Title: Attorney Grievance v. Saridakis

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Anthony A. Saridakis, Misc. Docket AG No. 25,
Sept. Term 2006.
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE - CONFLICT OF INTEREST WITH CURRENT CLIENT - AN
ATTORNEY-DRAFTER OF A WILL IN WHICH HE OR SHE IS A SUBSTANTIAL
BENEFICIARY VIOLATES MRPC 1.8(c) WHEN HE OR SHE FAILS TO APPRECIATE THE
APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY OF SELECTING AS “INDEPENDENT” COUNSEL FOR
THE CLIENT A FRIEND WITH WHOM HE OR SHE SHARES OFFICE SPACE AND OTHER
PROFESSIONAL RESOURCES SUCH THAT THE PUBLIC MIGHT PERCEIVE THE
CLOSENESS BETWEEN THE TWO ATTORNEYS AS PRESENTING THE POTENTIAL FOR
COLLUSION
Circuit Court for Mo ntgomery C ounty
Case # 21292-M
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 25
September Term, 2006
______________________________________
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION 
OF MARYLAND
v.
ANTHONY A. SARIDAKIS
______________________________________
__
Bell, C.J.
Raker
        *Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Wilner, Alan M. (Retired,
specially assigned),
JJ.
                                                                             
Opinion by Harrell, J.
               Greene and Wilner JJ., dissent.
                                                                             
Filed: December 7, 2007
* Cathell, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an
active member of this Court; after being recalled
pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section
3A, he also participated in the decision and
adoption of this opinion.
1 The May 1994 version of Rule 1.8(c), which was in effect at the time of its alleged
violation by Respondent, in relevant part, stated:
(c)  A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer
or a person related to the lawyer as a parent, child, sibling, or
spouse any substantial gift from a client, including a
testamentary gift, except where:
(1)  the client is related to the donee; or
(2) the client is represented by independent
counsel in connection with the gift.
The current version of Rule 1.8(c), which became effective 1 July 2005, provides:
(c) A lawyer shall not solicit any substantial gift from a client,
including a testamentary gift, or prepare on behalf of a client an
instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer
any substantial gift unless the lawyer or other recipient of the
gift is related to the client.  For purposes of this paragraph,
related persons include a spouse, child, grandchild, parent,
grandparent or other relative or individual with whom the
lawyer or the client maintains a close, familial relationship.
The Attorney Grievance Commission (“Petitioner”), acting through Bar Counsel,
filed with this Court on 27 July 2006 a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action (the
“Petition”) against Anthony Alex Saridakis (“Respondent”) alleging violations of the
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct (“MRPC”) in connection with his preparation of
a will on behalf of an unrelated, long-time client, Wylette Speed, in which he was named the
beneficiary of a substantial bequest (in excess of $400,000.00).  Respondent was charged
accordingly with violations of MRPC 1.8(c) (Conflicts of Interest: Current Clients)1 and
2 The May 1994 version of Rule 8.4(d), in pertinent part, read: 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
*     *     *
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice.
3 Maryland Rule 16-752(a) provides:
Upon the filing of a Petitioner for Disciplinary or Remedial
Action, the Court of Appears may enter an order designating a
judge of any circuit court to hear the action and the clerk
responsible for maintaining the record.  The order of
designation shall required the judge, after consultation with Bar
Counsel and the attorney, to enter a scheduling order defining
the extent of discovery and setting dates for the completion of
discovery, filing of motions, and hearing.
4 Maryland Rule 16-757(c) provides:
(c) Findings and conclusions. The judge shall prepare and file
(continued...)
2
8.4(d) (Misconduct).2
I. Procedural History
Respondent answered the Petition, admitting most of the factual allegations therein,
but denying those averments concluding that his actions constituted violations of the MRPC.
Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-752(a),3 we referred the matter to the Honorable Joseph A.
Dugan, Jr., of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, to conduct an evidentiary hearing
and render findings of fact and recommended conclusions of law according to Maryland
Rule 16-757(c).4  Following an evidentiary hearing, Judge Dugan filed on 1 February 2007
4(...continued)
or dictate into the record a statement of the judge’s findings of
fact, including findings as to any evidence regarding remedial
action, and conclusions of law. If dictated into the record, the
statement shall be promptly transcribed. Unless the time is
extended by the Court of Appeals, the written or transcribed
statement shall be filed with the clerk responsible for the record
no later than 45 days after the conclusion of the hearing. The
clerk shall mail a copy of the statement to each party.
5 DeOrsey & Thompson was composed originally of Mr. DeOrsey; Robert K.
Thompson; his brother, William D. Thompson; and Respondent.  By 1991, DeOrsey and the
Thompson brothers had passed away, leaving Respondent at the helm of the Firm.
3
his written findings of fact and conclusions of law, which stated his determination that
Respondent did not commit the ethical violations alleged.  Petitioner filed timely with this
Court its Exceptions to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.  Were Petitioner’s
Exceptions well-taken, it recommended a sanction of indefinite suspension.  Respondent
filed a Response to those exceptions and urged dismissal of the Petition.
  
II. The Hearing Judge’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Respondent was admitted by the Court of Appeals and to the District of Columbia
Bar in 1974.  Respondent, since then, remains a member in good standing in both
jurisdictions.  After being employed for several years with the United States Department of
State, and later engaged in private practice, Respondent became associated in 1983 with the
law firm of DeOrsey & Thompson (“the Firm”).  Since 1991, he has been the only lawyer
practicing under the Firm name.5  His practice focuses mainly on estate planning, probate
and trust administration, and taxation.  
4
When Respondent  joined DeOrsey & Thompson in 1983, the Firm had a pre-existing
business client named Speed & Briscoe, which operated truck stops along the Interstate 95
corridor.  Mr. Speed and Mr. Briscoe, the partners of the business, were close friends.  Mr.
Lee Speed and his wife, Wylette, the testatrix, did not have any children.  Mr. and Mrs.
Briscoe had one child, Lee Speed Briscoe.  Lee and Wylette were the godparents of the
Briscoes’ child.  Mr. Speed passed away in 1975, leaving a trust estate in favor of his wife.
American Security and Trust Company was designated as the trustee.  Because Wylette’s
husband had relied on DeOrsey & Thompson for his legal services, Wylette entrusted
Respondent, as an associate of the Firm, to represent her legal interests.
Wylette had no immediate family in close proximity to her residential condominium
unit in Bethesda, Maryland.  Her only relatives consisted of a sister in ill health residing in
Baltimore and a niece who lived in Ohio.  Her primary social contacts thus were with her
trust officers, Marny McCain and her husband, Robert McCain; her godson, Lee Speed
Briscoe; and Respondent.  Respondent visited with Wylette on a regular basis throughout
his legal representation of her.  Although Mrs. Speed was a quiet person, and generally kept
to herself, she demonstrated a strong will and keen ability to participate in the decision-
making process concerning recommendations made to her by the trust officers and
Respondent.
In the late 1980s, Respondent drafted several wills for Wylette, at her request.  She
also executed a general power of attorney in favor of Respondent and named him as her
5
health care agent.  As a result, Respondent exercised control over all of her financial and real
estate matters.  The hearing judge in the present case determined that Wylette was satisfied
with Respondent’s work and reposed a great deal of trust in him as her attorney.
In 1992, Wylette suffered a debilitating stroke.  Respondent came to visit Wylette at
least once during her stay at Suburban Hospital to bring her clothes, and on one other
occasion to facilitate her transfer to a nursing home.  Respondent visited Wylette frequently
at the first nursing home and undertook to research a more suitable place for her after she
complained of her accommodations.  As a result of Respondent’s efforts, Mrs. Speed was
transferred to a facility that paid closer attention to her wants and needs.  While in these
quarters, Respondent visited Wylette several times a month and continued to manage her
trust, estate, and tax matters, in addition to serving as the “family member” at all meetings
with the nursing home staff, where her medical care and therapy were discussed and
evaluated.
After several months in the new nursing home, Wylette repeated her request, made
once previously while in the first nursing home, that Respondent draft for her a new will
that, for the first time, would include Respondent as a beneficiary of her residuary estate.
Respondent reviewed the bequests with her and advised her that he did not feel comfortable
composing a will in which he was a beneficiary.  Wylette, however, was adamant about her
wishes, so Respondent told her that she should consult with another attorney because of his
concerns about preparing such a will.  Mrs. Speed responded that she did not know any other
6
attorneys because of her long-standing reliance on the Firm and Respondent.  She asked
Respondent to locate another attorney in order to carry out her desired disposition.  In the
meantime, Wylette informed her godson, Lee Speed Briscoe, of her proposed bequest to
Respondent.  Her godson reacted to this news as a natural and reasonable decision, given
his awareness of the close relationship she had with her attorney.
Respondent prepared the will according to Wylette’s instructions and consulted with
an experienced estates and trusts attorney, Richard Lawlor, who shared office space with
Respondent, for the purpose of reviewing the will with Wylette and gauging her
competence.  Lawlor and Respondent came to know one another initially while representing
independent clients in an estate matter in 1988.  Several years later, DeOrsey & Thompson
relocated its offices into an office suite in Silver Spring, Maryland, shared by the firm for
which Lawlor was working.  From 1990 until 1995, the firms maintained separate leases for
the office suite, but shared a receptionist and a conference room.  The firms did not,
however, share clients and maintained distinct law practices.
Lawlor agreed to meet with Wylette Speed.  On the appointed day of 13 May 1994,
Lawlor and Respondent traveled separately to Wylette’s nursing home.  Respondent
introduced Lawlor to Wylette and explained the terms of the will he drafted at her request.
He then explained to Wylette that Lawlor was going to serve as her attorney for the day in
order to discuss and, if necessary, modify the will.  Respondent then left the room for
Wylette and Lawlor to consult privately.  Lawlor, according to the available evidence,
6 A jurat generally is  “[a] certification added to an affidavit or deposition stating
when and before what authority the affidavit or deposition was made.”  BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 866 (8th ed. 1999).  Respondent referred to the jurat as a “notary jurat,” but
acknowledged that Lawlor, the drafter of the jurat, was not a notary.  In context, the jurat
to which Respondent alluded appears to be what is known as a “witness jurat.”  BLACK’S,
supra at 866 (“A subscribing witness’s certificate acknowledging the act of witnessing.”).
7
conversed generally with Mrs. Speed, which allowed him to form the opinion that she was
of sound mind and competent to execute a will.  Next, Lawlor reviewed all of the items
contained in the will drafted by Respondent and verified Wylette’s donative intent as to each
item, including the bequest to Respondent.  Because Mrs. Speed was unable to sign her own
name – a disability stemming from her stroke – she executed the will by marking an “X” on
the signature line.  This mark was accompanied by a jurat6 prepared by Lawlor, intended to
verify that he witnessed Wylette Speed execute the will.
The hearing judge concluded that Lawlor “acted as independent counsel to Wylette.”
As principal support for this conclusion, Judge Dugan relied on a three-page, typed
memorandum, prepared by Lawlor immediately following the meeting, relating to his
consultation with Wylette at the nursing home on 13 May 1994.  This memorandum was the
source of Lawlor’s recount of what transpired between he and Mrs. Speed.  Lawlor also
opened a client file for Wylette, noted the nature of his representation as “estate planning
consultation,” and prepared a bill for his services.  Lawlor addressed the bill to Wylette,
which ultimately was forwarded to Respondent so that it could be paid from  Mrs. Speed’s
trust assets.  Wylette was apprised of this arrangement and consented.
7 Professor Dash testified that “[m]y opinion is that in 1994 when that will was
drafted under the facts in this case, Mr. Saridakis had not violated 1.8(c).”  Bar Counsel did
not object to the expert witness offering this legal conclusion.   In any event, this Court, by
virtue of its exclusive jurisdiction in attorney discipline cases, is the final arbiter of what
conduct constitutes a violation of the MRPC.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Steinberg, 395
Md. 337, 361, 910 A.2d 429, 443 (2006) (“[T]his Court has the ultimate authority to decide
whether a lawyer has violated the MRPC.”).
8
Wylette Speed died on 6 April 2000.  Respondent, in his capacity as personal
representative for Mrs. Speed, made the appropriate filings to administer her estate.  Among
the documents submitted for probate was a “First and Final Account,” which listed all
bequests, including the residuary bequest in favor of Respondent in the amount of
$413,281.00, out of a gross estate of $3,548,410.00.  The account was approved by the
Circuit Court for Montgomery County, sitting as the Orphan’s Court.
The hearing judge in the present case accepted as an expert witness in the field of
legal ethics, Professor Abraham Dash of the faculty of the University of Maryland School
of Law.  The judge’s findings stated that “Professor Dash’s opinion, which was accepted in
full by this Court, is that Respondent did not violate Rule 1.8(c) of the Maryland Rules of
Professional Conduct in 1994.”7  The witness concluded that Lawlor was a truly independent
attorney for Wylette, thus satisfying the purpose inherent in MRPC 1.8(c) of affirming the
donor’s donative intent.  The hearing judge also was persuaded by the character witnesses
who vouched for the professional integrity of both Respondent and Lawlor.  Judge Dugan
also found persuasive that the Complainant in this disciplinary matter, Wylette Speed’s niece
in Ohio, was aware of both the relationship between her aunt and Respondent and the
9
residuary bequest, but failed to challenge the gift as the result of undue influence while the
will was in probate.  This delay, in Judge Dugan’s opinion, prejudiced Respondent because
Lawlor’s independent recollection of events had diminished over time.
Accordingly, the hearing judge concluded that Respondent did not exert undue
influence over Wylette Speed with regard to her making a residuary bequest to him in her
will.  Further, Respondent did not violate MRPC 1.8(c) because Lawlor served as Wylette’s
independent counsel in his consultations with her regarding the gift to Respondent.  As a
natural incident to that conclusion, there was no violation of MRPC 8.4(d).  Respondent’s
Motion to Dismiss, based on the equity principle of laches, however, was denied because
Bar Counsel was not responsible for the delay (attributable to the Complainant in making
Bar Counsel aware of the matter) in prosecuting the charges  against Respondent. 
III. Standard of Review
This Court conducts an independent review of the record and generally accepts a
hearing judge’s findings of fact unless we determine that they are clearly erroneous.
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Lee, 390 Md. 517, 524, 890 A.2d 273,  277 (2006); Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 50, 891 A.2d 1085, 1095 (2006); Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Stolarz, 379 Md. 387, 397, 842 A.2d 42, 47 (2004); Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Culver, 371 Md. 265, 274, 808 A.2d 1251, 1256 (2002); Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Harrington, 367 Md. 36, 49, 785 A.2d 1260, 1267 (2001) (“The
‘hearing court's findings of fact are prima facie correct and will not be disturbed unless they
10
are shown to be clearly erroneous.’”) (internal citations omitted); see also Md. Rule 16-
759(b)(2)(B) (“This Court shall give due regard to the opportunity of the hearing judge to
assess the credibility of witnesses.”).
