Title: Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Fernandez

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Fernandez, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-3828.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-3828 
CINCINNATI BAR ASSOCIATION v. FERNANDEZ. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Fernandez, Slip Opinion No.  
2018-Ohio-3828.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Multiple violations of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct—Respondent’s law license indefinitely suspended. 
(No. 2017-1409—Submitted January 23, 2018—Decided September 25, 2018.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 
Court, No. 2016-041. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Justin Enrique Fernandez, of Cincinnati, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0062974, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1994.  On 
September 1, 2016, we publicly reprimanded Fernandez for his failure to provide 
sufficient information to his client to permit her to make informed decisions about 
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his plans to achieve her legal objectives.  Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Fernandez, 147 
Ohio St.3d 329, 2016-Ohio-5586, 65 N.E.3d 724. 
{¶ 2} In a formal complaint certified to the Board of Professional Conduct 
on October 4, 2016, relator, Cincinnati Bar Association, charged Fernandez with 
multiple violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct arising from his neglect of 
three client matters, his retention of fees paid by those clients, the overdraft of his 
client trust account, and his failure to respond to the ensuing disciplinary 
investigations. 
{¶ 3} The parties submitted stipulations of fact and misconduct, aggravating 
and mitigating factors, and three exhibits.  Fernandez was the only witness to testify 
at his hearing before a panel of the board.  The panel issued a report in which it 
made findings of fact, found that Fernandez had committed all but one of the 
alleged violations, and recommended that he be indefinitely suspended from the 
practice of law, with certain conditions placed on his reinstatement.1  The board 
adopted the panel’s findings and recommended sanction. 
{¶ 4} Fernandez objects and urges us to reject the board’s finding that he 
acted with a dishonest or selfish motive.  Consistent with the recommendation made 
by relator, he asks us to attribute mitigating effect to his intermittent homelessness 
and unspecified mental disorders and suspend him from the practice of law for one 
year. 
{¶ 5} Having reviewed the record, we adopt the board’s findings of fact and 
misconduct, aggravating and mitigating factors, and recommended sanction.  
Therefore, we indefinitely suspend Fernandez from the practice of law in Ohio and 
impose conditions on his reinstatement. 
 
 
                                                 
1. The panel unanimously dismissed an alleged violation of Prof.Cond.R. 5.3(b) (requiring a lawyer 
who employs and has direct supervisory authority over a nonlawyer to make reasonable efforts to 
ensure that the person’s conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer). 
January Term, 2018 
 
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Misconduct 
{¶ 6} Between April and June 2015, Fernandez agreed to assist Cleora Jean 
Smith and Betty Smith Carpenter with the settlement of their debts and to file a 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy on behalf of Eddie and Amie Foster.  As in Fernandez’s prior 
disciplinary case, these clients were referred to him by Morgan Drexen, Inc., a now 
defunct California company that provided paralegal and paraprofessional services 
to his law practice.  Fernandez stipulated that Morgan Drexen assisted him in 
performing “non-formal debt resolution” for his clients. 
{¶ 7} In April 2015, the United States District Court for the Central District 
of California enjoined Morgan Drexen’s business operations and froze its assets.  
Soon thereafter, Morgan Drexen filed for bankruptcy and went out of business.  In 
July 2015, Morgan Drexen’s clients were sent letters informing them that Morgan 
Drexen had filed for bankruptcy and that the attorney who represented them was 
no longer affiliated with the company.  The letters stated, “All administrative and 
support services will now be provided directly by employees of the law firm you 
hired to represent you” and “[r]est assured, none of your money is affected by 
Morgan Drexen’s bankruptcy because your lawyers, not Morgan Drexen are 
responsible for [electronically transferring funds from] your account and holding 
your money in trust.”  Those letters were sent on the letterhead of Howard Law, 
P.C., which bore the California mailing address that Morgan Drexen had used for 
Fernandez. 
{¶ 8} The board found that Fernandez had received $926 from Cleora Jean 
Smith, $2,618 from Betty Smith Carpenter, and $900 from Eddie and Amie Foster 
to secure his legal services.  Fernandez failed to respond to their efforts to 
communicate with him, and he confirmed that his voicemail prompt instructed his 
clients to leave no more than one message per week due to his work volume.  Not 
only did he fail to perform any legal services for these three clients, he failed to 
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advise the Fosters that they were ineligible to file bankruptcy because their previous 
one was so recent.  Moreover, he failed to refund any money to these four clients. 
{¶ 9} On October 19, 2015, relator received a notice from U.S. Bank that 
one of Fernandez’s client trust accounts was overdrawn.  In response to that notice 
and several client grievances, relator sent multiple letters of inquiry to Fernandez 
by regular and certified mail.  Fernandez did not respond to relator’s requests for 
information. 
{¶ 10} The parties stipulated and the board found that Fernandez’s conduct 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence in 
representing a client), 1.4(a)(2) (requiring a lawyer to reasonably consult with the 
client about the means by which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished), 
1.4(b) (requiring a lawyer to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to 
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation), 1.15(d) 
(requiring a lawyer to promptly deliver funds or other property that the client is 
entitled to receive), 2.1 (requiring a lawyer to exercise independent judgment and 
render candid advice while representing the lawyer’s clients), and 8.1(b) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly failing to respond to a demand for 
information from a disciplinary authority during an investigation).  In addition, the 
parties stipulated and the board found that Fernandez’s conduct with respect to his 
client trust account violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a) (requiring a lawyer to hold funds 
belonging to a client or third party in a client trust account separate from his own 
property and to maintain certain records regarding the funds held in that account) 
and that his failure to respond to relator’s inquiries regarding the overdraft of his 
client trust account constituted an additional violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(b). 
{¶ 11} We accept the board’s findings of fact and misconduct. 
Recommended Sanction 
{¶ 12} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the 
January Term, 2018 
 
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aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions 
imposed in similar cases. 
{¶ 13} The parties stipulated and the board found that four aggravating 
factors are present—that Fernandez has a prior disciplinary record, engaged in a 
pattern of misconduct, committed multiple offenses, and caused harm to his clients, 
who the board found were particularly vulnerable and in dire need of protection 
from creditors.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(1), (3), (4), (8). 
{¶ 14} The board rejected the parties’ stipulation to two mitigating 
factors—that Fernandez did not act with a selfish or dishonest motive and that he 
practiced for more than 20 years without incident before being publicly 
reprimanded in September 2016.  Instead, it found as additional aggravating factors 
that Fernandez had acted with a selfish and dishonest motive and “utterly failed to 
respond or cooperate in any way with Relator’s investigation of this matter.”  See 
Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(2) and (5).  The board also expressed its view that 
Fernandez’s apparent cooperation after relator filed its complaint should not 
“ameliorate his willful refusal to respond” to relator’s investigation. 
{¶ 15} The board rejected relator’s recommendation that Fernandez be 
suspended from the practice of law for one year as being “woefully inadequate to 
protect the public.”  Instead, the board found that Fernandez had accepted payments 
from clients and had then failed to perform any work, conduct that is tantamount to 
theft, for which the presumptive sanction is disbarment.  See, e.g., Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Horan, 123 Ohio St.3d 60, 2009-Ohio-4177, 914 N.E.2d 175, ¶ 22-23.  
Alternatively, the board noted that this matter could also be viewed as one in which 
an attorney had neglected entrusted legal matters and compounded that misconduct 
by failing to cooperate in the ensuing disciplinary investigation.  The presumptive 
sanction for such offenses is an indefinite license suspension.  See, e.g., Mahoning 
Cty. Bar Assn. v. DiMartino, 145 Ohio St.3d 391, 2016-Ohio-536, 49 N.E.3d 1280, 
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¶ 13-14; Disciplinary Counsel v. Golden, 97 Ohio St.3d 230, 2002-Ohio-5934, 778 
N.E.2d 564, ¶ 23. 
{¶ 16} The board acknowledged Fernandez’s testimony that he suffered 
from mental- health issues and that when he sought the assistance of the Ohio 
Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”), its professionals recommended that he 
seek inpatient treatment for those conditions.  While the board was sensitive to the 
possibility that Fernandez may, in fact, be suffering from significant mental or 
physical illnesses that could affect his ability to practice law in a competent, ethical, 
and professional manner, it also noted that Fernandez chose not to obtain the 
recommended treatment for financial reasons.  In the absence of medical evidence 
to substantiate Fernandez’s claimed mental disorder as a mitigating factor pursuant 
to Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7), the board found only that the possibility of its existence 
rendered the sanction of permanent disbarment “too harsh.”2  The board therefore 
recommended that we indefinitely suspend Fernandez from the practice of law, 
order him to make restitution to the affected clients, and place certain conditions on 
Fernandez’s reinstatement. 
Objection to the Recommended Sanction 
{¶ 17} Fernandez objects to the board’s finding that he acted with a 
dishonest and selfish motive and argues that the finding is contradicted by his own 
testimony regarding his gambling addiction and other unspecified and untreated 
mental disorders.  He urges us to take judicial notice that a homeless attorney is 
likely to have impaired judgment and that poor decision-making, not selfishness or 
dishonesty, caused his behavior.  Based on the remaining evidence, Fernandez 
                                                 
2. Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7) provides that a mental-health disorder qualifies as a mitigating factor 
when all the following factors exist: a diagnosis of a disorder by a qualified healthcare professional, 
a determination that the disorder contributed to the respondent’s misconduct, a sustained period of 
successful treatment, and a prognosis from a qualified healthcare professional that the attorney will 
be able to return to the competent, ethical professional practice of law under specified conditions. 
January Term, 2018 
 
7
contends that the appropriate sanction for his misconduct is a one-year suspension.  
We disagree. 
{¶ 18} Despite Fernandez’s claims, we find that the record amply 
demonstrates that he acted with a selfish motive.  His business relationship with 
Morgan Drexen was driven to maximize profit with high-volume representation by 
using paraprofessionals to perform much of the work with minimal attorney 
oversight.  Fernandez testified that after entering into a business relationship with 
Morgan Drexen, he typically had between 100 and 400 clients—as a sole 
practitioner.  He relied on Morgan Drexen to communicate with his clients and 
admitted that he had had had no personal contact with Cleora Jean Smith ten months 
after he commenced her representation.  He took his clients’ money, relied on 
Morgan Drexen to do the work, and failed to adequately monitor the status of his 
clients’ legal matters. 
{¶ 19} When asked if it was possible that there were other clients for whom 
he charged fees that were not earned, Fernandez stated that he could not give a 
definitive answer, explaining, “[O]ne of the weak points of the Morgan Drexen 
interaction with attorneys was attorneys were heavily dependent on the software 
and information systems and the paraprofessionals that they put together; and I 
don’t—well, I haven’t ever really closely reviewed any of the software data to see 
what was done and what wasn’t done.”  Ultimately, he admitted that he had just 
taken on too many clients. 
{¶ 20} Even more troubling than Fernandez’s lax oversight of his clients’ 
legal matters was his testimony regarding the management of the client-trust 
account that Morgan Drexen had established for him.  Although Fernandez claimed 
that the account was his, when he was questioned about who had signature authority 
for the account, he responded, “Well, I definitely should have had signature 
authority, but I—I—I hope it doesn’t turn out that there’s other signature authority 
there.  It should have been mine alone.”  When asked how he got paid, however, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8
Fernandez suggested that others had signature authority for the account, explaining 
that when a client made a payment, his “paraprofessionals at Morgan Drexen should 
put the money in the trust account; and then, as the fees are earned, withdraw that 
money, put [it] in the general business account, and pay [him] from the general 
business account.”  But Fernandez ultimately admitted that he did not know how 
the money moved because he never reviewed the banking records.  His misconduct 
is far more serious than his neglect of three client matters, his failure to refund 
unearned fees, and his failure to maintain required trust-account records, because 
he completely abdicated his duty to safeguard the client funds entrusted to his care. 
