Title: L.B. v. Chief Justice of Probate & Family Court Dep’t

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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SJC-11892 
 
L.B. & another1  vs.  CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE PROBATE AND FAMILY 
COURT DEPARTMENT & others.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 5, 2015. - May 4, 2016. 
 
Present:  Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Probate Court, Guardian.  Due Process of Law, Assistance of 
counsel.  Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel.  
Practice, Civil, Assistance of counsel. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on May 6, 2015. 
 
 
The case was reported by Botsford, J. 
 
 
 
Laura Williams Gal (Christina L. Paradiso with her) for 
L.B. & another. 
 
Norah E. Kane for the minor children of L.B. 
 
Jo Ann Shotwell Kaplan, Assistant Attorney General, for 
Chief Justice of the Probate and Family Court Department. 
 
Deborah W. Kirchwey for the minor child of C.L. 
 
Jamie Ann Sabino, Susan R. Elsen, Mary K. Ryan, & Melanie 
V. Woodward, for Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, Inc., & 
others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
                                                 
 
1 C.L. 
 
 
2 Justices of the Worcester County and Hampden County 
Divisions of the Probate and Family Court Department, the three 
minor children of L.B., and the minor child of C.L. 
2 
 
 
Andrew L. Cohen, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, submitted 
a brief. 
 
Susan M. Finnegan, Sandra J. Badin, & Geoffrey A. Friedman, 
for S.D., amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
Richard M. Page, Jr., for Boston Bar Association, amicus 
curiae, joined in a brief. 
 
 
 
SPINA, J.  In Guardianship of V.V., 470 Mass. 590 (2015), 
we held that a parent whose minor child is the subject of a 
guardianship petition pursuant to G. L. c. 190B, § 5-206, and 
who cannot afford counsel has a right to have counsel appointed 
and to be so informed.  The issue in this case is whether a 
parent also has a right to counsel if and when the parent 
petitions to have the guardian removed or to have the terms of 
the guardianship modified.  We conclude that a parent does have 
a right to counsel for certain of those types of petitions.  We 
also offer some guidance to the Probate and Family Court, where 
these private guardianships occur, for the development of rules 
and policies to implement this right to counsel. 
 
Procedural history.  The plaintiffs, L.B. and C.L., are the 
mothers of minor children for whom guardians were appointed, in 
2012 and 2013 respectively, pursuant to G. L. c. 190B, § 5-206.  
They commenced this action in the county court in 2015, 
challenging a written policy of the Chief Justice of the Probate 
and Family Court Department (Chief Justice) concerning the 
appointment of counsel in cases involving guardianships of 
3 
 
minors under G. L. c. 190B.  Specifically, they challenged a 
portion of a memorandum that the Chief Justice issued to the 
judges of the Probate and Family Court and to court personnel on 
February 20, 2015, shortly after we released our opinion in 
Guardianship of V.V., supra.  The memorandum addressed our 
decision and identified a number of steps that the Probate and 
Family Court was taking to implement our holding.  The portion 
of the memorandum challenged by the plaintiffs is a single 
sentence that, in speaking of Guardianship of V.V., states:  
"Based on the holding in this case, the right to counsel for 
indigent parents only applies in a Petition to Appoint a 
Guardian of a Minor."  By this sentence, the Chief Justice 
essentially informed the probate judges and court personnel 
that, in her view, the right to counsel recognized in 
Guardianship of V.V. applies only to proceedings on the initial 
petition for appointment of a guardian for a minor, and, 
conversely, does not apply in subsequent proceedings such as 
petitions to remove a guardian after he or she has been 
appointed or to modify the terms of the guardianship.  The 
plaintiffs, as described below, were engaged in the latter types 
of proceedings in the Probate and Family Court at the time they 
commenced this action, and their requests for counsel were 
denied. 
4 
 
 
The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that the Chief 
Justice's policy, by limiting the right to counsel to 
proceedings for the initial appointment of guardians, 
contravened our decision in Guardianship of V.V. and violated 
their right to due process.  A single justice of this court 
reserved and reported the plaintiffs' complaint to the full 
court.3 
 
Facts.4  As stated, the plaintiffs are the mothers of minor 
children for whom guardians were appointed pursuant to G. L. 
                                                 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services and the amicus brief submitted 
jointly by the Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, Women's Bar 
Association of Massachusetts, Greater Boston Legal Services, 
Justice Center of Southeast Massachusetts LLC, Community Legal 
Aid Services and Counseling Center, Harvard Legal Aid Bureau, 
Northeast Legal Aid, Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee, and 
Center for Public Representation.  The Boston Bar Association 
also submitted a letter stating that it endorsed the latter 
brief. 
 
