Title: Doble v. Interstate Amusements, Inc.

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO   
Docket No. 42744 
H. PETER DOBLE II, M.D., an individual 
residing in the State of Idaho, 
 
       Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
INTERSTATE AMUSEMENTS, INC., an 
Idaho corporation, 
 
       Defendant-Respondent, 
 
and 
 
DOES 1-50, inclusive, 
 
       Defendants. 
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Boise, April 2016 Term 
 
2016 Opinion No. 52 
 
Filed:  May 3, 2016 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Twin 
Falls County.  Hon. Randy J. Stoker, District Judge.  
District court order awarding attorney fees under Idaho Code  Section 12-121, 
affirmed. 
Marsh Rosa, LLP, Boise, for appellant.  Angelo L. Rosa argued. 
Worst, Fitzgerald & Stover, PLLC, Twin Falls, for respondent.   David W. Gadd 
argued. 
_________________________________ 
 
 
 
BURDICK, Justice 
 
H. Peter Doble II (Doble) appeals the Twin Falls County District Court’s order awarding 
Interstate Amusements, Inc. (Interstate) attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-121. The 
district court ruled that fees were appropriate under section 12-121 because Doble’s claims were 
brought frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation. We affirm. 
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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Interstate owned and operated a number of movie theaters throughout Magic Valley. As 
part of its business, Interstate marketed and sold vouchers known as “Cinema Cash.” These 
vouchers were purchased in $1.00 increments and could be redeemed for movie tickets and 
concessions sold at Interstate’s various theater locations. Each voucher was clearly marked with 
an expiration date after which the voucher was no longer redeemable. In or around December 
2013, Doble attempted to redeem a Cinema Cash voucher at one of Interstate’s movie theaters in 
Twin Falls. However, the voucher had passed its expiration date and was rejected by the ticket 
booth employee. 
On March 28, 2014, Doble filed a Complaint against Interstate in which he alleged that 
the issuance of Cinema Cash violated Idaho’s Consumer Protection Act (ICPA). Specifically, 
Doble alleged that the issuance of Cinema Cash with an expiration date violated the ICPA as an 
“unconscionable method, act or practice in the conduct of [a] trade or commerce” that “stands to 
outrage or offend the public conscience.” Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. On 
June 23, 2014, the district court heard oral argument and granted summary judgment in favor of 
Interstate.  
 
Thereafter, on October 14, 2014, the district court issued its Memorandum Opinion Re: 
Defendant’s Claim for Costs and Attorney Fees. Noting that an award of fees was within its 
discretion, the district court found that Doble brought his action “frivolously, unreasonably, and 
without foundation” and awarded Interstate attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-121. The 
district court then entered an amended judgment stating: “The defendant, Interstate Amusement, 
Inc., shall recover from the plaintiff costs in the amount of $320.44 and attorney’s fees in the 
amount of $7,972.50, for a total of $8,292.94.” 
 
 
II. ANALYSIS 
Doble claims that his action is not frivolous because his case is about protecting 
consumers from predatory practices and is based on existing law under the ICPA and a good 
faith argument for the extension of existing law. The district court found that Doble’s claim was 
not supported by existing law and that Doble’s arguments for an extension of existing law were 
unfounded and unreasonable. The district court was correct. 
 
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A. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded attorney fees under 
Idaho Code section 12-121.  
 
“This court has held that in deciding whether an award of attorney’s fees is proper, ‘the 
sole question is whether the losing party’s position is so plainly fallacious as to be deemed 
frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.’ ” Auto. Club Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 124 Idaho 874, 
879, 865 P.2d 965, 970 (1993) (quoting Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 
Idaho 87, 92, 803 P.2d 993, 998 (1991)). “The district court’s determination as to whether an 
action was brought or defended frivolously will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.” 
Idaho Military Historical Soc’y, Inc. v. Maslen, 156 Idaho 624, 629, 329 P.3d 1072, 1077 (2013) 
(citing Anderson v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 658, 660, 651 P.2d 923, 925 (1982)). In determining 
whether the district court abused its discretion, “this Court conducts a three-step inquiry: (1) 
whether the trial court properly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether that court 
acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards 
applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by the exercise of 
reason.” Id. 
 
Doble’s claim is based on the ICPA. The purpose of the ICPA is not to protect consumers 
from unwise purchases, but to protect consumers from unfair and deceptive practices. White v. 
Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 890, 104 P.3d 356, 364 (2004). In district court, Doble claimed that 
Interstate’s sale of Cinema Cash was “misleading, false, or deceptive to the consumer” and 
violated the ICPA as an “unconscionable method, act or practice in the conduct of trade or 
commerce” that “stands to outrage or offend the public conscience.” However, as the district 
court noted, Doble presented no evidence that Interstate’s Cinema Cash program was fraudulent, 
deceptive, or misrepresentative in any manner. Indeed, the evidence indicates that the vouchers 
were clearly marked with expiration dates. Moreover, Doble failed to offer any evidence that he 
actually purchased the rejected vouchers.1 We have consistently held that claims unsupported by 
evidence are frivolous and without foundation, e.g., Stevenson v. Windermere Real 
Estate/Capital Group Inc., 152 Idaho 824, 830, 275 P.3d 839, 845 (2012); Kiebert v. Goss, 144 
Idaho 225, 228–29, 159 P.3d 862, 865–66 (2007), and that claims brought under the ICPA must 
                                                          
 
1 There is no evidence in the record that Doble purchased the Cinema Cash vouchers he attempted to redeem in 
December 2013. Counsel for Doble was specifically asked about this during oral argument to which counsel 
responded that Doble had stated in his affidavit that he purchased the vouchers in question. However, a review of the 
affidavit only reflects that Doble purchased Cinema Cash in early March 2014, well after the alleged rejection of the 
vouchers in 2013.  
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be based on a contractual relationship. Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 846, 243 P.3d 642, 
662 (2010) (“[T]he aggrieved party must have been in a contractual relationship with the party 
alleged to have acted unfairly or deceptively.” (citing I.C. 48-608(1) (“Any person who 
purchases or leases goods or services and thereby suffers . . . .”))). By failing to support his claim 
with competent evidence, Doble’s claim lacked proper foundation; and the district court acted 
within the bounds of its discretion and consistently with the applicable legal standards by so 
ruling.  
 
Doble attempts to save his argument by asserting that the issue of whether gift vouchers 
can include expiration dates is an issue of “first impression” and that by virtue of such 
designation his argument was not frivolous or unreasonable. Doble is correct in asserting that 
this is an issue of first impression in Idaho, but only because Idaho law does not provide a cause 
of action for the selling of gift vouchers with expiration dates. As the district court noted, Idaho 
has “no such legislative enactments. Nor does Idaho have any case law from which a credible 
argument could be made to permit this cause of action.” Doble argues that other states have 
statutorily banned the issuance of gift vouchers with expiration dates and the ICPA should be 
interpreted to ban such vouchers as well. However, while it is true that the courts are permitted to 
look to the law of other states for guidance in determining the meaning of a statute, a court may 
not amend a statute to included offenses not listed therein. Thomas v. Riggs, 67 Idaho 223, 228, 
175 P.2d 404, 407 (1946) (“The legislature, and the legislature only, under our constitution, has 
power to legislate.”). If the legislature decides to follow the lead of other states and enact a 
provision that prohibits the expiration of vouchers or gift certificates it is obviously free to do so, 
the courts, however, are not. See, e.g., In re Dampier, 46 Idaho 195, 207, 267 P. 452, 455 (1928) 
(“This court is limited to the declaration of the intent of the Legislature, and can 
neither legislate nor by construction of the statute enlarge the words to include other conduct of 
like, equal, or greater atrocity, simply because it may be within the same mischief to be 
remedied, when it is not fairly included in the language of the act.”). Thus, the district court’s 
finding that Doble’s argument to expand Idaho’s law was unreasonable was also within the 
bounds of its discretion and consistent with applicable legal standards. 
Therefore, because the district court: (1) recognized that an award of fees under section 
12-121 was subject to its discretion; (2) found that under the applicable legal standards Doble 
failed to support his claim with any evidence that would constitute a violation of existing law or 
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to make a well grounded argument for the extension of existing Idaho law; and (3) supported its 
findings with clear and well-articulated reasoning, we hold that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in awarding fees under Idaho Code section 12-121.2 
B. Attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
 
Interstate requests fees on appeal under Idaho Code section 12-121. “Under I.C. § 12-
121, attorney fees are awarded to the prevailing party if the court is left with the belief that the 
proceeding was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.” 
Harris v. State, ex rel. Kempthorne, 147 Idaho 401, 406, 210 P.3d 86, 91 (2009). Further, “Under 
I.C. § 12–121, a party is entitled to attorney’s fees if the appeal merely invites the appellate court 
to second guess the trial court on the weight of evidence.” Kelley v. Yadon, 150 Idaho 334, 338, 
247 P.3d 199, 203 (2011). 
 
Doble’s argument about the district court’s award of attorney fees is simply inviting the 
Court to re-weigh the evidence Doble presented to the district court. Doble’s claim that this case 
is about protecting consumers from predatory practices misses the mark. The question is, as 
Doble himself asserts, whether “Interstate acted lawfully in issuing such vouchers and then 
refusing to redeem them;” and as the district court pointed out, Doble presented no evidence or 
law to support a claim that the ICPA or other existing Idaho law was violated, nor did he present 
a good faith argument for the extension of Idaho law. Doble’s argument is nothing more than an 
appeal for the courts to extend the law “to include other conduct” that, while prohibited in the 
statutes of other states, is “not fairly included in the language of the [ICPA].” It is well settled 
law that the courts will not engage in such activity. See, e.g., In re Dampier, 46 Idaho at 207, 267 
P. at 455. Accordingly, we hold this appeal to be “frivolous, unreasonable, and without 
foundation” and award costs and fees to Interstate. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the district court is affirmed. Fees and costs on 
appeal to Interstate.  
Chief Justice J. JONES and Justices EISMANN, W. JONES and HORTON, CONCUR. 
                                                          
 
2 We note that Idaho Code section 48-608(5) specifically provides for attorney fees in cases arising under the ICPA. 
However, neither party addressed the applicability of section 48-608(5) in their briefs or oral arguments to the Court. 
Thus, our decision today in no way forecloses any arguments regarding the applicability or exclusivity of that 
section in awarding attorney fees in cases arising under the ICPA.