Title: Commonwealth v. Canning

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11773 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOSIAH H. CANNING. 
 
 
 
Barnstable.     January 8, 2015. - April 27, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
 
Marijuana.  Medicine.  Controlled Substances.  Search and 
Seizure, Warrant, Affidavit, Probable cause.  Probable 
Cause.  Practice, Criminal, Warrant, Affidavit, Motion to 
suppress.  License. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Orleans Division of 
the District Court Department on May 30, 2013.  
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Brian 
R. Merrick, J.  
 
 
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 
appeal was allowed by Gants, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court 
for the county of Suffolk, and the case was reported by him to 
the Appeals Court.  The Supreme Judicial Court granted an 
application for direct appellate review.  
 
 
 
Elizabeth A. Sweeney, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Richard F. Comenzo for the defendant. 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
John M. Collins for Massachusetts Chiefs of Police 
Association, Inc. 
 
2 
 
 
Paul R. Rudof, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
Daniel J. Chao & another. 
 
Steven S. Epstein & Marvin Cable for National Organization 
for the Reform of Marijuana Law. 
 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  We consider here for the first time the 
Commonwealth's new medical marijuana law, "An Act for the 
humanitarian medical use of marijuana," St. 2012, c. 369 (act), 
which the voters approved in November, 2012.1  The central 
question presented is whether, with the act in effect, police 
may obtain a search warrant to search a property where they 
suspect an individual is cultivating marijuana by establishing 
probable cause that cultivation is taking place or are required 
to establish probable cause to believe that the individual was 
not registered, or licensed, to do so.  In accord with cases 
relating to other types of license regimes, we conclude that, if 
police seek a warrant to search such a property for evidence of 
illegal marijuana possession or cultivation, they must offer 
information sufficient to provide probable cause to believe the 
individual is not properly registered under the act to possess 
or cultivate the suspected substance.  In this case, a judge in 
the District Court allowed the defendant's motion to suppress 
evidence seized by police during a search of the defendant's 
property conducted pursuant to a warrant in May of 2013, after 
                     
 
1 The measure was placed before the voters at the Statewide 
election held November 6, 2012, pursuant to art. 48, The 
Initiative, Part V, § 1, amended by art. 81, § 2, of the 
Amendments of the Massachusetts Constitution.   
3 
 
the act went into effect.  We agree with the motion judge that 
the affidavit filed in support of the search warrant application 
demonstrated probable cause that the defendant was cultivating 
marijuana at the property, but that, in light of the act, the 
affidavit failed to establish probable cause to believe that the 
defendant was not authorized to do so and therefore was 
committing a crime.  We affirm the order allowing the motion to 
suppress.2   
 
Background.  On May 30, 2013, a three-count complaint 
issued from the Orleans Division of the District Court 
Department charging the defendant, Josiah H. Canning, with 
possession with the intent to distribute marijuana, G. L. 
c. 94C, § 32C (a); distribution of marijuana, G. L. c. 94C, 
§ 32C (a); and conspiracy to violate the drug laws, G. L. 
c. 94C, § 40.3  The complaint's issuance followed a search of the 
defendant's property in Brewster conducted May 30, 2013, 
pursuant to a search warrant issued on May 29.  The affidavit 
submitted by Detective Christopher Kent of the Yarmouth police 
                     
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by Daniel J. 
Chao and Shawn P. Kelly and by the National Organization for the 
Reform of Marijuana Laws, in support of the defendant; and the 
Massachusetts Chiefs of Police Association, Inc., in support of 
the Commonwealth.   
 
3 For reasons that have not been explained, the defendant 
was not charged with unlawful cultivation of marijuana.  There 
does not appear to be any evidence of distribution in this case.  
 
4 
 
department in support of the warrant application recited the 
following facts.   
 
During the week of May 19, 2013, Kent met with a 
confidential informant, who told Kent that the owner of certain 
property in Brewster (property) -- whom Kent later determined 
from town records to be the defendant -- and another male were 
involved in an indoor "marijuana grow" operation located at the 
property.4  On May 21, Kent and another detective observed the 
property from a nearby driveway, and noticed that windows of the 
addition to the house on the property were obscured by dark 
material, saw an aluminum flexible hose protruding out of one of 
the windows, and also observed a pickup truck registered to the 
defendant in front of the house.  On May 24 and 28, Kent and one 
or more additional police officers returned to observe the 
property; on both occasions, they smelled a strong odor of 
"freshly cultivated" marijuana emanating from the house, noticed 
the aluminum hose coming out of the window of the addition, 
heard the sound of fans, and, using night vision goggles, saw 
light emanating from another window.  Also on May 28, Kent was 
provided information from a police officer in another town that 
that officer previously had observed the defendant and another 
man purchasing "a large amount of indoor [marijuana] grow 
                     
4 The property consists of a house with a small addition to 
the rear (connected by a breezeway), a barn in the front yard, 
and a large barn in the back yard.   
 
5 
 
materials" from a "hydroponic shop" in Foxborough and then 
loading the materials into an automobile registered to the 
defendant.  On May 29, Kent obtained utility bills relating to 
electrical service for the property and neighboring homes on 
Main Street in Brewster.  These records revealed that for the 
previous six months, the average kilowatt usage for three 
neighboring homes was 542.3 kilowatt hours (kWh), 23.3 kWh, and 
246.6 kWh, respectively; the average kilowatt usage for the 
defendant's property for the same time period was 3,116.5 kWh.  
Based on his training and experience, Kent was aware that 
because marijuana growing operations require different types of 
electrical equipment, e.g., "high intensity discharge lamps, 
fluorescent lights, fans, reflectors, irrigation and ventilation 
equipment such as aluminum flexible hose" to be operating 
consistently, high usage of electricity -- a "noticeable 
increase in kilowatt usage" -- is to be expected.   
 
When the police executed the search warrant that, based on 
the affidavit, a judge in the District Court had issued, the 
defendant was present.  Seized during the search, among other 
items, were seventy marijuana plants, eleven fluorescent 
industrial lights, an aluminum flexible hose, a digital scale, 
approximately 1.2 pounds of marijuana, and $2,697.  The 
defendant was placed under arrest.   
6 
 
 
The defendant filed a motion to suppress the seized 
evidence, and also to suppress statements he made at the time of 
the search and his arrest.  A different District Court judge 
allowed the motion in a written memorandum of decision.  The 
judge concluded that the search warrant affidavit "establishe[d] 
probable cause that marijuana was being cultivated indoors at 
the defendant[']s home," but concluded in substance that in 
light of the act, the affidavit failed to establish probable 
cause that the cultivation was for more than a sixty-day supply 
of marijuana or that the defendant was not authorized to grow 
that amount -- and therefore that the cultivation was illegal.  
The Commonwealth filed a timely application for leave to file an 
interlocutory appeal of the judge’s suppression order and motion 
to stay further proceedings in the case.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 
15 (a) (2), as appearing in 422 Mass. 1501 (1996).  A single 
justice of this court allowed the application and reported the 
case to the Appeals Court.  Thereafter, we allowed the 
Commonwealth's motion for direct appellate review.   
 
Discussion.  1.  Overview of the act.  The voters approved 
the act as a ballot measure in 2012, and the act went into 
effect on January 1, 2013.  St. 2012, c. 369.  Section 1 of the 
act sets out a statement of purpose:   
"The citizens of Massachusetts intend that there 
should be no punishment under state law for qualifying 
patients, physicians and health care professionals, 
personal caregivers for patients, or medical marijuana 
7 
 
treatment center agents for the medical use of marijuana, 
as defined herein" (emphasis added).   
 