 
In addition, the single justice indicated in her 
reservation and report that the children and guardians in the 
underlying cases could be heard on the question whether they 
have standing to address the issue of appointment of counsel for 
the parents.  The guardians have not submitted briefs.  Both 
plaintiffs' children have submitted briefs arguing that they do 
have standing on that issue (although they take different 
positions on the substantive merits of the issue).  No party or 
amicus argues otherwise, so we shall assume without deciding 
that the children do have standing, and, accordingly, we 
consider their arguments on the issue as well. 
 
4 These facts are drawn principally from the materials in 
the record before the single justice. 
 
5 
 
c. 190B, § 5-206.5  Each guardianship proceeding began, and each 
appointment occurred, well before our decision in Guardianship 
of V.V., so it was not established at the time of those 
proceedings that parents whose minor children were the subject 
of guardianship petitions had a right to counsel.  It appears 
that neither L.B. nor C.L. was represented by counsel at the 
time the guardians were appointed.  The guardianship decree for 
each child specified that the guardianship was to extend to the 
child's eighteenth birthday, unless terminated sooner by order 
of the court.6,7 
                                                 
 
5 The statute provides in relevant part:  "A minor 
[fourteen] or more years of age or any person interested in the 
welfare of the minor may petition for appointment of a 
guardian."  G. L. c. 190B, § 5-206 (a). 
 
 
6 Specifically, in April, 2012, L.B.'s parents petitioned to 
have themselves appointed as guardians for her three minor 
children.  Their petitions were granted in October, 2012.  There 
was one guardianship petition, and one decree issued, for each 
child.  Each decree indicated that L.B. had been given proper 
notice of the petition and did not object to the appointment of 
guardians.  Each decree also stated that the guardians were 
prohibited from permanently removing the child from 
Massachusetts without a court order, and that the guardians were 
required to notify the court of any change of address for the 
guardians or the child.  Those were the only restrictions on the 
rights of the guardians expressly contained in the decrees.  
None of the decrees contained any provision for visitation by 
L.B. with her children or for any other type of contact or 
communication between her and them. 
 
 
7 In September, 2012, C.L.'s mother and stepfather 
petitioned to have themselves appointed as guardians for C.L.'s 
minor child.  Their petition was granted in February, 2013.  The 
decree stated that, after a hearing, C.L. was found to be unfit 
to parent her child.  The decree also contained provisions 
6 
 
 
In December, 2014, L.B. filed three petitions in the trial 
court pursuant to G. L. c. 190B, § 5-212,8 one with respect to 
each of her children, seeking to remove the guardians.  She 
alleged that she was able to "resume parental responsibilities."  
She stated that she "no longer consents to the guardianship[s] 
because [she] has appropriate housing and supportive services," 
that "she has played an active role in [her children's lives] 
during the guardianship[s]," and that "she is fit to resume 
primary responsibility for, and care of, her [children]." 
 
In February, 2015, C.L. filed a petition in the trial court 
seeking to modify the terms of her visitation with her child.9  
She alleged, among other things, that she was living in a stable 
environment, had income, and was attending college, and that she 
had "done what has been asked of [her]," presumably by the terms 
                                                                                                                                                             
similar to the decrees for L.B.'s children concerning removal or 
relocation of the child.  The decree further specified certain 
days and times that C.L. would be permitted to visit with the 
child; that additional visits could occur by agreement of the 
parties; that the visitation would be unsupervised; and that 
there was to be no contact during the visits between the child 
and C.L.'s boy friend. 
 
 
8 The statute provides in relevant part:  "Any person 
interested in the welfare of a ward or the ward, if [fourteen] 
or more years of age, may petition for removal of a guardian on 
the ground that removal would be in the best interest of the 
ward or for any other order that is in the best interest of the 
ward."  G. L. c. 190B, § 5-212 (a). 
 
 
9 The pleading was entitled "general probate petition."  It 
was, in essence, a petition to modify the guardianship pursuant 
to G. L. c. 190B, § 5-212 (a).  See note 8, supra. 
7 
 
of the guardianship and by the guardians.  She requested more 
visitation, and on different terms, than had been prescribed in 
the guardianship decree, specifically, overnight visitation on 
weekends and during vacations. 
 
