Title: Davis v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC19-716 
____________ 
 
ALVIN DAVIS, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
December 2, 2021 
 
CANADY, C.J. 
 
In this case, we consider whether a trial court’s consideration 
of failure to take responsibility during a sentencing proceeding 
necessarily violates a defendant’s due process rights.  We have for 
review the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Davis v. 
State, 268 So. 3d 958, 968-69 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019), in which the 
district court certified the following question to be of great public 
importance: 
WHEN, IF EVER, MUST AN APPELLATE COURT 
REVERSE A SENTENCE BASED ON THE TRIAL 
COURT’S CONSIDERATION OF “REMORSE,” “FAILURE 
TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY,” OR THE LIKE? 
 
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We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
The facts as set forth by the First District are as follows: 
A jury convicted Davis of possessing a firearm as a 
convicted felon.  According to trial testimony, a teenager 
was driving a car with Davis as a passenger.  Officers 
stopped the car and found drugs, drug paraphernalia, 
and a gun.  The teenage driver testified that he did not 
know a gun was in the car until right before the traffic 
stop, when Davis pulled out the gun, wrapped it in an 
orange shirt, and stuffed it under the seat. 
The teen’s testimony was essential, and the defense 
suggested it was also untrue. . . . The jury convicted. 
Davis moved for a new trial.  After a hearing, the 
court denied the motion, and the case proceeded to 
sentencing.  The presentence investigation report noted 
Davis’s “extensive criminal history,” which included 
“numerous violent offenses.”  It also concluded that Davis 
“appears to have a history of gang related activity” and 
“apparently continues to be a threat to the safety of the 
community.”  The PSI [(presentence investigation)] report 
recommended the maximum sentence.[N.1] 
 
[N.1]  A PSI’s purpose is to provide information 
to help the court impose an appropriate 
sentence.  See Fla. R. Crim P. 3.712(a). . . .  
At the sentencing hearing, Davis declared he was 
innocent.  He insisted that the gun was not his, that the 
jury convicted him without sufficient evidence, and that 
his counsel performed inadequately.  After Davis spoke, 
the court pronounced sentence.  In doing so, the court 
recounted Davis’s significant criminal history and told 
Davis “you still fail to take any responsibility for your 
actions.”  The court concluded that, “considering your 
history here, your failure to take any responsibility, the 
 
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nature of the crime, the fact that it involves a firearm, the 
Court will sentence you to 15 years . . . , which is the 
statutory maximum.” 
Davis, 268 So. 3d at 961-62.   
Davis appealed, and the First District heard his appeal en 
banc.  Receding from its own precedent, the First District concluded 
that “lack of remorse and refusal to accept responsibility can be 
valid sentencing considerations when sentencing within the 
statutory range.”  Id. at 961.   
In reaching this conclusion, the First District explained that 
“[t]he commonsense approach of considering a defendant’s 
remorse—or willingness to take responsibility—fits with the 
Legislature’s command that each sentence be not only 
commensurate with the severity of the offense but also fashioned in 
light of ‘the circumstances surrounding’ it.”  Id. at 963 (quoting 
§ 921.002(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2017)).  The district court noted the 
United States Supreme Court’s recognition that “ ‘possession of the 
fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and 
characteristics’ is ‘[h]ighly relevant—if not essential’ to a judge’s 
selection of an appropriate sentence,” id. (quoting Williams v. New 
York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)), and that Florida courts have 
 
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considered a variety of factors when sentencing a defendant, 
including financial resources, employment status, family 
obligations, and overall reputation in the community, id. at 964 
(citing Noel v. State, 191 So. 3d 370, 379 (Fla. 2016); Imbert v. 
State, 154 So. 3d 1174, 1175 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)).  The First 
District further explained that “[a] defendant’s remorse or 
willingness to accept responsibility comprises part of the whole 
picture,” and “speak[s] to a defendant’s character and to the 
defendant’s potential for rehabilitation,” which is important because 
a sentencing judge is obligated to consider a convicted defendant’s 
potential for rehabilitation, or lack thereof, in fashioning a sentence.  
Id. (citing Simmons v. State, 419 So. 2d 316, 320 (Fla. 1982)).   
The First District addressed several counterarguments to its 
change in precedent.  First, it discussed the “view that judges may 
rely on remorse to reduce a sentence but may not rely on a lack of 
remorse to increase a sentence.”  Id. at 965.  While the First District 
acknowledged that this approach was taken by this Court in the 
capital case Pope v. State, 441 So. 2d 1073, 1078 (Fla. 1983), it 
distinguished the instant case, because noncapital sentencing does 
not consider aggravating factors to justify a higher sentence as is 
 
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required in capital sentencing.  Davis, 268 So. 3d at 965.  In this 
case, the First District noted, the trial court was authorized to 
impose the maximum sentence based only on the fact of the 
conviction and without further findings, which are necessary to 
impose an aggravated sentence of death in a capital case.  Id.   
The First District explained that “if [it] held that Davis’s refusal 
to take responsibility could not increase his sentence but could 
justify not lowering his sentence, [it] would have to figure out which 
of those happened.”  Id. at 966.  But this could prove difficult since 
it is unclear whether a particular sentence reflects “an aggravated 
sentence or an unmitigated sentence.”  Id.  The court noted that 
none of the minority opinions written in this case “doubts the 
legality of considering remorse or acceptance of responsibility to 
reduce (or not reduce) a sentence.”  Id.1  The court took issue with 
this position, explaining,  
 
 
1.  Indeed, consideration of remorse to reduce a sentence is 
specifically authorized in section 921.0026(2)(j), Florida Statutes 
(2017), which permits a downward departure from the lowest 
permissible sentence in cases where “[t]he offense was committed in 
an unsophisticated manner and was an isolated incident for which 
the defendant has shown remorse.” 
 
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This further supports our conclusion that these 
considerations are, in fact, valid sentencing 
considerations.  It should go without saying that no up-
versus-down distinction would be an issue with truly 
impermissible sentencing factors.  With religion, for 
example, we would never say a judge could lighten a 
sentence for defendants who disavowed Catholicism, so 
long as the judge did not enhance sentences for those 
who embraced Catholicism.  We would instead say—quite 
emphatically—that a defendant’s religious faith must not 
play any part in the sentence.  In other words, we would 
say improper sentencing factors should not be factors in 
sentencings—up or down. 
Id. (citation omitted).  To put it another way, the court concluded 
that if acceptance of responsibility is a permissible sentencing 
consideration to reduce a sentence, then it is simply a proper 
sentencing consideration, regardless of its purpose. 
Finally, turning to this Court’s decision in Holton v. State, 573 
So. 2d 284, 292 (Fla. 1990), another capital case, the First District 
rejected the argument that Holton’s prohibition against using pleas 
of not guilty against defendants is comparable to the voluntary 
allocution in this case.  Davis, 268 So. 3d at 967.  The First District 
reasoned that “when a defendant forgoes permissible benefits of 
pleading guilty (such as a lenient sentence), it does not necessarily 
follow that his not-guilty plea was unconstitutionally ‘used against 
him.’ ”  Id. at 966-67.  The court continued, “To the extent Davis 
 
