Title: In re Jenkins

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
In re JASMINE JENKINS 
on Habeas Corpus. 
 
S267391 
 
Second Appellate District, Division One 
B301638 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court  
BA467828 
 
 
March 27, 2023 
 
Chief Justice Guerrero authored the opinion of the Court, in 
which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and 
Evans concurred. 
 
1 
In re JENKINS 
S267391 
 
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
After a jury found her guilty of voluntary manslaughter, 
Jasmine Jenkins appealed and filed a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus in the Court of Appeal.  In the writ petition, she claimed 
the prosecution had suppressed evidence at trial in violation of 
Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 (Brady).  Specifically, 
Jenkins alleged the People had suppressed evidence that the 
victim and a key witness had previously been prosecuted for 
aggravated assault arising from an incident that occurred 
12 years earlier, which Jenkins asserted would have supported 
her claim of self-defense.  To support her allegations, Jenkins 
attached as an exhibit an appellate court opinion downloaded 
from LexisNexis that apparently referred to the prior 
prosecution. 
The Attorney General filed an informal response and, 
after the Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause, 
submitted a brief in support of his return, arguing Jenkins had 
failed to present sufficient evidence of the prior case forming the 
basis of her Brady claim.  In particular, the Attorney General 
argued that the appellate opinion was “nothing but an apparent 
printout of an unspecified and unverified Internet source.”   
The Court of Appeal assumed the opinion from the prior 
case referred to the victim and the witness, but it concluded the 
evidence of prior prosecution was not material under Brady and 
denied Jenkins’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.   
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
2 
Jenkins filed a petition for review in which she contended 
that it was appropriate to grant review because the Attorney 
General had violated her right to due process by suppressing the 
same evidence that formed the basis of her Brady claim.  The 
Attorney General filed an answer stating he had no “obligation 
to provide additional evidence” pertaining to Jenkins’s petition 
for writ of habeas corpus.  Specifically, the Attorney General 
maintained he had no constitutional, ethical, or procedural duty 
to disclose evidence of the alleged prior prosecution in response 
to Jenkins’s petition.  We granted Jenkins’s petition for review 
on the limited issue of the Attorney General’s duties, if any, to 
disclose evidence in response to a habeas corpus petitioner’s 
Brady claim.   
We conclude that the Attorney General has both a 
constitutional and an ethical duty to disclose evidence in 
response to a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging a Brady 
violation under certain specified circumstances.  In addition, we 
conclude that the respondent to such a petition has a duty to 
disclose evidence forming the basis of the Brady claim under 
circumstances that we describe.  We explain how these duties 
may be performed when, as in this case, the evidence forming 
the basis of the Brady claim in a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus is subject to statutory disclosure restrictions.  Finally, we 
apply these conclusions in Jenkins’s case and reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand the matter to that 
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
3 
I. 
A. 
At the time of the incident giving rise to her manslaughter 
conviction, Jenkins was dating Kayuan Mitchell.1  Victim 
Brittneeh Williams (Brittneeh)2 and Mitchell had a daughter 
together.   
One evening in January 2018, Mitchell and Brittneeh got 
into a fight during which Mitchell assaulted Brittneeh.  Jenkins 
arrived at the scene of the fight and taunted Brittneeh.  Mitchell 
got into Jenkins’s car and Jenkins started to drive away.  After 
phoning her sister, Sade Williams (Sade), Brittneeh drove after 
Jenkins and Mitchell.  
During the car chase, Jenkins complied with Mitchell’s 
direction to pull into a gas station.  Brittneeh also pulled into 
the gas station.  Brittneeh came over to Jenkins’s car, shouted 
at Jenkins, and possibly punched her through an open window.  
Mitchell got out of Jenkins’s car and tried to restrain Brittneeh. 
As Mitchell and Brittneeh continued to fight, Jenkins 
exited her car with a large kitchen knife and became involved in 
the fight.  Jenkins stabbed Brittneeh three times with the knife, 
killing her, just as Sade arrived at the scene.  Sade testified that 
Jenkins stabbed Brittneeh while Mitchell held Brittneeh in a 
bear hug. 
 
1  
We provide a brief summary of facts leading to Jenkins’s 
conviction based on the Court of Appeal’s unpublished opinion 
in this matter.  (People v. Jenkins (Jan. 22, 2021, B294747, 
B301638) [nonpub. opn.].)   
2  
Because the victim and a witness share the same last 
name, after introducing them, we use their first names when 
referring to them individually to avoid confusion. 
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
4 
A jury acquitted Jenkins of murder but convicted her of 
voluntary manslaughter.  The trial court sentenced her to 
11 years in prison.  
B. 
Jenkins appealed.  While her appeal was pending, Jenkins 
filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Appeal.   
As relevant here, in her petition for writ of habeas corpus, 
Jenkins claimed that the trial prosecutor suppressed material 
exculpatory evidence in violation of her right to due process.  
Specifically, Jenkins alleged the prosecutor failed to disclose 
that the prosecutor’s office had, in 2006, successfully prosecuted 
Brittneeh and Sade for aggravated assault with hate crime and 
infliction of great bodily injury enhancements.3  As to Brittneeh, 
Jenkins maintained that evidence of Brittneeh’s prior 
commission of violence would have been admissible to 
demonstrate her character for violence and support Jenkins’s 
claim of self-defense.  As to Sade, Jenkins contended that the 
suppressed 
evidence 
would 
have 
been 
admissible 
for 
impeachment purposes, both as evidence of prior acts of moral 
turpitude and as evidence that Sade had lied to the jury when 
she had testified at Jenkins’s trial that Brittneeh had never 
previously acted like a “bully.”   
Along with her petition, among other exhibits, Jenkins 
filed a declaration from her trial counsel supporting her 
contention that the prosecutor suppressed the evidence.  In his 
declaration, trial counsel stated that Jenkins’s postconviction 
 
3  
Jenkins noted that the Los Angeles County District 
Attorney had prosecuted her case as well as the case allegedly 
involving Brittneeh and Sade.   
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
5 
counsel had recently provided him with a Court of Appeal 
opinion that “describes how the Williams sisters, both Sade and 
Brittneeh, brutally attacked three people without provocation, 
leaving them injured and concussed.”  Trial counsel stated, “I 
did not know anything about that case.”   
Attached to trial counsel’s declaration was the Court of 
Appeal opinion (People v. Emerald R. (Mar. 4, 2010, B196643) 
[nonpub. opn.] (Emerald R.)), which had been downloaded from 
LexisNexis.  As discussed in the opinion, in the matter 
underlying the appeal in Emerald R., a juvenile court declared 
two minors, referred to as “Brit. W.” and “Sade W.,” along with 
several other minors, to be wards of the court.  The juvenile 
court found the minors committed a series of aggravated 
assaults during an incident that occurred on Halloween night in 
2006.  Specifically, the juvenile court found that Brit. W. and 
Sade W. each committed three assaults with force likely to 
produce great bodily injury and found true hate crime 
allegations regarding each assault.  In addition, the juvenile 
court found that Brit. W. personally inflicted great bodily injury 
on two victims and that Sade W. personally inflicted great bodily 
injury on another victim.   
The Court of Appeal ordered Jenkins’s petition for writ of 
habeas corpus to be considered with her appeal, solicited an 
informal response to the petition, and permitted Jenkins to file 
a reply to the informal response.   
The Attorney General filed an informal response arguing 
that Jenkins had not stated a prima facie case for relief because 
she “offered no competent evidence that either [Brittneeh] or 
[Sade] suffered the adjudications [Jenkins] cite[d], . . . offer[ed] 
no evidence that the prosecutor failed to disclose them, 
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
6 
and . . . ha[d] not demonstrated how these prior adjudications 
were material or favorable to her.”   
In support of the first argument, the Attorney General, 
citing People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474–475 (Duvall), 
stated in part:  “Exhibit B, Attachment B[, the Emerald R. 
opinion,] is nothing but an apparent printout of an unspecified 
and unverified Internet source suggesting a direct appeal 
opinion in which minors ‘Brit W.’ and ‘Sade W.’ are listed as 
defendants, among others.  Because [Jenkins] has not provided 
sufficient evidence to show Brittneeh or Sade were the minors 
named, she has already failed to show a prima facie case for 
relief.”   
In her reply to the informal response, Jenkins objected to 
the Attorney General’s refusal to acknowledge whether 
Brittneeh and Sade were among the wards in Emerald R., 
stating in part:  “[The Attorney General’s4] approach in this case 
is deeply concerning — perhaps even more concerning than the 
prosecutor’s failure to disclose this past case, which very well 
may have been inadvertent.  Here, [Jenkins] alleged that the 
state suppressed evidence of Brittneeh’s prior assault.  The state 
now will not say whether or not this is in fact true, but instead 
plays word games with the Court of Appeal’s opinion in that 
 
4  
Although Jenkins uses the word “respondent” it is clear 
here, and in several other places in her briefing below and in 
this court, that she intended to refer to respondent’s counsel, the 
Attorney General, rather than respondent, the Secretary of the 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.  (See fn. 25, 
post.)  We have replaced the word “respondent” with “Attorney 
General” in those instances in which it is clear Jenkins intended 
to refer to the Attorney General.  
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
7 
case, characterizing that opinion as ‘an apparent printout of an 
unspecified and unverified Internet source . . . .’  
“However, as the chief law enforcement officer of the state, 
[the Attorney General] has access to Brittneeh’s criminal 
history.  (See Pen. Code, § 11105.)  Moreover, [the Attorney 
General’s] own office handled the appeal in that case.  (See 
Exh. B, Attachment B, p. 1.)  [¶] . . . . [¶] 
“If anyone knows whether this case involves Brittneeh 
Williams — or someone else the same age, from the same 
county, who is named Brit. W., with a sister named Sade W., 
who faced the same charges around the same time — it is [the 
Attorney General].  He should say so.”   
Jenkins added that any factual dispute as to whether 
Brittneeh and Sade were, in fact, two of the wards in Emerald R. 
was not a reason to deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus 
prior to the issuance of an order to show cause.  She argued that 
the Court of Appeal instead “should issue an Order to Show 
Cause, obtain formal pleadings — where the state can admit or 
deny in a verified answer whether Brittneeh was or was not the 
defendant in the prior assault case that [the Attorney General’s] 
own office handled — and order an evidentiary hearing in the 
unlikely event that a factual dispute remains after respondent 
answers this allegation under penalty of perjury.”   
The Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause.  The 
Attorney General filed a two-paragraph return on behalf of 
respondent that provided in relevant part:  “Respondent alleges 
that [Jenkins] is not entitled to relief because the prosecutor did 
not violate Brady . . . by failing to disclose [Brittneeh’s] and 
[Sade’s] purported prior juvenile adjudications for an incident 
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
8 
that occurred in 2006 because [the prosecutor] did not suppress 
such evidence and such evidence was not material . . . .”   
In a brief in support of the return, the Attorney General 
reiterated Jenkins had not demonstrated that either Brittneeh 
or Sade “were the minors in [Emerald R.],” repeating the 
argument first provided in the informal response that 
“Exhibit B, Attachment B is nothing but an apparent printout 
of an unspecified and unverified Internet source suggesting a 
direct appeal opinion in which minors ‘Brit W.’ and ‘Sade W.’ are 
listed as defendants, among others.”  The Attorney General also 
argued that, even assuming Brittneeh and Sade were among the 
wards in Emerald R., Jenkins had not “shown that the 
prosecutor suppressed these prior adjudications.”  Finally, the 
Attorney General argued, also in the alternative, that Jenkins 
had failed to show any of the allegedly suppressed evidence was 
material.   
In her traverse, Jenkins argued respondent had filed a 
“conclusory general denial” that “plead[ed] no other facts and 
denie[d] none of the numerous other facts pled in the [p]etition.”  
Jenkins noted that respondent’s brief in support of the return 
made clear that “respondent still questions whether [the 
Emerald R. case] even involved the Williams sisters.”  Jenkins 
argued further that the deficient return made it difficult to 
“isolate any disputed facts which may require an evidentiary 
hearing.”  In particular, with respect to the issue of whether 
Brittneeh and Sade were the wards in the Emerald R. case, 
Jenkins argued that respondent had failed its duty under 
Duvall to either admit or deny the allegations in the petition or 
to instead allege “ ‘(i) he or she has acted with due diligence; 
(ii) crucial information is not readily available; and (iii) that 
there is good reason to dispute certain alleged facts . . . .’ ”  
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
9 
(Quoting Duvall, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 485.)  Further, to the 
extent respondent could be understood to deny Jenkins’s 
allegation that Brittneeh and Sade were the wards in the 
Emerald R. case, she requested an evidentiary hearing on this 
factual dispute.   
Along with her traverse, Jenkins filed a brief that argued, 
“[L]est there be any real question as to whether this case 
involved someone other than the Williams sisters, petitioner is 
attaching to this Memorandum . . . a 2007 news article from the 
Long Beach Press Telegram . . . describing how teenaged ‘sisters 
Brittneeh and Sade Williams . . .’ and others were ‘convicted of 
assault’ for ‘beating three . . . women . . .’ on ‘Halloween night.’ ”  
Jenkins filed the quoted article as well as the Emerald R. 
opinion, this time downloaded from Westlaw.  The newspaper 
article states that Brittneeh and Sade Williams were among the 
minors involved in an incident that appears to form the basis of 
the offenses described in the Emerald R. opinion.   
The Court of Appeal affirmed Jenkins’s manslaughter 
conviction and denied her petition for writ of habeas corpus.  
Regarding the petition for writ of habeas corpus, the Court of 
Appeal began its analysis by stating, “In 2006, the Williams 
sisters, both juveniles, were declared wards of the court due to 
their having committed three hate-crime assaults with force 
likely to produce great bodily injury.  [Emerald R., supra, 
B196643.]”  Following this statement, the Court of Appeal 
included a footnote that provides:  “The juveniles in [Emerald 
R.], are referred to as ‘Brit. W.’ and ‘Sade W.’, which 
[r]espondent contends fails to establish they were the Williams 
sisters here.  That is a fair point, but for present purposes we 
will assume Brit. W. and Sade W. were Brittneeh and Sade 
Williams.”   
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
10 
The Court of Appeal explained that Jenkins contended the 
prosecutor violated her constitutional right to due process 
pursuant to Brady and its progeny by failing to disclose the 
adjudications before trial.  According to the Court of Appeal, 
Jenkins 
maintained 
that 
had 
she 
known 
about 
the 
adjudications, she would have used them to demonstrate that 
Brittneeh was the aggressor in their fight, and to impeach 
Sade’s credibility.   
After assuming that the prosecutor should have disclosed 
the adjudications and that they would have been admissible at 
trial, the Court of Appeal concluded that Jenkins’s Brady claim 
failed because “there is no reasonable probability that disclosure 
of the 2006 adjudication[s] would have altered the outcome of 
trial.”   
C. 
Jenkins filed a petition for review of the Court of Appeal’s 
denial of the writ petition.  The Attorney General filed an 
answer stating he had no “obligation to provide additional 
evidence confirming that Brittneeh and Sade had, in fact, 
suffered the prior juvenile adjudications.”   
We granted Jenkins’s petition for review and limited the 
issue to be briefed and argued to the following:  “Where a habeas 
petitioner claims not to have received a fair trial because the 
District Attorney failed to disclose material evidence in violation 
of Brady . . . — and where the Attorney General has knowledge 
of, or is in actual or constructive possession of, such evidence — 
what duty, if any, does the Attorney General have to 
acknowledge or disclose that evidence to the petitioner?  Would 
any such duty be triggered only upon issuance of an order to 
show cause?”   
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
11 
II. 
Jenkins 
claims 
the 
Attorney 
General 
cannot 
constitutionally or ethically suppress exculpatory evidence 
relevant to a habeas corpus petitioner’s Brady claim that the 
Attorney General knows, or reasonably should know, he 
possesses.  She argues further that the Attorney General must 
disclose such evidence in his possession upon the filing of a 
habeas corpus petitioner’s verified allegations alleging its 
existence.   
We consider the Attorney General’s constitutional duty to 
disclose alleged Brady evidence in habeas corpus proceedings in 
part II.A., post, and his ethical duty to disclose such evidence in 
part II.B., post.  In part II.C., post, we consider the duties of the 
respondent to a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging a 
Brady claim that arise from the procedural law governing such 
petitions.  In part II.D., post, we consider how the Attorney 
General and the respondent may carry out these duties in a 
case, such as this, in which the alleged Brady evidence consists 
of juvenile records subject to statutory disclosure restrictions.  
Finally, in part II.E., post, we summarize our conclusions and 
apply them to Jenkins’s case.  
A. 
Jenkins contends the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the federal Constitution prohibits the Attorney 
General from defending a Brady claim by “[s]uppressing the 
[s]ame [e]vidence the [trial] [p]rosecutor [s]uppressed.”5   
 
5  
Jenkins also contends in summary fashion, “Even [i]f the 
Attorney General [m]ay [s]uppress [e]vidence under the 
 
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
12 
“The Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution 
prohibits states from denying any person due process of law.  
This guarantee of due process affords criminal defendants the 
right to a fair trial, ‘impos[ing] on States certain duties 
consistent with their sovereign obligation to ensure “that ‘justice 
shall be done.’ ” ’ ”  (Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs 
v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 28, 39 (Deputy Sheriffs), 
quoting Cone v. Bell (2009) 556 U.S. 449, 451 (Cone).) 
“Prosecutors, as agents of the sovereign, must honor these 
obligations.”  (Deputy Sheriffs, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 39.)  “ ‘A 
prosecutor is held to a standard higher than that imposed on 
other attorneys because of the unique function he or she 
performs in representing the interests, and in exercising the 
sovereign power, of the state.’ ”  (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 
800, 820; accord, Banks v. Dretke (2004) 540 U.S. 668, 696 
(Banks) [“We have several times underscored the ‘special role 
played by the American prosecutor in the search for truth in 
criminal trials’ ”].)   
One special obligation that a prosecutor bears under our 
system pertains to the disclosure of evidence favorable to a 
defendant.  That duty “trace[s] its origins to early 20th-century 
strictures against misrepresentation and is of course most 
prominently associated with [the United States Supreme] 
Court’s decision in Brady . . . .”  (Kyles v. Whitley (1995) 514 U.S. 
419, 432 (Kyles).)  “Under Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83, and its 
 
[f]ederal Constitution . . . this [c]ourt [s]hould [b]ar [s]uch 
[c]onduct under the Due Process Clause of the [s]tate 
Constitution.”  However, Jenkins fails to develop her state 
constitutional argument, and we decline to address any such 
contention here.  (See People v. Guzman (2019) 8 Cal.5th 673, 
683, fn. 7.) 
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
13 
progeny, the prosecution has a constitutional duty to disclose to 
the defense material exculpatory evidence, including potential 
impeaching evidence.”  (People v. Superior Court (Johnson) 
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 696, 709 (Johnson).)  “ ‘The obligation is not 
limited to evidence the prosecutor’s office itself actually knows 
of or possesses, but includes “evidence known to the others 
acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including 
the police.” ’ ”  (People v. Cordova (2015) 62 Cal.4th 104, 123 
(Cordova).) 
We have not previously had occasion to consider the 
Attorney General’s duty, if any, under Brady and its progeny to 
disclose evidence forming the basis of a habeas corpus 
petitioner’s Brady clam.  However, numerous courts in other 
jurisdictions “have held that when state investigators or 
prosecuting officers know of favorable evidence before or during 
a defendant’s trial, the State’s duty to disclose the evidence 
continues to posttrial proceedings that are determinative of 
guilt or innocence.”  (State v. Harris (Neb. 2017) 893 N.W.2d 440, 
454 (Harris); see, e.g., Whitlock v. Brueggemann (7th Cir. 2012) 
682 F.3d 567, 588 (Whitlock) [“As we explained at length before, 
Brady and its progeny impose an obligation on state actors to 
disclose exculpatory evidence that is discovered before or during 
trial.  See [Steidl v. Fermon (7th Cir. 2007)] 494 F.3d [623,] 627–
630.  This obligation does not cease to exist at the moment of 
conviction”]; High v. Head (11th Cir. 2000) 209 F.3d 1257, 1264, 
fn. 8 [“The fact that the State had not provided High’s trial 
counsel with the audiotape does not dictate that the State would 
not have given the audiotape to his first habeas counsel if he had 
made a specific request for that item.  The State’s duty to 
disclose exculpatory material is ongoing”]; Thomas v. Goldsmith 
(9th Cir. 1992) 979 F.2d 746, 749–750 [“We do not refer to the 
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
14 
state’s past duty to turn over exculpatory evidence at trial, but 
to its present duty to turn over exculpatory evidence relevant to 
the instant habeas corpus proceeding”]; Blumberg v. Garcia 
(C.D.Cal. 2009) 687 F.Supp.2d 1074, 1135 [“The prosecution’s 
duty under Brady is a continuing one that extends through 
habeas proceedings”]; Canion v. Cole (Ariz. 2005) 115 P.3d 1261, 
1262 [the state has a continuing Brady duty to disclose evidence 
that “comes to its attention” after sentencing]; see also 
Runningeagle v. Ryan (9th Cir. 2012) 686 F.3d 758, 772, fn. 6 
[citing Canion].) 
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Steidl v. Fermon, supra, 
494 F.3d 623 (Steidl) is particularly instructive.  In Steidl, a 
former prisoner brought a suit under section 1983 of title 42 of 
the United States Code against several Illinois state police 
officials for violating his constitutional rights under Brady.6  
(Steidl, at p. 625.)  The defendants were not involved in Steidl’s 
case prior to his conviction.  (Ibid.)  However, while Steidl’s 
postconviction proceeding was pending, the defendants learned 
of certain exculpatory evidence that the government had 
possessed prior to the time of trial.  (Ibid.)  Notwithstanding this 
knowledge, the defendants failed to disclose the evidence.  
(Ibid.)  After his release, Steidl brought a claim in which he 
contended that the defendants’ act in “conceal[ing] exculpatory 
evidence from the courts during his post-conviction proceedings” 
 
