Title: McMahon v. Wirick

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
STACY McMAHON 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 131910 
JUSTICE CLEO E. POWELL 
 
 
 
SEPTEMBER 12, 2014 
MELANIE WHITE WIRICK 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Randy I. Bellows, Judge 
 
 
Stacy McMahon (“McMahon”) appeals the judgment of the trial 
court denying his petition to change the surname of his 
daughter.  Finding that McMahon failed to present any evidence 
that such a change was in the best interest of the child, we 
will affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
McMahon and Melanie White Wirick (“Wirick”), formerly 
Melanie White, are the natural parents of a minor child, Addison 
Grace White (“Addison”).  McMahon and Wirick were never married 
and Addison’s surname, White, is Wirick’s maiden name.  At some 
point after Addison’s birth, Wirick married and took her 
husband’s surname. 
 
McMahon and Wirick initially shared joint physical and 
legal custody of Addison.  This situation became untenable when 
Addison reached school age, as McMahon resides in Fairfax County 
and Wirick resides in the City of Richmond.  The parties agreed 
that it was in Addison’s best interest to attend Fairfax County 
schools.  Accordingly, the parties agreed that McMahon would 
 
2 
have primary physical custody during the school year and Wirick 
would have primary physical custody during the summer. 
 
On April 5, 2013, McMahon filed a petition pursuant to Code 
§ 8.01-217 seeking to change Addison’s surname from “White” to 
“McMahon.”  Wirick objected to the petition. 
 
At trial, McMahon proffered evidence of a number of 
difficulties caused by not sharing a surname with Addison.  
Specifically, he alleged that he received medical bills with the 
name “Addison Wirick” on them, that he had difficulty contacting 
Addison’s pre-school because she was enrolled as “Addison 
Wirick,” that he is constantly called “Mr. White” at school, and 
that a photograph for a school genealogy project identified 
McMahon, his wife, his son (Addison’s half-brother) and Addison 
as “the White Family.”  McMahon also claimed that Addison was 
“asking questions of her father.”1 
 
After considering the arguments of the parties, the trial 
court denied McMahon’s petition.  It found that “[t]he evidence 
that has been proffered by Mr. McMahon’s counsel does 
constitute . . . the legal criteria of minor inconvenience and 
minor embarrassment.”  The trial court explained that McMahon 
failed to meet any of the criteria laid out by this Court in 
Spero v. Heath, 267 Va. 477, 593 S.E.2d 239 (2004).  It further 
                     
 
1 Although the exact nature of these questions was never 
addressed, presumably they related to Addison asking why her 
surname was different from both her mother and father. 
 
3 
noted that, even if it did not consider Spero, the evidence was 
not sufficient to demonstrate that a name change was in 
Addison’s best interest. 
 
McMahon appeals. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
On appeal, McMahon first argues that the trial court erred 
in relying on Spero in determining whether to grant McMahon’s 
petition.  McMahon contends that Spero is inapplicable because 
Addison does not share a surname with either parent.  While it 
is true that the present case is factually distinguishable from 
all of our previous cases on this subject, we hold that the 
logic of Spero still applies. 
 
Under Code § 8.01-217, the parent seeking to change a 
child’s surname over the objection of the other parent bears the 
burden of proving that the name change is in the child’s best 
interest.  See Spero, 267 Va. at 479, 593 S.E.2d at 240; May v. 
Grandy, 259 Va. 629, 633, 528 S.E.2d 105, 107 (2000); Rowland v. 
Shurbutt, 259 Va. 305, 308, 525 S.E.2d 917, 919 (2000); Beyah v. 
Shelton, 231 Va. 432, 434, 344 S.E.2d 909, 911 (1986); Flowers 
v. Cain, 218 Va. 234, 237, 237 S.E.2d 111, 113 (1977).  In 
Flowers, this Court explained that, to prove that the name 
change is in the child’s best interest, the petitioning parent 
must demonstrate that “substantial reasons exist for the 
change.”  218 Va. at 236, 237 S.E.2d at 113.  The Court then 
 
