Title: Tolson v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
TYRONE A. TOLSON,  
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  No. 93, 2005 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
Appellant,  
 
 
§  Court Below – Superior Court 
   
 
 
 
 
 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§  in and for Kent County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  Cr. I.D. 0309007470 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
§ 
 
 
Appellee, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
   Submitted:  April 26, 2006 
 
 
 
 
      Decided:  May 18, 2006 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and 
PARSONS, Vice Chancellor.1 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED.   
 
 
Bernard 
J. 
O’Donnell, 
Esquire, 
Assistant 
Public 
Defender, 
Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant.   
 
John Williams, Esquire, Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware, for 
appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
                                          
 
1 Sitting by designation pursuant to Del. Const. art. IV, § 12 and Supr. Ct. R. 2 and 4. 
 
2
The defendant-appellant, Tyrone A. Tolson (“Tolson”), appeals from 
his judgments of conviction in the Superior Court for:  Trafficking in 
Cocaine, Possession with Intent to Deliver Cocaine, Maintaining a Vehicle 
for that Purpose, Possession of Cocaine within 1000 feet of a School; 
Possession of Cocaine within 300 feet of a Church, and Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia.  Tolson argues that the Superior Court erred in three respects:  
first, by concluding that the police had probable cause to arrest him; second, 
by determining that his inculpatory post-arrest statement to the police was 
not the product of interrogation; and third, by admitting into evidence 
measurements of the distance between Tolson’s arrest location and the 
neighboring school/church building, based on the results of an electronic 
device, a Range Finder.   
We have carefully considered each of Tolson’s claims.  The record 
does not support Tolson’s contentions.  Accordingly, the judgments of the 
Superior Court are affirmed. 
Facts 
 
This case arises from an undercover police operation.  A probationer, 
Trayoris Allen (“Allen”), told the police that in the past he had purchased 
cocaine from Tolson and that he could arrange to purchase more.  Allen 
explained to the police that Tolson would have other people drive him 
 
3
around when he (Tolson) was selling cocaine and that Tolson would not 
show up at the scene of a sale in a car, but would park at another location 
and approach on foot.   
Under police observation, Allen made a telephone call to Tolson from 
the Dover Police Department.  Allen arranged to purchase nine ounces of 
cocaine from Tolson at the Holiday Inn Express on Route 13 in Dover.  
Across Route 13 from that hotel is the Kent Christian Academy, which is 
both a church and a school.     
That evening, the police set up surveillance at the Holiday Inn 
Express.  They observed a black Ford Escort and a red Buick Skylark enter 
the parking lot.  Tolson was a passenger in the Escort, accompanied by a 
driver.  Only a driver was seen in the Skylark.  As the three men entered the 
hotel, Tolson was talking on his cell phone.   
The two men accompanying Tolson knocked on the door of the 
second floor hotel room designated by Allen and the police arrested them.  
Several minutes later the police observed Tolson leaving the hotel, still 
talking on the cell phone.  He entered the Skylark’s driver’s seat.  Tolson 
drove the Skylark to the parking lot of an adjacent business.  Tolson returned 
to the Holiday Inn Express on foot.   
 
4
Undercover officers, waiting on the second floor of the hotel, arrested 
Tolson as he left the elevator to approach the same pre-arranged room.  The 
arresting officers searched Tolson and found one ounce of crack cocaine and 
$341 in cash.  In executing a search warrant for the Skylark, police found 
eight more ounces of cocaine under the driver’s seat.   
While in a holding cell, awaiting processing after his arrest, Tolson 
created a commotion and asked repeatedly what the charges were against 
him.  Corporal Anthony J. DiGirolomo answered Tolson that he would be 
charged based on the cocaine found both in his pocket and in the Skylark.  
Tolson then admitted that the cocaine found on him was his, but stated that 
the cocaine found in the Skylark did not belong to him, and that he was 
delivering it for someone else.  Tolson had not been advised of his Miranda2 
rights before this exchange.  
Tolson’s Arrest 
Probable Cause Established 
 
Delaware law enforcement officers have statutory authority to make a 
warrantless arrest when a crime has been committed in their presence, or 
where they have “reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested 
has committed a felony, whether or not a felony has in fact been 
                                          
 
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 
5
committed.”3  A “reasonable ground to believe” must be more than mere 
suspicion and this Court has construed it to mean probable cause.4  
“Probable cause” is a practical, non-technical concept that must be measured 
by the totality of the circumstances.5  “Probable cause exists where ‘the facts 
and circumstances within their [the arresting officers’] knowledge and of 
which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in 
themselves to warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an 
offense has been or is being committed.”6   
The first question presented in this appeal is whether the officers’ 
reliance on the informant’s information was justified and sufficient to 
establish probable cause.  Information provided by an informant may 
constitute probable cause for a warrantless arrest where the “totality of the 
circumstances,” indicates that the information is reliable.7  In measuring the 
totality of the circumstances when an informant’s tip is involved, this Court 
considers the reliability of the informant, the details contained in the 
informant’s tip, and the degree to which the tip is corroborated by 
                                          
 
3 Del Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1904(b)(1) (2005). 
4 Thompson v. State, 539 A.2d 1052, 1055 (Del. 1988). 
5 Id.   
6 Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 
267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).  
7 Tatman v. State, 494 A.2d 1249, 1251 (Del. 1985) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213, 242-43 (1983)).  
 
6
independent police surveillance and information.8  If the informant’s tip can 
be corroborated, the tip may establish probable cause, even where nothing is 
known about the informant’s credibility.9   
In this case, the record reflects that, under the totality of the 
circumstances, there was probable cause for the arrest of Tolson based upon 
the information provided by Allen.  Although Allen was a new informant 
and there was nothing known about his credibility, there was adequate 
corroborating evidence to establish probable cause.  Specifically, Allen was 
able to predict details of Tolson’s behavior that supported the conclusion 
that Allen was truthful.  Tolson appeared at the Holiday Inn Express in 
accordance with Allen’s telephone instructions.  Allen accurately predicted 
that Tolson would arrive as a passenger in a car.  Allen correctly stated that 
Tolson would park elsewhere and then walk to the designated meeting place.   
Tolson conformed to all the instructions and predictions provided by 
Allen.  This evidence sufficiently corroborates Allen’s assertion that he 
could buy drugs from Tolson.  Accordingly, probable cause existed for 
Tolson’s arrest, which then provided probable cause for the subsequent 
issuance of a search warrant for the Skylark.  Therefore, the Superior Court 
properly admitted into evidence the drugs and money seized during Tolson’s 
                                          
 
8 Id. at 1251-52. 
9 Id. at 1251.  
 
7
arrest, as well as the evidence found during the execution of the warrant to 
search the Buick Skylark.   
No Interrogation Under Miranda 
 
Miranda warnings are required when police interrogate a suspect in a 
custodial setting.10  Interrogation under Miranda need not amount to actual 
questioning, but may be the functional equivalent of questioning.11  The 
“functional equivalent” of questioning includes “any words or actions on the 
part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) 
that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response from the suspect.”12  The later part of the definition is concerned 
with the perspective of the suspect, not the intent of the police.13  
Consequently, an officer cannot be held responsible for an unforeseeable 
statement by the suspect.  An interrogation only encompasses actions or 
words by the officer that he or she should have known would elicit an 
incriminating response.14  
                                          
 
10 DeJesus v. State, 655 A.2d 1180, 1190 (Del. 1995).  
11 Upshur v. State, 2004 WL 542164, at *1 (Del. Mar. 15, 2004) (citing Rhode Island v. 
Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 302 (1980)).  
12 Id. at fn 5. 
13 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (reflecting the fact that “Miranda 
safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of 
protection against coercive police practices.”). 
14 Id. at 301-02. 
 
8
At the time of the inculpatory statement at issue, Tolson was in a jail 
cell awaiting processing.  It was Tolson, and not the officers, who initiated 
the conversation when Tolson became disruptive and repeatedly asked what 
charges he faced.  The officer answered Tolson’s question in a direct manner 
that was not the functional equivalent of interrogation.  Enumerating the 
charges against Tolson, without more, was consistent with the booking 
process and it was not foreseeable that the enumeration would elicit an 
incriminating response.15  Tolson voluntarily admitted that the cocaine found 
in his pocket was his, but stated that the cocaine found in the car was not.   
Tolson mistakenly relies on Wainwright v. State16 to support his 
position that the officer’s response to Tolson’s question was the functional 
equivalent of interrogation because it referred to the State’s evidence against 
him.  In Wainwright, we reversed a Superior Court decision to admit into 
evidence a defendant’s statement made after the police not only informed 
him of the charges against him (which was consistent with booking 
practices), but also described the State’s evidence against the defendant, 
including the “highly incriminatory accusations” of a co-defendant.17  In 
                                          
 
15 See Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1102 (Del. 1986) (holding that under Rhode 
Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), words or actions by police that are normally 
attendant to arrest and custody, do not constitute interrogation for Miranda purposes).   
16 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096 (Del. 1986). 
17 Id. at 1103. 
 
9
Wainwright, however, because the defendant was well informed of the 
charges he faced, revealing the State’s testimonial evidence against him was 
gratuitous, and likely to elicit a reaction.   
In contrast, Tolson repeatedly and disruptively demanded what the 
charges were against him.  The police officer simply responded.  It was not 
foreseeable that informing Tolson of the charges against him, consistent with 
booking practices, would elicit a response.  Moreover, it is not problematic 
that the officer used plain language rather than phrase his response to Tolson 
as “possession of cocaine.”   
The record reflects that there was neither police interrogation nor its 
functional equivalent within the meaning of Miranda.  Thus, no Miranda 
violation occurred.  Therefore, the Superior Court properly admitted into 
evidence Tolson’s post-arrest inculpatory statement because it was not a 
product of an interrogation by the police before advising Tolson of his 
Miranda rights.  
Range Finder/Harmless Error 
 
The final evidentiary issue in this case involves the testimony given 
by Detective David Boney that the distance between the location of Tolson’s 
arrest and the Kent Christian Academy was 282 feet, as measured by his 
Osprey Industries Range Finder.  Detective Boney testified at trial that he 
 
10
personally had purchased the Range Finder three weeks before Tolson’s 
arrest for use in his police work in cases where measurement of distance was 
required.  Detective Boney testified that he had checked the Range Finder’s 
accuracy by comparing its measurements with known distances between 
landscaping in his backyard.  Detective Boney also explained that the Range 
Finder’s measurement generally was consistent with his knowledge of the 
area based on his police experience. 
When evaluating whether scientific evidence is admissible, this Court 
must determine (1) that the expert was qualified (D.R.E. 702); (2) that the 
evidence offered is otherwise admissible, relevant and reliable (D.R.E. 401 
& 402); (3) that the bases for the opinion are those “reasonably relied upon 
by experts in the field” (D.R.E. 702); (4) that the specialized knowledge 
being offered will assist the trier-of-fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue (D.R.E. 703); and (5) that such evidence would not 
create unfair prejudice, confuse the issues or mislead the jury (D.R.E. 403).18  
Moreover, when the scientific evidence is obtained from the use of a 
                                          
 
18 Nelson v. State, 628 A.2d 69, 74 (Del. 1993) (rejecting the Frye test and adopting 
standards for determining the admissibility of expert testimony relying on the Delaware 
Rules of Evidence, as consistent with the United States Supreme Court holding in 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)).  
 
11
scientific instrument, expert testimony is necessary to establish the reliability 
and accuracy of the instrument.19  
The State presented no expert testimony about the accuracy and 
reliability of the measurements taken by Range Finder devices generally, 
their general acceptance in the scientific community, or the reliability of the 
particular Range Finder used by Detective Boney.  Nor was any expert 
testimony provided that established the similarities between the lidar radar 
and the Range Finder technologies, or Detective Boney’s professional 
training with either device.  The only evidence of a performance test offered 
was the unscientific test conducted by Officer Boney in his backyard.   
The State mistakenly relies on cases establishing the admissibility of 
lidar radar results in speeding and traffic violations.  The fact that a scientific 
instrument uses similar, widely accepted technology does not eliminate the 
need to establish its accuracy or reliability.  For example, although the courts 
in Delaware have widely accepted the reliability and accuracy of devices 
using Light Amplification by Stimulated Emission of Radiation, or “laser” 
technology, when a previously unevaluated type of laser was offered as 
evidence, the Superior Court conducted a thorough, proper analysis of the 
                                          
 
19 Zimmerman v. State, 693 A.2d 311, 314 (Del. 1997). 
 
12
scientific evidence and of its accuracy and reliability.20  Detective Boney’s 
testimony about the results of his Range Finder test should not have been 
admitted into evidence because it fails to meet the threshold requirements for 
admission of scientific evidence.   
Nevertheless, the independent admissible testimony of Detective 
Boney was sufficient to establish that the distance in question was less than 
the statutory minimum necessary to prove that Tolson was in possession of a 
controlled substance within 300 feet of a church and 1,000 feet of a school.21 
Officer Boney testified he knew that highway lanes of travel are twelve feet 
apart and that the median is ten feet wide.  Thus, with four Northbound lanes 
for traffic and three Southbound lanes for traffic, there was approximately 
ninety-four feet of roadway between the hotel and the Christian Academy.  
Using the dimensions of the road and other information acquired during his 
seventeen years of police work, Officer Boney testified that the distance 
between the hotel and the church and school was less than the statutory 
minimum 1,000 and 300 feet respectively.   
Detective Boney’s estimate of distance based on his experience was 
relevant and admissible in its own right.  No other testimony contradicted 
that estimate.  Officer Boney’s independent testimony was sufficient to 
                                          
 
20 See State v. Jarwan, 2000 WL 33113846, at *3 (Del. Super. Dec. 8, 2000). 
21 Del. C. Ann. tit. 16, §§ 4767(a)(1) & 4768(a) (2003). 
 
13
support a jury verdict regarding the distances at issue without the use of the 
Range Finder.  Accordingly, we hold that the Superior Court’s error in 
admitting the Range Finder evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.22  Thus, Tolson’s final claim of error is also without merit. 
Conclusion 
 
The judgments of the Superior Court are affirmed. 
 
                                          
 
22 Van Arsdall v. State, 524 A.2d 5 (1987).