Title: Brown v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

369 A.2d 682 (1976)
Glenn BROWN, Defendant below, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff below, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Delaware.
Submitted December 8, 1975.
Decided January 15, 1976.
Arlen B. Mekler, Asst. Public Defender, Wilmington, for defendant below, appellant.
Richard R. Cooch, Deputy Atty. Gen., Wilmington, for plaintiff below, appellee.
Before HERRMANN, C. J., and DUFFY and McNEILLY, JJ.
*683 PER CURIAM.
In this appeal from a conviction in Superior Court' for possession of marijuana, defendant argues that he was prejudiced by the Trial Court's supplementary instruction to the jury.
Following a two-to-three hour trial, the jury retired but was unable to reach a verdict, after deliberating for 1½ hours, and so informed the Court. Over defendant's objection, based upon the lateness of the hour (4:30 P.M.), the Court recalled the jury and gave the following supplementary instruction:
Thereupon, the jury again retired and within twenty minutes returned a verdict of guilty.
Such supplementary instructions, sometimes referred to as an "Allen charge" or "dynamite charge", are generally proper in order to encourage the jury to reach a verdict. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S. Ct. 154, 41 L. Ed. 528 (1896); Hyman Reiver & Co. v. Rose, Del.Supr., 1 Storey 397, 147 A.2d 500 (1958); State v. MacClary, Del.Super., 193 A.2d 195 (1963). However, a trial judge may not coerce the jury into reaching a verdict and, for that reason, any such charge must be carefully examined to determine its total effect on the jury in reaching a verdict. Hyman Reiver & Co. v. Rose, supra.
It is basic to our criminal law that a jury verdict must be unanimous and freely given and that, in order to convict, each individual juror must be convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; it is likewise basic that there is no absolute necessity that the jury reach a verdict. The danger of a "dynamite charge" is that it may suggest to the jurors that these fundamental standards might be compromised in order that a verdict be reached. See United States v. Fioravanti, 3rd Cir., 412 F.2d 407 (1969).
Nevertheless, we believe that this danger can be eliminated by having the charge include an admonition that each individual juror not surrender his or her honest convictions and not to return any verdict contrary to the dictates of personal conscience. See the reference in Hyman Reiver & Co. v. Rose, supra, to those essential points. Without such an admonition, any supplementary charge may be, for that reason alone, overly coercive.
The Court's supplementary charge here failed to so admonish the jurors, and also intimated that the jury would have to remain for a substantial period of time if a verdict were not reached. In light of these factors, we conclude that the total effect of the charge was coercive and unduly influenced the jury; accordingly, the verdict must be set aside and a new trial granted.
Reversed and remanded.