4 
articulated four substantial reasons, which this Court restated 
in Spero: 
1) The parent sharing his or her surname 
with the minor has “abandoned the natural 
ties ordinarily existing between parent and 
child,” 
2) The parent sharing his or her surname 
with the minor “has engaged in misconduct 
sufficient to embarrass the [minor] in the 
continued use” of the parent's name, 
3) The minor “otherwise will suffer 
substantial detriment” by bearing the 
surname he or she currently bears, or 
4) The minor “is of sufficient age and 
discretion to make an intelligent choice and 
. . . desires that [his or her] name be 
changed.” 
267 Va. at 479-80, 593 S.E.2d at 240 (quoting Flowers, 218 Va. 
at 236-37, 237 S.E.2d at 113). 
 
It is readily apparent that our language in Flowers and 
Spero is not a “test” as McMahon characterizes it.  The “test” 
is whether the name change is in the child’s best interest.  See 
Flowers, 218 Va. at 235-36, 237 S.E.2d at 112-13.  Flowers and 
Spero merely provide a non-exclusive list of “substantial 
reasons” that have been recognized by this Court and others as 
prima facie evidence that the name change is in the child’s best 
interest. 
 
We recognize that, unlike the present case, all of our 
previous cases on this issue have involved at least one parent 
who shared a surname with the child.  Nevertheless, the 
 
5 
controlling standard remains the same – that the petitioning 
party must “prove by satisfactory evidence that the change is in 
the child’s best interest.”  Id. at 480, 593 S.E.2d at 240 
(quoting Rowland, 259 Va. at 308, 525 S.E.2d at 919; May, 259 
Va. at 632, 528 S.E.2d at 106).  Accordingly, we hold that the 
trial court did not err to the extent that it relied on our 
holding in Spero to determine whether the name change was in 
Addison’s best interest. 
 
McMahon further argues that, notwithstanding its reliance 
on Spero, the trial court abused its discretion in denying his 
petition because it is fundamentally in Addison’s best interest 
to share a surname with one of her parents.  Stated differently, 
McMahon argues that ensuring that a child shares a surname with 
at least one parent is a substantial reason for changing the 
child’s name.  Again, we must disagree. 
 
If one parent objects to the proposed name change of a 
child, the trial court is required to consider whether the name 
change is in the best interest of the child.  See Flowers, 218 
Va. at 235-36, 237 S.E.2d at 112-13.  We have recognized that 
trial courts are “vested with wide discretion” in determining a 
child’s best interest.  Dyer v. Howell, 212 Va. 453, 458, 184 
S.E.2d 789, 793 (1971).  Accordingly, we will only reverse a 
trial court’s decision to grant or deny a name change upon a 
showing that the trial court abused its discretion.  See May, 
 
6 
259 Va. at 632-33, 528 S.E.2d at 106-07 (holding that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in granting the name change 
over the objection of a parent); Rowland, 259 Va. at 309, 525 
S.E.2d at 919 (holding that the trial court abused its 
discretion in granting the name change over the objection of a 
parent). 
 
This Court has never held that it is fundamentally in a 
child’s best interest to share a surname with a parent.  
Although we have recognized that “a child’s use of [a parent]’s 
surname is relevant to a determination of the child’s best 
interest,” Beyah, 231 Va. at  436, 344 S.E.2d at 911, we have 
stopped short of saying that sharing a surname was dispositive 
of the child’s best interest.  Further, our recognition of the 
relevance of a child sharing a surname with a parent in Flowers 
was based on our reluctance to change a child’s surname over the 
objection of the parent who shared that surname “for fear that 
the change would damage further the already strained [parent]-
child relationship.”  Flowers, 218 Va. at 236, 237 S.E.2d at 
113.  Where, as here, neither party shares a surname with the 
child, any potential damage would be negligible.  Thus, the 
relevance of sharing a surname is necessarily diminished and is 
not dispositive of the present case. 
 
