Title: State v. Barnes

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 2002-Ohio-68.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. BARNES, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State v. Barnes (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 21.] 
Criminal law — Defendant asserting self-defense cannot introduce evidence of 
specific instances of a victim’s conduct to prove that the victim was the 
initial aggressor — Evid.R. 404(A) and 405, construed and applied. 
(Nos. 00-1595 and 00-1682 — Submitted September 19, 2001 — Decided 
January 9, 2002.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Portage County, No. 98-
P-0052. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
A defendant asserting self-defense cannot introduce evidence of specific instances 
of a victim’s conduct to prove that the victim was the initial aggressor.  
(Evid.R. 404[A] and 405, construed and applied.) 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J.  This cause presents two questions: first, whether a defendant 
who asserts self-defense may introduce evidence of specific instances of conduct 
by the victim to show that the victim was the initial aggressor, and second, 
whether the trial court committed plain error when it instructed the jury that 
felonious assault with a deadly weapon is a lesser included offense of attempted 
murder.  We answer both questions in the negative. 
I 
 
While attending a party in Kent, Ohio, the appellee, Marcus Barnes, 
became involved in an argument with other partygoers.  The argument escalated 
into a physical altercation involving Barnes, Christopher Wawrin, and 
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Christopher DeAngelis.  Barnes stabbed both men during the fracas; Wawrin died 
from his wound several days later. 
 
The Portage County Grand Jury indicted Barnes on one count of murder 
for the Wawrin stabbing and one count of attempted murder for the attack on 
DeAngelis.  Barnes asserted self-defense as to both charges and sought to 
introduce evidence of prior acts of violence committed by Wawrin.  The trial 
court granted the state’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of Wawrin’s prior 
acts.  While the court found that Barnes could introduce evidence about Wawrin’s 
“propensity for violence,” it ruled that Evid.R. 405(B) precluded the admission of 
a victim’s prior specific acts.  Barnes later proffered evidence of Wawrin’s 
specific violent acts following the state’s case-in-chief. 
 
At the close of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury on the elements 
of murder and attempted murder as charged in counts one and two of the 
indictment.  Without an objection from Barnes, the court also instructed the jury 
on involuntary manslaughter (as a lesser included offense of murder) and 
felonious assault with a deadly weapon (as a lesser included offense of attempted 
murder).  As to the count charging Barnes with the attempted murder of 
DeAngelis, the court specifically instructed that the jury could find Barnes guilty 
of felonious assault if it found that the state had failed to prove the essential 
elements of attempted murder. 
 
The jury found Barnes guilty of involuntary manslaughter (for killing 
Wawrin) and felonious assault (for stabbing DeAngelis).  The trial court 
sentenced Barnes to consecutive prison terms of nine years for involuntary 
manslaughter and six years for felonious assault.  Barnes appealed to the Eleventh 
District Court of Appeals, which reversed both convictions.  The court of appeals 
found that the trial court erred by (1) excluding evidence of Wawrin’s specific 
instances of violent conduct, (2) instructing the jury that felonious assault with a 
deadly weapon was a lesser included offense of attempted murder, and (3) 
January Term, 2002 
3 
sentencing Barnes to consecutive prison terms without making the factual 
findings required by R.C. 2929.14(E)(4).  The Eleventh District certified its 
decision on the first two issues as being in conflict with decisions from several 
appellate districts.1  The cause is now before this court upon our determination 
that a conflict exists (case No. 00-1682) and pursuant to the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal (case No. 00-1595). 
II 
 
In connection with its first proposition of law, the state argues that, under 
Evid.R. 404 and 405, a defendant who asserts self-defense cannot introduce 
specific instances of conduct by a victim to demonstrate that the victim was the 
initial aggressor.2  Barnes disagrees, arguing that specific instances of a victim’s 
conduct are admissible to demonstrate that the victim was the aggressor, even if 
the defendant lacked knowledge of the conduct at the time of the alleged criminal 
activity.  We determine that specific instances of a victim’s prior conduct are not 
admissible to prove that a victim was the initial aggressor, regardless of a 
defendant’s knowledge. 
 
It is well settled that “[t]he trial court has broad discretion in the admission 
of evidence, and unless it has clearly abused its discretion and the defendant has 
                                                          
 
1. 
As to the question whether specific instances of a victim’s conduct are admissible to 
show that the defendant was not the first aggressor, the court of appeals found its judgment to be 
in conflict with State v. Cuttiford (1994), 93 Ohio App.3d 546, 639 N.E.2d 472; State v. Busby 
(Sept. 14, 1999), Franklin App. No. 98AP-1050, unreported, 1999 WL 710353; State v. Weston 
(July 16, 1999), Washington App. No. 97CA31, unreported, 1999 Wl 552732; State v. Douglas 
(Mar. 16, 1999), Mahoning App. No. 94 CA 214, unreported, 1999 WL 159207; and State v. Scott 
(Sept. 7, 1995), Cuyahoga App. No. 67148, unreported, 1995 WL 527597.  As to the question 
whether felonious assault is a lesser included offense of attempted murder, the court of appeals 
found its judgment to be in conflict with State v. Kaiser (Oct. 15, 1986), Montgomery App. No. 
9287, unreported, 1986 WL 11812; State v. Box (1993), 89 Ohio App.3d 614, 626 N.E.2d 996; 
and State v. Heath (June 25, 1997), Hamilton App. No. C-950676, unreported, 1997 WL 346083. 
2. 
The state devotes a portion of its appellate brief to arguing that the excluded specific acts 
were not admissible under Evid.R. 404(B).  We need not address Evid.R. 404(B), however, 
because, as Barnes concedes in his appellate brief, he intended for the excluded evidence to show 
that Wawrin had acted in conformity with past violent acts pursuant to Evid.R. 404(A)(2), and 
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been materially prejudiced thereby, an appellate court should not disturb the 
decision of the trial court.”  State v. Issa (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 64, 752 N.E.2d 
904, 922.  Therefore, we confine our inquiry to determining whether the trial 
court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably in excluding evidence 
offered under Evid.R. 404 and 405.  See Calderon v. Sharkey (1982), 70 Ohio 
St.2d 218, 222, 24 O.O.3d 322, 323, 436 N.E.2d 1008, 1012. 
 
Evid.R. 404 and 405 govern the introduction of character evidence. 
Evid.R. 404(A) specifies when character evidence is admissible and provides: 
 
“Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his character is not 
admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a 
particular occasion, subject to the following exceptions: 
 
“* * * 
 
“(2) Character of the victim.  Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of 
the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the 
same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the 
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first 
aggressor is admissible; however, in prosecutions for rape, gross sexual 
imposition, and prostitution, the exceptions provided by statute enacted by the 
General Assembly are applicable.” 
 
This blanket exception permitting Barnes to introduce evidence of 
Wawrin’s character is subject to Evid.R. 405, which sets forth what form such 
evidence may take: 
 
“(A) Reputation or opinion.  In all cases in which evidence of character or 
a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as 
to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion.  On cross-examination, 
inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct. 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
“not for one of the enumerated purposes set forth under Evid.R. 404(B).”  We therefore confine 
our inquiry to Evid.R. 404(A) and 405. 
January Term, 2002 
5 
 
“(B) Specific instances of conduct.  In cases in which character or a trait 
of character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, 
proof may also be made of specific instances of his conduct.” 
 
It is undisputed that a defendant can introduce character evidence by 
reputation or opinion testimony under Evid.R. 405(A).  See, e.g., State v. Baker 
(1993), 88 Ohio App.3d 204, 210-211, 623 N.E.2d 672, 676.  But Evid.R. 405(B) 
is more narrowly drawn.  Thus, the relevant inquiry in this case is whether a 
victim’s character or character trait is an essential element of self-defense.  If the 
proof or failure of proof of the victim’s character would not be dispositive of an 
element of self-defense, then it is not an essential component of the defense and 
falls outside the limited scope of Evid.R. 405(B). 
 
To establish self-defense, a defendant must prove the following elements: 
(1) that the defendant was not at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the 
affray; (2) that the defendant had a bona fide belief that he was in imminent 
danger of death or great bodily harm and that his only means of escape from such 
danger was in the use of such force; and (3) that the defendant did not violate any 
duty to retreat or avoid the danger.  State v. Robbins (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 74, 12 
O.O.3d 84, 388 N.E.2d 755, paragraph two of the syllabus.  Although a victim’s 
violent propensity may be pertinent to proving that he acted in a way such that a 
defendant’s responsive conduct satisfied the elements of self-defense, no element 
requires proof of the victim’s character or character traits.  A defendant may 
successfully assert self-defense without resort to proving any aspect of a victim’s 
character.  Therefore, Evid.R. 405(B) precludes a defendant from introducing 
specific instances of the victim’s conduct to prove that the victim was the initial 
aggressor.3  State v. Cuttiford (1994), 93 Ohio App.3d 546, 555, 639 N.E.2d 472, 
                                                          
 
3. 
Because Barnes sought to introduce specific instances of Wawrin’s conduct to prove only 
that Wawrin was the initial aggressor, we address that sole evidentiary concern.  We express no 
opinion here as to whether evidence of specific instances of a victim’s conduct is admissible for 
other purposes in a self-defense case.  See Baker, 88 Ohio App.3d at 211, 623 N.E.2d at 676 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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478; State v. Baker, 88 Ohio App.3d at 210-211, 623 N.E.2d at 676; State v. 
Carlson (1986), 31 Ohio App.3d 72, 74, 31 OBR 112, 115, 508 N.E.2d 999, 
1001. 
 
We recognize that some courts in other jurisdictions have reached a 
contrary result.  But we find more compelling the reasoning of the persuasive 
authority that agrees with the rationale that we employ today.  Federal courts, 
interpreting the analogous Fed.R.Evid. 404 and 405, have held that specific 
instances of a victim’s violent propensities are not admissible to prove whether 
the victim was the initial aggressor in a particular instance.  See United States v. 
Keiser (C.A.9, 1995), 57 F.3d 847, 857 (“A defendant could * * * successfully 
assert a claim of self-defense against an avowed pacifist, so long as the jury 
agrees that the defendant reasonably believed unlawful force was about to be used 
against him.  Thus, even though relevant, [a victim’s] character is not an essential 
element of [a defendant’s] defense.”); see, also, United States v. Smith (C.A.7, 
2000), 230 F.3d 300, 308; United States v. Bautista (C.A.10, 1998), 145 F.3d 
1140, 1152, certiorari denied (1998), 525 U.S. 911, 119 S.Ct. 255, 142 L.Ed.2d 
210; United States v. Piche (C.A.4, 1992), 981 F.2d 706, 713.  State courts in 
other jurisdictions with analogous evidence rules also agree.  See State v. 
Custodio (App.2001), 136 Idaho 197, 30 P.3d 975, 982 (“Proof of a victim’s 
propensity for violence, standing alone, does not prove an element of a claim of 
self-defense. Proof of a victim’s violent character does not show that the victim 
was the first aggressor in a particular conflict, nor does proof of a victim’s passive 
demeanor foreclose the defendant from asserting a claim of self-defense”); Allen 
v. State (Alaska App.1997), 945 P.2d 1233, 1240-1241; Brooks v. State 
(Ind.1997), 683 N.E.2d 574, 576-577; State v. Newell (1996), 141 N.H. 199, 201-
202, 679 A.2d 1142, 1144-1145.  Cf. People v. Miller (Colo.App.1998), 981 P.2d 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(holding testimony of specific instances of a victim’s conduct admissible to show a defendant’s 
state of mind). 
January Term, 2002 
7 
654, 658 (holding that the exclusion of specific acts intended to prove a victim’s 
sexual orientation was proper because sexual orientation does not prove an 
essential element of self-defense). 
 
Given the plain language of Evid.R. 404 and 405 and the weight of 
compelling persuasive authority, we hold that a defendant asserting self-defense 
cannot introduce evidence of specific instances of a victim’s conduct to prove that 
the victim was the initial aggressor.  Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in excluding the evidence of Wawrin’s prior instances of conduct, and 
the court of appeals erred in holding to the contrary. 
III 
 
In its second proposition of law, the state challenges the court of appeals’ 
reversal of Barnes’s conviction for felonious assault arising out of the DeAngelis 
stabbing.  The court of appeals held that the trial court committed plain error 
when it instructed the jury that felonious assault with a deadly weapon under R.C. 
2903.11(A)(2) is a lesser included offense of attempted murder.  The state argues 
that felonious assault under R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) can be a lesser included offense 
of attempted murder when the offender uses a deadly weapon in connection with 
his attempt to kill the victim. 
 
In State v. Deem (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 205, 533 N.E.2d 294, this court 
adopted a three-pronged test to determine whether a criminal offense is a lesser 
included offense of another.  We held that a criminal offense may be a lesser 
included offense of another if (1) the offense carries a lesser penalty than the 
other; (2) the greater offense cannot, as statutorily defined, ever be committed 
without the lesser offense, as statutorily defined, also being committed; and (3) 
some element of the greater offense is not required to prove the commission of the 
lesser offense.  Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
In this case, the state characterizes felonious assault with a deadly weapon 
as the lesser offense and attempted murder as the greater offense.  R.C. 
2903.11(A)(2) defines felonious assault with a deadly weapon and provides: 
 
“(A) No person shall knowingly: 
 
“* * * 
 
“(2) Cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another * * * by means of 
a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance.” 
 
In contrast, R.C. 2903.02(A) and 2923.02(A) define the offense of 
attempted murder.  The murder statute, R.C. 2903.02(A), provides, “No person 
shall purposely cause the death of another.”  Thus, a person is guilty of attempted 
murder when he or she “purposely * * * engage[s] in conduct that, if successful, 
would constitute or result in” the purposeful killing of another.  R.C. 2923.02(A); 
see, also, State v. Kidder (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 279, 283, 513 N.E.2d 311, 316. 
 
The state urges us to find that felonious assault under R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) 
can be a lesser included offense of attempted murder in the specific factual 
scenario presented here (viz., when an offender uses a deadly weapon as a means 
of attempting murder).  But the second prong of the Deem test requires us to 
examine the offenses at issue as statutorily defined and not with reference to 
specific factual scenarios.  “[T]he evidence presented in a particular case is 
irrelevant to the determination of whether an offense, as statutorily defined, is 
necessarily included in a greater offense.”  Kidder, 32 Ohio St.3d at 282, 513 
N.E.2d at 315; see, also, State v. Koss (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 213, 218-219, 551 
N.E.2d 970, 975.  Our comparison of the statutory elements of the two offenses at 
issue here leads us to conclude that felonious assault under R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) is 
not a lesser included offense of attempted murder because it is possible to commit 
the greater offense without committing the lesser one.  For example, an offender 
may commit an attempted murder without use of a weapon, meaning that 
“attempted murder can sometimes be committed without committing felonious 
January Term, 2002 
9 
assault under [R.C. 2903.11(A)(2)].” (Emphasis sic.)  State v. Nelson (1996), 122 
Ohio App.3d 309, 315, 701 N.E.2d 747, 750.  We are therefore unable to 
conclude that “the greater offense [attempted murder] cannot, as statutorily 
defined, ever be committed without the lesser offense [felonious assault], as 
statutorily defined, also being committed.”  (Emphasis added.)  Deem, 40 Ohio 
St.3d 205, 533 N.E.2d 294, paragraph three of the syllabus.  Accordingly, the 
court of appeals correctly found the trial court’s instruction to be erroneous. 
 
