Title: Commonwealth v. Wolfe

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12257 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MICHAEL J. WOLFE. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     May 2, 2017. - October 13, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, 
& Cypher, JJ.1 
 
 
Motor Vehicle, Operating under the influence.  Practice, 
Criminal, Instructions to jury.  Constitutional Law, Self-
incrimination, Breathalyzer test.  Evidence, Breathalyzer 
test, Field sobriety test. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Marlborough Division 
of the District Court Department on February 13, 2015. 
 
 
The case was tried before Michael L. Fabbri, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Luke Rosseel for the defendant. 
 
Thomas D. Ralph, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Natalia Smychkovich, & Houston 
Armstrong, for Suffolk Defenders Program of Suffolk University 
Law School & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
                     
 
1 Justice Hines participated in the deliberation on this 
case prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
BUDD, J.  We are asked to decide whether, in a jury trial 
of an operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OUI) 
case, a trial judge may properly give a jury instruction that 
specifically mentions the absence of breathalyzer or other 
alcohol-test evidence.  We conclude that the judge should not 
give such an instruction unless the defendant requests it.2 
 
In this case, the jury were instructed about the absence of 
alcohol-test evidence in the judge's final instructions over the 
defendant's objection.  We conclude that giving the objected-to 
charge constituted error and that, in the circumstances of this 
case, the error was prejudicial.  Accordingly, we vacate the 
defendant's conviction and remand for a new trial.3 
 
Background.  The defendant was charged by complaint with 
one count of OUI, G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1), and twice faced 
trial on this complaint before a jury in the Marlborough 
Division of the District Court Department.  The first, in 
January, 2016, ended in a mistrial.  The second, in March, 2016, 
resulted in a conviction.  We summarize the facts as the jury 
                     
 
2 It is possible that a rare case could justify giving such 
an instruction over a defendant's objection, but we have trouble 
imagining such a scenario. 
 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief of the Suffolk Defenders 
Program of Suffolk University Law School, the Committee for 
Public Counsel Services, and the Massachusetts Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
3 
 
could have found them at the second trial,4 reserving additional 
details for later discussion. 
 
On February 13, 2015, at around 2 A.M., a Marlborough 
police officer patrolling the Main Street area noticed a Ford 
Explorer being driven with a broken taillight.  The officer 
followed the vehicle for approximately five to ten minutes.  
During that time, the officer witnessed the vehicle cross the 
double yellow line in a "jerking motion" to avoid hitting a snow 
bank, and later saw the vehicle cross the double yellow line 
again while executing a turn. 
 
The officer then stopped the vehicle at the intersection of 
Union Street and Stevens Street.  Upon approaching the vehicle, 
the officer observed the defendant in the driver's seat with 
"bloodshot glassy eyes, slurred speech and a distinct odor of 
alcohol coming from his breath when he spoke."  The defendant 
initially told the officer he was coming from a sandwich shop on 
Main Street.  When the officer replied that the shop closed much 
earlier in the evening, the defendant admitted that he had been 
at a nightclub where he had consumed "a few" drinks.  The 
defendant gave "delayed" responses to several of the officer's 
questions. 
 
The officer then asked the defendant to step out of the 
                     
4 The evidence at the two trials was essentially the same. 
4 
 
vehicle and walk back to the officer's patrol vehicle.  During 
this walk, the defendant used his own vehicle "for balance."  
Another officer at the scene testified that the defendant was 
"swaying" and "unsteady on his feet."  The defendant was placed 
under arrest and transported to the Marlborough police station 
for booking. 
 
At the station, the defendant "immediately" fell asleep in 
a holding cell.  During the booking procedure, the officer again 
noticed the smell of alcohol on the defendant's breath and had 
to repeat questions multiple times before the defendant 
responded.  At one point, the defendant was permitted to use his 
cellular telephone, but instead he sat "just staring" at his 
telephone and said that it would not turn on.  The officer 
allowed the defendant to use the station's telephone, and 
explained to the defendant how to dial an outside number.  The 
defendant appeared unable to understand this, so the officer 
dialed the number for him. 
 
There was no mention in the trial evidence of the lack of a 
breathalyzer test or other alcohol-test evidence.  Nevertheless, 
the judge instructed the jury, over the defendant's objection, 
not to consider the absence of breathalyzer tests, field 
sobriety tests, or blood tests.5  The judge explained that he 
                     
 
5 The full instruction was as follows: 
 
5 
 
believed this instruction was warranted, in part, because the 
jury in the first trial had asked a question about the absence 
of breathalyzer evidence before failing to reach a verdict. 
 
At the second trial, the jury found the defendant guilty.  
The defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, and we allowed 
his application for direct appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  Primarily, the defendant claims that the trial 
judge erred by instructing the jury, over objection, that they 
should disregard the lack of evidence of a breathalyzer test, 
blood test, or field sobriety test.6  Generally, trial judges 
have "considerable discretion in framing jury instructions."  
Commonwealth v. Kelly, 470 Mass. 682, 688 (2015).  However, 
when, as here, a defendant raises a timely objection to an 
instruction, we review for prejudicial error, conducting a two-
                                                                  
 
"Now, you may have noticed that there was no evidence 
of any breath test, blood test, or field sobriety test 
introduced in this case.  You are not to mention or 
consider in any way whatsoever during your deliberations 
either for or against either side that there was no such 
evidence introduced in this case.  Do not consider it in 
any way at all.  Do not mention it at all during your 
deliberations.  Put it completely out of your minds." 
 
 
6 The defendant also claims error in certain statements the 
prosecutor made during his closing argument.  Because our 
resolution of the jury instruction issue requires a new trial, 
we do not reach the closing argument claim.  However, to the 
extent it is helpful at retrial, we note that there appeared to 
be scant, if any, evidentiary support for the prosecutor's 
statement that "the booking station was filled with the odor of 
alcohol" due to the defendant's presence. 
6 
 
part test that asks (1) whether the instruction was legally 
erroneous, and, if so, (2) whether that error was prejudicial.  
Id. at 687-688, and cases cited. 
 
The challenged instruction was a modified version of an 
instruction upheld in Commonwealth v. Downs, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 
195, 198 (2001).7  In Downs, the Appeals Court distinguished 
Opinion of the Justices, 412 Mass. 1201 (1992), and Commonwealth 
v. Zevitas, 418 Mass. 677 (1994), in both of which this court 
held that reference to possible reasons for the absence of 
breathalyzer evidence violated a defendant's right against self-
incrimination under art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights.  See Downs, supra at 199. 
In Opinion of the Justices, 412 Mass. at 1202, this court 
was asked to opine on the constitutionality of a Senate bill 
proposing the admission of evidence in a criminal proceeding of 
a defendant's refusal to submit to a chemical test or 
breathalyzer.  The court determined that admitting such evidence 
would violate art. 12, as it would be tantamount to providing 
                     
 
7 The specific instruction at issue in Downs was as follows: 
 
 
"You are not to mention or consider in anyway 
whatsoever, either for or against either side, that there 
is no evidence of a breathalyzer.  Do not consider that in 
any way.  Do not mention it.  And put it completely out of 
your mind." 
 
Commonwealth v. Downs, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 195, 198 (2001). 
7 
 
the jury with the defendant's self-incriminating evidence, i.e., 
that he refused to submit to testing because he believed it 
would show he had too much to drink.  Id. at 1209, 1211. 
In Zevitas, 418 Mass. at 681-682, the defendant challenged 
a jury instruction stating, in part, that "a person has a legal 
right either to take or not to take" a breathalyzer test, and 
that "[i]n any particular situation, there may be a number of 
reasons why a person would not take such a test; and there may 
be a number of reasons why such a test was not administered by 
the police."  The court held that such an instruction, although 
at the time mandated by statute,8 violated the defendant's art. 
12 rights insofar as it invited speculation that the defendant 
failed to take a breathalyzer because he feared the results 
would be unfavorable.  Id. at 683-684. 
 
