Title: MARRIAGE OF BERTHIAUME

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 13554 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE OF MONTANA 1977 I N RE: THE MARRIAGE OF SIFROY J. BERTHIAUME, P e t i t i o n e r and Respondent, -vs- PAULINE H . BERTHIAUME , Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable P e t e r Meloy, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: / ; ; j 1 & C h r i s t i a n , McCurdy, Ingr9,ham & Wold, - & - , Montana Keith McCurdy argued, For Respondent: G a r r i t y and Keegan, Helena, Montana Donald A. Garrity argued, Helena, Montana . . Filed: Submitted: May 2 4 , 1977 Decided : M r . Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court : This i s an appeal by the wife from the provisions of a - , divorce decree granted July 14, 1976, in the d i s t r i c t court, Lewis and Clark County, concerning property settlement and support of minor children. N o issue i s taken t o the granting of the divorce. Appellant presents three issues for review: Issue 1. Whether the d i s t r i c t court abused i t s discretion i n mhking the property division and distribution a s s e t forth in i t s decree? Issue 2. Whether the d i s t r i c t court abused i t s discretion b.fai1in.g t o provide for the support of the minor children of the parties i n i t s decree? Issue 3. Whether the d i s t r i c t court kbused its discretion by denying appellant's motion for a new t r i a l and overruling her objections to the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law? Sifroy and Pauline Berthiaume were married in June 1970. Both were employed and continued to be so u n t i l Pauline quit her job in August 1974 t o take care of their two children. While employed, Pauline earned $6,100 and Sifroy $8,100 per year. Their earningswere put into a joint account and used for family pur- poses. Following Pauline's termination of employment, she drew unemployment compensation for 14 months a t the r a t e of $68 per week, which was deposited t o the joint account. The parties used their t o t a l earnings for the family with the exception of $100 per montb paid by Sifroy for support of a child of a previous marriage. A t the time of the marriage the p a r t i e s bought a home i n Helena. Sifroy paid $5,500 a s a down payment by cashing c e r t i - f i c a t e s of deposit. I n August 1973 the p a r t i e s purchased another home with 2 112 acres a t Elliston, Montana. They borrowed $6,000 from Pauline's parents t o ,make the down payment, paying it back when the Helena home was sold. I n addition, from the proceeds of the Helena s a l e they purchased some c a t t l e . The purchase price. of the E l l i s t o n property was $25,000 and a t the date of hearing approximately $16,000 remained t o be paid on the mortgage. The estimated value of the home and property was between $30,000 and $35,000. During the period they lived a t Elliston,they raised a few c a t t l e . The maximum number was 27 head. 7 head were given t o Pauline by her parents. Both p a r t i e s t e s t i f i e d t o the ownership of various items of personal property and the desired distribution. A t the time of t r i a l the minor children were aged 5 and 3 and were i n Pauline's custody. A t t h a t time Sifroy was earning $821 per month and Pauline, who was working f o r hourly wages a s a waitress and j a n i t r e s s , was making approximately $400 per month. Issue 1. Section 48-321(1), R.C.M. 1947, controls the t r i a l c o u r t ' s consideration and disposition of the marital property. This s t a t u t e provides: "Disposition of property. (1) I n a proceeding f o r dissolution of a marriage, l e g a l separation, o r disposition of property following a decree of dis- solution of marriage o r legal separation by a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse o r lacked jurisdiction t o dispose of the property, the.court, without regard t o marital misconduct, s h a l l , and i n a proceeding f o r l e g a l separation may, f i n a l l y equitably apportion between the p a r t i e s the property and a s s e t s belonging t o e i t h e r or both however and whenever acquired, and whether the t i t l e thereto i s i n the name of the husband or wife or both. In making apportionment the court shall consider the duration of the marriage, and prior marriage of either party, antenuptial agreement of the parties, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational s k i l l s , employability, estate, l i a b i l i t i e s , and need of each of the parties, custodial provisions, whether the apportionment i s i n l i e u of o r i n addition to maintenance, and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. The court shall also consider the contribution ,or dissipation of value of the respective estates, and the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker or t o the family unit. I n disposing of property acquired prior t o the marriage; property acquired by g i f t , bequest, devise or descent; property acquired i n exchange for property acquired before the marriage o r i n exchange for property acquired by g i f t , bequest, devise, or descent; the increased value of property acquired prior to marriage; and property acquired by a spouse a f t e r a decree of legal separation, the court shall consider those contributions of the other spouse t o the marriage, including the nonmonetary contribution of a homemaker; the extent t o which such contributions have facilitated the maintenance of t h i s property and whether or not the property disposition serves a s an alternative to maintenance arrangements. I t Here, the t r i a l court i n i t s findings of fact No. V I I I , found : "That the parties accumulated real and personal property which i s held mostly i n joint tenancy. "The properties of the parties should be divided as equally as possible." Then, the court went on, and awarded Sifroy Che family home without making anif6ffsetting provision for Pauline. Under the evidence, the t o t a l market value of the property awarded Pauline amounts t o less than $1,000 while that awarded Sifroy amounts t o over $17,000. I n percentages, Sifroy apparently re- ceived well over 90 percent of the combined r e a l and personal property --and such award -5s direcfly- contraryJ- to? the ;df'stri&t -court1 s finding of fact No. V I I I , that the property should be divided as equally as possible. Accordingly, it amounts t o a clear abuse of discretion by the t r i a l court and must be reconsidered. I n Porter v.! Porter, 155 Mont. 451, 457, 473 P.2d 538, t h i s Court stated the scope of review by the Supreme Court on appeal i n cases involving a claim that the d i s t r i c t court abused its discre t ion : "* * *a reviewing court i s never justified in substituting its discretion for that of the t r i a l court. In determining whether the t r i a l court abused i t s discretion, the question is.