Title: STATE v HUTTINGER

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 14546 I N THE SUPREME C W O F THE S T A T E OF M3JXWW 1979 THE s m I E O F I'xmlmm, Plaintiff and Respondent, -vs- BRAD m I A M m-, Defendant and Appellant. - 1 frcm: D i s t r i c t C o u r t of the Eighth Judicial D i s t r i c t , Honorable H. William Coder, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Ralph T. Randono argued, Great Falls, bbntana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, H e l e n a , Montana Chris Tweeten argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, mntana J. Fred Bourdeau, County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana S-tted: M a y 3, 1979 Decided: M D ; ~ 2 2 \:73 .- Filed : I I - ' M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court; Defendant Brad Huttinger appeals from t h e o r d e r of t h e D i s t r i c t Court of Cascade County, t h e Honorable H. William Coder, denying h i s motion t o withdraw a p l e a of g u i l t y t o t h e charge of d e l i b e r a t e homicide. The D i s t r i c t Court postponed sentencing pending t h e f i n a l d i s p o s i t i o n of t h i s appeal. H u t t i n g e r remains a t Warn Springs S t a t e H o s p i t a l where h e was s e n t pending sentencing. On J u l y 9 , 1976, Huttinger was charged w i t h t h e crimes of d e l i b e r a t e homicide and aggravated kidnapping i n t h e stabbing d e a t h of an e l d e r l y Great F a l l s woman. The D i s - t r i c t Court ordered a p s y c h i a t r i c e v a l u a t i o n of Huttinger which was conducted on August 4 , 1976. The r e p o r t i n g psy- c h i a t r i s t , D r . Ronald Hughes, concluded t h a t on t h e d a t e of t h e crimes charged t h a t Huttinger, although under t h e i n f l u - ence of a v a r i e t y of psychoactive drugs, "knew t h e d i f f e r e n c e between r i g h t and wrong i n s o f a r a s it i s r e l a t e d t o t h e charges a g a i n s t him" and d i d n o t " l a c k t h e a b i l i t y t o adhere t o t h e r i g h t . " (Ultimately, however, D r . Hughes recommended t h a t Huttinger be h o s p i t a l i z e d i n t h e maximum s e c u r i t y ward a t Warm Springs S t a t e H o s p i t a l . ) On December 3 , 1976, Huttinger e n t e r e d a p l e a of n o t g u i l t y t o t h e o f f e n s e charged. On February 1 4 , 1977, Hut- t i n g e r a l l e g e d l y changed h i s p l e a t o g u i l t y on t h e charge of d e l i b e r a t e homicide i n exchange f o r a d i s m i s s a l of t h e charge of aggravated kidnapping. Immediately a f t e r t h e February 1 4 proceedings, Huttinger w a s s e n t t o Warm Springs S t a t e H o s p i t a l f o r a complete p s y c h i a t r i c e v a l u a t i o n . The examining p s y c h i a t r i s t , D r . W i l l i a m Alexander, concluded: "Summary: There i s no evidence of o r g a n i c involve- ment. P a t i e n t i s f e l t t o be psychotic because of h i s f l a t a f f e c t , h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l d e t e r i o r a t i o n , and h i s i n a b i l i t y t o handle a b s t r a c t concepts. H i s a c t u a l i l l n e s s i s q u i t e w e l l encapsulated. H e seems t o be a compulsive type who has a g r e a t d e a l of i n t e r n a l h o s t i l i t y which i s b a r e l y con- t r o l l e d most of t h e t i m e . H e has a g r e a t d i f f i - c u l t y i n t r y i n g t o s o r t o u t h i s f e e l i n g s about h i s normal p a s s i v i t y i n r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e occa- s i o n a l o u t b u r s t s of aggression. There i s a g r e a t d e a l of a n x i e t y which i s r e l a t e d t o h i s f e a r s of l o s i n g c o n t r o l over himself. " P a t i e n t i s aware of t h e n a t u r e of t h e charges a g a i n s t him and has t h e a b i l i t y t o a s s i s t h i s lawyer i n h i s own defense. H e i s a l s o aware of t h e c r i m i n a l i t y of h i s a c t i o n s . Because of h i s s e v e r e emotional problems he has been unable t o conduct himself according t o t h e requirements of t h e law. H e i s a b l e t o have a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e of mind which i s an element of t h e o f f e n s e charged. "Diagnosis: Schizophrenia, paranoid type." I n a c l a r i f y i n g letter received on J u l y 25, 1977, D r . Alexander wrote t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court: " I n m y opinion, a t t h e t i m e of t h e i n c i d e n t , t h i s p a t i e n t w a s unable t o conduct himself according t o t h e requirements of t h e law because of h i s s e v e r e , chronic, emotional i l l n e s s which probably s t a r t e d i n very e a r l y childhood b u t was c e r t a i n l y p r e s e n t e i g h t y e a r s ago, and f o r which he has, t o m y knowledge, never received treatment." On September 1, 1977, t h e D i s t r i c t Court sentenced Huttinger t o 100 y e a r s i n p r i s o n without p a r o l e . Huttinger appealed t h e sentence and on A p r i l 10, 1978, t h i s Court, i n a n unreported p e r curiam o r d e r , vacated t h e sentence pur- s u a n t t o a s t i p u l a t i o n of counsel and remanded t h e c a s e f o r resentencing. Huttinger t h e r e a f t e r f i l e d a Motion f o r Leave of Court f o r Motion t o Withdraw P l e a of G u i l t y on May 2 6 , 1978. A t a hearing on t h i s motion, Huttinger a s s e r t e d t h a t , p r i o r t o o r i g i n a l l y e n t e r i n g h i s p l e a of g u i l t y t o t h e charge of d e l i b e r a t e homicide, he had n o t been informed of t h e a v a i l - a b i l i t y of t h e p o s s i b l e defense of i n s a n i t y o r t h a t o t h e r f a c t o r s p r e s e n t a t t h e t i m e of t h e crime charged might s e r v e t o m i t i g a t e h i s sentence. The S t a t e presented testimony of ~ u t t i n g e r ' s a t t o r n e y s a t t h e t i m e of e n t r y of h i s p l e a of g u i l t y t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t they had discussed t h e i n s a n i t y defense with Huttinger and he had r e j e c t e d it. On August 1 0 , 1978, t h e D i s t r i c t Court e n t e r e d f i n d - i n g s , conclusions, and an o r d e r denying H u t t i n g e r ' s motion. H u t t i n g e r appeals. The i s s u e presented f o r t h i s C o u r t ' s review i s : Did t h e District Court abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n denying H u t t i n g e r ' s motion t o withdraw h i s p l e a of g u i l t y ? This appeal r e q u i r e s a balancing of t h r e e c o n f l i c t i n g f a c t o r s o r a s p e c t s involved i n a c r i m i n a l d e f e n d a n t ' s a t - tempt t o withdraw a previously e n t e r e d p l e a of g u i l t y . The t h r e e f a c t o r s of which w e speak are (1) t h e adequacy of t h e i n t e r r o g a t i o n by t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e defendant a t t h e e n t r y of t h e g u i l t y p l e a a s t o t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s understanding of t h e consequences of h i s p l e a , ( 2 ) t h e promptness w i t h which t h e defendant a t t e m p t s t o withdraw t h e p r i o r p l e a , and ( 3 ) t h e f a c t t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s p l e a was apparently t h e r e s u l t of a p l e a bargain i n which t h e g u i l t y p l e a was given i n exchange f o r d i s m i s s a l of another charge, i n t h i s case, aggravated kidnapping, a felony. A l l t h r e e f a c t o r s , among o t h e r s , have been discussed i n previous cases a s considera- t i o n s i n t h e determination of whether a District Court should allow t h e withdrawal o f a g u i l t y p l e a . Before d i s c u s s i n g t h e s e p a r t i c u l a r f a c t o r s , w e f i r s t s t a t e some g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s governing t h e withdrawal of a g u i l t y p l e a . The r i g h t of a c r i m i n a l defendant t o a t r i a l by j u r y i s safeguarded by A r t . 1 1 S e c t i o n s 2 4 and 26 of t h e 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . S e c t i o n 95-1606 (e) , R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 46-12-204 MCA, s t a t e s i n p a r t : "The defendant s h a l l e n t e r a p l e a of g u i l t y o r n o t g u i l t y t o t h e indictment, information o r complaint. If t h e defendant r e f u s e s t o plead t o t h e indictment, information o r complaint a p l e a of n o t g u i l t y must be e n t e r e d . "The c o u r t may r e f u s e t o a c c e p t a p l e a of g u i l t y and s h a l l n o t a c c e p t t h e p l e a of g u i l t y without f i r s t determining t h a t t h e p l e a i s v o l u n t a r y w i t h