Title: Attorney Grievance v. Seiden

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Richard Seiden
AG No. 19, September Term, 2002
Headnote:
Indefinite suspension with the right to reapply in thirty days is warranted for
an attorney who violated MRPC 1.1, 1.15, 8.4(a) and (d).  As there was no
intentional misrepresentation or dishonest conduct under 8.4(b) and (c), a more
severe sanction is not warranted.
Circuit Court for Baltimore Cou nty
Case # 03-C-02-004540
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 19
September Term, 2002
Attorney Grievance Commission of
Maryland
v.
Richard Seiden
Bell, C. J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
           Battaglia,
JJ.
Opinion by Cathell, J.
Filed: March 14, 2003
1  Petitioner filed a petition with this Court initiating disciplinary proceedings against
Richard Seiden pursuant to former Maryland Rule 16-709(a) which stated that “[c]harges
against an attorney shall be filed by the Bar Counsel . . . .”  This portion of former Rule 16-
709 is now codified as Rule 16-751(a) regarding petitions for disciplinary or remedial action
which states, in part, that “Bar Counsel shall file a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial
Action in the Court of Appeals.”  This case arose and was processed under the attorney
grievance rules in effect prior to July 1, 2001.  Thus, we refer to those rules as they existed
prior to that date.
2  The relevant provisions of the MRPC state:
“Rule 1.1.
Competence.
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.  Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.
. . .
“Rule 1.15.
Safekeeping property.
. . . 
(b) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third
person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person.
Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement
with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any
funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and,
upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full
accounting regarding such property.
. . . 
“Rule 8.4. 
Misconduct.
(continued...)
On April 16, 2002, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, petitioner, by
Melvin Hirshman, Bar Counsel, and Gail D. Kessler, Assistant Bar Counsel, filed a petition1
for disciplinary action against Richard Seiden, respondent, for multiple violations of the
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC).  The petition alleged that respondent,
based upon his representation of Penelope L. Mentlik, had violated MRPC 1.1, 1.15(b) and
8.4(a) and (d).2 
2(...continued)
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct,
knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of
another;
. . .
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;
. . .”
3  The charges and pleadings were initially transmitted to Judge Christian M. Kahl
who recused himself from this matter.  The Court of Appeals substituted Judge Thomas J.
Bollinger, Sr. to hear and determine the charges filed against respondent.
4  Former Rule 16-711(b)(2) provided that “[w]ithin 15 days after the filing of the
record in the Court of Appeals, the attorney or the Bar Counsel may file in the Court of
Appeals exceptions to the findings and conclusions and may make recommendations
respecting the disciplinary sanction to be imposed . . . .”  The substance of former Rule 16-
711(b)(2) is now codified in Rule 16-758(b).
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On April 17, 2002, pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-709 et seq., this Court transmitted
the matter to Judge Thomas J. Bollinger, Sr. of the Circuit Court of Baltimore County to
conduct a hearing and to make findings of fact and conclusions of law.3  
On June 13, 2002, an evidentiary hearing was held before the hearing judge.  On
November 14, 2002, Judge Bollinger issued his Memorandum Opinion and found by clear
and convincing evidence that respondent violated MRPC 1.1, 1.15(b) and 8.4.  The record
was transferred from the hearing judge to our Court for oral argument.  Pursuant to
Maryland Rule 16-711(b)(2),4 respondent filed with this Court exceptions to the hearing
judge’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.  
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I.  Facts
Respondent was admitted to the Bar of Maryland on November 16, 1978 and
maintains his practice of law in his office located in Baltimore County.  The Petition for
Disciplinary Action in this case was based upon the complaint of Penelope L. Mentlik, BC
Docket No. 2001-234-3-9.  Her complaint was initially made by a letter dated December 27,
2000.  
