Title: Pickaway Cty. Skilled Gaming, L.L.C. v. Cordray

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Pickaway Cty. Skilled Gaming, L.L.C. v. Cordray, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-4908.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-4908 
PICKAWAY COUNTY SKILLED GAMING, L.L.C., ET AL., APPELLEES, 
v. CORDRAY, OHIO ATTY. GEN., APPELLANT, ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Pickaway Cty. Skilled Gaming, L.L.C. v. Cordray,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-4908.] 
Constitutional law — Equal protection — The prize-value limit set forth in R.C. 
2915.01(AAA)(1) is rationally related to legitimate government interests 
and does not violate the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and 
Ohio Constitutions. 
(No. 2009-1559 — Submitted June 9, 2010 — Decided October 12, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 08AP-1032, 183 
Ohio App.3d 390, 2009-Ohio-3483. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
The prize-value limit set forth in R.C. 2915.01(AAA)(1) is rationally related to 
legitimate government interests and does not violate the Equal Protection 
Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions. 
__________________ 
O’CONNOR, J. 
{¶ 1} R.C. 2915.02(A)(2) states that no person shall “[e]stablish, 
promote, or operate or knowingly engage in conduct that facilitates * * * any 
scheme of chance.”  R.C. 2915.01(C) defines “scheme of chance”; the subsection 
specifically states that a “scheme of chance” does not include a skill-based 
amusement machine.  These machines range from games (e.g., Skee-ball and 
Whack-a-Mole) commonly found at fair and amusement-park midways and in 
family fun centers to more sophisticated skill-based games found in the members-
only arcade involved in this case.  Although Ohio law permits the operation of 
skill-based amusement games, R.C. 2915.01(AAA)(1) establishes a ten-dollar 
prize-value limit for each play on the machines. 
{¶ 2} In this appeal, we address whether the ten-dollar limit imposed by 
R.C. 2915.01(AAA)(1) violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States 
and Ohio Constitutions.  Appellant, the Attorney General of Ohio, asserts that the 
limit is rationally related to two legitimate government interests:  (1) establishing 
economic regulations governing the operation of skill-based amusement machines 
and (2) protecting against criminal acts and enterprises as a prophylactic measure 
against illegal gambling.  Appellees, Pickaway County Skilled Gaming, L.L.C. 
(“PCSG”), and Steven S. Cline, argue that the prize-value limit set forth in R.C. 
2915.01(AAA)(1) serves no purpose other than to define criminal activity and that 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
the prize value is not rationally related to determining whether amusement 
machines are based on skill or on chance. 
{¶ 3} We hold that the prize-value limit is rationally related to legitimate 
government interests and does not violate the Equal Protection Clauses of the 
United States and Ohio Constitutions. 
Relevant Background 
{¶ 4} Cline owns PCSG.  PCSG owns and operates Spinners Skill Stop 
Games (“Spinners”), a members-only amusement-game arcade located in 
Circleville, Ohio.  The arcade contains 150 skill-based amusement machines for 
use by its members; the machines have names such as Queen Bee, Fruit Bonus 
2004, Mystery J&B 2003, Crazy Bugs, New Cherry, Monkey Land, Rosen’ Jack 
2003, and Triple Jack 2003. 
{¶ 5} R.C. Chapter 2915 prohibits gambling except as otherwise 
expressly permitted by law.  Pursuant to R.C. 2915.02(A)(2), “No person shall * * 
* [e]stablish, promote, or operate or knowingly engage in conduct that facilitates 
any game of chance conducted for profit or any scheme of chance.”  The 
definition of “scheme of chance” specifically excludes skill-based amusement 
machines.  R.C. 2915.01(C).  R.C. 2915.01(AAA) defines the term “skill-based 
amusement machine.”  Pursuant to R.C. 2915.01(AAA)(2), the device may not 
incorporate any element of chance.  The outcome of the game and the value of any 
prize must be based solely on the player’s ability to achieve the object of the game 
or the player’s score.  R.C. 2915.01(AAA)(2).  Additionally, the wholesale value 
of any merchandise prize or redeemable voucher awarded as a result of a single 
play of the machine cannot exceed ten dollars. R.C. 2915.01(AAA)(1). 1   
                                                 
1.  Pursuant to R.C. 2915.01(BBB), which is not at issue in this appeal, the merchandise prizes that 
may be awarded for playing skill-based amusement machines cannot include cash or gift cards; 
plays on games of chance, state lottery tickets, bingo, or instant bingo; firearms, tobacco, or 
alcoholic beverages; or vouchers redeemable for any of the prohibited items. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
{¶ 6} Prior to 2004, R.C. Chapter 2915 made no provision for the 
operation of skill-based amusement machines.  In 2003, the legislature amended 
Chapter 2915 to exclude skill-based amusement machines from the definition of 
“schemes of chance.”  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 95, 150 Ohio Laws, Part I, 396, 865.  
Under that law, a “skill-based amusement machine” required the player’s active 
participation and the outcome of the game could not be determined “largely or 
wholly by chance” or “by a person not actively participating in the game.”  
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 95, 150 Ohio Laws, Part I, at 875. 
{¶ 7} On August 22, 2007, Ohio Governor Ted Strickland issued 
Executive Order 2007-28S in response to a documented “increase in the number 
of illegal gambling machines around the State of Ohio.”  Executive Order 2007-
28S, 
¶ 
1 
(accessed 
at 
the 
website 
of 
Governor 
Strickland 
at 
http://www.governor.ohio.gov).  The governor noted that “[b]ecause of the 
imprecision of the statutory term ‘skill-based amusement machines’ and because 
components of illegal gambling machines have been continually altered to make 
them appear to be legal skill-based amusement games when they are not, the State 
has thus far been unsuccessful in effectively limiting the proliferation of illegal 
gambling machines masquerading as skill-based amusement machines.”  Id., ¶ 3.  
He also stated that “[t]he effects of illegal gambling machines are devastating, not 
only to the consumers who may spend excessive amounts of their financial 
resources to play these games in hopes of receiving a large pay-out, but also to the 
Ohio communities in which these machines are located that are experiencing an 
increase in other criminal and illegal activities due to the proliferation of these 
machines.”  Id., ¶ 4. 
{¶ 8} Through the Executive Order, Governor Strickland declared an 
emergency justifying suspension of the normal rulemaking process and authorized 
the attorney general to immediately adopt former Ohio Adm.Code 109:4-3-31.  
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
Executive Order 2007-28S at ¶ 9-10.  The attorney general adopted the new 
administrative rule, which, among other things, significantly changed the 
definition of “skill-based amusement machine.”  The rule made it an unfair and 
deceptive act to misrepresent that a game was skill-based if it did not meet the 
requirements of the rule.  Former Ohio Adm.Code 109:4-3-31(B).  The rule 
specified that the value of prizes and redeemable vouchers for any single play of a 
skill-based amusement machine could not exceed ten dollars.  Former Ohio 
Adm.Code 109:4-3-31(D)(1)(a)(ii) through (iv).  Also, skill-based amusement 
machines could not award cash prizes or gift cards; plays on games of chance, 
state lottery tickets, bingo, or instant bingo; firearms, tobacco, or alcoholic 
beverages; or vouchers redeemable for any of the prohibited prizes.  Former Ohio 
Adm.Code 109:4-3-31(D)(3)(a) through (d). 
{¶ 9} Under the authority of the new administrative rule, on August 22, 
2007, the attorney general ordered PCSG and Cline to cease and desist all 
operations at Spinners, charging that they had violated the Consumer Sales 
Practices Act, R.C. Chapter 1345, by representing that their games were legal 
skill-based amusement machines when, because they awarded cash payouts, the 
machines did not meet the definition set forth in the new rule.  PCSG and Cline 
filed a complaint against the attorney general seeking declaratory and injunctive 
relief.  The trial court granted PCSG and Cline’s request for a temporary 
restraining order and Spinners reopened. 
{¶ 10} While PCSG and Cline’s action was pending, the Franklin County 
Court of Common Pleas found in a similar action that Ohio Adm.Code 109:4-3-
31 exceeded the attorney general’s rule-making authority.  On October 10, 2007, 
the Ohio House of Representatives passed Sub.H.B. No. 177, which, among other 
provisions, amended R.C. 2915.01(AAA).  The bill incorporated into the statute 
much of the language defining “skill-based amusement machines” that had been 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
set forth in Ohio Adm.Code 109:4-3-31, including the ten-dollar prize-value limit.  
The Ohio Senate passed Sub.H.B. No. 177, Governor Strickland signed it, and it 
became effective immediately, on October 25, 2007.  Thereafter, the Franklin 
County Court of Common Pleas determined that passage of Sub.H.B. No. 177 
rendered the issues in the declaratory-judgment action moot and dismissed PCSG 
and Cline’s complaint. 
{¶ 11} In anticipation of the passage of Sub.H.B. No. 177, PCSG and 
Cline temporarily closed Spinners to avoid violating the new law, but they 
reopened the business after altering its operations.  Spinners continues to operate, 
but with substantially fewer members and fewer visits than it had prior to the 
enactment of Sub.H.B. No. 177. 
{¶ 12} On October 31, 2007, PCSG and Cline filed the present action 
against the attorney general2 seeking a judgment declaring R.C. 2915.01(AAA) 
unconstitutional and an injunction prohibiting the enforcement of the provisions 
of Sub.H.B. No. 177.  PCSG and Cline moved for summary judgment arguing that 
R.C. 2915.01(AAA)(1) violated the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States 
and Ohio Constitutions.  The attorney general filed a cross-motion for summary 
judgment.  The trial court reviewed state and federal equal-protection caselaw and 
concluded that R.C. 2915.01(AAA)(1) did not violate the Equal Protection 
Clauses of the state and federal constitutions.  The trial court held that the prize-
value limit is not rationally related to whether a machine is “skill-based.”  
However, the trial court concluded that the limit is rationally related to 
determining whether a machine is for the purpose of amusement.  The court stated 
that the legislature could reasonably conclude that high-value prizes are more 
closely associated with gambling, while low-value prizes are less likely to be 
January Term, 2010 
7 
 
connected with gambling and are consistent with playing for amusement.  
Accordingly, the trial court denied PCSG and Cline’s motion for summary 
judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of the attorney general. 
{¶ 13} PCSG and Cline appealed the trial court’s judgment to the Tenth 
District Court of Appeals, which held that the prize-value limit set forth in R.C. 
2915.01(AAA)(1) violated the state and federal Equal Protection Clauses.  
Pickaway Cty. Skilled Gaming, L.L.C. v. Cordray, 183 Ohio App.3d 390, 2009-
Ohio-3483, 917 N.E.2d 305, ¶ 52.  The court focused its analysis on the definition 
of gambling, noting that “Ohio courts have consistently defined the contours of 
gambling in terms of the essential elements of price paid, chance, and a prize, 
without reference to the amount or value of the prize.”  (Emphasis sic.) Id., ¶ 49, 
citing Stillmaker v. Dept. of Liquor Control (1969), 18 Ohio St.2d 200, 47 O.O.2d 
437, 249 N.E.2d 61, paragraph two of the syllabus.  “The essential ingredient that 
differentiates merely playing a game for amusement (which can include the added 
amusement of a prize) and playing a game for amusement that constitutes 
gambling is whether the outcome is determined in whole or in part by chance.”  
Id., ¶ 51.  The court noted that the legislature codified the distinction when it 
made chance-based machines illegal and skill-based machines legal in R.C. 
Chapter 2915.  Accordingly, the Tenth District held that the distinction between 
machines that award prizes worth more than ten dollars and those that do not is 
not rationally related to the legislature’s goal of distinguishing between illegal 
chance-based and legal skill-based amusement machines.  Id. 
{¶ 14} In light of its holding that R.C. 2915.01(AAA)(1) violated the state 
and federal Equal Protection Clauses, the court of appeals held that PCSG and 
Cline’s challenge to R.C. 2915.01(AAA)(1) on the ground that the statute was 
                                                                                                                                     
2.  PCSG and Cline initially filed their complaint against Director of the Ohio Department of 
Public Safety Henry Guzman, Pickaway County Sheriff Dwight E. Radcliff, and Pickaway County 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
vague on its face was moot and did not reach the merits of that argument.  Id., ¶ 
55. 
{¶ 15} PCSG and Cline filed notice of a discretionary appeal from the 
Tenth District’s judgment and the attorney general filed a cross-appeal.  We 
accepted jurisdiction over the attorney general’s second proposition on cross-
appeal to determine whether the prize-value limit in R.C. 2915.01(AAA)(1) 
violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions.  
Pickaway Cty. Skilled Gaming, L.L.C. v. Cordray, 123 Ohio St.3d 1506, 2009-
Ohio-6210, 917 N.E.2d 810.  We hold that it does not. 
Analysis 
The Equal Protection Clauses 
{¶ 16} The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution provides, “No State shall * * * deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  Ohio’s Equal Protection 
Clause, Section 2, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, states, “All political power is 
inherent in the people.  Government is instituted for their equal protection and 
benefit * * *.”  “ ‘The Equal Protection Clause[s do] not forbid classifications.  
[They] simply keep[] governmental decisionmakers from treating differently 
persons who are in all relevant respects alike.’ ”  Burnett v. Motorists Mut. Ins. 
Co., 118 Ohio St.3d 493, 2008-Ohio-2751, 890 N.E.2d 307, ¶ 30, quoting 
Nordlinger v. Hahn (1992), 505 U.S. 1, 10, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 120 L.Ed.2d 1. 
{¶ 17} The federal and Ohio equal-protection provisions are “functionally 
equivalent,”  State v. Williams, 126 Ohio St.3d 65, 2010-Ohio-2453, 930 N.E.2d 
770, ¶ 38, citing Eppley v. Tri-Valley Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 122 Ohio 
St.3d 56, 2009-Ohio-1970, 908 N.E.2d 401, ¶ 11, and State v. Thompson, 95 Ohio 
St.3d 264, 2002-Ohio-2124, 767 N.E.2d 251, ¶ 11, and “are to be construed and 
                                                                                                                                     
Prosecuting Attorney Judy Wolford, but subsequently dismissed these defendants. 
January Term, 2010 
9 
 
analyzed identically,”  Am. Assn. of Univ. Professors, Cent. State Univ. Chapter v. 
Cent. State Univ. (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 55, 60, 717 N.E.2d 286. 
{¶ 18} Courts apply varying levels of scrutiny to equal-protection 
challenges depending on the rights at issue and the purportedly discriminatory 
classifications created by the law.  “[A] statute that does not implicate a 
fundamental right or a suspect classification does not violate equal-protection 
principles if it is rationally related to a legitimate government interest.”  Williams, 
126 Ohio St.3d 65, 2010-Ohio-2453, 930 N.E.2d 770, ¶ 39, citing Eppley, 122 
Ohio St.3d 56, 2009-Ohio-1970, 908 N.E.2d 401, ¶ 15.  The parties do not dispute 
that this case does not involve a fundamental right or suspect classification3 and 
that rational-basis review applies. 
{¶ 19} “The rational-basis test involves a two-step analysis.  We must first 
identify a valid state interest.  Second, we must determine whether the method or 
means by which the state has chosen to advance that interest is rational.”  
McCrone v. Bank One Corp., 107 Ohio St.3d 272, 2005-Ohio-6505, 839 N.E.2d 
1, ¶ 9, citing Buchman v. Wayne Trace Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1995), 73 
Ohio St.3d 260, 267, 652 N.E.2d 952. 
{¶ 20} “Under the rational-basis standard, a state has no obligation to 
produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification.”  
                                                 
3.  The classification created by R.C. 2915.01(AAA) purportedly discriminates between operators 
of skill-based amusement machines who award prizes valued over ten dollars per play and 
operators who award prizes worth less than ten dollars.  PCSG and Cline argue that R.C. 
2915.01(AAA) also creates a discriminatory classification between players of skill-based 
amusement machines who receive prizes valued over ten dollars per play and players who receive 
prizes worth less than ten dollars.  However, the party challenging the constitutionality of a statute 
must be a member of the group that is the victim of the discriminatory classification.  Columbia 
Gas Transm. Corp. v. Levin, 117 Ohio St.3d 122, 2008-Ohio-511, 882 N.E.2d 400, ¶ 99.  Accord 
State ex rel Harrell v. Streetsboro City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 55, 63, 544 
N.E.2d 924 (“Since Streetsboro is not a member of the class it identifies, it lacks standing to attack 
the statute’s constitutionality on the ground that it violates others’ rights to equal protection”).  
Neither PCSG nor Cline claims to be a member of a player-based classification and therefore 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
Columbia Gas Transm. Corp. v. Levin, 117 Ohio St.3d 122, 2008-Ohio-511, 882 
N.E.2d 400, ¶ 91, citing Am. Assn. of Univ. Professors, Cent. State Univ. Chapter, 
87 Ohio St.3d at 58, 60, 717 N.E.2d 286.  “[S]tatutes are presumed to be 
constitutional and * * * courts have a duty to liberally construe statutes in order to 
save them from constitutional infirmities.”  Eppley, 122 Ohio St.3d 56, 2009-
Ohio-1970, 908 N.E.2d 401, ¶ 12, citing Desenco, Inc. v. Akron (1999), 84 Ohio 
St.3d 535, 538, 706 N.E.2d 323.  The party challenging the constitutionality of a 
statute “bears the burden to negate every conceivable basis that might support the 
legislation.”  Columbia Gas Transm. Corp. at ¶ 91, citing Lyons v. Limbach 
(1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 92, 94, 532 N.E.2d 106. 
The Prize-Value Limit Serves Legitimate Government Interests 
{¶ 21} R.C. 2915.02(A)(2) prohibits the operation of “any game of chance 
conducted for profit or any scheme of chance.”  Pursuant to R.C. 2915.01(C), 
skill-based amusement machines are excluded from the definition of a “scheme of 
chance.”  R.C. 2915.01(AAA) defines “skill-based amusement machines.”  Thus, 
it is clear that one purpose of R.C. 2915.01(AAA) is to differentiate between 
machines that are legal games of skill and those that constitute illegal games of 
chance. 
{¶ 22} The Tenth District seized on this purpose in holding that the prize-
value limit set forth in R.C. 2915.01(AAA)(1) violates the Equal Protection 
Clauses.  The appellate court reasoned that “[t]he essential ingredient that 
differentiates merely playing a game for amusement (which can include the added 
amusement of a prize) and playing a game for amusement that constitutes 
gambling is whether the outcome is determined in whole or in part by chance.” 
Pickaway Cty. Skilled Gaming, L.L.C., 183 Ohio App.3d 390, 2009-Ohio-3483, 
                                                                                                                                     
neither PCSG nor Cline has standing to challenge the constitutionality of R.C. 2915.01(AAA) on 
behalf of the players of the machines.  Our analysis is limited to the owner-based classification. 
January Term, 2010 
11 
 
917 N.E.2d 305, ¶ 51.  The court held that the prize-value limit was not rationally 
related to the statute’s purpose of distinguishing illegal chance-based games from 
legal skill-based amusement machines. 
{¶ 23} PCSG and Cline urge us to reach the same conclusion, arguing that 
the prize-value limit serves no purpose other than to define criminal activity.  
However, the Tenth District, PCSG, and Cline fail to recognize that “ ‘not every 
provision in a law must share a single objective.’ ”  Park Corp. v. Brook Park, 
102 Ohio St.3d 166, 2004-Ohio-2237, 807 N.E.2d 913, ¶ 27, quoting Fitzgerald v. 
Racing Assn. of Cent. Iowa (2003), 539 U.S. 103, 109, 123 S.Ct. 2156, 156 
L.Ed.2d 97.  Rather, “a statue can meet its proclaimed purpose while at the same 
time balancing other objectives.”  Id., ¶ 30. 
{¶ 24} In Park Corp., Brook Park imposed different taxes upon parking 
fees charged by an exhibition center and fees charged by airport parking lots.  The 
exhibition center argued that taxing its parking fees at a higher rate than the 
airport parking fees was not rationally related to the government’s interest in 
collecting revenue from parking facilities.  Id., ¶ 29.  This court noted that 
although the city primarily imposed the taxes to create a new revenue stream, the 
city may have had additional objectives in imposing a lower tax rate on airport 
parking fees, such as ensuring continued viability of the airport lots or seeking to 
aid the development of the part of the city that housed the airport lots.  Id., ¶ 30-
33. 
{¶ 25} In Fitzgerald, the United States Supreme Court held that an Iowa 
statute that imposed different taxes on revenue from slot machines at racetracks 
and on revenue from slot machines on riverboats did not violate the equal-
protection clause.  The court noted that the riverboat tax could have served 
multiple objectives in addition to raising tax revenue – for example, encouraging 
the economic development of river communities or providing incentives for 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
 
riverboats to stay in the state rather than relocate to other states.  539 U.S. 103, 
109, 123 S.Ct. 2156, 156 L.Ed.2d 97.  The court stated that “[o]nce one realizes 
that not every provision in a law must share a single objective, one has no 
difficulty finding the necessary rational support for [the different tax rates.”]. 
{¶ 26} The fact that one purpose of R.C. 2915.01(AAA) is to define 
“skill-based amusement machines” for the purpose of identifying what gambling 
is illegal does not negate the possibility that the prize-value limit set forth in R.C. 
2915.01(AAA)(1) may simultaneously serve other valid government interests.  
Indeed, the attorney general identifies two legitimate government interests that the 
prize-value limit purportedly serves. 
{¶ 27} First, the attorney general argues that the prize-value limit serves as 
an economic regulation of skill-based amusement machines.  The state plainly has 
a legitimate interest in regulating its local economies.  See New Orleans v. Dukes 
(1976), 427 U.S. 297, 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 49 L.Ed.2d 511.  The operation of skill-
based amusement machines is a valid statewide industry in Ohio, and the state has 
a legitimate interest in establishing economic regulations for the industry, 
including regulating the prizes that may be awarded. 
{¶ 28} Second, the attorney general contends that the prize-value limit 
protects against criminal acts and enterprises by acting as a prophylactic measure 
against illegal chance-based gambling.  Courts have long recognized that state 
legislatures have a legitimate interest in regulating gambling.  “The suppression of 
gambling is concededly within the police powers of a State, and legislation 
prohibiting it, or acts which may tend to facilitate it, will not be interfered with by 
the court unless such legislation be a ‘clear, unmistakable infringement of rights 
secured by the fundamental law.’ ”  Ah Sin v. Wittman (1905), 198 U.S. 500, 505-
506, 25 S.Ct. 759, 49 L.Ed. 1142, quoting Booth v. Illinois (1902), 184 U.S. 425, 
429, 22 S.Ct. 425, 46 L.Ed. 623.  See also State v. Posey (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 
January Term, 2010 
13 
 
420, 426, 534 N.E.2d 61 (noting that the state has a legitimate interest in 
regulating gambling and in permitting certain gambling activities for charitable 
purposes). 
{¶ 29} Accordingly, 
the 
prize-value 
limit 
set 
forth 
in 
R.C. 
2915.01(AAA)(1) satisfies the first prong of the rational-basis analysis.  It serves 
two vital and valid government interests:  economic regulation and protection 
against criminal acts and enterprises. 
The Prize-Value Limit is Rationally Related to the Government Interests 
{¶ 30} Having determined that R.C. 2915.01(AAA)(1) serves valid 
government interests, we turn to whether the prize-value limit is rationally related 
to those interests. 
{¶ 31} “Legislative enactments that do not involve a suspect classification 
are ‘presumptively rationally related to legitimate social and economic goals, 
unless the “varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the 
achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude 
that the legislature’s actions were irrational.” ’ ”  McCrone, 107 Ohio St.3d 272, 
2005-Ohio-6505, 839 N.E.2d 1, at ¶ 30, quoting State ex rel. Doersam v. Indus. 
Comm. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 201, 203, 533 N.E.2d 321, quoting Vance v. 
Bradley (1979), 440 U.S. 93, 97, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171.  In other words, 
“[a] statute will not be held to violate the Equal Protection Clause, and this court 
will not invalidate a plan of classification adopted by the General Assembly, 
unless it is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable.”  Id., ¶ 9. 
{¶ 32} “Ohio courts grant substantial deference to the legislature when 
conducting an equal-protection rational-basis review.”  Williams, 126 Ohio St.3d 
65, 2010-Ohio-2453, 930 N.E.2d 770, ¶ 40, citing State v. Williams (2000), 88 
Ohio St.3d 513, 531, 728 N.E.2d 342.  “ ‘[A] legislative choice is not subject to 
courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
 
evidence or empirical data.’ ”  Am. Assn. of Univ. Professors, Cent. State Univ. 
Chapter, 87 Ohio St.3d 55, 58, 717 N.E.2d 286, quoting Fed. Communications 
Comm. v. Beach Communications, Inc. (1993), 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 
2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211.  “Furthermore, ‘courts are compelled under rational-basis 
review to accept a legislature’s generalizations even when there is an imperfect fit 
between means and ends.  A classification does not fail rational-basis review 
because “it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results 
in some inequality.” ’ ”  Id., quoting Heller v. Doe (1993), 509 U.S. 312, 321, 113 
S.Ct. 2637, 125 L.Ed.2d 257, quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. 
(1911), 220 U.S. 61, 78, 31 S.Ct. 337, 55 L.Ed. 369.  “[O]ur role is not to cross-
check the General Assembly’s findings to ensure that we would agree with its 
conclusions.”  Eppley, 122 Ohio St.3d 56, 2009-Ohio-1970, 908 N.E.2d 401, ¶ 17, 
citing Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 
N.E.2d 420, ¶ 58. 
{¶ 33} Applying this highly deferential standard, as we must, we hold that 
the ten-dollar prize-value limit is rationally related to the state’s legitimate 
interests in regulating its economies and in preventing criminal acts and 
enterprises as a prophylactic measure against illegal chance-based gambling. 
{¶ 34} The analysis would not be complete without addressing the 
position put forth by the Ohio Coin Machine Association (“OCMA”) in their 
amicus curiae brief.  OCMA argues that decisions by three other state supreme 
courts are instructive because each held that laws related to coin-operated games 
of skill violated state and federal equal-protection clauses.  Ragland v. Forsythe 
(1984), 282 Ark. 43, 666 S.W.2d 680; State v. Bloss (1980), 62 Hawai'i 147, 613 
P.2d 354; Cossack v. Los Angeles (1974), 11 Cal.3d 726, 114 Cal.Rptr. 460, 523 
P.2d 260. 
January Term, 2010 
15 
 
{¶ 35} In Bloss, the Supreme Court of Hawai'i held that a law that 
prohibited minors from playing or loitering near pinball machines violated the 
state and federal Equal Protection Clauses.  62 Hawai'i at 157-158, 613 P.2d 354.  
The court held that the law was not rationally related to the legislative purposes of 
(1) protecting young people from harmful influences or (2) preventing young 
people from spending their lunch money on coin-operated amusement devices.  
Id. at 156-157.  Bloss involved an antiquated law that had been written when 
pinball machines did not have flippers and were games of chance, not skill, and 
before electronic videoscreen amusement games existed.  Although singling out 
pinball machines may have served a legitimate interest when the law was enacted, 
the Hawai'i court held that, particularly in light of the development of electronic 
video games that were not prohibited under the law, it no longer served such an 
interest and, therefore, it had no reasonable relationship to the harm that it sought 
to avoid.  Id. at 157.  In contrast to Bloss, R.C. 2915.01(AAA)(1) does not 
differentiate between types of skill-based amusement machines; the prize-value 
limit applies to all games of skill.  Further, Bloss did not involve a classification 
based on the value of prizes awarded by the machines.  Therefore, although it 
addresses the constitutionality of skill-based amusement machines, Bloss does not 
address the issue before this court. 
{¶ 36} The same is true of Cossack, in which the Supreme Court of 
California considered the constitutionality of an ordinance that prohibited the 
operation of certain types of gaming machines.  The plaintiffs sought to operate 
games of skill that fit within the technical definition of the games that had been 
prohibited by the ordinance.  However, the court concluded that because the 
ordinance was enacted when the machines in question were games of chance, it 
was intended to prohibit only games of chance.  11 Cal.3d at 734, 114 Cal.Rptr. 
460, 523 P.2d 260.  Because the machines had evolved into games of skill, the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
 
court held that the ordinance was not intended to prohibit their operation.  Id.  
However, the court stated that if the ordinance was intended to prohibit games of 
skill, it would violate the state and federal Equal Protection Clauses because it 
would result in an arbitrary distinction between the prohibited games of skill and 
other permissible games of skill.  Id.  As with Bloss, this case does not address the 
value of prizes awarded for playing the machines and does not reach the issue 
before this court. 
{¶ 37} Lastly, Ragland did not involve regulation of skill-based games 
and is, therefore, not instructive.  In Ragland, the Arkansas Supreme Court held 
that a law that allowed only Arkansas residents to own coin-operated amusement 
machines had no rational relationship to a valid state interest.  282 Ark. at 46, 666 
S.W.2d 680. 
{¶ 38} The cases cited by OCMA are inapposite.  They do not relate to the 
prize-value issue in this case.  Therefore, we turn to whether the prize-value limit 
set forth in R.C. 2915.01(AAA)(1) is rationally related to the legitimate interests 
that the Attorney General has established in this case.  We hold that it is. 
{¶ 39} First, the ten-dollar prize-value limit set forth in R.C. 
2915.01(AAA)(1) is a regulation that is part of the state’s scheme to protect its 
local economies.  The statute is calculated to further the state’s interest by 
eliminating the lure of big prizes and thus minimizing irresponsible play while 
providing a legal safe harbor for harmless games (e.g., Skee-ball) that award token 
prizes. 
{¶ 40} PCSG, Cline, and OCMA argue that the ten-dollar prize-value 
limit is not rationally related to the state’s interest because it does not eliminate 
the lure of big prizes.  Because the limit is based on each play, and R.C. 
2915.01(AAA)(1) does not limit the number of times an individual can play a 
skill-based amusement machine, PCSG, Cline, and OCMA argue that players can 
January Term, 2010 
17 
 
amass endless vouchers and redeem them for valuable prizes.  OCMA also argues 
that the prize-value limit does not eliminate the possibility of individuals 
becoming addicted to playing skill-based amusement machines. 
{¶ 41} “[I]n the local economic sphere, it is only the invidious 
discrimination, the wholly arbitrary act, which cannot stand consistently with the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”  Dukes, 427 U.S. at 303-304, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 49 L.Ed.2d 
511, citing Ferguson v. Skrupa (1963), 372 U.S. 726, 732, 83 S.Ct. 1028, 10 
L.Ed.2d 93.  “ ‘A legislative body may direct its legislation against any evil as it 
actually exists, without covering the whole field of possible abuses, and it may do 
so none the less that the forbidden act does not differ in kind from those that are 
not forbidden.’ ”  Benjamin v. Columbus (1957), 167 Ohio St. 103, 117, 4 O.O.2d 
113, 146 N.E.2d 854, quoting Xenia v. Schmidt (1920), 101 Ohio St. 437, 130 
N.E. 24, paragraph nine of the syllabus.  “ ‘The “task of classifying persons for * 
* * benefits * * * inevitably requires that some persons who have an almost 
equally strong claim to favored treatment be placed on different sides of the line,” 
and the fact the line might have been drawn differently at some points is a matter 
for legislative, rather than judicial consideration.’ ”  Fitzgerald, 539 U.S. at 108, 
123 S.Ct. 2156, 156 L.Ed.2d 97, quoting United States RR. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz 
(1980), 449 U.S. 166, 179, 101 S.Ct. 453, 66 L.Ed.2d 368, quoting Mathews v. 
Diaz (1976), 426 U.S. 67, 83, 96 S.Ct. 1883, 48 L.Ed.2d 478. 
{¶ 42} PCSG and Cline have the burden to negate every conceivable basis 
that might support the prize-value limit set forth in R.C. 2915.01(AAA)(1).  
Heller v. Doe (1993), 509 U.S. 312, 320, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 125 L.Ed.2d 257.  
PCSG and Cline have failed to meet their burden to establish that the prize-value 
limit is arbitrary and invidious. 
{¶ 43} We agree with PCSG, Cline, and OCMA that the prize-value limit 
does not eliminate every possibility that individuals might play skill-based 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
amusement machines in order to accumulate vouchers and redeem them for large 
prizes or that individuals may become addicted to such games.  However, it need 
not do so in order to pass rational-basis review.  The prize-value limit eliminates 
the possibility that an individual might receive a large prize after a few plays on a 
skill-based amusement machine.  Because of the limit, individuals must play these 
games many times in order to accumulate enough vouchers to obtain valuable 
prizes — and the more valuable the prizes, the more times individuals must play 
the games.  Moreover, based on the ten-dollar limit and the value of the prize they 
want, players can estimate the minimum number of plays that will be necessary to 
accumulate enough redeemable vouchers to obtain the prize.  Therefore, the prize-
value limit may dissuade players from spending excessive amounts of money 
playing skill-based amusement machines hoping to win an expensive prize.  The 
limit is not so unrelated to the state’s interest in establishing economic regulations 
governing the operation of skill-based amusement machines as to render it 
arbitrary or invidious. 
{¶ 44} OCMA also contends that the prize-value limit is not rationally 
related to a state interest because the General Assembly simply “rubberstamped 
the ten-dollar figure which was apparently pulled out of thin air by the Governor 
and/or Attorney General.” 4  As explained above, in enacting the prize-value limit, 
the legislature sought to eliminate the lure of big prizes and to prevent individuals 
from overspending when playing skill-based amusement machines.  In doing so, 
the legislature selected a nominal prize-value limit that was reasonably calculated 
                                                 
4.  OCMA also argues that the ten-dollar limit is bad for Ohio business because it bears no rational 
relationship to the rate of return a game of skill must yield in order to allow its operator to (1) 
recoup the capital investment it has made in the game and (2) to afford to satisfy players’ demand 
for the next generation of games.  OCMA argues that the limit will stifle economic activity by 
eliminating the high-end game-of-skill industry in Ohio and by forcing players to look outside 
Ohio for challenging state-of-the-art games of skill.  OCMA’s argument is a policy consideration 
for the legislature; not an issue for this court.  We will not substitute our judgment for that of the 
legislature.  Eppley, 122 Ohio St.3d 56, 2009-Ohio-1970, 908 N.E.2d 401, ¶ 17. 
January Term, 2010 
19 
 
to achieve this purpose.  A legislative enactment may be based on rational 
speculation and need not be supported by evidence or empirical data.  Am. Assn. 
of Univ. Professors, Cent. State Univ. Chapter, 87 Ohio St.3d at 58, 717 N.E.2d 
286.  Accordingly, although the Attorney General does not explain why the 
legislature chose the ten-dollar figure as opposed to a different prize value, the 
ten-dollar limit is rationally related to the government’s interest in eliminating the 
lure of expensive prizes and protecting the public from overspending while 
playing skill-based amusement machines. 
{¶ 45} The prize-value limit is also rationally related to the government’s 
interest in preventing criminal acts and enterprises by acting as a prophylactic 
measure against illegal, chance-based gambling.  “The suppression of gambling is 
concededly within the police powers of a state, and legislation prohibiting it, or 
acts which may tend to facilitate it, will not be interfered with by the court unless 
such legislation be a ‘clear, unmistakable infringement of rights secured by the 
fundamental law.’ ”  Ah Sin, 198 U.S. at 505-506, 25 S.Ct. 756, 49 L.Ed. 1142, 
quoting Booth v. Illinois (1902), 184 U.S. 425, 429, 22 S.Ct. 425, 46 L.Ed.623. 
{¶ 46} PCSG and Cline again do not meet their burden of negating any 
possible rational relationship between the prize-value limit and the government’s 
interest in suppressing illegal chance-based gambling.  Motivated by financial 
gain, operators of illegal chance-based amusement machines can easily alter 
games of chance to appear to be games of skill.  Financial motivation may come 
from charging more to play illegal games of chance or from individuals who 
overspend in hopes of winning big prizes.  As we explained above, the ten dollar 
prize-value limit is designed to eliminate the latter motivation.  Furthermore, it 
stands to reason that players will not pay the same fee to play games that award a 
ten dollar prize as they would to play games that offer higher value prizes.  By 
limiting the potential prizes awarded by skill-based amusement machines, R.C. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
 
2915.01(AAA)(1) effectively limits the fee that operators can charge to play the 
games.  Thus, the prize-value limit effectively removes the financial incentive for 
operators to disguise illegal chance-based machines as skill-based games. 
{¶ 47} OCMA argues that because chance-based machines are banned by 
the statute, except under certain conditions, any prophylactic benefit served by the 
prize-value limit in preventing operators from altering games of skill to include 
elements of chance is superfluous and overstated.  However, as far back as 1939, 
this court acknowledged that “[e]ven if a slot machine * * * is manufactured and 
intended for lawful operation, its potentiality and design is such that it may be 
easily put to unlawful use.  The regulation or prohibition of such a mechanism 
need not be postponed until such event occurs.”  Kraus v. Cleveland (1939), 135 
Ohio St. 43, 47, 13 O.O. 323, 19 N.E.2d 159. 
{¶ 48} The same is true of skill-based amusement machines.  In issuing 
Executive Order 2007-28S, Governor Strickland recognized that chance-based 
machines can be altered easily to make them appear to be skill-based amusement 
machines and that the state has been unsuccessful in limiting the proliferation of 
illegal gambling machines masquerading as skill-based amusement machines.  
Executive Order 2007-28S at ¶ 3.  Because the prize-value limit set forth in R.C. 
2915.01(AAA)(1) effectively removes the financial incentive for operators to 
disguise illegal chance-based machines as skill-based amusement machines, it is 
not so unrelated to the state’s legitimate interest in preventing criminal acts and 
enterprises as to render it arbitrary or invidious. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 49} We hold that the prize-value limit set forth in R.C. 
2915.01(AAA)(1) is rationally related to legitimate government interests and does 
not violate the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Ohio 
Constitutions.  We therefore reverse the judgment of the Tenth District Court of 
January Term, 2010 
21 
 
Appeals to the extent that it held otherwise.  Because we hold that R.C. 
2915.01(AAA)(1) does not violate the Equal Protection Clauses, PCSG and 
Cline’s void-for-vagueness argument is no longer moot.  Since the court of 
appeals did not reach the merits of PCSG and Cline’s argument that R.C. 
2915.01(AAA)(1) is void for vagueness, we remand the case to the Tenth District 
for consideration of PCSG and Cline’s first assignment of error. 
Judgment reversed  
and cause remanded. 
 
PRESTON, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., 
concur. 
 
PFEIFER, ACTING C.J., concurs in judgment only. 
 
VERNON L. PRESTON, J., of the Third Appellate District, sitting for 
BROWN, C.J. 
__________________ 
Butler, Cincione & DiCuccio, Gail M. Zalimeni, N. Gerald DiCuccio, and 
Alphonse P. Cincione, for appellees. 
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Solicitor General, 
Stephen P. Carney, Deputy Solicitor, Christopher P. Conomy, Assistant Solicitor, 
and Randall W. Knutti, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant. 
Roetzel & Andress, L.P.A., Jim M. Petro, and Jeremy S. Young, urging 
affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Coin Machine Association. 
______________________