In March, 2015, L.B. filed an application for the 
appointment of counsel to represent her in each of the three 
cases involving her, and C.L. similarly moved for appointment of 
counsel in the case involving her.  By that time, we had decided 
Guardianship of V.V. and the Chief Justice had issued her 
memorandum indicating her position that the holding in that case 
did not extend to situations like L.B.'s and C.L.'s.  Their 
requests for counsel were therefore denied.  Consistent with the 
Chief Justice's stated policy, the judge in L.B.'s cases denied 
her requests on the ground that a "petition for removal of [a] 
guardian does not qualify [for] appointment of parent's 
counsel," and the judge in C.L.'s case denied her motion because 
her pending petition to modify the guardianship was "not an 
initial petition" for appointment of a guardian.  Shortly 
thereafter, they commenced this action in the county court.10 
                                                 
10 After the case was reported by the single justice to the 
full court, L.B. resolved the matters involving her three 
children in the Probate and Family Court.  Consequently, her 
present claims are moot.  Nevertheless, we address her principal 
claim -- concerning a parent's due process right to counsel on a 
petition to remove a guardian -- because it is fully briefed, is 
likely to arise in many other cases, is of considerable public 
importance, and is something that can easily evade appellate 
8 
 
 
Discussion.  1.  The holding in Guardianship of V.V.  The 
plaintiffs maintain that our decision in Guardianship of V.V. 
already resolves the questions that are now before us.  That is 
incorrect.  That case involved a petition for the initial 
appointment of a guardian under G. L. c. 190B, § 5-206.  The 
sole question was whether the mother was entitled to counsel on 
that particular type of petition.  Guardianship of V.V., 470 
Mass. at 590-591.  Significantly, while the appeal was pending, 
the case proceeded to trial in the Probate and Family Court on 
the mother's petition to remove the guardian, and on that 
petition the mother was represented by counsel.  Id. at 591 n.2.  
The appeal therefore did not concern, and the court did not 
address, any question of a parent's right to counsel on a 
petition to remove the guardian or to modify the terms of the 
guardianship. 
 
To support their argument, the plaintiffs rely on two 
excerpts from Guardianship of V.V.  First, they cite a footnote 
near the beginning of the opinion that concerned mootness.11  The 
                                                                                                                                                             
review otherwise.  See Guardianship of V.V., 470 Mass. 590, 591-
592 (2015); Care & Protection of Erin, 443 Mass. 567, 568 
(2005), and cases cited. 
 
11 "That the mother was represented by counsel at the trial 
on her petition to remove the guardian would not render the 
appointment of counsel issue moot.  The fact remains that the 
mother was not represented by counsel at the outset of the 
guardianship proceedings, and our concern regarding whether a 
9 
 
plaintiffs read too much into the footnote.  It was meant only 
to explain that the presence of counsel on the petition to 
remove the guardian did not obviate the need to answer the 
question whether the mother was entitled to counsel on the 
petition for appointment of the guardian in the first place.  
Having counsel at one phase of a guardianship proceeding clearly 
does not suffice for due process purposes if the parent is also 
entitled to have counsel at another phase.  The additional 
statement in the footnote, that "our concern regarding whether a 
parent is entitled to counsel applies to all proceedings related 
to guardianship," was not a holding that the right to counsel 
does in fact apply to all such proceedings.  It was a 
recognition that the important question whether a parent has a 
right to counsel applies equally to all phases of the 
proceedings. 
 
The plaintiffs also rely on a sentence in which we said:  
"Because of the impact of a guardianship on the parent-child 
relationship, and the particular nature of the fundamental 
rights at stake, an indigent parent whose child is the subject 
of a guardianship proceeding is entitled to, and must be 
furnished with, counsel in the same manner as an indigent parent 
whose parental rights are at stake in a termination proceeding 
                                                                                                                                                             
parent is entitled to counsel applies to all proceedings related 
to guardianship."  Guardianship of V.V., 470 Mass. at 591 n.2. 
10 
 
or, similarly, in a care and protection proceeding."  
Guardianship of V.V., 470 Mass. at 592-593.  Read in context, 
that sentence refers only to the phase of the guardianship 
proceeding that was actually at issue in that case, namely, the 
initial petition to appoint a guardian.  It was not intended as 
a holding with respect to other phases of a guardianship 
proceeding that were not at issue. 
 
2.  Due process claim.  We next turn to the plaintiffs' 
main claim, that due process requires the appointment of counsel 
for indigent parents who petition to remove guardians for their 
children or to modify the terms of the guardianships.  The Chief 
Justice now acknowledges that counsel may be required 
constitutionally on a petition to remove a guardian; she argues, 
however, that the parent must first make a credible threshold 
showing of "substantial and relevant changed circumstances" 
since the guardian was appointed.  She also argues that there is 
no right to counsel when a parent petitions only to modify the 
terms of the guardianship. 
 
a.  Removal petitions.  It is well settled that "parents 
have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and 
management of their children," Matter of Hilary, 450 Mass. 491, 
496 (2008), and that "[d]ue process requirements must be met 
where a parent is deprived of the right to raise his or her 
child."  Care & Protection of Erin, 443 Mass. 567, 571 (2005).  
11 
 
See Department of Pub. Welfare v. J.K.B., 379 Mass. 1, 3 (1979).  
"In determining what process is due . . . this court 'must 
balance the interests of the individual affected, the risk of 
erroneous deprivation of those interests and the government's 
interest in the efficient and economic administration of its 
affairs.'"  Commonwealth v. Barboza, 387 Mass. 105, 112, cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 1020 (1982), quoting Thompson v. Commonwealth, 
386 Mass. 811, 817 (1982).  See Care & Protection of Robert, 408 
Mass. 52, 58-59 (1990).  When balancing the interests, we bear 
in mind that "[t]he requirements of procedural due process are 
pragmatic and flexible, not rigid or hypertechnical."  Roe v. 
Attorney Gen., 434 Mass. 418, 427 (2001).  Due process "calls 
for such procedural protections as the particular situation 
demands."  Id., quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 
(1972). 
 
i.  Individual interests.  The interest of parents in their 
relationship with their children is substantial.  "Our 
decisions, and those of the United States Supreme Court, leave 
no doubt that '[t]he rights to conceive and raise one's 
children' are 'essential . . . basic civil rights of man . . . 
far more precious . . . than property rights.'"  Department of 
Pub. Welfare v. J.K.B., 379 Mass. at 3, quoting Stanley v. 
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).  Fundamental rights and 
interests of parents are implicated not only at the stage when a 
12 
 
guardian is first appointed for a minor child, as in 
Guardianship of V.V., but also when a parent subsequently 
petitions to regain custody by removing the guardian.12  This is 
so because the appointment of a guardian only displaces the 
parent's rights and responsibilities for the duration of the 
guardianship (except as provided in the decree or otherwise by 
law); it does not terminate them.  Guardianship of V.V., 470 
Mass. at 592.  The parent is free to attempt to reactivate those 
rights by removing the guardian and putting an end to the 
guardianship.  It would be incongruous to recognize the 
significance of the parent's rights for due process purposes at 
the time those rights are first displaced, as we did in 
Guardianship of V.V., but not to do so at the time the parent 
seeks to regain them.  The deprivation at the former stage and 
the continued deprivation at the latter stage are equally real 
and significant.  Cf. Care & Protection of Erin, 443 Mass. at 
571 (describing review and redetermination proceeding in care 
                                                 
 
12 In the Probate and Family Court, L.B.'s cases involved 
petitions to remove guardians in order to put an end to the 
guardianships and restore the parent's right to custody.  The 
custody of the children was thus directly at stake.  The same 
rights and interests might not be implicated when a parent seeks 
to remove a guardian in circumstances that would not lead to the 
child returning to the parent, e.g., where the petition seeks 
merely to remove one guardian and replace him or her with 
another.  See G. L. c. 190B, § 5-212 (a) (authorizing petitions 
for removal of guardian and petitions by guardian for permission 
to resign; "A petition for removal or for permission to resign 
may, but need not, include a request for appointment of a 
successor guardian"). 
13 
 
and protection case as "a readjudication" of initial custody 
order; "[a]s such, it implicates the same liberty interests that 
exist at an initial determination that a child is in need of 
care and protection.  In a review and redetermination 
proceeding, the judge is deciding simply whether to maintain the 
separation of parent from child"). 
 
ii.  Risk of erroneous deprivation.  The risk of 
erroneously adjudicating these fundamental rights and interests 
of parents is no less real at the guardian removal stage than at 
the appointment stage.  Judges at both stages may be called on 
to make complex determinations that consider numerous factors 
regarding the child's best interest and the parent's fitness.13  
                                                 
