Title: Coleman v. Anne Arundel Police

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Charles Coleman v. Anne Arundel County Police Department, No. 34, September Term,
2001
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – BURDEN OF PROOF – LEOBR (LAW ENFORCEMENT
OFFICERS’ BILL OF RIGHTS) – DUE PROCESS.
(1)
The State LEOBR statute is silent as to the appropriate evidentiary standard to be
applied in an administrative proceeding convened in accordance with it. By operation
of Maryland’s Administrative Procedure Act, Md. Code (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol., 2001
Supp.), State Government Article, §§ 10-101-10-305, in contested case proceedings,
the preponderance of the evidence standard is applied in disciplinary actions under
LEOBR involving Maryland State Police.  Preponderance of the evidence, not clear
and convincing evidence, is determined also to be the appropriate standard to apply
in LEOBR contested cases involving local police personnel actions, even where the
allegations for termination include serious misconduct. 
(2)
It is the function of due process, under both the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, to “protect interest
in life, liberty and property from deprivation or infringement by government without
appropriate safeguards.”  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332, 96 S. Ct. 893, 901,
47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976). 
Procedural due process in an administrative proceeding requires that
administrative agencies performing adjudicatory functions observe the basic
principles of fairness.  The fundamental requisites of fairness are notice and an
opportunity to be heard.  We evaluate what process is due in the instant case utilizing
the balancing test developed by the United States Supreme Court in Mathews, 424
U.S. at 335, 96 S. Ct. at 903, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18.  First, we consider the “private interest
that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”  Id.      
For purposes of our analysis, we shall assume, arguendo, that Petitioner has
a cognizable property or liberty interest in his continued employment with the Anne
Arundel County Police Department.  Nevertheless, a review of the remaining two
factors under Mathews persuades us that the preponderance of the evidence standard
satisfies Petitioner’s due process rights.  We conclude the multi-tiered protections
prescribed by LEOBR, when conducted properly as it was here, adequately protects
against the risk of arbitrary decision-making and limits the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of Petitioner’s due process claims.  Nor do we find that implementation
of the clear and convincing standard of proof would so significantly reduce the risk
of error that it should be implemented regardless of any additional administrative or
financial burdens it would entail.  Finally, while a heightened evidentiary standard
would place a limited fiscal or administrative burden on law enforcement agencies,
we must “weigh heavily” their interest in maintaining internal discipline, the public’s
interest that is served by having chief law enforcement executives that are empowered
to expeditiously remove corrupt officers from its rank and file members, and a public
policy of uniformity among all law enforcement officers within the law enforcement
community.
Circuit Court for Anne A rundel Co unty 
Case # C-1998-47559
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 34
September Term, 2001
CHARLES COLEMAN
v.
ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY
POLICE DEPARTMENT
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
                    Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
JJ.
Opinion by Harrell, J.
Filed:   May 6, 2002
 
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory citations herein are to Maryland Code (1957,
1996 Repl. Vol., 1998 Supp.), Article 27, §§ 727-734D.  The Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill
of Rights is presently codified at Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2001 Supp.), Art. 27, §§
727-734D.
2 There is no clear indication in the record of what prompted the investigation of
Petitioner by IID.
This case was initiated as a personnel disciplinary action taken against former
Corporal Charles Coleman, Petitioner, by the Chief of Police (“Chief”) of the Anne Arundel
County Police Department (the “Department”), pursuant to a recommendation from a
departmental Administrative Hearing Board (“Board”) that had convened in the matter in
accordance with Maryland’s Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights (“LEOBR”),
Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 1998 Supp.), Article 27, §§ 727-734D.1  As a result,
Petitioner’s employment by the Department was terminated.  
Events began in late 1997.  Petitioner was then the target of a “sting” operation
conducted by the Internal Investigation Division (“IID”) of the Respondent Department.
Petitioner apparently had been the subject of an earlier “integrity test” and passed.2
Continuing its investigation of Petitioner, IID assembled an assortment of items, including
$76 in “marked” currency, in a fictitious “lost” fanny pack that was turned over to him on
4 December 1997 by undercover officers posing as citizens.  This effort was to determine
whether Petitioner would process the property in accord with departmental policies.
Although Petitioner properly processed several items in the fanny pack, the currency was not
processed nor a receipt created for it by Petitioner before the end of his work shift.
3 At the direction of Petitioner’s supervisory Captain, Petitioner was issued a written
emergency suspension of police powers order pursuant to LEOBR § 734A(2).  See infra note
14. 
4 As provided in the LEOBR § 727(d)(1), a hearing board is defined as: 
(1) A board which is authorized by the chief to hold a hearing on
a complaint against a law enforcement officer and which
consists of not less than three members . . . all to be appointed
by the chief and selected from law enforcement officers within
that agency, or law enforcement officers of another agency with
the approval of the chief of the other agency, and who have had
no part in the investigation or interrogation of the law
enforcement officer.  At least one member of the hearing board
shall be of the same rank as the law enforcement officer against
whom the complaint has been filed. 
While exceptions to § 727(d)(1) can be found in § 727(d)(2) & (3), they are not applicable
in the present case. Furthermore, “chief” is defined in § 727(g) to mean “superintendent,
commissioner, chief of police, or sheriff of a law enforcement agency, or the officer
designated by the official.”
2
The following day, Petitioner was ordered to report to his station house and, upon
arrival, was issued a written emergency suspension order by the on-duty lieutenant, acting
at the direction of his superior officer.3  Petitioner then was ordered to empty his pockets.
It was discovered that Petitioner had co-mingled the marked currency with his own funds,
except for $5 of the $76 that he had spent.  On 6 December 1997, Petitioner was suspended,
with pay, pending further investigation or a determination by a hearing board.  
Petitioner appeared before a three member administrative disciplinary hearing board4
on 27 April 1998,  to answer charges of eight essentially theft-related violations of the Anne
5 Specifically, Petitioner was charged with the following departmental violations:
1 - Index Code 302, Rule 1           “Conformance to Law”
2 - Index Code 302, Rule 7            “Integrity of Report System”
3 - Index Code 302, Rule 14         “Conduct Unbecoming”
4 - Index Code 302, Rule 16         “Neglect of Duty”
5 - Index Code 302, Rule 23         “Handling of Property”
6 - Index Code 1201, Sect. III, ¶a “Property Forms”
7 - Index Code 302, Rule 32         “Truthfulness”
8 - Index Code 102, Sect. II          “Code of Ethics”
A more detailed summary of the above charges will be discussed infra note 13 and related
text.
6 A “hearing” is defined in § 727(e) of the LEOBR to mean “any meeting in the course
of an investigatory proceeding, other than an interrogation, at which no testimony is taken
under oath, conducted by a hearing board for the purpose of taking or adducing testimony
or receiving other evidence.”
7 The Board recommended separately for the violations represented by Charges 1, 3,
4, 5, 7, and 8 that termination be imposed, and recommended separately for the violations
represented by Charges 2 and 6 that a 12-day suspension be imposed. 
3
Arundel County Police Department rules, regulations, and procedures.5  Following a three-
day evidentiary hearing,6 at which Petitioner and his counsel were present and fully
participating, the Board, in a unanimous decision, found Petitioner “guilty” of all eight
charges.  Pursuant to § 731 of the LEOBR, the Board, in its 15 May 1998 memorandum to
the Chief, effectively recommended termination of Petitioner’s employment.7  After
considering several mitigating factors, the Board also suggested that Petitioner receive credit
for any leave to which he was entitled prior to termination, thereby affording him the
opportunity to bridge his time of employment to meet the twenty-years of service necessary
8 At the time of Petitioner’s termination on 2 June 1998, he was six months shy of his
twenty-year anniversary as an Anne Arundel County police officer.  Under the Anne Arundel
County Code, a police officer does not vest for purposes of retirement benefits until the first
business day after his twenty-year anniversary, which, in Petitioner’s case, would have been
4 January 1999.  Termination prior to this date prevents vesting of all retirement benefits.
9 In accordance with § 731(c) of the LEOBR, the recommendations of an
Administrative Hearing Board as to punishment are not binding upon the chief, except in
limited circumstances not relevant here. Section 731(c) provides:
(c) Review by chief, final order by chief. — The written
recommendations as to punishment are not binding upon the
chief.  Within 30 days of receipt of the hearing board’s
recommendations, the chief shall review the findings,
conclusions, and recommendations of the hearing board and
then the chief shall issue a final order.  The chief’s final order
and decision is binding and may be appealed in accordance with
this subtitle.  Before the chief may increase the recommended
penalty of the hearing board, the chief personally shall:
(1) Review the entire record of the hearing board proceedings;
(2) Meet with the law enforcement officer and permit the law 
enforcement officer to be heard on the record;
(3) Disclose and provide to the officer in writing at least 10 days
prior to the meeting any oral or written communication not
included in the hearing board record on which the decision to
consider increasing the penalty is based, in whole or in part; and
(4) State on the record the substantial evidence relied on to
support the increase in the recommended penalty.
4
for vesting of retirement benefits.8  On 2 June 1998, after reviewing the record, the Chief
accepted the Board’s recommendation of termination, but decided to make the termination
effective immediately.9 
10 Section 732 of the LEOBR provides:
Appeal from decisions rendered in accordance with § 731 shall
be taken to the circuit court for the county pursuant to Maryland
Rule 7-202.  Any party aggrieved by a decision of a court under
this subtitle may appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. 
Section § 731 concerns any decision, order, or action taken as a result of an administrative
hearing pursuant to the LEOBR. 
