Title: Shelly v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC16-1195 
____________ 
 
LESHANNON JEROME SHELLY, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
December 13, 2018 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
LeShannon Jerome Shelly seeks review of the decision of the Fourth District 
Court of Appeal in Shelly v. State, 199 So. 3d 973 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016), on the 
basis that it expressly and directly conflicts with the decision of this Court in 
Welch v. State, 992 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 2008), on a question of law.  The decision 
below references Moss v. State, 60 So. 3d 540 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011), instead of 
Welch, even though it states that Shelly reinitiated communication after invoking 
his right to counsel.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. 
 
 
 
- 2 - 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On December 14, 2011, around 11:15 p.m., officers were called to the 
Orangewood Apartments in Indian River County, Florida, in response to a reported 
shooting.  Upon arrival, officers found two victims, Shanice Smith, who was dead, 
and Brittany Jackson, who was still alive.  The following day, Shelly appeared at 
the Indian River County Jail at approximately 5:00 a.m.  Shelly agreed to answer 
questions after being taken to the interrogation room and read his Miranda1 rights.  
The entire interrogation was videotaped and monitored.2     
 
Shelly claimed he was in Boynton Beach with two friends during the time of 
the murder.  However, Detective Kevin Heinig informed Shelly that both of his 
friends claimed that they were not with Shelly past 9:45 p.m.    
[Detective Heinig]:  Okay, um--you said you went down to South 
Florida? 
 
[Shelly]:  Yes sir.  
[Detective Heinig]:  And who was it you went with? 
[Shelly]:  Loudy and Ayesha Harden. 
[Detective Heinig]:  Who? 
[Shelly]:  Loudy Monplasir and Ayesha Harden. 
                                          
 
 
1.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 
2.  The entire interrogation lasted approximately four and one-half hours. 
 
- 3 - 
[Detective Heinig]:  Okay, I just spoke with both of them. 
[Shelly]:  Yes sir.  
[Detective Heinig]:  Okay.  Loudy tells me that they picked you up at 
9:30.  Oh no, I’m sorry.  Yes, they came to your house around 9:30, 
9:40, they picked you up, they took you to This and That and you 
bought a couple of things, they took you back home 9:45, somewhere 
in that area and they haven’t seen you again for the rest of the night. 
 
[Shelly]:  Man, yea right.   
 
[Detective Heinig]:  They’re, they’re both telling me that.  
 
Detective Heinig then informed Shelly that he was spotted by two 
eyewitnesses leaving the vicinity of the murder shortly after gunshots were heard.   
[Detective Heinig]:  Okay.  We also have a eye witness that witnessed 
the shooting at the park.  They saw the shooter. 
 
[Shelly]:  Yea.   
[Detective Heinig]:  Listen.  They saw the shooter shoot three times, 
turn around, turn back shoot two more times, and then was east 
through the complex.   
 
. . . .  
 
[Detective Heinig]:  Then I have another witness that sees you, one 
hundred percent sure you, they’ve known you for a long time-- 
 
[Shelly]:  Yea. 
 
[Detective Heinig]:  --go out of Orangewood Apartments through the 
back of it, cross across 30th. onto 43rd. Street.  
 
[Shelly]:  Yea. 
 
- 4 - 
[Detective Heinig]:  You were talking on your cell phone when you 
walked by them.   
 
[Shelly]:  I what?  Talking to myself? 
[Detective Heinig]:  Talking on your cell phone, had your cell phone 
up to your ear.   
 
[Shelly]:  How is that possible when I’m on 95-- 
 
[Detective Heinig]:  You’re not.  
[Shelly]:  --at the time? 
[Detective Heinig]:  You’re not on 95, because they’re telling me that 
you aren’t with them. 
 
Shelly then asked Detective Heinig to call his mother so she could confirm 
that he was dropped off by his two friends at the Fort Pierce Greyhound bus station 
after coming back from Boynton Beach.  Detective Heinig exited the interrogation 
room and Detective Chris Cassinari entered.  Detective Cassinari pointed out 
several issues within Shelly’s account of his whereabouts.  Shelly then asked 
Detective Cassinari to call his mother so she could corroborate his alibi.    
[Shelly]:  . . . I wasn’t there.  I don’t know who was there.  I know I 
wasn’t there.  And I know I was with Ayesha Harden.  Why would I 
bring they name up out of the blue? 
 
[Detective Cassinari]:  I don’t know why you would.   
 
[Shelly]:  I was with--call my mom.  You have a phone right there, all 
you got to do is call . . . “Mom who dropped me off at the um--
Greyhound Station right beside you in the green Honda?”  That’s all I 
want to know.  
 
 
- 5 - 
Detective Cassinari then exited the interrogation room.  While alone in the 
room, Shelly stated, “Y’all better watch the First 48.[3]  I ain’t done it.  I ain’t do it.  
When the man say he ain’t do it let ’em talk to his lawyer, y’all got to let ’em go 
man.  Y’all don’t have no evidence on me, dog.”  Detective Heinig then entered 
the room and played a portion of a recorded conversation that the detectives had 
with Shelly’s grandmother.  Shelly became frustrated that the detectives had 
spoken with his grandmother instead of his mother.  Detective Heinig explained to 
Shelly that Shelly’s mother was also on the phone during the conversation.  The 
following exchange then occurred: 
[Shelly]:  --call the 501 number on the top, that’s Adam.  Man, the 
man picked me up man.  Y’all asked my grandma.  I ain’t asked you 
to ask my grandma.  My grandma wasn’t there man.  Y’all tripping 
dude.  Y’all going all out the boundaries bro.  Man, let me talk to my 
lawyer now, dog.  Let me talk to my lawyer now man, since y’all 
want to play crazy.  Shit, man, y’all tripping, dog.  I ain’t doing 
nothing else without my lawyer, dog.  Lock me up, whatever you got 
to do.  I ain’t doing no more talking, now y’all tripping, dog.  Y’all 
asking my grandma, a person wasn’t even there.  My grandma ain’t 
had nothing to do with me picking up.  My grandma don’t know 
what’s going on man.      
 
[Detective Heinig]:  Stand up.  
 
                                          
 
 
3.  “The First 48” is a nonfiction investigative television series that “takes 
viewers behind the scenes of real-life investigations as it follows homicide 
detectives in the critical first 48 hours of murder investigations, giving viewers 
unprecedented access to crime scenes, interrogations and forensic processing.”  A 
& E Network, The First 48, a&etv.com, http://www.aetv.com/shows/the-first-48 
(last visited Aug. 20, 2017). 
 
- 6 - 
[Shelly]:  Yes, I’m gonna stand up.  
 
[Detective Heinig]:  Put your hands behind your back.  
 
[Shelly]:  Yea.  Yea man.  Doing no more talking without the lawyer.  
Y’all are asking my grandma.  My grandma at the house man.  I say 
call my mom, not my grandma.  Y’all call the last number-- 
 
[Detective Heinig]:  (Unintelligible) mom talked first-- 
 
[Shelly]:  --(Unintelligible), man call Adam-- 
 
[Detective Heinig]:  (Unintelligible.) 
 
[Shelly]:  --the number that’s on there last.  The man that was with my 
mom in Fort Pierce that picked me up from the Greyhound Station 
man.  
 
[Detective Heinig]:  Who we got to transport?  There’s no more 
runaround.  
 
[Shelly]:  Ain’t no more runaround? 
 
[Detective Heinig]:  (Unintelligible).  They’re gonna have to do the 
header first.  
 
[Shelly]:  Y’all gonna ask my grandma.  The shooter had--y’all said 
the shooter had on pants, I got shorts on and flip flops.   
 
[Detective Heinig]:  (Unintelligible) and have a seat.  
 
[Shelly]:  Huh? 
 
[Detective Heinig]:  Have a seat.   
 
 
Detective Heinig then stood immediately outside of the interrogation room 
and had a brief conversation with other detectives concerning Shelly’s pending 
transfer to jail.  While Detective Heinig was speaking with the other detectives 
 
- 7 - 
Shelly continued to make comments with regard to the phone call with his mother 
and grandmother.   
[Shelly]:  (Unintelligible.)  Y’all ready? 
 
[Detective Heinig]:  No.   
 
[Shelly]:  Oh.  
 
[Detective Heinig]:  Just relax. 
 
[Shelly]:  Alright.  I said, call my mom, you called my grandma.  
 
[Detective Heinig]:  (Unintelligible.) 
 
[Shelly]:  Excuse me sir.  My grandma don’t have anything to do 
with--my grandma was home. 
 
[Detective Heinig]:  I know they--when they talked to her-- 
 
[Shelly]:  Man you can’t talk to my grandma.  My momma is 
aggravated right now cause she feel like y’all trying to hinder me right 
now.  Talk to my mom, dog.  Ta--sir, not dog, but sir.  
 
[Detective Heinig]:  Alright. 
 
 
Detective Heinig then exited the room and Detective Tony Consalo entered.  
The following exchange then took place. 
[Detective Consalo]:  We’ll be taking you next door in just a few 
minutes.  
 
