Title: Belton v. Crudup

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
CHERYL BELTON 
v.  Record No. 060689  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
                                     March 2, 2007 
PAULA CRUDUP 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 
A. Bonwill Shockley, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we address the requirements set forth 
in Code § 64.1-5.1(4) for a child born out of wedlock to 
share in the distribution of a putative parent’s estate.  
Specifically, we decide whether the sole act of filing a 
list of heirs that identifies an individual as the 
decedent’s child tolls the period during which an action to 
adjudicate the existence of the parent-child relationship 
must be filed.  Concluding that it does not toll the period 
prescribed by statute, we will affirm the judgment of the 
circuit court. 
RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
James Arthur Crudup (Crudup) died intestate on 
September 13, 1999.  His wife at the time of his death, 
Paula B. Crudup (the Administratrix), qualified as 
administratrix of his estate on December 21, 1999.  At the 
time of her qualification, the Administratrix filed a list 
of Crudup’s heirs with the circuit court clerk, identifying 
herself as Crudup’s wife and Cheryl “Bellton” [sic] as his 
 
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daughter.  She also valued Crudup’s estate at less than 
$10,000. 
On July 17, 2001, the Administratrix filed an amended 
list of heirs, omitting the prior listing of Belton as 
Crudup’s daughter and showing herself as Crudup’s only 
heir.  She also reported the value of Crudup’s estate to be 
$100,000.  In subsequent correspondence to Belton, the 
Administratrix’s attorney advised that, since Crudup was 
not married to Belton’s mother at the time of Belton’s 
birth and had never formally acknowledged Belton as his 
daughter, the Administratrix took the position that Belton 
was not an heir to Crudup’s estate. 
On January 16, 2002, Belton filed a petition in the 
circuit court to establish herself as Crudup’s natural 
daughter and an heir to his estate.  In her petition, 
Belton alleged that the Administratrix had not only listed 
her as one of Crudup’s heirs, but had also sent Belton a 
notice advising her of that listing and of the 
Administratrix’s qualification as the personal 
representative of Crudup’s estate.∗  Belton further alleged 
that, despite the Administratrix’s representations to 
                     
∗ This notice contained a warning in bold letters on 
its face that the notice did not mean that Belton would 
receive any money or property. 
 
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Belton for over 18 months that Belton would share in the 
distribution of Crudup’s estate, the Administratrix omitted 
Belton’s name from the amended list of heirs. 
 
In her response to Belton’s petition, the 
Administratrix admitted that she initially listed Belton as 
Crudup’s daughter based on representations made by other 
relatives of Crudup.  The Administratrix asserted that she 
filed the amended list of heirs after determining that 
Belton should not be deemed Crudup’s daughter for purposes 
of intestate succession.  The Administratrix denied having 
made any representations that Belton would share in the 
distribution of Crudup’s estate, and she affirmatively 
alleged that Belton is not entitled to do so because her 
mother was never legally married to Crudup, nor had Crudup 
ever formally acknowledged Belton as his daughter.  
Finally, the Administratrix averred that Belton had “never 
filed the appropriate documents . . . to establish herself 
as” Crudup’s daughter. 
 
In connection with her petition, Belton filed two 
motions that are the subjects of this appeal.  First, she 
asked the circuit court to estop the Administratrix from 
asserting that Belton is not Crudup’s daughter and heir.  
Second, Belton filed a motion to toll the statutory one-
year period following a decedent’s death during which a 
 
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child born out of wedlock, which Belton acknowledges 
herself to be, must file both an affidavit asserting a 
parent-child relationship with the decedent and an action 
seeking adjudication of the existence of that relationship 
in order to share in the distribution of the decedent’s 
estate.  See Code § 64.1-5.1(4).  After an ore tenus 
hearing, the circuit court denied Belton’s motions for 
estoppel and to toll the running of the statutory one-year 
period.  The court concluded that in the absence of 
evidence that would invoke one of the exceptions to the 
one-year filing requirement provided for in Code § 64.1-
5.1(4), Belton failed to satisfy the statutory 
prerequisites to share in the settlement of Crudup’s 
estate.  We awarded Belton this appeal. 
ANALYSIS 
The statute at issue, Code § 64.1-5.1(4), provides: 
No claim of succession based upon the 
relationship between a child born out of wedlock 
and a parent of such child shall be recognized in 
the settlement of any decedent’s estate unless an 
affidavit by such child or by someone acting for 
such child alleging such parenthood has been 
filed within one year of the date of the death of 
such parent in the clerk’s office of the circuit 
court of the jurisdiction wherein the property 
affected by such claim is located and an action 
seeking adjudication of parenthood is filed in an 
appropriate circuit court within said time.  
However, such one-year period shall run 
notwithstanding the minority of such child.  The 
limitation period of the preceding sentence shall 
 
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not apply in those cases where the relationship 
between the child born out of wedlock and the 
parent in question is (i) established by a birth 
record prepared upon information given by or at 
the request of such parent; or (ii) by admission 
by such parent of parenthood before any court or 
in writing under oath; or (iii) by a previously 
concluded proceeding to determine parentage 
pursuant to the provisions of former § 20-61.1 or 
Chapter 3.1 (§ 20-49.1 et seq.) of Title 20. 
 
Thus, except under the particular circumstances set forth 
in the statute, the right of a child born out of wedlock to 
inherit from his or her parent is conditioned upon the 
satisfaction, within one year of the parent’s death, of two 
statutory prerequisites:  (1) the filing of an affidavit 
alleging the parent-child relationship by either the child 
or someone acting for the child; and (2) the filing of an 
action seeking an adjudication of the alleged parental 
relationship. 
 
Belton claims that the first requirement was met when 
the Administratrix included Belton in the original list of 
heirs filed on December 21, 1999.  Belton makes no 
contention, however, that anyone ever filed an action 
seeking adjudication of the alleged parent-child 
relationship between her and Crudup within one year of his 
death.  Rather, she assigns error to the circuit court’s 
refusal to toll the running of the statutory one-year 
period during the time her name appeared on the original 
 
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list of heirs filed by the Administratrix.  Belton claims 
she failed to file an action to determine her status as 
Crudup’s daughter within one year of his death because she 
relied in good faith on the Administratrix’s initial filing 
of the list of heirs.  According to Belton, the 
Administratrix’s identification of Belton in the original 
list of heirs excused her from having to satisfy the second 
requirement under Code § 64.1-5.1(4) during the time her 
name appeared on that list.  Moreover, she argues, unless 
equity is applied so as to toll the running of the time 
within which an action seeking adjudication of the parent-
child relationship must be filed, an unscrupulous 
administrator could misrepresent the status of a child born 
out of wedlock in order to prevent that child from taking 
appropriate steps to secure his or her right to inherit 
from the putative parent. 
 
We reject Belton’s arguments.  Assuming without 
deciding, as did the circuit court, that the original list 
of Crudup’s heirs was the type of “affidavit” contemplated 
by Code § 64.1-5.1(4), and assuming further that the 
Administratrix acted on Belton’s behalf when she filed it, 
neither the filing of that document nor Belton’s purported 
reliance on it relieved her of the statutorily prescribed, 
independent requirement that an action seeking adjudication 
 
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of her alleged relationship with Crudup be filed within one 
year of his death.  Indeed, Belton conceded as much in the 
proceedings below when she agreed that “merely being listed 
on a List of Heirs as a daughter did not change the 
requirement that [she] proceed with the legal proceeding 
pursuant to statute to establish . . . paternity.” 
 
Nor does Belton point to any action by the 
Administratrix, other than the filing of the original list 
of heirs, that would allow Belton to circumvent the 
requirement that an action seeking adjudication of the 
alleged parental relationship be filed within one year of 
Crudup’s death.  Indeed, not even the minority of a child 
born out of wedlock tolls the running of the one-year 
period.  The General Assembly was explicit in identifying 
only three instances in which the one-year period does not 
apply.  Belton does not fall within any of those 
exemptions, and we decline to carve out others when the 
General Assembly has not, in its wisdom, done so.  See, 
e.g., Jackson v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 269 Va. 303, 313, 
608 S.E.2d 901, 906 (2005) (under the maxim of expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius, when the General Assembly sets 
forth specific exceptions to the general applicability of a 
statute, those exceptions are deemed to be the only ones 
the legislature intended to make available). 
 
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We also find the prior decisions of this Court upon 
which Belton relies to be inapposite.  In Johnson v. 
Branson, 228 Va. 65, 319 S.E.2d 735 (1984), for instance, 
the dispositive issue was whether a putative son presented 
sufficient evidence of a parent-child relationship with the 
decedent to inherit the decedent’s estate.  Id. at 67, 319 
S.E.2d at 735.  Since this Court reversed the trial court’s 
decree in favor of the son because the evidence was 
insufficient to establish paternity, we did not decide 
whether the son’s affirmative response to a bill of 
complaint challenging his status as an heir satisfied the 
one-year filing requirement when that complaint had been 
filed more than a year after the decedent’s death.  Id. at 
70, 319 S.E.2d at 737.  Similarly, in Murphy v. Holland, 
237 Va. 212, 377 S.E.2d 363 (1989), the application of the 
predecessor statute to current Code § 64.1-5.1(4) was not 
at issue since the decedent had acknowledged his paternity 
of the child by signing the latter’s birth certificate.  
Id. at 214, 377 S.E.2d at 364.  Finally, in Marshall v. 
Bird, 230 Va. 89, 334 S.E.2d 573 (1985), we considered the 
point at which a child’s right of action to claim an 
inheritance accrued, thereby causing the statutory one-year 
period to commence to run, not whether a particular event 
 
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or condition tolled the running of the one-year period.  
Id. at 93, 334 S.E.2d at 575. 
CONCLUSION 
 
We therefore conclude that Belton cannot, as a matter 
of law, share in the settlement of Crudup’s estate because 
no action seeking to adjudicate the alleged parent-child 
relationship was commenced within one year of his death.  
Accordingly, we need not consider Belton’s argument that 
the circuit court erred by failing to estop the 
Administratrix from denying that Belton is Crudup’s 
daughter and heir.  If the Administratrix had not filed the 
amended list of heirs, the provisions of Code § 64.1-5.1(4) 
would nevertheless have barred Belton from sharing in the 
distribution of Crudup’s estate because she failed to file 
an action seeking adjudication of the alleged parent-child 
relationship within one year of Crudup’s death. 
 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the 
circuit court. 
Affirmed.