Title: Smith v. Delta Tau Delta, Inc.

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
  
ATTORNEYS FOR AMICI CURIAE 
 
 
                                
Stephen M. Wagner 
THETA CHI FRATERNITY, INC. 
23 NATIONAL AND NATIONAL 
Wagner Reese, LLP 
Gary A. Watt 
 
 
WOMEN'S GROUPS 
Carmel, Indiana 
Michael C. Osborne 
Jeffrey A. Musser 
 
 
 
 
Tiffany J. Gates 
Rocap Musser LLP 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Archer Norris, PLC 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
Kevin C. Schiferl 
Walnut Creek, California 
 
 
 
 
   
Lucy R. Dollens 
 
Sean P. Callan 
Vanessa A. Davis 
Cynthia E. Lasher  
Timothy M. Burke 
Frost Brown Todd LLC 
Norris Choplin Schroeder LLP  
Manley Burke, LPA 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
Indianapolis, Indiana  
 
Cincinnati, Ohio   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE NORTH-AMERICAN  
 
INDIANA TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOC. 
 
INTERFRATERNITY  CONFERENCE 
Timothy J. Vrana 
 
Bryan H. Babb 
 
 
Timothy J Vrana LLC 
 
Bose McKinney & Evans, LLP 
 
Columbus, Indiana 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
James B. Ewbank, II 
 
Ewbank & Harris, P.C. 
 
Austin, Texas 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
 
No.  54S01-1405-CT-356 
 
STACY SMITH AND ROBERT SMITH, 
Appellants (Plaintiffs), 
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS CO-PERSONAL  
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ESTATE OF  
JOHNNY DUPREE SMITH, DECEASED, 
 
v. 
 
DELTA TAU DELTA, INC. 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Defendant),   
 
  and 
 
BETA PSI CHAPTER OF DELTA TAU DELTA,  
WABASH COLLEGE,  
THOMAS HANEWALD, AND  
MARCUS MANGES, 
 
 
 
 
 
(Defendants).   
 
Appeal from the Montgomery Superior Court, No. 54D01-1009-CT-346 
The Honorable Donald L. Daniel, Special Judge 
May 28 2014, 1:30 pm
2 
 
_________________________________ 
 
On Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 54A01-1204-CT-169 
_________________________________ 
 
May 28, 2014 
 
Dickson, Chief Justice. 
 
 
After the acute alcohol ingestion death of their 18-year-old son, Johnny Dupree Smith, a 
freshman pledge of the Beta Psi Chapter of Delta Tau Delta fraternity at Wabash College, the 
plaintiffs, Stacy Smith and Robert Smith, brought this wrongful death action against Delta Tau 
Delta (the national fraternity)1; its Wabash College local affiliate chapter—Beta Psi Chapter of 
Delta Tau Delta (the local fraternity); Wabash College; and Thomas Hanewald and Marcus 
Manges.  The trial court granted the national fraternity's motion for summary judgment and, 
finding no just reason for delay, entered a judgment in favor of the national fraternity, thus per-
mitting the plaintiffs to bring this appeal as to the national fraternity.  Ind. Trial Rule 54(B).   The 
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.  Smith v. Delta Tau Delta, 988 N.E.2d 325 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2013).  We now grant transfer to examine the issues presented in light of our recent deci-
sion in Yost v. Wabash College, 3 N.E.3d 509 (Ind. 2014), which presented factual similarities 
and related questions of law.  
 
 
In the present case, as to the national fraternity, the plaintiffs' amended complaint pre-
sents three theories of liability.  Count I claims negligence per se for engaging in hazing in viola-
tion of Indiana Code section 35-42-2-2.  Count II alleges negligence in furnishing alcoholic bev-
erages to a minor, in violation of Indiana Code sections 7.1-5-7-8 and 7.1-5-10-15.5.  Count III 
asserts a claim of negligence based upon breaches of an assumed duty (a) to protect freshman 
pledges from hazing and excessive alcohol consumption, (b) to protect freshman pledges from 
the reasonably foreseeable criminal acts of third parties, and (c) to render aid to the plaintiffs' 
decedent after it became clear that he could not care for himself.  The plaintiffs' claims in each of 
these counts are predicated on the alleged negligence of the national fraternity "through [its] 
                                              
1 Delta Tau Delta, Inc. is a not-for-profit corporation incorporated in New York that maintains its 
headquarters in Fishers, Indiana.  It grants charters to local fraternities in the United States and Canada.  
3 
 
agents and officers."  Appellants' App'x at 153.           
 
