Title: P. v. Yeoman

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

1
Filed 7/17/03 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S016719 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Sacramento County 
RALPH MICHAEL YEOMAN, 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 86216 
 
 
) 
 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
___________________________________ ) 
 
A jury found defendant Ralph Michael Yeoman guilty of the first degree 
murder of Doris Horrell and found true the special circumstance that the murder 
occurred during the commission of a robbery.  (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 190.2, subd. 
(a)(17)(A).) 1  The jury also found defendant guilty of robbery and false 
imprisonment (§§ 211, 236) and found true the allegation that, in each of these 
crimes, defendant personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5).  The jury found not true 
the additional special circumstance that the murder occurred during the 
commission of a kidnapping.  (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(B).)  The jury imposed the 
sentence of death.  The trial court stayed the convictions for robbery and false 
imprisonment under section 654, struck the enhancements under section 1385 and 
entered judgment accordingly.  This is the automatic appeal from that judgment.  
(§ 1239, subd. (b).)  We affirm.   
                                             
 
1  
All further citations to statutes are to the Penal Code, except as noted.   
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I.  FACTS 
A.  Guilt Phase 
1.  The Murder of Doris Horrell 
Defendant robbed and murdered Doris Horrell, a 73-year-old resident of 
Citrus Heights, on February 13, 1988.  Sheriff’s deputies found her body about 
9:40 p.m. in an open field west of Interstate 5 in Sacramento County, while setting 
flares to direct traffic out of the Arco Arena.  Horrell had left a Valentine’s Day 
party earlier that evening in her car to pick up an acquaintance at the airport.  She 
was wearing a bright red dress, jewelry and designer eyeglasses.  Police found no 
jewelry, eyeglasses, keys or purse.  Nor did they find a coat, but they did find 
three lavender-colored buttons.  Postmortem examination revealed the cause of 
death as six gunshot wounds to the head and left side of the body, any of which 
could have been fatal.  The shots had been fired at close range from a .22-caliber 
gun.  Horrell’s inoperable car was later towed from the side of the freeway, about 
four miles from the place where her body had been found.  Investigators 
determined that a palm print on the hood of Horrell’s car was defendant’s and that 
the fatal bullets had the general characteristics of rounds fired from defendant’s 
.22-caliber revolver. 
On February 16, 1988, Debra Stafford called the Sacramento County 
Sheriff’s office and reported that defendant was Horrell’s killer.  Stafford told the 
following story, which she repeated at trial.  On the evening Horrell died, Stafford 
and defendant were visiting defendant’s friend Ron Kegg at his Sacramento 
apartment.  Defendant left the apartment alone in his pickup truck about 7:30 p.m., 
saying he needed “[t]o go get some money.”  He returned about an hour later, 
telling Stafford “[w]e have got to hurry, go.”  Stafford left with him.  On the road, 
defendant explained the situation.  “He told me,” Stafford testified, “that he 
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needed me to help him, that he murdered a lady and he wanted me to drive his 
truck while he went to the car that was sitting on the side of the freeway and 
needed to drive it off . . . .”  Defendant said “he had fingerprints on the car” and 
needed to “clean it up.”  Defendant had stopped for Horrell “[b]ecause she was 
dressed nice and she looked like she might have some money.”  She “was broke 
down on the freeway and he stopped to help her,” but “he couldn’t get her car 
started so she got in the truck.  He was going to give her a ride, and he killed her.”  
Stafford perceived defendant as calm while he recounted these events. 
Arriving at Horrell’s car, defendant found it still would not start.  He used 
Stafford’s shirt to wipe his fingerprints off the car, and cleaned the windows with 
a fire extinguisher and squeegee from the trunk.  Driving away, defendant pointed 
a gun at Stafford and told her that he had shot Horrell “sitting where you are 
sitting.”  He said he had used a .22-caliber pistol and had “emptied the clip in her.”  
Stafford noticed a very small amount of blood on the floor of the truck.  Defendant 
then took her to see Horrell’s body.  Stafford did not want to go, but defendant 
insisted, saying, “well, I want to go see it and see if they found it yet.”  On the 
way, Stafford looked through Horrell’s purse and noted her name.  Defendant 
stopped his truck near the Arco Arena, where flares had been set to guide traffic.  
Horrell’s body had not yet been discovered.  Defendant shone a light, and Stafford 
saw the body of an older woman in a red dress with gray hair.   
After seeing the body, defendant said he wanted to visit Horrell’s apartment 
and try to withdraw money from her bank.  Defendant showed Stafford rings and 
earrings he had taken from Horrell, along with $20 and a light purple coat.  After 
stopping briefly at Kegg’s apartment, defendant drove to Horrell’s address in 
Citrus Heights using information from her purse.  Defendant threatened to kill 
Stafford or have her killed if she turned him in.  Arriving at Horrell’s apartment 
complex, defendant explained that he wanted to “go in, grab the jewelry box and 
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TV and leave.”  But the area was too brightly lit and too many people were about, 
so he abandoned this plan.  Next, the two attempted to withdraw money from an 
ATM machine using Horrell’s bank card but failed for want of her PIN number.  
Finally, they drove to Stafford’s home in Marysville where, after searching the 
purse one last time for a PIN number or other useful information, they burned 
most of Horrell’s effects.  They kept her jewelry, coat and a few other items.  
Defendant tried to give the coat to Stafford, but she would not take it.  She noticed 
bullet holes and powder burns under the left armpit.  Buttons were missing.   
A day or two later, defendant arrived at Stafford’s house with Kegg.  The 
two men attempted to persuade her to go with them to Sacramento, but she 
refused.  Afterwards, defendant called her repeatedly with the same request.  
Scared, Stafford spoke with her father.  At his suggestion she called the United 
States Marshall, who put her in touch with Deputy Sheriff John Cabrera.  
Searching Stafford’s house, Deputy Cabrera and other officers found Horrell’s fire 
extinguisher, squeegee and lipstick holder, and a brochure for a recreational area 
in South Dakota where Horrell’s family owned property.  In Stafford’s fire pit, 
officers found eyeglasses and documents that, while burned, could still be 
identified as Horrell’s.  That same day, police arrested defendant and Kegg.  
Defendant had the parts of a .22-caliber revolver in his pocket.  Kegg subsequently 
turned over Horrell’s jewelry to the police.   
Stafford, when called by the People as a witness at trial, was serving a 90-
day sentence for a misdemeanor drug offense; she had previously been convicted 
of felony failure to appear.  She testified that the People had offered no 
consideration, promises or help in exchange for her testimony.  So far as she 
knew, she might still be prosecuted for her conduct with defendant.  Kegg, also 
called as a witness by the People, had suffered a felony conviction for burglary 
and several felony convictions relating to drugs.   
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The defense endeavored to show that defendant was under the influence of 
methamphetamine at the time he killed Horrell and did not form the intent to steal 
until after killing her.  On direct examination by the People, both Stafford and 
Kegg denied seeing defendant use drugs on the day he killed Horrell.  Stafford and 
Kegg also testified on direct that defendant appeared to be calm, behaving 
normally and apparently making sense.  At the preliminary hearing, however, 
Kegg had testified that both he and defendant were using methamphetamine 
heavily during that general period of time.  Kegg had also previously testified that 
defendant arrived at his house seeming “wired,” frantic and confused.  After 
refreshing his memory with this prior testimony, Kegg explained that his own use 
of drugs had probably impaired his perception of defendant.   
Lorraine Andrews, R.N., called by the defense, described her routine 
medical examination of defendant as an inmate at the Sacramento County jail.  
Defendant reported to Andrews that he had been on a “drug run,” that he used 
cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, LSD and marijuana, and that he had recently 
lost 50 pounds.  Defendant had injection scars, or “tracks,” but Andrews could not 
say how old they were.  Andrews drew a sample of defendant’s blood, but tested it 
only for communicable diseases and not for drugs.   
A defense expert witness, Dr. Fred Rosenthal, M.D., Ph.D., opined that 
defendant “very likely” was using methamphetamine at the time he killed Horrell.  
Dr. Rosenthal, a psychologist and psychiatrist, had not interviewed defendant and 
did not know his criminal history.  Instead, Dr. Rosenthal based his opinion on 
factual materials supplied by defense counsel, including the preliminary hearing 
transcript, the statements of witnesses, and a videotaped interrogation of defendant 
by police on February 16, 1988, three days after the crime occurred.  The trial 
court permitted the defense to play the videotape for the jury without sound to 
show defendant’s demeanor, which Dr. Rosenthal described as sleepy and thus 
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indicating long-term methamphetamine use.  The trial court also permitted Dr. 
Rosenthal to repeat, as part of the basis of his opinion, defendant’s statement on 
the tape that he was puzzled about what had happened.  In Dr. Rosenthal’s 
opinion, a person whose thinking was disorganized by methamphetamine would 
not likely be able to form the plan to pose as a good Samaritan in order to rob and 
kill a stranded motorist.  Dr. Rosenthal acknowledged, however, the “unlikely” 
possibility that a methamphetamine user could form the intent to kill and steal.   
2.  The Robbery and Attempted Kidnapping of Geraldine Ford 
During the guilt phase, the People proved that defendant had previously 
robbed and attempted to kidnap another female motorist, Geraldine Ford.  The 
trial court admitted this evidence under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision 
(b), to show defendant’s intent with respect to Doris Horrell.   
The crime occurred on January 4, 1988, in the parking lot of a Target store 
in Sacramento.  Ford, an auditor for the California Highway Patrol, had been 
shopping.  While she was inside the store, the sun had gone down and the lights in 
the parking lot had come on.  Backing her car out of a parking slot, she realized 
the car had a problem.  Defendant approached, pointed out a flat tire and offered to 
change it.  Ford noted defendant’s general description and a flower tattoo on the 
back of his hand.  After finishing the job, defendant returned the tools to the trunk 
of Ford’s car.  Ford saw a gun tucked into the waistband of defendant’s pants and 
asked whether he was in law enforcement.  He replied that he worked for the 
county.  Ford thanked him, and he followed her to the open driver’s side door of 
her car.  He then held a gun and a knife to Ford’s stomach, told her to get into his 
truck and said, “don’t run or I will shoot you.  And don’t scream or I will stab 
you.”  Saying, “you’ve got to be kidding; I’m not getting into your truck,” Ford 
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backed away, ran and then hid behind another vehicle.  Defendant grabbed her 
purse from the driver’s seat of her car and fled in his pickup truck.   
Ford’s purse contained, among other things, two distinctive rings and a 
Sprint telephone card.  Defendant gave the rings to Patricia Weers, who sold one 
to Debbie Yoast.  Defendant later asked Weers to return the ring she had kept, 
explaining that it might incriminate him in an offense against a woman who 
worked for the California Highway Patrol.  Police eventually recovered the other 
ring from Yoast.  Defendant used Ford’s previously unused Sprint telephone card 
to charge calls to his friend Ron Kegg.  After police arrested defendant for the 
murder of Doris Horrell, Detective Craig Trimble visited him in prison.  When the 
detective told defendant he was investigating a robbery at a Target store and had a 
lead involving the victim’s Sprint card, defendant replied, “You are on the right 
track.”  That same day, Ford identified defendant as her assailant in a 
photographic lineup.  She later identified him in court, as well.   
The People proved this incident through the testimony of Geraldine Ford, 
Patricia Weers and the investigating officers.  The defense focused on challenging 
Ford’s identification of defendant.   
B.  Penalty Phase 
1.  The Aggravating Evidence 
The People’s evidence in aggravation consisted of the circumstances of the 
capital offense (§ 190.3, factor (a)), three prior felony convictions (id., factor (c)) 
and five incidents of criminal activity involving violence or a threat of violence 
(id., factor (b)).  One such incident was the robbery and attempted kidnapping of 
Geraldine Ford, which the People had proved at the guilt phase and as to which 
they offered no additional evidence at the penalty phase.   
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a.  The robbery of James Jacobs 
On March 2, 1976, defendant entered the home of his 91-year-old neighbor, 
James Jacobs, on the ruse of needing to borrow a plunger.  Inside, defendant cut 
the telephone cord, slit Jacobs’s throat with a four-inch folding knife, ransacked 
the house and stole a variety of pain medications and anticonvulsives.  Defendant 
reported these events to his brother Steve Yeoman, who informed the police over a 
year later.  Defendant subsequently admitted the crime and, in 1977, pled guilty to 
robbery with great bodily harm.  (§ 211.)  The People proved the crime and its 
violent circumstances through official records and the testimony of witnesses.  
These included Steve Yeoman, the housekeeper who rendered first aid, the police 
officers who responded to the call and investigated the crime scene, and the 
detective who interviewed Steve Yeoman and heard defendant’s confession.  The 
court admitted this evidence as showing both violent criminal activity (§ 190.3, 
factor (b)) and a prior felony conviction (§ 190.3, factor (c)). 
On direct examination, Steve Yeoman made conflicting statements about 
whether defendant had bragged of hurting Jacobs, ultimately acknowledging “[h]e 
may have, but it was the drugs that was making him brag.”  Defense cross-
examination focused on defendant’s heavy use of drugs and subsequent 
expressions of remorse for the crime.   
b.  The molestation of Sharon C. and Duane C. 
At the same time defendant pled guilty to the robbery of James Jacobs, he 
also pled guilty to the crimes of lewd and lascivious conduct (§ 288) against his 
stepdaughter Sharon C., and oral copulation of Sharon’s brother, Duane C. 
(§ 288a).  The People proved these prior felony convictions (§ 190.3, factor (c)) 
through official records.  Because defendant’s crime against Sharon had involved 
a threat of violence, the court also admitted evidence of its factual circumstances 
as showing criminal activity.  (§ 190.3, factor (b).)  The People proved the 
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circumstances through the testimony of Sharon, herself, and of the investigating 
officer.   
Sharon testified that defendant molested her from the time she was 10 until 
she was 13.  She did not initially know defendant’s conduct was wrong.  At the 
age of 13, however, she confronted him.  Defendant said that if she told anyone, 
her mother would not believe her, the family would be broken up, and this would 
be her fault.  Defendant also threatened to kill her.  Sharon believed him because 
he had beaten both her mother and herself.  On defense cross-examination, Sharon 
acknowledged that she had not reported defendant’s threats to the investigating 
officer.  On redirect, she explained that she had not done so because the 
investigating officer had guaranteed her that defendant would be out of the home 
and in jail.  The record does not reflect Duane C.’s precise age at the time 
defendant molested him.  Sharon testified he was four to five years younger than 
she.   
c.  The rape of Linda E. 
In 1968, while defendant was in the United States Army, he forcibly raped 
the wife of a friend and fellow soldier then serving in Vietnam.  The court 
admitted this evidence as showing prior violent criminal activity (§ 190.3, factor 
(b)) but not a prior felony conviction (id., factor (c)), because the parties had 
agreed that convictions in courts martial were not admissible for that purpose.  The 
People proved the rape through the testimony of the victim, Linda E., portions of 
the transcript of the court martial and the stipulation that defendant had in that 
proceeding admitted a forcible rape.   
The relevant evidence showed that defendant was stationed at Fort Riley, 
Kansas, in a special detachment for soldiers who had been absent without leave.  
Linda’s husband, who was defendant’s friend, had left for Vietnam a week earlier.  
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On August 3, 1968, Linda, defendant and a soldier named Elliot drove Linda’s car 
to a park on the base.  As planned, the two men spent the afternoon there replacing 
the car’s damaged door.  The men drank wine as they worked, but Linda did not.  
After finishing the work, all three drove to a more remote location on the base 
where defendant and Elliot wanted to drink beer.  Linda had planned to drop them 
off and leave, but defendant would not relinquish her ignition key.  She got out of 
the car, started walking away and then ran, but defendant caught her.  Defendant 
threatened her with a hunting knife, and both men raped her.  Afterwards, 
defendant told Linda he would kill both her and her husband if she turned him in.   
Cross-examining Linda, the defense attempted to suggest that the rape was 
a ruse intended to support her effort to obtain a hardship discharge for her 
husband.  The defense also sought to prove that Linda earlier in the day had 
implicitly offered defendant consensual sex by agreeing to his proposal that he 
would fix the car’s door if she would “supply the beer and the company.”  Linda 
denied this.   
d.  The killing of David Hill 
On January 14, 1988, a month before killing Doris Horrell, defendant killed 
David Hill.  Although defendant was not charged with that crime in this 
proceeding, the court admitted the evidence as showing criminal activity involving 
force or violence.  (§ 190.3, factor (b).) 
Hill operated an automobile repair business out of his home in Roseville.  
He also sold drugs.  On January 15, Hill was found dead on his living room floor.   
The house had been ransacked in a manner suggesting a search for drugs.   
Postmortem examination of Hill’s body revealed two gunshot wounds, one to the 
head and one to the neck and shoulder.  The fatal slugs had fragmented and could 
11
not be identified.  A spent slug found in the wall, however, bore marks showing it 
could have been fired from any Smith & Wesson .38-caliber weapon.   
Hotel records and other evidence showed that defendant had stayed at the 
Best Western Roseville Inn from January 14 to January 15, 1988.  On January 14, 
defendant called his friend Ron Kegg from the motel and asked for a ride.  In 
defendant’s room, Kegg saw an attaché case full of methamphetamine and a large 
amount of cash.  Defendant also had a distinctive short-barreled .38-caliber 
revolver with custom fat grips and a shrouded hammer (i.e., no spur), similar to a 
Smith & Wesson that defendant’s brother-in-law Michael Ayers later reported 
stolen.  Defendant and Kegg injected some of the methamphetamine and left in 
Kegg’s car.  Kegg dropped defendant off at a medical building in Roseville, less 
than half a mile from Hill’s house.  Hill was found dead the next day, January 15.  
Hotel records showed that defendant checked out on January 15 at 10:49 a.m.  A 
blue Mercury Monarch that witnesses had seen at Hill’s house on the afternoon of 
January 14, loaded with household goods, was found abandoned at the motel and 
subsequently impounded by police.   
Four months later, police recovered several items that had belonged to Hill 
from the home of defendant’s stepmother, Roberta Yeoman.  Roberta had 
removed these items from defendant’s rented storage locker at his request.  The 
items were identified by Hill’s girlfriend, Monique Hubertus.  Hubertus had lived 
in Hill’s house with her children since 1985 and had moved out only recently, 
after Hill developed problems with drugs and alcohol.  The items Hubertus 
identified included, among many other things, a distinctive handmade knapsack, 
Hubertus’s own diaper bag, and a yellow ski vest she had bought for Hill and for 
which she still had the receipt.  Hubertus also identified as Hill’s several items 
found on defendant’s person, including Hill’s San Francisco Forty-Niners wallet 
and his black Uniroyal jacket.  Keys found at Roberta Yeoman’s house, and other 
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keys found in defendant’s possession when he was arrested, fit automobiles that 
had been seen on Hill’s property on the day he died.  One of these was the blue 
Mercury Monarch police had impounded at the Roseville Inn.   
At some point before February 16, 1988, when he was arrested for the 
murder of Doris Horrell, defendant admitted to his brother-in-law Michael Ayers 
that he had shot Hill.  Ayers, however, did not believe this.  After he was arrested, 
defendant twice again admitted the killing in telephone calls from jail to his sister 
Linda Ayers.  In those conversations, defendant described Hill as “a no good drug 
dealer.”   
The People proved these events through the testimony of Ron Kegg, 
Michael Ayers, Linda Ayers, Roberta Yeoman, Monique Hubertus, other persons 
who could identify Hill’s possessions, the manager of the Roseville Inn, the man 
who discovered Hill’s body, the investigating officers, medical and firearms 
experts, and other witnesses.   
The defense focused on suggesting that various persons other than 
defendant might have killed Hill.  Jason Montgomery visited Hill’s home a few 
days after Christmas 1987 and saw him arguing about money with two heavy-set 
“Spanish looking” men.  The men had driven a white Trans Am.  Montgomery 
saw the same Trans Am at Hill’s house again on January 13.  He described the 
driver, whom he could not positively identify, as “similar” to a photograph of 
Michael Ayers.  On January 14, the day Hill died, Carol Grabowsky saw a stocky, 
well-dressed man leaving Hill’s house about 1:00 p.m.  Sometime in the early 
afternoon, Robert Connors saw a young man with unkempt clothes kneeling down 
on the sidewalk across from Hill’s house looking extremely nervous and 
frightened.  Dawn Worley saw a two-toned blue car driving away from Hill’s 
house between noon and 2:00 p.m.  Arthur Bracco, a mailman, saw Hill alive at 
3:00 p.m., speaking with another man who stepped into the shadows to avoid 
13
being seen.  Finally, Carla Nebeker saw a man with shoulder-length hair 
staggering away from Hill’s house about 6:00 or 7:00 p.m.  But other witnesses 
testified that Hill’s automobile repair business had caused his property to look like 
a used car lot, with much traffic during the day and someone working on cars at all 
times, day and night.   
The defense also called Lori Bakos, who testified that William Summers 
and James Baxter had bragged of shooting Hill in the head and using their knives 
to remove the bullets.  The two men said this, Bakos claimed, on the evening of 
January 14 in Bob Bragg’s upholstery shop.  But Baxter and Summers, called by 
the defense as witnesses, denied this.  Bakos’s story also conflicted with the 
physical evidence, which showed that the single slug entering Hill’s skull had 
fragmented and remained in place until the autopsy.  Bakos also claimed to be “an 
undercover police officer” but retracted the claim on cross-examination, 
describing herself instead as an “informant.”  The officers for whom she claimed 
to have worked, Officers Frederick Rockholm and Tod Call, described her as 
unreliable and tending to fantasize.  Bakos had once reported a homicide at a 
specific location, but no body could be found and her information could not be 
linked with any reported crime.  Officer Rockholm had on a single occasion 
unsuccessfully attempted to use Bakos to make a controlled buy of narcotics.  He 
had not, however, contrary to Bakos’s testimony, ever asked a judge to make her a 
“legal informant,” a term with which he was unfamiliar.     
On rebuttal, the People further challenged Bakos’s credibility.  Lieutenant 
Joel Neves, who investigated Hill’s death, testified that Bakos had earlier told a 
different story.  On February 16, 1988, two days after Hill died, Bakos told 
Lieutenant Neves, Detective Brian Wilder and Officer Darrell Stump that the 
killing had resulted from a drug war between rival organizations led by Bob Bragg 
and Robert Welch, and that the actual killer was Kevin Ray Pool.  Bakos did not 
14
mention Summers or claim that he and Baxter had killed Hill.  Later, Bakos said 
that she had allowed Pool to move in with her in order to learn more about Hill’s 
murder.  After a week, she retracted her claim that Pool was responsible and said 
she did not know who the murderer was.   
2.  The Mitigating Evidence 
The defense mitigating evidence, in summary, showed that defendant had 
suffered serious physical and sexual abuse in childhood that affected his 
development and behavior and possibly caused brain damage.  Correctional 
personnel and former employers testified that defendant was a good worker.  
Defendant’s stepdaughter testified that he had saved her daughter’s life. 
More specifically, defendant’s family lived in Tyler, California, near 
Nevada City.  They were extremely poor.  They had little to eat and took clothing 
and toys from the dump.  Defendant’s father, Ralph Yeoman, called defendant a 
bastard and claimed his true father was Ralph’s brother, Cliff.  Ralph beat his wife 
and children, including defendant, frequently and brutally.  Defendant’s brother 
Terry Lumsdon once saw Ralph break a two-by-four over defendant’s back and 
head, and various witnesses saw him kick defendant repeatedly in the head.  Ralph 
sexually molested both his daughters and defendant.  When defendant was nine, 
Ralph attempted to penetrate him sexually.  Defendant’s uncle Richard gave him 
alcohol and engaged him in oral copulation.  When defendant was 14, his mother 
had sexual intercourse with him after finding her husband in bed with another 
woman.   
Dr. Mindy Rosenberg, Ph.D., a psychologist, testified extensively about 
defendant’s personal and family history and its effect on his personality and 
psychological development.  Dr. Rosenberg explained that persons who have 
experienced very serious physical, sexual and psychological abuse as children are 
15
at greater risk for experiencing a wide range of later problems, possibly including 
violent behavior.  While Dr. Rosenberg would not say that defendant’s abusive 
childhood had caused his criminal behavior, she did opine that the severity and 
brutality of the abuse he suffered had affected him significantly.   
Correctional officers and employees who had supervised defendant in 
various institutions consistently testified that he was a helpful, good worker who 
did not cause trouble.  While in custody as a mentally disordered sex offender at 
Atascadero State Hospital, defendant held responsible jobs working in an office, 
helping to process new arrivals, and assisting with building maintenance.  In the 
latter job, defendant was cleared for access to sharp tools.  While imprisoned at 
Soledad State Prison, defendant worked in the kitchen and was considered 
sufficiently reliable to be released for work during lock-downs.  Two private 
employers, both in the roofing business, also testified that defendant was a good 
worker.  One of these employers, David Petrali, had discussed the Bible with 
defendant and believed he had a deep interest in religion.   
Dr. Arthur Kowell, M.D., a neurologist, interpreted the results of a BEAM 
(brain electrical activity mapping) test performed on defendant.  Dr. Kowell 
opined that the test results showed a dysfunction in defendant’s temporal or left 
parietal lobe consistent with childhood physical abuse.   
Cynthia Witt, defendant’s stepdaughter, testified that defendant had helped 
to care for her young daughter Brandy during a severe illness and had saved her 
life with mouth-to-mouth resuscitation.  Out of gratitude, Cynthia named her son 
Derek Michael after defendant.   
16
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Guilt Phase Issues 
1.  Challenges for Cause 
Defendant claims the trial court deprived him of due process and a fair trial 
by denying his challenges of four prospective jurors for cause.2  None of the four 
sat on defendant’s jury because he peremptorily challenged each.  Defendant 
eventually exhausted his peremptory challenges and expressed dissatisfaction with 
the jury.  While the claim is thus properly before us, we may reject it without 
examining the merits of defendant’s challenges for cause because defendant 
cannot show prejudice.   
To prevail on such a claim, defendant must demonstrate that the court’s 
rulings affected his right to a fair and impartial jury.  (People v. Crittenden (1994) 
9 Cal.4th 83, 121.)  None of the four prospective jurors could possibly have 
affected the jury’s fairness because none sat on the jury.  (People v. Ramos (1997) 
15 Cal.4th 1133, 1159; see Ross v. Oklahoma (1988) 487 U.S. 81, 85-86.)  The 
harm to defendant, if any, was in being required to use four peremptory challenges 
to cure what he perceived as the trial court’s error.  Yet peremptory challenges are 
given to defendants subject to the requirement that they be used for this purpose.  
(People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1248, fn. 4.)  While defendant’s 
compliance with this requirement undoubtedly contributed to the exhaustion of his 
peremptory challenges, from this alone it does not follow that reversible error 
occurred.  An erroneous ruling that forces a defendant to use a peremptory 
challenge, and thus leaves him unable to exclude a juror who actually sits on his 
case, provides grounds for reversal only if the defendant “can actually show that 
                                             
 
2  
Rollend F., Larry J., Deborah P. and Laura P.  
17
his right to an impartial jury was affected . . . .”  (People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 
Cal.3d 1046, 1087-1088, italics added.)  In other words, the loss of a peremptory 
challenge in this manner “ ‘provides grounds for reversal only if the defendant 
exhausts all peremptory challenges and an incompetent juror is forced upon 
him.’ ”  (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 487, italics added, quoting 
Ross v. Oklahoma, supra, at p. 89; cf. United States v. Martinez-Salazar (2000) 
528 U.S. 304, 315-317.)  Here, defendant cannot show his right to an impartial 
jury was affected because he did not challenge for cause any sitting juror.  No 
incompetent juror was forced upon him. 
2.  Wheeler Motion  
Defendant claims the trial court erroneously denied his motion for a 
mistrial under People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler).  In the motion, 
defendant asserted the People had peremptorily challenged four African-American 
prospective jurors on account of their race.  The motion would more properly have 
been brought as a motion to dismiss the venire, but this procedural irregularity has 
not prevented us from considering similar claims in other cases. (See People v. 
Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 662, fn. 9; People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 
668, 722, fn. 7.)   
Defendant presented his motion orally, after the 12 trial jurors had been 
selected but not yet sworn.  Defendant’s entire presentation on the motion 
consisted of naming the four prospective jurors in question, noting their juror 
numbers, occupations and race, and citing our decision in Wheeler, supra, 22 
Cal.3d 258.  The court deferred its ruling in order to give the motion “more than 
cursory attention” and to review the record.  The court thereafter entered a written 
order finding no prima facie case of group bias as to three of the four prospective 
jurors and directing the prosecutor to explain his reasons for challenging one.  
18
When the prosecutor offered his explanation, the court declared itself satisfied and 
denied the motion.  The jury as sworn included 11 jurors who identified 
themselves as “White” or “Caucasian” and one who identified himself as “Black.”   
In finding that defendant had failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of 
group bias as to the first three prospective jurors, the trial court did not err.  Such a 
demonstration entails, at the least, making as complete a record as feasible of the 
relevant circumstances, establishing that the excluded persons belong to a 
cognizable group, and showing that the other party has more likely than not 
exercised its peremptory challenges because of group association rather than any 
specific bias.  (People v. Johnson (June 30, 2003, S097600) __ Cal.4th __ [pp. 6, 
15, 18]; see Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258, 280.)  Defense counsel’s cursory 
reference to prospective jurors by name, number, occupation and race was 
insufficient.  It was no more helpful to the court than the similarly cursory 
presentation we held insufficient in People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 
1154, where counsel relied exclusively on the fact that the prosecutor had 
challenged the only two African-American prospective jurors without making 
“any effort to set out the other relevant circumstances, such as the prospective 
jurors’ individual characteristics, the nature of the prosecutor’s voir dire, or the 
prospective jurors’ answers to questions.”   
When a trial court denies a motion under Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258, 
after finding no prima facie case of group bias, we consider the entire record of 
voir dire for evidence to support the trial court’s ruling.  If the record suggests 
grounds upon which the prosecutor might reasonably have challenged the 
prospective jurors in question, we affirm.  (People v. Johnson, supra, __ Cal.4th 
__ [p. 28]; People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1155.)   
Here, the record does indicate grounds on which the prosecutor might 
reasonably have challenged each of the three prospective jurors as to which the 
19
trial court found no prima facie case of group bias.  While each of the three 
prospective jurors gave appropriate answers to oral questions intended to confirm 
his or her willingness to follow the court’s instructions and to vote for the death 
penalty if appropriate, each prospective juror’s written responses to the jury 
questionnaire might reasonably have caused the prosecutor to prefer other jurors.  
For example, Prospective Juror Margaret B., a 42-year-old surgical nurse, 
indicated on her questionnaire that she “would not like to sit as a juror,” “cannot 
judge another,” and felt “frustrated” that “the Supreme Court is far to the right.”  
Theresa H., a 32-year-old computer system administrator, indicated on her 
questionnaire that she had not favored the 1978 initiative reinstating the death 
penalty, and that the causes of and solution to “crime problems,” respectively, 
were “haves and have nots” and the “possibility of socialism.”  Vera Mae M., a 
52-year-old seamstress, left blank several of the questions intended to explore her 
attitudes towards crime and capital punishment, including the questions “What is 
your attitude towards the death penalty?” and “Did you favor the 1978 Briggs 
Initiative which reinstated the death penalty in California?”  Because the record 
suggests these race-neutral reasons why the prosecutor might reasonably have 
preferred other jurors, the trial court’s decision not to find a prima facie case as to 
these prospective jurors must be affirmed.  (People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th 
1132, 1155.) 
Defendant disputes this conclusion, asserting that jurors and prospective 
jurors the prosecutor did not challenge gave responses comparable to those he did 
challenge.  Defendant did not, however, present a comparative juror analysis to the 
trial court.  We recently reaffirmed in People v. Johnson, supra, __ Cal.4th __ 
[pp. 19-27], our understanding that a reviewing court should not attempt its own 
comparative juror analysis for the first time on appeal.   
20
Turning to the single prospective juror as to whom the trial court did find a 
prima facie case, we find no flaw in the trial court’s subsequent determination that 
the People’s peremptory challenge was based on factors other than group bias.  
The prospective juror in question was Isaac J., a 43-year-old correctional officer at 
the California Medical Facility at Vacaville.  Concerning Isaac J., the prosecutor 
explained that he had “opted towards jurors, all twelve in that box, who have 
stronger death penalty views.”  Isaac J., the prosecutor explained, had not 
answered written questions intended to explore his attitude toward the death 
penalty and had testified on voir dire that he had not given the subject much 
thought.  For the trial court to accept this explanation was reasonable because the 
record supported the prosecutor’s assertions about the prospective juror’s 
responses, and because the prospective juror’s apparent ambivalence towards the 
death penalty had been the exclusive subject of the prosecutor’s questions to him 
on voir dire. 
For the first time on appeal, defendant asserts a claim under Batson v. 
Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson), in which the high court held that the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
forbids prosecutors to exclude prospective jurors on account of their race.  In the 
trial court, defendant cited only Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258, which interprets 
the representative cross-section requirement of article I, section 16 of the 
California Constitution.  (Wheeler, supra, at pp. 276-277.)  The People contend 
defendant waived his federal claim by failing to raise it below.  The decisions in 
People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 173, and People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 
Cal.3d 932, 987, support the People’s position.  In more recent cases, however, we 
have not held that defendants waived Batson claims by citing only Wheeler at 
trial.  Instead, we have simply observed that Wheeler and Batson articulate the 
same standard and, after deciding the Wheeler claim on its merits, rejected the 
21
Batson claim as moot.  (People v. Farnham (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 139, fn. 11; 
People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 117, fn. 4.)  More recently, in People v. 
Johnson, supra, __ Cal.4th __, we reached the merits of the defendant’s Batson 
claim without suggesting that he somehow forfeited that claim by failing to cite 
Batson at trial. 
Consistently with these recent cases, we believe that to consider 
defendant’s claim under Batson, supra, 476 U.S. 79, is more consistent with 
fairness and good appellate practice than to deny the claim as waived.  As a 
general matter, no useful purpose is served by declining to consider on appeal a 
claim that merely restates, under alternative legal principles, a claim otherwise 
identical to one that was properly preserved by a timely motion that called upon 
the trial court to consider the same facts and to apply a legal standard similar to 
that which would also determine the claim raised on appeal.  Defendant’s Batson 
claim is of that type.  His motion under Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258, required 
the trial court to conduct the same factual inquiry required by Batson into the 
possibly discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, and to apply a standard 
identical to Batson’s for determining whether defendant had stated a prima facie 
case.  (See People v. Johnson, supra, __ Cal.4th __ [pp. 11-18].)  Under these 
circumstances, the Batson claim is properly cognizable on appeal by analogy to 
the well-established principle that a reviewing court may consider a claim raising a 
pure question of law on undisputed facts.  (E.g., People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 
997, 1061; Hale v. Morgan (1978) 22 Cal.3d 388, 394; Ward v. Taggart (1959) 51 
Cal.2d 736, 742.)  While defendant does dispute the trial court’s resolution of the 
factual issues underlying his Batson claim (i.e., whether he stated a prima facie 
case and whether the prosecutor’s explanation was adequate), the same factual 
issues are properly before us already because of defendant’s timely Wheeler 
motion.  Under these circumstances, to consider the Batson claim entails no 
22
unfairness to the parties, who had an opportunity to litigate the relevant facts and 
to apply the relevant legal standard in the trial court.3  Nor does it impose any 
additional burden on us, as the reviewing court.  Accordingly, we may properly 
consider defendant’s Batson claim on the merits.  Doing so, we conclude it fails 
for the same reason his Wheeler claim fails.  
Defendant’s unelaborated citations to the Fifth, Sixth and Eighth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution add nothing to his argument.  
Holland v. Illinois (1990) 493 U.S. 474, which defendant also cites, provides no 
conceivable support for his objection to the People’s use of peremptory 
challenges.  In Holland, which has been applied retroactively (Bell v. Baker (6th 
Cir. 1992) 954 F.2d 400, 401-402, cert. den. (1992) 506 U.S. 984), the high court 
held that the Sixth Amendment does not preclude litigants from using their 
peremptory challenges to exclude members of cognizable racial groups from petit 
juries.   
3.  Motion for Additional Peremptory Challenges  
Defendant moved at trial for additional peremptory challenges to replace 
those he had used to dismiss the prospective jurors he unsuccessfully challenged 
for cause.  (See ante, at p. 16 et seq.)  The trial court denied the motion.  We 
perceive no error.  To be sure, we have observed that “an erroneous denial of a 
challenge for cause can be cured by giving the defendant an additional peremptory 
challenge.”  (People v. Bittaker, supra, 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1088.)  Yet, while a trial 
                                             
 
3  
“The general rule confining the parties upon appeal to the theory advanced 
below is based on the rationale that the opposing party should not be required to 
defend for the first time on appeal against a new theory that ‘contemplates a 
factual situation the consequences of which are open to controversy and were not 
put in issue or presented at the trial.’  [Citation.]”  (Ward v. Taggart, supra, 51 
Cal.2d 736, 742.) 
23
court that was convinced it had erred might well grant additional peremptory 
challenges, the mere claim of error cannot reasonably be thought sufficient to 
compel the court to do so.  Otherwise, the number of peremptory challenges a trial 
court must allow would be limited only by the number of challenges for cause a 
party was willing to assert, regardless of merit.  In another context, we have held 
that “to establish [a] constitutional entitlement to additional peremptory 
challenges . . . , a criminal defendant must show at the very least that in the 
absence of such additional challenges he is reasonably likely to receive an unfair 
trial before a partial jury.”  (People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 679 [rejecting 
a claim of error based on the trial court’s refusal to allow additional peremptory 
challenges to redress the effects of pretrial publicity].)  We see no reason the same 
standard should not apply in this context.  Applying that standard, we conclude 
defendant cannot show the trial court’s failure to allow additional peremptory 
challenges caused him to receive an unfair trial, because he did not challenge any 
sitting juror for cause. 
Defendant also claims the trial court should have granted him additional 
peremptory challenges to redress what he describes as the court’s error under 
Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258, and Batson, supra, 476 U.S. 79.  The claim lacks 
merit, because the court did not err.  (See ante, at p. 17 et seq.)  Defendant’s 
unelaborated citations to the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution in support of this claim add nothing to his 
argument.   
4.  Motion for Separate Guilt and Penalty Phase Juries  
Before trial, defendant asked the court to empanel separate juries for the 
guilt and penalty phases of his trial.  The court exercised its discretion to deny the 
request.  (See People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 268.)  Defendant contends 
24
the court thereby abused its discretion and prejudiced the defense by forcing it to 
disclose information about his prior offenses in voir dire, thus biasing the jury 
against him at the guilt phase.   
The claim lacks merit.  Certainly a court has the power to empanel separate 
juries for the various phases of a capital case “for good cause shown.”  (§ 190.4, 
subd. (c).)  Yet the Legislature has expressed a preference for a single jury (ibid.), 
and we have repeatedly held that defense counsel’s desire to conduct voir dire one 
way for the guilt phase and another for the penalty phase does not constitute good 
cause for separate juries.  (People v. Rowland, supra, 4 Cal.4th 238, 268; People v. 
Nicolaus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 551, 573-574.)  Contrary to defendant’s assertion, 
California law does not force capital defendants to mention their criminal history 
during voir dire.  The decision whether to use voir dire to probe the prospective 
jurors’ attitudes about other offenses that may be introduced at the penalty phase is 
just one of the difficult tactical decisions counsel routinely faces.  (People v. 
Nicolaus, supra, at p. 573.) 
Defendant distinguishes our prior decisions.  (People v. Rowland, supra, 4 
Cal.4th 238, 268; People v. Nicolaus, supra, 54 Cal.3d 551, 573-574.)  In those 
decisions, he contends, “defense counsel chose to forgo complete voir dire rather 
than risk polluting the guilt phase jury with other crimes evidence.”  Here, defense 
counsel made the opposite decision.  Thus, “for the first time,” defendant 
continues, “this Court is in a position to assess the prejudice which flows from 
defense counsel’s decision to conduct complete voir dire at the cost of polluting 
the guilt phase jury.”  The argument is not persuasive.  The teaching of People v. 
Nicolaus is simply that the decision whether to use voir dire to probe prospective 
jurors’ attitudes towards a defendant’s other offenses is a tactical one entrusted to 
counsel’s good judgment.  Counsel’s decision to use voir dire in this way does not 
25
transform into an abuse of discretion the court’s proper order denying separate 
juries.4   
Defendant also contends that the trial court, by refusing to empanel separate 
guilt and penalty phase juries, denied him due process and the right to a jury trial.  
(See U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.)  Defendant relies on Leonard v. 
United States (1964) 378 U.S. 544 (per curiam) and Johnson v. Armontrout (8th 
Cir. 1992) 961 F.2d 748.  But those cases involved jurors who had been exposed 
to information about the defendants’ criminality outside of the proceedings in 
which they were empanelled.  In Leonard v. United States, the prospective jurors 
had been permitted to observe a trial in which the defendant was convicted of a 
related charge.  The United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction in a 
brief opinion based on the Solicitor General’s concession of error.  (Leonard v. 
United States, supra, at p. 545.)  In Johnson v. Armontrout, 10 of the prospective 
jurors and four of the trial jurors had recently rendered a verdict of guilt against 
the defendant’s accomplice in another proceeding.  The Eighth Circuit vacated the 
conviction because the petitioner on habeas corpus proved, among other things, 
that two jurors had harbored actual bias against him.  (Johnson v. Armontrout, 
supra, at pp. 754, 756.)  These decisions suggest no basis for reversing a verdict 
rendered by presumably impartial jurors whose knowledge of the facts of the case 
                                             
 
4  
Defendant does not claim that counsel’s tactical decision to inform the 
prospective jurors of defendant’s prior offenses deviated from the standard of care 
expected of criminal defense attorneys.  To the contrary, he concedes that “[i]t was 
necessary to pose the question in order to ferret out attitudes which would have 
otherwise affected the penalty phase judgment.”  He also concedes that the 
exercise did succeed in producing information relevant to jury selection.  
According to defendant, the prospective jurors’ answers to the question gave 
reason to exclude many, and “[n]o person served on the jury who expressed a 
prejudgment based on the defendant’s prior record.”   
26
derived solely from information properly presented in the proceeding in which 
they have been sworn. 
5.  Admission of Evidence Concerning the Robbery of Geraldine Ford 
to Prove Identity and Intent  
Defendant contends the court erred in admitting evidence that he robbed 
and attempted to kidnap Geraldine Ford.  We find no error.   
The evidence relevant to this claim has already been summarized.  (See 
ante, at p. 6 et seq.)  Very briefly, defendant approached Ford in the parking lot of 
a department store, offering to change her car’s flat tire.  The repair completed, 
Ford thanked defendant and stood at the open door of her car.  Defendant held a 
gun and a knife to her stomach and ordered her into his truck.  Ford fled, and 
defendant took her purse from the driver’s seat of her car.  The People offered this 
evidence to show the intent and identity of Doris Horrell’s killer.  (Evid. Code, 
§ 1101, subd. (b).)  The defense moved to exclude the evidence as inadmissible 
character evidence (see id., § 1101, subd. (a)) and also as posing a danger of unfair 
prejudice substantially outweighing any probative value (see id., § 352).  The 
court denied the motion.   
Defendant’s identity as Horrell’s killer “was never seriously questioned,” as 
defendant concedes.  The defense did, however, earnestly challenge the People’s 
theory that defendant formed the intent to rob Horrell before killing her.  The 
People were required to prove that defendant harbored such an intent in order to 
establish the robbery-murder special circumstance.  (People v. Musselwhite (1998) 
17 Cal.4th 1216, 1263; § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A).)  To rebut the People’s theory 
was the purpose of the defense evidence that defendant was under the influence of 
methamphetamine when he killed Horrell, and of the defense cross-examination of 
Debra Stafford, who had testified on direct examination that defendant said he had 
27
stopped for Horrell “[b]ecause she was dressed nice and she looked like she might 
have some money.”   
Recognizing the importance of the issue to both sides, we nevertheless 
readily conclude the trial court properly exercised its discretion to admit 
defendant’s conduct against Geraldine Ford in order to show his intent to rob 
Doris Horrell.  Defendant contends the crimes against Ford bore insufficient 
common features to be probative of intent.  To be admissible to show intent, 
however, the prior conduct and the charged offense need only be sufficiently 
similar to support the inference that defendant probably harbored the same intent 
in each instance.  (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402.)  As the trial court 
here explained, defendant’s use of a “good Samaritan ploy” to rob and attempt to 
kidnap Ford, a stranded female motorist, was sufficiently similar to his later 
conduct against Horrell to support the inference that he probably harbored a 
similar intent to rob Horrell when he stopped for her on the freeway.  The 
probative value of defendant’s prior conduct against Ford was, moreover, 
sufficient to outweigh any risk of unfair prejudice.  (See Evid. Code, § 352.) 
Challenging these conclusions, defendant argues that his conduct against 
Ford shows only an intent to kidnap, not to rob.  Although he took Ford’s purse, 
defendant argues, he must have taken it from the driver’s seat of her car after she 
fled and, thus, not from her immediate presence or while she still was under force 
or fear, as required for robbery.  His conduct and words before Ford fled, 
defendant continues, show nothing more than an effort to force her into his truck, 
leaving the purse on the front seat of her car.  Assuming for the sake of argument 
that defendant’s interpretation of the evidence is plausible, at least equally 
plausible is the alternative inference that an assailant holding a gun and a knife to 
his victim’s stomach may intend to control her while simultaneously reaching a 
few feet for valuable property.  Ford testified that the purse was within reach as 
28
she stood at the car’s open door.  Certainly the inference that one of defendant’s 
reasons for approaching Ford was to take her property by force or fear was strong 
enough to support the court’s discretionary decision to permit the jury to consider 
the evidence. 
The trial court also admitted the evidence of defendant’s attack on Ford to 
show the identity of Doris Horrell’s killer.  To be admissible to show identity, the 
prior conduct and the charged offense must share common features that are 
sufficiently distinctive to support the inference that the same person committed 
both acts.  (People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th 380, 403.)  The degree of similarity 
required to show identity is thus higher than that required to show intent.  (Id., at 
pp. 402-403.)  Here, the People argued that sufficient common features resided in 
the evidence already mentioned (i.e., defendant’s use of a good Samaritan ploy to 
attempt to kidnap female motorists with car trouble), together with the additional 
evidence that defendant, on both occasions, used the same truck and gave to 
female friends items of jewelry taken from the victims.  We need not decide 
whether these common features sufficed to show identity.  The court’s ruling 
admitting the evidence for that purpose, even if erroneous, could not have 
prejudiced defendant because the same evidence was properly admitted to show 
intent and because defendant concedes that his identity as Horrell’s killer “was 
never seriously questioned.”   
Turning to federal law, defendant contends that the trial court’s decision to 
admit his prior bad acts against Ford was arbitrary and fundamentally unfair, and 
thus violated due process.  (See Terranova v. Kincheloe (9th Cir. 1988) 852 F.2d 
424, 428-429.) 5  Defendant advanced essentially the same claim at trial, where he 
                                             
 
5  
Of tangential relevance only are the other authorities defendant cites.  (In re 
Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 362-364 [due process requires proof beyond a 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
29
argued that to admit the Ford incident would violate due process because it would 
permit the jury to find him guilty on insufficient evidence, and that any such error 
would affect the reliability of the penalty phase verdict.  In support of his position 
defendant repeats his previous citations to the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and adds an unelaborated citation 
to the Fifth Amendment.  We reject the argument because the trial court’s decision 
to admit the evidence was correct under state law (Evid. Code, §§ 352, 1101, subd. 
(b); see People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th 380, 402-403), was neither arbitrary 
nor fundamentally unfair, and did not render the death verdict unreliable. 
6.  Claims Based on Geraldine Ford’s Identification of Defendant 
a.  Suggestive lineup 
Defendant asserts that a suggestive photographic lineup tainted Geraldine 
Ford’s identification of him as her assailant.  On this basis, he claims the trial 
court erred in denying his motion in limine to exclude Ford’s out-of-court 
identification and in permitting her to identify him in court.  We perceive no error.  
Due process requires the exclusion of identification testimony only if the 
identification procedures used were unnecessarily suggestive and, if so, the 
resulting identification was also unreliable.  (Manson v. Brathwaite (1977) 432 
U.S. 98, 106-114; Neil v. Biggers (1972) 409 U.S. 188, 196-199; see People v. 
Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 989.)  Defendant has not shown that the 
identification procedures used in this case were unnecessarily suggestive.   
                                                                                                                                      
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
reasonable doubt of criminal charges]; Brinegar v. United States (1949) 338 U.S. 
160, 174 [same]; People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 630-636 [reversing a 
criminal conviction because admission of other-crimes evidence was prejudicial 
under the circumstances of the case].) 
30
The following summary of the facts is drawn from the evidence presented 
at the hearing on defendant’s motion in limine to exclude Ford’s identification 
testimony.  On January 4, 1988, the day Ford was robbed, she observed defendant 
for 10 to 15 minutes while he changed her car’s flat tire and then confronted her 
with weapons.  It was just starting to get dark, and the lights in the parking lot 
were on.  Detective Craig Trimble met with Ford the next day, January 5, to 
review her prior statement to the responding officer.  At that time, Ford helped to 
make a composite sketch of her assailant and mentioned that his left hand bore a 
flower tattoo.     
On January 8, Trimble showed Ford about 150 photographs in mug shot 
books.  She did not, however, identify any possible suspects.  On February 3, Ford 
called Trimble to say she had seen in the newspaper a photograph of a person who 
was wanted by the Sacramento Police and who, she thought, might be the person 
who had attacked her.  The photograph was of Lowell Mugridge, also known as 
Dan Bennett.  On February 17, Trimble showed Ford a lineup of five color 
photographs.  The fourth photograph was of defendant and was at least a year, or a 
year and a half, old.  Ford did not identify anyone as a suspect.  In preparing the 
lineup, Trimble did not include a photograph of Mugridge because Ford had 
already seen his picture in a mug book on January 8 but had not identified him.  
On March 18, Trimble showed Ford a second lineup of five color photographs.  
This lineup included, again in the fourth position, a different, more recent 
photograph of defendant taken after his arrest for the murder of Doris Horrell on 
February 16.  After viewing this lineup, Ford identified defendant as her assailant.  
In selecting the fourth image, Ford told Trimble, “[t]his person here looks just like 
him except for the way his hair is combed.  His facial features are the same and 
color of the hair is the same.”  Trimble did not tell Ford she had selected the right 
person.  Trimble also showed Ford a photograph of the back of defendant’s hands, 
31
but Ford was unable positively to identify the flower tattoo in the photograph as 
the one she had seen.  Trimble did not tell Ford that the hands in the photograph 
belonged to the same person she had selected in the lineup.  Before each lineup, 
Trimble admonished Ford that the suspect’s photograph might or might not be 
included and that she should not feel obligated to choose one.  Trimble never 
suggested or intimated by word or gesture that Ford should pick a particular 
photograph.  
We perceive nothing unduly suggestive in the identification procedures just 
described.  To determine whether a procedure is unduly suggestive, we ask 
“whether anything caused defendant to ‘stand out’ from the others in a way that 
would suggest the witness should select him.”  (People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 
Cal.4th 312, 367, quoting People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1217.)  
Defendant emphasizes that his image appeared in both lineups, each time in the 
fourth position.  To use a suspect’s image in successive lineups might be 
suggestive if the same photograph were reused or if the lineups followed each 
other quickly enough for the witness to retain a distinct memory of the prior 
lineup.  But here, different photographs of defendant appeared in each lineup, and 
the two lineups were separated in time by a month.  Under these circumstances we 
see no reason to believe that the use or position of defendant’s image in both 
lineups was unnecessarily suggestive.6  Defendant seems to argue that any further 
                                             
 
6  
We have inspected the two lineups, which were admitted as defendant’s 
exhibits M-19-A and M-19-B-1 through 5.  Each lineup consists of five identically 
sized photographs of Caucasian males of apparently similar age and with similar 
facial features.  Four of the men depicted in the original color photographs that 
comprise exhibits M-19-B-1 through 5 (the March 18 lineup) appear to have 
similarly colored light red hair.  One man has grey hair.  Hair color is not evident 
in exhibit M-19-A, which is a black-and-white photocopy of the February 17 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
32
attempt to elicit a positive identification of a particular suspect from an eyewitness 
who does not identify the suspect from the first photograph shown must be 
considered unduly suggestive.  But no such rule exists.  Defendant also argues that 
the lineups in this case were unnecessarily suggestive because Detective Trimble 
did not include in them a photograph of Mugridge, whom Ford had named as a 
possible suspect.  But this omission has no apparent significance, since no 
evidence suggests, and defendant has never claimed, that Mugridge actually 
committed the crime against Ford.   
Our determination that the identification procedures used here were not 
unnecessarily suggestive disposes of defendant’s claim under due process.  Only if 
the challenged identification procedure is unnecessarily suggestive is it necessary 
to determine the reliability of the resulting identification.  (People v. Johnson, 
supra, 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1216; People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1242.)   
Defendant also contends that Ford’s identification of him was tainted by 
her attendance, in September 1988, at a portion of his preliminary hearing for the 
murder of Doris Horrell.  As the trial court below expressly found, however, 
Ford’s attendance at the September hearing has no conceivable bearing on the 
accuracy of her identification of defendant in the March lineup, six months earlier, 
or on the dispositive question of whether the lineups were unduly suggestive.  
                                                                                                                                      
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
lineup.  The color photographs show their subjects against identical blue 
backgrounds.   
 
During the motion in limine to exclude Ford’s identification testimony, the 
trial court stated that the different photographs of defendant used in the two 
lineups appeared to show “two different human beings.”  In fact, the two 
photographs are significantly different.  In the February 17 lineup, defendant is 
wearing different clothes than in the March 18 lineup, has a different facial 
expression and appears to be looking down at the camera. 
33
Ford’s attendance at the September hearing might conceivably have affected her 
identification of defendant in court.  But testimony at defendant’s motion in limine 
revealed that Ford had not been called as a witness at the preliminary hearing, had 
attended on her own volition and not at the direction of the People, and had seen 
defendant’s back only.  Ford’s unilateral decision to attend does not implicate the 
rule of Manson v. Brathwaite, supra, 432 U.S. 98, and Neil v. Biggers, supra, 409 
U.S. 188, which speaks only to suggestive identification procedures employed by 
the People.  Thus, Ford’s attendance at the hearing affects only the weight, rather 
than the admissibility, of her testimony.  Because the court properly permitted the 
defense to cross-examine her on this matter before the jury, we see no plausible 
claim of error.   
b.  Sanction for loss of original photographs  
The People lost the original color photographs that formed the lineup of 
February 17; only a black-and-white photocopy was available for trial.  As a 
sanction for the original photographs’ loss, defendant asked the trial court to 
exclude Ford’s identification testimony.  Defendant later changed his request to 
one for an instruction that the missing original photograph from the first lineup, 
which Ford did not identify, showed a likeness of defendant that was “as good or 
better” than the photograph Ford subsequently identified on March 18.  The trial 
court rejected all of these proposed sanctions as unduly severe because no 
evidence suggested the loss was intentional or showed bad faith, because the 
People had conducted a search for the originals, and because a photocopy was 
available.  The trial court did, however, instruct the jury that the People would not 
be permitted to suggest that Ford had failed to identify defendant from the lost 
photograph because it was a poor likeness, and that it would be unfair for the jury 
to draw any such conclusion.   
34
In these rulings we find no error.  “[C]ourts enjoy a large measure of 
discretion in determining the appropriate sanction that should be imposed because 
of the destruction of discoverable records and evidence.  ‘[N]ot every suppression 
of evidence requires dismissal of charges. . . .  The remedies to be applied need be 
only those required to assure the defendant a fair trial.’ ”  (People v. Zamora 
(1980) 28 Cal.3d 88, 99.)  Despite the loss of the original photographs, the defense 
successfully proved with the photocopy and through the testimony of Detective 
Trimble that Ford had failed to identify defendant on February 17.  The court’s 
remedial rulings barred the People from attempting to rebut the defense evidence 
by arguing that the original photograph was not a good likeness of defendant.  On 
this record, we see no reason to doubt that defendant received a fair trial.   
Assuming for the sake of argument that the sanction actually imposed was 
insufficient, the hypothetical error could not have caused prejudice.  This is true 
even if, as defendant argues, we must evaluate prejudice under the standard of 
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, based on the assumption that the 
People’s loss of the original photographs implicated defendant’s due process 
rights.  (See U.S. Const., 14th Amend.)  In support of this argument, defendant 
cites Arizona v. Youngblood (1988) 488 U.S. 51 and California v. Trombetta 
(1984) 467 U.S. 479, both of which recognize the People’s obligation to preserve 
potentially exculpatory evidence.   
The evidence identifying defendant as Ford’s attacker, even disregarding 
Ford’s identification testimony, easily justifies the conclusion that the trial court’s 
failure to impose the harsher sanctions proposed by the defense was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  (Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18, 24.)  
Patricia Weers, to whom defendant gave Ford’s distinctive diamond and pearl 
ring, testified that defendant said he had gotten the ring from a woman who 
worked for the California Highway Patrol and he wanted it back “because it could 
35
incriminate him in a crime.”  Police eventually recovered the ring from Debbie 
Yoast, who had bought it from Weers.  Ford’s telephone bill showed calls to 
defendant’s friend Ron Kegg, made on a Sprint card Ford had never used.  When 
Detective Trimble told defendant he “was investigating a robbery that occurred at 
the Target Store on Madison Avenue on or about January 4” and “had a lead 
concerning the use of the victim’s Sprint card,” defendant replied, “[y]ou are on 
the right track.”  Finally, Ford identified a photograph of defendant’s camper as 
the one on her assailant’s pickup truck.  In view of this evidence, which left no 
serious doubt that defendant was Ford’s assailant, the trial court’s failure to 
impose the harsher sanctions proposed by the defense was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
7.  Sufficiency of the Evidence  
Defendant claims the People did not introduce sufficient evidence to prove 
the robbery-murder special circumstance.  (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A).)  The claim 
lacks merit.   
In order to prove the special circumstance, the People had to prove that 
defendant formed the intent to steal before or while killing Doris Horrell.  (People 
v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 618-619; People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 
52-53.)  The relevant evidence showed that defendant left Ron Kegg’s apartment 
shortly before the killing, telling Debra Stafford that he had to get some money.  
Defendant then stopped on the highway for Horrell, a well-dressed, stranded 
motorist, taking her purse, jewelry, coat, house keys and bank cards before 
abandoning her body.  Shortly thereafter, defendant explained to Stafford that he 
had stopped for Horrell “[b]ecause she was dressed nice and looked like she might 
have some money.”   
36
This evidence sufficed.  When “one kills another and takes substantial 
property from the victim, it is ordinarily reasonable to presume the killing was for 
purposes of robbery.”  (People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 688.)  Here, 
defendant took valuable property from the victim and had no other apparent 
reason for killing her.  The defense attempted to supply another reason with Dr. 
Rosenthal’s opinion testimony that the killing was an irrational act caused by 
defendant’s use of methamphetamine.  But the jury was not required to accept the 
witness’s opinion.  In any event, the defense theory that defendant killed 
irrationally and only later decided to steal was contradicted by the evidence that he 
intentionally selected a vulnerable, well-dressed victim, took valuable property 
and immediately afterwards destroyed evidence linking himself to the crime.  The 
testimony that defendant had recently committed a similar crime against another 
stranded motorist (Ford) provided additional circumstantial evidence that his 
purpose in stopping for Horrell was to steal.   
Although a jury must acquit if it finds the evidence susceptible of a 
reasonable interpretation favoring innocence, it is the jury rather than the 
reviewing court that weighs the evidence, resolves conflicting inferences and 
determines whether the People have established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  
(People v. Millwee (1988) 18 Cal.4th 96, 132.)  When our examination of the 
whole record discloses evidence that is sufficiently reasonable, credible and of 
such solid value as to permit a reasonable trier of fact to find the defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt, we must affirm.  (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 
557, 578.)  The record in this case does disclose sufficient evidence, as we have 
explained.   
The same conclusion disposes of defendant’s claim under the due process 
clause of the United States Constitution, which bars criminal convictions except 
on proof sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  (In re Winship, 
37
supra, 397 U.S. 358, 362-364; see U.S. Const., 14th Amend.)  Defendant also 
cites the Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments in support of this claim, but he does 
not explain how any of those provisions might support a conclusion different than 
we now reach. 
8.  Failure to Instruct on Theft  
Defendant contends the trial court erred in declining his request for an 
instruction on theft from a dead human body (§ 642) and in failing to instruct the 
jury sua sponte on theft (§ 484), a lesser included offense of robbery.  The former 
ruling does not support a claim of error.  Assuming for the sake of argument the 
latter does, we find no possibility of prejudice. 
At the conclusion of the guilt phase, the trial court instructed the jury on 
robbery (§ 211), murder (§ 187), the robbery-murder special circumstance (190.2, 
subd. (a)(17)(A)), various lesser included offenses of murder and other matters not 
relevant to this discussion.  The court declined to instruct on theft from a dead 
human body, explaining that nothing “in the evidence . . . suggests less than 
robbery.”  The court did, however, instruct the jury that “[r]obbery requires proof 
of an intent to steal before or during the application of force, rather than merely 
after the application of force.  Further, there is no robbery if the intent to steal 
arises only after the possessor of the property is dead; that is, the intent to steal did 
not arise before or during the act of killing.”  Applying these instructions, the jury 
convicted defendant of robbery and murder, and found the robbery-murder special 
circumstance true. 
The trial court’s failure to instruct on theft from a dead human body (§ 642) 
does not support a claim of error.  That offense is not included within robbery, and 
a defendant has no unilateral right to an instruction on an uncharged offense that is 
not necessarily included within a charged offense.  (People v. Birks (1998) 19 
38
Cal.4th 108, 136.)  While theft from a dead human body might have been 
sufficiently related to robbery to have permitted an instruction under the reasoning 
of People v. Geiger (1984) 35 Cal.4th 510, we retroactively overruled Geiger in 
People v. Birks, supra, at page 113. 
Theft (§ 484), on the other hand, is a lesser offense necessarily included 
within robbery.  (People v. Ortega (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 693-694; People v. 
Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1055.)  Defendant did not, however, specifically 
request an instruction on theft, as distinguished from theft from a dead human 
body.  A duty to instruct sua sponte on a lesser included offense arises only when 
evidence exists that would justify a conviction on the lesser offense.  (People v. 
Bradford, supra, at p. 1055.)  In defendant’s view, the record does contain 
evidence showing he first formed the intent to take property from Doris Horrell 
only after she had died and, thus, was guilty only of theft rather than robbery.  
Defendant would find such evidence primarily in the testimony of defense expert 
Dr. Rosenthal, who testified that defendant probably killed Horrell under the 
influence of methamphetamine and that advanced levels of methamphetamine 
intoxication can render a user unable to formulate so complex a plan as to pose as 
a good Samaritan for the purpose of killing a stranded motorist and taking her 
valuables.   
Assuming for the sake of argument this evidence sufficed to require an 
instruction on theft, the trial court’s failure to give such an instruction could not 
have caused prejudice.  This is because the court instructed the jury that “[r]obbery 
requires proof of an intent to steal before or during the application of force, rather 
than merely after the application of force.  Further, there is no robbery if the intent 
to steal arises only after the possessor of the property is dead; that is, the intent to 
steal did not arise before or during the act of killing.”  By finding defendant guilty 
of robbery despite this instruction, the jury must have resolved against him the 
39
question whether he formed the intent to steal only after Horrell died.  Therefore, 
any hypothetical error was harmless.  (See People v. Turner, supra, 50 Cal.3d 668, 
690-691; see also People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 721.)   
Even though the jury must have resolved the question of intent against him 
under the proper instruction just quoted, defendant contends the trial court 
nevertheless erred under Beck v. Alabama (1980) 447 U.S. 625.  The decision in 
Beck has nothing to do with this case.  In Beck, the United States Supreme Court 
held that an Alabama law barring instructions on lesser included offenses of 
capital murder violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution.  (Beck, supra, at pp. 627, 637-638.)  California law is not 
similar.  Moreover, the trial court below did instruct on several lesser included 
offenses of capital murder, including second degree murder, voluntary 
manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter.  Because the jury thus “was not faced 
with an all-or-nothing choice between the offense of conviction (capital murder) 
and innocence,” the “central concern of Beck simply is not implicated.”  (Schad v. 
Arizona (1991) 501 U.S. 624, 647; see also People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 
920, 953-954.)  In any event, the high court in Beck did not purport to require 
instructions on lesser included offenses of crimes other than capital murder.  (See 
Beck, supra, at p. 637.)  
9.  Instructions on Suppression of Evidence and Conscious Possession 
of Recently Stolen Property 
The trial court instructed the jury in the language of CALJIC No. 2.06 that 
an attempt by defendant to suppress evidence tended to show consciousness of 
guilt but was, by itself, insufficient to prove guilt.7  The court also instructed, in 
                                             
 
7 
The court instructed:  “If you find the defendant attempted to suppress 
evidence against himself in any manner such as by destroying evidence or 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
40
language based on CALJIC No. 2.15, that conscious possession of recently stolen 
property did not by itself permit the inference that defendant was guilty of 
robbery, but did permit such an inference if corroborating evidence existed.8  
Defendant objected to both instructions.   
Defendant does not contend that these instructions lacked a sufficient 
evidentiary basis.  He does, however, argue they violated People v. Wright (1988) 
45 Cal.3d 1126, 1137, in which we disapproved argumentative instructions that 
imply certain conclusions from specified evidence.  We rejected the same claim as 
to CALJIC No. 2.06 in People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1223-1224, and 
see no reason to reconsider the point.  We have not previously considered the 
claim that CALJIC No. 2.15 violates People v. Wright, supra, 45 Cal.3d 1126.  
Considering the claim now, we find that the instruction has a proper purpose 
rather than the argumentative purpose condemned in Wright.  Among other things, 
CALJIC No. 2.15 informs the jury that conscious possession of recently stolen 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
concealing evidence, such attempt may be considered by you as a circumstance 
tending to show a consciousness of guilt.  In other words, circumstantial evidence.  
[¶] However, such conduct is not sufficient by itself to prove guilt, and its weight 
and significance, if any, are matters for your consideration.”   
8  
The court instructed:  “If you find that a defendant was in conscious 
possession of recently stolen property, the fact of such possession is not by itself 
sufficient to permit an inference that the defendant, in this case, Mr. Yeoman, is 
guilty of the robbery of that recently stolen property.  [¶] Before guilt of that 
offense, of robbery may be inferred, there must be corroborating evidence tending 
to prove the defendant’s guilt.  However, this corroborating evidence need only be 
slight and need not by itself be sufficient to warrant an inference of guilt of the 
robbery.  [¶] As corroboration, you may consider the attributes of the possession, 
the time, place, manner of the possession, whether or not the defendant had an 
opportunity to commit the crime charged, the defendant’s conduct, or any other 
evidence which tends to connect the defendant with the crimes charged.”  
41
property is insufficient, without corroboration, to sustain a conviction.  “If the 
court tells the jury that certain evidence is not alone sufficient to convict, it must 
necessarily inform the jury, either expressly or impliedly, that it may at least 
consider the evidence.  Nothing in Wright affects such an instruction.”  (People v. 
Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 531-532.)   
Defendant also contends that CALJIC Nos. 2.06 and 2.15 violate due 
process because they create mandatory inferences or conclusive presumptions that 
shift, in effect, the People’s burden of proof to the defense.  (See generally 
Sandstrom v. Montana (1979) 442 U.S. 510, 521-524.)  We have previously 
rejected the contention because the instructions in question permit, but clearly do 
not require, the jury to draw the inferences described therein.  (See People v. 
Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1223-1224 [upholding CALJIC No. 2.03]; see 
also People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 676-677 [upholding CALJIC No. 2.15]; 
People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 37 [same].)   
Defendant also claims that CALJIC Nos. 2.06 and 2.15 violate due process 
even if seen as creating permissive inferences.  But “[a] permissive inference 
violates the Due Process Clause only if the suggested conclusion is not one that 
reason and common sense justify in light of the proven facts before the jury.” 
(Francis v. Franklin (1985) 471 U.S. 307, 314-315; see Ulster County v. Allen 
(1979) 442 U.S. 140, 157-163.)  Here, reason and common sense amply justified 
the suggested conclusion that defendant’s suppression of evidence showed 
consciousness of guilt.  (See CALJIC No. 2.06.)  Among other things, defendant’s 
expressed desire to remove his fingerprints from Horrell’s car immediately 
followed his admission to Stafford that he had murdered its driver.  Reason and 
common sense also justified the conclusion that defendant’s conscious possession 
of Horrell’s recently stolen property tended to show he was guilty of robbery (see 
CALJIC No. 2.15), in view of the corroborating evidence, which included most 
42
notably the admission that he had stopped for the stranded motorist because she 
was well dressed and seemed likely to have money.   
B.  Penalty Phase Issues 
1.  Failure to Conduct Foundational Hearing Before Admitting 
Evidence of the Killing of David Hill  
The People at the penalty phase presented evidence that defendant had 
killed David Hill.  (See ante, at p. 10 et seq.)  The evidence was relevant to prove 
an aggravating circumstance, namely, the presence of criminal activity by 
defendant involving the use of force or violence.  (§ 190.3, factor (b).)  Defendant 
contends the court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence without first 
holding a foundational hearing under Evidence Code section 402 to determine 
whether the evidence was sufficient to prove defendant guilty of the offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  For the reasons set out below, we find no abuse of 
discretion.   
To admit evidence of unadjudicated crimes under section 190.3, factor (b) 
necessarily entails a risk that the evidence may not be sufficient to convince all 
jurors of the defendant’s guilt.  Yet we have described this risk as acceptable in 
view of the need to place before the jury all evidence properly bearing on its 
capital sentencing decision, and in view of the rule that no juror may consider such 
evidence unless first convinced of its truth beyond a reasonable doubt.  (People v. 
Caro (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1035, 1057.)  The court must give such an instruction sua 
sponte whenever it admits evidence under factor (b).  (People v. Michaels (2002) 
28 Cal.4th 486, 539; People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 53-55.)  
Foundational hearings, which can also help to mitigate the risk, “may be 
advisable” (People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792, 849; see People v. Phillips 
(1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 72, fn. 25) but are not required.  The matter lies entirely 
within the court’s discretion.  (People v. Fauber, supra, at p. 849.)   
43
In this case, defendant has failed to show either an abuse of discretion or 
any possibility of prejudice.  The evidence that defendant murdered Hill, which 
we have already summarized (see ante, at p. 10 et seq.), was sufficient to prove his 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  The court had no reason to believe otherwise at 
the time it declined to hold a foundational hearing.  Defendant’s various theories 
of third party culpability did not compel the jurors to reject the prosecution’s 
evidence.  In any event, any hypothetical juror whom the prosecution’s evidence 
might not have convinced beyond a reasonable doubt must be presumed to have 
followed the court’s instruction to disregard the evidence.   
Defendant argues that California law denies him equal protection (U.S. 
Const., 14th Amend.) by requiring preliminary hearings for charged offenses but 
not for uncharged criminal acts admitted under section 190.3, factor (b).  But 
equal protection does not require the procedures for proving uncharged crimes 
admitted under factor (b) to be as stringent as the procedures for proving charged 
offenses.  (People v. Bacigalupo (1991) 1 Cal.4th 103, 136; People v. Medina 
(1990) 51 Cal.3d 870, 906-907; cf. People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 204-
205 [rejecting a similar claim under the due process clause].)  The differing 
treatment is justified by the need to allow the “jury to weigh and consider the 
defendant’s prior criminal conduct in determining penalty, so long as reasonable 
steps are taken to assure the defendant a fair and impartial penalty trial.”  (People 
v. Medina, supra, at p. 907.)   
Restating this claim under the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, defendant argues that to admit evidence of the Hill killing under 
section 190.3, factor (b), without first testing the strength of the evidence in a 
44
foundational hearing, rendered the death sentence arbitrary and unreliable.9  The 
People contend defendant waived the claim because he referred in the trial court 
only to the due process and equal protection clauses of the federal and state 
Constitutions.  Defendant’s new claim, however, merely invites us to draw an 
alternative legal conclusion (i.e., that the death sentence is arbitrary and 
unreliable) from the same information he presented to the trial court (i.e., that the 
evidence showing he killed Hill was untested and, thus, could not be presented to 
the jury without causing unfair prejudice).  We may therefore properly consider 
the claim on appeal.  (See ante, at p. 21 et seq.)   
Considering the Eighth Amendment claim, we find it lacks merit.  
Defendant argues that “[w]ithout a reasonable guarantee of certainty that the [Hill 
killing] was committed by the defendant, there is no means to conclude that the 
death penalty has been fairly imposed.”  We have, however, already concluded 
that the evidence defendant killed Hill was sufficient to prove his guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  The United States Supreme Court has upheld section 190.3, 
factor (b), which authorizes the admission of uncharged offenses, against an 
Eighth Amendment challenge because the factor “is phrased in conventional and 
understandable terms and rests in large part on a determination whether certain 
events occurred, thus asking the jury to consider matters of historical fact.”  
(Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 976.)  The requirement that each 
juror be convinced by such evidence beyond a reasonable doubt before 
considering it enhances the reliability of the sentence.  (People v. Michaels, supra, 
28 Cal.4th 486, 539; People v. Robertson, supra, 33 Cal.3d 21, 53-55.)   
 
                                             
 
9  
Defendant also cites the Fifth and Sixth Amendments without, however, 
articulating intelligible claims under those provisions. 
45
2.  Admission of Threats to Kill and Denial of a Continuance  
The People proved that defendant had committed various sexual acts upon 
his stepdaughter, Sharon C., when she was between 10 and 13 years old, and that 
Sharon had submitted to defendant because she feared him.  (See ante, at p. 8 et 
seq.)  The court permitted the jury to consider this evidence under section 190.3, 
factor (b), as criminal activity involving a threat of violence.  The court also 
permitted the jury to consider under section 190.3, factor (c), as a prior felony 
conviction, defendant’s 1977 guilty plea to a charge of lewd and lascivious 
conduct (§ 288, subd. (a)) arising out of the same conduct.  On appeal, defendant 
claims the People did not give adequate notice of their intent to introduce the 
violent circumstances of the molestation under factor (b), that the prosecutor 
affirmatively misled the defense on this point, and that the court abused its 
discretion in denying a continuance to investigate the evidence.  These claims lack 
merit. 
The People must give notice of the aggravating evidence they plan to offer 
“within a reasonable period of time as determined by the court, prior to trial.”  
(§ 190.3.)  The law permits the People to introduce, under section 190.3, factor 
(b), the violent circumstances of a prior felony conviction introduced under 
section 190.3, factor (c), even though the least adjudicated elements of the prior 
conviction do not include violence.  (People v. McDowell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 551, 
566-568.)  In this case, the People expressly declared in their timely pretrial notice 
of aggravating evidence the intention to prove, among other things, “[t]he felony 
convictions of Ralph Michael Yeoman for robbery with great bodily injury, oral 
copulation with a child under 14 years, and child molestation . . . and the 
circumstances underlying those convictions.  Penal Code sections 190.3(b) and 
(c).”  (Italics added.)  Neither violence nor the threat of violence is an element of 
lewd and lascivious conduct.  (§ 288, subd. (a).)  Yet the defense still had reason 
46
to believe the People would seek to admit the circumstances of that crime under 
factor (b), because the notice had said precisely that and because the People had 
disclosed in pretrial discovery the police reports on the molestation, which 
mentioned Sharon’s statement that she feared defendant because he had beaten her 
mother, Wilma.  (See People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1359 [police 
reports can provide actual notice of aggravating evidence].)  Taken as a whole, 
this information was adequate to place defendant on notice and to give him a fair 
opportunity to investigate the relevant facts.   
Also without merit are defendant’s additional claims that the prosecutor 
misled the defense and that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to grant 
a continuance.  Before the penalty phase opening statements commenced, the 
People requested a hearing under Evidence Code section 402 to clarify whether 
the court would admit the circumstances of the molestation under Penal Code 
section 190.3, factor (b).  At the same time, the prosecutor stated that Sharon in a 
recent interview had revealed additional facts previously unknown to the People.  
Based on the interview, the prosecutor believed that Sharon “would say that from 
the time she was about ten to twelve she submitted to these acts because she just 
thought there was nothing wrong with it.  [¶] At about the time, two years into this 
program of the sexual acts being done on her, she, on her own, figured out it was 
wrong and confronted the defendant about it.  And at that time, he threatened to 
kill her if she told on him, and from there on she submitted to him because she was 
afraid of what he would do to her.”  The prosecutor made these statements in court 
on Tuesday, March 20, 1990.  The last preceding court day had been Tuesday, 
March 13.  The prosecutor had interviewed Sharon on Thursday, March 15 and 
disclosed her new statements to the defense on Monday, March 19, the day before 
the trial resumed.   
47
On Wednesday, March 21, 1990, the next day of trial, the court conducted a 
foundational hearing on Sharon’s testimony outside the jury’s presence.  
Consistently with the prosecutor’s representation, Sharon testified that when she 
confronted defendant about his sexual conduct towards her, he told her the family 
would be split up if she revealed what had happened, that this would be her fault, 
and that he would kill her.  After hearing this, Sharon submitted to further sexual 
acts because she “couldn’t run away, other than on the streets,” and because she 
“was scared to death of him.”  On cross-examination, still outside the jury’s 
presence, Sharon acknowledged she had not told the police officers who 
investigated the molestations that defendant had threatened her.  Sharon had not 
mentioned the threats because the officers had told her that defendant “would be 
out of the home” and because she was not, at that time, “thinking of the death 
threat.  [She] was thinking of a way out, whether it was suicide or what else.”   
Based on this testimony, the court correctly ruled that the circumstances of 
the 1977 conviction for lewd and lascivious conduct were admissible under factor 
(b) because they entailed a “threat to use force or violence.”  (§ 190.3, factor (b).)  
Sharon’s ensuing testimony before the jury was consistent with her foundational 
testimony, except that, when asked by the prosecutor why she feared defendant, 
she added the new fact that defendant had actually beaten her.  “I was scared for 
my life as well as my mother and brother and sisters,” Sharon testified.  “He told 
me if I ever told anybody he would kill me.  Numerous times I saw him beat my 
mother, beat me.”   
Defendant claims the prosecutor misled the defense concerning the nature 
of Sharon’s testimony.  The record, however, gives no reason to believe that the 
prosecutor, at any time, obtained more detailed knowledge of Sharon’s possible 
testimony than he promptly thereafter revealed to the defense.  Nor did the court 
err in denying a continuance to permit the defense to investigate.  Both Sharon and 
48
her mother had been designated as witnesses before trial.  Moreover, the police 
reports gave the defense notice that Sharon claimed to fear defendant because she 
had seen him beat her mother.  (See People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th 1229, 
1359.)  Finally, in denying defendant’s request for a continuance, the court 
expressly offered to reconsider the matter should the defense show that it was 
unable to find a witness it was actually attempting to find.  The defense never 
offered to make such a showing.  Under these circumstances, we see no basis for 
concluding the trial court abused its discretion.   
Citing the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution, defendant contends the People’s failure to give notice of 
Sharon’s testimony, and the court’s refusal to grant a continuance, denied him the 
rights to due process, a fair trial, reasonable notice of the charges against him, the 
effective assistance of counsel and a death judgment based on reliable evidence.  
These claims fail because their factual predicate is false:  Contrary to defendant’s 
assertion, the People gave adequate notice of their intent to introduce the violent 
circumstances of the molestations under section 190.3, factor (b).   
3.  Admission of Evidence of Rape 
The People introduced evidence that defendant, while in the United States 
Army, had forcibly raped Linda S., the wife of a friend and fellow soldier.  (See 
ante, at p. 9 et seq.)  The court allowed the jury to consider the evidence under 
section 190.3, factor (b), as showing prior violent criminal activity.  Defendant 
contends the admission of this evidence, which he describes as stale, violated his 
rights to due process, a speedy trial and a reliable determination of penalty.  
Defendant characterizes the claim as arising under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  Defendant 
unsuccessfully raised the same claim at trial.   
49
The claim lacks merit.  In People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, we 
concluded that the admission of violent criminal conduct occurring many years 
before the penalty trial is not necessarily inconsistent with a defendant’s rights to 
due process, a speedy trial and a reliable penalty determination.  We reasoned that 
“the state has a legitimate interest in allowing a jury to weigh and consider a 
defendant’s prior criminal conduct in determining the appropriate penalty, so long 
as reasonable steps are taken to assure a fair and impartial penalty trial.”  (Id., at 
p. 1161.)  We identified those “reasonable steps” as including notice of the 
evidence to be introduced, the opportunity to confront the available witnesses, and 
the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  When these steps have been 
taken, we concluded, the remoteness of the offense affects its weight, not its 
admissibility.  (Ibid.)   
Defendant argues for a different result in this case because certain witnesses 
who might have been able to offer testimony about the 1968 rape were not 
available.  The record, however, does not make clear that such a claim was 
adequately preserved.  In his written motion to exclude evidence of the rape, 
defendant identified several witnesses who testified at the court martial, or who 
might have been called to testify had defendant not terminated that proceeding by 
changing his plea to guilty.  Arguing the motion later in court, however, the 
defense identified only three assertedly unavailable witnesses whose prior 
testimony they wished to offer:  Sergeant Theopia James, who had investigated the 
rape, Delbert Marshall, whom the defense did not further identify, and Sergeant 
Fitzgerald, who had released defendant from duty on the day of the rape.  The 
court ruled that Sergeant Fitzgerald was unavailable but did not rule on the other 
two proposed witnesses.  Nevertheless, defense counsel immediately thereafter 
stated that, “[b]asically, all we are introducing is Sergeant Fitzgerald,” and never 
again mentioned the other witnesses or offered their prior testimony into evidence.  
50
The defense had already cross-examined Linda and, in so doing, attempted to raise 
the inference that she had consented to sex and fabricated the rape in order to 
secure her husband’s return from Vietnam on a claim of hardship.  The reading of 
Sergeant Fitzgerald’s prior testimony provided a factual basis for the questions 
about consent that the defense had posed to Linda on cross-examination.   
On this record, we see no reason to believe that the age of the rape charge, 
the unavailability of witnesses or the trial court’s rulings deprived defendant of a 
fair opportunity to present a defense.  The fair opportunity defendant did enjoy, 
and the court’s instruction to the jury not to consider the rape unless convinced of 
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, satisfied constitutional requirements.  
(See People v. Rodriguez, supra, 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1161.)  Defendant cites Johnson 
v. Mississippi (1988) 486 U.S. 578 as holding that the procedures for considering 
aggravating evidence of other crimes must conform in all respects to the 
constitutional standards governing proof of charged offenses.  But Johnson does 
not so hold.  In that decision, the high court reversed a death judgment because the 
prosecution had been allowed to prove a prior conviction with nothing more than 
the record of a judgment that had been reversed on appeal; “the prosecutor did not 
introduce any evidence concerning the alleged assault itself . . . .”  (Johnson v. 
Mississippi, supra, at p. 585.)  Here, in contrast, the People did not seek to prove a 
prior conviction for rape.  Instead, they merely proved other violent criminal 
conduct by defendant (§ 190.3, factor (b)) through properly admitted evidence.  
About this, Johnson has nothing to say. 
4.  Admission of Defendant’s Court-martial Guilty Plea 
The trial court permitted the People to introduce, as part of their proof that 
defendant had raped Linda E., defendant’s admission and plea of guilty to that 
crime in a court-martial.  The court instructed the jury to consider the plea as an 
51
admission of prior violent criminal conduct under section 190.3, factor (b), but not 
as a prior conviction under section 190.3, factor (c).  Defendant contends that the 
use of his plea for this purpose violated his rights to due process and to a reliable 
sentencing determination.  Defendant describes the claim as arising under the 
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  
The claim lacks merit.   
Defendant’s argument rests upon the following three propositions:  First, 
convictions rendered in courts-martial are not admissible as prior convictions 
under section 190.3, factor (c) because the procedural rights of defendants in 
military proceedings differ from those of defendants in civilian proceedings.  
Second, although the jurors were told not to consider the plea as evidence of a 
prior conviction, they probably did not grasp the fine distinction between evidence 
of a prior conviction and evidence of guilt; thus, the jury could only have viewed 
the plea as a prior conviction.  Third, the prosecutor exacerbated the problem by 
stressing in closing argument the evidentiary weight of defendant’s admission and 
guilty plea.   
We need not consider defendant’s first proposition, i.e., that guilty pleas 
offered in courts-martial are not admissible as evidence of prior convictions.  The 
People did not offer the plea as evidence of a prior conviction, and the jurors were 
informed by stipulation not to consider the plea for that purpose.10  Defendant’s 
                                             
 
10  
The following stipulation was read to the jury:   
 
“After August 3rd 1968, the United States Army charged the defendant 
Ralph Michael Yeoman with the crime of forcible rape of Linda S.  On or about 
December 16, 1968, during the court-martial proceedings at Fort Riley, Kansas, 
the defendant, Ralph Michael Yeoman, after advice of counsel, entered a plea of 
guilty and admitted the forcible rape of Linda S[.] as charged against him.  [¶] A 
military court-martial adjudication does not constitute a prior felony conviction 
under California Penal Code section 190.3, [factor] (b).  This is because a court-
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
52
second proposition—that the jurors probably did not grasp the distinction they 
were asked to draw—does not readily command assent.  Jurors are routinely 
instructed to make similarly fine distinctions concerning the purposes for which 
evidence may be considered, and we ordinarily presume they are able to 
understand and follow such instructions.  (E.g., People v. Williams (2000) 79 
Cal.App.4th 1157, 1171 [jury presumed to understand and follow instruction not 
to consider as evidence of guilt a statement taken in violation of Miranda v. 
Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 and offered only to impeach].)  Indeed, we and 
others have described the presumption that jurors understand and follow 
instructions as “[t]he crucial assumption underlying our constitutional system of 
trial by jury.”  (People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 689, fn. 17; see Francis v. 
Franklin, supra, 471 U.S. 307, 324, fn. 9.)  We see no reason to abandon the 
presumption in this case, where the relevant instructional language seems clear 
and easy to understand.   
As mentioned, defendant also contends that the prosecutor in closing 
argument incorrectly described the evidentiary weight to which defendant’s guilty 
plea was entitled.  This proposition may be considered either as part of 
defendant’s more general argument that the jury must have misunderstood the 
limited purpose for which defendant’s guilty plea was entered, or as a separate 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
martial proceeding has differences in procedures—as opposed to our state court 
procedure in California—differences in proof and the rights of an accused.  
[¶] Thus you may consider the fact of the defendant’s guilty plea in admission of 
the crime of forcible rape only as it relates to the proof of other violent crimes 
within the meaning of Penal Code [s]ection 190.3[, factor] (b), a different section 
we have talked about.  [¶] Before you may consider the crime of forcible rape 
against Ralph Michael Yeoman as it pertains to Linda S[.], it must be proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”   
53
claim of prosecutorial misconduct.  Considered either way, the argument lacks 
merit.  The record shows that the prosecutor appropriately described defendant’s 
guilty plea as one of three evidentiary points supporting the People’s claim that 
defendant had raped Linda S.  Those three points were Linda S.’s own testimony, 
the lack of significant impeaching evidence in the record of the court-martial or 
elsewhere, and, finally, defendant’s guilty plea and admission to forcible rape.  
The import of the prosecutor’s remarks about defendant’s plea and admission was 
not that they were conclusive, but that they tended to negate the defense 
suggestion that the victim might have consented.   
In summary, because defendant’s guilty plea was admitted to prove violent 
criminal conduct (§ 190.3, factor (b)) and not a prior felony conviction (id., factor 
(c)), because there is no reason to believe the jury misunderstood or failed to 
consider the limiting instruction, and because the prosecutor in closing argument 
did not use the evidence for a purpose inconsistent with the limiting instruction, 
we perceive no violation of due process and no risk that the judgment of death was 
based on evidence that should have been excluded as unreliable.   
5.  Exclusion of Evidence that a Third Person Killed David Hill 
The defense attempted to prove that David Hill was killed not by defendant 
but instead by Michael Ayers, Williams Summers and/or James Baxter.  (See ante, 
at p. 12 et seq.)  Defendant contends the court abused its discretion under 
Evidence  Code section 352 by sustaining the People’s objections to certain 
questions apparently intended to suggest three additional possible killers—Jerry 
Huebner and two unidentified persons.  We find no abuse of discretion.   
Monique Hubertus, called by the People at the penalty phase, identified as 
having belonged to Hill several unique items found in defendant’s possession 
shortly after the murder.  (See ante, at p. 11.)  On cross-examination, defense 
54
counsel asked Hubertus whether she knew “a short time prior to David Hill’s 
death that he had owned an automobile that was the subject of a car burglary” and 
whether she had subsequently received “a telephone call from one of the suspects 
of that car burglary.”  The People objected, and the court excused the jury to 
consider the matter in camera.  After considering it, the court disallowed the 
questions under People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826 (Hall), thus in effect 
exercising its discretion to exclude evidence under Evidence Code section 352, 
which Hall interpreted.  We find no abuse of discretion.   
In camera, the defense explained the theory on which their questions were 
based:  About a week before Hill was killed, Roseville police had charged two 
men, including Jerry Huebner, with attempting to burglarize one of Hill’s 
automobiles; the charges were dropped after Hill, the complaining witness, died.  
According to defense counsel, Huebner had called Hubertus “looking for David 
Hill, complaining about the fact that if [Hill] didn’t withdraw the charges they 
were going to jail for twelve years.”  Defense counsel theorized that Huebner, or 
his unidentified accomplice, murdered Hill to suppress his testimony.  Answering 
the court’s question, however, the defense acknowledged that it had no other 
foundation for this additional theory of third party culpability, such as evidence 
that Huebner or his accomplice was seen in the vicinity of Hill’s house at or about 
the time of the killing.   
Based on this offer of proof, the trial court correctly exercised its discretion 
to exclude the evidence.  Evidence that a third person actually committed a crime 
for which the defendant has been charged is relevant but, like all evidence, subject 
to exclusion at the court’s discretion under Evidence Code section 352 if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of undue delay, prejudice 
or confusion.  (Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d 826, 834.)  The decision in Hall guides the 
exercise of discretion in this context.  “To be admissible, the third-party evidence 
55
need not show ‘substantial proof of a probability’ that the third person committed 
the act; it need only be capable of raising a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt.”  
(Id., at p. 833.)  However, “evidence of mere motive or opportunity to commit the 
crime in another person, without more, will not suffice to raise a reasonable doubt 
about a defendant’s guilt:  there must be direct or circumstantial evidence linking 
the third person to the actual perpetration of the crime.”  (Ibid.)  Here, defendant’s 
offer of proof showed motive, only, and was thus insufficient.  The court did not 
abuse its discretion. 
The trial court also sustained the People’s objection to a question asked by 
defense counsel of witness Carla Nebeker.  Called by the defense, Nebeker 
testified that she had spoken to Hill at one or two o’clock in the afternoon in front 
of his house about buying one of his trucks.  Nebeker lived three houses down 
from Hill.  The People objected under Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d 826, to the further 
question why she had not returned to Hill’s house that evening to finish 
negotiating.  In camera, the defense offered to prove that Nebeker did not visit Hill 
that evening because Hill had said he would have an important meeting and that 
Nebeker saw someone walking out of Hill’s house about 6:00 p.m.  The trial court 
ruled that defense counsel could ask Nebeker about the unidentified man she had 
seen leaving Hill’s house, but not about the meeting.  (See ante, at pp. 12-13.)   
In so ruling, the court did not abuse its discretion.  Nebeker’s testimony that 
an unidentified person unlike defendant in appearance had left the murder site 
close to the time of the crime was highly relevant.  The court thus properly 
permitted the defense to present this matter to the jury.  In contrast, the fact that 
Hill had mentioned a meeting did not directly or circumstantially connect any 
identifiable person with the crime.  (See Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d 826, 833.)  On 
appeal, counsel suggests that Hill may have planned to meet with Michael Ayers, 
James Baxter and/or William Summers, some of the persons whom the defense 
56
attempted to implicate in Hill’s killing.  But the law does not require the admission 
of evidence made relevant only by speculative hypothesis.   
Here, as at trial, defendant argues the trial court violated due process by 
applying Evidence Code section 352 and Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d 826, 
“mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice” (Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 
410 U.S. 284, 302) and, more specifically, to defeat his Eighth Amendment rights 
to a sentencing determination of heightened reliability (e.g., Lankford v. Idaho 
(1991) 500 U.S. 110, 125, fn. 21) and to present to the jury any relevant 
circumstance that could cause it to decline to impose the death penalty (McCleskey 
v. Kemp (1987) 481 U.S. 279, 306).  The argument is not persuasive.  We have 
previously determined that due process does not bar the application of Evidence 
Code section 352 at the penalty phase of capital trials.  (People v. Babbitt (1988) 
45 Cal.3d 660, 684-685.)  We based this conclusion on the fact that neither due 
process nor Chambers v. Mississippi has led the high court to “question[] the 
power of States to exclude evidence through the application of evidentiary rules 
that themselves serve the interests of fairness and reliability—even if the 
defendant would prefer to see that evidence admitted.”  (Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 
476 U.S. 683, 690; see People v. Babbitt, supra, at pp. 684-685.)  We see no 
reason in defendant’s argument or the circumstances of this case to reconsider our 
prior conclusion. 
6.  Refusal to Instruct on the Use of Circumstantial Evidence (CALJIC 
No. 2.01) at the Penalty Phase 
Defendant contends the court erred in declining to instruct the jury with 
CALJIC No. 2.01 at the penalty phase.  We find no error. 
The purpose of CALJIC No. 2.01 is to clarify the proper use of 
circumstantial evidence.  The instruction explains, among other things, that a 
finding of guilt “may not be based on circumstantial evidence unless the proved 
57
circumstances are not only (1) consistent with the theory that the defendant is 
guilty of the crime, but (2) cannot be reconciled with any other rational 
conclusion.”  (Ibid.)  We have held that the court must give such an instruction on 
its own motion when the proof of guilt rests substantially on circumstantial 
evidence.  (People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 406; People v. Yrigoyen 
(1955) 45 Cal.2d 46, 49; see Use Note to CALJIC No. 2.01 (6th ed. 1996) p. 38.)  
But the instruction need not be given when the circumstantial evidence merely 
corroborates other evidence (People v. Wright, supra, at p. 406; People v. 
Williams (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 869, 874-876), because in such cases the 
instruction may confuse the jury regarding the weight to which other evidence is 
entitled (People v. Williams, supra, at p. 874).  In this case, the instruction would 
have created a risk of confusion by seeming to tell the jury, incorrectly, to reject 
defendant’s extrajudicial admissions of guilt unless they could not be reconciled 
with any rational conclusion other than guilt.     
Defendant contends the People relied substantially on circumstantial 
evidence to prove he killed David Hill.  To be sure, the People introduced much 
circumstantial evidence, including defendant’s presence near the scene of the 
crime at the relevant time, his possession immediately before the crime of the type 
of gun that fired the fatal bullets, and his possession after the crime of unique, 
personal items that had belonged to the victim.  (See ante, at p. 10 et seq.)  Yet the 
trial court nevertheless declined to give CALJIC No. 2.01 because it felt that the 
People’s proof of this violent criminal act (§ 190.3, factor (b)) rested largely on 
defendant’s extrajudicial admissions to his sister, Linda Ayers, and to her 
husband, Michael Ayers.  (See ante, at p. 12.)  Specifically, Michael testified that 
defendant said before his arrest that he had shot Hill.  Linda testified that 
defendant, in two postarrest calls from jail, admitted he had killed Hill and 
described him as “a no good drug dealer.”  In view of these admissions, the trial 
58
court reasonably determined for purposes of instructing the jury that the People’s 
case did not rest substantially or exclusively on circumstantial evidence.  We have 
not required an instruction on circumstantial evidence under similar 
circumstances.  (E.g., People v. Wright, supra, 52 Cal.3d 367, 406.)   
Defendant argues the jury must have rejected the testimony of Michael and 
Linda Ayers about defendant’s extrajudicial admissions as self-serving efforts on 
their part to avoid suspicion, since Michael knew Hill and since defendant may 
have used Michael’s gun to kill Hill.  If the jury did reject the extrajudicial 
admissions, defendant continues, any conclusion by the jury that defendant killed 
Hill must have rested entirely on the circumstantial evidence to that effect.  The 
argument is too speculative to accept.  In any event, the fact that some evidence 
may impeach a defendant’s extrajudicial admissions does not logically affect the 
court’s instructional responsibilities when the circumstantial evidence merely 
corroborates those admissions.   
In view of these conclusions, we see no reason to accept defendant’s further 
claim that the trial court’s failure to give CALJIC No. 2.01 led to an erroneous 
determination that defendant murdered Hill and thus tilted the balance unfairly 
towards the death penalty.  Nor do we perceive any violation of the federal 
constitutional provisions defendant perfunctorily cites.  (U.S. Const., 4th, 6th, 8th 
& 14th Amends.) 
7.  Prosecutorial Misconduct During Closing Argument 
Defendant contends the prosecutor during closing argument made various 
statements amounting to misconduct.  Defendant timely objected to each such 
statement.  While the claims are thus properly before us (People v. Hill (1988) 17 
Cal.4th 800, 820; People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, 27), we find no misconduct 
under state or federal law for the reasons set out below. 
59
a.  Death penalty “would be virtually meaningless” if not applied 
to defendant 
After reviewing the circumstances of Doris Horrell’s murder, the 
prosecutor offered the following argument:  “[I]n this case, given these facts and 
what we know about this defendant, the murder of Mrs. Horrell, I submit to you 
that the proper measurement of the defendant’s crime and the defendant is the 
death penalty.  And, quite frankly, if it were not to be applied in this particular 
case, to me it would be virtually a meaningless . . . .”  At this point defense 
counsel objected that the argument was “not proper . . . .”  The court overruled the 
objection, and the prosecutor continued:  “It would be, the law would be virtually 
meaningless.  What would be the point of having it?”   
On appeal, defendant unconvincingly compares the prosecutor’s argument 
with the different argument we condemned in People v. Farmer (1989) 47 Cal.3d 
888.  There, the prosecutor incorrectly asserted that the jurors “do not decide life 
or death.  The law does that.”  (Id., at p. 928.)  This argument, we concluded, 
violated Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320, 333, by inviting the jurors to 
believe that the responsibility for choosing between life and death lay elsewhere.  
(People v. Farmer, supra, at p. 928.)  In contrast, the prosecutor here merely 
argued that the penalty phase evidence strongly pointed to death.  We described a 
very similar statement by the prosecutor in People v. Jones (1997) 15 Cal.4th 119, 
185, as “within the bounds of proper argument.”  Certainly the prosecutor here did 
not invite the jury “to minimize the importance of its role.”  (Caldwell v. 
Mississippi, supra, at p. 333.)  Immediately after making the challenged remark, 
the prosecutor strongly emphasized the jurors’ personal responsibility for doing 
the “very difficult job” of choosing the “just punishment.”   
60
b.  Defendant “was literally the judge, the jury and the executioner 
of Mrs. Horrell”  
At one point in his closing argument, the prosecutor asked the jury to 
remember “the punishment [defendant] inflicted on [Horrell] . . . no due process, 
no judges, no jurors, no act of the courts.  That is not what he did.  He was literally 
the judge, the jury . . . .”  At this point the court “noted” but did not sustain 
defense counsel’s objection “to this form of argument.”  The prosecutor then 
completed the sentence:  “He was literally the judge, the jury and the executioner 
of Mrs. Horrell.”  On appeal, defendant acknowledges that the prosecutor’s 
statement was “not meant to be taken literally” but nevertheless construes it as an 
invitation to employ “frontier justice” “by giving little consideration to factors in 
mitigation.”  We find no misconduct. 
The statements defendant challenges, read in the context of the prosecutor’s 
entire closing argument, cannot fairly be construed as an invitation to take lightly 
the sentencing decision or the mitigating evidence.  Just before making those 
statements, the prosecutor had described the sentencing decision as a “very 
difficult job” that would require “courage” and “introspection.”  After making that 
remark, he acknowledged “how difficult it is for probably all twelve of you 
[jurors] to arrive at what a just and true verdict ought to be in this case.”  He then 
correctly stated that “the lawful process to make this legally right and morally 
right decision involves a weighing and a balancing of certain factors, or certain 
circumstances commonly known or referred to in the law as factors in aggravation 
and factors in mitigation.”  Finally, the prosecutor concluded this segment of his 
argument by reading the entire fourth paragraph of CALJIC No. 8.88, which 
describes the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  He then 
began the next segment of his argument, which constituted a detailed examination 
of the mitigating evidence.  Nowhere in his closing argument did the prosecutor 
61
suggest, explicitly or implicitly, that the jurors should take lightly either the 
mitigating evidence or their duty to determine the appropriate penalty according to 
the law. 
c.  Section 190.3, factor (d) “means what it says” 
Defendant contends the prosecutor’s argument about section 190.3, factor 
(d) misstated the law and led the jury not to consider proper mitigating evidence.  
Factor (d) directs the jury to take into account, if relevant, “[w]hether or not the 
offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance.”  We find one misstatement of law, which the 
prosecutor immediately corrected, but no misconduct. 
Defendant’s argument has three parts.  We may easily dispose of the first.  
The prosecutor did not misstate the law by telling the jury that “the language [of 
factor (d)] means what it says” and that, consequently, the mental or emotional 
disturbance referred to therein “has to be extreme.”  We have held that trial courts 
should not omit the adjective “extreme” from the language of section 190.3, factor 
(d) when instructing juries.  (People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th 312, 416; 
People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3th 754, 803-804.)  A fortiori, the prosecutor need 
not do so in closing argument. 
Defendant next claims the prosecutor misstated the effect of section 190.3, 
factor (d) by saying, “[b]asically, that factor exists for people who are psychotic.”  
Indeed, the statement was incorrect, and defense counsel properly objected on that 
basis.  Factor (d) permits the jury to consider any evidence of “extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance” (§ 190.3, factor (d)), whether or not the result of 
psychosis.  Immediately after making this statement, however, the prosecutor 
corrected it by characterizing factor (d) more expansively as describing “people 
who are so badly disturbed that though they are legally responsible for their crime, 
62
they have been found guilty and so forth, that they are so bad that you as a human 
being and the law and your morality says maybe we ought to consider how 
screwed up they were and give them a break.  That is why that factor is there.”  
Thereafter, the prosecutor discussed at length the same evidence the defense 
contended was relevant under factor (d), namely, the disputed evidence that 
defendant had killed Horrell under the influence of methamphetamine and that he 
suffered from brain damage.  The prosecutor’s argument on this point was not that 
the evidence was irrelevant, but that it was unpersuasive because the 
circumstances of the crime showed “planning,” the deliberate selection of a 
vulnerable victim and consciousness of guilt. 
Considering the prosecutor’s entire closing argument, his erroneous 
statement that section 190.3, factor (d) was intended “for people who are 
psychotic” did not amount to misconduct.  There was no misconduct under federal 
law because the statement was immediately corrected and did not infect the trial 
with such unfairness as to violate due process.  (People v. Morales (2001) 25 
Cal.4th 34, 44; see Donnelly v. DeChristoforo (1974) 416 U.S. 637, 642-643.)  
Nor was there misconduct under state law because the prosecutor did not use 
deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade the jury, and because it 
is not reasonably likely the jury construed or applied any of the challenged 
remarks in an objectionable fashion.  (People v. Morales, supra, at p. 44.)   
Finally on this point, defendant contends that the same remarks by the 
prosecutor set out above confused the jury about section 190.3, factor (k).  To be 
sure, defendant was entitled to have the jury consider under factor (k) “[a]ny other 
circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime,” including, among other 
things, evidence of nonextreme mental or emotional disturbance.  (People v. 
Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 769.)  Yet we find no reason to believe the 
prosecutor’s closing argument confused the jury on this point.  Indeed, the 
63
prosecutor described the evidence of defendant’s drug use and brain damage as 
matters implicated by factor (k).   
d. Evidence of defendant’s childhood was a “ploy” 
Defendant’s case in mitigation focused on evidence that he had been 
abused as a child and had not received adequate help for psychological and 
behavioral problems resulting from the abuse.  The defense also introduced family 
photographs of defendant taken when he was a child.  Commenting on this 
evidence in closing argument, the prosecutor told the jurors:  “I’m not asking you 
to punish some kid.  That is not what we are doing here.  And don’t be fooled by 
that.  Don’t be fooled by that ploy in factor (k).”  Defense counsel objected to the 
prosecutor’s “characterization” of the mitigating evidence and asked the court to 
admonish the jury that the evidence was relevant.  The court overruled the 
objection, but did remind the jury of the “wide range of relevancy under [section 
190.3,] factor (k) . . . .”   
On appeal, defendant claims the prosecutor’s use of the word “ploy” 
suggested to the jury that the mitigating evidence had not been properly admitted 
and constituted a personal attack on the integrity of opposing counsel.  The claim 
lacks merit.  We do not understand the prosecutor’s argument as challenging the 
court’s ruling or defense counsel’s integrity.  Immediately after the court overruled 
defense counsel’s objection, the prosecutor clarified his position:  “The point that I 
was making in going through some of this evidence of poor upbringing, abusive—
abused child and its relevance, is that it ignores the obvious in this case,” namely, 
that such evidence “is not an acceptable excuse for a lifetime of moral failure by 
this defendant.”  In short, the prosecutor simply argued that the evidence relating 
to defendant’s childhood had little mitigating force and did not warrant sympathy.  
This he was entitled to do.  (People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 547-548.)   
64
e. Victim-impact argument 
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by referring in 
closing argument to the impact of defendant’s capital offense on the victim and 
her family.  We find no misconduct. 
The subject arose while the prosecutor was discussing the evidence that 
defendant as a child had been abused by family members.  Commenting on that 
evidence, the prosecutor said:  “And you have to kind of be a little careful here.  
And what happens in these type [of] cases is the case goes along in this trial [and] 
we first start with the victim, but you really don’t—other than the fact she was 
killed, you don’t know anything about her life, her family, her dreams, her home.”  
Defense counsel objected under Booth v. Maryland (1987) 482 U.S. 496.  The 
court noted but did not sustain the objection.  The prosecutor continued:  “But 
what happens, you really never get that type [of] evidence in the case and instead 
just what happens to her, real sterile here in this courtroom.  I’m not eloquent 
enough to tell you the pain, fear, agony she suffered.”  The prosecutor concluded 
this portion of his argument by asking the jury not to confuse their sympathy with 
defendant’s testifying family members with sympathy for defendant himself. 
Any claim that the prosecutor’s argument violated the Eighth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution has been preempted by Payne v. Tennessee 
(1991) 501 U.S. 808, in which the high court held that capital sentencing juries 
may consider the specific harm a defendant has caused.  As Payne explains, 
“ ‘[t]he State has a legitimate interest in counteracting the mitigating evidence 
which the defendant is entitled to put in, by reminding the sentencer that just as 
the murderer should be considered as an individual, so too the victim is an 
individual whose death represents a unique loss to society and in particular to his 
family.’ ”  (Id., at p. 825, quoting Booth v. Maryland, supra, 482 U.S. 496, 517 
(dis. opn. of White, J.).)  Payne thus overruled Booth v. Maryland and South 
65
Carolina v. Gathers (1989) 490 U.S. 805, which had prohibited victim-impact 
evidence and argument.  (See Payne, supra, at p. 830; cf. People v. Edwards 
(1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 833 [evidence of the specific harm a defendant has caused 
is admissible as a circumstance of the crime under section 190.3, factor (a)].) 
Defendant argues the prosecutor’s remarks were improper under state and 
federal law because they invited the jurors to speculate about facts not in the 
record.  (See, e.g., People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th 926, 1026; United 
States v. Atcheson (9th Cir. 1996) 94 F.3d 1237, 1244-1245.)  But defendant’s 
argument is belied by his concession that the evidence incidentally showed that 
Horrell was close to her daughter, granddaughter and friends, who had testified at 
the guilt phase to establish the facts of the crime.  That Horrell had suffered was a 
fair inference from the evidence, which the prosecutor was entitled to argue.  
(People v. Cunningham, supra, at p. 1026; United States v. Atcheson, supra, at 
p. 1244.)  Certainly there was no misconduct.  Nothing the prosecutor said on this 
subject was deceptive or reprehensible, or infected the trial with such unfairness as 
to violate due process.  Nor is it reasonably likely that the jury construed or 
applied any of the challenged remarks in an objectionable fashion.  (People v. 
Morales, supra, 25 Cal.4th 34, 44.)   
f.  Reference to defendant as an “animal” 
Several defense witnesses testified that defendant possessed good character 
traits.  Addressing this testimony, the prosecutor asked the jury not to judge 
defendant by his quiet, benign appearance but instead by the evidence.  “Don’t be 
fooled by appearances,” the prosecutor argued.  “Now that you know what this 
evidence is, what this animal is like . . . . ”  Defense counsel objected, the court 
overruled the objection, and the prosecutor continued:  “The point is, you can try a 
million murder cases over the years and there is no special mark an individual has 
66
when he does murders.  He’s just like you and me.  Sometimes he wears a coat 
and a tie, sometimes cinched up, sometimes it is not.  But there is no special mark 
that is like a stigma.  So don’t decide the facts of the case on that.  Decide the facts 
on the evidence.”   
Based on these remarks, defendant asserts three claims of misconduct.  
None has merit:  (1) The prosecutor’s advice to look beyond defendant’s 
appearance and demeanor and to decide the case based on the evidence was not 
inappropriate.  (People v. Stansbury (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1017, 1058-1059; People v. 
Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 453-454.)  (2) While prosecutors should not invoke 
their personal beliefs or experiences as support for facts not in evidence (e.g., 
People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 776), the prosecutor here did not clearly 
violate that rule.  His words—“you can try a million murder cases over the years 
and there is no special mark an individual has when he does murders”—merely 
restated, albeit from the rhetorical stance of a trial lawyer, the common wisdom 
that appearances can deceive.  (3) The prosecutor’s reference to defendant as an 
“animal,” even if arguably improper, does not amount to reversible misconduct.  
While we do not condone the use of opprobrious terms in argument (People v. 
McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 1002), the prosecutor’s single reference to 
defendant as an “animal” during a closing argument otherwise free of intemperate 
language cannot reasonably be considered prejudicial misconduct.   
g.  What might have happened to Mrs. Ford 
In closing argument the prosecutor also discussed the robbery and 
attempted kidnapping of Geraldine Ford, whom defendant had attempted at gun- 
and knifepoint to force into his truck.  During the course of this discussion, the 
prosecutor observed:  “Again, but for the grace of God, Mrs. Ford is a very, very, 
lucky, lucky woman today to have been able to come into this courtroom and 
67
testify to you.  [¶] A gun and a knife used in that case.  We can speculate, and I 
don’t really want you to get into speculation, but you know what was going to 
happen.”  Here, the court overruled defense counsel’s objection that the prosecutor 
was, indeed, asking the jury to speculate.  The prosecutor continued:  “Let me 
change the word.  We draw reasonable inferences of what was going to happen to 
Mrs. Ford if he was successful in getting her into the truck.  These are reasonable 
inferences you guys can draw.  In this case you don’t need it.  The actual evidence 
[of] a rob[bery] and attempted kidnapping, that should be enough.”   
On appeal defendant renews his claim that the prosecutor improperly 
invited the jury to speculate about crimes not actually committed.  Certainly a 
prosecutor should not invite the jury to speculate, but here the prosecutor 
prudently amended his remarks to ask the jury to draw reasonable inferences about 
defendant’s probable intent based on the evidence.  This was proper.  (People v. 
Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 723 [prosecutor in closing argument at the penalty 
phase permissibly implied that a more serious crime might have occurred had 
someone not interrupted the defendant’s molestation of a 14-year-old girl].)  
Based on the evidence, the jury was entitled to draw the reasonable inference that 
defendant had an unlawful purpose for attempting to force Ford into his truck. 
h.  Evidence that defendant would not be dangerous as a life 
prisoner was “pure unadulterated speculation” 
The defense called five witnesses to testify that defendant behaved well in 
custody.  Each was or had been employed at a correctional facility.  (See ante, at 
p. 15.)  The general import of their testimony was that defendant was a reliable, 
hard worker who avoided trouble.  Two witnesses provided more specific grounds 
for inferring that defendant would not pose a danger to correctional employees or 
to other prisoners.  Ed Dawson had supervised defendant’s work on building 
maintenance projects at Atascadero State Hospital while defendant was confined 
68
there as a mentally disordered sex offender.  Dawson testified that defendant had 
been cleared for access to sharp tools and had never had any problems, even 
though his job was demanding and entailed pressure.  Dave Roberts supervised the 
culinary unit at the California Training Facility at Soledad.  He testified that 
defendant’s immediate supervisor gave him an unusually favorable work 
evaluation, and that life prisoners tended to behave better than other inmates in 
order to avoid restrictions on their freedom.   
Addressing this evidence in closing argument, the prosecutor characterized 
it as “essentially ask[ing] you to speculate on whether or not he will ever do 
anything down the line, and who the hell knows?  We know he has history.  The 
defense can stand up and say he’s been in a lot of institutions and never got in 
trouble before, but as everybody sits here now, you will never know whether or 
not you are mortgaging the lives of counselors, workers in the joint . . . .”  Defense 
counsel objected to the argument as “improper.”  The court overruled the 
objection, and the prosecutor continued:  “That’s just pure unadulterated 
speculation.  So don’t fall for it.  Don’t fall for it at all.”   
On appeal, defendant claims the prosecutor committed misconduct by 
addressing the subject of future dangerousness in closing argument when “[t]he 
defense had introduced no testimony on future dangerousness . . . .”  But this is 
incorrect.  The defense had introduced the testimony set out above.  In any event, 
when a defendant presents evidence of his capacity to adjust to life in prison, it is 
permissible for the prosecutor to argue that the evidence is unpersuasive.  (People 
v. Osband, supra, 13 Cal.4th 622, 723.)  The prosecutor here did no more than 
that. 
69
8.  Challenge to CALJIC Nos. 8.86 and 8.87 
The trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC Nos. 8.86 and 8.87.  Using 
these standard instructions, the court enumerated the other violent criminal acts 
(§ 190.3, factor (b)) and prior felony convictions (id., factor (c)) the People had 
sought to prove as aggravating factors and informed the jury not to consider them 
unless convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of their truth.    
On appeal, defendant claims the instructions violated People v. Wright, 
supra, 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1135-1138, because they argumentatively pinpointed the 
evidence on which one side relied.  In People v. Robertson, supra, 33 Cal.3d 21, 
55, footnote 19, however, we encouraged the People to request instructions 
enumerating the other crimes on which they rely as aggravating evidence.  
Defendant contends that “Wright is in conflict with Robertson on this point.”   
The argument lacks merit.  The two decisions address different problems.  
People v. Wright, supra, 45 Cal.3d 1126, addresses the problem of apparent bias 
caused by argumentative instructions that seem to invite the jury to draw certain 
conclusions from specified evidence.  (Id., at p. 1137.)  People v. Robertson, 
supra, 33 Cal.3d 21, addresses the danger of confusion that arises from evidence 
suggesting a defendant has committed crimes other than those of which the People 
have given formal notice under section 190.3 and sought to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Absent instructions like CALJIC Nos. 8.86 and 8.87, there is no 
assurance the jury will consider only proper aggravating evidence.  (People v. 
Robertson, supra, at p. 55, fn. 19.)  Here, without such instructions, the jury might 
have attributed incorrect significance to the evidence that defendant stole a firearm 
from Michael Ayers, possessed methamphetamine, and possessed and attempted 
to sell property stolen from David Hill’s residence.  While courts need not give 
CALJIC Nos. 8.86 and 8.87 sua sponte (People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 
1210, 1267), we find no error in their use here and no reason to find a violation of 
70
the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution, as defendant perfunctorily claims.   
9.  Refusal to Give Instructions Proposed by Defense—Part 1 
Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to give two jury 
instructions proposed by the defense to highlight specific mitigating evidence.  
Proposed instruction No. 47 would have noted defendant’s admission to police of 
his guilt in the death of Doris Horrell.  Proposed instruction No. 50 would have 
noted various assertedly mitigating circumstances, including the admission noted 
above, any lingering doubt concerning defendant’s guilt, and the fact that 
defendant did not attempt to escape from custody or use force to avoid arrest.  The 
same instruction would also have restated section 190.3, factor (k).   
Neither state nor federal law supports defendant’s claim.  State law does 
not require instructions highlighting specific mitigating evidence.  (People v. 
Musselwhite, supra, 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1269-1270.)  Arguing to the contrary, 
defendant relies on People v. Sears (1970) 2 Cal.3d 180, 190, in which we held 
that “[a] defendant is entitled to an instruction relating particular facts to any legal 
issue.”  But Sears does not require argumentative instructions that merely 
highlight specific evidence without further illuminating the relevant legal 
standards.  (People v. Musselwhite, supra, at pp. 1269-1270.)  The only legal 
standard plausibly illuminated by the instructions here at issue was section 190.3, 
factor (k), which permits the jury to consider all mitigating evidence offered by the 
defense.  But the court adequately set forth that principle by giving CALJIC No. 
8.85.  Apart from repeating factor (k), the proposed instructions merely argued the 
evidence. 
Nor does federal law support defendant’s claim.  In Buchanan v. Angelone 
(1998) 522 U.S. 269, 277, the United States Supreme Court held that a trial court 
71
did not err by instructing a capital sentencing jury simply to consider “ ‘all of the 
evidence.’ ”  The trial court was not required to list Virginia’s statutory mitigating 
circumstances or the specific mitigating evidence the defendant wished to 
highlight.  (Id., at pp. 273-274, 276-279.)  If a defendant has properly been found 
eligible for the death penalty, the high court reasoned, and if the jury has been 
permitted to consider all constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence, the state 
may, but need not, further structure the manner in which the jury considers the 
mitigating evidence.  (Id., at p. 276.)  In this context, jury instructions violate the 
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution only if there is a reasonable 
likelihood the jury has understood them as barring consideration of 
constitutionally relevant evidence.  (Ibid.)  We see no such likelihood here 
because the trial court instructed the jury with the expanded version of CALJIC 
No. 8.85 to consider “[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the 
crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime, and any sympathetic or 
other aspect of the defendant’s character or record that the defendant offers as a 
basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the events for which 
he is on trial.”   
Defendant contends that the jurors likely believed the law did not permit 
them to give any mitigating force to the circumstance that defendant admitted his 
guilt in the killing of Horrell.  We see no possibility the jurors labored under such a 
misunderstanding.  Defendant’s admissions came into evidence partly at the penalty 
phase, through Linda Ayers’s testimony that he admitted the killing to her in a 
telephone call from jail, and partly at the guilt phase, through the testimony of 
defense expert Dr. Rosenthal.  The court permitted the doctor, who opined that 
defendant had killed Horrell under the influence of methamphetamine, briefly to 
summarize defendant’s hearsay statements to police as part of the basis of his 
opinion.  Defendant, according to Dr. Rosenthal, “report[ed] his sense of being 
72
puzzled by what happened” and “that he had actually been using drugs for a long 
period of time . . . .”  The court instructed the jury at the guilt phase not to consider 
defendant’s statements to the police for the truth of the matters asserted therein.  
Later, however, at the conclusion of the penalty phase, the court expressly gave 
defense counsel “free rein” to argue the evidence, and counsel told the jury without 
contradiction that the evidence was indeed relevant.11  For this reason, and because 
the court properly instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 8.85, we see no reason to 
believe the jury was confused on this point.   
Defendant unsuccessfully attempts to compare his case with McDowell v. 
Calderon (9th Cir. 1997) 130 F.3d 833.  In McDowell, the Ninth Circuit held that 
a trial court violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution by 
failing to correct the erroneous stated belief of 11 jurors that the law did not permit 
them to consider certain mitigating evidence related to the defendant’s personal 
and family history.  (McDowell v. Calderon, supra, at pp. 837-841.)  The jurors 
had communicated their misunderstanding during deliberations in a note to the 
court seeking guidance on the matter.  (Id., at p. 835.)  In the case before us, 
nothing in the record suggests any juror was similarly confused.   
10.  Refusal to Give Instructions Proposed by Defense—Part 2 
As we have already explained, neither state nor federal law requires trial 
courts to give jury instructions cataloging the mitigating evidence.  (See ante, at 
p. 70 et seq.; see also Buchanan v. Angelone, supra, 522 U.S. 269, 273-274, 276-
                                             
 
11  
Defense counsel argued as follows:  “you can consider the fact even after 
his arrest, and Mike Yeoman admitted responsibility to the police for killing Mrs. 
Horrell, and he expressed a general sense of puzzlement about what he had done.  
[¶] And you can consider that he admitted his guilt to killing Mrs. Horrell to Linda 
Ayers, and he expressed his remorse for having done that.”   
73
279; People v. Musselwhite, supra, 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1269-1270.)  Arguing to the 
contrary once again, defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to give his 
proposed instruction No. 46.  The proposed instruction would have enumerated 21 
mitigating circumstances, including such things as defendant’s “lack of a sense of 
self esteem and self-worth,” his “expressions of concern for others,” his “positive 
contributions while in the state hospital and in prison, in his work and in his 
poetry,” and the fact that he “tearfully admitted his guilt in killing [Horrell] to 
[Linda Ayers] and expressed his remorse.”  In declining to give so argumentative 
an instruction, the court did not err.   
Defendant also contends the court’s failure to give the proposed instruction 
violated federal law in a number of respects.  While he perfunctorily cites the 
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, 
he offers no specific arguments under any of those provisions except as noted 
below. 
Relying on Hicks v. Oklahoma (1980) 447 U.S. 343, 346, defendant argues 
that the court violated due process by arbitrarily refusing to give an instruction 
pinpointing mitigating evidence at the penalty phase, when defendants are entitled 
to analogous instructions pinpointing evidence at the guilt phase.  The argument 
fails because the premise is erroneous:  In no context is a defendant entitled to an 
argumentative instruction that simply highlights particular evidence without 
further elucidating the relevant legal standards.  (People v. Musselwhite, supra, 17 
Cal.4th 1216, 1269-1270; see ante, at p. 70.)   
Citing Hitchcock v. Duger (1987) 481 U.S. 393, defendant contends the 
court’s failure to give the proposed instruction prevented the jury from 
understanding the scope of the factors they might consider in mitigation.  
Hitchcock is not apposite.  In that case, a Florida trial court had instructed a jury to 
consider only the mitigating evidence that fell within a restrictive set of statutory 
74
mitigating factors; the trial court thus erroneously precluded the capital sentencing 
jury from considering other constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence.  
(Hitchcock v. Duger, supra, at pp. 398-399; see Skipper v. South Carolina (1986) 
476 U.S. 1, 4.)  In contrast, the jury in the case before us was properly instructed 
with CALJIC No. 8.85 to consider “[a]ny other circumstance” proffered as 
mitigating evidence.  (See § 190.3, factor (k).)   
Finally, citing Wardius v. Oregon (1973) 412 U.S. 470, 472, defendant 
contends the trial court violated due process by refusing to give the proposed 
instruction enumerating mitigating evidence while nevertheless giving CALJIC 
Nos. 8.86 and 8.87, which enumerate the other violent criminal acts (§ 190.3, 
factor (b)) and prior felony convictions (id., factor (c)) the People had sought to 
prove.  The decision in Wardius, however, merely requires that certain discovery 
obligations be reciprocal.  It does not support defendant’s argument.  Perhaps 
drawing a loose analogy to Wardius, defendant argues that the trial court 
“impermissibly tilted the balance in the penalty trial in favor of the prosecution” 
by refusing the proposed instruction.  But CALJIC Nos. 8.86 and 8.87 have no 
such effect.  Instead, they serve the evenhanded goal of preventing the jury from 
considering evidence suggesting a defendant has committed crimes other than 
those of which the People have given formal notice under section 190.3 and 
sought to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.  (People v. Robertson, supra, 33 
Cal.3d 21, 55, fn. 19.) 
11.  Refusal to Give Instructions Proposed by Defense—Part 3 
Defendant argues the court erred in refusing to give instructions proposed 
by the defense on sympathy and the benefit of the doubt.  We find no error. 
75
The proposed instruction on sympathy is set out in the margin.12  In 
essence, the proposed instruction paraphrased the reasons this court gave in 
People v. Lanphear (1984) 36 Cal.3d 163, 167, for concluding that juries must be 
allowed to consider sympathy for the defendant as a mitigating circumstance.  The 
proposed instruction was necessary, defendant claims, because no instruction 
given in this case informed the jury “that sympathy may be based independently 
on the abuse which defendant suffered as a child, without a demonstrable 
connection to the crimes committed as an adult.”  In fact, such an instruction was 
given.  Through the language of CALJIC No. 8.85, the trial court directed the jury 
to consider, among other things, “any sympathetic or other aspect of the 
defendant’s character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence 
less than death, whether or not related to the events for which he is on trial.”  
(Italics added.)  In any event, the United States Supreme Court has held that even 
the unadorned language of section 190.3, factor (k) satisfies the requirements of 
the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution in this context.  (Boyde v. 
California (1990) 494 U.S. 370, 377-382.)  A fortiori, the expanded version of 
factor (k) set out in CALJIC No. 8.85 must also be satisfactory.   
As mentioned, the trial court also declined an instruction proposed by the 
defense on the benefit of the doubt.  The proposed instruction would have told the 
jurors they “must,” if in doubt as to which penalty to impose, “give the defendant 
                                             
 
12  
Defendant’s proposed instruction No. 14 provided:  “The jury is permitted 
to consider mitigating evidence relating to the defendant’s character and 
background precisely because that evidence may arouse sympathy or compassion 
for the defendant.  If a mitigating circumstance or an aspect of the defendant’s 
background or his character called to the attention of the jury by the evidence or 
its observation of the defendant arouses sympathy or compassion such as to 
persuade the jury that death is not the appropriate penalty, the jury may act in 
response thereto and opt instead for life without possibility of parole.”  
76
the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict fixing the penalty at life without the 
possibility of parole.”  Defendant argues that California law requires such an 
instruction, but we have previously held to the contrary.  (People v. Cunningham, 
supra, 25 Cal.4th 926, 1041-1042; People v. Musselwhite, supra, 17 Cal.4th 1216, 
1270.)  Defendant presents no adequate justification for reconsidering that 
holding.   
We find no merit in defendant’s conclusory assertions that the trial court, 
by denying the proposed instructions discussed above, left the jury with open-
ended discretion to impose the death penalty, precluded the jury from giving the 
defendant individualized sentencing discretion, rendered the death verdict 
arbitrary, capricious and unreliable, or violated the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution.   
12.  Refusal to Give Instructions Proposed by Defense—Part 4 
Defendant contends the trial court committed three additional errors in 
instructing the penalty phase jury.  We find none. 
First, the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury that the 
statutory aggravating factors were exclusive.  Lacking such an instruction, 
defendant contends, the prosecutor was free to rely on nonstatutory aggravating 
factors in his closing argument.  Defendant’s premise and conclusion are both 
incorrect.  Nothing in the instructions given by the court suggested the jury might 
properly consider nonstatutory aggravating factors.  In fact, the court strongly 
suggested the contrary by directing the jury to “consider, and take into account 
and be guided by the applicable factors of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances upon which you have been instructed.”  (CALJIC No. 8.88.)  
CALJIC No. 8.85 freed the jury to consider nonstatutory mitigating factors by 
explaining section 190.3, factor (k), but no instruction did the same for 
77
aggravating factors.  Furthermore, defendant does not persuade us that the 
prosecutor did in fact argue nonstatutory aggravating factors.  The prosecutor’s 
fleeting reference to the impact of defendant’s crimes on Horrell’s relatives was a 
permissible reference to a statutory aggravating factor, namely, the circumstances 
of the crime.  (§ 190.3, factor (a); see People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d 787, 
833; see also ante, at p. 64  et seq.)  Nor did the prosecutor argue future 
dangerousness as a nonstatutory aggravating factor.  As we have already 
explained, he merely asked the jury to reject defense counsel’s speculation that 
defendant would not be dangerous if sentenced to life without the possibility of 
parole.  (See ante, at p. 68.)   
Second, the court did not err in instructing the jury to consider defendant’s 
molestation of Sharon C. both as violent criminal conduct (§ 190.3, factor (b)) and 
as a prior felony conviction (id., factor (c)).  On appeal, defendant argues the court 
erroneously directed the jury to double-count defendant’s prior offense.  We have 
rejected identical arguments many times before.  (E.g., People v. Gutierrez (2002) 
28 Cal.4th 1083, 1154; People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 764.)  The 
argument lacks merit because factors (b) and (c) serve the different purposes of 
showing, respectively, a defendant’s propensity for violence and his failure to be 
deterred by past criminal sanctions.  (People v. Melton, supra, at p. 764.)  In any 
event, the concept of counting has no real significance in this context.  Jurors are 
directed not to count aggravating and mitigating factors in a mechanical way but, 
instead, to assign to each whatever moral or sympathetic value they deem 
appropriate.  (CALJIC No. 8.88; see People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 541.) 
Third, the court did not err in instructing the jurors that, to return a verdict 
of death, they need not unanimously agree on the weight or significance to be 
given each aggravating and mitigating circumstance.  (People v. Bacigalupo, 
supra, 1 Cal.4th 103, 147.)  Nor do we see any flaw in the trial court’s 
78
extemporaneous instruction on this point, which correctly described California law 
as requiring a unanimous verdict but permitting the jurors to arrive at that verdict 
“by twelve separate routes.”  To be sure, as defendant argues, to require unanimity 
on the treatment of each sentencing factor would increase the People’s burden and 
thus offer defendants more protection.  We said as much in People v. Jackson 
(1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 357.  But it does not logically follow that the absence of 
such a requirement biases the jury in favor of death when each juror must decide 
for himself or herself “whether the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in 
comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life 
without parole.”  (CALJIC No. 8.88.)   
Briefly addressing federal law, defendant argues that the trial court’s 
instructions to the jury on the three matters discussed above violated the Fifth, 
Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  We 
perceive no credible federal claim.  In particular, we see no reason to believe the 
trial court caused the death judgment to be unreliable or arbitrary for Eighth 
Amendment purposes by failing to instruct the jury that the statutory aggravating 
circumstances were exclusive.  Other properly given instructions suggested as 
much, and the prosecutor did not argue nonstatutory aggravating factors.  (See 
ante, at p. 76.)  Nor are we persuaded that the jury was biased in favor of death 
because the instructions referred twice to defendant’s molestation of Sharon C., or 
because no instruction told the jurors they had to agree on the significance and 
weight to be assigned to each sentencing factor.  The jurors were instructed not to 
count factors mechanically, and each juror was permitted to assign to each factor 
whatever sympathetic or moral weight he or she deemed appropriate.  (See ante, at 
p. 77.)  The decisions on which defendant relies (Zant v. Stephens (1983) 462 U.S. 
862, 884-891; Godfrey v. Georgia (1980) 446 U.S. 420, 427-433) address the 
79
constitutional ramifications of using vague factors to determine a defendant’s 
eligibility for the death penalty.  They are not apposite. 
13.  Juror Misconduct 
Defendant unsuccessfully moved for a new trial on the ground of jury 
misconduct.  On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying the motion, in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing, and in failing to 
issue subpoenas to compel the testimony of jurors who had declined to speak with 
defense investigators.  Defendant also contends the alleged misconduct, and the 
trial court’s rulings, violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  All of these claims 
lack merit. 
Defendant raises four claims of misconduct.  In each, he asserts that jurors 
brought to their deliberations extraneous information derived from their personal 
knowledge and experience rather than the evidence at trial.  We review such 
claims under the standards set out in In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 653:  
“To summarize, when misconduct involves the receipt of information from 
extraneous sources, the effect of such receipt is judged by a review of the entire 
record, and may be found to be nonprejudicial.  The verdict will be set aside only 
if there appears a substantial likelihood of juror bias.  Such bias can appear in two 
different ways.  First, we will find bias if the extraneous material, judged 
objectively, is inherently and substantially likely to have influenced the juror.  
[Citations.]  Second, we look to the nature of the misconduct and the surrounding 
circumstances to determine whether it is substantially likely the juror was actually 
biased against the defendant.  [Citation.]  The judgment must be set aside if the 
court finds prejudice under either test.”   
80
The evidence of misconduct consists of declarations prepared by the 
defense for Jurors Mary Ann F., Karen H., Michael L., Carol M. and Peg P.  The 
declarations repeat, with fair consistency, remarks attributed to the various jurors 
claimed to have committed misconduct.  The defense submitted these declarations 
in support of the motion for a new trial.  The defense also submitted declarations 
by defense investigators repeating statements by Jurors Robert A. and Franklin K., 
who had refused to sign declarations.  The trial court did not expressly determine 
the admissibility of these statements, but they are generally consistent with the 
signed declarations and appear to add to them nothing of significance.  Finally, the 
defense submitted declarations by defense counsel naming jurors who had chosen 
not to cooperate in their investigation of alleged misconduct.   
a.  Drug screening procedures 
Defendant’s first claim concerns Juror Donald P., who apparently repeated 
during the guilt phase deliberations second-hand information about drug screening 
procedures at the Sacramento County jail.  According to the declarations, Donald 
P. told the other jurors that he was married to a nurse who was friendly with a 
nurse currently working at the county jail, possibly defense witness Lorraine 
Andrews, R.N.  Donald P. also told the other jurors that, according to his wife, a 
person who is arrested and brought to jail is carefully screened for drug use or 
withdrawal and that, if either is noted, the matter is documented and therapy 
begun.  As a prospective juror, Donald P. had disclosed on his questionnaire the 
information that his wife was a nurse formerly employed by the county health 
department and that he, himself, was friendly with a prison physician.  While all 
the prospective jurors were asked to review a list of potential witnesses, the name 
of defense witness Andrews did not appear on the list.  No declarant asserts that 
81
Juror Donald P. claimed to have spoken with his wife or any other person about 
the case during the jury’s deliberations.   
Juror Donald P.’s remarks might conceivably be viewed as extraneous 
information of conceivable relevance to the case, and thus misconduct.  The 
defense had attempted to defeat the People’s robbery-murder special circumstance 
allegation by showing that defendant did not form the intent to rob victim Doris 
Horrell until after killing her because he was under the influence of methampheta-
mine.  Defense witness Andrews, who as a nurse examined jail inmates for health 
problems, testified that she did not test defendant’s blood for drugs, even though 
he had reported recent drug use.  Conceivably, Juror Donald P.’s information 
about drug screening procedures might have caused him to believe, or suggested 
to other jurors, that defendant must not have appeared to be under the influence of 
drugs at the time he arrived at the county jail.   
While Juror Donald P.’s remarks were arguably improper, we perceive no 
substantial likelihood that the remarks indicated bias on his own part or caused 
any other juror to become biased.  (See In re Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th 634, 
653.)  Defendant killed Doris Horrell on February 13, 1988.  He was arrested on 
February 16 and examined by Nurse Andrews on February 22.  Whether or not 
defendant appeared to be under the influence of drugs on February 22, or even on 
February 16, had little apparent relevance to his mental state on February 13.  
Whether defendant ever used drugs was not at issue; many witnesses testified that 
he frequently did.  Instead, the material, disputed fact was whether defendant on 
February 13 formed the intent to rob Horrell before or while killing her.  The 
evidence properly admitted at trial on that issue included substantial evidence of 
rational activity preceding and following the crime, in which defendant posed as a 
good Samaritan to lure a stranded, vulnerable motorist into his car, killed her, 
removed her jewelry and other valuable possessions, calmly admitted to Debra 
82
Stafford what he had done, immediately returned to the scene of the crime to 
destroy and conceal evidence, and surveyed the victim’s house but abandoned a 
contemplated burglary as too risky in view of the good lighting and the presence 
of neighbors.  (See ante, at p. 2 et seq.) 
Viewed thus in the light of the entire record, we cannot say that Juror 
Donald P.’s extraneous information about drug screening procedures at the county 
jail was inherently and substantially likely to have indicated bias on his own part 
or caused any other juror to become biased.  Nor does it appear substantially 
likely, looking to the nature of the juror’s remarks and the surrounding 
circumstances, that he or any other juror was, on account of the statements, 
actually biased against defendant.  (See In re Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th 634, 
653.) 
b.  “Sociopath” 
In his second claim of misconduct, defendant asserts that Juror Mary Ann 
F., a nurse, brought extraneous information to the jury’s deliberations by 
explaining the term “sociopath” and how it might apply to defendant.  The record 
does not clearly show that any misconduct occurred.  Nevertheless, assuming for 
the sake of argument that misconduct did occur, we find no substantial likelihood 
that any juror was biased.  (In re Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th 634, 653.) 
The term “sociopath” was not used at trial, but the prosecutor did use the 
similar term “antisocial personality disorder” in cross-examining two defense 
expert witnesses.  These witnesses were Dr. Fred Rosenthal, the psychiatrist and 
psychologist who testified at the guilt phase that defendant probably was under the 
influence of methamphetamine when he killed Doris Horrell, and Dr. Mindy 
Rosenberg, the psychologist who testified at the penalty phase about defendant’s 
social history and the effects of child abuse.  To each expert, the prosecutor posed 
83
questions apparently intended to explore whether the diagnostic label in question 
might apply to defendant.  The defense unsuccessfully objected to these questions 
as beyond the scope of direct examination.  Answering the questions, both experts 
testified that they had not been asked to diagnose defendant.  Neither opined that 
the label “antisocial personality disorder” did, or did not, apply.  During the guilt 
phase, the court offered to instruct the jury, if necessary, that there was “no 
evidence that [defendant] has or has not been diagnosed as having an antisocial 
personality or is a so-called psychopath.”  Ultimately, however, the court gave no 
such instruction because the prosecutor did not refer to the concept in argument at 
either phase of the trial.  The defense briefly mentioned the concept in its guilt 
phase closing argument, but only to say the concept was not relevant. 
The testimony, objections and argument about “antisocial personality 
disorder” and “psychopath[s]” apparently led to discussion among the jurors.  In 
her declaration, Juror Mary Ann F. stated:  “During deliberations we discussed the 
meaning of the term sociopath.  We tried to describe what we felt sociopath was.  
We also discussed why the defense objected to testimony about the subject.”13  
The same juror also declared:  “Because of my career as a nurse, the jurors fielded 
medical type questions to me.  Some of these questions were beyond my area of 
expertise and I did not attempt to answer them.”  Juror Carol M. similarly declared 
that Juror Mary Ann F. “helped us in explaining psychological terms and 
diagnoses.  She told us some of what she learned in her nurse[’]s training; For 
example she used the term sociopath and explained how it might apply to Michael 
                                             
 
13  
Because no attorney or witness had used the term “sociopath” at trial, we 
assume the jurors used the term as a colloquial way of referring to a person with 
antisocial personality disorder, in much the same way defense counsel used the 
term “psychopath” in closing argument.   
84
Yeoman.”  Juror Michael L. declared more cryptically that Juror Mary Ann F. 
“explained some medical terms to us.”   
Certainly a juror commits misconduct by asserting a “claim to expertise or 
specialized knowledge of a matter at issue.”  (In re Malone (1996) 12 Cal.4th 935, 
963.)  Yet “it is not improper for a juror, regardless of his or her educational or 
employment background, to express an opinion on a technical subject, so long as 
the opinion is based on the evidence at trial.  Jurors’ views of the evidence, 
moreover, are necessarily informed by their life experiences, including their 
education and professional work.”  (Ibid.; see also People v. Steele (2002) 27 
Cal.4th 1230, 1265-1267.)  The evidence presented here does not show that Juror 
Mary Ann F. offered the jurors any basis for deciding the case other than the 
evidence and testimony presented at trial.  No declaration suggests the juror made 
any assertion inconsistent with the properly admitted evidence and testimony.  
Moreover, defendant does not claim, and the declarations do not suggest, that the 
juror brought reference materials to the jury room, consulted such materials 
outside the jury room, or spoke with anyone other than jurors about the case.  For 
these reasons we doubt whether the evidence actually establishes that misconduct 
occurred.  “Indeed, lay jurors are expected to bring their individual backgrounds 
and experiences to bear on the deliberative process.”  (People v. Pride (1992) 3 
Cal.4th 195, 268.)  That they do so is both a strength of the jury system and a 
weakness that must be tolerated.  (Ibid.)     
Nevertheless, assuming for the sake of argument that the juror’s remarks 
did entail misconduct, reviewing the entire record we find no substantial 
likelihood that any juror was biased.  (In re Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th 634, 653.)  
Juror Mary Ann F.’s remarks about the term “sociopath,” as reported in the 
various jurors’ declarations, are not inherently and substantially likely to indicate 
bias on her part or to have influenced any juror.  Nor, in view of the nature of the 
85
juror’s remarks and the surrounding circumstances, is it substantially likely that 
any juror was actually biased against the defendant.  (Ibid.) 
c.  Jurors’ experiences with drugs 
Defendant also claims that several jurors committed misconduct by 
recounting personal experiences involving drugs.  According to the declarations, 
Juror Mary Ann F. described her brother’s abuse of and withdrawal from drugs; 
Juror Peg P. told how her son was arrested and straight-jacketed after using drugs 
and brandishing a gun; and Juror Robert A. described his own use of and reactions 
to various drugs.  Defendant argues these jurors thereby acted as “pseudo-
experts,” rebutting the defense claim that defendant’s conduct was related to his 
drug use.  We find no misconduct.  The effect of drugs, while certainly a proper 
subject of expert testimony, has become a subject of common knowledge among 
laypersons.  On this subject, as we recognized in People v. Fauber, supra, 2 
Cal.4th 792, 839, “[j]urors cannot be expected to shed their backgrounds and 
experiences at the door of the deliberation room.”  (See also People v. Steele, 
supra, 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1265-1267.) 
d.  Life without parole, release and escape 
Defendant claims a juror committed misconduct by remarking during 
deliberations that defendant might escape from prison if sentenced to life without 
the possibility of parole.  The claim is based on the declaration of Juror Karen H., 
who stated “[t]hat during the penalty deliberation someone brought up whether 
[defendant] might escape if given life without parole.”  The juror continues:  
“Someone made a ‘crack’ about this . . . it was not discussed in any way.”  It thus 
appears the remark was intended, however inappropriately, as sarcasm or in jest.  
While the remark might literally be described as injecting an extraneous fact into 
the jury’s deliberations, or as speculation about facts not in evidence, few verdicts 
86
would stand if held to such an impossible standard.  (People v. Pride, supra, 3 
Cal.4th 195, 268; see In re Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th 634, 654-655.)  Reasoning 
that “[t]he average juror undoubtedly worries that a dangerous inmate might 
escape” (People v. Pride, supra, at p. 268), we concluded in Pride that a prison 
employee’s far more detailed remarks to his fellow jurors about the possibility of 
escape did not constitute misconduct (ibid.).  The same reasoning more easily 
justifies a similar conclusion here.   
Defendant also claims the jurors committed misconduct by discussing the 
possibility of parole.  The claim is based on the declaration of Juror Mary Ann F., 
who stated:  “It was brought up by one juror that if we gave [defendant] life 
without parole, he’ll probably get out in seven years.  This seemed like an off hand 
comment.”  The claim is also based on the declaration of defense investigator 
Margaret Erickson, who asserts that Juror Robert A. told her “[t]he jurors 
discussed whether or not life without parole really means what it says” and that, 
“[i]n terms of [defendant’s] being released in the future, there was concern about 
revenge.”14   
Accepting as true for the sake of argument all of defendant’s assertions 
about juror misconduct, we find no substantial likelihood of bias.  (In re 
Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th 634, 653.)  We have recognized that jurors cannot 
always be effectively precluded from discussing such topics of general awareness 
and concern as the possibility of parole (People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 
130, 195), escape (People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th 195, 268), and the infrequent 
nature of executions (People v. Majors (1998) 18 Cal.4th 385, 421; People v. Cox 
                                             
 
14  
By repeating this evidence, we do not suggest that the hearsay statements of 
the defense investigator would necessarily be admissible to prove the facts 
asserted, namely, what Juror Robert A. said in the jury room. 
87
(1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 696).  Thus, in People v. Mendoza, we upheld a trial court’s 
finding that the jurors in a capital case did not commit misconduct by discussing 
briefly the possibility of parole during the course of penalty phase deliberations 
that otherwise properly focused on the facts of the case and the aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances.  (Mendoza, supra, at p. 195.)  The evidence in this case 
offers no justification for a different conclusion.  Assuming for the sake of 
argument that the statements defendant challenges might be viewed as 
misconduct, we perceive in them no substantial likelihood of bias, either 
inherently or in view of their nature and the surrounding circumstances.  (In re 
Carpenter, supra, at p.  653.) 
Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in declining to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing on the defense allegations of jury misconduct or in failing to 
compel jurors to testify.  While these procedural tools are available to trial courts, 
not every allegation of misconduct justifies their use.  We have emphasized that 
evidentiary hearings should not be used as fishing expeditions to search for 
possible misconduct.  Instead, such hearings should be conducted only when the 
defense has come forward with evidence demonstrating a strong possibility that 
prejudicial misconduct has occurred.  Moreover, even when the defense has made 
such a showing, an evidentiary hearing will generally be unnecessary unless the 
evidence presents a material conflict that can be resolved only at such a hearing.  
(People v. Hedgecock (1990) 51 Cal.3d 395, 419.)  In this case, the affidavits 
submitted by the defense did not demonstrate a strong possibility that prejudicial 
misconduct had occurred.   
14.  Jury Unanimity on Other Violent Criminal Conduct 
Defendant contends the trial court erred in instructing the jurors they did 
not need to agree on whether any particular violent criminal activity offered as 
88
evidence in aggravation (see § 190.3, factor (b)) had occurred.  In so doing, the 
court used standard language drawn from the last paragraph of CALJIC No. 
8.87.15  Defendant unsuccessfully objected to the instruction, proposed an 
alternative instruction that did not mention unanimity, and renewed the objection 
in his motion for a new trial.   
The claim lacks merit.  California law does not require the jurors to agree 
on instances of criminal activity offered as aggravating evidence under section 
190.3, factor (b).  (People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 910; People v. Ghent 
(1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 773-774.)  Nor does the absence of any such requirement 
render a judgment of death unreliable for Eighth Amendment purposes.  (People v. 
Raley, supra, at p. 910; People v. Bacigalupo, supra, 1 Cal.4th 103, 135.)  
Defendant claims that factor (b) also violates the Eighth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution in not requiring the jurors to agree unanimously on violent 
criminal activity and, thus, in failing to narrow adequately jurors’ discretion to 
impose the death penalty.  (See McCleskey v. Kemp, supra, 481 U.S. 279, 305.)  
The claim fails because the required narrowing function is performed in California 
by the special circumstances set out in section 190.2, rather than by the 
aggravating and mitigating factors set out in section 190.3.  (Pulley v. Harris 
(1984) 465 U.S. 37, 53; People v. Whitt (1990) 51 Cal.3d 620, 659-660.)  
15.  Miscellaneous Constitutional Challenges to the Death Penalty 
Defendant asserts a variety of challenges, under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution, to the procedures under which the 
                                             
 
15  
The court instructed:  “It is not necessary for all jurors to agree.  If any 
juror is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that such criminal activity occurred, 
that juror may consider that activity as a fact in aggravation.  [¶] If a particular 
juror is not so convinced, that juror must not consider that evidence for any 
purpose.” 
89
death penalty is imposed in California.  We have previously considered and 
rejected each claim.  Defendant offers no persuasive reason to reconsider our prior 
decisions.  More specifically:   
a.  Trial courts need not delete from the list of sentencing factors set out in 
CALJIC No. 8.85 those that may not apply.  (People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d 
739, 776.)  The failure to do so does not deprive defendant of his rights to an 
individualized sentencing determination (People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 
207-208) or to a reliable judgment (People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 79).  
b.  The jury need not prepare written findings identifying the aggravating 
factors on which it relied.  (People v. Davenport (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1171, 1232.)  
Nor does the absence of any such requirement violate defendant’s right to 
meaningful appellate review.  (Ibid.)   
c.  The jury need not find beyond a reasonable doubt the truth of the 
aggravating factors on which it relies, that the aggravating factors outweigh the 
mitigating factors, or that death is the appropriate penalty.  (People v. Boyette 
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 466.)  The absence of any such requirement does not 
render a death judgment unreliable, or violate due process or equal protection.  
(Id., at p. 465.)   
d.  The court need not review a death judgment for proportionality with 
sentences in other cases.  (Pulley v. Harris, supra, 465 U.S. 37, 50-51; People v. 
Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1384.)  
e.  The adjectives “extreme” and “substantial” do not render vague the 
sentencing factors that include those words.  (§ 190.3, factors (d) & (g); see 
People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1217.)  Nor do those adjectives bar 
consideration of proper mitigating evidence, since factor (k) permits the jury to 
consider “[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime.”  
(§ 190.3, factor (k); see People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d 754, 803-804.)   
90
f.  California’s statutory special circumstances (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(1)-(22)) 
are not so numerous or inclusive as to fail to narrow the class of murderers eligible 
for the death penalty.  (People v. Michaels, supra, 28 Cal.4th 486, 541.)   
g.  To give the district attorney of each county the discretion to decide 
whether to seek the death penalty does not render such decisions arbitrary, even in 
the absence of statewide standards for, or oversight of, such decisions.  (People v. 
Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th 619, 702.)   
III. DISPOSITION 
The judgment is affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
BROWN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY KENNARD, J. 
 
 
I concur in the majority opinion.  I offer these additional thoughts on 
defendant’s contention that the prosecutor peremptorily challenged four Black 
jurors because of their race, in violation of Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 
(Batson) and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler).  In rejecting that 
contention, the majority makes several references to this court’s very recent 
decision in People v. Johnson (June 30, 2003, S097600) __ Cal.4th __ (Johnson), 
in which I dissented.  As I shall explain, Johnson is superficially similar but 
fundamentally different from this case. 
A trial court may deny a Wheeler motion outright if the moving party has 
failed to make a prima facie showing that impermissible group bias motivated the 
opposing party’s challenges.  In Johnson, a majority of this court held that to 
establish a prima facie case, “the objector must show that it is more likely than not 
the other party’s peremptory challenges, if unexplained, were based on 
impermissible group bias.”  (Johnson, supra, __ Cal.4th at p. __ [p. 2], italics 
added.)  I disagreed.  As I explained, to establish a prima facie case the objecting 
party need only “prove facts that, if unexplained, permit a reasonable inference of 
discriminatory purpose.”  (Id. at p. __ [p. 2] (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.), italics 
added.) 
But the discussion in Johnson, supra, __ Cal.4th __, on what it takes to 
establish a prima facie case of group bias in challenging prospective jurors has 
nothing to do with the issue here.  That discussion pertains only to the standard of 
2 
proof the trial court must use to determine a prima facie showing of group bias.  
Here, defendant claims the court misapplied that standard to the facts.  In 
reviewing that claim, the majority here correctly applies the standard for appellate 
review of a trial court’s determination that a moving party did not make a prima 
facie showing, rather than the standard that the Johnson majority said the trial 
court should use. 
In Johnson, the majority upheld the trial court’s ruling that the defendant 
had not made a prima facie showing of group bias.  I disagreed.  I explained:  
“[D]efendant showed that the prosecutor challenged all three Blacks on the jury 
panel, used a disproportionate number of his peremptory challenges against 
members of that racial group, and failed to engage in any questioning whatever of 
any these prospective jurors notwithstanding invitations to do so by the trial court.  
With respect to two of the three jurors, there is nothing in their oral or written 
responses that stands out to show they would be unacceptable jurors.”  (Johnson, 
supra, __ Cal.4th __, __ [p. 16] (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).)  This aspect of my 
dissent in Johnson was based on the facts of that case, not on any disagreement 
with the underlying legal principles.  This case presents a different factual pattern.  
Defendant argued that the prosecutor’s challenges of four prospective Black jurors 
were motivated by group bias.  With respect to one of those jurors, the trial court 
found a prima facie case and, after hearing the prosecutor’s explanation, 
concluded that the challenge was not based on group bias.  As to the remaining 
three prospective jurors, the trial court ruled that defendant had not made a prima 
facie case of group bias.  I agree with the majority that these jurors’ oral and 
written responses on voir dire afforded the prosecution race-neutral reasons for its 
peremptory challenges.  Thus, unlike Johnson, the majority here properly upholds 
the trial court’s ruling that defendant failed to make a prima facie showing that the 
3 
prosecutor’s peremptory challenges were based on group bias.  On that basis, I 
concur in the majority’s opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
1 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Yeoman 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S016719 
Date Filed: July 17, 2003 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Sacramento 
Judge: Rothwell B. Mason 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Charles M. Bonneau, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, 
Assistant Attorney General, Ward A. Campbell and Carlos A. Martinez, Deputy Attorneys General, for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Charles M. Bonneau 
980 Ninth Street, Suite 1400 
Sacramento, CA  95814 
(916) 444-8828 
 
Carlos A. Martinez 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street, Suite 125 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 324-5274