Title: Pickering v. Hollabaugh

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

194 Kan. 804 (1965)
401 P.2d 891
C.W. PICKERING and LILLIAN HUBBARD PICKERING, Appellees,
v.
ZOE L. HOLLABAUGH, JR., Executor of the Estate of Zoe J. Hollabaugh, Deceased, and MARY L. HOLLABAUGH, Appellants.
No. 44,082

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed May 15, 1965.
William R. Smith and H.E. Jones, both of Wichita, argued the cause, and A.W. Hershberger, Richard Jones, Wm. P. Thompson, Jerome E. Jones, Robert J. Roth and Robert J. O'Connor, all of Wichita, were with them on the briefs for the appellants.
A.D. Weiskirch, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the briefs for the appellees.
*805 The opinion of the court was delivered by
HATCHER, C.:
This was an action to enforce specific performance of an agreement to exchange real property.
On October 11, 1961, Zoe J. and Mary L. Hollabaugh, husband and wife, entered into an agreement with C.W. and Lillian Hubbard Pickering, husband and wife, for the exchange of real properties. The contract read in part as follows:
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It became apparent after a time that the defendants did not intend to comply with the agreement and an action was brought by the Pickerings to enforce specific performance.
We will be unable to supply any dates as the record sets out an amended petition, an answer, a reply, a stipulation and a motion for judgment without giving any dates as to when such instruments were filed or served.
The substance of the petition was to the effect that plaintiffs are ready, willing and able to comply with the terms of the contract but that defendants refused to execute a conveyance and abide by the terms of the agreement.
*806 The answer denied that the plaintiffs had performed any of the conditions imposed upon them by the agreement and denied that they were able to perform. It was further alleged that the plaintiffs were guilty of laches in the prosecution of the action.
The reply was a general denial.
The parties entered into a stipulation, the material parts of which will be considered later.
The defendants then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings and the stipulation for the reason that it was shown plaintiffs were unable to perform. The motion was overruled.
Zoe J. Hollabaugh died November 6, 1963, and his executor was substituted as a defendant in the action.
The case was tried to the court which made findings of fact and conclusions of law and decreed specific performance of the contract.
Defendants have appealed.
Appellants first contend that the court erred in overruling their motion for judgment on the pleadings and stipulation.
Appellants support their contention with the argument that the appellees agreed to convey approximately 221 acres located in section 1 (more specifically described):
They further suggest that it was stipulated:
The appellants argue that the stipulation establishes the fact that the appellees were not in position to deliver the acreage covered by the agreement.
We are not informed on what ground the trial court overruled the motion for judgment. It must be assumed that it either felt that the stipulation as to the acreage was ambiguous or that the discrepancy in the acreage was immaterial at that stage of the proceeding. Either ground would have been valid.
*807 The stipulation tended to confuse rather than make definite the amount of acreage. According to the stipulation the records of the county clerk indicate the Pickerings owned 172.78 acres in section 1, while the surveyor estimated the acreage, from the description only, to be 199.25 acres. The stipulation left much to be explained.
It may also be suggested that the phrases "approximate acreage of 221 acres" and "more or less" constituted words of description which merely served to identify the property owned by the appellees in section 1. The words were not a warranty of the acreage conveyed. The land could only be described accurately by metes and bounds because of the Tuttle Creek Reservoir. The scrivener was attempting to reach all of the appellees' land in section 1.
We had the same question before us in Martin v. Ott, 114 Kan. 419, 219 Pac. 275. In the Martin case the land was conveyed as "lots 1 and 2 in S.W. fractional quarter of 32-12-21 East, containing 65 acres more or less." The farm in fact contained only 35.6 acres. It was held:
The same rule was announced in Brewer v. Schammerhorn, 183 Kan. 739, 332 P.2d 526, at page 745 of the opinion:
If there was any ambiguity because of the language used it was clarified by testimony covering the particular circumstances involved and presented in connection with other issues to be discussed.
The appellants next contend that evidence of statements made by Zoe J. Hollabaugh, now deceased, should have been excluded *808 as hearsay. Zoe J. Hollabaugh died after the contract was made and before the case came to trial. During the trial C.W. Pickering, one of the appellees, was permitted to testify:
The appellants contend that the testimony was hearsay. However, declarations against interest have always been one of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule. Admissions against interests are always admissible if otherwise competent and presented by a competent witness. G.S. 1949, 60-2804 which prohibited a person from testifying respecting transactions or communications had personally with a person since deceased was not incorporated into the new Code of Civil Procedure and has therefore been repealed. This was the only prohibition against a party to a transaction with a person since deceased testifying as to his statements or declarations. In Hurley v. Painter, 182 Kan. 731, 324 P.2d 142, we stated at page 733 of the opinion:
Testimony such as we are now considering is specifically made admissible by the new Code of Civil Procedure. K.S.A. 60-460 provides in part as follows:
..............
*809 Appellants next contend that confidential communications between Zoe J. Hollabaugh and his attorney were improperly admitted in evidence and should have been excluded as privileged.
Mr. Walter F. McGinnis, an attorney residing at El Dorado, Kansas, prepared the contract in controversy. He testified that he did not know whether it was Mr. Zoe J. Hollabaugh or his broker that first talked to him, it was very possible the broker. He was not sure who gave him the information that went into the contract. The testimony to which the objection is addressed was summarized as follows:
We find nothing in the record to indicate a confidential communication. It would appear that the attorney was acting as a mere scrivener in drafting the contract. There was no basis for applying the lawyer client privilege as that rule is announced in K.S.A. 60-426. In Cunningham v. Cunningham, 107 Kan. 318, 191 Pac. 294, we stated at page 323 of the opinion:
*810 In Cranston v. Stewart, 184 Kan. 99, 334 P.2d 337, we held:
It is contended that evidence varying the terms of the written contract should have been excluded as a violation of the parole evidence rule. Appellants state:
The evidence clearly disclosed that there had been a mutual mistake in the description of the land. The description covered only the land in section 1. There was also approximately 27 acres of adjoining land in section 2 which was intended to be conveyed. When this situation was called to the attention of a court of equity it was its responsibility to correct the mutual mistake before decreeing specific performance. The addition of the 27 acres from section 2 resulted in appellants' benefit. They are hardly in position to claim prejudicial error.
The appellants contend that there was no substantial evidence to support the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law; that appellants' motion for directed verdict should have been sustained, and that there was no substantial evidence to support the judgment.
The reasonable limits of a judicial opinion will not permit a review of all the findings and the evidence to support them.
Appellants' specific complaint is, first, it was impossible for appellees to perform their obligations under the contract because of acreage shortage and second, appellees made no tender of performance.
The court found the facts and concluded:
There was substantial competent evidence to support the basic findings and conclusions material to the determination of the issues.
The appellants' chief complaint stems from their error in construing the words approximately 221 acres more or less to be words of guarantee rather than description.
We have carefully considered the record, reviewed the contentions of appellants and find no trial errors which would justify the granting of a new trial.
Judgment is affirmed.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.
WERTZ, J., not participating.