The term "medical use of marijuana" is defined in the act as 
follows:   
"'Medical use of marijuana' shall mean the acquisition, 
cultivation, possession, processing (including development 
of related products such as food, tinctures, aerosols, 
oils, or ointments), transfer, transportation, sale, 
distribution, dispensing, or administration of marijuana, 
for the benefit of qualifying patients in the treatment of 
debilitating medical conditions, or the symptoms thereof" 
(emphasis added).   
 
St. 2012, c. 369, § 2 (I).  The substantive provisions of the 
act that follow the definitional section first set out the 
parameters of protection from State prosecution and penalties 
that the act respectively gives to physicians and health care 
professionals, qualifying patients and their personal 
caregivers, and licensed dispensary agents.  See id. at §§ 3–5.5  
                     
 
5 Pertinent to this case is § 4 of St. 2012, c. 369 (act):   
 
"Protection From State Prosecution and Penalties for 
Qualifying Patients and Personal Caregivers   
 
"Any person meeting the requirements under this law shall 
not be penalized under Massachusetts law in any manner, or 
denied any right or privilege, for such actions.   
 
"A qualifying patient or a personal caregiver shall not be 
subject to arrest or prosecution, or civil penalty, for the 
medical use of marijuana provided he or she:   
 
"(a) Possesses no more marijuana than is necessary for the 
patient's personal medical use, not exceeding the amount 
necessary for a sixty-day supply; and   
 
8 
 
See also id. § 6 (A) ("The lawful possession, cultivation, 
transfer, transport, distribution, or manufacture of medical 
marijuana as authorized by this law shall not result in the 
forfeiture or seizure of any property").  These provisions are 
followed by a section specifying "limitations" of the act, 
including the following:  "Nothing in [the act] supersedes 
Massachusetts law prohibiting the possession, cultivation, 
transport, distribution, or sale of marijuana for nonmedical 
purposes."  Id. at § 7 (E).  Thereafter, the act establishes a 
medical marijuana registration or licensing regime that is to be 
set up and administered by the Department of Public Health 
(department), and that covers nonprofit medical marijuana 
treatment centers, medical marijuana center dispensary agents, 
and qualifying patients and personal caregivers.  See id. at 
§§ 9-12.  Under the act, it is clear that the principal source 
of medical marijuana is intended to be the nonprofit medical 
marijuana treatment centers, or dispensaries, that are to be 
registered by the department.  See id. at §§ 2 (H), 9 (B), (C).  
To that end, the act directed that during the first year the act 
was in effect, the department "shall" have registered up to 
thirty-five of these centers, with at least one in every county, 
and further states that "[i]n the event the [d]epartment 
                                                                  
"(b) Presents his or her registration card to any law 
enforcement official who questions the patient or caregiver 
regarding use of marijuana."   
 
9 
 
determines in a future year that the number of treatment centers 
is insufficient to meet patient needs, the [d]epartment shall 
have the power to increase or modify the number of registered 
treatment centers.  See id. at § 9 (C).   
Of particular relevance here are the act's provisions 
relating to qualifying patients and personal caregivers as well 
as to hardship cultivation registrations.  A "qualifying 
patient" is defined as "a person who has been diagnosed by a 
licensed physician as having a debilitating medical condition."  
St. 2012, c. 369, § 2 (K).  The act requires a qualifying 
patient as well as a personal caregiver6 to obtain from the 
department a "registration card," which is a personal 
identification card issued by the department that serves both to 
"verify that a physician has provided a written certification to 
the qualifying patient," and to "identify for the [d]epartment 
and law enforcement those individuals who are exempt from 
Massachusetts criminal and civil penalties for conduct pursuant 
to the medical use of marijuana."  Id. at § 2 (L).  See id. at 
§ 12 (describing application requirements for medical marijuana 
registration card for qualifying patients and personal 
caregivers).  A qualifying patient or his or her personal 
caregiver is permitted to possess up to a sixty-day supply of 
                     
 
6 A "personal caregiver" is defined to mean "a person who is 
at least twenty-one (21) years old who has agreed to assist with 
a qualifying patient's medical use of marijuana."  St. 2012, 
c. 369, § 2 (J).   
10 
 
marijuana necessary for the patient's personal medical use.  See 
id. at § 4 (A).  In addition, a qualifying patient whose access 
to a licensed medical marijuana treatment center is limited by 
finances or an inability to travel to a licensed center may 
obtain a "hardship cultivation registration" that allows the 
patient or the patient's personal caregiver to cultivate a 
sufficient number of marijuana plants to produce and maintain a 
sixty-day supply of marijuana.  Id. at § 11.  The act tasks the 
department with defining "the quantity of marijuana that could 
reasonably be presumed to be a sixty-day supply for qualifying 
patients."  Id. at § 8.7   
 
The act provides that the department was to issue 
regulations to govern implementation of all the registration 
provisions in the act.  St. 2012, c. 369, § 13.  These 
regulations were to be published within 120 days of the act's 
effective date, May 1, 2013.  The act also provides, however, 
that "[u]ntil the approval of final regulations, written 
certification by a physician shall have constituted a 
                     
 
7 Under the medical marijuana regulations of the Department 
of Public Health (department), discussed in the next paragraph 
of the text, the presumptive sixty-day supply of medical 
marijuana is defined as ten ounces.  See 105 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 725.004 (2013).  The sixty-day supply may be greater than ten 
ounces for an individual qualifying patient upon the patient's 
certifying physician providing written certification and 
documentation that a greater supply is necessary.  See 105 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 725.010(I) (2013).  The regulation does not 
identify the number of marijuana plants that may be necessary to 
grow ten ounces of marijuana.   
 
11 
 
registration card for a qualifying patient."  Id.  See id. at 
§ 2 (N) (definition of "written certification").  Additionally, 
until final regulations were in place, "the written 
recommendation of a qualifying patient's physician shall have 
constituted a limited [i.e., hardship] cultivation 
registration."  Id. at § 11.8   
 
The department issued its final medical marijuana 
regulations on May 8, 2013.  105 Code Mass. Regs. § 725.000 
(2013).  But of significance to the present case, § 725.015 of 
these regulations, which defines the registration requirements 
for a qualifying patient, provides that if a qualifying patient 
received an initial written certification signed by a physician 
before the department was accepting registration applications, 
                     
8 It appears that the act uses the terms "certification" and 
"recommendation" interchangeably.  Reading together the quoted 
provisions of St. 2012, c. 369, §§ 13 and 11, relating to what 
respectively constitutes a qualifying patient's registration 
card and a hardship cultivation registration pending approval of 
the department's regulations, we understand them to be referring 
to the same document, namely, the "written certification" 
defined in St. 2012, c. 369, § 2 (N), that is signed by a 
licensed physician and certifies the qualifying patient for use 
of medical marijuana.  A memorandum appearing on the 
department's Web site concerning implementation of the act 
confirms this understanding.  See "Guidance for Law Enforcement 
Regarding the Medical Use of Marijuana," Department of Public 
Health, Bureau of Health Care Safety and Quality, Medical Use of 
Marijuana Program, at 2 (Updated Apr. 15, 2015) ("Until [the 
department] begins to process hardship cultivation applications, 
patients or their caregivers may conduct limited cultivation at 
their primary residence, but may only grow a sufficient amount 
for their sixty day supply as certified by the patient’s 
physician").   
 
12 
 
"the initial certification will remain valid until the 
application for the registration card is approved or denied by 
the [d]epartment."9  The same holds true for limited cultivation 
registrations:  a qualifying patient who received written 
certification from a physician is entitled to continue to use 
that written certification as a hardship cultivation 
registration "until the application for the hardship cultivation 
registration card is approved or denied by the [d]epartment."  
105 Code Mass. Regs. § 725.035(L) (2013).  The parties do not 
dispute that at the time of the search of the property, the 
department was not yet approving or denying any applications for 
registration, and there were no registered medical marijuana 
treatment centers in operation.10  Thus, a qualified physician's 
                     
 
9 There is a separate provision governing the registration 
requirements for personal caregivers, 725 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 725.020 (2013), and it also provides that "the initial 
certification will remain valid until the application for the 
registration card is approved or denied by the [d]epartment."  
Id. at § 725.020(C).   
 
 
10 According to its public announcements, the department has 
determined that the registration process should be electronic.  
See Program Update -- October 8, 2014, Information for Patients 
and Caregivers, Massachusetts Department of Public Health, 
http://www.mass.gov/eohhs/gov/departments/dph/programs/hcq/ 
medical-marijuana/patients-and-caregivers.html [http://perma.cc/ 
7GS7-ADNU].  The department's goal of having the electronic 
registration system ready by January, 2014, see 105 Code Mass. 
Regs. §§ 725.015(C), 725.020(C), 725.035(L) (setting initial 
registration deadline at January 1, 2014), went unrealized.  On 
October 8, 2014, the department announced that, effective 
February 1, 2015, "paper certifications" by physicians would no 
longer be valid proxies for proper registration and, as of that 
date, every qualifying patient would be required to obtain an 
13 
 
written recommendation, undocumented in any database, sufficed 
as both a medical marijuana registration card and a limited 
medical marijuana cultivation registration.   
 
2.  Search warrant and application.  "Our inquiry as to the 
sufficiency of the search warrant application always begins and 
ends with the four corners of the affidavit. . . .  The 
magistrate considers a question of law:  whether the facts 
presented in the affidavit and the reasonable inferences 
therefrom constitute probable cause. . . .  [W]e determine 
whether, based on the affidavit in its entirety, the magistrate 
had a substantial basis to conclude that a crime had been 
committed, . . . and that the items described in the warrant 
were related to the criminal activity and probably in the place 
to be searched" (quotations and citations omitted).  
Commonwealth v. O'Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297-298 (2003).  See 
Commonwealth v. Donahue, 430 Mass. 710, 711-712 (2000).   
 
The Commonwealth contends that Kent's affidavit established 
probable cause for the search because, as the motion judge 
concluded, the affidavit provided probable cause to believe that 
the defendant was engaged in cultivating marijuana at the 
property, and in the Commonwealth's view all-or-any cultivation 
                                                                  
electronic certification from his or her physician and to be 
formally and electronically registered with the department.  See 
Program Update -- October 8, 2014, Information for Patients and 
Caregivers, supra.  
 
14 
 
of marijuana remains illegal even under the act.  To the extent 
that the act permits a limited class of properly licensed or 
registered persons to grow marijuana, the argument continues, 
the existence of a license or registration is an affirmative 
defense for a defendant charged with unlawful cultivation to 
raise at trial -– the Commonwealth is not obligated to disprove 
such a status in order to conduct a search at the outset of an 
investigation.   
 
We disagree.  Although as a general matter, marijuana 
cultivation is a crime, see G. L. c. 94C, § 32C (a); 
Commonwealth v. Palmer, 464 Mass. 773, 777 (2013), and the act 
specifies generally that it remains so, see St. 2012, c. 369, 
§ 7 (E), the Commonwealth is incorrect that the act has not 
effected any change in the statutory and regulatory landscape 
relevant to establishing probable cause for a search targeting 
such cultivation.  What § 7 (E) states is that nothing in the 
act "supersedes Massachusetts law prohibiting the . . . 
cultivation . . . of marijuana for nonmedical purposes" 
(emphasis added).  Under the act, cultivation of marijuana is 
expressly permitted if a person or entity is properly registered 
to do so, and the cultivation does not exceed the amount 
necessary to yield a sixty-day supply of medical marijuana.  See 
St. 2012, c. 369, §§ 9 (B), (D), 11.  See also id. at §§ 4-6.  
As previously stated, when the search at issue here took place, 
15 
 
the act was not fully implemented; no marijuana treatment 
centers were operating; and therefore, pursuant to the act's 
express provisions, see id. at §§ 11, 13, every person who was 
certified as a qualifying patient or the patient's personal 
caregiver was authorized to cultivate a sufficient quantity of 
marijuana to produce a sixty-day supply -- presumptively ten 
ounces. 
 
In these circumstances, as the motion judge suggested, our 
cases involving searches for firearms that may be legally 
possessed with a license but are illegal in the absence of one 
provide an appropriate analytic framework.  See Commonwealth v. 
Toole, 389 Mass. 159, 163 (1983).11  Accord Commonwealth v. 
Nowells, 390 Mass. 621, 627 (1983) (search warrant affidavit did 
not establish probable cause for search of defendant's apartment 
for illegal firearms where informants only indicated they had 
seen guns there:  "The ownership or possession of a handgun [or 
                     
 
11 In Toole, we considered a warrantless search of a vehicle 
in which police suspected a gun was located:  "[I]t has not 
[been] shown that, when the search was conducted, the police 
reasonably believed that there was a connection between the 
vehicle and any criminal activity of the defendant, an essential 
element to a finding of probable cause. . . .  The empty holster 
and ammunition found on the defendant certainly created probable 
cause to believe that there was a gun in the cab.  But carrying 
a .45 caliber revolver is not necessarily a crime.  A possible 
crime was carrying a gun without a license to carry firearms, 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a).  However, the police did not learn that 
the defendant had no firearm identification card until after the 
search.  They apparently never asked the defendant whether he 
had a license to carry a firearm" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Toole, 389 Mass. 159, 163 (1983).   
 
16 
 
a rifle] is not a crime and standing alone creates no probable 
cause").  See also Commonwealth v. Couture, 407 Mass. 178, 181, 
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 951 (1990); Commonwealth v. Stevens, 361 
Mass. 868 (1972).  As these cases indicate, although firearms 
cannot legally be carried without a license to carry, see G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (a), in the absence of any evidence beyond the 
"unadorned fact," Couture, supra, that the defendant was 
carrying a gun, there was no probable cause to suspect a crime 
was being committed.12  Cf. Commonwealth v. Marra, 12 Mass. App. 
Ct. 956, 956-957 (1981) (defendant convicted of storing dynamite 
                     
 
12 Commonwealth v. Gouse, 461 Mass. 787 (2012), a case on 
which the Commonwealth relies, is inapposite.  In Gouse, the 
defendant attacked the victim, his former girl friend, on the 
street and left the scene; the investigating police were told by 
bystanders as well as the defendant's father that he might be 
armed; the police also had information that he had been released 
recently from prison, and had been observed armed with a weapon 
and dealing "crack" cocaine.  Id. at 788, 790-791.  On the same 
day as the attack of the victim, the defendant was stopped by 
the police while driving in a vehicle, removed from the vehicle, 
and arrested, and the vehicle was impounded.  Id. at 791.  The 
police thereafter, during a warrantless search of the vehicle, 
found a gun in a bag that had been placed in the trunk of the 
vehicle.  Id. at 791-792.  Before trial, the defendant 
unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence of the gun, but not on 
the ground that probable cause did not exist to believe he was 
not licensed to carry the weapon.  See id. at 792-794.  (Indeed, 
such an argument would have been highly problematic, given that 
the defendant at the time, in the court's words, was "a fleeing 
felon."  See id. at 794.  A felon, by definition, may not be 
licensed to carry a firearm.  See G. L. c. 140, § 131 [d] [i].)  
The defendant in Gouse did raise a challenge related to the 
license issue, but the challenge concerned the allocation of the 
burden of proof between the defendant and the Commonwealth at 
trial concerning the existence of a license.  See Gouse, supra 
at 799-808.   
 
17 
 
without license; conviction reversed where search warrant 
authorizing search of defendant's trailer for dynamite was not 
based on probable cause:  "The observation of a box containing 
[dynamite] blasting caps, without more, to indicate that their 
storage was unlicensed, does not provide probable cause for 
entry into the [defendant's] trailer" where no circumstances set 
out in affidavit indicated blasting caps were, or were 
reasonably likely to be, unlicensed).   
 
The Commonwealth again misses the mark in seeking to 
distinguish these cases and arguing that the existence of a 
registration card or written certification, like the existence 
of a license, constitutes an affirmative defense that the 
defendant himself is obliged to raise in the first instance -- 
at trial.  A license does constitute an affirmative defense at 
trial to be raised by the defendant.  See G. L. c. 278, § 7.13  
See also Commonwealth v. Gouse, 461 Mass. 787, 804-808 (2012); 
Couture, 407 Mass. at 181-182; Commonwealth v. Jones, 372 Mass. 
403, 405-406 (1977).  But this case is not about defenses at 
trial; the issue is probable cause to conduct an investigatory 
search.  At the trial of a case in which the existence or 
nonexistence of a license defines whether the charged conduct 
was legal or instead a crime, as Couture explains, the defendant 
                     
 
13 General Laws c. 278, § 7, provides:  "A defendant in a 
criminal prosecution, relying for his justification upon a 
license . . . shall prove the same; and until so proved, the 
presumption shall be that he is not so authorized."   
18 
 
"has every opportunity to respond" by producing the license 
authorizing his conduct, and in the absence of the defendant's 
doing so, it is not unfair for the jury to presume in accordance 
with c. 278, § 7, that the defendant did not have a license.  
Couture, supra at 182.  Accord Gouse, supra at 806.  At the time 
of a search, however, such a defendant is in a very different 
position:  the police arrive, armed with (among other things) a 
warrant authorizing the search; the defendant has no right to 
object or respond, and indeed may not even be present.  Cf. 
Couture, supra at 182-183 (contrasting position of defendant at 
trial with defendant's position when confronted by police 
stopping defendant's truck, removing him from it at gunpoint, 
and conducting warrantless search of truck to locate pistol 
police suspected would be present).  Cf. also Commonwealth v. 
Landry, 438 Mass. 206, 211 (2002) (charge of unlawful possession 
of hypodermic needle; contrasting defendant's burden to raise 
affirmative defense of license at trial with question whether 
probable cause existed for unlawful possession at time of 
arrest).14   
                     
 
14 The Commonwealth cites five decisions from other States' 
courts as ostensibly persuasive authority that a medical 
marijuana license is exclusively an affirmative defense, rather 
than a legalizing mechanism for program participants.  See 
Niehaus vs. State, Nos. A-8385, 4798 (Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 10, 
2003); People v. Sexton, 296 P.3d 157 (Colo. App. 2012); State 
vs. Meharg, No. DC-06-16 (Mont. 21st Jud. Dist. Ct. May 26, 
2006); State v. Senna, 194 Vt. 283 (2013); State v. Fry, 168 
Wash. 2d 1, 13 (2010).  We do not think these cases offer useful 
19 
 
 
The firearms and other license cases just discussed govern 
the result here.  Beginning with the initial statement of 
purpose, the act's provisions make it abundantly clear that its 
intent is to protect the lawful operation of the medical 
marijuana program established by the legislation from all 
aspects of criminal prosecution and punishment, including search 
and seizure of property as part of a criminal investigation.  
See St. 2012, c. 369, §§ 1, 3-6.  The act's medical marijuana 
program is structured as a licensing or registration system, and 
expressly contemplates the lawful possession, cultivation, and 
distribution of marijuana for medical purposes by a number of 
different individuals (and certain nonprofit entities), as long 
as they are registered to do so.  In light of the statutory and 
regulatory framework created by the act, a search warrant 
affidavit setting out facts that simply establish probable cause 
to believe the owner is growing marijuana on the property in 
question, without more, is insufficient to establish probable 
cause to believe that the suspected cultivation is a crime.  
Missing are facts indicating that the person owning or in 
                                                                  
guidance here.  The courts were considering substantially 
different medical marijuana laws, and also very different 
factual contexts.   
 
20 
 
control of the property is not or probably not registered to 
cultivate the marijuana at issue.15   
 
Detective Kent's affidavit filed in support of the search 
warrant in this case did not contain any information at all 
addressing whether the defendant was or was not registered as a 
qualifying patient or personal caregiver to grow the marijuana 
the police reasonably suspected was growing on the property.16  
Nor, as the motion judge observed, did it contain other facts or 
qualified opinions that might supply an alternate basis to 
establish the necessary probable cause to believe the 
cultivation was unlawful.  See note 15, supra.  As such, the 
affidavit failed to establish probable cause for the search.17   
                     
 
15 This is not to say that such an affidavit always must 
contain facts directly establishing that the person whose 
property the police seek to search for evidence of unlawful 
marijuana cultivation is or is probably not registered to do so; 
reasonable inferences may be drawn that a suspected marijuana 
cultivation operation is unlawful from other facts.  For 
example, except for registered medical marijuana treatment 
centers, it remains unlawful to cultivate marijuana for sale.  
Facts indicating that a confidential informant recently 
purchased marijuana from the owner of the property where the 
cultivation operation is suspected to be taking place would 
likely supply the requisite probable cause to search that 
property for evidence of unlawful cultivation, as would 
information that police recently had observed marijuana plants 
growing on the property and that, in the opinion of a properly 
qualified affiant, the number of plants exceeded the quantity 
necessary to grow a sixty-day supply of ten ounces.   
 
 
16 From start to finish, the affidavit reads as though the 
act did not exist.   
 
 
17 In arguing against this conclusion, the Commonwealth 
relies heavily on Commonwealth v. Palmer, 464 Mass. 773, 775-778 
21 
 
We disagree with the Commonwealth that the result we reach 
imposes an impossible burden on police to search for elusive and 
difficult-to-locate information about whether a person suspected 
of growing marijuana is registered to do so.  Although not 
available in 2013 when the search here was conducted, we assume 
that with the introduction of the electronic registration 
system, see note 10, supra, there is or soon will be available 
to law enforcement officers an accessible list of "the persons 
issued medical marijuana registration cards" as provided in § 15 
of the act.18  Moreover, as we have suggested (see note 15, 
supra), information independent of registration status may also 
                                                                  
(2013).  The reliance is misplaced.  In Palmer, we considered 
what impact, if any, the decriminalization of possession of one 
ounce or less of marijuana, a ballot measure approved by the 
voters in 2008, had on G. L. c. 94C, § 32C (a), which defines 
the offense of cultivation of marijuana.  See Palmer, supra at 
775.  We concluded that the decriminalization measure did not 
affect the cultivation statute, and that cultivation of 
marijuana of one ounce or less remained a crime.  Id. at 774, 
777, 779.  But the events giving rise to the criminal charges at 
issue in Palmer occurred in 2010, see id. at 774, no issue 
concerning the medical marijuana act, passed in 2012, was raised 
in Palmer, and the court did not consider the relationship of 
the medical marijuana act to § 32C (a) in any respect.   
 
 
18 Section 15 of the act states:   
 
"The department shall maintain a confidential list of the 
persons issued medical marijuana registration cards.  
Individual names and other identifying information on the 
list shall be exempt from [G. L. c. 66, § 10, the Public 
Records Law], and not subject to disclosure, except to 
employees of the department . . . and to Massachusetts law 
enforcement officials when verifying a card holder's 
registration" (emphasis added).   
22 
 
be presented to establish probable cause concerning the 
suspected unlawful cultivation of marijuana.   
 
Conclusion.  The order allowing the defendant's motion to 
suppress is affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.