Even though the lesser-included-offense instruction was erroneous, the 
state alternatively argues that the court of appeals should not have found plain 
error warranting reversal under Crim.R. 52(B).  Although Barnes challenged the 
jury instruction in the court of appeals, he failed to object to it at trial and thereby 
forfeited all but plain error.  State v. Allen (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 626, 634, 653 
N.E.2d 675, 685; see, also, Crim.R. 30(A).  Despite our agreement with the court 
of appeals that the lesser-included-offense instruction was improper, we cannot 
agree with its determination that the trial court committed plain error warranting 
reversal of the conviction. 
 
Under Crim.R. 52(B), “[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights 
may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.”  By 
its very terms, the rule places three limitations on a reviewing court’s decision to 
correct an error despite the absence of a timely objection at trial.  First, there must 
be an error, i.e., a deviation from a legal rule.  State v. Hill (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 
191, 200, 749 N.E.2d 274, 283 (observing that the “first condition to be met in 
noticing plain error is that there must be error”), citing United States v. Olano 
(1993), 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1776, 123 L.Ed.2d 508, 518 
(interpreting Crim.R. 52[B]’s identical federal counterpart, Fed.R.Crim.P. 52[b]).  
Second, the error must be plain.  To be “plain” within the meaning of Crim.R. 
52(B), an error must be an “obvious” defect in the trial proceedings.  State v. 
Sanders (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 245, 257, 750 N.E.2d 90, 111, citing State v. Keith 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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(1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 514, 518, 684 N.E.2d 47, 54; see, also, Olano, 507 U.S. at 
734, 113 S.Ct. at 1777, 123 L.Ed.2d at 519 (a plain error under Fed.R.Crim.P. 
52[b] is “ ‘clear’ or, equivalently, ‘obvious’ ” under current law).  Third, the error 
must have affected “substantial rights.”  We have interpreted this aspect of the 
rule to mean that the trial court’s error must have affected the outcome of the trial.  
See, e.g., Hill, 92 Ohio St.3d at 205, 749 N.E.2d at 286; State v. Moreland (1990), 
50 Ohio St.3d 58, 62, 552 N.E.2d 894, 899; State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 
91, 7 O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 804, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
 
Even if a forfeited error satisfies these three prongs, however, Crim.R. 
52(B) does not demand that an appellate court correct it.  Crim.R. 52(B) states 
only that a reviewing court “may” notice plain forfeited errors; a court is not 
obliged to correct them.  We have acknowledged the discretionary aspect of 
Crim.R. 52(B) by admonishing courts to notice plain error “with the utmost 
caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest 
miscarriage of justice.”  State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 7 O.O.3d 178, 372 
N.E.2d 804, paragraph three of the syllabus; see, also, Olano, 507 U.S. at 736, 
113 S.Ct. at 1779, 123 L.Ed.2d at 521 (suggesting that appellate courts correct a 
plain error “if the error ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings,’ ” quoting United States v. Atkinson [1936], 
297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S.Ct. 391, 392, 80 L.Ed. 555, 557). 
 
As we noted above, the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury that 
felonious assault with a deadly weapon was a lesser included offense of attempted 
murder.  Barnes therefore satisfied the “first condition to be met in noticing plain 
error,” i.e., the trial court having committed a legal error in instructing the jury on 
felonious assault as a lesser included offense of attempted murder.  State v. Hill, 
92 Ohio St.3d at 200, 749 N.E.2d at 283.  This error, however, was not “plain” at 
the time that the trial court committed it.  Before today, this court had not decided 
the question of whether felonious assault with a deadly weapon is a lesser 
January Term, 2002 
11 
included offense of attempted murder.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Beaver v. Konteh 
(1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 519, 521, 700 N.E.2d 1256, 1258, fn. 1; State v. Williams 
(1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 1262, 1262-1263, 693 N.E.2d 282 (Cook, J., dissenting).  
The Ohio appellate courts were divided on this issue as well.  Compare Nelson, 
122 Ohio App.3d 309, 701 N.E.2d 747; State v. Hall (May 17, 1996), Sandusky 
App. No. S-95-032, unreported, 1996 WL 256610, and State v. Hammers (Feb. 
28, 1996), Medina App. No. 2469-M, unreported, 1996 WL 84616 (felonious 
assault with a deadly weapon is not a lesser included offense of attempted 
murder), with State v. Kaiser (Oct. 15, 1986), Montgomery App. No. 9287, 
unreported, 1986 WL 11812, and State v. Mabry (Nov. 1, 1984), Cuyahoga App. 
No. 47821, unreported, 1984 WL 3553 (felonious assault with a deadly weapon is 
a lesser included offense of attempted murder).  The lack of a definitive 
pronouncement from this court and the disagreement among the lower courts 
preclude us from finding plain error.  Cf. United States v. Aguillard (C.A.11, 
2000), 217 F.3d 1319, 1321 (holding that an error cannot be deemed plain if there 
is no controlling case law on point and the authority in other circuits is split); 
United States v. Thompson (C.A.9, 1996), 82 F.3d 849, 856 (same); United States 
v. Alli-Balogun (C.A.2, 1995), 72 F.3d 9, 12 (same); United States v. Williams 
(C.A.6, 1995), 53 F.3d 769, 772 (same). 
 
Despite the lack of an obvious error by the trial court in giving the 
instruction, the court of appeals corrected the defect by reversing Barnes’s 
conviction for felonious assault.  In doing so, the court of appeals emphasized the 
third limitation on plain-error review, noting that it recognized plain error when a 
defect in the trial proceedings affects a defendant’s substantial rights.  But if a 
forfeited error is not plain, a reviewing court need not examine whether the defect 
affects a defendant’s substantial rights; the lack of a “plain” error within the 
meaning of Crim.R. 52(B) ends the inquiry and prevents recognition of the defect.  
See Sanders, 92 Ohio St.3d at 257, 750 N.E.2d at 111 (“under Crim.R. 52[B] 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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plain error must be ‘obvious’ as well as outcome-determinative”); see, also, Hill, 
92 Ohio St.3d at 205, 749 N.E.2d at 287 (Cook, J., concurring).  By failing to 
conduct the proper plain-error analysis required by Crim.R. 52(B), the court of 
appeals erred as a matter of law in reversing Barnes’s conviction for felonious 
assault. 
IV 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals 
and remand this cause for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs separately. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., dissents and would affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurring.  I concur as to the majority’s 
holding that a defendant asserting self-defense cannot introduce evidence of 
specific instances of a victim’s conduct to prove that the victim was the initial 
aggressor. I further concur that the trial court did not commit plain error when it 
instructed the jury that felonious assault with a deadly weapon is a lesser included 
offense of attempted murder. However, I disagree with the majority’s analysis 
because I would hold that the trial court did not commit error in its jury 
instruction. 
 
In State v. Williams (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 1262, 693 N.E.2d 282, I joined 
in a dissent that concluded that under State v. Deem (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 205, 
533 N.E.2d 294, felonious assault is not a lesser included offense of attempted 
murder.  However, I have subsequently seen the confusion and inconsistency 
January Term, 2002 
13 
resulting from the analysis delineated in Deem and State v. Kidder (1987), 32 
Ohio St.3d 279, 513 N.E.2d 311, and I therefore write separately to voice my 
disagreement with that analysis today. 
 
In this case, the defendant stabbed two men during an argument.  One of 
the two men died of his injuries several days later.  For this crime, Barnes was 
indicted on one count of murder but convicted of the lesser included offense of 
involuntary manslaughter.  With regard to the victim who survived (at issue in 
this case), Barnes was indicted on one count of attempted murder but was 
convicted of the lesser included offense of felonious assault. 
 
The appellate court reversed the conviction for felonious assault, finding 
that felonious assault is not a lesser included offense of attempted murder under 
prior precedent of this court.  The majority upholds that finding, despite the fact 
that the victim was stabbed, a scenario that common sense tells us would 
constitute felonious assault. 
 
