Title: State v. Dick

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 386PA16   
Filed 8 December 2017 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA   
 
 
v. 
QUENTON LEE DICK 
 
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous, 
unpublished decision of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 791 S.E.2d 873 
(2016), vacating defendant’s conviction after appeal from a judgment entered on 18 
June 2015 by Judge Susan E. Bray in Superior Court, Guilford County.  Heard in the 
Supreme Court on 10 October 2017. 
Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by James M. Stanley, Jr., Special Deputy 
Attorney General, for the State-appellant. 
Mark Montgomery for defendant-appellee. 
 
MORGAN, Justice.   
 
I. 
Background and Procedural History 
In this appeal we consider whether a jury was properly instructed on the 
theory that Quenton Lee Dick (defendant) committed a first-degree sexual offense by 
being aided and abetted by another individual in the commission of the sexual act.  
The Court of Appeals concluded that there was not sufficient evidence to submit the 
STATE V. DICK 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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instruction to the jury.  We hold that, based upon our enunciated test used to 
establish the principle of aiding and abetting, the evidence was sufficient to allow the 
jury to be instructed on the theory of aiding and abetting. 
 The State presented evidence at trial tending to show that at around 2:00 a.m. 
on 4 December 2013, E.M.1 was studying in her apartment for an examination and 
conversing with three of her friends, all of whom were college students.  Those in the 
apartment included E.M.’s roommate.  They were all getting ready for bed when there 
was a knock at the door, and E.M.’s roommate answered it because she was expecting 
a guest.  The person at the door asked for someone who did not live in the apartment.    
A short time later, there was another knock on the door and when the door was 
opened, a man wearing a bandanna on his face walked into the kitchen of the 
apartment, looked around, and walked back out.  E.M. and her friends were under 
the impression that someone was playing a trick on them.  E.M.’s roommate tried to 
push the door to close it, but four men prevented her from doing so by charging into 
the apartment.  All of the men were wearing bandannas across their faces and hoods 
on their heads.  At least two of the men had handguns.  Three of the men headed to 
the back of the apartment and started to ransack it.  The last man stayed in the living 
room with E.M. and the other students.  E.M. and her friends were ordered to go into 
                                            
1 We use initials to protect the victim’s privacy. 
STATE V. DICK 
 
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their rooms and bring back everything they had.  The men took several items, 
including cell phones, laptop computers, and a television.     
Next, the four college students were ordered to sit back down on the couch in 
the living room.  The intruders duct taped the students’ hands behind their backs.    
The man in the living room ordered E.M. to get up from the couch and walk into one 
of the bedrooms in the back of the apartment.  Three of the men were walking in the 
bedroom.  E.M. attempted to step into the bathroom that was connected to the 
bedroom, but one of the men grabbed her and told her to go into the bedroom.  E.M. 
started crying and begged the men not to rape her.  One of the men replied, “Shut up, 
bitch. We’re not going to rape you.”  In response, E.M. “kept crying and saying stuff.”  
One of the men responded, “Well, I see we’re going to have to . . . tape her mouth 
because she won’t shut up.”  He then taped shut E.M.’s mouth.  Another of the men 
left the room at that time in order to tape shut the other students’ mouths.    
E.M. had been left in the bedroom with two of the intruders, one of whom was 
defendant.  The two men took off E.M.’s pants, lifted her shirt and began touching 
her inappropriately.  A third man stepped into the room and said something 
indicating “that maybe they ha[d] to go or they need[ed] to hurry up or something.”  
All of the men then departed, leaving E.M. in the bedroom alone; however, defendant 
quickly returned to the room, ripped off the tape from E.M.’s mouth, and forced her 
to perform oral sex on him.  E.M. could see a gun in defendant’s pocket while 
STATE V. DICK 
 
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performing the sexual act.  During this time, E.M.’s shirt had been lifted and she was 
not wearing any underwear.  E.M.’s hands were still duct taped behind her back.    
The sexual act lasted about thirty seconds.  Defendant ejaculated on E.M.’s face and 
shirt.  Subsequently, he ran out of the apartment.   
E.M. and her friends went to her neighbor’s apartment and called the police.  
Law enforcement officers arrived and questioned the victims.  They then took E.M. 
to a local hospital, where she completed a rape kit.  Defendant’s DNA profile was later 
determined to match the semen on E.M.’s shirt.     
On 3 February 2014, defendant was indicted on four counts of first-degree 
kidnapping, one count of first-degree burglary and four counts of robbery with a 
dangerous weapon.  Defendant was also charged with conspiracy to commit robbery 
with a firearm, but that charge was subsequently dismissed by the State.  On 2 June 
2014, defendant was indicted on one count of first-degree sexual offense.  After all of 
the evidence was presented at trial, defendant moved to dismiss all charges for 
insufficiency of the evidence. These motions were denied.  A jury returned unanimous 
verdicts of guilty on all the charges.  The four robbery with a firearm convictions and 
the four kidnapping convictions were consolidated for judgment, with defendant 
being sentenced to four consecutive terms of 83 to 112 months each followed by a term 
of 276 to 392 months on the sexual offense charge and another consecutive term of 73 
STATE V. DICK 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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to 100 months on the first-degree burglary conviction.  Defendant gave written notice 
of appeal.   
At the Court of Appeals, defendant argued that the trial court erred by 
improperly instructing the jury on the first-degree sexual offense charge.  The jury 
was given a disjunctive instruction at trial, allowing it to find defendant guilty of 
first-degree sexual offense if defendant “employed a dangerous and deadly weapon or 
was aided and abetted by another person or persons” when he committed the sexual 
act.  In considering this issue and ultimately finding error by the trial court, the Court 
of Appeals reasoned that when a jury is given instructions at trial indicating that a 
defendant can be found guilty of a crime under two separate theories, there must be 
sufficient evidence to find such a defendant guilty under both theories.  State v. Dick, 
___ N.C. App. ___, 791 S.E.2d 873, 2016 WL 5746395 (2016) (unpublished).  The Court 
of Appeals noted in the instant case that defendant did not dispute that there was 
sufficient evidence to properly allow the jury to consider whether he had employed a 
dangerous or deadly weapon in the commission of the sexual offense, Dick, 2016 WL 
5746395, at *3; on the other hand, however, the Court of Appeals held that there was 
not sufficient evidence presented that defendant was aided or abetted by another 
individual during the act giving rise to defendant’s first-degree sexual offense 
conviction, id. at *4.2  This latter determination by the Court of Appeals regarding 
                                            
2 The Court of Appeals went on to conclude that there was error which prejudiced 
defendant based on our precedent in State v. Pakulski, 319 N.C. 562, 356 S.E.2d 319 (1987); 
STATE V. DICK 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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the lack of sufficient evidence of defendant’s guilt on the theory of aiding and abetting, 
which was a part of the disjunctive jury instruction, is erroneous and must be 
reversed.  
II. 
Standard of Review  
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in submitting the disjunctive 
instruction to the jury because the evidence was insufficient for the jury to determine 
that defendant was aided or abetted when he committed the sexual act.  “Substantial 
evidence is that amount of relevant evidence necessary to persuade a rational juror 
to accept a conclusion.”  Scott, 356 N.C. at 597, 573 S.E.2d at 869.  We have held that 
there must be sufficient evidence to find a defendant guilty under either theory of 
criminal culpability for the disjunctive instruction to be properly given to the jury.  
State v. Lynch, 327 N.C. 210, 219, 393 S.E.2d 811, 816 (1990) (holding that 
insufficient evidence regarding one theory submitted to the jury, when prejudicial, 
was reversible error requiring new trial).  In our view, in the case sub judice the 
evidence was sufficient to instruct the jury to consider both whether defendant 
employed a dangerous or deadly weapon in the commission of the sexual offense, as 
well as whether defendant was aided or abetted by another individual during the act 
giving rise to defendant’s first-degree sexual offense conviction.  There was 
                                            
however, we do not reach this issue for analysis because it is our determination that there 
was sufficient evidence presented by the State to allow the jury to find that defendant was 
aided or abetted by another individual when he committed the sexual offense.  
STATE V. DICK 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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substantial evidence to support each of these two theories of defendant’s guilt of this 
offense, thus legitimizing the disjunctive jury instruction.  
III. 
Analysis  
The trial court did not err in giving the jury the disjunctive instruction at issue 
because the evidence was sufficient to find defendant guilty of first-degree sexual 
offense under the theory that he employed a dangerous or deadly weapon in the 
commission of the sexual act as well as under the theory that he was aided and 
abetted by one or more persons in the perpetration of the crime.   
Defendant was charged with first-degree sexual offense.  A first-degree sexual 
offense is committed when 
the person engages in a sexual act with another person by 
force and against the will of the other person, and does any 
of the following: 
1) Employs or displays a dangerous or deadly weapon or         
an article which the other person reasonably believes to 
be a dangerous or deadly weapon. 
2)  Inflicts serious personal injury upon the victim or 
another person. 
3) The person commits the offense aided and abetted by 
one or more other persons. 
 
N.C.G.S. § 14-27.26 (2015).  In State v. Bell we reasoned that: 
Two lines of cases have developed regarding the use 
of disjunctive jury instructions.  State v. Diaz [,317 N.C. 
545, 346 S.E.2d 488 (1986), and its progeny] stand[ ] for the 
proposition that “a disjunctive instruction, which allows 
the jury to find a defendant guilty if he commits either of 
two underlying acts, either of which is in itself a separate 
offense, is fatally ambiguous because it is impossible to 
STATE V. DICK 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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determine whether the jury unanimously found that the 
defendant committed one particular offense.”  In such 
cases, the focus is on the conduct of the defendant. 
In contrast, this Court has recognized a second line 
of cases [stemming from State v. Hartness, 326 N.C. 561, 
391 S.E.2d 177 (1990),] standing for the proposition that “if 
the trial court merely instructs the jury disjunctively as to 
various alternative acts which will establish an element of 
the offense, the requirement of unanimity is satisfied.”  In 
this type of case, the focus is on the intent or purpose of the 
defendant instead of his conduct. 
 
359 N.C. 1, 29-30, 603 S.E.2d 93, 112-13 (2004) (citing and quoting State v. Lyons, 
330 N.C. 298, 302-03, 412 S.E.2d 308, 312 (1991)), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1052 (2005).  
The current case is consistent with the Hartness line of cases.  Whether defendant 
employed or displayed a dangerous or deadly weapon during the commission of the 
offense, or whether he was aided and abetted by at least one other individual, are 
different acts that will establish an element of first-degree sexual offense.  The 
properness of the disjunctive jury instruction involved in the present case depends on 
whether there is sufficient evidence to instruct the jury on the theory that defendant 
was aided and abetted when he committed the sexual act.  The Court of Appeals 
opined that a person is guilty of aiding or abetting another when he is 
actually or constructively present at the scene of the crime 
and . . . aids, advises, counsels, instigates or encourages 
another to commit the offense.  Even though not actually 
present during the commission of the crime, a person may 
be an aider or abettor if he shares the criminal intent of the 
perpetrator and if, during the commission of the crime, he 
is in a position to render any necessary aid to the 
perpetrator. 
 
STATE V. DICK 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Dick, 2016 2016 WL 5746395, at *3 (alteration in original)  (quoting State v. Barnette, 
304 N.C. 447, 458, 284 S.E.2d 298, 305 (1981) (citations omitted)). 
In stating this test, the Court of Appeals cited this Court’s decision in Barnette.  
That case applied the then-existing case law regarding aiding and abetting a crime.  
However, in State v. Bond, we recognized that 
[a]lthough several of our cases decided before 1981 state 
that actual or constructive presence is required to prove a 
crime under an aiding and abetting theory, this is no longer 
required. Our legislature abolished all distinctions 
between accessories before the fact and principals in the 
commission of felonies by enacting N.C.G.S. § 14–5.2, 
effective 1 July 1981.  Thus, accessories before the fact, who 
do not actually commit the crime, and indeed may not have 
been present, can be convicted of first-degree murder 
under a theory of aiding and abetting.  A showing of 
defendant’s presence or lack thereof is no longer required. 
 
345 N.C. 1, 23-24, 478 S.E.2d 163, 174 (1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1124 (1997).  
Thus, distinctions between individuals actually or constructively present at the scene 
and those not present at the scene are now irrelevant with respect to aiding and 
abetting.  The abolition of this distinction is further demonstrated by our decision in 
State v. Francis in which we upheld jury instructions concerning aiding and abetting 
advising the jury that it must 
find three things in order to convict the defendant of first-
degree murder on [the] theory [of aiding and abetting]: (1) 
that the crime was committed by another; (2) that the 
defendant knowingly advised, instigated, encouraged, 
procured, or aided the other person; and (3) that the 
defendant’s actions or statements caused or contributed to 
the commission of the crime by the other person. 
STATE V. DICK 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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341 N.C. 156, 459 S.E.2d 269 (1995) (citing State v. Allen, 339 N.C. 545, 453 S.E.2d 
150 (1995), abrogated by State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 483 S.E.2d 396 (1997)).  
Noticeably missing from this instruction is any reference to the defendant’s location 
when the crime was committed.  A year later in Bond, we concluded that giving a jury 
the pattern jury instructions with respect to aiding and abetting and its “accordance 
with the requirements delineated in Francis was sufficient.”  345 N.C. at 24, 478 
S.E.2d at 175.  Consistent with this evolution in the law pursuant to the 1981 
legislative enactment, this Court stated in Gaines, that “to the extent our cases 
decided after N.C.G.S. § 14–5.2 became applicable suggest that actual or constructive 
presence is necessary to prove a crime under an aiding and abetting theory, these 
cases are no longer authoritative on this issue.”  345 N.C. at 676, 483 S.E.2d at 414 
(citations omitted), cert. denied 522 U.S. 900 (1997).  Two years later, we reiterated 
the aiding and abetting test approved in Francis and reemphasized in Gaines.  State 
v. Goode 350 N.C. 247, 260, 512 S.E.2d 414, 422 (1999).  Accordingly, we now apply 
this same three-prong test to the case at bar because it aligns with the legislature’s 
intent to remove any required analysis concerning a person’s proximity to the alleged 
criminal incident.   
In the instant case, the elements needed to satisfy the principle of aiding or 
abetting are met.  Although the other individuals left the room before defendant 
committed the sexual act, there is sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the 
individuals aided and abetted defendant.  E.M. testified that “two of [the men], I 
STATE V. DICK 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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think, began to tape us up behind our backs with duct tape.”  Three of the men worked 
together to separate E.M. from the rest of the group.  One of the men grabbed E.M. 
and ordered her to come back into the bedroom when she instead tried to go into the 
adjoining bathroom.  In the bedroom defendant and another individual 
inappropriately groped E.M., removed all of her clothes below her waist, and fondled 
her body.  The majority of these acts were executed by defendant, along with others.  
The acts of taping shut E.M.’s mouth, taping her hands behind her back, moving her 
to the bedroom, removing her clothing, and inappropriately touching E.M. equate to 
encouragement, instigation, and aid which collectively readily meet the standards of 
the aiding and abetting test that we articulated in Bond and its progeny.  Thus, there 
is evidence here tending to show that defendant committed the crime of first-degree 
sexual offense while other individuals instigated, encouraged and aided him.  By 
joining defendant in unclothing and immobilizing E.M., while performing a series of 
overt acts that created an atmosphere to subvert the will of E.M., others are deemed 
to have contributed to the commission of the crime. 
Defendant argues that there is insufficient evidence for a jury to find that he 
was aided or abetted by another during the commission of the sexual act because he 
was the only individual in the room with the victim when the incident occurred, 
thereby demonstrating that no one was in a position to render any necessary aid to 
him.  While the trial evidence regarding the precise physical locations of the other 
men who accompanied defendant is inexact during the time that defendant 
STATE V. DICK 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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committed the sexual act, the evidence nonetheless supports the conclusion that there 
was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that defendant was aided and abetted by at 
least one other individual, since under the Bond rationale, neither actual nor 
constructive presence was required to prove a crime under the theory of aiding and 
abetting based upon legislation that became effective the same year this Court issued 
our opinion in Barnette. 
In view of our holding in Bond and its succeeding line of cases, the other men 
aided, instigated or encouraged defendant to commit this offense.  We reach this 
conclusion in light of the evidence adduced at trial, and find it unnecessary to address 
the other men’s physical proximity to defendant or the victim at the time of the 
offense in order to prove defendant’s guilt under the theory of aiding and abetting.  
Due to the sufficiency of the evidence as to defendant being one who employed or 
displayed a dangerous or deadly weapon, and that he was aided and abetted by one 
or more other persons in the commission of the crime of first-degree sexual offense, 
the trial court gave a proper disjunctive jury instruction. 
Therefore, the Court of Appeals erroneously reversed the trial court by 
vacating defendant’s conviction for this offense and remanding the matter for a new 
trial on this charge.  Accordingly, this Court reverses the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals and instructs that court to reinstate the trial court’s judgment and  
defendant’s conviction for first-degree sexual offense.  
STATE V. DICK 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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REVERSED.