Title: State v. Stover

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Respondent,  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) No. SC91760 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
MELVIN STOVER, JR.,  
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant.  
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CLAY COUNTY 
The Honorable Larry D. Harman, Judge 
 
Opinion issued September 25, 2012 
 
 
Melvin Stover, Jr., appeals his conviction and sentence of 12 years without 
probation or parole for the class A felony of trafficking drugs in the first degree, section 
195.222.5.1  On appeal, Mr. Stover claims that the trial court erred in overruling his 
motion for acquittal because there was insufficient evidence to prove he knowingly 
possessed the illegal drugs, overruling his motion to suppress evidence because he was 
detained without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and in overruling his 
objections to evidence of the incriminating statements he made before he received 
Miranda warnings.2  He further claims that the trial court erred in overruling his 
                                             
 
1 All references are to RSMo Supp. 2008, unless otherwise indicated. 
2 Miranda warnings must be provided when a person is subjected to custodial 
interrogation.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
objection to the verdict-directing instruction.  Because the submission of the verdict 
director was plain error, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded. 
Facts and Procedural Background 
 
Missouri State Highway Patrol Corporal Brian Hagerty has worked in drug 
interdiction with the highway patrol since 1998 and has been the supervisor of his troop’s 
“Criminal Interdiction Unit” since 2001.  By November 2003, the veteran trooper had 
made “hundreds, if not thousands, of drug interdiction arrests” during his career.  Most of 
the significant drug seizures he has made occurred on eastbound Interstate 70. 
 
The morning of November 25, 2003, Corporal Hagerty and another trooper were 
patrolling Interstate 70 in Lafayette County.  During the patrol, Corporal Hagerty noticed 
a 2004 Mercury Grand Marquis traveling eastbound on Interstate 70 in front of his patrol 
car.  Corporal Hagerty observed the Grand Marquis, which was occupied by two males, 
move from the left lane into the right lane between two tractor-trailers.  Corporal Hagerty 
noted that the vehicle was traveling at 65 miles per hour and following fewer than two car 
lengths behind the first tractor-trailer.  Corporal Hagerty pulled his patrol car in front of 
the second tractor-trailer and behind the Grand Marquis.  From behind the Grand 
Marquis, Corporal Hagerty could see that the vehicle had California license plates.  The 
Grand Marquis then slowed to an approximate 55 miles per hour in the 70-mile-per-hour 
zone.  His observation of the vehicle and its occupants and the driver’s reaction to the 
patrol car caused Corporal Hagerty to suspect the two men were engaged in illegal 
activity. 
 
Corporal Hagerty activated his emergency lights to stop the vehicle for following 
the tractor-trailer too closely.  The stop occurred shortly after 10:54 a.m. near an exit 
ramp to a rest area in Lafayette County.  Corporal Hagerty and his fellow trooper 
approached the vehicle to speak with the two male occupants.  During his approach, 
Corporal Hagerty suspected that the vehicle was a rental car based of the tint of the 
windows, its clean condition, and the lack of dealership markers or license plate brackets 
that are typically present on other vehicles.  As Corporal Hagerty continued to approach 
the vehicle, he looked into the window and noticed several gift bags and pieces of art 
work in the passenger compartment, some of which appeared to be newly purchased with 
price tags still attached.  He saw no evidence of any luggage, toiletries, or any other items 
that might indicate vacation travel.  Corporal Hagerty contacted the driver and passenger, 
explained the reason for the stop, and requested the license of the driver, Mr. Stover. 
 
After receiving Mr. Stover’s Washington, D.C., license, Corporal Hagerty asked 
Mr. Stover to sit in the patrol car.  Mr. Stover agreed, exited the Grand Marquis, and 
entered the patrol car with Corporal Hagerty and the other trooper.   Mr. Stover’s 
traveling companion, Oris Butler, remained in the Grand Marquis.  Corporal Hagerty 
obtained the information from Mr. Stover necessary to process the traffic stop and also 
engaged in general conversation with Mr. Stover.  Their conversation, which was 
recorded by a video camera in the patrol car, caused him to become increasingly 
suspicious that Mr. Stover and Mr. Butler were trafficking narcotics. 
 
During the conversation in the patrol car, Mr. Stover told Corporal Hagerty that he 
was returning from Las Vegas, Nevada, to his home in Washington, D.C.  He said he and 
 
3
Mr. Butler had flown to Las Vegas for a single day of gambling on Saturday, November 
22, which was three days before the traffic stop.  Mr. Stover told Corporal Hagerty that 
each man purchased his own one-way airplane tickets for approximately $900.  When 
Corporal Hagerty asked Mr. Stover why no luggage was visible in the vehicle, Mr. Stover 
said he had not brought any luggage because he and Mr. Butler only planned to be in Las 
Vegas for one day.  During their conversation, Corporal Hagerty said that D.C. had 
unusual licenses and that he was slow to get a response in the car on his laptop computer.   
 
While waiting, Corporal Hagerty and Mr. Stover discussed the Las Vegas trip in 
more detail.  Corporal Hagerty learned that the two men gambled at MGM Grand but 
that, instead of staying there, they stayed at a cheaper hotel down the street.  Mr. Stover 
told Corporal Hagerty that he initially won $2,000 but that he then lost all but $600.  As a 
result, Mr. Stover said that they were unable to purchase tickets for a return flight and 
instead rented the vehicle to drive back to Washington, D.C.  Finally, when Corporal 
Hagerty asked if either he or Mr. Butler had been arrested in the past, Mr. Stover said he 
had not and, when asked about Mr. Butler, Mr. Stover said Mr. Butler had not been 
arrested “in the last four to five years.” 
 
Corporal Hagerty then informed Mr. Stover that he was going to return to the 
Grand Marquis to retrieve the vehicle rental agreement from Mr. Butler.  While doing so, 
Corporal Hagerty obtained Mr. Butler’s Maryland identification.  He also asked Mr. 
Butler some of the same questions he had asked Mr. Stover in the patrol car.  When 
questioned, Mr. Butler’s previously calm demeanor changed, and he became animated.  
In addition, Mr. Butler’s answers to several questions were different than Mr. Stover’s 
 
4
answers.  For example, Mr. Butler told Corporal Hagerty that he and Mr. Stover left 
Washington, D.C., on Friday, when Mr. Stover said they flew out on Saturday.  Mr. 
Butler told Corporal Hagerty the pair was driving back east because they got “hung up” 
in Las Vegas and wanted to see the country.  In contrast, Mr. Stover said they were 
driving back due to lack of money.  Furthermore, the rental agreement Corporal Hagerty 
obtained from the Grand Marquis showed Mr. Stover rented the car in Las Vegas on 
November 21, 2003, the day before Mr. Stover said he had arrived in Las Vegas.  The 
vehicle was due in Washington, D.C., on November 24, 2003, making the vehicle one 
day overdue at the time of the stop.  Corporal Hagerty then returned to the patrol car.   
 
On his return, Corporal Hagerty initiated a radio check of Mr. Butler’s 
identification and learned that Mr. Butler had been arrested several times for drug-related 
offenses.  At this point, Corporal Hagerty asked Mr. Stover if the vehicle contained 
anything illegal.  Mr. Stover replied that there was nothing illegal in the car and began 
asking why he had been stopped.  At approximately 11:14 a.m., 20 minutes after the stop 
began, Corporal Hagerty asked for consent to search the vehicle.  Mr. Stover firmly 
refused, and, according to Corporal Hagerty, his speech became strained and his 
demeanor became argumentative.  Corporal Hagerty told Mr. Stover that he intended to 
call in a canine unit, and Mr. Stover asked why that was necessary.  As Corporal Hagerty 
began to explain, Mr. Stover interrupted him, saying for the first time that he needed to 
get home as soon as possible because his mother soon would be admitted to a 
Washington, D.C., hospital.  Mr. Stover continued talking to Corporal Hagerty, which 
prevented Corporal Hagerty from calling for the canine unit for approximately six 
 
5
minutes.  At 11:20 a.m., approximately 26 minutes after initiating the stop, Corporal 
Hagerty successfully requested a canine unit by radio. 
 
After the request for a canine unit, Mr. Stover asked if Corporal Hagerty would get 
him a cigarette from the rental car.  Corporal Hagerty said he would and returned to the 
Grand Marquis.  While there, Corporal Hagerty asked Mr. Butler about Mr. Stover’s 
statement regarding his ill mother.  Mr. Butler stated that he did not know of any illness 
in Mr. Stover’s family.  Mr. Butler also told Corporal Hagerty that there were no 
cigarettes in the vehicle and that Mr. Stover did not smoke.   
 
Corporal Hagerty returned once more to the patrol car to confront Mr. Stover with 
what he believed were contradictions between the two men’s statements.  Mr. Stover 
suggested that everything he had told the officer made sense, and Corporal Hagerty said 
he disagreed.  Mr. Stover then changed his story to say that Mr. Butler was correct that 
they flew out on November 21.  He also stated for the first time that a third man was with 
them in Las Vegas, although he never identified that person.  At 11:33 a.m., 
approximately 40 minutes after the stop, Corporal Hagerty called to check on the status 
of the canine unit. 
 
At 11:39 a.m., 19 minutes after Corporal Hagerty radioed for the canine unit, it 
arrived at the scene.  After the canine had acclimated to its surroundings, it performed a 
sniff test of the Grand Marquis and “alerted” at the trunk.  Corporal Hagerty announced 
that he was going to conduct a search, and he opened the trunk.  Corporal Hagerty found 
a large suitcase in the trunk, which was opened to reveal 11 plastic bottles containing a 
yellowish liquid that later was determined to be approximately 10 gallons of PCP, a 
 
6
controlled substance.  Corporal Hagerty also found a newly purchased watch in a gift bag 
in the trunk near the suitcase.  The troopers arrested Mr. Stover and advised him of his 
Miranda rights.  Corporal Hagerty then called a tow truck to move the Grand Marquis to 
a safe location at a scale house off the highway.  At the scale house, Mr. Stover told the 
officer who responded with the canine that he owned the Fossil watch found in a gift bag 
in the trunk next to the suitcase containing the PCP.   
 
Thereafter, the men were taken to the Lafayette County jail.  When Mr. Butler was 
searched during booking, a JetBlue flight itinerary in Mr. Butler’s name and a ticket stub 
were recovered from his person.  The itinerary and ticket stub were for a one-way fare of 
$259 from Washington, D.C., to Long Beach, California, on Thursday, November 20, 
2003.   When the troopers conducted an inventory of the rental vehicle, they found a 
receipt for a flight on Southwest Airline in Mr. Butler’s name from Los Angeles 
International Airport to Las Vegas on Friday, November 21, 2003.  The troopers also 
found a vehicle condition report showing that Mr. Stover had inspected the vehicle for 
damage at the time he rented it.   
 
On February 1, 2007, the state charged Mr. Stover with first-degree trafficking, a 
class A felony, under section 195.222.5.  Prior to trial, Mr. Stover filed a motion to 
suppress the contraband seized during the search, the evidence of incriminating 
statements made during the traffic stop, and the evidence of his refusal to consent to the 
 
7
search.3  At a hearing on the motion to suppress, Corporal Hagerty testified as to the 
timeline of events.  He acknowledged that Mr. Stover was not free to leave at any time 
throughout the detention.  After the hearing, the trial court overruled Mr. Stover’s motion 
to suppress.  At trial, the state presented evidence that the DEA publicly commended 
Corporal Hagerty for the drug seizure.  The trial court admitted this evidence over Mr. 
Stover’s hearsay objection.  During the jury instruction conference, Mr. Stover objected 
to the definition of “possession” in the state’s verdict director.  The court overruled the 
objection and submitted the state’s instructions to the jury.  After deliberations, the jury 
found Mr. Stover guilty.  The trial court overruled Mr. Stover’s motion for judgment of 
acquittal based on the state’s failure to provide sufficient evidence of knowing possession 
of the contraband.  The trial court sentenced Mr. Stover to twelve years in prison without 
the possibility of probation or parole.  Mr. Stover appealed.  This Court granted transfer 
after opinion by the court of appeals.  Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10.   
 
On appeal, Mr. Stover claims that the trial court erred in: (1) overruling his motion 
for acquittal on the ground of insufficient evidence to convince a reasonable trier of fact 
that he knowingly possessed the contraband; (2) overruling his motion to suppress the 
contraband seized during the search of his vehicle because the detention was conducted 
without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and lasted beyond the time reasonably 
required to complete a traffic ticket; (3) overruling his motion to suppress evidence of 
                                             
 
3 The motion to suppress initially was filed in Lafayette County.  After venue was 
changed to Clay County, an identical motion to suppress was filed in Clay County.  
Because the motions were identical, they will be referred to as one motion. 
 
 
8
incriminating statements made during the detention and prior to the arresting officers 
issuing a Miranda warning; (4) allowing into evidence his refusal to consent to a search 
of the vehicle; (5) allowing Corporal Hagerty’s testimony that he received a 
commendation from the DEA for making the largest PCP seizure in the history of the 
United States until 2003; and (6) overruling his objection to the verdict-directing 
instruction because it did not require the jury to find that he knew of the content and 
character of the PCP or that he was aware of its presence and nature.  For ease of 
discussion, some of Mr. Stover’s points will be addressed out of order.  
Conviction Supported by Sufficient Evidence 
 
On appeal, Mr. Stover first contends that the trial court erred in overruling his 
motions for a judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence to support a 
conviction of trafficking drugs in the first degree.  He claims that the state did not 
produce sufficient evidence to convince a reasonable trier of fact that he knowingly 
possessed the PCP. 
 
