Title: State v. Brown

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Brown, 100 Ohio St.3d 51, 2003-Ohio-5059.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. BROWN, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Brown, 100 Ohio St.3d 51, 2003-Ohio-5059.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder — Death penalty upheld, when — 
Misleading of defendant by police during interrogation insufficient to 
render confession involuntary, when — Jury not irreconcilably 
deadlocked, when. 
(No. 2001-0524 — Submitted July 22, 2003 — Decided October 8, 2003.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Mahoning County, No. 96 C.A. 56, 
2001-Ohio-3175. 
__________________ 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J. 
{¶1} 
On March 4, 1994, the Mahoning County Grand Jury indicted 
defendant-appellant, Mark A. Brown, for four counts of aggravated murder in the 
deaths of Isam Salman and Hayder Al Turk.  Counts one and two alleged that 
appellant did purposely and with prior calculation and design cause the deaths of 
Salman and Al Turk.  Each of these counts carried death penalty specifications 
alleging that the murders were committed as a course of conduct involving the 
purposeful killing or attempt to kill two or more persons and occurred while the 
offender was committing aggravated robbery.  The counts also carried gun 
specifications.  Counts 3 and 4 alleged that appellant committed aggravated 
murder while committing aggravated robbery, and contained the same death 
penalty and firearm specifications.  Appellant was also indicted in count 5 for 
aggravated robbery and in count 6 for having a weapon under disability. 
Facts 
{¶2} 
On the evening of January 28, 1994, appellant went with his friend, 
Allen Thomas, a.k.a. “Boonie,” a juvenile, and Boonie’s uncle, Gary Thomas, to a 
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store to purchase beer and wine.  Thomas then drove them to the home of 
Boonie’s cousin, Kenny Dotson, to play cards.  A group of juveniles was also at 
the house that evening.  Appellant and Boonie drank wine mixed with a number 
of Valiums, and  smoked marijuana in “blunts,” which are cigars that have been 
cut open, emptied of tobacco, and filled with marijuana.  Thomas stated that while 
playing cards, appellant pulled out a gun and put it back in his pants or coat 
pocket.  Thomas further stated that appellant talked about the movie “Menace II 
Society” and said that he wanted to copy the scene in the movie where assailants 
robbed and killed two Oriental store clerks. 
{¶3} 
Later that night, Thomas drove appellant and Boonie to the 
Midway Market in Youngstown to buy more drinks.  Thomas parked the car 
while appellant and Boonie entered the store together.  A group of minors who 
had been at Dotson’s house earlier were standing just outside the store.  Two of 
the minors, Marcus Clark and Myzelle Arrington, saw appellant and Boonie leave 
the store.  They then saw appellant reenter the store alone, wearing a mask or 
bandanna around his neck.  They said that Boonie and Thomas were in the car.  
They then heard gunshots and ran back to the Dotson home. 
{¶4} 
Thomas verified the boys’ account of what occurred, and added 
that before reentering the store, appellant said, “I forgot to do something.”  While 
appellant was in the store, Thomas heard gunshots.  Thomas saw appellant 
casually walk away from the store and get back into his car.  When Thomas asked 
appellant what went on in the store, appellant replied, “Oh, that wasn’t nothing 
but some firecrackers.”  Thomas drove appellant and Boonie back to the Dotson 
home, where he observed appellant “messing with the gun.”  Thomas also noticed 
that there was blood on appellant’s hand and clothing.  Both Clark and Arrington 
saw appellant either wiping off or loading a 9-mm black gun.  Arrington saw him 
counting money. 
January Term, 2003 
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{¶5} 
At approximately 9:55 that evening, Officer Timothy Morgan Jr. 
of the Youngstown Police Department received a call that a robbery was in 
progress at the Midway Market.  He and his partner arrived on the scene and 
found two Arab males who had been shot and were apparently dead.  One victim 
was found lying on the floor face up and the other was kneeling behind the 
register counter.  A “blunt” and a packet of marijuana were on the floor nearby.  
The victims were later identified as storeowner Isam Salman and employee 
Hayder Al Turk.  Dr. Anil Nalluri, Chief Deputy Coroner of Mahoning County, 
performed autopsies and determined that the victims died of hemorrhage and 
shock as a result of gunshot wounds to the head. 
{¶6} 
Lieutenant David McKnight interviewed several witnesses and, on 
January 31, 1994, secured a warrant for appellant’s arrest.  On February 3, 1994, 
appellant was arrested in Warren and transported back to Youngstown.  After 
advising him of his Miranda rights, which he waived in writing, police began 
questioning him.  During the questioning, appellant admitted being at the Midway 
Market but claimed that Boonie was the shooter.  Although police knew that 
video cameras in the store were not operating during the murders, the lieutenant 
asked appellant whether he knew that there were video cameras in the store.  
Appellant said that he had not noticed.  Police told him that there were two video 
cameras in the store.  Appellant replied, “Well, I guess you know what happened 
there then.”  When the police answered, “yes,” appellant stated, “Well, you’ve got 
me.”  He also said, “Then you know I did it.”  Appellant then admitted to 
shooting one of the victims, but stated that he did not recall shooting the second 
victim.  Appellant claimed that he got the gun from Steven Dotson and had “just 
flipped out.”  Appellant expressed regret over what happened and explained, “It’s 
the Valliums [sic].  They make you go off.” 
{¶7} 
When appellant was apprehended, police retrieved a 9-mm Glock 
semiautomatic firearm under the couch cushion in the front room.  The firearm 
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was later identified by Steve Jones, who said that Brown had robbed him of his 
car at gunpoint on December 15, 1993; Jones’s Glock was in the car’s trunk at the 
time.  Michael Roberts, a forensic scientist in the BCI firearms department, 
examined the Glock firearm, nine cartridge casings recovered from the crime 
scene, and four bullets retrieved from the victims.  He concluded that all nine 
cartridges were fired from the Glock firearm.  He further concluded that the 
bullets recovered from the victims indicated that they were fired from a Glock 
weapon; however, he could not confirm or eliminate the Glock retrieved from 
appellant as the weapon from which they were fired. 
{¶8} 
At trial, appellant took the stand in his own defense.  Appellant 
admitted shooting one of the victims but not the other.  He testified that Boonie 
was with him at the time of the shooting, and that Boonie took the gun from him 
after the first victim was shot.  He stated that he did not steal any money from the 
store.  Although he told police that he got the gun from Steven Dotson, he 
testified that he actually got it from a different friend, Mike Austin.  Appellant 
further testified that he was “messed up” when police interviewed him, and that 
he requested an attorney two or three times, but that this request was denied. 
{¶9} 
The jury convicted appellant of two counts of aggravated murder 
committed with prior calculation and design.  The jury also found him guilty of 
the firearm specifications attached to these counts and the death penalty 
specifications that the murders occurred in the course of killing two people, but 
acquitted him of the specifications that the murders were committed while 
committing aggravated robbery.  The jury returned not guilty verdicts as to counts 
three, four, and five, which charged appellant with aggravated murder while 
committing aggravated robbery, and with the crime of aggravated robbery itself.  
The jury recommended that appellant receive the death penalty for the aggravated 
murder of Salman and life imprisonment for the aggravated murder of Al Turk.  
The trial court sentenced appellant to death and to life imprisonment with parole 
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eligibility after 30 years, with the sentences to run consecutively, and to three 
years of actual incarceration on the firearm specification for each of the two 
counts, to be served consecutively. 
{¶10} Appellant appeals from the judgment to this court as a matter of 
right. 
{¶11} Appellant has raised 15 propositions of law.  We have fully 
considered each argument advanced and have reviewed the record in its entirety.  
We have also independently weighed the aggravating circumstance against the 
mitigating factors and have reviewed the death penalty for appropriateness and 
proportionality pursuant to R.C. 2929.05(A).  Upon review, and for the  reasons 
that follow, we affirm appellant’s convictions and sentence of death. 
Pretrial Issue—Voluntariness of Confession 
{¶12} In proposition of law V, appellant argues that the confession he 
made to police on February 4, 1994, was involuntary and that the trial court erred 
in refusing to suppress the confession. 
{¶13} In determining whether a pretrial statement is involuntary, a court 
“should consider the totality of the circumstances, including the age, mentality, 
and prior criminal experience of the accused; the length, intensity, and frequency 
of interrogation; the existence of physical deprivation or mistreatment; and the 
existence of threat or inducement.”  State v. Edwards (1976), 49 Ohio St.2d 31, 3 
O.O.3d 18, 358 N.E.2d 1051, paragraph two of the syllabus.  Under the totality of 
the circumstances, and for the reasons that follow, we conclude that appellant 
made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights, and 
that his confession to police was voluntarily made. 
{¶14} Appellant first argues that he was intoxicated and under the 
influence of drugs when he made the statement; thus, he maintains that his signed 
waiver was invalid because he did not fully understand his rights.  The testimony 
of the detectives who interviewed appellant contradicts this claim.  Detective 
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McKnight testified that appellant was cooperative and alert during the interview.  
He further testified that he did not smell alcohol and did not observe anything that 
would indicate that appellant was under the influence of drugs or alcohol.  
Furthermore, at the suppression hearing, Detective Gerald Maietta, who also 
interviewed appellant, testified that he exhibited no signs of being intoxicated or 
on drugs, but was “friendly, cognizant, appeared to understand what we were 
talking about.”  Neither officer remembered appellant’s telling them that he was 
under the influence of drugs or alcohol. 
{¶15} It is well established that at a suppression hearing, “the evaluation 
of evidence and the credibility of witnesses are issues for the trier of fact.”  State 
v. Mills (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366, 582 N.E.2d 972, citing State v. Fanning 
(1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 1 OBR 57, 437 N.E.2d 583.  The trial court was free 
to find the officers’ testimony more credible than appellant’s.  We therefore defer 
to the trial court’s ruling regarding the weight and credibility of witnesses.  State 
v. Moore (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 22, 31, 689 N.E.2d 1. 
{¶16} Appellant also argues that because of his youth and lack of 
experience with the criminal justice system, he was incapable of making a 
voluntary statement.  Appellant was 21 years old at the time of the offense, had 
finished tenth grade, and could read and write.  He did not lack the intelligence to 
understand what was being asked of him.  Cf. Annotation, Mental Subnormality 
of Accused as Affecting Voluntariness or Admissibility of Confession (1981), 8 
A.L.R.4th 16.  Moreover, appellant had been charged with and convicted of two 
prior felonies, at which times he was advised of his Miranda rights and was 
represented by counsel.  He cannot legitimately argue that he was unfamiliar with 
the criminal justice system. 
{¶17} Appellant further asserts that he was coerced into signing the 
waiver and deceived into admitting to killing one of the victims.  This argument 
lacks merit.  Appellant conceded at the suppression hearing that he was not 
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mistreated or deprived of sleep or food during questioning.  The interview itself 
lasted for one hour and ten minutes and thus was not unduly long.  Although the 
police misled appellant into thinking that his crime had been caught on video 
cameras, this fact alone was insufficient to render his confession involuntary, and 
appellant claims no further coercion.  See State v. Wiles (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 71, 
81, 571 N.E.2d 97. 
{¶18} Appellant next argues that the trial court should have suppressed 
his confession because police ignored his request to have an attorney present.  
Under the Fifth Amendment, if an accused requests counsel during questioning, 
the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.  Arizona v. Roberson 
(1988), 486 U.S. 675, 677, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 100 L.Ed.2d 704; Edwards v. Arizona 
(1981), 451 U.S. 477, 484-485, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378.  For the 
interrogation to cease, however, the accused must clearly invoke his constitutional 
right to counsel.  Davis v. United States (1994), 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S.Ct. 
2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362.  In order to do this, an accused “must articulate his desire 
to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the 
circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.”  
Id.  No cessation of questioning is required if the request is ambiguous. 
{¶19} In this case, Detective McKnight testified that he had no 
recollection that appellant requested a lawyer.  However, even if we assume the 
truth of appellant’s testimony, we would still find that he did not clearly invoke 
his constitutional right to counsel.  At the suppression hearing, appellant testified 
as follows:  “Before he asked me to understand my rights, he asked me do I have 
any questions, and I asked him, don’t I supposed to have a lawyer present; and 
neither one of them answered.”  This statement is at best ambiguous.  It is similar 
to the statement made in State v. Henness (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 53, 62, 679 
N.E.2d 686, where the defendant stated, “I think I need a lawyer.”  In Henness, 
we held that this remark was not an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel.  
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Id. at 63, 679 N.E.2d 686.  We likewise find that the alleged statement by 
appellant was not a clear invocation of his right to counsel. 
{¶20} Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court did not err in 
failing to suppress appellant’s confession.  We overrule proposition of law V. 
Trial Issues 
“Other Acts” Evidence 
{¶21} In proposition of law III, appellant argues that the trial court erred 
and denied him a fair trial by allowing the prosecution to introduce “other acts” 
testimony.  In particular, appellant maintains that the trial court should not have 
allowed witness Steve Jones to testify that appellant robbed him of his Glock 9-
mm gun, which was later identified as the murder weapon.  Appellant further 
argues that it was improper for his mother to testify that he was a member of a 
gang and belonged to the “Baby Crips” when he was a child living in California. 
{¶22} Evid.R. 404(B) provides:  “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or 
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he 
acted in conformity therewith.  It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, 
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” 
{¶23} With respect to Jones’s testimony that appellant robbed him of his 
Glock 9-mm gun, the trial court instructed the jury that his testimony “may be 
considered for the purpose of determining the proof of the identity of the 
defendant.  Said evidence may not be considered as proof that the defendant 
committed the robbery of Steve Jones or of the character of the defendant.”  At 
the close of the trial, the court reiterated to the jury that the evidence could be 
used to prove only the defendant’s identity. 
