Title: Shalant v. Girardi, et al.

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

Filed 6/23/11 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
JOSEPH L. SHALANT, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S182629 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/1 B211932 
THOMAS V. GIRARDI et al., 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County Super. Ct. 
 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
No. BC363843 
____________________________________) 
 
 
) 
JOSE CASTRO, 
)  
 
)  
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/1 B214302 
JOSEPH L. SHALANT, 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County Super. Ct. 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
No. BC366214 
____________________________________) 
 
Plaintiff Joseph L. Shalant, having previously been declared a vexatious 
litigant (Code Civ. Proc., § 391, subd. (b)),1 was subject to a prefiling order, 
issued under section 391.7, barring him ―from filing any new litigation‖ (id., subd. 
(a)) in propria persona in a California court without leave of the court‘s presiding 
judge.  He filed the present litigation through counsel, but lost his representation 
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless 
otherwise specified. 
2 
while the action was pending.  On defendants‘ motions, the trial court dismissed 
Shalant‘s complaint on the ground he had not complied with section 391.7.  The 
Court of Appeal reversed, holding section 391.7 applies only to actions filed in 
propria persona by vexatious litigants.   
We agree with the Court of Appeal.  By its unambiguous terms, section 
391.7, subdivision (a) authorizes only a ―prefiling‖ order prohibiting a vexatious 
litigant from ―filing‖ new litigation without prior permission, and only when the 
litigant is unrepresented by counsel.  Subdivision (c) of the section provides that 
the court clerk shall not ―file‖ any such litigation without an order from the 
presiding judge permitting the ―filing,‖ and if the court clerk mistakenly ―files‖ the 
litigation without such an order, the litigation is to be dismissed.  Section 391.7‘s 
dismissal provision did not apply here because Shalant was not in propria persona 
when he filed the litigation. 
This interpretation, which is compelled by the statutory language, does not 
leave a defendant without protection against a vexatious litigant‘s continued 
pursuit of an action initially filed through counsel.  In this situation, a defendant in 
the pending litigation may move for an order requiring the vexatious litigant 
plaintiff to furnish security.  (§ 391.1.)  If security is ordered but not furnished, the 
action is to be dismissed.  (§ 391.4.) 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In 2002, in an action unrelated to this one, the superior court entered an 
order declaring Shalant, an attorney, to be a vexatious litigant as defined in section 
391.  The court further entered a prefiling order under section 391.7, prohibiting 
him from ―filing any new litigation in propria persona in the courts of California 
without approval of the presiding judge of the court in which the action is filed.‖  
In May 2005, the State Bar Court recommended that Shalant be disbarred and 
3 
placed him on inactive status.  This court ordered Shalant disbarred in December 
2005. 
On December 22, 2006, Shalant, through Attorney L‘Tanya M. Butler, filed 
the present action against Thomas V. Girardi and National Union Fire Insurance 
Company (National Union).  The action arose from Shalant and Girardi‘s 
representation of Jose Castro and his wife in a personal injury suit in which 
National Union insured the defendant.  When the personal injury case settled, 
Girardi paid Shalant $745,000 of the proceeds pursuant to a fee-splitting 
agreement, but Shalant alleges he was owed an additional $27,745 in fees and 
costs.  
In May 2007, Attorney James T. Biesty substituted in for Butler as 
Shalant‘s attorney.  With the exception of one month when Shalant represented 
himself, Biesty represented Shalant in this action until March 2008, when Butler 
returned as attorney of record.  On June 26, 2008, however, Butler applied, over 
Shalant‘s objection, for permission to withdraw as counsel, citing ―an irremediable 
breakdown in the attorney/client relationship.‖  The trial court granted Butler‘s 
application on July 15, 2008. 
With Shalant now acting in propria persona, Girardi and National Union 
moved to dismiss his complaint against them under section 391.7.  The trial court 
gave Shalant until September 14, 2008, to retain counsel or obtain permission 
from the presiding judge to proceed in propria persona, and set a hearing on the 
motions to dismiss for September 18.  On that date, the court granted the motions, 
finding that Shalant had ―failed to rectify his violation under section 391.7.‖  The 
court entered judgment for National Union, and Shalant (represented by counsel) 
appealed.  
4 
The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and directed the superior court 
to deny the motions to dismiss.  We granted Girardi and National Union‘s joint 
