Title: James Roger Huff v. State of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC91913
____________
JAMES ROGER HUFF,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[May 25, 2000]
PER CURIAM.
James Roger Huff, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals the trial
court’s order denying his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion for
postconviction relief.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1) of
the Florida Constitution.  For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the trial
court's denial of postconviction relief.
Huff was convicted of two counts of murder in the first degree and sentenced
to death.  In Huff v. State, 437 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 1983), this Court reversed the
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convictions and remanded for a new trial due to prosecutorial misconduct.  On
retrial, Huff was again convicted and sentenced to death.  In Huff v. State, 495 So.
2d 145 (Fla. 1986), this Court affirmed the convictions and sentences.  In 1988,
Huff filed his first rule 3.850 motion, which was subsequently stricken by the trial
court.  In Huff v. State, 569 So.2d 1247 (Fla.1990), this Court held that the circuit
court should have considered Huff's rule 3.850 motion.  On remand, the circuit court
considered Huff’s motion but denied relief without a hearing.  In doing so, the
circuit court entered a proposed order submitted by the State without affording Huff
the opportunity to raise objections or submit an alternative order.  Thus, in Huff v.
State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993), this Court again remanded and ordered the circuit
court to hold a hearing for the purpose of determining whether an evidentiary
hearing was required and to hear legal argument relating to the rule 3.850 motion. 
Such hearings have subsequently become known as Huff hearings.  The proceedings
that followed our 1993 remand are the subject of the instant appeal.  
On November 8, 1996, Huff filed an amended rule 3.850 motion.  On
December 23, 1996, the circuit court held a Huff hearing in order to determine
whether any of the claims raised in the motion required an evidentiary hearing.  Of
the forty-two claims raised by Huff, the circuit court ruled that only one subclaim
1In claim number (5), Huff pointed out numerous instances where trial counsel
was allegedly ineffective at the guilt phase of the trial.  The circuit court granted an
evidentiary hearing on Huff’s subclaim that his trial attorneys rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel in (1) failing to tell Huff about a plea bargain from the State and
(2) failing to discuss whether it was advisable to accept the offer.  The remainder of this
claim was summarily denied by the circuit court.  
2The following claims were summarily denied by the circuit court: (1) that access
to the files and records pertaining to Huff’s case in the possession of certain state
agencies was improperly denied; (2) Huff’s emotional state precluded him from giving
a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights; (3) Huff was not fully advised
of his Miranda rights; (4) the introduction of inculpatory statements allegedly made by
Huff was a violation of his constitutional rights; (6) counsel provided ineffective
assistance by failing to move for a continuance of the penalty phase in order to more
fully explain the consequences of waiving the penalty phase and for failing to request
a competency hearing; (7) Huff was denied his right to confront a witness through
cross-examination; (8) Huff’s conviction is invalid since the State’s comments on
Huff’s silence violated his right against self-incrimination; (9) it was a violation of
Huff’s Eighth Amendment right not to have all mitigating circumstances construed in
his favor; (10) the prosecutor’s systematic exclusion of non-Witherspoon-excludables
by use of peremptory challenges violated Huff’s constitutional rights; (11) Huff was
denied adversarial testing at his capital trial due to (a) the State’s suppression of
exculpatory and impeachment evidence, the State’s presentation of false and misleading
evidence, and to the extent that the prosecution was aware of this information, a
violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264
(1959), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) occurred, and (b) defense
counsel’s failure to investigate and present evidence in challenging the State’s case;
(12) Huff is innocent of first-degree murder and he is innocent of the death sentence;
(13) the rules prohibiting Huff’s collateral counsel from interviewing jurors to
determine the extent of the juror misconduct in this case violates Huff’s constitutional
rights; (14) Florida’s statute setting forth aggravating circumstances to be considered
in a capital case is facially vague and overbroad; (15) Florida’s capital sentencing
statute is unconstitutional on its face and as applied for failing to prevent the arbitrary
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required an evidentiary hearing.1  The remaining claims were found to be
procedurally barred, legally insufficient, or refuted by the record.2  Shortly after 
and capricious imposition of the death penalty and for violating the constitutional
guarantee prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment; (16) Huff’s trial court proceedings
were fraught with procedural and substantive errors which cannot be harmless when
viewed as a whole; (17) Huff was denied a fair trial by an impartial jury and judge
because the court and counsel for the State engaged in misconduct that interfered with
the jury’s ability to be impartial; (18) newly discovered evidence establishes that Huff’s
capital conviction and sentence are constitutionally unreliable; (19) Huff’s jury was
misled by comments and instructions that unconstitutionally diluted the jury’s sense of
responsibility; (20) Huff’s constitutional rights were violated because no reliable
transcript of his capital trial exists and reliable appellate review was and is impossible;
(21) Huff’s constitutional rights were denied by the prosecutor’s improper comments;
(22) Huff is entitled to a new trial because the judge absented himself during the
proceedings in violation of Huff’s constitutional rights; (23) the court denied the public
the right to access a post- sentencing phase proceeding and compromised Huff’s right
to a fair trial; (24) due to the State’s improper use of its peremptory challenges, Huff
was tried by a petit jury which was not a fair cross-section of the community, resulting
in the unconstitutional exclusion of a significant portion of the nonwhite population
from the jury pool; (25) the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravating factor is
unconstitutionally vague and the court considered the wrong instruction on this
aggravating factor; (26) Huff’s convictions, based solely on his alleged out-of-court
statements which were uncorroborated by any evidence, violated Huff’s constitutional
rights; (27) the State failed to prove each element of the offenses charged against Huff
in violation of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), and In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358 (1970); (28) Huff’s absence from critical stages of the proceedings prejudiced his
guilt phase and penalty phase and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure
Huff’s presence; (29) Huff was denied a fair trial when the court permitted individuals
lacking the proper qualifications to give testimony which was the province of experts;
(30) Huff’s trial and sentencing, conducted by a state attorney lacking constitutionally
conferred jurisdiction to prosecute, rendered Huff’s convictions and sentences
unconstitutional and constituted an impermissible bill of attainder; (31) due to an
improper jury prequalification procedure, Huff was tried by a petit jury which was not
a fair cross-section of the community, resulting in the unconstitutional systematic
exclusion of a significant portion of the nonwhite population from the jury pool; (32)
no rational factfinder could find that the elements of the heinous, atrocious, and cruel
aggravating factor were proven beyond a reasonable doubt; (33) the court’s reliance
on nonstatutory aggravating factors rendered Huff’s conviction and sentence unfair;
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(34) Huff’s sentence is unconstitutional because of the improper application of the
pecuniuary gain aggravating factor; (35) Huff’s sentence is unconstitutional because
Huff was incompetent to waive his right to a penalty phase; (36) Huff’s sentence is
unconstitutional because counsel’s performance was prejudicially ineffective in failing
to investigate for the penalty phase; (37) due process was violated when the Sumter
County Sheriff misplaced or destroyed physical evidence directly related to the charges
against Huff; (38) the sentencing court erred by failing to impose a written sentence of
death and in relying on facts not in evidence in sentencing Huff; (39) the intense
security measures undertaken during Huff’s trial in the presence of the jury abrogated
the presumption of innocence, diluted the State’s burden to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, and injected misleading factors into the trial; (40) in sentencing Huff,
the trial court relied on material misinformation and counsel was ineffective in failing
to correct the court’s misunderstanding of its sentencing options; (41) pursuant to an
investigative subpoena requesting long-distance phone bills for the telephones of the
attorney who represented Huff at his first trial, the State (a) improperly interfered with
Huff’s right to counsel, resulting in a violation of Huff’s attorney-client privilege, and
(b) failed to disclose material exculpatory evidence; and (42) Huff is being denied
effective representation due to the lack of funding available to postconviction counsel.
   
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the Huff hearing, the Office of the Capital Collateral Representative (CCR) moved
to withdraw due to a conflict of interest.  The circuit court granted CCR’s motion to
withdraw and, in February of 1997, appointed attorney William K. Eble, Sr., to
represent Huff at the evidentiary hearing.  On August 8, 1997, the circuit court held
the evidentiary hearing.  In October 1997, the circuit court entered its order denying
relief.  Huff now appeals the circuit court's denial of his motion for postconviction
relief.
Huff raises three issues in this appeal.  Huff claims that: (1) the trial court
erred in finding that Huff's counsel did not render ineffective assistance in
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connection with an alleged plea offer; (2) the trial court erred in finding that Huff
was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the other issues raised in his rule 3.850
motion; and (3) the trial court erred by refusing to allow Huff's newly appointed
counsel to file an amended rule 3.850 motion.
In his first claim, Huff contends that the trial court erred in finding that Huff’s
counsel did not render ineffective assistance in connection with an alleged plea
offer.  The focus of the evidentiary hearing below was whether the State conveyed a
plea offer to Huff or his attorneys prior to the 1984 retrial.  Because this evidentiary
hearing took place some thirteen years after the retrial, many of the witnesses had
trouble remembering the events preceding the 1984 trial.  Prosecutor James Martin
Brown testified that he did not offer Huff a plea to second-degree murder.  Defense
attorney Mark J. Hill testified that to the best of his recollection, he did not receive
an offer from the State.  However, assistant state attorney Jeffery Mark Pfister
testified that he remembered that there was an offer made by the State.  Finally,
defense attorney Horace Danforth Robuck, Jr., testified that if Huff had told him
that he wanted to propose a plea offer to the State, then he would have
communicated such an offer to the State.   
During the evidentiary hearing, Huff introduced two documents relating to
potential plea offers.  The first document, dated March 19, 1984, was signed by
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Huff and stated that Huff "rejects the plea offer communicated to me by my
attorneys" for two counts of second-degree murder with a probable sentence of eight
years.  The second document was neither dated nor signed and stated that Huff
agreed to plea to two counts of second-degree murder and to serve consecutive life
sentences.
Huff’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is twofold:  (1) he alleges that
his attorneys failed to tell him about a plea offer from the State and that his attorneys
failed to discuss whether it was advisable to accept this offer, and (2) he asserts that
his attorneys failed to convey to the State a plea offer made by him.  Huff's theory is
that an offer was made by the State in March of 1984, as evidenced by the March
19, 1984, document, but that he rejected this offer based on his attorneys'
representations that (a) there would be a crime scene expert to establish that the
crime scene was tainted, and (b) one of the State's key witnesses, Sheriff Johnson,
would be impeached.  Huff claims that these representations by counsel were false
and therefore counsel was ineffective.  Huff also claims that as the trial got closer, it
became apparent to him that there would be no crime scene expert, and therefore he
changed his mind and wanted to enter a plea, even if it meant life sentences.  Huff
claims that the second document supports this claim.  Huff alleges that his attorneys
were ineffective for failing to convey this offer to the State.  When defense attorney
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Hill was asked about the March 19, 1984, document, he stated that he prepared the
document to "cover his tail," even though the State had not extended an offer.
In order to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant
must demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient and that there is a
reasonable probability that but for the deficiency, the outcome would have been
different.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694 (1984).  In
Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. 1999), this Court established the standard
of review for ineffective assistance of counsel claims:
Ineffectiveness is not a question of "basic, primary, or
historical fact."  Rather, like the question whether multiple
representation in a  particular case gave rise to a conflict
of interest, it is a mixed question of law and fact. 
Although state court findings of fact made in the course of
deciding an ineffectiveness claim are subject to the
deference requirement . . . both the performance and
prejudice components of the ineffectiveness inquiry are
mixed questions of law and fact.
[Strickland, 466 U.S.] at 698 (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied). 
Thus, under  Strickland, both the performance and prejudice prongs are
mixed question of law and fact, with deference to be given only to the
lower court's factual findings.
Id. at 1033.  Whether or not an offer was ever made by the State is a question of
fact.  In its order denying relief, the circuit court concluded that the evidence did not
establish that there was a plea offer extended from the State to counsel for the
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defense.  Our review of the record reveals competent, substantial evidence to
supports this factual finding.  See id. at 1031.  (“The State takes the position, and
we agree, that the ‘competent substantial evidence’ standard announced in
Grossman[v. State, 708 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 1997),] applies to the trial court's factual
findings.”).  Thus, we find no merit to Huff’s first claim that his attorneys were
ineffective for failing to tell him about a plea offer from the State.  As to his second
claim (whether counsel conveyed Huff's offer to the State), the circuit court further
concluded that the evidence did not support Huff’s allegation that counsel for the
defense failed to extend a plea offer from Huff to the State, or that the State would
have been interested in such an agreement.  Again, we find that competent,
substantial evidence supports this factual finding.  Therefore, we conclude that there
is also no merit to Huff’s assertion that his attorneys were ineffective for failing to
convey his alleged plea offer to the State.
In his second claim, Huff asserts that the trial court erred in finding that Huff
was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the other issues raised in his rule 3.850
motion.  A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing unless the motion and the
files and records in the case conclusively show that he is entitled to no relief.  See
Lemon v. State, 498 So. 2d 923, 923 (Fla. 1986). 
The circuit court in this case conducted a lengthy hearing at which both sides
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were permitted to present argument regarding the forty-two claims raised in Huff’s
motion.  The circuit court in this case granted an evidentiary hearing for one
subclaim.  Of the claims that were summarily denied, the court found that each of
them was either procedurally barred, legally insufficient, or refuted by the record. 
The court thoroughly addressed each claim and explained the reasons for the denial
in its order.  For the claims that were found to be procedurally barred, the court
concluded that the claims either could have been raised on direct appeal or were
raised on direct appeal and found to be without merit.  We agree with the circuit
court’s conclusion that an evidentiary hearing was not warranted for these claims.  
Huff further claims that the circuit court erred in failing to attach the relevant
portions of the files and records.  He cites to Roberts v. State, 678 So. 2d 1232,
1236 (Fla. 1996), wherein this Court remanded and stated:
Here, the order denies Roberts' motion for postconviction relief after "having
considered the Motion [to Vacate Judgment and Sentence], the State's
Answer thereto, the files and records in this cause, and arguments of counsel,
and being otherwise fully advised in the premises."   There are no records or
files attached, no citation to the portions of the record that the judge relied
upon in denying relief, nor any explanation for the basis of the court's ruling. 
Thus, we can only speculate as to the court's basis for denying the motion.
However, unlike Roberts, the circuit court in the present case did provide both
citations to the record and explanations for the court's rulings.  Any error by the
court in failing to attach portions of the files or records to its order is harmless if the
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court refers to the specific portions of the files or records in the order.  See Goode v.
State, 403 So. 2d 931, 933 (Fla. 1981).  Therefore, we find no merit to Huff’s
second claim.
Finally, Huff alleges that the trial court erred by refusing Huff's newly
appointed counsel (Eble) to file an amended rule 3.850 motion.  The standard of
review for a trial court's determination regarding a motion to amend a rule 3.850
motion is whether there was an abuse of discretion.  See McConn v. State, 708 So.
2d 308, 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).  
As stated in the above factual history, Huff has been afforded numerous
opportunities to amend his rule 3.850 motion since the original motion was filed in
1988.  After this Court’s most recent remand in 1993, Huff was again given an
opportunity to file an amended rule 3.850 motion.  Pursuant to this Court’s
instructions, the circuit court held a Huff hearing in order to determine whether the
issues raised in Huff’s motion warranted an evidentiary hearing.  After the circuit
court concluded that most of Huff’s claims were either legally insufficient,
procedurally barred, or refuted by the record, Huff again attempted to amend his
motion.  This time, however, Huff’s attempt to amend the motion was denied by the
circuit court.  Huff claims the circuit court abused its discretion in making this
ruling.
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We recognize that after the Huff hearing, counsel for CCR was permitted to
withdraw from the case and attorney William Eble was appointed to represent Huff
at the evidentiary hearing.  Eble argues that he should be able to correct those
claims in the motion that the circuit court concluded were legally insufficient. 
However, upon reviewing the motion to amend, it appears that the motion actually
raises new issues of ineffective assistance of counsel that were not raised in the
previous motion. 
Under the circumstances of the present case, we conclude that the circuit
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Huff’s motion to amend.  Huff's
sentence was affirmed on appeal in 1986 and Huff has been given ample
opportunities in the subsequent years to prepare and amend his rule 3.850 motion. 
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order denying Huff's rule 3.850
motion.
It is so ordered. 
HARDING, C.J., and SHAW, WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED. 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Sumter County,
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Hon. Richard Tombrink, Circuit Judge - Case No. 80-94-CF
Frederick W. Vollrath, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellant
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Judy Taylor Rush, Assistant Attorney
General, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Appellee