Title: In re LeClair

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

2011 VT 63













In re LeClair (2010-244)
 
2011 VT 63
 
[Filed 13-Jun-2011]
 
ENTRY ORDER
 
2011 VT 63
 
SUPREME COURT
  DOCKET NO. 2010-244
 
JANUARY TERM, 2011
 
In re Brian LeClair
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APPEALED FROM:
 
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Washington Superior Court 
 
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DOCKET NO. 624-8-09 Wncv
 
 
 
 
 
Trial Judge: Geoffrey W. Crawford
 
In the above-entitled
cause, the Clerk will enter:
 
¶ 1.            
In this complaint for review of governmental action under Vermont Rules
of Civil Procedure 75, plaintiff inmate appeals the superior court's refusal to
order the Department of Corrections to give him double credit for time served
in a correctional facility after his furlough status was improperly
revoked.  We dismiss the appeal as moot.
¶ 2.            
In November 2006, plaintiff was charged with burglary.  At the
time, he was being supervised by the Department on conditional reentry furlough
in connection with eight previous convictionsincluding two for burglarythat
had resulted in an approximately three-to-eight-year sentence.  The
November 2006 charge was based on an incident that occurred in April 2004,
before plaintiff's conviction on the previous charges.  The new charge
arose when DNA evidence connected plaintiff to the earlier offense.  At
the time of the new charge, plaintiff had completed his minimum, but not his
maximum, sentence.  Although he was on conditional reentry furlough when
the new charge was filed, he was incarcerated for what was to be a short period
of time for violating the terms of his conditional reentry furlough
agreement.  When the new charge was filed, however, the Department revoked
plaintiff's furlough status, and he remained incarcerated.  Independent of
his furlough revocation, plaintiff was held for lack of bail on the new charge.
¶ 3.            
Plaintiff challenged his furlough revocation.  In an August 2007
decision, the superior court ruled that because the sole basis of the
revocation was plaintiff's alleged violation of his promise in the furlough
agreement not to commit any illegal act, his furlough status had been
improperly revoked based on an incident that occurred before he signed the
agreement.
¶ 4.            
In August 2007, plaintiff was sentenced on the November 2006 burglary
charge to a term of zero-to-two years to be served consecutively to the
previous sentences.  In August 2009, after exhausting his administrative
remedies, plaintiff filed a complaint for review of governmental action under
Rule 75, arguing that the Department was compelled to award him credit for the
279 days between the revocation of his furlough and his conviction on the new
burglary chargenot only against his original sentences, but also against his
sentence on the new charge.  In a May 2010 decision, the superior court
ruled that plaintiff was not entitled to double credit for those 279 days,
notwithstanding the fact that his furlough status had been improperly revoked.
¶ 5.            
Plaintiff appeals that decision to this Court, arguing that because he
had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in his furlough status, the
Department's improper revocation of that status based on an incident that
occurred before his original sentences were imposed compelled the Department to
give him double creditagainst both the underlying sentence and the new
sentencefor the 279 days that he was incarcerated after the improper furlough
revocation and before his conviction on the new charge.  In addition to
challenging the merits of this argument, the State contends that the case is
now moot.
¶ 6.            
We first address the question of mootness.
 The State argues that this appeal is moot because plaintiff completed his
maximum sentence on the underlying charges on November 10, 2010, and even
though he was charged with yet another burglary on March 26, 2010, he has been
accepted into drug court for that charge.  According to the State, the
expiration of plaintiff's underlying sentences and his acceptance into drug
court on the most recent charge means that our decision on the merits of his
appeal would have no impact on plaintiff, and thus there is no live
controversy.  Plaintiff responds that a live controversy continues to
exist because, if we find in his favor in this appeal, his maximum sentence
would be considered completed in February 2010, before this latest charge, and
thus he could receive credit against any new sentence for the time he spent in
custody after the new charge was filed.  Plaintiff makes no mention of his
acceptance into drug court on the latest charge.
¶ 7.            
We conclude that the instant appeal is moot.  Generally, "a case
becomes moot when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a
legally cognizable interest in the outcome."  In re Moriarity, 156 Vt. 160, 163, 588 A.2d 1063, 1064 (1991)
(quotation omitted).  Here, as noted, plaintiff completed his
maximum sentence for the underlying convictions in November 2010.  Thus,
even if plaintiff were to prevail in this appeal, and
we were to grant him credit for the 279 days against the November 2006
conviction, he would gain nothing because he has already served his maximum
sentence for that conviction.  Plaintiff argues, however, that because he
was charged once again with burglary in March 2010, if we were to rule in his
favor in this appeal, he could receive credit for the time he was incarcerated
between the date of the new charge and the date he completed his maximum
sentence.
¶ 8.            
We find this argument unavailing.  Plaintiff is not serving a
sentence on the new charge.  The superior court docket entries indicate
that plaintiff has been admitted into drug court.  If plaintiff graduates
from drug court, he will receive a sentence of two-to-five years, all
suspended, with immediate discharge from probation.  While it is true that
participants in drug court may be discharged for various reasons and have their
cases sent back to criminal court, we will not assume a "sufficient prospect"
of negative consequences based on speculation that plaintiff will fail to
graduate from drug court and be sentenced in regular criminal court.  See In
re Collette, 2008 VT 136, ¶ 16, 185 Vt. 210, 969 A.2d 101 ("[O]ur recognition of negative collateral consequences as an
exception to mootness is limited to situations where
proceeding to a decision in an otherwise dead case is justified by a sufficient
prospect that the decision will have an impact on the parties." (quotation omitted)).  Moreover, even if we were to
assume that plaintiff will not graduate from drug court and will be sentenced
in criminal court, the State has conceded that plaintiff would be entitled to
credit for the 279 days against the current burglary charge because he was
serving that time as a detentioner for the current
charge and he had completed his maximum sentence on the previous
convictions.  Accordingly, plaintiff no longer has a cognizable interest
in resolution of this appeal.
           
Appeal dismissed as moot.
 
 
BY THE COURT:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paul L. Reiber,
  Chief Justice
 
 
  
 
 
John A. Dooley, Associate
  Justice
  
 
 
 
 
Denise R. Johnson,
  Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Brian L. Burgess, Associate
  Justice