Title: Davila v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC09-2177 
____________ 
 
RICARDO DAVILA, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
[October 6, 2011] 
 
LABARGA, J. 
 
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Third District 
Court of Appeal in Davila v. State, 26 So. 3d 5 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).  The district 
court certified that its decision is in direct conflict with the decision of the Second 
District Court of Appeal in Muniz v. State, 764 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).  
We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. 
 
The case under review concerns Petitioner Ricardo Davila (“Davila”), who 
was convicted of several crimes, including the kidnapping of his eleven-year-old 
son, which occurred between February 2000 and July 2000.  The conflict issue 
before us centers on whether a parent can lawfully be convicted of kidnapping his 
 
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own child under section 787.01, Florida Statutes (2000).  For the reasons expressed 
below, we approve the decision of the Third District in Davila to the extent that it 
held that a parent can be criminally liable for kidnapping his own child pursuant to 
section 787.01 under certain circumstances, but disapprove the reasoning and 
analysis of the district court.  We also disapprove the decision of the Second 
District in Muniz.  We begin our discussion with an overview of the facts and 
procedural history. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Davila was charged by amended information with thirty-six counts of 
aggravated child abuse, three counts of false imprisonment of a child under the age 
of thirteen, one count of child neglect, one count of child abuse, one count of 
attempted felony murder, and three counts of kidnapping a child under the age of 
thirteen.  With specific regard to the kidnapping charges, the State alleged that on 
or between February 5, 2000, and July 7, 2000, Ricardo Davila did “forcibly, 
secretly, or by threat, confine, abduct, or imprison another person under thirteen 
(13) years of age, to wit: R.D. (A MINOR), against that person‟s will, with the 
intent to inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim or any other person, and 
in the course of committing said offense, the defendant committed aggravated 
child abuse, as defined in s. 827.03, in violation of s. 787.01(3)(a) and s. 777.011 
Florida Statutes.” 
 
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Davila and his wife, Josefa Davila, were both tried before a jury for various 
criminal offenses against their son, R.D.  The evidence presented at trial 
demonstrated that R.D. arrived from Nicaragua on February 5, 2000, and thereafter 
resided with his parents and two siblings in Sweetwater, Florida.  Shortly after his 
arrival from Nicaragua, R.D. was struck by his parents several times for 
misbehaving and lying.  Additionally, R.D. testified that his parents placed him in 
the storage room of their home for approximately two weeks and that, while he 
was free to roam about the room, he was not allowed out of the room during the 
two-week period. 
 
R.D. also testified that he had been placed in one of the bathrooms of his 
parents‟ home on two separate occasions—once in May for a period of three weeks 
and once in July for about one week.  One of those occasions occurred after his 
mother complained that R.D. had not washed the dishes well and instructed Davila 
to lock R.D. in the bathroom, which he did.  Davila then blindfolded R.D. with 
handkerchiefs, tied his hands and feet with rope, placed a bucket over his head and 
a handkerchief in his mouth, and locked the bathroom door.   
 
According to R.D., his father also hit him on his back, hands, and legs with a 
broomstick after discovering that R.D. managed to free himself from the rope, and 
kicked him once while R.D. was in the bathroom because he had removed the 
handkerchiefs from around his eyes.  As a result of his father‟s kick, R.D. hit a 
 
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bathroom wall and broke a tile.  R.D. testified that he was required to lie down in 
the bathtub during his time in the bathroom, and if he did not do so, his father 
would hit him.  R.D. eventually managed to escape from the bathroom and flee to a 
neighbor‟s home sometime in July 2000.  
Davila‟s testimony conflicted to some extent with R.D.‟s testimony as to the 
length of time and condition in which R.D. was kept in the bathroom.  Davila 
testified that the first time he put R.D. in the bathroom he only placed a bucket 
over his head and left R.D. in the bathroom for one day, releasing him at night.  He 
further testified that he had placed his son in the bathroom one other time for about 
four or five hours because R.D. had lied and hit both of his parents.  Davila denied 
that his son had been tied up for more than twenty-four hours, and then explained 
that he had not really tied up his son when R.D. was placed in the bathroom, but 
rather that he had “rolled” R.D.‟s hands a certain way.   
The jury convicted Davila of twenty-nine counts of aggravated child abuse, 
one count of child neglect, one count of child abuse, and three counts of 
kidnapping.1  Subsequently, Davila was sentenced to thirty years in prison for the 
convictions of aggravated child abuse, five years in prison for the convictions of 
                                          
 
 
1.  The trial court entered a judgment of acquittal on the counts for false 
imprisonment of a child under the age of thirteen, and the jury was instructed that 
false imprisonment of a child under the age of thirteen constituted a lesser included 
offense of the kidnapping offenses. 
 
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child abuse and child neglect, and life imprisonment for the convictions of 
kidnapping.  The trial court ordered 198 days‟ credit for time served, and further 
ordered that the sentences run concurrently.  Davila appealed his convictions to the 
Third District, which affirmed in Davila v. State, 829 So. 2d 995, 996 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 2002). 
Davila then filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 3.850.  The trial court denied all of the claims and an appeal 
to the Third District followed.  See Davila, 26 So. 3d at 6-8.  On appeal, Davila 
argued that the three counts of kidnapping should be vacated because a parent 
cannot be convicted of kidnapping his own child as a matter of law.  Id. at 7.2  The 
Third District noted that Davila was the father of the victim and that there was no 
                                          
 
 
2.  In his postconviction appeal to the district court, Davila argued 
alternatively that it was improper to convict him of aggravated child abuse and 
then use the same acts of aggravated child abuse to enhance the kidnapping charge 
from a first-degree felony punishable by life imprisonment to a life felony.  Davila, 
26 So. 3d at 7.  The district court concluded that the postconviction record before it 
did not conclusively refute this claim, and consequently reversed this part of the 
trial court‟s order and remanded for further proceedings.  Id.  Davila also raised on 
appeal a double jeopardy violation involving the counts for kidnapping and false 
imprisonment.  The district court remanded this issue because the trial court had 
not addressed this claim.  Id. at 7-8.  Further, the district court remanded the case 
for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether trial counsel conceded Davila‟s 
guilt on multiple counts at trial without the defendant‟s consent.  Id. at 8.  Lastly, 
the Third District rejected Davila‟s contention that it was a double jeopardy 
violation to charge the defendant with multiple acts of aggravated child abuse 
occurring during a six-month period.  Id.  Davila does not raise any of these claims 
before this Court.  
 
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court order which deprived him of custody rights.  Id.  The district court observed 
that, as a general rule, a parent cannot be convicted of kidnapping his or her own 
child.  Id. at 7 (citing Johnson v. State, 637 So. 2d 3, 4 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)).  The 
court then noted:  “We have recognized an exception, however, to the general rule 
where the parent „does not simply exercise his rights to the child, but takes [the 
child] for an ulterior and unlawful purpose which is specifically forbidden by the 
kidnapping statute itself.‟ ”  Id. (quoting Lafleur v. State, 661 So. 2d 346, 349 (Fla. 
3d DCA 1995)).  The Third District thus denied Davila relief on his claim that a 
parent cannot be convicted of kidnapping his own child.  The district court then 
certified conflict with the Second District‟s decision in Muniz, noting that if the 
case were before the Second District, Davila would be entitled to relief on the 
kidnapping issue.  Davila, 26 So. 3d at 7.  We turn now to the Second District‟s 
decision in the conflict case. 
In Muniz, the Second District reversed the defendant‟s conviction for 
kidnapping, holding that absent a court order depriving him of authority over his 
child, Muniz could not be convicted of kidnapping his own child.  See Muniz, 764 
So. 2d at 729 (citing Johnson, 637 So. 2d at 4).  Muniz had argued with and 
battered the mother of his nonmarital five-week-old son, after which the mother 
fled the home, leaving the baby behind.  Id. at 729-30.  The police were called and 
when they arrived, they escorted the mother back to the home and knocked on the 
 
