Title: In re Care & Protection of Rashida

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13072 
 
CARE AND PROTECTION OF RASHIDA.1 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     May 5, 2021. - August 20, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Department of Children & Families.  Minor, Custody, Temporary 
custody.  Parent and Child, Custody of minor.  Appeals 
Court, Appeal from order of single justice.  Moot Question. 
 
 
 
 
Petition filed in the Norfolk County Division of the 
Juvenile Court Department on February 3, 2020. 
 
 
A motion for a reasonable efforts determination was heard 
by Linda G. Sable, J. 
 
 
A proceeding for interlocutory review was heard in the 
Appeals Court by Sabita Singh, J., a motion for reconsideration 
was considered by her, and questions were reported by her to the 
Appeals Court.  The Supreme Judicial Court granted an 
application for direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Ann Balmelli O'Connor, Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, for the mother. 
 
William A. Comeau for the child. 
 
Jeremy Bayless for Department of Children and Families. 
 
Jonathan M. Albano, Michael C. Polovich, & Emma Coffey, for 
Lawyers for Civil Rights, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
1 A pseudonym. 
2 
 
 
Jessica Berry, Claire Donohue, & Thomas J. Carey, Jr., for 
Jessica Berry & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  When a child is removed from his or her home 
and placed into the custody of the Department of Children and 
Families (department), the department is required by statute to 
make ongoing "reasonable efforts to make it possible for the 
child to return safely to his [or her] parent or guardian."  
G. L. c. 119, § 29C.  See Care & Protection of Walt, 478 Mass. 
212, 221 (2017).  The primary issue presented by the reported 
questions is whether the statute's provision that "the court 
shall determine [reasonable efforts] not less than annually" 
permits or requires a Juvenile Court judge to make a reasonable 
efforts determination at other times.  The department contends 
that such a determination shall be made not more frequently than 
the permanency hearings, typically held annually, and that 
Juvenile Court judges have no discretion to consider such 
motions or make such determinations at other times. 
 
We conclude that a party may file a motion for a 
determination of reasonable efforts at other times.  We also 
conclude that a Juvenile Court judge has several options when 
presented with such a motion.  If the party filing such motion 
fails to meet its burden of production, the judge may simply 
deny the motion without making a determination of reasonable 
efforts.  Further, where a motion challenging the department's 
3 
 
reasonable efforts regarding reunification is appropriately 
considered a challenge to a specific service or services, rather 
than the reasonableness of the department's efforts more 
generally, the judge has the option to treat such a motion as a 
motion for abuse of the department's discretion in providing 
such services.  Finally, we conclude that when the judge 
determines that the burden of production has been satisfied to 
raise doubts about the reasonableness of the department's 
efforts towards reunification, the department bears the burden 
of proving that it has made reasonable efforts.2 
 
Legal framework.  1.  Reasonable efforts in care and 
protection cases.  "Reasonable efforts" is generally understood 
to include "accessible, available, and culturally appropriate 
services that are designed to improve the capacity of families 
to provide safe and stable homes for their children" and "to 
ensure that parents and other family members . . . are making 
progress on case plan goals."  United States Department of 
Health & Human Services, Administration for Children & Families, 
Children's Bureau, Reasonable Efforts to Preserve or Reunify 
Families and Achieve Permanency for Children 2 (September 2019).  
See Care & Protection of Walt, 478 Mass. at 227 ("What 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by Lawyers for 
Civil Rights and by Jessica Berry, Claire Donohue, Cristina 
Freitas, Debbie Freitas, Children's Law Center of Massachusetts, 
Citizens for Juvenile Justice, Massachusetts Law Reform 
Institute, and Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee. 
4 
 
constitutes reasonable efforts . . . must be evaluated in the 
context of each individual case . . .").  To evaluate whether 
the department has fulfilled its responsibility to make 
reasonable efforts, a brief overview of the law governing care 
and protection cases is in order.3 
 
When the department "has reasonable cause to believe a 
child's health or safety is in immediate danger" and "removal is 
necessary to protect the child from abuse or neglect," it shall 
immediately take the child into temporary custody.  G. L. 
c. 119, § 51B (c), (e).  When a child is removed from his or her 
home in this emergency manner, the department must file a care 
and protection petition within twenty-four hours.  Id.  See 
G. L. c. 119, § 24.  "On the day a petition is filed, a judge 
will conduct an emergency hearing . . . [usually] with the 
department's petitioner present but not the parents."  Care & 
Protection of Walt, 478 Mass. at 220.  A second hearing must be 
held within seventy-two hours to determine whether temporary 
custody of the child will continue past that seventy-two hours.  
Id. at 220.  G. L. c. 119, § 24.  This hearing is commonly known 
as the "seventy-two hour hearing" and is an adversarial 
 
 
3 In order to receive Federal funding, State frameworks for 
foster care and adoption assistance must provide that 
"reasonable efforts shall be made to preserve and reunify 
families."  42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B). 
5 
 
evidentiary hearing.  Care & Protection of Walt, supra at 213, 
220. 
 
A judge is required by statute to determine whether the 
department has made reasonable efforts at the emergency hearing, 
the seventy-two hour hearing, and "not less than annually" 
thereafter.4  G. L. c. 119, § 29C.  At both the emergency hearing 
and the seventy-two hour hearing, the judge is required to 
determine that the department "has made reasonable efforts prior 
to the placement of a child with the department to prevent or 
eliminate the need for removal from the home."  Id.5  See Care & 
Protection of Walt, 478 Mass. at 213.  Thereafter, "the purpose 
of those efforts shifts from preventing or eliminating the need 
for removal from the home to making it 'possible for the child 
to return safely to his parent or guardian.'"6  Id. at 221, 
quoting G. L. c. 119, § 29C. 
 
 
4 A judge must also make a reasonable efforts determination 
before terminating parental rights.  Adoption of West, 97 Mass. 
App. Ct. 238, 242 (2020). 
 
 
5 Section 29C lays out limited exceptions to the requirement 
of determining reasonable efforts that do not apply to this 
case. 
 
 
6 Or, "[i]f a court has determined . . . that reasonable 
efforts to safely return the child to his [or her] parent or 
guardian are inconsistent with the permanency plan for the 
child," the department must make "reasonable efforts to place 
the child in a timely manner in accordance with the permanency 
plan."  G. L. c. 119, § 29C. 
6 
 
 
So long as the child remains in the care of the department, 
the court must hold an annual permanency hearing, the purpose of 
which is threefold:  (1) to "determine the permanency plan for 
the child or young adult and when the plan will be implemented";7 
(2) to "aid in the timely implementation of such plan"; and (3) 
to determine reasonable efforts.  Rule 8 of the Uniform Rules 
for Permanency Hearings, Trial Court Rule VI (URPH).  See G. L. 
c. 119, §§ 29B, 29C; Rules 3(a) & 9(b) of the URPH.  The annual 
review of the department's reasonable efforts usually coincides 
with the annual permanency review. 
 
In addition to the annual permanency hearing, within twelve 
to fifteen months of the filing of the petition, the court 
adjudicates whether the child is in need of care and protection.  
See G. L. c. 119, § 26 (b); Juvenile Court Standing Order 2-18, 
§ III; Rule 15(c) of the Juvenile Court Rules for the Care and 
Protection of Children (Care and Protection Rules).8  At this 
hearing on the merits, the court must both make a reasonable 
efforts determination and determine whether a parent is 
currently unfit.  G. L. c. 119, §§ 26 (b), 29C.  Care & 
 
 
7 The permanency plan includes the permanency goal for the 
child:  reunification, adoption, guardianship, permanent care 
with relatives, or another permanent planned living arrangement.  
G. L. c. 119, § 29B. 
 
 
8 The permanency hearing may be held simultaneously with the 
full adjudication of the care and protection petition.  Rule 
8(c)(5) of the URPH. 
7 
 
Protection of Erin, 443 Mass. 567, 570 (2005) ("In a proceeding 
to commit a child to the custody of the department under G. L. 
c. 119, § 26, the department bears the burden of proving, by 
clear and convincing evidence, that a parent is currently unfit 
to further the best interests of a child and, therefore, the 
child is in need of care and protection").  The court may 
determine that the department has failed to meet its reasonable 
efforts obligation, but nonetheless determine a parent is 
currently unfit and commit a child to the department's custody, 
if the court concludes that doing so is in the child's best 
interests.  G. L. c. 119, § 29C.  Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. 
53, 61-62 (2011). 
 
2.  Abuse of discretion motions.  Parents have "many 
avenues available to raise a claim of inadequate services," 
particularly a motion for a finding that the department abused 
its discretion by failing to adequately provide a particular 
service or services.  Adoption of West, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 238, 
242 (2020).  The Appeals Court has stated, and we agree, that a 
"claim of inadequate services can be raised by a so-called 
'abuse of discretion' motion."  Id. at 243, citing Adoption of 
Daisy, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 768, 781 (2010), S.C., 460 Mass. 72 
(2011) (mother filed motion claiming that department abused its 
discretion by failing to secure specific services).  Because 
this court has never directly addressed whether an abuse of 
8 
 
discretion motion is a proper vehicle for contesting specific 
inadequate services by the department, or how it differs from a 
reasonable efforts determination, we briefly summarize the 
history and framework of such motions. 
 
Addressing a Probate and Family Court judge's order 
mandating specific placement and treatment for an individual 
under guardianship, this court stated in Matter of McKnight, 406 
Mass. 787, 798 (1990), "[t]he placement of individuals and the 
coordination of the provision of services financed by [a social 
services agency] are executive functions" that should not be 
"imping[ed] on" by the judiciary.  Drawing on this reasoning, in 
Care & Protection of Isaac, 419 Mass. 602, 611 (1995), the court 
determined that the department's decisions regarding custodial 
placements are reviewable "for legal error or abuse of 
discretion."  Specifically, the court concluded that a judicial 
order mandating a certain residential placement for a child was 
inappropriate because "decisions related to normal incidents of 
custody, by the terms of [G. L. c. 119,] §§ 21, 26 and 32, are 
committed to the discretion of the department."  Id. at 609.  We 
extended this decision to children in temporary custody in Care 
& Protection of Jeremy, 419 Mass. 616, 622 (1995).  However, 
these decisions were rooted in statutory language addressing 
custodial placements and did not address the provision of 
9 
 
services.  The court referenced this language, but did not 
expand on it, in Care & Protection of Walt, 478 Mass. at 230. 
 
Like the "individual placement decision" addressed in Care 
& Protection of Isaac, 419 Mass. at 611, an individual service 
decision is committed to the discretion of the department.  See 
id. (Legislature charged department "with administering a highly 
complex social services program within the constraints of a 
finite annual appropriation").  The department "is authorized to 
promulgate rules and policies 'necessary for the full and 
efficient implementation of programs . . . in the area of social 
services.'"  Id. at 607, quoting G. L. c. 18B, § 3 (B) (1), as 
in effect prior to St. 2008, c. 176, § 26.  The department 
offers specific services to parents and families in order to 
fulfill that obligation.  See 110 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 7.000 
(2011).  Although the department is statutorily obliged to make 
reasonable efforts towards reunification, "the means of 
fulfilling that obligation [are] within the department's 
discretion."  Care & Protection of Isaac, supra at 606, citing 
Attorney Gen. v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, 394 Mass. 624, 630 
(1985).   Therefore, an abuse of discretion motion is an 
appropriate vehicle for challenging a specific service or 
specific services, though it is not, as discussed at length 
infra, an appropriate vehicle for challenging the department's 
over-all reasonable efforts to reunify a family.  See Rule 14(B) 
10 
 
of the Care and Protection Rules (court may hear motions 
regarding service issues at any time "in the interests of 
justice"). 
 
Facts and procedural history.9  The mother gave birth to a 
child, whom we shall call Rashida, on or about January 29, 2020.  
The mother has severe cognitive impairments, lives with her 
parents and siblings, and speaks Somali Mai Mai as her primary 
language.  Shortly after the birth, the department received a 
report pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 51A, that alleged the mother 
was unable to care for Rashida.  After an investigation, the 
department found the allegations were supported, and filed a 
care and protection petition.  On February 3, 2020, the 
department was awarded temporary custody of Rashida in an ex 
parte hearing. 
 
The department initially provided the mother with weekly 
supervised in-person visitation, which was disrupted by the 
Statewide shutdown in response to the COVID-19 pandemic in March 
2020.  Following the shutdown, the department sent video 
recordings and pictures of Rashida to the mother, through her 
brother, twice a week.  On April 29, 2020, the mother began 
weekly supervised remote video visits, and weekly supervised in-
person visits recommenced on July 15, 2020.  Four visits were 
 
 
9 We summarize the facts of the case up to the time of the 
mother's motion for a determination of reasonable efforts on 
September 15, 2020, the subject of this appeal. 
11 
 
canceled or took place remotely due to weather, transportation 
problems, or the mother being ill.  Two visits were canceled 
because the mother failed to confirm them ahead of time. 
 
The department completed a family assessment regarding 
Rashida and her parents10 on June 22, 2020, and reviewed the 
resulting action plan with the mother on July 15, 2020.11  In 
addition to visitation, the action plan included participating 
in a neuropsychological and parenting evaluation, continuing to 
engage in a program for pregnant and new mothers from which the 
mother received services during her pregnancy, enrolling with 
the Department of Developmental Services (DDS), and 
participating in parent aide services.  The mother did not 
enroll with DDS, so she did not receive a referral for a 
neuropsychological evaluation.  The department sent the release 
for parent aide services to the mother on August 25, 2020, but 
was unable to find a provider who spoke Mai Mai. 
 
 
10 The father did not respond to the department or otherwise 
participate in the assessment. 
 
 
11 By statute and regulation, the assessment and action plan 
should have been completed by April 6, 2020, forty-five working 
days after the initial petition.  See 110 Code Mass. Regs. 
§ 5.03 (2008) (full assessment "must be completed within [forty-
five] working days" of department's initial petition); G. L. 
c. 119, § 29 (parent entitled to receive service or case plan 
within forty-five days of department's initial petition).  
However, on March 10, 2020, the Governor declared a state of 
emergency in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, which disrupted 
visitation and the functioning of State agencies including the 
department.  Desrosiers v. Governor, 486 Mass. 369, 370, 373-374 
(2020). 
12 
 
 
On September 15, 2020, the mother filed a motion for a 
determination that the department committed a breach of its 
legal duty to make "reasonable efforts to make it possible for 
the child to return safely to [her] parent."  G. L. c. 119, 
§ 29C.  The mother alleged that the department did not provide 
her with any services or accommodations to assist her with 
parenting time.  The department responded that any delay in 
providing services beyond visitation was because of 
"difficulties and delay presented by Mother and Mother's counsel 
throughout the proceedings." 
 
A Juvenile Court judge denied the motion on October 14, 
2020.12  The mother filed a petition for interlocutory review 
pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 118, which was denied by a single 
justice of the Appeals Court.  The mother then filed a motion 
for reconsideration and requested that the single justice report 
a question regarding a Juvenile Court judge's discretion to 
determine reasonable efforts more than once a year.  On January 
15, 2021, the single justice reported the following questions to 
the Appeals Court: 
1.  "After judicial certification of reasonable efforts at 
the emergency custody hearing pursuant [to] G. L. c. 119, 
§ 24, and the so-called '[seventy-two] hour hearing' 
pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 24, is the trial court judge 
 
 
12 The judge first stated in court that she had no authority 
to determine reasonable efforts until a permanency hearing.  
Later, in written findings, she stated that she declined to make 
a determination because reasonable efforts were previously 
litigated at the seventy-two hour hearing. 
13 
 
required to determine whether the department has continued 
to engage in reasonable efforts at any time prior [to] the 
statutorily mandated annual review pursuant to G. L. 
c. 119, § 29C, upon the motion of a parent or child?" 
 
2.  "If the answer to question one is in the negative, does 
the trial court judge have the discretion to make such a 
determination upon the motion of a parent or child?  If so, 
what is the burden of the parent or child in raising the 
issue and how is a judge's discretion to be guided in 
determining whether to make such a determination?" 
 
3.  "If the answer to either question one or question two 
is in the affirmative, does the department bear the burden 
of proving that it continues to engage in reasonable 
efforts in response to the motion of the parent or child?" 
 
4.  "If the answers to questions one and two are in the 
negative, may the parent or child raise the issue of the 
department's failure to engage in reasonable efforts at 
reunification in the context of a so-called 'motion for 
abuse of discretion'?  Adoption of West, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 
238, 243 (2020). If so, what is the allocation of burdens?" 
 
 
We accepted the mother's application for direct appellate 
review. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Mootness.  Rashida's annual permanency 
review was scheduled to take place on January 29, 2021.  The 
single justice noted in her report that the permanency hearing 
was likely to render the mother's motion for a reasonable 
efforts determination moot, as a reasonable efforts 
determination must be made at a permanency hearing, thus 
fulfilling the mother's request for a reasonable efforts 
determination.  See G. L. c. 119, § 29B (d).  However, as the 
mother notes, the requirements of § 29C -- and therefore our 
resolution of its interpretation -- apply for the entirety of 
14 
 
the department's custody, even if a permanency hearing has been 
held.  Even assuming the mother's instant petition for a 
reasonable efforts determination was satisfied by a 
determination made at the permanency hearing, she still has an 
ongoing stake in the ability to request a reasonable efforts 
determination so long as Rashida remains in the department's 
custody.  See Commonwealth v. Pena, 462 Mass. 183, 186 (2012) 
(case moot when issues are no longer "live" or parties lack 
legally cognizable interest).  Thus, the mother's motion for a 
reasonable efforts determination is not moot. 
Further, the reported questions are of public importance 
and capable of repetition while evading review, and so we 
address them regardless of the satisfaction of the mother's 
petition at the permanency hearing.  Care & Protection of Isaac, 
419 Mass. at 605 n.2, quoting Norwood Hosp. v. Munoz, 409 Mass. 
116, 121 (1991).  See Care & Protection of Walt, 478 Mass. at 
219 (deciding moot case because judicial determination of 
compliance with reasonable efforts is "of public importance, 
fully argued and briefed on all sides, very likely to arise 
again in similar factual circumstances, and might otherwise 
evade appellate review"). 
 
2.  Statutory interpretation.  "[I]n interpreting a 
statute, we begin with the language of the statute, and when a 
statute is plain and unambiguous, we interpret it according to 
15 
 
its ordinary meaning" (quotations, citations, and alterations 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Hanson H., 464 Mass. 807, 810 (2013).  
"Where the meaning of the statutory language is plain and 
unambiguous, and where a literal construction would not 'yield 
an absurd or unworkable result,' we need not look to extrinsic 
evidence to discern legislative intent."  Care & Protection of 
Walt, 478 Mass. at 223-224, quoting Adoption of Daisy, 460 Mass. 
72, 76 (2011).  The statutory provision at issue in this case 
states in relevant part: 
"the court shall determine not less than annually whether 
the department or its agent has made reasonable efforts to 
make it possible for the child to return safely to his [or 
her] parent or guardian." 
 
G. L. c. 119, § 29C.13 
 
The plain meaning of this statutory provision is clear.  
The court shall make at least one determination not less than 
annually that the department or its agent has made reasonable 
efforts towards reunification.  The court is not precluded from 
making additional determinations.  The phrase "not less than 
annually" creates a minimum frequency at which there must be a 
reasonable efforts determination.  It does not limit the 
determination to those times specifically enumerated in the 
 
 
13 The statute also provides that when a court initially 
grants temporary custody to the department, it "shall determine 
whether the department or its agent, as appropriate, has made 
reasonable efforts prior to the placement of a child with the 
department to prevent or eliminate the need for removal from the 
home."  G. L. c. 119, § 29C. 
16 
 
statute.  To set such a limit or maximum frequency, the 
Legislature uses the phrase "not more than."  See, e.g., G. L. 
c. 119, § 26 (c) (review and redetermination hearing may be held 
"not more than once every [six] months").  See Commonwealth v. 
Williamson, 462 Mass. 676, 682 (2012) ("use of different 
language strongly suggests the legislative intent to convey a 
different meaning").  Simply put, "not less than" means "not 
less than;" it does not, as the department argues, mean "only" 
or "not more than."  See Hanson H., 464 Mass. at 810 (plain and 
unambiguous language is given ordinary meaning). 
 
The result of a plain language construction of § 29C is 
that a Juvenile Court judge has the discretion to make a 
reasonable efforts determination at other times.  The department 
argues that this reading is contrary to the purpose of the 
statutory scheme, and that the correct reading of the phrase 
"not less than annually" in § 29C refers to the practical 
possibility of an annual permanency hearing occurring sooner 
than statutorily required.  We disagree. 
 
By statute, permanency hearings must be held "not less than 
every [twelve] months," and must include reasonable efforts 
determinations.  G. L. c. 119, § 29B (a), (d) (permanency 
hearings must include "determinations required by . . . section 
29C").  The parties may request, or the court may schedule, a 
permanency hearing to be held more frequently than required.  
17 
 
Rule 3(a) of the URPH.  The department contends that if a party 
wishes for the court to make a reasonable efforts determination, 
the proper vehicle is to request an early permanency hearing. 
 
The department's proposed interpretation is not only 
contrary to the plain meaning of § 29C, but also changes the 
purposes of permanency hearings.  Section 29C makes no reference 
to permanency hearings or § 29B when laying out the reasonable 
efforts requirements at issue.14  Although reasonable efforts 
determinations are part of permanency hearings, G. L. c. 119, 
§ 29B (d), permanency hearings are more comprehensive than 
reasonable efforts determinations and require significantly more 
preparation and scheduling coordination than what would be 
necessary even for an evidentiary hearing on a motion to 
determine reasonable efforts.15  To require a party seeking a 
reasonable efforts determination to do so by requesting a 
 
 
14 Section 29C's only reference to § 29B is to note that if 
the permanency goal is not reunification, the department's 
obligation is to make reasonable efforts "to place the child in 
a timely manner in accordance with the permanency plan." 
 
 
15 See G. L. c. 119, § 29B (a) (detailing requirements of 
permanency report); Rule 4 of the URPH (same); Rule 6(a) of the 
URPH (permanency report must be filed no less than thirty days 
prior to permanency hearing); Rule 8(c)(2) of the URPH (author 
of permanency report shall be available at hearing for cross-
examination).  See also G. L. c. 119, § 29B (a) ("court shall 
consult with the child in an age-appropriate manner about the 
permanency plan"); Rule 8(b) of the URPH (child, foster parents, 
preadoptive parents, or relatives have right to attend 
permanency hearing and be heard, and there is presumption child 
age fourteen or older will attend). 
18 
 
permanency hearing would be significantly more burdensome than 
to allow the party to move for a reasonable efforts 
determination, thus causing unnecessary delay of the resolution 
of the contested issue, and risking transformation of the over-
all purpose of a permanency hearing. 
 
By contrast, interpreting the statute to allow the judge 
discretion to determine reasonable efforts at other appropriate 
times is in keeping with the stated Legislative purpose of the 
statutory scheme: 
"[T]he Legislature, through its enactment of G. L. c. 119, 
§ 1, declared it 'to be the policy of this commonwealth to 
direct its efforts, first, to the strengthening and 
encouragement of family life for the care and protection of 
children; to assist and encourage the use by any family of 
all available resources to this end; and to provide 
substitute care of children only when the family itself or 
the resources available to the family are unable to provide 
the necessary care and protection . . . .'" 
 
Care & Protection of Walt, 478 Mass. at 219, quoting St. 1954, 
c. 646, § 1.  Ongoing court oversight of the department's 
requirement to make reasonable efforts to reunite the family 
serves this legislative purpose by "protect[ing] children and 
families against . . . unnecessarily prolonged foster care 
placement."  Care & Protection of Walt, supra at 222, quoting H. 
Rep. 96–136, 96th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1979).16 
 
 
16 See, e.g., Care & Protection of Walt, 478 Mass. at 223 
("removal of a child from his or her parents is a last resort"); 
Petition of the Dep't of Pub. Welfare to Dispense with Consent 
to Adoption, 383 Mass. 573, 587-588 (1981) (parents have 
 
19 
 
 
The department also argues that "[a] parent has many 
avenues available to raise a claim of inadequate services," 
including an abuse of discretion motion directed at the services 
provided by the department and administrative remedies.  
Adoption of West, 97 Mass. App. Ct. at 242-243 ("A claim of 
inadequate services can be raised by a so-called 'abuse of 
discretion' motion"), citing Adoption of Daisy, 77 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 781 ("It is well-established that a parent must raise a 
claim of inadequate services in a timely manner").  However, the 
existence of these alternative remedies does not contradict the 
statutory requirements regarding reasonable efforts 
determinations.  Further, none of the alternative "avenues" put 
forward by the department is the legal equivalent of a 
reasonable efforts determination.  See Adoption of West, supra.  
They serve different purposes and meet different legal 
requirements.  The department has a statutory requirement to 
 
fundamental right to custody of their children, and child's best 
interest is best served in custody of parent as "a stable, 
continuous family environment"); National Council of Juvenile 
and Family Court Judges, Enhanced Resource Guidelines 27 (2016) 
("More frequent and timely court oversight can effectively move 
children to safe permanency sooner"); L. Edwards, Reasonable 
Efforts:  A Judicial Perspective 98 (2014) ("Early attention to 
reasonable efforts means that critical issues will be addressed 
quickly and efficiently. . . .  Children and families are in 
trauma as the result of social services and court intervention.  
The longer the process takes, the more extensive the 
trauma. . . .  Early inquiry into these issues will result in 
earlier determinations regarding reunification.  It will serve 
the best interest of children and their families"). 
20 
 
make reasonable efforts, but discretionary authority regarding 
particular services.  Compare G. L. c. 119, §§ 24, 26, 29B, 29C 
(mandating judicial determination of reasonable efforts), and 
Care & Protection of Walt, 478 Mass. at 221 (department has 
"obligation to make reasonable efforts . . . making it possible 
for the child to return safely to his [or her] parent or 
guardian" [citation omitted]), with Matter of McKnight, 406 
Mass. at 792 (means of fulfilling obligation is within 
discretion of public agency). 
 
Importantly, contesting a specific service or services 
through an abuse of discretion motion differs significantly from 
a reasonable efforts determination.  An abuse of discretion 
motion is a narrower claim that a service has been provided 
inadequately or that the department's refusal or requirement of 
a particular service falls "outside the range of reasonable 
alternatives," L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 
(2014), from which the department has discretion to choose to 
"fulfil its legal obligation" to make reasonable efforts in the 
context of the case at issue, Care & Protection of Isaac, 419 
Mass. at 606-607.  A reasonable efforts determination 
necessarily requires a judge to consider the contested service 
or services, but it is a more comprehensive review of the 
entirety of the department's actions in the context of a 
particular case.  See, e.g., Care & Protection of Walt, 478 
21 
 
Mass. at 227 ("What constitutes reasonable efforts . . . must be 
evaluated in the context of each individual case, considering 
any exigent circumstances that might exist"); Adoption of Ilona, 
459 Mass. at 61-62 (reviewing multiple facets of case as part of 
review of reasonable efforts determination).  As discussed 
infra, the department bears the burden of showing that it has 
made reasonable efforts.  In contrast, the department has 
discretionary authority regarding which particular services to 
recommend, and how those services shall be provided.  The 
adequacy of such services must be evaluated in the context of 
the department's discretionary authority.17 
 
Similarly, other administrative remedies that the 
department raises as alternatives to reasonable efforts 
determinations are not functional or legal equivalents.  
Internal administrative review is not equivalent to independent 
judicial oversight; it is a lengthy administrative process, 
governed by different standards, and subject to the direction 
 
 
17 As we discuss infra, a judge may determine that a motion 
titled as a motion for a determination of reasonable efforts 
would be more appropriately treated as a motion for discretion.  
Such a conclusion should not be confused with the notion that an 
abuse of discretion motion and a reasonable efforts 
determination are equivalent.  On the contrary, a judge has the 
discretion to conclude that the motion has been mislabeled:  
that in substance the motion for a reasonable efforts 
determination is more properly considered a challenge to the 
provision of a particular discretionary service, not the 
reasonable efforts towards reunification as a whole. 
22 
 
and control of the department.18  Even when not delayed, the 
regulatory timeline for a fair hearing process can extend to 
over six months, excluding judicial review.  See 110 Code Mass. 
Regs. §§ 10.08, 10.10, 10.29 (2014).  The department's 
suggestions that utilizing administrative processes other than 
the department's formal review process, such as rejecting the 
action plan or "raising their concern with the department," are 
adequate solutions are similarly unavailing.  Independent 
judicial oversight through a reasonable efforts determination is 
different from administrative resolution processes in kind, not 
degree. 
 
Thus, none of the "avenues available to raise a claim of 
inadequate services" is the legal equivalent of a reasonable 
efforts determination.  Adoption of West, 97 Mass. App. Ct. at 
242.  Nor could they displace a reasonable efforts requirement, 
given the express statutory requirement in § 29C governing 
reasonable efforts determinations. 
 
Giving meaning to the plain language of § 29C, which aligns 
with express legislative intent, we conclude that a Juvenile 
Court judge has discretion to make a reasonable efforts 
 
 
18 A recent independent audit, although recognizing 
progress, identified serious concerns with the timeliness, 
procedural obstacles, and independence of the department's 
administrative review process.  See Ripples Group, Report to the 
Office of the Child Advocate and the Legislature Regarding the 
Department of Children and Families (DCF) Fair Hearing System 5-
6, 9-10, 19 (June 29, 2015). 
23 
 
determination more frequently than once a year.  It naturally 
follows from this interpretation and the Juvenile Court rules 
governing motions that a party may file a motion for a 
determination of reasonable efforts before the passage of a 
year.19  See Rule 7 of the Care and Protection Rules (governing 
motion practice); Rule 14(B) of the Care and Protection Rules 
(court may hear motions regarding the department's plan to 
achieve permanence and service issues at any time "in the 
interests of justice").  Concluding that a party may properly 
file such a motion also aligns with the established requirement 
that claims regarding services must be raised "in a timely 
manner so that reasonable accommodations may be made."  Adoption 
of Gregory, 434 Mass. 117, 124 (2001).  See Adoption of West, 97 
Mass. App. Ct. at 242 ("Raising the issue at an early stage in 
the proceedings allows the department to remedy the inadequate 
services, which in turn fosters a greater chance of family 
reunification"). 
 
3.  Deciding the motion.  Once a party has made a motion 
for a determination of reasonable efforts, the Juvenile Court 
judge has multiple options based on the merits of the filing.  
As explained infra, the judge may simply deny the motion for a 
 
 
19 A Juvenile Court judge may also make a reasonable efforts 
determination sua sponte, consistent with the permissive 
language of § 29C and the importance of judicial oversight in 
care and protection cases. 
24 
 
reasonable efforts determination if the burden of production is 
not met.  If the burden of production is met and the motion is 
properly framed as a challenge to the department's reasonable 
efforts towards reunification, the judge may proceed to conduct 
a reasonable efforts determination.20  The judge may also 
determine that the motion is more appropriately considered an 
abuse of discretion motion directed at a particular service or 
services provided by the department, rather than the 
department's reasonable efforts to reunify the family more 
generally. 
 
In evaluating a motion for a reasonable efforts 
determination, as in all matters and decisions by the 
department, "[t]he health and safety of the child shall be of 
paramount concern and shall include the long-term well-being of 
the child."  G. L. c. 119, § 1.  Thus, time is also of the 
essence.  In making its decision, the court must consider not 
only the need for a timely resolution of the contested issues 
regarding reasonable efforts, but also timely resolution of the 
 
 
20 In deciding the motion, the judge may consider whether a 
permanency hearing is imminent.  If so, the judge may use his or 
her discretion to conduct a single reasonable efforts 
determination at the permanency hearing, rather than conduct two 
reasonable efforts determinations so close in time that they are 
nearly identical.  In considering whether to combine the two 
proceedings, the judge must weigh the effect of any delay in 
addressing and remedying inadequacies in the department's 
reasonable efforts towards reunification. 
25 
 
entire care and protection case itself.21  In most circumstances, 
resolving the underlying issue regarding reasonable efforts 
expeditiously will promote a timely resolution of the entire 
case by establishing either that the services are reasonable or 
that they require correction.  At the same time, prolonged or 
protracted proceedings regarding the reasonable efforts 
determination must nonetheless be avoided to avoid unnecessary 
and harmful delays.  See National Council of Juvenile and Family 
Court Judges, Enhanced Resource Guidelines 29-30 (2016) (noting 
both negative effects of "[c]ourt delays caused by prolonged 
litigation" and importance of judicial oversight in holding 
agency accountable to provide services in timely manner).  See 
also Care & Protection of Walt, 478 Mass. at 222 (foster care 
should not be "unnecessarily prolonged"); Adoption of West, 97 
Mass. App. Ct. at 242 (stressing need to address inadequate 
services early in proceedings to "foster[] a greater chance of 
family reunification); Adoption of Emily, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 579, 
581 (1988), citing Custody of a Minor, 389 Mass. 755, 764 & n. 
2, (1983) (emphasizing that "[s]peedy resolution of cases 
involving issues of custody or adoption is desirable"); Connor 
B. ex rel. Vigurs v. Patrick, 985 F. Supp. 2d 129, 138-156 (D. 
 
 
21 Of course, the judge's consideration should not be 
limited to the factors discussed here.  It is impossible to 
create an exhaustive list of all the relevant considerations in 
a care and protection case. 
26 
 
Mass. 2013) (extensive findings of fact regarding negative 
effects of extended foster care in Massachusetts); G. L. c. 119, 
§ 1 (prioritizing reunification and providing resources to 
families); 110 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 1.01-1.02 (2008) 
(department's policy prioritizes reunification and "swift 
action," and "substitute care is a temporary solution"). 
 
The party seeking a reasonable efforts determination bears 
the burden of production -- that is, the "obligation to come 
forward with evidence to support its claim."  Bulwer v. Mount 
Auburn Hosp., 473 Mass. 672, 681 n.7 (2016), quoting Director, 
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, Dep't of Labor v. 
Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 272 (1994).  Cf. Care & 
Protection of Erin, 443 Mass. at 568 (moving party seeking 
review and redetermination of care and protection adjudication 
"bears an initial burden to produce some credible evidence").  
Thus, to satisfy the burden of production, the moving party must 
submit evidence that, if found credible at an evidentiary 
hearing, would support the claim that the department has not 
made reasonable efforts to reunify the family.22  In many cases, 
the burden of production may be satisfied by the affidavit that 
must accompany all motions in Juvenile Court.  See Rule 7(B) of 
the Care and Protection Rules (motion must be accompanied by 
 
 
22 The moving party's burden of production should not be 
confused with the department's burden of proof, discussed infra. 
27 
 
"affidavit signed by the person with personal knowledge of the 
factual basis of the motion" that "shall state with 
particularity the grounds therefor").  Where the judge 
determines that the burden of production has not been satisfied, 
the judge may simply deny the motion for a determination of 
reasonable efforts. 
 
4.  Further judicial discretion regarding motions for a 
reasonable efforts determination.  A motion titled as a motion 
for a determination of reasonable efforts may, in some 
instances, be more appropriately considered a challenge to a 
specific service or services or lack thereof.  In those 
instances, where a parent has not satisfied the burden of 
production regarding the department's reasonable efforts as a 
whole, but only raised questions regarding a particular service 
or services, a judge has multiple options.  The judge can deny 
the motion for a reasonable efforts determination, explaining 
that the department's reasonable efforts as a whole have not 
been adequately challenged.  It is also within a judge's 
discretion to treat the motion as an abuse of discretion motion 
contesting a particular service and address the merits of the 
motion.  See Munshani v. Signal Lake Venture Fund II, LP, 60 
Mass. App. Ct. 714, 721 (2004), quoting Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 
U.S. 626, 630-631 (1962) (courts have control "to manage their 
own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious 
28 
 
disposition of cases").23  This conclusion reflects the long-
standing principle that judges have the flexibility to decide a 
motion based on its substance, rather than its title.  See, 
e.g., Care & Protection of Manuel, 428 Mass. 527, 532 (1998), 
quoting Lambley v. Kameny, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 277, 280 (1997) 
("the label attached to a pleading or motion is far less 
important than its substance"); Colorio v. Marx, 72 Mass. App. 
Ct. 382, 385 (2008), quoting Honer v. Wisniewski, 48 Mass. App. 
Ct. 291, 294 (1999) ("Courts may determine whether and under 
what section relief might be granted; the label attached to the 
motion is not dispositive"); Watros v. Greater Lynn Mental 
Health & Retardation Ass'n, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 657, 662 n.7 
(1994), S.C., 421 Mass. 106 (1995) (citing multiple practice 
guides for principle that "[i]t is, of course, the substance of 
a motion and not its technical name or label that determines its 
nature and legal effect"). 
 
Most importantly, the exercise of discretion here requires 
a careful review of the substance of the motion, particularly 
the affidavit in support thereof, and the distinctions discussed 
above regarding whether the motion is properly raising questions 
about the department's reasonable efforts towards reunification 
or is challenging the provision of a particular discretionary 
 
 
23 At a hearing on the motion, a judge may also, of course, 
attempt to resolve the issue expeditiously and informally 
through agreement by the parties. 
29 
 
service or services.24  Finally, this decision should not be 
based on judicial efficiency.  Rather, it should be based on the 
scope and substance of the motion, "the health and safety . . . 
[and] the long-term well-being of the child," and "the 
strengthening and encouragement of family life."  G. L. c. 119, 
§ 1. 
5.  Burden of proof.  The ultimate burden of proof of 
reasonable efforts determinations is not in dispute here, and is 
only briefly addressed by the parties.  When a properly framed 
request for a reasonable efforts determination is made and the 
burden of production is met, the department retains the burden 
of proving that it has made reasonable efforts to reunify the 
family.  See Care & Protection of Erin, 443 Mass. at 571 
(upholding department's burden of proof for both initial care 
and protection proceedings and review and redetermination 
because of parental liberty interests).  Where, as with 
reasonable efforts, the State "has the power to shape the 
historical events that form the basis for" future requests for 
termination of parental rights, it is appropriate for the burden 
 
 
24 We note that there may be unusual circumstances where a 
motion may only address a single service and still be an 
appropriate motion for reasonable efforts determination.  For 
example, if the department determines that the only necessary 
service is a particular type of counseling, but only refers the 
parent to one counseling resource with a six-month waiting list, 
the movant could credibly claim that the department's over-all 
efforts towards reunification do not meet the reasonable efforts 
standard. 
30 
 
of proof to remain with the department.  Id., quoting Santosky 
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 763 (1982).  This is consistent with 
other instances when a reasonable efforts determination is made, 
at which the department also bears the burden of proof.  See 
Care & Protection of Walt, 478 Mass. at 220, quoting Care & 
Protection of Robert, 408 Mass. 52, 68 (1990) (department bears 
burden of proof at seventy-two hour hearing); Adoption of Ilona, 
459 Mass. at 60-61 (department must show parent unfit and 
reasonable efforts determination must be made before terminating 
parental rights); Care & Protection of Erin, supra ("where a 
parent is deprived of the right to raise his or her child . . . 
it is never permissible . . . to shift the burden of proof to 
the respondent parent," in reference to "care and protection 
proceeding" and "cases that involve severing parental rights"); 
G. L. c. 119, §§ 29B (d), 29C (mandating judicial determination 
of reasonable efforts at permanency hearings and removals).25 
 
 
25 For the same reasons outlined in Care & Protection of 
Walt, 478 Mass. at 228, where a judge finds that the department 
"failed to fulfil its duty to make reasonable efforts . . . [the 
judge] ha[s] the equitable authority to order the department to 
take reasonable remedial steps to diminish the adverse 
consequences of its breach of duty."  Id., citing G. L. c. 218, 
§ 59 (Juvenile Court has equity jurisdiction in all cases and 
matters arising under G. L. c. 119).  Nonetheless, "[w]here a 
court contemplates an injunctive order to compel an executive 
agency to take specific steps, it must tread cautiously in order 
to safeguard the separation of powers mandated by art. 30 of the 
Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution."  Care 
& Protection of Walt, supra at 230, quoting Smith v. 
Commissioner of Transitional Assistance, 431 Mass. 638, 651 
 
31 
 
 
Conclusion.  We answer the first three reported questions 
as follows: 
 
There is no requirement, following judicial certification 
of reasonable efforts at the emergency custody hearing and the 
seventy-two hour hearing pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 24, that a 
trial court judge, upon the motion of a parent or child, 
determine that the department has continued to engage in 
reasonable efforts at any time prior to the statutorily mandated 
annual review prescribed in G. L. c. 119, § 29C; however, the 
trial court judge has the discretion to make such a 
determination upon the motion of a parent or child.  The moving 
party bears the burden of producing evidence that, if found 
credible at an evidentiary hearing, would support the claim that 
the department has not made reasonable efforts to reunify the 
family.  If the burden of production is not met, the judge may 
simply deny the motion.  The judge also has the discretion to 
conclude that the motion, albeit inadequate as a challenge to 
the reasonableness of the department's over-all efforts to 
reunify the family, is nonetheless sufficient to challenge the 
adequacy of a specific discretionary service or services and 
address the merits of the motion as an abuse of discretion 
motion.  In response to such a motion by a parent or child, the 
 
(2000).  Of course, at all times the physical and psychological 
health and safety of the child is paramount.  G. L. c. 119, § 1. 
32 
 
department bears the burden of proving that it continues to 
engage in reasonable efforts. 
 
We decline to answer the fourth reported question.  For 
clarity, we respond that an abuse of discretion motion is not 
the legal equivalent of a motion for a reasonable efforts 
determination; they serve different purposes and must meet 
different legal requirements.  A reasonable efforts 
determination necessarily requires a judge to consider the 
contested service or services, but it is a more comprehensive 
review of the entirety of the department's actions in the 
context of a particular case.  The department also bears the 
statutory burden of showing that it has made reasonable efforts.  
In contrast, the department has discretionary authority 
regarding which particular services to recommend, and how those 
services shall be provided.  Therefore, a party may not properly 
raise the issue of the department's failure to engage in 
reasonable efforts through a motion for abuse of discretion.  A 
more complicated question is presented when a party's motion for 
a reasonable efforts determination is in substance a challenge 
only to a particular service or service.  As discussed in detail 
supra, a party's labeling of a motion does not control the 
judge's decision-making, as a judge reviews the substance of the 
motion -- not just its form or title.  The judge therefore has 
the discretion, if he or she so chooses, to convert such a 
33 
 
motion for a reasonable efforts determination into an abuse of 
discretion motion and address its merits as a challenge to a 
discretionary decision by the department. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.