Title: MARTIN I LEVY V MARK L MARTIN

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________ 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JANUARY 3, 2001  
MARTIN I. LEVY and  
MARTIN I. LEVY, D.D.S., P.C.,  
Plaintiffs-Appellants,  
v 
No. 115603  
MARK L. MARTIN, GERALD HOSKOW, 
and HOSKOW & MARTIN, P.C.,  
Defendants-Appellees.  
PER CURIAM  
The plaintiffs filed a malpractice action that the  
circuit court dismissed on the ground that the limitation  
period had expired. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Because  
we agree with the plaintiffs that their suit was timely, we  
reverse in part the judgments of the circuit court and the  
Court of Appeals.  
I  
From 1974 until 1996, accountants Mark L. Martin and  
Gerald Hoskow1 prepared the annual tax returns of Martin I.  
1 Messrs. Martin and Hoskow were principals in an 
accounting firm that bore their names.  In this opinion, when 
we refer to them, we also mean their firm.  
 
Levy, D.D.S.2
 As the result of an audit by the Internal  
Revenue Service, Dr. Levy was required to pay additional taxes  
for 1991 and 1992, as well as penalties and interest.3  He  
also incurred legal expenses and additional accounting  
expenses.4  
In August 1997, Dr. Levy filed in circuit court a  
complaint in which he alleged that losses exceeding ninety  
thousand dollars had been caused by the malpractice of Messrs.  
Martin and Hoskow.5  
The 1991 and 1992 tax returns of which Dr. Levy  
complained were prepared and submitted in 1992 and 1993,  
respectively.
 Observing that the limitation period for a  
malpractice action is two years,6 Messrs. Martin and Hoskow  
filed a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer.7  The circuit  
2 Taxes were also prepared for Dr. Levy’s professional 
corporation.  References to Dr. Levy include the corporation.  
3 In his application to this Court, Dr. Levy says he 
received a “notice of deficiency” form in December 1995 and 
that he settled with the IRS in March 1997, when stipulated 
orders were entered in two cases in the United States Tax  
Court.  
4 This case was dismissed by the circuit court before a 
trial or discovery. For present purposes, we thus accept as 
true the plaintiffs’ allegations.  
5 
 That allegation was contained in count I of the 
complaint, which was titled “Negligence & Professional  
Malpractice.”
 There also was a count II-
--“Negligent and  
Fraudulent Misrepresentation.”  
6 MCL 600.5805(4); MSA 27A.5805(4).  
7 In their brief in support of the motion, Messrs. Martin 
and Hoskow relied on MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (8).  
2  
court agreed that the malpractice claim was not timely, and  
dismissed the complaint on that basis.8  
The Court of Appeals affirmed.9  In a separate opinion,  
Judge WHITBECK dissented, expressing the belief that the  
malpractice claim had been filed timely.10  
Dr. Levy has applied to this Court for leave to appeal.  
II  
As indicated, the limitation period for a malpractice  
claim is two years.11  The present dispute concerns the date  
on which Dr. Levy’s malpractice claim accrued, i.e., the date  
on which the two-year period began to run.  
To resolve this issue, we turn to MCL 600.5838; MSA  
8 Actually, the court dismissed count I on that basis. 
The court also granted summary disposition on count II on the 
ground 
that 
the 
compliant did not contain specific 
allegations 
of fraud, and thus did not (except insofar as it reiterated 
the untimely malpractice claim) state a claim on which relief 
can be granted.  
9 Unpublished opinion per curiam issued September 17, 
1999 (Docket No. 207797).  
10 Judge WHITBECK concurred in the affirmance of the  
summary disposition of count II.  
11 A malpractice claim is barred unless filed within the 
two-year period “or within 6 months after the plaintiff 
discovers or should have discovered the existence of the  
claim, whichever is later.” MCL 
600.5838(2); 
MSA 
27A.5838(2). 
In light of our disposition of this matter, it is unnecessary 
to consider whether the six-month discovery provision is 
applicable to this case.  
3  
  
 
 
 
27A.5838.12  That section13 provides that a malpractice claim  
“accrues at the time that person discontinues serving the  
plaintiff in a professional . . . capacity as to the matters  
out of which the claim for malpractice arose, regardless of  
the time the plaintiff discovers or otherwise has knowledge of  
the claim.” MCL 600.5838(1); MSA 27A.5838(1).  
In Morgan v Taylor, 434 Mich 180; 451 NW2d 852 (1990),  
this Court explained this “last treatment rule,” from its  
development in De Haan v Winter, 258 Mich 293, 296-297; 241 NW  
12 Questions of statutory interpretation are decided de 
novo. Northern Concrete Pipe, Inc v Sinacola Cos-
--Midwest,  
Inc, 461 Mich 316, 320, n 14; 603 NW2d 257 (1999).  
13  
(1) Except as otherwise provided in [MCL 
600.5838a; MSA 27A.5838(1), which concerns medical 
malpractice], a claim based on the malpractice of a 
person who is, or holds himself or herself out to 
be, a member of a state licensed profession accrues 
at the time that person discontinues serving the 
plaintiff in a professional or pseudoprofessional 
capacity as to the matters out of which the claim 
for malpractice arose, regardless of the time the 
plaintiff discovers or otherwise has knowledge of 
the claim.  
(2) Except as otherwise provided in [MCL 
600.5838a; MSA 27A.5838(1), which concerns medical 
malpractice], an action involving a claim based on 
malpractice may be commenced at any time within the 
[two-year limitation period of MCL 600.5805(4); MSA 
27A.5805(4)], 
or 
within 
6 
months 
after 
the  
plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the 
existence of the claim, whichever is later. 
The  
burden of proving that the plaintiff neither  
discovered nor should have discovered the existence  
of the claim at least 6 months before the  
expiration of the period otherwise applicable to 
the claim shall be on the plaintiff. A malpractice 
action which is not commenced within the time  
prescribed by this subsection is barred.  
4  
 
 
923 (1932), through the subsequent codification in MCL  
600.5838; 
MSA 
27A.5838 
and the statutory amendments enacted 
as  
1986 PA 178.  
The plaintiffs in Morgan filed two complaints in 1985,  
alleging malpractice in connection with a 1981 optometric  
examination.  An examination also had been conducted in 1983,  
less than two years before the complaints were filed, and the  
issue in Morgan was whether “routine, periodic examinations”  
extend the limitation period.  Resolving the question, this  
Court wrote:  
In the instant case defendant argues that the 
rationale underlying the last treatment rule does 
not apply in the context of routine, periodic 
examinations.  It is contended that there is no air  
of truthfulness and trust once the examination is  
concluded.
 We disagree. 
It is the doctor's  
assurance 
upon 
completion 
of 
the 
periodic 
examination that the patient is in good health 
which induces the patient to take no further action 
other 
than 
scheduling 
the 
next 
periodic 
examination.  
Particularly in light of the contractual  
arrangement which bound defendant and entitled  
plaintiff to periodic eye examinations,[14] it cannot  
be said that the relationship between plaintiff and 
defendant terminated after each visit. 
The  
obligation and responsibility of defendant to  
provide glaucoma testing extended beyond the 1981 
examination of plaintiff's eyes. We conclude that  
defendant 
did 
not 
discontinue 
"treating 
or  
otherwise serving"[15] plaintiff "as to the matters  
14 The patient in Morgan was entitled, under a contract  
between his employer and his labor union, to an eye 
examination every two years.  
15 As one can see in footnote 13, the statute is now 
framed only in terms of “serving” the plaintiff.  That change 
is related to the Legislature’s decision to eliminate the last  
5  
 
__________________________________________________ 
 
__________________________________________________ 
out of which the claim for malpractice arose" until 
August 18, 1983.  Thus, we hold that the claim of 
plaintiff is not barred by the statute of  
limitations.19  
Since the facts here are unique, and the 
Legislature has now repealed the last treatment 
rule as it applied to medical malpractice,[16] we  
limit our holding to the facts of this case.  
19  
There is no suggestion that this plaintiff returned to 
[the optometrist] on August 18, 1983, merely to extend the 
statutory period of limitations.  Our decision might be 
different if there were evidence that such a visit had been made  
as a mere artifice to extend the limitations period.  
[434 Mich 194.]  
III  
In the present case, the Court of Appeals said that  
“[t]he preparation of yearly tax returns is not analogous to  
the periodic eye examinations in Morgan v Taylor, 434 Mich  
180; 451 NW2d 852 (1990),” since “[e]ach individual tax return  
reflects the examination of a discrete, contained body of  
information.”  
Writing in dissent, Judge WHITBECK disagreed about the  
applicability of Morgan. He countered that its analysis of  
the 
statute 
was 
“instructive 
and, 
in 
appropriate  
circumstances, controlling.”  He continued with an analysis  
that we find persuasive, and adopt as our own:  
treatment rule with respect to medical malpractice claims. 
See Morgan, 434 Mich 192, n 17, and MCL 600.5838(1); MSA 
27A.5838(1) and MCL 600.5838a; MSA 27A.5838(1) as amended and 
enacted, respectively, by 1986 PA 178.  
16 See footnote 15.  
6  
 
I consider a faithful application of the legal 
principles enunciated in Morgan to control the  
issue at hand. A health professional and patient 
on the one hand are similarly situated in this 
regard to an accountant who provides annual income 
tax preparation services and the accountant’s  
client.
 As, under the rationale of the last  
treatment rule, a patient was (before the amendment 
of § 5838[1] making it inapplicable to medical 
malpractice claims) entitled to rely “completely” 
on the health professional and not inquire into the 
effectiveness of the health professional’s measures 
prior to the termination of the relationship, an 
accountant’s client is likewise entitled to rely 
“completely” on the account’s [sic: accountant’s] 
skills and effectiveness until the termination of  
the relationship. 
A patient who attended a  
periodic examination and was not diagnosed with any 
medical problem was under the rationale of the last 
treatment rule provided with an “assurance” of good 
health that induced the patient to take no further 
action to investigate the pertinent health matters 
until the next periodic examination. Likewise, a 
client who entrusts preparation of annual tax 
returns to an accountant is provided with an 
assurance of professional preparation of the tax 
returns that induces the client to take no further  
action regarding those matters until it is time to 
prepare the next year’s tax returns. As discussed  
above, accepting the well-pleaded allegations of 
the complaint as true, [Home Ins Co v Detroit Fire  
Extinguisher Co, Inc, 212 Mich App 522, 527-528; 
538 NW2d 424 (1995)], defendants prepared annual 
tax 
returns 
for 
plaintiffs 
from 
1974 
until  
1996-
--encompassing the times of the alleged 
professional negligence in preparing the 1991 and 
1992 tax returns. Thus, I conclude that, based on 
the 
well-pleaded 
allegations 
of 
plaintiffs’ 
complaint, under the last treatment rule of  
§ 5838(1) as explained in Morgan, plaintiffs’ 
possible claim did not accrue-
--meaning the statute 
of limitations did not begin to run-
--until at least  
1996.  The complaint in this case was filed in 1997 
and 
thus 
was 
plainly 
within 
the 
applicable 
limitation period, which was two years as noted by 
the majority. 
Thus, in my view, the trial court 
erred by granting summary disposition in favor of 
defendants under MCR 2.116(C)(7) based on the 
statute of limitations.  
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s  
7  
 
 
attempt to distinguish the “continuing care of one 
patient’s set of eyes in Morgan, supra,” from what  
the majority describes as “the series of unrelated 
tax calculations in this case.” . . . The  
touchstone of the analysis in Morgan was the  
continuing professional relationship between a  
professional 
and 
the 
person 
receiving 
the  
professional’s services with regard to a particular 
subject matter, not any direct connection between 
the 
work 
performed 
by 
the 
professional 
at  
continuing 
periodic 
sessions 
during 
that  
relationship.
 The alleged negligence in Morgan  
occurred during a glaucoma test on the principal 
plaintiff in Morgan at a 1981 eye examination.  
Morgan, supra at 182-183. The principal plaintiff 
in Morgan did not return to the defendant optical 
company for an examination until 1983 for his next 
routine eye examination. Id. at 182. There is no  
indication in Morgan that the manner in which the  
eye examination was conducted in 1983 had any 
direct connection to the performance of the 1981 
glaucoma test. 
Nevertheless, the Morgan Court  
concluded 
that, 
due 
to 
the 
statutory 
“last  
treatment” rule, the statute of limitations with 
regard to alleged negligence in the 1981 glaucoma 
test did not begin to run on the date it was 
performed because of the continuing professional 
relationship between the patient and the optical 
company.  
Similarly, 
in 
this 
case, 
plaintiff s’ 
complaint 
alleges, without any contrary documentary evidence 
in the record, the existence of a continuing 
relationship of tax preparer and client that did 
not end until 1996.  Until the end of that  
relationship, for purposes of applying the “last 
treatment” rule and thereby ascertaining whether 
the 
statute 
of 
limitations 
bars 
this 
suit, 
plaintiffs had “no duty to inquire into the  
effectiveness of [defendants’] measures” until the 
end of the professional relationship.  Id. at 188  
(citation omitted).3  
I note that it may (or may not) be wise for 
MCL 600.5838(1); MSA 27A.5838(1) to be amended to 
completely abolish the “last treatment” rule.  
However, “[t]he wisdom of the provision in question 
in the form in which it was enacted is a matter of  
legislative responsibility with which the courts 
may not interfere.” Morgan, supra at 192, quoting 
Melia v Employment Security Comm, 346 Mich 544,  
8  
__________________________________________________ 
 
