Title: Colony Surf, Ltd. v. Director of the Department of Planning and Permitting.

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'I

---000---

 

COLONY SURF, LTD., Plaintif£/Appellant-Appellee,
vs.

DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING AND PERMITTING; MICHEL! S
INC. and D.G. ANDERSON, Defendants/Appellees-Appellante,

ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS, Defendant/Appellee-Appellee.

SSS

ive

 

Wo. 26037

92330)

APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(CIV. No, 03-1-0294)

  

DECEMBER 26, 2007

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.

 

OPINION OF THE COURT BY NAKAYAMA, J.
Defendants/Appellees-Appellants, director of the
Department of Planning and Pezmitting, State of Hawai'i, Michel's
Inc., and D.G. Anderson (collectively referred to as
“Appellants”), appeal from the first circuit court's! July 23,
2003 judgment on appeal in favor of Plaintif# /Appellant-Appellee,

Colony Surf, Ltd. ("CSL"), Appellants

   

jet the following
points of error on appeal: (1) the circuit court erred by ruling
that the daytime operation of Michel’s “constitute(d] an
‘expanded’ nonconforming use” under section 21-4.110 (c} (1) of

the Land Use Ordinance, codified as Revised Ordinances of

+The Honorable Eden Elizabeth Hifo presided.
 

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Honolulu ("ROHY) § 21-4.120(c) (1)s* (2) the circuit court erred
by ruling that the daytime operation of Michel's following its
tenporary cessation constituted an “action” within the meaning of
ROH § 21-4.110(c) (5),? inasmuch as it did not intend to reduce
its hours; (3) the circuit court erred by construing ROH $6 21-
4,120(¢) (2),* (c) (3),* and (c) (5) dn-pari materia and by ruling
that the daytime operation of Michel’s violated ROH § 21-
4,110(c) (5) and (4) the circuit court erred by ruling that the

daytime operation of Michel's increased its hours of operation

+ RoW § 21-4.110(c) (2) states in pertinent part, "A nonconforning
lise shall not extend to any part of the structure or lot which was not
arranged or designed for such use at the time of adoption of the provisions of
this chapter or subsequent amendment; nor shall the nonconforming use be
‘expanded in any manner, or the hours of operation increases.”

    

 

% Row § 21-4.110(c) (5) provides, “Any action taken by an owne:
lessee, or authorized operator which reduces the negative effects associated
with the operation of s nonconforming use =~ such aa, but not limited to,
Teducing hours of operation of exterior Lighting intensity <= shell not be
reversed.”

 

‘Row § 21-€.120(¢) (2) states, An pertinent part

Any nonconforning use that is discontinued for any
reason for" [thelve] ‘consecutive nonths, cr for [eighteen]
fonths during any three-year period, shall not be resumed:
however, a temporary cessation of the nonconforming use for
porposes of ordinary repairs for a period not exceeding 120
Says during say [twelve)-nonth perios shall not be
Considered « discontinuation.

 

   

   

* Row § 21-4.110(¢) (3) provides, in pertinent part:

ork may be done on any structure devoted in whole oF
in part to any nonconforming use, provided that work oa the
nonconforming use portion shall be limited to ordinary
Fepairs, For purposes of this subsection, ordinary repairs
Shall only be construed to ineluge the following

 

 

 

May include work required to comply with federal
Eandates such as, but not limited to, the Anericans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) oF the National Environmental
Protection Act (NEPA)

(©) May include interior and exterior alterations,
provided that there is no physical expansion of the
Ronconferming use or intensification of the use

     

 

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+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER,

within the meaning of ROH § 21-4.110(e) (1).

Based upon the following analysis, we reverse the
circuit court's July 23, 2003 judgment.

T. BACKGROUND

CSL is the owner of Colony surf, a residential
apartment building located at 2895 Kalakaua Avenue, Honolulu,
Hawai'i. Colony Surf was originally constructed in 1959 and
included a ground-floor restaurant as an accessory use.

In 1961, CSL subleased the restaurant space to Colony
Surf Development Corporation for the purpose of operating
Michel's Restaurant ("Michel's"). At that time, Michel’s
operated 365 days per year, from 6:30 a.m. to 2:00 a.m.

In 1982, the area was rezoned A-2, which rendered the
accessory restaurant use nonconforming.

In October 1995, Michel’s was temporarily closed as a
result of a mortgage foreclosure. D.G. Anderson (“Anderson”)
emerged as the successful bidder at the ensuing foreclosure sale,
held in January 1996. Immediately after purchasing the lease,
Anderson sought to renovate Michel’s in two phases.

Upon completion of the first phase of interior
renovations in August 1996, Michel’s reopened, mainly operating
from 4:30 p.m. to about 2:00 a.m. and offering Sunday brunch
daytine services “for about a month.” From August 1996 until
January 1998, limited daytime operation of Michel’s consisted of:
(a) a regular Sunday brunch from Decenber 29, 1996 until June 15,
1997; (b) three lunch functions held on August 22, 1996, Novenber
22, 1996, and December 7, 19977 and (c) one breakfast function
held on July 12, 1997. In January 1998, Michel’s began its
 

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daytime operations from 7:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. to accommodate
private functions, including weddings, on a periodic basis.
After Colony Surf consented to ADA access compliance
Amprovenents on September 23, 1998, Anderson conmenced
construction of this second phase of renovations. Once the
second phase renovations were completed in October 1998, Michel's
entered into a $650,000 contract with Wedding Emporium to host
wedding services and receptions inside of its restaurant.
Michel's opened its dining room to regularly‘ host wedding

ceremonies from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. and receptions from 10:00

 

a.m, to 10:00 p.m.
‘The daytime wedding emporium use of Michel's resulted
in “noise, traffic and congestion” in the residential
neighborhood “which severely and negatively affect [ed] the
neighborhood quality of life."* On December 3, 1998, CSL sent a

 

 

‘The frequency of wedding receptions at Michel
per day to none during a week

ranged from three

> the restaurant was not open to the public during daytime hours but
wes available to the public for dinner and private dinner parties.

* csi complained that the wedding emporium is incompatible with the
residential character of the neighborhood

colony Surf has zero parking stalls for Michel"s ~ zero, none, not
one. There is not even a leading zone for delivery trucks

Deeger trucks can’t even turn around on the property. irucks
making food deliveries to Michel's aust use the neighbor’ ¢
froperty cr back cut a twovnundred-foot long, twonty-food wide
Griveway to Kalakaua Avenue. The trucks backing up fills the
Fesidential neighborhood with the incessant beep-beep-beep of
their reversing signals, "Now add to that problem @ series of
thirty-foot Long limousines arriving at the sane tine (norning
hours}, each with a bride and groom, an entourage of wedding
attendants, photographers, anda driver. None of these wedding
parties arrives ina taxi! There is no place to park the
Tisousine so st alts clogging the driveway, The limousines can’t
turn around, so they too mst back out {oF use the neighbor's
property).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
 

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letter to the director of the Department of Planning and
Permitting, State of Hawai'i (“director”) challenging Michel's
use of the premises for weddings, receptions, and other private
functions. By letter dated February 17, 1999, the director
rejected CSL’s challenge, informing it that such uses were
subsumed within the scope of restaurant uses.

In a January 19, 2001 letter to the director, CSL
questioned Michel's hours of operation under ROH $$ 21-
4.120(c) (1) and (5). By letter dated January 2, 2002, the
director concluded that “the daytime operation of (Michel's)
nonconforming use (an eating establishment with an accessory
wedding chapel) is not in conflict with (ROH $$] 21-4.110(c) (1)
and/or (5).

