Title: State ex rel. Navistar, Inc. v. Industrial Commission

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Navistar, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-712.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-712 
THE STATE EX REL. NAVISTAR, INC., APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Navistar, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 
2020-Ohio-712.] 
Workers’ compensation—Voluntary abandonment is an affirmative defense—If 
evidence of voluntary abandonment has been brought into issue, a hearing 
officer’s failure to address the issue constitutes a mistake of law—The 
employer has the burden to raise and produce evidence of voluntary 
abandonment—Court of appeals’ judgment denying writ of mandamus 
affirmed. 
(No. 2018-1416—Submitted October 2, 2019—Decided March 4, 2020.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 16AP-776, 
2018-Ohio-3386. 
________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
2
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio granted the request of 
appellee Gary E. Bisdorf for permanent-total-disability (“PTD”) compensation.  
The Tenth District Court of Appeals denied the request of Bisdorf’s former 
employer, appellant, Navistar, Inc., for a writ of mandamus ordering the 
commission to vacate the PTD-compensation award.  Navistar appealed that 
judgment and moved for oral argument.  During the pendency of the case before 
this court, Bisdorf died.  We ordered Navistar to show cause why its appeal should 
not be dismissed as moot.  Navistar responded with a motion to continue (i.e., 
proceed with) the case, which we grant.  We affirm the Tenth District’s judgment 
and deny Navistar’s request for oral argument. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
{¶ 2} Bisdorf sustained two industrial injuries during his 30 years of 
employment as an assembler with Navistar.  His 1971 knee injury and 2001 
shoulder injury both resulted in approved workers’ compensation claims and 
multiple surgeries.  Bisdorf retired from Navistar in 2003 but worked part-time as 
a sales associate and firearms instructor at a gun store from 2004 to 2010. 
{¶ 3} During his employment at the gun store, Bisdorf applied for a period 
of temporary-total-disability (“TTD”) compensation for knee surgery related to his 
1971 injury.  The commission determined that Bisdorf had voluntarily retired from 
Navistar but had rejoined the workforce by accepting employment at the gun store, 
and it granted his request for TTD compensation.  Bisdorf returned to work, but the 
gun store closed in 2010, and he did not seek new employment. 
{¶ 4} In 2015, Bisdorf applied for PTD compensation.  After a hearing 
before a staff hearing officer (“SHO”), the commission granted Bisdorf’s 
application.  Navistar moved for reconsideration, arguing that the commission had 
failed to consider evidence of Bisdorf’s voluntary retirement and that the 
commission had relied on two medical reports—by Drs. James Rutherford and 
January Term, 2020 
 
3
David Grunstein—that Navistar claimed were conclusory and contradictory.  The 
commission denied Navistar’s request for reconsideration. 
{¶ 5} Navistar asked the Tenth District for a writ of mandamus ordering the 
commission to vacate its prior orders and to enter a new order denying Bisdorf’s 
PTD-compensation application.  Navistar asserted that the commission had abused 
its discretion in numerous ways, including by awarding PTD compensation without 
first ruling on whether Bisdorf had voluntarily abandoned his employment and by 
relying on the reports by Drs. Rutherford and Grunstein. 
{¶ 6} The Tenth District’s magistrate initially recommended that the court 
grant a limited writ ordering the commission to consider whether Bisdorf had 
voluntarily abandoned his employment.  2017-Ohio-8976, ¶ 2.  But the court 
sustained the commission’s objections to the magistrate’s recommendation and 
held that Navistar had failed to raise the issue of voluntary abandonment before the 
SHO.  Id. at ¶ 20-24.  The court therefore returned the case to the magistrate to 
consider the remaining issues that Navistar had asserted.  Id. at ¶ 29.  After doing 
so, the magistrate recommended that the court deny the writ.  2018-Ohio-3386, ¶ 3.  
Navistar objected, but the court overruled Navistar’s objections and adopted the 
magistrate’s recommendation.  Id. at ¶ 10.  Navistar appealed the Tenth District’s 
judgment to this court and moved for oral argument. 