The national fraternity's motion for summary judgment asserts that there are no genuine 
issues of material fact and (1) that the individual members of the local chapter were not acting as 
agents of the national fraternity and thus it is not liable for the actions of the individual members 
of the local chapter with respect to any of the counts; (2) that there is no allegation or evidence 
that the national fraternity itself furnished alcoholic beverages or knew that the plaintiffs' dece-
dent was visibly intoxicated; (3) that the national fraternity did not assume any duty to control 
the hazing and alcohol consumption at the local chapter; and (4) that the plaintiffs' decedent was 
more than 50% at fault for his own death as a matter of law, precluding the recovery of damages 
under the Indiana Comparative Fault Act.  See Ind. Code § 34-51-2-1 et seq.   
 
The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment without accompanying findings 
of fact or conclusions of law, neither of which are required nor prohibited in ruling on summary 
judgment motions.  City of Gary v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 732 N.E.2d 149, 153 (Ind. 2000).  Chal-
lenging the grant of summary judgment, the plaintiffs' appeal asserts two principal claims: 
(1) that the trial court erred in denying the plaintiffs' motion to strike part of the evidence desig-
nated by the national fraternity and (2) that genuine issues of material fact prevent summary 
judgment as to whether the national fraternity assumed a duty to protect the local chapter pledges 
and as to whether the national fraternity is vicariously liable for the negligence of the officers 
and representatives of the local chapter.  Appellants' Br. at 1.   
 
1.  Motion to Strike Designated Evidence 
 
 
On appeal, the plaintiffs first challenge the trial court's denial of their motion to strike an 
affidavit and two purported interview transcriptions designated as evidentiary material by the 
national fraternity.   
 
A party seeking summary judgment may submit "supporting affidavits" and must desig-
nate pleadings, discovery responses, and such other "evidentiary matter [showing] that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that [it] is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  
4 
 
T.R. 56(C).  The rule contemplates the submission of supporting and opposing affidavits made 
on personal knowledge and setting forth facts that would be admissible in evidence and that 
show the affiant is competent to testify thereon.  T.R. 56(E).  To support its motion, the national 
fraternity designated four items.  First, it designated specific rhetorical paragraphs of the plain-
tiffs' amended complaint.  The second item was the affidavit of James B. Russell, Executive Vice 
President of the national fraternity.  The third and fourth designated items were each identified as 
a "Crawfordsville Police Department Interview:" the first of Stevan Stankovich and the second of 
Alan Tom.  The plaintiffs sought to strike the Russell affidavit because it "directly contradicts his 
later deposition testimony on numerous key points" and to strike the two purported Crawfords-
ville Police Department interviews because they are hearsay and "unsworn, unverified, and unau-
thenticated statements."  Appellants' App'x at 82.  The trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion to 
strike.   
 
 
To support their claim of trial court error in failing to grant their motion to strike the Rus-
sell affidavit, the plaintiffs assert that when particular aspects of an affidavit "contradict the affi-
ant's deposition testimony, the contradictory portions of the affidavit should be stricken."  Appel-
lants' Br. at 20; see also Appellants' App'x at 83.  For this proposition, the plaintiffs cite Hayes v. 
Trustees of Indiana Univ., 902 N.E.2d 303 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied; Chance v. State 
Auto Ins. Cos., 684 N.E.2d 569, 571 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied; and Kroger Co. v. 
Plonski, 930 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. 2010).  Appellants' Br. at 20.  The plaintiffs did not otherwise chal-
lenge the nature, form, or content of the affidavit, nor the competency or knowledge of its affi-
ant.    
 
We find the cited authorities do not support the plaintiffs' argument.  In Hayes, the Court 
of Appeals upheld the striking of portions of the plaintiff's affidavit because it contradicted her 
sworn deposition testimony, citing the principle that "a genuine issue of material fact may not be 
created by submitting an affidavit that contradicts earlier sworn statements."  902 N.E.2d at 311 
(emphasis added) (citing Morgan County Hosp. v. Upham, 844 N.E.2d 275, 281 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2008), trans. denied).  Hayes does not specifically state whether the deposition preceded or fol-
lowed the affidavit.  The plaintiffs' second cited authority, Chance, disregarded a party's subse-
quent contradictory statement, holding that a "party cannot create an issue of material fact for 
5 
 
summary judgment purposes by contradicting a prior sworn statement."  684 N.E.2d at 571 (em-
phasis added).  Kroger, which found trial court error in the granting of a motion to strike a party's 
affidavit, does not hold to the contrary.  930 N.E.2d 2d at 5–6.   
 
 
The seminal Indiana case addressing this issue is Gaboury v. Ireland Rd. Grace Brethren, 
Inc., in which we found the following principle "well reasoned:" 
If a party who has been examined at length on deposition could raise an issue of fact 
simply by submitting an affidavit contradicting his own prior testimony, this would great-
ly diminish the utility of summary judgment as a procedure for screening out sham  
issues of fact. 
446 N.E.2d 1310, 1314 (Ind. 1983) (quoting Perma Research & Dev. Co. v. Singer Co., 410 F.2d 
572, 578 (2d Cir. 1969)).  In the present case, the Russell affidavit, when signed and filed, did 
not contradict any prior testimony of Russell.  The affidavit was signed on July 22, 2011, and 
submitted with the national fraternity's motion for summary judgment, which was filed on July 
29, 2011.  Four months later, on December 11, 2011, the plaintiffs took Russell's deposition.   
 
 
In support of their motion to strike at the trial court, the plaintiffs acknowledged the tim-
ing was reversed and presented "the opposite situation" from the Indiana case law that had per-
mitted subsequent affidavits to be stricken, but urged the earlier Russell affidavit be stricken here 
because of the contradictory statements in the subsequent deposition testimony.  Appellants'  
App'x at 83. 
 
Clearly, the affidavit was not crafted to contradict any then-existing testimony from Rus-
sell.  Furthermore, the challenged affidavit was not submitted by the non-movants, the plaintiffs, 
to raise an issue of fact in opposition to summary judgment.  The purpose of allowing the subse-
quent contradictory affidavits to be stricken is not implicated in the present case.  The trial court 
did not err in refusing to strike the Russell affidavit.   
  
 
  The plaintiffs likewise moved to strike the two purported police interview transcripts 
that the national fraternity had designated as evidence in support of its motion for summary 
judgment.  As to this issue, we summarily affirm the Court of Appeals.  "Unsworn statements 
and unverified exhibits do not qualify as proper Rule 56 evidence."  Indiana Univ. Med. Ctr., Ri-
6 
 
ley Hosp. for Children v. Logan, 728 N.E.2d 855, 858 (Ind. 2000).  These police interviews meet 
neither the Trial Rule 56(E) requirements for affidavits, nor the Trial Rule 56(C) requirements 
for admissibility of other designated evidence.  Thus the Russell affidavit, but not the purported 
interview transcripts, will be considered in evaluating the national fraternity's motion for sum-
mary judgment. 
 
2.  Summary Judgment 
 
Apart from their challenge to the denial of their motion to strike, the plaintiffs challenge 
the grant of summary judgment by asserting that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding 
two issues: first, whether the national fraternity assumed a duty to protect freshmen pledges from 
hazing and the dangers of excessive alcohol consumption; and second, whether the local fraterni-
ty was the agent of the national fraternity thereby subjecting it to vicarious liability for the ac-
tions of the officers and representatives of the local chapter with respect to claims of negligence 
per se for hazing and furnishing alcohol to a minor.  See Appellants' Br. at 15–16, 23.     
 
