Title: PEOPLE OF MI V NORMAN K SMALL

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________ 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED SEPTEMBER 17, 2002  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 120617  
NORMAN K. SMALL,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
PER CURIAM  
This case involves a carjacking from a driver-victim who  
may have illegally come into possession of the vehicle.  The  
trial court foreclosed defendant from presenting evidence at  
trial that might have shown the victim was not in lawful  
possession of the vehicle on the ground that such evidence was  
irrelevant.  
Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of  
carjacking, MCL 750.529a, and assault with intent to commit  
murder, MCL 750.83, and was sentenced to concurrent prison  
terms of seven to fifteen years for each conviction.  The  
  
 
Court of Appeals affirmed.1  
Defendant has filed an application for leave to appeal,  
arguing, among other things, that his carjacking conviction is  
invalid because the prosecution did not prove that the driver  
of the vehicle was in lawful possession of the vehicle.  We  
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reject  
defendant's claim that an element of the crime of carjacking  
required the driver to be in lawful possession of the vehicle  
in the context of this case.  
I  
Timothy Tyson testified that he knew defendant as a  
relative of his neighbors in Mississippi.  Tyson said he  
agreed to drive defendant to Michigan from Mississippi.  After  
arriving in Michigan, Tyson and defendant made several stops.  
At one point, Tyson pulled over so defendant could speak with  
Willie McCall.  Defendant and McCall spoke to each other on  
the sidewalk while Tyson waited in the vehicle.  Defendant and  
McCall got into the vehicle, asking Tyson to take McCall to a  
relative’s house.  While Tyson was driving, McCall grabbed him  
from behind and defendant reached across from the passenger’s  
seat and stabbed him in the chest.  Defendant said he was  
1Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued October 26, 2001 
(Docket No. 224913).  
2 
 
  
 
taking the vehicle, grabbed the wheel, and turned into an  
alley.  Eventually defendant pushed Tyson out of the vehicle.  
Tyson reported the incident to the police, and defendant and  
McCall were arrested.2  
When defense counsel began asking Tyson about the  
ownership of the vehicle, the trial court sustained a  
prosecution objection.  In refusing to allow defendant to  
present evidence regarding the propriety of Tyson’s possession  
of the vehicle, the court said:  
The first thing they teach you in criminal law 
is that the title of a thief is good against the 
whole world, except the true owner.  As long as he 
had custody of that car, no one had a right to use 
any force to get it from him.  
II  
Determining the scope of a criminal statute is a matter  
of statutory interpretation, subject to de novo review.  
People v Stone, 463 Mich 558, 561; 621 NW2d 702 (2001).  The  
trial court's decision regarding the admission of evidence is  
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  People v Layher, 464  
Mich 756, 761; 631 NW2d 281 (2001).  However, where the  
decision regarding the admissibility of evidence involves a  
preliminary question of law, that question is reviewed de novo  
2McCall was also convicted of carjacking and assault with 
intent to murder at a separate trial.  His case is not before  
us.  
3  
  
  
on appeal.  People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 488; 596 NW2d 607  
(1999).  
III  
Defendant claims that he was denied his right to present  
a defense and to confront witnesses because the trial court  
precluded him from questioning the victim with regard to  
whether he was in lawful possession of the motor vehicle.  
It is generally understood that one need not rob the  
actual owner of property in order to be lawfully charged and  
convicted of armed robbery because it is sufficient if the  
victim has an interest in the property superior to that of the  
defendant. People v Rodgers, 248 Mich App 702, 710-711; 645  
NW2d 294 (2001).3  
The case at bar presents the related question whether a  
stolen vehicle may be the subject of a carjacking.  
The carjacking statute, MCL 750.529a(1), provides:  
A person who by force or violence, or by threat  
3The Rodgers Court explained:  
[T]he essence of armed robbery is not that the 
property belonged to the victim, but rather that it 
belonged to someone other than the thief. To  
constitute an armed robbery, the property must be 
taken by force or violence, "'not necessarily from 
the owner, but from any person in possession 
thereof whose right of possession is superior to 
that of the robber.’” [Id. at 711-712 (citations 
omitted).]  
4 
  
of force or violence, or by putting in fear robs, 
steals, or takes a motor vehicle as defined in [MCL 
750.412] from another person, in the presence of 
that person or the presence of a passenger or in the  
presence of any other person in lawful possession of  
the motor vehicle, is guilty of carjacking, a felony 
punishable by imprisonment for life or for any term 
of years. [Emphasis added.]  
We begin by noting that the prosecutor's theory in this  
case was based on a taking "from another person, in the  
presence of that person."  
Defendant contends that the “in the presence” part of the  
statute means that the person from whom the car is stolen must  
have had lawful possession of the vehicle.  In contrast, the  
prosecution contends that the “lawful possession” portion of  
the statute refers only to takings “in the presence of any  
other person.”  
We agree with the trial court, the Court of Appeals, and  
the prosecution that “in lawful possession” only applies to  
the words “in the presence of any other person” in the  
carjacking statute. 
We note that this construction is  
consistent with the common grammatical rule of construction  
that a modifying clause will be construed to modify only the  
last antecedent unless some language in the statute requires  
a different interpretation.4 Stanton v Battle Creek, 466 Mich  
4Unless set off by commas, a modifying word or phrase, 
where no contrary intention appears, refers solely to the last  
5  
 
  
611, 616; 647 NW2d 508 (2002). 
Under this rule of  
construction, the phrase "in lawful possession" only modifies  
the phrase "in the presence of any other person."  It does not  
modify the preceding phrases "in the presence of that person"  
or "in the presence of a passenger."  
Having concluded that a driver need not be in lawful  
possession of a vehicle in order to have the vehicle  
carjacked, we conclude that the trial court did not err in  
precluding defendant from eliciting testimony that the driver  
may not have been in lawful possession of the vehicle because  
whether the driver was in lawful possession of the vehicle  
simply was not relevant to whether defendant is guilty of  
carjacking.  
Logical relevance is the foundation for admissibility of  
evidence. People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 60; 508 NW2d 114  
(1993). MRE 402 provides:  
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as 
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United 
States, the Constitution of the State of Michigan, 
these rules, or other rules adopted by the Supreme 
Court. Evidence which is not relevant is not  
admissible.  
As defined by MRE 401, "relevant evidence" is evidence that  
has  
antecedent.  2A Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction (6th  
ed), § 47.33, p 369, 373.  
6 
 
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that 
is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence.  
We also note that MCL 768.29 similarly provides:  
It shall be the duty of the judge to control 
all proceedings during the trial, and to limit the 
introduction of evidence . . . to relevant and  
material matters . . . .  
Given our conclusion that the victim need not have been  
in lawful possession of the vehicle, any evidence that the  
driver was not in legal possession of the vehicle was not  
related to any fact of consequence relating to the carjacking  
charge.  Accordingly, such evidence was not relevant, and thus  
inadmissible.  Therefore, the trial court properly precluded  
defendant from presenting evidence that the driver may not  
have been in lawful possession of the vehicle.  
We conclude that the Legislature did not intend to  
require legal possession as a prerequisite to all carjacking  
convictions.  Because the prosecutor's theory in this case was  
based on a taking "from another person, in the presence of  
that person," MCL 750.529a(1), we reject defendant's claim  
that the evidence was insufficient to support his carjacking  
conviction.  
IV  
We thus affirm defendant’s carjacking conviction and  
7  
 
 
 
sentence. In all other respects we deny leave to appeal.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and WEAVER, KELLY, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN,  
JJ., concurred.  
CAVANAGH, J., concurred in the result only.  
8