude
the special circumstance of lying in wait.  “As long as the murder is immediately
preceded by lying in wait, the defendant need not strike at the first available
opportunity, but may wait to maximize his position of advantage before taking the
victim by surprise.”  (People v. Ceja (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1134, 1145.)  Whether
defendant waited the half-hour or more to make sure JoAnn was asleep, as the
Attorney General contends, or to make sure his escape car was available, as
defendant said in his confession, is immaterial, since the victim was killed in an
uninterrupted flow of events from the time defendant and Popik emerged from their
hiding place.
3.  Burglary and robbery special circumstances
Before the murder occurred, defendant told four people (Mark Herbert, Joseph
Paulk, Kimberly Pratt, and Velinda Davis) that he was going to “tax” someone in
Escondido.  He told Pratt he was going to get jewelry from an old lady, and that Pratt
should meet him in a bar at closing time if she wanted a good deal.  He offered
24
Herbert $5,000 to participate, and promised Popik his choice of items from the
Clemons’s apartment.
The murder scene showed signs of a robbery – furs were spread on the couch,
and a purse was found with its contents dumped out.  When Popik was arrested, he
had a Walkman radio and three sets of earrings from the apartment.  Defendant in his
confession said that he took nothing from the apartment.  He later remarked to
Kimberly Buckhalter that he had furs and jewelry she might want.  There is, however,
no evidence that anything was missing from the apartment other than the items found
with Popik.
The evidence of burglary and robbery is uncontested.  Defendant recruited
Popik by promising him that he could have his choice of property from JoAnn’s
apartment.  Defendant opened the apartment door for Popik, and the two together
subdued and killed JoAnn.  Popik was later arrested with property taken from JoAnn.
On these facts, it is clear that Popik is guilty of burglary and robbery, and that
defendant was his accomplice.
The prosecution, however, did not try the case on a theory that defendant was an
accomplice to Popik’s burglary and robbery.  Neither does the Attorney General
defend the verdict on such a theory here.  Instead, he maintains that the defendant
entered the apartment and killed JoAnn with the intention of stealing her property,
but was interrupted when the police arrived and escaped without taking anything.
(See People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 984, upholding a special circumstance
finding based on robbery although the defendant fled without taking any property.)
Defendant said his reason for killing JoAnn was to protect Christina, his
girlfriend, from abuse by her mother, JoAnn.  The Attorney General agrees that this
was one reason, but argues that defendant had a separate, independent felonious
purpose — to steal her property.  Such a concurrent intent will support the felony-
murder special circumstance.  (People v. Zapien, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 984; People
25
v. Bonin (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 850-851; People v. Murtishaw (1981) 29 Cal.3d
733, 752, fn. 13.)  Defendant here responds that even if he planned a robbery, the
robbery was merely incidental to the murder.  (See People v. Green (1980) 27
Cal.3d 1, 60-61 [robbery to conceal identity of murder victim and thus facilitate
killer’s escape]; People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 323-325 [threat of
robbery to conceal that a defendant’s goal was murder – after the killing the
defendant left without taking the property the victim had given him].)  He claims that
he had no motive to steal from JoAnn other than to reward his accomplices, because
once he had killed JoAnn, Christina, his girlfriend, would inherit JoAnn’s property
and could simply enter the apartment and take whatever she wanted.
The question whether the burglary and robbery in this case were “merely
incidental” to the murder was submitted to the jury under proper instructions, so the
issue is simply whether substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict.  We
conclude that it does.  Defendant is in effect arguing that we should believe his
confession, in which he said his only motive was to protect Christina, and should
disregard as boasting the comments he made before and after the murder.  Defense
witnesses described defendant as given to boasting to protect his image, but the jury
could conclude otherwise and could infer from the evidence that defendant had an
independent, if secondary, purpose of taking property from JoAnn.
4.  Murder for financial gain
Substantial evidence supports the special circumstance finding of murder for
financial gain.  (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(1).)  Before JoAnn’s murder, Velinda Davis heard
defendant tell Christina, “Now we can knock off the old lady.”  Christina replied
“And then we can get the money.”  Defendant told codefendant Popik that JoAnn had
insurance coverage of $100,000, and that the money would help Christina and him to
get a new start, and would provide Christina with money “to do good.”  After the
26
murder Christina told the police that defendant said he thought her mother had
insurance.  After his confession to the police, when Detective Gaylor asked
defendant if the life insurance policy was a secondary benefit of killing JoAnn,
defendant agreed.  Defendant said Christina had told him about JoAnn’s insurance
policy, and that she was interested in going to a mechanics school in Phoenix and
needed $9,000.
A killing for the purpose of obtaining life insurance benefits, as contrasted with
a killing during a burglary or robbery, falls squarely within the scope of the financial
gain special circumstance.  To avoid any overlap with burglary or robbery special
circumstances, we have construed the financial gain special circumstance to apply
“only when the victim’s death is the consideration for, or an essential prerequisite
to, the financial gain sought by the defendant.”  (People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d
731, 751.)  Obtaining life insurance benefits falls within this description, because
the death of the insured is an essential prerequisite for the financial gain.  (See
People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th 86; Lewis v. Witik (C.D. Cal. 1996) 927 F.Supp.
1288.)
Defendant argues that his primary purpose in killing JoAnn was to protect
Christina from abuse by JoAnn, but the financial gain special circumstance applies
even if the gain is only a secondary purpose.  (People v. Nogura (1992) 4 Cal.4th
599, 635.)  Neither does it matter that no financial gain was realized because the
insurer refused to pay the benefits to Christina, the beneficiary of JoAnn’s life
insurance policy, because Christina was involved in JoAnn’s murder.  (People v.
Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1025.)  Finally, it does not matter that Christina,
not defendant, would be the direct recipient of the financial gain.  Although some
cases in which the defendant was the direct recipient have used language that spoke
of the special circumstance as applying when the defendant expected to obtain
financial gain (e.g., People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 409) the statute is not
27
so limited, but speaks of intentional murder “carried out for financial gain.”
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(1).)  There is no reason why it should not apply to an intentional
murder carried out for the financial gain of a third person.
D.  Issues Relating to Defendant’s Representation
The trial court initially appointed James Burns and Charles Duff to represent
defendant.  On July 31, 1989, the court replaced Duff, the second counsel, with
Mark Chambers.  On August 21, 1989, the court granted defendant’s Marsden
motion (People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118) and removed lead counsel James
Burns.  Two days later, at the hearing to appoint counsel, Chambers said he and
defendant had interviewed several attorneys and wanted a one-week continuance so
the attorneys could apply to the court for appointment.  The court refused the
continuance and also refused to delay matters for 15 minutes so one of the attorneys
interviewed, Mr. Mueller, could appear.  Instead, the court appointed Richard
Grossberg as lead attorney.  Chambers continued to serve as second counsel.  The
judge explained that he would not appoint Chambers as lead counsel because of
Chambers’s lack of experience and the fact that he was rated by the San Diego Public
Defender’s Office as a Class III Attorney; the office requires a Class VI rating to act
as lead attorney in a capital case.
