Title: Frederick County v. Vache

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 111
September Term, 1997
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
FOR FREDERICK COUNTY et al.
v.
BRIDGET VACHE
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasnow
Raker
Wilner
Cathell,
JJ.
Opinion by Cathell, J.
Filed:   May 14, 1998
Frederick County Board of County Commissioners and Great American Insurance
Company, appellants, appeal from an order entered in the Circuit Court for Frederick
County.  That order affirmed an award by the Maryland Workers’ Compensation
Commission (the Commission) of workers’ compensation benefits to Bridget Vache,
appellee, for injuries she sustained after slipping on an icy sidewalk upon returning to work
from lunch on February 10, 1994.  We hold that because the circumstances surrounding
appellee’s injuries do not fall within any exception to the going and coming rule, her injuries
do not arise out of and in the course of her employment and, therefore, are not compensable
under the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act.  Accordingly, we shall reverse the trial
court.
 
I.  Facts
The facts in this case are not disputed.  On February 10, 1994, appellee was employed
by the Frederick County Board of Commissioners (employer).  Parking privileges were not
a part of her employment in that the employer did not provide appellee with a parking space.
The employer leased office space from the Frederick County Board of Education (BOE)
inside BOE’s building.  A lease between BOE and the employer, which was introduced as
evidence, reflects that BOE agreed to maintain the area outside the building, including the
removal of snow and ice.
On the day in question, snowy, icy, and slippery conditions existed throughout the
region because of a severe snow storm.  BOE closed its offices due to the inclement weather.
Frederick County government offices, however, remained open.  
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On the morning of February 10, appellee parked in BOE’s parking lot.  Normally, she
was not permitted to park there, but because BOE was closed, there were ample open spaces.
Appellee left that lot during her lunch break to run some errands in her car and, upon her
return, found the BOE lot full.  Appellee drove around the area to find another space, but
because the public streets were piled up with snow, no street parking was available.
Consequently, appellee parked in the St. John’s Catholic Church parking lot behind the BOE
lot.
Appellee waited at the back door of the BOE building, which was locked and for
which appellee had no key, for a few minutes to see if someone might open the door.  The
back door was the closest door into the building from the church’s lot.  No one opened the
door, so appellee decided to walk around to the front entrance of the building.  To get to the
front entrance, appellee had to walk on the sidewalk along Church Alley.  Appellee testified
that she saw ice on the Church Alley sidewalk, but that there were no other walkways to the
front of the building and she could not walk on the street because cars were traveling on it.
Appellee fell on the icy sidewalk and sustained injuries.
Appellee subsequently filed a workers’ compensation claim against appellants, which
they contested.  On March 27, 1995, the Commission issued an order finding “that [appellee]
sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment on February
10, 1994, and that the disability of [appellee] is the result of the aforesaid accidental injury.”
Appellants appealed this finding to the Circuit Court for Frederick County.  That court
affirmed the Commission’s award on May 13, 1997.  Appellants filed a timely notice of
 All statutory references shall be to the Labor and Employment Article unless otherwise
1
indicated.
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appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  On November 4, 1997, the parties filed a Joint
Petition for Writ of Certiorari before the Court of Special Appeals heard arguments in the
matter.  We granted the petition on January 16, 1998 to address the scope of the proximity
or “special hazard” exception to the going and coming rule.
Appellants present the following questions for our review:   
1.  Does the “going and coming rule” bar a workers’ compensation
claim by a Claimant who falls on a walkway just outside her place of
employment when she is going to work?
2.  Does the “proximity exception,” or “special hazards exception,” to
the going and coming rule apply to a Claimant who falls on the sidewalk just
outside of her place of employment, when the fall is caused by ice and snow
all over the region?
II.  Discussion 
The Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act, Maryland Code (1991 Repl. Vol., 1997
Supp.), sections 9-101 through 9-1201 of the Labor and Employment Article,  provides
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benefits to persons who suffer “an accidental injury that arises out of and in the course of
employment.”  § 9-101(b)(1).  Generally speaking, injuries the employee incurs by going to
or coming from work are not compensable under the act because they do not arise out of and
in the course of employment.  Morris v. Board of Educ., 339 Md. 374, 380, 663 A.2d 578,
580 (1995); Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane v. Tornillo, 329 Md. 40, 44, 617 A.2d 572, 573-74
(1993); Wiley Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 280 Md. 200, 206, 373 A.2d 613, 616 (1977); Saylor v.
