Title: State v. Pope

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2019 WI 106 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP1720-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Robert James Pope, Jr., 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 385 Wis. 2d 211,923 N.W.2d 177 
(2018 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 17, 2019   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 6, 2019   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit    
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Jeffrey A. Conen   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
ZIEGLER, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ROGGENSACK, C.J., KELLY and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. 
BRADLEY, REBECCA GRASSL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in 
which BRADLEY, ANN WALSH and DALLET, JJ., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed 
by 
Andrea 
Taylor 
Cornwall, 
assistant 
state 
public 
defender. There was an oral argument by Andrea Taylor Cornwall. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Daniel J. O’Brien, assistant attorney general; with whom on the 
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by Daniel J. O’Brien. 
 
 
 
2019 WI 106
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2017AP1720-CR 
(L.C. No. 
1996CF960574) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Robert James Pope, Jr., 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
DEC 17, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ZIEGLER, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ROGGENSACK, C.J., KELLY and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. 
BRADLEY, REBECCA GRASSL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in 
which BRADLEY, ANN WALSH and DALLET, JJ., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished opinion of the court of appeals, State v. Pope, No. 
2017AP1720-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 
2018), reversing the Milwaukee County circuit court's1 order.  
The circuit court vacated Robert James Pope, Jr.'s ("Pope") 1996 
                                                 
1 The 
Honorable 
Jeffrey 
A. 
Conen 
presided 
over 
the 
postconviction motion.  Other circuit court judges presided over 
the trial, sentencing, and earlier motions in this case.  But 
only the postconviction order is before this court on review. 
No. 2017AP1720-CR   
 
2 
 
judgment 
of 
conviction 
for 
two 
counts 
of 
first-degree 
intentional homicide, party to a crime, and granted Pope's 
postconviction motion for a new trial.  The circuit court 
concluded that a new trial was necessary because there was no 
transcript of Pope's 1996 jury trial available.  The court of 
appeals reversed and reinstated Pope's conviction.  The court of 
appeals concluded that Pope was not entitled to a new trial 
because he failed to meet his burden to assert a facially valid 
claim of error.  We affirm the court of appeals. 
¶2 
Under State v. Perry and State v. DeLeon, when a 
transcript is incomplete, a defendant may be entitled to a new 
trial, but only after the defendant makes a facially valid claim 
of arguably prejudicial error.  Perry, 136 Wis. 2d 92, 101, 401 
N.W.2d 748 (1987); DeLeon, 127 Wis. 2d 74, 377 N.W.2d 635 (Ct. 
App. 1985).  This court must decide whether the Perry/DeLeon 
procedure applies even when the entire trial transcript is 
unavailable.  Pope argues that the Perry/DeLeon procedure does 
not apply, and that courts should presume prejudice when the 
entire transcript is unavailable.  The State argues that under 
the Perry/DeLeon procedure Pope is not entitled to a new trial 
because he has not asserted a facially valid claim of arguably 
prejudicial error.  
¶3 
We decline to presume prejudice when the entire trial 
transcript is unavailable.  We conclude that the Perry/DeLeon 
procedure applies whether all or a portion of a transcript is 
unavailable.  We also decline to create an exception to the 
Perry/DeLeon procedure for Pope because the transcript is 
No. 2017AP1720-CR   
 
3 
 
unavailable due to Pope's own delay.  Thus, we affirm the court 
of appeals. 
 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶4 
On September 27, 1995, City of Milwaukee Police 
Officers William Walsh and John Krason responded to reports of a 
shooting at a house.  When they arrived at the house, the 
officers found Anthony Gustafson and Joshua Viehland suffering 
from multiple gunshot wounds.  Both young men were pronounced 
dead at the scene of the crime. 
¶5 
On January 12, 1996, the State filed a criminal 
complaint against Pope, charging him with two counts of first-
degree intentional homicide while armed, party to a crime, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 940.01(1), 939.63, and 939.05 (1995-
96).2  Since there is no trial transcript available, the 
following allegations are drawn from the criminal complaint 
only.  The complaint alleged that Pope, Pope's girlfriend J.R., 
I.G., D.K., and D.R. all plotted to kill Joshua Viehland because 
Viehland threatened their friend.  According to J.R.'s statement 
to officers, Pope told her that he would protect her from 
Viehland.  According to I.G.'s statement to officers, the five 
met at a house to discuss Viehland's threats.  J.R. told them 
all that if they did not shoot Viehland and Jessie Letendre, she 
and Pope would do it.  The complaint alleges that the five made 
                                                 
2 Where relevant, we reference the 1995-96 version of the 
Wisconsin Statutes.  All other references to the Wisconsin 
Statutes are to the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 2017AP1720-CR   
 
4 
 
a plan to call Letendre and have Letendre and Viehland meet them 
at the house.  I.G.'s statement to police was that D.R. called 
Letendre from a phone booth.  D.R. kept talking to Letendre at 
the phone booth and J.R. drove Pope, I.G., and D.K. to the 
house.   
¶6 
Pope, I.G., and D.K. hid in the house, and J.R. waited 
in a car down the hill.  At the house, Pope asked what the guys 
they were going to kill looked like.  He had never met them.  
D.K. told Pope that they were waiting for a bald, white man with 
glasses.  The complaint alleges that two people approached the 
house.  As it turned out, these two men were Viehland and 
Gustafson, not Letendre.  Pope rounded a corner and fired his 
gun at them.  Pope's gun jammed and then D.K. started firing 
shots.  D.K. stated that he shot Viehland, and then shot the 
other man, not knowing who he was.  I.G. stated that when he 
rounded the corner, he saw a young man lying on the floor.  He 
did not recognize him.  He then saw another man fall.  I.G. saw 
this man was Viehland, and then shot him in the head.  I.G., 
D.K., and Pope ran to the car and J.R. drove them away. 
¶7 
J.R. stated that Pope sat in the front seat with her 
and that he was excited and breathing heavily.  He told her that 
they had shot two men, and he thought they were dead.  Pope told 
J.R. that he had fired one shot into a man's chest and then his 
gun jammed; that he did not care who died because he did not 
know them.  Pope threw a gun in the river and the group 
dispersed, congratulating one another. 
 
No. 2017AP1720-CR   
 
5 
 
II.  PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶8 
The charges against Pope proceeded to trial.  On 
May 31, 1996, the jury returned its verdict and found Pope 
guilty of two counts of first-degree intentional homicide as a 
party to the crime.  But the jury did not find that the State 
proved Pope committed either offense while using a dangerous 
weapon. 
¶9 
On July 2, 1996, the circuit court sentenced Pope to 
life imprisonment without parole.  That same day, Pope and his 
trial counsel signed an SM-33 form.3  The form indicated that 
Pope intended to pursue postconviction relief and that counsel 
would timely file a formal notice of intent to pursue 
postconviction relief within 20 days——or by July 22, 1996.  The 
form also indicated that Pope knew the notice had to be filed 
within 20 days.  If trial counsel had actually filed the notice 
of intent to pursue postconviction relief, it would have set in 
motion the procedures for obtaining a trial transcript and 
appointment of appellate counsel.  See Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.30(2)(c)-(h) (1995-96).4  But trial counsel did not file that 
                                                 
3 The SM-33 form has since been replaced by CR-233 Notice of 
Right to Seek Postconviction Relief adopted by the Wisconsin 
Judicial Conference.  
4 Rule 809.30(2) (1995-96) provided, as follows: 
(2)  Appeal 
or 
postconviction 
motion 
by 
defendant.  (a)  A defendant seeking postconviction 
relief in a felony case shall comply with this 
section.  Counsel representing the defendant at 
sentencing shall continue representation by filing a 
notice under par. (b) if the defendant desires to 
No. 2017AP1720-CR   
 
6 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
pursue postconviction relief unless sooner discharged 
by the defendant or by the trial court. 
(b)  Within 20 days of the date of sentencing, 
the defendant shall file in the trial court and serve 
on the district attorney a notice of intent to pursue 
postconviction relief. . . .   
(c)  Within 5 days after a notice under par. (b) 
is filed, the clerk shall: 
1.  If the defendant requests representation by 
the 
state 
public 
defender 
for 
purposes 
of 
postconviction relief, send to the state public 
defender's appellate intake office a copy of the 
notice, a copy of the judgment or order specified in 
the notice, a list of the court reporters for each 
proceeding in the action in which the judgment or 
order was entered and a list of those proceedings in 
which a transcript has been filed in the court record 
at the request of trial counsel.  
. . .  
(e)  Within 30 days after the filing of a notice 
under par. (b) requesting representation by the state 
public defender for purposes of postconviction relief, 
the state public defender shall appoint counsel for 
the defendant and order a transcript of the reporter's 
notes, except that if the defendant's indigency must 
first be determined or redetermined, the state public 
defender shall do so, appoint counsel and order 
transcripts within 50 days after the notice under par. 
(b) is filed. 
(f)  A 
defendant 
who 
does 
not 
request 
representation by the state public defender for 
purposes of postconviction relief shall order a 
transcript of the reporter's notes within 30 days 
after filing a notice under par. (b). 
. . .  
(g)  The court reporter shall file the transcript 
with the trial court and serve a copy of the 
transcript on the defendant within 60 days of the 
ordering of the transcript. Within 20 days of the 
No. 2017AP1720-CR   
 
7 
 
notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief, as required by 
Wis. Stat. § 809.30(2)(b), in order to commence a direct appeal.  
As a result, Pope's direct appeal rights expired and no appeal 
was initiated. 
¶10 On September 16, 1997, about 14 months after the 
filing deadline, Pope finally made his first effort to correct 
trial counsel's error.  He filed a pro se motion to extend the 
deadline 
for 
filing 
the 
notice 
of 
intent 
to 
pursue 
postconviction relief in the court of appeals.  Pope argued that 
his trial counsel had failed to file the notice of intent, 
despite Pope's instructions that he file it.  Pope attached to 
his motion a letter he had received from the State Public 
Defender's office that explained,  
When [a Notice of Intent] is timely filed, appellate 
counsel is appointed, transcripts are ordered and the 
appeal proceeds in the normal fashion.  If the Notice 
of Intent is not filed within 20 days of sentencing, 
it is necessary to ask the court of appeals to extend 
the time by filing a motion.   
The letter also explained that the State Public Defender had "no 
idea why the Notice was not timely filed and therefore you are 
going to have to explain the reason to the court in a motion to 
extend the time for filing the Notice."  The letter also 
instructed Pope to send any order granting the extension to 
their Appellate Intake office. 
                                                                                                                                                             
ordering of a transcript of postconviction proceedings 
brought under sub. (2) (h), the court reporter shall 
file the original with the trial court and serve a 
copy of that transcript on the defendant. 
No. 2017AP1720-CR   
 
