Title: ECOSYSTEM RESOURCES, L.C. V. BROADBENT LAND & RESOURCES, L.L.C.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ECOSYSTEM RESOURCES, L.C. V. BROADBENT LAND & RESOURCES, L.L.C.2007 WY 87158 P.3d 685Case Number: 05-277Decided: 05/23/2007
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
ECOSYSTEM 
RESOURCES, L.C.,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
BROADBENT 
LAND & RESOURCES, L.L.C.,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofUintaCounty

The 
Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Phillip 
William Lear of Lear & Lear, L.L.P., Salt Lake City, Utah.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Clayton 
B. Thomas, Evanston, Wyoming; M. David Eckersley of Prince, Yeates & 
Geldzahler, Salt Lake City, Utah.  
Argument by Mr. Eckersley.    

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
* Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

            

[¶1]      In the early 
1900s, Union Pacific Railroad Company (Union Pacific) conveyed real property 
located in UintaCounty to Broadbent Land 
& Resources, LLC's (Broadbent) predecessors in interest, but reserved and 
excepted "all timber" on said lands.  
Nearly one hundred years later, Ecosystem Resources, L.C. (Ecosystem) 
acquired the timber rights and proceeded to harvest the timber.  As surface owner, Broadbent asked the 
district court to quiet title to the timber in it.  Relying on a rule of law adopted in 
other jurisdictions, Broadbent argued that, because Union Pacific's timber 
interests were not expressly made perpetual in the deeds, they were limited to a 
reasonable time and more than a reasonable time had passed since Union Pacific 
reserved its timber interests.  The 
district court agreed with Broadbent and granted its motion for judgment on the 
pleadings declaring Ecosystem's timber interests had lapsed and title to the 
timber reverted to the surface land owner, Broadbent.    

 
 
[¶2]      On appeal, we are 
called upon to determine, as a matter of first impression, the duration of an 
interest in timber created in a deed when no time limit is set out in the 
language of the deed.  We reject a 
rigid rule of interpretation which does not consider the parties' intent.  Instead, we reverse the district court's 
judgment on the pleadings and remand for consideration of evidence of the facts 
and circumstances surrounding execution of the deeds.   

            

ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]      Ecosystem 
presents the following issues for review on appeal:

 
 

1.                  
Did 
the trial court err as a matter of law in holding that a reservation of "all 
timber" created an estate in timber limited to a reasonable time rather than an 
estate in perpetuity?

 
 

2.                  
Assuming 
Wyoming law 
requires words of duration to create a perpetual timber easement, did the trial 
court err in holding that the reservation did not contain such 
language?

 
 
Broadbent 
does not offer a separate statement of the issues.  

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      In 1908, Union 
Pacific executed a warranty deed granting 15,941 acres in Uinta County, Wyoming to 
HeberLand and Livestock Company 
in consideration for $7,970.57.  The 
deed contained the following language: 

 
 
Excepting 
and reserving to Union Pacific Railroad Company, the exclusive right to cut and 
remove all timber from said land and the right of ingress, egress and regress 
upon said land, and the right to use as much of the surface thereof as may be 
necessary for the proper conduct of said business thereon . . . .  

 
 
[¶5]      In 1909, Union 
Pacific executed a warranty deed granting approximately 5,037 acres to James 
Chesney in exchange for $3,779.52.  
The deed excepted and reserved to "Union Pacific Railroad Company, its 
successors and assigns" "all timber" on the land, together with the "exclusive 
right to cut and remove" it from the land, the "right of ingress, egress and 
regress" upon the land and the right to use so much of the surface as necessary 
to properly conduct its business.    

 
 
[¶6]      Ecosystem is the 
successor in interest to Union Pacific's interests, and Broadbent is the 
successor in interest to Heber's and Chesney's interests.  In 2005, Ecosystem communicated its 
plans to harvest the timber, prompting Broadbent to file a complaint seeking to 
have Ecosystem's timber rights under the deeds extinguished and title to the 
timber quieted in it.  Broadbent 
argued that Union Pacific and its successors were required to remove the timber 
within a reasonable time and, having failed to do so, lost the timber 
rights.    

