Title: State v. Sayles

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

State of Maryland v. Karon Sayles, No. 15, September Term, 2020; State of Maryland v. 
Bobby Jamar Johnson, No. 16, September Term, 2020; State of Maryland v. Dalik Daniel 
Oxely, No. 17, September Term, 2020 
 
JURY NULLIFICATION – JURY QUESTIONS – SUPPLEMENTAL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS – PREJUDICE – Court of Appeals held that, despite circumstance that 
jury nullification sometimes occurs, jury nullification is not authorized in Maryland and 
jury does not have right to engage in nullification.  No case, statute, or rule in Maryland 
authorizes or gives juries right to engage in jury nullification, i.e., there is no grant of 
authority permitting jury to utilize nullification.  
 
Court of Appeals reiterated that Maryland case law makes clear that it is improper for 
attorney to argue jury nullification to jury, and that jury instructions on law are binding and 
trial courts must advise juries as much.  On request, during voir dire, trial court must ask 
whether any prospective jurors are unwilling or unable to comply with jury instructions 
concerning certain fundamental principles.  In addition, legally inconsistent verdicts and 
verdict resulting from jury nullification are comparable because both involve 
circumstances in which jury acts contrary to trial court’s instructions as to proper 
application of law and both are impermissible.  Court of Appeals held that, taken together, 
these principles of law lead to conclusion that jury nullification is not authorized in 
Maryland and jury may be so advised.  Although jury may have inherent ability to nullify 
and Court recognized that jury nullification occurs, jury does not have right to engage in 
jury nullification.  Rather, in Maryland, jury is required to determine facts and render 
verdict based on instructions provided to it by trial court.  
 
Court of Appeals held that, in this case, trial court did not abuse its discretion when, in 
response to jury notes about jury nullification, it instructed jury, among other things, that 
jury nullification is juror’s knowing and deliberate rejection of evidence, it could not 
engage in jury nullification, jury nullification is contrary to law and engaging in it would 
violate jury’s oath, and jury nullification would violate court’s order and it is law of 
Maryland that jury must apply law as instructed by court.  Court of Appeals held that trial 
court’s instructions were neither legally incorrect nor prejudicial.
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
Nos. 15, 16, & 17 
 
September Term, 2020 
______________________________________ 
 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
v. 
KARON SAYLES 
______________________________________ 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
v. 
BOBBY JAMAR JOHNSON 
______________________________________ 
 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
v. 
DALIK DANIEL OXELY 
______________________________________ 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty 
Booth 
Biran, 
 
JJ. 
______________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Watts, J. 
Hotten, J., dissents. 
______________________________________ 
 
Filed: January 29, 2021 
 
Circuit Court for Montgomery County 
Case Nos. 132381C, 132377C, & 132379C 
 
Argued: December 4, 2020 
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act  
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document 
is authentic.
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk  
Suzanne Johnson
2021-01-29 14:48-05:00
 
 
Anecdotally speaking, jury nullification occurs where individual jurors, or the jury 
as a whole, in a criminal case may believe a defendant to be guilty, but nevertheless choose 
not to convict because the jury considers the law involved in the case to be unjust or wrong 
or perhaps the jury simply does not want to apply the law.  Legally speaking, “jury 
nullification” has been defined as: 
A jury’s knowing and deliberate rejection of the evidence or refusal to apply 
the law either because the jury wants to send a message about some social 
issue that is larger than the case itself or because the result dictated by law is 
contrary to the jury’s sense of justice, morality, or fairness. 
 
Jury Nullification, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). 
This case raises as a matter of first impression the question of whether a jury in 
Maryland has the authority to engage in jury nullification and whether, in responding to 
questions from a jury, the trial court correctly instructed the jury, among other things, that 
it was not authorized to engage in nullification and that doing so would violate the jury’s 
oath.  In this case, Karon Sayles, Bobby Jamar Johnson, and Dalik Daniel Oxely, 
Respondents, were each charged with multiple offenses related to a home invasion, armed 
robbery, and kidnapping that occurred over the course of two days on August 1 and 2, 
2017, in Silver Spring, Maryland.  At a joint trial in the Circuit Court for Montgomery 
County, during jury deliberations, the jury sent three notes inquiring about jury 
nullification.  In the first note, the jury asked whether it had the right to use jury 
nullification.  The circuit court provided a written response advising that the jury’s verdict 
must be based solely on the evidence, that the choices were guilty or not guilty, and that 
the jury should reread the court’s instructions.   
- 2 - 
 
Later, in a second more insistent note, a juror asked that the question about the right 
to use jury nullification be answered with a yes or no response.  In answer, the circuit court 
orally instructed the jury, among other things, that: jury nullification is “a juror’s knowing 
and deliberate rejection of the evidence or refusal to apply the law”; a jury cannot engage 
in jury nullification; the jury was to decide the case based on the evidence as it found it and 
apply the law as given to it by the court; and jury nullification should not be a consideration.  
 In a third note that was “[f]rom juror #112[,]” the juror directly asked whether any 
law in Maryland prohibited jury nullification.  In response, the circuit court orally 
instructed the jury as a whole, among other things, that the jury could not engage in jury 
nullification, jury nullification is improper, contrary to the law, and would violate the jury’s 
oath, and jury nullification would violate the court’s order and that the jury must apply the 
law as explained by the court.  At the end of the next day, the jury returned verdicts finding 
Respondents guilty of numerous crimes, including home invasion, armed robbery, and 
kidnapping.  
Respondents each appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which, in a reported 
opinion, reversed the circuit court’s judgment and remanded the case to that court for a 
new trial.  See Sayles v. State, 245 Md. App. 128, 167, 226 A.3d 349, 372 (2020).  In doing 
so, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that the power of jury nullification exists and 
held that the circuit court’s instructions in response to the second and third jury notes 
concerning jury nullification “were legally incorrect and prejudicial.”  Id. at 151, 144, 226 
A.3d at 362, 359.  The State filed petitions for writs of certiorari, which we granted.  See 
State v. Sayles, 469 Md. 659, 232 A.3d 259 (2020); State v. Johnson, 469 Md. 658, 232 
- 3 - 
 
A.3d 258 (2020); State v. Oxely, 469 Md. 658, 232 A.3d 258 (2020). 
Against this backdrop, we must decide whether the Court of Special Appeals was 
incorrect in concluding that a jury has the power to engage in jury nullification and whether 
the circuit court abused its discretion in instructing the jury that it could not engage in jury 
nullification.  Basically, we must determine whether jury nullification is authorized in 
Maryland, i.e., whether juries have the right to engage in jury nullification.  We must also 
decide whether the circuit court’s instructions were incorrect and prejudiced Respondents, 
as the Court of Special Appeals concluded. 
We hold that, despite the circumstance that jury nullification occurs, jury 
nullification is not authorized in Maryland and a jury does not have a right to engage in 
jury nullification.  No case, statute, or rule in Maryland authorizes or gives juries the right 
to engage in jury nullification, i.e., there is no grant of authority permitting a jury to nullify.  
Rather, Maryland case law makes clear that it is improper for an attorney to argue jury 
nullification to a jury, and that jury instructions on the law are binding and trial courts must 
advise juries as much.  On request, during voir dire, a trial court must ask whether any 
prospective jurors are unwilling or unable to comply with the jury instructions on certain 
fundamental principles.  In addition, a verdict resulting from jury nullification is analogous 
to the return of legally inconsistent verdicts because in both instances a jury acts contrary 
to a trial court’s instructions as to the proper application of the law and both occurrences 
are impermissible.  Taken together, these principles lead us to conclude that jury 
nullification is not authorized in Maryland.  
Stated otherwise, although a jury may have the ability to nullify, and we recognize 
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that jury nullification occurs, a jury does not have the right to engage in jury nullification.  
As such, for the reasons explained herein, we hold that, in this case, the circuit court did 
not abuse its discretion when, in response to the second and third jury notes about jury 
nullification, it instructed the jury, among other things, that: jury nullification is a juror’s 
knowing and deliberate rejection of the evidence or refusal to apply the law; the jury could 
not engage in jury nullification; jury nullification is contrary to the law and engaging in it 
would violate the jury’s oath; jury nullification would violate the court’s order; and, in 
Maryland, the jury must apply the law as instructed by the court.  The circuit court’s 
instructions were neither legally incorrect nor prejudicial.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and remand the case to that Court for 
consideration of the remaining issues not addressed on appeal.1 
BACKGROUND 
On September 7, 2017, Respondents were each charged with forty-two offenses, 
including home invasion, armed robbery, kidnapping, first- and second-degree assault, 
 
1In its opinion, to provide guidance upon retrial, the Court of Special Appeals 
addressed whether the circuit court was correct in denying a motion to suppress two photo 
array identifications filed by Sayles, and held that the circuit court did not err.  See Sayles, 
245 Md. App. at 162, 167, 226 A.3d at 369, 372.  There is no issue before this Court with 
respect to the motion to suppress. 
In the Court of Special Appeals, Respondents, however, collectively raised a total 
of six issues.  See id. at 136, 226 A.3d at 354.  Two of the six issues pertained to jury 
nullification and a third issue pertained to the photo array identifications.  The remaining 
three issues—whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying a motion to recuse 
the trial judge and in denying a motion for a mistrial and whether all but one conviction 
and sentence for conspiracy should be vacated—were not addressed by the Court of Special 
Appeals.  We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and remand 
the case to that Court for consideration of the outstanding issues. 
- 5 - 
 
false imprisonment, burglary, motor vehicle theft, fourth-degree sexual offense, and 
multiple conspiracy offenses.  From August 20 to 31, 2018, the Circuit Court for 
Montgomery County conducted a joint jury trial of Respondents.  On August 31, 2018, the 
jury found Sayles and Oxely each guilty of home invasion, five counts of armed robbery, 
kidnapping, second-degree burglary, first-degree assault, five counts of second-degree 
assault, five counts of false imprisonment, motor vehicle theft, and related conspiracies.  
The jury found Johnson guilty of home invasion, five counts of armed robbery, kidnapping, 
second-degree burglary, five counts of second-degree assault, five counts of false 
imprisonment, motor vehicle theft, and related conspiracies.  The jury found Johnson not 
guilty of first-degree assault and conspiracy to commit first-degree assault.2  On November 
20, 2018, Sayles was sentenced to a total of forty-two years’ imprisonment, Johnson was 
sentenced to a total of forty years’ imprisonment, and Oxely was sentenced to a total of 
fifty years’ imprisonment.   
The Home Invasion and Armed Robbery 
Because providing the details of the underlying crimes is not necessary for 
resolution of the questions presented, we give only a brief overview of the facts for context.  
On the night of August 1, 2017, Respondents, together with two other individuals, Younus 
Muayad Alaameri and Edwin Ajeo, disguised themselves as maintenance workers and 
gained entry into a two-bedroom apartment in Silver Spring that Aracely Ochoa shared 
 
2Before submitting the case to the jury, the circuit court granted Respondents’ 
motions for judgment of acquittal as to fourth-degree sexual offense and conspiracy to 
commit fourth-degree sexual offense.  
- 6 - 
 
with her husband, David Rivera; her mother, Blanco Armina Campos; her stepfather, 
Rolando Callejas; and her son, who was a minor.  Ochoa, who worked as a manager at a 
nearby Cash Depot, where customers came to cash checks and send money orders, 
recognized Alaameri as a regular customer of the store.  The men attacked Rivera and 
bound him, Ochoa, and Callejas with zip-ties and forced them to lie face-down on the floor.  
Over the course of the night and following morning, the assailants engaged in multiple 
failed attempts to gain access to the Cash Depot—once with Johnson and Oxely going 
alone, a second time with Johnson and Oxely taking Ochoa with them, and a third time 
with Johnson alone taking Ochoa.  Initially, Alaameri obtained the keys to the Cash Depot 
and the code to the store’s safe from Ochoa and sent Johnson and Oxely to the Cash Depot.  
Alaameri hit Ochoa in the head with a pocketknife and threatened to harm her son if she 
failed to cooperate.  Ochoa provided the code to the safe but told Alaameri that she did not 
have the code to the alarm system at the Cash Depot.  Alaameri instructed Ochoa that if 
she received a telephone call from the Cash Depot’s alarm company while Johnson and 
Oxely were gone, she should say that two people were cleaning the store.  Johnson and 
Oxely returned to the apartment and informed the others that the alarm had sounded when 
they attempted to enter the Cash Depot.  Ochoa did not receive a call. 
  At approximately 1:00 a.m. on August 2, 2017, Campos, who had been at work, 
arrived home, where she was dragged through the door, taken to the bedroom where the 
others had been moved, and had a blanket thrown over her face. 
Next, Johnson and Oxely took Ochoa to the Cash Depot in the family van.  But, 
when they arrived, Ochoa’s boss was at the store.  So, they returned to the apartment. 
- 7 - 
 
