Title: Estate of Blair v. Austin

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Estate of Jeffrey Blair by Personal Representative Tiauna Blair v. David Austin, No. 35, 
September Term 2019.  Opinion by Hotten, J.  
 
APPELLATE REVIEW – JURY FACTUAL FINDINGS – In a civil jury trial, when 
the evidence produces only one inference, then it is an issue of law for the court to decide.  
However, where the evidence generates several possible inferences, the jury, as the trier of 
fact, is the sole arbitrator of the weight and value of the evidence.  Appellate courts have 
very limited roles in reviewing the jury’s factual findings and must not substitute the jury’s 
findings with its own.  The Court of Appeals held that the Court of Special Appeals erred 
when it replaced the jury’s factual findings that Officer Austin exceeded the level of force 
an objectively reasonable officer would use under the circumstances for its own. 
 
EXCESSIVE FORCE – EVIDENCE – LEGAL SUFFICIENCY – In a civil jury trial, 
the plaintiff must establish legally sufficient evidence, under a preponderance of the 
evidence standard, to support a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.  In an excessive force case, 
the trier of fact must determine that a preponderance of the evidence establishes an officer 
exceeded the level of force that an objectively reasonable officer would use under the 
circumstances, to favorably find for the plaintiff.  The Court of Appeals held that legally 
sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s decision to deny Officer Austin’s motions 
for judgment and submit the case to the jury to decide whether Officer Austin exceeded 
the level of force that an objectively reasonable officer would have used under the 
circumstances. 
 
EXCESSIVE FORCE – VIDEO EVIDENCE – In Scott v. Harris, the United States 
Supreme Court held that “[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which 
is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court 
should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment.”  550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1776 (2007).  The Court of Appeals held 
that the Court of Special Appeals misapplied Scott to this case and should not have 
conducted its own independent evaluation of the video evidence. 
 
 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
Case No. 24-C-15-007117 
Argued: December 5, 2019 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 35 
 
September Term, 2019 
 
__________________________________ 
 
ESTATE OF JEFFREY BLAIR BY 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
TIAUNA BLAIR  
v. 
DAVID AUSTIN  
__________________________________ 
 
Barbera, C.J., 
McDonald, 
Watts, 
Hotten, 
Getty, 
Booth, 
Battaglia, Lynne A. (Senior Judge, 
Specially Assigned), 
 
JJ. 
__________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Hotten, J., which Barbera, 
C.J., and McDonald, J., join. 
Opinion by Watts, J. 
Getty, Booth, and Battaglia, JJ., dissent. 
__________________________________ 
 
Filed: June 2, 2020  
 
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act  
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document 
is authentic.
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk  
Suzanne Johnson
2020-06-03 14:34-04:00
A jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City awarded damages to the Estate of 
Jeffrey Blair (“the Estate”)1 after finding that Baltimore City Police Officer David Austin 
(“Officer Austin”) used excessive force during his encounter with Jeffrey Blair (“Mr. 
Blair”).  The Court of Special Appeals reversed and held that Officer Austin acted as a 
reasonable officer would under the circumstances, based on the Court’s independent 
evaluation of video evidence.  The Estate, through its Personal Representative, Tiauna Blair 
(“Ms. Blair”), seeks review of the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals.  We granted 
certiorari to address the following question:  
Did [the Court of Special Appeals] err when, based solely on [its] 
interpretation of the video evidence that the jury considered in reaching its 
verdict, it overturned the jury’s factual finding that [Officer Austin] exceeded 
the level of force that an objectively reasonable officer in his situation would 
have used? 
 
For reasons expressed below, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Factual Background 
On February 22, 2015 at approximately 12:00 p.m., Officer Austin, while on routine 
patrol duty, stopped at a traffic light at the intersection of Pennsylvania Avenue and Martin 
Luther King Jr. Boulevard in Baltimore City.  He observed Mr. Blair driving on the wrong 
side of the road, entering the intersection, and making a right turn against the red light.  
Officer Austin activated his lights and siren, cleared the intersection, and pursued Mr. Blair, 
who initially failed to stop his vehicle as directed.  Mr. Blair drove at a speed between 20 
                                              
1 Mr. Blair died as a result of circumstances unrelated to this incident before his 
wife, Tiauna Blair brought this action. 
 
2 
 
and 25 miles per hour, making several turns and running another red light, before pulling 
over.  Although Mr. Blair failed to stop his vehicle as directed and briefly drove on the 
wrong side of the road, he did not force other drivers off the road, cause a collision, or 
otherwise place Officer Austin or pedestrians at risk during the slow pursuit.   
After driving about a mile, a surveillance video camera without audio capacity, 
mounted above the street level on the 1000 block of Fremont Avenue, showed Mr. Blair’s 
vehicle and Officer Austin’s patrol vehicle advance toward the camera and stop on the right 
side of the road.  Officer Austin observed Mr. Blair lean over toward his passenger seat 
before exiting his vehicle.  Although the video does not reveal Mr. Blair’s actions inside 
his vehicle, the video shows Mr. Blair, relatively large in stature, originally emerge from 
his vehicle and move toward Officer Austin’s patrol car.  The surveillance video does not 
reflect whether Mr. Blair was armed.  In response, Officer Austin exited his vehicle, briefly 
attempted to shield himself with his door, and then removed himself from behind the door, 
initially without his weapon drawn.  Thereafter, Officer Austin advised Mr. Blair to return 
to his vehicle.  Instead, Mr. Blair rapidly increased his pace toward Officer Austin, but 
there was no indication whether Mr. Blair was armed. 
Although Officer Austin testified that Mr. Blair attempted to grab Officer Austin’s 
firearm and then appeared to go into his pants’ pocket as if to grab a weapon, Officer Austin 
also testified that he withdrew his firearm before he thought Mr. Blair may have been 
reaching for a weapon.  The surveillance video appears to have an obstructed view that 
does not clearly reflect any movements consistent with Mr. Blair reaching into his pants’ 
pocket, or the presence of a weapon in Mr. Blair’s possession; however, no weapon was 
 
3 
 
recovered on the scene.  Additionally, no evidence indicated that Mr. Blair verbally 
threatened Officer Austin.  The video reveals that minimal time elapsed between when 
Officer Austin withdrew his firearm and when Mr. Blair fell to the ground after being shot 
several times.  Subsequent testimony revealed that Officer Austin fired four shots at Mr. 
Blair. 
After Mr. Blair fell to the ground, Officer Austin called for additional law 
enforcement officers and a medic to treat Mr. Blair.  While Mr. Blair lay on the ground, 
Officer Austin maintained a distance from him, testifying that he did so because he believed 
Mr. Blair possessed a weapon.  Officer Austin testified that Mr. Blair failed to remain on 
the ground after being shot; thus, when the responding law enforcement officers arrived on 
the scene, they subdued him by use of a taser.  Subsequently, an ambulance transported 
Mr. Blair to shock trauma at the University of Maryland Medical Center, where he was 
treated for gunshot wounds to his abdomen and right hand. 
Mr. Blair was released from the hospital to Central Booking in Baltimore City, on 
or about March 9, 2015.  He was held on bail for charges related to this incident and 
remained in custody until May 6, 2015.  In June 2015, Mr. Blair died of causes unrelated 
to this incident. 
Procedural Background 
1. Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
In 2016, Ms. Tiauna Blair, the widow of Mr. Blair, filed a complaint on behalf of 
his Estate in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against several law enforcement officers, 
including Officer Austin.  The complaint sought relief for nine counts, including one count 
 
4 
 
of civil assault, one count of false arrest, two counts of false imprisonment, one count of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, one count of conversion, one count of excessive 
force, one count of deprivation of property without due process, and one survival action, 
in connection with the encounter against Mr. Blair.  At trial, the parties presented the video 
camera evidence, testimony from several fact and expert witnesses, and documentary 
evidence, including Mr. Blair’s medical records and a diagram of the scene. 
 
A. The Estate’s Case 
On behalf of the Estate, the following witnesses were called: Ms. Anne Blair, Mr. 
Blair’s mother; Ms. Tiauna Blair, widow of Mr. Blair and Personal Representative of the 
Estate; Rachel Bennett, Esquire, an assistant public defender who represented Mr. Blair on 
a previous occasion; and Dr. Tyrone Powers.  Dr. Powers, a former Maryland State 
Trooper, FBI agent, and consultant for police departments, testified as an expert witness 
for the Estate and opined regarding the reasonableness of the use of force by Officer Austin.  
During his testimony, Dr. Powers explained a concept called the continuum of force, which 
describes the seven levels of force law enforcement officers may use to initiate and 
complete an arrest or stabilize a situation involving members of the public.  He asserted 
that “a reasonable officer being attacked by an unarmed individual would have limited his 
use of force to defensive tactics or impact techniques, such as use of a baton or a taser[]” 
and that “[Officer] Austin’s use of deadly force—firing his [weapon]—breached this 
standard.”  Austin v. Estate of Blair by Blair, No. 580, 2019 WL 1873495, at *1 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. Apr. 25, 2019) (footnote omitted).  He concluded that Officer Austin exceeded 
the level of force an objectively reasonable officer would use under the circumstances. 
 
5 
 
 
B. Officer Austin’s Case 
Following the denial of Officer Austin’s motion for judgment at the end of the 
Estate’s case, Officer Austin presented three witnesses: Officer Austin, Baimba Sesay, and 
expert witness Mr. Charles Key.  At trial, Officer Austin conceded that he did not see Mr. 
Blair in possession of a weapon, but thought he might have one because he reached for his 
pants’ pocket.  During cross-examination, Officer Austin conceded that the police academy 
trained him to use a collapsible baton or mace spray to maintain distance between himself 
and another person.  However, he elected to control the distance between himself and Mr. 
Blair by pulling his firearm and discharging it. 
Officer Austin offered Mr. Charles Key as an expert witness.  The defense attorney 
for Officer Austin presented the following hypothetical factual scenario to Mr. Key: 
Q: Let me present you with additional hypothetical facts.  A uniformed police 
officer, marked police vehicle, observes an individual driving the wrong way 
against traffic and running a red light.  Fact number one.  Fact number two, 
the officer attempts to stop the individual when he fails to stop.  Hypothetical 
fact number three, after the individual stops, he gets out of his vehicle and 
runs toward[] that officer.  Hypothetical fact number four of six, the officer 
observes that it is a large male, orders him to stop, and begins to back away 
from him in an area where there’s snow and ice on the ground.  Hypothetical 
fact five of six.  The man reaches toward[] his waist, continues to run at the 
officer, closest to narrowly within an arm’s reach of that particular officer, 
reaches toward[] the officer’s weapon, and then reaches toward[] his own 
waist.  And the final hypothetical fact, after retreating a distance, the officer 
draws his weapon and discharges his weapon upon the individual. 
 
Now, given those facts that I’ve just described, do you have an opinion within 
a reasonable degree of certainty within your field of expertise as to whether 
Officer Austin was objectively reasonable in the discharge of his weapon and 
was that consistent with the accepted practices of police standards, and 
policies, and training? 
 
 
6 
 
Based on the hypothetical presented, Mr. Key rendered an opinion regarding the 
reasonableness of Officer Austin’s use of force and concluded that Officer Austin acted 
reasonably under the circumstances and pursuant to police standards and policies. 
Mr. Blair’s medical records reflected a history of mental illness.  Those records 
included Mr. Blair’s thoughts regarding the interaction between him and Officer Austin, 
including suicidal ideation and the hope that he would be shot by a police officer.  The 
record does not reflect, however, that Mr. Blair communicated this intent to Officer Austin 
or that Officer Austin was otherwise cognizant of Mr. Blair’s intention, or the existence of 
those medical records at the time of the incident. 
 
C. Motions for Judgment and Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict 
At the close of the Estate’s case, Officer Austin moved for judgment as a matter of 
law pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-5192, asserting that the Estate failed to establish a prima 
                                              
2 Maryland Rule 2-519 reads:  
 
(a) Generally.  A party may move for judgment on any or all of the issues in 
any action at the close of the evidence offered by an opposing party, and in 
a jury trial at the close of all the evidence.  The moving party shall state with 
particularity all reasons why the motion should be granted.  No objection to 
the motion for judgment shall be necessary.  A party does not waive the right 
to make the motion by introducing evidence during the presentation of an 
opposing party’s case. 
 
(b) Disposition.  When a defendant moves for judgment at the close of the 
evidence offered by the plaintiff in an action tried by the court, the court may 
proceed, as the trier of fact, to determine the facts and to render judgment 
against the plaintiff or may decline to render judgment until the close of all 
the evidence.  When a motion for judgment is made under any other 
circumstances, the court shall consider all evidence and inferences in the 
light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(continued . . .) 
 
7 
 
facie case regarding the question of excessive force, and whether the force applied was 
objectively reasonable.  Officer Austin argued, regarding the assault count against him, 
that an essential element of assault is an apprehension of imminent bodily harm.  Officer 
Austin asserted that because he fired his weapon almost immediately after drawing it, there 
is no evidence that Mr. Blair saw it coming and, therefore, cannot prove an essential 
element of assault.  Regarding the excessive force count, Officer Austin argued that Dr. 
Powers’ testimony was not supported by any factual predicate and should not be credited.  
Officer Austin contended that he ceased the use of force against Mr. Blair once Mr. Blair 
was on the ground.  Considering all the evidence and any rational inferences thereto, in the 
light most favorable to the Estate as the non-moving party, the circuit court granted Officer 
Austin’s motion on several counts, including the count of false arrest, both counts of false 
imprisonment, the count of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the count of 
conversion, the count of deprivation of property, and the survival action.  The circuit court 
denied Officer Austin’s motion for judgment relative to the civil assault and excessive force 
                                              
(. . . continued) 
(c) Effect of Denial.  A party who moves for judgment at the close of the 
evidence offered by an opposing party may offer evidence in the event the 
motion is not granted, without having reserved the right to do so and to the 
same extent as if the motion had not been made.  In so doing, the party 
withdraws the motion. 
 