The majority sets forth the test articulated by this court in Deem, 40 Ohio 
St.3d 205, 533 N.E.2d 294, in order to determine whether a criminal offense is a 
lesser included offense of another.  A criminal offense may be a lesser included 
offense of another if (1) the offense carries a lesser penalty than the other; (2) the 
greater offense cannot, as statutorily defined, ever be committed without the 
lesser offense, as statutorily defined, also being committed; and (3) some element 
of the greater offense is not required to prove the commission of the lesser 
offense.  Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus. 
 
In this case, only the second prong of the Deem test is at issue, that is, 
whether the greater offense (attempted murder), as statutorily defined, cannot ever 
be committed without the lesser offense (felonious assault), as statutorily defined, 
also being committed.  The majority looks to the statutory definitions of 
attempted murder and felonious assault and concludes that felonious assault under 
R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) is not a lesser included offense of attempted murder because 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
it is possible to commit the greater offense without committing the lesser one.  
The majority cites as an example an offender who commits attempted murder 
without the use of a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance. 
 
Deem and the two statutes compel the conclusion reached by the majority; 
however, I disagree with the majority’s method of analysis.  Instead, I would hold 
that “[i]n determining whether one offense is a lesser included offense of the 
charged offense, the potential relationship of the two offenses must be considered 
not only in the abstract terms of the defining statutes, but must also be considered 
in light of the particular facts of each case.”  Ingram v. State 
(Ala.Crim.App.1990), 570 So.2d 835, 837 (although interpreting a statute 
different from ours, I find that the Alabama Criminal Court of Appeals’ position 
addresses the realities of cases such as the one presently before the court today).  
See, also, Ex parte Jordan (Ala.1986), 486 So.2d 485, 488. 
 
Further, I disagree with the dicta that this court set forth in State v. Kidder 
(1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 279, 513 N.E.2d 311, in which we held that considering the 
underlying facts of the crimes in completing this analysis is “contrary to our 
longstanding rule that the evidence presented in a particular case is irrelevant to 
the determination of whether an offense, as statutorily defined, is necessarily 
included in a greater offense.  The facts become relevant only in the determination 
of whether a jury could reasonably convict the defendant of the lesser included 
offense as defined.”  Kidder, 32 Ohio St.3d at 282, 513 N.E.2d at 315. 
 
I believe that the abstract test that this court employs today will beget 
illogical results in the future.  Decisionmaking in the abstract leaves trial courts to 
struggle with a test that allows criminal defendants to walk away from their 
crimes, despite the fact that they fit all of the elements of the lesser included 
offense, unless the state indicts them separately on each potential offense. 
 
The Fifth District Court of Appeals expressed frustration over this very 
issue in State v. Nelson (1996), 122 Ohio App.3d 309, 701 N.E.2d 747.  Nelson 
January Term, 2002 
15 
was arrested and charged with attempted murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02 and 
2923.02 after he knifed the victim.  Nelson was bound over on the charge of 
felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and (2), but he was later 
indicted on one count of attempted murder.  The jury was instructed on attempted 
murder and felonious assault.  The jury found Nelson not guilty of attempted 
murder but guilty of felonious assault. 
 
The Fifth District Court of Appeals held, “Though we find the decision to 
sustain appellant’s third assignment of error distasteful, we are compelled to do so 
as a matter of law.  What is distasteful is that we fully believe that the evidence 
totally supports the jury’s finding that appellant was guilty of felonious assault.  
However, we find that the rule set forth by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. 
Deem (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 205, 533 N.E.2d 294, paragraph three of the syllabus, 
mandates reversal.”  Nelson, 122 Ohio App.3d at 313, 701 N.E.2d at 750. 
 
