Title: Metzger v. Kalke

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Metzger v. Kalke1985 WY 185709 P.2d 414Case Number: 84-146Decided: 11/12/1985CHARLES D. METZGER, AND CAROLYN K. METZGER, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS), 

v. 

HEIN H. KALKE, M.D., RUQAIYA HUSSAIN, M.D., AND MEDICAL CENTER FOR WOMEN, P.C., APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
CHARLES D. METZGER, AND 
CAROLYN K. METZGER, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS), 

v. 

HEIN H. KALKE, M.D., 
RUQAIYA HUSSAIN, M.D., AND MEDICALCENTER FOR WOMEN, P.C., APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, CampbellCounty, Terrence L. 
O'Brien, J.

 
 
Rick A. Thompson 
of Hathaway, Speight & Kunz, Cheyenne, and 
Rollin R. Bailey of Bailey, Polsky, Cada, Todd & Cope, Lincoln, Nebraska, for appellants.

Michael J. 
Sullivan, J. Kenneth Barbe and Jeffrey C. Brinkerhoff of Brown, Drew, Apostolos, 
Massey & Sullivan, Casper, for 
appellees Kalke and Medical Center for Women, P.C.

J.E. Vlastos and 
Ann Rochelle of Vlastos, Reeves, Murdock & Brooks, P.C., Casper, for appellee 
Hussain.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE,* ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, 
JJ.

* Retired November 1, 
1985

ROSE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal stems from 
medical malpractice actions brought by appellants Charles and Carolyn Metzger, 
husband and wife, to recover damages allegedly resulting from the failure of 
appellees Ruqaiya Hussain, M.D., and Hein Kalke, M.D., to diagnose and properly 
treat the pituitary tumor from which Carolyn Metzger suffered. The district 
court dismissed appellants' claims against Hussain as barred by the statute of 
limitations applicable to medical tort actions, § 1-3-107, W.S. 1977. The court 
granted Kalke's motion for summary judgment on the dual grounds that no dispute 
of material fact existed as to his professional conduct and that § 1-3-107 
barred appellants' suits for alleged acts or omissions occurring prior to 
September 13, 1981. We will reverse the order of dismissal and the order 
granting summary judgment entered by the district court.

[¶2.]     The record before us 
consists of the depositions of the parties, the depositions of appellants' 
expert witnesses, the transcript of the hearing on appellees' pretrial motions, 
and the pleadings. The record also contains affidavits of the Metzgers, their 
expert witness, and their attorney. These affidavits were served on appellees at 
the hearing on pretrial motions and were disallowed by the trial court except 
for purposes of determining the timeliness of appellants' suits. The parties 
have not appealed this ruling by the trial court. The following factual summary 
is based on the record allowed by the district court and designated on appeal 
and reflects only those points pertinent to the district court's 
judgment.

FACTS

[¶3.]     In December, 1979, 
Carolyn Metzger first contacted Dr. Hussain, a specialist in obstetrics and 
gynecology at the MedicalCenter for Women, P.C., in Gillette, Wyoming. Metzger remained under the care of 
Hussain until May 12, 1981, at which time the physician moved out of the state. 
Dr. Kalke, also a specialist at the MedicalCenter for Women, assumed the care of 
Metzger, who had become pregnant in late 1980. Kalke's last contact with Metzger 
was September 28, 1981, when he conducted a post-partum 
examination.

[¶4.]     On December 19, 1981, 
Carolyn Metzger contacted an ophthalmologist in Lincoln, Nebraska, who diagnosed a pituitary tumor. The 
tumor was surgically removed December 22, 1981. Since that time, Metzger has 
been under the care of Arthur Annin, M.D., a specialist in internal medicine in 
Lincoln.

[¶5.]     While Carolyn Metzger 
was hospitalized for surgery, Charles Metzger contacted Harvey Froscheiser, an 
attorney, and requested that he investigate the possible bases for legal action 
against appellees. No suit was filed at that time. The Metzgers state in their 
affidavits that they attempted without success in early 1982 to obtain Carolyn 
Metzger's medical records from appellees. Dr. Annin says in his affidavit that 
during the first half of 1982 he received only incomplete records concerning 
Carolyn Metzger's prior medical treatment and that such records were of no 
significance in evaluating the care provided by appellees. Annin says that he 
made no statement about the treatment which appellees afforded Metzger until he 
expressed his concern to Attorney Froscheiser on July 15, 1982. Froscheiser 
states in his affidavit that he had no information from any knowledgeable source 
prior to July 15, 1982, of any wrongful acts by appellees.