[Shelly]:  Yes sir, I understand that.  Hey sir--excuse me man, sir.  All 
I ask can you do one thing.  
 
[Detective Consalo]:  What is that? 
 
[Shelly]:  Just call my mom, man.  At--listen, sir-- 
 
- 8 - 
 
[Detective Consalo]:  Shannon-- 
 
[Shelly]:  --I’m trying to tell you-- 
 
[Detective Consalo]:  --listen, I just talked to your mom.  Your mom 
called here.  
 
[Shelly]:  Yea.  
 
[Detective Consalo]:  Okay.  I-- 
 
[Shelly]:  Didn’t she pick me up from Fort Pierce, sir? 
 
[Detective Consalo]:  Listen to me.  Okay, you, you already--you 
asked for an attorney, okay you didn’t want to talk anymore. 
 
[Shelly]:  Yea. 
 
[Detective Consalo]:  Do you--so I’m not gonna ask you any 
questions.  
 
[Shelly]:  Alright. 
 
[Detective Consalo]:  Okay?  If you want me to answer that question 
then you need to tell me that you want to reinitiate conversation with 
us.  Alright, cause I was the one that talked to your mom.  
 
[Shelly]:  I know my mom picked me up from Fort Pierce sir. 
 
[Detective Consalo]:  Okay.   
 
[Shelly]:  We met there dog.  Sir.  Not dog, but sir.  I know we did.  I 
know we did.  I know we did.  I know we did.  We was there man.  
She was there sitting in a green Honda, right in the um--the 
Greyhound Station in Fort Pierce, that station, the Greyhound-- 
 
[Detective Consalo]:  Listen-- 
 
[Shelly]:  --(Unintelligible). 
 
- 9 - 
 
[Detective Consalo]:  You, you know your rights, you know you 
might not want to say--if you want to talk to us a little bit longer then 
you need to say I want to talk to you a little bit longer-- 
 
[Shelly]:  No.  
 
[Detective Consalo]:  --and I’ll sit there and talk to you.  Okay? 
 
[Shelly]:  Y’all fixing to book me for nothing.  What y’all booking me 
ah--like for?  Okay, no more talk.  
 
[Detective Consalo]:  Ah--that’s up to you.  You said, you, you-- 
 
[Shelly]:  (Unintelligible.) 
 
[Detective Consalo]:  --(Unintelligible). 
 
[Shelly]:  No, I’m alright.  I’m alright.   
 
[Detective Consalo]:  You, you said that you-- 
 
[Shelly]:  No more talking. 
 
[Detective Consalo]:  --wanted your attorney, so no more talking.  
 
[Shelly]:  Yea.  
 
[Detective Consalo]:  If you want to talk I will be more than happy 
and I’m gonna shoot straight with you.  I’ve known your family for a 
long time.  I’ve played softball with your, your, your uncle a many, 
many times, great-- 
 
[Shelly]:  Sir, and-- 
 
[Detective Consalo]:  --softball player.  
 
[Shelly]:  --guess what?  That’s who picked me up man.  
 
[Detective Consalo]:  I--I’m-- 
 
- 10 - 
 
[Shelly]:  Alright, you want--I’ll tal--I’ll talk to you.  
 
[Detective Consalo]:  You want to talk? 
 
[Shelly]:  I’ll talk to you.  I’ll talk to you.  
 
[Detective Consalo]:  And you are reinitiating contact with us, 
correct-- 
 
[Shelly]:  I’ll talk to you.  
 
[Detective Consalo]:  --at your request? 
 
[Shelly]:  (Unintelligible.) 
 
[Detective Consalo]:  Okay. 
 
[Shelly]:  I don’t want to talk man. 
 
[Detective Consalo]:  Yes, or no? 
 
[Shelly]:  If you gonna lock me up, lock me up.  
 
[Detective Consalo]:  Alright, so-- 
 
[Shelly]:  I know I ain’t do it.  
 
[Detective Consalo]:  --yes or no?  You tell me if you want to talk.  
That’s up to you.  
 
[Shelly]:  Cause it ain’t getting nowhere I told y’all who picked me 
up.  
 
[Detective Consalo]:  I, I will tell you what your momma said, and I’ll 
tell you what your grandma said.  Okay?  If you want to talk to me, 
but I-- 
 
[Shelly]:  Well why--I got a question.  I got one more question.  Why 
is y’all asking my grandma when my grandma don’t-- 
 
- 11 - 
 
[Detective Consalo]:  We didn’t ask your grandma.  
 
[Shelly]:  He did.  He had it on tape recorder.  
 
[Detective Consalo]:  You did--you gonna let me tell you-- 
 
[Shelly]:  Okay.  
 
[Detective Consalo]:  That’s what I was going to say, but I’m telling 
you right now you need to say--I--I’m--do you want me to sit here and 
talk to you for a few minutes?  You asked for an attorney, alright, I’m 
not gonna ask you any further questions, or talk any further this [sic] 
about it, unless you want to and you have to say I want to, I want to 
reinitiate contact with you.  Is that what you want to do? 
 
[Shelly]:  Well I ain’t getting nowhere with it.  Y’all-- 
 
[Detective Consalo]:  Well, you didn’t get anywhere with those guys.  
Alright? 
 
[Shelly]:  But I’m trying--all I need man is you to call my mom-- 
 
[Detective Consalo]:  I’m telling you I’ve talked to your mom 
Shannon.  
 
[Shelly]:  But I-- 
 
[Detective Consalo]:  That’s what I’m telling you brother.  That’s-- 
 
[Shelly]:  (Unintelligible.) 
 
[Detective Consalo]:  You tell me, if you want to, if you want me to 
sit down for a few minutes and talk, I’ll just talk.  I won’t even ask 
you qu-- 
 
[Shelly]:  I’ll talk, come on man.  
 
 
- 12 - 
[Detective Consalo]:  You want to-- 
 
[Shelly]:  Reinitiate, come on let’s do it.  
 
[Detective Consalo]:  You’re reinitiating conversation? 
 
[Shelly]:  I’ll talk to you man.  
 
 
Detective Consalo then communicated to Shelly the conversation that he had 
with Shelly’s mother earlier in the morning.   
[Detective Consalo]:  Your mom--listen to me for a second Shannon, 
okay.  Your mom called and your mom was hysterical.   
 
[Shelly]:  I know.  
 
[Detective Consalo]:  Okay? 
 
[Shelly]:  Cause about-- 
 
[Detective Consalo]:  She said, she said--her--your momma’s name is 
Annie, correct. 
 
[Shelly]:  Yes sir.   
 
[Detective Consalo]:  She said, “This is Annie.”  And I said, “Annie 
this is Tony Consalo.”  And we started talking.  I said, “you remember 
the old fish market down in Gifford?”  I said, “That was my dad’s 
place.” 
 
[Shelly]:  (Unintelligible.) 
 
[Detective Consalo]:  I said, “I know Sherman.”  I said, “I know some 
of your family and stuff.”  I said, “I know you lost a son years ago to 
this stuff.”  I said, “You don’t need to lose somebody else.” 
 
[Shelly]:  Right.  
 
 
- 13 - 
[Detective Consalo]:  I, I--so what you’re doing right now is not 
helping yourself, because there’s a difference between a needle in 
your arm and maybe a set--a, a--you know a different person.  
 
(Radio transmission in background.) 
 
[Unidentified Deputy]:  Hey Tony, come to my officer [sic] before 
move [sic] him.  
 
[Detective Consalo]:  Okay?  Um--there’s a difference between 
getting a needle put in your arm for what happened tonight and having 
a life sentence.  Okay?  Or maybe even a, a possibility of getting out.  
And that’s remorse.  Okay?  That’s showing that you, you, you have 
feelings for another human being.  I’ve dated girls and I know how 
mad they can make you.  Okay?  And I know I’ve snapped, not the 
extent that what happened tonight.  But I’m telling you man to man 
that your momma called, Annie called just a few minutes ago.  She 
called the front office.  My secretary told me that, “Annie Shelly is on 
the phone and she would like to speak to you.”  I got on that phone, 
Annie was on the phone.  I explained to her what was going on and 
she broke down.  Um--she broke down like my mom broke down 
when I lost my sister to cancer years ago.  
 
[Shelly]:  Yes sir.  
 
[Detective Consalo]:  I, I know what it’s like to lose a family member.  
A mom knows what it’s like to lose a son.  Okay? 
 
[Shelly]:  Yes sir. 
 
 
Shelly continued to allege his alibi; however, Detective Consalo responded 
that his time frames were off and that there were multiple witnesses that 
contradicted his alibi.     
[Detective Consalo]:  Okay, we’re done then.  Alright?  I’m telling 
your momma--even your momma didn’t go with it.  Even Annie, 
before your grandma was on that phone Annie called and she was 
crying because she’s losing another son, that’s why.  Plain and simple 
 
- 14 - 
brother.  And I’m telling you that’s the difference. 
 
[Shelly]:  Sir.  
 