11 Maryland Rules 7-201-7-210 regulate judicial review of administrative agency
decisions where judicial review is authorized by statute. 
5
On 1 July 1998,  pursuant to § 73210 of the LEOBR and in accordance with Maryland
Rules 7-201-7-210,11 Petitioner sought judicial review in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel
County of his termination, alleging, inter alia, various errors of law, including an alleged
error that the Board had applied the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof, rather
than the clear and convincing evidence standard required by the circumstances, in its
assessment of whether the Department had proven the charges.  On 3 January 2000, the
Circuit Court filed its Opinion and Order affirming the termination decision.  Of particular
relevance, the Circuit Court, citing Meyers v. Montgomery County Police, 96 Md. App. 668,
626 A.2d 1010 (1993), acknowledged that the preponderance of the evidence standard may
be used by an  LEOBR hearing board (see Meyers, 96 Md. App. at 708, 626 A.2d at 1030),
but concluded that the Board in this case actually considered and decided the case utilizing
the clear and convincing standard.  Accordingly, even assuming the clear and convincing
standard was required to be used by the Board as Petitioner argued, the Circuit Court found
no error because the record, in its judgment, satisfied that standard.  
6
Petitioner filed an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, raising due process
violations and other errors of law, and again asserting an alleged error concerning the
appropriate standard of proof to be applied in a local police department action under the
LEOBR.  In a published opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed.  Coleman v. Anne
Arundel County Police Dep’t, 136 Md. App. 419, 452, 766 A.2d 169, 187 (2001).  With
regard to the proper standard of proof, the Court of Special Appeals found that the
preponderance of the evidence standard was the correct standard to apply in a LEOBR case
involving a local police disciplinary personnel action, but disagreed with the Circuit Court
that the Board had utilized the preponderance of the evidence standard, not the clear and
convincing standard, in the matter. 
Petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court, which was granted.
Coleman v. Anne Arundel Police, 364 Md. 461, 773 A.2d 513 (2001).  We also granted
Respondent’s conditional cross-petition.  The Maryland Chiefs of Police Association was
permitted to file an amicus brief in support of Respondent.
Issues
Petitioner presents the following issue for our review:
Whether Everett v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 307 Md. 286, 513
A.2d 882 (1986), the Due Process Clause, or both, require clear
and convincing evidence - - and not a mere preponderance of the
evidence - - to (1) convict a police officer of eight theft-related
disciplinary charges, (2) terminate his career within nine months
of retirement, and (3) deny him more than one million dollars in
actuarially calculated retirement benefits?
12 In its brief to this Court, Respondent actually posed two questions for this Court’s
review.  The first question, however, was essentially the same question presented by
Petitioner.  
7
In Respondent’s conditional cross-petition, the following question was presented:12
Did the Court of Special Appeals err by failing to hold that the
Petitioner’s trial Board used the clear and convincing standard?
The Record
We recount the underlying facts as framed by the Court of Special Appeals.
On December 4, 1997, the Internal Investigation Division
(IID) of [Respondent], Anne Arundel County Police Department
(the “Department”), conducted an investigation targeting
[Petitioner], a nineteen year veteran of the force.  A number of
items were assembled to be turned over to [Petitioner] to
determine whether he would properly process them.  The
following articles were put into a green cloth fanny pack: three
Tylenol tablets, a clear plastic baggy with white residue, two
black film canisters with leafy vegetable residue, a Mickey
Mouse key chain with a key and toy baseball bat attached, and
a total of $76.25, consisting of three nickels, one dime, two $20
bills, three $10 bills, one $5 bill, and one $1 bill. 
Two Howard County detectives, posing as ordinary
citizens, turned the fanny pack over to [Petitioner].  They
advised him that they had found the pack containing no
identification outside a convenience store.  [Petitioner] asked
them no questions and let them leave without taking down any
information.  [Petitioner] radioed in for a case number for the
recovered property and potential controlled dangerous
substances (CDS) and then returned to the police station.
[Petitioner] then called the convenience store and spoke with the
clerk, who indicated that no one had reported lost or stolen
property.
8
[Petitioner] prepared the suspected CDS for forwarding
to the laboratory for testing.  He placed the CDS into a sealed
envelope, labeled the envelope appropriately, had the envelope
witnessed, and recorded it in the logbook.  These actions
comported with departmental regulations.  
Petitioner separated the bills from the rest of the items
left in the fanny pack.  He filled out a “Recovered Property
Form” on which he made the following notations: “Mickey
Mouse key chain with one key” and “3 nickels, 1 dime
American currency.” These items were placed in a blue
envelope.  Neither the Tylenol tablets nor the bills were turned
in.
[Petitioner] has maintained that it was his understanding
that he needed a supervisor to count the paper currency, seal the
envelope containing it, and sign the envelope.  Because there
was no supervising officer on duty that evening, and he believed
it unwise to leave the money on his desk, [Petitioner] put it in
his shirt pocket.  He took it with him with the intention of
having it signed in later by a supervisor.  Believing that he
would see his direct supervisor at some point during the shift,
[Petitioner] did not seek out a supervisor.  Instead, he went back
out to work on making his performance levels for DWIs and
traffic tickets.  
[Petitioner] took the money home with him.  The next
morning, he put it with the rest of his money, and took it with
him to a court appearance.  He stopped by a fast food restaurant
and paid with a five dollar bill. 
After court and pursuant to orders to return to the station,
[Petitioner] was ordered by the on-duty lieutenant that
afternoon, Lieutenant Kenneth Schlein (“Lt. Schlein”), to empty
his pockets and, after he did, to surrender the money to him.
Schlein testified at the hearing that the following exchange,
initiated by [Petitioner], took place: 
[[Petitioner]]: It’s here.
9
[Lt. Schlein:] What’s here?
[[Petitioner]]: All the money from last night:
sixty-five dollars;1 I knew it was a setup; It was
stupid of me.
[Petitioner] pulled a money clip out of his pocket and took $71
from the total amount he had and began comparing the bills
himself to the ones an IID officer had photocopied the previous
day.
Lt. Schlein confronted [Petitioner] with the five dollar 
difference, and [Petitioner] stated that he must have spent the
money. [Petitioner] was served an emergency suspension notice
the same day.  On December 12, 1997, he was charged with
violating eight Anne Arundel County Police Department rules,
regulations, policies and/or procedures.  We quote from the
Statement of Facts contained in [Petitioner’s] brief, which
accurately summarize[s] the charges as follows:
Charge 1 alleged that Cpl. Coleman failed
to conform to “Md. Ann. Code art. 27, section
342" (the theft offense statute) when he “stole the
$76 instead of reporting its recovery and
submitting it . . .”  Charge 2 alleged that Cpl.
Coleman violated the integrity of the reporting
system when he “failed to submit [an] accurate
and complete recovered 
property incident report.”
Charge 3 alleged that Cpl. Coleman engaged in
conduct unbecoming a police officer by
committing “theft” in that he “stole the $76.00"
and his “conduct was criminal, dishonest and
improper.”  Charge 4 alleged that Cpl. Coleman
neglected his duty and had an unsatisfactory
performance “by stealing $76.00.”  Charge 5
alleged that Cpl. Coleman violated the reporting
_____________
1 There was actually $76.00 in the fanny pack, but all indications
were that [Petitioner] merely made a mistake about the amount
he had recovered the night before. 
13 For specific departmental code violations, see supra note 5.
10
 requirement regarding property or contraband by
committing “theft” when he “stole the $76.00
instead of reporting its recovery.”  Charge 6
alleged that Cpl. Coleman failed to comply with
the Recovered Property Form by “not put[ting
$76] on Recovered Property Form.”  Charge 7
alleged 
that 
Cpl. 
Coleman 
violated 
the
truthfulness 
requirement 
by 
“intentional
misrepresentation by not mentioning $76.”
Charge 8 alleged that Cpl. Coleman violated his
oath of office and the Code of Ethics by the fact
that he “stole the $76 . . ., was dishonest in
thought and deed, and showed disrespect for . . .
the law against theft.” [13]
The hearing before the Board was originally scheduled to
take place on February 3, 1998.  Pursuant to [Petitioner’s]
request, the hearing was continued to February 9, 1998.  After
an additional request by [Petitioner], the hearing was again
postponed from February 9, 1998, to March 11, 1998.
Additional correspondence then took place between IID and
[Petitioner] wherein [Petitioner] requested hearing dates of April
27, 28, and 29, 1998.  The Chair of the Board, Lieutenant
Thomas Rzepkowski (“Lt. Rzepkowski”), granted this further
continuance, and the hearing began on April 27, 1998.
In the meantime, on or about April 6, 1998, [Petitioner]
was placed on Family and Medical Leave pursuant to the FMLA
due to mental illness. [Petitioner’s] personal physician, Dr.
Dvoskin, identified his illness as “adjustment disorder with
depressed mood, consider major depression.”  Dr. Dvoskin
certified that [Petitioner] was unable to perform his duties and
that it would not be possible for the Department to offer him
reasonable accommodations so that he could continue working.
The Board convened for a hearing that lasted three days.
On May 15, 1998, the Board sent its disposition and
11
recommendation to the Chief.  In its report, the Board made
extensive findings of fact and unanimously found [Petitioner]
guilty of all eight charges.  The Board was also unanimous in its
recommendations for punishment.  It recommended termination
in connection with Charges 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8, and twelve day
suspensions in connection with Charges 2 and 6.  The Board, in
light of the fact that [Petitioner] was so close to retirement, also
stated the following:
In recommending this punishment, it is not
the intent of the Board to allow Corporal Coleman
to safely retire and avoid the stigma of being
“fired.”  The recommendation is for termination.
However, the Board carefully listened to and
considered the mitigating factors which Defense
Counsel persuasively explained, including the
financial impact to innocent family members.
The Board also scrupulously viewed Corporal
Coleman’s 19+ year personnel folder.  With
minor exception, Corporal Coleman’s work
history is positively portrayed with sufficient
commendations for good work performance.  In
the absence of any evidence offered to the
contrary, the Board felt that it did not want to take
away that which Corporal Coleman had
apparently earned.
In fashioning its recommendation, the
Board decided to ask the Chief of Police to
consider allowing Corporal Coleman to be
credited for any leave which he was lawfully
entitled to prior to actual termination.  The Board
did not have access to actual numbers credited to
Corporal Coleman, but the Board intended
Corporal Coleman to be terminated the moment
his leave ran out.  The Board also did not have
particular knowledge of accepted County policy
regarding retirement eligibility details, but the
Board did not intend to give anything additional
to Corporal Coleman to allow him to reach his
12
actual retirement date.  If his numbers gave him
the time permitted by contract to leave County
service at 20-years, he would then be terminated
at that first available date. (Emphasis in original).
The Chief issued his final order on June 2, 1998, immediately
terminating [Petitioner’s] employment.
Coleman, 136 Md. App. at 425-29, 766 A.2d at 172-174 (alterations in original) (citation
omitted).  We will include additional administrative factual findings as necessary to our
analysis.
Scope of Review
No statute expressly establishes the scope of judicial review of an administrative
proceeding initiated by a county police department pursuant to the LEOBR.  See Montgomery
County v. Stevens, 337 Md. 471, 482, 654 A.2d 877, 882 (1995); Younkers v. Prince
George’s County, 333 Md. 14, 17, 633 A.2d 861, 862 (1993) (noting that unlike the scope
of review established under the State Administrative Procedure Act (APA) when a state
police agency is involved, Md. Code (1984, 1993 Repl. Vol., 1993 Cum. Supp.), State
Government Art., §§ 10-201-10-226, the LEOBR is silent as to a specified scope of judicial
review in a disciplinary action involving a county police officer).  We have concluded that
the scope of judicial review in a LEOBR case “‘is that generally applicable to administrative
appeals.’”  Stevens, 337 Md. at 482, 654 A.2d at 882 (quoting Younkers, 333 Md. at 17, 633
A.2d at 862).  Thus, to the extent that the issue under review turns on the correctness of an
agency’s findings of fact, judicial review is narrow.  It is “‘limited to determining if there is
13
substantial evidence’ in the administrative record as a whole ‘to support the agency’s
findings and conclusions . . . .’” Id.  (quoting United Parcel v. People’s Counsel, 336 Md.
569, 577, 650 A.2d 226, 230 (1994)).  See also Younkers, 333 Md. at 18-19, 633 A.2d at 863;
Meyers, 96 Md. App. at 708-09, 626 A.2d at 1030.  While “an administrative agency’s
interpretation and application of the statute which the agency administers should ordinarily
be given considerable weight by reviewing courts,” Board of Physician Quality Assurance
v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 69, 729 A.2d 376, 381 (1999), “we owe no deference to agency
conclusions based upon errors of law.”  State Ethics v. Antonetti, 365 Md. 428, 447, 780
A.2d 1154, 1166 (2001).  See Belvoir Farms Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. North, 355 Md. 259,
267, 734 A.2d 227, 232 (1999); Catonsville Nursing Home, Inc. v. Loveman, 349 Md. 560,
569, 709 A.2d 749, 753 (1998).  Petitioner’s sole issue before us, namely, whether an
incorrect standard of proof was applied in the assessment of whether the Department proved
the charges, presents a purely legal question.  Accordingly, this Court reviews the matter de
novo. 
Discussion
The Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights, currently codified at Md. Code (1957,
1996 Repl. Vol., 2001 Supp.), Art. 27, §§ 727-734D, was enacted in 1974.  See Chapter 722,
Acts of 1974.  The primary purpose of the LEOBR is “‘to guarantee certain procedural
safeguards to law enforcement officers during any investigation or interrogation that could
lead to disciplinary action, demotion, or dismissal.’”  Prince George’s County P.D. v.
14
Zarragoitia, 139 Md. App. 168, 171, 775 A.2d 395, 397 (2001) (quoting Meyers, 96 Md.
App. at 686, 626 A.2d at 1019).  See § 728.  See also Fraternal Order of Police v. Mehrling,
343 Md. 155, 181, 680 A.2d 1052, 1065 (1996); Balt. City Police v. Andrew, 318 Md. 3, 12,
566 A.2d 755, 759 (1989); DiGrazia v. County Executive for Montgomery County, 288 Md.
437, 452-53, 418 A.2d 1191, 1200 (1980) (“The legislative scheme of the LEOBR is simply
this: any law-enforcement officer covered by the Act is entitled to its protection during any
inquiry into his conduct which could lead to the imposition of a disciplinary sanction.”).  It
is the officer’s exclusive remedy in matters of departmental discipline.  See § 734B.  See also
Moats v. City of Hagerstown, 324 Md. 519, 526, 597 A.2d 972, 975 (1991) (noting that
“[t]he language and history of the Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights demonstrates
an intent to establish an exclusive procedural remedy for a police officer in departmental
disciplinary matters”).  
The LEOBR grants “extensive rights to law enforcement officers that are not available
to the general public.”  Meyers, 96 Md. App. at 686, 626 A.2d at 1019.  See also Nichols v.
Balt. Police Dep’t, 53 Md. App. 623, 627, 455 A.2d 446, 449 (1983).  This is because “the
nature of the duties of police officers [are] different from that of other public employees.”
Cancelose v. City of Greenbelt, 75 Md. App. 662, 666, 542 A.2d 1288, 1290 (1988).  Section
728(b) of the LEOBR sets forth specific standards for the investigation of a law enforcement
officer’s alleged misconduct.  If the investigation results in the recommendation of some
action, such as a “dismissal, transfer, loss of pay, reassignment, or similar action which
14 Section 730(a) provides two exceptions to a law enforcement agency taking
immediate disciplinary action.  Of relevance in the instant case is the exception allowed
under § 734A(2) of the LEOBR, which provides as follows:
(2)(i) Emergency suspension with pay may be imposed by the
chief when it appears that the action is in the best interest of the
public and the law enforcement agency.
(ii) If the officer is suspended with pay, the chief may suspend
the police powers of the officer and reassign the officer to
restricted duties pending . . . final determination by an
administrative hearing board as to any departmental violation.
(iii) Any person so suspended shall be entitled to a prompt
hearing.  
Petitioner was issued an emergency suspension at the direction of his Police Captain on 5
December 1997 and immediately relieved of his police duties.  See supra note 3.
15
would be considered a punitive measure,” before an agency can take such action,14 notice
must be provided to the officer “that he is entitled to a hearing on the issues by a hearing
board.”  § 730(a).  Section 730 provides a detailed recitation governing the conduct of the
hearing and the introduction of evidence. 
This Court has been asked, by both parties, to determine the requisite standard of
proof to be applied in a LEOBR administrative disciplinary proceeding involving a local
department’s action.  That this is at all an open question stems from the combination of the
General Assembly standing mute in the LEOBR statute as to the appropriate burden of proof
to be applied in proceedings brought under its auspices and the State APA not applying
directly to such local government proceedings.  Where the legislature has not spoken, judicial
interpretation is often required to “fill in the blanks.”  JOSEPH F. MURPHY, JR., MARYLAND
EVIDENCE HANDBOOK § 400, at 150 (2d ed. 1993).  See also, e.g., Grimes v. Kennedy
15 Respondent’s rules controlling the standard of proof for the Board to use are found
in both the Administrative Hearing & Suspension Boards Manual and the Trial Board
Procedures Manual.  Both manuals require the Board to apply the preponderance of the
evidence standard in determining whether charges are proven.
Section III.F.1.e. of the Administrative Hearing & Suspension Boards Manual, titled
“Degree of Proof,” provides the following:
[T]he degree of proof necessary for a hearing board to make a
finding of guilt is the “preponderance of the evidence.”
Preponderance of evidence denotes evidence which is of greater
weight or more convincing than that which is offered in
(continued...)
16
Krieger, 366 Md. 29, 100, 782 A.2d 807, 850 (2001).  There also is a need to re-visit this
Court’s decision in Everett v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 307 Md. 286, 513 A.2d 882 (1986), in
which the clear and convincing standard was applied in an administrative adjudication before
the Maryland Public Service Commission (whose proceedings expressly are exempt from the
contested case provisions of the State APA) involving charges of fraud, in tandem with
consideration of the Court of Special Appeals’s decision in Meyers v. Montgomery County
Police Dep’t, 96 Md. App. 668, 626 A.2d 1010 (1993), in which the preponderance of the
evidence standard was determined by the intermediate appellate court to apply in an
administrative disciplinary proceeding brought by a local police department under the
LEOBR, where the police officer was charged with excessive use of force in making an on-
duty arrest. 
In the present case, the Department promulgated standards and procedures to be used
by its departmental boards.  Those standards and procedures  specify that disciplinary charges
against an officer be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.15  Petitioner’s first
15(...continued)
opposition to it; that is, evidence which as a whole shows that
fact or causation sought to be proved is more probable than not.
The trier of facts has to determine on which side of an issue the
majority of “preponderance” or credible evidence falls. 