 
 
[¶7]      Ecosystem 
answered claiming its timber rights were perpetual and counterclaimed seeking 
quiet title.  Broadbent filed a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings.  
Ecosystem responded arguing the plain language of the deeds reserved a 
perpetual right to the timber, and the district court should consider the facts 
and circumstances surrounding execution of the deeds before implying a 
"reasonable time" limitation into the deeds.   To that end, Ecosystem proffered 
evidence about the nature of the railroad's business operations at the time the 
deeds were executed and the need to have a sufficient supply of timber to 
sustain those operations.  It also 
presented evidence suggesting the grantees paid a lower price for their 
properties because of the reservations included in the deeds.  The district court did not consider 
Ecosystem's evidence.  Instead, it 
granted Broadbent's motion for judgment on the pleadings holding, as a matter of 
law, because the timber reservations were "silent as to their duration" they 
were for a reasonable amount of time; ninety-five years was an unreasonable 
amount of time; the reservations lapsed; and, consequently, Broadbent owned the 
timber situate on the lands.   

 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 
 
[¶8]      We review a 
district court's decision granting a judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to 
W.R.C.P. 12(c), de novo by applying 
the same standards used by the district court in ruling on the motion.  See, Box L Corp. v. Teton County, 2004 WY 75, 
¶ 2, 92 P.3d 811, 813 (Wyo. 2004); Rodriguez v. Casey, 2002 WY 111, ¶ 4, 50 P.3d 323, 325 (Wyo. 2002):

 
 
            
A defendant is entitled to judgment on the pleadings if the undisputed 
facts appearing in the pleadings, supplemented by any facts of which the 
district court may take judicial notice, establish that no relief can be 
granted.  A judgment on the 
pleadings is appropriate if all material allegations of fact are admitted in the 
pleadings and only questions of law remain.

 
 

Greeves 
v. Rosenbaum, 
965 P.2d 669, 671 (Wyo. 1998) (citations omitted).  Review of a judgment on the pleadings is 
akin to review of a dismissal under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted.  
Id. at 672.  The facts are reviewed in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion and the motion is granted only if 
"those facts dictate that judgment should be entered as a matter of law."  Wilson v. Town of Alpine, 2005 WY 57, ¶ 4, 111 P.3d 290, 291 (Wyo. 2005).  If an 
issue of fact exists, the motion should not be granted.  Reno v. Reno, 
626 P.2d 552, 554 (Wyo. 1981).  

            

DISCUSSION 

 
 
[¶9]      We are charged 
with interpreting Union Pacific's deeds to determine the duration of the timber 
interests reserved in those documents.  
Although we have never had occasion to address this issue before,1 a well-established paradigm for 
interpreting deeds exists to guide our analysis.  Our deed interpretation rules focus on 
deriving the intentions of the parties.  
Mullinnix LLC v. HKB Royalty 
Trust, 2006 WY 14, ¶ 22, 126 P.3d 909, 919 (Wyo. 2006); Caballo Coal Co. v. 
Fid. Exploration & Prod. Co., 2004 WY 
6, ¶ 11, 84 P.3d 311, 314 (Wyo. 
2004).  We start with the language 
utilized by the parties to the deed, giving that language its plain and ordinary 
meaning.  Hickman v. Groves, 2003 WY 76, ¶ 6, 71 P.3d 256, 258 
(Wyo. 2003).  If the language is 
clear and unambiguous, we look only to the "four corners" of the deed in 
ascertaining the parties' intent.  
Caballo Coal, ¶ 11, 84 P.3d  at 
314.  

 
 
[¶10]   However, we have also recognized 
that, even if a contract is unambiguous, we can examine evidence of the 
circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed to arrive at the parties' 
intent.  Hickman, ¶¶ 6-11, 71 P.3d  at 
257-58.  Relevant considerations may 
include the relationship of the parties, the subject matter of the contract, and 
the parties' purpose in making the contract.  Id. 

 
 
 [I]t has long been the law that we look 
to the meaning of terms at the time of execution of an unambiguous deed.  In 1899, we stated in Balch, 9 Wyo. at 29, 59 P. at 436:  "The rule in such cases [involving deed 
interpretation] is that the intention of the parties is to be ascertained by 
considering all the provisions of the deed, as well as the situation of the parties, 
and then to give effect to such intention if practicable."  (emphasis added).  Understanding the importance of the use 
of "surrounding circumstances" evidence is not difficult when you take into 
account the definition of "plain meaning" as used in contract interpretation 
cases.  The "plain meaning [of a 
contract's language] is that meaning which [the] language would convey to 
reasonable persons at the time and place 
of its use.'"  Newman, ¶ 12, 53 P.3d  at 544, 
quoting  Moncrief v. Louisiana Land and Exploration 
Company, 861 P.2d 516, 524 (Wyo. 1993) (emphasis added).   

 
 

Mullinnix, 
¶ 23, 
126 P.3d  at 919.

 
 
[¶11]   The plain language included in 
Union Pacific's deeds reserved "all timber" and did not limit the time for 
removing the timber.  Nevertheless, 
the district court accepted Broadbent's claim that there is a general rule 
across the country which states that, unless expressly made perpetual, a timber 
right created by contract or deed will be interpreted as expiring after a 
reasonable time for removing the timber has passed.  Ruling from the bench after the parties 
argued the motion for a judgment on the pleadings, the district court 
stated:

 
 
The 
question presented is whether the reservation of the timber rights runs in 
perpetuity without an express reservation that contains the language in 
perpetuity.  The majority rule 
appears to be that a conveyed or reserved right to growing timber is a 
terminable estate unless a specific term of years or a perpetual right is stated 
in the document of conveyance.  
Here, there is no such language.  
If there is no language defining the period of time the timber may be 
harvested, then it must be a reasonable time.  Ordinarily, what is reasonable is a 
question of fact unless reasonable minds could not differ.  The Court finds as a matter of law that 
ninety-nine years or ninety-seven years, the period of time that has lapsed 
between the execution of the deeds and the present time, is not a reasonable 
period of time.

 
 
[¶12]   Ecosystem challenges the district 
court's application of the "reasonable time" rule on several fronts.  Relying on Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-2-101 
(LexisNexis 2005), Ecosystem argues all of an interest in real property passes 
with a grant or is retained in a reservation unless the intent to pass or 
reserve a lesser estate is clearly expressed in the instrument.  Section 34-2-101 
states:

 
 
            
The term "heirs", or other words of inheritance, shall not be necessary 
to create or convey an estate in fee simple, and every conveyance of real estate 
shall pass all the estate of the grantor therein, unless the intent to pass a 
less estate shall expressly appear or be necessarily implied in the terms of the 
grant.

   

The 
statute is substantially the same today as it was when the deeds were 
executed.  See, R.S. 1899 § 
2737.

 
 
[¶13]   As we understand it, Ecosystem is 
arguing that, under § 34-2-101, Union Pacific reserved the largest estate possible, 
i.e. a perpetual fee simple interest in the timber.  However, the statute could also be read 
in favor of the grantee and against the grantor's reservation, compelling the 
conclusion that Union Pacific granted the greatest estate possible 
when it conveyed the surface lands and, therefore, only reserved the timber for 
a reasonable time.  Rather than 
spend too much time trying to discern the proper interpretation of "all the 
estate," we turn to the next provision of the statute which specifically directs 
us back to the lynchpin of deed interpretation  the parties' intent.  Although the statute does little to 
advance the analysis in this case, it does reiterate the importance of the 
parties' intentions in interpreting deeds.  

 
 
[¶14]   Ecosystem also argues that the 
district court should not have eschewed this Court's approach to interpreting 
deeds in favor of an approach that mechanically applies the reasonable time 
rule.  We recognize it is tempting 
to resolve this case by jumping directly to the cases from other jurisdictions 
interpreting timber deeds.  However, 
it is important to determine how those cases fit into our well established deed 
interpretation jurisprudence before considering or adopting their 
rationale.  Consequently, although 
we will discuss the cases from other jurisdictions, we will do so in the context 
of applying this court's oft-stated deed interpretation principles.  

