Title: State v. Mole

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Mole, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-5124.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-5124 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. MOLE, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Mole, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-5124.] 
Criminal law―Sexual battery―R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) unconstitutional―Statute 
violates equal protection by irrationally imposing strict liability on peace 
officers―Government cannot punish class of professionals without making 
connection between classification and prohibited act―Creating separate 
class for peace officers in order to subject their off-duty behavior to 
criminal sanctions on basis of strict liability is not rationally related to 
governmental interest in maintaining public confidence in law enforcement, 
ensuring integrity of its members, or protecting minors from sexual 
exploitation. 
(No. 2013-1619—Submitted July 9, 2014—Decided July 28, 2016.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 
No. 98900, 2013-Ohio-3131. 
_____________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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O’CONNOR, C.J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, we address the validity of a facial constitutional attack, 
on equal-protection grounds, against a subdivision of Ohio’s sexual-battery statute, 
R.C. 2907.03(A)(13).  R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) prohibits sexual conduct when one 
person is a minor and “the offender is a peace officer, and the offender is more than 
two years older than the other person.” 
{¶ 2} R.C. 2907.03 is generally a valid scheme insofar as it imposes strict 
liability for sexual conduct between various classes of offenders who exploit their 
victims through established authoritarian relationships.  But subdivision (A)(13) 
irrationally imposes that same strict liability on peace officers even when there is 
no occupation-based relationship between the officer and the victim.  We therefore 
conclude that R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) is an arbitrarily disparate treatment of peace 
officers that violates equal protection under the Ohio Constitution and the United 
States Constitution.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Eighth District 
Court of Appeals declaring R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) facially unconstitutional. 
RELEVANT BACKGROUND 
{¶ 3} Appellee, Matthew Mole, was a police officer.  He first encountered 
J.S. when J.S. initiated a conversation with Mole through the use of a dating 
application on his mobile phone. 
{¶ 4} J.S. claimed to be 18 years old and a senior in high school.  Mole was 
35.  Upon J.S.’s invitation, Mole came to J.S.’s house at 3:00 a.m. on December 
19, 2011, and was led into an unlit sunroom at the back of the house.  The two 
undressed and performed oral sex on each other in the dark.  They were discovered 
by J.S.’s mother shortly after.  At that point, Mole learned, for the first time, that 
J.S. was 14 years old. 
{¶ 5} Mole was charged with one count of unlawful sexual conduct with a 
minor, R.C. 2907.04, which prohibits sexual conduct with a minor between the ages 
of 13 and 15 years old when the offender is 18 or older and knows the other person’s 
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age or is reckless in that regard.  He was also charged with one count of sexual 
battery under R.C. 2907.03(A)(13), which prohibits sexual conduct by a peace 
officer with a minor when the officer is more than two years older than the minor. 
{¶ 6} Before trial, Mole moved the trial court to declare R.C. 
2907.03(A)(13) unconstitutional and to dismiss the sexual-battery charge from the 
indictment.  Mole unsuccessfully argued that the statute’s lack of a mens rea and 
failure to connect a defendant’s occupational status with proscribed sexual activity 
violates equal protection and due process.  The trial court summarily denied the 
motion. 
{¶ 7} At trial, Mole elected to have the unlawful-sexual-conduct charge 
tried to the jury and the sexual-battery charge tried to the bench.  The jury became 
deadlocked, the court declared a mistrial, and the state dismissed the indictment as 
to the charge under R.C. 2907.04. 
{¶ 8} But the bench trial resulted in Mole’s conviction for sexual battery 
under R.C. 2907.03(A)(13), which makes peace officers strictly liable for sexual 
conduct with anyone under the age of 18 when the offender is more than two years 
older. Thus, despite the jury’s inability to find that Mole was reckless with regard 
to J.S.’s age, the state was nevertheless able to obtain Mole’s conviction for the 
same conduct based solely on Mole’s chosen profession, i.e., without proving that 
Mole knew or was reckless about J.S.’s age, without proving that J.S. knew that 
Mole was a peace officer, and without proving that Mole’s profession and status as 
a peace officer had any relation to his acquaintance with J.S. or the sexual conduct 
with him.  Mole was sentenced to two years in prison. 
{¶ 9} Mole appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, arguing that 
R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of both 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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the Ohio Constitution and the United States Constitution.  In a split decision,1 the 
appellate court concluded that R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) violated equal protection and 
was facially unconstitutional.  We accepted the state’s discretionary appeal, in 
which the state asserts that R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) does not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution or the Ohio Constitution. 
ANALYSIS 
{¶ 10} At the outset, we are mindful of our duty to defer to the General 
Assembly:  
 
A statute is presumed constitutional.  “In enacting a statute, it is presumed 
that * * * [c]ompliance with the constitutions of the state and of the United 
States is intended.”  R.C. 1.47(A).  See also State v. Carswell, 114 Ohio 
St.3d 210, 2007-Ohio-3723, 871 N.E.2d 547, ¶ 6. Courts have a duty to 
liberally construe statutes “to save them from constitutional infirmities.”  
Desenco, Inc. v. Akron, 84 Ohio St.3d 535, 538, 706 N.E.2d 323 (1999). 
 
Mahoning Edn. Assn. of Dev. Disabilities v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 137 Ohio 
St.3d 257, 2013-Ohio-4654, 998 N.E.2d 1124, ¶ 13.  However, this presumption of 
constitutionality is rebuttable.  State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher, 164 Ohio St. 
142, 128 N.E.2d 59 (1955), paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 11} The presumption of constitutionality is rebutted only when it appears 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute and the Constitution are clearly 
incompatible.  Id.; State v. Hayden, 96 Ohio St.3d 211, 2002-Ohio-4169, 773 
N.E.2d 502, ¶ 7.  When incompatibility is clear, it is the duty of this court to declare 
                                                          
 
1 Although Judge Stewart concurred in judgment only and Judge Celebrezze dissented, Judge 
Stewart agreed that Mole’s conviction under R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) was unconstitutional.  2013-
Ohio-3131, 994 N.E.2d 482, ¶ 48 (Stewart, A.J., concurring in judgment only). 
January Term, 2016 
 
5
the statute unconstitutional.  Cincinnati City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Walter, 158 
Ohio St.2d 368, 383, 390 N.E.2d 813 (1979). 
{¶ 12} With these principles in mind, we turn to the Constitution and our 
analysis of R.C. 2907.03(A)(13). 
{¶ 13} Article I, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution provides that “[a]ll 
political power is inherent in the people.  Government is instituted for their equal 
protection and benefit * * *.”  The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides that “[n]o State shall * * * deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 
{¶ 14} Although this court previously recognized that the Equal Protection 
Clauses of the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution are 
substantively equivalent, and that the same review is required,  Am. Assn. of Univ. 
Professors, Cent. State Univ. Chapter v. Cent. State Univ., 87 Ohio St.3d 55, 60, 
717 N.E.2d 286 (1999) (“the federal and Ohio Equal Protection Clauses are to be 
construed and analyzed identically”), we also have made clear that the Ohio 
Constitution is a document of independent force,  Arnold v. Cleveland, 67 Ohio 
St.3d 35, 42, 616 N.E.2d 163 (1993).  As we explained in Arnold: 
 
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly reminded 
state courts that they are free to construe their state constitutions as 
providing different or even broader individual liberties than those 
provided under the federal Constitution. See, e.g., City of Mesquite 
v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc. (1982), 455 U.S. 283, 293, 102 S.Ct. 1070, 
1077, 71 L.Ed.2d 152, 162 (“ * * * [A] state court is entirely free to 
read its own State’s constitution more broadly than this Court reads 
the Federal Constitution, or to reject the mode of analysis used by 
this Court in favor of a different analysis of its corresponding 
constitutional guarantee.”); and California v. Greenwood (1988), 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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486 U.S. 35, 43, 108 S.Ct. 1625, 1630, 100 L.Ed.2d 30, 39 
(“Individual States may surely construe their own constitutions as 
imposing more stringent constraints on police conduct than does the 
Federal Constitution.”). See, also, Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. 
Robins (1980), 447 U.S. 74, 81, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 2040, 64 L.Ed.2d 
741, 752.  Further, in Michigan v. Long (1983), 463 U.S. 1032, 1041, 
103 S.Ct. 3469, 3476-3477, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201, 1214-1215, the 
Supreme Court reinforced its comments in this area by declaring that 
the state courts’ interpretations of state constitutions are to be 
accepted as final, as long as the state court plainly states that its 
decision is based on independent and adequate state grounds. 
 
Arnold at 41-42. 
{¶ 15} Arnold stands as the court’s first clear embrace of Justice William J. 
Brennan’s watershed article, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
Rights, 90 Harv.L.Rev. 489 (1977), which has been described as a “plea for a 
renaissance in state constitutionalism.” Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State 
Constitutionalism, 106 Harv.L.Rev. 1147 (1993). 
{¶ 16} Notably, however, in the wake of Arnold, we have often, but 
inconsistently, heeded the hortatory call to the new federalism. 
{¶ 17} Four years after our decision in Arnold, this court disavowed the 
“new federalism,” at least in the context of the constitutional rights protecting 
individuals from searches and seizures by the government.  State v. Robinette, 80 
Ohio St.3d 234, 238, 685 N.E.2d 762 (1997) (“Despite this wave of New 
Federalism, where the [state and federal constitutional] provisions are similar and 
no persuasive reason for a differing interpretation is presented, this court has 
determined that protections afforded by Ohio’s Constitution are coextensive with 
those provided by the United States Constitution”).  But two years later, in 
January Term, 2016 
 
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Simmons-Harris v. Goff, we again made clear that even when we previously have 
discussed provisions in the federal and Ohio Constitutions jointly, we will not 
“irreversibly tie ourselves” to an interpretation of the language of the Ohio 
Constitution just because it  is consistent with language of the federal Constitution.  
86 Ohio St.3d 1, 10, 711 N.E.2d 203 (1999).  And the following year, in Humphrey 
v. Lane, we made clear that the Ohio Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause grants 
broader protections to Ohio’s citizens than the federal Constitution affords.  89 
Ohio St.3d 62, 68, 728 N.E.2d 1039 (2000). 
{¶ 18} In 2003, we again embraced the new federalism, even in areas in 
which we had rejected it previously.  In State v. Brown, we departed from 
Robinette’s disavowal of the new federalism and held that Article I, Section 14 of 
the Ohio Constitution “provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution against warrantless arrests for minor misdemeanors.”  
99 Ohio St.3d 323, 2003-Ohio-3931, 792 N.E.2d 175, syllabus.  And three years 
later, we held that Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution provides greater 
protection to criminal defendants than the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  State v. Farris, 109 Ohio St.3d 519, 2006-Ohio-3255, 849 N.E.2d 
985, ¶ 48. 
{¶ 19} Soon thereafter, we announced that Ohio’s Constitution protected 
Ohioans from government appropriation of their private property if the 
appropriation was based solely on the fact that it would provide an economic benefit 
to the community.  Norwood v. Horney, 110 Ohio St.3d 353, 2006-Ohio-3799, 853 
N.E.2d 1115, paragraph one of the syllabus.  In doing so, we were undaunted by 
the fact that the United States Supreme Court had recently expressly permitted 
similar takings under federal constitutional law.  Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 
469, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 162 L.Ed.2d 439 (2005).  See Norwood, ¶ 76 (expressly 
rejecting Kelo’s approach for interpreting the Ohio Constitution). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 20} Our decisions that have affirmed our autonomy under the Ohio 
Constitution to afford our people greater rights than those secured by the federal 
Constitution have not been without dissents, including dissents by the justice 
authoring this opinion.  See, e.g., Brown, ¶ 26-32 (O’Connor, C.J., dissenting).  
More recently, our decisions holding that the Due Process Clause of the Ohio 
Constitution forbids the use of uncounseled juvenile dispositions to enhance the 
penalty of a subsequent offense, State v. Bode, 144 Ohio St.3d 155, 2015-Ohio-
1519, 41 N.E.3d 1156, and that traffic stops for even minor misdemeanors that are 
made outside of an officer’s statutory jurisdiction violate Article I, Section 14 of 
the Ohio Constitution, State v. Brown, 143 Ohio St.3d 444, 2015-Ohio-2438, 39 
N.E.3d 496, were also met with vigorous dissents.  See Bode at ¶ 31-42 (French, J., 
dissenting); Brown at ¶ 28-43 (French, J., dissenting).  But the fact that the adoption 
of independent state constitutional law provokes “ ‘bitter, accusatorial’ ” dissents, 
State v. Short, 851 N.W.2d 474, 486 (Iowa 2014), quoting Williams, The Law of 
American State Constitutions 180 (2009), does not dissuade us. 
{¶ 21} We once again reaffirm that this court, the ultimate arbiter of the 
meaning of the Ohio Constitution, can and will interpret our Constitution to afford 
greater rights to our citizens when we believe that such an interpretation is both 
prudent and not inconsistent with the intent of the framers.  We also reaffirm that 
we are not confined by the federal courts’ interpretations of similar provisions in 
the federal Constitution any more than we are confined by other states’ high courts’ 
interpretations of similar provisions in their states’ constitutions.  As Judge Sutton 
has explained, 
 
There is no reason to think, as an interpretive matter, that 
constitutional guarantees of independent sovereigns, even 
guarantees with the same or similar words, must be construed the 
same.  Still less is there reason to think that a highly generalized 
January Term, 2016 
 
9
guarantee, such as prohibition on “unreasonable” searches, would 
have just one meaning for a range of differently situated sovereigns. 
 
Sutton, What Does—and Does Not—Ail State Constitutional Law, 59 U.Kan.L.Rev. 
687, 707 (2011).  Federal opinions do not control our independent analyses in 
interpreting the Ohio Constitution, even when we look to federal precedent for 
guidance.  See Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1007 (Alaska 2008). 
{¶ 22} We can and should borrow from well-reasoned and persuasive 
precedent from other states and the federal courts, but in so doing we cannot be 
compelled to parrot those interpretations.  See Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 
20-21 (Tex.1992).  Instead, we embrace the notion that we may, and should, 
consider Ohio’s conditions and traditions in interpreting our own state’s 
constitutional guarantees.  See Sutton, Why Teach―And Why Study―State 
Constitutional Law, 34 Okla.City U.L.Rev. 165, 173-174 (2009).  In doing so, we 
are cognizant that “the individual-rights guarantees of the Bill of Rights were based 
on pre-existing state constitutional guarantees, not the other way around.”  Id. at 
176; see also Short, 851 N.W.2d at 481-482 (state constitutions were the original 
sources of written constitutional rights and the founders first looked to the states 
for the preservation of those rights).  This is particularly important to remember 
whenever the United States Supreme Court’s decisions dilute or underenforce 
important individual rights and protections.  See Short at 486, citing Williams, The 
Law of American State Constitutions at 137. 
{¶ 23} With these understandings in mind, we turn to the question before 
us, which arises in the realm of equal-protection principles under both the federal 
and Ohio Constitutions.  As explained below, we hold that R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) is 
violative of both.  In so holding, however, we make clear that even if we have erred 
in our understanding of the federal Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause, we find 
that the guarantees of equal protection in the Ohio Constitution independently 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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forbid the disparate treatment of peace officers through a legislative scheme that 
criminalizes their sexual conduct while removing virtually all of their due-process 
protections, such that an officer’s conduct can constitute a criminal offense even 
when that conduct is not found to be illegal by a jury of the officer’s peers. 
Equal Protection 
{¶ 24} An equal-protection analysis of any law centers upon the law’s 
classification of persons and whether the classification relates to a legitimate 
government interest.  State ex rel. Doersam v. Indus. Comm., 45 Ohio St.3d 115, 
119-120, 543 N.E.2d 1169 (1989).  The federal Equal Protection Clause does not 
prohibit a legislature from creating laws that treat a group of people differently from 
others outside the group.  But it does prohibit different treatment based on criteria 
that are unrelated to the purpose of the law.  Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 374, 
94 S.Ct. 1160, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974); State ex rel. Doersam at 119-120.  “[A]ll 
persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”  Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985).  As the high court 
has explained,  
 
The equal protection clause, like the due process of law 
clause, is not susceptible of exact delimitation. No definite rule in 
respect of either, which automatically will solve the question in 
specific instances, can be formulated. Certain general principles, 
however, have been established, in the light of which the cases as 
they arise are to be considered. In the first place, it may be said 
generally that the equal protection clause means that the rights of all 
persons must rest upon the same rule under similar circumstances, 
Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U.S. 321, 337, 6 S.Ct. 57, 29 
L.Ed. 414 [1885]; Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 
U.S. 283, 293, 18 S.Ct. 594, 42 L.Ed. 1037 [1898], and that it applies 
January Term, 2016 
 
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to the exercise of all the powers of the state which can affect the 
individual or his property * * *. 
 
Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37, 48 S.Ct. 423, 72 L.Ed. 770 
(1928). 
{¶ 25} Although the federal Equal Protection Clause does not forbid 
classification, any classification must rest upon some ground of difference having 
a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons 
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.  Id., citing Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 
270 U.S. 230, 240, 46 S.Ct. 260, 70 L.Ed. 557 (1926); Air-way Corp. v. Day, 266 
U.S. 71, 85, 45 S.Ct. 12, 69 L.Ed. 169 (1924); Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 
U.S. 412, 415, 40 S.Ct. 560, 64 L.Ed. 989 (1920).  “[T]he attempted classification 
‘must always rest upon some difference which bears a reasonable and just relation 
to the act in respect to which the classification is proposed, and can never be made 
arbitrarily and without any such basis.”  Id., citing Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. 
v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 155, 17 S.Ct. 255, 41 L.Ed. 666 (1897).  And 
“[d]iscrimination[] of an unusual character especially suggest[s] careful 
consideration to determine whether they are obnoxious to the constitutional 
provision.”  Id. at 37-38. 
The classification at issue 
{¶ 26} R.C. 2907.03 outlaws sexual battery, and the classification in R.C. 
2907.03(A)(13) is of peace officers.  R.C. 2907.03(C)(4) states that “ ‘[p]eace 
officer’ has the same meaning as in section 2935.01 of the Revised Code.”2  We 
first note that Mole does not claim that this classification involves a fundamental 
                                                          
 
2 R.C. 2935.01’s lengthy definition of “peace officer” includes not only police officers, sheriffs and 
deputy sheriffs, and the state highway patrol, but a variety of less expected categories of officers, 
such as the house of representatives sergeant at arms, certain investigators employed by the 
Department of Taxation, park and wildlife officers, special police officers employed at municipal 
airports, and many others. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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right or a suspect class.  Accordingly, the standard of review in this case is the 
“rational basis” test, which requires that the statute be upheld if it is rationally 
related to a legitimate governmental purpose.  State v. Peoples, 102 Ohio St.3d 460, 
2004-Ohio-3923, 812 N.E.2d 963, ¶ 7, citing Roseman v. Firemen & Policemen’s 
Death Benefit Fund, 66 Ohio St.3d 443, 447, 613 N.E.2d 574 (1993); Am. Assn. of 
Univ. Professors at 57-58. 
{¶ 27} Under a federal rational-basis analysis,  
 
The appropriate standard of review is whether the difference in 
treatment between [the affected class and those outside the class] 
rationally furthers a legitimate state interest.  In general, the Equal 
Protection Clause is satisfied so long as there is a plausible policy 
reason for the classification, see United States Railroad Retirement 
Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174, 179, 101 S.Ct. 453, 459, 461, 66 
L.Ed.2d 368 (1980), the legislative facts on which the classification 
is apparently based rationally may have been considered to be true 
by the governmental decisionmaker, see Minnesota v. Clover Leaf 
Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464, 101 S.Ct. 715, 724, 66 L.Ed.2d 
659 (1981), and the relationship of the classification to its goal is not 
so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational, see 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. [432] at 446, 105 
S.Ct. [3249] at 3257 [87 L.Ed.2d 313]. 
 
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992). 
Similarly, under the Ohio Constitution,  
 
“The rational-basis test involves a two-step analysis. We 
must first identify a valid state interest. Second, we must determine 
January Term, 2016 
 
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whether the method or means by which the state has chosen to 
advance that interest is rational.”  McCrone v. Bank One Corp., 107 
Ohio St.3d 272, 2005-Ohio-6505, 839 N.E.2d 1, ¶ 9, citing Buchman 
v. Wayne Trace Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 
260, 267, 652 N.E.2d 952. 
“Under the rational-basis standard, a state has no obligation 
to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory 
classification.” Columbia Gas Transm. Corp. v. Levin, 117 Ohio 
St.3d 122, 2008-Ohio-511, 882 N.E.2d 400, ¶ 91, citing Am. Assn. 
of Univ. Professors, Cent. State Univ. Chapter, 87 Ohio St.3d at 58, 
60, 717 N.E.2d 286. “[S]tatutes are presumed to be constitutional 
and * * * courts have a duty to liberally construe statutes in order to 
save them from constitutional infirmities.” Eppley [v. Tri-Valley 
Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn.], 122 Ohio St.3d 56, 2009-Ohio-
1970, 908 N.E.2d 401, ¶ 12, citing Desenco, Inc. v. Akron (1999), 
84 Ohio St.3d 535, 538, 706 N.E.2d 323. The party challenging the 
constitutionality of a statute “bears the burden to negate every 
conceivable basis that might support the legislation.” Columbia Gas 
Transm. Corp. at ¶ 91, citing Lyons v. Limbach (1988), 40 Ohio 
St.3d 92, 94, 532 N.E.2d 106. 
 
Pickaway Cty. Skilled Gaming, L.L.C. v. Cordray, 127 Ohio St.3d 104, 2010-Ohio-
4908, 936 N.E.2d 944, ¶ 19-20. 
{¶ 28} Although the legislature has no obligation to justify or even state its 
reasons for making a particular classification,  rational-basis review,  whether under 
Ohio constitutional principles or federal ones, does not mean toothless scrutiny.  
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510, 96 S.Ct. 2755, 49 L.Ed.2d 651 (1976).  And 
the rational-basis test requires that the classification must bear a rational 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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relationship to a legitimate government interest or that reasonable grounds must 
exist for drawing the distinction.  Holeton v. Crouse Cartage Co., 92 Ohio St.3d 
115, 131, 748 N.E.2d 1111 (2001).  In other words, the Equal Protection Clause 
requires that “in defining a class subject to legislation, the distinctions that are 
drawn have ‘some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made.’ ”  
Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309, 86 S.Ct. 1497, 16 L.Ed.2d 577 (1966), 
quoting Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111, 86 S.Ct. 760, 15 L.Ed.2d 620 
(1966).  Thus, although we respect that the General Assembly has the power to 
classify, we insist that its classifications must have a reasonable basis and may not 
“subject individuals to an arbitrary exercise of power.”   Conley v. Shearer, 64 Ohio 
St.3d 284, 288, 595 N.E.2d 862 (1992).  “[E]ven in the ordinary equal protection 
case calling for the most deferential of standards, we insist on knowing the relation 
between the classification adopted and the object to be attained.”  Romer v. Evans, 
517 U.S. 620, 632, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996). 
{¶ 29} What, then, is the “object to be obtained” by R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) 
and its classification of peace officers?  Our assessment of possible state interests 
behind R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) is best served by first reviewing the history of similar 
sex-crime legislation and the legislative history leading up to the enactment of the 
statute. 
Historical Background of R.C. 2907.03 and 
Strict-Liability Sex Crimes Based on Relationships 
{¶ 30} Legislative perspectives on laws proscribing sex between certain 
classes of people have been mutable over the decades as societal norms have 
changed.  The law of consent is an example of an area affected by shifting 
standards. 
{¶ 31} The original age of consent for sexual activity for females in the 
United States under the common law was ten years.  Michael M. v. Superior Court 
of Sonoma Cty., 450 U.S. 464, 494, 101 S.Ct. 1200, 67 L.Ed.2d 437 (1981), fn. 9 
January Term, 2016 
 
15 
(Brennan, J., dissenting).  From the 19th to the 20th century, the age of consent rose 
to 16 years under Ohio statutory law, and as high as 18 years old in other states.  
See State v. Daniels, 169 Ohio St. 87, 95, 157 N.E.2d 736 (1959); Williams v. 
United States, 327 U.S. 711, 724-725, 66 S.Ct. 778, 90 L.Ed. 962 (1946), fn. 29.  
Just prior to the omnibus revision to Ohio’s criminal code in the 1970s, anyone over 
17 years old was strictly criminally liable for engaging in sexual conduct with any 
female under 16.  See former R.C. 2905.03.3   
{¶ 32} When enacting the new R.C. Chapter 2907, the General Assembly 
intended that private sexual conduct between consenting adults ought not to be 
criminalized, but that the law ought to proscribe sexual conduct that is assaultive, 
that involves the young and immature, or that carries a significant risk of harm.  
Ohio Legislative Service Commission, Summary of Am.Sub.H.B. 511 13 (Dec. 
1972).4 The seriousness of harm or risk of harm is based on one or more of four 
factors:  “the type of sexual activity involved; the means used to commit the 
offense; the age of the victim; and whether the offender stands in some special 
relationship to the victim.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. 
{¶ 33} In accordance with these factors, the new R.C. Chapter 2907 
increased the possibility of criminal liability for sexual conduct with prepubescent 
minors by removing the element of force that was previously required.  Compare 
R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) (prohibiting sexual conduct with a nonspouse who is “less 
than thirteen years of age, whether or not the offender knows the age of the other 
person”) with former R.C. 2905.02 (1953 H.B. No. 1) (prohibiting sexual 
                                                          
 
3 Former R.C. 2905.03 provided: “No person eighteen years of age or over shall carnally know and 
abuse a female person under the age of sixteen years with her consent.”  1953 H.B. No. 1, repealed 
by Am.Sub.H.B. No. 511, 134 Ohio Laws, Part II, 1866. 
4 For example, 1972 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 511 repealed statutes that had criminalized sexual conduct 
solely due to marital status, see former R.C. 2905.08, 1953 H.B. No. 1 (adultery), solely due to 
kinship of any degree, see former R.C. 2905.07, id.  (incest), or solely due to the specific sex acts 
involved, see former R.C. 2905.44, id. (sodomy).  And “[d]istinctions of sex between offenders and 
victims [were] general[ly] discarded.” Ohio Legislative Service Commission, Summary of 
Am.Sub.H.B. 511 13 (Dec. 1972).     
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
intercourse with “a female person under twelve years of age, forcibly and against 
her will”).  And it reduced the possibility of criminal liability for sexual conduct 
with minors aged 13 to 15 years old by eliminating strict liability and requiring 
proof that the offender acted knowingly or recklessly regarding the age of the 
victim. Compare R.C. 2907.04(A) (“No person who is eighteen years of age or 
older shall engage in sexual conduct with another, who is not the spouse of the 
offender, when the offender knows the other person is thirteen years of age or older 
but less than sixteen years of age, or the offender is reckless in that regard”) with 
former R.C. 2905.03 (“No person eighteen years of age or over shall carnally know 
and abuse a female person under the age of sixteen years with her consent”). 
{¶ 34} Using the above four factors, the General Assembly created a new 
offense of sexual battery, R.C. 2907.03, to prohibit “sexual conduct with a person 
other than the offender’s spouse in a variety of situations where the offender takes 
unconscionable advantage of the victim.”  Legislative Service Commission 1973 
comment to R.C. 2907.03 as enacted by Am.Sub.H.B. No. 511.  The version of 
R.C. 2907.03 currently in effect provides: 
 
(A) No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another, 
not the spouse of the offender, when any of the following apply: 
(1) The offender knowingly coerces the other person to 
submit by any means that would prevent resistance by a person of 
ordinary resolution. 
(2) The offender knows that the other person’s ability to 
appraise the nature of or control the other person’s own conduct is 
substantially impaired. 
(3) The offender knows that the other person submits 
because the other person is unaware that the act is being committed. 
January Term, 2016 
 
17 
(4) The offender knows that the other person submits 
because the other person mistakenly identifies the offender as the 
other person’s spouse. 
(5) The offender is the other person’s natural or adoptive 
parent, or a stepparent, or guardian, custodian, or person in loco 
parentis of the other person. 
(6) The other person is in custody of law or a patient in a 
hospital or other institution, and the offender has supervisory or 
disciplinary authority over the other person. 
(7) The offender is a teacher, administrator, coach, or other 
person in authority employed by or serving in [an elementary or 
secondary school], the other person is enrolled in or attends that 
school, and the offender is not enrolled in and does not attend that 
school. 
(8) The other person is a minor, the offender is a teacher, 
administrator, coach, or other person in authority employed by or 
serving in an institution of higher education, and the other person is 
enrolled in or attends that institution. 
(9) The other person is a minor, and the offender is the other 
person’s athletic or other type of coach, is the other person’s 
instructor, is the leader of a scouting troop of which the other person 
is a member, or is a person with temporary or occasional disciplinary 
control over the other person. 
(10) The offender is a mental health professional, the other 
person is a mental health client or patient of the offender, and the 
offender induces the other person to submit by falsely representing 
to the other person that the sexual conduct is necessary for mental 
health treatment purposes. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
(11) The other person is confined in a detention facility, and 
the offender is an employee of that detention facility. 
(12) The other person is a minor, the offender is a cleric, and 
the other person is a member of, or attends, the church or 
congregation served by the cleric. 
(13) The other person is a minor, the offender is a peace 
officer, and the offender is more than two years older than the other 
person. 
(B)  Whoever violates this section is guilty of sexual battery.  
Except as otherwise provided in this division, sexual battery is a 
felony of the third degree. * * *  
 
{¶ 35} The first six subdivisions of R.C. 2907.03(A), which relate to an 
offender’s parental relationship with the victim, the offender’s authoritative 
relationship over a prisoner or patient, or the offender’s knowing acts of coercion, 
trickery, or exploitation of a victim’s inability to consent, were included in the 
original version of R.C. 2907.03 in 1974.  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 511, 134 Ohio Laws, 
Part II, 1866, 1909.  Subsequently, the statute was amended in response to incidents 
involving inappropriate sexual conduct committed by adults who had special 
authoritative relationships with minors or other vulnerable populations but who 
were not covered by subdivisions (1) through (6) of the statute. 
{¶ 36} For example, almost 20 years after the passage of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 
511, the Ottawa County prosecutor unsuccessfully attempted to prosecute a high 
school teacher and coach for violating R.C. 2907.03(A)(5) by engaging in sexual 
conduct with a 16-year-old student on school property.  The Sixth District upheld 
the trial court’s dismissal of the state’s case.  State v. Noggle, 6th Dist. Ottawa No. 
91-OT-024, 1991 WL 2777821 (Dec. 31, 1991).  We agreed with the Sixth District 
that a person cannot be considered, as a matter of law, to stand in loco parentis for 
January Term, 2016 
 
19 
purposes of subdivision (A)(5) based solely on his or her role as a teacher.  State v. 
Noggle, 67 Ohio St.3d 31, 34, 615 N.E.2d 1040 (1993).  We held that the General 
Assembly had chosen to enumerate “specific situations where an offender might 
take unconscionable advantage of a victim,” but that the teacher-student 
relationship was not among those enumerated.  Id. at 33.  We noted that sexual 
conduct in the context of a teacher-student relationship violated societal and 
professional standards, but it could not be considered a violation of R.C. 
2907.03(A)(5), which “was not designed for teachers, coaches, scout leaders, or 
any other persons who might temporarily have some disciplinary control over a 
child.”  Id. 
{¶ 37} Directly after our decision in Noggle, the General Assembly 
amended R.C. 2907.03 by adding subdivisions (A)(7) through (A)(9), making the 
statute applicable to the relationship between students and teachers, coaches, scout 
leaders, or any other persons who might temporarily have some disciplinary 
control.  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 454, 145 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 6133-6134. 
{¶ 38} The statute was next amended in an apparent response to outrage 
over cases in which psychologists had sex with their clients but received little to no 
punishment from their governing state boards of psychology.  Ohio Senate Session, 
June 
28, 
2001, 
Part 
1, 
available 
at 
http://www.OhioChannel.org/MediaLibrary/Media.aspx?fileId=111704, at 12:18-
50.  Initially, legislative efforts focused on criminalizing any sexual contact or 
conduct between mental-health professionals and their clients.  Legislative Service 
Commission Bill Analysis of S.B. No. 9, as Introduced, 124th General Assembly.  
During the legislative debate, however, there were concerns about singling out one 
profession from the myriad of professions that serve vulnerable clients and about 
penalizing all consensual sexual activity between professionals and their clients 
regardless of the client’s mental state.  Ohio Senate Session, May 23, 2000, 
available 
at 
http://www.ohiochannel.org/MediaLibrary/Media.aspx?fileId= 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
111763, at 25:35 to 29:03.  A much more limited version of the bill ultimately 
became R.C. 2907.03(A)(10), which requires an affirmative unconscionable act by 
the mental-health professional in addition to the existence of the professional 
relationship with the client.  Am.Sub.S.B. No. 9, 149 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1247. 
{¶ 39} The next two additions, R.C. 2907.03(A)(11) and (12), returned to 
the broader scope of criminalizing sexual conduct based solely on relationships, 
specifically, the relationship between a detention-facility employee and a detainee 
and between a cleric and a minor parishioner.  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 510, 149 Ohio 
Laws, Part V, 9296-9297; Am.Sub.S.B. No. 17, 151 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1144-1145.  
The addition of these relationships was spawned by a request from the Ohio 
Department of Rehabilitation and Correction and by the highly publicized media 
accounts of widespread child sexual abuse by religious leaders.  See Ohio House of 
Representatives 
Hearing, 
May 
23, 
2002, 
available 
at 
http://www.ohiochannel.org/MediaLibrary/Media.aspx?fileId=112252, at 7:19 to 
9:59; 
Ohio 
Senate 
Hearing, 
Mar. 
16, 
2005, 
available 
at 
http://www.ohiochannel.org/MediaLibrary/Media.aspx?fileId=111520, at 35:15 to 
70:10. 
{¶ 40} Finally, the General Assembly added the statutory provision at issue 
today, R.C. 2907.03(A)(13), in the wake of the incident that gave rise to State v. 
Stout, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-06-12, 2006-Ohio-6089.  Stout, a Logan County 
detective, had befriended the victim during his investigation of a case involving the 
victim.  The state alleged that Stout became the victim’s confidant, purporting to 
help the victim with her “emotional, psychological and physical healing process.”  
Id. at ¶ 5.  It was further alleged that shortly after the victim turned 16, she and 
Stout engaged in sexual conduct in Stout’s sheriff’s-office vehicle.  Id. 
{¶ 41} Similarly to the Ottawa County prosecutor in Noggle, the Logan 
County prosecutor pursued sexual-battery charges under R.C. 2907.03(A)(5).  That 
January Term, 2016 
 
21 
prosecution was unsuccessful.  Stout’s motion to dismiss on the basis that he was 
not a person in loco parentis was granted.  Id. at ¶ 6. 
{¶ 42} The case led to calls for modifying the law to add peace officers to 
the sexual-battery statute.  See Ohio House Session, remarks of Rep. Anthony Core 
favoring adoption of H.B. No. 209, available at http://www.ohiochannel.org/ 
video/house-session-may-7-2008 (May 7, 2008) at 44:10 to 45:21.  The General 
Assembly responded.  As enacted, R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) contains no professional-
relationship-based requirement. 
State Interests 
{¶ 43} The foregoing history demonstrates that the purpose of R.C. 2907.03 
is to protect particularly vulnerable people, including minors and others who are 
legally unable to consent to sexual activity, from the harms that flow from sexual 
conduct.  But in doing so, the General Assembly focused its criminalization of 
sexual conduct on those who use their professional status to take unconscionable 
advantage of minors, except in the case of peace officers.  Peace officers are liable 
under the statute even if they did not use their status as peace officers to identify 
potential victims and abuse them. 
{¶ 44} The state asserts two reasons for the legislature’s classification of 
peace officers without regard to whether the peace officer uses his or her 
professional status to facilitate the forbidden sexual conduct: (1) holding peace 
officers to a higher standard to ensure integrity and to maintain the public trust and 
(2) protecting minors.  We address each reason, mindful that whatever the 
legislative justification, we are obligated to consider any conceivable reason that 
the legislature might have had in enacting the classification.  Columbia Gas 
Transm. Corp. v. Levin, 117 Ohio St.3d 122, 2008-Ohio-511, 882 N.E.2d 400,  
¶ 91; Fed. Communications Comm. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 
315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).  See also Romer, 517 U.S. at 632, 
116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (“In the ordinary case, a law will be sustained if 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
it can be said to advance a legitimate government interest, even if the law seems 
unwise or works to the disadvantage of a particular group, or if the rationale for it 
seems tenuous”). 
1. The state’s interest in maintaining public confidence in law 
enforcement and ensuring the integrity of peace officers 
{¶ 45} The state asserts that because peace officers hold a special position 
in society, the government has a legitimate interest in imposing standards on them 
that are higher than those that apply to every other Ohioan.  That interest is widely 
accepted as legitimate.  See Warrensville Hts. v. Jennings, 58 Ohio St.3d 206, 207, 
569 N.E.2d 489 (1991) (noting “higher standard of conduct” for police officers). 
{¶ 46} We agree that a peace officer occupies a unique position of public 
trust and authority that calls for special standards and penalties in many 
circumstances.  See, e.g., R.C. 2921.02 (bribery); R.C. 2921.41 (theft by public 
official); R.C. 2921.44 (dereliction of duty); R.C. 2921.45 (interfering with civil 
rights); R.C. 2907.03(A)(6) and (A)(11) (sexual battery of confined or detained 
person under officer’s authority).  But we do not agree that a person’s status as a 
peace officer justifies the imposition of different sexual-conduct standards in 
circumstances in which the officer’s status is irrelevant.  The instant situation is just 
such a circumstance. 
{¶ 47} The sexual conduct at issue here was unrelated to Mole’s 
professional status.  And the jury’s failure to convict him of unlawful sexual 
conduct with a minor makes clear that, but for his status as a peace officer, Mole 
would not be subject to criminal liability for the sexual conduct at issue in this case.  
Indeed, because the jury was unable to conclude that Mole had knowingly had 
sexual relations with a minor or that he was reckless in not ascertaining the minor’s 
age, see R.C. 2907.04(A), the trial judge declared a mistrial on the unlawful-sexual-
conduct count and the state exercised its prerogative to dismiss that count of the 
indictment and to not retry Mole. 
January Term, 2016 
 
23 
{¶ 48} The state urges that peace officers should be above suspicion of 
violation of the very laws they are sworn to enforce, and peace officers are regularly 
subjected to restrictions in their employment that are not applicable to ordinary 
citizens.  When peace officers violate the high standards imposed on them by their 
professions, they are subject to discipline, including discharge. These interests are, 
of course, legitimate.  As seen from the list of statutes above, the interest in holding 
peace officers to a higher standard is embedded in Ohio law.  See also R.C. 737.11 
(members of municipal police force shall obey and enforce all laws); Ironton v. 
Rist, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 10CA10, 2010-Ohio-5292 (striking down 
reinstatement of officer who falsified traffic ticket as violating well-defined public 
policy favoring honest police force that commands the public trust); Jones v. 
Franklin Cty. Sheriff, 52 Ohio St.3d 40, 555 N.E.2d 940 (upholding dismissal of 
peace officer for conduct unbecoming an officer).  And the need to maintain the 
efficiency and honesty of law enforcement serving the community is widely 
recognized.  See Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v. Pasadena, 51 Cal.3d 564, 273 
Cal.Rptr. 584, 797 P.2d 608 (1990) (affirming necessity of police internal 
investigations and discipline to assure public that officer misconduct is promptly 
and properly dealt with); Gwynn v. Philadelphia, 719 F.3d 295, 303 (3d Cir.2013) 
(need for public confidence justifies lower standard for testing reasonability of 
warrantless search of officers in internal-affairs investigation); Kelley v. Johnson, 
425 U.S. 238, 96 S.Ct. 1440, 47 L.Ed.2d 708 (1976) (upholding hair-grooming 
requirement for male members of police force against Fourteenth Amendment 
challenge). 
{¶ 49} But none of the cited authorities stand for the proposition that 
singling out the occupation of police officers for differential criminal treatment is 
rational when it is based on nothing more than the occupation itself.  See, e.g., 
Kelley at 248 (noting that the personal-grooming regulations of police officers had 
a rational basis of ensuring a uniformity of appearance so that the officers are 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
24 
“readily recognizable to the members of the public” or fostering esprit de corps 
within the force through similarity of appearance).  All of the restrictions that the 
high court has held permissible are directly tied to the officer’s conduct as an 
officer. 
{¶ 50} To be sure, the kind of conduct criminalized by R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) 
could legitimately be used to justify the termination of a peace officer’s 
employment.5  See R.C. 737.12 (allowing suspension or dismissal of police officers 
for any reasonable cause, including “gross immorality”); Jones v. Franklin Cty. 
Sheriff, 52 Ohio St.3d at 43-44, 555 N.E.2d 940 (holding that public policy supports 
the termination of a police officer for any conduct unbecoming an officer, whether 
committed on or off duty).  After all, the government has a valid interest in strictly 
controlling the immoral or unbecoming conduct of peace officers as employees 
regardless of any causal connection between the conduct and the employment itself.  
That governmental interest, however, does not justify differential treatment under 
the criminal law of peace officers acting as private citizens when there is no 
connection between the criminalized conduct and the office, duties, or other aspects 
of the occupation of a peace officer. 
{¶ 51} Peace officers must accept certain burdens as part of their 
employment in order to maintain the honor and privilege of being peace officers 
and to foster public trust.  They do not lose all of their rights as ordinary citizens, 
including their constitutional right to be treated equally under the criminal law, 
simply because they have chosen the profession of peace officer.  See Garrity v. 
New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500, 87 S.Ct. 616, 17 L.Ed.2d 562 (1967) (“policemen, 
like teachers and lawyers, are not relegated to a watered-down version of 
constitutional rights”). 
                                                          
 
5 Mole resigned from his position at the Waite Hill Police Department immediately after he was 
criminally charged.   
January Term, 2016 
 
25 
{¶ 52} Although the state’s interest in maintaining public trust and 
confidence in peace officers is considerable and undeniably legitimate, R.C. 
2907.03(A)(13), as currently worded, is a constitutionally impermissible attempt to 
further that interest. 
 2.  The interest in protecting minors from sexual coercion 
{¶ 53} The second interest offered by the state as justification for the 
classification of peace officers is the interest as “prohibiting peace officers from 
engaging in sex with children.”   
There is no dispute that the government has a 
legitimate, compelling interest in protecting the mental, emotional, and physical 
well-being of minors.  See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Norfolk Cty. Superior 
Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 73 L.Ed.2d 248 (1982).  “A democratic 
society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young 
people into full maturity as citizens * * *.”  Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 
168, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944). 
{¶ 54} Accordingly, the Supreme Court has sustained legislation aimed at 
protecting the physical and emotional well-being of youth even when the laws have 
operated in the sensitive area of constitutionally protected rights.  See, e.g., Osborne 
v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109-110, 110 S.Ct. 1691, 109 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990) 
(government’s interest in protecting children from victimization in child-
pornography industry justifies impingement on possessor’s First Amendment 
rights); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-757, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 
1113 (1982) (child pornography not entitled to First Amendment protection due to 
government interest in preventing exploitation and abuse of children).  We, too, 
have recognized the state’s interest in protecting minors, including protections from 
sexual exploitation.  State v. Young, 37 Ohio St.3d 249, 256-257, 525 N.E.2d 1363 
(1988) (upholding statute criminalizing possession of child pornography as 
justified by state’s compelling interest in protecting children), rev’d on other 
grounds sub nom. Osborne v. Ohio; State v. Romage, 138 Ohio St.3d 390, 2014-
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
26 
Ohio-783, 7 N.E.3d 1156, ¶ 10 (noting state’s “legitimate and compelling interest 
in protecting children” from lewd acts).  Whether articulated as a general interest 
in protecting minors, or more specifically as an interest in protecting minors from 
sexual exploitation by those with special access to them or an authoritative 
relationship over them, the legitimacy of this interest is clear. 
{¶ 55} The decisive question is whether the statutory classification of peace 
officers is a rational means of advancing that interest. 
{¶ 56} The state asserts that because R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) prohibits peace 
officers from engaging in sexual activity with persons under 18 years, it achieves 
the purpose of protecting minors from peace officers who use their authoritative 
relationship with minors to take unconscionable advantage of those minors in order 
to engage in sexual activity.  In other words, the state urges us to agree that because 
the category of peace officers necessarily includes those officers who would abuse 
their authoritative relationship with minors to engage in sexual conduct with them, 
the classification of peace officers is rationally related to the governmental interest 
in protecting minors from sexual coercion.  We decline to adopt that fallacious 
logic. 
{¶ 57} There is no profession that per se makes its members more likely to 
engage in sexually predatory behavior, including sex with minors. Rather, federal 
studies show that three-quarters of child sexual abuse occurs at the hands of family 
members or others in the victim’s “circle of trust,” including their neighbors, 
teachers, coaches, scout leaders, youth-group volunteers, and doctors.  Wingert, 
Priests Commit No More Abuse than Other Males, Newsweek (Apr. 7, 2010), 
available 
at: 
http://www.newsweek.com/priests-commit-no-more-abuse-other-
males-70625.  And although a pedophile may seek employment in a capacity that 
permits contact with children or access to them, a number of professions afford 
those opportunities.  In addition to other ways of gaining access to children, “[a] 
pedophile may also seek employment where he will be in contact with children 
January Term, 2016 
 
27 
(e.g., teacher, camp counselor, babysitter, school bus driver, coach) or where he can 
eventually specialize in working with children (e.g., physician, dentist, clergy 
member, photographer, social worker, law-enforcement officer).”  Lanning, Child 
Molestors:  A Behavioral Analysis (5th Ed.2010) 57, available at 
http://www.missingkids.org/en_US/publications/NC70.pdf.  In other words, it is 
the access provided by the occupational relationship, and not the occupation by 
itself, that creates the risk of harm. 
{¶ 58} Undeniably, the state has a valid, rational interest in proscribing the 
use of professional authority to sexually exploit minors or other vulnerable persons.  
And R.C. 2907.03(A) may have been born from the desire to prevent those in 
positions of authority or control from abusing that authority or control to sexually 
exploit vulnerable persons. But here, to obtain a conviction, the statute does not 
require the state to prove that Mole knew J.S. was a minor or that Mole was reckless 
in not knowing J.S. was a minor.  Nor does it require the state to prove that Mole’s 
sexual contact with J.S. had any connection to Mole’s status as a peace officer.  
Thus, although the state’s interest in protecting minors from sexual conduct is 
rational, the classification of peace officers in R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) is not.  Indeed, 
the irrationality of the R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) classification is evident when 
considered in the larger context of the statutory scheme at issue here, which 
otherwise requires that there be a nexus between the offender’s employment and 
the offender’s illegal conduct with a child or other defenseless person. 
{¶ 59} R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) omits any mention of a relationship between 
the conduct and the profession. 
{¶ 60} To obtain a conviction under R.C. 2907.03(A)(13), the state does not 
need to prove the existence of any authoritative relationship.  But in other sections 
of the statute, the state must demonstrate that the potential offenders used trickery 
or occupied a position of authority in order to make sexual conduct with the victim 
a crime under the statute.  How is it rational to require that the state demonstrate 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
28 
that offenders in other professions that provide access to children, including 
coaches, teachers, clerics, employees of detention facilities, and scout leaders,6 
used their professional capacity to exploit the victim, but to omit that requirement 
if the offender is a peace officer?  This irrationality is particularly evident in light 
of the legislative history of the act (in which amendments to the law followed 
reports of incidents in which the offender had misused his or her professional 
capacity to commit the crime) and the knowledge that many professions afford 
offenders access to children. 
{¶ 61} “[E]qual protection requires * * * that reasonable grounds exist for 
making a distinction between those within and those without a designated class.”  
State v. Buckley, 16 Ohio St.2d 128, 134, 243 N.E.2d 66 (1968).  When 
criminalization is based solely on the status of the classified group without any 
relationship to a legitimate state interest, the classification may be found to be 
unconstitutionally arbitrary.  See Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 
69 S.Ct. 1291, 93 L.Ed. 1544 (1949) (discriminatory taxation of out-of-state entities 
based solely on residency status is arbitrary and violates equal protection); Metro. 
Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 105 S.Ct. 1676, 84 L.Ed.2d 751 (1985) (same).  
The statute at issue here reflects impermissible arbitrariness. 
{¶ 62} Moreover, we are cognizant that the failure to include the 
relationship element in R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) does not merely ease the state’s 
burden of proving the risk of unconscionable advantage, but rather, it entirely 
eliminates the state’s burden of proof beyond establishing the age of the minor, the 
profession of the peace officer, and the fact that sexual conduct took place. 
{¶ 63} There is some indication that the legislature’s omission of the 
relationship element might have been meant to ease the prosecutorial burden of 
                                                          
 
6 The scout leader, for instance, must be the victim’s scout leader.  R.C. 2907.03(A)(10).  If the 
offender is a cleric, the victim must be a member of the congregation or church served by the cleric.  
R.C. 2907.03(A)(12). 
January Term, 2016 
 
29 
proof. 
 
Ohio 
Senate 
Session, 
Dec. 
16, 
2008, 
available 
at 
http://www.ohiochannel.org/MediaLibrary/Media.aspx?fileId=117520, 39:10-20 
(“the sponsor had some concerns with the prosecutors about the ability to prosecute 
under that section”).  If that motive did in fact figure in the removal of that element, 
it may have been well intended,7 but that does not make it constitutionally 
sufficient.  Undoubtedly, most prosecutorial burdens would be eased by removing 
constitutional protections of individuals, including the rights to counsel, due 
process, and equal protection and the rights against self-incrimination and 
warrantless searches.  “[T]he legislature may go a good way in raising 
[presumptions] or in changing the burden of proof, but there are limits.  * * * [I]t is 
not within the province of a legislature to declare an individual guilty or 
presumptively guilty of a crime.”  (Emphasis added.)  McFarland v. Am. Sugar 
Refining Co., 241 U.S. 79, 86, 36 S.Ct. 498, 60 L.Ed. 899 (1916) (invalidating a 
statute that imposed a rebuttable presumption that a refiner who systematically 
purchases sugar in Louisiana for less than the refiner pays elsewhere has violated 
antimonopoly laws).  Compare United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609-610, 91 
S.Ct. 1112, 28 L.Ed.2d 356 (1971) (strict criminal liability for possession of 
unregistered hand grenades is justified because no reasonable person would believe 
that possessing such highly dangerous offensive weapons is an innocent act) with 
Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 468, 63 S.Ct. 1241, 87 L.Ed. 1519 (1943) 
(striking down as irrational a statutory presumption that a person previously 
convicted of a crime of violence who is found in possession of a firearm must have 
received that firearm in interstate commerce). 
{¶ 64} We must conclude that R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) imposes strict liability 
on Mole via an irrational presumption.  There is absolutely no ground for presuming 
                                                          
 
7 We see no practical difficulty in proving the existence of an authoritative relationship.  It should 
be a simple matter to prove that a peace officer’s acquaintance with or interactions with a particular 
minor arose from, or occurred during, the performance of the peace officer’s duties.   
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
30 
that Mole used his status as a peace officer to gain access to or bend the will of J.S. 
or to facilitate the sexual conduct by any means connected to his occupation.  And 
there is no dispute that J.S. was unaware of Mole’s occupation and that Mole’s 
interaction with J.S. had absolutely no connection with Mole’s occupational status. 
{¶ 65} The state argues that in many other sexual encounters involving 
peace officers and minors, there will be such a connection, and that Mole therefore 
cannot prove that R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) is unconstitutional in all applications.  But 
it is unlikely that proof of such a connection, let alone proof of an unconscionable 
advantage flowing from that connection, will ever be part of any prosecution under 
R.C. 2907.03(A)(13), because there is no need to prove, and thus no opportunity to 
disprove, the connection. 
{¶ 66} Ohio has codified the exception that dispenses with the necessity to 
prove scienter in sex offenses committed against victims under the age of consent.  
See, e.g., R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), which eliminates scienter from the offense of rape 
when the victim is under the age of 13.  Maintaining strict liability in situations 
such as child rape is well supported.  Scienter is justifiably imputed in such cases.  
The physical immaturity of a prepubescent child is obvious, and engaging in sexual 
behavior with a child indicates a vicious will on the part of the offender.  A 
prepubescent child’s undeveloped physical features will, by themselves, provide 
notice of the child’s age, and thus the potential offender is presumed to know that 
sexual activity with that child is proscribed.  In re D.B., 129 Ohio St.3d 104, 2011-
Ohio-2671, 950 N.E.2d 528, ¶ 18.  Scienter may also be imputed in situations where 
offenders engage in sexual activity with someone over whom they have great 
authority and control.  See R.C. 2907.03(A)(6) through (9). 
{¶ 67} But in R.C. 2907.03(A)(13), scienter is not imputed from any factor 
that might justify inferring a guilty knowledge or a nefarious intent.  No factor such 
as the victim’s inability to consent or the offender’s authority to compel consent is 
provided.  Instead, scienter is imputed, improperly, from the mere occupational 
January Term, 2016 
 
31 
status of the offender, and that imputation applies to all peace officers, even when 
the victim is entirely ignorant of the offender’s status and thus cannot have been 
exploited in any way that is connected to that status. 
{¶ 68} The differential treatment of peace officers in this statutory scheme 
is based on an irrational classification.  The statute not only fails to include any 
relationship or other element that justifies the omission of a scienter requirement, 
but also disparately affects peace officers in a way that bears no rational relationship 
to the government’s interest in protecting minors from sexual coercion by people 
in positions of authority who use that authority to compel submission.  Having 
carefully considered the compelling interests at play here, the constitutional 
protections afforded our citizens, and the strong presumption of constitutionality 
that can only be overcome by a showing that the statute clearly and unequivocally 
violates the Constitution, we are compelled to conclude that R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) 
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Ohio and United States Constitutions. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 69} We do not condone the conduct of appellee.  Nor do we easily reach 
our conclusion that R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) represents a “classification of persons 
undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal Protection Clause does not 
permit.”  Romer, 517 U.S. at 635, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855. 
{¶ 70} Although the government has a compelling interest in protecting 
minors from sexual coercion and an interest in prohibiting peace officers from 
abusing their authority in order to sexually exploit minors, the government cannot 
punish a class of professionals without making a connection between the 
classification and the prohibited act.  We therefore affirm the judgment of the 
Eighth District Court of Appeals, declaring R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) to be 
unconstitutional on its face. 
Judgment affirmed. 
PFEIFER and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
32 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in judgment only, in an opinion. 
KENNEDY, J., dissents in an opinion that O’DONNELL, J., joins. 
FRENCH, J., dissents in an opinion that O’DONNELL, J., joins. 
_________________ 
LANZINGER, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 71} “The decisions of the [United States Supreme] Court are not, and 
should not be, dispositive of questions regarding rights guaranteed by counterpart 
provisions of state law. Accordingly, such decisions are not mechanically 
applicable to state law issues, and state court judges and the members of the bar 
seriously err if they so treat them.”  (Footnote omitted.)  Brennan, State 
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv.L.Rev. 489, 502 
(1977). 
{¶ 72} Based on the analysis that the Ohio Constitution is a document of 
independent force, I join the majority in judgment only. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 73} Respectfully, I dissent.  Since 1895, we have held that the Ohio 
Equal Protection Clause provides the same protection as the federal Equal 
Protection Clause.  See State ex rel. Schwartz v. Ferris, 53 Ohio St. 314, 41 N.E. 
579 (1895), paragraph four of the syllabus. Today, the majority, without any 
analysis of the differences in the text of those provisions or any consideration of 
the history of the Ohio and federal Equal Protection Clauses, departs from that 
century-old precedent and declares that the Ohio Equal Protection Clause affords 
more protection than the Fourteenth Amendment in order to invalidate R.C. 
2907.03(A)(13).  Because the majority has stretched the precedent of this court and 
that of the United States Supreme Court to the breaking point, I must dissent. 
{¶ 74} Absent a textual or historical analysis that demonstrates that we 
should depart from our longstanding precedent, there is no reason to do so today. 
January Term, 2016 
 
33 
Because the federal and Ohio Equal Protection Clauses afford the same protection, 
and because the statute is rationally related to a valid state interest, R.C. 
2907.03(A)(13) is constitutional. 
I. PRELIMINARY ISSUES 
{¶ 75} I agree with the majority’s recitation of the facts. The majority is also 
correct that the appropriate standard of review is the “rational-basis test” because 
R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) does not implicate a suspect class or fundamental right.  
Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 
420, ¶ 64.  Additionally, the majority correctly holds that R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) 
meets the first requirement of rational-basis review because the statute reflects a 
legitimate state interest in maintaining the public’s confidence in peace officers by 
ensuring that their integrity is above reproach.  Id. at ¶ 66 (statute must be upheld 
if it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest). 
{¶ 76} I part with the majority, however, in its declaration that Article I, 
Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution affords greater protection than the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  I further disagree that R.C. 
2907.03(A)(13) is facially unconstitutional and that the statute is not rationally 
related to a valid state interest. 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
A. The Ohio Equal Protection Clause does not afford greater protection 
than the federal Equal Protection Clause 
{¶ 77} The majority declares the statute unconstitutional on the bases of the 
federal and Ohio Equal Protection Clauses, then concludes that even if it is wrong 
about the application of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Ohio Constitution’s Equal 
Protection Clause “independently forbid[s] the disparate treatment of peace 
officers.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
34 
{¶ 78} In support of its decision, the majority relies on Arnold v. Cleveland, 
67 Ohio St.3d 35, 42, 616 N.E.2d 163 (1993).  Arnold is the first case wherein this 
court interpreted the Ohio Constitution as providing greater protection than the 
federal Constitution.  However, today’s majority fails to provide any of the careful 
analysis set forth in the Arnold opinion to justify its conclusion that the Ohio 
Constitution affords greater protection. 
{¶ 79} In Arnold, we examined the right to bear arms in light of Article I, 
Section 4 of the Ohio Constitution and the Second Amendment. We recognized that 
the Ohio Constitution contained language that is not included in the federal 
Constitution.  Id. at 43.  We noted that the additional language indicated that the 
people of Ohio chose “to go even further” than the Second Amendment’s focus on 
the preservation of a militia.  Id.  In securing to every person an individual right to 
bear arms, the Ohio provision, unlike the federal provision, “was obviously 
implemented to allow a person to possess certain firearms for defense of self and 
property.”  Id. Therefore, the Arnold court advanced a rationale for interpreting the 
Ohio Constitution differently than the federal provision. We then went on to 
examine the history of the Ohio constitutional provision and the lack of debate that 
attended both the original version and its 1851 revision, which demonstrated the 
wide acceptance and uncontroversial nature of the right to possess and use certain 
arms.  Id. 
{¶ 80} Arnold serves as the model for the type of the analysis this court 
should undertake when deciding whether the Ohio Constitution offers greater 
protection than the federal Constitution.  However, this analytical framework is 
absent from the majority opinion. 
{¶ 81} In lieu of a textual or historical analysis, the majority cites five cases 
as authority for its position that this court “heeded the hortatory call to the new 
federalism.”  I agree that those cases do indeed reflect the new federalism in that 
they conclude that a provision of the Ohio Constitution can afford greater protection 
January Term, 2016 
 
35 
than its federal counterpart.  However, three of those cases involved a careful 
comparison and analysis of the text of the Ohio and federal provisions at issue, such 
as appeared in Arnold but not in today’s majority.  The other two cases cited by the 
majority, State v. Brown, 99 Ohio St.3d 323, 2003-Ohio-3931, 792 N.E.2d 175, and 
State v. Farris, 109 Ohio St.3d 519, 2006-Ohio-3255, 849 N.E.2d 985, are highly 
distinguishable from the case here. 
{¶ 82} In the three cases where we proactively interpreted the Ohio 
Constitution to provide greater protection than the federal Constitution, or at least 
reserved the power to do so, we engaged in an Arnold analysis by examining the 
text and history of the provision before taking the formidable step of declaring that 
a provision of the Ohio Constitution is more protective. 
{¶ 83} In Simmons-Harris v. Goff, we examined the Establishment Clause 
in the Ohio and federal Constitutions, and we concluded that the language in the 
Ohio clause is quite different from the federal.  86 Ohio St.3d 1, 10, 711 N.E.2d 
203 (1999). We also observed that while in the past we had discussed the Ohio and 
federal clauses together, “[t]here is no reason to conclude that the Religion Clauses 
of the Ohio Constitution are coextensive with those in the United States 
Constitution  * * *.”  Id.  As a result, we stated we would not “irreversibly tie 
ourselves” to the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal 
Establishment Clause. 
{¶ 84} In Humphrey v. Lane, we concluded that the protection provided by 
the Ohio Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause goes beyond that provided by the 
federal Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause. 89 Ohio St.3d 62, 67, 728 N.E.2d 1039 
(2000).  We reached this conclusion because we determined that the phrase “nor 
shall any interference with the rights of conscience be permitted” is broader than 
the federal Constitution’s prohibition against laws that prohibit the free exercise of 
religion.  Id. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
36 
{¶ 85} Finally in Norwood v. Horney, we compared the Ohio Takings 
Clause with its federal counterpart.  110 Ohio St.3d 353, 2006-Ohio-3799, 853 
N.E.2d 1115.  We held that unlike the federal Constitution as interpreted by the 
United States Supreme Court, the Ohio Constitution prohibited government 
appropriation of private property when the sole justification was economic benefit 
to the community.  Norwood at ¶ 75. 
{¶ 86} The majority’s reliance on Farris and Brown is also misplaced.  
These two cases are highly distinguishable from the case at bar because both 
involved a reaffirmation of our view that the Ohio Constitution provides greater 
protection even after the United States Supreme Court narrowed the protections of 
the federal counterpart.  Farris, 109 Ohio St.3d 519, 2006-Ohio-3255, 849 N.E.2d 
985, ¶ 48-49, and Brown, 99 Ohio St.3d 323, 2003-Ohio-3931, 792 N.E.2d 175,  
¶ 22. The state is not arguing that an intervening case imposing a narrower, more 
restrictive interpretation of the federal Equal Protection Clause by the United States 
Supreme Court requires a similar restriction of the Ohio Equal Protection Clause. 
{¶ 87} In Farris, we examined the admissibility of physical evidence seized 
as a result of unwarned statements in a criminal trial.  Farris at ¶ 48.  While 
acknowledging that such evidence would be admissible under the Fifth 
Amendment, id. at ¶ 45, we held that Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution 
prohibited its admission.  We concluded that the Ohio Constitution was more 
protective than the Fifth Amendment because “the overall administration of justice 
in Ohio requires a law-enforcement environment in which evidence is gathered in 
conjunction with Miranda, not in defiance of it.”  Id. at ¶ 49.  “[T]o hold otherwise 
would encourage law-enforcement officers to withhold Miranda warnings and 
would thus weaken Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.”  Id. 
{¶ 88} This holding was in response to the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in United States v. Patane, in which the court held that the failure to give 
Miranda warnings does not require the suppression of physical evidence seized 
January Term, 2016 
 
37 
from a suspect as a result of the unwarned voluntary statements. 542 U.S. 630, 631, 
124 S.Ct. 2620, 159 L.Ed.2d 667 (2004).  We decided Farris two years after 
Patane.  We declined to follow the Patane court and declared that the Ohio 
Constitution provided greater protection to criminal defendants than the Fifth 
Amendment. Farris at ¶ 48. 
{¶ 89} In Brown, our decision was in response to the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Atwater v. Lago Vista, which held that a warrantless arrest for 
a misdemeanor did not violate the Fourth Amendment even when the offense did 
not involve a breach of the peace.  532 U.S. 318, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 
(2001), and Brown at ¶ 21. The United States Supreme Court concluded that when 
the Fourth Amendment was framed, the common law permitted warrantless arrests 
for similar offenses.  Atwater at 326-340.  One year prior to the Atwater decision, 
in State v. Jones, we had examined the same issue, and we held that warrantless 
arrests for minor misdemeanors, which are crimes that do not involve a breach of 
the peace, are not permissible under the Ohio and federal Constitutions.  88 Ohio 
St.3d 430, 727 N.E.2d 886 (2000), syllabus.  Two years after Atwater, we decided 
Brown, and we declined to extend the holding in Atwater to the Ohio Constitution.  
Brown at ¶ 7. 
{¶ 90} Based on our precedent, in order to hold that the Ohio Constitution 
is more protective than federal Constitution, the majority needs to point to some 
language in Article I, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution that is different than the 
language of the Fourteenth Amendment. The majority opinion is silent on this 
point. 
{¶ 91} It appears that the majority’s interpretation of Ohio’s Equal 
Protection Clause is not based on its text or history but on the majority’s sense of 
judicial necessity.  However, our constitutional interpretation should be guided 
exclusively by the language and history of the clause at issue. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
38 
{¶ 92} The majority acknowledges that we have previously held that the 
federal and Ohio Equal Protection Clauses are to be construed and analyzed 
identically, citing Am. Assn. of Univ. Professors, Cent. State Univ. Chapter v. Cent. 
State Univ., 87 Ohio St.3d 55, 60, 717 N.E.2d 286 (1999).  However, the majority 
does not distinguish that case from the present one in any way that would justify its 
departure from that holding.  Instead, the majority merely cites Arnold for the 
general proposition that “the Ohio Constitution is a document of independent 
force.” Majority opinion at ¶ 14.  That statement is true enough, but hardly 
sufficient by itself.  Moreover, the majority is silent regarding our long line of 
precedent, beginning in 1895, holding that the protection provided by the Ohio 
Equal Protection Clause is identical to that provided by the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. 
{¶ 93} In State ex rel. Schwartz v. Ferris, we announced that the federal 
Equal Protection Clause was “not broader than the second section of our bill of 
rights.” 53 Ohio St. at 341, 41 N.E. 579.  In 1937, we again said that “the ‘equal 
protection of the law’ provision * * * is substantially the same as the guarantee in 
that respect contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution.”  
(Emphasis added.)  State ex rel. Struble v. Davis, 132 Ohio St. 555, 560, 9 N.E.2d 
684 (1937).  In 1975, we held that “[t]he limitations placed upon governmental 
action by the Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio and United States constitutions 
are essentially identical.”  (Emphasis added.)  Kinney v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. 
Corp., 41 Ohio St.2d 120, 123, 322 N.E.2d 880 (1975).  See also State ex rel. Heller 
v. Miller, 61 Ohio St.2d 6, 8, 399 N.E.2d 66 (1980) (same). In 1999, we declared 
that “the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, contained in 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Ohio 
Constitution, contained in Section 2, Article I, are functionally equivalent.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Desenco, Inc. v. Akron, 84 Ohio St.3d 535, 544, 706 N.E.2d 
323 (1999).  As recently as 2010, we reiterated that “[t]he federal and Ohio equal-
January Term, 2016 
 
39 
protection provisions are ‘functionally equivalent.’ ” Pickaway Cty. Skilled 
Gaming, L.L.C. v. Cordray, 127 Ohio St.3d 104, 2010-Ohio-4908, 936 N,E.2d 944, 
at ¶ 17, quoting State v. Williams, 126 Ohio St.3d 65, 2010-Ohio-2453, 930 N.E.2d 
770, ¶ 38. 
{¶ 94} Although the majority effectively overrules these cases, glaringly 
absent from the majority’s opinion is the rigorous three-step analysis required 
before this court may overturn a prior decision.  Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 
Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 95} Rejecting 120 years of precedent and without any of the analysis 
reflected in Arnold, the majority invalidates R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) because it 
believes that the statute is “arbitrary.” 
A.  R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) is not Facially Unconstitutional 
and Survives Rational-Basis Review 
1.  Facial Challenges Are Disfavored 
{¶ 96} The majority concludes that R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) is facially 
unconstitutional. Majority opinion at ¶ 2.  The judicial authority to override the 
legislative will should be used with extreme caution and restraint, because declaring 
a statute unconstitutional based on a facial challenge is an “exceptional remedy.”  
Carey v. Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d 189, 201 (6th Cir.2010).  “A facial challenge alleges 
that a statute, ordinance, or administrative rule, on its face and under all 
circumstances, has no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.”  
Wymsylo v. Bartec, Inc., 132 Ohio St.3d 167, 2012-Ohio-2187, 970 N.E.2d 898,  
¶ 21.  This type of challenge is the most difficult to successfully mount because the 
challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the act 
would be valid.  Id., citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 
2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987).  “The fact that a statute might operate 
unconstitutionally under some plausible set of circumstances is insufficient to 
render it wholly invalid.”  Harrold v. Collier, 107 Ohio St.3d 44, 2005-Ohio-5334, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
40 
836 N.E.2d 1165, ¶ 37.  “In order for a statute to be facially unconstitutional, it 
must be unconstitutional in all applications.” Oliver v. Cleveland Indians Baseball 
Co. Ltd. Partnership, 123 Ohio St.3d 278, 2009-Ohio-5030, 915 N.E.2d 1205,  
¶ 13, citing Harrold at ¶ 37, and Salerno at 745.  These challenges seek to remove 
a law from the books, i.e., to “leave nothing standing.”  Warshak v. United States, 
532 F.3d 521, 528 (6th Cir.2008). 
{¶ 97} Facial challenges are “contrary to the fundamental principle of 
judicial restraint.” Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 
552 U.S. 442, 450, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008). A facial challenge 
forces the court to “ ‘ “anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the 
necessity of deciding it” ’ ” and to “ ‘ “formulate a rule of constitutional law broader 
than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.” ’ ”  Id. at 450, 
quoting Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-347, 56 S.Ct. 
466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), quoting Liverpool, New York 
& Philadelphia Steamship Co. v. Emigration Commrs., 113 U.S. 33, 39, 5 S.Ct. 
352, 28 L.Ed 899 (1885).  They raise the risk of a “ ‘premature interpretatio[n] of 
statutes’ on the basis of factually barebones records.”  Sabri v. United States, 541 
U.S. 600, 609, 124 S.Ct. 1941, 158 L.Ed.2d 891 (2004), quoting United States v. 
Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22, 80 S.Ct. 519, 4 L.Ed.2d 524 (1964).  Because of the 
breadth of the remedy and the loosening of judicial restraint involved in facial 
constitutional litigation, courts disfavor facial challenges. Washington State 
Grange, 552 U.S. at 450, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 170 L.Ed.2d 151. Courts do and should 
prefer as-applied challenges, which are the “ ‘basic building blocks of constitutional 
adjudication.’ ”  Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168, 127 S.Ct. 1610, 167 
L.Ed.2d 480 (2007), quoting Fallon, As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-
Party Standing, 113 Harv.L.Rev. 1321, 1328 (2000). 
  
 
 
January Term, 2016 
 
41 
2.  R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) is Rationally Related to a Valid State Interest 
{¶ 98} When a statute is challenged as facially unconstitutional and when, 
as here, the standard of review is the rational-basis standard, the court must conduct 
a two-step analysis: “We must first identify a valid state interest.  Second, we must 
determine whether the method or means by which the state has chosen to advance 
that interest is rational.” McCrone v. Bank One Corp., 107 Ohio St.3d 272, 2005-
Ohio-6505, 839 N.E.2d 1, ¶ 9, citing Buchman v. Wayne Trace Local School Dist. 
Bd. of Edn., 73 Ohio St.3d 260, 267, 652 N.E.2d 952 (1995); Pickaway Cty. Skilled 
Gaming, 127 Ohio St.3d 104, 2010-Ohio-4908, 936 N.E.2d 944, ¶ 19.  As to the 
first step, the majority finds a valid state interest in play, but concludes that the 
second step is not satisfied because the method or means chosen to advance the 
interest is not rational.  I disagree. 
{¶ 99} The second step in a rational-basis review requires us to determine 
whether the law is rationally related to a valid state interest.  If a statute is 
challenged as facially unconstitutional, the challenger must demonstrate that the 
statute can never be applied in a manner that is rationally related to a valid state 
interest and show instead, that it is “unconstitutional in all applications.” Oliver, 
123 Ohio St.3d 278, 2009-Ohio-5030, 915 N.E.2d 1205, ¶ 13, citing Harrold, 107 
Ohio St.3d 44, 2005-Ohio-5334, 836 N.E.2d 1165, at ¶ 37, and Salerno 481 U.S. at 
745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697. Those arguing that a statute’s classification 
violates equal protection have the burden of rebutting every conceivable basis that 
might support it.  Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364, 93 
S.Ct. 1001, 35 L.Ed.2d 351 (1973).  A statute will survive a facial equal protection 
challenge when there is a legitimate state interest with a rational basis, that is, when 
the means and method the state uses to further that interest has some reasonable 
basis. McCrone at ¶ 8.  As we have held: 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
42 
Legislative enactments that do not involve a suspect classification 
are “presumptively rationally related to legitimate social and 
economic goals, unless the ‘varying treatment of different groups or 
persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of 
legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature’s 
actions were irrational.’ ” 
 
McCrone, 107 Ohio St.3d 272, 2005-Ohio-6505, 839 N.E.2d 1, at ¶ 30, quoting 
State ex rel. Doersam v. Indus. Comm., 40 Ohio St.3d 201, 203, 533 N.E.2d 321 
(1988), quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 
(1979). 
{¶ 100} There is a “strong presumption of validity” that the United States 
Supreme Court has repeatedly applied when a statute, challenged as 
unconstitutional, does not involve fundamental rights or a suspect classification.  
Fed. Communications Comm. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314, 
113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993); Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 
487 U.S. 450, 462-463, 108 S.Ct. 2481, 101 L.Ed.2d 399 (1988); Hodel v. Indiana, 
452 U.S. 314, 331–332, 101 S.Ct. 2376, 69 L.Ed.2d 40 (1981); Massachusetts Bd. 
of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314-315, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 
(1976).  While the majority holds that R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) does not involve a 
fundamental right or suspect classification, it merely pays lip service to the strong 
presumption that R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) is constitutional in its rush to invalidate the 
statute because it believes that it is based on fallacious logic. 
{¶ 101} Like the United States Supreme Court, we too have held that it is 
not within the purview of rational-basis review to decide whether a statute is wise 
or misguided. We have observed: 
 
January Term, 2016 
 
43 
The vast weight of authority requires that, when utilizing the 
“rational basis” test, the courts defer to the legislature on the issue 
of constitutionality. “We do not inquire whether this statute is wise 
or desirable * * *. * * * Misguided laws may nonetheless be 
constitutional.” 
 
Morris v. Savoy, 61 Ohio St.3d 684, 692, 576 N.E.2d 765 (1991), quoting James v. 
Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 133, 92 S.Ct. 2027, 32 L.Ed.2d 600 (1972). We have also 
observed that “[i]t is a fundamental principle that the determination of the propriety, 
wisdom, policy or expediency of legislation is not within the judicial function and 
laws may not be declared invalid by the courts because deemed inexpedient or 
unwise * * *.”  State v. Parker, 150 Ohio St. 22, 24, 80 N.E.2d 490 (1948). 
{¶ 102} Additionally, “ ‘courts are compelled under rational-basis review 
to accept a legislature's generalizations even when there is an imperfect fit between 
means and ends.’ ”  Pickaway Cty. Skilled Gaming, 127 Ohio St.3d 104, 2010-
Ohio-4908, 936 N.E.2d 944, ¶ 32, quoting Am. Assn. of Univ. Professors, 87 Ohio 
St.3d at 58, 717 N.E.2d 286.  Furthermore, a classification does not fail rational-
basis review merely because it is not made with mathematical precision or because 
it results in some inequality.  Id. 
{¶ 103} The majority concludes that R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) violates the 
Equal Protection Clause because the General Assembly’s decision to treat peace 
officers differently than other people who hold positions of trust based solely on 
their profession is not logical. The purpose of the Equal Protection Clause is not to 
allow courts to repeal laws that they believe are illogical.  Instead, as the United 
States Supreme Court has explained, “ ‘ “[t]he purpose of the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the State’s 
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination * * *.” ’ ” Willowbrook 
v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000), quoting 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
44 
Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota Cty., Nebraska, 260 U.S. 441, 445, 43 S.Ct. 190, 
67 L.Ed. 340 (1923), quoting Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 
352, 38 S.Ct. 495, 62 L.Ed. 1154 (1918). 
{¶ 104} Criminalizing sexual conduct between a peace officer and a minor 
is rationally related to a legitimate state interest because it punishes peace officers 
for conduct that if discovered would diminish them in the eyes of the community. 
If a peace officer discovered after the fact that the person with whom he engaged 
in sexual conduct was a minor, he would have a strong incentive to do whatever is 
necessary to ensure that his employer never found out, even to the point of 
compromising his integrity.  Moreover, there is the potential for blackmail, which 
could lead to corrupt behavior or worse.  These considerations demonstrate how the 
statute is rationally related to a legitimate government interest of protecting the 
public trust in peace officers by criminalizing conduct that is not only immoral but 
is fraught with the potential for corruption and exploitation. 
{¶ 105} The majority’s argument at its core is simply that the statute is 
arbitrary because peace officers are held criminally liable for engaging in sexual 
conduct with minors when that conduct is not connected with their status as peace 
officers.  However, the proper analysis for a facial challenge of a statute using the 
rational-basis standard of review is not whether the statute is unconstitutional in the 
challenged circumstance but whether the statute can ever be applied in a 
constitutional manner.  See Oliver, 123 Ohio St.3d 278, 2009-Ohio-5030, 915 
N.E.2d 1205, at ¶ 13.  The majority’s analysis must support the conclusion that the 
statute is “unconstitutional in all applications,” id., and it must “rebut every 
conceivable basis which might support it.”  Lehnhausen, 410 U.S. at 364, 93 S.Ct. 
1001, 35 L.Ed.2d 351. 
{¶ 106} Instead the majority focuses its analysis on why the statute is 
unconstitutional when applied to appellee and his circumstances.  However, the 
majority does not rebut the application of the statute to peace officers who do have 
January Term, 2016 
 
45 
some professional connection to the victim or to peace officers who meet a minor 
in the course of their duties as a peace officer after engaging in sexual conduct with 
the minor.  The majority merely states that the state is not required to prove a 
professional connection between the peace officer and victim because it is not an 
element of the offense. 
{¶ 107} This reasoning fails because it shifts the burden of proving that the 
statute is unconstitutional in all circumstances from the party challenging the statute 
to the state.  “[T]he challenger must establish that there exists no set of 
circumstances under which the statute would be valid.”  Harrold, 107 Ohio St.3d 
44, 2005-Ohio-5334, 836 N.E.2d 1165, ¶ 37.  Appellee chose to mount a facial 
attack on the statute, so he must show that all applications of the statute bear no 
rational relation to any valid state interest.  It is not the state’s burden to introduce 
evidence to prove constitutionality. 
{¶ 108} The majority admits that the statute would be constitutional if the 
General Assembly had included a nexus between the peace officer’s professional 
status and the minor with whom he engages in sexual conduct.  However, the statute 
criminalizes this category of conduct between peace officers and minors as part of 
its broad prohibition against sexual conduct between peace officers and minors. 
The majority admits that the statute would achieve its legitimate state interest by a 
rational means and method if applied to a peace officer who uses his professional 
status to initiate sexual conduct with a minor. Under the majority’s own reasoning, 
the statute is not “unconstitutional in all applications.” Oliver, 123 Ohio St.3d 278, 
2009-Ohio-5030, 915 N.E.2d 1205, at ¶ 13. Therefore, the statute cannot be facially 
unconstitutional because it can be constitutionally applied in some instances.  Id. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 109} Since 1895, we have held that the Ohio Equal Protection Clause 
provides the same protection as the federal Equal Protection Clause.  Absent a 
textual or historical analysis supporting a departure from that precedent, there is no 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
46 
reason to do so today.  Because the federal and Ohio Constitution Equal Protection 
Clauses afford the same protection and R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) does not target a 
fundamental right or suspect class, our analysis is limited to a rational-basis review.  
Because the statute involves a valid state interest and the statute is rationally related 
to that valid state interest, I would find that R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) is constitutional.  
Therefore, I dissent. 
 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
 
FRENCH, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 110} I dissent from the majority’s decision and would hold that R.C. 
2907.03(A)(13) does not violate the guarantees of equal protection under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article I, Section 2 of 
the Ohio Constitution. 
{¶ 111} The majority, while noting the presumption of constitutionality and 
deference afforded to legislative enactments under rational-basis review, has in fact 
applied an elevated level of judicial scrutiny.  As the party invoking the extreme 
remedy of striking down an entire statute on its face, Mole must “negate every 
conceivable basis that might support the legislation.”  Columbia Gas Transm. Corp. 
v. Levin, 117 Ohio St.3d 122, 2008-Ohio-511, 882 N.E.2d 400, ¶ 91.  Mole has not 
met this very high burden. 
{¶ 112} In its analysis, the majority failed to consider applications of the 
statute that might support its validity, as rational-basis scrutiny requires.  Instead, 
the majority concludes that the imposition of criminal liability on peace officers 
under the circumstances in Mole’s case—“when there is no occupation-based 
relationship between the officer and the victim”—violates equal protection.  
Majority opinion at ¶ 2.  But the General Assembly enacted this law in the wake of 
State v. Stout, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-06-12, 2006-Ohio-6089, which arose when a 
detective allegedly used his position of trust to engage in sexual conduct with a 16-
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47 
year-old victim and witness of a murder-suicide involving her family.  Stout at ¶ 5.  
See also Ohio House Session, May 7, 2008, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 209, available at 
http://www.ohiochannel.org/video/house-session-may-7-2008 at 44:03. 
{¶ 113} The Stout case demonstrates one set of circumstances falling under 
the legitimate sweep of the statute, that is, when a peace officer’s unlawful sexual 
conduct with a minor relates directly to the officer’s professional status.  And 
because the statute has at least some valid application that is rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest, it must survive a facial challenge.  Oliver v. Cleveland 
Indians Baseball Co. Ltd. Partnership, 123 Ohio St.3d 278, 2009-Ohio-5030, 915 
N.E.2d 1205, ¶ 13. 
{¶ 114} The majority also concludes that R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) does not 
bear a rational relationship to the state’s interest in protecting minors from sexual 
coercion.  On the one hand, the majority deems the statute overinclusive because it 
designates all peace officers for differential treatment when only some officers 
might abuse their authoritative positions.  Majority opinion at ¶ 57.  On the other 
hand, the majority deems the statute underinclusive because members of other 
professions with access to children are just as likely to engage in sexual predation.  
Id. at ¶ 58. 
{¶ 115} Rational-basis review, however, does not demand “mathematical 
exactitude,” New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 49 L.Ed.2d 
511 (1976), and we are compelled under this deferential standard “ ‘ “to accept a 
legislature’s generalizations even when there is an imperfect fit between means and 
ends.” ’ ” Pickaway Cty. Skilled Gaming, L.L.C. v. Cordray, 127 Ohio St.3d 104, 
2010-Ohio-4908, 936 N.E.2d 944, ¶ 32, quoting Am. Assn. of Univ. Professors, 
Cent. State Univ. Chapter v. Cent. State Univ., 87 Ohio St.3d 55, 58, 717 N.E.2d 
286 (1999), quoting Fed. Communications Comm. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 
508 U.S.307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).  The General Assembly 
determined that the privilege of serving as a peace officer comes with the obligation 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
48 
to adhere to a higher standard of conduct both on and off duty.  As permitted under 
rational-basis scrutiny, the legislature concluded that the benefits of prohibiting all 
such sexual encounters between peace officers and minors outweigh the risk of 
underinclusion. 
{¶ 116} I would therefore conclude that R.C. 2907.03(A)(13) is rationally 
related to the state’s legitimate interests in preserving public confidence in the 
integrity of law-enforcement officers and in protecting minors from sexual 
predation. 
{¶ 117} I also dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the Ohio 
Constitution provides an independent basis to invalidate R.C. 2907.03(A)(13).  See 
majority opinion at ¶ 23 (“even if we have erred in our understanding of the federal 
Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause, we find that the guarantees of equal 
protection in the Ohio Constitution independently forbid the disparate treatment of 
peace officers * * *”).  Once again, the majority has declared without any textual 
analysis or support that a right secured by the Ohio Constitution affords broader 
protection to its citizens than the federal Constitution.  See State v. Bode, 144 Ohio 
St.3d 155, 2015-Ohio-1519, 41 N.E.3d 1156, ¶ 31-42 (French, J., dissenting); State 
v. Brown, 143 Ohio St.3d 444, 2015-Ohio-2438, 39 N.E.3d 496, ¶ 28-43 (French, 
J., dissenting).  I wholeheartedly agree that the Ohio Constitution may provide 
greater protection of individual rights than the federal Constitution and that 
“[f]ederal opinions do not control our independent analyses in interpreting the Ohio 
Constitution * * *.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 21.  But that is exactly what is missing 
from the majority’s opinion:  an independent analysis of the equal-protection 
guarantee in Article I, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution premised on its language, 
history or early understandings.  Absent that analysis, the majority has not 
presented any “ ‘ “compelling reasons why Ohio constitutional law should differ 
from the federal law.” ’ ”  Brown at ¶ 34 (French, J., dissenting), quoting Bode at  
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49 
¶ 33 (French, J., dissenting), quoting State v. Wogenstahl, 75 Ohio St.3d 344, 363, 
662 N.E.2d 311 (1996). 
{¶ 118} Even more puzzling, after declaring that Article I, Section 2 of the 
Ohio Constitution affords greater protection than the federal Equal Protection 
Clause, the majority does not articulate a new rule or standard for examining equal-
protection claims under the Ohio Constitution.  Rather, the majority recites a 
substantially similar rational-basis test under both the Ohio and federal 
Constitutions.  See majority opinion at ¶ 27.  In the end, it is unclear what the 
majority accomplishes with its declaration of independence from federal precedent, 
other than inviting parties to invoke the Ohio Constitution as an alternative basis 
for relief when they cannot obtain the desired outcome under the federal 
Constitution. 
{¶ 119} For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Timothy J. McGinty, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Daniel 
T. Van, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
John Fatica and Richard J. Perez, for appellee. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Eric E. Murphy, State Solicitor, 
Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor, and Kathryn L. Kreps, Assistant 
Attorney General, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Attorney General 
Michael DeWine. 
_________________