Title: State Of Florida v. Antwan Jenkins

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC07-1738 
____________ 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
ANTWAN JENKINS,  
Respondent. 
 
[February 28, 2008] 
 
PARIENTE, J. 
 
We have for review Jenkins v. State, 963 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007), 
which is alleged to be in express and direct conflict with the Fifth District Court of 
Appeal’s decision in Lawson v. State, 941 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006), 
approved, 969 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 2007).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), 
Fla. Const. 
At the time the First District issued its decision in Jenkins and the petition 
for review in that case was filed, the Fifth District’s decision in Lawson was 
pending review in this Court.  Subsequently, this Court issued its decision in 
Lawson v. State, 969 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 2007), in which we approved the Fifth 
District’s decision and held that a trial court has discretion to find a defendant in 
willful and substantial violation of probation for being discharged from a court-
ordered drug treatment program for nonattendance, even if the sentencing court 
fails to specify the number of chances the defendant would have to complete the 
program or impose a time period for compliance. 
In Jenkins, the First District relied on its precedent in Campbell v. State, 939 
So. 2d 242 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), and held that “evidence of the failure to complete 
a counseling program is insufficient to establish a willful and substantial violation 
of probation if the condition in question does not specify a time for completion.”  
Jenkins, 963 So. 2d at 264 (quoting Campbell, 939 So. 2d at 244).  Although 
Jenkins concedes that the First District’s decision is in express and direct conflict 
with our decision in Lawson, he contends that we should exercise our discretion 
and not accept jurisdiction because there is an independent ground on which to 
affirm the First District, namely, its conclusion that the finding of a violation of 
probation was impermissibly based on hearsay.  Jenkins further argues that it 
would now be inequitable to disturb the status quo because his probation has been 
reinstated.  
Although the First District’s decision contains an alternative basis for 
reversal, we have determined that the better course in this case is for the First 
District to reconsider its decision in light of Lawson and the arguments now raised 
 
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by the parties.  Accordingly, we grant the petition for review, quash the decision 
under review to the extent it is inconsistent with Lawson, and disapprove of the 
First District’s decision in Campbell.  This matter is remanded to the First District 
Court of Appeal for proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
It is so ordered. 
 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., 
concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict 
 
 
First District - Case No. 1D06-2052, 2054, 2057, 2134, 2135, and 2199 
 
 
(Leon County) 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Trisha Meggs Pate, Bureau Chief, and Philip 
W. Edwards, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Michael Robert Ufferman of Michael Ufferman Law Firm, P.A., Tallahassee, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent