Title: Reed v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC11-2149 
____________ 
 
GROVER REED,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[February 28, 2013] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This case is before the Court on appeal from an order denying a motion to 
vacate a judgment of conviction of first-degree murder and a sentence of death 
under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, 
§ 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the denial of relief. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Grover Reed was convicted of the first-degree murder of Betty Oermann and 
was sentenced to death.  The underlying facts are set forth in our opinion on direct 
appeal, in which we affirmed Reed’s conviction and sentence.  Reed v. State, 560 
So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1990).  Reed filed an initial postconviction motion, and after this 
 
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Court remanded for an evidentiary hearing on some of his ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims, see Reed v. State, 640 So. 2d 1094, 1098 (Fla. 1994), the 
postconviction court denied relief.  This Court affirmed on appeal and denied 
Reed’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.  Reed v. State, 875 So. 2d 415, 440 (Fla. 
2004).   
On March 16, 2011, Reed filed an amended successive postconviction 
motion to vacate his judgments of conviction and sentence,1
                                         
 
1.  Reed filed his successive postconviction motion through his federal 
registry counsel, asserting the following claims: (1) Reed’s sentence violates the 
Sixth and Eighth Amendments under Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (2009); and 
(2) newly discovered evidence establishes that Reed is innocent of the murder for 
which he was convicted and that manifest injustice warrants invocation of the 
court’s inherent equitable powers and the issuance of rule 3.851 relief.  The State 
responded with a motion to strike the postconviction motion because federal 
counsel was not permitted to file in state court proceedings.  Reed filed a motion 
for appointment of federal counsel in state court proceedings, which the 
postconviction court granted on November 15, 2010.   
 asserting the 
following claims: (1) Reed’s sentence violates the Sixth and Eighth Amendments 
under Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (2009); (2) newly discovered evidence 
establishes that Reed is innocent of the murder for which he was convicted and 
manifest injustice warrants invocation of the court’s inherent equitable powers and 
the issuance of rule 3.851 relief; and (3) Reed’s sentence violates the Eighth 
Amendment because a drug constitutionally required to prevent lethal injections 
from being cruel and unusual is unavailable to the State of Florida.  On May 7, 
 
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2011, Reed filed a motion for discovery with regard to the second postconviction 
claim of newly discovered evidence of Reed’s innocence, requesting production of 
a photograph card of an unidentified fingerprint found on the victim’s check.  Reed 
sought to compare the unidentified fingerprint with that of Dwayne Kirkland, a 
now-deceased death row inmate who Reed contends was the real murderer.  On 
September 7, 2011, the postconviction court denied Reed’s motion for discovery 
and summarily denied his amended successive postconviction motion. 
 
Reed appeals, raising the following claims for our review: (1) the circuit 
court erred in not accepting affidavits executed by James Wayne Hazen and 
Johnny Shane Kormondy as true and by not evaluating the newly discovered Brady 
evidence of Kirkland’s confession cumulatively with Reed’s previously presented 
Brady2/Giglio3 and Strickland4
                                         
 
2.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 claims, and it was error to summarily deny Reed’s 
claim without conducting an evidentiary hearing; (2) the circuit court erred in 
denying Reed’s motion for discovery and in refusing to give Reed access to the 
photograph of the latent print on check number 400 so that it could be compared to 
Kirkland’s fingerprints; (3) the failure to apply the proper Strickland standard of 
review in Reed’s case while numerous similarly situated individuals have received 
 
3.  Giglio v. U.S., 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
 
4.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 
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the benefit of proper Strickland analysis violates Reed’s equal protection and due 
process rights, as well as his Eighth Amendment rights; and (4) Reed was deprived 
of his due process rights of notice and opportunity to be heard and to present 
evidence on his challenge to Florida’s lethal injection procedures when the circuit 
court summarily denied his Rule 3.851 challenge to the  new lethal injection 
protocol and in denying his request for an evidentiary hearing on the claim. 
 
On September 25, 2012, Reed filed a motion to relinquish jurisdiction, or in 
the alternative, allow supplemental briefing regarding his lethal injection claim, 
asserting that the Florida Department of Corrections had again revised the lethal 
injection protocol on September 4, 2012, and changed the second drug used in the 
three-drug protocol.  This Court denied Reed’s motion.  
ANALYSIS 
 
Postconviction Motion 
 
In his amended successive postconviction motion with the circuit court 
below, Reed asserted that he was entitled to relief based on newly discovered 
evidence of two affidavits executed by James Wayne Hazen, an inmate, and 
Johnny Shane Kormondy, a death row inmate, stating that another death row 
inmate, Dwayne Kirkland, who is now deceased, confessed to them that he killed 
an old white lady in Jacksonville in the mid 1980s.  The postconviction court 
 
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summarily denied relief.  We find that the postconviction court correctly 
summarily denied relief. 
a. Timeliness 
 
The postconviction court correctly found Reed’s claim time-barred.  Rule 
3.851(d)(2) provides that a motion for postconviction relief must be filed within 
one year of a defendant’s judgment and sentence becoming final unless the motion 
alleges: 
(A) the facts on which the claim is predicated were unknown to 
the movant or the movant’s attorney and could not have been 
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence, or 
(B) the fundamental constitutional right asserted was not 
established within the period provided for in subdivision (d)(1) and 
has been held to apply retroactively, or 
(C) postconviction counsel, through neglect, failed to file the 
motion. 
 