[Detective Consalo]:  That’s the difference.  Shannon, I, I can’t do 
anything for you.  Okay?  Only you can do something for you and if 
you’re gonna keep denying it, brother we can’t--I’m, I’m telling you, 
I’m telling you-- 
 
. . . .   
 
[Detective Consalo]:  . . . I’m telling you Brittany is alive.  Okay?  
Brittany is alive and she is gonna pull through and I know you’re 
happy about that.  And the reason I say that because I know you didn’t 
want--what happened tonight you didn’t want that to happen.  I know 
that.  You know that.  But unless you tell me that, unless you ah--I 
can’t, I can’t--I’m telling you, I’m telling you Shannon it, it--Brittany 
is gonna make it.  Okay?  Brittany is gonna make it.  She was shot.  
She was shot in the face.  Okay? . . . I’m telling you she’s gonna make 
it and that is something there’s no way, there’s no way to get past that.   
 
[Shelly]:  You’re right man.   
 
[Detective Consalo]:  Tell me what happened.  
 
Detective Consalo then vocalized that Shelly had reinitiated contact and read 
him his Miranda rights again.   
[Detective Consalo]:  Alright.  Before we go any further-- 
 
[Shelly]:  Yes sir.  
 
[Detective Consalo]:  You re-initiated contact, remember we talked 
about that.  Alright?  I want to read you your rights one more time.  
Okay?  
 
[Shelly]:  What happen if I don’t re-initiate? 
 
[Detective Consalo]:  You--we’re done.  
 
- 15 - 
 
[Shelly]:  And I just go to booking? 
 
[Detective Consalo]:  Yea, but we’re dealing with what we said.  
Okay, let me just read you these for a second.  Okay?  Alright, 
Shannon you have the right to remain silent.  Do you understand that?   
 
[Shelly]:  (No audible response.) 
 
[Detective Consalo]:  Okay.  Anything you say can and will be used 
against you in a court of law.  Do you understand that? 
 
[Shelly]:  Yes sir.  
 
[Detective Consalo]:  Okay.  You have the right to talk to a lawyer 
and have him present with you while you’re being questioned.  Do 
you understand that?   
 
[Shelly]:  Yes sir.  
 
[Detective Consalo]:  Okay.  If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer one 
will be appointed to represent you before any questioning if you wish 
one.  
 
[Shelly]:  Yes sir.  
 
[Detective Consalo]:  Do you understand that? 
 
[Shelly]:  (No audible response.) 
 
[Detective Consalo]:  Okay.  Alright, do you understand each of the 
rights that I explained to you? 
 
[Shelly]:  Yes sir.  
 
[Detective Consalo]:  Okay.  With those rights in mind do you want to 
talk to me? 
 
[Shelly]:  I’ll talk to you man.  
 
 
- 16 - 
[Detective Consalo]:  I appreciate that.  
 
 
Shelly then confessed to shooting both victims but claimed the shooting was 
an accident.  Before trial, Shelly moved to suppress his statements, asserting that 
the detectives had violated his right against self-incrimination and right to counsel.  
Shelly also asserted that his confession should have been suppressed because his 
confession was involuntary based on the detectives’ discussions with him 
regarding the death penalty and the impact the death penalty would have on his 
mother.   
The Motion to Suppress Hearing 
  
At the suppression hearing, Detective Consalo was questioned by Shelly’s 
counsel regarding Shelly’s first mention of an attorney when Shelly was in the 
interrogation room alone.   
[Detective Consalo]:  I wouldn’t say that that’s a request for an 
attorney.  I think he’s just stating, he’s talking about The First 48.  
He’s talking about you don’t have any evidence.  I don’t think that’s 
an invocation, that he’s requesting an attorney at all and I didn’t take 
it that way.   
 
[Defense Counsel]:  Okay.  So he’s talking about an attorney at that 
point in time.  
 
[Detective Consalo]:  He’s talking about a TV show and what happens 
during a TV show is what he’s talking about.  
 
 
Shelly’s counsel then questioned Detective Consalo with regard to Shelly’s 
subsequent Miranda right invocations and reinitiation of communication with 
 
- 17 - 
detectives.  Shelly’s counsel contended that despite each invocation of either the 
right to silence or to an attorney, the detectives continued to interrogate Shelly.   
Shelly’s counsel asserted that Shelly had not reinitiated conversation with officers 
and any conversation after his assertion of rights should be considered invalid 
because Shelly was being continuously prompted by detectives to reinitiate 
conversation when all communication should have immediately ceased when 
Shelly invoked his rights.    
 
The State responded that after each of Shelly’s invocation of rights Shelly 
continued to ask the detectives questions, thereby reinitiating conversation.  The 
State asserted that Detective Consalo went beyond that which is required by law by 
reminding Shelly that he had invoked his rights and asked for an attorney.  The 
State averred that Detective Consalo was not required to reread Shelly his Miranda 
rights because Shelly had reinitiated conversation.   
 
The trial court denied both Shelly’s initial and renewed motions to suppress 
his confession.  Interrogation transcripts were provided to the jury and Shelly’s 
confession was played during trial.  The jury found Shelly guilty of first-degree 
murder and attempted first-degree murder.  Shelly was sentenced to life in prison 
without the possibility of parole.   
 
 
 
- 18 - 
Shelly’s Appeal 
 
 
Shelly appealed his judgment to the Fourth District on the basis that his 
confession should have been suppressed because (1) he invoked his right to an 
attorney and (2) his confession was involuntary based on the detectives’ 
discussions with him regarding the death penalty.  Shelly, 199 So. 3d at 974.  The 
Fourth District affirmed as to the second argument, without discussion, holding 
that “the discussion was a proper interrogation tactic, ‘[m]erely informing a 
suspect of realistic penalties and encouraging him to tell the truth.’ ”  Id. (quoting 
Nelson v. State, 688 So. 2d 971, 974 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)).  As to Shelly’s first 
argument, the Fourth District held that the totality of the circumstances 
demonstrated the statements made by Shelly were preceded by reinitiated 
communications of Shelly with the officers.  Id.  The district court found that 
Shelly was the catalyst for further conversation which led to his confession, and 
the denial of the motion to suppress the videotape was affirmed.  Id.   
ANALYSIS 
As an initial matter, we hold that Welch is the correct standard when 
evaluating circumstances where an accused has invoked his or her right to counsel 
or silence and then subsequently has allegedly reinitiated communication with 
officers.  The decision below references Moss not Welch, even though recognizing 
that reinitiated communications after the invocation of a right to counsel was at 
 
- 19 - 
issue.  We must consider the origins of the two standards and analyze why Welch 
is the correct standard to be applied here.  
In Moss, the Fourth District stated, “If the accused invoked his right to 
counsel, courts may admit his responses to further questioning only on finding that 
he (a) initiated further discussions with the police, and (b) knowingly and 
intelligently waived the right he had invoked.”  60 So. 3d at 544 (quoting Smith v. 
Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95 (1984)).  However, in Welch, this Court held that “even 
when an accused has invoked the right to silence or right to counsel, if the accused 
initiates further conversation, is reminded of his rights, and knowingly and 
voluntarily waives those rights, any incriminating statements made during this 
conversation may be properly admitted.”  992 So. 2d at 214 (emphasis added) 
(citing Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045-46 (1983)).  Although both the 
Moss and Welch standards appear to be nearly identical, there exists one crucial 
difference.  Both involve a suspect that has (1) invoked his or her right to counsel 
or right to silence; (2) engaged in further conversation with police; and (3) waived 
his or her previously invoked rights.  Importantly, however, missing from the Moss 
standard is the requirement in Welch that the accused be reminded of his or her 
rights.  Compare Moss, 60 So. 3d at 544, with Welch, 992 So. 2d at 214.  Thus, 
there is some discrepancy between these elements as to the correct legal standard.  
 
- 20 - 
We must understand the origin of the two standards and how each standard has 
been used in Florida.    
 
The standard in Welch is derived from Bradshaw.  See Welch, 992 So. 2d at 
214.  Although the standard is not explicitly stated in Bradshaw, the facts of the 
case outline that which would become the standard articulated by this Court in 
Welch.  Bradshaw was questioned during an investigation of the death of a person 
whose body had been found in Bradshaw’s pickup truck.  Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 
1041.  Bradshaw was advised of his Miranda rights and admitted to providing the 
victim with liquor for a party but denied involvement in the traffic accident that 
killed the victim.  Id.  Bradshaw was then arrested for providing liquor to the 
victim, a minor, and was again advised of his Miranda rights.  Id.  An officer then 
stated to Bradshaw his theory which placed Bradshaw behind the wheel of the 
vehicle.  Id.  Bradshaw again denied his involvement and then stated, “I do want an 
attorney before it goes very much further.”  Id. at 1041-42.  The officer then 
immediately terminated the interrogation.  Id. at 1042.  Sometime later, Bradshaw 
inquired to a police officer, “Well, what is going to happen to me now?”  Id.  The 
officer responded, “You do not have to talk to me.  You have requested an attorney 
. . . .”  Id.  A conversation followed in which Bradshaw agreed to take a polygraph 
examination, stating he was willing to do whatever he could to clear up the matter.  
Id.  Bradshaw was again reminded of his Miranda rights and ultimately recanted 
 
- 21 - 
his earlier story, admitting he was the driver of the vehicle in which the victim was 
killed.  Id.  The Oregon Court of Appeals held that Bradshaw’s inquiry of what 
would happen to him did not “initiate” a conversation with the officer, and that 
therefore his eventual incriminating statements should have been excluded under 
Edwards.4  Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1042.  The United States Supreme Court 
reversed, holding that Edwards did not stand for the proposition that the initiation 
of a conversation by an accused after having invoked the right to counsel amounts 
to a waiver of the right to counsel.  Id. at 1044.   Rather, a two-step process is 
involved—after finding no Edwards violation, the inquiry is whether, under the 
totality of circumstances, the accused made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the 
right to counsel.  Id. at 1045-46.  The Court further held that, in asking “Well, what 
is going to happen to me now?,” Bradshaw had “initiated” further conversation for 
purpose of the Edwards rule.5  Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045-46.    
Likewise, in Welch, this Court held that Welch’s statements were admissible 
because they were made pursuant to a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver.  
                                          
 
 
4.  Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). 
 