 
 
[¶15]   Starting with the plain language of 
the deeds, we note the two Union Pacific deeds used similar language in 
excepting and reserving the timber interests.  The deeds excepted and reserved2 to Union Pacific the exclusive 
right to cut and remove all timber from the land, the right of ingress, egress 
and regress upon said land, and the right to use as much of the surface as 
necessary to properly conduct its business thereon.  The only material difference between the 
reservations in the two deeds is that the 1909 deed expanded the reservation to 
Union Pacific's successors and assigns.      

 
 
[¶16]   The existence or absence of certain 
terms in the document creating  a 
timber interest has been considered important to courts in determining the 
duration of the interest when no time is specifically stated in the 
document.  See, Annotation, "Rights of parties to a 
timber contract within the time fixed or within a reasonable time", 15 A.L.R. 41 
(1921), and cases cited therein for a discussion of relevant cases and the 
terminology employed in various documents.  
For example, use of the term "forever" in describing the timber interest 
has been interpreted as important in creating a perpetual right to the 
timber.  See, e.g., Baker v. Kenney, 124 N.W. 901, 904 
(Iowa 1910); 
Dean v. Great Northern Nekoosa Corp., 
303 S.E.2d 445, 447-48 (Ga. 1983).  Words indicating that the parties were 
referring only to presently existing timber, such as "merchantable timber" or 
timber "standing," "growing," or "being" at the time of the deed, have been 
construed as reflecting an intention to limit the timber interest to a 
reasonable time.  See, e.g., Person v. Elmblad, 136 N.W.2d 741 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1965); Annotation, supra, 
at 51-59, and cases cited therein.  
In contrast, words indicating the parties intended to extend the grant to 
timber grown in the future have been held to confer a perpetual interest in 
timber in other cases.  See, e.g., Franke v. Welch, 458 P.2d 441, 443-44 
(Ore. 
1969).  Some courts have identified 
the omission or incorporation of words of inheritance as important in 
determining the duration of the timber right.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Oklahoma Planning & 
Res. Bd.  v. Smith, 317 P.2d 219, 223-24 (Okla. 1957).  Language indicating the parties intended 
the timber to be removed from the surface has been construed as limiting the 
timber interest to a reasonable time.  
See discussion in Gabbard, 200 S.W.  at 944-45.  Courts have also looked to language 
defining the timber holder's right to access his timber across the surface 
owner's other lands as important in determining the duration of the timber 
interest.  See, e.g., Clyde v. Walker, 348 P.2d 1104 
(Ore. 
1960).  

 
 
[¶17]   The Union Pacific deeds contain 
some of the terms referenced in the above referenced cases, but do not contain 
others.  The deeds do include the 
term "forever" in the context of the duration of the grant, but the term does 
not clearly apply to the reservations.  
Thus, the failure to specifically use the word "forever" in the 
reservation may weigh in favor of a finding that the timber interest was limited 
to a reasonable time.  On the other 
hand, the reservations referred to "all timber" and did not limit the rights to 
standing timber or timber "in being" at the time of the deeds.  The "all timber" language suggests the 
grant may have been intended to be perpetual.  To further complicate the analysis, one 
of the deeds contains language indicating the timber interest is to inure to 
Union Pacific's successors and assigns, but the other does not.      

 
 
[¶18]   Union Pacific clearly intended to 
retain the right to "cut and remove" the timber from the land.  Some cases indicate that, when removal 
of the timber is contemplated in the conveyance, such removal must occur in a 
reasonable time.  See, Gabbard, 200 S.W. at 943-44; Hicks v. Phillips, 142 S.W. 394, 395 
(Ky. Ct. App. 1912).   However, 
the Montana Supreme Court rejected such an argument. 
stating:

 
 

This 
argument makes a grant of timber in perpetuity well-nigh impossible, since 
removal is contemplated at some time during the life of the timber in almost 
every case.

 

R.M. 
Cobban Realty Co. v. Donlan, 149 P. 484, 487 (Mont. 1915).  Many of the cases we have read involved 
a dispute over which party (the timber right holder or the surface owner) was 
entitled to remove the timber.  See, Annotation, supra, at 41, and cases cited 
herein.  We, therefore, agree with 
the Montana Supreme Court that it is not particularly helpful to look at whether 
the parties intended the timber to be removed in determining whether the grant 
was perpetual or only for a "reasonable time" because the right to remove the 
timber will nearly always be of importance to the timber right holder.  

 
 
[¶19]   Finally, in determining the 
duration of the timber estate, some cases have considered language which 
accompanied the timber grant or reservation giving the timber interest owner the 
right to access its timber lands over other property belonging to the surface 
owner.  See, e.g., Clyde, 348 P.2d  at 1106; Donlan, 149 P.  at 487.  In the case at bar, Union Pacific 
reserved the rights to "ingress, egress and regress" across the surface owners' 
estate in order to make use of its reserved timber interests.    Ecosystem argues the term 
"regress" indicates Union Pacific's intent to retain the right to the timber in 
perpetuity.  The definition of 
"regress" regarding property is: "reentry or right of reentry."  Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary 1913 (2000).  This 
definition indicates Union Pacific had the right to repeatedly traverse the 
surface land to exploit its timber interests.  It does not, however, expressly address 
the duration of the right. 

 
 
[¶20]   The plain language of the deeds 
does not limit the duration of the timber interests to a "reasonable time."  Nevertheless, the district court 
resolved the case by applying the "reasonable time" rule found in cases from 
other jurisdictions but declined to consider Ecosystem's proffered evidence 
regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of the Union 
Pacific deeds, indicating that it could make its decision based upon the 
pleadings.  We find this ruling 
perplexing because the district court did not simply rely on the pleadings or 
the plain language of the deeds in resolving this case, but, instead, relied on 
the judicially created "reasonable time" rule.  

 
 
[¶21]   Remaining true to our rules of deed 
interpretation, we note that the existence of  a general rule at the time the deeds 
were executed implying a reasonable time limitation in timber deeds could be 
part of the facts and circumstances surrounding that execution  and, consequently, reflective of the 
parties' intentions with regard to the duration of the deeds.  Although Broadbent claims the 
"reasonable time" rule is "universal" and the district court characterized it as 
the "majority" rule,  after 
reviewing many cases, we are not convinced the rule was a "universal" or, even a 
clear majority rule, in the United States in 1908 and 1909.  While there were numerous cases decided 
in the same general time frame applying the "reasonable time" rule, see, e.g., Lewison v. Axtell, 195 N.W. 622 (Iowa 
1923);  Berry v. Marion County Lumber Co., 93 S.E. 328 (S.C. 1917); Carson v. Three 
States Lumber Co., 69 S.W. 320 (Tenn. 1902), there were also cases holding 
that a timber interest that is not expressly limited in time continues in 
perpetuity.  See, e.g, Walters v. Sheffield, 78 So. 539 
(Fla. 1918); 
Butterfield Lumber Co. v. Guy, 46 So. 78 (Miss. 
1908); Donlan, 149 P. at 486-88; Magnetic Ore Co. v. Marbury Lumber Co., 
16 So. 632 (Ala. 1894).  See also, Annotation, supra,  at 43-51 and cases cited therein. 

 
 
[¶22]   Even current treatises indicate 
there is no "universal rule."  52 
Am. Jur. 2d, Logs & Timber, § 47 
(2007) states, in pertinent part:

 
 

There 
exists a difference of opinion whether a reservation or exception of timber 
gives the grantor of the land a title in perpetuity or a limited fee required to 
be exercised within a limited time by removal of the timber. While this is 
partly explainable by a difference in the phraseology of the instruments, it is 
also due in part to a difference in the rule of law applied. According to some 
courts, when a deed contains a clause reserving certain timber to the grantor of 
the land, without any provision as to the time of cutting or with nothing to 
indicate that a severance from the realty is contemplated, there is more than a 
mere reservation of the right to cut and remove timber; the grantor actually 
excepts the timber from the deed of the land, with the result that the title to 
it remains in the grantor and is not lost by a failure to cut and remove within 
a reasonable time. Some courts, however, require a plainly manifest intention to 
reserve a perpetual right of removal, on the ground that such a right is 
unreasonable.

