Title: CONNIE PLYMALE f/k/a CONNIE DONNELLY V. GAVIN DONNELLY

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CONNIE PLYMALE f/k/a CONNIE DONNELLY V. GAVIN DONNELLY2007 WY 77157 P.3d 933Case Number: 06-219Decided: 05/11/2007
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
CONNIE PLYMALE f/k/a CONNIE 
DONNELLY,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

                                                                                            

v.

 
 
GAVIN 
DONNELLY,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofAlbanyCounty

The Honorable Wade 
Waldrip, Judge

 
 
Representing Appellant:

 
 
Patrick M. Hunter, Casper, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing Appellee:

 
 
Devon O'Connell Coleman, Pence and MacMillan, LLC, 
Laramie, Wyoming.                   

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Connie Plymale 
(Mother) challenges an order granting Gavin Donnelly's (Father's) claim for 
abatement following the summer of 2005.  
She contends that the district court erred by crediting Father for time 
in August when he did not meet the statutory consecutive day requirement and by 
abating Father's entire child support obligation for the time the children 
resided with him during the summer.  
We reverse.

 
 

 
 

[¶2]      Mother states the issue 
as:

 
 

1.      
Did the [district court] 
improperly calculate the abatement allowable to [Father]?

 
 
Father presents three 
issues for review:

 
 

1.      
Did [Mother] fail to file 
a timely objection to [the] claim for abatement and as such should this appeal 
be dismissed?

 
 

2.      
Is the issue of proper 
abatement in this matter barred by collateral estoppel and as such should this 
appeal be dismissed?

 
 

3.      
Was it clearly erroneous 
for the district court to permit abatement in child support in the amount of 
$2,310.00 due to [Father's] status as the summer custodial 
parent?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]      The 
parties were married in 1997 and two children were born as issue of the 
marriage.  They resided in 
Laramie, Wyoming.  
Unhappy with the marriage, Mother moved to Casper with the children.  Father filed for divorce in July of 
2002, and a custody battle ensued.  
A decree of divorce was entered in July of 2003.  Mother was awarded primary residential 
custody during the school year.  
Father was awarded primary residential custody during the summer.  Both parties enjoy liberal visitation 
while the children are residing with the other parent.  Based on this custodial arrangement, 
Father's child support obligation was initially set at $788.00 per month.  The decree of divorce does not address 
the abatement of child support.  

 
 

[¶4]      Following 
the summer of 2003, Father filed a claim for the abatement of his child 
support.  He requested abatement in 
the amount of $518.45 for June 12, 2003, through August 26, 2003.  Mother objected asserting that Father 
was only entitled to abate through August 8, 2003.  She claimed that Father was not entitled 
to the extra days in August, because the children were in her care from August 
8, 2003, through August 17, 2003, and that time period interrupted the number of 
consecutive days Father had physical custody of the children.  The district court agreed with Mother 
and granted abatement in the amount of $346.68 for the dates of June 12, 2003, 
through August 8, 2003.  This amount 
represented one-half (1/2) of Father's daily support 
obligation.

 
 

[¶5]      In June 
of 2004, Mother filed a petition to modify the child support order.  Eventually, the parties stipulated that 
Father would pay $1,050.00 per month (the presumptive amount) effective June 1, 
2004.  The modification of the 
support order did not address the calculation of child support abatements.  

 
 

[¶6]      Following 
the summer of 2004, Father filed another claim for abatement.  He requested that his support abate by 
$788.00 for the time period of June 11, 2004, through August 22, 2004.  Seemingly in response to a new judge 
presiding over the case, Father filed correspondence addressed to the district 
court requesting full relief from his child support obligation for the summer 
months.1  Father reasoned that, due to Mother's 
relocation to Casper, he incurred substantial expense in 
order to exercise his visitation.  
He also claimed that he should not be required to pay support during the 
summer months because he is the custodial parent during that time.  