5.  “[A]n accused . . . having expressed his desire to deal with the police 
only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until 
counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further 
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.”  Edwards, 451 U.S. 
at 484-85.   
 
- 22 - 
992 So. 2d at 214.  Welch was advised of his Miranda rights during an 
interrogation concerning a double homicide.  Id.  After some interrogation Welch 
invoked his right to silence and the interrogation stopped.  Id.  Welch was left 
alone for forty-five minutes before asking a detective, “What is going to happen to 
me now?”  Id.  Welch was readvised of his Miranda rights before detectives began 
interrogating him again, which led to Welch ultimately making a confession.  Id. at 
215.  This Court held that “even when an accused has invoked the right to silence 
or right to counsel, if the accused initiates further conversation, is reminded of his 
rights, and knowingly and voluntarily waives those rights, any incriminating 
statements made during this conversation may be properly admitted.”  Id. at 214 
(emphasis added) (citing Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045-46).  Thus this Court held 
that Welch’s statements were admissible.  Id. at 215. 
This Court formulated the Welch standard in 2008.  See id.  However, in 
2011, the Fourth District applied a different standard in Moss.  See Moss, 60 So. 3d 
at 544.  In Moss, the Fourth District held that the trial court erred in denying 
Moss’s motion to suppress.  See id.  While being advised of his Miranda rights 
Moss stated, “I want to talk to a lawyer.”  Id. at 542.  The Fourth District reversed 
the trial court’s determination that Moss’s invocation was equivocal.  Id. at 543.  
The Fourth District then addressed waiver and stated, “[I]f the accused invoked his 
right to counsel, courts may admit his responses to further questioning only on 
 
- 23 - 
finding that he (a) initiated further discussions with the police, and (b) knowingly 
and intelligently waived the right he had invoked.”  Id. (quoting Smith, 469 U.S. at 
95).  The district court held that the detective interrogating Moss coerced him into 
confessing by continuing to question Moss after Moss’s invocation.  Id.  “[T]he 
detective disregarded Moss’s invocation of his right to counsel and continued to 
question Moss in the first breath after the invocation. . . . After his request for a 
lawyer, Moss did not reinitiate further exchanges with law enforcement; the 
ongoing interrogation never paused.”  Id.   
The standard in Moss is extracted from Smith, 469 U.S. 91.  See Moss, 60 
So. 3d at 543.  In Smith, the Supreme Court reversed the Illinois Supreme Court’s 
holding that Smith had not effectively invoked his right to counsel.  469 U.S. at 99.  
When Smith was informed that he had the right to counsel being present during 
questioning, he responded, “Uh, yeah.  I’d like to do that.”  Id. at 93.  Questioning 
did not cease and Smith eventually made incriminating statements.  Id. at 93-94.  
The Appellate Court of Illinois and the Illinois Supreme Court held that Smith did 
not clearly assert his right to counsel because he had responded to further 
questioning.  Id. at 94.  The Supreme Court disagreed and stated that if an “accused 
invoked his right to counsel, courts may admit his responses to further questioning 
only on finding that he (a) initiated further discussions with the police, and (b) 
knowingly and intelligently waived the right he had invoked.”  Id. at 95 (citing 
 
- 24 - 
Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485, 486 n.9).  “[A]n accused’s postrequest responses to 
further interrogation may not be used to cast retrospective doubt on the clarity of 
the initial request itself.”  Id. at 100.   
 
Factually, both Moss and Smith involve instances where detectives did not 
cease questioning once the defendant had invoked his right to counsel.  See Moss, 
60 So. 3d at 544; Smith, 469 U.S. at 99.  On the other hand, both Welch and 
Bradshaw involve instances where the accused invoked the right to silence or 
counsel, the interrogation ceased, and the accused allegedly reinitiated 
communication with officers.  See Welch, 992 So. 2d 206; Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 
1039.  However, if an accused invokes his or her Miranda rights but later 
reinitiates communication, an accused must be reminded of his or her Miranda 
rights pursuant to this Court’s holding in Welch.  See Welch, 992 So. 2d at 214.  
Thus there is conflict between the two standards.    
 
Subsequent to this Court’s decision in Welch, the standard formulated by the 
Supreme Court in Smith has been used a total of five times within Florida.  See 
Simon v. State, 216 So. 3d 720, 722 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017); Davis v. State, 153 So. 
3d 360, 365 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014); Calder v. State, 133 So. 3d 1025, 1030 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2014); Black v. State, 59 So. 3d 340, 346 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011); Moss, 60 So. 
3d at 544.  Welch expands the requirements of the standard in Smith by specifically 
including a requirement that the accused be specifically given his or her Miranda 
 
- 25 - 
rights after an alleged reinitiation.  We conclude that it is incorrect for the standard 
in Moss to be utilized.  Accordingly, we conclude that Welch is the correct 
standard when an accused has invoked his or her right to counsel or silence, and 
then is alleged to have subsequently reinitiated communication with officers.  
 Shelly’s First Mention of a Lawyer  
 
With regard to this case, Shelly’s first mention of a lawyer, while seated 
alone in the interrogation room, was equivocal.   
[A]ppellate courts should . . . accord a presumption of correctness to 
the trial court’s rulings on motions to suppress with regard to the trial 
court’s determination of historical facts, but appellate courts must 
independently review mixed questions of law and fact that ultimately 
determine constitutional issues arising in the context of the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendment and, by extension, article I, section 9 of the Florida 
Constitution.  
 
Miller v. State, 42 So. 3d 204, 220 (Fla. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Connor v. State, 803 So. 2d 598, 608 (Fla. 2001)). 
In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court determined that 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ prohibition against self-
incrimination requires advising a prospective defendant that he has the 
right to remain silent and also the right to the presence of counsel.  
384 U.S. 479; Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 481-82 (1981).  
After being advised of his rights, if an accused indicates that he 
wishes to remain silent, “the interrogation must cease.”  Miranda, 384 
U.S. at 474; see also Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482.   
 
Welch, 992 So. 2d at 214.  “After a suspect invokes his or her Miranda rights, 
police officers are prohibited from engaging in words or actions that the officers 
‘should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the 
 
- 26 - 
suspect.’ ”  Cuervo v. State, 967 So. 2d 155, 164 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Rhode Island 
v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)).  The prohibition of further questioning applies 
not only when the suspect requests counsel, but also when the suspect exercises his 
or her right to remain silent.  See Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 966 (Fla. 1992). 
  
The Supreme Court has held: 
Invocation of the Miranda right to counsel “requires, at a minimum, 
some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression 
of a desire for the assistance of an attorney.”  But if a suspect makes a 
reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a 
reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have 
understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to 
counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of questioning. 
 
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994) (citation omitted) (quoting 
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991)).  
 
Shelly contends that his statement, “Y’all better watch the First 48.  I ain’t 
done it.  I ain’t do it.  When the man say he ain’t do it let ’em talk to his lawyer, 
y’all got to let ’em go man”—made while seated alone in the interrogation room— 
was unequivocal.  Detective Consalo and counsel for Shelly had the following 
exchange at the motion to suppress hearing:  
[Defense Counsel]:  So he asked for an attorney and you were 
monitoring that and you knew that?  
 
[Detective Consalo]:  I wouldn’t say that that’s a request for an 
attorney.  I think he’s just stating, he’s talking about The First 48.  
He’s talking about you don’t have any evidence.  I don’t think that’s 
an invocation, that he’s requesting an attorney at all and I didn’t take 
it that way.   
 
- 27 - 
 
[Defense Counsel]:  Okay.  So he’s talking about an attorney at that 
point in time.   
 
[Detective Consalo]:  He’s talking about a TV show and what happens 
during a TV show is what he’s talking about. 
 
 
In our view, Shelly’s first mention of a lawyer in this passage was not 
unambiguous.  A reasonable police officer under the circumstances would not 
reasonably understand that Shelly was invoking his Miranda rights because Shelly 
simply mentioned the word “lawyer” within the broader context of discussing a 
television program.  Shelly’s statement, “When the man say he ain’t do it let ’em 
talk to his lawyer, y’all got to let ’em go man,” is not sufficiently clear to 
reasonably conclude that Shelly was invoking his Miranda rights with these words.  
Moreover, even though Detective Consalo was monitoring the interrogation room 
via video feed when Shelly made this statement, the statement was made while 
Shelly was in the interrogation room alone.  As a result, Detective Consalo did not 
reasonably understand Shelly’s utterance to be an invocation of his right to 
counsel.  Accordingly, we conclude that Shelly’s initial reference to a lawyer was 
equivocal and the detectives were not required to cease questioning.   
 Shelly’s Unequivocal Invocation 
Shelly contends that it was the detectives, not he, who reinitiated 
communication after he invoked his Miranda rights.  Review of the interrogation, 
however, reveals that Shelly continued to make comments and ask the detectives 
 
- 28 - 
questions directly related to the investigation after he invoked his Miranda rights.  
See supra pp. 6-7.  Shelly had the following exchange with Detective Consalo after 
being placed in handcuffs. 
[Detective Consalo]:  We’ll be taking you next door in just a few 
minutes.  
 
[Shelly]:  Yes sir, I understand that.  Hey sir--excuse me man, sir.  All 
I ask can you do one thing. 
 
[Detective Consalo]:  What is that? 
 
[Shelly]:  Just call my mom, man.  At--listen, sir--  
  
 
In Bradshaw, the Supreme Court held that a suspect’s inquiries that related 
generally to the investigation evinced the suspect’s willingness and desire for a 
discussion about the investigation.  462 U.S. at 1045-46.  We conclude that Shelly 
reinitiated communication with Detective Consalo by asking him to call his 
mother, who Shelly asserted was an alibi witness.   
Importantly, however, Shelly later unequivocally invoked his right to 
silence.  
[Detective Consalo]:  You, you know your rights, you know you 
might not want to say--if you want to talk to us a little bit longer then 
you need to say I want to talk to you a little bit longer-- 
 
[Shelly]:  No.  
 
[Detective Consalo]:  --and I’ll sit there and talk to you.  Okay? 
 
[Shelly]:  Y’all fixing to book me for nothing.  What y’all booking me 
ah--like for?  Okay, no more talk.  
 
- 29 - 
 
[Detective Consalo]:  Ah--that’s up to you.  You said, you, you-- 
 
[Shelly]:  (Unintelligible.) 
 
[Detective Consalo]:  --(Unintelligible). 
 
[Shelly]:  No, I’m alright.  I’m alright.   
 
[Detective Consalo]:  You, you said that you-- 
 
[Shelly]:  No more talking. 
 
[Detective Consalo]:  --wanted your attorney, so no more talking.  
 
[Shelly]:  Yea.  
 
[Detective Consalo]:  If you want to talk I will be more than happy 
and I’m gonna shoot straight with you.  I’ve known your family for a 
long time.  I’ve played softball with your, your, your uncle a many, 
many times, great-- 
 
[Shelly]:  Sir, and-- 
 
[Detective Consalo]:  --softball player.  
 
[Shelly]:  --guess what?  That’s who picked me up man.  
 
[Detective Consalo]:  I--I’m-- 
 
[Shelly]:  Alright, you want--I’ll tal--I’ll talk to you.  
 
[Detective Consalo]:  You want to talk? 
 
[Shelly]:  I’ll talk to you.  I’ll talk to you.  
 
[Detective Consalo]:  And you are reinitiating contact with us, 
correct-- 
 
 
- 30 - 
[Shelly]:  I’ll talk to you.  
 
[Detective Consalo]:  --at your request? 
 
[Shelly]:  (Unintelligible.) 
 
[Detective Consalo]:  Okay. 
 
[Shelly]:  I don’t want to talk man. 
[Detective Consalo]:  Yes, or no? 
 
[Shelly]:  If you gonna lock me up, lock me up.  
 
[Detective Consalo]:  Alright, so-- 
 
[Shelly]:  I know I ain’t do it.  
 
[Detective Consalo]:  --yes or no?  You tell me if you want to talk.  
That’s up to you.  
 
[Shelly]:  Cause it ain’t getting nowhere I told y’all who picked me 
up.  
 
[Detective Consalo]:  I, I will tell you what your momma said, and I’ll 
tell you what your grandma said.  Okay?  If you want to talk to me, 
but I-- 
 
From this exchange we can see that Detective Consalo wholly ignored Shelly’s 
invocations of his rights and immediately proceeded to attempt to coax him into 
continuing with the interrogation.  Detective Consalo failed to cease interrogating 
Shelly after Shelly unequivocally invoked his right to silence.  See Welch, 992 So. 
2d at 214 (“[I]f an accused indicates that he wishes to remain silent, ‘the 
 
- 31 - 
interrogation must cease.’ ” (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474)); see also 
Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482.   
We hold that Detective Consalo’s subsequent statements—with regard to (1) 
knowing Shelly’s family; (2) promising to tell Shelly what Shelly’s mother said; 
(3) telling Shelly that Shelly’s mother is losing another son; and (4) telling Shelly 
two times that there is a difference between “getting a needle put in your arm” and 
a life sentence—amounted to interrogation.  See supra p. 9-14; see also Innis, 446 
U.S. at 301 (“[T]he term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express 
questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police . . . that the 
police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from 
the suspect.”); Cuervo, 967 So. 2d at 164 (statements by officers to the defendant 
that he still had an opportunity to tell “his side of the story” amounted to 
interrogation because the officers could reasonably anticipate they would elicit an 
incriminating response); Calder, 133 So. 3d at 1030 (“After Calder made his 
unequivocal request for counsel, the detective did not cease questioning him.  
Instead, he continued talking to Calder in an effort to coax him into speaking 
without counsel. . . . These statements constituted interrogation . . . .”); Gilbert v. 
State, 104 So. 3d 1123, 1125 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (“Almost immediately after [the 
defendant] invoked his right to counsel, the detectives engaged in interrogation by 
telling the defendant that they were trying to ‘protect’ him and encouraging him to 
 
- 32 - 
tell his ‘side of the story.’ ”); Black, 59 So. 3d at 346 (detective was in violation of 
Miranda by continuing to ask defendant whether he wanted to talk to him about 
the crimes after the defendant had clearly invoked his right to counsel).  Detective 
Consalo’s actions can be likened to the proverbial carrot-and-stick—using reward 
and punishment to induce Shelly to acquiesce to continued interrogation.  There 
can be no doubt these statements induced Shelly to continue engaging with 
Detective Consalo, even though he had clearly previously invoked his right to 
silence numerous times. 
When, as in this case, a detective persists in attempting to coax a suspect to 
continue the interrogation after the suspect has unequivocally invoked his right to 
silence, the detective is not asking harmless clarifying questions; he is violating the 
suspect’s Miranda rights.  See Cuervo, 967 So. 2d at 165.    
[A]ny statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be 
other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise.  Without 
the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation 
operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a 
statement after the privilege has been once invoked. 
 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474.  Any statements that are produced as a result of a 
Miranda violation must be suppressed.  Id. at 479 (“[U]nless and until such 
warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence 
obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.”). 
 
- 33 - 
Having concluded that Shelly’s Miranda rights were violated, we cannot 
hold that his subsequent waiver was voluntary. 
As this Court and the United States Supreme Court have made clear, 
“the ultimate issue of voluntariness is a legal rather than factual 
question.”  Ramirez [v. State], 739 So. 2d [568,] 575 [(Fla. 1999)] 
(citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985)).  The State bears 
the burden of showing that “the confession was not compelled, but 
was voluntarily made.”  Id. at 573.  Further, where a confession is 
obtained after the administration of Miranda warnings, “the State 
bears a ‘heavy burden’ to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly 
and intelligently waived his or her privilege against self-incrimination 
and the right to counsel.”  Id. at 575.  
 
Ross v. State, 45 So. 3d 403, 418 (Fla. 2010) (citations omitted).  Shelly did not 
voluntarily initiate further conversation with Detective Consalo because the 
interrogation never stopped once Shelly invoked his right to silence.  Any 
statement taken after the invocation of a suspect’s Fifth Amendment privilege 
cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise.  Edwards, 451 
U.S. 477; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479; see also Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 
(1990).  Thus Shelly’s subsequent waiver was the product of Detective Consalo’s 
coercively persistent and repeated efforts to wear down Shelly’s resistance and 
induce Shelly to continue the interrogation and eventually confess.  We conclude 
then that the State is unable to meet its heavy burden of demonstrating that 
Shelly’s subsequent Miranda waiver was voluntarily made.  
The admissibility of any statements obtained after the accused has invoked 
his right to counsel and decided to remain silent “depends under Miranda on 
 
- 34 - 
whether his ‘right to cut off questioning’ was ‘scrupulously honored.’ ”  Michigan 
v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474, 479); see 
also Cuervo, 967 So. 2d at 161.  Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred 
in admitting Shelly’s confession.  
Harmless Error Analysis 
Miranda violations are subject to a harmless error analysis.  See 
Caso v. State, 524 So. 2d 422, 425 (Fla. 1988).  To affirm a conviction 
despite error at trial, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the error “did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively stated, 
that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the 
conviction.”  State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986).  
Under DiGuilio, the focus of this Court is on the overall effect of the 
error on the trier of fact; not to substitute itself for the trier of fact and 
reweigh the evidence.  See id. at 1139.  Further, if a defendant’s 
statement resulted from a law enforcement officer’s illegal actions, 
that evidence is “fruit of the poisonous tree” and the trial court should 
exclude it from trial.  See State v. Frierson, 926 So. 2d 1139, 1143 
(Fla. 2006) (quoting Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)). 
 
