Title: State ex rel. Yost v. Rover Pipeline, L.L.C.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Yost v. Rover Pipeline, L.L.C., Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-766.] 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-766 
THE STATE EX REL. YOST, ATTY. GEN., APPELLANT, v. ROVER PIPELINE, 
L.L.C., ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Yost v. Rover Pipeline, L.L.C., Slip Opinion No. 
2022-Ohio-766.] 
Clean Water Act—33 U.S.C. 1341(A)(1)—State certification—One-year period 
during which the state must act on a request for certification under 33 
U.S.C. 1341(A)(1) begins when application is submitted, not when it is 
deemed complete—State waives its rights or authority only with respect to 
activities approved under federal application when it fails to act on 33 
U.S.C. 1341(A)(1) application—Trial court’s dismissal was improper 
because it failed to determine whether any of allegations brought by state 
address issues outside the contours of the federal application. 
(No. 2020-0091—Submitted January 26, 2021—Decided March 17, 2022.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Stark County, 
No. 2019CA00056, 2019-Ohio-5179. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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_______________________ 
 
DONNELLY, J. 
{¶ 1} Appellee Rover Pipeline, L.L.C., sought a license to construct an 
interstate pipeline that crossed several counties in Ohio.  As required by Section 
401 of the Clean Water Act (“section 401”), 33 U.S.C. 1341(a)(1), Rover applied 
for certification from the state of Ohio that any discharge into the state’s navigable 
waters would comply with applicable provisions of federal law.  When the pipeline 
discharged pollutants into surrounding waters, the state of Ohio sued Rover and 
other companies involved in building the pipeline.  Rover argued that the state’s 
complaint should be dismissed because the state had waived its ability to participate 
in the certification process when it did not respond to Rover’s application within 
one year.  We agree.  The waiver applies, however, only to issues that are related 
to the section 401 certification, the contours of which have not been established by 
the trial court.  Accordingly, we reverse, and we remand with instructions to 
determine whether the violations alleged by the state can be prosecuted or whether 
the state has waived the right to take action. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
{¶ 2} Appellant, the Ohio Attorney General (“the state”), sought injunctive 
relief and other remedies after pollutants were discharged from the pipeline into 
Ohio’s navigable waters.  On July 19, 2018, in a third amended complaint, the state 
alleged, among other things, that Rover and the other appellees, Pretec Directional 
Drilling, L.L.C.; Laney Directional Drilling Company; Atlas Trenchless, L.L.C.; 
Mears Group, Inc.; and B&T Directional Drilling, Inc., (collectively, “the 
defendants”) had “illegally discharged millions of gallons of drilling fluids to 
Ohio’s waters, causing pollution and degrading water quality on numerous 
occasions and in various counties across the state.”  The state alleged seven specific 
counts: 
January Term, 2022 
 
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(1)  “Defendants discharged pollutants to waters of the state without point source 
[National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System] permits.” 
(2)  “Rover failed to obtain a general storm water permit for its storm water 
discharges.” 
(3)  “Defendants violated Ohio’s general water quality standards.” 
(4)  “Defendants violated Ohio’s wetland water quality standards.” 
(5)  “Rover violated the [Ohio Environmental Protection Agency] Director’s 
orders.” 
(6)  “Rover violated the hydrostatic permit.” 
(7)  “Rover engaged in activities without effective certification.” 
The state also asked the trial court to retain jurisdiction “to carry out its judgment” 
and such other relief as may be just. 
{¶ 3} Rover and Mears filed a joint motion to dismiss the complaint; the 
other defendants filed separate motions to dismiss.  In an order issued on March 12, 
2019, the trial court noted that the motions were largely duplicative and therefore 
focused on the motion submitted by Rover and Mears, because “the claims arising 
against the other defendants are a result of actions taken at the behest of Rover.”  
The trial court granted the various Civ.R.12(B) motions to dismiss, stating: 
 
 
On November 16, 2015, the State of Ohio received a 401 
Certification request from Rover.  As such, the State of Ohio had 
until November 16, 2016, to “act” on such request pursuant to 
Section 401 of the Clean Water Act.  * * * 
 
* * *  The Court finds that, in order to assert its rights under 
the Clean Water Act, the State of Ohio was required to “act,” i.e., 
grant or deny, upon Rover’s November 16, 2015, 401 Certification 
request on or before November 16, 2016.  Its failure to do so, 
resulted in a waiver of rights. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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The court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over the matter, because the 
state had “failed to act upon rights specifically given to it pursuant to the Clean 
Water Act within the Act’s specified period of time.” 
{¶ 4} The state appealed.  The court of appeals affirmed, stating that it “is 
undisputed in the case [that the state] failed to act on Rover’s original certification 
request within one year of November 16, 2015.”  2019-Ohio-5179, 150 N.E.3d 491, 
¶ 20.  With respect to the extent of the waiver, the court of appeals essentially 
deferred to the findings of the trial court.  Having overruled the first assignment of 
error, which was related to the issue of waiver by the state, the court of appeals 
deemed a second assignment of error addressing other asserted defenses moot. 
{¶ 5} The state timely appealed, and we accepted the appeal.  158 Ohio 
St.3d 1482, 2020-Ohio-1487, 143 N.E.3d 520. 
ANALYSIS 
{¶ 6} This case is before us based on the trial court’s grant of the 
defendants’ motions to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(1) & (6).  We review dismissals 
pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) de novo, Alford v. Collins-McGregor Operating Co., 
152 Ohio St.3d 303, 2018-Ohio-8, 95 N.E.3d 382, ¶ 10, presume the truth of all 
material factual allegations in the complaint, id., and make all reasonable inferences 
in the state’s favor, State ex rel. Bohlen v. Halliday, 164 Ohio St.3d 121, 2021-
Ohio-194, 172 N.E.3d 114, ¶ 12, citing State ex rel. Zander v. Judge of Summit Cty. 
Common Pleas Court, 156 Ohio St.3d 466, 2019-Ohio-1704, 129 N.E.3d 401, ¶ 4.  
We also review dismissals under Civ.R. 12(B)(1) de novo.  State ex rel. Ohio Civ. 
Serv. Emps. Assn. v. State, 146 Ohio St.3d 315, 2016-Ohio-478, 56 N.E.3d 913, 
¶ 12. 
{¶ 7} The state’s second proposition of law states: “The one-year time limit 
in Section 401 of the Clean Water Act begins to run only once the applicant submits 
a completed application.”  We disagree. 
January Term, 2022 
 
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{¶ 8} Section 401 states:  
 
If the State, interstate agency, or Administrator, as the case 
may be, fails or refuses to act on a request for certification, within a 
reasonable period of time (which shall not exceed one year) after 
receipt of such request, the certification requirements of this 
subsection shall be waived with respect to such Federal application. 
 
33 U.S.C. 1341(a); see Sierra Club v. State Water Control Bd., 898 F.3d 383, 388 
(4th Cir.2018) (after receiving a section 401 application, a state has four options: 
grant a certificate without conditions, grant it with conditions, deny it, or waive its 
right to participate in the process). 
{¶ 9} The state encourages us to rely on AES Sparrows Point LNG, L.L.C. 
v. Wilson, 589 F.3d 721, 729 (4th Cir.2009), which deferred to an Army Corps of 
Engineers’ determination that the clock did not begin to run until a completed 
section 401 application was submitted.  The state argues that an application is not 
valid unless it is complete, which had been the practice of the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) until August 1985, see California ex rel. State 
Water Resources Control Bd. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm., 966 F.2d 1541, 
1552 (9th Cir.1992). 
{¶ 10} Rover, Pretec Directional, and Mears Group argue that allowing the 
state to determine when the one-year clock starts based on its own determination 
whether an application is complete gives the state too much discretion.  In our view, 
it is discretion that is not needed, because the state can reject an application as 
incomplete or for another legitimate reason. 
{¶ 11} Other courts have concluded that the clock starts running upon the 
submission of an application.  In New York State Dept. of Environmental 
Conservation v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm., 884 F.3d 450, 456 (2d Cir.2018), 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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the court specifically addressed the issue before us and concluded that because the 
statute does not refer to “complete” applications, the one-year period begins upon 
the submission of an application.  See California State Water Resources Control 
Bd. at 1552 (the court noted that the FERC had issued a new rule on February 11, 
1987, regarding section 401 certification, that stated that the “one-year period for 
waiver would commence on the date the certifying agency received the certification 
request”). 
{¶ 12} We conclude that the one-year period during which the state must 
act on a request for certification under section 401 begins when the application is 
submitted, not when it is deemed complete.  Though we do not rely on it, we note 
that the federal Environmental Protection Agency recently stated that “the section 
401 certification process begins on the date when the certification request is 
received by a certifying authority.”  Clean Water Act Section 401 Certification 
Rule, 85 Fed.Reg. 42210, 42243 (July 13, 2020); see also 40 C.F.R. 121.6(d) (“The 
Federal agency may extend the reasonable period of time at the request of a 
certifying authority or a project proponent, but in no case shall the reasonable 
period of time exceed one year from receipt”).  It is clear from the record, and the 
parties’ failure to dispute it, that more than one year had passed between the date 
that the application was filed and the date that the state approved it.  Accordingly, 
we agree with the court of appeals that “the state failed to act on the certification 
request in a timely manner, thereby waiving its right to participation in the 
certification process.”  2019-Ohio-5179, 150 N.E.3d 491, ¶ 27. 
{¶ 13} We turn now to the state’s first proposition of law, which addresses 
the consequences of the state’s waiver of its right to participate in the certification 
process.  The state argues that “[a] State’s decision not to act on a Section 401 
water-quality certification has no effect on the State’s power to enforce state water-
pollution laws.”  We disagree.  Frankly, it is not plausible that the state’s failure to 
act would not have any effect, and the state concedes that point. 
January Term, 2022 
 
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{¶ 14} According to 33 U.S.C. 1341(a)(1), “the certification requirements 
of this subsection shall be waived with respect to such Federal application” if the 
state fails to act on a request for certification.  The state’s failure to act on the section 
401 application means (quite plainly) that the state waived its rights or authority 
only with respect to the federal application.  But the vast bulk of the state’s rights 
and authority—those that apply to matters not encompassed by the section 401 
application—remain intact.  How could it be otherwise? 
{¶ 15} Rover, Pretec Directional, and Mears Group argue that the state’s 
“failure to timely act on the certification request means that it cannot enforce its 
water-pollution laws as to the pipeline construction’s water-quality impacts.”  But 
this argument is contradicted by the Clean Water Act itself: “[N]othing in this 
chapter shall (1) preclude or deny the right of any State * * * to adopt or enforce 
(A) any standard or limitation respecting discharge of pollutants.”  33 U.S.C. 1370.  
The Clean Water Act also states that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to 
limit the authority of any department or agency pursuant to any other provision of 
law to require compliance with any applicable water quality requirements.”  33 
U.S.C. 1341(b).  See Natl. Assn. of Home Builders v. United States Army Corps of 
Engineers, 453 F.Supp.2d 116, 134 (2006) (“the authority provided to the states to 
control water quality is not usurped by Section 401”). 
{¶ 16} Because this action was dismissed pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), a full 
record has not been developed and we do not know the extent to which the claims 
asserted by the state fall within the four corners of the federal application.  The trial 
court concluded that “the State of Ohio can prove no set of facts entitling it to its 
requested relief.”  We disagree.  We consider it possible, even likely, that given the 
opportunity to present evidence, the state will be able to establish that certain of its 
allegations fall outside the contours of the Section 401 certification. 
{¶ 17} For example, the state contends that “[b]ecause none of the 
Defendants’ water pollution discharges are from fill placement, all of the violations 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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are outside the scope of the 401 certification.”  (Emphasis sic.)  That the discharges 
are not “fill placement” is a material factual assertion that must be presumed to be 
true when considering a motion to dismiss.  Whether the discharges are outside the 
scope of the 401 certification is a legal determination that the trial court needs to 
address.  Similarly, the state contends that the flow of storm water is governed by 
the federal and state environmental-protection agencies, not by the 401 
certification.  At a minimum, the trial court must determine whether these assertions 
can be proved.  If they can, the alleged violations are outside the contours of the 
401 certification and waiver does not apply. 
{¶ 18} “In order for a trial court to dismiss a complaint under Civ.R. 
12(B)(6) for failure to state claim upon which relief can be granted, it must appear 
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that 
would entitle the plaintiff to the relief sought.”  Ohio Bur. of Workers Comp. v. 
McKinley, 130 Ohio St.3d 156, 2011-Ohio-4432, 956 N.E.2d 814, ¶ 12.  As 
mentioned above, we are not convinced that the state can prove no set of facts in 
support of its claims. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 19} We conclude that the state waived its right to participate with respect 
to certification under 33 U.S.C. 1341 and, therefore, that the state cannot assert 
rights related to that certification.  That waiver does not extend, however, to the 
state’s rights and authority that are unrelated to that certification.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, and we remand to the trial court to 
determine whether any of the allegations in the seven specific counts set forth by 
the state address issues that are outside the contours of the Section 401 certification. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and STEWART and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
FISCHER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion joined by 
January Term, 2022 
 
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KENNEDY and DEWINE, JJ. 
_________________ 
FISCHER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 20} I agree with the conclusion set forth in the majority opinion that the 
one-year period during which the state must act on a request for certification under 
Section 401 of the Clean Water Act (“section 401”), 33 U.S.C. 1341(a)(1), begins 
when the application is submitted, not when the application is deemed complete.  
However, I respectfully disagree with the conclusion set forth in the majority 
opinion that the contours of the section 401 certification have not been established 
in this case. 
I. The Parties’ Arguments 
{¶ 21} In this appeal, the state argues that the failure to timely act on a 
certification request waives only the state’s ability to object if conduct that it has 
thus allowed to proceed under the certification causes pollution.  In connection with 
this argument, the state focuses on the phrase “with respect to such Federal 
application” of section 401(a)(1).  See 33 U.S.C. 1341(a) (providing that if the state 
fails to act on a request for certification, the certification requirements in that 
section “shall be waived with respect to such Federal application”).  It argues that 
the waiver provision of section 401 applies only to discharges within the scope of 
a federal application and thus the state may enforce its laws in response to any 
discharge that is beyond the scope of the certification at issue.  As it pertains to this 
case, the state asserts that appellee, Rover Pipeline, L.L.C. (“Rover”), was 
permitted to use only naturally occurring, nontoxic bentonite clay and water when 
drilling and that the state’s waiver applies only to the discharge of this material into 
wetlands.  It argues that, because nothing in the application indicated that Rover 
would discharge diesel-laced fluid, the discharge of that fluid is beyond the scope 
of the application and the state is permitted to enforce its laws in regard to that 
discharge. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 22} The state further argues that it has the general power to enact and 
enforce water-pollution laws and that federal approval under section 401 does not 
free the applicant from having to comply with state-issued permits and laws.  It 
asserts that the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq., does not contain a clear 
statement of Congress’s intention to preempt state water laws and that the Clean 
Water Act should not be read to impermissibly require the state to follow federal 
law in this area. 
{¶ 23} Rover responds that section 401 applies more broadly than the state 
argues.  Rover asserts that section 401 requires the state to consider the eventuality 
of any discharge into state waters that may result from any activity under the federal 
license or permit.  Rover argues that the state’s waiver applies to any discharge that 
could result from the activity for which the applicant sought a permit.  In response 
to the state’s preemption argument, Rover asserts that the Clean Water Act is a 
valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause of the United 
States Constitution and that there are no constitutional concerns arising from 
interpreting section 401 to impose a complete waiver of a state’s ability to enforce 
its laws. 
II. Section 401 Certification Applies to “Any Discharge” that “May Result” 
from the Activity, Resulting in a Broad Waiver 
{¶ 24} Section 401 provides: “If the State * * * fails or refuses to act on a 
request for certification, within a reasonable period of time (which shall not exceed 
one year) after receipt of such request, the certification requirements of this 
subsection shall be waived with respect to such Federal application.”  33 U.S.C. 
1341(a).  Relying on the reference to the federal application in the statute, the 
majority concludes that “[t]he state’s failure to act on the section 401 application 
means (quite plainly) that the state waived its rights or authority only with respect 
to the federal application.”  Majority opinion, ¶ 14.  This conclusion, however, does 
not answer the question before us; it is undisputed that the waiver relates to the 
January Term, 2022 
 
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application for a federal permit.  The issue in this case turns on which activities 
performed as a result of the application are encompassed within the scope of the 
waiver.  To answer that question, it is necessary to look at other portions of section 
401. 
{¶ 25} In part, section 401 as codified in 33 U.S.C. 1341(a)(1), provides: 
 
