Title: Citizens to Establish a Reform Party v. Priest

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

CITIZENS to ESTABLISH a REFORM PARTY in
Arkansas, et al. v. Sharon PRIEST, in Her
Official Capacity as Secretary of State for
the State of Arkansas

96-639                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered July 8, 1996


1.   Statutes -- construction of -- basic rule. -- The basic rule
     of statutory construction, to which all other interpretive
     guides must yield, is to give effect to the intent of the
     General Assembly; as a guide in ascertaining legislative
     intent, the supreme court often examines the history of the
     statutes involved, as well as the contemporaneous conditions
     at the time of their enactment, the consequences of
     interpretation, and all other matters of common knowledge
     within the court's jurisdiction.

2.   Statutes -- words inadvertently left in statute may be
     disregarded -- repeal of one act may render provisions of
     another act meaningless. -- Where the language of both
     statutes which excepted presidential primaries from their
     application was superfluous in that it was held over from a
     time when it was necessary to distinguish between presidential
     and nonpresidential primaries, the exception contained in Ark.
     Code Ann.  7-1-101(1)(B (Supp. 1995)) and  7-7-203(g)(Supp.
     1995) was no longer necessary; words that the legislature has
     inadvertently left in a statute and that are unnecessary or
     serve no useful purpose may be disregarded; further, repeal of
     one act may render provisions of another act meaningless. 

3.   Statutes -- language in statute included by mistake --
     codification error cannot be allowed to circumvent legislative
     intent. -- In the case of Ark. Code Ann.  7-7-203(g), the
     presidential-primary exception was included in the Code by
     mistake where the legislature eliminated the exception in Act
     248 of 1987; although the supreme court is reluctant to
     interpret a statute in a manner contrary to its express
     language, a drafting error or codification error cannot be
     allowed to circumvent legislative intent.  

4.   Statutes -- interpretation of law which leads to absurd result
     will not be adopted -- legislature did not intend to except
     presidential primaries from application of the new party
     petition deadlines. -- The legislature could not have intended
     that new parties wishing to run a candidate for president be
     completely exempt from any petition deadline; the court will
     not adopt an interpretation of the law that leads to an absurd
     result; therefore, it was held that the legislature did not
     intend to except presidential primaries from the application
     of the new party petition deadlines in these statutes and  7-
     7-203(g) in particular.

5.   Statutes -- conflicting deadlines existed in statutes -- 
     "last passed" rule inapplicable -- intent of Legislature must
     be given effect. -- Normally, when two statutes are in
     conflict with each other, the latter act controls; however,
     the rule must yield when its application would undermine
     legislative intent; where Acts passed at the same session
     contain conflicting clauses, the whole record of legislation
     will be examined to ascertain the legislative intent, which,
     if ascertained, will be given effect, regardless of priority
     of enactment.

6.   Statutes -- amendments to law -- those portions of a law that
     are retained and not amended are not considered new
     enactments. -- When an act amends the law, portions of the law
     that are not amended but simply retained are not thought of as
     new enactments; resorting to the "last passed" rule under such
     circumstances would elevate mechanical application over
     thoughtful analysis.

7.   Statutes -- construction of statutes to divine intent of
     legislature -- January deadline served legislative intent. -- 
     In divining the intent of the legislature, the court may 
     construe the statutes in question by looking to all laws on
     the subject, viewing them as a single system and giving effect
     to the general purpose of the system; here, when the state's
     system of election laws was viewed as a whole, it was clear
     that the January deadline contained in  7-7-203(g) was most
     likely to serve the intention of the legislature.  

8.   Statutes -- May deadline unworkable -- interpretation of
     statute which leads to unworkable consequences will be
     rejected. -- The May deadline contained in  7-1-101(1)(B) was
     virtually unworkable under Arkansas's scheme of election laws
     because a potential political party submitting its petition on
     May 7 could not, from a practical standpoint, have
     participated in the primary process; a January deadline would
     have allowed a proper review of petition signatures, while a
     May deadline would not; additionally, various statutory
     deadlines which peaceably coexist with a January 2 deadline
     would be rendered meaningless if the May 7 deadline prevailed;
     an interpretation of a statute that leads to absurd or
     unworkable consequences will be rejected.  

8.   Statutes -- deadline contained in Ark. Code Ann. 7-7-203(g)
     best reflected legislature's intent -- appellants failed to
     timely qualify as a new political party. -- Where it was
     proper, and in fact necessary, for the court to consider the
     practical effect of choosing one statute over another, and the
     last purposeful, unadulterated enactment of a new petition
     deadline, which was not the product of a mere restatement of
     existing law, established a January deadline with no
     exceptions of any kind, the supreme court was convinced that
     the deadline contained in  7-7-203(g) best reflected the
     intention of the legislature; because that deadline for
     purposes of 1996 would have been January 2, and because the
     appellants did not file a meritorious petition by that date,
     they failed to qualify as a new political party.


     Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court; David Bogard, Judge;
affirmed.
     Cuddy & Lanham, by:  Samuel Lanham, Jr., of Counsel, and
Williams & Anderson, by:  G. Alan Perkins, for appellants.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Angela S. Jegley, Asst. Att'y
Gen., for appellee.

     Bradley D. Jesson, Chief Justice.July 8, 1996
*ADVREP*SC3*




CITIZENS TO ESTABLISH A REFORM
PARTY IN ARKANSAS, ET AL.,
                    APPELLANTS,

V.

SHARON PRIEST, IN HER OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR THE STATE OF ARKANSAS,
                    APPELLEE,




96-639


APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT,
NO. 96-5104,
HON. DAVID BOGARD, JUDGE,




AFFIRMED.



                BRADLEY D. JESSON, CHIEF JUSTICE


     
     This case concerns the appellants' efforts to establish the
Reform Party as a new political party in the State of Arkansas. 
Their objective is to field a slate of candidates for national,
state, and county offices in the 1996 general election.  Arkansas
law provides two means of forming a new political party.  The
convention process permits a political group to hold a convention
for the purpose of choosing presidential and vice-presidential
candidates.  See Ark. Code Ann.  7-8-302 (Repl. 1993).  If the
candidates poll at least three percent of the vote in the general
election, the candidates' group is established as a political
party.  See Ark. Code Ann.  7-1-101(1)(A) (Supp. 1995).  The
petition process, which was used by these appellants, permits a
political group to submit a petition to the Secretary of State
declaring its intention of organizing a political party.  The
petition must contain the signatures of qualified electors equal in
number to at least three percent of the total vote cast for the
office of Governor or nominees for presidential electors at the
last preceding election.  See Ark. Code Ann.  7-1-101(1)(A) (Supp.
1995);  Ark. Code Ann.  7-7-203(g) (Supp. 1995).  
     The central issue in this case concerns the deadline by which
such a petition must be filed.  There are two Arkansas statutes
which address the deadline and they are in utter conflict.  Ark.
Code Ann.  7-1-101(1)(B) (Supp. 1995) sets out the deadline as
follows:   

     Except in preferential presidential primary elections,
     the petition shall be filed with the Secretary of State
     not later than 12:00 noon of the first Tuesday in May
     before the preferential primary election in which the
     political party filing the petition desires to
     participate.

    
     Ark. Code Ann.  7-7-203(g) sets out a different deadline: 

     The petitions shall be filed with the Secretary of State
     no later than 12:00 noon on the first Tuesday in the
     fourth month before the preferential primary
     election....However, this subsection does not apply to
     preferential presidential primary elections.


     Two problems are readily apparent.  First, under  7-1-
101(1)(B), the effective filing deadline in 1996 was May 7.  Under
 7-7-203(g), the effective filing deadline for 1996 was January 2. 
Second, each statute exempts preferential presidential primaries
from its application.  The trial judge resolved these matters by
holding that the January 2 deadline in  7-7-203(g) was controlling
and that the legislature did not intend to exempt presidential
primaries from  7-7-203(g).  We agree and affirm.
     The facts of this case are undisputed.  In November of 1995,
Deborah Kraus, a political consultant for the Reform Party,
approached a representative of the Secretary of State's office to
discuss procedures for formation of a new political party.  She was
told that her group would have to submit a petition containing
21,505 signatures, which was three percent of the total votes cast
for Governor in the 1994 election.  She was further told that the
deadline for filing the petition with the Secretary of State was
January 2, 1996.  On that date, the appellants presented a petition
containing 28,546 signatures.  Forty-five days later, the Secretary
rejected the petition after concluding that only 17,262 of the
signatures were valid. 
     Upon rejection of their petition, the appellants reviewed the
law and discovered the conflict which exists between  7-1-
101(1)(B) and  7-7-203(g).  They then took the position that the
deadline for filing their petition was not January 2, 1996, as
established by  7-7-203(g), but May 7, 1996, as established by 
7-1-101(1)(B).  On May 6, 1996, they tendered to the Secretary of
State a petition containing 7,000 new signatures and purported
proof that 1,952 signatures from the original petition had been
wrongfully rejected.  The Secretary refused to accept the tender
and reasserted the January 2, 1996 deadline.  The appellants
immediately filed suit in Pulaski County Circuit Court, seeking the
following relief:  1) a writ of mandamus directing the Secretary to
accept the May 6 petition and declare the Reform Party a new
political party in Arkansas;  2) a declaration that the May 7
deadline set out  7-101-1(1)(B) was the operative deadline;  3) a
declaration that neither  7-1-101(1)(B) nor  7-7-203(g) provided
a deadline for a new party to participate in a presidential
preferential primary election; and, 4) a declaration that the
Secretary's refusal to accept the May 6 petition violated the
Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993.
     A hearing was held on May 9, 1996, just three days after the
lawsuit was filed.  On May 14, 1996, one week before the State's
preferential primary election, the trial judge issued a letter
opinion in which he held that the controlling deadline was January
2, 1996, pursuant to  7-7-203(g).  The judge further held that the
legislature did not intend to exempt new parties wishing to
participate in presidential preferential primaries from the January
2 deadline.  Finally, the judge held that no violation of the
Arkansas Civil Rights Act had occurred.  The letter ruling was
memorialized in an order entered May 17, 1996 and it is that order
from which the appellants bring their appeal.    
     The basic rule of statutory construction, to which all other
interpretive guides must yield, is to give effect to the intent of
the General Assembly.  Pugh v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 317
Ark. 304,