 
 

[¶7]      Mother 
did not respond to the arguments raised in Father's correspondence to the 
district court judge.  However, she 
objected to Father's claim for abatement contending that he was only entitled to 
a credit of one-half (1/2) the daily support obligation for the dates of June 
11, 2004, through August 9, 2004.  
She again asserted that Father was not entitled to the additional days in 
August because he did not meet the statutory consecutive day requirement.     

 
 

[¶8]      On 
November 5, 2004, the district court entered its order granting the claim for 
abatement in the amount of $2,310.00 for June 11, 2004, through August 22, 
2004.  Mother filed a motion to 
reconsider on November 9, 2004, claiming that such an amount was improper.  The motion was denied on December 7, 
2004.  Mother appealed from the 
order denying the motion to reconsider.  
Plymale v. Donnelly, 2006 WY 
3, 125 P.3d 1022 (Wyo. 2006).    

 
 

[¶9]      While 
that appeal was pending, Father filed his claim for abatement following the 
summer of 2005.  Pursuant to his 
claim, Father requested abatement of his support for the dates of June 11, 2005, 
through August 22, 2005 (72 days).  
He again filed correspondence requesting relief from his child support 
obligation on the basis that he is the custodial parent during the summer 
months.

 
 

[¶10]   Due to 
the pending appeal, the parties agreed to allow abatement of $983.84, which 
represented one-half (1/2) of Father's daily support obligation for 57 days, and 
to reserve decision on the remainder of Father's claim until the appeal was 
resolved.  The agreement was 
incorporated in the Stipulated Order Allowing Temporary Abatement and Reserving 
Final Abatement Order Until Decision on Appeal is Received, entered on October 
20, 2005.  The stipulated order 
recognized Mother's objection to Father's abatement claim, although Mother did 
not file her formal objection until October 28, 2005.

 
 

[¶11]   On 
January 6, 2006, we dismissed the appeal of the 2004 abatement on jurisdictional 
grounds because Mother appealed from the order denying her motion for 
reconsideration and not the order granting abatement.  Plymale, 125 P.3d 1022.  After the dismissal, Father filed a 
motion requesting that his full claim for the abatement for the summer of 2005 
be entered.  The district court 
entered its order granting the abatement in the amount of $2,310.00 for 72 days 
on August 24, 2006.  This appeal 
followed.

            

DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶12]   Mother challenges the 
district court's order granting Father's claim for abatement for the summer of 
2005.  She contends the district 
court erred in calculating the percentage of abatement and the period of time 
for which the abatement was allowed. Specifically, Mother claims the district 
court improperly credited Father for time in August when he did not have the 
children for fifteen (15) consecutive days and improperly relieved Father of his 
child support obligation for the summer months by granting a one-hundred percent 
(100%) abatement for the time the children were in his care.  Before we reach the merits of Mother's 
arguments, we must first address Father's contentions that this appeal should be 
dismissed.

  

I.                    
Failure to Timely 
Object

 
 

[¶13]   As a threshold issue, 
Father contends that we must dismiss this appeal because Mother failed to file a 
timely objection to his claim.  He 
directs our attention to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-305(c), (d) (LexisNexis 2005), 
which provides that an objection must be filed within thirty days or the 
objection is barred.2  Father asserts that since he filed his 
abatement claim on September 20, 2005, Mother was required to file her objection 
by October 20, 2005.  She did not 
file her formal objection with the district court until October 28, 2005.  As a result, Father argues that the 
objection is untimely and the appeal should be dismissed.  We disagree.

 
 

[¶14]   In making his 
contentions, Father ignores the stipulated order that was entered by the 
district court on October 20, 2005.  
The Stipulated Order Allowing Temporary Abatement and Reserving Final 
Abatement Order Until Decision on Appeal is Received 
provides:

 
 
THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER 
HAVING COME BEFORE THE COURT upon 
the parties' stipulation as evidenced by this Order Approved as to Form by 
Counsel for the parties, and the Court being fully advised as to the premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:  

 
 

1.      
[Mother] has not filed a 
separate objection to abatement but is deemed to have objected to the abatement 
filed by [Father] on September 20, 2005, for abatement in excess 
of $983.84, such objection is twofold, first objection is made to abatement in 
excess of 50%, and second objection is made to abatement beyond the 
7th of August, 2005.

