Title: State ex rel. Romine v. McIntosh

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Romine v. McIntosh, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-6826.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-6826 
THE STATE EX REL. ROMINE, APPELLANT, v. MCINTOSH, JUDGE, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Romine v. McIntosh, Slip Opinion No.  
2020-Ohio-6826.] 
Criminal law—Sentencing—Allied offenses of similar import—Void and voidable 
sentences—Imposition of two sentences for allied offenses prior to merger 
is a violation of R.C. 2941.25(A)—Imposition of compound sentences for 
allied offenses is an error in the exercise of jurisdiction, to be challenged at 
sentencing and remedied on direct appeal. 
(No. 2020-0369—Submitted August 4, 2020—Decided December 23, 2020.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 19AP-439. 
________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Nelson L. Romine Jr., appeals the decision of the Tenth 
District Court of Appeals dismissing his complaint for a writ of mandamus or a writ 
of prohibition against Judge Stephen McIntosh of the Franklin County Court of 
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Common Pleas.  For the reasons below, we affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
Background 
{¶ 2} Romine was the subject of two indictments arising out of the death of 
A. Kenneth Jackson and the kidnapping and aggravated robbery of William Farmer.  
In the first indictment, which became case No. 09CR-4171, he was charged with 
one count of aggravated murder and one count of kidnapping, each with a firearm 
specification, plus a felony charge of improperly handling a firearm in a motor 
vehicle.  In the second indictment, which became case No. 09CR-7222, he was 
charged with one count of aggravated murder and one count of aggravated robbery, 
each with a firearm specification.  On December 23, 2009, a jury found Romine 
guilty of all counts in both cases. 
{¶ 3} In case No. 09CR-4171, Judge McIntosh sentenced Romine to 25 
years to life for aggravated murder, 5 years for kidnapping, and 18 months for the 
firearm felony, plus 3 years each for the two firearm specifications.  State v. 
Romine, 2010 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 6848.  Judge McIntosh ordered the aggravated-
murder and kidnapping sentences to be served consecutively but the sentence for 
the firearm felony to run concurrently, for a minimum term of 33 years.  Id.  In case 
No. 09CR-7222, Judge McIntosh sentenced Romine to 15 years to life for murder,1 
10 years for aggravated robbery, plus 3 years each for the two firearm 
specifications, for an aggregate minimum of 18 years.  State v. Romine, 2010 Ohio 
Misc. LEXIS 9733.  Judge McIntosh then merged the aggravated-murder count in 
case No. 09CR-4171 with the murder count in case No. 09CR-7222 and imposed 
an aggregate prison sentence of 36 years to life.  Id. 
                                                 
1.  Although the indictment in case No. 09CR-7222 charged Romine with aggravated murder, the 
trial court imposed sentence on “Count One of the indictment, to wit, Murder.”  Romine alleges that 
the jury found him not guilty of aggravated murder but guilty of the lesser-included offense of 
murder, but that fact, if true, is not reflected in the sentencing entry. 
January Term, 2020 
 
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{¶ 4} On July 11, 2019, Romine filed an original action in the Tenth District 
Court of Appeals seeking a writ of mandamus or a writ of prohibition against Judge 
McIntosh.  Romine alleged that Judge McIntosh had improperly sentenced him 
twice, for murder and aggravated murder, in connection with the death of a single 
person.  Romine demanded extraordinary relief compelling Judge McIntosh to 
vacate or correct what Romine deemed to be void sentences. 
{¶ 5} A Tenth District magistrate recommended that the court of appeals 
dismiss Romine’s complaint.  The magistrate rejected Romine’s contention that he 
had been sentenced to serve two separate life sentences for killing the same victim.  
Instead, the magistrate reasoned that because the sentences were merged, although 
there were two convictions, there was only one sentence.  The magistrate viewed 
Romine’s claims as a sentencing error that he could have raised on direct appeal 
from his convictions. 
{¶ 6} Romine did not file objections to the magistrate’s decision.  The court 
of appeals adopted the magistrate’s recommendation to dismiss the complaint, but 
it modified the magistrate’s conclusions law.  10th Dist. Franklin No. 19AP-439.  
Specifically, the court of appeals agreed that Romine could have raised the 
sentencing error on direct appeal and that mandamus was therefore not available, 
but the court pointed out that “contrary to the magistrate’s finding, the trial court 
did impose a separate prison sentence both for murder and aggravated murder.”  Id. 
at ¶ 4.  Citing State v. Williams, 148 Ohio St.3d 403, 2016-Ohio-7658, 71 N.E.3d 
234, overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Henderson, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 
2020-Ohio-4784, ___ N.E.3d ___, the court of appeals held that Judge McIntosh 
erred by merging the two murder counts after imposing sentence, and the court 
suggested that as a result, the sentences were void.  10th Dist. Franklin No. 19AP-
439 at ¶ 5-6.  “Nevertheless,” the court concluded, “because [Romine] could have 
challenged his convictions in a direct appeal, [he] had an adequate remedy at law.”  
Id. at ¶ 6.  Romine appealed. 
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Legal analysis 
A. Standard of review 
{¶ 7} For a court to dismiss a complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), it must 
appear beyond doubt that the relator can prove no set of facts warranting relief, 
after all of the factual allegations in the complaint are presumed to be true and all 
reasonable inferences are made in the relator’s favor.  State ex rel. Natl. Elec. 
Contrs. Assn., Ohio Conference v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Servs., 83 Ohio St.3d 179, 
181, 699 N.E.2d 64 (1998).  We review a dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) de novo.  
State ex rel. Brown v. Nusbaum, 152 Ohio St.3d 284, 2017-Ohio-9141, 95 N.E.3d 
365, ¶ 10. 
B. Prohibition 
{¶ 8} Romine’s complaint sought relief in both mandamus and prohibition.  
To state a claim for a writ of prohibition, Romine had to allege the exercise of 
judicial power, the lack of authority for the exercise of that power, and the lack of 
an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  See State ex rel. Elder v. 
Camplese, 144 Ohio St.3d 89, 2015-Ohio-3628, 40 N.E.3d 1138, ¶ 13.  However, 
if the absence of jurisdiction is patent and unambiguous, a relator in prohibition 
need not establish the lack of an adequate remedy at law.  State ex rel. Sapp v. 
Franklin Cty. Court of Appeals, 118 Ohio St.3d 368, 2008-Ohio-2637, 889 N.E.2d 
500, ¶ 15. 
{¶ 9} The magistrate recommended denying Romine’s request for a writ of 
prohibition, because she concluded that the trial court had statutory authority to 
merge the convictions and that Romine had had an adequate remedy by way of 
appeal.  Romine did not file objections.  He has therefore waived any argument 
with respect to the prohibition claim.  State ex rel. Franks v. Ohio Adult Parole 
Auth., 159 Ohio St.3d 435, 2020-Ohio-711, 151 N.E.3d 606, ¶ 10. 
 
 
January Term, 2020 
 
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C. Mandamus 
{¶ 10} To state a claim for a writ of mandamus, the relator must allege (1) 
a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a clear legal duty on the part of the 
respondent to provide it, and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary 
course of the law.  See State ex rel. Love v. O’Donnell, 150 Ohio St.3d 378, 2017-
Ohio-5659, 81 N.E.3d 1250, ¶ 3.  Here again, the magistrate determined that 
Romine had an adequate remedy, so as to foreclose extraordinary relief, and 
Romine did not file objections.  But the court modified the magistrate’s conclusion 
of law: in dicta, the court agreed with Romine that the imposition of multiple 
sentences for allied offenses rendered his sentences void.  The court agreed with 
the magistrate, however, that Romine could not satisfy the elements of mandamus 
because he had an adequate remedy by way of appeal. 
{¶ 11} Romine argues that the court of appeals’ finding that his sentences 
are void compels a reversal: by definition, if the sentences are void, he may 
collaterally attack them at any time, and therefore the availability of an appeal 
should not bar the mandamus action. 
{¶ 12} Romine’s ability to collaterally attack his sentences depends on 
whether the sentences were void or merely voidable.  If a judgment entry is 
voidable, then it must be challenged on direct appeal, or else principles of res 
judicata will apply, whereas a “defendant’s ability to challenge an entry at any time 
is the very essence of an entry being void, not voidable.”  State v. Harper, ___ Ohio 
St.3d ___, 2020-Ohio-2913, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 18. 
{¶ 13} As a general rule, “when a trial court finds that convictions are not 
allied offenses of similar import, or when it fails to make any finding regarding 
whether the offenses are allied, imposing a separate sentence for each offense is not 
contrary to law and any error must be asserted in a timely appeal or it will be barred 
by principles of res judicata.”  Williams, 148 Ohio St.3d 403, 2016-Ohio-7658, 71 
N.E.3d 234, at ¶ 26.  However, once the trial court determines that the offender has 
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been found guilty of allied offenses of similar import that are subject to merger, 
R.C. 2941.25 prohibits the imposition of multiple sentences.  State v. Damron, 129 
Ohio St.3d 86, 2011-Ohio-2268, 950 N.E.2d 512, ¶ 17.  And in Williams, we held 
that because a trial court has a mandatory duty to merge allied offenses by imposing 
a single sentence, “the imposition of separate sentences for those offenses—even if 
imposed concurrently—is contrary to law * * *.”  Id. at ¶ 28.  After holding that the 
sentences in Williams were imposed in violation of R.C. 2941.25(A), we concluded 
that therefore, “those sentences [were] void.”  (Emphasis added.)  Williams at ¶ 28, 
overruled, Henderson, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2020-Ohio-4784, ___ N.E.3d ___. 
{¶ 14} The court of appeals relied on Williams when it declared Romine’s 
sentence void.  In this case, Judge McIntosh found that the two counts were allied 
offenses and merged them, but he did so only after imposing two sentences.  If 
imposing two sentences for allied offenses but running them concurrently is a 
violation of R.C. 2941.25(A), then imposing two sentences prior to merger is 
equally a violation: in both scenarios, the defendant actually received two separate 
sentences, even though he will not have to serve both.  Thus, under Williams, 
Romine would have been permitted to challenge his sentence in a collateral 
proceeding. 
{¶ 15} However, that aspect of Williams is no longer good law.  Instead, 
“when a specific action is within a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, any error in 
the exercise of that jurisdiction renders the judgment voidable, not void.”  Harper, 
___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2020-Ohio-2913, ___ N.E.3d ___, at ¶ 26; see also Henderson 
at ¶ 27.  The imposition of compound sentences for allied offenses is an error in the 
exercise of jurisdiction, to be challenged at sentencing and remedied on direct 
appeal. 
{¶ 16} Romine contends that the trial court imposed multiple sentences for 
offenses it deemed to be subject to merger under the allied-offenses statute.  Such 
a claim raises a constitutional challenge that the court has imposed greater 
January Term, 2020 
 
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punishment than the legislature authorized.  See State v. Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 
385, 2015-Ohio-2459, 38 N.E.3d 860, ¶ 16; State v. Underwood, 124 Ohio St.3d 
365, 2010-Ohio-1, 922 N.E.2d 923, ¶ 31.  And as we recently held in State v. 
Patrick, R.C. 2953.08(D)(3) does not preclude an appellate court’s review of a 
constitutional challenge to a sentence for murder or aggravated murder.  ___ Ohio 
St.3d ___, 2020-Ohio-6803, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 22.  Therefore, because Romine’s 
sentencing entry was voidable and he therefore had an adequate remedy by way of 
direct appeal, mandamus will not lie. 
{¶ 17} For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FRENCH, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, 
and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
Nelson L. Romine Jr., pro se. 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Bryan B. Lee, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
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