-not whether the reviewing court agrees with the t r i a l court, but, rather, did the t r i a l court i n the exercise of .its dis&retio~i'a~t~arbitsariity',wfthout ,the: ; c 3 : employment of conscientious judgment or exceed the bounds of reason, i n view of a l l the circum- stances, ignoring recognized principles resulting i n substantial injustice." 155 Mont. 457. Issue 2 is directed a t the failure of the t r i a l court t o make provisions i n its judgment decree for the support and maintenance of the minor children. The d i s t r i c t court did make i t s finding of fact No. V I and i t s conclusion of law No. 3, providing : I . That the petitioner i s an able-bodied person who is capable of contributing t o the support and maintenance of the said minor children of the parties hereto. That the petitioner is a t the present time employed by the State Motor Pool, State of Montana, and holding a position with that department which pays approximately $800 a month. That $50 a month per child is a reasonable sum t o be contributed by the petitioner for the support of said minor children. That support payments should continue for each of said children u n t i l said child reaches the age of 18, or is emancipated, whichever should occur first." "3. That petitioner s h a l l pay t o respondent the reasonable sum of $50 per month per child for the support of said minor children of the parties hereto; that said support payments shall continue for each of said children u n t i l said child reaches the age of 18, o r is emancipated, whichever should occur f i r s t ; that the petitioner s h a l l maintain i n force and effect an insurance policy providing for medical and hospitali- zation coverage for the minor children of the parties hereto; that both petitioner and respondent are able- bodied persons capable of providing for the reasonable medical, dental and optical expenses incurred for the proper care and maintenance of the minor children of the parties hereto over and above those amounts covered by the insurance policy presently i n effect on said children; that, therefore, a l l medical, dental and optical expenses incurred for the proper care and maintenance of the minor children of the parties hereto, over and above those amounts covered by the insurance policy presently in effect on said children, s h a l l be divided equally between petitioner and respondent." The failure of the t r i a l court t o make provision i n the decree for the support of the minor children was an obvious oversight and must be corrected. The controlling statute i n t h i s respect is section 48-323, R.C.M. 1947: "In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, legal separation, maintenance, or child support, the court may order either or both parents owing a duty of support t o a child t o pay an amount reasonable or necessary for h i s support, without regard t o marital misconduct, a f t e r considering a l l relevant factors including: "(1) the financial resources of the child; "(2) the financial resources of the custodial parent ; "(3) the standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved; "(4) the physical and emotional condition of thechild, and h i s educational needs; and " (5) the financial resources and needs of the noncustodial parent. " O n remand, the d i s t r i c t court is directed t o make an award of support money i n its decree i n conformity with section 48-323. Issue three concerns denial by the d i s t r i c t court of appel- lant ' s motion for a new t r i a l and the overruling of her objections t o i t s findings of fact and conclusions of law. Section 93-5602, R:C.M. 1947, provides: "New t r i a l i n equity cases. N o new t r i a l shall be granted i n equity cases, o r i n cases t r i e d by the court without a jury, except on the grounds mentioned i n the f i r s t , third, and fourth subdivision of section 93-5603 ." Section 93-5603, R.C.M.1947, provides in relevant part: "When a new t r i a l may be granted. The former verdict or other decision may be vacated and a new t r i a l granted, on the application of the party aggrieved, for any of the following causes, materially affecting the substantial rights of such party: "1. Irregularity i n the proceedings of the court, jury, or adverse party, or any order of the court, o r abuse of discretion, by which'either party was pre- vented from having a f a i r t r i a l ; "-3. Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against; 4 . Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced a t the t r i a l * * *.Ir This Court i n Downs v. Downs, , Mont . , 551 P.2d 1025, 1026, 1027, 33 St.Rep. 576, 578, 579, remanded the cause t o the d i s t r i c t court with directions t o hold a new t r i a l stating: "In view of the unreliability of the record a s t o the true net worth of defendant a t the time of the marriage and a t the time of the divorce, the judgment i s s e t aside." Further i n Downs in support of its conclusion, t h i s Court stated: 'I* * * This failure t o fully put before the t r i a l court proper valuation of a l l the property caused the t r i a l court t o make an inequitable distribution of the property -;insofar?: as p l a i n t i f f ' s needs are concerned .I' Paulinet s motions t o amend the findings of fact and conclu- sions of law and t o a l t e r o r amend the judgment should have been granted by the d i s t r i c t court for the reasons hereinbefore recited. A s an alternative, Pauline asked for a new t r i a l . This motion was also denied. This denial constituted an abuse of discretion i n that the d i s t r i c t court should have required testimony on the value of the real and personal property, thus enabling it to make an equal distribution of the marital assets and provide for the support of the minor children. The t r i a l court's decree i s s e t aside and the cause i s remanded for new t r i a l on the issues of equitable division of r e a l and personal property of the parties and for determination and inclusion i n the decree of a provision for the support of the minor children. W e Concur: c h i e m u s t ice' /\.