{¶ 7} On July 30, 2019, after briefing in this court was complete, Bisdorf’s 
counsel filed a suggestion of death indicating that Bisdorf had died on July 8.  We 
ordered Navistar to show cause why the case should not be dismissed as moot, and 
we permitted appellees to respond to Navistar’s filing.  156 Ohio St.3d 1491, 2019-
Ohio-3263, 129 N.E.3d 474.  In response to the show-cause order, Navistar filed a 
motion to continue (i.e., proceed with) the case.  The Industrial Commission and 
counsel for Bisdorf filed responses to Navistar’s motion. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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II. ANALYSIS 
A. State of the Case After Bisdorf’s Death 
{¶ 8} Navistar asserts two reasons why we should proceed to decide the 
case.  First, citing Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Mayfield, 11 Ohio St.3d 70, 
464 N.E.2d 133 (1984), it argues that an employer’s appeal from an adverse 
decision by the commission is not subject to dismissal due to a claimant’s death.  
Second, without citing any authority, it argues that “the case should continue due 
to the precedential value of the two issues to be determined.”  The second argument 
is without merit.  As the commission notes in its response, we do not issue advisory 
opinions.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Food & Water Watch v. State, 153 Ohio St.3d 1, 
2018-Ohio-555, 100 N.E.3d 391, ¶ 29. 
{¶ 9} As to the first argument, while an injured worker’s claim for benefits 
abates upon his death, Ohio Adm.Code 4123-5-21, this court held in Youghiogheny 
that “[a]n employer’s appeal, pursuant to R.C. 4123.519, from an adverse ruling by 
the Industrial Commission is not subject to dismissal due to the death of the 
employee during the pendency of the appeal,” id. at syllabus.  In reaching this 
conclusion, this court reasoned that under former R.C. 4123.519, the employer was 
entitled to recover from the state surplus fund any benefits that had been improperly 
disbursed to the claimant before his death.  Id. at 72.  The state (which was already 
a party to the proceedings in the form of the Administrator of the Bureau of 
Workers’ Compensation) therefore became a real party in interest and could 
proceed in place of the claimant to protect the surplus fund.  Id. 
{¶ 10} In response to Navistar’s motion, the commission asserts that 
Youghiogheny does not apply here because that case involved a direct appeal to the 
court of common pleas under former R.C. 4123.519 (now R.C. 4123.512), while 
this case involves an original action in mandamus.  But this distinction is of no 
import, because the reasoning underlying this court’s conclusion in Youghiogheny 
applies equally to a mandamus action.  R.C. 4123.512(H)(1) broadly provides, “If, 
January Term, 2020 
 
5
in a final administrative or judicial action, it is determined that payments of 
compensation or benefits, or both, made to or on behalf of a claimant should not 
have been made, the amount thereof shall be charged to the [state] surplus fund 
account.”  (Emphasis added.)  The plain language of this statute encompasses 
actions in mandamus such as this.  Youghiogheny’s framing of its holding in terms 
of an appeal reflected the facts of that particular case, not a statutory limitation. 
{¶ 11} Notably however, since 2006, self-insured employers like Navistar 
have had the ability to opt out of participation in the state surplus fund, and if they 
do opt out, then they are not entitled to reimbursement from the fund.  See R.C. 
4123.512(H)(3); Am.Sub.S.B. No. 7, 151 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1019, 1071-1072 
(amending R.C. 4123.512(H)).  The record before this court does not indicate 
whether Navistar opted out of participation in the fund. 
{¶ 12} But regardless of whether it participates in the surplus fund, 
Navistar, as a self-insured employer, must pay to the state an annual assessment to 
the safety-and-hygiene fund and must also pay administrative costs.  R.C. 
4123.35(J).  The amount of each assessment depends on the amount that Navistar 
paid out in workers’ compensation benefits during the prior year.  Id.  And “any 
amount that is determined not to have been payable to * * * a claimant in any final 
administrative or judicial proceeding,” R.C. 4123.35(L), may be excluded from the 
employer’s paid compensation for the year, Ohio Adm.Code 4123-17-32(B).  See 
also R.C. 4123.512(H)(1).  The outcome of this appeal will therefore affect the 
amount of the assessment that Navistar is required to pay to the state.  Accordingly, 
as in Youghiogheny, 11 Ohio St.3d 70, 464 N.E.2d 133, a continuing controversy 
remains and the commission’s arguments on the merits serve to protect the state’s 
interests in Navistar’s annual assessment (and the surplus fund, if applicable).  We 
therefore proceed to the merits of Navistar’s appeal. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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B. Mandamus Standard 
{¶ 13} Mandamus relief is appropriate only if the relator establishes “a clear 
legal right to the relief requested, a clear legal duty on the part of the commission 
* * * to provide the relief, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course 
of the law.”  State ex rel. Baker v. Indus. Comm., 143 Ohio St.3d 56, 2015-Ohio-
1191, 34 N.E.3d 104, ¶ 12.  In matters before it, the commission is the exclusive 
evaluator of the weight and credibility of the evidence.  State ex rel. LTV Steel Co. 
