Title: Charles Robert Watson and Carolyn Watson, Respondents v. Robert K. Mense and Carolyn K. Mense, Appellants

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Missouri 
en banc 
 
 
CHARLES ROBERT WATSON AND   
) 
CAROLYN WATSON, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
Respondents,  
   
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC89936 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
ROBERT K. MENSE AND CAROLYN K. 
)  
MENSE, 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
) 
 
 
 
Appellants.  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MACON COUNTY 
The Honorable Gary Wallace, Judge 
 
Opinion issued November 17, 2009. 
I. Introduction 
 
The Watsons brought actions for ejectment, trespass, quiet title and the 
establishment of an easement by prescription against the Menses regarding parcels 
of farmland.  The trial court found in favor of the Watsons.  The trial court’s 
judgement as to ejectment damages is reversed.  The trial court is required to enter 
a more definite legal description of the new borderline between the party’s parcels 
and the easement by prescription and to determine the fair rental value of the 
 
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disputed parcel.  In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.  The case is 
remanded. 
II. Factual Background 
 
This is a dispute over farmland in Macon County.  Charles and Carolyn 
Watson own two 40-acre, square parcels that are connected at a single diagonal 
point: one to the northwest and the other to the southeast.  A path and a gate some 
16 to 24 feet wide connect the two Watson parcels at the corner intersection.  
Robert and Carolyn Mense own a single 80-acre rectangular parcel that abuts both 
of the Watsons’ parcels: it is south of the northwest parcel and west of the 
southeast parcel.  
 
Starting in 1958, Charles Watson’s mother, Jane Boulton, owned the two 
parcels and farmed various crops and grazed cattle.  Boulton often moved cattle, 
trucks, and farming combines between the two parcels using the path through the 
corner intersection.  Boulton’s neighbor at the time, Frank Bush, owned the Mense 
parcel.  A hedgerow and a fence created the border between the northern Watson 
tract and Bush’s tract. Neither Bush nor Boulton farmed beyond their respective 
sides of the fence.   There was never a dispute about the borderline location.  Both 
parties recognized the fence and hedgerow as the border. 
 
During the 1980s, Bush bulldozed the eastern half of the hedgerow and 
fence leaving an elevated “hump” of ground behind. However, Bush still never 
crossed the borderline.   The western half of the fence still remained.  Eventually, 
Bush sold his tract to Jim Nelson, who in turn sold it to the Menses in 2006.   
 
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The current dispute arose in 2006 when the Menses took title to their 
parcel.    Using the termination point of the eastern property as a reference, Mr. 
Mense believed the borderline was eight feet to the north of hedgerow hump.  In 
the spring of 2006, Mense planted corn up to that assumed border.  In response, 
Charles Watson erected a post on the eastern side of the “hump,” lining up the post 
with the remaining western fence line.   
In further response, Mense used his tractor to tear out the post and parked 
the tractor in front of the diagonal gate between the two Watson parcels. Mense 
also placed a sign, threatening to arrest anyone who moved the tractor and offering 
to pay half the cost of a survey.  Mr. Watson tried to replace the post some time 
later, but Mense removed it again.     
 
In the summer of 2006, Mense hired Macon County surveyor Edward 
Cleaver, who adduced that the true borderline was about eight feet north of the 
fence erected by Mr. Watson.1  On the survey, Cleaver noted the location of the 
Watson’s post and the hump of the hedgerow.  During the spring of 2007, Mense 
planted soybeans up to the Cleaver survey line. 
 
The Watsons then filed suit for ejectment, trespass and quiet title and asked 
the court to recognize an easement by prescription over the diagonal path between 
their two parcels and issue an order prohibiting the Menses from interfering with 
                                             
 
1 The survey in the record notes the old fence was located in a position 7.2 feet 
south of the center point of the southeast quarter of  Section 21, Township 59 
North, R13W going forward in a straight line to a termination point 8.4 feet south 
of the of the center eastern survey point of the same southeast quarter.  The 
Watson’s argue that this is the true borderline.  
 
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their easement.  The Menses counterclaimed, asking for ejectment and trespass 
damages of their own.  Before trial, the Menses consented to judgment quieting 
title to the record land descriptions, but maintained their contest over the disputed 
area north of the hedgerow.  
The trial court found that the Watsons had established their adverse 
possession claim through the testimony of Jane Boulton, Charles Watson’s mother 
and predecessor in title, and the testimony of Frank Bush and Jim Nelson who all 
testified that the hedgerow and fence were respected as the boundary line, and 
aerial survey photographs that showed cultivation up to the fence line by Boulton 
and the Watsons.  Subsequently, the trial court awarded $75.00 in trespass 
damages for removal of the two posts and $90.00 as the value of the soybeans 
wrongfully planted on the Watson parcel.  The trial court further found that the 
movement of equipment and livestock between the two parcels established an 
easement 24 feet in width and ordered that the Menses no longer interfere with the 
use of the easement.   This appeal followed. 
 
The Menses argue several points on appeal, which may be summarized as 
follows: First, that the trial court erred in finding that the Watsons adversely 
possessed the disputed parcel (point I) and awarding to the Watsons both trespass 
damages (point II) and ejectment damages (point III), and denying the Menses’ 
quiet title action (point VI) and trespass damages (point IX).  
 
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Second, the Menses argue error in declaring the width of the easement to be 
24 feet (point IV) and ordering the Menses to stop interfering with the easement 
(point V). 
Third, they argue that the trial court erred in drafting a legally insufficient legal 
description in its final judgment (point VII).2   
III. Analysis 
A. Standard of Review 
The appellate court will affirm the trial court’s determination “unless there 
is no substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against the weight of the 
evidence, unless it erroneously declares the law, or unless it erroneously applies 
the law.”  Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. 1976).  The trial court is 
free to believe or disbelieve all, part or none of the testimony of any witness. 
T.B.G. v. C.A.G., 772 S.W.2d 653, 654 (Mo. banc 1989). When determining the 
sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court will accept as true the evidence and 
inferences from the evidence that are favorable to the trial court’s decree and 
disregard all contrary evidence. Morgan v. Morgan, 701 S.W.2d 177, 179 (Mo. 
App. 1985).  
B. (Points I-III, VI)  
                                             
 
2 The Menses also argue in point VIII that the judgment is outside the scope of the 
pleadings because the Watsons consented to judgment that the Menses were 
record owners of the tract.  As this suit deals with adverse possession which 
establishes a new title to the land, such an argument is without merit.  See 
Boeckmann v. Fitzpatrick, 491 S.W.2d 524, 527 (Mo. 1973); Moran v. Roaring 
River Development Co., 461 S.W.2d 822, 831 (Mo. 1970). 
 
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Adverse Possession 
To acquire title by adverse possession or prescription, possession must be: 
(1) hostile, that is, under a claim of right, (2) actual, (3) open and notorious, (4) 
exclusive, and (5) continuous for the necessary period of years prior to the 
commencement of action.  Walker v. Walker, 509 S.W.2d 102, 106 (Mo. 1974).  
The party claiming ownership by adverse possession has the burden of proving his 
claim by a preponderance of the evidence.  Shuffit v. Wade, 13 S.W.3d 329, 335 
(Mo. App. 2000).  The ten year period to confer title by adverse possession need 
not occur immediately prior the suit.   Moore v. Hoffman, 39 S.W.2d 339, 344 
(Mo. 1947).  A claimant may tack her period of adverse possession with that of 
her predecessors in order to meet the ten year requirement.  Kitterman v. Simrall, 
195 S.W.3d 548, 554 (Mo. App. 1996).   The Menses argue that the Watsons’ 
possession was not adverse because it was not hostile or actual.  
The adverse possession doctrine encourages land owners to bring border 
disputes in timely fashion, thereby weeding out stale claims.  When a border, even 
though erroneous, is observed by all parties as the boundary for the statutory 
period, it becomes the true boundary through adverse possession.   This Court 
dealt with almost identical facts more than 50 years ago in Finck Realty Co. v. 
Lefler, 208 S.W.2d 213 (Mo. 1948).  In Finck, a dispute arose between owners of 
two parcels of farmland over the borderline. Id. at 213-14. For nearly 50 years, 
defendants’ predecessors in title and plaintiff erroneously regarded a fence as the 
 
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borderline between their two parcels Id.  A survey revealed that the fence was 
encroaching over the true borderline onto the defendant’s land. Id. at 215.  This 
Court held that there need not be a dispute to make the plaintiff’s possession 
adverse to the defendant and that there was sufficient evidence to find actual 
possession because the plaintiff predecessor in title had cultivated the enclosed 
land for over 50 years. Id.   
i. Hostile possession 
There need not be a dispute between two adjoining landowners over the 
location of borderline to satisfy the hostile requirement.  Boeckman v. Fitzpatrick, 
491 S.W.2d 524, 527 (Mo. 1973).  The element will be satisfied even if the 
possessor only mistakenly believes she owns the land and occupies the land in 
question.  Underwood v. Hash, 67 S.W.3d 770, 775 (Mo. App. 2002); State ex rel. 
Edie v. Shain, 152 S.W.2d 174, 176 (Mo. 1941).  The lack of a dispute between 
the Watsons and the Menses’ predecessors in title is irrelevant to the hostility 
requirement.  The trial court found that the Watsons believed that they owned the 
land north of the fence line which is sufficient to meet this element.  Under 
Murphy, this finding is not disturbed.   
ii. Actual possession 
The Menses also challenge the “actual” prong of the adverse possession test 
arguing that the Watsons took no action to possess the contested hedgerow area of 
land north of the fence line. 
 
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Whether an act constitutes actual possession “depend[s] on the nature and 
location of the property, the uses to which it can be applied and all the facts and 
circumstances of a particular case.” Murphy v. Holman, 289 S.W.3d 234, 237 
(Mo. App. W.D. 2009).   The element is less strict for wild, undeveloped land.  
Martens v. White, 195 S.W.3d 548, 554 (Mo. App. S.D. 2000).   
Evidence before the trial court showed that the Watson family had been 
farming, pasturing and cultivating the land continually as their own since 1958. 
During this period the land was enclosed by a fence and hedgerow that the 
Menses’ and Watsons’ predecessors in title treated as the boundary line.   All 
parties still respected the border, even after the fence and hedgerow were removed. 
The Watsons and their predecessors in title excluded their neighbors from the 
disputed area.  The trial court explicitly found that the Watsons and Boulton 
farmed up to fence line for a continuous 45-year period. 
This evidence was supported by 45 years worth of aerial survey photos.  As 
required by Murphy, an appellate court must give deference to the trial court’s 
factual determinations when sitting as fact-finder.  There was substantial evidence 
to support the trial court’s finding of actual possession because it found that the 
Watsons and Boulton farmed up to the fence line.   
The hostile and actual elements were met; therefore, the trial court properly 
found that the Watsons acquired title to the disputed land.  Point denied. 
iii. Trespass Damages 
 
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The question now turns to whether there was substantial evidence to 
support damages for trespass.  The trial court found credible Charles Watson’s 
testimony that the two removed posts were worth $75.00.  We do not disturb these 
findings under Murphy.  Point denied. 
iv. Ejectment Damages 
The Menses correctly argue that the $90.00 in ejectment damages are in 
error.  Damages may also be appropriate relief in ejectment.  Pankins v. Jackson, 
891 S.W.2d 845, 848 (Mo. App. 1995).  When crops are planted wrongfully, the 
proper measure of damages in ejectment is not the value of the crops, but the fair 
rental value of the land for such period as the land owner had been deprived of 
possession.  Dent v. Dent, 166 S.W.2d 582, 587-88 (Mo. 1942).  The Watsons 
were awarded $90.00, the value of the soybeans grown on the disputed land.  
While this is some evidence from which fair rental value of the land might be 
inferred, it does not take into account the Menses’ expenses, the value of their 
labor, or any value for the risk they undertook raising and harvesting the soybeans.  
The judgment is reversed on this point so that damages can be determined in 
accordance with the appropriate measure— fair rental value. 
C. Prescriptive Easement (Points IV-V)  
i. Order prohibiting interference with the easement 
 
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The Menses do not challenge whether the Watsons have acquired an 
easement by prescription. Rather, they only contest the trial court’s determination 
that the easement is 24 feet wide and its omission of the easement’s permissible 
uses.  Because they admit the easement exists, the Menses must not interfere with 
the use of the easement.  The trial court found that the Menses tractor parked in 
front of the gate interfered with the use of the easement. Under Murphy, this 
finding is not disturbed, nor is the order prohibiting the Menses’ interference with 
the easement.  Point denied. 
 ii. Width of easement 
The trial court’s determination that the easement is 24 feet wide is 
supported by substantial evidence.  Charles Watson explicitly testified to this fact, 
and the trial court noted that photographic evidence of the gate confirmed his 
testimony.  Again, under Murphy, this determination is not disturbed. Point 
denied. 
iii. Permissible uses of easement  
The trial court’s omission of the specific uses from the easement 
description is not error.  When an easement is claimed by prescription, the 
character and extent of it is fixed and determined by the use under which it is 
gained.  Holian v. Guenther, 471 S.W.2d 457, 459 (Mo. 1971).  Accordingly, the 
trial court necessarily defines the acceptable use of an easement by the factual 
findings that gave rise to the prescription.  The Watson family had moved 
combines, cattle and other farming equipment between their two parcels.  This 
 
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would be the acceptable uses of the easement.  If the easement holder thereafter 
unreasonably exploits the easement beyond those uses, the servient owner may 
bring suit to enjoin that behavior.  Point denied. 
D. Legal Description (Point VII) 
 
Finally, the Menses argue that the trial court’s judgment was not reasonably 
certain in two respects:  first, that the prescriptive easement did not specify that 
only half of the width of the easement burdened the Mense land; second, that the 
judgment designating the “fence row” as the actual border was indefinite.  The 
Court agrees in both respects.    
i. Easement Description 
 
At trial, all testimony, including that of both Robert Mense and the 
Watsons, indicated that the easement burdened the property of Donald Ross, a 
non-party, and the Menses equally. 3  This information was omitted from the trial 
court’s description of the easement.  When a single prescriptive easement will 
burden multiple owners, the trial court should carefully describe the burden of 
each.  On remand, the trial court shall specify the portion of the easement that 
burdens the Menses’ property. 
 
                                             
 
3 Nothing in trial court’s order can bind Donald Ross.  A trial court’s verdict 
cannot materially affect the real property interest of a non-party  Schaeffer v. 
Moore, 262 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Mo.1953).   Moreover, neither party raised this in 
briefing, therefore this issue is not reached. 
 
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ii. Quiet Title Description 
Judgments should describe with reasonable certainty the land adjudicated 
therein, both in ejectment and actions to determine title.  Hart v. T. L. Wright 
Lumber Co., 196 S.W.2d 272, 278 (Mo. 1946). Mere reference to a fence in a 
judgment, without further description of that fence’s actual location, is not a 
description with reasonable certainty. See Lollar v. Maness, 765 S.W.2d 695, 700 
(Mo. App. 1989).  Here, the final judgment quieting title states that the new 
borderline is “the fence line between the [southeast] quarter-quarter and 
Defendants’ property south of it.”  Therefore, the judgment establishing the border 
as the “fence line” is affirmed, but on remand the trial court shall take the steps 
necessary to determine by metes and bounds the location of the fence line in 
conformity with its previous ruling. 
E. Conclusion 
The judgment as to the $90.00 in ejectment damages is reversed, and the 
case is remanded.  On remand, the trial court shall enter more definite descriptions 
of the new border and the location of the prescriptive easement and determine the 
fair rental value of the disputed land area.   In all other respects, the judgment is 
affirmed.  
 
 
 
______________________________ 
 
William Ray Price, Jr., Chief Justice 
All concur. 
 
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