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had to choose between maintaining his innocence at sentencing or 
seeking a more favorable sentence, he was in no different situation 
than defendants facing plea offers every single day.”  Id. at 967.  
The First District then distinguished cases of true judicial 
vindictiveness, which would clearly be violative of due process 
rights.  Id. at 967-68.  But, the court reasoned, withholding 
leniency, as the trial court here did, is not equivalent to punishing a 
defendant.  Id. 
Concluding that there was no constitutional violation, the 
First District held “that a trial judge does not violate a defendant’s 
due process rights by merely considering the defendant’s lack of 
remorse or refusal to accept responsibility.”  Id. at 961.  The First 
District thus affirmed Davis’s conviction and sentence but certified 
the aforementioned question to be one of great public importance.  
Id. at 968-69. 
 
We accepted jurisdiction to answer the certified question, but 
because the district court did not pass upon the entirety of the 
question as framed, we first rephrase it based on the specific 
circumstances presented by this case: 
 
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DOES A TRIAL COURT, WHEN IMPOSING A SENTENCE 
ON A DEFENDANT WHO HAS VOLUNTARILY CHOSEN 
TO ALLOCUTE AND MAINTAIN HIS INNOCENCE AT THE 
SENTENCING HEARING, VIOLATE THE DEFENDANT’S 
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS BY CONSIDERING THE 
DEFENDANT’S FAILURE TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
HIS ACTIONS?2 
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
Davis contends that consideration by a trial court at 
sentencing of a defendant’s failure to take responsibility for his or 
her actions violates due process “because it infringes on the 
defendant’s right to testify and not incriminate himself.”  Initial Br. 
of Pet. at 13.  We disagree.  In support of his position, Davis relies 
on this Court’s opinion in Holton, a capital case, in which this Court 
stated that “[a] trial court violates due process by using a 
protestation of innocence against a defendant.”  573 So. 2d at 292.  
He relies on another capital case, Pope, which states that “lack of 
remorse should have no place in the consideration of aggravating 
 
 
2.  Our rephrasing of the question should not be understood 
to suggest that we view lack of remorse as materially different than 
failure to take responsibility.  Lack of remorse and failure to take 
responsibility ordinarily are simply different ways of characterizing 
the same attitude manifested by a defendant. 
 
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factors.”  441 So. 2d at 1078.  But his reliance on these capital 
cases is misplaced.   
 
In Pope, “[t]he trial court, in finding the murder especially 
heinous atrocious or cruel commented that ‘the Defendant has [not] 
shown any remorse, having elected to steadfastly deny his guilt.’ ”  
Id. at 1077.  The standard jury instruction explaining the heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel capital aggravator in effect at the time included a 
definition of “cruel” that “tended to focus attention on the mindset 
of the murderer—his consciencelessness or pitilessness.”  Id.  Thus, 
we explained that “lack of remorse came to be considered relevant 
to the determination under this aggravating factor.”  Id.  Before 
ultimately concluding that any error was harmless because “the 
applicability of this aggravating factor was proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt without regard to Pope’s remorse or lack thereof,” 
id. at 1078, this Court wrote that “[t]o equate a defendant’s not-
guilty plea with lack of remorse which may be considered in 
weighing an aggravating circumstance in support of imposition of 
the death penalty would in effect punish the defendant for 
exercising rights of due process,” id. at 1077.  The Court went on to 
conclude that “any consideration of defendant’s remorse” is 
 
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“extraneous to the question of whether the murder of which he was 
convicted was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel.”  Id. at 1078.  
The Court reasoned that “[e]vents occurring after death, no matter 
how revealing of depravity and cruelty, are not relevant to the 
atrocity of the homicide.”  Id. 
 
Having resolved the issue on that basis, the Court went on to 
observe: 
Unfortunately, remorse is an active emotion and its 
absence, therefore, can be measured or inferred only 
from negative evidence.  This invites the sort of mistake 
which occurred in the case now before us—inferring lack 
of remorse from the exercise of constitutional rights.  
This sort of mistake may, in an extreme case, raise a 
question as to whether the defendant has been denied 
some measure of due process, thus mandating a remand 
for reconsideration of the sentence.  For these reasons, 
we hold that henceforth lack of remorse should have no 
place in the consideration of aggravating factors.  Any 
convincing evidence of remorse may properly be 
considered in mitigation of the sentence, but absence of 
remorse should not be weighed either as an aggravating 
factor nor as an enhancement of an aggravating factor. 
Id. 
 
But Pope is inapplicable here.  This case is not a capital case 
requiring consideration of aggravating factors.  In capital cases, 
only statutory aggravating factors may be considered, and a 
statutory aggravating factor is required to be proven beyond a 
 
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reasonable doubt before a sentence of death may be imposed.  See  
§ 921.141(2)(b)2., Fla. Stat. (2020) (“If the jury . . . [u]nanimously 
finds at least one aggravating factor, the defendant is eligible for a 
sentence of death . . . .”); State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487, 491 (Fla. 
2020) (upholding this Court’s prior ruling that “a jury must 
unanimously find the existence of a statutory aggravating 
circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt”), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 
1051 (2021).  In a noncapital case, the statutory maximum 
sentence is a legal sentence by virtue of the conviction alone.  See § 
921.002(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (2017) (“The trial court judge may impose a 
sentence up to and including the statutory maximum for any 
offense . . . .”).  As the First District correctly observed: 
In Davis’s case, . . . the judge had statutory authority to 
impose a sentence of up to fifteen years.  § 775.082(1)(d), 
Fla. Stat.  He could do so with a remorseful defendant, 
and he could do so with an unremorseful defendant.  He 
could do so with a defendant taking responsibility for his 
crimes, and he could do so with a defendant unwilling to 
take responsibility.  The conviction alone was enough to 
justify the sentence.  No “aggravator” or additional 
findings were necessary. 
Davis, 268 So. 3d at 965.  In other words, the Legislature 
empowered the trial court to sentence Davis to fifteen years’ 
imprisonment whether or not he took responsibility for his actions, 
 
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because it was the fact of his conviction that subjected him to a 
sentence up to and including the statutory maximum.  So the 
statutory scheme applicable here, unlike the statute governing 
aggravating circumstances in capital cases that was applied in 
Pope, does not foreclose consideration in sentencing of the 
defendant’s failure to accept responsibility. 
In Holton, the trial court declined to apply the proposed 
mitigating circumstance that the capacity of the defendant to 
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct 
to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired.  573 So. 
2d at 292.  In finding that this mitigating circumstance was not 
established, the trial court wrote, “The defendant testified he was 
addicted to drugs but still maintained his innocence of these 
offenses.  This factor would not apply in view of that sworn 
testimony.”  Id.   
On appeal, this Court said that “[t]he fact that a defendant has 
pled not guilty cannot be used against him or her during any stage 
of the proceedings because due process guarantees an individual 
the right to maintain innocence even when faced with evidence of 
overwhelming guilt,” and that “entering a plea of not guilty does not 
 
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preclude consideration by the sentencer of matters relevant to 
mitigation.”  Id.  In sum, this Court concluded that the trial court 
had used the defendant’s not guilty plea as an improper basis for 
rejecting a mitigating circumstance that was established.  
Ultimately, this Court concluded that any error was harmless 
because Holton’s drug abuse was considered mitigating under a 
different mitigating circumstance.  Id. at 298.  Holton’s broad, 
unqualified statement that “using a protestation of innocence 
against a defendant” “violates due process,” id. at 292, goes far 
beyond the facts presented and is unnecessary to the Court’s 
decision.  It constitutes dicta that we expressly disapprove—dicta 
that cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s decision in 
United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978), which we discuss 
below. 
The facts of this case are entirely distinguishable from Holton.  
This again is not a capital case that involves a weighing of 
aggravating factors and mitigating circumstances in order to 
determine a sentence.  “Judges in noncapital cases . . . do not 
consider ‘aggravators’ and ‘mitigators’ in the same sense that 
capital sentencers do.”  Davis, 268 So. 3d at 965.   
 
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If a judge gives an unremorseful defendant a longer 
sentence than he might have given a remorseful 
defendant, we often will never know whether the 
resulting differential flowed from an “aggravated” 
sentence or an “unmitigated” sentence.  There is no 
baseline sentence, no upward or downward departure—
just a sentence that involved a judge’s consideration (in 
some fashion) of the offense and the defendant’s 
characteristics. 
Id. at 966.3 
And the fact that Davis maintained his innocence and the trial 
court observed that he failed to take responsibility for his actions 
did not result in the trial court “preclud[ing] consideration” of other 
relevant sentencing factors, particularly because Davis did not offer 
any.  During his allocution, Davis discussed only his innocence.  He 
 
 
3.  This line of analysis helps explain why our decision in State 
v. Mischler, 488 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 1986), has no persuasive force 
here.  In Mischler, we cited Pope for the proposition “that lack of 
remorse cannot be inferred from the exercise of constitutional 
rights.”  488 So. 2d at 526.  Although Mischler involved a noncapital 
case, it nonetheless arose in a context dissimilar to the context 
presented by this case.  Mischler addressed the issue of what 
constituted “clear and convincing reasons” for an upward departure 
sentence under the guidelines sentencing scheme then in effect.  Id. 
at 525.  The trial court found the lack of remorse to be a ground for 
an upward departure sentence based on statements of the 
defendant in the presentence report that protested her innocence 
and criticized the criminal justice system.  Id. at 526.  We 
determined that such “facts do not support a finding of lack of 
remorse” under the applicable “clear and convincing” standard.  Id.  
Of course, no such standard is applicable here. 
 
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offered no other reasons to the court why a sentence less than the 
maximum should be imposed.  The trial judge therefore had no 
opportunity to “preclude consideration” of other matters offered by 
Davis that might have been relevant to the sentence.  Indeed, Davis 
specifically told the trial court that he was not asking for leniency 
because he did nothing wrong.  (“If I did anything wrong, or said 
anything that’s inappropriate, I would apologize.  Right now, and I 
ask -- I would be asking for leniency, but I did nothing wrong.  I am 
not guilty of the charge that I’m accused of.  I am innocent.”)  
Instead, he accused multiple parties of misconduct, blamed the 
driver of the car, the police, his lawyer, and the trial court, 
repeatedly attempted to explain his interpretations of the law to the 
judge, and asked the judge to consider evidence that was not 
introduced at the trial.   
The lowest permissible sentence under the Criminal 
Punishment Code, in accordance with Davis’s sentencing 
scoresheet, was 118.125 months (approximately nine years and ten 
months) and the statutory maximum sentence was fifteen years.  
The State requested that the court impose the maximum sentence 
because of Davis’s numerous previous convictions and violent 
 
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history, while defense counsel urged the court to impose the lowest 
permissible sentence per the scoresheet.  The law therefore provided 
the trial judge with a range from approximately ten to fifteen years 
to which he could sentence Davis.  In fashioning the sentence, the 
trial court considered that Davis had “an extensive violent history 
here and a lot of it involves a firearm,” including, “a second degree 
murder, attempted second degree murder, attempted armed 
robbery with a firearm, armed robbery with a firearm, aggravated 
assault with a deadly weapon, discharging a firearm on school 
property, aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, battery on a law 
enforcement officer, felony battery.”  The court categorized this as “a 
violent, unfortunate history that we’re dealing with” and noted that 
the offense for which Davis was to be sentenced also involved a 
firearm.  
The trial judge had numerous valid reasons for imposing the 
maximum sentence here, but, as stated previously, he did not need 
to articulate any reason.  The judge was statutorily authorized to 
impose a sentence up to fifteen years based solely on the fact of the 
conviction, regardless of any sentencing considerations and 
whether or not Davis took responsibility for his actions.  “The 
 
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conviction alone was enough to justify the sentence.  No ‘aggravator’ 
or additional findings were necessary.”  Davis, 268 So. 3d at 965-
66.  The Supreme Court has long recognized that due process 
permits “a sentencing judge [to] exercise a wide discretion in the 
sources and types of evidence used to assist him in determining the 
kind and extent of punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by 
law.”  Williams, 337 U.S. at 246.  The Court has “never [called into] 
doubt[] the authority of a judge to exercise broad discretion in 
imposing a sentence within a statutory range.”  United States v. 
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005).  Whether a defendant says 
nothing at sentencing or takes full responsibility and is able to 
show that he is a pillar of the community, a judge retains the 
discretion to impose the maximum sentence. 
Further, while a defendant does have the right to maintain his 
innocence by pleading not guilty and going to trial, and the right to 
remain silent, Davis chose to voluntarily allocute at his sentencing 
and thus waived his right to remain silent.  And because Davis 
waived the right to maintain his silence, the trial court did not 
violate Davis’s right to due process by considering the words that 
Davis voluntarily offered in imposing a sentence.  “Just as a jury 
 
