Title: Commonwealth v. Chalue

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12457 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DAVID T. CHALUE. 
 
 
 
Berkshire.     November 6, 2020. - February 23, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Instructions to 
jury, Deliberation of jury, Argument by prosecutor, Opening 
statement, Motion to suppress.  Evidence, Prior misconduct, 
Inflammatory evidence, Relevancy and materiality, 
Photograph, Hearsay, Joint venturer.  Search and Seizure, 
Threshold police inquiry, Reasonable suspicion.  
Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Reasonable 
suspicion.  Threshold Police Inquiry.  Cellular Telephone. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on October 6, 2011. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by C. 
Jeffrey Kinder, J., and the cases were tried before him. 
 
 
Andrew S. Crouch for the defendant. 
David F. Capeless, Special Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  As Tropical Storm Irene raged through western 
Massachusetts during the late night and early morning hours of 
August 27 and 28, 2011, David Glasser, Edward Frampton, and 
2 
 
Robert Chadwell were murdered.  Their dismembered bodies, each 
with multiple gunshot and stab wounds, were found buried in 
plastic bags.  Glasser was scheduled to testify against Adam Lee 
Hall, a sergeant at arms in a local chapter of the Hells Angels 
motorcycle club, regarding a previous altercation between Hall 
and Glasser.  The Commonwealth's theory of the case was that 
Hall and two of his acquaintances, Caius Veiovis and David 
Chalue (the defendant), killed Glasser to prevent him from 
testifying against Hall in two pending criminal cases.  
Frampton, Glasser's roommate, and Chadwell, who was visiting 
Glasser and Frampton's apartment at the time, were killed 
because they were witnesses to Glasser's kidnapping. 
 
Hall, Veiovis, and the defendant were tried separately, and 
respective juries convicted each man of three counts of murder 
in the first degree.1  We previously affirmed both Hall's and 
Veiovis's convictions of murder in the first degree.  See 
                     
 
1 The defendant and Veiovis were also each convicted of 
three counts of kidnapping and three counts of witness 
intimidation.  See Commonwealth v. Veiovis, 477 Mass. 472, 473 
n.1 (2017).  In addition, Hall was convicted of armed robbery, 
assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, four counts 
of witness intimidation, four counts of kidnapping, possession 
of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and conspiracy.  
See Commonwealth v. Hall, 485 Mass. 145, 146 n.1 (2020). 
 
3 
 
Commonwealth v. Hall, 485 Mass. 145, 171 (2020); Commonwealth v. 
Veiovis, 477 Mass. 472, 490 (2017).2 
 
On appeal, the defendant claims reversible error by the 
trial judge for (1) giving a charge in accordance with 
Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 364 Mass. 87, 101-102 (1973) 
(Appendix A), and Commonwealth v. Tuey, 8 Cush. 1, 2-3 (1851) 
(Tuey-Rodriquez instruction), to an individual juror after the 
jury had been polled; (2) admitting various categories of unduly 
prejudicial character evidence; (3) admitting Hall's statements 
under the coventurer exemption to the rule against hearsay; and 
(4) denying the defendant's pretrial motion to suppress.  He 
also contends that he is entitled to a new trial because the 
prosecutor made numerous improper statements in his opening and 
closing remarks.  We affirm the convictions and conclude that 
the defendant is not entitled to relief under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E. 
 
1.  Background.  "We recite the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, reserving certain details for 
later discussion."  Commonwealth v. Tavares, 484 Mass. 650, 651 
(2020).  Because the defendant does not dispute that there was 
sufficient evidence of Hall's and Veiovis's culpability in the 
                     
 
2 We also affirmed Hall's and Veiovis's convictions of the 
lesser counts, with the exception of one of the counts of 
kidnapping against Hall pertaining to a 2010 incident, which we 
vacated.  See Hall, 485 Mass. at 147; Veiovis, 477 Mass. at 474. 
4 
 
killings, we focus primarily on the evidence implicating the 
defendant in the joint venture. 
 
The circumstances leading up to the killings began in July 
2009, when Hall beat Glasser with a baseball bat because he 
believed that Glasser had stolen and sold motor vehicle parts 
that belonged to Hall.  Hall was later arrested for the assault.  
In July 2010, while the charge against Hall of assault and 
battery by means of a dangerous weapon was pending, Hall 
concocted a scheme to discredit Glasser by framing him on a 
false kidnapping charge.  The scheme backfired, and resulted in 
further charges being filed against Hall.3 
 
The defendant entered the scene in the summer of 2011, when 
he started spending time with Hall.  At the time, Hall's trial 
for his charged conduct against Glasser was pending. 
 
The timeline of events in the days before and after the 
killings is important in evaluating the evidence implicating the 
defendant's participation in the killings.  On the evening of 
Friday, August 26, Hall, Veiovis, the defendant, and Katelyn 
                     
 
3 For a more thorough description of the 2009 and 2010 
incidents, see Hall, 485 Mass. at 147-148, and Veiovis, 477 
Mass. at 474.  Because the Commonwealth presented substantively 
the same evidence with respect to these prior incidents at each 
of the three trials, and this defendant was not involved in 
either incident, we need not detail them here. 
 
5 
 
Carmin (a friend of Hall) drove around in Hall's tan Buick4 
visiting several bars and eventually the Hells Angels clubhouse 
in Lee.  Hall ranted about Glasser, saying he was going to "kill 
that motherfucker" for ruining his life.  In response, Veiovis 
said things that "fuel[ed] up the fire," but the defendant only 
added, "You'll be all right, everything is going to be fine."  
At the clubhouse, the group rode all-terrain vehicles.  When 
Carmin was driving one of the vehicles with either Veiovis or 
the defendant on the back, Hall told her to be careful because 
he needed Veiovis and the defendant "for a job." 
 
The next night, Hall, Veiovis, and the defendant again 
spent time at the Hells Angels clubhouse, where they met up with 
two women, Allyson Scace and Kayla Sewell.  Afterwards, the 
group decided to go to Veiovis's apartment in Pittsfield.  The 
defendant, Veiovis, and the two women traveled together in 
Sewell's car.  Hall drove separately, stopping at his friend 
Steven Hinman's house in Lenox, where he showed Hinman a .45 
caliber semiautomatic pistol that he had tucked in his vest, as 
well as a bag that contained a .44 caliber Magnum revolver, a 
.22 caliber Derringer, and an M-16-type weapon.  When Hall 
arrived at Veiovis's apartment, he pulled the firearms out of a 
dog food bag and asked Veiovis where he could find gloves and 
                     
 
4 At other times during the trial, witnesses described the 
same Buick as gold. 
6 
 
cleaning fluid.  Veiovis directed him to the kitchen, and then 
went upstairs with Sewell.  The defendant was sitting on the 
couch during this exchange.  While Veiovis and Sewell were 
upstairs, Hall and the defendant disassembled and cleaned the 
firearms. 
 
Late that night or early Sunday morning, the three victims 
were kidnapped from Glasser's Pittsfield apartment.  The three 
men were last seen sometime after 10 P.M., when Glasser's 
upstairs neighbor came down and asked Glasser to move his truck.  
The last call made from Chadwell's cell phone was at 11:21 P.M.  
Sometime before 2 A.M. on Sunday, the upstairs neighbor heard 
banging on the front door of Glasser's apartment. 
 
On Sunday at around 1:30 A.M., Hall arrived at the 
residence of his friends, the Sutton family, in Pittsfield.  He 
went upstairs and spoke briefly to Rose Dawson and her friend 
Alexandra Ely.  Ely was Hall's girlfriend and was staying 
overnight with Dawson at the Sutton residence.  Hall asked 
Dawson if he could borrow her cell phone.  She gave it to him, 
and he said he would be back soon.  Hall got into the 
passenger's side of a Jeep and left.  It was unclear whether 
there were other people in the Jeep. 
 
Hall was next seen at a convenience store in Pittsfield at 
around 5:30 A.M. on Sunday, looking wet and dirty.  He purchased 
three candy bars and a pack of Marlboro cigarettes using cash 
7 
 
that was crumpled and wet.  He left the store, but returned a 
couple minutes later and bought Black and Mild cigars.  Hall got 
into the driver's side of his Buick and drove away; the store 
operator could not see if anyone else was in the car with him.  
Hall did not smoke.  Veiovis, however, smoked Black and Mild 
cigars, and the defendant smoked Marlboro cigarettes. 
 
Shortly thereafter, Hall returned to the Sutton residence 
in the Buick, parked it on the front lawn, and then got picked 
up by Veiovis driving his Jeep.  Nobody else was in the Jeep 
with Veiovis. 
 
Sometime after 9 A.M. on Sunday, Hall, Veiovis, and the 
defendant arrived at the Sutton residence in Veiovis's Jeep.  
Hall gave Dawson and Ely the keys to his Buick and a handful of 
"wet and yucky" cash, and asked them to go to a grocery store in 
Peru to purchase bleach and food for breakfast.  He told them to 
wash their hands after touching the money, and also told them 
not to look in a bag on the floor on the passenger's side of the 
car.  Despite Hall's prohibition, Dawson looked in the bag and 
saw a glove that looked like a batting glove.  While Ely and 
Dawson were at the store, Hall called them and told them not to 
buy the bleach after all. 
 
Ely and Dawson then met the three men at Hall's house in 
Peru to eat breakfast.  The three men looked tired and wet, and 
the defendant was in bed.  Hall returned Dawson's cell phone to 
8 
 
her and told her to delete the call log and not tell anyone he 
had borrowed it.  Dawson replied, "I'm not stupid." 
 
At around 2 P.M. on that same Sunday, Hall went to the home 
of his friend David Casey in Canaan, New York.  Hall told Casey 
he was having trouble with a car in Becket and needed somewhere 
to park it.  Casey called his friend Alan Pavoni.  Pavoni agreed 
to let Hall park in his driveway in Becket. 
 
Hall then told Casey that he had killed Glasser, as well as 
a "fat guy" and a black man who were with Glasser.  He said that 
when he tried to shoot Glasser, the gun misfired, and as he 
tried to rechamber another round, Glasser ran into the woods.  
Someone went after Glasser and shot but did not kill him, 
instead bringing Glasser back to Hall so that Hall could kill 
him.  Casey thought that Hall named the person who went after 
Glasser as "Davey," but he was not sure.5  Hall went on to 
describe the murders, saying that Glasser was "begging for his 
life" and saying "please don't kill me" and "I won't testify."  
In response, Hall told Glasser, "I told you what would happen if 
                     
 
5 The defendant often went by "Davey."  In Casey's initial 
statement to police, as well as in his testimony to the grand 
jury, he did not say that Hall had mentioned any names.  In a 
letter Casey wrote to the district attorney's office reporting 
what happened, Casey wrote, "I did not get his name."  In 
January 2014 -- three months prior to the defendant's trial -- 
Casey testified under oath that Hall did not name any of his 
coventurers.  At the defendant's trial, Casey testified, "I 
thought [Hall] said:  Davey was on him real quick," and added, 
"[B]ut I'm not sure about that." 
9 
 
you witnessed against me."  Hall told Casey that they had 
tortured and cut up the other victims.  Hall said that it had 
been raining through all this and that he "really enjoyed it 
because he liked doing things in the rain." 
 
Hall asked Casey to bury the men on his property.  Casey 
refused.  Hall then asked if Casey was still doing work with his 
excavator on Daniel Cole's property in Becket.  Hall asked Casey 
to dig a hole there with the excavator.  Casey agreed, and they 
arranged to go there the next morning, meeting beforehand at 
Pavoni's nearby home.  Hall also told Casey that if he agreed, 
no harm would come to Casey's sister or her boyfriend.  Casey 
was "numb, nervous, [and] scared," and agreed because he was 
afraid of repercussions. 
 