Deviney v. State, 112 So. 3d 57, 79 (Fla. 2013).  Further, as explained by this Court 
in Diguilio: 
[H]armless error analysis must not become a device whereby the 
appellate court substitutes itself for the jury, examines the permissible 
evidence, excludes the impermissible evidence, and determines that 
the evidence of guilt is sufficient or even overwhelming based on the 
permissible evidence. . . .  
Overwhelming evidence of guilt does not negate the fact 
that an error that constituted a substantial part of the 
prosecution’s case may have played a substantial part in 
the jury’s deliberation and thus contributed to the actual 
verdict reached, for the jury may have reached its verdict 
because of the error without considering other reasons 
 
- 35 - 
untainted by error that would have supported the same 
result. 
 
. . . . 
 
. . . The test is not a sufficiency-of-the-evidence, a correct 
result, a not clearly wrong, a substantial evidence, a more probable 
than not, a clear and convincing, or even an overwhelming evidence 
test.  Harmless error is not a device for the appellate court to substitute 
itself for the trier-of-fact by simply weighing the evidence.  The focus 
is on the effect of the error on the trier-of-fact.  The question is 
whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the 
verdict.  The burden to show the error was harmless must remain on 
the state.  If the appellate court cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the error did not affect the verdict, then the error is by definition 
harmful.   
 
Diguilio, 491 So. 2d at 1136-39 (citation omitted) (quoting People v. Ross, 429 
P.2d 606, 621 (Cal. 1967) (Traynor, C.J., dissenting), rev’d sub nom. Ross v. 
California, 391 U.S. 470 (1968)). 
Under the standard articulated by this Court in DiGuilio, we conclude that 
the admission of Shelly’s taped confession cannot be deemed harmless error.  
Shelly’s interrogation and transcripts of the recorded interrogation were provided 
to the jury.  It is difficult to dispute that such a confession most likely played a role 
in Shelly’s conviction.  Additionally, the prosecutor used Shelly’s interrogation 
statements to have Shelly mark down how many lies he told the detectives before 
confessing to the shootings.  The prosecutor also pointed out that Shelly’s 
confession was contrary to his testimony at trial.  Further, in his closing argument, 
the prosecutor repeatedly mentioned Shelly’s confession during the interrogation 
 
- 36 - 
and played several clips of the taped confession.  Therefore, we conclude that it is 
impossible to say that Shelly’s confession did not contribute to the verdict.  Thus 
the admission of Shelly’s taped confession cannot be deemed harmless error.  
CONCLUSION  
For the reasons discussed, we quash the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s 
decision.  We remand this case to the district court with instructions that the case 
be further remanded for a new trial to be conducted without introducing the 
portions of statements made on December 15 after Shelly unequivocally invoked 
his right to silence.   
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, and LABARGA, JJ., concur. 
LAWSON, J., dissents with an opinion, in which CANADY, C.J., and  
POLSTON, J., concur. 
 
ANY MOTION FOR REHEARING OR CLARIFICATION MUST BE FILED 
WITHIN SEVEN DAYS.  A RESPONSE TO THE MOTION FOR 
REHEARING/CLARIFICATION MAY BE FILED WITHIN FIVE DAYS 
AFTER THE FILING OF THE MOTION FOR 
REHEARING/CLARIFICATION.  NOT FINAL UNTIL THIS TIME PERIOD 
EXPIRES TO FILE A REHEARING/CLARIFICATION MOTION AND, IF 
FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
LAWSON, J., dissenting.   
The majority concludes that a citation in the Fourth District’s three-
paragraph decision in Shelly v. State, 199 So. 3d 973 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016), 
expressly and directly conflicts with a sentence in Welch v. State, 992 So. 2d 206 
 
- 37 - 
(Fla. 2008).  It does not.  Because we have no authority to decide this case, I 
dissent.  
The Florida Constitution grants this Court authority to “review any decision 
of a district court of appeal . . . that expressly and directly conflicts with a decision 
of another district court of appeal or of the supreme court on the same question of 
law.”  Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  This constitutional provision is the only one 
alleged as granting us power to decide this case.  For this Court to lawfully 
entertain jurisdiction under this provision, the “[c]onflict between decisions must 
be express and direct, i.e., it must appear within the four corners of the majority 
decision” of the district court.  Reaves v. State, 485 So. 2d 829, 830 (Fla. 1986) 
(emphasis added).  The jurisdictional rationale suggested by the majority fails this 
well-settled requirement. 
According to the majority, a direct conflict is apparent from the following 
citation in the third paragraph of Shelly:   
“When an accused has ‘expressed his desire to deal with the 
police only through counsel, [he] is not subject to further interrogation 
by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless 
the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or 
conversations with the police.’ ”  Moss v. State, 60 So. 3d 540, 542-43 
(Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (alteration in original) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 
68 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1981)). 
 
Shelly, 199 So. 3d at 974.  See majority op. at 1, 18-25.  As discussed further 
below, the premise that this citation gives rise to express-and-direct conflict 
 
- 38 - 
jurisdiction is unsound for several reasons: first, the citation is to binding, valid 
precedent; second, the majority’s explanation for the conflict with that precedent 
depends on facts not stated in the district court’s opinion; third, the purported 
conflict, if it exists at all, is actually between Moss and Welch, rather than Shelly 
and Welch; fourth, Welch did not even reach the holding upon which the finding of 
conflict is based; and, fifth, the purported Welch holding pertains to a matter that 
was not raised to the Fourth District in Shelly’s case. 
 
As to the first observation, the majority holds that a pin citation to an 
accurate quotation from a binding United States Supreme Court decision creates a 
conflict between Shelly and one of this Court’s decisions.  This proposition cannot 
be valid—unless the allegedly conflicting decision of this Court is erroneous, 
which the majority has not suggested to be the case.  Because all Florida courts are 
bound by Edwards, the seminal United States Supreme Court case on the Fifth 
Amendment question decided in Shelly, the language identified by the majority as 
the sole basis for conflict—a pin citation to an accurate quotation of the Edwards 
holding—cannot support a finding of express and direct conflict between the 
district court’s decision and one of this Court’s decisions.  See Miami Home Milk 
Producers Ass’n v. Milk Control Bd., 169 So. 541, 544 (Fla. 1936) (explaining that 
“we are of course bound by the decisions of” the United States Supreme Court 
“construing the meaning and effect of” provisions of the United States 
 
- 39 - 
Constitution).  The majority’s reliance on the Moss citation as its basis for finding 
jurisdiction is also analytically indistinguishable from reliance on a citation in a 
district court decision that merely affirms with citation—which is clearly 
unauthorized.  Gandy v. State, 846 So. 2d 1141, 1143 (Fla. 2003) (“This Court 
does not have jurisdiction to review per curiam decisions of the district courts of 
appeal that merely affirm with citations to cases not pending review in this Court.” 
(quoting Persaud v. State, 838 So. 2d 529, 532 (Fla. 2003)). 
Despite these oversights, given the majority’s lengthy recitation of facts and 
legal analysis of the “Edwards rule” issue, see Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 
1039, 1045-46 (1983) (discussing “the Edwards rule”), one could easily come 
away with an impression that this Court must have jurisdiction given the majority’s 
explanation of how the Fourth District misapplied Edwards to reach an incorrect 
result.  However, none of the facts relevant to the majority’s legal analysis are set 
forth in the Shelly opinion.  Therefore, they cannot support the majority’s exercise 
of jurisdiction.  See Gandy, 846 So. 2d at 1144 (explaining that in “cases where the 
district court has not explicitly identified a conflicting decision, it is necessary for 
the district court to have included some facts in its decision so that the question of 
law addressed by the district court in its decision” is manifest within the four 
corners of the decision and can serve as a basis for conflict jurisdiction (quoting 
Persaud, 838 So. 2d at 532)).   
 
- 40 - 
As explained in Reaves:  
The only facts relevant to our [jurisdictional decisions] are those facts 
contained within the four corners of the decisions allegedly in 
conflict. . . . [W]e are not permitted to base our conflict jurisdiction on 
a review of the record . . . . Thus, it is pointless and misleading to 
include a comprehensive recitation of facts not appearing in the 
decision below.   
 
Reaves, 485 So. 2d at 830 n.3.  Applying this rule to the Shelly decision should end 
our jurisdictional review.  The facts and law stated in the Fourth District’s decision 
show that the issue raised to the Fourth District was simply whether Shelly’s 
statements were the result of the officer’s failure to cease interrogation after Shelly 
invoked his rights or whether Shelly reinitiated communication under Edwards.  
See Shelly, 199 So. 3d at 974.  Given the Fourth District’s summary conclusion 
that “Shelly . . . was the one who reinitiated communications with the officers,” id., 
and inclusion of no facts from which a reader could question its resolution of the 
issue, id., we do not have jurisdiction to decide the issue.  Gandy, 846 So. 2d at 
1144; Reaves, 485 So. 2d at 830.6 
                                          
 
 
6.  If the facts relied upon by the majority to find a Miranda violation in this 
case appeared on the face of the district court opinion, we would probably have 
jurisdiction based on some case in our precedent finding a Miranda violation under 
indistinguishable circumstances.  However, Welch would not qualify as such a 
case.  This Court concluded in Welch that the defendant reinitiated communication 
by asking a direct, unsolicited question about the investigation after being left 
alone for more than forty-five minutes.  Welch, 992 So. 2d at 214.  The 
circumstances of the reinitiation in Welch are not comparable to those of the instant 
 
- 41 - 
It should also be apparent from the majority’s circuitous explanation of a 
conflict between Shelly and Welch, based upon a purported conflict between Moss 
and Welch, see majority op. at 18-25, that even if the majority’s described conflict 
existed it would not be manifest “within the four corners of” the Shelly decision, 
Reaves, 485 So. 2d at 830, and it would not place Shelly in “direct” conflict with 
Welch as required by Florida’s constitution before we can hear this case.  Mystan 
Marine, Inc. v. Harrington, 339 So. 2d 200, 201 (Fla. 1976) (“The jurisdiction of 
this Court extends only to the narrow class of cases enumerated in [a]rticle V, 
[s]ection 3(b) of the Florida Constitution.”).  After all, even if Moss had preceded 
Welch and Welch had expressly overruled Moss on a different question of law, 
Shelly could have still pin-cited to the Edwards quote in Moss and this still would 
not have given rise to an express and direct conflict between Shelly and Welch “on 
the same question of law.”  Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  Indeed, although the 
majority asserts as its jurisdictional rationale that the Shelly court came into 
conflict with our precedent by citing the Edwards rule, the majority’s merits 
decision in this case is based on its application of this very rule to facts not stated 
in the Shelly opinion.  Majority op. at 31-34. 
                                          
 
case and, therefore, do not control one way or the other the determination of 
whether it was Shelly or the detective who reinitiated communication. 
 
- 42 - 
Moreover, even the indirect and unexpressed conflict identified by the 
majority does not exist because Welch could not and did not reach the holding on 
which the majority’s jurisdictional rationale is based.   
The majority begins its conflict analysis by “hold[ing] that Welch is the 
correct standard when evaluating circumstances where an accused has invoked his 
or her right to counsel or silence and then subsequently has allegedly reinitiated 
communication with officers.”  Majority op. at 18 (emphasis added).  Then, the 
majority sets out to explain the origin of the Welch “standard” and to contrast this 
new standard with what it describes and rejects as the incorrect rule set forth in 
Moss.  Majority op. at 18-25.  Ironically, the standard the majority rejects as 
incorrect is found in a single sentence in the Moss opinion that is not cited or 
addressed in Shelly and that simply quotes the standard dictated by the United 
States Supreme Court in Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95 (1984).  Moss states: 
[I]f the accused invoked his right to counsel, courts may admit his 
responses to further questioning only on finding that he (a) initiated 
further discussions with the police, and (b) knowingly and 
intelligently waived the right he had invoked.   
 
60 So. 3d at 544 (quoting Smith, 469 U.S. at 95).  How could a state court legally 
err by correctly quoting binding precedent from the United States Supreme Court 
on an issue of United States constitutional law, or how could this Court have 
adopted a different standard on this Fifth Amendment issue in Welch?  See Milk 
Control Bd., 169 So. at 544 (explaining that this Court is bound by decisions of the 
 
- 43 - 
United States Supreme Court on questions of United States constitutional law).7  
Of course, neither proposition could occur.     
 
Nevertheless, the majority opines that the Moss panel erred and came into 
conflict with Welch by quoting the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Smith because Smith leaves out a purported independent third inquiry, supposedly 
recognized in Welch as an expansion of the rule set forth in Smith, majority op. at 
24, that (c) “the accused be reminded of his or her rights” after he or she reinitiates 
communication.  Majority op. at 19.  The majority asserts that Welch gleaned this 
extra requirement from the United States Supreme Court’s plurality opinion in 
Bradshaw, which was issued before the Court decided Smith.  Majority op. at 20.  
In so concluding, the majority fails to explain how an earlier plurality opinion 
(Bradshaw) from the United States Supreme Court could trump a later majority 
opinion (Smith) from that Court on the same issue.   
The majority does acknowledge that the supposed Bradshaw “standard is not 
explicitly stated in Bradshaw.”  Majority op. at 20.  However, the majority fails to 
                                          
 
 
7.  Although this Court could develop a Florida standard governing the right 
against self-incrimination under article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution, 
provided that the standard gives citizens at least as much protection as does the 
federal constitution, Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 961 (Fla. 1992), that is not 
what occurred in Welch.  Welch was a straightforward application of federal 
precedent to a Fifth Amendment issue with no reference to the Florida 
Constitution.  See 992 So. 2d at 213-15.   
 
- 44 - 
acknowledge that Bradshaw unequivocally uses the same two-step analysis as 
Smith.  See Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1044-46 (applying the “Edwards rule” as the 
first inquiry in this context and identifying “the next inquiry [as] ‘whether a valid 
waiver of the right to counsel and the right to silence had occurred, that is, whether 
the purported waiver was knowing and intelligent and found to be so under the 
totality of the circumstances’ ” (quoting Edwards, 451 U.S. at 486 n.9)).  Contrary 
to the majority’s assertion, the United States Supreme Court has never articulated 
or implied a third inquiry or standard requiring that police “remind” the accused of 
his or her Miranda rights, in Bradshaw or any other case.  Rather, both Edwards 
and Bradshaw make clear that the waiver issue involves a totality-of-the-
circumstances test.  Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1046 (“[T]he next inquiry was ‘whether 
a valid waiver of the right to counsel and the right to silence had occurred, that is, 
whether the purported waiver was knowing and intelligent and found to be so 
under the totality of the circumstances . . . .’ ” (quoting Edwards, 451 U.S. at 486 
n.9) (emphasis added)).8  And, as explained below, this Court did not reach a 
different conclusion in Welch. 
                                          
 
 
8.  As a practical matter, police would usually need to reinstruct the accused 
on his or her Miranda rights, after the accused’s reinitiation of communication, to 
assure that the waiver is knowing and intelligent (and to be able to prove it later).  
This reminder was given in Bradshaw, Smith, Welch, and Shelly.  However, it is 
easy to think of a circumstance where this reminder would be unnecessary to meet 
the totality-of-the-circumstances “valid waiver” test set forth in Edwards and 
Bradshaw. 
 
- 45 - 
Welch did not add to the two-step analysis required by the United States 
Supreme Court and did not create a new standard—which is the foundation of the 
majority’s jurisdictional analysis.  Welch was a direct appeal following a plea of 
guilty to two counts of first-degree premeditated murder (among other charges) 
and a penalty-phase trial in which Anthony Welch was sentenced to death for the 
two murders.  992 So. 2d at 208-09.  This Court reversed, ordering a new penalty-
phase trial due to an error in jury selection.  Id. at 212-13.  After thoroughly 
analyzing the jury selection issue, the Court “touch[ed] briefly on some of the 
remaining claims in order to provide guidance for the new penalty phase.”  Id. at 
213.  One of those issues was Welch’s claim “that the trial court erred in denying 
his motion to suppress the incriminating confession he made at the Broward 
County Sherriff’s Office.”  Id.   
Welch was interviewed at the sheriff’s office after waiving his Miranda 
rights.  Id.  He then announced that he no longer wanted to talk, and the first 
                                          
 
For example, the accused could be a seasoned criminal defense attorney who 
reinitiated contact by reminding police of her profession and stating that she was 
fully aware of the Edwards rule and was reinitiating communication with full 
knowledge that she was waiving her right to counsel and other Fifth Amendment 
rights.  In that scenario, the State could easily demonstrate a valid waiver 
irrespective of whether police reminded her of those rights.  Under the new 
standard explained in the majority opinion, however, it appears that any statements 
made by the accused would still be suppressed unless police also independently 
reminded her of those rights.  Majority op. at 19.  This approach is misguided and 
inconsistent with the Edwards and Bradshaw totality-of-the-circumstances test.   
 
- 46 - 
interview concluded.  Id.  Welch, however, reinitiated communication and police 
again advised him of his Miranda rights before the second interview.  Id.  In its 
“brief touch” of the legal issues surrounding Welch’s argument, the Court did not 
analyze the law in this area but simply summarized it.  Id. at 214 (summarizing 
Miranda and Edwards).  Then, citing Bradshaw, Welch states: 
[E]ven when an accused has invoked the right to silence or right to 
counsel, if the accused initiates further conversation, is reminded of 
his rights, and knowingly and voluntarily waives those rights, any 
incriminating statements made during this conversation may be 
properly admitted. 
 
Id.  It made perfect sense for this Court in Welch to cite Bradshaw because the 
facts of the two cases appear legally indistinguishable, including the words used by 
each suspect to “reinitiate” communication.  Compare Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 
1043-44 (holding that suspect’s unprompted question, “Well, what is going to 
happen to me now?” satisfied Edwards rule) with Welch, 992 So. 2d at 213-14 
(citing Bradshaw and holding that suspect’s unprompted question, “What is going 
to happen to me now?” satisfied Edwards rule).   
The sentence quoted from Welch is accurate if viewed as summarizing a 
factually indistinguishable case in which the United States Supreme Court found 
no violation of a suspect’s Fifth Amendment rights.  If viewed in this light, the 
quoted sentence from Welch is not inconsistent with the “standard” set forth in 
Smith and quoted in Moss—comprising two distinct and separate inquires.  
 
- 47 - 
Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1044-45 (explaining that Edwards rule is a “separate” 
inquiry that should not be “meld[ed] together” with the different and distinct 
question of whether, after the suspect reinitiates communication, “subsequent 
events indicate[] a waiver of the Fifth Amendment right to have counsel present 
during the interrogation”).  The accuracy of this view is established both by what 
the Welch opinion says next and by what this Court did not say at all in that 
opinion. 
 
Although Welch does not cite Smith, it does go on to conduct the same two-
step analysis recited in Smith after its summary explanation of Bradshaw.  “First,” 
the Court concluded that Welch reinitiated communication with an unsolicited 
question almost identical to the unsolicited question in Bradshaw.  Id. at 214.  
Then, in the next paragraph, the Court stated: 
Second, Welch’s incriminating confession was made after a voluntary, 
knowing, and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights. 
 
Id. at 215.  Although the Court discussed the fact that Welch was “again advised of 
his Miranda rights,” this observation was made in support of its conclusion that 
Welch’s waiver of his Miranda rights was valid—the same analytical framework 
used in Bradshaw, summarized in Smith, and quoted in Moss.  See id.  
 
Significantly, nowhere in its “brief touch” on this issue did this Court hint 
that it was creating a new standard that “expands the requirements of,” majority op. 
at 24, the very analytical framework that it employed.  The majority’s conclusion 
 
- 48 - 
that this is how Welch should be read, which is the basis for its jurisdictional 
determination, is incorrect.  Because this Court cannot change the requirements of 
federal law—by expansion or otherwise—it should be clear that Welch did not add 
a requirement to the federal framework for addressing the issues resolved in Welch 
and, consequently, that the majority’s basis for reviewing this case—conflict 
between Welch and the Moss court’s citation of binding United States Supreme 
Court precedent—is invalid.  See supra p. 41-42. 
Finally, that the majority reaches outside the bounds of our constitutional 
authority to take this case is evident because the majority bases its jurisdictional 
determination on issues that were not argued—and, therefore, not decided—below.  
Shelly’s arguments to the Fourth District (and this Court) focused on the 
reinitiation question—the Edwards rule—and not the separate question of whether 
a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights followed any such 
reinitiation.  Consequently, that separate totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry is 
not an issue properly before this Court—and the same would be true of the 
supposed Welch requirement that police remind the suspect of Miranda rights.  
Shelly never raised that as an issue for review because it was not implicated by the 
facts of the case (as the police did restate the Miranda warnings).  Therefore, the 
majority should not have based its jurisdictional determination on a purported 
conflict on a question of law that the Fourth District did not address.  In fact, 
 
- 49 - 
irrespective of the label it uses, the majority’s adoption of a new standard under the 
guise of a jurisdictional analysis is dicta resolving a purported conflict that does 
not appear in the four corners of the Fourth District’s decision and is not even 
germane to an issue presented to this Court for review in the merits briefs.  State v. 
Yule, 905 So. 2d 251, 259 n.10 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (“A holding consists of those 
propositions along the chosen decisional path or paths of reasoning that (1) are 
actually decided, (2) are based upon the facts of the case, and (3) lead to the 
judgment.  If not a holding, a proposition stated in a case counts as dicta.”) 
(Canady, J., specially concurring) (quoting Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell 
Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 953, 1065 (2005)); New Port Largo, Inc. 
v. Monroe County, 985 F.2d 1488, 1500 n.7 (11th Cir. 1993) (explaining that even 
a statement labeled as a holding is not a holding unless it decides a matter that 
“was squarely presented by the facts of the case and was a proposition that 
absolutely must have been decided to decide the concrete case then before the 
court”) (Edmonson, J., concurring specially) (emphasis added). 
The majority reads a conflict into the Fourth District’s decision by pointing 
out the Fourth District’s conclusion that Shelly reinitiated communication with the 
officers and then explaining, in reliance on Welch, that whether the accused 
reinitiates communication after invoking his right to silence or counsel is not the 
end of the inquiry when the accused argues on appeal that his confession should 
 
- 50 - 
have been suppressed because he invoked his right to an attorney.  Majority op. at 
18-25.  This approach to express-and-direct conflict jurisdiction overlooks the 
limited role Florida’s appellate courts have in addressing trial-court error.  The 
district court in this case was required to rule only on the issues properly raised and 
argued by Shelly in his appellate briefs.  See City of Miami v. Steckloff, 111 So. 2d 
446, 447 (Fla. 1959) (“It is an established rule that points covered by a decree of 
the trial court will not be considered by an appellate court unless they are properly 
raised and discussed in the briefs.”); see also Bainter v. League of Women Voters 
of Fla., 150 So. 3d 1115, 1126 (Fla. 2014) (“ ‘Basic principles of due process’—to 
say nothing of professionalism and a long appellate tradition—‘suggest that courts 
. . . ought not consider arguments outside the scope of the briefing process.’ ” 
(quoting Powell v. State, 120 So. 3d 577, 591 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013))); Rigterink v. 
State, 66 So. 3d 866, 897 (Fla. 2011) (declining to address whether an alleged error 
was fundamental because the appellate brief did not argue that it was); Fla. 
Emergency Physicians—Kang & Assocs., M.D., P.A. v. Parker, 800 So. 2d 631, 
636 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (noting the well-settled rule that appellate courts “do not 
address issues not clearly set out in the issues on appeal”).  It is clear from the four 
corners of the Fourth District’s opinion that Shelly raised a narrow issue to the 
Fourth District: whether the officers violated his right to counsel by reinitiating 
communication with him after he invoked that right.  See Shelly, 199 So. 3d at 974.   
 
- 51 - 
Having received the record after jurisdiction was improvidently granted in 
this case, we can confirm that Shelly’s Fourth Amendment argument to the district 
court was as narrow as the opinion indicates.  In ruling on Shelly’s motion to 
suppress, the trial court identified the pertinent inquiries as (1) whether Shelly’s 
confession resulted from the detective’s failure to scrupulously honor Shelly’s 
invocation of his right to remain silent or from Shelly’s reinitiation of 
communication and (2) whether, after any such reinitiation, Shelly’s decision to 
waive his rights again was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.  The trial court 
found in favor of the State as to each inquiry, and Shelly’s appellate argument 
focused on the first inquiry, involving Shelly’s lack of “reinitiation” under the 
governing standards.  Given Shelly’s limitation of his appellate argument, the 
district court was not required to address anything further and, in fact, would have 
been in error to do so.  See Sebo v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 208 So. 3d 694, 699 
n.2 (Fla. 2016) (opining that the district court improperly decided an issue where it 
was neither preserved in the trial court nor raised to the district court); Steckloff, 
111 So. 2d at 447.  And, given this limited role of an appellate court, the district 
court’s failure to address anything beyond the reinitiation of communication does 
not expressly and directly conflict with any case law discussing the second inquiry. 
Ultimately, from the four corners of the Shelly decision, it is clear that the 
issue that was raised and decided was simply whether error occurred at the first 
 
- 52 - 
step of the Edwards test, not whether any subsequent waiver was valid under 
Welch.  See id.  Because conflict must appear on the face of the two decisions 
being compared to be express and direct and therefore empower this Court to 
exercise jurisdiction, Reaves, 485 So. 2d at 830, the Florida Constitution dictates 
that we discharge this case irrespective of our view of the merits or importance of 
the issue that would otherwise be presented.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.   
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, J., concur. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Direct 
Conflict of Decisions  
 
 
Fourth District - Case No. 4D14-1910 
 
 
(Indian River County) 
 
Cathy A. Williams of Law Office of Cathy A. Williams PLLC, Cornelius, North 
Carolina; and Thomas J. Seider of Brannock & Humphries, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Celia A. Terenzio, Chief 
Assistant Attorney General, Cynthia L. Comras, Luke R. Napodano, and Donna M. 
Perry, Assistant Attorneys General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent