Title: State v. Olayinka Kazeem Lagundoye

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2004 WI 4 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-2137, 02-2138, 02-2139 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Olayinka Kazeem Lagundoye,  
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2003 WI App 63 
260 Wis. 2d 805, 659 N.W.2d 501 
(Ct. App. 2003-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 30, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 13, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Victor Manian   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: SYKES, J., did not participate. 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Godfrey Y. Muwonge and Godfrey Y. Muwonge’s Law Office, 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Godfrey Y. Muwonge. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by James 
M. Freimuth, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2004 WI 4 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-2137, 02-2138 & 02-2139  
(L.C. No. 
98 CF 1261, 96 CM 614344 & 96 CF 966266) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Olayinka Kazeem Lagundoye,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 30, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
JON 
P. 
WILCOX, 
J.   Olayinka 
Kazeem 
Lagundoye 
(Lagundoye) seeks review of a published court of appeals 
decision, State v. Lagundoye, 2003 WI App 63, 260 Wis. 2d 805, 
659 N.W.2d 501, which affirmed an order of the Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court, Victor Manian, Judge, denying his post-conviction 
motions seeking a vacatur of judgments rendered against him in 
three separate circuit court criminal cases in Milwaukee County.  
I. 
ISSUE 
¶2 
The issue presented on appeal is whether the rule we 
announced in State v. Douangmala, 2002 WI 62, 253 Wis. 2d 173, 
646 N.W.2d 1, can be applied retroactively to a defendant who 
No. 
02-2137, 02-2138 & 02-2139   
 
2 
 
exhausted his direct appeal rights before Douangmala was 
decided, such that he is entitled to withdraw his pleas in 
criminal cases where the circuit court failed to advise him of 
the 
possible 
deportation 
consequences 
of 
his 
plea 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c)(1997-98)1 and the defendant meets the 
requirements for plea withdrawal under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2).  
We conclude that the rule we announced in Douangmala is a new 
rule of criminal procedure that can be retroactively applied 
only to cases that were not yet final when Douangmala was 
decided.  Further, we conclude that because the rule in 
Douangmala does not fall within either of the two narrow 
exceptions to this general rule of nonretroactivity, it cannot 
be applied retroactively to collateral appeals.  Finally, we 
conclude that under the law, as it existed when Lagundoye 
entered his pleas, the error of the circuit courts in failing to 
advise Lagundoye of the possible deportation consequences of his 
plea under § 971.08(1)(c) was harmless.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the court of appeals' decision.  
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶3 
On February 6, 1997, Lagundoye pled guilty to theft2 
and burglary3 charges as part of a plea agreement.  He was 
sentenced on these two charges, and judgment was rendered on 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise noted. 
2 Case No. 96-CM-614344 
3 Case No. 96-CF-966266  
No. 
02-2137, 02-2138 & 02-2139   
 
3 
 
March 27, 1997.  On April 24, 1998, Lagundoye, in a separate 
criminal case,4 pled guilty to two counts of forgery pursuant to 
a plea agreement.  He was thereafter sentenced on June 30, 1998, 
and judgment of conviction was entered on July 1, 1998.   
¶4 
It is undisputed that the circuit court in all three 
cases failed to comply with the mandates of Wis. Stat. § 971.08.5  
Section 971.08(1) provides:  
Before the court accepts a plea of guilty or no 
contest, it shall do all of the following:   
 . . . . 
(c)  Address the defendant personally and advise the 
defendant as follows:  "If you are not a citizen of 
the United States of America, you are advised that a 
plea of guilty or no contest for the offense with 
which you are charged may result in deportation, the 
exclusion from admission to this country or the denial 
of naturalization, under federal law."  
 . . . . 
Section 971.08(2) provides the remedy if the circuit court fails 
to comply with the above mandate:   
If a court fails to advise the defendant as required 
by sub. (1)(c) and the defendant later shows that the 
plea 
is 
likely 
to 
result 
in 
the 
defendant's 
                                                 
4 Case No. 98-CF-001261 
5 Lagundoye also received a conviction in Milwaukee County 
in September 1996 for theft, Case No. 96-CM-610289.  Lagundoye 
initially sought similar relief in this case, but later withdrew 
his request, as the record indicated that the circuit court, 
Timothy G. Dugan, 
Judge, 
had, in 
fact, 
given 
the 
oral 
deportation warning.  Thus, this conviction is not subject to 
the present appeal.  Interestingly, this conviction, where 
Lagundoye did receive the oral warning, predated the other three 
convictions that are the subject of this appeal. 
No. 
02-2137, 02-2138 & 02-2139   
 
4 
 
deportation, exclusion from admission to this country 
or 
denial 
of 
naturalization, 
the 
court 
on 
the 
defendant's 
motion 
shall 
vacate 
any 
applicable 
judgment 
against 
the 
defendant 
and 
permit 
the 
defendant to withdraw the plea and enter another plea.  
This subsection does not limit the ability to withdraw 
a plea of guilty or no contest on any other grounds.  
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2).  
¶5 
At the time Lagundoye entered his pleas, the law 
governing the application of § 971.08 was controlled by State v. 
Chavez, 175 Wis. 2d 366, 498 N.W.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1993).  The 
court of appeals in Chavez concluded that the interaction of 
§ 971.08 and Wis. Stat. § 971.266 required an appellate court to 
employ a harmless-error analysis when a defendant sought to 
withdraw his plea based on a circuit court's failure to comply 
with the dictates of § 971.08(1)(c).  Id. at 370-71.  The court 
of appeals in Chavez further concluded that a circuit court's 
failure to comply with the mandate in § 971.08(1)(c) constituted 
harmless error if the defendant was "aware of the potential for 
deportation when he entered his plea."  Id. at 368, 371.7  
Lagundoye did not seek a plea withdrawal under § 971.08(2) for 
any of his three convictions on direct appeal.   
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.26 
provides: 
 
"No 
indictment, 
information, complaint or warrant shall be invalid, nor shall 
the trial, judgment or other proceedings be affected by reason 
of any defect or imperfection in matters of form which do not 
prejudice the defendant." 
7 Three subsequent decisions by the court of appeals 
followed the harmless-error analysis announced in State v. 
Chavez, 175 Wis. 2d 366, 498 N.W.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1993).  See 
State v. Garcia, 2000 WI App 81, ¶¶1, 11-13, 234 Wis. 2d 304, 
610 N.W.2d 180; State v. Lopez, 196 Wis. 2d 725, 731-32, 539 
N.W.2d 700 (Ct. App. 1995); State v. Issa, 186 Wis. 2d 199, 209-
210, 519 N.W.2d 741 (Ct. App. 1994). 
No. 
02-2137, 02-2138 & 02-2139   
 
5 
 
¶6 
Lagundoye's 
application 
for 
status 
as 
a 
lawful 
permanent resident was denied on December 21, 2001.  On January 
3, 2002, the United States Department of Immigration and 
Naturalization Service notified Lagundoye that it had commenced 
deportation proceedings against him arising out of his criminal 
convictions.  Thereafter, on June 19, 2002, this court issued 
its opinion in Douangmala, 253 Wis. 2d 173.  In Douangmala, we 
concluded: 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c) sets forth the language a 
circuit court must use to inform a defendant of the 
deportation consequences of entering a plea of guilty 
or no contest. . . . If a circuit court fails to give 
the statutorily mandated advice and if a defendant 
moves the court and demonstrates that the plea is 
likely to result in the defendant's deportation, then 
§ 971.08(2) requires the circuit court to vacate the 
conviction and to permit the defendant to withdraw the 
guilty or no-contest plea.  
Id., ¶46.8 
¶7 
On July 22, 2002, Lagundoye moved to reopen and vacate 
the aforementioned judgments of convictions and withdraw his 
                                                 
8 In so holding, we expressly overruled Chavez, Issa, Lopez, 
and Garcia to the extent they applied a harmless error analysis 
to 
violations 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c). 
 
State 
v. 
Douangmala, 2002 WI 62, ¶42, 253 Wis. 2d 173, 646 N.W.2d 1.   
No. 
02-2137, 02-2138 & 02-2139   
 
6 
 
respective pleas under § 971.08(2),9 seeking to benefit from the 
freshly annunciated rule in Douangmala.  At the time Lagundoye 
filed his motion to vacate his convictions, he had completely 
discharged his sentences relating to the theft and burglary 
convictions, but was still serving his sentence in relation to 
the two forgery convictions.   
¶8 
The circuit court denied Lagundoye's motion for post-
conviction relief with respect to the two convictions in which 
he had completely served his sentence because it found it lacked 
jurisdiction to consider a collateral challenge to a guilty plea 
where the defendant was no longer in state custody.  With 
respect to his remaining conviction, the circuit court denied 
Lagundoye's motion on the grounds that the rule in Douangmala 
was a new rule of criminal procedure and applies retroactively 
only to cases that were pending on direct review or not yet 
final when Douangmala was decided.   
                                                 
9 Pursuant 
to 
§ 971.08(2), 
a 
court shall 
vacate any 
applicable judgment against the defendant and permit the 
defendant to withdraw his plea and enter another if "a court 
fails to advise a defendant as required by sub. (1)(c) and a 
defendant later shows that the plea is likely to result in the 
defendant's deportation . . . ." (emphasis added).  There are no 
cases interpreting the phrase "later shows," that would indicate 
when a defendant may properly bring a § 971.08(2) motion.  The 
federal government notified Lagundoye on January 3, 2002, that 
it had commenced deportation proceedings against him.  Lagundoye 
did not file his § 971.08(2) motion until July 22, 2002, six 
months after he learned that he could be deported.  However, as 
the State has conceded Lagundoye's motion for plea withdrawal 
was timely filed, we need not address the issue of when a 
defendant 
may 
properly 
bring 
a 
motion 
for 
relief 
under 
§ 971.08(2). 
No. 
02-2137, 02-2138 & 02-2139   
 
7 
 
¶9 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
did 
not 
address 
the 
jurisdictional issue relied upon by the circuit court with 
respect to two of Lagundoye's convictions; instead, it affirmed 
the circuit court's conclusion that the rule in Douangmala does 
not apply retroactively to defendants who exhausted their direct 
appeal rights before Douangmala was decided.  Lagundoye, 260 
Wis. 2d 805, ¶3 & n.2.  The court of appeals then concluded that 
all three of Lagundoye's cases were governed by the pre-
Douangmala 
harmless-error 
analysis, 
and 
Lagundoye was not 
entitled to withdraw his pleas because he did not contend that 
he did not know of the deportation consequences of his pleas.  
Id., ¶¶10-11.  
¶10 On August 5, 2002, the United States Department of 
Justice Immigration Court entered an order deporting Lagundoye 
to Nigeria.  Counsel has informed the court that Lagundoye was 
in fact deported to Nigeria subsequent to the court of appeals' 
decision.10  
                                                 
10 As Lagundoye has already served two of his sentences and 
has been deported to Nigeria, there is a possibility that this 
case is moot.  This court has defined mootness as follows: 
"A moot case  . . . [is] one which seeks to determine 
an abstract question which does not rest upon existing 
facts or rights, or which seeks a judgment in a 
pretended controversy when in reality there is none, 
or one which seeks a decision in advance about a right 
before it has been asserted or contested, or a 
judgment upon some matter which when rendered for any 
cause cannot have any practical legal effect upon the 
existing controversy." 
No. 
02-2137, 02-2138 & 02-2139   
 
8 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
¶11 There are three lines of cases that govern whether a 
rule should be applied retroactively to criminal cases on 
appeal.  These cases establish that whether a rule should be 
applied 
retroactively 
is 
dependent 
upon 
two 
threshold 
determinations:  1) whether the rule is a new rule of substance 
or new rule of criminal procedure and 2) whether the case which 
seeks to benefit from retroactive application is on direct 
review or is final, such that it is before the court on 
collateral review.   
¶12 First, a new rule of substantive criminal law is 
presumptively applied retroactively to all cases, whether on 
direct appeal or on collateral review.  See Bousley v. United 
States, 523 U.S. 614, 620-21 (1998); State v. Howard, 211 
Wis. 2d 269, 283-85, 564 N.W.2d 753 (1997), overruled on other 
grounds by State v. Gordon, 2003 WI 69, ¶40, 262 Wis. 2d  380, 
663 N.W.2d 765.  Second, Wisconsin follows the federal rule 
                                                                                                                                                             
State ex rel. La Crosse Tribune v. Circuit Ct. for La Crosse 
County, 115 Wis. 2d 220, 228, 340 N.W.2d 460 (1983)(quoting 
Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd. v. Allis Chalmers W. Union, 
252 Wis. 436, 440-41, 32 N.W.2d 190(1948)).  
Counsel indicated at oral argument that if Lagundoye's 
convictions are vacated and his pleas withdrawn, Lagundoye could 
petition the federal government for readmission into the United 
States.  Thus, this decision could, theoretically, have a 
practical effect upon the existing controversy.  In any event, 
both parties agree that the issue is not moot, and we believe 
the issue of the potential retroactive application of a ruling 
of this court to cases on collateral review involves an issue of 
great public importance that is likely to reoccur.  See State v. 
Leitner, 2002 WI 77, ¶14, 253 Wis. 2d 449, 646 N.W.2d 341. 
No. 
02-2137, 02-2138 & 02-2139   
 
9 
 
announced in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987), 
that new rules of criminal procedure are to be applied 
retroactively to all cases pending on direct review or non-
finalized cases still in the direct appeal pipeline.  State v. 
Koch, 175 Wis. 2d 684, 694, 499 N.W.2d 152 (1993).   
¶13 Third, a new rule of criminal procedure generally 
cannot be applied retroactively to cases that were final before 
the rule's issuance under the federal nonretroactivity doctrine 
announced by the Supreme Court plurality opinion in Teague v. 
Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), and later adopted by the majority of 
the Court in Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 467 (1993).  Under 
Teague, a new rule of criminal procedure is not applied 
retroactively to cases on collateral review unless it falls 
under either of two well-delineated exceptions.  Teague, 489 
U.S. at 307.  First, a new rule of criminal procedure should be 
applied retroactively to cases on collateral review if it 
"places 'certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct 
beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to 
proscribe.'"  Id. (citation omitted).  Second, a new rule of 
criminal procedure should be applied retroactively to cases on 
collateral review if it encompasses procedures that "'are 
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'" Id. (citation 
omitted).   
¶14 While Teague, read narrowly, applies only to federal 
habeas corpus proceedings, Wisconsin has adopted the Teague 
framework in all cases involving new rules of constitutional 
criminal 
procedure 
on 
collateral 
review 
pursuant 
to 
No. 
02-2137, 02-2138 & 02-2139   
 
10 
 
Wis. Stat. § 974.06.  State v. Horton, 195 Wis. 2d 280, 287-90, 
536 N.W.2d 155 (Ct. App. 1995).  Further, this court has 
extended 
the 
Teague 
retroactivity 
analysis 
to 
cases 
on 
collateral review involving a new rule based on a statutory 
right.  See State ex rel. Schmelzer v. Murphy, 201 Wis. 2d 246, 
256-59, 548 N.W.2d 45 (1996).11   
¶15 Both parties cite to Schmelzer for the proposition 
that Wisconsin has carved out a third exception to the general 
rule of nonretroactivity in Teague.  In fact, Howard states that 
this court in Schmelzer "articulated a third exception, to 
include claims that can only be raised on collateral review."  
                                                 
11 The dissent argues that we need not follow Teague v. 
Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), and that this court may decide for 
itself whether a new interpretation of a statute may be applied 
retroactively to cases on collateral review.  Dissent, ¶72 n.25.  
However, this court has unequivocally decided that Wisconsin has 
elected 
to 
follow 
the 
federal 
retroactivity 
analysis 
as 
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Teague and 
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987).  See State v. Lo, 
2003 WI 107, ¶63, 264 Wis.2d 1, 665 N.W.2d 756; State v. Howard, 
211 Wis. 2d 269, 282-84, 564 N.W.2d 753 (1997), overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Gordon, 2003 WI 69, ¶40, 262 
Wis. 2d 380, 663 N.W.2d 765; State ex rel. Schmelzer v. Murphy, 
201 Wis. 2d 246, 256-59, 548 N.W.2d 45 (1996); State v. Koch, 
175 Wis. 2d 684, 694, 499 N.W.2d 152 (1993).  Having elected to 
follow Teague, Wisconsin has developed its own robust case law 
regarding retroactivity, which this decision applies to the 
facts of this case.  While the divergent foreign authorities 
cited by the dissent may make the Teague analysis blurry and 
uncertain, the aforementioned Wisconsin cases, as discussed 
below, have applied the Teague doctrine in a consistent and 
clear manner.  Today's decision merely follows Wisconsin's 
formulation of the Teague analysis, as developed by the above 
authorities.   
No. 
02-2137, 02-2138 & 02-2139   
 
11 
 
Howard, 211 Wis. 2d at 285.  However, this is a misreading of 
Schmelzer.   
¶16 Teague was somewhat unique in that it discussed the 
retroactive application of a new rule while deciding whether to 
adopt the rule.  Teague, 489 U.S. at 315.  After discussing the 
aforementioned general principles of retroactivity, Teague went 
on to hold "habeas corpus cannot be used as a vehicle to create 
new constitutional rules of criminal procedure unless those 
rules would be applied retroactively to all defendants on 
collateral review through one of the two exceptions we have 
articulated."  Id. at 316 (first emphasis added).  The Court 
then declined to adopt the rule sought by petitioner because it 
would not fit within either of the two exceptions.  Id.  
¶17 It is this later holding that the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court in Schmelzer decided not to follow.  In discussing the 
second holding of Teague, this court stated:  
[T]he Teague plurality also holds that "habeas corpus 
cannot 
be 
used 
as 
a 
vehicle 
to 
create 
new 
constitutional rules of criminal procedure unless 
those rules would be applied retroactively to all 
defendants on collateral review through one of the two 
exceptions we have articulated." . . . The rule we 
here announce, based on a statutory right to counsel 
and not a constitutional right, does not rise to the 
level of giving protection to a "primary activity" or 
invoking an "absolute prerequisite to fundamental 
fairness," . . . so 
neither 
exception 
allowing 
retroactivity is present.  However, . . . a claim of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel may only 
be heard through a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus.  Applying Teague strictly would mean that this 
court could never announce a new rule of law relating 
to this type of claim unless the new rule fell into 
one of two exceptions, a result plainly absurd.  We 
No. 
02-2137, 02-2138 & 02-2139   
 
12 
 
therefore conclude that where, as in the present 
situation, a type of claim may only be made through a 
form of collateral relief, the creation of new rules 
of law is not forbidden by the Teague rule as adopted 
by this court for use in Wisconsin.   
Schmelzer, 
201 
Wis. 2d at 
257-58 
(final 
emphasis 
added)(citations omitted).   
¶18 Thus, Schmelzer parted ways with Teague only insomuch 
as Teague held that courts could not create new rules of 
criminal procedure on habeas corpus review unless they fell 
within either of the two nonretroactivity exceptions.  Schmelzer 
did not deviate from or modify Teague as it pertained to the 
retroactive application of a new rule; in fact, it proceeded to 
apply the Teague retroactivity analysis:  "[W]e conclude that we 
may apply the new rule announced in this case to the defendant, 
Schmelzer, although, consistent with Teague, we do not apply it 
No. 
02-2137, 02-2138 & 02-2139   
 
13 
 
retroactively to cases finalized before the issuance of this 
opinion."  Schmelzer, 201 Wis. 2d at 258 (emphasis added).12   
¶19 Schmelzer, therefore, stands for the proposition that 
this court can create a new rule of criminal procedure on habeas 
corpus review and apply the new rule to the case before it—the 
habeas case wherein the rule was created—even if that case could 
have come to this court only on collateral review.  The court 
can create a new rule in this limited situation, even though the 
rule would not apply retroactively to other cases that are 
final.  However, Schmelzer does not stand for the proposition 
that this court can apply a previously announced new rule 
retroactively to a case on collateral review when the rule does 
not otherwise fall within either of the two Teague exceptions.  
                                                 
12 We note that in our latest application of the Teague 
doctrine to a new interpretation of a statute, Lo, 264 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶62-63, we recognized no such "third exception."  
Furthermore, recognizing an exception where a claim can be 
brought only on collateral review would swallow the general rule 
of nonretroactivity and conflict with the decisions in State v. 
Horton, 195 Wis. 2d 280, 536 N.W.2d 155 (Ct. App. 1995) and Lo.  
Horton held that the federal Teague retroactivity analysis 
applies "for all cases on collateral review in our state courts 
under 
§ 974.06, 
Stats." 
 
Horton, 
195 
Wis. 2d at 
290.  
Subsequently, this court in Lo reiterated, "claims of error that 
could have been raised on direct appeal or in a previous 
§ 974.06 motion are barred from being raised in a subsequent 
§ 974.06 motion, absent a showing of a sufficient reason."  Lo, 
264 Wis. 2d 1, ¶15.  Thus, in most instances, a claim brought 
under § 974.06 is one that could only be brought on collateral 
appeal.  If we were to recognize a third exception to the Teague 
doctrine for cases that can only be brought on collateral 
appeal, the general rule of nonretroactivity announced in Teague 
would not apply to most § 974.06 motions.  However, Horton 
specifically held that the Teague analysis is applicable to all 
§ 974.06 motions.  Horton, 195 Wis. 2d at 290. 
No. 
02-2137, 02-2138 & 02-2139   
 
14 
 
Therefore, we withdraw our language from Howard, 211 Wis. 2d at 
285, to the extent it implies that Wisconsin recognizes a third 
exception to the general rule of nonretroactivity for cases on 
collateral review.   
¶20 Applying these principles to the case at bar, it is 
undisputed that all of Lagundoye's underlying criminal cases 
were final when Douangmala was decided and that his appeal is a 
collateral challenge to these convictions.  A case is final if 
the prosecution is no longer pending, a judgment or conviction 
has been entered, the right to a state court appeal from a final 
judgment has been exhausted, and time for certiorari review in 
the United States Supreme Court has expired.  See Horton, 195 
Wis. 2d at 284 n.2; Koch, 175 Wis. 2d at 694 n.3.13   
                                                 
13 With respect to Lagundoye's burglary and theft charges, 
the record indicates that judgment of conviction was entered 
March 27, 1997, and Lagundoye has finished serving these 
sentences.  The record does not indicate that Lagundoye pursued 
an appeal 
with respect 
to 
these 
charges. 
 
Pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 809.30(2)(b), he had 20 days from the date of 
sentencing or conviction to serve notice of intent to appeal.  
As he did not appeal these convictions within the statutory 
timeline, his right to a direct appeal expired.   
No. 
02-2137, 02-2138 & 02-2139   
 
15 
 
¶21 Next, we must determine whether the rule we announced 
in Douangmala worked a substantive change in the criminal law or 
whether it was a new rule of criminal procedure.  In E.B. v. 
State, 111 Wis. 2d 175, 189, 330 N.W.2d 584 (1983), this court 
held that "'substantive law is that which declares what acts are 
crimes 
and 
prescribes 
the 
punishment 
therefor; 
whereas, 
procedural law is that which provides or regulates the steps by 
which one who violates a criminal statute is punished.'" (citing 
Roberts v. Love, 333 S.W.2d 897, 901 (Ark. 1960); State v. 
Garcia, 229 So.2d 236, 238 (Fla. 1969); State v. Augustine, 416 
P.2d 281, 283 (Kan. 1996)) (emphasis in original).  
¶22 The dissent cites to Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620-21, for 
the proposition that Teague does not apply where a court 
                                                                                                                                                             
Regarding Lagundoye's forgery charges, the record indicates 
that the circuit court entered judgment of conviction on July 1, 
1998.  Thereafter, on January 11, 1999, Lagundoye, acting pro 
se, filed a motion to modify his sentence.  The circuit court 
denied this motion on January 12, 1999, and Lagundoye filed his 
notice of appeal on February 5, 1999.  On July 25, 2000, the 
court of appeals affirmed the circuit court.  The record does 
not reflect that Lagundoye took any other action, save his 
present challenge, regarding these charges.  Finally, under U.S. 
Sup. Ct. R. 13.1 (1998), the 90-day time limit for filing a writ 
of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court regarding his 
forgery convictions has run and there is no indication in the 
record that he pursued such relief.  Thus, Lagundoye has 
exhausted his direct appeal rights in relation to his two 
forgery convictions.   
No. 
02-2137, 02-2138 & 02-2139   
 
16 
 
interprets a criminal statute.  Dissent, ¶¶91-92.14  This 
statement is true only if one assumes that all criminal statutes 
are "substantive."  The Court in Bousley considered whether its 
decision in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 144 (1995), 
which changed the elements for "use of a firearm" under 11 
U.S.C. § 924(c)1, should be applied retroactively.  Bousley, 523 
U.S. at 616-18.  The new rule in Bailey was properly 
characterized as "substantive" because it changed the nature of 
the crime by altering what acts were proscribed under the 
statute.  See E.B., 111 Wis. 2d at 189.15  However, a statute in 
                                                 
14 The 
dissent 
cites 
many 
foreign 
cases 
that 
have 
interpreted Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998), to 
mean that the Teague analysis does not apply to judicial 
interpretation of statutes.  Dissent, ¶92 n.41.  However, these 
authorities are contrary to Wisconsin law.  This court applied 
the 
Teague 
analysis 
to 
new 
interpretations 
of 
criminal 
procedural statutes in both Lo, 264 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶58-64, and 
Schmelzer, 201 Wis. 2d at 257-58.   
15 Thus, Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620-21, involved the question 
of whether the defendant's plea was knowing and voluntary only 
because the decision in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 
144 (1995), changed the elements of Bousley's underlying 
offense.  As the elements of his offense had been altered, he 
could rightfully argue that his plea was involuntary because he 
was misinformed as to the elements of his offense.  See Bousley, 
523 U.S. at 617-18.  As our decision in Douangmala did not 
legalize the underlying offenses for which Lagundoye was 
convicted or add an additional element thereto, this case, 
unlike Bousley, does not involve the issue of whether Lagundoye 
knowingly and voluntarily entered into his pleas.  Even if this 
case did involve the issue of whether Lagundoye knowingly and 
voluntarily entered into his pleas, Bousley would be of no use 
to the dissent.  The Court in Bousley ultimately concluded that 
the defendant had waived his right to challenge his plea because 
he did not raise the issue on direct review. 
"It is well settled that a voluntary and intelligent 
plea of guilty made by an accused person, who has been 
No. 
02-2137, 02-2138 & 02-2139   
 
17 
 
the criminal code that "regulates the steps by which one who 
violates a [substantive] criminal statute is punished" is, by 
definition, procedural.  Id.     
¶23 The 
dissent 
further 
mischaracterizes 
Bousley 
by 
arguing the Court's decision was based on the fact that the rule 
involved was not new.  Dissent, ¶¶58-59.  The Bousley Court did 
not follow Teague because of the important "distinction between 
substance and procedure," noting that  
decisions of this Court holding that a substantive 
federal criminal statute 
does not 
reach 
certain 
conduct, like decisions placing conduct "'beyond the 
power 
of 
the 
criminal 
law-making 
authority 
to 
proscribe'"[i.e. 
decisions 
announcing 
substantive 
rules], necessarily carry a significant risk that a  
defendant stands convicted of "an act that the law 
does not make criminal." 
Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620 (citations omitted).  As the above 
language from Bousley unambiguously indicates, the Court's 
decision to not follow Teague resulted from the fact that the 
rule announced in Bailey was a substantive rule such that 
                                                                                                                                                             
advised by competent counsel, may not be collaterally 
attacked." 
 
And 
even 
the 
voluntariness 
and 
intelligence of a guilty plea can be attacked on 
collateral review only if first challenged on direct 
review. . . . Indeed, 
"the 
concern 
with 
finality 
served by the limitation on collateral attack has 
special force with respect to convictions based on 
guilty pleas." 
Bousley, 523 U.S. at 621 (citations omitted).  As Lagundoye did 
not challenge his pleas on direct appeal on the basis that they 
were not knowing and voluntary, the dissent's attempt to covert 
this case into a question of whether Lagundoye knowingly and 
voluntarily entered into his plea is unavailing.   
No. 
02-2137, 02-2138 & 02-2139   
 
18 
 
Bousley may have been "misinformed as to the true nature of the 
charges against him."  Id. at 619. 
¶24 The dissent further argues that the rule in Douangmala 
was substantive law because Lagundoye's convictions would be 
vacated under Douangmala.  Dissent, ¶87.  However, the test for 
determining whether a new rule constitutes substantive law is 
not whether the defendant's convictions would be reversed under 
the new rule or whether the new rule has a "substantive impact" 
on a defendant.  Dissent, ¶84.  Rather, the test for determining 
whether a new rule is substantive or procedural is whether the 
new rule affected the legality of the underlying conduct for 
which he was convicted.  Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620; See also 
State v. Kurzawa, 180 Wis. 2d 502, 512, 509 N.W.2d 712 (1994) 
(noting that when a new rule "criminalized conduct that was 
innocent when committed, it could not be retroactively applied" 
because of ex post facto concerns); E.B., 111 Wis. 2d at 189 
(defining "substantive law").   
¶25 The rule we announced in Douangmala merely repudiated 
the harmless-error analysis previously used to determine whether 
a defendant could withdraw his plea if a circuit court violated 
the dictates of Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c).  We did not declare 
any act to be illegal or proscribe the punishment for an act; 
rather, we simply modified the procedure for relief when a 
circuit court violates a statutory rule of procedure.  Notably, 
Douangmala did not legalize Lagundoye's acts of stealing 
property on multiple occasions for which he was convicted or add 
any additional element to the charged crimes.  Thus, the rule in 
No. 
02-2137, 02-2138 & 02-2139   
 
19 
 
Douangmala is properly characterized as a rule of criminal 
procedure and not a substantive rule of criminal law.  
¶26 Likewise, 
it 
is 
clear 
that 
under 
Wisconsin's 
formulation of the Teague doctrine, the rule we announced in 
Douangmala was "new."  "'[A] case announces a new rule if the 
result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the 
defendant's conviction became final.'"  State v. Lo, 2003 WI 
107, ¶62 n.1, 264 Wis. 2d 1, 665 N.W.2d 756 (quoting Teague, 489 
U.S. at 301) (emphasis in original).16  The proper inquiry is not 
whether a case implicated an "old notion."  Dissent, ¶70.  
Rather,  
"a case announces a new rule if its outcome was 
susceptible to debate among reasonable minds, or if a 
contrary result would not have been an illogical or 
even a grudging application of prior precedent."  In 
contrast, a case extends an old rule only if its 
holding 
is 
"compelled 
or 
dictated 
by 
existing 
precedent." 
                                                 
16 See also Teague, 489 U.S. at 301  ("In general, however, 
a case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes 
a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government."). 
No. 
02-2137, 02-2138 & 02-2139   
 
20 
 
Horton, 195 Wis. 2d at 291 (citations omitted).17  Therefore, the 
pertinent question is not whether the issue or question before 
the court was pre-existing, dissent, ¶59, but whether the 
court's holding or the rule it announced adhered to precedent on 
a pre-existing issue.  
¶27 The 
result 
in 
Douangmala 
was 
not 
dictated 
by 
precedent; it overruled a line of precedent applying the 
harmless-error analysis to violations of § 971.08(1)(c).  The 
harmless-error rule announced in Chavez was issued in 1993, 
followed by State v. Issa, 186 Wis. 2d 199, 519 N.W.2d 741 (Ct. 
App. 1994); State v. Lopez, 196 Wis. 2d 725, 539 N.W.2d 700 (Ct. 
App. 1995); and State v. Garcia, 2000 WI App. 8l, 234 Wis. 2d 
304, 610 N.W.2d 180, and remained the law until 2002.  This 
court denied petitions for review in State v. Lopez, 197 
Wis. 2d clxiv (1995), and State v. Garcia, 234 Wis. 2d 178 
(2000).  Thus, while application of the harmless-error rule to 
§ 971.08(2) was abandoned by this court in Douangmala, its 
                                                 
17 Contrary to the dissent's assertion, the fact that the 
interpretation given to § 971.08 by Chavez was subsequently 
determined to be incorrect does not render that interpretation 
illogical.  Dissent, ¶¶74-78.  As this court has often stated, 
"[s]tatutes relating to the same subject matter should be read 
together and harmonized when possible."  Hubbard v. Messer, 2003 
WI 145, ¶9, ___Wis. 2d ___, ___N.W.2d ___.  The court of appeals 
in Chavez interpreted § 971.08 in conjunction with § 971.26.  
Chavez, 175 Wis. 2d at 370-71.  Both statutes concern when a 
defendant may be relieved of a judgment based on a defect in the 
proceedings.  Thus, while the court of appeals erred in ignoring 
the plain language of § 971.08, its attempt to harmonize the 
statute with § 971.26 was not illogical or unreasonable.  This 
court in Douangmala never found the court of appeals' decision 
in Chavez to be "unreasonable." 
No. 
02-2137, 02-2138 & 02-2139   
 
21 
 
utilization certainly was not illogical, nor unsusceptible to 
debate among reasonable minds.   
¶28 The fact that our rule in Douangmala was based on the 
plain language of § 971.08(2) does not change this conclusion.  
This 
court 
in 
Schmelzer, 
101 
Wis. 2d at 
253, 
based 
its 
recognition of a right to counsel in petitions for review on 
pre-existing statutes, but nonetheless considered the right to 
counsel to be a "new" rule.  Id. at 258.  Thus, we conclude that 
the rule we announced in Douangmala, providing for an automatic 
plea withdrawal if the conditions set forth in § 971.08(2) are 
met, constituted a new rule of criminal procedure. 
¶29 The dissent argues that the rule we announced in 
Douangmala was not new.  Dissent, ¶58.  The dissent asserts that 
the rule in Douangmala was not new law because when a court 
"interprets a statute . . . [it] declares what the statute 
always meant."  Dissent, ¶94.  Under the dissent's approach, the 
new interpretation provides what the statute meant before and 
after the decision; the previous interpretation never was the 
law.  Dissent, ¶¶94-96.  Under this rationale, the holding in 
Douangmala somehow pre-existed its rendering.18  We decline to 
                                                 
18 Compare dissent, ¶87 (arguing that Douangmala was the law 
when Lagundoye entered his pleas and was convicted) with 
dissent, ¶110 (recognizing that Lagundoye could not challenge 
his convictions by direct appellate review because the basis of 
his challenge, the Douangmala decision, was announced after the 
time for his appeal ran out).  Conveniently, for the dissent, 
Douangmala was both the law and not the law when Lagundoye was 
convicted.  
No. 
02-2137, 02-2138 & 02-2139   
 
22 
 
engage in this post hoc legal fiction, which is contrary to both 
Lo and Schmelzer.  
¶30 To pretend that Chavez, Issa, Lopez, and Garcia never 
existed or applied to any case simply to reach a desired result 
is disingenuous to the litigants, attorneys, and circuit courts 
that were bound by those decisions.  If the dissent's approach 
were 
the 
law 
in 
Wisconsin, 
then 
every time 
this 
court 
reinterpreted a procedural statute in the criminal code, every 
conviction affected by that statute that was finalized before 
the new interpretation could be collaterally attacked.  This 
result would run counter to Lo and Schmelzer.  The untenable 
result of the dissent's approach, which flies in the face of the 
need for finality in judgments, would be that the law at any 
given point in time would be uncertain and in a constant state 
of flux.19 
                                                 
19 The dissent's peculiar assertion that we are rewriting 
the effective date of § 971.08, dissent, ¶88, is equally non-
meritorious.  Chavez, Issa, Lopez, and Garcia all applied 
§ 971.08; 
they 
simply 
gave 
the 
statute 
a 
different 
interpretation 
than 
this 
court 
did 
in 
Douangmala. 
 
The 
judiciary's reinterpretation of a statute does not affect the 
effective date of the statute simply because the previous 
interpretation was changed.  
No. 
02-2137, 02-2138 & 02-2139   
 
23 
 
¶31 Given that the rule in Douangmala was a new rule of 
criminal procedure20 and that Lagundoye's underlying criminal 
convictions 
were 
final 
before 
Douangmala 
was 
decided, 
Lagundoye's case falls under the Teague retroactivity analysis 
and the Griffith rule of retroactivity, applicable only to cases 
on direct review, does not apply.21  As discussed supra, 
Wisconsin follows the general rule in Teague that a new rule of 
criminal procedure does not apply retroactively to cases that 
were final before the date of its issuance.  Schmelzer, 201 
Wis. 2d at 257.  In other words, a new rule generally cannot be 
applied retroactively to cases on collateral review.  Thus, 
under the general rule of nonretroactivity, Douangmala would not 
apply to Lagundoye's case because Lagundoye's convictions all 
became final before Douangmala was decided.  
                                                 
20 In an attempt to "have their cake and eat it too," the 
dissent later argues that the rule in Douangmala falls under the 
second Teague exception.  Dissent, ¶97.  However, in order for 
one of the exceptions to the Teague rule of nonretroactivity to 
apply, the Teague rule itself must first be applicable.  As 
noted supra, substantive rules and "old" rules do not fall under 
the Teague framework.  Thus, by arguing that one of the 
exceptions to Teague applies, the dissent is maintaining two 
logically inconsistent positions.  On the one hand the dissent 
argues that Douangmala was an existing rule of substantive law 
(not subject to Teague).  On the other hand, it argues that the 
second exception to Teague applies.  However, Teague applies 
only to new rules of criminal procedure.  Thus, the dissent is 
simultaneously arguing that Douangmala was an existing rule of 
substantive criminal law and a new rule of criminal procedure.  
21 See Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (noting "'the important 
distinction between direct review and collateral review.'") 
(citation omitted).   
No. 
02-2137, 02-2138 & 02-2139   
 
24 
 
¶32 The first exception to the Teague nonretroactivity 
rule applies if the new rule "places 'certain kinds of primary, 
private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-
making authority to proscribe.'"  Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 
(quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971)).  
This first exception applies to conduct that "is classically 
substantive."  Howard, 211 Wis. 2d at 283.  Douangmala did not 
decriminalize any conduct or place any conduct beyond the power 
of the legislature to proscribe.  Likewise, the Douangmala rule, 
modifying the test for plea withdrawal under § 971.08(2), does 
not apply to substantive conduct.22  Thus, the Douangmala rule 
does not fall within the first exception to Teague. 
¶33 The second Teague exception applies if the new rule 
encompasses procedures that "'are implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty.'"  Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (citation omitted).  
The Teague court noted that this second exception is "reserved 
for watershed rules of criminal procedure."  Id. at 311.  The 
                                                 
22 See Lo, 264 Wis. 2d 1, ¶70 (holding the new rule that 
clarified the burden of the state to disprove mitigating 
circumstances 
in 
prosecution 
for 
first-degree 
intentional 
homicide did not fall within the first Teague exception); 
Schmelzer, 201 Wis. 2d 246, 257-58 (holding that the new rule 
granting criminal defendants the right to counsel on petitions 
for habeas corpus review did not "rise to the level of giving 
protection to a 'primary activity' . . . ."); State v. Denny, 
163 Wis. 2d 352, 357, 471 N.W.2d 606 (Ct. App. 1991)(holding the 
new rule that the confrontation clause bars a co-defendant's 
confession 
at 
joint 
trial 
where 
the 
non-testifying 
co-
defendant's confession is not directly admissible against the 
defendant did not fall within the first Teague exception).  
No. 
02-2137, 02-2138 & 02-2139   
 
25 
 
plurality in Teague cited with approval the language used by 
Justice Harlan in Mackey, explaining this second exception: 
"Typically, it should be the case that any conviction 
free from federal constitutional error at the time it 
became final, will be found, upon reflection, to have 
been fundamentally fair and conducted under those 
procedures essential to the substance of a full 
hearing.  However, in some situations it might be that 
time and growth in social capacity, as well as 
judicial perceptions of what we can rightly demand of 
the adjudicatory process, will properly alter our 
understanding of the bedrock procedural elements that 
must be found to vitiate the fairness of a particular 
conviction.  For example, such, in my view, is the 
case with the right to counsel at trial now held a 
necessary condition precedent to any conviction for a 
serious crime."  
Id. at 311-12 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693-94).   
¶34 The Teague court concluded that the second exception 
is limited to "those new procedures without which the likelihood 
of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished."  Id. at 313.  
Further, the plurality in Teague stated, "[b]ecause we operate 
from the premise that such procedures would be so central to an 
accurate determination of innocence or guilt, we believe it 
unlikely that many such components of basic due process have yet 
to emerge."  Id. at 313.  Notably, Teague ruled that the 
requirement that a jury venire be composed of a fair cross 
section of the community would not fall within the second 
exception because "the absence of a fair cross section of the 
jury venire does not undermine the fundamental fairness that 
must underlie a conviction or seriously diminish the likelihood 
of obtaining an accurate conviction . . . ."  Id. at 315.  As a 
further indication of how narrow this exception is, the Supreme 
No. 
02-2137, 02-2138 & 02-2139   
 
26 
 
Court in Graham concluded that the ruling sought by the 
petitioner, involving a change in the law regarding the 
mitigation testimony a jury was permitted to hear in a capital 
murder case, would not fall within the second Teague exception, 
as the ruling would not be part of the "small core" of rules 
required in the concept of ordered liberty.  Graham, 506 U.S. at 
478. 
¶35 Wisconsin 
has 
consistently 
followed 
the 
Teague 
formulation of the second exception, limiting its application to 
new constitutional rules that implicate the fairness and 
accuracy of the fact-finding process.  For example, in State v. 
Denny, 163 Wis. 2d 352, 357, 471 N.W.2d 606 (Ct. App. 1991), 
this court held that a new rule prohibiting the introduction of 
a non-testifying co-defendant's confession at a joint trial 
where the co-defendant's statement would not be directly 
admissible against the defendant qualified for retroactive 
application under the second Teague exception.  The court 
reasoned that because "[t]he confrontation clause of the sixth 
amendment guarantees the right of the criminal defendant to be 
confronted with the witness against him[,] . . . [f]ailing to 
apply a rule interpreting this right would offend our concept of 
ordered liberty."  Id.   
¶36 In 
contrast, 
this 
court 
has 
held 
that 
a 
new 
statutorily based rule, providing a criminal defendant with the 
right to counsel on petition for habeas corpus, would not be 
applied retroactively, as it did not invoke "an 'absolute 
prerequisite to fundamental 
fairness[.]'"  
Schmelzer, 201 
No. 
02-2137, 02-2138 & 02-2139   
 
27 
 
Wis. 2d at 257-58 (citing Teague, 489 U.S. at 314).  Also, this 
court has held that a new rule clarifying the statutory elements 
for 
imperfect 
self-defense 
did 
not 
merit 
retroactive 
application, as it did not constitute "a watershed rule of 
criminal procedure, implicating fundamental fairness and the 
concept of ordered liberty."  Lo, 264 Wis. 2d 1, ¶71.   
¶37 We do not think the Douangmala rule falls within the 
small core of procedural rules meriting retroactive application 
under the second exception.  The rule in Douangmala, providing 
for an automatic plea withdrawal if a defendant meets the 
requirements of § 971.08(2), does not constitute "a watershed 
rule of criminal procedure, implicating fundamental fairness and 
the concept of ordered liberty."  Lo, 264 Wis. 2d 1, ¶71.  
Douangmala altered the standard for granting relief when a 
circuit court violates the dictates of a procedural statute.  
Prescribing for an automatic vacatur if the requirements of 
§ 971.08(2) are met, instead of a harmless-error analysis, 
certainly does not affect the integrity or accuracy of the fact-
finding process.   
¶38 Further, the Douangmala rule does not implicate a 
constitutional right that is included in the foundation of 
bedrock procedural elements considered necessary for a fair 
trial.  The holding in Douangmala was based solely upon the 
legislative 
history 
of 
§ 971.08(2). 
 
Douangmala, 
253 
Wis. 2d 173, ¶¶26-30.  The one case in which a Wisconsin court 
found a new rule to apply retroactively to a case on collateral 
review under the second Teague exception involved a new rule 
No. 
02-2137, 02-2138 & 02-2139   
 
28 
 
based on a constitutional right.  Denny, 163 Wis. 2d at 357.  
The court in both Schmelzer and Lo considered new rules based 
solely on existing statutes and concluded the new rule in each 
respective 
case 
did 
not 
warrant 
retroactive 
application.  
Significantly, Schmelzer involved the right to counsel and Lo 
involved the elements for mitigation of a crime.  If these new 
rules did not constitute watershed rules of criminal procedure 
implicating fundamental principles of ordered liberty, then 
repudiation of the harmless-error analysis in Douangmala can 
hardly be considered such a rule.   
¶39 Contrary to the dissent's assertion, the fact that the 
result of not applying a new rule retroactively may result in 
unpleasant consequences to a particular litigant, dissent, ¶¶97, 
104-109, does not render the Douangmala rule part of the small 
core of watershed rules essential in the concept of ordered 
liberty.  As noted supra, this second Teague exception is 
limited to new procedural rules that affect the likelihood of an 
accurate conviction.  Thus, "unless a new rule of criminal 
procedure is of such a nature that 'without [it] the likelihood 
of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished,' there is no 
reason to apply the rule retroactively."  Bousley, 523 U.S. at 
620 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 313).   
¶40 It is important to emphasize that under the previous 
harmless-error analysis of Chavez and its progeny, the failure 
of a circuit court to inform a defendant under § 971.08(1)(c) 
that he may be subject to deportation by pleading guilty 
constituted harmless error if the defendant nonetheless actually 
No. 
02-2137, 02-2138 & 02-2139   
 
29 
 
knew that he could be deported.  Chavez, 175 Wis. 2d at 368.  
Thus, Douangmala essentially ruled that a defendant is entitled 
to 
a 
plea 
withdrawal 
if 
he 
meets 
the 
requirements 
of 
§ 971.08(2), even if he already knew that he could be subject to 
deportation proceedings by pleading guilty.  The rule in 
Douangmala, therefore, did not affect the accuracy or integrity 
of the fact-finding process.  The fact that deportation is a 
harsh consequence for Lagundoye's criminal offenses has no 
bearing as to whether the second Teague exception applies. 
¶41 The 
rule 
in 
Douangmala 
did 
not 
implicate 
a 
constitutional right, the accuracy or fundamental fairness of a 
trial, or change our understanding of the bedrock procedural 
elements inherent in the concept of ordered liberty.  Thus, the 
new rule announced in Douangmala does not fall within the second 
Teague exception.  Douangmala does not fit within either of the 
two Teague exceptions to nonretroactivity; hence, it cannot be 
applied retroactively to cases that were not on direct review 
when Douangmala was decided.  Therefore, we hold that Douangmala 
does not apply retroactively to cases, such as Lagundoye's, that 
were final before Douangmala was decided and are now on 
No. 
02-2137, 02-2138 & 02-2139   
 
30 
 
collateral review.23  In the end, the dissent's smokescreen of 
pejoratives and results-oriented rationale cannot obscure the 
reality that our decision is perfectly consistent with those 
Wisconsin authorities that have interpreted whether a rule is 
"old" 
or 
"new" 
and 
whether 
a 
rule 
is 
"procedural" 
or 
"substantive" for the purposes of retroactivity.   
¶42 As Douangmala does not apply to Lagundoye, his case is 
governed by the law as it existed when his convictions became 
final.  Thus, the Chavez harmless-error analysis applies to 
Lagundoye's case.  Under Chavez, a circuit court's failure to 
advise a defendant, pursuant to § 971.08(1)(c), of the possible 
deportation consequences of his guilty plea constitutes harmless 
error if 
the 
defendant 
was 
aware 
of 
the 
potential for 
deportation when he entered his plea.  Chavez, 175 Wis. 2d at 
368.   
¶43 As the court of appeals noted, Lagundoye does not 
contend that he was unaware of the deportation consequences of 
his guilty pleas when he entered into them.  Lagundoye, 260 
                                                 
23 As Douangmala was not the governing law when Lagundoye 
entered his guilty pleas and was convicted, the dissent's 
argument that this court is violating his right to due process 
is unpersuasive.  Dissent, ¶87 & n.38.  Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 
225, 228 (2001), is inapplicable here because, unlike the 
statutory interpretation at issue in Fiore, we conclude that the 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 971.08 rendered in Douangmala 
constituted a new rule of criminal procedure.  As Douangmala was 
not the law when Lagundoye was convicted, there is no due 
process violation.  See Fiore, 531 U.S. at 228-229.  "In any 
event . . . a state is not constitutionally compelled to make 
retroactive its new construction of a statute."  Lo, 264 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶74. 
No. 
02-2137, 02-2138 & 02-2139   
 
31 
 
Wis. 2d 805, ¶11.  Further, it is clear from the record that 
Lagundoye did know of the possible deportation consequences of 
his guilty pleas.  Lagundoye's September 1996 conviction for 
theft, which has not been appealed to this court, Case No. 96-
CM-610289, was chronologically his first conviction.  As noted 
supra, Lagundoye initially sought to withdraw his plea in this 
case as well, but later dropped this appeal, after it was 
determined that the circuit court did comply with § 971.08(1)(c) 
and orally informed him of the deportation consequences of his 
plea.  Thus, because Lagundoye has not alleged that he was 
unaware of the deportation consequences of his pleas when he 
entered into them, the circuit courts' failure to advise him of 
those consequences as mandated by § 971.08(1)(c) constitutes 
harmless error.  Therefore, Lagundoye is not entitled to relief.   
IV. SUMMARY 
¶44 We conclude the automatic vacatur rule announced in 
Douangmala is a new rule of criminal procedure.  We hold that 
Douangmala may not be applied retroactively to cases that were 
final before Douangmala was decided because the rule in 
Douangmala does not fit within either of the two exceptions to 
the Teague doctrine.  Douangmala, therefore, does not apply to 
Lagundoye because all of Lagundoye's cases were final before 
Douangmala was decided.  Finally, we hold that Lagundoye is not 
entitled to relief under the law as it existed when his cases 
became final because Lagundoye has not alleged that he was 
unaware of the deportation consequences of his pleas, and thus 
the circuit courts' failure to advise him of the deportation 
No. 
02-2137, 02-2138 & 02-2139   
 
32 
 
consequences of his plea pursuant to § 971.08(1)(c) constitutes 
harmless error.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.  
¶45 DIANE S. SYKES, J., did not participate. 
 
 
No.  02-2137.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶46 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
majority in this case is in the uniquely unenviable position of 
rendering a decision that is wrong on the law as well as being 
fundamentally unfair and unjust.  Because neither the law nor 
fundamental fairness and justice can support the majority 
opinion's conclusions, I dissent. 
¶47 The majority opinion frames the legal issue as 
follows: whether the rule announced in State v. Douangmala, 2002 
WI 
62, 
253 
Wis. 2d 173, 
646 
N.W.2d 1, 
can 
be 
applied 
retroactively to a defendant whose opportunity for a direct 
appeal expired before Douangmala was decided.24  This court did 
not decide in Douangmala whether its decision was to be 
retroactively applied to an individual such as Lagundoye who 
raised the issue in a collateral post-conviction proceeding.  
¶48 Although this court is not required to follow federal 
rules regarding the retroactive application of changes in the 
criminal law, this court has, in the past, relied on federal 
interpretations in this area and has explicitly adopted three 
United States Supreme Court cases elaborating upon various 
aspects of the doctrine of retroactivity: Bousley v. United 
States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998), Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 
(1989), and Griffith v. United States, 479 U.S. 314 (1987). 
¶49 Following the federal rules of retroactivity is not 
easy.  One commentator has noted that "the Court's decisions in 
this area have spawned a veritable cottage industry of academic 
                                                 
24 Majority op., ¶2. 
No.  02-2137.ssa 
 
2 
 
attempts to impose some order on the chaos."25  Another concluded 
that the Court's jurisprudence in this area seems to be the 
product of a split personality.26 
¶50 Retroactivity under these cases turns on whether a 
court announces a new or an old rule, whether the new rule is 
one of substantive criminal law or criminal procedural law, and 
whether the defendant's challenge is made on direct appeal (or 
while in the direct appeal pipeline) or on collateral review.27  
New 
rules 
of 
substantive 
criminal 
law 
are 
presumptively 
retroactive;28 new rules of criminal procedure are generally not 
retroactive to cases that became final before the new rule was 
announced.29  This case is a review of a collateral post-
conviction proceeding.  The majority opinion concludes that the 
present case involves a new rule of criminal procedure. 
                                                 
25 Trevor W. Morrison, Fair Warning and the Retroactive 
Judicial Expansion of Federal Criminal Statutes, 74 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 455, 466 (2001). 
26 Linda Meyer, "Nothing We Say Matters": Teague and New 
Rules, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 423, 459 (1994).  See also Barry 
Friedman, Failed Enterprise, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 485, 524-25 (1995) 
(describing Teague as a nearly impenetrable disaster). 
27 Majority op., ¶¶11-13. 
28 Majority op., ¶12. 
29 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989); majority op., 
¶13. 
No.  02-2137.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶51 The lines between a "new rule" and an "old rule,"30 and 
between a substantive and a procedural change in the law,31 are 
blurry and often difficult to perceive.  But blurriness is no 
excuse for myopia.  The majority opinion's failure to come to 
grips with the difficult, nuanced issues presented by this case 
is 
vexing, 
and 
I 
cannot 
agree 
with 
its 
short-sighted 
conclusions. 
¶52 I agree with the majority opinion that this case is 
governed by the United States Supreme Court's decisions in 
Teague and Bousley.  I conclude, however, that Lagundoye's 
conviction must be vacated for the following reasons: 
¶53 First, the rule announced in Douangmala is not a new 
rule under the Bousley decision. 
¶54 Second, Douangmala did not announce, under Teague, a 
new rule even though it overruled prior court of appeals 
decisions. 
¶55 Third, 
Douangmala 
announced, 
under 
Teague, 
a 
substantive rule, not a procedural rule. 
                                                 
30 The United States Supreme Court has fully acknowledged 
that "[i]t is admittedly difficult to determine when a case 
announces a new rule for retroactivity purposes."  Teague v. 
Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989).  The Court has sought to provide 
some guidance in this area, but its guidance on what constitutes 
a new rule has often proved more opaque than clarifying. 
31 See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) 
("The line between 'substance' and 'procedure' shifts as the 
legal context changes.  'Each implies different variables 
depending upon the particular problem for which it is used.'"). 
No.  02-2137.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶56 Fourth, the majority determines the effective date of 
a statute instead of abiding by the legislative determination of 
the effective date of Wis. Stat. § 971.08.  
¶57 Fifth, 
even 
if 
Douangmala 
is 
viewed 
as 
having 
announced a new procedural rule, this case falls under the 
Teague exception that allows retroactive application of a 
"'small core' of rules required in the concept of ordered 
liberty."32  This case implicates significant concerns of liberty 
and fairness. 
I 
¶58 First, the rule announced in Douangmala is not a new 
rule under the Bousley decision. 
¶59 This case is very similar to Bousley.  Both Bousley 
and the present case involve whether a plea was knowingly and 
intelligently made.  The Court concluded in Bousley that the 
requirement that a plea be knowing and intelligent is an old 
rule and therefore even a new rule governing what constitutes a 
knowing and intelligent plea is applied retroactively.  Bousley 
governs this case.   
¶60 In Bousley, the petitioner pled guilty to the charge 
of "knowingly and intentionally us[ing] firearms during and in 
relation to a drug trafficking crime."33  The petitioner's guilty 
plea was accepted, and he was sentenced.  The petitioner 
appealed, challenging the sentence, not the guilty plea.   
                                                 
32 Majority op., ¶34. 
33 Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 616 (1998). 
No.  02-2137.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶61 After the appeal was final, the petitioner sought a 
writ of habeas corpus, "challenging the factual basis for his 
guilty plea on the ground that neither the 'evidence' nor the 
'plea allocution' showed a 'connection between the firearms in 
the bedroom of the house, and the garage, where the drug 
trafficking occurred.'"34  The district court dismissed the 
petitioner's habeas petition, and the petitioner appealed.   
¶62 While the petitioner's appeal was pending, the United 
States Supreme Court decided Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 
137 (1995), which held that "active employment of [a] firearm" 
required a use such as "brandishing, displaying, bartering, 
striking with, . . . [or] firing or attempting to fire the 
weapon."35 
¶63 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's 
dismissal of the habeas petition on the ground that the 
petitioner had waived any challenges to his guilty plea or 
conviction by failing to raise these challenges in his direct 
appeal.  The United States Supreme Court granted review to 
resolve a circuit split over the "permissibility of post-Bailey 
collateral attacks on convictions under the use of firearms in 
drug trafficking statute where the conviction was obtained 
pursuant to a guilty plea."36 
¶64 At the United States Supreme Court, the petitioner 
contended that "neither he, nor his counsel, nor the court 
                                                 
34 Id. at 617. 
35 Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 144 (1995). 
36 Bousley, 523 U.S. at 618. 
No.  02-2137.ssa 
 
6 
 
correctly understood the essential elements of the crime with 
which he was charged."37  Petitioner therefore argued that he was 
not correctly informed "as to the true nature of the charge 
against him."38   
¶65 The United States Supreme Court ruled that the 
underlying constitutional claim Bousley made (although based on 
the new Bailey case) was that the petitioner's guilty plea was 
not "knowing and intelligent."39  The Court concluded that 
"nothing was new about this principle."40   
¶66 Bousley 
emphasized 
that 
the 
critically 
important 
factor was not the change in the substantive law made in Bailey, 
but rather how the change in the substantive law affected the 
knowing and intelligent entry of a guilty plea.   
¶67 For entry of a guilty plea to be knowing and 
intelligent, a defendant must "understand[] . . . the nature of 
the charge and the consequences of his plea."41  The reason for 
this requirement is that a guilty plea "cannot be truly 
voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the 
law in relation to the facts."42  In Bousley, the Court concluded 
                                                 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 620. 
40 Id. (citing Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941), for 
the proposition that pleas must be entered knowingly and 
intelligently). 
41 McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 (1969).  See 
also United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002); Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). 
42 McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466. 
No.  02-2137.ssa 
 
7 
 
that the petitioner may collaterally attack the entry of a 
guilty plea without running afoul of Teague.43 
¶68 The United States Supreme Court ultimately concluded 
in Bousley, however, that the petitioner waived the argument 
that his plea was not "knowing and intelligent" when he failed 
to raise it on direct appeal.  
¶69 In this case, unlike in Bousley, waiver is not an 
issue.  The Wisconsin legislature has conclusively determined 
that the failure to advise an accused of potential deportation 
justifies vacating the conviction.  The statute "does not limit 
the ability to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest on any 
other grounds" than those stated in the statute.44  Langudoye has 
met all the statutory conditions.  The Douangmala court 
concluded that the Wisconsin legislature intended that if the 
statutory conditions are met (as they are in the present case), 
the circuit court shall vacate the judgment.45  The legislature 
                                                 
43 The Court in Bousley went on to explain that although the 
claim was not barred by Teague, the petitioner faced an uphill 
battle because "a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made 
by an accused person, who has been advised by competent counsel, 
may not be collaterally attacked."  Bousley, 523 U.S. at 621 
(citing 
Mabry 
v. 
Johnson, 
467 
U.S. 
504, 
508 
(1984).  
Furthermore, the Court noted that the petitioner would have to 
show that the voluntariness and intelligence of the guilty plea 
was first challenged on direct review.  Id.   
44 State v. Douangmala, 2002 WI 62, ¶24, 253 Wis. 2d 173, 
646 N.W.2d 1. 
45 See Wis. Stat. § 971.08(d): 
If a court fails to advise a defendant as required by 
sub. (1)(c) and a defendant later shows that the plea 
is likely to result in the defendant's deportation, 
exclusion from admission to this country or denial of 
naturalization, the court on the defendant's motion 
No.  02-2137.ssa 
 
8 
 
has, in effect, declared that when an accused enters a guilty 
plea without having received the admonition about deportation 
from the circuit court, the guilty plea is invalid and must be 
vacated.  The legislature declared that a plea entered without 
the admonition is not knowingly and intelligently made.  The 
harmless error rule does not apply.  Neither does the waiver 
rule.  The legislature has explicitly provided a different rule 
from the ones usually applicable when determining whether a plea 
was made knowingly and intelligently. 
¶70 For these reasons, I conclude that Douangmala involves 
the old notion that a guilty plea must be knowingly and 
intelligently made.  The legislature has set forth a special 
rule that if an admonition about deportation is not given, the 
guilty plea is not knowingly and intelligently made and the 
conviction must be vacated.  Such a decision is, according to 
Bousley, retroactive.    
II 
¶71 Second, Douangmala did not announce a new rule even 
though it overruled prior court of appeals decisions.  Under 
Teague, a federal court will not disturb a final state 
conviction "unless it can be said that a state court, at the 
time the conviction or sentence became final, would have acted 
                                                                                                                                                             
shall vacate any applicable judgment against the 
defendant and permit the defendant to withdraw the 
plea and enter another plea.  This subsection does not 
limit the ability to withdraw a plea of guilty or no 
contest on any other grounds. 
No.  02-2137.ssa 
 
9 
 
objectively unreasonably by not extending the relief later 
sought in federal court."46   
¶72 A unanimous court in Douangmala concluded that the 
earlier court of appeals cases interpreting the statute were 
"objectively wrong under the language of the statute."47  Thus 
Douangmala did not announce a new rule under Teague.48     
¶73 According to the majority opinion, "a case announces a 
new rule if its outcome was susceptible to debate among 
reasonable minds."49  It concludes that the court of appeals' 
harmless error analysis in cases prior to Douangmala was 
susceptible to debate among reasonable minds.  Not so, said the 
court in Douangmala. 
                                                 
46 O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 156 (1997).  See 
Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414 (1990) ("The 'new rule' 
principle 
therefore 
validates 
reasonable, 
good-faith 
interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts even 
though they are shown to be contrary to later decisions.").   
47 Douangmala, 253 Wis. 2d 173, ¶42. 
48 This court may, regardless of Teague, judicially decide 
for itself whether an interpretation of a statute is a correct 
statement of the law as of the date of conviction or whether the 
interpretation of the statute creates new law.  See Fiore v. 
White, 531 U.S. 225, 228 (2001), in which the United States 
Supreme Court asked a state supreme court to determine whether 
its statutory interpretation stated the correct interpretation 
of the disputed statute on the date the conviction became final.  
See also Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 
365 (1932) (A "state in defining the limits of adherence to 
precedent may make a choice for itself between the principle of 
forward operation and that of relation backward. . . . The 
alternative is the same whether the subject of the new decision 
is common law or statute."). 
49 Majority 
op., 
¶26 
(quoting 
State 
v. 
Horton, 
195 
Wis. 2d 280, 291, 536 N.W.2d 155 (Ct. App. 1995) (quoting 
Teague, 489 U.S. at 301)). 
No.  02-2137.ssa 
 
10 
 
¶74 When the Douangmala court declared the court of 
appeals' prior interpretations to be "objectively wrong," it was 
saying that no reasonable court would conclude that the statute 
meant something else. 
¶75 As this court has explained, we do not examine the 
reasonableness of the mind of the person or the court making the 
interpretation, but rather, we look at the reasonableness of the 
interpretation itself.50  Thus, according to the case law, 
reasonable people, the objective test, can reach unreasonable 
interpretations.  When an interpretation adds words to the 
explicit language of a statute, such as adding the concept of 
harmless error to a statute that contains no such concept, it 
is, as this court has stated, "not a case of conflicting, 
reasonable 'plain meaning' interpretations; it is a case of 
lower court error." 51   
¶76 Douangmala was not a case in which the "outcome was 
susceptible to debate among reasonable minds."52  Douangmala was 
not a case in which this court declared that the language of the 
statute supported multiple reasonable interpretations.53  All of 
the members of this court agreed in Douangmala that the text of 
                                                 
50 Bruno v. Milwaukee 
County, 
2003 WI 
28, 
¶22, 260 
Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656. 
51 Bruno, 260 Wis. 2d 633, ¶23.  
52 Holland v. McGinnis, 963 F.2d 1044, 1053 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(citing Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. at 415). 
53 
Douangmala 
thus 
contrasts 
with 
Schmelzer, 
201 
Wis. 2d 246, in which the court had to interpret two statutes 
and draw reasonable inferences from them in order to reach the 
conclusion it did. 
No.  02-2137.ssa 
 
11 
 
the statute prescribed both the warning to be given about 
possible deportation and the remedy for a circuit court's 
failure to give the warning.  Douangmala is a decision in which 
this court held that the court of appeals reached what this 
court viewed as an unreasonable interpretation, "a case of lower 
court error."54   
¶77 In Douangmala, we unhesitatingly concluded that "[t]he 
precise 
words 
of 
§ 971.08(2) 
lead 
inexorably 
to 
one 
conclusion . . . :  the circuit court must permit the defendant 
to withdraw his plea."55  Our ruling in Douangmala "merely 
clarified the plain language of the statute."56  It didn't change 
the law.  Douangmala finally and conclusively declared what 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08 has always meant since its enactment in 1986 
because 
its 
interpretation 
of 
the 
statute 
was 
the 
only 
reasonable one.   
¶78 Yet, the majority opinion persists in asserting that 
merely because the court of appeals' decisions in State v. 
Chavez, 175 Wis. 2d 366, 498 N.W.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1993); State 
v. Issa, 186 Wis. 2d 199, 519 N.W.2d 741 (Ct. App. 1994); State 
v. Lopez, 196 Wis. 2d 725, 539 N.W.2d 700 (Ct. App. 1995); and 
State v. Garcia, 2000 WI App 81, 234 Wis. 2d 304, 610 N.W.2d 180 
were 
overruled 
by 
Douangmala 
does 
not 
mean 
that 
those 
                                                 
54 Bruno, 260 Wis. 2d 663, ¶23. 
55 Douangmala, 253 Wis. 2d 173, ¶25. 
56 Fiore v. White, 757 A.2d 842, 848-49 (Pa. 2000). 
No.  02-2137.ssa 
 
12 
 
interpretations were unreasonable.57  The only way the majority 
opinion can come to this conclusion is to declare that an 
objective reading of a statute now includes unreasonable 
interpretations as well as reasonable ones. 
¶79 If this court were following federal law, as it very 
frequently does, and if this court were following Teague and 
Bousley, as it professes to do, it should conclude that 
Douangmala was merely an objectively correct reading of the 
language of an existing statute and therefore not a new rule.  I 
conclude that Douangmala did not announce a new rule, and it 
should therefore apply retroactively.  
III 
¶80 Third, even if Douangmala announced a new rule, the 
rule is not procedural but substantive.   
¶81 Douangmala is not, as the majority opinion claims, new 
procedural law.  Rather, it is old substantive criminal law.58  
                                                 
57 Majority op., ¶26, n.17.  The majority opinion also 
argues that statutes relating to the same subject matter should 
be harmonized when possible.  Although § 971.08 and § 971.26 
reside 
in 
the 
same 
chapter, 
they 
can 
not 
be 
properly 
characterized as relating to the same subject matter when 
§ 971.08 
fully 
sets 
forth 
the 
conditions 
under 
which 
a 
conviction is vacated and when the court determined that 
inclusion of the harmless error analysis was objectively wrong. 
58 For a discussion of substantive law, see State v. Lo, 
2003 WI 107, 264 Wis. 2d 1, 665 N.W.2d 756 (Abrahamson, C.J., 
dissenting), in which I argued in dissent that the change in the 
law made in State v. Howard, 211 Wis. 2d 269, 564 N.W.2d 753 
(1997), which the defendant sought to apply retroactively in Lo, 
was a substantive rather than a procedural change.  I argued 
that as such, the change should have applied retroactively 
because it did not fall within the scope of Teague.  Lo, 264 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶113. 
No.  02-2137.ssa 
 
13 
 
¶82 I 
acknowledge 
that 
if 
one 
reads 
the 
statute 
superficially, 
it 
appears 
to 
be 
procedural. 
 
Section 
971.08(1)(c), governing the admonition about deportation, has 
the surface feel of a procedural statute because it addresses, 
at least in part, the procedure for taking a guilty plea. 
¶83 Rules do not, however, "fall neatly under either the 
substantive or procedural doctrine category."59  They may partake 
of attributes of both.  
¶84 The statute and the Douangmala case do more than 
govern the procedure for taking a guilty plea.  Douangmala 
declared that a conviction based on a guilty plea made without a 
circuit court's admonition about deportation must, as a matter 
of law, be vacated.  Douangmala thus affects the scope and 
application of all criminal statutes because it challenges the 
validity of all guilty pleas and, for purposes of Teague, has a 
substantive impact. 
¶85 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.08 sets forth the procedure for 
a circuit court to warn a defendant about deportation but makes 
the warning a substantive right by vacating a conviction when a 
circuit court fails to give the warning.  In adopting the 
procedure outlined in § 971.08, the legislature statutorily 
determined the substantive consequence of a circuit court's 
failure to adhere to the statute.   
¶86 Under Bousley, a court holding is "substantive" when 
it affects the scope and application of a substantive criminal 
                                                 
59 United States v. Woods, 986 F.2d 669, 677-78 (3d Cir. 
1993). 
No.  02-2137.ssa 
 
14 
 
statute.60  In Bousley the Court ruled that the Bailey decision 
affected the scope and application of a substantive criminal 
statute.  So, too, does Douangmala affect the scope and 
application of substantive criminal statutes.  Accordingly, I 
conclude that the rule in Douangmala is substantive and should 
be applied retroactively.   
¶87 Furthermore, 
because 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08 
and 
Douangmala were, objectively, the law when Lagundoye entered his 
pleas and was convicted, the majority's failure to provide the 
remedy established by the legislature and requested by Lagundoye 
has, in my opinion, deprived Lagundoye of the substantive right 
to knowingly and intelligently enter a plea and interfered with 
his statutorily created right to have his conviction vacated.  I 
conclude that validating a conviction explicitly required to be 
vacated by state statute might very well violate the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.61 
                                                 
60 Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620. 
61 Compare Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225, 228 (2001), a 
unanimous per curiam opinion, in which the Court held that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's failure to overturn the conviction 
of a defendant, when the proper interpretation of the statute 
existing at the time the defendant was convicted did not support 
his 
conviction, 
violated 
the 
Due 
Process 
Clause 
of 
the 
Fourteenth Amendment.   
See also State v. Hazen, 198 Wis. 2d 554, 559, 543 
N.W.2d 503 (Ct. App. 1995) ("The due process clause protects 
interests in life, liberty, and property, and state laws can 
create additional interests protected by the due process 
clause.") (citing Ky. Dept. of Corrs. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 
460 (1989)).   
No.  02-2137.ssa 
 
15 
 
IV 
¶88 Fourth, the majority has determined the effective date 
of a statute instead of abiding by the legislative determination 
of the effective date. 
¶89 In the present case, in which the prior interpretation 
of a statute was "objectively wrong," the majority opinion 
effectively ignores the legislature's prerogative to determine 
when a statute goes into effect.  Section 971.08 went into 
effect on April 24, 1986, and it has remained unchanged ever 
since, even though this court did not definitively declare what 
it objectively meant until 2002.   
¶90 Lagundoye's 
crimes, 
pleas, 
and 
convictions 
all 
occurred after the effective date of the statute.  Section 
971.08 was, according to the legislature, in effect when three 
circuit court judges failed to inform Lagundoye personally that 
he was subject to deportation.  When the majority opinion 
declares Douangmala to be a new rule effective after the opinion 
was announced, it rewrites the effective date of the statute, 
contrary to the directive of the legislature, and exceeds the 
authority of this court.   
¶91 The 
court 
commented 
in 
Bousley 
that 
Teague 
is 
inapplicable to criminal statutes.  The court stated that  
"because Teague by its terms applies only to procedural rules, 
                                                                                                                                                             
The precise mechanism by which state laws create liberty 
interests protected by the due process clause is not clear.  See 
Kirsch v. Endicott, 201 Wis. 2d 705, 715, 549 N.W.2d 761 (Ct. 
App. 1996). 
No.  02-2137.ssa 
 
16 
 
we think it is inapplicable to the situation in which this Court 
decides the meaning of a criminal statute enacted by Congress."62   
¶92 The Bousley Court did not further explain what it 
meant when it declared that Teague did not apply to criminal 
statutes.  The Court may have meant that all criminal statutes, 
including 
criminal 
procedural 
statutes, 
enacted 
by 
the 
legislature are not subject to Teague because that doctrine only 
applies to court-made rules of constitutional procedure.63  
Alternatively, it may have meant that Teague does not apply to 
substantive criminal statutes.64 
                                                 
62 Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620. 
63 At least one court, prior to Bousley, concluded that this 
justification makes little sense as statutes are of less 
importance than the Constitution.  Hrubec v. United States, 734 
F. Supp. 60 (E.D.N.Y. 1990). 
64 Subsequent decisions in the federal courts have not 
clarified this issue.  Cases citing Bousley have arisen when the 
Court's interpretation of a criminal statute resulted in a 
substantive change in the law.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Lopez, 
248 
F.3d 
427, 
432 
(5th 
Cir. 
2001) 
("Teague 
is 
inapplicable, 
because 
Richardson consisted 
of 
the Supreme 
Court's 
interpretation 
of 
a 
statute 
and 
is 
therefore 
retroactively available on collateral review."); Lanier v. 
United States, 220 F.3d 833, 838 (7th Cir. 2000) ("Teague is 
inapt here where we interpret a criminal statute."); Glover v. 
Hargett, 56 F.3d 682, 685 n.4 (5th Cir. 1995) ("[B]ecause Teague 
concerned the retroactive application of court-made rules of 
criminal procedure, not state statutes" retroactivity analysis 
does not apply); United States v. Guardino, 972 F.2d 682, 687 
n.7 
(6th 
Cir. 
1992) 
("Teague 
prohibited 
the 
retroactive 
application of a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure 
to an existing conviction.  Teague does not bar the retroactive 
application of Hughey because, unlike Teague, Hughey did not 
announce a new constitutional rule, but merely interpreted a 
statute . . . ").   
No.  02-2137.ssa 
 
17 
 
¶93 Justice Stevens' concurrence in Bousley provides a 
more nuanced explanation as to why Teague does not apply to 
criminal 
statutes. 
 
In 
his 
concurrence, 
Justice 
Stevens 
expressed the view that Bousley did not raise any Teague 
retroactivity issues because "Bailey . . . did not change the 
law.  It merely explained what [the statute] had meant since 
[it] was enacted.  The fact that a number of Courts of Appeals 
had construed the statute differently is of no . . . legal 
significance . . . ."65 
¶94 Justice Stevens' concurrence in Bousley was consistent 
with a line of cases, both criminal and civil, that state the 
rule that when the United States Supreme Court interprets a 
statute, the decision ordinarily applies retroactively because 
the Court declares what the statute always meant. 
¶95 The United States Supreme Court's construction of a 
federal statute "is an authoritative statement of what the 
statute meant before as well as after the decision of the case 
giving rise to that construction."66  Under this theory, when the 
Court interprets the meaning of a statute, it "explain[s] its 
understanding of what the statute has meant continuously since 
the date when it became law.  In statutory cases, the Court has 
                                                                                                                                                             
This court has, however, applied Teague to statutory 
interpretation. See State ex rel. Schmelzer v. Murphy, 201 
Wis. 2d 246, 255, 548 N.W.2d 45 (1996). 
65 Bousley, 523 U.S. at 625 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
66 Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312-13 
(1994). 
No.  02-2137.ssa 
 
18 
 
no authority to depart from the congressional command setting 
the effective date of a law that it has enacted."67  
¶96 If this court were following Teague and Bousley, as it 
professes to do, I suggest that it should not trump the 
legislature's authority to decide when a statute becomes 
effective 
and 
should 
conclude 
that 
Douangmala 
is 
the 
authoritative statement of what the statute meant since the 
effective date of the law set by the legislature.  For these 
reasons, I conclude that Douangmala is retroactive. 
V 
¶97 Fifth, 
even 
if 
Douangmala 
is 
viewed 
as 
having 
announced a new procedural rule, this case falls under the 
Teague exception that allows retroactive application of a 
"'small core' of rules required in the concept of ordered 
liberty."68   
                                                 
67 Rivers, 511 U.S. at 313 n.12.  See also United States v. 
Gonzales, 332 F.3d 825, 826 (5th Cir. 2003) ("A statement of 
what the law is and always was cannot be a new constitutional 
rule of criminal procedure."); United States v. City of Tacoma, 
Washington, 332 F.3d 574, 580 (9th Cir. 2003) (Interpretation of 
a statute "cannot be considered a 'change' of operative law.  
The theory of a judicial interpretation of a statute is that the 
interpretation gives the meaning of the statute from its 
inception, and does not merely give an interpretation to be used 
from the date of decision."); Dixon v. Dormire, 263 F.3d 774, 
781 (8th Cir. 2001) ("Where, as here, there has been no change 
in the law, we must give effect to the Supreme Court's 
enunciation of what the statute has always meant, even though 
our circuit precedent may have been otherwise when this dispute 
arose.") (internal citations omitted).  See also Agee v. 
Russell, 751 N.E.2d 1043, 1047 (Ohio 2001) (decision overturning 
a lower court's statutory interpretation is retroactive in its 
operation; the former decision never was the law). 
68 Teague, 489 U.S. at 307. 
No.  02-2137.ssa 
 
19 
 
¶98 Under the Teague exception, a new rule must seriously 
enhance 
the 
accuracy 
of 
the 
proceedings 
and 
alter 
our 
understanding of bedrock procedural elements essential to the 
fairness of the proceeding.69  A guilty plea based on information 
required by the legislature to be imparted to a defendant 
enhances the accuracy of the proceedings.  That's why the 
legislature adopted the statute.  It wanted a defendant facing 
deportation to be informed of the consequences of a guilty plea.   
                                                                                                                                                             
The notion of ordered liberty is a concept designed to 
limit the arbitrariness of government action.  One scholar has 
classified the elements of fair process under ordered liberty as 
being twofold: the requirement of rule-obedience and the 
requirement of minimum procedures.  Edward Rubin, Due Process 
and the Administrative State, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 1044, 1105 (1984). 
Rule-obedience requires that "government decisionmakers must 
follow preestablished rules in adjudicative processes."  The 
minimum 
procedure 
principle 
argues 
that 
"certain 
minimum 
adjudicatory procedures must be followed in various situations." 
 
Arguably, the majority opinion does not satisfy these 
strands of due process required to ensure the notion of ordered 
liberty.  The legislature set forth in § 971.08 the minimum 
procedures required to be performed by an adjudicative body in 
order to ensure that a defendant facing deportation is fully and 
personally informed of the consequences of pleading guilty.  By 
failing to apply the rule in Douangmala to Lagundoye, the 
majority opinion violates both the minimum procedures the 
legislature 
has 
provided 
to 
protect 
defendants 
facing 
deportation and the rule that this court itself adopted in 
Douangmala. 
 
69 Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 665 (2001) ("To fall within 
this 
exception, 
a 
new 
rule 
must 
meet 
two 
requirements: 
Infringement of the rule must "seriously diminish the likelihood 
of obtaining an accurate conviction," and the rule must "'"alter 
our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements"' essential 
to the fairness of a proceeding.") (citations omitted); Sawyer 
v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242 (1990); Teague, 489 U.S. at 311; 
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971).  
No.  02-2137.ssa 
 
20 
 
¶99 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.08 and the Douangmala decision 
alter our understanding of bedrock procedural elements essential 
to the fairness of the proceedings because at issue is the 
statutorily mandated legal principle that a guilty plea must be 
knowingly and intelligently made and cannot be knowing or 
intelligent if the circuit court does not admonish the defendant 
about possible deportation consequences flowing from his plea. 
¶100 In other words, this court should be examining 
"whether the claimed error of law was a 'fundamental defect 
which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice' 
and whether '[i]t presen[s] exceptional circumstances where the 
need for the remedy afforded' in a collateral proceeding" is 
evident.70 
¶101 This case implicates significant concerns of liberty 
and fairness.  Deportation may result in the loss of "all that 
makes life worth living."71  The United States Supreme Court 
clearly and persuasively articulated the significant interests 
involved in deportation in Bridges v. Wixon as follows: 
Though deportation is not technically a criminal 
proceeding, 
it 
visits 
a 
great 
hardship 
on 
the 
individual and deprives him of the right to stay and 
live and work in this land of freedom.  That 
deportation is a penalty——at times a most serious one—
—cannot be doubted.  Meticulous care must be exercised 
                                                 
70 Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974) (quoting 
Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)). 
71 Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). 
No.  02-2137.ssa 
 
21 
 
lest the procedure by which he is deprived of that 
liberty not meet the essential standards of fairness.72 
¶102 The legislature of this state has explicitly decided 
in Wis. Stat. § 971.08 that a defendant facing deportation 
deserves to be expressly and explicitly informed on the record 
each time he or she enters a guilty plea that may actually 
result in deportation.  Our state legislature understands the 
seriousness of deportation.  To ensure absolute fairness, an 
individual facing deportation must personally be reminded by a 
circuit court of this serious consequence so that he or she can 
carefully consider the consequences before entering a guilty 
plea. 
¶103 A comment in the drafting record of § 971.08 describes 
similar statutes in other states "as going a long way to 
alleviate the hardship and unfairness when an alien unwittingly 
pleads guilty to a charge without being informed of the 
immigration consequences of a plea."73  Our legislature went 
further than these other state legislatures to alleviate that 
hardship and unfairness by ensuring that whether or not an alien 
enters a plea unwittingly, a court must allow the alien to 
withdraw his plea if he or she was not personally informed about 
possible deportation.74  That an accused is aware of the 
deportation consequences of a plea at the time he or she entered 
                                                 
72 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945).  See also 
Rose v. H.L. Woolwine, 344 F.2d 993, 995 (4th Cir. 1965); 
Handlovits v. Adcock, 80 F. Supp. 425, 427 (1948).  
73 See Douangmala, 253 Wis. 2d 173, ¶28.  
74 See id., ¶31. 
No.  02-2137.ssa 
 
22 
 
the plea is irrelevant.75  Today the majority opinion breaks the 
legislature's commitment to that noble goal. 
¶104 Lagundoye came to the United States from Nigeria as a 
nine-year-old in 1984, about 20 years ago, with his mother, 
younger brother, and sister.  He attended public elementary and 
high school in Milwaukee.  He enrolled in college at the 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.  In short, Lagundoye spent 
most of his life in the United States.  Lagundoye's mother, 
father, two sisters, and brother are all U.S. citizens. 
¶105 Lagundoye was 21 years old when he committed the first 
crime for which he was convicted and was 22 or 23 years old when 
he committed his last crime.  He was deported when he was 27 
years old. 
¶106 Lagundoye was convicted of five crimes.  The crimes 
are classified as property crimes, not crimes against life and 
bodily security:  two counts of misdemeanor theft (involving his 
employer's business), burglary (entering a building with intent 
to steal), and two counts of forgery (taking credit card slips 
from his employer and forging them).  He was sentenced to prison 
on the forgery count in 1998, and, while completing his 
sentence, he was deported in 2002. 
¶107 Lagundoye's criminal behavior was and is deplorable 
and inexcusable.  With all the opportunities afforded him, by 
the age of 23 he was a criminal, five times over.  He had been 
in the House of Corrections, on probation, and in prison.  
                                                 
75 Id., ¶¶3, 4, 17, 46. 
No.  02-2137.ssa 
 
23 
 
Although he was still relatively young, he was not a promising 
prospect to live a productive life in society. 
¶108 The State deprived him of liberty for more than 8 
years by imprisoning him but left him with the opportunity to 
return to his home in Milwaukee to try to make a fresh start at 
the end of his prison term.  The federal government banished 
Lagundoye to Nigeria, isolated from his family, friends, and the 
American culture in which he grew up.  The federal government 
deprived him of any hope or opportunity to return to his family 
or this country. 
¶109 The question before us is whether Lagundoye deserves 
to be punished by banishment when, after his first conviction, 
three circuit courts failed to follow the requirements set forth 
in Wis. Stat. § 971.08 by failing to warn him that a conviction 
would subject him to deportation.  Yet each circuit court is 
held to know that its failure to give the warnings would result 
in the conviction being vacated. 
¶110 The majority relies on a technicality to allow the 
convictions to stand.  The technicality is that the defendant 
made his challenge to the convictions by collateral attack 
rather than on direct appellate review.  The majority concedes 
that Lagundoye would prevail, and his convictions would be 
vacated, if his challenge were being heard on direct appellate 
review.  Yet had Lagundoye challenged his convictions by direct 
appellate review, the challenges might have been viewed as 
frivolous because the court of appeals had already ruled on the 
No.  02-2137.ssa 
 
24 
 
challenge he might have made and does not have the power to 
overturn its own decisions.76 
¶111 The majority opinion's decision is wrong on the law 
and shocks the conscience, at least my conscience.  I dissent. 
¶112 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
                                                 
76 Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 186-90, 560 N.W.2d 246 
(1997). 
No.  02-2137.ssa 
 
 
 
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