(d) Reservation of Decision in Jury Cases.  In a jury trial, if a motion for 
judgment is made at the close of all the evidence, the court may submit the 
case to the jury and reserve its decision on the motion until after the verdict 
or discharge of the jury.  For the purpose of appeal, the reservation constitutes 
a denial of the motion unless a judgment notwithstanding the verdict has been 
entered. 
 
8 
 
counts, finding there was sufficient evidence to generate a jury question on both counts.  
At the close of the entire case, Officer Austin renewed his motion for judgment regarding 
the remaining counts, but the motion was denied, and the case was submitted to the jury 
for its consideration. 
Following a consideration of the evidence presented and deliberations, the jury 
returned a verdict, determining that Officer Austin civilly assaulted Mr. Blair and used 
excessive force in his interaction with Mr. Blair, in violation of Article 24 of the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights, and awarded damages in favor of the Estate.  Thereafter, Officer 
Austin filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to Maryland Rule 
2-5323, which was denied.  Officer Austin noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special 
Appeals. 
2. The Court of Special Appeals Proceeding 
Ultimately, the Court of Special Appeals reversed and held in favor of Officer 
Austin, based on its independent weighing of a single piece of evidence – the surveillance 
video. 
Relying on Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007), the Court held 
that “when faced with a claim of excessive use of force by a police officer where reliable 
video evidence is available, appellate courts should not blindly adopt the interpretation 
promoted by either of the parties.  Rather, an appellate court should view the facts in the 
                                              
3 Maryland Rule 2-532(a) reads: “In a jury trial, a party may move for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict only if that party made a motion for judgment at the close of 
all the evidence and only on the grounds advanced in support of the earlier motion.” 
 
9 
 
light portrayed by the video.”  Austin, 2019 WL 1873495 at *3 (internal citation omitted).  
Although “a factfinder is to assess the credibility of the witnesses and make the necessary 
inferences to determine the material facts[,]” the Court held that the material facts were on 
the video, not in the subsequent testimony.  Id. at *3 (citing Benton v. State, 224 Md. App. 
612, 121 A.3d 246 (2015)). 
The Court of Special Appeals concluded that Officer Austin acted as a reasonable 
officer would under the circumstances.  The Court noted that  
[u]nder the objective reasonableness standard, the relevant question is not 
whether there was any evidence, no matter how slight, from which a jury 
might reasonably have concluded that this specific officer on this specific 
occasion could have or should have done something different; the question 
is whether the actions taken were so deficient that no reasonable officer under 
the same circumstances would have done the same thing. 
 
Id. at *5 (footnote omitted).  The Court also observed that “[i]t is a bedrock principle of 
law that appellate judges will not, in the absence of abuse of discretion, overturn factfinding 
below.  Yet the advent and prevalence of video cameras has created a crack in this 
bedrock.”  Id. at *1.  Accordingly, the Court reversed. 
Judge Stuart Berger dissented, disagreeing with the Majority that the video evidence 
demonstrated the reasonableness of Officer Austin’s actions.  He surmised that “[a] video 
can show what happened, but it cannot tell a jury how a reasonable officer would have 
responded in the circumstances.”  Id. at *6.  Judge Berger further explained that the video 
showed Officer Austin 
had reason to believe he was in danger.  Nevertheless, the jury had to assess 
the level of danger, and [Officer] Austin’s response to that danger, from the 
perspective of an objectively reasonable officer.  In doing so, an average 
juror, lacking the specialized training of a police officer, could reasonably 
 
10 
 
look for some guidance as to how an objective[ly] reasonable officer, armed 
with both lethal and non-lethal weapons, would have approached the 
situation.  Dr. Powers’[] testimony provided such guidance. 
 
Id. at *6.  Judge Berger explained that “[w]eighing these various considerations is a 
difficult and fact-intensive undertaking, and [ ] reasonable minds could easily reach 
different results.”  Id. at *7.  Ultimately, Judge Berger concluded that “the level of risk 
associated with the different choices that [Officer] Austin faced on that day [was] a 
question of fact for the jury[;]” thus the Majority unjustifiably took the question of whether 
Officer Austin’s use of deadly force was reasonable from the province of the jury.  Austin, 
2019 WL 1873495 at *7 (Berger, J., dissenting). 
 
Thereafter, the Estate filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted.  
Officer Austin filed a conditional cross-petition, which we denied. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
In a jury trial, we review a trial court’s “denial of a motion for judgment [ ] if there 
is ‘any evidence, no matter how slight, that is legally sufficient to generate a jury question.’  
Put another way, we will reverse the trial court’s denial of a motion for judgment [ ] only 
if the facts and circumstances permit but a single inference as relates to the appellate issue 
presented.”  Jones v. State, 425 Md. 1, 30-31, 38 A.3d 333, 350 (2012) (internal citation 
omitted).  “We review the trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for judgment in 
a civil case without deference.”  Sugarman v. Liles, 460 Md. 396, 413, 190 A.3d 344, 353 
(2018).  In our review, we “conduct the same analysis that a trial court should make when 
considering the motion for judgment[,]” meaning we “evaluate all evidence and reasonable 
evidentiary inferences, viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party” to 
 
11 
 
determine whether the trial court properly granted or denied the motion for judgment.  C&B 
Construction, Inc. v. Dashiell, 460 Md. 272, 279, 190 A.3d 271, 275 (2018) (internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted).  “A judge must grant a civil defendant’s motion for 
judgment as a matter of law if the plaintiff failed to present evidence that could persuade 
the jury of the elements of the tort by a preponderance of the evidence.”  Sugarman, 460 
Md. at 412, 190 A.3d at 353 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis 
omitted).  Ultimately this is a question of law, which we review under a de novo standard 
of review.  Howell v. State, 465 Md. 548, 561, 214 A.3d 1128, 1136 (2019). 
DISCUSSION 
A. The Court of Special Appeals lacked the authority to usurp the jury’s role and 
substitute its own factual findings for those of the jury. 
 
In a jury trial, “when the facts and circumstances only permit one inference with 
regard to the issue presented, [ ] the issue is one of law for the court and not one of fact for 
the jury.”  Nat’t Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. The Fund for Animals, Inc., 451 Md. 
431, 457, 153 A.3d 123, 138 (2017) (quoting Thomas v. Panco Mgmt. of Maryland, LLC, 
423 Md. 387, 394, 31 A.3d 583, 588 (2011)).  When the evidence presents more than one 
inference, however, the issue is for the jury to decide.  Id.  In a jury trial, “the jury [ ] 
determine[s] [ ] whether the burden of proof has been met. . . .  In making this 
determination, the jury assesses and evaluates the weight to be assigned to the evidence 
presented to it and decides its effect.”  Dennard v. Green, 335 Md. 305, 321, 643 A.2d 422, 
430 (1994) (quoting Thodos v. Bland, 75 Md. App. 700, 714, 542 A.2d 1307, 1314 (1988)).  
In other words, “[t]he weight and value of the evidence are matters solely for the jury.”  Id. 
 
12 
 
at 323, 643 A.2d at 431.  We have long held that “[n]either the trial court nor this Court is 
permitted to substitute its evaluation of [the] evidence for that of the jury. . . .  To do so 
would be an invasion of the jury’s province[.]”  Id. at 321, 643 A.2d at 430 (quoting 
Thodos, 75 Md. App. at 714, 542 A.2d at 1314) (ellipses in Dennard).  Accordingly, an 
appellate court has “no power to review the finding of the jury upon matters of fact.”  
Johnson v. Johnson, 105 Md. 81, 84, 65 A. 918, 919 (1907).  Ultimately, even if we would 
reach a different conclusion than the jury, we are not permitted to substitute the jury’s 
factual findings for our own. 
Here, the evidence, including the video evidence, permitted several inferences and 
interpretations.  On the question of excessive force, Officer Austin and the Estate produced 
expert witnesses who expressed conflicting opinions.  As such, it was for the jury to weigh 
and evaluate the level of risk generated by the interaction between Officer Austin and Mr. 
Blair, the options relative to the levels of force available to Officer Austin in response to 
the interaction, and the level of force an objectively reasonable officer would have used 
under the circumstances.4 
Based on its analysis and weighing of the evidence, the jury found that Officer 
Austin exceeded the appropriate level of force and acted unreasonably under the 
circumstances.  Thereafter, the trial judge denied Officer Austin’s motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, concluding that the jury’s verdict was supported by legally 
                                              
4 The jury also evaluated whether Officer Austin civilly assaulted Mr. Blair, but at 
issue before this Court is the excessive force count.  Thus, our discussion is limited to the 
question of excessive force. 
 
13 
 
sufficient evidence.  However, on appeal, the Court of Special Appeals usurped the jury’s 
role and substituted its own factual findings for those of the jury, asserting that the decision 
of the United States Supreme Court in Scott permitted the Court to “engage in a more 
searching review of [the] video evidence” because it involved “allegations of excessive use 
of force by police officers in the line of duty.”  Austin, 2019 WL 1873495 at *1.  As we 
discuss below, the Court of Special Appeals misapplied Scott.  The Court rejected the jury’s 
factual findings, thereby invading “the jury’s province[.]”  Dennard, 335 Md. at 321, 643 
A.2d at 430.  The Court erred in overturning the jury’s factual findings based on its own 
interpretation of the video camera evidence because it had “no power to review the finding 
of the jury upon matters of fact.”  Johnson, 105 Md. at 84, 65 A. 919. 
The dissent suggests that this case is similar to Roy v. Inhabitants of the City of 
Lewiston, 42 F.3d 691, 696 (1st Cir. 1994), and indicates that the jury should not “second-
guess” Officer Austin’s decision to use deadly force against Mr. Blair.  Admittedly, this 
may be a close case, as the dissent observes.  However, a reasonable jury could have 
concluded that Officer Austin acted as an objectively reasonable officer would have, or 
not, based on the presented evidence, and an appellate court cannot justifiably invade the 
jury’s province merely because the case is close.  In Roy, law enforcement officers 
responded to a domestic violence situation and were approached by an intoxicated, knife-
wielding man, who verbally threatened them.  42 F.3d at 693.  The man charged at the 
officers, and the officers initially retreated.  Shortly after charging, the man lunged at the 
officers with his knife, and the officers discharged their firearms, striking the man twice.  
Id.  The First Circuit held that “the facts might point so clearly toward reasonableness that 
 
14 
 
no reasonable jury could decide for the plaintiff” and determined that no jury could decide 
that the officers acted in an objectively unreasonable manner in using deadly force against 
the man.  Id. at 694.   
Contrary to the dissent’s position, that is not the case here.  Although a “jury does 
not automatically get to second-guess these life and death decisions,” the jury must decide 
whether an objectively reasonable officer would have used deadly force in the same or 
similar situation.  Id. at 695.  As we discuss infra, the Estate and Officer Austin both 
submitted evidence suggesting that Officer Austin was objectively reasonable and 
unreasonable in using deadly force against Mr. Blair.  A reasonable jury could have 
credited or discredited testimony and evidence on either side and decided in favor of either 
the Estate or Officer Austin.  Because a reasonable jury could have resolved the question 
of excessive force in this case in favor of either party, the First Circuit’s decision in Roy is 
unpersuasive in the case at bar.  Accordingly, we decline to invade the jury’s province in 
the instant case and maintain the Court of Special Appeals erred in doing so. 
B. Legally sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s denial of Officer Austin’s 
motion for judgment and its decision to submit the question to the jury regarding 
Officer Austin’s use of excessive force. 
 
 
1. Legally Sufficient Evidence 
 
Evidence is legally sufficient when it could satisfy the burden of proof in the eyes 
of a reasonable jury.  See Jones, 425 Md. at 31, 38 A.2d at 350.  “[T]he broad concept of 
‘burden of proof’ consists of at least two component parts: the burden of production (also 
referred to as the duty of going forward with the evidence) and the burden of persuasion.”  
Kassap v. Seitz, 315 Md. 155, 161-62, 553 A.2d 714, 717 (1989). 
 
15 
 
The burden of producing evidence on an issue means the liability to an 
adverse ruling (generally a finding or directed verdict) if evidence on the 
issue has not been produced. . . . The burden of producing evidence is a 
critical mechanism in a jury trial, as it empowers the judge to decide the case 
without jury consideration when a party fails to sustain the burden. 
 
Id. at 162, 553 A.2d at 717.  This burden of production, however, fluctuates based on the 
burden of persuasion.  Therefore, a trial judge must “account for and consider the 
appropriate burden of persuasion in deciding whether to allow the jury to decide an issue.”  
Darcars Motors of Silver Spring, Inc. v. Borzym, 379 Md. 249, 270, 841 A.2d 828, 840 
(2004) (“Darcars Motors”).  After submitting the case to the jury, “if the party having the 
burden of persuasion has failed to satisfy that burden, the issue is to be decided against 
him.”  Kassap, 315 Md. at 162, 553 A.2d at 717.  Thus, if the burden of persuasion is not 
satisfied by the plaintiff, the evidence is not legally sufficient to reasonably support a 
finding in favor of the plaintiff. 
The burden of persuasion in a civil case is a preponderance of the evidence, meaning 
the plaintiff must prove that its case is more likely true than not true.  See Volodarsky v. 
Tarachanskaya, 397 Md. 291, 305, 916 A.2d 991, 999 (2007); see also MD. CIVIL PATTERN 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Burden of Proof: Preponderance of the Evidence, 1:14 (MD. STATE 
BAR STANDING COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS 5th ed. 2019).  If the plaintiff 
fails “to present evidence that could persuade the jury of the elements of [a] tort by a 
preponderance of the evidence[,]” a reasonable jury could not find in favor of the plaintiff.  
Darcars Motors, 379 Md. at 270, 841 A.2d at 840-41 (emphasis in original); see also 
Marrick Homes LLC v. Rutkowski, 232 Md. App. 689, 707-08, 161 A.3d 53, 64 (2017) (“In 
a civil case, the evidence is legally sufficient to support a finding in [favor] of the prevailing 
 
16 
 
party if, on the facts adduced at trial[,] viewed most favorably to that party, any reasonable 
fact finder could find the existence of the elements of the cause of action by a 
preponderance of the evidence.”).  Thus, the trial judge cannot submit the case to the jury 
for its consideration unless the judge determines that the plaintiff’s evidence could satisfy 
the burden of proof in the eyes of a reasonable jury.   
In an excessive force case, just as in any other civil tort, the plaintiff bears the burden 
to prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence.  As we explain in greater depth infra, 
in an excessive force case, the plaintiff must prove that the law enforcement officer acted 
in an objectively unreasonable manner in her or his use of force.  Richardson v. McGriff, 
361 Md. 437, 452, 762 A.2d 48, 56 (2000).  Thus, the plaintiff must establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the officer exceeded the level of force an objectively 
reasonable officer would use under the same or similar situation.  In the case at bar, the 
trial court denied Officer Austin’s motions for judgment, establishing that the Estate 
satisfied its burden of production.  Following deliberations, the jury rendered a favorable 
verdict for Mr. Blair, concluding that the Estate established, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that Officer Austin exceeded the level of force an objectively reasonable officer 
would have used under the circumstances. 
 
