Title: Kane v. Lamothe

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Kane v. Lamothe (2006-229)

2007 VT 91

[Filed 24-Aug-2007]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 2007 VT 91

                                No. 2006-229


  Joanne Kane                                    Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.                                        Franklin Superior Court


  Trooper Maurice Lamothe                        March Term, 2007
  and the State of Vermont


  Geoffrey W. Crawford, J.

  Kurt M. Hughes and Margaret Glazier, Legal Assistant (On the Brief) of
    Murdoch Hughes & Twarog, Burlington, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

  William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and Eve Jacobs-Carnahan, Assistant
    Attorney General, Montpelier, for Defendants-Appellees.


  PRESENT:  Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Johnson, and Burgess, JJ.

        
       ¶  1.  BURGESS, J.  Plaintiff appeals from a trial court order
  dismissing her claims of negligence and gross negligence against defendants
  State of Vermont and Trooper Maurice Lamothe.  These claims arise from an
  alleged failure by the trooper to properly investigate a reported incident
  of domestic abuse against plaintiff that continued after the trooper left
  the scene.  We conclude that the State and the trooper owed no special duty
  to plaintiff.  We therefore affirm the trial court's dismissal. (FN1)
         
       ¶  2.  In reviewing a motion to dismiss, we accept all of the
  nonmoving party's alleged facts as true to determine whether there are any
  circumstances that may entitle that party to relief.  Alger v. Dep't of
  Labor & Indus., 2006 VT 115, ¶ 12, __ Vt. __, 917 A.2d 508.  "We treat all
  reasonable inferences from the complaint as true, and we assume that the
  movant's contravening assertions are false."  Id.  

       ¶  3.  Plaintiff's complaint alleges the following relevant facts.  On
  November 18, 2002, plaintiff's former boyfriend sexually assaulted and
  battered her, leaving visible marks.  The boyfriend had a history of
  domestic violence and was on probation at the time of the assault.  After
  the sexual assault and battery, plaintiff's son told the clerk at a nearby
  store that plaintiff was still in danger.  The clerk called 911, and the
  trooper responded.  Plaintiff's son showed the trooper to plaintiff's
  apartment, where the boyfriend opened the door and let him in.  The trooper
  interviewed the boyfriend separately while plaintiff was in the bedroom. 
  After that interview, the boyfriend retrieved plaintiff from the bedroom,
  and the trooper interviewed plaintiff in the apartment doorway within
  earshot of the boyfriend.  The trooper observed the marks on plaintiff's
  face, but left the apartment without making an arrest or investigating
  further.  After the trooper left, the boyfriend sexually assaulted and
  battered plaintiff a second time. 
   
       ¶  4.  In the early morning hours of the following day, the
  boyfriend broke into plaintiff's apartment and again beat and sexually
  assaulted her.  Afterwards, he dragged plaintiff down the stairs, causing
  her bodily injury that required medical attention.  At the hospital,
  plaintiff was treated for a bruised lip, depression, anxiety, and post-rape
  trauma.  A week later, the boyfriend was taken into custody and charged
  with second-degree aggravated domestic assault, burglary and sexual
  assault.  He was found guilty of domestic assault and sexual assault and
  was sentenced to twenty to forty-five years.


       ¶  5.  Plaintiff subsequently filed the present suit, claiming that
  negligent supervision of the trooper by the State and gross negligence by
  the trooper led to the continued physical and sexual abuse of plaintiff. 
  Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that sovereign immunity barred the
  claims against the State under the Vermont Tort Claims Act, 12 V.S.A. §§
  5601-06, and further arguing that plaintiff failed to state a claim of
  gross negligence, as was necessary to overcome the trooper's statutory
  immunity.  The court granted the motion, holding that plaintiff's claims
  against the State were not permitted under the Tort Claims Act because
  there was no private analog to the police action at issue, and the
  allegations against the trooper failed to depict the total absence of care
  required to support a claim of gross negligence. (FN2)  Plaintiff appealed. 
   
       ¶  6.  Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, claims against the
  State are barred "unless immunity is expressly waived by statute."  Sabia
  v. State, 164 Vt. 293, 298, 669 A.2d 1187, 1191 (1995).  The Tort Claims
  Act waives immunity in cases where liability arises from "injury to persons
  . . . caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of
  the State while acting within the scope of employment, under the same
  circumstances, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
  person would be liable to the claimant . . . ."  12 V.S.A. § 5601(a). 
  "Thus, the State remains immune for governmental actions for which no
  private analog exists" and "waives its immunity only to the extent a
  plaintiff's cause of action is comparable to a recognized cause of action
  against a private person."  Sabia, 164 Vt. at 298, 669 A.2d  at 1191
  (quotations omitted).  This approach bars negligence actions against the
  State in connection with purely "governmental functions" so as to avoid
  imposing "novel and unprecedented liabilities" on the State.  Denis Bail
  Bonds, Inc. v. State, 159 Vt. 481, 485-86, 622 A.2d 495, 498 (1993).

       ¶  7.  Before determining whether a private analog exists, we must
  first determine whether the factual allegations satisfy the necessary
  elements of a recognized cause of action.  See id. at 487, 622 A.2d  at 498.
  (FN3)   To prove negligence, plaintiff must show that defendant owed her a
  legal duty, that a breach of that duty was a proximate cause of harm, and
  that she suffered actual damages.  Watson v. Dimke, 2005 VT 29, ¶ 9, 178
  Vt. 504,