Sometime later on Sunday afternoon or evening, Hall, 
Veiovis, and the defendant returned to the Sutton residence in 
the Jeep, and exchanged it for the Buick.  At around 5 or 6 
P.M., Hall dropped off the Buick at the Pavoni house in Becket.  
One or two other people arrived in the Buick with Hall, but the 
defendant was not among them.  Nor was the defendant among the 
"about three people" who arrived in a Jeep a few minutes later 
to pick up Hall. 
 
On Monday morning, Casey met Hall at the Pavoni house at 
around 10 A.M.  The defendant was there, and Hall introduced the 
defendant to Casey as "Davey" and said that the defendant was in 
10 
 
the Aryan Brotherhood.6  Hall then had the defendant step out of 
earshot, and spoke to Casey about burying the bodies.  Hall 
opened the trunk of the Buick and said, "They're starting to 
smell."  Hall and Casey drove in Casey's truck to the Cole 
property, which was about three miles away.  They ascertained 
that Cole was not home and then returned to Pavoni's house to 
retrieve the Buick.  The defendant was still at Pavoni's house 
when they returned.  Hall then drove the Buick to the Cole 
property, following Casey in his truck.  Using the excavator at 
the Cole property, Hall and Casey dug a hole and buried the 
bodies.  After they finished, Hall said to Casey, "[R]emember, 
keep your mouth shut.  Even in jail, I can make things happen." 
 
While Hall and Casey were burying the bodies, the defendant 
made four unanswered calls7 to Hall's cell phone between 11:58 
A.M. and 12:34 P.M., and sent text messages saying, "Hey, what's 
going on?" and "Dude, I'm ready to leave.  I don't know what to 
tell you."  Hall's cell phone was turned off. 
                     
 
6 Casey did not mention the defendant's presence in his 
initial statements to police.  He explained that he did not do 
so given that he did not think the defendant had anything to do 
with the murders because Hall did not mention him when Hall 
described committing the crimes. 
 
 
7 The cell phone records indicated that the calls were of 
"extremely short durations" but did not show whether the calls 
went through.  We infer that given the number of calls, the 
calls' short duration, the fact that Hall's cell phone was off, 
and the content of the text messages, it was likely the calls 
were unanswered. 
11 
 
 
Later on Monday afternoon, Hall and Dawson used a hose to 
wash out the inside and outside of Hall's blue Hyundai8 at the 
Sutton house.  The defendant was present, but he did not assist 
Hall.  Ely and Dawson both testified that Hall mentioned that a 
guy and two of his friends were missing.  Dawson testified that 
later Hall pulled her aside and said, "one of them was fixing 
the computer, one was laying on the couch, and one was sitting 
in front of the couch playing video games." 
 
At around 4:30 P.M. on Monday, Hall and another man9 brought 
the Buick to a salvage yard and sold it for scrap.  Much of the 
back seat was entirely ripped out, and the floors of the car 
were soaked.  The other man drove a purple Pontiac, and after 
leaving the Buick at the salvage yard, Hall left with the man in 
the purple car.  At 8:43 P.M. that evening, Hall and the 
defendant went to a department store, where Hall bought boots 
and socks, telling an employee that his old ones were wet. 
 
On Monday night, Hall, Ely, Dawson, and the defendant went 
to the Hells Angels clubhouse in the blue Hyundai.  Hall and the 
defendant got drunk, and were joking, laughing, and having fun.  
The defendant pointed and laughed as Hall acted out a scene 
                     
 
8 The color of Hall's Hyundai was variously referred to as 
blue and purple throughout the trial. 
 
 
9 The salvage yard proprietor declined to identify this man 
as the defendant at trial. 
12 
 
where he said, "Help me, help me," while being chased.  The 
defendant did not act anything out and "didn't really say 
anything."  Hall referenced someone whose new nickname was 
"Butch" or "Butcher," and described him as "a crazy mother 
fucker" and "a real pro." 
 
Hall and the defendant spent Tuesday night at the Hells 
Angels clubhouse with Ocean Sutton.10  On Wednesday morning, 
while still at the clubhouse, Hall burned some of his clothing.  
The defendant was at the clubhouse, but he did not burn his own 
clothing and had "no part" in the burning of Hall's clothes.  
Hall, Ocean, and the defendant then drove in Hall's Hyundai to 
get something to eat.  On the way back, they stopped the car on 
a bridge.  Hall threw an empty shoebox, empty bags, and socks 
into the river.  Some of the items did not make it off the 
bridge, so at Hall's direction, the defendant picked those items 
up and threw them in the river. 
 
On Sunday, August 28, and Monday, August 29, there had been 
no response to Glasser's door or telephone, but his truck 
remained in the driveway.  On Monday, Glasser did not appear to 
bring a friend to work as planned, and Frampton missed a 
                     
 
10 Because various members of the Sutton family testified at 
trial, Ocean and Edward Sutton are referred to by their first 
names. 
13 
 
doctor's appointment.  A missing person's report was filed on 
Glasser and Frampton on Wednesday, August 31.11 
 
On Sunday, September 4, Hall, Veiovis, and the defendant 
were questioned by State police at a gasoline station in 
Pittsfield.  Police seized Veiovis's Jeep, Hall's socks and 
boots, and each man's cell phone.  Later that day, Hall was 
arrested on other charges. 
 
On Monday, September 5, State police Lieutenant David Foley 
told the defendant he was going to be arrested.  The defendant 
remained in the area, staying at Ocean's apartment with her. 
 
On Friday, September 9, after Casey revealed to police the 
location of the bodies, police began to search the property with 
Cole's consent.  When police eventually excavated the property, 
they recovered a severed arm and black plastic bags containing 
the dismembered remains of Glasser, Frampton, and Chadwell.  The 
autopsy of the body parts revealed that all of the victims had 
been shot and stabbed; their neck, arms, and legs had been 
removed, and two of the bodies had been cut through the torso.  
Most of the dismemberment had been accomplished by chopping or 
hacking with a sharp instrument, such as a butcher knife or meat 
cleaver.  Veiovis and the defendant were arrested on Saturday, 
September 10.  At some point after his arrest, the defendant 
                     
 
11 A missing person's report had previously been filed for 
Chadwell on Monday, August 29. 
14 
 
called his girlfriend from jail and told her that the police had 
no clothes that they could tie to the victims in the case. 
 
On September 12, police executed search warrants at two 
apartments in the same building in Pittsfield; one was Veiovis's 
current apartment, and the other he had recently vacated.  In 
one of them, police found various weapons and anatomical 
illustrations, which we detail and discuss infra. 
 
While in segregation at the Berkshire County house of 
correction in September 2011, the defendant met a fellow inmate, 
Christopher Letalien.  Letalien testified that the defendant 
told him, "I got a body.  Not only do I got one body, I got 
three bodies. . . .  Not only do I got three bodies, but I made 
them disappear. . . .  Not only did I make them disappear, but 
fourteen days later, they found them cut up into pieces at the 
bottom of a ditch."  In several telephone calls from jail, 
Letalien asked family and friends to lie to help him with his 
pending case.  In one, he said that his "ace" was his testimony 
against the defendant. 
 
Subsequently, in October 2011, the defendant met another 
inmate, Jason Lemieux, in the Berkshire County house of 
correction.  The defendant spoke to Lemieux about his case, 
which surprised Lemieux.  Lemieux interpreted the defendant's 
willingness to discuss his case as both to brag as well as to 
intimidate other inmates.  The defendant described to Lemieux 
15 
 
that the victims were "tortured beyond torture" and "cut up and 
made to disappear."  Leimeux also testified that the defendant 
referenced his involvement in the Aryan Brotherhood. 
 
Two years later, in 2013, the defendant was held pretrial 
at Souza-Baranowski Correctional Center (SBCC), where he met 
Jethro Kempton, a fellow inmate and member of the Aryan 
Brotherhood.  Kempton testified that before they met in person, 
the defendant wrote him a letter, which stated in part: 
"Jethro, what's up, brother?  I send my salutation your 
way.  My name is David Chalue.  I was with Kurt.  I've 
heard a great deal about you, all good things, and I'm 
hoping to meet you when you get out.  I'm a 52(a), fighting 
a triple out of Pittsfield.  Things look good on that case.  
I'm to beat it and get back out there.  About another year 
to [eighteen] months before trial.  Anyways, was talking 
with Mark the other day, and he was saying you have two on 
deck.  He said you like them and thought they would make a 
good addition.  Keep them on deck, but right now, they 
[sic] just can't be any new additions until things are 
cleared up out west, et cetera.  I'm sure if [sic] you knew 
this, so I just wanted to know.  Also this is not for the 
two on deck to know about it.  It's in-house biz.  When 
things are cleared up everyone has to approve before those 
on deck are in.  But there will be a lot of time to talk 
about it when you get over here.  Hopefully, it won't be 
too long." 
 
The letter was signed "David SS" and accompanied by lightning 
bolts that symbolized association with the Aryan Brotherhood.  
Kempton testified that when he and the defendant eventually met 
in person, the defendant noted that he had connections to the 
Aryan Brotherhood in the Federal penal system and California.  
After Kurt King, who was the former head of the Aryan 
16 
 
Brotherhood in Massachusetts, died, it was decided that Kempton 
would be the new head of the Aryan Brotherhood in Massachusetts 
and the defendant would "go along" with him. 
 
Kempton testified that the defendant had said he felt like 
he could trust Kempton, and thus told Kempton about his case.  
The defendant described Hall to Kempton as a "Big Dummy," and 
said he was just using Hall to attain access to firearms.  
Kempton testified that the defendant described the kidnappings, 
saying that "he knocked on the door of the individual's home.  
He went to get one guy -- the guy they were looking for -- and 
they happened to have two friends over that night."  The 
defendant described the killings in a joking manner.  Kempton 
testified, describing the defendant's statements:  "[W]hile they 
were shooting them, one guy ran off in the woods naked.  He said 
he stripped naked and started shooting him.  He didn't say who 
shot who or who ran after who.  He just said we had to track him 
down in the woods."  Kempton further testified that the 
defendant "let the bodies, you know, sit for [a while] so the 
blood would coagulate, so that when they dismembered them, it 
wouldn't . . . squirt." 
 
Also in 2013 while at SBCC, the defendant met another 
inmate, Jeffrey Cashman.  Cashman had previously become a member 
of the Aryan Brotherhood, but later learned his membership was 
in doubt.  Cashman spoke with the defendant about his issue with 
17 
 
his Aryan Brotherhood membership.  The defendant told Cashman, 
"[Y]ou're all set.  I'm putting you up.  You're in."  The 
defendant told Cashman he trusted him.  At one point, the 
defendant told Cashman that he wanted him to read a "novel."  
The "novel" was sent down to Cashman's cell, and it turned out 
to be the defendant's discovery packet.  Inside the packet, 
there was a small note that stated: 
"Yeah, check out this novel on a bro's case.  A quick read, 
but enjoyable read.  Keep in mind the names of all of the 
rats in this case.  I'm sure they will all be making their 
way up this way.  And yes, they're all in the hat.  Listen, 
I'm willing to reinstate you, but I first have to know 
without a doubt, [one hundred] percent, are you willing to 
give your life for this thing, because once you're in, 
there's no way out.  That means making your bones when the 
time comes.  Are you willing to do that?  If so, let me 
know.  Respects, D." 
 