 
When appellate courts review the grant or denial of summary judgment, the reviewing 
court stands in the shoes of the trial court and applies the same methodology.  Manley v. Sherer, 
992 N.E.2d 670, 673 (Ind. 2013).  The moving party has the burden of making a prima facie 
showing from the designated evidentiary matter that there are no genuine issues of material fact 
and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Gill v. Evansville Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 
970 N.E.2d 633, 637 (Ind. 2012); T.R. 56(C).  If the moving party satisfies this burden, then the 
non-moving party must show from the designated evidentiary matter the existence of a genuine 
issue of fact precluding summary judgment.  Manley, 992 N.E.2d at 673.  In ruling on summary 
judgment, a court considers only the designated evidentiary matters, and all evidence and infer-
ences are reviewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.  Mangold ex rel. Man-
gold v. Ind. Dep't of Natural Res., 756 N.E.2d 970, 973 (Ind. 2001).     
 
a.  Liability for Breach of Assumed Duty 
 
The plaintiffs assert that genuine issues of fact preclude summary judgment as to their 
7 
 
claim that the national fraternity breached an assumed duty to protect freshmen pledges at the 
local fraternity from hazing and the dangers of excessive alcohol consumption.  When addressing 
this issue in the analogous case of Yost, we explained:  
A duty of care may arise where one party assumes such a duty, either gratuitously or vol-
untarily. The assumption of such a duty creates a special relationship between the parties 
and a corresponding duty to act in the manner of a reasonably prudent person. The as-
sumption of such a duty requires affirmative, deliberate conduct such that it is apparent 
that the actor specifically [undertook] to perform the task that he is charged with having 
performed negligently, for without actual assumption of the undertaking there can be no  
correlative legal duty to perform the undertaking carefully.  
3 N.E.3d at 517 (internal quotations, citations, and ellipses omitted).  After referring to Restate-
ment (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 42 (2012),2 we concluded: 
"Thus, to impose liability resulting from breach of assumed duty, it is essential to identify and 
focus on the specific services undertaken.  Liability attaches only for the failure to exercise rea-
sonable care in conducting the 'undertaking.'"  Id.   
 
 
The plaintiffs argue that the designated evidentiary materials show that the national fra-
ternity "undertook actual oversight and control over the conduct of members at the local fraterni-
ty."  Appellants' Supp. Br. in Response to Trans. Pet. at 1–2.  The plaintiffs argue that the evi-
dence showing the national fraternity's undertaking "specific action to promulgate rules against 
hazing, and [to] discover, investigate and prevent future 'pledge family' hazing at [the local fra-
ternity]" supports its claim that the national fraternity assumed a duty to protect the local fraterni-
ty's freshman pledges, including the plaintiffs' deceased son.  Id. at 3.   
 
The national fraternity does not dispute the plaintiffs' factual assertions regarding the na-
                                              
2 The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 42 (2012) states: 
An actor who undertakes to render services to another and who knows or should know 
that the services will reduce the risk of physical harm to the other has a duty of reasona-
ble care to the other in conducting the undertaking if: 
 
(a) the failure to exercise such care increases the risk of harm beyond that which 
existed without the undertaking, or 
 
(b) the person to whom the services are rendered or another relies on the actor's 
exercising reasonable care in the undertaking.   
 
8 
 
tional fraternity's involvement with the local chapter, but argues that the national fraternity 
"lacked any direct oversight and control of the individual fraternity members," and thus "did not 
assume any duty related to their actions."  Appellee's Supp. Br. in Support of Trans. Pet. at 4.  
  