2. The Legally Sufficient Evidence in the Instant Case 
The jury found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Officer Austin exceeded 
the level of force an objectively reasonable officer would have used in her or his encounter 
with Mr. Blair.  The evidence in this case was legally sufficient to survive both motions for 
judgment and allow the case to be submitted to the jury for its consideration.  We explain. 
 
17 
 
As the Court of Special Appeals stated, “[w]hether a police officer has used 
excessive force in violation of the Maryland Declaration of Rights is judged under the 
standard of objective reasonableness established by the United States Supreme Court to 
analyze analogous claims made under the Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution.”  
Austin, 2019 WL 1873495 at *2 (citing Richardson, 361 Md. at 452, 762 A.2d at 56 
(applying Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989))).  “Determining 
whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is reasonable . . . requires a careful 
balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment 
interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.”  Graham, 490 U.S. at 
396, 109 S. Ct. at 1871 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).5  This 
                                              
 
5 In Graham, Officer Connor, an officer of the Charlotte, North Carolina, Police 
Department, witnessed Dethorne Graham (“Graham”) hastily enter and exit a convenience 
store and became suspicious.  490 U.S. at 388, 109 S. Ct. at 1868.  Officer Connor made 
an investigative stop about one-half mile from the convenience store and “ordered 
[William] Berry [(“Berry”)] and Graham to wait while he found out what, if anything, had 
happened at the convenience store.”  Id. at 389, 109 S. Ct. at 1868.  “When Officer Connor 
returned to his patrol car to call for backup assistance, Graham got out of the car, ran around 
it twice, and finally sat down on the curb, where he passed out briefly.”  Id. 
 
 
In the ensuing confusion, a number of other Charlotte police officers arrived 
on the scene in response to Officer Connor’s request for backup.  One of the 
officers rolled Graham over on the sidewalk and cuffed his hands tightly 
behind his back, ignoring Berry’s pleas to get him some sugar. . . . .  Several 
officers then lifted Graham up from behind, carried him over to Berry’s car, 
and placed him face down on its hood.  [O]ne of the officers . . . shoved his 
face down against the hood of the car.  Four officers grabbed Graham and 
threw him headfirst into the police car. . . . Finally, Officer Connor received 
a report that Graham had done nothing wrong at the convenience store, and 
the officers drove him home and released him. 
 
Id.  Because of the encounter, Graham suffered a broken foot, cuts on his wrists, a bruised 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(continued . . .) 
 
18 
 
“reasonableness” determination, therefore, is incapable “of precise definition or 
mechanical application[;]” the factfinder must pay particular attention “to the facts and 
circumstances of each particular case[.]”  Id. at 396, 109 S. Ct. at 1872.  In its inquiry, the 
factfinder must judge a law enforcement officer’s use of force “from the perspective of a 
reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight[.]”  Id.  In 
making its decision, the factfinder must consider the totality of the circumstances, 
including “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat 
to the safety of the officers or others, [ ] whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting 
to evade arrest by flight[,]” and that law enforcement officers “are often forced to make 
split-second judgments [ ] in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly 
evolving[.]”  Id. at 396-97, 109 S. Ct. at 1872.  Regarding deadly force specifically, a law 
enforcement officer may use deadly force when the officer “has probable cause to believe 
that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or others[.]”  
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 1701 (1985).  “A police officer may 
not seize an unarmed, non[-]dangerous suspect by shooting him dead.”  Id.  As such, an 
                                              
(. . . continued) 
forehead, and an injured shoulder. 
 
 
Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court held that the lower courts should have 
assessed whether the law enforcement officers acted objectively reasonable in their 
encounter with Graham.  Id. at 399, 109 S. Ct. at 1873.  Because the lower courts applied 
the incorrect standard, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to 
the District Court with instructions to assess the officers’ use of force under the correct 
standard.  Id. 
 
19 
 
objectively reasonable officer would use deadly force only when threatened with serious 
physical harm. 
In the case at bar, the trial court properly denied Officer Austin’s motions for 
judgment and submitted the case to the jury.  As we discussed supra, we review a trial 
court’s “denial of a motion for judgment [ ] if there is ‘any evidence, no matter how slight, 
that is legally sufficient to generate a jury question.’”  Jones, 425 Md. at 30-31, 38 A.3d at 
350 (internal citation omitted).  In doing so, we “evaluate all evidence and reasonable 
evidentiary inferences, viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party” to 
determine whether the trial court properly granted or denied a motion for judgment.  C&B 
Construction, 460 Md. at 279, 190 A.3d at 275 (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted).  The Estate had to present sufficient evidence to prove that Officer Austin acted 
in an objectively unreasonable manner in his use of force against Mr. Blair, to overcome 
Officer Austin’s motions for judgment. 
Regarding Officer Austin’s first motion for judgment, the trial judge could only 
consider the evidence presented during the Estate’s case.  At this juncture, the trial judge 
and jury had observed the video evidence and considered testimony from four witnesses, 
including expert testimony from Dr. Powers.  The evidence revealed that Officer Austin 
fired four separate shots at Mr. Blair, an unarmed civilian, but the evidence did not clearly 
establish when Officer Austin discharged his firearm.  Based on the video evidence, a 
reasonable jury could find that Officer Austin’s movements could have suggested he 
discharged his firearm at any moment after wielding his firearm.  In offering his expert 
testimony on behalf of the Estate, Dr. Powers surmised that Officer Austin’s action of 
 
20 
 
shooting Mr. Blair four separate times exceeded the level of force an objectively reasonable 
officer would have used in the same or similar situation.  Dr. Powers opined that an 
objectively reasonable officer would have used non-lethal weapons at her or his disposal.  
At the time of Officer Austin’s initial motion for judgment, the Estate had presented a 
prima facie case on the issue of excessive force, such that the case could proceed.  As such, 
the trial court properly denied Officer Austin’s initial motion for judgment. 
At the close of all the evidence, Officer Austin renewed his motion for judgment.  
At this juncture, the trial judge was permitted to consider evidence submitted by the 
Estate’s case in chief, outlined supra, and Officer Austin’s defense.  Evidence revealed 
during Officer Austin’s defense could have suggested that Officer Austin’s actions were 
objectively reasonable, or not.  Because of Mr. Blair’s relatively large stature and quick 
approach, an argument could be made that Officer Austin was forced to respond quickly to 
address, and ultimately de-escalate, the situation, and, thus, Officer Austin may have 
believed he was in danger.  However, this alone may not have sufficiently shown that Mr. 
Blair’s actions threatened Officer Austin or the greater public with serious physical harm, 
thereby justifying the use of deadly force.6  In fact, no evidence indicated that Mr. Blair 
verbally threatened Officer Austin, the greater public, or other law enforcement officers.  
                                              
 
6 The dissent places great weight on how rapidly the encounter unfolded between 
Mr. Blair and Officer Austin.  Certainly, the dissent recognizes, just as we do, that all law 
enforcement officers, at some point in their careers, will have to respond to “tense, 
uncertain, and rapidly evolving situations” similar to the encounter between Mr. Blair and 
Officer Austin.  The use of deadly force is not reasonable simply because the situation is 
tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving. 
 
 
21 
 
Although Mr. Blair’s medical records revealed his suicidal ideation and hope that he would 
be shot by the police during this encounter, and thus his mental instability, this was 
unknown to Officer Austin at the time of the encounter.  Additional evidence revealed that 
Mr. Blair initially failed to adhere to Officer Austin’s commands to pull his vehicle over 
after a slow speed pursuit, but Mr. Blair did not engage Officer Austin in a dangerous, 
reckless, high-speed car chase that threatened serious harm to the public or law 
enforcement officers.  Mr. Blair did not force other drivers off the road, cause a collision, 
or harm pedestrians during the slow pursuit or after exiting his vehicle.7  Turning to the 
expert testimony, Dr. Powers suggested Officer Austin could have used non-lethal options 
during his interaction with Mr. Blair.  However, Officer Austin was not carrying one of the 
suggested weapons, a taser, and testified that he believed using his baton would be 
ineffective because of Mr. Blair’s size and speed.  Officer Austin also testified that he 
believed using his mace at such a close range would have exposed both him and Mr. Blair 
to contact by the chemical.  Mr. Key, testifying as an expert witness for Officer Austin, 
surmised that Officer Austin acted reasonably under the circumstances and pursuant to 
police standards and policies.  We recognize that an objectively reasonable officer would 
adhere to proper law enforcement guidelines and policies, or else render said guidelines 
and policies meaningless.  However, Officer Austin, himself, testified that he decided to 
pull and discharge his firearm, a lethal weapon, before he thought Mr. Blair may have 
                                              
 
7 We do not recount the “antecedent events” to suggest that antecedent events factor 
into whether Officer Austin acted as an objectively reasonable officer would at the precise 
moment of the shooting, as the dissent urges.  We include these events to provide context 
for the entirety of the situation. 
 
22 
 
possessed or may have been reaching for a weapon.  Officer Austin further testified that he 
used deadly force to maintain distance between Mr. Blair and himself, not to protect 
himself, the public, or other law enforcement officers and not because he believed himself, 
the public, or other law enforcement officers to be in danger of death or serious physical 
harm.  Officer Austin admitted that he has been trained to accomplish this objective by 
using non-lethal means, but instead chose to use a lethal weapon.  Despite compelling 
evidence submitted by both parties, we must review the entirety of the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the Estate as the non-moving party.  The evidence reflects that there was 
sufficient evidence for the question of excessive force to be considered by the jury.  As 
such, the trial court properly denied Officer Austin’s renewed motion for judgment. 
In reviewing the evidence for legal sufficiency, we do not suggest that an appellate 
court may assess an excessive force case with “20/20 vision of hindsight[.]”  Graham, 490 
U.S. at 396, 109 S. Ct. at 1872.  Instead, we must determine whether the record at that 
juncture supported the trial court’s denial of Officer Austin’s motions for judgment and 
ultimately the submission of the case to the jury.  In reviewing the evidence, we must 
include Dr. Powers’ expert testimony, Mr. Key’s expert testimony, and the surveillance 
video in our analysis.  Accordingly, there was legally sufficient evidence that buttressed 
the trial court’s denial of Officer Austin’s motion for judgment and the decision to submit 
the case to the jury.  
C. The Decision in Scott is Inapplicable to the Instant Case. 
 
The United States Supreme Court decision in Scott v. Harris, which the Court of 
Special Appeals erroneously relied upon in support of its independent, restricted focus on 
 
23 
 
the video evidence in this case, is factually distinguishable from the instant case.  In Scott, 
which was decided within the context of the denial of a motion for summary judgment, the 
Supreme Court held that “[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which 
is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court 
should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment.”  550 U.S. at 380-81, 127 S. Ct. at 1776.  The holding in Scott in no way supports 
the decision by the Court of Special Appeals to review the video evidence to the exclusion 
of other evidence at trial, nor does the decision support usurping the jury’s factual findings 
and verdict on the question of whether Officer Austin exceeded the level of force that an 
objectively reasonable officer would use under the circumstances.8  Accordingly, the Court 
of Special Appeals erred in applying Scott to the case at bar.   
CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, we hold that the Court of Special Appeals erred when it substituted 
its judgment for the factual findings and verdict of the jury regarding Officer Austin’s 
excessive use of force, for that of its own, based on its own independent evaluation of the 
video camera evidence.  As Judge Stuart Berger’s very well-reasoned dissent observes, 
“[a] video can show what happened, but it cannot tell a jury how a reasonable officer would 
have responded in the circumstances.”  Austin, 2019 WL 1873495 at *6 (Berger, J., 
                                              
 
8 We leave to an appropriate case in the future, should such a case arise, the predicate 
to allowance of a trial court or an appellate court, to determine as a matter of law, that a 
video is dispositive in a disputed case.  However, we would not go so far as to hold that, 
under no circumstance would it be proper to dispose of a disputed case on what is seen in 
a video that is capable of only one interpretation, not subject to dispute by other evidence. 
 
24 
 
dissenting).  Understandably, “an average juror, lacking the specialized training of a police 
officer, could reasonably look for some guidance as to how an objective[ly] reasonable 
officer, armed with both lethal and non-lethal weapons, would have approached the 
situation.”  Id. (Berger, J., dissenting).  The Court of Special Appeals erred when it applied 
the United States Supreme Court decision in Scott, a case that is factually distinguishable 
from the case at bar.  The issue of whether the force used was objectively reasonable under 
the circumstances was a question for the jury to resolve.  We hold that legally sufficient 
evidence supported the trial court’s decision to submit the case to the jury regarding Officer 
Austin’s use of excessive force.  We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the Court of Special 
Appeals. 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF 
SPECIAL APPEALS IS REVERSED.  
COSTS TO BE PAID BY OFFICER 
DAVID AUSTIN.  
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 35 
 
September Term, 2019 
______________________________________ 
 
ESTATE OF JEFFREY BLAIR BY 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE TIAUNA 
BLAIR 
 
v. 
 
DAVID AUSTIN 
______________________________________ 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty 
Booth 
Battaglia, Lynne A. (Senior 
Judge, Specially Assigned), 
 
JJ. 
______________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Watts, J. 
______________________________________ 
 
Filed: June 2, 2020 
 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
Case No. 24-C-15-007117   
Argued: December 5, 2019 
 
Respectfully, I agree with the outcome expressed in Judge Hotten’s opinion, and 
would most assuredly reverse the Court of Special Appeals’s judgment, see J. Hotten Slip 
Op. at 23-24, and remand to the Court of Special Appeals for consideration of the 
evidentiary issues raised by Officer David Austin, Respondent, on appeal but not addressed 
by that Court.  I write separately to explain my reasons. 
From my perspective, the Court of Special Appeals’s decision is troubling, in that, 
as Judge Hotten aptly notes, the Court of Special Appeals usurped the jury’s role as the 
finder of fact.  See id. at 11-12.  This Court would naturally be concerned if a trial court 
invaded the jury’s province.  It is even more concerning where an appellate court acts to 
do so.  Here, in reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment, the Court of Special Appeals 
made an independent determination regarding whether video evidence showed excessive 
force.  That pronouncement cannot be allowed to stand. 
I would hold that the issue of whether a law enforcement officer’s use of force was 
reasonable is a question of fact, see Fillmore v. Page, 358 F.3d 496, 504 (7th Cir. 2004); 
Baldwin v. Stalder, 137 F.3d 836, 839 (5th Cir. 1998); King v. Blankenship, 636 F.2d 70, 
71 (4th Cir. 1980), and that the circuit court was correct in denying the motion for 
judgment1 of Officer Austin, given that the Estate of Jeffrey Blair (“Mr. Blair’s estate”), 
                                              
1A motion for judgment—also known as a motion for judgment as a matter of law—
is “[a] party’s request that the court enter a judgment in its favor before the case is 
submitted to the jury . . . because there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis on which 
a jury could find for the other party.”  Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, Black’s 
Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).  Here, Officer Austin moved for judgment at the close of 
Mr. Blair’s estate’s case and renewed the motion for judgment at the close of evidence.  A 
review of the Court of Special Appeals’s opinion shows that the Court did not distinguish 
 
2 
Petitioner, presented sufficient evidence to generate a question for the jury as to Officer 
Austin’s liability for excessive force and assault.2  
Despite setting forth the procedural history of the case, and stating that there was a 
motion for judgment at the end of Blair’s estate’s case and a motion for judgment at the 
conclusion of all of the evidence, and that the circuit court denied both motions, Judge 
Hotten’s opinion reviews the propriety of the denial of the motion for judgment made at 
the close of Blair’s estate’s case as well as the motion for judgment made at the close of 
                                              
which motion for judgment it was reviewing when it concluded that the circuit court “erred 
in denying [Officer] Austin’s motion for judgment.”  David Austin v. Estate of Jeffrey 
Blair by Personal Representative Tiauna Blair, No. 580, Sept. Term, 2017, 2019 WL 
1873495, at *2 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 25, 2019) (“At the close of the Estate’s case, 
Austin moved for judgment.  The circuit court granted the motion on all counts except 
those alleging civil assault and excessive force.  Austin renewed his motion on those counts 
at the close of evidence, but it was again denied. . . . [W]e conclude that . . . the circuit 
court [] erred in denying Austin’s motion for judgment.”  (Footnote omitted)).  In a footnote 
immediately following the holding, the Court of Special Appeals stated that Officer Austin 
raised four issues, including that the circuit court erred by “denying his motions for 
judgment[,]” and, because of the Court’s “resolution of [that] issue, [it did] not address his 
remaining issues.”  Id. at *2 n.3.   
This Court has stated that, “[i]n Maryland, a motion for judgment, made at the close 
of an opponent’s case and thereafter denied, is withdrawn when the party making the 
motion offers evidence in its own case-in-chief.  But, after offering evidence, the motion 
may be re-offered or renewed.”  Gen. Motors Corp. v. Seay, 388 Md. 341, 351, 879 A.2d 
1049, 1055 (2005) (citation omitted).  See also Md. R. 2-519(c) (“A party who moves for 
judgment at the close of the evidence offered by an opposing party may offer evidence in 
the event the motion is not granted . . . .  In doing so, the party withdraws the motion.”).  
In this case, after the motion for judgment made at the close of Mr. Blair’s estate’s case 
was denied as to the civil assault and excessive force claims, Officer Austin offered 
evidence, and, at the close of evidence, renewed the motion for judgment.  Thus, in offering 
evidence, Officer Austin essentially withdrew the motion for judgment made at the close 
of Mr. Blair’s estate’s case, and the denial of the renewed motion for judgment made at the 
close of evidence was what was before the Court of Special Appeals for review.   
2Lack of excessive force is an element of perfect self-defense, see Porter v. State, 
455 Md. 220, 234-35, 166 A.3d 1044, 1053 (2017), which is a defense to a claim for assault, 
see Richardson v. McGriff, 361 Md. 437, 453, 762 A.2d 48, 56 (2000). 
3 
the evidence.  See J. Hotten Slip Op. at 16, 19-20.  However, the first motion for judgment, 
made at the close of Blair’s estate’s case, was effectively withdrawn when the circuit court 
denied the motion as to the claims for excessive force and assault and Officer Austin 
offered evidence.  See Md. R. 2-519(c); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Seay, 388 Md. 341, 351, 879 
A.2d 1049, 1055 (2005).  There is no need for the opinion to review the denial of the motion 
for judgment made at the close of Blair’s estate’s case, as that motion was superseded when 
Officer Austin renewed the motion for judgment at the close of the evidence.  In its opinion, 
the Court of Special Appeals did not state that it reviewed multiple motions for judgment.  
The Court of Special Appeals’s decision and the petition for a writ of certiorari concerned 
only the question of whether “the circuit court [] erred in denying [Officer] Austin’s motion 
for judgment.”  David Austin v. Estate of Jeffrey Blair by Personal Representative Tiauna 
Blair, No. 580, Sept. Term, 2017, 2019 WL 1873495, at *2 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 25, 
2019) (footnote omitted).   
The Court of Special Appeals was wrong to find error in the circuit court’s denial 
of Officer Austin’s motion for judgment.  An appellate court reviews without deference a 
trial court’s ruling on a motion for judgment.  See Sugarman v. Liles, 460 Md. 396, 413, 
190 A.3d 344, 353 (2018).  The question that is before the appellate court is not whether 
the jury’s verdict was correct, or whether the jury assessed the case’s merits correctly; 
rather, the question is whether the trial court was correct in determining that there was, or 
was not, sufficient evidence to submit the case to the jury.  At a jury trial, there is a high 
bar for granting a motion for judgment.  The trial court must “consider all evidence and 
inferences in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made”—i.e., 
4 
the plaintiff or counter-plaintiff.  Md. R. 2-519(b).   
Officer Austin was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there was 
more than sufficient evidence to submit to the jury the claims for excessive force and 
assault.  Specifically, Mr. Blair’s estate called as a witness Tyrone Powers, Ph.D., who had 
been a Maryland State Trooper for approximately four years, had been a special agent of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation for approximately ten years, and had served as a 
consultant for numerous law enforcement organizations and administrators.  The circuit 
court admitted Dr. Powers as an expert in, among other fields, use of force.  Dr. Powers 
testified that it was unreasonable for Officer Austin to use deadly force by firing his gun at 
Mr. Blair.  As Judge Hotten writes, Dr. Powers’s expert opinion generated an issue for the 
jury to decide as to excessive force and assault.  See J. Hotten Slip Op. at 21-22.  The 
weight to which Dr. Powers’s expert opinion was entitled—as well as the weight that was 
to be given to the expert opinion of Charles “Joe” Key, Officer Austin’s expert witness—
were for the jury, not the circuit court or an appellate court, to determine. 
As to the First Circuit’s holding in Roy v. Inhabitants of the City of Lewiston, 42 
F.3d 691 (1st Cir. 1994), contrary to the Dissent, see Dissent Slip Op. at 9-10 n.3, it would 
not be accurate to conclude that the case supports the proposition that “the specific [expert] 
testimony here is not relevant” in the objective reasonableness inquiry.3  In Roy, id. at 693-
                                              
3That said, the dissenting opinion makes an apt observation that Judge Hotten’s 
opinion relies upon circumstances that are not relevant to review of the circuit court’s 
denial of the motion for judgment.  See Dissent Slip Op. at 12-13.  But, within Judge 
Hotten’s opinion is the basic holding, consistent with Judge Berger’s dissent in the Court 
of Special Appeals, that there was sufficient evidence, i.e., a prima facie case, concerning 
 
5 
94, 695-96, in reviewing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants (officers, the city, and the police chief), the First Circuit fully considered the 
plaintiff’s expert witness’s anticipated testimony, as set forth in an affidavit, and 
determined that the testimony would not have affected the determination as to whether the 
officers’ use of force was reasonable.  There were no competing experts offering different 
views.  And, the plaintiff’s expert’s proposed testimony hinged on the opinion that the 
officers could have acted differently if they had adequate training and equipment (a noxious 
spray that they did not have).  See id. at 694, 696.  The First Circuit discounted the expert’s 
testimony and concluded that it was not obvious that retreating was an option because that 
would have left an armed man able to hurt the public.  See id. at 696.  There is no basis for 
the conclusion that the First Circuit held or suggested that an appellate court should not 
include or consider expert witness testimony in an analysis of objective reasonableness in 
excessive force cases.  As such, it is a reach to suggest that an appellate court can review 
the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment—or, as here, a motion for 
judgment—and not consider expert testimony.  Moreover, in stating that, “in close cases, 
a jury does not automatically get to second-guess [] life and death decisions, even though 
the plaintiff has an expert and a plausible claim that the situation could better have been 
handled differently[,]” the First Circuit was discussing substantive liability and qualified 
                                              
excessive force for submission to the jury.  From my perspective, the Dissent goes too far 
in concluding that Dr. Powers’s expert testimony should not have been considered by the 
circuit court and the Court of Special Appeals in assessing Officer Austin’s motion for 
judgment.  See Dissent Slip Op. at 9-10 n.3.  And, the concern with Judge Hotten’s opinion 
is not that it reaches the wrong result, but that the opinion muddies the waters about the 
issue that is before the Court and how to resolve it.     
6 
immunity in excessive force cases, not whether expert testimony could or should be 
considered.  Id. at 695. 
Also, in Roy, id. at 693, the facts were undisputed; indeed, the First Circuit noted 
that, in opposing summary judgment, the plaintiff did not contradict the events and agreed 
that he had knives and made the movement in question.  Rather, the plaintiff alleged only 
that he did not intend to hurt the officers and was seeking to put down the knives.  See id.  
By contrast, in this case, the facts and inferences to be drawn from the facts are disputed.  
For example, there is a question of whether one shot was sufficient to subdue Blair, and 
there is a question of whether Officer Austin gave commands to stop and if they were 
sufficient to warn of ensuing force used by the officer.  Roy does not stand for the 
proposition that, where there is an issue of whether multiple shots were necessary to subdue 
a perceived threat or whether a warning was given as alleged, a trial court or appellate court 
may make that factual determination. 
The issue of whether Officer Austin’s use of deadly force was reasonable was a 
factual matter, see, e.g., King, 636 F.2d at 71, which heavily depended on the 
circumstances of which Officer Austin was aware when he shot Mr. Blair.  The video from 
the surveillance camera lacks audio, and thus does not make clear what, if anything, Officer 
Austin and Blair said to each other in the moments leading up to the shooting.  Notably, at 
trial, Officer Austin did not rely exclusively on the video, or contend only that the video 
spoke for itself, or that the video, without more, established that there was no excessive 
force.  To the contrary, Officer Austin offered into evidence multiple documents that were 
part of Mr. Blair’s medical records, called an expert witness, and testified about his 
7 
encounter with Mr. Blair.4  Specifically, Officer Austin testified that he told Mr. Blair “to 
go back to his car” and yelled “Stop” and “Don’t do it” at Mr. Blair multiple times.  Because 
the video did not include audio, the video could not be used to confirm or deny the accuracy 
of this aspect of Officer Austin’s testimony.  It was up to the jury to determine whether 
Officer Austin’s testimony about what he said to Mr. Blair was credible, and, if so, whether 
Officer Austin’s warnings to Mr. Blair were sufficient to preclude a finding of excessive 
force. 
In the same vein, although it was clear that Officer Austin fired his gun four times, 
and that Mr. Blair received gunshot wounds to his torso, right hand, and scalp, it was 
unclear in what order Mr. Blair received those gunshot wounds, and whether one shot 
would have been sufficient to disable Mr. Blair and end any threat to Officer Austin.  As 
the circuit court aptly observed, the video of the traffic stop—i.e., the recording from a 
surveillance camera—did not resolve the factual question “as to exactly when Officer 
Austin fired his weapon.”  Contrary to the position of Officer Austin and the Court of 
Special Appeals, see Austin, 2019 WL 1873495, at *3, the video did not establish all of the 
facts necessary to resolve the issue of excessive force. 
By relying on its own interpretation of the video and independently resolving the 
                                              
4Although the existence of the medical records was obviously not known to Officer 
Austin at the time that he shot Mr. Blair, Officer Austin contended at trial that Mr. Blair 
appeared to be dangerous and that Mr. Blair seemed to want to kill him.  The medical 
records were offered by Officer Austin in an attempt to confirm that his (Officer Austin’s) 
observations about Mr. Blair at the time of the shooting were correct.  Although an officer’s 
subjective beliefs do not govern the excessive force determination, an objective 
reasonableness inquiry does not discount the officer’s observations of the incident or the 
circumstances as they appeared to the officer. 
8 
question of whether Officer Austin’s use of deadly force was reasonable, see id. at *1, the 
Court of Special Appeals substituted its view of the evidence for the jury’s, and essentially 
acted as a second jury in deciding factual matters and the merits of the case.  Such an 
analysis would be unwarranted under any circumstances, but, here, the Court of Special 
Appeals’s independent determination of the facts of the case is particularly troubling when 
the only issue that the Court purported to address was whether the circuit court erred in 
denying the motion for judgment.  The issue that was before the Court of Special Appeals 
required only a determination of whether the circuit court was correct in concluding that, 
viewing the evidence and the inferences that were to be drawn therefrom in the light that 
was most favorable to Mr. Blair’s estate, see Md. R. 2-519(b), there was sufficient evidence 
for the jury to determine Officer Austin’s liability for excessive force and assault, see 
Sugarman, 460 Md. at 412-13, 190 A.3d at 353.  Plainly, Mr. Blair’s estate produced 
sufficient evidence, especially considering Dr. Powers’s expert testimony, to produce for 
the jury a question as to excessive force. 
The Court of Special Appeals was incorrect in determining that independently 
interpreting the video was appropriate based on the Supreme Court’s holding in Scott v. 
Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).  See Austin, 2019 WL 1873495, at *3.  I agree that Scott does 
not control the disposition of this case.  See J. Hotten Slip Op. at 22-23.  Scott, 550 U.S. at 
378, involved an appeal from a denial of summary judgment, which is proper where “the 
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Md. R. 2-501(a).  
The Supreme Court clearly decided the issue of whether the officer was entitled to 
9 
summary judgment through use of video evidence.  See Scott, 550 U.S. at 379-80.  The 
Supreme Court noted that, in the context of deciding a motion for summary judgment, 
when one party provides a version of the events that is clearly contradicted by the record 
(i.e., in Scott, the video evidence), a court need not adopt that party’s version of the events 
in deciding a motion for summary judgment.  See id. at 380.  The Supreme Court stated: 
At the summary judgment stage, facts must be viewed in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a genuine dispute as 
to those facts.  As we have emphasized, when the moving party has carried 
its burden . . . , its opponent must do more than simply show that there is 
some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts[.]  Where the record taken 
as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving 
party, there is no genuine issue for trial.  The mere existence of some alleged 
factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly 
supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no 
genuine issue of material fact.  When opposing parties tell two different 
stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no 
reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the 
facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment. 
 
Id. (cleaned up). 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Scott is in no way transferable to the use that the 
Court of Special Appeals made of it.  The Supreme Court’s holding does not mention, or 
even hint, that, in reviewing the trial court’s denial of a motion for judgment, an appellate 
court may review a video, disregard other evidence produced at trial, and reach a 
determination about the existence of excessive force based solely on its review of the video.  
Although it has been said the standards for granting a motion for summary judgment and a 
motion for judgment are “analogous[,]” or similar, the considerations by the trial court are 
different.  Pittman v. Atl. Realty Co., 359 Md. 513, 537, 754 A.2d 1030, 1043 (2000) (“The 
test under Maryland law for determining whether no triable issue of fact is presented on 
10 
summary judgment is highly analogous to whether a motion for judgment should be 
granted in a case tried to a jury.”  (Citations omitted)).  See also Berkey v. Delia, 287 Md. 
302, 305, 413 A.2d 170, 171 (1980) (“We have observed that the function of the trial [court] 
on [] a motion [for summary judgment] is much the same as that which [the trial court] 
performs at the close of all the evidence in a jury trial when a motion for a directed verdict 
or a request for peremptory instructions makes it necessary that [the trial court] determine 
whether an issue requires resolution by a jury or may be decided by the court as a matter 
of law.”  (Citations omitted)).   
The two types of motions share the circumstance that the moving party claims to be 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, as well as the principle that the trial court must 
consider the facts/evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party.  See Md. R. 2-501(a); de la Puente v. Cty. Comm’rs of Frederick Cty., 
386 Md. 505, 510, 873 A.2d 366, 369 (2005); Sugarman, 460 Md. at 412-13, 190 A.3d at 
353.  But, a determination of the motions differs in that granting a motion for summary 
judgment depends on whether there is “a genuine dispute of material fact,” whereas the 
granting a motion for judgment depends on whether there is sufficient evidence for the jury 
to find in the plaintiff’s favor.  In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a trial court 
considers the documents, affidavits, and/or exhibits that may be filed with the court in 
support of the motion.  Generally, by definition, there has only been discovery, as there has 
not yet been a trial.  As such, there is no “evidence” or “testimony” for the trial court to 
consider.  By contrast, in deciding a motion for judgment at the conclusion of the evidence 
in the case, the trial court must consider all of the evidence (i.e., exhibits and testimony) 
11 
that was adduced at trial—regardless of whether the evidence consists of video evidence, 
lay and expert witness testimony, or other types of exhibits.  I would not conclude that, 
because the Supreme Court, in Scott, reviewed a decision with respect to a motion for 
summary judgment, and, based on information submitted in support of the motion, 
considered an item that consisted of a video, an appellate court in assessing the denial of a 
motion for judgment may review video evidence to the exclusion of other evidence in the 
case and make a factual determination concerning the outcome of the case. 
Importantly, in Scott, the Supreme Court did not indicate that either party had 
retained an expert witness, much less that there were dueling expert opinions.  By contrast, 
here, at trial, each of the parties called an expert witness who offered opposing opinions 
regarding whether Officer Austin’s use of force was reasonable.  In sum, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Scott was not an indication that, in all instances, regardless of other 
evidence, appellate courts may review videos of police encounters with civilians, assess 
such videos’ contents, and determine whether the videos establish sufficient facts to show 
excessive force.   
Under the Court of Special Appeals’s holding, an appellate court would be free to 
independently review a video and determine that a case should not have been submitted to 
a jury, irrespective of other evidence, such as trial exhibits and lay witness and expert 
witness testimony.  From my perspective, in assessing a motion for judgment, regardless 
of whether the case involves video evidence, a court should determine whether, considering 
12 
all of the evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there 
is evidence from which a reasonable juror could find the elements of the tort.5   
There is no need, as the Court of Special Appeals did, to determine a different 
standard for deciding and reviewing a motion for judgment where video evidence is 
involved, and the Supreme Court’s holding in Scott does not authorize courts to make such 
a change.  In excessive force cases involving videos, in reviewing the grant or denial of a 
motion for judgment, an appellate court must consider without deference all of the evidence 
in the case in the light most favorable to the non-moving party to determine whether a party 
has generated a sufficient question for the jury, and not merely review video evidence to 
independently determine the reasonableness of a law enforcement officer’s actions. 
The Honorable Stuart R. Berger deserves to be commended for his “well-reasoned 
dissent[.]”  J. Hotten Slip Op. at 23.  Judge Berger hit the nail on the head in stating: “It is 
not our role to opine on the correctness of the jury’s decision, but to determine whether the 
Estate established a prima facie case of excessive force.”  Austin, 2019 WL 1873495, at 
*14 (Berger, J., dissenting).   
With certainty, factual matters are for juries, not appellate courts, to determine.  As 
technology becomes more prevalent in day-to-day life, issues involving its use will also 
become more prevalent in trials.  Video recordings, audio recordings, and images from 
social media websites will be offered as evidence more frequently as time goes on.  
                                              
5That said, this is not to suggest that there are no circumstances under which a trial 
court in assessing a motion for judgment, in a case where video evidence is involved, may 
determine that a plaintiff has not established a prima facie case and grant the motion, if the 
video evidence is unambiguous and there is no other evidence to the contrary. 
13 
Although an appellate court may be tempted to believe that it is in just as good a position 
as a jury to assess the weight of such evidence, the jury’s province must remain sacrosanct, 
and an appellate court must not usurp the jury’s role, no matter what type of evidence a 
case involves.  I would conclude that we cannot allow an appellate court to substitute its 
interpretation of video evidence—or any evidence, for that matter—for the jury’s, and, I 
would not put a “crack in this bedrock” principle and dispense with the long-recognized 
standard of review of a motion for judgment.  Austin, 2019 WL 1873495, at *1. 
                    
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 35 
 
September Term, 2019 
______________________________________ 
 
ESTATE OF JEFFREY BLAIR BY 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
TIAUNA BLAIR 
 
v. 
 
DAVID AUSTIN 
______________________________________ 
 
Barbera, C.J., 
McDonald, 
Watts, 
Hotten, 
Getty, 
Booth, 
Battaglia, Lynne A. (Senior 
Judge, Specially Assigned), 
 
JJ. 
______________________________________ 
 
Dissenting Opinion by Getty, J, 
which Booth and Battaglia, JJ., join. 
 
______________________________________ 
 
Filed: June 2, 2020 
 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
Case No. 24-C-15-007117 
Argued: December 5, 2019 
[T]he term reasonableness is used in different 
ways in different contexts; and in this one—the 
use of deadly force by the police in dangerous 
situations—the Supreme Court has allowed more 
latitude than might be customary in a simple tort 
case . . . . 
 
Roy v. Inhabitants of the City of Lewiston, 42 
F.3d 691, 696 (1st Cir. 1994). 
 
In mere seconds, an individual who led police on a mile-long pursuit suddenly 
stopped his vehicle, exited, and charged directly at a police officer.  In that “tense, 
uncertain, and rapidly evolving” situation, the officer swiftly backpedaled and commanded 
the individual to stop before ultimately discharging four rounds from his firearm.  Graham 
v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).  We must now determine whether, under the Supreme 
Court’s test set out in Graham and its progeny, the officer’s conduct is “objectively 
reasonable.”  Id.  “The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from 
the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of 
hindsight.”  Id. at 396.  Because Judge Hotten’s analysis exhibits the hallmarks of armchair 
reflection from the peace of a judge’s chambers, focuses on evidence that has no bearing 
on the reasonableness inquiry, and neglects to engage with meaningful federal case law 
interpreting Graham, I respectfully dissent. 
 
When a party moves for judgment, a circuit court “must determine if there is any 
evidence, no matter how slight, that is legally sufficient to generate a jury question.”  Nat’l 
Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Fund for Animals, Inc., 451 Md. 431, 457 (2017) 
(“Nat’l Union Fire”) (quoting Thomas v. Panco Mgmt. of Md., LLC, 423 Md. 387, 394 
(2011)).  As this Court has long observed, “[t]he words ‘legally sufficient’ have 
2 
significance.  They mean that a party who has the burden of [proof] . . . cannot sustain this 
burden by offering a mere scintilla of evidence, amounting to no more than surmise, 
possibility, or conjecture[;] . . . such evidence must be of legal probative force and 
evidential value.”  Cavacos v. Sarwar, 313 Md. 248, 259 (1988) (quoting Fowler v. Smith, 
240 Md. 240, 247 (1965)). 
The circuit court must, in a light most favorable to the non-movant, consider: (1) 
the evidence; and (2) reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence.  Sugarman v. Liles, 
460 Md. 396, 413 (2018).  “[W]hen the ‘facts and circumstances only permit one inference 
with regard to the issue presented,’ . . . the issue is one of law for the court and not one of 
fact for the jury.”  Thomas, 423 Md. at 394 (quoting Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. v. Saville, 
418 Md. 496, 503 (2011)).  “A judge must grant a civil defendant’s motion for judgment 
as a matter of law if the plaintiff failed to present evidence that could persuade the jury of 
the elements . . . by a preponderance of the evidence.”  Darcars Motors of Silver Spring, 
Inc. v. Borzym, 379 Md. 249, 270 (2004) (emphasis omitted).  On review of a motion for 
judgment,1 an appellate court conducts the same analysis as the circuit court, but without 
                                              
1 I agree with Judge Watts’ concurring opinion with respect to appellate review of a motion 
for judgment under Maryland Rule 2-519.  See Judge Watts’ Slip Op. at 1 n.1, 3.  
Specifically, I agree that “[t]here is no need for [Judge Hotten’s] opinion to review the 
denial of the motion for judgment made at the close of Blair’s estate’s case, as that motion 
was superseded when Officer Austin renewed the motion for judgment at the close of the 
evidence.”  Judge Watts’ Slip Op. at 3.  Therefore, my analysis only focuses Officer 
Austin’s renewed motion for judgment at the close of all the evidence. 
 
 
On a separate note, I also agree with Judge Watts’ analysis regarding the Court of 
Special Appeals’ improper reliance on Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).  See Judge 
Watts’ Slip Op. at 8–12. 
3 
deference.  Nat’l Union Fire, 451 Md. at 457; District of Columbia v. Singleton, 425 Md. 
398, 406–07 (2012). 
 
In my view, a defendant-officer’s motion for judgment in an excessive force case 
requires the circuit court to make the following threshold determination.  The circuit court 
must determine if the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, removes 
the officer’s conduct from a range of objective reasonableness, as that standard has been 
articulated by the Supreme Court and lower federal courts.  If the plaintiff produces 
evidence that the officer’s conduct could be deemed objectively unreasonable—i.e., 
outside that range of reasonableness—then the plaintiff has generated a factual question fit 
for submission to a jury.  However, if the evidence, even when viewed in a light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, “only permit[s] one inference,” that the officer’s conduct is within 
the spectrum of objective reasonableness, then the circuit court is presented with an issue 
of law and it must enter judgment.  Nat’l Union Fire, 451 Md. at 457 (quoting Thomas, 
423 Md. at 394). 
Put another way, the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that an officer’s 
actions are so egregious that they are removed from the range of objective reasonableness 
articulated by the Supreme Court.  When the plaintiff fails to present evidence satisfying 
this burden, and the evidence viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff demonstrates 
reasonable conduct, as here, the matter is not for a jury and the motion for judgment should 
be granted. 
4 
 
To survive a motion for judgment, the Estate needed to demonstrate that Officer 
Austin acted in an objectively unreasonable manner.2  The Estate failed to do so.  Judge 
Hotten’s opinion highlights select portions of evidence admitted at trial to reach its 
conclusion that Officer Austin used excessive force, but the evidence upon which it relies 
has no bearing on the reasonableness inquiry.  When such improper evidence is removed 
from the reasonableness calculus, it becomes clear that the Estate failed to show that 
Officer Austin acted in an objectively unreasonable manner.  Therefore, the motion for 
judgment should have been granted. 
A. 
The Analytical Framework in an Excessive Force Claim Focuses Only on the 
Objective Reasonableness of an Officer’s Conduct. 
 
The Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Graham v. Connor made clear that claims 
against a police officer’s alleged use of excessive force are judged in light of the Fourth 
Amendment.  490 U.S. at 395  (holding that “all claims that law enforcement officers have 
used excessive force—deadly or not—in the course of an arrest . . . of a free citizen should 
be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard, rather than 
under a ‘substantive due process’ approach”).  The inquiry, like others in the Fourth 
Amendment context, “is an objective one: the question is whether the officer[’s] actions 
                                              
2 Judge Hotten suggests that the circuit court’s denial of Officer Austin’s motion for 
judgment “establish[ed] that the Estate satisfied its burden of production.”  Judge Hotten’s 
Slip Op. at 16.  However, the circuit court’s ruling on the motion cannot, and does not, 
conclusively establish anything because we review the circuit court’s ruling without 
deference.  Nat’l Union Fire, 451 Md. at 457; Singleton, 425 Md. at 406–07. 
 
5 
are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, 
without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.”  Id. at 397. 
While Graham arose in the context of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for violation of a 
Federal Constitutional right, the same standard is applicable to alleged uses of excessive 
force in violation of Articles 24 or 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  Richardson 
v. McGriff, 361 Md. 437, 452 (2000); see also Randall v. Peaco, 175 Md. App. 320, 330 
(2007) (“[A] claim of excessive force brought under Article 24 is analyzed in the same 
manner as if the claim were brought under Article 26.”).  As we said in Okwa v. Harper, 
“when a right protected under Maryland’s Constitution is also secured under a companion 
provision of the U.S. Constitution, Maryland courts often have looked to federal cases 
interpreting the parallel federal provision.”  360 Md. 161, 202–03 (2000) (collecting cases).  
As such, we have long interpreted the protections guaranteed by Article 26 in light of the 
Fourth Amendment.  Richardson, 361 Md. at 452.  It follows, then, that “decisions of the 
Supreme Court interpreting the Federal right are entitled to great respect in construing the 
State counterpart.”  Id. at 453. 
To preface the objective reasonableness inquiry, we begin with the oft-quoted 
language from Graham: “[d]etermining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure 
is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of ‘the nature 
and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests’ against the 
countervailing governmental interests at stake.”  490 U.S. at 396 (quoting Tennessee v. 
Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)).  “Because ‘[t]he test of reasonableness under the Fourth 
Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application,’ . . . its proper 
6 
application requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular 
case. . . .”  Id. (internal citation omitted).  The quantum of force employed must be weighed 
against these considerations: “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses 
an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively 
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”  Id.  The question then becomes 
“whether the totality of the circumstances justifie[s] a particular sort of . . . seizure.”  
Garner, 471 U.S. at 8–9. 
The Graham Court continued, “[t]he ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force 
must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with 
the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”  490 U.S. at 396 (emphasis added).  Properly analyzed, 
“[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers 
are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, 
uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular 
situation.”  Id. at 396–97. 
This, Judge Hotten’s opinion contends, is the governing framework through which 
to analyze this case.  While I agree that it is the foundation of such a framework, there also 
exists a robust body of case law from the federal courts applying Graham.  These cases—
indeed, Graham’s progeny—further refine the “objective reasonableness” standard in the 
context of an excessive force claim.  While Judge Hotten’s opinion overlooks federal cases 
analyzing excessive force claims, I find them enlightening.  The Eighth Circuit has 
summarized additional aspects of the objective reasonableness inquiry rather well: 
7 
The Fourth Amendment inquiry focuses not on what the most prudent course 
of action may have been or whether there were other alternatives available, 
but instead whether the seizure actually effectuated falls within a range of 
conduct which is objectively “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment.  
Alternative measures which 20/20 hindsight reveal to be less intrusive (or 
more prudent) . . . are simply not relevant to the reasonableness inquiry. 
 
Schulz v. Long, 44 F.3d 643, 649 (8th Cir. 1995). 
When an officer employs deadly force, the reasonableness inquiry “is simply 
whether ‘the officer [using the force] has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses 
a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.’”  Id. (quoting 
Garner, 471 U.S. at 3); see also Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1996) (“A 
police officer may use deadly force when the officer has sound reason to believe that a 
suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm to the officer or others.”).  “Officers need 
not be absolutely sure, however, of the nature of the threat or the suspect’s intent to cause 
them harm—the Constitution does not require that certitude precede the act of self[-
]protection.”  Elliott, 99 F.3d at 644 (emphasis added). 
An officer’s use of deadly force tends more toward a finding of reasonableness if: 
(1) “the suspect poses an immediate threat of serious physical harm to officers or others”; 
(2) “the suspect committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of 
serious harm”; (3) “the officers either issued a warning or could not feasibly have done so 
before using deadly force”; and (4) “the officer ‘had [an] articulable basis to think [the 
suspect] was armed.’”  Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1293 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting 
Penley v. Eslinger, 605 F.3d 843, 850 (11th Cir. 2010); Garner, 471 U.S. at 20). 
8 
An officer’s subjective motivations behind a chosen use of force is simply 
irrelevant.  Graham, 490 U.S. at 397 (noting that the reasonableness inquiry is conducted 
“without regard to [an officer’s] underlying intent or motivation”); see also Elliott, 99 F.3d 
at 642 (“[T]he question is whether a reasonable officer in the same circumstances would 
have concluded that a threat existed justifying the particular use of force.”).  Moreover, a 
court’s review of the officer’s decision to use deadly force is limited to “‘the information 
that [the officer] possessed at the time of his decision’ to use such force.”  Schulz, 44 F.3d 
at 648 (alteration in original) (quoting Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir. 1994)); 
see also Bella v. Chamberlain, 24 F.3d 1251, 1255 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that a court 
will “scrutinize only the seizure itself, not the events leading to the seizure, for 
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment” (quoting Cole, 993 F.2d at 133)).  
In Roy v. Inhabitants of the City of Lewiston, two police officers of the Lewiston, 
Maine Police Department were dispatched to investigate a report of domestic violence.  42 
F.3d at 693.  Upon arrival, the officers learned that Roy was intoxicated, armed with two 
knives, and had threatened to harm any police officer who approached him.  Id.  A third 
officer arrived and made contact with an unarmed Roy.  Id.  Displeased with the interaction, 
Roy entered his home and reemerged with two knives.  Id.  The officers drew their firearms 
and ordered Roy to drop the knives; however, Roy advanced toward the officers.  Id.  The 
officers stepped away, retreating “back to a sharp downward incline.”  Id.  The officers’ 
repeated warnings and attempted to distract and disarm Roy, which proved unsuccessful.  
Id.  Ultimately, Roy made a “kicking-lunging motion” toward two of the officers, one of 
whom shot and struck Roy twice.  Id.  Roy recovered and instituted a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
9 
action alleging that “the three police officers had unreasonably used deadly force,” and that 
the officers were not adequately trained “in non-lethal alternatives for subduing dangerous 
but intoxicated persons.”  Id. 
The First Circuit began its discussion by noting that “[j]udgments about 
reasonableness are usually made by juries in arguable cases, even if there is no dispute 
about what happened.”  Id. at 694.  However, and notably for our purposes, “the facts might 
point so clearly toward reasonableness that no reasonable jury could decide for the 
plaintiff.”  Id.  The Roy court’s approach underscores that “the Supreme Court’s standard 
of reasonableness is comparatively generous to the police in cases where potential danger, 
emergency conditions or other exigent circumstances are present.”  Id. at 695.   
Referring to Graham, the First Circuit further observed that “the Supreme Court 
intends to surround the police who make these on-the-spot choices in dangerous situations 
with a fairly wide zone of protection in close cases.”  Id.  Therefore, “in close cases, a jury 
does not automatically get to second-guess these life and death decisions, even though the 
plaintiff has an expert and a plausible claim that the situation could better have been 
handled differently.”3  Id. (emphasis added).   
                                              
3 Judges Hotten and Watts rely on the testimony of the Estate’s expert, Dr. Powers.  See 
Judge Hotten’s Slip Op. at 19–21; Judge Watts’ Slip Op. at 4.  I disagree with their reliance 
for two reasons.  First, Officer Austin moved in limine to exclude Dr. Powers’ testimony 
on the grounds that he would opine on a legal question, but the circuit court denied the 
motion.  Officer Austin renewed the objection when Dr. Powers arguably testified to a 
question of law.  Officer Austin presented this and other issues to the Court of Special 
Appeals, but that court did not need to reach these questions because it reversed the circuit 
court on Officer Austin’s first contention of error—i.e., the erroneous denial of the motion 
for judgment.  Austin v. Blair, No. 580, Sept. Term, 2017, 2019 WL 1873495, at *2 n.3 
 
10 
Under the facts presented in Roy, and the law set out in Graham, the First Circuit 
concluded that 
                                              
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 25, 2019).  Judge Hotten neglects to address Officer Austin’s 
arguments on this point; however, I would conclude that Dr. Powers’ testimony should 
have been excluded.  Therefore, the testimony should not be considered in the objective 
reasonableness inquiry. 
 
 
“[I]t is the general rule that an expert witness may not opine on questions of law.”  
Solomon v. State Bd. of Physician Quality Assurance, 155 Md. App. 687, 706 (2003); see 
also Franceschina v. Hope, 267 Md. 632, 642 (1973) (“Shivers [v. Carnaggio, 223 Md. 
585 (1960)] should not be interpreted to mean that an expert witness may in his opinion on 
the facts include an opinion on a matter of law.”); Md. Rule 5-702 (“Expert testimony may 
be admitted . . . if the court determines that the testimony will assist the trier of fact to . . . 
determine a fact in issue.” (emphasis added)).  Yet, Judge Hotten directly quotes Dr. 
Powers’ testimony on the very question of law at issue in the motion for judgment: whether 
Officer Austin’s actions were objectively reasonable.  See Judge Hotten’s Slip Op. at 4 
(noting Dr. Powers’ testimony that “Austin’s use of deadly force—firing his [weapon]—
breached this standard”).  Because Dr. Powers’ testimony was not the proper subject of 
expert testimony and embraced a question of law, it should have been excluded at trial.  
Therefore, it is not properly included in the objective reasonableness inquiry. 
 
Second, even if Dr. Powers’ testimony were properly admitted, I would not consider 
it for reasons well stated by the Majority below: 
 
[A]n expert’s interpretation of facts does not materially alter them.  Powers’ 
testimony relied on paused images from the video to review, frame by frame, 
the distance between Austin and Blair, the movements they both made, and 
the precise location of Blair’s hands.  But as the events were unfolding in 
real time, Austin did not have the option to pause Jeffrey Blair. 
 
Austin, 2019 WL 1873495, at *4 n.4.  The reasonableness of an officer’s actions is not 
judged “with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”  Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.  Instead, expert 
testimony of the sort Dr. Powers provided is little more than a window into how “the 
situation could better have been handled differently.”  Roy, 42 F.3d at 695.  I do not purport 
to argue that Roy stands for the proposition that expert testimony may never be relevant in 
the objective reasonableness inquiry, see Judge Watts’ Slip Op. at 4, only that the specific 
testimony here is not relevant to the inquiry. 
 
 
 
11 
[p]erhaps a jury could rationally have found that [the officer] could have done 
a better job; but in our view a jury could not find that his conduct was so 
deficient that no reasonable officer could have made the same choice as [the 
officer]—in circumstances that were assuredly “tense, uncertain, and rapidly 
evolving.”  Put differently, [the officer’s] actions, even if mistaken, were not 
unconstitutional. 
 
Id. at 695–96 (citation omitted and emphasis added).4 
B. 
Judge Hotten’s Analysis of Officer Austin’s Conduct Focuses on Evidence that 
has No Bearing on the Reasonableness Inquiry. 
 
 
Turning to the instant matter, Judge Hotten’s opinion attempts to cobble together a 
case that Officer Austin exceeded an objectively reasonable level of force by relying on 
information that is inapposite to the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry.  Paring 
away the improperly considered evidence reveals that the Estate failed to present legally 
                                              
4 Judge Watts’ seeks to distinguish Roy because of disputed facts in the record.  However, 
as I explain infra 11–20, the “disputed” facts are not pertinent in the objective 
reasonableness inquiry; likewise, they do generate an issue of fact fit for submission to the 
jury.  See Judge Watts’ Slip Op. at 6.  To be sure, Judge Watts questions (1) “whether one 
shot was sufficient to subdue Blair”; (2) “whether the tasing on the ground was necessary”; 
and (3) “whether Officer Austin gave commands to stop and if they were sufficient to warn 
of ensuing force used by the officer.” 
 
First, the number of shots fired is not dispositive of excessive force, especially 
where an officer exercises restraint in shooting, because officers may justifiably shoot until 
the threat ceases to exist.  See infra 16–17.  Second, the use of a taser cannot be considered 
against Officer Austin in the instant excessive force inquiry.  Officer Austin did not carry 
a taser; another responding officer deployed that method of force.  See Judge Hotten’s Slip 
Op. at 3, 21.  The officer that deployed the taser is not a defendant here.  Imposing that use 
of force on Officer Austin would be improper.  Third, whether Officer Austin gave verbal 
warnings is not determinative of whether the force used was reasonable or unreasonable.  
While a “suspect ordinarily must be warned . . . before a police officer may use deadly 
force,” this is so “when a warning is feasible.”  Conlogue v. Hamilton, 906 F.3d 150, 156 
(1st Cir. 2018).  To the extent these facts are in dispute, they do not negate the application 
of Roy. 
12 
sufficient evidence showing that Officer Austin exceeded the range of permissible, 
objectively reasonable conduct.  I shall address each in turn. 
1. 
Subjective Motivation & Police Training. 
 
Judge Hotten’s opinion cites Officer Austin’s testimony that “he used deadly force 
to maintain distance between Mr. Blair and himself, not to protect himself, the public, or 
other law enforcement officers and not because he believed himself, the public, or other 
law enforcement officers to be in danger of death or serious physical harm.”  Judge 
Hotten’s Slip Op. at 21–22.  Moreover, Judge Hotten’s opinion contends, because Officer 
Austin was “trained to [maintain physical distance] by using non-lethal means,” he 
exceeded a level of objectively reasonable force by choosing “to use a lethal weapon.”  
Judge Hotten’s Slip Op. at 22. 
An officer’s subjective motivations have no place in determining whether an 
officer’s use of force is objectively reasonable.  See Graham, 490 U.S. at 397 (“[T]he 
‘reasonableness’ inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the question is 
whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and 
circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.”); 
Elliott, 99 F.3d at 642 (“The intent or motivation of the officer is irrelevant.”).  Given that 
our test is clearly objective, Officer Austin’s testimony about his subjective motivation as 
to why he used deadly force makes no difference to our analysis. 
Likewise, general assertions that an officer failed to act in accordance with 
department policy and training are misplaced.  Greenidge v. Ruffin, 927 F.2d 789, 791–92 
(4th Cir. 1991) (rejecting arguments that an officer’s “misconduct of failing to comply with 
13 
the standard police procedures” factored into the reasonableness inquiry).  Judge Hotten’s 
opinion suggests that “an objectively reasonable officer would adhere to proper law 
enforcement guidelines and policies, or else render said guidelines and policies 
meaningless.”  Judge Hotten’s Slip Op. at 21.  Yet, crucially in an excessive force analysis, 
“the issue is whether the government official violated the Constitution . . . , not whether he 
violated the policies of a state agency.”  Cole, 993 F.2d at 1334 (emphasis added); see also 
Richardson, 361 Md. at 458 (declining to consider an officer’s decision not to wait for 
additional backup, in violation of “police guideline or regulation,” in the objective 
reasonableness inquiry).  Because Officer Austin’s conduct is not judged against the policy, 
procedures, or training of the Baltimore City Police Department,5 the notion that he failed 
to act in accordance with his training is irrelevant.  Judge Hotten’s contention—that Officer 
Austin should have reacted with non-lethal force consistent with his training—permeates 
her next argument that Officer Austin should have used less force. 
2. 
Proportionate Force. 
Judge Hotten’s implicit argument that Officer Austin should have employed less 
force, or non-lethal force is similarly unpersuasive.  “[T]he Fourth Amendment inquiry 
focuses not on what the most prudent course of action may have been or whether there 
were other alternatives available, but instead whether the seizure actually effectuated falls 
within a range of conduct which is objectively ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment.”  
Richardson, 361 Md. at 455 (emphasis added) (quoting Schulz, 44 F.3d at 649).  
                                              
5 We have recognized that “the Baltimore City Police Department is a state agency.”  
Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Clark, 404 Md. 13, 28 (2008). 
14 
“Alternative measures which 20/20 hindsight reveal to be less intrusive (or more prudent) 
. . . are simply not relevant to the reasonableness inquiry.”  Id. (quoting Schulz, 44 F.3d at 
649).  Certainly, Officer Austin could have deployed non-lethal force in hopes that it would 
stop Mr. Blair.  However, “[t]his suggestion that the officer[] might have responded 
differently is exactly the type of judicial second look that the case law prohibits.”  Elliott, 
99 F.3d at 643.  As such, it is irrelevant here. 
Judge Hotten’s opinion relies in part on Garner in an attempt to show that Officer 
Austin’s use of deadly force is unreasonable.  See Judge Hotten’s Slip Op. at 18–19 (noting 
that because “‘[a] police officer may not seize an unarmed, non[-]dangerous suspect by 
shooting him dead[,]’  . . . an objectively reasonable officer would use deadly force only 
when threatened with serious physical harm”).  This comparison fails.  Garner involved a 
police officer shooting at a burglary suspect to prevent escape, despite the officer being 
“reasonably sure” the suspect was unarmed.  471 U.S. at 4.  The officer surmised that 
“Garner was 17 or 18 years old and about 5’5” or 5’7”.”  Id. at 3.  Moreover, the Court 
noted that the officer “could not reasonably have believed that Garner—young, slight, and 
unarmed—posed any threat.”  Id. at 21.  Yet, the officer employed deadly force against 
Garner when the suspect was attempting to flee.  Id. at 3. 
The facts here are diametrically inconsistent with those in Garner.  The most evident 
difference is that Mr. Blair charged directly at Officer Austin.  Mr. Blair did not attempt to 
evade arrest or flee, like Garner.  Another patent difference between these cases is that 
Officer Austin could not be “reasonably sure” that Mr. Blair was unarmed.  Officer Austin 
had but ten seconds from the time Mr. Blair stopped his car to when Mr. Blair was within 
15 
an arm’s reach to decide how to react to Mr. Blair’s unprovoked show of aggression.  
Unlike in Garner, where the suspect was a “young, slight” teenager, Mr. Blair was an adult 
male, approximately six feet tall, and weighing between 230 and 250 pounds.  To Officer 
Austin, “Mr. Blair appeared to be dangerous” and “seemed to want to kill him.”  Judge 
Watts’ Slip Op. at 7 n.4.  Garner simply cannot stand for the overly-broad proposition 
Judge Hotten’s opinion urges.  The only alternative reading of Judge Hotten’s opinion on 
this point is that Officer Austin did not face serious physical harm, or else use of deadly 
force would be objectively reasonable.  Despite such an attempt to diminish the threat to 
Officer Austin, Mr. Blair undeniably posed a serious threat to the officer’s safety.  See infra 
at 22. 
Judge Hotten’s reliance on Mr. Blair’s lack of a weapon—unbeknownst to Officer 
Austin in the moment—is an “armchair reflection” of the worst sort; it is exactly the type 
“officers on the beat are not often afforded.”  Elliott, 99 F.3d at 642; see also Dooley v. 
Tharp, 856 F.3d 1177, 1182–83 (8th Cir. 2017) (“[L]aw enforcement officers are not 
afforded the opportunity of viewing in slow motion what appears to them to constitute life-
threatening action.”).  Officer Austin had no chance to confirm that Mr. Blair was unarmed.  
Instead, before Mr. Blair exited the vehicle, Officer Austin observed Mr. Blair moving 
around his vehicle.  Mere seconds elapsed between Mr. Blair’s exit from the vehicle and 
the time he had charged at Officer Austin.  Still, in that brief window of time, Officer 
Austin observed Mr. Blair put his hand in his waistband.  Even, assuming for sake of 
argument that Mr. Blair was unarmed, his decision to charge directly at Officer Austin 
16 
posed a serious threat to the officer’s safety.  Nothing more is required to employ deadly 
force. 
3. 
Number of Shots Fired. 
The number of bullets discharged by an officer’s firearm is not determinative in the 
excessive force inquiry.  See Elliott, 99 F.3d at 643 (“The number of shots by itself cannot 
be determinative as to whether the force used was reasonable.”).  Judge Hotten’s opinion 
stresses the fact that Officer Austin fired “four separate shots” at Mr. Blair to purportedly 
show excessive force.  Judge Hotten’s Slip Op. at 19–20.  In Elliott, the Fourth Circuit 
rejected a district court’s “concern that the number of shots fired was excessive.”  99 F.3d 
at 643.  There, two police officers handcuffed and placed Elliott in a police cruiser on 
suspicion of driving while intoxicated.  Id. at 641.  Despite an officer’s brief search of 
Elliott before placing him in the cruiser, Elliott pulled a small handgun from his person, 
put his finger on the trigger, and pointed it at the officers.  Id. at 642.  Realizing the 
imminent threat, “[b]oth officers fired almost simultaneously; neither officer emptied his 
firearm; and the evidence indicates that the shooting took place within a matter of seconds.”  
Id. at 643. 
Here, like in Elliott, Officer Austin had only moments to react, did not empty his 
firearm, and ceased fire in mere seconds.  Officer Austin discharged four of his weapon’s 
fifteen rounds; enough to temporarily subdue the threat of Mr. Blair charging at him.  “That 
multiple shots were fired does not suggest the officers shot mindlessly as much as it 
indicates that they sought to ensure the elimination of a deadly threat.”  Id. at 643; see also 
Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 777 (2014) (“[I]f police officers are justified in firing 
17 
at a suspect in order to end a severe threat to public safety, the officers need not stop 
shooting until the threat has ended.”).  Judge Hotten’s reliance on the number of shots 
Officer Austin discharged is, therefore, misplaced.6 
4. 
Antecedent Events. 
 
Judge Hotten recounts events antecedent to Officer Austin’s use of force to 
demonstrate that his actions were objectively unreasonable.  See Judge Hotten’s Slip Op. 
at 21.  This Court has categorically rejected the notion that antecedent events—i.e., those 
events which occur before the “critical moment” when force is deployed—bear on the 
reasonableness of an officer’s conduct.  Richardson, 361 Md. at 459; see also Randall, 175 
Md. App. at 335  (noting that this Court “squarely rejected the notion that the 
reasonableness of the use of lethal force must involve consideration of antecedent events 
that would at best involve a hindsight evaluation of the officer’s conduct”).  In Richardson, 
we based our decision on the view adopted by six federal appellate courts having addressed 
this issue.  361 Md. at 455; see, e.g., Greenidge, 927 F.2d at 792 (“[E]vents which occurred 
                                              
6 As briefly discussed supra at 11 n.4, Judge Watts contends that the order of shots 
sustained by Mr. Blair has some bearing on reasonableness.  To the contrary, Officer Austin 
was justified in shooting at Mr. Blair until the threat ended.  It is implausible to expect that 
officers discharge a single round, pause to see if a threat is adequately subdued, and if not, 
discharge another single round (and repeat as many times as may be necessary).  This is 
not to say that an officer may indiscriminately empty his weapon, but that an officer’s 
reaction need not be so tempered as Judge Watts suggests. 
18 
before [an officer] opened the car door and identified herself to the passengers are not 
probative of the reasonableness of [the officer’s] decision to fire the shot.”). 
 
Richardson warrants additional discussion.  There, a police officer received a call 
of shots fired in a vacant apartment where several males were present.  Richardson, 361 
Md. at 442.  The officer responded “and observed an open, vacant apartment, which was 
dark,” but waited for another officer to arrive with a flashlight.  Id. (Internal quotations 
omitted).  The officers entered the apartment together and announced their presence.  Id. 
at 443.  While conducting a “room-to-room search” in the unlit apartment, the officers 
heard a “bump” come from a closet.  Id. at 443–44.  One officer “moved out of the line of 
possible fire” and prepared to open the closet door, while the other officer positioned 
himself to “see into the closet when the door was opened.”  Id. at 444.  The latter officer 
“drew his pistol and aimed it at the center mast of the closet.”  Id.  As the closet door 
opened, the officer’s flashlight illuminated what the officer perceived as “a barrel of a big 
weapon” being lowered into a firing position.  Id.  The officer fired and struck Richardson.  
Id.  Only after discharging the weapon did the officer discover that the item was a pipe.  Id. 
 
Against these facts, and having rejected the view that antecedent events factor into 
the reasonableness inquiry, the Richardson Court still considered where Richardson’s 
arguments would lead.  Id. at 459.  We opined: 
Whether [the antecedent events] in hindsight could be regarded as negligent 
or imprudent, they existed and, at the crucial moment, could not be changed.  
At the moment [one officer] opened the closet door and [the second officer] 
saw what appeared to him to be an armed man lowering his weapon to firing 
position, what was he to do?  Under [Richardson’s] approach, [the second 
officer] would have been, at that split-second moment, faced with the 
impossible choice of either defending himself and, in so doing, risking 
19 
liability for any harm inflicted on [Richardson] because of past events or 
decisions that were then uncorrectable, or taking no defensive action and 
putting his life in immediate and mortal danger in order to save his 
pocketbook. The law cannot reasonably put officers in that situation. 
 
Id. 
 
Although Richardson involved an officer’s antecedent conduct, the principle applies 
with equal force here.  Mr. Blair’s antecedent conduct—leading Officer Austin on a low-
speed pursuit while committing a series of traffic violations—is inapplicable to the 
reasonableness inquiry.  Indeed, “Graham requires us to focus on the moment force was 
used; conduct prior to that moment is not relevant in determining whether an officer used 
reasonable force.”  Elliott, 99 F.3d at 643.  “The [Supreme] Court’s use of the phrases ‘at 
the moment’ and ‘split-second judgment’ are strong indicia that the reasonableness inquiry 
extends only to those facts known to the officer at the precise moment the officers 
effectuate the seizure.”  Schulz, 44 F.3d at 648; Richardson, 361 Md. at 454 (same).  
Therefore, Judge Hotten improperly relies on Mr. Blair’s conduct before the actual 
encounter where Officer Austin employed force.7 
                                              
7 Judge Hotten refrains, rightfully so, from relying on Mr. Blair’s medical records, history 
of mental illness, and suicidal ideations in the objective reasonableness analysis for the 
simple reason that Officer Austin did not know this information at the time of his encounter 
with Mr. Blair.  See Judge Hotten’s Slip Op. at 6 (“The record does not reflect . . . that Mr. 
Blair communicated this intent [to commit “suicide by cop”] to Officer Austin or that 
Officer Austin was otherwise cognizant of Mr. Blair’s intention, or the existence of those 
medical records at the time of the incident.”). 
 