{¶24} Evid.R. 404(B) clearly allows “other acts” evidence as proof of 
identity.  State v. Allen (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 626, 632, 653 N.E.2d 675.  Jones’s 
testimony was used as proof of identity in that it clearly helped link appellant to 
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the gun found in his possession when he was arrested.  Appellant asserts that 
identity was not at issue, since he had already admitted to killing one of the store 
clerks.  Thus, appellant maintains that the “other acts” testimony was unnecessary 
to prove identity.  This argument lacks merit.  As stated in State v. McNeill 
(1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 438, 442, 700 N.E.2d 596, need is irrelevant in determining 
the validity of an Evid.R. 404(B) objection.  Moreover, the trial court minimized 
the likelihood of undue prejudice by giving limiting instructions to the jury to 
alert them to the narrow purpose of admitting such evidence.  We consequently 
find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this “other acts” 
testimony. 
{¶25} However, we find that the trial court should not have allowed 
appellant’s mother to testify as to his participation in a gang.  This testimony was 
irrelevant and portrayed appellant in a negative light.  Nevertheless, given the 
substantial evidence of appellant’s guilt, we find that this evidence, even though 
improperly admitted, did not affect the outcome of the case and therefore 
constitutes harmless error.  See State v. Getsy (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 180, 193, 702 
N.E.2d 866.  We overrule proposition of law III. 
Use of Prior Convictions 
{¶26} In proposition of law IV, appellant argues that the trial court erred 
in allowing the state to use his prior drug-offense convictions for impeachment 
purposes.  Appellant filed a motion in limine to prevent the admission of such 
evidence.  The court initially granted his motion, but then upon reconsideration 
modified its ruling to allow defendant to be questioned about his prior felony 
convictions punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year if he decided to 
take the witness stand.  During direct examination, appellant testified that he had 
gone to jail for a previous drug conviction.  On cross-examination, appellant 
admitted to two prior drug-offense convictions. 
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{¶27} Evid.R. 609(A)(2) permits the admission of prior convictions if the 
crime was punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year, provided that the 
probative value outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
or misleading the jury, and the evidence is not excluded by the court in its 
discretion under Evid.R. 403(B).  A trial court is afforded broad discretion in 
determining the extent to which such evidence may be admitted under Evid.R. 
609.  State v. Wright (1990), 48 Ohio St.3d 5, 548 N.E.2d 923, syllabus.  The trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the state to use appellant’s prior drug 
convictions to impeach his credibility.  Appellant’s testimony on direct 
examination opened the door to further questioning on cross-examination about 
his prior drug-offense convictions.  Furthermore, since appellant’s version of what 
occurred the night of the murders contradicted some of the other witnesses, his 
credibility was at issue.  Under these circumstances, it was appropriate for the 
state to impeach appellant and to test his credibility by introducing testimony 
regarding these prior convictions.  Furthermore, we find no undue delay or 
needless accumulation in permitting such evidence under Evid.R. 403(B).  
Consequently, we overrule proposition of law IV. 
Sentencing Issues 
Supplemental Jury Instruction:  Deadlocked Jury 
{¶28} In proposition of law I, appellant argues that the trial court erred in 
failing to give the correct supplemental instruction to the deadlocked jury in the 
penalty phase.  Alternatively, appellant contends that the court should have 
declared a mistrial, discharged the jury, and sentenced him to life imprisonment. 
{¶29} The jury underwent lengthy penalty deliberations and was, for a 
time, deadlocked.  The jury began deliberating at 12:10 p.m. on February 22, 
1996, and retired for the day at 6:35 p.m.  The jury resumed deliberations the next 
day at 9:05 a.m.  At 2:20 p.m., the jury informed the court that it had “come to an 
agreement on one recommendation.  We cannot agree on the other; we’re 
January Term, 2003 
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deadlocked * * *.”  At this point, the court issued a supplemental instruction, 
referred to as a Howard charge (slightly modified from the charge in State v. 
Howard [1989], 42 Ohio St.3d 18, 537 N.E.2d 188).1  The instruction advised the 
jurors: 
{¶30} “It is your duty to decide the case, if you can conscientiously do 
so.  You should listen to one another’s arguments with the disposition to be 
persuaded.  Do not hesitate to reexamine your views and change your position if 
you are convinced that it is erroneous.  If there is disagreement, all jurors should 
reexamine their positions, given that a unanimous verdict has not been reached.  
Jurors for life should consider whether their doubt is reasonable, considering that 
it is not shared by others, equally honest to have heard the same evidence, with 
the same desire to arrive at the truth, and under the same oath.  Likewise, jurors 
for death should ask themselves whether they might not reasonably doubt the 
correctness of a judgment not concurred in by all other jurors.” 