On December 7, 1989, defendant moved to have Grossberg removed from the
case, asserting that Grossberg was not putting in the time needed to prepare the
defense.  The motion was denied.  On January 18, 1990, Grossberg moved to be
relieved as counsel.  This motion was also denied.
Grossberg renewed his motion to be relieved on February 5, 1990.  On the
same day defendant moved to represent himself.  After a hearing, the trial court again
refused to relieve Grossberg.
28
The court then turned to defendant’s motion to represent himself.  Finding that
defendant was competent and lucid and had made a knowing waiver of the right to
counsel, the court granted the motion.  It appointed Chambers and Grossberg as
advisory counsel.
On February 13, defendant asked for a 60-day continuance to prepare for trial.
He explained that because he was considered suicidal, he had been placed in a cell
that did not give him access to telephones or legal documents.  The court granted the
motion and ordered that defendant be housed in the downtown San Diego jail where
he would have better access to legal materials.
On March 9, defendant, through advisory attorney Chambers, asked for an
additional six-month continuance of trial.  The motion was based on problems with
the lack of preparation and investigation by his former attorneys.  The court denied
the motion and the case went to trial on April 23, 1990.
Although defendant represented himself, with Grossberg and Chambers as his
advisory counsel, at trial Chambers, who initially had been second counsel, took on
the role of lead counsel.  Grossberg did not participate and defendant’s participation
was minimal.  Whenever the judge asked defendant if he intended to participate, he
replied that Chambers was his attorney and would represent him.  Chambers
conducted the voir dire, examined witnesses, and presented all arguments, both at the
guilt phase and at the penalty phase.
1.  Defendant’s request for a continuance to find an attorney
After granting defendant’s motion to remove Burns as defendant’s lead
counsel, the trial court announced its intention to appoint Richard Grossberg.  The
judge described Grossberg as “having a long legacy of having handled homicide
matters,” and being an “amiable individual” who could probably get along with
defendant.  Mark Chambers, the second counsel, explained that he and defendant had
interviewed several attorneys.  He asked for a 15-minute delay so that one of those
29
attorneys, Mr. Mueller, could arrive, but the judge replied, “[I]f Mr. Mueller was
present, I would have to tell him, weighing the two, I would appoint Mr. Grossberg
anyway.  Mr. Grossberg has far more experience.”  The court said that another
attorney suggested by Chambers, Mr. Mills, was well qualified but was not present
and had not indicated a willingness to take the assignment.
At the hearing defendant did not object to Grossberg’s appointment other than
to note he was not among the attorneys defendant and Chambers had interviewed.
Now defendant claims that Grossberg was not qualified because he had tried only
one capital case, and that trial had occurred before the United States Supreme Court
decided Furman v. Georgia (1972) 408 U.S. 238.  But Grossberg’s qualifications
would depend on his experience in trying criminal cases, not just his experience in
capital cases, and an attorney with a long legacy of handling homicide cases may be
qualified to take on a capital case.  Grossberg was one of three San Diego County
attorneys classified by the public defender as Class VI – qualified to handle a capital
case.
The trial court gave the defendant the opportunity to express his views on who
should be appointed.  (See People v. Chavez (1989) 26 Cal.3d 334, 346-347.)
Chambers mentioned the names of some attorneys, but offered no reason why they
would be a better choice than Grossberg.  Under these circumstances, having found a
competent attorney who was willing to serve as lead counsel, the trial court had no
obligation to continue the proceedings to consider other possible appointees.
2.  Defendant’s motion to remove Grossberg
Defendant first sought to remove lead counsel Grossberg on December 1,
1989.  On December 7, he moved to recuse the trial judge because he had appointed
Grossberg, and advanced several objections to Grossberg’s performance.  Some of
his defendant’s objections were quite general:  that Grossberg had failed to follow
30
through on many defense options, and that he was unwilling to fight for defendant’s
basic rights.  Defendant’s only specific complaint was that Grossberg had
interviewed him in a jail interview room that was reputed to be illegally monitored.
Defendant said his relationship with Grossberg had deteriorated to the point that
defendant had ordered Grossberg not to contact him or anyone else concerning the
case.
The trial court concluded that defendant had failed to show that he was not
receiving adequate assistance from counsel, and that the difficulties encountered by
defense counsel were caused by defendant’s unwillingness to cooperate.
On January 18, 1990, Grossberg moved to be relieved as counsel.  He said he
could not properly prepare for trial because his relationship with defendant had
completely broken down and defendant refused to speak with him.  Grossberg also
said he had a conflict with second counsel Chambers.  Defendant and Chambers
wanted the robbery charges against defendant tried first, which Grossberg opposed.
There were other disagreements about strategy and investigation.  The judge denied
the motions for recusal and for removal of Grossberg.
A further hearing on February 5, 1990, showed continuing conflict between
Grossberg, Chambers, and defendant.  The court refused to remove Grossberg, but
suggested the possibility that Chambers take over as lead counsel.  Defendant,
however, said he would prefer to represent himself.
A trial court must grant a motion to replace counsel “if the record clearly
shows that the . . . appointed attorney is not providing adequate representation
[citation] or that defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an
irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result [citations].”
(People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 854.)  Nothing in the record here shows
that Grossberg was incompetent or would not provide adequate representation if he
received defendant’s cooperation.  But it is clear that he and defendant were in a
31
conflict that could imperil Grossberg’s ability to provide effective representation.
One consequence of the conflict is that defendant refused to review his confession
with Grossberg, depriving Grossberg of the opportunity to determine whether any
part of it was untrue.
But that does not demonstrate an “irreconcilable conflict” that would require
the trial court to replace appointed counsel.  Defendant cannot simply refuse to
cooperate with his appointed attorney and thereby compel the court to remove that
attorney.  “ ‘[I]f a defendant’s claimed lack of trust in, or inability to get along with,
an appointed attorney were sufficient to compel appointment of substitute counsel,
defendants effectively would have a veto power over any appointment and by a
process of elimination could obtain appointment of their preferred attorneys, which
is certainly not the law.’ ”  (People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1070,
quoting People v. Crandell, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 860.)
Here the record suggests that defendant would not cooperate with any attorney
not “pre-cleared” by him and second counsel Mark Chambers.  Defendant
complained that Grossberg was not doing enough to prepare for trial, yet Grossberg
at defendant’s request worked diligently to improve defendant’s conditions of
confinement, attended the trial of codefendant Popik, and interviewed witnesses.
