Title: Gregory v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC15-1663 
____________ 
 
WILLIAM A. GREGORY,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC16-183 
____________ 
 
WILLIAM A. GREGORY,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JULIE L. JONES, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[August 31, 2017] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
William A. Gregory appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion 
to vacate his convictions of first-degree murder and sentences of death filed under 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and petitions this Court for a writ of 
 
 
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habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  For the 
reasons that follow, we affirm the postconviction court’s order denying 
postconviction relief as to the guilt phase.  However, we reverse the death 
sentences and remand for a new penalty phase based on Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 
So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2161 (2017), and Mosley v. State, 
209 So. 3d 1248, 1268 (Fla. 2016), because the jury’s nonunanimous 
recommendation of death by a vote of seven to five as to both murders, is not 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, for reasons more fully explained below.  We 
also deny Gregory’s habeas petition except to the extent he seeks relief pursuant to 
Hurst.  Finally, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of Gregory’s 
Successive Motion to Vacate Judgment and Sentence (Newly Discovered 
Evidence). 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The facts of the underlying murders and criminal trial were described in this 
Court’s opinion on direct appeal:  
William A. Gregory, who was twenty-four years old when the 
murders were committed, was for a time involved in a romantic 
relationship with Skyler Dawn Meekins, who was seventeen at the 
time she was murdered.  Skyler and Gregory had a child together, 
although their romantic relationship ended in June 2007.  Skyler and 
Gregory both continued, however, to participate in raising their child. 
Around the time their relationship ended, Gregory was in jail 
and would often call Skyler’s house.  On several occasions, he spoke 
with Skyler’s brother, and the two would discuss Skyler’s 
whereabouts and activities.  During one call, Gregory said he was 
 
 
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“stressing about Skyler” and asked for information regarding any 
other men who might be calling for Skyler.  Gregory stated that he 
knew Skyler was “trying to . . . get with dudes” and indicated that he 
would have to “kind of try to get over Skyler or something.” 
During another call, Gregory asked Skyler’s brother to check 
Skyler’s e-mail account and online profile for other men with whom 
she might be communicating.  Gregory told Skyler’s brother that he 
had previously accessed Skyler’s e-mail account and “erased . . . all 
the dudes she had on there.”  Gregory also directed Skyler’s brother to 
delete a message Skyler had posted on her online profile about being 
newly single.  According to an individual who was incarcerated with 
Gregory during the period in which these calls were made, Gregory 
was jealous of Skyler, did not like the people she was spending time 
with, and stated that if he ever caught Skyler “cheating” on him, “he 
was going to blow her . . . head off.” 
Skyler began dating a new boyfriend, Daniel Arthur Dyer, on 
July 4, 2007.  Gregory was aware of Skyler’s new relationship with 
Daniel, but Gregory would continue to call for Skyler and, after his 
release from jail, would visit Skyler’s house several times per week.  
According to Skyler’s brother, Gregory would call and stop by to see 
Skyler “[a]t least three times a week . . . [u]sually not invited.” 
Gregory and Skyler did, however, agree to go shopping together for 
their child’s birthday party, and, while he was still in jail, Gregory 
would discuss the child on the phone calls he placed. 
On August 20, the day before the murders, Gregory, who was 
out of jail and on probation, spent the day with his brother and a few 
friends.  While at one friend’s house, he test-fired a pistol that 
someone was trying to sell, possibly leaving gunshot residue on his 
hands, and while riding around with his brother and another friend, he 
used marijuana and crack cocaine and took pills.  Sometime that 
afternoon, Gregory called Daniel’s cell phone, asking to speak to 
Skyler, who spent the day with Daniel and Daniel’s friend at Daniel’s 
house. 
Starting at 10:19 p.m. that night, Gregory began making a 
number of outgoing phone calls, including several to Skyler’s house. 
At 10:26 p.m., an incoming call was made from Skyler’s house to 
Gregory’s house number, and there were then six additional outgoing 
calls from Gregory to Skyler’s house after the incoming call to 
Gregory went unanswered.  At 11:31 and 11:32 p.m., Gregory called 
the number for a taxicab company that was no longer in business. 
 
 
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Gregory’s brother recalled seeing Gregory in their shared 
bedroom at approximately 3:00 or 3:30 a.m. in the early morning 
hours of August 21.  Gregory was wet and mumbling about being 
down by the beach.  Gregory later told his brother that he passed out 
at the beach and awoke with a wave washing up on him, that his shoes 
and wallet “got all soaked,” and that he then dove in the pool at a 
nearby condominium complex because he was “all . . . sandy.” 
At 4:17 a.m., Gregory called 911 to report himself for a 
probation violation as a result of his earlier drug use.  A law 
enforcement officer informed Gregory that Gregory would have to 
take the matter up with his probation officer.  Gregory’s brother and a 
friend said that they had used drugs with Gregory in the past and had 
never known him to self-report a probation violation. 
Around 6 a.m. that morning, Skyler’s grandparents, who had 
been sleeping in the home during the murders, awoke to find Skyler 
and her boyfriend Daniel dead in Skyler’s bed.  Skyler and Daniel had 
each suffered heavy head trauma caused by the firing of a shotgun at 
close range while they slept.  Skyler’s father, who lived next door, 
called the authorities, and sheriff’s deputies were dispatched to the 
home.  On arrival, the deputies observed Skyler’s and Daniel’s bodies 
in a back bedroom, along with a shotgun and two shotgun shells lying 
on the floor in front of the bed.  Skyler’s grandfather kept a shotgun 
and rifles, along with ammunition, in a house closet, which was 
usually left unlocked. 
Gregory had previously lived with Skyler in that house, and the 
guns were kept in the same location during that time.  A firearms 
analyst concluded that an individual would have to have been familiar 
with the particular shotgun used as the murder weapon in this case in 
order to load it because it was not a popular shotgun and was “quite 
different” in how it would be loaded.  Gregory’s fingerprints were 
found on this shotgun. 
After police had arrived at the home, Skyler’s brother called 
and left a message for Gregory at 7:26 a.m., stating, “You better run.” 
Gregory placed a 911 call at 8:24 a.m. to report this message to law 
enforcement and was taken by law enforcement to the Flagler County 
Sheriff’s Office as a result of calling in the threat.  Gregory was then 
arrested for a violation of probation based on his earlier admissions of 
using a controlled substance. 
While at the sheriff’s office, Gregory was tested for gunshot 
residue.  The results were negative, although Gregory apparently 
 
 
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thought that he had tested positive based on test-firing a pistol the 
prior day.  Gregory subsequently placed a call to a friend from jail, 
telling her not to incriminate herself because the calls were recorded, 
and then explaining that law enforcement had taken magnet samples 
on his skin and reminding her that he “was popping off that pistol in 
the backyard” the previous day. 
In subsequent phone calls, Gregory spoke to his mother and 
brother about the answers they were giving to law enforcement 
regarding his whereabouts at the time of the murders.  In particular, 
Gregory questioned his mother about why she told investigators that 
she did not see him on the morning of August 21, and told her, 
“nobody’s helping me out.” 
On August 25, Gregory was moved to a different housing 
facility.  During this time, he was in the same cell block as an inmate 
who had been certified as a paralegal, and Gregory discussed his 
situation with this inmate.  Gregory believed he had tested positive for 
gunshot residue and seemed very surprised about this because he said 
that was one of the reasons he had jumped in a pool after the incident. 
Gregory told the inmate that he used a shotgun instead of a pistol, 
thinking there would be less gunshot residue, and figured he must 
have tested positive because of firing the pistol the day before the 
murders. 
According to this inmate, Gregory knew Daniel and Skyler 
were together in Skyler’s house on August 21 because Gregory “said 
he was outside the house, like watching the house.”  Gregory told the 
inmate that he “just couldn't stand to see” Skyler with her new 
boyfriend and that the “worst part about it all was watching [Skyler] 
die.”  Gregory also stated to the inmate that he was “frustrated 
because he couldn’t talk to his family on the phone because he knew 
that it was being recorded” and stated that his family members “were 
going to be his alibi.” 
Gregory later spoke to a different inmate about his case. 
Gregory told this individual that it was “a joke” that the State was 
concerned about Gregory having walked to Skyler’s house on the 
night of the murders because it was “impossible for that to have 
happened.”  Gregory stated that he had a ride that night and that he 
“did what he had to do.” 
Gregory was subsequently indicted and tried for the murders of 
Skyler and Daniel.  The jury found Gregory guilty of two counts of 
 
 
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first-degree murder, one count of burglary, and one count of 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. 
 
The Penalty Phase 
During the penalty phase of Gregory’s trial, the State presented 
testimony from Gregory’s probation officer that Gregory was on 
felony probation at the time of the murders.  Gregory called his sister 
and mother to testify.  Gregory’s sister testified about Gregory’s 
history of drug use, lack of a relationship with his father, and his 
witnessing an incident during which she was raped when he was eight 
years old.  Gregory’s mother testified about two head injuries Gregory 
suffered as a child and about the effect her abusive relationships with 
men and the rape incident involving Gregory’s sister had on Gregory. 
By a vote of seven to five, the jury recommended that Gregory 
be sentenced to death for the murders of Skyler Dawn Meekins and 
Daniel Arthur Dyer.  A Spencer[1] hearing was held thereafter, where 
the State presented victim impact testimony and Gregory’s sister 
briefly testified on his behalf. 
In sentencing Gregory to death for both murders, the trial court 
found the following aggravating circumstances as to both victims: (1) 
the murders were committed by a person previously convicted of a 
felony who was on felony probation (moderate weight); (2) Gregory 
was previously convicted of a prior violent felony (very substantial 
weight); (3) the murders were committed during the course of a 
burglary (moderate weight); and (4) the murders were committed in a 
cold, calculated, and premeditated manner, without any pretense of 
moral or legal justification (CCP) (great weight).  The trial court 
found one statutory mitigating circumstance—the murders were 
committed while Gregory was under the influence of extreme mental 
or emotional disturbance (slight weight)—and six nonstatutory 
mitigating circumstances.  Finding that the aggravating circumstances 
far outweighed the mitigating circumstances, the trial court sentenced 
Gregory to death for both murders. 
 
Gregory v. State, 118 So. 3d 770, 775-78 (Fla. 2013) (footnotes omitted). 
 
                                          
 
 
1.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
 
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On direct appeal, Gregory raised five issues: (1) the trial court erred in 
denying his motion to disqualify the judge based on statements the judge made 
during a pretrial hearing; (2) the trial court erred in admitting into evidence 
threatening statements directed toward the victims made by Gregory to a co-
worker eight months before the murders; (3) the trial court erred in admitting 
testimony from a witness who could not identify Gregory in court; (4) the trial 
court erred in admitting testimony about a statement Gregory made to one of the 
victims; and (5) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on and in finding CCP.  
Id. at 778 n.4.  This Court denied Gregory relief on all claims and additionally 
found that the evidence was sufficient to support Gregory’s first-degree murder 
convictions and that Gregory’s death sentences were proportionate.  Id. at 787. 
 
Gregory filed a timely Motion to Vacate Judgment and Sentence pursuant to 
Rule 3.851, raising twelve claims:   
Claim I:  Gregory received ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel during the guilt phase of his capital trial in violation of his 
Fifth, Sixth, Eight [sic], and Fourteenth Amendment rights due to trial 
counsel’s failure to properly rebut the State’s theory of prosecution, 
that he was motivated by jealous anger; 
Claim II:  Gregory received ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel during the guilt phase of his capital trial in violation of his 
Fifth, Sixth, Eight [sic], and Fourteenth Amendment rights due to trial 
counsel’s failure to present the testimony of Sheri Meekins; 
Claim III:  Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of 
counsel by failing to properly impeach State witness [sic] Patrick 
Giovine and Tyrone Graves.  As a result of trial counsel’s deficient 
performance, Mr. Gregory was deprived of his rights under the 
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
 
 
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Constitution of the United States and of his corresponding rights 
pursuant to the Declaration of Rights under the Constitution of the 
State of Florida; 
Claim IV:  Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of 
counsel by failing to correct a wrongly transcribed word found in 
State’s exhibit #73 and stipulating to the transcript’s accuracy at trial, 
thereby violating Mr. Gregory’s rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United 
States and of his corresponding rights pursuant to the Declaration of 
Rights under the Constitution of the State of Florida; 
Claim V:  Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of 
counsel by failing to review and investigate all of Mr. Gregory’s 
juvenile justice records independently obtained by the Court and 
relied upon during the sentencing decision, thereby violating Mr. 
Gregory’s rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and of his 
corresponding rights pursuant to the Declaration of Rights under the 
Constitution of the State of Florida; 
Claim VI:  Gregory received ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel during the penalty phase of his capital trial in violation of his 
rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and of his 
corresponding rights pursuant to the Declaration of Rights under the 
Constitution of the State of Florida; 
Claim VII:  Florida’s capital sentencing structure is 
unconstitutional, and couches an ineffectiveness claim therein; 
Claim VIII:  Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), including 
an ineffectiveness sub-claim; 
Claim IX:  Cumulative error; 
Claim X:  Lethal Injection constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment; 
Claim XI:  Gregory is entitled to know the identity of the 
execution team members; and 
Claim XII:  Competency at the time of execution. 
 
The trial court issued an order on January 27, 2015, granting an evidentiary 
hearing on Claims I through VI.  Claims VII and VIII were summarily denied. 
 
 
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Claims IX through XII were ruled on as a matter of law at the conclusion of the 
hearing.   
An evidentiary hearing was held in which Gregory presented witnesses—
Leigha Weber Furmanek, Gregory’s younger sister; Mary Lou Wilson, Gregory’s 
maternal grandmother; and Lynda Wilson, f/k/a Lynda Probert, Gregory’s 
mother—all of whom supported his claim that his counsel was ineffective in the 
guilt phase for failure to rebut the State’s theory that Gregory’s motive for the 
murder was jealousy.   
After the evidentiary hearing, the trial court issued an order denying all of 
Gregory’s postconviction claims.  Gregory filed a notice of appeal in this Court.  
Shortly thereafter, Gregory filed a successive postconviction motion in the circuit 
court alleging newly discovered evidence.  Specifically, Gregory’s motion was 
based on the affidavit of State witness, Patrick Giovine, which purports to recant 
the testimony Giovine gave during Gregory’s original guilt phase trial.  This Court 
relinquished jurisdiction for the trial court to consider this motion. 
Without an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court issued an order denying 
Gregory’s successive postconviction motion based on newly discovered evidence.  
The postconviction court found that although Giovine’s statement appeared to be a 
recantation of his prior testimony, the recantation would not have led to an 
acquittal or lesser sentence for Gregory in light of the evidence presented against 
 
 
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him.  Moreover, the postconviction court noted that the trial court did not rely on 
Giovine’s testimony in its sentencing order.  Gregory subsequently filed an 
amended notice of appeal in this Court, also challenging the postconviction court’s 
denial of his successive postconviction motion.   
As we discuss below, we affirm the denial of the guilt phase claims and 
affirm the denial of the newly discovered evidence claim.  Because we conclude 
that Gregory is entitled to Hurst relief, we decline to address his penalty phase 
claims.2     
Guilt Phase Claims 
 
Gregory argues that his guilt phase counsel was ineffective for five reasons: 
(1) his failure to rebut the State’s theory of prosecution; (2) his failure to call Sherri 
Meekins as a defense witness; (3) his failure to impeach the testimony of Patrick 
Giovine and Tyronne Graves; (4) his failure to object to an erroneous transcription 
of a jailhouse phone call; and (5) cumulative error. 
                                          
 
 
2.  We deny Gregory’s claims related to method of execution and identity of 
executioners.  See, e.g., Allred v. State, 186 So. 3d 530, 542-43 (Fla. 2016) 
(rejecting defendant’s claim that he was constitutionally entitled to know the 
identity of his execution team and explaining that identity of executioners was not 
ascertainable because Governor had not signed death warrant); Muhammad v. 
State, 132 So. 3d 176, 205 (Fla. 2013) (explaining that “section 945.10(g), Florida 
Statutes (2013), makes the identity of the executioner and any persons preparing, 
dispensing or administering lethal injection confidential”); Power v. State, 886 So. 
2d 952, 958 (Fla. 2004) (rejecting Power’s claim that his execution is 
constitutionally prohibited because Power was insane as premature). 
 
 
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Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), this Court has explained that for ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims to be successful, two requirements must be satisfied:  
First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of 
the lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably 
competent performance under prevailing professional standards.  
Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be 
demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the 
proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined.   
Schoenwetter v. State, 46 So. 3d 535, 546 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Maxwell v. 
Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986) (citations omitted)).   
To establish the deficiency prong under Strickland, the defendant must prove 
that counsel’s performance was unreasonable under “prevailing professional 
norms.”  Morris v. State, 931 So. 2d 821, 828 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 688).  “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort 
be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 
circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 
counsel’s perspective at the time.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.   
As to the prejudice prong of Strickland, this Court has explained: 
“Strickland places the burden on the defendant, not the State, to show 
a ‘reasonable probability’ that the result would have been different.”  
Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15 (2009) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 694).  Strickland does not “require a defendant to show ‘that 
counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome’ 
of his penalty proceeding, but rather that he establish ‘a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in [that] outcome.’ ”   Porter v. 
 
 
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McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (2009) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-
94).  This Court employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the 
postconviction court’s factual findings that are supported by 
competent, substantial evidence, but reviewing legal conclusions de 
novo.  See Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 771-72 (Fla. 2004). 
Mosley, 209 So. 3d at 1264 (citing Smith v. State, 126 So. 3d 1038, 1042-43 (Fla. 
2013)).  
“[U]nder Strickland, both the performance and prejudice prongs are mixed 
questions of law and fact, with deference to be given only to the lower court’s 
factual findings.”  Eaglin v. State, 176 So. 3d 900, 906 (Fla. 2015) (quoting 
Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1033 (Fla. 1999)). 
1.  Failure to Rebut the State’s Theory of Prosecution 
Gregory contends that his attorney was ineffective because he failed to rebut 
the State’s theory that he was a jealous ex-lover through the use of testimony and 
photographs depicting Gregory’s continued relationship with the victim, Skyler 
Meekins, in the months preceding her death.  As to claim one, the postconviction 
court found:   
Mr. Gregory alleges trial counsel was ineffective due to his 
failure to rebut the State’s theory that the Defendant was motivated by 
jealous anger.  Counsel did offer evidence of the more favorable side 
to Mr. Gregory, and the victim, Skylar [sic] Meekins’ relationship 
through the testimony of Leigha Furmanek, Mary Lou Wilson and 
Lynda Wilson, f/k/a Lynda Probert.  Leigha testified in both the guilt 
and penalty phases of trial.  At the evidentiary hearing she testified 
she had known Skylar [sic] Meekins for approximately twelve years 
and considered her a friend.  Her brother, William Gregory, was in jail 
during most of June 2007.  Leigha recalls going to Skylar’s [sic] 
 