Cashman testified that "in the hat" meant "a death contract on 
you and all members of the Aryan Brotherhood in that 
institution, names go in a hat and whatever name comes out, 
they're the one that kills him or hurts him, whichever."  
Cashman testified, "'Making your bones' means you're on 
probation.  You're actually -- you're not a member.  You're an 
associate.  And then once you make your bones, you're -- you're 
directed to do a hit, either to hurt somebody or kill somebody -
- very rarely just to hurt; usually it's death.  Death 
contract." 
18 
 
 
Cashman's testimony about the defendant's description of 
the killings differed slightly from the other evidence.  Cashman 
testified that the defendant had said that after kidnapping the 
victims, the defendant, Hall, and Veiovis went to Casey's house 
in New York.  Casey was upset because he expected one victim, 
not three.  After that, the group went to one of Hall's 
properties, where the killings took place.  Further, Cashman 
testified that the defendant had referenced a woman being 
present during the killings, saying "one of the girls" went to 
pick up a saw and Hall told her "you don't want to touch that."  
The defense attorney impeached Cashman with evidence that 
Cashman had read the 103-page "novel" of discovery from the 
case, and thus was already familiar with many of the details.  
On cross-examination, Cashman testified that he had read many of 
the details in the discovery packet, including the information 
about a woman picking up a saw. 
 
The defendant was tried from April 22 to May 16, 2014, for 
murder in the first degree, kidnapping, and witness 
intimidation.12  After the defendant was convicted, he commenced 
this appeal. 
                     
 
12 The defendant was the second to be tried, after Hall and 
before Veiovis.  All three cases were tried in front of the same 
judge. 
19 
 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Tuey-Rodriquez charge.  The defendant 
argues that the judge twice administered an impermissible Tuey-
Rodriquez charge -- first to a lone juror, and then to the 
entire jury.  See Rodriquez, 364 Mass. at 101-102; Tuey, 8 Cush. 
at 2-3.  Because defense counsel timely objected to the charges, 
we apply the prejudicial error standard first to consider 
whether the judge erred and, if so, whether we can be certain 
that the improper instruction "did not influence the jury, or 
had but very slight effect" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348, 353 (1994).  We conclude that it was 
error for the judge to instruct an individual hold-out juror 
with certain elements of the Tuey-Rodriquez charge, but that it 
was not so coercive here as to require reversal of the 
defendant's convictions.13 
 
i.  The instruction.  On the fourth day of deliberation, 
the jury sent a note saying that they had reached unanimous 
verdicts.  Guilty verdicts were announced, and the defendant 
asked the judge to poll the jury.  The clerk inquired of the 
juror in seat one (juror no. 1) if she agreed with the verdicts, 
and she said "no."  After a brief recess and the judge's denial 
                     
 
13 We discern no error with the judge's instructions to the 
entire jury, as they did not contain any elements of the Tuey-
Rodriquez charge.  Thus, our analysis is limited to the judge's 
sidebar colloquy with the individual juror. 
20 
 
of the defendant's oral motion for a mistrial, the judge ordered 
the jury to resume deliberations. 
 
Five minutes later, the judge alerted counsel that juror 
no. 1 was refusing to reenter the deliberation room.  The judge 
informed counsel that he planned to call juror no. 1 to sidebar 
to speak with her.  The judge then had the following exchange 
with juror no. 1 at sidebar: 
The judge:  "[Juror no. 1], good afternoon." 
 
Juror no. 1:  "Good afternoon." 
 
The judge:  "Come closer, please.  I just want to say a 
couple of things to you.  First of all, I just want you to 
listen, I don't need you to say anything, okay?" 
 
Juror no. 1:  "Okay." 
 
The judge:  "As I instructed you before, if you have any 
honestly held feelings about the facts of this case, no one 
is suggesting that you surrender those feelings.  On the 
other hand, it is important that you listen to your fellow 
jurors with an open mind and see if you can come to a 
unanimous decision.  I'm going to ask that you return to 
deliberate with them.  I know it might be difficult but it 
is important that you keep an open mind and listen, and 
again, it's important that you not surrender your feelings 
if convinced." 
 
Juror no. 1:  "Okay." 
 
The judge:  "Can you do that?" 
 
Juror no. 1:  "Yes, sir." 
 
The judge:  "Thank you very much.  You may be excused." 
 
After the juror left the room, defense counsel objected to the 
discussion that had just taken place.  The jury resumed 
21 
 
deliberations, and they returned approximately two and one-half 
hours later asking to be excused for the evening. 
 
The next morning, defense counsel renewed his motion for a 
mistrial, and noted that several jurors, including the 
foreperson, had "act[ed] out" when asked to return to deliberate 
further.  Specifically, he reported that the foreperson threw a 
pencil, slammed his book on a chair, and shook his head when 
juror no. 1 said that she did not agree with the verdicts.  
Counsel also noted that several other jurors were crying. 
 
In response, the judge instructed the full jury: 
"Ladies and gentlemen, I know from my own observations of 
you yesterday, that some of you had an emotional reaction 
when the verdict was announced, when you were ordered to 
resume your deliberations after I determined that the 
verdict was not unanimous, and then again at the end of the 
day when I ordered you to return here today for continued 
deliberations. 
 
"You will recall that I earlier instructed you that emotion 
or sympathy, passion or prejudice, should play no role in 
your deliberations.  I urge you to follow that instruction 
and remove emotion from your deliberations in an effort to 
reach a unanimous verdict, if you can do so in good 
conscience. 
 
"Please try to be patient and respectful of the views of 
your fellow jurors as you work toward that end.  I now 
excuse you to continue your deliberations." 
 
The jury left the court room at 9:26 A.M. and returned at 2:35 
P.M. with unanimous verdicts of guilty on all charges.  At 
defense counsel's request, the judge again ordered the clerk to 
22 
 
poll the jury, and all jurors affirmed that the verdicts were 
theirs. 
 
ii.  Analysis.  The Tuey-Rodriquez charge -- first outlined 
in 1851 in Tuey, and later modified in 1973 in Rodriquez -- is a 
model charge intended for a deadlocked jury to encourage them to 
continue deliberating.  When used appropriately and after the 
jury have engaged in due and thorough deliberation, the charge 
is an important tool "designed to urge the jury to reach a 
verdict by giving more serious consideration to opposing points 
of view."  Commonwealth v. Semedo, 456 Mass. 1, 20 (2010).  See 
G. L. c. 234A, § 68C.  The trial judge is ordinarily in the best 
position to determine whether giving such a charge is 
appropriate, and thus "[t]he decision whether to provide the 
Tuey-Rodriquez charge is . . . committed to [his or her] sound 
discretion."  Ray v. Commonwealth, 463 Mass. 1, 6 (2012).  The 
Federal analog, known as the "Allen charge," borrows directly 
from Tuey.  Commonwealth v. Mascolo, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 266, 273 
n.6, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 899 (1978).  See Allen v. United 
States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896). 
 
These charges have been criticized for their "tendency to 
coerce jurors into returning verdicts."  Mascolo, 6 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 273-274.  See Ray, 463 Mass. at 6, quoting Rodriquez, 364 
Mass. at 100 (charge carries "a 'sting'" and risks coercion when 
used improperly).  The Allen (or Tuey-Rodriquez charge) has been 
23 
 
referred to as "the dynamite charge, the third degree 
instruction, the shotgun instruction, or the nitroglycerin 
charge" because of its ability to "blast a verdict out of a jury 
otherwise unable to agree that a person is guilty."  United 
States v. Bailey, 468 F.2d 652, 666 (5th Cir. 1972).  The 
coercive impact of the charge is heightened if a juror 
interprets the instruction as being leveled directly at him or 
her.  See United States v. Sae-Chua, 725 F.2d 530, 532 (9th Cir. 
1984).  To this end, many Federal courts have held that giving 
even a modified Allen charge to a lone juror -- or to the full 
jury when the judge knows the identity of a small number of 
hold-out jurors -- is reversible error.14 
                     
 
14 Indeed, this appears to be a consensus among Federal 
courts.  See United States v. Ajiboye, 961 F.2d 892, 894 (9th 
Cir. 1992) ("Even when the judge does not inquire but is 
inadvertently told of the jury's division, reversal is necessary 
if the holdout jurors could interpret the charge as directed 
specifically at them -- that is, if the judge knew which jurors 
were the holdouts and each holdout juror knew that the judge 
knew he was a holdout"); Sae-Chua, 725 F.2d at 532 (giving 
modified Allen charge was reversible error where judge knew 
identity of sole dissenting juror and juror aware that judge 
possessed that knowledge); Cornell v. Iowa, 628 F.2d 1044, 1048 
n.2 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981) 
("[C]oercive impact of even a modest Allen charge is heightened 
when preceded by any inquiry as to the jury's numerical 
division").  See also United States v. Vanvliet, 542 F.3d 259, 
268 n.12 (1st Cir. 2008) (no abuse of discretion when judge gave 
Allen charge after jury volunteered that they were split six to 
five, given that there were not just one or two hold-out jurors 
who would feel isolated and outnumbered and interpret charge as 
leveled directly at them).  Cf. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 
231, 253 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Allen charge given 
on the heels of a jury poll poses special risks of coercion"); 
24 
 
 
The instruction need not include every element of the Tuey-
Rodriquez charge to be analyzed as one.  Various courts have 
analyzed modified Allen charges, which include some, but not 
all, of the language of the model charge.  See, e.g., United 
States v. McElhiney, 275 F.3d 928, 936 (10th Cir. 2001) ("An 
instruction that departs from the pure charge, whether by 
omission or embellishment, we call a 'modified' Allen 
instruction").  The ultimate inquiry is not how closely an 
instruction tracks the model language, but rather whether the 
instruction was "impermissibly coercive in a way that undermined 
the integrity of the deliberation process" (citation omitted).  
Id. at 940.15 
                     
United States v. Brown, 426 F.3d 32, 38-39 (1st Cir. 2005), 
cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1189 (2006) (no abuse of discretion when 
judge declared mistrial instead of singling out lone hold-out 
juror for questioning because proper to prioritize avoiding 
coercion of questioning juror in isolation). 
 
 
15 Indeed, one court has held: 
 
"[E]ven if the [trial] court's comments did not constitute 
an instruction (Allen or otherwise), its remarks still had 
the potential to coerce the jury, and, as coercion is the 
primary concern with the giving of an Allen instruction, 
the overall Allen analysis would still be applicable.  In 
other words, the [trial] court's comments would be examined 
under all the circumstances to determine whether the 
verdict reached by the jury was a product of impermissible 
coercion. . . .  To summarize, the fact that [the trial] 
court's comments constituted a departure from the 'typical' 
Allen charge does not mean that they are subject to no 
critical inquiry whatsoever." 
 
25 
 
 
The defendant argues that this case is analogous to United 
States v. Zabriskie, 415 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2005).  There, the 
judge conducted an ex parte and in camera conversation with a 
hold-out juror, in which the judge questioned the juror about 
whether he could follow the judge's instructions with an open 
mind, asked whether he was willing to participate and 
deliberate, and told him not to sacrifice his personal beliefs 
if they were based on the evidence.  Id. at 1141-1143.  The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that 
"the trial judge's admonitions interspersed throughout her 
conversation with [the juror] match[ed] the essential elements 
of a typical Allen charge."  Id. at 1147 n.11.  The court held 
that it was "impermissibly coercive to selectively and privately 
give what amounts to an Allen instruction to a hold out juror."  
Id. at 1148. 
 
We agree with the defendant that the judge's sidebar 
colloquy with juror no. 1 was erroneous.  The judge conducted an 
individual colloquy with a hold-out juror, at which time the 
judge knew that she was a hold-out.  More importantly, the juror 
would have been aware that the judge knew her position when the 
jury were polled, a scenario that reasonably might lead a juror 
                     
McElhiney, 275 F.3d at 941.  See United States v. Cheramie, 520 
F.2d 325, 329 n.3 (5th Cir. 1975) ("the denomination of the 
charge is of only tangential importance"). 
26 
 
to question even honestly held beliefs.  See Sae-Chua, 725 F.2d 
at 532 (giving modified Allen charge was reversible error where 
judge knew identity of sole dissenting juror and juror was aware 
that judge possessed that knowledge).  Finally, the judge 
instructed the juror to keep an open mind and see whether the 
jury could come to a unanimous decision -- a prototypical 
element of the Tuey-Rodriquez charge.16  Thus, the indicia of 
coercion present in the judge's language here rendered it 
improper for the judge to give the lone juror this instruction 
in isolation.  See Sae-Chua, supra. 
 
However, although this was error, we are confident that it 
"did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect" for 
two reasons.  Flebotte, 417 Mass. at 353.  First, when 
considered together, the exchange here was less coercive than 
what took place in Zabriskie.  Although not dispositive, the 
conversation in Zabriskie occurred both ex parte and in camera -
- certainly a more coercive atmosphere than sidebar.17  See 
                     
 
16 The court in Zabriskie, 415 F.3d at 1147 n.11, held that 
the colloquy "match[ed] the essential elements of a typical 
Allen charge," although the judge did not actually recite the 
most coercive elements:  the judge did not reference the 
undesirability of a mistrial or jurors in the minority 
reconsidering their views in light of the majority.  See Allen, 
164 U.S. at 501.  That the colloquy did not contain every 
element of the Allen charge was immaterial. 
 
 
17 The Commonwealth distinguishes Zabriskie on this point 
alone, noting that giving a supplemental instruction ex parte 
without first consulting counsel violates a defendant's right to 
27 
 
Zabriskie, 415 F.3d at 1142.  Although the judge here and the 
judge in Zabriskie encouraged the juror to reach a consensus 
with other jurors, the language the judge used in Zabriskie was 
heavy-handed.18  Id. at 1143.  Further, in Zabriskie, the 
conversation was much longer and the judge asked the juror the 
same questions over and over again.19  See id. at 1142-1143.  
                     
be present.  See United States v. Collins, 665 F.3d 454, 462 (2d 
Cir. 2012).  While it is true that such a conversation may 
violate a defendant's right to be present, that was not part of 
the court's analysis in Zabriskie.  Zabriskie addressed whether 
the conversation was coercive, although the fact that the 
instruction was given "selectively and privately" was an 
important element of the analysis.  Zabriskie, 415 F.3d at 1148 
(raising concern that Allen charge "especially [coercive] when 
it is done in private"). 
 
 
18 For example, in Zabriskie, 415 F.3d at 1143, the judge 
told the juror, "It's your duty as jurors to consult with one 
another and deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement 
. . . ," whereas here the judge merely said, "[I]t is important 
that you listen to your fellow jurors with an open mind and see 
if you can come to a unanimous decision." 
 
 
19 For example, the judge in Zabriskie essentially asked the 
juror if he was participating and if he had an open mind five 
times in a row: 
 
The judge:  "But I understand that you have come into a 
block, and your fellow jurors say that some of that block 
is due to you.  Are you participating in jury 
deliberations" (emphasis added)? 
 
The juror:  "Yes, ma'am." 
 
. . . 
 
The judge:  "Are you participating in the jury 
deliberations (emphasis added)?" 
 
The juror:  "Yes, ma'am." 
28 
 
Indeed, when the juror was asked whether he was attempting to 
base his decision on the evidence, he revealed part of his 
thought processes, mentioning lying awake at night thinking 
about the case.  Id. at 1143.  Even then, the judge in Zabriskie 
did not relent, but rather continued to question the juror about 
whether he could follow the instructions, whether he could 
reexamine his own views, and again whether he could participate 
with an open mind.  See id.  In comparison, here, the judge's 
significantly shorter colloquy with juror no. 1 was more 
                     
 
. . . 
 
The judge:  "All right.  You know, I've given several 
instructions when this problem started coming up, which it 
did early, saying that it was the obligation of each juror 
to reexamine his or her own views.  In other words, you 
didn't go in there -- did you go -- you had to go in with 
an open mind" (emphasis added). 
 
The juror:  "Yes, ma'am.  I did." 
 
The judge:  "And then you have to look at the evidence and 
listen to the arguments and keep an open mind to what 
others are saying, but meanwhile you do not sacrifice your 
own firm convictions" (emphasis added). 
 
The juror:  "Yes, ma'am." 
 
The judge:  "You must at all times be open and be willing 
to participate and deliberate.  Do you believe you have 
followed that?"  (Emphasis added.) 
 
The juror:  "Yes, ma'am.  I'll follow it even more if need 
be." 
 
Zabriskie, 415 F.3d at 1142-1143. 
29 
 
restrained, emphasized twice that the juror not surrender her 
feelings, and thus contained fewer indicia of coercion. 
 
The second reason for concluding that the improper 
instruction was not prejudicial is that the jury here continued 
to deliberate for a substantial amount of time following the 
judge's exchange with juror no. 1.  The colloquy with juror no. 
1 took place around 3:30 P.M. on the fourth day of 
deliberations.  The jury then resumed deliberations for another 
two and one-half hours that afternoon, and returned the 
following day and deliberated another five hours before 
returning verdicts.  The amount of time the jury continue to 
deliberate is probative of how coercive the instruction was.  
See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 240 (1988) (verdict soon 
after supplemental instruction suggests possibility of 
coercion); United States v. Webb, 816 F.2d 1263, 1267 (8th Cir. 
1987) (that jury deliberated only fifteen minutes after 
receiving Allen charge went to coercive effect).  But see Smalls 
v. Batista, 191 F.3d 272, 281 (2d Cir. 1999) (length of 
deliberation did not diminish coerciveness of supplemental 
charge). 
 
Finally, we must consider the difficult position in which 
the judge found himself when juror no. 1 refused to reenter the 
jury room after the jury were polled, revealing nonunanimous 
verdicts.  The jury had not previously indicated that they were 
30 
 
deadlocked, and thus it would have been inappropriate to deliver 
the traditional Tuey-Rodriquez charge to the full jury.20  See 
Commonwealth v. Torres, 453 Mass. 722, 736 n.17 (2009) (judge 
correctly did not administer Tuey-Rodriquez after jury returned 
with nonunanimous verdict after polling).  Dismissing juror 
no. 1 would have raised a host of other issues.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Connor, 392 Mass. 838, 846 (1984) (reversible 
error when judge dismissed deliberating juror without holding 
hearing to determine if there was good cause for dismissal).  
There was not at that point any evidence concerning an issue 
personal to juror no. 1 about which it would have been 
appropriate for the judge to conduct a voir dire of the juror to 
determine if she was able to be impartial.  See, e.g., Torres, 
supra at 727, 733 (juror's potential bias against police 
officers and wish to go home not "mere euphemism" for assertion 
of minority position, and thus proper for judge to question 
individual juror). 
                     
 
20 The judge noted that the jury had not stated that they 
were deadlocked: 
 
"[W]e have not heard, once, from this jury that they are at 
an impasse of any kind.  They have continued their 
deliberations after having been sent out yesterday for well 
over two hours, and when told that they had an option to 
continue yesterday evening or come back today and resume 
their deliberations they elected to come back today without 
suggesting that they were at an impasse." 
31 
 
 
The judge was in a difficult situation.  He made a 
concerted effort to blunt the coercive aspect of his instruction 
-- "it is important that you listen to your fellow jurors with 
an open mind and see if you can come to a unanimous decision" -- 
by sandwiching it between two admonitions that juror no. 1 not 
surrender her honestly held beliefs.  While this approach 
certainly lessened the coercive effect, it did not eliminate it 
entirely, given the "risk of coercion inherent in questioning 
jurors, particularly in individual colloquies."  Ray, 463 Mass. 
at 5 n.5.  We recognize that "trial judge[s], 'unlike us,' 
interact[] with jurors while presiding at the trial" (citation 
omitted).  Id. at 6.  Situations arise during a jury trial that 
simply cannot be anticipated, and judges must respond to these 
situations with agility and leeway.  "It is not always clear at 
the outset whether a juror's problem is of a personal nature," 
Commonwealth v. Williams, 486 Mass. 646, 656 (2021), and here 
the judge needed to address why juror no. 1 refused to reenter 
the jury deliberation room.  "It is no easy task for a judge to 
discuss the juror's concerns generally, and do so without 
delving into deliberations" (quotations and citation omitted).  
Id.  Here, the judge was able to do so.  That he went too far 
with the juror in referencing aspects of the Tuey-Rodriquez 
charge at sidebar is an example of the type of error that may 
arise even in the pursuit of the most perfect trial.  In 
32 
 
recognition of the precarious position the trial judge was in, 
we set out guidance for speaking with jurors in similar 
situations in the Appendix.  Ultimately, we hold that the charge 
-- although erroneous -- did not have such a coercive effect as 
to require reversal.  See Flebotte, 417 Mass. at 353 (error not 
prejudicial if it "did not influence the jury, or had but very 
slight effect"). 
 
b.  Prior bad acts evidence.  The defendant next contends 
that the judge's rulings admitting evidence concerning the Aryan 
Brotherhood, anatomical drawings, and photographs of weapons 
amounted to an abuse of discretion.  The defendant argues that 
this evidence served no purpose other than to impugn his 
character as violent and lawless so as to suggest improperly 
that his actions here conformed to that more general criminal 
propensity. 
 
Although the prosecution may not introduce so-called prior 
bad act evidence to illustrate a defendant's bad character, such 
evidence may be admissible if relevant for a nonpropensity 
purpose.  See Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 249 
(2014); Commonwealth v. Drew, 397 Mass. 65, 79 (1986), S.C., 447 
Mass. 635 (2006), citing Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 385 Mass. 
244, 269 (1982).  See generally Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b) (2020).  
Even if the evidence is relevant for a proper purpose, it will 
not be admitted if the judge determines that its probative value 
33 
 
is outweighed by risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant, 
taking into account the effectiveness of any limiting 
instruction.  Commonwealth v. Caruso, 476 Mass. 275, 292 n.11 
(2017) ("We generally presume that a jury understand and follow 
limiting instructions . . .").  The defendant both moved in 
limine to bar these items from evidence and objected 
contemporaneously at trial, and thus we review the judge's 
decisions to determine whether there was an abuse of discretion 
and, if so, whether it amounted to prejudicial error.  See 
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 445 Mass. 589, 591 (2005). 
 
i.  Aryan Brotherhood evidence.  The defendant argues that 
evidence of his Aryan Brotherhood membership was not admissible 
for any proper purpose and carried a risk of unfair prejudice so 
substantial that it outweighed any perceived probative value.  
We conclude that most of the Aryan Brotherhood evidence was 
properly admitted, and to the extent that any of it crossed a 
line, the admission was not prejudicial. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the Aryan Brotherhood evidence 
was both relevant and admissible for two nonpropensity purposes:  
to show how Hall induced Casey to help bury the remains and to 
establish the credibility of testimony from several jailhouse 
informants.  We examine each of these purposes in turn. 
 
With respect to the first purpose, Casey testified that 
Hall told him that the defendant was a member of the Aryan 
34 
 
Brotherhood when Hall introduced them to each other.  Casey 
stated that he was worried about repercussions if someone were 
to testify, "[f]rom either the Hells Angels or the Aryans."  We 
conclude that Casey's testimony was probative to explain why he 
cooperated with Hall and why he did not initially go to the 
police or tell anyone else about what he had done.  See Mass. G. 
Evid. § 401.  Moreover, given that this reference to the Aryan 
Brotherhood was so limited, its probative value was not 
outweighed by risk of unfair prejudice.  See Crayton, 470 Mass. 
at 249. 
 
With respect to the second purpose, evidence of the 
defendant's affiliation with the Aryan Brotherhood was admitted 
through multiple jailhouse informants.  Lemieux testified that 
the defendant told him that he (the defendant) was a member of 
the Aryan Brotherhood.  Kempton testified that he and the 
defendant were both members of the Aryan Brotherhood, and that 
the defendant talked about the hierarchy of the local Aryan 
Brotherhood and who might be the leader of it in the future.  
Kempton also testified that the defendant had said that he felt 
like he could trust Kempton.  Cashman, who was also affiliated 
with the Aryan Brotherhood, similarly testified that the 
defendant had indicated he trusted Cashman. 
 