Judge Bollinger’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are, in part, as follows:
“FINDINGS OF FACT
“The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that . . . . The
complainant, Penelope L. Mentlik, was [the] Personal Representative of the
Dorothy P. Dunkel estate.  In August of 1998, Ms. Mentlik retained the
services of the Respondent to represent the estate.  During this representation
the Respondent attended the settlement of real estate property which was part
of the estate of Dorothy P. Dunkel.  At the settlement, a check was tendered
and made payable to ‘Penelope L. Mentlik, Personal Representative of the
Estate of Dorothy P. Dunkel.’  The check was in the amount of $32,422.58.
The Respondent deposited this check into his escrow account and signed Ms.
Mentlik’s name.  This Court can not find by clear and convincing evidence
that the Respondent signed Ms. Mentlik’s name, endorsing the check, without
her authority.  I also find that the Respondent wrote a check from his own
escrow account in the amount of $28,022.58 payable to ‘Penelope L. Mentlik,
Personal Representative of the Estate of Dorothy Dunkel.’  He deducted a
legal fee of $4400 from the estate funds without submitting a Fee Petition to
the Orphans Court and without the Complainant’s written consent to the fee.
At the hearing on this matter the Respondent had not maintained the $4400 in
his escrow account and still had not submitted a Fee Petition to the Orphans
Court for approval to take that fee.
“The Court finds, in mitigation, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the Respondent had a difficult client in the person of Ms. Mentlik and
there was a dispute between them regarding almost every aspect of the legal
representation.  The Court further finds that the Respondent suffered ill health
during the representation; however, the Court does not find these mitigating
5 See supra footnote 1.
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factors to excuse the taking of a fee without approval of the Orphans Court.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
“The Court, upon review of the various exhibits, deposition testimony
and testimony at the hearing, finds by clear and convincing evidence that the
Respondent has indeed violated Rule 1.1 Competence; Rule 1.15(b)
Safekeeping Property and Rule 8.4 Misconduct.
“Mr. Seiden had no lawful claim to the funds he took from Ms.
Dunkel’s estate and his taking of those funds for his personal use was theft
and a criminal act reflecting adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness and
fitness as an attorney.  His taking of those funds was dishonest.” [Emphasis
added.]
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Harris, 371 Md. 510, 539-40, 810 A.2d 457,
474-75 (2002), we recently stated:
“It is well established that ‘[t]his Court has original jurisdiction over
attorney disciplinary proceedings.’  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Dunietz,
368 Md. 419, 427, 795 A.2d 706, 710-11 (2002) (citing Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Snyder, 368 Md. 242, 253, 793 A.2d 515, 521 (2002)); Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Harris, 366 Md. 376, 388, 784 A.2d 516, 523 (2001);
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gavin, 350 Md. 176, 189, 711 A.2d 193, 200
(1998); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Adams, 349 Md. 86, 93, 706 A.2d
1080, 1083 (1998); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Glenn, 341 Md. 448, 470,
671 A.2d 463, 473 (1996); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kent, 337 Md.
361, 371, 653 A.2d 909, 914 (1995); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Powell,
328 Md. 276, 287, 614 A.2d 102, 108 (1992).  See also Md. Rule 16-709(b)
(stating that ‘[c]harges against an attorney shall be filed on behalf of the
[Attorney Grievance] Commission in the Court of Appeals’).5  Furthermore,
‘[a]s the Court of original and complete jurisdiction for attorney disciplinary
proceedings in Maryland, we conduct an independent review of the record.’
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Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Garfield, 369 Md. 85, 97, 797 A.2d 757, 763
(2002) (quoting Snyder, 368 Md. at 253, 793 A.2d at 521 (citing Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Garland, 345 Md. 383, 392, 692 A.2d 465, 469
(1997))).  
“In our review of the record, ‘[t]he hearing judge’s findings of fact will
be accepted unless we determine that they are clearly erroneous.’  Garfield,
369 Md. at 97, 797 A.2d at 763 (quoting Snyder, 368 Md. at 253, 793 A.2d
at 521 (citations omitted)).  See also Dunietz, 368 Md. at 427-28, 795 A.2d at
711 (‘The hearing judge’s findings of fact “are prima facie correct and will
not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous.”’) (quoting Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Zdravkovich, 362 Md. 1, 21, 762 A.2d 950, 960-61 (2000));
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Monfried, 368 Md. 373, 388, 794 A.2d 92,
100 (2002) (‘Factual findings of the hearing judge will not be disturbed if they
are based on clear and convincing evidence.’).  We recently reiterated the
definition of clear and convincing evidence in Harris, 366 Md. at 389, 784
A.2d at 523 (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mooney, 359 Md. 56,
79, 753 A.2d 17, 29 (2000)), when we said:
‘“The requirement of ‘clear and convincing’ or ‘satisfactory’
evidence does not call for ‘unanswerable’ or ‘conclusive’
evidence. The quality of proof, to be clear and convincing, has
also been said to be somewhere between the rule in ordinary
civil cases and the requirement of criminal procedure–that is, it
must be more than a mere preponderance but not beyond a
reasonable doubt.  It has also been said that the term ‘clear and
convincing’ evidence means that the witnesses to a fact must be
found to be credible, and that the facts to which they have
testified are distinctly remembered and the details hereof
narrated exactly and in due order, so as to enable the trier of the
facts to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the
truth of the precise facts in issue.  Whether evidence is clear and
convincing requires weighing, comparing, testing, and judging
its worth when considered in connection with all the facts and
circumstances in evidence.”  [Emphasis added.]
359 Md. at 79, 753 A.2d at 29 (quoting Berkey v. Delia, 287 Md. 302, 320,
413 A.2d 170, 178 (1980) (citing Whittington v. State, 8 Md. App. 676, 679
n.3, 262 A.2d 75, 77 n.3 (1970))).’  We recently explained in Dunietz that
‘[a]s to the hearing judge’s conclusions of law, “our consideration is
essentially de novo.”’ Dunietz, 368 Md. at 428, 795 A.2d at 711 (quoting
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Thompson, 367 Md. 315, 322, 786 A.2d 763,
768 (2001) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Briscoe, 357 Md. 554,
-6-
562, 745 A.2d 1037, 1041 (2000))).”
As indicated supra, respondent has filed exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings
of fact and conclusions of law.  After a review of the record, we affirm the hearing judge’s
findings of fact and hold that they are not clearly erroneous and are based on clear and
convincing evidence.  See Garfield, 369 Md. at 97, 797 A.2d at 763-64; Dunietz, 368 Md.
at 427-28, 795 A.2d at 711; Monfried, 368 Md. at 388, 794 A.2d at 100.  We adopt,
however, only those portions of the hearing judge’s conclusions of law that find the
respondent in violation of MRPC 1.1, 1.15(b), 8.4(a) and 8.4(d).  We shall sustain
respondent’s exception as to the hearing judge’s conclusion that respondent’s actions
constituted theft and a criminal act.  Petitioner filed no exceptions in this Court. 
B.  Respondent’s Exceptions
Respondent makes two specific exceptions to the hearing judge’s conclusions of law.
Respondent’s exceptions, however, for all intents and purposes, can be merged into a single
general exception to the last paragraph of the hearing judge’s conclusions of law, discussed
infra.  Respondent’s exceptions encompass the fact that the hearing judge found a general
violation of the entire MRPC 8.4 when respondent was only charged with violations of
MRPC 8.4(a) and (d).  These exceptions, however, do not encompass an exception to the
hearing judge’s conclusions that respondent violated MRPC 1.1, 1.15(b), 8.4(a) and 8.4(d).
In fact, respondent, in his Exceptions and Response to Recommendation for Sanctions,
specifically admits his violations of these rules when he stated:
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“The Petition [for Disciplinary Action] charged Respondent with violations of
the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rule 1.1
Competence, Rule 1.15(b) Safekeeping Property, and 8.4(a) and (d),
misconduct.  Respondent does not take exception to the conclusion of law that
he violated these charged provisions because his admitted conduct would
suffice to find violations of these provisions, notwithstanding Ms. Mentlik’s
permission.  However, insofar as Judge Bollinger’s Conclusion of Law
encompassed all of Rule 8.4, including (b) and (c), provisions with which he
was never charged, the Respondent takes exception.  In addition to Petitioner’s
failure to charge these offenses, the same absence of a factual finding of intent,
articulated fully above, would preclude Judge Bollinger’s conclusion of law
that Petitioner violated 8.4(b) and (c).” [Alteration added.]
Specifically, respondent excepts to the following language of the hearing judge’s conclusions
of law, especially the emphasized portion therein, which states: 
“Mr. Seiden had no lawful claim to the funds he took from Ms.
Dunkel’s estate and his taking of those funds for his personal use was theft
and a criminal act reflecting adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness and
fitness as an attorney.  His taking of those funds was dishonest.” [Emphasis
added.]
Respondent’s exception has merit in that the hearing judge’s conclusions, if the alleged
violations had been charged, would  mirror the exact language, as illustrated by the emphasis,
of MRPC 8.4(b) and (c), which states:
“Rule 8.4. 
Misconduct.
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
. . . 
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other
respects;
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit
or misrepresentation; . . .” [Emphasis added.]
However, respondent was not charged with such violations.  Under In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S.
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544, 88 S. Ct. 1222, 20 L. Ed. 2d 117 (1968), the United States Supreme Court held that an
attorney was denied due process when the disciplinary charges against him were amended
on the basis of his own testimony in his disciplinary proceeding. This Court has cited Ruffalo
for the proposition that “due process considerations dictate that attorneys are entitled to
notice of the charges against them when disciplinary proceedings begin.”  Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Goldsborough, 330 Md. 342, 352, 624 A.2d 503, 508 (1993); see also
Maryland Rule 16-709.  In this State, this notice requirement is met by the filing of a Petition
for Disciplinary Action in this Court.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Parsons, 310 Md.
132, 140, 527 A.2d 325, 329 (1987).
In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Monfried, 368 Md. 373, 378-79 n.7, 794 A.2d
92, 95 n.7 (2002), this Court recognized the appropriateness of a hearing judge’s actions in
limiting her Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the charges filed by Bar Counsel
although she did “‘not necessarily agree that the Commission ha[d] charged all of the Rules
of Professional Conduct violated by the’” lawyer in that case. (alteration added).  Similarly
in Attorney Grievance Commission v. Wright, 306 Md. 93, 106, 507 A.2d 618, 624 (1986),
this Court dismissed a petition against an attorney where the facts indicated a violation of
prior Disciplinary Rule (DR) 9-102(B)(4), but where the lawyer was only charged with a
violation of DR 2-106(A).  We dismissed the petition, citing Ruffalo, because the petition did
not charge the attorney for the violation that attorney’s conduct actually violated, i.e., it
merely alleged a violation of DR 2-106(A), charging an excessive fee, and not for a violation
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of DR 9-102(B)(4).  Regardless of whether respondent’s conduct constituted theft or
dishonesty, the Petition for Disciplinary Action in this case does not allege violations of
MRPC 8.4 (b) and (c).  It does not charge respondent with theft or dishonesty.  It instead
charges violations of MRPC 1.1 Competence, 1.15(b) Safekeeping Property and 8.4(a) and
(d) Misconduct.  For the hearing judge to conclude that respondent’s conduct constituted
theft and dishonesty, using the exact language of two rules he was not charged with violating,
was improper.
Respondent’s exception, however, is additionally supported by the facts, which
indicate that respondent’s conduct did not reach the level of dishonesty included in the
hearing judge’s conclusions of law.  The hearing judge specifically did not find that
respondent “signed Ms. M entlik’s name, endorsing the check, without her authority.”  Stated
in the alternative, in the hearing judge’s opinion the evidence equally supports the finding
that respondent deposited the check into his escrow account at his client’s direction.  Thus,
what could be established was that respondent took his fee, which Ms. Mentlik did not even
contest as unreasonable, from an escrow account without following the correct procedures
mandated in this State.
This Court, in Attorney Grievance Commission v. Stancil, 296 Md. 325, 333, 463 A.2d
789, 792 (1983), relied on the fact that the attorney misconduct in that case had “resulted
from a difficult relationship with a single client that appear[ed] to be an isolated episode not
likely to recur.” (alterations added).  The same could be said in the instant case.  The hearing
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judge specifically found that Ms. Mentlik was a difficult client.  Respondent points out
several inconsistencies in Ms. Mentlik’s testimony.  These inconsistencies include: 1) Ms.
Mentlik’s changing explanation of whether she authorized respondent to attend the
settlement and to sign for her; 2) Fountainhead Title’s Vice-President Scheeler’s testimony
contradicting Ms. Mentlik’s testimony that respondent was to send the check directly to Ms.
Mentlik; 3) Ms. Mentlik’s omission of her claim that respondent did not have verbal
authority to sign the check for her until her fifth correspondence with Bar Counsel; and, inter
alia, 4) Ms. Mentlik did not dispute the amount of the fee.  Additionally, respondent had
represented Ms. Mentlik for over two years dealing with two separate estates, one of which
was time-consuming, and he testified that Ms. Mentlik had given him verbal permission to
cash the check.  Ms. Mentlik even sent respondent a facsimile acknowledging the amount of
his fee, the same fee to which she later takes issue.  Respondent was not even aware of a
problem with Ms. Mentlik until he received notice of her grievance from the Attorney
Grievance Commission in February 2002.  This, in turn, caused confusion as to whether Ms.
Mentlik had terminated respondent.  Respondent then hired outside counsel to assist him in
attempting to complete the Fee Petition in Orphan’s Court in an effort to complete the estate
in line with Ms. Mentlik’s wishes.  According to respondent, “Ms. Mentlik thwarted all
attempts by Respondent to file a fee petition.”  Additionally, respondent did not hide his
actions from Ms. Mentlik, as evidenced by his sending her the settlement  proceeds (minus
his fee) along with a photocopy of the settlement check.
6 This Court has consistently levied harsh sanctions where attorneys committed
conduct ranging from theft and embezzlement to commingling of funds and intentional
misappropriation.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sullivan, 369 Md. 650, 801 A.2d 1077
(2002); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Powell, 369 Md. 462, 800 A.2d 782 (2002);  Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Vlahos, 369 Md. 183, 798 A.2d 555 (2002); Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Snyder, 368 Md. 242, 793 A.2d 515 (2002); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 773 A.2d 463 (2001); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bernstein,
363 Md. 208, 768 A.2d 607 (2001); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Tomaino, 362 Md. 483,
765 A.2d 653 (2001); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sheridan, 357 Md. 1, 741 A.2d 1143
(1999); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sabghir, 350 Md. 67, 710 A.2d 926 (1998); Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Hollis, 347 Md. 547, 702 A.2d 223 (1997); Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Kenney, 339 Md. 578, 664 A.2d 854 (1995) ; Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Williams, 335 Md. 458, 644 A.2d 490 (1994); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. White, 328
Md. 412, 614 A.2d 955 (1992); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ezrin, 312 Md. 603, 541
A.2d 966 (1988).
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In essence, respondent was presented with an extremely difficult situation, in which
he likely knew that it would be nearly impossible to procure his fee.  Instead of commencing
the proper procedures, respondent took the “easy” shortcut to obtaining his fee.  This
conduct, while violating the charged provisions of the MRPC, does not constitute a theft or
the type of dishonest conduct for which we consistently issue severe sanctions.6
We thus sustain respondent’s exceptions to the extent that the hearing judge’s
conclusions of law were that respondent violated MRPC 8.4(b) and (c) and that respondent
was dishonest by committing theft.  These charges were not included within the Petition.
Moreover, the uncharged alleged violations were not sufficiently supported by the findings
of the hearing judge.
III.  Sanction
We now consider the appropriate sanction for respondent’s misconduct.  In the case
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sub judice, the Attorney Grievance Commission, through Bar Counsel, argues that
respondent be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law with the right to apply for
reinstatement no sooner than three years.  Respondent advocates that he should receive a
public reprimand.  In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Gallagher, we set out the purposes
of the sanctioning process when we stated:
“‘This Court is mindful that the purpose of the sanctions
is to protect the public, to deter other lawyers from engaging in
violations of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, and
to maintain the integrity of the legal profession.  See Attorney
Grievance Comm’n of Maryland v. Hess, 352 Md. 438, 453, 722
A.2d 905, 913 (1999) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n of
Maryland v. Webster, 348 Md. 662, 678, 705 A.2d 1135, 1143
(1998)).  We have stated that “[t]he public is protected when
sanctions are imposed that are commensurate with the nature
and gravity of the violations and the intent with which they were
committed.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Maryland v.
Awuah, 346 Md. 420, 435, 697 A.2d 446, 454 (1997).
Therefore, the appropriate sanction depends upon the facts and
circumstances of each particular case, including consideration
of any mitigating factors.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n of
Maryland v. Atkinson, 357 Md. 646, 656, 745 A.2d 1086, 1092
(2000); Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Maryland v. Gavin, 350
Md. 176, 197-98, 711 A.2d 193, 204 (1998).’
Clark, 363 Md. at 183-84, 767 A.2d at 873.  In addition, we have stated that
‘[i]mposing a sanction protects the public interest “because it demonstrates to
members of the legal profession the type of conduct which will not be
tolerated.”’  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mooney, 359 Md. 56, 96, 753
A.2d 17, 38 (2000) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ober, 350 Md.
616, 631-32, 714 A.2d 856, 864 (1998)) (citation omitted).”
Gallagher, 371 Md. 673, 713-14, 810 A.2d 996, 1020 (2002).
“[T]he nature and gravity of the violations and the intent with which they were
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committed” is relevant to the sanctioning process.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Awuah,
346 Md. 420, 435,  697 A.2d 446, 454 (1997).  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Pennington, 355 Md. 61, 78, 733 A.2d 1029, 1037-38 (1999);  Attorney Grievance Comm’n
v. Milliken, 348 Md. 486, 519, 704 A.2d 1225, 1241 (1998);  Attorney Grievance Comm’n
v. Montgomery, 318 Md. 154, 165, 567 A.2d 112, 117 (1989).  The attorney’s prior grievance
history, i.e., whether there have been prior disciplinary proceedings, the nature of the
misconduct involved in those proceedings and the nature of any sanctions imposed, as well
as any facts in mitigation are similarly relevant, Attorney Grievance Commission v. Franz,
355 Md. 752, 762-63, 736 A.2d 339, 343-44 (1999); Maryland State Bar Association v.
Phoebus, 276 Md. 353, 362, 347 A.2d 556, 561 (1975), as are the attorney’s remorse for the
misconduct, Attorney Grievance Commission v. Wyatt, 323 Md. 36, 38, 591 A.2d 467, 468
(1991), and the likelihood of such conduct being repeated.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Freedman, 285 Md. 298, 300, 402 A.2d 75, 76 (1979). As to the repetition of violative
conduct, we have held that an attorney’s voluntary termination of the charged misconduct,
when accompanied by an appreciation of the serious impropriety of that past conduct and
remorse for it, may be evidence that the attorney will no longer engage in such misconduct.
Id., at 300, 402 A.2d at 76.  See Franz, 355 Md. at 762-63, 736 A.2d at 344.  See also
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Harris-Smith, 356 Md. 72, 90-91, 737 A.2d 567, 577
(1999)(acknowledging that the deterrence of other non-admitted attorneys from undertaking
a federal practice from an office in Maryland was achieved when the firm dissolved after bar
7 See, supra, for text of these provisions of the MRPC.
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counsel’s investigation commenced). 
In this case, we have upheld the hearing court’s findings of fact, by clear and
convincing evidence, and that judge’s conclusions of law relating to respondent’s violations
of MRPC 1.1, 1.15(a), 8.4(a) and 8.4(d).  In sustaining respondent’s exception to the final
portion of the hearing judge’s conclusions of law, we hold that the evidence before the
hearing judge does not support a finding that respondent had the requisite intent to constitute
intentional misappropriation or theft, nor a finding that respondent was dishonest or deceitful.
