Title: Bredthauer v. TSP

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Bredthauer v. TSP1993 WY 144864 P.2d 442Case Number: 93-11, 93-12Decided: 11/19/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
Charles E. BREDTHAUER and 
Cindy S. Bredthauer, husband and wife, 

Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

TSP, a Wyoming 
corporation, 

Appellee 
(Defendant),

Lila West; VIP Realty, a 
Wyoming corporation; Darryl W. Lynde; Douglas P. Marquiss; CCP; Lance Cramer; 
Gary W. Cain; Paul J. Polen; Helen Hafling; Christian, Spring, Seilbach and 
Associates, a Montana corporation; Davis Surveying, a Wyoming corporation; First 
American Title Guaranty Company, a Wyoming corporation; Rocky Mountain Title 
Insurance Agency, a Wyoming corporation; Campbell County Abstract Company, a 
Wyoming corporation; Lawrence J. Christensen; the Board of County Commissioners 
of Campbell County; Harry Underwood; W.B. Fitch; and B.L. Tarver, 

(Defendants).

 

Charles E. BREDTHAUER and 
Cindy S. Bredthauer, husband and wife, 

Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v. 

CHRISTIAN, SPRING, 
SEILBACH AND ASSOCIATES, a Montana corporation, 

Appellee 
(Defendant),

Lila West; VIP Realty, a 
Wyoming corporation; Darryl W. Lynde; Douglas P. Marquiss; CCP; Lance Cramer; 
Gary W. Cain; Paul J. Polen; Helen Hafling; TSP, a Wyoming corporation; Davis 
Surveying, a Wyoming corporation; Rocky Mountain Title Insurance Agency, a 
Wyoming corporation; Campbell County Abstract Company, a Wyoming corporation; 
Lawrence J. Christensen; the Board of County Commissioners of Campbell County; 
Harry Underwood; W.B. Fitch; and B.L. Tarver, (Defendants).

Appeal from The District 
Court, Campbell County,Terrence L. O'Brien, J.

Macy, C.J. 
and Thomas, J., filed dissenting 
opinions.

Michael N. 
Patchen, Gillette, for appellants.

Robert W. Brown 
and Robert G. Berger of Lonabaugh and Riggs, Sheridan, for appellee 
TSP.

Curtis B. 
Buchhammer of Orr, Buchhammer & Kehl, Cheyenne, for appellee Christian, 
Spring, Seilbach and Assoc.

Before MACY, 
C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ.

CARDINE, Justice.

[¶1]      Cindy and Charles 
Bredthauer sued Christian, Spring, Seilbach and Associates (CSSA) and TSP for 
conducting erroneous land surveys. The trial court granted CSSA and TSP summary 
judgment based on W.S. 1-3-107(a)(i) (1988), the two-year statute of limitations 
for professionals. In Bredthauer v. Christian, Spring, Seilbach and Assoc., 824 P.2d 560 (Wyo. 1992) (hereinafter Bredthauer I), we reversed the trial court 
because of error in determining the date that the statutory limitation period 
had begun running. Bredthauer I, 824 P.2d  at 564. On remand the trial court 
again granted CSSA and TSP summary judgment, this time based upon the limitation 
period in W.S. 1-3-111 (1988), the statute of repose. The Bredthauers appeal 
from this second summary judgment arguing res judicata, collateral estoppel, 
judicial estoppel and the doctrine of the law of the case.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellants 
Bredthauers phrase the issues as:

Did the District Court 
err in ruling by summary judgment that the appellee surveyors TSP and CSSA can 
now successfully assert a new statute of limitations, (W.S. § 1-3-111(a)) 
labeled as a statute of repose, after stipulating in Bredthauer v. CSSA, 824 P.2d 560 (Wyo. 1992) that W.S. § 1-3-107(a)(i) controlled this case which ruling 
is directly contrary to the law of the case decided by the previous appeal and 
the trial court's prior rulings?

Appellee TSP 
frames the issue as follows:

A. Whether the District 
Court erred in granting summary judgment to Appellee TSP on the basis of the 
statute of repose set forth in § 1-3-111(a) W.S. 1977, when the surveying work 
performed by Appellee TSP was substantially completed more than ten (10) years 
prior to the filing of Plaintiff's complaint.