[¶6.]     Charles Metzger and 
Carolyn Metzger separately filed actions against Hussain, Kalke, and the 
MedicalCenter for Women on 
September 13, 1983. Carolyn Metzger claims damages for the physical and mental 
injuries suffered as a result of the undiagnosed tumor, and Charles Metzger 
seeks to recover for the loss of his wife's society. The trial court granted 
Hussain's motion to dismiss the complaints against her on the ground that they 
were barred by § 1-3-107, the applicable statute of limitations. The court 
entered summary judgment in favor of Kalke and the Medical Center for Women, 
ruling that (1) § 1-3-107 precluded appellants' suit to recover for acts or 
omissions which occurred prior to September 13, 1981, and (2) no question of 
material fact existed as to the conduct of Dr. Kalke.

[¶7.]     Appellants ask this 
court to determine whether the trial court erred in its application of § 1-3-107 
and whether appellee Kalke carried his burden of establishing the absence of any 
material facts necessitating trial. We will hold that appellants timely filed 
their actions against appellee Hussain within the two-and-one-half-year 
limitation period set out in § 1-3-107(a)(iv) for wrongdoing discovered during 
the second year following its occurrence. With respect to appellees Kalke and 
the MedicalCenter for Women, we will 
hold that appellants timely brought suit on September 13, 1983, to recover for 
conduct occurring prior to September 13, 1981, since the cessation of treatment 
on September 28, 1981 completed the act which started the running of the 
two-year statute of limitations. Section 1-3-107(a)(i). Finally, we will hold 
that appellees Kalke and the Medical Center for Women failed to support their 
motion for summary judgment with any evidence tending to refute the allegations 
of malpractice in the complaints and, therefore, the district court erred in 
ruling that no issue of material fact existed for trial.

THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS

[¶8.]     Section 1-3-107(a) 
provides that medical malpractice actions must be initiated within two years of 
the wrongful act or omission, subject to specified 
exceptions:

"(a) A cause of action 
arising from an act, error or omission in the rendering of licensed or certified 
professional or health care services shall be brought within the greater of the 
following times:

"(i) Within two (2) years 
of the date of the alleged act, error or omission, except that a cause of action 
may be instituted not more than two (2) years after discovery of the alleged 
act, error or omission, if the claimant can establish that the alleged act, 
error or omission was:

"(A) Not reasonably 
discoverable within a two (2) year period; or

"(B) The claimant failed 
to discover the alleged act, error or omission within the two (2) year period 
despite the exercise of due diligence;

"(ii) For injury to the 
rights of a minor * * *;

"(iii) For injury to the 
rights of a plaintiff suffering from a legal disability other than minority * * 
*;

"(iv) If under paragraph 
(i) or (ii) of this subsection, the alleged act, error or omission is discovered 
during the second year of the two (2) year period from the date of the act, 
error or omission, the period for commencing a lawsuit shall be extended by six 
(6) months."

[¶9.]     In resolving the 
parties' conflicting interpretations of § 1-3-107(a), we must determine (1) the 
particular event in a continuing course of treatment which triggers the running 
of the statutory period under subsection (a)(i), and (2) with respect to the 
claims against Hussain, the extent of information sufficient to constitute an 
injured party's discovery of the alleged act, error or omission under subsection 
(a)(iv). In undertaking this task, we are mindful that the statute of 
limitations represents legislative and public policy controlling the right to 
litigate and that we must give full force to the applicable statute without 
regard to the merits of a particular claim. Olson v. A.H. Robins Company, Inc., 
Wyo., 696 P.2d 1294 (1985); Duke v. Housen, Wyo., 
589 P.2d 334, reh. denied, 590 P.2d 1340, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 863, 100 S. Ct. 132, 62 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1979). We also note, however, that, where two 
constructions as to the limitation period are possible, the courts prefer the 
one which gives the longer period in which to prosecute the action. Safeco Insurance Company of 
America v. Honeywell, Inc., 
Alaska, 
639 P.2d 996 (1981); 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction § 70.03, p. 301 (4th 
Ed. 1974). Statutes prescribing a relatively short period for suit are usually 
construed narrowly to give the holder of a cause of action a fair opportunity to 
present his claim. Safeco Insurance 
Company of America v. Honeywell, Inc., supra. With these rules in mind, we 
turn to consideration of § 1-3-107(a), which addresses the permissible time 
frame for initiating malpractice actions.

The Alleged Act, Error or 
Omission in a Continuing Course of Treatment

[¶10.]  Courts which have addressed the issue 
uniformly hold that where the defendant physician has provided a continuing 
course of care for the same or related complaints, the cessation of treatment 
completes the "act" which starts the running of the statutory period for filing 
suit. Farley v. Goode, 219 Va. 969, 252 S.E.2d 594, 3 A.L.R.4th 305 (1979); Johnson v. Winthrop Laboratories Division of Sterling Drug, Inc., 
291 Minn. 145, 190 N.W.2d 77 (1971); Borgia v. City of New 
York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319, 187 N.E.2d 777 (1962); Williams v. Elias, 140 Neb. 656, 1 N.W.2d 121 
(1941). The courts reason that the medical treatment and employment should be 
considered as a whole and if malpractice occurred during its course, the statute 
of limitations begins to run when the treatment terminates. Schmitt v. Esser, 178 Minn. 82, 226 N.W. 196, 
197 (1929). The Supreme Court of Nebraska set out the rationale for this 
"continuous treatment" rule in Williams 
v. Elias, supra, 1 N.W.2d at 124:

"* * * [I]n the treatment 
of a patient the diagnosis might change from time to time, and it is commonly 
accepted in the medical profession that the diagnosis, in the first instance, is 
not binding on the physician. He should have the right, during the course of 
treatment, to change the diagnosis. * * *

"* * * The diagnosis 
referred to was a continuing biweekly one, and each time an incorrect diagnosis 
was made and an incorrect treatment applied, plaintiff's injuries were extended. 
It was not the error in the diagnosis originally made by defendant but its 
adherence thereto and course of treatment that brought about the 
injuries."

[¶11.]  We hold with the foregoing authorities 
that the act, error or omission which starts the running of the statute of 
limitations against medical malpractice actions is the termination of the course 
of treatment for the same or related illnesses or injuries. Accordingly, the 
limitation period established by § 1-3-107(a) began to run with respect to 
appellants' claims against Dr. Kalke on September 28, 1981, the date he last 
treated Carolyn Metzger. Appellants timely filed their complaints against Kalke 
and the MedicalCenter for Women on 
September 13, 1983, within the two years allowed by subsection 
(a)(i).

[¶12.]  With respect to appellants' actions 
against appellee Hussain, the limitation period began to run on May 12, 1981, 
the date on which appellee last examined and treated Carolyn Metzger. The 
question then becomes whether appellants had two and one-half years under 
subsection (a)(iv) within which to bring their actions against Hussain or only 
two years under subsection (a)(i).

The Discovery of the 
Alleged Act, Error, or Omission under § 1-3-107(a)(iv)

[¶13.]  Appellants make no attempt to rely on the 
"discovery" exception incorporated in subsection (a)(i)(A) and (B), since they 
contend that they actually discovered the alleged act or omission of appellee 
Hussain on July 15, 1982, within two years of its occurrence on May 12, 1981. 
Appellants take the position, however, that they are entitled to rely on the 
extended limitation period provided in subsection (a)(iv), since they actually 
discovered the alleged wrongdoing in the second year following its occurrence. 
Appellants assert that prior to July, 1982, they had no knowledge that 
appellees' failure to diagnose the pituitary tumor constituted malpractice, and, 
therefore, they cannot be charged with an earlier discovery of "the alleged act, 
error or omission." According to appellants, their discovery of the alleged 
conduct occurred on July 15, 1982, when Dr. Annin suggested that appellees' 
failure to diagnose Carolyn Metzger's pituitary tumor was 
wrongful.

[¶14.]  Appellee Hussain contends that appellants 
discovered the alleged wrongful conduct on December 19, 1981, when Carolyn 
Metzger learned that she suffered from a pituitary tumor which had been growing 
for some time. At that point, according to appellee, Metzger knew of her 
affliction and knew that it had not been diagnosed by either Hussain or Kalke. 
Whether appellants knew that the physicians acted negligently makes no 
difference, appellee urges, in determining the date of appellants' discovery of 
the alleged act or omission for purposes of § 1-3-107(a)(iv). The appellee 
concludes that, since appellants discovered the missed diagnosis during the 
first year after its occurrence on May 12, 1981, they are bound by the two-year 
limitation period which expired prior to the initiation of these 
actions.

[¶15.]  Section 1-3-107(a)(iv) allows an 
additional six months within which to file a malpractice action when the injured 
party discovers "the alleged act, 
error or omission" (emphasis added) during the second year of the two-year 
period from the date of such act. Therefore, appellants' suits initiated 
September 13, 1983, would be timely with respect to Hussain only if they 
discovered the alleged act after May 12, 1982.

[¶16.]  In seeking to ascertain the legislative 
intent in enacting § 1-3-107(a)(iv), we begin by giving the words in the statute 
their plain, ordinary and usual meaning. McCoy v. Thompson, Wyo., 
677 P.2d 839 (1984). Subsection (a)(iv) speaks of the time of discovery of the 
"alleged act, error or omission," which simply means the date on which the 
plaintiff first learns of the wrongdoing which forms the basis of his complaint. 
Whether the injured party should have learned or had reason to know of the 
wrongful act at an earlier date is irrelevant for purposes of this portion of 
the statute.