 
13 The provision for removal of a guardian, G. L. c. 190B, 
§ 5-212 (a), speaks of removal when it is in "the best interest 
of the [child]."  Unlike the provision that states the bases for 
appointment of guardians initially, see G. L. c. 190B, § 5-
204 (a), it does not expressly mention parental fitness.  Our 
cases have made clear, however, that consideration of parental 
fitness, when parental fitness is at issue, will be highly 
relevant to a determination of a child's best interest.  See, 
e.g., R.D. v. A.H., 454 Mass. 706, 715 (2009) ("In the context 
of a custody determination, . . . it is essential to recognize 
that the determination whether a parent is 'unfit' is closely 
intertwined with a consideration of the best interests of the 
child"); Bezio v. Patenaude, 381 Mass. 563, 576 (1980) ("Neither 
the 'parental fitness' test nor the 'best interests of the 
child' test is properly applied to the exclusion of the other"), 
citing Petition of the New England Home for Little Wanderers to 
Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 367 Mass. 631, 641 (1975) 
(stating that "the tests . . . reflect different degrees of 
emphasis on that same factors" and "are not separate and 
distinct but cognate and connected").  Judges hearing removal 
petitions will thus inevitably hear evidence, and be asked to 
make determinations, concerning parental fitness. 
14 
 
Questions, often difficult ones, about the child's physical and 
psychological well-being must be answered; questions about a 
parent's mental and physical health, addictions, history of 
abuse or neglect, and the impact of these things on the parent's 
ability to meet the needs of the child are also often in play.  
Additionally, as the plaintiffs and amici point out, judges 
hearing removal petitions may be called on to consider evidence, 
and make difficult determinations, on the child's bonding with 
the guardian during the guardianship, and the potential effect 
on the child of being removed from the guardian's care and 
returned to the parent's custody.  See, e.g., Guardianship of 
Cheyenne, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 826, 830-831 (2010); Guardianship of 
Estelle, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 575, 581-582 (2007), and cases cited. 
 
With the complexity of the legal and factual issues comes 
an increased risk that a judge might incorrectly decide those 
issues, especially in the absence of counsel to present and 
defend the positions of the parent, and hence an increased risk 
that an unrepresented parent will suffer an erroneous 
deprivation of his or her rights.  Cf. Department of Pub. 
Welfare v. J.K.B., 379 Mass. at 4 (noting complexity of issues 
in adjudicating petitions to dispense with consent to adoption 
as consideration in finding right to counsel).  The presence of 
counsel for a parent will both help to protect the parent's 
rights and interests in this regard and assist a judge to ensure 
15 
 
accuracy and fairness in his or her adjudications.  Id. (noting 
benefits of counsel both for parents and for judges). 
 
iii.  Government interests.  Finally, we must consider the 
Commonwealth's interest in the efficient and economic operation 
of its affairs.  Although the Commonwealth is not a party per se 
in a private guardianship proceeding under G. L. c. 190B,14 it 
nevertheless has interests that are affected and must be 
weighed.  It has an interest in ensuring that the children of 
the Commonwealth are protected adequately and, toward that end, 
that accurate and fair adjudications are made by judges in these 
cases.  Care & Protection of Robert, 408 Mass. at 65-66, and 
cases cited.  Significantly, it also has an interest in seeing 
that State resources are not used irresponsibly.  There is no 
need, for example, to require the State to incur the cost and 
administrative burden of providing counsel for removal petitions 
that have no hope of prevailing.  The risk of erroneously 
depriving a parent of his or her interests on such a petition 
would be negligible, the presence of counsel would add little of 
value, and an expenditure of State resources for an attorney to 
                                                 
 
14 Many of the private guardianship cases in the Probate and 
Family Court do, however, concern children who have been 
involved with the Department of Children and Families.  See 
V. Weisz & B. Kaban, Children's Law Center of Massachusetts, 
Protecting Children:  A Study of the Nature and Management of 
Guardianship of Minor Cases in Massachusetts Probate and Family 
Court, at 22 (2008).  See also Annie E. Casey Foundation, The 
Kinship Diversion Debate:  Policy and Practice Implications for 
Children, Families and Child Welfare Agencies (2013). 
16 
 
pursue such a petition would therefore be unnecessary.  See Roe 
v. Attorney Gen., 434 Mass. at 427, quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (referring to "the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and 
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards" [emphasis added]). 
 
iv.  Balancing of interests.  The most pragmatic way to 
balance all three due process considerations -- the parental 
interests, the risk of erroneous adjudication of those 
interests, and the government interests -- is to require that 
counsel be made available for those petitions that present a 
colorable claim for removal, but not for petitions that are 
obviously meritless.  Requiring a parent to make a modest yet 
meaningful preliminary showing that he or she has a colorable 
case for removal of the guardian, before counsel is appointed to 
prosecute such a petition, will help to guard against an 
unnecessary and irresponsible expenditure of State resources 
and, we hope, will discourage, and thereby help to keep the 
courts free of, patently meritless attempts at removal. 
 
