Title: Gresham v. Schlumberger Industries, Inc.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

656 So. 2d 347 (1995)
Tommy GRESHAM
v.
SCHLUMBERGER INDUSTRIES, INC.
1931223.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
February 17, 1995.
Donald R. Harrison, Dadeville, for appellant.
Michael S. Jackson of Beers, Anderson, Jackson & Smith, Montgomery, for appellee.
COOK, Justice.
Tommy Gresham appeals from a judgment based on a directed verdict in favor of the *348 defendant Schlumberger Industries, Inc., on Gresham's claim seeking damages for an alleged retaliatory discharge. We reverse and remand.
In December 1989, Tommy Gresham injured himself while working at Schlumberger's plant. Following back surgery, his physician gave him a 10% impairment rating. He returned to work in July 1990. According to Gresham, he was again injured in October 1990, but continued to work until December of that year, when his back condition forced him to again seek medical attention. In February 1991, Gresham had surgery on his back; he was assessed an additional 2% impairment rating as a result of his second injury. In July 1991, Gresham's doctor released him for light-duty work, with the following restrictions: "no lifting more than 35 pounds; no walking more than two hours; no standing more than two hours; no prolonged squatting; no bending; limited reaching; and no twisting". Appellee's Brief, p. 10, quoting R.T. 76-77.
It is not disputed that the job Gresham had before his injury required him to lift weight outside the limitations imposed by the doctor. Gresham testified that after his doctor imposed the restrictions he contacted Schlumberger approximately 20 times over the next few months to inquire about a light-duty job. Paul Schindler, Schlumberger's personnel director, testified that there were no jobs available that permitted him to work within the restrictions prescribed by his doctor. Hence, Schlumberger contended, it told Gresham that when those limitations were lifted, it would see about finding an appropriate job for him. In January 1992, the doctor, at Gresham's request, revised Gresham's lifting limitation to 50 pounds; however, the other restrictions remained in place. Again, Schlumberger informed Gresham that there were no jobs within the restrictions prescribed by his doctor. Gresham's medical restrictions remained in place from December 1990 until July 1992. He was paid temporary total disability benefits from December 1990 through December 1991 and during that time Schlumberger paid all his medical expenses. Gresham testified that in January 1992, a few weeks after he had settled his worker's compensation claim against Schlumberger, he contacted Paul Schindler to inquire about a job at the plant.
R.T. 49-54.
Schlumberger did not place Gresham on light duty following his surgery. In June 1992, Schlumberger sent Gresham a letter stating that he had been on leave of absence for over one year and that, according to company policy, he was considered to have voluntarily relinquished his employment as of June 1, 1992. Gresham thereafter filed this action, alleging retaliatory discharge.
At trial, Gresham testified that before the termination no one at Schlumberger had told him of the one-year leave of absence policy and that he was never given a copy of the policy. R.T. 37. He further stated that he had repeatedly requested to go back to work at Schlumberger, but was consistently told there was no job available for him. While Schlumberger argues that there was no evidence that it even had light-duty jobs available within the limitations set by Gresham's physician, a Schlumberger management employee testified that some "light-duty" jobs were available at the plant, although he did not testify at length regarding the details of the requirements for those jobs.
Section 25-5-11.1, Code of Alabama 1975, states:
In determining whether the trial court erred in directing a verdict for Schlumberger, we must apply the following rule:
Continental Eagle Corp. v. Mokrzycki, 611 So. 2d 313, 319 (Ala.1992).
"536 So. 2d  at 1364."
Hayden v. Bruno's, Inc., 588 So. 2d 874, 876 (Ala.1991). See also Continental Eagle Corp. v. Mokrzycki, 611 So. 2d 313, 319 (Ala.1992).
Culbreth v. Woodham Plumbing Co., 599 So. 2d 1120, 1122 (Ala.1992).
In Culbreth, Woodham Plumbing Company informed an employee who had been on medical leave that the company had no job available for him. This Court stated:
Culbreth, 599 So. 2d  at 1123.
Gresham presented evidence tending to show that he was never told about Schlumberger's policy with regard to leaves of absence exceeding one year. Furthermore, Gresham testified that in January 1992 the company told him he was terminated and then called him in to say that the employee who had informed him that he was being terminated had misspoken. Additionally, Gresham testified that he was told by Schindler that "if he was going to bring somebody back to work that it wouldn't be somebody that wasthat had disabilities." Although his discussions with Schlumberger in January 1992 occurred after Gresham had been on leave of absence for more than one year, he contended at trial that no one ever informed him of the 12-month leave policy and that, despite continuous attempts to be placed on light-duty, he was never told that the company had considered him to have voluntarily quit his job. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Gresham, Mokrzycki, supra, we conclude that Gresham's evidence at trial presented a disputed issue of factwhether the reasons Schlumberger gave for Gresham's termination were pretextual. Therefore, the trial court erred in directing a verdict in favor of Schlumberger. The judgment based on that directed verdict is reversed and the cause is remanded.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
ALMON, SHORES and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.
HOUSTON, J., concurs specially.
*351 HOUSTON, Justice (concurring specially).
In my opinion, the trial court did not err in restricting the testimony of Billy Mack Gray, which was introduced to show that Schlumberger had a pattern and practice of terminating employees who filed workers' compensation claims. For pattern or practice evidence to be admissible, there must be substantial similarity between the event involved in the lawsuit and the earlier events alleged to be part of a pattern or practice. Continental Eagle Corp. v. Mokrzycki, 611 So. 2d 313, 319 (Ala.1992). Gray admitted that he had not been terminated for being away from his work for more than one year. Gray testified that Schlumberger had a three-step disciplinary process that it followed before terminating an employeea verbal warning, a written warning, and a suspension without pay. Gray had been subject to each of these three steps and was terminated for absenteeism and tardiness. The facts regarding Gray's termination and the facts regarding Gresham's "termination"claimed by Schlumberger to have been a "voluntary relinquishment" of employmentwere not substantially similar. Thus, Gray's testimony did not qualify as evidence of a pattern or practice.