The facts indicate that respondent may have failed to follow proper procedures, but his
conduct did not rise to that of an intentional misuse of his client’s funds.  The Review Board
did not sanction charging respondent with violations of MRPC 8.4(b) or (c), which
specifically forbid conduct involving criminal acts adversely reflecting on a lawyer’s honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness, as well as forbidding dishonest, fraudulent or deceitful conduct or
misrepresentations.7  And, under the principles stated in Ruffalo and Parsons, the facts in this
case illustrate that the hearing judge did not have clear and convincing evidence that
respondent was dishonest or that his conduct “was theft and a criminal act reflecting
adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness and fitness as an attorney.” 
This Court has issued sanctions ranging from a public reprimand to a 90-day
suspension where, as in this case, the lawyer’s violative conduct did not amount to an
intentional misappropriation or dishonesty.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. McClain, __
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Md. __, __, __ A.2d __, __ (2003)(imposing an indefinite suspension with the right to
reapply in 30 days for violations of MRPC 1.15(a) and §16-606 of the Business Occupations
and Professions Article of the Maryland Code where the attorney corrected his violation,
subsequently took a course in escrow account management and had no previous disciplinary
proceedings); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Culver, 371 Md. 265, 283-84, 808 A.2d 1251,
1261-62 (2002)(issuing an indefinite suspension with the right to reapply in 30 days for
violations of 1.5(c) and Maryland Rule 16-607(b)(2) where the facts indicated that the lawyer
did not return monies, the contingency fee was not put into writing and the lawyer had
previously been reprimanded); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. DiCicco, 369 Md. 662, 688,
802 A.2d 1014, 1028 (2002)(imposing an indefinite suspension with the right to reapply in
90 days for violations of MRPC 1.15(a), 1.15(c) and 8.4(a) where, despite of the attorney’s
negligent and sloppy administration of trust accounts, there was an absence of fraudulent
intent, the attorney had no previous disciplinary problems in 38 years of practice and the
attorney’s clients did not suffer a financial loss); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Adams, 349
Md. 86, 98-99, 706 A.2d 1080, 1086 (1998)(imposing an indefinite suspension with the right
to reapply in 30 days for violations of MRPC 1.15 and Maryland Rule 16-604 where the
lawyer’s conduct was a negligent, unintentional, misappropriation, and where the violation
was the attorney’s first, the client was a friend of the attorney, the attorney had good
intentions and the monies were paid to the Comptroller); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
McIntire, 286 Md. 87, 96, 405 A.2d 273, 278 (1979)(issuing a public reprimand for
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violations stemming from a fee dispute between the lawyer and his client where there was
not intentional wrongdoing, deceit or dishonesty).
Regardless of the fact that respondent has yet to file a Fee Petition and has not kept
the disputed fee in an escrow account, the record in the case sub judice is replete with
mitigating evidence that provides for a lesser sanction than the three-year suspension sought
by Bar Counsel.  This is respondent’s first disciplinary proceeding in over 24 years of
practicing law.  Respondent, as previously noted, was not charged with violations of MRPC
8.4(b) and (c), thus he did not intentionally misappropriate the monies of the complainant.
He is remorseful for his conduct and has been cooperative throughout these proceedings.
Respondent was also extremely ill from December of 2000 through mid-April of 2001,
which, according to respondent, prevented him from filing a Fee Petition during that time.
Respondent’s conduct directly resulted from his representations of a particularly difficult
client and will unlikely be repeated, as evidenced by his many years of practice without being
charged in a disciplinary proceeding.  Our weighing of the violations and the mitigating
circumstances in the case sub judice results in the conclusion that respondent’s conduct falls
within the range of sanctions levied in the cases cited above.
In light of these findings, we hold that an indefinite suspension from the practice of
law with the right to reapply within 30 days will suffice as an appropriate sanction for
respondent’s conduct.
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT
SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED
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BY THIS COURT, INCLUDING THE
COST OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS, FOR
WHICH 
SUM 
JUDGMENT 
IS
ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE
A T T O R N E Y  
G R I E V A N C E
COMMISSION 
OF 
MARYLAND
AGAINST RICHARD SEIDEN.