Title: County of Giles v. Wines

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
COUNTY OF GILES, ET AL. 
OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.  Record No. 001371 
June 8, 2001 
 
D. CHAD WINES 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GILES COUNTY 
Duane E. Mink, Judge 
 
 
The primary issue we consider in this appeal is whether a 
plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to support a jury's 
finding that he had an employment contract terminable only for 
just cause. 
 
We will state the facts and all reasonable inferences 
fairly deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to 
D. Chad Wines, the plaintiff and recipient of a jury verdict 
that was confirmed by the circuit court.  Atkinson v. Scheer, 
256 Va. 448, 450, 508 S.E.2d 68, 69 (1998).  Wines was 
employed by the County of Giles as manager of the Castle Rock 
Recreation Area from 1994 through 1996.  During his tenure 
with the County, Wines performed his duties well, and he 
received a significant increase in compensation. 
 
In January 1996, four new persons were sworn in as 
members of the Board of Supervisors of Giles County.  On 
January 2, 1996, Wines received a telephone call from Roger C. 
Mullins, the interim County administrator.  Mullins informed 
Wines that he needed to attend a meeting of the newly elected 
Board that day.  During the meeting, Larry J. Williams, a 
supervisor, made a motion to discharge Wines from his position 
as manager of the Castle Rock Recreation Area, effective 
immediately.  The Board unanimously voted to terminate Wines' 
employment. 
 
Wines had no prior indication that he would be 
discharged.  The Board did not give Wines notice of its intent 
to terminate his employment, nor did the Board inform him of 
the basis of the termination.  The next day, as Wines was 
"cleaning out" his office, Mullins explained to Wines that the 
Board had discharged him because of personality conflicts and 
that Wines was "a casualty of poor judgments and . . . 
personality conflicts within the County and supervisors." 
 
Wines retained an attorney who advised the Board by 
letter dated January 18, 1996 that the Board's termination of 
Wines' employment violated his constitutionally protected 
rights and his employment contract with the County as set 
forth in the County's Personnel Policy.  In response to that 
letter, the Board convened a special meeting, and Wines was 
immediately reinstated and simultaneously discharged effective 
January 26, 1996.  The Board did not provide Wines an 
opportunity to be heard regarding the Board's decision to 
terminate his employment.  The Board also refused to provide 
Wines with any post-termination procedures. 
 
2
 
Subsequently, Wines filed an "amended motion for 
declaratory judgment and motion for judgment" against the 
County, the Board, and the supervisors in their individual 
capacities.  Wines alleged, among other things, that the 
County and the Board (hereinafter the County) breached its 
employment contract with him because he could only be 
discharged for cause and that the County violated 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 because the County deprived him of a property right to 
continued employment subject to termination only for cause. 
 
During the trial, at the conclusion of the plaintiff's 
evidence and at the conclusion of all the evidence, the County 
made motions to strike the plaintiff's evidence on the basis 
that Wines was an employee terminable at-will and, therefore, 
the County was not required to discharge him solely for cause.  
The County also argued that the individual supervisors were 
entitled to qualified immunity.  The circuit court granted the 
motion to strike the evidence against the individual 
supervisors, and that ruling is not challenged in this appeal.  
The circuit court, however, held that the Giles County 
Personnel Policy created an employment contract which only 
permitted the County to discharge Wines for cause, and the 
court entered an order confirming the jury's verdict of 
$88,035.45 in favor of Wines and awarded Wines attorney's fees 
as permitted by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The County appeals. 
 
3
 
The Giles County Personnel Policy, which was enacted by 
its Board of Supervisors, states in pertinent part: 
"8-5  Discharges
 
 
"An employee may be discharged for 
inefficiency, insubordination, misconduct, or other 
just cause.  Discharge may be made by the Department 
Head with approval of the County Administrator in 
the case of employees below department head level.  
The County Administrator with the approval of the 
Board of Supervisors may discharge other employees.  
A written statement of the reasons for such action 
shall be furnished the employee and a copy shall be 
made part of the personnel file of the individual." 
 
The County argues that Wines was an employee terminable at-
will because its Personnel Policy did not create an employment 
contract terminable solely for cause.  Responding, Wines 
argues that he presented sufficient evidence to permit the 
jury to find that his employment contract with the County was 
terminable only for just cause and that when the County 
discharged him, it lacked cause to do so.  We disagree with 
Wines. 
 
We have stated that "Virginia strongly adheres to the 
common law employment-at-will doctrine."  Bailey v. Scott-
Gallaher, Inc., 253 Va. 121, 123, 480 S.E.2d 502, 503 (1997); 
Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth Corp. v. Brooks, 251 Va. 94, 96, 
465 S.E.2d 806, 808 (1996).  In Virginia, an employment 
relationship is presumed to be at-will, which means that the 
employment term extends for an indefinite period and may be 
 
4
terminated by the employer or employee for any reason upon 
reasonable notice.  Dray v. New Market Poultry Products, 258 
Va. 187, 190, 518 S.E.2d 312, 313 (1999); Doss v. Jamco, Inc., 
254 Va. 362, 366, 492 S.E.2d 441, 443 (1997); Progress 
Printing Co. v. Nichols, 244 Va. 337, 340, 421 S.E.2d 428, 429 
(1992); Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Harris, 190 Va. 966, 
976, 59 S.E.2d 110, 114 (1950); Hoffman Company v. Pelouze, 
158 Va. 586, 594, 164 S.E. 397, 399 (1932); Stonega Coal & 
Coke Co. v. Louisville and Nashville R.R. Co., 106 Va. 223, 
226, 55 S.E. 551, 552 (1906).*  In Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc., 234 
Va. 462, 465, 362 S.E.2d 915, 917 (1987), we explained that: 
 
"An employee is ordinarily at liberty to leave 
his employment for any reason or for no reason, upon 
giving reasonable notice, without incurring 
liability to his employer.  Notions of fundamental 
fairness underlie the concept of mutuality which 
extends a corresponding freedom to the employer.  
See Town of Vinton v. City of Roanoke, 195 Va. 881, 
80 S.E.2d 608 (1954)." 
 
 
The presumption that an at-will employment relationship 
exists may be rebutted, however, if sufficient evidence is 
produced to show that the employment is for a definite, rather 
than an indefinite, term.  Progress Printing Co., 244 Va. at 
340, 421 S.E.2d at 429.  In Norfolk Southern Railway Co., we 
held that a contractual agreement which stated that an 
                     
* Even though we have recognized exceptions to this rule, 
those exceptions are not pertinent to the resolution of this 
 
5
employee "will not be disciplined or dismissed from 
[employment] without a just cause" created a definite term for 
the duration of the employment and that the employer could 
only dismiss the employee for cause.  190 Va. at 969, 976, 59 
S.E.2d at 111, 114. 
 
Applying the principles enunciated in our well-
established precedent to the facts of this case, we hold that 
Wines failed to present evidence that he had an employment 
contract terminable solely for cause sufficient to rebut the 
employment at-will presumption.  Section 8-5 of the County's 
Personnel Policy does not change the nature of Wines' 
employment at-will contract with the County.  The language 
upon which Wines relies states that an "employee may be 
discharged for inefficiency, insubordination, misconduct, or 
other just cause."  This sentence does not state that an 
employee shall only be discharged for inefficiency, 
insubordination, misconduct, or other just cause; nor does it 
state that an employee will not be discharged without just 
cause.  We hold that the personnel policy at issue in this 
case is not sufficient to rebut the strong presumption in 
favor of the at-will employment relationship in this 
Commonwealth. 
                                                                
appeal.  See Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 229 Va. 534, 
539, 331 S.E.2d 797, 801 (1985). 
 
6
 
We note that Wines also relies upon § 8-7 of the County's 
Personnel Policy which enumerates "Causes for Suspension, 
Demotion, or Dismissal."  However, this section is devoid of 
any language which changes the nature of the at-will 
employment relationship between the County and its employees.  
There is simply no language in this section that limits the 
County's power to discharge an employee without cause. 
 
We also note that Wines states that this Court has 
"expressly held that '[w]here the evidence concerning the 
terms of a contract of employment is in conflict, the question 
whether the employment is at will or for a definite term 
becomes one of fact for resolution by a jury.'  Miller v. 
SEVAMP, Inc., 234 Va. 462, 465-66, 362 S.E.2d 915, 917 
(1987)."  Wines' reliance upon Miller is misplaced because in 
the present case, whatever conflict may appear in the 
evidence, the record is insufficient as a matter of law to 
prove that the County abrogated its employment at-will 
relationship with Wines. 
 
In Progress Printing Co., which is dispositive of this 
appeal, we considered whether an employee was terminable at-
will or whether he had an employment contract which prohibited 
termination without just cause.  The employer's personnel 
director provided the employee with a copy of the company's 
Employees' Handbook which stated that the company would not 
 
7
discharge or suspend an employee "without just cause and shall 
give at least one warning notice . . . in writing" except 
under certain circumstances.  Progress Printing Co., 244 Va. 
at 339, 421 S.E.2d at 429.  Subsequently, the employee signed 
a form which stated that the employment relationship between 
Progress Printing and the employee was "at will and may be 
terminated by either party at any time."  Id.
 
Rejecting the employee's contention that he had an 
employment relationship that was terminable only for cause, we 
held that assuming, without deciding, that the Employees' 
Handbook containing the termination for cause provision 
satisfied the statute of frauds, the acknowledgement form that 
the employee had executed superseded and replaced the 
provision in the handbook with the agreement that the 
employment relationship was terminable at-will.  We stated: 
 
"We conclude that the termination for cause 
language of the Handbook and the employment at will 
relationship agreed to in the subsequent 
acknowledgement form are in direct conflict and 
cannot be reconciled in any reasonable way.  If the 
documents are considered a single contract, as the 
trial court considered them, this conflict, along 
with the conflicting testimony of the parties as to 
the nature of the employment relationship, fails to 
provide sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption 
of employment at will."   
 
Id. at 342, 421 S.E.2d at 431.  In Progress Printing, even 
though there was a direct conflict between the Employees' 
Handbook and the acknowledgement form, we held that the 
 
8
employee failed to provide sufficient evidence to rebut the 
presumption of the employment at-will relationship. 
 
Wines observes that the County's interim administrator, 
Mullins, testified that it was his original belief that Wines 
could only be discharged for just cause.  Larry Williams, a 
member of the Board of Supervisors, testified that the Board 
"reinstated" Wines after it had initially discharged him, and 
then immediately discharged him again, effective January 26, 
1996, based upon the advice of the Board's attorneys.  Wines 
states that the "County's actions in 'reinstating' [him], and 
then firing him based on trumped up allegations of misconduct, 
are consistent only with the County's own interpretation that 
its Personnel Policy established a just cause employment 
relationship."  Continuing, Wines states that "[t]he County 
. . . argues that [he] and necessarily all other County 
employees . . . were at will employees.  This argument is 
inconsistent with the provisions of the Personnel Policy, the 
testimony of County officials, the County's own actions and 
the jury's specific fact findings." 
 
Wines' contentions are without merit.  Essentially, Wines 
suggests that the County is estopped by its conduct from 
asserting that Wines was an employee at-will.  However, we 
have repeatedly held that in Virginia estoppel cannot be 
asserted against a county acting in the discharge of its 
 
9
governmental functions.  See Notestein v. Board of Sup. of 
Appomattox County, 240 Va. 146, 152, 393 S.E.2d 205, 208 
(1990); Board of Supervisors v. Booher, 232 Va. 478, 481, 352 
S.E.2d 319, 321 (1987).  And, the County's interim 
administrator's mistaken belief that Wines could only be 
discharged for cause is not sufficient to change Wines' at-
will employment relationship with the County. 
 
The County argues that Wines has no substantive property 
right in continued employment because he was an at-will 
employee of Giles County.  Responding, Wines asserts that he 
"had a legitimate expectation of continued employment based on 
the just cause employment relationship established by the 
Giles County Personnel Policy."  We disagree with Wines. 
 
The United States Supreme Court held in Board of Regents 
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1972), that a public employee 
may be entitled to certain procedural due process from a 
governmental employer if the employee has a protected property 
interest.  Such property interests are not created by the 
federal constitution, but, rather "they are created and their 
dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings 
that stem from an independent source such as state law — rules 
or understandings that secure certain benefits and that 
support claims of entitlement to those benefits."  Id. at 577.  
Wines has conceded that he "relies on the just cause 
 
10
provisions in §§ 8-5 and 8-7 . . . to establish his 
constitutionally protected property interest in his 
employment."  However, as we have already stated, Wines failed 
to establish that he was an employee terminable solely for 
cause.  Therefore, he has no property right which is protected 
by the federal constitution and, hence, his claims under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 are not legally cognizable. 
 
In articulating our holdings in this case, we do not 
endorse the manner in which the County treated Wines during 
its process of discharging him.  However, we cannot change the 
Commonwealth's strong presumption in favor of the at-will 
employment relationship merely because we may be sympathetic 
to Wines' circumstances. 
 
In view of our holdings, we need not consider the 
litigants' remaining arguments.  Accordingly, we will reverse 
the judgment of the circuit court, and we will enter final 
judgment in favor of the County. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
JUSTICE LACY, with whom JUSTICE KINSER and JUSTICE LEMONS 
join, dissenting. 
 
 
In this case, the trial court took under advisement the 
County's motion to strike the employee's evidence and 
submitted to the jury the issue of whether an at-will 
employment relationship existed between the employee and the 
 
11
County.  Following a jury verdict in favor of the employee, 
the trial court denied the County's motion to strike and 
entered judgment on the jury verdict.  The County appeals, 
assigning error to the trial court's refusal to grant its 
motion to strike the employee's evidence. 
 
In a case such as this, where the trial court has 
declined to strike the plaintiff's evidence or to set aside a 
jury verdict, the standard of appellate review in Virginia 
requires this Court to consider whether the evidence 
presented, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, 
was sufficient to support the jury verdict in favor of the 
plaintiff.∗  We have instructed trial judges that in ruling on 
a motion to strike the plaintiff's evidence, the trial court 
is to accept as true all the evidence favorable to the 
plaintiff as well as any reasonable inferences a jury might 
draw therefrom that would sustain the plaintiff's cause of 
action.  The trial court is not to judge the weight and 
credibility of the evidence and may not reject any inference 
from the evidence favorable to the plaintiff unless it would 
                     
∗ The standard of appellate review for a motion to set 
aside a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff and a motion to 
strike the plaintiff's evidence is the same:  whether the 
evidence taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff is 
sufficient to support a jury verdict in favor of the 
plaintiff.  See, e.g., Lumbermen's Underwriting Alliance v. 
Dave's Cabinet, Inc., 258 Va. 377, 380-81, 520 S.E.2d 362, 
 
12
defy logic and common sense.  Austin v. Shoney's, Inc., 254 
Va. 134, 138, 486 S.E.2d 285, 287 (1997).  Where, as here, the 
prevailing party comes before us with a jury verdict that has 
been approved by the trial court, he holds the most favorable 
position known to the law.  Lumbermen's Underwriting Alliance 
v. Dave's Cabinet, Inc., 258 Va. 377, 380, 520 S.E.2d 362, 365 
(1999); Smith v. Litten, 256 Va. 573, 578, 507 S.E.2d 77, 80 
(1998).  As we reiterated in Stanley v. Webber, 260 Va. 90, 
95, 531 S.E.2d 311, 314 (2000), the trial court's judgment is 
presumed to be correct, and we will not set it aside unless 
the judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support 
it.  Code § 8.01-680.  Because the majority neither adverts to 
nor applies these standards in this case, I dissent. 
 
Section 8-5 of the personnel manual states that an 
employee "may be discharged for inefficiency, insubordination, 
misconduct, or other just cause."  Viewing this statement in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the word "may" must 
be construed to mean, not that the employer is at liberty to 
discharge for causes other than "just cause," but as allowing 
the employer to impose a penalty of less than discharge for 
any of those infractions although such infractions constitute 
grounds for termination.  Section 8-5 also requires the 
                                                                
364-65 (1999); Claycomb v. Didawick, 256 Va. 332, 335, 505 
S.E.2d 202, 204 (1998). 
 
13
employer to provide the employee with the reasons for 
termination, a condition that is inconsistent with employment 
at-will, which requires no reason for termination.  Finally, 
§ 8-7, "Causes for Suspension, Demotion, or Dismissal," lists 
sixteen other specific acts which support a decision to 
terminate employment.  Giving the provisions of the manual a 
reasonable construction and one favorable to the plaintiff 
compels the conclusion that the manual allows termination for 
no grounds other than those identified in §§ 8-5 and 8-7.  
 
The majority, however, rejected this construction of the 
personnel manual, concluding that the manual did not remove 
the nature of the relationship from the province of employment 
at-will because it did not contain an affirmative statement 
either that "an employee shall only be discharged for" the 
listed offenses or other just cause or that the employee "will 
not be discharged without just cause." 
 
Read in the light most favorable to the employee, the 
personnel manual alone was sufficient to support the jury 
verdict.  Nevertheless, the personnel manual was not the only 
evidence produced by the employee to support his contention 
that he could be terminated only for cause.  The County 
Administrator, who is the chief personnel officer of the 
County, testified that when the employee was first terminated, 
the Administrator interpreted the personnel policy as allowing 
 
14
termination only for cause.  Similarly, a member of the 
County's Board of Supervisors testified that he understood 
that the employee could be fired "only if he did something 
wrong as listed in § 8-7" of the personnel manual and that the 
procedures in the manual had to be followed.  The record also 
showed that the County, after initially terminating the 
employee without prior notice or providing any reason for 
termination, reinstated the employee and then terminated him 
again, citing five grounds for the termination and informing 
the employee that he "may also avail himself of the Grievance 
Procedure adopted as a part of the Giles County personnel 
policy." 
 
Consideration of this evidence is appropriate because 
evidence of the parties' conduct and intent, including a 
party's interpretation of the contract, is "entitled to great 
weight" in determining the construction of an ambiguous 
contract.  Dart Drug Corp. v. Nicholakos, 221 Va. 989, 995, 
277 S.E.2d 155, 158 (1981).  However, the majority ignores 
this evidence entirely because, according to the majority, 
such evidence "essentially" raises an estoppel argument and 
estoppel cannot be asserted against the County. 
 
The basis upon which the majority excludes this evidence 
is one created by the majority and not presented by either 
party or considered by the trial court.  The employee did not 
 
15
raise an estoppel argument either directly or indirectly.  The 
employee never claimed the actions of the County and the 
testimony of its officials precluded it from asserting that 
the employment was at-will.  Furthermore, the employer did not 
contend that the employee was improperly using this evidence 
to assert estoppel and in fact did not object to the evidence.  
According to the employer, reliance on such testimony "proves 
nothing" because the "the parties' . . . interpretation does 
not matter in the case of an unambiguous document." 
 
In my opinion, proper application of the appellate review 
principles recited above to the evidence in this case results 
in the conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to support 
the jury verdict. 
 
The majority not only ignores the standards of appellate 
review discussed above but also rejects the long-standing 
proposition that where "the evidence concerning the terms of a 
contract of employment is in conflict, the question whether the 
employment is at will or for a definite term becomes one of 
fact for resolution by a jury."  Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc., 234 
Va. 462, 465-66, 362 S.E.2d 915, 917 (1987).  Relying on 
Progress Printing Co. v. Nichols, 244 Va. 337, 421 S.E.2d 428, 
(1992), as "dispositive of this appeal," the majority opines 
that submission to the jury in this case was not required, 
because, regardless of any conflict in the evidence, "the 
 
16
record is insufficient as a matter of law to prove that the 
County abrogated its employment at-will relationship with 
Wines." 
While selected portions of the language used in the 
Progress Printing opinion may appear to stand for the 
proposition advanced by the majority, the case in its proper 
context does not.  In Progress Printing, as the majority 
opinion recites, the evidence included an employee handbook 
providing for just cause termination with prior notice and a 
subsequently executed acknowledgement form stating that the 
employment relationship was at will.  The employee sued the 
employer, asserting his termination without prior notice 
breached the employment contract.  The trial court, sitting 
without a jury, held that the acknowledgement form regarding an 
employment at-will status incorporated the employee handbook 
and that, as incorporated, the employment at-will status only 
applied to the 30-day probationary employment period and not to 
other types of employment.  Under this construction, the trial 
court concluded that the employee could be dismissed only for 
cause and was entitled to prior notice under the employee 
manual.  Id. at 339-40, 421 S.E.2d at 429. 
 
The posture of the case on appeal, therefore, presented 
the initial question of whether the trial court properly held 
that the acknowledgement form incorporated the personnel 
 
17
handbook.  We concluded that the trial court erred in this 
regard and held that the acknowledgement form did not 
incorporate the provisions of the employee handbook but  
"specifically superseded and replaced" the for cause 
termination provision "with the agreement that the employment 
relationship was at will."  Id. at 341, 421 S.E.2d at 430. 
While the Court was required to determine the nature of 
the employment, Progress Printing was not a case in which the 
judgment reviewed on appeal was grounded on the premise that 
the evidence had rebutted the presumption of at-will 
employment.  The crucial evidence in that case — the 
acknowledgment form — went beyond a presumption of at-will 
employment; it overtly established the at-will employment 
relationship.  The issue regarding the nature of the 
employment depended upon the construction of the 
acknowledgement form.  Thus the majority misapplies Progress 
Printing by asserting that the case supports the proposition 
that conflicting evidence on the issue of the nature of the 
employment need not be submitted to the fact finder for 
resolution.  Nothing in Progress Printing suggested that the 
evidence was not to be submitted to the fact finder for 
resolution.  Nothing in the fact pattern, evidence presented, 
or controlling legal issue of Progress Printing makes that 
case "dispositive" of this one.  As we have repeatedly said, 
 
18
these cases must be considered on a case by case basis in 
light of the evidence presented. 
 
A final, but equally important, basis for my dissent is 
my disagreement with the new standard which the majority has 
established.  As stated above, the majority rejected all 
evidence except the employee manual itself and vacated the 
jury verdict in favor of the employee because the employee 
could not point to a statement in the personnel manual that 
the employee "shall only" be terminated for cause or that the 
employee "will not be discharged without just cause."  For the 
first time in our jurisprudence of employment relationships, 
the lack of these words precludes submission of the issue to 
the jury and requires entry of a judgment in favor of the 
employer, regardless of the evidence introduced.  Under the 
majority analysis, if the employment agreement were silent on 
the issue and other evidence supported termination only for 
cause, the issue would be taken away from the jury and decided 
as a matter of law.  This result has never before been the law 
in Virginia and dramatically upsets the distinction between 
matters decided by the jury and those decided by the trial 
court.  The majority has imposed this new "rule," which 
eviscerates the historic role of the jury in employment 
termination cases, without acknowledging what has been done or 
explaining the basis for or perimeters of the rule imposed. 
 
19
 
For all these reasons I dissent. 
 
 
20