Title: Hughes v. Wilson

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: December 18, 2008
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
GREGORY A. HUGHES
and LAURIE ANN HUGHES,
Petitioners on Review,
v.
KEITH L. WILSON
and WASCO COUNTY PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT,
Defendants,
and
WASCO COUNTY,
Respondents on Review.
(CC
0500174CC; CA A132266; SC S055326)
En Banc
On review from the Court of
Appeals.*
Argued and submitted June 3,
2008.
Dean Heiling, Heiling Dwyer
& Associates, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner
on review.  With him on the brief was Don S. Willner, Portland.
Stan LeGore, Miller &
Wagner, LLP, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on
review. 
W. Eugene Hallman, Hallman
& Dretke, Pendleton, filed a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Oregon
Trial Lawyers Association.
Linda Wicks, Assistant
Attorney General, Salem, filed a brief on behalf of amicus curiae State
of Oregon.  With her on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary
H. Williams, Solicitor General.
WALTERS, J.
The decision of the Court of
Appeals is reversed.  The judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the case
is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
*Appeal from Wasco County
Circuit Court, John V. Kelly, Judge.  213 Or App 588, 162 P3d 1095 (2007).
WALTERS, J.
In this case, we consider a county's claim
of immunity from civil liability under ORS 30.265(3)(c), Oregon's discretionary
immunity statute.
Plaintiff Hughes was driving his
motorcycle on Cherry Heights Road, a county road in Wasco County, when defendant
Wilson drove out of a private driveway and the two vehicles collided. 
Plaintiff(1) brought a personal injury action against Wilson, alleging that Wilson was at
fault in entering the road from a point where visibility of approaching traffic
was obstructed,(2) 
and against Wasco County (county), alleging that a bush on the unpaved portion
of the county road obscured motorists' vision, causing plaintiff's injuries. 
In the trial court, the county moved
for summary judgment under ORS 30.265(3), which provides public bodies with
immunity from liability arising out of certain kinds of discretionary
decisions.  The county proffered evidence that it had delegated authority to make
policy decisions regarding maintenance of county roads to its Director of
Public Works, Boldt.  Boldt submitted an affidavit stating that he had adopted a
policy "for brush cutting"; that that policy was "established
and in force prior to the motor vehicle accident which forms the basis for the
present lawsuit"; and that it was "formulated through a balancing of
the needs of the County, the available resources, and public safety."  The
county argued that the uncontested evidence established that Boldt had made a
policy-level choice not to check or maintain vision clearance for private
driveways unless private landowners gave notice of an impairment to vision.  The
county asserted that that choice was a discretionary function and, therefore,
that the county was immune from liability under ORS 30.265(3)(c).  
Plaintiff opposed the county's motion
and characterized the evidence and the law differently.  Plaintiff submitted deposition
excerpts stating that the county's policy had not been set out in writing and that
the county had not communicated it to county officials, county employees, or private
landowners.  Therefore, plaintiff argued, that policy should not be given
effect.  Further, plaintiff contended, the county's policy amounted to a decision
not to fulfill the county's duties to inspect and maintain its roads and a
decision not to exercise care is not entitled to immunity under ORS
30.265(3)(c).
The trial court granted the county's motion
and entered a general judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint.(3) 
 The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court without
opinion.  Hughes v. Wilson, 213 Or App 588, 162 P3d 1095 (2007).  We
allowed plaintiff's petition for review and now reverse the decision of the Court
of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.  
We begin our analysis with the text
of ORS 30.265, which provides, in part:  
"(1)  Subject to the limitations of ORS
30.260 to 30.300, every public body is subject to action or suit for its torts
and those of its officers, employees and agents acting within the scope of
their employment or duties, whether arising out of a governmental or
proprietary function or while operating a motor vehicle in a ridesharing
arrangement authorized under ORS 276.598.
"* * * * *
"(3)  Every public body and its officers,
employees and agents acting within the scope of their employment or duties * *
* are immune from liability for:
"* * * * *
"(c) Any claim based upon the
performance of or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function
or duty, whether or not the discretion is abused."