6  
Steidl filed suit against several other defendants in 
addition to the Illinois State Police officials.  (See Steidl, supra, 
494 F.3d at p. 626.)  However, these other defendants were not 
parties to the Steidl appeal.  (Ibid.)  Thus, for ease of reference 
we refer to the Illinois State Police officials as defendants.   
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
15 
deprived him of a fair trial and led to his wrongful conviction.  
(Ibid.) 
After the district court denied the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss based on qualified immunity, they filed an interlocutory 
appeal.  (Steidl, supra, 494 F.3d at p. 625.)  On appeal, the Steidl 
court “agree[d] with the district court that the Brady line of 
cases has clearly established a defendant’s right to be informed 
about exculpatory evidence throughout the proceedings, 
including appeals and authorized post-conviction procedures, 
when that exculpatory evidence was known to the state at the 
time of the original trial.”  (Ibid.)  The Steidl court reasoned in 
part:  “In our view, Brady, Ritchie,[7] and the other cases in this 
line impose on the state an ongoing duty to disclose exculpatory 
information if, as Brady put it, that evidence is material either 
to guilt or to punishment and available for the trial. . . .  For 
evidence known to the state at the time of the trial, the duty to 
disclose extends throughout the legal proceedings that may 
affect either guilt or punishment, including post-conviction 
proceedings.  Put differently, the taint on the trial that took 
place continues throughout the proceedings, and thus the duty 
to disclose and allow correction of that taint continues.  We 
cannot accept the implicit premise of the state’s position here, 
which is that Brady leaves state officials free to conceal evidence 
from reviewing courts or post-conviction courts with impunity, 
even if that concealment results in the wrongful conviction of an 
 
7  
In Ritchie, which we discuss in greater detail in part II.D., 
post, the United States Supreme Court stated that a state’s 
“duty to disclose [under Brady] is ongoing; information that may 
be deemed immaterial upon original examination may become 
important as the proceedings progress.”  (Pennsylvania v. 
Ritchie (1987) 480 U.S. 39, 60, italics added (Ritchie).) 
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
16 
innocent person.  It is worth recalling, in this connection, that 
the Brady rule was derived from the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  ‘Society wins,’ the Court wrote, ‘not 
only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are 
fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any 
accused is treated unfairly.’  [Brady, supra,] 373 U.S. at 87.”  
(Steidl, at p. 630.) 
We find the Steidl court’s reasoning persuasive and 
consistent with the principles underlying Brady and its progeny 
that we outlined ante, as well as case law referring to the 
government’s obligations under Brady in the postconviction 
context.   
Further, we note that Steidl may not be distinguished on 
the ground that it involved a police officer’s duty under Brady, 
while, in this case, we consider the duty of the Attorney General.  
As the Steidl court explained, it is the government who 
ultimately is obligated to comply with the disclosure 
requirements imposed by Brady and its progeny.  (Steidl, supra, 
494 F.3d at pp. 630–631, citing Youngblood v. West Virginia 
(2006) 547 U.S. 867, 869–870; accord, Johnson, supra, 
61 Cal.4th at p. 716 [“ ‘suppression by the Government is a 
necessary element of a Brady claim’ ” (italics added)]; People v. 
Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 256, quoting Kyles, supra, 
514 U.S. at p. 434 [“ ‘A “reasonable probability” of a different 
result is accordingly shown when the government’s evidentiary 
suppression “undermines confidence in the outcome of the 
trial” ’ ” (italics added)].)  And, of course, the Attorney General 
acts on behalf of the government.  (See Cal. Const., art. V, § 13 
[“the Attorney General shall be the chief law officer of the State.  
It shall be the duty of the Attorney General to see that the laws 
of the State are uniformly and adequately enforced”].)   
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
17 
The Attorney General offers several arguments to support 
the contention that he does not have a duty to disclose evidence 
under Brady in the postconviction context.  We consider each in 
turn.  First, the Attorney General argues that “[t]here is no due 
process requirement that compels the Attorney General to 
disclose alleged Brady evidence at the outset of habeas litigation 
merely because a habeas petition raises a Brady claim.”  We 
agree with the Attorney General insofar as he argues that a 
petitioner’s allegations of a Brady violation do not determine the 
existence of the Attorney General’s Brady duties.8  Where the 
evidence underlying a Brady habeas corpus claim would not 
have been subject to disclosure by the government prior to 
conviction — because, for example, such evidence was not 
favorable to the defendant and material — then the Attorney 
General has no Brady duty to disclose the evidence in 
postconviction proceedings.   
However, just like a prosecutor at trial, it is also true that 
the Attorney General’s determination as to whether the evidence 
is subject to disclosure under Brady also is not dispositive as to 
the existence of a constitutional duty.  Therefore, it may be the 
case that the Attorney General “disclose[s] a favorable piece of 
evidence” in a case in which it is unclear whether Brady 
mandates disclosure.  (Kyles, supra, 514 U.S. at p. 439; see 
Deputy Sheriffs, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 40.)  “This is as it should 
be.”  (Kyles, at p. 439.)  Further, determining whether Brady 
 
8  
We note that while a petitioner’s allegations are not 
determinative of the Attorney General’s constitutional duty 
under Brady, such allegations do inform a respondent’s duties 
pursuant to our state’s habeas corpus procedures in filing a 
return to a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging a Brady 
violation.  (See part II.C., post.)   
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
18 
applies to a piece of evidence may be easier in the postconviction 
context given that its materiality, or lack thereof, may be more 
apparent than it is before judgment.  (Cf. Kyles, at pp. 438–439 
[recounting government’s argument that materiality is difficult 
to determine prior to judgment]; Deputy Sheriffs, at p. 40 [“it 
may be difficult to know before judgment what evidence will 
ultimately prove material”].)   
The Attorney General also broadly suggests he has no 
duty under Brady in the postconviction context, even if the 
evidence at issue was favorable to the defendant and material, 
was available at trial, and was suppressed.  He argues that the 
purpose of Brady is to “safeguard . . . the right to a fair trial,” 
and that “[w]hen a trial is over, Brady’s disclosure command 
lacks purpose and dissipates.”   
We generally agree with the Attorney General’s 
assessment of Brady’s purpose.  But we disagree that relieving 
him of the disclosure requirements of Brady — in the context of 
a habeas corpus proceeding — serves that purpose.  To 
understand why, we review the purpose of our state’s habeas 
corpus proceedings:  “The California Constitution has protected 
the right to seek relief by habeas corpus since our state’s 
founding.  [Citations.]  Habeas corpus, we have explained, ‘often 
represents a prisoner’s last chance to obtain judicial review’ of a 
criminal conviction.  [Citation.]  The law preserves this avenue 
to relief in service of principles of substantial justice:  ‘ “Despite 
the substantive and procedural protections afforded those 
accused of committing crimes, the basic charters governing our 
society wisely hold open a final possibility for prisoners to prove 
their convictions were obtained unjustly.” ’ ”  (In re Friend 
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 720, 736 (Friend).)  
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
19 
The postconviction Brady obligation that we outline today 
supports the right to a fair trial and is fully compatible with the 
purpose of habeas corpus proceedings.  Under Brady and its 
progeny, securing a conviction by failing to disclose material 
exculpatory evidence violates due process.  (Brady, supra, 
373 U.S. at p. 86; Johnson, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 709–710.)  
Imposing a continuing duty of disclosure on the government in 
this context is consistent with both the due process right on 
which Brady is based, and the “principles of substantial justice” 
on which our state’s long-standing habeas corpus tradition is 
founded.  (Friend, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 736.)   
The Attorney General also contends that, “It would be 
incongruous to graft Brady, a trial principle of constitutional 
criminal procedure, onto a postconviction civil proceeding with 
its own comprehensive procedural structure.”  While it is true 
that “[a] habeas corpus proceeding is not a criminal action” 
(Maas v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 962, 975), and may be 
characterized as “ ‘civil in nature’ ” for some purposes (Briggs v. 
Brown (2017) 3 Cal.5th 808, 838), we have generally refrained 
from deciding “ ‘whether a habeas corpus proceeding is civil or 
criminal,’ ” noting that “ ‘[i]t is a special proceeding and not 
entirely analogous to either category.’ ”  (Id. at p. 838, fn. 15, 
quoting In re Scott (2003) 29 Cal.4th 783, 815, fn. 6 (Scott); see 
also Maas, at p. 975, citing Pen. Code, pt. 2, tit. 12, ch. 1, § 1473 
et seq. [“the Legislature likewise . . . labeled the habeas corpus 
proceeding a ‘Special Proceeding [] of a Criminal Nature’ ”].)9  In 
any event, we see nothing incongruous about applying a rule 
designed to ensure that convictions are premised on due process 
 
9 
Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent statutory 
references are to the Penal Code. 
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
20 
to a procedure designed to “ ‘ “hold open a final possibility for 
prisoners to prove their convictions were obtained unjustly.” ’ ”  
(Friend, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 736.)   
Nor does the Attorney General cite any case from this 
court, or any other, holding that the government, in 
postconviction proceedings, lacks a duty to disclose Brady 
material that was available to the government at the time of 
trial.  The primary authority the Attorney General relies on, 
District Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne 
(2009) 557 U.S. 52 (Osborne), does not support the Attorney 
General’s position.  The defendant in Osborne sued Alaska 
officials in federal court alleging a violation of section 1983 of 
title 42 of the United States Code based, in part, on his claim 
that the due process clause gave him the right to access DNA 
evidence that “had been unavailable at trial.”  (Osborne, at p. 61, 
italics added.)  In considering whether the defendant had such 
a constitutional right “to obtain postconviction access to the 
State’s evidence for DNA testing” (ibid.), the Osborne court 
observed that “[t]he availability of technologies not available at 
trial cannot mean that every criminal conviction, or even every 
criminal conviction involving biological evidence, is suddenly in 
doubt.”  (Id. at p. 62, italics added.)  The Osborne court reasoned 
further that “[t]he dilemma [of] how to harness DNA’s power to 
prove innocence without unnecessarily overthrowing the 
established system of criminal justice,” was a problem to be 
solved “primarily [by] the legislature.”  (Ibid.) 
The Osborne court acknowledged that the defendant had 
“a liberty interest in demonstrating his innocence with new 
evidence under state law.”  (Osborne, supra, 557 U.S. at p. 68.)  
After discussing that state law, the Osborne court observed that 
a “ ‘state-created right can, in some circumstances, beget yet 
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
21 
other rights to procedures essential to the realization of the 
parent right.’ ”  (Ibid.)  However, the Osborne court concluded 
that the Ninth Circuit “went too far . . . in concluding that the 
Due Process Clause requires that certain familiar preconviction 
trial rights be extended to protect Osborne’s postconviction 
liberty interest.”  (Ibid.)  The Supreme Court explained that, 
unlike before trial when a defendant is entitled to the 
presumption of innocence, “[t]he State . . . has more flexibility in 
deciding what procedures are needed in the context of 
postconviction relief.  ‘[W]hen a State chooses to offer help to 
those seeking relief from convictions,’ due process does not 
‘dictat[e] the exact form such assistance must assume.’  
[Citation.]  Osborne’s right to due process is not parallel to a 
trial right, but rather must be analyzed in light of the fact that 
he has already been found guilty at a fair trial, and has only a 
limited interest in postconviction relief.  Brady is the wrong 
framework.”  (Id. at p. 69.) 
While Osborne certainly “distinguish[es] between the 
pretrial and the posttrial obligation to provide exculpatory 
evidence” (Barnett v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 890, 906 
(Barnett)), we do not understand Osborne as holding that the 
government lacks a duty to disclose, in the postconviction 
context, Brady evidence that was available prior to conviction.  
It is notable that Osborne repeatedly stated the evidence at 
issue in that case was unavailable at trial (see Osborne, supra, 
557 U.S. at pp. 61, 62), unlike the present case.  And the Osborne 
court’s reason for declining to extend Brady to evidence 
discovered in the postconviction context — namely, that the 
defendant received “a fair trial” (id. at pp. 68, 69), also does not 
apply where the prosecution violates Brady at trial.  (See, e.g., 
Cone, supra, 556 U.S. at pp. 459, 472 [determining that evidence 
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
22 
that had been “withheld from [the defendant] at trial” “deprived 
[him] of his right to a fair trial”].)   
Other courts have similarly understood Osborne.  In 
Whitlock, supra, 682 F.3d 567, the Seventh Circuit found no 
inconsistency between Osborne and its earlier conclusion in 
Steidl that a defendant has a “ ‘right to be informed about 
exculpatory evidence throughout the proceedings, including 
appeals and authorized post-conviction procedures, when that 
exculpatory evidence was known to the state at the time of the 
original trial.’ ”  (Id. at p. 587, quoting Steidl, supra, 494 F.3d at 
p. 625.)  The Whitlock court explained that the defendant police 
officials “read Osborne too broadly.  Osborne rejected a claim 
that Alaska’s procedures governing the access of defendants to 
post-conviction DNA testing violated due process.  Critically, the 
evidence that Osborne sought was not exculpatory evidence that 
had been in existence at the time of his original trial.  Instead, 
he was seeking the opportunity to collect and submit entirely 
new, and he hoped exculpatory, evidence.  The Court rejected 
the argument that Brady required the state to allow the 
defendant access to these new tests because the defendant had 
already been ‘proved guilty after a fair trial.’  [Citation.]  But 
Brady continues to apply to an assertion that one did not receive 
a fair trial because of the concealment of exculpatory evidence 
known and in existence at the time of that trial.”  (Whitlock, at 
pp. 587–588.) 
The Whitlock court noted further that the Steidl court 
decided only whether the government’s Brady duty applied to 
evidence “known and in existence at the time of that trial” 
(Whitlock, supra, 682 F.3d at p. 588), and that it did not decide 
whether Brady applied to “ ‘evidence discovered post-trial.’ ”  
(Ibid., quoting Steidl, supra, 494 F.3d at p. 629; see also Steidl, 
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
23 
at p. 630 [stating that “available for the trial” “qualification is 
important, to the extent that Brady identifies a trial right”].)  
Thus, while in Osborne the Supreme Court concluded a 
defendant has no Brady “right to have the State disclose 
exculpatory evidence that it learns about after a final judgment” 
(Harris, supra, 893 N.W.2d at p. 457, italics added), Osborne 
does not stand for the proposition that the Attorney General 
may constitutionally continue to suppress material exculpatory 
evidence in habeas corpus proceedings that was suppressed by 
a prosecutor at the time of trial.  (Whitlock, at p. 587; see also 
Thompson v. City of Chicago (7th Cir. 2013) 722 F.3d 963, 972 
[following Whitlock]; Collins v. City of New York (E.D.N.Y. 2013) 
923 F.Supp.2d 462, 474 [“In Osborne, [supra, 557 U.S. at 
pages 68–69,] the Supreme Court held that Brady does not 
require disclosure of exculpatory evidence — such as DNA 
testing — that was or could be created after trial.  [Citation.]  
Since Collins’s Brady claim involves nondisclosure of evidence 
in existence at the time of trial, Osborne does not apply”].)  In 
sum, as was true of the police official defendants in Whitlock, we 
similarly conclude that the Attorney General reads Osborne too 
broadly.   
Nor are we persuaded by the Attorney General’s argument 
that 
“regardless 
of 
the 
applicability 
of 
Brady 
postconviction, . . . logic and practicality” dictate that there can 
be no ongoing Brady violation once a petitioner files a petition 
for writ of habeas corpus claiming a Brady violation.  As for 
logic, the Attorney General reasons, “The very allegation that 
given information was suppressed means that the petitioner is 
now aware of the evidence, which is no longer suppressed.”  This 
contention is unpersuasive because the mere assertion of a 
Brady claim does not always demonstrate the petitioner has 
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
24 
sufficient direct or concrete evidence to support the allegations.  
Often it is through habeas corpus proceedings, that such 
evidence is revealed.  (See, e.g., Banks, supra, 540 U.S. at 
pp. 682, 685 [noting that the petitioner alleged in a habeas 
corpus proceeding “ ‘upon information and belief’ ” that 
prosecution failed to disclose witness’s identity as an informant, 
and that, several years later, in a habeas corpus evidentiary 
hearing, a deputy sheriff “acknowledged, for the first time, that 
[the witness] was an informant”]; In re Bacigalupo (2012) 
55 Cal.4th 312, 316 [describing reference proceeding that 
spanned “several hearings over a three-year period,” and during 
which “17 witnesses were called” to determine whether 
prosecution failed to disclose information it obtained from a 
confidential informant].)  In addition, the mere assertion of a 
Brady claim in a habeas corpus proceeding does not necessarily 
provide a sufficient evidentiary record for a court to resolve such 
claim.  (See, e.g., Pham v. Terhune (9th Cir. 2005) 400 F.3d 740, 
743 [ordering discovery of laboratory notes forming the basis of 
a Brady claim and stating “[o]nce [the] notes have been 
disclosed, the Brady issue is for the district court to decide in the 
first instance”].) 
The Attorney General’s “practicality” argument is 
similarly unpersuasive.  The fact that, as the Attorney General 
argues, the petitioner “knows enough to seek [the evidence]” 
does not provide any assurance that the evidence will be 
revealed given that, as the Attorney General acknowledges, “a 
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
25 
convicted person enjoys few opportunities to seek postconviction 
discovery by court order.”10   
In sum, we conclude that where a habeas corpus petitioner 
claims not to have received a fair trial because a trial prosecutor 
failed to disclose material evidence in violation of Brady — and 
where the Attorney General has knowledge of, or is in actual or 
constructive possession of, evidence that the trial prosecutor 
 
10  
While section 1054.9 authorizes postconviction discovery 
in certain cases, the statute does not apply to petitioner given her 
11-year sentence.  (§ 1054.9, subd. (a) [allowing postconviction 
discovery in cases involving a criminal conviction of a serious 
felony or a violent felony resulting in a sentence of 15 years or 
more].)  Thus, we express no opinion regarding the Attorney 
General’s postconviction statutory discovery duties under 
section 1054.9 or court-ordered discovery following an order to 
show cause.  (See Scott, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 813 [after order 
to show cause issues, the “scope of discovery in habeas corpus 
proceedings has generally been resolved on a case-by-case 
basis”].)   
We also express no opinion regarding the Attorney 
General’s duty in a hypothetical situation described in his brief, 
“in which no petition for a writ of habeas corpus has been filed 
alleging a Brady violation but the Attorney General becomes 
aware of evidence that should have been disclosed at trial 
pursuant to Brady.”   
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
26 
suppressed in violation of Brady11 — the Attorney General has 
a constitutional duty under Brady to disclose the evidence.12   
B. 
Jenkins claims the “[e]thics [r]ules [a]lso [p]rohibit the 
Attorney General from [s]uppressing [e]vidence.”   
Rule 3.8 of the Rules of Professional Conduct (Rule 3.8) 
provides in relevant part:  “The prosecutor in a criminal case 
 
11  
At oral argument, the Attorney General acknowledged the 
potential constitutional dimension to his disclosure duties in the 
habeas corpus context, stating, for example, that “there may 
well be some due process . . . based obligation to 
disclose . . . evidence” where a district attorney fails to turn over 
Brady material.  The Attorney General also stated, “[W]e are not 
denying that there may be a constitutional imperative behind 
this obligation.”  
However, the Attorney General expressed skepticism as to 
the applicability of the Brady right in the postconviction context 
because, according to the Attorney General, the postconviction 
context varies considerably from that which exists prior to 
conviction.  Specifically, the Attorney General argued that while 
Brady obligates the prosecutor to proactively disclose 
information to further the factfinding function of a trial, “when 
a habeas claim is filed it is not for the purpose of investigating 
potential violations.”  We emphasize the Brady duty we 
recognize in this opinion is limited to circumstances in which the 
Attorney General has knowledge of, or is in actual or 
constructive possession of, allegedly suppressed evidence that is 
referenced in a petition for writ of habeas corpus.  Given our 
disposition remanding the case to the Court of Appeal for 
further proceedings, we find it unnecessary to consider what 
circumstances would demonstrate constructive possession in 
this context.   
12  
In part II.D., post, we discuss how the Attorney General 
may comply with his disclosure obligations in a case in which 
the alleged Brady material is subject to confidentiality 
provisions under Welfare and Institutions Code section 827.  
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
27 
shall:  [¶] . . . [¶]  (d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all 
evidence or information known to the prosecutor that the 
prosecutor knows or reasonably should know tends to negate the 
guilt of the accused, mitigate the offense, or mitigate the 
sentence, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this 
responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal.”   
We have not previously had occasion to consider the 
Attorney General’s ethical duty, if any, pursuant to Rule 3.8(d) 
in postconviction proceedings generally and thus have not 
considered his duty as it pertains to a habeas corpus proceeding 
alleging a Brady violation.13  The Attorney General argues both 
that the rule has no application “in any postconviction scenario,” 
and that Rule 3.8(d) should not “be viewed as imposing a duty 
of disclosure independent of settled habeas procedures . . . .”  We 
disagree with both contentions.  
As to whether Rule 3.8(d) applies in postconviction 
settings, case law describing a prosecutor’s ethical duties in the 
postconviction context decided before Rule 3.8(d) was adopted 
supports such application.  Specifically, this court has 
repeatedly recognized that prosecutors have a continuing duty 
 