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weighs a defendant’s testimony once he waives his Fifth 
Amendment privilege at trial, a judge may consider a defendant’s 
freely offered allocution . . . during sentencing.”  United States v. 
Stanley, 739 F.3d 633, 652 (11th Cir. 2014).  This is true even if 
those words are detrimental to the defendant. 
Nor was Davis forced to choose between allocution and 
maintenance of his innocence; he certainly could have allocuted 
without voicing his disagreement with the verdict, blaming the 
driver, the police, his lawyer, and the trial court for his conviction, 
and attempting to explain his personal interpretations of the law to 
the judge.  He could have asked for leniency without admitting his 
guilt.  He could have provided the judge with reasons to impose a 
sentence less than the maximum besides his claimed innocence.  
But he instead chose to make a lengthy statement claiming 
innocence, denying responsibility, and placing blame for his 
conviction on the alleged misconduct of others.  The trial court was 
under no obligation to ignore such statements and did not err in 
considering those statements in imposing the legal sentence here.  
“[O]ur system need not treat as equals an unrepentant convict and 
 
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one who shows remorse.”  United States v. McClain, 2 F.3d 205, 207 
(7th Cir. 1993).4 
In Grayson, 438 U.S. at 44, the Court considered the propriety 
of the following statement by a sentencing judge considering the 
defendant’s testimony: “[I]t is my view that your defense was a 
complete fabrication without the slightest merit whatsoever.  I feel it 
is proper for me to consider that fact in the sentencing, and I will do 
so.”  (Emphasis removed.)  In rejecting the defendant’s due process 
argument—including a claim that allowing a sentencing judge to 
consider the falsity of testimony given by the defendant would chill 
the defendant’s right to testify—the Court stated that “[a] 
defendant’s truthfulness or mendacity while testifying on his own 
behalf, almost without exception, has been deemed probative of his 
attitudes toward society and prospects for rehabilitation and hence 
relevant to sentencing.”  438 U.S. at 50.  The Court thus concluded 
that “the defendant’s readiness to lie under oath—especially when, 
 
 
4.  We agree with the First District that the record here does 
not remotely suggest that the trial court punished the defendant for 
exercising his constitutional right to go to trial.  Davis, 260 So. 2d 
at 968.  And we need not speculate here about what facts would 
need to be proven to demonstrate a due process violation of that 
nature. 
 
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as here, the trial court finds the lie to be flagrant—may be deemed 
probative of his prospects for rehabilitation.”  Id. at 52. 
According to the Court, “The right guaranteed by law to a 
defendant is narrowly the right to testify truthfully in accordance 
with the oath—unless we are to say that the oath is mere ritual 
without meaning.”  Id. at 54.  Because there is no “protected right” 
to lie to the court, any potential “chilling effect on a defendant’s 
decision to testify falsely” “is entirely permissible.”  Id.  The Court 
therefore “reaffirm[ed] the authority of a sentencing judge to 
evaluate carefully a defendant’s testimony on the stand, 
determine—with a consciousness of the frailty of human 
judgment—whether that testimony contained willful and material 
falsehoods, and, if so, assess in light of all the other knowledge 
gained about the defendant the meaning of that conduct with 
respect to his prospects for rehabilitation and restoration to a 
useful place in society.”  Id. at 55.   
We see no reason to disagree with the teachings of Grayson.  
Nor do we see any reason to deny the relevance of those teachings 
to the issue presented by this case.  Just as in Grayson, the 
sentencing judge here was entitled to consider testimony that 
 
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indicated the defendant’s unwillingness to accept the truth and to 
take responsibility for his own conduct.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
We hold that when a defendant voluntarily chooses to allocute 
at a sentencing hearing, the sentencing court is permitted to 
consider the defendant’s freely offered statements, including those 
indicating a failure to accept responsibility.  Thus, we answer the 
rephrased question in the negative and approve the result in the 
decision on review. 
It is so ordered. 
LAWSON, MUÑIZ, COURIEL, and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. 
GROSSHANS, J., concurs with an opinion. 
POLSTON, J., dissents with an opinion, in which LABARGA, J., 
concurs. 
LABARGA, J., dissents with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
GROSSHANS, J., concurring. 
 
I agree with the majority’s holding that due process and the 
right against compelled self-incrimination do not preclude a 
sentencing court from considering a defendant’s refusal to take 
responsibility for his or her criminal conduct when the defendant 
 
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freely speaks at sentencing.  As a general matter, personal 
constitutional rights may be waived.  See In re Shambow’s Estate, 
15 So. 2d 837, 837 (Fla. 1943) (“It is fundamental that 
constitutional rights which are personal may be waived.”).  For 
example, a defendant may waive the right to trial by jury, the right 
to counsel, the right to confront witnesses, and the protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.  See United States v. 
Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 201 (1995); United States v. Garey, 540 
F.3d 1253, 1263 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. Basinski, 226 
F.3d 829, 834 (7th Cir. 2000). 
The right against compelled self-incrimination is no different.  
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966) (recognizing 
that a defendant in custody may waive the right to remain silent); 
Miller v. State, 208 So. 3d 178, 181 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (“When the 
defendant waives the privilege against self-incrimination and freely 
speaks to police, the State is free to treat the defendant’s testimony 
regarding those statements like that of any other witness.” (citing 
Ivey v. State, 586 So. 2d 1230, 1234 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991))); Allen v. 
State, 322 So. 3d 589, 602 (Fla. 2021) (noting that a defendant may 
waive the right to remain silent at trial, stating: “[W]hen a defendant 
 
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chooses to testify in a criminal case, the Fifth Amendment does not 
allow him to refuse to answer related questions on cross-
examination.”) (alteration in original) (quoting Kansas v. Cheever, 
571 U.S. 87, 94 (2013))); State v. Heath, 343 So. 2d 13, 15-16 (Fla. 
1977) (holding that an agreement to accept the terms of probation 
waives the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
with respect to information required to be disclosed pursuant to 
certain probationary terms).   
Here, Davis spoke voluntarily at sentencing, thereby waiving 
his constitutional right against compelled self-incrimination.  Once 
he waived this right, there could be no basis for claiming that the 
trial court violated due process for considering his statements in 
determining a proper sentence. 
And Davis’s uncoerced words were relevant to the severity of 
his criminal punishment.  Specifically, through his words, Davis 
manifested a refusal to take responsibility for his criminal conduct, 
a matter bearing on his amenability to rehabilitation.  Thus, the 
sentencing court properly considered Davis’s refusal to accept 
responsibility for his criminal conduct in imposing the maximum 
sentence. 
 
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Reaching a different conclusion, the dissent5 looks to the 
Florida Constitution, which provides, “No person shall be deprived 
of life, liberty or property without due process of law . . . or be 
compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness against oneself.”  
Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const.  According to the dissent, this provision 
affords a defendant the constitutional right to maintain his or her 
innocence at sentencing, regardless of whether he or she freely 
speaks.  Dissenting op. at 29, 33-43. 
However, nothing in the text of article I, section 9 confers such 
an unwaivable right or forbids consideration of Davis’s voluntary 
statements.  Aside from this lack of textual support, the dissent’s 
position is also inconsistent with federal case law holding that the 
self-incrimination clause of the United States Constitution—nearly 
identical to its Florida counterpart—does not bar a sentencing court 
from considering a defendant’s failure to take responsibility or lack 
of remorse.  See United States v. Stanley, 739 F.3d 633, 652 (11th 
Cir. 2014) (“Harris’s argument confuses the nature of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege.  During sentencing, a court ‘may not weigh 
 
5.  For purposes of this opinion, I refer to the dissent authored 
by Justice Polston, joined by Justice Labarga.  
 
- 25 - 
the exercise of [Fifth Amendment] rights against the defendant.’  
But a court may take into account a defendant’s freely offered 
statements indicating a lack of remorse.  Just as a jury weighs a 
defendant’s testimony once he waives his Fifth Amendment privilege 
at trial, a judge may consider a defendant’s freely offered allocution 
regarding remorse during sentencing.” (alteration in original) 
(citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 959 F.2d 
193, 197 (11th Cir. 1992))); accord United States v. McKee, 752 F. 
App’x. 462, 466 (9th Cir. 2018); United States v. Keskes, 703 F.3d 
1078, 1090-91 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Mitchell, 681 F.3d 
867, 885 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Douglas, 569 F.3d 523, 
527-28 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Abu Ali, 410 F. App’x. 673, 
681 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Bines, 309 F. App’x. 580, 582 
(3d Cir. 2009); United States v. Wallace, 755 F. App’x. 63, 65–66 (2d 
Cir. 2018); United States v. Cruzado-Laureano, 527 F.3d 231, 236-
37 (1st Cir. 2008). 
Not relying on the text of the Florida Constitution or federal 
case law, the dissent instead finds support in this Court’s 
jurisprudence—mainly Pope v. State, 441 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 1983), 
and Holton v. State, 573 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1990).  I agree with the 
 
- 26 - 
majority that Pope and Holton are distinguishable.  Both were 
capital cases governed by a statute not applicable to sentencing in 
the noncapital context.  Under that statute, refusal to take 
responsibility or show remorse is not relevant to any of the 
aggravating factors for consideration in sentencing a capital 
defendant.  § 921.141(6), Fla. Stat (2020) (providing an exclusive 
list of aggravating factors).  In contrast, a sentencing court in a 
noncapital case may consider a broader set of facts when deciding 
whether to impose the harshest sentence within the statutory 
range.6 
Though Holton is distinguishable, statements in that case 
arguably support the dissent.  In Holton, this Court stated, “A trial 
court violates due process by using a protestation of innocence 
against a defendant.  This applies to the penalty phase as well as to 
the guilt phase under article I, section 9 of the Florida 
Constitution.”  573 So. 2d at 292.  Though it is dicta, the district 
 
6.  Some of the district court decisions cited by the dissent 
also involved a defendant’s silence at sentencing or a defendant’s 
not-guilty plea.  E.g., Green v. State, 84 So. 3d 1169, 1172 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 2012).  Unlike the defendants in those cases, Davis made 
voluntary statements at sentencing.  Thus, those factually 
dissimilar cases are unpersuasive here.   
 
- 27 - 
courts have relied on this statement in evaluating sentencing 
challenges in noncapital cases.  See, e.g., Pierre v. State, 259 So. 3d 
859, 861 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018).  Consequently, I agree with the 
majority’s express disapproval of the Holton dicta as inconsistent 
with today’s decision.  Majority op. at 13. 
Finally, one statement of the majority warrants a brief 
discussion.  The majority states, “[T]he Legislature empowered the 
trial court to sentence Davis to fifteen years’ imprisonment whether 
or not he took responsibility for his actions, because it was the fact 
of his conviction that subjected him to a sentence up to and 
including the statutory maximum.”  Majority op. at 12.  I do not 
interpret this statement as meaning that a sentencing court can 
properly consider any and all facts so long as the sentence 
ultimately falls within the statutory range.  Thus, in my view, 
today’s decision would not excuse a court’s consideration of an 
unconstitutional factor, such as race or religion, in imposing a 
sentence up to and including the statutory maximum.  Accordingly, 
if a court considers an unconstitutional factor in imposing the 
sentence, that sentence would still be unlawful even if it was within 
the statutory range.  But here, as we have concluded, the 
 
- 28 - 
sentencing court considered no such unconstitutional factor and 
was fully authorized to sentence Davis to the statutory maximum 
based on his conviction. 
Thus, for the reasons given above, I join the majority opinion 
in its entirety. 
POLSTON, J., dissenting. 
 
I dissent from the majority’s decision holding that a trial court 
can punish a defendant for his lack of remorse during a sentencing 
proceeding.  This result is inconsistent with our precedent 
interpreting article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution, the 
consensus among the district courts of appeal, and has no basis in 
our statutory sentencing scheme.  Showing remorse is admitting 
you did something wrong—an admission of guilt.  And increasing a 
defendant’s sentence based on the failure to show remorse is 
punishing a defendant for failing to admit guilt.  Punishing someone 
unless they confess guilt of a crime is a violation of due process and 
the right against self-incrimination.  Accordingly, I would hold that 
a trial court violates a defendant’s constitutional right to due 
process and right against self-incrimination where it penalizes a 
defendant for the failure to admit guilt. 
 
- 29 - 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Alvin Davis was convicted of possession of a firearm as a 
convicted felon.  Davis v. State, 268 So. 3d 958, 961 (Fla. 1st DCA 
2019).  The statutory maximum for this offense was 15 years, but 
Davis’ sentencing scoresheet calculated the minimum sentence to 
be approximately 10 years.  At his sentencing hearing, Davis elected 
to speak on his behalf and made the following statement: 
Your Honor, I’d like to thank you for letting me talk 
on the record.  I do not understand why I was found 
guilty of possessing a gun I never touched, neither did I 
know was in that car.  It’s clear by the evidence that I am 
only a scapegoat for the driver of that vehicle.  The 
bullets that was in that glove compartment would have 
proven the driver’s DNA on it.  So, the State, nor my 
attorney refused to have it tested because it would have 
proved the driver was lying. 
Constructive possession means I had knowledge 
and control over that gun.  I did not, and nothing can 
prove that.  The police officer clearly on the record 
coerced and manipulated the driver into saying that it 
was my gun.  They recorded it as saying even to him that 
he could smoke weed and not be arrested.  They also told 
him, a juvenile, that if he was going to smoke weed he 
should buy a better quality of weed.  It is all on the 
transcript and you read it and seen it firsthand in the 
MAVRIC.[7] 
How could this injust (phonetic) take place in this 
courtroom without my lawyer taking part?  Evidence in 
 
 
7.  MAVRIC is the in-car camera system used to record audio 
and video of traffic stops. 
 
- 30 - 
the law of construction possession proves me right.  I 
understand I cannot get any justice here in this 
courtroom.  I trust my life and liberty in the hands of the 
First DCA Court who knows firsthand the illegal action 
taking place in this Leon County courtroom assistance, 
most of these appointed court lawyers. 
If I did anything wrong, or said anything that’s 
inappropriate, I would apologize.  Right now, and I ask--I 
would be asking for leniency, but I did nothing wrong.  I 
am not guilty of the charge that I’m accused of.  I am 
innocent.  And the facts, evidence and the law proves me 
right.  I will allow the First DCA to correct this injust 
(phonetic). 
I have no knowledge of a firearm.  I got charged with 
possession of a firearm.  That means it came off my 
possession.  They never found me with any firearm on my 
person.  I knew nothing about the MAVRIC transcript 
that you read, Your Honor, but I know you studied law 
for many years, I know you looked at that MAVRIC 
transcript.  I know you read it, just out of curiosity.  I 
know you know law from the front to the back.  I know 
you seen the injust (phonetic).  I know you seen him 
coerce with him.  I know you read it. 
Your Honor, I feel like I’m auctioned off to prison, 
my freedom, and nothing that I went to trial for, nobody, 
not even the evidence, not even the firearm had my 
fingerprints or my DNA on it.  I came in front of you, 
Your Honor.  On October 27th, I told you she refused to 
have the evidence suppressed, the ammunition.  She 
refused.  She coerced with the state Attorney about the 
MAVRIC.  They both agreed to not to even talk about the 
MAVRIC.  I knew nothing about it.  That wasn’t my 
agreement.  I wanted to show the MAVRIC.  I wanted to 
talk about the MAVRIC.  That was my defense. 
It clearly in the MAVRIC you see him coercing with 
him.  They’re talking to a juvenile.  If he’s on weed and 
marijuana at the time of the stop, he can’t give a 
statement without his parent present.  He can’t make a 
statement at all because he’s on drugs and alcohol.  He 
 
- 31 - 
admitted to them.  They told him they will show him 
leniency if he will make a statement saying that was my 
firearm they will let him go home.  He drove away.  I went 
to jail.  I’m the only one went to jail.  By law, he was in 
possession of that car.  He’s responsible for everything in 
that car.  He’s a primary driver of that vehicle.  Thank 
you, Your Honor.  I ask will you consider--I know you 
read the MAVRIC transcript.  I know. 
 
 
The trial court concluded the proceedings by sentencing Davis 
to 15 years, the statutory maximum, and addressed Davis: 
THE COURT:  All right.  Thank you.  All right.  Mr. 
Davis, quite frankly we’re not here to retry the facts of the 
case.  I heard the evidence.  It was put before a jury and 
they found beyond a reasonable doubt that you are guilty 
of the charged offense.  And from my review of the 
evidence, and from what I heard in the courtroom and 
the testimony and the evidence provided, quite frankly I 
think they got it right. 
And I can see here by your score sheet, you have an 
extensive violent history here and a lot of it involves a 
firearm.  We have a second degree murder, attempted 
second degree murder, attempted armed robbery with a 
firearm, armed robbery with a firearm, aggravated 
assault with a deadly weapon, discharging a firearm on 
school property, aggravated battery with a deadly 
weapon, battery on a law enforcement officer, felony 
battery.  Just a violent, unfortunate history that we’re 
dealing with.  And a lot of it involves a firearm.  And now 
we have a new offense that involves a firearm again. 
And quite frankly, you know, they found you with 
the firearm before any harm could come of it, because 
who knows what would have happened–  
THE DEFENDANT:  They found me with the 
firearm? 
THE COURT:  --if there was an opportunity to use 
that firearm in the future.  And so that is one of the good 
 
- 32 - 
things that came out of it was that there wasn’t that 
opportunity. 
You still fail to take any responsibility for your 
actions.  And considering your history here, your failure 
to take any responsibility, the nature of the crime, the 
fact that it involves a firearm, the Court will sentence you 
to 15 years in the Department of Corrections, which is 
the statutory maximum. 
 
On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal, sitting en banc, 
receded from its own precedent to hold that “lack of remorse and 
refusal to accept responsibility can be valid sentencing 
considerations when sentencing within the statutory range.”  Davis, 
268 So. 3d at 961.  Davis now asks us to quash the decision of the 
First District. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
Article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution provides:  “No 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due 
process of law, or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, or 
be compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness against oneself.”  
Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. (emphasis added).  Until now, this Court has 
interpreted this provision to protect a defendant’s right to maintain 
his innocence at sentencing without fear of retribution.  Beginning 
with Pope v. State, 441 So. 2d 1073, 1078 (Fla. 1983), we held that 
 
- 33 - 
a defendant’s lack of remorse did not bear on the consideration of 
aggravating factors in capital sentencing.8  The defendant in that 
case “steadfastly den[ied] his guilt,” which the trial court interpreted 
as a lack of remorse and used as a fact to establish the existence of 
the heinous, atrocious, and cruel aggravating circumstance.  Id. at 
1077.  But we distinguished the defendant’s denial of guilt from the 
defendant’s statements about the crime, explaining: 
Unfortunately, remorse is an active emotion and its 
absence, therefore, can be measured or inferred only 
from negative evidence.  This invites the sort of mistake 
which occurred in the case now before us—inferring lack 
of remorse from the exercise of constitutional rights.  
This sort of mistake may, in an extreme case, raise a 
question as to whether the defendant has been denied 
some measure of due process, thus mandating a remand 
for reconsideration of the sentence.  For these reasons, 
we hold that henceforth lack of remorse should have no 
place in the consideration of aggravating factors.  Any 
convincing evidence of remorse may properly be 
considered in mitigation of the sentence, but absence of 
remorse should not be weighed either as an aggravating 
factor nor as an enhancement of an aggravating factor. 
 
Id. at 1078. 
 
 
8.  Prior to Pope, we recognized that lack of remorse was an 
improper aggravating circumstance in capital sentencing in Jackson 
v. Wainwright, 421 So. 2d 1385, 1387 (Fla. 1982), and McCampbell 
v. State, 421 So. 2d 1072, 1075 (Fla. 1982), which both rejected 
lack of remorse as a statutory aggravator in and of itself. 
 
- 34 - 
In State v. Mischler, 488 So. 2d 523, 526 (Fla. 1986), we held 
that, in noncapital sentencing, lack of remorse inferred from an 
exercise of constitutional rights or an assertion of innocence was 
not a clear and convincing reason to support an upward departure 
sentence.  As we explained: 
The trial court’s finding that Mischler was not remorseful 
is based entirely on her statement in the presentence 
report that she did not commit the alleged theft, that the 
employer was the culpable party, and that she lost at 
trial because “he [the victim] had money and those with 
money rule the world.”  These statements cannot be 
termed as lack of remorse.  Rather, Mischler was merely 
maintaining her innocence and voicing her opinion on 
the workings of the criminal justice system in America. 
In Pope v. State, 441 So. 2d 1073, 1078 (Fla. 1983), 
we held that lack of remorse cannot be inferred from the 
exercise of constitutional rights.  Similarly, in Hubler v. 
State, 458 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), the court held 
that lack of remorse cannot be proven solely by the fact 
that a defendant maintains his innocence.  Thus, we hold 
that lack of remorse to support a departure sentence 
cannot be inferred from either the mere exercise of a 
constitutional right or a continuing assertion of 
innocence. 
 
Mischler, 488 So. 2d at 526. 
And in Holton v. State, 573 So. 2d 284, 292 (Fla. 1990), we 
expressed similar concerns while holding that protestations of 
innocence do not preclude a court from considering relevant 
statutory mitigators in capital sentencing.  The defendant in Holton 
 
- 35 - 
asked the court to consider an impaired capacity statutory 
mitigator, but the trial court did not apply this mitigator because it 
found that the defendant had demonstrated his capacity to 
appreciate the criminality of his actions by maintaining his 
innocence.  Id. at 292-93.  This Court found error and observed: 
A defendant has the right to maintain his or her 
innocence and have a trial by jury.  Art. I, § 22, Fla. 
Const.  The protection provided by the fifth amendment 
to the United States Constitution guarantees an accused 
the right against self-incrimination.  The fact that a 
defendant has pled not guilty cannot be used against him 
or her during any stage of the proceedings because due 
process guarantees an individual the right to maintain 
innocence even when faced with evidence of 
overwhelming guilt.  A trial court violates due process by 
using a protestation of innocence against a defendant.  
This applies to the penalty phase as well as to the guilt 
phase under article I, section 9, of the Florida 
Constitution. 
 
Id. at 292.  Significantly, in Holton, we concluded that where a 
defendant pleads not guilty and maintains his innocence at 
sentencing, article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution prohibits 
the trial court from using that fact against him.  See id. 
 
To summarize, we have recognized that lack of remorse may 
not be inferred from a defendant’s exercise of constitutional rights 
and that the Florida Constitution protects a defendant’s right to 
 
- 36 - 
maintain his innocence at sentencing.  The majority attempts to 
distinguish and isolate our precedent in Pope and Holton as 
applicable only in the capital context due to the consideration of 
aggravating factors in capital cases.  See majority op. at 7-11.  
However, we have applied these principles in capital as well as 
noncapital cases.  Our precedent in Holton, as well as Pope and 
Mischler, dictates that the protection against self-incrimination 
enumerated in article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution 
extends to protect a defendant from being penalized for maintaining 
his innocence throughout his proceedings.  The majority has not 
receded from this precedent, and I see no reason to depart from it. 
Further, the district courts consistently apply the rule that a 
trial court violates the defendant’s due process rights when it 
considers lack of remorse in sentencing where a defendant has 
maintained innocence throughout proceedings.  See, e.g., Jackson 
v. State, 39 So. 3d 427, 428 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (listing cases that 
show as “established law” that a “statement made by the trial court 
[that] can reasonably be read only as conditioning the sentence, at 
least in part, upon [the defendant]’s claim of innocence” violates 
due process), receded from by Davis, 268 So. 3d at 965; Whitmore v. 
 
- 37 - 
State, 27 So. 3d 168, 171 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (listing a “long, 
unwavering line of cases” that hold that “a trial court violates due 
process by using a protestation of innocence against a defendant at 
sentencing”); Jiles v. State, 18 So. 3d 1216, 1216-17 (Fla. 5th DCA 
2009) (reversing when the trial court noted at sentencing that the 
defendant “maintained his innocence at trial and during 
sentencing”); Bracero v. State, 10 So. 3d 664, 665-66 (Fla. 2d DCA 
2009) (finding a due process violation when the defendant spoke at 
sentencing about his claims of innocence, alleging his conviction 
was motivated by conspiracy, and the trial court explicitly said the 
sentence was imposed in part due to his lack of remorse); see also 
Corbitt v. State, 220 So. 3d 446, 450-54 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016); 
Donaldson v. State, 16 So. 3d 314, 314 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009); Soto v. 
State, 874 So. 2d 1215, 1217 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004). 
The district courts rightly recognize that not only is this rule 
compelled by our precedent, but it is also vital to the exercise of a 
defendant’s constitutional rights.  See, e.g., Catledge v. State, 255 
So. 3d 937, 940 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (“The stated reason for the 
general rule . . . is to ensure that a defendant is not unfairly 
punished for his plea of not guilty and the exercise of his 
 
- 38 - 
constitutional rights to remain silent and to proceed to a jury trial.” 
(quoting Corbitt, 220 So. 3d at 450-51)), receded from by Davis, 268 
So. 3d at 965; Allen v. State, 211 So. 3d 48, 54 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) 
(“Allowing a sentencing court to penalize a defendant for not 
admitting guilt after a conviction or adjudication would jeopardize 
various rights attached to these post-trial processes and chill a 
defendant’s right to remain silent.”); Green v. State, 84 So. 3d 1169, 
1172 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (“When a defendant chooses to remain 
silent at a sentencing hearing, and the trial court regards this 
silence as a lack of remorse or a failure to accept responsibility, it 
causes an impermissible chilling effect upon a defendant’s due 
process rights, and cannot serve as a constitutionally permissible 
sentencing consideration.”); Gilchrist v. State, 938 So. 2d 654, 657-
58 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (“When a court predicates the length of a 
sentence on the defendant’s failure to show any inclination toward 
repentance, the court violates the defendant’s right not to be 
required to incriminate himself.”).  I concur and find that our 
precedent compels a different result than the one reached by the 
majority and the First District below. 
 
- 39 - 
Here, in sentencing, the trial court expressly considered Davis’ 
refusal to take responsibility:  “You still fail to take any responsibility 
for your actions.  And considering your history here, your failure to 
take any responsibility, the nature of the crime, the fact that it 
involves a firearm, the Court will sentence you to 15 years in the 
Department of Corrections, which is the statutory maximum.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Davis’ due process rights and right against self-
incrimination were violated by being punished at sentencing for not 
admitting his guilt.  The plain language of article I, section 9 
supports this:  “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law, or be twice put in jeopardy for 
the same offense, or be compelled in any criminal matter to be a 
witness against oneself.”  (Emphasis added).  According to Justice 
Grosshans’ concurring opinion, because Davis voluntarily spoke, he 
waived his rights to due process and against self-incrimination.  
Concurring op. at 24-25.  However, simply because Davis chose to 
speak and maintain his innocence does not mean he should be 
punished for the failure to admit guilt.  Accepting responsibility is 
an admission of guilt and punishing someone for the failure to 
admit guilt is a violation of due process and the right against self-
 
- 40 - 
incrimination.  If law enforcement cannot coerce an admission of 
guilt from a defendant without violating due process, see Wilson v. 
State, 242 So. 3d 484, 491 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) (explaining that the 
Florida Constitution prohibits the admission of governmentally 
compelled statements), a court cannot likewise coerce an admission 
of guilt from a defendant. 
The judicial process, which is grounded on constitutional due 
process, protects a defendant’s right to maintain innocence and 
does not punish a defendant for doing so.  Moreover, this due 
process protection extends beyond the defendant being found guilty 
at the trial court level.  Indeed, as Justice Labarga notes in his 
separate dissenting opinion, our judicial proceedings include 
appeals from trials that are occasionally overturned and lead to the 
defendant ultimately being released.  A defendant’s right to 
maintain his or her innocence remains paramount in these 
proceedings. 
 
The majority relies on United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 
(1978), to support its assertion that “the sentencing judge here was 
entitled to consider testimony that indicated the defendant’s 
unwillingness to accept the truth and to take responsibility for his 
 
- 41 - 
own conduct.”  Majority op. at 21.  However, I disagree that 
Grayson is relevant to the issue presented in this case.  In Grayson, 
the trial court ruled that “it is my view that your defense was a 
complete fabrication without the slightest merit whatsoever.  I feel it 
is proper for me to consider that fact in the sentencing, and I will do 
so.”  438 U.S. at 44 (emphasis in original).  No such ruling was 
made by the trial court in this case.  Instead, the trial court 
improperly considered lack of remorse in its sentencing.  There is a 
distinct difference between the consideration of the defendant’s 
false testimony during trial based on a fabricated defense and the 
consideration of the defendant’s lack of remorse when the 
defendant maintains his innocence at sentencing.  The federal 
circuit court cases cited by Justice Grosshans’ concurring opinion 
are distinguishable.  Concurring op. at 25-26.  The federal 
sentencing framework differs from Florida’s framework in numerous 
ways, including the express authorization to consider all relevant 
information at sentencing and a downward adjustment provision 
that provides guidance on how to demonstrate remorse.  See 18 
U.S.C. § 3661 (2018) (“No limitation shall be placed on the 
information concerning the background, character, and conduct of 
 
- 42 - 
a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States 
may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an 
appropriate sentence.”); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1 
(U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2018) (explicitly permitting a court to 
decrease a defendant’s sentence “if the defendant clearly 
demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense”). 
 
The First District found that the Criminal Punishment Code 
(CPC) authorizes a consideration of lack of remorse at sentencing, 
but this assertion is incorrect for two reasons.  First, the CPC does 
not explicitly authorize consideration of lack of remorse when 
sentencing within the range.  Chapter 921, Florida Statutes, 
authorizes a trial court to impose a sentence lower than the 
minimum sentence if “[t]he offense was committed in an 
unsophisticated manner and was an isolated incident for which the 
defendant has shown remorse.”  § 921.0026(2)(j), Fla. Stat. (2019).  
This provision is not a blanket authorization to consider remorse in 
all circumstances, but instead only expressly authorizes a court to 
depart from the minimum sentence if a defendant has shown 
remorse.  Remorse and lack of remorse, however, are shown 
differently.  As we observed in Pope, “[u]nfortunately, remorse is an 
 
- 43 - 
active emotion and its absence, therefore, can be measured or 
inferred only from negative evidence.”  441 So. 2d at 1078.  
Moreover, it does not necessarily follow that a factor the Legislature 
intended for consideration in downward departures should be 
considered when sentencing within the range.  We may not read 
more into the statute than is apparent from the plain text.  
Accordingly, this provision does not authorize consideration of lack 
of remorse when sentencing within the statutory range. 
Second, even if the CPC authorized a court to consider that a 
defendant has maintained his innocence throughout proceedings, it 
would run afoul of the Florida Constitution.  As explained above, we 
have recognized a constitutional right to maintain innocence and to 
not have the exercise of that right used to a defendant’s detriment.  
Even with legislative authorization, we are not permitted to violate 
rights the people of Florida have sought to protect through 
constitutional amendment.  See Coleman v. State ex rel. Race, 159 
So. 504, 507 (Fla. 1935) (“The Legislature is the creature of the 
Constitution and can never be superior in powers to the will of the 
people as written by them in the Constitution.”). 
 
- 44 - 
The majority states that the trial judge did not need to 
articulate any reason for imposing the maximum sentence.  See 
majority op. at 12.  However, the trial judge expressly articulated 
the reason in this case.  A plain reading of the sentencing transcript 
shows that the trial judge relied on Davis’ claim of innocence.  In 
his allocution, Davis maintained that he was innocent and that his 
conviction was based on conspiratorial actions by the police and 
deficient legal representation.  The trial judge then admonished 
Davis for failing to take responsibility and sentenced him to the 
statutory maximum because he had failed to take responsibility.  
The trial judge improperly considered Davis’ exercise of his 
constitutional right to maintain his innocence at sentencing under 
this Court’s precedent, thereby violating article I, section 9 of the 
Florida Constitution. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
For the above reasons, I would answer the rephrased certified 
question in the affirmative, quash the First District’s decision, and 
hold that a trial court violates a defendant’s constitutional rights to 
due process and against self-incrimination where it considers that 
 
- 45 - 
he has maintained his innocence at sentencing and penalizes him 
for that fact. 
I respectfully dissent. 
LABARGA, J., concurs. 
LABARGA, J., dissenting. 
I wholeheartedly concur with Justice Polston’s dissent and 
could not disagree more strongly with the majority’s interpretation, 
which penalizes defendants who maintain their innocence 
throughout their trial and sentencing hearing.  Curiously, the 
majority reached its broad interpretation although the text of 
chapter 921, Florida Statutes, does not expressly permit the 
consideration of a defendant’s lack of remorse.  Nor should it, for 
reasons well explained in Justice Polston’s dissent. 
I, also, am unpersuaded by the majority’s attempt to 
distinguish Davis’s noncapital case from capital cases where this 
Court has long held that the lack of remorse is not an appropriate 
sentencing consideration. 
Indeed, I find that Florida’s capital cases provide important 
context here, and one needs to look no further than the thirty 
exonerations from Florida’s death row—the most of any state in our 
 
- 46 - 
nation.  Death Penalty Information Center, 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-
state/florida (last visited Oct. 4, 2021).  A defendant’s adherence to 
a claim of innocence is not always borne of a stubborn refusal to 
admit the truth.  Sometimes, people convicted by juries are actually 
innocent. 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal 
Certified Great Public Importance 
 
 
First District – Case No. 1D17-165 
 
 
(Leon County) 
 
Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Lori A. Willner, Assistant 
Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Trisha Meggs Pate, Bureau Chief, 
and Benjamin L. Hoffman, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent