Title: SHERRI R. SPETEN v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

SHERRI R. SPETEN v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 63185 P.3d 25Case Number: No. S-07-0253Decided: 06/09/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
SHERRI 
R. SPETEN,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty

The 
Honorable John R. Perry, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

John 
Craig Abraham of Plains Law Offices, LLP, Gillette, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce A. 
Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Teresa R. Nelson, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Nelson.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from the district court's denial of a motion to suppress as evidence 
methamphetamine discovered during a warrantless search of the appellant's 
purse.  The appellant entered a 
conditional plea of nolo contendere 
to possession of methamphetamine with the intent to deliver, in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2007), reserving her right to appeal that 
denial.  See W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2).  We conclude that the search of the 
appellant's purse violated neither the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution nor Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.  Therefore, we 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Whether the 
district court abused its discretion in denying the appellant's motion to 
suppress?

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶3]      A succinct 
statement of our standard for reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress 
evidence is found in Flood v. State, 
2007 WY 167, ¶ 10, 169 P.3d 538, 542 (Wyo. 2007) (quoting O'Boyle v. State, 2005 WY 83, ¶ 18, 117 P.3d 401, 407 (Wyo. 2005)):

 
 
            
Factual findings made by a trial court considering a motion to suppress 
will not be disturbed unless the findings are clearly erroneous.  Meek v. State, 2002 WY 1, ¶ 8, 37 P.3d 1279, ¶ 8 (Wyo. 2002).  Because the 
trial court has the opportunity to hear the evidence, assess witness 
credibility, and draw the necessary inferences, deductions, and conclusions, we 
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's 
determination. Id. Whether an 
unreasonable search or seizure occurred in violation of constitutional rights 
presents a question of law and is reviewed de novo.  Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 480 
(Wyo. 
1999).

 
 
[¶4]      The issue of the 
constitutionality of a search often focuses upon the question of whether or not 
the officer had probable cause to search, or the question of whether the officer 
had reasonable suspicion to initiate an investigative detention.  These questions are resolved by resort 
to an objective test, taking into account the totality of the circumstances, 
rather than by analyzing the subjective thought process of the officer.  Fertig v. State, 2006 WY 148, ¶ 25, 146 P.3d 492, 500 (Wyo. 2006) (probable cause); Meadows v. State, 2003 WY 37, ¶ 17, 65 P.3d 33, 37 (Wyo. 2003) (investigative detention).1  Probable cause to search exists "where 
the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable 
prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found[.]"  Damato v. State, 2003 WY 13, ¶ 17, 64 P.3d 700, 707 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695-96, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 
1661, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911 (1996)).  By 
contrast, reasonable suspicion is simply "a particularized and objective basis' 
for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity."  Id. (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695, 
66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981)).  Finally, 
while the test is objective, the officer's training, experience, and expertise 
are to be considered as part of the "totality of the circumstances."  McKenney v. State, 2007 WY 129, ¶ 11, 
165 P.3d 96, 98-99 (Wyo. 2007); Rohda v. 
State, 2006 WY 120, ¶ 24, 142 P.3d 1155, 1167 (Wyo. 2006); Vassar v. State, 2004 WY 125, ¶ 18 n.7, 
99 P.3d 987, 994 n.7 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶5]      The motion to 
suppress was heard on May 4, 2007.  
The only person to testify was Sheriff's Deputy Tony Seeman, a 
fourteen-year veteran of the Campbell County Sheriff's Office, with over four 
years served as a plain-clothed narcotics officer.  Before we discuss the district court's 
findings of fact, we will summarize the key facts of this case, drawn from 
Deputy Seeman's testimony.

 
 
[¶6]      During the 
evening of September 23, 2006, Deputy Seeman received a telephone call from his 
partner, asking him to go to the sheriff's department to assist with the 
execution of an arrest warrant and a search warrant.  Upon arrival at the department, Deputy 
Seeman learned that the warrants were being requested because a woman who 
we will identify as J.K. had been hospitalized after receiving an injection 
of methamphetamine from Dickie Fay Sandy.  Deputy Seeman was familiar with both J.K. 
and Sandy, having previously learned from J.K. 
that Sandy 
distributed methamphetamine from his automotive shop, where he sometimes hid 
drugs in engine blocks.  Deputy 
Seeman further learned from other deputies that the current situation had arisen 
when J.K. became seriously ill after receiving the methamphetamine injection 
from Sandy, was 
later found unconscious at her residence, and had been taken by city police 
officers to the hospital.