v. Indus. Comm., 88 Ohio St.3d 284, 287, 725 N.E.2d 639 (2000).  Therefore, “[t]o 
be entitled to an extraordinary remedy in mandamus, the relator must demonstrate 
that the [commission] abused its discretion by entering an order not supported by 
any evidence in the record.”  State ex rel. WFAL Constr. v. Buehrer, 144 Ohio St.3d 
21, 2015-Ohio-2305, 40 N.E.3d 1079, ¶ 12.  The relator must make that showing 
by clear and convincing evidence.  Id. 
C. Navistar’s Propositions of Law 
{¶ 14} Navistar asserts three propositions of law.  First, it argues that the 
commission abused its discretion by failing to address evidence of Bisdorf’s 
voluntary retirement.  Second, it argues that the reports of Drs. Rutherford and 
Grunstein show that Bisdorf could have worked four hours a day and that the 
commission abused its discretion by failing to consider various nonmedical factors 
(e.g., Bisdorf’s age, education, and work record) before concluding that Bisdorf 
could not engage in sustained remunerative employment.  And third, it argues that 
Dr. Rutherford’s opinion is conclusory and contradictory and that the commission 
abused its discretion by relying on it.  We reject the first two arguments and do not 
reach the third. 
1. Voluntary abandonment 
{¶ 15} “A 
claimant’s 
eligibility 
for 
permanent-total-disability 
compensation may be affected if the claimant has voluntarily retired or abandoned 
the job market for reasons not related to the industrial injury.”  State ex rel. Black 
January Term, 2020 
 
7
v. Indus. Comm., 137 Ohio St.3d 75, 2013-Ohio-4550, 997 N.E.2d 536, ¶ 14.  Ohio 
Adm.Code 4121-3-34(D), which provides guidelines that “shall be followed” by 
the adjudicator of an application for PTD compensation, states:  
 
If, after hearing, the adjudicator finds that the injured worker 
voluntarily removed himself or herself from the work force, the 
injured worker shall be found not to be permanently and totally 
disabled.  If evidence of voluntary removal or retirement is brought 
into issue, the adjudicator shall consider evidence that is submitted 
of the injured worker’s medical condition at or near the time of 
removal/retirement. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(D)(1)(d).  Navistar’s first 
proposition of law asserts that this regulation requires a hearing officer who is 
adjudicating a claim for PTD compensation to consider evidence of a claimant’s 
nondisability retirement and to address the issue of voluntary abandonment in the 
subsequent order. 
{¶ 16} However, the existence of that obligation depends on whether 
evidence of voluntary abandonment has been brought into issue.  As we have 
explained, “[b]ecause voluntary abandonment of all employment is an affirmative 
defense and an issue critical to eligibility for compensation for permanent total 
disability, if evidence of voluntary abandonment has been brought into issue, a 
hearing officer’s failure to address the issue constitutes a mistake of law.”  State ex 
rel. Stevens v. Indus. Comm., 142 Ohio St.3d 313, 2015-Ohio-1352, 29 N.E.3d 972, 
¶ 17, citing Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(D)(1)(d).  Conversely, however, the Tenth 
District has concluded that if the defense of voluntary abandonment has not been 
brought into issue at the SHO hearing, then it is an abuse of the hearing officer’s 
discretion to address it, because the claimant has not been afforded due process, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
8
i.e., sufficient notice and an opportunity to present evidence on the issue.  State ex 
rel. Jenkins v. Indus. Comm., 2017-Ohio-7896, 98 N.E.3d 944, ¶ 5 (10th Dist.).  
Similarly, in State ex rel. Quarto Mining Co. v. Foreman, an employer argued that 
the commission had abused its discretion by failing to initiate the issue whether 
voluntary abandonment precluded PTD compensation.  79 Ohio St.3d 78, 81-83, 
679 N.E.2d 706 (1997).  This court refused to relax the rule that issues not 
previously raised are waived and will not be considered by a reviewing court.  Id.  
