Title: STATE v NELSON

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 14848 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1979 THE STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, V S . MARK T H O M A S NELSON, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e Eleventh J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Robert Sykes, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: F i s h e r and Erickson, Whitefish, Montana Leif B. Erickson argued, Whitefish, Montana H. L. Garnaas, Missoula, Montana Hash, J e l l i s o n , O'Brien and B a r t l e t t , K a l i s p e l l , Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Mary B. Troland argued, A s s i s t a n t Attorney General, Helena, Montana Ted Lympus, County Attorney, K a l i s p e l l , Montana Submitted: November 8, 1979 Decided: b T C 1 4 7979 F i l e d : ccc 4 IW. M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. ~ e f e n d a n t was charged by information f i l e d i n t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eleventh J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t of the S t a t e of Montana, i n and f o r t h e County of Flathead, with t h e offense of aggravated a s s a u l t . During h i s arraignment, defendant pleaded g u i l t y t o t h e charge. The plea was accepted a t a l a t e r hearing held t o determine the f a c t s which w e r e t h e b a s i s of t h e g u i l t y plea. Subsequently, t h e D i s t r i c t Court r u l e d t h a t t h e mandatory minimum two-year sentence provision of s e c t i o n 45-5-202(2), MCA, applied, and t h e c r i t e r i a f o r t h e exceptions t o t h e mandatory two-year sentence found i n s e c t i o n 46-18-222, MCA, had n o t been m e t . A sentence of twenty years i n t h e s t a t e prison, with a l l b u t t h r e e years suspended, w a s imposed. Defendant then f i l e d an appeal from t h e finding t h a t the mandatory minimum two-year sentence applied i n h i s case. Thereafter, defendant f i l e d a motion with t h e D i s t r i c t Court requesting leave t o with- draw h i s plea of g u i l t y t o t h e offense of aggravated a s s a u l t and e n t e r a plea of n o t g u i l t y . This motion was denied and sentence imposed. Defendant appeals from t h e judgment. O n September 17, 1978, t h e d a t e of t h e a s s a u l t , defen- d a n t began drinking e a r l y i n the day. H e w a s depressed due t o a f i g h t with h i s g i r l f r i e n d and during t h e day, he con- sumed approximately one p i n t of 100-proof vodka and some p r e s c r i p t i o n sleeping p i l l s while only e a t i n g a hamburger. A s a r e s u l t of t h i s combination of alcohol, drugs and lack of food, defendant became intoxicated. Sometime during t h e morning defendant was informed t h a t a 9mm automatic p i s t o l he had loaned t o a f r i e n d had been returned t o t h e f r i e n d ' s house. H e went t o h i s f r i e n d ' s house t o recover t h e p i s t o l and i t s accessories, which included a 14-shot c l i p and a shoulder h o l s t e r . For ease i n carrying t h e p i s t o l , he p u t t h e shoulder h o l s t e r on and placed t h e p i s t o l i n it. Later t h a t morning he loaded t h e c l i p and went o u t t o take t a r g e t p r a c t i c e . During t h i s p r a c t i c e he f i r e d t h r e e o r four s h o t s and then placed t h e weapon i n t h e h o l s t e r . Apparently, t h e p i s t o l w a s s t i l l i n a cocked p o s i t i o n when it w a s returned t o t h e h o l s t e r . After t h e t a r g e t p r a c t i c e defendant drove t o h i s trailer home located on LaSalle Road across from a C i r c l e K s t o r e t o take a nap. He s l e p t u n t i l l a t e afternoon and upon waking, decided t o call h i s g i r l f r i e n d . Having no phone i n h i s t r a i l e r , he walked across t h e street t o t h e C i r c l e K s t o r e t o make t h e c a l l . H e w a s s t i l l carrying t h e p i s t o l i n t h e shoulder h o l s t e r . By t h e t i m e defendant l e f t t h e C i r c l e K s t o r e , it had become dark. A s he w a s recrossing LaSalle Road t o r e t u r n t o h i s trailer, a pickup truck approached t r a v e l i n g south. A t t h i s p o i n t t h e r e a r e two d i f f e r i n g versions of t h e f a c t s t h a t occurred. The f i r s t version i s t h a t of t h e d r i v e r of t h e pickup truck, Harold Keller. Keller t e s t i f i e d t h a t he w a s driving h i s pickup south on LaSalle Road near t h e C i r c l e K when a man, later i d e n t i f i e d as defendant, wandered across t h e street i n f r o n t of h i s truck. Keller stopped h i s truck t o allow t h e man t o c r o s s i n f r o n t of him. K e l l e r maintains defendant w a s swearing and waving h i s arms and pounded on t h e hood of t h e vehicle. K e l l e r proceeded t o d r i v e away when defendant s t a r t e d y e l l i n g and swearing. K e l l e r stopped h i s truck and looked through the back window a t defendant who w a s j u s t behind t h e truck. K e l l e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t defen- d a n t reached i n t o h i s pocket, pulled o u t a gun and f i r e d . A s t h e gun f i r e d , defendant f e l l over backwards and t h e gun s l i d o f f t h e road. Keller then sped o f f and c a l l e d t h e police. Keller t e s t i f i e d t h a t he thought defendant was e i t h e r drunk o r o u t of h i s mind. A t t h e t i m e of t h e shooting, defendant w a s about t e n f e e t away from where Keller was s i t t i n g i n h i s truck. However, t h e s l u g d i d n o t s t r i k e t h e pickup nor d i d it i n j u r e anyone, nor w a s it found. Defendant's version of t h e f a c t s only d i f f e r s on a few key p o i n t s . He t e s t i f i e d t h a t K e l l e r y e l l e d and swore a t him a s he went by and t h a t he f i r s t thought t h e r e w e r e two people i n t h e truck. When t h e pickup stopped he thought he was i n danger. H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t he pulled o u t t h e p i s t o l t o show t h e people i n t h e truck t h a t he had something with which t o p r o t e c t himself. I n t h e a c t of p u l l i n g it o u t , he dropped t h e gun and being i n a cocked p o s i t i o n , it f i r e d on h i t t i n g t h e ground. H e t e s t i f i e d he had n o t intended t o shoot t h e gun a t a l l when p u l l i n g it o u t and t h e discharge w a s a c c i d e n t a l . O n November 27, 1978, defendant was charged i n ~ i s t r i c t Court with t h e offense of aggravated a s s a u l t i n v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 94-5-202(1)(c), R.C.M. 1947 (now s e c t i o n 45-5- 202 (1) ( c ) , MCA) , by f i r i n g a p i s t o l a t Harold Keller. The defendant w a s arraigned on January 22, 1979. A t t h a t t i m e he s t a t e d he wished t o plead g u i l t y . The t r i a l judge, on f i n d i n g t h a t a f a c t u a l b a s i s was necessary p r i o r t o accep- t i n g defendant's p l e a , questioned him a s t o t h e events culminating i n t h e aggravated a s s a u l t charge. ~ e f e n d a n t r e p l i e d t h a t h i s memory of events w a s unclear because of h i s l e v e l of i n t o x i c a t i o n a t t h e t i m e of t h e c r i m e . H e d i d s t a t e , however, t h a t he had been carrying a gun on t h e n i g h t i n question and t h a t t h e weapon had been discharged. The t r i a l judge a t t h a t point declined f i n a l acceptance of defendant's g u i l t y plea u n t i l a more adequate f a c t u a l b a s i s could be established. O n February 16, 1979, t h e arraignment was continued. A t t h a t t i m e Harold Keller t e s t i f i e d a s t o h i s version of t h e incident. Defendant declined t o cross-examine Keller and d i d n o t present evi- dence. The t r i a l judge accepted defendant's g u i l t y plea, finding t h a t t h e r e w a s s u f f i c i e n t f a c t u a l b a s i s f o r such action. The judge a l s o made reference t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e g u i l t y plea w a s entered i n accordance with a plea bargain arrangement whereby t h e S t a t e agreed t o drop c e r t a i n charges i n j u s t i c e c o u r t i n r e t u r n f o r t h e e n t r y of t h e plea t o t h e aggravated a s s a u l t charge. O n May 29, 1979, a hearing was held f o r evidence i n aggravation and mitigation of sentence. During t h i s hearing defendant, f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e , revealed h i s version of t h e incident. I n addition t o t h e testimony of defendant, of defendant's character witnesses, and of t h e victim, the t r i a l judge a l s o had before him, a t t h e sentencing hearing, a presentence r e p o r t and an evaluation r e p o r t from t h e s t a t e p r i s o n where defendant had been given a 45-day evaluation. Based on t h i s evidence, t h e t r i a l judge sentenced defendant t o twenty years i n t h e state prison, a l l b u t t h r e e sus- pended. I n doing so, t h e judge s p e c i f i c a l l y found t h a t defendant w a s s u b j e c t t o t h e mandatory minimum sentence of t h e aggravated a s s a u l t s t a t u t e . O n J u l y 11, 1979, a hearing w a s held on defendant's motion t o withdraw h i s p l e a of g u i l t y and e n t e r a p l e a of n o t g u i l t y . The motion w a s based on t h e a l l e g a t i o n t h a t t h e p l e a was i n v a l i d because defendant had n o t admitted t h e f a c t s of t h e crime as a s s e r t e d by t h e victim. The t r i a l judge denied t h e motion r u l i n g t h e r e was an adequate f a c t u a l b a s i s f o r acceptance of t h e p l e a based on defendant's and t h e v i c t i m ' s testimony a t t h e arraignment. Defendant ap- p e a l s both h i s sentence and t h e d e n i a l of h i s motion t o withdraw h i s p l e a of g u i l t y . Two i s s u e s a r e presented t o t h i s Court f o r review: 1. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err i n accepting t h e g u i l t y p l e a entered by defendant? Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err i n determining t h a t t h e mandatory two-year sentence provision f o r aggravated a s s a u l t under s e c t i o n 45-5-202(2), MCA, applied under t h e f a c t s of t h i s case? The f i r s t i s s u e t o be resolved i s whether t h e District Court e r r e d i n denying defendant's motion t o withdraw h i s g u i l t y plea. General p r i n c i p l e s governing t h e withdrawal of a g u i l t y p l e a are w e l l s e t t l e d . A r t i c l e 11, Sections 24 and 26, 1972 Montana Constitution, p r o t e c t t h e r i g h t of a criminal defendant t o a t r i a l by jury. Section 46-12-204, MCA, states i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : " (1) The defendant s h a l l e n t e r a p l e a of g u i l t y o r n o t g u i l t y t o t h e indictment, information o r complaint. I f t h e defendant r e f u s e s t o plead t o t h e indictment, information, o r com- p l a i n t , a p l e a of n o t g u i l t y must be entered. " ( 2 ) The c o u r t may r e f u s e t o a c c e p t a p l e a of g u i l t y and s h a l l n o t accept t h e p l e a of g u i l t y without f i r s t determining t h a t t h e p l e a is voluntary with an understanding of t h e charge." Further, section 46-16-105(2), MCA, provides: "At any time before or after judgment the court may, for good cause shown, permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted." There is no precise rule which can be relied upon in any given case to withdraw a guilty plea. State v. Lewis (1978) Mont. , 582 P.2d 346, 352, 35 St.Rep. 1089, 1096. Each case must be examined on its own record. State v. Griffin (1975), 167 Mont. 11, 21, 535 P.2d 498, 503. We must rely on the discretion of the trial court. ". . . That discretion is subject to review only upon the showing of an abuse of discretion." State v. Lewis, supra, "'A plea of guilty will be deemed involuntary where it appears that the defendant was labor- ing under such a strong inducement, fundamental mistake, or serious mental condition that the possibility exists he may have plead guilty to a crime of which he is innocent.' . . . "If, however, there is any doubt that a plea is not voluntary, the doubt should be resolved in the defendant's favor. On application to change a plea, all doubts should be resolved in favor of a trial on the merits." State v. Huttinger (1979) Mont. , 595 P.2d 363, 367, 36 St-Rep. 945. (Citations omitted.) In Huttinger this Court held that there are three important considerations involved in a criminal defendant's attempt to withdraw a previously entered plea of guilty: ". . . (1) the adequacy of the interrogation by the District Court of the defendant at the entry of the guilty plea as to the defendant's understanding of the consequences of his plea, (2) the promptness with which the defendant attempts to withdraw the prior plea, and (3) the fact that the defendant's plea was appar- ently the result of a plea bargain in which the guilty plea was given in exchange for dis- missal of another charge. . ." 