Title: Atkinson v. Board of Parole

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED: September 21, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
DAVID LEE ATKINSON,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
BOARD OF PAROLE
AND POST-PRISON SUPERVISION,
Respondent on Review.
(CA A122599; SC S52476)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Submitted on the record February 3, 2006.
David Lee Atkinson, pro se, Ontario, filed the briefs for petitioner.
Steven R. Powers, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed the brief for respondent on
review.  With him on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams,
Solicitor General, Salem.
Jamesa J. Drake, Deputy Public Defender, Peter A. Ozanne, Executive Director, and
Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, Salem, filed a brief on behalf
of amicus curiae, Legal Services Division, Office of Public Defense Services.
CARSON, J.
The order of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
*Appeal from Final Order of the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision dated September 5, 2003.
CARSON, J.
In this case, we must decide what constitutes a
"substantial question of law" when the Court of Appeals
determines whether to grant a motion for leave to proceed with
judicial review of a parole order under ORS 144.335.  Petitioner
sought judicial review of a decision of the Board of Parole and
Post-Prison Supervision (board) and, pursuant to ORS
144.335(6), (1) filed such a motion for leave to proceed.  The
Court of Appeals denied petitioner leave to proceed and dismissed
his petition on its own motion, apparently concluding that
petitioner had failed to present a "substantial question of law." 
Petitioner then sought this court's review.  We allowed review
and now affirm the Court of Appeals order.  
During a robbery of a doughnut store in 1984,
petitioner shot and killed a store clerk.  As a result,
petitioner was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to
life in prison.  In 2003, after petitioner had served the minimum
period of incarceration for aggravated murder that was applicable
at the time that he committed that crime, the board conducted a
"murder review" hearing to determine whether petitioner was
"likely to be rehabilitated within a reasonable period of
time." (2)  Following that hearing, the board concluded that
petitioner was not likely to be rehabilitated within a reasonable
period of time and issued a written explanation of its decision,
entitled "Board Action Form 6" (BAF 6).  
Petitioner subsequently sought administrative review of
BAF 6.  In his request for administrative review, petitioner
alleged that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the
board's conclusion that petitioner was not likely to be
rehabilitated within a reasonable period of time; (2) petitioner
presented sufficient evidence to show, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that he was likely to be rehabilitated within a
reasonable period of time; (3) the board violated state and
federal constitutional ex post facto prohibitions by applying
administrative rules that were not in effect at the time that
petitioner committed his crime; and (4) the board "unlawfully
rescinded" a parole release date that had been set at a prior
hearing. (3)  In its written response, the board rejected each
of petitioner's allegations and affirmed its prior BAF 6
decision. Petitioner then sought judicial review of BAF
6.  To proceed with that review, ORS 144.335(6) required
petitioner to file a motion for leave to proceed.  In his pro se
motion, petitioner asserted, among other things, that "[t]he
board violated their own admitted standards of due process of the
law during the course of the hearing by accepting, considering
and using undisclosed evidence and/or testimony in violation of
ORS 183.450." (4)  Petitioner's motion contained no legal
analysis and cited no facts from the record in support of that
contention.  The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for
leave to proceed in an unpublished order, apparently concluding
that petitioner's request for judicial review did not present a
"substantial question of law."  Petitioner then sought this
court's review, which we allowed.  This court subsequently
narrowed the issues to be considered by sending the parties and
amicus curiae a letter explaining that we were interested in
deciding the following question:
"Does an inmate raise a substantial question of law for
purposes of judicial review of a board order when he
alleges that a murder review hearing conducted pursuant
to ORS 163.105 must comply with the requirements of ORS
183.450?" (5) 
We begin our analysis by setting out the relevant
statutory provisions.  ORS 144.335 provides, in part:
"(1) A person over whom the [board] exercises its
jurisdiction may seek judicial review of a final order
of the board as provided in this section if:
"(a) The person is adversely affected or aggrieved
by a final order of the board; and
"(b) The person has exhausted administrative
review as provided by board rule.
"* * * * *
"(4) If a person described in subsection (1) of
this section seeks judicial review of a final order of
the board, the person shall file a petition for
judicial review with the Court of Appeals * * *."
"* * * * *
"(6) Within 60 days after being served with a copy
of the record, * * * the petitioner shall file a motion
for leave to proceed with judicial review based on a
showing in the motion that a substantial question of
law is presented for review.
"(7) [The Court of Appeals may] determine whether
a motion for leave to proceed with judicial review
under subsection (6) of this section presents a
substantial question of law and may dismiss the
judicial review if the motion does not present a
substantial question of law.  A dismissal under this
subsection constitutes a decision on the merits of the
petitioner's issues on judicial review.
"* * * * *
"(12) If the court determines that the motion
filed under subsection (6) of this section, when
liberally construed, fails to state a colorable claim
for review of the board's order, the court may order
the petitioner to pay, in addition to the board's
recoverable costs, attorney fees incurred by the board
not to exceed $100."
(Emphasis added.) 