Appellee, CSSA, 
presents two issues:

I. Appellants have 
improperly raised issues on appeal that were not raised before the District 
Court. 

II. The District Court 
properly ruled that the statute of repose set forth in W.S. § 1-3-111 could be 
asserted to preclude Appellants' claims against Appellee Christian, Spring, 
Seilbach and Associates.

II. 
BACKGROUND

[¶4]      The underlying 
facts of this case are presented in Bredthauer I and need not be repeated here. 
See Bredthauer I, 824 P.2d  at 560-61. However, parts of the procedural history 
leading up to this second summary judgment are important and thus need 
mention.

[¶5]      In the fall of 
1990, after the Bredthauers filed their original complaint in this action, both 
TSP and CSSA filed motions to dismiss. TSP's motion to dismiss was premised on 
the two-year statute of limitations. CSSA's motion to dismiss, however, was 
based on both the two-year statute of limitations and W.S. 1-3-111, the statute 
of repose. On February 7, 1991, after a hearing on these motions to dismiss, the 
trial court issued an order granting TSP's and CSSA's motions and dismissing 
them both from the case. That order stated, in part:

     The parties agree that 
the provisions of W.S. § 1-3-107 state the applicable period of limitations with 
respect to all claims against the Defendants CSSA and TSP. * * *

* * * * * *

     The plaintiffs did not 
file their complaint in this action within two years after the plaintiffs knew 
or should have known of the existence of a cause of action against the 
Defendants CSSA and TSP. Therefore the Defendants CSSA and TSP should be 
dismissed from this action.

[¶6]      Around the same 
time that CSSA and TSP presented these motions to dismiss, another defendant, 
Davis Surveying, filed a motion for summary judgment arguing, in addition to the 
two-year statute of limitations, that the statute of repose applied to bar the 
Bredthauers' claim against them. On February 15, 1991, the trial court issued an 
order dismissing Davis Surveying based on the two-year statute of limitations. 
In this order the trial court commented on the applicability of the statute of 
repose by stating:

15. The plaintiffs have 
asked this court to apply the ten year statute of limitations set forth in W.S. 
1-3-111 to their claims against Defendant Davis. However, the court finds that 
W.S. 1-3-111 has no application to the facts of this case. * * *

[¶7]      The Bredthauers 
appealed to this court the February 7, 1991 order dismissing CSSA and TSP and 
presented as their only issue:

     The Trial Court erred 
by finding that the causes of action against the surveyors * * * accrued to the 
Plaintiff-Appellants on June 9, 1988, and as such barred their claims filed on 
July 2[0], 1990, by operation of * * * W.S. 1-3-107(a)(i).

Bredthauer I, 
824 P.2d  at 561. As a result of this appeal, we held in Bredthauer 
I:

[A]s a matter of law, the 
Bredthauers' cause of action did not accrue before July 28, 1988, the date on 
which they received their land surveyor's report advising them that the surveys 
conducted by the appellee surveyors [CSSA and TSP] were, in its opinion, in 
error.

* * * * * *

     The district court's 
finding that the cause of action accrued not later than June 9, 1988, is 
incorrect as a matter of law.

Bredthauer I, 
824 P.2d  at 562-64.

[¶8]      In the spring of 
1992, after remand from Bredthauer I, TSP and CSSA both filed motions for 
summary judgment arguing that the statute of repose applies to bar the 
Bredthauers from bringing their action. The Bredthauers responded with a motion 
opposing CSSA's and TSP's motions, arguing that the doctrines of res judicata 
and judicial estoppel preclude CSSA and TSP from raising the statute of repose 
and asserting that this court's Bredthauer I opinion ruled that the two-year 
statute of limitations controls. 

[¶9]      On June 23, 1992, 
the trial court heard oral arguments upon CSSA's and TSP's motions for summary 
judgment. During these arguments, the Bredthauers briefly mentioned the law of 
the case doctrine and specifically declined to argue the merits of applying the 
statute of repose to the facts of this case. In an order, filed on November 6, 
1992, the district court rejected the Bredthauers' res judicata and judicial 
estoppel arguments, granted CSSA's and TSP's motions for summary judgment based 
on the statute of repose, and certified the order as final under W.R.C.P. 54(b). 
The Bredthauers now appeal this order.