 
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house and seeing her write letters to Mr. Gregory in jail, also that they 
spoke on the phone a lot.  Leigha felt that they still cared about each 
other and weren’t on bad terms.  Mr. Gregory and Ms. Meekins had a 
child together who was not yet one at that time.  During the months of 
June, July and August 2007 Ms. Meekins and Mr. Gregory had spent 
the night together at Leigha’s house and had gone to a barbeque there.  
When Leigha bonded Mr. Gregory out of jail that July she had 
dropped her brother off at Skylar’s[sic] house; she had talked to 
Skylar[sic] who asked her to bring him there.  During July and August 
2007 Mr. Gregory and Ms. Meekins had “a lot of contact” because 
they were planning their daughter’s first birthday on July 31, 2007.  
Around that time Mr. Gregory advised Leigha that Ms. Meekins was 
dating someone else and that he was “okay with that.”  This was along 
the same lines as Leigha’s trial testimony.   
Mr. Gregory’s grandmother, Mary Ann Wilson and mother, 
Lynda Wilson also both testified at the trial that Gregory was still on 
and off with Skylar [sic] and she had spent the night at the Wilson’s 
home, with Mr. Gregory.  They were aware that Skylar [sic] was also 
dating Dan Dyer, but she and Mr. Gregory continued to see each 
other.  Their testimony at the evidentiary hearing was consistent with 
that presented at the trial.  
Mr. Wood testified that he made a strategic decision to omit 
some things from the jury such as pictures of Mr. Gregory and Ms. 
Meekins, and jail phone calls between them.  The concern he had was 
the negative impact it would have on the jury due to victim impact 
concerns in death penalty cases.  Attorney Wood decided not to put on 
the happy pictures of them shopping and having a birthday party for 
their daughter.  He feared the jury would compare them to the pictures 
of the crime scene, and that it would have a negative impact on his 
client.  Also on the phone calls when Mr. Gregory would get “lovey-
dovey” Skylar [sic] Meekins would turn the conversation away to 
Kyla, their daughter.  It appeared from the phone calls that Mr. 
Gregory was the pursuer, while Ms. Meekins, while accepting the 
calls, is not reengaging him. 
It appears from the record that Attorney Wood’s investigation 
was thorough; his trial strategy well-reasoned.  This court finds 
counsel was neither deficient nor prejudicial pursuant to the 
Strickland test. 
 
(Record citations omitted).   
 
 
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We conclude that the trial court’s factual findings are supported by 
competent, substantial evidence and that the conclusions as to deficiency and 
prejudice, along with its conclusions regarding the reasonable strategic decisions of 
counsel are factually and legally sound.  This Court has explained “strategic 
decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses 
have been considered and rejected and counsel’s decision was reasonable under the 
norms of professional conduct.”  Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 
2000).  From the testimony presented, it is clear that Attorney Wood was aware of 
the photographs, jailhouse phone calls, and the additional testimony that other 
witnesses could have provided that Gregory contends should have been admitted to 
rebut the State’s theory.   
Moreover, as the postconviction court stated, Attorney Wood explained his 
trial strategy in relation to the photographs and jailhouse phone calls during the 
postconviction evidentiary hearing.  Attorney Wood stated that he considered 
admitting the evidence to rebut the State’s theory but ultimately decided against it 
fearing that it would constitute an indirect form of victim impact evidence.  
Additionally, as the postconviction court stated in its order, the jailhouse phone 
calls did not depict Gregory in the best light, showing his attempts to show 
affection to Skyler and her obvious rejection of Gregory, a point that would have 
served to favor the State’s theory in this case that Gregory was a rebuked, jealous 
 
 
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ex-lover.  Attorney Wood’s actions do not appear unreasonable in light of the 
circumstances.  Accordingly, we conclude that Attorney Wood was not deficient in 
this respect, and the postconviction court correctly denied this claim.   
We also conclude that Gregory was not prejudiced by Attorney Wood’s 
strategic decision.  The jury heard and considered testimony and evidence that 
suggested Skyler and Gregory maintained an amicable relationship up to the time 
of the murders.  The evidence presented at the postconviction evidentiary hearing 
through the photographs and testimony detailing Gregory and Meekins’ ongoing 
relationship the summer before her death was largely cumulative to the evidence 
that was presented during the trial.  During the trial, both Gregory’s grandmother, 
Mary Ann Wilson, and Gregory’s mother, Lynda Wilson, testified that Gregory 
was still on and off with Skyler and she had spent the night at the Wilson’s home, 
with Gregory.  They also testified that they were aware Skyler was dating Dan 
Dyer, even though she and Gregory continued to see each other.  More 
importantly, the additional evidence could have led the jury to compare the photos 
of Meekins alive and well with those of the crime scene, and could have further 
highlighted to the jury that Skyler’s one-year-old child was now without a mother.  
This is exactly what Attorney Wood feared.   
Accordingly, Gregory is not entitled to relief on this claim. 
 
 
 
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2.  Failure to Present the Testimony of Sherri Meekins 
 
Next, Gregory contends that his guilt phase counsel was ineffective because 
he failed to present the testimony of the victim’s stepmother, Sherri Meekins, 
which included information inconsistent with the State’s theory of the case.  The 
postconviction court denied relief on this claim, stating: 
Trial counsel testified that he did not call Sherri Meekins 
because she was “a loose cannon.”  Although she could have offered 
testimony concerning the possibility of Mr. Gregory handling the 
murder weapon her testimony would have been a two-edged sword.  
Sherri Meekins could also testify that Mr. Gregory had called her 
earlier in the day and indicated to her, the victim’s stepmother, that he 
would be at the property to see Skylar[sic] Meekins around the time of 
the murder.  And that after their daughter was born Mr. Gregory and 
Skylar[sic] Meekins fought frequently; Gregory would hit Skylar[sic], 
and it would end up in terrible screaming and fighting.  “Counsel 
cannot be deemed ineffective merely because current counsel 
disagrees with trial counsel’s strategic decisions.”  Occhicone v. State, 
768 So. 2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000) (referencing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
689). 
 
(Record citations omitted). 
Once again, we conclude that the trial court’s findings of fact are supported 
by competent, substantial evidence and we agree with the trial court’s mixed 
findings of fact and law as to the reasonableness of the strategic decision, as well 
as the lack of deficiency and prejudice, explained more fully below.  Attorney 
Wood testified that he decided not to call Sherri Meekins because she was a “loose 
cannon” and because he did not want her to be able to say that Gregory had called 
her the day before the murders with a plan to come see Skyler.  Meekins testified 
 
 
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in her deposition and at the evidentiary hearing that Gregory called her and had 
wanted to come to the Meekins’ property on the night of the murders to pay Skyler 
for a puppy.  Meekins thought this was unusual because he had obtained the puppy 
some time before that.  Meekins also testified that she suffers from a long history 
of mental illness and was manic at the time of the trial.  Although Meekins testified 
at the evidentiary hearing to some points that could be helpful to Gregory, she also 
testified that she could not differentiate between guns; had never seen Gregory 
touch the gun in the closet with the vacuum cleaner; Gregory was one of the oldest 
people who hung out at the Meekins’ residence, while the other kids were middle- 
and high-school aged; she was bothered by Gregory’s behavior including an 
incident where he just came into her house uninvited in the middle of the night; 
and Gregory knew which doors were locked, which ones were not, and which ones 
were broken in the house where Skyler lived.  
Further, Gregory’s reliance on Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945, 951 (2010), 
Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 39 (2009), and Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 
362, 396 (2000), is misplaced.  In those cases, the Supreme Court acknowledged 
that potentially helpful evidence may not have been uniformly favorable to the 
defendant, but counsel’s failure to investigate and develop that evidence fell below 
the standards expected of a reasonable capital defense attorney.  In this case, by 
contrast, Attorney Wood carefully considered calling Meekins to testify.  However, 
 
 
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after concluding that her testimony was more harmful than helpful, he decided 
against it.  This is the quintessential strategic decision, made after considering and 
weighing the benefits versus the harms.  Accordingly, we conclude that Gregory’s 
attorney was not deficient in this respect.   
Additionally, Gregory has failed to demonstrate prejudice.  As the State 
notes, had Attorney Wood called Sherri Meekins to testify that she saw Gregory 
shooting a gun, such information would not have lent any more credibility to 
Gregory’s defense, nor would it have created reasonable doubt.  Moreover, the 
State could have cross-examined Meekins and elicited such information as 
Gregory was planning on coming over to the Meekins residence on the night of the 
crimes for a reason she described as “strange” and that she was bothered by 
Gregory’s behavior including an incident where he just came into her house 
uninvited, in the middle of the night.  Because Attorney Wood made a reasonable 
strategic choice after a thorough examination of the case, and even if trial counsel 
had elicited testimony from Sherri Meekins, there is no prejudice as our confidence 
in the outcome is not undermined.  
Accordingly, Gregory is not entitled to relief on this claim. 
 
 
 
 
 
- 19 - 
3.  Failure to Impeach the Testimony of State Witnesses Patrick Giovine and 
Tyrone Graves 
 
Gregory contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach 
two jailhouse “snitches” who testified for the State at trial.  The postconviction 
court denied this claim, stating: 
During the trial both Mr. Graves and Mr. Giovine were called 
by the state to testify about conversations they claimed to have had 
with Mr. Gregory in the Flagler County Inmate Facility; one witness 
prior to the murders and one witness after.  The witness Graves was 
unable to identify anyone in the courtroom of being William or Billy 
Gregory, the Appellant.  A review of the record demonstrates 
Attorney Wood successfully crossexamined Mr. Graves on many of 
the statements he made, including impeaching him with prior 
statements.  Likewise, Attorney Wood conducted a thorough cross-
examination of witness Giovine.   
At the evidentiary hearing Trial counsel testified that he 
handled the discrepancies in their testimonies on cross-examination.  
He felt he had effectively impeached them to poke holes in the state’s 
case.  He stated “[b]ased on the responses they gave and their 
demeanor and the way they appeared, I did not think the state had 
good witnesses out of either of those two individuals.”  “Fair 
assessment of attorney performance, for purposes of reviewing claim 
for ineffective assistance of counsel, requires that every effort be 
made to eliminate distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct 
circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate 
conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”  Blake v. State, [180 
So. 3d 89] (Fla. 2014) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).  Review of 
the trial record does not demonstrate a deficiency; counsel appeared to 
have carefully picked issues he wished to impeach the witnesses on.  
Counsel made a strategic decision; counsel’s reasonable trial decisions 
do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.  Jones v. State, 845 
So. 2d 55, 65 (Fla. 2003).  Further, the testimony of these two 
witnesses was not prejudicial to the outcome of the case. 
 
(Record citations omitted.)   
 
 
- 20 - 
The postconviction court’s factual findings are supported by competent, 
substantial evidence and its conclusions as to deficiency and prejudice are not in 
error.  Gregory contends that Attorney Wood should have used statements Giovine 
made during an initial interview with an investigator,3 which were inconsistent 
with the evidence presented at trial prior to Giovine’s testimony in order to 
impeach Giovine.  On cross-examination, trial counsel impeached Giovine with 
one prior felony conviction and one felony withheld; the fact his prison exposure 
was sixty years and he had entered a plea for eight to twelve years; the fact he had 
threatened the State that he would not testify unless he got a better deal; and the 
fact he was not going to testify but to save his own skin.  It is clear that trial 
counsel had Giovine’s statements, was familiar with them, and could impeach 
                                          
 
 
3.  During his interview Giovine stated: “[Gregory] just said . . . he told me 
they got shot—shot twice, both—each of them got shot twice.”  Giovine said the 
victims were both shot once in the chest and in the head.  Giovine stated that “Dan 
was on the floor and Skyler was on the bed,” and that the police never found the 
murder weapon.  Finally, Giovine said that only Skyler, Dan, and Skyler’s 
grandfather were in the house at the time of the murders.  During this same 
interview, Giovine admitted he had read documents which belonged to Mr. 
Gregory, specifically newspaper articles about the murders.  However, prior to 
Giovine’s testimony, the following unrefuted evidence was introduced by the 
State: (1) Meekins and Dyer were both lying on the bed at the time of the murders; 
(2) Meekins and Dyer were both shot once in the head; (3) the murder weapon was 
found on the floor next to the bodies and; (4) Meekins, Dyer, both Meekins’ 
grandparents, and Kyla were all in the house at the time of the murders. 
 
 
- 21 - 
Giovine with the information contained therein if he thought it was beneficial to do 
so.   
 
On cross-examination, trial counsel impeached Graves with his five prior 
felony convictions; the fact his first-degree felony charge was still pending and his 
possible prison exposure; the fact he had talked to a guard and other inmates, and 
read an article pertaining to the murders prior to giving his statement; and the fact 
he had been a confidential informant previously.  Gregory used Graves’ jail PIN to 
call Skyler in an attempt to trick her into answering because she would not answer 
for Gregory.  Based on Attorney Wood’s impeachment of Graves at trial, it is clear 
that Attorney Wood had Graves’ statements, was familiar with them, and could 
impeach Graves with the information contained therein if he thought it was 
beneficial to do so. 
“[A] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be 
made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 
circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 
counsel’s perspective at the time.”  McLean v. State, 147 So. 3d 504, 510 (Fla. 
2014) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).  As with other decisions Gregory’s 
attorney made, the assertions regarding deficiency are classic attempts to assess 
counsel’s conduct after the fact.   
 
 
- 22 - 
In this case, Gregory has not established that reasonable trial counsel would 
have used the statements to impeach Graves or Giovine as opposed to attacking the 
testimony on cross-examination as Attorney Wood did.  It is unclear what Attorney 
Wood could have done differently that would have been more effective in this 
case. 
  Further, Gregory has failed to explain how he was prejudiced by any 
alleged deficiency.  As Attorney Wood testified at the evidentiary hearing, he did 
not believe, following his cross-examination of both witnesses, that “the State had 
good witnesses out of either of those two individuals.”  There can be no prejudice 
for failing to further impeach Graves because even without Graves’ testimony, the 
State could still argue that Gregory would repeatedly call Skyler in an attempt to 
reach her and then become frustrated when he could not.  As to Giovine, who later 
recanted his testimony—the subject of Gregory’s newly discovered evidence claim 
—the State presented three other jailhouse informants who testified in varying 
ways, including that Gregory prophetically stated that he would “blow [the 
victim’s] f’ing head off” if she cheated on him.  Giovine did not testify that 
Gregory actually confessed the murder to him, but only that Gregory said that he 
“did what he had to do” and that Giovine assumed that Gregory meant committing 
the murders.  
Accordingly, Gregory is not entitled to relief on this claim. 
 
 
- 23 - 
4.  Failure to Object to an Erroneous Transcription 
 
Gregory contends that Attorney Wood was ineffective for failing to object to 
the erroneous transcription of one of the jailhouse phone calls presented at trial.  
Specifically, Gregory contends that on the call he actually stated to his mother: “I 
tried calling back a couple of times and that f***ing told me that, you know, she 
wasn’t there,” while the call was transcribed to indicate that he stated: “I tried 
calling back a couple of times and that f***er told me that, you know, she wasn’t 
there.”  The postconviction court denied this claim, stating:   
Trial counsel failed to correct a significant word found in state’s 
Ex #73—“f[***]er” instead of “f[***]ing.”  Ex. # 73 is audio 
recording of a jail call.  It is alleged the transcript contained the error; 
Appellant also claims the transcript, with error, improperly went back 
with jury for deliberation. 
At the evidentiary hearing Attorney Wood testified that the 
ultimate meaning of the call did not change: “to listen to the phone 
call, it was very clear that Mr. Gregory was not happy about Mr. Dyer 
being in the picture at all.”  Mr. Gregory did not protest to Attorney 
Wood that what was being presented to the jury was inaccurate.  Mr. 
Gregory made no showing that the jury having read the word 
“f[***]er” instead of “f[***]ing” would have been, more inclined to 
find him guilty. 
The transcripts in this case were properly used as demonstrative 
aids and did not go back to the jury room.  Attorney Wood testified it 
is his common practice to inspect the evidence that’s been marked 
before the bailiff takes it back to the jury room and he did that in this 
case.  He would not allow unmarked exhibits to go back to the jury 
room.   
June Laws, the deputy clerk in the case sub Judice, testified that 
she separates marked exhibits from demonstrative aids, and only 
marked exhibits are given to the bailiff to take into the jury room.  
Deputy Taylor, the bailiff in this case, testified that he only took the 
marked exhibits back to the jury room.   
 
 
- 24 - 
Additionally, the Court repeatedly advised the jury to rely on 
the audio, it was the evidence; the transcripts were simply an aid.  Mr. 
Gregory has failed to meet his burden, neither deficiency nor 
prejudice was shown as required by Strickland. 
 
(Record citations omitted.)  We agree.  Gregory did not produce any evidence to 
support his assertion that the word  “f***ing” was, in fact, transcribed inaccurately 
as the word “f***er,” or that the difference in words undermined confidence in the 
outcome of the case.   
Attorney Wood testified that Gregory was sitting beside him at counsel 
table, going through the transcripts as the jailhouse calls were being played for the 
jury, and Gregory never relayed to Attorney Wood that the calls had been 
inaccurately transcribed or otherwise indicated the transcription said something 
different from what he had said on the call.  Moreover, Gregory did not produce 
any evidence demonstrating that the meaning of the jailhouse call was at all 
changed by the exchange of expletives from the noun to the adjective form, or that 
the jury, having read the word “f***er” in the demonstrative aid rather than 
“f***ing,” would have been more inclined to find Gregory guilty.  Attorney Wood 
testified that, regardless of the word, the overall meaning and intent behind the call 
was clear: Gregory was not happy that Meekins was dating another man.   
Finally, the jury saw the transcript twice—once while the call was played 
and again on an overhead projector during closing arguments.  There was 
testimony during the evidentiary hearing that the transcripts were properly used as 
 
 
- 25 - 
demonstrative aids and did not go back into the jury room.  Each transcript was 
collected at the end of the phone call to which it pertained.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that Attorney Wood was not deficient. 
Additionally, we conclude there was no prejudice in this case.  Gregory has 
not demonstrated that the jury would have reached a different conclusion if the 
transcription, which they saw only twice for a short period of time, read “f***ing” 
instead of “f***er.”  As Attorney Wood testified at the postconviction evidentiary 
hearing, regardless of the word choice, from Gregory’s tone and demeanor during 
the phone call, it was clear that Gregory was not happy that Dyer was in the 
picture.  Thus, it was Gregory’s overall tone and demeanor on the call that was the 
most damaging aspect of the testimony, not the exact language he used. 
Accordingly, Gregory is not entitled to relief on this claim.4  We now 
address the newly discovered evidence claim that also relates to the guilt phase. 
GREGORY’S SUCCESSIVE MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF 
BASED ON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE 
 
After the circuit court’s denial of Gregory’s postconviction claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, Gregory filed a successive postconviction motion 
in the circuit court alleging newly discovered evidence.  Specifically, Gregory’s 
                                          
 
4.  Because Gregory has failed to prove ineffective assistance of counsel on 
each of the underlying claims, we also conclude that Gregory is not entitled to 
relief on his claim of cumulative error. 
 
 
- 26 - 
motion was based on the affidavit of State witness, Giovine, which purports to 
recant the testimony Giovine gave during Gregory’s original guilt phase trial.  
Because the denial of the postconviction motion was on appeal, this Court 
relinquished jurisdiction for the trial court to address this newly discovered 
evidence claim. 
 The circuit court did not hold an evidentiary hearing but denied Gregory’s 
motion after concluding that although Giovine’s statement appeared to be a 
recantation of his prior testimony, it would not have led to an acquittal or lesser 
sentence for Gregory in light of the evidence presented against him. 
A defendant may obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence if 
he satisfies two requirements.  “First, the evidence must not have been known by 
the trial court, the party, or counsel at the time of trial, and it must appear that the 
defendant or defense counsel could not have known of it by the use of diligence.” 
Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072, 1086 (Fla. 2008).  “Second, the newly 
discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an 
acquittal on retrial.”  Id. (citing Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998)).  
“If the defendant is seeking to vacate a sentence, the second prong requires that the 
newly discovered evidence would probably yield a less severe sentence.”  Id. 
(citing Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 915 (Fla. 1991)).  In cases concerning 
recanted testimony as newly discovered evidence, the court must be satisfied that 
 
 
- 27 - 
the recantation is true and that the recanted testimony would probably render a 
different outcome in the proceeding.  Davis v. State, 26 So. 3d 519, 526 (Fla. 
2009).  Further, when “determining the impact of the newly discovered evidence, 
when a prior evidentiary hearing has been conducted, the trial court is required to 
consider all newly discovered evidence which would be admissible at trial and then 
evaluate the ‘weight of both the newly discovered evidence and the evidence 
which was introduced at trial.’ ”  Melton v. State, 193 So. 3d 881, 885 (Fla. 2016) 
(quoting Jones, 709 So. 2d at 521). 
Regardless of whether the affidavit represents a recantation of Giovine’s 
testimony, we agree with the postconviction court that the new testimony would 
not have resulted in an acquittal on retrial.  As the postconviction court stated:  
At trial, the State presented several witnesses who provided 
overwhelming evidence of Defendant’s guilt.  Mr. Bowling, 
Defendant’s former co-worker, testified that Defendant commented 
that if his girlfriend ever cheated on him, he would kill her and the 
other man.  Defendant’s former cell mate, Mr. Graves, testified that 
Defendant told him that if he were to ever catch the victim cheating, 
“he was going to blow her f***ing head off.”  Another former cell 
mate, Mr. Goebel, testified that Defendant told him that he watched 
victim Meekins’ house, that he killed her, and that his family would 
be his alibi for the murders.  Mr. Goebel also testified that Defendant 
told him that he was surprised that he tested positive for gun residue 
since he went into the swimming pool after the incident in an effort to 
remove any gun residue that may have been present.    
A friend of victim Dan Dyer, Mr. Green, testified that victim 
Dyer told him that Defendant stated that victim Dyer ruined his life.    
Victim Meekins’ neighbor, Mr. Mahoney, testified that on the night of 
the murders he heard noises outside of his house and voices that stated 
“we’re over here” prior to hearing a car door close.  Mr. Mahoney’s 
 
 
- 28 - 
testimony rejects Defendant’s theory that it was impossible to have 
walked to victim Meekins’ home when the crimes were committed.  
Mr. Tucker, a Florida Department of Law Enforcement Analyst, 
testified that Defendant’s fingerprints were found on the shotgun that 
was used in the murders.  
Additionally, testimony was presented at trial that Defendant 
was possessive and excessively called victim Meekins wanting to 
know her whereabouts and who she was with when she was not home.    
Audio recordings of Defendant and victim Meekins’ brother, Colton 
Meekins (hereinafter “Mr. Meekins”), were played to the jury.  The 
audio recordings reflected that Mr. Meekins went into victim 
Meekins’ online accounts and read and erased messages from other 
men.  The audio recordings also reflected that Defendant admitted that 
he went into victim Meekins’ online account in the past and deleted 
messages from other men.  The jury heard telephone calls between 
Defendant and his brother, Kory Gregory (hereinafter “Mr. Gregory”), 
that reflected Defendant’s attempt to influence his family members’ 
statements.   
 
(Record citations omitted.) 
We conclude that, for the same reasons we find that Gregory was not 
prejudiced by his attorney’s failure to further impeach Giovine during the trial, 
Gregory would not have been acquitted had he been granted a new trial based on 
the newly discovered evidence of Giovine’s recantation.       
Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction court’s order denying Gregory 
relief. 
Hurst 
In Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), the United States Supreme Court 
held that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme was unconstitutional because “[t]he 
Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to 
 
 
- 29 - 
impose a sentence of death.  A jury’s mere recommendation is not enough.”  Id. at 
619.  On remand, this Court held that a unanimous jury recommendation is 
required before the trial court may impose a sentence of death.  Hurst, 202 So. 3d 
at 57.  Moreover, this Court held that “in addition to unanimously finding the 
existence of any aggravating factor, the jury must also unanimously find that the 
aggravating factors are sufficient for the imposition of death and unanimously find 
that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigation before a sentence of death may 
be considered by the judge.”  Id. at 54.  This Court also determined that Hurst error 
is capable of harmless error review.  Id. at 68.   
Hurst applies retroactively to defendants whose sentences became final after 
the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 
584 (2002).  Mosley, 209 So. 3d at 1283.  Thus, Hurst applies retroactively to 
Gregory’s sentences, which became final in 2013.  Accordingly, we must 
determine whether the Hurst error during Gregory’s penalty phase proceeding was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.   
As this Court has stated, “in the context of a Hurst v. Florida error, the 
burden is on the State, as the beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the jury’s failure to unanimously find all the facts necessary for 
imposition of the death penalty did not contribute to [the] death sentence.”  Hurst, 
202 So. 3d at 68.  As applied to the right to a jury trial with regard to the facts 
 
 
- 30 - 
necessary to impose the death penalty, it must be clear beyond a reasonable doubt 
that a rational jury would have unanimously found that each aggravating factor 
was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, that there were sufficient aggravating 
factors to impose death, and that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating 
circumstances.  Id. 
In Gregory’s case, we conclude that the State cannot establish that the Hurst 
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Here, the jury neither unanimously 
made the requisite factual findings nor unanimously recommended a sentence of 
death.  Instead, the jury recommended both of Gregory’s death sentences by a vote 
of seven to five.  Therefore, this Court has no way of knowing if the jury 
unanimously found whether the four aggravating factors—(1) the murders were 
committed by a person previously convicted of a felony who was on felony 
probation; (2) Gregory was previously convicted of a prior violent felony; (3) the 
murders were committed during the course of a burglary; and (4) the murders were 
committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner, without any pretense of 
moral or legal justification (CCP)—were sufficient to impose a sentence of death 
or whether the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating circumstances.  In 
this case, the trial court found one statutory mitigating circumstance—the murders 
were committed while Gregory was under the influence of extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance—and six nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.  This Court 
 
 
- 31 - 
cannot speculate why the five jurors who voted to recommend a sentence of life 
imprisonment determined that a sentence of death was not the appropriate 
punishment.  Thus, we conclude that the Hurst error in Gregory’s case was not 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  In doing so, we note that the jury in 
Gregory’s case recommended a sentence of death by the same narrow vote that 
Timothy Lee Hurst’s jury recommended death where the aggravating factors 
presented required a factual determination.  See Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 47.   
Accordingly, we vacate Gregory’s death sentences and remand for a new 
penalty phase. 
HABEAS PETITION 
 
In a separate petition for writ of habeas corpus, Gregory raises a Hurst claim, 
which we have already addressed and granted him relief. The only substantive 
claim that Gregory raises in his habeas petition regarding the guilt phase is that 
Gregory’s attorney on direct appeal was ineffective for failing to raise the issue 
that Gregory’s jailhouse phone calls should not have been admitted at trial. 
First, to the extent Gregory contends that appellate counsel was ineffective 
for failing to argue that the court erred by admitting, over the defense objection, 
the jailhouse phone calls that were introduced by the State, we conclude that 
Gregory is not entitled to relief.  Appellate counsel is not required to argue every 
preserved issue on appeal, particularly when that issue is meritless.  In Simmons v. 
 
 
- 32 - 
State, 105 So. 3d 475, 512 (Fla. 2012) (citing Davis v. State, 928 So. 2d 1089, 
1126-27 (Fla. 2005)), this Court recognized that appellate counsel cannot present 
every conceivable claim on direct appeal.   
Because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
allowing the jailhouse phone calls to be admitted, we deny relief as to this claim.  
The phone calls at issue were taped while Gregory was incarcerated during the 
summer of 2007, before the murders.  In denying the defense’s motion in limine 
with respect to the calls, the trial court stated:  
The State MAY offer as evidence relevant recorded telephone 
conversations between the Defendant and certain witnesses while the 
Defendant was incarcerated in the Flagler and St. Johns County Jails. 
These calls include, but are not limited to, the following: 
a.  Conversations between the Defendant and Skyler Meekins’ 
brother, Colton Meekins, prior to the murders concerning Skyler 
Meekins’ whereabouts, activities and communications as they related 
to other guys.  These conversations include, but are not limited to 
requests by the Defendant for Colton Meekins to access Skyler 
Meekins’ home computer, review her personal e-mails and MySpace 
account, and delete photographs of and communications between 
other guys.  Such conversations are relevant to the issue of motive and 
are, accordingly, admissible at trial. 
b.  Conversations between the Defendant and Skyler Meekins, 
Kory Gregory and/or Linda Probert prior to the murders concerning 
the relationship between the Defendant and Skyler Meekins, Skyler 
Meekins’ conduct, and/or the Defendant’s plans when he was released 
from jail.  These-conversations provide the context and background of 
the relationship and are relevant to the issue of motive. 
c.  Conversations between the Defendant and Kory Gregory and 
Linda Probert after the murders pertaining to his association to the 
murders, or the lack thereof.  Such statements are clearly relevant to 
the issues of this case. 
 
 
- 33 - 
d.  Conversations between the Defendant and Amber Curnutt 
after the murders in which the Defendant discusses shooting a gun the 
day before the murders and her relaying that information to law 
enforcement.  As stated previously, these statements are relevant to 
the issue of the Defendant’s consciousness of guilt.   
These calls, collectively, are quite lengthy and include a 
number of conversations that are not relevant to any issue in the case. 
These irrelevant conversations must be redacted prior to their 
publication of them at trial.  Counsels for the State and the Defendant 
have agreed to collaborate and attempt to agree on the necessary 
redactions.  To the extent that the parties are not able to agree, then 
they will submit to the court those conversations that remain in 
dispute, at which time the court will resolve the matter. 
 
This ruling was not erroneous.  The calls may have painted Gregory in a bad light, 
as Gregory contends; however, they also had considerable probative value as to the 
context of Gregory’s relationship with Meekins and Gregory’s possible motive for 
the crime.  Additionally, the trial court required the State to redact the phone calls 
by removing any irrelevant information.  Accordingly, had appellate counsel raised 
this claim on appeal it would have been rejected.  Appellate counsel cannot be 
ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim.  Simmons, 105 So. 3d at 512. 
Next, with respect to Gregory’s Cronic5 claim, this claim is not a proper 
habeas claim and, in any event, it is without merit as to any inference that his 
appellate counsel did not function as proper appellate counsel.  While we 
acknowledge that the appellate brief was only twenty-eight pages, Gregory has 
                                          
 
 
5.  United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). 
 
 
- 34 - 
failed to address any other meritorious issues that should have been raised.  Thus, 
this claim is meritless.   
Accordingly, we deny habeas relief. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the denial of both of Gregory’s motions 
for postconviction relief and we deny Gregory’s petition for habeas corpus relief.  
However, we vacate Gregory’s sentences of death and remand for a new penalty 
phase proceeding under Hurst.   
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. 
LEWIS, J., concurs in result. 
LAWSON, J., concurs specially with an opinion. 
POLSTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which 
CANADY, J., concurs.  
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
LAWSON, J., concurring specially. 
 
See Okafor v. State, 42 Fla. L. Weekly S639, S641, 2017 WL 2481266, at 
*6 (Fla. June 8, 2017) (Lawson, J., concurring specially). 
POLSTON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I concur with the majority’s decision except its vacating of the death 
sentence pursuant to Hurst. 
CANADY, J., concurs. 
 
 
- 35 - 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Flagler County,  
Joseph David Walsh, Judge - Case No. 182007CF000866XXXXXX 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus  
 
Jim Viggiano, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, Julie A. 
Morley, and Mark S. Gruber, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, 
Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida, 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Tayo Popoola, 
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
for Appellee/Respondent