Title: Commonwealth v. Rivera

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11700 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  LUIS FERNANDO RIVERA, JR. 
 
 
October 29, 2015. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Postconviction relief, Disqualification of 
judge. 
 
 
 
The defendant, Luis Fernando Rivera, Jr., was convicted on 
two indictments charging murder in the first degree and one 
indictment charging unlawful carrying of a firearm.  See 
Commonwealth v. Rivera, 424 Mass. 266 (1997), cert. denied, 525 
U.S. 934 (1998).  After we affirmed the convictions, a Superior 
Court judge denied the defendant's motion for a new trial, and a 
single justice of this court, on December 14, 2004, denied his 
application for leave to appeal, pursuant to G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E.  In May, 2014, the defendant filed a motion in the county 
court asking the same single justice to reconsider his 2004 
ruling and, on reconsideration, to recuse himself and to assign 
the matter to a different justice.  The single justice allowed 
the motion to reconsider, denied the request for recusal, and, 
on reconsideration, again denied the application for leave to 
appeal.  The defendant appealed. 
 
 
In an unpublished order, we allowed this appeal to proceed 
as to the recusal issue only.  We stated that it would be 
incumbent on the defendant to demonstrate that his request for 
recusal was timely, and that the single justice abused his 
discretion in denying the request.1 
                                                          
 
1 The order also stated:  "If Rivera prevails on appeal with 
respect to the recusal issue, then the single justice's order on 
the underlying application will need to be vacated and the 
matter assigned to a different single justice.  If Rivera's 
recusal argument fails on appeal, however, then his request for 
2 
 
 
 
Appealability of recusal ruling.  A single justice's denial 
of an application for leave to appeal pursuant to the gatekeeper 
provision of G. L. c. 278, § 33E, is "final and unreviewable."  
See Commonwealth v. Companonio, 472 Mass. 1004, 1005 (2015), and 
cases cited ("It cannot be appealed to the full court; it is not 
subject to review under G. L. c. 211, § 3; and it cannot be 
collaterally attacked").  In very limited circumstances, 
however, involving certain types of motions that are ancillary 
to the gatekeeper application and "intended to enhance the 
likelihood that a single justice . . . , acting as gatekeeper, 
would allow [the defendant] to appeal from the denial . . . of 
his . . . motion for a new trial," we have allowed the single 
justice's rulings to be reviewed on appeal.  Fuller v. 
Commonwealth, 419 Mass. 1002, 1003 (1994).  See Parker v. 
Commonwealth, 448 Mass. 1021, 1023 n.3 (2007).  The defendant's 
request that the single justice recuse himself is such a motion.  
If it were otherwise, a defendant whose application was denied 
by a single justice who ought to have been disqualified from 
ruling on the application would have no recourse.  As in all 
matters, a defendant who applies for leave to appeal is entitled 
to a ruling from a fair and impartial judge.  See S.J.C. Rule 
1:22 (c), 458 Mass. 1301 (2010) ("Recusal rulings in single 
justice cases are, and will continue to be, reviewable in the 
regular course on appeal from any adverse final judgment in the 
single justice case"). 
 
 
Background.  The basis for the defendant's disqualification 
claim is that, in 1993, the single justice, who was a Superior 
Court judge at that time, allowed a codefendant's motion to 
dismiss the indictments against him.  The codefendant, Jose 
Pacheco, had testified as an eyewitness for the Commonwealth 
against the defendant at the defendant's trial.  See Rivera, 424 
Mass. at 267 n.2 (describing Pacheco's testimony that "he was an 
unwilling participant who drove the vehicle on pain of threat to 
his and his family's safety").  Subsequently, at a brief 
nonevidentiary hearing on Pacheco's motion to dismiss, the 
Commonwealth conceded that he had acted under duress when he 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
review by the full court of the single justice's order denying 
his application will need to be dismissed, under 'the well-
settled principle that the decision of a single justice, acting 
as a gatekeeper pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, is final and 
unreviewable.  See Dickerson v. Attorney Gen., 396 Mass. 740, 
742 (1986); Leaster v. Commonwealth, 385 Mass. 547, 548 (1982).'  
Commonwealth v. Gunter, 456 Mass. 1017, 1017 (2010)." 
 
3 
 
participated in the murders, which was consistent with its 
position at the defendant's trial.  Concluding that duress was a 
defense to murder -- under the law as it was at that time2 -- the 
single justice dismissed the indictments against Pacheco on the 
ground that the Commonwealth would be unable to disprove duress 
at trial.3 
 
 
Years later, in 2003, the defendant moved for a new trial 
in the Superior Court, claiming that Pacheco had recanted his 
testimony and now denied being an eyewitness to the murders.  
The defendant also alleged errors in the instructions on 
reasonable doubt and ineffective assistance of counsel.  The 
judge who presided over the defendant's trial (not the single 
justice) denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing, 
stating that he had a "fairly clear memory" of the testimony and 
that he did not believe Pacheco's alleged recantation.  The 
defendant then applied in the county court for leave to appeal 
from that ruling, pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The single 
justice denied the defendant's gatekeeper application in 2004.  
In 2014, the defendant moved for reconsideration of the single 
justice's ruling, raising for the first time his claim that the 
single justice ought to have recused himself because of his 
ruling, as a Superior Court judge, allowing Pacheco's motion to 
dismiss in 1993. 
 
 
Discussion.  A judge's decision not to recuse himself is 
reviewable for abuse of discretion.  See Haddad v. Gonzalez, 410 
Mass. 855, 862 (1991).  When presented with "a question of his 
capacity to rule fairly, the judge [must] consult first his own 
emotions and conscience."  Lena v. Commonwealth, 369 Mass. 571, 
575 (1976).  Implicit in the single justice's ruling in this 
case is that he was satisfied that he could act "fairly and 
impartially."  Haddad, supra at 862.  See King v. Grace, 293 
Mass. 244, 247 (1936).  In addition, a judge must "attempt an 
objective appraisal of whether this was a proceeding in which 
'his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.'"  Haddad, 
                                                          
 
2 The law has since changed.  See Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 
462 Mass. 827, 835 (2012) (reviewing cases and rejecting duress 
as defense to murder). 
 
3 The issue before the single justice at that time was not 
Jose Pacheco's credibility, but rather legal principles of 
judicial estoppel and duress as a defense to murder.  See Choy 
v. Commonwealth, 456 Mass. 146, 154 n.12, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 
986 (2010). 
 
4 
 
supra, quoting S.J.C. Rule 3:09, Canon 3 (C) (1) (a), 386 Mass. 
811 (1981).  In this case, the defendant contends that because 
the single justice, as a Superior Court judge in 1993, had 
dismissed indictments against Pacheco, the single justice's 
impartiality in ruling on the defendant's gatekeeper application 
in 2004 could be questioned.  We disagree. 
 
 
The single justice, in the case against Pacheco in the 
Superior Court, made neither credibility determinations nor 
factual findings.  His order was based on a legal ruling that 
the Commonwealth was estopped from denying Pacheco's claim that 
he acted under duress -- because it consistently had supported 
that testimony during the prosecution of the defendant (and 
other codefendants) -- and his ruling that duress was a defense 
to murder.  As the single justice in the defendant's case in 
2004, he was not called on to review his 1993 order or the legal 
principles on which it was based.4  Information acquired by a 
judge in his or her judicial role in earlier proceedings, as 
opposed to from some extrajudicial source, "weighs heavily in 
favor of the judge's decision not to disqualify himself."  
Haddad, 410 Mass. at 863, quoting Commonwealth v. Dane 
Entertainment Servs., 18 Mass. App. Ct. 446, 450 (1984).  See 
                                                          
 
4 The defendant relies in part on Rice v. McKenzie, 581 F.2d 
1114 (4th Cir. 1978), in which the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a Federal District 
Court judge was disqualified from ruling on a habeas corpus case 
brought by the defendant in the Federal court, because, as a 
member of the State supreme court, the judge had participated in 
the adjudication of the same claims brought by the defendant in 
State court.  That situation is distinguishable from what we 
have here.  In this case the single justice was not being asked 
to rule on the correctness of anything he had done as a Superior 
Court judge in the codefendant's case (or even on the 
correctness of the trial judge's order denying the defendant's 
motion for a new trial), and nothing about the defendant's 
gatekeeper application depended on any findings or rulings he 
had made in that case.  The court in the Rice case itself 
recognized the difference between these two types of situations.  
See id. at 1118 (holding that judge's disqualification was 
required under principle that "a judge may not sit on appeal in 
review of his decisions as a trial judge," while simultaneously 
acknowledging that "neither an appellate nor a trial judge is 
disqualified from sitting in a case because of an earlier 
decision, in which he participated, of a similar case involving 
other parties"). 
 
5 
 
Lena, 369 Mass. at 574.  Presiding over a proceeding involving a 
codefendant is not necessarily a ground for disqualification.  
See Commonwealth v. Adkinson, 442 Mass. 410, 415 (2004) (recusal 
not required where judge previously heard and denied 
codefendant's suppression motion on basis that both defendant's 
and codefendant's testimony not credible); Commonwealth v. 
Campbell, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 571, 587 (1977).  Additionally, the 
"passage of time certainly can be a factor leading to a 
conclusion that any concerns about a judge's impartiality would 
be unreasonable."  Commonwealth v. Morgan RV Resorts, LLC, 84 
Mass. App. Ct. 1, 12 (2013). 
 
 
All of these considerations combine in this case to 
persuade us that there is no reasonable basis to question the 
single justice's impartiality.  The single justice presided over 
a nonevidentiary hearing involving a codefendant years before 
the defendant's gatekeeper application was filed, and he made a 
strictly legal determination that the Commonwealth would not be 
able to sustain its burden at trial against the codefendant. 
 
 
Furthermore, the defendant failed to raise this recusal 
issue with the single justice for years after he admittedly 
became aware of the single justice's involvement in Pacheco's 
case.5  Although he appears to have raised the issue 
(unsuccessfully) in the Federal court during that time, in a 
habeas corpus action, he did not bring it to the single 
justice's attention.  In these circumstances, the single justice 
properly could have denied the motion because it was untimely.  
See Commonwealth v. Gunter, 456 Mass. 1017, 1018 (2010), S.C., 
459 Mass. 480, cert. denied, 132 S. Ct 218 (2011) (defendant may 
"file a timely motion for reconsideration" of denial of 
gatekeeper petition with single justice); Demoulas v. Demoulas, 
432 Mass. 43, 50 (2000) (posttrial recusal motions presumptively 
untimely).  As we have said, "parties seeking disqualification 
of a judge . . . have an obligation to move at the earliest 
possible opportunity after learning of the grounds for the 
judge's recusal."  Demoulas, supra at 52. 
 
 
Conclusion.  The single justice's order declining to recuse 
himself is affirmed, and, consequently, the defendant's appeal 
                                                          
 
5 The defendant's claim that he first learned of the single 
justice's involvement in Pacheco's case "long after" the 
gatekeeper application had been denied is belied by the record.  
In 2005, the defendant filed an affidavit in Federal court 
describing the single's justice's involvement. 
6 
 
from the single justice's order denying the application pursuant 
to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, must be dismissed.  See note 1, supra. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
Chauncey B. Wood for the defendant. 
 
Jane Davidson Montori, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth.