Title: The Crossings At Fleming Island Community Development District, Etc. V. Lisa Reinhardt Echeverri, Etc., Et Al.

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC07-1556 
____________ 
 
 
THE CROSSINGS AT FLEMING ISLAND COMMUNITY 
DEVELOPMENT DISTRICT, etc., 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
LISA REINHARDT ECHEVERRI, etc., et al., 
Respondents. 
 
[July 3, 2008] 
 
WELLS, J. 
 
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the First District 
Court of Appeal in Zingale v. Crossings at Fleming Island Community 
Development District, 960 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (Crossings).  The district 
court certified that its decision is in direct conflict with the decision of the Second 
District Court of Appeal in Sun ‘N Lake of Sebring Improvement District v. 
McIntyre, 800 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (Sun ‘N Lake), “on the issue of 
whether a property appraiser has standing to defensively raise the constitutionality 
of a statute.”  Zingale v. Crossings at Fleming Island, No. 1D06-2026, 1D06-2158 
(Fla. 1st DCA order filed June 26, 2007).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 
3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  Based on the reasoning explained below, we hold that a 
property appraiser acting in his or her official capacity does not have standing to 
raise the constitutionality of a statute as a defense in an action filed by a taxpayer. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The Crossings at Fleming Island Community Development District (District) 
is a community development district in Clay County, Florida, established by 
general law, as set forth in chapter 190, Florida Statutes.  The District is a 
residential community that owns and operates several public recreational facilities, 
including a golf course, a swim and tennis center, a second swim center, and four 
playgrounds.  Beginning in December 2000, the District filed three complaints in 
the Fourth Judicial Circuit Court in and for Clay County for declaratory and 
injunctive relief against Wayne Weeks, as the Clay County Property Appraiser 
(Appraiser), Jimmy Weeks, as the Clay County Tax Collector (Tax Collector), and 
Jim Zingale, as the Executive Director of the Florida Department of Revenue 
(DOR).  The District asserted that pursuant to section 189.403(1), Florida Statutes 
(1999), a community development district is to be treated as a municipality for ad 
valorem tax purposes, and thus the Appraiser wrongfully denied exemptions for 
the above listed properties during the years 2000, 2001, and 2002.  Alternatively, 
the District asserted that it was entitled to equitable relief because the Appraiser 
 
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denied the exemptions in violation of its equal protection rights and Florida’s 
uniformity and equality laws.  The Appraiser raised the affirmative defense that 
section 189.403(1) was unconstitutional and argued that the properties were not 
entitled to exempt status.  Crossings, 960 So. 2d at 22. 
The District filed motions to strike the affirmative defense in each now-
consolidated case, arguing that the Appraiser lacked standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of a statute.  After a hearing, the trial court granted the motions to 
strike.  Crossings at Fleming Island Cmty. Dev. Dist. v. Weeks, No. 02-1024-CA 
(Fla. 4th Cir. Ct. order filed May 14, 2003) (Order Striking Affirmative Defense); 
Crossings at Fleming Island Cmty. Dev. Dist. v. Weeks, No. 01-920-CA (Fla. 4th 
Cir. Ct. order filed July 7, 2003) (same); Crossings at Fleming Island Cmty. Dev. 
Dist. v. Weeks, No. 00-921-CA (Fla. 4th Cir. Ct. order filed July 7, 2003) (same). 
After a one-day bench trial, the trial court found that the golf course 
(excluding the bar, restaurant, and pro shop), the swim and tennis center, the swim 
center, and the playgrounds were exempt from ad valorem taxation for tax years 
2000 through 2002 because the properties were used for activities that were 
essential to the health, morals, safety, and general welfare of the people within the 
District.  The trial court ordered the Tax Collector to refund ad valorem taxes paid 
on the exempt properties for those years.  The trial court also found as independent 
grounds for relief that the Appraiser violated the uniformity and equality 
 
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requirements of Florida law by the disparity of treatment of the District’s property 
from property of similar character and use owned by other entities in Clay County.  
Crossings at Fleming Island Cmty. Dev. Dist. v. Weeks, Nos. 2000-921-CA, 2001-
920-CA, 2002-1024-CA (Fla. 4th Cir. Ct. amended final judgment filed Apr. 17, 
2006). 
The Appraiser appealed to the First District, arguing that the trial court erred 
in finding that the golf course and the swim and tennis center were entitled to ad 
valorem tax exemption; in granting the District’s motion to strike his affirmative 
defense that section 189.403(1) was unconstitutional; and in denying a motion for 
recusal.  The Appraiser argued on appeal that he had standing because he may 
defensively raise the constitutionality of a statute and, alternatively, because he 
may raise the constitutionality of a statute to protect public funds.  The DOR 
challenged all of the exemptions on appeal.  Crossings, 960 So. 2d at 24, 26. 
The First District affirmed the trial court’s holding that the properties were 
exempt from ad valorem taxation pursuant to section 189.403(1), Florida Statutes 
(1999), and section 196.199(1), Florida Statutes (1999) (creating statutory 
exemption for property of “municipalities of this state or of entities created by 
general or special law . . . which is used for governmental, municipal, or public 
purposes”).  The First District reversed the trial court’s alternative basis for 
 
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granting relief, finding that no disparate treatment had been proven.  Crossings, 
960 So. 2d at 26. 
The First District also reversed the trial court’s ruling that the Appraiser 
lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of section 189.403(1).  Citing to 
Fuchs v. Robbins, 818 So. 2d 460, 464 (Fla. 2002), the First District held that the 
Appraiser could defensively raise the constitutionality of a statute in a lawsuit filed 
by a taxpayer.  Crossings, 960 So. 2d at 28.  Because it found that the appraiser had 
standing due to his procedural status as a defendant, the First District did not 
address the Appraiser’s alternative public funds argument.  Id. at 26.  Ultimately, 
the First District reversed and remanded for the trial court to address the 
Appraiser’s affirmative defense.1 
 
Following the First District’s decision, the District filed a motion to certify 
conflict with the Second District’s decision in Sun ‘N Lake, where the Second 
District held that a property appraiser did not have standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of section 189.403(1) in a tax suit filed by an independent special 
district.  The First District granted the motion.  The DOR, joined by the Appraiser, 
                                          
 
 
1.  Judge Kahn concurred in part and dissented in part.  He would have 
affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the Appraiser did not have standing based on 
the reasoning expressed in Justice Bell’s concurring opinion in Sunset Harbour 
Condominium Ass’n v. Robbins, 914 So. 2d 925, 933-38 (Fla. 2005) (Bell, J., 
specially concurring), and the Second District’s decision in Sun ‘N Lake.  
Crossings, 960 So. 2d at 29. 
 
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filed a motion for rehearing, motion for rehearing en banc, or in the alternative, 
motion to certify a question of great public importance, each of which was denied. 
ANALYSIS 
 
In Fuchs, this Court held that a property appraiser seeking review of an 
adverse decision of the county value adjustment board did not have standing to file 
an action pursuant to section 194.036(1), Florida Statutes (1997), to argue that an 
applicable taxing statute was unconstitutional.  After explaining that section 
194.036(1) preserved the historical rule that a public official acting in his or her 
official capacity does not have standing to initiate an action challenging the 
validity of a statute and holding that the property appraiser in Fuchs thus lacked 
standing, the Court added that a property appraiser may raise such a challenge as 
“a constitutional defense in an action initiated by the taxpayer challenging a 
property assessment” or where “the taxing statute at issue involves the 
disbursement of public funds.”  Fuchs, 818 So. 2d at 464.2  As this Court 
                                          
 
 
2.  Section 194.036(1), Florida Statutes (1997), defines the limited 
circumstances in which a property appraiser may file an action contesting the 
decision of the value adjustment board relating to a tax assessment.  Particularly, 
section 194.036(1)(a) states that “nothing herein shall authorize the property 
appraiser to institute any suit to challenge the validity of any portion of the 
constitution or of any duly enacted legislative act of this state.”  § 194.036(1)(a), 
Fla. Stat. (1997) (emphasis added).  Section 194.036(2) provides that a taxpayer 
could bring an action to contest a tax assessment pursuant to section 194.171 
without placing conditions on this statutory right.  While the statute expressly 
prohibits a property appraiser from instituting a suit challenging the 
constitutionality of a statute, the question at issue in Fuchs, it does not place any 
 
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recognized in Sunset Harbour, our discussion in Fuchs of whether a property 
appraiser would have standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute as a 
defense in a taxpayer suit was obiter dictum because the property appraisers in the 
conflict cases underlying Fuchs both filed lawsuits challenging the tax exemption 
statutes.  Sunset Harbour, 914 So. 2d at 928. 
 
