Title: State ex rel. Soley v. Dorrell

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO                               
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Thomas J. Moyer.                                                                 
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The State ex rel. Soley, Appellant, v. Dorrell, Judge, Appellee.                 
[Cite as State ex rel. Soley v. Dorrell (1994),      Ohio                        
St.3d     .]                                                                     
Courts -- Trial court has authority to weigh the evidence and                    
decide the applicable law on the question of whether a marriage                  
between first cousins is void ab initio.                                         
     (Nos. 93-2182 and 93-2192 Submitted March 29, 1994 --                       
Decided June 29, 1994.)                                                          
     Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Lucas County, No.                      
L-93-232.                                                                        
     On August 2, 1993, appellant, R. Stephen Soley, filed a                     
complaint seeking writs of prohibition and mandamus in the                       
Court of Appeals for Lucas County.  Appellant stated, and                        
appellee, Judge Robert Dorrell, admitted in his answer, that                     
appellant is the defendant in a divorce action pending before                    
appellee; that appellant claims that he and the plaintiff in                     
that case, Elizabeth Soley, are first cousins "by blood" and                     
that appellant filed a pro se answer, an unspecified motion,                     
and a motion to dismiss in the divorce action with evidence                      
that he and Elizabeth are first cousins.                                         
     Appellant requested a writ prohibiting appellee from                        
exercising further jurisdiction in the divorce case and another                  
compelling appellee to vacate orders previously issued in the                    
case.  On September 2, 1993, the court of appeals denied the                     
writs, holding that appellant had failed to establish a right                    
to have the marriage declared void ab initio and implying that                   
appeal was an adequate remedy at law.  On September 13, 1993,                    
appellant filed a Civ. R. 60(B)(1) motion for relief from                        
judgment, attaching his documentary evidence that he and                         
Elizabeth are first cousins and claiming that his failure to do                  
so before was "inadvertence."  On September 30, 1993, the court                  
of appeals denied the motion, stating that appellant "failed to                  
support by authority his proposition that a marriage between                     
first cousins is void ab initio" and that he "failed to show                     
that he did not have an adequate remedy at law because he                        
failed to allege any damage to him not addressable by an action                  
for money damages."                                                              
     On October 1, 1993, appellant appealed the September 2                      
decision (case No. 93-2182); on October 4, he appealed the                       
September 30 decision (case No. 93-2192).  On December 15,                       
1993, this court consolidated the two appeals.                                   
     On December 1, 1993, appellant filed his merit brief.  On                   
December 23, 1993, appellee filed a Civ. R. 12(B)(6) motion to                   
dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be                      
granted.  On January 3, 1994, appellant filed a memorandum                       
contra and motion to strike the motion to dismiss.  Appellee                     
has filed no merit brief.                                                        
     The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of                     
right.                                                                           
                                                                                 
     Crandall, Pheils & Wisniewski and David R. Pheils, Jr.,                     
for appellant.                                                                   
     Anthony G. Pizza, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney,                        
Bertrand R. Puligandla and Jeffery B. Johnston, Assistant                        
Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.                                             
                                                                                 
     Per Curiam.  For the following reasons, we affirm the                       
judgment of the court of appeals.                                                
     Appellee has filed a Civ. R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss                     
for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.                     
As appellant points out in his motion to strike, such a motion                   
has no place in an appeal.  Therefore, we grant the motion to                    
strike.  See Civ. R. 1(C)(1).  However, we treat the memorandum                  
in support of the motion to dismiss as a brief on the merits.                    
     For a writ of prohibition to issue, a court must find that                  
the respondent is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial                   
authority, that the exercise of such power is unauthorized by                    
law, and that relator has no other adequate remedy at law.                       
State ex rel. Judson v. Spahr (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 111, 515                     
N.E.2d 911.  The first element is clearly present; the other                     
two are disputed.                                                                
     The court of appeals first held that appellant had not                      
established, by clear precedent, that a marriage of first                        
cousins is void ab initio.  While R.C. 3101.01 limits the right                  
of marriage to those "not nearer in kin than second cousins,"                    
no statute or decision of this court states that a marriage                      
between first cousins is void ab initio.  Therefore, the trial                   
court has authority to weigh the evidence and decide the                         
applicable law for itself.  Appellant requests this court to                     
short-circuit this process with a writ of prohibition and                        
decide that first-cousin marriages are void ab initio in this                    
state.  Clearly, appellant does not seek a determination about                   
a court's jurisdiction or authority; he seeks a decision on an                   
unsettled aspect of the law of marriage.  However, a trial                       
court must have authority to determine the weight and                            
sufficiency of the evidence establishing the relationship.                       
Moreover, prohibition does not lie to prevent a merely                           
erroneous decision by the trial court.  Kelley v. State ex rel.                  
Gellner (1916), 94 Ohio St. 331, 114 N.E. 255, paragraph three                   
of the syllabus.  Accordingly, we hold that appellee has                         
authority to determine the law of marriage on this point, and                    
thus is not acting without authority for which prohibition will                  
intervene.                                                                       
     Because we hold that appellee is authorized by law to                       
exercise judicial authority, the issue of adequate remedy to                     
recover interim alimony payments is moot.                                        
                                Judgment affirmed.                               
     Moyer, C.J., A.W. Sweeney, Douglas, Wright and F.E.                         
Sweeney, JJ., concur.                                                            
     Pfeifer, J., dissents.                                                      
     Resnick, J., not participating.