an understanding of t h e charge." More s p e c i f i c a l l y , s e c t i o n 95-1902, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 46-16-105(2) MCA, s t a t e s i n p a r t : "At any t i m e b e f o r e o r a f t e r judgment t h e c o u r t may f o r good cause shown permit t h e p l e a of g u i l t y t o be withdrawn and a p l e a of n o t g u i l t y s u b s t i t u t e d . " "There i s no set r u l e o r standard which can be r e l i e d on i n any given c a s e where a motion i s made t o withdraw a g u i l t y p l e a . " S t a t e v. L e w i s (1978), Mon t . , 582 P.2d 346, 352, 35 St-Rep. 1089, 1096. "Each c a s e must be examined on i t s own record . . ." S t a t e v . G r i f f i n (1975), 167 Mont. 11, 21, 535 P.2d 498, 503. "The g r a n t i n g o r r e f u s a l of permission t o with- draw a p l e a of g u i l t y and s u b s t i t u t e a p l e a of n o t g u i l t y rests i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l c o u r t and i s s u b j e c t t o review only upon a show- i n g of an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . S t a t e v . Nance, (1947), 120 Mont. 152, 184 P.2d 554. "A p l e a of g u i l t y w i l l be deemed i n v o l u n t a r y where it appears t h a t t h e defendant was l a b o r i n g under such a s t r o n g inducement, fundamental m i s - t a k e , o r s e r i o u s mental c o n d i t i o n t h a t t h e pos- s i b i l i t y e x i s t s he may have plead g u i l t y t o a c r i m e of which he i s innocent." S t a t e ex rel. Gladue v. Eiqhth J u d i c i a l District (1978), - Mont . , 575 P.2d 65, 6 6 , 35 St.Rep. 220, 221-22. I f , however, t h e r e i s any doubt t h a t a p l e a i s n o t v o l u n t a r y , t h e doubt should be resolved i n t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s f a v o r . On a p p l i c a t i o n t o change a p l e a , a l l doubts should be resolved i n f a v o r of a t r i a l on t h e m e r i t s . S t a t e v. Doty (1977) Mont. , 566 P.2d 1388, 1391, 34 S t . Rep. 731, 734. With t h e s e g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s i n mind, w e proceed t o an examination of t h e t h r e e f a c t o r s d e s c r i b e d above. Adequacy - of D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s I n t e r r o g a t i o n . For e a s e of a n a l y s i s , w e f i n d it h e l p f u l t o set f o r t h t h e complete t r a n s c r i p t of t h e hearing a t which Huttinger a l l e g e d l y made h i s g u i l t y plea: "THE COURT: Ladies and Gentlemen, t h i s Court w i l l now be i n s e s s i o n . This i s t h e S t a t e of Montana a g a i n s t Brad W i l l i a m H u t t i n g e r , Cause No. 6857 A. M r . Barron, you a r e r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e defendant, M r . H u t t i n g e r , i n t h i s matter? "MR. BARRON: I do. "THE COURT: And it i s of course understood a t t h i s p o i n t i n t i m e you wish t o e n t e r a change of p l e a i n t h i s case; it t h a t c o r r e c t ? "MR. BARRON: Y e s , your Honor. M r . Huttinger would ask l e a v e t o withdraw h i s p l e a of Not G u i l t y t o D e l i b e r a t e Homicide. "THE COURT: You understand what a p l e a of g u i l t y e n t a i l s i n t h i s m a t t e r , do you n o t , M r . Huttinger? "MR. HUTTINGER: Y e s ; I do. "THE COURT: You understand t h a t change of p l e a , you waive your r i g h t t o remain s i l e n t ? You under- s t a n d t h a t ? "MR. HUTTINGER: Y e s . "THE COURT: You understand t h a t you waive your r i g h t t o counsel t o r e p r e s e n t you i n t h i s m a t t e r ? You understand t h a t ? "MR. HUTTINGER: Y e s . "THE COURT: You waive your r i g h t t o a jury t r i a l , you understand t h a t ? "MR. HUTTINGER: Y e s . "THE COURT: You a l s o understand t h a t you waive your r i g h t t o compel attendance of witnesses t o appear and t e s t i f y on your b e h a l f ; you understand t h a t ? "MR. HUTTINGER: Y e s . "THE COURT: You understand t h e p e n a l t y f o r D e - l i b e r a t e Homicide i n t h e S t a t e of Montana i s imprisonment i n t h e Montana S t a t e P r i s o n , Deer Lodge, f o r a t e r m n o t t o exceed one hundred y e a r s ; you understand t h a t ? "MR. HUTTINGER: Y e s . "THE COURT: I t i s a l s o t h e c o u r t ' s understanding, M r . Barron, t h a t t h e r e have been some negotia- t