Defendant objected that defense investigator Thomas, of whom he disapproved,
called a witness and scared the witness, but defendant did not set out what Thomas
said to the witness.  The nature of defendant’s complaints suggests that defendant’s
principal objection to Grossberg was that Grossberg was managing the defense as a
lead attorney should do, rather than deferring to defendant’s opinions.  Under these
circumstances, the trial court could reasonably conclude that the conflict between
lead counsel and defendant was not irreconcilable, but that defendant was rejecting
reconciliation and refusing to cooperate with the goal of removing Grossberg and
replacing him with Chambers.
32
3.  Defendant’s request to represent himself
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in granting his request to
represent himself.  (See Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806.)  Defendant
does not claim that he was incompetent to represent himself, or that the judge failed
to advise him properly on the dangers and consequences of that action.  He contends,
instead, that his request to represent himself was not unequivocal, because he made
it clear that he only wanted to represent himself if the court refused to remove
Grossberg as his attorney.  He points out that the court is not required to grant an
equivocal request for self-representation.  (People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997,
1028.)
Defendant confuses an “equivocal” request with a “conditional” request.  There
is nothing equivocal in a request that counsel be removed and, if not removed, that
the defendant wants to represent himself.  Once the court has decided not to remove
counsel, the defendant has the choice of going ahead with existing counsel or
representing himself.  There is nothing improper in putting the defendant to this
choice, so long as the court did not err in refusing to remove counsel.  (People v.
Smith (1985) 38 Cal.3d 945, 957; see People v. Crandell, supra, 46 Cal.2d 833,
860-861 [Faretta motion voluntary, although made in response to trial court’s
ruling denying defendant’s motion to remove counsel.].)  If, under these
circumstances, the defendant elects to represent himself, he need not show that he
would make the same decision if offered other counsel.
Moreover, even if an initial request for self-representation is equivocal, the
trial court is not required to deny it without further inquiry.  Here the trial court
discussed the perils of self-representation with defendant, and in that discussion
defendant made it unequivocally clear that he wanted to represent himself.
33
4.  Defendant’s request for an additional six-month continuance of
trial
One week after the trial court had granted his motion to represent himself,
defendant asked for a 60-day continuance to prepare for trial.  The court granted the
request and set the trial for April 23, 1990.  On March 9, however, defendant asked
for an additional six-month continuance.  Defendant complained that he had not been
put in a “pro. per. cell” with access to law books and writing implements until
February 23; that his former investigator, Thomas, had done little work; and that he
did not receive necessary funding until March 13, 1990.  The prosecutor pointed out
that attorney Chambers and the new defense investigator, Atwell, had been working
on the case for months.  Funding of $54,081.25 had been approved on February 7.
The court noted that defendant would have the benefit of pretrial motions prepared
by Grossberg.  It noted also that defendant had been placed in the “pro. per. cell” 60
days before trial, and that he would probably have at least 90 days before opening
statements at the trial.  (The actual time before opening statements was 105 days.)
The court then denied the request.
“The granting or denial of a motion for continuance rests within the sound
discretion of the trial court.”  (People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 660.)  Here
considerable work had been done to prepare for trial at the time of defendant’s
motion, and although much remained to be done, defendant had 60 days remaining in
which to prepare.  He had funding, an active investigator, and advisory counsel who
was familiar with the case.  The trial court’s ruling was not an abuse of discretion.
5.  Alleged ineffective assistance of advisory counsel
Before looking to the specific instances of ineffective assistance claimed by
defendant, we address the Attorney General’s preemptive contention that there is no
right to advisory counsel (People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 111; People v.
Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1994, 1218; see McKaskle v. Wiggins (1984) 465 U.S.
34
168, 183), and therefore defendant cannot complain if advisory counsel’s
performance falls below professional standards.  Respondent cites three federal
cases that have rejected a contention of ineffective assistance of standby counsel,
the federal equivalent of advisory counsel:  United States v. Schmidt (2d Cir. 1997)
105 F.3d 82, 90; United States v. Cochrane (9th Cir. 1993) 985 F.2d 1027, 1029;
and United States v. Windsor (7th Cir. 1992) 981 F.2d 943, 946-947.  Each of
these decisions, however, left open the possibility that on different facts the federal
court might allow a pro se defendant to challenge the performance of standby
counsel.
California decisions, however, provide a narrow and limited range within which
a defendant can raise the issue of ineffectiveness of advisory counsel.  In People v.
Hamilton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142, at footnote 14 on pages 1164-1165, we said that
“[o]n posttrial review, . . . a self-represented defendant may only raise those narrow
claims of ‘ineffective assistance’ which arise directly from assisting counsel’s
breach of the limited authority and responsibilities counsel has assumed.”  In People
v. Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pages 1226-1227, we explained that:  “To prevail on a
claim that counsel acting in an advisory or other limited capacity has rendered
ineffective assistance, a self-represented defendant must show that counsel failed to
perform competently within the limited scope of the duties assigned to or
assumed by counsel [citations] and that a more favorable verdict was reasonably
probable in the absence of counsel’s failings [citations].  A self-represented
defendant may not claim ineffective assistance on account of counsel’s omission to
perform an act within the scope of duties the defendant voluntarily undertook to
perform personally at trial.”  Our recent decision in People v. Lawley (2002) 27
Cal.4th 102, 145 confirmed that when advisory counsel is appointed “the defendant
is entitled to expect professionally competent assistance within the narrow scope of
advisory counsel’s proper role.”  We find no reason to reconsider that analysis.
35
The record here, however, is insufficient to establish ineffective assistance of
advisory counsel.  We have repeatedly emphasized that a claim of ineffective
assistance is more appropriately decided in a habeas corpus proceeding.  (People v.
Mendozo Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-267; People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th
926, 936; People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 426.)  The defendant must show
that counsel’s action or inaction was not a reasonable tactical choice, and in most
cases “ ‘ “the record on appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act
in the manner challenged . . . .” ’ ”  (People v. Mendozo Tello, supra, at p. 266;
People v. Wilson, supra, at p. 936; People v. Pope, supra, at p. 426.)  Moreover,
when, as here, a defendant has chosen self-representation, the defendant has the
power to make the tactical decisions.  Thus when a defendant raises an issue of
effective assistance of advisory counsel, defendant must also show that counsel’s
challenged action or inaction was not the result of the defendant’s own decision,
with advisory counsel merely carrying out defendant’s directions.  Finally, in ruling
on the merits of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellate court may
need to assess the cumulative effect of several claimed deficiencies, which is
difficult if discussion is fragmented between the appeal and the habeas corpus
petition.6
Defendant argues that his advisory counsel was incompetent on five grounds:
(1)  Chambers did not request a jury instruction on unreasonable self-defense.
                                                
6 
Defendant acknowledges that his claims pertaining to ineffective assistance
of advisory counsel would be better presented in a petition for habeas corpus, but he
fears that to do so will run the risk of waiver as to any claims that might be
presentable on appeal.  (See In re Dixon (1953) 41 Cal.2d 756, 759.)  After
defendant’s brief was filed, however, we said in In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th
770, that this court will not apply the procedural bar of Dixon to claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel.  (Robbins, supra, at p. 814, fn. 34.)