Section III of the Trial Board Procedures Manual is titled “Order and Burden of Proof,” and
provides the following:
For the prosecution to prevail, the Hearing Board must be
convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that the accused
did, in fact, violate the rule and/or regulation.  Some
commentators have indicated that a preponderance of the
evidence means a fifty-one (51) percent margin for the party
which has the burden of proof. . . .  
. . . .
If the administrative charge is that the accused violated
a criminal law, the prosecutor must prove every element of the
underlying crime, but only by a preponderance of the evidence
. . . .
The LEOBR does not address directly or expressly the authority of a local police
department to adopt rules or regulations to implement the statute.  The statute, however, does
appear to contemplate indirectly that such rules may exist.  For example, § 734B addresses
the Legislature’s intent to preempt conflicting legislative and regulatory enactments: 
[T]he provisions of this subtitle shall supersede any State,
county or municipal law, ordinance, or regulation that conflicts
with the provisions of this subtitle, and any local legislation
shall be preempted by the subject and material of this subtitle.
In addition, § 728(c) provides:
This subtitle does not limit the authority of the chief to regulate
the competent and efficient operation and management of a law
enforcement agency by any reasonable means including but not
limited to, transfer and reassignment where that action is not
punitive in nature and where the chief determines that action to
be in the best interests of the internal management of the law
enforcement agency.
17
contention essentially is that Everett mandates otherwise, arguing that the burden of clear and
convincing evidence, as opposed to the less rigorous standard of preponderance of the
16 In Maryland, there are three recognized standards of proof to test the sufficiency of
the evidence in differing contexts: (1) proof by preponderance of the evidence; (2) proof by
clear and convincing evidence; and (3) proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Wills v. State,
329 Md. 370, 373-74, 620 A.2d 295, 296 (1993); Meyers, 96 Md. App. at 687-89, 626 A.2d
at 1019-20;  Weisman v. Connors, 76 Md. App. 488, 502, 547 A.2d 636, 642-43 (1988).  The
Maryland Pattern Jury Instructions are  instructive with regard to defining those standards.
The standard of proof by a preponderance of the evidence is defined in the Maryland
Pattern Jury Instructions as follows:
To prove by a preponderance of the evidence means to
prove that something is more likely so than not so.  In other
words, a preponderance of the evidence means such evidence
which, when considered and compared with the evidence
opposed to it, has more convincing force and produces in your
minds a belief that it is more likely true than not true. 
. . . . 
If you believe that the evidence is evenly balanced on an
issue, then your finding on that issue must be against the party
who has the burden of proving it.  
MPJI 1:7 (3d ed. 2000).
Proof by clear and convincing evidence is defined in the Maryland Pattern Jury
Instructions as follows:
To be clear and convincing, evidence should be “clear”
in the sense that it is certain, plain to the understanding, and
unambiguous and “convincing” in the sense that it is so
reasonable and persuasive as to cause you to believe it.  
MPJI 1:8 (3d ed. 2000).  See also Berkey v. Delia, 287 Md. 302, 317-20, 413 A.2d 170, 177-
78 (1980).  The preponderance and clear and convincing standards are used in civil matters,
in both judicial and administrative contexts. 
The highest standard of proof, firmly entrenched in, and reserved for, our criminal
justice system, requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and is defined in the Maryland
Pattern Jury Instructions as follows:
The State has the burden of proving the guilt of the
defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . However, the State is
not required to prove guilt beyond all possible doubt or to a
mathematical certainty.  Nor is the State required to negate every
conceivable circumstance of innocence.
(continued...)
18
evidence, is required by the nature of the charges in the present case.16  Petitioner’s assertion
16(...continued)
A reasonable doubt is a doubt founded upon reason. 
 Proof beyond a reasonable doubt requires such proof as would
convince you of the truth of a fact to the extent that you would
be willing to act upon such belief without reservation in an
important matter in your own business or personal affairs. . . .
MPJI-Cr. 2:02 (2001).  See also Wills, 329 Md. at 375-85, 620 A.2d at 297-302.
19
primarily relies upon  this Court’s holding in Everett, which Petitioner contends stands for
the proposition that proof by clear and convincing evidence is required in an administrative
adjudicatory hearing whenever the charging allegation involves “fraud, dishonesty, or a
serious criminal offense.”  Petitioner argues that the allegations of his theft-related
misconduct include all of these elements, which, in a civil judicial forum, requires proof by
the clear and convincing standard.  Noting that the fixed burden of persuasion ought to be
the same in an administrative proceeding as it is in a civil judicial proceeding involving
allegations of like nature, Petitioner argues that the allegations of his theft-related misconduct
must be supported by the higher evidentiary standard of clear and convincing evidence.
Everett, 307 Md. at 303, 513 A.2d at 891.  In addition, Petitioner argues that his
administrative charges constitute serious misconduct that, if charged criminally, would
constitute a crime under the Maryland theft statute, Art. 27, § 342.  Indeed, Petitioner claims
that the allegations, and the severity of the potential punishment he faced, are even more
serious than the circumstances in Everett and Meyers, and thus necessitates application of the
higher standard of clear and convincing evidence. 
20
Petitioner’s second contention is that the holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
of this Court concerning Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, dictate application
of the clear and convincing standard of proof under the circumstances of this case.
    
I.
In Everett v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 307 Md. 286, 513 A.2d 882 (1986), this Court was
asked whether a regulated public utility provider (BGE) must prove allegations of fraud or
criminal conduct against a customer by a preponderance of the evidence, or by the more
demanding standard of clear and convincing evidence, in an administrative hearing before
the Maryland Public Service Commission (“Commission”).  The customer, an individual,
challenged BGE’s intended termination of her residential utility service.  BGE wished to
terminate Everett’s service at her then-present address for alleged non-payment of
fraudulently obtained service at a prior residence.  Upon receiving notice of the proposed
termination, and the grounds on which it was based, Everett filed a complaint against BGE
with the Commission, denying the allegations and requesting a hearing on the matter.  The
Commission ordered BGE to answer the complaint and assigned the matter to a hearing
examiner.
BGE’s response to Everett’s complaint alleged two instances of “fraudulent[] use[]
[of] gas and electric service supplied from BG & E” during an antecedent three (3) year
period, 1977-80, by applying for service under a fictitious or other family member’s name.
17 BGE’s evidence indicated that Everett resided at 508 E. 43rd Street during the period
in question and that she obtained service unlawfully at that address.  On the other hand,
Everett produced evidence that tended to show that she lived with her mother and brothers
on Round Road, not at the 43rd Street address, during the relevant time period.  According
to her evidence, the house on 43rd Street was occupied by her daughter Janet, her
grandchildren, and a boarder.  Everett, 317 Md. at 291, 513 A.2d at 885.
21
Everett, 307 Md. at 290-91, 513 A.2d at 884.  BGE also alleged that on two separate
occasions after Everett’s service had been denied for non-payment, she had her service
restored without BGE’s knowledge or permission.   Following the hearing, the examiner
issued a proposed order in which he concluded that BGE  bore the burden of proof by clear
and convincing evidence.  At that time, neither the Commission’s enabling statute or its
regulations addressed the question of what standard of proof applied in such circumstances.
Applying the clear and convincing standard to the record evidence,17 the hearing examiner
ultimately determined that BGE had not met its burden.  The utility appealed to the
Commission, which determined that the appropriate standard of proof was preponderance of
the evidence, and, upon application of that standard, concluded that the utility had sustained
its charges of fraudulent use.  Accordingly, Everett’s complaint was dismissed.
Everett sought judicial review in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of the
Commission’s order.  The court determined that proof by clear and convincing evidence was
the appropriate standard, and reversed the Commission’s order and remanded the case to the
Commission for further proceedings.  BGE and the Commission appealed the circuit court’s
decision to the Court of Special Appeals.  The intermediate appellate court concluded the
18 Md. Code (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 192, pertains to criminal fraud upon
gas companies by tapping or tampering with utility lines. 
22
preponderance of the evidence standard was appropriate and reversed the circuit court.
Everett petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals, which was granted. 
Focusing on the “nature” of the dispute between the parties before the Commission,
the Court first determined that Everett’s claimed use of a fictitious name in applying for
utility service amounted to an allegation of fraud.  Casting about for an appropriate standard
of proof in a legislative and administrative vacuum, the Court noted that, under a long-
standing common law principle, similar allegations must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence if made in civil judicial proceedings.  Everett, 307 Md. at 300-01, 513 A.2d at 889-
90 (citing Peurifoy v. Cong. Motors, Inc., 254 Md. 501, 517, 255 A.2d 332, 340 (1969)).
Addressing the other allegations leveled by BGE against Everett, the Court determined that
Everett’s supposed unauthorized use of service could support a criminal charge under Md.
Code (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 192,18 and accordingly, the conduct alleged by BGE
amounted to an allegation of the commission of a crime. 
Recognizing that the “preponderance of the evidence standard is generally applied in
civil cases in courts and administrative proceedings,” the Everett Court explained that
“certain cases require a more exacting standard because of the seriousness of the allegations.”
Everett, 307 Md. at 301, 513 A.2d at 890 (citing MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 337 at 959 (E.
Cleary 3d ed. 1984)).  The Court also reviewed its decisions in First Nat’l Bank of S. Md. v.
19 We have defined crimen falsi as “‘crimes in the nature of perjury or subornation of
perjury, false statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement, false pretense, or any other offense
involving some element of deceitfulness, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on [a]
witness’[s] propensity to testify truthfully.’” Sahin v. State, 337 Md. 304, 312, 653 A.2d 452,
456 (1995) (quoting Wicks, 311 Md. at 382, 535 A.2d at 462 (citation omitted)).  See also
(continued...)
23
U.S.F. & G. Co., 275 Md. 400, 411, 340 A.2d 275, 283 (1975) (applying the clear and
convincing evidence standard where there was an allegation of fraud) and Rent-A-Car v.
Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 161 Md. 249, 267, 156 A. 847, 855 (1931) (explaining that
when a crime is imputed in a civil case, something more than a mere preponderance of the
evidence must be produced to prove the conduct).  Ultimately we held:
[W]here a utility alleges that a customer engaged in conduct
amounting to fraud or to a crime and such conduct constitutes
the sole basis of the customer’s alleged responsibility for prior
unpaid bills, the utility must prove its allegation by clear and
convincing evidence to justify termination of service for non-
payment.  
Everett, 307 Md. at 304, 513 A.2d at 891. 
Petitioner claims in the instant case that close scrutiny of the “nature” of his alleged
conduct reveals that each of the eight allegations for which he was charged and found
“guilty” encompasses essentially the traits of fraud and dishonesty, as well as the criminal
offense of theft.  Petitioner notes that this Court has determined that theft is the “embodiment
of deceitfulness,” and, as such, is included among the crimen falsi.  Beales v. State, 329 Md.
263, 270, 619 A.2d 105, 108 (1993). See Wicks v. State, 311 Md. 376, 382, 535 A.2d 459,
461(1988).19  In an effort to align the facts of his case with those in Everett, Petitioner strains
19(...continued)
Beales, 329 Md. at 270, 619 A.2d at 108.
24
to argue that theft embodies, or is the equivalent of, common law fraud, assumedly because
of its shared characteristics of deceitfulness and/or dishonesty, thereby requiring the elevated
standard of proof of clear and convincing evidence under Everett.   See First Nat’l Bank of
S. Md., 275 Md. at 411, 513 A.2d at 283 (holding that when “fraud, dishonesty, or criminal
conduct” is imputed, “something more than a mere preponderance of the evidence must be
produced”).  Equating the burden of proof in an administrative proceeding to be the same as
in a parallel civil judicial proceeding involving allegations of the same nature, Petitioner
concludes that allegations of his theft-related misconduct, like fraud, must meet the higher
evidentiary standard of clear and convincing evidence.  Everett, 307 Md. at 302, 513 A.2d
at 890.
Alternatively, Petitioner contends that the administrative charges lodged against him
constitute allegations of serious wrongdoing that, in a criminal context, could constitute a
crime under Maryland’s theft statute, Art. 27, § 342.  Petitioner observes that theft, a
common law crime codified at Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2000 Supp.), Art. 27, §§
340-45, is a malum in se offense, meaning the conduct is “inherently evil,” WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 33-34 (3d ed. 2000).  Hence, Petitioner reasons that theft is a
serious criminal offense that requires, under the reasoning of Everett, at least the clear and
25
convincing standard of proof when charged in an administrative context.   See Everett, 307
Md. at 302, 513 A.2d at 890; Rent-A-Car, 161 Md. at 267, 156 A. at 855.
Petitioner allows that the intermediate appellate court’s holding in Meyers v.
Montgomery County Police Dep’t, 96 Md. App. 668, 626 A.2d 1010 (1993), may be
distinguished from the case sub judice.  In Meyers, the Court of Special Appeals addressed
the appropriate burden of proof in a LEOBR administrative disciplinary case in which an
officer was charged with two violations of the Montgomery County Police Department’s
(“Department”) “use of force” directive as a result of actions taken by him during an arrest.
Following a hearing conducted in accordance with the LEOBR, Officer Meyers was found
“guilty” of “kick[ing] and stomp[ing]” a citizen with his foot while the citizen was lying
prone and handcuffed on the ground.  Meyers, 96 Md. App. at 708, 626 A.2d at 1030.  The
hearing board recommended a short suspension as the sanction.  The chief ultimately
determined that Officer Meyers should receive a letter of reprimand in his file for this
misconduct.  Meyers, 96 Md. App. at 671, 626 A.2d at 1011.  
The Court of Special Appeals rejected Officer Meyers’s argument that the holding in
Everett required the clear and convincing standard of proof in his LEOBR proceeding where
the administrative allegation – use of excessive force – amounted to an allegation of criminal
conduct.  Meyers, 96 Md. App. at 694, 626 A.2d at 1023.  The intermediate appellate court
offered several reasons why Everett was distinguishable from Meyers’s case.  First, the court
noted the special nature of the domain of the Public Service Commission (“Commission”),
26
observing that,  “the expertise the Commission brings to its proceedings, as opposed to the
LEOBR proceedings that are conducted by laypersons, and the heightened judicial deference
given to Commission decisions [by the courts of this State] as compared to other
administrative agencies,” might explain the Court’s imposition of the clear and convincing
standard in Everett.  Meyers, 96 Md. App. at 693, 626 A.2d at 1022.  
The court further distinguished Everett, noting that at least one of the charges in
Everett amounted to an allegation of fraud.  The court found Everett to be inapposite in
Meyers’s case, where the administrative allegation could not be construed reasonably to state
a claim sounding in fraud.  Moreover, the court noted, Officer Meyers’s case involved an
internal dispute between a public employee and the agency (Montgomery County Police
Department) that employed him, contrasted to Everett which involved a dispute between a
public consumer and a regulated utility before the administrative agency responsible for the
field of public utility regulation.  
As in the present case, the police officer in Meyers cited First Nat’l Bank of S. Md.
v. U.S.F. & G. Co., 275 Md. 400, 340 A.2d 275 (1975), and Rent-A-Car Co. v. Globe &
Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 161 Md. 249, 156 A. 847 (1931), as additional support for his
contention that the clear and convincing standard was appropriate because allegations against
him “amounted to an allegation of criminal conduct.”  Meyers, 96 Md. App. at 695, 626 A.2d
at 1023.  The court described the factual predicates of those cases:
[T]he First National Bank of Southern Maryland [“Bank”]
brought an action against U.S.F. & G., the Bank’s insurer, on a
27
fidelity bond for the recovery of losses the Bank incurred as a
result of a Bank employee’s allegedly dishonest and fraudulent
acts.  The Bank claimed that the employee’s conduct fell within
the terms of the fidelity bond, which covered, inter alia, “[a]ny
loss through any dishonest, fraudulent or criminal act of any of
the Employees. . . .”  The Court of Appeals stated:
When fraud, dishonesty or criminal conduct is
imputed, 
something 
more 
than 
a 
mere
preponderance of evidence must be produced; the
proof must be “clear and satisfactory” and be of
such a character as to appeal strongly to the
conscience of the court.
Meyers, 96 Md. App. at 694, 626 A.2d at 1023. 
With regard to Rent-A-Car, the court said:
In that case, a car rental company brought suit against its insurer
when the insurer failed to pay a loss resulting from a fire.  The
insurer argued in its defense that the insured had intentionally
started the fire that caused the loss in an effort to defraud the
insurer.  Following a judgment for the insurer, the insured
appealed.  The Court of Appeals reversed on the basis that a jury
instruction required the defendant to prove its allegation of fraud
by a preponderance of the evidence. (citations omitted)
The Court stated:
The defense in this case amounted to a charge that
the appellant, its officers and employee, had
committed a serious criminal offense.  In such
cases the rule in England is that even in civil
cases something more than a mere preponderance
of evidence is required to establish guilt, and,
whatever the law may be elsewhere, that appears
to be the law of this state.
. . . .
[T]he general rule is stated as follows in Jones on
Evidence, sec. 195: “When fraud or criminal
conduct is imputed the decisions frequently
declare that something more than a mere
28
preponderance of evidence must be produced, and
that the proof must be clear and satisfactory.
Meyers, 96 Md. App. at 694-95, 626 A.2d at 1023 (citations omitted).  
The Meyers court rejected Officer Meyers’s argument, interpreting Everett, First Nat’l
Bank of S. Md., and Rent-A-Car, to stand for the proposition that “while the clear and
convincing standard must be applied in a civil [judicial] proceeding in which fraud,
dishonesty, or criminal conduct is alleged, this requirement d[id] not automatically extend
to administrative proceedings.” Meyers, 96 Md. App. at 695, 626 A.2d at 1023 (emphasis
added).  This interpretation, the appellate court explained, was permitted and supported by
the merely directory nature of the language employed by the Everett Court when it stated,
“‘where allegations involve fraud or criminal conduct, something more than a preponderance
of the evidence may be required in proving these charges.’”  Meyers, 96 Md. App. at 695-96,
626 A.2d at 1023-24 (quoting Everett, 307 Md. at 302, 513 A.2d at 891) (emphasis added).
Finally, the Meyers court noted that the holding in Everett, supra, was limited closely to the
facts of that case.  Meyers, 96 Md. App. at 696, 626 A.2d at 1024. 
While Petitioner concedes that the preponderance of the evidence standard properly
was approved in Meyers, he distinguishes the case sub judice based on a comparison of the
nature of the misconduct charged in each case.  He argues that while Meyers’s misconduct
amounted to assault and battery had it been asserted in a criminal context, the same
misconduct alleged in a civil context as a tort need be proved only by the lower standard of
preponderance of the evidence.  On the other hand, Petitioner asserts, “fraud and theft require
29
proof by clear and convincing evidence in a civil context;” accordingly the clear and
convincing evidence standard should be applied in a parallel contested administrative
adjudication.  
The most widely applied measure of the ultimate burden of persuasion in civil cases
is by a preponderance of the evidence, and generally that standard also is applicable in
administrative proceedings.  Calvert County Planning Comm’n v. Howlin Realty Mgmt., Inc.,
364 Md. 301, 327, 772 A.2d 1209, 1224 (2001); Everett, 307 Md. at 301, 513 A.2d at 890;
Bernstein v. Real Estate Comm’n, 221 Md. 221, 232, 156 A.2d 657, 663 (1959).  This was
so, and acknowledged to be, at the time Everett was decided.  In judicial proceedings,
however, this Court has said that “there are some factual issues that impinge so directly and
significantly on fundamental rights as to require more than mere preponderance of the
evidence to resolve adversely to the person affected.”  Howlin, 364 Md. at 327, 772 A.2d at
1224 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982)
(declaring unconstitutional a New York statute that required a preponderance of the evidence
to support termination of parental rights and requiring, instead, clear and convincing
evidence); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 60 L. Ed. 2d 323 (1979) (civil
commitment of person to mental institution); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 87 S. Ct. 483,
17 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1966) (deportation proceeding)).  See also Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 188,
618 A.2d 744 (1993) (requiring clear and convincing evidence for withdrawal of life
sustaining medical treatment). 
30
Not all cases, judicial or otherwise, that warrant imposition of the clear and
convincing standard, however, concern situations implicating individual liberties.  As we
have previously stated, allegations of fraud ordinarily must be established through clear and
convincing evidence.  See Everett, 307 Md. at 302, 513 A.2d at 890; First Nat’l Bank of S.
Md., 275 Md. at 411, 340 A.2d at 283. But see Krouse v. Krouse, 94 Md. App. 369, 376-81,
617 A.2d 1098, 1102-04 (1993) (finding in will caveats, the caveator need prove fraud by
only a preponderance of the evidence).  See also Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420,
469-70, 601 A.2d 633, 657 (1992) (requiring clear and convincing standard for proof of
punitive damages); Berkey, 287 Md. at 332-33, 413 A.2d at 185 (requiring the heightened
evidentiary standard of clear and convincing evidence for libel and slander);  Rent-A-Car,
161 Md. at 267, 156 A. at 855 (requiring “more than a mere preponderance of evidence”
when a crime is imputed in a claim or defense in a civil case).
We need not engage, as the Court of Special Appeals did in Meyers, in an elaborate
effort to distinguish Everett from the facts of the case at hand.  This is so because, unlike the
intermediate appellate court, we have the authority, and shall exercise it in this instance, to
overrule Everett.  We explain. 
At the time Everett was decided, the contours of general state  administrative law
principles in Maryland were materially different than now.  The Court then did not have the
benefit of a broad public policy pronouncement by the State legislature that expressed a
particular standard of proof requirement relative to contested administrative cases.  Seeking
20 The State APA, however, does not “attempt to resolve every procedural nicety.”
See Honorable John W. Hardwicke, The Central Hearing Agency: Theory and
(continued...)
31
a principled basis for its decision in the absence of such a policy, the Everett Court sought
guidance, by analogy, from the common law, which traditionally required the intermediate
standard of clear and convincing evidence to prove allegations of fraud in civil  judicial
proceedings.  The Court drew on that analogy to decide Everett.  The relevant legal terrain,
however, has changed since Everett was decided.  
It is instructive that the General Assembly, in its 1993 revision of Maryland’s
Administrative Procedure Act, Md. Code (1984, 1993 Repl. Vol., 1995 Supp.), State
Government Art., §§ 10-101-10-305, established, for the first time, preponderance of the
evidence as the generally applicable standard of proof to be used by covered state
administrative agencies in contested case hearings, including, of particular relevance here,
disciplinary actions by the Maryland State Police under the LEOBR.  See APA § 10-217.
This enactment occurred seven years after Everett was decided by this Court.
   
The State APA was enacted initially in 1957, see Chapter 94, Acts of 1957 (originally
codified at Md. Code (1957), Art. 41, §§ 244-256), and is currently codified at Md. Code
(1984, 1999 Repl. Vol., 2001 Supp.), State Government Art., §§ 10-101-10-305.  The
purpose of the State APA is to provide a “standard framework of fair and appropriate
procedures for agencies that are responsible for both administration and adjudication of their
respective statutes.”20  Bragunier Masonry Contractors v. Md. Comm’r of Labor & Indus.,
20(...continued)
Implementation in Maryland, in 14 JOURNAL OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES, 5, 58 (Honorable Edward J. Schoenbaum ed., Spring 1994).
The objective of the APA is to “address[] only the most important and fundamental policy
issues.  The procedural fine points of administrative practice are more appropriately
addressed in rules or regulations which can be changed more easily and frequently than can
a statute.”  Id. at 58-59 n.100 (quoting the Commission to Revise the Administrative
Procedure Act, Report 3-4 (September 1, 1992) (hereinafter “Report”)).  The Commission,
chaired by Paul Tiburzi, Esquire, (the “Tiburzi Commission), was appointed by Governor
William Donald Schaefer in 1991 to conduct a comprehensive review of Maryland’s APA.
21 Section 10-202(d)(1) & (2) of the State APA, Md. Code (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol,
2001 Supp.) of the State Government Article defines a ‘contested case’ as follows:
(d) Contested case. – (1) “Contested case” means a proceeding
before an agency to determine:
(i) a right, duty, statutory entitlement, or privilege of a
person that is required by statute or constitution to be
determined only after an opportunity for an agency hearing; or
(ii) the grant, denial, renewal, revocation, suspension, or
amendment of a license that is required by statute or constitution
to be determined only after an opportunity for an agency
hearing.
(2) “Contested case” does not include a proceeding before an
agency involving an agency hearing required only by regulation
unless the regulation expressly, or by clear implication, requires
the hearing to be held in accordance with this subtitle.
32
111 Md. App. 698, 705, 684 A.2d 6, 9 (1996).  The APA prescribes procedures for two types
of proceedings: (1) procedures for the adoption of regulations, see APA §§ 10-101-10-139,
and (2) adjudicatory procedures for deciding contested cases,  see APA §§ 10-201-10-227.21
It “applies to all state administrative agencies not specifically exempted.” Bragunier, 111
Md. App. at 705, 684 A.2d at 9.  See APA § 10-203 (expressly excluding certain entities
33
from the contested cases subtitle of the APA).  Although the Executive branch state agencies
excluded from the embrace of the State APA’s contested cases provisions include some
substantial portions of the State bureaucracy (the Worker’s Compensation Commission, the
State Department of Assessments & Taxation, and the Public Service Commission, to name
a few), the bulk of the Executive branch agencies are included.  This judicially noticeable
fact gives weight and impetus to the broad sweep of the fundamental principles of State
administrative law which should extend to similar proceedings beyond those conducted by
administrative bodies strictly covered by the State APA.  
A state police officer confronted with disciplinary proceedings is entitled to
protections afforded by the contested cases provisions of the APA, see APA § 10-202, as
well as  those provided under the LEOBR.  See § 727(b)(1) (defining “law enforcement
officer” to include members of the Department of the State Police).  See also Md. State
Police v. Zeigler, 330 Md. 540, 553, 625 A.2d 914, 920 (1993) (“The [Maryland State Police
Department] is a state administrative agency subject to the requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act . . . . [and] entitled to the protections of the [LEOBR] . . . .”).
 Cf. Everett, 307 Md. at 303, 513 A.2d at 891 (explaining that the APA expressly excludes
from its coverage the proceedings of the Public Service Commission).  The standard of proof
to be applied in such contested case hearings under the APA is that of, “the preponderance
22 Maryland statutes that impose the clear and convincing standard include “factual
findings in physician disciplinary cases [Md. Code Ann., Health-Occupations § 14-405(b)],
in cases involving the involuntary admission of a person to a state mental residential center
[Md. Code Ann., Health - General I § 7-503(e)] and in cases involving intentional violations
of the food stamp program [COMAR 07.01.04.12].” ARNOLD ROCHVARG, MARYLAND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 3.65 (MICPEL 2001).
23 Inclusion of § 10-217 in the APA was based upon a recommendation in the  Report,
supra note 22, which stated that it “is in the public interest to incorporate in the APA a
clearly articulated standard of proof,” and that “the best way to accomplish this goal [is] to
codify case law by specifying that preponderance of the evidence is the standard.”  Report,
supra note 22, at 25.  Quoting Bernstein v. Real Estate Comm’n, 221 Md. 221, 232, 156 A.2d
657, 663 (1959), the Tiburzi Commission noted that the “‘comparative degree of proof by
which a case must be established is the same in an administrative as in a civil proceeding,
i.e., a preponderance of the evidence is necessary.’” Report, supra note 22, at 25.  Citing
Everett v. Balt. Gas and Elec. Co., 307 Md. 286, 513 A.2d 882 (1986), the Tiburzi
Commission grudgingly acknowledged that certain types of cases may require application
of the clear and convincing evidence standard, and therefore, recommended the inclusion of
an “escape clause,” allowing a standard of clear and convincing evidence to be used, “but
only if it is imposed by statute, regulation, or the Constitution.” Report, supra note 22, at 25.
This disapproving view of the holding in Everett is one we now share. 
34
of evidence unless the standard of clear and convincing evidence is imposed on the agency
by regulation, statute,22 or constitution.”  See APA § 10-217.23  
County police agencies, as we noted earlier, are not included within the purview of
the State APA.  See Stevens, 337 Md. at 482, 654 A.2d at 882 (citing Younkers, 333 Md. at
17, 633 A.2d at 862, the Court noted that “agency action taken pursuant to the LEOBR by
county police departments is not reviewed according to a statutorily defined standard . . . .”).
Moreover, as previously indicated, the LEOBR is silent on the standard of proof to be applied
in a police disciplinary action.  That is not to say, however, that the Hearing Board in the
present case was left adrift entirely in determining the burden of persuasion to be applied in
24 Observing that “House Bill 877, 1993 Md. Laws ch. 59, § 10-217 [of the State
Government Art.], establishe[d] the preponderance of the evidence as the evidentiary
standard to be applied in all contested cases under the State Administrative Procedures Act
. . . ,” the court in Meyers declined to apply the provision in its review of the case.  Meyers,
96 Md. App. at 689 n.3, 626 A.2d at 1020 n.3.
35
its LEOBR proceeding.  Respondent promulgated departmental standards and procedures,
discussed supra note 15, providing that charged departmental violations must be proven by
a preponderance of the evidence standard.  There is no statute or other regulation that has
been brought to our attention, or that we could find, that imposes a higher burden in a local
police department LEOBR proceeding.  The departmental standard in the present case
obviously is consistent with APA § 10-217.
In the absence of a legislative or regulatory enactment to the contrary, we believe that
the preponderance of the evidence standard applied under analogous circumstances in
Meyers24 should apply generally in LEOBR proceedings to encourage uniformity of treatment
of police in  disciplinary matters, even where there are allegations of serious misconduct that
might be cognizable as criminal if alleged in a judicial forum.  This standard  makes for more
efficient and understandable LEOBR proceedings.  This is of particular concern where the
hearing boards are composed ordinarily of “‘laypersons’ who do not specialize in presiding
over proceedings or hearing disputes under the LEOBR . . . .”  Meyers, 96 Md. App. at 693,
626 A.2d at 1022.  As the  Chair of Petitioner’s Hearing Board  frankly stated in response to
counsel’s arguments concerning the appropriate standard of proof:  “we have, three police
36
officers up here.  We’re not lawyers.  We’re not judges . . . we don’t study or practice on a
regular daily basis, . . . the case, pertaining to the issue which you have addressed.” 
Moreover, a public policy of uniformity in law enforcement disciplinary matters is
consistent with the LEOBR’s policy of uniformity discussed by the Court in Moats, 324 Md.
at 527-29, 597 A.2d at 976-77.  In Moats, the Court denied two police officers the right to
waive the procedures under the LEOBR in lieu of pursuing a grievance under a collective
bargaining agreement through their union.   The Court emphasized that the legislative intent
behind the LEOBR was to provide a uniform system of discipline that enhanced law
enforcement’s effectiveness and the public trust, and avoided the deleterious effects of
“inconsistent application” of the LEOBR.  Moats, 324 Md. at 527-28, 597 A.2d at 976
(internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted).  Determining that the General Assembly
intended for the LEOBR to provide an exclusive procedural remedy for law enforcement
officers facing disciplinary charges, the Court discussed its legislative history: 
The General Assembly in 1987 passed Senate Bill 860, and in
1988 it passed Senate Bill 227.  The intent of these bills was ‘to
allow law enforcement officers to elect to waive rights under the
Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights and elect in the
alternative a procedural or substantive right or guarantee under
a collective bargaining agreement.’ . . . Each of these bills was
vetoed by the Governor. . . . [T]he Governor expressed concern
that this legislation would result in an ‘inconsistent application
of the [LEOBR]’ . . . [stating in a subsequent veto message on
Senate Bill 227 that] 
The Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights
(LEOBR) establishes a uniform system of police
discipline throughout the State . . . . The
25 In relevant part, § 734B provides:
[T]he provisions of this subtitle shall supersede any State,
county or municipal law, ordinance or regulation that conflicts
with the provisions of this subtitle, and any local legislation
shall be preempted by the subject and material of this subtitle.
37
uniformity 
of 
the 
system 
enhances 
its
effectiveness and the public’s confidence in law
enforcement. . . . 
Moats, 324 Md. at 527-28, 597 A.2d at 976.  See also § 734B (concerning LEOBR’s
preemption of conflicting State, county or municipal laws, ordinances or regulations). 25
Our conclusion is  reinforced by comparison of the decisions of other states addressing
similar questions.  See, e.g., Romulus v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 910 P.2d 610, 618-19 (Alaska
1996) (upholding termination of teacher for sexually abusing students based on
preponderance of the evidence standard which applies to disciplinary proceedings involving
a government employee); Clark v. Bd. of Fire and Police Comm’rs, 613 N.E.2d 826, 829-30
(Ill. 1993) (applying preponderance of the evidence standard in police officer’s termination
proceedings for obstruction of justice, bribery, conspiracy and official misconduct); Romeo
v. Dep’t of Employment and Training, 556 A.2d 93, 94 (Vt. 1988) (stating that misconduct
allegations of theft need only be proven by the civil standard of a preponderance of the
evidence).
Everett v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 307 Md. 286, 513 A.2d 882 (1986), is inconsistent
with the holding in the present case and is overruled.
38
 
II.
Petitioner’s second contention is that a procedure that permits “a finding of guilt for
eight theft counts, termination [of employment], and the loss of more than one million dollars
in actuarially calculated retirement benefits,” on a mere preponderance of the evidence
renders the result unconstitutional under both the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  See Roberts v. Total
Health Care, Inc., 349 Md. 499, 508-11, 709 A.2d 142, 146-47 (1998) (discussing procedural
due process).  Hence, Petitioner argues that there exists in this case a compulsion of
constitutional force for the application of the clear and convincing evidence standard.  
It is the function of due process to “protect interests in life, liberty and property from
deprivation or infringement by government without appropriate procedural safeguards.”
Roberts, 349 Md. at 508-09, 709 A.2d at 146-47.  See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
332, 96 S. Ct. 893, 901, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976).  We have recently explained that procedural
due process in an administrative proceeding “‘requires that administrative agencies
performing adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions observe the basic principles of fairness
as to parties appearing before them.’”  Gigeous v. E. Corr. Inst., 363 Md. 481, 509, 769 A.2d
912, 929 (2001) (quoting Regan v. State Bd. of Chiropractic Exam’rs, 355 Md. 397, 408, 735
A.2d 991, 997 (1999) (citation omitted)).  The fundamental requisites of fairness are notice
and an opportunity to be heard.  See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579, 95 S. Ct. 729, 738,
42 L. Ed. 2d 725 (1975); Sullivan v. Ins. Comm’n, 291 Md. 277, 285, 434 A.2d 1024, 1028-
39
29 (1981).  There is no question here that Petitioner received both notice and a hearing as
provided under the LEOBR.  See Art. 27, § 730(a) & (d).  Petitioner contends, however, that
the hearing board’s failure to apply the clear and convincing evidence standard in its
determination of his “guilt” provided him with less procedure than was his due in view of the
consequences he potentially faced. 
 Reflecting on the  nature of administrative due process, we have stated that, “[d]ue
process . . . is not a rigid concept. . . . ‘[it] is flexible and calls only for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands.’” Roberts, 349 Md. at 509, 709 A.2d at 147
(quoting Dep’t of Transp. v. Armacost, 299 Md. 392, 416, 474 A.2d 191, 203 (1984)). We
explained that “in determining what process is due, the Court will balance the private and
government interests affected.”  Id.  (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
In this regard, we apply the following balancing test developed by the Supreme Court in
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S. Ct. at 903, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18, to assist us in our endeavor: 
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally
requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private
interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.   See also Meyers, 96 Md.
App. at 697-98, 626 A.2d at 1024-25. 
40
While conventional rules of civil litigation require that parties “need only prove their
case by a preponderance of the evidence,” in certain limited circumstances, the heightened
burden of clear and convincing evidence is required “when the government seeks to take
unusual coercive action – action more dramatic than entering an award of money damages
or other conventional relief – against an individual.”  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228, 253, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1792, 104 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1989) (plurality opinion), aff’d, Hopkins
v. Price Waterhouse, 920 F.2d 967 (1990), superceded by statute on other grounds as stated
in, Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 251, 114 S. Ct. 1481, 1489-90, 128 L. Ed. 2d
229 (1993).  See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747, 102 S. Ct. at 1391, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599
(termination of parental rights);  Addington,  441 U.S. at 419, 99 S. Ct. at 1806, 60 L. Ed. 2d
323 (involuntary civil commitment); Woodby, 385 U.S. at 277, 87 S. Ct. at 484, 17 L. Ed. 2d
362 (deportation proceeding); Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 353, 81 S. Ct. 147, 149,
5 L. Ed. 2d 120 (1960) (denaturalization).  But see Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574, 580, 107
S. Ct. 3001, 3005, 97 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1987) (determining preponderance standard was
constitutionally adequate in paternity proceedings where the primary interest of the putative
parent is in avoiding the “serious economic consequences” that flow from a court order
establishing paternity).  In Addington, the Supreme Court considered the appropriate standard
of proof to be applied in an involuntary civil commitment proceeding.  The Supreme Court
explained that:
The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is
embodied in the Due Process Clause . . . is to ‘instruct the
41
factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society
thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions
for a particular type of adjudication.’  In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 370 [, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1075, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970)]
(Harlan, J., concurring).  The standard serves to allocate the risk
of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative
importance attached to the ultimate decision.  
441 U.S. at 423, 99 S. Ct. at 1808, 60 L. Ed. 2d 323.  Remarking on the evolution of the law
in this area, the Supreme Court recognized the emergence of three different, supposedly
distinct, standards of proof for different types of cases:
At one end of the spectrum is the typical civil case involving a
monetary dispute between private parties.  Since society has a
minimal concern with the outcome of such private suits,
plaintiff’s burden of proof is a mere preponderance of the
evidence.  The litigants thus share the risk of error in roughly
equal fashion. 