Evidence that the defendant was a member of the Aryan 
Brotherhood makes it more likely that the defendant truthfully 
35 
 
confided the details of his case to some of these particular 
inmates and thereby enhanced the credibility of their 
testimony.21  Because it is not common to share inculpatory 
details about one's case with fellow inmates, the shared 
                     
 
21 Typically, a party must wait to bolster its own witness's 
credibility until the witness has been impeached and thereby 
requires rehabilitation.  There are a limited number of 
circumstances, however, where one can bolster before 
impeachment, such as first complaint witnesses, prior statements 
of identification, and plea agreements.  See P.C. Giannelli, 
Understanding Evidence § 22.02 (5th ed. 2018). 
 
 
The situation here is akin to a prosecutor introducing 
evidence of a cooperating witness's statements in a plea bargain 
concerning the obligation to give truthful testimony.  
Generally, "any attempts to bolster the witness by questions 
concerning his obligation to tell the truth should await 
redirect examination, and are appropriate only after the 
defendant has attempted to impeach the witness's credibility by 
showing the witness struck a deal with the prosecution to obtain 
favorable treatment."  Commonwealth v. Washington, 459 Mass. 32, 
44 n.21 (2011), citing Commonwealth v. Ciampa, 406 Mass. 257, 
264 (1989). 
 
 
And yet this is not an "absolute prohibition that prevents 
any and all direct examination reference to the agreement's 
terms concerning 'truthful' testimony."  Commonwealth v. Rolon, 
438 Mass. 808, 813 (2003).  We have held that where defense 
counsel questions a Commonwealth witness's credibility in the 
defense's opening statement, it is not improper for the 
prosecutor to bolster the witness on direct examination by 
eliciting testimony regarding the plea agreement's requirement 
to tell the truth.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Webb, 468 Mass. 
26, 32-34 (2014); Rolon, supra at 814. 
 
 
Here, defense counsel extensively attacked the credibility 
of the jailhouse informants in his opening statement.  Thus, it 
was clear from the outset the jailhouse informants were going to 
be impeached.  It was therefore unnecessary for the Commonwealth 
to wait until redirect to elicit the Aryan Brotherhood evidence 
to enhance their credibility. 
36 
 
membership in a secret gang showed why the defendant would have 
trusted inmates who were also members.  Thus, all of the Aryan 
Brotherhood testimony was relevant. 
 
Further, we hold that with one exception discussed infra, 
the judge's determination that the probative value of the 
relevant evidence was not outweighed by prejudicial effect did 
not amount to a clear error of judgment outside the range of 
reasonable outcomes, and there was no abuse of discretion in 
admitting the evidence.  See L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 
169, 185 n.27 (2014).  The judge took multiple steps to minimize 
the prejudicial impact of the testimony.  During individual voir 
dire, he asked each prospective juror whether evidence of the 
defendant's affiliation with the Aryan Brotherhood would affect 
his or her ability to be fair and impartial, and excused 
multiple potential jurors who answered yes.  Moreover, the judge 
gave repeated limiting instructions, telling the jury they could 
only consider evidence of affiliation with the Aryan Brotherhood 
-- which was not illegal -- as it related to the relationship 
between the defendant and the witnesses in the case, and not as 
evidence of the defendant's bad character.22  Additionally, 
                     
 
22 A judge seeking to blunt the prejudicial effect of this 
type of group membership evidence may also consider allowing 
reference to "a secret type of prison organization" instead of 
the more specific term "Aryan Brotherhood."  This was the 
approach the trial judge took in United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 
45, 48-49 (1984), and here it may have been able to achieve the 
37 
 
despite mention of the defendant's affiliation with the Aryan 
Brotherhood, the jury heard very little detail about the group's 
status as the largest and deadliest prison gang in the United 
States or that it is known for its white supremacist ideology.23 
 
"'[W]e afford trial judges great latitude and discretion' 
with respect to the probative-unfairly prejudicial analysis, and 
'we uphold a judge's decision in this area unless it is palpably 
wrong.'"  Commonwealth v. Facella, 478 Mass. 393, 401 (2017), 
citing Commonwealth v. Sicari, 434 Mass. 732, 752 (2001), cert. 
denied, 534 U.S. 1142 (2002).  Here, we hold that it was well 
within the judge's discretion to admit most of the Aryan 
Brotherhood evidence. 
 
However, there was a portion of Cashman's testimony about 
the definition of "making your bones" that crossed the line into 
being unduly prejudicial.  Cashman testified that the defendant 
sent him a package of discovery materials from his case along 
with a note that referenced Cashman's need to "mak[e] [his] 
bones."  Cashman explained that "making your bones" meant 
killing someone -- a prerequisite to becoming a full member of 
                     
same effect of explaining why the defendant confided in Kempton, 
Cashman, and Lemieux, while avoiding other prejudicial 
associations of the Aryan Brotherhood. 
 
 
23 Southern Poverty Law Center, Aryan Brotherhood, 
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/group 
/aryan-brotherhood [https://perma.cc/F5BB-BCPC]. 
38 
 
the Aryan Brotherhood.  This statement was not necessary to 
explain why the defendant confided in Cashman, and instead 
implied that the defendant's affiliation with the Aryan 
Brotherhood meant that he had committed murder.  Thus, the judge 
abused his discretion in allowing this statement to be admitted.  
We conclude, however, that because this aspect of the Aryan 
Brotherhood was only mentioned once, and given the evidence that 
the defendant made statements glorifying the killings and 
dismemberments of the victims, the error was not prejudicial.  
See Commonwealth v. Graham, 431 Mass. 282, 288, cert. denied, 
531 U.S. 1020 (2000), quoting Flebotte, 417 Mass. at 353 (error 
not prejudicial "if we are sure that the error did not influence 
the jury, or had but very slight effect"). 
 
ii.  Anatomical drawings.  The defendant also argues that 
the anatomical drawings found in Veiovis's home were 
inadmissible against the defendant.  We disagree.24 
 
The drawings depicted images of human dissections and 
amputations of body parts.  We held that the same drawings were 
                     
 
24 This opinion's author dissented in Veiovis, arguing that 
it required impermissible propensity evidence to infer from 
Veiovis's possession of illustrations of dismemberment that he 
would have "seize[d] the opportunity" to commit real-life 
dismemberments.  Veiovis, 477 Mass. at 494 (Lowy, J., 
dissenting).  Nonetheless, this court has twice found the 
drawings admissible for that purpose, and thus it now 
constitutes stare decisis.  See Hall, 485 Mass. at 163; Veiovis, 
supra at 484. 
39 
 
admissible in both Veiovis and Hall for three purposes:  
identity, state of mind, and motive.  Hall, 485 Mass. at 162-
163; Veiovis, 477 Mass. at 483-485.  Consider identity first.  
In the codefendants' cases, there was evidence that Hall had 
said that "one of the guys really enjoyed torturing and cutting 
[the victims] up."  Hall, supra at 162.  Veiovis, supra at 482.  
In those cases, then, the drawings were probative of identity 
because they tended to show that Veiovis was the person to whom 
Hall was referring.  See Hall, supra; Veiovis, supra.  Here, in 
contrast, no such statement was admitted, and thus the drawings 
are not admissible to show identity.  See Veiovis, supra at 484 
("the anatomical drawings would not be admissible as identity 
evidence if Hall had not identified the third assailant as 
someone who enjoyed 'cutting [the victims] up'"). 
 
The drawings are, nonetheless, admissible to show both 
state of mind and motive.  With respect to state of mind, close 
analysis is required to show how the drawings are relevant to 
the defendant, and not just to Veiovis.  The drawings tend to 
show Veiovis's "state of mind as a person fascinated by 
amputation and human dissection, and of an intent to seize the 
opportunity of these killings to engage in actual amputations 
and human dissection."  Veiovis, 477 Mass. at 484.  There is no 
evidence that the defendant approved of the drawings in any way, 
and thus we cannot impute Veiovis's state of mind to the 
40 
 
defendant.  See Commonwealth v. Keo, 467 Mass. 25, 33 (2014) 
(improper to impute codefendant's wall decoration saying "crip 
killer" to defendant where no evidence that defendant had seen 
words and affirmed that he too wished to be "a 'crip killer'"). 
 
Veiovis's state of mind remains relevant, however, in a 
more general manner.  In Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 427 Mass. 
90, 95 (1998), we found that evidence of a coventurer's state of 
mind was admissible not because it could be imputed to the 
defendant, but because it "put the killing into the context of a 
narrative that was comprehensible to the jury and was relevant 
to the purpose of the joint venture."  The same is true here.  
Although the jury could not impute Veiovis's state of mind to 
the defendant, it was nonetheless relevant to the circumstances 
of the crimes and helped explain why the victims were 
dismembered.  Given the crimes' gruesome nature, information 
about one of the coventurers' state of mind would no doubt have 
helped the jury attempt to comprehend what precipitated the 
event. 
 
Finally, the evidence is admissible to show motive for the 
same reasons explained in Hall and in Veiovis.  Although the 
motive for the killings was to silence Glasser and the two men 
who would have been witnesses to Glasser's kidnapping, that does 
not explain why the victims were dismembered.  Veiovis, 477 
Mass. at 484.  The drawings tend to show Veiovis's fascination 
41 
 
with amputation and human dismemberment, offering "an 
explanation for what would otherwise be inexplicable."  Id. at 
485.  Because Veiovis was a coventurer with the defendant, 
Veiovis's potential motive is relevant to the defendant.  See 
Commonwealth v. Carroll, 439 Mass. 547, 553 (2003) ("There is no 
requirement that joint venturers share a motive for the success 
of the venture").  Thus, here the drawings are relevant both for 
state of mind and for motive of a coventurer. 
 
Turning from relevance to weighing of probative value, we 
hold that the judge here did not abuse his discretion in 
admitting the drawings.  In Veiovis, we found that the judge did 
not abuse his discretion in ruling that the probative value of 
this evidence was not outweighed by prejudicial effect because 
there were three relevant, noncharacter purposes for admitting 
the drawings.  Veiovis, 477 Mass. at 485.  See Hall, 485 Mass. 
at 163 (no abuse of discretion in admitting drawings).  What 
exacerbated the drawings' prejudicial effect in Hall and Veiovis 
was the admission of Hall's statement that "one of the guys" 
liked chopping people up.  That statement gave the jury a light 
in which to view the anatomical drawings, and all but cemented 
the drawings' meaning in the jury's mind as signs of Veiovis's 
inclination to chop people up. 
 
Here, even though there were only two relevant, 
noncharacter purposes, on the other side of the scale there was 
42 
 
also less prejudice than in the codefendants' cases:  Hall's 
statement that "one of the guys really enjoyed torturing and 
cutting [the victims] up" was not admitted.  Hall, 485 Mass. at 
162.  Veiovis, 477 Mass. at 482.  The jury could have made an 
inference that Veiovis had a passion for dismemberment, but such 
an inference was much weaker without the context supplied by 
Hall's statement.  Further, given that there was no direct 
connection between the defendant here and the drawings, there is 
less prejudice than there was in Veiovis, where the jury could 
have inferred that Veiovis himself had a peculiar interest in 
dismemberment and thus the propensity to commit the crimes.  
Thus, the judge did not abuse his discretion in finding that the 
probative value of the drawings was not outweighed by unfair 
prejudice. 
 
iii.  Photographs of weapons.  The defendant argues that 
the judge erred in admitting photographs of certain weapons 
found in Veiovis's apartment.  The jury saw photographs of 
numerous knives, cleavers, hatchets, a machete, a sickle, and a 
bat with nails.  We hold that the judge properly admitted most 
of the photographs of weapons, although it was error to admit 
both the bat with nails and the hatchet.  This error, however, 
was not prejudicial. 
 