36
(2)  Chambers’ cross-examination of Mark Herbert and Velinda Davis elicited
negative testimony that defendant had sold methamphetamine to Herbert and that
Davis did not believe that defendant’s girlfriend, Christina, had so much influence
over defendant that he would kill for her.
(3)  Chambers failed to object to instances of prosecutorial misconduct.
Defendant points in particular to the prosecutor’s cross-examination of Christina
about the incident where she and defendant had been arrested for illegal possession
of knives, and evidence that defendant had beaten Christina and once had left her
bound for several hours.  Some of the evidence about defendant’s beating Christina
was ultimately excluded by the trial court on its own motion, and the jury was
directed to disregard it.
(4)  Chambers’s cross-examination of witnesses, and his closing argument, fell
below professional standards.  Defendant objects in particular to Chambers’s
concession in closing argument that defendant was guilty of first degree murder,
even though Chambers went on to argue against special circumstance findings.
(5)  Counsel failed to object on the right grounds when, after a prosecution
witness, criminologist William Chisum, testified that he did not know how many
knives were used in the murder, the prosecutor asked him if he had talked to
defendant about where the knives might be.  Chambers did object to the question as
argumentative, and the objection was sustained.  Defendant’s claim on appeal is that
Chambers should also have objected that the question sought an unconstitutional
comment on defendant’s decision not to testify, a form of objection that might
preserve a federal constitutional issue that could be raised in a federal habeas corpus
proceeding.
The appellate record does not disclose advisory counsel Chambers’s reasons
for any of these alleged derelections, nor whether he was acting under defendant’s
direction.  The latter point is particularly relevant to Chambers’s concession in
37
closing argument of defendant’s guilt of first degree murder, because in a discussion
outside the jury’s presence defendant had personally told the trial court he admitted
guilt of first degree murder and asked the court to limit the trial to the issue of
special circumstances.  Because the record on appeal does not show Chambers’s
reasons for any of the challenged actions, nor whether he was acting under
defendant’s direction, we conclude that all the competency of counsel issues should
be raised by petition for habeas corpus, instead of on appeal.
E.  Prosecutorial Misconduct at the Guilt Phase
Defendant accuses the prosecutor of misconduct when he asked criminologist
William Chisum:  “And you haven’t had a chance to talk to Mr. Michaels about
where any of those knives [the knives used in the murder] might be, have you?”
Chisum answered:  “No, sir, I have not talked to Mr. Michaels.”  The trial court
sustained defendant’s objection and admonished the jury not to consider the
question and answer.
It is doubtful whether the prosecutor’s question could be construed as a
comment on defendant’s failure to testify; it appears to be a comment only on the
scope of Chisum’s investigation.  It was, however, argumentative and defendant
successfully objected on that ground.  We perceive no reason why the trial court’s
action in sustaining the objection and admonishing the jury would be insufficient to
cure any harm.
Defendant also complains of the prosecutor’s questions to prosecution
witnesses Rodney Hatch and Leon Madrid that elicited replies that defendant showed
no remorse after the murder.  Defendant’s contention that remorse or the absence of
remorse is inadmissible at the guilt phase overstates the law.  Absence of remorse is
irrelevant to prove that a defendant committed a homicide, but it may be relevant,
because it sheds light on the defendant’s mental state, in determining the degree of
38
the homicide or the existence of special circumstances.  (See People v. Mayfield
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 142, 178-179.)
Defendant made damaging admissions to both Hatch and Madrid.  He claimed
those statements were not true, but constituted boasting designed to enhance
defendant’s image as a powerful and dangerous person.  Defendant’s demeanor when
he made those statements would help the jury determine whether they constituted
truthful admissions or mere braggadocio.  That the questions elicited replies that
defendant did not appear remorseful does not make them improper.
Defendant complains that the prosecutor asked four witnesses – Mark Hebert,
Velinda Davis, Kimberly Buckhalter, and Dennis Lucas – if they had ever previously
seen defendant wearing a suit.  Defendant only objected once, on the third such
occasion, and that objection was sustained.  His failure to object bars him from
claiming prosecutorial misconduct on the other three occasions.  (People v. Lewis,
supra, 25 Cal.4th 610, 670-671.)
Defendant also complains of the prosecutor’s questions about defendant’s
violence toward Christina, but he failed to object at trial.  The trial court, however,
excluded the evidence on its own motion and admonished the jury to disregard it.
We conclude both that the defendant did not preserve the issue for appeal, and that
defendant has shown no prejudice.
F.  Jury Instructions
1.  Failure to instruct sua sponte on the doctrine of unreasonable
defense of others
Defendant contends the court should have instructed on its own motion that if
he killed JoAnn in the actual but unreasonable belief that the killing was necessary to
protect Christina from JoAnn’s physical and sexual abuse, then he would only be
guilty of voluntary manslaughter.  Defendant relies by analogy on the established
doctrine of unreasonable or imperfect self-defense.
39
“Under the doctrine of imperfect self-defense, when the trier of fact finds that
a defendant killed another person because the defendant actually, but unreasonably,
believed he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury, the defendant is
deemed to have acted without malice and thus can be convicted of no crime greater
than voluntary manslaughter.”  (In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 771.)  As
we explained in People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 200-201, imperfect self-
defense is not an affirmative defense, but a description of one type of voluntary
manslaughter.  Thus the trial court must instruct on this doctrine, whether or not
instructions are requested by counsel, whenever there is evidence substantial enough
to merit consideration by the jury that under this doctrine the defendant is guilty of
voluntary manslaughter.  (Id. at pp. 194, 201.)  If it were a true affirmative defense,
however, an instruction would be required only if it appears that the defendant was
relying on the defense, or that there was substantial evidence supportive of the
defense, and the defense was not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the
case.  (Id. at p. 195, see People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 716.)
The doctrine of unreasonable or imperfect defense of others, in contrast to the
doctrine of unreasonable or imperfect self-defense, is not well established in
California law.  It has been recognized in only one decision, People v. Uriarte
(1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 192, 198, and there the court found the doctrine inapplicable
because Uriarte did not present evidence that he believed (reasonably or
unreasonably) that the asserted danger to his wife was imminent or that shooting the
victims was necessary to rescue her.  Uriarte was decided two months after this case
was tried.  Thus at the time of the trial here, there was no California authority
recognizing a doctrine of imperfect defense of others.
Because defendant did not submit an instruction on unreasonable defense of
others, he can only argue here that the trial court should have given such an
40
instruction on its own motion.  The trial court, however, has no duty to so instruct on
doctrines of law that have not been established by authority.
People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 680-681 explained:  “[E]ven in the
absence of a request, a trial court must instruct on the general principles of law
governing the case, i.e., those principles relevant to the issues raised by the
evidence, but need not instruct on specific points developed at trial.  ‘The most
rational interpretation of the phrase “general principles of law governing the case”
would seem to be as those principles of law commonly or closely and openly
connected with the facts of the case before the court.’  [Citations.]  [¶]  . . . Given the
unique nature of [the] rule [urged by the defendant], obfuscated by infrequent
reference and inadequate elucidation, we conclude that heretofore it could not be so
considered.”  (Fn. omitted.)
Flannel held that a trial court was not required to instruct on imperfect self-
defense until that defense was recognized by California decisions.  (People v.
Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 680-683.)  Applying the same analysis, courts have
refused to require a trial court to instruct on its own motion that an unreasonable
belief one is acting under duress is a partial defense to robbery (People v.
Bacigalupo (1991) 1 Cal.4th 103, 125-126 (Bacigalupo I)); that imperfect self-
defense is a defense to the crime of torture (People v. Vital (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th
441, 446); or that imperfect self-defense is a defense to the crime of mayhem
(People v. Sekona (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 443, 451).
This reasoning governs here.  At the time of defendant’s trial, the concept of
imperfect defense of others was not a commonly known and established defense.
We acknowledge that this concept follows logically from the interplay between
statutory and decisional law.  Section 197 provides that “[h]omicide is . . . justifiable
when committed by any person . . .:  [¶]  . . . [w]hen resisting any attempt to murder
any person, or to commit a felony, or to do some great bodily injury upon any
41
person.”  Innovative counsel could view that statute in light of Flannel’s analysis of
imperfect self-defense (see People v. Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 674-680),
and propose an instruction on imperfect defense of others.  But the trial court here
was not required to so instruct on its own motion, because the doctrine of imperfect
or unreasonable self-defense was not a well-established legal doctrine under
California law.
It is also doubtful whether defendant was entitled to an instruction on imperfect
defense of others, or whether the failure to give such an instruction could be found
prejudicial.  Defendant’s problem is that both self-defense and defense of others
requires a fear of imminent harm (People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073,
1082), so presumably imperfect self-defense or imperfect defense of others would
require an unreasonable belief that harm was imminent.  But when defendant
committed the homicide, Christina was at Broad Horizons, a youth detention facility,
and murder victim JoAnn was asleep in her apartment.  The record does not indicate
when Christina would next be released to visit JoAnn, but even if it was the next day
it is doubtful that the facts would show that defendant believed, reasonably or
unreasonably, that any threatened danger to Christina was “imminent.”
2.  Jury instruction on the defense of necessity
The trial court instructed the jury:  “It is not a defense under the law of
necessity that the homicide was committed to prevent the victim from committing
future wrongdoing against the defendant or another.”  The court erred in giving this
instruction.  No defense of necessity was presented, and no evidence was presented
to support such a defense.  The prosecutor offered the instruction out of concern
that the jurors would on their own come up with such a defense and apply it in this
case.  But the jury was correctly instructed on the law of homicide and the defenses,
and those instructions plainly excluded any defense of necessity.  Instructions
42
should not be unnecessarily complicated by telling the jury that a defense unclaimed
by the defendant and excluded by the other instructions is inapplicable.
The trial court’s error in instructing on the defense of necessity was harmless,
however, because defendant did not assert this defense.  Defendant here argues that
the instruction precluded the jury from considering evidence of the murder victim’s
abuse of her daughter Christina, defendant’s girlfriend.  The instruction, however,
was limited to the defense of necessity, a defense that could, if present, lead to
complete exoneration.  It did not prevent the jury from considering the evidence of
abuse in connection with defendant’s argument that he killed in the heat of passion,
or that he did not act with the motivation required for some of the special
circumstances — the main focus of the guilt trial — or as mitigating evidence in the
penalty phase.
G.  Videotape Evidence
The prosecution offered into evidence several still photographs of the victim’s
body and a police videotape made shortly after the murder.  The first segment of the
videotape showed the areas around the victim’s apartment, including defendant’s
escape route.  Defendant here does not object to that segment.  The second segment
showed the victim’s nude body lying between the bed and the wall.  Defendant
complains that this segment contained repeated close-up shots of the victim’s pubic
area, falsely implying that she had been sexually assaulted.  (At the time the
videotape was made, the police thought the victim had been sexually assaulted.)  The
video’s third segment was taken at the coroner’s office.  After showing the body
being lifted to an examining table and the coroner opening the victim’s eyes, the
video segment focused on the fatal throat wound and then the bagging of the victim’s
hands and feet.  Defendant argues that all this was especially gruesome and
unnecessary.
43
At trial, the defense moved to exclude the photographs and the videotape.  The
judge noted that bagging the hands and feet was relevant because the prosecutor
introduced evidence of one of defendant’s hairs that was found in the victim’s hands.
The judge later found that the segment showing the victim’s body at the crime scene
was relevant to the special circumstance of lying in wait, apparently because it
showed her nude in her bedroom, implying that the assailants waited until she was in
bed or asleep before attacking.  The judge mentioned that he had presided over the
trial of codefendant Popik, and the jurors there did not seem shocked by the
videotape.  The judge also noted that the jurors in this case had been questioned
extensively in voir dire about their ability to deal with graphic photographs.  He
concluded that the photographs and videotape would not have a prejudicial effect that
outweighed their probative value.
Defendant questions whether voir dire can ever prepare a jury adequately for
gruesome photographs and videotapes.  He adds that everything shown by the
videotape was also proven by less shocking evidence.  Although photographic
evidence is often cumulative of testimonial evidence, that fact does not require its
exclusion, “[b]ecause the photographic evidence could assist the jury in
understanding and evaluating the testimony.”  (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324,
441.)  It is, however, a factor the trial court may consider in exercising its discretion
under Evidence Code section 352.  (People v. Marsh (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 987,
998.)
In ruling on the admissibility of photographs and videotapes under Evidence
Code section 352, “the court enjoys broad discretion in deciding whether prejudice
substantially outweighs probative value.”  (People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786,
866.)  The trial judge here was conscious of that discretion, and of the danger that
gruesome evidence could prejudice the jury, and ruled carefully in admitting the
evidence.  The photographs, and most of the videotape, were unquestionably
44
probative.  Defendant suggests that the tapes could have been edited to eliminate
sexual suggestiveness and to avoid showing the victim’s body being lifted to the
coroner’s table.  But whether or not such editing would have been desirable, we
cannot find an abuse of discretion in the trial judge’s conclusion that the tape as a
whole was more probative than prejudicial.
IV.  PENALTY PHASE ISSUES
A.  Admission of Aggravating Evidence
1.  Evidence of defendant’s claim to be a contract killer
Most of defendant’s taped confession was admitted at the guilt phase, but the
court excluded that portion in which defendant claimed that he was a contract killer
and had committed 10-15 contract killings.  The prosecution asked to play the entire
recording at the penalty trial.  Over defense objection, the judge granted this request.
