Title: State ex rel. Cooker Restaurant Corp. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Elections

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

THE STATE EX REL. COOKER RESTAURANT CORPORATION ET AL. v. MONTGOMERY 
COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Cooker Restaurant Corp. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of 
Elections (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 302.] 
Elections — Prohibition — Attorneys — Protest to local liquor option petitions 
filed by nonattorney properly dismissed — R.C. 3501.39(A)(1) requires that 
objections be specified in the protest — Board of elections does not abuse 
its discretion in limiting scope of protest hearing to specific objections 
raised in written protest — Liquor permit holders have no due process right 
to notice of impending local option election — Writ denied. 
(No. 97-2001 — Submitted October 20, 1997 — Decided October 24, 1997.) 
IN PROHIBITION. 
 
Intervening respondent, Sphere Investments, Ltd. (“Sphere”), owns a 
shopping center located in Precinct W of Washington Township in Montgomery 
County, Ohio.   One of Sphere’s shopping center tenants is a liquor permit holder 
that operates a nightclub named Diamond’s.  Sphere hired Hans H. Soltau, an 
attorney, to prepare and file local liquor option petitions for a residence district 
consisting of Precincts Q and W of Washington Township. 
 
Pursuant to R.C. 4301.33 and 4305.14, the Division of Liquor Control of 
the Ohio Department of Commerce provided Soltau with a list of the names and 
addresses of liquor permit holders in the residence district who would be affected 
by the election.  The list included relators Cooker Restaurant Corporation 
(“Cooker”), which operates a Cooker restaurant, and Brinker Ohio, Inc. 
(“Brinker”).  The list, however, specified only Brinker’s Cozymel’s Mexican Grill 
and Chili’s Grill & Bar restaurants and did not include its Romano’s Macaroni 
Grill restaurant, even though all of these restaurants are located in the same 
 
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vicinity in the residence district.  Soltau was not aware of the omission when he 
received the list from the Division of Liquor Control. 
 
On June 3, 1997, Soltau mailed notices to each of the permit holders 
specified on the list provided by the Division of Liquor Control.  Soltau informed 
the permit holders that he was circulating local liquor option petitions concerning 
Precincts Q and W in Washington Township.  Cooker and Brinker received the 
notices, although Brinker did not receive specific notice concerning its Romano’s 
Macaroni Grill restaurant. 
 
On June 6, Soltau filed two local option petitions for the residence district 
with respondent, Montgomery County Board of Elections.  Both petitions 
contained the same affidavit of Soltau certifying that he had notified all affected 
permit holders on the list supplied by the Division of Liquor Control in the manner 
and time required by R.C. 4301.33 and 4305.14 and that at the time every person 
signed the petition, each part-petition contained a copy of the list of affected 
permit holders provided by the Division of Liquor Control. 
 
Soltau’s petitions sought placement of the following liquor option questions 
on the November 4 election ballot in Precincts Q and W of Washington Township: 
 
1. “Shall the sale of wine, and mixed beverages by the package, under 
permits which authorize sale for on-premises consumption only, and under permits 
which authorize sale for both on-premise and off-premise consumption, be 
permitted in WASHINGTON TWP. PRECINCTS Q AND W?” 
 
2. “Shall the sale of spirituous liquors by the glass be permitted in 
WASHINGTON TWP. PRECINCTS Q & W?” 
 
3.  “Shall the sale [of] beer as defined in Section 4305.08 of the Revised 
Code under permits which authorize sale for on-premises consumption only, and 
 
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under permits which authorize sale for both on-premises and off-premises 
consumption, be permitted in WASHINGTON TWP. PRECINCTS Q & W?” 
 
The board determined that the petitions contained more than the required 
number of valid signatures and certified the sufficiency and validity of the 
petitions in August for placement of the liquor option issues on the November 4 
election ballot. 
 