As to the hearing judge’s conclusions of law, this Court has the ultimate authority to
decide whether a lawyer has violated the MRPC and, thus, reviews the hearing judge’s
conclusions of law on a de novo basis.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mahone, 398 Md.
257, 265-66, 920 A.2d 458, 463 (2007); Harrington, 367 Md. at 49, 785 A.2d at 1267-68
(citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Garland, 345 Md. 383, 392, 692 A.2d 465, 469
(1997); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Shaw, 354 Md. 636, 646, 732 A.2d 876, 881 (1999);
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Breschi, 340 Md. 590, 599, 667 A.2d 659, 663 (1995)); see
also Md. Rule 16-759(b)(1).
Bar Counsel, as petitioner in this case, bears the burden of proving a violation of the
MRPC by clear and convincing evidence, while the respondent  attorney only bears the
burden of proving an affirmative defense and/or matters of mitigation by a preponderance
of the evidence.  Guida, 391 Md. at 50, 891 A.2d at 1095 (applying Md. Rule 16-757(b)).
“Clear and convincing evidence must be more than a mere preponderance but not beyond
a reasonable doubt.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. DiCicco, 369 Md. 662, 681, 802 A.2d
1014, 1025 (2002).
IV. Exceptions Filed by Petitioner
Petitioner in this case challenges Judge Dugan’s conclusion that MRPC 1.8(c) was
8 The language of MRPC 1.8(c) at issue in Stein is the same as applies in the present
case.
11
not violated and, incidentally, protests the hearing judge’s refusal to find a violation of
MRPC 8.4(d).  With the exception of Judge Dugan’s purported factual finding that Lawlor
served as independent counsel to Wylette Speed, Petitioner does not impugn in its
Exceptions the hearing judge’s findings of fact.  Petitioner focuses its exception on the legal
conclusions drawn by the hearing judge that Lawlor actually was independent of Respondent
when he consulted with Mrs. Speed about her will.  Based on our independent review of the
record and findings of fact, we conclude that Respondent violated MRPC 1.8(c) and 8.4(d).
A. MRPC 1.8(c)
The version of MRPC 1.8(c) in effect at the time of the conduct giving rise to the
alleged violations required that a client be represented by independent counsel with respect
to any substantial bequest or gift the client sought to confer on a lawyer who was preparing
the will containing the gift.  See supra note 1.  Because we disagree with the hearing judge’s
conclusion that Lawlor sufficiently was possessed of the appearance of independence in his
role of consulting with Wylette Speed as to the residuary bequest to Respondent, we shall
sustain Petitioner’s exception to the conclusion that MRPC 1.8(c) was not violated.
Petitioner relies principally on our interpretation of MRPC 1.8(c) expressed in
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Stein, 373 Md. 531, 819 A.2d 372 (2003).8  In Stein, we said
that “[t]he independent counsel required by the Rule must be truly independent - the
12
requirement of the Rule may not be satisfied by consultation with an attorney who is a
partner of, shares space with, or is a close associate of the attorney-drafter.”  373 Md. at
537-38, 819 A.2d at 376 (emphasis added).  Petitioner, building on this language, argues
that an attorney who shares space with the attorney-drafter of the will should not qualify as
independent counsel to the donor client.  In this regard, Bar Counsel reminds us of the office
suite, conference room, and receptionist shared by Lawlor and Respondent.  As a result of
this “critical mass” of shared space and resources, Petitioner contends that, under Stein, it
should be clear that Lawlor should not have been perceived as sufficiently independent of
Respondent for the purpose of the Rule.
Respondent cries foul at Bar Counsel’s reliance on Stein as an unfair retrospective
application of law.  Stein was filed in 2003, approximately nine years after the series of
events unfolded that are the factual predicate of the instant disciplinary action.  We are
unpersuaded by Respondent’s “retrospectivity” argument.
We stated previously that, when setting forth and applying the law with regard to the
interpretation of a statute or rule in a certain case, the pronouncement of the law offered in
that case is viewed generally as what has always been the law, albeit unannounced until that
case.  Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Goldstein, 312 Md. 583, 591, 541 A.2d 955, 958 (1988)
(“In the overwhelming majority of cases, a judicial decision sets forth and applies the rule
of law that existed both before and after the date of the decision.”).  Because the
interpretation given in Stein had been the law, its application to facts arising before the
13
interpretation was articulated is a proper and fair retrospective application of the law.  A
retrospective application of the law, on the other hand, may be improper or unfair where “a
court overrules a prior interpretation of a constitutional or statutory provision, and renders
a new interpretation of the provision.”  Goldstein, 312 Md. at 591, 541 A.2d at 959.  This
is otherwise known as  a “clear break,” where a completely new interpretation of a rule
replaces an older, well-established interpretation of that rule.  Warrick v. State, 108 Md.
App. 108, 113, 671 A.2d 51, 53 (1996) (citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 324-25,
107 S. Ct. 708, 714, 93 L. Ed. 2d 649 (1987)).
It is clear to us that no “clear break” occurred when Stein announced this Court’s
interpretation of MRPC 1.8(c) to require independent counsel not be partners of, share space
with, or be close associates of the attorney drafting a will in which he is a substantial
beneficiary.  There was no departure from a widely-held prior interpretation of the Rule.
Rather, Stein set forth an interpretation of the independent counsel requirement in MRPC
1.8(c), based on its language and intent.  Stein’s interpretation of the Rule does not become
a “clear break” simply because it was rendered upon a set of facts not yet encountered by an
appellate court until that time.  See Goldstein, 312 Md. at 591, 541 A.2d at 959 (quoting
Potts v. State, 300 Md. 567, 577, 479 A.2d 1335, 1341 (1984)) (“In this usual situation,
‘where a decision has applied settled precedent to new and different factual situations, the
decision always applies retroactively.’”).
Respondent also argues that the facts in Stein are readily distinguishable from those
14
in the present case.  Be that as it may, Stein’s legal analysis and interpretation of MRPC
1.8(c), which is the only portion of Stein relied upon by this Court in the case now before
us, was not necessarily fact-driven.  The legal interpretation of “independent counsel”
offered in Stein focused on the Rule, rather than the facts that gave rise to the need in Stein
to interpret the Rule.  For the same reason that retrospective application of Stein here is not
an improper one, the factual distinctions between Stein and this case are immaterial to our
legal analysis of what the Rule requires.  Accordingly, we are unmoved at this juncture by
the factual distinctions urged by Respondent, though these distinctions will return to play
an important role in our consideration of what sanction is appropriate. 
It is evident from the record that Respondent endeavored to comply with MRPC
1.8(c).  Judge Dugan found that Respondent recognized the ethical quandary created by
Wylette Speed’s desire to include a bequest to him in the will she asked that he prepare.
Respondent even expressed to Wylette his  wariness about preparing a will containing a gift
to him and suggested finding another attorney to draft the will as she wanted it.  The record
reflects that Wylette responded by asking Respondent to find another attorney for her
because she was not in a position to do so.  Respondent’s mis-step, in attempting to comply
with MRPC 1.8(c), came when he recruited a friend and office suite co-tenant, Richard
Lawlor, to fulfill the role as independent counsel to Mrs. Speed.  While that choice may have
been blessed with the virtues of convenience and competence on Lawlor’s part, it lacked
consideration of the nuance of how the perception of closeness might be viewed as
9 The presence of an attorney’s good faith, for analysis of whether a violation of the
MRPC occurred, is distinct from the consideration of good faith as a matter of mitigation
when the Court determines the appropriate sanction.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Lee, 393 Md. 546, 564, 903 A.2d 895, 906 (2006).
15
undermining the independence requirement of the Rule.  That is not to say that, on this
record, Mr. Lawlor failed to discharge properly his duty as Mrs. Speed’s special counsel.
The record reflects that Lawlor consulted with Wylette in a manner in which independent
counsel would be expected to do.  That notwithstanding, Respondent’s choice for
independent counsel may not have appeared sufficiently independent to a member of the
public aware of the connection between Respondent and Lawlor and knowing the other
material background facts.
Accordingly, we believe that Respondent sacrificed adherence to the spirit of MRPC
1.8(c) in his nonetheless good faith attempt to satisfy the letter of the Rule.  See Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Fezell, 361 Md. 234, 254-55, 760 A.2d 1108, 1119 (2000).  The
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct sometimes call upon attorneys to make nuanced
ethical determinations, and, as a result, there may be occasions where attorneys expose
themselves to some ethical second-guessing,  even in their honest efforts to honor their
known ethical duties.  We cannot look away from a violation of the Rule at the expense of
the principles and spirit undergirding it solely because an attorney made a good faith effort
at compliance.9  The Preamble to the MRPC, entitled “A Lawyer’s Responsibilities,”
touches on this concern: “The Rules of Professional Conduct prescribe terms for resolving
10 We hasten to add that nothing in the record indicates that any collusion, in fact,
occurred between Respondent and Lawlor.  For purposes of finding a violation of MRPC
1.8(c), however, the objective perception by a member of the public, the protection of whom
these Rules are created and enforced, Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mba-Jonas, 397 Md.
690, 702, 919 A.2d 669, 677 (2007), is the proper vantage point from which to consider
whether an actionable appearance of impropriety occurred.
11 Contrary to Respondent’s assertion at oral argument, public perception of the
appearance of impropriety has always been a matter of concern for attorney discipline in
Maryland.  See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. James, 340 Md. 318, 326, 666 A.2d
1246, 1250 (1995) (affirming a violation of MRPC 5.5, relying, in part, on a Maryland State
Bar Association Committee on Ethics informal opinion discussing an arrangement that
“would give to the public the appearance of impropriety.”); Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
v. Los Angeles Rams Football Co., 284 Md. 86, 95, 394 A.2d 801, 806 (1978) (applying
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibited “the appearance of
impropriety resulting in a weakening of public confidence in the judicial system”); see also
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Cockrell, 304 Md. 379, 381 n.4, 499 A.2d 928, 929 n.4
(1985); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bailey, 285 Md. 631, 641-42, 403 A.2d 1261, 1267
(1979); STANARD T. KLINEFELTER & CRISTIN C. LAMBROS, 2 PRACTICE MANUAL FOR THE
(continued...)
16
[ethical] conflicts.  Within the framework of these Rules many difficult issues of
professional discretion can arise.  Such issues must be resolved through the exercise of
sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic principles underlying these
Rules.”  We conclude that Respondent failed to apply properly all of the principles
underlying MRPC 1.8(c) and created the potential for the appearance of impropriety, in a
situation where he stood to benefit significantly by his client’s intended gift, by retaining,
as counsel, an attorney with whom he shared office space, professional resources, and a
personal relationship.  A reasonable member of the public could well look askance at such
an arrangement and suspect that collusion could have taken place.10  This appearance of
impropriety is enough to constitute a violation of the Rule.11  Attorney Grievance Comm’n
11(...continued)
MARYLAND LAWYER § 13.33 (3d ed. 2005) (advising attorneys to be cautious in preparing
a will to which they are a beneficiary for fear of the appearance of impropriety).  Were we
to stop caring what the public perception of attorneys may be, we succumb to all of the
mean-spirited lawyer jokes and the largely unjustified rancor behind many of them.
17
v. Hines, 366 Md. 277, 293, 783 A.2d 656, 665 (2001) (quoting Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Kent, 337 Md. 361, 382, 653 A.2d 909, 919 (1995)) (“In order to maintain
public confidence in the legal system, lawyers must avoid not only actual acts of misconduct
but even the type of behavior that can suggest misconduct.”).  Accordingly, we sustain
Petitioner’s exception to Judge Dugan’s recommended conclusion that Respondent did not
violate MRPC 1.8(c).
B. MRPC 8.4(d)
Respondent’s actions, which created an appearance of impropriety, necessarily
constitute “conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”  MRPC 8.4(d).  We
said in Stein:
We view the violation [of MRPC 1.8(c)] as a most serious one.
There are many potential dangers inherent in an attorney
drafting a will in which he or she is the beneficiary. . . . [Among
some of the dangers are] the undermining of the public trust and
confidence in the legal profession . . . .
373 Md. at 538, 819 A.2d at 376 (emphasis added).  We have stated on numerous occasions
that when the public’s confidence in the judicial system is harmed by the occasion of
attorneys violating their professional responsibilities, the administration of justice is harmed
equally.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kapoor, 391 Md. 505, 532, 894 A.2d 502, 518
18
(2006); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Reinhardt, 391 Md. 209, 222, 892 A.2d 533, 540
(2006) (“Behavior that may seriously impair public confidence in the entire profession,
without extenuating circumstances, may be conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice.”); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Painter, 356 Md. 293, 306, 739 A.2d 24, 32
(1999) (holding that MRPC 8.4(d) is violated when an attorney engages in conduct which
undermines public confidence in the legal profession); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Richardson, 350 Md. 354, 368, 712 A.2d 525, 532 (1998) (“We have . . . recognized that
conduct that impacts on the image or the perception of the courts or the legal profession, and
that engenders disrespect for the courts and for the legal profession may be prejudicial to the
administration of justice. Lawyers are officers of the court and their conduct must be
assessed in that light.”) (citation omitted); see also Rheb v. Bar Ass’n of Baltimore City, 186
Md. 200, 205, 46 A.2d 289, 291 (1946).  Specifically, violations of MRPC 1.8(c) are
detrimental to public confidence in the legal system.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Lanocha, 392 Md. 234, 244, 896 A.2d 996, 1002 (2006) (citing Stein, 373 Md. at 543, 819
A.2d at 379).
Accordingly, we sustain Petitioner’s exception to Judge Dugan’s conclusion that
there was no violation of MRPC 8.4(d).
V. Sanction
Maryland Rule 16-759(c) provides that “[t]he Court of Appeals may order (1)
disbarment, (2) suspension, (3) reprimand, (4) inactive status, (5) dismissal of the
19
disciplinary or remedial action, or (6) a remand for further proceedings.”  Petitioner posits
that Respondent’s action are substantially the same as those in Stein, and recommends
accordingly that Respondent be suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.  While
Respondent argues that Stein is distinguishable, he has not offered any recommendations as
to an appropriate sanction.  Instead, he urges dismissal of the Petition.
We concluded that Respondent violated MRPC 1.8(c) and 8.4(d).  “The sanction for
a violation of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct depends on the facts and
circumstances of each case, including a consideration of any mitigating factors.”  Reinhardt,
391 Md. at 223, 892 A.2d at 541 (citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Zuckerman, 386
Md. 341, 375, 872 A.2d 693, 713 (2005)); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Atkinson, 357
Md. 646, 656, 745 A.2d 1086, 1092 (2000) (“In addition to the facts underlying the
misconduct, the attorney’s prior grievance history, as well as any mitigating factors are part
of the equation.”).  
We stated previously that 
[t]he primary purpose in imposing discipline on an attorney for
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct is not to punish
the lawyer, but rather to protect the public and the public’s
confidence in the legal profession.  Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Powell, 369 Md. 462, 474, 800 A.2d 782, 789
(2002).  Disciplinary proceedings also are aimed at deterring
other lawyers from engaging in similar conduct.  [Powell, 369
Md. at 474-75, 800 A.2d at 789].  The purpose, however, “is
not to punish the lawyer or to provide a basis upon which to
impose civil liability.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Monfried, 368 Md. 373, 394, 794 A.2d 92, 104 (2002).  When
this Court imposes a sanction, it protects the public interest
20
“because it demonstrates to members of the legal profession the
type of conduct which will not be tolerated.”  Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Mooney, 359 Md. 56, 96, 753 A.2d 17,
38 (2000).
Stein, 373 Md. at 537, 819 A.2d at 375.  These jurisprudential principles of attorney
discipline are well-settled in Maryland.  See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gallagher,
371 Md. 673, 713-14, 810 A.2d 996, 1020 (2002); Atkinson, 357 Md. at 656, 745 A.2d at
1092; Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hess, 352 Md. 438, 453, 722 A.2d 905, 913 (1999).
We generally impose sanctions which we believe are most appropriate and befitting of the
nature and gravity of the violations, together with the intent on the part of the violating
attorney.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Post, 379 Md. 60, 70-71, 839 A.2d, 718, 724
(2003); Stein, 373 Md. at 537, 819 A.2d at 375 (“[T]he public is protected when sanctions
are imposed that are commensurate with the nature and gravity of the violations and the
intent with which they were committed.”) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Awuah,
346 Md. 420, 435, 697 A.2d 446, 454 (1997)); see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Briscoe, 357 Md. 554, 568, 745 A.2d 1037, 1044 (2000) (“The gravity of misconduct . . .
is determined largely by the lawyer’s conduct.”) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm'n v.
Milliken, 348 Md. 486, 519, 704 A.2d 1225, 1241 (1998)).
With this in mind, we do not believe that the sanction imposed in Stein is
commensurate with the actions of Respondent.  In Stein, the conduct of the attorney was
12 Ordinarily, a violation of MRPC 1.8(c) evokes consideration of another possible
sanction .  In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Stein, 373 Md. 531, 819 A.2d 372 (2003),
several members of this Court argued forcefully for the requirement of disgorgement of a
testamentary gift improperly created by an attorney to whom it would be granted.  373 Md.
at 546-49, 819 A.2d at 381-82 (Wilner, J., dissenting, joined by Harrell, J.); Stein, 373 Md.
at 545, 819 A.2d at 380 (Cathell, J., concurring) (agreeing essentially with the notion of
disgorgement whether voluntary or involuntary).  Disgorgement as a sanction  in the
appropriate case should not be forgotten, although the present case is not that case. 
After considering two Ohio cases, Disciplinary Counsel v. Galinas, 666 N.E.2d 1083,
1087 (Ohio 1996) (Stratton, J., dissenting) and Mahoning County Bar Ass’n v. Theofilos,
521 N.E.2d 797, 799 (Ohio 1988) (Holmes, J. dissenting), in which disgorgement was
advocated by dissenting members of those courts, the majority in Stein concluded that such
a measure was unnecessary in light of another forum in which an equivalent sanction could
be achieved, namely a will caveat.  Further, in quoting from the preamble to the MRPC, the
majority in Stein hinted that disgorgement of an improper testamentary gift too closely
resembled a form of civil liability not contemplated by the Rules.  The MRPC, however,
permits other similar types of pecuniary reparation, namely restitution of monies belonging
rightfully to a client.  Maryland Rules 16-736(c)(3)(B) (listing “restitution of unearned or
excessive fees in a stipulated amount” as a possible term for a Conditional Diversion
Agreement); 17-760(h)(5) (providing that one possible condition of an order imposing
discipline is for the attorney to “make restitution to any client of any sum found to be due
to the client”); see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sachse, 345 Md. 578, 594, 693 A.2d
806, 814 (1997) (ordering restitution of trust funds be made by a conflicted attorney-trustee
who permitted the improper distribution of those funds).
We note also that conditions may be added to sanctions imposed in disciplinary
matters.  Md. Rule 16-721(c) (citing Md. Rule 16-760).  Specifically, if the Court orders a
reprimand, any number of ten different conditions are within the realm of contemplation.
Md. Rule 16-760(b), (h).  In addition to satisfying any judgment or reimbursing the Client
Protection Fund, Md. Rule 16-760(h)(4), and making restitution, Md. Rule 16-760(h)(5),
the Rule provides that the Court may order an attorney to “take any other corrective action
that may be reasonable and appropriate.”  Md. Rule 16-760(h)(10).  In the same way that
restitution is an appropriate sanction to remedy excessive fees, depleted trusts, or other
monies owed to a client, disgorgement of a testamentary gift improperly bequested to an
attorney is an appropriate sanction for the violation of MRPC 1.8(c).  The rationale for this
type of sanction was addressed well by Judge Wilner in his dissent in Stein.  373 Md. at 548,
819 A.2d at 382. At least one other state, Florida, has embraced the same logic of deterrence
by disgorging ill-gotten gains.  The Florida Bar v. St. Louis,       So.2d     , 32 Fla. L. Weekly
(continued...)
21
much more egregious than that of Respondent.12  Stein suggested to his client the substantial
12(...continued)
S191 (Fla. 2007) (applying Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 3-5.1(h), which provides for
forfeiture of fees made impermissible by the Rules, where restitution was inappropriate); The
Florida Bar v. Rodriguez, 959 So.2d 150, 32 Fla. L. Weekly S186 (Fla. 2007) (concluding
that “permitting Rodriguez to retain his ill-gotten gains would fail to provide a deterrent and
could actually encourage misconduct by greedy lawyers.”).  In fact, we have once before
considered requiring an attorney to disclaim a bequest.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Brooke, 374 Md. 155, 182, 821 A.2d 414, 429 (2003).
13 As indicated previously, supra note 9, the presence of good faith on the part of an
attorney is a relevant consideration for the purpose of imposing a sanction.  Lee, 393 Md.
at 564, 903 A.2d at 906.
22
gift to himself and only made a transparently superficial attempt at obtaining counsel,
independence aside, for his client-donor by recommending a member of his own firm, who
clearly would be conflicted.  Stein, 373 Md. at 543, 819 A.2d at 379.  When his client-donor
did not consult with the attorney he recommended, Stein disregarded his obligation to have
his client meet with independent counsel as to the gift and proceeded to prepare the will
containing a substantial gift to himself.  Id.  As we have noted previously, Respondent
recognized, in large measure, the ethical issue at hand and made a good faith effort to
comply with the letter of MRPC 1.8(c).13  He engaged the services of an experienced and
capable friend whom he had every reason to trust would serve as adequate counsel to Mrs.
Speed, who did not want to and/or was not capable of retaining another attorney on her own.
Respondent ran afoul of MRPC 1.8(c), however, when he failed to perceive the appearance
of impropriety of selecting such a close friend with whom he shared office space and other
professional resources.  Thus, the underlying principle on which the independent counsel
requirement rests was not honored entirely.  With a client in a vulnerable and dependent
23
state, Stein, 373 Md. at 538-39, 819 A.2d at 376 (citing Disciplinary Counsel v. Galinas,
666 N.E.2d 1083, 1086 (Ohio 1996) (discussing the hypersensitivity towards ethical matters
attorneys must exercise when dealing with clients “contemplating [their] own mortality”)),
Respondent should have located a similarly qualified independent counsel that would not
have raised an appearance of impropriety.
In examining other mitigating and aggravating factors, Stolarz, 379 Md. at 403, 842
A.2d at 51, we note that Respondent’s situation does not demonstrate any discernible
aggravating factors.  To the contrary, the record reflects that Respondent does not have any
prior disciplinary record.  He produced uncontroverted witnesses as to his exceptional
character.  We conclude also that it seems highly unlikely that Respondent will repeat the
actions in a similar situation as occurred in this case.  
In Atty. Griev. Comm’n v. Brooke, 374 Md. 155, 821 A.2d 414 (2003), misconduct
by the errant attorney resulted in an indefinite suspension for violation of MRPC 1.8(c) and
8.4(d).  Brooke, who professed to be unaware of the requirements of MRPC 1.8(c) at the
time, evinced a seeming indifference to the preparation of his client’s will by directing his
non-lawyer assistant to prepare for the client a will in which the attorney was to be a legatee.
Even though, as in Stein, the attorney was ignorant of the requirements of Rule 1.8(c),
committed only a single act of misconduct, lacked a prior disciplinary record, and was found
not to have exerted any undue influence over the testator with regard to the relevant bequest,
the Court concluded that indefinite suspension was the appropriate sanction.    The principal
24
distinction between the facts of Brooke and the present case is that Brooke took no
affirmative actions whatsoever that could be construed reasonably as honoring to any extent
the letter or the spirit of Rule 1.8(c).
The attorney in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Lanocha, 392 Md. 234, 896 A.2d 996
(2006), as in Stein and Brooke “had no knowledge whatsoever of Rule [1.8(c)] or its
existence or content” when he drafted a client’s will that contained a substantial bequest to
the attorney’s daughter.  Id. at 240, 896 A.2d at 1000 (alteration in original).  In Lanocha,
the attorney nonetheless advised his client to seek other counsel in connection with
preparation and execution of the will, but she declined.  Id.  Moreover, he did not suggest
the gift to his daughter be included in the will.  Id. at 245, 896 A.2d at 1003.
Lanocha defended against a finding of a violation of Rule 1.8(c) principally on the
basis that the gift to his daughter was dissimilar to Stein and Brooke where the beneficiaries
were the attorneys who drafted the wills.  Id. at 243, 896 A.2d 1002.  The Majority opinion
in Lanocha, while finding insufficient merit in this distinction for purposes of determining
whether the Rule was violated (id. at 243-244, 896 A.2d at 1001-1002), nonetheless
seemingly relied on that consideration to conclude that a reprimand was the appropriate
sanction in that case.  Id. at 245-246, 896 A.2d 1003-1004.
The present case, in our view, “plumbs the depth of the shallow end of the sanction
pool” among the modern cases considering violations of MRPC 1.8(c) and 8.4(d).  See
Stolarz, 379 Md. at 403, 842 A.2d at 51.  Unlike the respondent’s in Stein, Brooke and
14We rely not just upon our perception of Saridakis’s representations to this effect,
but also on the intervening change in the language of the Rule.  See FN.1, supra.
15Should Saridakis reject such a disposition, we shall consider anew a different,
appropriate sanction.
25
Lanocha, Saridakis was aware generally of the requirements of Rule 1.8(c) and made a
good faith effort to comply.  This situation, when combined with his otherwise unblemished
disciplinary record, the unlikelihood of repetition of the misconduct,14 the much more
egregious misconduct in Stein and Brooke, and his otherwise exemplary good character,
leads us to believe that a Stolarz-like disposition would be appropriate in this case.  See
Stolarz, 379 Md. at 402-406, 842 A.2d at 50-52.  Thus, under Rule 16-759(c), we remand
this case to the Commission for it to dismiss the petition, but with a warning to Saridakis.
See Rule 16-735(b).15
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT
SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED
BY THE CLERK OF THE COURT,
INCLUDING COSTS OF ALL
TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO
MARYLAND RULE 16-715(c), FOR
WHICH SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS
ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE
A T T O R N E Y  
G R I E V A N C E
COMMISSION AGAINST ANTHONY
A. SARIDAKIS. 
In the Circuit Court for M ontgomery County
Case No. 21292-M
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
 
     MARYLAND
Misc. Docket AG No. 25
September Term, 2006
_______________________________________
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
    OF MARYLAND
v.
ANTHONY A. SARIDAKIS
_______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Raker
        *Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Wilner, Alan M. (Retired,
   
specially assigned),
JJ.
_______________________________________
Dissenting Opinion by Wilner, J.,
which Greene, J. joins
______________________________________
Filed: December 7, 2007
*   Cathell, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an active
member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant
to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also
participated in the decision and adoption of this
opinion.
In 1994, respondent prepared a Will for a client under which, at the client’s 
express direction and without any solicitation from respondent, he became a substantial 
legatee.  The Court acknowledges that (1) there is no evidence in this record that respondent, or
anyone on his behalf, exercised any undue influence on the testatrix with respect to the Will, and,
indeed, when faced with the client’s direction to include himself as a beneficiary, respondent
attempted to dissuade her, (2) upon her insistence, he recognized the need for the client to have
independent legal advice in the matter and so advised her, (3) when she responded that she did
not know any other lawyers and had no ability to seek out one, he obtained for her a qualified
lawyer (Lawlor) with whom he had no personal, on-going professional, or business relationship
beyond the fact that the two shared a conference room and receptionist in their office suite, (4)
there was no collusion of any kind between respondent and Lawlor, and (5) Lawlor met with the
client, acted as her counsel, and gave what the trial judge who heard all of the evidence regarded
as true independent legal advice.  
Nonetheless, the Court finds that respondent violated the versions of MRPC 1.8(c) 
and 8.4(d) in effect in 1994 because respondent was not sufficiently prescient to anticipate this
Court’s unique pronouncement nine years later in Attorney Grievance v. Stein, 373 Md. 531,
819 A.2d 372 (2003), that, as a matter of law and notwithstanding the facts, a lawyer cannot, in
these circumstances, be regarded as giving independent legal advice if he or she shares office
space with the respondent.  The Court, at least tacitly, recognizes the gross unfairness of that
determination by sending the case back to Bar Counsel so that he can dismiss it.   That, to me,
is a classic “cop-out” and wholly inappropriate.  The Court pronounces publicly that respondent
2
has been guilty of serious violations of the Rules of Professional Responsibility, which will tar
him for the rest of his career, and yet directs Bar Counsel quietly to dismiss the case.  
With respect, I dissent.  If, as the Court holds, respondent violated MRPC 1.8(c) and
8.4(d) because he should have known that it was impermissible to obtain a lawyer with whom
he shared office space to give independent legal advice to his client, he should be punished for
that misconduct.  If the Court is right that respondent should somehow have known that his
conduct was unlawful and prejudicial to the administration of justice, the petition should not be
dismissed, with or without a warning.  He should be sanctioned as other lawyers have been for
that very kind of violation.  The problem is that the Court is dreadfully wrong in finding those
violations; that is the unacceptable unfairness.
The version of MRPC 1.8(c) in effect in 1994 provided, in relevant part, that
“A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer or a
person related to the lawyer . . . any substantial gift from a client,
including a testamentary gift, except where:
(1) the client is related to the donee; or
(2) the client is represented by independent counsel in 
connection with the gift.”
That version of MRPC 1.8(c) was adopted by the Court effective January, 1987.  There
was no counterpart to the Rule in the previous Disciplinary Rules, although former Ethical
Consideration 5-5 stated that “if a client voluntarily offers to make a gift to his lawyer, the
lawyer may accept the gift, but before doing so, he should urge that the client secure
disinterested advice from an independent, competent person who is cognizant of 
all the circumstances.”  Unquestionably, respondent satisfied that requirement.  He did 
3
urge his client to obtain such advice.
There was nothing in the previous Disciplinary Rule or Ethical Consideration and there
was nothing in MRPC 1.8(c) or any comment to it that purported to define “disinterested
advice,” “independent person,” or “independent counsel,” or that stated any specific criteria for
determining who might or might not qualify.  Nor, in 1994, was there 
any judicial gloss from this Court in that regard.  We had not yet construed the Rule.  
Lawyers were left to use their best, honest judgment.
Respondent had represented the client, Ms. Speed, since 1983, and he became, in addition
to her lawyer, a trusted advisor and friend.  Ms. Speed had no children and, after the death of her
husband, no close relatives other than a sister in ill health in Baltimore and a niece in Ohio.
Respondent had drafted several Wills for Ms. Speed and a power of attorney in which she named
him as her health care agent.  So far as this record reveals, all of this was quite proper.  After Ms.
Speed suffered a stroke in 1992 and had to be placed in a nursing home, respondent visited her
frequently, continued to manage her affairs, and, as the Court notes, served as her “family
member” at meetings with the nursing home staff.
In 1993, Ms. Speed asked respondent to prepare a new Will in which he, Ms. Speed’s
sister, her former and current trust officers, and her godson would be named as residuary
legatees.  She apparently had no desire to name her niece in Ohio as a beneficiary. Respondent
made clear to Ms. Speed that he was not comfortable with any bequest to him and asked that she
think about it some more.  When, several months later, she repeated her request that he prepare
4
the Will as directed, he again expressed discomfort at drafting a Will in which he would be a
beneficiary.  She insisted, whereupon he told her that she would need to consult another attorney.
She responded that she did not know any other attorneys and was not in a position to find one.
Respondent thereupon drafted the Will as directed but, before presenting it to her for her
signature, he consulted Mr. Lawlor, an attorney whom he knew and respected, explained the
situation and his concern, and asked if Lawlor would review the Will with her.  Respondent and
Lawlor shared a receptionist and a conference room but had entirely separate offices and
practices and no other personal, professional, or business relationship.  The trial judge found,
on essentially undisputed evidence, that “the configuration within the suite was not substantially
different than if Mr. Lawlor occupied an office next door.  With the independent practices each
firm had, there was no working relationship between them.”
Mr. Lawlor visited Ms. Speed at the nursing home.  Although respondent introduced him
to her and explained that Lawlor would go over the Will with her, respondent left the room when
that occurred.  The trial judge found as a fact that Lawlor “acted as independent counsel” to Ms.
Speed.  The judge concluded that Lawlor “proceeded to have a general conversation with her
which allowed him to form an opinion that she was competent to make and execute a will” and
that “[h]e followed by going over her will in detail and confirming her donative intent to make
the included bequest.”  Lawlor opened a file and charged Ms. Speed for his services.  Ms. Speed
executed a codicil to the Will in 1994 that did not change any of the bequests, and she died in
April, 2000.
5
When the relevant events here occurred, in 1994, no State in the country, including
Maryland, had adopted the view that, as a matter of law, the mere sharing of office space with
the client’s attorney precludes an attorney from being considered as independent counsel for
purposes of MRPC 1.8(c).  Indeed, so far as I can determine, there had, at the time, been only
one reported attorney discipline case in which the sharing of office space was even mentioned
in this context – People v. Berge, 620 P.2d 23 (Colo.1980).  
In Berge, an attorney was charged, among other things, with exerting undue influence on
a client in connection with the preparation of a Will in which the attorney was named as a
beneficiary and failing to adopt appropriate safeguards to avoid undue influence and the
appearance of impropriety in respect to the drafting and execution of the Will.  Berge had
prepared a Will for the client in 1967 in which he was not named as a beneficiary.  In 1968, the
client asked Berge to prepare a new Will in which Berge would be a beneficiary.  Recognizing
the conflict, Berge declined to prepare the Will and recommended two other attorneys.  The
client rejected those recommendations and asked if there was someone in Berge’s office who
could draft the Will.  Berge suggested an attorney (Smith) whom he described as independent,
but who rented office space from Berge’s law firm, shared with the firm all office expenses,
including secretarial salaries and telephone expenses, on a proportional basis, and had a close
personal relationship with the members of the firm.
Berge informed Smith that his client wanted to make Berge a beneficiary and asked Smith
to prepare the Will.  Smith met with the client and went over a marked-up copy of the existing
6
Will.  They did not discuss the client’s family situation, the tax consequences of the proposed
new Will, or any other factors that might have affected the Will.  The conference took between
ten and fifteen minutes, and Smith gave the client “no substantive advice.”  Id. at 25.  In contrast
to the old Will, the new one left Berge 47% of the residuary estate and contained an in terrorem
clause disinheriting any beneficiary who challenged the Will.  The client returned to Smith’s
office several days later and signed the Will in Berge’s presence, with Berge acting as a witness.
The relevant standard in Colorado with respect to this conduct was Ethical Consideration
5.5, which, as noted, allowed a lawyer to accept a gift from a client but before doing so was
supposed to urge that the client secure disinterested advice from an independent, competent
person who is cognizant of the relevant circumstances and that “[o]ther than in exceptional
circumstances, a lawyer should insist that an instrument in which his client desires to name him
beneficially be prepared by another lawyer selected by the client.”  The Colorado court
concluded that Berge’s conduct did not satisfy that standard.  It noted:
“The close relationship of the respondent and his firm with Smith
is inconsistent with the appearance of independence. Much more
importantly, the manner in which Smith handled this matter
establishes that he was not independent in fact.  His inquiry into the
facts essential to proper representation was minimal.  He did not
inquire into [the client’s] family situation, the size of his estate, or
any other facts essential to proper representation.  He gave [the
client] no substantive advice, but acted only as a scrivener in
making changes noted on a copy of an earlier will. . .   He never
billed [the client] even though he had no expectation of becoming
attorney for the estate.  Smith candidly admitted that his services in
the matter were performed as a favor to the respondent. . . . The way
he treated this matter testifies eloquently to the close relationship
between the respondent and Smith and to Smith’s lack of
7
independence.”
Id. at 27 (Emphasis added).
That, essentially, was the legal landscape when respondent prepared the Will for Ms.