This court went on to explain that relaxing that rule would “deny the claimant a 
meaningful opportunity to respond,” id. at 82, and “forc[e] an already overworked 
commission to comb the files of every PTD case in search of issues that could 
potentially be raised by both sides at the hearing table,” id. at 82-83. 
{¶ 17} The question is, therefore, whether Navistar brought evidence of 
voluntary abandonment into issue at the SHO hearing.  While Navistar presented 
no argument regarding voluntary abandonment to the commission prior to its 
motion for reconsideration, Navistar asserts that it brought voluntary abandonment 
into issue by presenting “written evidence and testimony related to the subject” at 
the SHO hearing.  However, this court rejected the same argument in Quarto 
Mining.  In that case, the employer argued that the issue of voluntary abandonment 
“raises itself by virtue of being manifest in the record.”  Id. at 81.  This court 
disagreed, stating that the employer has the burden “to raise and produce evidence 
on its claim that other circumstances independent of the claimant’s allowed 
conditions caused him to abandon the job market.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 84. 
{¶ 18} Navistar attempts to distinguish Quarto Mining by pointing out that 
the employer in that case first raised the issue of voluntary abandonment in a 
petition for a writ of mandamus, while Navistar first argued the issue in its motion 
for reconsideration before the commission.  That distinction makes no difference: 
either way, the claimant has been denied the opportunity to present evidence on the 
issue.  See Jenkins at ¶ 5; see also Quarto Mining at 81-82.  The purpose of 
January Term, 2020 
 
9
reconsideration of a hearing officer’s order is to address new or changed 
circumstances, fraud, clear mistakes of law or fact, or errors by the hearing 
officer—not to permit a party to present additional arguments or evidence that 
could have been presented at the hearing.  See Industrial Commission Resolution 
No. R08-1-01.  In its motion for reconsideration, Navistar argued that the 
commission had made a mistake of law by not addressing voluntary abandonment, 
but, as explained above, that argument contradicts Quarto Mining. 
{¶ 19} Navistar did no more than the employer in Quarto Mining: it merely 
presented evidence that could relate to voluntary abandonment and then waited for 
the SHO to “initiate the issue,” Quarto Mining, 79 Ohio St.3d at 83, 679 N.E.2d 
706.  Navistar has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that it brought 
Bisdorf’s alleged voluntary abandonment into issue at the SHO hearing.  
Accordingly, we reject Navistar’s first proposition of law. 
2. Four-hour work day 
{¶ 20} “ ‘Permanent total disability’ means the inability to perform 
sustained remunerative employment due to the allowed conditions in the claim.”  
Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(B)(1).  In its second proposition of law, Navistar argues 
that Bisdorf could have worked four hours a day and that State ex rel. Bonnlander 
v. Hamon, 150 Ohio St.3d 567, 2017-Ohio-4003, 84 N.E.3d 1004, therefore 
required the commission to consider various nonmedical factors before granting 
Bisdorf’s request for PTD compensation.  See State ex rel. Stephenson v. Indus. 
Comm., 31 Ohio St.3d 167, 173, 509 N.E.2d 946 (1987) (identifying age, education, 
and work record as relevant nonmedical factors). 
{¶ 21} However, the commission is the exclusive finder of fact in workers’ 
compensation matters.  State ex rel. Vonderheide v. Multi-Color Corp., 156 Ohio 
St.3d 403, 2019-Ohio-1270, 128 N.E.3d 188, ¶ 7.  And the commission did not find 
that Bisdorf could have worked four hours a day.  On the contrary, it found that 
Bisdorf was incapable of performing any sustained remunerative employment 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
10 
solely as a result of the medical impairments from his allowed physical conditions.  
Accepting Navistar’s argument would require us to reject that factual determination 
and substitute a new finding that Bisdorf was able to work four hours a day—an 
improper invasion of the commission’s role as the exclusive fact-finder. 
{¶ 22} In addition, Bonnlander is inapposite.  In Bonnlander, we rejected 
an argument that the ability to work at least four hours a day necessarily means that 
the claimant can engage in sustained remunerative employment.  Bonnlander at 
¶ 13-14, 20.  Rather, we held that “there is no hourly standard for determining one’s 
capability to perform sustained remunerative employment on a part-time basis.  The 
commission decides whether a claimant is capable of sustained remunerative 
employment on a case-by-case basis.”  Id. at ¶ 20. 