 
 
[¶7]      Deputy Seeman was 
ordered to go to the location of Sandy's shop for surveillance purposes until 
the warrants could be obtained.  
Upon arrival at the shop, Deputy Seeman observed a vehicle he knew to be 
driven by Sandy, 
and he saw that the shop lights were lit.  When Deputy Seeman notified the other 
officers that he believed Sandy was present, he was told to maintain 
surveillance pending completion of the warrants, but to effectuate a "probable 
cause arrest" if Sandy began to leave.

 
 
[¶8]      Deputy Seeman 
began surveillance at about 8:50 p.m.  
Nothing occurred until about 9:22 p.m., when a man and a woman left the 
shop and walked toward Sandy's vehicle.  Deputy Seeman watched the man appear to 
wipe off the vehicle's tires, while the woman paced back and forth.2  Deputy Seeman recognized the man as 
Sandy, but did 
not recognize the woman.  As 
Sandy walked 
around his vehicle, he came to a spot where he had a direct view of where Deputy 
Seeman was sitting.  Fearful that 
Sandy would see him and would attempt to leave or 
go back into the building, Deputy Seeman called a nearby backup officer, and the 
two of them proceeded to arrest Sandy.

 
 
[¶9]      The two deputies 
rapidly approached Sandy and the woman and, at gunpoint, ordered Sandy to the ground, at 
the same time ordering the woman to put her hands in the air and not to move. 
 Deputy Seeman testified that it is 
standard operating procedure to make felony drug arrests at gunpoint because it 
is common for drug dealers to carry weapons.  After Sandy was handcuffed and placed in the backup 
officer's patrol car for transport to the detention center, Deputy Seeman 
returned to where the woman was standing and began to question her as to her 
reason for being there.  The woman, 
later to become the appellant herein, identified herself by name, but indicated 
that she did not know where her "I.D." was.3  This caused Deputy Seeman some concern 
because he did not know exactly with whom he was dealing.  In response to the deputy's question as 
to her purpose there, the appellant said that she had just arrived and that she 
was looking for a vehicle to buy.  
Deputy Seeman then noted that the appellant's vehicle, which he had not 
noticed earlier, was not parked in front of the shop, but was parked in a line 
of cars that "appeared to either be abandoned or for sale or just kind of parked 
off to the side."

 
 
[¶10]   Deputy Seeman told the appellant 
that he had been there for some time, that he knew she had not just arrived, and 
that he had not seen her look at any of the vehicles.  He then suggested to her that most women 
carry their I.D. in their purse, and asked her if she would like to look in her 
purse for her I.D.4  The appellant declined to look in her 
purse, but suggested that the backup officer could search her vehicle to see if 
her I.D. was there.

 
 
[¶11]   Deputy Seeman continued to question 
the appellant, during which time she appeared nervous and fidgety, was pacing, 
and was "quite animated and upset that the police had come to make this arrest 
on Mr. Sandy . . ."  Deputy Seeman 
concluded that her actions resembled those of someone "who could possibly be 
under the influence of methamphetamine."  
When asked about methamphetamine use, the appellant admitted that she 
used it occasionally, and that she had smoked methamphetamine the previous 
day.

 
 
[¶12]   During this interview, Deputy 
Seeman received a telephone call from Chris McDonald, an agent with the Wyoming 
Division of Criminal Investigation.  
McDonald told Seeman that the appellant was a known methamphetamine 
dealer, according to several "street level targets" who had named her as their 
source.  By that juncture, Deputy 
Seeman's "overall sense of what's going on" was that the appellant was at the 
shop to get methamphetamine from Sandy and that she probably had already done 
so.

 
 
[¶13]   What happened next is the focus of 
this appeal, and it is best described by Deputy Seeman's 
testimony:

 
 
Q         
What happened then?

 
 
A         
Detective Brent Wasson arrived on the scene.  The search warrants and arrest warrants 
had just been in transit to the CountyAttorney's Office, to the  to the Judge's 
house, I believe.  They were just 
being finalized, at least they were almost completed.  Miss Speten stated that she wanted to 
leave, and before she left I took her purse, placed it on the back of my car and 
opened it to give it back to her, or to make sure that it was safe; that it was 
still in the immediate area.  When I 
opened the purse, I immediately saw a glass methamphetamine pipe on 
top.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
Q         
What were your concerns and reasons for opening the 
purse?

 
 
A         
My concern was that I still had not properly identified Miss Speten, that 
she could have some type of weapon in the purse and still in the immediate area; 
that there was possibly narcotics that I believed could be dangerous narcotics 
that could be released into our community that I did not want to leave that 
scene.