Speed.  Every court that had considered the issue, whether in the context of an attack on the Will
for undue influence or in an attorney grievance context, looked at all of the underlying facts –
the overall connection between the two lawyers and the actual conduct of the second attorney
–  in deciding whether the first attorney’s conduct was proper. See, for example, 
In re Lobb’s Will, 160 P.2d 295 (Or. 1945); In re Moses’ Will, 227 So.2d 829 (Miss. 1969);   
State v. Beaudry, 191 N.W.2d 842 (Wis. 1972).  None had purported to hold that the sharing of
office space alone precluded an otherwise independent attorney from acting as such and giving
independent advice.
What dooms respondent, in the Court’s eyes, is this Court’s Opinion in Attorney
Grievance v. Stein, supra, 373 Md. 531, 819 A.2d 372, filed nine years after the relevant events
in this case.  In that case, when his client indicated a desire to have a new Will prepared under
which Stein would be a beneficiary, Stein suggested that the client speak with another attorney
in his law firm.  He never suggested that she consult independent counsel, and she never did so.
The client did not contact the suggested lawyer, or any other lawyer, and Stein prepared the Will,
under which he received one-third of the residuary estate.  In sustaining a finding that Stein had
violated MRPC 1.8(c) – the same version of the Rule that existed in 1994 – the Court noted:
“Respondent drafted a will for his client in which he stood to inherit
a substantial gift.  He was not related to the client, and the client did
8
not consult with independent counsel.  The independent counsel
required by the Rule must be truly independent – the requirement of
the Rule may not be satisfied by consultation with an attorney who
is a partner of, shares space with, or is a close associate of the
attorney-drafter.  See, e.g., People v. Berge, 620 P.2d 23, 27
(Colo.1980); State v. Beaudry, 53 Wis.2d 148, 191 N.W.2d 842,
844-45 (1971).”
(Emphasis added).
That is the first time, to my knowledge, that any court has held, seemingly as a matter of
law, that a lawyer who merely shares office space with the client’s attorney cannot be regarded
as independent for purposes of MRPC 1.8(c).  The uniqueness of that statement is remarkable
for two reasons.  One, it clearly was dicta.   As noted, the client did not consult with any other
lawyer before signing the Will drafted by Stein, so the issue of whether a lawyer sharing space
could render independent advice was simply not presented.  Second, neither Berge nor Beaudry
– the two cases cited by the Court – support the conclusion that space-sharing is an automatic
disqualification.  Berge has already been discussed.  The issue there was not space-sharing but
rather the overall relationship between Smith and Berge and the fact that Smith never even
purported to give independent advice to Berge’s client.  Beaudry is even less on point.
Beaudry was founded on two earlier Wisconsin cases – State v. Horan, 123 N.W.2d 488
(Wis. 1963) and State v. Collentine, 159 N.W.2d 50 (Wis. 1968).  At the time of Horan, there
was no Rule in Wisconsin governing the drawing of a Will by a lawyer for a client in which the
lawyer was to be a beneficiary, and the commentators were in some disagreement as to whether,
or under what circumstances, it was proper for a lawyer to undertake such work.  Concerned
9
about the lurking problem of undue influence, the Horan court concluded that “prudence
requires that such a will be drawn by some other lawyer of the testator’s own choosing so that
any suspicion of undue influence is thereby avoided.”  Id. at 491.  The court added a caveat,
however – that a lawyer could draw a Will for a client in which the lawyer would be a
beneficiary “after fully advising his client of the effect thereof and when he is justified in
believing that there is or will be independent competent evidence which rebuts the inference [of
undue influence].”  Id. at 492.
In Collentine, the court disavowed that caveat and closed the loophole, concluding that:
“When a testator wishes to have his attorney draft a will in which
that attorney is entitled to anything more than he would be at law,
it is the absolute duty of the attorney to refuse to act.  He has the
responsibility of advising his client to consult another attorney if he
wishes to pursue such a bequest.”
Collentine, 159 N.W.2d at 53.
Under that approach, as the Wisconsin court acknowledged in Beaudry, a lawyer was
forbidden to draft a Will for a client, even a close relative, if the lawyer or a member of the
lawyer’s family would receive a bequest greater than if the client died intestate.  See Beaudry,
191 N.W.2d at 843. In Beaudry, the Will at issue was drafted after the decision in Horan but
about two-and-a-half months before the decision in Collentine.  Beaudry was not related to his
client and would therefore have received nothing from her had she died intestate, so, under
Collentine, he was precluded from drafting a Will for her that provided any bequest to him.
When his client, who had suffered a stroke and was in a nursing home, insisted on making him
10
a beneficiary, he told her that another attorney would have to draft the Will, and he asked
whether she wanted him to find another attorney for her.  She said that she did, and Beaudry
found a young attorney, with limited experience, who had represented him in some minor
matters.  He explained to the attorney that the client wanted to disinherit her son and make
Beaudry the principal beneficiary.  He took the attorney and the attorney’s secretary (who was
also his sister), to the nursing home for the purpose of actually writing a Will, which the attorney
did and had the client sign.
In a disciplinary action against Beaudry, the court concluded that the duty of an attorney
who selects another attorney to draft a Will for a client is to select “as competent and as
independent an attorney as the client would pick out,” not a mere scrivener.  Beaudry, 191
N.W.2d at 844.   It was thus Beaudry’s responsibility “to instruct [the other lawyer] he was to
act as an independent attorney for [the client] with no obligations to him and ascertain from her
by specific inquiry what her intentions were, the natural objects of her bounty, the value of her
property, and all other matters which would be pertinent to her testamentary capacity to make
a will and her intentions for the disposition of her property.”  Id. 
There was no office-sharing in Beaudry.  The problem was the overall close relationship
between the two attorneys and the manner in which the Will was drafted, presented, and
executed.
I accept the statement in Stein relied on by the Court as the current controlling law in
Maryland -- a bright line that, from the date the Opinion was filed, lawyers were bound to heed.
11
To apply that bright line to conduct that occurred nine years before it was painted, however,
when neither the Rule itself nor any court in the country gave any hint of such a line, is wholly
unfair.  In concluding that Stein did not constitute a “clear break” with pre-existing law, the
Court seems either to be ignoring the fact that no court in the country had previously even dealt
with the issue, much less decided it, or to be resurrecting some notion of that “brooding
omnipresence” lurking in the ether, waiting for the Court, in its discerning wisdom, to discover
and bring it to earth, but which, even before that discovery and articulation, has constituted the
law and thus governed human behavior from the time of Adam and Eve.  
Such a notion – that the law was always there, even if never articulated by any court or
legislature -- is, at best, an unwarranted extension of natural law theory, and, while it may have
influenced the intellectual meanderings of the Eighteenth Century judicial establishment, it has
long, and for good reason, been replaced by the more realistic precept of legal positivism.  As
applied by the Court in this case, it would presume a clairvoyance that, for ordinary mortals, is
wholly unreasonable and that I suspect even the current (and retired) members of this Court do
not possess.  
I would sustain the findings and conclusions of the trial judge and dismiss the complaint
against Mr. Saridakis.  If there is no violation of MRPC 1.8(c), there cannot, on this record, be
any violation of MRPC 8.4(d).  The Court should do the right thing and dismiss the petition
itself, not publicly and permanently find respondent to be unethical for conduct that was not
impermissible when committed and then direct Bar Counsel to dismiss the petition.
12
Judge Greene joins this Dissent.