The Chief Justice contends that the parent should be 
required to make an initial showing that there have been 
"substantial and relevant changed circumstances" since the 
guardian was appointed.  She analogizes to review and 
redetermination proceedings in care and protection cases, see 
17 
 
G. L. c. 119, § 26,15 and relies heavily on the analysis in Care 
& Protection of Erin, 443 Mass. at 570-572.  This court held in 
that case that the ultimate burden of proof on review and 
redetermination is on the Department of Children and Families 
(then the Department of Social Services) (department) to prove 
that a parent remains unfit to further the best interests of the 
child and that the child, therefore, is still in need of care 
and protection.  Id. at 572.  The court also held that the 
parent petitioning for review and redetermination bears a 
preliminary burden to produce some credible evidence of changed 
circumstances since the initial determination, and it is then 
and only then that the department is put to its burden of proof.  
Id.  It is the latter kind of burden that the Chief Justice 
argues is applicable by analogy here. 
 
The Chief Justice's analogy is not perfect, but, as stated, 
we agree in general that there should be some threshold 
assessment of the claim for removal before the right to counsel 
materializes.  We are concerned, however, that her formulation 
of what is required -- a demonstration of "substantial and 
                                                 
 
15 The statute provides in relevant part:  "On any petition 
filed in any court under this section, the [Department of 
Children and Families] or the parents, person having legal 
custody, probation officer or guardian of a child or the counsel 
or guardian ad litem for a child may petition the court not more 
than once every [six] months for a review and redetermination of 
the current needs of such child whose case has come before the 
court. . . ."  G. L. c. 119, § 26 (c). 
18 
 
relevant changed circumstances"16 -- will set the bar too high 
for an unrepresented litigant before the right to counsel is 
triggered.  "Substantial," "relevant," "material," and 
"significant" all suggest that a parent's burden would be to 
show that circumstances have changed in a legally significant 
manner and to a legally cognizable degree.  It would be unusual 
and potentially unfair to require a litigant unaided by counsel 
to make that kind of a legal demonstration before the right to 
counsel arises.  A more appropriate threshold showing would be 
for the parent simply to satisfy the judge that he or she has a 
colorable or "meritorious" claim in the sense that it is worthy 
of being presented to and considered by the court.  See General 
Motors Corp., petitioner, 344 Mass. 481, 482 (1962) ("A 
meritorious case is one that is worthy of presentation to a 
court, not one which is sure of success").  This is a lighter, 
less technical burden than the one proposed by the Chief 
Justice, and something that will be more manageable for an 
unrepresented litigant with fundamental liberty interests at 
stake.  "Meritorious" is a familiar concept that has been 
                                                 
 
16 The brief of the Chief Justice of the Probate and Family 
Court Department (Chief Justice) also describes the proposed 
burden as a showing that "circumstances have materially and 
significantly changed since due process procedures were afforded 
or available last (i.e., at the time of the original appointment 
or the most recent review of the appointment pursuant to a 
petition to remove the guardian)." 
19 
 
applied in a variety of circumstances.17  It is not an onerous 
standard. 
 
In sum, we hold that when an indigent, unrepresented parent 
seeks, pursuant to G. L. c. 190B, § 5-212, to remove a guardian 
for a minor child and thereby regain custody of the child, the 
parent has a due process right to counsel to prosecute the 
petition, and to be so informed, provided the parent presents a 
meritorious claim for removal. 
 
b.  Modification petitions.  Petitions to modify the terms 
of a guardianship, like petitions to remove a guardian and 
regain custody of a child, can also affect the fundamental 
rights and interests of a parent.  A petition such as C.L.'s, 
                                                 
 
17 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gunter, 459 Mass. 480, 487, 
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 218 (2011) (gatekeeper proceeding 
pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E; when determining whether new 
issue is "substantial," "[t]he bar . . . is not high.  It must 
only be a meritorious issue in the sense of being worthy of 
consideration by an appellate court"); Lovell v. Lovell, 276 
Mass. 10, 11-12 (1931) (petition to remove default decree 
requires some showing that petitioner has meritorious claim or 
defense to assert -- "one which is worthy of judicial inquiry"); 
Jones v. Manns, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 485, 492-493 & n.9 (1992) 
(transfer of appeal filed in wrong court; case "involves 
meritorious issues, in the usual sense of that phrase in 
appellate practice," i.e., "worthy of presentation to a court" 
[citation omitted]); Levin v. Levin, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 501, 503-
504 (1979) (stay of execution of sentence pending appeal; 
discussing "meritorious" standard and concluding that it 
connotes opposite of "frivolous"); Tisei v. Building Inspector 
of Marlborough, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 379 (1975) (motion for 
leave to docket appeal late; moving party must show "a case 
meritorious or substantial in the sense of presenting a question 
of law deserving judicial investigation and discussion" 
[citation omitted]). 
20 
 
which seeks a significant change in the terms of visitation 
based on changed circumstances since the appointment of the 
guardian, is such a case.18  Visitation, like custody, is at the 
core of a parent's relationship with a child; being physically 
present in a child's life, sharing time and experiences, and 
providing personal support are among the most intimate aspects 
of a parent-child relationship.  For a parent who has lost (or 
willingly yielded) custody of a child temporarily to a guardian, 
visitation can be especially critical because it provides an 
opportunity to maintain a physical, emotional, and psychological 
bond with the child during the guardianship period, if that is 
in the child's best interest; and in cases where the parent 
aspires to regain custody at some point, it provides an 
opportunity to demonstrate the ability to properly care for the 
child.  See generally L. Edwards, Reasonable Efforts:  A 
Judicial Perspective, at 41-47 (2014); M. Smariga, American Bar 
Association Center on Children and the Law & ZERO TO THREE 
Policy Center, Visitation with Infants and Toddlers in Foster 
Care:  What Judges and Attorneys Need to Know (2007). 
                                                 
 
18 In the Probate and Family Court, C.L.'s case involved a 
petition to modify the guardianship by changing the terms of the 
visitation.  Obviously, not all modification petitions concern 
visitation.  Petitions that seek other changes to the 
guardianship -- for example, changes in child support or other 
strictly financial matters -- will not necessarily implicate the 
same core parent-child concerns. 
21 
 
For these reasons, and considering the due process factors 
discussed above, we hold that an indigent parent who petitions 
to modify the terms of a guardianship by seeking a substantial 
change in the provisions for visitation, like a parent 
petitioning to remove a guardian and regain custody, is entitled 
as a matter of due process to counsel, and to be so informed, 
provided the parent presents a meritorious claim. 
3.  Other issues.  The plaintiffs and amici raise a host of 
additional issues that go well beyond the issues raised by the 
plaintiffs' complaint.  For example, the plaintiffs argue, in 
addition to their due process claim, that they have a right to 
counsel based on equal protection principles; they also ask us 
to "issue a directive" definitively resolving certain questions 
concerning the burden of proof and the elements of proof on 
petitions to remove a guardian under G. L. c. 190B, § 5-212.  
The children, who filed no pleadings of their own in the county 
court, and who were brought into the case for the limited 
purpose of addressing a question of standing on their right to 
be heard on the plaintiffs' claims, see note 3, supra, argue 
that they have their own right to counsel in cases like this.  
And the amicus Committee for Public Counsel Services asks us to 
decide a number of other issues in order to "clarify the 
parameters of the right to counsel for indigent parents in 
guardianship cases." 
22 
 
These matters are not properly before us, and we therefore 
decline to address them.  Some of these questions will 
undoubtedly need to be resolved in future cases where they are 
properly raised and preserved in the trial court and fully 
briefed on appeal,19 and where the records for deciding them are 
fully developed.  Others might appropriately be addressed by 
court rules and policies established by the Probate and Family 
Court or by amendments to the governing statutes. 
4.  Development of court rules and policies.  Our decision 
in Guardianship of V.V., decided approximately fifteen months 
ago, recognized a parent's due process right to counsel in 
guardianship of minor cases where none previously existed, on 
the initial petition for appointment of a guardian.  The Probate 
and Family Court has taken a number of steps since then to 
implement that right.  Our decision today establishes a right to 
counsel beyond that, on a parent's petition to remove a guardian 
and regain custody of the child or to modify the guardianship in 
order to make a significant change in visitation.  Recognizing 
                                                 
 
19 We note, for example, that no guardian has submitted a 
brief in the case before us.  Some of the other issues we are 
asked to decide would clearly affect a guardian's rights and 
interests. 
 
23 
 
that additional steps will be needed to implement these rights, 
we offer a few thoughts and suggestions.20 
 
a.  The Probate and Family Court can facilitate the process 
for unrepresented parents by creating forms that will help the 
parent to articulate -- in plain, nonlegal terms -- the reasons 
why he or she believes the guardian should be removed or the 
visitation modified, and the facts on which he or she relies to 
support that claim.  Forms that promote a clear and sufficiently 
detailed statement from the parent will also help judges to 
evaluate whether the parent has stated a meritorious claim as we 
have described that term, such that the parent may have an 
attorney if he or she would like one.21 
 
b.  We leave it to the Probate and Family Court to consider 
in the first instance whether an indigent, unrepresented parent 
must actually file a pro se petition to remove the guardian or 
                                                 
 
20 A working group of experienced probate judges, child 
advocates, guardians ad litem, representatives of guardian and 
parent interests, and others concerned may be helpful to explore 
these suggestions (and other possibilities) in depth.  The Chief 
Justice may wish to consider convening such a group if none 
already exists. 
 
 
21 Nothing we have said requires that counsel actually be 
appointed for every indigent parent who presents a meritorious 
claim.  Parents must be fairly informed of the right to counsel 
and of the procedure for requesting counsel, but due process in 
these circumstances only requires that counsel actually be 
appointed if the parent so requests.  A parent who has been 
informed of the right to counsel and the procedure for 
requesting counsel will always have the prerogative to opt to 
proceed without counsel. 
24 
 
modify the guardianship before an attorney is appointed.  
Another approach might be for the parent to be allowed first to 
apply for counsel, and be required to state on an application 
for counsel form the meritorious reasons why he or she is 
seeking removal or modification.  The judge would then be in a 
position to assess whether appointment of counsel is called for 
before the actual petition is filed.  The Probate and Family 
Court is better equipped than this court to weigh the pros and 
cons of each approach initially.  It would appear that either 
approach provides due process. 
c.  General Laws c. 190B, § 5-212, places no express 
limitation on how often a parent may file a petition to remove a 
guardian or to modify a guardianship.  The Probate and Family 
Court might consider whether it is feasible and wise to create 
guidelines designed to discourage the filing of unnecessarily 
frequent petitions.  For example, the court may be able to 
identify different classes of petitions according to what relief 
is being sought (e.g., removal or modification) and the bases on 
which the guardianships were established initially (e.g., 
consent, various reasons for unavailability or unfitness, etc.), 
and indicate frequencies with which petitions in the different 
classes might reasonably be expected to be filed.  Petitions 
filed at more frequent intervals than provided by the guidelines 
presumptively would not merit the appointment of counsel.  These 
25 
 
guidelines and presumptions would not be binding, since the 
statute appears to permit the filing of a removal or 
modification petition at any time, each case is different, and 
counsel should always be appointed for a meritorious case, but 
they may help to create realistic expectations for unrepresented 
parents as to how often, at most, they should file.22 
 
d.  In deciding both Guardianship of V.V. and this case, we 
have found it useful to draw certain comparisons between the 
guardianship process under G. L. c. 190B and the care and 
protection process under G. L. c. 119.  We have not held, 
however, that all of the procedures and protections provided by 
statute in care and protection cases must necessarily be 
incorporated into private guardianship proceedings under the 
rubric of due process.  The two types of proceedings, while 
similar in some respects, are not identical.  What process is 
constitutionally due in guardianship cases must continue to be 
decided by applying the factors discussed above. 
e.  Although we do not decide the question of a child's 
constitutional right to counsel in this case, we note the 
provisions of G. L. c. 190B, § 5-106 (a).  "After filing of a 
petition for appointment of a guardian . . . if the ward . . . 
                                                 
 
22 Likewise, it may be possible in some situations for the 
judge, at the time the guardianship is created, to indicate when 
or on what conditions the parent might realistically expect to 
petition for removal or modification. 
26 
 
or someone on his behalf requests appointment of counsel; or if 
the court determines at any time in the proceeding that the 
interests of the ward . . . are or may be inadequately 
represented, the court shall appoint an attorney to represent 
the person."  Id.  The court may also appoint a "guardian ad 
litem . . . to investigate the condition of the ward . . . and 
make appropriate recommendations to the court."  G. L. c. 190B, 
§ 5-106 (b).  We trust that judges of the Probate and Family 
Court will consider exercising one or both of these prerogatives 
in appropriate cases, especially where counsel is appointed for 
a petitioning parent but the judge is concerned that the 
petition might not be in the child's best interest.  Guardians 
faced with removal or modification claims should also be fairly 
informed that they may request counsel for the child. 
 
Conclusion.  A judgment shall enter in the county court 
declaring that (a) when an indigent parent seeks, pursuant to 
G. L. c. 190B, § 5-212, to remove a guardian for a minor child 
and thereby regain custody of the child, the parent has a due 
process right to counsel to prosecute the petition, and to be so 
informed, provided the parent presents a meritorious claim for 
removal; and (b) similarly, when an indigent parent seeks to 
modify the terms of a guardianship by substantially changing the 
terms of visitation with the minor child, the parent also has a 
27 
 
due process right to counsel, and to be so informed, provided 
the parent presents a meritorious claim for modification. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.