Title: Spencer v. Bristol-Meyers Squibb

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). O'HERN, J., writing for a unanimous Court. In this employment discrimination case, the Court considers the admissibility into evidence of a statement by a personnel director to an employee in respect of the reason for the denial of her promotion. In October 1989, Diane E. Spencer was employed as a Director of Strategic Planning by E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. As a result of its merger with Bristol-Meyers Company, Spencer and others were scheduled to lose their jobs. Just before the effective date of her termination, Spencer interviewed with several Bristol-Meyers Squibb Company (BMS) supervisors for the position of Director of Marketing Research. After her interview, she spoke with Walker, BMS's Director of Human Resources about her prospects for obtaining the position. She maintained that Walker told her that her supervisors had some concern about putting her in the position because a key figure in the company (Dr. Neu) did not want a black woman of her age and race to hold the position she sought because he did not want his daughter, also an employee in the company, to view her as a role model. When Spencer was subsequently denied the position, she filed an employment discrimination action against BMS under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD). At a pretrial hearing, BMS challenged the admissibility of Walker's statements. Spencer testified specifically concerning all of the details regarding the substance and context of Walker's statements to her. Her testimony included the names of persons Walker allegedly identified as having expressed reservations about hiring her for the position she sought. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court excluded the statements attributed to Walker. Because those statements were the only proffered evidence of discrimination, the trial court dismissed Spencer's complaint. Spencer appealed from the dismissal of her complaint. BMS cross-appealed from the denial of its motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed the dismissal of Spencer's case, affirmed the orders denying BMS's motion for summary judgment and remanded for trial. The panel concluded that Spencer could avail herself of the vicarious admission exception to the hearsay rule, N.J.R.E. 803(b)(4), for both levels of hearsay because she had adequately identified the links in the hearsay chain and had demonstrated the relation of the statements to the recruitment and hiring process for the position she sought. The panel further found that no triple hearsay problem existed because the truth or falsity of Dr. Neu's statements or attitudes was not in issue. Finally, the Appellate Division found that the trial court had improperly included an assessment of Spencer's credibility. The Supreme Court granted BMS's petition for certification. HELD: Because the personnel director's statement identified the supervisors involved, and because the alleged statements by the supervisors fall within the scope of their employment, the personnel director's statement to Spencer had sufficient reliability to be admitted into evidence as a party admission under N.J.R.E. 803(b)(4). 1. Any requirement of personal knowledge was met because Spencer testified to information that was within her personal knowledge, as she knew what Walker said to her. (pp. 6-9) 2. Whether what Walker said to Spencer is admissible depends on whether Walker could have given the testimony at trial. Because each interpretation of Walker's statement suggests a sufficient foundation of personal knowledge, his statement is admissible. (pp. 9-10) 3. Because N.J.R.E. 803(b) classifies vicarious admissions as an exception to the hearsay rule, a statement is only admissible if it would have been admissible if made by the declarant at the hearing. Each component of the proffered testimony meets an enumerated exception to the hearsay rule. (pp. 10-11) 4. It could not be more clear that the statement made by Walker, the Personnel Director, concerned a matter within the scope of his employment and that the statement was made during the existence of his employment relationship with BMS. (pp. 11-12) 5. Spencer need only show that BMS employees were reacting to their perceived understanding of Dr. Neu's statements or attitudes and not that those statements were truthful. Therefore, on remand, the court could consider excising the statements attributed to Dr. Neu or directing the jury to consider any such references only as background information. (p. 12) 6. Although the reliability of proffered evidence is a legitimate concern, by far the greater vice is the exclusion of relevant evidence where the circumstances of the case indicate its trustworthiness. (pp. 13-15) 7. The lack of corroboration of Spencer's testimony may affect the weight it should be given, but not its admissibility. (pp. 15-16) Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, STEIN and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE O'HERN's opinion. JUSTICE GARIBALDI did not participate. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 140 September Term 1997 DIANE E. SPENCER, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. BRISTOL-MEYERS SQUIBB COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation and E.R. SQUIBB & SONS, INC., a New York Corporation, Defendants-Appellants. Argued September 14, 1998 -- Decided December 8, 1998 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Rosemary Alito argued the cause for appellants (McCarter & English, attorneys; Ms. Alito and Anthony Palmisano, Jr., on the briefs). James B. Sharp argued the cause for respondent (Reiseman & Sharp, attorneys; Meghan E. Walsh, on the brief). The opinion of the Court was delivered by O'HERN, J. This is an employment discrimination case. At issue is the admission into evidence of a statement by a personnel director to an employee to the effect that the employee was denied promotion because her immediate supervisors did not wish a woman of her age and race to hold the position that the employee sought. We hold that, because the personnel director's statement identified the supervisors involved, and because the alleged statements by the supervisors fall within the scope of their employment, the personnel director's statement to plaintiff had sufficient reliability to be admitted into evidence as a party admission under N.J.R.E. 803(b)(4). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division holding the statement admissible. Her father is kind of manipulative and had his hand in her career since she started at the company. To be honest, there is some concern in the company and he didn't say who, concern that if we bring you into the department, her father would be a little concerned about the idea of having a black female of your age as her role model (emphasis added). In her statement, "he didn't say who," plaintiff apparently indicated that Walker did not say at the time whose concerns he was expressing. Later in the same deposition, plaintiff said that Walker had mentioned Poon, Gentile, and Oaks, who was the Vice President of Marketing. Plaintiff later added, "He [Walker] told me he met with Chris Poon and he talked with her. There was no problem with me from Chris Poon, but there was concern from the others." When plaintiff was denied the position, she brought an employment discrimination action against BMS. Under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), specifically N.J.S.A. 10:5-12, she alleged age and race discrimination in the termination of her employment under the reduction in force and in BMS's refusal to hire her as assistant director of marketing research within the hospital marketing and marketing services department. At a pretrial hearing, BMS challenged the admissibility of Walker's statements. Plaintiff testified at the hearing regarding the substance and context of Walker's statements to her. Plaintiff was quite specific concerning all the details of the conversation. Plaintiff stated for the first time that Walker had also mentioned Jim Mauzey as one of the concerned managers in the marketing department. She testified that she "asked who specifically [was concerned because of her age and race] and [Walker] told [her]." When asked, "And who did he tell you?," Spencer answered, "He said--he said Rick Gentile, Moe Oaks, and Jim Mauzey." At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court excluded the statements attributed to Walker. Because the statements were the only proffered evidence of discrimination, the trial court dismissed plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff appealed from the dismissal of her complaint. BMS cross-appealed from the denial of its motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed the dismissal of plaintiff's case, affirmed the orders denying BMS's motion for summary judgment and remanded for trial. The panel found that plaintiff could avail herself of the vicarious admission exception to the hearsay rule, N.J.R.E. 803(b)(4), for both levels of hearsay, because plaintiff had adequately identified the links in the hearsay chain and had demonstrated the relation of the statements to "the recruitment and hiring process for the position in which plaintiff had evinced an interest." The court concluded that "the triple hearsay problem perceived by the trial court d[oes] not exist," because "the truth or falsity" of Dr. Neu's statements or attitudes was not in issue. The court concluded that the trial court's ruling improperly included an assessment of plaintiff's credibility, where the trial court should have assessed merely whether the "statement was made . . . under circumstances establishing sufficient reliability." (quoting State v. Gross, 216 N.J. Super. 98, 110 (App. Div. 1987), aff'd, 121 N.J. 1 (1990)). We granted BMS's petition for certification. 152 N.J. 190 (1998). Although reliability is a legitimate concern, "by far the greater vice is the exclusion of relevant evidence where the circumstances of the case indicate its trustworthiness." Ruszcyk v. Secretary of Pub. Safety, 517 N.E.2d 152, 155 (Mass. 1988). Although BMS contends that employers may have difficulty in producing employee witnesses to counter such hearsay admissions, "logic and experience teach that where, as in this case, a corporation or institution is a party to litigation arising from the activities of its agent or employee, relevant information as to the incident underlying the dispute may well be more readily available than to its opponent." Ibid. In this case, nothing indicates that Walker, Gentile, Oakes and Mauzey will be unavailable to testify for BMS. In fact, Walker has already testified favorably to BMS in a deposition. We are satisfied from our review of the record that despite the trial court's insistence that it was not excluding the evidence on the basis of credibility, that was the net effect of its ruling. The trial court appeared displeased that Spencer first mentioned Jim Mauzey at the Rule 104 hearing. At one point, the trial court stated, " . . . I can't accept testimony that keeps shifting on me." The trial court later added, "in order to make this hearsay credible, there would have to be some underlying independent evidence other than the statement by the plaintiff." The lack of corroboration may affect the weight to be given to plaintiff's testimony, but not its admissibility. The jury will have to assess whether, in fact, Walker truthfully informed the plaintiff of the supervisors' reasons for denying her employment. The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, STEIN and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE O'HERN's opinion. JUSTICE GARIBALDI did not participate. NO. A-140 DIANE E. SPENCER, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. BRISTOL-MEYERS SQUIBB COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation and E.R. SQUIBB & SONS, INC., a New York Corporation, Defendants-Appellants. DECIDED