Title: Commonwealth v. Carter

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11517 
SJC-11518 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ANTWAN CARTER 
(and three companion cases1). 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     May 7, 2021. - August 16, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Firearms.  Joint Enterprise.  Jury and Jurors.  
Constitutional Law, Jury, Sex discrimination, Equal 
protection of laws.  Practice, Criminal, Jury and jurors, 
Challenge to jurors, Capital case.  Evidence, Prior 
misconduct, Relevancy and materiality, Inflammatory 
evidence, Joint enterprise, Statement of codefendant, Acts 
and declarations of conspirator. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on November 16, 2007. 
 
The cases were tried before Linda E. Giles, J. 
 
 
David J. Nathanson for Antwan Carter. 
Donald A. Harwood for Daniel Pinckney. 
Shane T. O'Sullivan, Assistant District Attorney (David D. 
McGowan, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
Ethan Rice & Richard Saenz, of New York, Katharine Naples-
Mitchell, Mary L. Bonauto, Gary D. Buseck, Chris Erchull, & 
 
1 One against Antwan Carter, and two against Daniel 
Pinckney. 
2 
 
Anthony Lombardi, for Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for 
Race and Justice & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
GEORGES, J.  Following two mistrials, a Superior Court jury 
convicted the defendants, Antwan Carter and Daniel Pinckney, of 
murder in the first degree on a theory of joint venture.2  On 
appeal, the defendants assert reversible error by the judge in 
allowing the Commonwealth's peremptory challenges of five 
prospective jurors over the defendants' objections pursuant to 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 95 (1986), and Commonwealth v. 
Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 486, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979) -- 
four based on the prospective jurors' race and one based on a 
juror's sexual orientation.  The defendants also assert numerous 
errors in the trial proceedings. 
We conclude that it was an abuse of discretion for the 
judge not to require the Commonwealth to provide a race-neutral 
reason for its challenge of at least one African-American juror.  
Because the judge's decision constitutes structural error for 
which prejudice is presumed, see Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 485 
Mass. 491, 514 (2020), we vacate the defendants' convictions and 
remand their cases for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.  We also conclude that sexual orientation is a 
protected class for purposes of a Batson-Soares challenge, 
 
2 The defendants also were convicted of possessing firearms 
without a license. 
3 
 
although the defendants did not satisfy their burden of 
production under the first step of the Batson-Soares inquiry 
with respect to that particular challenge.  See Commonwealth v. 
Jones, 477 Mass. 307, 321-322 (2017).  Finally, we address other 
claimed errors insofar as they may recur at any new trial.3 
Background.  1.  Facts.  We summarize the relevant facts as 
the jury could have found them, reserving certain details for 
discussion of specific issues. 
 
In late February 2007, Rashawn Hills, a friend of Carter 
and Pinckney, was shot and wounded.  Carter was present at the 
time but could not identify the shooter.  Subsequently, in 
conversations overheard by Pinckney's girlfriend, Latoya Thomas-
Dickson, Pinckney and Carter discussed the idea of retaliating 
against "the Highland Street kids," whom they believed were 
responsible for shooting Hills. 
On March 14, 2007, Thomas-Dickson overheard Carter and 
Pinckney speaking with a third person about "get[ting] one of 
them Highland Street kids."  The men appeared "amped" and "riled 
up."  Pinckney then asked Thomas-Dickson to join them on a drive 
in his vehicle, a black Pontiac; Pinckney drove while Thomas-
Dickson sat in the front passenger's seat and Carter in the back 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Charles 
Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice, Black and Pink 
Massachusetts, GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders, and Lambda 
Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. 
4 
 
seat.  The trio first stopped on Dorr Street, where Pinckney 
left the vehicle and walked along the street until he was shot 
at by someone described only as a "dark skinned chubby dude."  
Unhurt but "pissed off," Pinckney got back into the vehicle and 
quickly drove toward Centre Street. 
The trio then stopped at the corner of Centre and Highland 
Streets, where a man and two women were standing.  One of the 
women recognized Thomas-Dickson and knew the driver, Pinckney, 
by the name of "D."  Pinckney asked the man, Jermaine Davis, 
whether he was "from Highland Street," to which Davis responded, 
"No."  Pinckney then drove away.  Davis and the two women, in 
turn, walked toward a local convenience store (market) located 
on Highland Street. 
Pinckney drove back to Centre Street and parked in an 
alley, where he told Carter to "get [his gun] ready so when [he 
is] ready to shoot there's no complications."  Pinckney further 
instructed Carter to "hit anybody, just shoot, hit anybody."  At 
Pinckney's direction, Thomas-Dickson gave Carter her black 
cotton gloves, after which Carter got out of the vehicle and 
Pinckney drove along Highland Street, turned onto Norfolk 
Street, and parked. 
Meanwhile, the victim, Cedric Steele, mistakenly had locked 
his keys inside his car, which was outside the market.  Davis 
and his two female companions approached Steele, who "looked 
5 
 
nervous" and expressed a desire to get away from Highland 
Street.  As Davis and a manager at the market helped Steele try 
to get into his locked vehicle, gunfire erupted.  The manager 
saw a young man wearing blue jeans and a green hooded sweatshirt 
running on Highland Street with a gray pistol.  Davis, who had 
seen a black Pontiac being driven by moments earlier, saw an 
individual wearing a "dark colored hoodie" run along Highland 
Street, firing off several shots in quick succession, and then 
turn onto Norfolk Street.4  Steele was shot eight times by a nine 
millimeter handgun and died at the scene. 
As the shooting was unfolding, Pinckney and Thomas-Dickson 
remained in the black Pontiac on Norfolk Street.  After hearing 
gunshots nearby, Thomas-Dickson saw Carter running with a silver 
handgun from Highland Street onto Norfolk Street.  As he ran, 
Carter took off the green hooded sweatshirt and black gloves he 
was wearing and threw them underneath a nearby car.  Carter then 
 
4 Neither of Jermaine Davis's female companions directly 
witnessed the shooting.  One ran into the market after seeing a 
young man wearing a navy hooded sweatshirt, black sweater cap, 
and gloves pass by and take out a silver handgun.  The other 
also ran into the market after seeing what she believed to be 
the same black car that had stopped in front of her and Davis 
earlier being driven by the market and an individual wearing a 
green hooded sweatshirt and holding a silver gun approach 
Steele.  Meanwhile, two nearby residents heard gunshots and 
observed an individual wearing a forest green or dark-colored 
hooded sweatshirt run or quickly walk along Highland Street with 
a silver gun; one of them then saw the individual turn onto 
Norfolk Street. 
6 
 
got into the vehicle, whereupon Pinckney attempted to get 
Thomas-Dickson to take control of the gun, but she refused and 
asked Pinckney to drop her off at her mother's house a few 
blocks away.  Later, Thomas-Dickson called Pinckney to express 
her anger for involving her in the situation, to which Pinckney 
replied that he "wanted to see if [she] was a ride or die 
chick," meaning whether she was willing to go to jail for him.  
A few days later, she overheard the defendants discussing the 
shooting, during which the defendants stated, "We got one of 
them Highland Street kids." 
2.  Procedural history.  The defendants were indicted for 
murder in the first degree, G. L. c. 265 § 1; and possession of 
a firearm without a license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h).5  After two 
mistrials, on both occasions due to deadlocked juries, the 
defendants were convicted at a third joint jury trial on both 
indictments.  The present appeals followed. 
Discussion.  1.  Race-based peremptory challenges.  During 
jury selection in the third trial, the judge, relying on the 
racial composition of the then-seated jury, concluded that the 
defendants could not establish the necessary prima facie case of 
racial discrimination to warrant requiring the prosecutor to 
 
5 Carter also was indicted for intimidation of a witness, 
G. L. c. 268, § 13B, but his motion for a required finding of 
not guilty as to that charge was allowed during the first trial. 
7 
 
account for exercising peremptory challenges of four African-
American prospective jurors.  The defendants contend that this 
was an abuse of discretion.  For context, we summarize the 
relevant proceedings. 
a.  Background.  Carter first raised a race-based Batson-
Soares challenge when he objected to the Commonwealth striking 
juror no. 165, an African-American female.  By then, the 
Commonwealth had exercised fourteen peremptory challenges, 
including three to strike other African-Americans.  After noting 
that the Commonwealth's prior two challenges were of Caucasian 
females and that two African-American females already were 
seated on the jury, the judge determined that Carter had not 
established a prima facie case of racial discrimination as to 
juror no. 165. 
Carter again objected when the Commonwealth struck juror 
no. 171, another African-American female.  As the judge 
acknowledged, by that point the Commonwealth had used four of 
seventeen challenges to strike African-Americans.  After further 
noting that five of the ten seated members of the jury were 
African-American, however, the judge again concluded that Carter 
had failed to make a prima facie showing of irregularity as to 
the Commonwealth's challenge. 
Subsequently, Carter objected to the Commonwealth's 
challenge to juror no. 187, an African-American male in his 
8 
 
twenties.  This time, Pinckney also objected and noted that the 
juror was one of few considered by that point who would qualify 
as a "peer" of the defendants and thus potentially could relate 
to their life experiences in a way the other seated African-
American jurors, all in their fifties, could not.  The judge, 
however, was unpersuaded, noting that six of the twelve seated 
jurors were African-Americans, that Batson-Soares objections are 
"not extended to age," and that there were four Caucasians in 
their twenties already on the panel.  Accordingly, the judge 
declined to inquire into the prosecutor's strike of juror no. 
187. 
Finally, the defendants objected to the Commonwealth's 
challenge to juror no. 227, another African-American female.  
Once again, however, the judge declined to inquire of the 
prosecutor, having concluded that she did not discern any 
pattern of impermissible use of peremptory challenges by the 
Commonwealth given that five of the fourteen seated jurors were 
African-American. 
b.  Analysis.  "The Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights prohibit a party from exercising a peremptory 
challenge on the basis of race."  Jones, 477 Mass. at 319.  See 
Batson, 476 U.S. at 95; Soares, 377 Mass. at 486.  "A challenge 
to a peremptory strike, whether framed under State or Federal 
9 
 
law, is evaluated using a burden-shifting analysis."  
Commonwealth v. Ortega, 480 Mass. 603, 606 (2018), quoting 
Jones, supra.  "First, the burden is on the objecting party to 
establish a 'prima facie showing of impropriety' sufficient to 
'overcome[] the presumption of regularity afforded to peremptory 
challenges.'"  Commonwealth v. Henderson, 486 Mass. 296, 311 
(2020), quoting Commonwealth v. Robertson, 480 Mass. 383, 390-
391 (2018).  A single challenge can be sufficient to establish a 
prima facie case.  See Sanchez, 485 Mass. at 511, quoting 
Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2244 (2019) ("The 
[Federal] Constitution forbids striking even a single 
prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose").  If the judge 
finds that a prima facie case has been established, "the burden 
shifts to the party attempting to strike the prospective juror 
to provide a group-neutral reason for doing so."  Jones, supra.  
Finally, the judge must evaluate whether the proffered reason is 
"adequate" and "genuine" (citation omitted).  Robertson, supra 
at 391.  The issue here is whether the judge abused her 
discretion by concluding that the defendants had not made a 
prima facie showing of racial discrimination as to one or more 
of the peremptory challenges of jurors nos. 165, 171, 187, and 
227.  See Jones, supra at 320. 
As to the first step of the Batson-Soares inquiry, "the 
presumption of propriety is rebutted when 'the totality of the 
10 
 
relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory 
purpose.'"  Sanchez, 485 Mass. at 511, quoting Johnson v. 
California, 545 U.S. 162, 168 (2005).  Specifically, the inquiry 
is "merely a burden of production, not persuasion."  Jones, 477 
Mass. at 321, citing Sanchez v. Roden, 753 F.3d 279, 306 (1st 
Cir. 2014) (Sanchez V).  Because establishing a prima facie case 
of impropriety "is not an onerous task," Jones, supra, we have 
long cautioned that judges should "think long and hard before 
they decide to require no explanation from the prosecutor for 
the challenge and make no findings of fact."  Sanchez, supra at 
514, quoting Commonwealth v. Issa, 466 Mass. 1, 11 n.14 (2013). 
In determining whether a prima facie case of discriminatory 
purpose has been established, a judge may consider all relevant 
circumstances, see Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97, including 
"(1) 'the number and percentage of group members who have 
been excluded'; (2) 'the possibility of an objective group-
neutral explanation for the strike or strikes'; (3) 'any 
similarities between excluded jurors and those, not members 
of the allegedly targeted group, who have been struck'; (4) 
'differences among the various members of the allegedly 
targeted group who were struck'; (5) 'whether those 
excluded are members of the same protected group as the 
defendant or the victim'; and (6) 'the composition of the 
jurors already seated.'" 
 
Henderson, 486 Mass. at 311–312, quoting Jones, 477 Mass. at 
322.  We review the judge's decisions on the peremptory 
challenges for an abuse of discretion.  Ortega, 480 Mass. at 
606-607. 
11 
 
The Commonwealth contends that the judge did not err 
because she tracked the race and gender of each challenged 
juror; there was "no . . . dearth" of African-American jurors on 
the panel at the time of the subject challenges; and, at most, 
only twenty-seven percent of its challenges were used against 
African-Americans.  We are not persuaded. 
In concluding that the defendants failed to establish a 
prima facie case of discrimination as to any of the four jurors, 
the judge relied all but exclusively on the racial composition 
of the previously seated jurors.6  We have stressed, however, 
that "[w]hile the composition of seated jurors provides a prism 
through which to determine discriminatory intent, 'that is only 
one factor among many, and must be assessed in context.'"  
 
6 Although the judge noted that she also took into account 
the gender of the challenged jurors, the jurors' race was the 
dispositive factor the judge considered in overruling the 
defendants' Batson-Soares challenges.  For example, with respect 
to the Commonwealth's challenge of juror no. 227, the record 
indicates the following exchange: 
 
The judge:  "So how many African[-]Americans do we have on 
the Jury still?" 
 
The clerk:  "Five." 
 
The judge:  "Out of?" 
 
The clerk:  "Fourteen." 
 
The judge:  "Fourteen.  All right.  [Defense counsel], 
again, I will note your objection.  But I can't determine 
that you've made a prima facie showing [of racial 
discrimination]."  (Emphasis added.) 
12 
 
Ortega, 480 Mass. at 607, quoting Jones, 477 Mass. at 325.  We 
have cautioned judges not to rely heavily on composition, as 
"[t]he bare fact that some members of a protected group were 
seated on a jury does not immunize future peremptory challenges 
from constitutional scrutiny."  Sanchez, 485 Mass. at 512 n.16.  
Placing "undue weight on this factor not only would run counter 
to the mandate to consider all relevant circumstances . . . but 
also would send the 'unmistakable message that a prosecutor can 
get away with discriminating against some African-Americans 
. . . so long as a prosecutor does not discriminate against all 
such individuals.'"  Ortega, supra, quoting Jones, supra.  For 
this reason, in Sanchez V, 753 F.3d at 303-307, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit concluded that, 
notwithstanding the fact that five African-American jurors had 
already been seated in that case, a prima facie case of racial 
discrimination had been established, and the prosecutor should 
have been required to articulate a race-neutral reason for his 
peremptory strike.  This underscores our exhortation that the 
aforementioned factors are "neither mandatory nor exhaustive; a 
trial judge and a reviewing court must consider 'all relevant 
circumstances' for each challenged strike'" (footnote omitted).  
Sanchez, supra at 513, quoting Jones, supra at 322 n.24. 
Of particular concern here was the judge's decision not to 
require an explanation for striking juror no. 187.  At the time, 
13 
 
the Commonwealth had exercised five out of nineteen challenges 
against African-Americans, a rate in excess of twenty-five 
percent.  The rate at which the Commonwealth struck either 
African-American or Caucasian jurors relative to the entire jury 
pool is not evident from the record, and in any event, the rate 
challenges were used against African-American members of the 
venire, alone, does not establish a prima facie case.  Contrast 
Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 411 Mass. 313, 316-317 (1991) (prima 
facie showing made solely on basis that sixty-seven percent of 
African-American members of venire struck compared to fourteen 
percent of Caucasian members).  Importantly, however, juror no. 
187 was the first prospective juror to share both the same race 
and approximate age as the defendants.  See Robertson, 480 Mass. 
at 393, citing Issa, 466 Mass. at 9 (emphasizing need to keep 
"keen eye" out for challenges of members of same protected class 
as defendant).7 
In addition, "[w]hen reviewing a judge's decision not to 
inquire about a party's reason for exercising a peremptory 
challenge, we may consider the absence of a neutral reason 
 
7 We acknowledge, as did the judge during jury selection, 
that age is not a protected class for purposes of a Batson-
Soares challenge.  We note juror no. 187's age only to 
demonstrate that because no other individual juror shared the 
defendants' race, approximate age, and gender, juror no. 187 
uniquely could be deemed a "peer" of the defendants suited for 
jury service. 
14 
 
apparent in the record."  Robertson, 480 Mass. at 392–393.  
Juror no. 187 did not give any answers during voir dire to raise 
concerns.  When questioned by the judge, he affirmed that the 
nature of the charges would not impair his ability to be 
impartial and that the estimated length of the trial would not 
impose a hardship.  So, too, unlike with other jurors, the 
prosecutor did not find anything in juror no. 187's 
questionnaire that warranted further questioning.  Nonetheless, 
and notwithstanding having found juror no. 187 indifferent, the 
judge did not require the prosecutor to give a race-neutral 
reason for his peremptory challenge. 
Furthermore, the concern that juror no. 187 was struck 
because of his race only grows when compared to another juror 
seated over another Commonwealth challenge.  On the third and 
final day of jury selection, the Commonwealth challenged juror 
no. 252, an African-American female who, like juror no. 187, was 
twenty-six years old.  As with juror no. 187, the judge had 
found juror no. 252 to be indifferent based on answers provided 
during voir dire.  After noting that the Commonwealth had 
challenged two African-American females consecutively, however, 
the judge determined that a prima facie case of impropriety had 
been established and inquired of the Commonwealth.  The 
prosecutor stated that he challenged juror no. 252 due to her 
age and the possibility she may not have "roots in the 
15 
 
community."  Noting that there already were five seated jurors 
in their twenties, the judge was not persuaded and permitted 
juror no. 252 to be seated as the sixteenth and final juror. 
The similarities between jurors nos. 187 and 252 are 
striking.  Had the judge required the prosecutor to account for 
challenging the former, as she had with the latter, "the 
prosecutor might well have proffered an adequate and genuine 
race-neutral reason."8  Jones, 477 Mass. at 325.  Such was not 
the case, however, and thus we are compelled to conclude that 
the defendants made the limited showing necessary to make a 
prima facie case of racial discrimination with respect to the 
challenge of juror no. 187.9  Accordingly, "the defendants' 
 
8 With respect to another one of the four jurors on which 
the defendants focus, juror no. 171, the Commonwealth asserts in 
its brief that it struck this juror because she previously sat 
on a criminal jury that returned a not guilty verdict, as it had 
with eighty percent of the prospective jurors who expressed a 
similar past juror experience.  This post hoc assertion, 
however, only reinforces our conclusion that the judge should 
have required the Commonwealth to explain the basis for its 
strike at the time the defendants raised their Batson-Soares 
challenge.  We also note that the Commonwealth's brief does not 
provide an explanation for its challenge of juror no. 187. 
 
9 Because we conclude that the judge erred in not inquiring 
into the Commonwealth's challenge to juror no. 187, we need not 
address further the Commonwealth's challenges of jurors nos. 
165, 171, and 227. 
16 
 
convictions must be reversed."10  Ortega, 480 Mass. at 607-608.  
See Jones, supra at 325-326.11 
2.  Peremptory challenge based on sexual orientation.  The 
defendants also contend that the judge abused her discretion by 
declining to require the prosecutor to provide an explanation 
for striking a potentially gay person from the jury.  The 
parties agree that, albeit an issue of first impression, see 
Commonwealth v. Smith, 450 Mass. 395, 405, cert. denied, 555 
U.S. 893 (2008), sexual orientation is a protected class for 
purposes of a Batson-Soares objection.  The Commonwealth 
contends, however, that the judge did not err because there was 
insufficient certainty as to the juror's sexual orientation to 
 
10 The Commonwealth argues that there is a constitutionally 
permissible option available of remanding the case for an 
evidentiary hearing, at which it would bear the burden of 
establishing race-neutral justifications for its challenges that 
would render the errors harmless.  See Commonwealth v. Jones, 
477 Mass. 307, 326 n.31 (2017), citing Sanchez v. Roden, 753 
F.3d 279, 307 (1st Cir. 2014).  This argument is misguided 
because "[i]n Massachusetts, . . . we essentially have rejected 
remand as a remedy when a judge erroneously fails to find a 
prima facie showing at the first stage of the Batson-Soares 
inquiry."  Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 485 Mass. 491, 502 (2020).  
In addition, "[t]he possibility of a remand also conflicts with 
those cases where we have determined that prematurely 
terminating a Batson-Soares inquiry is structural error, the 
defining feature of which is a conclusive presumption of 
prejudice."  Id. at 503 n.7, citing Commonwealth v. Robertson, 
480 Mass. 383, 397 (2018). 
 
11 Although our conclusion above is dispositive and warrants 
reversal, we discuss some of the issues raised by the defendants 
that may arise at a new trial.  See Commonwealth v. Ortega, 480 
Mass. 603, 608 n.11 (2018). 
17 
 
warrant further inquiry.  Once again, we start by briefly 
reciting the relevant facts. 
a.  Background.  At the request of the defense during the 
first day of jury selection, the judge asked juror no. 202, a 
sixty-four year old female, to clarify her household status and 
listed the options of "single, married, domestic partner, 
separated, divorced or widowed," to which the juror answered, 
"domestic partner."  After the judge found the juror to be 
indifferent, the Commonwealth exercised a peremptory challenge.  
Carter's trial counsel then raised a Batson-Soares objection, 
asserting that the challenge was against a person who "may be 
considered gay."12  After noting that the phrase "domestic 
partner" could refer to both heterosexual and gay persons, the 
judge chose not to engage in any further Batson-Soares inquiry 
because this court has only required as much in instances 
 
12 At the time of the objection to the striking of juror no. 
202, Carter's trial counsel also objected to the Commonwealth's 
prior successful challenge of juror no. 176, a male juror, on 
the ground that it, too, was motivated by that juror's perceived 
gay sexual orientation.  Even if we were to assume (without 
deciding) that the objection was timely, however, the 
Commonwealth contends that it challenged juror no. 176 because 
he disclosed during voir dire that he was a litigation attorney.  
Because a neutral justification "evident from the record" may 
render a peremptory challenge permissible, see Commonwealth v. 
Lopes, 478 Mass. 593, 601 (2018), we focus on the challenge to 
juror no. 202.  We also note that the defendants do not cite, 
and we are unable to discern, any factual support in the record 
for trial counsel's assertion that juror no. 176 was gay. 
18 
 
involving "gender and race," and "sexual orientation is not one 
of those suspect classifications." 
b.  Sexual orientation as protected class.  "Article 12 
. . . proscribes the use of peremptory challenges 'to exclude 
prospective jurors solely by virtue of their membership in, or 
affiliation with, particular, defined groupings in the 
community.'"  Smith, 450 Mass. at 405, quoting Soares, 377 Mass. 
at 486.  These groupings are defined by art. 1 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, as amended by art. 106 of 
the Amendments (Equal Rights Amendment), which protects against 
discrimination based on sex, race, color, creed, or national 
origin.  See Soares, supra at 488-489.  Since then, we have 
recognized that the scope of these protections has expanded, see 
Commonwealth v. Prunty, 462 Mass. 295, 305 n.13 (2012), as 
"[e]qual protection of the laws is a concept that permeates the 
Massachusetts Constitution," Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. 
Connector Auth., 459 Mass. 655, 667 (2011).  See J.E.B. v. 
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (extending 
Federal Batson procedure to peremptory challenges based on 
gender).  We now conclude that a peremptory challenge based on a 
prospective juror's sexual orientation is prohibited by arts. 1 
and 12 and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Three important considerations mandate this 
conclusion. 
19 
 
First, it cannot be doubted that gay individuals 
historically have faced pernicious discrimination, including by 
the State, solely because of their sexual orientation.  As the 
United States Supreme Court has recognized, throughout our 
history, "[g]ays and lesbians were prohibited from most 
government employment, barred from military service, excluded 
under immigration laws, targeted by police, and burdened in 
their rights to associate," not to mention that "[f]or much of 
the [Twentieth] [C]entury . . . homosexuality was treated as an 
illness."  Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 661 (2015).  This 
discrimination is rooted in the fact that, "for centuries[,] 
there have been powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as 
immoral."  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003). 
Such discrimination is not only historical; its cultural 
and societal effects continue in modern times.  In 
Massachusetts, specifically, gay partners were not permitted to 
partake in the civil institution of marriage until a landmark 
decision by this court fewer than twenty years ago.  See 
Goodridge v. Department of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309, 344 
(2003) ("barring an individual from the protections, benefits, 
and obligations of civil marriage solely because that person 
would marry a person of the same sex violates the Massachusetts 
20 
 
Constitution").13  And recently, in Bostock v. Clayton County, 
Ga., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737-1738 (2020), the Supreme Court 
considered the case of a long-time, distinguished Georgia county 
employee who was abruptly discharged after it was discovered he 
had joined a gay recreational softball league.  Given this 
painful history of discrimination, there is no question that gay 
people constitute a "discrete group" as contemplated by art. 12 
and as protected by the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott 
Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 484 (9th Cir. 2014) ("we are required by 
[United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013),] to apply 
heightened scrutiny to classifications based on sexual 
orientation for purposes of equal protection" under Fourteenth 
Amendment).  Cf. Soares, 377 Mass. at 488 ("Further discussion 
is hardly required to establish that [African-Americans] 
constitute a discrete group" for equal protection purposes). 
Second, a person's sexual orientation is "inextricably 
bound up with sex."  Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1742.  As the 
 
13 As testament to the still-nascent nature of our society's 
progress in the area of gay and lesbian discrimination, we note 
that as recent as this court's decision in Goodridge v. 
Department of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309 (2003), is, it still 
predates by nearly twelve years the Supreme Court's decision in 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 675 (2015), wherein the 
Court first declared that same-sex couples have a fundamental 
right to marry safeguarded by the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
21 
 
Supreme Court recognized in the context of employment 
protections under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, "it 
is impossible to discriminate against a person for being 
homosexual . . . without discriminating against that individual 
based on sex," id. at 1741, because "[w]hen an employer fires an 
employee for being homosexual . . . , it necessarily and 
intentionally discriminates against that individual in part 
because of sex."  Id. at 1744.  The same dynamics apply in the 
jury selection context:  for a prospective juror to be 
challenged based on sexual orientation, the challenging party 
must inherently rely on the person's perceived sex and the 
gender norms associated therewith. 
Third, and most simply, a prospective juror's sexual 
orientation is not at all relevant to whether that person is 
able to serve as an impartial juror; on the contrary, "[s]trikes 
exercised on the basis of sexual orientation continue this 
deplorable tradition of treating gays and lesbians as 
undeserving of participation in our nation's most cherished 
rites and rituals."  SmithKline Beecham Corp., 740 F.3d at 485.  
See Morgan v. State, 134 Nev. 200, 212 (2018), quoting 
SmithKline Beecham Corp., supra at 486 (Batson challenges extend 
to sexual orientation, based on "[t]he history of exclusion of 
gays and lesbians from democratic institutions and the 
pervasiveness of stereotypes").  Indeed, "the exclusion of 
22 
 
prospective jurors 'solely by virtue of their membership in, or 
affiliation with, particular, defined groupings in the 
community' . . . violates a defendant's constitutional right to 
a fair and impartial jury."  Commonwealth v. Williams, 481 Mass. 
443, 457 (2019), quoting Soares, 377 Mass. at 486. 
The constitutional harm is not limited just to the 
defendant, however.  "While injustice to any individual is 
intolerable under our system of justice, and denial of the 
rights of a cognizable group is unconstitutional, in the long 
run, the greatest threat of failure to guarantee the right of 
gays and lesbians to serve on juries is to the [C]ommonwealth," 
People v. Garcia, 77 Cal. App. 4th 1269, 1279 (2000), as "[t]he 
diverse and representative character of the jury must be 
maintained 'partly as assurance of a diffused impartiality and 
partly because sharing in the administration of justice is a 
phase of civic responsibility" (quotation omitted), id., quoting 
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 134.14 
 
14 We emphasize that it is neither appropriate nor 
encouraged for judges or parties to ask prospective jurors their 
sexual orientation.  "No one should be 'outed' in order to take 
part in the civic enterprise which is jury duty."  People v. 
Garcia, 77 Cal. App. 4th 1269, 1280 (2000).  As the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit aptly explained: 
 
"For some [gay] individuals, being forced to announce their 
sexuality risks intruding into the intimate process of 
self-discovery that is 'coming out,' a process that can be 
at once affirming and emotionally fraught.  Equally 
important, coming out for many gays and lesbians is a life-
23 
 
While we now hold that sexual orientation is a protected 
class for purposes of a Batson-Soares challenge, we conclude 
that there were insufficient facts in the record to reasonably 
establish juror no. 202's sexual orientation, and thus the 
defense did not satisfy its burden of production under the first 
step of the Batson-Soares inquiry with respect to that 
particular challenge.  See Jones, 477 Mass. at 321.  
Accordingly, we need not address this issue further.15 
 
defining moment of celebrating one's dignity and identity.  
Deciding when, and how, and to whom one comes out is a 
vital part of this process, and it should not be co-opted 
in the name of affording a group that has long been 
discriminated against the constitutional rights to which it 
is entitled." 
 
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 487 (9th 
Cir. 2014). 
 
15 We acknowledge that "[f]or gays and lesbians, keeping 
one's sexual orientation private has long been a strategy for 
avoiding the ramifications -- job loss, being disowned by 
friends and family, or even potential physical danger -- that 
accompanied open acknowledgment of one's sexual orientation for 
most of the [T]wentieth [C]entury and sometimes even today."  
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 740 F.3d at 486–487.  See Yoshino, 
Covering, 111 Yale L.J. 769, 814 (2002).  These privacy 
concerns, coupled with the fact that sexual orientation is 
"concealable" in ways unlike race or gender, see post at    , 
could potentially complicate application of the first step of 
the Batson-Soares inquiry to challenges based on sexual 
orientation.  Although the concurrence asserts that this court 
should abandon the first step of the Batson-Soares inquiry, see 
post at    , "a determination to do so unquestionably is a 
decision we cannot reach here, without full briefing and input 
from the bar," Sanchez, 485 Mass. at 513 n.19.  See id. at 518 
(Gants, C.J., concurring) ("if we were to announce such a 
departure from our current [Batson-Soares] jurisprudence, we 
should do so in a case where the question is squarely presented 
24 
 
3.  Prior bad acts.  The defendants also challenge the 
admission of various prior bad acts evidence, including (1) 
Carter's prior arrest for unlawful possession of a firearm; (2) 
various evidence of both defendants' contacts with law 
enforcement and alleged gang affiliation; and (3) testimony from 
a witness regarding an unresolved shooting near Highland Street 
three days before Steele's murder.  We briefly discuss each in 
turn. 
a.  Carter's prior firearm arrest.  The Commonwealth 
introduced, over objection, evidence that Carter was arrested in 
August 2006 for unlawful possession of a loaded nine millimeter 
handgun, found in a bureau in his home.  The evidence was 
admitted subject to a limiting instruction that the jury could 
consider the prior arrest only as it related to Carter's 
knowledge of and access to firearms generally.  The defendants 
argue that the unduly prejudicial nature of the evidence 
outweighed any such probative value because the firearm had been 
seized and could not have been used to murder Steele.  They also 
contend that the Commonwealth urged the jury to draw an improper 
inference from the prior arrest when, during closing argument, 
the prosecutor suggested it was proof of Carter's role in a gang 
as the provider of guns. 
 
and where we have the benefit of briefing by the parties and 
amici"). 
25 
 
The Commonwealth maintains that the evidence was properly 
admitted and that the prior arrest contextualized global 
positioning system (GPS) evidence from Carter's ankle monitoring 
bracelet on the day of Steele's murder, which showed that he 
returned to his home briefly before joining Pinckney at 
Pinckney's residence, where they would plot revenge for Hills's 
shooting.  More to the point, the Commonwealth suggests that it 
is reasonable to infer from the combination of the prior firearm 
arrest and the GPS evidence that Carter retrieved the eventual 
murder weapon during that brief visit to his home. 
"Evidence of previous possession of a firearm other than 
the one used to commit the crime . . . may be admissible 'to 
show that the defendant had access to or knowledge of 
firearms.'"  Commonwealth v. Pierre, 486 Mass. 418, 424 (2020), 
quoting Commonwealth v. McGee, 467 Mass. 141, 157 (2014).  Even 
if evidence is relevant to this purpose, however, it will not be 
admitted if its probative value is outweighed by the risk of 
unfair prejudice to the defendant.  Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 
Mass. 228, 249 (2014).  "Where a weapon definitively could not 
have been used in the commission of the crime, we have generally 
cautioned against admission of evidence related to it."  
Commonwealth v. Collazo, 481 Mass. 498, 501 (2019), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Imbert, 479 Mass. 575, 585 (2018).  "This is 
because the prejudicial impact on the jury is likely to outweigh 
26 
 
the 'tenuous relevancy of evidence of a person's general 
acquaintance with weapons.'"  Pierre, supra at 425, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Toro, 395 Mass. 354, 358 (1985).  Such was the 
case here. 
There was, at best, a tenuous connection between Carter's 
prior firearm arrest and Steele's murder.  While the firearms 
from both incidents were nine millimeter handguns, the firearm 
from 2006 had been seized and thus "definitively" was not used 
in Steele's murder in 2007; indeed, the parties stipulated as 
much at trial.  As for the GPS evidence, it indicated only that 
Carter was present in his home "for a minute" before he went to 
Pinckney's residence on the day of the murder.  The Commonwealth 
does not cite, nor are we aware of, any other evidence to 
support an inference that Carter retrieved the murder weapon 
during that time. 
Furthermore, while the prior arrest evidence may have 
established Carter's familiarity with the kind of firearm used 
in Steele's murder, it ultimately was used for an improper 
purpose when the prosecutor urged the jury during closing 
argument to conclude, based on the prior arrest, that it was 
Carter's larger responsibility to "hav[e] access to those guns" 
and his "role" to supply gang members with firearms.  Carter's 
arrest for unlawful possession of a firearm, without more, does 
not reasonably support such an inference.  Contrast Pierre, 486 
27 
 
Mass. at 426 (admission of prior arrest for firearm similar to 
murder weapon not error where prosecutor did not dwell on it 
either during evidentiary portion of trial or at closing 
argument).  Accordingly, the admission of the evidence 
constituted prejudicial error. 
b.  Gang evidence.  The Commonwealth introduced evidence, 
over the defendants' objections, of the defendants' alleged gang 
affiliation, which included, among other things, the defendants' 
prior contacts with probation officers and the youth violence 
strike force of the Boston police department; several traffic 
stops by police in April 2007; and testimony from Thomas-Dickson 
about various imagery on Pinckney's social media account 
suggesting he was the leader of the Mass. Ave. Hornets gang.  
The defendants contend that the judge improperly admitted 
evidence of their gang affiliation because there was 
insufficient evidence to support the Commonwealth's theory that 
Steele's murder was part of a feud between the Mass. Ave. 
Hornets gang and a rival Highland Street gang.  Thus, the 
defendants contend that the gang evidence, coupled with 
testimony about their prior contacts with law enforcement, 
served to prejudice them in the eyes of the jury.  The 
Commonwealth disagrees, arguing that the evidence was admissible 
to show the defendants' motive and participation in Steele's 
28 
 
murder as joint venturers, specifically to exact revenge against 
a rival gang they believed was responsible for shooting Hills. 
"Gang evidence may be admissible to show motive or to 
establish joint venture."  Commonwealth v. Akara, 465 Mass. 245, 
267 (2013).  Specifically, "[w]e have most often allowed gang 
evidence to be admitted for the purpose of establishing joint 
venture in cases where the evidence showed that the offense 
involved retaliation or conflict between rival gang members, and 
that the defendants therefore shared a common motive."  Id. at 
268.  "We [also] have, however, urged caution in admitting gang-
related evidence because of the risk of suggesting that the 
defendant may have a propensity for criminality or violence."  
Commonwealth v. Lopes, 478 Mass. 593, 604 (2018).  This is 
because, "[a]lthough not all gangs are the same and not all gang 
affiliations are the same, community attitudes towards gang 
violence are likely to color [the] evidence" (quotation and 
citation omitted).  Akara, supra at 267-268.  Thus, the 
proffered gang evidence must not only be relevant to motive, but 
also be more probative than unduly prejudicial.  See 
Commonwealth v. Gray, 463 Mass. 731, 753 (2012); Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 404(b) (2021). 
We conclude that the probative value of the gang evidence 
was outweighed by its prejudicial unfairness.  Here, the judge 
noted multiple times that the various pieces of gang affiliation 
29 
 
evidence would be admitted subject to the expectation that 
Thomas-Dickson's testimony (or that of another witness) would 
establish the existence of a rival gang and "hostilities" 
between the defendants and that rival gang.16  The record, 
however, does not provide sufficient foundation for this theory.  
Thomas-Dickson testified simply that the defendants believed one 
of "the Highland Street kids" was responsible for shooting 
Hills; she did not testify to the existence of a rival gang, let 
alone a feud or state of hostilities.  Nor is there any other 
evidence in the record establishing such a gang feud or rivalry. 
Furthermore, gang membership was not "essential to 
understanding the motivation behind the crimes."  Commonwealth 
v. Maldonado, 429 Mass. 502, 504 (1999).  Given Thomas-Dickson's 
testimony that the defendants believed Hills had been shot by 
someone from the Highland Street neighborhood, and Pinckney's 
later instruction to Carter to "hit anybody, just shoot, hit 
anybody," the evidence establishes that the defendants intended 
to exact revenge for Hills's shooting by retaliating against 
someone on Highland Street.  Evidence of the defendants' gang 
affiliation was not necessary for the jury to understand that 
 
16 Specifically, the judge told the prosecutor:  "I'm going 
to allow the motion only insofar . . . [as] that you may call a 
person with a proper foundation who can testify as to what is 
meant by a Highland kid.  In other words, if he's a member of a 
gang called Highland Street or whatever they're called." 
30 
 
the defendants were motivated by revenge, and unlike in other 
cases we have considered, the record does not establish that 
Steele was, or likely could have been, a member of a rival gang.  
Contrast Commonwealth v. Wardsworth, 482 Mass. 454, 471-472 
(2019) (gang evidence admissible to show motive where witness 
had personal knowledge of gang rivalry and knew specific members 
of both gangs who were shot in months leading up to killing); 
Commonwealth v. Phim, 462 Mass. 470, 477-478 (2012) (gang 
affiliation admissible to explain why defendant fired into 
crowded residence where members of rival gang had gathered).  
Accordingly, the repeated references to the defendants' alleged 
gang affiliation, coupled with the witnesses' repeated 
references to the defendants' prior contacts with law 
enforcement, rendered the evidence more unduly prejudicial than 
probative. 
c.  Unresolved shooting.  Over the defendants' objection, a 
witness testified that, three days before Steele's murder, he 
observed a "black male in a . . . hoodie" fire a gun near Dorr 
and Highland Streets and flee in a dark-colored vehicle.  The 
defendants contend that the judge erred in admitting this 
testimony and that its influence on the jury was heightened by 
the fact that the Commonwealth referenced the shooting during 
closing argument to suggest there were "problems up on Dorr 
Street."  The Commonwealth contends the evidence was relevant to 
31 
 
establishing "hostilities" on Highland Street leading up to 
Steele's murder. 
This evidence was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial.  The 
witness could not identify the earlier shooter and the testimony 
did not in any way tie the prior shooting to either of the 
defendants or Steele's murder three days later.  Moreover, the 
identification of the earlier shooter as a "black male in a 
hoodie" could have led the jury to infer, without adequate 
foundation, that it was one of the defendants.  Accordingly, the 
testimony regarding the earlier shooting should not have been 
admitted. 
4.  Joint venturer statements.  Following Steele's murder 
on March 14, 2007, and while in custody on an unrelated charge, 
Carter made a series of telephone calls between May and July 
2007 in which he urged others, in graphic terms, to "take care" 
of Thomas-Dickson.  At trial, the statements were admitted 
against Pinckney, over objection, as statements of a joint 
venturer.  Pinckney argues that this was error because there was 
insufficient evidence of a joint venture when Carter's 
statements were made.  We disagree. 
"[O]ut-of-court statements by joint venturers are 
admissible against the others if the statements are made during 
the pendency of the criminal enterprise and in furtherance of 
it."  Commonwealth v. Lopez, 485 Mass. 471, 474–475 (2020), 
32 
 
quoting Commonwealth v. Winquist, 474 Mass. 517, 520-521 (2016).  
"Statements made in an effort to conceal a crime, made after the 
crime has been completed, may be admissible under the joint 
venture [exemption] because the joint venture is then ongoing, 
with a purpose to ensure that the joint venture itself remains 
concealed."  Commonwealth v. Carriere, 470 Mass. 1, 11 (2014).  
We review the decision to admit such statements for abuse of 
discretion, and we view the evidence of the existence of the 
joint venture in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 
recognizing that it may be proved by circumstantial evidence.  
Lopez, supra at 475. 
The record does not indicate whether Carter and Pinckney 
were in contact between May and July of 2007.  However, they 
simultaneously engaged in efforts to prevent Thomas-Dickson from 
implicating them in Steele's murder.  Through telephone calls 
and letters to Thomas-Dickson between May and June of 2007, 
while he too was in custody on charges unrelated to Steele's 
murder, Pinckney instructed Thomas-Dickson to lie to the police 
about their whereabouts on the day of the murder.  He told her, 
"You already know what to do.  Just keep your mouth closed and 
don't say anything at all[!]  You hear me[???]," and threatened 
her should she fail to comply.17  Thomas-Dickson understood 
 
17 During the second trial, Thomas-Dickson recanted her 
inculpatory testimony from the first trial and, as Pinckney had 
33 
 
Pinckney's threats as an effort to keep her from implicating him 
and Carter in Steele's murder. 
"Absent some affirmative indication that the venture had 
terminated, or that the defendant had withdrawn from it, we do 
not treat attempts to conceal the criminal actions and purposes 
of a pre-existing joint venture as constituting a new venture 
requiring a separate evidentiary foundation" (footnote omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Bright, 463 Mass. 421, 437 (2012).  Although 
both defendants were in custody separately at the time Carter's 
statements were made, neither defendant was in custody for 
charges related to Steele's murder.  Contrast Commonwealth v. 
Drew, 397 Mass. 65, 70-71 (1986), S.C., 447 Mass. 635 (2006), 
cert. denied, 550 U.S. 943 (2007) (coconspirator statements not 
admissible under joint venture exemption to hearsay rule where 
defendant and declarant accomplice already arrested for crimes 
charged).  Thus, while the defendants may not have acted 
together to conceal their criminal behavior at the time Carter 
made the statements, his statements, like Pinckney's, were 
 
instructed her, falsely testified that the two of them were at 
his mother's house in another town on the day of the murder.  
The Commonwealth then held her as a material witness and 
immunized her for perjuring herself.  Nonetheless, Thomas-
Dickson continued to testify falsely at the second trial as to 
her and Pinckney's whereabouts on the day of the murder.  
Subsequently, she was charged with perjury and pleaded guilty.  
At the third trial, conducted while she was awaiting sentencing, 
Thomas-Dickson again provided inculpatory testimony, as she did 
in the first trial. 
34 
 
nevertheless "part and parcel of their ongoing joint venture to 
murder [Steele], to conceal their involvement in the crimes, and 
to avoid detection and arrest by eliminating a potential witness 
who knew too much about their activities."  Winquist, 474 Mass. 
at 525.  Accordingly, the judge did not abuse her discretion by 
admitting Carter's statements against Pinckney under the joint 
venture exemption to the hearsay rule. 
Conclusion.  The defendants' convictions are vacated, and 
the cases are remanded to the Superior Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
LOWY, J. (concurring).  I agree with the court that the 
Batson-Soares test (Batson test) protects against discriminatory 
peremptory challenges based on sexual orientation.  See Batson 
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93-94 (1986); Commonwealth v. Soares, 
377 Mass. 461, 489-490, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979).  
Although the issue need not be decided because the defendants' 
convictions are reversed on other grounds, I write separately 
out of a concern that the first step of the Batson test -- which 
requires that the party objecting to a peremptory challenge make 
a prima facie showing of discrimination -- is unworkable when 
applied to cases of discrimination based on sexual orientation.  
To illustrate the point, I consider three possible approaches 
discussed by commentators that would retain the first step as 
applied to sexual orientation discrimination.  None of these 
approaches is well suited to guarantee in practice the 
protections announced by the court.  Consequently, today's 
opinion leads me to reaffirm my view that "upon timely objection 
to a peremptory challenge made on the basis of [a] protected 
class, we should conclude that that party has met the first 
prong of the Batson-Soares test."  Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 485 
Mass. 491, 515 (2020) (Lowy, J., concurring). 
1.  Application of Batson to discrimination based on sexual 
orientation.  As commentators have noted, "[t]he extension of 
Batson to sexual orientation is primarily complicated by the 
2 
 
difficulty of demonstrating the first prong."  Last, Peremptory 
Challenges to Jurors Based on Sexual Orientation:  Preempting 
Discrimination by Court Rule, 48 Ind. L. Rev. 313, 332 (2014).  
See, e.g., Note, Beyond Comparison:  Practical Limitations of 
Implementing Comparative Juror Analysis in the Context of Sexual 
Orientation, 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1075, 1089-1091 (2016) 
(Beyond Comparison) (cataloging difficulties of applying Batson 
to sexual orientation without modifying first step); Young, 
Outing Batson:  How the Case of Gay Jurors Reveals the 
Shortcomings of Modern Voir Dire, 48 Willamette L. Rev. 243, 261 
(2011) ("applying Batson in its current form to sexual 
orientation . . . would be glaringly inadequate to safeguard 
these jurors' equal protection rights"). 
 
The reason behind this difficulty is that "[s]exual 
orientation, unlike race and gender, is concealable," or at 
least more readily so.  Note, Extending Batson to Sexual 
Orientation:  A Look at SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs, 
2015 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1681, 1705 (2015).  As a result, when a 
party objects to a peremptory challenge based on sexual 
orientation, the first step places that party at a unique 
disadvantage.  See Note, Looking Beyond Batson:  A Different 
Method of Combating Bias Against Queer Jurors, 61 Wm. & Mary L. 
Rev. 1759, 1777 (2020) ("Batson's failure to address both 
pretense and implicit bias makes it difficult to apply in a 
3 
 
racial context and nearly impossible to apply to invisible 
identities"). 
 
To see how, consider members of the venire who provide no 
information about their sexual orientation.  Even though their 
orientation has not been volunteered, "an attorney may still 
strike with discriminatory animus based on stereotypes about 
sexual orientation, including:  vocal pitch, hairstyle, and 
clothing."  Beyond Comparison, 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 1090.  
See Comment, Juror Sexual Orientation:  The Fair Cross-Section 
Requirement, Privacy, Challenges for Cause, and Peremptories, 46 
UCLA L. Rev. 231, 243, 246-247 (1998) (detailing how attorneys 
find ways to target members of venire based on sexual 
orientation despite this attribute not being "readily 
identifiable"). 
 
Because of this continued possibility of discrimination, 
commentators have discussed three options for making out a prima 
facie case if the first step is preserved unmodified.  See 
Young, 48 Willamette L. Rev. at 256-261.  Those options are (1) 
inquiring directly into jurors' sexual orientation, (2) allowing 
the objecting party to use stereotypes to meet the first step, 
and (3) only allowing a first step challenge based on explicit 
information offered by jurors that illustrates their sexual 
orientation.  None of these approaches adequately protects 
against discrimination in this context. 
4 
 
a.  Inquiring into the sexual orientation of members of the 
venire.  The first option -- inquiring directly into the  sexual 
orientation of members of the venire, either through the jury 
form, in camera, or via some other way -- can be rejected 
outright as an intolerable intrusion into privacy interests that 
courts ought to respect.  See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior 
Court, 464 U.S. 501, 514 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring) 
("Certainly, a juror has a valid interest in not being required 
to disclose to all the world highly personal . . . information 
simply because he is called to do his public duty"); Brandborg 
v. Lucas, 891 F. Supp. 352, 360 (E.D. Tex. 1995) ("[A person] 
should not lose [his or] her expectation of privacy merely by 
becoming a prospective juror").1 
Even if the impact on privacy interests were bearable, this 
approach misconstrues the analysis, focusing on how members of 
the venire identify instead of how the striking party perceives 
them.  See generally Shay, In the Box:  Voir Dire on LGBT Issues 
in Changing Times, 37 Harv. J.L. & Gender 407, 456 (2014) ("It 
should not matter whether the prospective juror identifies as a 
 
 
1 Privacy interests may be particularly salient in the 
context of sexual orientation.  See Young, Outing Batson:  How 
the Case of Gay Jurors Reveals the Shortcomings of Modern Voir 
Dire, 48 Willamette L. Rev. 243, 258 (2011) ("depending on the 
juror's circumstance, public questioning could subject him or 
her to professional, personal, or physical harm -- in addition 
to discomfort, embarrassment, and irritation at having a roomful 
of strangers speculate about the sex of her romantic partners"). 
5 
 
transgender woman or a gay man; it is unacceptable for the state 
to strike a juror because the prosecutor reads the venireperson 
as gender non-conforming or transgender").  Given that it both 
invades the  privacy of the member of the venire and, in the 
process, misplaces the focus of analysis, this option must be 
discarded. 
 
b.  Condoning use of stereotypes.  The second option would 
be to allow the objecting party to employ stereotypes to make 
out a prima facie case of discrimination.  While, unlike the 
previous approach, this one would appropriately frame the 
analysis around the striking party's perceptions of the juror's 
sexual orientation, it would also do more harm than good.  This 
approach would be tantamount to judicial sanctioning of the very 
prejudices that Batson is meant to purge from the jury selection 
process.  See Young, 48 Willamette L. Rev. at 258 (detailing how 
this option would "saddle[]" judges "with the task of separating 
the traits which contribute to the juror's 'seeming' 
homosexuality from those which do not -- an uncomfortable 
proposition fraught with guesswork and prejudice, in addition to 
extreme disrespect to the juror").  As such, it, too, must be 
rejected. 
 
c.  Limiting the basis for a first step challenge to 
explicit information offered by the juror.  Finally, one could 
limit the information that an objecting party may draw upon to 
6 
 
that freely given by the prospective jurors themselves that 
either states or implies their sexual orientation.  Although 
this option avoids prying into the personal lives of members of 
the venire and sidesteps equally disrespectful colloquies, it 
still does not adequately protect against discrimination.  See 
Young, 48 Willamette L. Rev. at 260 ("If Batson was applied to 
sexual orientation, but attorneys were neither permitted to 
inquire about jurors' sexual orientation directly, nor permitted 
to engage in the bizarre [and disrespectful speculations about a 
juror's possible sexual orientation] . . . , Batson would offer 
protection only to jurors who happened to state, in the course 
of answering other questions, that they are gay or lesbian").  
Whole swaths of members of the venire would not be protected 
against discrimination based on sexual orientation under this 
approach. 
 
Specifically, challengers under this approach may rely, 
albeit furtively, on a host of stereotypes that they perceive 
when exercising a peremptory.  See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 
231, 267 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) ("At Batson's first 
step, litigants remain free to misuse peremptory challenges as 
long as the strikes fall below the prima facie threshold 
level").  Objectors, however, will only be able to rely on the 
information explicitly provided by members of the venire about 
their sexual orientation -- assuming any relevant information is 
7 
 
provided -- in mounting a prima facie case against the 
challenge.  When applied to sexual orientation, this option 
skews the information asymmetry inherent in Batson further in 
favor of the party exercising an improper peremptory challenge.2 
2.  Alternative solution.  Each of the three possible 
approaches to retaining the first step unmodified in this 
context is replete with problems.  These inadequacies, among 
other reasons, see generally Sanchez, 485 Mass. at 514-518 
(Lowy, J., concurring), are why I believe that upon timely 
objection to a peremptory challenge based on sexual orientation, 
we should conclude that that party has met the first prong of 
the Batson test. 
Proceeding to the second step upon a timely objection to a 
peremptory challenge based on a protected class avoids many of 
the problems presented by the options above:  it would respect 
jurors' privacy interests, properly place the focus of the 
analysis on the intentions of the party using the preemptory 
 
 
2 Putting the onus on members of the venire also presents 
them with a dilemma:  either they must explicitly provide their 
sexual orientation to the court and thus give information that 
may form the basis of both a discriminatory peremptory challenge 
and an objection to it, or they must remain silent and thus risk 
being discriminated against without the objecting party having 
much recourse.  In short, rather than judges making the 
difficult decision of how best to protect the jury selection 
process from discrimination, the third option outsources a 
crucial aspect of this task to the very people whom courts are 
bound to protect. 
8 
 
challenge, and better safeguard against discriminatory exercises 
of peremptory strikes when members of the venire do not provide 
information concerning their sexual orientation.  As an 
additional benefit, proceeding to the second step upon a timely 
objection would create a record on a Batson issue for appellate 
review, lessening the possibility of a reversal -- as happened 
yet again here -- with its attendant prospect of a costly 
retrial.  See Sanchez, 485 Mass. at 515-516 (Lowy, J., 
concurring) (cataloging cases where ending inquiry at first step 
resulted in reversal).  See also People v. Rhoades, 8 Cal. 5th 
393, 469-470 (2019) (Liu, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 414 
S. Ct. 659 (2020) (advancing to second step upon timely 
objection "would serve the important goals of promoting 
transparency, creating a record for appellate review, and 
ensuring public confidence in our justice system, while imposing 
'the comparatively low cost of requiring a party to state its 
actual reasons for striking a minority prospective juror'" 
[citation omitted]). 
 
Admittedly, the changes I suggest represent a notable shift 
in practice.  See Sanchez, 485 Mass. at 513 n.19.  However, 
other jurisdictions have already charted similar courses.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Moore, 28 M.J. 366, 368 (C.M.A. 1989) 
(elimination of prima facie requirement in military courts); 
State v. King, 249 Conn. 645, 658 n.18 (1999) ("the party 
9 
 
objecting to the exercise of the peremptory challenge satisfies 
step one of the tripartite process simply by raising the 
objection" [citation omitted]); Melbourne v. State, 679 So. 2d 
759, 764 (Fla. 1996) (first prong met upon timely objection, 
upon showing that struck "venireperson is a member of a 
distinct" group, and upon request that court ask challenging 
party for reason for challenge); State v. Meeks, 495 S.W.3d 168, 
173 (Mo. 2016) (en banc) (first prong satisfied where defendant 
raises Batson objection and identifies protected group to which 
member of venire belongs); Wash. Gen. R. 37(d) ("Upon objection 
to the exercise of a peremptory challenge pursuant to this rule, 
the party exercising the peremptory challenge shall articulate 
the reasons the peremptory challenge has been exercised"). 
 
In each of those jurisdictions, the bar has adapted to 
changes to the first step akin to what I recommend.  See, e.g., 
State v. Whitby, 975 So. 2d 1124, 1126 (Fla. 2008) (Pariente, 
J., concurring) ("Since Melbourne, we have repeatedly reaffirmed 
the viability and value of the simplified procedure set forth in 
that decision"); Conn. Judicial Branch, Report of the Jury 
Selection Task Force to Chief Justice Richard A. Robinson, at 21 
(Dec. 31, 2020) (reporting how, after adoption of rule 37(d) in 
Washington, "lawyers [there] -- including prosecutors -- have 
adapted to [the elimination of the first step] and accept it as 
part of a changed legal landscape").  Moreover, there has not 
10 
 
been an "explosion" of frivolous or bad faith objections to 
preemptory strikes in these jurisdictions.3  See Whitby, supra at 
1127 n.2 (Pariente, J., concurring) ("In my years both as a 
trial attorney and an appellate judge I have not witnessed an 
explosion of abuses based on Melbourne and I note that the brief 
of the Florida Prosecuting Attorneys Association does not cite 
to a single case or authority for the assertion that there has 
been a 'proliferation of totally frivolous Melbourne 
objections'"). 
 
Lawyers and judges in Massachusetts could likewise adapt.  
Given that we have consistently "exhort[ed]" judges to "think 
long and hard before they decide to require no explanation from 
the prosecutor for the challenge and make no findings of fact," 
Sanchez, 485 Mass. at 514, quoting Commonwealth v. Issa, 466 
Mass. 1, 11 n.14 (2013), our own approach to the Batson test has 
 
 
3 Notably, should the first step be eliminated, lawyers 
would still have a duty to avoid frivolous objections to 
peremptory challenges.  See Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.1, as appearing 
in 471 Mass. 1414 (2015) ("A lawyer shall not bring, continue, 
or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue 
therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so 
that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for 
an extension, modification or reversal of existing law").  See 
also State v. Whitby, 975 So. 2d 1124, 1127 (Fla. 2008) 
(Pariente, J., concurring) ("We must rely on attorneys' good 
faith obligations as officers of the court to refrain from 
making frivolous, dilatory objections"). 
 
11 
 
already been trending towards eliminating the first step for 
some time.4 
 
3.  Conclusion.  "[T]he evil meant to be prevented by the 
whole Batson-Soares schema is the discriminatory use of 
peremptory challenges."  Sanchez, 485 Mass. at 501.  With this 
in mind, we must develop mechanisms that will check this evil 
both in theory and in practice. 
Advancing to the second step of the Batson test upon timely 
objection balances the traditional use of peremptory challenges 
with the need to protect from discrimination against persons 
whose identities may not be readily apparent.  "So long as a 
challenging party can provide the court with a group-neutral 
reason, the Batson inquiry will continue."  Id. at 518 (Lowy, 
J., concurring).  "And if the challenging party cannot, then the 
second prong will have accomplished exactly what the courts 
intended the Batson inquiry to accomplish -- discovering and 
eradicating discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, whether 
 
4 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ortega, 480 Mass. 603, 607 n.9 
(2018) (urging judges to proceed to second step); Commonwealth 
v. Robertson, 480 Mass. 383, 396 n.10 (2018) (judges have broad 
discretion to move to second prong without having to decide that 
defendant met first prong); Commonwealth v. Jones, 477 Mass. 
307, 325 (2017) ("Had the judge allowed the inquiry to go 
forward, the prosecutor might well have proffered an adequate 
and genuine race-neutral reason for her strike . . ."); 
Commonwealth v. Issa, 466 Mass. 1, 11 n.14 (2013) ("the judge 
created a significant and needless risk of reversal by failing 
to require the prosecutor to explain her reasons for challenging 
[the] juror"). 
12 
 
implicit or purposeful."  Id.  Because applying the first step 
to instances of alleged discrimination based on sexual 
orientation is unworkable, I continue to advocate for this 
approach.