Title: Furman v. Rural Elec. Co.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Furman v. Rural Elec. Co.1994 WY 19869 P.2d 136Case Number: 93-13Decided: 02/18/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
Betty Joann FURMAN, as the personal representative

 of the Estate of Howard G. Furman, 
deceased, 

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

RURAL 
ELECTRIC COMPANY, a Wyoming corporation,

 Appellee (Defendant).

Appeal 
from the District Court, Laramie County, 

Edward 
L. Grant, J.

Representing 
Appellant:

Jack 
Gage and Robert T. Moxley, Cheyenne.

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg of Herschler, Freudenthal, Salzburg, Bonds & Rideout, P.C., 
Cheyenne.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      This appeal 
arises from a wrongful death suit against appellee Rural Electric Company (REC). 
Appellant Betty Joann Furman (Furman) alleged negligent construction and 
maintenance of a high voltage power line caused the death of her son Howard 
Furman (decedent). Decedent was electrocuted when the aluminum surveying rod he 
was using contacted a high voltage power line. The jury returned a verdict 
finding REC zero percent at fault. Furman appeals, asserting that the trial 
court erred by admitting a toxicology report showing that decedent used 
marijuana and in instructing the jury.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      Appellant states 
the issues as:

I. 
Was it an error of law or abuse of discretion to admit legally unreliable 
defense testimony which falsely implied that the decedent was under the 
influence of marijuana and amphetamines at the time of the incident leading to 
his death?

II. 
Was it an error of law to instruct the jury that the decedent's employer under 
the circumstances of the case had a duty to prevent the incident which took 
decedent's life?

III. 
Was it an error of law for the trial court to refuse jury instructions, tendered 
by the plaintiff, which defined the defendant's duty of care as a higher duty, 
commensurate with the ultrahazardous activity involved?

IV. 
Were the jury instructions cumulatively unfair, prejudicial to the plaintiff, 
and erroneous, which minimized the defendant's duty and over-emphasized the 
decedent's duty for self-preservation?

FACTS

[¶4]      Initially, we 
address appellant's violations of our rules of appellate procedure and determine 
whether appellant's case can be reviewed by this court. See State, Game & 
Fish Comm'n v. Thornock, 851 P.2d 1300, 1304 (Wyo. 1993). Appellant's first 
violation was a brief submitted by counsel which did not contain a statement of 
facts. The Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure require that the brief of 
appellant shall contain "a statement of the facts relevant to the issues 
presented for review with appropriate references to documents listed in the 
index of the transmitted record." WYO.R.APP.P. 7.01(e)(2). A failure to comply 
with the rules of appellate procedure is ground for such action as this court 
deems appropriate, "including but not limited to: citation of counsel or a party 
for contempt; refusal to consider the offending party's contentions; assessment 
of costs; dismissal; or affirmance." WYO.R.APP.P. 1.03.

[¶5]      Counsel is 
admonished to comply with appellate rules; however, the facts in this record are 
straightforward and appellant's violation of the rules did not detract from our 
review. We therefore have proceeded to consider appellant's issues. 
Thornock, 851 P.2d  at 1304.

[¶6]      Appellant's 
second violation was a reply brief submitted by counsel which repeated its 
principal brief. A reply brief is "limited to those new issues and arguments 
raised by the brief of appellee." WYO. R.APP.P. 7.03. Because appellant's reply 
brief stated that it would "emphasize again" and "reexamine," it was disregarded 
by this court.

[¶7]      On August 13, 
1990, Howard Furman (decedent) was electrocuted when an aluminum survey rod he 
was handling contacted a high voltage power line owned by REC. The decedent was 
working as part of a summer survey crew for the Wyoming Highway Department 
(Highway Department). On the morning of his death, the decedent's crew was 
surveying near the intersection of Campstool Road and Interstate 80, about five 
miles east of Cheyenne, Wyoming. Decedent was to mark survey monuments with a 
twenty-five foot, telescoping aluminum rod with a prism placed on top, while the 
rest of the crew would aim a geodimeter at the elevated prism and record its 
location. The twenty-five foot rod was necessary because the other crew members' 
view of the monuments was blocked by a difference in elevation and an 
intervening highway overpass. After marking and recording the location of one 
monument, the decedent, working alone, moved to a second monument which was 
located underneath a 7,200 volt power line.

[¶8]      At this second 
monument, the decedent somehow contacted the power line with the extended prism 
pole. No one witnessed the accident. The crew went to the decedent only after 
being unable to contact him on their two-way radios. When they arrived, they 
found the decedent lying in the field next to the monument.

[¶9]      A warning sticker 
on the aluminum rod stated that it was not to be used during electrical storms 
or near electrical lines. The decedent had demonstrated an awareness of the 
danger presented by use of the rod because he had previously refused to use it 
during a threatening thunderstorm. Decedent had been trained about other 
existing methods which could have been used to locate this monument and did not 
require use of the aluminum pole. Also, the Highway Department's safety policy 
required certain safety measures before use of the rod around electrical power 
sources.

[¶10]   The monument and the REC-owned 
power lines above it were located next to the entrance to eastbound Interstate 
80 from Campstool Road but were on the outside of the Interstate's 
control-of-access fence. REC's power line was, at the time and place of contact, 
somewhere between eighteen feet, one and one-half inches and eighteen feet, two 
and one-quarter inches above the ground. Because the pole was dismantled after 
decedent was found and, before measurement of its length at the time of the 
accident, an investigator reconstructed the pole's length based upon burn marks. 
The burn marks indicated that the pole's length at the time of contact was 
twenty feet, seven inches.

