Title: In re Cohen

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed:  August 10, 2000
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In Re: Complaint as to the Conduct ofRICHARD D. COHEN,   
	Accused.
(OSB 95-83, 96-129; SC S39908)

	En Banc
	On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.
	Argued and submitted November 4, 1999.
	Jane E. Angus, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Lake Oswego,
argued the cause and filed the petition and reply brief for the
Oregon State Bar.  Jeffrey D. Sapiro, Disciplinary Counsel, Lake
Oswego, filed a supplemental brief for the Oregon State Bar.
	Robert A. Shlachter, Portland, argued the cause for the
accused.  Richard D. Cohen, Portland, filed the answering brief
pro se.  Robert A. Shlachter and Scott Shorr, of Stoll Stoll
Berne Lokting & Shlachter, P.C., filed a joint supplemental
brief.
	PER CURIAM 
	The accused is reprimanded in case 96-129.  The accused's
probation is terminated in case 95-83.
	Riggs, J., concurred in part and dissented in part, and
filed an opinion.
		PER CURIAM
		In this lawyer disciplinary proceeding, the Oregon
State Bar (the Bar) seeks review of a decision of a trial panel
of the Disciplinary Board that reprimanded lawyer Richard D.
Cohen (the accused) for violating Code of Professional
Responsibility Disciplinary Rule (DR) 6-101(B) (1) (neglect of a
legal matter) and also continued his probation for an earlier
violation of that same rule.  The Bar seeks imposition of a 60-day suspension for the second violation, to be served
consecutively with a previously stayed 120-day suspension for the
first violation.  The accused admits that he violated DR 6-101(B)
in the second matter, but contends that the trial panel reached
the appropriate disposition in both matters.  For the reasons
that follow, we reprimand the accused and terminate his
probation.
FACTS

		This proceeding involves two instances of neglect by
the accused, the first of which resulted in a stipulation for
discipline in 1995 (case 95-83).  In that case, the accused
neglected the legal matter of a client named Richardson, who had
hired the accused in 1992 to pursue a claim against the state for
damages caused by a Dammasch State Hospital patient.  The accused
stipulated that, between November 1994 and March 1995, he had
violated DR 6-101(B) by failing to communicate with Richardson
and failing to respond to her attempts to communicate with him,
failing to pursue the case actively, failing to advise Richardson
concerning potential dismissal of the case and his actions on it,
and failing to file certain paperwork in the case.  		
		In October 1995, the accused and the Bar entered into a
stipulation for discipline, which this court accepted by order in
December 1995, nunc pro tunc November 1995.  In that stipulation,
the accused admitted that his conduct, as alleged in the Bar's
complaint, had violated DR 6-101(B).  He further agreed to accept
a 180-day suspension, 120 days of which were stayed, subject to a
two-year probationary period beginning on the effective date of
the stipulation.  The stipulation set out a number of conditions
of probation, including that the accused comply with all
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility and that he
regularly certify to the Bar that he had brought all his cases to
current status.  The stipulation also required mental health
counseling and supervision of the accused by another lawyer, as
probationary conditions, and provided that the accused would not
be eligible for reinstatement following his 60-day suspension
until a mental health professional confirmed that he adequately
was able to perform his duties as a lawyer.  Finally, the
stipulation provided that, if the accused failed to comply with
the conditions of his probation, then the Bar may seek to revoke
his probation under Bar Rule of Procedure (BR) 6.2(d), set out
post, and impose the stayed 120-day suspension. 
		The second instance of neglect, which involved a client
named Poch, overlapped to some extent with the period of time
during which the accused was negotiating the stipulation for
discipline in case 95-83.  The accused began representing Poch,
the wife in a marriage dissolution action, in July 1994.  Between
August 1994 and April 1995, the accused and husband's lawyer,
White, negotiated the sale of the Pochs' real property to one of
the Pochs' daughters.  While the sale was pending, the accused
and White filed a stipulated judgment (pending final judgment)
with the court.  The sale closed, the proceeds were delivered to
White, and White deposited them into her trust account.  The
accused did not confirm White's receipt or deposit of the
proceeds.  
		In May 1995, the court dismissed the Pochs' dissolution
action, which could be reinstated only by court order.  The
accused received notice of the dismissal, but he did not notify
Poch and took no action to reinstate the case.  Also, between May
1995 and December 1995, the accused spoke to Poch only twice, at
her initiation.  
		In December 1995, as noted, this court accepted the
stipulation for discipline in case 95-83.  The accused began
serving his suspension in late December 1995.  At about the same
time, he sent a draft of a final stipulated judgment in the Poch
case to White, together with a letter explaining that he was not
then working as a lawyer and that his supervising lawyer, Chally,
would be acting in Poch's behalf.  The accused did not send a
copy of that letter to Poch.  
		In March 1996, the accused was reinstated, after his
mental health therapist, Dr. Jones, confirmed that he could
function as a lawyer under the terms and conditions of his
probation in case 95-83.  In April 1996, the accused met with
Poch.  The accused told Poch that action was needed on her case,
but he did not tell her that the case had been dismissed.  The
accused took no action to reinstate Poch's case until mid-July
1996, and he returned only a few telephone calls from Poch.
		In July 1996, Poch filed a complaint with the Bar.  On
the day that the Bar drafted a letter notifying the accused of
Poch's complaint, the accused wrote to White, apologizing for the
delay and lack of communication, and recommending a final
resolution of the case. (2)  The accused copied Poch on that letter
and advised Poch that Chally had agreed to take over the case.  
		In February 1997, the Bar filed a formal complaint
against the accused, alleging a violation of DR 6-101(B) in the
Poch matter, spanning the time period between May 1995 and March
1996 (case 96-129).  In April 1997, the Bar petitioned to revoke
the accused's probation in case 95-83.  The two cases then were
consolidated for proceedings before a trial panel.
		A trial panel hearing was held in July 1997.  The
parties submitted stipulated facts that, unlike the allegations
in the Bar's complaint in case 96-129, reflected that the accused
had neglected the Poch case between May 1995 and mid-July 1996,
rather than between May 1995 and March 1996.  The accused
admitted in the stipulated facts that his conduct in case 96-129
had violated DR 6-101(B).  He further admitted to the trial panel
that, by virtue of that conduct, he also had violated his
probation in case 95-83, by failing to adhere to the Code of
Professional Responsibility and by failing to stay current on a
case.  
		The accused also presented testimony of 11 witnesses,
in addition to himself, as well as testimony by stipulation of
nine other witnesses.  In general, that testimony summarized a
number of personal problems and mental depression that the
accused had suffered in early 1994 through 1995, and the active
steps that he had taken, beginning in mid-1996, to improve his
mental health and his office practices.  Such steps included
cooperation with Chally and a second supervising lawyer,
McCollom; self-initiated, regular contact with a practice
management advisor at the Professional Liability Fund (PLF);
incorporation of office improvements suggested by those
individuals and others; and regular therapy sessions with Jones. 
Almost without exception, the witnesses testified that both the
accused's mental health and his office practices had improved
remarkably, particularly within the six months preceding the
hearing.  All witnesses who were so asked testified that the
accused was a talented trial lawyer who was fit to practice law. 
The Bar presented no witnesses, but the accused stipulated that
some professionals and clients had found his pattern of
responsiveness "less than satisfactory."
		In November 1998, more than a year after the hearing,
the trial panel concluded that the appropriate sanction in case
96-129 was a public reprimand.  The trial panel further concluded
that the probation in case 95-83 would not be revoked but,
rather, that its terms and conditions would continue in full
force and effect.  The trial panel declined to impose the
previously stayed 120-day period of suspension.
		The Bar petitioned for review in this court, BR 10.1,
contending that, in case 96-129, the accused should be suspended
for 60 days and that, in case 95-83, the accused's probation
should be revoked and the previously stayed 120-day suspension
now should be imposed.  The accused responds that, as to the
disposition of both cases, this court should reach the same
conclusion as the trial panel.  We review de novo.  ORS 9.536(3);
BR 10.6.
SANCTION IN CASE 96-129