“‘Suicide by cop’ is a term used by law enforcement . . . to describe an incident in 
which an individual engages in behavior which poses an apparent risk of serious injury or 
death, with the intent to precipitate the use of deadly force by law enforcement personnel 
 
20 
Removing this evidence from the Fourth Amendment inquiry, the analysis into the 
reasonableness of Officer Austin’s conduct becomes exceptionally straightforward. 
C. 
Because Officer Austin’s Conduct was Objectively Reasonable, the Circuit Court 
Should Have Granted the Motion for Judgment. 
 
Guided by Graham and its progeny, supra 4–11, and cognizant that this appeal 
stems from a motion for judgment, we consider whether the evidence demonstrates that 
Officer Austin’s conduct is removed from a permissible range of objective reasonableness.  
I believe the Estate failed to present legally sufficient evidence to do so.  Viewing the 
pertinent information in a light most favorable to the Estate, the evidence fairly 
demonstrates the following. 
Mr. Blair failed to stop his vehicle after Officer Austin initiated his patrol car’s 
emergency equipment.  Mr. Blair ultimately brought his vehicle to a complete stop in a 
snowbank on the right side of a Baltimore City street.8  Officer Austin stopped his patrol 
car behind Mr. Blair’s vehicle and observed Mr. Blair reaching around the passenger side 
                                              
towards that individual.”  Kris Mohandie & J. Reid Meloy, Clinical and Forensic 
Indicators of “Suicide by Cop,” 45 J. Forensic Sci. 384, 384 (2000). 
 
Nonetheless, Judge Watts cites the medical records offered by Officer Austin at trial 
as part of a larger argument that the use of force was a factual issue for the jury.  See Judge 
Watts’ Slip. Op. at 6.  I disagree, because none of this information was known to Officer 
Austin before (or during) the encounter and I would not rely on this information in the 
objective reasonableness calculus. 
  
8 As best I can tell, Mr. Blair brought his vehicle to a stop somewhere near the area of N. 
Fremont Avenue and Pitcher Street in Baltimore City.  The parties’ briefs are unclear as to 
the specific location, but refer to the video footage entered at trial as Defendant’s Exhibit 
5: “(Full) 1115-Freemont St – Pitcher St – 20150222-122800.”  So far as I am aware, 
“Freemont Street” is not the proper street name. 
21 
of the vehicle.  Mr. Blair then opened the door on the driver’s side of the vehicle, placed 
his feet on the ground, and quickly exited the vehicle.   Mr. Blair appeared approximately 
six feet tall, 230 pounds, and empty-handed.  Mr. Blair took three to four slow steps towards 
Officer Austin’s patrol car.  Officer Austin similarly exited his patrol car.  Once Officer 
Austin stepped outside the patrol car, Mr. Blair charged directly in Officer Austin’s 
direction.  Mr. Blair quickly advanced to within an arm’s length of Officer Austin before 
the officer started rapidly backpedaling.  Mr. Blair followed.  As Officer Austin passed the 
back end of his patrol car, running backwards, he drew his service weapon from its holster, 
aimed it at Mr. Blair and fired four shots.  Officer Austin continued to back away as Mr. 
Blair fell to the ground.  A matter of mere seconds elapsed from the time Mr. Blair stopped 
his vehicle to when Officer Austin concluded firing. 
1. 
Factors for Consideration in Excessive Force Claims. 
As previously noted, supra at 7, determining whether a particular use of force is 
objectively reasonable involves a series of considerations.9   
The first of these factors, and in my view, the preeminent factor in this analysis, is 
whether Mr. Blair “pose[d] an immediate threat of serious physical harm” to Officer Austin 
or others.  See Garner, 471 U.S. at 8–9; Salvato, 790 F.3d at 1293.  Mr. Blair undeniably 
posed a serious threat to Officer Austin’s safety such that the use of force was necessary to 
protect the officer’s life.  Within a matter of mere seconds, and in a “tense, uncertain and 
                                              
9 While Judge Hotten’s opinion mentions these factors in passing, it neglects to engage 
with meaningful discussion of the same.  See Judge Hotten’s Slip Op. at 18. 
22 
rapidly evolving” encounter, Mr. Blair exited his vehicle and charged directly at Officer 
Austin.  Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. 
The Fourth Amendment did not obligate Officer Austin to wait and see if Mr. Blair 
was, in fact, armed before resorting to deadly force; such a rule is untenable.  See id. (“The 
Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to wait until a suspect shoots to confirm 
that a serious threat of harm exists.”); see also Long v. Slaton, 508 F.3d 576, 581 (5th Cir. 
2007) (“[T]he law does not require officers in a tense and dangerous situation to wait until 
the moment a suspect uses a deadly weapon to act to stop the suspect.”).  “The critical 
point . . . is precisely that [Mr. Blair] was ‘threatening,’ threatening the life[] of [Officer 
Austin.]”  Elliott, 99 F.3d at 643.  Indeed, the use of deadly force has been upheld as 
justifiable where an officer reasonably felt threatened, even “in a situation where he could 
not see the suspected weapon at all.”  Id. (citing Slattery v. Rizzo, 939 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 
1991)). 
Contrary to Judge Hotten’s position, the circumstances presented to Officer Austin 
justified his use of deadly force.  “[N]o court can expect any human being to remain passive 
in the face of an active threat on his or her life.”  Id. at 644.  All that is required before an 
officer employs deadly force is that the officer “have sound reason to believe that the 
suspect poses a serious threat to their safety or the safety of others.”  Id.; see also Garner, 
471 U.S. at 11 (“Where the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a 
threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally 
unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force.”).   
23 
Given that “[t]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness,” Florida 
v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991), an officer need not be omniscient.  Elliott, 99 F.3d at 
644.  Indeed, “[o]fficers need not be absolutely sure . . . of the nature of the threat or the 
suspect’s intent to cause them harm.”  Id.  As here, where Officer Austin was not afforded 
the opportunity to confirm that Mr. Blair was unarmed, and where a physical fight would 
otherwise ensue, no more should be required of Officer Austin.  That Mr. Blair posed a 
serious threat to Officer Austin made it objectively reasonable for Officer Austin to employ 
deadly force. 
Second, we consider whether “the officers either issued a warning or could not 
feasibly have done so before using deadly force.”  Salvato, 790 F.3d at 1293.  It is important 
to recall that, in reviewing a motion for judgment, this Court “assume[s] the truth of all 
credible evidence on the issue.”  Barrett v. Nwaba, 165 Md. App. 281, 290 (2005) (quoting 
Moore v. Myers, 161 Md. App. 349, 362 (2005)).  Certainly, we are “not [privileged] to 
dissect the evidence and weigh the credibility of its messengers.”  John Crane, Inc., v. 
Puller, 69 Md. App. 1, 18 (2006).  Judge Watts’ opinion directly indicates credible 
evidence on this point: “Officer Austin testified that he told Mr. Blair ‘to go back to his 
car’ and yelled ‘Stop’ and ‘Don’t do it’ at Mr. Blair multiple times.”  Judge Watts’ Slip 
Op. at 7.  Assuming the veracity of this evidence, Officer Austin made his warnings 
abundantly clear.  Therefore, this factor tends toward the reasonableness of Officer 
Austin’s actions. 
The third consideration is whether “the officer ‘had [an] articulable basis to think 
[the suspect] was armed.’”  Salvato, 790 F.3d at 1293.  Judge Hotten regards Mr. Blair as 
24 
an “unarmed civilian.”10  See Judge Hotten’s Slip Op. at 19.  While this fact became clear 
in the aftermath of the encounter, I do not agree that it is a fair characterization of the events 
as Officer Austin perceived them.  Indeed, even crediting the Estate’s account that Mr. 
Blair did not display a weapon, credible evidence existed that would have given Officer 
Austin reason to believe Mr. Blair may have been armed.11  At a minimum, Officer Austin 
could not be sure of whether Mr. Blair possessed a weapon based on their limited 
interaction because Mr. Blair’s conduct—exiting the vehicle and charging directly at the 
officer—prevented Officer Austin from conducting a protective frisk to determine that Mr. 
Blair was unarmed.  Therefore, despite the lack of an articulable basis for believing Mr. 
Blair possessed a weapon, Officer Austin could not be expected to make a reliable 
determination on this point before choosing how to react to Mr. Blair.12 
                                              
10 Notably, Judge Hotten observes that “the video does not reveal Mr. Blair’s actions inside 
his vehicle . . . [and the] video does not reflect whether Mr. Blair was armed.”  Judge 
Hotten’s Slip Op. at 2.  However, the video evidence need not demonstrate these facts 
because we accept credible evidence—such as Officer Austin’s testimony—as true for 
purposes of appellate review. 
 
11 The record reveals that after Mr. Blair stopped his vehicle, but before exiting the same, 
he reached around the passenger side of his vehicle.  This furtive movement, viewed 
together with Mr. Blair’s failure to stop, could give Officer Austin reason to believe that 
Mr. Blair was looking for a weapon. 
 
12 We also consider the “severity of the crime at issue.”  Garner, 471 U.S. at 8–9.  Officer 
Austin observed Mr. Blair commit several traffic infractions.  See Judge Hotten’s Slip Op. 
at 1.  Specifically, Mr. Blair failed to stop after Officer Austin activated the emergency 
equipment in violation of Maryland Code (1986, 2012 Repl. Vol., 2019 Supp.), 
Transportation § 21-904.  Alone, this would tend to lean against the reasonableness of using 
force.  However, while traffic violations are not particularly serious when compared to 
violent crime, we are cognizant that this factor is not dispositive. 
25 
Finally, considering that Officer Austin testified that (1) he did not carry a taser; (2) 
a baton would have been ineffective against Mr. Blair’s size and speed; and (3) using mace 
was not feasible because it would have contaminated himself at such a close range, the 
Estate failed to produce evidence showing that the officer’s split-second decision was “so 
deficient that no reasonable officer could have made the same choice.”  Roy, 42 F.3d at 
695.  Viewing all of this evidence together, the totality of the circumstances justified 
Officer Austin’s particular use of force; i.e., the officer acted within the scope of objective 
reasonableness as articulated by the Supreme Court.  The Estate failed to introduce legally 
sufficient evidence to show that Officer Austin’s conduct exceeded the permissible range 
of conduct. 
2. 
The Circuit Court Should Have Granted Officer Austin’s Motion for Judgment. 
 
Judge Hotten’s opinion today disregards Garner, Elliott, Schulz, Roy and other cases 
analyzing the reasonableness of deadly force.  The Fourth Amendment does not permit 
judges or juries to “Monday morning quarterback” the decisions of a police officer facing 
an imminent and serious threat “because it only requires that the seizure fall within a range 
of objective reasonableness.” Schulz, 44 F.3d at 649.  Officer Austin had “sound reason to 
believe that [Mr. Blair] pose[d] a threat of serious physical harm,” justifying the use of 
deadly force.  Elliott, 99 F.3d at 642.  Anything more—including the suggestion that 
Officer Austin “wait and see” if Mr. Blair is armed, or engage in hand-to-hand combat—
edges dangerously close to the level of certitude “the Constitution does not require . . . 
precede the act of self[-]protection.”  Id. at 644.  Much like we pondered in Richardson, 
26 
“what was [the officer] to do?”  361 Md. at 459.  Under Judge Hotten’s approach, Officer 
Austin was 
at that split-second moment, faced with the impossible choice of either 
defending himself and, in so doing, risking liability for any harm inflicted on 
[Mr. Blair] . . . or taking no defensive action and putting his life in immediate 
and mortal danger in order to save his pocketbook. 
 
Id.  “The law cannot reasonably put officers in that situation.”  Id. 
Under the objective reasonableness standard articulated by the Supreme Court in 
Graham and its progeny, Officer Austin acted reasonably based upon “the information that 
[he] ‘possessed at the time of his decision’ to use such force.”  Schulz, 44 F.3d at 648.  
Because the Estate failed to produce evidence demonstrating that Officer Austin’s conduct 
exceeded the spectrum of objective reasonableness, the circuit court should have granted 
Officer Austin’s motion for judgment.  Therefore, while I would affirm the judgment of 
the Court of Special Appeals, I would do so on different grounds.13 
                                              
13 Judge Hotten’s disposition of this case deprives Officer Austin the ability to pursue his 
remaining challenges to the propriety of the trial below.  Given that four judges of this 
Court reverse the opinion below, the proper procedural recourse would be to remand this 
case to the Court of Special Appeals.  Under that result, Officer Austin would be afforded 
review of the remaining three issues presented below, but not reached by the Court of 
Special Appeals, because of its original disposition.  See Austin, 2019 WL 1873495, at *2 
n.3 (“[Officer] Austin raises four issues, challenging that the trial court erred by (1) denying 
his motions for judgment; (2) denying his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; 
(3) allowing the Estate’s expert witness to give his opinion on legal conclusions; and (4) 
admitting irrelevant and prejudicial character evidence about Jeffrey Blair.  Because of our 
resolution of [Officer] Austin’s first issue, we do not address his remaining issues.”).  To 
be sure, this is the course chosen by the dissent below.  Id. at *9 (Berger J., dissenting) 
(“Because I would hold that the verdict returned by the jury should not be set aside, it is 
necessary to consider the other two issues raised by Austin, which relate to the admissibility 
of evidence.”). 
27 
Judge Booth and Judge Battaglia have authorized me to state that they join in this 
opinion. 
The correction notice(s) for this opinion(s) can be found here:  
https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/import/appellate/correctionnotices/coa/35a19cn.pdf