Robert Young, an employee of The Craig Group, Inc., a public relations and 
consulting firm, subsequently became aware that the board had certified the local 
liquor option issues.  The Craig Group, Inc. consults on liquor industry matters 
and conducts local option election campaigns for liquor permit holders.  After 
Young contacted liquor permit holders in Precinct Q, relator Cooker authorized 
him to act on its behalf to file a statutory protest under R.C. 4301.33, 4305.14, and 
3501.39 against the petitions.  Young is not an attorney. 
 
On September 2, Young filed a protest on behalf of Cooker with the board, 
requesting that the petitions be invalidated. On the same date, relator Karen A. 
Meyer, an elector of Precinct W in Washington Township, filed a protest against 
the petitions.  Young’s and Meyer’s protests specified certain grounds to 
invalidate the petitions. 
 
On September 9, the board held a hearing on the protests.  At the hearing, 
Meyer’s counsel objected to Cooker’s representation by Young, who is not an 
attorney.  Despite Meyer’s objection, the board permitted Young to present 
Cooker’s case through oral argument, examination of witnesses, and introduction 
of exhibits.  The board further granted Meyer’s motion to continue the protest 
hearing.  On September 18, the board reconvened the protest hearing and 
reconsidered Meyer’s objection to Young’s representation of Cooker and 
dismissed Cooker’s protest.  The board determined that it lacked jurisdiction over 
 
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Cooker’s protest because it had been filed by a nonattorney.  The board noted that 
although Cooker had an attorney present for the September 18 hearing, the 
statutory deadlines for submitting a proper protest under R.C. 4301.33 and 
4305.14 had passed. 
 
The board also granted Sphere’s motion to restrict the evidence presented at 
the hearing to those grounds specified in Meyer’s protest.  Meyer then proffered 
evidence in support of her and Cooker’s contention that Precincts Q and W did not 
constitute an appropriate residence district under R.C. 4301.01(B)(19) because 
they are not contiguous. 
 
Although Brinker appeared at the hearing, the board did not permit it to 
introduce evidence.  Instead, the board indicated that it would conduct its own 
investigation concerning the allegation that Brinker had not received notice that its 
liquor permit at its Romano’s Macaroni Grill restaurant would be affected by the 
liquor option petitions.  At the conclusion of the September 18 hearing, the board 
denied Meyer’s protest. 
 
On September 24, relators, Cooker, Meyer, and Brinker, brought this action 
for a writ of prohibition to prevent the board from holding a November 4 election 
on the liquor option issues.  Relators also filed a motion for the issuance of an 
alternative writ.  We granted Sphere’s motion to intervene as a respondent.  
Respondents filed answers and motions to dismiss, and relators filed a motion to 
strike the motions to dismiss.  Relators and Sphere subsequently filed merit briefs.  
Pursuant to the expedited election schedule set forth in S.Ct.Prac.R. X(9), this 
cause is now before the court for a consideration of the merits. 
__________________ 
 
Brunner, Brunner & Alexander Co., L.P.A., Rick L. Brunner and Lisa A. 
Atkins; J. Richard Lumpe; Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff, L.L.P., N. 
 
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Victor Goodman, James F. DeLeone and Mark D. Tucker, for relator Cooker 
Restaurant Corporation. 
 
Gary L. Jones Co., L.P.A., Gary L. Jones and James J. Andrioff, for relator 
Brinker Ohio, Inc. 
 
Boucher & Boucher and Richard A. Boucher; and Don A. Little, for relator 
Karen A. Meyer. 
 
Mathias H. Heck, Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Victor T. Whisman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent Montgomery 
County Board of Elections. 
 
McTigue & Brooks and Donald J. McTigue, for respondent Sphere 
Investments, Ltd. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
Prohibition 
 
In order to be entitled to the requested writ of prohibition, relators must 
establish that (1) the board is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power, (2) 
the exercise of such power is not legally authorized, and (3) if the writ is denied, 
they will suffer injury for which no other adequate legal remedy exists.  Christy v. 
Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 35, 36-37, 671 N.E.2d 1, 3.  A 
board’s exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial power is unauthorized if it engaged in 
fraud or corruption, abused its discretion, or acted in clear disregard of applicable 
legal provisions.  State ex rel. Thurn v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1995), 72 
Ohio St.3d 289, 292, 649 N.E.2d 1205, 1208.  Here, relators contend that the 
board abused its discretion and acted in clear disregard of applicable statutes and 
other law.  An abuse of discretion implies an unreasonable, arbitrary, or 
 
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unconscionable attitude.  State ex rel. Crabtree v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Health 
(1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 247, 249, 673 N.E.2d 1281, 1283. 
 
With the foregoing standards in mind, relators’ claims are next addressed. 
Cooker Protest:  Unauthorized Practice of Law 
 
Relators contend that the board of elections abused its discretion and acted 
in clear disregard of applicable law by dismissing Cooker’s protest because it had 
been submitted by Young, a nonattorney, on behalf of Cooker. 
 
The last paragraph of R.C. 4301.33(B) provides the following protest 
procedure for local option petitions concerning the sale of wine, mixed beverages, 
spirituous liquor, and intoxicating liquor: 
 
“Protest against local option petitions may be filed by any elector eligible to 
vote on the question or questions described in the petitions or by a permit holder 
in the precinct or residence district as described in the petitions, not later than four 
p.m. of the sixty-fourth day before the day of the general or primary election for 
which the petition qualified.  The protest shall be in writing and shall be filed with 
the election officials with whom the petition was filed.  Upon filing of the protest, 
the election officials with whom it is filed shall promptly fix the time for hearing 
it, and shall mail notice of the filing of the protest and the time and place for 
hearing it to the person who filed the petition and to the person who filed the 
protest.  At the time and place fixed, the election officials shall hear the protest 
and determine the validity of the petition.” 
 
R.C. 4305.14(D) provides a similar protest procedure for local option 
petitions on the sale of beer: 
 
“Protest against a local option petition may be filed by any qualified elector 
eligible to vote on the question or questions specified in the petition or by a permit 
holder in the precinct or residence district as described in the petition, not later 
 
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than four p.m. of the sixty-fourth day before the day of such general or primary 
election.  Such protest must be in writing and shall be filed with the election 
officials with whom the petition was filed.  Upon filing of such protest the election 
officials with whom it is filed shall promptly fix the time for hearing the same, and 
shall forthwith mail notice of the filing of the protest and the time for hearing  it to 
the person who filed the petition which is protested and to the person who filed the 
protest.  At the time fixed, the election officials shall hear the protest and 
determine the validity of the petition.” 
 
In Sharon Village Ltd. v. Licking Cty. Bd. of Revision (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 
479, 678 N.E.2d 932, syllabus, we held that “[t]he preparation and filing of a 
complaint with a board of revision on behalf of a taxpayer constitute the practice 
of law.”   See, also, Gammarino v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision (1997), 80 Ohio 
St.3d 32, 684 N.E.2d 309.  In so holding, we relied on several factors, including 
that (1) the board of revision is a quasi-judicial body, (2) in order to invoke its 
jurisdiction, it is necessary to file a verified complaint, (3) the board must give 
notice to property owners and boards of education when a complaint is filed by 
other parties, and (4) preparation and filing of the complaint contained statutorily 
defined jurisdictional requirements that, if not properly met, barred the rights of 
owners to contest their valuations.  Sharon Village, 78 Ohio St.3d at 481-482, 678 
N.E.2d at 934-935. 
 
For the reasons that follow, the board did not abuse its discretion or clearly 
disregard applicable law by dismissing Cooker’s protest because it was not 
submitted by an attorney.  First, a board of elections, like a board of revision, is a 
quasi-judicial body when it considers protests.  See State ex rel. Harbarger v. 
Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 44, 45, 661 N.E.2d 699, 
700, citing Thurn, 72 Ohio St.3d at 291, 649 N.E.2d at 1207 (“A protest hearing in 
 
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election matters is a quasi-judicial proceeding.”).  Second, in order to invoke the 
board’s statutory authority to consider protests to local liquor option petitions 
under R.C. 4301.33(B) and 4305.14(D), it is necessary to file a protest.  Third, the 
board must give notice to the petitioner of the filing of a protest, fix a time for 
hearing it, and notify the petitioner and protestor of the time and place for the 
hearing.  R.C. 4301.33 and 4305.14(D).  Fourth, if the protestor does not properly 
meet the requirements for filing a protest, e.g., time or specificity, it may bar the 
protestor’s rights to contest the petitions.  See R.C. 4301.33, 4305.14(D), and 
3501.39(A)(1). 
 
Therefore, based on Sharon Village, the preparation and filing of a statutory 
protest with a board of elections constitute the practice of law.  See R.C. 4705.01. 
Young submitted a protest, gave professional advice to his client, and appeared at 
the September 9 protest hearing before the board on Cooker’s behalf, presenting 
argument and evidence, and conducting direct examination of witnesses.  See 
Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Estep (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 172, 657 N.E.2d 499.  The 
board of elections thus properly dismissed Cooker’s protest because it was not 
properly filed by an attorney.  Relators’ reliance on Jemo Assoc., Inc. v. Lindley 
(1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 365, 18 O.O.3d 518, 415 N.E.2d 292, is unavailing because, 
as noted in Sharon Village, 78 Ohio St.3d at 483, 678 N.E.2d at 935, we did not 
consider the issue in Jemo because it was irrelevant.  This issue, however, is not 
irrelevant here. 
 
Finally, any argument that Young relied on the advice of the board in 
determining that it was permissible for a nonattorney to file a protest is likewise 
meritless.  Sphere introduced evidence that the board did not advise Young 
whether he had to be an attorney to file a protest on behalf of someone else.  
Furthermore, any mistaken advice by the board of elections did not estop it from 
 
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invalidating the protest submitted by Young.  See State ex rel. Chevalier v. Brown 
(1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 61, 63, 17 OBR 64, 66, 477 N.E.2d 623, 625, quoting Besl 
Corp. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1976), 45 Ohio St.3d 146, 150, 74 O.O.2d 262, 265, 
341 N.E.2d 835, 838 (“ ‘[T]he principle of estoppel does not apply against a state 
or its state agencies in the exercise of a governmental function.’ ”); State ex rel. 
McMillan v. Ashtabula Cty. Bd. of Elections (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 186, 189, 602 
N.E.2d 631, 633. 
Meyer Protest: Specificity 
 
Relators contend that the board abused its discretion and acted in clear 
disregard of applicable law by not invalidating the petitions because (1) Precincts 
Q and W are not a “residence district” as defined in R.C. 4301.01(B)(19), since 
they are not contiguous, and (2) Sphere did not attach an original R.C. 4305.14(B) 
affidavit to its beer option petition.  Meyer, however, did not raise either of these 
specific objections in her written protest.  The board prevented Meyer from 
introducing evidence relating to objections she had not raised in her protest. 
 
R.C. 3501.39(A)(1) provides that a board of elections shall accept any 
petition unless a “written protest against the petition or candidacy, naming specific 
objections, is filed, a hearing is held, and a determination is made by the election 
officials with whom the protest is filed that the petition is invalid, in accordance 
with any section of the Revised Code providing a protest procedure.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  R.C. 3501.39(A)(1) thereby incorporates the liquor option protest 
procedures of R.C. 4301.33 and 4305.14(D).  See Harbarger, 75 Ohio St.3d at 46, 
661 N.E.2d at 700; State ex rel. Herman v. Klopfleisch (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 581, 
585, 651 N.E.2d 995, 998 (“All statutes relating to the same general subject matter 
must be read in pari materia, and in construing these statutes in pari materia, this 
 
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court must give them a reasonable construction so as to give proper force and 
effect to each and all of the statutes.”). 
 
R.C. 3501.39(A)(1) required Meyer to specify her objections in her protest.  
One of the evident purposes of this requirement is to give notice to the petitioner 
and the opportunity to present evidence to rebut the objections specified.  See R.C. 
4301.33 and 4305.14(D).  This purpose is not served if the board permits 
protestors to introduce evidence on objections not specified in their protests.  
Meyer herself acknowledged the specificity requirement of R.C. 3501.39(A)(1) by 
referring to it in her protest. 
 
Based on the unambiguous language of R.C. 3501.39(A)(1), the board did 
not err in preventing Meyer from introducing evidence which was not pertinent to 
the specific objections in her written protest.  Further, because the alleged 
substantive petition defects now raised by Meyer in this action were not specified 
in her protest, we need not consider these issues.  State ex rel. Shumate v. Portage 
Cty. Bd. of Elections (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 12, 14-15, 591 N.E.2d 1194, 1196-
1197.  Finally, while relators correctly observe that the board is empowered to 
refuse to accept a petition even in the absence of a written protest if it determines 
that the petition violates the applicable legal requirements under R.C. 
3501.39(A)(3), see State ex rel. O’Beirne v. Geauga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1997), 
80 Ohio St.3d 176, 685 N.E.2d 502, the board does not abuse its discretion by 
limiting the scope of a protest hearing to the specific objections raised by the 
written protest necessitating the hearing.  R.C. 3501.39(A)(1). 
Cooker and Meyer:  Adequate Remedy at Law 
 
Cooker’s and Meyer’s claims regarding alleged substantive defects in the 
liquor option petitions are additionally barred because they failed to properly raise 
these issues by valid statutory protest, which is an adequate remedy that precludes 
 
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issuance of an extraordinary writ.  Shumate, 64 Ohio St.3d at 14-15, 591 N.E.2d at 
1196-1197.  Cooker’s protest was invalid because it was not prepared and 
submitted by an attorney.  Meyer’s protest failed to specify the claims she now 
raises. 
Cooker and Meyer:  Laches 
 
Cooker’s and Meyer’s claims are also barred by laches.  “Extreme diligence 
and promptness are required in election-related matters.”  In re Contested Election 
of November 2, 1993 (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 411, 413, 650 N.E.2d 859, 862. 
 
Although the liquor option petitions were circulated and filed with the board 
in early June, Cooker and Meyer waited until after the board certified the 
sufficiency and validity of the petitions in August and thereafter until the statutory 
protest deadline in early September to file their protests.  Cooker received notice 
of the petitions’ circulation and filing in June and could have discerned its main 
substantive objections at that time.  At the September 9 protest hearing, Meyer 
requested and received a continuance of over one  week.  Cooker and Meyer then 
waited another six days following the board’s September 18 decision to file this 
prohibition action.  Their delay was prejudicial because by the time the expedited 
briefing schedule was complete, the board of elections could not make changes in 
the absentee ballots, which had already been printed.  Some of the absentee ballots 
had also been mailed.  State ex rel. Polo v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1995), 
74 Ohio St.3d 143, 145-146, 656 N.E.2d 1277, 1279.  In fact, the continuance of 
the protest hearing because of Meyer’s request forced the board to delay printing 
the absentee ballots. 
 
Consequently, Cooker and Meyer did not exercise the required diligence in 
this election case, and their claims are barred by laches. 
Brinker:  Notice 
 
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Relators, including Brinker, finally assert that Sphere’s failure to provide 
notice to Brinker under R.C. 4301.33 and 4305.14 of the circulation of the liquor 
option petitions denied Brinker due process and deceived signers of the petitions.  
The board did not permit Brinker to argue or introduce evidence at the protest 
hearings. 
 
Notwithstanding relators’ argument to the contrary, liquor permit holders do 
not possess a constitutional due process right to notice of an impending local 
option election because the election is a legislative action by the local electorate.  
37712, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Liquor Control (C.A.6, 1997), 113 F.3d 614, 619 
(“[T]he failure of Ohio law to provide notice and a hearing prior to the alleged 
‘taking’ (consequent to an adverse local option election) of a person’s privilege 
pursuant to an ODLC-issued liquor license to market one or more varieties of 
alcoholic beverages in a particular precinct or residence district does not violate 
due process, because no notice or opportunity to be heard need [precede] any 
legislative action of general applicability.”); State ex rel. Red Carpet Kamms, Inc. 
v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1988), 46 Ohio App.3d 126, 127, 546 N.E.2d 
418, 419. 
 
In addition, R.C. 4301.33 and 4305.14 require only that the petitioner and 
the board provide notice to the liquor permit holders on the list provided by the 
Division of Liquor.  For example, R.C. 4301.33 provides: 
 
“Within five days after a petitioner has received from the division the list of 
liquor permit holders who would be affected by the question or questions set forth 
on a petition for local option election, the petitioner shall, using the form provided 
by the board of elections, notify by certified mail each permit holder whose name 
appears on that list. * * * 
 
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“The petitioner shall attach a copy of the list provided by the division to 
each petition paper.  A part petition paper circulated at any time without the list of 
affected permit holders attached to it is invalid. 
 
“At the time the petitioner files the petition with the board of elections, the 
petitioner shall provide to the board the list supplied by the division and an 
affidavit certifying that the petitioner notified all affected permit holders on the list 
in the manner and within the time required in this section and that, at the time each 
signer of the petition affixed the signer’s signature to the petition, the petition 
paper contained a copy of the list of affected permit holders. 
 
“Within five days after receiving a petition calling for an election for the 
submission of one or more of the questions specified in divisions (A) to (C) of 
section 4301.35 or section 4301.351 of the Revised Code, the board shall give 
notice by certified mail that it has received the petition to all liquor permit holders 
whose names appear on the list of affected permit holders filed by the petitioner as 
furnished by the division.  Failure of the petitioner to supply the affidavit required 
by this section and a complete and accurate list of liquor permit holders as 
furnished by the division invalidates the entire petition. * * *”  (Emphasis added.)  
See, also, R.C. 4305.14(B), which contains similar requirements; cf. Kamms, 46 
Ohio App.3d at 127, 546 N.E.2d at 418-419, which held that permit holders have 
an express statutory right to notice of the filing of a local option election petition 
under a previous version of R.C. 4301.33, which did not limit the notice 
requirement to those affected liquor permit holders specified on the list provided 
by the Division of Liquor Control. 
 
Relators’ argument that the failure to specifically notify Brinker deceived 
signers of the petitions so as to render the petitions invalid is also meritless.  None 
of the cases cited by relators applies to this case, where the petitioner complied 
 
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with all applicable legal requirements.  Unlike State ex rel. Green v. Casey (1990), 
51 Ohio St.3d 83, 554 N.E.2d 1288, there are no legal defects in the petitions here.  
Cf. Thurn, 72 Ohio St.3d at 293, 649 N.E.2d at 1208, quoting Cincinnati v. 
Hillenbrand (1921), 103 Ohio St. 286, 133 N.E. 556, paragraph two of the 
syllabus (“ ‘[W]here the mandatory provisions of the Constitution or statute 
prescribing the necessary preliminary steps to authorize the submission to the 
electors of an initiative statute or ordinance have been complied with, the 
submission will not be enjoined.’ ”). 
Conclusion 
 
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we deny the writ of prohibition.  
Based on the evidence presented by the parties, relators have not established their 
entitlement to the requested extraordinary relief.  This conclusion moots the 
parties’ various motions. 
Writ denied. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, 
JJ., concur. 
 
COOK, J., concurs separately. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in judgment only. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., concurring.  I concur in the judgment denying the writ of 
prohibition as to Brinker on the notice issue.  As to Cooker and Meyer, I concur  
in the judgment denying the writ only on the basis of laches and concur with the 
analysis of that subject in the per curiam opinion.