13  
“In 2018, [this court] approved a comprehensive revision 
of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, effective 
November 1, 2018.  The new rules replace the former rules, and 
implement a decimal numbering and organizational system 
based on the American Bar Association Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct.”  (Davis v. TWC Dealer Group, Inc. (2019) 
41 Cal.App.5th 662, 677.)  Rule 3.8 became effective as part of 
this revision.   
This court had previously entered an order enacting a rule 
of professional conduct, operative November 2, 2017, identical 
in all material respects to Rule 3.8(d), as an amendment to 
former rule 5-110 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.   
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
28 
in postconviction proceedings to disclose exculpatory evidence 
that should have been disclosed at trial.  In People v. Gonzalez 
(1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179 (Gonzalez), after concluding that a trial 
court had erred in ordering the Attorney General, among others, 
to provide certain discovery to a defendant in the postconviction 
setting (see id. at pp. 1256–1257), we stated:  “Of course, the 
prosecution has a well-established duty to disclose information 
materially favorable to the defense, even absent a request 
therefor.  [Citations.]  ‘. . . At trial this duty is enforced by the 
requirements of due process, but [even] after a conviction the 
prosecutor . . . is bound by the ethics of his office to inform the 
appropriate authority of . . . information that casts doubt upon 
the correctness of the conviction.’  [Citation]; see also rule 5-220, 
Rules Prof. Conduct of State Bar;[14] ABA Model Code Prof. 
Responsibility, DR 7-103 (B), EC 7-13; ABA Model Rules Prof. 
Conduct, rule 3.8(d).)  [¶]  We expect and assume that if the 
People’s lawyers have such information in this or any other case, 
they will disclose it promptly and fully.”  (Id. at pp. 1260–1261.) 
In In re Steele (2004) 32 Cal.4th 682, we noted the 
Attorney General argued that the fact that prosecutors have a 
continuing ethical duty to disclose exculpatory evidence 
obviated the need to interpret section 1054.9 as providing for the 
postconviction discovery of such evidence:  “The Attorney 
General also argues that, as we pointed out in People v. 
Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pages 1260 and 1261, prosecutors 
have a continuing duty to disclose information favorable to the 
 
14  
Former rule 5-220 of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
provided, “A member shall not suppress any evidence that the 
member or the member’s client has a legal obligation to reveal 
or to produce.” 
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
29 
defense, and we expect and assume that they will perform this 
duty promptly and fully, and, moreover, that ‘[i]t is presumed 
that official duty has been regularly performed.’  (Evid. Code, 
§ 664.)  Accordingly, he urges, any interpretation of 
section 1054.9 that extends to discovery the prosecution should 
have provided at time of trial makes it redundant of other law.  
However, the expectation and assumption we stated in Gonzalez 
merely mean that normally, and unless the defendant 
overcomes Evidence Code section 664’s presumption as to 
specific evidence, there will be no discovery for the trial court to 
order that the prosecutor should have provided at trial.”  (In re 
Steele, at p. 694.) 
Finally, in In re Lawley (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1231 (In re 
Lawley), we repeated our admonition from Gonzalez concerning 
the continuing ethical duties of a prosecutor — in the 
postconviction setting — to disclose evidence that should have 
been disclosed at trial, this time specifically quoting American 
Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3.8(d) 
(ABA Model Rule 3.8(d)) as providing, “ ‘The prosecutor in a 
criminal case shall:  [¶] . . . [¶] (d) make timely disclosure to the 
defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor 
that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the 
offense.’ ”  (In re Lawley, at p. 1246; see ibid. [“Before and during 
trial, due process requires the prosecution to disclose to the 
defense evidence that is material and exculpatory.  [Citations.]  
This obligation continues after trial.”  (Citing, inter alia, ABA 
Model Rule 3.8(d))].) 
Gonzalez, In re Steele, and In re Lawley all were decided 
during a period when California did not have a specific rule of 
professional conduct mandating that a prosecutor disclose 
exculpatory evidence.  Even without a specific rule, this court 
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
30 
repeatedly stated that a prosecutor had an ethical duty to 
disclose exculpatory evidence in the postconviction setting.  
Indeed, in both Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pages 1260–1261 
and In re Lawley, supra, 42 Cal.4th at page 1246, we relied on 
ABA Model Rule 3.8(d) in noting the existence of such a duty. 
With the adoption of Rule 3.8(d), California now has a 
specific rule of professional conduct mandating the disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence by prosecutors.  The adoption of a rule of 
professional conduct that is based in part on ABA Model 
Rule 3.8(d) — which this court has repeatedly relied on in 
concluding that prosecutors have a disclosure obligation in the 
postconviction 
context — 
supports 
our 
conclusion 
that 
Rule 3.8(d) similarly applies in postconviction settings.  
The Attorney General argues that the “language [of 
Rule 3.8(d)] suggests exclusively pretrial application.”  We are 
not persuaded.  The text of Rule 3.8(d) contains no language 
expressly limiting its application to proceedings prior to 
conviction.  Nor do we infer any limitation based on the language 
cited by the Attorney General.  The Attorney General notes that 
Rule 3.8(d) refers to “the accused” (Rule 3.8(d)), a description the 
Attorney General contends is inapt when referring to a 
convicted defendant.  Similarly, the Attorney General notes that 
Rule 3.8(d) refers to the “defense,” a description that technically 
does not apply to a petitioner in a habeas corpus proceeding.  
The Attorney General’s textual arguments ascribe too much 
significance to terms we take to be shorthand references to a 
person who is, or who has been, the subject of criminal 
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
31 
proceedings and to that person’s lawyer(s).15  (Cf. People v. 
Superior Court (Pearson) (2010) 48 Cal.4th 564, 573 [rejecting 
district attorney’s argument that “the Legislature’s use of the 
word ‘defendant’ rather than ‘petitioner’ in section 1054.9,” 
demonstrated that the Legislature was not “creat[ing] discovery 
in a separate habeas corpus matter”].)  Further, the Attorney 
General fails to cite any authority attaching import to the use of 
the terms “accused” or “the defense” in language derived from 
ABA Model Rule 3.8(d), a provision that we have previously 
found applicable in postconviction proceedings.  (See In re 
Lawley, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1246; cf. Com’n for Lawyer 
Discipline v. Hanna (Tex.Ct.App. 2016) 513 S.W.3d 175, 180–
181 [stating “we hesitate to hold that the term ‘accused’ 
standing 
alone 
is 
conclusive” 
while 
discussing 
Texas 
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3.09(d), which 
like Rule 3.8(d) “was modeled after [ABA Model] Rule 3.8(d)”].)  
We also reject the Attorney General’s contention that 
Rule 3.8(d) should not be interpreted to apply in postconviction 
proceedings because “ ‘timely’ ” disclosure “is no longer possible” 
in habeas corpus proceedings where guilt has been adjudicated.  
Timeliness must be measured in relation to the proceeding in 
which the disclosure is at issue.  (See Rule 3.8, com. [3] [“A 
disclosure’s timeliness will vary with the circumstances”].)  
When applied to postconviction proceedings, Rule 3.8(d)’s 
requirement that the prosecutor “make timely disclosure” is 
 
15  
Although not specifically mentioned by the Attorney 
General, we have also considered that Rule 3.8 refers 
generically to a “prosecutor in a criminal case,” and does not 
specifically refer to the Attorney General in habeas corpus 
proceedings. 
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
32 
reasonably interpreted as mandating timeliness in those 
proceedings. 
Nor are we persuaded by the Attorney General’s argument 
that “the inclusion of rules that expressly do apply 
postconviction” demonstrates that Rule 3.8(d) does not apply in 
this postconviction setting.  (Italics added, citing Rule 3.8(f) & 
(g).)16  The fact that Rule 3.8(f) and (g) refer to a “convicted” 
defendant, while Rule 3.8(d) does not use that term, can be 
explained by the fact that Rule 3.8(f) and (g) apply exclusively to 
convicted defendants, while Rule 3.8(d) also applies prior to 
conviction.17    
 
16  
Rule 3.8(f) provides:  “When a prosecutor knows of new, 
credible and material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood 
that a convicted defendant did not commit an offense of which 
the defendant was convicted, the prosecutor shall:  
“(1) promptly disclose that evidence to an appropriate court or 
authority, and  
“(2) if the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor’s 
jurisdiction,  
“(i) promptly disclose that evidence to the defendant unless a 
court authorizes delay, and  
“(ii) undertake further investigation, or make reasonable efforts 
to cause an investigation, to determine whether the defendant 
was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit.”   
Rule 3.8(g) provides:  “When a prosecutor knows of clear 
and convincing evidence establishing that a defendant in the 
prosecutor’s jurisdiction was convicted of an offense that the 
defendant did not commit, the prosecutor shall seek to remedy 
the conviction.”   
17  
In addition, the paragraph of ABA Model Rule 3.8(d) from 
which Rule 3.8(d) was drawn was first adopted in 1977 (see 
Attorney Grievance v. Cassilly (Md.Ct.App. 2021) 262 A.3d 272, 
 
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
33 
Having determined that the Attorney General has an 
ethical duty pursuant to Rule 3.8(d) in postconviction settings, 
we consider the Attorney General’s argument that Rule 3.8(d) 
does not establish any additional “duty of disclosure” beyond 
that provided for by the law governing habeas corpus 
procedures.  The Attorney General’s argument is based on 
comment [3] to Rule 3.8, which provides in part that Rule 3.8(d) 
should not be “applied in a manner inconsistent with statutory 
and constitutional provisions governing discovery in California 
courts.”  This argument fails because even assuming that 
respondent’s duties that we describe in part II.C., post, are 
discovery provisions binding on the Attorney General,18 the 
Attorney General has not demonstrated how “imposing a duty 
of disclosure [pursuant to Rule 3.8(d)] independent of settled 
habeas procedures establishing a duty on the part of the 
 
311), while the paragraphs of the ABA Model Rule 3.8 from 
which Rule 3.8(f) and (g) were drawn were not adopted until 
2008.  (See Cassilly, at p. 311.)  The adoption of these provisions 
at different times provides a practical explanation for drafting 
terminology differences.  (Cf. United Riggers & Erectors, Inc. v. 
Coast Iron & Steel Co. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1082, 1093 [“Different 
bills, drafted by different authors, passed at different times, 
might well use different language to convey the same basic 
rule”].) 
18  
As a technical matter, the law governing petitions for writ 
of habeas corpus binds the respondent to such a petition — in 
this case, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation.  (See fn. 25, post.)  Rule 3.8(d) prescribes the 
ethical duties of respondent’s counsel, the Attorney General.  
Further, we are not convinced that the procedural duties we 
describe in part II.C., post, arising from our case law governing 
petitions for writ of habeas corpus, should be interpreted as 
“statutory . . . provisions governing discovery” within the 
meaning of comment [3] to Rule 3.8.   
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
34 
Attorney General to acknowledge and potentially disclose the 
evidence at issue,” is inconsistent with those habeas corpus 
procedures.  However, while we reject the Attorney General’s 
argument that comment [3] to Rule 3.8 limits his duty of 
disclosure to that prescribed in the procedural law governing 
habeas corpus proceedings, we do not suggest that Rule 3.8(d) 
imposes duties beyond those specified in statutory and 
constitutional provisions governing discovery in California 
courts.   
In fact, we note that the ethical duty in Rule 3.8(d) appears 
to be similar to the prosecutor’s statutory duty at trial to provide 
discovery of “ ‘[a]ny exculpatory evidence.’ ”  (Cordova, supra, 
62 Cal.4th at p. 124, quoting § 1054.1, subd. (e).)19  That duty 
“requires the prosecution to provide all exculpatory evidence, 
not just evidence that is material under Brady and its progeny.”  
(Cordova, at p. 124; see also Barnett, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 901 
[for purposes of postconviction discovery under § 1054.9, “[i]f 
petitioner can show he has a reasonable basis for believing a 
specific item of exculpatory evidence exists, he is entitled to 
receive that evidence without additionally having to show its 
materiality”]; accord, Deputy Sheriffs, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 40 
[noting that “[s]tatutory and ethical obligations may require 
even more” than the disclosure of material evidence and citing 
§ 1054.1, subds. (d)–(e) and Rule 3.8(d) & com. [3]].) 
 
19  
While it is unnecessary for us to decide whether the two 
duties are identical, we emphasize that nothing in this opinion 
should be understood to prescribe a duty of disclosure 
“inconsistent with statutory and constitutional provisions 
governing discovery in California courts.”  (Rule 3.8, com. [3].)  
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
35 
The Attorney General also appears to argue that the 
applicability of Rule 3.8(d) in habeas corpus proceedings raising 
a Brady claim turns on the Attorney General’s assessment of 
whether the evidence at issue is material to the petitioner’s 
conviction.20  We reject any such argument.  Comment [3] to 
Rule 3.8 expressly states, “The disclosure obligations in 
paragraph (d) are not limited to evidence or information that is 
material as defined by Brady . . . and its progeny.”  This court’s 
approval of Rule 3.8(d) and the accompanying comment makes 
clear that the ethical disclosure obligation under Rule 3.8(d) is 
not limited to evidence material to a conviction.   
Accordingly, we conclude that, pursuant to Rule 3.8(d), in 
responding to a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging a 
Brady violation, the Attorney General has an ethical duty to 
make timely disclosure to the petitioner of all evidence or 
information known to the Attorney General that was available 
but not disclosed at trial21 that the Attorney General knows or 
reasonably should know tends to negate the guilt of the 
petitioner, mitigate the offense, or mitigate the sentence, except 
when the Attorney General is relieved of this responsibility by a 
protective order of the tribunal.22   
 
20  
In his answering brief, the Attorney General argues, “No 
ethical rule would have required the Attorney General in this 
case to disclose records the Attorney General did not consider 
material to the trial outcome.”   
21  
The parties have not briefed, and we do not consider, 
whether Rule 3.8(d) requires disclosure of evidence that was not 
available at trial. 
22  
The Attorney General also cites another portion of 
comment [3] to Rule 3.8, which provides that the rule “ ‘does not 
 
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
36 
C. 
In addition to the Attorney General’s constitutional and 
ethical duties described in parts II.A. and II.B., ante, a 
respondent to a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging a 
Brady claim also has duties that arise from procedural law 
governing such petitions. 
We begin by summarizing well established law governing 
petitions for writ of habeas corpus.  (Duvall, supra, 9 Cal.4th at 
pp. 474–475.)  In Duvall, we outlined a habeas corpus 
petitioner’s initial pleading burden:  “To satisfy the initial 
burden of pleading adequate grounds for relief, an application 
for habeas corpus must be made by petition, and ‘[i]f the 
imprisonment is alleged to be illegal, the petition must also state 
in what the alleged illegality consists.’  [Citation.]  The petition 
should both (i) state fully and with particularity the facts on 
which relief is sought [citations], as well as (ii) include copies of 
reasonably available documentary evidence supporting the 
claim, including pertinent portions of trial transcripts and 
affidavits or declarations.  [Citations.]  ‘Conclusory allegations 
made without any explanation of the basis for the allegations do 
not warrant relief, let alone an evidentiary hearing.’  [Citation.]  
We presume the regularity of proceedings that resulted in a 
 
require disclosure of information protected from disclosure by 
federal or California laws and rules.’ ”  Thus, the Attorney 
General argues Rule 3.8(d) would not compel disclosure of the 
evidence at issue in this case because it consists of confidential 
juvenile court records protected from dissemination pursuant to 
Welfare and Institutions Code section 827.  We discuss in part 
II.D., post, how the Attorney General may comply with his 
ethical duty of disclosure in cases involving records subject to 
Welfare and Institutions Code section 827. 
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
37 
final judgment [citation], and . . . the burden is on the petitioner 
to establish grounds for his release.”  (Id. at p. 474.) 
“An appellate court receiving such a petition evaluates it 
by asking whether, assuming the petition’s factual allegations 
are true, the petitioner would be entitled to relief.”  (Duvall, 
supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 474–475.)  The court may request that 
the respondent provide an “informal written response.”  (Cal. 
Rules of Court, rule 8.385(b)(1); see also id., rules 4.551(b) 
[“informal response” in noncapital habeas corpus proceedings in 
superior court], 4.573(a) [“informal written response” in capital 
habeas corpus proceedings in superior court].)   
In People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 742 (Romero) we 
described the “screening function” that an informal response 
serves in resolving petitions for writ of habeas corpus:  “Through 
the informal response, the custodian or real party in interest 
may demonstrate, by citation of legal authority and by 
submission of factual materials, that the claims asserted in the 
habeas corpus petition lack merit and that the court therefore 
may reject them summarily, without requiring formal pleadings 
(the return and traverse) or conducting an evidentiary hearing.  
If the petitioner successfully controverts the factual materials 
submitted with the informal response,[23] or if for any other 
reason the informal response does not persuade the court that 
the petition’s claims are lacking in merit, then the court must 
proceed to the next stage by issuing an order to show cause or 
the now rarely used writ of habeas corpus.  Deficiencies in the 
 
23  
The Romero court noted that a petitioner is afforded an 
opportunity to file a reply to any informal response.  (Romero, 
supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 741; see Cal. Rules of Court, rules 
8.385(b)(3), 4.551(b)(2), 4.573(a)(3).) 
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
38 
informal response do not provide a justification for shortcutting 
this procedural step.”  (Ibid., fn. omitted.) 
Upon the issuance of the order to show cause, the 
respondent files a return.  (Duvall, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 475.)  
In 
the 
return, 
the 
respondent 
is 
required 
to 
“ ‘allege facts tending to establish the legality of petitioner’s 
detention.’ ”  (Id. at p. 476.)  “Those facts are not simply the 
existence of a judgment of conviction and sentence when the 
petitioner challenges his restraint in prison.  The factual 
allegations of a return must also respond to the allegations of 
the petition that form the basis of the petitioner’s claim that the 
confinement is unlawful.  [Citations.]  In addition to stating 
facts, the return should also, ‘where appropriate, . . . provide 
such documentary evidence, affidavits, or other materials as will 
enable the court to determine which issues are truly disputed.’ ”  
(Ibid., fn. omitted.)  Following the filing of the return, the 
petitioner may file a pleading called a traverse that responds to 
the facts pleaded in the return.  (Ibid.)   
In Duvall, we emphasized that the “requirement that the 
return allege facts responsive to the petition is critical, for the 
factual allegations in the return are either admitted or disputed 
in the traverse and this interplay frames the factual issues that 
the court must decide.”  (Duvall, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 477.)  
Further, we specifically “reiterate[d] our disapproval of the 
practice of filing returns that merely contain a general denial of 
a habeas corpus petitioner’s factual allegations.”  (Id. at 
pp. 480–481.)  However, the Duvall court outlined the 
procedures to follow when a respondent does not have access to 
information needed to either admit or deny a factual allegation 
of the petition.  In such circumstances, the “return should set 
forth with specificity:  (i) why information is not readily 
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
39 
available; (ii) the steps that were taken to try to obtain it; and 
(iii) why [respondent] believes in good faith that certain alleged 
facts are untrue.”  (Id. at p. 485.) 
With these procedures in mind, we consider a respondent’s 
duty in responding to a habeas corpus petitioner’s Brady claim 
in a case in which the respondent has knowledge of, or is in 
actual or constructive possession of, the evidence forming the 
basis of the claim.  As alluded to above, we reiterate that upon 
the filing of a petition alleging a Brady violation, if the allegedly 
suppressed evidence is material and exculpatory, the Attorney 
General has an independent constitutional duty to disclose the 
evidence (see pt. II.A., ante), and to the extent the evidence is 
subject to Rule 3.8(d), the Attorney General has an independent 
ethical duty to disclose the evidence (see pt. II.B., ante).24  In 
this part we consider additional duties arising from habeas 
corpus procedural law that apply upon the mere allegation of a 
Brady violation.  Specifically, we consider respondent’s duty in 
filing an informal response prior to the issuance of an order to 
show cause, and respondent’s duty in filing a return should a 
court issue an order to show cause.  
 
24  
In addition, even where disclosure is not mandated by 
Brady or Rule 3.8(d), the Attorney General may disclose the 
evidence to promote justice as a policy matter.  Further, the 
Attorney General’s disclosure of allegedly suppressed evidence 
in response to a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging a 
Brady violation is not necessarily an admission or concession on 
the merits because, as noted in part II.A., ante, the Attorney 
General may disclose the evidence in an attempt to comply with 
his Brady duty even where a court ultimately concludes that 
Brady did not mandate disclosure.  (Kyles, supra, 514 U.S. at 
p. 439; Deputy Sheriffs, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 40.)   
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
40 
Jenkins contends the “Attorney General[25] should not be 
permitted to sit on exculpatory evidence undermining a criminal 
defendant’s conviction and hope that the case does not survive 
the informal briefing stage.”  She supports her argument by 
noting “the vast number of unrepresented habeas petitioners,” 
and argues that a contrary rule would “incentivize continued 
suppression.”  She argues that the mere filing of a petition for 
writ of habeas corpus alleging a Brady claim requires the 
Attorney General to disclose the allegedly exculpatory evidence. 
We reject this argument.  To begin with, a petitioner’s 
filing of a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging a Brady 
claim, does not establish the existence of any exculpatory 
evidence.  Thus, the analysis depends on whether the mere 
allegation of a Brady violation in a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus triggers a respondent’s duty under our habeas corpus 
case law to disclose the existence of known evidence underlying 
such claim.26 
The informal response is a judicially created procedure.  
(See Romero, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 741–742 [outlining history 
 
25  
While our order limiting the issue to be briefed and argued 
suggested that this duty was the Attorney General’s, as a 
technical matter, the duty belongs to the Attorney General’s 
client, respondent Secretary of the Department of Corrections 
and Rehabilitation.  (See § 1477 [stating that a writ of habeas 
corpus “must be directed to the person having custody of or 
restraining the person on whose behalf the application is 
made”].)  However, the Attorney General must also comply with 
the habeas corpus procedural duties specified in this opinion 
when acting on behalf of respondent as counsel. 
26  
Again, the fact that respondent has knowledge, whether 
actual or constructive, of the evidence does not establish that 
the evidence is material or exculpatory.  
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
41 
of the development of the use of informal responses in habeas 
corpus proceedings].)  We are not aware of any case law, and 
Jenkins cites none, holding that a respondent must come 
forward with affirmative evidence of any kind in an informal 
response.  (See In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 798, fn. 20 
[“Nothing in . . . Duvall, supra, 9 Cal.4th 464, [476], suggests, 
much 
less 
holds, 
that 
respondent 
is 
obligated 
to 
provide . . . documentary evidence in an informal response,” 
that will “ ‘ “enable the court to determine which issues are truly 
disputed” ’ ”].)  Nor do the relevant rules of court that now 
govern informal responses in habeas corpus proceedings specify 
any such duty.  (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.385(b), 4.551(b), 
4.573(a).)  Further, the “screening function” (Romero, at p. 742) 
that an informal response serves — allowing for the 
identification of facially deficient petitions — does not support 
imposing such a duty.   
Therefore, we agree with the Attorney General that, prior 
to the issuance of an order to show cause, in an informal 
response, respondent may choose to neither “confirm nor 
dispute” the existence of the alleged Brady evidence and may 
argue instead that, assuming the existence of the evidence, the 
evidence is not subject to Brady.27  Permitting respondent to 
 
27  
Again, we emphasize that we are discussing here only the 
respondent’s duties under the law governing habeas corpus 
petitions in responding to an allegation of a Brady violation.  If 
the allegedly suppressed evidence is in fact subject to Brady 
and/or Rule 3.8(d), the Attorney General has a duty to disclose 
the evidence as outlined in part II.A. and/or part II.B., ante, 
respectively.  
 
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
42 
argue in such a fashion should not prejudice a habeas corpus 
petitioner who merely carries a pleading burden prior to the 
issuance of an order to show cause.  (See Duvall, supra, 9 Cal.4th 
at p. 474 [specifying a habeas corpus petitioner’s pleading 
burden].)  
However, given that a court is empowered, after allowing 
a petitioner to file a reply to the informal response (see Romero, 
supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 741) to summarily reject a petition for 
habeas corpus on the basis of “factual materials” submitted in 
an informal response (id. at p. 742, italics added), we do impose 
one 
restriction 
on 
a 
respondent’s 
informal 
response.  
Specifically, we conclude that, if the Attorney General has 
knowledge of, or is in actual or constructive possession of, 
evidence underlying a habeas corpus petitioner’s Brady claim, 
he shall not file an informal response on behalf of respondent 
that argues the petitioner has failed to present “documentary 
evidence supporting the claim” (Duvall, supra, 9 Cal.4th at 
p. 474), unless the Attorney General explains the basis for such 
an argument (e.g., by explaining that confidentiality provisions 
prohibit the Attorney General from confirming the existence of 
the evidence and the petitioner has failed to utilize available 
procedures to seek access to the evidence).28  This limited 
 
In addition, if the evidence does not in fact exist, contrary 
to our hypothetical positing that the Attorney General has 
knowledge of its existence, respondent may argue that the 
evidence does not exist.   
28  
In discussing his responsibilities in filing an informal 
response responding to a habeas corpus petitioner’s Brady 
claim, the Attorney General proposes a similar restriction, 
stating, “[W]hen the Attorney General has ready access to 
 
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
43 
restriction is sufficient to guard against the possibility that a 
court would summarily reject a petition on the erroneous 
premise that the evidence does not exist, when in fact the 
Attorney General has knowledge of the existence of the 
evidence.   
However, after the issuance of an order to show cause, 
different rules apply.  As we outlined ante, Duvall requires a 
respondent to plead facts responsive to the petitioner’s 
allegations, including “ ‘where appropriate, . . . provid[ing] such 
documentary evidence, affidavits, or other materials as will 
enable the court to determine which issues are truly disputed.’ ”  
(Duvall, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 476.)  Thus, as the Attorney 
General acknowledges, “This obligation to allege facts would 
ordinarily include acknowledging the existence of alleged Brady 
evidence known to or possessed by the Attorney General.”  We 
agree.   
Thus, for example, if a habeas corpus petitioner alleged 
that a prosecution witness had a prior conviction that was 
suppressed at trial under Brady, after the issuance of an order 
to show cause, the Attorney General, on behalf of respondent, 
would normally be required to file a return that either admitted 
or denied the existence of the prior conviction.29  By either 
 
information that would confirm or dispel the accuracy of 
petitioner’s factual claims, the Attorney General should not 
contest the sufficiency of evidence provided by petitioner 
without providing factual clarification — or identifying a 
statutory inability to do so.”    
29  
In this hypothetical scenario, the Attorney General would 
have knowledge of such evidence  given his role in administering 
the state’s depository of criminal history records.  (Cf. § 11105, 
 
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
44 
admitting or denying the factual basis of the habeas corpus 
petitioner’s Brady claim, respondent would thereby “sharpen[] 
the issues” that remain to be decided in any evidentiary 
hearing.30  (Duvall, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 480.)   
Accordingly, we conclude that prior to the issuance of an 
order to show cause on a petition for writ of habeas corpus 
raising a Brady claim, the Attorney General generally may file 
an informal response on behalf of a respondent that neither 
confirms nor disputes the existence of the alleged Brady 
evidence.  However, the Attorney General shall not file an 
informal response contending that the petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate the existence of the evidence where the Attorney 
General has knowledge of, or is in actual or constructive 
possession of, the evidence, without providing a reasoned 
explanation rooted in the Attorney General’s inability to confirm 
the existence of the evidence and petitioner’s failure to utilize 
procedures for obtaining the evidence.  Further, at the return 
stage, the Attorney General, on behalf of the respondent, shall 
not persist in raising any argument put forth in an informal 
response that the petitioner failed to carry his or her burden of 
showing the evidence exists without providing a reason for why 
respondent is unable to confirm or deny the existence of the 
 
subd. (a)(2)(A) [“ ‘State summary criminal history information’ 
means the master record of information compiled by the 
Attorney General pertaining to the identification and criminal 
history of a person”].)   
30  
At the return stage, the respondent remains free to 
present whatever legal arguments he or she deems appropriate 
in responding to the petitioner’s claim.  Thus, with respect to a 
Brady claim, the respondent might argue that the evidence is 
not material.   
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
45 
evidence (e.g., because the alleged evidence is subject to 
disclosure prohibitions).31  
D. 
In his answering brief in this court, the Attorney General 
points out that the evidence underlying Jenkins’s Brady claim, 
namely the juvenile adjudications that Brittneeh and Sade 
allegedly suffered, are subject to disclosure restrictions 
contained in Welfare and Institutions Code section 827.32  In 
considering the relevance of this fact to the duties discussed in 
this opinion, we first outline the existing law governing the 
government’s Brady obligation in the context of confidential 
records protected by Welfare and Institutions Code section 827.  
We then discuss how this law applies with respect to the 
constitutional, ethical, and habeas corpus procedural duties 
outlined in parts II.A., II.B., and II.C., ante, respectively.33   
 
31  
As previously noted, we discuss in part II.D., post, how the 
respondent may carry its Duvall pleading duty when a statute, 
such as Welfare and Institutions Code section 827, restricts the 
disclosure of the evidence underlying the respondent’s pleading 
burden.   
32  
Neither party referred to these disclosure restrictions in 
the proceedings in the Court of Appeal or at the petition stage 
in this court.  In her reply brief, Jenkins does not dispute that 
Welfare and Institutions Code section 827 restricts the 
disclosure of the alleged adjudications.   
33  
Apart from Welfare and Institutions Code section 827, we 
express no opinion as to whether and how other disclosure 
restrictions might apply with respect to the evidence underlying 
a Brady claim in a petition for writ of habeas corpus and how 
such restrictions might affect the duties we have outlined in 
parts II.A., II.B., and II.C., ante. 
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
46 
Welfare and Institutions Code section 827 has long since 
“repose[d] in the juvenile court control of juvenile records.”  
(T.N.G. v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 767, 780.)  The statute 
“requires the permission of the court before any information 
about juveniles is disclosed to third parties by any law 
enforcement official.”  (Ibid.)  In J.E. v. Superior Court (2014) 
223 Cal.App.4th 1329 (J.E.), the Court of Appeal provided an 
overview of Welfare and Institutions Code section 827’s 
confidentiality provisions and the petition procedure that may 
be used by those not specifically statutorily authorized to inspect 
such records to gain access to them, including criminal 
defendants such as Jenkins:  “Section 827 specifies who is 
authorized to inspect the files, and it lists the prosecutor as one 
of the authorized persons.  An authorized person, in turn, may 
not disclose information from the files to an unauthorized 
person without a court order. . . .  [¶]  Section 827 also contains 
provisions that permit unauthorized persons to directly petition 
the juvenile court for access to the confidential records.  
[Citations.]  Under section 827 the juvenile court has ‘exclusive 
authority to determine whether and to what extent to grant 
access to confidential juvenile records’ to unauthorized persons.  
[Citation.]  This statutory scheme reflects a legislative 
determination that the juvenile court has ‘both the “ ‘sensitivity 
and expertise’ to make decisions about access to juvenile 
records.” ’ ”  (J.E., at p. 1337, fns. omitted.) 
The J.E. court also summarized the in camera review 
procedures specified by Welfare and Institutions Code 
section 827 and California Rules of Court, rule 5.552 that govern 
a petition for disclosure of confidential juvenile documents.  
(J.E., supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1338.)  The J.E. court 
concluded that these in camera review procedures provide the 
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
47 
“proper mechanism to resolve a defense Brady disclosure 
request involving information in a juvenile file.”  (Ibid.)   
In reaching this conclusion, the J.E. court noted that 
although the “government’s Brady obligations are typically 
placed upon the prosecutor, the courts have recognized that the 
Brady requirements can also be satisfied when a trial court 
conducts an in camera review of documents containing possible 
exculpatory 
or 
impeachment 
evidence.” 
 
(J.E., 
supra, 
223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1336, citing, inter alia, Ritchie, supra, 
480 U.S. at pp. 57–58.)  The J.E. court noted that, in Ritchie, the 
United States Supreme Court held that a defendant’s right to a 
fair trial was sufficiently protected by a trial court’s in camera 
review of confidential child protection agency files that the 
defendant sought.  (J.E., at p. 1336, citing Ritchie, at pp. 59–61.)  
The Ritchie court stated that the trial court was required to 
disclose the material to the defense if it were to determine the 
confidential files contained Brady material.  (Ritchie, at pp. 60–
61.)   
The J.E. court explained that Welfare and Institutions 
Code section 827 codified a similar procedure for in camera 
review, and possible disclosure, of juvenile records that “has 
long been recognized as an appropriate vehicle to protect both 
the defendant’s right to a fair trial and the state’s interest in 
confidentiality of the files.”  (J.E., supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 1338, citing, inter alia, People v. Martinez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 
399, 450–454.)  And, as we described in Johnson, “The J.E. court 
explained that, ‘[a]s a practical matter, use of a [Welfare and 
Institutions Code] section 827 petition to secure Brady review 
can also serve to streamline the review process.  A section 827 
petition filed directly with the juvenile court bypasses the 
prosecutor as an intermediary and allows the court to make the 
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
48 
disclosure decision in the first instance.  This eliminates the 
need for the prosecution to request court permission for 
disclosure after its Brady review, and forestalls litigation 
brought by the defense over whether the prosecution has 
complied with its Brady obligations.  Given that the Legislature 
has established the section 827 court petition process for access 
to juvenile files, it makes practical sense to allow use of this 
process to resolve Brady requests through a single procedure.’  
([J.E.], supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1339.)”  (Johnson, supra, 
61 Cal.4th at p. 718.)  Accordingly, in Johnson, we cited Ritchie 
and J.E., as providing the “procedure used for confidential 
juvenile records.”  (Ibid.)   
Finally, in People v. Stewart (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 755 
(Stewart), the Court of Appeal concluded that the People had 
violated their duty under Brady and its progeny in connection 
with a police report that was protected from disclosure by 
Welfare and Institutions Code section 827.  The alleged victim 
of the offenses discussed in the police report, which pertained to 
an incident separate from the charged offenses, was a minor and 
a key prosecution witness in the defendant’s case.  (Stewart, at 
pp. 761, 776.)  After discussing Ritchie, J.E., and Johnson — 
“three cases that bear on a prosecutor’s Brady obligation in the 
context of confidential records” (Stewart, at p. 771) — the 
Stewart court concluded that the government had suppressed 
the police report, which contained potentially impeaching 
information as to the alleged victim/witness.  (Id. at pp. 775–
776.)  The Stewart court reasoned that the People could have 
satisfied their Brady obligation under such case law by 
“informing 
the 
defense 
of 
the 
existence 
of 
potential 
impeachment material in the police report, making a copy of the 
[police report] available for the juvenile court’s review, and 
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
49 
referring [the defendant] to the section 827 procedure to obtain 
it,” but had failed to do so.  (Id. at p. 775.)   
This case law informs our assessment of the Attorney 
General’s duty in responding to a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus alleging a Brady violation from the failure to disclose 
evidence in a case in which the Attorney General is himself 
prohibited from disclosing the evidence pursuant to Welfare and 
Institutions Code section 827.  Applying such law, we conclude 
that the Attorney General may satisfy his Brady duty under 
such circumstances by:  (1) informing the petitioner or 
petitioner’s counsel that the materials allegedly suppressed are 
protected by Welfare and Institutions Code section 827; 
(2) informing the petitioner or petitioner’s counsel of the Welfare 
and Institutions Code section 827 procedure needed to obtain 
such evidence; and (3) after the petitioner files a Welfare and 
Institutions Code section 827 petition, making any such 
evidence that the Attorney General possesses available for a 
juvenile court’s review under that statute.  (See Stewart, supra, 
55 Cal.App.5th at p. 775 [outlining prosecutor’s duty with 
respect to such evidence prior to conviction].)   
Similarly, with respect to his ethical duty under 
Rule 3.8(d) under these circumstances, while the Attorney 
General properly notes that comment [3] to Rule 3.8 specifies 
that it “does not require disclosure of information protected from 
disclosure by federal or California laws and rules,” as discussed 
in the previous paragraph, the Attorney General need not 
disclose confidential materials.  Rather, we conclude that the 
Attorney General may comply with his Rule 3.8(d) duty in the 
same manner as he may comply with his Brady duty with 
respect to confidential materials.  (Cf. Stewart, supra, 
55 Cal.App.5th at p. 775.) 
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
50 
Finally, with respect to a respondent’s duty in filing a 
return under these circumstances, we conclude that a 
respondent may plead an inability to plead facts about the 
alleged Brady evidence due to the Welfare and Institutions Code 
section 827 disclosure bar.  Permitting a respondent to file such 
a pleading would be consistent with our discussion in Duvall of 
pleading rules to be applied “where access to critical information 
is limited or denied to one party.”  (Duvall, supra, 9 Cal.4th at 
p. 485.)  Such a pleading would also be consistent with the 
requirement in Duvall that the “return should set forth with 
specificity . . . why information is not readily available.”  (Ibid.)  
The Attorney General should also state in respondent’s return 
that the petitioner or petitioner’s counsel may utilize the 
procedure specified in that statute to attempt to obtain such 
evidence and make any such evidence he possesses available for 
a juvenile court’s review under Welfare and Institutions Code 
section 827.  By filing such a return, respondent also will serve 
the salutary purpose of alerting the habeas corpus court of the 
possible need for ancillary proceedings in the juvenile court 
before the habeas corpus court can “endeavor to determine 
whether there are facts legitimately in dispute that may require 
holding an evidentiary hearing.”  (Duvall, at p. 485.) 
In sum, in responding to a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus alleging a Brady violation based on a failure to disclose 
evidence when the Attorney General is himself prohibited from 
disclosing that evidence pursuant to Welfare and Institutions 
Code section 827, the Attorney General need not, and should 
not, himself disclose the evidence in contravention of statutory 
confidentiality procedures.  However, the existence of such 
confidentiality provisions does not relieve the Attorney General 
of the various disclosure duties outlined in this opinion.  Instead, 
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
51 
when faced with such a petition, the Attorney General should 
proceed as outlined in this part and, in so doing, will comply 
with the duties we have described in this opinion without 
contravening the disclosure restrictions contained in Welfare 
and Institutions Code section 827. 
E. 
To recap, where allegedly suppressed evidence forming 
the basis of a Brady claim in a petition for writ of habeas corpus 
is in fact subject to Brady, the Attorney General has a 
constitutional duty of disclosure that exists as of the time of the 
filing of the petition as outlined in part II.A., ante.34  Where such 
evidence is not subject to Brady, but is subject to Rule 3.8(d), the 
Attorney General has an ethical duty of disclosure that exists as 
of the time of the filing of the petition as outlined in part II.B., 
ante.  Where such evidence is neither subject to Brady nor 
subject to disclosure under Rule 3.8(d), respondent has a duty to 
disclose the existence of the evidence under Duvall that arises 
 
34  
The Attorney General states in his brief that in cases in 
which the material underlying a Brady petition for writ of 
habeas corpus is in fact Brady material, as a “policy decision,” 
he will either:  (1) provide the material directly to the petitioner, 
or (2) if the evidence is subject to disclosure restrictions, provide 
the petitioner with notice sufficient to permit the petitioner to 
seek court-ordered disclosure.  We emphasize that the Attorney 
General has a legal duty mandated by Brady and its progeny to 
disclose such evidence.  In addition, because evidence that is in 
fact Brady material will also, by definition, be subject to 
Rule 3.8(d), the Attorney General also has an ethical duty to 
disclose such evidence.  In addition, as noted in the text, in a 
case in which the evidence is subject to disclosure restrictions 
contained in Welfare and Institutions Code section 827, the 
Attorney General may satisfy those duties by proceeding as 
outlined in part II.D., ante. 
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
52 
after the issuance of an order to show cause as outlined in part 
III.C., ante.  Finally, where such evidence is subject to disclosure 
restrictions contained in Welfare and Institutions Code 
section 827, the Attorney General and the respondent may 
fulfill their duties by proceeding as outlined in part II.D., ante. 
We emphasize that where the evidence at issue is actually 
Brady material and/or subject to Rule 3.8(d), the Attorney 
General’s 
constitutional 
and 
ethical 
obligations 
exist 
independently from respondent’s duty under habeas corpus case 
law to respond to a petitioner’s Brady claim.  Thus, when 
triggered, such duties exist as of the filing of the petition.  In 
addition, the respondent has procedural duties that arise from 
a petitioner’s allegation that are triggered upon the issuance of 
an order to show cause.   
In light of the Attorney General’s admittedly deficient 
litigation practices in the Court of Appeal,35 as well as our 
clarification of the Attorney General’s disclosure duties, it is 
appropriate to remand the matter to the Court of Appeal for 
 
35  
In his merits brief in this court, the Attorney General 
acknowledged that his return in the Court of Appeal was 
“deficient . . . because it . . . argued (in part) that petitioner had 
not 
provided 
sufficient 
proof 
of 
the 
alleged 
juvenile 
adjudications, yet did not provide clarifying materials or plead 
an inability to do so.”  In addition, in that brief, the Attorney 
General stated that his informal response in the Court of Appeal 
“did not represent best practices” for similar reasons.  At oral 
argument in this court, the Attorney General stated, “We did not 
fulfill our duty to assist the habeas tribunal to understand what 
facts were actually at issue in this case.”  While we appreciate 
the Attorney General’s eventual concessions, we emphasize that 
we do not condone such errors and that a prudent prosecutor 
should take care to not make these mistakes in the future.   
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
53 
further proceedings so as to permit that court to consider 
Jenkins’s petition upon a fulsome record prepared in accordance 
with the principles that we have outlined in this opinion.  In 
remanding, we express no opinion on the merits of Jenkins’s 
petition for writ of habeas corpus.   
Finally, we urge the prosecutors in this case, and in every 
other, to carefully consider the constitutional, ethical, and 
habeas corpus procedural duties that we have outlined herein to 
ensure that they faithfully bear the special responsibilities 
ascribed to the prosecution in our system of justice.  We remind 
the prosecutors of today of what we said in In re Ferguson (1971) 
5 Cal.3d 525:  “The search for truth is not served but hindered 
by the concealment of relevant and material evidence.  Although 
our system of administering criminal justice is adversary in 
nature, a trial is not a game.  Its ultimate goal is the 
ascertainment of truth, and where furtherance of the adversary 
system comes in conflict with the ultimate goal, the adversary 
system must give way to reasonable restraints designed to 
further that goal.  Implementation of this policy requires 
recognition of a duty on the part of the prosecution to disclose 
evidence to the defense in appropriate cases.”  (Id. at pp. 531–
532.) 
 In re JENKINS  
Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J. 
 
54 
DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the 
matter is remanded to that court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
 
We Concur: 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
EVANS, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  In re Jenkins 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished) XX NP opn. filed 1/22/21 – 2d Dist., 
Div. 1 
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S267391 
Date Filed:  March 27, 2023 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Los Angeles  
Judge:  Lisa B. Lench 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Rudolph J. Alejo, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Petitioner Jasmine Jenkins. 
 
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, 
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey and Jeffrey 
M. Laurence, Assistant Attorneys General, Zee Rodriguez, Paul Thies, 
Seth K. Schalit and J. Michael Chamberlain, Deputy Attorneys 
General, for Respondent Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation.
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Rudolph J. Alejo  
Attorney at Law 
520 South Grand Avenue, 4th Floor 
Los Angeles, CA 90071 
(213) 243-0300 
 
J. Michael Chamberlain 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA 94102 
(415) 510-3775