In Downs, 53 Mass. App. Ct. at 199-200, the Appeals Court 
reasoned that, because the instruction at issue made "no mention 
either of a defendant's legal right to refuse to take the 
                     
 
8 See G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (e), as amended through 
St. 1994, c. 25, § 5 ("When there is no [alcohol-test] evidence 
presented at a civil or criminal proceeding . . . the presiding 
judge at a trial before a jury shall include in his instructions 
to the jury . . . that a person has a legal right to take or not 
take such a test; that there may be a number of reasons why a 
person would or would not take such a test; that there may be a 
number of reasons why such test was not administered; that there 
shall be no speculation as to the reason for the absence of the 
test and no inference can be drawn from the fact that there was 
no evidence of a blood alcohol test . . .").  See also St. 2003, 
c. 28, § 3 (striking out above language). 
8 
 
breathalyzer or the possible reasons for any refusal," it 
avoided the art. 12 obstacles identified in Opinion of the 
Justices and Zevitas. 
 
The defendant disagrees with that logic and asks us to 
reject the reasoning of Downs.  He argues, in effect, that all 
so-called Downs instructions suffer from the same art. 12 defect 
found in Opinion of the Justices and Zevitas.  The Commonwealth, 
on the other hand, urges us to embrace the distinction 
articulated in Downs and hold that a Downs instruction 
adequately protects both the Commonwealth and defendants against 
jury speculation without inappropriately implicating a 
defendant's art. 12 rights. 
 
These arguments boil down to competing claims about who is 
most at risk of being harmed if the jury fail to follow 
instructions.  In this way, both arguments diverge from a long 
tradition of appellate courts presuming that juries can and will 
follow a judge's instructions.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Andrade, 468 Mass. 543, 549 (2014); Commonwealth v. Cline, 213 
Mass. 225, 227 (1913).  The Commonwealth's argument assumes that 
a breathalyzer-specific instruction is necessary because, 
without it, the jury will speculate about the absence of 
breathalyzer evidence, contrary to the judge's more general 
directive to base their verdict solely on the evidence.  See 
Instruction 2.120 of the Criminal Model Jury Instructions for 
9 
 
Use in the District Court (2016) ("You are not to decide this 
case based on what you may have read or heard outside of this 
courtroom.  You are not to engage in any guesswork about any 
unanswered questions that remain in your mind, or to speculate 
about what the 'real' facts might or might not have been").  The 
Downs case itself makes a similar assumption.  See Downs, 53 
Mass. App. Ct. at 199 ("without some form of a limiting 
instruction concerning the breathalyzer, a jury very well could 
rely upon their common knowledge and engage in the same 
speculation invited by the erroneous instruction [rejected in 
Zevitas]"). 
 
Similarly, the defendant claims that giving a Downs 
instruction unnecessarily introduces the specter of refusal 
evidence into the jury room and will have the opposite of the 
intended effect, that is, it will cause the jury specifically to 
focus on the absence of breathalyzer evidence.  And, indeed, our 
decision in Zevitas, 418 Mass. at 684, was structured around our 
assessment of the risk that juries may not always hew to a 
judge's instructions to refrain from speculating about matters 
not in evidence. 
 
We have encountered a variation of this problem before, 
when asked to decide whether (and, if so, when) a judge should 
instruct a jury about a defendant's choice not to testify at 
trial.  See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 441 Mass. 358, 370-371 
10 
 
(2004); Commonwealth v. Buiel, 391 Mass. 744, 746-747 (1984).  
In Buiel, supra at 746, we remarked that it is "difficult to 
determine" whether an instruction about the defendant's election 
not to testify "is beneficial to a particular defendant or to 
defendants as a group."  On the one hand, such an instruction 
"warns the jury against drawing inferences adverse to the 
defendant from his not testifying."  Id. at 746-747.  On the 
other, it "may focus the jury's attention on the question why 
the defendant decided not to assist the jury in their fact-
finding function."9  Id. at 747.  In light of that difficulty, we 
announced the prospective and "not constitutionally based" rule 
that it would be "reversible error if a judge instructs the jury 
concerning a defendant's right not to testify when the defendant 
has requested that no such instruction be given."  Id. at 746, 
747. 
 
In Rivera, we reconsidered the rigidity of this rule, but 
not its basic thrust.  We said that it would no longer be "per 
                     
 
9 As the amici point out, this notion draws strong support 
from common sense and experience.  See F.M. Dostoevsky, Winter 
Notes on Summer Impressions 112 (R.L. Renfield trans., 1955) 
("Try this experiment on yourself:  try not to think of a polar 
bear and you will see that the cursed animal keeps returning to 
your mind").  Psychologists refer to this phenomenon as "ironic" 
mental processing and posit that an instruction not to think 
about something can trigger a mental monitoring process to guard 
against the forbidden thought; this monitoring process, in turn, 
may increase the frequency and power of the forbidden thought.  
See Lieberman & Arndt, Understanding the Limits of Limiting 
Instructions, 6 Psych., Pub. Pol'y & L. 677, 697-700 (2000). 
11 
 
se reversible error" for a judge to give an instruction about 
the defendant not testifying, but that the instruction, when 
objected to, would be subject to review for prejudicial error.  
Rivera, 441 Mass. at 370-371 & n.9.  Nevertheless, "[w]e 
remain[ed] of the view that judges should not give the 
instruction when asked not to do so."  Id. at 371 n.9. 
 
We believe that similar logic applies here and compels a 
similar conclusion with respect to an objected-to instruction 
about the lack of alcohol-test evidence in an OUI case.  The 
challenge here, as in Buiel and Rivera, is rooted in the 
defendant's art. 12 protection against self-incrimination.  
Although a Downs instruction does not implicate a defendant's 
self-incrimination rights as directly as an instruction about a 
defendant's choice not to testify, it evokes similar concerns.  
See Zevitas, 418 Mass. at 683-684; Downs, 53 Mass. App. Ct. at 
199-200.  Also, as in Buiel, 391 Mass. at 746, we find it 
difficult to assess whether a Downs-type instruction "is 
beneficial to a particular defendant or to defendants as a 
group."  Doing so would require us to engage in a series of 
generalizations about defendants in OUI cases, make assumptions 
about whether and when juries are able to follow a judge's 
instructions, and speculate ourselves about where the jury's 
speculation may lead -- all without the benefit of any 
supporting empirical evidence.  The same basic problems are 
12 
 
inherent in assessing the Commonwealth's claim that it, too, may 
be harmed by the lack of a Downs instruction.10 
 
We are persuaded instead that the simpler and safer 
approach is to leave such an instruction to the defendant's 
choice.  This approach has the benefit of simplicity because it 
reaffirms our traditional presumption that the jury will heed 
the judge's general instruction not to speculate about evidence 
                     
 
10 Along these lines, we agree with the dissent that a 
trial, at its core, is a search for the truth.  See post at    .  
But we have a difference of opinion as to how to best achieve 
that goal.  The dissent believes that giving a jury instruction 
that specifically mentions the absence of breathalyzer evidence 
is necessary to ensure that the jury, in fact, do not consider a 
missing breathalyzer test.  See id. at    .  As discussed below, 
we do not agree that such an instruction is necessary to stave 
off speculation by the jury.  Even so, we acknowledge that such 
an instruction very well may be effective.  However, there is 
another possibility:  that such a targeted instruction 
introduces the idea of missing breathalyzer evidence into the 
jury room, and, as a result, prompts the jury to wonder about 
the missing breathalyzer evidence and do the opposite of what 
they have been instructed to do.  See note 9, supra, and 
accompanying text.  Because this latter path risks encroaching 
upon a defendant's constitutional right not to incriminate 
himself or herself, we believe the decision whether the jury 
receive such an instruction should rest with the defendant, not 
the Commonwealth or the court.  See Commonwealth v. Buiel, 391 
Mass. 744, 747 (1984). 
 
 
To borrow the dissent's metaphor, we do not disagree that 
the jury might find an "oar," in the form of a more specific 
jury instruction, helpful in navigating the legal waters of an 
OUI case.  Post at note 1.  But we do not think it wise to 
present the jury with such a device in a case like this, where, 
for the reasons discussed in the text, the jury may use it so 
readily to paddle into restricted waters -- i.e., a defendant's 
art. 12 rights -- at least not without the defendant's consent, 
as in Buiel, 391 Mass. at 747, and Commonwealth v. Rivera, 441 
Mass. 358, 371 n.9 (2004). 
13 
 
not before them.  By adhering to that presumption from the 
outset, the need for the breathalyzer-specific instruction 
approved of in Downs dissipates.11 
 
We also agree with the defendant that in Opinion of the 
Justices and Zevitas we have suggested a tendency to err on the 
side of caution when it comes to encroaching upon a defendant's 
constitutional right not to incriminate himself or herself.  In 
those cases, we expressed concern that the introduction of 
refusal evidence (Opinion of the Justices) or instructions 
highlighting, however indirectly, the possibility of refusal 
(Zevitas) would nudge the jury toward using refusal evidence 
against a defendant in violation of his or her art. 12 rights.  
See Zevitas, 418 Mass. at 684; Opinion of the Justices, 412 
Mass. at 1211.  Although this risk may be relatively low, its 
potential consequences are quite serious.  See Commonwealth v. 
                     
 
11 The dissent does not adequately explain why, if it is 
presumed that the jury follow the judge's instructions, there is 
any need for a Downs instruction in the first place.  If we 
presume the jury follow the judge's instructions, that 
presumption should apply equally to the judge's general 
instruction not to speculate about matters not in evidence.  
This would protect both the Commonwealth and the defendant from 
speculation about the absence of breathalyzer evidence without 
creating the possibility of inducing speculation by specifically 
mentioning the absence of breathalyzer evidence.  To the extent 
the dissent is concerned about jurors speculating based on their 
collective knowledge, from outside the court room, about 
breathalyzer testing, we have rejected a similar supposition 
when called upon to examine the need, or lack thereof, for so-
called "CSI" instructions.  See Commonwealth v. Vuthy Seng, 456 
Mass. 490, 503-504 (2010). 
14 
 
Sneed, 376 Mass. 867, 871 (1978) ("Even an unintended suggestion 
that might induce the jury to draw an unfavorable inference 
[based on defendant's right not to incriminate himself] is 
error").  And, of course, leading the jury down an inappropriate 
path is precisely the opposite of what jury instructions are 
supposed to do.  Cf. King v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 420 Mass. 
52, 64 (1995), quoting Pfeiffer v. Salas, 360 Mass. 93, 100-101 
(1971) (jury instructions "should be full, fair and clear as to 
the issues to be decided by the jury, the rules to be followed 
by the jury in deciding the facts, and the law they are to apply 
to the facts found"). 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that typically a defendant should 
be able to elect whether the jury are instructed about the 
absence of alcohol-test evidence.  See Buiel, 391 Mass. at 746-
747.  We emphasize that this conclusion, although rooted in 
constitutional concerns, is not a new constitutional rule 
requiring retroactive application.12  See Rivera, 441 Mass. at 
370; Buiel, supra at 747.  Rather, as an exercise of our 
superintendence power, we conclude that, as a matter of 
                     
 
12 Although Commonwealth v. Zevitas, 418 Mass. 677 (1994), 
announced a constitutionally based rule requiring retroactive 
application, see Commonwealth v. D'Agostino, 421 Mass. 281, 286-
287 (1995), this case is distinguishable because the challenged 
instruction here, unlike in Zevitas, supra at 682, does not 
specifically mention the possibility of refusing a breathalyzer 
test.  We reiterate that our decision today is procedural only 
and has only prospective application. 
15 
 
procedure, the better practice is for a judge to refrain from 
giving a Downs-type instruction absent a request by the 
defendant or some rare set of facts that specifically directs 
the jury's attention to the absence of alcohol-test evidence.13  
Cf. Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 423, 444-445, 447–
448 (2004) (using superintendence power to regulate presentation 
of evidence at trial in requiring, under certain circumstances, 
jury instructions regarding defendant's unrecorded statement to 
police). 
 
In this case, the instruction regarding alcohol-test 
evidence was given over the defendant's objection.  Based on our 
analysis today, this was error.14  Because the defendant objected 
at trial and argued for this rule on direct appeal, he should 
have the benefit of this decision, which otherwise shall apply 
only prospectively.  See Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 443 Mass. 
649, 667 (2005).  Accordingly, we review for prejudicial error.  
                     
 
13 Further, when a jury ask a question about the absence of 
alcohol-test evidence, as occurred in the defendant's first 
trial, we think it is the better practice to simply reiterate 
the general instruction not to speculate about matters not in 
evidence and, to the extent possible, refrain from reinforcing 
the jury's focus on items not in evidence by mentioning the lack 
of alcohol-test evidence. 
 
 
14 We understand why the trial judge in the defendant's 
second trial chose to give the instruction that he did, given 
the Appeals Court's ruling in Downs.  However, in light of our 
decision today, which differs from that of the Appeals Court in 
Downs, the instruction constituted legal error. 
16 
 
Commonwealth v. Allen, 474 Mass. 162, 168 (2016).  This means 
that we "inquire[] whether there is a reasonable possibility 
that the error might have contributed to the jury's verdict."  
Commonwealth v. Alphas, 430 Mass. 8, 23 (1999) (Greaney, J., 
concurring).  "An error is not prejudicial if it 'did not 
influence the jury, or had but very slight effect.'"  
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 445 Mass. 589, 591 (2005), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348, 353 (1994). 
 
Here, the evidence of impaired operation was far from 
overwhelming.  For example, the defendant offered a plausible 
explanation that his first crossing of the double yellow line 
was necessary to avoid hitting a snow bank in the roadway, and 
that the second was a relatively brief and minor infraction in 
the course of making a left-hand turn.  He also plausibly 
suggested that, as he walked back to the arresting officer's 
cruiser, he used his own vehicle to steady himself not because 
he was impaired, but as a caution against ice on a cold February 
night.  Moreover, the erroneous remarks at issue here "f[e]ll 
from the judge himself," and thereby likely had a more damaging 
effect on the jury.  See Zevitas, 418 Mass. at 684, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Goulet, 374 Mass. 404, 414 (1978).  Under these 
circumstances, we cannot fairly say that "the jury would have 
inevitably reached the same result if the judge had omitted the 
challenged instruction."  Buiel, 391 Mass. at 747. 
17 
 
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons discussed, the defendant's 
conviction is vacated and the case is remanded for a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
LOWY, J. (dissenting, with whom Gaziano and Cypher, JJ., 
join).  Today the court recognizes that a defendant should be 
able to remove speculation regarding the absence of breathalyzer 
evidence from a trial on a charge of operating a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of alcohol (OUI) by requesting an 
instruction pursuant to Commonwealth v. Downs, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 
195, 198 (2001).  I agree.  However, because I feel that the 
Commonwealth should also be able to remove such speculation by 
requesting the same instruction, I respectfully dissent. 
 
A trial serves many purposes, but at its core, it is a 
search for truth.  When jurors find facts, not from a fair 
consideration of the evidence, but rather based upon 
bewilderment as to why no evidence of a breathalyzer test was 
introduced, confidence in trial by jury in some measure 
incrementally dissipates.  Perhaps one might respond:  jurors 
are instructed to apply the facts to the law as given and not to 
speculate as to any unanswered questions they may have.  A 
general instruction not to speculate is ineffective in the face 
of common knowledge of the breathalyzer test.  The beauty and 
simplicity of the Downs instruction is that it thoroughly 
removes speculation regarding the absence of breathalyzer 
evidence without prejudicing the defendant or the Commonwealth. 
 
In Downs, 53 Mass. App. Ct. at 199, the Appeals Court held 
that the jury instruction complained of here did not violate the 
2 
 
defendant's privilege against self-incrimination under art. 12 
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, noting that the jury 
"were simply but forcefully instructed that they were not to 
think about or otherwise consider the fact that no evidence was 
offered concerning the breathalyzer."  The Appeals Court also 
pointed out the danger of allowing the specter of the 
breathalyzer to hang over the trial and that an OUI jury trial 
without any reference whatsoever to breathalyzer testing risks 
unfair prejudice to a defendant and the Commonwealth.  Id. at 
199 & n.2.  That is to say, without some form of a limiting 
instruction concerning the breathalyzer, a jury very well could 
rely upon their common knowledge and engage in improper 
speculation. 
 
Indeed, this type of speculation appears to have occurred 
at the defendant's first trial, which resulted in a mistrial.  
There, the jury asked the judge, "Are we allowed to ask:  'Why 
there are no tests?' eg. Breathalyzer or blood test?"  Although 
that record is not before us, presumably the jury were given the 
general instruction that they were to decide the case on the 
evidence presented to them and not to speculate on anything not 
in evidence.  Yet they still engaged in speculation. 
 
The Downs instruction prevents precisely this kind of 
speculation and rests on the long-standing principle that the 
3 
 
jury are presumed to follow the judge's instructions.1  See 
Commonwealth v. Cline, 213 Mass. 225, 227 (1913).  This 
principle lies at the very heart of our justice system: 
 
"Unless we proceed on the basis that the jury will 
follow the court's instructions where those instructions 
are clear and the circumstances are such that the jury can 
reasonably be expected to follow them, the jury system 
makes little sense.  Based on faith that the jury will 
endeavor to follow the court's instructions, our system of 
jury trial has produced one of the most valuable and 
practical mechanisms in human experience for dispensing 
substantial justice." 
 
Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 242 (1957), rev'd on 
other grounds by Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 
(1968). 
                     
 
1 The court concludes that the presumption that the jury 
follow instructions should apply equally to the general 
instruction not to speculate as it does to the specific Downs 
instruction.  The existence of a general instruction cannot, 
however, preclude the possibility that a specific instruction is 
needed.  For example, in a trial where autopsy photographs are 
introduced, a general instruction that jurors should disregard 
emotion and sympathy when reaching a verdict does not preclude a 
judge from specifically instructing the jury on the proper use 
of such photographs.  See Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 404 Mass. 
378, 390 (1989).  Just because we send a jury navigating a rough 
sea of complex legal issues a life raft (i.e., general jury 
instructions) does not mean we should not also give them an oar 
(i.e., a specific instruction or Downs instruction). 
 
 
Further, a general instruction not to speculate may be 
ineffective in the face of jurors' likely knowledge of the 
scientific capability to measure the amount of alcohol in an 
individual's blood.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Gray, 465 Mass. 330, 
339-340 (2013) (not abuse of discretion "for voir dire questions 
designed to counter any 'CSI effect'" in certain circumstances). 
4 
 
 
For more than fifteen years, Downs has been the law of this 
Commonwealth.  See Commonwealth v. Gibson, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 
834, 836 (2012).  Nothing in this record suggests that the 
decision was in any way unsound.  Because I believe the best way 
to prevent prejudice to the defendant and the Commonwealth is to 
allow either party to remove the threat of speculation from jury 
deliberations, I respectfully dissent.