		We begin with case 96-129, which involved the Poch
matter.  In determining the appropriate sanction for the
accused's misconduct, we look to the American Bar Association's
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991) (amended 1992)
(ABA Standards) and to this court's case law.  In re Meyer (II),
328 Or 220, 226, 970 P2d 647 (1999).  We first consider three
factors:  (1) the ethical duty violated by the accused's
misconduct; (2) the accused's mental state at the time of the
misconduct; and (3) the actual or potential injury caused by the
misconduct.  ABA Standard 3.0; Meyer (II), 328 Or at 226.  We
then make an initial determination of the appropriate sanction,
based upon those factors.  Meyer (II), 328 Or at 226.  Next, we
consider the existence of any aggravating or mitigating factors,
and the extent to which the sanction should be adjusted
accordingly.  ABA Standard 3.0; Meyer (II), 328 Or at 226. 
Finally, in determining the appropriate sanction, this court also
considers Oregon case law.  Meyer (II), 328 Or at 226. 
		The ABA Standards assume that the most important
ethical duties are those that a lawyer owes to the client.  ABA
Standards at 5; In re Sousa, 323 Or 137, 145, 915 P2d 408 (1996). 
We find that the accused violated his duty to Poch to act with
diligence and promptness in handling her case.  See ABA Standard
4.4 (describing that duty).
		As to mental state, the ABA Standards define
"knowledge" as "the conscious awareness of the nature or
attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious
objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result."  ABA
Standards at 7.  The ABA Standards define "negligence" as "the
failure of a lawyer to heed a substantial risk that circumstances
exist or that a result will follow, which failure is a deviation
from the standard of care that a reasonable lawyer would exercise
in the situation."  Id.
		The Bar contends that the accused acted with knowledge
when he neglected the Poch matter.  The accused argues that he
acted negligently.  We conclude that the accused's state of mind
changed during the course of handling the Poch matter.  As to the
neglect that occurred between May and December 1995, there is no
evidence that the accused acted knowingly.  However, after being
reinstated in March 1996, the accused reviewed his case list,
including the Poch case, with Chally on a monthly basis, which
demonstrates that he continually must have been aware of the
status of the case.  We therefore find that, as to the neglect
that occurred from March to mid-July 1996, the accused acted with
"conscious awareness of the * * * attendant circumstances of the
conduct but without the conscious objective or purpose to
accomplish a particular result."  ABA Standards at 7. 
		Turning to injury, the only evidence of actual injury
to Poch is that she suffered anxiety and frustration as a result
of the accused's neglect of her legal matter.  See In re
Schaffner, 325 Or 421, 426-27, 939 P2d 39 (1997) (client's
anxiety and frustration can constitute actual injury under ABA
Standards). (3)  Further, we infer from the circumstances --
particularly the accused's failure to take action for several
months after Poch's case was dismissed and to advise Poch of that
fact -- also caused potential injury to Poch's legal interests. 
See generally In re Garvey, 325 Or 34, 43, 932 P2d 549 (1997)
(accused lawyer's neglect caused potential injury to clients'
legal interests).
		The ABA Standards suggest that, as a preliminary
matter, a public reprimand would be the appropriate sanction for
the accused's misconduct in case 96-129.  See ABA Standard 4.43
(reprimand generally appropriate when lawyer does not act with
reasonable diligence in representing client and causes potential
injury to client); ABA Standard 4.44 (admonition generally
appropriate when lawyer does not act with reasonable diligence
and causes little or no actual or potential injury).  We now
consider the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors that
might affect our determination of the appropriate sanction.
		The first, and most significant, applicable aggravating
factor is the accused's prior disciplinary record.  See ABA
Standard 9.22(a) ("prior disciplinary offenses" serve as
aggravating factor).  In addition to the neglect at issue in case
95-83, for which the accused stipulated that a 180-day suspension
(with 120 days stayed) was an appropriate sanction, the accused
also received a public reprimand in 1993 for violating         
DR 5-105(E), which prohibits multiple representations that would
result in current client conflicts.  In re Cohen, 316 Or 657, 853
P2d 286 (1993).
		The accused also has received two letters of
admonition.  Although this court in the past generally has
considered such letters to be part of a lawyer's prior
disciplinary record, see, e.g., In re Stauffer, 327 Or 44, 68,
956 P2d 967 (1998) (one letter of admonition constituted lawyer's
only "prior disciplinary offense"), we now conclude, as explained
below, that we shall consider a letter of admonition as an
aggravating factor only in certain, limited circumstances.
		Letters of admonition fall within the discretion of the
State Professional Responsibility Board (SPRB).  The SPRB may
issue such a letter to a lawyer against whom a complaint has been
filed with the Bar, upon a determination that probable cause
exists to believe that misconduct has occurred.  The letter is
issued in lieu of referring the complaint either to a Local
Professional Responsibility Committee (LPRC) for investigation or
to the Bar for filing a formal complaint.  BR 2.5(d)(1). (4)  
		Under the Bar Rules of Procedure, a letter of
admonition neither is a "sanction," nor is it part of a
"disciplinary proceeding" or an accused lawyer's "prior record." 
See BR 1.1(m) ("[d]isciplinary [p]roceeding" defined as
proceeding in which Bar charges lawyer with misconduct "in a
formal complaint"); BR 6.1 (listing "sanctions" available in
"disciplinary proceedings" as public reprimand, suspension,
disbarment, restitution, and reimbursement to Client Security
Fund); BR 5.5(a) (defining "[p]rior record," for purpose of
prohibiting admission of same to prove character or to impeach,
as "any contested * * * disciplinary * * * decision of the
Disciplinary Board or the Supreme Court which has become final"). 
See also BR 3.6(c)(iv) (requiring stipulation for discipline to
recite accused lawyer's "prior record of reprimand, suspension or
disbarment").  Under the Bar Rules of Procedure, then, it is
inaccurate to characterize an earlier letter of admonition as a
"sanction" or as part of a "prior record" of discipline
previously imposed upon an accused lawyer. (5)
		Notwithstanding the particular wording of those various
rules, this court's case law demonstrates that a letter of
admonition can be relevant to the determination of the
appropriate sanction in a subsequent proceeding involving other
misconduct.  Indeed, this court has discussed the existence of
earlier letters of admonition as part of an accused lawyer's
"prior disciplinary record" in 15 cases; the court discounted the
letters in only two of those cases. (6)  The case law further
demonstrates that a letter of admonition particularly can be
significant if it involved misconduct that was similar to the
misconduct at issue in the case at bar and if the accused lawyer
received the letter close in time to the misconduct at issue. 
See In re Porter, 320 Or 692, 708, 708 n 9, 890 P2d 1377 (1995)
(court considered letter of admonition arising from
misrepresentation and issued three months before lawyer engaged
in misconduct involving dishonesty to be particularly significant
in determining appropriate sanction for dishonesty).  It also
bears noting that, in In re Jones, 326 Or 195, 200, 951 P2d 149
(1997), this court considered the accused lawyer's two letters of
admonition to be part of his disciplinary record when it set out
the following construct for analyzing such a record:
	"We take this opportunity to discuss our
application of the 'prior offenses' aggravating factor.
First, that factor refers to offenses that have been
adjudicated[ (7)] prior to imposition of the sanction in
the current case.  Second, the following considerations
also are an important part of our analysis:  (1) the
relative seriousness of the prior offense and resulting
sanction; (2) the similarity of the prior offense to
the offense in the case at bar; (3) the number of prior
offenses; (4) the relative recency of the prior
offense; and (5) the timing of the current offense in
relation to the prior offense and resulting sanction,
specifically, whether the accused lawyer had been
sanctioned for the prior offense before engaging in the
offense in the case at bar.  Those considerations are
important, because they can serve to heighten or
diminish the significance of earlier misconduct."
		As this court has noted before, the ABA Standards,
which represent a comprehensive authority concerning sanctions in
lawyer discipline cases, serve as a helpful guide to this court 
-- although not as binding authority -- in determining issues
surrounding the determination of the appropriate sanction in a
given circumstance.  See In re Morrow, 303 Or 102, 107, 734 P2d
867 (1987) (so stating).  As to the issue before us here, the ABA
Standards generally confirm the approach taken in this court's
case law, as discussed above.  See ABA Standard 2.6 (admonition
available "sanction" for ethical misconduct); ABA Standard 8.3(b)
(reprimand generally appropriate when lawyer has received
admonition for same or similar misconduct, and causes injury or
potential injury to client, public, legal system, or profession). 
Indeed, the "prior disciplinary offenses" aggravating factor, 
ABA Standard 9.22(a), incorporates any admonition previously
imposed upon an accused lawyer as a sanction for earlier
misconduct.  See Commentary to ABA Standard 9.2, citing People v.
Vernon, 660 P2d 879, 881 (Colo 1982) (when considering
appropriate sanction for conversion of client funds, Supreme
Court of Colorado noted that accused lawyer had received three
letters of admonition for misconduct occurring after misconduct
at issue; lawyer had no other disciplinary record).  See also 
generally American Bar Association's Model Rules for Lawyer
Disciplinary Enforcement (1996), Rule 10(A)(5) (admonition may
serve as evidence of prior misconduct bearing upon sanction in
subsequent proceeding).
		We draw the following principles from the foregoing
sources of law and related materials.  First, as noted, it is
inaccurate under the Bar Rules of Procedure to characterize a
letter of admonition as a form of "sanction" or as part of a
"prior record" of discipline imposed upon an accused lawyer. 
Nonetheless, this court's case law demonstrates that such a
letter can be relevant to the determination of the appropriate
sanction in a subsequent proceeding for other misconduct, because
it demonstrates that the accused lawyer has engaged in misconduct
in the past.  Finally, this court has taken particular note when
an earlier letter of admonition involved the same or similar type
of misconduct as that at issue in the case at bar, and when the
earlier letter was issued shortly before the accused lawyer
engaged in the misconduct at issue.
		We conclude that a letter of admonition should be
considered under ABA Standard 9.22(a), as evidence of past
misconduct, if the misconduct that gave rise to that letter was
of the same or similar type as the misconduct at issue in the
case at bar.  If that circumstance is present, then it is
appropriate to consider a letter of admonition -- together with
an accused lawyer's formal disciplinary record, if any -- under
the construct set out in Jones, 326 Or at 200.  Stated
differently, if the letter of admonition involved the same or
similar type of misconduct as that presently at issue, then the
remaining factors set out under Jones -- including the relative
recency of the misconduct giving rise to the letter of admonition
and whether the accused lawyer had received that letter before
engaging in the misconduct at issue -- serve to heighten or
diminish the significance of the misconduct that gave rise to the
letter of admonition.  However, if a letter of admonition
involved misconduct wholly different in nature from the
misconduct at issue in the case at bar, then we ordinarily shall
not consider that letter under ABA Standard 9.22(a).
		In this case, the accused was admonished in May 1989,
and again in December 1990, for violating DR 6-101(B).  Because
those two earlier letters of admonition concerned precisely the
same type of misconduct at issue in the Poch matter, we shall
