Title: Ozark Auto Transp., Inc. v. Starkey

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

OZARK AUTO TRANSPORTATION, INC., an Arkansas
Corporation v. Vernie D. STARKEY

96-873                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered February 10, 1997


1.   Appeal & error -- trial court's findings not reversed unless clearly
     erroneous or against preponderance of evidence -- decisions regarding
     witness credibility made by trier of fact. -- The appellate court
     will not reverse the trial court's findings unless they are
     clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the
     evidence; due regard is given to the superior position and
     opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
     witnesses, and where there are disputed matters of fact, it is
     axiomatic that decisions regarding the credibility of the
     witnesses are to be made by the trier of fact.

2.   Bailment -- damaged goods -- return -- inference of negligence. --
     Generally, where a bailee returns goods in a damaged condition
     that were not so damaged when received, an inference of
     negligence applies; the bailee may then go forward with proof
     that he exercised ordinary care in handling the bailed goods.

3.   Bailment -- damaged goods -- overcoming inference of negligence -- burden
     of proof. -- In bailment cases, the bailee may overcome the
     inference of negligence arising against it because of delivery
     in good condition and return in damaged condition by telling
     all that it knows of the casualty and that it exercised
     ordinary care in all that it did with respect to the vessel;
     this burden, unlike that of persuasion that rests at all times
     on the bailor, simply requires the bailee to go forward with
     evidence sufficient to show that it had no more knowledge of
     the cause of the casualty than was available to the bailor and
     that it exercised ordinary care; the burden of going forward
     then shifts back to the bailor to ultimately persuade the
     trier of facts that negligence on the part of the bailee
     proximately caused the casualty.

4.   Bailment -- damaged goods -- trial court's decision finding that appellant
     had not overcome inference of negligence and awarding damages not clearly
     against preponderance of evidence. -- Based upon the trial court's
     findings and the trial testimony, the supreme court concluded
     that the trial court's decision that appellant had not
     overcome the inference of negligence arising against it was
     not clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of
     the evidence; furthermore, as the trial judge was presented
     with documentary evidence by appellee concerning the cost of
     the repairs to appellee's car, the supreme court could not
     conclude that the award of damages in the exact amount
     reflected on the check written by appellee was not supported
     by the evidence.

5.   Evidence -- offers to compromise -- ARE Rule 408 is not blanket
     prohibition against admission. -- Rule 408 of the Arkansas Rules of
     Evidence is not a blanket prohibition against the admission of
     all evidence concerning offers to compromise; the rule only
     prohibits the introduction of such evidence when the evidence
     is offered to prove "liability for, invalidity of, or amount
     of the claim or any other claim"; Rule 408 does not prohibit
     evidence concerning offers to compromise when introduced for
     any other reason; such evidentiary rulings are within the
     sound discretion of the trial court and will not be set aside
     by this court absent a manifest abuse of that discretion.

6.   Appeal & error -- appellant's burden to produce record demonstrating error.
     -- Where appellant failed to abstract a letter from
     appellant's vice-president to appellee, and there was no
     indication from the abstracted portion of the corporate
     officer's testimony, other than the argument of appellant's
     counsel, that the letter contained any discussion or
     compromise, the supreme court could not conclude that the
     trial court erred in allowing its use in the impeachment of
     appellant's vice-president; it is the appellant's burden to
     produce a record demonstrating error on appeal; appellant
     having failed to meet this burden, the supreme court affirmed.


     Appeal from Washington Circuit Court, Second Division; Kim M.
Smith, Judge; affirmed.
     Scott E. Smith, for appellant.
     Gocio, Dossey & Reeves, by: Samuel M. Reeves, for appellee.

     Donald L. Corbin, Justice.
     Appellant Ozark Auto Transportation, Inc., appeals the
judgment of the Washington County Circuit Court holding that
Appellant breached its duty of ordinary care to Appellee and
awarding Appellee damages in the amount of $3,858.43.  Jurisdiction
is properly in this court pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(a)(15)
(as amended per curiam July 15, 1996), as this case presents 
questions about the law of torts.  In support of its appeal,
Appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence presented
below to support the verdict against Appellant and the amount of
damages awarded to Appellee, and that the trial court erred in
allowing Appellee to impeach the testimony of one of Appellant's
agents with portions of an alleged letter of settlement.  We find
no error and affirm the judgment.
     The testimony presented at the nonjury trial revealed the
followings facts.  Appellee had employed the services of Appellant
to transport a car from Mountain Home, Arkansas, to the Port of
Baltimore, Maryland, so that the car could be shipped to Appellee
in Germany.  Appellee made the transportation arrangements with
Marvin Creamer, a salesman for Appellant.  The agreement was that
Appellant was to deliver the car to E.H. Harms at the marine
terminal in Baltimore, where it would be shipped by another company
to Germany.  When the car did not arrive in Germany on time,
Appellee talked to Marvin, who stated that a radiator and a gas
tank that were stored in the trunk of a 1940 Mercury belonging to
a Mr. Taylor, which was also being transported by Appellant and was
located in the upper deck of the transport truck, had fallen onto
Appellee's car, damaging the hood and breaking the windshield. 
When the car finally arrived in Germany, Appellee reported that the
hood was badly dented and that the car's climate-control system was
full of glass splinters, apparently from the broken windshield. 
The windshield had already been replaced, upon Appellant's request,
before shipment overseas.  Appellee took photographs of the damage
and had the car repaired in Germany.  Appellee presented the
photographs and documents to the trial court including a copy of a
check in the amount of $3,858.43 that Appellee stated was written
for the repairs to the car.  
     Appellant's vice-president, Lance Creamer, told the trial
court that he had been contacted by an assistant concerning the
damage to Appellee's car, and that he had, in turn, instructed the
assistant to get an estimate on the damage and to have the
windshield replaced, as he knew that the car could not be shipped
overseas without a windshield.  Lance Creamer denied knowledge
concerning the cause of the damage to Appellee's car, but conceded
that if the hood had been dented and the windshield had been broken
when the car was picked up by his driver, such damage would have
been noted on the pre-transport inspection conducted by his driver. 
Lance Creamer also stated that Appellee actually talked to him,
rather than Marvin Creamer, concerning the damage to his car and
that he never told Appellee anything about parts falling out of the
trunk of a 1940 Mercury and onto Appellee's car.  Marvin Creamer
likewise denied ever speaking to Appellee about the damage to the
car.
     Lance Creamer initially denied knowledge as to whether
Appellee's car was damaged during transport.  Appellee's counsel
then confronted Lance Creamer with a letter written by him to
Appellee, which referred to "damages caused during transport while
the car was in our care."  Lance Creamer admitted that he had
written the letter to Appellee and that it was safe to assume that
the car had been damaged when it had been dropped off at the port
in Baltimore, due to the fact that he had obtained an estimate of
the damages at that time.   
     Appellant's transport driver, Mark Smith, informed the trial
court that he had performed an inspection on Appellee's car prior
to transporting the car to Baltimore.  Smith indicated that the
only damage noted on his inspection was a "touch-up" ding below the
left door handle and jack indentations on the bottom of the car's
frame.  Smith stated that no damage had been done to the car while
it was in his care prior to being delivered to the port in
Baltimore.  Smith conceded that when he arrived at the port, he did
not deliver the car to E.H. Harms as instructed; instead, he left
the car, unlocked and with the keys in it, just inside the main
gate of the port without having anyone sign for receipt of the
vehicle.  
     The trial court ruled that Appellee had met his burden of
proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the damage to his car
occurred while it was in Appellant's care and possession.  The
trial court found further that the facts presented created a
bailment situation, and that in such a situation where the bailee
returns damaged goods that were not damaged when received, an
inference of negligence arises and the bailee must then go forward
with evidence that he exercised ordinary care in handling the
goods.  In applying the law to the facts, the trial court
determined that Appellant had not overcome the inference of
negligence arising against it and that Appellee was entitled to
damages in the amount of $3,858.43, the actual costs of the
repairs.  The trial court found it significant that Lance Creamer
had instructed his assistant to have an estimate done for the
repairs and to have a windshield installed, all the while
Appellant's agents maintained that the car was not damaged when it
was delivered to Baltimore.  Appellant filed a posttrial motion and
brief asking the court to reconsider its judgment, but the motion
was denied.  This appeal followed.
                  Sufficiency of the Evidence
     For its first point for reversal, Appellant argues that the
trial court's verdict against it as well as the amount of the
damages awarded to Appellee were clearly against the preponderance
of the evidence presented at trial.  We do not agree.  
     We have long held that we will not reverse the trial court's
findings unless they are clearly erroneous or clearly against the
preponderance of the evidence.  ARCP Rule 52(a); Farm Bureau Mut.
Ins. Co. v. David, 324 Ark. 387, 921 S.W.2d 930 (1996).  Due regard
shall be given to the superior position and opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses, ARCP Rule
52(a), and where there are disputed matters of fact, such as in the
case at bar, "[i]t is axiomatic that decisions as to the
credibility of the witnesses are to be made by the trier of fact,"
in this case the court sitting without a jury.  Silvey Cos. v.
Riley, 318 Ark. 788, 791,