 
 
On 
the other hand, other decisions take the view that when an exception of certain 
timber is inserted in a deed to land without any limitation of the time of its 
removal, a reasonable time only will be allowed for such removal. 

 
 
(footnotes 
omitted).  

 
 
[¶23]   Moreover, the policy expressed by 
courts when adopting the "reasonable time" rule may or may not be applicable in 
Wyoming.  The policy espoused for limiting the 
duration of a timber interest generally holds that it is unreasonable to 
perpetually burden the land with the timber interest because the surface owner 
cannot make use of his interest while the timber owner exploits his interest or 
until the timber is cleared from the land.  
See, e.g., Davis v. Haslam Lumber Co., 213 S.W.2d 771, 780 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); Smith, 
317 P.2d at 222-23; Franke, 458 P.2d  at 442-43.  

 
 
[¶24]   In states which, unlike Wyoming, 
are heavily forested, it may be true that the surface owner could not make use 
of his interest until the timber was cleared from the land, and the failure of 
the timber interest owner to remove the timber in a reasonable time would be 
unduly burdensome.  In Wyoming, however, it is 
fair to say there are many properties which could be used simultaneously by the 
surface owner for uses such as grazing and the timber owner for logging or other 
forestry related purposes.  See generally, Baker, 124 N.W.  at 904 (recognizing that 
the surface owner of land burdened with a separate timber interest could still 
use his land for "pasture or for any other purpose not inconsistent with the 
preservation of the timber and growth of timber thereon.").  

 
 
[¶25]   Simultaneous use of different 
interests in the same real property is common in Wyoming.  
The severance of the mineral estate from the surface estate has routinely 
occurred, requiring the different interest owners to find a way to work together 
so they can simultaneously exploit their interests in the property.  When faced with the argument that timber 
interests must be limited to a reasonable time in order to protect the surface 
owners' rights to the property, the Alabama Supreme Court could discern no 
reason why the duration of timber interests should be limited when mineral 
interests were not and, consequently, the court refused to apply the "reasonable 
time" rule to a deed which separately conveyed the timber interests in the 
land.  Magnetic Ore, 16 So.  at 633.   Similarly, the Montana Supreme 
Court offered a cogent analysis of the issue:    

 
 
In 
its essentials, [the deed], conveying the timber with the right of entry to cut 
and remove the same, differs not from a grant or reservation of coal or 
minerals, with a similar right of entry to mine and remove.  That such a grant or reservation, 
couched in terms employed in [the deed] would be absolute, no one would 
deny[.]  

 
 

Donlan, 
149 P. 
at 487.    

 
 
[¶26]   In addition to reserving the timber 
interests, the Union Pacific deeds in this case also excepted and reserved all 
coal and other minerals3 within or underlying the lands 
conveyed.  Ecosystem argues that, 
under Wyoming 
law, the reservation of minerals was perpetual and it would be improper to apply 
a different interpretation to the timber reservations by holding they were 
limited to a reasonable time.  In 
general, we agree that, unless the facts and circumstances surrounding execution 
of the Union Pacific deeds suggest otherwise, there is no reason to treat timber 
interests differently than mineral interests.  

 
 
[¶27]   One of the key cases Broadbent 
relies upon in support of its argument that the timber interests should be 
limited to a reasonable time is United 
States v. State Box Co., 219 F. Supp. 684 (D. Cal. 1963).  The State Box case involved timber interests 
transferred to the railroad pursuant to federal law.  Id. at 685.  In 1902, the railroad sold its timber 
interests to a lumber operation.  
Id.  
State Box eventually acquired the timber interest originally 
belonging to the railroad.  
Id.  However, in 1955, the federal government 
sold the same timber interest to the Grizzly Creek Lumber Company.  Id.  

