Title: Commonwealth v. Dalton

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Lacy, Hassell, Koontz, and  
         Kinser, JJ., and Stephenson, Senior Justice 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
OPINION BY  
v.  Record No. 990764 
SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 
 
 
 
January 14, 2000 
PAUL MICHAEL DALTON, JR. 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the Court 
of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court erred in 
refusing to grant an accessory-after-the-fact jury instruction. 
I 
 
Paul Michael Dalton, Jr., was tried by a jury in the 
Circuit Court of Pittsylvania County upon an indictment charging 
the murder of Aubrey Clark Adkins.  The jury found Dalton guilty 
of first-degree murder and fixed his punishment at 20 years' 
imprisonment.  The trial court entered judgment in accordance 
with the verdict. 
 
At trial, although Dalton had not been charged with being 
an accessory after the fact to murder, he requested an 
accessory-after-the-fact jury instruction, asserting that the 
instruction was supported by the evidence.  The trial court 
refused to grant the instruction, concluding that the crime of 
being an accessory after the fact was not a lesser-included 
offense of the crime of murder. 
 
A panel of the Court of Appeals reversed Dalton's 
conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.  Dalton v. 
Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 381, 499 S.E.2d 22 (1998).  
Subsequently, the Court granted the Commonwealth's petition for 
a rehearing en banc.  Upon rehearing, the Court of Appeals again 
reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further 
proceedings.  Dalton v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 316, 512 
S.E.2d 142 (1999) (en banc).  The Court held that a defendant, 
who has not been charged with the crime of being an accessory 
after the fact to a charged offense, has a right to an 
accessory-after-the-fact jury instruction if it is supported by 
the evidence.  Id. at 327-28, 512 S.E.2d at 147.  We awarded the 
Commonwealth this appeal. 
II 
 
On December 17, 1995, Aubrey Adkins' body was found in a 
shallow grave in a wooded area approximately two-tenths of a 
mile from the nearest State road.  Adkins had been killed by a 
gunshot wound to his right upper chest.  He also had been shot 
in his left side "just above the belt" after his heart had 
stopped beating. 
 
Ronald Cassady, Matthew Cassady, and Jimmy Cook testified 
that Dalton confessed to having killed Adkins during the week of 
December 12, 1995.  Ronald Cassady testified that Dalton told 
him that, "when [Adkins] come down the road, [he] was laying in 
 
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the road and jumped up when [Adkins] stopped and [he] shot 
[Adkins]." 
 
Matthew Cassady testified that Dalton told him that "he met 
. . . [Adkins] on his grandma's road" and that "somehow he got 
in the car or something and he shot [Adkins]."  Matthew also 
testified that Dalton said he killed Adkins "because [Adkins] 
raped his sister." 
 
Jimmy Cook testified that, after Dalton drafted a note 
confessing to the murder, Dalton explained his reasons for the 
note.  According to Cook, Dalton "said he wanted to write a note 
. . . because he said he done it all by himself, and he didn’t 
want to get his sister or [his sister's boyfriend] . . . blamed 
for something they didn't do." 
 
A note written and signed by Dalton was introduced into 
evidence.  In the note, Dalton stated that he "did in fact kill 
[Adkins] . . . and [his sister] and [her boyfriend] did not have 
inthing [sic] to do with it." 
 
At trial, Dalton denied shooting Adkins.  Dalton testified 
that, on December 12, 1995, he and his sister's boyfriend were 
sitting in the woods watching his sister attempt to buy 
marijuana from Adkins.  According to Dalton, after his sister 
exited Adkins' car, he saw his sister's boyfriend approach 
Adkins and shoot him twice.  Dalton stated that the boyfriend 
"shot [Adkins] one time through the passenger side door, . . . 
 
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reloaded, . . . walked around and . . . opened the driver's side 
door[,] and shot [Adkins] again." 
 
Dalton further testified that, after the shooting, he 
helped the boyfriend place Adkins' body in the trunk of Adkins' 
car and accompanied the boyfriend as he drove Adkins' car to a 
remote location in the woods.  Dalton stated that, at some 
point, his sister's boyfriend took money and some marijuana from 
Adkins' body and divided it among himself, Dalton, and Dalton's 
sister.  "A couple of days later," Dalton helped the boyfriend 
carry Adkins' body from the trunk of the car to a location in 
the woods where the boyfriend buried it.  Dalton said he wrote 
his confession note because he "didn't want [his sister] to go 
to jail." 
III 
 
The Due Process Clauses of the Constitution of the United 
States and the Constitution of Virginia mandate that an accused 
be given proper notification of the charges against him.  U.S. 
Const. amend. XIV; Va. Const. art. 1, § 8.  Code § 19.2-220 
provides, in pertinent part, that an indictment shall be "a 
plain, concise and definite written statement, (1) naming the 
accused, (2) describing the offense charged, (3) identifying the 
county, city or town in which the accused committed the offense, 
and (4) reciting that the accused committed the offense on or 
about a certain date."  An indictment, to be sufficient, must  
 
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give an accused notice of the nature and character of the 
charged offense so the accused can make his defense.  Satcher v. 
Commonwealth, 244 Va. 220, 231, 421 S.E.2d 821, 828 (1992), 
cert. denied, 507 U.S. 933 (1993). 
 
It is firmly established, therefore, that an accused cannot 
be convicted of a crime that has not been charged, unless the 
crime is a lesser-included offense of the crime charged.  Thus, 
neither the Commonwealth nor an accused is entitled to a jury 
instruction on an offense not charged, unless the offense is a 
lesser-included offense of the charged offense. 
 
An offense is not a lesser-included offense of a charged 
offense unless all its elements are included in the offense 
charged.  Stated differently, an offense is not a lesser-
included offense if it contains an element that the charged 
offense does not contain.  Jones v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 757, 
759, 240 S.E.2d 658, 660, cert. denied, 435 U.S. 909 (1978). 
 
There are three elements to the crime of being an accessory 
after the fact to a felony.  First, the felony must be complete.  
Second, the accused must know that the felon is guilty.  Third, 
the accused must receive, relieve, comfort, or assist the felon.  
It is essential that the accused, at the time he assists or 
comforts the felon, has notice, direct or implied, that the 
felon committed the crime.  Manley v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 642, 
 
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645, 283 S.E.2d 207, 208 (1981); Wren v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. 
(26 Gratt.) 952, 956 (1875). 
 
While convicting an accused of being an accessory after the 
fact requires proof that the accused provided assistance to a 
person with knowledge that the person was guilty of a completed 
felony, no such proof is required to convict an accused of 
murder.  Thus, the crime of being an accessory after the fact 
contains an element that the crime of murder, the charged 
offense in the present case, does not contain.  Therefore, the 
crime of being an accessory after the fact is not a lesser-
included offense of the crime of murder. 
 
The Court of Appeals acknowledged, and the parties agree,  
that the crime of being an accessory after the fact is not a 
lesser-included offense of murder.  Dalton, 29 Va. App. at 325, 
512 S.E.2d at 146.  Nevertheless, relying upon Code § 19.2-286 
and Rule 3A:17(c), the Court held that the evidence was 
sufficient to entitle Dalton to an accessory-after-the-fact jury 
instruction.  Id. at 328, 512 S.E.2d at 148. 
 
Code § 19.2-286 provides the following: 
 
On an indictment for felony the jury may find the 
accused not guilty of the felony but guilty of an 
attempt to commit such felony, or of being an 
accessory thereto; and a general verdict of not 
guilty, upon such indictment, shall be a bar to a 
subsequent prosecution for an attempt to commit such 
felony, or of being an accessory thereto. 
 
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Code § 19.2-286 was formerly Code § 19.1-254.  Former Code 
§ 19.1-254, as it existed prior to its repeal in 1975, provided 
that "[o]n an indictment for felony the jury may find the 
accused not guilty of the felony but guilty of an attempt to 
commit such felony, or of being an accessory after the fact."  
(Emphasis added.)  In 1975, when Title 19.2 of the Code replaced 
Title 19.1, the statute was changed by substituting the term 
"accessory thereto" for the term "accessory after the fact." 
 
In deleting the modifier, "after the fact," the General 
Assembly indicated its intention to eliminate accessories after 
the fact from the application of Code § 19.2-286.  By limiting 
the statute's application to accessories before the fact, any  
conflict between the statute and the notification requirements 
of due process was avoided. 
 
Rule 3A:17(c) reads as follows: 
 
The accused may be found not guilty of an offense 
charged but guilty of an offense, or of an attempt to 
commit any offense, that is substantially charged or 
necessarily included in the charge against the 
accused.  When the offense charged is a felony, the 
accused may be found not guilty thereof, but guilty of 
being an accessory after the fact to that felony. 
We interpret the last sentence of Rule 3A:17(c) to mean that, 
even if the accused is acquitted of a felony, he may be found 
guilty of the separate, misdemeanor crime of being an accessory 
after the fact.  The rule merely reiterates the proposition that 
the crime of being an accessory after the fact contains an 
 
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element that the felony does not contain.  Therefore, it is not 
a lesser-included offense, and an acquittal of the felony does 
not preclude a trial on the misdemeanor. 
IV 
 
Therefore, we hold that, before a defendant can be tried 
and convicted of being an accessory after the fact, he must be 
charged with that offense.  Unless such a charge is specifically 
made, neither the Commonwealth nor an accused is entitled to an 
accessory-after-the-fact instruction. 
 
In the present case, Dalton was not charged with being an 
accessory after the fact to murder.  Therefore, the trial court 
correctly refused to grant the accessory-after-the-fact 
instruction, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the 
trial court's judgment.  Accordingly, we will reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the 
Court of Appeals with directions for it to remand the case to 
the trial court for reinstatement of its judgment. 
Reversed and remanded. 
JUSTICE KOONTZ, with whom JUSTICE LACY joins, dissenting. 
 
I respectfully dissent.  The issue whether the trial court 
erred in refusing to grant an accessory after-the-fact jury 
instruction in this case is properly analyzed in the context of 
the undisputed circumstances in which the issue arose at the 
murder trial of Paul Michael Dalton, Jr.  Contrary to the 
 
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conclusion reached by the majority here, in my view, those 
circumstances dictate the conclusion reached by the Court of 
Appeals that the trial court erred. 
 
Dalton was tried by a jury upon an indictment charging him 
with the murder of Aubrey Clark Adkins.  During the trial, 
Dalton presented evidence which if believed by the jury 
established that he was not guilty of the murder but, rather, 
that he was guilty of the crime of being an accessory after the 
fact to the murder.  Dalton requested an accessory after-the-
fact instruction and the trial court refused to grant it, 
reasoning that the crime of being an accessory after-the-fact is 
not a lesser-included offense of the crime of murder.  
Significantly, the trial court did not determine that the 
requested instruction was unsupported by credible evidence.  
Under those circumstances, Dalton was denied a jury instruction 
on his theory of the case, which was supported by credible 
evidence.  “It is immaterial that the jury could have reached 
contrary conclusions.  If a proffered instruction finds any 
support in credible evidence, its refusal is reversible error.”  
McClung v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 654, 657, 212 S.E.2d 290, 293 
(1975); see also Frye v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 370, 388, 345 
S.E.2d 267, 280 (1986). 
 
Nevertheless, the majority employs a different analysis to 
reach the legal conclusion that the instruction was properly 
 
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refused.  First, based upon well established principles of 
constitutional and statutory law, the majority notes that “[a]n 
indictment, to be sufficient, must give an accused notice of the 
nature and character of the offense charged” and that “an 
accused cannot be convicted of a crime that has not been 
charged, unless the crime is a lesser-included offense of the 
crime charged.”  Upon this rationale, the majority then 
concludes that “neither the Commonwealth nor an accused is 
entitled to a jury instruction on an offense not charged, unless 
the offense is a lesser-included offense of the charged 
offense.”  I agree that the Commonwealth may not effectively 
ambush the accused with an instruction that would effectively 
permit the jury to convict an accused for a separate crime not 
charged in the indictment.  However, here Dalton requested the 
instruction and, thus, his due process rights were not 
implicated.  Rather, without the requested instruction, Dalton 
was required to run a virtual gauntlet in which the jury would 
not weigh the evidence that supported his guilt of being an 
accessory after the fact in conjunction with the evidence that 
supported his guilt of murder in fixing Dalton’s criminal 
responsibility.  Under such circumstances, the jury’s search for 
the truth was materially hampered and that is inconsistent with 
Dalton’s right to a fair trial. 
 
