Title: McGraw v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC18-792 
____________ 
 
BYRON MCGRAW, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
November 27, 2019 
 
LAWSON, J. 
 
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fourth District 
Court of Appeal in McGraw v. State, 245 So. 3d 760 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018).  In its 
decision the district court ruled upon the following question, which the court 
certified to be of great public importance: 
Under the Fourth Amendment, may a warrantless blood draw of an 
unconscious person, incapable of giving actual consent, be pursuant to 
section 316.1932(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2016) (“Any person who is 
incapable of refusal by reason of unconsciousness or other mental or 
physical condition is deemed not to have withdrawn his or her consent 
to [a blood draw and testing].”), so that an unconscious defendant can 
be said to have “consented” to the blood draw? 
 
Id. at 777-78.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  During the 
pendency of this appeal the United States Supreme Court considered a materially 
 
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indistinguishable issue relating to a similar Wisconsin statute and vacated the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision, which had analyzed the Fourth Amendment 
issue using the “consent” framework of the statute.  Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. 
Ct. 2525, 2531-32, 2539 (2019).  Instead, a plurality of the United States Supreme 
Court held that when law enforcement has a reasonable basis to believe that an 
unconscious driver was intoxicated while driving, the exigent circumstances 
created by the natural metabolization of alcohol in the blood stream combined with 
the driver’s unconsciousness “almost always” permits law enforcement to secure a 
blood sample for blood alcohol testing without a warrant.  Id. at 2531, 2539.  For 
this reason, we decline to address the certified question as framed, apply Mitchell, 
vacate the Fourth District’s decision, and remand for further proceedings. 
BACKGROUND 
I.  McGraw 
 
Byron McGraw, a licensed Florida driver, was injured and rendered 
unconscious in a single-car rollover accident.  McGraw, 245 So. 3d at 762.  A 
police officer with the Riviera Beach Police Department investigated the crash, 
where he smelled alcohol on McGraw’s skin, clothing, and car.  Id.  McGraw was 
transported to a hospital, and the officer followed.  Id.  Once the medical 
professionals completed their initial treatment of McGraw, the officer requested a 
blood sample because he was investigating a possible DUI case and McGraw 
 
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remained unconscious.  Id.  The officer did not seek to obtain a search warrant for 
the blood draw, nor did he contact any fellow officers about acquiring a search 
warrant.  A hospital nurse then drew McGraw’s blood.  The blood draw kit was 
later tested, showing a blood alcohol content (BAC) significantly above the legal 
limit.   
The State subsequently arrested and charged McGraw with two counts of 
driving under the influence causing or contributing to injury to person or property.  
McGraw filed a motion to suppress the results of the blood test, arguing that the 
warrantless blood draw violated the Fourth Amendment because he had not 
consented to the search.  At the evidentiary hearing, the State argued that the 
search was justified under Florida’s implied consent law, section 316.1932(1)(c), 
Florida Statutes (2016), which provides that unconscious drivers are deemed not to 
have withdrawn implied consent to the draw.  The trial court denied the motion, 
holding that although a Fourth Amendment violation occurred, the officer’s 
reliance on the statute to draw McGraw’s blood was reasonable under the good-
faith exception to the exclusionary rule.  The trial court concluded that the relevant 
provision of the implied consent law was unconstitutional because it did not 
provide the type of actual consent necessary under the Fourth Amendment.  The 
trial court also concluded that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant 
requirement did not apply. 
 
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On appeal, the Fourth District held that section 316.1932(1)(c) was valid and 
that the blood draw was constitutional.  The district court reasoned that the United 
States Supreme Court’s precedent in Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 
(2016), specifically approved of the constitutionality of implied consent statutes 
imposing civil and evidentiary penalties for refusing a chemical test, and that 
section 316.1932(1)(c) was valid under the Fourth Amendment because it imposed 
those penalties.  The district court therefore affirmed the trial court’s denial of 
McGraw’s motion to suppress, finding the blood draw constitutional based upon 
McGraw’s implied consent, and certified the question of great public importance to 
this Court. 
II.  United States Supreme Court Precedent 
 
As explained above, this Fourth Amendment issue was addressed by the 
United States Supreme Court in Mitchell.  As in our case, Mitchell involved a 
warrantless blood draw from an unconscious DUI suspect.  State v. Mitchell, 914 
N.W.2d 151, 154 (Wis. 2018).  The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the blood 
draw, concluding that it was reasonable because both Wisconsin’s implied consent 
statute and the driver’s choice to drive on state highways rendered his implied 
consent to search constitutionally sufficient.  Id. at 162.  This is similar to the 
rationale that the Fourth District employed below.  McGraw, 245 So. 3d at 766-67, 
769-70.  The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide “[w]hether a 
 
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statute authorizing a blood draw from an unconscious motorist provides an 
exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.”  Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 
2532. 
The United States Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court and held that a DUI suspect’s unconsciousness, combined with the 
necessity for a blood draw when an “evidentiary breath test” cannot be 
administered, creates a sufficient urgency to justify a warrantless blood draw under 
the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.  Id. at 2536-39.  
The plurality opinion explained: 
[E]xigency exists when (1) BAC evidence is dissipating and (2) some 
other factor creates pressing health, safety, or law enforcement needs 
that would take priority over a warrant application.  Both conditions 
are met when a drunk-driving suspect is unconscious . . . [such that] a 
warrantless blood draw is lawful. 
 
Id. at 2537. 
 
The plurality opinion also made clear that the Supreme Court was 
“adopt[ing] a rule for an entire category of cases—those in which a motorist 
believed to have driven under the influence of alcohol is unconscious and thus 
cannot be given a breath test.”  Id. at 2534 n.2; see also id. (“This rule is not based 
on what happened in petitioner’s particular case but on the circumstances generally 
present in cases that fall within the scope of the rule.”).  Despite its express 
adoption of a rule “almost always” authorizing warrantless blood draws on 
 
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unconscious DUI suspects under the exigent circumstances exception to the 
warrant requirement, id. at 2531, 2539, the Supreme Court did “not rule out the 
possibility that in an unusual case a defendant would be able to show that his blood 
would not have been drawn if police had not been seeking BAC information, and 
that police could not have reasonably judged that a warrant application would 
interfere with other pressing needs or duties,” id. at 2539.  “Because Mitchell did 
not have a chance to attempt to make that showing,” the Supreme Court 
determined that “a remand for that purpose [was] necessary.”  Id. 
ANALYSIS 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the rights 
of people to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures, U.S. Const. amend. IV, 
and a blood alcohol test is a “search,” Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2173.  We are bound 
to follow United States Supreme Court precedent construing the Fourth 
Amendment.  U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2.  Additionally, under the applicable 
conformity clause in the Florida Constitution, we must interpret the comparable 
provision in Florida’s constitution in conformity with the Supreme Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence.  See art. I, § 12, Fla. Const.; see also State v. Butler, 
655 So. 2d 1123, 1125 (Fla. 1995) (“This Court is bound, on search and seizure 
issues, to follow the opinions of the United States Supreme Court . . . .”). 
 
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Because this case falls squarely within the rule announced in Mitchell, the 
warrantless blood draw in this case appears to be legal.  Consistent with Mitchell, 
however, we also vacate the decision of the Fourth District below and remand with 
directions that the case be remanded to the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial 
Circuit so that McGraw can be given an opportunity to demonstrate that his blood 
would not have been drawn if police had not been seeking BAC information, and 
that police could not have reasonably judged that a warrant application would 
interfere with other pressing needs or duties. 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LAGOA, and MUÑIZ, JJ., concur. 
LABARGA, J. concurs with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
LABARGA, J., concurring. 
 
As stated in the majority opinion, this Court has a constitutional obligation 
to decide Fourth Amendment search and seizure issues in a manner consistent with 
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court.  Consequently, in light of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525 (2019), I 
concur with the majority. 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – 
Discretionary Jurisdiction/Certified Great Public Importance  
 
Fourth District - Case No. 4D17-232 
 
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(Palm Beach County) 
 
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Benjamin Eisenberg, Assistant Public 
Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Celia A. Terenzio, 
Bureau Chief, and Richard Valuntas, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm 
Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent 
 
Flem K. Whited, III of Whited Law Firm, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Amicus Curiae National College for DUI Defense