 
 
[¶28]   The case came before the federal 
district court on State Box's motion to recover the value of the timber removed 
by Grizzly Creek Lumber.  Id. at 687.  In resolving the case, the court noted 
that "all grants made by the United States must be construed favorably to the 
Government and that nothing passes but what is conveyed in clear and explicit 
language - inferences being resolved not against but for the Government.'"  Id., quoting Caldwell v. United States, 250 U.S. 14, 20, 39 S. Ct. 397, 398, 63 L. Ed. 816 (1919).   The court 
also stated, "it must be assumed that Congress made such grants with knowledge 
of the common-law principle that such grants of timber must be removed within a 
reasonable time."  State Box, 219 F. Supp.  at 688.  Relying on these principles, the court 
ruled that the railroad's interest in the timber had expired and the title to 
the timber reverted to the surface owner, the federal government.  Id. at 690.  

 
 
[¶29]   
State Box is readily distinguishable from the case at bar.  There, the court was concerned with 
determining what rights the United States still held after 
transfer of some interests in the property to the railroad under a congressional 
grant.  The federal government does 
not claim an interest in the timber at issue in this case.  The rule of "strict construction" 
applicable to federal land grants does not, therefore, apply.  Moreover, the State Box court indicated the 
"reasonable time" rule was the common law rule, but it did not engage in a 
comprehensive analysis of case law to support that statement or even recognize 
that authority to the contrary existed.  
Id. at 688-89.  For these reasons, State Box is not controlling of the 
issue before this Court.    

 
 
 [¶30]  Broadbent and the district court also 
referred to a 1997 ruling by the Wyoming 
federal district court in Cottonwood 
Resources, L.C. v. Hamilton, 97-CV-222-J (D. Wyo. 1997) as 
support for implying the "reasonable time" limitation into the deeds at issue 
here.  In Cottonwood, the federal court denied the 
plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order in a dispute over the 
rights to timber on Wyoming land.  The plaintiff filed the underlying quiet 
title action, claiming it owned the timber rights to certain land because it was 
the successor in interest to Union Pacific's reservation of timber rights in 
1906 and 1910 deeds.  The defendants 
were the surface owners, i.e. the successors in interest to Union Pacific's 
grantees, and claimed they owned the timber because Union Pacific's right had 
expired when it failed to remove the timber within a reasonable time.  The federal district court was unable to 
find any Wyoming case law on point.  Relying on cases from other 
jurisdictions applying the "reasonable time" rule, the federal district court 
held the timber interest owner had failed to establish that it was likely to 
prevail on the merits and, consequently, denied its motion for a temporary order 
restraining the surface owner from removing the timber.    

 
 
[¶31]   There are a number of similarities 
between Cottonwood and the case at bar, including the 
dates of the deeds involved and the fact that Union Pacific was the grantor who 
reserved the timber interest in the deeds.  
However, there are also a number of factors that distinguish the 
Cottonwood decision from the case at hand.  First, Cottonwood arose in the very 
different procedural context of a motion for a temporary restraining order.  Also, the federal district court did not 
rely upon nor apply our standards for construing deeds to discern the intent of 
the parties.  Thus, we do not find 
the ruling in Cottonwood helpful in resolving this case.  

 
 
[¶32]   If we were interpreting a simple 
contract or bill of sale for removal of standing timber, we would have no 
difficulty accepting the district court's decision that, when no time is 
specified for completion of the contract, it must be performed in a reasonable 
time.  See, e.g., Scherer Constr., LLC v. Hedquist Constr., 
Inc., 2001 WY 23, ¶ 32, 18 P.3d 645, 657 (Wyo. 2001); Zitterkopf v. Roussalis, 546 P.2d 436, 
439 (Wyo. 
1976).  Indeed, it is settled law in 
Wyoming that 
"[w]here . . .  no time for 
performance is specified in a contract, the law implies performance must be 
within a reasonable time, and what is a reasonable time depends upon the 
circumstances of each case.'"  Scherer, ¶ 32, 18 P.3d  at 657, quoting 
G.C.I., Inc. v. Haught, 7 P.3d 906, 
909 (Wyo. 2000). 