595 P.2d at 366. Here, w e a r e only concerned with t h e f i r s t f a c t o r a s defendant's motion t o withdraw h i s p l e a w a s timely and t h e c o u r t refused t o accept t h e plea bargain agreement when presented t o t h e court. While t h e i n t e r r o g a t i o n here w a s more complete than i n Huttinger, defendant d i d n o t admit t h a t he had comrni t t e d aggravated a s s a u l t , nor d i d he declare t h e f a c t s upon which h i s p l e a of g u i l t y w a s based. Here, the i n t e r r o g a t i o n by t h e judge concerning t h e incident went as follows: "THE COURT: You a r e aware of t h e nature of t h i s charge a g a i n s t you and t h a t it could be up t o 20 years a t hard labor i n the S t a t e Prison? "THE DEFENDANT: Y e s , sir. "THE COURT: A r e you s a t i s f i e d with t h e s e r v i c e s rendered by your attorney, M r . B a r t l e t t ? "THE DEF,ENnANT: Y e s j . sir. "THE COURT: M r . B a r t l e t t , a r e you s a t i s f i e d t h a t t h e Defendant i s entering t h i s plea volun- t a r i l y ? "MR. BARTLETT: Y e s , sir. "THE COURT: Now, even though you have t h e r i g h t t o remain s i l e n t , as I s t a t e d , I won't accept a p l e a of g u i l t unless t h e r e i s a f a c t u a l b a s i s j u s t i f y i n g such plea, so I ' m going t o ask you, d i d you, on September 17, 1978, discharge a Smith & Wessons Model 59 p i s t o l a t a Harold Keller? "THE DEFENDANT: I w a s highly intoxicated a t t h e t i m e , your Honor, and I ' m n o t sure--I d o n ' t re- c a l l t h e a c t u a l events t h a t happened. "THE COURT: Did you have a p i s t o l with you? "THE DEFENDANT: Y e s , sir. "THE COURT: And was it discharged? "THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. "THE COURT: Now, p r i o r t o t h i s t i m e , I assume t h a t your attorney knew of--had access t o t h e County Attorney's f i l e a s t o t h e p o l i c e i n v e s t i - gation? "THE DEFENDANT: Y e s , sir. "THE COURT: What had you been drinking at the time? "THE DEFENDANT: Vodka and orange juice. "THE COURT: And how long? "THE DEFENDANT: About 12, 14 hours. "THE COURT: Now, who else was there, do you recall? "THE DEFENDANT: No, just myself. "THE COURT: Do you know where the gun was dis- charged from? "THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. "THE COURT: And where was it? "THE DEFENDANT: On LaSalle Road. "THE COURT: And why was it discharged, do you know? "THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. "THE COURT: Who is Allen Baker? "THE DEFENDANT: I have no idea, sir. "THE COURT: Harold Keller? "THE DEFENDANT: I don't know him either. "THE COURT: You have never met him before? THE DEFENDANT : No. "THE COURT: But this was the person involved with the discharge of the gun? "THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. "THE COURT: Well, under these circumstances, at the time of the hearing, I think that Mr. Keller should be here in order that the circumstances be more fully known to the Court. . ." The court at this time properly refused to accept defendant's guilty plea. It did, however, accept it without further interrogation of defendant after hearing the testi- mony of the victim on March 8, 1979. While this case involves an aggravated assault, it has the same problems and defects that were pointed out in State v. Azure (1977), - Mont. , 573 P.2d 179, 34 St.Rep. 1569, and reiterated in Huttinger. Here, defendant was not made aware of the differing elements of assault as set forth in sections 45-5-201 and 45-5-202, MCA. The District Court had before it evidence indicating the defendant was under the influence of a com- bination of drugs and alcohol and was possibly suffering from mental distress or instability. These mitigating circumstances may have prevented the defendant from being able to commit an aggravated assault as defined by statute. " ' * * * Real notice and understanding by a defen- dant of the true nature of the charge against him is the first and most universally recognized requirement of due process * * * understanding of the nature of the charge is indispensable to a valid plea of guilty * * * ' " State v. Azure, supra, 573 P.2d at 183. The transcripts indicate defendant actually remembered the facts surrounding the alleged assault. From statements made by his original counsel, it appears defendant testified contrary to these facts because of his mistaken interpreta- tion of counsel's advice that he was to advise the court he was too intoxicated to remember the details surrounding the alleged assault. It appears that defendant, who was a newcomer to the criminal justice system, clearly misunder- stood not only the advice of counsel, but the ramifications of failing to tell the truth. The attorney, however, should have taken steps to protect his client from a situation of this kind, if not immediately, at least before the second hearing. Matters were further complicated, however, when defen- dant's original attorney became ill and one of his associ- ates, who was unfamiliar with the facts, assumed the case shortly before the second hearing. At the second hearing, no evidence was introduced by defense counsel t o c o n t r a d i c t t h e testimony of t h e victim, although defendant c l e a r l y had a d i f f e r e n t version of t h e incident. The judge accepted t h e p l e a without ever hearing defendant's version. This i s an unfortunate chain of circumstances which should n o t happen i n our criminal j u s t i c e system. I f t h e matter was properly understood by t h e judge i n the f i r s t i n s t a n c e , it i s conceivable t h a t t h e judge would n o t have accepted defendant's p l e a , t h e r e being r e a l questions con- cerning whether o r n o t an aggravated a s s a u l t was a c t u a l l y committed. The second i s s u e before t h i s Court i s whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n determining t h a t t h e mandatory two- year sentence provision f o r aggravated a s s a u l t under s e c t i o n 45-5-202(2), MCA, must apply here. Section 45-5-202(2), MCA, s t a t e s : "A person convicted of aggravated a s s a u l t s h a l l be imprisoned i n t h e s t a t e p r i s o n f o r a t e r m of n o t less than 2 y e a r s o r more than 20 years, except a s provided i n 46-18-222." Section 46-18-222, MCA, provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : "All mandatory minimum sentences prescribed by t h e laws of t h i s s t a t e . . . do n o t apply i f : " ( 2 ) t h e defendant's mental c a p a c i t y , a t t h e t i m e of t h e commission of t h e o f f e n s e f o r which he i s t o be sentenced, was s i g n i f i c a n t l y impaired, although n o t s o impaired a s t o c o n s t i t u t e a de- fense t o t h e prosecution; " ( 5 ) where applicable, no s e r i o u s bodily i n j u r y w a s i n f l i c t e d on t h e victim." Both p a r t i e s agree t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d and t h a t t h e exemptions enumerated above apply. The t r a n s c r i p t s are r e p l e t e with testimony t h a t t h e defendant w a s very drunk on t h e n i g h t of t h e i n c i d e n t . This testimony, however, may be viewed d i f f e r e n t l y by reasonable men as it concerns i n t e n t . Y e t , whether defendant could o r could n o t form t h e necessary i n t e n t i s of no consequence here, as t h e exception i n subsection (5) above enumerated i s applicable. Although a loaded weapon was involved and although s e c t i o n 46-18-221(1), MCA, provides f o r a minimum sentence f o r crimes committed with a firearm, t h i s s e c t i o n i s a l s o s u b j e c t t o t h e exceptions of s e c t i o n 46-18-222. I n t h e l a s t l e g i s l a t i v e session, s e c t i o n 46-18-222(5) was amended s o t h a t t h e exception involving absence of s e r i o u s bodily i n j u r y i s i n a p p l i c a b l e i f a weapon i s used i n t h e c r i m e , even i f no s e r i o u s bodily i n j u r y i s i n f l i c t e d . Chapter 396, Section 1, Laws of Montana (1979). This amend- ment, however, d i d n o t become e f f e c t i v e u n t i l J u l y 1, 1979, and t h e r e f o r e cannot be r e t r o a c t i v e l y applied t o persons committing crimes p r i o r t o t h a t d a t e . S t a t e v. Azure, supra, 587 P.2d a t 1297. Therefore, on t h e f a c t s and t i m e frame of t h i s case, t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n finding s e c t i o n 46-18-222(5) inapplicable. The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court i s reversed, and t h e sentence imposed on t h a t judgment vacated and s e t a s i d e . The cause i s remanded t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court with i n s t r u c t i o n s t o permit defendant t o withdraw h i s previously entered p l e a of g u i l t y and e n t e r h i s p l e a of n o t g u i l t y t o t h e crime charged. We concur: ' ; t Chief Justice