{¶31} Defense counsel objected to the Howard charge and requested that 
the court read a different supplemental instruction taken from State v. Martens 
(1993), 90 Ohio App.3d 338, 629 N.E.2d 462, which discussed the impossibility 
of reaching a verdict.  The Martens charge, which is reflected in 4 Ohio Jury 
Instructions (2000), Section 415.50(4), instructs the jury:  “If you decide that you 
cannot agree and that further deliberations will not serve a useful purpose you 
may ask to be returned to the courtroom and report that fact to the court.  If there 
is a possibility of reaching a verdict you should continue your deliberations.”  Id. 
at 343, 629 N.E.2d 462.  The court refused to give this instruction. 
{¶32} Nearly four hours after the court read its Howard charge, defense 
counsel, arguing that the jury was irreconcilably deadlocked, moved for a mistrial 
under  State v. Springer (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 167, 586 N.E.2d 96.  In Springer, 
                                                 
1. 
The Howard charge was modified by the judge so that the words “jurors for acquittal” 
were changed to “jurors for life.”  Also, the term “death” was substituted for “guilt.” 
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we held that “[w]hen a jury becomes irreconcilably deadlocked during its 
sentencing deliberations in the penalty phase of a capital murder trial and is 
unable to reach a unanimous verdict * * *, the trial court is required to sentence 
the offender to life imprisonment.”  Id. at syllabus.  The trial court overruled the 
motion for mistrial.  The jury continued deliberating until 9:08 p.m. that day. 
{¶33} The next day, February 24, 1996, the jury reconvened at 10:30 a.m.  
Defense counsel requested that the court either instruct the jury to “move on” and 
consider one of the life-sentence options or give the Martens charge.  The court 
refused.  About three hours later, with the jury still deliberating, defense counsel 
repeated the request.  Again the court declined. 
{¶34} At 4:35 p.m., between 12 and 13 hours after the court read its 
Howard charge, the jury announced its verdict.  The jurors recommended that 
appellant receive the death sentence for the murder of Isam Salman and life 
imprisonment for the murder of Hayder Al Turk with parole eligibility after 30 
years.  When the jury was polled, Juror York stated, “Your Honor, I compromise 
with the other eleven jurors [sic].” 
{¶35} The court then asked her, “Are these your verdicts?”  Juror York 
answered, “No, they’re not.”  The court repeated, “These are not your verdicts?”  
She answered, “I compromised, Your Honor, with the other jurors.” 
{¶36} The court then sent the jurors back into the jury room.  Defense 
counsel moved for a mistrial or, in the alternative, for a Martens charge.  The 
judge declined, but decided to reread the penalty instructions in their entirety to 
the jury, but without the Howard charge.  Approximately two and one-half hours 
later, the jurors reached a unanimous verdict and, when polled, all jurors, 
including York, stated without reservation that it was their verdict. 
{¶37} In this proposition of law, we are asked to decide whether the trial 
court abused its discretion in giving the Howard charge rather than the Martens 
charge, and erred in failing to remove the case from the jury and sentencing 
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Brown to life imprisonment.  Whether the jury is irreconcilably deadlocked is 
essentially “a necessarily discretionary determination” for the trial court to make.  
Arizona v. Washington (1978), 434 U.S. 497, 510, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717, 
fn. 28.  In making such a determination, the court must evaluate each case based 
on its own particular circumstances.  State v. Mason (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 144, 
167, 694 N.E.2d 932.  There is no bright-line test to determine what constitutes an 
irreconcilably deadlocked jury.  In fact, we have stated that “[n]o exact line can be 
drawn as to how long a jury must deliberate in the penalty phase before a trial 
court should instruct the jury to limit itself to the life sentence options or take the 
case away from the jury, as done in Springer.”  Mason at 167, 694 N.E.2d 932. 
{¶38} In this case, although the jury deliberated for many hours, we are 
unwilling to find that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the jury 
was not irreconcilably deadlocked and in choosing to issue a Howard rather than 
a Martens charge.  We have twice upheld the use of a Howard charge, specifically 
finding that such an instruction is not coercive, and, in fact, is “intended for a jury 
that believes it is deadlocked, so as to challenge them to try one last time to reach 
a consensus.”  State v. Robb (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 59, 81, 723 N.E.2d 1019; see, 
also, Mason, 82 Ohio St.3d at 167, 694 N.E.2d 932.  In this case, even though the 
jurors deliberated for a lengthy period of time, they never advised the court, after 
their initial deadlock, that they were unable to reach a verdict.  Thus, the court 
acted within its discretion in refusing to give the Martens instruction regarding the 
impossibility of reaching a verdict.  Even the Martens court itself, in refusing to 
require the instruction in that case, acknowledged that such an instruction should 
not be given prematurely.  Otherwise, “the instruction may be contrary to the goal 
of the Howard charge of encouraging a verdict where one can conscientiously be 
reached.”  Martens, 90 Ohio App.3d at 343, 629 N.E.2d 462. 