 
 
[¶33]   However, in this case we are asked 
to interpret deeds purporting to reserve "all timber" to the grantor.  As the Montana Supreme Court noted in Donlan, 149 P.  at 486, when it construed 
a timber deed, a deed is "an instrument customarily employed only for the 
conveyance of an interest in real estate and legally requisite for such 
purpose."  Thus, we are reluctant to 
impose a reasonable time requirement unless we are convinced that was the 
general intent of the parties when they entered into the Union Pacific deeds at 
issue here.

   

[¶34]   After reviewing numerous cases, we 
conclude it would be imprudent, as well as inconsistent with our jurisprudence, 
to recite a general rule as to how long a timber interest should continue when 
there is no expression of duration in the conveying document.  The vagaries in the language and the 
facts and circumstances of the deeds and contracts interpreted in cases from 
across the country can be used to distinguish any individual case from 
another.  Adopting the "reasonable 
time" rule which is expressed in some, but certainly not all, of the cases from 
around the country throughout the nearly 100 years since the deeds were 
executed, without considering whether the "rule" was consistent with the general 
intent of the parties to the Union Pacific deeds, inflicts undue damage to our 
rules of deed interpretation.  The 
district court mistakenly eschewed the parties' intent in favor of applying a 
rigid "reasonable time" rule.  

 
 
[¶35]   Wyoming precedent demands that courts look to 
the language of the deeds and, when appropriate, to the facts and circumstances 
surrounding their execution to determine the parties' intent.   Case law from other jurisdictions 
may be considered as part of the facts and circumstances surrounding execution 
of the deeds; however, in order to fulfill their proper role in our paradigm, 
the scope of cases relevant to determining the parties' intent should be limited 
to those interpreting timber deeds from the same era as the Union Pacific 
deeds.  

 
 
[¶36]   While relevant case law may form 
part of the facts and circumstances, the nature of the parties, the type of land 
included in the deeds, and the purposes for the conveyances and/or reservations 
may also be important to determining the parties' intent.  Ecosystem submitted other materials to 
the district court seeking to show the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
Union Pacific transfers which, it argued, supported a finding that the grants of 
timber rights were perpetual.  It 
proffered evidence about the nature of the railroad's use of timber in its 
business activities and the consideration paid by the surface owners for the 
conveyances.  The district court 
should have considered all of the facts and circumstances surrounding execution 
of the Union Pacific deeds to determine the parties' general intent.  

 
 
[¶37]   We reverse and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1In Cundy v. Range Tel. Coop, Inc., 2005 WY 
153, ¶ 28, n. 9, 123 P.3d 901, 911, n. 9 (Wyo. 2005), we responded to Cundy's 
argument that he was the successor in interest to a reservation of perpetual 
timber rights as follows:  "This 
issue was not dispositively litigated in this case, but we point our readers' 
attention to authorities which suggest that timber rights may not be construed 
as perpetual unless that was clearly the intent of the grantor."  Id. (citations omitted).  It is obvious that our statement in Cundy was simply dicta and, 
consequently, does not bind us to any particular rule of law in this 
case.

  

2Union 
Pacific excepted and reserved the timber interests.  Some cases from other jurisdictions 
discuss the legal distinction between an exception and a reservation in deeds 
and suggest that, in certain cases, the distinction could be important in 
determining the duration of a timber interest.  See, e.g., Bardon v. O'Brien, 120 N.W. 827 
(Wis. 1909); 
Gabbard v. Sheffield, 200 S.W. 940 
(Ky. Ct. App. 1918); Walters v. 
Sheffield, 78 So. 539 (Fla. 1918).  See also, Holland v. Windsor, 461 P.2d 47 
(Wyo. 1969) (discussing the difference between 
an exception and reservation under Wyoming law, but not in the context of timber 
rights).   In this case, the 
distinction is not helpful since the deeds both "except" and "reserve" the 
timber interest.

   

3The 1909 
deed also specifically reserved "oil."  
(Vol. I, p. 64).