 
 

2.      
[Father] shall have an 
abatement of the sum of $983.84 which constitutes 57 days (June 11th 
through August 7th, 2005) at ½ abatement, with the decision on the 
balance of the abatement request being stayed until the Wyoming Supreme Court 
renders its decision on the pending appeal.

 
 
            
. . .

 
 
            
DATED this 20th day of October, 
2005.

 
 
/s/ District Court Judge

Approved as to form:

/s/  
Attorney for [Father]

/s/  
Attorney for [Mother]

 
 
(Emphasis added.)  The stipulated order acknowledged that 
Mother had not yet filed a separate objection, but indicated that she was 
"deemed to have objected."  In light 
of the stipulated order finding that Mother objected to Father's claim, we 
reject Father's contention that the appeal must be dismissed.  

 
 
II.         
Collateral Estoppel

 
 

[¶15]   Next, Father claims that 
the issues Mother raises in this appeal are precluded by the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel.  He contends 
that the issues involving the proper calculation of abatement were previously 
litigated in the district court in 2004, and the matter was also considered by 
this Court.  In support of his 
contentions, Father refers us to a portion of the facts contained in Plymale, ¶ 2, 125 P.3d  at 1023 
stating:

 
 
Father was given primary 
residential custody of the children during the summer.  Father requested child support abatement 
from the district court for the time he had residential custody of the children 
during the summer of 2004.  The 
district court granted an abatement.  
No appeal was taken from the order granting the 
abatement.

 
 
Father asserts that 
because no appeal was taken from the 2004 order granting abatement, any issues 
relating to future abatement claims are collaterally estopped. 

 
 

[¶16]   In determining whether an 
issue is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, we consider four 
factors:

 
 
(1) whether the issue 
decided in the prior adjudication was identical with the issue presented in the 
present action; (2) whether the prior adjudication resulted in a judgment on the 
merits; (3) whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a 
party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) whether the 
party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding.

 
 

Aragon v. 
Aragon, 
2005 WY 5, ¶ 11, 104 P.3d 756, 760 (Wyo. 2005) (quoting Markstein v. Countryside I, L.L.C., 2003 
WY 122, ¶ 15, 77 P.3d 389, 394-395 (Wyo. 2003)).  

 
 

[¶17]   Applying these factors, 
it is clear that the 2004 claim for abatement was fully litigated.  However, Mother is not challenging the 
2004 order granting abatement.  
Instead, she challenges Father's 2005 abatement claim.  The question then, is whether Mother is 
estopped from challenging future abatement claims in light of the determination 
of Father's 2004 claim.   

 
 

[¶18]   Each time Father has 
physical custody of his children for more than 15 consecutive days, he is 
permitted, by statute, to file a claim for abatement.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-305(a).  Mother, in turn, is permitted to object 
to the claimed abatement.  
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 20-2-305(c).  An order 
is then entered either granting or denying the abatement.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-305(e).  The amount of abatement can be contested 
each time a new claim is made.  As a 
result, it is inappropriate to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel simply 
because a prior abatement for a different time period was approved.  

 
 

[¶19]   In this case, Mother 
timely appealed from the order granting Father's 2005 claim for abatement.  The contested matters have not been 
fully litigated because it is a new and different claim than that presented by 
Father following the summer of 2004.  
As a result, we find that Mother is not estopped from challenging the 
2005 order.

 
 
III.        
Calculation of Abatement

 
 

[¶20]   Mother's challenge to the 
order granting Father's abatement is two-fold.  First, she claims the district court 
erred by abating Father's child support for time in August when he did not have 
the children for fifteen (15) consecutive days as required by the abatement 
statute.  Second, she contends the 
district court erred by abating Father's support by one-hundred percent (100%) 
for the summer months.  