{¶ 23} Unlike in this case, the commission in Bonnlander found that the 
claimant could work up to four hours per day.  150 Ohio St.3d 567, 2017-Ohio-
4003, 84 N.E.3d 1004, at ¶ 5.  The commission then considered the nonmedical 
factors listed in Stephenson, 31 Ohio St.3d at 173, 509 N.E.2d 946, and denied the 
claimant’s request for PTD compensation.  Bonnlander at ¶ 6.  While the 
commission may not deny PTD compensation without considering nonmedical 
factors, it may grant PTD compensation without considering nonmedical factors 
when “medical factors alone preclude sustained remunerative employment.”  State 
ex rel. Galion Mfg. Div., Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Haygood, 60 Ohio St.3d 38, 40, 
573 N.E.2d 60 (1991).  That is what occurred here: the commission concluded 
based on medical evidence that Bisdorf could not work at all.  Navistar’s argument 
that the commission was required to consider the Stephenson nonmedical factors is 
therefore not well-taken.  Accordingly, we reject Navistar’s second proposition of 
law. 
3. Dr. Rutherford’s opinion 
{¶ 24} “[E]quivocal medical opinions are not evidence.”  State ex rel. 
Eberhardt v. Flxible Corp., 70 Ohio St.3d 649, 657, 640 N.E.2d 815 (1994).  
January Term, 2020 
 
11 
“[E]quivocation occurs when a doctor repudiates an earlier opinion, renders 
contradictory or uncertain opinions, or fails to clarify an ambiguous statement.”  Id.  
In its third proposition of law, Navistar argues that Dr. Rutherford’s opinion is 
equivocal on the question whether Bisdorf could have engaged in sustained 
remunerative employment and that the commission abused its discretion by relying 
on Dr. Rutherford’s opinion.  However, this argument is immaterial, because the 
commission relied on the reports of both Dr. Rutherford and Dr. Grunstein, and 
even if we were to exclude Dr. Rutherford’s report as equivocal, Dr. Grunstein’s 
report would constitute some evidence supporting the commission’s conclusion 
that Bisdorf was incapable of sustained remunerative employment.  See State ex 
rel. Ehlinger v. Indus. Comm., 76 Ohio St.3d 400, 402, 667 N.E.2d 1210 (1996).  
Accordingly, we do not reach Navistar’s third proposition of law. 
D. Oral Argument 
{¶ 25} In a direct appeal such as this, the granting of a request for oral 
argument is subject to this court’s discretion.  S.Ct.Prac.R. 17.02(A).  We typically 
do not grant a request for oral argument unless the case involves (1) a matter of 
great public importance, (2) complex issues of law or fact, (3) a substantial 
constitutional issue, or (4) a conflict among courts of appeals.  See State ex rel. BF 
Goodrich Co., Specialty Chems. Div. v. Indus. Comm., 148 Ohio St.3d 212, 2016-
Ohio-7988, 69 N.E.3d 728, ¶ 23.  Navistar’s motion for oral argument does not 
address any of the above factors; Navistar argues only that the court of appeals 
erred and misapplied the law.  We therefore deny the motion for oral argument. 
III. CONCLUSION 
{¶ 26} For these reasons, we grant Navistar’s motion to continue the case, 
affirm the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, and deny Navistar’s 
motion for oral argument. 
Motion to continue granted 
and judgment affirmed. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
12 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, and 
STEWART, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 27} The narrow issue before this court is when and how an employer 
must raise the defense of voluntary abandonment of employment when an injured 
worker requests permanent-total-disability (“PTD”) compensation. 
{¶ 28} In this case, the Tenth District Court of Appeals determined that 
appellant, Navistar, Inc., failed to present clear and convincing evidence that at an 
administrative hearing before a staff hearing officer (“SHO”), it had raised a 
defense asserting that appellee Gary E. Bisdorf had voluntarily abandoned the 
workforce, precluding him from receiving PTD compensation.  Citing State ex rel. 
Jenkins v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 16AP-534, 2017-Ohio-7896, ¶ 3-5, the 
Tenth District held that voluntary retirement or abandonment of the workforce is 
an affirmative defense and may not be raised in the first instance in a motion for 
reconsideration.  Rather, the court of appeals held that that defense must be raised 
at the hearing in front of appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio.  The Tenth 
District further held that because Navistar failed to assert at the hearing that Bisdorf 
had voluntarily retired or abandoned the workforce, Navistar waived the ability to 
assert that defense in its complaint for a writ of mandamus.  Although the magistrate 
found that Navistar had “clearly raised” the issue before the commission and that 
the commission had had a duty to address it, 2017-Ohio-8976, ¶ 77, the Tenth 
District rejected that finding and returned the case to the magistrate for rulings on 
additional assertions made by Bisdorf, id. at ¶ 22-23.  The Tenth District did not 
address the merits of Navistar’s voluntary-abandonment argument. 
