Title: Green v. Green

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JANE G. GREEN,1 
 
 
Petitioner Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
DANIEL D. GREEN, 
 
Respondent Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ No. 259, 2016 
§ 
§  Court Below—Family Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§     
§  File No. CN15-01148 
§  Petition No. 16-10248 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
Submitted:  September 23, 2016 
Decided:  December 12, 2016 
 
Before VALIHURA, VAUGHN, and SEITZ, Justices.  
 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 12th day of December 2016, upon consideration of the appellee’s 
motion to strike the appellant’s reply brief, the appellant’s response, the appellee’s 
reply, the parties’ briefs, and the record below, it appears to the Court that:   
(1) 
The appellant, Jane G. Green (“Wife”), filed this appeal from the 
Family Court’s April 21, 2016 order dismissing her petition for alimony.  We find 
no error or abuse of discretion in the Family Court’s decision.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the Family Court’s judgment. 
(2) 
The parties were married on September 24, 1999, separated on 
October 20, 2014, and divorced on May 4, 2015.  The Wife filed a motion for 
                                                 
1 The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the parties under Supreme Court Rule 7(d).  
2 
 
interim and permanent alimony.  In July 2015, the Family Court awarded the Wife 
interim alimony of $1,075 per month.  The interim alimony award provided that it 
was subject to retroactive modification at the time of the final ancillary hearing.   
(3) 
On January 19, 2016, the Family Court held the final ancillary hearing 
on property division and alimony.  In an order dated February 1, 2016 (“February 
1, 2016 Order”), the Family Court divided the parties’ marital assets and bank 
accounts, as well as the 401(k) of the appellee, Daniel D. Green (“Husband”), 
65/35 in favor of the Wife.  The Family Court denied the Wife’s request for 
alimony because she failed to present evidence of her dependency at the ancillary 
hearing.  In an order dated March 7, 2016 and amended on March 8, 2016, the 
Family Court denied the Wife’s motion for reargument of the Family Court’s 
denial of alimony.  The Wife did not appeal the Family Court’s judgment. 
(4) 
On April 8, 2016, the Wife filed another petition for alimony.  The 
Family Court dismissed the petition on April 21, 2016.  The Family Court held the 
Wife’s petition was barred by the February 1, 2016 Order under the doctrine of res 
judicata.  This appeal followed.   
(5) 
We first address the Husband’s motion to strike the Wife’s reply brief 
as untimely.  Under the briefing schedule and Supreme Court Rule 15(a)(iii), the 
reply brief was due fifteen days after service of the answering brief.  The 
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answering brief was filed and served by mail on July 22, 2016.  The reply brief 
was not filed and served by mail until August 22, 2016.   
(6) 
The Wife’s counsel admits the reply brief was late due to his mistaken 
belief that he had thirty days to file it.  He asks this Court to accept the late reply 
brief because he made a good faith mistake and he believes the reply brief will aid 
the Court in resolving issues of importance to the Wife, the Family Court, and the 
Family Court bar.  Having carefully considered the parties’ positions, we conclude 
that the good faith beliefs of Wife’s counsel do not excuse the late filing of the 
reply brief.  The reply brief is stricken.           
(7) 
We next address the substantive merits of the Wife’s appeal.  This 
Court’s review of a Family Court decision includes a review of both the law and 
the facts.2  Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.3  Factual findings will not be 
disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous.4   
(8) 
On appeal, the Wife argues that the Family Court erred in concluding 
that the February 1, 2016 Order barred the Wife’s April 8, 2016 petition for 
alimony.  According to the Wife, 13 Del. C. § 1512(d), which provides that “a 
person shall be eligible for alimony for a period not to exceed 50% of the term of 
the marriage,” allows her to seek alimony at any time during the period she is 
                                                 
2 Mundy v. Devon, 906 A.2d 750, 752 (Del. 2006). 
3 Id.  
4 Id.  
4 
 
eligible for alimony (half of the parties’ almost fifteen year marriage, or 
approximately seven and a half years).  To the extent Section 1512(d) is 
ambiguous, the Wife argues that any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of 
preserving her eligibility for alimony.  The Husband argues that the February 1, 
2016 Order barred the Wife’s April 8, 2016 petition for alimony under the doctrine 
of res judicata and that there is no ambiguity in Section 1512(d). 
(9) 
  “Res judicata exists to provide a definite end to litigation, prevent 
vexatious litigation, and promote judicial economy.”5  Res judicata will bar a claim 
when: (i) the original court had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; 
(ii) the parties to the original action were the same parties, or in privity, in the case 
at bar; (iii) the original cause of action or the issues decided were the same as those 
in the case at bar; (iv) the issues in the original action were decided adversely to 
the petitioner in the case at bar; and (v) the order in the original action was final.6  
(10) Applying these elements, the Family Court concluded that: (i) the 
Family Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the January 19, 2016 
ancillary hearing; (ii) the parties to the ancillary action (the Wife and the Husband) 
were the same as the parties in the Wife’s April 8, 2016 alimony petition (the Wife 
and the Husband); (iii) alimony was one of the issues decided in the February 1, 
                                                 
5 LaPoint v. Amerisource Bergen Corp., 970 A.2d 185, 191 (Del. 2009) (citations omitted). 
6 Dover Historical Soc’y, Inc. v. City of Dover Planning Comm’n, 902 A.2d 1084, 1092 (Del. 
2006). 
5 
 
2016 Order and was the issue raised in the April 8, 2016 alimony petition; (iv) the 
issue of alimony was decided adversely to the Wife in the February 1, 2016 Order; 
and (v) the February 1, 2016 Order was final.  Based on this analysis, the Family 
Court concluded that the Wife’s April 8, 2016 petition for alimony was barred by 
the February 1, 2016 Order under the doctrine of res judicata.   
(11) The Wife does not dispute the elements of res judicata or the Family 
Court’s analysis of those elements.  Instead, the Wife seems to argue that the 
doctrine of res judicata did not apply to her April 8, 2016 alimony petition 
because, notwithstanding the Family Court’s denial of her request for alimony in 
the February 1, 2016 Order, she could apply for alimony for almost seven and half 
years under Section 1512(d).  In making this argument, the Wife ignores the plain 
language of Section 1512. 
(12) “The goal of statutory construction is to determine and give effect to 
legislative intent.”7  When the unambiguous language of the statute clearly reflects 
the intent of the legislature, the statutory language controls.8  If the statute is 
determined to be unambiguous, “there is no need for judicial interpretation, and the 
plain meaning of the statutory language controls.”9  “A statute is ambiguous ‘if it is 
reasonably susceptible of different constructions or interpretations’ or ‘if a literal 
                                                 
7 Eliason v. Englehart, 733 A.2d 944, 946 (Del. 1999). 
8 Spielberg v. Slate, 558 A.2d 291, 293 (Del. 1989). 
9 Eliason, 733 A.2d at 946. 
6 
 
reading of the statute would lead to an unreasonable or absurd result not 
contemplated by the legislature.’”10 
(13) Section 1512 governs the award of alimony.  Under Section 1512(a), 
the Family Court may award interim alimony, as the Family Court did here, to a 
dependent party during the pendency of a divorce.11  Under Section 1512(b), a 
party may be awarded alimony (interim or post-divorce) only if the Family Court 
determines she is a dependent party after consideration of the factors set forth in 
Section 1512(c).12    
(14) Section 1512(d) provides that a party who is married for less than 
twenty years is eligible “for alimony for a period not to exceed 50% of the term of 
the marriage” while a party married for more than twenty years is eligible for life.13  
Section 1512(e) imposes a continuing affirmative obligation upon a party who is 
awarded alimony to make good faith efforts to seek appropriate vocational 
training, if necessary, and employment unless the Family Court finds it would be 
inequitable to require a party to do so.14  Under Section 1512(f), a party who has 
waived or released her right to alimony in writing has no remedy Section 1512.15  
Section 1512(g) provides that the obligation to pay future alimony is terminated 
                                                 
10 LeVan v. Independence Mall, Inc., 940 A.2d 929, 933 (Del. 2007) (quoting Newton Vill. Serv. 
Corp. v. Newtowne Rd. Dev. Co., 772 A.2d 172, 175 (Del. 2001)). 
11 13 Del. C. § 1512(a). 
12 13 Del. C. § 1512(b), (c).   
13 13 Del. C. § 1512(d).   
14 13 Del. C. § 1512(e).   
15 13 Del. C. § 1512(f).   
7 
 
upon the death of either party or the remarriage or cohabitation of the party 
receiving alimony.16 
(15) Contrary to the Wife’s contentions, nothing in Section 1512 
authorizes a party who is denied alimony after failing to provide evidence of 
dependency at an ancillary hearing to file another petition for alimony during the 
Section 1512(d) eligibility period and to have another opportunity to prove 
dependency.  Section 1512(d) defines how long a party may receive alimony if 
they meet the other criteria of Section 1512—it does not authorize an unsuccessful 
party to file serial applications for alimony until one of the petitions is successful.  
The Wife is correct that the statute contemplates the circumstances of an alimony 
recipient may change.  Section 1512(e), for example, provides that a party awarded 
alimony generally has an affirmative obligation to make good faith efforts to seek 
appropriate vocational training, if necessary, and employment.  If there is a “real 
and substantial change of circumstances” under Section 1519(a)(4), the Family 
Court may modify an alimony award.17  In this case, however, there was no claim 
of a “real and substantial change of circumstances” under Section 1519(a)(4) in the 
Wife’s April 8, 2016 alimony petition.   
(16) Having carefully considered the positions of the parties, we conclude 
that Section 1512 is not ambiguous and did not authorize the Wife’s April 8, 2016 
                                                 
16 13 Del. C. § 1512(g).   
17 13 Del. C. 1519(a)(4). 
8 
 
alimony petition.  The Family Court did not err in finding the Wife’s April 8, 2016 
alimony petition was barred by the February 1, 2016 Order under the doctrine of 
res judicata. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Strike is 
GRANTED and the judgment of the Family Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/  James T. Vaughn, Jr.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Justice