Title: State v. Robert K.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2005 WI 152 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP2330 & 2004AP2331 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the Termination of Parental Rights  
to Moriah K., a Person Under the Age of  
18: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
Robert K.,  
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
In re the Termination of Parental Rights  
to Briar K., a Person Under the Age of  
18: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
Robert K.,  
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  277 Wis. 2d 876, 690 N.W.2d 886 
(Ct. App. 2004-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
November 18, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 28, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael G. Malmstadt   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
WILCOX, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
PROSSER and ROGGENSACK, J.J., join the 
concurrence. 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
2
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
by John J. Grau and Grau Law Office, Waukesha, and oral argument 
by John J. Grau. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent the cause was argued by 
Michelle Ackerman Havas, assistant district attorney, with whom 
on the brief was E. Michael McCann, district attorney. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Carol C. Petersen, 
Milwaukee, on behalf of the Legal Aid Society of Milwaukee, 
Inc., and there was oral argument by Carol C. Petersen.  
 
2005 WI 152
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP2330, 2004AP2331  
(L.C. No. 
03TP487, 03TP488) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Termination of Parental Rights  
to Moriah K., a Person Under the Age of  
18: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Robert K.,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
FILED 
 
NOV 18, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
In re the Termination of Parental Rights  
to Briar K., a Person Under the Age of  
18: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Robert K.,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
No. 
2004AP2330, 2004AP2331   
 
2 
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished opinion of the court of appeals1 affirming the order 
of the circuit court for Milwaukee County, Michael G. Malmstadt, 
Judge, terminating the parental rights of Robert K., the father 
of Briar and Moriah K.  We affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
¶2 
Robert K. challenges the order of termination.  He 
argues that because the fact-finding hearing was held more than 
45 days after the contested plea hearing, contrary to the 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 48.422(2),2 and no exception under 
Wis. Stat. § 48.315 applies, the circuit court lost competency 
to proceed with the fact-finding hearing.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 48.422(2) provides that if a petition to terminate parental 
rights is contested, the circuit court shall set a date for the 
fact-finding to be held within 45 days of the hearing on the 
petition.3  Wisconsin Stat. § 48.315 provides for delays, 
extensions, and continuances of the statutorily mandated time 
periods. 
                                                 
1 State 
v. 
Robert 
K., 
Nos. 
2004AP2330, 
2004AP2331, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2004). 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
2004 version unless otherwise noted. 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.422(2) states:  "If the petition [to 
terminate parental rights] is contested the court shall set a 
date for a fact-finding hearing to be held within 45 days of the 
hearing on the petition . . . ." 
No. 
2004AP2330, 2004AP2331   
 
3 
 
¶3 
Robert K. asserts that the circuit court improperly 
interpreted Wis. Stat. § 48.315(1)(b)4 to allow the guardian ad 
litem for the children to consent to setting the fact-finding 
hearing more than 45 days after the contested plea hearing.  He 
further asserts that the record is insufficient to establish 
good cause under Wis. Stat. § 48.315(2)5 for continuing the fact-
finding hearing beyond the 45-day time period.   
¶4 
We affirm the decision of the court of appeals and the 
order of the circuit court, but on different grounds than relied 
upon by those courts.6  We conclude that a continuance may be 
granted under Wis. Stat. § 48.315(2), independent of the other 
grounds for a continuance specified in § 48.315(1), and that the 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.315(1)(b) states:  "(1) The following 
time period shall be excluded in computing the time requirements 
within this chapter: . . . (b) Any period of delay resulting 
from a continuance granted at the request of or with the consent 
of the child and his or her counsel or of the unborn child by 
the unborn child's guardian ad litem."   
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.315(2) provides:   
A continuance shall be granted by the court only upon 
a showing of good cause in open court or during a 
telephone conference under s. 807.13 on the record and 
only for so long as is necessary, taking into account 
the request or consent of the district attorney or the 
parties and the interest of the public in the prompt 
disposition of cases.   
6 We may affirm a judgment or order of the circuit court and 
a decision of the court of appeals on different grounds than 
those relied upon by those courts.  State v. Scheidell, 227 
Wis. 2d 285, 311 n.14, 595 N.W.2d 661 (1999) (citing Koestler v. 
Pollard, 162 Wis. 2d 797, 809 n.8, 471 N.W.2d 7 (1991), and 
Liberty Trucking Co. v. DIHLR, 57 Wis. 2d 331, 342, 204 
N.W.2d 457 (1973)). 
No. 
2004AP2330, 2004AP2331   
 
4 
 
record in the present case establishes good cause under 
§ 48.315(2) for holding the fact-finding hearing beyond the 45-
day time period.  Therefore, we conclude that the circuit court 
did not lose competency to proceed with the fact-finding 
hearing.  Because we hold that good cause existed to hold the 
fact-finding hearing more than 45 days after the contested plea 
hearing, we do not address the issue upon which the circuit 
court ruled, that is, whether a guardian ad litem's acquiescence 
in the circuit court's setting the fact-finding hearing beyond 
the 45-day period fulfills the consent requirement of Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.315(1)(b). 
I 
¶5 
The undisputed facts are as follows.  Robert K. is the 
biological father of twins Briar and Moriah K., born June 22, 
2001.  Briar and Moriah, along with four other children (who are 
involved in TPR proceedings but not subject to this appeal),7 
were placed in foster care by social workers on September 25, 
2001.  On July 18, 2002, the circuit court found Briar and 
Moriah to be children in need of protection or services (CHIPS), 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 48.13(10).  On July 17, 2003, the State 
of Wisconsin filed a Petition for Termination of Parental Rights 
                                                 
7 Robert K. is also the biological father of Justin K. and 
Cody and Colt K., for whom TPR proceedings were commenced at the 
same time as those for Briar and Moriah K.  In addition, another 
child was involved in the TPR proceedings, Isiah B., the son of 
Briar and Moriah's mother but not of Robert K.  The four other 
children were involved in TPR proceedings but are not subject to 
this review. 
No. 
2004AP2330, 2004AP2331   
 
5 
 
(TPR petition), requesting that the parental rights of Robert K. 
to Briar and Moriah be terminated.   
¶6 
The State asserted two grounds for termination of 
Robert K.'s parental rights: continuing CHIPS8 and failure to 
assume parental responsibility.9 
¶7 
An initial plea hearing involving four parents subject 
to TPR petitions was held on August 8, 2003.  The plea hearing 
was rescheduled for September 19, 2003.  Robert K. does not 
contest 
this 
continuance 
beyond 
the 
30-day 
time 
period 
prescribed by Wis. Stat. § 48.422(1).10  
¶8 
Present at the September 19 plea hearing were the 
assistant district attorney, six lawyers for the parents (on 
both visitation and TPR issues), and two guardians ad litem.11  
In consultation with the parties, the circuit court determined 
that the cases should be divided into two separate trials for 
the three children of each mother.  The circuit court also 
determined that each trial would take one week to complete. 
¶9 
The circuit court initially suggested the week of 
November 3 for the first trial.  November 3 would have been 
                                                 
8 Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2). 
9 Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6). 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.422(1) provides: "The hearing on the 
petition to terminate parental rights shall be held within 30 
days after the petition is filed." 
11 One guardian ad litem was appointed to represent Justin 
K. and Cody and Colt K.  The other guardian ad litem represented 
Isiah B. and Briar and Moriah K. 
No. 
2004AP2330, 2004AP2331   
 
6 
 
within 45 days of the contested plea hearing, satisfying the 
time period established in Wis. Stat. § 48.422(2). 
¶10 No dates prior to November 3 were offered because the 
week of November 3 was the first available trial week in the 
Milwaukee County Children's Court calendar; trials are scheduled 
in the court every six weeks.12  Neither trial could be held the 
week of November 3 because the assistant district attorney and 
one guardian ad litem had other court matters scheduled.   
¶11 The next available trial week after November 3 was the 
week of December 15, but the assistant district attorney was 
scheduled in a trial in another children's court; an attorney 
for one of the birth mothers was scheduled to be in another 
trial; and one of the guardians ad litem was to be out of the 
country.   
¶12 The next available trial week in the circuit court's 
six-week schedule began on January 26, 2004.  The TPR proceeding 
for Robert K.'s older children, Justin K. and Cody and Colt K., 
was scheduled for this trial date.  The lawyer for Moriah and 
Briar's mother had two other cases scheduled for January 29, 
2004, and would have been unable to attend the full five-day 
trial.   
¶13 The circuit court then scheduled the fact-finding 
hearing for the TPR for the parents of Moriah, Briar, and their 
half-sibling Isiah on the next available trial date, March 8, 
                                                 
12 Apparently each of the eight courts comprising the 
Milwaukee County Children's Court set aside one week for intake, 
one week for initial appearances, one week for trial, and so on. 
No. 
2004AP2330, 2004AP2331   
 
7 
 
2004.  At that time, neither Robert K. nor his attorney objected 
to scheduling the fact-finding hearing in March.13  
¶14 After a five-day trial from March 8 to March 13, 2004, 
the jury found the facts required to support the grounds for 
termination 
of 
Robert 
K.'s 
parental 
rights. 
 
At 
the 
dispositional hearing held on April 23, 2004, the circuit court 
ordered the termination of Robert K.'s parental rights.  
¶15 Robert K. appealed this termination order.  The court 
of appeals held that the guardian ad litem's acquiescence to the 
March 8 hearing date was sufficient to satisfy the requirements 
of Wis. Stat. § 48.315(1)(b) (governing continuances by request 
or consent of the child and the child's counsel or the guardian 
ad litem for an unborn child) and affirmed the order of the 
circuit court terminating Robert K.'s parental rights.  
II 
¶16 The timelines for fact-finding hearings in contested 
TPR petitions in Wisconsin applicable to the instant case are 
governed by Wis. Stat. § 48.422(2) and Wis. Stat. § 48.315.   
¶17 Section 48.422(2) provides that a circuit court shall 
set a date for a fact-finding hearing within 45 days of the 
                                                 
13 No party waived the 45-day statutory time period by 
failing to object in circuit court to the circuit court's 
scheduling the fact-finding hearing in March.  A competency 
challenge based on a court's failure to act within a statutory 
time period cannot be waived by the failure to object in circuit 
court.  Sheboygan County Dep't of Social Servs. v. Matthew S., 
2005 WI 84, ¶30, 282 Wis. 2d 150, 698 N.W.2d 631 (TPR case 
involving 45-day time period between contested plea hearing and 
fact-finding hearing). 
No. 
2004AP2330, 2004AP2331   
 
8 
 
hearing on the petition unless the necessary parties agree to 
commence the hearing on the merits immediately.  Failure to 
comply with this statutory time period may result in the circuit 
court losing competence to proceed.14  
¶18 Having 
established 
time 
periods 
for 
various 
proceedings under the Children's Code, the legislature also 
recognized the importance of permitting circuit courts some 
flexibility 
to 
extend 
the 
time 
periods 
in 
appropriate 
situations.15 
¶19 Section 48.315(1) sets forth "time periods that shall 
be excluded in computing time requirements" in Chapter 48. 
Section 48.315(2) further provides that "a continuance shall be 
granted by the court only upon a showing of good cause in open 
court or during a telephone conference under s. 807.13 on the 
record and only for so long as is necessary, taking into account 
the request or consent of the district attorney or the parties 
and the interest of the public in the prompt disposition of 
cases."    
                                                 
14 See Matthew S., 282 Wis. 2d 150, ¶¶16, 36; State v. April 
O., 2000 WI App 70, ¶5, 233 Wis. 2d 663, 607 N.W.2d 927; T.H. v. 
La Crosse County, 147 Wis. 2d 22, 27-31, 33, 433 N.W.2d 16 (Ct. 
App. 1988). 
15 Matthew S., 282 Wis. 2d 150, ¶36 ("Because of the clear 
statutory language and legislative intent behind these statutes, 
we must emphasize the importance of strictly following the 
provisions of Wis. Stat. ch. 48.  While we recognize the need 
for 
flexibility 
in 
the 
Children's 
Code, 
we 
believe 
the 
legislature addressed this problem with the enactment of Wis. 
Stat. § 48.315."). 
No. 
2004AP2330, 2004AP2331   
 
9 
 
¶20 It is undisputed that the fact-finding hearing in this 
case did not occur within 45 days of the plea hearing as 
required by Wis. Stat. § 48.422(2).16  
¶21 Whether the circuit court complied with Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.315(2) when setting the date for the fact-finding hearing 
beyond the 45-day period presents a question of statutory 
interpretation.17  The interpretation and application of a 
statute to undisputed facts ordinarily is a question of law that 
this court determines independently of the circuit court and 
court of appeals, but benefiting from the analysis of both.18 
¶22 We first address whether the action taken by the 
circuit court is governed by Wis. Stat. § 48.315(2), which 
refers only to "continuances." 
¶23 The present case does not involve what is often 
thought of as a continuance.  The fact-finding hearing was not 
set within the 45-day period and then continued beyond the 45-
day period.  Rather, the fact-finding hearing was initially set 
beyond the 45-day period. 
                                                 
16 The time period between the plea hearing on September 19, 
2003, and the fact-finding hearing on March 8, 2004, was almost 
six months, approximately four and one-half months beyond the 
45-day time period. 
17 April O., 233 Wis. 2d 663, ¶6 (TPR relating to 30-day 
statutory period between filing of petition and plea and 45-day 
statutory period between fact-finding hearing and disposition 
hearing). 
18 State v. Morford, 2004 WI 5, ¶19, 268 Wis. 2d 300, 674 
N.W.2d 349. 
No. 
2004AP2330, 2004AP2331   
 
10 
 
¶24 The 
ordinary 
usage 
of 
the 
word 
"continuance" 
encompasses more than just events set for and beginning on a 
fixed date and then continued to a later date.  A continuance 
also encompasses a postponement, that is, a delay of an event 
that has no set date until a future date.19  
¶25 Indeed, cases under the Children's Code have applied 
Wis. Stat. § 48.315(2) to situations like the present case in 
which a circuit court initially schedules a hearing beyond the 
statutorily prescribed period.20  The court has written that Wis. 
Stat. § 48.315(2) is applicable to "all extensions of time under 
the Children's Code."21  
¶26 Were 
we 
to 
define 
"continuance" 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.315(2) narrowly, a circuit court would have to set a date 
for a fact-finding hearing within the statutorily mandated 45-
day time period, knowing the hearing would not take place.  At 
the scheduled date the circuit court would receive and grant a 
motion for a continuance to another date.  This process would 
entail a great waste of time and resources and favors form over 
substance.  The legislature could not have intended this result.   
                                                 
19 See any dictionary. 
20 See, e.g., State v. Quinsanna D., 2002 WI App 318, ¶¶25-
26, 259 Wis. 2d 429, 655 N.W.2d 752 (TPR case; at conclusion of 
fact-finding 
hearing, 
circuit 
court 
scheduled 
disposition 
proceeding beyond the 45-day time period under Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.424(2) for scheduling disposition hearing). 
21 M.G. v. La Crosse County Human Servs. Dep't, 150 
Wis. 2d 407, 418, 441 N.W.2d 227 (1989) (CHIPS case). 
No. 
2004AP2330, 2004AP2331   
 
11 
 
¶27 Defining 
the 
word 
"continuance" 
to 
include 
postponement comports with the legislative purpose.  In M.G. v. 
La Crosse County Human Services Department, 150 Wis. 2d 407, 441 
N.W.2d 227 (1989), the court declared that "the applicability of 
section 48.315 to the entire Children's Code suggests that a 
restrictive interpretation of this general provision is not 
appropriate.  Although the express conditions of this section 
should be carefully construed, they must be given a reasonable 
reading."22     
¶28 We therefore conclude that the word "continuance" in 
Wis. Stat. § 48.315(2) is sufficiently broad to encompass 
situations in which the fact-finding hearing is originally 
scheduled beyond the statutory 45-day time period.   
¶29 We turn now to whether, as a matter of statutory 
interpretation, a court's calendar and lawyers' scheduling 
conflicts 
may 
constitute 
good 
cause 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.315(2).  No provision in § 48.315 explicitly states that a 
circuit court's schedule or lawyers' or litigants' difficulties 
in scheduling court dates amount to good cause for extension, 
delay, or continuance under § 48.315(2).23   
                                                 
22 M.G., 150 Wis. 2d at 418 (holding good cause existed for 
extension of time in CHIPS case). 
23 Although Wis. Stat. § 48.315 (in the Children's Code) and 
Wis. Stat. § 938.315 (in the Juvenile Justice Code) are 
substantially similar, § 938.315(1)(dm) has no counterpart in 
§ 48.315.  Section 938.315(1)(dm) reads as follows:  
The following time periods shall be excluded in 
computing time requirements in this chapter:  
No. 
2004AP2330, 2004AP2331   
 
12 
 
¶30 Case law supports the conclusion that lawyer and 
litigant scheduling problems may constitute good cause under 
Wis. Stat. § 48.315(2).  In State v. Quinsanna D., 2002 WI 318, 
259 Wis. 2d 429, 655 N.W.2d 752, concerning the 45-day time 
period between an uncontested plea hearing and a dispositional 
hearing, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
recognized 
that 
lawyers' 
scheduling difficulties constitute good cause under Wis. Stat. § 
48.315(2).24 
III 
¶31 We must now decide whether the facts of record in the 
present case constitute good cause justifying the setting of the 
fact-finding hearing beyond the 45-day time period established 
in Wis. Stat. § 48.422(2) and whether, in accordance with 
§ 48.315(2), the continuance was only for so long as was 
                                                                                                                                                             
 . . . Any 
period of 
delay resulting 
from 
court 
congestion or scheduling.   
Chapter 938 was created by 1995 Wis. Act 77.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 938.315(1)(dm) was added by 1995 Wis. Act 354.  The 
drafting history reveals that Wis. Stat. § 938.315(1)(dm) was 
added to codify the ruling in J.R. v. State, 152 Wis. 2d 598, 
607, 449 N.W.2d 52 (Ct. App. 1989), a juvenile justice case 
holding that "[a] good cause adjournment of a fact-finding 
hearing by a trial court sua sponte due to court congestion is a 
proper method to adjourn the fact-finding hearing."  See Letter 
from 
Racine 
County 
District 
Attorney 
Robert 
Flancher 
to 
Representative Bonnie Ladwig, Feb. 13, 1996, Drafting Records to 
95 Wis. Act 352 (available at Legislative Reference Bureau, 
Madison, Wis.).   
Nothing in the legislative history indicates that the 
legislature was trying to distinguish in this manner Wis. Stat. 
§§ 938.315 and 48.315. 
24 Quinsanna D., 259 Wis. 2d 429, ¶39. 
No. 
2004AP2330, 2004AP2331   
 
13 
 
necessary, taking into account the request or consent of the 
district attorney or the parties and the interest of the public 
in the prompt disposition of cases.25  
¶32 By its plain language, Wis. Stat. § 48.315(2) provides 
a continuance be granted, inter alia, "only upon a showing of 
good cause in open court or during a telephone conference under 
s. 807.13 on the record."  In the present case, in open court, 
within the 45-day time period, and with all parties present, the 
circuit court scheduled the fact-finding hearing for a date 
beyond the 45-day time period.26  The circuit court did not 
mention Wis. Stat. § 48.315(2) and never explicitly stated that 
good cause existed for scheduling the fact-finding hearing after 
the applicable 45-day statutory time period ended.       
                                                 
25 The State's motion to strike arguments from Robert K.'s 
brief relating to whether there was good cause to hold the 
hearing outside of the 45-day time limit and whether the hearing 
was continued for only so long as necessary is denied. 
26 We contrast the present case with other cases in which 
good cause was not found.  In Matthew S., 282 Wis. 2d 150, ¶¶2, 
6, 36, involving scheduling a fact-finding hearing beyond the 
45-day time period, the circuit court lost competency because it 
failed to grant a proper extension or continuance on the record 
in open court.  The circuit court rescheduled the fact-finding 
hearing based on letters written by the deputy district attorney 
and the father's attorney requesting a continuance.  In 
contrast, the record in this case shows that the circuit court 
granted a continuance in open court prior to the expiration of 
the 45-day time period. 
In April O., 233 Wis. 2d 663, ¶¶3, 11, the court of appeals 
held that the circuit court lost competency for a dispositional 
hearing because "it did not properly extend the time limit by 
finding, before the time limit [under § 48.424(4)] expired and 
in open court, that good cause existed."   
No. 
2004AP2330, 2004AP2331   
 
14 
 
¶33 Case law establishes, however, that a circuit court 
need not refer to Wis. Stat. § 48.315(2) in open court in 
scheduling fact-finding hearings and need not utter any magic 
words or deliver any special utterances to invoke § 48.315(2).  
The court of appeals explained as follows:   
Where the record "contains ample evidence to support a 
finding of good cause" for a continuance of a 
termination hearing, the trial court's "incantation of 
statutory phrases [is] unnecessary" for this court to 
conclude that a continuance, beyond what otherwise 
would have been the statutory time limits, does not 
deprive the trial court of competence.27 
¶34 A reviewing court may examine the record to determine 
whether good cause existed under Wis. Stat. § 48.315(2) and 
whether the delay was only for so long as necessary.  A 
reviewing court "will affirm decisions of the trial court if 
that court reached a result that the evidence would sustain had 
a specific finding supporting that result been made."28  Although 
good cause can be inferred when the record contains ample 
evidence to support such a determination, the court urges, as 
explained below, that a circuit court state on the record its 
reasoning for continuing, delaying or extending a fact-finding 
hearing beyond the 45-day period between the plea hearing and 
the fact-finding hearing in a TPR proceeding.     
                                                 
27 Quinsanna D., 259 Wis. 2d 429, ¶38 (a TPR case; quoting 
R.A.C.P. v. State, 157 Wis. 2d 106, 113, 458 N.W.2d 823 (Ct. 
App. 1990)). 
28 R.A.C.P. v. State, 157 Wis. 2d 106, 113, 458 N.W.2d 823 
(Ct. App. 1990)(a TPR case). 
No. 
2004AP2330, 2004AP2331   
 
15 
 
¶35 Although a determination of good cause may be based on 
many factors, courts have emphasized the following four factors 
when evaluating good cause:  (1) good faith of the moving party; 
(2) prejudice to the opposing party; (3) prompt remedial action 
by the dilatory party; and (4) the best interest of the child.29   
¶36 Regarding the first factor in evaluating good cause, 
no evidence exists in the record that any party was seeking to 
extend the date of the fact-finding hearing without the 
requisite good faith.  The discussions on the record about 
scheduling suggest that the circuit court, litigants, and 
lawyers did their best to accommodate the scheduling needs of 
the various participants, while working within the calendaring 
constraints of the Milwaukee County circuit court.   
¶37 The dates for the fact-finding hearings had to fit the 
circuit court's calendar.  The Milwaukee County Children's Court 
operates on a six-week trial cycle, with one week of the cycle 
devoted to trials.  According to the record, to adhere to the 
six-week cycle the circuit court could not schedule a jury trial 
before November 3, 2003. 
¶38 The sheer number of persons involved in the hearings 
significantly affected the circuit court's ability to schedule 
the matter.  There were two guardians ad litem, the assistant 
district attorney, four parents, and six attorneys representing 
the parents.  Several had obligations that interfered with 
                                                 
29 M.G., 150 Wis. 2d at 418 n.12 (CHIPS case; quoting with 
approval F.E.W. v. State, 143 Wis. 2d 856, 861, 422 N.W.2d 893 
(Ct. App. 1988) (delinquency case)). 
No. 
2004AP2330, 2004AP2331   
 
16 
 
scheduling the hearings.  Each attorney had obligations to other 
clients and other courts to appear at already scheduled trials.  
Requiring attorneys to reschedule other trials to accommodate 
the present case would do no more than force another circuit 
court in another proceeding (and the parties therein) to bear 
the burden of delay and perhaps fail to meet statutory time 
deadlines.  
¶39 November 3, the first date offered by the circuit 
court, was within the statutory time period.  The guardian ad 
litem for one set of children would have been unable to attend 
the final day of the week-long trial had it been held the week 
of November 3, 2003.  The assistant district attorney had a 
trial scheduled during this week. 
¶40 The next available circuit court trial date after 
November 3 was December 15, 2003.  During the week of December 
15, the assistant district attorney and the attorney for one of 
the mothers were both scheduled to be in trial.  In addition, 
one of the guardians ad litem was unavailable.  
¶41 The circuit court proceeded to schedule the trials for 
the next two available trial dates, January 29 and March 8.  
Robert K.'s other children were assigned the January 29 date 
because the lawyer for Moriah and Briar's mother had two other 
cases scheduled on that date.  Each trial was scheduled to be 
one week long and each required the presence of Robert K.  
Working within these restrictions, the circuit court scheduled 
the trials back-to-back, within the confines of its six-week 
No. 
2004AP2330, 2004AP2331   
 
17 
 
trial cycle.  These dates were the first practicable dates for 
all involved.30 
¶42 The 
following 
exchange 
is 
illustrative 
of 
the 
difficulties faced by the parties and the circuit court in 
setting a date for the fact-finding hearings.  December 15 met 
with the following objections: 
THE COURT: Okay.  Next date I have available is 
December 15th. 
MS. ACKERMAN [ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY]: I'm in 
trial. 
 
. . . .  
MS. SMITH [GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOR JUSTIN, COLT, AND 
CODY]: I'm out of the country. 
MR. ROTHSTEIN [ATTORNEY FOR MOTHER OF BRIAR AND 
MORIAH]: I'm in a jury trial.  
¶43 The record supports the State's description of the 
dilemma faced by the circuit court in scheduling the fact-
finding 
hearing 
within 
the 
time 
periods 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.422(2): 
The 
efforts 
of 
the 
court 
were 
stymied 
by 
the 
complexity and size of Robert K.'s family structure, 
which resulted in the need for multiple counsel to be 
appointed for the mothers of his children, the need to 
separate his children into two groups so that the 
trials could be as straight forward as possible (using 
the GAL for each set of children that had represented 
them in the CHIPS proceedings and knew the history of 
the case), and the need for a full week of trial time 
given the volume of documents produced by the work of 
                                                 
30 Robert K. argues that the court could have scheduled one 
of the trials to be heard in front of another judge.  The record 
does not show, however, whether another court was available. 
No. 
2004AP2330, 2004AP2331   
 
18 
 
the BMCW [Bureau of Milwaukee Child Welfare] on Robert 
K.'s behalf. 
¶44 Rather than scheduling a hearing on a date at which 
some would be absent, and risking a continuance based upon their 
absence, the circuit court found dates suitable to all parties 
involved.  The circuit court was then committed to those dates, 
declaring that they were "written in stone."     
¶45 The circuit court made clear that it would not 
consider an adjournment request by any party once the fact-
finding hearing dates were set: 
MR. McCLINDEN [ATTORNEY FOR ROBERT K.]: These dates 
are going to stay?  
THE 
COURT: 
You 
bet. 
We 
are 
not 
changing——the 
substitution is not going to change dates.  We have 
eight judges out here.  I will rope one of them into 
making sure that they will be doing this case on those 
dates, and I will be doing their calendar. We are not 
going 
to 
change 
dates. . . . [I]f 
there 
is 
a 
substitution filed on me, the dates would stay the 
same. . . . We all know that if that should happen, 
the dates are going to stay the same because the civil 
judge who gets this case——because we have in effect 
nine available judges to do this case, ten, so the 
dates are written in stone.  Okay? 
¶46 Were we faced with a case in which the circuit court's 
calendar was not based on a six-week cycle, in which parties and 
attorneys were not required for two trials, and in which the 
requests for different dates were premised on less valid 
concerns than conflicting court appearances, we might not be 
persuaded that the individuals were acting in good faith, given 
the importance of the statutory time period.  But where, as 
No. 
2004AP2330, 2004AP2331   
 
19 
 
here, the circumstances made scheduling unusually troublesome, 
the record supports the existence of good faith.  
¶47 The second factor in evaluating good cause is whether 
the objecting party has been prejudiced.  Between the plea 
hearing and the fact-finding hearing, Robert K. did not have 
visitation rights to his children.  He contends that he was 
prejudiced by the delay based upon his inability to see his 
children during that period of time.   
¶48 While we are not insensitive to this concern, Robert 
K. has shown no prejudice relating to the outcome of the 
proceedings caused by scheduling the fact-finding hearing after 
the 45-day statutory time period ran.   
¶49 Indeed, the delay in the hearing might have afforded 
Robert K. time to meet the conditions for safe return of the 
children within twelve months of the fact-finding hearing.31  
When considering whether to terminate parental rights, a jury 
must consider "all evidence bearing on that question, including 
evidence of events and conduct occurring since the filing of the 
petition . . . ."32  Thus, during the delay, Robert K. had the 
opportunity to change his behavior such that a jury could be 
convinced that he would meet the conditions for safe return of 
his children within twelve months of the fact-finding hearing.    
¶50 The third factor in evaluating good cause is whether 
the dilatory party took prompt remedial action.  This factor is 
                                                 
31 Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a)3. 
32 Wis JI——Children 324. 
No. 
2004AP2330, 2004AP2331   
 
20 
 
not applicable here.  There was no dilatory party.  The circuit 
court offered each and every available trial week between the 
September 19 plea hearing and the fact-finding hearing scheduled 
in March.  Each individual who expressed scheduling difficulties 
made an effort to be available at the next open trial date.     
¶51 The fourth factor in evaluating good cause is the best 
interest of the child.  Scheduling a fact-finding hearing when 
each parent, lawyer, and guardian ad litem can be present 
promotes an accurate determination of termination of parental 
rights and in the present case was in the best interest of the 
children.   
¶52 Thus we conclude that all four factors were met in 
evaluating good cause under Wis. Stat. § 48.315(2). 
¶53 Furthermore, the delay was no longer than necessary.  
In the instant case, the complexity and size of Robert K.'s 
family made it necessary to have multiple lawyers and guardians 
ad litem present.  By scheduling the fact-finding hearing for a 
date beyond the 45-day time period, the circuit court ensured 
the appearance of and representation for all parties in this 
case.  The facts of the instant case show that, given the 
circuit court's six-week trial cycle and the scheduling problems 
of the many attorneys, the delay was no longer than was 
necessary. 
¶54 Not all cases will support a six-month time period 
between 
the 
plea 
hearing 
and 
the 
fact-finding 
hearing.  
Scheduling conflicts for the circuit court or the attorneys or 
litigants will not always constitute good cause.  This court 
No. 
2004AP2330, 2004AP2331   
 
21 
 
well understands the docket pressures in the circuit courts.  
Such pressures do not, however, relieve circuit courts of their 
responsibility to follow the strict time limits prescribed in 
the Children's Code and the legislative requirement that these 
matters be handled within the prescribed time periods.  In the 
present 
case, 
the 
circumstances 
satisfy 
the 
good 
cause 
requirement of Wis. Stat. § 48.315(2).  
¶55 Before we conclude, we urge each circuit court that 
relies on Wis. Stat. § 48.315(2) to cite the statute on the 
record; to state the basis for concluding good cause exists to 
continue, delay or extend a fact-finding hearing beyond the 45-
day period between the plea hearing and the fact-finding hearing 
in a TPR proceeding; and to explain that the fact-finding 
hearing was not delayed longer than was necessary.33  In other 
words, the record should reflect the circuit court's concern 
with meeting the mandatory statutory time periods and protecting 
the rights of parents, children, and the public by making clear 
under § 48.315(2) the factors that influence its decision to 
delay, continue, or extend a hearing beyond the mandatory time 
periods. 
¶56 When a circuit court states on the record its basis 
for finding good cause, the parties and reviewing courts are 
                                                 
33 This court has previously stated its preference for 
explicit reasoning on the record when granting continuances, 
extensions, or delays: "We suggest that trial judges when 
addressing these questions [concerning extensions of time] refer 
directly to and cite the appropriate statutory provision." M.G., 
150 Wis. 2d at 418 (CHIPS case). 
No. 
2004AP2330, 2004AP2331   
 
22 
 
assured that the circuit court has considered the legislative 
directive for prompt disposition of TPR cases.  With such a 
record, fewer appeals are likely to ensue based on whether good 
cause existed under Wis. Stat. § 48.315(2).  While we recognize 
such a procedure might place a slight burden on the circuit 
court, this burden is outweighed by the substantial benefit to 
the parties, the public, and the legal system. 
¶57 We reiterate the importance of complying with the 
statutorily mandated time period.34  Circuit courts must take 
seriously the time periods the legislature has established in 
the Children's Code.  A child's calculation of time differs from 
an adult's.  "What seems like a short wait to an adult can be an 
intolerable separation to a young child to whom a week can seem 
like a year and a month forever."35  Therefore, it is incumbent 
                                                 
34 The federal courts have recognized that Milwaukee County 
has had difficulties disposing of adoption-related cases quickly 
and effectively.  The Milwaukee County foster care system is 
currently operated under the supervision of a consent decree 
entered by a federal court.  See Jeanine B. v. McCullum, No. 93-
C-0547, consent decree (E.D. Wis. June 19, 2001). The consent 
decree is premised on the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 
(ASFA).  For discussions of ASFA, see Thomas J. Walsh, The Clock 
Is Ticking: Do the Time Limits in Wisconsin's Termination of 
Parental Rights Cases Serve the Best Interests of Children?, 83 
Marq. L. Rev. 743 (2000); Madelyn Freundlich, Expediting 
Termination of Parental Rights: Solving a Problem or Sowing the 
Seeds of a New Predicament?, 28 Cap. U. L. Rev. 97 (1999); 
Stephanie Jill Gendell, In Search of Permanency: A Reflection on 
the First 3 Years of the Adoption and Safe Families Act 
Implementation, 39 Fam. Ct. Rev. 25 (2001). 
35 T.H. v. La Crosse County, 147 Wis. 2d 22, 37, 433 
N.W.2d 16 (Ct. App. 1988) (delinquency case; citing The Model 
Statute for Termination of Parental Rights, reprinted in The 
National Bench Book for Juvenile Courts 154 (rev. ed. 1979)). 
No. 
2004AP2330, 2004AP2331   
 
23 
 
upon a circuit court to minimize the uncertainty in a child's 
life and to protect constitutional rights by concluding a 
proceeding on termination of parental rights with dispatch.  A 
circuit court's failure to comply with the statutory time 
periods may result in loss of competency to proceed. 
¶58 We affirm the decision of the court of appeals and 
order of the circuit court, but on different grounds than relied 
upon by those courts.  We conclude that a continuance may be 
granted under Wis. Stat. § 48.315(2), independent of the other 
grounds for a continuance specified in § 48.315(1), and that the 
record in the present case establishes good cause under 
§ 48.315(2) for holding the fact-finding hearing beyond the 45-
day time period.  Therefore, we conclude that the circuit court 
did not lose competency to proceed with the fact-finding 
hearing.  Because we hold that good cause existed to hold the 
fact-finding hearing more than 45 days after the contested plea 
hearing, we do not address the issue upon which the circuit 
court ruled, that is, whether a guardian ad litem's acquiescence 
in the circuit court's setting the fact-finding hearing beyond 
the 45-day period fulfills the consent requirement of Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.315(1)(b). 
¶59 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2004AP2330, 2004AP2331.jpw 
 
1 
 
¶60 JON P. WILCOX, J.   (concurring).  I agree with the 
majority that a continuance may be granted directly under 
Wis. Stat. § 48.315(2) (2003-04).36  Furthermore, I agree that a 
proper continuance was granted in this case, as the record 
establishes the requisite good cause under § 48.315(2).  I write 
separately to address my concern that the majority does not 
adequately recognize the problems of court congestion and that 
such congestion may, in appropriate instances such as this, 
constitute good cause for a continuance.   
¶61 The problems in conducting the fact-finding hearing 
beyond the 45-day time limit mandated by Wis. Stat. § 48.422(2) 
were not limited to lawyer and litigant scheduling problems.  
Another significant problem, but discussed only offhand by the 
majority, was the lack of available dates in the court's 
calendar.  Notably, the court needed a full week of trial time 
to properly hear all of the evidence, given the volume of 
documents produced by the Bureau of Milwaukee Child Welfare.   
¶62 The week of November 3, 2003, was the first available 
time frame on the circuit court's calendar.  The fact-finding 
hearing would have been within the 45-day time period required 
under § 48.422(2) on this date.  When the assistant district 
attorney and one of the guardians ad litem notified the court of 
scheduling conflicts, Robert K. argues that there was no reason 
given for why dates prior to November 3 were never considered.   
                                                 
36 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are 
to the 2003-04 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2004AP2330, 2004AP2331.jpw 
 
2 
 
¶63 I believe that it is readily apparent that court 
congestion was a significant factor in the delay of this case.  
There simply were no other dates prior to November 3 available 
for a full week of trial time.  The Milwaukee County Children's 
Court is on a tight six-week scheduling system that makes it 
extremely difficult in complicated TPR cases such as this one, 
to meet the strict timing demands of the Children's Code despite 
the best efforts of a sometimes overwhelmed judiciary.   
¶64 Indeed, Wisconsin case law has recognized that court 
congestion 
may 
be 
a 
legitimate 
reason 
for 
granting 
a 
continuance.  As the court of appeals has stated:  "A 
continuance can be granted by a court to a party under 
§ 48.315(2) for court congestion provided that good cause is 
shown and the trial court does so in a timely manner on the 
record."  In re J.R., 152 Wis. 2d 598, 607, 449 N.W.2d 52 (Ct. 
App. 1989); accord State v. April O., 2000 WI App 70, ¶9, 233 
Wis. 2d 663, 607 N.W.2d 927.   
¶65 It is no secret that court congestion is a serious 
problem that plagues the Milwaukee County Children's Court and 
affects its ability to meet the statutory deadlines of Chapter 
48.  Granted, congestion may not constitute good cause in every 
instance, but in this case, congestion clearly was an important 
factor that bore on the decision to extend the time beyond the 
45-day limit between the hearing on the petition and the fact-
finding hearing.  
As 
such, 
the 
court should 
take 
this 
opportunity to acknowledge that congestion may constitute good 
No.  2004AP2330, 2004AP2331.jpw 
 
3 
 
cause 
sufficient 
for 
a 
continuance 
under 
§ 48.315(2) 
in 
appropriate instances. 
¶66 I am authorized to state that Justices DAVID T. 
PROSSER and PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join this concurrence.
No.  2004AP2330, 2004AP2331.jpw 
 
 
 
1