Title: Helton v. State

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Robert Neal HELTON Jr. v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 96-106                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered June 24, 1996


1.   Appeal & error -- postconviction relief -- review of trial
     court's denial. -- The supreme court will reverse a trial
     court's denial of postconviction relief only if its findings
     are clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of
     the evidence.

2.   Attorney & client -- claim of ineffective assistance of
     counsel -- what petitioner must show -- presumption of
     reasonable conduct. -- In order to succeed on a claim of
     ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show that
     counsel's conduct was outside the range of reasonably
     professional assistance and sufficiently deficient to have
     denied petitioner a fair trial; there is a strong presumption
     that trial counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of
     reasonable professional assistance, and a petitioner has the
     burden of overcoming this presumption by identifying specific
     acts or omissions of trial counsel that, when viewed from
     counsel's perspective at the time of the trial, could not have
     been the result of reasonable professional judgment.

3.   Appeal & error -- trial tactics and strategy not grounds for
     postconviction relief. -- Matters of trial tactics and
     strategy are not grounds for postconviction relief.

4.   Attorney & client -- claim of ineffective assistance of
     counsel -- two-prong test. -- A convicted defendant's claim
     that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require
     reversal of a conviction has two components: first, the
     defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient,
     which requires showing that counsel made errors so serious
     that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed
     the defendant by the Sixth Amendment; second, the defendant
     must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the
     defense, which requires showing that counsel's errors were so
     serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial
     whose result is reliable.

5.   Attorney & client -- claim of ineffective assistance of
     counsel -- totality of evidence must be considered. -- Because
     there is a strong presumption that a duly licensed attorney is
     competent, a court deciding an ineffectiveness claim must
     consider the totality of the evidence that was before the jury
     and judge the reasonableness of the challenged conduct on the
     facts of the particular case at the time of counsel's actions.

6.   Attorney & client -- claim of ineffective assistance of
     counsel -- petitioner must show that outcome of case would
     have been different. -- Under the two-prong standard, even
     professionally unreasonable errors by counsel do not warrant
     reversal of a conviction if the errors were not prejudicial to
     the defendant and had no effect on the judgment; a petitioner
     must show that but for counsel's errors at trial, the outcome
     of the case would have been different.

7.   Attorney & client -- trial counsel's decision not to present
     serologist's testimony was within relam of professional
     judgment. -- Trial counsel's decision not to present the
     testimony of a serologist concerning the presence of the "B"
     blood-group substance in the victim's underpants was a
     tactical one within the realm of counsel's professional
     judgment; an attorney's decision not to call a particular
     witness is largely a matter of professional judgment, and the
     fact that there was a witness or witnesses who could have
     offered testimony beneficial to the defense is not itself
     proof of counsel's ineffectiveness.

8.   Appeal & error -- postconviction relief -- Rule 37 is not
     forum for debating trial tactics or strategy. -- Arkansas Rule
     of Criminal Procedure 37 does not provide a forum to debate
     trial tactics or strategy, even if that strategy proves
     improvident.

9.   Attorney & client -- trial counsel's decision not to call
     alibi witness was trial strategy and not grounds for relief. -
     - Where, when questioned about his decision not to call the
     brother of appellant's fiancé as an alibi witness, trial
     counsel stated that his decision was based on the other three
     members of the brother's family having testified so badly that
     he felt it best not to submit an additional bad witness who
     would testify to essentially the same things that the other
     three had described, the supreme court could not say that the
     decision not to call the alibi witness was anything other than
     trial strategy; thus, counsel's decision was not grounds for
     granting postconviction relief.

10.  Witnesses -- omission of witness whose testimony is cumulative
     does not deprive defense of vital evidence. -- Where an alibi
     witness's testimony would have been cumulative, counsel's
     decision not to call the witness was neither erroneous nor
     prejudicial to the defense; the omission of a witness when his
     or her testimony is cumulative does not deprive the defense of
     vital evidence.

11.  Attorney & client -- trial counsel's failure to call friend of
     appellant was not ineffective assistance. -- Where appellant's
     counsel had strategically developed an alibi defense and had
     presented witnesses in support of that strategy, and where the
     testimony of appellant's friend would have been in direct
     conflict with the strategy, the supreme court could not say
     that counsel's omission of the testimony of appellant's friend
     was prejudicial to appellant's case, even though it may have
     tended somewhat to discredit the victim's testimony; further,
     because counsel testified that he had never been informed of
     the information before trial, the supreme court was not
     prepared to say that counsel omitted the testimony at all;
     because the conflicting testimony was potentially damaging to
     the defense, the supreme court held that, even had counsel
     been aware of the testimony, counsel's failure to call
     appellant's friend as a defense witness did not amount to
     ineffective assistance of counsel.