Rather than continue on the path of examining cases in a vacuum, I would 
hold that the offense of felonious assault can be a lesser included offense of 
attempted murder, depending on the facts and circumstances of each case.  
Further, I would hold that in determining whether one offense is a lesser included 
offense of the charged offense, the potential relationship of the two offenses must 
be considered not only in the abstract terms of the defining statutes, but must also 
be considered in light of the particular facts of each case.  Ingram, 570 So.2d at 
837. 
 
Accordingly, I would find that felonious assault under R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) 
can be a lesser included offense of attempted murder where, as here, an offender 
uses a deadly weapon as the means of attempting murder.  Clearly, this stabbing 
victim was feloniously assaulted.  To find otherwise frustrates the administration 
of justice.  I therefore concur with the majority’s holding in Part III, but dissent 
from its analysis. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting.  I dissent from both of the majority’s holdings.  
First, I dissent from the majority’s effective holding that a defendant can never 
introduce specific instances of a victim’s conduct to prove a self-defense claim.  
The majority holds that if a victim’s character or character trait is not a legal 
element of the defense, that is, a definitional element of the defense, then specific 
conduct proving that character trait cannot be introduced as evidence.  The 
majority holds that an element of the defense must require proof of the victim’s 
character or character traits before specific conduct may be introduced.  Since no 
element of self-defense requires any evidence of the victim’s character, the 
majority’s holding is broader than it admits. 
 
I believe that the rule has a more practical reading.  Evid.R. 405 is a rule 
of evidence, and the rule should be read to say that as long as the instances of 
specific conduct provide evidence of an essential element of a defense, they are 
admissible.  This reading of the rule preserves the divide between reputation 
testimony and evidence of specific conduct.  A defendant can introduce reputation 
testimony if the character trait of the victim is “pertinent.” Evid.R. 404(A)(2) and 
405(A).  The standard for evidence of specific conduct is higher: it must go to an 
essential element of the defense. Evid.R. 405(B).  The majority elevates to a level 
of impossibility the standard for admission of specific conduct.  Although the 
majority claims to leave open the issue of whether testimony of specific instances 
of a victim’s conduct is admissible to show a defendant’s state of mind, it has, in 
effect, resolved that question, too.  While a defendant’s state of mind is an 
element of a self-defense case, that element does not require proof of the victim’s 
character or character traits.  Thus, under today’s holding, evidence of specific 
conduct would also be inadmissible in that context despite the majority’s apparent 
approval of State v. Baker (1993), 88 Ohio App.3d 204, 211, 623 N.E.2d 672, 676 
and its holding otherwise. 
January Term, 2002 
17 
 
Evidence of the victim’s character offered in the form of specific instances 
of his conduct could have been employed by this defendant to establish the first 
element of self-defense: that he was not at fault in creating the situation giving 
rise to the affray. State v. Robbins (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 74, 12 O.O.3d 84, 388 
N.E.2d 755, paragraph two of the syllabus.  The trial court erred in not admitting 
that evidence. 
 
I also dissent from the majority’s holding that the trial court did not 
commit plain error when it instructed the jury that felonious assault with a deadly 
weapon is a lesser included offense of attempted murder.  The majority correctly 
finds that under R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), felonious assault is not a lesser included 
offense of attempted murder.  But it finds that the trial court’s error in holding 
otherwise was not obvious enough to constitute plain error.  To the contrary, 
simply reading the syllabus law of this court in State v. Deem (1988), 40 Ohio 
St.3d 205, 533 N.E.2d 294, and comparing the statutes defining felonious assault 
with a deadly weapon and attempted murder leads to the inescapable, crystal clear 
conclusion that the majority itself reaches.  It’s cold logic.  It’s unassailable.  It’s 
obvious.  It’s plain error. 
__________________ 
 
Victor V. Vigliucci, Portage County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kelli K. 
Norman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
Dennis Day Lager, Portage County Public Defender, for appellee. 
 
Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecuting Attorney, and LuWayne 
Annos, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio 
Prosecuting Attorneys Association. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and David M. Gormley, State 
Solicitor, urging reversal for amicus curiae Attorney General of Ohio. 
__________________