Title: FRANCIS J. TAYLOR, JR., Appellant, vs. STATE OF IOWA, Appellee.

State: iowa

Issuer: Iowa Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 49 / 99-1285

Filed May 7, 2003

FRANCIS J. TAYLOR, JR.,

Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,

Appellee. 

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, George W. Bergeson and Scott D. Rosenberg, Judges.

Postconviction relief applicant appeals from the district court's denial of his request for postconviction relief.  AFFIRMED.

Marlyn S. Jensen, Osceola, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Cristen C. Odell, Kevin Struve and Richard Williams, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.

Per Curiam.
The criminal proceedings involving the underlying conviction and the postconviction relief proceeding that followed present us with a long and convoluted procedural history.  Francis J. Taylor, Jr., the postconviction relief applicant, raises numerous issues on appeal from the district court’s denial of his request for postconviction relief.  We find Taylor has failed to preserve error on most of those issues.  To the extent Taylor has preserved error on issues, we find no merit in them.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
I.  Criminal Proceedings. 
In 1991, Taylor was convicted of willful failure to file Iowa income tax returns for 1985 and 1986.  See State v. Taylor, 490 N.W.2d 536, 537 (Iowa 1992).  Taylor filed a pro se motion for new trial prior to sentencing, which was denied.  He appealed and contended the district court erred in (1) refusing to dismiss the prosecution on venue and jurisdiction grounds, (2) allowing evidence of prior tax filing violations, and (3) imposing sentence.  Id.  We affirmed Taylor’s conviction but vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing because we concluded the district court had no statutory authority to impose a thirty-percent surcharge against Taylor.  Id. at 539.  We did not preserve any issues for postconviction relief proceedings.
At the resentencing in November 1992, Taylor filed a “verified motion in arrest of judgment” and requested an evidentiary hearing on the motion.  The court denied the motion, prompting Taylor to file an application for interlocutory appeal and for stay of the sentencing hearing.  We denied the stay and directed the district court not to consider any pending motions filed by Taylor.  We did however indicate that the district court’s authority to resentence was not limited solely to recalculation of the surcharge.  
Our directive not to consider pending motions did not deter Taylor from filing what he captioned “defendant’s objection to denial of evidence and waiver; renewed motion for evidentiary hearing upon motions; and sworn offer of proof” prior to resentencing.  The district court refused to hear the motion.  The court did not allow Taylor to read his objection and offer of proof into the record. Instead, the court entered it as an exhibit.   One of the objections addressed the admission into evidence of exhibit 9.  The exhibit is a Fiduciary Return of Income for the Taylor receivership, which shows net farm profit of $29,847, and which has notations at the top of the document stating, “Items to report by Frank and Mary Taylor.”  The court then suspended Taylor’s sentence and placed him on probation.  
II.  Postconviction Proceedings.
In 1994, Taylor filed an application for postconviction relief, alleging numerous grounds.  In its answer, the State alleged Taylor had failed to raise a substantial number of those issues on appeal, thereby waiving the right to raise them in his postconviction relief application.  Nevertheless, the district court, District Judge Scott D. Rosenberg, did address on the merits one ground that was not preserved on direct appeal—ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  The court focused primarily on Taylor’s allegations surrounding the admission of exhibit 9 into evidence.  The court rejected the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  As to Taylor’s other claims, the court found no error “either by way of ineffective assistance of counsel or any error at law.”  The court dismissed the application.  
Taylor filed a motion pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 179(b) (now rule 1.904(2)).  In the motion, Taylor asked the court to address issues surrounding exhibit 9 and some additional issues.  Without waiting for a ruling, Taylor appealed and asked for a limited remand for the district court to address his pending motion.  We granted the limited remand but only for the limited purpose of addressing Taylor’s rule 179(b) motion.     
On remand, Taylor filed a “First Supplement to Rule 179 Motion for Reconsideration and New Trial.”  In that filing, Taylor for the first time asked for a new postconviction relief hearing, alleging Judge Rosenberg  should recuse himself because he had developed an interest in the proceeding.  The judge recused himself and granted Taylor a new postconviction relief hearing, believing—incorrectly—that only he could rule on the rule 179(b) motion.
The State cross-appealed from this ruling and Taylor dismissed his appeal.  We held Judge Rosenberg did not abuse his discretion by his recusal but did err in interpreting rule 179(b) as requiring a new hearing because of his recusal.   We reversed the grant of a new hearing, reinstated the limited remand, and returned the case “to the status it held at the time of our first remand.”  Taylor v. State, 632 N.W.2d 891, 896 (Iowa 2001).  We remanded to allow the district court “to rule on the question posed by the original rule 179(b) motion as directed and restricted by our initial order for limited remand.”  Id.
On this last remand, District Judge George W. Bergeson ruled on the rule 179(b) motion.  In effect, the court denied the motion, concluding that the postconviction ruling by Judge Rosenberg adequately dealt with the issues Taylor had presented in his rule 179(b) motion.   Taylor appealed again.
III.  Issues.
Taylor raises ten issues.  He contends:  (I) the underlying conviction is the direct product of prosecutorial misconduct; (II) he was denied his constitutional right to confront witnesses against him at the criminal trial; (III) evidence critical to the prosecution was obtained in violation of Iowa statutes, the Iowa Constitution, and the United States Constitution; (IV) a false declaration (exhibit 9) admitted into evidence at the criminal trial misled the jury and was not corrected by an appropriate jury instruction; (V) his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective; (VI) he was denied the right to be heard prior to entry of judgment in the criminal case and instead was forced to wait until postconviction, when the burden of proof rests with him and not the State, thereby violating federal rules; (VII) the district court (Judge Bergeson) on remand erred by not providing a hearing on the merits, not meaningfully addressing the specifics of his rule 179(b) motion, and improperly choosing between two diametrically opposed rulings of Judge Rosenberg;  (VIII) the cumulative effect of the errors identified requires not only reversal of the postconviction relief ruling, but also requires the setting aside of  the criminal conviction; (IX) this court in Taylor v. State, 632 N.W.2d 891 (Iowa 2001) failed to recognize that when it modified the district court ruling granting Taylor a new postconviction relief hearing, it was reversing a matter dictated by the merits (not by procedure) and thus it addressed the merits without a hearing in violation of federal due process and its own rules; and (X)  he is being denied his due process right to a fair and impartial decision maker.
IV.  Scope of Review.
We review postconviction relief proceedings for correction of errors at law.  DeVoss v. State, 648 N.W.2d 56, 60 (Iowa 2002).
V.  Error Preservation.
Postconviction relief proceedings are not an alternative means for litigating issues that were or should have been properly presented for review on direct appeal.  Berryhill v. State, 603 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Iowa 1999); Iowa Code § 822.2 (1993) (postconviction relief “is not a substitute for . . . any remedy, incident to the proceedings in the trial court, or of direct review of the sentence or conviction”).  Therefore, any claim not properly raised on direct appeal may not be litigated in a postconviction relief proceeding.  Berryhill, 603 N.W.2d at 245.  
There is, however, an exception. The rule is not applied if the postconviction relief applicant can show sufficient reason why any ground for relief asserted in a postconviction relief application was not previously asserted at trial or on direct appeal.  DeVoss, 648 N.W.2d at 63. In addition the applicant must demonstrate actual prejudice resulting from the alleged error.  Id.  Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel may provide sufficient reason.  Berryhill, 603 N.W.2d at 245.
The State raised the preservation of error issue in its answer to the postconviction relief application with respect to issues I through V and VIII, and it now raises the error preservation issue on appeal with respect to those same issues.  Although the district court did not address the error preservation issue, we may uphold the district court ruling on that ground. See DeVoss, 648 N.W.2d at 61-63 (holding that we may uphold the district court’s ruling on a ground other than the one upon which the district court relied, provided the ground was urged in that court).
We agree with the State that Taylor failed to raise issues I through V and VIII on direct appeal and has failed to show sufficient reason for failing to do so.  He has also failed to show actual prejudice resulting from the claimed errors with respect to those issues.  He has therefore not preserved error on those issues.  Additionally, we reject those issues on the merits.
With respect to issue V (ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel), we think more explanation would be appropriate.  Taylor contends his trial counsel was ineffective in several respects.  Specifically, he argues (1) counsel conducted no discovery concerning the State’s investigator’s information; (2) counsel failed to file a motion to suppress evidence obtained using civil subpoenas, rather than administrative warrants; (3) counsel did not object to the introduction of exhibit 9 into evidence; and (4) counsel did not request a jury instruction on who had the duty to report receivership income.  
Taylor first raised the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel during the first sentencing hearing in 1991.  He raised the issue in his postconviction relief application but did not do so on direct appeal of his criminal conviction.  Therefore, Taylor has waived this issue.
Taylor has never specifically raised the issue of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  He alludes to the issue in his postconviction relief application, but makes no specific allegations or arguments.  Moreover, Taylor raises the issue in his brief on appeal, but does not discuss it or otherwise address it in his arguments.  Therefore, that issue is deemed waived.  See Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(1)(c) (“Failure in the brief to state, argue, or to cite authority in support of an issue may be deemed waiver of that issue.”).  
Additionally, the district court in its postconviction relief ruling only addressed the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel as it related to trial counsel and did not address the issue of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  In his rule 179(b) motion, Taylor did not ask the court to address the issue of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  This is an additional reason why the issue is waived.
VI.  Merits of remaining claims. 
A.  Right to be heard prior to entry of judgment in criminal case (Issue VI).  Prior to resentencing in the criminal case, Taylor filed a motion in arrest of judgment and a motion for new trial, both of which the district court ruled untimely and refused to hear.  Taylor contends this refusal was error.  We disagree.  The motions were untimely.  See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(2)(a) (“The application for new trial . . . shall be made not later than 45 days after verdict of guilty”) (emphasis added); (3)(b) (motion in arrest of judgment “must be made not later than 45 days after . . . verdict of guilty”) (emphasis added).
	In addition, Taylor ignores the procedural posture of the case at the point that he filed the motions—on direct appeal of his criminal conviction we had remanded the case to the district court for resentencing.  Therefore, he already had an opportunity to raise on direct appeal the arguments he raised in his motions.  He should not be afforded an opportunity to raise arguments he could have and should have raised on direct appeal.  We recognized that fact when in our ruling we directed the district court not to consider any other pending motions filed by Taylor.
	To the extent Taylor argues he was denied his right to allocution, this argument is also without merit.  It appears from the record that the district court gave Taylor ample opportunity to speak at his resentencing hearing.  Before the resentencing, the court heard testimony from Taylor and Taylor presented the court with his written “offer of proof,” which outlined his objections.  See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(3)(d) (before rendition of judgment, “counsel for the defendant, and the defendant personally, shall be allowed to address the court where either wishes to make a statement in mitigation of punishment”).
	B.  The rule 179(b) ruling (Issue VII). Taylor contends Judge Bergeson, on remand, erred by (1) not providing a hearing on the merits of Taylor’s rule 179(b) motion, (2) not meaningfully addressing the specifics of his motion in its ruling, and (3) improperly choosing between two diametrically opposed rulings of Judge Rosenberg.  We reject all three contentions.
	No hearing was required because rule 179(b) allows the district court to enlarge or modify findings based on evidence already in the record. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.904(2) (formerly rule 179(b)).  The motion is not a vehicle for parties to retry issues based on new facts.  In re Marriage of Bolick, 539 N.W.2d 357, 361 (Iowa 1995).  
	Nor was it necessary for the district court to address the specifics of the motion in the court’s ruling.  The fundamental purpose of the motion is to preserve error on issues the district court did not address in its ruling. See Starling v. State, 328 N.W.2d 338, 342 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982) (“[A] party must move under rule 179(b) to enlarge the findings and conclusions of the court in its postconviction proceeding in order to preserve error on its claim that the court failed to make such findings and conclusions sufficiently specific.”).  If the court generally overrules the motion without addressing the specifics, error is preserved.   In addition, Judge Bergeson's failure to address the issues raised in the rule 179(b) motion did not prejudice Taylor because all of the issues raised in Taylor’s motion had not been preserved on direct appeal of his criminal conviction.  Therefore, Taylor had waived those issues.
	As to the last contention, Taylor argues that Judge Bergeson in ruling on the 179(b) motion on remand made a selection from two of Judge Rosenberg's rulings which were directly opposite in result:  the initial postconviction relief ruling, dismissing Taylor's application, and the later ruling, granting Taylor a new postconvicition relief hearing.  Taylor is incorrect on this point given the posture of the case on remand for ruling on the rule 179(b) motion.  At the time we returned the postconviction case for a ruling on the 179(b) motion, we made it clear that we were returning the case to the status it held at the time of our first remand.  Taylor, 632 N.W.2d at 896. Therefore, it was as if there never was a ruling by Judge Rosenberg on the rule 179(b) motion.
	C.  Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor v. State, 632 N.W.2d 891 (Iowa 2001) (Issue IX).  Taylor contends that this court failed to recognize that when it reversed Judge Rosenberg’s ruling granting Taylor a new hearing, it was reversing a matter dictated by the merits (not by procedure), and thus addressed the merits without a hearing in violation of federal due process and its own rules.  In effect, Taylor is arguing that when Judge Rosenberg granted the new hearing because of his recusal, he was actually ruling on the merits. 
	This argument is likewise without merit.  When Judge Rosenberg recused himself and granted a new postconviction hearing, he did so based on procedure rather than on the merits.  Moreover, procedurally, Taylor cannot attack this court’s decision in the way he attempts to do so here.  We will not review our own decisions except upon a timely filed petition for rehearing.  See Iowa R. App. P. 6.27 (petition for rehearing must be filed within 14 days after the filing of an opinion).
D. Fair and impartial decision maker (Issue X).  The final issue Taylor raises is his contention that he was denied his due process right to a fair and impartial decision maker.  This argument deals with exhibit 9 and a finding in Judge Rosenberg’s postconviction relief ruling about who prepared the exhibit.  Taylor contends the ruling named the wrong person as the preparer and that such error somehow showed Judge Rosenberg was trying to avoid Taylor’s objection to the exhibit based on a denial of his right of confrontation.  (The actual preparer was not available as a witness at the criminal trial.)
We reject the contention out of hand.  We think that by his recusal Judge Rosenberg was bending over backwards to avoid any perception of partiality to the State.  If the court made a mistake about who prepared the exhibit, it was clearly unintentional.  Our careful review of the record bears out the following statement from the judge upon his self-imposed recusal:
The Court will further state, however, for whatever it is worth, that at no time has this Court taken any position or manifested an interest in the outcome of this matter in regard to either of the parties at any time.  Such an accusation offends the integrity of this Court and its sense of fairness, which it has always applied vigorously in every case before it.
Taylor offers nothing to counter this statement. 
	Finding no error, we affirm.
	AFFIRMED.
	This is not a published opinion.