Title: Novick/Crew v. Myers

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED:  November 18, 2004
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STEVEN NOVICK,
Petitioner,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General,
State of Oregon,
Respondent.
MICHAEL D. CREW,
Petitioner,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General,
State of Oregon,
Respondent,
and
ARWEN BIRD,
Intervenor.
(SC S51686 (Control); S51690)
(Consolidated for Opinion)
En Banc
On petitions to review ballot title.
Submitted on the record September 21, 2004.
Lawrence Wobbrock and Richard Lane, Lawrence Wobbrock Trial
Lawyer, P.C., Portland, filed the petition for petitioner Novick. 
John A. DiLorenzo, Jr., Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP,
Portland, filed the petition for petitioner Crew.  With him on
the petition was Timothy R. Volpert.
Denise G. Fjordbeck, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
filed the answering memoranda for respondent.  With her on the
answering memoranda were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary
H. Williams, Solicitor General.
Steven C. Berman, Stoll Stoll Berne Lokting & Shlachter
P.C., Portland, filed the memorandum for intervenor.
DURHAM, J.
Ballot title certified.
Riggs, J., concurred in part, dissented in part, and filed
an opinion.
DURHAM, J.
The court has consolidated for opinion two petitions
for review of a ballot title under ORS 250.085(2).  Petitioners
Novick and Crew are electors who are dissatisfied with the
Attorney General's certified ballot title.  Because petitioners
timely submitted written comments regarding the draft ballot
title, they are entitled to seek review in this court.  ORS
250.085(2).  Intervenor Bird has intervened in support of the
objections that petitioner Novick filed and in opposition to the
objections that petitioner Crew filed.
The proposed measure, if adopted, would amend ORS
20.340 to impose an upper limit of $100,000 on the attorney fees,
exclusive of actual expenses and costs, that a lawyer could
charge to the plaintiff in a civil action for personal injury or
wrongful death, except for any class action.  The full text of
the proposed measure appears as an Appendix to this opinion.  For
that proposed measure, which the Secretary of State has
delineated as Initiative Petition 3 (2006), the Attorney General
certified the following ballot title:
"LIMITS COMPENSATION OF ATTORNEY(S) FOR INDIVIDUAL
PLAINTIFF IN ALL PERSONAL INJURY OR WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIMS
"RESULT OF 'YES' VOTE:  'Yes' vote limits maximum
compensation to attorney(s) for plaintiff in a personal
injury or wrongful death claim (other than certified
class action) to $100,000.
"RESULT OF 'NO' VOTE:  'No' vote retains current
law, which imposes no set monetary limitations on
plaintiff's attorney fees for claims arising out of
personal injury or wrongful death.
"SUMMARY:  Current law places no limit on fee
agreements between injured individuals, their spouses,
or legal representatives and attorneys who agree to
represent them, unless resulting fee is excessive or
illegal.  Measure limits attorneys' fees in all claims
for personal injury or death to a maximum of $100,000,
regardless of the result achieved.  Measure does not
apply to certified class actions.  Measure applies to
arbitration, mediation, and settlement, as well as
litigation.  Limitation applies to each individual
claim made, regardless of the number of attorneys
representing the injured individual and regardless of
the number of individuals or entities against whom
claim is made.  Limitation does not apply to attorney
fees for attorneys for the individuals or entities that
caused the injury or death.  Other provisions."
Petitioner Novick challenges the Attorney General's
"yes" and "no" vote result statements.  Petitioner Crew
challenges the caption, "yes" vote result statement, and summary
of the Attorney General's ballot title.  We review the Attorney
General's ballot title to determine whether it substantially
complies with the requirements of ORS 250.035(2).  ORS
250.085(5).
NOVICK PETITION
Petitioner Novick asserts that the Attorney General's
"yes" vote result statement fails to describe the result if the
voters approve the proposed measure, as ORS 250.035(2)(b)
requires.  According to petitioner Novick,
"[t]he true 'result' of passage of the measure would be
to establish an unequal system in which defendants in
personal injury or wrongful death cases would be able
to spend unlimited amounts on attorneys, but plaintiffs
would not.  The creation of such a two-tiered system is
a fundamental change in the law, which this section
should make clear."
(Emphasis omitted.)  The Attorney General responds that the "yes"
vote result statement is adequate because it "specifically states
that the limitation applies only to plaintiff's counsel."
For the following reasons, we agree with the Attorney
General.  The proposed measure, if adopted, would limit the
attorney fees of lawyers for plaintiffs in personal injury and
wrongful death litigation.  Because the proposed measure would
not limit or have any other effect on fees charged by lawyers for
defendants or other parties in personal injury or wrongful death
litigation, the inequality of which petitioner Novick complains
is undeniable.  The legal question is whether the Attorney
General must identify that inequality as a result of the approval
of the proposed measure in the "yes" vote result statement.  To
address that question, we must examine the legislature's intent
in requiring a ballot title to include a "yes" vote result
statement. (1)

ORS 250.035(2)(b) states that a "yes" vote result
statement is "[a] simple and understandable statement of not more
than 25 words that describes the result if the state measure is
approved."  The legislature provided no special statutory
definition of the term "result."  Consequently, we assume that
the legislature intended to use that term of common usage in
accordance with its ordinary dictionary definition.  The
dictionary defines a "result" as:
"[A] decision or resolution of a deliberative
legislative body * * * something that results as a
consequence, effect, issue, or conclusion * * *
beneficial or tangible effect : FRUIT * * * something
obtained, achieved, or brought about by calculation,
investigation, or similar activity * * *."
Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1937 (unabridged ed 1993).
In determining what the legislature intended in
requiring a description of the "result" of the approval of a
proposed measure, we also must consider other contextual clues
about the legislature's intent, including those in related
statutes.  ORS 250.035(2)(d) provides that a ballot title also
must contain "[a] concise and impartial statement of not more
than 125 words summarizing the state measure and its major
effect."  (Emphasis added.)  The term "effect" in that statute
means "something that is produced by an agent or cause :
something that follows immediately from an antecedent : a
resultant condition : RESULT, OUTCOME * * *."  Webster's at 724.
The definitions set out above do not draw a bright line
between, on the one hand, the "result" of a proposed measure's
approval and, on the other hand, its "major effect."  The
legislature's use of distinctive terminology in describing the
elements of a "yes" vote result statement and summary signals its
intent to require messages about the proposed measure that are
distinctive, at least to some degree, in those separate parts of
the ballot title.  However, it also is clear that the definitions
of "result" and "effect" overlap; each definition incorporates
the other term either as a synonym or as an important descriptor
of meaning.
The legislature's choice of terminology in this
context, which has evolved over time, demonstrates that the
legislature intended to require the Attorney General to
determine, in the first instance, the consequences of enactment
of a proposed measure that require description in the "yes" vote
result statement and also those consequences of enactment that
belong in the summary.  As noted, the Attorney General's
authority in that regard is not unfettered.  The legislature's
intent, rather than the discretion of the Attorney General,
controls whether a particular descriptive message refers to a
"result" or a "major effect" of a proposed measure.
In addition, the legislature imposed different word
limitations on the result statements (25 words) and summaries
(125 words).  The shorter, 25-word limitation in ORS
250.035(2)(b) indicates that the result of a proposed measure's
enactment that belongs in the "yes" vote result statement is that
outcome that is the most significant and immediate, or that
carries the greatest consequence, for the general public.  Stated
differently, the legislature intended the 25-word "yes" vote
result statement to notify petition signers and voters of the
result or results of enactment that would have the greatest
importance to the people of Oregon.  By contrast, the
legislature's allotment of 125 words to the summary in ORS
250.035(2)(d) signals an intention to require the Attorney
General to disclose in greater detail the proposed measure's
major effects.  Logically, those would include additional
important consequences or details that the result statement does
not convey and helpful contextual information about the impact of
the proposed measure on existing law.  As noted, the Attorney
General's choices in those respects are subject to review by this
court for substantial compliance under ORS 250.085(5).  A party
does not demonstrate a failure of substantial compliance merely
by showing that some other choice by the Attorney General would
have been appropriate.  
With that overview of ORS 250.035(2)(b) and (d) in
mind, we turn to Novick's specific objections to the "yes" vote
result statement.  In support of his theory that the proposed
measure would create a discriminatory, two-tier system of legal
representation in many personal injury civil cases, Novick argues
that the "yes" vote result statement should incorporate the
phrase "defendants' attorney fees unlimited."  The proposed
measure, however, would enact no provision stating that
"defendants' attorney fees [will be] unlimited" if voters approve
the proposed measure.  Instead, the proposed measure's unequal
treatment of attorney fees in civil litigation arises from its
express limitation of plaintiffs' attorney fees and its silence
about attorney fees payable to lawyers for defendants and other
parties.
Novick relies on Novick v. Myers, 330 Or 351, 7 P3d 518
(2000).  In that case, the Attorney General's result statements
indicated that the proposed measure limited "certain" campaign
contributions and expenditures.  This court determined that the
result statements were insufficient because the word "certain"
failed to make clear that "the applicability of differing limits
and prohibitions * * * would turn on the status of the
contributor."  Id. at 356.  Novick contends that the "yes" vote
result statement in this proceeding similarly fails to make clear
that the applicability of the attorney fee limitation depends on
the party that the lawyer represents.
Novick is distinguishable.  Under the proposed measure
in that case, the applicability of various limits and
prohibitions on political contributions turned on the status of
the contributor.  The proposed measure expressly created the
categories of contributors to which the differing limits and
prohibitions applied.  The court's concern in Novick focused on
the insufficiency of the term "certain" to alert voters about the
key factor that triggered the proposed measure's new limitations. 
That is not true here.  The Attorney General's "yes" vote result
statement for Initiative Petition 3 (2004) discloses that the
proposed measure limits "compensation to attorney(s) for
plaintiff * * *."
The Attorney General has chosen to address the issue
that Novick raises in two ways.  First, the Attorney General
described the proposed measure's express limitation on
plaintiffs' attorney fees in the "yes" vote result statement. 
Second, the Attorney General disclosed the inapplicability of the
proposed measure's limitation on the fees of lawyers for
defendants in the following statement in the summary: 
"Limitation does not apply to attorney fees for attorneys for the
individuals or entities that caused the injury or death."
The Attorney General's approach substantially complies
with ORS 250.035(2)(b).  As noted, the proposed measure embodies
a statutory amendment that would impose a limit solely on the
attorney fees of lawyers for the plaintiff in personal injury
litigation.  That amendment constitutes the "result if the state
measure is approved," ORS 250.035(2)(b), because the limitation
on attorney fees for plaintiffs' lawyers is the consequence or
the thing that enactment would obtain or achieve.  That
limitation would be the most significant and immediate result of
the enactment of the proposed measure and carries the greatest
consequence for the general public.  As a result, the Attorney
General properly chose to describe that limitation in the "yes"
vote result statement.
Moreover, the Attorney General correctly decided to
disclose in the summary, rather than in the "yes" vote result
statement, the inapplicability of the limitation to attorney fees
for lawyers for defendants or the discriminatory effect of
limiting only the fees of lawyers for plaintiffs.  The 25-word
limitation in ORS 250.035(2)(b) often can inhibit a clear
description of every consequence of the adoption of a proposed
measure.  For example, in the present proceeding, the additional
phrase that Novick advocates, "defendants' attorney fees
unlimited," risks both ambiguity and inaccuracy by attempting to
convey Novick's point in only four words.  The Attorney General
recognized Novick's point, i.e., that the proposed measure would
affect plaintiffs, defendants, and their lawyers unequally. 
However, the Attorney General was required to choose how to
describe that discriminatory effect without speculation and in
terms that enhance the voters' understanding of the most
important consequences of enactment.  The Attorney General
determined that identifying the proposed measure's bias in favor
of defendants and their lawyers, while significant, was not as
important to the voters as the identification of the proposed
measure's bias against plaintiffs and their lawyers.  Although it
was not the only choice available, the Attorney General's choice
passes muster under the standard of review that ORS 250.085(5)
prescribes.
Novick next asserts that the Attorney General's "no"
vote result statement fails to provide a simple and
understandable description of the result of rejection of the
proposed measure.  Novick points out that Code of Professional
Responsibility Disciplinary Rule (DR) 2-106(A) provides that "[a]
lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge or collect
an illegal or clearly excessive fee."  Novick argues that,
although no current law imposes a specific cap on any attorney
fee agreement, DR 2-106 does prohibit an illegal or excessive fee
in any case, and the "no" vote result statement must disclose
that limitation expressly to describe current law in an accurate,
understandable manner.
ORS 250.035(2)(c) requires a ballot title to include
"[a] simple and understandable statement of not more than 25
words that describes the result if the state measure is
rejected."  We conclude that the Attorney General's "no" vote
result statement satisfies that requirement.  First, the Attorney
General has addressed the substance of current law on the subject
matter of the proposed measure, i.e., whether current law imposes
monetary limits on plaintiffs' attorney fees in personal injury
claims.
Second, the Attorney General has summarized the current
law accurately.  The Attorney General's phrase, "no set monetary
limit," clearly indicates that the statement addresses set
monetary limitations, as opposed to the more general limitations
that DR 2-106 imposes.
Third, the Attorney General has disclosed the point
that Novick raises by including the following statement in the
summary:
"Current law places no limit on fee agreements between
injured individuals, their spouses, or legal
representatives and attorneys who agree to represent
them, unless resulting fee is excessive or illegal."
The inclusion of that statement in the summary substantially
reduces any risk that the "no" vote result statement might cause
a voter or petition signer to conclude, erroneously, that current
law imposes no limitations of any kind on plaintiffs' attorney
fee agreements.
CREW PETITION
Petitioner Crew argues that the caption, (2)
 "yes"
vote result statement, and summary are inaccurate.  According to
Crew, the caption and "yes" vote result statement erroneously
state that the proposed measure would limit the maximum
"compensation" of lawyers for plaintiffs in personal injury
cases.  He asserts that the term "compensation" is misleading
because the proposed measure limits only a lawyer's "fees" and
does not limit a lawyer's "compensation" in the form of
reimbursement of costs and expenses actually incurred in
representing the plaintiff.  He also contends that the summary is
inadequate because it fails to explain that the proposed measure
would not limit the recovery by plaintiffs' lawyers of actual
expenses and costs reasonably incurred in personal injury
litigation.  
The Attorney General's draft caption and "yes" vote
result statement had incorporated the phrase "attorney fees
charged" rather than the term "compensation."  However, the
Attorney General responded to a comment by intervenor about the
draft ballot title by deleting the phrase "attorney fees charged"
and replacing it with the term "compensation" in the caption and
"yes" vote result statement of the certified ballot title. 
Intervenor had asserted that the phrase "attorney fees charged"
was inaccurate because, in personal injury litigation, the
plaintiff's lawyer often receives payment for services not from
the client but from the proceeds of a judgment or settlement that
a defendant pays.  The Attorney General determined that
"compensation" was the more accurate term because it focused on
the lawyer's pay for services, rather than on the manner of
charging or paying for those services.
The Attorney General asserts that "compensation" is the
appropriate term in the context of the caption and "yes" vote
result statement.  According to the Attorney General, the
proposed measure would limit payments to lawyers for legal
services and has no effect on the ability of lawyers to recover
costs and expenses.  The Attorney General argues that, in this
context, "[c]osts and expenses are not compensation."  Finally,
the Attorney General contends that the summary properly describes
the proposed measure as a limitation on "the attorney fee, the
compensation to which the attorney is entitled.  Reference to
costs and expenses is superfluous."
We agree with the Attorney General.  The limitation in
the proposed measure affects only a plaintiff's lawyers' payment
for legal services rendered; it has no effect on a lawyer's
entitlement to payment of out-of-pocket costs and expenses. 
Although lawyers commonly refer to a payment for services
rendered as an "attorney fee," it is less than clear that the
general public equally shares that understanding of the term or
readily distinguishes it from a reimbursement of costs and
expenses.
The term "compensation," in this context, means
"payment for * * * service rendered."  Webster's at 463.  The
Attorney General contends, and we agree, that the ordinary
meaning of the term "compensation" accurately describes the
subject matter of the proposed measure.  The phrase that Crew
prefers, "attorney fees," also refers to the lawyers'
compensation, but we cannot say that, in this context, the phrase
"attorney fees" is more accurate or less confusing than the term
"compensation."  Given the difficulty of eliminating all
ambiguity in this context, we conclude that the Attorney
General's choice to use "compensation" instead of "attorney fees"
in the caption and "yes" vote result statement was a reasonable
one.  Those portions of the Attorney General's ballot title
substantially comply with ORS 250.035(2)(a) and (b).
The Attorney General's draft summary also stated that
"[t]he limitation does not include actual expenses and costs
reasonably incurred by the attorney(s)."  However, again
responding to a comment by intervenor, the Attorney General
struck that sentence from the certified summary.  According to
the Attorney General, that choice was correct, because the
proposed measure does not purport to limit or regulate in any
manner the recovery of a lawyer's costs or expenses of
litigation.
Again, we agree.  The proposed measure mentions
litigation costs ("$100,000, exclusive of actual expenses and
costs reasonably incurred * * *") only for the purpose of making
clear that the proposed measure's limitation has no relationship
to, and no effect on, the recovery of the expenses and costs of
litigation.  The Attorney General's summary does not include any
wording that refers ambiguously to the recovery of costs or
expenses.  As a result, the additional wording that petitioner
Crew seeks is not needed to correct any confusing or misleading
wording in the summary.
The Attorney General's summary describes the scope of
the proposed measure in part by setting out several aspects of
litigation to which it does not apply.  For example, the summary
provides that the proposed measure does not apply to "certified
class actions[]" and "attorney fees for attorneys for the
individuals or entities that caused the injury or death."  Crew
proposes to add an additional 14-word sentence to the summary to
state his point about costs and expenses.  That would require the
elimination or significant modification of one or more messages
in the Attorney General's summary, thus increasing the risk of
ambiguity in the balance of the summary.  Ultimately, we are
unpersuaded that the Attorney General's summary requires
modification to describe an aspect of the litigation process to
which the proposed measure would have no application. 
As a consequence of the foregoing, we certify the
Attorney General's ballot title.  ORS 250.085(8).
Ballot title certified.
RIGGS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority’s rejection of the arguments
for modification submitted by petitioner Crew.  As to the
majority’s rejection of petitioner Novick’s arguments, I
respectfully dissent.  Contrary to the view expressed in the
majority opinion with respect to the Novick petition, the result
statements do not comply substantially with the requirements of
ORS 250.035(2)(b) and (c).  Both the Attorney General and the
majority tiptoe by and otherwise ignore the elephant in the
living room.  Nor do I believe that their reasoning comports with
this court’s holding in Novick v. Myers, 330 Or 351, 7 P3d 518
(2000).  I cannot ignore the obvious and would, therefore, refer
the ballot title to the Attorney General for modification. 
The clear goal of this proposed measure is to establish
an unequal, two-tiered system in which defendants may spend
unlimited amounts for attorneys in personal injury and wrongful
death cases, but plaintiffs may not.  In my view, that two-tiered
system is the overriding result and most significant outcome if 
this proposed measure was enacted.
Because the proposed measure is silent regarding any
effect on defendants’ attorney fees, the majority seems to
believe that the result statements may simply mimic that silence. 
Yet a result statement must reasonably inform and alert voters
about the most significant impacts of a proposed law, not
disguise them.  Novick, 330 Or at 357; ORS 250.035(2)(b).  The
majority defines a “result” as that which is “brought about by
calculation.”  If so, then a result statement should disclose
that which is “brought about.”  Because this ballot title
proposes an inequitable system that favors one side in civil
litigation, the result statements must disclose that inequity.
Contrary to the majority’s assertion, this court’s
decision in Novick is consistent with this view.  The ballot
title in Novick proposed a similarly discriminatory measure.  The
result statement failed to reveal that proposed measure’s
discriminatory impact because it failed to identify with
specificity against whom the discriminatory application would
operate.  Novick, 330 Or at 355.  This court’s holding in Novick
requires that voters are informed clearly when a proposed measure
discriminates according to status.  Id. at 357.  Just as
ambiguous terms might fail to inform Oregon’s voters in a
meaningful way, so does the nondisclosure of critical terms that
effectively hide the ball.
The result statement for a “no” vote equally must be
clear and, here, there is a requirement of parallelism; ORS
250.035(3) requires “no” vote result statements to contain
wording that parallels the “yes” vote result statement as much as
possible.  Because I would require revision of the "yes" vote
result statement, the "no" vote statement would require similar
revision to maintain the required parallelism.
Furthermore, the most accurate and least misleading
statement regarding the current state of the law is not that
there are "no set monetary limitations on plaintiff's attorney
fees" but that there are none imposed on either plaintiffs' or
defendants' attorney fees.  Wording to that effect should appear
in the "no" vote result statement. (3)

In sum, I would refer the ballot title to the Attorney
General for modification of the "yes" and "no" vote result
statements.
Appendix 1
AN ACT
Relating to attorney fees; creating new provisions; amending ORS
20.340.
Be It Enacted by the People of the State of Oregon:
SECTION 1.  ORS 20.340 is amended to read:
(1)  Except as provided in Section 3 of this 2006 Act,
[I]in any civil action arising out of bodily injury, death or
property damage, including claims for emotional injury or
distress, loss of care, comfort, companionship and society, and
loss of consortium, if an attorney for a plaintiff in respect to
any civil action enters into an agreement with the plaintiff
whereby the attorney receives as a fee a percentage of the amount
of any settlement or judgment awarded to the plaintiff:
(a) The contingent fee agreement shall be written in
plain and simple language reasonably believed to be
understandable by the plaintiff.
(b) The attorney shall explain the terms and conditions
of the agreement in compliance with a model explanation in plain
and simple language prepared by the Oregon State Bar a reasonable
time before the agreement is signed.
(c) The contingent fee agreements must contain a
provision allowing the plaintiff to rescind the agreement within
24 hours after signing upon written notice to the attorney.
(2) Any contingent fee agreement entered into on or
after September 26, 1987, that does not comply with the
requirements of subsection (1) of this section is voidable.
SECTION 2.  Section 3 of this 2006 Act is added to and made a
part of ORS 20.075 to 20.340.
SECTION 3.  (1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this
Section, in any civil action arising out of bodily injury or
death, including claims for emotional injury or distress, loss of
care, comfort, companionship and society, and loss of consortium,
the attorney fees charged to the plaintiff, the plaintiff's legal
representative or the plaintiff's estate by one or more
attorney(s), whether based on a contingency fee or an hourly
rate, shall not exceed a total of $100,000, exclusive of actual
expenses and costs reasonably incurred, whether received by
judgment, settlement, or otherwise, and regardless of the number
of plaintiff's attorneys or defendants.  Notwithstanding the
above, in cases covered by this subsection, attorney(s) and
client may negotiate attorney fees, whether based on a
contingency fee or an hourly rate, in an amount not to exceed
$100,000.
(2) The attorney fees limit set forth in subsection (1) of this
Section shall not apply to attorney fees charged to a member of a
class in any class action maintained by order of the court in
accordance with ORCP 32.
SECTION 4.  The amendment to ORS 20.340 by Section 1 of this 2006
Act and the new provisions set forth in Section 3 of this 2006
Act apply to all attorney fee agreements that are entered into on
or after January 1, 2007.
1. Although decisions from this court determining whether
particular "yes" vote result statements complied substantially
with the requirements of ORS 250.035(2)(b) are legion, it does
not appear that this court has attempted to construe that
statutory wording according to the methodology set out in PGE v.
Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 859 P2d 1143 (1993). 
We take this opportunity to do so, both because the issues that
these petitions present call for such a construction and in the
hope that by clarifying the statutory standard –- as opposed to
merely applying that standard to particular proposed measures –- 
both the Attorney General and others who participate in the
ballot title process will be able to focus their efforts
accordingly and reduce the need for this court to resolve
disputes.
2. ORS 250.035(2)(a) requires a ballot title to include
"[a] caption of not more than 15 words that reasonably identifies
the subject matter of the state measure."
3. And, ideally, in the summary.