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Next, the majority concludes that “the crime of being an 
accessory after the fact is not a lesser-included offense of the 
crime of murder” and that neither Code § 19.2-286 nor Rule 
3A:17(c) provides authority for the requested instruction.  
While I agree that accessory after the fact is a separate crime 
and not a lesser-included offense of the crime of murder, I do 
not agree with the majority’s analysis of Code § 19.2-286 and 
Rule 3A:17(c).  Specifically, I disagree with the legislative 
history analysis employed by the majority to conclude that 
“[t]he General Assembly indicated its intention to eliminate 
accessories after the fact from the application of Code § 19.2-
286” and the majority’s conclusion that the last sentence of the 
rule “merely reiterates the proposition that the crime of being 
an accessory after the fact contains an element that the felony 
does not contain.” 
 
Code § 19.2-286 in plain language provides that: 
 
 
On an indictment for felony the jury may find the 
accused not guilty of the felony but guilty of an 
attempt to commit such felony, or of being an 
accessory thereto; and a general verdict of not 
guilty, upon such an indictment, shall be a bar to a 
subsequent prosecution for an attempt to commit such 
felony, or of being an accessory thereto. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
In my view, Code § 19.2-286 statutorily entitles the 
accused, unlike the Commonwealth, to have the jury instructed on 
the elements of the separate offense of being an accessory to 
 
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the crime of murder where credible evidence supports that 
instruction.  And, as previously stated, such was the 
circumstance in Dalton’s case when he requested such an 
instruction. 
 
Admittedly, as the majority notes, Code § 19.2-286 was 
formerly Code § 19.1-254 and prior to a 1975 revision the former 
statute provided that “[o]n indictment for felony the jury may 
find the accused not guilty of the felony but guilty of an 
attempt to commit such felony, or of being an accessory after 
the fact.”  (Emphasis added).  The majority states that the 
change in wording from “accessory after the fact” to “accessory 
thereto” in 1975 represented a legislative determination to 
eliminate accessories after the fact from § 19.2-286.  The 
legislative history of that change, however, does not support 
that conclusion.  The change in language occurred as part of a 
recodification.  Title 19.1 was recodified as Title 19.2.  A 
long-standing principle of statutory construction is that, 
unless specifically noted, there is a presumption that a 
recodification does not result in substantive changes in the 
law.  See Waldrop v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 210, 214, 495 S.E.2d 
822, 825 (1998).  This recodification was accompanied by a 
Report of the Code Commission to the Governor and the General 
Assembly of Virginia, Revision of Title 19.1 of the Code of 
Virginia, House Document No. 20 (1975).  That document included 
 
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special comments for those sections which effected substantive 
changes and no such comments accompanied the reenacted § 19.2-
286.  The Report cross-referenced former § 19.2-254 as the 
source of the recodified § 19.2-286, which included accessory 
after the fact. 
The phrase “accessory thereto” contained in the 
recodification is not, by its terms, limited to an accessory 
before the fact.  The only conclusion which this inclusive 
language, the legislative history of the section, and the 
principle that recodifications do not make substantive changes 
unless noted supports is that § 19.1-286 includes accessories 
before and after the fact. 
 
This interpretation is further supported by the language 
and history of Rule 3A:17(c).  This rule specifically stating 
that when the charged offense is a felony, the accused may be 
found “guilty of being an accessory after the fact to that 
felony” has remained virtually unchanged since 1971.  Of course 
in 1971, the language of the Rule, at that time Rule 3A:24, and 
the language of former § 19.1-254 were entirely consistent.  In 
the early 1980s, the Judicial Council undertook a major review 
and revision of the Rules of Court.  The revision was undertaken 
to “ascertain conflicts between existing Rules and sections of 
the Code of Virginia.”  Report of the Judicial Council to the 
General Assembly and Supreme Court of Virginia, at 72 (1982).  
 
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While the Report recommended many areas of change or deletion in 
the Rules required by legislative changes, the only change 
regarding the provision at issue here was redesignating the 
relevant rule from Rule 3A:24 to its current designation of Rule 
3A:17(c).  A fair inference from this history is that if the 
1975 recodification of former § 19.1-254 contained the 
substantive change suggested by the majority here, the Rules 
revision committee would have suggested alteration of language 
in the rule which was in direct conflict with the statute as 
interpreted by the majority today.  No such suggestion was made, 
in my opinion, because there was no change or intent to change 
the substance of § 19.1-254 when it was recodified as § 19.2-
286. 
 
For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals finding that the trial court erred in not granting 
Dalton’s requested jury instruction. 
 
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