Title: Sheltra v. Vermont Asbestos Group

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Sheltra v. Vermont Asbestos Group (2002-116); 175 Vt. 499; 820 A.2d 221

2003 VT 22

[Filed 19-Feb-2003]

                                 2003 VT 22
       	
                                 ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2002-116

                             NOVEMBER TERM, 2002

  Merriman Sheltra	               }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
       v.	                       }	Commissioner of Labor & Industry
                                       }	
  Vermont Asbestos Group	       }
                                       }	DOCKET NO. P-25383

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶  1.  Defendant, Vermont Asbestos Group, appeals the decision of
  the Commissioner of Labor and Industry denying its motion for summary
  judgment on the grounds that plaintiff's claim for worker's compensation is
  time-barred by the Occupational Disease Act,  21 V.S.A. § 1006(a) (1987)
  (repealed by 1999, No. 41 § 8(a)(1)) (the "ODA").  The Commissioner held
  that the applicable statute of limitations is that encompassed in 21 V.S.A.
  § 660(b), and that plaintiff properly filed his claim within two years of
  the date of the discovery of the injury.  We reverse. 

       ¶  2.  Plaintiff was employed at an asbestos mine near Eden,
  Vermont, from January 1958 to February 24, 1994.  He officially retired
  December 1, 1994.  During his employment, plaintiff was exposed to airborne
  asbestos.  In the late 1990s, plaintiff began experiencing minor coughing
  as well as  some shortness of breath.  His condition progressively
  deteriorated.  On February 22, 2000, Dr. Gerald S. Davis, Director of
  Pulmonary Disease and Critical Care Medicine at Fletcher Allen Health Care
  examined plaintiff and diagnosed him with "clinically significant
  asbestosis."  On August 28, 2000, plaintiff filed a Notice of Injury and
  Claim for Compensation.  

       ¶  3.  This is another case in which the harsh results of the former
  five-year statute of limitations on occupational diseases falls heavily on
  plaintiff.  Although the ODA has been replaced with a new statute that
  reflects greater recognition of the delayed onset of some occupational
  diseases, see 21 V.S.A. § 660(b), effective July 1, 1999, there are still
  cases that are barred by the old statute.  The result in the case before us
  is controlled by our recent decision in Carter v. Fred's Plumbing &
  Heating, Inc., 13 Vt. L. W. 345 (2002) (mem.).
   
       ¶  4.  In Carter, we held that the five-year statute of limitations
  of ODA operated to bar a claim for injury from pulmonary asbestosis in
  which the last injurious exposure to asbestos was in 1981 and the diagnosis
  of the disease was in 1999.  Id. at 346.  Because the disease did not
  manifest itself "within five years of the last injurious exposure to such
  disease in employment" the claim was barred.  Id.; 21 V.S.A. § 1006(a).  We
  further held that the appropriate statute of limitations was the one in
  effect when the cause of action accrued, which was five years from the last
  injurious exposure.  Carter, 13 Vt. L.W. at 346.  Moreover, we concluded
  the Legislature did not intend that the new statute of limitations, §
  660(b), apply retroactively to save causes of action that had already
  expired, and despite such non-retroactivity, that our holding did not
  violate Chapter I, Article 4 of the Vermont Constitution.

       ¶  5.  In plaintiff's case, the cause of action accrued on his last
  day of work, February 24, 1994 and expired under the five-year rule in
  February 1999, before the new statute went into effect and before plaintiff
  was diagnosed with occupational disease on February 22, 2000.  Plaintiff
  raises  issues identical to those in Carter.  Because we have so recently
  addressed those issues in the same context, we decline to address them
  here.   There is no distinguishing factual difference from Carter that
  compels a different result.

       Reversed.

                                       BY THE COURT:

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice

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       Note:  Justice Morse was present when the case was submitted on the
  briefs but did not participate in this decision.