Title: RAY ANTHONY FARMER V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

State: kentucky

Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court

Document:

IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION

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BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION
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RENDERED: MARCH 23, 2017
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky

2015-SC-000285-MR

RAY ANTHONY FARMER APPELLANT

ON APPEAL FROM TRIGG CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE CLARENCE A. WOODALL, III, JUDGE
‘NO, 14-CR-00056

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

‘MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Ray Anthony Farmer, appeals from a-judgment of the Trigg,
Circuit Court convicting him of five counts of third degree burglary and

sentencing him to four years’ imprisonment on each charge, to be served
consecutively for a total of twenty years in prison. Appellant asserts that the
trial court erred by: 1) admitting evidence contrary to KRE 404(b); 2) admitting
evidence in violation of KRE 503, the attorney-client privilege; 3) failing to
recognize and constrain the prosecutor's improper closing argument; and 4)
failing to grant directed verdicts on three of the charges. For the reasons
stated below, we affirm the judgment.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Five businesses in Cadiz, Kentucky, situated close in proximity, were

burglarized on the same night. Although surveillance cameras at or near two

of the businesses captured video images of the burglar, the business owners
and local law enforcement officers were unable to identify him. The Cadiz
Police Department published images derived from the video and requested the
public's assistance in identifying the perpetrator. A detective from the
Clarksville (Tennessee) Police Department saw the images and recognized the
burglar as Appellant, Ray Anthony Farmer. Based primarily upon that
identification, Appellant was indicted for five counts of third degree burglary
and five counts of possession of burglary tools. The latter charges were
dismissed but Appellant was convicted at trial on all five burglary charges.
‘This appeal followed.

1 ANALYSIS:
A. The detective's identification of Appellant was properly admitted

into evidence; the detective’s reference to Appellant's prior
involvement with law enforcement did not merit a mistrial.

The critical aspect of the Commonwealth's case against Appellant was
proving that he was the person whose image was captured in the crime scene
videos. Prior to trial, and pursuant to KRE 404(c}, the Commonwealth gave
notice that it intended to present testimony of the Clarksville detective who first
recognized the image of the burglar as Appellant. The detective would explain
that he knew Appellant because of Appellant's prior involvement with law
enforcement in Tennessee and that an active warrant was pending for
Appellant's arrest for a burglary in Clarksville, Tennessee, with facts similar to
the Cadiz burglaries for which Appellant was charged.

‘The trial court granted Appellant's pretrial motion to exclude any
reference to the pending Tennessee burglary charge and the detective was

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instructed accordirigly, Otherwise, the trial court permitted the detective to
testify that he recognized Appellant in the crime scerie images because of his
prior involvement with Appellant. The detective was also allowed, over
Appellant's objection, to identify Appellant as the person in an arrest photo
taken approximately six months after the Cadiz burglaries. The photograph
was carefully cropped to conceal the orange jail jump suit worn by Appellant.

During the Commonwealth's redirect examination of the detective, the
following exchanged occurred:

Prosecutor: How familiar are you with Mr, Farmer?

Detective: Since about October 2012 I've been assigned some
cases in which . .. [cut off by objection].

 

Counsel: Objection judge. This is not a *yes” or “no,” we
discussed this as “yes” or “no.” We object and move
for a mistrial,

Judge: I'm going to let the detective answer in general terms
why he’s familiar with Mr. Farmer and in particular in
light of the cross examination questions and then I
deal with your motion . . . .

 

Prosecutor: Have you had several opportunities to study instances
where you have been able to determine what Mr.
Farmer looks like?

Detective: Yes, ma'am.

Prosecutor: And you feel comfortable with that determination?

Detectis

 

Yes, ma'am.

Prosecutor: And you mentioned all the way back to 2012 you have been
familiar with Mr. Farmer's identity for that long or even
longer?