Before the tape was played to the jury, the judge gave a limiting instruction:
Defendant’s statements as to possible other homicides were being “offered on the
issue of his mental state and motive on the nature and circumstances of the present
offense, and not for the truth of whether there were other homicides.”  The jury was
not to consider such evidence “for any purpose except the limited purpose for which
it is admitted.”
The prosecutor did not argue that defendant had committed other homicides.
Instead, he argued that the confession showed one of defendant’s motives in killing
JoAnn was to enhance his reputation as a ruthless and dangerous person:
“[Defendant] needs to have it on the streets that he was a killer.  And that’s one of
the reasons why he cut JoAnn Clemons’s throat.  So he could feel good about
himself, so he could scare people. . . .  So [defendant] sat on a lady’s chest and cut
her throat so he could pump up his reputation.”
45
Defendant contends that this court’s decision in People v. Phillips (1985) 41
Cal.3d 29, compels the conclusion that defendant’s statements about his
commission of contract killings were not admissible.  In Phillips, the prosecution
presented evidence of four instances in which Phillips had discussed committing
other crimes.  The evidence was offered under factor (b) of section 190.3, which
permits the penalty jury to consider “[t]he presence or absence of criminal activity
by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the
express or implied threat to use force or violence.”  We examined the evidence of
each of the four incidents and concluded that one showed solicitation of murder in
violation of section 653f.  (Phillips, at pp. 75-77.)  The evidence of the other three
instances, however, failed to show the commission of a crime.  (Id. at pp. 73-75.)
They were therefore inadmissible under factor (b), and the trial court’s error in
admitting that evidence, in connection with other errors, led to a reversal of the
penalty judgment in Phillips.
We agree with the Attorney General that Phillips is distinguishable.  The
evidence there was offered as proof of a criminal act involving force or violence
under factor (b) of section 190.3, without any limiting instruction.  The prosecution
had argued that Phillips was planning or at least proposing to commit the murders he
discussed, and that the evidence showed Phillips’s casual attitude toward killing and
his readiness to commit murder.  (People v. Phillips, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 83.)
The evidence in the case before us was offered under section 190.3, factor (a), as
part of the circumstances of the charged murder, not under factor (b).  The trial court
here told the jury it could not consider defendant’s confession as proof that he had
committed other homicides.  The prosecution did not claim defendant had
committed any contract killings or planned to do so.  The evidence was admitted
solely to show defendant’s attitude and motive in connection with the charged
murder and, so limited, was properly admitted.
46
Defendant also objects to the admission of a paper that said “hit list,” followed
by a list of names, that he was carrying when he was arrested.  Murder victim JoAnn
Clemons’s name was not on the list.
Possession of the list was not a crime, and there was no evidence defendant
actually intended to kill anyone on the list, so it was not admissible under section
190.3, factor (b).  The trial court, however, admitted the list under section 190.3,
factor (a) as an “overall background piece of information,” which would help the
jury evaluate the nature and circumstances of the murder.
The prosecution does not claim defendant had the list when he killed JoAnn
Clemons.  Its theory is that the list, like defendant’s confession to being a
professional hit man and enforcer, shows defendant’s motive to establish a
reputation as a contract killer.  It was admissible for that purpose.
Defendant argues, however, that both the list and the statement in his
confession that he was a contract killer should have been excluded as more
prejudicial than probative under Evidence Code section 352, which authorizes a trial
court in its discretion to exclude evidence “if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue
consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of
confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.”  In reply, the Attorney General
argues that section 352 is inapplicable to penalty phase evidence offered under Penal
Code section 190.3, factor (a).  In People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, however,
we concluded that the trial court retains a limited discretion to exclude unduly
inflammatory evidence.  “[T]he trial court,” we said, “lacks discretion to exclude all
factor (a) evidence on the ground that it is inflammatory or lacking in probative
value.”  (Id. at pp. 1200-1201.)  It retains, however, “its traditional discretion to
exclude ‘particular items of evidence’ by which the prosecution seeks to
demonstrate either the circumstances of the crime (factor (a)), or violent criminal
47
activity (factor (b)), in a ‘manner’ that is misleading, cumulative, or unduly
inflammatory.”  (Id. at p. 1201.)
The trial court here did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged
evidence.  The prejudicial effect of the evidence was that it might lead the jury to
believe that defendant had committed other murders or planned to do so.  But in view
of the prosecutor’s avoidance of any such claim, the absence of any evidence to
support it, and the trial court’s limiting instruction, it is far more likely that the
jurors would recognize the defendant’s actions as mere braggadocio.  Thus the trial
court could reasonably conclude that, as long as it gave limiting instructions, the
probative value of the evidence at issue would outweigh its prejudicial effect.
2.  Evidence of defendant’s possession of weapons
Factor (b) of section 190.3 permits the introduction of evidence of “[t]he
presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or
attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or
violence.”  The prosecution presented evidence that on November 27, 1987,
defendant was arrested in Texas for possession of a double-edged dagger with a
seven-inch blade and a butcher knife with an eight-inch blade, both of which were
illegal under Texas law.  On January 23, 1988, he was arrested in California for
illegal possession of knives.  Finally on August 31, 1988, the day after defendant’s
robbery of Fuller at Camp Pendleton, defendant was found in a parking lot with a
concealed handgun in the glove box.  None of these events involved the actual or
attempted use of force, or an express threat to use force.  The issue here is whether
the evidence is admissible as proof of an implied threat.
In a series of cases beginning with People v. Harris (1981) 28 Cal.3d 935,
962-963, and continuing through People v. Ramirez (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1158, 1186,
People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 589, and People v. Williams (1997) 16
48
Cal.4th 153, 238, we have held that the possession of a weapon in a custodial setting
– where possession of any weapon is illegal – “involve[s] an implied threat of
violence even when there is no evidence defendant used or displayed it in a
provocative or threatening manner.”  (People v. Tuilaepa, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 589;
People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1260 (conc. opn. of Baxter, J.).)
Three cases discuss implied threats under section 190.3, factor (b) in a
noncustodial setting.  In People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, the prosecution
presented evidence that the defendant had slapped his side indicating that “he had a
handgun in his waistband, while stating that he had ‘all the protection he needed.’ ”
(Id. at p. 809.)  We held that it was error to admit this evidence:  “Although such
[conduct] is arguably an ‘express or implied threat to use force or violence’
(§ 190.3), it was not directed at a particular victim or victims, and did not amount to
criminal conduct in violation of a penal statute.”  (Ibid.)  Defendant here relies on
Belmontes to support his contention that the challenged evidence was improperly
admitted, but Belmontes turned on the fact that the conduct there was not criminal.
By contrast, here in each instance defendant’s possession was illegal.  His
possession of knives in Texas was illegal, both because the blades exceeded five
inches and because the dagger was double-edged.  His possession of knives and a
firearm in California were concealed, making the possession illegal under California
law.  (§ 12020, subd. (a).)