In a criminal case, on the other hand, the interests of the
defendant are of such magnitude that historically and without
any explicit constitutional requirement they have been protected
by standards of proof designed to exclude as nearly as possible
the likelihood of an erroneous judgment. . . . This is
accomplished by requiring under the Due Process Clause that
the state prove the guilt of an accused beyond a reasonable
doubt.
The intermediate standard, which usually employs some
combination of the words “clear,” “cogent,” “unequivocal,” and
“convincing,” is less commonly used, but nonetheless ‘is no
stranger to the civil law.’  One typical use of the standard is in
civil cases involving allegations of fraud or some other quasi-
criminal wrongdoing by the defendant.  The interests at stake in
those cases are deemed to be more substantial than mere loss of
money and some jurisdictions accordingly reduce the risk to the
defendant of having his reputation tarnished erroneously by
increasing the plaintiff’s burden of proof.    Similarly, this Court
42
has used the “clear, unequivocal and convincing” standard of
proof to protect particularly important individual interests in
various civil cases.
Addington, 441 U.S. at 423-24, 99 S. Ct. at 1808, 60 L. Ed. 2d 323 (citations omitted).
Applying the balancing test developed in Mathews, the Supreme Court determined that clear
and convincing evidence – not the criminal standard of beyond a reasonable doubt –
adequately satisfied appellant’s procedural due process rights in the civil commitment
context presented there.  See Addington, 441 U.S. at 433, 99 S. Ct. at 1813, 60 L. Ed. 2d 323.
In Santosky, the Supreme Court held that the heightened standard of clear and
convincing evidence – not preponderance of the evidence – was mandated in termination of
parental rights proceedings.  Evaluating the issue under the Mathews balancing test, the
Court found “the private interest affected [was] commanding; the risk of error from using a
preponderance standard [was] substantial; and the countervailing governmental interest
favoring that standard [was] comparatively slight.”  Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758, 102 S. Ct. at
1397, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599.   Discussing the intermediate standard of proof, the Supreme Court
remarked:
This Court has mandated an intermediate standard of
proof – “clear and convincing evidence”  – when the individual
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that threaten the individual involved with ‘a significant deprivation of liberty’ or ‘stigma.’
43
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 756-57, 102 S. Ct. at 1396, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (internal quotations
omitted) (citations omitted). 
Applying the Mathews test to the case at hand, we first examine “the private interest
that will be affected by the official action.”  424 U.S. at 335, 96 S. Ct. at 903, 47 L. Ed. 2d
18.  Petitioner claims deprivation of two private interests: (1) a “property” interest in his
continued employment as a police officer and, by corollary, his pension benefits; and/or (2)
a “liberty” interest based upon the deleterious nature of the charges lodged against him that,
with a finding of “guilt,” would result in damage to his reputation in the community at large
and/or result in the attachment of a stigma that would preclude other employment
opportunities.  For purposes of our analysis, we shall assume, arguendo, that Petitioner
demonstrated a cognizable property or liberty interest in his continued employment with the
Anne Arundel County Police Department.  Nevertheless, a review of the remaining two
factors under Mathews persuades us that the preponderance of the evidence standard satisfies
Petitioner’s due process rights here. 
Our inquiry under the second factor in Mathews is twofold: we must first consider
“the risk of an erroneous deprivation of [Petitioner’s] interest through the procedures used”
in compliance with the LEOBR; we then appraise the “probable value, if any, of additional
or substitute procedural safeguards”as proposed by Petitioner.  Id.  In this vein, we weigh
“both the risk of erroneous deprivation of private interests resulting from use of a ‘fair
preponderance’ standard and the likelihood that a higher evidentiary standard would reduce
44
that risk” to determine “whether a preponderance standard fairly allocates the risk of an
erroneous factfinding between the[] two parties.”  Santosky, 455 U.S. at 761, 102 S. Ct. at
1399, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599.  See Meyers, 96 Md. App. at 702, 626 A.2d at 1027. 
The LEOBR provides essentially a two-phase administrative process in law
enforcement disciplinary actions.  The first phase regulates the procedures to be followed at
interrogation or investigation of an officer’s alleged misconduct.  See Art. 27, § 728(b).  The
second phase concerns an adjudicatory proceeding before a hearing board if an investigation
or interrogation results in a recommendation that the officer be subject to any disciplinary
action.  See §§ 730-731.   The procedural safeguards mandated by § 730 guarantee an officer,
inter alia, notice that he is entitled to a hearing on the issues before a hearing board, see §
730(a); the right to present evidence and argument with respect to the issues involved and
the right to be represented by counsel, see § 730(d); the right of cross-examination of the
witnesses who testify, see § 730(f); and the right to compel attendance of witnesses by
summons, see § 730(j).  Moreover, if the hearing board recommends the imposition of a
disciplinary sanction, the chief of police makes the final determination whether to impose
punishment based upon the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the hearing
board.  See § 731(c).   Finally, the LEOBR provides for judicial review of a final order by
the police chief.  See § 732.
 There is no question here that Petitioner was afforded the panoply of rights provided
by the LEOBR.   Petitioner received a written, detailed notice of the pending charges; he
45
retained legal counsel to represent his interests; he was given a copy of the investigation and
discovery; he was granted a pre-termination evidentiary hearing that was conducted over a
three-day period before a three-member hearing board comprised of his peers; he was
provided with a written decision by the hearing board containing its findings; he was
provided a written decision from the Chief explaining his reasons for the termination; and
he has taken full advantage of his right to judicial review.  As we indicated earlier, supra
pages 13-15, the LEOBR grants extensive procedural protections and rights to law
enforcement officers in disciplinary proceedings that are not available to the general public.
We conclude that the multi-tiered protections prescribed by the LEOBR, when conducted
properly as here, adequately protect against the risk of arbitrary decision-making and limits
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s due process claims. 
Nor do we find that implementation of the heightened standard of proof sought by
Petitioner would so significantly reduce the risk of error that it should be implemented
regardless of any additional administrative or financial burdens it would entail.  Candor
requires that we acknowledge the difficulty a lay panel may encounter in perceiving the
subtle distinctions and nuances between these two abstract standards when called upon to
apply it.  See Addington, 441 U.S. at 425, 99 S. Ct. at 1809, 60 L. Ed. 2d 323 (discussing the
difficulty lay jurors may have in understanding the differences among the three standards of
proof, Chief Justice Burger observed, “we probably can assume no more than that the
difference between a preponderance of the evidence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt
46
probably is better understood than either of them in relation to the intermediate standard of
clear and convincing evidence.”).  See also Wills v. State, 329 Md. 370, 374, 620 A.2d 295,
297 (1993) (noting that the terms “preponderance,” “clear and convincing,” and “reasonable
doubt” are not “at least in their legal sense, street familiar”); Weisman v. Connors, 76 Md.
App. 488, 503, 547 A.2d 636, 643 (1988) (noting the “amorphous” nature of the clear and
convincing standard); Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1158-59 (4th Cir. 1971), cert.
dismissed, sub nom.  Murel v. Balt. City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355, 360, 92 S. Ct. 2091,
2094, 32 L. Ed. 2d 791 (1972) (“However meaningful the distinction [between the two
standards] may be to . . . judges, . . . it is greatly to be doubted that a jury’s verdict would
ever be influenced by the choice of one standard or the other.”).  This precise sentiment was
reflected by the Chair of Petitioner’s Hearing Board when he expressed his uncertainty about
the board’s ability to effectively differentiate between the two standards, see supra page 38.
That is not to say the adoption of a standard of proof is an “empty semantic exercise.”
Addington, 441 U.S. at 424-25, 99 S. Ct. at 1808-09, 60 L. Ed. 2d 323 (quoting Tippett, 436
F.2d at 1166 (Sobeloff, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).  The standard of proof
as adopted by the courts “‘reflects the value society places on individual liberty.’”  Id.
(quoting Tippett, 436 F.2d at 1166). 
Finally, under Mathews, we must consider “the Government’s interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.”  424 U.S. at 335, 96 S. Ct. at 903, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18.
47
While a heightened evidentiary standard would place a limited fiscal or administrative burden
on county and municipal police agencies, we must “weigh heavily in their favor their interest
in the internal discipline of the Police Department.”  Meyers, 96 Md. App. at 705, 626 A.2d
at 1028.  It also serves the public’s interest that the chief law enforcement executives are
empowered to remove expeditiously corrupt officers from departmental ranks.  Moreover,
the adoption of a scheme that would mandate a higher level of proof in a local police
department disciplinary action versus one initiated in the State police organization would
create an inexplicable disparate impact between officers within the overall law enforcement
community itself.  This would not comport with LEOBR’s public policy of uniformity
discussed supra page 38.  
Based on our evaluation of Petitioner’s due process claims under Mathews, we
conclude that the procedures afforded under LEOBR adequately protect an officer against
an erroneous deprivation of his or her due process claims.  The evidentiary standard of
preponderance of the evidence, added to the array of other protections, strikes the appropriate
balance between protecting the private interests of an officer accused of misconduct and a
law enforcement agency’s interest in maintaining internal discipline.  We therefore conclude
that the correct evidentiary standard to be applied under LEOBR in local police agency cases
is the preponderance of the evidence standard.  Accordingly, we do not address Respondent’s
questions presented in its conditional cross-petition.
48
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; PETITIONER TO
PAY COSTS.