Detective: For that long, yes ma’am,

 

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‘The trial court denied Appellant's motion for a mistrial, but offered to
admonish the jury. Appellant declined the offer.
When the testimony resumed, the detective was asked where Appellant

was living at the time of the Cadiz burglaries. The detective responded:

 

cannot say specifically where, he was a suspect in some things . . . [cut off by
objection|.” Appellant moved again for a mistrial, which was denied. Appellant
again declined the trial court's offer to admonish the jury.

‘Two issues are presented here. The first issue is Appellant's general
objection that the detective should not have been allowed to testify to his,
opinion that Appellant was the person depicted in the crime scene videos or
identify Appellant in the cropped photo as the jury would have inferred prior
involvement in criminal activity. The second issue is the whether the
detective’s brief but specific reference to Appellant as a “suspect” in other cases,
assigned to the officer was error.

[As to the first issue, the Commonwealth argues that Morgan v.
Commonwealth, 421 8.W.3d 388 (Ky. 2014), authorizes the detective’s
identification testimony. In Morgan we held that KRE 602! and KRE 701?
allowed the witness with personal knowledge of the suspect’s physical

1 KRE 602 provides, in pertinent part, “[a] witness may not testify to a matter
‘unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has
personal knowledge of the matter.”

2 KRE 701 provides, pertinently, that a lay witness may provide “opinions or
inferences which are: (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness; [and] (b)
helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a
fact in issu

 
‘appearance to identify the suspect as the person depicted in photographs and
videos admitted into evidence. Morgan relied in part on United States v. White,
explaining that under FRE 701, “glenerally, a lay witness may testify regarding
the identity of a person depicted in a surveillance photograph if there is some
basis for concluding that the witness is more likely to correctly identify the
defendant from the photograph than is the jury.” 639 F.3d 331, 336 (7th Cir.
2011) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

In this case, three and one-half years lapsed between the date of the
burglaries during which the video images were recorded and the date of
Appellant's trial. Appellant's physical appearance changed during that time
span. Because the Clarksville detective was personally familiar with
Appellant's appearance at the time depicted in the crime scene video, and the
jury was not, the detective was better able to correctly determine if Appellant
‘was the person seen in the video. Under these circumstances, we see no error
in admitting the detective's identification testimony.

In connection with this issue, Appellant argues that the detective’s use of
the photograph taken of Appellant six months after the Cadiz burglaries was
also prejudicial error. He contends that despite the effort to crop the photo to
conceal his orange jail garb, jurors could still perceive it as an arrest photo,

suggesting once again his prior problems with law enforcement. Because

 

Appellant denied being the person depicted in the Cadiz burglary videos,
appearance nearer to the time of those crimes was a critical point of

comparison, We believe the prejudicial effect of the photograph was not great

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relative to its probative value. The photo in question was taken three years
before the trial but only six months after the Cadiz burglaries. His appearance
uring that period was highly relevant to the comparison the jury needed to
‘make to determine if Appellant was the burglar. The trial court did not err in
allowing the jury to see it or in allowing the detective to testify about it.

‘The second issue of concern is whether the detective’s testimony that he
was familiar with Appellant because of “some cases” assigned to him and that
‘Appellant was “a suspect in some [other] things” violates KRE 404(b)'s general
prohibition against admitting evidence of other crimes? and its focus on
liminating the prejudicial effect that unavoidably ensues from such testimony.
‘To'be sure, the testimony in question was curtailed by timely objections, but
enough was said to create the impression that Appellant was well kriown to
Clarksville police because of his criminal conduct there.

KRE 404(b)(1) allows evidence of “other crimes” when it is relevant to
prove identity and knowiedge; and KRE 404(b)(2) allows such evidence when it
is “inextricably intertwined” with other essential evidence. Appellant's identity

was an issue at trial; also at issue was whether the detective had sufficient

8 KRE 404(b) provides:

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible:

(2) H offered for some other purpose, such as proof of motive,
‘opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident

(2) Ifso inextricably intertwined with other evidence essential to the case
‘that separation of the two (2) could not be accomplished without serious
adverse effect on the offering party.

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knowledge of Appellant to credibly identify him as the Cadiz burglar.
Appellant's prior acts, at least to the extent of their minimal reference here,
were inextricably intertwined with the detective's ability to identify Appellant.
It would be difficult to conceive how the detective could honestly and fairly
‘explain his familiarity with Appellant without saying something indicative of
Appellant's prior brushes with the law.

We agree that on the scales of a KRE 403 analysis, under different
circumstances the prejudicial effect of prior crimes evidence could readily

 

outweigh it
balance toward inadmissibility. We conclude that the challenged testimony

probative value, But the limited reference here does not tip the

‘was admissible to demonstrate the witness's knowledge of Appellant, and its
prejudicial effect was sufficiently contained. Accordingly, we further conclude
that the trial court correctly declined Appellant's motion for mistrial

‘Shabazz v. Commonwealth holds: “It is universally agreed that a mistrial
is an extreme remedy and should be resorted to only when there is a
fundamental defect in the proceedings which will result in a manifest
injustice.” 153 S.W.3d 806, 811 (Ky. 2005) (citation omitted). The prejudicial
inferences that might reasonably be drawn from the detective’s testimony did
not impose a fundamental defect in the proceedings resulting in a manifest
injustice, and thus presented no cause to declare a mistrial, The trial court
offered to provide admonitions to diminish or eliminate the prejudicial effect of
those statements. “The cure for accidental admission of prior bad acts is an

admonition to the jury to disregard the testimony. When an admonition is

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sufficient to cure an error and the defenidant fails to ask for one, we will not
review the error.” Boyd v. Commonwealth, 439 8.W.3d 126, 132-33 (Ky. 2014)
(internal citations omitted). Consequently, with Appellant declining the
admonitions, we conchude that the trial court did not err when making the
evidentiary rulings regarding the detective’s testimony.

B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing a police

officer's testimony that he saw Appellant wearing glasses during a
trial break.

‘The burglar shown in the video recordings of the Cadiz burglaries wore
glasses. During his trial, Appellant did not wear glasses. A Cadiz police officer
was permitted to testify that he saw Appellant wearing glasses during a trial
break. Appellant objected to the testimony on the grounds that at the time of
the officer’s observation, Appellant was conferring with counsel in the only
place available to them and therefore the observation was part of a protected
confidential communication. Appellant cites KRE 503(b) and KRE 503(a)(5),
the rules governing the lawyer-client privilege, as authority for preventing the
officer from disclosing his observation of Appellant and his counsel,
communicating.

KRE 503(b)(1) cloaks a lawyer's client with the authority “to prevent any
other person from disclosing a confidential communication [between the client
‘and the client's lawyer] made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of
professional legal services to the client.” “A communication is ‘confidential’ if [it

is) not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom.

 

disclosure is made in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services
to the client or those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the
communication.” KRE $03(a)(5}.

KRE 503 is intended and phrased to protect the content of the

 

‘communications between a client and his lawyer. “Communications from
attorney to client are privileged only if they constitute legal advice, or tend
directly or indirectly to reveal the substance of a client confidence.” Robert G.
Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, § 5.10 at 233 (Sd Ed. 1993)
(quoting United States v. Defazio, 899 F.2d 626, 635 (7th Cir. 1990)). See also
St. Clair v. Commonwealth,.140 8.W.3d 510, 548 (Ky. 2004) (*[T]he Kentucky
Evidence Rules Study Commission's commentary to KRE 503 states that {t]he
privilege does not extend to . .. non-communicative acts.’ (emphasis in
original)).”

‘We appreciate Appellant's desire to suppress the testimony that he wore
glasses 80 as to avoid the likely comparison with the individual depicted in the
crime scene video. But the fact remains that his appearance at the time of the
conference (or the conduct of wearing glasses) was not part of a lawyer-client
communication, and therefore it enjoys no privilege. The testimony in question
disclosed no protected communication between the lawyer and the client. Its

admission was not error.*

“+ We note that the Commonwealth cites a number of instances of Appellant
wearing glasses at pretrial hearings, so the fact that he, like the burglar depicted in
the video, wore eyeglasses, was no secret.

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C. The prosecutor's closing argument does not constitute palpable

error.
Appellant asserts that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by making
the following statement during closing argument.

You know, defense attorneys, they have a job to do. They've done a
great job in this trial. But they like to throw in these things that I
call smoke and mirrors. It's anything to distract away from the
fact that their client's committing these crimes. . .. It seems like
for defense attorneys nothing is ever good enough.

 

Appellant argues that the prosecutor's comment implies that his
attorneys are dishonest, and deprived him of a fair trial. Appellant made no
objection at the time of trial so he secks palpable error review of the issue
pursuant to RCr 10.26.5 Such review is available when an error is “easily
perceptible, plain, obvious and readily noticeable” and “the defect in the
proceeding was shocking or jurisprudentially intolerable.” Young v.
Commonwealth, 426 8,W.3d 577, 584 (Ky. 2014) (citations omitted).

“The parties have wide-latitude during closing statements to argue their
respective cases, to comment on the evidence and draw reasonable inferences
therefrom, and to draw attention to the weaknesses in the opposing party's.
case.” Ordway v. Commonwealth, 391 8.W.3d 762, 796 (Ky. 2013). However,

itis also recognized that the prosecutor must also “avoid abuse of defendants

® As provided in RCr 10.26, ‘[a] palpable error which affects the substantial
rights ofa party may be considered by the court on motion for a new trial or by an
‘appellate court on appeal, even though insuficiently raised or preserved for review,
land appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination that manifest injustice
hhas resulted from the error.”

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‘and their counsel.” Caudill v. Commonwealth, 374 8.W.3d 301, 309 (Ky. 2012)
(citation omitted).

‘We do not regard the comments under review as falling beyond the
bounds of proper closing statements. The reference to “smoke and mirrors”
merely suggests an artful effort by defense counsel to divert the jury's attention
from evidence the prosecutor wants them to see. It does not impute dishonesty
or deceit to the defense. Consequently, we do not find that palpable error or
manifest injustice occurred.

D. The trial court did not err when denying Appellant’s motions for a
directed verdict.

Appellant argues that he should have been granted a directed verdict on
the three burglaries which were not captured by surveillance video and for
which no forensic evidence implicated Appellant, When considering a request
for a directed verdict, “the trial court must draw all fair and reasonable
inferences from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth. If the evidence is
sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant is guilty, a directed verdict should not be given.”
Commonweaith v. Benham, 816 8.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991). Upon appellate
review of a directed verdict denial, it must be decided whether “under the
evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt.”
1d. (citing Commonwealth v. Sawhill, 660 8.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1983)). If so, only then
is the defendant entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal. Id.

Appellant argues that without photographic (or video) evidence or DNA

evidence connecting him to three of the burglaries, the jury could only find him
ul
 

guilty upon conjecture and suspicion. We disagree. All five business were
burglarized the same night under very similar circumstances: telephone lines
and security system lines at each site were severed; entry doors at each
building were damaged; the interiors were ransacked; and nothing but cash
‘was stolen. Moreover, the two burglaries which were captured on video were
within close proximity (less than 100 yards) of the other three. From this
circumstantial evidence it would not be unreasonable for a juror to believe
beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual pictured in two of the burglaries
also committed the other nearly identical break-ins, and that Appellant was
that person, Accordingly, we agree with the trial court's decision to deny

Appellant's motions for a directed verdict.

II, CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Trigg Circuit Court
entered in this matter is affirmed.

All sitting. All concur.

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COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Brandon Neil Jewell
Assistant Public Advocate
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Andy Beshear
Attorney General of Kentucky

Jeffrey Allan Cross
Assistant Attorney General

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