In the instant case, the District argues that the First District erred in relying 
on the defensive posture dictum in Fuchs to hold that a property appraiser has 
standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute as a defense in an action 
filed by a taxpayer.  The District, joined by the Florida Chamber of Commerce as 
amicus curiae, urges this Court to disapprove the defensive posture dictum and 
quash the First District’s decision.  In contrast, the Appraiser, joined by the Florida 
Association of Property Appraisers, Inc., and numerous other property appraisers 
as amici curiae, asks this Court to approve the dictum and the First District’s 
decision.  In the alternative, the property appraisers ask this Court to find the 
public funds exception applicable to property appraisers challenging taxing statutes 
and affirm on that basis the First District’s holding that the Appraiser had standing 
to challenge section 189.403(1).  Finally, the Appraiser argues on appeal that the 
                                                                                                                                        
restrictions on a property appraiser’s answer to a suit filed by a taxpayer or 
expressly sanction defenses previously prohibited by common law.  Thus, section 
194.036 was not cited to support the defensive posture exception discussed in 
Fuchs and does not resolve the question currently before the Court. 
 
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First District erred in affirming the trial court’s decision that the golf course, swim 
and tennis centers, and playgrounds are exempt from ad valorem taxation pursuant 
to sections 189.403(1) and 196.199(1), Florida Statutes (1999), because the 
properties are used exclusively for an exempt public purpose.  We decline to 
review this issue and limit our review to the issue upon which the district court has 
certified conflict. 
Similarly, we decline to review whether the public funds exception is 
applicable to property appraisers wishing to challenge the constitutionality of 
taxing statutes.  While the Appraiser raised the public funds exception on appeal to 
the First District, it appears from the record that the Appraiser failed to raise the 
issue before the trial court.  Because the issue was not presented to the trial court, 
we decline to address the issue at this time.  See Moss v. Moss, 939 So. 2d 159, 
166 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (declining to review issue not properly preserved for 
appellate review and explaining that “[t]he trial court could not err by denying a 
claim that was never actually presented to it”).  We do caution that past precedent 
indicates that the public funds exception is a narrow exception.  See, e.g., Dep’t of 
Educ. v. Lewis, 416 So. 2d 455, 459 (Fla. 1982) (holding that public funds 
exception did not confer standing to challenge constitutionality of proviso in 
appropriations bill upon Department of Education, State Board of Education, and 
Commissioner of Education in his official capacity, and distinguishing such 
 
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entities and officials from comptroller, who “as the state’s chief officer for 
disbursement of funds, would have standing to challenge a proviso in an 
appropriations bill”). 
Turning to the paramount issue before this Court, we find that this Court’s 
decision in State ex rel. Atlantic Coast Line Railway Co. v. State Board of 
Equalizers, 94 So. 681 (Fla. 1922), which held that a public official may not 
defend his nonperformance of a statutory duty by challenging the constitutionality 
of the statute, is binding authority in the instant case.  The Atlantic Coast Line 
decision promotes an important public policy of ensuring the orderly and uniform 
application of state law and is consistent with over eighty years of legislative 
enactments relating to tax assessment litigation.  Accordingly, we disapprove the 
defensive posture exception dictum from Fuchs, which is inconsistent with the rule 
of Atlantic Coast Line, and quash the First District’s decision. 
 
The controversy underlying Atlantic Coast Line began in 1921, when the 
Legislature created the position of the State Equalizer of Taxes and a State Board 
of Equalizers.  Ch. 8584, Laws of Fla. (1921).  The Equalizer’s duty was to 
examine the tax rolls of the counties to ascertain whether tax valuations across 
property classes were reasonably uniform and to give orders and directions to the 
county property appraisers to accomplish a reasonably uniform tax assessment.  
County commissioners were charged with ensuring that the county property 
 
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appraisers followed the State Equalizer’s orders and directions.  In the event a 
board of county commissioners was dissatisfied with the State Equalizer’s orders, 
it could appeal to the State Board of Equalizers, consisting of the Governor, the 
State Treasurer, and the Attorney General.  Id. §§ 1-5.3  The Act also provided that 
the State Comptroller was to assess all property in the state owned by railroad 
companies and that a railroad company dissatisfied with its assessment could 
appeal directly to the Board of Equalizers.  Id. §§ 6-7. 
In Atlantic Coast Line, a railway company was dissatisfied with the 
Comptroller’s assessment of its property and filed an appeal with the State Board 
of Equalizers pursuant to chapter 8584, section 7.  When the board refused to hear 
the appeal, the railway petitioned for a writ of mandamus compelling the board to 
hear its appeal, and the board responded by arguing that sections 6 and 7 of the law 
were unconstitutional.  The Court framed the issue presented as whether a 
ministerial officer has “the right or power to declare an act unconstitutional, or to 
raise the question of its unconstitutionality without showing that he will be injured 
in person, property, or rights by its enforcement.”  Atlantic Coast Line, 94 So. at 
                                          
 
 
3.  Chapter 8584, Laws of Florida (1921), relating to the equalization of 
property taxes across counties, was repealed, and the position of State Tax 
Equalizer was abolished in 1931.  Ch. 15027, § 1, Laws of Fla. (1931).  Currently, 
the DOR serves this oversight function by reviewing many stages of the tax 
assessment and collection process, and setting policies and procedures for tax 
assessors, tax collectors, and county value adjustment boards.  See generally ch. 
195, Fla. Stat. (2007). 
 
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682.  In answering in the negative, the Court explained that “every act of the 
Legislature is presumptively constitutional until judicially declared otherwise, and 
the oath of office ‘to obey the Constitution’ means to obey the Constitution, not as 
the officer decides, but as judicially determined.”  Id. at 683.  The Court found that 
to allow a public official to refuse to obey a law would be “the doctrine of 
nullification, pure and simple.”  Id.  As a result, the Court held that an allegation of 
unconstitutionality is “unwarranted, unauthorized, and affords no defense” in a 
mandamus proceeding.  Id. at 685. 
In the years following Atlantic Coast Line, Florida courts identified several 
exceptions to the general rule that public officials may not refuse to administer a 
statute due to a belief that it is unconstitutional.  However, in Barr v. Watts, 70 So. 
2d 347 (Fla. 1953) (granting petition for writ of mandamus to compel State Board 
of Law Examiners to permit applicant to sit for admission examination), the Court 
reaffirmed the rule from Atlantic Coast Line that the “right to declare an act 
unconstitutional . . . cannot be exercised by the officers of the executive 
department under the guise of the observance of their oath of office to support the 
Constitution” and clarified the narrow circumstances in which a public official has 
standing to challenge a statute.  Barr, 70 So. 2d at 351.  The Court explained that 
allowing executive officers to refuse to administer statutes not yet judicially passed 
upon would result in “chaos and confusion” and that the “people of this state have 
 
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the right to expect that each and every such state agency will promptly carry out 
and put into effect the will of the people as expressed in the legislative acts of their 
duly elected representatives.”  Id. at 351.  The Court then specifically disapproved 
dictum from City of Pensacola v. King, 47 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 1950), and State ex rel. 
Harrell v. Cone, 177 So. 854 (Fla. 1938), that could be interpreted as authorizing a 
public official to refuse to apply a statute on the theory that it would be a violation 
of his oath of office to apply a statute that he or she believes is unconstitutional.  
Barr, 70 So. 2d at 350. 
In its own dicta, the Barr Court approved two exceptions to the general rule 
that a ministerial officer may not raise the constitutionality of a statute with which 
he or she is charged to administer.  First, citing Atlantic Coast Line, the Court 
found that a ministerial officer may raise the constitutionality of a statute upon 
showing that “he will be injured in his person, property, or rights by its 
enforcement.”  Barr, 70 So. 2d at 350.  Second, citing Steele v. Freel, 25 So. 2d 
501 (Fla. 1946), the Court found that a ministerial officer may challenge the 
constitutionality of a statute where “his administration of the Act in question will 
require the expenditure of public funds.”  Barr, 70 So. 2d at 350. 
Notably, while the Board of Law Examiners was the defendant in the Barr 
litigation, no defensive posture exception was discussed.  Instead, the defensive 
posture exception cited by the First District appears in this Court’s decisions in 
 
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Fuchs and Lewis, neither of which concerned a public official defensively raising 
the constitutionality of a statute.  Lewis in turn cited three cases in support of the 
defensive posture exception: City of Pensacola; Cone; and State ex rel. Florida 
Portland Cement Co. v. Hale, 176 So. 577 (1937).  In each, a public official raised 
a challenge to a statute as a defense in an action initiated by another party, but none 
of the cases expressly relied on a defensive posture exception.  Rather, as pointed 
out by Justice Bell in his specially concurring opinion in Sunset Harbour, each can 
be read in terms of the public officials having standing as a result of the official’s 
duty to control or disburse public funds.  914 So. 2d at 935-37. 
In summary, we have found no support for the defensive posture exception.  
The dictum in Fuchs is inconsistent with the rule of Atlantic Coast Line, which 
remains good law, and thus Fuchs should be disapproved.4  While we recognize 
                                          
 
 
4.  We disapprove the defensive posture dictum rather than distinguish 
Fuchs, which concerned a taxpayer appeal from a decision of the value adjustment 
board rather than an action filed in the circuit court without first seeking 
administrative review, because a taxpayer’s decision whether to first seek 
administrative review does not render the holding of Atlantic Coast Line any less 
applicable.  Section 194.034(b), Florida Statutes (1999), which outlines procedures 
for value adjustment board hearings, provides that “[n]othing herein shall preclude 
an aggrieved taxpayer from contesting [in circuit court] his or her assessment in the 
manner provided by s. 194.171, whether or not he or she has initiated an action 
pursuant to s. 194.011 [providing for informal conferences with property 
appraisers and petitions to value adjustment board].”  Allowing property appraisers 
to raise some types of defenses in an appeal from a decision of the value 
adjustment board and not in a direct action to the circuit court, or vice versa, would 
not be in keeping with the statutory directive that a taxpayer’s circuit court action 
 
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that property appraisers have a superior perspective regarding taxing statutes and 
are perhaps uniquely situated to protect taxpayers from unconstitutional 
exemptions, we find the policy interest against selective enforcement of the law 
more compelling.  As the Court in Barr explained: 
The people of this state have the right to expect that each and every 
such state agency will promptly carry out and put into effect the will 
of the people as expressed in the legislative acts of their duly elected 
representatives.  The state’s business cannot come to a stand-still 
while the validity of any particular statute is contested by the very 
board or agency charged with the responsibility of administering it 
and to whom the people must look for such administration. 
70 So. 2d at 351. 
 
Moreover, no common law or statutory developments in the realm of ad 
valorem taxation since our decision in Atlantic Coast Line have altered the basic 
principle, rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers, that property appraisers 
must abide by all applicable Florida statutes when assessing property and thus do 
not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of such statutes.  To the 
contrary, a review of the statutory and common law history of tax assessment 
litigation confirms that while property appraisers have been given some statutory 
rights to contest property assessments and assessment policies, they have not been 
granted standing in their official capacities to challenge taxing statutes—regardless 
                                                                                                                                        
should not be affected by whether or not that taxpayer has first petitioned the value 
adjustment board. 
 
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of whether the property appraiser happens to be a plaintiff or a defendant in the 
action. 
Historically, taxpayers have had a statutory right to administrative review of 
property assessments.  Any taxpayer who felt “aggrieved at the valuation placed 
upon any item of property” could complain to the board of county commissioners 
at its meeting in August of each year.  § 716, Rev. Gen. Stat. Fla. (1920).  The role 
of the county commissioners in the tax assessment process varied little until 1969.  
During this period, a taxpayer who was dissatisfied with the value assigned to his 
or her property could raise an objection before the board of county commissioners, 
and if dissatisfied with the decision of the board, the taxpayer could authorize the 
tax appraiser to advertise and conduct a public auction to determine the value of 
the disputed property.  § 193.271, Fla. Stat. (1967).  There was no statutory 
recourse for a property appraiser who was dissatisfied with the decision of the 
board. 
 
Beginning in 1921, the Legislature created a second avenue of review of a 
tax assessment by enacting chapter 8586, which “Vest[ed] in Courts of Chancery 
the Jurisdiction to Inquire Into and Determine the Legality of Tax Assessments and 
to Enjoin the Collection of Illegal Taxes on Real or Personal Property.”  Ch. 8586, 
Laws of Fla. (1921).  This Act provided that the chancery courts had jurisdiction in 
all cases involving the legality of any tax.  But like the previously available 
 
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administrative review before the board of county commissioners, the Act was 
designed to give taxpayers, not property appraisers, access to the courts to 
adjudicate tax disputes.  See id. (requiring “complainant” to “tender into court and 
file with the bill of complaint the full amount of any such tax, assessment or toll 
which he shall admit to be legal and due by him, or file with the bill of complaint a 
receipt showing payment of the same prior to the institution of the suit”). 
In 1969, the Legislature created county boards of tax adjustment to assume 
the responsibilities relating to ad valorem taxation of the county boards of 
commissioners, including the duty to hear taxpayer complaints about tax 
assessments.  Ch. 69-140, § 2, Laws of Fla.; see also §§ 194.032, 194.062, Fla. 
Stat. (1969).5  The board of tax adjustment has been known by several names since 
1969, most recently becoming the value adjustment board in 1991, but has at all 
times consisted of three members of the governing body of the county and two 
members of the county school board.  In 1974, the statutes were revised to 
expressly provide that a taxpayer’s decision to pursue an administrative hearing 
before the board of tax adjustment would not preclude an action in the circuit court 
                                          
 
 
5.  At that time, the Legislature also enacted a statute that enabled a taxpayer 
who was dissatisfied with the board’s decision to seek arbitration, although the 
arbitration statute was repealed just two years later.  § 194.033, Fla. Stat. (1969); 
ch. 69-140, § 5, Laws of Fla.; ch. 71-371, Laws of Fla.  Notably, the statute 
enabled taxpayers, not property appraisers, to seek arbitration of the board’s 
decision. 
 
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pursuant to section 194.171, Florida Statutes.  Ch. 74-234, § 6, Laws of Fla.  
However, property appraisers continued to have no statutory right to instigate a 
legal challenge to a tax assessment. 
In 1976, the board of tax adjustment was renamed the property appraisal 
adjustment board.  Ch. 76-133, § 6, Law of Fla.  More significantly, that same year 
the Legislature amended section 194.032, Florida Statutes, to provide a method of 
appealing the board’s decision to the circuit court—the first legislation to grant 
property appraisers a statutory right to file a lawsuit challenging a tax assessment.  
Ch. 76-234, § 3, Laws of Fla. 6  Newly created subsection 194.032(6) provided that 
a taxpayer could file an action in the circuit court pursuant to section 194.171 to 
contest an assessment and that a property appraiser who disagreed with the 
decision of the board could appeal to the circuit court in limited circumstances.  
Specifically, the statute authorized an appraiser to seek judicial review if: 
 
1.  The property appraiser determines and affirmatively asserts 
in any legal proceedings that there is a specific constitutional or 
statutory violation, or a specific violation of administrative rules, in 
the board’s decision, except that nothing herein shall authorize the 
property appraiser to institute any suit to challenge the validity of any 
portion of the Constitution or of any duly enacted legislative act of 
this state; 
                                          
 
 
6.  While this process is referred to as an “appeal” of the board’s decision, 
actions brought in the circuit court pursuant to section 194.032, now section 
194.036, are original actions, not appeals.  Williams v. Law, 368 So. 2d 1285, 
1286 (Fla. 1979). 
 
