Title: Care and Protection of M.C.

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12339 
 
CARE AND PROTECTION OF M.C. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 3, 2017. - April 9, 2018. 
 
Present (Sitting at Greenfield):  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, 
Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Impoundment.  Minor, Care and protection.  Parent and Child, 
Care and protection of minor.  Constitutional Law, Waiver 
of constitutional rights, Impoundment order, Self-
incrimination.  Witness, Self-incrimination.  Evidence, 
Communication between patient and psychotherapist.  
Practice, Civil, Care and protection proceeding, 
Impoundment order, Waiver.  Waiver. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on December 28, 2016. 
 
 
The case was reported by Lenk, J. 
 
 
 
Jeanne M. Kaiser (Bonnie G. Allen also present) for the 
mother. 
 
Mark H. Bluver for the father. 
 
Steven Greenbaum, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Scott R. Chapman, Committee for Public Counsel Services 
(Jessica McArdle, Committee for Public Counsel Services, also 
present) for the child. 
 
 
2 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  In this case, we consider the appropriate 
standards and procedures for requests by the parties and the 
Commonwealth for the release of impounded records in a care and 
protection proceeding in the Juvenile Court.  The mother and the 
father are the subjects of a care and protection proceeding 
commenced in the Juvenile Court by the Department of Children 
and Families (department), and are defendants in criminal child 
abuse cases pending in the Superior Court.  The records from the 
care and protection proceeding, including the transcripts and 
exhibits from a trial to terminate parental rights, are 
impounded, pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 38, and Juvenile Court 
Standing Order 1-84, Mass. Ann. Laws Court Rules, Standing 
Orders of the Juvenile Court, at 1107 (LexisNexis 2016). 
The father sought access to impounded records from the care 
and protection proceeding in conjunction with his upcoming 
criminal trial.  The Commonwealth also sought access to the 
records for its use in preparation for both the father's and the 
mother's pending criminal trials.  The mother opposed portions 
of the father's motion, and opposed the Commonwealth's motion in 
its entirety.  The child opposed the release of any records on 
privacy grounds.  Concluding that both the father and the 
Commonwealth had met the burden of demonstrating that there was 
good cause to grant the requested relief from impoundment, a 
Juvenile Court judge allowed both motions.  After the mother's 
3 
 
application for relief in the Appeals Court was denied, she 
filed a petition for relief in the county court, pursuant to 
G. L. c. 211, § 3; the single justice reserved and reported the 
case to the full court. 
In her report, the single justice asked the parties to 
address three specific issues, in addition to any other 
questions they thought relevant.  Those issues are the 
following: 
 
"1.  In determining whether Juvenile Court case 
records of care and protection proceedings should be 
released to the Commonwealth or a defendant in a related 
criminal proceeding, what standard should be used to 
evaluate the request for disclosure; whether the moving 
party or the party opposing disclosure has the burden of 
proof. 
 
 
"2.  Where a party to a care and protection proceeding 
voluntarily has disclosed therapeutic communications and 
records in connection with that proceeding, whether the 
waiver of the statutory patient-psychotherapist privilege 
and the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination 
is limited in scope to the care and protection proceeding. 
 
 
"3.  Whether standards and protocols similar to those 
applicable to discovery of third party documents in 
criminal proceedings, see Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 
122 (2006); Mass. R. Crim. P. 17, [378 Mass. 885 (1978),] 
should apply where the documents are sought by the 
Commonwealth or a defendant and consist of Juvenile Court 
case records of care and protection proceedings." 
 
 
We conclude that, where a party to the proceeding or the 
Commonwealth seeks access to the impounded records of a care and 
protection proceeding in the Juvenile Court, the requestor bears 
the burden of demonstrating that the records should be released 
4 
 
under the good cause standard of Rule 7 of the Uniform Rules on 
Impoundment Procedure, Mass. Ann. Laws Court Rules, Uniform 
Rules on Impoundment Procedure, at 930 (LexisNexis 2016) (Rule 
7).  If the proponent of release meets the good cause standard, 
records may be disclosed, for limited, confidential review and 
use, as the order in this case specified.  That these records 
may be discoverable, however, does not also make them admissible 
at a subsequent criminal proceeding.  Admissibility is a 
separate inquiry, best left, as the motion judge did here, to 
the trial judge, to weigh the multiple, at times competing, 
privacy interests and the constitutional rights involved. 
We conclude further that a parent's decision to present 
evidence at a care and protection proceeding does not result in 
a waiver of the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination at other proceedings.  Accordingly, at a 
subsequent criminal trial, where the rights involved and the 
stakes at issue are quite different, a party may rely on the 
privilege against self-incrimination and choose not to testify.  
In addition, we conclude that a parent's prior testimony at a 
care and protection trial is not admissible in a subsequent 
criminal proceeding.  Finally, as to the question whether the 
mother's waiver of her psychotherapist privilege at the care and 
protection proceeding would serve as a waiver of that privilege 
at a criminal trial, we conclude that the privilege is case-
5 
 
