Title: Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Estate of Werning

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

233 Kan. 671 (1983)
665 P.2d 192
UNION NATIONAL BANK & TRUST COMPANY, of Manhattan, Kansas, Conservator of the Estate of Herman A. Werning, An Incapacitated Person, Appellant,
v.
THE ESTATE OF HERMAN A. WERNING, Deceased, PAUL E. MILLER, Administrator, Appellee.
No. 55,012

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed June 10, 1983.
Charles S. Arthur, of Arthur, Green, Arthur & Conderman, of Manhattan, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.
Anne Burke Miller, of Ball & Miller, of Manhattan, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
McFARLAND, J.:
The issue presented in this appeal is whether the nonclaim statute (K.S.A. 59-2239) bars payment from a decedent's estate of conservatorship and guardian fees and expenses allowed in a conservatorship estate where no claim or demand has been filed in the decedent's estate within six months after the date of the first published notice to creditors. The district court held the failure of the conservator Union National Bank & Trust Company of Manhattan, Kansas, to exhibit a claim in the decedent's estate pursuant to K.S.A. 59-2239 barred payment of same by the decedent's estate. The bank appeals from said determination.
Defendant Estate of Herman A. Werning, deceased, is in agreement with the facts as recited in the appellant bank's brief. These facts are summarized as follows. On July 3, 1980, the Riley County District Court issued Letters of Conservatorship to the *672 bank for Herman A. Werning, an incapacitated person (Case No. 80 P 53). The ward's daughter, Wilma A. Brooks, was named guardian of Mr. Werning.
On May 6, 1981, the ward died intestate. On May 15, 1981, Mr. Werning's widow, Helen L. Werning, petitioned the Riley County District Court (Case No. 81 P 46) to appoint an administrator for the estate of Herman A. Werning, deceased. On May 19, 1981, notice to creditors was published pursuant to K.S.A. 59-2236 by the decedent's estate.
On May 26, 1981, the conservator bank filed a petition in the conservatorship for final settlement including allowance of fiduciary fees and expenses. On July 29, 1981, the Court in the conservatorship allowed the following fees and expenses: (1) guardian fees $660.00; (2) guardian expenses $675.00; (3) conservator fees $1,065.00 and (4) conservator expenses (attorney fees) $2,915.17. On the same date the conservator bank was directed to pay the deceased's funeral bill and $500.00 to the guardian ad litem. The guardian and guardian ad litem were each discharged at that time. The conservator bank paid the funeral bill. Additionally the guardian was paid her expenses and a partial payment was made on the guardian fees. There were insufficient liquid assets in the conservatorship to pay the balance of the allowed fees and expenses.
Mr. Werning left three heirs. They are his two daughters, Wilma A. Brooks and Adria Gay Parker, and his widow, Helen L. Werning, who is the stepmother of deceased's daughters. There was much dissension among the heirs as to who should be appointed administrator. As a result thereof the administrator, Paul E. Miller, was not appointed until October 20, 1981. In the interim period the bank performed services for the decedent's estate in an unofficial capacity but the bank's claim for fees and expenses does not involve any of these transitional services. On November 19, 1981, the six-month period for exhibiting claims against the decedent's estate, pursuant to K.S.A. 59-2239, expired. On May 19, 1982, the bank filed a "Petition to Intervene and For Order to Deliver Funds" in the decedent's estate. The purpose of the petition was stated as follows:
On June 11, 1982, the petition was heard. On September 2, 1982, the petition was denied on the grounds the claim was barred by K.S.A. 59-2239. The Bank, former conservator, appeals therefrom.
The issue presented appears to be one of first impression in Kansas. The nonclaim statute, K.S.A. 59-2239, provides:
*674 K.S.A. 59-2236 sets forth the requirements of the published notice to creditors of a decedent's estate and is reproduced in pertinent part as follows:
K.S.A. 59-2237 sets forth how a demand may be exhibited in a decedent's estate and is reproduced in pertinent part as follows:
To recapitulate, K.S.A. 59-2239, the nonclaim statute, provides "[a]ll demands ... against a decedent's estate ... not exhibited as required by this act within six (6) months after the date of the first published notice to creditors as herein provided, shall be forever barred from payment. ..." (Emphasis supplied.) Are the guardian's fees, conservator fees and conservator expenses for which payment is sought herein encompassed within the statutory term all demands? We believe logic mandates the question be answered affirmatively.
As stated in Gano Farms, Inc. v. Estate of Kleweno, 2 Kan. App.2d 506, 582 P.2d 742, rev. denied 225 Kan. 844 (1978):
Continuing:
"All demands" is certainly broad language. As noted in 3 Bartlett, Kansas Probate Law and Practice § 1316 (Rev. ed. 1953):
In In re Estate of Grindrod, 158 Kan. 345, 148 P.2d 278 (1944), this court discussed the broad application of the statute as follows:
Exceptions from the requirement of having to file claims against a probate estate are not favored by law. One treatise has observed:
K.S.A. 59-2239(2) provides a limited exception to the six-month limitation imposed on those making demands against an estate. It provides an individual who has a tort claim against the decedent may file suit against the personal representative at any time within the statute of limitations for the tort action itself, notwithstanding the limitations of K.S.A. 59-2239. Gatewood v. Bosch, 2 Kan. App.2d 474, 478, 581 P.2d 1198 (1978).
In 1979 Mr. Richard C. Harris, writing in the Kansas Law Review, commented:
Bartlett's Kansas Probate Law and Practice, in discussing the purpose of the nonclaim statute, declared:
The district court in its opinion denying the conservator's action to intervene and take funds from the sale of the deceased's real estate, noted the repercussions the bank's argument could have upon the stability and certainty of probate administration as follows:
Jones v. St. Francis Hosp. & School of Nursing, 225 Kan. 649, *677 594 P.2d 162 (1979), has been cited by both parties to this action and was referred to by the court below. In Jones the hospital obtained a personal judgment against the deceased before his death. After his death the hospital did not comply with the nonclaim statute. The hospital's claim was held barred by reason of its failure to comply with K.S.A. 59-2239. The estate in the instant action asserts the status of the hospital, as a judgment creditor, is akin to the status of the conservator bank in the present litigation. Namely, both the hospital and the bank had obtained court judgments. The hospital had obtained its judgment through a personal action against the deceased before his death and the bank had received its judgment in the final accounting of a conservatorship. As the court in Jones ruled it was necessary for the hospital to have taken its personal judgment and complied with K.S.A. 59-2239, the estate herein argues it was also necessary for the conservator to have taken its award in the conservatorship case and complied with the nonclaim statute by filing a claim in the decedent's estate. The district court herein found Jones persuasive when it stated:
While Jones is factually distinguishable from the instant action, Jones and its legal ancestors, e.g., Burns v. Drake, 157 Kan. 367, 139 P.2d 386 (1943); In re Estate of Charles, 158 Kan. 460, 148 P.2d 765, modified on rehearing 159 Kan. 228, 154 P.2d 117 (1944); In re Estate of Bourke, 159 Kan. 553, 156 P.2d 501 (1945), 157 A.L.R. 1107, stand for the proposition a party seeking to remove something from a decedent's estate must comply with the nonclaim statute in the absence of an express statutory exception such as set forth in K.S.A. 59-2239(2). No such statutory exception exists applicable to the guardian and conservator fees and expenses herein.
We therefore conclude the district court did not err in holding the bank's claim for guardian and conservator fees and expenses was barred by the nonclaim statute, K.S.A. 59-2239.
The judgment is affirmed.
MILLER, J., dissenting.