III. 
DISCUSSION

[¶10]   As we have stated many 
times,

[w]hen reviewing the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment, we examine the case in the same manner 
as the trial court. Our task requires that we make a dual finding that no 
genuine issue of material fact exists, and that the prevailing party was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When considering questions of law, we 
accord no special deference to the district court's determination.

Davidson v. 
Sherman, 848 P.2d 1341, 1343 (Wyo. 1993) (citations omitted). Since the 
Bredthauers have not raised an issue concerning the facts, we examine only if 
TSP and CSSA were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Although the 
Bredthauers raise only a single issue, they argue a number of different legal 
theories as support. Thus, we will address each theory separately.

A. JUDICIAL 
ESTOPPEL

[¶11]   This court has, on several 
occasions, invoked the doctrine of judicial estoppel. Matter of Paternity of 
JRW, 814 P.2d 1256, 1265-66 (Wyo. 1991); Zwemer v. Production Credit Ass'n, 792 P.2d 245, 246 (Wyo. 1990); Anderson v. Sno-King Village Ass'n, Inc., 745 P.2d 540, 545 (Wyo. 1987); Texas West Oil & Gas Corp. v. First Interstate Bank, 
743 P.2d 857, 866 (Wyo. 1987); Matter of Parental Rights of ARW, 716 P.2d 353, 
356 (Wyo. 1986); Snell v. Ruppert, 582 P.2d 916, 918 (Wyo. 1978); Gray v. 
Fitzhugh, 576 P.2d 88, 91 (Wyo. 1978); Allen v. Allen, 550 P.2d 1137, 1142 (Wyo. 
1976); Hatten Realty Co. v. Baylies, 42 Wyo. 69, 89-93, 290 P. 561, 566-68 
(1930). In Hatten, this court held that where "a man is successful in the 
position taken in the first proceeding" then that position "rise[s] to the 
dignity of conclusiveness." Hatten, 42 Wyo. at 93, 290 P.  at 568.

[¶12]   In Allen, we described judicial 
estoppel as

a doctrine which estops a 
party to play fast and loose with the courts or to trifle with judicial 
proceedings. It is an expression of the maxim that one cannot blow hot and cold 
in the same breath. A party will just not be allowed to maintain inconsistent 
positions in judicial proceedings * * *.

Allen, 550 P.2d  
at 1142. In JRW, we stated that under the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel:

"[A] party who by his 
pleadings, statements or contentions, under oath, has assumed a particular 
position in a judicial proceeding is estopped to assume an inconsistent position 
in a subsequent action."

JRW, 814 P.2d  at 
1265-66 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 761 (5th ed. 1979)). In addition to the 
requirement of inconsistent positions, most courts also require that the 
"initial position taken must be one regarding fact." In other words, judicial 
estoppel does not apply to legal conclusions based on undisputed facts. Rand G. 
Boyers, Comment, Precluding Inconsistent Statements: The Doctrine of Judicial 
Estoppel, 80 NW.U.L.Rev. 1244, 1262 (1986); see also 31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 117b 
at 627 (1964).

[¶13]   We decline to invoke judicial 
estoppel in this case because there is no evidence in the record that CSSA or 
TSP has played "fast and loose" with the courts, the position now asserted by 
TSP and CSSA is not inconsistent with any position they took previously in this 
litigation, and the two alleged inconsistent positions are legal conclusions and 
not statements of fact. 

[¶14]   The Bredthauers assert that CSSA's 
and TSP's position in this appeal, that W.S. 1-3-111 (the statute of repose) 
bars the action, is inconsistent with the position they took in the earlier 
appeal, that W.S. 1-3-107 (two-year statute of limitations) was the applicable 
period of limitations for all of the Bredthauers' claims against CSSA and TSP. 
These positions, however, are not truly inconsistent because W.S. 1-3-107 is a 
statute of limitations and W.S. 1-3-111 is a statute of repose. As we have 
previously described:

"Statutes of repose and 
statutes of limitations are often confused. They are similar in that both 
prescribe the time period within which a plaintiff may commence his suit. The 
distinguishing feature between the two is the time at which the respective 
periods commence. Generally, * * * if the plaintiff's cause of action accrues 
and the statutory period commences when the injury occurs, or, as is most often 
the case, when the plaintiff is or should be aware that he has been injured, the 
statute is properly termed a statute of limitations. If the statutory period 
commences upon the occurrence of an event, regardless of when the injury occurs, 
at a time when the plaintiff may or may not be aware of any injury, the statute 
is properly termed a statute of repose. * * * Consequently, the plaintiff's 
claim may be barred before he is or should be aware that he has been injured or 
has a claim."

Worden v. 
Village Homes, 821 P.2d 1291, 1295 (Wyo. 1991) (quoting State ex rel. Wyoming 
Worker's Comp. Div. v. Halstead, 795 P.2d 760, 765 n. 9 (Wyo. 1990)). Because a 
statute of repose and a statute of limitations can be applied to the same facts 
to bar the same cause of action, they are not truly inconsistent.

[¶15]   The statement contained in the 
parties' stipulation concerning CSSA's and TSP's initial position, "the parties 
agree that the provisions of W.S. § 1-3-107 state the applicable period of 
limitations * * *," is a legal conclusion because a statute of limitations 
defense is a question of law. Mason v. Laramie Rivers Co., 490 P.2d 1062, 1065 
(Wyo. 1971). CSSA and TSP are not now asserting a new factual position, but only 
that a different statute, as applied to the same facts, bars the cause of 
action. Since judicial estoppel does not apply to inconsistent assertions of 
law, we reject the Bredthauers' invitation to invoke the doctrine.

B. RES JUDICATA & 
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

[¶16]   The Bredthauers next assert that 
the closely related doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel bar CSSA 
and TSP from raising the statute of repose defense. However, the Bredthauers 
failed to explain why or how these two doctrines bar CSSA and TSP from raising 
the statute of repose defense. Concerning the merits of the two doctrines, the 
Bredthauers make only the following conclusive statement:

The Appellees are * * * 
collaterally estopped and prohibited by res judicata from asserting a new 
statute of limitations.

As we have held 
numerous times before, arguments not supported by cogent argument or authority 
will not be considered by this court. Weisbrod v. Ely, 767 P.2d 171, 176 (Wyo. 
1989).

C. OTHER 
ARGUMENTS

[¶17]   In their brief and reply brief, the 
Bredthauers raise several additional legal theories in support of their position 
that CSSA and TSP are precluded from raising the statute of repose. These legal 
theories include the law of the case doctrine, improperly raising an issue which 
is subject to a stipulation, waiver, W.R.C.P. 8(c), statutory construction, and 
constitutionality of the statute of repose. The problem with these arguments is 
that none of them were properly raised before the district court.

[¶18]   We strongly adhere to the rule 
forbidding us to "consider for the first time on appeal issues that were neither 
raised in, nor argued to, the trial court," except for those issues which are 
jurisdictional or are fundamental in nature. Oatts v. Jorgenson, 821 P.2d 108, 
111 (Wyo. 1991). We follow this rule because "it is unfair to reverse a ruling 
of a trial court for reasons that were not presented to it, whether it be legal 
theories or issues never formally raised in the pleadings nor argued to the 
trial court." Id.

[¶19]   In their motions opposing CSSA's 
and TSP's motions for summary judgment, the Bredthauers raised only res judicata 
and judicial estoppel as legal theories to support their position. Additionally, 
the trial court's orders, granting summary judgment to CSSA and TSP based upon 
the statute of repose, addressed only res judicata and judicial estoppel. 
Although the Bredthauers' counsel did mention, at oral argument for the summary 
judgment motions, the notion of the law of the case, it was not discussed 
anywhere else in the record. Therefore, based on the record, it is clear that 
the only legal theories properly raised to and considered by the trial court 
were res judicata and judicial estoppel.

[¶20]   Of the additional legal theories 
raised on appeal by the Bredthauers, only one, the constitutionality of the 
statute of repose, fits the exceptions which permit review. The 
constitutionality of a statute is fundamental in nature, and, therefore, we may 
address that issue despite it not being properly raised below. White v. Fisher, 
689 P.2d 102, 105 (Wyo. 1984).

[¶21]   We have recently addressed the 
question of whether W.S. 1-3-111 (the statute of repose) is constitutional. 
Worden, 821 P.2d  at 1291. In that case, we specifically held W.S. 1-3-111 
constitutional in the face of art. 1, § 8 of the Wyoming Constitution. Id., at 
1295. Since the Bredthauers raise this same objection to the statute of repose, 
we need go no further than reaffirm our decision in Worden to reject their claim 
of unconstitutionality.

IV. 
CONCLUSION

[¶22]   We affirm the trial court's grant 
of summary judgment to both CSSA and TSP because there are no issues of material 
fact and because the trial court was correct, as a matter of law, in concluding 
that the doctrines of judicial estoppel and res judicata did not preclude the 
application of W.S. 1-3-111.

MACY, Chief Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶23]   I dissent.

[¶24]   The issue of the application of 
WYO. STAT. § 1-3-111(a) (1988) was res judicata when we remanded Bredthauer v. 
Christian, Spring, Seilbach and Associates, 824 P.2d 560 (Wyo. 1992). In an 
order dismissing the Bredthauers' claim against Davis Surveying, which is not a 
party to this appeal, the district court determined that § 1-3-111(a) did not 
apply to the facts of this case. It also held that WYO. STAT. § 1-3-107(a)(i) 
(1988) did apply and was fatal to the Bredthauers' case. It is clear that TSP 
and CSSA were relying upon only § 1-3-107(a)(i) as a bar to the Bredthauers' 
action against them. The Bredthauers appealed, but the other parties, including 
TSP and CSSA, did not appeal the ruling on § 1-3-111(a), which was adverse to 
them and which was appealable because the district court made the required 
W.R.C.P. 54(b) certification (no just reason for delay and express direction 
that judgment be entered). The only purpose for the interlocutory review 
pursuant to the W.R.C.P. 54(b) certification was to determine whether the 
Bredthauers' suit was barred by time (either by the statute of limitations or by 
the statute of repose). When this case was remanded to the district court, at 
least one thing was certain: Neither § 1-3-107(a)(i) nor § 1-3-111(a) barred the 
Bredthauers' action.

[¶25]   It is of no great significance 
whether we premise our decision upon the doctrine of res judicata or upon the 
law of the case. However, in my view, the doctrine of res judicata is the 
appropriate theory in this instance.

[¶26]   If the district court's ruling had 
done some sort of violence to the law, I might have been inclined to go along 
with the majority in this case; however, the district court was correct in its 
initial decision and, absent an appeal and reversal of that determination, its 
decision must stand. 

THOMAS, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶27]   I must dissent from the resolution 
of this case according to the majority opinion. In Bredthauer v. Christian, 
Spring, Seilbach and Assoc., 824 P.2d 560 (Wyo. 1992) (Bredthauer I), we 
reversed a dismissal of this case based upon the claimed defense of the statute 
of limitations, WYO. STAT. § 1-3-107 (1988), holding the plaintiffs were 
entitled to have an adjudication of their claims upon the merits. Subsequently, 
the defendants recognized they really meant to rely upon the statute of repose 
to defeat the plaintiffs' claims, and they persuaded the trial court they were 
entitled to a dismissal for that reason. The statute invoked, WYO. STAT. § 
1-3-111 (1988) provides, in pertinent part (emphasis added):

     (a) Unless the parties 
to the contract agree otherwise, no action to recover damages, whether in tort, 
contract, indemnity or otherwise, shall be brought more than ten (10) years 
after substantial completion of an improvement to real property, against 
any person constructing, altering or repairing the improvement, manufacturing or 
furnishing materials incorporated in the improvement, or performing or 
furnishing services in the design, planning, surveying, supervision, observation 
or management of construction, or administration of construction contracts 
for:

     (i) Any deficiency in 
the design, planning, supervision, construction, surveying, manufacturing or 
supplying of materials or observation or management of construction.

In applying this 
statute to the facts of this case, the compelling questions for me are: What 
improvement? What construction?

[¶28]   There is no dispute the surveys in 
question were made of undeveloped real estate for the purposes of platting that 
real estate for a subdivision. Bredthauer I. More than fifty years ago, this 
court stated statutes of limitations are statutes of repose and are based on 
sound public policy, but the context may limit a term used in the statute. Board 
of Comm'rs of Big Horn County v. Bench Canal Drainage Dist., 56 Wyo. 260, 108 P.2d 590 (1940). More recently we said:

Statutes of limitations 
are so construed that even if the case seems to be one within the reason, if it 
be not mentioned in the statute, it is not deemed that the legislature thought 
it proper to apply such limitations. Roberts v. Roberts, 62 Wyo. 77, 91, 162 P.2d 117, 121 (1945), same case subsequent appeal 64 Wyo. 433, 196 P.2d 361 
(1948), rehearing denied 64 Wyo. 455, 197 P.2d 697.

John Meier & 
Son v. Horse Creek Conservation Dist., 603 P.2d 1283, 1287 (Wyo. 
1979).

[¶29]   The term "surveying" is used in the 
context of "substantial completion of an improvement to real estate." Another 
provision of the statute provides this definition:

     As used in this act 
[§§ 1-3-110 through 1-3-113] "substantial completion" means the degree of 
completion at which the owner can utilize the improvement for the purpose for 
which it was intended.

WYO. STAT. § 
1-3-110 (1988).

The term 
"improvement" is not defined in the provisions relating to the statutes of 
limitations and repose, but it is defined in the statutes relating to liens in 
this way:

"Improve or improvement" 
means:

(A) Demolition, erection, 
alteration or repair of any property for its permanent 
benefit;

(B) Any work performed or 
material furnished for the permanent change of any real property; 
and

(C) Materials 
manufactured pursuant to contract.

WYO. STAT. § 
29-1-201(a)(iii) (1981) (emphasis added).

[¶30]   The surveys provided to the 
Bredthauers did not make any permanent change in this property nor was 
any permanent benefit afforded to the property. Logic dictates the 
surveys were detrimental to the property rather than beneficial. The issue 
confronting this court was correctly decided in Ciancio v. Serafini, 40 Colo. 
App. 168, 574 P.2d 876, 877-78 (1977), the court saying:1

     We have found no case, 
and none has been called to our attention, which holds that a boundary survey 
alone constitutes an improvement. There is nothing in the complaint here, or in 
the agreed facts to indicate that the then owners who ordered the survey 
contemplated construction of a building. The survey shows on its face that it is 
a boundary survey only.

* * * * * *

     We hold that a survey 
which is not part of an improvement or building project does not constitute an 
"improvement to real property" as that term is used in § 13-80-127, C.R.S. 1973, 
and that actions accruing because of negligence in performing such surveys are 
not within the purview of that statute.

[¶31]   The statute relied upon by the 
appellees and the trial court to justify dismissal does not connote any 
surveying other than surveying accomplished in connection with some construction 
upon the property. A survey for purposes of a subdivision is not contemplated 
by, and it is not mentioned in, the statute. Even if one were to conclude that 
somehow a survey for a subdivision plat constitutes an improvement to the 
property within the context of the statute, it is impossible to determine how 
the statute has been triggered by substantial completion in this instance. The 
owner has been effectively prevented from utilizing the survey for the purpose 
for which it was intended. The majority opinion, by judicial fiat, has expanded 
the scope of the statute, and that prerogative should be left to the 
legislature.

[¶32]   I submit this court was right the 
first time in holding the Bredthauers were entitled to have their claims 
determined on their merits. Reliance upon the statute of repose in this factual 
situation is nothing more than sophistry, and it should not be countenanced by 
this court. The case should be reversed, and I would so 
hold.

FOOTNOTES

1 The statute in this 
case, COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-127 (1973) provided:

All 
actions against any architect, contractor, engineer, or inspector brought to 
recover damages for injury to person or property caused by the design, planning, 
supervision, inspection, construction, or observation of construction of any 
improvement to real property shall be brought within two years after the claim 
for relief arises, and not thereafter, but in no case shall such an action be 
brought more than ten years after the substantial completion of the improvement 
to the property.