With those provisions in mind, we turn now to the task
of determining the meaning of the phrase "substantial question of
law."  When interpreting a statute, this court must discern and
give effect to the legislature's intent.  PGE v. Bureau of Labor
and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610, 859 P2d 1143 (1993).  We begin
by considering the text and context of the statute in question. 
Id. at 610-11.  We give "words of common usage their plain,
natural, and ordinary meaning[,]" and "[w]ords that have a
well-defined legal meaning are given that meaning."  Norden v.
Water Resources Dept., 329 Or 641, 645, 996 P2d 958 (2000). 
Statutory context "includes other provisions of the same statute
and other related statutes, as well as the preexisting common law
and the statutory framework within which the law was enacted[.]" 
Denton and Denton, 326 Or 236, 241, 951 P2d 693 (1998) (internal
citations omitted).  Finally, the "use of the same term
throughout a statute indicates that the term has the same meaning
throughout the statute[.]"  PGE, 317 Or at 611 (internal citation
omitted).  If, upon an analysis of text and context, the
legislature's intent is clear, we proceed no further. (6)  Id.  
              Initially, we note that no statute explicitly
defines the phrase "substantial question of law," for purposes of
ORS 144.335(6).  A "question of law," however, is a question
framed in such a way "that [it] is susceptible of adjudication by
way of pronouncement as to what the law is."  Western Helicopter
Services v. Rogerson Aircraft, 311 Or 361, 364, 811 P2d 627
(1991).  At the same time, "substantial" ordinarily is defined as
"considerable in amount, value, or worth * * * having a solid or
firm foundation:  soundly based:  carrying weight * * *." 
Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 2280 (unabridged ed 2002). 
Reading those definitions together, a "substantial question of
law" is a soundly based, firmly supported question capable of
adjudication as to what the law is. 
ORS 144.335(12) provides relevant context within which
to interpret the phrase in question from ORS 144.335(6). 
Specifically, ORS 144.335(12) allows the court to order a
petitioner to pay the board's costs and attorney fees if the
court determines that the petitioner's motion for leave to
proceed, "when liberally construed, fails to state a colorable
claim for review of the board's order * * *."  (Emphasis added.) 
Consequently, ORS 144.335 uses two different phrases in
instructing the court on how to respond to various motions for
leave to proceed.  First, the court determines whether the motion
for leave to proceed presents a "substantial question of law." 
ORS 144.335(7).  If it does not, then the court may dismiss the
petition for judicial review.  Second, the court determines
whether the motion for leave to proceed states a "colorable claim
for review[.]"  ORS 144.335(12).  If it does not, then the court
may require the petitioner to pay the board's costs and attorney
fees.  As this court has explained previously, when the
legislature uses different terms within the same statute,
normally it intends those terms to have different meanings.  See
State v. Keeney, 323 Or 309, 316, 918 P2d 419 (1996) (so
holding).  
ORS 144.335 thus establishes two different standards
for the court to use when considering the relative merit of
motions for leave to proceed.  Between those standards, the
"colorable claim" standard embodies a lower quantum of merit than
the "substantial question of law" standard.  Such a conclusion is
apparent from the legislature's desire to discourage motions
failing to satisfy the former standard by making the petitioners
filing those motions subject to costs and fees.  See McKean-Coffman v. Employment Div., 314 Or 645, 650-51, 842 P2d 380
(1992) (recognizing that imposition of attorney fees discourages
persons from pursuing certain claims); see also Butler v. United
Pacific Ins. Co., 265 Or 473, 476, 509 P2d 1184 (1973) (noting
that statute imposing certain costs was intended as "a penalty to
discourage frivolous appeals").  Conversely, the legislature
chose not to penalize the petitioners filing motions that fail to
satisfy the latter standard, subjecting them to only dismissal,
with no monetary penalty.  
Comparison of those two standards is helpful, because
this court already has determined the meaning of the "colorable
claim" standard, thereby establishing a reference point from
which to delineate the standard in question here.  In State ex
rel Dept. of Human Services v. Rardin, 338 Or 399, 406, 110 P3d
580 (2005), this court examined what constitutes a "colorable
claim" as the term is used in ORS 419A.200(5)(a)(A). (7)  That
statute provides that a person may pursue an untimely appeal of a
parental termination judgment if, among other requirements,
"[t]he person shows a colorable claim of error in the proceeding
from which the appeal is taken[.]"  ORS 419A.200(5)(a)(A).  Based
upon the text and context of ORS 419A.200(5)(a)(A), this court
concluded that the "colorable claim" standard describes "a claim
that a party reasonably may assert under current law and that is
plausible given the facts and the current law (or a reasonable
extension or modification of current law)."  Rardin, 338 Or 408
(emphasis added).  Of particular importance to our task here,
this court determined that the "colorable claim" standard
contained both a factual component and a legal component.  
Here, ORS 144.335(6) also contains both a factual
component and a legal component.  The statute's text requires
that a motion for leave to proceed with judicial review must be
filed "[w]ithin 60 days" after the petitioner has been "served
with a copy of the record[.]"  The statute clearly contemplates
that the record will be available for use in writing the motion,
thus indicating that the motion should rely upon facts contained
in the record to the extent that those facts are relevant to the
petitioner's legal claim.  The statute also requires a motion for
leave to proceed to show that a "substantial question of law is
presented for review."  (Emphasis added).  The statutory wording,
"is presented," necessitates that the facts of the petitioner's
case, procedural or historical, actually present the question of
law raised in the motion, rather than simply requiring the motion
to raise some abstract question of law without reference to the
facts of the particular case.  Therefore, like the "colorable
claim" standard in Rardin, the "substantial question of law"
standard contains both factual and legal requirements.  
Those requirements, however, are more demanding
because, as discussed previously, the "substantial question of
law" standard reflects a greater quantum of arguable legal merit
than the "colorable claim" standard.  Thus, considering the text
of ORS 144.335(6) and its context, a "substantial question of
law" is a soundly based, firmly supported question capable of
adjudication as to what the law is that is presented by the facts
of the particular case at bar.   
Using the definition set out above, we now test
petitioner's motion for leave to proceed to determine whether it
presents a "substantial question of law."  As noted previously,
petitioner's motion for leave to proceed asserted that "[t]he
board violated their own admitted standards of due process of the
law during the course of the hearing by accepting, considering
and using undisclosed evidence and/or testimony in violation of
ORS 183.450."  Petitioner provided no explanation as to how ORS
183.450 applied to the board or what that statute, if applicable,
requires. (8)  Petitioner also failed to explain any "due
process" requirement that he suggested was applicable to the
board. (9)  Petitioner cited no facts from the record to show
that the board considered or used any "undisclosed evidence
and/or testimony[.]"  Petitioner's allegation was merely a one-sentence conclusion with no legal analysis or factual recitation
to support it.  For those reasons, petitioner's motion for leave
to proceed lacked both legal and factual support.  As such, it
falls far short of presenting a "substantial question of law." 
The Court of Appeals therefore correctly dismissed petitioner's
petition for judicial review.   
The order of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
1. ORS 144.335(6) provides:
"Within 60 days after being served with a copy of
the record, or such further time as the court may
allow, the petitioner shall file a motion for leave to
proceed with judicial review based on a showing in the
motion that a substantial question of law is presented
for review."   
2. ORS 163.105 (1983) provided, in part:
"(3) At any time after [completion of the minimum
period of confinement for an aggravated murder
conviction], the State Board of Parole, upon the
petition of a prisoner so confined, shall hold a
hearing to determine if the prisoner is likely to be
rehabilitated within a reasonable period of time.  The
sole issue shall be whether or not the prisoner is
likely to be rehabilitated within a reasonable period
of time * * *.
"* * * * * 
"(4) If, upon hearing all of the evidence, the
board finds that the prisoner is capable of
rehabilitation and that the terms of the prisoner's
confinement should be changed to life imprisonment with
the possibility of parole, or work release, it shall
enter an order to that effect and the order shall
convert the terms of the prisoner's confinement to life
imprisonment with the possibility of parole or work
release.  Otherwise the board shall deny the relief
sought in the petition." 
ORS 163.105 has been amended several times since 1983.  Those
amendments are not relevant to our decision in this case.   
3. Petitioner also asserted that the board had violated
numerous other state and federal constitutional provisions, state
statutes, and state administrative rules.  However, petitioner
cited no facts to support those allegations, and the board
declined to respond to them.  Petitioner further alleged that the
board had violated multiple statutes and administrative rules
during a prior proceeding.  Because those allegations did not
involve any board action taken during petitioner's present murder
review hearing, the board declined to consider them.      
4. ORS 163.105(3) (1983) provided, in part:
"The ["murder review"] proceeding shall be
conducted in the manner prescribed for a contested case
hearing under ORS 183.310 to 183.550 except that:
"(a) The prisoner shall have the burden of proving
by a preponderance of the evidence the likelihood of
rehabilitation within a reasonable period of time; and
"(b) The prisoner shall have the right, if the
prisoner is without sufficient funds to employ an
attorney, to be represented by legal counsel, appointed
by the board, at state expense."
5. Petitioner raises additional claims in his brief, which we
decline to consider.  See ORAP 9.20(2) (providing that this court
"may limit the questions on review").
6. The parties have offered no legislative history regarding
the legislature's intention in enacting ORS 144.335(6), and they
assert that the available legislative history, if offered, would
provide no assistance in determining the meaning of the phrase in
question. 
7. Although in Rardin the phrase "colorable claim" was used in
a statute involving termination of parental rights, nothing
indicates that the legislature intended that phrase to have a
different meaning in this context.  
8. We note that ORS 183.315(1) (1983), in part, provided that,
"[t]he provisions of ORS 183.410, 183.415, 183.425, 183.440,
183.450 * * * do not apply to * * * [the] State Board of Parole." 
(Emphasis added.)  ORS 183.315 has been amended several times
since 1983.  Those amendments are not relevant to our decision in
this case.     
9. Even assuming that some due process requirements were
applicable to the board, the United States Supreme Court has held
that parole release hearing procedures that prohibit a prisoner
from hearing adverse testimony or cross-examining adverse
witnesses do not violate due process principles.  Greenholtz v.
Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 US 1, 5, 15-16, 99 S Ct 2100, 60 L Ed
2d 668 (1979).