Title: Reifsnyder, Remp & Hoffa v. WCAB (Dana Corporation) (Dissenting Opinion)

State: pennsylvania

Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Document:

[J-152-2004] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA EASTERN DISTRICT JEFFREY REIFSNYDER v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (DANA CORPORATION) APPEAL OF: DANA CORPORATION DENNIS REMP v. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (DANA CORPORATION) APPEAL OF: DANA CORPORATION RICHARD HOFFA v. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (DANA CORPORATION) APPEAL OF: DANA CORPORATION : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : No. 4 EAP 2004 Appeal from the Order entered on 4/23/03 in the Commonwealth Court at No. 780 CD 2002 reversing and remanding the Order entered on 2/28/02 in the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board at No. A00- 2551 No. 5 EAP 2004 Appeal from the Order of the Commonwealth Court entered on 4/23/03 at 781 CD 2002 (reargument denied on 6/30/03) reversing the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board order entered on 2/28/02 at A00-2553 and remanding to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board No. 6 EAP 2004 Appeal from the Order of the Commonwealth Court entered on 4/23/03 at 782 CD 2002 (reargument denied on 6/30/03) reversing the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board order entered on 2/28/02 at A00-2552 and remanding to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board ARGUED: October 18, 2004 [J-152-2004] - 2 DISSENTING OPINION MR. JUSTICE SAYLOR DECIDED: September 28, 2005 I would affirm based on the reasoning applied by the Commonwealth Court, which I believe implemented a plain-meaning interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions. See Reifsnyder v. WCAB (Dana Corp.), 826 A.2d 16 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003); accord Bethlehem Structural Products v. WCAB (Vernon), 789 A.2d 767 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001). Although the majority also lays claim to the application of a plain-meaning approach, I am not persuaded that this characterization is supported. In this regard, while on the one hand the majority gives effect to the substantial difference in connotation between the terms “work” and “employment” in some aspects of its analysis, see Majority Opinion, slip op. at 16 (“Notably, the general rule set forth in Section 309(d) does not speak in terms of the continuity of ‘work,’ but rather, the continuity of the ‘employment’ relationship.”), it nevertheless proceeds to equate these two terms in a pivotal passage construing Section 309(d.2). See id. at 15 (equating “employees who worked less than a single complete period of thirteen calendar weeks at the time they suffered a work injury” exclusively with “recent hires” for purposes of Section 309(d.2)). I respectfully dissent, as I believe that the Commonwealth Court’s more consistent treatment of the distinct statutory terms involved is the better one. See Reifsnyder, 826 A.2d at 20 (“[T]he issue is whether Claimants worked a complete 13 week period in the 52 weeks preceding their injuries.” (emphasis in original)). Given the specific terms selected by the Legislature, and particularly since the relevant policy [J-152-2004] - 3 considerations and equities are substantially mixed,1 it seems to me to be preferable to leave the task of any necessary adjustments to the statutory compensation scheme to the Legislature, within constitutional limitations. 1 The effort to implement a comprehensive workers’ compensation system entailing standardized benefit formulas implemented in the course of an underlying trade-off between loss spreading and insulation of employers from tort liability inherent in the workers’ compensation scheme, see generally 2 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION, §60.31(c), at 10-751-52 (1993), is bound to yield results that, viewed from the individual perspective of claimants and employers in discrete cases, may appear inequitable.