Title: Martin v. Duncan

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, and 
Millette, JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 
 
PAMELA MARTIN 
 
v.  Record No. 072571 
 
 
OPINION BY SENIOR JUSTICE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    ELIZABETH B. LACY 
CHRISTOPHER DUNCAN  
 
 
    January 16, 2009 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE 
John E. Clarkson, Judge Designate 
 
In this appeal we consider whether the costs of impaneling 
a jury may be imposed upon a plaintiff seeking a nonsuit as a 
matter of right. 
 
Pamela Martin filed a complaint against Christopher Duncan 
seeking recovery of damages she sustained as a result of 
Duncan’s alleged negligence.  During a jury trial, Martin moved 
to strike Duncan’s evidence on the issue of liability.  The 
trial court denied that motion and Martin sought a nonsuit.  
Duncan’s counsel asked the trial court to assess expenses 
incurred in securing the deposition of an expert witness and 
Duncan’s travel costs.  The trial court concluded that Code 
§ 8.01-380(C) did not allow assessment of the costs and expenses 
sought by Duncan.  The trial court, however, assessed Martin the 
jury costs associated with the case, $540, finding that 
assessing jury costs was “pretty standard here in this court.” 
 
Martin filed a timely appeal to this Court raising five 
assignments of error.  We awarded Martin an appeal limited to 
the single issue whether the trial court had the authority to 
require Martin to pay the jury costs when Martin took a nonsuit 
as a matter of right. 
DISCUSSION 
Martin argues that only the costs set out in Code § 8.01-
380(C) may be imposed on a plaintiff taking a nonsuit as a 
matter of right and those costs do not include the costs of 
impaneling a jury.1  Duncan, however, asserts that the trial 
court’s action was proper because nothing in Code § 8.01-380 
prohibits the assessment of jury costs in these circumstances.  
Duncan further argues that Chesapeake Circuit Court Local Rule 5 
authorized the imposition of jury costs in this case.2  We first 
                                                 
1 Code § 8.01-380(C) states: 
If notice to take a nonsuit of right is given to the 
opposing party within seven days of trial, the court 
in its discretion may assess against the nonsuiting 
party reasonable witness fees and travel costs of 
expert witnesses scheduled to appear at trial, which 
are actually incurred by the opposing party solely by 
reason of the failure to give notice at least seven 
days prior to trial.  The court shall have the 
authority to determine the reasonableness of expert 
witness fees and travel costs. 
 
2 Local Rule 5 of the Circuit Court for the City of 
Chesapeake states in relevant part: 
To promote the convenient and efficient use of 
this Courthouse and Office of the Clerk of Circuit 
Court and the orderly management of the Court docket, 
and in an effort to attain a more efficient 
administration of justice by avoiding undue hardships 
to citizens serving as jurors and to avoid needless 
expense, the following procedure will become 
effective beginning July 1, 2006: 
 
. . . . 
 
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consider whether assessment of costs associated with the grant 
of a first nonsuit are limited to those costs set out in Code 
§ 8.01-380(C). 
The General Assembly has established two categories of 
nonsuit – a first nonsuit which can be taken as a matter of 
right and subsequent or discretionary nonsuits which require the 
consent of the trial court.  Code § 8.01-380(B).  Either type of 
nonsuit is available to a plaintiff any time in the litigation 
before a motion to strike the evidence has been sustained, the 
matter has been submitted to the court for decision, or the jury 
has retired from the bar.  Code § 8.01-380(A).  Consequently, 
costs may have been incurred at the time a nonsuit is taken – 
regardless of the type of nonsuit.  The General Assembly enacted 
subsections (B) and (C) of Code § 8.01-380 to authorize the 
assessment of costs against the nonsuiting party; however, the 
costs which may be assessed are not the same for the two 
categories of nonsuit.  Subsection (B) of Code § 8.01-380 allows 
a trial court to assess “costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees” 
                                                                                                                                                             
(3) Any party, having demanded a trial by jury, may 
waive a jury by giving notice to said Clerk, the Jury 
Administrator, and the opposing side.  In the event 
the case is settled or is not to be tried, notice 
shall be given to said Clerk, the Jury Administrator, 
and the opposing side.  If any such notice is not 
given prior to the day of trial, the cost of the 
jury, if incurred, will be assessed against a 
defendant in a criminal case, or in a civil case will 
be charged against the party or parties who have 
failed to notify said Clerk and Jury Administrator. 
 
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against the nonsuiting party in connection with a discretionary 
nonsuit, while subsection (C) limits the assessable costs 
associated with a nonsuit as a matter of right to “reasonable 
witness fees and travel costs of expert witnesses scheduled to 
appear at trial.”  This difference in assessable costs is 
consistent with the differing nature of the two categories of 
nonsuit.  To impose financial burdens on the exercise of the 
right to a first nonsuit erodes the ability to exercise that 
right, thereby justifying a more limited category of assessable 
costs. 
We have previously held that “with respect to a first 
nonsuit a trial court may not place limitations on the absolute 
right of the plaintiff to seek the nonsuit beyond those found in 
the statute.”  Janvier v. Arminio, 272 Va. 353, 365, 634 S.E.2d 
754, 760 (2006); see also McManama v. Plunk, 250 Va. 27, 32, 458 
S.E.2d 759, 762 (1995).  The imposition of financial costs not 
authorized in Code § 8.01-380(C) places a limitation on the 
absolute right of a plaintiff to exercise that right.  
Accordingly, we conclude that because jury costs are not costs 
authorized by statute to be imposed on a plaintiff exercising 
his absolute right to a first nonsuit, the trial court could not 
assess such costs on Martin in this case. 
 
In light of this holding we also reject Duncan’s argument 
that Local Rule 5 gave the trial court the authority to impose 
 
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the jury costs.  Code § 8.01-4 provides that a local rule cannot 
be enforced if it “is inconsistent with . . . any . . . 
statutory provision . . . or . . . has the effect of abridging 
substantive rights of persons before such court.”  Assuming 
Local Rule 5 applied in this case and was relied on by the trial 
court when assessing Martin the jury costs, it is inconsistent 
with Code § 8.01-380(C) and had the effect of abridging Martin’s 
absolute right to a first nonsuit.  Therefore, Local Rule 5 
could not be the source of authority to impose the costs at 
issue.  
 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, we will reverse 
that portion of the judgment of the trial court assessing Martin 
jury costs in the amount of $540. 
Reversed and final judgment.