Title: Anderson v. Sturm

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Reversed November 20, 1956.
Petition for rehearing denied December 28, 1956.
*191 E.B. Sahlstrom, Eugene, argued the cause for appellant. On the briefs were Thompson & Sahlstrom, Eugene.
Walter J. Cosgrave, Portland, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Maguire, Shields, Morrison & Bailey, Portland.
Before WARNER, Chief Justice, ROSSMAN, PERRY and McALLISTER, Justices.
REVERSED.
PERRY, J.
The plaintiff commenced this tort action against the defendant to recover damages for the alienation of her husband's affections. The defendant is the mother of Vincent Anderson, who was the husband of the plaintiff. Upon the trial of the cause, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendant appeals.
The defendant assigns as error the failure of the trial court to sustain her motions for a nonsuit and a directed verdict.
1, 2. When the sufficiency of the evidence is thus challenged, the evidence offered must be viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, and every reasonable inference that can be drawn from facts favorable to the plaintiff will aid the plaintiff in the establishment *192 of her cause of action. Hicklin v. Anders, 201 Or 128, 253 P2d 897, 269 P2d 521. However, a purely speculative inference or conclusion is not substantial evidence. Lemons et al. v. Holland et al., 205 Or 163, 284 P2d 1041, 286 P2d 656.
3, 4. The gist of a suit of this type is the intentional and malicious enticing of one spouse to leave the other. Where the defendant is a parent, a plaintiff is required to show by substantial evidence that a defendant's acts were committed either wilfully, maliciously, or from improper motives, from which malice in law could be implied, and that the acts were the controlling cause of the separation. Hughes v. Holman et al., 110 Or 415, 223 P 730, 31 ALR 1108.
5. Also, where a parent is charged by a spouse with the alienation of the affections of his child, a presumption arises that any acts done were done in good faith and not to injure the complainant. Bradford v. Bradford, 165 Or 297, 107 P2d 106. This, of course, is a disputable presumption, and may be overcome by either direct or circumstantial evidence.
With these rules of law in mind, we will now examine the evidence in the case.
The plaintiff and Vincent Anderson, son of the defendant, were married on July 29, 1939, and resided in Eugene, Oregon, for a period of about 2 years, then moved to California where they lived until about the time Vincent Anderson was to be called into military service, at which time they moved to Ogden, Utah, where the defendant resided. The plaintiff and Vincent rented an apartment in Ogden and both were employed at the army depot there. In December, 1943, Vincent was inducted into military service where he remained until 1946. During his military service he was stationed at San Diego, California, for about two *193 and one-half years, and the plaintiff and Vincent resided together at that place. They later moved to Coos Bay where two children were born, and from there plaintiff moved to Portland in March, 1951. Vincent commuted back and forth between Portland and Coos Bay until in September, 1951, when the home in Coos Bay was sold. When Vincent came to Portland, he told plaintiff that he was "tired and nervous" and he was "going down to Southern California to see a friend of ours." Later Vincent went to San Francisco to be with his sister, who was hospitalized, and to see his mother, who was visiting her daughter, and at this time the plaintiff states that she and Vincent were discussing whether they would remain in Portland or return to San Diego. In April, 1952, Vincent rented a home in Ogden, Utah, and the parties moved there. While there is a dispute in the evidence, the plaintiff testified that during all this time their domestic life was tranquil and happy.
While these parties were residing in Ogden, Vincent and his mother, the defendant, took a trip. The plaintiff testified:
Vincent and his mother did not return to Ogden together as he returned via Los Angeles, California. On May 21, 1952, Vincent again left home, his departure being described in the testimony by the plaintiff as follows:
On July 2, 1952, Vincent came to Portland, staying with plaintiff and his children at their abode overnight, and leaving on July 3rd. Prior to Vincent's journey to Portland, the defendant had, on June 9, 1952, written to him a letter, the material parts thereof being as follows:
The letter inclosed to "Jacque", Vincent's present wife, is as follows:
On July 12, 1952, Vincent wrote a letter to the plaintiff from Ogden, Utah, stating he did not believe a reconciliation possible, and advising plaintiff against postponing obtaining a divorce from him. The letter *197 also set forth his views of a property settlement, and further stated that, if she preferred, he would commence the suit for divorce, which he felt should be accomplished at once.
In September, 1952, Vincent filed suit for a divorce from the plaintiff. Thereafter, plaintiff filed her cross complaint, and she was granted a decree of divorce from Vincent.
Because this case must be determined upon the basis of the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from plaintiff's evidence, we have, perhaps, detailed the evidence of the plaintiff more fully than is necessary.
The plaintiff's contention is that there may be drawn from this recital a reasonable inference that the defendant's actions were the controlling cause of the separation of the plaintiff and her husband.
The first separation of these parties, within the time alleged in the complaint, occurred in Ogden, Utah, on May 21, 1952. There is no evidence offered of any acts of the defendant prior to that time that could be considered as relating to the cause of the separation. It would be pure speculation to say that the defendant had counseled the defendant to leave the plaintiff. We do not believe that the defendant's statement "If Vincent ever comes back to you again I will never speak to him," can be construed any more forcefully than to say "I am glad you are now separated and I do not wish for you to renew your marital status." At most, it was approval of the son's previous action, and casts no light upon the cause. Noll v. Carlin et ux., 101 Or 203, 208, 199 P 596.
The same may be said of the letters written by the defendant; they, at most, show approval of his actions, but do not by reasonable inference show any active *198 participation in bringing about the estrangement of the parties.
The plaintiff in her brief draws the conclusion that the defendant selected "Jacque" as the paramour of Vincent, and so engineered the separation of husband and wife. The only direct evidence upon this subject is by Vincent himself to the effect that he had been in love with Jacque for more than five years, and there is no evidence that defendant had any knowledge of her existence until about the time of the separation.
6. We are unable to find any evidence in this record of acts done or statements made by the defendant from which it might reasonably be inferred that the defendant was the controlling cause of the alienation of her son's affections from the plaintiff.
The cause is reversed with instructions to sustain the defendant's motion for a directed verdict.
Reversed.