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2.  There is a variance from the property appraiser’s assessed 
value in excess of the following: 15 percent variance from any 
assessment of $50,000 or less; 10 percent variance from any 
assessment in excess of $50,000 but not in excess of $500,000; 7 1/2 
percent variance from any assessment in excess of $500,000 but not in 
excess of $1,000,000; or 5 percent variance from any assessment in 
excess of $1,000,000; or 
3.  There is an assertion by the property appraiser to the 
Department of Revenue that there exists a consistent and continuous 
violation of the intent of the law or administrative rules by the 
Property Appraisal Adjustment Board in its decisions. 
 
§ 194.032(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (1977) (emphasis added).7  The 1976 act likewise 
revised section 194.181(1) to include an appraiser appealing from a decision of the 
board pursuant to section 194.032 as a potential plaintiff in a tax suit.  Ch. 76-234, 
§ 4, Laws of Fla.  As discussed above, in Fuchs the Court considered the scope of a 
property appraiser’s standing pursuant to section 194.036(1)(a).  The Court 
expressly adopted the Second District’s reasoning that “[t]his statutory prohibition 
of constitutional challenges by property appraisers is in accord with the general 
common law principle denying ministerial officers the power to challenge the 
constitutionality of statutes.”  Fuchs, 818 So. 2d at 464 (quoting Turner v. 
Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, 739 So. 2d 175, 179-80 (Fla. 2d DCA 
1999) (citing Atlantic Coast Line; Barr)). 
                                          
 
 
7.  The provisions governing appeals of the board’s decisions were moved to 
their own statute, section 194.036, Florida Statutes, in 1983.  Except for minor 
editorial changes, the conditions for appealing the board’s decisions remain 
unchanged. 
 
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Soon after the 1976 legislation enabling property appraisers to appeal 
adverse decisions of the property appraisal adjustment board, this Court was asked 
to decide whether property appraisers had standing to file a declaratory action 
alleging uncertainty about how to apply various advisory opinions by the Attorney 
General.  See Dep’t of Revenue v. Markham, 396 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 1981).  We 
held that property appraisers generally do not have standing to initiate declaratory 
actions to avoid performing their official duties. 
For important policy reasons, courts have developed special 
rules concerning the standing of governmental officials to bring a 
declaratory judgment action questioning a law those officials are duty-
bound to apply.  As a general rule, a public official may only seek a 
declaratory judgment when he is “willing to perform his duties, but 
 . . . prevented from doing so by others.”  Reid v. Kirk, 257 So. 2d 3, 4 
(Fla. 1972).  Disagreement with a constitutional or statutory duty, or 
the means by which it is to be carried out, does not create a justiciable 
controversy or provide an occasion to give an advisory judicial 
opinion.  See Askew v. City of Ocala, 348 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1977).  
Since the property appraisers under section 195.027(1), Florida 
Statutes (1977), had a clear statutory duty to comply with the 
prescribed Department of Revenue regulations governing the 
taxability of household goods, they clearly lacked standing for 
declaratory relief in their governmental capacities. 
Id. at 1121 (footnote omitted). 
While Markham was pending before this Court, the Legislature amended 
section 195.092, Florida Statutes, which previously allowed the DOR to file suit 
against any public official charged with executing Florida’s tax laws, to provide: 
The property appraiser or any taxing authority shall have the 
authority to bring and maintain such actions as may be necessary to 
 
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contest the validity of any rule, regulation, order, directive or 
determination of any agency of the state, including but not limited to 
disapproval of all or any part of an assessment roll or a determination 
of assessment levels. 
Ch. 80-274, § 6, Laws of Fla.  In essence, the Legislature partially overruled 
Markham before it was released.8  However, importantly for the current inquiry, 
the Legislature did not authorize property appraisers to challenge state statutes. 
 
Moreover, subsequent decisions have relied on the reasoning in Markham to 
hold that property appraisers do not have standing to file declaratory actions 
challenging the constitutionality of a taxing statute.  For example, in Miller v. 
Higgs, 468 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), disapproved on other grounds by 
Capital City Country Club, Inc. v. Tucker, 613 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 1993), the Monroe 
County Property Appraiser filed a declaratory action alleging that chapter 80-368, 
Laws of Florida, was an unconstitutional reclassification of leasehold interests in 
government-owned land.  The First District affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the 
property appraiser lacked standing as a property appraiser.  Miller, 468 So. 2d at 
374 (citing Markham).  The First District explained that “[s]tate officers and 
agencies are required to presume that the legislation affecting their duties is valid, 
and they do not have standing to initiate litigation for the purpose of determining 
                                          
 
 
8.  The Court did not address newly enacted section 195.092(2), Florida 
Statutes (Supp. 1980), in its decision because that statute was not applicable to 
Markham’s suit filed in 1978.  Markham, 396 So. 2d at 1121 n.1. 
 
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otherwise.”  Id. (citing Lewis; Barr); see also Jones v. Dep’t of Rev., 523 So. 2d 
1211, 1214 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (holding that property appraiser did not have 
standing in his official capacity to pursue declaratory judgment challenging 
validity of taxing statute). 
 
In summary, this review has revealed that while throughout the 1970s and 
1980s the Legislature acted to empower property appraisers to seek judicial review 
of tax assessments and DOR regulations and directives, the Legislature did not 
alter the common law principle expressed in Atlantic Coast Line and Markham that 
property appraisers, as public officials, lack standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of a statute.  Accordingly, we find Atlantic Coast Line to be 
binding in the instant case and hold that the property appraiser did not have 
standing to raise the constitutionality of section 189.403(1) as a defense. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, we resolve the conflict among the district courts by 
holding that a property appraiser does not have standing in his or her official 
capacity to raise the constitutionality of a statute as a defense in a tax suit filed by a 
taxpayer.  In the case on review, the trial court did not err in striking the property 
appraiser’s affirmative defense challenging the constitutionality of section 
189.403(1).  We therefore quash the decision of the First District in this case and 
 
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approve the decision of the Second District in Sun ‘N Lake on the issue of property 
appraiser standing. 
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, C.J., and ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur. 
LEWIS, J., concurs in result only. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
First District - Case No. 1D06-2026 and 1D06-2158 
 
 
(Clay County) 
 
Don H. Lester of Lester and Mitchell, P. A., Jacksonville, Florida, and Robert M. 
Bradley, Jr. of Kopelousos and Bradley, P.A., Orange Park, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Larry E. Levy and Loren E. Levy of The Levy Law Firm, Tallahassee, Florida,  
 
 
for Respondent Wayne Weeks, Clay County Property Appraiser 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Louis F. Hubener, 
Chief Deputy Solicitor General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent Lisa Echeverri, Executive Director of the Florida 
Department of Revenue 
 
Victoria L. Weber and Sarah M. Doar of Hopping, Green and Sams, P.A., 
Tallahassee, Florida, and Roy C. Young of Young van Assenderp, P.A., 
Tallahassee, Florida, on behalf of the Florida Chamber of Commerce; Gaylord A. 
Wood, Jr., B. Jordan Stuart, and J. Christopher Woolsey of Wood and Stuart, P.A., 
Bunnell, Florida, on behalf of Abe Skinner, Collier County Property Appraiser, 
Kristina Kulpa, Hendry County Property Appraiser, Alvin Mazourek, Hernando 
 
- 22 -
 
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County Property Appraiser, Ed Havill, Lake County Property Appraiser, Francis 
Akins, Levy County Property Appraiser, Laurel Kelly, Martin County Property 
Appraiser, Sharon Outland, St. Johns County Property Appraiser, David Johnson, 
Seminole County Property Appraiser, Ronnie Hawkins, Sumter County Property 
Appraiser, and Morgan B. Gilreath, Jr., Volusia County Property Appraiser; Elliott 
Messer and Thomas M. Finley of Messer, Caparello and Self, P.A., Tallahassee, 
Florida, on behalf of Greg Brown, Santa Rosa County Property Appraiser, and 
Chris Jones, Escambia County Property Appraiser; and Sherri L. Johnson of Dent 
and Johnson, Chartered, Sarasota, Florida, on behalf of the Florida Association of 
Property Appraisers, Inc., 
 
 
as Amici Curiae