Title: Torsch v. McLeod

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

665 So. 2d 934 (1995)
Vicki TORSCH, as executrix of the Estate of Dr. Theodore A. Torsch, deceased
v.
Don McLEOD, as administrator of the Estate of Lois McLeod, deceased.
1931330.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
June 9, 1995.
Rehearing Denied July 21, 1995.
*935 Alan T. Rogers of Balch & Bingham, Birmingham, Sterling G. Culpepper, Jr. and Donald R. Jones, Jr. of Balch & Bingham, Montgomery, for appellant.
John A. Tinney, Roanoke, Walter McGowan, Tuskegee, for appellee.
SHORES, Justice.
The estate of the defendant doctor appeals from a $3 million medical malpractice judgment entered following a nonjury trial. We affirm, conditioned upon the filing of a remittitur.
Lois McLeod sued Dr. Theodore A. Torsch on April 8, 1988, alleging that he had performed her cataract surgery on the wrong eye. Her complaint also alleged that he had negligently implanted an experimental lens in her blind eye and that she had thereby incurred damage, that she was caused to undergo further medical treatment, and that she suffered great pain and suffering and severe emotional distress. In 1989, she amended her complaint to denote her claim against Dr. Torsch as one alleging medical malpractice and to include claims against Surgidev Corporation, the manufacturer of the lens implanted in her eye, and Wedowee Hospital, at whose facility the surgery was performed. In the amended complaint she alleged claims of fraud and outrageous conduct against the hospital. Both Mrs. McLeod and Dr.Torsch died before the trial.[1]
Before the trial, counsel for the estate of Mrs. McLeod and counsel for the estate of Dr. Torsch filed the following stipulation of facts:
After a nonjury trial, Circuit Judge Howard Bryan issued the following order:
After the court made its ruling against Dr. Torsch, it dismissed Surgidev Corporation as a defendant, and the plaintiff's claims against Wedowee Hospital for damages for fraud and outrageous conduct were settled for $400,000. Dr. Torsch's estate filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment, a motion for a new trial, and a motion for a remittitur and a set-off based on the pro tanto settlement. These motions were denied by operation of law. Rule 59.1, Ala.R.Civ.P.
The estate of Dr. Torsch argues on appeal that it is entitled, as a matter of law, to a set-off in the amount of the pro tanto settlement with the hospital and that the trial court erred in entering a final judgment assessing damages against the estate of Dr. Torsch. It argues that Dr. Torsch and the hospital should be considered joint tort-feasors that acted together to bring about one injury to Mrs. McLeod.
However, the hospital and Dr. Torsch cannot be considered joint tort-feasors, as a matter of law. See Green v. Wedowee Hospital, 584 So. 2d 1309 (Ala.1991). The fact situation in Green is almost identical to the one before us. The question in Green was whether the doctrine of res judicata would bar a fraud action against the hospital after the medical malpractice case was settled. This Court concluded that it would not be barred by the doctrine of res judicata, holding the fraud action to be separate and distinct from the medical malpractice action:
584 So. 2d  at 1316. It is settled law that a defendant in a tort case who is not a joint tort-feasor cannot, as a matter of law, claim a set-off for any amount received by the plaintiff in settlement with other defendants, *940 based on distinct acts of those defendants. Ex parte Martin, 598 So. 2d 1381, 1385 (Ala. 1992).
The estate of Dr. Torsch next contends that the trial court's finding in favor of the estate of Lois McLeod is not supported by the evidence. This case was presented to the trial judge on ore tenus evidence. The judgment of a trial court based on ore tenus evidence is presumed correct, and its findings "will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are palpably wrong, manifestly unjust, or without supporting evidence." McCoy v. McCoy, 549 So. 2d 53, 57 (Ala.1989); McCrary v. Butler, 540 So. 2d 736 (Ala.1989); Jones v. Jones, 470 So. 2d 1207 (Ala.1985); Clark v. Albertville Nursing Home, Inc., 545 So. 2d 9,12-13 (Ala.1989).
The only record before this Court is the clerk's record, which contains the stipulation of facts entered into by the parties and the trial court's findings of fact.[2] Nothing before us disputes the trial judge's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Therefore, we cannot say that the trial judge's findings are palpably wrong, manifestly unjust, or without supporting evidence.
The estate of Dr. Torsch contends, finally, that the $3 million damages award is excessive. It argues that neither the complaint nor the amended complaint stated a prayer for punitive damages, and, thus, that the plaintiff sought only compensatory damages. The trial court's judgment did not denominate any portion of the award as "punitive damages," although the trial judge stated in his findings of fact that the conduct of Dr. Torsch was "reprehensible"; thus, the award of damages is presumed to be compensatory. As to compensatory damages, we note the following:
United Services Auto. Ass'n v. Wade, 544 So. 2d 906, 912 (Ala.1989).
The estate of Dr. Torsch argues that because compensatory damages are intended only to reimburse the plaintiff, the evidence in this case does not support the award of $3 million, because 1) the medical expenses incurred by Lois McLeod as a result of Dr. Torsch's actions were nominal; 2) at the time of the surgery Mrs. McLeod was 77 years old and confined to a nursing home, and thus suffered no loss of earnings or earning capacity as a result of the surgery; 3) for about 20 years Mrs. McLeod had been blind in the eye upon which Dr. Torsch operated, and, therefore, she suffered no loss of use of the eye; 4) evidence of physical and mental suffering was insufficient to substantiate such an award.
Having carefully considered the record, we find the compensatory award excessive, but we conclude that the judgment should be affirmed if the plaintiff accepts a remittitur of the compensatory damages award. While the Court cannot discount the physical pain and mental anguish associated with the experience of having the wrong eye operated on, it is a fact that Mrs. McLeod's medical expenses were nominal and that she had no loss of earnings or earning capacity. We order a remittitur, on the authority of Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Harris, 630 So. 2d 1018 (Ala.1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 2135, 128 L. Ed. 2d 865 (1994), in which this Court explained:
630 So. 2d  at 1033. For these reasons, we order a $1 million remittitur, to leave a $2 million compensatory damages award to the estate of Lois McLeod.
*941 For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed, conditioned upon the plaintiff's filing the remittitur. If within 30 days after the date of this opinion, the estate of Lois McLeod files a remittitur, pursuant to § 12-22-71, Ala.Code 1975, reducing the total judgment to $2 million as ordered herein, then the judgment is affirmed; otherwise, this judgment will stand reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
AFFIRMED CONDITIONALLY.
MADDOX, HOUSTON, KENNEDY, and COOK, JJ., concur.
[1]  Dr. Torsch died June 16, 1988; Mrs. McLeod died November 6, 1992.
[2]  The estate of Dr. Torsch did not furnish this Court a transcript of the trial.