Title: Helmlinger v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Helmlinger v. State1993 WY 93855 P.2d 363Case Number: 92-166Decided: 06/30/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
Michael 
HELMLINGER, 

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The 
STATE of Wyoming, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Wyoming 
Public Defender Program: Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender, Dave M. 
Gosar, Asst. Public Defender, and Sheldon Skelcher, Student Intern, Gerald M. 
Gallivan, Defender Aid Program, David T. Bonfiglio, Student Intern, for 
appellant.

Joseph 
B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Barbara Boyer, Sr. 
Asst. Atty. Gen., Theodore E. Lauer, Director, Prosecution Assistance Program, 
Edna Young, Student Intern, for appellee.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, 
JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1]      The significant 
issue in this case is whether the sentencing court was without authority to 
enter an order revoking probation that required the payment of restitution in 
the amount of $10 a month as a condition of parole. Michael Dean Helmlinger 
(Helmlinger) asserts as error the inclusion in an Amended Order of Revocation of 
Probation of a requirement for the payment of $10 a month toward restitution as 
a condition of future parole. Helmlinger also contends that the trial court 
erred in failing to make an appropriate finding of his ability to pay 
restitution. We conclude that the Amended Order of Revocation of Probation does 
not encompass any unlawful requirement for the payment of restitution and, in 
light of recent authority, we hold there is no requirement for a finding of the 
ability to pay, although this record does demonstrate an adequate finding of 
Helmlinger's ability to pay restitution. The Amended Order of Revocation of 
Probation is affirmed.

[¶2]      In his Brief of 
Appellant, Helmlinger sets forth the following issues:

I. 
Whether the trial judge failed to make a determination of defendant's ability to 
pay prior to ordering restitution?

II. 
Whether the trial judge can impose conditions upon the parole board, limiting 
the granting, conditions and length of a parole?

In 
its Brief of Appellee, the State of Wyoming offers this statement of the 
issues:

I. 
Did the district court fail to make a finding as to appellant's ability to pay 
restitution?

II. 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when, in revoking appellant's 
probation and sentencing him to a term in the penitentiary, it ordered that 
appellant pay restitution of $10.00 per month upon his release from prison as a 
condition of any parole which may be granted?

[¶3]      Helmlinger was 
arrested on August 9, 1991, for forging his employer's signature on three 
checks. He pleaded guilty to two counts of forgery, charged in violation of WYO. 
STAT. § 6-3-602(a)(ii) (1988). Acting upon his plea of guilty, the district 
court sentenced Helmlinger to a term of not less than three, nor more than five, 
years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary, but it suspended the execution of the 
sentence to imprisonment and placed him on supervised probation for a term of 
five years. The conditions of Helmlinger's probation included among others, that 
he complete one year at the Community Alternatives of Sweetwater County and pay 
restitution in the amount of $2,682.27, which was to be paid during his 
five-year term of probation.

[¶4]      On May 14, 1992, 
the State filed a petition for revocation of Helmlinger's probation. At the 
probation revocation hearing, Helmlinger admitted he had violated the conditions 
of his probation. The district court thereupon entered an order revoking 
Helmlinger's probation followed by an Amended Order of Revocation of Probation 
entered on July 14, 1992. The amended order provides, among other conditions, 
"that Defendant will make the required payment of $10.00 while in prison, or 
upon his release as a condition of any parole which may be granted." Helmlinger 
has appealed from the Amended Order of Revocation of 
Probation.

[¶5]      We resolve first 
Helmlinger's challenge to that portion of the Amended Order of Revocation of 
Probation providing that he should pay restitution of $10 a month as a condition 
of any parole. Helmlinger refers, in his brief, to language in the Order of 
Revocation of Probation conditioning his release from parole on full payment of 
restitution. The Amended Order of Revocation of Probation does not incorporate 
this accused language, however, and our review must be limited to the question 
of whether the district court had authority to require restitution payments as a 
condition of parole.

[¶6]      Helmlinger relies 
upon Keller v. State, 771 P.2d 379 (Wyo. 1989), and Sorenson v. State, 604 P.2d 1031 (Wyo. 1979), in contending the trial court exceeded its authority. 
Helmlinger's contention is that a sentencing court has no power to impose any 
post-incarceration conditions since the legislature has delegated that authority 
to the Board of Parole. In Sorenson and Keller, the rationale underlining the 
decisions is that the legislature defines the authority of a court to impose 
sentence and, therefore, the court cannot impose post-incarceration conditions 
without specific legislative authorization. Sorenson; Keller. The holding in 
both of those cases is that the court imposing the sentence was without 
authority to impose the post-incarceration conditions that had been 
ordered.

[¶7]      This instance is 
different, however, because here the trial court not only had the authority to 
order the defendant to pay restitution, but WYO. STAT. §§ 7-9-102 and -103 
(Supp. 1992) require such an order unless the court finds that there is no 
ability to pay. Murray v. State, 855 P.2d 350 (Wyo. 1993). In addition to this 
requirement, WYO. STAT. § 7-13-421(b) (1987) provides:

The 
board shall provide for restitution in the amount determined by the court 
pursuant to W.S. 7-9-103 unless the board finds the parolee is not reasonably 
capable of making the payments, in which case the board may modify the amount of 
restitution to be paid, taking into account the factors enumerated in W.S. 
7-9-106.

This 
statute specifically contemplates that the sentencing court will make an order 
for restitution, and the Board of Parole will enforce that order unless the 
Board determines the parolee is not reasonably capable of making the payments. 
We conclude the rules articulated in Sorenson and Keller do not control the 
disposition of this case. The correct reading of §§ 7-9-102 and -103 and § 
7-13-421(b), collectively, is that these statutes specifically authorize the 
sentencing court to impose restitution and make payment of the restitution so 
ordered a condition of parole unless the Board of Parole intervenes. The record 
in this case does not disclose any adjustment or contrary finding by the Board 
of Parole, and the challenged condition is lawful.

[¶8]      With respect to 
Helmlinger's contention the trial court erred in failing to determine his 
ability to pay prior to ordering restitution payments, as required by § 
7-9-103(a), that contention is resolved by a more recent authority than 
Shongutsie v. State, 827 P.2d 361 (Wyo. 1992) and Leach v. State, 836 P.2d 336 
(Wyo. 1992). In Murray, 855 P.2d 350, we held that § 7-9-102 is controlling with 
respect to a finding of ability to pay, and a silent record justifies the 
imposition of restitution. Only a specific finding by the court of inability to 
pay can avoid the imposition of restitution as a part of a sentence. We have 
receded from the suggestion that § 7-9-103(a) demands a specific finding of fact 
regarding the present or prospective ability of the defendant to pay 
restitution, and have concluded the thrust of § 7-9-103(a), read in pari 
materia, is that the record must contain information justifying the 
imposition of the amount of restitution ordered by the court. 

[¶9]      In any event, 
this case would be affirmed under the earlier rules. We discern in the record 
information and a finding of fact that would have satisfied the prior rule with 
respect to Helmlinger's ability to pay restitution at the rate of $10 per month. 
The record discloses the following comment by Helmlinger's 
attorney:

     DEFENSE COUNSEL: [A]s 
this Court is well aware, at the penitentiary, people don't earn a whole lot of 
money.

     If he can't get a job, 
$90 a month is considered very good pay, and most people start at about $30 a 
month. That little bit of money from the penitentiary normally goes towards 
things like toiletries and minor necessities the penitentiary's not able to 
provide, and there's a fair amount of restitution due and 
owing.

Having 
received and considered this information, the court said:

COURT: 
Court finds that he will have the ability, even in the penitentiary, to pay a 
portion of [the restitution] each month. Based on the Court's understanding that 
a person can make around $30 per month, the Court would order that he pay $10 of 
that per month toward his restitution.

[¶10]   It is clear that the order of the 
district court for restitution payments of $10 per month was reasonable in view 
of the amount of money Helmlinger could earn while incarcerated. Certainly, the 
trial court reasonably could conclude Helmlinger would have the ability to pay 
that amount, or a reasonable probability existed he would have the ability to 
pay that amount. In addition, the court reasonably could conclude, based on the 
amount of payments Helmlinger was able to make prior to his incarceration, that 
he would have the ability to make payments in the amount of $10 per month after 
being paroled. Prior to revocation of his probation, Helmlinger had paid over 
$300 toward the restitution ordered. This is an adequate demonstration of 
ability to earn income and make payments to satisfy the obligation for 
restitution and also supports the district court's finding of ability to 
pay.

[¶11]   To summarize, the Amended Order of 
Revocation of Probation does not contain any unlawful requirement for 
restitution. Statutory authority is present for the court to order the payment 
of $10 per month as a condition of parole. The law, as we have now interpreted 
it, does not require a specific finding of either Helmlinger's ability to pay or 
a reasonable probability that he will have the ability to pay in order for the 
court to order restitution. In any event, the record satisfies the demands of § 
7-9-103(a) with respect to a determination of the appropriate amount of 
restitution.

[¶12]   The Amended Order of Revocation of 
Probation is affirmed.