petition for review, which raised only the issue of dismissal under section 391.7.   
DISCUSSION 
The vexatious litigant statutes (§§ 391-391.7) are designed to curb misuse 
of the court system by those persistent and obsessive litigants who, repeatedly 
litigating the same issues through groundless actions, waste the time and resources 
of the court system and other litigants.  (Bravo v. Ismaj (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 
211, 220-221.)  Sections 391 to 391.6 were enacted in 1963, while section 391.7, 
the section at issue here, was added in 1990.  (Stats. 1963, ch. 1471, § 1, pp. 
3038-3039; Stats. 1990, ch. 621, § 3, pp. 3072-3073.) 
―Vexatious litigant‖ is defined in section 391, subdivision (b) as a person 
who has, while acting in propria persona, initiated or prosecuted numerous 
meritless litigations, relitigated or attempted to relitigate matters previously 
determined against him or her, repeatedly pursued unmeritorious or frivolous 
tactics in litigation, or who has previously been declared a vexatious litigant in a 
related action.  Section 391.1 provides that in any litigation pending in a California 
court, the defendant may move for an order requiring the plaintiff to furnish 
security on the ground the plaintiff is a vexatious litigant and has no reasonable 
probability of prevailing against the moving defendant.  The action is stayed 
pending determination of the motion.  (§ 391.6.)  If, after a hearing, the court finds 
for the defendant on these points, it must order the plaintiff to furnish security ―in 
such amount and within such time as the court shall fix.‖  (§ 391.3.)  The 
plaintiff‘s failure to furnish that security is grounds for dismissal.  (§ 391.4.) 
―In 1990, the Legislature enacted section 391.7 to provide the courts with 
an additional means to counter misuse of the system by vexatious litigants.  
Section 391.7 ‗operates beyond the pending case‘ and authorizes a court to enter a 
5 
‗prefiling order‘ that prohibits a vexatious litigant from filing any new litigation in 
propria persona without first obtaining permission from the presiding judge. 
(McColm v. Westwood Park Assn. [(1998)] 62 Cal.App.4th [1211,] 1216.)  The 
presiding judge may also condition the filing of the litigation upon furnishing 
security as provided in section 391.3.  (§ 391.7, subd. (b).)‖  (Bravo v. Ismaj, 
supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 221.) 
Section 391.7 did not displace the remedy provided in sections 391.1 to 
391.6 for defendants in pending actions; by its terms it operates ―[i]n addition to 
any other relief provided in this title . . . .‖  (§ 391.7, subd. (a).)  Rather, it added a 
powerful new tool designed ―to preclude the initiation of meritless lawsuits and 
their attendant expenditures of time and costs.‖  (Bravo v. Ismaj, supra, 99 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 221-222.)   
Once a person has been declared a vexatious litigant, the court, on its own 
or a party‘s motion, may ―enter a prefiling order which prohibits [the person] from 
filing any new litigation in the courts of this state in propria persona without first 
obtaining leave of the presiding judge of the court where the litigation is proposed 
to be filed.‖  (§ 391.7, subd. (a).)  Disobedience of the order is punishable as a 
contempt.  (Ibid.)  ―The presiding judge shall permit the filing of that litigation 
only if it appears that the litigation has merit and has not been filed for the 
purposes of harassment or delay.  The presiding judge may condition the filing of 
the litigation upon the furnishing of security for the benefit of the defendants as 
provided in Section 391.3.‖  (§ 391.7, subd. (b).)  Court clerks are directed not to 
file litigation from a vexatious litigant subject to a prefiling order without the 
presiding judge‘s order permitting the filing.  If the clerk mistakenly does file the 
action, any party may seek dismissal through a notice that the plaintiff is subject to 
a prefiling order.  ―The litigation shall be automatically dismissed unless the 
plaintiff within 10 days of the filing of that notice obtains an order from the 
6 
presiding judge permitting the filing of the litigation as set forth in subdivision 
(b).‖  (§ 391.7, subd. (c).)  
As the court in McColm v. Westwood Park Assn., supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at 
page 1216, footnote 4, explained:  ―Sections 391.1-391.6 differ from section 391.7 
in some significant ways.  Under the former sections, the litigant may proceed 
with the case without showing a reasonable probability of prevailing, but the 
litigant will have to furnish security to proceed if the court finds success 
improbable. Under the latter section, the litigant is barred from filing the action or 
proceeding if success is considered improbable. . . .  [¶] Section 391.7‘s extra 
burden upon the vexatious litigant arises because a state court has taken a second 
step in addressing the vexatious litigant problem and has determined that no court 
or adverse party should be burdened by the particular plaintiff‘s meritless 
litigation.‖ 
To summarize, our vexatious litigant statutes provide courts and 
nonvexatious litigants with two distinct and complementary sets of remedies.  In 
pending litigation, a defendant may have the plaintiff declared a vexatious litigant 
and, if the plaintiff has no reasonable probability of prevailing, ordered to furnish 
security.  If the plaintiff fails to furnish the security, the action will be dismissed.  
(§§ 391.1-391.6.)  In addition, a potential defendant may prevent the vexatious 
litigant plaintiff from filing any new litigation in propria persona by obtaining a 
prefiling order and, if any new litigation is inadvertently permitted to be filed in 
propria persona without the presiding judge‘s permission, may then obtain its 
dismissal.  (§ 391.7.) 
In the present case, defendants pursued the wrong statutory remedy for the 
situation in which they found themselves.  Although Shalant is a vexatious litigant 
subject to a prefiling order under section 391.7, he did not violate that order by 
filing the present action through counsel, and the action was therefore not subject 
7 
to dismissal as violative of the order.  As the Court of Appeal below explained:  
―The prefiling order entered against Shalant (on a form approved by the Judicial 
Council) prohibits Shalant ‗from filing any new litigation in propria persona in the 
courts of California without approval of the presiding judge of the court in which 
the action is to be filed.‘ . . .  [¶] Shalant filed only one civil action or proceeding 
in this case, namely, his action against Girardi and National Union.  He did not file 
it in propria persona but rather filed it through counsel.  Nothing in the prefiling 
order prohibits Shalant from continuing to prosecute or maintain an action in 
propria persona as long as he did not file the action in propria persona (and 
nothing in the statutory language would authorize the issuance of a prefiling order 
containing such a prohibition).  Shalant therefore did not violate the prefiling 
order, and the trial court erred by granting the motions to dismiss.‖   
Defendants could have proceeded under section 391.1 for an order 
requiring Shalant to post adequate security before continuing to prosecute his 
action against them, making it subject to dismissal under section 391.4 if he failed 
to do so.  On remand, they may still pursue this remedy.  They could not, however, 
properly seek dismissal under section 391.7, as it governs only the filing of new 
litigation, and the present action, filed as it was through counsel, did not violate 
the section 391.7 prefiling order against Shalant. 
In concluding otherwise, defendants and the trial court relied on Forrest v. 
Department of Corporations (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 183 (Forrest), which held 
that ―the requirements of a prefiling order, under section 391.7, remain in effect 
throughout the life of a lawsuit and permit dismissal at any point when a vexatious 
litigant proceeds without counsel or without the permission of the presiding 
judge.‖  (Id. at p. 197.) 
Despite the breadth of its holding, the Forrest court may have reached the 
right result on the facts before it.  Forrest, a vexatious litigant subject to a prefiling 
8 
order, was unrepresented by counsel when she filed the action; she later retained 
counsel, who filed and served an amended complaint but withdrew before trial.  
(Forrest, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at pp. 188-190.)  Thus, Forrest violated the 
prefiling order when, acting in propria persona, she ―file[d] . . . new litigation‖ 
without permission of the superior court‘s presiding judge (§ 391.7, subd. (a); see 
Forrest, at p. 188), and her action was arguably subject to dismissal under section 
391.7, subdivision (c) despite counsel‘s later filing of an amended complaint.2  
The Forrest court erred, however, in holding broadly that a prefiling order under 
section 391.7 ―permit[s] dismissal at any point when a vexatious litigant proceeds 
without counsel or without the permission of the presiding judge.‖  (Forrest, at 
p. 197.)  By its terms, the statute and orders made pursuant to it apply only to the 
vexatious litigant‘s filing of new litigation.3   
The Forrest court noted that in an order barring a vexatious litigant from 
―filing any new litigation‖ in propria persona (§ 391.7, subd. (a)), ―the word ‗new‘ 
plainly refers to a civil lawsuit filed after entry of the prefiling order.  It does not, 
as Forrest contends, refer to an early procedural stage in the lawsuit.‖  (Forrest, 
supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 196.)  This observation was correct:  An action that 
was improperly filed in propria persona by a plaintiff subject to a prefiling order 
remains, under section 391.7, subdivision (c), subject to dismissal at any point in 
its pendency, not only at the early stages.  At the same time, however, the statutory 
term ―filing‖ plainly refers to filing the lawsuit, not to prosecuting or maintaining 
                                              
2  
We have no occasion here to decide whether, or under what circumstances, 
the filing of an amended complaint constitutes the filing of new litigation within 
the meaning of section 391.7. 
3  
We therefore disapprove Forrest v. Department of Corporations, supra, 
150 Cal.App.4th 183, to the extent it held section 391.7 applies to acts other than 
the filing of new litigation in propria persona. 
9 
it.  If the plaintiff was represented by counsel when he or she filed the action, 
section 391.7 does not apply at all. 
The Forrest court deemed it anomalous for section 391.7‘s application to 
be limited to the filing of a new lawsuit, given that a person can be declared a 
vexatious litigant for having ―prosecuted‖ or ―maintained‖ prior unmeritorious 
litigation in propria persona, or for having filed unmeritorious motions or 
employed frivolous or delaying tactics in the course of prior litigation.  (§ 391, 
subd. (b)(1), (3); see Forrest, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 197.)  We detect no 
anomaly.  As previously explained, defendants in a pending action brought by a 
vexatious litigant have a remedy under sections 391.1 to 391.6.  Section 391.7, 
added in 1990 to supplement those existing statutes, ―operates beyond the pending 
case and affects the litigant‘s future filings.‖  (McColm v. Westwood Park Assn., 
supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 1216.)  A potential defendant who, because of a 
prefiling order under section 391.7, is never sued, is thus also relieved of the 
burden of defending against a vexatious litigant‘s unwarranted prosecution of an 
action or use of frivolous or delaying tactics in its prosecution.  If, as here, the 
plaintiff is able to file the action through counsel, sections 391.1 to 391.6 continue 
to provide a remedy against the plaintiff‘s unjustifiable behavior in the pending 
case.4 
                                              
4  
Nor does our plain language reading of section 391.7 conflict with the 
definition of ―litigation‖ in section 391, subdivision (a), as including an action 
―maintained or pending‖ in a state or federal court.  That definition, while 
applicable to section 391.7, does not broaden that statute‘s exclusive authorization 
for an order barring a vexatious litigant from ―filing‖ any new litigation without 
prior permission of the court‘s presiding judge.  (§ 391.7, subd. (a).) 
10 
 
Defendants observe that ―litigation‖ is defined, for purposes of the 
vexatious litigant statutes, as ―any civil action or proceeding‖ (§ 391, subd. (a), 
italics added) and that the term ―proceeding‖ can, in some contexts, refer ―not only 
to a complete remedy . . . but also to a mere procedural step that is part of a larger 
action or special proceeding.‖  (Rooney v. Vermont Investment Corp. (1973) 10 
Cal.3d 351, 367, fn. omitted.)  From this they argue that a vexatious litigant who is 
barred by a prefiling order from ―filing any new litigation‖ in propria persona 
(§ 391.7, subd. (a)), and who becomes self-represented while an action is pending, 
―cannot take any further procedural steps in the action without first obtaining 
permission from the presiding judge . . . .‖   
Reading the vexatious litigant statutes as a collective whole, defendants‘ 
construction is not a plausible one.  If ―litigation‖ as defined in section 391, 
subdivision (a) included every motion or other procedural step taken during an 
action or special proceeding, and that definition were applied throughout the 
vexatious litigant statutes, several provisions would take on absurd, unworkable, 
or clearly unintended meanings.  Under section 391, subdivision (b)(1), a person 
could be declared a vexatious litigant for losing five motions—all of which might 
have been filed in the same lawsuit—in a seven-year period.  Section 391, 
subdivision (b)(3)‘s reference to ―motions, pleadings, or other papers‖ filed in the 
course of a litigation would make little sense if every motion, pleading, or paper 
filed was itself a new litigation.  Under section 391.1, the defendant could move 
for an order requiring the plaintiff to post security each time the plaintiff filed a 
motion or took any other procedural step.  The trial court would then have to hold 
a hearing—separate from any hearing on the motion itself—and determine 
whether the plaintiff was reasonably likely to prevail on the motion or other 
procedural step.  (§ 391.2.)  On a negative finding, the court would then be 
11 
required to order the plaintiff to furnish security, presumably cumulative to any 
ordered at earlier stages of the action.  (§ 391.3.)  If the plaintiff failed to provide 
the security, the action would, according to section 391.4, be ―dismissed,‖ though 
the negative ruling on a motion is ordinarily referred to as a ―denial‖ rather than a 
―dismissal.‖   
Under section 391.7 itself, defendants‘ construction of ―litigation‖ would 
be unworkable.  A vexatious litigant in Shalant‘s position, having filed the action 
through counsel but then having lost representation, would be required to seek 
permission of the presiding judge before filing any motion or other paper.  The 
presiding judge of the court would thus be placed in the position of overseeing 
each procedural step of an action pending in another department and deciding in 
each instance whether the particular motion, pleading, or paper had ―merit.‖ 
(§ 391.7, subd. (b).)5  If the clerk inadvertently filed any motion or other paper 
from the plaintiff, a notice from any other party that the plaintiff was subject to a 
prefiling order would automatically stay the ―litigation‖ (§ 391.7, subd. (c))—that 
is, the particular motion filed or other procedural step taken—but the rest of the 
                                              
5  
At oral argument, defense counsel asserted the presiding judge would have 
to grant permission only for the first filing by a newly unrepresented vexatious 
litigant; counsel further argued the presiding judge would determine the merit or 
lack thereof of the entire action, not the particular filing.  These assertions, 
however, are contrary to defendants‘ reading of the statutes, under which the 
phrase ―new litigation‖ in section 391.7, subdivision (a) includes each motion or 
other procedural step taken by a vexatious litigant in a pending lawsuit.  An order 
under section 391.7, subdivision (a) prohibits the filing of ―any‖ new litigation, 
not merely the first new litigation, and under subdivision (b) of the section the 
presiding judge must determine whether ―that litigation‖ has merit and is being 
filed for purposes other than harassment or delay.  The presiding judge, under 
defendants‘ interpretation, would therefore have to assess the merits and purposes 
of each new motion or other filing in an action pending in another department.   
12 
action would not necessarily be stayed at the same time.  Pretrial and trial 
proceedings would be constantly interrupted for trips to the presiding judge‘s 
department; an orderly and efficient trial would be impossible.  Again, the statute 
provides that if permission is not granted, an inadvertently filed litigation is to be 
―dismissed‖ (ibid.), indicating the drafters did not intend each motion, which 
would ordinarily be granted or denied, but not ―dismissed,‖ to be considered a 
separate ―litigation.‖6 
Section 391.7, then, is not reasonably susceptible to a reading under which 
a prefiling order would bar the vexatious litigant from filing motions or other 
papers in propria persona even when the action (or special proceeding; see §§ 22, 
23) was itself properly filed through counsel.  Any ambiguity on this point, 
moreover, would be dispelled by examination of the legislative history behind 
section 391.7‘s enactment, which shows a clear focus on precluding vexatious 
litigants from filing in propria persona unmeritorious new ―actions‖ or 
―lawsuits.‖7  Nowhere in this history is there any suggestion the new section 
                                              
6 
Subdivision (d) of section 391.7 provides that in a proceeding under the 
Family Code or Probate Code ― ‗litigation‘ ‖ does include ―any petition, 
application, or motion other than a discovery motion . . . for any order.‖  This 
provision would be unnecessary if, as defendants argue, ―litigation‖ throughout the 
vexatious litigant statutes included every motion or other paper filed by the 
plaintiff. 
7  
Senate Bill No. 2675 (1989–1990 Reg. Sess.), by which section 391.7 was 
enacted (and the vexatious litigant statutes strengthened in other respects), was 
proposed by the California Attorney General‘s Office, which, in a letter to the 
chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in preparation for a committee 
hearing, explained that the office ―spends substantial amounts of time defending 
unmeritorious lawsuits brought by vexatious litigants.‖  (Deputy Atty. Gen. 
Jeffrey J. Fuller, letter to Sen. Bill Lockyer re Sen. Bill No. 2675 (1989–1990 Reg. 
Sess.) Apr. 11, 1990, p. 1, italics added.)  The proposed law would address this 
problem by, among other measures, ―[p]roviding for judicial review of subsequent 
actions brought by a vexatious litigant prior to filing.‖  (Id. at p. 2, italics added.)  
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
13 
would bar vexatious litigants from filing motions or papers in pending litigation.  
The additional remedy provided by section 391.7 was, instead, ―directed at 
precluding the initiation of a meritless lawsuit and the costs associated with 
defending such litigation.‖  (Bravo v. Ismaj, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 222, 
italics added.) 
Defendants argue that interpreting section 391.7 according to its plain 
language would allow a vexatious litigant to ―easily evade the statute simply by 
finding a lawyer who is willing to put his or her name on the complaint and later 
substitute out of the case.‖  However, we cannot assume, contrary to the evident 
premise of section 391.7, that attorneys generally will fail to act as gatekeepers 
against frivolous litigation.  ―Attorneys are governed by prescribed rules of ethics 
and professional conduct, and, as officers of the court, are subject to disbarment, 
suspension, and other disciplinary sanctions not applicable to litigants in propria 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
The committee analysis for the ensuing hearing, in explaining the need for 
legislation, relayed the Attorney General‘s concern with the resources spent 
defending ―unmeritorious lawsuits brought by vexatious litigants‖ and his view 
that the law should be strengthened to ―prevent the waste of public funds required 
for the defense of frivolous suits.‖  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill 
No. 2675 (1989–1990 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 17, 1990, pp. 2-3, italics added.)  A later 
bill summary and a local cost estimate prepared by the Department of Finance 
stated the bill would ―make it more difficult to file frivolous suits and actions‖ by, 
among other things, ―prohibit[ing] court clerks from filing any suit by a vexatious 
litigant unless the presiding judge issues an order permitting such filing.‖  (Dept. 
of Finance, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 2675 (1989–1990 Reg. Sess.) May 8, 1990, 
p. 1, italics added; Dept. of Finance, Local Cost Estimate for Sen. Bill No. 2675 
(1989–1990 Reg. Sess.) May 8, 1990, p. 1, italics added.)  Finally, in urging the 
Governor to sign the legislation, the bill‘s author explained it would ―provide for 
judicial review of subsequent actions filed by persons who have been adjudged 
vexatious litigants.‖  (Sen. Milton Marks, letter to Governor George Deukmejian 
re Sen. Bill No. 2675 (1989–1990 Reg. Sess.) Sept. 11, 1990, ¶ 3, italics added.) 
14 
persona.‖  (Taliaferro v. Hoogs (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 521, 527.)  ―Since fewer 
sanctions are available against a pro per litigant, the power to declare him 
vexatious becomes an important tool for the courts to manage their dockets and 
prevent frivolous claims.  Attorneys, on the other hand, are bound by rules of 
ethics and—perhaps just as importantly—rely on their reputation in the 
community to sustain their careers.  Attorneys therefore are much less likely to file 
frivolous claims, event [sic: even] absent the threat of their clients being declared 
vexatious litigants.‖  (Doran v. Vicorp Restaurants, Inc. (C.D.Cal. 2005) 407 
F.Supp.2d 1115, 1118, fn. omitted.)  One might add that the threat of malicious 
prosecution liability for bringing an unmeritorious action or special proceeding 
without probable cause, while it may do little to deter a vexatious litigant, is likely 
to have more significance for the vexatious litigant‘s attorney.8   
The Legislature‘s express distinction between litigation filed in propria 
persona and that filed through an attorney, therefore, is not an absurd one that 
could not have been intended.  Even if a broader rule, barring vexatious litigants 
from filing or maintaining new litigation in propria persona, would serve the 
statute‘s purposes better by ending more frivolous litigation more quickly, we 
have no warrant to ignore section 391.7‘s unambiguous language in favor of such 
a rule.  As the appellate court below remarked:  ―We sympathize with the plight of 
already overburdened trial courts that are forced to contend with the abusive 
                                              