Further, “[t]o be considered timely filed as newly discovered evidence, the 
successive 3.851 motion was required to have been filed within one year of the 
date upon which the claim became discoverable through due diligence.”  Jimenez 
v. State, 997 So. 2d 1056, 1064 (Fla. 2008); Clark v. State, 35 So. 3d 880, 892 (Fla. 
2010) (citing rule 3.851(d)(2)(A) in holding that “[c]laims of newly discovered 
evidence must be raised within one year of the time of discovery.”).  As 
determined by the postconviction court, Reed’s newly discovered evidence claim 
fails to meet the one-year deadline, because although the affidavits were signed in 
 
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January of 2007, the successive motion raising this claim was not filed until 
November of 2010.   
b. Standard of Review 
 
Furthermore, the record in this case conclusively shows that Reed is entitled 
to no relief.  In Walton v. State, 3 So. 3d 1000 (Fla. 2009), this Court articulated 
the standard of review of a summarily denied postconviction motion: 
 
A successive rule 3.851 motion may be denied without an 
evidentiary hearing if the records of the case conclusively show that 
the movant is entitled to no relief.  See
Id. at 1005.   
 Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B).  
This Court reviews the circuit court’s decision to summarily deny a 
successive rule 3.851 motion de novo, accepting the movant’s factual 
allegations as true to the extent they are not refuted by the record, and 
affirming the ruling if the record conclusively shows that the movant 
is entitled to no relief. 
c. Newly Discovered Evidence 
Reed claims that the Hazen and Kormondy affidavits constitute newly 
discovered evidence and that the circuit court erred when it denied this claim 
without an evidentiary hearing.  We disagree.   
To obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a defendant must 
meet two requirements: (1) the evidence must not have been known by the trial 
court, the party, or counsel at the time of trial, and it must appear that the defendant 
or defense counsel could not have known of it by the use of diligence; and (2) the 
newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce 
 
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an acquittal on retrial.  Jones v. State (Jones II), 709 So. 2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998).  
“Newly discovered evidence satisfies the second prong of the Jones II test if it 
‘weakens the case against [the defendant] so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt as 
to his culpability.’ ”  Gore v. State, 91 So. 3d 769, 774 (Fla.) (quoting Jones II, 709 
So. 2d at 526), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1904 (2012).  “ ‘If the defendant is seeking 
to vacate a sentence, the second prong requires that the newly discovered evidence 
would probably yield a less severe sentence.’ ”  Id. at 774 (quoting Marek v. State, 
14 So. 3d 985, 990 (Fla. 2009)).   
Even taking Reed’s assertions as true, Reed fails to establish the second 
prong that the newly discovered evidence would probably produce an acquittal or 
less severe sentence on retrial.  The affidavits of Hazen and Kormondy stating that 
Kirkland confessed to murdering an old white woman in Jacksonville in February 
of 1986, do not implicate Kirkland in the murder for which Reed was convicted.  
No specific names, places, or dates were provided by Kirkland or the affidavits in 
order to link Kirkland’s confession to the murder for which Reed was convicted.  
Moreover, none of the information in the affidavits negates the ample evidence 
implicating Reed in the murder, including Reed’s own confessions and his 
fingerprints, hat, and hair found at the murder scene.  See Reed, 875 So. 2d at 419, 
422, n.5.  This, in addition to the inherent credibility issues surrounding affidavits 
of two incarcerated men implicating another death row inmate who is now 
 
