Title: MARKSTEIN v. COUNTRYSIDE I, L.L.C.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

MARKSTEIN v. COUNTRYSIDE I, L.L.C.2003 WY 12277 P.3d 389Case Number: 02-214Decided: 09/26/2003
April 
Term, A.D. 2003

 

 

 

KENNETH 
W. MARKSTEIN and CAROLE

MARKSTEIN,

 

Appellants(Plaintiffs) 
,

 

v.

                                                                                                

COUNTRYSIDE 
I, L.L.C., a Wyoming limited

liability 
company; COUNTRYSIDE, L.L.C., a

Wyoming 
limited liability company; JOHN C.

THORNTON; 
THUNDER HOLDINGS, LLC, a

Wyoming 
limited liability company; FINIS F.

CONNOR 
and JULIE A. CONNOR, as Trustees of

the 
CONNOR FAMILY TRUST; JOHN R. TOZZI

and 
GEORGENE M. TOZZI, as Trustees of the

TOZZI 
FAMILY TRUST; KENNETH H. TAYLOR,

JR., 
as Trustee of the AGREEMENT OF TRUST OF

KENNETH 
H. TAYLOR, JR.; G. DORROS FAMILY

LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP, a Wisconsin  
limited

partnership; 
TARGHEE PINES, L.C., an Idaho

limited 
liability company; JOSEPH KRAUS, IV; THE

JACKSON 
HOLE LAND TRUST, a Wyoming non-

profit 
corporation; and LASALLE BANK NATIONAL

ASSOCIATION, 
an Illinois banking association,

 

Appellees(Defendants) 
.

 

 

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Teton County

The 
Honorable Dan Spangler, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellants:

R. 
Michael Mullikin and Carolyn L. Null-Anderson of Mullikin, Larson & Swift, 
Jackson, WY; and Harvey S. Schochet,  
and Andrew A. Bassak of Steefel, Levitt & Weiss, San Francisco, 
CA.  Argument by Messrs. Mullikin 
and Schochet.

 

Representing 
Appellees:

David 
F. DeFazio of DeFazio Law Office, Jackson, WY; Gerald R. Mason of Mason & 
Mason, PC, Pinedale, WY; Bret F. King of King & King, Jackson, WY; Peter J. 
Young of Schwartz, Bon, Walker & Studer, LLC, Casper, WY; and Joe M. Teig of 
Holland & Hart, Jackson, WY.  
Argument by Messrs. Mason and DeFazio.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

 

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      This 
is an appeal from summary judgment granted against appellants Kenneth W. 
Markstein and Carole Markstein (collectively the Marksteins) in an action 
concerning fishing and club use rights granted along the Snake River near 
Wilson, Wyoming.  We affirm in part, 
reverse in part, and remand.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      The Marksteins 
set forth very lengthy and broadly stated issues on appeal that may be 
summarized as follows:

 

1.  Did 
the district court err in disregarding the effect of the bankruptcy court's 
orders?

 

2.  Did 
the district court err in not finding a breach of the Stipulation Re License 
Claims?

 

3.  Did 
the district court err in concluding that the fishing license agreements did not 
create an interest in real property that ran with the land but, rather, were 
revocable licenses that were terminated upon purchase of 
land?

 

4.  Did 
the district court err in finding a proper revocation of the Marksteins' club 
use rights?

 

5.  Did 
the district court err in its finding of bona fide purchaser for value status 
under the Wyoming Recording Act?

 

Appellees 
John C. Thornton; Countryside, L.L.C.; Countryside I, L.L.C.; Thunder Holdings, 
LLC; John R. Tozzi and Georgene M. Tozzi, as trustees of the Tozzi Family Trust; 
Targhee Pines, L.C.; The Jackson Hole Land Trust; and LaSalle Bank National 
Association (collectively appellees) do not specifically set forth a statement 
of issues on appeal.  However, 
appellees address those issues raised by the Marksteins and raise the following 
additional issues:

 

1.  Did 
the trustee in bankruptcy reject the Marksteins' fishing license and club use 
agreements as executory contracts in the bankruptcy case?

 

2.  Was 
the recording of the license agreement for Parcel 2 void as a violation of the 
bankruptcy automatic stay provision?

 

3.  To 
the extent that the fishing license agreements are easements, are they null and 
void under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-1-141 for failure to provide a sufficient 
legal description?

 

 

FACTS1

 

[¶3]      In 1981, 
Rivermeadows Associates, Ltd. (RMA) developed Crescent H Ranch, a commercially 
operated guest ranch located along the Snake River.  Thereafter, Fish Creek Meadows, Inc. 
(FCM) developed 186 acres adjacent to Crescent H Ranch (Fish Creek Meadows 
Property). 

 

[¶4]      In 1993, the Marksteins 
purchased Parcel 1 of the Fish Creek Meadows Property, in part, acquiring 
fishing and club rights on the Crescent H Ranch.  No memoranda for the fishing and club 
rights regarding Parcel 1 were recorded.  
Nevertheless, terms of the Parcel 1 purchase provided that if Parcel 1 
was split, duplicate fishing and club rights would immediately issue with that 
newly split parcel.  In April of 
1994, the Marksteins completed a lot split of Parcel 1. 

 

[¶5]      On January 16, 
1995, RMA granted FCM fishing rights to the Crescent H Ranch, which was 
appurtenant to Parcel 2 of the Fish Creek Meadows Property.  On January 17, 1995, RMA filed for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy with RMA operating as a debtor in possession until a 
trustee in bankruptcy was appointed for the bankruptcy estate in July of 
1995.  Later that same day, RMA 
recorded a Memorandum of License Agreement regarding fishing rights involving 
Parcel 2.2  Subsequently in 1995, FCM also filed for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 

 

[¶6]      On November 12, 
1996, the trustee in bankruptcy for the RMA bankruptcy estate and appellee John 
C. Thornton (Thornton) entered into a purchase agreement concerning the Crescent 
H Ranch.  This agreement provided 
that the sale was subject to all existing fishing and club use rights relating 
to the Crescent H Ranch, except to the extent such rights were "avoided" in the 
bankruptcy.  On that same date, 
Thornton assigned all his rights and obligations under the purchase agreement to 
appellee Countryside, L.L.C.  On 
December 30, 1996, appellant Kenneth A. Markstein purchased Parcel 2 of the Fish 
Creek Meadows Property through the trustee of the FCM bankruptcy estate.  No memorandum for club rights concerning 
Parcel 2 was recorded although such rights were again apparently extended 
pursuant to the purchase.  

 

[¶7]      In January 1997, 
the trustee for the RMA bankruptcy estate filed an avoidance action seeking to, 
in part, avoid the Marksteins' fishing rights.  On May 12, 1997, that same trustee along 
with Countryside, L.L.C. requested by motion that the bankruptcy court approve 
the proposed purchase of the Crescent H Ranch.  The Marksteins objected to these 
motions.  On June 10, 1997, the 
Marksteins and others entered into a Stipulation Re License Claims with the 
trustee of the RMA bankruptcy estate and Countryside, L.L.C. wherein 
Countryside, L.L.C. agreed that any challenge it might wish to assert to the 
fishing and club use rights would be limited to the "claims asserted by the 
trustee" in the avoidance action.  
On June 13, 1997, the bankruptcy court approved the sale of the 
Rivermeadows property to Countryside, L.L.C., but ruled that the sale "shall not 
be free and clear of the interests of those fishing license and use agreement 
holders."  Countryside, L.L.C. 
assigned its rights and obligations under this sale to appellee Countryside I, 
L.L.C. on June 25, 1997.  The 
Stipulation Re License Claims was approved by the bankruptcy court on July 21, 
1997.  

 

[¶8]      On February 25, 
1998, the bankruptcy court dismissed the avoidance action filed by the RMA 
bankruptcy trustee seeking to avoid the Marksteins' fishing and club use 
rights.  Nevertheless, on April 2, 
1998, Countryside I, L.L.C. sent a letter to the Marksteins disavowing their 
fishing and club use rights. 

 

[¶9]      On November 23, 
1998, the trustee for the RMA bankruptcy estate filed his Third Amended 
Liquidating Plan of Reorganization ("Plan of Reorganization").  On December 3, 1998, the bankruptcy 
court entered its order confirming the Plan of Reorganization.  

 

[¶10]   This action was filed in district 
court by the Marksteins seeking to enforce their fishing and club use 
rights.  Ultimately, cross-motions 
for summary judgment were filed by the parties, with the district court entering 
summary judgment in favor of appellees.  
This appeal followed.  

 

 

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 

[¶11]   Our standard of review in summary 
judgment cases is well established.  

 

            
Summary judgment motions are determined under the fol­lowing language 
from W.R.C.P. 56(c):

 

The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law.
 

            
The purpose of summary judgment is to dispose of suits before trial that 
present no genuine issue of material fact.  
Moore v. Kiljander, 604 P.2d 204, 207 (Wyo. 1979).  Summary judgment is a drastic remedy 
designed to pierce the formal alle­gations and reach the merits of the 
controversy, but only where no genuine issue of material fact is present.  Weaver v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of 
Wyoming, 609 P.2d 984, 986 (Wyo. 1980).  A fact is material if proof of that fact 
would have the effect of establishing or refuting one of the essential elements 
of a cause of action or defense asserted by the parties.  Schuler v. Commu­nity First Nat. 
Bank, 999 P.2d 1303, 1304 (Wyo. 2000).  
The summary judgment movant has the initial burden of establishing by 
admissible evidence a prima facie case; once this is accom­plished, the 
burden shifts and the opposing party must present specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue of material fact.  
Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 710 (Wyo. 
1987); Gennings v. First Nat. Bank of Thermopolis, 654 P.2d 154, 156 
(Wyo. 1982).

 

            
This Court reviews a summary judgment in the same light as the district 
court, using the same materials and following the same standards.  Unicorn Drilling, Inc. v. Heart 
Mountain Irr. Dist., 3 P.3d 857, 860 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Gray v. Norwest 
Bank Wyoming, N.A., 984 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Wyo. 1999)).  The record is reviewed, however, from 
the vantage point most favorable to the party who opposed the motion, and this 
Court will give that party the benefit of all favorable infer­ences that may 
fairly be drawn from the record.  
Garcia v. Lawson, 928 P.2d 1164, 1166 (Wyo. 1996). 

 

McGee 
v. Caballo Coal Co., 
2003 WY 68, ¶6, 69 P.3d 908, ¶6 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Garnett v. Coyle, 
2001 WY 94, ¶¶3-5, 33 P.3d 114, ¶¶3-5 (Wyo. 2001)).  We also recognized in Mize v. North 
Big Horn Hosp. Dist., 931 P.2d 229, 232 (Wyo. 1997) that little mystery 
remains concerning our willingness to dispose of cases via summary judgment, 
provided there is no genuine issue of material fact and the law clearly entitles 
the party to prevail.   

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

Res 
Judicata/Collateral Estoppel/Judicial Estoppel

 

[¶12]   Initially, the Marksteins state 
that the district court disregarded the bankruptcy court order authorizing the 
sale of the property and the order approving the Stipulation Re License 
Claims.  According to the 
Marksteins, these court orders established the terms and conditions of the 
Crescent H Ranch purchase and that Thornton and his successors purchased the 
ranch subject to the granted fishing and club use rights. Thus, the Marksteins 
assert that the bankruptcy court orders have the effect of a final judgment 
regarding the validity of the fishing and club use rights.  The Marksteins also contend that the 
district court erred in not finding that Thornton and his successors had 
breached the Stipulation Re License Claims. 

 

[¶13]   In replying to these arguments, 
appellees claim that the decision of the bankruptcy court to dismiss the 
avoidance action did not resolve the validity of the fishing and club use 
rights.  Rather, the bankruptcy 
court simply dismissed this proceeding, finding that it was not 
justiciable.  Thus, appellees 
conclude this order does not constitute a decision on the merits and, although 
Thornton and Countryside, L.L.C. may have agreed to be bound by the decision of 
the bankruptcy court concerning the fishing and club use rights involved in the 
avoidance action, the bankruptcy court never reached a decision on this 
issue.  Appellees also argue that 
the sale order entered by the bankruptcy court specifically provided that 
Countryside, L.L.C. purchased Crescent H Ranch free of any RMA obligations, and 
Countryside, L.L.C. never agreed to accept assignment of the rights asserted 
absent a bankruptcy court determination that the rights were enforceable. 