 
 
Q         
And in addition to the pipe, did you find other items in the 
purse?

 
 
A         
Yes, there was [sic] some bags.  
I believe it was six, and I'll have to look.

 
 
            
Yeah, it was six separate small Ziplock bags, each containing 
approximately .8 grams of methamphetamine that was tested 
later.

 
 
[¶14]   The district court ruled from the 
bench in denying the motion to suppress.  
An Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress was later entered, but 
rather than enumerating specific findings of fact, the Order simply incorporated 
by reference the court's oral pronouncements at the time the motion was denied. 
 Consequently, we will identify the 
district court's apparent findings of fact by perusing the transcript from that 
hearing.  Those apparent findings of 
fact are as follows:

 
 
1.   The underlying situation, that 
being the arrest of a drug dealer, created a high degree of 
danger.

 
 
2.   The incident occurred at night, in 
a commercial area.

 
 
3.   The degree of danger was heightened 
by the fact that the arrest occurred at gunpoint.

 
 
4.   The appellant lied to Deputy 
Seeman.

 
 
5.   The appellant parked her vehicle in 
an odd location.

 
 
6.   The fact that the appellant placed 
her purse on the ground heightened the curious nature of the 
encounter.

 
 
7.   The appellant told Deputy Seeman 
that she was a methamphetamine user and had used the drug the previous 
day.

 
 
8.   The appellant intended to leave and 
to take her purse with her.

 
 
9.   The officers believed they were 
dealing with a contaminated drug supply.

 
 
[¶15]   Based upon these findings of fact, 
the district court reached three conclusions of law:

 
 
1.   Under the totality of the 
circumstances, Deputy Seeman had probable cause to arrest the appellant before 
he seized and searched her purse.

 
 
2.   Seizure and search of the purse was 
justified by the doctrine of Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 
(1968).

 
 
3.   The list of exceptions to the 
requirement for a search warrant found in Fenton v. State, 2007 WY 51, 154 P.3d 974 (Wyo. 2007), is not exhaustive.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶16]   
Because the search of the appellant's purse was carried out without 
Deputy Seeman having obtained a warrant authorizing him to do so, we will begin 
this discussion with a review of the law governing warrantless 
searches:

 
 
            
The United States Constitution and the Wyoming Constitution prohibit 
"unreasonable searches and seizures."  
U.S. Const. amend. IV; Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4.  We have stated that under both 
constitutions, warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless 
they are justified by probable cause and established exceptions.  Morris v. State, 908 P.2d 931, 935 
(Wyo. 
1995).  In addition to the consent 
exception to the warrant requirement, these specific exigent circumstances 
exceptions include:

 
 
--search 
of an arrested suspect and the area within his control;

 
 
--search 
conducted while in pursuit of a fleeing suspect;

 
 
--search 
and/or seizure to prevent the imminent destruction of 
evidence;

 
 
--search 
and/or seizure of an automobile upon probable cause;

 
 
--search 
which results when an object is inadvertently in the plain view of police 
officers while they are where they have a right to be; and

 
 
--search 
which results from an entry into a dwelling in order to prevent loss of life or 
property.

 
 

Hughes [v. State], [2003 WY 35,] ¶ 11, [65 P.3d 378, 382 (Wyo. 2003)] (citing Andrews v. 
State, 2002 WY 28, ¶ 18, 40 P.3d 708, ¶ 18 (Wyo. 2002)).  The existence of exigent circumstances 
is dependent upon all of the facts or circumstances viewed in their 
entirety.  Hughes, ¶ 13.  When a proper objection or motion is 
made by a defendant, the State bears the burden of proving that one of these 
exceptions applies.  Mickelson v. State, 906 P.2d 1020, 1022 
(Wyo. 1995); Dickeson v. State, 843 P.2d 606, 610 
(Wyo. 
1992).

 
 

Pe±a v. 
State, 2004 
WY 115, ¶ 29, 98 P.3d 857, 870 (Wyo. 2004).  See also Fenton v. State, 2007 WY 51, ¶ 
2, 154 P.3d 974, 975 (Wyo. 2007). 

 
 
[¶17]   As the district court noted in its 
conclusions of law, this list is not exhaustive.  We have, for example, approved the 
"inventory search" of an impounded vehicle without probable cause.  Vargas-Rocha v. State, 891 P.2d 763, 767 
(Wyo. 
1995).  We have also found 
constitutionally reasonable a "weapons frisk" of an arrestee's companion without 
probable cause, for officer safety purposes.  Perry v. State, 927 P.2d 1158, 1164 
(Wyo. 
1996).  This has been called the 
"automatic companion rule."  
Id. at 
1163.  In Cotton v. State, 2005 WY 115, ¶ 22, 119 P.3d 931, 936 (Wyo. 2005), we held the search of an arrestee's shirt to be 
reasonable under all the circumstances, even though the arrestee was not wearing 
the shirt at the time of the arrest.  
That holding, under state constitutional analysis, was based upon the 
officer safety concerns of both the search incident to arrest exception and the 
automatic companion rule, because the arrestee attempted to have his passenger 
retrieve the shirt from his vehicle just after being arrested and before he was 
escorted to the patrol car.  
Id. at ¶¶ 5, 22, 
119 P.3d  at 932, 936.

 
 
[¶18]   In another line of cases, we have 
recognized that the "community caretaker" function of law enforcement officers 
may lead to encounters with citizens that, at the outset, are based upon neither 
probable cause nor even reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.  Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 217 
(Wyo. 1994), began when a police officer saw 
Wilson limping 
badly at 12:30 a.m.  The officer 
pulled over to determine whether Wilson was injured.  Wilson 
was then detained while the officer ran a "warrants check" locally and with the 
NationalCrimeInformationCenter.  Id.  Relying upon Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 
2528, 37 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1973), we concluded that the officer's initial contact 
with Wilson was 
constitutional under the community caretaker function.  Wilson, 874 P.2d  
at 221.  We also concluded that the 
officer's request that Wilson produce identification did not convert 
the encounter into a seizure.  
Id. at 222.  However, we held that Wilson's detention during the warrants check and the 
officer's subsequent directive to Wilson to wait at a particular location until 
the officer returned from a seemingly unrelated investigation constituted a 
seizure under the Fourth Amendment and were unlawful because they were not 
supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.  Id. 
at 223-25.

 
 
[¶19]   Over the years, we have been called 
upon to consider the community caretaker doctrine in various circumstances.  In Morris v. State, 908 P.2d 931, 935 (Wyo. 
1995),  we held that officers were 
justified in escorting the unsteady and disoriented Morris to the sheriff's 
office to enable him to call a friend for a ride, but not in searching Morris's 
wallet, which had been misplaced in the patrol car.  In particular, we found that none of the 
exceptions to the requirement for a search warrant applied.  Id. 
at 936-37.  In a substantially 
dissimilar case a year later, we relied upon the community caretaker function of 
law enforcement to justify the continued questioning of a vehicular-homicide 
arrestee because of confusion over whether there had been one or two passengers 
in his vehicle at the time of the accident.  Bloomquist v. State, 914 P.2d 812, 
821-22 (Wyo. 
1996).  Finally, in Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 69, 43 P.3d 80, 105 (Wyo. 2002), we described how a community caretaker case may become 
an eventual arrest:

 
 
            
The lesson to be learned from these cases is that resolution of a search 
and seizure issue in the context of an investigatory stop that becomes an arrest 
requires application of a totality of the circumstances test.  Martindale v. State, 2001 WY 52, ¶ 11, 
24 P.3d 1138, 1141 (Wyo. 2001); Buckles 
v. State, 998 P.2d 927, 930 (Wyo. 2000).  The same test must be used in cases such 
as Wilson and Morris and the instant case, where the 
initial contact with the defendant did not arise out of an investigatory stop, 
but was initiated out of concern for the defendant's welfare.  When an officer observes conduct that 
suggests a person may be injured or otherwise in need of assistance, the 
officer's community caretaker function allows him to contact that person 
regardless of the lack of any articulable suspicion of criminal activity.  Instead, the contact may be justified by 
showing the "specific and articulable facts" upon which the officer relied in 
exercising his community caretaker function; that is, in acting to enhance the 
public safety.  Morris, 908 P.2d  at 936.  Facts learned during that initial 
contact may lead to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and that 
reasonable suspicion may lead to further investigation and an eventual 
arrest.