When reviewing whether sufficient evidence supports a criminal conviction, this 
Court gives great deference to the trier of fact.  State v. Moore, 303 S.W.3d 515, 519 
(Mo. banc 2010).  Appellate review “is limited to a determination of whether there is 
sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror might have found the defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. Oliver, 293 S.W.3d 437, 444 (Mo. banc 2009) 
(quoting State v. Chaney, 967 S.W.2d 47, 52 (Mo. banc 1998)).  In applying this 
standard, “the Court accepts as true all of the evidence favorable to the state including all 
 
9
favorable inferences drawn from the evidence and disregards all evidence and inferences 
to the contrary.”  Id. 
 
Mr. Stover was charged with first-degree trafficking in violation of section 
195.222.5, RSMo Supp. 2011, which provides: 
A person commits the crime of trafficking drugs in the first degree if . . . he 
distributes, delivers, manufactures, produces or attempts to distribute, 
deliver, manufacture or produce more than thirty grams of a mixture or 
substance containing a detectable amount of phencyclidine (PCP). 
 
In support of the first-degree trafficking charge, the state alleged that Mr. Stover 
possessed ninety grams or more of the controlled substance and such conduct was a 
substantial step toward committing the crime by attempting to distribute, deliver, or sell 
the controlled substance to another person.  On appeal, Mr. Stover contends that there 
was insufficient evidence to prove that he knowingly possessed the PCP.  Although 
possession of the PCP is not an element of the crime of first-degree trafficking, evidence 
of knowing possession may support the conviction when the state alleges that the 
defendant attempted to distribute, deliver, manufacture or produce the controlled 
substance, and this evidence may be circumstantial.  See State v. McNaughton, 924 
S.W.2d 517, 526 (Mo. App. 1996), overruled on other grounds by State v. Pond, 131 
S.W.3d 792, 794 (Mo. banc 2004); State v. Wilson, 359 S.W.3d 60, 67 (Mo. App. 2011) 
(evidence of possession was sufficient to establish that defendant was aware of the nature 
of controlled substance being produced in the house in which defendant was present 
when police executed search warrant).  Substantial evidence that Mr. Stover possessed 
 
10
the contraband, then, will supply the requisite knowledge of its presence to support a 
conviction for trafficking in the first degree. 
 
 The legislature defined the word “possessed” or the phrase “possessing a 
controlled substance” to mean: 
A person, with the knowledge of the presence and nature of a substance, 
has actual or constructive possession of the substance.  A person has actual 
possession if he has the substance on his person or within easy reach and 
convenient control.  A person who, although not in actual possession, has 
the power and intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control 
over the substance either directly or through another person or persons is in 
constructive possession of it. 
 
Section 195.010(34), RSMo Supp. 2011. 
 
To prove possession of a controlled substance, the state must show conscious and 
intentional possession of the substance, either actual or constructive, and awareness of the 
presence and nature of the substance.  State v. Purlee, 839 S.W.2d 584, 587 (Mo. banc 
1992).  Proof of a defendant’s knowledge often is supplied by circumstantial evidence of 
the acts and conduct of the defendant that permit an inference that he or she knew of the 
existence of the contraband.  Id.  “Proof of constructive possession requires, at a 
minimum, evidence that defendant had access to and control over the premises where the 
substance was found.”  Id. at 588.  Exclusive control over the premises raises an 
inference of possession and control.  Id.  However, when there is joint control over the 
premises where the drugs are discovered, some further evidence or admission must 
connect the accused with the illegal drugs.  Id. 
 
“In cases involving joint control of an automobile, ‘a defendant is deemed to have 
both knowledge and control of items discovered within the automobile, and, therefore, 
 
11
possession in the legal sense, where there is additional evidence connecting him with the 
items.’”  State v. Woods, 284 S.W.3d 630, 640 (Mo. App. 2009) (quoting State v. 
Sanderson, 169 S.W.3d 158, 164 (Mo. App. 2005)).  “This additional evidence must 
demonstrate sufficient incriminating circumstances to permit the inference of a 
defendant’s knowledge and control over the controlled substance.”  Id.  The Woods court 
listed additional incriminating circumstances that could support an inference of 
knowledge and control of the items: 
Finding a large quantity of drugs in the vehicle; 
Finding drugs having a large monetary value in the vehicle; 
Easy accessibility or routine access to the drugs; 
The odor of drugs in the vehicle; 
The presence of the defendant’s personal belongings in close proximity to 
the drugs; 
Making false statements in an attempt to deceive the police; 
The defendant’s nervousness during the search; 
The defendant’s flight from law enforcement; 
The presence of drugs in plain view; 
Other conduct and statements made by the accused; and 
The fact that the defendant rented the vehicle. 
 
Id.   
 
Because Mr. Stover did not have exclusive control of the vehicle, the state was 
required to present additional incriminating evidence in order to prove knowledge and 
control sufficient to support a finding of possession of the controlled substance.  Mr. 
Stover contends that there was no evidence that he was shaking or exhibited unusual 
nervousness, no incriminating statements concerning the drugs, and that the drugs were 
not in plain view when he was in the vehicle.  Mr. Stover further states that the drugs 
were not commingled with any of his belongings.  The state contends that it showed at 
 
12
trial sufficient additional evidence to connect Mr. Stover to the contraband.  The issue, 
therefore, is whether the state presented sufficient evidence of incriminating 
circumstances in order to permit an inference of Mr. Stover’s knowledge and control over 
the drugs. These factors from Woods, while not exhaustive, guide this Court’s analysis of 
whether additional incriminating circumstances sufficiently connected Mr. Stover to the 
PCP in the trunk of the car. 
 
Based on the evidence presented at trial, the state met its burden to show 
additional incriminating circumstances to support an inference of Mr. Stover’s 
knowledge and control over the controlled substance in the vehicle.  A state laboratory 
technician testified that there was a large quantity, approximately 10 gallons, of PCP in 
the bottles found in the trunk.  Further testimony established that 10 gallons of PCP 
amounts to approximately 37,850 doses, which supports a conclusion that the drugs had a 
large monetary value.  As the named customer on the rental agreement and the driver of 
the vehicle, it is reasonable for a jury to infer that Mr. Stover had easy access to the trunk 
where the drugs were found.   
 
Significantly, the trooper who responded with the canine testified that Mr. Stover 
admitted to ownership of the Fossil watch found in the trunk next to the PCP.  Although 
Mr. Stover denied ever accessing the trunk, he could not explain how his newly 
purchased watch came to be in the trunk next to the suitcase full of PCP.  This additional 
evidence supports the inference that Mr. Stover had knowledge and control of the drugs.   
 
Further, the evidence at trial was that Mr. Stover made false statements to 
Corporal Hagerty, such as telling him that he and Mr. Butler had arrived in Las Vegas a 
 
13
day later than Mr. Stover actually had.  Inconsistencies in the stories told to Corporal 
Hagerty, such as Mr. Stover stating that they had to rent a vehicle due to their lack of 
funds and Mr. Butler stating that they got “hung up” in Las Vegas and wanted to see the 
country, were evidence that the men were making false statements in an attempt to 
deceive Corporal Hagerty.  According to Corporal Hagerty’s testimony at trial, Mr. 
Stover exhibited physical symptoms of anxiety during the vehicle stop, such as the pulse 
visibly beating on the side of his neck.  When Corporal Hagerty requested Mr. Stover’s 
consent to search the vehicle, his demeanor changed:  His hands became animated, and 
his tone became argumentative.  Consistent with Corporal Hagerty’s experience that drug 
trafficking often is accomplished by traveling in a rental vehicle, Mr. Stover rented the 
Grand Marquis that served to transport the PCP in this case.  
 
Importantly, the state admitted into evidence receipts and ticket stubs from Mr. 
Butler’s travel that show he flew from Washington, D.C., to Long Beach, California, on 
Thursday, November 20, and then from Los Angeles International Airport to Las Vegas 
on Friday, November 21.  This evidence shows that all the statements made by Mr. 
Stover and Mr. Butler as to their joint travel from Washington, D.C., to Las Vegas on 
either Friday, November 21, or Saturday, November 22, were false and demonstrates an 
intent by the two men to deceive Corporal Hagerty.   
 
The record contains substantial evidence linking Mr. Stover to the controlled 
substance in the trunk beyond his presence in the vehicle of which his name was listed as 
the customer.  Mr. Stover’s knowing possession of the PCP reasonably may be inferred.  
The trial court did not err in overruling his motion for acquittal.    
 
14
Reasonable Suspicion Existed for Investigative Detention 
 
For his next point on appeal, Mr. Stover contends that the trial court erred in 
failing to sustain his motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic 
stop because the detention was without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and 
extended beyond the time reasonably required to complete a traffic ticket.  He 
characterizes the stop as a “prolonged detention” without reasonable suspicion to believe 
that any criminal activity, other than the traffic violation itself, was occurring. 
 
This Court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress in the light most 
favorable to the ruling and defers to the trial court’s determinations of credibility.  State 
v. Schroeder, 330 S.W.3d 468, 472 (Mo. banc 2011).  Review is limited to determining 
whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence.  Id.  Analysis of whether 
conduct violates the Fourth Amendment is an issue of law that this Court review de novo.  
Id. 
 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right of 
all citizens to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.  U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
“A routine traffic stop based on the violation of state traffic laws is a justifiable seizure 
under the Fourth Amendment.”  State v. Granado, 148 S.W.3d 309, 311 (Mo. banc 
2004).  Such a seizure is constitutional “[s]o long as the police are doing no more than 
they are legally permitted and objectively authorized to do.”  Id.  An officer has authority 
to “check the driver’s license and registration, ask the driver about his destination and 
purpose, and request that the driver sit inside the patrol car.”  United States v. Brown, 345 
F.3d 574, 578 (8th Cir. 2003).  But “[t]he fact that the police may detain a person for a 
 
15
routine traffic stop does not justify indefinite detention.”  Granado, 148 S.W.3d at 311.  
A seizure can become unconstitutional if the detention lasts beyond the time necessary 
for the officer to conduct a reasonable investigation of the traffic violation.  Id. 
 
An officer may continue to detain the individual beyond the time period necessary 
to investigate the traffic violation if the officer develops “reasonable and articulable 
grounds for suspicion of illegal activity” based on the behavior and responses of the 
individual during the traffic stop.  See State v. Waldrup, 331 S.W.3d 668, 674 (Mo. banc 
2011); United States v. Lyons, 486 F.3d 367, 371 (8th Cir. 2007) (circumstances that 
establish reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is carrying contraband 
provide justification for greater intrusion unrelated to the traffic offense).  “The 
[reasonable] suspicion that will justify the minimally intrusive ‘Terry’ stop is present 
when ‘a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude 
in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot.”  Waldrup, 331 S.W.3d at 
674 (quoting State v. Mack, 66 S.W.3d 706, 709 (Mo. banc 2002)).  “[A] court must 
examine the totality of the circumstances in order to evaluate whether the standard for 
“reasonable suspicion” has been met.”  Id.  
 
As with the traffic stop investigation, the continued detention must “be strictly 
circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.”   Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
25 (1968).  In United States v. Place, the United States Supreme Court “question[ed] the 
wisdom of a rigid time limitation” because “[s]uch a limit would undermine the equally 
important need to allow authorities to graduate their responses to the demands of any 
particular situation.”  462 U.S. 696, 709 n.10 (1985).  In determining whether a traffic 
 
16
stop takes too much time to be justified as investigatory, courts “examine whether the 
police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel 
their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.”  
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985).  “A court making this assessment 
should take care to consider whether the police are acting in a swiftly developing 
situation, and in such cases the court should not indulge in unrealistic second-guessing.”  
Id. The officer may ask “a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to 
try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicion.”  Id. (citing 
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984)). 
 
In this case, Corporal Hagerty had sufficient justification to detain Mr. Stover 
during his reasonable investigation of the traffic stop and to detain Mr. Stover further and 
investigate his activities upon attaining reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was 
afoot.  Corporal Hagerty stopped the Grand Marquis for following a tractor-trailer in an 
unsafe manner.  During the traffic stop, Corporal Hagerty required Mr. Stover to join him 
in the patrol car to process the traffic ticket.  Corporal Hagerty testified that Mr. Stover’s 
Washington, D.C., license delayed the process for issuing the traffic warning.  In the 
meantime, Corporal Hagerty engaged in general conversation with Mr. Stover and Mr. 
Butler about their trip and plans. 
 
Corporal Hagerty’s continued detention of Mr. Stover was justified because the 
circumstances supported an objective reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was 
occurring.  Specifically, Corporal Hagerty noted that the men were driving eastbound on 
I-70 in a brand new rental car with California license plates.  They said they had 
 
17
purchased one-way tickets and were traveling without luggage.  After talking with Mr. 
Stover and Mr. Butler, Corporal Hagerty noticed several discrepancies between their 
stories.  The statements disagreed about the date Mr. Stover and Mr. Butler traveled to 
Las Vegas.  Mr. Stover also told Corporal Hagerty that he rented the Grand Marquis 
because the two men were unable to afford a return flight after losing money while 
gambling.   The car’s rental agreement, however, revealed that Mr. Stover rented the car 
on November 21, the day before he purportedly flew to Las Vegas and lost money 
gambling and that the rental car was overdue.  Mr. Butler increased Corporal Hagerty’s 
suspicions by asserting they rented the vehicle not because they lost money gambling, but 
because they wanted to see the country.  When Corporal Hagerty confronted Mr. Stover 
with these conflicting statements, Mr. Stover stated for the first time that he needed to 
return because his mother was ill, but Mr. Butler did not know of any illness in Mr. 
Stover’s family.  Also when confronted, Mr. Stover’s speech became strained and, 
according to Corporal Hagerty, he became argumentative. 
 
Corporal Hagerty testified at trial that the unusual conduct and circumstances of 
the traffic stop, in light of his experience, led him to conclude that criminal activity may 
be occurring.  Corporal Hagerty testified that many of the actions taken by Mr. Stover are 
indicative of criminal activity, specifically drug trafficking.  Corporal Hagerty testified 
that I-70 is a well-recognized drug corridor through the United States.  He testified that 
people engaged in criminal activity overreact upon seeing a law enforcement vehicle, 
which the officer noted when the Grand Marquis braked to go 15 miles per hour under 
the speed limit when it already was traveling below the speed limit.  Corporal Hagerty 
 
18
also testified that a person’s actions of purchasing expensive, one-way airfare, staying for 
a short period of time, and returning with a different method of transportation often 
indicates drug trafficking.  He found it additionally suspicious in his experience that the 
men packed no luggage in a cross-country trip and gave inconsistent stories as to their 
travel itinerary and the reason they rented the car.  Under the totality of the circumstances 
during the traffic stop, it was reasonable for Corporal Hagerty to suspect that illegal 
activity may be occurring. 
 
Once Corporal Hagerty reasonably concluded that criminal activity might have 
been occurring under the circumstances, he continued to detain Mr. Stover and sought 
diligently to confirm or dispel his reasonable suspicion.  Corporal Hagerty completed 
both his processing of the traffic violation and confirmation of his suspicions of criminal 
activity within 20 minutes of the stop and asked Mr. Stover for consent to search the 
vehicle.  After Mr. Stover refused, Corporal Hagerty announced his intention to call a 
canine unit.  Corporal Hagerty was unable to call the canine unit for 6 minutes, however, 
because Mr. Stover prevented him from doing so by continuously engaging him until 
Corporal Hagerty asked him to stop talking to him so he could call.  After the call to the 
canine unit, Mr. Stover continued to act in a manner that confirmed the reasonable 
suspicion of illegal activity.  For the first time during the detention, Mr. Stover said he 
needed to leave because his mother was being admitted into a hospital, an assertion Mr. 
Butler did not corroborate.  Mr. Stover also changed his story to say that the men left for 
Las Vegas on Friday instead of Saturday.  He thereafter asked Corporal Hagerty to get 
him a cigarette from the Grand Marquis when none existed in the vehicle and Mr. Stover 
 
19
does not smoke.  All the while Mr. Stover continuously affirmed Corporal Hagerty’s 
reasonable suspicion, the canine unit was on its way; it arrived 19 minutes after it was 
called. 
 
Mr. Stover’s entire detention – including the traffic stop, the discussions between 
Mr. Stover and Mr. Butler, and summoning a canine unit – was conducted swiftly and did 
not last beyond the time necessary for Corporal Hagerty to investigate his reasonable 
suspicion.  Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686.  The detention as a whole lasted for 49 minutes, half 
of which was the travel time of the canine unit and much of the remaining time was the 
processing of the traffic ticket and overcoming the delays and requests by Mr. Stover.  
Many cases find that a near-hour long detention is reasonable if the officer acted 
diligently to confirm or dispel reasonable suspicion.  See United States v. Maltais, 403 
F.3d 550, 557; United States v. Sanchez, 417 f.3d 971, 975 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding a 45 
minute detention reasonable when the officer acted diligently to minimize the detention 
period); United States v. White, 42 F.3d 457, 460 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding a stop lasting 
80 minutes reasonable when the officer radioed for a dog after developing reasonable 
suspicion and it took some time for the dog to arrive); United States v. Bloomfield, 40 
F.3d 910, 917 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding a 60-minute detention reasonable when the officer 
was performing a diligent investigation of the reasonable suspicion).  Accordingly, the 
duration of the detention in this case was reasonable. 
 
Mr. Stover relies on State v. Maginnis, 150 S.W.3d 117 (Mo. App. 2004), and 
State v. Sund, 215 S.W.3d 719 (Mo. banc 2007), to advance his argument that the traffic 
 
20
stop extended beyond the time reasonably required to complete the investigation.  Both 
are distinguishable from this case. 
 
In Maginnis, the court of appeals noted that the initial questioning of Mr. 
Maginnis in the patrol car did nothing to create any suspicion and that the officer 
conducted a “fishing expedition” without any developed, articulable suspicion.  
Maginnis, 150 S.W.3d at 122.  The court found that the officers never had any grounds 
for suspicion of criminal activity.  Id.  In Mr. Stover’s case, the trooper was conducting 
the routine investigation of the traffic violation while asking questions that were related 
to Mr. Stover’s trip.  The responses to those questions developed the reasonable suspicion 
lacking in Maginnis. 
 
In Sund, the officer completed the investigation of the traffic violation and 
returned the license to the driver of the car.  215 S.W.3d at 722.  After telling the driver 
she was free to go and concluding the traffic stop, the officer told the driver to stop and 
gave her the choice of either consenting to a search or waiting for a canine unit.  Id.  The 
driver consented to the search, and the officer discovered a significant amount of 
marijuana in the vehicle.  Id.  The officer admitted that he had no reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity that would have justified a search of the vehicle or further detention 
beyond the time it took to complete the investigation.  Id. at 723.  Under these 
circumstances, because there was no reasonable suspicion and the traffic stop had been 
concluded when the officer initiated further detention, the search was unreasonable.  Id. 
at 725.  Here, Corporal Hagerty’s reasonable suspicion was ongoing and escalating 
throughout the stop. 
 
21
 
22
 
Corporal Hagerty was justified in asking questions during the investigation of the 
traffic stop.  When he completed the investigation into the traffic violation, he already 
had developed reasonable suspicion to detain the travelers further.  When he asked 
questions to confirm or dispel these suspicions, the travelers’ responses were inconsistent 
and created additional reasonable suspicion.  Officer Hagerty observed specific, 
articulable facts indicating suspicious behavior from the time of the stop to the time of 
the arrest, which made the 49-minute window of time between the initial traffic stop and 
the time the canine made its alert to the trunk of the vehicle not unreasonable under the 
circumstances of this case.  Corporal Hagerty detained Mr. Stover under reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity and did not extend Mr. Stover’s detention beyond the time 
necessary to conduct a reasonable investigation.  The trial court did not err in overruling 
Mr. Stover’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop. 
Verdict Director was Plain Error 
Mr. Stover next asserts that the trial court erred when it overruled his objection to 
verdict-directing Instruction No. 6 because it did not require the jury to find Mr. Stover 
knew of the PCP’s content and character.  He claims the erroneous instruction violated 
his rights to due process and a fair trial.   
Instruction No. 6 was patterned after MAI-CR3d 325.10.2 but omitted the phrase 
“knowing of the substance’s content and character” from the definition of trafficking in 
the pattern instruction.4  The paragraph of Instruction No. 6 defining “trafficking” read:  
                                             
 
4 The full text of Instruction No. 6 reads: 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
If you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt: 
 
First, that on or about November 25, 2003, in the County of 
Lafayette, State of Missouri, the defendant or Oris Butler, 
possessed 90 grams or more of a mixture or substance 
containing a detectable amount of phencyclidine (PCP), a 
controlled substance, and 
 
Second, that such conduct was a substantial step toward the 
commission of the offense of trafficking in the first degree by 
attempting to distribute, deliver, or sell to another person 90 
grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a 
detectable amount of phencyclidine (PCP), a controlled 
substance, and 
 
Third, that defendant or Oris Butler engaged in conduct for the 
purpose of committing such trafficking in the first degree, 
 
 
 
then you will find that the offense of trafficking in the first degree has 
occurred, and if you find and believe from the evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt: 
 
Fourth, that with the purpose of promoting or furthering the 
commission of that trafficking in the first degree, the 
defendant acted alone or together with or aided Oris Butler in 
committing the offense;  
 
then you will find the defendant guilty of trafficking in the first degree. 
 
  
 
However, unless you find and believe from the evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt each and all of these propositions, you must find the 
defendant not guilty of that offense. 
 
  
 
A person commits the crime of trafficking of a controlled substance 
if he knowingly distributes, delivers, or sells 90 grams or more of a mixture 
or substance containing a detectable amount of phencyclidine (PCP), a 
controlled substance. 
 
  
 
As used in this instruction, the term “substantial step” means 
conduct that is strongly corroborative of the firmness of the defendant’s or 
Oris Butler’s purpose to complete the offense of trafficking in the first 
degree. 
 
23
“A person commits the crime of trafficking of a controlled substance if he knowingly 
distributes, delivers, or sells 90 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a 
detectable amount of phencyclidine (PCP), a controlled substance.”  Had the instruction 
mirrored MAI-CR3d 325.10.2, the paragraph would have read:  “A person commits the 
crime of trafficking in the first degree of a controlled substance if he knowingly 
distributes, delivers, or sells 90 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a 
detectable amount of phencyclidine (PCP), a controlled substance knowing of the 
substance’s content and character.”  (Emphasis added). 
 
Rule 28.03 requires “specific objections to instructions . . . considered erroneous” 
to preserve error for review on appeal.  The objection must state “distinctly the matter 
objected to and the grounds of the objection. . . .  The objections must also be raised in 
the motion for new trial . . . .”  Id.  While Mr. Stover claims he objected timely to 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
  
 
As used in this instruction, the term “possessed” means either actual 
or constructive possession of the substance.  A person has actual possession 
if he has the substance on his person or within easy reach and convenient 
control.   A person who is not in actual possession has constructive 
possession if he has the power and intention at a given time to exercise 
dominion or control over the substance either directly or through another 
person or persons.  Possession may also be sole or joint.  If one person 
alone has possession of a substance, possession is sole.  If two or more 
persons share possession of a substance, possession is joint. 
 
  
 
As used in this instruction, controlled substance includes 
phencyclidine (PCP). 
 
  
 
As used in this instruction, a person acts purposely, or with purpose, 
with respect to the person’s conduct or to a result thereof when it is his or 
her conscious object to engage in conduct or to cause that result. 
 
 
24
Instruction No. 6, his ground for objection at trial differs from his claim of error on 
appeal.  At trial, Mr. Stover’s attorney objected that the definitions in Instruction No. 6 
were confusing, and he referenced the definition of “possession,” in particular.  He said, 
“Your honor, I recognize that these instructions appear to conform to the approved 
instructions that have been issued by our state supreme court.  It does still seem to me 
that the definitions of possession and the definitions of, in the form of the instruction, are 
confusing to the jury and I think unnecessarily so and I will object on that grounds.”  His 
objection referenced a different paragraph of Instruction No. 6 than he challenges on 
appeal.  Significantly, he did not object that the instruction failed to conform to MAI-
CR3d 325.10.2 or that there was an error in the definition of “trafficking.”  Because Mr. 
Stover failed to make the specific objection to the definition of “trafficking” that he raises 
on appeal, this Court is limited to plain error review.  Rule 30.20; State v. Wurtzberger, 
40 S.W.3d 893, 898 (Mo. banc 2001).  The question before this Court, then, is whether 
Instruction No. 6’s omission of the phrase “knowing of the substance’s content and 
character” is plain error.   
 
“A verdict-directing instruction must contain each element of the offense charged 
and must require the jury to find every fact necessary to constitute essential elements of 
[the] offense charged.”  State v. Cooper, 215 S.W.3d 123, 125 (Mo. banc 2007) (citing 
State v. Doolittle, 896 S.W.2d 27, 30 (Mo. banc 1995).  A defendant’s due process rights 
are violated when an instruction relieves the state of its burden to prove the existence of 
every essential element of the crime and does not require the jury to deliberate on and 
determine a contested element of the crime.  Id. at 126.  Instructional error rises to the 
 
25
level of plain error when the appellant demonstrates that the trial court “so misdirected or 
failed to instruct the jury as to cause manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice.”  Id. at 
125.  Plain error exists when an instruction omits an essential element and the evidence 
establishing the omitted element was seriously disputed.  Id. at 126. 
 
This Court previously has found plain error due to a defective verdict director in a 
criminal case.   See Cooper, 215 S.W.3d at 123, and Doolittle, 896 S.W.2d at 27.  In 
Cooper, a defendant was convicted of burglary.  At trial, Mr. Cooper disputed whether 
his entry into the victim’s home was unlawful.  Though the applicable Missouri 
Approved Instruction required a jury to find the defendant entered the victim’s home 
“unlawfully,” the verdict director at trial omitted the word “unlawfully” and did not 
require the jury to find Mr. Cooper’s entry was unlawful.  This Court found “the State 
had the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, . . . that [the defendant’s] entry 
into [the victim’s] house was unlawful.”  Id.  It further found that omitting this essential 
element from the jury instructions relieved the State of its burden and was plain error, 
requiring reversal of Mr. Cooper’s conviction.  Id. at 127.     
 
In Doolittle, Mr. Doolittle was convicted of first-degree robbery, attempted first-
degree robbery, and armed criminal action.  The jury instructions for the charge of first-
degree robbery failed “to define dangerous instrument and it failed to require that the 
appellant used or threatened the use of the dangerous instrument in the commission of the 
offense.”  Doolittle, 896 S.W.2d at 29.  Because Mr. Doolittle’s use of a dangerous 
instrument was disputed at trial, this Court found that the jury instructions’ omission 
 
26
“totally excused the State from its burden of proof as to a contested element of a crime.”  
The Court found plain error and reversed the defendant’s conviction.  Id. at 30. 
 