On the third attempt, on the morning of August, 2, 2017, at the time that Ochoa was 
scheduled to go to work, Johnson took Ochoa to the store alone.  But, when they arrived, 
there was a crossbar on the door preventing access.  While Ochoa was gone with Johnson, 
Oxely slashed Rivera with a knife.  Rivera gained possession of the knife, however, and 
went to the living room, and yelled for the police.  Oxely ran out the front door.  Callejas 
broke, and climbed out of, a window to seek help.  Callejas made it to a bus stop, where he 
found a telephone and called the police.  Campos also climbed out the window.  When 
Johnson and Ochoa returned from the Cash Depot, Ochoa saw Campos running across the 
street, and Johnson told her to make Campos return to the apartment.  Ochoa, Campos, and 
Johnson returned to the apartment.  Rivera opened the door, pulling Ochoa and Campos 
inside.  Johnson ran off.  By that time, all of the assailants had left the apartment, and the 
police arrived.  Several items were discovered to be missing from the apartment, including 
a computer, watches, documents, and currency.  
Jury Deliberations and Jury Notes 
On August 29, 2018, the first day of jury deliberations, at 6:57 p.m., the circuit court 
received from the jury what would be the first of three notes concerning jury nullification, 
asking: “Do we have the right to use jury nullification of a charge?”3  The circuit court 
gathered counsel, read the jury note, and asked for counsel’s positions on how to respond 
to the jury note.  The prosecutor indicated that he would respond by saying that the verdict 
 
3The jury note included a notation indicating that it was “From a Juror[.]”  In other 
words, the note appeared to be sent by a single juror, not from the jury’s foreperson on 
behalf of the entire jury. 
- 8 - 
 
sheet offered the only two choices—i.e., guilty or not guilty.  Oxely’s counsel stated that 
“it’s difficult to have a position other than they are either not guilty or the[y’re] guilty[,]” 
and deferred to the circuit court on how to respond.  Johnson’s counsel argued: “[O]ur 
position would be [] to instruct the jury that deliberations and rendering the verdicts [are] 
in the sole providence [sic] of the jury.”  Sayles’s counsel stated that he “was trying to look 
up some law . . . because it’s kind of an unusual question,” but that he was “inclined to say, 
yes.”  Sayles’s counsel explained: 
The last time I looked at this which was a long time ago, I believed 
that there wasn’t any support for the Court instructing the jury that they could 
nullify, but I don’t think that there’s any case that says that if there’s a 
question, the Court should tell the jury that they can’t.  You know, I think 
that’s [the] only right answer to this because, you know, I agree that the Court 
really can’t instruct the jury up front about jury nullification, but if they have 
a question and the answer is anything other than yes, I think it’s essentially 
the Court saying that, no, you don’t have the right to use jury nullification 
and I’m continuing to frantically try and find some cases on this. . . . So, 
anyway, our request is that the Court answer yes.  
 
The circuit court disagreed, stating that responding affirmatively “would be a violation of 
the rules of evidence, it would be a violation of the law in Maryland, it would be a violation 
of the United States Constitution and [the court was] not going to do that.  There is no right 
to jury nullification.”  The circuit court instead provided the following written response to 
the jury note at 7:25 p.m.: “Your verdict must be based solely on the evidence.  Your 
choices, based on the evidence[,] are Not Guilty or Guilty.  Reread your instructions.”  
(Paragraph break omitted).  Sayles’s counsel objected to the written response based on his 
earlier comments.  Johnson’s counsel also objected to the written response, specifically, 
the last line of the response instructing the jury to reread the instructions, arguing that it 
- 9 - 
 
was coercive.  
Later that same day, at 7:58 p.m., the circuit court received a second note, asking: 
“Can you answer the jury nullification with a yes or no response?  From a juror?”  The 
record reflects that the circuit court met with counsel in chambers to discuss the note, but 
the record is silent as to the discussion that occurred.  Afterward, in open court, the circuit 
court read the jury note aloud and stated that, as indicated in chambers, the jury would be 
brought into the courtroom and provided an oral response.  Thereafter, the circuit court 
orally instructed the jury as follows: 
Now, I am not a hundred percent sure that the juror or jurors that wrote the 
question have the same definition of jury nullification as the law has it. 
 
But if it is, then here’s the answer.  Here’s what jury nullification is.  
Jury nullification, a juror’s knowing and deliberate rejection of the evidence 
or refusal to apply the law, that’s considered jury nullification.[4]  And the 
answer is no, you can’t have jury nullification.  You have to decide this case 
based on the evidence as you find it and apply the law as I gave it to you. 
 
You decide the facts, the weight of the evidence, you, the 12, then you 
apply the law.  To say you can do jury nullification would be a miscarriage 
of justice because there’d be no reason reading you the law and no reason 
you considering the evidence.  And that wouldn’t make sense would it?  You 
are the only ones that weigh the evidence.  You decide what weight you want 
to give it, what you find. 
 
Once you get to where you are with the evidence, you take the law as 
I give it to you, you put it together and apply it and try and reach a verdict.  
So, your decision is going to be made on the evidence, applying your 
common sense, your past life experiences and you’re going to take the law 
and apply it to all of that.  So, nullification shouldn’t even be a consideration.  
It’s not on the verdict sheet.  It’s not in the instructions.  Okay, I think I’ve 
said enough on that.[5]  
 
4The circuit court’s definition of jury nullification appears to be based, in part, on 
the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of the term.  See Jury Nullification, Black’s Law 
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).  
5The jury note contains the following written notation: 
 
 
- 10 - 
 
 
After instructing the jury, the circuit court dismissed the jury for the evening and Sayles’s 
counsel objected to the instruction. 
The next day, August 30, 2018, the jury resumed its deliberations and, at 9:35 a.m., 
the circuit court received a third note with a question about nullification, asking: 
Why is there is a legal definition of jury nullification where a juror can refuse 
to apply the law if there is no legal circumstances where that can occur?  Can 
you please cite the specific law that does not allow a juror the right to jury 
nullification in the state of Maryland? 
 
The third jury note stated that it was “[f]rom juror #112[.]”  A discussion as to how the 
circuit court should respond to the note ensued.  The prosecutor pointed out that the jury 
had already been instructed, and argued: 
I continue to feel like any other information that they’re given, I understand 
that the definition for jury nullification was given, but I almost feel like that 
actually even clouds it even more.  So I know it’s difficult to say it, but I 
would propose that you simply say again your instructions were given to you 
and you decide on guilt or innocen[ce] based on what you remember the 
evidence being and I would breach it and leave it at that.  I don’t want to give 
anyone else any further instructions. 
 
Johnson’s counsel responded:  
 
[T]he Court gave him [i.e., Juror No. 112,] his definition of a jury 
nullification last night and at this point, with that definition given already 
being instructed that it was improper that we can one, instruct the juror that 
if the juror believes that -- it seems that there’s some inkling of belief that the 
elements are not being met and if that’s the case and his free will to be able 
[to] deliberate with other jurors is th[e] issue, then I would propose that the 
Court give an allocute instruction,[6] that that’s really what’s going on 
 
answered on the record 
8:19 
8/29/18 
6It appears that where the transcript indicates that, in this response, counsel said 
“allocate instruction,” counsel was referring to an Allen instruction.  See note 9, infra.  
- 11 - 
 
because it seems that somehow this juror cannot deliberate properly with the 
other jurors.  So I would, you know I know of course they would not bring 
them in or even be able to observe it they’re not able to get along or this 
single juror is being ostra[c]ized, but I wouldn’t take -- you know just to ask 
the same question that was asked before, it seems like there’s something, 
there’s an undercurrent here and that undercurrent very likely is that there’s 
not a free deliberation process, that this juror’s simply wheels are being ran 
over and at that point we should instruct the juror do you feel as if the 
elements are met, that it’s innocent or guilty and if not and there’s some other 
issue, then we at this point there’s only hours into the deliberation that we go 
into an allocute instruction. 
 
Sayles’s counsel responded:  
 
I think we should answer the question and as far as I can tell there is no law 
that does not allow a juror the right to jury nullification, the best that I’ve 
been able to find is [] there’s case law saying that it’s not proper for the Judge 
to instruct the jury at the attorney’s request and it’s not proper to make the 
arguments in closing, but I’m not aware of any law that says that the jury 
cannot use nullification.  I would suggest that we cite the Maryland 
Constitution Article 23 in the trial called criminal cases, the jury shall be the 
judges of law as well as fact.  The clause ends, except that the Court ma[y] 
pass upon a sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, I don’t know 
that that last clause is necessary, but I think that what the jury wants to know 
is, is there any law that does or does not allow a juror the right to jury 
nullification in the State of Maryland, I think the answer is no.  But I think 
the Maryland Constitution does provide the closest possible answer which is 
the jury shall be the judge of law as well the fact instructed.  
 
The circuit court rejected the notion that the jury is the judge of the law as being contrary 
to Maryland law.  The circuit court stated that the jury is “not the judge of the law” and 
that it was “not going to advise him of anything close to it.”  Sayles’s counsel noted that 
Juror Number 112 was asking for the law and the “closest” he could “find [was] the plain 
language of Article 23 in the Maryland Constitution so [he] would suggest that we cite 
- 12 - 
 
that.”7  The circuit court stated that doing so would essentially give the jury three options—
not guilty, guilty, and jury nullification—which does not “exist in Maryland law[.]”  The 
circuit court reiterated that the jury must apply the law as explained by the court in arriving 
at a verdict, and stated: 
So they have to apply the law.  They’re told they can find the facts any way 
they want and that’s their prerogative and if they choose to find that the facts 
are insufficient, that’s their call, but jury nullification by definition is saying 
I think somebody’s, I think the evidence supports guilt, I think the law when 
you apply the evidence supports a guilty finding.  I find beyond the 
reasonable doubt somebody’s guilty, however, for whatever reason public 
statement, you name it, I’m going to choose to find them not guilty, that’s a 
definition of jury nullification and that’s improper.  I can’t, I don’t think by 
saying that it’s their prerogative to find the evidence of the facts they want 
basically addresses the nullification.  
 
The circuit court recessed briefly and once back on the record, Johnson’s counsel 
argued: 
I was just thinking that maybe we could suggest to the juror that it is not 
providence [sic] of the Court to second-guess the juror’s analysis of the 
evidence and the juror, if the juror feels that the elements are not met of the 
crime, then the not guilty verdict is probably.  But if the jury fee[l]s as if the 
elements are met, then the juror should vote for guilty, but it is not our job to 
probe into the analysis that each individual makes in reaching their 
conclusions.  I mean I know it doesn’t address it head on.  
 
The circuit court responded, in part, by explaining that it would direct its instructions to 
Juror Number 112:  
[I]t’s going to say basically attention juror 112, you may not use or resort to 
jury nullification.  It is improper and would be a violation of your oath to and 
then “to truly try to give a true verdict according to the evidence.”  
Furthermore, nullification would violate the Court’s order, the court’s order 
 
7In relevant part, Article 23 provides: “In the trial of all criminal cases, the Jury shall 
be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact, except that the Court may pass upon the sufficiency 
of the evidence to sustain a conviction.” 
- 13 - 
 
and instruction.  Well the Court’s order that you must apply the laws as I 
explained it in arriving at your verdict and I believe that the Defense, all three 
defendant[]s would object to that instruction for the reasons you’ve stated, 
correct?  
 
Sayles’s counsel and Johnson’s counsel both responded in the affirmative.  The circuit 
court asked Sayles’s counsel whether he wanted the court to respond by saying that the 
jury could implement jury nullification, and the following colloquy occurred: 
[SAYLES’S COUNSEL]: No, Your Honor.  What the question asks for is 
the law that does or does not allow a juror the right to jury nullification. 
 
THE COURT: Right, it’d be like if [the] Court orders you not to do 
something, there’s contempt, but there’s not a law that says you can’t violate 
a Judge’s order.  I mean it’s the opposite for, there’s not a law in there, there’s 
not a specific statute that says you can’t have implement jury nullification. 
 
[SAYLES’S COUNSEL]: Well then I think you should say that, I think that’s 
what the question is.  It says can you please cite the specific law and if the 
Court’s position is there’s no law addressing that, then you should say there 
is no specific law that does or does not allow a juror the right to jury 
nullification. 
 
THE COURT: Okay, that’s telling him in essence that you can do it since 
there’s no law against it, he’s not an attorney and even if he is, he’s wrong.  
He’s as I said it’s, I think by telling him that there’s no specific law basically 
is telling him it’s okay.  
 
Johnson’s counsel requested that the circuit court direct the response to the jury foreperson 
because he did not want to “singl[e] out” Juror Number 112 or make the juror “feel like 
we’re ganging up on him.”  The circuit court took Johnson’s counsel’s suggestion.  
The jury returned to the courtroom and the circuit court responded to the third note 
by instructing the jury as a whole as follows:  
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury you may not use, implement or resort 
to jury nullification.  It is improper, it’s contrary to the law [and] would be a 
violation of your oath to truly try and reach a verdict according to the 
- 14 - 
 
evidence, which you all took that oath.  Furthermore, nullification would 
violate this Court’s order and it’s the law of Maryland that “you must apply 
the laws I explained it in arriving at your verdict,” sincerely me.  I’ll give 
you a copy of that.[8]  
 
After responding to the third jury note, the circuit court gave a modified Allen instruction.9 
 
8The written instruction given to the jury in response to the third jury note on jury 
nullification was worded slightly different from the circuit court’s oral instruction but 
substantively contained the same response, providing: 
 
Jurors: 
 
You may not use or implement or resort to jury nullification.  It is 
improper, contrary to the law and would be a violation of your oath to “truly 
try to reach a verdict according to the evidence.” 
 