__________________________________________________ 
561; 78 NW2d 273 (1956).  Our duty is to faithfully 
apply the legislatively adopted policy of the “last 
treatment” 
rule 
to 
claims 
of 
professional 
malpractice, other than medical malpractice, not to 
attempt to limit that policy by an unduly narrow 
application.  
3 However, I further question the majority’s apparent view 
of the preparation of each year’s tax returns as inherently 
involving a completely separate transaction on the basis of 
“common sense.” 
Depending on its complexity and the tax 
situation of the taxpayer, a given tax return may (or may not) 
reflect “the examination of a discrete, contained body of 
information.”  I think it is fairly well recognized, for  
example, that, especially with regard to business income  
taxation, certain matters such as depreciation of business 
assets and eligibility for certain tax credits often depend on 
facts that extend further into the past than the prior tax year. 
Thus, from the current state of the record, it is not clear that 
each instance of preparation of annual income tax returns by 
defendants involved calculations and judgments that lacked any 
direct connection to their preparation of income tax returns in 
prior years.  
[Emphasis in original.]  
We respectfully disagree with the dissent’s assertion  
that this case should be distinguished from Morgan on the  
ground that Morgan involved the continuing treatment of the  
same set of eyes while this case involves discrete tax  
calculations.  The basis for our disagreement comes from a  
review of the development of the last treatment rule in  
Michigan.  
Over six decades ago, in De Hann, supra at 296-297, this  
Court applied the common-law last treatment rule in holding  
that a patient’s claim of professional malpractice for  
treatment of a fracture in his leg did not commence to run  
“while treatment of the fracture continues” as “[d]uring the  
course of treatment plaintiff was not put to inquiry relative  
to the treatment accorded him.”  Thereafter, codifying what it  
9  
wished to have as the last treatment rule, the Legislature, as  
part of the Revised Judicature Act, enacted MCL 600.5838; MSA  
27A.5838 in its original form:17  
A claim based on the malpractice of a person 
who is, or holds himself out to be, a member of a 
state licensed profession accrues at the time that 
person discontinues treating or otherwise serving 
the 
plaintiff in 
a 
professional 
or 
psuedo­
professional capacity as to the matters out of 
which the claim for malpractice arose.  
This statute constituted not only a codification, but also an  
expansion of the common-law last treatment rule. First, the  
statute expanded the common-law rule because it applied to a  
“member of a state licensed profession” meaning that the last  
treatment rule was extended not just to medically licensed,  
but 
to nonmedical state licensed professionals.  
Moreover, 
the  
statutory 
language 
“discontinues 
treating 
or 
otherwise 
serving  
the plaintiff . . . as to the matters out of which the claim  
for malpractice arose” extended the last treatment rule of De  
Haan to maters other than treating a specific recognized  
injury.  How broadly to read “the matters out of which the  
claim for malpractice arose” was addressed by this Court in  
Morgan.  There, unlike the situation in De Haan, the plaintiff  
was not receiving treatment for a specific ailment, but rather  
was receiving periodic eye examinations from the defendants.  
This Court held that it was those examinations, not any  
17 
 The current version of MCL 600.5838(1); MSA  
27A.5838(1) is substantively the same, except for its  
exclusion of claims of medical malpractice from its  
provisions.  
10  
injury, that constituted “the matters out of which the claim  
for malpractice arose.”18  Using the same reasoning, it is  
clear 
here 
that 
plaintiffs, 
rather 
than 
receiving 
professional  
advice for a specific problem, were receiving generalized tax  
preparation services from defendants. 
These continuing  
services, just like 
the 
continuous 
eye 
examinations in Morgan,  
to be consistent with the Morgan approach, must be held to  
constitute “the matters out of which the claim for malpractice  
arose.”19  
18  While not articulated in Morgan, we note that its 
result seems to find support in the statute’s use of the 
plural term “matters” in the phrase “the matters out of which 
the claim for malpractice arose.”  Plainly, this means that 
the statute of limitations for a nonmedical malpractice claim 
against a state licensed professional does not begin to run 
when the professional has ceased providing services with 
regard to a single matter.  On the contrary, the statute of 
limitations begins to run only when the professional has 
ceased providing services as to the broad “matters” out of 
which the claim arises.  This indicates that a continuing 
course of eye examinations (or preparation of income tax 
returns) should be considered the “matters” out of which a 
claim for malpractice arose for purposes of the statute, 
rather 
than 
considering the completion of each 
eye 
examination 
(or tax preparation) to begin running the statute of  
limitations with respect to negligence during that singular 
matter.  In addition, the phrase “discontinues serving” as 
used in MCL 600.5838; MSA 27A.5838 should not be ignored or 
overlooked.
 Defendants in this case did not discontinue  
serving plaintiffs with regard to accounting matters until 
well after the preparation of the 1992 income tax returns.  
19 We note that we are reviewing this case in the context 
of a motion for summary disposition brought by defendants 
under MCR 2.116(C)(7) based on the statute of limitations.  In  
bringing such a motion, a defendant may, but is not required 
to, submit documentary evidence in support of its assertion 
that a claim is barred by the statute of limitations.  See  
Patterson v Kleiman, 447 Mich 429, 432; 526 NW2d 879 (1994).  
However, in the present 
case, 
defendants 
have 
not offered  
11  
Finally, the dissent raises the specter of a very long  
delayed claim being possible under MCL 600.5838(1); MSA  
27A.5838(1) based on the rationale of this opinion. Slip op  
at 11. It is certainly true that the last treatment rule as  
codified and expanded by MCL 600.5838(1); MSA 27A.5838(1) may  
allow 
suits 
against 
non-medical 
professionals 
based 
on 
alleged  
negligence that has occurred much farther in the past than  
would be the case absent that statutory provision. However,  
for better or worse, we believe that such an extended statute  
of limitations is precisely the point of MCL 600.5838(1); MSA  
27A.5838(1) as currently enacted.  Policy arguments for  
changing the statute may be addressed to the Legislature, but  
we must endeavor to apply the statute in light of its plain  
documentary evidence regarding the nature of the professional 
services that were provided by defendants to plaintiffs. As  
Judge WHITBECK stated below, in the absence of any documentary 
evidence on a point, in reviewing a summary disposition motion 
under MCR 2.116(C)(7) we must accept the well-pleaded 
allegations in a complaint as true. Plaintiffs alleged that 
defendants prepared their income tax returns from 1974 to 
1996.  Defendants have failed to present any evidence that 
this is untrue—or that each income tax preparation was a 
discrete transaction that should be considered to separately 
constitute “the matters out of which the claim for malpractice 
arose,” MCL 600.5838(1); MSA 27A.5838(1), for purposes of the 
last treatment rule.  Accordingly, 
we 
conclude 
that 
defendants 
have not established that plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the 
statute of limitations.  We note that the result may have been 
different if defendants had come forward with documentary 
evidence that each annual income tax preparation was a 
discrete transaction that was in no way interrelated with 
other transactions. Accordingly, this opinion does not mean, 
for example, that if an accountant prepared income tax returns 
for a party annually over a period of decades, the statute of 
limitations for alleged negligence in preparing the first of 
these tax returns would not run until the overall professional 
relationship ended.  
12  
 
 
language, 
well-established 
principles 
of 
statutory  
construction, and this Court’s prior construction of the  
statute in Morgan.20  
For these reasons, we reverse in part the judgments of  
the circuit court and the Court of Appeals.21  We remand this  
case to the circuit court for further proceedings on the  
plaintiffs’ malpractice claim against the defendants.  MCR  
7.302(F)(1).  
KELLY, TAYLOR, CORRIGAN, and YOUNG, JJ., concurred.  
CAVANAGH, J., concurred in the result only.  
20  It is to be recalled that neither the majority nor the 
dissent challenges the soundness of the Morgan rationale.  
21 We have reviewed the plaintiffs’ other claims on 
appeal, including his contention that the circuit court erred 
in granting summary disposition on count II of the complaint, 
and we are not persuaded that additional relief should be 
granted.  
13  
 
 
_________________________________ 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
MARTIN I. LEVY and  
MARTIN I. LEVY, DDS, P.C.,  
Plaintiffs-Appellants,  
v 
No. 115603  
MARK L. MARTIN, GERALD HOSKOW, 
and HOSKOW & MARTIN, P.C.,  
Defendants-Appellees.  
MARKMAN, J. (dissenting).  
I respectfully disagree with and dissent from the  
majority’s 
conclusion 
that the “last treatment” rule 
served 
to  
keep plaintiff’s professional malpractice action viable in  
this case.1  Rather, I believe that the Court of Appeals  
correctly affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary  
disposition in defendants’ favor.  
From the very limited record in this case, it appears  
that defendants were hired by plaintiffs to act as their  
personal and corporate accountants.  Defendants prepared  
plaintiffs’ annual tax returns for the years 1974 through  
1 
   I concur with the majority’s determination that 
plaintiff’s other claims on appeal are not worthy of  
additional relief.  
 
1996, a period of twenty-two years.  Plaintiffs’ 1991 and 1992  
tax returns were audited by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)  
in 1994, with the IRS presenting plaintiffs with a notice of  
deficiency in December 1995.  Plaintiffs subsequently filed a  
two-count complaint against defendants in August 1997,  
alleging professional negligence and fraud.  
In lieu of answering plaintiffs’ complaint, defendants  
filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7)  
(expiration of the applicable limitation period) and (8)  
(failure to state a claim).  The circuit court granted  
defendants’ motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, with  
Judge WHITBECK dissenting.  
This Court reviews the grant or denial of summary  
disposition de novo. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597  
NW2d 817 (1999).  Similarly, we review questions of statutory  
construction de novo as a matter of law.  Sands Appliance  
Services, Inc v Wilson, 463 Mich 231, 238; 615 NW2d 241  
(2000); Donajkowski v Alpena Power Co, 460 Mich 243, 248; 596  
NW2d 574 (1999).  
The essential question in this case is: When did  
plaintiffs’ claim of professional malpractice accrue for  
purposes of applying the pertinent limitation period?  MCL  
600.5805; MSA 27A.5805 provides that  
[a] person shall not bring or maintain an action to 
recover damages for injuries to persons or property 
unless, after the claim first accrued to the  
plaintiff or to someone through whom the plaintiff  
2  
 
 
claims, the action is commenced within the periods 
of time prescribed by this section.  
* * *  
(4) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, 
the period of limitations is 2 years for an action 
charging malpractice.  
With regard to the time of accrual of a professional  
malpractice claim, other than one for medical malpractice,2  
MCL 600.5838(1); MSA 27A.5838(1) states that  
a claim based on the malpractice of a person who 
is, or holds himself or herself out to be, a member 
of a state licensed profession accrues at the time 
that person discontinues serving the plaintiff in a 
professional or pseudoprofessional capacity as to  
the matters out of which the claim for malpractice  
arose, regardless of the time the plaintiff 
discovers or otherwise has knowledge of the claim. 
[Emphasis added.]  
An action involving a claim based on professional  
malpractice (other than medical malpractice) may be commenced  
at any time within the applicable period prescribed in MCL  
600.5805(4); MSA 27A.5805(4), or within six months after the  
plaintiff discovers or should 
have 
discovered 
the 
existence of  
the claim, whichever is later. 
MCL 600.5838(2); MSA  
27A.5838(2).
 A malpractice action that is not commenced  
within the time prescribed by this subsection is barred.  Id.  
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to  
identify and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.  
2 
   The accrual of a medical malpractice claim is 
determined pursuant to MCL 600.5838a; MSA 27A.5838(1).  
3  
Helder v Sruba, 462 Mich 92, 99; 611 NW2d 309 (2000). 
The  
first step in discerning intent is to examine the language of  
the statute. Id.  If the language of a statute is clear and  
unambiguous, the plain meaning of the statute reflects the  
legislative 
intent 
and 
judicial 
construction 
is 
not 
permitted. 
 Western Michigan Univ Bd of Control v Michigan, 455 Mich 531,  
538; 565 NW2d 828 (1997).  “Each word of a statute is presumed  
to be used for a purpose, and, as far as possible, effect must  
be given to every clause and sentence.” Robinson v Detroit,  
462 Mich 439, 459; 613 NW2d 307 (2000).  
In Michigan, the “last treatment” rule originated in De  
Haan v Winter, 258 Mich 293; 241 NW2D 923 (1932). 
At that  
time, the limitations statute contained no provision fixing  
the accrual point of a malpractice action.  As in the present  
case, the De Haan Court was faced with the question:  
When did plaintiff’s cause of action accrue? 
Until treatment of the fracture ceased the relation  
of patient and physician continued, and the statute 
of limitations did not run.  [Citations omitted.]  
While decisions are not in accord upon this  
question, we are satisfied that in such an action 
as this the statute of limitations does not  
commence to run while treatment of the fracture  
continues.  Failure to give needed continued care 
and treatment, under opportunity and obligation to 
do so, would constitute malpractice.  During the  
course of treatment plaintiff was not put to 
inquiry relative to the treatment accorded him. 
[Id. at 296-297 (emphasis added).]  
The legislative comment accompanying the 1961 enactment of §  
5838, indicates that “[s]ection 5838 is based on the rule  
4  
 
 
 
 
stated and followed in the Michigan case of De Haan.” Morgan  
v Taylor, 434 Mich 180, 187, n 13; 451 NW2d 852 (1990).3  
“The rationale for the last treatment rule has been  
explained on grounds that the patient, while his treatment  
continues, ‘relies completely on his physician and is under no  
duty to inquire into the effectiveness of the latter’s  
measures.’” Id. at 187-188 (emphasis added).  I believe it is  
important to 
reiterate the facts of Morgan, a medical  
malpractice case.  In Morgan, the plaintiff was an employee of  
D.W. Zimmerman Company and a member of United Auto Workers  
(UAW) Local 417.  Zimmerman and the UAW contracted with the  
defendant Cooperative Optical Services, Inc. (COS); under the  
contract, each covered employee was entitled to an eye  
examination every two years.  The plaintiff received eye  
examinations by COS staff in 1976, 1978, and on March 7, 1981,  
and August 18, 1983.  Id. at 182.  During the plaintiff’s  
March 1981 examination, a test for glaucoma indicated  
intraocular pressure beyond the normal range.  However, the  
COS optometrist failed to  take any further action. During  
the plaintiff’s August 1983 examination, abnormal intraocular  
pressure was again detected and the plaintiff was referred to  
3 
   The “last treatment” rule announced in De Haan v  
Winter, supra at 241, was codified in 1961 PA 236, the Revised 
Judicature Act of 1961, MCL 600.5838; MSA 27A.5838.  The rule  
was later amended by 1975 PA 142, and later repealed, as to 
medical malpractice actions, by 1986 PA 178.  
5  
  
 
an ophthalmologist, who determined that the plaintiff had  
incurred irreversible nerve damage due to the abnormal  
pressure. 
Id. at 183. 
The plaintiff sued, and the trial  
court found that the August 1983 examination amounted to “a  
continuation of treatment or services” within the meaning of  
MCL 600.5838(1); MSA 27A.5838(1); thus, the plaintiff’s claim  
of malpractice “was not barred by the statute of limitations  
because it had been filed within two years of the date the  
action accrued.” Id. at 184.  
In the present case, the majority relies on the Court of  
Appeals dissent, which in turn relied on this Court’s analysis  
in Morgan, supra. Respectfully, I disagree with the dissent’s  
assertion 
that 
“[t]he 
touchstone” of the “last treatment” 
rule  
is the “continuing professional relationship between a  
professional and the person receiving the professional’s  
services . . . .”  Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued  
September 17, 1999 (Docket No. 207797)(WHITBECK, J., concurring  
in part and dissenting in part), slip op at 4 (emphasis in the  
original).  
The plain language of subsection 5838(1) does not state  
that a claim of professional malpractice accrues on the last  
date of service (i.e., “last date of treatment”), period.  
Rather, the statutory language clearly defines the point of  
accrual, confining the last date of service expressly to those  
matters “out of which the claim for malpractice arose”; from  
6  
 
 
 
this language, certainly, a professional relationship may  
continue on even though a malpractice claim arising out of  
that relationship has accrued and the clock has started to run  
with regard to the two-year limitation period. The Court of  
Appeals dissent and the majority’s adoption of the dissent’s  
analysis without explanation fail to acknowledge and give  
effect to the plain language of the entire sentence comprising  
subsection 5838(1), thereby rendering the modifying phrase  
“matters out of which the claim for malpractice arose”  
superfluous.  
The majority asserts that, in enacting § 5838, the  
Legislature 
“extended” 
or 
“expanded” 
upon 
the 
common-law 
“last  
treatment” rule set forth in De Haan.  See slip op at 10.  
However, in my judgment, the legislative comment that § 5838  
“is based on the rule stated and followed in the Michigan case  
of De Haan” effectively militates against the majority’s  
assertion.  The facts in De Haan involved a distinct period of  
medical treatment, relating to a distinct medical condition,  
with this Court concluding that a claim of professional  
malpractice, 
arising 
“[d]uring 
the 
course 
of 
[that]  
treatment,” would not be barred by the limitation period as  
long as that particular course of treatment, for that  
particular medical condition, continued. 
Id. at 297.  
Specifically, De Haan did not determine that once the  
treatment of the plaintiff’s fracture ceased, his claim of  
7  
  
  
 
 
professional 
malpractice, arising out of the 
treatment 
for 
the  
fracture, remained viable as long as a physician-patient  
relation continued.  
The phrase “as to the matters out of which the claim for  
malpractice arose,” found in subsection 5838(1), clearly  
equates with the phrases “[u]ntil treatment of the fracture  
ceased” and “[d]uring the course of treatment” found in De  
Haan.  Id. at 296, 297. 
Moreover, Morgan refers to the De  
Haan language “while . . . treatment continues” in attempting  
to explain the rationale for the “last treatment” rule. 434  
Mich 187.  Importantly, this Court, in determining that the  
facts of Morgan were “unique,” limited its holding to the  
facts of that case. 
Id. at 194. 
Thus, I can discern no  
logical force to the suggestion that the Legislature intended  
to broaden the common-law “last treatment” rule, as stated and  
applied in De Haan, when it drafted the language of § 5838.  
Further, the facts in the present case, although very  
sparse for purposes of appellate review, are nevertheless  
quite distinguishable from the facts found in Morgan, supra.  
In Morgan, there was a requirement under an employer/union  
contract that the plaintiff be given an opportunity to have  
his eyes examined and reevaluated every two years.4  Granted,  
4 
  I find the existence of a contractual agreement in  
Morgan a highly distinguishable fact not present in the 
instant case.  I believe that this Court, in Morgan, also  
(continued...)  
8  
 
  
there may have been changes that occurred in the plaintiff’s  
eyes between visits, but it would be necessary to address  
these changes in the context of the condition of the  
plaintiff’s same eyes, determined at the last visit and every  
visit before that.  There was certainly an interrelation, even  
an interdependency, between one eye examination and the next  
because the same eyes were being examined each time.  
However, plaintiffs’ annual tax returns in the present  
case cannot be considered analogous to the plaintiff’s eyes in  
Morgan. The preparation of annual tax returns involves the  
compilation and computation of a distinct and discrete body of  
information, generally not the same from year to year.  In  
other words, in each successive year, a client is not bringing  
to his accountant the same aggregation of receipts to be  
reevaluated and reexamined, to discern if some change has  
taken place in that particular body of information and data.  
Rather, the client generally brings in a new aggregation of  
receipts specific and distinct to the year for which the tax  
return is being completed.  An accountant is generally not  
4 (...continued) 
considered the contractual agreement to be of peculiar 
importance in reaching its decision:  
Particularly in light of the contractual  
arrangement which bound defendant and entitled  
plaintiff to periodic eye examinations, it cannot 
be said that the relationship between plaintiff and 
defendant terminated after each visit. [Id. at 194  
(emphasis added).]  
9  
“caring for” the client’s same tax return from year to year,  
as a physician cares for the same set of eyes, or the same  
liver, kidneys, or heart, from examination to examination.  
Thus, in the present case, each successive annual tax return  
represented “the matters out of which the claim for  
malpractice arose,” a phrase to which the Court of Appeals  
dissent and the majority here give little apparent effect.  
Further, I do not share the Court of Appeals dissent’s  
concern that “with regard 
to 
business 
income 
taxation, certain  
matters such as depreciation of business assets and  
eligibility for certain tax credits often depend on facts that  
extend further into the past than the prior tax year.” Slip  
op at 5, n 3.  While such an assertion may or may not be  
accurate, the important factor is that the body of information  
and data used each successive year to compile, compute, and  
prepare an income tax return is not the same; it is not  
analogous to the same set of eyes or the same liver or the  
same heart that is examined and evaluated by a physician at  
each office visit.  The fact that there may be some common  
information that is used in preparing an annual income tax  
return does not change the fact that it is used in conjunction  
with an entirely different 
and 
distinct 
amalgam 
of information  
and data collected specifically for each year for which the  
tax return is being prepared, an amalgam representing the  
“matters out of which the claim for malpractice [may arise]”  
10  
 
 
 
for purposes of establishing the claim’s accrual date.  
Subsection 5838(1).5  
5 
  In the present case, the only allegations specifically 
made by plaintiffs, in bringing their claim of malpractice, 
are that: (1) the professional relationship with defendants 
existed from 1974-1996, (2) the IRS audited the annual returns 
in two of those years, 1991-92, and (3) pursuant to this 
audit, 
plaintiffs 
were 
assessed 
additional taxes for these two 
years. Plaintiffs here presented no allegations that any of 
the individual annual 
tax 
returns 
completed 
by defendants over 
the twenty-two-year professional relationship contained any 
information or data that carried over from one year to the 
next, or that each annual tax return was not otherwise  
separate and distinct.  
However, the majority here would place the burden upon 
the defendant to come forward, in bringing a motion for 
summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), with  
additional evidence establishing that the entirety of the 
professional relationship did not consist of “the matters out 
of which the claim for malpractice arose,” in order to prevail 
against a 
plaintiff’s 
assertion 
that 
the claim for malpractice 
did not accrue until the end of the professional relationship. 
Slip op at 12 n 19.  I do not agree with this allocation of 
the burden in the application of subsection 5838(1).  Under  
the majority’s approach, it appears that as long as a 
plaintiff 
pleads 
the 
existence 
of 
a 
professional 
relationship, 
“the matters out of which the claim for malpractice arose” 
will be presumed to consist of the entire duration of the 
relationship, a presumption which, in my judgment, runs 
contrary to the statutory language of subsection 5838(1).  
The majority’s argument would be more compelling if the 
instant matter involved the treatment of, or the provision of 
service to, the same eyes, the same pancreas, the same heart, 
or any other object or transaction that is treated or serviced 
on a continuing or interrelated basis.  Thus, arguably it may 
be incumbent upon a defendant, when faced with a professional 
malpractice action 
involving 
such 
an 
object or transaction, to 
come forward with additional evidence demonstrating that one 
provided treatment or service was distinct from another.  But  
here, in my judgment, the individual annual tax returns cannot 
truly be equated with the same set of eyes, pancreas, heart, 
or other object or transaction that is treated or serviced on 
a continuing or interrelated basis. Thus, I believe that it 
is the plaintiff’s burden, not the defendant’s, to set forth 
(continued...)  
11  
 
In the present case, the “matters out of which  
[plaintiffs’] 
claim 
for 
malpractice 
arose” 
involved  
defendants’ preparation of their 1991 and 1992 income tax  
returns.  Thus, under the plain language of subsection  
5838(1), plaintiffs’ claim of professional malpractice  
accrued, and the two-year limitation period began to run, when  
defendants worked their last day with regard to these distinct  
returns.  Even assuming that defendants worked on plaintiffs’  
1992 tax return through December 1993, plaintiffs’ cause of  
action for malpractice was barred by subsection 5805(4) on the  
last day of December 1995.  Plaintiffs’ complaint was not  
filed until August 1997.6  
5 (...continued) 
well-pleaded allegations evidencing that there existed some 
connection 
between 
treatments 
or 
services 
occurring 
within 
the 
professional relationship.  
In stating that “it is clear here that plaintiffs, rather 
than receiving professional advice for a specific problem, 
were receiving generalized tax preparation services from 
defendants,” slip op at 11-12, the majority gainsays the 
discrete nature of each individual annual tax return prepared 
by defendant, 
and 
essentially 
considers 
the termination of the 
professional relationship itself (i.e., the end of plaintiffs 
“receiving 
generalized 
tax 
preparation 
services”) 
as 
the 
point 
at which plaintiffs’ claim for malpractice accrued.  The  
statutory phrase “as to the matters out of which the claim for 
malpractice arose” is, 
thus, 
given 
little 
effect.  Essentially 
then, my concerns about the majority’s allocation of the 
burdens in (C)(7) motions parallel my larger concerns about 
the majority’s focus upon the professional relationship in a 
malpractice action rather than upon the “matters out of which 
the claim for malpractice arose.”  
6 
   I do not believe it is necessary to elaborate on the 
(continued...)  
12  
The Court of Appeals dissent’s analysis, and the  
majority’s reliance on this analysis, effectively erode the  
policy bases for having statutory limitation periods in the  
first place.  Obviously, while one policy base is to afford  
plaintiffs 
a reasonable opportunity to bring 
suit, 
statutes 
of  
limitation are also intended to: (1) compel the exercise of a  
right of action within a reasonable time so that the opposing  
party has a fair opportunity to defend; (2) relieve a court  
system from dealing with stale claims, where the facts in  
dispute occurred so long ago that evidence was either  
forgotten 
or 
manufactured; 
and 
(3) 
protect 
potential  
defendants from protracted fear of litigation. Chase v Sabin,  
445 Mich 190, 199; 516 NW2d 60 (1994).  
Asserting, as the Court of Appeals dissent does in the  
present case, that the termination of the professional  
relationship is the beginning and end of the analysis in  
determining 
when 
a 
professional 
malpractice 
claim 
has 
accrued,  
tolls the limitation period in a potentially large number of  
professional 
malpractice 
cases, 
pending 
the 
ultimate 
and 
final  
termination of the professional relationship. 
Under the  
6 (...continued) 
six-month discovery rule of MCL 600.5838(2); MSA 27A.5838(2). 
Plaintiffs knew as early as December 1995, when they received 
the IRS deficiency notice, that a possible cause of action 
existed against defendants. See Solowy v Oakwood Hosp Corp, 
454 Mich 214, 223; 561 NW2d 843 (1997)(once a plaintiff is 
aware of an injury and its possible cause, the plaintiff is 
equipped with the necessary knowledge to preserve and  
diligently pursue his claim).  
13  
    
majority’s 
interpretation 
of 
subsection 
5838(1), 
a  
professional 
relationship 
may 
exist for one hundred years; 
if,  
perchance, malpractice was committed in the very first year of  
the relationship, a claim could potentially remain viable for  
another 101 years.  Certainly, a reasonable time would have  
long since passed, thereby undermining the opposing party’s  
ability to defend such a stale claim, extending the potential  
defendant’s apprehension of litigation to unreasonable and  
unacceptable 
lengths, 
and 
unnecessarily 
burdening 
the 
judicial  
system with claims so stale as to be virtually untriable. See  
Chase, supra. 
 In enacting § 5838, it is reasonable to conclude that  
the Legislature addressed the conflict between the accrual of  
a simple tort claim, which generally involves but a single act  
or omission, and the accrual of a professional malpractice  
claim, where actual malpractice may occur within an extended,  
but nevertheless distinct, period of continuing professional  
service.7  
7 
For example, in 1990, Mr. Smith is sued in a  
premises liability action.  He retains Lawyer Jones for the 
purpose of legal representation. Because he is an extremely 
busy professional, Lawyer Jones overlooks the issue of 
personal jurisdiction in the action against Mr. Smith, fails 
to object to the clear absence of such jurisdiction, and, 
instead, files an answer on Mr. Smith’s behalf, effectively 
waiving the issue. After extended discovery, the litigation 
proceeds to trial and ultimately, in 1995, to a large jury 
verdict against Mr. Smith. Lawyer Jones persuades Mr. Smith 
to appeal the verdict and Mr. Smith consents.  During the 
pendency of the appeal process, Mr. Smith, in 1996, is 
(continued...)  
14  
 
 
 
The “matters out of which [plaintiffs’] claim for  
7 (...continued) 
involved in an automobile accident and is sued by a person who 
was a passenger in the car with which Mr. Smith collided.  Mr.  
Smith again retains Lawyer Jones to represent his legal 
interests in this second case.  In 1997, the Michigan Court of 
Appeals affirms the 1995 jury verdict against Mr. Smith and he 
satisfies himself that further appeal is futile.  The 1996  
automobile 
accident 
lawsuit 
involves 
protracted 
litigation 
and 
continues into 2001 when it is finally set for trial. 
Fortunately for Mr. Smith, a jury, in 2002, returns a verdict 
of no cause of action regarding the 1996 automobile accident 
lawsuit.  
Before the enactment of § 5838, the general tort statute 
of limitation would have applied, and Mr. Smith’s  claim  
against Lawyer Jones, for failing to object to personal 
jurisdiction in the first lawsuit, would have accrued in 1990, 
at the time the malpractice occurred, MCL 600.5827; MSA 
27A.5827, and the limitation period would have run three years 
after the actual act of malpractice.  MCL 600.5805(9); MSA 
27A.5805(9).
 However, after the enactment of § 5838, in 
applying the plain language of this statute to this example, 
Mr. Smith’s malpractice claim would have accrued in 1997, at 
the end of Lawyer Jones’ representation of Mr. Smith in the 
1990 premises liability action; the limitation period would 
have run two years later. MCL 600.5805(5); MSA 27A.5805(5).  
A second example might involve a patient visiting a 
dentist on five separate occasions for the purpose of 
repairing a tooth.  In the course of this treatment, a root 
canal is necessary, and the dentist negligently damages the 
nerve that serves the tooth, causing severe and chronic jaw 
pain.
 The purpose of subsection 5838(1), prior to the 
enactment of § 5838a, would be served in its application 
because there would be no necessity to parse out the visits, 
thereby placing an extremely confusing burden on the parties 
or factfinder, to identify which specific visit resulted in 
the negligently provided treatment.  It would only be 
necessary to examine the entire sequence of events, regarding 
that course of treatment, to determine the accrual date of the 
plaintiff’s claim of professional malpractice.  
Thus, a very different result is obtained under the facts 
of either example when the plain language of subsection 
5838(1) is applied, compared with the result obtained under 
the general tort statute of limitation.  
15  
malpractice arose” involved defendants’ preparation of  
plaintiffs’ 1991 and 1992 income tax returns.  Pursuant to the  
plain language of subsection 5838(1), the last date on which  
defendants worked in preparing such returns was the date on  
which plaintiffs’ claim `for professional malpractice accrued  
for purposes of the running of the statute of limitations.  
Because plaintiffs failed to file their complaint until well  
after the applicable two-year 
limitation 
period 
had 
run, their  
claim for professional malpractice, in my judgment, was time­
barred and the circuit court properly granted summary  
disposition in favor of defendants in this case.  I would,  
therefore, affirm.  
16  
 
 
________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
MARTIN I. LEVY and  
MARTIN I. LEVY, D.D.S., P.C.,  
Plaintiffs-Appellants,  
No. 115603  
MARK L. MARTIN, GERALD HOSKOW, 
and HOSKOW & MARTIN, P.C.,  
Defendants-Appellees.  
WEAVER, C.J. (dissenting).  
I would grant leave to appeal in this case because I  
believe the issue presented needs oral argument.