 
 

[¶21]   We have not previously 
set forth a standard of review applicable to orders abating child support.  
The parties suggest that the abuse of discretion standard may be appropriate. 
 See, e.g., Bellamy v. 
Bellamy, 949 P.2d 875, 876 (Wyo. 1997) (involving the modification of 
child support and the failure to properly file claims for abatements).  We 
can also envision appellate review of abatement orders centering upon disputed 
factual issues, in which case our "clearly erroneous" standard of review would 
apply.  Hammond v. Hammond, 14 P.3d 199, 203 (Wyo. 2000).  However, such factual issues are not at 
issue here.  This case rests primarily upon the proper interpretation of 
the child support abatement statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-305.  Statutory 
interpretation presents a question of law, which we review de novo.  
Bd. of County Comm'rs v. City of Cheyenne, 2004 WY 16, ¶ 8, 85 P.3d 999, 
1002 (Wyo. 2004). 

 

            
A.  Length of Abatement 
Period

 
 

[¶22]   In his claim for 
abatement, Father requested that credit be given for the dates of June 11, 2005, 
through August 22, 2005.  Mother 
objected to that time period, asserting that Father was only entitled to abate 
his support through August 7, 2005, because the children were in her care from 
August 8, 2005, through August 15, 2005.  
Due to this gap in Father's visitation period, she contends that Father 
cannot claim abatement through August 22, 2005.

 
 

[¶23]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-2-305(a) sets forth the amount of time a non-custodial parent must have the 
children in his or her care before a proper claim for abatement may be made.3  In that regard, the statute provides 
that child support shall abate by one-half (1/2) of the daily support obligation 
for each day the noncustodial parent has physical custody for fifteen (15) or 
more consecutive days.  The statute 
further provides that "[f]or the purposes of computing abatement and determining 
whether the noncustodial parent has met the consecutive day requirement of this 
subsection, overnight and weekend visits with the custodial parent during the 
period for which abatement is claimed shall be disregarded."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-2-305(a).

 
 

[¶24]   In this case, it is not 
disputed that Mother had the children in her care from August 8, 2005, through 
August 15, 2005.  This time period 
is longer than the overnight or weekend visits the statue permits to be 
disregarded.  Accordingly, Father 
was required to have the children for another consecutive fifteen (15) days 
after they were returned to his care on August 15, 2005, in order to properly 
claim abatement for that time.  He 
did not meet the requisite amount of time and, therefore, it was improper to 
abate his support after August 8, 2005.

 
 

[¶25]   Father urges us to find 
that Mother's one week visitation is akin to a weekend visit and thus does not 
interrupt the period of calculating Father's abatement.  However, we are bound by the plain 
language of the statute, which defines what may be considered a weekend 
visit.  The statute provides:  "For purposes of this section, weekend' 
means any two (2) consecutive days, except if a legal holiday precedes or 
follows the days constituting a weekend under this section the weekend shall 
consist of three (3) days."  
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 20-2-305(h).  The 
statute does not permit the district court to disregard longer periods of 
time.  "The omission of words from a 
statute is considered to be an intentional act by the Legislature, and [we] will 
not supply words in the process of interpretation."  Fullmer v. Wyoming Employment Sec. 
Comm'n., 858 P.2d 1122, 1124 (Wyo. 1993).  We conclude that the district court 
erred by allowing Father's claim for abatement beyond August 8, 
2005.

