Title: Wheble v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

0 non

428Nev., Advance Opinion | |
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA.

JANET WHEBLE, P.A-C; AND JANET No. 58774
WHEBLE, P.A.-C, LTD.,

Petitioners,

‘THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT |
COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK,
AND THE HONORABLE GLORIA
STURMAN, DISTRICT JUDGE,
Respondents,

and

ROBERT ANSARA, AS SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF
ANDREW PEDRETTI; KAREN GRZEDA,
INDIVIDUALLY; ALOK CHANDRA
SAXENA, M.D., INDIVIDUALLY;

VEGAS VALLEY PRIMARY CARE, A
NEVADA CORPORATION; AND ALOK

C, SAXENA, M.D., CHARTERED, A
NEVADA CORPORATION,

Real Parties in Interest.

iLED

vate

 

   

 

Original petition for writ of mandamus challenging district
court orders denying petitioners’ motions to dismiss and for summary
judgment in a medical malpractice matter.

Petition granted,

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP and S. Brent Vogel and Erin E.
Dart, Las Vegas,
for Petitioners.

John H. Cotton & Associates, Ltd., and John H, Cotton and Katherine L.
‘Turpen, Las Vegas,

for Real Parties in Interest Alok Chandra Saxena, M.D.; Alok C. Saxena,
M.D., Chartered; and Vegas Valley Primary Care,

12 -06596

 

 
‘Nursing Home Justice Center and Terry A. Coffing, Micah 8. Echols, and
Jamie A. Frost, Las Vegas,
for Real Parties in Interest Robert Ansara and Karen Grzeda.

BEFORE DOUGLAS, HARDESTY and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ.

OPINION
PER CURIAM:

In this petition for extraordinary writ relief, we must
determine whether the district court can apply NRS 11.500, Nevada's
“savings statute,” to save otherwise time-barred medical malpractice
claims that have been previously dismissed for failure to comply with the
affidavit requirements of NRS 41A.071. We conclude that NRS 11.500
does not save medical malpractice claims dismissed for failure to comply
with NRS 414.071 because these claims are void, and NRS 11.500 applies,
only to actions that have been “commenced.” Thus, writ relief is
appropriate here,

EAC URAL HISTORY,

On November 22, 2006, real parties in interest Robert Ansara,
‘as Special Administrator of the Estate of Andrew Pedretti, and Karen
Grzeda (plaintiffs) filed a complaint in district court against Alok Chandra
Saxena, MJ

 

; Vegas Valley Primary Care; Alok C. Saxena, M.D.,

Chartered; Janet Wheble, P.A.C; and Janet Wheble, P.A.-C, Ltd.,

 

(defendants). Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged claims for medical negligence,
wrongful death, and statutory abuse and neglect against defendants, a

"Because only some of the defendants below brought this petition,
for clarity we will refer to the parties as plaintiffs and defendants.

 

 
 

4

physician and physician's assistant, arising from the care of Andrew
Pedretti while he was a patient at the Desert Lane Care Center. The
complaint referenced an expert affidavit, as required by NRS 41A.071, but
no affidavit was attached. An errata to the complaint, attaching the
expert affidavit, was filed on November 27, 2006.

On July 20, 2009, defendants moved for summary judgment,
arguing that plaintiffs’ failure to attach an expert affidavit to their initial
complaint rendered the entire complaint void ab initio as to the medical
malpractice claims under Washoe Medical Center v, District Court, 122
Nev. 1298, 148 P.3d 790 (2006). ‘The district court denied defendants’
‘motion, and the defendants subsequently filed a petition for writ of
mandamus in this court, This court granted defendants’ petition, finding
that the district court manifestly abused its discretion in not granting
summary judgment in defendants’ favor on plaintiffs’ medical malpractice
the medical
malpractice claims without prejudice due to the failure to attach the
expert affidavit. See Saxena v, District Court, Docket No. 54775 (Order
Granting in Part Petition for Writ of Mandamus, January 8, 2010).

claims, as the district court was required to dismi:

 

Plaintiffs filed a new complaint on January 21, 2010,
reasserting the dismissed medical malpractice claims, and the district
court consolidated the two cases. The Saxena defendants filed a motion to
dismiss, arguing that the statute of limitations passed for plaintiffs
medical malpractice claims before the January 2010 complaint was filed,
and that the claims could not be rofiled after the statute of limitations
under the savings clause in NRS 11.500. The district court denied the
motion. The Wheble defendants then filed a motion for summary
judgment asking the district court to find NRS 11.500 unconstitutional,

 

 
1

 

which the district court also denied. ‘The Wheble defendants then filed
this writ for mandamus relief.
DISCUSSION
‘The Wheble defendants argue that extraordinary writ relief is
appropriate because the district court was required to grant their motion
to dismiss plaintiffs’ January 21, 2010, medical malpractice action as
untimely. “A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of

an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or

 

ation or to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion.”
Williams v, Dist. Ct., 127 Nev. __, __, 262 P.8d 360, 364 (2011) (quoting
International Game Tech. v, Dist, Ct., 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556,
558 (2008) (footnote omitted)); see also NRS 34.160, A writ of mandamus
will not issue if the petitioner has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. NRS 34.170; see also Williams, 127 Nev. at
— 262 P.3d at 364.

‘This writ proceeding involves an issue of first impression—
whether medical malpractice claims previously dismissed for failure to
comply with NRS 41A.071 can be refiled under NRS 11,500 after the
expiration of the statute of limitations. As there is potential for the
district courts to inconsistently interpret this legal issue, we elect to
exercise our discretion to entertain the merits of this writ petition and
clarify this issue of law.

“Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review
de novo, even in the context of a writ petition.” International Game Tech.,
124 Nev. at 198, 179 P.3d at 559. When a statute is clear on its face, we
will not look beyond the statute’s plain language. Beazer Homes Nevada,
Inc_v, Dist. Ct,, 120 Nev. 575, 579-80, 97 P.3d 1132, 1135 (2004).

 
os

 

Plaintiffs argue that because this court's January 8, 2010, order directed
the district court to enter an order dismissing their medical malpractice
claims without prejudice, the plain language of NRS 11.500(1) allowed
them to refile their claims within 90 days of dismissal, even though the
statute of limitations for the claims had passed.

NRS 11.500(1) states:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and
except as otherwise provided in this section, if an
action that is commenced within the applicable
period of limitations is dismissed because the
court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the action, the action may be recommenced in the
court having jurisdiction within:
(a) The applicable period of limitations; or
(b) Ninety days after the action is
dismissed,
whichever is later.

By the plain language of the statute, an action must have been
“commenced” in order for it to be refiled under NRS 11.500(1) after the
statute of limitations for the claim has passed. NRCP 3 states that “[a]
civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.” As this
court held in Washoe Medical Center, “a medical malpractice complaint
filed without a supporting medical expert affidavit is void ab initio,
meaning it is of no force and effect. Because a complaint that does not
comply with NRS 414.071 is void ab initio, it does not legally exist...”
122 Nev. at 1304, 148 P.3d at 794 (footnote omitted).

Here, because the plaintiffs’ complaint was dismissed for
failure to comply with NRS 414.071, the complaint never legally existed,
and because the complaint never existed, the action was never
“commenced” as defined by NRCP 3. NRS 11.500(1) does not apply to

 
factions dismissed for failure to comply with NRS 41A.071, therefore, the
district court must dismiss the plaintiffs’ January 21, 2010, complaint as it,
was brought beyond the expiration of the statute of limitations for the
plaintiffs’ claims.
CONCLUSION

Where medical malpractice claims have been dismissed for
failure to comply with the affidavit requirement of NRS 41A.071, NRS
11.500(1) cannot be used to refile the same claims beyond the statute of
limitations. A medical malpractice complaint filed without the required
affidavit is void ab initio and never legally existed; therefore, the
dismissed action was never “commenced,” as is required for NRS 11.500(1)
to apply. ‘Thus, the district court was required to dismiss the plaintiffs’
January 21, 2010, complaint reasserting claims previously dismissed for
failure to comply with NRS 41A.071 because the statute of limitations for
the claims had expired.

Accordingly, we grant the petition and direct the clerk of this
[court to issue a writ of mandamus directing the district court to dismiss

 

plaintits

 

January 21, 2010, complaint.

 

 

Hi v Parraguirre

fardesty

“Because we have concluded that NRS 11.500 does not apply to the
plaintiffs’ claims, we do not need to address the Wheble defendants’ other
arguments.