In this case, the record shows that Mr. Stover’s knowledge of the content and 
character of the suitcase’s contents was seriously disputed.  There was no evidence that 
Mr. Stover had physical possession of the suitcase and its contents.  Instead, the state’s 
evidence related to whether Mr. Stover had constructive possession of the suitcase by 
showing that he had access to and control over the vehicle in which the PCP was found.  
Because Mr. Stover and Mr. Butler had joint control over the vehicle where the suitcase 
and drugs were discovered, the state had the burden of presenting additional evidence 
connecting Mr. Stover with the PCP in the suitcase and creating a reasonable inference 
that he had knowledge and control of the PCP.   
 
The state presented the evidence discussed previously, such as evidence of his 
incriminating false statements and Mr. Stover’s admission of ownership of the watch 
found in the trunk next to the suitcase, which the jury could find was the required 
additional evidence that Mr. Stover knew of the suitcase and the PCP.  Nevertheless, Mr. 
Stover disputed the state’s evidence.  For example, there was testimony from Tom Gray, 
a certified technician for the Missouri State Highway Patrol that Mr. Stover told him he 
did not look into the trunk and did not know what was in the trunk.  Corporal Hagerty 
also testified Mr. Stover said he did not know the suitcase was in the trunk and did not 
know what was in the suitcase.  Corporal Hagerty acknowledged that neither the suitcase 
nor the trunk had a discernable odor that would alert Mr. Stover to the presence of a 
controlled substance, even if Mr. Stover had opened the trunk.  Corporal Hagerty further 
 
27
testified when he placed Mr. Stover in the patrol car, he did not smell any odor on Mr. 
Stover that suggested to him that he had been around illegal drugs.  Cf., e.g., State v. 
Purlee 839 S.W.2d 584, 588 (Mo. banc 1992) (finding strong odor of marijuana in van 
jointly possessed by defendant and passenger during a 12-hour drive supported 
defendant’s knowledge of the presence of a controlled substance).  Corporal Hagerty also 
testified that, at one point, Mr. Stover denied the watch was his, and Corporal Hagerty 
could not tell if the gift bag and watch had been placed in the trunk before or after the 
suitcase. 
 
The record shows that whether Mr. Stover knew the content and substance of the 
liquid in the suitcase was seriously disputed.  Because the verdict director deviated from 
MAI-CR3d 325.10.2, it did not require the jury to find that Mr. Stover knew the content 
or character of the drugs in the suitcase to find him guilty.  The trial court’s failure to so 
instruct the jury relieved the state of its burden of proving each element of the offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  This failure was plain error and requires the reversal of Mr. 
Stover’s conviction and sentence and remand of the case to the trial court.  Mr. Stover’s 
remaining claims of trial court error will be addressed because the issues are likely to 
arise on retrial. 
Pre-Miranda Statements are Admissible 
 
Mr. Stover contends that the trial court erred in failing to sustain his motion to 
suppress and in allowing into evidence the statements he made during the traffic stop 
before he received Miranda warnings.  This Court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a 
motion to suppress in the light most favorable to the ruling and defers to the trial court’s 
 
28
determinations of credibility.  Schroeder, 330 S.W.3d at 472.  The inquiry is limited to a 
determination of whether the trial court’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.  
Id. 
 
A criminal suspect is entitled to Miranda warnings once the suspect is subjected to 
a custodial interrogation.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).  Missouri 
defines “custodial interrogation” as “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers 
after a person has been taken into custody . . . .”  State v. Gaw, 285 S.W.3d 318, 321 (Mo. 
banc 2009) (citing State v. Glass, 136 S.W.3d 496, 511 (Mo. banc 2004).  Statements 
obtained during a custodial interrogation not preceded by Miranda warnings are subject 
to suppression at trial.  Id. 
 
The statements made by Mr. Stover during the traffic stop, however, did not occur 
during a custodial interrogation.  In Berkemer v. McCarty, the United States Supreme 
Court definitively stated that the “noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us 
to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to [traffic stops] are not ‘in custody’ 
for the purposes of Miranda.”  468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984).  Accordingly, Mr. Stover’s 
statements made during that time are not subject to suppression on the basis of Miranda.   
Evidence of Refusal to Consent to Search is Admissible 
 
In another point on appeal, Mr. Stover contends that the trial court erred in 
admitting evidence and argument regarding his refusal to consent to a search of the 
vehicle, thereby inducing the jury to infer that he was guilty based on invocation of his 
Fourth Amendment right.  The trial court overruled Mr. Stover’s objections to allowing 
into evidence the testimony and the patrol car DVD showing his refusal to consent to a 
 
29
search and overruled his objection to the state playing the DVD during the closing 
argument.  Mr. Stover contends that the evidence of his refusal to consent to a search was 
used to prove his guilt, in violation of his right to due process and a fair trial.  
 
Mr. Stover contends that admitting evidence of his refusal to consent to a search is 
unconstitutional, akin to admitting evidence of a suspect remaining silent after receiving 
Miranda warnings.  See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976) (use of defendant’s 
silence at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings for purpose of 
impeachment violates due process clause).  However, Mr. Stover fails to cite to a case 
holding that evidence of a suspect’s refusal to consent to a search is constitutionally 
barred when used to explain subsequent actions as opposed to a suspect’s guilt.5  The 
holding in Doyle “rests on ‘the fundamental unfairness of implicitly assuring a suspect 
that his silence will not be used against him and then using his silence to impeach an 
explanation subsequently offered at trial.’”  Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 291 
                                             
 
5 Some federal appellate courts have discussed the issue.  See United States v. Dozal, 173 
F.3d 787, 794, n.2 (10th Cir. 1999) (rejecting argument that state’s comment at trial on 
defendant’s refusal to consent violated constitutional rights); United States v. Thame, 846 
F.2d 200, 207 (3rd Cir. 1988) (improper for state to argue refusal of consent to search 
constituted evidence of guilt); United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1350 (9th Cir. 
1978) (improper for state to argue refusal of consent to search constituted evidence of 
guilt); United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 249-250 (5th Cir. 2002) (if improper, 
harmless error under circumstances); United States v. Moreno, 233 F.3d 937, 941 (7th 
Cir. 2000) (if improper, harmless error under circumstances).  Regardless, the cases cited 
refer to the impropriety of using such evidence to prove guilt.  Here, the state did not 
argue that Mr. Stover’s refusal of consent to search constituted evidence of guilt; rather, 
the evidence explained the subsequent actions of Corporal Hagerty and Mr. Stover.  
Further, Mr. Stover expressly refused the trial court’s offer to instruct the jury that it 
could not consider his refusal to consent to a search as evidence of his guilt. 
 
 
 
30
(1986) (citation omitted).  The rationale of Doyle does not extend to prohibit admission 
of evidence of a suspect’s refusal to consent to a search for a purpose other than proving 
guilt of the refusing party.   
Evidence of DEA Commendation Admissible 
 
For his final point on appeal, Mr. Stover contends that the trial court abused its 
discretion in overruling his hearsay objection and allowing the testimony of Corporal 
Hagerty regarding the commendation he received from the DEA.  After Corporal Hagerty 
discovered the PCP in Mr. Stover’s possession, the DEA publicly recognized Corporal 
Hagerty for making the largest PCP seizure in the history of the United States up to 2003.  
Over Mr. Stover’s objection, the trial court permitted Corporal Hagerty’s testimony that 
he received a commendation for such a large seizure.  The trial court’s decision to admit 
or exclude evidence is reviewed for a clear abuse of discretion and will not be reversed 
absent prejudice.  Baumruk, 280 S.W.3d at 607. 
 
“A hearsay statement is any out-of-court statement that is used to prove the truth 
of the matter asserted and that depends on the veracity of the statement for its value.”  
State v. Kemp, 212 S.W.3d 135, 146 (Mo. banc 2007).  Corporal Hagerty’s testimony 
regarding the DEA commendation was not introduced to prove that the seizure was in 
fact the largest PCP seizure in the United States until 2003.  The testimony was 
introduced to demonstrate to the jury that the amount of PCP seized was a large amount, 
consistent with the intent to sell or distribute.  Further, evidence of a large amount of a 
controlled substance is admissible as circumstantial evidence to prove knowing 
possession, as discussed in Mr. Stover’s second point on appeal.   
 
31
 
32
Conclusion 
 
The submission of a verdict director that did not require the jury to find that Mr. 
Stover knew the substance and character of the liquid in the suitcase was plain error.  The 
judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      PATRICIA BRECKENRIDGE, JUDGE 
 
 
Teitelman, C.J., Russell, Stith 
and Draper, JJ., concur; Fischer, J., 
dissents in separate opinion filed. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
Respondent,  
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
No. SC91760 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
MELVIN STOVER, 
 JR.,  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
Appellant. 
 
) 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION 
 
I respectfully dissent from the principal opinion.  The principal opinion holds that 
verdict-directing Instruction No. 6 constituted plain error because it did not contain a 
phrase that Melvin Stover knew of the content and character of the substance in his trunk.  
I would hold that, despite the omission in the verdict director, no miscarriage of justice or 
manifest injustice occurred.  I would affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 
Standard of Review 
Because Stover failed to make a specific objection at trial to the definition of 
"trafficking" contained in Instruction No. 6, this Court's review of the instruction is 
limited to plain error review.  State v. Wurtzberger, 40 S.W.3d 893, 898 (Mo. banc 2001). 
For instructional error to rise to the level of plain error, Stover must demonstrate 
that the circuit court "so misdirected or failed to instruct the jury that the error affected 
the jury's verdict."  State v. Dorsey, 318 S.W.3d 648, 652 (Mo. banc 2010).  The 
misdirection must cause manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice.  State v. Doolittle, 
896 S.W.2d 27, 29 (Mo. banc 1995).  "Clear and obvious instructional error is rarely 
found to result in manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice, requiring reversal for 
plain error."  State v. White, 92 S.W.3d 183, 192 (Mo. App. 2002). 
If substantial grounds exist for believing that manifest injustice or miscarriage of 
justice resulted from the error, this Court may proceed to review the claim under a two-
step process pursuant to rule 30.20.  First, the court decides whether plain error has 
occurred.  State v. Baumruk, 280 S.W.3d 600, 607 (Mo. banc 2009).  "All prejudicial 
error, however, is not plain error, and plain errors are those which are evident, obvious, 
and clear."  Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  Second, the Court must 
consider whether or not a miscarriage of justice or manifest injustice will occur if the 
error is left uncorrected.  Id.      
Analysis 
 
This Court unanimously agrees that there was sufficient evidence to support the 
jury verdict that Stover knowingly possessed PCP for the purpose of committing the 
offense of trafficking.  The principal opinion holds that the omission of the phrase 
"knowing of the substance's content and character" from Instruction No. 6 constituted 
plain error, in that the omission was a serious miscarriage of justice.  I do not agree.   
 
I agree with the principal opinion that the omission in Instruction No. 6 was error.  
To be in compliance with MAI-CR 325.10.2, the definition of "trafficking" needed to 
include the phrase "knowing of the substance's content and character."  It did not.   
 
2
I disagree with the principal opinion that the mistake rises to the level of a 
miscarriage of justice as to warrant plain error relief.  At trial, it was undisputed that the 
suitcases in the trunk of Stover's rental car contained ten gallons of liquid.  It was 
undisputed that this liquid was tested in a laboratory, and it was undisputed that the 
substance was found to be PCP.  Stover never disputed the "content and character" of the 
substance at trial.  Rather, Stover disputed that he had any knowledge of the presence of 
the suitcase or the suitcase's contents.       
 
Instruction No. 6 required the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Stover 
knowingly possessed 90 grams or more of PCP and that the possession was a substantial 
step toward the commission of the offense of trafficking.  The instructions required the 
jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that either Stover or Butler possessed the PCP for 
the purpose of committing the offense of trafficking in the first degree.  The instructions 
defined "purpose" as requiring that Stover had the conscious object to commit the offense 
of trafficking in the first degree.  Moreover, the instructions defined "trafficking in the 
first degree" as "knowingly distributes, delivers or sells 90 grams or more" of PCP.   
 
In my view, it is implausible to suggest that the jury would have found that Stover 
was unaware of the content and character of the PCP while simultaneously finding that he 
knowingly distributed, delivered, or sold 90 grams or more of the substance.  As noted in 
the principal opinion, "Mr. Stover's knowing possession of the PCP reasonably may be 
inferred."  Slip Op. at 15.  All the evidence cited by the principal opinion to support the 
notion that Stover contested the content and character of the substance – testimony that 
Stover did not know what was in the trunk, testimony that Stover did not look in the 
 
3
 
4
trunk, testimony that neither the suitcases nor Stover smelled like PCP – shows that 
Stover's true dispute concerned his knowledge of the presence of the suitcases or the 
liquid.  This evidence is an attempt to show that Stover was unaware of the suitcase and, 
if the jury did not believe that proposition, that Stover did not know the suitcases 
contained 10 gallons of liquid.  There was no assertion that Stover believed the substance 
to be something other than PCP. 
Conclusion 
Under the facts of this case, the omission in Instruction No. 6 did not so misdirect 
the jury as to affect its verdict.  Simply put, though error occurred, no miscarriage of 
justice or manifest injustice resulted.  This Court should affirm the judgment.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zel M. Fischer, Judge