Title: Colleen Pawlowski v. American Family Mutual Ins. Co.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2009 WI 105 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP2651 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Colleen Pawlowski and Thomas Pawlowski, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
     v. 
American Family Mutual Ins. Co. and Nancy L. 
Seefeldt, 
          Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2009 WI App 7 
Reported at: 315 Wis. 2d 799, 762 N.W.2d 802 
(Ct. App. 2009-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 29, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 13, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Winnebago   
 
JUDGE: 
Thomas J. Gritton   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
defendants-respondents-petitioners 
there 
were 
briefs by Sandra L. Hupfer, Christina L. Peterson, Kathryn M. 
Ver Boort, and Stellpflug Law, S.C., De Pere, and oral argument 
by Sandra L. Hupfer. 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants there was a brief by Michael 
S. Siddall, Andrew J. Rossmeissl, and Herrling Clark Law Firm 
Ltd., Appleton, and oral argument by Michael S. Siddall and 
Andrew J. Rossmeissl. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Timothy M. Barber, and 
Axley Brynelson, LLP, Madison and William C. Gleisner III, and 
Law Offices of William Gleisner, Milwaukee, on behalf of the 
Wisconsin Association for Justice. 
 
 
 
 
2009 WI 105
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
No.  2007AP2651  
(L.C. No. 
2006CV1307) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Colleen Pawlowski and Thomas Pawlowski, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
American Family Mutual Ins. Co. and Nancy L. 
Seefeldt, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 29, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals1 reversing a judgment 
of the Circuit Court for Winnebago County, Thomas J. Gritton, 
Judge.  The circuit court granted summary judgment to the 
defendants, American Family Mutual Insurance Company and their 
insured, Nancy L. Seefeldt (collectively referred to as Ms. 
Seefeldt), against the plaintiffs, Colleen Pawlowski and her 
                                                 
1 Pawlowski v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2009 WI App 7, ¶28, 
315 Wis. 2d 799, 762 N.W.2d 802. 
No. 
2007AP2651   
 
2 
 
husband, Thomas Pawlowski.  The circuit court concluded that 
there were no genuine issues of material fact and that Ms. 
Seefeldt was not a "keeper" of a dog, that is, that she was not 
a statutory owner of the dog under Wis. Stat. § 174.02 (2007-08)2 
at the time of the dog bite incident.  According to the circuit 
court,  Ms. Seefeldt was not exercising control over the dog at 
the time of the dog bite incident.  The circuit court concluded 
that Ms. Seefeldt is not liable to the plaintiffs for damages 
under the statute.  The circuit court also concluded that 
judicial public policy precluded liability.     
¶2 
The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the 
circuit court, holding that Ms. Seefeldt "was a keeper of the 
dog and remained a keeper" at the time of the plaintiffs' injury 
and therefore "is strictly liable as a statutory owner under 
Wis. Stat. § 174.02."  The court of appeals concluded that Ms. 
Seefeldt was, under the circumstances of the present case, a 
statutory owner of the dog as a keeper of the dog at the time of 
the dog bite incident and that she was liable under the statute 
for damages to the plaintiffs.  We affirm the decision of the 
court of appeals. 
¶3 
The issue before this court is whether a homeowner is 
liable under Wis. Stat. § 174.02, as a person who either 
"harbors" or "keeps" a dog, for injuries caused by a dog she 
allows to reside in her home when the dog injures a third party 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-
08 version, unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2007AP2651   
 
3 
 
after the unleashed dog is allowed out of the house by its legal 
owner.     
¶4 
Under Wis. Stat. § 174.02, a person who owns, harbors, 
or keeps a dog is liable for damages caused by the dog injuring 
or causing injury to a person.  It is undisputed that Ms. 
Seefeldt does not own the dog in question.  The dispositive 
question, therefore, is whether under the facts of this case Ms. 
Seefeldt is liable under the statute as a person who either 
"harbors" or "keeps" the dog that bit Colleen Pawlowski.   
¶5 
Ms. Seefeldt argues that she was not a "keeper" or 
"harborer" of the dog for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 174.02 at the 
time of the dog bite incident because Mr. Waterman, the dog's 
owner, had "full custody, control and dominion over the dog" at 
that time and that her limited dominion as a keeper was 
terminated when Mr. Waterman left the house with the unleashed 
dogs.3  She claims that at that moment, the "dual authority" 
shared by her and Mr. Waterman was "merged in the owner," and 
her "responsibilities concerning the dog [were] at an end."4  She 
                                                 
3 Ms. Seefeldt urges that a homeowner should not be held 
strictly liable under Wis. Stat. § 174.02 for injuries caused by 
a "tenant/houseguest's dog" where: (1) the homeowner did not 
have custody or control of the dog at the time of injury; (2) 
there is not a familial relationship between the homeowner and 
the dog-owning tenant/houseguest; and (3) the homeowner does not 
provide the sole source of lodging, board, and support for the 
dog and its owner. 
4 Ms. Seefeldt relies on this language from Janssen v. Voss, 
189 Wis. 222, 224, 207 N.W. 279 (1926). 
No. 
2007AP2651   
 
4 
 
also asserts that judicial public policy precludes recovery by 
the plaintiffs.5 
¶6 
In contrast, the plaintiffs argue that Ms. Seefeldt 
was an "owner," that is, one who harbors or keeps a dog, 
regardless of whether she was in immediate control of the dog at 
the time the injury occurred.  The plaintiffs assert that Ms. 
Seefeldt had not relinquished her "owner" status under the 
statute at the time of the dog bite incident.    
¶7 
We conclude that Ms. Seefeldt harbored the dog and was 
thus a statutory "owner" of the dog under Wis. Stat. § 174.02 at 
the time of the dog bite incident.  Her status as a harborer of 
the dog was not extinguished when the dog's legal owner took 
momentary control of the dog.  We also conclude that the 
traditional public policy factors that delimit tort liability in 
Wisconsin do not bar recovery in the present case.  Accordingly, 
we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.   
I 
¶8 
The undisputed facts are taken from the depositions 
submitted as part of the summary judgment motions.   
¶9 
In June or July of 2003, Ms. Seefeldt agreed to let 
Walter Waterman, an acquaintance of her daughter, move into her 
                                                 
5 At the circuit court, Ms. Seefeldt argued that she was not 
liable for double damages under § 174.02(1)(b) because she had 
no notice or knowledge that the dog had previously caused injury 
to another person. The parties did not argue about Ms. 
Seefeldt's notice or knowledge in the court of appeals and do 
not argue this issue in this court.  Damages have not yet been 
tried in the present case. 
No. 
2007AP2651   
 
5 
 
home when he was unemployed and needed a place to stay where he 
could keep his two dogs.  Ms. Seefeldt had three of her own dogs 
and a large fenced backyard.  Mr. Waterman never paid rent; they 
apparently had an informal arrangement that Mr. Waterman would 
help with some home repairs and housekeeping.   
¶10 Ms. Seefeldt reported that when Mr. Waterman moved in, 
she was told that the dogs, Boo and Diesel, were friendly, but 
she also acknowledged that Mr. Waterman told her that Boo had 
recently nipped a six-year-old girl on the arm and frightened 
her.  Ms. Seefeldt stated she was not told of any other incident 
in which Boo injured anyone.   
¶11 On the afternoon of October 26, 2003, as Colleen 
Pawlowski walked in front of Ms. Seefeldt's home, she heard a 
sound like a door opening and saw Mr. Waterman's two unleashed 
dogs jump off the porch and charge her.  Mr. Waterman chased the 
dogs and shouted to stop them but was unable to bring them under 
his control.  Boo jumped up on Colleen Pawlowski and tried to 
bite her left shoulder, tearing her coat.  The dog then bit at 
her left thigh and finally punctured her calf, causing Ms. 
Pawlowski to fall to her knee before Mr. Waterman was able to 
control both dogs.  Although her shoulder and thigh were 
uninjured, Ms. Pawlowski did suffer puncture wounds to her calf.  
¶12 Mr. Waterman then grabbed the dogs and held them as he 
offered to give Colleen Pawlowski a ride home, which she 
declined.  Colleen Pawlowski observed that the skin was broken 
and told Mr. Waterman she would need to go to the emergency 
No. 
2007AP2651   
 
6 
 
room.  She then walked to the end of the street, to the home of 
a neighbor whom she knew, and asked the neighbor for a ride. 
¶13 At the time the attack occurred, Ms. Seefeldt was at 
home.  She did not see the attack and did not learn of it until 
a police officer came to her door to investigate later that day.  
Following the attack, Mr. Waterman apparently proceeded to the 
grocery store, taking his dogs with him.  When he returned to 
the house, Ms. Seefeldt asked him about the attack and Mr. 
Waterman relayed that when he had opened the door to leave for 
the grocery store the dogs had run into the street, toward 
Colleen Pawlowski, instead of running to the car.  He told her 
that Boo bit Colleen Pawlowski and that he had offered Ms. 
Pawlowski a ride home or to the doctor, but that she declined 
the offer.  Ms. Seefeldt told Mr. Waterman that Boo should be 
put 
to sleep, but she apparently did not seek further 
information about the incident.  One to two weeks later, Ms. 
Seefeldt asked Mr. Waterman and his dogs to leave her home.   
¶14 Mr. Waterman is not and has never been a named 
defendant and has not been located for purposes of discovery and 
litigation.  Both a legal owner and statutory owner of a dog can 
be simultaneously strictly liable under Wis. Stat. § 174.02.6  
                                                 
6 Fire Ins. Exch. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 2000 WI App 82, 
¶17, 234 Wis. 2d 314, 610 N.W.2d 98 ("Reading the statute to 
allow both owners and keepers to be liable comports with the 
statute's policy of assigning responsibility to those in a 
position to protect innocent third parties from dog bites."). 
No. 
2007AP2651   
 
7 
 
II 
¶15 We review summary judgment decisions using the same 
standards and method as are applied by the circuit court.  Under 
Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2),7 a moving party is entitled to summary 
judgment if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.8  A 
court may also determine that the nonmoving party is entitled to 
summary judgment.  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(6).   
¶16 Interpretation of a statute and application of a 
statute to undisputed facts (as in the present case) are 
generally 
questions 
of 
law 
that 
this 
court 
determines 
independently of the court of appeals and circuit court but 
benefiting from the analyses of these courts.9  Application of 
judicial public policy factors is a question of law that this 
court determines independently of the court of appeals and 
circuit court but benefiting from the analyses of these courts.10   
                                                 
7 Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch.-Freistadt v. 
Tower 
Ins. Co., 2003 WI 46, ¶25, 261 Wis. 2d 333, 661 
N.W.2d 789; Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 315, 
401 N.W.2d 816 (1987). 
8 Olson v. Town of Cottage Grove, 2008 WI 51, ¶34, 309 
Wis. 2d 65, 749 N.W.2d 211. 
9 Malone v. Fons, 217 Wis. 2d 746, 763, 580 N.W.2d 697 (Ct. 
App. 1998) ("Determining whether Fons may be held strictly 
liable under § 174.02, Stats., involves the construction and 
application of a statute to a set of undisputed facts, which is 
a task we perform de novo."). 
10 Fandrey ex rel. Connell v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2004 
WI 62, ¶6, 272 Wis. 2d 46, 680 N.W.2d 345.  
No. 
2007AP2651   
 
8 
 
III 
¶17 We begin by examining the language of the applicable 
statute.  Wisconsin Stat. § 174.02 provides that "the owner of a 
dog is liable for the full amount of damages caused by the dog 
injuring or causing injury to a person."  Section 174.02 is a 
strict liability statute.  If the owner "was notified or knew 
that the dog previously injured or caused injury to a person," 
then the victim can recover double damages.  
¶18 The 
liability provisions of Wis. Stat. § 174.02 
provide as follows: 
§ 174.02(1)(a).  Without notice. Subject to s. 895.045 
and except as provided in s. 895.57(4), the owner of a 
dog is liable for the full amount of damages caused by 
the dog injuring or causing injury to a person, 
domestic animal or property. 
§ 174.02(1)(b). After notice. Subject to s. 895.045 
and except as provided in s. 895.57(4), the owner of a 
dog is liable for 2 times the full amount of damages 
caused by the dog injuring or causing injury to a 
person, domestic animal or property if the owner was 
notified or knew that the dog previously injured or 
caused 
injury 
to 
a 
person, 
domestic 
animal 
or 
property. 
¶19 Critically here, the statutory "owner" of a dog is 
defined for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 174.02 more inclusively 
than simply a legal owner of the dog.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 174.001(5) defines the word "owner" as including "any person 
who owns, harbors or keeps a dog."11  The statutes do not define 
                                                 
11 The statutory definition applicable to this case was 
codified as § 174.001(5) by 1979 Wis. Act 289.  The present 
statutory language plainly defines the singular term "owner" 
used in § 174.02 to include the legal owner as well as one who 
"harbors" or "keeps" a dog. 
No. 
2007AP2651   
 
9 
 
the words "harbors" or "keeps."  The definition of "owns" is not 
important here because no one argues that Ms. Seefeldt is the 
legal owner of the dog.  
¶20 Whether a person is one who "harbors" or "keeps" a dog 
is ordinarily a factual question for the fact finder and 
"depends upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of each 
individual case."12  Here the facts are undisputed, and the 
question of law presented is whether Ms. Seefeldt is a 
"statutory owner" of the dog, as defined in § 174.001(5), that 
is, whether on the established facts she is one who "harbors" or 
"keeps" Boo. 
¶21 Ms. Seefeldt argues that there appears to be little 
distinction between a "harborer" and "keeper."  We agree that 
some dictionary definitions of these two words are similar and 
that the words seem to have overlapping meanings.13  We decline, 
however, to hold that there is no distinction between the words.    
¶22 As a basic rule of statutory construction, we endeavor 
to give each statutory word independent meaning so that no word 
is redundant or superfluous.  When the legislature chooses to 
use two different words, we generally consider each separately 
                                                 
12 Hagenau v. Milliard, 182 Wis. 544, 547, 195 N.W. 718 
(1923).  See also John P. Ludington, Annotation, Who "Harbors" 
or "Keeps" Dog Under Animal Liability Statute, 64 A.L.R. 4th 
963, §2(a) (1988) ("The question of who is the keeper or 
harborer of a dog is ordinarily a question of fact for the 
factfinder, which turns on all the circumstances of the case."). 
13 Ms. 
Seefeldt 
notes 
that 
Webster's 
New 
Collegiate 
Dictionary defines "harbor" as "to have 'an animal' in one's 
keeping." 
No. 
2007AP2651   
 
10 
 
and presume that different words have different meanings.14  The 
use of different words joined by the disjunctive connector "or" 
normally broadens the coverage of the statute to reach distinct, 
although potentially overlapping sets. 
¶23 The distinction between one who "keeps" and one who 
"harbors" a dog has not been crisp over the years either in the 
dog injury statutes or in the case law.   
¶24 "[E]arly Wisconsin cases appear to use these terms 
interchangeably."15  In Hagenau v. Millard, 182 Wis. 544, 547, 
195 N.W. 718 (1923), the court defined a "keeper" of a dog as 
one who harbored the dog.  The court stated that "[t]o be a 
keeper of a dog, one must harbor the animal, and the word 
'harbor' in its meaning signifies protection . . . ."  The 1923 
statutory provision at issue in Hagenau used the words "keeper" 
                                                 
14 Donaldson v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 306, 315, 286 N.W.2d 817 
(1980) ("A statute should be construed so that no word or clause 
shall be rendered surplusage and every word if possible should 
be given effect."); Graziano v. Town of Long Lake, 191 
Wis. 2d 812, 822, 530 N.W.2d 55, 59 (Ct. App. 1995) ("[W]here 
the legislature uses similar but different terms in a statute, 
particularly within the same section, we may presume it intended 
the terms to have different meanings."). 
15 Pattermann v. Pattermann, 173 Wis. 2d 143, 150 n.4, 496 
N.W.2d 613 (Ct. App. 1992). 
No. 
2007AP2651   
 
11 
 
and "owner," not the word "harbor."  Other 1923 statutory 
provisions governing dogs used the words "harbors" and "keeps."16  
¶25 In Hagenau, the court concluded that the proprietor of 
a restaurant and lodging house was not the keeper of his 
employee's dogs when the employee kept the dogs in a separate 
apartment on the third floor where the employee "maintained a 
separate and distinct home or place of abode."  Hagenau, 182 
Wis. at 546, 548, 549. 
¶26 The 
distinction between "keep" and "harbor" was 
discussed more recently by the court of appeals in Pattermann v. 
Pattermann, 173 Wis. 2d 143, 496 N.W.2d 613 (Ct. App. 1992).  
"Keeping," stated the court of appeals in Pattermann, generally 
requires "exercising some measure of care, custody or control 
over the dog," while "'harboring' is often defined as sheltering 
                                                 
16 In 1923, when this court interpreted the term "keeper" in 
Hagenau, 182 Wis. at 547, the underlying statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 174.02 (1923), read, "the owner or keeper of any dog which 
shall 
have 
injured 
or 
caused 
the 
injury 
of 
any 
person . . . shall be liable to the person so injured" (emphasis 
added).  Another provision of the 1923 statutes, Wis. Stat. 
§ 174.05 (1923), sub-titled "Dog licenses; application for," 
stated that "the word 'owner' when used in chapter 174 . . . in 
relation to property in, or possession of, dogs shall include 
every person who owns, harbors or keeps a dog." 
The 
1923 
statutes 
further 
muddied 
the 
water. 
 
The 
provisions in the 1923 version of chapter 174 refer to both "the 
person owning or harboring such dog," § 174.03, and the "owner 
or keeper" of a dog.  See, e.g., §§ 174.02, .04. 
No. 
2007AP2651   
 
12 
 
or giving refuge to a dog.  Thus, 'harboring' apparently lacks 
the proprietary aspect of keeping."17   
¶27 According to the Pattermann decision, "'[h]arboring a 
dog' means something more than a meal of mercy to a stray dog or 
the casual presence of a dog on someone's premises.  Harboring 
means to afford lodging, to shelter or to give refuge to a 
dog."18  Thus the court of appeals distinguished "harboring" a 
dog from "keeping" a dog, concluding that harboring "means to 
afford lodging, to shelter or to give refuge to a dog."19     
¶28 In Pattermann, the court of appeals concluded that the 
defendant homeowner who allowed the dog in his home for a short 
time did not harbor or keep the dog.  In contrast to the present 
case, the dog did not live in the house, and the homeowner had 
not "fed or cared for the dog in any way."20    
                                                 
17 Pattermann v. Pattermann, 173 Wis. 2d 143, 149 n.4, 496 
N.W.2d 613 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing Ludington, 64 A.L.R. 4th at 
969).  The comment in Pattermann that a landowner could be 
liable under a common law negligence theory for injuries caused 
by a known dangerous dog allowed on her premises was abrogated 
in Smaxwell v. Bayard, 2004 WI 101, ¶42 n.8, 274 Wis. 2d 278, 
306, 682 N.W.2d 923.  
18 Pattermann, 173 Wis. 2d at 151. 
19 Id.  
"Keeping is often defined in terms of the three Cs——that 
is, that keeping is exercising some measure of care, custody, or 
control over a dog.  Harboring . . . is usually defined as 
sheltering or giving refuge to a dog."  Ludington, supra note 
12, at 963, §2[a]. 
20 Pattermann, 173 Wis. 2d at 150. 
No. 
2007AP2651   
 
13 
 
¶29 Under the Pattermann definition of harboring, which we 
adopt, Ms. Seefeldt "harbored" Boo.  She allowed the dog to live 
in her home for several months, affording the dog shelter and 
lodging.  As Ms. Seefeldt's reply brief describes the situation, 
Ms. Seefeldt was "temporarily providing refuge" to the dog.  
¶30 Most of the reported cases interpreting "owner" under 
Wis. Stat. § 174.02 have focused on the word "keeper," rather 
than on the word "harbor."  The case law has examined several 
aspects of being a "keeper," and the cases state the attributes 
of a keeper somewhat differently.  According to the cases, to be 
a keeper a person must exercise "some measure of custody, care 
or control over the dog";21 have custody, dominion or authority 
over the dog even though the keeper's dominion or authority is a 
limited one subject to being terminated by the owner;22 or keep 
the dog at the person's dwelling and feed the dog.23  The casual 
presence of a dog will not transform a person into a keeper; 
there must be evidence that the person has furnished the dog 
with shelter, protection, or food or exercised control of the 
dog. 
                                                 
21 Pattermann, 173 Wis. 2d at 149, n.4.  See also Armstrong 
v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 202 Wis. 2d 258, 267, 549 N.W.2d 723 
(1996) (citing Hagenau, 182 Wis. at 547-48) (exercise control 
over, or furnish with shelter, protection, or food). 
22 Janssen v. Voss, 189 Wis. 222, 224, 207 N.W. 279 (1936). 
23 Koetting v. Conroy, 223 Wis. 550, 552, 270 N.W.625 (1936) 
(citing Hagenau, 182 Wis. at 547). 
No. 
2007AP2651   
 
14 
 
¶31 Relying on the case law discussion of the words 
"harbor" and "keep" and the distinction between "harbor" and 
"keep" set forth in Pattermann, and acknowledging the sometimes 
overlapping meaning of the words "harbor" and "keep" (and their 
variations), we conclude that Ms. Seefeldt is a person who 
harbored the dog at issue.  The court of appeals viewed Ms. 
Seefeldt as a keeper of the dog because she sheltered, 
maintained, and protected the dog on her premises.24  That this 
court and the court of appeals characterize Ms. Seefeldt 
differently under Wis. Stat. § 174.02 is not significant.  The 
concepts of "harbor" and "keep" are similar, and the liability 
of one who harbors a dog and one who keeps a dog is the same.   
¶32 We 
further 
conclude 
that 
Ms. 
Seefeldt 
had 
not 
relinquished her status as a statutory owner when the dog bit 
Colleen Pawlowski.  Our conclusion is supported by the case law.  
In essence we agree with the court of appeals' analyses of the 
cases that inform our decision.  
¶33 Three key cases, Janssen v. Voss, 189 Wis. 222, 207 
N.W. 279 (1926), Koetting v. Conroy, 223 Wis. 550, 270 N.W. 625 
(1936), and Armstrong v. Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Co., 202 
Wis. 2d 258, 
549 
N.W.2d 723 
(1996), 
do 
not 
support 
Ms. 
Seefeldt's position that she lost her status as a statutory 
owner when Mr. Waterman was exercising dominion and control over 
the dog during the dog bite incident. 
                                                 
24 See Pawlowski, 315 Wis. 2d 799, ¶¶11-14.  
No. 
2007AP2651   
 
15 
 
¶34 In Janssen, the mother of a 14-year-old boy left town 
for a funeral, arranging for her son's dog to be kept at a dog 
hospital.25  The mother left explicit instructions that the dog 
should remain at the hospital during her absence.  In spite of 
these instructions, the son removed the dog from the hospital 
and tied it in the yard of the house where he was staying.  The 
dog bit a 17-month-old infant, and the mother was sued. 
¶35 It was conceded in Janssen that the mother was the 
keeper of the dog until she left for the funeral.  She had 
bought the dog, given it to the son, maintained the dog in her 
home at her expense, and exercised control over the dog for more 
than a year prior to the incident.   
¶36 The Janssen court held that under the circumstances in 
which the mother had turned over all control to the dog hospital 
during her absence, and the son who was legal owner took 
personal custody and possession of the dog, "he thereby became 
the legal keeper."26  The complaint against the mother was 
dismissed because the owner-son had terminated the mother's 
status as a keeper.27 
¶37 Ms. Seefeldt argues that she was not a statutory owner 
because she did not have control or dominion over the dogs "at 
                                                 
25 The court interpreted "keeper" without reference to the 
statutory definition of "owner" in the then-current version of 
§ 174.05, which effectively defined "owner" as does the present 
statute.   
26 Janssen, 189 Wis. at 225. 
27 Id. at 224. 
No. 
2007AP2651   
 
16 
 
that very moment" when the attack occurred.  Her argument relies 
principally on the following language from Janssen, 189 Wis. at 
224: 
Where the keeper is not the owner, it may be assumed, 
as a general proposition, that the dominion or 
authority of the keeper over the dog is a limited one, 
subject to be terminated at any time by the owner.  In 
the absence of special circumstances, the owner may 
terminate the dominion of the keeper over the dog at 
any time and remove the dog from the custody of the 
keeper.  The moment that is done, the dual authority 
theretofore exercised over the dog by the owner and 
the keeper is merged in the owner, and at that very 
moment 
the 
keeper's 
rights 
and 
responsibilities 
concerning the dog are at an end.  
¶38 Reliance on this language is unavailing.  Janssen 
would be on point had Ms. Seefeldt left town and had the dog 
been removed from the Seefeldt home.   
¶39 Ten years after Janssen, this court decided Koetting 
v. Conroy, 223 Wis. 550, 270 N.W. 625 (1936).28  Koetting, like 
Janssen, involved a parent homeowner who was not present at the 
time of the injury.  In Koetting, an adult woman lived with her 
father "as a member of his family."29  She received board, 
lodging, and support from her father.  She kept her dog in the 
family home.  She took her dog to a public park and let it off 
its leash.  The plaintiff, who was injured when the dog knocked 
her down, sued both the dog's owner and the owner's father.   
                                                 
28 The statutory language in Koetting was for present 
purposes identical to the language applicable in Hagenau and 
Janssen. 
29 Koetting v. Conroy, 223 Wis. 550, 552, 270 N.W. 625 
(1936). 
No. 
2007AP2651   
 
17 
 
¶40 In Koetting, although the father was not present at 
the time of the injury and had no knowledge that the daughter 
had taken the dog out of the house at the time of the injury, 
the father was held to be a keeper under the statute.  The 
father did know that the daughter was in the habit of taking the 
dog out.30  
¶41 The 
Koetting 
opinion 
explicitly 
referenced 
the 
statutory definition in § 174.05, "providing that one who 
'harbors' a dog makes him the owner."31  The Koetting court also 
specifically rejected the defendant's interpretation of the 
Hagenau and Janssen cases as holding that "the keeper is not 
liable for injuries done by a dog if the dog is under the 
control of another at the immediate time."32 
¶42 The Koetting court distinguished the Hagenau and 
Janssen cases, reasoning that in Janssen the mother had 
"particularly exempted herself from being [the dog's] keeper by 
causing the dog to be kept for the period of her absence in a 
dog hospital.  To be within the rule of [Janssen] the defendant 
[father] should have refused to permit the dog to be kept on his 
premises, should have compelled the daughter to keep it or have 
                                                 
30 In Koetting, 223 Wis. at 557, the father was found not 
liable under the version of Wis. Stat. § 174.02 then in 
existence, which required that the dog be "either vicious or 
mischievous," a condition which was not met.  
31 Koetting, 223 Wis. at 551. 
32 Id. at 555. 
No. 
2007AP2651   
 
18 
 
it kept elsewhere."33  The Koetting court expressly rejected the 
argument that the keeper is not liable for injuries done by a 
dog if the dog is under the control of another at the time of 
the dog bite incident.34 
¶43 As the court of appeals correctly recognized in the 
present case, "the holding in Koetting appears to govern the 
outcome in this case."35  The Koetting court plainly rejected the 
argument that moment-to-moment control is required in order to 
be a keeper of the dog. 
¶44 The Koetting court concluded that the father had not 
given up his statutory owner status even though the dog owner 
took the dog out of the house and had control and dominion over 
the dog.  The father's liability as a keeper depended on his 
keeping the dog in the house and feeding it, not his moment-to-
moment control over the dog.   
¶45 When the injury occurred not at the house but in a 
public park, and the legal owner's father was not even present, 
the Koetting court recognized that the father "doubtless 
exercised no control over the [adult daughter's] dog except that 
he controlled whether the dog should be kept in his home or not, 
and whether it should be fed from the family larder or not, but 
that sort of control is the thing that, in view of the statute 
                                                 
33 Id.  The Koetting court mistakenly cited the Hagenau case 
instead of the Janssen case. 
34 Koetting, 223 Wis. at 555. 
35 Pawlowski, 315 Wis. 2d 799, ¶23. 
No. 
2007AP2651   
 
19 
 
and the cases . . ., make [sic] him the dog's keeper."36  
Although the father had argued "that a person is not the keeper 
of a dog unless it is under his custody and control," the court 
found that view "too narrow."37  
¶46 Court of Appeals Judge Snyder in dissent saw a tension 
between Janssen and Koetting.  He asserted that in both cases 
the legal owner had control over the dog, and the alleged 
"keeper" had no control.  Yet the two cases reach opposite 
results.  Although there appears to be a superficial tension 
between the cases, the cases can be reconciled.  In Janssen, the 
keeper's relationship with the dog was terminated by the owner's 
actions.  In Koetting, neither the keeper nor the owner took 
action to terminate the keeper's relationship with the dog. 
¶47 Ms. Seefeldt insists that Koetting does not apply.  We 
are not persuaded.  The holding in Koetting, as in Janssen, did 
not depend on the family relationship between the dog owner and 
the homeowner but rather on the fact that the father allowed the 
dog to remain in his home and cared for the dog.  The father had 
not 
relinquished 
keeper 
status. 
 
Koetting 
cannot 
be 
distinguished on the grounds that the dog owner was related to 
the homeowner who served as the sole source of lodging, board, 
and support for both the dog and its owner, and the dog owner 
had taken no action to terminate the keeper's limited control, 
custody, or care of the dog. 
                                                 
36 Koetting, 223 Wis. at 554. 
37 Id. 
No. 
2007AP2651   
 
20 
 
¶48 The facts of the present case are directly analogous 
to the facts in Koetting.  In Koetting and in the present case, 
an adult was the legal owner of the dog and was in immediate 
control of the dog at the time of the dog bite incident.  The 
homeowner in Koetting and the homeowner in the present case, 
unlike the homeowner in Janssen, had taken no affirmative action 
to relinquish control over the dog to another.  
¶49 Armstrong v. Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Co., 202 
Wis. 2d 258, 549 N.W.2d 723 (1996), also supports our conclusion 
that Ms. Seefeldt is liable under Wis. Stat. § 174.02.  In 
Armstrong, the vacationing dog owners left the dog at a kennel. 
The dog bit a part-time employee of the kennel, and the question 
presented was whether the employee was a keeper under § 174.02.  
The court concluded that the employee was a keeper because the 
owners had affirmatively relinquished physical custody and 
control over the dog.  The court recognized that while a 
person's status as keeper can change over time, with the focal 
point being the time of the injury, the owners affirmatively 
relinquished physical custody to a kennel.  The Armstrong court 
favorably cited Koetting.    
¶50 Here, Ms. Seefeldt took neither "affirmative" nor 
"explicit" steps to terminate her harboring of the dog before 
the dog bit incident.  Indeed, the dog continued to live in her 
home for some time after the dog bite incident.  When a 
homeowner has become a statutory owner by virtue of the dog's 
living in her residence for several months, that status does not 
No. 
2007AP2651   
 
21 
 
vary on a minute-to-minute basis, depending on which person 
happens to open the door to let the dog run free. 
¶51 Ms. Seefeldt's argument that she is akin to a "pro 
bono landlord" also does not command a different outcome than 
the one we reach.  Ms. Seefeldt does not argue that she and Mr. 
Waterman have landlord-tenant relationship.  Rather, she argues 
only that their relationship is similar to that of landlord-
tenant.   
¶52 The landlord-tenant dog bite cases in which the 
landlord was not held liable under Wis. Stat. § 174.02 are 
inapposite to the case at hand.  Ms. Seefeldt's reliance on 
Gonzales v. Wilkinson, 68 Wis. 2d 154, 227 N.W.2d 907 (1975), 
Malone v. Fons, 217 Wis. 2d 746, 580 N.W.2d 697 (Ct. App. 1998), 
and Smaxwell v. Bayard, 2004 WI 101, 274 Wis. 2d 278, 682 
N.W.2d 923, is misplaced.38  Gonzales and Smaxwell are negligence 
cases, not strict liability cases under Wis. Stat. § 174.02.  
Furthermore, these cases are traditional landlord-tenant cases, 
in which the tenant-owner of the dog occupied and maintained a 
separate residence from the landlord.  In such cases the 
landlord had limited control over the tenant's premises.  In 
contrast, in the present case Mr. Waterman occupied a bedroom in 
Ms. Seefeldt's home.  He is more akin to a houseguest than a 
tenant.      
                                                 
38 In Hagenau, 182 Wis. at 547-49, the court also held that 
the landlord was not the keeper of the tenant's dogs. 
No. 
2007AP2651   
 
22 
 
¶53 In Gonzales, the plaintiff sought recovery against the 
owner-occupant of a duplex for injuries caused by the dog owned 
by the tenant who lived in the other unit of the duplex.  
Liability was sought against the owner-occupant under attractive 
nuisance and negligence theories.39  The court concluded that the 
dog was not an attractive nuisance and that the complaint was 
not sufficient to state a cause of action against the owner-
occupant for negligence. 
¶54 The Gonzales court further explained that there was no 
allegation that the owner-occupant was either an owner or keeper 
of the dog or had any dominion over the dog.  The court stated 
that although the owner-occupant knew of the dog, the law does 
not require him as the owner of the building to be an insurer 
for the acts of his tenant.  Unlike Gonzales, this is a Wis. 
Stat. § 174.02 case, and the Seefeldt home is not a duplex; 
rather, both Ms. Seefeldt and Mr. Waterman, along with their 
dogs, lived in the same undivided residence.   
¶55 In Malone v. Fons, 217 Wis. 2d 746, 580 N.W.2d 697 
(Ct. App. 1998), the dog owner kept his dog in his own separate 
rented premises.  The court held that a landlord does not become 
a harborer of a tenant's dog merely by permitting a tenant to 
keep a dog.  The landlord was not liable under § 174.02.40   
                                                 
39 Gonzales v. Wilkinson, 68 Wis. 2d 154, 155-56, 227 
N.W.2d 907 (1975). 
40 Malone v. Fons, 217 Wis. 2d 746, 750-51, 580 N.W.2d 697 
(Ct. App. 1998).   
No. 
2007AP2651   
 
23 
 
¶56 In Smaxwell v. Bayard, 2004 WI 101, 274 Wis. 2d 278, 
682 N.W.2d 923, in which the victim of a dog bite asserted a 
negligence claim against a landlord, the court declined to hold 
that the landowner was liable for failure to maintain her 
property by allowing known dangerous dogs to run at large on the 
property.  Rather, the court precluded liability in this 
negligence case based on judicial public policy factors.41     
¶57 These dog bite cases support our conclusion that Ms. 
Seefeldt is a harborer and is liable for the injuries the 
plaintiffs sustained as a result of the dog bite.   
IV 
¶58 We turn now to the question whether Ms. Seefeldt's 
liability is precluded by judicial public policy considerations.  
¶59 The 
six 
"traditional public policy factors" are 
identified in Colla v. Mandella, 1 Wis. 2d 594, 598–99, 85 
N.W.2d 345 (1957), as follows: 
[E]ven where the chain of causation is complete and 
direct, recovery against the negligent tort-feasor may 
sometimes be denied on grounds of public policy 
because [1] the injury is too remote from the 
negligence or [2] too "wholly out of proportion to the 
culpability of the negligent tort-feasor," or [3] in 
retrospect it appears too highly extraordinary that 
the negligence should have brought about the harm, or 
                                                 
41 Smaxwell v. Bayard, 274 Wis. 2d 278, ¶39. 
The Smaxwell court declared, "based on public policy 
factors, that common-law liability of landowners and landlords 
for negligence associated with injuries caused by dogs is 
limited to situations where the landowner or landlord is also 
the owner or keeper of the dog causing injury."  Smaxwell, 274 
Wis. 2d 278, ¶54. 
No. 
2007AP2651   
 
24 
 
[4] because allowance of recovery would place too 
unreasonable a burden upon [a class of tortfeasors], 
or [5] be too likely to open the way to fraudulent 
claims, or [6] would "enter a field that has no 
sensible or just stopping point."   
¶60 These six judicial public policy considerations have 
been used to bar liability in a dog bite case under Wis. Stat. 
§ 174.02.  In Fandrey ex rel. Connell v. American Family Mutual 
Insurance Co., 2004 WI 62, ¶8, 272 Wis. 2d 46, 680 N.W.2d 345, 
we held that "courts may use the six traditional public policy 
factors to bar a claim under § 174.02, even if a plaintiff 
otherwise establishes liability." 
¶61 In Fandrey, decided on summary judgment like the 
present case, a three-year-old girl and her mother entered the 
home of their friends while the friends were not home, without 
either express or implied consent, and knowing that the family 
dog was normally kept in the home.  The young girl then wandered 
away from her mother and was bitten by the dog.  The circuit 
court concluded that the owners could not have done anything 
"more restrictive than to keep the dog inside their home,"42 as 
they had done.  Applying judicial public policy factors, the 
circuit court denied liability. 
¶62 On review, the court began with the observation that 
Wis. Stat. "§ 174.02 imposes strict liability" and "obviates the 
need for a plaintiff to prove specific acts of negligence in 
each case."43  The court recognized that "[w]hen we preclude 
                                                 
42 Fandrey ex rel. Connell v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2004 
WI 62, ¶5, 272 Wis. 2d 46, 56, 680 N.W.2d 345. 
43 Id., ¶9. 
No. 
2007AP2651   
 
25 
 
liability based on 'public policy factors' . . . [w]e do so in 
order to assure that 'in cases so extreme that it would shock 
the conscience of society to impose liability, the courts may 
step in and hold as a matter of law that there is no 
liability.'"44 
 
Acknowledging 
the 
"sometimes-harsh 
results . . . under § 174.02," the court held that the judicial 
public policy factors may "limit liability in appropriate cases 
under § 174.02."45  
¶63 This case, however, although arguably "harsh," does 
not provide an appropriate instance to draw a judicial limit on 
the strict liability imposed by § 174.02.  In the present case, 
application of judicial public policy to bar liability would 
undermine the legislative decision to impose strict liability on 
a statutory owner of a dog.  The instant case is significantly 
different from Fandrey. 
¶64 In Fandrey, three of the public policy factors weighed 
against allowing liability.  Here none of these factors is 
present. 
¶65 With regard to the first judicial public policy 
factor, we concluded in Fandrey that recovery would be too 
disproportionate to the culpability of the dog's owners.46  In 
that case, "essentially the only thing [the owners] did 
                                                 
44 Id., ¶15 (quoted source omitted). 
45 Id., ¶26. 
46 Id., ¶34. 
No. 
2007AP2651   
 
26 
 
'wrong' . . . was to leave their door unlocked."47  At times when 
the owners were at home with the dog, they "made a conscious 
effort" to separate the dog from children.48  Here, Ms. 
Seefeldt's desire to assist Mr. Waterman was well-intentioned, 
but it does not appear she made "a conscious effort" to reduce 
the risks of another dog injury.  Although she states that she 
had never seen Mr. Waterman let the dogs out of the front door 
without a leash prior to the attack on Colleen Pawlowski, she 
does not claim to have enforced a leash rule.  Although she 
claims she would not have let the dog live in her home if she 
had known of the prior biting incidents, she admitted in a 
deposition that she "made no inquiries at all as to the 
temperament of the dog, whether or not it had ever injured 
anybody."  In short, unlike the Fandrey case in which there was 
nothing more within reason the owners might have done to prevent 
the injury, there are several steps Ms. Seefeldt might have 
taken. 
¶66 The second public policy factor applicable in Fandrey 
was that recovery "would place too unreasonable a burden" on dog 
owners.  The court reasoned in Fandrey that recovery would force 
dog owners "prior to leaving their homes, to kennel their dogs, 
muzzle them, or lock them in cages."49  Here, recovery does not 
imply an unreasonable burden on Ms. Seefeldt or others in her 
                                                 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id., ¶35. 
No. 
2007AP2651   
 
27 
 
position.  In allowing an unknown dog to live in one's home, it 
is not unreasonable that the homeowner take precautions to 
ensure that the dog is leashed or restrained in some manner when 
walking in the street.   
¶67 Ms. Seefeldt contends that "to burden [her] with 
strict liability . . . makes her an insurer of the legal owner, 
Waterman."  She asserts that blame more properly lies with Mr. 
Waterman and that she and her insurance company are named as 
defendants only because their "affluence is more apparent."50  
Nothing in this opinion bars a suit against Mr. Waterman.  The 
legal owner, the keeper, and the harborer are all liable under 
Wis. Stat. § 174.02.51   
¶68 The third public policy factor, "perhaps the strongest 
factor weighing against imposing liability" in Fandrey, was that 
imposing liability "would enter a field that has no sensible or 
just stopping point."52  There, the court evaluated a situation 
                                                 
50 Smaxwell v. Bayard, 2004 WI 101, ¶46, 274 Wis. 2d 278, 
682 N.W.2d 923 (quoting Malone, 217 Wis. 2d at 767: "Our rule 
[that a landlord who merely allows a tenant to keep a dog is not 
liable under Wis. Stat. § 174.02] also promotes the salutary 
policy of placing responsibility where it belongs, rather than 
fostering a search for a defendant whose affluence is more 
apparent than his culpability."). 
51 "Reading the statute to allow both owners and keepers to 
be liable comports with the statute's policy of assigning 
responsibility to those in a position to protect innocent third 
parties from dog bites."  Fire Ins. Exch. v. Cincinnati Ins. 
Co., 2000 WI App 82, ¶17, 234 Wis. 2d 314, 327, 610 N.W.2d 98.   
52 Fandrey, 2004 WI 62, ¶36, 272 Wis. 2d 46, 75, 680 
N.W.2d 345. 
No. 
2007AP2651   
 
28 
 
where the injured person was tantamount to a trespasser, 
entering defendant's home without permission.  We reasoned that 
imposing liability in that case would be indistinguishable from 
making a homeowner liable to a burglar who had "meticulously 
picked a locked door . . . only to unexpectedly encounter a 
vigilant hound."53   
¶69 Here, holding Ms. Seefeldt strictly liable as a 
statutory owner under § 174.02 creates no similarly open-ended 
liability.  The present case does not make a homeowner liable as 
a statutory "owner" under § 174.02 for a mere "transient 
invasion"54 of a dog or for "the casual presence of a dog on 
someone's premises."55  Nothing in the present opinion overturns 
or alters Malone,56 Gonzales,57 or Smaxwell,58 addressing the 
liability of landlords and property owners in negligence, or in 
strict liability under Wis. Stat. § 174.02 for dogs residing 
with tenants on the landowners' property.  
                                                 
53 Id., ¶39. 
54 Pattermann v. Pattermann, 173 Wis. 2d 143, 151, 496 
N.W.2d 613, 616 (Ct. App. 1992) 
55 Armstrong v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 202 Wis. 2d 258, 
265, 549 N.W.2d 723 (1996). 
56 Malone v. Fons, 217 Wis. 2d 746, 580 N.W.2d 697 (Ct. App. 
1998). 
57 Gonzales v. Wilkinson, 68 Wis. 2d 154, 227 N.W.2d 907, 
(1975). 
58 Smaxwell v. Bayard, 2004 WI 101, 274 Wis. 2d 278, 682 
N.W.2d 923.  
No. 
2007AP2651   
 
29 
 
¶70 Beyond the three public policy factors that barred 
recovery in Fandrey, none of the three remaining public policy 
factors requires a different result here. 
¶71 Remoteness is the fourth judicial policy factor to 
consider in denying liability.  The injury in the present case 
is not "too remote" from Ms. Seefeldt's actions to bar recovery. 
Here, the dog bit a neighbor walking in front of Ms. Seefeldt's 
home when the uncontrolled dog left the home.  This incident is 
not too remote from the act of harboring the dog to prohibit 
recovery.  Indeed, it is the kind of incident that the statute 
would ordinarily cover.   
¶72 Nor does the fifth public policy factor apply.  It 
does not appear in hindsight "too highly extraordinary" that Ms. 
Seefeldt's giving the dog a home would give rise to the injury 
here.  There is always the risk that a dog will get loose and 
injure someone.  Section 174.02 embodies a legislative judgment 
that those who own, harbor, or keep a dog are in the best 
position to reduce the risk of injury and should bear liability 
for any damages, rather than making those who are injured by no 
fault of their own suffer without compensation.  It is not 
"highly extraordinary" that providing shelter for a dog in your 
home may create risks for a passerby if the dog is not properly 
restrained.   
¶73 Lastly, 
this 
case 
does 
not 
open 
the 
door 
for 
fraudulent claims, the sixth judicial policy factor. The 
uncontested facts here demonstrate that Ms. Seefeldt was an 
owner as defined in § 174.001(5).  Factual proof of keeper or 
No. 
2007AP2651   
 
30 
 
harborer status will be required in each case, and here, Ms. 
Seefeldt's own deposition establishes that the dog lived in her 
home on more than a transient or casual basis.  This fact 
situation creates no unusual likelihood of fraud. 
¶74 None of the judicial public policy factors bars the 
Pawlowskis from recovering from Ms. Seefeldt in the present 
case. 
¶75 We need not define the farthest limits of liability of 
statutory dog owners to decide the present case.  Here, it is 
clear that the dog and its owner lived in a single private 
residence with Ms. Seefeldt, that the dog resided in the 
residence for a period of approximately four months, and that 
both the dog and its legal owner had the homeowner's explicit 
permission to reside in the home.  No authority in dog bite 
cases has been cited that treats a houseguest or cohabitant in a 
single residence as a "tenant."   
¶76 The purpose of Wis. Stat. § 174.02 is "to protect 
those people who are not in a position to control the dog."59  
                                                 
59 Armstrong, 202 Wis. 2d at 268. 
See also Cole v. Hubanks, 2004 WI 74, ¶22, 272 Wis. 2d 539, 
681 
N.W.2d 147 
("Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 174.02 
is 
a 
'strict 
liability' statute wherein the legislature has made the policy 
choice to place the burden of damage caused by a dog on the 
dog's owner."); Koetting v. Conroy, 223 Wis. 550, 555, 270 
N.W. 625 (1936) (the purpose is to protect against "injury by 
dogs by whomsoever the dogs are kept or harbored, and to make a 
person who keeps or harbors a dog responsible for all injuries 
inflicted by it . . ."); Fire Ins. Exch. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 
2000 WI App 82, ¶17, 234 Wis. 2d 324, 610 N.W.2d 98 (the statute 
"assign[s] responsibility to those in a position to protect 
innocent third parties from dog bites").  
No. 
2007AP2651   
 
31 
 
Imposing liability in the present case furthers the legislative 
policy embodied in Wis. Stat. § 174.02 of protecting innocent 
people from injury by dogs, of ensuring that an innocent victim 
of a dog bite recovers compensation, and of making a person who 
owns, harbors, or keeps a dog responsible for injuries inflicted 
by the dog.  The legislative purpose and policy of § 174.02 
would be defeated if the court applied judicial public policy 
factors to preclude liability in the present case. 
¶77 Court of Appeals Chief Judge Brown aptly summed up the 
present case as follows:  
As I see it, the purpose of the statute is to protect 
from harm the surrounding neighbors, passers-by and 
those who come in proximity to a dog.  If a neighbor 
agrees to keep and shelter a dog in the home, it means 
the dog is living in that home just as much as would 
be the case if the homeowner was the legal owner of 
the dog.  Unless and until the homeowner's status as 
keeper is intentionally terminated in time and space 
by the dog's removal from the home, that homeowner is 
strictly liable for any dog-bite injury to his or her 
neighbors, passers-by and others in proximity.  I do 
not believe the legislature meant to allow the keeper 
of the dog to avoid strict liability to his or her 
neighbors, 
passers-by or others in proximity by 
pointing a finger at someone else and arguing that at 
that certain moment in time, even though the dog was 
still 
within 
the 
perimeter 
of 
the 
homeowner's 
property, he or she had temporarily stopped being the 
keeper.  To allow such a result would be to drown the 
statute in a sea of minutiae.60 
¶78 For the reasons set forth, we conclude that Ms. 
Seefeldt was a statutorily defined owner of the dog under Wis. 
                                                 
60 Pawlowski, 
315 
Wis. 2d 799, 
¶30 
(Brown, 
C.J., 
concurring). 
No. 
2007AP2651   
 
32 
 
Stat. § 174.02 at the time of the dog bite.  She was a person 
who harbored the dog.  Her status as a harborer of the dog was 
not extinguished when the dog's legal owner took momentary 
control of the dog.  We also conclude that the traditional 
public policy factors that may preclude tort liability do not 
bar recovery in the present case.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals.  
¶79 By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No. 
2007AP2651   
 
 
 
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