Title: Gilmore v. Finn

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton,1 Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, 
and Kinser, JJ. 
 
JAMES S. GILMORE, III, 
GOVERNOR OF THE COMMONWEALTH 
OF VIRGINIA, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 990779 
 
MICHELE P. FINN 
 
     OPINION BY 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
      March 3, 2000 
MICHELE P. FINN 
 
v.  Record No. 990796 
 
JAMES S. GILMORE, III, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY 
Frank A. Hoss, Judge 
 
 
In these appeals, we consider whether the trial court erred 
in awarding sanctions pursuant to Code § 8.01-271.1, limited to 
the actual attorney’s fees and costs incurred by the opposing 
party, against the Governor and the Commonwealth (hereafter 
collectively, the Governor) for filing a lawsuit that allegedly 
was neither “well grounded in fact [nor] warranted by existing 
law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or 
reversal of existing law.” 
                     
1Justice Compton participated in the hearing and decision of 
this case prior to the effective date of his retirement on 
February 2, 2000. 
BACKGROUND 
 
On March 9, 1995, Hugh Finn was injured in an automobile 
accident.  As a result of the accident, he suffered severe brain 
damage and required continuous nursing home care, including 
artificially administered hydration and nutrition through 
feeding tubes.  At all times relevant to these appeals, Hugh 
Finn was a resident of Annaburg Manor Nursing Home in the City 
of Manassas. 
 
In June 1998, Michele P. Finn, Hugh Finn’s wife and legal 
guardian, determined that it would not have been her husband’s 
wish that he be kept alive by artificial means, including the 
administration of hydration and nutrition, if there were no 
reasonable possibility of his recovering from a persistent 
vegetative state.  Michele Finn then informed Hugh Finn’s 
immediate family of her decision that pursuant to the provisions 
of the Virginia Health Care Decisions Act (the Act), Code 
§ 54.1-2981 et seq., she intended to direct the medical staff at 
Annaburg Manor Nursing Home to withdraw this life-prolonging 
procedure from her husband.  A series of legal actions between 
the various members of Hugh Finn’s family followed.  These legal 
actions were emotionally difficult for the family, ultimately 
became the subject of public debate and, indeed, led to the 
involvement of the Governor of Virginia. 
 
2
A. The John Finn Lawsuit 
 
Several members of Hugh Finn’s immediate family disagreed 
with Michele Finn’s decision.  John Finn, Hugh Finn’s brother, 
filed a chancery suit in the Circuit Court of Prince William 
County (the trial court) seeking a permanent injunction to 
prohibit the withdrawal of hydration and nutrition from Hugh 
Finn and to remove Michele Finn as Hugh Finn’s guardian (the 
John Finn lawsuit).  On July 17, 1998, the trial court granted a 
temporary restraining order prohibiting Michele Finn from taking 
action to withdraw the life-prolonging procedure being 
administered to Hugh Finn. 
 
On July 29, 1998, the trial court held a hearing to 
consider John Finn’s request for a permanent injunction and to 
remove Michele Finn as guardian.  The trial court received 
testimony from Hugh Finn’s neurologist, his physiatrist and Dr. 
Robin B. Merlino, his attending physician.  The trial court 
found that the unanimous diagnosis of these three physicians 
provided “clear and convincing evidence that Hugh Finn has been 
and remains in a persistent vegetative state as defined in Va. 
Code § 54.1-2982, that can be characterized as a permanent 
vegetative state, meaning that, to a reasonable degree of 
medical probability, it is irreversible.”  The trial court 
further found that there was credible testimony from Michele 
Finn and in the de bene esse deposition of Kenneth L. Sales, 
 
3
Hugh Finn’s attorney, that Hugh Finn had on “multiple occasions 
before his tragic accident” expressed that “he would not wish to 
have his life artificially prolonged with artificial life 
sustaining medical treatment, and that he would specifically 
wish to have [artificially administered] nutrition and hydration 
withdrawn if he were in a persistent or permanent vegetative 
state.”2
 
Addressing the provisions of the Act found in Code § 54.1-
2986, the trial court found that Michele Finn had satisfied the 
requirement that she make “a good faith effort to ascertain the 
risks and benefits of and alternatives to the treatment and the 
religious beliefs and basic values of . . . the patient 
receiving treatment.”  The trial court further found that it was 
“impossible to communicate with Hugh Finn as a result of the 
permanent vegetative state” and, thus, it was appropriate for 
Michele Finn to “base[] her decision on [her husband’s] 
                     
2Although not referenced in the trial court’s order, the 
record reflects that the testimony of Hugh Finn’s sister, Karen 
Finn, corroborated Michele Finn’s and Sales’ testimony.  The 
evidence further showed that Sales had been asked by Hugh Finn 
to draft a Medical Directive, or “Living Will,” expressing his 
desires a short time prior to his accident. 
 
The trial court also reviewed the de bene esse deposition 
of John Collins Harvey, M.D., Ph.D., a Catholic physician 
theologian and expert on the subject of Catholic doctrines 
regarding euthanasia and related issues.  Hugh Finn was a 
practicing Catholic prior to his incapacitation.  Dr. Harvey 
expressed the opinion that Hugh Finn’s wishes were not 
inconsistent with the doctrines of the Catholic faith.   
 
4
religious beliefs and basic values and [his] preferences 
previously expressed . . . regarding such treatment.” 
 
Based upon these findings, the trial court determined that 
“the termination of [Hugh Finn’s] medical treatment . . . 
including the withdrawal of [artificially administered] 
nutrition and hydration, is a medically appropriate, ethical 
treatment decision that is not inconsistent with Hugh Finn’s 
personal wishes or his personal religious beliefs.”  
Accordingly, the trial court concluded that John Finn had not 
satisfied his burden of demonstrating the likelihood of 
ultimately prevailing on the merits of a challenge to either the 
appropriateness of Michele Finn’s decision or to her suitability 
as Hugh Finn’s guardian. 
 
In an order dated August 31, 1998, the trial court denied 
John Finn’s request for a permanent injunction, dissolved the 
temporary injunction issued in the July 17, 1998 order, and 
dismissed John Finn’s petition to remove Michele Finn as Hugh 
Finn’s guardian.  Although granting Michele Finn authority to 
proceed with her decision to direct the withdrawal of Hugh 
Finn’s artificially administered hydration and nutrition, the 
trial court stayed that authority for 21 days.3  The trial court 
                     
3The trial court subsequently amended the period of the stay 
to 30 days, that is, until September 30, 1998, to permit an 
appeal to this Court.   
 
 
5
further required John Finn to pay one-half of the fees for the 
guardian ad litem appointed for Hugh Finn, one-half of the fees 
for the expert witnesses, and one-half of the attorney’s fees 
and costs incurred by Michele Finn in defending the suit. 
 
During the period of the stay imposed on Michele Finn by 
the trial court, John Finn filed a motion for reconsideration.  
In that motion, he asserted that new evidence had been acquired 
to show that his brother was not in a persistent vegetative 
state. 
 
On September 21, 1998, the trial court held a hearing on 
that motion and reviewed the affidavit of Marie F. Saul, R.N., a 
utilization review nurse employed by the Commonwealth’s 
Department of Medical Assistance Services.  In that affidavit, 
Saul stated that while reviewing Hugh Finn’s medical records, 
she attempted to communicate with him.  After repeatedly saying 
“Hi” to him, Saul believed she heard him respond in a similar 
fashion.  Saul further stated that she then persisted in 
attempting to communicate with Hugh Finn for over an hour, but 
received no further response, although she observed Hugh Finn 
“[s]moothing” his hair.  Saul also testified at the hearing, 
essentially reiterating the statements in her affidavit. 
 
By proffer, the trial court received evidence from Michele 
Finn that the Commonwealth’s Department of Health and Human 
Resources had conducted its own investigation of Hugh Finn’s 
 
6
condition and that the Department’s report concurred in the 
diagnosis of his treating physicians that Hugh Finn was in a 
persistent vegetative state.  Michele Finn further proffered 
evidence that it was beyond the usual responsibility or training 
of a utilization review nurse, such as Saul, to make clinical 
observations or to report on the physical or medical condition 
of a patient.  The evidence further showed that there had been 
no change in Hugh Finn’s condition or in the diagnosis of that 
condition by his treating physicians since the entry of the 
August 31, 1998 order. 
 
The trial court found that Saul’s affidavit and testimony 
did not constitute new evidence and, moreover, “did not 
contradict a finding that [Hugh Finn] is [] in a persistent 
vegetative state” as previously determined by that court.  
Accordingly, the trial court denied the motion for 
reconsideration.  John Finn was ordered to pay the additional 
fees and costs arising from the hearing on his motion. 
B. Michele Finn’s Motion to Prohibit Intervention by the 
Commonwealth 
 
 
At various times following the July 29, 1998 hearing and 
continuing after the trial court’s denial of John Finn’s motion 
for reconsideration, agencies of the Commonwealth, apparently 
responding to requests from a relative of Hugh Finn and a member 
of the General Assembly of Virginia, made a series of 
 
7
investigative visits to Annaburg Manor Nursing Home to examine 
Hugh Finn.  These visits were conducted without the knowledge of 
Michele Finn and contrary to her express instructions that 
access to her husband be limited to family members and medical 
staff.  On September 20, 1998, twenty members of the General 
Assembly released an informal declaration “In the Matter of Hugh 
Finn” in which they asserted that “the provision of comfort care 
as well as food and water should not be denied patients where 
such removal will be the underlying cause of death.” 
 
Under the aegis of the prior action filed by John Finn, 
Michele Finn filed a motion seeking an order to enjoin the 
Commonwealth from making further intrusions into her husband’s 
privacy.  The trial court conducted a hearing on Michele Finn’s 
motion on September 25, 1998.  At that hearing, the evidence 
showed that three physicians employed by the Commonwealth’s 
Department of Health and Human Resources had examined Hugh Finn 
and determined that he was in a persistent vegetative state.  
The physicians had further stated in an interview with David 
Tucker, Administrator of Annaburg Manor Nursing Home, that 
removal of Hugh Finn’s feeding tubes would have been warranted 
as much as a year and a half prior to the date of their 
examination.  Additional evidence showed that the Commonwealth’s 
physicians discounted Saul’s report that Hugh Finn had actually 
responded to her efforts to communicate with him.  The trial 
 
8
court sustained the Commonwealth’s demurrer to Michele Finn’s 
motion on the ground that the Commonwealth was not a party to 
the John Finn lawsuit. 
 
On September 28, 1998, Hugh Finn’s family members who had 
opposed Michele Finn’s decision to withdraw the life-prolonging 
procedure being administered to Hugh Finn agreed not to pursue 
further legal action.  Accordingly, no appeal was taken from the 
judgment rendered in the John Finn lawsuit. 
C. The Governor’s Lawsuit 
 
On September 30, 1998, James S. Gilmore, III, “acting in 
his official capacity [as Governor of the Commonwealth of 
Virginia] and in the name of the Commonwealth,” filed a bill of 
complaint against Annaburg Manor Nursing Home, Dr. Merlino, and 
Michele Finn seeking a temporary restraining order and a 
permanent injunction to prohibit the respondents from 
withdrawing the administration of hydration and nutrition from 
Hugh Finn (the Governor’s lawsuit).  The Governor asserted in 
the bill of complaint that the suit was brought pursuant to Code 
§ 2.1-49, which provides, in pertinent part, that “pursuant to 
his duty to protect or preserve the general welfare of the 
citizens of the Commonwealth, the Governor may institute any 
action, suit, motion or other proceeding on behalf of its 
citizens, in the name of the Commonwealth acting in its capacity 
as parens patriae, where he shall determine that existing legal 
 
9
procedures fail to adequately protect existing legal rights and 
interests of such citizens.” 
 
In addition, it was asserted that the suit was brought 
pursuant to Code § 54.1-2986(E), which provides that:  “On 
petition of any person to the circuit court of the county or 
city in which any patient resides or is located for whom 
treatment will be or is currently being provided, withheld or 
withdrawn pertinent to this article, the court may enjoin such 
action upon finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
action is not lawfully authorized by this article or by other 
state or federal law.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
The Governor, as pertinent to the present appeal, contended 
that Hugh Finn is “dependent upon the artificial administration 
of nutrition and hydration in order to survive” and that the 
withdrawal of this procedure “will initiate a process of dying 
which will cause Hugh Finn to die from starvation and/or 
dehydration.”  Accordingly, the Governor further contended that 
“the Virginia Health Care Decisions Act . . . does not authorize 
the withholding of nutrition and hydration from Hugh Finn” 
because Code § 54.1-2990 expressly provides that “nothing in 
[the Act] shall be construed to condone, authorize or approve 
mercy killing or euthanasia, or to permit any affirmative or 
deliberate act or omission to end life other than to permit the 
natural process of dying.”  The Governor further contended that 
 
10
“[u]pon information and belief, Hugh Finn is not in a persistent 
vegetative state as defined under Code § 54.1-2982; however, 
even if Hugh Finn were in a persistent vegetative state, the 
Respondents would not be authorized under the Act . . . to 
withhold or withdraw the administration of nutrition and/or 
hydration” from Hugh Finn. 
 
On October 1, 1998, the trial court held a hearing on the 
Governor’s request for a temporary restraining order.  At that 
hearing, the Governor, represented by the Office of the Attorney 
General, conceded that there was no new evidence to present in 
support of the contention that Hugh Finn was not in a persistent 
vegetative state and relied solely on Saul’s affidavit.  The 
Governor contended, however, that Hugh Finn’s medical condition 
was not dispositive inasmuch as the principal contention of the 
bill of complaint was that the withdrawal of hydration and 
nutrition under the circumstances of the case was prohibited by 
Code § 54.1-2990. 
 
Hugh Finn’s guardian ad litem advised the trial court that 
there was new evidence in the form of a medical report prepared 
for the Department of Medical Assistance Services by Dr. Naurang 
S. Gill, which the guardian ad litem had obtained from the 
Office of the Attorney General.  Dr. Gill’s report confirmed the 
previous diagnoses of Hugh Finn’s personal physicians and the 
physicians employed by the Department of Health and Human 
 
11
Resources that Hugh Finn “had been and remained in a persistent 
vegetative state.”  Dr. Gill further opined “that [Hugh Finn’s] 
chances of any meaningful recovery . . . are practically zero.” 
 
On the day the hearing was held, the trial court denied the 
Governor’s request for a temporary restraining order.  In that 
order, the trial court reviewed the prior proceedings and its 
factual findings in the John Finn lawsuit and then reiterated 
its prior determination that Michele Finn had “full authority 
under the Act, to withhold and withdraw life-prolonging medical 
procedures,” including the artificial administration of 
hydration and nutrition.  Addressing the argument that Code 
§ 54.1-2990 prohibited the withdrawal of hydration and 
nutrition, the trial court concluded that “a person in a 
persistent vegetative state is, as a matter of law, in the 
natural process of dying within the meaning of [Code § 54.1-
2990] and . . . the withholding and/or withdrawal of artificial 
nutrition or hydration from a person in a persistent vegetative 
state merely permits the natural process of dying and is not 
mercy killing or euthanasia with[in] the meaning of [Code 
§ 54.1-2990].” 
 
Pursuant to Code § 8.01-626, the Governor filed an 
emergency petition in this Court for review of the trial court’s 
order.  The Governor’s sole assignment of error asserted that 
the denial of the motion for a temporary restraining order “was 
 
12
error, and was based on an erroneous interpretation of Va. Code 
§ 54.1-2990.”  Without conceding that Hugh Finn was in a 
persistent vegetative state, the Governor argued for reversal of 
the trial court’s order on the ground that a person in a 
persistent vegetative state is not in the “natural process of 
dying,” but rather that the withdrawal of hydration and 
nutrition would “initiate a dying process not previously 
present.”  Thus, the Governor contended, as he had in the trial 
court, that a plain reading of Code § 54.1-2990 would prohibit 
the withdrawal of hydration and nutrition from a person not 
otherwise in the process of dying from some other disease or 
condition.  The Governor further contended that even if this 
Court were unwilling to construe the statute in this manner, the 
failure to issue the temporary restraining order deprived the 
parties of the opportunity “to make [a] more deliberate 
investigation” of Hugh Finn’s condition, “whatever that 
condition may be.” 
 
By order entered October 2, 1998, we denied the Governor’s 
emergency petition for review.  In that order, we held that the 
“withholding and/or withdrawal of artificial nutrition and 
hydration from . . . a person in a persistent vegetative state[] 
merely permits the natural process of dying and is not mercy 
killing or euthanasia within the meaning of Code § 54.1-2990.”  
Gilmore, et al. v. Annaburg Manor Nursing Home, et al., Order 
 
13
Denying Emergency Petition for Review (October 2, 1998).  Hugh 
Finn subsequently died following the withdrawal of the life-
prolonging procedure in question. 
D. Michele Finn’s Motion for Fees and Sanctions  
 
On November 5, 1998, pursuant to Code § 8.01-271.1, Michele 
Finn filed in the trial court a motion seeking an award of fees 
and sanctions against the Governor, the Attorney General, and 
the attorneys in the Attorney General’s office who had endorsed 
the pleadings in the Governor’s lawsuit.  Michele Finn contended 
that the Governor’s lawsuit was supported by “no law, nor facts, 
on which to base [the] claim for injunctive relief, and no 
standing to justify the Governor’s intervention . . . when [the 
Governor and his counsel] brought this ill-advised, improvident 
and spurious lawsuit.” 
 
In a memorandum in opposition to this motion, the Governor 
responded to Michele Finn’s motion contending that his lawsuit 
was filed in good faith and based upon a reasonable belief in 
the merits of both the factual assertion that Hugh Finn was not 
in a persistent vegetative state and the legal assertion that 
the Act did not permit the withdrawal of artificially 
administered hydration and nutrition from any person not 
otherwise in the natural process of dying.  In support of his 
assertion that the factual issue of Hugh Finn’s medical 
condition was controverted and, thus, raised in good faith, the 
 
14
Governor referenced Saul’s affidavit.  In addition, for the 
first time the Governor cited medical studies on misdiagnosis of 
patients thought to be in a persistent vegetative state, an 
alleged failure to correct a problem with a drainage shunt 
intended to relieve pressure on Hugh Finn’s brain, and reports 
from Annaburg Manor Nursing Home that Hugh Finn had demonstrated 
improvement in manual dexterity and verbal responsiveness to 
questions.  The Governor also supplied an affidavit of a lay 
Catholic minister who related that “tears came to Mr. Finn’s 
eyes” when the minister told him he could not receive the 
physical Eucharist due to medical reasons and that Hugh Finn 
once “reached up and took [the minister’s] hand” during prayer. 
 