Two other cases have found an implied threat in a noncustodial context.  In
People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 676, the defendant carried a knife while
committing a burglary, but did not use it.  The court held that his action was “an
implied threat to use the knife against anyone who might interfere.”  (Id. at p. 677.)
In People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, a search of the residence of the
defendant, an ex-felon, turned up a machine gun, a silencer, and concealable
49
handguns.  The defendant’s possession of these firearms was illegal.  We held that
the evidence was properly admitted.  (Id. at pp. 203-204.)
Defendant’s possession similarly shows an implied intention to put the
weapons to unlawful use.  On two occasions the weapons defendant possessed were
knives with seven-to-eight-inch blades; in People v. Ramirez, supra, 50 Cal.3d at
pages 1186-1187, we said that “such an implement is a ‘classic instrument[] of
violence’ [citation] that is ‘normally used only for criminal purposes.’ ”  Indeed
JoAnn Clemons was killed with a similar knife.  The concealed firearm found on
defendant was the same gun he had used to rob Chad Fuller the previous day.
We conclude that the criminal character of defendant’s possession of knives
and firearms, and the evidence of defendant’s use of those or similar weapons to
commit crimes, is sufficient to permit a jury to view his possession as an implied
threat of violence.  Defendant, of course, was free to and did present evidence to the
jury to show that his possession was for the purpose of self-protection, or the
protection of someone else, not for criminal violence.  (People v. Ramirez, supra,
50 Cal.3d at p. 1187.)
3.  Defendant’s pending armed robbery charge
Defendant argues that the armed robbery charge pending against him at the time
of the murder trial, stemming from the August 30, 1988, robbery of Chad Fuller
could not be admitted under factor (c) of section 190.3, because that factor is
limited to convictions entered before to the date of the murder.  Defendant is
correct as to factor (c).  (People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 203.)  The
evidence was admissible, however, under factor (b) of section 190.3 as proof of a
criminal act involving force or violence.  (See People v. Caro (1988) 46 Cal.3d
1035, 1055-1057.)
50
4.  The Popik note
At the penalty phase the prosecution offered as rebuttal evidence a note
defendant had given to his attorney during the preliminary hearing.  (At the time of
the preliminary hearing the case against defendant had not been severed from that
against Popik and Paulk.)  The note read in part:  “Neither of [Popik’s] co-defendants
are willing to restrain themselves from doing Popik bodily harm if forced to be
locked up to him or sit next to him.  Popik will be hurt if something can’t be worked
out.”
When the prosecutor initially offered the note, the trial court ruled that it was
not admissible under section 190.3, factors (a) or (b).  After defendant had presented
evidence from his minister, his stepfather, and a psychiatrist that he was not a violent
person, the prosecutor again offered the evidence as rebuttal.  The trial court
admitted it because rebuttal evidence does not have to pertain to a specific
aggravating factor.  (In re Ross (1995) 10 Cal.4th 184, 206-207.)
Defendant argues that introduction of the note violated the attorney-client
privilege.  The note was unquestionably a communication from the client to the
attorney, and thus falls within the broad privilege established by Evidence Code
section 954.  The Attorney General relies on the exception to that privilege “if the
services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or
plan to commit a crime or a fraud.”  (Evid. Code, § 956.)  This exception is
inapplicable here.  Defendant did not seek advisory counsel’s services to commit a
crime; he was asking counsel’s help to avoid the commission of a crime.
We discussed the application of the attorney-client privilege to threats of
future criminal conduct in People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583.  There, the trial
court admitted evidence that defendant, when examined by a defense psychiatrist,
threatened to kill the victim’s brother.  (Although the statement was made to a
psychiatrist, the attorney-client privilege applied because the psychiatrist had been
51
appointed to assist defense counsel.)  (Id. at pp. 618-619, fn. 28.)  We held that the
admission of this evidence violated the attorney-client privilege, although it was not
prejudicial.  (Id. at p. 623.)  Clark observed that “[n]o express exception to the
attorney-client privilege exists for threats of future criminal conduct” (id. at p. 621),
and that “[t]he comments of the California Law Revision Commission accompanying
these sections suggest that no exception was intended to apply to a statement of
intent to commit a crime alone.”  (Ibid.)
Recognizing that existing law might require an attorney to conceal knowledge
that the attorney’s client was planning to commit a serious crime, the 1993
Legislature enacted section Evidence Code 956.5, which provides that there is no
attorney-client privilege “if the lawyer reasonably believes that disclosure of any
confidential communication . . . is necessary to prevent the client from committing a
criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily
harm.”  If this stature had been in effect at the time of defendant’s trial, the Popik
note would have been admissible.  Defendant, however, was tried in 1990, three
years before Evidence Code section 956.5 took effect.  Thus, the trial court erred in
ruling that the attorney-client privilege did not protect defendant from the
introduction of the Popik note.
The trial court’s error was harmless.  Although the Popik note shows that
defendant was aware of his own violent impulses, it was in fact a successful appeal to
defendant’s attorney to take action to avert the violence.  The jury might even have
viewed it as favorable to defendant.  It is not reasonably possible that its admission
made the difference between a verdict of death and one of life imprisonment without
possibility of parole.  (See People v. Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1232; People
v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 446-449.)
52
B.  Jury Instructions
Defendant asked the court to instruct the jury that, under section 190.3, factor
(k), they could consider:  whether defendant was “emotionally impacted” by his
sister’s sexual abuse by his father, the rape of his mother, and the rape of his sister;
whether defendant was “motivationally impacted” by JoAnn’s sexual and physical
abuse of Christina; and whether defendant was impaired as a result of his overall
psychological condition.  Except for the last matter, the trial court rejected the
proffered items as argumentative, but instructed the jury on defendant’s overall
psychological condition.
That ruling was correct.  The rejected portion of the proposed instruction
assumed facts that were not necessarily true – e.g., that defendant’s mother and
sister were raped – and constituted claims properly presented in argument, not
instructions.  People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 886, upheld a trial court’s
refusal to give a similar instruction, noting that because such an instruction
“ ‘invite[s] the jury to draw inferences favorable to one of the parties from specified
items of evidence,’ it is considered ‘argumentative’ and therefore should not be
given.”
Defendant next complains that the trial court gave an instruction, requested by
the prosecution, that evidence had been introduced of seven prior criminal acts that
might have involved force or violence, or the threat of force of violence.  The court
explained to the jury that an act violating multiple statutes constituted a single
aggravating act, and that the jury could not consider such an act unless it was
convinced that the act was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  The court then
explained the elements of each of the crimes involved.  Defendant asserts that by
giving these instructions, while rejecting most of the defendant’s proposed
instructions, the court created a prejudicial imbalance in the jury’s consideration of
aggravating and mitigating factors.