 
 

B.                
Percentage of 
Abatement    

 
 

[¶26]   Mother also claims that 
the district court improperly abated Father's child support obligation in excess 
of the amount authorized by statute.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-305 governs child support abatements and provides 
in pertinent part:

  (a) Unless 
otherwise ordered by the court, child support shall abate by one-half (1/2) of 
the daily support obligation for each day the noncustodial parent has physical 
custody of the child for whom support is due, provided that the noncustodial 
parent has custody of the child for fifteen (15) or more consecutive days. For 
the purposes of computing abatement and determining whether the noncustodial 
parent has met the consecutive day requirement of this subsection, overnight and 
weekend visits with the custodial parent during the period for which abatement 
is claimed shall be disregarded.

. . 
.

 
 
Mother reads this statute 
as restricting the amount of abatement to one-half (1/2) of the daily support 
obligation, unless the court has "otherwise ordered" a different percentage in 
the support order.  Because the 
parties' support order is silent regarding abatements, she contends that the 
one-half (1/2) figure found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-305 applies, and it was 
error for the district court to abate Father's full support obligation for the 
summer months.

 
 

[¶27]   Father views Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 20-2-305 much differently.  
He interprets the "unless otherwise ordered by the court" language of 
subparagraph (a) as conferring broad discretion upon the district court to abate 
support in any amount it desires.  
Father argues that the order approving his claim for abatement is the 
order referenced in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-305.  

 
 

[¶28]   Although we commented in 
Bellamy, 949 P.2d  at 877, that "[t]he 
legislature has described the mechanics of abatement with clarity," we have not 
previously construed the meaning of "unless otherwise ordered by the court" in 
the operation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-305(a).  To aid us in that determination,  

 
 
[w]e turn to our 
well-established rules of statutory interpretation. The paramount consideration 
is to determine the [L]egislature's intent, which must be ascertained initially 
and primarily from the words used in the statute.  We look first to the plain and ordinary 
meaning of the words to determine if the statute is ambiguous. A statute is 
clear and unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to 
agree on its meaning with consistency and predictability.  Conversely, a statute is ambiguous if it 
is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations. 

RME Petroleum Co. v. Wyo. Dep't of 
Revenue, 2007 WY 16, ¶ 25, 150 P.3d 673, 683 (Wyo. 2007) (internal citations 
omitted).

 
 

[¶29]   The statutory language 
"unless otherwise ordered by the court" contemplates some order of the court 
altering the right of abatement described within the statute.  However, there is no temporal limitation 
or identification of the type of order which may suffice.  Conceivably, a court order altering the 
statutory abatement right could be the original support order, a modification of 
that support order, or any order resolving an abatement claim.  In this case, both the original support 
order and the modification of that order are silent concerning the calculation 
of abatements.  Therefore, the only 
order that may have ordered otherwise is the district court's order granting 
Father's abatement. The issue, then, is whether this order satisfies the "unless 
otherwise ordered by the court" language contained in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-2-305.  

 
 

[¶30]   Our resolution of this 
issue requires interpretation of the abatement statute.  We construe statutes "in pari materia; and in ascertaining the 
meaning of a given law, all statutes relating to the same subject or having the 
same general purpose must be considered and construed in harmony."  McClean v. State, 2003 WY 17, ¶ 6, 62 P.3d 595, 597 (Wyo. 2003).  "Child 
support payments are court-imposed obligations based on the parent's ability to 
pay and [are] designed to meet the needs of the children . . . ."  Broyles v. Broyles, 711 P.2d 1119, 1126 
(Wyo. 
1985).  Because the abatement of 
those support payments impacts the amount of support available to meet the 
children's needs, we must read Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-305 in harmony with the 
child support guidelines.  

