Title: State v. Neighbors

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 105,588 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
JUSTIN W. NEIGHBORS, 
Appellee. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a warrantless 
entry into a private dwelling by law enforcement officers is considered unreasonable and 
invalid unless it falls within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Kansas 
courts interpret § 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights to provide the same 
protection from unlawful government searches and seizures as the Fourth Amendment. 
 
2. 
On a motion to suppress evidence, an appellate court reviews the factual findings 
underlying the trial court's suppression decision using a substantial competent evidence 
standard. The legal conclusions drawn from those factual findings are reviewed using a 
de novo standard. The court does not reweigh evidence.   
 
3. 
Kansas recognizes various exceptions permitting warrantless entries and searches: 
consent; search incident to lawful arrest; stop and frisk; probable cause to search 
accompanied by exigent circumstances, such as hot pursuit; emergency aid; inventory 
2 
 
 
 
searches; plain view; and administrative searches of closely regulated businesses. It is the 
State's burden to demonstrate a warrantless entry and the ensuing search and seizure were 
lawful. 
 
4. 
Emergency aid is an exception to the warrant requirement. It requires that (a) law 
enforcement officers enter the premises with an objectively reasonable basis to believe 
someone inside is seriously injured or imminently threatened with serious injury and (b) 
the manner and scope of any ensuing search once inside the premises is reasonable. Our 
prior caselaw applying a different test is overruled.  
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed November 10, 
2011. Appeal from Lyon District Court; W. LEE FOWLER, judge. Opinion filed April 25, 2014. Judgment 
of the Court of Appeals reversing the district court is reversed. Judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
 
Amy L. Aranda, senior assistant county attorney, argued the cause, and Vernon E. Buck, first 
senior assistant county attorney, Marc Goodman, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, 
were on the brief for appellant.  
 
Stephen J. Atherton, of Atherton & Huth, of Emporia, argued the cause and was on the brief for 
appellee.   
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
BILES, J.:  A warrantless entry into a private dwelling by law enforcement officers 
must fall within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement to be considered 
reasonable and valid under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
§ 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. In this case, we consider whether a 
warrantless entry by police and their ensuing search and seizure were justified under the 
3 
 
 
 
emergency aid exception when officers entered a locked apartment to assist an 
unresponsive person but then began a criminal investigation once the individual was 
awake and clearly not needing emergency medical assistance. We hold the officers 
unreasonably exceeded the permissible scope of their warrantless entry and agree with 
the district court that the drug evidence obtained as a result should be suppressed. 
 
In so ruling, we realign our previous Kansas test for applying the emergency aid 
exception (also referred to in our caselaw as the "emergency doctrine") with more recent 
decisions of the United State Supreme Court. See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 
398, 403, 406-07, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2006) (emergency aid exception 
allows warrantless entry into a dwelling when officers have objectively reasonable basis 
to believe an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with serious injury). 
We reverse the Court of Appeals decision reversing the district court's suppression ruling 
and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with our 
ruling. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
A landlord at an Emporia apartment complex used his key to enter a tenant's 
apartment when the rent was past due. The landlord testified he knocked and entered the 
apartment around 10:30 a.m. to see if it had been abandoned. As he entered, he saw a 
man lying on a couch. The man did not respond to the landlord's attempts to wake him up 
by yelling and beating on the door. The landlord called 911 and reported, "[T]here's 
someone in an apartment of mine, and I don't know who it is, and they won't wake up." 
Two officers and two training officers responded at 10:35 a.m. to a "trespass problem." 
 
Officer Lane Doty testified he approached the apartment with the landlord, 
knocked on the door, and identified himself as a police officer. Doty said there was no 
4 
 
 
 
response. The landlord opened the door, and the officers could see from the doorway a 
person lying on the couch. Doty testified they attempted to wake him by yelling and 
again stated who they were. There was still no response. Officers then notified dispatch 
of the situation, indicating a concern for the unidentified man's safety. Doty testified, 
"We weren't sure what [the man's] health condition was, and we made entry."  
 
But the officers were able to wake the defendant, Justin T. Neighbors, who 
initially appeared to be "groggy, very unstable." Doty testified Neighbors at first was not 
able to sit up. Doty said, "[H]e tried to verbalize things and tell us his name, and he was 
not able to do that for a little bit." Neighbors eventually did identify himself, and the 
officers reported his name to dispatch and confirmed he did not have any outstanding 
warrants. 
 
The officers then began questioning Neighbors about whether he had permission 
to be in the apartment. Neighbors said he did and informed them the tenant was in jail in 
Morris County. The officers confirmed with the tenant through their central dispatch that 
Neighbors had permission to be in the apartment. 
 
In the meantime, officers discovered a woman in the apartment's back bedroom. 
The officers had similar concerns regarding the woman's permission to be there, but they 
did not contact the tenant as they had done with Neighbors.  
 
While this ensued, Officer Lance Delgado, a narcotics investigator, heard 
Neighbors' and the woman's names broadcast over his police radio. Delgado and Deputy 
Cory Doudican, a sheriff's deputy with the drug task force, recognized the names as drug 
offenders and drove to the apartment to investigate. Delgado and Doudican both arrived 
at 10:50 a.m. Doudican testified that within a few seconds after he entered the apartment 
5 
 
 
 
officers told him Neighbors had permission to be there. The deputy immediately went to 
the bedroom to speak with the woman.  
 
As Delgado entered the apartment, Neighbors was sitting on the couch. Delgado 
immediately approached Neighbors; observed a Q-Tip with black residue nearby, which 
can suggest drug use; and noted Neighbors "seemed a little sleepy." Delgado said 
Neighbors looked like a methamphetamine user because he was sweating profusely and 
gaunt. But Delgado also admitted Neighbors was awake and able to converse. Delgado 
testified he immediately asked Neighbors if he had any weapons on him. Neighbors said 
he had a knife in his pants. Delgado instructed him to stand against a wall while he patted 
him down for weapons and removed the knife. 
 
After this first pat-down search, Delgado told Neighbors to sit on the couch and 
relax. But believing Neighbors was "possibly in possession of methamphetamine and/or 
drug paraphernalia," Delgado obtained consent to search Neighbors' outer clothing. After 
finding nothing, Delgado asked Neighbors for consent to search the pants underneath his 
outer pants. Neighbors paused for a moment but then consented. Delgado discovered a 
small bag of methamphetamine in the seam area of Neighbors' boxer shorts. Neighbors 
was arrested and charged with possession with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of 
school property, failure to affix a drug tax stamp, and felony use or possession of drug 
paraphernalia. 
 
It is not clear when Delgado was told Neighbors had permission to be in the 
apartment. Delgado testified he spoke to another officer while standing in the living room 
talking to Neighbors and that this officer told him the tenant had been contacted. 
 
In pretrial proceedings, Neighbors filed a motion to suppress the drug evidence, 
alleging the warrantless entry and seizure of evidence violated the Fourth Amendment 
6 
 
 
 
and § 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. Neighbors argued any justification for 
the warrantless entry based on the emergency aid doctrine dissipated before Delgado 
arrived and began a drug investigation. If so, Neighbors continued, the officers' continued 
presence and subsequent searches were unlawful.   
 
The district court granted the motion to suppress after a hearing but without 
making any factual findings. The journal entry states only that the motion was granted. 
Accordingly, the district court's analysis must be gleaned from its comments during the 
hearing. 
 
The district court held the officers' entry was proper given the landlord's testimony 
about an unresponsive person inside the apartment. But the district court found the 
emergency ended once the officers knew Neighbors was lawfully on the premises, which 
suggests the court believed the trespass investigation was part of the emergency. The 
court also stated it was not certain how much time elapsed between when Officer Doty 
learned Neighbors was lawfully present and when Delgado began questioning Neighbors, 
but it found Neighbors was illegally seized by that point because "the officers exceeded 
their time spent allowed in the apartment." The judge went on to hold:  
 
"[I]t's really two separate investigations. And Delgado comes in later, goes straight to him 
inside the residence, and starts asking these questions and investigates the case.  
 
"And really at that point, absen[t] some other manifestation of some sort of 
evidence that would indicate there were drugs on the premises, which I didn't see, that 
didn't exist. So I'm going to suppress the evidence based upon exceeding the reasonable 
time allowed to investigate the well-being or the identity of the defendant."  
 
The State filed an interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed, with 
Judge, now Chief Judge, Malone concurring and dissenting in part. State v. Neighbors, 
No. 105,588, 2011 WL 5526574 (Kan. App. 2011) (unpublished opinion). 
7 
 
 
 
 
The panel agreed the initial entry into the apartment was permitted under the 
emergency aid doctrine because Neighbors was unresponsive on the couch. 2011 WL 
5526574, at *3. It held Delgado's subsequent entry was also lawful, stating:   
 
"The 911 call indicating a possible burglary or trespass in progress, coupled with 
[Delgado's] personal knowledge of both Neighbors' and [the other occupant's] criminal 
histories, established that Officer Delgado had reasonable grounds to believe that there 
was an emergency at hand and an immediate need for assistance for the protection of 
property." 2011 WL 5526574, at *4. 
 
The majority then examined whether Delgado's actions once entering were lawful. 
It characterized Neighbors' argument as suggesting this situation was no different than an 
investigatory detention under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 
(1968) (officer who makes legal stop may conduct protective frisk of suspect if officer 
has reasonable suspicion the suspect is armed and dangerous). The panel then noted the 
United States Supreme Court had only extended the Terry analysis to allow a protective 
sweep inside a dwelling, but it held the Terry analysis was nevertheless applicable to 
determine whether Delgado's pat-down search violated Neighbors' constitutional rights. 
Neighbors, 2011 WL 5526574, at *4-5. 
 
Using that analytical framework, the panel upheld the pat-down search, finding 
Delgado had a particularized, reasonable suspicion that Neighbors was armed and 
dangerous. The majority then upheld the consensual pat-down searches of Neighbors' 
clothing based on its conclusion that Delgado was lawfully present and had reasonable 
suspicion of wrongdoing based on the totality of the circumstances. 2011 WL 5526574, 
at *6. Judge Malone agreed Delgado acquired reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to 
investigate further, but he would have remanded to the district court to make findings as 
to whether Neighbors' consent was voluntary. 2011 WL 5526574, at *6-7.  
8 
 
 
 
Neighbors petitioned for this court's review, which was granted under K.S.A. 20-
3018(b) and K.S.A. 60-2101(b). 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a warrantless 
entry into a private dwelling by law enforcement officers is considered unreasonable and 
invalid unless it falls within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Kansas 
courts interpret § 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights to provide the same 
protection from unlawful government searches and seizures as the Fourth Amendment. 
 
Kansas recognizes various exceptions permitting warrantless entries or searches: 
consent; search incident to lawful arrest; stop and frisk; probable cause to search 
accompanied by exigent circumstances, of which hot pursuit is one example; emergency 
aid; inventory searches; plain view; and administrative searches of closely regulated 
businesses. State v. Mendez, 275 Kan. 412, 421, 66 P.3d 811 (2003). The principal issue 
in this case is whether the emergency aid exception applies, but there are aspects of plain 
view and consent intermingled with what happened. It is the State's burden to 
demonstrate that a warrantless entry and the ensuing search and seizure were lawful. See 
State v. Carlton, 297 Kan. 642, 646, 304 P.3d 323 (2013). 
 
Standard of Review 
 
The standard of review governing motions to suppress is well established and 
succinctly stated in State v. Karson, 297 Kan. 634, 639, 304 P.3d 317 (2013):  
 
 
"Our review of an evidence suppression issue is bifurcated. Without reweighing 
the evidence, the appellate court first examines the district court's findings to determine 
9 
 
 
 
whether they are supported by substantial competent evidence. [Citation omitted.] The 
district court's legal conclusions are then reviewed de novo. If there are no disputed 
material facts, the issue [of whether to suppress evidence] is a question of law over which 
the appellate court has unlimited review. [Citation omitted.]" (Emphasis added.)   
 
But without explanation, the Court of Appeals, after first citing to the correct 
standard of review, held:  "The district court made no factual findings in its order 
granting the suppression; therefore, our review is under a de novo standard." (Emphasis 
added.) Neighbors, 2011 WL 5526574, at *2. The panel does not explain how the 
absence of factual findings by a district court transforms an appellate court's bifurcated 
review into de novo review, and this court is aware of no authority to support the panel's 
standard. Inadequate findings do not necessarily permit de novo appellate review of the 
facts involved in a warrantless search and seizure. Appellate courts do not reweigh 
conflicting evidence.  
 
When an appellate court is presented with inadequate findings, the proper course 
taken depends on whether the issue was raised and can be resolved without remand. See 
State v. Raskie, 293 Kan. 906, 925-26, 269 P.3d 1268 (2012) (remanding because the 
district court made inadequate findings on defendant's cruel and unusual punishment 
argument); see also Drach v. Bruce, 281 Kan. 1058, 1080, 136 P.3d 390 (2006) (district 
court presumed to have made all necessary factual findings to support its judgment in the 
absence of an objection to inadequate findings), cert. denied 549 U.S. 1278 (2007). 
 
In this case, Neighbors correctly points out the panel should have remanded if it 
believed the district court made inadequate factual findings that would have prevented 
appellate review. We hold the panel erred when it applied a de novo standard of review 
when faced with what it characterized as inadequate factual findings. Accordingly, we 
must determine first whether we can proceed. And as discussed below, we hold the 
10 
 
 
 
district court's findings as reflected in the hearing transcript are sufficient to analyze and 
decide the controlling legal issue. 
 
Defining the Emergency Aid Exception 
 
The State argues that the first four officers lawfully entered the apartment under 
the emergency aid exception. The panel agreed and held the "initial entry by responding 
officers is not in dispute." Neighbors, 2011 WL 5526574, at *3. It held further that the 
record supported application of the emergency doctrine to that initial entry. 2011 WL 
5526574, at *3. Neighbors did not petition for review as to that portion of the analysis, so 
that much is deemed settled. See Supreme Court Rule 8.03(g)(1) (2013 Kan. Ct. R. 
Annot. 74); State v. Allen, 293 Kan. 793, 795-96, 268 P.3d 1198 (2012) (party must 
allege issue was erroneously decided to be properly before the Supreme Court on petition 
for review). Our dispute focuses on the propriety of the officers' actions after their initial 
entry. 
 
Neighbors argues the emergency attenuated after it was determined Neighbors did 
not need assistance, so the officers exceeded the permitted scope of their entry into the 
apartment before Delgado began his narcotics investigation. The State contends the 
officers were still engaged in a lawful trespass investigation, so Delgado had authority to 
question Neighbors. The panel took a third approach and effectively applied the 
emergency doctrine a second time to justify Delgado's separate entry into the apartment. 
Neighbors, 2011 WL 5526574, at *4 ("[B]ased on what Officer Delgado knew at the time 
of his warrantless entry into the apartment, the emergency doctrine justified his 
warrantless entry onto the property."). Both the State and the panel misconstrue how the 
emergency aid exception operates. 
 
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United States Supreme Court Emergency Aid Exception Cases 
 
 
The United States Supreme Court first recognized emergency aid as an exception 
to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 
S. Ct. 2408, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1978). In Mincey, an undercover police officer arranged to 
buy heroin at an apartment and arrived with nine plainclothes narcotics officers. The 
undercover officer slipped in when the apartment door opened, but the occupant 
attempted to slam the door to keep the other officers out. Those other officers made a 
warrantless entry, heard a "rapid volley of shots," and saw the undercover officer 
collapse. He later died.  
 
 
After the shooting, the officers performed a quick search for additional shooting 
victims. They found four injured persons and requested emergency assistance. The 
officers refrained from any further criminal investigation. But within 10 minutes, 
homicide detectives arrived after hearing a radio report about the shooting. These 
detectives supervised removal of the suspects and then began an "exhaustive and 
intrusive" warrantless search of the apartment, which lasted 4 days. 437 U.S. at 388-89. 
  
The Mincey Court held:  "We do not question the right of police to respond to 
emergency situations." 437 U.S. at 392. In so ruling, the Court cited numerous state and 
federal decisions recognizing "the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from 
making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person 
within is in need of immediate aid." (Emphasis added.) 437 U.S. at 392. 
 
But the Mincey Court also cautioned that a warrantless search "must be 'strictly 
circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.'" 437 U.S. at 393 (quoting 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 25-26). And based on that limitation, the Court refused to apply the 
emergency aid exception because everyone in the apartment had been located before 
12 
 
 
 
homicide officers arrived to begin their search. Moreover, the 4-day time span for the 
ensuing search, which included ripping up carpets, could "hardly be rationalized in terms 
of the legitimate concerns that justify an emergency search." 437 U.S. at 393. The Court 
held there were no exigent circumstances justifying the apartment's warrantless search by 
the homicide detectives. 437 U.S. at 394.  
 
In its next decision addressing the emergency aid exception, the Court found it 
applicable. In Brigham City, 547 U.S. 398, four police officers responded at 3 a.m. to a 
call about a loud house party. Upon arrival, officers saw two juveniles drinking beer in 
the backyard and four adults attempting to restrain another juvenile by pressing him 
against a refrigerator with enough force that the refrigerator began sliding across the 
floor. When the juvenile broke free, he punched one of the adults, who had to spit up 
blood in a nearby sink. The officers announced their presence, but the occupants did not 
hear them. The officers then made a warrantless entry resulting in an arrest. Defendant 
sought to suppress all evidence obtained after the officers entered the home, arguing the 
warrantless entry violated the Fourth Amendment.  
 
The Court upheld the warrantless entry in a unanimous decision, stating: "One 
exigency obviating the requirement of a warrant is the need to assist persons who are 
seriously injured or threatened with such injury." 547 U.S. at 403. Quoting Mincey, 437 
U.S. at 392, and Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1963), the Court 
held:  "'"The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for 
what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency."'" Brigham City, 547 
U.S. at 403. 
 
The Court also held the officers' subjective intent upon entering the dwelling was 
irrelevant, noting the Court's long-established rule that "an action is 'reasonable' under the 
Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer's state of mind, 'as long as the 
13 
 
 
 
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action.' . . . The officer's subjective 
motivation is irrelevant. [Citations omitted.]" 547 U.S. at 404-05. The Court held the 
officers' entry was "plainly reasonable under the circumstances" because they had an 
objectively reasonable basis for believing the injured adult might need help and that the 
violence in the kitchen was just the beginning of a larger altercation. 547 U.S. at 406. 
Finally, the Court concluded the manner of the officers' entry was reasonable because 
they performed the equivalent to a knock on the screen door, satisfying the knock-and-
announce rule. 547 U.S. at 407. 
 
Mincey and Brigham City, together with Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 47-49, 
130 S. Ct. 546, 175 L. Ed. 2d 410 (2009), are the only decisions by the United States 
Supreme Court applying the emergency aid exception. The facts in these cases restrict the 
exception's application to circumstances when there is an objectively reasonable basis for 
believing an occupant in a dwelling is "seriously injured or imminently threatened with 
such injury." 547 U.S. at 400, see Fisher, 558 U.S. at 47-49; Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392 
("[T]he Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries 
and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate 
aid."). This is seen in how the Court articulated the exception and its reliance on the 
often-quoted rationale advanced by then Circuit Judge Warren E. Burger in Wayne, in 
which he stated: 
 
"[A] warrant is not required to break down a door to enter a burning home to rescue 
occupants or extinguish a fire, to prevent a shooting or to bring emergency aid to an 
injured person. The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification 
for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency." 318 F.2d at 212. 
 
One additional case is relevant to understanding the development of the Kansas 
caselaw discussed next. Almost 20 years before Brigham City, the Court decided Cady v. 
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 37 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1973). In that case, an off-
14 
 
 
 
duty Chicago policeman was arrested for drunk driving. The officer's car was towed and 
left outside a nearby garage where the arresting officers conducted a warrantless search 
of the vehicle because department policy required off-duty personnel to carry a service 
revolver and they thought a gun might be in the car. The searching officers found 
evidence linking Cady to a recent homicide. Cady appealed his eventual homicide 
conviction, arguing the automobile search violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court 
upheld the search. 413 U.S. at 448. 
 
The Cady Court reasoned that officers must "engage in what, for want of a better 
term, may be described as community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the 
detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal 
statute." 413 U.S. at 441. It held the search was justified under this caretaking function to 
protect "the safety of the general public who might be endangered if an intruder removed 
a revolver from the trunk of the vehicle." 413 U.S. at 447. The Cady Court also held the 
police had a reasonable belief Cady's car contained a gun. 413 U.S. at 448.   
 
But the Cady Court took great pains to emphasize the search in that case involved 
an automobile—not a dwelling. It explained: 
 
 
"The Court's previous recognition of the distinction between motor vehicles and 
dwelling places leads us to conclude that the type of caretaking 'search' conducted here of 
a vehicle that was neither in the custody nor on the premises of its owner, and that had 
been placed where it was by virtue of lawful police action, was not unreasonable solely 
because a warrant had not been obtained." 413 U.S. at 447-48.  
 
And consistent with this distinction, several federal Circuit Courts of Appeals have 
applied a community caretaking exception only to automobile searches. See, e.g., United 
States v. Bute, 43 F.3d 531, 535 (10th Cir. 1994) ("We agree with this line of authority 
holding the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement is applicable 
15 
 
 
 
only in cases involving automobile searches."); United States v. Erickson, 991 F.2d 529, 
532 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Cady clearly turned on the 'constitutional difference' between 
searching a house and searching an automobile."); United States v. Pichany, 687 F.2d 
204, 208-09 (7th Cir. 1982). As discussed below, our caselaw at times has conflated the 
community caretaking function with the emergency aid exception.   
 
The Emergency Aid Exception in Kansas 
 
In 1978, as an issue of first impression in Kansas, the Court of Appeals excused a 
warrantless entry by police responding to an apartment fire, which subsequently led to the 
seizure of drugs found in plain view during a search for occupants. State v. Jones, 2 Kan. 
App. 2d 38, 41, 573 P.2d 1134 (1978) (Jones I). It is significant to note Jones I predated 
Mincey. 
 
Although focused on the plain-view exception, the Jones I court first had to 
determine whether the officers had a legitimate prior justification for the initial intrusion 
that afforded them their plain view of the incriminating evidence at issue. And in 
upholding the search, the court observed:  "Among the well-established 'legitimate 
reasons' for a police officer to be present on privately occupied premises is in response to 
an emergency." 2 Kan. App. 2d at 41 (citing Wayne; State v. Boyle, 207 Kan. 833, 839, 
486 P.2d 849 [1971]). The Jones I court relied in part on then-Judge Burger's statement in 
Wayne that the "'need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for 
what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency.'" 2 Kan. App. 2d at 41 
(quoting Wayne, 318 F.2d at 212). 
 
The Jones I court and the federal cases it relied on articulated a limited exception 
allowing warrantless entry when necessary to provide emergency medical assistance. 
This exception and its rationale were consistent with the federal and state caselaw at that 
16 
 
 
 
time. But 19 years later, in another case involving a warrantless entry into an apartment, 
the justification was expanded by the Court of Appeals to include protection of property. 
State v. Jones, 24 Kan. App. 2d 405, 409-17, 947 P.2d 1030 (1997) (Jones II). In Jones 
II, the court adopted a three-part test for the emergency doctrine, offering first a different 
rationale for the exception, stating: 
 
"The emergency doctrine reflects a recognition that the police perform a 
community caretaking function which goes beyond fighting crime. [Citation omitted.] 
Under this function, the community looks to the police to render aid and assistance to 
protect lives and property on an emergency basis regardless of whether a crime is 
involved. Warrantless entries into and searches of private property pursuant to this 
exception are not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
or by Section 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights." (Emphasis added.) 24 Kan. 
App. 2d at 409-10. 
 
It then adopted its three-part test from People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 177-78, 
383 N.Y.S.2d 246, 347 N.E.2d 607 (1976):  
 
 
"'(1) The police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an 
emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or 
property. 
 
 
"'(2) The search must not be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize 
evidence. 
 
 
"'(3) There must be some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to 
associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched.'" Jones II, 24 Kan. App. 2d 
at 413.  
 
In 2003, this court considered the emergency aid exception for the first time and 
accepted the three-part test from Jones II. See Mendez, 275 Kan. at 425-28 (uninvited, 
17 
 
 
 
nonconsensual entry into private residence when no emergency existed did not justify 
exception to Fourth Amendment warrant requirement). Thereafter, that test was applied 
in all subsequent cases until the United States Supreme Court decided Brigham City. See 
State v. Drennan, 278 Kan. 704, 720-22, 101 P.3d 1218 (2004) (applying three-part test); 
State v. Horn, 278 Kan. 24, 31-37, 91 P.3d 517 (2004) (applying three-part test). 
 
But this court has not considered the emergency aid exception since Brigham City 
v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2006), although the Court of 
Appeals has interpreted Brigham City to eliminate the test's second prong (search not 
primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence). See State v. Geraghty, 38 
Kan. App. 2d 114, 124, 163 P.3d 350, rev. denied 285 Kan. 1175 (2007). Neighbors' case 
provides us the opportunity to revisit the exception in light of Brigham City. And we have 
determined some modification is necessary.  
 
Refinement of the Emergency Aid Exception 
 
Many jurisdictions followed the Mitchell three-part test before Brigham City was 
issued. See, e.g., United States v. Najar, 451 F.3d 710, 718 (10th Cir. 2006) (recognizing 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals followed the three-part test before Brigham City). But 
Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 404-05, explicitly overruled the second factor and called into 
question the exception as articulated under the three-part test. The Kansas Court of 
Appeals' modification to the test in Geraghty was no doubt an attempt to follow this 
court's precedent to the extent allowed under Brigham City, but that revised test continues 
to be broader than the emergency aid exception recognized by the United States Supreme 
Court under the Fourth Amendment.  
 
One problem with the current Kansas test, even as modified by the Court of 
Appeals in Geraghty, is that it jumbles the community caretaking function recognized in 
18 
 
 
 
Cady with the emergency aid exception cases. See Shapiro, The Road to Fourth 
Amendment Erosion Is Paved with Good Intentions: Examining Why Florida Should 
Limit the Community Caretaker Exception, 6 Fla. Int'l. U. L. Rev. 351, 357-60, 361-64 
(Spring 2011) (defining community caretaker exception and differentiating it from the 
emergency aid exception). In other words, emergency aid is a limited exception 
applicable only when aiding an occupant who is seriously injured or imminently 
threatened with injury. See Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 400, 403. Our statement of the 
exception needs to be more constrained.  
 
The Mitchell three-part test previously followed in Kansas applies the exception to 
circumstances involving the immediate need for assistance for the protection of life or 
property. But the doctrine's extension to property protection is inconsistent with current 
federal caselaw and the rationale for the exception. The Brigham City Court clearly 
reflects that the emergency aid exception turns on whether there is "an objectively 
reasonable basis for believing an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened 
with such injury." 547 U.S. at 400. That statement accurately defines the emergency aid 
exception to the warrant requirement. 
 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' current test integrated Brigham City's manner 
and Mincey's scope requirements into a standard used by that court, which now involves 
whether "(1) the officers have an objectively reasonable basis to believe there is an 
immediate need to protect the lives or safety of themselves or others; and (2) the manner 
and scope of the search is reasonable." United States v. Gordon, 741 F.3d 64, 70 (10th 
Cir. 2014). But it is not entirely clear why the Tenth Circuit expands the first factor to 
include officer protection because the caselaw already recognizes a stand-alone officer 
safety exception. See State v. Campbell, 297 Kan. 273, 280, 300 P.3d 72 (2013) ("If an 
officer can articulate how the presence of a weapon affected the officer's safety, this court 
19 
 
 
 
has interpreted the Fourth Amendment to allow a warrantless entry into a person's home 
based upon officer safety concerns.").  
 
Accordingly, the emergency aid exception must be seen as a limited exception 
permitting a warrantless search when:  (1) law enforcement officers enter the premises 
with an objectively reasonable basis to believe someone inside is seriously injured or 
imminently threatened with serious injury; and (2) the manner and scope of any ensuing 
search once inside the premises is reasonable. Our prior caselaw holding otherwise is 
overruled. 
 
With the articulation of this revised test for what we now will more accurately 
term the "emergency aid exception," we consider next its application to the facts in this 
case. 
 
Application of the Emergency Aid Exception  
 
It is undisputed that Officer Doty and the three other responding officers lawfully 
entered the apartment under the emergency aid exception. Neighbors' concern is that the 
officers exceeded the exception's scope following their initial entry by remaining in the 
apartment after Neighbors was awake and his right to be in the apartment confirmed. 
Using the Mincey Court's language, the issue is whether the events occurring after entry 
were "'strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.'" 437 U.S. at 
393 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 [1968]); 
see also State v. Walker, 292 Kan. 1, 13, 251 P.3d 618 (2011) ("'In other words, we must 
determine whether running a warrants check [during an investigatory detention] was 
"reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the 
first place."'"). We hold they were not. 
 
20 
 
 
 
In this case, both lower courts correctly held the emergency aid exception 
permitted the initial entry. The officers knew an unresponsive male was seen lying on the 
couch and could not be awakened by yelling or pounding on the front door. This was 
sufficient to establish an objectively reasonable basis to believe someone inside the 
apartment could be seriously injured. And while there may have been other concerns 
related to the landlord's trespass claim, any subjective motivation harbored by the officers 
prior to their initial entry regarding a trespass investigation was irrelevant so long as the 
actions were reasonable when viewed objectively. See Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 405; 
Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771-72, 121 S. Ct. 1876, 149 L. Ed. 2d 994 (2001) 
(An objectively reasonable search based on probable cause will not be rendered invalid 
even when the motive for the search was pretextual.). 
 
Notably, the parties do not focus on whether the responding officers were 
permitted to begin a trespass investigation once Neighbors was awake and responsive. 
Instead, their arguments focus on Officer Delgado's actions, which came after the 
trespass investigation. We consider Delgado's conduct next. 
 
The State relies on People v. Hochstraser, 178 Cal. App. 4th 883, 100 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 728 (2010), for authority that Delgado's arrival and search was lawful. But that case is 
inapposite. There, a woman's daughter made a missing persons report and indicated there 
had been a domestic violence incident the night before. Responding officers went to the 
woman's apartment, knocked several times, and announced their presence and purpose to 
no avail. Officers then made a warrantless entry to check on her welfare, which the court 
upheld under the emergency aid exception. 178 Cal. App. 4th at 899-901. Upon entering, 
the officers encountered the woman's boyfriend, who stated she had left that morning but 
he did not know where she was. Officers noticed an open window on a cold, windy night 
and a "'chloriney'" smell reminiscent of a cleaned-up crime scene; then in plain view, 
they observed a spotless bathroom in an otherwise messy apartment; sawzall blades in the 
21 
 
 
 
kitchen and living room; the victim's personal items such as cell phone, keys, and 
identification; the boyfriend's spacey demeanor and lack of concern; facial redness and 
cuts on his face and hands, together with the boyfriend's admission of a domestic 
violence incident the previous night; and his disregard of a ringing telephone. The 
officers were suspicious and searched the house and the boyfriend's car. The woman's 
body parts were in the car.  
 
Charged with her killing, the boyfriend sought to suppress the evidence. The court 
addressed whether the house or car search impermissibly extended the "justification to 
render emergency aid to someone inside the home." 178 Cal. App. 4th at 901. The court 
ruled it did not. The Hochstraser court noted that based on the officers' observations they 
were justified in continuing their investigation into the woman's whereabouts. 178 Cal. 
App. 4th at 903. But it upheld the automobile search under the automobile exception, not 
the emergency aid exception. 178 Cal. App. 4th at 904. 
 
Hochstraser is consistent with the line of cases recognizing an officer may 
continue an emergency investigation until assured there is no one inside in need of 
assistance—particularly when the officer encounters circumstances that continue to raise 
suspicions. See 3 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 6.6(a), pp. 620-23 & n.64-65 (5th ed. 
2012) (discussing various circumstances and citing numerous cases supporting this 
proposition). The State's problem is that the officers in Neighbors' case were not 
continuing an emergency investigation because Neighbors was alert and responsive. In 
other words, the purpose for their entry—rendering emergency aid—no longer existed. 
The responding officers had shifted their focus to a trespass investigation, while Delgado, 
who would arrive on the scene even later, entered the premises to launch his own 
narcotics investigation. 
 
22 
 
 
 
Neighbors' case is more like the United States Supreme Court's Mincey v. Arizona, 
437 U.S. 385, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1978), decision in which homicide 
detectives heard a radio dispatch about a shooting during a narcotics sting operation and 
reported to the scene 10 minutes later. The homicide detectives then began an extensive 
warrantless search of the apartment, even though other officers had already identified the 
apartment's occupants and called for emergency assistance. The Mincey Court held the 
homicide detective improperly exceeded the emergency investigation's scope. 437 U.S. at 
393-94. 
 
The emergency aid exception gives an officer limited authority to "do no more 
than is reasonably necessary to ascertain whether someone is in need of assistance and to 
provide that assistance." 3 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 6.6(a), p. 622 & n.65. The 
officer also is limited in the areas of the premises that can be searched. See, e.g., Najar, 
451 F.3d at 718-20 (holding officers were entitled to search areas where a person needing 
assistance could be found); United States v. Russell, 436 F.3d 1086, 1090-93 (9th Cir. 
2006) (upholding search limited to areas in which a criminal could be hiding or a victim 
found). And the right of entry dissipates once an officer confirms no one needs assistance 
or the assistance has been provided. See, e.g., United States v. Cervantes, 219 F.3d 882, 
891-92 (9th Cir. 2000) (second entry unlawful after fear that methamphetamine lab 
would explode was dispelled); United States v. Goldenstein, 456 F.2d 1006, 1010-11 (8th 
Cir. 1972) (after realizing no one required aid within hotel room, search of suitcase was 
illegal).  
 
To be sure, once inside, officers may seize any evidence of a crime in plain view 
during the course of their legitimate emergency activities. See Horn, 278 Kan. at 36 
(citing Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392-93). But an officer must be lawfully present to invoke the 
plain-view exception. See State v. Fisher, 283 Kan. 272, 293-94, 154 P.3d 455 (2007) 
(plain view "deals with circumstances in which an officer has already justifiably intruded 
23 
 
 
 
into a constitutionally protected area and then spots and removes incriminating 
evidence"). And the object's incriminating character must be immediately apparent 
without conducting some further search of the object. State v. Wonders, 263 Kan. 582, 
590, 952 P.2d 1351 (1998); see Gordon, 741 F.3d at 71 (citing Minnesota v. Dickerson, 
508 U.S. 366, 375, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334 [1993]).  
 
In Neighbors' case, the only evidence arguably in plain view was the Q-Tip, and it 
is unclear from the record whether it was even confiscated. The only testimony at the 
suppression hearing was that Delgado observed it, but there was no testimony indicating 
it was tested for drugs. But even assuming Neighbors' motion to suppress included the Q-
Tip, it is questionable whether the seizure could be upheld under the plain-view exception 
because its incriminating nature was not apparent without conducting some further search 
of it. More importantly, and as discussed next, Delgado was not lawfully present from the 
outset, so his discovery of the Q-Tip fell outside the justification for the initial entry.  
 
The only report of an emergency came from the landlord, who informed officers 
there was an unresponsive male on the couch. In light of that limited emergency, the 
responding officers impermissibly exceeded the scope of the emergency when they began 
investigating the landlord's trespass allegations. And like the homicide detectives' 
apartment search in Mincey and the suitcase search in Goldenstein, the trespass 
investigation was wholly unrelated to the perceived medical emergency. The emergency 
aid exception could not be invoked as a basis for validating the trespass investigation. 
The responding officers were required to leave the apartment once it was clear the 
occupants did not need medical assistance. 
 
The evidence presented at Neighbors' suppression hearing does not establish a 
firm time line as to when the officers found and were able to speak with the woman 
located in the back bedroom, so there is some latitude in determining when the cutoff for 
24 
 
 
 
the emergency aid exception occurred. But the record does establish that officers had 
already obtained her name and ascertained that she did not need medical assistance 
before Delgado arrived, so the evidence is at least clear that any concern for rendering 
emergency assistance had ended. The State cannot rely on any medical emergency to 
invoke the emergency aid exception to validate Delgado's later entry and ensuing search. 
 
Nor can the search be saved under the notion that the events occurred within a 
short time period. In Mincey, the homicide detectives arrived within 10 minutes and that 
search was held unlawful because it exceeded the scope of the exigency. 437 U.S. at 393; 
cf. State v. Morlock, 289 Kan. 980, 996, 218 P.3d 801 (2009) ("An officer is not required 
to disregard information which may lead him or her to suspect independent criminal 
activity during a traffic stop. When the 'responses of the detainee and the circumstances 
give rise to suspicions unrelated to the traffic offense, an officer may broaden his inquiry 
and satisfy those suspicions.'"). 
 
We also cannot accept the panel's rationale—adopted absent argument by the 
State—that a different emergency triggered the emergency aid, rendering Officer 
Delgado's entry lawful. The panel surmised that Officer Delgado heard a 911 call 
indicating a possible "burglary or trespass in progress." Neighbors, 2011 WL 5526574, at 
*4. And that information coupled with his personal knowledge of both Neighbors' and the 
woman's criminal histories established reasonable grounds to believe there was an 
emergency at hand and an immediate need for assistance for the protection of property. 
2011 WL 5526574, at *4. But the State has not alleged the officers had probable cause 
combined with exigent circumstances allowing a warrantless entry, so we do not entertain 
that possibility. 
 
One additional problem we note with the panel's analysis is that it seems to create 
an end run around the probable cause requirement by characterizing a criminal 
25 
 
 
 
investigation itself as an emergency. See 3 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 6.6(b), pp. 623-
30 (discussing exigent circumstances allowing warrantless entry on private property to 
protect property; citing numerous cases). We reject that suggestion. We cannot find any 
previous Kansas case invoking the emergency aid exception for the protection of 
property. See Drennan, 278 Kan. at 721-22 (welfare check); Horn, 278 Kan. at 34-37 
(welfare check); State v. Mendez, 275 Kan. 412, 413, 66 P.3d 811 (2003) (assisting 
juvenile); Jones I, 2 Kan. App. 2d at 38, 42 (search for occupants in smoke-filled 
apartment); State v. Manley, No. 104,915, 2011 WL 5389881, at *3-6 (Kan. App. 2011) 
(unpublished opinion) (911 call fearing injured neighbor); see also State v. Swansen, No. 
100,331, 2009 WL 401007, at *4-7 (Kan. App. 2009) (unpublished opinion) (holding 
emergency doctrine did not apply to search of methamphetamine lab). And as mentioned 
earlier, this expansion of the exception would be difficult to reconcile with Brigham City. 
 
We hold the emergency aid exception—as articulated in Brigham City—does not 
apply to the protection of property. We hold further that the potential medical emergency 
that justified the four officers' initial entry into the apartment abated prior to the time 
Delgado arrived.  
 
Having held the officers' authority to remain in the apartment ended once its 
occupants were determined not to need emergency assistance, it is unnecessary to address 
the panel's other holdings that (1) Delgado had reasonable suspicion to believe Neighbors 
was armed and dangerous; (2) Terry applies to pat-down searches inside a home; and (3) 
Neighbors' consent to search was valid. Finally, the State has not argued the evidence is 
admissible under the United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 
677 (1984), good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, so that argument is waived. 
See State v. Hicks, 282 Kan. 599, 617-18, 147 P.3d 1076 (2006). 
 
26 
 
 
 
The Court of Appeals' judgment reversing the district court is reversed. We affirm 
the district court's suppression holding.