{¶ 29} However, there are no pleading requirements, magic words, or 
talismanic incantations needed to assert that an injured worker voluntarily 
January Term, 2020 
 
13 
abandoned the workforce.  At Bisdorf’s PTD hearing, he testified that after working 
at Navistar for 30 years, he voluntarily retired.  Subsequently, he worked part-time 
at a gun store for approximately six years.  Bisdorf stopped working for reasons 
unrelated to his workplace injury when the gun store closed, which occurred 
approximately five years before he sought PTD compensation.  At the hearing, 
counsel for Navistar argued that Bisdorf had taken “regular retirement” and that he 
was able to work while at the gun store and remained capable of working 
afterwards.  The record reflects that Navistar sufficiently raised the defense that 
Bisdorf voluntarily retired or abandoned the workforce before becoming 
permanently and totally disabled, and the SHO made a clear mistake of law in 
failing to address that issue, warranting reconsideration by the commission. 
{¶ 30} Because the commission abused its discretion in failing to consider 
evidence in the record indicating that Bisdorf voluntarily retired or otherwise 
abandoned all employment before becoming permanently and totally disabled, I 
would reverse the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals and issue a writ 
of mandamus directing the commission to vacate its award of PTD compensation. 
{¶ 31} Because the majority holds otherwise, I dissent. 
{¶ 32} R.C. 4123.54(A) provides that an injured worker “is entitled to 
receive the compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury” as provided 
by R.C. Chapter 4123.  Relying on this language, we have explained that “[f]or 
purposes of compensability, a causal relationship must exist between the 
employee’s industrial injury and the loss that the requested benefit is designed to 
compensate.”  State ex rel. McCoy v. Dedicated Transport, Inc., 97 Ohio St.3d 25, 
2002-Ohio-5305, 776 N.E.2d 51, ¶ 35.  Therefore, in seeking PTD compensation, 
the claimant has the burden “to establish that the disability is permanent and that 
the inability to work is causally related to the allowed conditions.”  State ex rel. 
Sheppard v. Indus. Comm., 139 Ohio St.3d 223, 2014-Ohio-1904, 11 N.E.3d 231, 
¶ 16. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
14 
{¶ 33} This court has recognized that “[v]oluntary retirement precludes 
[PTD] compensation.”  State ex rel. Crisp v. Indus. Comm., 64 Ohio St.3d 507, 508, 
597 N.E.2d 119 (1992).  A claimant who retires or otherwise voluntarily abandons 
employment for reasons unrelated to his or her injury cannot receive PTD 
compensation, because it is the claimant’s own action, not the workplace injury, 
that prevents the claimant from engaging in sustained remunerative employment.  
State ex rel. Chrysler Corp., v. Indus. Comm., 62 Ohio St.3d 193, 196, 580 N.E.2d 
1082 (1991).  In those circumstances, the injury is not the proximate cause of the 
inability to work.  Sheppard at ¶ 20; see also State ex rel. Reliance Elec. Co. v. 
Wright, 92 Ohio St.3d 109, 748 N.E.2d 1105 (2001) (“pre-PTD voluntary 
abandonment of the labor force can be perceived as an intervening act that breaks 
the nexus between an allowed condition and PTD”). 
{¶ 34} The administrative rules adopted by the commission align with this 
precedent.  Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(D)(3)(a) places the burden on the injured 
worker to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that “the disability is 
permanent and that the inability to work is causally related to the allowed 
conditions.”  Further, under Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(D)(3)(b), the SHO must 
determine whether “the inability to work is due to the allowed conditions in the 
claim,” and under Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(D)(3)(g), the SHO must “review all 
relevant factors in the record that may affect the injured worker’s ability to work.”  
That includes considering whether a claimant’s inability to work has resulted from 
retirement or other voluntary abandonment of employment; Ohio Adm.Code 4121-
3-34(D)(1)(d) states that “[i]f, after hearing, the adjudicator finds that the injured 
worker voluntarily removed himself or herself from the work force, the injured 
worker shall be found not to be permanently and totally disabled.”  (Emphasis 
added.) 