 
 

[¶31]   The Legislature has 
chosen the "income shares" model to determine the presumptive amount of child 
support due.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-2-304(a) (LexisNexis 2005); Laura W. Morgan, Child Support Guidelines: Interpretation and 
Application, app. B, at 291 (Supp. 2006).  When calculated in accordance with the 
guidelines, this amount is presumed to be the correct amount of child support to 
be awarded in any proceeding to establish or modify temporary or permanent child 
support amounts. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-307(a) (LexisNexis 
2005).  In determining the 
presumptive amount of support, the guidelines contemplate differing custodial 
arrangements.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-2-304(a) is used to calculate support when one parent has physical custody of 
the children for the majority of the time and the other parent exercises 
visitation.  Support is calculated 
using subsection (c) of the statute where each parent keeps the children 
overnight for more than forty percent (40%) of the year and contributes 
substantially to the expenses of the children in addition to the payment of 
child support.  Finally, subsection 
(d) provides a child support calculation for situations where the parents enjoy 
split custody of the children.  
Regardless of the custodial situation, one parent generally has a 
presumptive child support obligation pursuant to the guidelines.  

 
 

[¶32]   Based on the type of 
custodial arrangement, certain assumptions regarding the care of the children 
are factored into the child support guidelines.  Cranston v. Cranston, 
879 P.2d 345, 349 (Wyo. 1994).  One such assumption is that "the 
children are living primarily with one parent but staying overnight with the 
other parent in an ordinary visitation arrangement, such as every other weekend, 
a portion of the summer and during some holidays."  Id.  This assumption most accurately reflects 
the situation of the parties involved in this case.  

 
 

[¶33]   Although a certain amount 
of visitation is contemplated by the child support guidelines, our statutory 
scheme permits the abatement of support when the non-custodial parent has 
physical custody of the children for fifteen (15) consecutive days or more.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-305.  If the requisite timeframe is met, the 
statute provides that child support shall abate by "one-half (1/2) of the daily 
support obligation" for each day the children are in the non-custodial parent's 
care.  Id.  This statement, however, is preceded by 
the phrase "unless otherwise ordered by the court."  Id.

 
 

[¶34]   Father interprets this 
phrase to mean that each time a claim for abatement is submitted, the district 
court has discretion to order the abatement of support in any amount it finds 
appropriate, including the full amount of support due.  He asserts that the district court can 
exercise this discretion when it enters its order on the abatement claim.  Father contends that due to the 
substantial expense he incurs to have the children in his care for the summer, 
abating his support by one hundred percent (100%) during that time is 
appropriate.    

 
 

[¶35]   Mother disagrees with 
Father's rationale.  She argues that 
abatements of one hundred percent (100%) undermine the purposes served by the 
presumptive child support guidelines and the strict requirements that must be 
met when deviating from those guidelines.  
Mother contends that unless it is otherwise ordered in the child support 
order, abatements must be in the amount of one-half (1/2) of the daily support 
obligation. 

 
 

[¶36]   We agree with 
Mother.  When the abatement statute 
is read in pari materia with the child support 
guidelines, it becomes clear that the discretion of the district court regarding 
the proper amount of abatement comes into play during the proceedings involving 
the establishment or modification of support.  The discretion to change the percentage 
of abatement is not conferred upon a district court when simply determining the 
merits of a claim for abatement.  

 
 

[¶37]   In establishing support 
pursuant to the guidelines, the district court has discretion to deviate from 
the presumptive amount on a case by case basis.  The statute provides a list of factors 
the court can appropriately consider for purposes of deviating from the 
presumptive child support amount.  
Some of the factors listed are:  

 
 

(i)                 
The age of the 
child;

(ii)               
The cost of necessary 
child day care;

(iii)             
Any special health care 
and educational needs of the child;

. . . 

(vii)           
The cost of 
transportation of the child to and from visitation;

. . . 

(ix)       The amount 
of time the child spends with each parent;

(x)        Any 
other necessary expenses for the benefit of the child;

. . . 

(xiii)         
Other factors deemed 
relevant by the court.

 
 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-2-307(b).  The parties may submit 
evidence in support of their position on whether a deviation is 
appropriate.  However, deviation 
from the presumptive amount can only occur if the requirements of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 20-2-307(b) are followed.  If 
a court finds that a deviation is proper, it must set forth detailed findings of 
fact and conclusions of law.  
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 20-2-307(b).  

 
 

[¶38]   In contrast, the 
abatement process, as outlined by the Legislature, is intended to be streamlined 
to make it easy for parents to seek the abatement of support following times of 
extended visitation.  A parent 
wishing to claim abatement simply provides the dates the children were in his or 
her care and sets forth the amount of the monthly support obligation.  The claim is then submitted to the clerk 
of the district court along with the requisite filing fee.  In this case, Father submitted his claim 
on a pre-printed form provided by the clerk of court.  After the non-custodial parent files a 
claim, "[t]he custodial parent's right to object [is] limited solely to [the] 
issues related to the legitimacy or [the] accuracy of the abatement claim."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-305(c).  The statute does not require the 
district court to make specific findings of fact or conclusions of law. 

 
 

[¶39]   If we were to accept 
Father's interpretation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-305, we would be rendering the 
phrase "shall abate by one-half (1/2) of the daily support obligation" 
essentially meaningless.  The 
purpose of abating child support payments is to reallocate those costs that 
decrease for the custodial parent and increase for the non-custodial parent 
during times of extended visitation.  
For example, a study conducted in South Dakota found that 38% of 
visitation costs are "variable costs" (food and other costs directly associated 
with the presence of the child within the household); 28% are "duplicated fixed" 
costs (housing and other expenditures incurred by both parents regardless of the 
child's presence in the household); and 34% are "nonduplicated" costs (clothing 
and other expenditures incurred by one parent regardless of the child's 
presence).  Linda Lea M. Viken, Child Support in South Dakota From Obligor 
Only To Shared Responsibility, an Overview, 48 S.D. L. Rev. 443, 448 
(2003).  Applying similar research, 
one commentator has explained that

 
 
the custodial parent's 
fixed costs-rent or mortgage payments, utilities, car maintenance, and medical 
insurance-have not decreased as a result of the visitation.  Even some of the variable 
costsclothing, for example-may not be affected by the extended visitation, 
because the child probably will bring clothes and other necessities along.  

 
 
The only expenses sure to 
decrease for the custodial parent during that . . . time are food and 
entertainment.  Food costs are 
estimated to be only 18.8 to 22.5 percent of the total annual expenditures on a 
child, while entertainment accounts for 9.6 percent.  Therefore, the custodial parent likely 
decreases expenditures by only 30 percent during . . . visitation. . . 
.

 
 
Karen A. Getman, Changing Formulas for Changing Families: 
Shared Custody Must Not Shortchange Children, 10 Spg Fam. Advoc. 47, 49 
(1988).  While the specific 
statistics may vary, it cannot be denied that a custodial parent's expenditures 
on behalf of the children do not decrease by one hundred percent (100%) while 
the children are on extended visitation.4   

 
 

[¶40]   We find that the 
Legislature's selection of the one-half (1/2) figure was not merely a 
suggestion.  Rather, by selecting 
the one-half (1/2) amount for abatement, the Legislature signaled its intent to 
strike a balance between the decreased costs to the custodial parent and the 
increased costs to the non-custodial parent while extended visitation is 
occurring.  The statute must be read 
to give effect to this legislative intent.

 
 

[¶41]   Based on the foregoing, 
we find that the proper interpretation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-305(a) is 
that child support shall abate by one-half (1/2) of the daily support 
obligation unless otherwise ordered by the court in the original support order 
or a modification of that order.  
Under this approach, a district court retains discretion to abate support 
in an amount greater or lesser than one-half (1/2) of the daily support 
obligation depending on what is deemed appropriate within proceedings 
establishing or modifying a support order.  
If, however, a support order fails to address abatements, the default 
statutory provision applies and the abatement amount is one-half (1/2) of the 
daily support obligation.  This 
interpretation appears to be the most logical, consistent, and harmonious 
reading of the statute.  

 
 

[¶42]   Father also argues that 
effect must be given to the decretal language which declares him to be the 
custodial parent in the summer months.  
He claims that the only way to give effect to this language is to permit 
abatement of his full support obligation or have Mother pay child support to him 
during that time.  We find Father's 
argument unpersuasive.  Mother 
relocated to Casper prior to entry of the divorce 
decree.  The district court was 
aware of Mother's relocation when it determined the custodial arrangements for 
the children.  Based on the 
custodial arrangements, the court determined that Father owed support to 
Mother.  The district court did not 
deviate from the presumptive support amount even though it was clear Father 
would incur expenses for travel and other costs associated with the visitation 
schedule.  If the district court 
intended to relieve Father of his support obligation for the summer months, it 
could have provided that relief in the original decree or in the subsequent 
modification of the support order.  
It did not. 

            
 

CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶43]   The 
district court erred by abating Father's child support obligation in 
contravention of the allowable time period contained in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-2-305(a).  The district court also erred 
by granting an abatement greater than one-half (1/2) of the daily support 
obligation due.  We reverse the 
district court's order granting the abatement for the year 2005 and remand for 
entry of an order consistent with this opinion.

            

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The district 
court judge who signed the original decree and the 2003 abatement order had 
retired.

 
 

2Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 20-2-305(c), (d) provides:

(c) The 
custodial parent shall have the right to object to any claim for abatement made 
by the noncustodial parent. The custodial parent's right to object shall be 
limited solely to issues related to the legitimacy or accuracy of the abatement 
claim. The custodial parent shall file any objection to the abatement claim with 
the clerk of court within thirty (30) days of the date the clerk mailed the 
notice of claim for abatement and shall pay to the clerk a fee of ten dollars 
($10.00). The custodial parent may approve the abatement claim prior to the 
expiration of the thirty (30) day time period for objections by filing notice of 
immediate approval with the clerk of the court, and no filing fee shall be 
assessed for filing of such notice of immediate approval. The clerk shall mail a 
copy of the objection or notice of immediate approval to the noncustodial parent 
at the address provided to the clerk by that parent.

(d) 
Claims, objections or responses not timely filed or not accompanied by the 
requisite fee are barred without further order of the 
court.

 
 
 
 

3The decree 
of divorce refers to Father as the custodial parent during the summer 
months.  For the sake of simplicity, 
we will refer to Father as the non-custodial parent throughout the opinion 
recognizing that a conflict exists between the language utilized in the 
abatement statute and the language contained in the divorce 
decree.

 
 

4Recognizing 
that not all costs for the custodial parent disappear during visitation, other 
courts considering the issue have concluded that abatement of the full amount of 
child support during times of extended visitation is improper.  For example, in Abbott v. Abbott, 25 P.3d 291, 294 
(Okla. 2001), the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed a district court's order 
allowing the abatement of 100% of the support order reasoning that "[m]ost 
expenses borne by the custodial parent for the maintenance of the child remain 
fixed and constant for that parent even though the child is visiting with the 
other parent."  Utilizing a similar 
approach, the court in Flanagan v. 
Flanagan, 656 So. 2d 1228, 1231 (Ala. 1995), explained:  

   The custodial parent's 
obligation to provide for the child cannot conveniently be segmented on a month 
to month basis. The parent must provide shelter, clothing, toys, furniture and 
many other items that last beyond a month, and the cost of which must be 
amortized over a longer period of time than reflected in a monthly child support 
obligation. In the instance where the visitations are of a short duration and 
dispersed over a period of time it would impose a penalty on the child to 
suspend the support payments during visitation . . . . We conclude that [the] 
husband's child support payment 
should 
not be suspended during the children's summer visitation with 
him.

 
 
(quoting 
In re Marriage of Burns, 811 P.2d 654, 657 (Ore. Ct. App. 1991) (quotation marks omitted)).  See also Bondi v. Bondi, 586 N.W.2d 145, 
147 (Neb. 1998) (explaining that "[t]he fixed obligation of the custodial parent 
to provide the necessities of life for his children is a continuing one and does 
not cease during the temporary absences of the children while on 
visitation").