Furthermore, nullification would violate t[he] Court’s Order that “you 
must apply t[he] law as I explain it in arriving at your verdict.” 
 
Sincerely, 
 
[Circuit Court Judge] 
 
9While the parties and the circuit court discussed the proper response to the third 
jury nullification note, at 11:36 a.m., the circuit court received from the jury another note 
asking: “What do we do in the case of the presence of guilty AND non-guilty votes and we 
feel that further deliberations will not change these votes?”  In response, the circuit court 
gave a modified Allen instruction, instructing: 
 
[Y]our verdict must be the considered judgment of each of you.  In order to 
reach a verdict, all of you must agree.  In other words, your verdict must be 
unanimous.  You must consult with one another and deliberate with a view 
towards reaching an agreement if you can do so without violence to your 
individual judgment.  Each of you must decide this case for yourself, but do 
so only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with your fellow 
jurors.  During the deliberation, do not hesitate to re-examine your own 
views.  You should change your opinion if convinced you are wrong, but do 
not surrender your honest belief as to the weight or effect of the evidence 
only because of the opinion of your fellow jurors or for the mere purpose of 
reaching a verdict.  
 
- 15 - 
 
Later the same day, at 3:40 p.m., the circuit court received from the jury a note 
stating that it had “agreed on the guilt of one defendant[,]” but had “not agreed to the 
identification of 2 defendants[,]” and that some jurors were “adamant about their decisions 
(not Guilty)[.]”  Less than an hour later, at 4:33 p.m., the circuit court received from the 
jury another note stating that it was “not sure how to proceed” and asking the circuit court 
to “advise[.]”  And, at 5:14 p.m., the circuit court received from the jury yet another note 
indicating that it was “unable to move forward” and that it was “deadlocked[.]”  At that 
point, the circuit court acknowledged the notes and sent the jury home for the evening to 
rest.   
The following day, August 31, 2018, the jury resumed its deliberations.  At 9:45 
a.m., the circuit court received from the jury a note asking: “Can we please get the answers 
from yesterday’s questions?”  At 10:15 a.m., the circuit court responded by instructing the 
jury in writing: “Yes. See answers provided.”  At 12:24 p.m., the circuit court received 
from the jury a note stating: “[W]e need to let you know we have made significant 
progress.”  At 4:03 p.m., the circuit court received a note stating that the jury had “reached 
final verdicts” in the case.  Thereafter, the jury assembled in the courtroom and returned 
the verdicts discussed above.  
 
 
In State v. Fennell, 431 Md. 500, 508 n.4, 66 A.3d 630, 635 n.4 (2013), we noted that an 
Allen instruction “is derived from an instruction given to a deadlocked jury as discussed 
by the United States Supreme Court in Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 [] (1896).”  
Such an instruction involves asking the jurors “to conciliate their differences and reach a 
verdict[,]” and “is intended to stress to jurors the necessity of unanimity in their decision, 
as well as to encourage a juror to listen to the viewpoints of other jurors.”  Fennell, 431 
Md. at 508 n.4, 66 A.3d at 635 n.4 (cleaned up). 
- 16 - 
 
Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals 
Respondents each noted an appeal, and on April 1, 2020, the Court of Special 
Appeals reversed the circuit court’s judgment and remanded the case to the circuit court 
for a new trial.  See Sayles, 245 Md. App. at 167, 226 A.3d at 372.  The Court of Special 
Appeals held that the circuit court’s instructions in response to the second and third jury 
notes about jury nullification were legally incorrect and prejudicial.  See id. at 144, 226 
A.3d at 359.10  The Court of Special Appeals concluded that the circuit court’s instruction 
that engaging in jury nullification is contrary to the law was inaccurate because the power 
of jury nullification is well established and, as such, not contrary to the law.  See Sayles, 
245 Md. App. at 158, 226 A.3d at 367.  The Court of Special Appeals determined that the 
circuit court’s instruction that engaging in jury nullification would violate the court’s order 
was inaccurate because “juries have the power to nullify absent any legal consequences[,]” 
whereas, according to the Court of Special Appeals, the circuit court’s instruction 
suggested that jurors could possibly face legal consequences for engaging in jury 
nullification.  Id. at 158, 226 A.3d at 367.  The Court of Special Appeals stated that the 
circuit court’s “error” in instructing the jury was “compounded” by its “problematic 
definition of jury nullification[,]” which, according to the Court of Special Appeals, was 
 
10In the Court of Special Appeals, the State raised an issue as to preservation and 
the Court of Special Appeals concluded that Respondents preserved the issue concerning 
the circuit court’s jury nullification instructions.  See Sayles, 245 Md. App. at 144-46, 226 
A.3d at 359-60.  The Court of Special Appeals determined that, to the extent that the issues 
concerning the jury nullification instructions were unpreserved, it nevertheless would 
exercise its discretion to consider the issues as to all three Respondents.  See id. at 146, 226 
A.3d at 360.  No issue as to preservation was raised in this Court. 
- 17 - 
 
incomplete and did not contain information about the motive for jury nullification—“to 
send a message about some social issue that is larger than the case itself or because the 
result dictated by law is contrary to the jury’s sense of justice, morality or fairness.”  Id. at 
158-59, 226 A.3d at 367 (quoting Jury Nullification, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 
2019)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  In the Court of Special Appeals’s view, it is the 
motive for the rejection of evidence that makes the rejection nullification, not the act of 
rejection of the evidence in and of itself.  See id. at 159, 226 A.3d at 367.   
The Court of Special Appeals also concluded that Respondents demonstrated 
“probable prejudice.”  Id. at 162, 226 A.3d at 369.  The Court of Special Appeals stated 
that, after receiving the circuit court’s response to the third jury nullification note, 
“informing the jury that jury nullification is ‘contrary to law’ and would constitute a 
violation of the court’s order, the jury -- which had been previously deadlocked -- soon 
returned a verdict of guilty for all three” Respondents.  Id. at 162, 226 A.3d at 369.  As 
such, the Court of Special Appeals was persuaded that, after hearing the circuit court’s 
instruction in response to the third jury nullification note, “it [was] at least probable that a 
juror who would have otherwise voted to acquit one or more of [Respondents] on a 
nullification theory would have changed his or her vote after being informed that 
nullification was prohibited and would constitute a violation of the court’s order.”  Id. at 
162, 226 A.3d at 369. 
Petitions for Writs of Certiorari 
On May 18, 2020, the State filed three petitions for a writ of certiorari, one as to 
each Respondent, raising the following two issues: 
- 18 - 
 
1. Did the Court of Special Appeals wrongly conclude that a jury has the 
power to nullify the verdict and, therefore, the trial court abused its discretion 
when, in response to a jury note, it told the jury that it could not resort to jury 
nullification? 
 
2. If the trial court abused its discretion when it responded to the jury’s 
inquiries concerning jury nullification, did the Court of Special Appeals 
wrongly conclude that this error prejudiced [Respondents]? 
 
On July 13, 2020, this Court granted the petitions.  See Sayles, 469 Md. 659, 232 A.3d 
259; Johnson, 469 Md. 658, 232 A.3d 258; Oxely, 469 Md. 658, 232 A.3d 258. 
 
On September 2, 2020, Respondents each filed a motion to consolidate, requesting 
that this Court consolidate the three cases for briefing and argument.  The State had no 
objection to the granting of the motions, and this Court granted the motions, consolidating 
the cases for briefing and oral argument. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In Appraicio v. State, 431 Md. 42, 51, 63 A.3d 599, 604 (2013), this Court observed 
that a trial court’s decision to give a particular jury instruction “will not be disturbed on 
review except on a clear showing of abuse of discretion, that is, discretion manifestly 
unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons.”  (Cleaned up).  
In response to a jury question, a trial court may give a supplemental instruction.  See id. at 
51, 63 A.3d at 604.  In State v. Bircher, 446 Md. 458, 463, 132 A.3d 292, 295, cert. denied, 
___ U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 145 (2016), we stated that “[w]hether to give supplemental 
instructions is within the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed on 
appeal, absent a clear abuse of discretion.”  (Cleaned up). 
- 19 - 
 
DISCUSSION 
I. 
The Parties’ Contentions 
The State contends that the Court of Special Appeals improperly concluded that a 
jury has the power to nullify and that the circuit court abused its discretion in instructing 
the jury, in response to questions from the jury, that the jury could not engage in jury 
nullification.  The State argues that there is no power of jury nullification in Maryland and 
that the circuit court properly responded to questions from the jury by instructing the jury 
that it must apply the laws as instructed, and by informing the jury that jury nullification is 
contrary to the law and would violate the jury’s oath.  According to the State, because jury 
nullification is not authorized in Maryland, when asked by a jury, a trial court may not 
imply that a jury may engage in jury nullification.  The State asserts that, even if jury 
nullification were “legitimate,” the circuit court’s instructions in this case were proper 
“because the theoretical existence of jury nullification does not vindicate a judge 
instructing jurors that they may set aside their oaths and make a decision contrary to the 
evidence.”  The State maintains that, because a jury lacks the power to engage in jury 
nullification, the circuit court’s instructions in this case—that jury nullification is contrary 
to the law and would violate the court’s order—constituted a correct statement of the law. 
The State argues that the circuit court could not have responded to the jury notes in the 
affirmative—i.e., stating that jury nullification is an option—without “running afoul” of 
case law that provides that a trial court’s instructions on the law are binding. 
Respondents counter that the Court of Special Appeals was correct in concluding 
- 20 - 
 
that the circuit court abused its discretion in instructing the jury that engaging in jury 
nullification would be contrary to the law and violative of a court order because such 
instructions contain inaccurate statements of the law.  Respondents argue that the Court of 
Special Appeals correctly recognized the well-established power of the jury to engage in 
jury nullification and appropriately adopted the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of the 
term.  Respondents assert that, although jury nullification is disapproved of, “it remains a 
fundamental truth that juries retain the power to nullify.”   
Respondents maintain that, although it is improper both for a trial court to 
affirmatively instruct a jury that it may engage in jury nullification and for parties to argue 
nullification to a jury, a jury nonetheless has the power to nullify and this Court has never 
held that a jury is prohibited from exercising that power.  Respondents contend that, even 
if this Court holds that a jury does not have the power to engage in jury nullification, 
reversal is warranted because the circuit court’s instructions in this case constituted an 
abuse of discretion and were prejudicial as the circuit court failed to give the complete 
definition of jury nullification and inaccurately suggested that the jury could face legal 
consequences for engaging in nullification.  Respondents also argue that the circuit court’s 
responses to the jury’s questions led the jury to believe that it was not free to reject any of 
the State’s evidence.  
In a reply brief, the State contends that the circuit court’s instructions, considered in 
totality, lead to the conclusion that the definition of jury nullification provided by the court 
“was correct, complete, and did not contribute to any usurpation of the jury’s role as fact 
finder.”  The State points out that, after defining jury nullification, the circuit court 
- 21 - 
 
reminded the jury that it (the jury) must decide the facts and the weight of the evidence, 
and apply the law, and that, as such, the jury would not have interpreted the definition of 
jury nullification as prohibiting it from rejecting evidence presented at trial.  
Law 
It is well known that jury deliberations are private and conducted in secret.  See 
Stokes v. State, 379 Md. 618, 638, 843 A.2d 64, 75 (2004).  The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit has stated that the secrecy of jury deliberations is a 
“cornerstone” of the American judicial system and that, generally, nobody, including the 
trial judge, “has a ‘right to know’ how a jury, or any individual juror, has deliberated or 
how a decision was reached by a jury or juror.”  United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 
618 (2d Cir. 1997).  The secrecy and privacy of jury deliberations enables jury nullification 
to occur.  See id.   
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “jury nullification” as: 
A jury’s knowing and deliberate rejection of the evidence or refusal to apply 
the law either because the jury wants to send a message about some social 
issue that is larger than the case itself or because the result dictated by law is 
contrary to the jury’s sense of justice, morality, or fairness. 
 
Jury Nullification, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).  Some Federal courts have 
favorably cited and adopted this definition.  See, e.g., Verlo v. Martinez, 820 F.3d 1113, 
1119 & n.1 (10th Cir. 2016) (The Tenth Circuit described jury nullification as “a practice 
in which a jury refuses to convict a defendant despite legal evidence of guilt because the 
jury members believe the law at issue is immoral” and then footnoted the Black’s Law 
Dictionary definition of “jury nullification.”); see also United States v. Boone, 458 F.3d 
- 22 - 
 
321, 328 n.2 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1147 (2007); United States v. Young, 
403 F. Supp. 3d 1131, 1148 (D.N.M. 2019).  By contrast, in Thomas, 116 F.3d at 608, 614, 
the Second Circuit referred to jury nullification as “the intentional disregard of the law as 
stated by the presiding judge[,]” and stated that jury nullification, by definition, “is a 
violation of a juror’s oath to apply the law as instructed by the court[.]” 
 
In Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 74 (1895), the Supreme Court of the United 
States stated that juries “have the physical power to disregard the law, as laid down to them 
by the court[,]” but they do not “have the moral right to decide the law according to their 
own notions or pleasure.”  In Sparf, id. at 63, 99-100, the Supreme Court concluded that 
the trial court properly gave a supplemental instruction that told the jury “that, in view of 
the evidence, the only verdict the jury could under the law properly render would be either 
one of guilty of the offense charged, or one of not guilty of the offense charged[.]”  In so 
concluding, the Supreme Court stated that it “must hold firmly to the doctrine that in the 
courts of the United States it is the duty of juries in criminal cases to take the law from the 
court, and apply that law to the facts as they find them to be from the evidence.”  Id. at 
102.11   
 
In addressing the issue of jury nullification, Federal courts have followed the 
Supreme Court’s lead in Sparf.  In United States v. Drefke, 707 F.2d 978, 982 (8th Cir.), 
 
11The Supreme Court recognized, however, that its holding did not necessarily apply 
in jurisdictions where there was a contrary constitutional provision permitting the jury to 
decide both the law and facts.  See Sparf, 156 U.S. at 102 (“[W]here the matter is not 
controlled by express constitutional or statutory provisions, it cannot be regarded as the 
right of counsel to dispute before the jury the law as declared by the court.”). 
- 23 - 
 
cert. denied sub nom. Jameson v. United States, 464 U.S. 942 (1983), the Eighth Circuit 
stated that, since Sparf, “federal courts have uniformly recognized the right and duty of the 
judge to instruct the jury on the law and the jury’s obligation to apply the law to the facts, 
and that nullification instructions should not be allowed.”  And, in United States v. 
Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1190 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1223 (1994), the 
First Circuit stated that, “although jurors possess the raw power to set an accused free for 
any reason or for no reason, their duty is to apply the law as given to them by the court.”  
(Citation omitted).  Moreover, although “jurors may choose to flex their muscles, ignoring 
both law and evidence in a [] rush to acquit a criminal defendant, neither the court nor 
counsel should encourage jurors to exercise this power.”  Id. (citation omitted).  In Thomas, 
116 F.3d at 615, the Second Circuit further explained that “the power of juries to ‘nullify’ 
or exercise a power of lenity is just that—a power; it is by no means a right or something 
that a judge should encourage or permit if it is within his [or her] authority to prevent.”  
And, in United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1983), the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that a trial court properly 
refused to give an instruction on jury nullification requested by the defendant because the 
defendant’s “assertion that an instruction on jury nullification is the best assurance against 
its arbitrary exercise . . . has no support in the law and flies in the face of common sense.”  
(Cleaned up). 
Consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Sparf, courts in many States have 
recognized that jury nullification sometimes occurs but have expressly disapproved of the 
practice.  In Walden v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1182, 1184 (Ind. 2008), the Supreme Court of 
- 24 - 
 
Indiana stated that, in an earlier case, it had “made clear that Indiana juries do not have a 
broad, general nullification power of criminal cases.”  In People v. Williams, 21 P.3d 1209, 
1223 (Cal. 2001), the Supreme Court of California stated that “[j]ury nullification is 
contrary to our ideal of equal justice for all and permits both the prosecution’s case and the 
defendant’s fate to depend upon the whims of a particular jury, rather than upon the equal 
application of settled rules of law.”  As such, the Supreme Court of California “reaffirm[ed] 
the basic rule that jurors are required to determine the facts and render a verdict in 
accordance with the court’s instructions on the law.”  Id.  Similarly, over a decade earlier, 
in People v. Partner, 180 Cal. App. 3d 178, 186 (1986), a California Court of Appeal 
concluded that, “although a jury may occasionally exercise a raw power to return a verdict 
more favorable to the defendant than warranted by the evidence and the law, this power 
should not be legitimized in instructions to the jury.”  The Court determined “that the jury 
should not be instructed on so-called jury nullification. . . . The jury should not be instructed 
that it may disregard the law.”  Id. (citation omitted).  In People v. Goetz, 532 N.E.2d 1273, 
1274 (N.Y. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1053 (1989), the Court of Appeals of New York 
stated that, although nothing prevents a “jury from acquitting although finding that the 
prosecution has proven its case, this so-called ‘mercy-dispensing power’, as defendant 
concedes, is not a legally sanctioned function of the jury and should not be encouraged by 
the court[.]”  (Citations omitted).  And, in Commonwealth v. Fernette, 500 N.E.2d 1290, 
1298 (Mass. 1986), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts declined to approve of 
an instruction requested by the defendant that would inform “the jury of their power to 
nullify the law as stated by the court, in effect sanctioning jury nullification.”  (Footnote 
- 25 - 
 
omitted).  In a footnote, the Court “recognize[d] that jurors may return verdicts which do 
not comport with the judge’s instructions[,]” but did “not accept the premise that jurors 
have a right to nullify the law on which they are instructed by the judge, or that the judge 
must inform them of their power.”  Id. at 1298 n.23 (citations omitted). 
Likewise, in Walker v. State, 445 N.E.2d 571, 575 (Ind. 1983), the Supreme Court 
of Indiana held that a trial court correctly instructed a jury that, although it was to determine 
the law, that did “not mean that you have the right to make, repeal, disregard, or ignore the 
law as it exists.  The instructions of the Court are the best source as to the law applicable 
to this case.”  And, the Supreme Court of Indiana held that the trial court properly refused 
to give instructions that “would have conveyed to the jury the belief that it had a power of 
nullification, which clearly it does not possess under the law.”  Id. (citations omitted).  
More recently, in Lohmiller v. State, 884 N.E.2d 903, 911 & n.8 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana confirmed that a specific section of the Indiana Constitution—
providing that “in all criminal cases whatever, the jury shall have the right to determine the 
law and the facts”—“does not provide a right for jury nullification.”  (Footnote omitted).  
The Court also concluded that the trial court properly rejected giving the defendant’s 
requested instruction on jury nullification, noting that the Supreme Court of Indiana had 
previously held that, because the Indiana Constitution “does not provide the right for jury 
nullification, the trial court properly refused to give a tendered instruction on the issue.”  
Id. at 911 n.9.  In People v. Montanez, 667 N.E.2d 548, 553 (Ill. App.), appeal denied, 671 
N.E.2d 739 (Ill. 1996), the Appellate Court of Illinois stated: “The power of jury 
nullification exists, but it is not authorized by the law.  A defendant has no right to have 
- 26 - 
 
the jury defy the law or ignore the undisputed evidence.”  (Citation omitted).  And, in 
Hartley v. State, 653 P.2d 1052, 1055 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982), where a defendant made an 
argument that was “a variation on the doctrine of jury nullification[,]” the Court of Appeals 
of Alaska “reject[ed] th[e] argument and the doctrine of nullification[,]” determining that 
a “jury has a duty, albeit unenforceable, to decide a criminal case on the law and the 
evidence.”  (Citations omitted). 
Similarly, in State v. Paredes-Solan, 222 P.3d 900, 908-09 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009), 
the Court of Appeals of Arizona held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing 
to instruct the jury on nullification, explaining: 
[The defendant] has not cited, nor have we found, any Arizona or 
federal authority supporting his argument that he was entitled to a jury 
nullification instruction.  But, we find extremely persuasive the substantial 
jurisprudence from the federal courts concluding defendants are not entitled 
to such an instruction.  It is true, as [the defendant] notes, that the jury’s 
nullification power is well-established.  However, jury nullification is not the 
legal right of either the defendant or the jury; the jury merely has a power to 
acquit on bad grounds, because the government is not allowed to appeal from 
an acquittal by a jury.  Thus, although a jury-nullification verdict must stand, 
such a verdict contravenes the law the jury has been instructed to follow in 
deciding the case.  Consequently, although juries have the power to ignore 
the law in their verdicts, courts have no obligation to tell them they may do 
so.  
 
(Cleaned up).  And, in Mouton v. State, 923 S.W.2d 219, 221 (Tex. App. 1996), where a 
defendant argued that the jury should have been advised that, because of his youth, it could 
ignore the law if they so decided and acquit the defendant, the Court of Appeals of Texas 
held that the defendant was not entitled to a jury nullification instruction.  The Court stated 
that, although it was “undisputed that a jury has a power of nullification” and it “is a 
recognized aspect of our jury system, there is no constitutional implication that would 
- 27 - 
 
require a trial judge to instruct the jury on nullification.”  Id.  The Court stated that, over a 
hundred years earlier, in Sparf, the Supreme Court had rejected the argument raised by the 
defendant, and that “Federal courts faced with requests for jury nullification instructions 
have consistently followed the Sparf reasoning.”  Mouton, 923 S.W.2d at 221-22 (cleaned 
up).  The Court concluded that, although jury nullification exists, “it is not a legal standard 
and is not a constitutional right of the defendant.  The court’s duty is to instruct the jury on 
the law, and the trial court in the instant case complied with that duty.”  Id. at 222. 
Yet, some States have recognized a jury’s ability to engage in jury nullification and 
granted trial courts the authority to advise juries about the practice.  For example, in State 
v. Paris, 627 A.2d 582, 588-89 (N.H. 1993), the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held 
that a trial court did not err in refusing to give the jury nullification charge that the 
defendant had requested where it instead gave a different instruction that was the equivalent 
of a jury nullification instruction.  The Court stated that a jury nullification charge informs 
“the jury of its historical prerogative to acquit a defendant even if the verdict is contrary to 
the law and the facts of the case.”  Id. at 588 (cleaned up).  The Court concluded that the 
instruction that the trial court gave—“that ‘if you find that the State has proven all of the 
elements of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant 
guilty’”—essentially was a jury nullification instruction because it informed the jury that 
it “may acquit the defendant even if the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt each 
element of the offenses charged.”  Id. at 589 (emphasis in original).  In State v. Paul, 104 
A.3d 1058, 1062 (N.H. 2014), the Supreme Court of New Hampshire explained: 
It is well established that jury nullification is neither a right of the defendant 
- 28 - 
 
nor a defense recognized by law.  Rather, jury nullification is the undisputed 
power of the jury to acquit, even if its verdict is contrary to the law as given 
by the judge and contrary to the evidence.  The trial court ordinarily gives 
the Wentworth instruction,[12] which is the equivalent of a jury nullification 
instruction.  The defendant is not entitled to a more specific jury nullification 
instruction, and the decision to give such an instruction, when requested, lies 
within the sound discretion of the trial court depending on the facts of a 
particular case. 
 
(Cleaned up).  In other words, in New Hampshire, it appears that the giving of a Wentworth 
instruction, which is considered to be the equivalent of a jury nullification instruction, is 
authorized by case law.13 
In Maryland, with the exception of the Court of Special Appeals’s opinion here, no 
case, statute, or rule expressly defines the term “jury nullification” or approves of the 
practice of jury nullification.  Case law, however, clearly holds that it is improper for an 
attorney to argue jury nullification to a jury.  In Blackwell v. State, 278 Md. 466, 478-80, 
 
12Derived from State v. Wentworth, 395 A.2d 858, 863 (N.H. 1978), the Wentworth 
instruction is:  
 
If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether the State has proved any one or 
more of the elements of the crime charged, you must find the defendant not 
guilty.  However, if you find that the State has proved all of the elements of 
the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the 
defendant guilty. 
 
Paul, 104 A.3d at 1059 (quoting Wentworth, 395 A.2d at 863) (emphasis in original). 
13As another example, in Walker v. State, 723 P.2d 273, 284 (Okla. Crim. App.), 
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995 (1986), the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma described 
jury nullification as “the jury’s exercise of its inherent power to bring a verdict of acquittal 
in the teeth of both law and facts[,]” and stated that, in capital cases, a jury nullification 
instruction “inform[s] the jury of its right to return a sentence of life no matter how great 
the weight of evidence supporting the circumstances.”  (Cleaned up).  The Court held that, 
although a trial court may exercise its discretion to give a jury nullification instruction, a 
defendant is not entitled to such an instruction and it is not error for a trial court to refuse 
the defendant’s request.  See id.  
- 29 - 
 
365 A.2d 545, 552-53 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918 (1977), this Court held that the 
trial court properly sustained an objection to defense counsel’s opening statement because 
counsel’s statement encouraged the jury to disregard the law, thereby essentially 
encouraging the jury to engage in jury nullification.  We explained that Maryland law “does 
not confer upon the[ jury] untrammeled discretion to enact new law or to repeal or ignore 
clearly existing law as whim, fancy, compassion or malevolence should dictate, even 
within the limited confines of a single criminal case.”  Id. at 479, 365 A.2d at 553 (cleaned 
up).  Likewise, in Thomas v. State, 29 Md. App. 45, 52, 349 A.2d 384, 388-89 (1975), cert. 
granted, 278 Md. 736 (1976), cert. dismissed, 279 Md. 604 (1977), where a defendant 
“candidly acknowledge[d] that his purpose” in wanting to inform the jury in closing 
argument of the mandatory sentence for use of a handgun in the perpetration of a felony 
was to seek jury nullification, the Court of Special Appeals held that such argument was 
improper. 
To be sure, this Court, in dicta, has acknowledged the reality that juries sometimes 
engage in jury nullification.  In Chambers v. State, 337 Md. 44, 45, 51, 650 A.2d 727, 727, 
730 (1994), where we held that a particular section of a Maryland Rule did not require “a 
trial court, upon request, to instruct the jury that it may recommend that the court show 
mercy to a criminal defendant[,]”14 we remarked, in dicta, that “[j]uries may have statutory 
 
14At issue was former Maryland Rule 4-327(f), which provided that “[a] jury may 
recommend that the court show mercy to a defendant.  The recommendation is not part of 
the verdict and is not binding upon the court.”  Chambers, 337 Md. at 45 n.1, 650 A.2d at 
727 n.1 (quoting Md. R. 4-327(f)).  That provision has since been repealed.  See Md. R. 4-
327. 
- 30 - 
 
power over punishment in some cases, and they always have the ability to nullify the 
application of the criminal law to a particular defendant.”  (Citation omitted).  We 
explained that, “[n]evertheless, at common law, a defendant generally had no right to 
mercy from the jury; that function was performed by other officers.”  Chambers, 337 Md. 
at 51, 650 A.2d at 730 (citation omitted).  In Chambers, the jury’s ability to engage in jury 
nullification was not at issue, and aside from the statement noting that jury nullification 
exists, this Court did not otherwise comment on jury nullification.15 
Significantly, this Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that, other than with 
respect to the crime charged, a trial court’s jury instructions are binding, and it is improper 
for a trial court to advise a jury that instructions are advisory only or that the jury is free to 
disregard them.  See Stevenson v. State, 289 Md. 167, 180, 423 A.2d 558, 565 (1980); 
Montgomery v. State, 292 Md. 84, 91, 437 A.2d 654, 658 (1981).  Although Article 23 of 
the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides, in pertinent part, that “[i]n the trial of all 
 
15In Jackson v. State, 322 Md. 117, 124, 126-28, 586 A.2d 6, 9, 10 (1991), this Court 
held that a trial court did not err in permitting the State, over objection, to enter a nolle 
prosequi to lesser-included offenses.  This Court concluded that the evidence adduced at 
trial “did not fairly support a conviction on the nol prossed counts[,]” and, accordingly, 
under the circumstances, the defendant “was not entitled to have the lesser included 
offenses go to the jury.”  Id. at 126-27, 586 A.2d at 10.  After holding as much, this Court 
cautioned that the holding was “not to be read as indicating in any way an encroachment 
on the function of the jury.”  Id. at 128, 586 A.2d at 11.  Then, in dicta, this Court remarked 
that “[a] jury has power to err, either fortuitously or deliberately, and to compromise or 
exercise lenity.  It, therefore, retains the power to be the final arbiter in the determination 
of which, if any, of the crimes charged the accused is guilty.”  Id. at 128, 586 A.2d at 11 
(cleaned up).  Although the reference in dicta to a jury exercising lenity could be interpreted 
as showing that we recognized that jury nullification occurs, notably, in Jackson, this Court 
did not use the term “jury nullification” and no issue of jury nullification was present in 
the case. 
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criminal cases, the Jury shall be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact[,]” in Stevenson, 289 
Md. at 180, 423 A.2d at 565, we concluded that, although under Article 23 the jury “is the 
final arbiter of disputes as to the substantive ‘law of the crime’[ and] the ‘legal effect of 
the evidence,’” “all other aspects of the law (e.[]g., the burden of proof, the requirement of 
unanimity, the validity of a statute) are beyond the jury’s pale, and the judge’s comments 
on these matters are binding upon that body.”  See also Montgomery, 292 Md. at 91, 437 
A.2d at 658 (This Court held that instructions on certain bedrock principles “are not ‘the 
law of the crime;’ they are not advisory; and they cannot be the subject of debate by counsel 
before the jury.  They are binding.”).  
Specifically, in 1980, in Stevenson, 289 Md. at 178, 189, 423 A.2d at 564, 570, this 
Court held that the language of Article 23 did not on its face violate the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, but that case law 
showed that Article 23 did not grant a jury “the power to decide all matters that may be 
correctly included under the generic label ‘law.’  Rather, [a jury’s] authority is limited to 
deciding the law of the crime, or the definition of the crime, as well as the legal effect of 
the evidence before the jury.”  (Cleaned up).  Accordingly, we held that “all other aspects 
of law (e.[]g., the burden of proof, the requirement of unanimity, the validity of a statute) 
are beyond the jury’s pale, and that the judge’s comments[, i.e., jury instructions,] on these 
matters are binding upon that body.  In other words, the jury should not be informed that 
all of the court’s instructions are merely advisory[.]”  Id. at 180, 423 A.2d at 565. 
The following year, in Montgomery, 292 Md. at 91, 437 A.2d at 658, this Court held 
that a trial court erred in instructing a jury that it “could pay no attention to instructions on 
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the law which did not pertain to the elements of the crime but which were standard 
instructions invoked to preserve the integrity of the judicial system and to assure the 
defendant a fair and impartial trial.”  We explained that the trial court’s advisory only 
instructions were improper because instructions on certain “bedrock characteristics” of the 
American criminal justice system “are indispensable to the integrity of every criminal trial” 
and “are not ‘the law of the crime;’ they are not advisory; and they cannot be the subject 
of debate by counsel before the jury.  They are binding.  They are the guidelines of due 
process to which every jury is required to adhere.”  Id. at 91, 437 A.2d at 658.16   
Recently, in Kazadi v. State, 467 Md. 1, 9, 223 A.3d 554, 559 (2020), this Court 
held “that, on request, during voir dire, a trial court must ask whether any prospective 
jurors are unwilling or unable to comply with the jury instructions on the fundamental 
principles of presumption of innocence, the State’s burden of proof, and the defendant’s 
right not to testify.”  In so holding, this Court relied on key developments in the law—
namely, the holdings in Stevenson, 289 Md. at 179-80, 423 A.2d at 565, and Montgomery, 
292 Md. at 91, 437 A.2d at 658, “that, other than with respect to the crime charged, jury 
instructions are binding[.]”  Kazadi, 467 Md. at 8-9, 223 A.3d at 559.  We reiterated that, 
“[c]onsistent with Stevenson, 289 Md. at 180, 423 A.2d at 565, and Montgomery, 292 Md. 
at 91, 437 A.2d at 658, today, jury instructions about the law are binding and trial courts 
 
16In Montgomery, 292 Md. at 89, 437 A.2d at 657, this Court explained that a trial 
court’s instructions to the jury are advisory only in “instances when the jury is the final 
arbiter of the law of the crime.  Such instances arise when an instruction culminates in a 
dispute as to the proper interpretation of the law of the crime for which there is a sound 
basis.”  
- 33 - 
 
advise juries as much.”  Kazadi, 467 Md. at 44, 223 A.3d at 579.  We explained that the 
“long-standing fundamental rights” concerning the presumption of innocence, the burden 
of proof, and a defendant’s right not to testify are “critical to a fair jury trial in a criminal 
case[,]” and voir dire questions about a juror’s inability or unwillingness to honor those 
fundamental rights are “mandatory on request[.]”  Id. at 46, 223 A.3d at 581.  We concluded 
that, “[o]n request, during voir dire, a trial court must ask whether any prospective jurors 
are unwilling or unable to comply with the jury instructions on the presumption of 
innocence, the burden of proof, and the defendant’s right not to testify.”  Id. at 48, 223 
A.3d at 582. 
In addition, this Court has held that legally inconsistent verdicts are not permissible.  
In McNeal v. State, 426 Md. 455, 458, 44 A.3d 982, 984 (2012), this Court defined a 
“legally inconsistent verdict” as  
one where the jury acts contrary to the instructions of the trial judge with 
regard to the proper application of the law.  Verdicts where a defendant is 
convicted of one charge, but acquitted of another charge that is an essential 
element of the first charge, are inconsistent as a matter of law. 
 
(Cleaned up).  This Court has long held that guilty verdicts may not be legally inconsistent, 
regardless of whether a jury or a trial court tried the defendant.  See Givens v. State, 449 
Md. 433, 448, 144 A.3d 717, 725 (2016).  Before McNeal and Givens, in Price v. State, 
405 Md. 10, 29, 949 A.2d 619, 630 (2008), this Court overruled prior case law—in which 
we had held that a guilty verdict and a not-guilty verdict could be legally inconsistent where 
a jury tries the defendant—by holding “that ‘inconsistent verdicts shall no longer be 
allowed.’”  Givens, 449 Md. at 452, 144 A.3d at 728 (quoting Price, 405 Md. at 29, 949 
- 34 - 
 
A.2d at 630); see also McNeal, 426 Md. at 458, 44 A.3d at 984 (This Court stated that, in 
Price, we concluded “clearly that legally inconsistent jury verdicts in criminal cases were 
prohibited henceforth in Maryland.”).   
By contrast, factually inconsistent verdicts—“those where the charges have 
common facts but distinct legal elements and a jury acquits a defendant of one charge, but 
convicts him or her on another charge”—“are illogical, but not illegal[,]” i.e., factually 
inconsistent verdicts are permissible.  McNeal, 426 Md. at 458, 44 A.3d at 984 (cleaned 
up).  In McNeal, id. at 471, 44 A.3d at 992, this Court stated that “[p]ractical considerations 
of how a trial judge would correct an inconsistent verdict militate[d] against reading the 
holding of Price to apply to factually inconsistent verdicts.”  In discussing the possible use 
of the process for correcting legally inconsistent verdicts to potentially correct factually 
inconsistent verdicts, we stated: 
The process, other than reversal on appeal, for correcting legally inconsistent 
verdicts (i.e., allowing the defendant, upon proper and timely objection, to 
have the trial judge send the verdict back to the jury for further resolution), 
as applied to factually inconsistent verdicts, would be risky because it may 
invade the province of the jury with regard to factual determinations.  
Because of the position of authority the trial judge occupies in the court room, 
his/her instructions to resolve the factual inconsistency may be construed by 
the jurors as a suggested outcome, or that their original conclusions are 
deemed incorrect.  Juries may engage in internal negotiations, compromise, 
or even make mistakes; however, we cannot divine whether the inconsistency 
is the product of lenity.  We will not risk disturbing a verdict for the wrong 
reasons.  [United States v.] Powell, 469 U.S. [57,] 65 [(1984)] (noting that 
jury lenity . . . has been recognized by courts and commentators as the “jury’s 
historic function, in criminal trials, as a check against arbitrary or oppressive 
exercises of power by the Executive Branch”). 
 
McNeal, 426 Md. at 471-72, 44 A.3d at 992.  More recently, though, in State v. Stewart, 
464 Md. 296, 303-04, 211 A.3d 371, 375-76 (2019) (plurality op.), we explained that the 
- 35 - 
 
reason for distinguishing between factually inconsistent verdicts and legally inconsistent 
verdicts is the “concern that a court not intrude on the jury’s factfinding function while also 
ensuring that the jury has not taken the law into its own hands.”  (Footnote omitted). 
Finally, it is worth noting that Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 2:00A, 
concerning the binding nature of instructions, provides, in relevant part: 
Members of the jury, the time has come to explain the law that applies to this 
case.  The instructions that I give about the law are binding upon you.  In 
other words, you must apply the law as I explain it in arriving at your verdict.  
On the other hand, any comments that I may have made or may make about 
the facts are not binding upon you and are advisory only.  You are the ones 
to decide the facts and apply the law to those facts. 
 
MPJI-Cr 2:00A (2d ed., 2020 Repl.). 
Analysis 
Here, we unequivocally hold that, despite the circumstance—and our recognition—
that jury nullification sometimes occurs, jury nullification is not authorized in Maryland 
and a jury does not have the right to engage in jury nullification.  Indeed, no case, statute, 
or rule in Maryland authorizes or gives juries the right to engage in jury nullification, i.e., 
there is no grant of authority permitting a jury to nullify.  Instead, Maryland case law makes 
plain that it is improper for an attorney to argue jury nullification to a jury, and that jury 
instructions about the law are binding and that trial courts advise juries as much.  When 
requested, during voir dire, a trial court must ask whether any prospective jurors would be 
unwilling or unable to comply with the jury instructions on specific fundamental principles.  
Moreover, a verdict achieved via jury nullification is akin to the return of legally 
inconsistent verdicts in that a jury acts contrary to a trial court’s instructions as to the proper 
- 36 - 
 
application of the law and in both instances that is impermissible.  Collectively, these 
principles of law lead to the conclusion that jury nullification is not a practice that is 
authorized in Maryland.  Taking our cue from the United States Supreme Court in Sparf 
and the Second Circuit (and other Federal courts), we agree that although a jury may have 
the inherent ability or power to nullify, it “is just that—a power; it is by no means a right 
or something that a [trial court] should encourage or permit if it is within [the court’s] 
authority to prevent.”  Thomas, 116 F.3d at 615.  In Maryland, a jury is required to 
determine the facts and render a verdict based on the instructions on the law provided to it 
by the trial court.  
We hold that, in this case, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when, in 
response to the second and third jury notes about jury nullification, it instructed the jury, 
among other things, that: jury nullification is a juror’s knowing and deliberate rejection of 
the evidence or refusal to apply the law; it could not engage in jury nullification; jury 
nullification is contrary to the law and engaging in it would violate the jury’s oath; and jury 
nullification would violate the court’s order and the jury must apply the law as instructed 
by the court. 
We begin by turning to the definition of “jury nullification.”  The term is not defined 
by Maryland case law, statute, or rule.  In addition to the definition set forth in Black’s 
Law Dictionary, the Second Circuit has discussed jury nullification as “the intentional 
disregard of the law as stated by the presiding judge[,]” and stated that jury nullification 
“is, by definition, a violation of a juror’s oath to apply the law as instructed by the court—
in the words of the standard oath administered to jurors in the federal courts, to ‘render a 
- 37 - 
 
true verdict according to the law and the evidence.’”  Thomas, 116 F.3d at 608, 614 
(cleaned up).  See also United States v. Fattah, 914 F.3d 112, 148 (3d Cir. 2019) 
(“[N]ullification—a juror’s refusal to follow the law—is a violation of the juror’s sworn 
oath to render a verdict according to the law and evidence.”  (Citing Thomas, 116 F.3d at 
614-18)).  From our perspective, neither definition is wrong.  Jury nullification plainly 
encompasses a jury’s refusal to follow the law whether that refusal be based on a reason 
related to the jury’s sense of justice, morality, or fairness, or otherwise.  Consistent with 
the definition set forth by the Second Circuit, we conclude that jury nullification involves 
a refusal to apply the law as explained by the trial court, see Thomas, 116 F.3d at 608, and 
a jury may not withdraw or retreat from, i.e. nullify, its obligation to follow a court’s 
instructions on the law for any reason.   
With the definition of jury nullification in mind, we observe that, to be sure, 
Maryland case law acknowledges the reality that jury nullification occurs, but our case law 
unmistakably holds that a party may not argue jury nullification to a jury and that 
instructions as to the law are binding on the jury.  That this Court and the Court of Special 
Appeals have discussed or mentioned jury nullification because at times it occurs, though, 
is far removed from either court having authorized or sanctioned the practice.   
For instance, in Chambers, 337 Md. at 51, 650 A.2d at 730, in considering the 
propriety of a mercy instruction in a criminal case, this Court commented, in dicta, that 
juries “always have the ability to nullify the application of the criminal law to a particular 
defendant.”  This statement is no more than an acknowledgment of the reality that jury 
nullification occurs because juries have the ability on their own without the imprimatur or 
- 38 - 
 
authorization of the Court to reach a verdict for reasons other than those that are based on 
the applicable law.  In Chambers, this Court did not state in any manner whatsoever that 
jury nullification is authorized or that it occurs under the auspices of relevant case law or 
any other authority.  Indeed, beyond the observation referenced above, this Court offered 
no additional comment on jury nullification and the case did not involve the resolution of 
any issue as to jury nullification.  Although we acknowledged that it occurs, i.e., that a jury 
has the ability to nullify, we did not approve the use of jury nullification or otherwise state 
that a jury has a right to engage in jury nullification. 
Notwithstanding that this Court has acknowledged that jury nullification occurs, 
existing case law leads to the inescapable conclusion that jury nullification is not 
authorized.  Our case law makes clear that counsel may not argue or encourage a jury to 
engage in jury nullification.  In Blackwell, 278 Md. at 478-80, 365 A.2d at 552-53, this 
Court held that a trial court properly sustained an objection to defense counsel’s opening 
statement that essentially encouraged the jury to engage in jury nullification.17  And, we 
expressly disapproved of the notion of jury nullification, stating that Maryland law does 
not give a jury “untrammeled discretion” to “ignore clearly existing law as whim, fancy, 
compassion or malevolence should dictate[.]”  Blackwell, 278 Md. at 479, 365 A.2d at 553 
(cleaned up).  It would, of course, create an inexplicable dichotomy within our case law if 
this Court were to hold that, although trial counsel may not argue jury nullification, a jury 
is authorized to engage in the practice.  
 
17Likewise, in Thomas, 29 Md. App. at 52, 349 A.2d at 388-89, the Court of Special 
Appeals held that closing argument seeking to encourage jury nullification was improper. 
- 39 - 
 
That counsel may not argue jury nullification to a jury makes sense in light of the 
meaning of the term and the binding nature of a trial court’s instructions as to the law.  
Counsel—or a trial court—would run afoul of this Court’s holdings that jury instructions 
about the law are binding if counsel were permitted to argue that a jury should disregard 
the trial court’s instructions and refuse to apply the law as provided to it by the trial court.  
As Stevenson, 289 Md. at 180, 423 A.2d at 565, and Montgomery, 292 Md. at 91, 437 
A.2d at 658, plainly hold, and as we reiterated lately in Kazadi, 467 Md. at 8-9, 44, 223 
A.3d at 559, 579, jury instructions about the law are binding and a trial court may not 
instruct a jury to the contrary—i.e., that its instructions as to the law are advisory only (not 
binding) and that the jury is free to disregard the law.  If instructions about the law are 
binding on the jury, and trial counsel may not argue the opposite to a jury and a trial court 
may not instruct a jury otherwise, it follows that a jury is not free to engage in jury 
nullification and refuse to apply the law because it disagrees with the law in some respect.  
Moreover, in Montgomery, 292 Md. at 91, 437 A.2d at 658, we held that “certain 
bedrock characteristics” of the American criminal justice system are binding guidelines of 
due process that the jury must adhere to, including the presumption of innocence, the 
State’s burden of proof, and the defendant’s right not to testify.  Indeed, the importance of 
these fundamental principles to a fair jury trial in a criminal case resulted in this Court 
holding, in Kazadi, 467 Md. at 9, 223 A.3d at 559, “that, on request, during voir dire, a 
trial court must ask whether any prospective jurors are unwilling or unable to comply with 
the jury instructions on the fundamental principles of presumption of innocence, the State’s 
burden of proof, and the defendant’s right not to testify.”  It would not only be inconsistent 
- 40 - 
 
with case law concerning the binding nature of a trial court’s instructions on the law for 
this Court to hold that jury nullification is authorized, but it would also conflict with the 
Court’s recent determination in Kazadi, id. at 49, 223 A.3d at 559, that, when requested, a 
trial court is required to ask voir dire questions aimed at determining whether jurors are 
willing and able to comply with the court’s jury instructions concerning fundamental 
principles.  Holding that a jury could engage in jury nullification and disregard a trial 
court’s instructions on fundamental principles would be to vary from our conclusion in 
Kazadi, that a juror is required to comply with instructions on the presumption of 
innocence, the burden of proof, and the defendant’s right not to testify.  Put simply, it would 
be inconsistent with existing case law—namely, our holdings in Stevenson, Montgomery, 
and Kazadi—for us to hold today that jury nullification is permissible or authorized in 
Maryland, thereby sanctioning the practice of juries knowingly and deliberately 
disregarding or refusing to apply the law, as instructed by the trial court.  That a jury has 
the ability to nullify and that jury nullification sometimes occurs does not mean that jury 
nullification is consistent with, or authorized by, Maryland law. 
Our holding that jury nullification is not authorized in Maryland is also supported 
by the principle that legally inconsistent verdicts are not permitted.  As we explained in 
McNeal, 426 Md. at 458, 44 A.3d at 984, legally inconsistent verdicts involve a jury acting 
“contrary to the instructions of the trial judge with regard to the proper application of the 
law[,]” i.e., the jury fails to act in accord with a trial court’s instructions on the law.  
(Citation omitted).  One of the reasons for the prohibition against legally inconsistent 
verdicts is to “ensur[e] that the jury has not taken the law into its own hands.”  Stewart, 
- 41 - 
 
464 Md. at 303-04, 211 A.3d at 375-76 (footnote omitted).  If a jury had the right to 
disregard its instructions on the law, i.e., to engage in jury nullification, the prohibition 
against legally inconsistent verdicts would be meaningless because a jury would be free to 
return legally inconsistent verdicts in contradiction to jury instructions and the proper 
application of the law as provided to it by the trial court.  Stated otherwise, permitting jury 
nullification could result in a defendant being convicted of an offense and acquitted of 
another offense that is an element of the offense of conviction.  This is the very 
circumstance that is precluded by the prohibition of legally inconsistent verdicts.  
Certainly, the circumstance that legally inconsistent verdicts are not permitted in Maryland 
informs the conclusion that jury nullification is likewise not permitted, even if it happens 
to occur from time to time without authorization. 
Based on our existing case law, and in accord with Federal case law and the case 
law of the many States that do not condone the practice of jury nullification, we conclude 
that jury nullification is neither authorized nor sanctioned in Maryland.  Indeed, after the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Sparf, Federal courts have generally recognized a jury’s 
responsibility to apply the law to the facts and that jury nullification instructions are not to 
be given.  See, e.g., Drefke, 707 F.2d at 982.  Likewise, numerous States have concluded 
that jury nullification, although occurring, should not be legitimized in instructions to the 
jury, see Partner, 180 Cal. App. 3d at 186, and is not an approved function of the jury and 
should not be encouraged by a trial court, see Goetz, 532 N.E.2d at 1274.  From our 
perspective, these jurisdictions have the approach that is most consistent with our 
interpretation of Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and our existing case 
- 42 - 
 
law, and this is the view that best ensures the overall integrity of the jury trial process in 
criminal cases.  That a jury has the ability or power to engage in jury nullification, in 
secrecy, does not mean that jury nullification is authorized or sanctioned.  Authorizing a 
jury to engage in jury nullification would pose a risk to equal justice under law, as jury 
nullification can occur for any reason, benevolent or otherwise, and indeed nullification 
could result for some in less than fair and equal treatment under the law. 
Unlike some of the States using a different approach, nothing in Maryland law 
grants trial courts the authority to advise juries about jury nullification or otherwise 
provides for the giving of a jury nullification instruction or its equivalent.  Different than 
Maryland, New Hampshire has a jury instruction that is described as the equivalent of a 
jury nullification instruction, the Wentworth instruction, which advises that if the State has 
proven all of the elements of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, a jury “should” find 
the defendant guilty, leaving open the possibility that the jury may not find the defendant 
guilty.  Paris, 627 A.2d at 589 (emphasis omitted); Paul, 104 A.3d at 1059 (emphasis 
omitted).  There has never been such a corollary in Maryland law—no case, statute, rule, 
or pattern instruction sets forth or authorizes the giving of a jury nullification instruction 
or an instruction that could be deemed a jury nullification instruction. 
Turning to the circuit court’s instructions in this case in response to the second and 
third notes about jury nullification, we conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its 
discretion in giving the instructions that it did.  We examine each instruction.  In response 
to the second note about jury nullification, asking the circuit court for a yes or no response 
to the jury nullification question, the circuit court instructed the jury as follows: 
- 43 - 
 
Jury nullification, a juror’s knowing and deliberate rejection of the evidence 
or refusal to apply the law, that’s considered jury nullification.  And the 
answer is no, you can’t have jury nullification.  You have to decide this case 
based on the evidence as you find it and apply the law as I gave it to you. 
 
You decide the facts, the weight of the evidence, you, the 12, then you 
apply the law.  To say you can do jury nullification would be a miscarriage 
of justice because there’d be no reason reading you the law and no reason 
you considering the evidence.  And that wouldn’t make sense would it?  You 
are the only ones that weigh the evidence.  You decide what weight you want 
to give it, what you find. 
 
Once you get to where you are with the evidence, you take the law as 
I give it to you, you put it together and apply it and try and reach a verdict.  
So, your decision is going to be made on the evidence, applying your 
common sense, your past life experiences and you’re going to take the law 
and apply it to all of that.  So, nullification shouldn’t even be a consideration.  
It’s not on the verdict sheet.  It’s not in the instructions.  Okay, I think I’ve 
said enough on that.  
 
As an initial point, the circuit court’s statements that “you can’t have jury nullification” 
and that the jury had “to decide this case based on the evidence as you find it and apply the 
law as I gave it to you” are correct statements of the law.  As explained above, the circuit 
court’s instructions on the law are binding on the jury. 
As to the circuit court’s definition of jury nullification, consistent with the 
discussion above, we conclude that it was not incorrect.  The circuit court’s definition is 
the same definition as set forth in Black’s Law Dictionary, albeit not the full definition 
from Black’s Law Dictionary.  To the extent that the specific definition provided in the 
first paragraph of the circuit court’s instruction did not include the part of the definition 
that explains why a jury would engage in jury nullification, from our perspective, this is of 
no consequence.  At bottom, as explained by the Second Circuit and discussed above, jury 
nullification involves the intentional disregard of the law as provided by the trial judge.  
See Thomas, 116 F.3d at 608.  Moreover, reading the circuit court’s instruction in its 
- 44 - 
 
totality demonstrates that the circuit court correctly advised the jury that it was to consider 
the evidence, weigh the evidence, and make a decision based on the evidence.  
 Also, that the full definition of jury nullification from Black’s Law Dictionary was 
not given is not significant here because there is no indication that the portion of the 
definition not given by the circuit court applied to the circumstances of the case.  Although 
the jury inquired about jury nullification, there is no indication in this case that the jury 
was motivated by a desire to reject evidence or not follow the law based on a sense of 
justice, morality, or fairness.  As the State pointed out at oral argument, this was not a 
strong case for the belief that a jury would reject evidence or refuse to apply the law for 
the reasons described in the definition of jury nullification set forth in Black’s Law 
Dictionary.  In this case, Respondents, along with other men, were charged with home 
invasion, kidnapping, and armed robbery offenses that occurred as they held a family, 
including a child, in an apartment overnight, slashed one of the victims, and threatened to 
hurt the child.  Although the jury inquired about nullification, it is not clear from the jury’s 
questions that any member of the jury was motivated to find the defendants not guilty 
because of an individual sense of justice.  Stated otherwise, it is not apparent that the 
portion of the definition from Black’s Law Dictionary not given by the circuit court was in 
any way relevant to the case or had any bearing on the jury’s questions.  It is just as likely 
that the jury inquired about nullification because the jury had not reached a unanimous 
verdict or a member of the jury was eager to leave.  But more importantly, even if the jury 
sought to avoid applying the law based on its own sense of justice, morality, or fairness, 
that would not have changed the circumstance that the circuit court gave the correct 
- 45 - 
 
response that jury nullification is not permitted.  The facts of a case play no role in how a 
court should respond to a note asking about jury nullification. 
We do not read the circuit court’s instruction as advising the jury that it could not 
reject the State’s evidence and that the jury was required to find Respondents guilty.  
Rather, read in totality, the circuit court’s instruction stressed the jury’s role in considering 
the evidence and in making a decision based on the evidence.  The entirety of the 
instruction, and the emphasis the circuit court placed on the jury’s role with respect to 
considering the evidence, negates the argument that the jury could have interpreted the 
definition of jury nullification as prohibiting it from rejecting evidence that the State 
presented at trial.   
In response to the third note about jury nullification, the circuit court instructed the 
jury: 
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury you may not use, implement or resort 
to jury nullification.  It is improper, it’s contrary to the law [and] would be a 
violation of your oath to truly try and reach a verdict according to the 
evidence, which you all took that oath.  Furthermore, nullification would 
violate this Court’s order and it’s the law of Maryland that “you must apply 
the laws I explained it in arriving at your verdict,” sincerely me.  I’ll give 
you a copy of that.  
 
We discern no abuse of discretion as to this instruction.  The instruction contains an 
accurate statement of the law concerning jury nullification and was given in response to 
the last of three notes from the jury or an individual juror asking increasingly specific 
questions about jury nullification.  The circuit court had already given progressive 
responses to the first two notes, first advising the jury that its verdict must be based solely 
on the evidence and to reread the jury instructions.  In response to the second question, the 
- 46 - 
 
circuit court advised the jury that jury nullification could not be applied and should not be 
a consideration.  Not satisfied with the circuit court’s answer, Juror Number 112 sent a note 
asking why there is a legal definition of the concept of jury nullification if there is no legal 
circumstance permitting nullification and asked the court to cite the law that prohibited 
nullification.  It was under this circumstance that the circuit court for the first time took the 
measure of telling the jury in response to a specific question about the law that prohibited 
jury nullification that using jury nullification would be a violation of the jury’s oath and 
the court’s order and that the jury must apply the law as it was explained to it.  Given that 
the circuit court had already provided two increasingly detailed responses to specific 
questions about jury nullification (the jury must base its verdict on the evidence and jury 
nullification is not available), when presented with a third question asking whether any law 
prohibits jury nullification, the circuit court accurately responded, and indeed had little 
choice but to respond, that the oath taken by the jury (which includes that the jury shall 
render a verdict based on the evidence)18 and the court’s order to apply the law as instructed 
 
18When the jury was sworn in, the clerk of the court asked: “You and each of you 
do solemnly promise and declare that you shall well and truly try and a true deliverance 
make between the State of Maryland, Bobby Johnson, Dalik Oxely, and Gary Sayles who 
shall you have in charge and a true verdict give according to the evidence?”  The jury 
responded: “I do.”  And, after reciting the charges, the clerk stated as follows: 
 
Upon this indictment they hath been arraigned, upon their arraignment they 
hath pleaded not guilty and for their trial have put themselves upon the 
country, which country you are so that your charge is to inquire whether they 
be guilty of the matters whereof they stand indicted or not guilty.  If guilty 
you will say so.  If not guilty you will say so and no more.  Ladies and 
gentlemen of the jury, are you all sworn?  Please respond. 
 
The jury responded in the affirmative. 
- 47 - 
 
prohibit jury nullification.  For all of these reasons, we conclude that the circuit court did 
not abuse its discretion in responding to the second and third notes on jury nullification. 
II. 
The Parties’ Contentions 
The State contends that the Court of Special Appeals incorrectly concluded that the 
circuit court’s instructions about jury nullification prejudiced Respondents and required 
reversal.  The State maintains that the circuit court’s responses to the second and third jury 
notes were accurate statements of the law and, in particular, there is no indication that the 
response to the third note prejudiced Respondents by coercing the jury’s verdict.  Among 
other things, the State points out that, contrary to the Court of Special Appeals’s 
determination, the jury did not render its verdict “soon” after the circuit court’s response 
to the third note about nullification.  Rather, according to the State, more than twenty-four 
hours passed between the circuit court’s response to the third note and the jury’s verdict.   
Respondents counter mainly that the Court of Special Appeals was correct in 
holding that the circuit court erred and that such error was not harmless because it 
prejudiced them.  Respondents also argue that the circuit court’s instructions resulted in 
unfair prejudice and were coercive because the instructions threatened the jury with perjury 
and contempt, and, in addition, the instructions stated jury nullification is contrary to the 
law, leading the jury to believe that under the circuit court’s definition of jury nullification, 
it was unable to reject evidence. 
Law 
In general, an appellate court may conclude that a trial court abused its discretion in 
- 48 - 
 
giving a supplemental jury instruction, even if the instruction was a correct statement of 
the law, was generated by the evidence, and was not fairly covered by the initial jury 
instructions, where the instruction prejudices the defendant.  See, e.g., Cruz v. State, 407 
Md. 202, 204, 963 A.2d 1184, 1186 (2009) (“The [trial] court’s supplemental instruction, 
though generated by the evidence, was not appropriate . . . because defense counsel’s 
reliance on the [trial] court’s pre-closing argument instructions resulted in prejudice to” the 
defendant.).  For example, in Bircher, 446 Md. at 461, 482, 132 A.3d at 294, 306, this Court 
concluded that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving a supplemental jury 
instruction on transferred intent after the jury asked a question during deliberations about 
the term “intent” “because the evidence generated the instruction and the instruction did 
not prejudice” the defendant.   
In Butler v. State, 392 Md. 169, 171-72, 896 A.2d 359, 361 (2006), this Court held 
that a trial court improperly addressed the jury in response to a jury note “in such a way 
that the defendants may have been denied their right to a fair trial[.]”  One of the defendants 
was charged with possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance and 
related charges.  See id. at 171, 896 A.2d at 360.  At trial, much of the State’s case rested 
upon testimony of a law enforcement officer who was an undercover agent and participated 
in an operation focused on arresting street-level drug dealers.  See id. at 172-73, 896 A.2d 
at 361-62.  During deliberations, the trial court received a note from the jury that stated: 
“We have one juror who does not trust the police no matter the circumstance.”  Id. at 176, 
896 A.2d at 363.  In response to the note, the trial court instructed the jury as follows: 
Madam Forelady, ladies and gentlemen we received two notes from you. 
- 49 - 
 
. . . The second note we’re essentially going to ignore.  It says we have one 
juror who does not trust the police no matter the circumstance.  Anybody 
who had felt that way should have said so in voir dire so a challenge could 
have occurred, and if anybody deliberates with that spirit now, I suggest they 
might be violating their oath. 
 
Id. at 178, 896 A.2d at 364 (emphasis omitted).  One defendant’s counsel objected to the 
instruction and the other defendant’s counsel moved for a mistrial on behalf of both co-
defendants, arguing that the trial court’s instruction had not been requested by the parties 
and had a “chilling effect” on the juror.  Id. at 178-79, 896 A.2d at 364-65 (emphasis 
omitted).  Counsel argued that the trial court “scolded that juror[.]”  Id. at 179, 896 A.2d at 
365.  The trial court denied the motion.  See id. at 179, 896 A.2d at 365.  The jury resumed 
deliberations and found one of the defendants guilty on all counts and found the other 
defendant guilty on all conspiracy counts.  See id. at 179, 896 A.2d at 365. 
On review, we observed that a “judge’s actions need not be intentional to 
inappropriately influence the jury.”  Id. at 182, 896 A.2d at 367.  We explained that the 
instruction given by the trial court was problematic:  
As gentle as the admonishment may have appeared to the judge, it may have 
carried great weight in the minds of the jurors (especially the mind of the 
juror who allegedly held certain views about police officers) who may be 
very susceptible to a judge’s words and instructions.  Furthermore, the judge 
acknowledged that his purpose in making the statement was to advise the 
juror to “rethink her legal obligation.”  Such “rethinking” could have led the 
juror to put aside his or her firmly held opinion and to vote with the majority 
even if the juror retained his or her prior position in respect to his or her 
disbelief of the police either in general or in the instant case. 
 
Id. at 182, 896 A.2d at 367.  We noted that, “in urging that juror to consider setting aside 
his or her opinion as to the credibility of the police, the judge in effect may have 
compromised the well[-]recognized principle that the credibility of witnesses is entirely 
- 50 - 
 
within the province of the trier of fact, i.e., the jury in th[e] case.”  Id. at 182-83, 896 A.2d 
at 367 (citation omitted).  We concluded that it was “possible for a juror to infer from the 
trial judge’s comment . . . that the juror was obligated to put aside his or her own judgment 
or risk violating his or her oath and face the consequences of such a violation.”  Id. at 186, 
896 A.2d at 369.  In our view, it was “difficult to imagine that the juror” described in the 
jury note “would not have been placed in some discomfort or consider that the comment 
might be suggesting that he or she should abandon his or her conscientious position.”  Id. 
at 186-87, 896 A.2d at 370 (cleaned up).  Ultimately, we concluded that the trial court’s 
“comment, made during jury deliberations . . . , was potentially coercive and, as a result, 
[the defendants] may have been denied their constitutional right to a fair trial.”  Id. at 192, 
896 A.2d at 373. 
Analysis 
In this case, having decided that jury nullification is not authorized in Maryland and 
that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in responding to questions from the jury 
concerning jury nullification, we now turn to the question of prejudice.  In light of the 
Court of Special Appeals’s determination that, in addition to the circuit court’s instructions 
being inaccurate, the instructions caused “probable prejudice,” Sayles, 245 Md. App. at 
162, 226 A.3d at 369, we address the issue.  We conclude that the circuit court’s 
instructions about jury nullification did not prejudice Respondents.  We disagree with 
Respondents that the circuit court’s instructions in response to the second and third 
questions were coercive.  To be sure, in responding to the third note, the circuit court 
advised the jury that engaging in jury nullification would be contrary to the oath that jurors 
- 51 - 
 
take and the court’s order.  It cannot be fairly said, though, that this language gave rise to 
an inference that a juror could be punished for engaging in jury nullification.  In neither 
instruction did the circuit court state that a juror could be punished for engaging in jury 
nullification, either by being charged with perjury or contempt or in some other manner.  
Indeed, in its instructions, the circuit court never mentioned punishment, prosecution, or 
that any consequence would befall the jury if it engaged in jury nullification.  The record 
reveals that the jury was capable of—and did—send follow-up notes, specifically, the 
second and third notes on jury nullification, and other notes when it wanted clarification of 
matters it was concerned about.  We observe that the jury did not send a follow-up note 
requesting clarification about any possible repercussions for engaging in jury nullification.   
Moreover, like the State, we observe that the jury did not render its verdict 
immediately, or even soon, after the circuit court’s instruction in response to the third note 
about jury nullification.  Instead, the record demonstrates that the jury continued to 
deliberate the afternoon of August 30, 2018, after receiving the third instruction on jury 
nullification, and most of the following day, August 31, 2018, before returning its verdict.  
In that period of time, not only did the jury continue to deliberate, but it also continued to 
send various notes to the court, including multiple notes indicating that it was deadlocked.  
The lapse in time between the circuit court’s instruction in response to the third note about 
jury nullification (which was received at 9:35 a.m. on August 30, 2018) and the verdict 
(which was taken sometime after 4:03 p.m. the next day) and the notes sent by the jury, 
including the note indicating it was deadlocked, support the conclusion that the jury was 
not coerced by the court’s instructions on jury nullification into reaching a verdict.   
- 52 - 
 