apply the considerations set out in Jones to both those letters
of admonition, as well as to the accused's formal disciplinary
record, which included his stipulation for discipline in case  
95-83 and his 1993 public reprimand for violating DR 5-105(E).  
		We first note that, although the accused's earlier
offenses were not relatively serious in isolation, it is
significant that he has been disciplined once and admonished
twice for neglect of a client matter.  It also bears
consideration that the accused has engaged in four earlier
instances of misconduct; however, the significance of the first
three instances is diminished somewhat, as they were removed in
time from his misconduct in the Poch matter.  Finally, we find it
significant that the accused neglected the Poch matter while
negotiating his stipulation for discipline in case 95-83 and, for
a short period of time, after being reinstated following his
suspension in that case. 
		Turning to other aggravating factors, we note that the
accused engaged in a pattern of misconduct when he neglected the
Poch matter in part on the heels of being disciplined for the
same type of misconduct in case 95-83.  ABA Standard 9.22(c); see
also In re Bourcier, 325 Or 429, 436, 939 P2d 604 (1997) (finding
pattern of misconduct to exist when accused lawyer failed to
cooperate after recently having been disciplined for similar
misconduct, among other misconduct); Schaffner, 325 Or at 427
(finding pattern in light of accused's recent discipline for
similar misconduct).  We further note, however, that we already
have considered the weight of the accused's earlier neglectful
conduct in aggravation under ABA Standard 9.22(a).
		The final applicable aggravating factor is substantial
experience in the practice of law, ABA Standard 9.22(i), the
accused having been admitted to practice in 1979.
		We find a significant number of mitigating factors to
exist, including absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, good
faith effort to rectify the consequences of the misconduct, full
disclosure and cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary
proceedings, favorable character and reputation, and remorse. 
ABA Standards 9.32(b), (d), (e), (g), and (l).  We discuss
additional mitigating factors below.
		The trial panel found that the accused suffered from
personal and emotional problems, as well as a mental disability,
when he neglected the Poch matter.  ABA Standards 9.32(c) and (i)
(amended 1992).  Under the ABA Standards, mental disability may
be considered a mitigating factor only when: 
	"(1) there is medical evidence that the [accused
lawyer] is affected by a * * * mental disability;
	"(2) the * * * mental disability caused the
misconduct;
	"(3) the [accused lawyer's] recovery from the    
* * * mental disability is demonstrated by a meaningful
and sustained period of successful rehabilitation; and
	"(4) the recovery arrested the misconduct and
recurrence of that misconduct is unlikely."
ABA Standard 9.32(i) (amended 1992); see also In re Murdock, 328
Or 18, 29-30, 968 P2d 1270 (1998) (applying 1992 version of ABA
Standard 9.32(i) in context of chemical dependency).  We turn to
a review of the facts that are relevant to determining whether
ABA Standard 9.32(i) (amended 1992), as well as ABA Standard
9.32(c), are applicable here.
	In early 1994, while the accused was representing
Richardson in case 95-83, his children's long-time nanny and his
ex-wife, a quadriplegic for whom the accused had acted as a
primary caretaker and with whom he had maintained a close
relationship, both died suddenly.  Their deaths occurred within a
month of each other, leaving the accused to care for his two
daughters, of whom he already had primary custody, without his
long-standing family support system.  As a result of those
events, coupled with a 1992 courtroom suicide of a client in the
accused's presence, the accused suffered from "dysthemic
disorder," a form of depression, (8) as well as post-traumatic
stress syndrome.  According to Jones, the accused's depression
diminished his ability to function throughout most of 1994 and
1995, and had its greatest detrimental impact upon his office
administrative tasks (as opposed to his high-pressure trial
practice).  Although it is clear from the record that the
accused's depression greatly contributed to his misconduct in
case 96-129, the accused also acknowledged that, had more
efficient office practices been in place, he might have weathered
his depression without violating DR 6-101(B). (9)
		The accused began taking medication for his condition
in late 1995 and continued to do so through mid-1996.  Jones
testified that the medication made a "remarkable difference" in
the accused's mental function.  A number of witnesses also
testified that, in the year before the trial panel hearing in
July 1997, the accused had made great strides in improving his
mental health and overall outlook, his energy level, and his
office practices.  The same witnesses further testified that they
thought that the accused would continue to improve and would not
engage in future misconduct.
		The foregoing facts support application of ABA
Standards 9.32(c) (personal and emotional problems) and 9.32(i)
(amended 1992) (mental disability).  Compare Murdock, 328 Or at
29-30 (declining to find chemical dependency as mitigating factor
under ABA Standard 9.32(i) (amended 1992) when accused lawyer
failed to demonstrate causation, recovery, or unlikeliness of
recurrence); In re Butler, 324 Or 69, 74, 921 P2d 401 (1996)
(declining to apply ABA Standard 9.32(c) when accused lawyer did
not demonstrate that his personal problems contributed to his
misconduct); In re Morin, 319 Or 547, 565, 878 P2d 393 (1994)
(declining to apply ABA Standard 9.32(c) when accused lawyer
acted with pattern of intentional deception and misconduct).  We
give very great weight to the mental-disability factor in the
context of this case.  See Commentary, ABA Standard 9.32 (amended
1992) (mental disability should be given "very great weight" as
mitigating factor when it was "principally responsible" for
misconduct in question).
		A final mitigating factor is delay in the disciplinary
process.  ABA Standard 9.32(j) (amended 1992).  The misconduct at
issue in case 96-129 occurred between May 1995 and mid-July 1996. 
The trial panel hearing was held a year later, in July 1997, and
the trial panel did not release its decision until November 1998.
This court heard oral argument a year later, in November 1999. (10) 
In short, it has been four years since the accused neglected the
Poch matter, and, according to the parties at oral argument, no
complaints have been filed against the accused since that time. 
See In re Unrein, 323 Or 285, 288, 917 P2d 1022 (1996) (citing
delay as particularly significant mitigating factor when four
years elapsed between misconduct and court's decision, and no
additional complaints had been filed); Morrow, 303 Or at 106 n 1,
106-07, 109 (court stayed suspension and imposed probation in
light of improvements in accused lawyer's practice in nine years
since misconduct in question occurred and at least three years
since other misconduct occurred).
		We now consider the applicable case law.  At the
outset, we observe that a public reprimand can be an appropriate
sanction for a single instance of neglect, particularly the type
of neglect at issue in this case.  See In re Rudie, 290 Or 471,
622 P2d 1098 (1981) (public reprimand for neglect of client's
dissolution action, resulting in opposing party taking a default
decree; accused lawyer found not to have committed other multiple
violations).  Cases involving isolated instances of neglect
coupled with related misconduct have resulted in short
suspensions.  See In re Hedges, 313 Or 618, 836 P2d 119 (1992)
(63-day suspension for neglect, misrepresentation, failure to
maintain complete client-funds records and to pay funds to
client, and failure to cooperate); In re Kissling, 303 Or 638,
740 P2d 179 (1987) (63-day suspension for neglect,
misrepresentation, false statements, and failure to carry out
contract of employment).
		 We have found only one case from this court in which
an accused lawyer was charged with a single violation of       
DR 6-101(B).  In Meyer (II), 328 Or 220, this court imposed a
one-year suspension upon an accused lawyer who knowingly
neglected a client matter, causing actual injury to the client's
case.  The accused lawyer in that case previously had been
reprimanded for neglect and improper withdrawal.  He also
contemporaneously had been suspended for other, unrelated
misconduct of the same gravity as the neglect at issue in Meyer
(II).  Additional aggravating factors were the accused lawyer's
substantial experience in the practice of law and his refusal to
acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct.  No mitigating
factors applied.  Id. at 227-29.  A lengthy suspension like that
imposed in Meyer (II) is not warranted here, in light of the less
grievous nature of the neglect at issue, the lack of harm to the
client's case, and the significant number of applicable
mitigating factors.
		In addition to Meyer (II), the Bar cites cases in which
the accused lawyers repeatedly had engaged in neglect, among
other misconduct, warranting lengthy suspensions.  See Bourcier,
325 Or 429 (disbarment for neglect and failure to respond to
Bar's inquiries, when accused lawyer acted knowingly and had
record of neglecting client matters and failing to respond);
Schaffner, 325 Or 421 (two-year suspension for neglect, failure
to deliver client property, and failure to respond, when accused
lawyer acted knowingly and had been disciplined within prior year
for similar misconduct).  Those cases do not suggest the
appropriate sanction here, because they both involved much more
egregious incidents of neglect, coupled with complete, knowing
failures to cooperate with Bar investigations, and no mitigating
factors existed in either case.
		However, Bourcier, Schaffner, and Meyer (II) all
demonstrate that this court generally imposes a sanction of
greater magnitude than ordinarily would be warranted when an
accused lawyer has a prior disciplinary record, particularly when
that record includes misconduct similar to the misconduct at
issue in the case at bar.  See also Jones, 326 Or at 202 (in
light of prior disciplinary record that included similar
misconduct, single act of misrepresentation warranted 45-day
suspension, instead of 30-day suspension); In re Hereford, 306 Or
69, 76, 756 P2d 30 (1988) (imposing 126-day suspension instead of
public reprimand for failure to cooperate, when accused lawyer
had record of neglect and related misconduct).  The Bar relies
upon that unspoken principle in this case, asserting that, in
light of the accused's prior disciplinary record, a suspension,
rather than a public reprimand, is warranted here.  See also
generally ABA Standard 8.2 and accompanying commentary
(suspension generally appropriate when lawyer previously
reprimanded for same or similar misconduct, and causes injury or
potential injury to client, among others); Porter, 320 Or at 708
(citing and applying ABA Standard 8.2).
		Although that approach may be a sound one in most
cases, we conclude that this case is exceptional.  As noted, the
only evidence of any actual injury to Poch is that of anxiety and
frustration.  Other than the accused's disciplinary record and
earlier letters of admonition, the only aggravating factor of
note is his substantial experience in the practice of law. 
Multiple mitigating factors exist, including full and free
disclosure, and complete candor and cooperation with the Bar's
investigation.  We further note that the accused's depression
contributed to his misconduct in case 95-83, which is the most
significant instance of earlier misconduct.  Indeed, we view that
instance of misconduct on a continuum together with case 96-129,
rather than in isolation, because both occurred when the accused
was in the depths of depression caused by personal crises and
while he was in the beginning stages of recovering from that
depression.  Finally, the record is replete with testimony
concerning the accused's concentrated efforts, beginning in mid-1996, to improve his mental health and his office practices, and
his success in doing both.  In short, the circumstances of this
case justify imposition of a less severe sanction than ordinarily
would be warranted in light of the accused's earlier instances of
misconduct.  See generally In re Allen, 326 Or 107, 127-30, 949
P2d 710 (1997) (existence of nine mitigating factors balanced
against only two aggravating factors warranted shorter suspension
than earlier case involving comparable misconduct).
		As this court has stated before, 

"[t]he purpose of a lawyer disciplinary proceeding is
to protect the public and the administration of justice
from lawyers who have not discharged, will not
discharge, or are unlikely to discharge properly their
professional duties to clients, the public, the legal
system, and the legal profession."
Bourcier, 325 Or at 437; see also ABA Standards at 7 (so
stating).  After reviewing the entire record in this case, we
cannot say that the accused is unlikely to discharge those
professional duties.  Indeed, in the four years that have elapsed
since his misconduct in the Poch matter, the accused by all
accounts has acted aggressively and effectively to remedy the
deficiencies that led to his misconduct, and has made remarkable
and consistent improvement in all the areas that required
attention.
		On de novo review, we conclude that the appropriate
sanction in case 96-129 is a public reprimand.
PROBATION REVOCATION IN CASE 95-83 

		Finally, the Bar contends that, because the accused
violated DR 6-101(B) during the time when he was negotiating the
stipulation for discipline in case 95-83, and during the
beginning of his probationary period in that case, this court
should revoke his probation and impose the previously stayed 120-day suspension.  The accused responds that his probation was
subject to a number of detailed terms and conditions, only one of
which was violated -- failing to stay current on a single case
out of about 130 cases.  The accused further points out that,
while his probation originally was to be for a two-year period,
set to expire in December 1997, (11) he continued on probation until
just before oral argument in this court in November 1999,
complying with every term and condition thereof. (12)  In the
accused's view, the purpose of his probation has been met, and,
therefore, there is no reason to revoke his probation and impose
the stayed 120-day suspension.
		As noted, the accused was on probation from
approximately December 1995 to November 1999 -- a period
encompassing almost four years.  Moreover, the Bar effectively
conceded at oral argument that the accused's term of probationary
supervision had ended; however, it still seeks to have the 120-day suspension imposed.  In the Bar's view, the accused must be
held to his part of his agreement with the Bar, by serving the
stayed suspension as a consequence for violating a condition of
his probation.  
		For the following reasons, we disagree.  First,      
BR 6.2(a), which sets out the authority to impose probation,
provides, in part:
	"Upon determining that an accused should be
suspended, the trial panel[ (13)] may decide that the
execution of the suspension shall be stayed, in whole
or in part, and that the accused shall be placed on
probation for a period no longer than three years."
We have found nothing in the Bar Rules of Procedure that provides
for an extension of probation beyond three years.  Here, the
accused served his probationary term for almost a year more than
the maximum three-year term allowed under BR 6.2(a), and,
according to the Bar, it no longer is supervising the accused. 
From those facts, any dispute concerning the accused's probation
and the suspension stayed as a result of that probation arguably
is moot.  
		Even if the issue were not resolved on mootness
grounds, the Bar Rules of Procedure do not require that a lawyer
who violates a probationary term must, as a result of that
violation, serve out the stayed suspension.  Rather, BR 6.2(d)
provides, in part:
	"Disciplinary Counsel [of the Bar] may petition
the * * * Supreme Court * * * to revoke the probation
of any attorney for violation of any probationary term. 
The * * * court may order the attorney to appear and
show cause, if he or she has any, why the attorney's
probation should not be revoked and the original
sanctions imposed.  A petition for revocation of an
attorney's probation shall not preclude the Bar from
filing independent disciplinary charges based on the
same conduct as alleged in the petition."
(Emphasis added.)  In short, the Bar is not entitled to a
revocation of the accused's probation and imposition of the
suspended sentence; rather, it is granted the discretion to
petition for revocation, as it did in this case.  
		Finally, the record demonstrates conclusively that,
with the single exception of neglecting the Poch matter within
the first six months of his probation, the accused has complied
with the terms and conditions of his probation in every respect. 
Indeed, the accused willingly has taken all the steps to improve
his mental health and his office practices that the Bar would
encourage any lawyer in his position to take, including therapy,
active solicitation and implementation of advice from the PLF and
other lawyers for improving his office practices, cooperation
with his supervising lawyers, and commendable candor and
acknowledgment of the Bar's need to scrutinize his practice in
every step of the process.  In short, nothing in the record
supports the conclusion that the previously stayed 120-day
suspension now should be imposed, assuming that we would have the
power to do so.  To the contrary, we conclude that the accused's
probation in case 95-83 should be terminated.  This opinion shall
serve that function.
CONCLUSION

		We do not view neglect of a client matter lightly --
particularly repeated instances of neglect.  However, in
aggressively and successfully addressing his mental health
problems and the deficiencies in his office practices that led to
his misconduct, the accused in this case has contributed to the
integrity of the disciplinary process.  The only sanction that is
warranted in the matters before us is a public reprimand.
		The accused is reprimanded in case 96-129.  The
accused's probation is terminated in case 95-83.
		RIGGS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
		I concur with the majority's result and analysis,
except to the extent that the majority fails to apply
prospectively what can be considered only a newly announced rule
concerning past letters of admonition as a factor that aggravates
a current sanction.
		The majority asserts that this court, in the past,
generally has considered letters of admonition to be part of a
lawyer's prior disciplinary record.  In re Cohen, ___ Or ___, ___
P2d ___ (August 10, 2000) (slip op at 10) (Cohen II).  In support
of that position, the majority cites In re Stauffer, 327 Or 44, 
956 P2d 967 (1998), and a series of cases set out in footnote 6
of the majority's opinion.  Cohen II, ___ Or at ___ n 6 (slip op
at 13 n 6).  The majority suggests that those cases support its
position because those cases refer either to the admonition being
a "prior disciplinary offense" or part of the accused lawyer's
"prior disciplinary record."  In my view, however, those cases
are not clear on the significance, if any, of a letter of
admonition.  Compare In re Gildea, 325 Or 281, 299 n 24, 936 P2d
975 (1997) (expressly declining to consider letter of admonition
as part of prior disciplinary record), with In re Jones, 326 Or
195, 200, 951 P2d 149 (1997) (stating that this court considers
only "offenses that have been adjudicated," but nevertheless
noting that accused had engaged in misconduct that resulted in
letters of admonition), and In re Whipple, 320 Or 476, 489 n 9,
886 P2d 7 (1994) (noting, without further discussion, that
accused had received letter of admonition).   
	An example of this court's confusing pronouncements on
the issue is the Jones court's reference to "adjudicated"
offenses.  The majority now concedes that the use of that term
"is not [an] entirely accurate" description for a letter of
admonition.  Cohen II, ___ Or at ___ n 7 (slip op at 14 n 7). 
	The majority also posits that this court's "case law
further demonstrates that a letter of admonition particularly can
be significant if it involved misconduct that was similar to the
misconduct at issue in the case at bar and if the accused lawyer
received the letter close in time to the misconduct at issue." 
Cohen II, ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 13).  Although I agree with
the wisdom of such a rule, I disagree that our case law, taken as
a whole, supports the claimed history of such a rule of law.  My
review of the 15 cases cited by the majority in its footnote 6
discloses seven cases wherein the court did not mention the
nature of misconduct that was the subject of the letter of
admonition.  Those cases are In re Devers, 328 Or 230, 243, 974
P2d 191 (1999); Stauffer, 327 Or at 68; Gildea, 325 Or at 299 n
24; Whipple, 320 Or at 489 n 9; In re Gastineau, 317 Or 545, 558,
857 P2d 136 (1993); In re Devers, 317 Or 261, 263-64, 855 P2d 617
(1993); In re Benson, 317 Or 164, 170, 854 P2d 466 (1993).  In
four additional cases, the misconduct involved in the prior
letter of admonition differed from the misconduct at issue. 
Those cases are In re Starr, 326 Or 328, 347, 952 P2d 1017
(1998); Jones, 326 Or at 200; In re Cohen, 316 Or 657, 664, 853
P2d 286 (1993) (Cohen I); In re Hedrick, 312 Or 442, 450, 822 P2d
1187 (1991).  In only two cases that the majority cites, In re
Porter, 320 Or 692, 708 n 9, 890 P2d 1377 (1995), and In re
Benjamin, 312 Or 515, 523, 823 P2d 413 (1991), did the letter of
admonition involve misconduct that was similar to the misconduct
at issue.
	The majority also points out that the Board of
Governors (BOG) of the Oregon State Bar has adopted the following
policy statement concerning letters of admonition:
	"An admonition does not constitute the imposition of
formal discipline.  An admonition is, however, a public
statement that the attorney's conduct, in the opinion
of the SPRB, violated the rules of professional conduct
of the Oregon State Bar."
BOG Policy 9.305(B), approved as of August 1990 (emphasis added). 
The BOG policy statement does not constitute a disciplinary rule,
nor does it bind this court unless adopted as a rule. 
Nevertheless, the existence of the policy statement has the
potential to have misled lawyers who have settled their
differences with the Bar in the belief that the BOG policy
statement meant that the acceptance of a letter of admonition
would not carry with it the consequences that the majority's
opinion now mandates.
	Because of the lack of clarity in this court's case law and
the existence of BOG Policy 9.035(B), and because I believe that
we have created unwittingly today a trap for those who have
detrimentally relied on the previous state of the law, I would
apply the rule concerning letters of admonition prospectively
only.
	For those reasons, I concur in the result of the majority,
but I dissent as to the retroactive application of that part of
the majority's opinion that deals with the effect of prior
letters of admonition.

1.      	DR 6-101(B) provides:  "A lawyer shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to the lawyer."

2.      	It is unclear from the record whether the accused wrote
that letter before or after he received notice that Poch had
filed a complaint against him.

3.      	The Bar did not call Poch as a witness before the trial
panel; however, Chally testified that Poch had suffered anxiety
and frustration, and the accused acknowledged before the trial
panel that his misconduct had caused that type of injury to Poch.

4.      	BR 2.5(d)(1) provides, in part:
	"[Unless the complaint is referred to an LPRC],
the SPRB shall evaluate the complaint based on the
report of Disciplinary Counsel to determine whether
probable cause exists to believe misconduct has
occurred.  The SPRB shall either dismiss the complaint,
refer it to an LPRC, admonish the attorney, approve the
filing of a formal complaint by the Bar against the
attorney, or take other action within the discretion
granted to the SPRB by these rules.
	"(A) If the SPRB determines that probable cause
does not exist to believe misconduct has occurred, the
complaint shall be dismissed and the complainant and
the attorney shall be notified of the dismissal in
writing by Disciplinary Counsel.
	"(B) If the SPRB determines that the attorney
should be admonished, such procedure shall be initiated
within 14 days of the SPRB's meeting.  If an attorney
refuses to accept the admonition, a formal complaint
shall be filed by the Bar against the attorney. * * *"
(Emphasis added.)  See also BR 2.5(f)(1) (providing same options
for SPRB after LPRC investigation).

5.      	The Board of Governors of the Bar (BOG) has adopted the
following policy statement concerning letters of admonition: 
	"An admonition does not constitute the imposition
of formal discipline.  An admonition is, however, a
public statement that the attorney's conduct, in the
opinion of the SPRB, violated the rules of professional
conduct of the Oregon State Bar."
BOG Policy 9.305(B), approved as of August 1990 (emphasis added). 
See also ORS 9.110 (BOG "may formulate and declare rules for
carrying out the functions of the state bar").

6.      	The court considered an earlier letter or letters of
admonition to constitute a "prior disciplinary offense" or part
of the accused lawyer's "prior disciplinary record" in the
following cases:  In re Devers, 328 Or 230, 243, 974 P2d 191
(1999); Stauffer, 327 Or at 68; In re Starr, 326 Or 328, 347, 952
P2d 1017 (1998); In re Jones, 326 Or 195, 199-201, 951 P2d 149
(1997); In re Jeffery, 321 Or 360, 375, 898 P2d 752 (1995); In re
Porter, 320 Or 692, 708, 890 P2d 1377 (1995); In re Whipple, 320
Or 476, 489 n 9, 886 P2d 7 (1994); In re Devers, 317 Or 261, 363-64, 855 P2d 617 (1993); In re Benson, 317 Or 164, 170, 854 P2d
466 (1993); Cohen, 316 Or at 664; In re McKee, 316 Or 114, 131,
849 P2d 509 (1993); In re Benjamin, 312 Or 515, 523, 823 P2d 413
(1991); In re Hedrick, 312 Or 442, 450, 822 P2d 1187 (1991).  The
court declined to consider the accused lawyer's earlier letter of
admonition in In re Gildea, 325 Or 281, 299 n 24, 936 P2d 975
(1997) (letter of admonition not of "sufficient moment" to be
relevant to subsequent sanction), and in In re Gastineau, 317 Or
545, 558, 857 P2d 136 (1993) (letter of admonition considered in
mitigation, because remote in time).

7.      	Because, under BR 1.1(m) and BR 6.1(a), a letter of
admonition is not part of a disciplinary proceeding, the term
"adjudication" is not entirely accurate in that respect. 
Instead, when read in context, Jones was referring both to
offenses for which the SPRB had issued a letter of admonition and
to those for which the accused lawyer formally had been
disciplined by public reprimand, suspension, or disbarment.

8.      	Jones described the accused's dysthemia as a "chronic
depressive disorder that doesn't completely impair one's ability
to function in the outside world, but is a major detrimental
factor in terms of functioning at peak capabilities." 

9.      	The Bar contends that, because the accused neglected
the Poch matter in part after being reinstated in March 1996
based upon Jones's recommendation that he was fit to practice, he
could not be said to have been suffering from a mental disability
after that time.  After reviewing the entire record, we find that
the accused's depression continued to affect his ability to
function through mid-1996 (although to a lesser extent than in
1994 and 1995), encompassing the time period in question.

10.      	There is no explanation in the record for the delay in
the release of the trial panel's decision.  In this court, the
Bar received two 14-day extensions of time for briefing purposes,
and the accused received one 21-day extension.  Oral argument
also was reset from September to November 1999, at the accused's
request.

11.      	The stipulation for discipline in case 95-83 provided
that the accused's probation was to commence on the effective
date of the stipulation.  This court approved the stipulation in
December 1995, nunc pro tunc November 1995.  The parties both
characterize the accused's probation as beginning in December
1995, on the date when he began serving his 60-day suspension.

12.      	The accused characterizes the excessive length of his
probation as resulting from an "extension" initiated by the Bar. 
The Bar, however, contends that its petition to revoke probation
and this court's resulting show-cause order in case 95-83
"tolled" the accused's probationary status.  Nothing in the Bar
Rules of Procedure or this court's case law speaks to a "tolling"
of probation, and there is no documentation in the record
indicating that the Bar sought an extension of the accused's
probation or a formal declaration that his probation had been
"tolled."
		At oral argument, the Bar stated that it recently had
informed the accused that it no longer would be supervising him,
although it could not confirm when or if his probation in fact
had terminated.  In any event, the accused had complied with all
the terms and conditions of his probation throughout the time
period between the filing of the Bar's petition for revocation
and oral argument.

13.      	Although BR 6.2(a) refers to suspension by a trial
panel, BR 3.6(c)(iii) provides for the execution of a stipulation
for discipline that sets out the "designated form of discipline"
agreed to by an accused lawyer.  Such a designated form of
discipline may include probation and a stayed term of suspension,
as contemplated by BR 6.2(a) and as agreed to by the parties in
this case.