McMahon next argues that the trial court abused its 
discretion because he presented sufficient evidence that the 
 
7 
name change was in Addison’s best interest.  McMahon contends 
that he presented evidence that his having a different surname 
from Addison resulted in confusion with regard to communications 
with her preschool and with her health insurance carrier.2  He 
also relies on the embarrassing situations caused by having 
different surnames, such as the incorrectly labeled picture and 
being referred to as “Mr. White” at Addison’s school. 
 
It is important to note that the evidence presented by 
McMahon involved the inconveniences and embarrassment that he 
felt as a result of having a different surname.  McMahon failed 
to produce any evidence that Addison suffered any such 
inconveniences or embarrassment, much less that she suffered 
“substantial detriment.”  The closest that he came to proffering 
any evidence related to the effect having a different surname 
has had on Addison was a statement that Addison was “asking 
questions of her father.”  Indeed, McMahon admitted that he had 
no evidence that Addison would “suffer substantial detriment by 
bearing the surname . . . she currently bears.” 
 
This Court has repeatedly admonished that “[a] ‘change of 
name will not be authorized . . . merely to save . . . minor 
inconvenience or embarrassment’ to the parent or the minor.”  
                     
 
2 We note that Addison is now covered under McMahon’s 
insurance and, as the trial court pointed out, any confusion 
related to the prior health insurance “is not likely to recur.” 
 
 
8 
Spero, 267 Va. at 480, 593 S.E.2d at 240. (quoting Flowers, 218 
Va. at 237, 237 S.E.2d at 113).  Here, the evidence is clear 
that McMahon experienced no more than minor inconveniences or 
embarrassment and it is inconclusive that Addison experienced 
any complications as a result of not sharing a surname.  Indeed, 
we note that the confusion related to Addison’s school occurred 
because Addison was enrolled under the wrong name, not because 
she did not share McMahon’s surname.  Wirick enrolled Addison in 
preschool under the name “Addison Wirick.”  The problems with 
the health insurance occurred for the same reason: Addison’s 
name was incorrect on Wirick’s husband’s insurance.  Both of 
these problems have presumably been resolved, as McMahon is 
unlikely to have enrolled Addison in school as “Addison Wirick” 
and she is now under McMahon’s insurance, not Wirick’s husband’s 
insurance.  As for the misidentification in the school 
photograph, McMahon failed to offer any evidence as to how this 
amounted to anything more than a minor embarrassment.  
Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying the petition. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
the trial court denying McMahon’s petition to change the surname 
of his daughter. 
Affirmed. 
JUSTICE McCLANAHAN, concurring. 
 
Although I agree that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying the petition for a name change under the 
best interest analysis, I would hold that the four-factor 
analysis set forth in Spero v. Heath, 267 Va. 477, 479-80, 593 
S.E.2d 239, 240 (2004), is not applicable to this case and that 
the trial court erred in applying it. 
 
The controlling standard for determining whether a petition 
to change the name of a minor should be granted is explicitly 
set forth in Code § 8.01-217.  Pursuant to subsection A, when 
both parents of the minor are living and the parent who does not 
join in the petition objects, “a hearing shall be held to 
determine whether the change of name is in the best interest of 
the minor.”  We have previously interpreted the statute to mean 
that “the burden is upon the petitioning parent, under the 
circumstances of [the] case, to prove by satisfactory evidence 
that the change is in the child’s best interest.”  Rowland v. 
Shurbutt, 259 Va. 305, 308, 525 S.E.2d 917, 919 (2000). 
   
Under the specific circumstances where the parent objecting 
to the name change shares the child’s surname, we have stated 
that the parent petitioning for the child’s name to be changed 
“may prove that the name change is in the best interest of the 
minor by showing” sufficient evidence of one of the following 
 
10 
four factors enumerated in Flowers v. Cain, 218 Va. 234, 237 
S.E.2d 111 (1977): 
1) The parent sharing his or her surname with the 
minor has “abandoned the natural ties ordinarily 
existing between parent and child,” 
 
2) The parent sharing his or her surname with the 
minor “has engaged in misconduct sufficient to 
embarrass the [minor] in the continued use” of 
the parent’s name, 
 
3) The minor “otherwise will suffer substantial 
detriment” by bearing the surname he or she 
currently bears, or 
 
4) The minor “is of sufficient age and discretion 
to make an intelligent choice and . . . desires 
that [his or her] name be changed.” 
 
Spero, 267 Va. at 479-80, 593 S.E.2d at 240-41 (emphasis added) 
(quoting Flowers, 218 Va. at 236-37, 237 S.E.2d at 113, and 
concluding that petitioner failed “to show any of the criteria 
required by Flowers”).  This test is clearly intended to apply 
when the objecting parent and the child have a common surname.  
Under such circumstances, the Court has required the petitioning 
parent to prove that the parent sharing the surname with the 
child abandoned the child or engaged in conduct that will cause  
the child to suffer embarrassment or other harm by bearing the  
 
 
 
 
 
11 
parent’s surname.1  In my view, the analysis outlined in Spero 
cannot logically be applied when the child does not share the 
objecting parent’s surname.2 
Addison does not bear Wirick’s surname and, therefore, 
McMahon did not seek to prove that Addison should no longer bear 
Wirick’s name.3  In fact, McMahon candidly represented to the 
trial court that he was not contending the presence of any one 
of the Spero factors.  Concluding that the factors in Spero were 
controlling, however, the trial court considered each factor, 
noting that while the fourth factor was not present due to 
Addison’s age, McMahon failed to satisfy any of the other three 
factors, and ultimately declared that “the petition will be 
denied on that basis.”  Since, in my view, the Spero analysis 
was inapplicable, I believe the trial court erred in ruling that  
 
                     
 
1 Under the fourth factor, the petitioning parent may also 
prove that the name change is in the best interest of the child 
when a child of sufficient age and discretion desires the name 
change. 
 
 
2 Although the majority opinion states that “[i]t is readily 
apparent” that the above-quoted language is not a “test,” we 
have expressly referred to the four-factor analysis as “the test 
for determining whether a name change is in the best interest of 
a child.”  Spero, 267 Va. at 480, 593 S.E.2d at 240 (emphasis 
added).  As I stated previously, however, this test, by its 
plain language, applies to circumstances in which the child 
shares a surname with the objecting parent. 
 
 
3 Instead, McMahon argued that it was in Addison’s best 
interest to share a surname with a parent. 
 
12 
 
McMahon’s failure to prove the existence of any of the factors 
precluded relief on his petition. 
Nevertheless, the trial court then provided an alternative 
basis for its ruling: “even if I did not conclude that the 
failure to meet any of [the Spero] criteria was a bar to 
relief,” the name change was not in the best interest of Addison 
under a “best interest analysis.”4  Code § 8.01-217.  Applying 
this standard, I agree with the majority opinion that McMahon 
failed to prove that the name change was in Addison’s best 
interest.5  Thus, I concur in the Court’s judgment that the trial 
court did not err in denying the petition. 
 
                     
 
4 It is evident the trial court was unsure as to whether the 
factors in Spero should apply, which led to the alternative 
basis for its decision.  Although the majority holds that the 
trial court properly relied upon the Spero factors, it does not 
discuss the applicability of those factors to this case or 
address the trial court’s initial ruling that relief was 
precluded on the basis that none of the Spero criteria was met.  
In my view, the majority’s ruling that the trial court properly 
applied the Spero factors will simply foster continued confusion 
as to the applicability of the Spero analysis when the 
petitioning parent does not seek to change the child’s surname 
from one that is shared with the other parent. 
 
5 Addison continues to share a name with Wirick since Wirick 
legally changed her middle name to White.  Addison also shares 
her surname with her half-brother, Tyler White.  Additionally, 
Wirick testified that Addison self-identifies as Addy White.