i o n s w i t h regard t o d i s m i s s a l of t h e o t h e r count of Aggravated Kidnapping; i s t h a t c o r r e c t ? "MR. BARRON: That i s c o r r e c t , your H o n o r . W e are informed by M r . Bourdeau he w i l l d i s m i s s t h e Aggravated Kidnapping charge. "THE COURT: M r . Bourdeau? "MR. BOURDEAU: Y e s , your Honor. A t t h i s t i m e t h e prosecution w i l l o r a l l y move t h e Court f o r permission t o d i s m i s s t h e charge of Aggravated Kidnapping h e r e t o f o r e f i l e d i n t h i s a c t i o n . "THE COURT: Okay. A t t h i s p o i n t i n t i m e , M r . Huttinger, it i s incumbent upon t h e Court t o a s c e r t a i n and make a f a c t u a l b a s i s f o r t h e p l e a of g u i l t y . You understand what t h e Court i s i n d i c a t i n g now? "MR. HUTTINGER: Y e s . "MR. BUTTINGER: Y e s . "THE COURT: A l l r i g h t , M r . - Huttinger. - The Court w i l l a c c e p t --- your p l e a of G u i l t y t o D e l i b e r a t e Homicide, and t h e Court w i l l a l s o a c c e p t t h e County A t t o r n e y ' s motion t o d i s m i s s t h e Aggravated Kidnapping i n t h i s m a t t e r . By v i r t u e of t h e na- t u r e of t h i s c a s e , M r . Huttinger, t h e Court w i l l o r d e r a pre-sentence i n v e s t i g a t i o n , and it i s t h e C o u r t ' s understanding a t t h i s p o i n t i n time from your counsel, M r . Barron, t h a t h e would l i k e t o have, a s a p a r t of t h e pre-sentence i n v e s t i g a t i o n , a n examination by D r . Alexander a t t h e Warm Springs S t a t e Hospital; i s t h a t c o r r e c t ? "MR. BARRON: T h a t ' s r i g h t , your Honor. "THE COURT: The Court w i l l a c c e p t a p l e a of G u i l t y i n t h i s m a t t e r , $Ir. Huttinger. I w i l l set t h e hearing on t h e sentencing March 1 4 , 1977, a t 2 P.M. and t h e Court w i l l o r d e r you t r a n s f e r r e d t o Warm Springs f o r an examination p r i o r t o t h e sentencing. "MR. BARRON: Your Honor, t h e r e have been two r e p o r t s received by t h e Court, one psychological e v a l u a t i o n , one p s y c h i a t r i c e v a l u a t i o n from our Mental Health C l i n i c here. I would l i k e permis- s i o n from t h e Court t o have t h e Clerk copy t h o s e and f u r n i s h m e w i t h c o p i e s , and a s a p a r t of t h e pre-sentence r e p o r t , w e would a l s o l i k e t o have M r . H u t t i n g e r ' s r e p o r t s from M i l e s C i t y and Twin Bridges i n o r d e r t o make it a complete r e p o r t t o t h e Court. "THE COURT: A l l r i g h t . For purposes of sentencing have t h e Court f i l e made a v a i l a b l e t o you. "MR. BARRON: Thank you. "COURT ADJOURNED." ( k p h a s i s added.) Review of t h i s t r a n s c r i p t r e v e a l s s e v e r a l s e r i o u s inadequacies. A t t h e most b a s i c , it appears t h a t Huttinger never r e a l l y d i d admit, i n s o many words, t h a t he committed any d e l i b e r a t e homicide, only t h a t such a homicide was committed. Neither d i d he a c t u a l l y plead g u i l t y t o any o f f e n s e a t a l l ; he only asked " l e a v e t o withdraw h i s p l e a of Not Gui 1 t y . " Beyond t h e s e perhaps t e c h n i c a l o r semantic d i s c r e - pancies, however, t h e r e a r e more s e r i o u s flaws. Never was t h e name of t h e v i c t i m s t a t e d o r t h e d a t e o r p l a c e of t h e a l l e g e d o f f e n s e s p e c i f i e d ; nothing t o i d e n t i f y t h e p a r t i c u - l a r crime t o which Huttinger a l l e g e d l y was pleading speci- f i c a l l y appears i n t h e t r a n s c r i p t . The underlying f a c t s of t h e o f f e n s e w e r e n o t s t a t e d o r admitted. I n s h o r t , Hut- t i n g e r d i d n o t plead anything t o any o f f e n s e s p e c i f i e d i n any manner. F u r t h e r , t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d n o t a s c e r t a i n p a r t i c u - l a r l y t h a t defendant was s a t i s f i e d w i t h h i s appointed counsel o r t h a t he thought h i s counsel was competent. F i n a l l y , t h e v o l u n t a r i n e s s of t h e g u i l t y p l e a i s c a l l e d f u r t h e r i n t o q u e s t i o n by t h e f a c t t h a t immediately a f t e r e n t r y of t h e p l e a , Huttinger was s e n t t o Warm Springs S t a t e H o s p i t a l f o r p s y c h i a t r i c examination and treatment. H e remained a t Warm Springs f o r over s i x months before being sentenced and i s c u r r e n t l y being h e l d a t Warm Springs pend- i n g t h i s appeal. The q u e s t i o n n a t u r a l l y a r i s e s , was Hut- t i n g e r competent t o e n t e r any p l e a ? I n S t a t e v. L e w i s , 582 P.2d a t 352, 35 St-Rep. a t 1097, w e held: ". . . when i n t h e sentencing procedure, t h e D i s - t r i c t Court c a r e f u l l y , as h e r e , examines t h e defendant, f i n d s him t o be competent, and d e t e r - mines from him t h a t h i s p l e a of g u i l t y i s volun- t a r y , he understands t h e charge and h i s p o s s i b l e punishment, he i s n o t a c t i n g under t h e i n f l u e n c e of drugs o r a l c o h o l , he admits h i s counsel i s competent and he has been w e l l advised, and he d e c l a r e s i n open c o u r t t h e f a c t s upon which h i s g u i l t i s based, then a p l e a of g u i l t y accepted by t h e D i s t r i c t Court on t h e b a s i s of t h a t exami- n a t i o n w i l l be upheld . . ." When compared t o t h e s e standards, t h e i n t e r r o g a t i o n of Huttinger by t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e f a l l s s h o r t on a l l counts. There i s one o t h e r r e s p e c t i n which t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n t e r r o g a t i o n i s inadequate. I n S t a t e v . Azure (1977), - Mont. , 573 P.2d 179, 34 St.Rep. 1569, t h i s Court va- c a t e d t h e judgment and sentence and i n s t r u c t e d t h e District Court t o allow t h e withdrawal of t h e g u i l t y p l e a . W e s t a t e d as o u r r a t i o n a l e : "The D i s t r i c t Court made no i n q u i r y a s t o whether defendant understood t h a t by purposely o r know- i n g l y causing t h e d e a t h of Randy L e w i s he may have committed e i t h e r d e l i b e r a t e homicide o r m i t i - gated d e l i b e r a t e homicide. Nor was defendant informed t h a t i f he went t o t r i a l on t h e charge of d e l i b e r a t e homicide, he would have t h e r i g h t t o p r e s e n t evidence of m i t i g a t i o n , and i f t h e jury accepted h i s v e r s i o n of t h e o f f e n s e and convicted him of m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide, t h e maximum sentence he could r e c e i v e would be a 40 year p r i s o n t e r m . "When an accused p l e a d s g u i l t y t o t h e crime of d e l i b e r a t e homicide charged under Montana's s t a t u t o r y scheme which sets o u t d i s t i n c t kinds of c r i m i n a l homicide, it is of v i t a l importance t h a t t h e record d i s c l o s e s t h e defendant had a f u l l understanding of t h e p r e c i s e kind of homi- c i d e t o which h e plead. Absent such a showing, t h i s Court w i l l n o t assume t h e p l e a w a s made ' w i t h an understanding of t h e charge.' "Because t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d n o t determine whether defendant understood t h e d i f f e r i n g ele- ments and e f f e c t s of d e l i b e r a t e homicide and m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide, w e hold t h a t ac- ceptance of h i s p l e a of g u i l t y w a s improper. The District Court should have g r a n t e d defen- d a n t ' s motion f o r l e a v e t o withdraw t h e g u i l t y p l e a . " 573 P.2d a t 183, 34 St.Rep. a t 1574, 1575. W e conclude t h a t t h e i n s t a n t appeal i s governed by Azure, a t l e a s t s o f a r a s c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e adequacy of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s i n t e r r o g a t i o n . I n n e i t h e r c a s e was t h e defendant informed of t h e d i f f e r i n g elements of homicide, although i n both cases t h e D i s t r i c t Court knew, o r should have known, of p o s s i b l e evidence of m i t i g a t i n g circumstances-- i n both cases t h e defendant w a s under t h e i n f l u e n c e of drugs and a l c o h o l and p o s s i b l y s u f f e r i n g from mental d i s t r e s s o r i n s t a b i l i t y . I n both c a s e s , t h e defendant appeared i n c o u r t w i t h appointed counsel and e n t e r e d a p l e a of g u i l t y t o t h e charge of d e l i b e r a t e homicide. When compared t o t h e D i s - t r i c t Court i n t e r r o g a t i o n found inadequate i n Azure, t h e i n t e r r o g a t i o n of t h e defendant h e r e i s even less s u f f i c i e n t . The S t a t e ' s argument t h a t w e should n o t r e t r o a c t i v e l y apply Azure ( o r presumably L e w i s ) i s n o t persuasive. While it i s t r u e t h a t Azure w a s decided a f t e r t h e o r i g i n a l e n t r y of t h e g u i l t y p l e a , it was decided b e f o r e H u t t i n g e r ' s motion t o withdraw h i s p l e a and before h e had been sentenced. Even more important, however, i s t h a t t h e e q u i t i e s of t h e s i t u a t i o n and t h e ends of j u s t i c e f a v o r a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e s e l a t e r c a s e s t o t h e i n s t a n t appeal. By applying them, w e a r e n o t r e l e a s i n g Huttinger from h i s p o s s i b l e criminal l i a b i l i t y . Rather, t h e c a s e would merely go t o t r i a l . A s w e s t a t e d i n Doty, 566 P.2d a t 1391, 34 St.Rep. a t 734-35: "Here, any i r r e g u l a r i t y and doubt should have been resolved by t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n favor of defendant, i n h i s motion f o r a change of p l e a ; then t h a t doubt could properly be resolved by a jury. Only through t r i a l on t h e m e r i t s f o l - lowing a change of p l e a would t h e ends of jus- tice b e s t be served i n t h i s case." I n any event, t h e r u l e s s t a t e d i n Azure and L e w i s a r e n o t new. The law i n both c a s e s can b e t r a c e d back through many d e c i s i o n s over many years. See, e . g . , S t a t e v. Casaras (1937), 104 Mont. 404, 66 P.2d 774; S t a t e v. Nance (1947), 120 Mont. 152, 184 P.2d 554; S t a t e v. 5lcBane (1954), 128 Mont. 369, 275 P. 2d 218. Having concluded t h a t t h e i n t e r r o g a t i o n of Huttinger by t h e D i s t r i c t Court was inadequate f o r determining whether h i s g u i l t y p l e a was v o l u n t a r i l y given, w e proceed t o con- s i d e r a t i o n of t h e e f f e c t of t h e two a d d i t i o n a l f a c t o r s s p e c i f i e d e a r l i e r . Timeliness of -- t h e Motion - t o Withdraw. I n S t a t e v. L e w i s , 582 P.2d a t 352, 35 St.Rep. a t 1096, and S t a t e v. S a t t l e r (1976), 170 Mont. 35, 549 P.2d 1080, 1081, t h i s Court h e l d t h a t a claim of laches may l i e a g a i n s t a motion t o withdraw a g u i l t y p l e a i n c a s e s where t h e records upon which t h e p l e a of g u i l t y was entered a r e missing, t h e w i t - nesses a r e unavailable, o r evidence has been disposed o f . The S t a t e a s s e r t s t h a t laches should s i m i l a r l y bar Hut- t i n g e r ' s motion here. Huttinger f i r s t e n t e r e d h i s g u i l t y p l e a on February 1 4 , 1977. H e t h e r e a f t e r w a s sentenced t o 100 y e a r s i n p r i s o n without p a r o l e on September 1, 1977. This sentence w a s vacated by t h i s Court on appeal by s t i p u l a t i o n of counsel, and t h e cause remanded f o r resentencing on A p r i l 10, 1978. S i x weeks l a t e r , on May 26, and before h e had been resen- tenced, Huttinger f i l e d h i s motion f o r withdrawal of p l e a . This sequence i n d i c a t e s d e f e n d a n t ' s p o s i t i o n h e r e i s s t r o n g e r than t h a t found t o j u s t i f y a claim of l a c h e s i n L e w i s . Cf. S t a t e v. Nance (1947), 120 Mont. 152, 184 P.2d 554 (one month between e n t r y of g u i l t y p l e a and motion t o withdraw h e l d n o t reasonably t i m e l y ) . I n L e w i s over one y e a r elapsed between t h e d a t e of sentencing and t h e d a t e of t h e motion t o withdraw p l e a , with no r e c o r d of an i n t e r - vening appeal t o t h e Supreme Court. I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , while e i g h t and one-half months elapsed between t h e d a t e of sentencing and t h e motion t o withdraw, t h e r e a l s o was t h e i n t e r v e n i n g appeal and r e v e r s a l of t h e sentence. ~ u t t i n g e r promptly proceeded t o make h i s motion t o withdraw a f t e r t h e f i r s t sentence was vacated and b e f o r e t h e new sentence was pronounced. Neither has t h e S t a t e presented any evidence t h a t r e c o r d s a r e l o s t , evidence missing, o r w i t n e s s e s unavail- a b l e a s was done i n S a t t l e r . I n f a c t , p a r t of t h e r e c o r d on appeal a r e t h e p o l i c e r e p o r t s made during t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n of t h e homicide. "The g e n e r a l l y accepted r u l e i s t h a t i n o r d e r t o re- c e i v e f a v o r a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n an a p p l i c a t i o n t o withdraw a p l e a of g u i l t y should be made w i t h i n a reasonable time." S t a t e v. Nance, 120 Nont. a t 165, 184 P.2d a t 561. S e c t i o n 95-1902, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 46-16-105(2) MCA, provides t h a t withdrawal may be made " [ a l t any t i m e before o r a f t e r judgment." I n S t a t e v. McBane, 128 Mont. a t 377, 275 P.2d a t 222, J u s t i c e Freebourn s p e c i a l l y concurred s t a t i n g : "Being guaranteed t h e r i g h t t o a t r i a l by jury, t h e r e is no sound reason, s i n c e t h e s t a t e g i v e s up nothing, why a defendant charged w i t h a f e l o n y should b e denied t h e ' s a c r e d 1 r i g h t t o a t r i a l by jury, where a f t e r p l e a of g u i l t y b u t be- f o r e t h e commencement of h i s sentence he demands such r i g h t . " H u t t i n g e r ' s motion, made before f i n a l sentencing and b e f o r e h e a c t u a l l y s t a r t e d s e r v i n g h i s sentence, was timely. P l e a Bargaining. I n exchange f o r H u t t i n g e r ' s p l e a of g u i l t y t o t h e charge of d e l i b e r a t e homicide, t h e Cascade County Attorney agreed t o a d i s m i s s a l of a charge of aggra- v a t e d kidnapping although no w r i t t e n record of t h i s p l e a bargain was made. This Court has s t a t e d many t i m e s t h a t ". . . i t w i l l n o t l e n d i t s a s s i s t a n c e t o an accused c r i m i - n a l i n escaping t h e o b l i g a t i o n s of h i s agreement a f t e r a c c e p t i n g t h e b e n e f i t s t h e r e o f . " S t a t e v. S a t t l e r (1976) , 170 Mont. 35, 37, 549 P.2d 1080, 1081. Accord, S t a t e v. Nance (1947), 120 Mont. a t 166, 184 P.2d a t 561. This i s undoubtedly t h e most t r o u b l i n g a s p e c t of t h i s appeal and i s t h e f a c t o r weighing most s t r o n g l y a g a i n s t allowing Huttinger t o withdraw h i s g u i l t y p l e a . W e con- c l u d e , however, t h a t it does n o t outweigh t h e o t h e r f a c t o r s which f a v o r allowing withdrawal. This conclusion i s based on s e v e r a l grounds. F i r s t , a s noted e a r l i e r , immediately a f t e r e n t r y of h i s g u i l t y p l e a , Huttinger was s e n t t o Warm Springs S t a t e H o s p i t a l f o r psy- c h i a t r i c e v a l u a t i o n and treatment. H e remained a t Warm Springs f o r over s i x months before being f i r s t sentenced. A f t e r sentencing, Huttinger was t r a n s f e r r e d t o Warm Springs f o r f u r t h e r treatment. H e i s now i n Warm Springs pending t h i s appeal. I n a l l , s i n c e J u l y 1976 when h e was f i r s t charged, Huttinger has s p e n t nine months i n t h e S t a t e Hos- p i t a l and only s i x months i n t h e S t a t e P r i s o n . Therefore, t h e r e i s now, and t h e r e w a s a t t h e t i m e of h i s g u i l t y p l e a , a s e r i o u s q u e s t i o n a s t o H u t t i n g e r ' s competency t o e n t e r i n t o any p l e a bargain. Second, a t t h e hearing on t h e motion t o withdraw h i s g u i l t y p l e a , Huttinger and h i s (adoptive) p a r e n t s both t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a defense based on mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t was n o t presented o r discussed by e i t h e r of h i s appointed counsel. While t h i s testimony was contra- d i c t e d by testimony from t h e a t t o r n e y s involved, it does r a i s e a q u e s t i o n a s t o whether Huttinger was s a t i s f i e d w i t h t h e competency of h i s a t t o r n e y . This goes t o t h e i s s u e of whether Huttinger w a s aware of a l l h i s o p t i o n s before e n t e r i n g i n t o t h e p l e a bargain. A s noted e a r l i e r , whether t h e defendant was s a t i s f i e d with h i s a t t o r n e y ' s competency i s one of t h e a r e a s t h a t should be i n v e s t i g a t e d by t h e D i s t r i c t Court a t t h e t i m e it a c c e p t s a g u i l t y p l e a . S t a t e v. L e w i s , 582 P.2d a t 352, 35 St.Rep. a t 1097. This inves- t i g a t i o n was n o t undertaken by t h e District Court i n t h i s c a s e . S i m i l a r l y , nowhere does it appear t h a t Huttinger was advised of t h e f a c t t h a t he could i n t r o d u c e evidence i n m i t i g a t i o n of t h e d e l i b e r a t e homicide charge. H e was n o t informed, i n a sense, of a l l t h e elements of t h e p l e a bar- g a i n i n g arrangement. I t i s conceivable t h a t had he known t h a t t h e d e l i b e r a t e homicide charge, c a r r y i n g a maximum t e r m of 100 y e a r s o r perhaps death, could have p o s s i b l y been reduced by t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of m i t i g a t i n g circumstances t o m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide c a r r y i n g a maximum sentence of 4 0 y e a r s , Huttinger might have decided n o t t o e n t e r i n t o t h e p l e a bargain. See, S t a t e v. Azure, supra. W e emphasize a g a i n t h a t doubts i n c a s e s involving motions t o withdraw a g u i l t y p l e a should be resolved i n f a v o r of allowing withdrawal and a t r i a l on t h e merits. Taking a l l t h e f a c t o r s involved i n t h i s c a s e and r e s o l v i n g doubts i n f a v o r of t h e defendant, w e conclude t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n r e f u s i n g t o allow Huttinger t o withdraw h i s g u i l t y p l e a . The judgment of t h e District Court i s reversed and t h e c a s e .is remanded f o r f u r t h e r proceedings c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s opinion. / J u s t i c e W e concur: &44&&&w4 Chief ~ u g t i c e M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d i s s e n t i n g : I r e s p e c t f u l l y d i s s e n t . A s I view it, w e have a fac- t u a l s i t u a t i o n t h a t t a k e s p l a c e over a two-year p e r i o d , involving t h r e e defense a t t o r n e y s and a t r i a l judge making every e f f o r t t o e x p l a i n t o t h e defendant h i s r i g h t s . Perhaps t h e golden words "Are you g u i l t y of t h e murder of M r s . I 1 w e r e n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y used, b u t t h e t r i a l judge asked i n t h e colloquy between t h e c o u r t , t h e defendant, and h i s a t t o r n e y : "THE COURT: And it i s of course understood a t t h i s p o i n t i n t i m e you wish t o e n t e r a change of p l e a i n t h i s case; is t h a t c o r r e c t ? "MR. BARRON: Y e s , your Honor. M r . Huttinger would a s k l e a v e t o withdraw h i s p l e a of Not G u i l t y t o D e l i b e r a t e Homicide. "THE COURT: You understand what a p l e a of g u i l t y e n t a i l s i n t h i s m a t t e r , do you n o t , Fir. Huttinger? "MR. HUTTINGER: Y e s ; I do. "THE COURT: You understand t h a t change of p l e a , you waive your r i g h t t o remain s i l e n t ? You under- s t a n d t h a t ? "MR. HUTTINGER: Y e s . "THE COURT: You understand t h a t you waive your r i g h t t o counsel t o r e p r e s e n t you i n t h i s matter? You understand t h a t ? "MR. HUTTINGER: Y e s . "THE COURT: You waive your r i g h t t o a jury t r i a l , you understand t h a t ? "MR. HUTTINGER: Y e s . "THE COURT: You a l s o understand t h a t you waive your r i g h t t o compel attendance of w i t n e s s e s t o appear and t e s t i f y on your b e h a l f ; you understand t h a t ? "MR. HUTTINGER: Y e s . "THE COURT: You understand t h e p e n a l t y f o r De- l i b e r a t e Homicide i n t h e S t a t e of Yontana i s imprisonment i n t h e Montana S t a t e P r i s o n , Deer Lodge, f o r a term n o t t o exceed one hundred y e a r s ; you understand t h a t ? "MR. HUTTINGER: Yes." I n withdrawing h i s p l e a of n o t g u i l t y , I b e l i e v e t h e only p l e a t h a t can be considered under t h e s e circumstances i s t h a t he i s e n t e r i n g a p l e a of g u i l t y . H e s t a t e d he understood waiving h i s r i g h t s and t h e sentence t o be imposed and s o t h e record i n d i c a t e s he understood t h e p l e a bargain- i n g i n dropping t h e aggravated kidnapping charge, which could have r e s u l t e d i n a death p e n a l t y i f defendant had been convicted of both charges. Under t h e s e p a r t i c u l a r circumstances, I would a f f i r m t h e judgment and sentence.