Any applicant for a Federal license or permit to conduct any 
activity * * * which may result in any discharge into the navigable 
waters, shall provide the licensing or permitting agency a 
certification from the State in which the discharge originates or will 
originate * * * that any such discharge will comply with the 
applicable provisions of sections 1311, 1312, 1313, 1316, and 1317 
of this title. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Further, the statute requires that a state’s section 401 
certification “shall set forth any effluent limitations and other limitations, and 
monitoring requirements necessary to assure that any applicant for a Federal license 
or permit will comply with any applicable effluent limitations and other limitations 
* * * and with any other appropriate requirement of State law set forth in such 
certification.”  (Emphasis added.)  33 U.S.C. 1341(d).  The limitations set forth in 
the state’s section 401 certification “shall become a condition on” the federal 
permit.  Id. 
{¶ 26} The United States Supreme Court has held that these provisions 
authorize the state to impose conditions and requirements related not just to the 
specific discharge proposed in the federal application for a permit but rather to the 
entire activity for which the permit is being sought.  PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cty. v. 
Washington Dept. of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 711-712, 114 S.Ct. 1900, 128 L.Ed.2d 
716 (1994).  Section 401, the court explained, “allows the State to impose ‘other 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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limitations’ on the project in general to assure compliance with various provisions 
of the Clean Water Act and with ‘any other appropriate requirement of State law.’ ”  
Id. at 711; see also id. at 712 (section 401(d) “is most reasonably read as authorizing 
additional conditions and limitations on the activity as a whole”). 
{¶ 27} The state would have this court construe the effect of its failure to 
attach conditions to the permit much more narrowly.  It asserts that by failing to act 
within the required one-year timeframe, it waived the ability to object only to the 
discharge method authorized by the permit.  If, however, as the United States 
Supreme Court has explained, section 401 empowers the state to attach conditions 
related to any part of the proposed activity, then the waiver of the opportunity to 
impose requirements on the federal project under that same provision must 
necessarily apply just as broadly. 
{¶ 28} As the state acknowledges, Rover applied to construct an interstate 
natural-gas pipeline.  Thus, the “activity” contemplated under section 401 in this 
case was construction of the pipeline.  Both the state and Rover contemplated that 
this activity could result in the discharge of materials into Ohio waters.  The state 
argues that the only discharge contemplated involved naturally occurring nontoxic 
bentonite clay and water, while Rover argues that other discharges, including 
discharges involving diesel-laced fluid, were contemplated during the application 
process.  What type of discharges were contemplated is irrelevant to this appeal, 
however, for the section 401 certification applies to “any discharge” that “may 
result” from the activity.  There, accordingly, is no reason to remand this case for 
the trial court to determine whether the discharges at issue are outside the scope of 
the section 401 certification, as instructed in the majority opinion.  See majority 
opinion at ¶ 19.  Because the federal application at issue in this case permitted 
Rover’s activity of building the pipeline, the state waived all certification 
requirements with respect to that application, including any requirements relating 
January Term, 2022 
 
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to “any discharge” resulting from the activity, whether that discharge involved 
natural fluids or diesel-laced fluids. 
{¶ 29} I would also conclude that the state’s preemption argument is 
unavailing.  It is well established that under the Commerce Clause, U.S. 
Constitution, Article I, Section 8, cl. 3, the federal government “has dominion, to 
the exclusion of the States, over navigable waters of the United States.”  Islander 
E. Pipeline Co., L.L.C. v. Connecticut Dept. of Environmental Protection, 482 F.3d 
79, 92 (2d Cir.2006), citing Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320, 334, 
78 S.Ct. 1209, 2 L.Ed.2d 1345 (1958).  But “[b]y enacting the [Clean Water Act], 
Congress provided states with an offer of shared regulatory authority.”  Id., citing 
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 101, 112 S.Ct. 1046, 117 L.Ed.2d 239 (1992) 
(stating that the Clean Water Act “anticipates a partnership between the States and 
the Federal Government, animated by a shared objective”). 
{¶ 30} As the Supreme Court of the United States has established, the Clean 
Water Act is a valid exercise of Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause, 
and in regard to that Act, Congress has the power to offer states the choice of 
regulating activity according to federal law or having state law preempted by 
federal law.  See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167-168, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 
120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992).  Moreover, this is not a situation in which Congress 
requires states to enact a certain piece of legislation.  Instead, Congress has 
effectively delegated to the states the option to exercise some authority to enforce 
state environmental laws that are more stringent or broader than federal laws if the 
states follow a certain procedure.  Significantly, Congress could have completely 
prevented the states from exercising any authority regarding this interstate-pipeline 
project.  For these reasons, there are no constitutional concerns regarding section 
401’s broad waiver provision. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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III. The State May Enforce the Hydrostatic Permit 
{¶ 31} While I would conclude that the state waived all certification 
requirements with respect to the federal section 401 application, I would note that 
the state is not entirely barred from raising claims against appellees.  Although the 
state waived participation in the federal permitting process, the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) required Rover to obtain a hydrostatic permit 
from the state in order for FERC to sign off on construction.  The Fifth District 
Court of Appeals concluded that because of the state’s section 401 waiver, it could 
not enforce the separately obtained hydrostatic permit.  2019-Ohio-5179, 150 
N.E.3d 491, ¶ 31.  However, because the hydrostatic permit was obtained 
independently of the section 401 certification process at the behest of FERC, I 
would conclude that the state may seek to enforce the terms of the hydrostatic 
permit, and I would reverse the Fifth District’s decision on this limited basis. 
{¶ 32} Finally, I would also note that the state’s waiver in regard to the 
section 401 certification does not necessarily mean that the state is without a 
remedy for damages from violations of the federal permit.  As the Supreme Court 
of the United States has noted, the state may still sue for violations of federal law.  
United States Dept. of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 613, 112 S.Ct. 1627, 118 
L.Ed.2d 255 (1992), fn. 5 (states may bring a suit under the Clean Water Act 
pursuant to the act’s citizen-suit provision, 33 U.S.C. 1365).  The state’s ability to 
file a suit under the Clean Water Act, coupled with its ability to enforce the 
hydrostatic permit, means that the state has some tools at its disposal to ensure 
Rover’s compliance with its relevant obligations, despite the state’s section 401 
waiver. 
IV. Conclusion 
{¶ 33} I would hold that when the state fails to act within the one-year 
period specified in section 401 of the Clean Water Act, the state waives its ability 
with respect to that permit to enforce any conditions that it could have otherwise 
January Term, 2022 
 
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imposed regarding the discharge of any materials into Ohio water that may have 
resulted from the permitted activity.  In this case, because the state failed to act 
within the one-year period, it waived its ability in connection with the federal 
permit to enforce any state laws regarding any discharges resulting from the activity 
of constructing the pipeline, not just the discharge of naturally occurring nontoxic 
bentonite clay and water.  For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the 
Fifth District Court of Appeals in part, but I would reverse that court’s judgment to 
the extent that it concluded that the state may not enforce the terms of its hydrostatic 
permit.  I accordingly concur in part, and I would order a remand for further 
proceedings related to the hydrostatic permit. 
KENNEDY and DEWINE, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, Benjamin M. Flowers, Solicitor General, 
Samuel C. Peterson, Deputy Solicitor General, and Aaron S. Farmer, Janean R. 
Weber, and Amanda M. Ferguson, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant. 
 
McMahon Degulis, L.L.P., Erin M. McDevitt-Frantz, and Michael S. 
McMahon; and Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, L.L.P., William S. Scherman, David 
DeBold, Ruth Porter, and Matthew Rozen, for appellee Rover Pipeline, L.L.C. 
 
Tucker Ellis, L.L.P., Joseph P. Koncelik, Anthony R. Petruzzi, and Melissa 
Z. Kelly, for appellee Pretec Directional Drilling, L.L.C. 
 
Thompson Hine, L.L.P., Kip T. Bollin, and Heidi B. Friedman, for appellee 
Laney Directional Drilling Company. 
 
Ulmer & Berne, L.L.P., Frederic X. Shadley, and David A. Meyer, for 
appellee Mears Group, Inc. 
 
Dworken & Bernstein Company, L.P.A., Grant Keating, Richard N. Selby 
II, and Erik L. Walter, for appellee B & T Directional Drilling, Inc. 
 
Murphy Landen Jones, P.L.L.C., Kevin L. Murphy, J. Jeffrey Landen, and 
Michael S. Jones; and Atlas Trenchless, L.L.C., and Philips J. Vallakalil, for 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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appellee Atlas Trenchless, L.L.C. 
 
Trent Dougherty and Chris Tavenor, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio 
Environmental Council and Sierra Club. 
_________________