 

[¶14]   Upon our review of the bankruptcy 
court's order dismissing the adversary proceeding, we agree that such order did 
not resolve the validity or invalidity of the fishing and club use rights.  That order discloses that the bankruptcy 
court recognized that the adversary complaint filed by the RMA bankruptcy 
trustee sought to avoid or set aside fishing and club use rights on the Crescent 
H Ranch, including those rights asserted by the Marksteins.3  However, after acknowledging this fact, 
the bankruptcy court concluded that because the trustee had sold his avoidance 
powers along with the Crescent H Ranch to Thornton and his successors, there was 
no benefit to the bankruptcy estate in determining the claims asserted.  The bankruptcy court 
stated:

 

[The 
trustee] is exercising his avoidance powers to seek relief which will have no 
effect on the estate and which treats similarly situated lot owners 
differently.  Yet, he has no 
cognizable interest in the outcome.  
Any ruling on the validity of the lot owners' rights will not control or 
alter the ultimate result, and will not change the circumstances of the 
parties.

 

Thus, 
the bankruptcy court concluded that resolution of this issue effectively 
disposed of the adversary complaint in its entirety.   

 

[¶15]   In Amoco Prod. Co. v. Board of 
County Comm'rs, 2002 WY 154, ¶12, 55 P.3d 1246, ¶12 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting 
Eklund v. PRI Environmental, Inc., 2001 WY 55, ¶¶15-20, 25 P.3d 511, 
¶¶15-20 (Wyo. 2001)), we recognized that res judicata and collateral estoppel 
are related but distinct concepts.  
We noted that res judicata bars the relitigation of previously litigated 
claims or causes of action and that four factors are examined to determine 
whether the doctrine of res judicata applies:  (1) identity in parties; 
(2) identity in subject matter; (3) the issues are the same and relate 
to the subject matter; and (4) the capacities of the persons are identical 
in reference to both the subject matter and the issues between them. Collateral 
estoppel bars relitigation of previously litigated issues and involves an 
analysis of four similar factors:  
(1) whether the issue decided in the prior adjudication was 
identical with the issue presented in the present action; (2) whether the 
prior adjudication resulted in a judgment on the merits; (3) whether the 
party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity 
with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) whether the party against 
whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate 
the issue in the prior proceeding. 

 

[¶16]   As in both Amoco and 
Eklund, the doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable to the bankruptcy 
court's order because res judicata applies to claims or causes of action.  The adjudication of the adversary 
complaint by the bankruptcy court involved a claim asserted by the RMA 
bankruptcy trustee against the Marksteins and others, while this action concerns 
a claim by the Marksteins against Thornton and his successors.  While the two involve the same fishing 
and club use rights and the Crescent H Ranch, they are separate and distinct 
claims.  In addition, we conclude 
that the doctrine of collateral estoppel cannot be applied in this instance 
because the bankruptcy court did not make a determination on the merits of the 
adversary complaint. 

 

[¶17]   However, we reach a different 
conclusion than the district court upon our review of the other relevant 
documents involved in both the RMA bankruptcy and this action.  Looking first at the purchase agreement 
entered into by the trustee of the RMA bankruptcy estate and Thornton concerning 
the sale of the Crescent H Ranch, it discloses that the transaction clearly 
included the sale of the trustees' avoidance powers.  The purchase agreement provides for this 
transfer by stating that the transfer would include:

 

1.1.6  Avoidance 
Powers.  All rights and power of the 
Trustee, whether under state law or the Bankruptcy Code (including, but not 
limited to, Sections 544 through 553 of the Bankruptcy Code), to set aside or 
avoid any interest in the Property. 

 

That 
document also goes on to define permitted exceptions regarding title as 
follows:

 

3.1  Title: 
Permitted Exceptions.  The Debtor 
shall transfer all of its right, title and interest in the Property free and 
clear of all liens, claims and encumbrances pursuant to (a) section 363(f) of 
the Bankruptcy Code or (b) a confirmed plan of reorganization, subject to the 
exceptions, restrictions, liens and encumbrances as may be agreed upon by the 
parties following delivery of the Title Commitment referred to in Section 3.2, 
which shall then be attached hereto as Exhibit 3.1 (the "Permitted 
Exceptions").

 

[¶18]   Exhibit 3.1 to the purchase 
agreement provides, in pertinent part, that the fishing and use licenses could 
constitute permitted exceptions specifying:

 

Fishing 
Licenses

 

30.  Fishing 
licenses, use agreements, or other rights to use or possess the Property which 
cannot be set aside or avoided by the Debtor under federal bankruptcy law, 
applicable state law, or rejected as executory contracts under federal 
bankruptcy law.

 

[¶19]   Therefore, the purchase agreement 
unambiguously expresses Thornton's agreement to abide by the fishing and club 
use licenses issued involving the Crescent H Ranch that were not set aside, 
avoided, or rejected by the RMA bankruptcy trustee.  This intention is also further 
enunciated in the Stipulation Re License Claims entered into between the trustee 
of the RMA bankruptcy, Countryside, L.L.C., as the successor in interest of 
Thornton, the Marksteins, and Jon M. and Arlene M. Malinski, who also asserted 
fishing and club rights concerning the Crescent H Ranch.  This document clarifies 
that:

 

1.  The 
sale of the Rivermeadows property by the Trustee to Countryside or any other 
buyer shall be made subject to, and not free and clear of, the License 
Claimants' rights and entitlements with respect to their five fishing license 
and use agreement claims.

 

2.  Notwithstanding 
paragraph 1 above, the License Claimants' fishing license and use 
agreement rights and entitlements shall be subject to the claims asserted by the 
Trustee in the [adversary] Complaint.

 

(Emphasis 
added.)  This stipulation was 
approved by the bankruptcy court.  

 

[¶20]   The order entered by the bankruptcy 
court authorizing the sale of Crescent H Ranch directed that the sale 
"shall not be free and clear of the interests of those fishing license and 
use agreement holders identified in the Sale Motion."  In addition, the bankruptcy court 
ordered that:

 

Upon 
the Closing (as defined in the Purchase Agreement) title to the Property shall 
vest in Countryside or its assignees free and clear of all such liens, 
interests, claims, claims of co-ownership or community property, security 
interests, encumbrances, charges, liabilities, rights of parties to pending 
litigation relating to or arising in connection with the Property, prior 
assignments or interests of any kind, nature or description whatsoever 
(but not the interests of those fishing license and use agreement holders 
identified in the Sale Motion).[4]  

 

(Emphasis 
added.)  The order also particularly 
provided that:  "The provisions of 
the Purchase Agreement and this Order shall be binding upon and inure to the 
benefit of the parties to the Purchase Agreement and their respective successors 
and assigns."  

 

[¶21]   Finally, a reading of the Plan of 
Reorganization evidences that the trustee carved out an exception from the 
general "rejection" provision found at § 9.01 of the proposed plan with 
respect to fishing and club use agreements.  Section 9.03 of the Plan of 
Reorganization states:

 

9.03  Exclusion 
of Fishing License, Club Amenity, and Similar Agreements.  Nothing contained in Section 9.01 of the 
Plan shall be interpreted or construed as affecting or otherwise altering any 
rights, duties, and obligations arising out of, or in connection with, any 
prepetition fishing license, club amenity, club use, or other agreement that 
granted (a) fishing and access rights to the riparian lands formerly owned and 
occupied by the Debtor, and/or (b) rights of access to, and to the use of, the 
riparian lands and the amenities connected with the real property commonly known 
as the Crescent H Guest Ranch and formerly owned and occupied by the Debtor, 
including, without limitation, those rights, duties, and obligations arising out 
of any agreements under which . . . Kenneth W. Markstein and Carole Markstein . 
. . claim to have fishing, riparian use, and/or guest service rights to the real 
property that was conveyed and transferred to Countryside pursuant to the 
Countryside Sale Order.

 

Section 
9.03 goes on to explicitly state that the fishing license and club use 
agreements were not to be treated as executory contracts by 
providing:

 

The 
Plan does not classify or treat any fishing license, club amenity, club use, or 
other similar types of agreements as executory contracts and expressly disclaims 
any characterization of any such licenses or agreements as executory 
contracts.

 

The 
bankruptcy court later confirmed the Plan of Reorganization.  

 

[¶22]   The immediately-referenced 
documents establish that Thornton and his successor Countryside, L.L.C. entities 
purchased Crescent H Ranch subject to the fishing and club use rights unless set 
aside, avoided, or rejected by RMA in its bankruptcy.  RMA never set aside, avoided, or 
rejected the fishing and club use rights possessed by the Marksteins.  The fact that RMA never set aside, 
avoided, or rejected the fishing and club use rights possessed by the Marksteins 
demonstrate that the bankruptcy proceedings simply preserved the status quo  and support the application of both the 
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.

 

[¶23]   As we noted in Amoco, at ¶12 
(quoting Eklund) the application of res judicata to those situations 
where a plaintiff attempts to bring the same claim in a subsequent action 
against the same or different defendants has a logical basis:  It encourages resolution of the 
plaintiff's claims in a single action, and it forces 
parties to abide by their agreements.  It is also logical that this same rule 
of law be followed in a circumstance such as this, where Thornton and his 
successors specifically agreed that they would honor the fishing and club use 
rights concerning the purchase of the Crescent H Ranch that were not set aside, 
avoided, or rejected by RMA.  RMA 
never formally set aside, avoided, or rejected the fishing and club use rights 
held by the Marksteins.  
Notwithstanding, Countryside I, L.L.C. sent a letter to the Marksteins 
disavowing their fishing and club use rights, in essence forcing the Marksteins' 
to file this action seeking to enforce their fishing and club use rights.  

 

[¶24]   In further discussing the 
Eklund decision in our Amoco opinion, we also identified that such 
positioning by a party is inherently unfair.  Specifically, we acknowledged with 
approval those cases cited by Eklund that set forth authority for the 
application of the doctrine of res judicata to consent judgments and 
settlements.  See 
Jefferson v. Greater Anchorage Area Borough, 451 P.2d 730 (Alaska 1969); 
Clark v. Haas Group, Inc., 953 F.2d 1235 (10th Cir. 1992); and In re 
Laing, 31 F.3d 1050 (10th Cir. 1994).  
Amoco, at ¶12.  The 
actions taken by Thornton and his successors demand the same result.  

 

[¶25]   We even went further in our 
analysis in Amoco, at ¶12, to address the effect of collateral estoppel 
on settlements or consent judgments.  
Therein, we established that normally issue preclusion (collateral 
estoppel) does not attach unless it is clearly shown that the parties intended 
that the issue be foreclosed in other litigation and that, in most 
circumstances, it is recognized that consent agreements are usually intended to 
preclude any further litigation on the claim presented (res judicata) but are 
not intended to preclude further litigation on any of the issues presented 
(collateral estoppel).  Hence, we 
determined that consent judgments will ordinarily support claim preclusion (res 
judicata) but not issue preclusion (collateral estoppel).  Nevertheless, we recognized an exception 
to the general rule that the doctrine of collateral estoppel should be applied 
when settlement agreements that clearly express the intention of the parties to 
be bound in further proceedings are involved.  Amoco, at ¶12 (citing 18 Charles 
Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Jurisdiction § 4443, at 382-85 (1981); Linder v. Missoula 
County, 824 P.2d 1004, 1006-07 (Mont. 1992); and Hofsommer v. Hofsommer 
Excavating, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 380, 385 (N.D. 1992)).  

 

[¶26]   Here, the exception to the general 
rule must be applied.  Thornton and 
his successors in interest agreed to be bound by the fishing and club use rights 
granted the Marksteins with respect to the purchase of the Crescent H Ranch if 
they were not set aside, avoided, or rejected by RMA.  RMA never formally set aside, avoided, 
or rejected the fishing and club use rights held by the 
Marksteins.

 

[¶27]   We identified in Amoco, at 
¶17, that the application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel requires a 
similar result. 

 

            
In Cross v. Berg Lumber Co., 7 P.3d 922, 930 (Wyo. 2000) (citing 
Allen v. Allen, 550 P.2d 1137, 1142 (Wyo. 1976)), we stated that judicial 
estoppel is sometimes referred to as a doctrine which estops a party to play 
fast and loose with the courts or to trifle with judicial proceedings.  It is an expression of the maxim that 
one cannot blow hot and cold in the same breath.  A party will just not be allowed to 
maintain inconsistent positions in judicial proceedings.  Further, we enunciated that judicial 
estoppel requires that "where a man is successful in the position taken in the 
first proceeding, then that position rises to the dignity of conclusiveness." 
Cross, at 930 (citing Erhart v. Flint Engineering & Const., 
939 P.2d 718, 724 (Wyo. 1997); Hatten Realty Co. v. Baylies, 42 Wyo. 69, 
290 P. 561, 566 (1930)).

 

[¶28]   Again, the undisputed evidence 
establishes that Thornton and his successors agreed to be obligated by the 
fishing and club use rights granted to the Marksteins with respect to the 
purchase of the Crescent H Ranch unless these rights were set aside, avoided, or 
rejected by RMA.  Yet, RMA never 
formally set aside, avoided, or rejected those rights held by the Marksteins.5

 

Easement/License

 

[¶29]   The Marksteins contend that the 
district court improperly concluded that the fishing and club use agreements 
constituted licenses, not easements.  
Rather, the Marksteins argue that the fishing license and club use 
agreements created an interest in real property that ran with the land, not 
revocable licenses that were terminated upon the purchase of the land.  In particular, they complain that the 
district court's ruling belies the plain language of the agreements concerning 
the fishing and club use rights making it clear that these rights were perpetual 
and could not be terminated upon transfer of the Crescent H Ranch.  

 

            
A license is a privilege to do certain acts of a temporary character on 
the land of another which is revocable at the will of a licensor unless a 
definite time has been specified, or unless it is coupled with an interest.  Coumas v. Transcontinental 
Garage, 68 Wyo. 99, 230 P.2d 748, 758 (1951).  A license does not give any interest in 
the land, but means that one who possesses a license is not a trespasser.  Anthony Wilkinson Live Stock Co. v. 
McIlquam, 14 Wyo. 209, 226-27, 83 P. 364, 369 (1905); Metcalf v. 
Hart, 3 Wyo. 513, 527, 27 P. 900, 905 (1891).  A license may be created by parol, a 
writing, or can be implied from the acts of the parties, from their relations, 
and from usage and custom. Kendrick v. Healy, 27 Wyo. 123, 148, 192 P. 601, 610 (1920).  Usually, an 
implied license is terminable at will.  
See Coach House Restaurant, Inc. v. Coach and Six Restaurants, 
Inc., 934 F.2d 1551, 1563 (11th Cir. 1991); cf. Sarfaty v. 
Evangelist, 142 A.D.2d 995, 530 N.Y.S.2d 417, 418 (4 Dept. 1988) (unless the 
conduct of the licensor makes it inequitable to permit licensor to revoke 
license).

 

Sammons 
v. American Auto. Ass'n, 
912 P.2d 1103, 1105-06 (Wyo. 1996).

 

[¶30]   We also stated in Baker v. 
Pike, 2002 WY 34, ¶11, 41 P.3d 537, ¶11 (Wyo. 2002):

 

            
Generally, an easement is a "nonpossessory interest in land of 
another."   Jon W. Bruce and 
James W. Ely, Jr., The Law of Easements and Licenses in Land § 1:1 (2001) 
(hereinafter Bruce and Ely). An easement grants the holder the right to a 
limited use or enjoyment over another's property. Mueller v. Hoblyn, 887 P.2d 500, 504 (Wyo. 1994).  An 
easement differs from a license in that a license generally grants permission to 
do something on another's property.  
Bruce and Ely at § 1:4.  
Since permission to do something can be easily rescinded, the landowner 
usually can terminate the license. Id. Alternatively, easements are 
generally irrevocable interests in land.  
Id.

 

[¶31]   In Hasvold v. Park County School 
Dist. No. 6, 2002 WY 65, ¶13, 45 P.3d 635, ¶13 (Wyo. 2002), we also 
recognized:

 

            
An easement is defined as "an interest in land which entitles the 
easement holder to a limited use or enjoyment over another person's property." 
Mueller v. Hoblyn, 887 P.2d 500, 504 (Wyo. 1994); Restatement of 
Property § 450(a) (1944).  In 
construing an easement, we seek to determine the intent of the parties to the 
easement.  R.C.R., Inc. v. 
Rainbow Canyon, Inc., 978 P.2d 581, 586 (Wyo. 1999). See also Restatement 
Third, Property (Servitudes) § 4.1 (2000).  We begin by attempting to glean the 
meaning of the easement from its language.  
R.C.R., Inc., 978 P.2d  at 586; Steil v. Smith, 901 P.2d 395, 396 (Wyo. 1995). If the language of the easement is clear and unambiguous, 
we interpret the easement as a matter of law, without resorting to the use of 
extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intent. Id. If, however, the 
language is ambiguous, then the court looks to extrinsic evidence to ascertain 
the parties' intent.  R.C.R., 
Inc., 978 P.2d  at 586; Edgcomb v. Lower Valley Power and Light, Inc., 
922 P.2d 850, 855 (Wyo. 1996).

 

Later, 
in Baker 
v. Pike, 
¶20, we stated:

 

In 
determining whether an easement or a license exists, the critical factor to 
consider is the parties' intent, identified by the manner in which the right was 
created, the nature of the right created, the duration of the right, the amount 
of consideration given for the right, and whether there is a reservation of 
power to revoke the right.  Bruce 
and Ely, supra, at § 1:5.

 

In 
addition, in Rehnberg v. Hirshberg, 2003 WY 21, ¶9, 
64 P.3d 115, ¶9 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Sowerwine v. Keith, 997 P.2d 1018, 
1020 (Wyo. 2000)), a case wherein we recently were called to review a real 
estate contract deed which involved fishing rights, we elaborated 
that:

 

            
Our rules of contract construction are well known.  First, we do not need to construe 
contracts that are not ambiguous.  
Evans v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 2001 WY 110, ¶9, 34 P.3d 284, 286 
(Wyo. 2001).

 

            
Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law. O'Quinn 
Enterprises [v. Central Wyoming Regional Water System Joint Powers 
Board], 975 P.2d [1062], 1064 [(Wyo. 1999)].  When deciding whether a contract is 
ambiguous, we endeavor to determine the intention of the parties.  Wolter [v. Equitable Resources 
Energy Company, Western Region], 979 P.2d [948], 951 [(Wyo. 1999)]. An 
ambiguity exists when a contract's language conveys an obscure or double 
meaning.  Kirkwood v. CUNA Mutual 
Insurance Society, 937 P.2d 206, 208 (Wyo. 1997).  When contract provisions are not 
ambiguous or uncertain, the document speaks for itself.  937 P.2d  at 209. With an unambiguous 
agreement, we secure the parties' intent from the words of the agreement as they 
are expressed within the four corners of the document. Wolter, 979 P.2d  
at 951. All conversations, contemporaneous negotiations, and parol agreements 
between the parties that occurred prior to the written agreement are merged into 
the written agreement.  O'Quinn 
Enterprises, 975 P.2d  at 1064. We turn to extrinsic evidence and rules of 
contract construction only when the contract language is ambiguous and its 
meaning is doubtful or uncertain. Wolter, 979 P.2d  at 
951.

 

Fishing 
Rights

 

[¶32]   Upon our review of the fishing 
license agreement at issue, we conclude, as did the district court, that it is 
unambiguous as a matter of law.6  However, we disagree with the 
determination of the district court that this document creates only a revocable 
license.  Initially, we note that in 
making its ruling the district court partially relied on the fact that the 
parties within the agreement are referred to as "licensor" and "licensee."  We further recognize that the title to 
the document utilizes the wording "Fishing License Agreement."  "The label that the parties give the 
right, however, does not dictate its legal effect."  Jon W. Bruce and James W. Ely, Jr., 
The Law of Easements and Licenses in Land, at § 1:5 (2001).  Also, the title to an instrument is not 
controlling in determining whether the right conferred is a license or an 
easement; the intent of the parties to the agreement is controlling.  25 Am.Jur. 2d Easements and 
Licenses, §§ 3 and 137 (1996).  
In addition, § 14 of the agreement expressly states that the headings 
used within the agreement are for convenience only and are not to be utilized in 
construction of the document. 

 

[¶33]   The plain language used within the 
agreement supports the conclusion that the fishing rights involved run with the 
land and do not merely constitute revocable license rights.  In attempting to discern the parties' 
intent, 1) identified by the manner in which the right was created, 
2) the nature of the right created, 3) the duration of the right, 
4) the amount of consideration given for the right, and 5) whether 
there is a reservation of power to revoke the right as we are required, we can 
reach no other resolution but that these rights run with the land.  See Baker v. Pike, at 
¶20.

 

[¶34]   The agreement clearly expresses at 
§ 1 that the rights given are granted in consideration for the purchase of land, 
whether it be the purchase of Parcel 1 or Parcel 2 of the Fish Creek Meadows 
Property.  In addition, terms of the 
Parcel 1 purchase provide that if Parcel 1 was split, duplicate fishing and club 
rights would immediately issue with that newly split parcel.  Section 3 of the agreement also 
specifies that the rights extended are given as an accommodation and shall be 
rent free; the only consideration given in return for such rights is the mutual 
obligations and acknowledgments expressed within the agreement.  Obviously, the obligations referred to 
are those explicitly referenced within the agreement wherein the Marksteins 
promise to abide by the various terms identified within the agreement along 
with their ownership of the specified real property.  The intention that the rights designated 
run with the land is further confirmed by the fact that the agreement expresses 
that these rights are not assignable in whole, or in part, except to any 
successor owner 
of the particular real estate (i.e., either Parcel 1 or Parcel 2).  These successors are each classified as 
a "member" in good standing of the Fish Creek Meadows Homeowner's Association, 
Inc., generally defined as owners 
of real property within the association who are in compliance with the declared 
covenants, conditions, and restrictions, and such successors do not exceed the 
original number of owners 
originally granted the rights defined.  
In tandem with this idea, the "licensee" expressly acknowledges title of 
the licensor to the premises in the agreement and agrees never to assail, 
resist, or deny such title.  
Likewise, it is stated within the agreement that "[n]o greater fishing 
rights shall be granted to any other Licensee as 
purchaser of a lot 
than those granted to Licensee hereunder."  

 

[¶35]   Verbiage within the agreement 
details that the rights involved are to be used within a certain portion of the 
servient estate.  In particular, the 
fishing rights are to be utilized within a legally described area of land with 
the specific legal description of this land attached as an exhibit to the 
agreement.  Two separate sketch maps 
are also incorporated and attached to the agreement to further denote the 
applicable area of land involved.  
The fact that the agreement states that the agreement shall not be 
recorded is also not determinative, as the parties are allowed to execute and 
record a memorandum of the agreement.  

 

[¶36]   Duration of the rights granted is 
also expressly stated within the agreement.  The agreement at § 9 
provides:

 

This 
License Agreement shall be perpetual 
unless 
terminated as herein provided.  The term of this License Agreement and 
the ownership of Parcel 1, notwithstanding, the Licensor may, at his election, 
unilaterally terminate this Agreement upon twenty (20) days written notice and 
failure to correct within that time, if Licensee or any successor licensee shall 
fail to:  (a) comply with or abide 
by each and all of the provisions hereof; (b) keep all and singular Licensee's 
promises herein; c) remain a "member" in good standing (as a "member" is defined 
in the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Fish Creek 
Meadows) of the Fish Creek Meadows Homeowner's Association, Inc., subject to 
Licensee's right to assign their interest herein to successive owners of Parcel 
1 and provided that if notice of breach of the conditions is given three (3) 
times in any 12-month period then upon the fourth breach in such period this 
License may be terminated immediately without further 
notice[.]

 

(Emphasis 
added.)  The parties clearly 
intended that the rights granted would be granted permanently unless the 
Marksteins or their successors failed to abide by the terms of the agreement as 
defined.7  Moreover, while the agreement allows for 
the "unilateral" termination of the agreement by the "licensor," the right to 
terminate the agreement may not be exercised in an unfettered and unrestricted 
manner. Rather, termination may be effectuated only upon the occurrence of the 
specified events.  This intention is 
further expressed in both the memoranda signed by the parties involving the 
agreements concerning both Parcel 1 and Parcel 2, which state "Licensor has 
reserved and does reserve the right to terminate the License Agreement in 
accordance with its terms for failure on the part of the Licensee to perform its 
obligations."  

 

[¶37]   The permanency of the rights 
granted is also implied within additional language contained in § 9 of the 
agreement which details that if the "licensor" provides substantially identical 
fly fishing opportunities through the establishment of The Lodge Club at the 
Crescent H Ranch or a similar club through the homeowner's association, the 
license shall be deemed to be suspended.  
In addition, should the Club or other entity be subsequently dissolved, 
the fishing rights shall be reinstated.  

 

[¶38]   Similarly, although appellees argue 
that only a license is inferred because they are entitled to specify the access 
point for exercise of the fishing rights, the means of access via foot travel, 
the parking of vehicles with respect to such access, the type of fishing 
allowed, and they may restrict fishing by the licensees and their guests under 
certain conditions, such powers are limited.  These limitations may only be enforced 
upon good faith consideration of the surrounding circumstances and, in the 
latter case, space availability and within "specific times of the day or week in 
order to avoid overcrowding of the fishing habitats."  Likewise, while an assignment of the 
fishing rights must be performed in writing, with the successive owners agreeing 
to be bound by each of the terms of the agreement and the "licensor" must first 
approve the form of any assignment agreement, the "licensor" must assert such 
right "in good faith" and cannot unreasonably withhold its 
approval.

 

[¶39]   The Marksteins paid substantial 
consideration, having paid the sum of $1,450,000.00 for Parcel 1 and 
approximately $1,600,000.00 for Parcel 2.  
This court noted in Masinter 
v. Markstein, 
2002 WY 64, fn.4, 45 P.3d 237, fn.4 (Wyo. 2002), that there was evidence that 
the fishing rights added at least $125,000.00 in value to each parcel within the 
subdivision.  Mr. Markstein 
testified in his deposition that Mr. Thornton wanted $600,000.00 to grant 
similar fishing and club use rights when he attempted to negotiate for these 
rights previously.  "Substantial 
consideration indicates an easement."  
Bruce and Ely, at § 1:5 and those cases cited therein.  

 

[¶40]   Last, we recognize that an express 
reservation of the power to cancel, revoke, or terminate the right may indicate 
a license.  However, the power to 
terminate in the landowner does not necessarily mean that a license was 
created.  Specifying a power to 
terminate for a particular reason or in limited circumstances may be seen as 
inconsistent with the unabridged right to revoke retained by one who grants a 
license.  An easement may also be 
expressly subject to termination by the servient owner upon the occurrence of a 
specified event.  Id.  

 

[¶41]   As indicated previously, the 
parties 
expressed that the rights granted would be permanent in nature unless the 
Marksteins or their successors failed to abide by the terms of the agreement as 
defined.  Thus, those rights of termination or 
revocation may not be exerted at will. Additionally, the "licensor" reserved 
"all rights of ownership, including but not limited to the right to use or allow 
others to use the premises for fishing or any other purpose, and the right to 
mortgage, sell or otherwise encumber or dispose of the premises and to construct 
buildings, structures or otherwise make improvements to the premises."  However, these reserved rights are 
specifically "subject to the rights" of the "licensee" expressed within the 
agreement.  

 

[¶42]   Finally, the agreement states that 
the "licensor" "specifically reserves the right to transfer his rights and 
obligations . . . to his successor or assigns, by devise or under an instrument 
specifically designating such successor or assigns as a successor or assign" and 
that "any new successor or assign will be subject to and receive the 
benefits of the terms and conditions contained herein."  (Emphasis added.)  Critically, the agreement also 
explicitly states that "[i]t is mutually agreed that all of the covenants 
and agreements herein contained shall extend to and be obligatory upon the 
successors and permitted assigns of the respective parties."  The agreement goes on to provide that it 
may not be changed orally, but only in writing signed by the party against whom 
enforcement of any waiver, change, modification, or discharge is sought.  This language clearly expresses the 
intent of the parties that the rights delineated would be 
continual.

 

[¶43]   Accordingly, we hold that the 
rights granted pursuant to the fishing license agreements constitute an easement 
running with the land.  As we stated 
in Baker v. Pike, at ¶12:  
"An easement is appurtenant when the easement is created to benefit and 
does benefit the possessor of land in his use of the land.'  This means that the easement must be 
created to benefit the owner of the easement as a possessor of a particular 
parcel of land." (Citations omitted.)  
Such is the case here.

 

[¶44]   In addition, appellees assert that 
even assuming that the agreements are easements, they are void under Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 34-1-141 (LexisNexis 2003) because they do not sufficiently describe the 
location of the alleged easement.  
Section 34-1-141 provides:

 

            
(a)  Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, 
easements across land executed and recorded after the effective date of this act 
which do not specifically describe the location of the easement are null and 
void and of no force and effect.

 

            
. . .

 

(c)  For 
purposes of this act [section] an easement or agreement which does not 
specifically describe the location of the easement or which grants a right to 
locate an easement at a later date shall be valid for a period of one (1) year 
from the date of execution of the easement or agreement.  If the specific description is not 
recorded within one (1) year then the easement or agreement shall be of no 
further force and effect.

 

(d)  For 
purposes of this act [section] the specific description required in an easement 
shall be sufficient to locate the easement and is not limited to a 
survey.

 

[¶45]   As indicated previously, language 
within the agreement provides that the rights involved are to be used within a 
particular region of the servient estate and includes a specific legal 
description of this land attached as an exhibit to the agreement.  In addition, two separate sketch maps 
are also incorporated and attached to the agreement to further denote the 
applicable area of land involved.  
This description and demarcation is adequate to meet the requirements set 
forth by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-1-141. 

 

Club 
Use Rights

 

[¶46]   When the Marksteins 
purchased both Parcels 1 and 2 of the Fish Creek Meadows Property, they were 
also granted certain club use rights regarding the "Crescent H Ranch amenities 
and facilities in customary and usual form offered to all Crescent H Homeowners" 
apparently in the form of an "Interim Club Agreement".8  Upon our review of the language utilized 
in the club use agreement, we again determine that the agreement is not 
ambiguous, but conclude that this agreement must be designated a revocable 
license.  

 

[¶47]   While it is true that the agreement 
creates the rights indicated by virtue of the purchase and ownership of 
specifically delineated land, contrary to the fishing rights agreements, this 
document specifies that participation in horseback rides and utilization of the 
cross-country ski trails and the dining facilities are limited.  Indeed, it is stated within the 
agreement that during "certain brief periods throughout the summer certain 
groups or corporations" may reserve the Crescent H Ranch "for their exclusive 
use, during which time it may not be possible to schedule a horseback ride" and 
that reservations for horseback rides must be made a day in advance.  These rights may also only be exercised 
during the normal Crescent H Ranch summer season and usual riding hours.  Dining privileges are extended solely 
during the summer and winter seasons of operation, on a "reasonable as 
available' basis, with twenty-four hours notice."9  The club use agreement also states that 
the cross-country ski trails may be used each winter ski season only in those 
areas designated each year by the licensor and that any of the rights granted 
are subject to regulations and policies set solely by the licensor.  These granted rights are further 
only  "transferable" to subsequent 
owners of the land.

 

[¶48]   Additionally, the agreement 
requires that an annual fee to enjoy these rights of use be paid in the amount 
of $1,000.00 and that this amount may be adjusted in the future on a reasonable 
basis.  Separate fees for breakfast, 
lunch, dinner, and barbeques shall also be set each year by the licensor on a 
reasonable basis.  The licensor also 
reserved the right to impose regulations and policies that must be followed as a 
condition of continued enjoyment of the various rights of use.  No duration of the rights granted is 
expressed within the agreement, but no reservation of the power to revoke such 
rights is maintained.

 

[¶49]   Upon review of each of the 
expressed terms and surrounding circumstances, we hold that the language 
utilized by the parties in the club use agreement evidences the intent of the 
parties to grant the rights inferred on a terminable basis and not in 
perpetuity.  As such, we classify 
the club use agreement as a revocable license.  Simply put, this agreement granted 
rights that were temporary in nature and could be unilaterally revoked at the 
will of the licensor.

 

 

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶50]   We hold that the district court 
improperly determined that summary judgment should be granted in favor of 
appellees with respect to the fishing rights granted the Marksteins.  To the contrary, the record before us 
presents no material issues of fact, and the Marksteins were entitled to summary 
judgment as a matter of law on this issue.  
Thornton and his successors in interest agreed to be bound by the fishing 
rights granted the Marksteins with respect to the purchase of the Crescent H 
Ranch if they were not set aside, avoided, or rejected by RMA.  RMA never formally set aside, avoided, 
or rejected the fishing and club use rights held by the Marksteins.  In addition, the fishing agreements 
constitute valid appurtenant easements. 

 

[¶51]   We affirm the district court's 
ruling that the club use agreements constituted revocable licenses and that 
appellees should be granted summary judgment in such regard.  While Thornton and his successors in 
interest agreed to be bound by the club use rights granted the Marksteins with 
respect to the purchase of the Crescent H Ranch if they were not set aside, 
avoided, or rejected by RMA and RMA never formally set aside, avoided, or 
rejected these club use rights, the club use agreement rights were revocable at 
will and were properly revoked.

 

[¶52]   Accordingly, the Marksteins should 
have been granted summary judgment concerning their second claim for quiet title 
regarding only the fishing rights granted, the third claim for declaratory 
relief concerning the subject fishing rights, the fourth claim requesting 
restoration of the lost or destroyed Parcel 2 Fishing License Agreement, and the 
eleventh claim for breach of the Stipulation re: License Claims again regarding 
solely the fishing rights issues.  
Appellees must be granted summary judgment on the second claim for quiet 
title with respect to the club use rights, fifth claim for declaratory relief on 
the club use rights, the seventh claim for breach of contract concerning the 
club use rights, the ninth claim of tortious interference with contract as it 
relates to the club use rights, and the eleventh claim for breach of the 
Stipulation re: License Claims relating to the club use 
rights.

 

[¶53]   Therefore, the remaining causes of 
action that must still be adjudicated are those for damages stemming from the 
sixth claim for breach of contract concerning the fishing license agreements, 
the eighth claim for contractual attorneys fees, and the ninth claim for 
tortious interference with contract as it relates to the fishing license 
agreements. 

 

[¶54]   Affirmed, in part, reversed, in 
part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1An 
appeal in this action was previously filed, with this court issuing its opinion 
in that matter at Masinter v. Markstein, 2002 WY 64, 45 P.3d 237 (Wyo. 
2002).

 

2Appellees 
assert that to the extent the Marksteins must rely upon the post-petition filing 
of this memorandum to protect their claim, the recording is void as a violation 
of the automatic stay.  Under our 
reasoning detailed below, the Marksteins need not rely upon the post-petition 
filing of this memorandum.  
Accordingly, this court does not address such issue because it is 
moot.  

 

3The 
trustee for the RMA bankruptcy estate asserted that the fishing agreements were 
avoidable because they were either never recorded or recorded after the 
bankruptcy was filed and therefore void as a violation of the automatic stay 
order. The trustee also asserted that the fishing agreements could be set aside 
given the trustee's alleged status as a bona fide purchaser. 

4Fishing 
and club use rights, including those asserted by the Marksteins, were 
specifically designated in the motion seeking approval by the bankruptcy court 
of the proposed purchase of the Crescent H Ranch.  This motion also indicated that the 
transfer of the Crescent H Ranch would be subject to these rights unless 
avoided.

5As 
an aside, the Marksteins also assert that the district court erred in finding 
that appellees are entitled to protection under the Wyoming Recording Act 
because each of the appellees had notice of the fishing and club use 
rights.  Clearly, appellees each had 
notice of the fishing and club use rights granted the Marksteins, as they agreed 
to abide by them upon purchase of the subject property from the bankruptcy 
estate unless formally set aside, avoided, or rejected by the trustee in the RMA 
bankruptcy.  

 

In 
addition, while the RMA bankruptcy trustee became a bona fide purchaser on the 
date of the filing of the petition for that bankruptcy with respect to those 
rights that were not formally a matter of record as of that date, the trustee 
essentially waived his right to claim the benefit of bona fide purchaser status 
when he sold the property subject to the fishing and club use rights.  Further, Thornton and the Countryside, 
L.L.C. entities similarly waived any rights they had to claim the benefit of the 
trustee's bona fide purchaser status by agreeing to take title to the property 
subject to the fishing and club use rights.   

6Only 
one such agreement appears in the record.  
The license agreement involving Parcel 2 is verbatim in substance and 
form to the agreement regarding Parcel 1. 

7No 
allegation has been made that the Marksteins breached the agreement so as to 
allow the termination of those rights provided within the 
agreement.

8The 
Interim Club Agreement by its terms was to remain in affect only until more 
formal "Club" documents were completed.  
However, the more formal "Club" documents were evidently never 
finalized.  

 

9This 
agreement also refers to fishing rights in a general nature but then references 
the much more specific Fishing License Agreement already discussed 
above.