8  
We express no opinion as to whether section 391.7 may be applied when 
the record shows the vexatious litigant‘s attorney has, in filing the action, acted as 
a ―mere puppet[]‖ of the litigant.  (In re Shieh (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1167.)  
The trial court made no such finding in dismissing Shalant‘s action, and 
defendants, though they cite Shieh as supporting a broad interpretation of section 
391.7, do not argue the dismissal should be affirmed on grounds the attorney who 
filed this action was merely a puppet for Shalant. 
15 
conduct of vexatious litigants.  But in their efforts to deal with the problem of 
vexatious litigants, courts must observe the limits set by the applicable statutory 
scheme.  If those limits are too confining, then it is the function of the Legislature, 
not the courts, to expand them.‖  As already noted, defendants here may avail 
themselves of the remedy under sections 391.1 to 391.6, applicable to pending 
actions, by seeking an order that Shalant post security to continue his prosecution 
of this action. 
DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. 
  
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
HILL, J.*
                                              
* 
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned 
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Shalant v. Girardi 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 183 Cal.App.4th 545 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S182629 
Date Filed: June 23, 2011 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Teresa Sanchez-Gordon 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Joseph L. Shalant, in pro. per.; Law Offices of Brian A. Yapko and Brian A. Yapko for Plaintiff and 
Appellant and for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Girardi  Keese, Shawn J. McCann; Niddrie, Fish & Buchanan, Law Offices of Martin N. Buchanan and 
Martin N. Buchanan for Defendant and Respondent Thomas v. Girardi and for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith and Rebecca R. Weinreich for Defendant and Respondent National 
Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA. 
 
Garrett & Tully, Ryan C. Squire and Jennifer R. Slater for Los Angeles Society for the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Animals as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Joseph L. Shalant 
14924 Camarosa Dr. 
Pacific Palisades, CA 90272 
(213) 380-2020 
 
Martin N. Buchanan 
Law Offices of Martin N. Buchanan 
600 B Street, Suite 1900 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 238-2426