Respondents’ reliance on Butler for the proposition that the circuit court’s 
instruction in response to the third note was coercive is unpersuasive.  In Butler, 392 Md. 
at 176, 178, 896 A.2d at 363, 364, in response to the jury note advising that one juror did 
not trust the police under any circumstances, the trial court pointedly singled out the juror 
who allegedly held such views by advising that that juror should have disclosed as much 
during voir dire and warning that if “anybody” was deliberating in that spirit, the juror 
“might be violating their oath.”  (Emphasis omitted).  The trial court’s instruction not only 
singled out the juror at issue, but also urged the juror to set aside his or her opinion as to 
credibility, a matter that is clearly within the province of the trier of fact.  See id. at 182-
83, 896 A.2d at 367.   
By contrast, here, the circuit court did not chastise or criticize any juror’s views or 
suggest that the juror who had signed the note (Juror Number 112) had single handedly 
violated the juror’s oath.  The circuit court’s instructions in response to the second and 
third jury notes were directed to the entire jury (“you, the 12,” and “[l]adies and gentlemen 
of the jury[,]” respectively).  Nor did the circuit court’s instructions advise or urge the 
jurors to abandon any opinions or positions with respect to considering and weighing the 
evidence or the credibility of the witnesses.  In fact, in response to the second jury note, 
the circuit court did the opposite—it emphatically instructed the jury about its role in 
deciding the facts, weighing the evidence, and applying the law as instructed.  And, in 
response to the third jury note, the circuit court advised the jury as a whole, without 
suggesting or implying the prospect of punishment, that engaging in jury nullification, i.e., 
refusing to apply the law as instructed, was contrary to its oath, that oath being to “truly try 
- 53 - 
 
and reach a verdict according to the evidence[.]”  In other words, the circuit court advised 
that the prospect of the jury engaging in nullification would be contrary to the oath to truly 
try the case; whereas, in Butler, the trial judge advised a specific juror that deliberating 
with views that should have been disclosed, in the past, during jury selection was a 
violation of the juror’s oath.  In our view, the circuit court’s instructions in this case are a 
far cry from the pointed admonishment that the trial court gave in Butler and do not rise to 
the level of potential coercion that we perceived in Butler. 
CONCLUSION 
In closing, we pause briefly to offer some guidance to trial courts on how to handle 
questions from a jury about jury nullification.  When asked whether a jury may engage in 
jury nullification, a trial court should respond in much the same manner that the circuit 
court in this case responded to the first note about jury nullification—by advising the jury 
that its verdict must be based solely on the evidence, that the jury should reread the 
instructions previously provided, and that, based on the evidence, the jury should return a 
verdict of not guilty or guilty.  But, if asked specifically whether there is authority or the 
right to engage in jury nullification in Maryland, a trial court must respond in the negative 
and advise that jury nullification is not authorized, i.e., that a jury does not have the right 
to engage in jury nullification, and explain that there is no authority for the jury to decide 
the case on a basis other than the evidence presented and the law as instructed.  That is 
exactly what the circuit court here did.  We conclude that the circuit court correctly 
responded to the jury notes about jury nullification and the circuit court’s instructions were 
not coercive or otherwise prejudicial.  
- 54 - 
 
 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL 
APPEALS REVERSED.  CASE REMANDED TO 
THAT 
COURT 
WITH 
INSTRUCTION 
TO 
CONSIDER REMAINING ISSUES BEFORE THE 
COURT.  RESPONDENTS TO PAY COSTS IN 
THIS COURT. 
Circuit Court for Montgomery County 
Case Nos. 132381C, 132377C, 132379C 
Argued: December 4, 2020 
 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
Nos. 15, 16, & 17 
 
September Term, 2020 
 
__________________________________ 
 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
v.   
KARON SAYLES 
__________________________________ 
 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
v. 
BOBBY JAMAR JOHNSON 
__________________________________ 
 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
v. 
DALIK DANIEL OXLEY 
__________________________________ 
 
Barbera, C.J., 
McDonald, 
Watts, 
Getty, 
Hotten, 
Booth, 
Biran, 
 
JJ. 
__________________________________ 
 
Dissenting Opinion by Hotten, J. 
__________________________________ 
 
Filed: January 29, 2021
 
Respectfully, I dissent.  Our justice system empowers juries to acquit a defendant 
no matter how apparently convincing the evidence of guilt.  A jury verdict is final.  United 
States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671, 16 S. Ct. 1192, 1195 (1896).  Jury nullification occurs 
when a jury exercises its unassailable power to acquit, even when the jury “had no right to 
exercise [the power].”  Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 22, 100 S. Ct. 1999, 2007 
(1980) (quoting Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393, 52 S. Ct. 189, 190 (1932)) 
(emphasis added).  The trial court erred by instructing the jury that it cannot use 
nullification, because juries have the power to nullify, notwithstanding any contrary right 
or authority.  I am persuaded that this erroneous jury instruction constituted an abuse of 
discretion, and I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. 
Juries Have the Power to Nullify a Verdict  
Jury nullification describes the power of juries to disregard the facts and law when 
reaching a verdict.  This Court, along with other jurisdictions who have confronted the 
issue, acknowledge nullification as an inherent power of juries.  Chambers v. State, 337 
Md. 44, 51, 650 A.2d 727, 730 (1994) (“[Juries] always have the ability to nullify the 
application of the criminal law to a particular defendant.”); see also Teresa L. Conaway, 
Carol L. Mutz & Joann M. Ross, Jury Nullification: A Selective, Annotated Bibliography, 
39 Val. U. L. Rev. 393 (2004).  There is a fine, but decisive, distinction between 
recognizing the power of nullification and encouraging the exercise of nullification.  A trial 
court cannot instruct juries to ignore the facts or the law.  Unger v. State, 427 Md. 383, 388 
n.2, 48 A.3d 242, 244 n.2 (2012) (“[A] judge’s instructions to the jury concerning the 
burden of proof, the presumption of innocence, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and other 
2 
 
matters implicating federal constitutional requirements, must be binding upon the jury.”).  
It is equally a misstatement of the law for the trial court to instruct juries that they do not 
have the power to nullify.  Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 74, 15 S. Ct. 273, 282 (1895) 
(“[Juries] have the physical power to disregard the law, as laid down to them by the court.  
But I deny that, in any case, civil or criminal, they have the moral right to decide the law 
according to their own notions or pleasure.”) (citation omitted). 
The power of jury nullification has a venerable history in American law.  In 1670, 
jurors refused to follow a judge’s instruction to convict William Penn.  British attempts to 
control colonial juries provided “one of the grievances that led to the Declaration of 
Independence.”  United States v. Krzyske, 857 F.2d 1089, 1094-95 (6th Cir. 1988) (Merritt, 
J., dissenting) (citing Scheflin & Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a 
Controversy, 43 L. & Contemp. Probs. 51, 56-58 (1980)).  The practice gained additional 
notoriety in colonial America during the case of John Peter Zenger, when the jury acquitted 
Zenger following his attorney’s explanation that the jury had a right “beyond all dispute to 
determine both the law and the fact[s.]”  Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure, 6 
Crim. Proc. § 22.1(g) (4th ed. Dec. 2020) (quoting A Brief Narration of the Case and Trial 
of John Peter Zenger 78 (J. Alexander ed. 1963)).   
The Supreme Court has noted that it is “beyond cavil” that the Zenger case “had to 
be in the minds of the Framers[.]”  Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 247, 119 S. Ct. 
1215, 1226 (1999); see also Wayne LaFave & Jerold Israel, Criminal Procedure § 24.7(a) 
(2d ed. 1992) (recognizing arguments that the power of jury nullification is grounded in 
the constitution). 
3 
 
Maryland has codified the power and autonomy of the jury in its constitution.  See 
e.g., Samuel K. Dennis, Maryland’s Antique Constitutional Thorn, 92 U. Pa. L. Rev. 34 
(1943) (discussing the history and application of the jury’s power of nullification in 
Maryland).  While this Court has curtailed the jury’s power to disobey the trial court’s 
instructions, it has never abrogated the longstanding historical power of Maryland juries to 
nullify.  The power of jury nullification in Maryland remains alive today.  Paul Mark 
Sandler & Matthew A.S. Esworthy, Jury Nullification – A Quixotic Theory, Part II, in 
Raising the Bar: Practice Tips and Trial Technique for Young Maryland Lawyers (Paul 
Mark Sandler and the Maryland Institute for Continuing Professional Education of 
Lawyers, Inc. eds., 2006) (“While the jury’s right to judge the law in criminal cases has 
been eroded, it will never completely disappear.  Jury nullification will always exist in a 
practical sense because it is, at its core, a doctrine grounded in the essential power granted 
to jurors to issue verdicts based on their unique responses to trials.”). 
The power of jury nullification in Maryland and throughout the United States has 
drawn both praise and criticism.  On the one hand, it can serve as a tool in achieving 
positive, social outcomes.  Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in 
the Criminal Justice System, 105 Yale L.J. 677, 679 (1995) (“the black community is better 
off when some nonviolent lawbreakers remain in the community rather than go to prison. 
. . . Legally, the doctrine of jury nullification gives the power to make this decision to 
African-American jurors who sit in judgment of African-American defendants.”).  On the 
other hand, it can also disrupt the administration of justice.  John W. Bissel, Comments on 
Jury Nullification, 7 Cornell J.L. & P. 51, 51 (1997).  Regardless of whether the exercise 
4 
 
of the power is right or wrong, the legal scholarship acknowledges the jury’s inherent 
power to do so. 
The Trial Court Erroneously Instructed the Jury That It Cannot Use Jury Nullification 
The trial court denied the jury’s power of nullification at a pivotal moment in the 
trial.  The jury sent several notes reflecting that it struggled to reach consensus.  The jury 
asked the court, “[d]o we have the right to use jury nullification of a charge?”  An hour 
later, the jury asked, “can you answer the jury nullification question with a yes or no 
response?”  The trial court responded with an incorrect statement of law, “the answer is no, 
you can’t have jury nullification.”   
By stating that the jury cannot resort to jury nullification, the trial court’s instruction 
disregarded the recognized power of juries to nullify verdicts in Maryland.  The instruction 
conflated the jury’s obligation to render a verdict and obey court instructions with its 
fundamental power to nullify.  A jury can nullify a verdict, notwithstanding the trial court’s 
binding instruction to apply the law as given.   
A Jury Instruction Contrary to the Law Constitutes an Abuse of Discretion 
A trial court abuses its discretion when it incorrectly states the law in a jury 
instruction.  Carroll v. State, 428 Md. 679, 689, 53 A.3d 1159, 1164 (2012).  The incorrect 
statement on jury nullification constituted an abuse of discretion.  Such an error warrants 
reversal.  Rotwein v. Bogart, 227 Md. 434, 436, 177 A.2d 258, 259-260 (1962) (“the lower 
court’s ruling may be reversed if clearly erroneous or an abuse of judicial discretion.”).  
 The trial court could have avoided misstating the law by not commenting on 
whether the jury can resort to nullification.  The trial court could have encouraged the jury 
5 
 
to continue deliberating without having to explore the subject of nullification.  
Alternatively, the trial court could have reemphasized to the jury that they must apply the 
law as provided by the trial court and they are not legally authorized to disobey the trial 
court’s instructions.  If the jury nonetheless decides to exercise the power of nullification, 
the trial court has not articulated an incorrect statement of law, nor has it sanctioned the 
practice. 
The Court of Special Appeals has also cited United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 
1161 (1st Cir. 1993) as another example of a trial court’s deft response to a jury question 
about nullification: 
[T]rial judges are forbidden to instruct on jury nullification, because they are 
required to instruct only on the law which applies to a case.  As I have 
indicated to you, the burden in each instance which is here placed upon the 
Government is to prove each element of the offenses . . . beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and in the event the Government fails to sustain its burden of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt as to any essential element of any offense charged 
against each defendant, it has then failed in its burden of proof as to such 
defendant and that defendant is to be acquitted.  In short, if the Government 
proves its case against any defendant, you should convict that defendant.  If 
it fails to prove its case against any defendant you must acquit that defendant.   
Sayles v. State, 245 Md. App. 128, 160, 226 A.3d 349, 368 (2020) (quoting Sepulveda, 15 
F.3d at 1189-90) (ellipses in original).  This response, as noted by the Court of Special 
Appeals, addressed the jury’s inquiry without encouraging nor prohibiting jury 
nullification.  It underscored the jury’s obligation of finding the defendant guilty, if the 
government proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, or of acquitting the defendant, if 
the government failed in meeting its burden. 
6 
 
 
The unadulterated power of juries to reach a verdict, including acquittal in the face 
of evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, is a constitutionally protected feature of our justice 
system.  Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2080 (1993) 
(“‘fundamental to the American scheme of justice’ . . . [is] the jury, rather than the judge, 
reach the requisite finding of ‘guilty.’”).  Trial courts should not insinuate otherwise in 
instructing a jury. 
CONCLUSION 
Admittedly, the inherent power of a jury to nullify a verdict generates an 
uncomfortable tension with a jury’s binding obligation to apply the law as provided by the 
trial court.  The trial court erred in its instruction by conflating the fine, but vital, distinction 
between a jury’s power to nullify and its authority to nullify. 
For these reasons, I dissent and would affirm the judgment of the Court of Special 
Appeals.