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Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 258 Md. 605, 607-08, 267 A.2d 81, 83 (1970).  “The reason for
this rule is because getting to work is considered to be an employee’s own responsibility and
ordinarily does not involve advancing the employer’s interests.”  Morris, 339 Md. at 380,
663 A.2d at 580 (citing Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 660 A.2d 423 (1995)); see also Wiley,
280 Md. at 206, 373 A.2d at 616.  This general rule has come to be known as the “going and
coming rule.”
Several exceptions to the going and coming rule, however, have evolved.  We
described all four exceptions in Alitalia, 329 Md. at 44, 617 A.2d at 574, where we stated:
Onto this general rule, however, the courts have engrafted several
exceptions when compensation benefits may properly be granted.  [1.] Thus,
where the employer furnishes the employee free transportation to and from
work, the employee is deemed to be on duty, and an injury sustained by the
employee during such transportation arises out of and in the course of
employment.  Tavel v. Bechtel Corporation, 242 Md. 299, 304, 219 A.2d 43
(1966); Rumple v. Henry H. Meyer Co., Inc., 208 Md. 350, 357, 118 A.2d 486
(1955).  [2.] Compensation may also be properly awarded where the employee
is injured while traveling along or across a public road between two portions
of the employer’s premises.  Wiley Mfg., 280 Md. at 206, 373 A.2d 613;
Procter-Silex v. DeBrick, 253 Md. 477, 482, 252 A.2d 800 (1969).  [3.] The
“proximity” exception allows compensation for an injury sustained
off-premises, but while the employee is exposed to a peculiar or abnormal
degree to a danger which is annexed as a risk incident to the employment.
Pariser Bakery v. Koontz, 239 Md. 586, 591, 212 A.2d 324 (1965); see Md.
Paper Products Co. v. Judson, 215 Md. 577, 584-588, 139 A.2d 219 (1958).
[4.] Injuries incurred while the employee travels to or from work in performing
a special mission or errand for the employer are likewise compensable.
Reisinger-Siehler Co. v. Perry, 165 Md. 191, 199, 167 A. 51 (1933); see Dir.
of Finance v. Alford, 270 Md. 355, 359-364, 311 A.2d 412 (1973).
The only exceptions at issue in this case are the second and third, the “premises” exception
and the “proximity” or “special hazard exception.” 
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Under the premises exception, although the notion of “premises” does not necessarily
include all of the property owned by the employer, it does contemplate “compensation for
injuries occurring on parking lots provided for the use of the employees,” Saylor, 258 Md.
at 609, 267 A.2d at 83, and where there is an “integral relationship between the place of
injury on the employer’s property and where [the employee] worked.”  Furthermore, the
employee can receive compensation for injuries he or she suffers when 
the employee travels along or across a public road between two portions of his
employer’s premises, whether going and coming, or pursing his active duties.
. . .  But if the parking lot is a purely private one, the principle of passage
between two parts of the premises is not available, and an employee crossing
a public street to get to the parking lot is not protected.
DeBrick, 253 Md. at 482-83, 252 A.2d at 803 (quoting 1 LARSON, WORKMEN’S COMPENSA-
TION LAW, § 15.14 (1968)).  The principle behind this exception has been stated as: 
“Since . . . a parking lot owned or maintained by the employer is treated
by most courts as part of the premises, the majority rule is that an injury in a
public street or other off-premises place between the plant and the parking lot
is in the course of employment, being on a necessary route between the two
portions of the premises. . . .”
Wiley, 280 Md. at 206-07, 373 A.2d at 616 (quoting 1 LARSON, LAW OF WORKMEN’S
COMPENSATION § 15.14 (1972)).  Accordingly, the premises exception can apply when the
employee’s injuries occur on a parking lot maintained by the employer for the use of its
employees or when the injuries occur between that employer-controlled parking lot and the
physical place of employment.
Under the proximity exception, an employee can recover workers’ compensation
benefits while going to and coming from work and off of the employer’s premises when
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the employment itself involves peculiar and abnormal exposure to a common
peril which is annexed as a risk incident to the employment, i.e., where the
location of the plant is at a place so situated as to make the customary and only
practicable way of immediate ingress and egress one of hazard which causes
the injury.
 
Pariser Bakery, 239 Md. at 591, 212 A.2d at 327.  In Pariser Bakery, the employee, Koontz,
who regularly worked the night shift, was leaving the bakery at the end of his shift at
approximately 4:00 a.m.  As he departed the building and was stepping from the building’s
property line and onto the public sidewalk, Koontz heard a loud noise, looked to his right,
and saw an object headed in his direction.  As he stepped back toward the building, the
object, an out-of-control automobile, ran onto the sidewalk and knocked down a street light.
This street light fell on top of and injured Koontz.
Koontz sought workers’ compensation benefits, claiming that his injuries arose out
of and in the course of his employment.  The circuit court agreed, granting Koontz relief
under the proximity exception to the going and coming rule.  On appeal, we disagreed.
These injuries, we said, occurred on an ordinary sidewalk and 
[t]he danger which caused his injury was not a regular or frequent one to
which his employment exposed him to a greater degree than was the general
public.  There was no evidence that he was placed near the danger by reason
of his work, such as a railroad or a dock, to allow him compensation under the
proximity rule.  
Id.  We then went on to clarify:  “The gravamen of that rule is not that the employee is in
close proximity to his place of employment, but rather that by reason of such proximity the
employee is subjected to danger peculiarly or to an abnormal degree beyond that to which
the general public was subjected.”  Id.
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We examined the application of the proximity exception in Salomon v. Springfield
State Hospital, 250 Md. 150, 242 A.2d 126 (1967).  In that case, Salomon, an employee of
the hospital, was struck by another car and injured as she crossed a newly opened portion of
highway on her way to the hospital.  The car struck Salomon’s car just inside the hospital
grounds.  Holding that the proximity exception did not apply in those circumstances, this
Court noted: 
We have held in the past that traveling upon and crossing busy streets and
highways, while it does entail some degree of danger, does not subject an
employee traveling to and from work, to a greater degree of danger than he
would be exposed to as a member of the general public.  
Id. at 154, 242 A.2d at 129.  See also Morris, 339 Md. at 380, 663 A.2d at 580-81(“[T]he
hazards encountered by an employee while commuting to work are common to all workers,
no matter what their job, and, hence, such risks cannot be directly attributable to a person’s
particular employment.”).
Finally, in Wiley, 280 Md. at 208-16, 373 A.2d at 617-21, this Court extensively
analyzed the proximity exception to the going and coming rule.  In that case, Wilson and his
companions were released early from work one day at Wiley Manufacturing Company.
After they “punched out,” Wilson and his two co-workers headed for one of the parking lots
maintained by the employer as a “fringe benefit” for employees.  The men walked to the lot
along main line tracks of the Penn Central Railroad, which was a shortcut to the parking lot.
This shortcut customarily was taken by Wilson, his companions, and many other company
employees.  
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On this particular day, the men were walking along the tracks when a northbound train
approached them from behind.  Apparently because of the noise generated by the other
trains, only one of the men heard the approaching train and was able to leap to safety.  The
other two men were struck from behind and injured.  The two injured employees filed
workers’ compensation claims.
In our opinion, we first noted that the going and coming rule applied because the
employees were en route from work to leave for the day.  We went on, however, to discuss
exceptions to the going and coming rule, namely, the premises exception and the proximity
or special hazard exception.  With regard to the proximity exception, we explained that the
exception had two components:  “The first is the presence of a special hazard at the
particular off-premises point.  The second is the close association of the access route with
the premises, so far as going and coming are concerned.”  Id. at 208, 373 A.2d at
617(quotation omitted).  Stated another way, “the proximity rule contains two elements: the
presence of a special hazard at the particular off-premises point and the close association of
the access route with the premises in respect to the ‘going and coming.’”  Id. at 215, 373
A.2d at 621.  Addressing why most of the Maryland cases up until that time rejected the
application of the proximity exception, we explained that “[w]hat was lacking in the prior
Maryland cases . . . was the ‘special hazard’ component.  In none of those cases was there
peculiar and abnormal exposure to a common peril beyond that to which the general public
was subjected.”  Id.  
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Under the circumstances of the Wiley case, we said, the proximity exception did
apply, namely because the employees were injured in close proximity to the plant, they and
other employees had used that same shortcut continually and over a number of years, and
“there was peculiar and abnormal exposure to a hazard beyond that to which the general
public was subjected.”  Id. at 217-18, 373 A.2d at 621. 
With the foregoing discussion in mind, we turn now to the case at hand.
III.  Analysis
A.  Standard of Review
In general, decisions by the Commission are “presumed to be prima facie correct.”
§ 9-745(b)(1).  A reviewing court’s role upon appellate review is to determine whether the
Commission “(1) justly considered all of the facts about the accidental personal injury . . .;
(2) exceeded the powers granted to it under this title; or (3) misconstrued the law and facts
applicable in the case decided.”  § 9-745(c).  If the reviewing court determines “that the
Commission . . . did not correctly construe the law and facts, [it] shall reverse or modify the
decision or remand the case to the Commission for further proceedings.”  § 9-745(e)(2).  
We have held that an appellate court “may reverse a [C]ommission ruling only upon
a finding that its action was based upon an erroneous construction of the law or facts.”
Frank v. Baltimore County, 284 Md. 655, 658, 399 A.2d 250, 252-53 (1979).  Notwithstand-
ing the deferential treatment of the Commission’s decision, a reviewing court has broad
authority and may reverse the Commission’s decision when it is based on an erroneous
conception of the law.  Id.; Bureau of Mines v. Powers, 258 Md. 379, 383, 265 A.2d 860,
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862 (1970); Egypt Farms, Inc. v. Lepley, 49 Md. App. 171, 176, 430 A.2d 122, 125 (1981).
As we shall explain, both the Commission and the circuit court erroneously construed and
applied the premises and proximity exceptions to the going and coming rule in this case. 
The circuit court, in its ruling from the bench, essentially found that appellee was
entitled to workers’ compensation benefits because the accident occurred on her way into
work and “either . . . [on] the premises or in close proximity to the premises.  The risk of
opening and inviting its employees to risk was beyond . . . that of the general public, it was
created by the ice which was peculiarly located to the premises.”
With regard to workers’ compensation cases involving the coming and going rule and
its exceptions, we often have said that each case “turns on its own particular facts.”  Morris,
339 Md. at 381, 663 A.2d at 581; Alitalia, 329 Md. at 46, 617 A.2d at 574-75; Wiley, 280
Md. at 216, 373 A.2d at 621.  See also Saylor, 258 Md. at 610, 267 A.2d at 84; Pariser
Bakery, 239 Md. at 589, 212 A.2d at 326.  We perceive that the facts in this case did not fall
within either the premises or the proximity exceptions to the going and coming rule.
B. The Premises Exception
As we have indicated, the premises exception applies when an employee suffers
injuries away from the place of employment but on a separate area maintained by the
employer for the employees or en route from or to those two locations.  Thus, when an
employee is injured traveling between a parking lot maintained by the employer for use by
that employee to the place of employment, the injuries are compensable under workers’
compensation.
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In the case at hand, appellee was injured while walking on a public sidewalk on her
way into work, but was not en route from any lot maintained by her employer for her use.
Rather, the lot was privately owned and maintained by the St. John’s Catholic Church.  As
we have stated, “if the parking lot is a purely private one, the principle of passage between
two parts of the premises is not available, and an employee crossing a public street to get to
the parking lot is not protected.”  DeBrick, 253 Md. at 482-83, 252 A.2d at 803 (quoting 1
LARSON, WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION LAW, § 15.14 (1968)).  Accordingly, because appellee
was en route to work from a private, non-employer maintained parking lot, the premises
exception does not apply in this case.  
C. The Proximity Exception
This Court has not considered the proximity exception to the going and coming rule
for some twenty years.  See Wiley, 280 Md. 200, 373 A.2d 613 (1977).  The parties now ask
us to revisit this issue, define the scope of the exception, and determine whether snow and
ice, which blanketed the entire region because of a severe snow storm and was present on
virtually all public walkways, were a “special hazard” under the proximity exception.  We
hold that the proximity exception does not apply under the circumstances of this case. 
We have said the proximity rule has two components, both of which must be satisfied
in order for the rule to apply.  The first component is “the presence of a special hazard at the
particular off-premises point.”  Id. at 208, 373 A.2d at 617.  The second component “is the
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close association of the access route with the premises.”  Id.  With regard to the first
component, we have described this special hazard as a “peculiar and abnormal exposure to
a common peril beyond that to which the general public was subjected.”  Id. at 215, 373
A.2d at 621.  Furthermore, the “gravamen of the rule” is not that the employee was near her
workplace, but by virtue of her proximity to her workplace she was exposed to a danger
peculiarly or to an abnormal degree greater than the degree to which the general public is
exposed.
Appellants essentially take issue with the first component of the proximity exception.
They argue that “[t]here is no evidence whatsoever that [appellee] was subjected to a danger
peculiarly or to an abnormal degree beyond that to which the general public was subjected.”
There was no special hazard in this case, they claim, because the ice, snow, and generally
slippery conditions were present everywhere, not just on the Church Alley sidewalk.
Appellee, on the other hand, contends that the route was closely associated, at least
geographically, with the employer’s premises because, when walking on the sidewalk, she
could literally reach out and touch the building.  She then goes on to argue essentially that
because ice and snow were located on that walkway, which was the access from the church
parking lot to the BOE building, that ice was a hazardous risk to Frederick County
employees beyond that to the general public.         
We agree with appellants that the conditions in this case are not the type contemplated
by the proximity or special hazard exception.  Slippery ice and snow were present
everywhere in that region on that day.  The public at large, including appellee, was exposed
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to those conditions.  In fact, most offices, including BOE offices, closed due to the inclement
weather.  Although appellee testified that Church Alley is the only access between the church
lot and the front door leading to the employer’s offices within the BOE building, Church
Alley is a public street with a public sidewalk, which permits anyone from the general public
to traverse this walkway at any given time.  Further, appellee presented no evidence at either
the Commission hearing or trial that the sidewalk was peculiarly or to an abnormal degree
more dangerous to Frederick County employees in the BOE building than to anyone else in
the general public.   
Additionally, there was no indication that the employer directed or even knew that
appellee or other employees parked in the church’s lot.  Rather, appellee was free to park
anywhere she wanted.  Appellee presented evidence that, as a practical matter, the conditions
prohibited her from parking where she might normally park because snow had piled up over
most of the streets.  This only demonstrates, however, the widespread inclement weather
conditions, such as the hazardous snow and ice, to which everyone in the Frederick area was
exposed during the relevant period.  Accordingly, although the conditions on the Church
Alley sidewalk were hazardous, we do not believe those conditions were a special hazard as
contemplated by the proximity exception.    
We hold that adverse weather conditions present throughout an area generally do not
constitute a special hazard because the conditions created by adverse weather are not a
special peril to which employees walking on public sidewalks are peculiarly or abnormally
exposed.  The snow storm and the conditions generated by it, although obviously hazardous
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to all Frederick County citizens, were not unique to Frederick County employees working
in the BOE building because any member of the general public could have walked on this
same public sidewalk and encountered the same dangerous conditions.  Therefore, because
the icy sidewalk was not a special hazard, the proximity exception does not apply under the
facts of this case.
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 IV. Conclusion
We hold that when an employee is injured on a public sidewalk en route to her place
of employment while she was traveling from a parking lot not provided by her employer but
from a privately-owned lot not associated with the employer’s premises, the premise
exception to the going and coming rule does not apply.  We further hold that the proximity
or special hazard exception does not apply when an employee is injured by falling on a
public sidewalk outside of her place of employment when the fall is due to slippery
conditions resulting from snowy, icy, or other inclement weather conditions.  
JUDGMENT 
REVERSED; 
CASE
REMANDED TO THE CIRCUIT COURT
WITH DIRECTIONS TO REVERSE THE
COMMISSION’S DECISION; COSTS TO BE
PAID BY APPELLEE.