[¶17.]  The alleged conduct in the case at bar is 
appellees' wrongful failure to diagnose Carolyn Metzger's pituitary tumor. In 
other words, to state a valid cause of action in their complaint appellants had 
to allege not only that the defendants missed diagnosing the tumor but also that 
the defendants should have diagnosed it given her symptoms and history. Thus, to 
come within the scope of subsection (a)(iv), appellants had to discover during 
the second year that the doctors' treatment of Carolyn Metzger was 
wrongful.

[¶18.]  This conclusion that § 1-3-107(a)(iv) 
contemplates the discovery of all of the elements of one's cause of action is 
consistent with our previous applications of the discovery rule as a tool in 
determining when a particular statute of limitations attaches. In Olson v. A.H. Robins Company, Inc., 
supra, 696 P.2d  at 1297, we said:

"Wyoming is a `discovery' 
state; therefore, the statute of limitations is triggered when the plaintiff 
knows or has reason to know the existence of the cause of action. Duke v. Housen, supra; Banner v. Town of Dayton, Wyo., 
474 P.2d 300 (1970). * * *"

In Duke v. Housen, supra, 589 P.2d  at 341, 
we defined a cause of action as:

"A `cause of action' is 
the fact or combination of facts which give rise to a `suit', the latter being a 
proceeding to enforce a right. * * *"

 

[¶19.]  Other courts that have interpreted the 
statute of limitations in light of the discovery rule have said that the period 
of limitation begins to run in malpractice cases when the injured party 
discovers that the harm resulted from the defendant's wrongdoing. Mastro v. Brodie, Colo., 682 P.2d 1162 (1984); Moore v. JacksonParkHospital, 95 Ill. 2d 223, 69 Ill.Dec. 191, 447 N.E.2d 408 (1983); Massey v. Litton, 99 Nev. 723, 669 P.2d 248 (1983); Yamaguchi v. Queen's MedicalCenter, 65 Haw. 84, 648 P.2d 689 
(1982); Renner v. Asli, W. Va., 280 S.E.2d 240 (1981); Foil v. Ballinger, 
Utah, 601 P.2d 144 (1979); Schalm v. 
Mount Clemens General Hospital, 82 Mich. App. 669, 267 N.W.2d 479 (1978); Brown v. Mary Hitchcock Memorial 
Hospital, 117 N.H. 739, 378 A.2d 1138 (1977); Baines v. Blenderman, Iowa, 223 N.W.2d 199 (1974); Renner v. Edwards, 93 
Idaho 836, 475 P.2d 530 (1969). The Supreme Court of Utah observed in Foil v. Ballinger, supra, 601 P.2d  at 
147, that the patient is seldom in a position to recognize substandard medical 
care at the time of its occurrence:

"* * * In the health care 
field it is typically the case that there often is a great disparity in the 
knowledge of those who provide health care services and those who receive the 
services with respect to expected and unexpected side effects of a given 
procedure, as well as the nature, degree, and extent of expected after effects. 
While the recipient may be aware of a disability or dysfunction, there may be, 
to the untutored understanding of the average layman, no apparent connection 
between the treatment provided by a physician and the injury suffered. Even if 
there is, it may be passed off as an unavoidable side effect or a side effect 
that will pass with time. Indeed, common experience teaches that one often 
suffers pain and other physical difficulties without knowing or suspecting the 
true cause, and may, as often happens, ascribe a totally erroneous cause to the 
manifestations. Even those who are trained in medical science often require the 
additional expertise of one possessing specialty training to diagnose properly 
the cause of certain ailments. A number of medical difficulties can readily be 
attributed by a layman to causes that are known or should be known. But when 
injuries are suffered that have been caused by an unknown act of negligence by 
an expert, the law ought not to be construed to destroy a right of action before 
a person even becomes aware of the existence of that 
right."

In cases 
involving an undiagnosed affliction especially, the patient may not discover the 
wrong until so informed by another doctor:

"The question of 
malpractice in a diagnostic situation is often dependent upon when the plaintiff 
is informed by another physician that the original diagnosis was wrong and 
whether if a correct diagnosis had been made and treatment rendered the ultimate 
result would have changed. * * *" Renner 
v. Asli, supra, 280 S.E.2d  at 242.

Moreover, the 
fact that plaintiff obtains a correct diagnosis does not necessarily constitute 
notice that the earlier, incorrect diagnosis was rendered negligently. Schalm v. Mount Clemens General Hospital, 
supra, 267 N.W.2d  at 482.

