Title: Drumheller v. Shelburne ZBA

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 88-203


Philip and Linda Drumheller                  Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
     v.                                      Chittenden Superior Court

Shelburne Zoning Board of Adjustment         April Term, 1989


Matthew I. Katz, J.

James W. Coffrin of Pierson, Affolter & Wadhams, Burlington, for
  plaintiffs-appellants

Steven F. Stitzel of McNeil, Murray & Sorrell, Inc., Burlington, for
  defendant-appellee


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ.


     DOOLEY, J.   Appellants Philip and Linda Drumheller sought a
declaratory ruling that a part of their property should be considered to be
a separate lot for the purposes of the Town of Shelburne zoning and
subdivision regulations, even though its area is less than allowed by the
zoning ordinance for the district in which it lies.  The Chittenden Superior
Court ruled that all of appellants' property must be considered to be a
single lot, and therefore that a part could not be conveyed free of local
regulation and permit requirements.  We affirm.
     The Browns, appellants' predecessors in title, acquired a 94-acre
parcel of land in 1940, including all the property now in dispute.  In 1957
the Browns conveyed a small parcel of 1.3 acres (56,628 square feet) with a
camp residence on it to the Wyeths, who conveyed it back to the Browns in
1961. (FN1) In 1987 the Browns conveyed to appellants 8.15 acres (355,014 square
feet) of land, with two residences, including what had been the Wyeth lot
and camp.
     The Town of Shelburne first adopted zoning bylaws in 1963.  In 1971, a
minimum lot size of 100,000 square feet was established for the district in
which the subject property is located. (FN2) The zoning bylaws applicable to
this case were adopted in 1985, effective January 1986, and continued the
requirement that lots in this district (Residential II) be a minimum of
100,000 square feet in area.
     In March of 1987, Philip Drumheller requested a declaratory ruling from
the Shelburne Zoning Administrator on whether the Wyeth lot continued as a
lot separate from its surroundings.  He noted that it had a separate deed
and plat recorded in the town clerk's office and that it had been taxed
separately from the surrounding land.  When the zoning administrator
answered that the Wyeth lot was no longer a separate lot but had merged into
the surrounding land also owned by the Browns, Philip Drumheller appealed to
the Shelburne Zoning Board.  While the appeal was pending, appellants
bought the property.  The board ruled that the 1.3-acre lot "is not a
preexisting lot within the meaning of Section 1490.3" of the zoning
ordinance and sustained the position of the zoning administrator.  In its
findings, the board stated that since the 1.3-acre lot was not a preexisting
lot, "a conveyance of this lot into separate ownership would violate the
Shelburne Zoning Regulations presently in effect."
     The case went from the zoning board to superior court, where appellants
sought a declaratory judgement "that [the Wyeth] parcel . . . has not been
merged into [the remaining] parcel . . . and that it may be conveyed sepa-
rate and apart from [the remaining land] . . . ."  The case was submitted on
cross motions for summary judgement, and the superior court granted the
Town's motion, holding that the parcels had merged as of the effective date
of the 1971 ordinance.  This appeal followed.
     This case is in an unusual procedural posture because the issue is
about the subdivision of land, but it has been dealt with in the context of
a zoning declaratory ruling rather than a request for a permit to subdivide
the property. (FN3) Partially as a result of the procedural posture, many of the
arguments have centered on the applicability of { 1490.3 of the Shelburne
Zoning Ordinance which provides:
Existing Small Lots.

           Any lot in individual and separate and non-affiliated
         ownership from surrounding properties in existence on
         the effective date of these regulations, may be devel-
         oped for the purposes permitted in the district in which
         it is located, even though not conforming to minimum lot
         size requirements, if such lot is not less than 1/8th
         acre in area with a minimum width or depth dimension of
         forty (40) feet.
The ordinance provision is identical to the relevant portion of the
applicable statute and is required to be included in every zoning ordinance
in the state.  24 V.S.A. { 4406(1).  Appellants point out that the existing
small lot provision regulates development and argue that there is no
proposal here to develop the Wyeth lot since it is already built upon,
despite the proposal to subdivide.
     We cannot accept appellants' narrow construction of the applicable
provisions of the zoning ordinance.  Appellants' argument is based almost
entirely on the use of the phrase "may be developed" in the existing small
lot section of the ordinance.  From the wording of the ordinance, appellants
construe the section to restrict development of undersized lots but not to
restrict the creation of a small lot that has already been developed.
Appellants' argument involves an incomplete analysis of the relevant
statutory and ordinance sections that misconstrues the use of the term
"development" in the ordinance.
     First, appellants' argument is inconsistent with the minimum lot area
requirement of the ordinance.  For the district containing the land in
question, the minimum lot size is "100,000 square feet for single family
dwellings."  Shelburne Zoning Ordinance { 730.1(a).  Section 1490.3 creates
a limited exception to the minimum lot size requirement for certain
undersized lots in existence on the effective date of the "regulations."
The parties appear to agree that the regulations referred to are those
imposing the minimum size requirement and that the Wyeth lot did not meet
the requirements of the exception.
     The failure to meet the exception is of significance only if the sale
of the Wyeth lot is itself an act subject to the zoning ordinance.  Under
the statute, the purpose of a zoning ordinance is to "permit, prohibit,
restrict, regulate, and determine land development."  24 V.S.A. {
4401(b)(1).  The term "land development" is specifically defined to include
not only the erecting of structures on the land but also the "division of a
parcel into two or more parcels."  24 V.S.A. { 4303(3).  Thus, the act of
subdividing land is itself a form of development and brings the landowner
under the authority of the zoning ordinance.
     The broad ambit of zoning power under the statute undercuts
appellants' argument that the existing small lot section to the ordinance is
irrelevant to this case because appellants do not propose to "develop" the
Wyeth lot.  In fact, the selling of part of appellants' land is by
definition developing that land under the statute.  Thus, the exception to
the minimum lot size requirement is relevant to appellants' circumstances,
and appellants fail to fit within it.  Since they fail to fit within it,
they are subject to the minimum lot size requirement of the ordinance and
violate the ordinance by creating and selling an undersized lot.
     In reaching this construction of the relevant provisions, we think it
significant that the existing small lot provision is contained in the
zoning enabling act in virtually identical words.  See 24 V.S.A. { 4406(1).
We must read provisions that are part of the same statutory scheme in pari
materia.  See Blundon v. Town of Stamford, ___ Vt. ___, ___, 576 A.2d 437,
439 (1990).  Thus, we construe the provision describing the zoning power and
the provision on existing small lots as using the same concept of
development.  Reading them together, we take the existing small lot
provision, and its requirement of "individual and separate and non-
affiliated ownership" as defining when land may be considered a separate
parcel for purposes of the definition of "land development" in { 4303(3).
     Second, the construction we have reached is most consistent with the
intent and purpose of the legislature.  See Lubinsky v. Fair Haven Zoning
Bd., 148 Vt. 47, 50,