[¶11]   The National Electric Safety Code 
(NESC) is a document created to establish national standards for the 
construction, installation and maintenance of electricity. WYO. STAT. § 37-3-114 
(1988) requires the Public Service Commission to "adopt * * * the provisions of 
the current edition of the National Electric Safety Code * * *." It was 
undisputed that the 1973 edition of the NESC applied to these wires and that 
this 7,200 volt line was hanging one foot below the 1973 NESC minimum clearance 
standard of nineteen feet. REC's expert testified that even if the wire had been 
at the 1973 NESC height of nineteen feet, the rod and prism, being extended to 
twenty feet, seven inches, would still have contacted the wire.

[¶12]   REC's chief engineer testified 
concerning the actual installation of the wire contacted by the decedent. He 
stated that the installation designs called for the wire to clear the ground by 
twenty-three feet. He could not state why the wire was five feet below that 
design height at the time decedent contacted it, although he gave three possible 
explanations, including improper installation. If the line had been installed at 
the height of twenty-three feet as designed, decedent's survey rod, which was 
extended to a height of twenty feet and seven inches at the time of the 
accident, would not have come in contact with the power line.

[¶13]   An autopsy performed on the 
decedent revealed the presence of cannabinoids, the active ingredients in 
marijuana, and phenylpropanolamine, a stimulant found in over-the-counter cold 
medicines. The autopsy and toxicology report did not reveal when the decedent 
had been exposed to marijuana or how he was exposed to it. This information was 
admitted into evidence over Furman's objection.

[¶14]   On October 29, 1992, a jury 
returned a verdict finding REC zero percent at fault, attributing thirty percent 
of the fault to decedent and seventy percent to the Highway Department. Furman 
appeals from this verdict.

DISCUSSION

A. 
Admissibility of Toxicologist's Report

[¶15]   Furman contends that the district 
court abused its discretion when it admitted a toxicology report which offered 
little probative value and was substantially outweighed by its unfair 
prejudicial effect. Furman also contends there was inadequate foundation for the 
admission of the report.

[¶16]   The report was performed as part of 
decedent's autopsy and showed the presence of amphetamines and cannabinoids 
(marijuana) in the decedent's urine at the time of his death. The admitted 
evidence included the toxicology report and testimony from a Cheyenne 
pathologist describing the amphetamine class as actually phenylpropanolamine, a 
common cold medicine ingredient found in Dimetapp. Cross-examination revealed 
that the pathologist could only determine the drugs were present, but could not 
state an opinion whether decedent was under the influence of either at the time 
of his death.

[¶17]   Questions of admissibility of 
evidence are within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its decisions 
will not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion. Buckles v. 
State, 830 P.2d 702, 705 (Wyo. 1992). The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in this case because the toxicology report was relevant as a possible 
explanation of why decedent raised the pole into the high voltage line. Evidence 
is relevant if it tends to make any fact of consequence more or less probable 
than it would be without that evidence. WYO.R.EVID. 401; Buckles, 830 P.2d  at 706. All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided 
by statute, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. 
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. WYO.R.EVID. 402; 
Buckles, 830 P.2d  at 706.

[¶18]   The issue was why decedent 
disregarded his own knowledge, training, and the warning on the pole and raised 
it into the high voltage line. Furman had offered an explanation through the 
testimony of a "human factors engineer" expert in her case in chief. The expert 
testified that among several possible explanations it was most likely that 
decedent believed he could safely raise the pole and clear the line. The expert 
further testified decedent's belief was probably based on safely raising the 
pole in the past and the human eye's limitation on judging the distance of a 
power line.

[¶19]   REC countered the expert's 
testimony with the toxicology test and asserts that the evidence of 
phenylpropanolamine and marijuana use was as probative of the reason for 
Furman's conduct as that presented by Furman's expert and has the additional 
benefit of a factual basis. The district court based its admission of the 
toxicology report upon Buckles. There, this court held that the trial court had 
abused its discretion in excluding evidence that the victim of an alleged 
vehicular homicide had been found to have metabolites of cocaine in his urine. 
We found the evidence relevant for two reasons. It was relevant to a conclusion 
whether or not the state had proved the cause of death beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and it was relevant to a conclusion whether or not the defendant had 
caused the death as charged. Buckles, 830 P.2d  at 705. In this case, we agree 
the toxicology report evidence was relevant to support REC's theory that 
decedent's conduct was consistent with impairment of his faculties. This premise 
could lead to the conclusion that it was decedent's negligence which caused his 
death.

[¶20]   The evidence was not unfairly 
prejudicial. WYO.R.EVID. 403 provides:

Although 
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

[¶21]   Furman appeals a jury verdict which 
found REC blameless. This evidence bears only upon the conduct of decedent and 
his negligence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. Furman also 
asserts

that 
[REC] did not lay adequate foundation for the admission of the actual test 
results. That is, the expert witness gave an opinion relating to the 
significance of the tests. The expert did not, and could not, opine about the 
chain of evidence or accuracy of the tests.

This 
statement, however, is the only reference to the alleged foundational error, and 
it is not accompanied by any legal authority. This cursory statement does not 
amount to cogent argument. We decline, therefore, to consider Furman's claim 
that the toxicology evidence lacked foundation. Rolfe v. Varley, 860 P.2d 1152, 1161 (Wyo. 1993).

B. 
Instructions

[¶22]   Furman raises several objections 
concerning the trial court's instructions to the jury. First, she claims that 
the trial court erred by rejecting her offered instructions and by accepting 
REC's offered instructions on the question of each party's duty of care. Second, 
Furman argues that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury regarding 
the Highway Department's duties.