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deceased in a murder, when considered in conjunction with the evidence at Reed’s 
trial and 3.850 proceedings, are not of such nature that they would probably 
produce an acquittal or less severe sentence on retrial.  Cf. Clark v. State, 35 So. 3d 
880, 891 (Fla. 2010) (“Clark waited two years to raise the claim.  Further, the 
postconviction court found that Clark ‘failed to establish that this evidence would 
have been admissible at [his] trial’ and that “Thompson’s testimony was not of 
such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal for the Defendant on 
retrial, especially in light of Thompson’s [an inmate implicating a third inmate] 
credibility issues.”) (footnote omitted); Hitchcock v. State, 991 So. 2d 337, 349-51 
(Fla. 2008) (finding that the circuit court did not err in denying postconviction 
relief with regard to a newly discovered evidence claim based on a deceased third 
party’s alleged confession, in light of the credibility issues of the witnesses who 
testified to said confession, the evidence implicating Hitchcock, and the fact that 
the evidence presented was unlikely to change the verdict where the jury had 
already rejected the same defense theory); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417-18 
(1993) (observing, in a capital case, where the affidavits exonerating the defendant 
were given over eight years after petitioner’s trial, that “[n]o satisfactory 
explanation has been given as to why the affiants waited until the 11th hour—and, 
indeed, until after the alleged perpetrator of the murders himself was dead—to 
make their statements.”).  
 
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d. Brady Claim 
Reed asserts a Brady claim regarding Edith Bosso’s interview statement to 
police of her observations on the evening of February 27, 1986, wherein she stated 
that when she was returning home from the dog track, she saw a black man 
walking in the neighborhood at about 6:30 p.m. toward Ortega Forest Drive.  
Bosso described the man as wearing dark clothes and having something sticking 
out of his back pocket.  She described this man as slender and about six feet in 
height.  Reed claims that the State did not provide this interview information to the 
defense before the trial, and that the newly discovered evidence provided by the 
Hazen and Kormondy affidavits that Kirkland, a black man, confessed to killing an 
old white woman in Jacksonville in the 1980s made the exculpatory and material 
nature of the Brady
To establish a 
 violation of Bosso’s interview information apparent.   
Brady
Buzia v. State, 82 So. 3d 784, 797 (Fla. 2011) (citations omitted).   
 violation, a defendant must show: (1) that 
favorable exculpatory or impeaching evidence (2) was suppressed by 
the State, either willfully or inadvertently, and (3) that the evidence 
was material.  Evidence is material or prejudicial if there is a 
reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different.  That is, the undisclosed 
favorable evidence, reasonably “considered in the context of the entire 
record,” must undermine confidence in the verdict. 
The interview information was not material or prejudicial.  See Guzman v. 
State, 941 So. 2d 1045, 1050 (Fla. 2006) (recognizing that Brady’s materiality 
prong test is the same as Strickland’s prejudice prong test).  None of the interview 
 
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information negates or impeaches the ample evidence of Reed’s guilt, including 
Reed’s own confessions and Reed’s fingerprints, hat, and hair at the crime scene.  
Reed, 875 So. 2d at 419, 422, n.5.  The undisclosed evidence reasonably 
considered within the context of the entire record, does not undermine confidence 
in the verdict.   
e. Porter
 
 Claim 
We affirm the denial of Reed’s claim that Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 
(2009), is retroactive.  See Walton v. State, 77 So. 3d 639 (Fla. 2011).  Although 
Reed requests that this Court reconsider its decision in Walton, he has not provided 
any compelling reason for us to do so.   
Reed also argues that refusing to apply the benefit of the “evolutionary 
refinement” of Porter to his case, where Porter received that same benefit, is 
arbitrary and a violation of due process.  This claim is without merit.  This Court 
stated in Walton that Porter “involved a mere application and evolutionary 
refinement and development of the Strickland analysis, i.e., it addressed a 
misapplication of Strickland.”  Walton, 77 So. 3d at 644 (emphasis added).  This 
Court did not state that the Strickland standard had changed such that it would be a 
violation of due process and unconstitutionally arbitrary not to apply it in Reed’s 
case.  Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of this claim. 
f. Lethal Injection Claim 
 
 
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Reed asserts that Florida’s new lethal injection protocol is unconstitutional.  
This claim is controlled by this Court’s decision in Valle v. State, 70 So. 3d 530, 
546 (Fla.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1 (2011) (affirming the circuit court’s denial of 
Valle’s postconviction claim that the substitution of pentobarbital for sodium 
thiopental constituted cruel and unusual punishment); see also Pardo v. State, 37 
Fla. L. Weekly S749, S751 (Fla. December 4, 2012) (reaffirming Valle), cert. 
denied, 133 S. Ct. 815 (2012).   
Reed asserts that because he filed an amended Rule 3.851 motion with this 
claim before the defendant in Valle, Reed should be granted an evidentiary hearing 
on this issue.  Specifically, although this Court denied in Valle the merits of Reed’s 
lethal injection claim, Reed nevertheless contends that because he brought a claim 
before Valle and because this Court ultimately determined in Valle that an 
evidentiary hearing was warranted, he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing of his 
own.   
Even accepting for the sake of argument that the circuit court erred in 
summarily denying Reed’s initial lethal injection claim with respect to the new 
drug, which was filed before this Court decided the merits of Valle, any such error 
would be harmless.  Reed did not allege what evidence he would present 
differently than was considered in Valle.  Nor did he present any allegations 
beyond those of Valle.  See Ventura v. State, 2 So. 3d 194, 198 (Fla. 2009) (“We 
 
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have repeatedly and consistently rejected Eighth Amendment challenges to 
Florida’s current lethal-injection protocol. . . .  Ventura has not presented any 
allegations beyond those of Lightbourne and Schwab (who predicated his claims 
upon those of Lightbourne).  This Court has thus previously rejected each of these 
challenges to Florida’s lethal-injection protocol and—based upon the sound 
principle of stare decisis—we continue the same course here.” (citations and 
footnote omitted)); Schwab v. State, 969 So. 2d 318, 323, n.2, 325 (Fla. 2007) (“In 
this case, judicial notice would have been sufficient because Schwab has not 
presented any argument as to specific evidence he wanted to present in this case 
that had not been presented in the Lightbourne proceeding.”  “Given the record in 
Lightbourne and our extensive analysis in our opinion in Lightbourne v. 
McCollum
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of relief on 
Reed’s postconviction motion.  
, we reject the conclusion that lethal injection as applied in Florida is 
unconstitutional.”). 
Motion for Discovery 
 
A Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) report dated March 10, 
1986, noted that two latent fingerprints of value for identification were developed 
and that photographs of the unidentified latent fingerprints were prepared for 
FDLE’s files.  FDLE fingerprint specialist, Bruce Carl Scott, ultimately concluded 
 
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that one of the latent prints matched Reed’s known prints.  However, the other 
latent fingerprint of value for identification was not matched to Reed and remained 
unidentified through Reed’s trial.  Based upon the Hazen and Kormondy affidavits, 
Reed filed a Motion for Discovery on or about May 7, 2011, requesting production 
of the fingerprint card containing the unidentified fingerprint so that it could be 
compared to Kirkland’s fingerprints.  At the same time, Reed again raised the 
credibility of the fingerprint evidence offered against him at trial.   
The motion was considered simultaneously with Reed’s amended successive 
postconviction motion filed on or about March 15, 2011.  The circuit court found 
that because Reed’s newly discovered evidence claim was both untimely and 
without basis, Reed was not entitled to the discovery he sought in his motion.  The 
circuit court also noted that the credibility of the fingerprint evidence offered 
against the defendant at trial was specifically addressed at the rule 3.850 
evidentiary hearing conducted by the circuit court pursuant to Reed’s initial 
postconviction motion, which was addressed and affirmed on appeal, and thus was 
procedurally barred from further litigation.  See Reed, 875 So. 2d at 426-28.  The 
postconviction court thus denied Reed’s motion for discovery of the fingerprint 
card.  Reed asserts that the circuit court erred in denying this motion. 
 
“There is no unqualified general right to engage in discovery in a 
postconviction proceeding.  ‘[A]vailability of discovery in a postconviction case is 
 
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a matter firmly within the trial court’s discretion.’ ”  Johnston v. State, 27 So. 3d 
11, 24 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Marshall v. State, 976 So. 2d 1071, 1079 (Fla. 2007)).  
“[A] trial court’s determination with regard to a discovery request is reviewed 
under an abuse of discretion standard.”  Id. (quoting Overton v. State, 976 So. 2d 
536, 548 (Fla. 2007)). 
We find that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by denying 
Reed’s motion for discovery.  There is no reasonable probability that the testing 
results of the fingerprint card would result in an acquittal on retrial.  Testing the 
other unidentified fingerprint would not negate the fact that Reed’s fingerprints 
were found on the victim’s check, which were taken from the murder scene and 
were reconfirmed during a postconviction evidentiary hearing in 2002 to be 
Reed’s.  Nor would the other fingerprint negate the other substantial evidence 
implicating Reed as stated above.  Thus, Reed has not shown that his request for 
the picture of the unidentified latent fingerprint on the check would result in 
discovery of relevant or material evidence.   
Furthermore, to any extent Reed reasserts that defense counsel was 
ineffective for failing to present an expert fingerprint witness during trial, such 
argument was fully litigated and addressed on the merits in Reed’s initial 
postconviction appeal and is procedurally barred.  See Reed, 875 So. 2d at 426-28. 
 
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Accordingly, the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by denying 
Reed’s motion for discovery of the fingerprint card. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of Reed’s 
successive postconviction motion and denial of Reed’s motion for discovery. 
 
It is so ordered. 
POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, LABARGA, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED.  
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County, 
Michael R. Weatherby, Judge - Case No. 16-1986-CF-6123-AXXX 
 
Martin J. McClain of McClain & McDermott, P.A., Wilton Manors, Florida,  
 
for Appellant  
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General and Charmaine Millsaps, Assistant Attorney 
General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
for Appellee