Tensions inherent in the text of that statute have defied easy resolution.  Section
(1) of ORS 30.265 makes public bodies liable for their torts.  Paragraph (3)(c)
grants those entities immunity from claims based upon a "discretionary
function or duty."  In fact, however,
whenever a governmental employee determines facts and acts accordingly, that
employee makes a number of choices and thereby exercises discretion.  Yet, the
law often imposes limits on those choices and recognizes that acts in violation
of those limits may give rise to liability.(4)
Recognizing those tensions, this
court has explained that the legislature used the words "discretionary
function or duty" to exempt governmental entities from liability only for "certain
types of decisions, namely, those that require supervisors or policy makers to
assess costs and benefits, and to make a choice among competing goals and
priorities."  Vokoun v. City of Lake Oswego, 335 Or 19, 31, 56 P3d
396 (2002) (citing McBride v. Magnuson, 282 Or 433, 437, 578 P2d 1259
(1978)).  Accord Mosley v. Portland School Dist. No. 1J, 315 Or
85, 89, 843 P2d 415 (1992).  This court also has explained that, if the law
requires a government to exercise due care, then ORS 30.265 does not
immunize its decision not to exercise care at all.  When a public body owes a duty of care, that body has discretion in
choosing the means by which it carries out that duty.  Little v. Wimmer,
303 Or 580, 589, 739 P2d 564 (1987); Miller v. Grants Pass Irrigation,
297 Or 312, 320, 686 P2d 324 (1984).  But "[t]he range of permissible
choices does not * * * include the choice of not exercising care."  Mosley,
315 Or at 92.
On review to this court, the county bases
its defense of discretionary immunity on what it characterizes as a policy-level
choice of means to fulfill its road maintenance duties.  To analyze that defense,
we first examine the nature of the county's road-maintenance duties.
The common law imposes a general, nondiscretionary
duty on landowners to make their property reasonably safe for their invitees.  Accordingly,
public landowners must make public property reasonably safe for members of the public
who use the property in a manner that is consistent with its public purpose.  See
Woolston v. Wells, 297 Or 548, 557-58, 687 P2d 144 (1984) (possessor of
land has a duty to use reasonable care to make land safe for invitees); Taylor
v. Baker, 279 Or 139, 146, 566 P2d 884 (1977) (invitees include members of
the public on land for purpose for which land is open to public).  As this
court has stated, the duty to make property reasonably safe includes a duty to
inspect the property for conditions that create an unreasonable risk of harm:
"In general, it is the duty of the possessor of land to
make the premises reasonably safe for the invitee's visit. The possessor must
exercise the standard of care above stated to discover conditions of the
premises that create an unreasonable risk of harm to the invitee. The possessor
must exercise that standard of care either to eliminate the condition creating
that risk or to warn any foreseeable invitee of the risk so as to enable the
invitee to avoid the harm."
Woolston, 297 Or at 557-58. 
The legislature has assigned county
road-maintenance responsibilities to county governing bodies and road
officials, ORS 368.001,(5)
and, in doing so, has evidenced an intent that accords with the common law.  By
assigning local governments the responsibility to carry out road-maintenance functions,
the legislature intends that those governments will fulfill their common-law
responsibilities and make travel on their roads reasonably safe for the general
public.  See Little, 303 Or at 589 (stating principle based on
state highway statutes).  A county's responsibility for road maintenance extends
not only to the paved portion of county roads, but also to county rights-of-way
in their entirety.  ORS 368.001(1) defines "county road" as "a
public road under the jurisdiction of a county that has been designated
as a county road" (emphasis added), and ORS 368.001(6) defines a "road"
as "the entire right of way of any public or private way that
provides ingress to or egress from property by means of vehicles or other means
or that provides travel between places by means of vehicles."  (Emphasis
added.)
In this
case, therefore, the county had a general common-law duty to inspect its
roads, including the unpaved portions of those rights-of-way, and to maintain those
roads, in their entirety, in a reasonably safe condition for the benefit of the
traveling public.(6)

The next step in our analysis is to examine
the policy-level decision which the county asserts to render it immune from
liability for plaintiff's claim.(7) 
Plaintiff, in his complaint, alleged that the county was negligent in its
execution of its road-maintenance duties because it had allowed a bush that
obscured the vision of motorists to grow on the unpaved portion of Cherry
Heights Road, had failed to remove the bush, and had failed to warn motorists
of the obstructed vision.  As an affirmative defense to plaintiff's claim, the
county alleged that its "program for the removal of shrubbery from and
adjacent to the roadway system in Wasco County and the execution thereof"
entitled it to discretionary immunity.  In support of its motion for summary
judgment, the county submitted the Boldt affidavit, which described the
policies and general practices that the county had established as follows:
"a.  Vision clearance shall be maintained
for all vehicles driving on County roads such that drivers in the actual
driving lanes on a County roadway shall have an unobstructed view of both lanes
of traffic on the County roads;
"b.  Every County road shall be inspected
at least once a year for vision clearance and any brush shall be removed that
impairs the vision of both lanes of traffic on the County road for any vehicle
in either lane of the County road; and,
"c.  Because the County does not have
sufficient time to inspect vision clearance for private driveways which enter
upon County roads, the County relies on private landowners to remove the brush
or to notify the County that the vision from a private driveway is impaired by
brush, and the County shall clear that brush as necessary."
Boldt also averred that the county had acted consistently
with that policy in not removing the bush in question.  Thus, the "discretionary
function or duty" on which the county bases its claim of immunity is the
county's establishment of -- and the county's action or nonaction in accordance
with -- those policies and practices.(8)
The
county's policy provided that the county would inspect its roads and
remove brush in two circumstances.  Paragraph "b" provided that the
county would inspect its roads at least once a year for vision clearance and would
remove brush that impaired the "vision of both lanes of traffic on
the County road."  Paragraph "c" provided that the county would
not inspect vision clearance for private driveways, but that, when private
landowners notified the county that the vision from a private driveway was
impaired by brush, the county would clear that brush.      
In this case, the bush that allegedly
obstructed the view of motorists did not satisfy either of the two removal
criteria that the policy had specified.  The bush was located on the unpaved
portion of the road and did not extend into, or obscure motorists' vision of, the
lanes of traffic; therefore, it was not subject to removal under paragraph
"b."  No landowner had notified the county that the bush posed an
obstacle to vision from the driveway; therefore, it was not subject to removal
under paragraph "c."  
In its brief, the county argues that
its policy was that it "would not check or maintain vision
clearance except as set forth in its policy."  (Emphases added.)  Although
Boldt did not describe the county policy in those terms in his affidavit, he
did set forth the instances in which the county would clear brush from
the unpaved portions of its roads, and he did state that in not removing the
bush, the county had acted in conformance with that policy.  Therefore, by
negative implication, the county's policy provided that the county would
not clear brush on the unpaved portions of its roads except in the
two circumstances specified in its policy.  As applied to the facts
of this case, the policy provided that the county would not remove
the bush located on the unpaved portion of its roads, unless notified by a
private landowner to do so.
Having described the road-maintenance
duties owed by the county, and the policy upon which it rests its claim of
discretionary immunity, we next determine whether the county established that its
policy was a choice within the "range of permissible choices" of means
to carry out its duties, and not a "choice of not exercising care."  Mosley,
315 Or at 92.  See Vokoun, 335 Or at 31 (county has burden to establish discretionary immunity).   Because this
issue arises on the county's motion for summary judgment,(9) the county must demonstrate that the record shows
that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact" and that it
is "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  ORCP 47C.  As that rule further provides:
"No genuine issue as to a material fact exists if,
based on the record before the court viewed in a manner most favorable to the
adverse party, no objectively reasonable juror could return a verdict for the
adverse party on the matter that is the subject of the motion for summary
judgment."
In this case, because plaintiff is the adverse party, we view
the record in the manner most favorable to plaintiff to determine whether an
objectively reasonable juror could return a verdict for plaintiff on the defense
of discretionary immunity.
The record discloses that, although
no landowner had informed the county that the offending bush posed a hazard, Boldt
personally had observed the bush and was familiar with its location.(10) 
However, the county had not received a request from a landowner to remove the
bush and, therefore, pursuant to its policy, the county did not remove it.  Significantly,
the record also discloses that the county had not informed landowners that it
was relying on them to give the notice that was a necessary prerequisite to
county action.
The county based its discretionary immunity
defense on a decision to rely on landowners, over whom it had no right of
control, to perform a key function in carrying out its road maintenance duties.(11) 
However, on summary judgment, the county did not demonstrate that it had put
its policy into effect by communicating it to those landowners.  Merely
weighing costs and benefits and making a decision, even if that decision might
qualify as a permissible discretionary decision, is not sufficient to entitle a
government to immunity.  The government must also demonstrate that it took the
action necessary to effectuate that decision.  So, for example, if a government
made a policy-level choice about which road signs to install, its decision could
be described as discretionary, but that decision alone would not entitle the
government to immunity:  The government would also have to show that it had
installed the signs that it had selected.  Even if the county's decision to
have others act for it could constitute a permissible means of carrying out its
duties -- an issue that we need not and do not decide -- the county is not
entitled to immunity on this record because it did not demonstrate that it had
implemented its policy.  In particular, the county did not establish that
it had informed landowners that it was relying on them to signal the need for
brush removal.  We hold that the trial court erred in granting the county's
motion for summary judgment.
In stating our holding, we emphasize
that we address only the county's affirmative defense of discretionary immunity. 
The issue presented does not require us to decide, and we do not decide,
whether the county can be held liable to this plaintiff on his negligence
claim.  Issues remain as to whether a reasonable factfinder could find that the
county acted unreasonably in failing to cut the bush in question.  On remand, the
county is entitled to argue that, given its fiscal constraints and the
foreseeable risk of harm, it cannot be subject to liability for negligence.  See
Donaca v. Curry County, 303 Or 30, 36-38, 734 P2d 1339 (1987) (county
liability for failing to maintain right-of-way depends on whether county's
action was reasonable in light of risk, including feasibility and cost of
avoiding risk).  Today we decide only that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment in favor of the county on its discretionary immunity defense.(12)
The decision of the Court of Appeals
is reversed.  The judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
1. Hughes's
wife is also a plaintiff in the action, bringing a claim for loss of
consortium.  Her claims do not present separate issues; therefore, for
simplicity, we will discuss the case as one brought by Hughes alone.  
2. Plaintiff
also alleged that Wilson was at fault in failing to keep a proper lookout,
failing to keep his vehicle under reasonable control, and failing to yield the
right of way to plaintiff.  
3. The
trial court granted the county's motion for summary judgment and entered a
limited judgment in favor of the county.  Plaintiff and Wilson stipulated to
entry of a limited judgment in favor of Wilson, and the trial court then
entered a general judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint.
4. The
pairing of the terms "discretionary" and "duty" is
particularly paradoxical.  Whereas choice is intrinsic to discretion, duty
ordinarily implies a legally dictated course of action.  A former member of
this court expressed his befuddlement as to how a duty can ever be
discretionary.  See Miller v. Grants Pass Irr. Dist., 297 Or 312,
324, 686 P2d 332 (1984) (Lent, J., concurring):
"[A] discretionary function is one concerning which the
governmental agency involved has power to make a choice among valid
alternatives, but if there is a duty imposed by law there is no choice but to
obey.  If there is no duty, to which adherence is required, then the agency is
concerned with a function rather than a duty.  I really don't know what a discretionary duty looks like."
5. ORS
368.046 provides that a county road official shall work under the direction of
the county governing body and shall:
"(a)  Assist the county governing body in
preparing specifications for county work to be done on any road within the
county;
"(b)  Superintend work done by the county
upon roads within the county, whether the work is done under contract or
otherwise;
"(c)  Recommend to the county governing
body methods to be adopted for the construction, improvement, repair and
maintenance of roads; and
"(d)  Perform other duties assigned by the
county governing body."
6. The
county does not disavow those common-law duties.  In fact, the policy on which
the county relies for its claim of immunity recognizes and purports to address
the county's obligation to inspect and maintain its roads.  Boldt stated in his
deposition that part of his department's responsibility was to keep brush off
county roads when it could be a safety hazard, and in his affidavit he stated that
"[r]oad projects that must be provided include maintenance of the County
roads."  Boldt also stated in his affidavit that maintenance of county
roads includes "maintaining and replacing signs along all 700 miles
of County roads, and maintaining drainage ditches and culverts along all
County roads for the safety of all who use the County roads," and that
"[p]art of maintaining the shoulders includes cutting brush
that impairs visibility for vehicles that are driving on the County
roads."  (Emphasis added.)  In addition, the county also submitted Boldt's
job description, which requires that Boldt "cause[]to be * * * kept in
good repair all County roads," and which provides that Boldt's duties may
entail "cleaning road shoulders."  (Emphasis added.)
7. Plaintiff
does not contend that Boldt lacked the requisite authority to set county policy. 
Thus, there is no issue in that regard.
8. For
simplicity, we discuss the county's discretionary immunity defense as a defense
based on the county's "policy."  But we do not imply that, to be
entitled to immunity, a government's policy-level decision must be formally
adopted.  See, e.g., Garrison v. Deschutes County, 334 Or 264, 268-69,
48 P3d 807 (2002) (immunity based on decision-makers' "debate"); Mosley,
315 Or at 92 (immunity based on principal's decision).
9. Plaintiff
did not move for summary judgment, and therefore we do not consider the question
of whether plaintiff would be entitled to prevail on the issue of discretionary
immunity as a matter of law.
10. In
his affidavit, Boldt stated that he was very familiar with the scene of the
accident, passed by its exact location at least twice a week, and knew the
location of the bush by personal observation.
11. This
court previously has held that a city was not entitled to summary judgment on
its claim of discretionary immunity when a city enacted an ordinance requiring
that abutting landowners remove foliage obscuring stop signs.  Pritchard v.
City of Portland, 310 Or 235, 241, 796 P2d 1184 (1990) (summary judgment
inappropriate when plaintiff is suing city for city's failure to cut foliage,
not for its decision to require landowners to do so).
12. We
also do not reach plaintiff's contention that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment because there was a question of fact as to whether Boldt actually
had adopted the county policy that he recited.