Title: State v. Sanders

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Sanders , 94 Ohio St.3d 150, 2002-Ohio-350.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v.  SANDERS, N.K.A. HASAN, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Sanders (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 150.] 
Appellate procedure — Application for reopening appeal from judgment of 
conviction based on claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 
— Application denied when applicant fails to show the existence of a 
genuine issue as to whether he had been denied the effective assistance 
of counsel on appeal as required by App.R. 26(B)(5). 
(No. 99-536 — Submitted September 18, 2001 — Decided January 30, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-960253. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Appellant, Carlos Sanders, n.k.a. Siddique Abdullah Hasan, 
challenges the denial of his application to reopen his direct appeal under App.R. 
26(B). 
 
Sanders was sentenced to death for the aggravated murder of Correctional 
Officer Robert Vallandingham.  The Court of Appeals for Hamilton County 
affirmed his convictions and sentences.  State v. Sanders (May 1, 1998), Hamilton 
App. No. C-960253, unreported, 1998 WL 212756.  We affirmed the court of 
appeals’ judgment.  State v. Sanders (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 245, 750 N.E.2d 90. 
 
On July 24, 1998, Sanders filed his App.R. 26(B) application in the court 
of appeals.  That court denied the application, holding that Sanders had failed to 
show the existence of a genuine issue as to whether he had been denied the 
effective assistance of counsel on appeal.  State v. Sanders (Feb. 4, 1999), 
Hamilton App. No. C-960253, unreported. 
 
App.R. 26(B)(5) requires that the applicant show “a genuine issue as to 
whether the applicant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel on 
appeal.”  As the court of appeals recognized, Strickland v. Washington (1984), 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, sets forth the standard for judging 
ineffective-assistance claims.  “When a convicted defendant complains of the 
ineffectiveness of counsel’s assistance, the defendant must show that counsel’s 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”  Id. at 687-
688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693.  Furthermore, “[t]he defendant must 
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  
Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698.  See, also, State v. Bradley 
(1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, paragraphs two and three of the 
syllabus. 
 
Strickland charges us to “[apply] a heavy measure of deference to 
counsel’s judgments,” 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695, and 
to “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance,” id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 80 
L.Ed.2d at 694.  Moreover, we must bear in mind that appellate counsel need not 
raise every possible issue in order to render constitutionally effective assistance.  
See Jones v. Barnes (1983), 463 U.S. 745, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987. 
 
Finally, we note that courts must “judge the reasonableness of counsel’s 
challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of 
counsel’s conduct.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 
695. 
 
The two-part Strickland test “is the appropriate standard to assess a 
defense request for reopening under App.R. 26(B)(5).”  State v. Spivey (1998), 84 
Ohio St.3d 24, 25, 701 N.E.2d 696, 697.  Applying Strickland, we agree with the 
court of appeals’ conclusion that Sanders has failed to raise a genuine issue of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
January Term, 2002 
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Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Mark C. Piepmeier, Special Prosecuting Attorney, and William E. Breyer, 
Assistant Special Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Patricia A. Millhoff, for appellant. 
__________________