 
 
[¶20]   With this body of law in mind, we 
will now explore the various rationales that have been offered by the State in 
support of the constitutionality of Deputy Seeman's search of the appellant's 
purse.  Deputy Seeman, himself, 
testified that he searched the purse as the appellant prepared to leave the 
scene (1) to make sure that it was safe; (2) because he had not properly 
identified the appellant; (3) because the purse could have contained a weapon; 
and (4) because the purse could have contained some of the suspectedly 
contaminated methamphetamine. See 
supra ¶ 13.  In the State's 
opening statement at the motion hearing, the prosecutor proffered (1) "in a 
Terry-type situation there's what's called an automatic companion 
doctrine," (2) the community caretaker function of law enforcement; (3) the 
"Carroll doctrine," and (4) "if there's not probable cause to arrest this 
defendant at the time the search is made, it's awfully, awfully close to 
probable cause[.]"5  In closing argument, the prosecutor 
argued (1) search incident to arrest; (2) probable cause for arrest; (3) the 
automatic companion rule; and (4) the community caretaker function.  As noted hereinabove, the district court 
upheld the search on two grounds:  
probable cause to arrest and the Terry doctrine.  See supra ¶ 15.

 
 
[¶21]   In her appellate brief, the 
appellant focuses on two points:  
first, the search of the purse was not done pursuant to any of the 
recognized exceptions to the constitutional warrant requirement, and second, 
Deputy Seeman's actions were not reasonably related to the circumstances that 
justified the appellant's original detention.  In response, the State contends that the 
search was justified under the automatic companion rule of Perry, or that it was reasonable under 
all of the circumstances.  For the 
latter contention, the State emphasizes Putnam v. State, 995 P.2d 632, 637 (Wyo. 
2000), where we quoted the following passage from Terry in justification of a pat-down 
search for weapons during an investigative detention:

 
 
The 
officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue 
is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in 
the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. [Citations and 
footnote omitted]  And in 
determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due 
weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 
"hunch," but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw 
from the facts in light of his experience.  
[Citation omitted]

 
 

Id.  (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1883, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)).6

 
 
[¶22]   Finally, at oral argument, counsel 
boiled the issue down to its essence.  
The appellant contended that the Terry reasoning dissipated after 20 
minutes of questioning, meaning that the "stop and frisk" rationale no longer 
applied at the time of the purse search.  
In other words, if Terry's 
purpose is to provide for officer safety during an investigative detention, 
that purpose no longer existed once the detention had ended and the appellant 
was going to leave.  The State 
argued, to the contrary, that the officer safety concern actually increased 
during the conversation, as the officer learned more about the appellant, 
meaning that the case fits directly under Terry.  In pursuing this argument, the State for 
all intents and purposes abandoned the automatic companion 
argument.

 
 
[¶23]   The State has thrown all of its 
stated justifications into a hypothetical funnel, with the officer safety 
rationale of Terry falling out the 
bottom, but if we reject that theory, we will have to decide whether any other 
relevant theory justified the search of appellant's purse, because we are 
reviewing the facts under an objective standard, and because we may affirm the 
district court upon any theory supported by the record.  Vigil v. State, 2004 WY 110, ¶ 17, 98 P.3d 172, 177 (Wyo. 2004); Billingsley v. 
State, 2003 WY 61, ¶ 9, 69 P.3d 390, 395 (Wyo. 2003).  We begin with the observation that, 
obviously, Deputy Seeman did not obtain a warrant to search the purse.  Consequently, the search was 
unreasonable, and therefore, unconstitutional, unless it was justified by a 
recognized exception to the warrant requirement.  The potential exceptions to the warrant 
requirement, under the circumstances of this case, are:  (1) probable cause to search, with the 
exigency of the imminent loss or destruction of evidence; (2) probable cause to 
arrest the appellant, coupled with a search incident to that arrest; (3) the 
automatic companion doctrine; (4) the community caretaker function; and (5) the 
Terry doctrine.  Given the somewhat confused and somewhat 
confusing arguments presented in the trial court, in the briefs, and in oral 
argument, we feel compelled to note that there is neither a "freestanding" right 
to search based solely upon officer safety concerns, nor is there a 
"freestanding" right to search based solely upon reasonable suspicion of the 
presence of weapons or contraband.  
The right to search or "frisk" for weapons arises out of the need for 
officer safety during an arrest, which arrest, whether by warrant or not, is 
supported by probable cause, or it arises out of the need for officer safety 
during an investigative detention, the latter by its required nature being based 
upon reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

 
 
[¶24]   Under Terry analysis, the question is 
this:  at the time he searched the 
appellant's purse, did Deputy Seeman have a reasonable suspicion that the 
appellant was engaged in criminal activity, and if so, did the officer safety 
concern that engendered Terry justify 
the deputy's search of the appellant's purse 20 minutes after the encounter 
began, and just as it was about to end?  
Asked more plainly, did Deputy Seeman have the right to pick up the 
appellant's purse and search it before handing it to her so she could 
leave?  We conclude that, while this 
was not the typical fact pattern that leads to a Terry "stop and frisk," Deputy Seeman 
did, at the time of the search, have reasonable suspicion that the appellant was 
engaged in criminal activity, and Deputy Seeman did, at the time of the search, 
have reasonable apprehension as to officer safety.  An officer safety concern does not 
necessarily exist at only one precise moment in time during an investigative 
detention, and we believe the rationale of Terry would allow a limited search for 
weapons at any time during that detention that the officer safety concern 
becomes apparent.

 
 
[¶25]   Viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the State, as we must, these were the facts:  (1) a known felony drug dealer had just 
been arrested at gunpoint; (2) the arrest occurred at night; (3) the arrest 
occurred at the location where the arrestee was believed to conceal and deal 
methamphetamine; (4) the appellant was present during, and quite agitated by, 
the gunpoint arrest;  (5) the 
appellant emerged from the shop building with Sandy after being inside for about 
one-half hour; (6) the appellant lied to Deputy Seeman about how long she had 
been at the scene; (7) Deputy Seeman, an experienced law enforcement officer 
with considerable narcotics training, recognized the appellant's fidgeting and 
nervousness as characteristic of someone using methamphetamine; (8) Deputy 
Seeman learned during the investigative detention that the appellant was 
suspected to be a drug dealer, and that she was an admitted methamphetamine 
user; (9) the appellant's refusal to look into or open her purse was unusual; 
and (10) drug dealers often carry weapons.  
Under these circumstances, we cannot say that Deputy Seeman's safety 
concerns were unreasonable.  He 
could have searched the appellant and her purse for weapons when he arrested 
Sandy, under the 
automatic companion rule.  He did 
not do so, however, but followed up the arrest with an investigative detention 
of the appellant.  That is when the 
Terry doctrine "kicked in," and we 
believe that, under the particular circumstances of this case, the right to 
frisk for weapons existed when the purse search occurred.  Many of the facts that justified the 
search were developed during the detention, and Terry certainly should not be read so 
narrowly as to allow a weapons search at the onset, or not at 
all.

 
 
[¶26]   Whether raised under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, or Article 1, Section 4 of the 
Wyoming Constitution, the answer to the question is the same.  We have used the "totality of the 
circumstances" approach to judging reasonableness that is required for analysis 
under the state constitution.  We 
found no facts that would support a conclusion that the greater protections of 
Article 1, Section 4 require reversal in this case.  Moreover, in her meager state 
constitutional analysis, the appellant has failed to provide any foothold for 
such a conclusion.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶27]   Having concluded that Deputy 
Seeman's search of the appellant's purse was constitutional as a reasonable 
search for weapons during an investigative detention, we need not further 
consider any of the other theories and justifications discussed by the 
parties.

 
 
[¶28]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Probable 
cause for an arrest is also reviewed under an objective standard.  Goettl v. State, 842 P.2d 549, 552 
(Wyo. 
1992).

 
 

2In 
commenting upon the woman's pacing, Deputy Seeman testified that "it was kind of 
brisk that night."

 
 

3The 
record is not clear, but we assume that "I.D." means driver's 
license.

 
 

4The 
record reflects that the appellant's purse was on the ground next to her, but 
does not clarify how or when it got there.  
The most logical inference from the known facts is that she placed or 
dropped it there upon raising her hands in the air when Sandy was arrested.  Nothing in the record suggests that she 
actually physically possessed the purse at any time throughout her questioning 
by Deputy Seeman.

 
 

5We assume 
that, by the "Carroll doctrine," the prosecutor was referring to the automobile 
exception to the warrant requirement, as recognized in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 
45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925).  
See Hunter v. State, 704 P.2d 713, 715 (Wyo. 1985); Neilson v. State, 599 P.2d 1326, 1339 
(Wyo. 1979); State v. Munger, 43 Wyo. 404, 408, 4 P.2d 1094, 1095 (1931).  It has no 
application here.

 
 

6It is 
noteworthy that neither brief in this case distinguishes well between the 
concepts of probable cause to arrest and reasonable suspicion to detain.  That may be because, despite the arrest 
and detention language, the common denominator is actually the search incident 
thereto, which raises the similar common denominator of officer safety.  The automatic companion rule allows the 
pat down of an arrestee's companion for officer safety reasons.  Terry allows the pat down of a suspect 
during an investigative detention, also for officer safety 
reasons.