[¶23]   When reviewing jury instructions 
for error, we look at the instructions "as a whole and in the context of the 
entire trial" and determine if the alleged erroneous instruction "fairly and 
adequately presents the issues for the jury's consideration." Seaton v. Wyo. 
Highway Comm'n Dist. No. 1, 784 P.2d 197, 206 (Wyo. 1989). In order to find 
reversible error in a trial court's instructions to the jury, Furman must 
demonstrate prejudice in the form of proof that the instruction confused or 
misled the jury with respect to the proper principles of law. DeJulio v. 
Foster, 715 P.2d 182, 186 (Wyo. 1986).

1. 
Instructions on Duty of Care

Decedent's 
Duty

[¶24]   Furman first challenges Instruction 
No. 11 as overstating decedent's duty of care. The instruction 
provided:

In 
this case, Rural Electric Company contends that Howard Furman was negligent in 
raising the pole while standing beneath the power line, and that this negligence 
was the proximate cause of his death. You are instructed that Howard Furman had 
a duty to act reasonably to assure his own safety, given the situation in which 
he found himself, including keeping a "proper lookout." By a "proper lookout" is 
meant that the lookout which would be maintained by an ordinarily careful person 
in light of all present conditions.

"Proper 
lookout" includes a duty to see objects in plain sight and a person is bound to 
see reasonably that which is open and apparent and he must take knowledge of 
obvious dangers. This duty is not one of merely looking, but of observing which 
imposes on a person the necessity of being observant as to the conditions which 
exist in the general situation.

[¶25]   Furman argues that the trial court 
should have given her proffered instruction based on Gish v. Colson, 475 P.2d 717 (Wyo. 1970), instead of this instruction. In Gish, this court 
determined that a decedent is presumed to have exercised ordinary care if there 
is no eyewitness or other sufficient evidence to rebut that evidence. Furman 
proposed instructing the jury that decedent was presumed to have exercised 
reasonable care. In rejecting Furman's proposed instruction, the trial court 
stated that the presumption was not applicable because there was sufficient 
evidence for the jury to determine whether decedent used ordinary 
care.

[¶26]   This court recognizes that failure 
to comprehend and recognize danger may in itself constitute negligence. Ely 
v. Kirk, 707 P.2d 706, 710 (Wyo. 1985); Brittain v. Booth, 601 P.2d 532, 535 (Wyo. 1979). The evidence indicates decedent was aware that he should 
not use the pole in the vicinity of power lines and that the pole itself carried 
a warning against such use. Furman's own expert rendered the opinion that 
decedent was aware of the danger of using the pole in the vicinity of power 
lines and, knowing the danger, raised the pole because he thought the pole would 
clear the lines. Furman's own evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to 
determine if decedent exercised ordinary care when decedent extended a pole he 
knew conducted electricity and raised it under a power line. Under the facts of 
this case, Furman's offered instruction would have been error.

REC's 
Duty

[¶27]   Furman next asserts the trial 
court's instructions Nos. 4, 5, 14, and 15 incorrectly stated REC's duty of care 
because they failed to state that REC was engaged in an extrahazardous activity 
and, thus, had to exercise "utmost care." Furman asserts that the trial court's 
error in determining the proper standard of care then caused Instruction No. 18 
to be in error. For both of these arguments, Furman relies on Ruhs v. Pac. 
Power & Light, 671 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1982), interpreting this court's 
decision in Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Like, 381 P.2d 70 (Wyo. 1963) as 
authority for the higher standard of care.

[¶28]   The subject instructions read as 
follows:

INSTRUCTION 
NO. 4

Defendant 
Rural Electric Company had a duty toward [decedent] to exercise due care in the 
design, installation and maintenance of its lines, to avoid undue risk of harm 
to him.

INSTRUCTION 
NO. 5

When 
the word negligence is used in these instructions, it means the failure to use 
ordinary care. Ordinary care means the degree of care which might reasonably be 
expected of the ordinary careful person under the same or similar circumstances. 
The law does not say how such an ordinary careful person would act. That is for 
you to decide.

INSTRUCTION 
NO. 14

Each 
utility shall construct, install, operate and maintain its plant, including 
structure, equipment and lines, in accordance with accepted good engineering 
practice.

INSTRUCTION 
NO. 15

When 
electrical lines and equipment are put into service, they shall comply with the 
safety rules of the National Electrical Safety Code. Electrical lines shall be 
inspected at such intervals as experience is shown to be necessary. Lines and 
equipment with recorded defects which could reasonably be expected to endanger 
life or property shall be promptly repaired, disconnected or 
isolated.

INSTRUCTION 
NO. 18

In 
the design, construction and maintenance of its power lines, Rural Electric 
Company's duty was to do so in consideration of the reasonably foreseeable 
activities which would occur beneath the power lines. A failure to anticipate 
and guard against a happening which would not have arisen but for exceptional or 
unusual circumstances is not negligence, nor does the law require those 
maintaining power transmission lines to anticipate every possible circumstance 
that might cause injurious contacts with those lines.

If 
you should find that Rural Electric Company was negligent in the design, 
construction or maintenance of the power line in question, that negligence is 
not the proximate cause of the injury unless, under all the circumstances, the 
injury might have been reasonably foreseen.

[¶29]   The trial court rejected Furman's 
proposed instructions asserting the higher standard because there was no Wyoming 
case law to support the requested instructions, and the other included 
instructions adequately covered the fact that electricity is a dangerous 
instrumentality. This court has recently held that a jury should not be 
instructed there is a higher degree of care when a dangerous instrumentality is 
involved. Wyrulec Co. v. Schutt, 866 P.2d 756, 762 (Wyo. 
1993).