{¶39} As to the trial court’s refusal to declare a mistrial under Springer, 
again, we find no abuse of discretion.  In Springer, it was evident that the jury 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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was irreconcilably deadlocked on sentencing.  On the second day of deliberations, 
the jury informed the judge that it was “stalemated.”  Id. at 168, 586 N.E.2d 96.  
The court then gave the jury a supplemental charge similar to the Howard charge.  
Deliberations continued into the third day.  The jurors queried the judge several 
more times, again indicating that they were still struggling against a stalemate.  
The jury informed the court on the third day of deliberations that it was hopelessly 
deadlocked and could not recommend any sentence, and they were discharged.  In 
contrast, after hearing the Howard charge, the jury in this case, unlike the jury in 
Springer, made no further inquiries to the court.  It never informed the court that 
they continued to be deadlocked.  Instead, even after the polling of the jury, the 
jurors continued their deliberations without hesitation.  The trial court was 
justified in refusing to give the Martens charge, since there was no clear 
indication that the jurors would be unable to reach a verdict.  For these reasons, 
we overrule proposition of law I. 
Allegedly Compromised Jury Verdict 
{¶40} In proposition of law II, appellant argues that the trial court should 
have declared a mistrial when juror York stated that her verdict had been 
compromised.  At the least, appellant contends that the court should have 
questioned the juror further after hearing that her verdict was compromised.  See 
State v. Brumback (1996), 109 Ohio App.3d 65, 73-74, 671 N.E.2d 1064. 
{¶41} R.C. 2945.77 and Crim.R. 31(D) provide for the polling of the jury 
to determine whether there is a unanimous verdict.  In particular, R.C. 2945.77 
provides:  “If one of the jurors upon being polled declares that said verdict is not 
his verdict, the jury must further deliberate upon the case.”  Crim.R. 31(D) states, 
“If upon the poll there is not unanimous concurrence, the jury may be directed to 
retire for further deliberation or may be discharged.” 
{¶42} The determination of whether to grant a mistrial is within the 
sound discretion of the trial court.  State v. Glover (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 18, 19, 
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517 N.E.2d 900.  In deciding whether there has been an abuse of discretion, we 
are cognizant of the fact that the trial judge remains in the best position to view 
the demeanor and actions of the juror to determine whether further questioning is 
necessary.  Id. at 20, 517 N.E.2d 900.  We will not second-guess that 
determination absent an abuse of discretion.  See State v. Williams (1995), 73 
Ohio St.3d 153, 167, 652 N.E.2d 721. 
{¶43} Although the better practice would be for the trial judge to conduct 
further inquiry of a dissenting juror, see, e.g., State v. Hessler (2000), 90 Ohio 
St.3d 108, 115-122, 734 N.E.2d 1237, neither the Criminal Rules nor the statute 
mandates further questioning.  Nor does the fact that Juror York expressed 
reservation necessitate the granting of a mistrial or reversal of the verdict.  The 
Hessler decision exemplifies this point.  In Hessler, after signing the penalty 
form, a juror was visibly upset, crying in the hallway and refusing to go into the 
courtroom.  The trial judge questioned the juror in his chambers and informed her 
that she was free to change her mind if she felt that her vote had been coerced.  
Following the inquiry, when polled, the juror stated that she agreed with the 
recommendations.  In finding no error in the judge’s approach, we noted that the 
juror was given the chance to change her mind, but when she was individually 
polled, she stated that she agreed with the recommendation.  Under those 
circumstances, we held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
proceeding as it did.  Id., 90 Ohio St.3d at 115-121, 734 N.E.2d 1237. 
{¶44} Even though the trial court in this case did not question Juror York 
further, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion.  Unlike the 
distraught juror in Hessler, York willingly went back into deliberations and did 
not express any further concern.  Had she expressed further reservation about her 
verdict or about further deliberating, then it may have been necessary to conduct 
an inquiry.  However, in this case, when the final verdict was read, Juror York 
unequivocally answered that she agreed with the verdict. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
{¶45} Certainly, a jury’s attempt to reach a unanimous verdict is a 
difficult and emotional undertaking.  This is inherent in the structure of the jury 
system itself, since “[t]he very object of the jury system is to secure unanimity by 
a comparison of views, and by arguments among the jurors themselves.”  Allen v. 
United States (1896), 164 U.S. 492, 501, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528.  As we 
stated in Hessler, 90 Ohio St.3d at 120, 734 N.E.2d 1237, “The requirement of a 
unanimous decision, however, does not come without a price.  Heightened 
emotions and intense feelings are part and parcel of this process.  Experience tells 
us that during deliberations, it is not unusual to find heavy-handed influencing, 
browbeating, and even bullying to a certain extent.” 
{¶46} Under the circumstances presented, we do not find that the trial 
court abused its discretion in the handling of Juror York.  Consequently, we 
overrule proposition of law II. 
Readmission of Trial Exhibits 
{¶47} In proposition of law VI, appellant contends that the trial court 
erred in readmitting trial exhibits during the mitigation phase.  We have 
previously held that the trial court may properly allow reintroduction of exhibits 
from the trial phase into the mitigation phase pursuant to R.C. 2929.03(D)(1).  
State v. DePew (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 275, 528 N.E.2d 542, paragraph one of the 
syllabus; State v. Myers, 97 Ohio St.3d 335, 358-359, 780 N.E.2d 186, ¶ 138-139.  
We overrule proposition of law VI. 
Cumulative Error 
{¶48} In proposition of law VII, appellant contends that he was denied a 
fair trial due to the cumulative effect of errors by the trial court.  Although we 
recognize the doctrine of cumulative error, State v. DeMarco (1987), 31 Ohio 
St.3d 191, 31 OBR 390, 509 N.E.2d 1256, paragraph two of the syllabus, the 
doctrine is not applicable to the instant case, since any error we have found was 
either harmless or curable by our independent review.  See State v. Garner 
January Term, 2003 
17 
(1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 64, 656 N.E.2d 623.  We overrule this proposition of 
law. 
Settled Issues 
{¶49} Appellant raises several issues that we have previously resolved 
and require no further discussion.  See State v. Poindexter (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 
1, 520 N.E.2d 568, syllabus.  Accordingly, we summarily overrule propositions of 
law IX and XI, which challenge the constitutionality of our proportionality 
review.  See State v. Steffen (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 31 OBR 273, 509 N.E.2d 
383, paragraph one of the syllabus.  We also overrule propositions of law X, XII, 
XIII, XIV, and XV, which challenge the constitutionality of Ohio’s death penalty 
scheme on various grounds.  See, e.g., State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 
15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264; State v. Mapes (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 108, 116-
117, 19 OBR 318, 484 N.E.2d 140; State v. Maurer (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 
241-242, 15 OBR 379, 473 N.E.2d 768; State v. Zuern (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 56, 
64-66, 512 N.E.2d 585; State v. Carter (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 593, 607-608, 734 
N.E.2d 345.  We further reject proposition of law VIII, where appellant argues 
that he was denied due process because the jury was not required to articulate the 
methods and reasoning by which it determined that the aggravating circumstance 
outweighed the mitigating factors, since we have consistently rejected similar 
arguments.  See Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d at 176-177, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264; 
State v. Dunlap (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 308, 318, 652 N.E.2d 988. 
Independent Review and Proportionality 
{¶50} Appellant called four mitigation witnesses.  His mother, Betty 
Brown, testified about raising appellant in an unstable environment, where she 
openly drank alcohol, used drugs, and frequently left appellant and his two older 
siblings alone.  On one occasion during his childhood, when left alone, appellant 
started a fire in their apartment when cooking.  Betty also admitted that during the 
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first trimester of her pregnancy with appellant, she used heroin, and also smoked 
marijuana on a daily basis.  Betty never married appellant’s father. 
{¶51} Betty testified that she moved her children from place to place and 
often left them in the care of others.  At times, appellant lived with either an aunt 
or uncle in Youngstown.  For a time, he lived with his mother in Los Angeles but 
then returned without her twice to live again with a relative in Youngstown.  
Betty lost contact with her son and rarely saw him after he was twelve years old. 
{¶52} Stephanie Johnson also testified on appellant’s behalf.  She stated 
that appellant’s sister, Michelle, lived with her in Pittsburgh from time to time.  
She further stated that Betty Brown often grossly neglected her children and was a 
heavy drug user.  She described appellant as quiet and slightly withdrawn. 
{¶53} Robert L. Smith, a clinical psychologist, testified that he 
interviewed appellant twice for a total of nine hours.  He testified that appellant 
had suffered a series of losses in his life, including the abandonment of his father 
and recurrent abandonments by his mother.  Appellant grew up in an unstable 
environment, surrounded by drug and alcohol abuse, with little nurturing.  He 
began using alcohol and marijuana when he was ten or eleven years old.  By late 
adolescence, appellant was addicted to alcohol, marijuana, and sedatives.  He was 
also sexually abused when he was six and then became very sexually active 
around age fifteen. 