In support of his contention that his legal challenge 
concerning the construction of Code § 54.1-2990 was made in good 
faith, the Governor noted that this statute had not been 
authoritatively construed by the courts and contended that the 
statute was susceptible to two interpretations.  The 
interpretation advocated by the Governor was that the 
artificially administered hydration and nutrition merely 
compensated for Hugh Finn’s inability to chew and swallow and 
could have sustained his life indefinitely.  Thus, he was not in 
the natural process of dying and the withdrawal of this life-
prolonging procedure would have the effect of initiating a dying 
process in violation of the statute.  The second interpretation, 
 
15
acknowledged by the Governor, was that because Hugh Finn was in 
a persistent vegetative state, he was already in the process of 
dying as a matter of law and, thus, the withdrawal of the life-
prolonging procedure merely permitted that process to continue.  
Although conceding that the latter interpretation was ultimately 
adopted by the trial court and upheld by this Court, the 
Governor contended that at the time he filed suit his 
interpretation was “warranted by existing law or good faith 
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law such that the imposition of sanctions under Code 
§ 8.01-271.1 would not be warranted.”  In addition, the Governor 
further contended that the imposition of sanctions would 
impermissibly invade executive decision-making and violate the 
separation of powers doctrine. 
 
In a reply memorandum, Michele Finn contended that the 
Governor’s basis for supporting his challenge to Hugh Finn’s 
medically diagnosed condition was “unworthy of belief and 
ignores the prior findings of [the trial court], as well as the 
very results [of] the Governor’s own investigation.”  She 
further contended that Code § 54.1-2990, when read in the 
context of the other definitions and provisions of the Act, was 
not reasonably subject to the interpretation advanced by the 
Governor and that in any case the issues of mercy killing and 
euthanasia had been litigated in the John Finn lawsuit. 
 
16
 
On November 25, 1998, the trial court heard argument from 
the parties in support of their positions.  In summarizing its 
findings and conclusions, the trial court stated, “[T]he real 
issue in this case is whether or not the [Governor’s] pleadings 
were well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law.”  With 
respect to the Governor’s argument that he had a good faith 
belief that the diagnosis of Hugh Finn’s medical condition was 
controverted, the trial court found that the evidence cited by 
the Governor was too far removed in time to contradict the 
evidence that had been developed during the John Finn lawsuit.  
The trial court further found that the Governor had “simply 
glossed over” Dr. Gill’s report that Hugh Finn was in a 
persistent vegetative state with almost no hope of improvement, 
which the trial court found “compelling on the issue of whether 
the Commonwealth, the Attorney General, or the Governor could, 
in good faith, argue otherwise.” 
 
The trial court further stated that “[t]here is precious 
little construction that needs to be made” when Code § 54.1-2990 
is read in the context of the other definitions and provisions 
of the Act.  The trial court found that the Governor’s assertion 
that this statute was subject to two constructions was not 
warranted by existing law and stated that this finding “is 
supported by the unprecedented manner in which this case was 
decided by a unanimous Supreme Court of Virginia within just a 
 
17
few days of the signing of [the trial] Court’s order.”  In 
addition, with regard to the Governor’s legal assertions 
concerning the Act, the trial court further stated that “[i]t 
seems clear to [this court] from all that [this court has] 
observed in this case since it gained such public prominence is 
that there are legislators, and apparently the Governor too, 
that do not favor this law.  This is certainly their 
prerogative.  But the challenge that should be mounted . . . is 
one to be made in the political arena and not in the court, and 
certainly not in the manner that it was done in this case.” 
 
The trial court further rejected the Governor’s contention 
that any imposition of sanctions against him would impermissibly 
invade his executive decision-making prerogative and would 
violate the separation of powers doctrine.  The trial court 
assumed that Code § 2.1-49 provided the Governor with standing 
to bring the lawsuit in the name of the Commonwealth, but 
further reasoned that having thus submitted himself to the 
authority of the courts, the Governor could not claim executive 
privilege to avoid the consequences of that authority being 
exercised. 
 
Accordingly, the trial court imposed on the Governor and 
the Commonwealth, jointly and severally, a compensatory sanction 
in the form of an award of attorney’s fees and costs to Michele 
 
18
Finn in the amount of $13,124.20.4  The trial court declined a 
request by Michele Finn that it assess a punitive sanction 
against the Governor, the Commonwealth, the Attorney General, 
and the attorneys in the Attorney General’s office who had 
signed the pleadings, finding that a punitive sanction was not 
appropriate under the facts of this case. 
 
The Governor and the Commonwealth filed a petition for writ 
of error in this Court asserting that the trial court had erred 
in rejecting the separation of powers doctrine argument, in 
considering evidence outside the record, in determining that the 
Governor’s lawsuit was not well grounded in fact, and in ruling 
that the Governor’s legal argument was sanctionable.  Michele 
Finn also filed a petition for writ of error asserting that the 
trial court erred in failing to assess a punitive sanction and 
in failing to assess liability for the compensatory sanction 
against the Attorney General and the individual attorneys who 
signed the pleadings.  We awarded appeals to both the Governor 
and Michele Finn. 
DISCUSSION 
 
Our consideration of the trial court’s imposition of 
sanctions under Code § 8.01-271.1 in this case necessarily 
                     
4The Commonwealth was further directed “not as a sanction 
but pursuant to appropriate statutory authority” to pay the 
guardian ad litem’s fee of $2,731.00.  This assessment of the 
guardian ad litem’s fee is not challenged in this appeal.  
 
19
begins with a review of the other pertinent statutes that were 
the focal point in the proceedings below.  The Health Care 
Decisions Act, Code § 54.1-2981 et seq., as the name implies is 
a legislative response to and acknowledgement of the fact that a 
competent adult may decide not to undergo life-prolonging 
medical procedures in the event such person should have a 
terminal condition.  The right to make that decision is 
specially acknowledged in Code § 54.1-2983.  By its very nature, 
however, such a decision, while reasonable and perhaps even 
prudent in the abstract, in its application in a given case is 
of considerable concern and impact, not only to the terminally 
ill person, his family and physicians but, indeed, in a broad 
sense, to the welfare of all the citizens of this Commonwealth.  
This is so because society considers a human life to be unique 
and precious and, in the context of this Act, its termination is 
rightfully permitted only in “the natural process of dying.” 
 
When so viewed, the Act provides for various procedures to 
be followed to ensure that the decision of a terminally ill 
person not to undergo life-prolonging procedures is communicated 
to his physician at the appropriate time.  Under the best of 
circumstances, this is accomplished by an “advance directive” 
made by the person, and the Act provides in detail the 
requirements for such a medical directive.  See Code §§ 54.1-
2983 and 54.1-2884.  In the absence of an advance directive, 
 
20
Code § 54.1-2986 provides the conditions and requirements for 
permitting an attending physician, upon authorization of the 
guardian of the patient or other specified persons, to withhold 
or withdraw life-prolonging procedures.  Michele Finn, in her 
capacity as legal guardian of Hugh Finn, invoked this statute 
when she made the decision to direct her husband’s physicians to 
withdraw the hydration and nutrition being artificially 
administered to him. 
 
As we have previously noted, in addition to issues raised 
as to whether that decision was consistent with Hugh Finn’s 
religious beliefs and his previously expressed preferences for 
treatment, this decision was challenged by some of Hugh Finn’s 
family as not being consistent with the statutory definitions of 
a life-prolonging procedure in the specific context of Hugh 
Finn’s medical condition.  Code § 54.1-2982 defines “Life-
prolonging procedure” as “any medical procedure, treatment or 
intervention which (i) utilizes mechanical or other artificial 
means to sustain, restore or supplant a spontaneous vital 
function, or is otherwise of such a nature as to afford a 
patient no reasonable expectation of recovery from a terminal 
condition and (ii) when applied to a patient in a terminal 
condition, would serve only to prolong the dying process.  The 
term includes artificially administered hydration and 
nutrition.”  (Emphasis added.)  The statute defines “Terminal 
 
21
condition” as “a condition caused by injury, disease or illness 
from which, to a reasonable degree of medical probability a 
patient cannot recover and (i) the patient’s death is imminent 
or (ii) the patient is in a persistent vegetative state.”  
(Emphasis added.)  The statute defines “Persistent vegetative 
state” as “a condition caused by injury, disease or illness in 
which a patient has suffered a loss of consciousness, with no 
behavioral evidence of self-awareness or awareness of 
surroundings in a learned manner, other than reflex activity of 
muscles and nerves for low level conditioned response, and from 
which, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, there can 
be no recovery.” 
 
In the John Finn lawsuit, Michele Finn prevailed on the 
factual and legal contentions that Hugh Finn was in a persistent 
vegetative state and, therefore, as a matter of law was in a 
terminal condition, and that the artificial administration of 
hydration and nutrition was a life-prolonging procedure the 
statute permitted her to direct to be withdrawn because it would 
serve only to prolong the dying process of her husband.  No 
appeal was taken in that case.  However, Code § 54.1-2990 which, 
in pertinent part, provides that “[n]othing in this article 
shall be construed to condone, authorize or approve mercy 
killing or euthanasia, or to permit any affirmative or 
deliberate act or omission to end life other than to permit the 
 
22
natural process of dying” was neither asserted nor expressly 
considered in that suit.  The Governor did not intervene in that 
suit and thus was not a party to it.  Instead, the Governor 
filed a separate suit in which this provision of Code § 54.1-
2990 was the focal point of his contention that, notwithstanding 
the provisions of Code § 54.1-2982, this statute as applied to 
Hugh Finn’s circumstances required the conclusion that the 
withdrawal of the artificially administered hydration and 
nutrition was not permitted because that withdrawal would 
initiate a dying process because Hugh Finn was not otherwise in 
the process of dying.  That contention was rejected by the trial 
court and by this Court on appeal. 
 
It is then manifest that our consideration of whether 
sanctions were appropriately imposed upon the Governor in the 
present case is to be focused primarily upon the Governor’s 
lawsuit and not the John Finn lawsuit.  Accordingly, we turn now 
to the statutes and legal principles that guide our further 
analysis. 
 
Initially we note that to the extent that Michele Finn 
challenged the Governor’s “standing” to file suit in this case, 
that challenge is totally without merit.  Code §§ 2.1-49 and 
54.1-2986(E) provide that standing.  The question is whether the 
Governor pursued the lawsuit in a fashion that was not in 
violation of Code § 8.01-271.1. 
 
23
 
Code § 8.01-271.1, in pertinent part, provides that: 
 
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes 
a certificate by him that (i) he has read the 
pleading, motion, or other paper, (ii) to the best of 
his knowledge, information and belief, formed after 
reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in fact and is 
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for 
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing 
law, and (iii) it is not interposed for any improper 
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary 
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. 
 
* * * * 
 
 
If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed 
or made in violation of this rule, the court, upon 
motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon 
the person who signed the paper or made the motion, a 
represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, 
which may include an order to pay to the other party 
or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses 
incurred because of the filing of the pleading, 
motion, or other paper or making of the motion, 
including a reasonable attorney’s fee. 
 
 
We begin our consideration of the application of this 
statute to the present case with the proposition that the 
Governor is not above the law and, where appropriate, is fully 
subject to the imposition of sanctions under Code § 8.01-271.1.  
We also note that the Governor does not contend otherwise in 
this appeal. 
 
We have previously identified some of the policy 
considerations in sanction cases.  “The possibility of a 
sanction can protect litigants from the mental anguish and 
expense of frivolous assertions of unfounded factual and legal 
claims and against the assertions of valid claims for improper 
 
24
purposes. . . .  Yet the threat of a sanction should not be used 
to stifle counsel in advancing novel legal theories or asserting 
a client’s rights in a doubtful case.”  Oxenham v. Johnson, 241 
Va. 281, 286, 402 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1991).  All of these policy 
considerations are facially implicated by the proceedings in 
this case. 
 
“[W]e apply an abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing a 
trial court’s award or denial of a sanction.”  Id. at 287, 402 
S.E.2d at 4.  In making that review, we apply an objective 
standard of reasonableness in order to determine whether a 
litigant and his attorney, after reasonable inquiry, could have 
formed a reasonable belief that the pleading was warranted by 
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law.  Nedrich v. Jones, 
245 Va. 465, 471-72, 429 S.E.2d 201, 204 (1993). 
 
There can be no real dispute that under an objective 
standard of reasonableness the Governor’s allegation in his bill 
of complaint that “Hugh Finn is not in a persistent vegetative 
state” was not well grounded in fact after a reasonable inquiry 
into the facts available to the Governor and his counsel when 
the Governor’s lawsuit was filed.  However, this allegation 
appears in a single-count pleading, in conjunction with the 
legal assertion in the pleading that “even if Hugh Finn [is] in 
a persistent vegetative state, the Respondents would not be 
 
25
authorized under the Act . . . to withhold or withdraw the 
administration of nutrition and/or hydration.”  While the 
factual and legal viability of separate claims are individually 
assessed for sanction purposes, see Nedrich, 245 Va. at 472-79, 
429 S.E.2d at 205-07, this factual allegation was not essential 
to the Governor’s unitary legal theory concerning the asserted 
construction of Code § 54.1-2990 upon which, if correct, he 
could obtain the relief sought in his bill of complaint. 
 
Accordingly, for purposes of the imposition of sanctions 
under Code § 8.01-271.1, we must consider whether there was a 
reasonable and good faith basis for the legal assertions in the 
Governor’s pleading.  That consideration, as we stated in 
Nedrich, does not require that we decide that the Governor’s 
pleading was actually warranted by existing law but, rather, 
whether the Governor could have formed a reasonable belief that 
his action was warranted by existing law or a good faith 
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law.  In other words, “the wisdom of hindsight should 
be avoided” in applying the appropriate objectively reasonable 
standard of review.  Tullidge v. Board of Supervisors, 239 Va. 
611, 614, 319 S.E. 2d 288, 290 (1990). 
 
While, as we have stated, the Governor is not above the 
law, the Governor is also not merely “any person” as 
 
26
contemplated by Code § 54.1-1986(E) when sanctions under Code 
§ 8.01-271.1 are at issue.  Code § 2.1-49(B) provides: 
 
In accordance with subsection A and pursuant to 
his duty to protect and preserve the general welfare 
of the citizens of the Commonwealth, the Governor may 
institute any action, suit, motion or other proceeding 
on behalf of its citizens, in the name of the 
Commonwealth acting in its capacity as parens patriae, 
where he shall have determined that existing legal 
procedures fail to adequately protect existing legal 
rights and interests of such citizens. 
 
 
This statute, for purposes of our present considerations, 
is more than a standing statute.  It clearly acknowledges the 
Governor’s duty, rather than a mere right, to protect the 
general welfare of all citizens of the Commonwealth.  The trial 
court gave little significance to the duty of the Governor under 
this statute in exercising its discretion to impose sanctions in 
this case.  We are of the opinion, however, that the duty placed 
upon the Governor is a highly significant factor to be 
considered in this and any case in which the appropriateness of 
sanctions against a Governor is at issue.  No other litigant has 
the duty “to protect and preserve the general welfare of the 
citizens of the Commonwealth,” including in this case the legal 
rights and interests of Hugh Finn.  With regard to the 
imposition of sanctions, we do not suggest that the Governor’s 
action is clothed with a dispositive presumption of 
reasonableness or good faith.  Rather, we are of the opinion 
that when, as here, the Governor asserts a legal contention in 
 
27
the context of fulfilling the duty to protect the welfare of one 
or all the citizens of this Commonwealth acting in the capacity 
as parens patriae, any doubts about the good faith of that 
action should be resolved in favor of the Governor’s contention.  
It is only when the Governor’s legal contention is totally 
without merit that his action is appropriately sanctioned.  See, 
Tullidge, 239 Va. at 614, 391 S.E.2d at 290.5
 
It is undisputed that at the time the Governor filed his 
lawsuit he was advancing a novel legal theory in the sense that 
there was no prior authoritative construction of the Act.  That 
authoritative construction was obtained by the Governor’s 
lawsuit upon appeal to this Court.  Accordingly, we are of the 
opinion that the trial court erred in giving any weight to the 
promptness with which we rejected the Governor’s legal 
assertions of the proper construction of the Act.  That decision 
addressed the merits of the Governor’s legal argument and had 
nothing to do with whether it was objectively reasonable for the 
Governor to have made that argument.  Moreover, the immediacy 
                     
5In this regard, however, we do not agree with the 
Governor’s assertion that the doctrine of separation of powers 
is implicated in this case on the theory that an imposition of 
sanctions would have a “chilling effect” on the exercise of 
executive discretion provided by Code § 2.1-49(B).  The logical 
extension of that contention would be the conclusion that the 
Governor’s actions are not always required to be taken in good 
faith, as are the actions of any other litigant.  Accordingly, 
we reject this contention. 
 
 
28
with which that decision was rendered was mandated by the 
circumstances of the case. 
 
Continuing, we are further of the opinion that the 
Governor’s legal assertion that Code § 54.1-2990 prohibited the 
withdrawal of artificially administered hydration and nutrition 
in this case because such withdrawal would initiate the dying 
process rather than merely to permit the natural process of 
dying, while ultimately incorrect, was nevertheless not totally 
without merit.  It cannot be said that this interpretation had 
no reasonable possibility of being judicially adopted at the 
time this assertion was made in the trial court.  Thus, it 
cannot be said that the Governor’s assertion that a conflict 
existed between the provisions of Code § 54.1-2990 and Code 
§ 54.1-2986 lacked any objectively reasonable basis, and the 
trial court erred in holding otherwise.  See Nedrich and 
Tullidge, supra. 
 
Finally, the record amply demonstrates that the Governor 
was not alone in advancing the contention that the withdrawal of 
artificially administered hydration and nutrition as the sole 
form of life-sustaining medical treatment was not permitted 
under the Act.  A significant level of public debate concerning 
the issue preceded the Governor taking action to intervene in 
the matter.  While Michele Finn asserts that the Governor’s suit 
was motivated solely by some unidentified political objective, 
 
29
the record does not support that assertion.  Moreover, assuming 
that the impetus for the Governor’s suit may have been 
“politically” motivated to some degree, nonetheless after 
reasonable inquiry the Governor could have formed the reasonable 
belief that his suit was warranted by existing law or a good 
faith argument that his legal assertions might be adopted by the 
court. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that, under the circumstances of this 
case, the trial court abused its discretion in imposing 
compensatory sanctions against the Governor and the Commonwealth 
under Code § 8.01-271.1.6
CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
trial court and enter final judgment in favor of the Governor 
and the Commonwealth. 
Record No. 990779 — Reversed and final judgment. 
 
 
       Record No. 990796 — Dismissed. 
                     
6In light of this holding, the issues raised in Michelle 
Finn’s appeal are now moot, and that appeal will be dismissed. 
 
30