[¶30]   We confirmed in Wyrulec that 
the Ruhs case did not hold there was a higher duty of care for a 
dangerous instrumentality. We also confirmed that the Pan American case 
was properly interpreted as stating the standard of care is ordinary care under 
all of the circumstances, regardless of whether a dangerous instrumentality is 
involved. It is not necessary to have degrees of care because the legal standard 
remains constant. However, what constitutes ordinary care increases as the 
danger increases. Wyrulec, 866 P.2d  at 761-62. All of these instructions 
properly instructed the jury on the law.

2. 
Instructions Concerning Decedent's Employer

[¶31]   Furman next asserts that the 
instructions given concerning the Highway Department's duty of care are not 
supported by law. Furman did not object to these instructions as required by 
WYO.R.CIV.P. 51; therefore, we review these instructions for plain error only. 
Hashimoto v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 767 P.2d 158, 163 (Wyo. 1989). 
Furman asserts that the instructions given concerning the Highway Department's 
duties are not supported by law and that the trial court should have instructed 
the jury concerning the Highway Department's immunity from suit.

[¶32]   Instruction No. 16 described a 
highway department policy concerning its employees working near high voltage 
lines and Instruction No. 17 described certain rules and regulations imposed by 
the Wyoming Occupational Safety Commission. Furman's sole argument is that the 
policy described in Instruction No. 16 comes from the Wyoming High Voltage Power 
Lines and Safety Restrictions Act (High Voltage Act) which, she argues, does not 
apply to the Highway Department. This argument fails to demonstrate how the 
giving of these instructions amounts to clear violation of a clear rule of law 
which adversely affects her substantial rights. See, Goggins v. Harwood, 
704 P.2d 1282, 1291 (Wyo. 1985). The safety policy described in Instruction No. 
16 applied to the Highway Department because it was self-imposed and in place 
before Furman's accident, not because the High Voltage Act required 
compliance.

[¶33]   Lastly, Furman asserts that the 
trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the effect of the verdict 
form. She claims the verdict form should have indicated that the decedent's 
employer was immune from suit. Again, because Furman failed to properly object, 
we search only for plain error. Goggins, 704 P.2d  at 1291. WYO. STAT. § 
1-1-109(b)(i)(B) (1988) provides:

(i) 
The court may, and when requested by any party shall:

* 
* * * * *

(B) 
Inform the jury of the consequences of its determination of the percentage of 
fault.

[¶34]   The trial court gave an instruction 
describing Wyoming' comparative fault scheme and alerting the jury that if it 
found decedent over fifty percent at fault then Furman will recover nothing. We 
recently found a similar instruction adequate for compliance with WYO. STAT. § 
1-1-109(b)(i)(B). Haderlie v. Sondgeroth, 866 P.2d 703 (Wyo. 1993). Therefore, 
we find no plain error by the trial court in failing to inform the jury that the 
Highway Department was immune from suit.

CONCLUSION

[¶35]   The trial court's admission of the 
toxicology report was not error. The trial court correctly rejected an 
instruction to the jury that decedent was presumed to have exercised ordinary 
care and correctly instructed on the proper standard of care for those dealing 
with high voltage electric wires. We affirm the jury verdict.

CARDINE, 
Justice, dissenting.

[¶36]   Betty Joann Furman (Furman) sued 
the Rural Electric Company (REC) for wrongful death of her son Howard Furman 
(decedent), alleging negligent construction and maintenance of a high voltage 
power line. Decedent was killed when the aluminum surveying rod he was using 
contacted a high voltage power line. The jury returned a verdict finding REC 0% 
at fault; Furman appeals, asserting that the trial court erred by admitting a 
toxicology report showing that decedent used marijuana and in instructing the 
jury.

[¶37]   I would reverse.

[¶38]   Furman raises the following 
issues:

I. 
Was it an error of law or abuse of discretion to admit legally unreliable 
defense testimony which falsely implied that the decedent was under the 
influence of marijuana and amphetamines at the time of the incident leading to 
his death?

II. 
Was it an error of law to instruct the jury that the decedent's employer under 
the circumstances of the case had a duty to prevent the incident which took 
decedent's life?

III. 
Was it an error of law for the trial court to refuse jury instructions, tendered 
by the plaintiff, which defined the defendant's duty of care as a higher duty, 
commensurate with the ultrahazardous activity involved?

IV. 
Were the jury instructions cumulatively unfair, prejudicial to the plaintiff, 
and erroneous, which minimized the defendant's duty and over-emphasized the 
decedent's duty for self-preservation?

I. 
FACTS

[¶39]   On August 13, 1990, Howard Furman 
(decedent) was electrocuted when an aluminum survey rod he was handling 
contacted a high voltage power line owned by the defendant REC. At the time, 
decedent was working on a summer survey crew for the Wyoming Highway Department 
(highway department). That morning, the decedent's crew was surveying near the 
intersection of Campstool Road and Interstate 80, about five miles east of 
Cheyenne, Wyoming. The decedent's duty that morning was to mark survey monuments 
with a twenty-five foot, telescoping aluminum rod with a prism placed on top, 
while the rest of the crew would aim a geodimeter at the elevated prism and 
record its location. The twenty-five foot rod was necessary because the 
monuments were well below the point where the rest of the crew was located. 
After marking and recording the location of one monument, the decedent, working 
alone, moved on to a second monument which was located underneath a 7,200 volt 
power line.

[¶40]   At this second monument, the 
decedent somehow contacted the power line as he attempted to raise the rod high 
enough for the rest of the crew to see it. None of the rest of the crew 
witnessed the accident. They went to the decedent only after being unable to 
contact him on their two-way radios. When they arrived, they found the decedent 
lying in the field next to the monument.

[¶41]   The monument and the REC owned 
power lines above it were located next to the entrance to eastbound Interstate 
80 from Campstool Road. REC's power line was, at the time and place of contact, 
somewhere between eighteen feet one and a half inches and eighteen feet two and 
a quarter inches above the ground. When decedent was found, immediately after 
electrocution, the rod and prism were determined to have been extended to a 
length of twenty feet and seven inches.

[¶42]   The National Electrical Safety Code 
(NESC) is a document created to establish national standards for the 
construction, installation and maintenance of electricity. Wyoming Statute 
37-3-114 requires the Public Service Commission to "adopt * * * the provisions 
of the current edition of the National Electrical Safety Code[.]" It was 
undisputed that the 1973 edition of the NESC applied to these wires and that 
this 7,200 volt line was hanging one foot below the 1973 NESC minimum clearance 
standard of nineteen feet. 

[¶43]   REC's chief engineer testified that 
the installation designs called for this wire to clear the ground by 
twenty-three feet. He could not state why the wire was five feet below that 
design height at the time decedent contacted it, although he gave three possible 
explanations, including improper installation. If the line had been installed at 
the height of twenty-three feet as designed, decedent's survey rod, which was 
extended to a height of twenty feet and seven inches at the time of the 
accident, would not have come in contact with the power line, and there would 
have been no accident.

[¶44]   An autopsy, performed on the 
decedent, revealed the presence of cannabinoids - the active ingredients in 
marijuana - and phenylpropanolamine - described as an amphetamine. The autopsy 
and toxicology report did not reveal when the decedent had been exposed to 
marijuana nor how he was exposed to it. This evidence of the presence of 
marijuana and amphetamines was admitted into evidence over the objection of the 
plaintiff.

[¶45]   On October 29, 1992, a jury 
returned a verdict finding REC 0% at fault, attributing all of the fault to 
decedent and the highway department. Furman appeals from this 
verdict.

II. 
DISCUSSION

A. 
ADMISSIBILITY OF TOXICOLOGIST'S REPORT

[¶46]   Furman asserts that the district 
court abused its discretion when it admitted a toxicology report, performed as 
part of decedent's autopsy, because the probative value of the report was 
outweighed by its prejudicial effect and because there was inadequate 
foundation. The admitted evidence included testimony from a Cheyenne pathologist 
and the toxicology report. The report revealed that decedent had tested positive 
for cannabinoids (marijuana) and for phenylpropanolamine. The pathologist 
explained the significance of the two substances but could not give an opinion 
as to the potential effect the substances might have had on decedent at his time 
of death.

[¶47]   Furman's cross-examination of the 
pathologist revealed that it could not be determined when or whether decedent 
had used or simply been exposed to marijuana. It also revealed that 
phenylpropanolamine is a common cold medicine ingredient.

[¶48]   A trial court's decision on the 
admissibility of evidence will be affirmed by this court unless it is 
demonstrated that there has been a clear abuse of discretion. Barnes v. 
State, 858 P.2d 522, 527 (Wyo. 1993). This standard applies to trial court 
decisions concerning the "adequacy of foundation" and relevancy. L.U. Sheep 
Co. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 790 P.2d 663, 673 (Wyo. 1990). Furman bears 
the burden of proving that the trial court acted unreasonably in admitting this 
evidence. Goff v. Goff, 844 P.2d 1087, 1092 (Wyo. 1993).

[¶49]   Subject to authentication and 
several rules of exclusion, all relevant evidence is admissible. Barnes, 
858 P.2d  at 526. Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." W.R.E. 
401, see also Barnes, at 526. Thus, there are two key parts to relevant 
evidence, probative value and materiality. John W. Strong, 1 McCormick on 
Evidence § 185 at 773 (4th ed. 1992).

[¶50]   It is unlikely that this evidence 
in this case is even relevant, for I am unable to discern "what fact of 
consequence" it makes more or less probable. There was no evidence that a drug 
was ingested, the quantity of drug present, nor impairment anywhere in the case. 
On the contrary, the only evidence is that appellant's decedent performed his 
job satisfactorily, without difficulty. The evidence was inadmissible because it 
was not relevant.

[¶51]   Assuming, arguendo that this 
evidence was relevant, still its slight probative value was outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice. One of the rules of exclusion, W.R.E. 403, 
provides:

Although 
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

[¶52]   Furman asserts that the trial court 
should have excluded the toxicology evidence because the danger of unfair 
prejudice outweighed the little probative value the evidence might have had. The 
evidence failed to establish any quantity of the substances and whether they had 
any effect at all upon decedent at the time of the accident. No witness 
testified that the decedent was impaired, unstable, under the influence or 
unable to perform his job, and there were no physical facts to support an 
inference of such. On direct examination, the pathologist gave the following 
testimony as to the significance of the toxicology report:

Q. 
Based solely on the presence of cannabinoids and phenylpropanolamine in the 
urine of [decedent] and the quantities that are shown in that test result, can 
you state any opinion regarding whether or not Howard Furman was under the 
influence of either of those drugs at the time of his death?

A. 
I cannot state that opinion.

Q. 
What conclusions can be drawn from those tests?

A. 
From my point of view as a pathologist performing an autopsy to determine cause 
of death, only that those substances were present in the quantities 
reported by the reference laboratory. [emphasis added]

[¶53]   While cross-examining this 
pathologist, Furman's counsel further demonstrated the limits of this evidence 
by showing that phenylpropanolamine was a common ingredient in cold medicine, 
not an amphetamine, and by showing that the pathologist could not determine when 
or how decedent ingested the marijuana. Thus, the probative value of the 
presence of drugs was low.

[¶54]   Furman claims that the unfair 
prejudice of the toxicology evidence was high because it portrayed decedent as a 
user of marijuana and unlawful drugs and because the report misstated 
phenylpropanolamine as an amphetamine. Unfairly prejudicial evidence is evidence 
which will likely "stimulate an excessive emotion or * * * awaken a fixed 
prejudice * * * and thus dominate the mind of the [jury] and prevent a rational 
determination of the truth." 22 Wright & Graham, Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Evidence § 5215 at 278 (1978) (quoting Wigmore, Code of 
Evidence, p. 355 (3d ed. 1942)).

[¶55]   The use of unlawful drugs is an 
emotional, highly charged, controversial subject in present day society. 
Admission of such evidence was exceedingly harmful to Furman's case. The trial 
court should exercise extreme caution in admitting this kind of evidence. Such 
evidence should only be admitted if, in addition to the presence of drugs, there 
is also some evidence that the amount present will likely result or not result 
in impairment or there is evidence of impairment. (At least with alcohol, the 
jury is informed of the percentage of blood alcohol and the legal effect of such 
amount). There was a total absence in this case of either the amount of drugs 
present or impairment.

[¶56]   The evidence of the mere presence 
of drugs leads to an inference of use which permits the further inference of 
impairment, without any evidence of impairment of Furman or the effect of the 
quantity found. The evidence of the presence of drugs found at the autopsy was 
such as was likely to cause "excessive emotion," "awaken fixed prejudice" and 
dominate the jury's mind. I would hold that the admission of evidence of the 
presence of drugs was therefore, in this case, an abuse of discretion and 
error.

B. 
INSTRUCTIONS

[¶57]   Furman raises several objections 
concerning the trial court's instructions to the jury. First, she claims that 
the trial court erred by rejecting her offered instructions and by accepting 
REC's offered instructions on the question of each party's duty of care. Second, 
Furman argues that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury regarding 
the duties of the highway department.

[¶58]   When reviewing jury instructions 
for error, we look at the instructions "as a whole and in the context of the 
entire trial" and determine if the alleged erroneous instruction "fairly and 
adequately presents the issues for the jury's consideration." Seaton v. Wyo. 
Highway Comm'n, 784 P.2d 197, 206 (Wyo. 1989). In order to find reversible 
error in a trial court's instructions to the jury, Furman must demonstrate 
prejudice in the form of proof that the instruction confused or misled the jury 
with respect to the proper principles of law. DeJulio v. Foster, 715 P.2d 182, 186 (Wyo. 1986).

Decedent's 
Duty

[¶59]   Furman argues that the trial court 
should have given her proffered instruction based on Gish v. Colson, 475 P.2d 717 (Wyo. 1970). In Gish, a wrongful death action, this court granted a new 
trial because the trial court committed prejudicial error by instructing the 
jury regarding contributory negligence despite a total lack of evidence to 
support the defense. See Gish, 475 P.2d  at 718. In reaching that 
conclusion, the Gish court stated that a decedent is presumed to have 
exercised ordinary care if there is no eyewitness or other sufficient evidence 
to rebut that presumption. Gish, at 718. Furman's proposed instruction 
provided:

In 
the absence of eye witnesses to an accident or other evidence sufficient to 
dispel or rebut the presumption, it is presumed that the decedent, acting on the 
instinct of self-preservation, was exercising ordinary care. However, the 
presumption becomes important only when negligence is found on the part of the 
defendant. Absent such a finding, the question of the decedent's due care does 
not arise.

[¶60]   The instruction is a correct 
statement of the law. It was for the jury to determine whether the evidence was 
sufficient to dispel or rebut the presumption and whether REC was negligent. The 
question of REC's negligence must be resolved upon correct instructions and upon 
all of the law which includes the presumption of due care for a deceased person 
where there is no eyewitness to the accident. The jury found REC 0% negligent. 
It made this finding upon inadmissible evidence of drug use and upon incorrect 
instructions of law. REC designed this high voltage line to be twenty-three feet 
above the ground. That may have been because of the proximity of this high 
voltage line to a heavily travelled state highway and a population center and 
because REC recognized these and other safety reasons for a higher than minimum 
height installation in this area. While not required by NESC to install the line 
at the twenty-three foot height, once having undertaken to do so, there was a 
duty of care in installation which the jury might consider in determining the 
negligence of the respective parties. Whether the presumption of due care to 
which Furman was entitled would have resulted in the jury viewing the negligence 
of all parties differently we cannot say. We recognize the probability that REC 
might overcome the presumption. Yet Furman was entitled to have the correct law 
stated in an instruction given to the jury. We can never know precisely what 
happened in the jury room, but resolution of these negligence questions, having 
in mind the presumption of due care, the acts of the parties and the degrees of 
negligence resulting, is for the jury.

[¶61]   In rejecting Furman's proposed 
instruction the trial court stated that the presumption was not applicable 
because there was sufficient evidence for the jury to determine whether decedent 
used ordinary care. Ordinarily, whether the evidence is sufficient to rebut the 
presumption is for the jury, not the court. There was no eyewitness to this 
accident. The evidence of negligence in this case is not such as to take from 
the jury the question of sufficiency of the evidence to dispel the presumption; 
and Furman, therefore, was entitled to the instruction on the presumption of due 
care. The trial court need not give a party's proposed instruction as long as 
the jury is adequately apprised of the law by the other instructions. 
DeJulio, 715 P.2d  at 186. The jury was not instructed upon the 
presumption of due care, and this was error.

REC's 
Duty

[¶62]   Concerning REC's duty, Furman 
asserts that the instructions incorrectly stated REC's duty of care because they 
failed to state that REC was engaged in an extrahazardous activity and thus, had 
to exercise "utmost care." The relevant instructions provided in pertinent part: 

INSTRUCTION 
NO. 4

Defendant 
Rural Electric Company had a duty toward [decedent] to exercise due care in the 
design, installation and maintenance of its lines, to avoid undue risk of harm 
to him.

INSTRUCTION 
NO. 5

When 
the word negligence is used in these instructions, it means the failure to use 
ordinary care. Ordinary care means the degree of care which might reasonably be 
expected of the ordinary careful person under the same or similar circumstances. 
The law does not say how such an ordinary careful person would act. That is for 
you to decide.

INSTRUCTION 
NO. 14

Each 
utility shall construct, install, operate and maintain its plant, including 
structures, equipment and lines, in accordance with accepted good engineering 
practice.

INSTRUCTION 
NO. 15

When 
electrical lines and equipment are put into service, they shall comply with the 
safety rules of the National Electrical Safety Code. Electrical lines shall be 
inspected at such intervals as experience is shown to be necessary. Lines and 
equipment with recorded defects which could reasonably be expected to endanger 
life or property shall be promptly repaired, disconnected or 
isolated.

INSTRUCTION 
NO. 18

In 
the design, construction and maintenance of its power lines, Rural Electric 
Company's duty was to do so in consideration of the reasonably foreseeable 
activities which would occur beneath the power lines. A failure to anticipate 
and guard against a happening which would not have arisen but for exceptional or 
unusual circumstances is not negligence, nor does the law require those 
maintaining power transmission lines to anticipate every possible circumstance 
that might cause injurious contacts with those lines.

If 
you should find that Rural Electric Company was negligent in the design, 
construction or maintenance of the power line in question, that negligence is 
not the proximate cause of the injury unless, under all the circumstances, the 
injury might have been reasonably foreseen.

The 
question we must answer is, did these instructions adequately inform the jury of 
the law in Wyoming or should the trial court have instructed the jury that REC 
had a higher duty than ordinary care? Furman offered an instruction which 
required REC to exercise a higher degree of care when dealing with dangerous 
instrumentalities. In rejecting Furman's proposed instructions asserting the 
higher standard, the trial court reasoned that there was no Wyoming case law to 
support the requested instructions and that the other included instructions 
adequately covered the fact that electricity is a dangerous 
instrumentality.

[¶63]   The trial court is correct in its 
conclusion that there is no Wyoming Supreme Court case law which directly 
designates high voltage electricity as an extrahazardous or 
dangerous instrumentality, requiring a higher standard of care. However, Wyoming 
case law has dealt with the law governing extrahazardous activities and has to 
date identified natural gas and mining as dangerous, extrahazardous 
activities.

[¶64]   In Ruhs v. Pacific Power & 
Light, 671 F.2d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir. 1982), the Tenth Circuit, relying on 
this court's decision in Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Like, 381 P.2d 70 
(Wyo. 1963), interpreted Wyoming law to require a higher standard of care for 
electrical utilities. Our decision in Pan Am., adopted a higher standard 
of care when dealing with a dangerous agency. Pan Am., 381 P.2d  at 74; 
see also Diamond Management Corp. v. Empire Gas Corp., 594 P.2d 964, 967 
(Wyo. 1979) (applying the higher standard to natural gas); Case v. Goss, 
776 P.2d 188, 192 (Wyo. 1989) (applying the higher standard to mining 
activities); and Wyrulec Co. v. Schutt, 866 P.2d 756 (Wyo. 1993). The 
Tenth Circuit correctly analogized high voltage wires to the natural gas in 
Pan Am., both being extrahazardous instrumentalities. 

[¶65]   The notion that high voltage 
electric wires are dangerous or extrahazardous instrumentalities requiring a 
high degree of care is well established. See Denver Consolidated Electric Co. 
v. Simpson, 21 Colo. 371, 41 P. 499, 501 (1895); J.D. Lee and Barry A. 
Lindahl, 1 Modern Tort Law § 3.16 P. 63 (1988 Rev. ed. & 1993 
Cum.Supp.); W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts § 34 P. 208 (5th ed. 1984). In Case, we looked to the Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act's list of "Extrahazardous Industries" to determine that mining 
was an extrahazardous activity. Case, 776 P.2d  at 192. Like mining, electric 
services is listed under the "Extrahazardous Industries" category of the Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation Act. W.S. 27-14-108(a)(i)(D)(V) (1991). There can be 
little doubt that the handling of high voltage transmission wires is extremely 
hazardous and equally dangerous as natural gas and mining. Therefore, like the 
natural gas in Pan Am. and the mining in Case, the high voltage 
electricity here is a dangerous agency requiring a greater duty of care than 
"under the ordinary circumstances of life or business where little or no risk is 
involved." Case, 776 P.2d  at 192.

[¶66]   That REC owed a higher duty of care 
because it dealt with an extrahazardous instrumentality cannot be questioned. 
Therefore, it is clear that the failure to instruct accordingly was error. In at 
least two jurisdictions it has been held that a failure to instruct on the 
higher duty of care required of those dealing with extrahazardous 
instrumentalities is reversible error. Blueflame Gas, Inc. v. Van Hoose, 
679 P.2d 579 (Colo. 1984); Widmyer v. Southeast Skyways, Inc., 584 P.2d 1 
(Alaska 1978); see also Prosser, § 34 P. 209. In Blueflame, the 
trial court instructed the jury that the standard of care was "`that degree of 
care which a reasonably prudent person would use under the same or similar 
circumstances.'" Blueflame, 679 P.2d  at 587. The Colorado Supreme Court 
held that it was reversible error for the trial court to define the duty as only 
"reasonable care" and to refuse the plaintiff's instruction, which designated 
natural gas as a dangerous instrumentality requiring the highest standard of 
care, because the law in Colorado sets the standard of care for natural gas 
suppliers at that higher level. Blueflame, 679 P.2d  at 587-88. In 
reaching its decision, the Colorado court advised:

Instead, 
the court should have informed the jury by appropriate instruction that, because 
of its dangerous character, the defendants were obliged to exercise the highest 
degree of care with respect to the odorization of the propane sold to the 
plaintiffs. An instruction formulated in terms of the highest degree of care is 
nothing more than a plain statement to the jury that the inordinate risk posed 
by escaping propane requires an amount of care commensurate with that 
risk.

