Title: STATE v GARRIDO

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

N o . 80-219 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1980 T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, JOHNNY GARZA GARRIDO, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of Cascade. Honorable John McCarvel, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Lawrence A. Anderson, Public Defender, argued, Great F a l l s , Montana For Respondent : Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Mark J. Murphy argued, A s s i s t a n t Attorney General, Helena, Montana Randall Snyder argued, Deputy County Attorney, Great F a l l s , Montana -- Submitted: November 18, 1980 Decided: JAN 14 'I981 F i l e d : 1 4.1981' M r . ~ u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. O n September 20, 1979, defendant-appellant Johnny Garza Garrido was charged i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t of t h e S t a t e of Montana with two counts of felony t h e f t under s e c t i o n 45-5-301(1) ( a ) , MCA. The county a t t o r n e y and t h e defendant entered i n t o a p l e a agreement. Defendant was subsequently sentenced t o f i v e years i n t h e Montana S t a t e Prison and designated a nondangerous offender. Defendant appeals. Defendant w a s charged with two counts of felony t h e f t under s e c t i o n 45-5-301 (1) ( a ) , MCA. Thereafter, defendant entered a p l e a of " n o t g u i l t y " t o each count. After various p r e t r i a l motions, t h e county a t t o r n e y and defendant entered i n t o a p l e a agreement on January 4 , 1980. The t e r m s of t h e agreement were: (1) defendant would plead " g u i l t y " t o Count I, felony t h e f t ; (2) t h e S t a t e would dismiss Count I1 of i t s information, a l s o felony t h e f t ; ( 3 ) defendant would recom- mend t o t h e c o u r t t h a t he r e c e i v e a deferred imposition of sentence; ( 4 ) t h e county a t t o r n e y would make no recommenda- t i o n a s t o sentencing; and (5) t h e county a t t o r n e y would i n d i c a t e t o the c o u r t a t t h e t i m e of sentencing t h a t defen- d a n t had cooperated with t h e p o l i c e and o t h e r a u t h o r i t i e s i n t h i s cause and i n o t h e r causes pending before t h e D i s t r i c t Court . Pursuant t o t h e t e r m s of the agreement on January 4, 1980, defendant pleaded " g u i l t y " t o Count I. The ~ i s t r i c t Court accepted defendant' s plea and t h e S t a t e dismissed Count 1 1 of t h e information. The c o u r t set sentencing f o r February 5, 1980. Defendant then submitted himself t o t h e probation and p a r o l e department f o r a presentence interview and i n v e s t i g a t i o n . P r i o r t o sentencing a presentence r e p o r t was submitted t o the court. Defense counsel received a copy of t h e pre- sentence r e p o r t which s t a t e d , " a l l law enforcement agency records attached." The presentence r e p o r t concluded by recommending t h a t defendant receive a three-year deferred imposition of sentence. A t the sentencing on February 5, 1980, pursuant t o t h e t e r m s of t h e plea agreement, the S t a t e advised t h e c o u r t t h a t defendant had f u l l y cooperated with p o l i c e and law enforcement a u t h o r i t i e s and t h a t h i s cooperation had re- s u l t e d i n a conviction i n another case. Defense counsel a l s o advised the c o u r t t h a t defendant b a s i c a l l y accepted t h e recommendations of t h e presentence r e p o r t . The c o u r t then imposed sentence s t a t i n g : " I t is t h e judgment of t h i s c o u r t you be sentenced t o t h e Montana S t a t e Prison f o r a period of f i v e years. For t h e purpose of e l i g i b i l i t y of parole, you a r e found t o be a nondangerous offender. Anything f u r t h e r ? " "NO, s i r . " The following day, February 6, 1980, the Great F a l l s Tribune p r i n t e d a s t o r y s t a t i n g the c o u r t ' s reasons f o r imposing the sentence. The c o u r t s t a t e d t h a t defendant was i n the business of racket-style household t h e f t s . Defen- dant, through h i s counsel, then moved t h e c o u r t i n a com- bined motion t o reconsider the sentence and/or t o withdraw h i s "guilty" plea. The motion w a s based on grounds t h a t the a r t i c l e i n the Tribune a r t i c u l a t e d t h e c o u r t ' s reasoning f o r imposing the sentence, whereas no such reasons w e r e arti- culated i n open c o u r t before defendant and h i s counsel. The reasons given f o r imposition of the sentence indicated t h a t t h e c o u r t obtained information i n regard t o t h i s case from sources o t h e r than t h e f a c t s and matters contained i n t h e c o u r t f i l e and t h e record generated i n open court. A hearing on t h e motion t o reconsider was held on February 11, 1980. The author of t h e presentence r e p o r t w a s c a l l e d a s a witness. The c o u r t then authorized defense counsel t o ask t h e c o u r t questions i n regard t o t h e i n f o r - mation upon which it based i t s sentencing decision. Defense counsel, having assumed t h a t p o l i c e i n v e s t i g a t i v e r e p o r t s w e r e n o t included within t h e term " a l l l a w enforcement agency records," asked t h e c o u r t how it obtained information t h a t defendant was involved i n f i v e b u r g l a r i e s and t h r e e t h e f t s . The c o u r t then asked defense counsel whether it had a copy of t h e p o l i c e r e p o r t s . Defense counsel advised t h a t he d i d have copies of t h e p o l i c e r e p o r t s , and the c o u r t then exhibited copies of t h e p o l i c e r e p o r t s contained i n i t s f i l e . A t t h a t t i m e defense counsel learned t h a t t h e c o u r t r o u t i n e l y received copies of p o l i c e i n v e s t i g a t i v e r e p o r t s which w e r e n o t g e n e r a l l y attached t o t h e copy of t h e pre- sentence r e p o r t delivered t o t h e defense counsel, b u t de- fense counsel admits t h a t h i s copies a r e g e n e r a l l y obtained by discovery. The combined motion was t h e r e a f t e r denied. The i s s u e s presented on appeal a r e : 1. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court abused its d i s c r e t i o n by imposing sentence and judgment without f i r s t a r t i c u l a t i n g t h e b a s i s f o r its decision. 2. Whether t h e f a i l u r e t o provide defendant with a l l information supplied t o t h e c o u r t i n t h e presentence r e p o r t denied defendant t h e r i g h t of e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel. A sentencing judge i s vested with d i s c r e t i o n a r y power t o determine t h e e x t e n t of punishment which may be imposed. P e t i t i o n of Amor (1963), 143 Mont. 305, 389 P.2d 54. I n t h e i n s t a n t case, defendant was charged with and pleaded g u i l t y t o committing t h e crime of felony t h e f t and w a s sentenced t o f i v e years i n t h e S t a t e Prison. The maximum sentence which may be imposed f o r t h e crime of felony t h e f t i s t e n years. Section 45-6-301, MCA. This Court has c o n s i s t e n t l y held t h a t i f a sentence i s within t h e l i m i t s provided by s t a t u t e , it i s n o t an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . S t a t e v. Mann (1976), 169 Mont. 306, 546 P.2d 515; S t a t e v. Gussenhoven (1944), 116 Mont. 350, 152 P.2d 876. The sentence which defendant received was n o t an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . Defendant, however, challenges n o t so much t h e sentence a s t h e manner i n which it was determined. The foundation of h i s challenge i s S t a t e v. Stumpf (1980), Mont. , 609 P.2d 298, 37 St-Rep. 673, which states t h a t a t r i a l c o u r t i s required t o a r t i c u l a t e t h e b a s i s upon which i t s sentencing d i s c r e t i o n is exercised. Defendant a l l e g e s t h a t by n o t s t a t i n g i t s reasons f o r imposing t h e five-year sen- tence, the t r i a l c o u r t abused its d i s c r e t i o n . The holding of Stumpf, however, has prospective a p p l i c a t i o n only. I t was n o t decided u n t i l A p r i l 3, 1980, some t i m e a f t e r t h i s defen- d a n t w a s sentenced on February 5, 1980. Y e t , by g r a n t i n g a motion f o r reconsideration, it would appear t h a t defendant had access t o any f a c t s he may d e s i r e . I t i s w e l l s e t t l e d t h a t t h i s Court presumes t h e cor- r e c t n e s s of t h e lower c o u r t ' s order on appeal. I t i s t h e burden of t h e a p p e l l a n t t o overcome such a presumption. S t a t e v. Lane, Jr. (1977), 175 Mont. 225, 573 P.2d 198; S t a t e ex rel. Stevens v. D i s t r i c t Court (1976), 170 Mont. 22, 550 P.2d 385, 388. Defendant here has f a i l e d t o over- come t h e presumption and, thus, has f a i l e d t o meet h i s burden of proof. Defendant a l l e g e s t h a t he was denied the r i g h t t o ef- f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel because he was n o t provided with a l l information which was supplied t o the c o u r t i n the presentence r e p o r t . However, the t r a n s c r i p t record r e v e a l s t h a t he was i n possession of a l l the p o l i c e r e p o r t s . This discrepancy i l l u s t r a t e s t h a t any claimed i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s was n o t due t o the c o u r t ' s withholding of information. Rather, defense counsel f a i l e d t o i n s p e c t the r e p o r t s and, thus, proceeded on an i n c o r r e c t assumption of what was contained t h e r e i n . There i s no evidence t h a t defendant was prejudiced by h i s c o u n s e l ' s f a i l u r e t o i n s p e c t the presentence r e p o r t s . Defendant has never a l l e g e d o r attempted t o prove t h a t he d i d n o t engage i n a "business" o r a s e r i e s of steal-to-order t h e f t s o r t h a t he d i d n o t commit f i v e the£ ts and t h r e e b u r g l a r i e s . These were the reasons sentence was imposed, and i n the absence of any prejudice caused thereby, r e l i e f cannot be granted. Affirmed. - J u s t i c e W e concur: M r . Chief J u s t i c e Frank I . Haswell, c o n c u r r i n g i n p a r t and d i s s e n t i n g i n p a r t : While I concur with t h e r e s u l t reached by t h e m a j o r i t y w i t h r e g a r d to t h e r i g h t to c o u n s e l i s s u e , I must r e s p e c t f u l l y d i s s e n t from t h e m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n concerning t h e i s s u e of abuse o f d i s c r e t i o n . The m a j o r i t y d e c l i n e to a p p l y t h e requirement of S t a t e v. S tumpf ( 1980 ) , Mont . , 609 P.2d 298, 37 St.Rep. 673, t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t must a r t i c u l a t e t h e r e a s o n s u n d e r l y i n g its sen- t e n c e d e t e r m i n a t i o n . The h o l d i n g of Stumpf e x p r e s s l y states t h a t it is t o have p r o s p e c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n o n l y , and f o r t h i s r e a s o n t h e m a j o r i t y f i n d t h e case i n a p p l i c a b l e . Y e t t h e r e q u i r e m e n t set f o r t h i n Stumpf was a p p l i e d to t h e d e f e n d a n t t h e r e i n , r e s u l t i n g i n t h e s e t t i n g a s i d e of a s e n t e n c e imposed by a d i s t r i c t judge who was unaware of t h e r e q u i r e m e n t . I f t h i s d e f e n d a n t ' s appeal had been p r e s e n t e d to u s p r i o r to t h e Stumpf c a s e , w e would have a p p l i e d t h e same a n a l y s i s and reached t h e same r e s u l t . The r e a s o n s f o r r e q u i r i n g d i s t r i c t judges t o a r t i c u l a t e t h e b a s i s f o r t h e i r s e n t e n c i n g d e c i s i o n s s t i l l e x i s t , r e g a r d l e s s of what Stumpf states w i t h regard to p r o s p e c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n . The i s s u e s a r e i d e n t i c a l . The a n a l y s i s s h o u l d be i d e n t i c a l and t h e r e s u l t should be i d e n t i c a l . Chief J u s t i c e M r . J u s t i c e D a n i e l J. Shea d i s s e n t s and w i l l f i l e a d i s s e n t i n g o p i n i o n later. T h i s c a u s e w a s s u b m i t t e d p r i o r t o J a n u a r y 5, 1981.