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door.  Id. at 730.  Although Muniz did not respond to the officers‟ knock on the 
door, the child‟s mother opened the door and the officers went inside.  The officers 
confronted Muniz as he held his child in his arms and demanded that Muniz hand 
over the baby, but he refused.  Id.  When an officer approached him, Muniz picked 
up a razor and threatened both the baby and himself with the razor.  After spending 
hours trying to persuade Muniz to release the child to them, the police seized 
Muniz and safely removed the baby.  Id. 
Muniz subsequently was charged with domestic violence battery and armed 
kidnapping, and a jury trial was held.  Id.  Muniz moved for a judgment of 
acquittal at the conclusion of trial, asserting that he could not be convicted of 
kidnapping his own child.  The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that the 
mother was the sole natural guardian of the nonmarital child pursuant to section 
744.301(1), Florida Statutes (1997).  Id. (citing § 744.301(1), Fla. Stat. (1997) 
(“The mother of a child born out of wedlock is the natural guardian of the child 
and is entitled to primary residential care and custody of the child unless a court of 
competent jurisdiction enters an order stating otherwise.”)).  On appeal, the Second 
District concluded that even if the mother was the child‟s guardian, Muniz was the 
legal father of the child and, thus, a parent of the alleged victim.  Id. at 729-30.  
The district court held that “[t]he kidnaping statute does not criminalize the 
confinement of a child under the age of thirteen by „a parent or a legal guardian.‟ ” 
 
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Id. at 729 (quoting § 787.01(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (1997)).  The court ruled that while 
the defendant‟s conduct was inappropriate, “section 787.01(1)(b) prevents 
prosecution of Mr. Muniz for the first-degree felony offense of kidnaping his own 
child.”  Id. at 731.   
ANALYSIS 
The conflict issue in this case centers on whether section 787.01, Florida 
Statutes (2000), provides a basis to convict a parent of kidnapping his or her own 
child as the term “kidnapping” is defined in the statute.  This question turns in 
large part on the legal effect of subsection (1)(b) of that statute.  “The 
interpretation of a statute is a purely legal matter and therefore subject to the de 
novo standard of review.”  Kasischke v. State, 991 So. 2d 803, 807 (Fla. 2008) 
(quoting Kephart v. Hadi, 932 So. 2d 1086, 1089 (Fla. 2006)).  “A court‟s purpose 
in construing a statute is to give effect to legislative intent, which is the polestar 
that guides the court in statutory construction.”  Larimore v. State, 2 So. 3d 101, 
106 (Fla. 2008) (citing Bautista v. State, 863 So. 2d 1180, 1185 (Fla. 2003)).  We 
look primarily to the actual language used in the statute to discern legislative 
intent.  See id.  “[W]hen the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and 
conveys a clear and definite meaning . . . the statute must be given its plain and 
obvious meaning.”  Velez v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Police Dep‟t, 934 So. 2d 1162, 
1164 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Fla. Dep‟t of Revenue v. New Sea Escape Cruises, Ltd., 
 
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894 So. 2d 954, 960 (Fla. 2005)).  “Further, we are „without power to construe an 
unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify, or limit, its express 
terms or its reasonable and obvious implications.‟ ”  Id. at 1164-65 (quoting 
McLaughlin v. State, 721 So. 2d 1170, 1172 (Fla. 1998)).  We thus begin our 
analysis with the language of section 787.01, Florida Statutes (2000).  
The criminal offense of kidnapping, which is codified in section 787.01, 
Florida Statutes (2000), is defined in relevant part as follows: 
(1)(a) The term “kidnapping” means forcibly, secretly, or by 
threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against her 
or his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: 
1.  Hold for ransom or reward or as a shield or hostage. 
2.  Commit or facilitate commission of any felony. 
 
3.  Inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim or another 
person. 
 
4.  Interfere with the performance of any governmental or 
political function. 
§ 787.01(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2000).  Subsection (1)(b) further provides: “Confinement 
of a child under the age of 13 is against her or his will within the meaning of this 
subsection if such confinement is without the consent of her or his parent or legal 
guardian.”  § 787.01(1)(b), Fla. Stat.  In this case, the jury was instructed in 
relevant part that to convict Davila of kidnapping a child under the age of thirteen, 
the State had to prove that the defendant “forcibly or by threat confined or 
imprisoned R.D. against his will . . . with intent to inflict bodily harm upon or 
terrorize R.D.”  Davila contends that under section 787.01(1)(b), a parent of a child 
 
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under the age of thirteen cannot be criminally liable for kidnapping that child 
where there was no court order depriving the parent of custody and where the 
alleged confinement of the child was with that parent‟s consent.  We disagree.   
The plain language of section 787.01(1)(a) requires the State to prove an 
overt act on the part of the defendant; namely, a forceful, secretive, or threatening 
act that confines, abducts, or imprisons another person against his will.  Further, to 
prove the offense of kidnapping, it must be established that the defendant 
performed the overt act with one of the four specific intents delineated under 
subsection (1)(a) of the kidnapping statute.  The plain language of subsection 
(1)(b) of the statute sets forth a method of proof which allows the State to establish 
that the overt act on the part of the defendant was against a person‟s will when that 
person is a child under the age of thirteen.   
The unambiguous language of section 787.01, Florida Statutes (2000), does 
not exempt a parent from criminal liability for kidnapping his or her own child.  
Thus, by its own terms, section 787.01 permits Davila to be legally convicted of 
kidnapping R.D.3  It is our view that if the Legislature intended to exempt a parent 
from criminal liability for kidnapping his or her own child, it would have expressly 
                                          
 
3.  Our holding today does not suggest that a parent may never discipline his 
or her own child.  However, under our holding, section 787.01 does not exempt a 
parent from criminal liability for committing a forceful, secretive, or threatening 
act that confines, abducts, or imprisons a child when such an overt act is 
committed with one of the four specific intents delineated under subsection (1)(a) 
of the kidnapping statute. 
 
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stated so.  We trust that if the Legislature did not intend the result mandated by the 
plain and unambiguous language of section 787.01, the Legislature itself will 
amend the statute.  Until such time, we hold that a parent is not exempt from 
criminal liability for kidnapping his or her own child under section 787.01, Florida 
Statutes (2000). 
Having resolved the conflict issue presented before us, we decline to address 
the parties‟ remaining assertions. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the plain language of section 
787.01, Florida Statutes (2000), does not preclude a parent from being held 
criminally liable for kidnapping his or her own child.  We therefore approve the 
result reached by the Third District of Appeal in Davila v. State, 26 So. 3d 5 (Fla. 
3d DCA 2009), and disapprove the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal 
in Muniz v. State, 764 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). 
 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs with an opinion. 
CANADY, C.J., dissents with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
PARIENTE, J., concurring. 
 
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The evidence presented at trial in this case detailed horrific abuse inflicted 
by the defendant on the victim, who was under the age of thirteen, and instances of 
the defendant locking the victim in a storage room and bathroom for extended 
periods of time.  The defendant was convicted of child neglect, child abuse, 
kidnapping, and numerous counts of aggravated child abuse; he was sentenced to 
thirty years in prison for the aggravated child abuse convictions, five years for the 
child abuse and neglect convictions, and life imprisonment for the kidnapping 
convictions.  The issue in this case concerns whether the defendant can be 
convicted of kidnapping.  The defendant contends that he cannot because the 
victim is his own son. 
 
I agree with the majority‟s holding that under the kidnapping statute, a 
parent or legal guardian can kidnap his or her own child.  Subsection (1)(b) of the 
statute operates as a method of proof that allows the State to prove that the act of 
kidnapping is against the child‟s will when the child is under the age of thirteen 
and is confined without the consent of his or her legal guardian.  However, the 
subsection was not intended to operate to preclude criminal liability for parents or 
legal guardians who meet the elements of the statute. 
 
Under the dissent‟s construction of the statute, the parent or legal guardian 
could be convicted of kidnapping a child who is thirteen years of age or older, but 
not a child under the age of thirteen.  See dissenting op. at 16 (“[I]t is reasonable to 
 
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understand the statute as establishing the absence of parental consent as a 
necessary condition for a determination that the confinement is „against the will‟ of 
the victim when the victim is a child under thirteen.” (emphasis added)).  This 
leads to the absurd result that children who are thirteen and older are afforded more 
protection under the kidnapping statute than children who are under thirteen.  This 
flies in the face of logic—younger children are more vulnerable and in need of 
greater protection.  
 
The majority‟s reading of the statute is supported by an application of sound 
statutory construction principles.  A statute “must be construed in its entirety and 
as a whole.”  Koile v. State, 934 So. 2d 1226, 1233 (Fla. 2006) (quoting St. Mary‟s 
Hosp., Inc. v. Phillipe, 769 So. 2d 961, 967 (Fla. 2000)).  Subsection (1)(b) cannot 
be read in isolation, but “must [be] read . . . within the context of the entire section 
in order to ascertain legislative intent for the provision.”  Fla. Dep‟t of Envtl. Prot. 
v. ContractPoint Fla. Parks, LLC, 986 So. 2d 1260, 1265 (Fla. 2008).  Further, 
“[s]tatutes, as a rule, „will not be interpreted so as to yield an absurd result.‟ ”  
State v. Iacovone, 660 So. 2d 1371, 1373 (Fla. 1995) (quoting Williams v. State, 
492 So. 2d 1051, 1054 (Fla. 1986)).  When these principles of statutory 
construction are applied, it is clear that the only reasonable interpretation of 
subsection (1)(b) is that the provision creates a method of proof intended to operate 
when the offender is not the parent or legal guardian and the child is under the age 
 
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of thirteen.  The dissent relies on the rule of lenity; however, we have 
“recognize[d] that the rule of lenity is a canon of last resort.”  Kasischke v. State, 
991 So. 2d 803, 814 (Fla. 2008).  It certainly should not be applied to produce an 
absurd or unreasonable result.  See Clines v. State, 912 So. 2d 550, 560 (Fla. 2005) 
(“[T]he rule [of lenity] „is applicable to sentencing provisions‟ if they „create 
ambiguity or generate differing reasonable constructions.‟ ” (emphasis added)).   
 
The Legislature has defined kidnapping as “forcibly, secretly, or by threat 
confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against her or his will and 
without lawful authority” with one of four specific intents.  § 787.01(1)(a), Fla. 
Stat. (2000).  Subsection (1)(b) of the statute provides: “Confinement of a child 
under the age of 13 is against her or his will within the meaning of this subsection 
if such confinement is without the consent of her or his parent or legal guardian.”  
§ 787.01(1)(b), Fla. Stat.  Thus, when the defendant is not the child‟s parent or 
legal guardian, the statute has provided that the element that the confinement is 
against the victim‟s will is proven when (a) the victim is under the age of thirteen, 
and (b) the confinement is without the consent of the victim‟s parent or legal 
guardian.  However, nothing within the statute implies that subsection (1)(b) is the 
only method by which to prove that the kidnapping of a child under the age of 
thirteen is against his or her will.  Nor does the statute provide that the absence of 
parental consent is an element of the crime when the child is under thirteen.   
 
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The dissent reads the statute as if it stated, “Confinement of a child under the 
age of thirteen is against her or his will within the meaning of this subsection only 
if such confinement is without the consent of her or his legal guardian.”  However, 
when read in context of the statute as a whole, it becomes clear that subsection 
(1)(b) is just one method by which the State can prove that the confinement was 
against the victim‟s will for a child under the age of thirteen; it is not the exclusive 
method.  Nothing within the statute establishes the absence of parental consent as 
an element of the crime or a necessary predicate to prove the crime of kidnapping. 
 
CANADY, C.J., dissenting. 
 