53
The prosecutor’s proposed instructions related to evidence under factor (b) of
section 190.3.  Although other aggravating or mitigating factors do not carry a
burden of proof, under factor (b) a juror may not consider evidence of the
defendant’s prior conduct unless convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the
conduct occurred and constituted a crime.  (People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d
21, 53-56; People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1103.)  That determination
may require the juror to know the elements of the relevant crimes, so in People v.
Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 281-282, we held that a trial court may instruct
on the elements of those crimes when either the prosecution or the defense requests
such an instruction, or when the court itself determines that the instruction is vital to
a proper consideration of the evidence.  The trial court’s instruction here was proper
under Davenport.  Unlike the defense instruction the court rejected, the court’s
factor (b) instructions did not merely highlight evidence, but explained legal
principles essential to the juror’s evaluation of that evidence.
C.  Alleged Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at the Penalty Phase
Defendant argues that advisory counsel Chambers failed to object prosecutorial
misconduct during closing argument at the penalty phase.  He points to two
instances:
1.  In response to defendant’s evidence that he had joined a church during his
stay in Texas, the prosecutor observed in argument that defendant’s tackle box had a
drawing of a pentagram and the number 666, which “I think we call devil worship, and
three sixes is a sign of the beast, and that is Mr. Michaels; he is a beast.”
2.  The prosecutor argued that Joseph Paulk, whom defendant recruited as the
getaway driver, was “another victim” of defendant’s because Paulk “will be serving a
life sentence for this murder.”  The prosecutor’s statement that Paulk would serve a
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life sentence was premature.  At the time of penalty phase arguments in the case
here, Paulk was still awaiting trial and had not been sentenced.
The record before us does not disclose Attorney Chambers’s reasons for not
objecting to these statements.  Accordingly, as we explained earlier, the claim that
counsel was constitutionally incompetent in failing to object cannot be raised on
appeal, but only by petition for habeas corpus.  (See ante, p. 36.)
D.  Prosecutorial Misconduct at the Penalty Phase
The defense did object to one penalty phase argument by the prosecutor.  The
prosecutor asked the jurors to:  “Just think of all the generations of prisoners that
will go through the prison system and be exposed to [the] extreme danger that is Kurt
Michaels.  Just think of all the prison guards who will be lucky enough to meet Kurt
Michaels.”  The trial court overruled the objection but told the prosecutor to move
on to a new subject.
Defendant contends that because future dangerousness is not a listed
aggravating factor, the prosecutor can argue that point only to rebut defense
argument or evidence.  We disagree.  This court has “repeatedly declined to find
error or misconduct where argument concerning a defendant’s future dangerousness
in custody is based on evidence of his past violent crimes admitted under one of the
specific aggravating categories of section 190.3.”  (People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th
313, 353.)  Likewise, in People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 940, a case in
which the defendant introduced no penalty phase evidence, we said:  “Although we
have held that at the penalty phase of a capital case the prosecutor may not introduce
expert testimony forecasting that, if sentenced to life without the possibility of
parole, a defendant will commit violent acts in prison (People v. Murtishaw (1981)
29 Cal.3d 733, 779), we have never held that in closing argument a prosecutor may
not comment on the possibility that if the defendant is not executed he or she will
55
remain a danger to others.  Rather, we have concluded that the prosecutor may make
such comments when they are supported by the evidence.”
V.  CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE
CALIFORNIA DEATH PENALTY LAW
Defendant asserts that California’s death penalty law suffers from a number of
constitutional defects.  We have in past decisions rejected each of these
contentions.
He first argues that section 190.3 does not sufficiently narrow the class of
murderers eligible for the death penalty.  (See Zant v. Stephens (1983) 462 U.S.
862, 887-888; People v. Bacigalupo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 457, 462-463.)  As in People
v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 669, “defendant has not demonstrated on this
record, or through sources of which we might take judicial notice, that his claims are
empirically accurate, or that, if they were correct, this would require the invalidation
of the death penalty law.”  Section 190.2, which sets out the special circumstances,
on its face provides some criteria that may narrow the class of death-eligible
persons.  Contrary to defendant’s contention, we cannot simply deduce from the
language and structure of section 190.2 and the cases interpreting that section that
this narrowing is constitutionally inadequate.
The absence of a burden of proof, except for proof of prior criminal acts under
section 190.3, factor (b), does not render the California law unconstitutional.
(People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 852-853 [no burden to prove death is
the appropriate penalty]; People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 777-778 [no
burden of proof for aggravating factors]; People v. Alcala (1992) 4 Cal.4th 749, 809
[no requirement that aggravating factors been proven beyond a reasonable doubt].)
No written findings are required.  (People v. Davenport (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1171,
1232.)
56
Neither the federal Constitution nor state law requires inter-case
proportionality review.  (Pulley v. Harris (1984) 465 U.S. 37; Bacigalupo I, supra,
1 Cal.4th at p. 151.)  Defendant here does not contend on appeal that the death
penalty is disproportionate to his individual culpability.  (See Bacigalupo I, supra, at
p. 152.)
We have held that the California law is not unconstitutional because it allows
the introduction, as an aggravating consideration, of unadjudicated criminal acts
(People v. Robertson, supra, 48 Cal.3d 18, 42) and does not require that the jury
agree unanimously on whether the defendant committed those crimes (People v.
Alcala (1992) 4 Cal.4th 742, 809).  We have rejected contentions that factors (d)
and (g) of section 190.3 are unconstitutionally vague, because factor (d) refers to
“extreme” mental or emotional disturbance and factor (g) to “extreme” duress.
(People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 698-699 [factor (d)]; People v. Visciotti
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 75 [factor (g)].)  Finally, we do not require a trial court to
instruct the jury as to the meaning of “mitigation.”  (People v. Hawkins (1995) 10
Cal.4th 920, 965.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
KENNARD, J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C.J.
BAXTER, J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
BROWN, J.
MORENO, J.
57
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion People v. Michaels
__________________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal XXX
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion No. S016924
Date Filed: July 18, 2002
__________________________________________________________________________________
Court: Superior
County: San Diego
Judge: J. Morgan Lester
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Appellant:
Harry M. Caldwell and Karen L. Landau, under appointments by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and
Appellant.
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for  Respondent:
Daniel E. Lungren and Bill Lockyer, Attorneys General, George Williamson and David P. Druliner Chief
Assistant Attorneys General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Robert M. Foster, Laura
Whitcomb Halgren, Keith I. Motley and Bradley A. Weinreb, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
58
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Harry M. Caldwell
24255 Pacific Coast Highway
Malibu, CA  90263
(310) 456-4669
Karen L. Landau
P.O. Box 13082
Oakland, CA  94461-0082
(510) 338-0603
Bradley A. Weinreb
Deputy Attorney General
110 West “A” Street, Suite 1100
San Diego, CA  92101
(619) 645-2298