B. Procedural History

1, Director declared that Michel's did not increase its.
operating nours

on March 1, 2002, CSL filed a petition for a
Declaratory Ruling with the director alleging that Michel's
reduced its hours of operation and subsequently “reversed the
reduction in hours and began opening at about 9:00 a.m. for
wedding functions” in violation of ROH §§ 21-4.110(c) (1) and (5).
‘The director concluded that:
there was no action taken by the new owner of Michel"s to reduce
the Inpact of the nonconforming eating establishment when daytime
Services were not fully restored open assuming ownership. Andy
therefore, there was no increase in operating hours ence the owner

was finally able to resune full daytime services after renovations
wore completed.

 
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2. Zoning Board of Appeals affirmed the director's ruling

On May 28, 2002, CSL appealed the director's ruling to
the Zoning Board of Appeals ("ZBA”). CSL argued that Michel's
violated ROH §§ 21-4.110(1), (2), and (5), inasmuch as: (1) its
wedding operations constituted an expanded type of nonconforming
use, (2) it resumed its daytime operation, and (3) it increased
its operating hours of the nonconforming use. In its “Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision, and Order on
Petitioner Appealing From Director’s Declaratory Ruling No.
2002/DEC~1," filed January 10, 2003, the ZBA affirmed the
director's decision.
3, Circuit court reversed the ZBA's decision

On February 7, 2003, CSL filed a notice of appeal in
the circuit court. On July 23, 2003, the circuit court filed a
judgment on appeal reversing the decision of the ZBA.

In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the
circuit court found and concluded in pertinent part:

1. FINDms oF race

6. eeu te ‘son aggrieved” by the 20A Decision within
tthe meaning of Haweli Revised Statutes ("HRS") 31-149).

7." The Court hereby incorporates by reference che
Findings of Fact set forth in the Director's Ruling and the 2B
Decsaion

    

(2:00 a.m. (daytime seeearieny oat (tutes an “expanded
2 -
SESS ss iste a eisiin the pean ef (eoal {6)_izhe
S, ii daxbine operation of Michel's “increased” ite
“hours of operation” sithin the neaaTae at Thon Teta
eter
3 . amas an

‘Anderson's davtime operation of Michel's was an
“action” by Anerson Wich reversed a reduction in “the neative
‘Sicects associaced with the operation of Michels witnia che

   

ea aisle
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(Emphases:

appeal.

 

TT. CONCLUSIONS OF Law

 

In determining whether the daytime operation of
Michel's violates the (FOll), "strict Limits are placed upon
Ronconforning uses to discourage the perpetuation of these us
an thus facilitate the tinely conversion to conforming uses."
(Row) (6) 21-4.110%}

5.) "A honconforming use shall not be expanded in any
manner.” (ROR) {8} 21-4.110(c) (1)

 

é, “the hours of operation of a nonconforming use shall
not be increased. (ROH) {8} 21-110(c) (2)
4.125

The contrary conclusions set forth in the Director’ e

   

Ruling and the Z8A Decision are in “vielation of constitutional or
statutory provisions” within the meaning of ARS 91-1¢(9)(1)-

5.” P'the term “use” in’ [80H] (6] 21-4110(e) (2) (sie] refers
to the Aonconforming use in the entirety, as opposed to daytime

20, The daytine use of Michel's does not violate (Rot) ($)
2a-a1i0(e) (2) Tate) -

21, Laws in'pari materia, or upon the same subject matter,
shall be ‘construed with reference to each other. What is clear in
one stetute may be called in aid to explain what se doubtful in
fanether. Kan’. Woh, 770 P-2d 414 (Haw. 1969)

12, ““the subsections of (ROM) Sec. 71-4/110(c) are dn part

 

materia. Kam ¥. "Noh, 170" P.24 414. (Haw. 1983) |
13. o

wien S Peicular with the tine

Disabilities ac = way of (80H

SLC U0, the davtine operation of Michel's violates
BOW 1s) 2i-C ties
Te. The contrary conclusions set forth in the Director's
Ruling and the Z6A decision are in “violation of constitutional oF
statutory provisions” within the meaning of HRS (§] 91-14(g) (1)

 

added.)

on August 22, 2003, Appellants filed a timely notice of

XI. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Secondary Appeal

Review of a decision made by the cizcuit court upon its
review of an agency's decision ta a secondary appeal. The
Standard of review i one in which this court most determine
whether the circuit court was right or wrong in ite decision,
Spplying the standards set forth in HRS § 91-14(g) (1993) te the
agency's decision.
1+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

v. Zonin
and County of Honolulu, 114 Hawai'i 184, 193, 159 P.3d 143, 153
(2007) (citing Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Temple of Hawai'i v

Sullivan, 87 Hawai'i 217, 229, 953 P.2d 1315, 1327 (1998).

HRS § 91-14, “Judicial review of contested cases,”

provides in pertinent par

 

(g) Upon review of the record the court may affirm the decision of
the agency or renand the case with instructions for further
proceedings; of it may reverse or nodity the decision and order if
fhe substantisl rights of the petitioners nay have been prejudiced
Decause the administrative findings, conclusions, decisions, oF

 

(2) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions: of
(2) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the
agency: oF

(3) Made pon unlawful procedure; oF

(4) Affected by other error of Law or

(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and
substantial evidence on the whole record; oF

(6) Arbitrary, or capricious, or characterized by abuse of
Giscretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of digcretion.

 

 

Interpretation of Administrative Rule!

When interpreting municipal ordinances, we epply the sane
rules of construction that we spply to statutes. ‘while an
Adainistraive agency's interpretation of the ordinance that it is
Fesponsible for implenenting is normally accorded grest weight, no
Geforence is required when the agency's interpretation conflicts
with or contragicts che manifest purpose of the ordinance it secks
fo implement

City and County of Honolulu v. Hsiung, 109 Hawai'i 159, 172, 124
P.3d 434, 447 (2005).

 

III, DISCUSSION

A, ‘The Issue That the Daytime Operation of Michel's Constitutes
an “Expanded” Nonconforming Use Under ROH § 21-4,110(c) (1)
Was Not Properly Before the Circuit Court

Appellants’ first point of error asserts that the
 

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circuit court erred by ruling that the “operation of Michel's
prior to 4:30 p.m. and after 2:00 a.m. (‘daytime operation’)
constitutes an ‘expanded’ nonconforming use of Michel’s within
the meaning of [ROH §] 21-4.110(c) (1).” Although framed as a
challenge on the merits, Appellants actually argue that the
circuit court “exceeded its jurisdiction in ruling that the
daytime operation of Michel’s” “expanded” the nonconforming use,
insofar as CSL “challenged the daytime hours of operation under
[ROH] $§ 21-4.110(c) (1) and (5), and not the use of Michel's for
wedding functions” in its petition to the director. Thus,
according to Appellants, the director and the 2BA did not rule on
the issue, and it vas therefore not a matter properly before the

circuit court.

Although CSL petitioned the director regarding the
“daytime operation” of Michels violating ROH § 21-4.110(e) (1),
it did not contend that Michel’s expanded the type of
nonconforming use, but merely argued that the increase in
operating hours of Michel's violated ROH § 21-4.110(c) (1).? CSL.
presented case law and legal arguments in support of its sole
position that “Michel's is a nonconforming use, which reduced its
hours of operation and then reversed the reduction and expanded
ts hours of operation in violation of [ROH $§ 21-4.110(c) (1) and
(5)1." (Emphasis added.) ‘Thus, the director properly limited
his review of the petition to whether Michel's was precluded from

+ cst explained that the petition followed the director’s
determination that “the daxtime operation of the... nonconforming use (an
esting establishment with an accessory wedding chapel) is not in conflict with
[ROK ),21-4.110(e) (1) and/or (8]," But dig net reassert thet the daytine
operation conflicts with NOH § 21°4.110(c) (2) in the petition itself,

 

 

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increasing its hours of operation pursuant to ROH §§ 21-
4.110(c) (1) and (5).

Because the director ruled that Michel's did not
increase its hours of operation in violation of ROH § 21-
4.110(c) (1), the 2BA’s ruling regarding whether Michel’s complied
with ROH § 21-4.110(c) (1) was limited to this matter. See
Revised Charter of Honolulu § 6-1516 (2001) (providing that the
ZBA shall “hear and determine appeals from the actions of the
director”). Inasmuch as the 2BA did not rule on whether the type
of daytime operation itself (a wedding business) constituted an
“expansion” of the nonconforming use, the matter was not properly
before the circuit court, and the circuit court’s finding that

the daytime operation violates ROH § 21-4.110(c) (1) should be

reversed. See Hoh Corp, v, Motor Vehicle Indus, Licensing Bd.
Dep't of Commerce ¢ Consumer Affairs, 69 Haw. 135, 141, 736 P.2d

1271, 1275 (1987) (*[JJudicial review of an agency determination
must be ‘confined to issues properly raised in the record of the
administrative proceedings below.’”); Aetna Life Ins, Co. vs
Bark, 5 Haw. App. 115, 119, 678 P.2d 1101, 1104 (1984) ("It is
explicit in the provisions of HRS § 91-14, and in the case law
interpreting those provisions, that a review of the
Commissioner's decision is confined to the issues properly raised

in the record of the proceedings leading up to that decision.

 

10
   

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B. Anderson Did Not Take An “Action” That Reduced the Negative
Effects of the Nonconforming Use Pursuant to ROH §§ 21-
4.110(c) (2), (3) and (5), Inasmuch As The Nineteen Month
Cessation of Daytime Operation Was Within the Permissible
Discontinuation of the Nonconforming Use, and Therefore, He
Zs Not Precluded From Resuming the Daytime Operating Hours
of Michel’ s Under ROH § 21-4.110(c) (5)

In their second point of error, Appellants argue that

 

the circuit court erred by (1) ruling that the resumption of the
daytime nonconforming use following its temporary cessation for
nineteen months constituted an “action . . . which reduces the
negative effects associated with the nonconforming use” within
the meaning of ROH § 21-4,110(c) (5); (2) construing ROH § 21~
4.110(c) (5) in pari materia with ROH §§ 21-4,110(c} (2) and (3);
and (3) concluding that ROH § 21~

the daytime operation of Michel’s, inasmuch as the owner of

 

-110(c) (5) precludes renewal of

Michel’s did not intend to reduce the hours of Michel's, and
therefore, could not have later increased the negative effects of

the daytime nonconforming use.

1. Action” under ROH § 21-4.110(c)(5) does not require
he_intent_to permanently reduce the negative effects

of the nonconforming use
ROH § 21-4.110(c) (5) provides, “Any action taken by an

owner, lessee, or authorized operator which reduces the negative
effects associated with the operation of a nonconforming use --
such as, but not limited to, reducing hours of operation or
exterior lighting intensity -- shall not be reversed.” In
determining whether “action” under ROH § 21-4.110(c) (5) requires
the intent to permanently reduce the negative effects of the
nonconforming use, we are guided by established principles of

statutory interpretation.

un
 

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linen construing a statute, our forenost obligation is to ascertain
and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is te
bbe obtained primarily trom the language contained in the statute
itself. And we mist read statutory language in the context of the
entire statute and construe it ina manner consistent with ie
purpose’

hen there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, oF
indistinctiveness or uncertainty of an expression used in @
statute, an ambiguity exist

In construing an ambiguous statute, “{t}he mesning of the
anbiquous words may be souaht by examining the context, mith which
tthe ambiguous words, phrases, and sentences may be compared, in
order to ascertain their true meaning.” HRS § 1-15(1) (1993)

Gray v, Admin, Dir. of the Court, 84 Hawai'i 138, 148, 931 P.2d
580, 590 (1997) (some citations omitted). “Furthermore, the

 

 

legislature is presumed not to intend an absurd result, and
legislation will be construed to avoid, if possible,
inconsistency, contradiction, and illogicality.” Id. (relying on
HRS § 1-15(3) (1993) ("Every construction which leads to an
absurdity shall be rejected.”)).

Clearly, the “action . . . which reduces the negative
effects associated with the operation of a nonconforming use”
must be “voluntary” or “intentional” in order to preclude the
owner, lessee, or authorized operator from later increasing the
negative effects. ROH § 21-4.110(c) (5). See Black's Lay
Dictionary 26, 1605 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “act”
“{slomething done or performed, (especially) voluntarily, and

 

“voluntary” as “done by design or intention”). However, the
Appellants’ interpretation that the ordinance requires a
voluntary “action” as well as an action with the intention of
permanently reducing the negative effects is an additional
element that is not supported by the ordinance’s plain language.
Under a strict interpretation of ROH § 21-4.110(c) (5), once an

2
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waction . . . which reduces the negative effects associated with
the operation of a nonconforming use” is taken, the action may
not be reversed, See Waikiki Marketplace Inv, Co, v. Chair of
Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 86 Hawai'i 343, 354, 949 P.2d 183, 194
(App. 1997) ("[ZJoning laws and ordinances are strictly
construed, ‘as they are in derogation of the common law, and
their provisions may not be extended by implication." (citing
Foster Village Community Ass'n v. Hess, 4 Haw. App. 463, 469, 667
P.2d 850, 854 (1983))).

 

Inder the in pari materia doctrine, ROH $$ 21-
eotjoier (2) and) clarify ROWS 21-4, 11076115
However, inasmuch as “we must read statutory language
in the context of the entire statute and construe it in a manner
consistent with its purpose,” the construction of ROH § 21-
4.210(c) (5) is not complete. Gray, 84 Hawai'i at 148, 931 P.2d
at 590 (citation and emphasis omitted). ROH $§ 21-4.110(c) (2),
(3), and (5) relate to the subject matter of nonconforming uses.
ROH § 21-4.110(c) (2) permits the cessation of a nonconforming use
based on the purpose and period of time of the discontinued use,
as follows:

Any nonconforming use that is discontinued for any reason for
(twelve) consecutive months, or for [eighteen] months during any

a temporary
‘of ordinary
jeriog not exceeding 120 Gays during any [twelve]-
1 not be considered @ discontinuation.

 

   

repairs for
snonth period

 

ROH § 21-4.110(c) (3) permits “ordinary repairs,” including
“interior and exterior alterations,” to be done on any structure
with a nonconforming use so long as the nonconforming use is not

expanded. As construed above, ROH §21-4.110(c) (5) prohibits an

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“action . . . which reduces the negative effects associated with
the operation of a nonconforming use” from being reversed. AS
this court has stated, however, “where the statutes simply
overlap in their application, effect will be given to both if
possible, as repeal by implication is disfavored.” Enoka v. AIG
Hawai'i Ins. Co., Inc., 109 Hawai'i 537, 560, 128 P.3d 850, 873
(2006) (quoting Richardson v. City 6 County of Honolulu, 76
Hawai'i 46, 54-55, 868 P.2d 1193, 1201-02 (1994) (brackets
omitted)).

Therefore, in order to apply ROH $§ 21-4.110(2) (3),
and (5), these subsections must be construed materia,
inasmuch as they pertain to the same purpose and subject matter.
Appellants argue that the circuit court erred by construing ROH
$$ 21-4.110(c) (2), (3), and (5) in pari materia because it
invoked this doctrine sua sponte and these subsections pertain to
different purposes and were enacted at different times. HRS $
1-16 (1993) (“Laws in pari materia, or upon the same subject
matter, shall be construed with reference to each other.”).

However, these subsections have the same purpose:
“Strict limits are placed on nonconforming uses to discourage the
perpetuation of these uses, and thus facilitate the timely
conversion to conforming uses.” ROH § 21-4.110(c). Moreover,
Appellants admit that ROH §§ 21-4,110(c) (2) and (5) relate to the
same subject matter, which is exactly what requires a court to
invoke the in pari materia doctrine. HRS § 1-16. Accordingly,

 
  

53 P.3d 214, 235

mnting) (stating that “[s}tatutes are considered to be
to the sane person or thing, to the same

Wve the sane purpose or object”)

 

 

class of persons or things,

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ROH §§ 21-4.110(c) (2), (3), and (5) must be construed in
reference to each other, and the circuit court did net err by
doing so.

Under the in pari materia doctrine, ROH §§ 21-
4.110(e) (2) and (3) clarity ROH § 21-4.110(c) (5), which does not
specify any period of time or manner in which the reconmencenent
of the nonconforming use is permissible. ROH § 21-4.110(c) (2),
which protects the temporary cessation of nonconforming use,
explains which of ROH § 21-4,110(c) (5) “actions . . . which
reduce the negative effects associated with the operation of a
nonconforming use” may be taken without jeopardizing the right to
resume the operation of the nonconforming use. Further, ROH §
21-4.110(c) (3) provides that work on @ nonconforming use may be
performed for purposes of “ordinary repairs,” which includes
‘work required to comply with federal mandates such as, but not
Limited to, the (ADA],” and interior and exterior alterations
that do not physically expand the “nonconforming use or
intensification of use." ROH $§ 21-4110(c) (3) and (5).

Hence, a nonconforming use may be temporarily
discontinued (and thereby is an “action” which reduces the
negative effects) for (1) less than twelve consecutive months for
any purpose plus 120 days for ordinary repairs during any twelve
month period or (2) for less than eighteen months during any
three-year period for any purpose plus 120 days for ordinary
repairs during any twelve month period, and then resumed. ROH
§§ 21-4.110(c) (2) and (5). This construction provides clarity
and exactness to ROH § 21-4.110(c) (5), and moreover, it promotes

the purpose of the ordinance, to “discourage the perpetuation” of

as
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nonconforming uses. ROH § 21-4.110(c).

3

davrine cnecetior op manet san month a scutes a

the: Eton neon! use,

Under the foregoing interpretation of ROH § 21-
4,110(c) (5), the January 1998 “daytime operation” of Michel's,
which Increased its hours of operation of Michel's since its
cessation in October 1995, is not an “action” in violation of ROH
§ 21-4,110(c) (5), because Appellants discontinued these hours and
reduced the negative effects within the permissible
Siscontinuation of nonconforming use period.

Since its closure in October 1995 until January 1998,
the regular daytime operation’! of Michel’s consisted of: (1) a
Sunday brunch in August 1996 “for about a month,” (2) a Sunday
brunch from December 29, 1996 to June 15, 1997, and (3) 7:00 a.m.

to

 

0 p.m. hours of operation beginning January 1996. Thus,
the daytime operation of Michel's was temporarily ceased for ten
months from October 1995 until August 1996, three months from

Septenber 1996 until December 1996, and 2ix months from June 1997
until January 1998, for a total of nineteen months over a twenty-

six month period.
However, between March 1996 and August 1996, Michel's

[Although Michel's held two special lunch functions in fal) 1996
and a breakfast and Lunch function in 1997, they were #0 infrequent that they
fare not relevant in determining the regular daytine operation cf Michel's

y 325-A.26 654, 658 (Fa. 1974) ("after a
Cessation of activity Dy an owner, nowever, a more casual, occesional and
infrequent return to the original activity is not sufficient te continue oF
Fenew a prior nonconforming use, nor can & new, separate, and distinct
enterprise gain the protection of the nonconforming use." (citing fH, Mifflin
wa toning Wearing Bil, 20¢A.24 320 (Pe. 1971)))

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was closed because of “extensive interior renovations,” or
Yordinary repairs.” As construed supra, an owner, lessee, or
authorized operator has 120 days to make “ordinary repairs,”
which aze net counted as part of the permissible temporary
cessation of the nonconforming use. ROH § 21-4.110(c) (5).
Because the nineteen month discontinuation of the daytime
operation of the nonconforming use included 120 days in which the
owner of Michel’s nade “ordinary repairs,” the daytime cessation
of Michel's was within the permissible temporary discontinuation
period of: (1) twelve consecutive months for any purpose and 120
days for ordinary repairs, and (2) eighteen months in a three
year period for any purpose and 120 days for ordinary repairs.
Therefore, Michel's is not precluded from resuming its daytime
operations under ROH § 21-4,110(c) (5). We reverse the circuit

court’s rulings that:

 

(1) Anderson's daytime hours of operation
of Michel’s was an “‘action’ by Anderson which reversed a
reduction in ‘the negative effects associated with the operation’
of Michel’s within the meaning of [ROH § 21-4.110(c) (5),” and (2)
“the daytime operation of Michel's violates ROH [$] 21-

4.110(¢) (5).

 

¢. The Circuit Court Erred By Concluding That The Daytime
Operation of Michel's Violates ROH § 21-4.110(c) (1)

In their third point of error, Appellants assert that
the circuit court erred by ruling that the “daytime operation of
Michel's violates ROH § 21-4.110(c)(1)." As stated supra, there
was no decrease in operating hours under ROH § 21-4.110(c) (5) and
thus, Appellants correctly assert that there was no increase in

operating hours in violation of ROH § 21-4.110(c) (1). Therefore,

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+ FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

we reverse the circuit court’s conclusion that “[t]he daytime

 

operation of Michel's violates (ROH $] 21-4.110(c) (1).”
IV. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing analysis, we hold that: (1)

the issue as to whether the operation of Michel’s as a different
type of use constitutes an “expanded” nonconforming use within
the meaning of ROH § 21-4.110(c)(1), was not properly before the
circuit court, inasmuch as (a) CSL argued before the director
that Michel's violated ROH § 21-4.110(c) (1) by increasing its
hours of operation, (b) the director limited his review of the
petition to whether Michel’s was precluded from increasing its
hours of operation pursuant to ROH § 21-4.110(c) (1), and (ec) the
2BA was limited to rendering a decision regarding the additional
hours of operation of Michel's; (2) ROH $$ 21-4.120(c) (2), (3),
and (5), which have the same purpose, subject matter, and clarity
what constitute permissible “actions” which reduce the negative
effects associated with nonconforming uses, must be construed in
parimaterias (3) Under ROH § 21-4.110(c) (5), a nonconforming use
may be temporarily discontinued (constituting an “action” which
reduces the negative effects) for (a) less than twelve
consecutive months for any purpose plus 120 days for ordinary
repairs during any twelve-nonth period or (b) for less than
eighteen months during any three-year period for any purpose plus
120 days for ordinary repairs during any twelve month period, and
then resumed; (4) the January 1996 “daytime operation” of
Michel's, which increased the hours of operation of Michel's
after temporarily discontinuing its daytime operation of the

nonconforming use for nineteen months, including 120 days for

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HAWAI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *

 

“ordinary repairs,” was permissible because the discontinuation
was within the permissible temporary cessation period of: (1)
twelve consecutive months for any purpose plus 120 days for
ordinary repairs, and (2) eighteen months in a three year period

for any purpose plus 120 days for ordinary repaire;

 

and (5) the
daytime operation of Michel’s does not violate ROH § 21-
4,110(c) (1), inasmuch as it did not “decrease” ite operating
hours under ROH § 21-4.110(c} (5) and therefore, did not
“increase” its operating hours in violation of ROH § 21-
4.2206) (2).

Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court’s July 23,
2003 judgment.

On the briefs:

of Planning and Permitting A

and Donna Y.L. Leong, and ae
Kaiulani £.S. Kidani of Cades Vanes Cede 4 06
Schutte LLP, for Defendants/

Appellees-Appellants Michel’ s
Inc. and D.G, Anderson

Bruce L. Lamon of Goodsill Grnere. Duly Ore
Andersch Quinn ¢ Stitfel,

for Plaintiff /Appellant~Appellee

   

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