{¶ 21} At the panel hearing, Fernandez testified that he “was having some 
mental health issues” and had lost his home to foreclosure the year before the 
charged misconduct began.  He has furthermore admitted that he has a gambling 
problem and that his problems are not of a short-term or acute character, but rather 
that they have resulted in “repeated bouts of homelessness.”  He has presented no 
evidence that those issues have been diagnosed by a qualified healthcare 
professional, that they contributed to his misconduct, that he has achieved a 
sustained period of successful treatment, or that he has received a prognosis from a 
qualified healthcare professional that he will be able to return to the competent, 
ethical professional practice of law.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7).  Furthermore, at 
oral argument, Fernandez confirmed that he had received no treatment for those 
issues—despite OLAP’s recommendation that he seek inpatient treatment—and he 
suggested that if he were not living with a friend, he would still be homeless. 
{¶ 22} Despite Fernandez’s argument, we find that the record plainly 
demonstrates that he acted with a selfish—though perhaps not dishonest—motive 
and that his lax business practices, poor judgment, and mental-health issues present 
an ongoing danger to the public.  We are not unsympathetic to Fernandez’s plight, 
but given the seriousness of his misconduct and the significant effects he admits 
that his untreated mental-health issues have had on the management of his personal 
January Term, 2018 
 
9
affairs, we are convinced that an indefinite suspension with conditions for 
reinstatement, followed by a period of monitored probation once he is reinstated, is 
the appropriate sanction in this case. 
{¶ 23} Accordingly, Justin Enrique Fernandez is indefinitely suspended 
from the practice of law in Ohio, and any reinstatement shall be subject to the 
following conditions:  that he (1) submit proof, within 60 days of our order, that he 
has made restitution of $926 to Cleora Jean Smith, $2,618 to Betty Smith Carpenter, 
and $900 to Eddie and Amie Foster, (2) complete 12 hours of continuing legal 
education with an emphasis on law-office and client trust-account management, in 
addition to the requirements of Gov.Bar R. X, (3) submit to an evaluation by a 
qualified healthcare professional to investigate the possible existence of a disorder 
as defined in Gov.Bar R. V(35) and comply with any treatment recommendations 
made as a result of that evaluation, and (4) show evidence that he has not engaged 
in further misconduct.  Upon reinstatement, Fernandez is to serve a two-year term 
of monitored probation in accordance with Gov.Bar R. V(21).  Costs are taxed to 
Fernandez. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH, HALL, and FISCHER, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by O’DONNELL and DEWINE, 
JJ. 
MICHAEL T. HALL, J., of the Second District Court of Appeals, sitting for 
O’NEILL, J. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 24} Because the record does not support the findings of the Board of 
Professional Conduct that respondent, Justin Fernandez, acted with a selfish motive 
and deserved no credit for his cooperation in the disciplinary process, I dissent from 
the majority’s decision to adopt its recommendation that we indefinitely suspend 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10 
him from the practice of law.  Rather, in my view, the one-year suspension 
recommended by relator, the Cincinnati Bar Association, is the appropriate sanction 
in this case. 
{¶ 25} Fernandez contracted with a California company called Morgan 
Drexen, Inc., to provide him with outsourced paraprofessional, intake, accounting, 
and marketing and advertising services.  Through this agreement, Morgan Drexen 
referred prospective clients in Ohio seeking debt relief to Fernandez, and these 
clients authorized direct deposits from their bank accounts to trust accounts opened 
and managed by Morgan Drexen.  Fernandez might have represented as many as 
500 clients at one time, and monthly withdrawals were collected by Morgan Drexen 
on Fernandez’s behalf until the client had paid a sufficient amount to offer a 
settlement to the client’s creditors.  Morgan Drexen also paid fees to the 
paraprofessionals and to Fernandez once they were earned. 
{¶ 26} The United States District Court for the Central District of California 
enjoined Morgan Drexen’s business operations in April 2015 for charging an 
unlawful upfront fee for debt-relief services and engaging in deceptive advertising.  
Consumer Fin. Protection Bur. v. Morgan Drexen, Inc., 101 F.Supp.3d 856, 860-
861, 875 (C.D.Cal.2015).  According to the court, Morgan Drexen began 
contracting with attorneys in 2010 to bundle its services with bankruptcy services 
in order to continue collecting upfront fees; “Morgan Drexen received 85% to 95% 
of the fees paid by the customer, and the attorneys received 5% to 15%.”  Consumer 
Fin. Protection Bur. v. Morgan Drexen, Inc., C.D.Cal. No. 8:13-cv 01267-JLS 
JEM, 2015 WL 12712302, *1 (July 6, 2015), rev’d on other grounds by Consumer 
Fin. Protection Bur. v. Howard Law, P.C., 671 Fed.Appx. 954 (9th Cir.2016). 
{¶ 27} Morgan Drexen filed for bankruptcy protection and went out of 
business the following June, transferring its business-support services to Howard 
Law, P.C.  In July 2015, clients received letters on “Howard Law, P.C.” letterhead 
informing them of Morgan Drexen’s bankruptcy and advising that their lawyers 
January Term, 2018 
 
11 
were no longer affiliated with the company but would continue to represent them 
and hold their money in trust.  Fernandez then apparently received support services 
from Howard Law. 
{¶ 28} In September 2015, the Cincinnati Bar Association filed an amended 
complaint charging Fernandez with professional misconduct related to a client who 
had contacted Morgan Drexen to settle her debts, and on September 1, 2016, we 
issued a public reprimand based on his failure to have any direct communication 
with her during the four months that he represented her.  Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. 
Fernandez, 147 Ohio St.3d 329, 2016-Ohio-5586, 65 N.E.3d 724, ¶ 1, 19. 
{¶ 29} On October 4, 2016, the Cincinnati Bar Association filed a second 
complaint against Fernandez alleging similar misconduct involving three additional 
clients who had been referred to him by Morgan Drexen.  Although he failed to 
respond to letters of inquiry from the relator, it is not disputed by the parties that he 
cooperated in the disciplinary process after the investigation stage.  Fernandez 
stipulated to his misconduct, acknowledged his wrongdoing, and admitted that a 
suspension would be appropriate.  In addition, the parties stipulated to aggravating 
factors (prior discipline, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, and harm to the 
victims) and mitigating factors (absence of a dishonest or selfish motive and the 
lack of discipline from Fernandez’s licensure in 1994 to his public reprimand in 
2016). 
{¶ 30} The board found that relator had proved violations of the 
Professional Rules and the aggravating factors by clear and convincing evidence, 
but it rejected the stipulation regarding mitigating factors and found three additional 
aggravating factors: (1) “[t]he victims of Respondent’s misconduct were 
particularly vulnerable because Respondent deprived these clients of financial 
resources and neglected their needs at a time that they were in dire need of 
assistance and protection from creditors,” (2) “Respondent utterly failed to respond 
or cooperate in any way with Relator’s investigation of this matter,” and (3) 
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“Respondent acted with a selfish and dishonest motive.”  It also indicated that 
Fernandez’s conduct in taking fees for work that he failed to perform “is tantamount 
to theft.” 
{¶ 31} Based on its findings, the board recommends that we indefinitely 
suspend Fernandez from the practice of law in Ohio. 
{¶ 32} There is no doubt that Fernandez fell well short of the professional 
standards demanded of all attorneys, and this case raises serious questions 
regarding whether his relationship with Morgan Drexen and its paralegals complied 
with Prof.Cond.R. 5.3 and 5.4 pertaining to an attorney’s association with 
nonlawyers.  Nonetheless, the record does not contain clear and convincing 
evidence that Fernandez acted with a selfish motive or failed to cooperate in the 
disciplinary process. 
{¶ 33} First, with respect to two of the clients—Betty Smith Carpenter and 
Cleora Jean Smith—the evidence does not demonstrate that Fernandez collected a 
fee and then failed to perform the work he agreed to complete.  The debt-relief 
services he supplied to his clients involved their making monthly payments to build 
up a sufficient reserve over a period time to offer creditors a settlement.  Clients 
reached out directly to Morgan Drexen, gave that company their financial 
information, and authorized it to withdraw money from their accounts, and the 
nature of the debt-relief services required a sufficient amount of money to be 
accumulated over a period of time before an offer could be made to settle the debt 
with the creditor.  These cases could continue for more than five years before 
settlements could be completed.  And although Fernandez received client funds into 
his trust account and did not issue a refund, the clients did not know what became 
of their money.  For instance, Jack Smith averred that his mother had had $374 per 
month withdrawn from her account from July 2015 to February 2016, but he had 
“not been informed of where the money went, or who was paid, or if any settlements 
with creditors were reached.”  Similarly, Cleora Jean Smith stated in her affidavit 
January Term, 2018 
 
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that funds had been withdrawn from her account, but she did not assert that creditors 
had not been paid or that no work had been completed. 
{¶ 34} And although attorney Richard A. Goulder’s affidavit indicated that 
Fernandez had collected $900 to file a bankruptcy for two other clients, Eddie and 
Amie Foster, and that Fernandez had not refunded that fee, Fernandez testified that 
Morgan Drexen’s paralegals had performed the intake for his bankruptcy cases and 
he had never spoken to the Fosters or advised them.  Fernandez also testified that 
he did not believe that he owed any clients money, but he had not reviewed any 
banking records from his trust account to know where client funds had gone.  It 
does not appear that there has ever been an accounting made, and at most, relator 
asserted that it was “not aware that any work was performed by Mr. Fernandez.” 
{¶ 35} The board relied on Disciplinary Counsel v. Horan, 123 Ohio St.3d 
60, 2009-Ohio-4177, 914 N.E.2d 175, but that case is distinguishable.  There, the 
attorney fraudulently altered fee applications to seek payment for court-appointed 
work that she had not performed.  She also accepted fees from numerous clients but 
failed to appear at hearings or complete the work promised; the clients sought 
refunds but were unable to contact the attorney, who had signed some checks over 
to a relative.  The attorney was also named a guardian ad litem in charge of a minor 
beneficiary’s trust account, with the funds to be paid to the beneficiary on his 18th 
birthday, but after turning 18, the beneficiary was unable to locate the money.  We 
disbarred the attorney for stealing from her clients. 
{¶ 36} There is a distinction between an attorney’s collecting fees with no 
intention of completing the work and no intention of giving a refund—which is 
tantamount to theft and evinces a selfish and dishonest motive—and an attorney 
who agrees to perform work but out of neglect fails to do so.  For example, in 
Columbus Bar Assn. v. Albrecht, 106 Ohio St.3d 301, 2005-Ohio-4984, 834 N.E.2d 
812, the attorney accepted retainers and then failed to complete work promised to 
three clients, but we nonetheless accepted the board’s finding that the attorney 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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lacked a dishonest or selfish motive.  More recently, in Toledo Bar Assn. v. Crosser, 
147 Ohio St.3d 499, 2016-Ohio-8257, 67 N.E.3d 789, the attorney accepted a 
retainer, failed to perform the work, lied to the client to cover up her neglect, and 
then failed to timely refund the fee, and we accepted the finding that she acted 
without a selfish motive. 
{¶ 37} Accordingly, the board’s analogy of Fernandez’s case to one 
involving an attorney who misappropriated funds and who acted with a selfish 
motive is not well taken.  The evidence shows that Fernandez relied on Morgan 
Drexen and its paralegals to help him manage his practice, that Morgan Drexen 
managed the fees paid by the clients it solicited, and that Morgan Drexen paid 
Fernandez when he earned his fees.  However, since the board rejected the violation 
of having an improper relationship with nonlawyers, the remaining evidence 
indicates that Fernandez took on too many clients and neglected their cases.  There 
is insufficient proof that he acted with a selfish motive, however. 
{¶ 38} The board also justified its recommended sanction on its finding that 
Fernandez exhibited a “complete failure” to cooperate with the disciplinary 
investigation.  Although Fernandez admitted failing to respond to any of relator’s 
inquiries before it filed the complaint in this case, he admitted his misconduct and 
accepted responsibility for it during the course of these proceedings, 
communicating and cooperating with relator in proceedings before the board, 
stipulating to the admissibility and truth of the testimony in his victims’ affidavits, 
and waiving his right to cross-examine them.  Further, relator admits in its brief that 
Fernandez’s cooperation aided the disciplinary process.  This court has recognized 
that an attorney’s eventual cooperation in the disciplinary process is a basis to 
impose a lesser sanction.  See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Davis, 121 Ohio St.3d 
84, 2009-Ohio-500, 902 N.E.2d 25, ¶ 16; Columbus Bar Assn. v. Dice, 120 Ohio 
St.3d 455, 2008-Ohio-6787, 900 N.E.2d 189, ¶ 10-11; Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Boulger, 88 Ohio St.3d 325, 327, 725 N.E.2d 1112 (2000). 
January Term, 2018 
 
15 
{¶ 39} Tellingly, in its independent review of Fernandez’s objection to the 
board’s recommendation, the majority does not marshal a single decision from this 
court supporting imposition of an indefinite suspension in this case, and in my view, 
a lesser sanction is warranted. 
{¶ 40} This case is analogous to Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Larson, 124 Ohio 
St.3d 249, 2009-Ohio-6766, 921 N.E.2d 618.  There, the attorney failed to perform 
work promised to three clients, did not promptly refund unearned fees, and failed 
to respond to letters of inquiry involving the grievance.  He demonstrated problems 
managing an expanding number of cases, and “his hearing testimony showed that 
he had made few concrete changes for the future.  He repeatedly referred to a 
general ambition to limit the number of his cases, the counties in which he 
practiced, and the time he spent out of the office.  But these goals remain largely 
aspirational.”  Id. at ¶ 40.  But unlike Fernandez, the attorney had also engaged in 
a course of conduct to conceal his failure to competently pursue claims on the 
clients’ behalf, and the presumptive sanction for this misconduct was a two-year 
license suspension; based on the circumstances, we imposed a two-year suspension 
with 12 months stayed on conditions.  Id. at ¶ 19. 
{¶ 41} In this case, Fernandez accepted more clients than he could 
competently represent, failed to monitor their cases and keep track of and account 
for client funds, and effectively allowed nonlawyers to run his practice.  However, 
there is no proof that he misappropriated client funds, acted with a selfish or 
dishonest motive, or completely failed to cooperate in the disciplinary process.    
{¶ 42} Accordingly, I would adopt the recommendation of relator in this 
case and impose a one-year license suspension with reinstatement subject to the 
conditions recommended by the board. 
O’DONNELL and DEWINE, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Edwin W. Patterson III, Bar Counsel; Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, L.L.P., 
and Justin D. Flamm; and Zingarelli Law Office, L.L.C., and Nicholas A. 
Zingarelli, for relator. 
Justin Enrique Fernandez, pro se. 
_________________