[¶20.]  In view of the specific language of § 
1-3-107(a) and the rationale behind the discovery rule generally, we hold that a 
plaintiff discovers an "alleged act, error or omission" within the meaning of 
subsection (a)(iv) when he learns that his harm resulted from the wrongful 
conduct of the defendants. When such discovery occurs during the second year 
following the alleged wrongdoing, the limitation period for filing suit extends 
two and one-half years from the date of the alleged act.

[¶21.]  In reaching this holding, we do not mean 
to imply that discovery of the alleged act under § 1-3-107(a)(iv) necessarily 
includes discovery of the legal theories which support a claim. We expressly 
rejected the notion in Olson v. A.H. 
Robins Company, Inc., supra, 696 P.2d  at 1299, that a plaintiff does not 
discover her cause of action until she discovers her legal rights. Section 
1-3-107(a)(iv) focuses on the facts 
which make up a cause of action rather than on the applicable legal theories. 
Accordingly, we find pertinent that said by the California Court of Appeals in 
Graham v. Hansen, 128 Cal. App. 3d 965, 
180 Cal. Rptr. 604, 609 (1982), in applying the discovery rule in a medical 
malpractice action:

"Plaintiff contends she 
did not realize she had a viable cause of action for medical malpractice until 
she contacted her attorney 24 months after the alleged malpractice and 18 months 
after she terminated the physician-patient relationship with defendants. This 
contention ignores the well-settled principle that ignorance of a legal theory 
of recovery against defendants is irrelevant. `The statute of limitations is not 
tolled by belated discovery of legal 
theories, as distinguished from belated discovery of facts. * * *' (Emphasis in original; 
[citations].) If plaintiff believes because of injuries she has suffered that 
someone has done something wrong, such a fact is sufficient to alert a plaintiff 
`to the necessity for investigation and pursuit of her remedies.' 
[Citations.]"

See also Mastro v. Brodie, supra, 682 P.2d  at 
1168; Massey v. Litton, supra, 669 P.2d  at 252.

[¶22.]  Appellee Hussain contends that even if § 
1-3-107(a)(iv) contemplates discovery of a wrongdoing, appellants made such a 
discovery in December, 1981, as evidenced by Charles Metzger's consultation with 
an attorney. We would point out, however, that subsection (a)(iv) extends the 
limitation period based on the plaintiff's actual discovery of the alleged conduct. 
We are not concerned with what appellants in this case may have suspected or 
what they should have known in December, 1981. The affidavits submitted on 
behalf of appellants establish that they learned of appellees' alleged 
wrongdoing on July 15, 1982. Since appellants actually discovered the alleged 
act of appellee Hussain during the second year after its occurrence, they were 
entitled to rely on the provisions of § 1-3-107(a)(iv) and brought their suits 
within the applicable limitation period.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS

[¶23.]  Appellees Dr. Kalke and the MedicalCenter for Women moved for summary 
judgment against the Metzgers on the ground

"[t]hat plaintiffs have 
failed to establish a prima facie case against these defendants. In support of 
the motion defendants request use of and will submit excerpts from the 
depositions of plaintiffs, defendant Hein Kalke, M.D.[1] and plaintiffs' 
experts."

At the hearing 
on their motion, appellees contended that they were entitled to summary judgment 
based on appellants' failure to produce any expert evidence in support of their 
claims of negligence filed against Dr. Kalke. The district court agreed and 
entered summary judgment on the ground that no dispute existed as to any 
material fact concerning the propriety of Kalke's care and treatment of Carolyn 
Metzger.

[¶24.]  Appellants urge on appeal that the burden 
was on appellees, as the parties moving for summary judgment, to come forward 
with affidavits or other evidence which refuted the allegations of negligence in 
the complaints. Since appellees failed to make this initial showing, appellants 
deny any obligation on their part to produce expert testimony evaluating Kalke's 
conduct. Therefore, appellants conclude, the issue of Kalke's negligence 
remained for resolution at trial, and the district court erred in awarding 
summary judgment.

[¶25.]  Appellees concede that the movant in 
summary-judgment proceedings bears the burden of showing an absence of genuine 
issues of material fact. Appellees submit, however, that they carried that 
burden by pointing to the record and the absence of any proof of Kalke's 
negligence in the depositions of appellants' experts. Appellees cite our opinion 
in Harris v. Grizzle, Wyo., 625 P.2d 747 (1981), for the proposition that the defendant physician in a medical 
malpractice case is presumed to have carefully and skillfully treated his 
patient and that, therefore, the plaintiff in such case must come forward with 
expert evidence in opposition to a motion for summary judgment. Appellees call 
our attention to the following language in Harris v. Grizzle, supra, 625 P.2d at 
751:

"In order to defeat a 
motion for summary judgment in a medical malpractice action, a 
plaintiff:

"`* * * has the 
obligation to establish (1) the accepted standard of medical care or practice, 
(2) that the doctor's conduct departed from the standard, and (3) that his 
conduct was the legal cause of the injuries suffered.' 
[Citation.]"

We cannot agree 
with appellees' interpretation of the manner in which a moving defendant 
properly satisfies his burden in summary judgment proceedings in a medical 
malpractice case.

[¶26.]  Rule 56 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure permits a party to a civil action to move for summary judgment. 
Subsection (c) of the rule provides:

"* * * The judgment 
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. * * *"

This court has 
consistently held that in a medical malpractice case, as in any other case, the 
burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact is upon the 
party moving for summary judgment. Siebert v. Fowler, Wyo., 637 P.2d 255 
(1981); Bancroft v. Jagusch, Wyo., 
611 P.2d 819 (1980); DeHerrera v. 
Memorial Hospital of Carbon County, Wyo., 590 P.2d 1342 (1979). The 
nonmoving plaintiff in a malpractice action has no obligation to support his 
pleadings with affidavits or other evidence until the defendant physician 
establishes that no factual issues exist for trial. DeHerrera v. Memorial Hospital of Carbon 
County, supra; Rule 56(e), W.R.C.P.2

[¶27.]  Our holding in DeHerrera v. Memorial Hospital of Carbon 
County is particularly relevant to the discussion in the instant case, 
because the affidavits filed by both sides in that case were untimely and the 
defendant hospital and physician attempted to justify their summary judgment on 
the ground that the plaintiff had failed to produce proper evidence of 
malpractice. We reversed the summary judgment entered by the trial court and 
said:

"Appellees' reliance upon 
Keller v. Anderson, Wyo., 554 P.2d 1253 (1976)[3] for the proposition that the 
burden of proof or of going forward with reference to establishing issues of 
fact is initially upon the plaintiff in a malpractice suit is misplaced. The 
court there held that the plaintiff's affidavits were inadequate in addressing 
the ultimate facts of the case. The Keller case does not establish a 
different standard in the area of burden of proof or going forward for 
malpractice actions than otherwise exists. The general rule is as stated in Mealey v. City of Laramie, Wyo., 472 P.2d 787, 792 (1970):

"`It must be remembered 
that the burden is on the movant to demonstrate clearly that there was no 
genuine issue of material fact and that movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law, [citations]. This is so regardless of which party would have the 
burden of proof at the trial, [citations]. If, however, the movant has 
adequately supported the motion to the point of demonstrating that the issue 
tendered by the opposing party is frivolous or a sham, [citations] then "a 
burden," [citations] is cast upon the opposing party to come forward as required 
by Rule 56(e), W.R.C.P.'" 590 P.2d  at 1345.

[¶28.]  Harris v. Grizzle, upon which appellees 
rely, does not stand for a different rule. The moving physicians in that case 
filed supporting affidavits and did not rely solely on the absence of expert 
testimony by the plaintiff to justify summary judgment. We 
said:

"The motions for a 
summary judgment filed by the respective appellees [defendant physicians] were 
accompanied by affidavits adequate for summary judgment purposes. When these motions were filed, appellant 
became obligated to offer competent evidence that would be admissible at trial 
showing that there were genuine issues of material fact. Rule 56(e), 
W.R.C.P.; Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2739; DeHerrera v. Memorial Hospital of Carbon 
County, Wyo., 590 P.2d 1342 (1979); Keller v. Anderson, Wyo., 554 P.2d 1253 
(1976); Mealey v. City of Laramie, 
Wyo., 472 P.2d 787 (1970); Newton v. 
Misner, Wyo., 423 P.2d 648 (1967). Appellant failed to meet this burden." 
(Emphasis added and footnote omitted.) 625 P.2d  at 
749-750.

We went on to 
set out the rather substantial burden imposed on the plaintiff as a result of 
the appropriate supporting affidavits filed by the moving doctors. We said that 
in such case the plaintiff had to establish the accepted standard of care, the 
defendant's departure from that standard, and legal causation. 625 P.2d  at 751. 
In justifying our imposition of this burden, we observed that expert testimony 
is ordinarily required to establish negligence on the part of a physician in the 
care and treatment of his patients. We referred, in this connection, to the 
presumption of skillful treatment enjoyed by physicians at trial. 625 P.2d  at 
753. We did not intend to imply that a physician could rely on such presumption 
in support of a motion for summary judgment. Such a reading of Harris v. Grizzle would be inconsistent 
with our observation in DeHerrera v. 
Memorial Hospital of Carbon County, supra, 590 P.2d  at 1345, that courts 
proceed with caution in awarding summary judgments in malpractice 
actions:

"As said in Holl v. Talcott, Fla., 191 So. 2d 40, 46 
(1966):

"`* * * [S]ummary 
judgment procedures should be applied with special caution in negligence 
actions. [Citations]. This is particularly true in malpractice suits where, as 
here, the attending facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of the movants and 
the showing of negligence is generally dependent upon expert testimony as to the 
standard of care required and observed.'"

[¶29.]  In reviewing the propriety of summary 
judgments entered in medical malpractice cases in other jurisdictions, the 
courts have held that the nonmoving plaintiff has no obligation to present 
expert testimony at the pretrial stage, unless the movant establishes that no 
material questions of fact exist with respect to the allegations in the 
complaint. Felske v. Worland, 63 Or. 
App. 442, 664 P.2d 427 (1983); Smith v. 
Hoffman, Colo. App., 656 P.2d 1327 (1982); Holl v. Talcott, Fla., 191 So. 2d 40 
(1966). In Felske v. Worland, the 
defendant physician filed a motion for summary judgment supported by his 
deposition and portions of the plaintiff's deposition. The plaintiff submitted 
no expert testimony in opposition, and the trial court granted summary judgment. 
The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed, saying:

"The burden is on the 
party moving for summary judgment to establish that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
[Citations.] Defendant did not sustain that burden. In his deposition, defendant 
did not testify that his acts were consistent with the degree of care, skill and 
diligence which is used by ordinarily careful physicians in the same or similar 
circumstances in his or a similar community. [Citations.] The court should not 
have found that there was no issue of material fact as to defendant's 
negligence." (Footnotes omitted.) 664 P.2d  at 428-429.

[¶30.]  In Smith v. Hoffman, the defendant's 
affidavit in support of summary judgment gave the reasons why he had performed 
dental surgery but did not contradict the negligence claims asserted in the 
complaint. The plaintiff, in response, filed an expert's report which made no 
reference to any negligence by the defendant. The trial court reasoned that 
expert testimony was required to substantiate the plaintiff's negligence claims 
and granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. In reversing the 
judgment, the Colorado Court of Appeals noted that plaintiff's expert might 
testify favorably at trial, and, furthermore, the defendant himself could be 
called as an adverse witness to present expert testimony. The appellate court 
concluded

"* * * that in the 
circumstances here presented, plaintiff's failure, prior to trial, to produce a 
statement from an expert witness asserting that defendant's conduct was 
negligent is not sufficient to permit the dismissal of his complaint. Disputed 
material facts disclosed by the pleadings remain unresolved and must, therefore, 
await resolution by the appropriate finder of fact." 656 P.2d  at 
1329.

[¶31.]  The record on appeal in the case at bar 
contains no affidavits, depositions or other evidence purporting to refute the 
claims of negligence asserted by the Metzgers in their complaints. Appellees Dr. 
Kalke and the Medical Center for Women, as the parties moving for summary 
judgment, bore the burden of establishing that no genuine issues of material 
fact existed for resolution at trial. Absent a showing of specific facts 
probative of appellees' right to judgment, appellants had no obligation to 
support their complaint with expert testimony. The pleadings of the parties 
structure a question of fact as to appellees' negligence and summary judgment 
was improper.

[¶32.]  Reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

ROONEY, 
J., 
concurs in part and dissents in part.

1 The record contains a 
notice, filed by appellants, to take appellee Kalke's deposition. However, the 
record designated and filed on appeal does not contain Kalke's deposition, and 
the questions of whether and to what extent that deposition affects the 
propriety of the summary judgment are not before us.

2 Rule 56(e), W.R.C.P., 
provides in part:

"* * * When a motion for 
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule an adverse party 
may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not 
so respond summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against 
him."

3 In 
Keller 
v. Anderson, Wyo., 554 P.2d 1253 (1976), the plaintiffs in a medical malpractice 
action attempted to rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to defeat the 
defendant physicians' motions for summary judgment. The defendants had filed 
"factual and detailed" supporting affidavits to the effect that they had 
complied with the appropriate standards of care in the community. We observed 
that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was unavailable to a plaintiff in a 
medical malpractice case where the determination of alleged negligence was not 
within the common knowledge of man and held that the plaintiff had to counter 
the defendants' affidavits with expert evidence of the claimed negligence in 
order to withstand the motions for summary judgment.

ROONEY, Justice, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part.

[¶33.]  I concur with that part of the majority 
opinion reversing the summary judgment for appellee Kalke, but I dissent from 
that part of it reversing the summary judgment for appellees Hussain and the 
Medical Center for Women. I believe the trial court properly held that the 
action against appellees Hussain and the Medical Center for Women was barred by 
the statute of limitations.