In both Veiovis and Hall, there was evidence that the 
machete, cleaver, hatchets, and knives were consistent with the 
43 
 
tools used to dismember the victims, and could have served as 
the means to accomplish the dismemberment.  See Hall, 485 Mass. 
at 161-162; Veiovis, 477 Mass. at 485-486.  Although they tested 
negative for blood at the time the apartment was searched -- 
approximately two weeks after the killing -- they could not be 
excluded as the weapons used in the killings.  Veiovis, supra.  
Thus, we held that they were admissible to show Veiovis and Hall 
had the means to dismember the victims' bodies.  See Hall, supra 
at 162; Veiovis, supra at 486.  Further, in those cases we held 
that it was error to admit the photograph of the spiked baseball 
bat because there was no evidence that it could have been used 
in the commission of the crimes.  See Hall, supra; Veiovis, 
supra.  We held that the error was not prejudicial, however, 
given the other admissible evidence depicting what was found in 
Veiovis's apartment.  See Hall, supra; Veiovis, supra, citing 
Graham, 431 Mass. at 288. 
 
Here, the same photographs of weapons were admitted, yet 
the forensic testimony differed slightly.  The forensic 
anthropologist testified that the machete and the cleaver shown 
in the photographs could have been used in the commission of the 
crimes.  But, unlike in Veiovis, the forensic anthropologist 
testified that the injuries were not consistent with cuts from a 
hatchet.  See Veiovis, 477 Mass. at 485.  Thus, photographs of 
the machete and cleavers were admissible because these weapons 
44 
 
could have been used in the commission of the crimes.  See id.  
See also Commonwealth v. Pierre, 486 Mass. 418, 424 (2020) 
("Evidence regarding a weapon that could have been used in the 
course of a crime is admissible, in the judge's discretion, even 
without direct proof that the particular weapon was in fact used 
in the commission of the crime" (quotation and citation 
omitted).  In contrast, it was error to introduce the 
photographs of not only the spiked baseball bat,25 but also the 
hatchet because these weapons could not have been used to commit 
the crimes.  See id at 425 ("Where a weapon definitively could 
not have been used in the commission of the crime, [this court 
has] generally cautioned against admission of evidence related 
to it" [citation omitted]).  However, as in Hall and Veiovis, we 
conclude that this error was not prejudicial given "the other 
admissible evidence, particularly the testimony regarding the 
injuries inflicted, the weapons consistent with those injuries, 
and the weapons that were ultimately found at Veiovis's 
apartment."  Hall, 485 Mass. at 162.  In other words, the jury 
had ample evidence to find that the defendant had access to 
potential tools of dismemberment. 
                     
 
25 The forensic anthropologist did not specifically exclude 
the spiked bat as a possible weapon, although he did not include 
it -- or any similar spiked instrument -- when describing 
possible weapons used. 
45 
 
 
c.  Admission of coventurer statements.  The defendant 
argues that the judge erred in admitting Hall's statements to 
Ely and Dawson under the statements of a coventurer exemption to 
the rule against hearsay. See Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(2)(E).26  
Because the defendant objected at trial, we review the judge's 
admission of these statements for prejudicial error.  See 
Flebotte, 417 Mass. at 353.  We hold that the judge did not 
abuse his discretion in admitting the statements. 
 
i.  The testimony.  Ely and Dawson both testified to 
statements that incriminated Hall because they showed Hall knew 
that Glasser and two men had gone missing before it was public 
knowledge, as well as that he knew what the victims were doing 
before they were abducted.  On Monday, August 29, Hall and 
Dawson washed Hall's Hyundai, inside and out, at the Sutton 
residence.  Ely testified that after washing the car, Hall was 
on the porch of the Sutton house with Karen Sutton and Ely.  
Hall mentioned that "people were missing," and mentioned 
Glasser's name specifically.  Because this statement was made on 
Monday, and all three victims were not reported missing until 
Wednesday, Hall's statement was probative of his guilt because 
it showed his knowledge that the victims were missing.  The 
                     
 
26 Exemptions to the rule against hearsay are statements 
that are defined as "not hearsay" under Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d).  
In contrast, exceptions to the rule against hearsay are outlined 
by Mass. G. Evid. §§ 803 and 804. 
46 
 
judge allowed this testimony as a statement of a coventurer, 
over the defendant's objection. 
 
Dawson testified describing the same conversation that took 
place on the porch of the Sutton residence.  She testified that 
Hall said that "that guy and two of his friends were missing," 
although he did not say who "that guy" was.  She went on to say 
that Hall pulled her aside and spoke further about the three men 
who had gone missing.  She testified that Hall said that "one of 
them was fixing the computer, one was laying on the couch, and 
one was sitting in front of the couch playing video games."  
Again, the judge allowed this testimony over the defendant's 
objection.  Two days later, Dawson heard that police were on 
Linden Street (where Glasser and Frampton had lived) and 
contacted Hall.  At some point in that period of time, Hall told 
Dawson that if she were ever stopped by police, she should tell 
them that a man named "Whitey" was involved in the disappearance 
of the victims.  On September 1, Dawson was stopped by police 
and told them the story involving Whitey.  When she relayed this 
to Hall, he was pleased.  Dawson further testified that at the 
time she told this information to police, she believed it was 
true. 
 
ii.  Analysis.  A statement of a coventurer is admissible 
against the others involved in the joint venture if it is made 
"during the pendency of the cooperative effort and in 
47 
 
furtherance of its goal."  Commonwealth v. Bongarzone, 390 Mass. 
326, 340 (1983).  See Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(2)(E).  Before 
admitting such evidence, a judge "must find, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, the existence of a joint venture independent of 
the statement being offered."  Commonwealth v. Holley, 478 
Mass. 508, 534 (2017).  Further, "[b]efore considering the 
statement as bearing on the defendant's guilt, . . . the jury 
must make their own independent determination, again based on a 
preponderance of the evidence other than the statement itself, 
that a joint venture existed and that the statement was made in 
furtherance thereof" (quotation and citation omitted).  Id.  
This exemption to the rule against hearsay "is premised on a 
belief that '[t]he community of activities and interests which 
exists among the coventurers during the enterprise tends in some 
degree to assure that their statements about one another will be 
minimally reliable.'"  Bongarzone, supra, quoting Commonwealth 
v. White, 370 Mass. 703, 712 (1976). 
 
"It is well established that the joint venture [exemption] 
to the hearsay rule does not apply to statements made after the 
joint venture has ended."  Commonwealth v. Winquist, 474 Mass. 
517, 522 (2016).  "However, '[s]tatements made in an effort to 
conceal a crime, made after the crime has been completed, may be 
admissible under the joint venture [exemption] because the joint 
venture [remains] ongoing, with a purpose to ensure that the 
48 
 
joint venture itself remains concealed."  Id., quoting 
Commonwealth v. Carriere, 470 Mass. 1, 11 (2014).  "In essence, 
the inquiry to determine whether a statement was made during the 
pendency of a criminal enterprise and in furtherance of it 
'focuses not on whether the crime has been completed, but on 
whether a joint venture was continuing.'"  Winquist, supra at 
522-523, quoting Commonwealth v. Stewart, 454 Mass. 527, 537 
(2009). 
 
Here, the joint venture was clearly ongoing:  the bodies 
had yet to be found, and Hall was washing one of the cars likely 
used in the crimes -- presumably in an attempt to conceal 
evidence -- moments before making the statements.  The more 
difficult issue is whether the statements were made in 
furtherance of the crimes.  The defendant argues that the 
statements objectively served to thwart the joint venture by 
unnecessarily disclosing incriminating information to people who 
were not members of it.  In response, the Commonwealth argues 
that by intimating his involvement in the crimes to Ely and 
Dawson, Hall was trying to enlist their loyalty by giving them 
enough information that they would feel complicit in the crimes, 
and therefore not speak up.  See Commonwealth v. Wood, 469 Mass. 
266, 272 n.12, 280-281 (2014) (codefendant's statement to third 
party describing crimes admissible under hearsay exemption 
because it may have been intended to "frighten her to silence").  
49 
 
That Hall later attempted to use Dawson to funnel misinformation 
to investigators buttresses the Commonwealth's theory that he 
was trying to implicate her in furtherance of the plot.  
Although it is a close call, we agree with the Commonwealth and 
hold that the judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting 
these statements on the basis that they were in furtherance of 
the conspiracy.  See L.L., 470 Mass. at 185 n.27 (abuse of 
discretion only where judge makes "clear error of judgment in 
weighing the [relevant] factors" and "decision falls outside the 
range of reasonable alternatives" [quotation and citation 
omitted]). 
 
d.  Commonwealth's opening and closing.  The defendant 
argues that the prosecutor made numerous statements in his 
opening and closing remarks that misstated the evidence, argued 
inferences with no basis in the record, suggested he had 
knowledge of facts not in evidence, and attempted to excite the 
jury's passion and prejudice.  We analyze each in turn. 
 
i.  Opening.  "The proper function of an opening is to 
outline in a general way the nature of the case which the 
counsel expects to be able to prove or support by evidence" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Fazio, 375 Mass. 451, 454 
(1978).  See Mass. G. Evid. § 1113(a).  The prosecutor's 
expectation must be "reasonable and grounded in good faith."  
Fazio, supra at 456.  Where defense counsel did not object to 
50 
 
the opening, we review to determine whether there was misconduct 
and, if so, whether it created a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Silva, 455 Mass. 
503, 514 (2009). 
 
In his opening statement, the prosecutor contended the 
underlying dispute began in July of 2009 when Glasser took 
carburetors that belonged to the defendant.  Further, the 
prosecutor contended that the defendant stopped in Lenox to 
procure the guns used in the murders.  It appears that in both 
of these instances, the prosecutor meant to refer to Hall, not 
the defendant.27  These mistakes seem more akin to a slip of the 
tongue than bad faith.  Moreover, defense counsel pointed out 
the mistakes immediately afterwards in his own opening 
statement, and thus the jury were unlikely to give much credence 
to them -- especially where there was no evidence presented at 
trial to substantiate them.  Thus, we hold that the 
misstatements did not give rise to a substantial likelihood of 
miscarriage of justice. 
 
Also in his opening, the prosecutor referred to the 
defendant burning clothing and argued that the defendant was a 
lookout while Hall and Casey buried the bodies.  Because the 
                     
 
27 The Commonwealth concedes this, at least with regard to 
the second statement about procuring guns in Lenox. 
51 
 
prosecutor repeated these same remarks in his closing -- where 
they were objected to -- we conduct the relevant analysis infra. 
 
ii.  Closing.  Remarks made during closing argument are 
considered in the context of the entire argument, in light of 
the judge's instructions to the jury, and in view of the 
evidence presented at trial.  Commonwealth v. Whitman, 453 Mass. 
331, 343-345 (2009).  See Mass. G. Evid. § 1113(b).  
"Prosecutors are entitled to argue theories supported by 
evidence and reasonable, possible inferences from the evidence."  
Commonwealth v. Auclair, 444 Mass. 348, 359 (2005).  "We 
consider four factors in determining whether an error made 
during closing argument is prejudicial:  '(1) whether the 
defendant seasonably objected; (2) whether the error was limited 
to collateral issues or went to the heart of the case; (3) what 
specific or general instructions the judge gave the jury which 
may have mitigated the mistake; and (4) whether the error, in 
the circumstances, possibly made a difference in the jury's 
conclusions.'"  Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 480 Mass. 299, 306 
(2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 
807 (2009).  Here, defense counsel timely objected to the 
relevant portions of the closing argument. 
 
A.  Statements that the defendant burned clothing with 
Hall.  In closing, the prosecutor stated that the defendant, 
52 
 
along with Hall, burned clothing at the Hells Angels clubhouse 
after the murders.28 
 
The evidence did not support this remark.  Ocean testified 
that Hall alone burned clothing.  She testified that she was 
holding the clothing for Hall and that the clothes, which bore 
the Hells Angels insignia, belonged to Hall, not the defendant.  
She stated explicitly that the defendant "had no part in the 
burning of the clothes."  State police Trooper Michael Scott 
testified that he observed the scorched metal plate, and said 
that he received no indication that the defendant burned any 
clothing, only that Hall had. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that a fair inference could be 
drawn from this evidence that the defendant, in addition to 
Hall, burned the clothing because there was evidence that, 
later, the defendant and Hall together threw other pieces of 
evidence off a bridge.  We disagree.  Ocean clearly stated that 
Hall, not the defendant, burned the clothing, and Scott did not 
contradict her.  Inferences that run contrary to the evidence 
are by definition unreasonable.  See Auclair, 444 Mass. at 359 
(in closing, prosecutors may only argue reasonable and possible 
inferences from evidence). 
                     
 
28 The prosecutor made similar statements in his opening 
remarks. 
53 
 
 
Nevertheless, we hold that these remarks were not 
prejudicial error.  Insofar as the prosecutor relied on the 
remarks to show that the defendant's destruction of evidence 
indicated a consciousness of guilt, it is unlikely that it made 
a difference in the jury's conclusions, because there was other 
testimony that the defendant actually had helped Hall destroy 
other pieces of evidence, thus similarly indicating a 
consciousness of guilt.29  See Alvarez, 480 Mass. at 306. 
 
B.  Statements that defendant was a lookout.  In his 
closing, the prosecutor asserted multiple times that the 
defendant had acted as a lookout outside the Cole property while 
Hall and Casey buried the bodies.30  Casey testified that on 
Monday, August 29, he met Hall and the defendant at the Pavoni 
residence where the Buick was parked with the bodies inside.  
Casey and Hall then drove to the Cole property, approximately 
three miles away in Becket, with the intention of burying the 
bodies.  The two of them checked the Cole house to make sure no 
one was home, and then returned to the Pavoni house, where Hall 
got out of the car and spoke with the defendant, who was still 
there.  Hall then followed Casey in the Buick back to the Cole 
                     
 
29 Ocean testified that she saw the defendant and Hall 
throwing items from a bridge. 
 
 
30 The prosecutor made similar remarks in his opening 
statement as well. 
54 
 
residence, where the two of them used the excavator to dig a 
hole to bury the bodies.  Hall and Casey then returned to the 
Pavoni house, where the defendant was still "hanging around." 
 
The defendant's cell phone records indicated that he called 
and sent text messages to Hall multiple times while Hall and 
Casey were at the Cole house.  At 11:58 A.M., the defendant sent 
Hall a text message saying, "Hey, what's going on?"  At 12:33 
P.M., the defendant sent Hall a text message saying, "Dude, I'm 
ready to leave.  I don't know what to tell you."  Special Agent 
Eric Perry of the Federal Bureau of Investigation testified that 
the defendant's cell phone records indicated that, during the 
time he made these calls and text messages to Hall, he was 
closer to the Pavoni property than to the Cole property.  But in 
the agent's opinion, the towers that the cell phone was 
utilizing showed it was likely the cell phone was not stationary 
at the Pavoni home during that whole time period; more likely, 
it was traveling.  The Commonwealth further points to Cashman's 
testimony to show that the defendant was a lookout.  Cashman 
testified that the defendant told him that the defendant was "in 
the car parked in the driveway" during the burial. 
 
It was up to the jury to decide whether the defendant was 
truly a lookout.  But the evidence of the defendant's cell 
phone's location, coupled with Cashman's testimony that the 
defendant was parked in the driveway during the burial, support 
55 
 
a reasonable and possible inference that the defendant was 
indeed a lookout at the Cole property during the burial.  See 
Commonwealth v. Jones, 432 Mass. 623, 628 (2000) ("inferences 
drawn from the evidence need not be necessary and inescapable, 
only reasonable and possible").  Thus, we discern no error in 
the prosecutor's statements. 
 
C.  Statements that the defendant intended to kill a 
witness.  The defendant argues that in the Commonwealth's 
closing, the prosecutor insinuated that the defendant planned to 
kill a witness.  The prosecutor stated: 
"And as his being a lookout, the idea that can't possibly 
happen because Hall's phone is out, what do you think the 
plan was going to be, that if Mr. Cole decided to come home 
during the middle of the day he's going to call him?  
They're going to drop what they are doing and leave all of 
the evidence there?  No, unfortunately, ladies and 
gentlemen, he was just simply going to follow Hall until he 
got there.  And at that point Mr. Cole would just be 
another witness." 
 
The defendant argues that because the Commonwealth's theory of 
the case was that Frampton and Chadwell were killed because they 
were witnesses to Glasser's kidnapping, the meaning of the 
prosecutor's statement that "Mr. Cole would just be another 
witness" was to imply that if Cole had returned home, he, too, 
would have been killed. 
 
We agree with the defendant that, in this context, the 
phrase "would just be another witness" implies that the 
defendant would have at the very least harmed Cole if he had 
56 
 
returned home.  Although we think it reasonable to infer that 
the defendant was a lookout, the further inference that his role 
as a lookout meant he would have hurt or killed potential 
witnesses is not a reasonable and fair inference based on the 
evidence.  However, we hold that this improper statement was not 
prejudicial error in light of the judge's instructions that the 
opening and closing are not evidence,31 and because the 
implication of this statement was subtle and limited to a 
collateral issue.  See Alvarez, 480 Mass. at 306. 
 
D.  Statements regarding the Aryan Brotherhood.  In his 
closing argument, the prosecutor referenced the Aryan 
Brotherhood evidence and stated: 
"Well, you have to ask yourself, did the Defendant take 
orders from The Big Dummy [(Hall)]?  Without knowing 
beforehand or even asking afterwards?  The guy who strolls 
in and takes over the local Aryan Brotherhood, he's the one 
unknowingly taking orders?  Ask yourselves, really?" 
 
The defendant had previously told Cashman that he considered 
Hall to be a "[b]ig dummy, goofball, idiot," and explained that 
he (the defendant) "was just using [Hall]" to obtain access to 
guns.  Thus, in its closing, the Commonwealth was implying that 
the defendant was culpable because he was not merely taking 
                     
 
31 In the jury charge, the judge instructed the jury that 
the "closing arguments of counsel are not evidence" and told 
them that their "collective memory of the evidence controls, not 
the memory of the attorneys." 
57 
 
orders from Hall, but rather had some amount of control over 
him. 
 
The defendant argues that this reference in the closing 
statement exceeded the permissible uses of the Aryan Brotherhood 
evidence.  At sidebar, in response to the defendant's objection, 
the judge stated that the Aryan Brotherhood evidence was 
admitted in large part to establish the nature of the 
relationship between the defendant and the three jailhouse 
informants, but that it was not specifically limited to the 
informants because the language of the instruction referred to 
"any witnesses in the case." 
 
As discussed supra, the Aryan Brotherhood evidence was 
properly admitted to show the relationship between the defendant 
and the jailhouse informants, as well as to show why Casey did 
not initially come forward.  But we do not agree with the judge 
that the Aryan Brotherhood evidence was permissible to establish 
the relationship of the defendant with any witnesses in the case 
-- especially here, where the prosecutor used it to imply that 
the defendant's association with the Aryan Brotherhood meant he 
would not be "unknowingly taking orders" and instead had an 
active role in plotting the murders.  Where in other contexts 
the Aryan Brotherhood evidence was properly used, here it 
crossed the line into being used as impermissible propensity 
evidence. 
58 
 
 
This error, however, was not prejudicial.  As discussed 
supra, the judge asked during individual voir dire whether 
evidence that the defendant was a member of the Aryan 
Brotherhood would impair jurors' impartiality, and repeatedly 
instructed that the Aryan Brotherhood evidence could not be used 
as evidence of the defendant's bad character or criminal 
propensity.  Thus, this statement by the prosecutor does not 
amount to prejudicial error. 
 
e.  Motion to suppress.  Next, the defendant argues that 
the judge erred by denying his motion to suppress the fruits of 
the September 4 search of his person and seizure of his cell 
phone.  We disagree. 
 
"[I]n reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we accept 
the judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error but 
conduct an independent review of his [or her] ultimate findings 
and conclusions of law" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Tremblay, 480 Mass. 645, 652 (2018).  Because the defendant 
moved to suppress before trial, we review for harmless error.  
See Commonwealth v. Tavares, 482 Mass. 694, 709 (2019). 
 
i.  Facts.  We provide a brief summary of the facts that 
the judge, following an evidentiary hearing, found were known to 
the officers on September 4.  The facts are supplemented with 
uncontroverted facts in the record.  Commonwealth v. Jones-
Pannell, 472 Mass. 429, 431 (2015). 
59 
 
 
Glasser was scheduled to testify in a kidnapping case 
against Hall regarding the August 2010 scheme to discredit 
Glasser, and that trial was scheduled to begin three weeks after 
the weekend of the storm.  Glasser, Frampton, and Chadwell were 
last seen at around 10 P.M. on Saturday, August 27, 2011, and 
despite repeated attempts to contact them, no one had heard from 
them since.  Hall, Veiovis, and the defendant were suspects in 
the disappearances:  Edward Sutton had reported that Hall had 
stated that the "witness" had "disappeared" and that it was "too 
bad."  Brittany Breault, one of the Sutton daughters, informed 
police that on the day after the storm, Hall asked if the 
defendant could shower at the Sutton house.  Moreover, after 
police started inquiring into the victims' disappearance, a man 
fitting Hall's description was seen discarding items off a 
bridge.  A later search of the river below the bridge uncovered 
pieces of a shoebox from a store where the defendant, with Hall, 
had been shopping a few days earlier.  Further, in reviewing 
Hall's cell phone records, officers noticed what appeared to be 
a three-way call involving Hall and the defendant on the morning 
of Sunday, August 28, 2011. 
 
On Sunday, September 4, officers were conducting a field 
search of the Pittsfield State Forest when they saw a black Jeep 
that had been driving towards them abruptly turn around.  The 
officers learned that Hall was driving the Jeep, and they 
60 
 
proceeded to follow it towards Pittsfield.  The Jeep eventually 
pulled into a gasoline station, and officers followed but did 
not signal for the Jeep to pull over.  Hall was driving, Veiovis 
was in the passenger's seat, and the defendant was in the back 
seat.  The officers recognized Hall and noted that Veiovis and 
the defendant fit the descriptions of suspects in the victims' 
disappearance. 
 
At the gasoline station, officers engaged the three men in 
conversation and, when Hall asked if they were free to leave, 
officers told him to stay because other officers were on their 
way to talk to them.  Eventually, officers gave the three men an 
exit order, pat frisked them, and took their photographs.  The 
officers then seized the Jeep, each man's cell phone, and Hall's 
boots and socks.32 
                     
 
32 The defendant argues that, in deciding the motion to 
suppress, many of the trial judge's findings of fact were 
clearly erroneous, including the judge's findings that police 
had knowledge that the defendant was at a Hells Angels party 
with Hall and Veiovis on August 27, that "Hall and his co-
defendants" demonstrated consciousness of guilt by destroying 
evidence, and that Veiovis and the defendant's presence with 
Hall in that vicinity on September 4 "'reasonably suggested that 
Hall and his co-defendants had hidden evidence of the men's 
disappearance' there and 'returned' on September 4 to either 
retrieve or conceal evidence."  Because we think that none of 
these facts was necessary to support the finding that the stop 
and seizure were proper, we do not address whether they were 
clearly erroneous. 
61 
 
 
ii.  Analysis.  We hold that the officers had reasonable 
suspicion to conduct a threshold inquiry of the defendant and 
probable cause to seize the defendant's cell phone. 
 
First, when officers pulled up near the defendant, Hall, 
and Veiovis at the gasoline station and asked their names and 
who owned the Jeep, that was not a stop but more akin to a field 
interrogation observation.  See Commonwealth v. Narcisse, 457 
Mass. 1, 2 n.1 (2010) ("A 'field interrogation observation' has 
been described as an interaction in which a police officer 
identifies an individual and finds out that person's business 
for being in a particular area").  Thus, no justification was 
required.  See Commonwealth v. Murdough, 428 Mass. 760, 763 
(1999) (no level of justification required for police to 
approach parked vehicle at rest area and make noncoercive 
inquiry). 
 
The interaction became a stop in the constitutional sense 
when, after Hall asked if he was free to go, officers told him 
to "stay because a couple of other officers were on their way to 
talk to them."  See Commonwealth v. Matta, 483 Mass. 357, 362 
(2019) (stop occurs when officer communicates that he or she 
would use police power to coerce person to stay).  Because the 
defendant was a passenger in Hall's vehicle, this effectively 
stopped the defendant as well.  See Commonwealth v. Buckley, 478 
Mass. 861, 865 (2018) ("A passenger in a vehicle may challenge 
62 
 
the constitutionality of a stop").  To justify this stop (and 
the subsequent exit order and frisk), police needed reasonable 
suspicion both that criminal activity was afoot and that the 
suspects were armed and dangerous.  Narcisse, 457 Mass. at 7.  
See Commonwealth v. Torres-Pagan, 484 Mass. 34, 38-39 (2020) 
(outlining level of justification needed for each level of 
intrusion).  Officers met both prongs of this test based on 
their knowledge of Hall's history with Glasser and statements 
that a "witness" had "disappeared"; Hall's and the defendant's 
association with the Hells Angels and the Aryan Brotherhood, 
respectively; the Jeep's abrupt turn-around when it encountered 
the police; the fact that the defendant and Veiovis matched the 
descriptions of the other suspects in the victims' 
disappearance; and the violent nature of the crimes under 
investigation. 
 
Finally, officers had probable cause to seize the 
defendant's cell phone.  In order to seize the cell phone, 
police needed a substantial basis for concluding that it 
contained "evidence connected to the crime" under investigation 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. White, 475 Mass. 583, 588 
(2016).  In other words, the government must demonstrate a 
"'nexus' between the alleged crime and the article to be 
searched or seized."  Commonwealth v. Snow, 486 Mass. 582, 586 
(2021).  Here, police had the proper nexus to the defendant's 
63 
 
cell phone because cell phone records reflected that the cell 
phone had been involved in a three-way call with Hall and an 
unknown party on the morning of Sunday, August 28.  Because Hall 
was a suspect in the case thanks to his extensive history with 
Glasser, his statements to Edward and Breault, and his 
destruction of evidence, and given the fact that this call took 
place mere hours after the victims were last heard from, there 
was a substantial basis to conclude that the cell phone would 
contain evidence related to the victims' disappearance.  
Therefore, it was proper for officers to seize the defendant's 
cell phone. 
 
f.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  As part of our 
plenary review of the case, we note that the judge omitted a 
critical part of the reasonable doubt instructions and allowed 
the prosecutor to quote a statement using a racial slur. 
 
i.  Beyond a reasonable doubt jury instruction.  In his 
final jury instructions, the judge told the jury that "the 
evidence must convince you of the defendant's guilt to a 
reasonable and moral certainty," but omitted the phrase from the 
reasonable doubt instruction in Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 
295, 320 (1850),33 that clarified the meaning of that phrase:  "a 
certainty that convinces and directs the understanding, and 
                     
 
33 We recently modified the traditional Webster charge in 
Commonwealth v. Russell, 470 Mass. 464, 468-479 (2015). 
64 
 
satisfies the reason and judgment, of those who are bound to act 
conscientiously upon it."34  Because the defendant did not 
object, we review to determine whether the judge's deviation 
created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
See Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 468 Mass. 204, 220 (2014). 
 
This part of the judge's instructions were identical to 
those given in Veiovis.  There, we found that the "judge's use 
of the phrase 'abiding conviction' in conjunction with 'moral 
                     
 
34 The judge instructed the jury: 
 
"I have said that the burden -- it's on the Commonwealth to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is 
guilty of the charges against him.  What is proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt?  The term is often used but not easily 
defined. 
 
"Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond 
all possible doubt, for everything in the lives of human 
beings is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. 
 
"A charge is proved beyond a reasonable doubt if, after 
you've considered all of the evidence, you have in your 
minds an abiding conviction to a moral certainty that the 
charge is true. 
 
"I've told you that every person is presumed to be innocent 
until he is proved guilty and that the burden of proof is 
on the prosecutor.  If you evaluate all of the evidence and 
you still have a reasonable doubt remaining, the defendant 
is entitled to the benefit of that doubt and must be 
acquitted. 
 
"It is not enough for the Commonwealth to establish a 
probability, even a strong probability, that the defendant 
is more likely to be guilty than not guilty.  Instead, the 
evidence must convince you of the defendant's guilt to a 
reasonable and moral certainty.  That is what we mean by 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt." 
65 
 
certainty,' coupled with his fidelity to the Webster instruction 
in every respect except for the noted omission, convince[d] us 
that the omission did not create a risk that the jury failed 
adequately to understand the reasonable doubt standard, and 
therefore did not create a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice."  Veiovis, 477 Mass. at 490.  We reach 
the same conclusion here, and hold that there was no substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
ii.  Racial profanity.  Lastly, we comment on the judge's 
allowance of a racial slur in both the Commonwealth's opening 
and closing statements, as well as in a statement by Hall.  
Casey testified that when Hall was describing the killings to 
him, Hall indicated that he had killed Glasser and that "the fat 
guy and the nigger" were with him.  The Commonwealth referenced 
this statement in both its opening and closing.  In opening, the 
prosecutor inaccurately forecasted that Casey would quote Hall's 
statement as "I didn't mind shooting the nigger."  In closing, 
the prosecutor again referenced Hall's statement to Casey, 
stating, "I finally got him.  I ousted him.  That he killed 
Dave, the Fat Guy, as he referred to -- Hall did, The nigger." 
 
Any probative value of the word was substantially 
outweighed by a risk of unfair prejudice, and the references in 
both the Commonwealth's opening and closing served to exacerbate 
the prejudice.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 403.  The word -- combined 
66 
 
with the substantial Aryan Brotherhood evidence -- implied that 
the murder was in some way racially motivated, despite the fact 
that the Commonwealth was not prosecuting the case on such a 
theory.  Contrast Commonwealth v. Cruzado, 480 Mass. 275, 279 
(2018) (no error to allow admission of interview in which 
defendant referred to victim as "a nigger," where racial animus 
was partial motive for killing and judge asked jurors during 
voir dire whether use of word would affect their ability to be 
impartial).  Thus, it was error to allow use of the word in this 
context.  This inclusion, however, did not give rise to a 
substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice, given its 
limited instances and the strength of the Commonwealth's case 
against the defendant. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  Given the foregoing, and upon review of 
the entire record, we conclude that the verdicts of murder in 
the first degree are consonant with justice, and we decline to 
exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a new 
trial or direct the entry of verdicts of a lesser degree of 
guilt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed. 
 
 
 
Appendix. 
 
 
 
While every circumstance is different, where, as in this 
case, a judge is faced with a juror who indicated a verdict at 
odds with the verdict slip when polled, and who refused to 
reenter the jury room to deliberate, the judge might consider 
the following approach: 
 
First, inform the juror that he or she should not disclose 
to the court the substance of the jury's deliberations or where 
they stand numerically or otherwise in their deliberations.  
Then inquire of the juror whether he or she is willing to 
maintain his or her oath to conscientiously try the charges and 
decide them according to the evidence.  Should the juror respond 
"yes," ask the juror if the juror believes that he or she is 
able to review the evidence impartially based upon a fair 
consideration of the evidence and discuss the issues with his or 
her fellow jurors.  If the juror responds "yes," instruct the 
juror, "With those answers to my questions in mind, please 
return to your deliberations.  Please do not discuss either my 
questions or your responses with your fellow jurors." 
 
Next, bring the entire jury back into the court room and 
inform them that your conversation with their fellow juror has 
nothing to do with their role as the sole and exclusive judges 
of the facts of this case and instruct them that the jury are 
2 
 
not to speculate on that discussion.  Then, further instruct the 
jury, "You should find the facts from a fair consideration of 
the evidence and apply those facts to the law as I have 
instructed you in order to seek to reach a fair and a just 
verdict.  In order to return a verdict of guilty or not guilty, 
the verdict must be unanimous.  You may return to your 
deliberations." 
 
Of course, things rarely go so smoothly.  If the juror 
responds "no" to either of the questions above, the judge must 
proceed with a steady hand and the utmost caution.  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Torres, 453 Mass. 722, 736 (2009).  First, the 
judge should remind the juror not to reveal any details of the 
jury's deliberations.  Then the judge should ask the juror 
whether the reason he or she responded "no" to the court's 
inquiry was personal to the juror, as opposed to reasons 
involving issues in the case or with the juror's relationship 
with his or her fellow jurors.1  If it is a personal matter, the 
                     
 
1 In Commonwealth v. Connor, 392 Mass. 838, 845 (1984), we 
stated that if a "'problem' juror is questioned, the judge 
should preliminarily inform him that he cannot be discharged 
unless he has a personal problem, unrelated to his relationship 
to his fellow jurors or his views on the case."  However, we 
have also upheld determinations by a judge where such a 
preliminary communication was not provided.  See Commonwealth v. 
Holley, 478 Mass. 508, 529-530 (2017) (defendants' argument that 
judge was required to preliminarily inform visibly ill juror 
according to Connor "elevate[d] form over substance").  The 
spirit of Connor is aimed at ascertaining whether the juror's 
issue is personal, not at informing the juror about the criteria 
3 
 
judge should then inquire as to what the personal matter is that 
is interfering with the juror's ability to be fair and 
impartial, and ascertain whether it is a "mere euphemism[]" for 
the assertion of a minority view.  See Commonwealth v. Connor, 
392 Mass. 838, 846 (1984).  If the juror attempts to disclose 
the content of jury deliberations, the judge will need to 
interrupt the juror and caution him or her yet again not to 
disclose anything about the substance or course of jury 
deliberations.  If the juror's reason for indicating his or her 
inability to deliberate are personal to the juror and divorced 
from the juror's views of the merits of the case -- and the 
juror confirms that it will prevent him or her from deliberating 
fairly -- the juror may be excused.  See id. 
 
If, on the other hand, the juror states that the reason he 
or she cannot continue deliberating is not a personal matter, 
the judge must simply inform the juror that the judge cannot 
discuss the issue, and send the juror back to continue 
deliberating.  If the juror continues to refuse, the judge could 
consider whether there has been due and thorough deliberation 
and whether it would be appropriate to give the traditional 
Tuey-Rodriquez charge to the entire jury.  See Commonwealth v. 
                     
for discharge or continuing to deliberate.  Indeed, a judge may, 
in certain circumstances, be wary of instructions that 
implicitly give a juror a roadmap of how -- or how not to -- be 
discharged. 
4 
 
Rodriquez, 364 Mass. 87, 101-102 (1973) (Appendix A); 
Commonwealth v. Tuey, 8 Cush. 1, 2-3 (1851). 
 
We recognize, of course, that such questions are often not 
amenable to following a script, despite the best efforts of the 
judge.  We also recognize that matters personal to the juror and 
those having to do with the merits of the case are not always 
easily compartmentalized.  Ultimately, in reviewing such 
matters, we must recognize that the judge needs to respond to 
such situations with leeway and agility, and that no script can 
contemplate every contingency.