This issue has previously been addressed in various Indiana cases.  In Delta Tau Delta v. 
Johnson, 712 N.E.2d 968 (Ind.1999), discussed in Paragon Family Rest. v. Bartolini, 799 N.E.2d 
1048, 1053 (Ind. 2003), this Court expressly found no assumption of duty by a national fraternity 
to protect a guest of the local fraternity from sexual assault.  We noted that a series of posters 
against date rape and alcohol abuse provided by the national fraternity to be hung by the local 
fraternity in public places "did not profess to have security available . . . nor did they state that 
one could call [the national fraternity] for help with problems such as date rape or alcohol 
abuse."  Id. at 975.  Similarly, in Foster v. Purdue Univ. Chapter, 567 N.E.2d 865 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1991), trans. denied, summary judgment was affirmed for a national fraternity.  The Court of 
Appeals found no assumption of a duty to control an alcohol problem within the local fraternity 
where a new fraternity member was seriously injured in an alcohol-related incident.  The nation-
al fraternity there had published an advisory pamphlet, conducted inspections, and compiled re-
ports, which actions were found insufficient to establish the assumption of a duty to control alco-
hol consumption by the local fraternity members.  Id. at 872.  And most recently, in Yost, this 
Court found no assumption of duty, notwithstanding evidence of a national fraternity's strong 
disapproval of hazing in its charters, bylaws, and promotional materials; its provision of an 
online course on fraternity life that contains instruction on the dangers of hazing; its powers to 
issue and suspend charters and to discipline or expel individual members; and its right to approve 
the local chapter's selection of an advisor to act as liaison with the national chapter.  3 N.E.3d at 
520–21.  
 
The principal facts in the present case are not in dispute.  The plaintiffs' amended com-
plaint asserts that the local fraternity "was an Indiana self-governing, unincorporated association 
of undergraduate students."  Appellants' App'x at 142.  The national fraternity's constitution, by-
laws, and Membership Responsibility Guidelines3 ("MRGs") show its disapproval of hazing and 
                                              
 
3 Membership Responsibility Guidelines ("MRGs") provide the general expectations the national 
fraternity has for local chapter members.  They prohibit hazing and abusive behavior, explain expecta-
9 
 
irresponsible and underage drinking.  In addition to these materials, the national fraternity also 
provided an online alcohol education program for all new local chapter members, to help them 
understand the "individual health problems, learning problems . . . relationship problems . . . and 
legal problems" associated with alcohol consumption.4  Id. at 234.  The national fraternity re-
quired all pledges to complete the program within the first semester of their pledgeship.  The na-
tional fraternity recommended that local chapters have a house risk manager—a trained officer 
of the house who can help respond to emergency situations—who is elected by the local fraterni-
ty without the approval of the national fraternity.  Id. at 248, 272.  Like all elected officials in a 
local fraternity, the national fraternity provided educational materials to the house risk manager 
to assist him in his duties for the local chapter.  Id.  Also, similar to the facts in Yost, the national 
fraternity's authority for enforcing its guidelines and policies on hazing and alcohol consumption 
allowed it to suspend charters, discipline or expel individual members, or even require 
"[a]dditional educational programming," with decisions to sanction charters or individuals sub-
ject to appeal.  Id. at 229–32.  Each local chapter likewise had a chapter advisor5 appointed by 
the national fraternity's Division President6 and subject to the approval of the Arch Chapter, 
which is the "executive body of the [national fraternity]" and is composed of eleven individual 
members.  Id. at 174.  The advisor's duties include being "deputy of the Arch Chapter" and a 
"custodian of the [local fraternity's] charter, secret books, files, official documents, and Ritual."7  
Id. at 184.  He is tasked with complying with all requests and orders of the Division President.  
Id.  Finally, local chapters are responsible for electing a treasurer to maintain the local chapter's 
                                                                                                                                                  
tions for the management and local operation of chapters, provide certain rules regarding alcohol and drug 
use, and state that enforcement of these rules and policies is "the responsibility of every undergraduate 
chapter member and alumnus."  Appellants' App'x at 227–29. 
 
4 The MRGs, in reference to the alcohol education program state: "With the education of youth 
our primary objective, the Arch Chapter has adopted GreekLifeEdu as the [national fraternity's] alcohol 
education program."  Id. at 234 
 
5 The chapter advisor is a volunteer (unpaid) alumni.  This position is not to be confused with the 
chapter consultant.  A chapter consultant is a "full-time exempt employee[]" of the national fraternity and 
typically will visit a local fraternity once per semester to "improve the operations of the chapter" by 
"meet[ing] with the [local] chapter officers . . . [and] alumni volunteers."  Id. at 264.  A chapter consultant 
is "analogous to a corporate consultant" and he "provide[s] feedback for operations . . . goal setting, [and] 
next steps" for the local chapter.  Id.   
 
6 The national fraternity is divided into geographical divisions for more effective governance, and 
has a Division President for each of the five geographical divisions.  Id. at 166–67. 
 
7 Ritual is a term defined by the national fraternity's constitution and bylaws.  It is a uniform cer-
emony prescribed by the Karnea—the entity containing the national fraternity's legislative power.  Id. at 
172. 
10 
 
financial records and bookkeeping.  Id. at 205.  Once per month, a local chapter must certify to 
the national fraternity that the record keeping is correct and accurate, especially in regard to ac-
counts receivable.  Id. at 183, 245.  And, generally once per semester, a chapter consultant is to 
check the account information and record keeping with the treasurer to promote accuracy and 
ensure the books are up to date.  Id. at 243–44, 264.  The national fraternity reserves the right to 
discipline local chapters and individuals for violations of its policies, including the suspension of 
an individual's membership and the withdrawal of a local chapter's charter.  Id. at 229–30.  In the 
present case, the chapter advisor, Doug Coy, was at the local fraternity the day before the inci-
dent and the morning of the incident helping the local fraternity to prepare for the house's home-
coming dedication.  Id. at 308.  The MRGs and Coy's deposition explain that it is the duty of the 
chapter advisor to "see that the Guidelines are upheld, and equally importantly, that the spirit of 
the Guidelines is met."  Id. at 229.  Furthermore, in Coy's deposition testimony, he explains a 
prior scenario at the local fraternity where he reported that rumors of in-house boxing matches 
were circulating, which would have been a violation of certain MRGs.  Coy's reporting of that 
rumor effectively squelched the situation, as the chapter consultant came to talk with the local 
fraternity after Coy's report.  Id. at 310–11.  This deposition evidence tends to corroborate the 
constitution, bylaws, and MRGs—that it was part of Coy's duties to report anything he became 
aware of that would amount to hazing or underage drinking.  And, as Coy himself admits, he 
"felt like [he] had a duty to take action" when acting as chapter advisor if he observed anything 
that could be considered hazing or underage drinking.  Id. at 310.  The chapter advisor in this 
case, Coy, was responsible for attending at least one chapter meeting per month, for ensuring the 
alcohol education program was timely completed by the local fraternity members, and, most sig-
nificantly to this particular case, for reporting any violation of MRGs of which he became aware 
to the national fraternity.  Id. at 229, 310.   
 
 
The nature of the national fraternity's involvement with the local fraternity and its efforts 
to combat the problems of hazing and alcohol abuse in this case may certainly be seen as more 
robust and extensive than those described in Foster, Johnson, and Yost.  But they are not differ-
ent in nature and character.  There is no designated evidentiary material that shows that the na-
tional fraternity had a right to exercise direct day-to-day oversight and control of the behavior of 
the activities of the local fraternity and its members.  Like Yost, the specific duty undertaken in 
11 
 
regards to the policies on hazing and underage and irresponsible drinking was an educational one 
without any power of preventative control.   
  
 
Favorably construing the facts to the plaintiffs as the non-moving party, as we must, we 
find that the national fraternity's involvement with the local fraternity, while more extensive than 
in Yost, fails to establish any significant difference in the nature of the specific services under-
taken—providing information to the local fraternity to discourage hazing and alcohol abuse and 
disciplining chapters and members for violations.  There is no evidence that the national fraterni-
ty assumed any duty of preventative, direct supervision and control of the behaviors of its local 
chapter members.  While it certainly was the commendable objective of the national fraternity to 
actively engage in programs to discourage hazing and alcohol abuse, we find that the specific 
services assumed by the national fraternity did not rise to the level of assuring protection of the 
freshman pledges from hazing and the dangers of excessive alcohol consumption—the assumed 
duty alleged by the plaintiffs.  The national fraternity did have a duty of reasonable care in the 
performance of its assumed duty of providing information and guidance.  But the national frater-
nity's conduct did not demonstrate any assumption of a duty directly to supervise and control the 
actions of the local fraternity and its members.  The national fraternity did not have a duty to in-
sure the safety of the freshman pledges at the local fraternity. 
 
b.  Vicarious Liability for Negligence of the Local Fraternity and its Officers 
 
 
The plaintiffs also challenge the grant of summary judgment as to the issue of whether 
the local fraternity was the agent of the national fraternity, so as to impose vicarious liability on 
the latter for the actions of the officers and representatives of the local chapter with respect to 
claims of negligence per se for hazing and furnishing alcohol to a minor.  The national fraternity 
contends that it is entitled to summary judgment because there was no agency relationship be-
tween the national and local fraternities.  It asserts that the designated evidence shows that it did 
not have the power to control the conduct of the local fraternity nor that of its officers toward 
freshman pledges, nor did the local fraternity or its officers consent to any such control.   
 
 
As is discussed in more detail in Yost, for the liability of an agent to be imputed to a 
12 
 
principal, an agency relationship must exist, and an essential element of that relationship is that 
the agent must "act on the principal's behalf."  Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 (2006).  
Also, the agent must consent to act on the principal's behalf, as well as be subject to the princi-
pal's control.  Id. cmt. c; see also Foster, 567 N.E.2d at 872 ("Agency is a relationship which re-
sults from manifestation of consent by one party to another.  The elements of agency are consent 
and control.  An agent must acquiesce to the arrangement, and be subject to the principal's con-
trol.").  Citing Trinity Lutheran Church, Inc. of Evansville, Ind. v. Miller, 451 N.E.2d 1099, 
1101–02 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983), trans. denied, the plaintiffs point out that the "right to control" 
"does not require the master actually exercising control over the actions of an agent, but merely 
having the right to do so."  Appellants' Br. at 32.  With respect to the plaintiffs' assertion of vicar-
ious liability for conduct constituting hazing or providing alcoholic beverages to minors, the 
plaintiffs' claims are based on the conduct of the local fraternity or its individual members.  If an 
agency relationship is determined to exist, then such conduct is imputed to the the national fra-
ternity, which may result in vicarious liability.  "Whether an agency relationship exists is gener-
ally a question of fact, but if the evidence is undisputed, summary judgment may be appropri-
ate."  Demming v. Underwood, 943 N.E.2d 878, 884 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied.    
 
 
 The plaintiffs contend that the designated facts show that the national fraternity, through 
its broad enforcement powers, had the right to control local fraternity pledge activities and alco-
hol use.  It is significant, however, that these alleged enforcement powers are remedial only.  The 
national fraternity has no right to direct or control a local fraternity member's personal actions 
and behavioral choices.  The national fraternity's role in imposing post-conduct sanctions does 
not establish the right to control for purposes of creating an agency relationship.   
 
The relationship between the national fraternity and the local fraternity involves the na-
tional fraternity offering informational resources, organizational guidance, common traditions, 
and its brand to the local fraternity.  Additionally, the national fraternity furthers joint aspiration-
al goals by encouraging individual members' good behavior and by investigating complaints and 
reports that affect the health, reputation, and stability of local chapters.  The national fraternity 
has the right to discipline, suspend, or revoke its affiliation with the local fraternity or its mem-
bers.  The local fraternity's everyday management and supervision of activities and conduct of its 
13 
 
resident members, however, is not undertaken at the direction and control of the national fraterni-
ty.  The local fraternity is responsible for electing its own officers without the consent or over-
sight of the national fraternity.  Local officers are expected to abide by the aspirational goals 
promulgated by the national fraternity, but are never given the authority to act on behalf of the 
national fraternity.  
 
 
Considering the undisputed evidentiary material and resolving any disputed factual issues 
in favor of the plaintiffs as the non-moving party, we conclude as a matter of law that an agency 
relationship does not exist between the national fraternity and the local fraternity or its members.  
Although subject to remedial sanctions, in their choice of conduct and behavior, the local frater-
nity and its members were not acting on behalf of the national fraternity and were not subject to 
its control.  This is not a matter upon which there is any dispositive issue of material fact but ra-
ther an issue of law.  The national fraternity is not subject to vicarious liability for the actions of 
the local fraternity, its officers, or its members. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
The trial court correctly granted the national fraternity's motion for summary judgment.  
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.   
 
 
 
 
Rucker, David, Massa, Rush, JJ., concur.