[¶34.]  The trial court did not err in applying 
the statute of limitations set out in § 1-3-107(a), W.S. 1977,1 if appellants "discovered" the fact 
that appellees had failed to diagnose and properly treat appellant Carolyn 
Metzger's tumor [the "alleged act, error or omission" from which a cause of 
action arose] prior to May 12, 1982, one year after the last day of treatment by 
appellees.

[¶35.]  The majority opinion places the fact of discovery on July 15, 1982, when 
appellant Carolyn Metzger's treating physician in Lincoln, Nebraska, suggested 
to appellants' attorney that appellees' treatment had been wrongful. The 
attorney had been contacted by appellants in December 1981 with the request that 
he investigate the bases for legal action against 
appellees.

[¶36.]  The majority opinion does not question 
the propriety of the summary judgment on the ground that there is a question of 
fact as to the date of "discovery," but it decides that the "discovery" is at 
the time when it is learned that the treatment "was wrongful." I agree that 
there is no issue of fact to prevent a summary judgment. The factual situation 
is not controverted. The problem is only from the application of the facts to 
the requirements of the statute.

[¶37.]  To me the answer is simple. When the 
attorney was consulted in December 1981, appellants had reason to know the 
existence of the cause of action and the two-year statute of limitations applied 
without any extension due to "discovery" after the first year. The quotation in 
the majority opinion from Olson v. A.H. 
Robins Company, Inc., Wyo., 696 P.2d 1294, 1297 (1985) is 
pertinent:

"`Wyoming is a 
"discovery" state; therefore, the statute of limitations is triggered when the 
plaintiff knows or has reason to know the existence of the cause of action. Duke v. Housen, supra [589 P.2d 334 
(1979)]; Banner v. Town of Dayton, 
Wyo., 474 P.2d 300 (1970). * * *'" (Emphasis added.)

[¶38.]  Inconsistent with its holding, the 
majority opinion said that:

"In reaching this 
holding, we do not mean to imply that discovery of the alleged act under § 
1-3-107(a)(iv) necessarily includes discovery of the legal theories which 
support a claim. We expressly rejected the notion in Olson v. A.H. Robins Company, Inc., 696 P.2d  at 1299, that a plaintiff does not discover her cause of action until she 
discovers her legal rights. * * *"

[¶39.]  Appellants contacted the attorney to 
ascertain their legal rights. They believed at that time that someone had done 
something wrong.2 They had reason to know of the 
existence of a cause of action. Why else see an attorney? Again, as quoted in 
the majority opinion from Graham v. 
Hansen, 128 Cal. App. 3d 965, 180 Cal. Rptr. 604, 609 
(1982):

"`* * * If plaintiff 
believes because of injuries she has suffered that someone has done something 
wrong, such a fact is sufficient to alert a plaintiff "to the necessity for 
investigation and pursuit of her remedies." [Citations.]'"

[¶40.]  It is beyond the legislative intent to 
allow an attorney to obtain a six-month extension of the statute of limitations 
by delaying his investigation into the matter until a year after the alleged act 
by means of failing to obtain a statement during the first year after the 
alleged act from the treating physician to the effect that other physicians had 
failed to make a proper diagnosis. It was not the intent to place such control 
in the attorney.

[¶41.]  I do not disagree with the proposition 
supported by the cases cited in the majority opinion that the statute of 
limitations begins to run in malpractice cases, in light of the discovery rule, 
when the injured party discovers that the harm resulted from defendant's 
wrongdoing. The scenario of this case is that such discovery occurred in 
December of 1981 when surgery was performed on appellant Carolyn Metzger and 
appellant Charles Metzger engaged the services of an attorney in connection with 
legal action against appellees.

[¶42.]  I would affirm the summary judgment for 
appellees Hussain and the Medical Center for Women and reverse the summary 
judgment for Kalke.

1 Section 1-3-107(a), W.S. 
1977, provides in pertinent part:

"(a) A cause of action 
arising from an act, error or omission in the rendering of licensed or certified 
professional or health care services shall be brought within the greater of the 
following times:

"(i) Within two (2) years 
of the date of the alleged act, error or omission, except that a cause of action 
may be instituted not more than two (2) years after discovery of the alleged 
act, error or omission, if the claimant can establish that the alleged act, 
error or omission was:

"(A) Not reasonably 
discoverable within a two (2) year period; or

"(B) The claimant failed 
to discover the alleged act, error or omission within the two (2) year period 
despite the exercise of due diligence;

* * * * * 
*

"(iv) If under paragraph 
(i) or (ii) of this subsection, the alleged act, error or omission is discovered 
during the second year of the two (2) year period from the date of the act, 
error or omission, the period for commencing a lawsuit shall be extended by six 
(6) months."

2 The actual determination 
as to whether or not the act, error or omission was wrongful would not occur 
until the jury returned its verdict. The very purpose of the lawsuit is to make 
that determination.