{¶54} Smith administered several tests on appellant, including the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory II, the Substance Abuse Subtle 
Screening Inventory, the Michigan Alcoholism Screening Test, and the Drug 
Abuse Screening Test.  Smith diagnosed appellant as suffering from substance 
dependence and a borderline personality disorder.  Smith found that appellant 
suffered from an identity disturbance and effective instability, which is 
characterized by chronic feelings of emptiness and difficulty controlling anger, 
January Term, 2003 
19 
coping with life, and trusting others.  Smith testified that appellant had difficulty 
controlling his impulses, which were intensified by his drug and alcohol abuse. 
{¶55} Appellant made an unsworn statement in which he expressed deep 
remorse for his actions.  He asked the victims’ families for forgiveness and asked 
God for forgiveness as well. 
{¶56} After independent assessment, we conclude that the evidence 
proves beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating circumstance in this case, that 
appellant murdered Isam Salman as part of a course of conduct as defined in R.C. 
2929.04(A)(5). 
{¶57} We find nothing in the nature and circumstances of the offense to 
be  mitigating.  The evidence shows that appellant reentered the store with a gun, 
wearing a bandanna or mask around his face.  After he allegedly “had words” 
with Al Turk, appellant then repeatedly shot Al Turk and Salman.  He casually 
walked back to the car and said that the gunshots were simply the sound of 
firecrackers.  Appellant’s actions lack any mitigating features. 
{¶58} Appellant’s history, character, and background provide some 
mitigation.  He grew up in an unstable home environment.  He moved around a 
great deal and was frequently left to live with persons other than his mother or, 
when he was with his mother, was expected to care for himself.  Appellant was 
also surrounded by drug and alcohol abuse, and was sexually abused at an early 
age. 
{¶59} We find that the mitigating factors of R.C. 2929.04(B) are either 
inapplicable or are entitled to little weight.  Under R.C. 2929.04(B)(1), there was 
no evidence that the victims induced or facilitated the murders.  Nor was there 
sufficient evidence of duress, coercion, or strong provocation as set forth in R.C. 
2929.04(B)(2).  In fact, appellant himself testified that he simply “flipped out” 
when he committed the murders.  Although he suffers from substance dependence 
and a borderline personality disorder, appellant does not suffer from a mental 
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20 
disease or defect that caused him to lack substantial capacity to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the law.  R.C. 2929.04(B)(3).  
The fact that appellant was 21 at the time of the murders is entitled to only slight 
mitigating weight under R.C. 2929.04(B)(4) (youth of the offender).  See, e.g., 
State v. Madrigal (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 400, 721 N.E.2d 52.  R.C. 
2929.04(B)(5) and (6) are inapplicable, since appellant had a history of two prior 
felony drug convictions and because he was the sole offender in the murders.  The 
catchall factor of R.C. 2929.04(B)(7) is applicable.  Appellant’s poor upbringing, 
substance-abuse problems, and personality disorder merit some weight in 
mitigation, as does the fact that he expressed remorse for his actions.  State v. 
Johnson (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 95, 123, 723 N.E.2d 1054; State v. Mitts (1998), 
81 Ohio St.3d 223, 236-237, 690 N.E.2d 522.  Appellant’s voluntary intoxication 
is entitled to little mitigating weight.  Id. at 237, 690 N.E.2d 522. 
{¶60} In weighing the mitigating factors against the aggravating 
circumstance, we find that the aggravating circumstance outweighs the mitigating 
factors beyond a reasonable doubt.  The evidence showed that appellant went 
back into the store armed with a gun and with a bandanna or mask covering his 
face.  He then shot and killed the two victims as part of a course of conduct and 
initially tried to conceal the fact that he was the triggerman.  Appellant’s actions 
merit the capital penalty to which he was sentenced. 
{¶61} We further conclude that the death penalty imposed for each 
aggravated murder is appropriate and proportionate when compared to similar 
capital crimes involving the purposeful killing or attempt to kill two or more 
persons.  State v. Taylor, 98 Ohio St.3d 27, 2002-Ohio-7017, 781 N.E.2d 72; 
State v. Davie (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 311, 686 N.E.2d 245; State v. Lundgren 
(1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 474, 653 N.E.2d 304. 
{¶62} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm appellant’s convictions and 
death sentence. 
January Term, 2003 
21 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR and 
O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Paul J. Gains, Mahoning County Prosecuting Attorney, and Janice T. 
O’Halloran, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Mary Jane Stephens and John B. Juhasz, for appellant. 
__________________