8 
 
¶11 But, on September 25, 1997, the court of appeals 
denied Pope's motion.  It reasoned:  
Even assuming the truth of Pope's representations 
regarding the performance of trial counsel, Pope has 
failed 
to 
provide 
the 
court 
with 
a 
sufficient 
explanation as to why, when counsel failed to initiate 
postconviction proceedings timely, he did not attempt 
to commence postconviction proceedings on his own.  
The court can see nothing in the motion that would 
warrant 
a 
fifteen-month[5] 
delay 
in 
commencing 
postconviction proceedings. 
¶12 Thus, the court of appeals concluded that Pope had not 
shown good cause for his delay in bringing the motion.  It 
denied the motion.  Importantly, this 1997 court of appeals' 
decision is not before this court for review.  Rather, we review 
its 2018 decision concluding that Pope is not entitled to a new 
trial because he failed to assert a facially valid claim of 
error.  Since 1997 Pope has made multiple attempts to reinstate 
his appeal rights.  The procedural history of his case is 
lengthy.  But it is Pope's inaction for 14 months from July 1996 
to September 1997 that partially controls the outcome in this 
case——both then in September 1997, and now in 2019. 
¶13 On October 15, 1997, Pope filed a pro se Wis. Stat. 
§ 974.06 motion to reinstate his rights to appeal in the circuit 
court, arguing that trial counsel was ineffective for not filing 
                                                 
5 The court of appeals has repeatedly referred to a 15-month 
delay in this case.  That is not accurate.  The deadline to file 
the notice of intent was July 22, 1996.  Pope filed his pro se 
motion on September 16, 1997——just under 14 months later.  But 
the difference between 14 and 15 months delay is immaterial to 
our analysis in this case.   
No. 2017AP1720-CR   
 
9 
 
a notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief.  The circuit 
court denied the motion, citing the court of appeals' September 
1997 decision.  On November 5, 1997, Pope filed a notice of 
appeal.  As part of that appeal, Pope filed a statement on 
transcript, which the court of appeals construed as a motion to 
waive transcript fees.  The court of appeals remanded to the 
circuit court to determine whether Pope was entitled to a waiver 
of transcript fees under Wis. Stat. § 814.29(1).6  The circuit 
court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law.  It 
concluded that Pope had not made a claim for relief and was not 
entitled to free transcripts.  On December 23, 1997, the court 
of appeals noted that Pope had not yet filed a statement on 
transcript as required under Wis. Stat. §§ (Rules) 809.11(4) and 
809.16,7 and ordered him to do so.  On January 2, 1998, Pope 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 814.29(1)(a) (1995-96) provided as 
follows:  
Any person may commence, prosecute or defend any 
action or proceeding in any court, or any writ of 
error or appeal therein, without being required to 
give security for costs or to pay any service or fee, 
upon order of the court based on a finding that 
because of poverty the person is unable to pay the 
costs of the action or proceeding, or any writ or 
error or appeal therein, or to give security for those 
costs. 
7 Rule 809.11(4) (1995-96) provided as follows: 
(4)  Statement on transcript.  The appellant 
shall file with the clerk of the court of appeals 
within 10 days of the filing of the notice of appeal 
in the trial court, a statement that a transcript is 
not necessary for prosecution of the appeal or a 
statement by the court reporter that the transcript or 
designated 
portions 
thereof 
have 
been 
ordered, 
No. 2017AP1720-CR   
 
10 
 
filed a statement on transcript, asserting that the only 
transcript 
necessary 
for 
his 
appeal 
was 
the 
sentencing 
transcript.   
¶14 On March 5, 1999, the court of appeals affirmed the 
circuit court's order denying Pope's Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion 
to reinstate his right to appeal.  The court of appeals once 
again concluded that "[b]ecause Pope failed to provide any 
reason for his fifteen-month delay before seeking § 974.06 
relief, he waived his right to appeal . . . ."  Then Pope filed 
a petition for review with this court.  On March 10, 1999, we 
                                                                                                                                                             
arrangements have been made for the payment by the 
appellant of the cost of the original transcript and 
all copies for other parties, the date on which the 
transcript was ordered and arrangements made for 
payment, and the date on which the transcript is due.  
The appellant shall file a copy of the statement on 
transcript with the clerk of the trial court within 10 
days of the filing of the notice of appeal. 
Rule 809.16(1) (1995-96) provided as follows:  
Within 10 days of the filing of the notice of 
appeal, the appellant shall make arrangements with the 
reporter for the preparation of a transcript of the 
reporter's notes of the proceedings and service of 
copies and file in the court a designation of the 
portions of the reporter's notes that have been 
ordered. Any other party may file within 10 days of 
service of the appellant's notice, a designation of 
additional portions to be included in the transcript.  
The appellant shall file within 10 days of the service 
of 
the 
other 
party's 
designation 
the 
statement 
required by s. 809.11(4) covering the other party's 
designations.  If the appellant fails or refuses to 
order the designated portions, the other party may 
order the portions or file a motion with the trial 
court for an order requiring the appellant to do so. 
No. 2017AP1720-CR   
 
11 
 
denied it as untimely.  We reasoned that the petition 
essentially asked this court to review the court of appeals' 
September 1997 decision, meaning it should have been filed back 
in 1997. 
¶15 Four years later, on June 20, 2003, Pope filed a pro 
se motion to extend the time for filing his postconviction 
motion in the court of appeals.  On July 11, 2003, the court of 
appeals denied the motion, concluding that the issue was 
"settled and will not be relitigated." 
¶16 Eleven years later, on July 21, 2014, Pope filed a 
Knight8 petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  He argued that his 
direct appeal rights should be reinstated because trial counsel 
was ineffective for not filing a notice of intent.  On 
November 13, 2015, the court of appeals remanded to the circuit 
court for fact-finding.  The circuit court appointed counsel for 
Pope.  After a hearing, the circuit court issued findings of 
fact on June 7 and 28, 2016.  The circuit court found that: (1) 
Pope was represented at sentencing by counsel; (2) Pope and his 
counsel filed the SM-33 form on July 2, 1996, indicating Pope's 
intent to pursue postconviction relief; (3) his counsel did not 
file the notice of intent; (4) his counsel's practice was to 
file a defendant's notice of intent personally or via mail; (5) 
Pope wrote two letters to his counsel on July 8 and 18, 1996, 
regarding the status of his appeal and transcripts, of which his 
counsel had no memory; (6) his counsel was publicly reprimanded 
                                                 
8 State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 484 N.W.2d 540 (1992). 
No. 2017AP1720-CR   
 
12 
 
for his representation of clients in other postconviction 
matters; and (7) Pope had been attempting pro se to get his 
appeal rights reinstated since 1996.9  Additionally, the circuit 
court found that: (1) Pope's testimony regarding his efforts to 
reach his counsel was credible; (2) his counsel did not follow 
up with Pope or preserve his files; and (3) there was no 
evidence that his counsel filed a notice of intent. 
¶17 Following the circuit court's findings, on August 16, 
2016, Pope and the State filed a joint stipulation for 
reinstatement of Pope's direct appeal deadlines and dismissal of 
the habeas petition.  On September 29, 2016, based on the 
parties' stipulation, the court of appeals ordered that Pope's 
direct appeal rights be reinstated and dismissed the habeas 
petition.  On October 4, 2016, 20 years after his conviction, 
Pope filed a notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief in 
the circuit court.  He also ordered trial transcripts for the 
first time.  But the court reporters no longer had any notes 
from Pope's 1996 jury trial.  In the end, Pope obtained 
                                                 
9 While some might argue that this factual finding should 
change the outcome of our review here, the circuit court's 
factual finding cannot change the law of Pope's case.  In 1997, 
the court of appeals concluded that Pope delayed in bringing his 
motion to extend the deadline to file a notice of intent and he 
failed to show good cause for his delay.    
No. 2017AP1720-CR   
 
13 
 
transcripts of his preliminary hearing and sentencing only.  The 
transcript of Pope's 1996 jury trial is now unavailable.10 
¶18 On March 7, 2017, Pope filed a Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.30 postconviction motion for a new trial.  Pope argued that 
the lack of a trial transcript denied him his constitutional and 
statutory right to appeal his convictions and denied him due 
process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  The State opposed the motion and argued that, 
under Perry, Pope was not entitled to a new trial because he 
failed to make a claim of error.  On July 19, 2017, the 
postconviction court held a hearing and ordered a new trial.  It 
issued a written order two days later.  The postconviction court 
concluded that, without even a portion of the trial transcript, 
it would be impossible to make a claim of error.  Thus, it 
concluded there was "no other option but to order a new trial in 
                                                 
10 Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 72.01(47), court reporters 
are required to keep their notes for 10 years after a court 
proceeding.  Pope did not order a trial transcript until over 20 
years after his trial.  Thus, by the time he ordered the trial 
transcript, it was unavailable.  Supreme Court Rule 72.01(47) 
provides as follows: 
SCR 72.01 Retention of original record. 
Except as provided in SCR 72.03 to 72.05, the 
original paper records of any court shall be retained 
in the custody of the court for the following minimum 
time periods: . . .  
(47)  Court 
reporter 
notes.  Verbatim 
steno-
graphic, shorthand, audio or video notes produced by a 
court reporter or any other verbatim record of in-
court proceedings: 10 years after the hearing. 
No. 2017AP1720-CR   
 
14 
 
this case."  The court of appeals applied Perry and reversed.  
Pope, No. 2017AP1720-CR, unpublished slip op.  It concluded: 
"Pope had the initial burden in his postconviction motion of 
claiming some facially valid claim of error.  He failed to do 
so."  Id., ¶38.  
¶19 Pope filed a petition for review in this court.  We 
granted the petition. 
 
III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶20  The circuit court's decision whether to grant a new 
trial due to lack of transcript is discretionary.  Perry, 136 
Wis. 2d at 109.  It will be upheld if "due consideration is 
given to the facts then apparent, including the nature of the 
claimed error and the colorable need for the missing portion——
and to the underlying right under our constitution to an 
appeal."  Id.  A circuit court erroneously exercises its 
discretion if it commits an error of law.  State v. Raye, 2005 
WI 68, ¶16, 281 Wis. 2d 339, 697 N.W.2d 407. 
 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
A.  The Right To An Appeal 
¶21 The Wisconsin Constitution guarantees the right to an 
appeal.  Pursuant to Article I, Section 21(1) of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, "Writs of error shall never be prohibited, and 
shall be issued by courts as the legislature designates by law."  
See also Perry, 136 Wis. 2d at 98.  The legislature designated 
the court of appeals as the court where the right to appeal 
No. 2017AP1720-CR   
 
15 
 
should be exercised.  See Wis. Stat. § 808.02 ("A writ of error 
may be sought in the court of appeals.")  Regarding criminal 
appeals, this court has said, "Basic to a criminal appeal is the 
statement of the errors that an aggrieved defendant alleges were 
committed in the course of the trial and a showing that such 
errors (or error) were prejudicial."  Perry, 136 Wis. 2d at 99.  
Accordingly, 
when 
a 
defendant 
asserts 
that 
an 
arguably 
prejudicial error occurred at trial, the defendant has a 
constitutional right to assert that prejudicial error on appeal.   
¶22 A 
defendant's 
argument 
regarding 
such 
arguably 
prejudicial trial error is based upon and identified in the 
trial transcript.  Thus, a transcript of the trial proceedings 
is crucial to such an appeal.   
In order that the right [to an appeal] be meaningful, 
our law requires that a defendant be furnished a full 
transcript——or a functionally equivalent substitute 
that, in a criminal case, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
portrays in a way that is meaningful to the particular 
appeal exactly what happened in the course of trial. 
Perry, 136 Wis. 2d at 99. 
¶23 Because a transcript is crucial to the right to an 
appeal, Wisconsin courts provide additional protection for 
appellants when they do not have a complete transcript.  Id.  
When a trial transcript is incomplete, the appellant need only 
assert a facially valid claim of arguably prejudicial error in 
the unavailable transcript.  Id. at 108-09.  The appellant need 
not actually prove a claim of error.  Id.  Rather, once the 
appellant has asserted a facially valid claim of arguably 
prejudicial error, the appellant triggers a procedure to 
No. 2017AP1720-CR   
 
16 
 
reconstruct the record.  Id.  If reconstruction is impossible, 
then the appellant gets a new trial.  Id.  We discuss that 
procedure in detail below.  
B.  The Perry/DeLeon Procedure 
¶24 This 
court's 
decision 
in 
Perry 
sets 
forth 
the 
procedure that parties and the court must follow when a record 
is incomplete during post-trial proceedings.  Perry is best 
understood in conjunction with its predecessor, State v. DeLeon. 
¶25 In 
DeLeon 
a 
defendant 
sought 
reversal 
of 
his 
conviction for first-degree sexual assault because the court 
reporter 
somehow 
lost 
approximately 
15 
minutes 
of 
trial 
testimony.  DeLeon, 127 Wis. 2d at 76.  His trial was to the 
court, not a jury.  The circuit court denied DeLeon's motion for 
a new trial.  Id.  It concluded that, rather than a new trial, 
the proper remedy was to recall the witnesses whose testimony 
was lost and reconstruct the record.  Id.  The court of appeals 
affirmed.  Id.  It also set forth the procedure Wisconsin courts 
should follow in similar situations.   
¶26 First, the appellant must allege a facially valid 
claim of arguably prejudicial error.  The appellant need not 
demonstrate actual prejudice, but nonetheless must make an 
adequate showing. 
Before any inquiry concerning missing notes takes 
place, common sense demands that the appellant claim 
some reviewable error occurred during the missing 
portion of the trial.  Obviously, the trial court need 
not conduct an inquiry if the appellant has no 
intention of alleging error in the missing portion of 
the proceedings.  If, however, the trial court 
No. 2017AP1720-CR   
 
17 
 
determines that the appellant has at least a facially 
valid claim of error, the inquiry should take place. 
DeLeon, 127 Wis. 2d at 80 (emphasis added).  If this prejudice 
is not so demonstrated, then the analysis ends. 
¶27 If, however, the circuit court concludes that the 
defendant has demonstrated a facially valid claim of arguably 
prejudicial error, then the court must proceed to make the 
discretionary determination of whether the missing record can be 
reconstructed.  DeLeon, 127 Wis. 2d at 81.  This determination 
is case-specific.  Id.  The circuit court utilizes its 
discretion to determine what information may be relevant to the 
issue at hand, but some considerations might include "the length 
of the missing transcript, the availability of witnesses and 
trial counsel, and the amount of time which had elapsed . . . ."  
Id.  If the circuit court determines that record reconstruction 
is impossible, then it must order a new trial.  Id.  If the 
circuit court determines that record reconstruction is possible, 
then the appellant bears the burden to reconstruct the record.  
Id. 
¶28 When record reconstruction is possible, the circuit 
court proceeds to determine what the record would have been.  
For example, the appellant may draft an affidavit describing the 
missing record.  Id.  The respondent may then file objections, 
propose amendments, or approve the affidavit.  Id.  The parties 
may also draft and file a joint statement.  Id.  If the parties 
dispute the record, then the circuit court may attempt to 
resolve the dispute.  Id.  The circuit court may not speculate 
No. 2017AP1720-CR   
 
18 
 
regarding the contents of the original record.  Id.  Rather, the 
circuit court must try to establish what the record actually 
was, relying on the parties' submissions, its own recollection, 
hearings, counsel, and other sources.  Id. at 81-82.  When 
reconstructing the record, the level of proof required is the 
same as at trial.  Id. at 82.  That means, in a criminal case, 
the circuit court "must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the missing testimony has been properly reconstructed."  
Id.  If the circuit court is so satisfied beyond a reasonable 
doubt, then the record is reconstructed accordingly.  Id.  If 
not, then the circuit court must order a new trial.  Id.  Thus, 
the court of appeals in DeLeon established a procedure for 
record reconstruction. 
¶29 In Perry this court was called upon to determine 
whether the DeLeon procedure should apply when portions of the 
court reporter's trial notes were destroyed in the mail.  Perry, 
136 Wis. 2d at 95-96.  Perry, unlike DeLeon, had a trial to a 
jury.  Id. at 95.  About one-eighth of the trial transcript was 
lost, including the testimony of two witnesses and closing 
arguments.  Id. at 107.  Perry moved for a new trial, arguing 
that the transcript deficiency alone denied him his right to 
appeal.  Id. at 96.  The circuit court denied the motion, 
concluding that the available portions of the transcript were 
sufficient to proceed on appeal.  Id. at 96-97.  The court of 
appeals 
reversed, 
concluding 
that 
the 
transcript 
was 
insufficient and declining to follow the DeLeon procedure.  Id. 
at 97, 102.  The court of appeals concluded that DeLeon should 
No. 2017AP1720-CR   
 
19 
 
be limited to its facts and that a remand to the trial court to 
undergo the DeLeon procedure would serve no purpose.  Id. at 
102.  On appeal to this court, we affirmed the court of appeals' 
determination, but clarified that the DeLeon procedure is not 
limited to its facts and indeed must be followed.  Id.  We 
stated, "[T]he essence of DeLeon is its methodology, which is as 
appropriate for this case as it was for DeLeon."  Id.  Thus, in 
Perry, we concluded that the DeLeon procedure "can be applied to 
a broad spectrum of cases."  Id. at 102-03.  The outcomes of the 
procedure may vary; whether the record can be reconstructed is 
an inquiry that depends on the facts of each case.  But the 
Perry/DeLeon procedure guides each inquiry. 
¶30 Thus, in Perry we concluded that the procedure first 
established in DeLeon would be applicable "to a broad spectrum 
of cases."  Regarding its threshold requirement, we emphasized 
that, while the appellant need not demonstrate actual prejudice, 
the appellant must allege a facially valid claim of arguably 
prejudicial error in order to trigger the reconstruction portion 
of the Perry/DeLeon procedure.  Perry, 136 Wis. 2d at 108-09.  
More than 30 years later, we are called upon to now decide 
whether this procedure applies when the entire trial transcript 
is unavailable.  
C.  The Perry/DeLeon Procedure Applies. 
¶31 Pope argues that the Perry/DeLeon procedure should not 
apply to this case because the unavailability of the entire 
trial transcript prevents appellate counsel from determining 
whether any arguably prejudicial errors exist for appeal.  
No. 2017AP1720-CR   
 
20 
 
Instead, Pope argues that courts should here presume prejudice 
because the entire trial transcript is unavailable.  The State 
argues that the Perry/DeLeon procedure applies and Pope must 
first assert a facially valid claim of arguably prejudicial 
error.  We agree with the State.  We decline to presume 
prejudice when the entire trial transcript is unavailable.  We 
conclude that the Perry/DeLeon procedure applies to a "broad 
spectrum of cases" including when the entire trial transcript is 
unavailable.  This conclusion is consistent with both Perry and 
DeLeon.  We find additional support for this conclusion in 
federal law and appellate procedure generally. 
¶32 Perry made clear that the Perry/DeLeon procedure is 
broadly applicable.  Perry, 136 Wis. 2d at 102-03.  It also 
emphasized that the appellant's initial burden to assert a 
facially valid claim of arguably prejudicial error was necessary 
to trigger that procedure.  Id. at 108.  Additionally, for the 
court of appeals in DeLeon, putting the initial burden on the 
appellant was a matter of "common sense."  DeLeon, 127 Wis. 2d 
at 80.  We agree and conclude that "common sense demands that 
the appellant claim some reviewable error occurred" whether a 
portion or an entire transcript is missing.  Id.  Logic dictates 
that when the defendant claims an arguably prejudicial error 
occurred 
in 
the 
missing 
trial 
transcript, 
that 
missing 
transcript is critical to the defendant's argument, regardless 
of the missing portion's size——large, small, or all. 
¶33 There is nothing exceptional about requiring the 
appellant 
to 
assert 
a 
facially 
valid 
claim 
of 
arguably 
No. 2017AP1720-CR   
 
21 
 
prejudicial error.  This is consistent with appellate procedure 
generally.  All appellants must make a valid claim for appeal at 
some point.  Put simply, there is no appeal without a claim.  
Additionally, under the Perry/DeLeon procedure, the appellant 
does not need to actually prove a claim of error.  The circuit 
court requires only an assertion of a facially valid claim in 
order to trigger record reconstruction or, potentially, a new 
trial.  Thus, rather than setting an exceptional burden, the 
Perry/DeLeon procedure merely requires some arguable showing 
before the efforts of reconstruction are undertaken.  If an 
adequate record cannot be so reconstructed, then, unlike a 
traditional appellant who would need to prove the right to 
relief on the merits of the argument presented, the appellant 
with an incomplete transcript would receive the requested relief 
based upon the missing record.   
¶34 Nor is there anything extraordinary about placing the 
initial burden to present facts on the appellant or, at the 
reconstruction stage, requiring the defendant to take the 
laboring oar even when the entire transcript is unavailable.  In 
fact, federal courts also place the burden to reconstruct the 
record on the appellant.  Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
10(c) establishes the procedure for reconstructing a record when 
a transcript is unavailable: 
If 
the 
transcript 
of 
a 
hearing 
or 
trial 
is 
unavailable, the appellant may prepare a statement of 
the evidence or proceedings from the best available 
means, including the appellant's recollection.  The 
statement must be served on the appellee, who may 
serve objections or proposed amendments within 14 days 
No. 2017AP1720-CR   
 
22 
 
after being served.  The statement and any objections 
or proposed amendments must then be submitted to the 
district court for settlement or approval.  As settled 
and approved, the statement must be included by the 
district clerk in the record on appeal. 
Fed. R. App. P. 10(c).  This procedure is broadly applicable in 
federal appeals, and it is very similar to the Perry/DeLeon 
procedure.   
¶35 Indeed, the court of appeals in DeLeon discussed Rule 
10 prior to concluding that Wisconsin courts should use a 
similar procedure.  The court of appeals summarized Rule 10 and 
a case applying it.  DeLeon, 127 Wis. 2d at 78-80.  It then 
stated: 
Using the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 
and the Cole[11] case as guides, we now develop the 
procedure 
that 
trial 
courts 
should 
follow 
in 
Wisconsin.  Although the appeal is a criminal case, 
the same procedure will apply in civil cases. 
Before any inquiry concerning missing notes takes 
place, common sense demands that the appellant claim 
some reviewable error occurred during the missing 
portion of the trial. 
Id. at 80.  Thus, from its inception, Wisconsin courts have 
considered the Perry/DeLeon procedure, including its threshold 
claim-of-error requirement, to be consistent with the federal 
lead.  We agree, and we will continue to follow the federal 
lead.  
¶36 Pope's 
request 
that 
we 
presume 
prejudice 
could 
actually provide the most relief to offenders who are serving 
the longest sentences.  In Wisconsin, court reporters need only 
                                                 
11 Cole v. United States, 478 A.2d 277 (D.C. 1984). 
No. 2017AP1720-CR   
 
23 
 
maintain their notes for ten years.  See SCR 72.01(47).  If we 
were to presume prejudice when the entire transcript is 
unavailable, there would be nothing to stop criminal defendants 
from sitting on their hands for ten years, and then claiming 
that they told trial counsel to file a notice of intent.  Under 
Pope's proposed rule, criminal defendants would automatically be 
entitled to a new trial after ten years regardless of their 
sentence because their transcripts would be unavailable if not 
previously requested.  We decline to provide such relief to 
those who might unduly benefit from sitting on their right to 
request appellate relief contemporaneously (with the best 
available evidence, testimony, and transcripts), and instead 
wait until no transcript is available. 
¶37 Pope argues that requiring appellate counsel to assert 
a facially valid claim of arguably prejudicial error conflicts 
with counsel's ethical and statutory obligations.  See SCR 
20:3.1(a)(1) (prohibiting lawyers from "knowingly advanc[ing] a 
claim or defense that is unwarranted"); and Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.32 (requiring appellate counsel who concludes that a direct 
appeal would be frivolous and without merit, upon the client's 
request, to file a no-merit report identifying each potential 
claim and why it lacks merit).  We disagree; there is no 
conflict.  The Perry/DeLeon procedure requires a facially valid 
claim in order to proceed.  It does not require counsel to do 
anything unethical or illegal.  Rather, the Perry/Leon procedure 
is consistent with counsel's obligations.  Under each framework, 
if there is no valid claim, then the litigation must end. 
No. 2017AP1720-CR   
 
24 
 
¶38 We therefore decline to presume prejudice when the 
entire trial transcript is unavailable.  We conclude that the 
Perry/DeLeon procedure applies even when the entire trial 
transcript is unavailable.  This conclusion is consistent with 
Perry 
and 
DeLeon, 
federal 
law, 
and 
appellate 
procedure 
generally.   
D.  The Transcript Is Unavailable Due To Pope's Delay. 
¶39 Pope argues that we should carve out an exception to 
the Perry/DeLeon threshold requirement that the appellant assert 
a facially valid claim of arguably prejudicial error when the 
entire transcript is unavailable.  We decline to create an 
exception to the Perry/DeLeon procedure for Pope because, as we 
explain below, the transcript is unavailable due to his delay. 
¶40 To begin, creating an exception to the Perry/DeLeon 
procedure when the lack of transcript is attributable to the 
appellant is inconsistent with Perry and DeLeon.  Both cases 
were premised on the fact that the defendants were not at fault 
for the lost transcript.  In DeLeon the court reporter lost some 
of her trial notes.  127 Wis. 2d at 76.  The court of appeals 
concluded, "Where, as here, a portion of the record is lost 
through no fault of the aggrieved party, that party should not 
be made to bear the burden of this loss."  Id. at 77 (emphasis 
added).  And in Perry, portions of the court reporter's trial 
notes were lost in the mail.  136 Wis. 2d at 96.  Again, the 
notes were lost "through no fault of the aggrieved party," the 
appellant.  DeLeon, 127 Wis. 2d at 77.  Furthermore, Perry 
"ha[d] done everything that reasonably could be expected in 
No. 2017AP1720-CR   
 
25 
 
order to perfect his appeal."  Perry, 136 Wis. 2d at 108.  Thus, 
neither case supports the proposition that an appellant should 
automatically get a new trial when the appellant caused the 
transcript to be unavailable on appeal.  Those cases simply did 
not contemplate the situation presented here.  Nor can it be 
said that Pope "has done everything that reasonably could be 
expected in order to perfect his appeal."  Id. 
¶41 In 
this 
case, 
the 
appellant, 
Pope, 
caused 
the 
transcript to be unavailable because he sat on his rights.  
First, Pope sat on his rights for 14 months after the notice of 
intent was due.  Pope knew that his notice of intent was due on 
July 22, 1996.  On July 2, 1996, the day of Pope's sentencing, 
he and his counsel signed the SM-33 form, which indicated that 
Pope knew the notice of intent had to be filed within 20 days.  
Additionally, the postconviction court found that Pope wrote two 
letters to counsel on July 8 and 18, 1996, regarding the status 
of his appeal and transcripts.  Pope knew that the deadline to 
file his notice of intent was approaching.   
¶42 That deadline, July 22, 1996, came and went and 
counsel did not file the notice of intent.  Pope could have 
immediately moved for an extension of the deadline.  But he did 
not.  Rather, Pope sat on his rights for 14 months, until 
September 1997.  Even then, Pope could have argued that he had 
good cause for his 14-month delay.  But he did not.  Thus, the 
court of appeals denied his motion to extend the deadline 
because he did not show good cause.  It concluded: 
No. 2017AP1720-CR   
 
26 
 
Even assuming the truth of Pope's representations 
regarding the performance of trial counsel, Pope has 
failed 
to 
provide 
the 
court 
with 
a 
sufficient 
explanation as to why, when counsel failed to initiate 
postconviction proceedings timely, he did not attempt 
to commence postconviction proceedings on his own. 
The court of appeals denied Pope's motion because he delayed 14 
months in bringing it and provided no justification.  That 
decision became the law of Pope's case. 
¶43 Subsequent decisions of the circuit court, court of 
appeals, and even this court, cited the court of appeals' 
September 1997 decision to repeatedly deny Pope's motions to 
extend the deadline or reinstate his appeal rights.  Thus, over 
20 years went by and Pope never filed a notice of intent.  If 
Pope had filed a notice of intent, it would have triggered the 
statutory procedure for ordering a transcript and appointing 
appellate counsel.  See supra note 4 (quoting portions of Wis. 
Stat. § (Rule) 809.30(2) (1995-96)).  But Pope could not file a 
notice of intent because no court granted his motions to extend 
the deadline or reinstate his appeal rights due to his 14-month 
delay. 
¶44 Second, Pope failed to order the transcript on his own 
at any point during the ten years after his trial.  Court 
reporters in Wisconsin are required to keep their trial notes 
for only ten years.  See SCR 72.01(47) (court reporter notes 
"shall be retained" for "10 years after the hearing").  Pope's 
trial transcript is unavailable because Pope did not order it at 
any point during the ten-year period when the court reporter was 
required to keep it pursuant to SCR 72.01(47).  After those ten 
No. 2017AP1720-CR   
 
27 
 
years passed, the court reporter was not required to and did 
not, in fact, keep a copy of the trial transcript.  The 
transcript is unavailable in this case because Pope sat on his 
rights.12  Accordingly, we decline to create an exception to the 
Perry/DeLeon 
procedure——which 
specifically 
contemplated 
a 
faultless 
appellant——for 
Pope 
because 
the 
transcript 
is 
unavailable due to his delay.13 
¶45 In support of his argument that he should be granted a 
new trial, Pope cites cases from other jurisdictions where the 
appellant was granted a new trial.  But none of those cases 
supports the proposition that an appellant who causes the 
transcript to be unavailable should automatically get a new 
trial.  See Cole v. United States, 478 A.2d 277, 279 (D.C. 1984) 
(appellant timely noticed appeal and ordered a trial transcript, 
but the court reporter's notes were lost); State v. Yates, 821 
S.E.2d 650, 652-53 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018) (appellant timely 
noticed 
appeal, 
but 
court 
reporter's 
recording 
equipment 
malfunctioned); Johnson v. State, 524 S.W.3d 338, 339-40 (Tex. 
                                                 
12 The parties' 2016 joint stipulation to reinstate Pope's 
direct appeal rights and the court of appeals' subsequent order 
to that effect do not change the fact that the trial transcript 
is unavailable due to Pope's delay.  The stipulation and order 
permitted Pope to file an appeal.  They did not guarantee that 
Pope's appeal would be successful or that he would automatically 
win a new trial.   
13 One could argue that Pope is somehow due relief, but that 
argument would rely on our discretionary authority under Wis. 
Stat. § 751.06 to reverse a judgment if "the real controversy 
has not been fully tried" or "it is probable that justice has 
for any reason miscarried."  § 751.06.  Neither of those 
criterion is met here.   
No. 2017AP1720-CR   
 
28 
 
Ct. App. 2017) (appellant did not abandon his appeal, but "a 
significant portion of the record had been lost or destroyed 
through no fault of the appellant . . . "); Johnson v. State, 
805 S.E.2d 890, 891-93 (Ga. 2017) (appellant timely moved for a 
new trial, but the entire trial transcript was destroyed in a 
fire at the court reporter's house); In re Shackleford, 789 
S.E.2d 15, 17 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016) (respondent timely noticed 
appeal, but the courtroom recording equipment failed, and no 
court reporter was present); see also People v. Jones, 178 Cal. 
Rptr. 44, 45 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (appellant did not timely 
appeal, but court of appeal granted appellant's motion for 
relief and court reporter voluntarily destroyed her notes from 
appellant's 1973 trial); State v. Hobbs, 660 S.E.2d 168, 169-70 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (appellant did not timely notice appeal, 
but court of appeals allowed appellant's writ petition and court 
reporter's notes and audiotapes were lost). 
¶46 Pope also argues that the burden of his procedural 
shortcomings should lie with the State because he was acting as 
a pro se litigant, abandoned by counsel.  See Coleman v. 
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 754 (1991) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 
477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)) ("[I]f the procedural default is the 
result of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Sixth Amendment 
itself requires that responsibility for the default be imputed 
to the State.").  Both parties and this court all agree that 
counsel's failure to file the notice of intent was inexcusable.  
But that does not excuse Pope's failure to timely move to extend 
the deadline to file the notice of intent.  Nor does it excuse 
No. 2017AP1720-CR   
 
29 
 
his failure to order the trial transcript for over ten years.  
Pro se litigants, though acting without counsel, are still 
required to timely assert their rights.  If they do not, then 
they may forfeit those rights.  There are other contexts in 
Wisconsin law where an appellant's untimeliness forfeits an 
appeal. 
¶47 For example, in State v. Escalona-Naranjo we concluded 
that an appellant who fails to assert a claim that could have 
been asserted on direct appeal or a Wis. Stat. § 974.02 motion 
is barred from subsequently asserting that claim for the first 
time in a postconviction motion under Wis. Stat. § 974.06.  
185 Wis. 2d 168, 173, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994).  In support of 
imposing the Escalona-Naranjo bar for failure to timely assert a 
claim, we reasoned: 
Section 
974.06(4) 
was 
not 
designed 
so 
that 
a 
defendant, 
upon 
conviction, 
could 
raise 
some 
constitutional issues on appeal and strategically wait 
to raise other constitutional issues a few years 
later.  Rather, the defendant should raise the 
constitutional issues of which he or she is aware as 
part of the original postconviction proceedings.  At 
that point, everyone's memory is still fresh, the 
witnesses and records are usually still available, and 
any remedy the defendant is entitled to can be 
expeditiously awarded. 
Id. at 185-86.  Thus, we determined that appellants' rights are 
best protected when they assert their claims in a timely manner.  
We concluded that Escalona-Naranjo forfeited his ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claim because he failed to timely 
assert it and did not allege good cause for the delay.  Id. at 
186. 
No. 2017AP1720-CR   
 
30 
 
¶48 We did something similar in State ex rel. Flores v. 
State, 183 Wis. 2d 587, 516 N.W.2d 362 (1994).  In that case, we 
held that once a defendant has been adequately informed of his 
right to request a no-merit report under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.32, the defendant is presumed to have waived that right 
unless he exercises it.  Id. at 617-18.  "A defendant may rebut 
this presumption by showing exceptional circumstances or good 
cause . . . ."  Id. at 618. 
¶49 We have also long held that unreasonable delay may bar 
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under the equitable 
doctrine of laches.  See State ex rel. Coleman v. McCaughtry, 
2006 WI 49, 290 Wis. 2d 352, 714 N.W.2d 900; see also State ex 
rel. Lopez-Quintero v. Dittmann, 2019 WI 58, 387 Wis. 2d 50, 928 
N.W.2d 480.  In sum, there is nothing particularly remarkable 
about the notion that a pro se litigant cannot sit on his 
rights. 
¶50 Pope knew that his trial counsel needed to file a 
notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief by July 22, 
1996.  When trial counsel failed to file the notice of intent, 
Pope failed to defend his rights for 14 months.  When Pope 
finally filed a motion to extend the deadline to file, the court 
of appeals denied his motion because he had delayed for 14 
months and there was no good cause shown.  Thus, Pope did not 
file a notice of intent for 20 years.  Nor did he timely order a 
trial transcript.  Now the trial transcript is unavailable.  
Accordingly, 
we 
decline 
to 
create 
an 
exception 
to 
the 
No. 2017AP1720-CR   
 
31 
 
Perry/DeLeon procedure for Pope because the transcript is 
unavailable due to his delay.14 
V.  CONCLUSION 
¶51 We decline to presume prejudice when the entire trial 
transcript is unavailable.  We conclude that the Perry/DeLeon 
procedure applies whether all or a portion of a transcript is 
unavailable.  We also decline to create an exception to the 
Perry/DeLeon procedure for Pope because the transcript is 
unavailable due to Pope's own delay.  Thus, we affirm the court 
of appeals. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
                                                 
14 The State argued that, if we adopted Pope's exception to 
the 
Perry/DeLeon 
procedure, 
we 
should 
vacate 
the 
joint 
stipulation reinstating Pope's right to direct appeal and remand 
to the court of appeals to consider a laches defense.  Because 
we decline to create an exception in this case, we do not 
consider the State's arguments regarding the stipulation or 
laches.  
Additionally, the court of appeals' decision relied in part 
on Pope's assertion on his 1998 pro se statement on transcript 
that the only transcript necessary for his appeal was the 
sentencing transcript.  Pope argued that a statement on 
transcript should not bind a pro se litigant in subsequent 
appeals.  Because we base our conclusions on the Perry/DeLeon 
procedure and Pope's delay, we do not decide the extent to which 
a pro se litigant is bound by his assertions on a statement on 
transcript.  
No.  2017AP1720-CR.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶52 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  The Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees all 
criminal defendants the right to effective counsel on direct 
appeal, even defendants convicted of heinous crimes.  Douglas v. 
California, 372 U.S. 353, 355-58 (1963); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 
U.S. 387, 396-97 (1985).  The Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the 
assistance 
of 
counsel 
means 
that 
an 
attorney 
is 
"constitutionally ineffective [when he] fail[s] to file a notice 
of appeal."  Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477 (2000).  
When a defendant establishes that his counsel's deficient 
performance deprived him of his direct appeal, "prejudice is 
presumed" and his direct appeal rights are restored with "no 
need for a 'further showing' of his claims' merit."  Garza v. 
Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 744, 747 (2019) (quoted source omitted).1  
"If the defendant told his lawyer to appeal, and the lawyer 
dropped the ball, then the defendant has been deprived, not of 
                                                 
1 See also Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477, 483-84 
(2000) (loss of the "entire [appellate] proceeding itself, which 
a defendant wanted at the time and to which he had a 
right . . . demands a presumption of prejudice"; "[w]e have long 
held that a lawyer who disregards specific instructions from the 
defendant to file a notice of appeal acts in a manner that is 
professionally unreasonable," and "'when counsel fails to file a 
requested appeal, a defendant is entitled to [a new] appeal 
without showing that his appeal would likely have had merit'") 
(quoted source omitted); Rodriquez v. United States, 395 U.S. 
327, 330 (1969) ("Those whose right to appeal has been 
frustrated should be treated exactly like any other appellants; 
they should not be given an additional hurdle to clear just 
because their rights were violated at some earlier stage in the 
proceedings."); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
692 (1984) ("Actual or constructive denial of the assistance of 
counsel 
altogether 
is 
legally 
presumed 
to 
result 
in 
prejudice."). 
No.  2017AP1720-CR.rgb 
 
2 
 
effective assistance of counsel, but of any assistance of 
counsel on appeal," which is a "per se violation of the sixth 
amendment."  Castellanos v. United States, 26 F.3d 717, 718 (7th 
Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). 
¶53 The majority acknowledges the failure of Robert James 
Pope Jr.'s trial counsel to file the Notice of Intent to Pursue 
Postconviction Relief——the prerequisite to the appointment of 
appellate counsel——which resulted in the deprivation of Pope's 
constitutionally-guaranteed direct appeal rights.  Majority op., 
¶9.  Nevertheless, the majority repeats the error made by the 
court of appeals in 1997 when it denied Pope's first attempt to 
resurrect his direct appeal rights:  the majority burdens a pro 
se criminal defendant with commencing postconviction proceedings 
on his own and without the assistance of counsel the Sixth 
Amendment otherwise promises him.  When this pro se criminal 
defendant inevitably committed errors, this court seized upon 
his inability to correctly follow the rules of appellate 
procedure 
to 
deny 
him 
what 
the 
Constitution 
guarantees.  
Statutes 
cannot 
override 
constitutional 
rights. 
 
"[O]ne 
principal reason why defendants are entitled to counsel on 
direct appeal is so that they will not make the kind of 
procedural errors that unrepresented defendants tend to commit.  
The Constitution does not permit a state to ensnare an 
unrepresented defendant in his own errors and thus foreclose 
access to counsel."  Betts v. Litscher, 241 F.3d 594, 596 (7th 
Cir. 2001) (emphasis added). 
No.  2017AP1720-CR.rgb 
 
3 
 
¶54 After more than twenty years of attempts to reinstate 
his direct appeal rights following his attorney's failure to 
initiate an appeal, the State stipulated to affording Pope a 
direct appeal and the court of appeals ordered Pope's rights 
reinstated.2   Pope's constitutionally-guaranteed direct appeal 
was back on track until his appellate counsel, new to the case, 
discovered that no transcripts from Pope's trial existed.  Court 
reporters are required to keep trial notes for only 10 years and 
the notes from Pope's trial were destroyed in 2006.  See SCR 
72.01(47) (requiring that court reporter notes "shall be 
retained" for "10 years after the hearing").  Because she had 
nothing to review, Pope's appellate counsel could not proceed 
with Pope's constitutionally and statutorily secured right to 
meaningful appellate review.3 
                                                 
2 The State requests the opportunity to assert laches, but 
the current posture of this case precludes consideration or 
application of that equitable doctrine, which is available in 
response to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus but not as a 
defense to postconviction motions.  The court of appeals 
dismissed 
Pope's 
habeas 
petition 
following 
the 
parties' 
stipulation to the reinstatement of Pope's direct appeal rights.  
These appellate proceedings dispose of Pope's postconviction 
motion for a new trial.  Laches may not be asserted in defense 
of such a motion.  See State v. Evans, 2004 WI 84, ¶35, 273 
Wis. 2d 192, 682 N.W.2d 784, abrogated on other grounds by State 
ex rel. Coleman v. McCaughtry, 2006 WI 49, 290 Wis. 2d 352, 714 
N.W.2d 900 ("unlike [Wis. Stat.] § 974.06 motions, a habeas 
petition 
under 
[State 
v.]Knight[, 
168 
Wis. 2d 509, 
484 
N.W.2d 540 (1992)] is subject to the doctrine of laches because 
a petition for habeas corpus seeks an equitable remedy."). 
3 Wis. Const. art. I, § 21(1); Wisconsin Stat. § 808.03(1); 
State v. Perry, 136 Wis. 2d 92, 99, 401 N.W.2d 748 (1987) 
(recognizing defendant's right to appeal must be a "meaningful 
one"). 
No.  2017AP1720-CR.rgb 
 
4 
 
¶55 Accordingly, Pope's appellate counsel filed a Wis. 
Stat. § 809.30 motion for a new trial, which she asserted was 
the only relief available because no trial transcripts existed, 
Pope's trial counsel had destroyed his file and had no memory of 
the case, and 20 years had passed since the trial.  The circuit 
court agreed, vacated Pope's conviction, and granted the motion 
for a new trial.  The court of appeals reversed, applying the 
partially-missing transcript rule from State v. Perry, 136 
Wis. 2d 92, 401 N.W.2d 748 (1987), under which a defendant must 
allege that a colorable claim of error exists in the missing 
portion of the trial transcript as a prerequisite to relief.  
The majority affirms the court of appeals, holding:  (1) the 
Perry rule applies to cases where no trial transcripts exist, 
see majority op., ¶¶3, 38, 51; (2) Pope is at fault because he 
"sat on his rights for 14 months" before seeking to restore 
them, id., ¶¶41-42; (3) Pope is to blame for the unavailability 
of the transcripts, id., ¶¶3, 39, 50-51; and (4) after being 
deprived of his constitutional right to effective assistance of 
counsel for his direct appeal, Pope bore the burden of 
successfully navigating the justice system pro se and his 
failure to do so sooner than "14 months" after sentencing means 
he forfeited all of his rights, id., ¶¶42-44, 46, 50. 
¶56 Compounding the calamity of errors that deprived Pope 
of his direct appeal, the majority casts aside constitutional 
and statutory rights, misapplies cases, and wrongfully blames 
Pope for his attorney's errors.  Even though a jury found Pope 
guilty of two counts of first-degree homicide as party to a 
No.  2017AP1720-CR.rgb 
 
5 
 
crime, he nevertheless retains the constitutional and statutory 
rights our laws secure.  Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) 
("Federal courts sit . . . to enforce the constitutional rights 
of all 'persons,' including prisoners[.]"); Turner v. Safley, 
482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987) ("[P]risoners retain the constitutional 
right 
to 
petition 
the 
government 
for 
the 
redress 
of 
grievances . . . and 
they 
enjoy 
the 
protections 
of 
due 
process[.]" (internal citations omitted)). 
¶57 The Constitution guarantees every criminal defendant 
the right to an attorney for an obvious reason.  Attorneys are 
properly trained in the law and know how to navigate the court 
system.  Nevertheless, the majority absurdly holds convicted 
prisoners to the same standards as trained lawyers.  The 
Constitution 
grants 
criminal 
defendants 
the 
right 
to 
a 
meaningful direct appeal, aided by counsel.  The majority pays 
lip service to these rights but then violates them.  According 
to this court, if appointed counsel abandons his client and 
forfeits his appeal, then the criminal appellant must proceed on 
his own, without any counsel at all.  If he does not follow the 
rules closely enough or within whatever unspoken period of time 
the court believes appropriate for deciphering the rules of 
appellate procedure, the appellant is simply out of luck.  The 
Constitution does not countenance such a perversion of the 
criminal justice system. 
¶58 The Constitution compels the opposite conclusions the 
majority reaches:  (1) Perry cannot apply when the entire trial 
transcript is unavailable; (2) Pope did not sit on his rights; 
No.  2017AP1720-CR.rgb 
 
6 
 
(3) Pope is not to blame for the unavailability of the 
transcripts; and (4) the law does not impose on an imprisoned 
convict the burden to pursue his own direct appeal pro se 
because the Constitution guarantees him an effective appellate 
counsel and a meaningful appeal.  I would reverse the decision 
of the court of appeals and reinstate the circuit court's 
decision; therefore, I respectfully dissent.4 
I 
¶59 After the circuit court sentenced Pope to two life 
terms, Pope went to prison with the belief that his trial 
attorney would initiate his direct appeal.  As Pope would later 
learn, his attorney not only ignored him, but abandoned him 
completely.  Pope signed a form indicating he wanted to pursue 
postconviction relief and his attorney assured Pope he would 
take care of filing the Notice of Intent, which would have put 
                                                 
4 This is not a case where a defendant manipulated the 
system to secure a new trial.  Pope signed the SM-33 form on the 
day he was sentenced stating he would seek relief from the 
judgment of conviction.  Not surprisingly, Pope counted on his 
counsel to initiate his direct appeal as counsel promised to do.  
If Pope had instructed his counsel not to file the Notice of 
Intent to Pursue Postconviction Relief and then intentionally 
let the 10-year time period for trial transcript retention 
expire before seeking relief, he would clearly not be entitled 
to relief.  That is not what happened in this case and the 
majority's assertion that "there would be nothing to stop 
criminal defendants from sitting on their hands for ten years" 
in order to get a new trial is absurd.  Majority op., ¶36.  Our 
statutory procedures obviously foreclose such tactics.  Surely 
the majority does not mean to insinuate that criminal defense 
lawyers would intentionally violate appellate procedures or 
purposefully abandon their clients in order to secure a new 
trial——the only scenarios under which the majority's fear of the 
appellate floodgates opening could possibly come to fruition. 
No.  2017AP1720-CR.rgb 
 
7 
 
the direct appeal in motion.  Had Pope's attorney filed that 
form, Pope would have received his direct appeal and this case 
would have come to an end.  However, Pope's attorney, Michael 
Backes, did not file that form, nor did he respond to the two 
letters Pope wrote inquiring about his appeal.  Pope tried 
repeatedly to reach Backes by phone, as did Pope's mother, to 
ask about the appeal. 
¶60 The record suggests that after a year of waiting, Pope 
gave up on Backes.  In August 1997, he wrote to the Wisconsin 
State Public Defender's ("SPD") office asking about his appeal.  
The SPD responded that it had not received any paperwork for his 
appeal.  Apparently, Pope then asked the SPD to appoint 
appellate counsel to represent him because on September 8, 1997, 
the SPD acknowledged Pope's request for counsel and advised that 
no Notice of Intent was filed in his case and if Pope wanted an 
SPD lawyer, Pope would have "to take some steps to reinstate 
your appeal rights."  The SPD explained: 
The applicable appellate rules require the filing 
of a Notice of Intent to Pursue Postconviction Relief 
in the trial court within 20 days of sentencing.  When 
that notice is timely filed, appellate counsel is 
appointed, transcripts are ordered and the appeal 
proceeds in the normal fashion.  If the Notice of 
Intent is not filed within 20 days of sentencing, it 
is necessary to ask the court of appeals to extend the 
time by filing a motion. 
The State Public Defender is willing to appoint 
counsel to represent you on appeal if the court of 
appeals extends the time for filing the Notice of 
Intent in your case.  I have no idea why the Notice 
was not timely filed and therefore you are going to 
have to explain the reason to the court in a motion to 
extend the time for filing the Notice. 
No.  2017AP1720-CR.rgb 
 
8 
 
The SPD enclosed two forms to help Pope file his motion seeking 
reinstatement of his direct appeal. 
¶61 Within a week of receiving the SPD letter, Pope filed 
a pro se motion asking the court of appeals "to reinstate his 
(appellant's) 
rights 
to 
direct 
appeal 
to 
his 
criminal 
conviction."  Pope explained that his trial counsel told Pope he 
"would file a notice of appeal and ensure that the appellant's 
case was reviewed by the state court of appeals," but Pope "lost 
all communication with attorney Backes, and no notice of appeal 
has been filed and no appellate attorney has been appointed."  
Pope further explained he was "unfamiliar" with how to initiate 
an appeal "due to [his] lack of knowledge."  Nine days later, on 
September 25, 1997, the court of appeals perfunctorily denied 
Pope's motion with a single paragraph of analysis and (as the 
majority acknowledges) a miscounting of the extent of Pope's 
delay: 
Even assuming the truth of Pope's representations 
regarding the performance of trial counsel, Pope has 
failed 
to 
provide 
the 
court 
with 
a 
sufficient 
explanation as to why, when counsel failed to initiate 
postconviction proceedings timely, he did not attempt 
to commence postconviction proceedings on his own.  
The court can see nothing in the motion that would 
warrant 
a 
fifteen-month 
delay 
in 
commencing 
postconviction proceedings.  Because no good cause is 
shown, 
IT IS ORDERED that the motion to extend the 
deadline for filing a notice of intent to pursue 
postconviction relief is denied.  
(Emphasis added).  As the majority notes, less than 14 months 
lapsed between sentencing and the filing of Pope's pro se motion 
No.  2017AP1720-CR.rgb 
 
9 
 
to extend the deadline for filing the Notice of Intent.  
Majority op., ¶11 n.5. 
¶62 After the court of appeals' denial, all subsequent 
attempts by Pope to restore his direct appeal rights were 
rejected until he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in 
July 2014.5  The court of appeals sat on the habeas petition 
until March 2015 when it ordered the State to respond to Pope's 
petition.  In November 2015, the court of appeals sent Pope's 
petition to the circuit court with directions to hold a 
factfinding hearing within 90 days.  Notably, the court of 
appeals' delay between the filing of the habeas petition and the 
remand to the circuit court for a hearing was 16 months——two 
months longer than Pope's delay while he waited for his attorney 
to initiate an appeal. 
                                                 
5 In October 1997, Pope filed a Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion 
alleging his attorney rendered ineffective assistance.  The 
circuit court denied the motion, saying it was bound by the 
court of appeals' September 25, 1997 order.  Pope filed a notice 
of appeal in November 1997 and a document construed to be a 
request for waiver of transcript fees; the court of appeals 
remanded to the circuit court to determine whether Pope was 
entitled to free transcripts.  The circuit court ruled Pope 
failed to allege any meritorious claim so he was not entitled to 
free transcripts.  In February 1999, the court of appeals denied 
Pope's motion to extend the time to file a direct appeal, 
referring to its earlier order.  In March 1999, the court of 
appeals summarily affirmed the circuit court denial of the 
§ 974.06 motion concluding that Pope waived his appeal.  Pope 
petitioned this court for review and we denied the petition on 
the ground that it was untimely.  In June 2003, Pope filed 
another motion seeking to extend time, asserting he did not 
waive his right to direct appeal with counsel but he was 
completely denied direct appeal counsel.  The court of appeals 
denied Pope's motion as "settled." 
No.  2017AP1720-CR.rgb 
 
10 
 
¶63 Despite the court of appeals order for the factfinding 
hearing to take place within 90 days, it did not.  In February 
2016, Pope notified the court of appeals that the circuit court 
had not complied with the 90-day order.  In March 2016, the 
circuit court sought an extension of time to hold the hearing, 
which was granted.  The factfinding hearing finally occurred in 
April 
2016——21 
months 
after 
Pope 
filed 
his 
motion.  
Paradoxically, the majority insists Pope's 14-month delay was 
unreasonable, see majority op., ¶¶12, 41, 42, 50.  In May 2016, 
the circuit court made findings based on the testimony at the 
hearing:  (1) Pope signed the SM-33 form indicating his desire 
to file a direct appeal; (2) Backes never filed the Notice of 
Intent and had other disciplinary actions regarding improper 
handling of postconviction matters; (3) Pope had been attempting 
to reinstate his direct appeal rights since 1996;6 and (4) Pope 
was credible about the efforts he took to contact Backes. 
¶64 In August 2016, the State entered into a Stipulation 
with Pope that it would jointly move the court of appeals to 
reinstate Pope's direct appeal rights if Pope dismissed his 
habeas petition.  Pope agreed to do so, and in September 2016, 
                                                 
6 The majority mistakenly dismisses this factual finding 
based on the "law of Pope's case" from the 1997 court of appeals 
decision.  Majority op., ¶16 n.9.  The majority apparently fails 
to recognize that the 1997 court of appeals decision no longer 
stands as the "law of the case" because the 2015 court of 
appeals decision sent Pope's case to the circuit court for 
factfinding following the filing of his habeas petition.  This 
factual finding is the law of the case unless an appellate court 
says it was clearly erroneous, which no court, including this 
one, has done. 
No.  2017AP1720-CR.rgb 
 
11 
 
the court of appeals ordered Pope's direct appeal rights 
reinstated. 
¶65 At this point it appeared Pope would finally get the 
direct appeal the Constitution guarantees him and which he had 
been trying to secure for more than 20 years.  However, when his 
appellate counsel discovered that all trial transcripts had been 
destroyed and Backes had no file or memory of the case, the only 
relief available to Pope was to move for a new trial. 
¶66 The circuit court found that without a transcript, 
there could be no meaningful direct appeal and the only option 
was to grant a new trial.  The State appealed the decision and 
the court of appeals reversed.  It held that Perry applied and 
because Pope did not allege any errors to be found in the 
missing "part" of the transcript (which was actually the entire 
trial), he was not entitled to relief.  Pope petitioned for 
review, which this court granted. 
II 
¶67 The majority errs in extending Perry to cases where 
the entire trial transcript is unavailable.  In Perry, this 
court adopted a procedure to use when part of the trial 
transcript is missing.  136 Wis. 2d at 104-05.  Initially, the 
procedure had been used in a court of appeals case, State v. 
DeLeon, 127 Wis. 2d 74, 80-82, 377 N.W.2d 635 (Ct. App. 1985).  
Under the Perry/DeLeon procedure:  (1) the defendant must allege 
a colorable claim of error in the missing part of the 
transcript; (2) if the defendant does so, then the circuit court 
must determine whether the missing portion can be reconstructed; 
No.  2017AP1720-CR.rgb 
 
12 
 
(3) if reconstruction is impossible, the circuit court must 
order a new trial but if reconstruction is possible, the parties 
may collaborate on reconstructing the record, which the circuit 
court must then approve after resolving any disagreements 
between the parties.  Perry, 136 Wis. 2d at 100-102; DeLeon, 127 
Wis. 2d at 80-82. 
¶68 The Perry/DeLeon procedure cannot be applied in a case 
with no trial transcripts, a situation neither case reflects or 
contemplates.  Both Perry and DeLeon involved cases with only 
small portions of missing transcript.  In DeLeon, merely fifteen 
minutes of the transcript was missing, the error was discovered 
not long after the sentencing, and the case was tried to the 
court——not 
a 
jury.7 
 
127 
Wis. 2d at 
76. 
 
Under 
those 
circumstances, the details of DeLeon's trial were fresh in 
everyone's minds.  More importantly, counsel had other portions 
of the record to review in order to formulate colorable claims 
of error.  Following the procedure DeLeon adopted prevents 
insignificant or harmless errors from triggering a new trial.  
"[N]ot all deficiencies in the record nor all inaccuracies 
require a new trial."  Perry, 136 Wis. 2d at 100. 
¶69 In Perry, substantial portions of two mornings of the 
nine-day trial were missing.  136 Wis. 2d at 95-96.  The circuit 
court 
heard 
Perry's 
motion 
on 
the 
missing 
transcripts 
                                                 
7 DeLeon suggests that when the time between trial and 
discovery of the missing transcript is "several months," an 
accurate reconstruction of the record "may be the exception 
rather than the rule."  State v. DeLeon, 127 Wis. 2d 74, 82, 377 
N.W.2d 635 (Ct. App. 1985). 
No.  2017AP1720-CR.rgb 
 
13 
 
approximately 
one 
year 
after 
the 
trial. 
 
Id. 
at 
97.  
Nevertheless, the circuit court that presided over the trial 
remembered 
it 
and 
found 
the 
transcripts 
that 
existed 
"substantially 
cover[ed] 
all 
of 
the 
proceedings 
as 
[it] 
recall[ed] them."  Id.  Nevertheless, this court reversed, 
granting Perry a new trial.  Id. at 104-109.  Although this 
court adopted and applied the DeLeon procedure, it identified 
significant problems precluding meaningful appellate review when 
the missing transcripts represented one-eighth of the trial and 
established the following principles the majority in this case 
altogether ignores: 
 "[T]he right of appeal to the court of appeals is 
constitutionally guaranteed in the State of Wisconsin" 
and "the appeal [must] be a meaningful one."  Id. at 98-
99. 
 "In order that the right be meaningful, our law requires 
that a defendant be furnished a full transcript——or a 
functionally equivalent substitute[.]"  Id. at 99. 
 "The usual remedy where the transcript deficiency is such 
that there cannot be a meaningful appeal is reversal with 
directions that there be a new trial."  Id. (citations 
omitted). 
¶70 In 
Pope's 
case, 
the 
majority 
misapplies 
Perry 
entirely.  The factors that led this court to grant Perry a new 
trial are even more compelling in Pope's case.  In Perry, one 
year passed since the trial; in this case, Pope's trial occurred 
more than twenty years ago.  Perry had new counsel on appeal, 
No.  2017AP1720-CR.rgb 
 
14 
 
making the transcript appellate counsel's "principal guide."  In 
this case, Pope's appellate counsel has no guide whatsoever.  In 
both Perry and this case, trial counsel was unable to alert 
appellate counsel to possible errors that may have occurred at 
trial.  However, Perry's colorable claim arose from an assertion 
of prosecutorial misconduct, which could be readily resolved 
using existing parts of the record.  Perry was able to assert 
that he needed the prosecutor's closing argument, which was 
within the missing part.  136 Wis. 2d at 107.  In contrast, Pope 
and 
his 
appellate 
counsel 
are 
completely 
precluded 
from 
identifying any colorable claim because they have no transcripts 
to review. 
¶71 Finally, this court in Perry recognized that the 
"context of the entire record" is important in assessing 
"whether error is prejudicial or harmless."  Id. at 105.  In 
Pope's case, there is no record whatsoever from which to glean 
any context; as a result, appellate counsel is totally hamstrung 
in identifying any error, much less assessing whether a 
particular 
error 
may 
be 
prejudicial 
or 
harmless. 
 
Most 
significantly, the majority in this case disregards "the 
absolute and constitutional necessity for providing a criminal 
defendant a transcript that will make possible a meaningful 
appeal."  Id. 
¶72 The 
majority 
mistakenly 
interprets 
this 
court's 
statement in Perry that the DeLeon procedure applies to a "broad 
spectrum of cases" to mean the Perry/DeLeon procedure applies 
even when NO transcripts exist and when counsel's deficient 
No.  2017AP1720-CR.rgb 
 
15 
 
performance delays the direct appeal for more than two decades 
post-trial.  Majority op., ¶¶30-32.  Neither Perry or DeLeon 
said anything close to the majority's construction of them.  
"Broad spectrum" cannot possibly encompass an appeal like 
Pope's, finally permitted more than 20 years post-trial, absent 
any transcript whatsoever for appellate counsel to review.  The 
majority disregards DeLeon's reliance on Cole v. United States, 
478 A.2d 277 (D.C. 1984), which shows the DeLeon procedure was 
never intended to apply in cases with no available transcripts.  
In Cole, two days of trial transcripts were almost entirely 
reconstructed. 
 
The 
Cole 
court 
nevertheless 
deemed 
them 
inadequate:  "We are convinced that under the circumstances of 
this 
case, 
the 
supplemental 
record 
on 
appeal 
lacks 
the 
completeness 
and 
the 
reliability 
necessary 
to 
protect 
appellant's 
right 
to 
pursue 
an 
appeal 
and 
this 
court's 
obligation to engage in meaningful review."8  Id. at 287. 
¶73 Pope's case stands in stark contrast to Perry.  With 
no trial transcripts for Pope's appellate attorney to review, 
determining whether any claim of error exists is impossible.  
Because Pope's trial was more than 20 years ago, the memories of 
                                                 
8 Other jurisdictions recognize the indispensability of the 
transcript.  See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 805 S.E.2d 890, 898 
(Ga. 2017) ("An appeal is Johnson's chance to point to the 
record and overcome those presumptions [that a trial court 
followed the law and that trial counsel rendered adequate 
assistance].  He can only do that with an adequate transcript.  
In this case, where the whole original verbatim transcript of 
his trial is lost and the narrative recreation is manifestly 
inadequate, Johnson has not been given a fair opportunity to 
identify any trial errors and resulting harm or deficient 
performance by counsel and resulting prejudice."). 
No.  2017AP1720-CR.rgb 
 
16 
 
those who participated are either substantially faded or 
nonexistent.  If only portions of a transcript are missing, the 
appellant at least has some transcripts to review to allow him 
to meet the burden.  Not so here.  The docket in this case shows 
a total of 21 witnesses and 67 exhibits introduced during a 
four-day trial.  If two days of missing transcripts in Cole and 
something less than two mornings of missing transcripts in Perry 
were inadequate for a meaningful appeal, then the absence of any 
portion of the four-day trial transcript in Pope's case compels 
the same conclusion and warrants a new trial, as in Perry.  The 
majority's denial of Pope's rights lacks any support under the 
very law on which the majority bases its decision.  In fact, the 
controlling cases contradict the majority's conclusions. 
¶74 This 
court 
in 
Perry 
recognized 
the 
overriding 
importance of the trial transcript, something the majority in 
this case utterly ignores:  
[T]he most basic and fundamental tool of [an appellate 
advocate's] 
profession 
is 
the 
complete 
trial 
transcript, through which his trained fingers may leaf 
and his trained eyes may roam in search of an error, a 
lead to an error, or even a basis upon which to urge a 
change 
in 
an 
established 
and 
hitherto 
accepted 
principle of law. 
Perry, 136 Wis. 2d at 106 (quoting Hardy v. United States, 375 
U.S. 227, 288 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring)).  "[W]here 
counsel on appeal is new to the case, it is the transcript which 
must be his principal guide."  Perry, 136 Wis. 2d at 105 
(emphasis added).  Perry noted the handicap under which new 
counsel operates because "[r]ecollections and notes of trial 
counsel . . . are apt to be faulty and incomplete."  Id. at 106 
No.  2017AP1720-CR.rgb 
 
17 
 
(quoted source omitted).  "There is no way appellate counsel can 
determine if there is arguable merit for the appeal without 
either 
having 
been 
the 
trial 
attorney 
or 
reading 
the 
transcript."  In the Interest of J.D., 106 Wis. 2d 126, 132, 315 
N.W.2d 365 (1982) (emphasis added). 
¶75 The majority neglects to explain how Pope's appellate 
counsel could possibly identify a single meritorious issue for 
the appeal without having been the trial attorney and with no 
transcript to review.  Applying the procedures of Perry and 
DeLeon in cases with no trial transcripts defies logic and 
denies a defendant his constitutional right to a meaningful 
direct appeal.  Requiring Pope to allege a colorable claim with 
no transcripts from the trial constitutes a "failure of the 
appellate process which prevents a putative appellant from 
demonstrating possible error" and "a constitutional deprivation 
of the right to appeal."  See Perry, 136 Wis. 2d at 99. 
¶76 The majority says "[t]here is nothing exceptional 
about requiring the appellant to assert a facially valid claim 
of arguably prejudicial error."  Majority op., ¶33.  This is 
certainly true when an appellant has been afforded the effective 
assistance of counsel for a direct appeal and the trial 
transcripts——the primary guide for asserting error on appeal—— 
are available.  However, when an appellant has been deprived of 
those 
constitutionally-guaranteed 
rights, 
requiring 
him 
to 
assert a facially valid claim of arguably prejudicial error 
without any basis for doing so imposes a condition no appellant 
could meet.  The law affords Pope a new trial but the majority 
No.  2017AP1720-CR.rgb 
 
18 
 
denies him one, thereby perpetuating the trampling of his 
constitutional rights that began with his counsel abandoning him 
and the court of appeals looking the other way. 
III 
¶77 The majority justifies denying Pope a meaningful 
appeal by blaming him for the results of his attorney's 
inaction.  The majority inaccurately concludes that Pope "sat on 
his rights for 14 months."  Majority op., ¶¶41-42.  The record 
itself refutes this statement.  First, the circuit court found 
that Pope has been trying to reinstate his appeal rights since 
1996.  This finding is not clearly erroneous.  Pope wrote and 
called his trial counsel multiple times.  Pope's mother called 
Backes multiple times.  Perhaps Pope believed Backes initiated 
the appeal as he promised to do and Pope simply waited to hear 
the results.  Appeals are not resolved overnight and waiting a 
year before taking action under Pope's circumstances was not 
unreasonable.  The record shows that in August 1997, Pope 
reached out to the SPD to ask about his appeal.  Once the SPD 
advised Pope what to do, he immediately took action.  The 
majority ignores this record in concluding that Pope "sat on his 
rights for 14 months." 
¶78 Regardless, any missteps Pope made attempting to 
assert his direct appeal rights resulted from his trial 
counsel's ineffective assistance.  If Backes had filed the 
Notice of Intent as he promised he would, Pope's appeal would 
have proceeded in a timely manner with the assistance of 
appointed appellate counsel.  When a "procedural default is the 
No.  2017AP1720-CR.rgb 
 
19 
 
result of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Sixth Amendment 
itself requires that responsibility for the default be imputed 
to the State."  Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 754 (1991) 
(quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)).  The 
Seventh Circuit ably explained why counsel on direct appeal is 
so important: 
Yet one principal reason why defendants are entitled 
to counsel on direct appeal is so that they will not 
make the kind of procedural errors that unrepresented 
defendants tend to commit.  The Constitution does not 
permit a state to ensnare an unrepresented defendant 
in his own errors and thus foreclose access to 
counsel. 
Betts, 241 F.3d at 596.  The majority ignores these cases in 
faulting and then penalizing Pope for procedural missteps.  The 
deprivation of constitutionally-guaranteed counsel on direct 
appeal is properly imputed to the State. 
IV 
¶79 The majority makes a fundamental factual error that 
undermines the foundation of the entire opinion:  not only does 
the majority base its "outcome" on "Pope's inaction for 14 
months"9 the majority blames Pope for the destruction of the 
trial transcripts.  The majority says that by waiting until 
September 1997 to file his first motion, Pope caused the 
unavailability of the trial transcripts.  This statement is 
patently false.  Pope's first motion was filed in 1997 and the 
trial transcripts did not dematerialize until 2006, by operation 
of Supreme Court Rule 72.01(47).  Even if Pope waited until 2005 
                                                 
9 Majority op., ¶12. 
No.  2017AP1720-CR.rgb 
 
20 
 
to file his first motion, he would not have caused the 
unavailability of the transcripts. 
¶80 Blame for the transcript destruction lies with the 
court system and the State.  See SCR 72.01(47) (requiring that 
court reporter notes "shall be retained" for "10 years after the 
hearing").  If the court of appeals had realized in September 
1997 that Pope had been deprived of his constitutional rights to 
effective counsel and a direct appeal, it would have granted 
Pope's motion and the SPD would have provided appellate counsel.  
Transcripts would have been ordered in 1997 and available for 
Pope's direct appeal.  The State could have apprehended the same 
in 1997 and advised the court of appeals to grant Pope's motion.  
If the courts or the State grasped the deprivation of Pope's 
constitutional rights during any of Pope's multiple attempts to 
restore his direct appeal rights, the transcripts could have 
been obtained.  Instead, the courts and the State overlooked 
Pope's rights until it was too late.  It is the court system's 
errors that caused the unavailability of the transcripts, not 
the filing of Pope's first motion 14 months after sentencing and 
nine years before the records retention policy applicable to 
court reporters resulted in the destruction of the transcripts. 
¶81 Inexplicably, the majority repeatedly faults Pope for 
not ordering the transcript within the 10 years following his 
trial.  Majority op., ¶¶17 n.10, 44, 46.  Not surprisingly, the 
majority neglects to explain how Pope was supposed to identify 
or track down the correct court reporter, or pay the substantial 
fees necessary to obtain a four-day trial transcript, or know 
No.  2017AP1720-CR.rgb 
 
21 
 
that the court reporter's notes would be destroyed 10 years 
after the trial unless he orders the transcript, all without the 
assistance of counsel.  His trial counsel's failure to fulfill 
his obligations to Pope, who was constitutionally entitled to 
receive the transcript along with the assistance of counsel to 
pursue his direct appeal, bears the initial fault for the delays 
in this case.  The court system's subsequent failures to 
recognize Pope's constitutional rights to counsel, a direct 
appeal, and a transcript, caused the destruction of the trial 
transcripts, not Pope. 
¶82 Because 
Pope 
was 
not 
responsible 
for 
the 
unavailability of the transcripts, he should not bear the 
consequences of their destruction.  When "the record is lost 
through no fault of the aggrieved party, that party should not 
be made to bear the burden of the loss."  Perry, 136 Wis. 2d at 
111 (quoting DeLeon, 127 Wis. 2d at 77); see also United States 
v. Ullrich, 580 F.2d 765, 773 n.13 (5th Cir. 1978).  The 
majority flouts the law by imposing the consequences of the lost 
transcripts on Pope despite the fault plainly lying elsewhere. 
V 
¶83 Despite the purely procedural nature of Pope's appeal, 
the majority nevertheless conveys in excruciating detail the 
facts 
underlying 
Pope's 
conviction, 
filling 
its 
"Factual 
Background" section with allegations pulled from the Complaint, 
explaining it does so because there is no trial transcript.  It 
is improper for this court to recast allegations from the 
Complaint as "facts" rather than citing evidence actually 
No.  2017AP1720-CR.rgb 
 
22 
 
introduced at trial.  Of course, neither this court nor Pope can 
recount 
any 
evidence 
from 
the 
trial 
because 
the 
trial 
transcripts do not exist.  The Complaint cannot accurately 
substitute for what happened at trial.  Because this case was 
tried to a jury, it cannot be determined whether what was 
alleged in the Complaint was entered into evidence or whether 
witnesses 
testified 
differently 
or 
whether 
objections 
to 
particular questions soliciting the facts the majority recites 
were sustained. 
¶84 The majority speculates regarding what may have been 
presented as evidence during the trial, which illustrates the 
impossibility of the task the majority imposes on Pope.  Without 
a transcript, the majority invites Pope and other similarly 
situated defendants to fabricate colorable claims of error.  At 
least the majority could base its factual recitation on the 
Complaint.  If the Complaint had been destroyed along with the 
transcripts, the majority would not have been able to write 
about any facts at all.  Pope has no record whatsoever on which 
to base an asserted colorable claim of error. 
VI 
¶85 Analogizing Pope's case to the waiver and forfeiture10 
situations recognized in State v. Escalona-Naranjo,11 Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
10 "Although cases sometimes use the words 'forfeiture' and 
'waiver' interchangeably, the two words embody very different 
legal concepts.  'Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the 
timely assertion of a right, waiver is the 'intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.'"  State v. 
Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶29, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612 (quoting  
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)). 
11 185 Wis. 2d 168, 173, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994). 
No.  2017AP1720-CR.rgb 
 
23 
 
§ 974.06 cases, or a defendant's failure to respond in a no-
merit 
appeal 
demonstrates 
the 
majority's 
profound 
misunderstanding of criminal appellate procedure.  Pope's case 
is markedly different from each of those situations because Pope 
asked for but never received his constitutionally guaranteed 
direct appeal.  The forfeiture rules established in Escalona-
Naranjo and governing § 974.06 cases typically apply when the 
defendant already received his constitutional right to his 
direct appeal or initially decided not to appeal but later 
changed his mind.  The forfeiture rules operate to foreclose 
postconviction proceedings initiated after a direct appeal or 
after 
a 
convicted 
defendant 
decided 
to 
forgo 
an 
appeal 
altogether.  Those defendants already had an opportunity to 
raise issues on appeal.  Pope never did. 
¶86 Likewise, Wisconsin's no-merit procedure supplies no 
support for this court's deprivation of Pope's constitutional 
rights.  The no-merit procedure is triggered when appellate 
counsel reviews a defendant's case and concludes that no 
meritorious issues exist.  See Wis. Stat. § 809.32(1)(a).  Even 
then, a defendant has the right to file a response to his 
attorney's no-merit report and assert any issues he thinks do 
have merit——and the defendant is entitled to a copy of the 
transcripts in order to do so.  § 809.32(1)(b).  Even if the 
defendant does not file a report in response, his attorney must 
file a no-merit report if the defendant does not consent to 
closing the file without one.  § 809.32(1)(b).  As an additional 
safeguard for the defendant, whenever a no-merit appeal is 
No.  2017AP1720-CR.rgb 
 
24 
 
taken, the court of appeals must independently review the record 
to decide whether it agrees with the appellate counsel's no-
merit determination.  See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 
744-45 (1967); State v. Fortier, 2006 WI App 11, ¶21, 289 
Wis. 2d 179, 709 N.W.2d 893.  In other words, even when an 
appellate attorney thinks there are no arguable claims of error 
to appeal, a defendant's constitutional right to a meaningful 
direct appeal is honored and protected——by the court. 
¶87 In State ex rel. Flores v. State, 183 Wis. 2d 587, 516 
N.W.2d 362 (1994), the SPD-appointed appellate counsel reviewed 
Flores' case and concluded it had no merit.  183 Wis. 2d at 607-
608, 618.  She met with Flores and told him he had no issues for 
appeal and then closed the file.  Id. at 618-19.  This court 
held that Flores was adequately informed about his rights to 
appeal and the no merit procedure because he had received a 
written packet regarding the appellate process.  Id. at 614.  
This court held Flores waived his right to appeal because he did 
not tell his attorney he disagreed with her about the non-
meritorious nature of his case or that he wanted her to file a 
no merit report, and he did not object to her closing the file.  
Id. at 618-19.  Significantly, we said in Flores "[t]his is not 
a case in which counsel simply abandoned her client."  Id. at 
618.  In contrast, Pope's counsel did abandon him after Pope 
made it clear he wanted to appeal.  Pope never received the 
appellate information packet from the SPD because his counsel 
never filed the Notice of Intent, which would have put Pope on 
the SPD's radar.  Pope told his counsel he wanted to appeal and 
No.  2017AP1720-CR.rgb 
 
25 
 
his counsel said he would take care of it.  Trusting his counsel 
to do exactly what he promised to do cannot be reasonably 
construed as either a forfeiture or a waiver of his direct 
appeal. 
VII 
¶88 "The hard fact is that sometimes we must make 
decisions we do not like.  We make them because they are right, 
right in the sense that the law and the Constitution, as we see 
them, compel the result."  Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420-
21 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Undoubtedly many will 
celebrate——indeed, be relieved by——the result the majority 
reaches in this case.  A person convicted of double homicide 
remains confined.  However, the law does not support the 
majority's decision in this case; the law contradicts it.  
Achieving a preferred result should never influence judicial 
interpretations of the law and can never override constitutional 
rights.  The price of the majority's decision in this case is 
paid not just by Pope, but by all of the citizens of this State.  
Pope's 
conviction 
stands, 
unreviewed, 
at 
the 
expense 
of 
constitutional guarantees designed by the framers to protect the 
innocent, not free the guilty.  While some may be tempted to 
deny defendants their fundamental constitutional rights when 
they have been convicted of heinous crimes, doing so erodes the 
constitutional rights of all citizens——including the innocent——
by leaving their enforcement to the discretionary impulses of 
the government at the expense of individual liberty. 
No.  2017AP1720-CR.rgb 
 
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¶89 When counsel's inexcusable error deprives a criminal 
defendant of his right to an appeal, the court of appeals should 
promptly reinstate direct appeal rights.  The Constitution 
commands this.  If the court of appeals had granted Pope's first 
motion, his direct appeal would have proceeded with the 
assistance of an appellate public defender.  In most cases, no 
prejudicial error is found and judgments of conviction are 
affirmed.  Properly handled, this case would have been over for 
Pope and for the victims' families decades ago, affording the 
latter some closure and finality.  The court of appeals' early 
misstep generated 23 years of battles, filings, court hearings, 
and uncertainty.  The people of Wisconsin should be troubled by 
any conviction or imprisonment that stands at the expense of 
fundamental constitutional rights.  Imprisoning a person without 
following the rule of law opens the door for the sort of 
governmental abuses against which the founders sought to 
insulate the citizens of the United States.  The constitutional 
rights of Wisconsin's citizens cannot be conditioned on the 
competency of counsel.  Because the majority acquiesces to the 
deprivation of constitutional rights caused solely by the errors 
of appointed counsel, I respectfully dissent. 
¶90 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and REBECCA FRANK DALLET join this dissent. 
 
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