specific.  Should a parent decide to introduce his or her mental 
state as a defense at a subsequent criminal trial, the 
provisions of G. L. c. 233, § 20B (c), would be applicable to 
psychotherapist testimony introduced at a care and protection 
proceeding. 
The judge in this case determined that the confidential 
records from the care and protection trial should be released to 
the father and to the Commonwealth, but were not to be copied or 
disclosed to others, and were to be returned to the court at the 
end of the criminal proceedings.  He did not, however, discuss 
in his decision, nor appear to have considered, certain of the 
factors required in order to make a finding of good cause.  That 
is understandable, as the judge had no definitive guidance on 
the proper standard of review in questions of release from 
impoundment in a care and protection trial.  Accordingly, the 
matter is remanded to the county court for entry of an order 
vacating and setting aside the decision of the Juvenile Court 
judge and remanding the matter to the Juvenile Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
1.  Background.  For purposes of this appeal, the parties 
agreed to the following facts.  The mother and the father are 
defendants in criminal cases pending in the Superior Court.  The 
charges arose out of allegations that the father injected a 
6 
 
caustic substance into the child's cecostomy tube.1  The father 
is charged with attempted murder, assault and battery on a child 
by means of a dangerous weapon, two counts of assault and 
battery on a child causing substantial injury, and two counts of 
assault and battery on a child by permitting substantial bodily 
injury.  The mother is charged with two counts of assault and 
battery on a child causing substantial injury and two counts of 
assault and battery on a child by permitting substantial bodily 
injury. 
Based on related allegations, the department filed a care 
and protection petition on behalf of the child in the Juvenile 
Court.  A judge of that court held a trial on the department's 
care and protection petition on multiple days between May 2, 
2016, and July 8, 2016.  The record from that hearing, including 
the transcripts and exhibits, is impounded.  See G. L. c. 119, 
§ 38. 
 
In June, 2016, the father, who was present throughout the 
course of the care and protection trial, filed a motion 
requesting access to records from that proceeding, specifically 
"1) A complete unredacted copy of the trial transcript . . . ; 
2) All exhibits received by the [c]ourt in the referenced trial; 
                     
1 A cecostomy tube is a thin tube placed in a child's 
abdomen where the child has a blockage in the intestines; it is 
used to flush stool out of the intestines.  Stedman's Medical 
Dictionary 331 (28th ed. 2006). 
7 
 
3) The [c]ourt investigator's report(s); 4) The [guardian ad 
litem (GAL)] report(s); [and] 5) All pleadings filed in the 
referenced case."  The father's motion stated that he needed the 
records to prepare for his criminal trial and argued that his 
"due process rights to a fair trial require that his criminal 
counsel be allowed to review the requested records."  The father 
added that "many, if not all of the witnesses who have testified 
for" the department in the care and protection proceeding would 
be called by the Commonwealth in the criminal case.  Moreover, 
the father argued that much of the material must be disclosed 
because it is exculpatory, and also must be released to prepare 
him to cross-examine the witnesses against him, pursuant to his 
right to cross-examination under the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.  In October, 2016, the father filed 
a supplemental motion requesting access to the court's order, 
findings of fact, and conclusions of law in the care and 
protection trial. 
 
In July, 2016, the Commonwealth moved to intervene in the 
care and protection proceeding and to obtain access to the 
impounded trial record, as well as the other documents in the 
file.  The Commonwealth asserted an interest in the litigation 
because it is prosecuting the father and the mother, in separate 
proceedings, for crimes allegedly committed against the child.  
Specifically, the Commonwealth's motion sought access to witness 
8 
 
testimony and "[GAL reports], medical records, recordings and 
other relevant materials"; it asserted, without discussion, that 
the record in the care and protection proceeding "most likely 
provided significant information" that "is extremely relevant" 
to the criminal proceedings. 
 
The mother opposed portions of the father's motion; she did 
not oppose his request for transcripts of testimony from 
witnesses called by the department, the GAL report, or the 
investigator's report, but did oppose release of a transcript of 
her own testimony, which concerned, inter alia, her 
communications with her psychotherapist.  The mother argued that 
the father had failed to show good cause and was "attempt[ing] 
to circumvent the more restrictive and robust criminal discovery 
rules that govern production of many of the same materials in 
the criminal case," which "is expressly prohibited by Rule 11 of 
the Uniform Rules [on] Impoundment [Procedure, Mass. Ann. Laws 
Court Rules, Uniform Rules on Impoundment Procedure, at 937 
(LexisNexis 2016) (Rule 11)]."  The mother maintained further 
that her privacy interest in the testimony and the records of 
her psychologist, in conjunction with the lack of relevance of 
that material to the father's criminal trial, weighed against 
releasing it to the father.  She argued also that her testimony 
should not be released because it would not be admissible at the 
father's trial, where she retained the privilege not to testify. 
9 
 
 
The mother opposed the entirety of the Commonwealth's 
motion on other grounds.  She asserted that the Commonwealth had 
failed to identify relevant documents, and that it was 
attempting to use the Juvenile Court to circumvent the ordinary 
procedure for obtaining third-party and confidential documents 
in the criminal proceedings.  The mother argued that the 
Commonwealth had not shown good cause to obtain the medical 
records, medical testimony, and her own testimony, because that 
testimony and the records were protected by privilege in the 
criminal proceedings, notwithstanding her decision to testify at 
the trial on the termination of parental rights. 
 
The child opposed both parties' motions on the ground of 
her privacy interests.2 
 
After a hearing on the motions was held in August, 2016, 
the Juvenile Court judge allowed both the father's motions and 
the Commonwealth's motion.  The judge found that the father and 
the Commonwealth "met their burden of showing good cause for the 
release of court records."  In finding good cause, the judge 
relied on the child's interest in justice for her severe 
injuries and the parents' interest in just resolutions of their 
criminal cases.  The court allowed the parties access to the 
                     
2 On appeal, the child has changed position and now argues 
that the Juvenile Court judge's order should be affirmed as 
containing no abuse of discretion. 
10 
 
docket sheets, the transcripts, the evidence introduced at 
trial, and the judge's findings and decision in the care and 
protection proceeding.  Although he stated that the parties' 
motions were allowed, the judge's order permitted the release of 
"only trial records, not other files, including [GAL] reports 
not marked and admitted during the trial."  The judge stayed the 
order for ten days to allow any party to appeal. 
 
In December, 2016, the mother filed an emergency petition 
to a single justice of the Appeals Court.  The single justice 
stayed the order allowing release of impoundment pending 
resolution of the petition, then denied the petition a few weeks 
later.  The mother then filed an emergency petition for relief 
in the county court, and a single justice of this court issued a 
stay of the order allowing release.  The single justice 
subsequently reserved and reported the case to the full court, 
and ordered the parties to address in their briefs the three 
issues quoted supra:  the standard the Juvenile Court should use 
in evaluating whether impounded records should be disclosed and 
which party should bear the burden; whether a waiver of patient-
psychotherapist privilege in a care and protection proceeding, 
and a waiver to the privilege against self-incrimination, is 
limited in scope to that proceeding; and whether the standard 
for discovery of third-party documents in criminal proceedings, 
11 
 
see Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122 (2006), should apply to 
records in a care and protection case in the Juvenile Court. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Appropriate standard of review.  The 
Legislature has determined that care and protection proceedings 
are impounded and should be closed to the general public to 
protect the privacy of all of the parties.  See G. L. c. 119, 
§ 38.3  To do so, Juvenile Court Standing Order 1-84, adopted by 
this court on May 8, 1984, provides: 
 
"All [J]uvenile [C]ourt case records and reports are 
confidential and are the property of the court.  Reports 
loaned to or copied for attorneys of record, or such other 
persons as the court may permit, shall be returned to the 
court after their use or at the conclusion of the 
litigation, whichever occurs first.  Said reports shall not 
be further copied or released without permission of the 
court." 
 
Mass. Ann. Laws Court Rules, Standing Orders of the Juvenile 
Court, at 1107.  The order effectuates the purpose of G. L. 
                     
 
3 Following this court's decision in Care & Protection of 
Sharlene, 445 Mass. 756, 772 (2006), the Legislature amended the 
statute to allow public access to hearings in the Juvenile Court 
that are "related to court orders to not resuscitate or to 
withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment for children in the 
custody of the department under a care and protection order."  
See G. L. c. 119, § 38.  See also Care & Protection of Sharlene, 
supra at 773-775 (Spina, J., concurring) (although statute 
closes all care and protection hearings, "[a hearing about 
withdrawing life support] does not implicate the public policy 
concerns that provide the basis for closing care and protection 
cases to the public because it involves no accusation of 
parental unfitness, remediation of parental unfitness, or stigma 
associated with parental unfitness that the child will carry 
with her through life.  If the order to withdraw life support is 
made, it is expected that the child will not live to suffer any 
stigma"). 
12 
 
c. 119, § 38 -- protecting the confidentiality of the parties -- 
by keeping the hearing and all records from public view.  See 
Care & Protection of Sharlene, 445 Mass. 756, 772 (2006) 
(standing order "unambiguously makes all Juvenile Court case 
records the property of the court"). 
 
While all proceedings in the Juvenile Court are statutorily 
impounded, Rule 11 provides that "[a]ny party or interested 
nonparty may file a motion supported by affidavit for relief 
from impoundment."  Beyond suggesting that "procedures set forth 
[elsewhere] in these rules shall govern requests for relief from 
impoundment to the extent practicable," Rule 11 does not provide 
a standard to evaluate such a motion. 
 
An examination of the other uniform rules on impoundment 
procedure suggests one reasonable set of procedures that might 
be practicable and appropriate in reviewing requests for the 
release of records in a care and protection trial on termination 
of parental rights.  Where records are not statutorily 
impounded, Rule 7 contains a standard to be followed in order to 
permit impoundment of a document that otherwise presumptively 
would be public.4  Pursuant to Rule 7(a), "[t]he court may enter 
                     
 
4 As stated, the presumption of the public's right of access 
is reversed in care and protection proceedings.  Compare Care & 
Protection of Sharlene, 445 Mass. at 772, with Boston Herald, 
Inc. v. Sharpe, 432 Mass. 593, 605 (2000) ("There is a well-
 
13 
 
an order of impoundment for good cause shown."  Pursuant to Rule 
7(b), "[i]n determining good cause, the court shall consider all 
relevant factors, including, but not limited to, (i) the nature 
of the parties and the controversy, (ii) the type of information 
and the privacy interests involved, (iii) the extent of 
community interest, (iv) constitutional rights, and (v) the 
reason(s) for the request."  The good cause standard of Rule 7 
requires a court to "balance the rights of the parties based on 
the particular facts of each case."  See Boston Herald, Inc. v. 
Sharpe, 432 Mass. 593, 604 (2000).  We conclude that the good 
cause standard of Rule 7, which ordinarily applies to motions 
for impoundment, is appropriate in evaluating requests by the 
parties or the Commonwealth for access to the impounded records 
of care and protection proceedings.  Because Rule 7 requires a 
Juvenile Court judge to balance the rights of the parties based 
upon the specific facts presented in each case, there is no need 
to adopt standards and protocols similar to those set forth in 
Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122.  See discussion, infra. 
 
b.  Application of Rule 7 in care and protection context.  
We turn to the application of the good cause standard in 
Juvenile Court care and protection proceedings.  Under the good 
cause framework of Rule 7, specifically concerning "the type of 
                                                                  
established common-law right of access to the judicial records 
of civil proceedings"). 
14 
 
information and the privacy interests involved," the analysis 
begins with the recognition that records held in care and 
protection case files, which have not been introduced in 
evidence at a trial on termination of parental rights, have 
heightened privacy interests and should not be disclosed absent 
compelling circumstances.  "[T]he legitimate expectations of 
privacy, possessed by most litigants in domestic relations 
proceedings, would ordinarily constitute 'good cause' to justify 
impoundment of discovery materials which are confidential in 
nature."  George W. Prescott Publ. Co. v. Register of Probate 
for Norfolk County, 395 Mass. 274, 278 (1985) (concluding that 
good cause to impound deposition of public official where 
testimony included allegations of misconduct in office requires 
showing of overriding necessity).  See, e.g., Care & Protection 
of Erin, 443 Mass. 567, 570 (2005). 
 
The purposes of a care and protection proceeding, and the 
evidence introduced in such proceedings, are entirely different 
from the concerns of a criminal trial.  An individual filing a 
care and protection petition must allege "under oath" that a 
child "(a) is without necessary and proper physical or 
educational care and discipline; (b) is growing up under 
conditions or circumstances damaging to the child's sound 
character development; (c) lacks proper attention of the parent, 
guardian with care and custody or custodian; or (d) has a 
15 
 
parent, guardian or custodian who is unwilling, incompetent or 
unavailable to provide any such care, discipline or attention."  
Care & Protection of Lillian, 445 Mass. 333, 337 (2005), quoting 
G. L. c. 119, § 24.  Investigation of these types of assertions 
necessarily involves the most intimate details of the parents' 
and the child's lives, and reports undertaken by the department 
may well include much that is hearsay, not relevant to the 
events at issue in a criminal case, and specifically intended to 
attack a parent's character.  See Gilmore v. Gilmore, 369 Mass. 
598, 604–606 (1976).  See, e.g., Care & Protection of Frank, 409 
Mass. 492, 494-495 (1991) ("Where a person's character is itself 
in issue, as a parent's character generally is in custody or 
adoption cases, courts have usually held that it may be proved 
by evidence of specific acts of misconduct bearing on 
character").  Such proceedings also may include evidence of 
misconduct entirely unrelated to the particular events that led 
to the criminal charges.  See id. at 494 (evidence of possession 
of marijuana and operating motor vehicle while under influence 
of alcohol relevant to parent's character and fitness).  While 
important in determining parental fitness, such considerations 
of character have no place in a criminal trial. 
 
Similarly, investigative reports, such as the GAL report, 
that are written to provide the court with a comprehensive 
overview of all of the family circumstances, almost inevitably 
16 
 
contain unsupported assertions by third parties.  As a result, 
the judge may only rely on GAL reports when the parent has the 
opportunity to contest the information contained in the report.  
Adoption of Mary, 414 Mass. 705, 710 (1993) ("Due process 
concerns and fundamental fairness require that a parent have an 
opportunity effectively to rebut adverse allegations [contained 
in a GAL report] concerning child-rearing capabilities, 
especially in a proceeding that can terminate all legal parental 
rights").  See Gilmore v. Gilmore, 369 Mass. 598, 604–605 (1976) 
(where judge relied on GAL report, error for judge to prevent 
GAL from testifying, because "the parties should have the 
opportunity to rebut the report, including the right to cross-
examine the investigator").  Such concerns, and the lack of 
relevance of these types of materials in a criminal proceeding, 
should guide judges in weighing whether good cause exists for 
the release of such materials. 
 
In addition, in an effort to retain custody or a 
relationship with a child, parents themselves may feel compelled 
to introduce much of the same type of material.  Indeed, as the 
department is permitted to draw an adverse inference from a 
parent's decision not to testify, Custody of Two Minors, 
396 Mass. 610, 616 (1986), the parties do not dispute that, 
without parental testimony at a care and protection proceeding, 
a parent's chance of retaining custody of a child is, as a 
17 
 
practical matter, greatly diminished.  "The liberty interest 
. . . of parents in the care, custody, and control of their 
children . . . is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty 
interests recognized by [the United States Supreme] Court."  
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).  There is "no doubt 
that '[t]he rights to conceive and to raise one's children' are 
'essential . . . basic civil rights . . . far more 
precious . . . than property rights.'"  Department of Pub. 
Welfare v. J.K.B., 379 Mass. 1, 3 (1979), quoting Stanley v. 
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).  "[F]undamental fairness, as 
well as due process concerns, requires that a parent be given 
the opportunity effectively to rebut adverse allegations 
concerning his or her child rearing capabilities" (citation 
omitted).  Brantley v. Hampden Div. of the Probate & Family Ct. 
Dept., 457 Mass. 172, 185 (2010). 
 
While the "crucial fact [remains] that the focus of the 
[care and protection] proceeding should be on the best interests 
of the child," "the balance to be struck [with parental rights 
is] complex" (citation omitted).  J.K.B., 379 Mass. at 5.  Care 
and protection proceedings strike that balance, in part, through 
certain procedural protections, such as a right to counsel.  See 
G. L. c. 119, § 29.  "Custody proceedings are not criminal in 
nature[, however,] and, accordingly, the full panoply of 
constitutional rights afforded criminal defendants does not 
18 
 
apply in these cases."  Custody of Two Minors, 396 Mass. at 616.  
Care and protection proceedings, where a parent's procedural 
rights do not receive the full protection of criminal 
adjudications, are not designed to be discovery mechanisms for 
criminal proceedings. 
 
In this case, the judge properly drew a distinction between 
records that were admitted at the trial on the termination of 
parental rights and those records that were provided to, and 
used by, the Juvenile Court for other purposes, such as the GAL 
report.  The decision not to disclose the GAL report was 
appropriate, in part, because "[GAL] reports may properly 
contain hearsay information."  Adoption of Georgia, 433 Mass. 
62, 68 (2000).  See Gilmore, 369 Mass. at 604–606 (where judge 
relies on GAL report, GAL must testify in order to determine 
"reliability and accuracy of a report" that is based on 
interviews with other individuals).  Where it was likely that 
the reports contained information that not only was irrelevant 
to the criminal proceedings, but also would not be admissible as 
evidence, the trial judge properly withheld their disclosure. 
 
Although many of the documents filed in a care and 
protection proceeding focus on things not likely to be relevant 
to a criminal trial, where the records were admitted at the 
termination of parental rights trial, the parties had at least 
19 
 
some opportunity to contest their admissibility.5  In addition, 
by introducing some records in evidence and relying on them at 
the care and protection trial, the mother relinquished some of 
her privacy interests in those documents.  Although a decision 
to introduce documents, such as her medical records, is fraught 
with some of the same considerations involving a parent's 
decision whether to testify, see part 2.d, infra, the mother may 
not have the same right to privacy in records she chose to 
introduce at trial.  This is particularly so where one of the 
parties seeking access to the records was also a party to the 
care and protection hearing.6  We emphasize, however, that a 
decision to introduce records at trial, in an effort to retain 
custody of a child, is not itself dispositive and, in deciding 
whether records should be released, a trial judge must carefully 
weigh all of the good cause factors under Rule 11. 
c.  Mother's arguments on Dwyer protocol.  The mother 
argues that the good cause standard is not sufficiently 
                     
 
5 At the hearing on the motion, the Commonwealth specified 
that its request for "relevant" materials meant that it sought 
"the entire file" in the care and protection case.  The judge 
allowed the Commonwealth and the father to access "only trial 
records, not other files, including [GAL] reports not marked and 
admitted during the trial." 
 
 
6 The decision not to introduce records in evidence does not 
necessarily shield them from disclosure, as the judge should 
consider all of the good cause factors when making a 
determination. 
20 
 
protective, and that the procedures used in Dwyer proceedings 
should apply in requests for release of records in care and 
protection proceedings.  She argues, in particular, that good 
cause is not a sufficiently strict standard under which to 
evaluate requests for release of her trial testimony concerning 
her conversations with her psychotherapist, her therapist's 
testimony, and the medical records of her psychotherapist that 
were introduced at the trial on termination of parental rights.  
In addition, the mother argues that allowing access to what 
parents properly believed would be private communications with 
psychotherapists could lead to critical information being 
unavailable at a care and protection proceeding, as parents 
would choose not to introduce communications with their 
psychotherapists if they fear doing so would result in those 
communications becoming discoverable in a criminal proceeding.7 
                     
 
7 The mother observes that under a Federal statute, 
42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2), there may be another reason that the 
motions for release from impoundment should be denied.  That 
statute provides: 
 
 
"A State plan submitted under paragraph (1) shall 
contain a description of the activities that the State will 
carry out using amounts received under the grant to achieve 
the objectives of this subchapter, including . . . an 
assurance in the form of a certification by the Governor of 
the State that the State has in effect and is enforcing a 
State law, or has in effect and is operating a statewide 
program, relating to child abuse and neglect that includes 
. . . methods to preserve the confidentiality of all 
 
21 
 
We note, first, that Dwyer addresses access to third-party 
records protected by statute or privilege that are not in the 
court's possession.  Pursuant to Juvenile Court Standing Order 
1-84, however, records introduced in evidence at a care and 
protection trial are the property of the Juvenile Court.  See 
Care & Protection of Sharlene, 445 Mass. at 772 ("Standing Order 
1–84 . . . unambiguously makes all Juvenile Court case records 
the property of the court . . .").  Accordingly, the test for 
third-party records under Dwyer, 448 Mass. at 140-141, 145-147, 
is not an appropriate test for determining discoverability of 
these medical records or other third-party records introduced at 
trial. 
                                                                  
records in order to protect the rights of the child and of 
the child's parents or guardians . . . ." 
 
 
The statute, however, contains an exception to that 
requirement of confidentiality:  "records made . . . shall only 
be made available to . . . Federal, State, or local government 
entities, or any agent of such entities, as described in clause 
(ix)."  42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(viii)(II).  Clause (ix) requires 
the State plan to include "provisions to require a State to 
disclose confidential information to any Federal, State, or 
local government entity, or any agent of such entity, that has a 
need for such information in order to carry out its 
responsibilities under law to protect children from child abuse 
and neglect."  42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(ix). 
 
 
As the Commonwealth seeks the records from the Juvenile 
Court for the purposes of prosecuting alleged child abuse, the 
disclosure is within the exception of clause (ix).  See 42 
U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(ix). 
22 
 
The privacy interests that underlie Dwyer, and that 
motivate the mother's arguments, are adequately protected by the 
good cause standard that we adopt today.  In this case, 
confidential access by the parties and the Commonwealth, where 
the Commonwealth affirms that it is already aware, through the 
department, of the substance of numerous departmental records, 
would not result in release of the mother's therapeutic 
conversations to the public.  Relatedly, in this case, the 
father was present throughout the care and protection trial, 
heard the mother's testimony, and viewed many of the records 
entered in evidence.  Therefore, here, the mother has a 
diminished privacy interest in the records of that proceeding, 
with respect to the parties seeking the records. 
We emphasize that the good cause standard we adopt today is 
applicable only to the parties to a care and protection 
proceeding and the Commonwealth; as does Dwyer, our decision 
seeks to safeguard against public disclosure of private 
materials.  See Dwyer 448 Mass. at 148–149 (Appendix).  A judge 
considering release of Juvenile Court records in care and 
protection proceedings may require that records released to 
parties and the Commonwealth be kept confidential and may order 
the parties to take steps to safeguard them against public 
disclosure. 
23 
 
We emphasize as well that a decision to allow the parties 
limited access to records of care and protection trials, if a 
judge of the Juvenile Court finds good cause to do so, is not a 
decision that the records are admissible at a criminal trial.  A 
determination as to any further use will require an additional 
weighing, with many additional factors to consider, and 
opportunities to be heard, by the trial judge in the criminal 
proceeding.  The mother's testimony, however, as discussed, is 
subject to further, constitutional limitations. 
In sum, applying the good cause standard of Rule 7 to the 
records of a care and protection trial is consistent with the 
instruction in Rule 11 that the standard for release from 
impoundment should follow "procedures set forth [elsewhere] in 
the[] rules" where practicable.  Under this standard, a Juvenile 
Court judge should consider, among other things, "the reason(s) 
for the request," as stated in Rule 7.  This would suggest that 
disclosure would be precluded if a request for access were based 
on irrelevant considerations, sought documents that were not 
material to the asserted purpose, were a vague and general 
fishing expedition, or were redundant.  Here, for example, the 
Commonwealth sought the entire case file on the ground that its 
contents "most likely provided significant information."  A 
party's choice to disclose records by admitting them in evidence 
at a care and protection proceeding, on the other hand, could be 
24 
 
a significant factor to consider in deciding whether good cause 
exists, subject to the constitutional limitations discussed 
below. 
d.  Burden of proof.  Because of the presumption of public 
access to records, a party seeking to impound a record under 
Rule 7 has the burden to demonstrate good cause for impoundment.  
Globe Newspaper Co., petitioner, 461 Mass. 113, 120-121 (2011).  
In care and protection proceedings, however, the statute 
requires that the record be impounded to protect the privacy 
interests of the parties.  Accordingly, it follows that a party 
or the Commonwealth seeking to pierce this veil of privacy 
should bear the burden of demonstrating good cause for release 
from impoundment.  We reject the Commonwealth's contention that, 
rather than the proponent of the motion for release bearing the 
burden of establishing good cause for such release, the 
individual opposing release should bear the burden of showing 
why the statutorily impounded record should remain impounded.  
To impose the burden on the party opposing the release would be 
contrary to the Legislature's reasons for requiring Juvenile 
Court proceedings to be closed and Juvenile Court records to be 
impounded.  Moreover, it is inconsistent with our usual approach 
of requiring the proponent of a motion to bear the burden of 
establishing that it should be granted. 
25 
 
 
e.  Waiver of privilege.  We turn to the question of 
waiver.  In her reservation and report, the single justice asked 
whether a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination in 
a care and protection proceeding, and a waiver of the patient-
psychotherapist privilege, is limited in scope to that 
proceeding. 
 
i.  Privilege against self-incrimination.  We address first 
whether the mother's testimony in the care and protection 
proceeding extinguished her right to decline to testify in the 
subsequent criminal trials.  The mother argues that her waiver 
of her rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution was limited to the context of the care and 
protection trial.  The Commonwealth argues, by contrast, that 
the mother may not "retroactively" claim a privilege not to 
testify where not only did she decide to testify in the closed 
Juvenile Court proceeding, but both she and her attorney were 
aware of the criminal proceeding pending against her, and, as 
the judge found, her attorney reasonably should have been aware 
of the potential future request for the trial record before the 
mother testified.  The Commonwealth further argues that the 
mother's statements at the hearing are admissible in the future 
criminal trial as both an admission by a party opponent and as 
prior recorded testimony of an unavailable witness if she 
chooses to invoke her privilege. 
26 
 
 
Under the waiver by testimony rule, a testifying witness 
waives the privilege against self-incrimination only for the 
same proceeding.  "The waiver, once made, waives the privilege 
only with respect to the same proceeding; the witness may once 
again invoke the privilege in any subsequent proceeding." 
Commonwealth v. King, 436 Mass. 252, 258 n.6 (2002).  See 
Commonwealth v. Martin, 423 Mass. 496, 501 (1996), citing 
Commonwealth v. Borans, 388 Mass. 453, 457-458 (1983) 
("testimony before a grand jury should not be considered a 
waiver of a witness's privilege against self-incrimination for 
the purpose of offering testimony at a subsequent trial on an 
indictment returned by that grand jury"); Taylor v. 
Commonwealth, 369 Mass. 183, 190-191 (1975); Commonwealth v. 
Fiore, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 785, 786, 789-790 (2002) (witness's 
deposition testimony in criminal defendant's civil action 
against insurance company was not waiver of witness's privilege 
against self-incrimination at defendant's arson trial because 
events were "clearly separate proceedings").  Contrast King, 
436 Mass. at 258 n.6 (if victim's testimony at voir dire 
evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to exclude victim's 
statements to police were voluntary and waived privilege against 
self-incrimination, witness could not later invoke privilege at 
criminal trial because hearing and trial are same proceeding); 
Commonwealth v. Judge, 420 Mass. 433, 445 n.8 (1995) (same for 
27 
 
pretrial hearing on motion to suppress); Luna v. Superior Court, 
407 Mass. 747, 750-751 (1990) (same for pretrial hearing on 
motion to dismiss). 
 
A care and protection trial focuses on the child's best 
interests and whether the parents should retain custody of the 
child, while a criminal trial is concerned with whether an 
individual committed a crime; the two are entirely different 
proceedings.  As discussed, to retain custody of a child, a 
parent has little choice but to testify at the care and 
protection proceeding.  See Custody of Two Minors, 396 Mass. at 
617. 
 
Due to the separate concerns of a trial on the termination 
of parental rights and a criminal trial, we conclude that the 
waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination at a trial on 
the termination of parental rights does not result in a waiver 
of that privilege in a subsequent criminal trial.  In any future 
criminal proceeding, with entirely different stakes and rights 
at issue, the mother may reassert the privilege against self-
incrimination. 
 
ii.  Admission of prior testimony.  Fifth Amendment 
jurisprudence consistently has treated testimony at an earlier 
proceeding as being inadmissible at a separate, subsequent 
proceeding.  In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), 
the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant's 
28 
 
statements from a hearing on the suppression of evidence could 
not be admitted at the defendant's criminal trial for the 
purpose of determining guilt or innocence.  Id. at 382, 389-390, 
394.  By holding that the statements were inadmissible, the 
Court eliminated the "Hobson's choice" that the defendant 
otherwise would have faced:  whether to forgo a potentially 
valid claim under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution or effectively to surrender the Fifth Amendment 
right to avoid self-incrimination.  Id. at 391, 394.  Similarly, 
in Bridgeman v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 471 
Mass. 465, 493 (2015), S.C., 476 Mass. 298 (2017), this court 
relied on Simmons to hold that a defendant's testimony at a 
hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea following 
government misconduct was inadmissible at any future criminal 
trial. 
 
"Th[e] interest of parents in their relationship with their 
children is a fundamental right and is constitutionally 
protected."  Custody of Two Minors, 396 Mass. at 617.  If the 
mother's testimony from the care and protection trial were 
admissible at a future criminal trial, the mother would confront 
an intolerable Hobson's choice:  testify in the hope of 
retaining her right to care for her child and sacrifice her 
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, or choose her 
right not to incriminate herself over any possibility of 
29 
 
retaining custody of her child.8  See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 
U.S. 745, 759 (1982).  This choice would be particularly 
poignant because the Juvenile Court is permitted to draw adverse 
inferences from a parent's refusal to testify.  See Custody of 
Two Minors, supra at 616.  In light of Simmons and its progeny, 
we conclude that the mother's testimony from the care and 
protection proceeding ordinarily is not admissible at a future 
criminal proceeding.9 
 
iii.  Psychotherapist privilege.  Lastly, we turn to the 
question whether the mother's introduction of psychiatric 
evidence at the care and protection trial served as a waiver of 
her right to assert the patient-psychotherapist privilege at a 
subsequent criminal trial.  The mother argues that her testimony 
regarding conversations with her psychotherapist should not be 
admissible at a future criminal proceeding because her waiver of 
psychotherapist privilege was specific to the care and 
protection trial.  The Commonwealth does not agree that the 
waiver was limited to that trial. 
                     
 
8 Adoption of Don, 435 Mass. 158, 168 (2001), citing Little 
v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 13 (1981). 
 
 
9 Should the mother choose to testify at her criminal trial, 
however, and should her testimony differ significantly from her 
testimony at the care and protection proceeding, her prior 
testimony at the care and protection proceeding would be 
admissible as impeachment evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 
425 Mass. 633, 637–638 (1997). 
30 
 
 
The patient-psychotherapist privilege is set forth in G. L. 
c. 233, § 20B.  The statute provides, in relevant part: 
"[I]n any court proceeding . . . a patient shall have 
the privilege of refusing to disclose, and of 
preventing a witness from disclosing, any 
communication, wherever made, between said patient and 
a psychotherapist relative to the diagnosis or 
treatment of the patient's mental or emotional 
condition." 
 
See Mass. G. Evid. § 503 (2017).  This privilege is case-
specific; the language of G. L. c. 233, § 20B, explicitly 
contemplates that the privilege exists for a particular 
proceeding.  At this time, then, the mother retains her 
psychotherapist privilege for any future criminal trial.  The 
psychotherapist evidence is not admissible at the mother's trial 
unless she puts her mental health at issue in her defense.  If 
she indicates at that point that she intends to do so, 
admissibility at the criminal trial is a matter to be decided by 
the Superior Court judge, who is required to determine whether a 
defendant "'introduce[d] his [or her] mental or emotional 
condition as an element of his [or her] . . . defense,' G. L. 
c.  233, § 20B (c), such that he [or she] waived the privilege."  
Commonwealth v. Dung Van Tran, 463 Mass. 8, 19 (2012).  If the 
mother, as a defendant in a criminal proceeding, chooses not to 
present a defense that includes mental health as an element, 
then the psychotherapist testimony will not be admissible.  See 
id.  Because it is uncertain whether the mother will place her 
31 
 
mental or emotion condition at issue in a future criminal trial, 
at this stage the question of the mother's waiver of the 
psychotherapist privilege is premature. 
 
f.  Application of good cause test.  The judge made his 
determination in a proceeding where there was no prior 
precedent; he was guided only by a single decision of a single 
justice in the Appeals Court, upon which he relied extensively.  
In his decision, the judge correctly assigned the burden of 
proof to the moving parties, and required all of the parties to 
protect privacy interests by keeping the records confidential.  
In relying on the single justice's decision, the judge stated 
that he found good cause for release for "trial preparation" 
only. 
 
Nonetheless, while many aspects of the decision are 
appropriate, as the parties acknowledge in their briefs, the 
judge does not appear to have applied the good cause analysis as 
set forth in Rule 7.  Among other things, he appears to have 
based his reasoning on the purpose of the care and protection 
proceeding rather than on the competing factors under Rule 7.  
More generally, he appears to have considered issues of 
"convenience" for the parties, who state that they have other 
means of accessing many of the requested documents, or already 
have done so, rather than under the good cause rubric.  We 
32 
 
remand this case to the Juvenile Court to apply the good cause 
test in the first instance. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The matter is remanded to the county court 
for entry of an order vacating and setting aside the decision of 
the Juvenile Court judge and remanding the matter to the 
Juvenile Court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.