{¶ 35} Although this court has determined that retirement or other voluntary 
abandonment of employment breaks the chain of cause and effect that is necessary 
January Term, 2020 
 
15 
to prove that a loss of employment resulted from a workplace injury, McCoy, 97 
Ohio St.3d 25, 2002-Ohio-5305, 776 N.E.2d 51, at ¶ 36, this court has nonetheless 
rejected the argument that “since it is [the] claimant’s burden to prove that his 
disability is causally related to allowed conditions in the claim, it is necessarily 
[the] claimant’s burden to prove that nonallowed conditions played no part in his 
decision to retire,” State ex rel. Quarto Mining Co. v. Foreman, 79 Ohio St.3d 78, 
83, 679 N.E.2d 706 (1997).  Rather, we concluded that “[t]he burden should * * * 
properly fall upon the employer to raise and produce evidence on its claim that 
other circumstances independent of the claimant’s allowed conditions caused him 
to abandon the job market.”  Id. at 84.  And for that reason, “the commission, in 
evaluating a claimant’s application for PTD compensation, does not abuse its 
discretion by failing to initiate the issue whether claimant’s retirement precludes 
his or her eligibility for PTD compensation.”  Id. 
{¶ 36} More recent cases have also described voluntary abandonment as an 
affirmative defense, meaning that the burden of proof is on the employer to raise 
and establish it.  See State ex rel. Pacheco v. Indus. Comm., 157 Ohio St.3d 126, 
2019-Ohio-2954, 132 N.E.3d 670, ¶ 26; State ex rel. Stevens v. Indus. Comm., 142 
Ohio St.3d 313, 2015-Ohio-1352, 29 N.E.3d 972, ¶ 17.  Navistar does not challenge 
the appellate court’s characterization of voluntary retirement or abandonment of 
employment as an affirmative defense, and we need not revisit that question to 
decide this case. 
{¶ 37} Assuming that voluntary retirement or abandonment of employment 
is an affirmative defense, the administrative rules do not impose any pleading 
requirement for asserting it.  For example, either party may request a prehearing 
conference, Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(C)(7), and at such a conference, each party 
must be prepared to discuss evidence, if any, related to the injured worker’s 
retirement and refusal to work, Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(C)(8)(a) and (b).  The 
rule also states that the failure to request a prehearing conference or to raise a 
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defense at one “does not act to waive any assertion, argument, or defense that may 
be raised at a hearing held under paragraphs (D) and (E),” Ohio Adm.Code 4121-
3-34(C)(7), including the defense of voluntary abandonment, Ohio Adm.Code 
4121-3-34(D)(1)(d).  And although Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34 provides a specific 
procedure for reviewing applications for PTD compensation, it makes no other 
reference to how or when defenses must be raised or preserved.  Unlike the Rules 
of Civil Procedure, the administrative rules do not include any formal requirements 
for pleading a defense. 
{¶ 38} And we have never required magic words or talismanic incantations 
to assert an affirmative defense in workers’ compensation cases.  Rather, the 
employer is required to “raise and produce evidence,” Quarto Mining Co., 79 Ohio 
St.3d at 84, 679 N.E.2d 706, that is sufficient to put the claimant on notice that the 
defense is at issue in order to allow “the claimant a meaningful opportunity to 
respond,” id. at 82.   
{¶ 39} In this case, the evidence presented and the arguments raised created 
a question of fact regarding whether Bisdorf severed the causal connection between 
his workplace injury and his loss of sustained remunerative employment by retiring 
and voluntarily abandoning all employment.  Bisdorf testified that he had retired 
from Navistar after working 30 years, and the commission previously found that he 
had voluntarily retired in February 2003.  He also testified that he could have 
continued working, but he “was spending more time on the table getting operated 
on than [he] was working.”  Although he was not looking for a new job and 
“considered [himself] retired,” he began working part-time as a sales associate and 
firearms instructor at a gun store in May 2004.  He stopped working at the gun store 
when it went out of business in September 2010—not because he was incapable of 
performing his job duties—and he did not look for another place of employment.  
Bisdorf did not specifically testify that his lack of employment after the gun store 
closed was due to his prior workplace injuries, but in any case, there is no medical 
January Term, 2020 
 
17 
evidence in the record that he was permanently and totally disabled at the time he 
stopped working at the gun store or at any time during the next five years.  Dr. 
