Title: Ingalls v. Triple L., Inc.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Ingalls v. Triple L., Inc.1999 WY 157991 P.2d 746Case Number: 99-136Decided: 12/01/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming

KOLEEN INGALLS, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

TRIPLE L., INC., a Wyoming corporation, Appellee 
(Defendant).

                                 

 

Appeal from the District Court of Fremont County, The 
Honorable

Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge.

 

       John R. 
Hursh, Central Wyoming Law Associates, P.C., representing 
appellant.

        Judith A. 
Studer, Schwartz, Bon, Walker & Studer, LLC, representing 
appellee.

 

       Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN & HILL, JJ.

 

       
MACY, Justice.

      [¶1]  Appellant Koleen Ingalls appeals from 
the judgment entered by the trial court following a jury verdict which did not 
award her damages on her negligence claim against Appellee Triple L., 
Inc.

 

     [¶2]  We affirm.

 

                                  
ISSUES

 

     [¶3]  Ingalls presents two issues in her 
appeal:

 

                                  
ISSUE I

 

Was there an error by the jury in awarding zero 
damages in a confessed liability case with admitted medical treatment and 
stipulated incurred medical expenses?

 

                                 
ISSUE II

 

Was the verdict contrary to law where the 
overwhelming weight of the competent medical evidence on causation and damages 
favored the appellant and where there was no competent medical evidence to 
sustain a jury verdict of zero damages?

 

                                   
FACTS

 

     [¶4]  This case arises from an automobile 
accident that occurred on October 7, 1993. Ingalls was driving in Riverton with 
three of her children. While stopped at a traffic light, her vehicle was 
rear-ended by a semi-truck owned by Triple L. and driven by Lloyd Voice, an 
employee of Triple L. Ingalls told the investigating officer that she and her 
children were not injured. Several weeks later, however, she sought medical 
attention for symptoms she claimed were related to the 
accident.

     

     [¶5]  Ingalls filed a complaint against Triple 
L., claiming that she had been injured by Voice's negligence. Triple L. admitted 
liability, and the case was tried to a jury in October 1998 on the question of 
the amount of damages. The jury returned a verdict, finding that Ingalls was 
"not entitled to recover any amount as damages," and the trial court entered a 
judgment to that effect. Ingalls filed a motion for a new trial, which the 
district court denied. Ingalls appeals to this Court.

 

                            
STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

     [¶6]  Although Ingalls articulates two issues 
for our review, they are both essentially the same: Whether sufficient evidence 
existed for the jury to find that she did not suffer damages as a result of the 
accident. When an appellant challenges the basis for a jury's verdict, we apply 
the following standard of review:

 

On review, this court assumes that the evidence in 
favor of the successful party is true. We leave out of consideration entirely 
the evidence presented by the unsuccessful party that conflicts with the 
evidence of the successful party, and we afford to the evidence of the 
successful party every favorable inference that may be reasonably and fairly 
drawn from it.

 

Kadrmas v. Valley West 
Homeowner's Association, 848 P.2d 826, 828 (Wyo. 1993) (citation omitted); see 
also Francis v. Pountney, 972 P.2d 143, 145 (Wyo. 1999).

 

                                
DISCUSSION

 

     A. Stipulated 
Damages

 

     [¶7]  Ingalls contends that the jury erred in 
not awarding her damages because Triple L. admitted liability for the accident 
and did not object at trial to the admission of a list of her medical 
expenses.  She claims that the 
medical expenses were stipulated to and that, at the very least, she should have 
been awarded the amount of her medical expenses. Triple L. responds that, 
although it stipulated that Ingalls incurred the expenses, it did not stipulate 
that the expenses were related to the accident, and it further argues that the 
jury's verdict simply reflects Ingalls' failure to meet her burden of proof. We 
agree with Triple L. The stipulation did not relieve Ingalls of the burden of proving causation, 
nor did it preclude Triple L. from denying causation.

 

     [¶8]  The elements of a negligence claim are: 
"(1) a duty; (2) a violation of that duty; (3) which violation is a proximate 
cause of; (4) injury to the claimant."  
Francis, 972 P.2d  at 145.  A 
plaintiff must prove all four elements to prevail on a claim.  In an Order on Final Pretrial 
Conference, the trial court recognized that Triple L. admitted liability, which established 
the first two elements.  The order 
also noted that Ingalls' list of medical expenses was admitted without 
objection, which proved the fourth element.  However, neither the list nor the trial 
court's order established the third element:  causation. The order, in fact, specified 
that Triple L. might argue the presence of preexisting conditions as the cause 
of Ingalls' symptoms.

 

     [¶9]  Accepting, as we must, that the evidence 
in favor of Triple L. is true, we cannot say that the jury erred in refusing to 
award Ingalls her medical expenses. Although Ingalls undoubtedly incurred the 
expenses, the parties presented conflicting evidence regarding the causation of 
those expenses. In keeping with our standard of review, we must disregard much 
of Ingalls' evidence. We are left with Triple L.'s theory that Ingalls' symptoms 
were due to conditions predating the accident, and we conclude that the jury 
reasonably refused to award Ingalls her medical expenses.

 

     B. Sufficiency of the 
Evidence

 

     [¶10]  Ingalls claims that the jury's verdict 
was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.  The trial evidence, considered in the 
light most favorable to Triple L., supported the jury's verdict. The jury heard 
evidence that Ingalls had been treated before the accident for symptoms 
identical to the ones for which she sought compensation. They also heard Triple 
L.'s medical expert testify that those symptoms were caused by a preexisting degenerative disk disease and an 
undiagnosed neurological condition.  
The jury could have reasonably 
concluded from that testimony that Ingalls failed to meet her burden of proving 
causation.  The verdict was, 
therefore, supported by sufficient evidence.

 

     [¶11]  Affirmed.