Blueflame, 
679 P.2d  at 588-89.

[¶67]   As the Colorado court did, the 
Supreme Court of Alaska also reversed a judgment where a trial court instructed 
the jury that the standard of care for an airline (common carrier) was "what was 
reasonable under the circumstances" instead of instructing, as the plaintiff 
requested, that the duty was "utmost care" as required by Alaska law. 
Widmyer, 584 P.2d  at 5-6.

[¶68]   Some jurisdictions apply only a 
single standard of care to all activities whether ordinary, non-hazardous or 
extrahazardous. Laney v. Consumers Power Co., 341 N.W.2d 106 (1983); 
Lovell v. Oahe Elec. Co-op, 382 N.W.2d 396 (S.D. 1986); City of 
Decatur v. Eady, 186 Ind. 205, 115 N.E. 577 (1917). A single standard - 
ordinary care - is a cop out - an easy solution - but no help at all to a lay 
jury and no clear statement of what is expected of those dealing with 
extrahazardous activities. If the circumstances require greater care, what is 
wrong with saying so? The "ordinary care" rule is surely a bonanza for entities 
dealing with gas, explosives, high voltage electricity and other hazards, for 
the jury is mislead when told that "only ordinary care" is required.

[¶69]   Counsel representing persons killed 
by an extrahazardous activity should understand that they must now establish the 
greater duty owed by entities engaged in extrahazardous activities. They must 
now prove by competent evidence how a reasonable careful company would act when 
engaged in an extrahazardous activity. In essence, plaintiff must prove "the 
circumstances" that require a higher degree of care than in undertaking ordinary 
activities. Proof of dangers involved, of frequency and severity of accidents, 
probability of death resulting, safety measures and devices available to prevent 
accidents and prior knowledge of the actor is now required.

[¶70]   The above onerous expensive 
procedure might be unnecessary if the court followed precedent found in the 
cases in Wyoming, as in Colorado and Alaska, which uniformly hold that a higher 
degree of care is required when the defendant is dealing with extrahazardous 
instrumentalities and require that the jury be so instructed. See Pan 
Am., 381 P.2d  at 74; Diamond Management Corp., 594 P.2d  at 967; 
Case, 776 P.2d  at 192. Wyoming recognizes different degrees of care, and 
the jury ought to be so informed.

[¶71]   The instructions in this case fail 
to state that high voltage electric wires are an extrahazardous instrumentality 
and fail to state that the standard of care is greater than required in ordinary 
affairs in life where little risk is involved. Furman was entitled to the 
requested instructions, and the trial court erred in denying them because they 
are supported by the evidence and are consistent with the Wyoming law. The 
phrase "the degree of care which might reasonably be expected of the ordinarily 
careful person under the same or similar circumstances" relates a far different 
meaning than stating "the degree of care for those persons engaged in 
extrahazardous activity is a higher degree of care than required in the ordinary 
and everyday activities engaged in by all of mankind."

[¶72]   A trial court's refusal to give a 
requested instruction which is correct as a matter of law is not reversible 
unless it is prejudicial and affects a substantial right of the complaining 
party. Branson v. Roelofsz, 52 Wyo. 101, 70 P.2d 589, 597 (1937). Here, 
because the jury was not advised that high voltage electric wires are an 
extrahazardous instrumentality requiring a higher standard of care, it was 
misled concerning the Wyoming law which applies to these facts; and, therefore, 
Furman was denied his substantial right to have the jury correctly instructed on 
the applicable law resulting in reversible error. DeJulio, 715 P.2d  at 
186; see also Cervelli v. Graves, 661 P.2d 1032, 1036 (Wyo. 
1983).

[¶73]   It is suggested that the survey rod 
being extended to a height of twenty feet seven inches would have contacted the 
high voltage wire even if it was at a height of nineteen feet in compliance with 
the NESC and, therefore, the wire, being only eighteen feet above the ground, 
was not the proximate cause of the accident. We note here that compliance with 
NESC is only evidence of the exercise of due care. Folks v. Kansas Power 
& Light Co., 243 Kan. 57, 755 P.2d 1319, 1326 (1988). The 7,200 volt 
line was designed to be installed at a height twenty-three feet above the 
ground. A jury instructed upon the duty when dealing with an extrahazardous 
activity could reasonably find that failure to construct the line according to 
design for greater safety may be evidence of negligence. Had the line been at 
twenty-three feet as designed, there would have been no accident. But questions 
of negligence and proximate cause are for the jury to decide under correct 
instructions on the law. It was error not to instruct the jury that high voltage 
electricity is extrahazardous requiring a higher standard of care.

III. 
CONCLUSION

[¶74]   I would reverse the trial court's 
judgment because there was error in admission of the drug testing, because the 
court failed to instruct the jury on the decedent's presumption that he was 
exercising ordinary care, and because of the failure to instruct on the proper 
standard of care for those dealing with high voltage electric wires.

[¶75]   I would reverse and remand for a 
new trial.