David M. Grunstein, a chiropractic physician, examined Bisdorf in October 2015 
and found him to be permanently and totally disabled.  Based on Dr. Grunstein’s 
report, Bisdorf requested PTD compensation commencing on the date of that exam. 
{¶ 40} In summation at the hearing before the SHO, counsel for Navistar 
pointed out that Bisdorf had taken “regular retirement” and had been able to 
continue working at the gun store for six years.  Pointing to another medical report, 
counsel stated that at the time of Bisdorf’s retirement and during the time that he 
worked at the gun store, his allowed conditions “had improved significantly.”  
Counsel also pointed to evidence that Bisdorf was still capable of doing sedentary 
work.  While counsel did not use the magic words “voluntary retirement or other 
abandonment of all employment,” the import of his argument was that at the time 
Bisdorf stopped working and long afterward, he was not permanently and totally 
disabled. 
{¶ 41} A hearing officer is required to “ ‘specifically state what evidence 
has been relied upon in reaching the conclusion.’ ”  State ex rel. Penske Truck 
Leasing Co., L.P. v. Indus. Comm., 153 Ohio St.3d 133, 2018-Ohio-2153, 101 
N.E.3d 456, ¶ 12, quoting Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(D)(3)(h).  But in granting 
Bisdorf PTD compensation, the SHO’s order stated only, “Based upon the reports 
of James Rutherford, M.D., dated 03/15/2016, and David Grunstein, D.C., dated 
10/22/2015, it is found that the Injured Worker is unable to perform any sustained 
remunerative employment solely as a result of the medical impairment caused by 
the allowed physical conditions.”  However, neither of those reports provided any 
medical evidence that the allowed conditions prevented Bisdorf from working after 
the gun store closed in September 2010.  Tellingly, the commission awarded 
compensation beginning in October 2015, even though Bisdorf had stopped 
working more than five years earlier, and the order points to no evidence that the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
18 
workplace injury prevented him from seeking other employment after the gun store 
closed.  The order simply ignores this gap in the record. 
{¶ 42} PTD compensation may not be granted unless the injured worker has 
met his or her burden to prove that the allowed conditions caused the inability to 
work.  Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(D)(3)(a) and (b).  And when evidence presented 
at the hearing indicates that the injured worker retired or otherwise voluntarily 
abandoned employment for reasons unrelated to the injury, that evidence must be 
considered and weighed by the hearing officer in deciding whether proximate cause 
was established.  See Sheppard, 139 Ohio St.3d 223, 2014-Ohio-1904, 11 N.E.3d 
231, at ¶ 21 (explaining that the hearing officer is required address voluntary 
abandonment, proximate cause, and “all relevant factors in the record that may 
affect the claimant’s ability to work”). 
{¶ 43} In my view, Navistar sufficiently presented and preserved the 
argument that Bisdorf voluntarily abandoned the workforce before he became 
permanently and totally disabled.  If the majority believes that the evidence and 
argument presented at the hearing was insufficient, then what is sufficient?  This 
court should provide guidance to practitioners and the commission regarding what 
words an employer must say in order to trigger the commission’s duty to consider 
evidence that the injured worker voluntarily retired or otherwise abandoned 
employment.  If magic words or a talismanic incantation are needed, the court 
should say so.  If the majority believes that notice in writing before the hearing is 
required, then it should say that and the commission should include the requirement 
in Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34.  However, the majority falls short of telling 
practitioners and parties what is expected of them going forward, and they should 
take notice that the failure to use the right language at the hearing could foreclose 
any finding that the injured worker voluntarily retired or abandoned employment, 
no matter how strong the evidence of it in the record is. 
January Term, 2020 
 
19 
{¶ 44} During the SHO hearing, Navistar presented the commission with 
evidence that Bisdorf had voluntarily retired from the workforce before he became 
permanently and totally disabled.  And that issue should have been addressed when 
Navistar filed its motion for reconsideration.  The commission abused its discretion 
by failing to determine whether Bisdorf had voluntarily removed himself from the 
workforce and whether he was ineligible for PTD compensation for that reason. 
{¶ 45} Therefore, I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and 
issue a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to vacate its award of PTD 
compensation. 
_________________ 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., and Corrine S. Carman, for 
appellant. 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Kevin J. Reis, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio. 
Stanley R. Jurus Law Office and Michael J. Muldoon, for appellee Gary E. 
Bisdorf. 
_________________