12.  Attorney & client -- omitted testimony not prejudicial to
     appellant's case. -- Where trial counsel denied the vitality
     of the omitted testimony from the serologist and the brother
     of appellant's fiancé, denied knowledge of the testimony of
     appellant's friend, and gave full, reasonable explanations
     concerning his reasons for not presenting the testimony to the
     jury, the supreme court was satisfied that the omitted
     testimony was not in fact prejudicial to appellant's case.

13.  Criminal procedure -- postconviction relief -- failure to seek
     particular scientific test does not amount to denial of
     counsel. -- There are numerous scientific tests that could be
     conducted on physical evidence in a criminal trial, and
     failure of counsel to seek a particular test will not amount
     to a denial of the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment
     unless it can be concluded that the test was one that any
     competent attorney under the same circumstances would have
     sought.

14.  Attorney & client -- trial counsel was not ineffective in
     failing to seek independent DNA testing. -- Where trial
     counsel's explanation of his decision not to seek DNA testing
     was reasonable, and where appellant offered neither proof that
     any competent attorney in counsel's situation would have
     sought such a test nor proof that, but for counsel's failure
     to request a DNA test, there was a reasonable probability that
     the outcome of appellant's trial would have been different,
     the supreme court was not convinced that the results of any
     scientific testing would have altered the outcome of
     appellant's trial, especially since a victim's testimony alone
     provides substantial evidence to support a conviction of rape;
     further, because the supreme court did not know what the
     outcome of the tests would have been, it could not gauge
     whether DNA testing would have caused the jury to have a
     reasonable doubt of appellant's guilt; thus, the supreme court
     could not hold that the trial court was clearly erroneous in
     finding that trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to
     seek independent DNA testing.

15.  Attorney & client -- claim of ineffective assistance of
     counsel -- appellant could not prove that any mitigating
     evidence existed. -- Where appellant failed to identify with
     any specificity what mitigating evidence counsel omitted
     during sentencing, providing instead only bare allegations,
     and where appellant could not even prove that any mitigating
     evidence existed, the supreme court held that trial counsel's
     conduct did not deprive petitioner of effective assistance of
     counsel.


     Appeal from Saline Circuit Court, Seventh Judicial District;
John W. Cole, Judge; affirmed.
     Etoch Law Firm, by: Louis A. Etoch, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Clint Miller, Deputy Att'y
Gen. and Senior Appellate Advocate, for appellee.

     Donald L. Corbin, Justice.Associate Justice Donald L.
Corbin, 6-24-96   *ADVREP*SC7*




ROBERT NEAL HELTON JR.,
                    APPELLANT,

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS,
                    APPELLEE,



CR 96-106



APPEAL FROM THE SALINE COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT, SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT,
NO. CR 94-196-1,
HON. JOHN W. COLE, JUDGE,



AFFIRMED.





     Appellant, Robert Neal Helton Jr., was found guilty by a jury
of rape in 1994 and sentenced to life in the Arkansas Department of
Correction.  This court affirmed.  Helton v. State, 320 Ark. 352,
896 S.W.2d 887 (1995).  Helton now appeals the ruling of the Saline
County Circuit Court denying him postconviction relief under Rule
37.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure.  Jurisdiction is
properly in this court pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(a)(5).  In
support of his claims on appeal, appellant argues that he was
denied effective assistance of trial counsel during the guilt phase
as well as the sentencing phase of the trial.  We find no error in
the denial of postconviction relief, and therefore we affirm.
     We see no need to repeat the facts of this case as they are
fully stated in our prior decision.  Helton, 320 Ark. 352, 896 S.W.2d 887 (1995).  Suffice it to say that appellant was convicted
of rape and sentenced by the jury to life imprisonment.  During
appellant's trial, the state called five witnesses, including the
victim, the couple with whom the victim resided, the victim's
boyfriend, and the police detective assigned to the case.  The
state introduced no physical or documentary evidence, nor any
medical evidence during the guilt phase of the trial.  Appellant
did not take the stand in his own behalf; however, three alibi
witnesses, appellant's fiancé and her parents, testified in his
defense.  Appellant presented no physical or medical evidence
during either phase of the trial.  Following appellant's
conviction, direct appeal was taken, and this court affirmed the
judgment of conviction.
     Appellant argues on appeal that his trial counsel was
ineffective during both the guilt phase and the sentencing phase of
the trial.  Specifically, appellant asserts that trial counsel was
ineffective during the guilt phase in failing to call three
additional witnesses for the defense and in failing to secure
independent DNA testing.  Appellant claims that trial counsel was
ineffective during the sentencing phase for not calling any
witnesses nor presenting any argument in mitigation.  We conclude
there is no merit to either of appellant's claims. 
                     I.  Standard of Review
     This court will reverse a trial court's denial of
postconviction relief only if its findings are clearly erroneous or
clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.  Vickers v.
State, 320 Ark. 437,