In interpreting statutory provisions defining criminal acts, we are bound by a 
rule—codified in section 775.021(1), Florida Statutes (2000)—requiring that such 
statutes “shall be strictly construed” and that “when the language is susceptible of 
differing constructions, it shall be construed most favorably to the accused.”  This 
“rule of lenity” only comes into play when the statutory provisions at issue “create 
an ambiguity or generate differing reasonable constructions.”  Nettles v. State, 850 
So. 2d 487, 494 (Fla. 2003). 
 
The question presented by this case is whether a parent—with full custodial 
rights—of a child under age thirteen can properly be convicted of kidnapping that 
child.  The appellant argues that such a conviction is precluded—at least under 
circumstances like those presented here—by the requirement that an act of 
 
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kidnapping be “against the will” of the victim.  Appellant bases his argument on 
the provision of the kidnapping statute which states:  “Confinement of a child 
under the age of 13 is against her or his will within the meaning of this subsection 
if such confinement is without the consent of her or his parent or legal guardian.”  
§ 787.01(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2000) (emphasis added). 
 
I conclude that the statutory interpretation urged by the appellant cannot be 
rejected as an unreasonable reading of the text of the kidnapping statute.  Given the 
is/if structure of subsection (1)(b), it is reasonable to understand the statute as 
establishing the absence of parental consent as a necessary condition for a 
determination that the confinement is “against the will” of the victim when the 
victim is a child under thirteen.  By using the word “is” rather than language such 
as “may be,” the statute explicitly defines “against [the] will” of a child under the 
age of thirteen—for purposes of delineating the elements of kidnapping—as 
“without the consent of her or his parent or legal guardian.” 
 
The majority‟s alternative construction of section 787.01(1)(b) as setting 
forth a nonexclusive “method of proof,” majority op. at 10, is supported by neither 
the text of that subsection nor anything else in the text or structure of the 
kidnapping statute.  The majority‟s reading collides with the doctrine of inclusio 
unius est exclusio alterius, which instructs that “when a law expressly describes the 
particular situation in which something should apply, an inference must be drawn 
 
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that what is not included by specific reference was intended to be omitted or 
excluded.”  Gay v. Singletary, 700 So. 2d 1220, 1221 (Fla. 1997).  But even if it is 
assumed that the majority‟s reading is reasonable, the rule of lenity requires the 
rejection of that reading in favor of the alternative reasonable reading urged by the 
appellant. 
 
I reject the majority‟s suggestion that we should interpret the text of the 
kidnapping statute based on the assumption “that if the Legislature intended to 
exempt a parent from criminal liability for kidnapping his own child, it would have 
expressly stated so.”  Majority op. at 10-11.  Such an assumption cannot be 
reconciled with the express rule of construction established by the Legislature in 
the rule of lenity.  Nor can it be reconciled with general principles of statutory 
interpretation, including the inclusio unius canon.  In applying the statutes adopted 
by the Legislature, we must pay careful attention to what the Legislature actually 
said and not substitute our own view of what we think the Legislature must have 
really meant to say or what it would have said if confronted with the egregious 
circumstances of the case at issue. 
 
I also reject the view, which is articulated in the concurrence, that the 
absurdity doctrine should be applied here effectively to trump a reasonable reading 
of the text of the kidnapping statute and the statutory rule of lenity.  Based on a 
policy view about appropriate punishment, the concurrence deploys the absurdity 
 
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doctrine in the service of a “rule of severity.”  The rationale for applying the 
absurdity doctrine here is singularly unpersuasive.  I cannot see why it is absurd for 
the Legislature in effect to exempt custodial parents from criminal liability for 
kidnapping their own children who are under thirteen.  It is by no means obvious 
that the kidnapping statute is aimed at protecting young children from their own 
custodial parents. 
 
I therefore dissent.  I would disapprove the Third District‟s decision and 
order remand for a new sentencing hearing.  I agree with the State‟s argument that 
the sentencing court should not be precluded from imposing consecutive sentences 
for the remaining convictions. 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Third District - Case No. 3D07-2103 
 
 
(Dade County) 
 
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Marti Rothenberg, Assistant Public 
Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Richard L. Polin, Bureau 
Chief, and Ansley B. Peacock, Assistant Attorneys General, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent