Title: Bogle v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC11-2403 
____________ 
 
BRETT A. BOGLE,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC12-2465 
____________ 
 
BRETT A. BOGLE,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JULIE L. JONES, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
[February 9, 2017] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Brett Bogle appeals an order of the trial court denying his amended motion 
to vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death filed under 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and petitions this Court for a writ of 
 
 
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habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  For the 
reasons we explain below, we affirm the denial of postconviction relief and deny 
the habeas petition. 
FACTS 
 
Brett Bogle was charged in Hillsborough County with the first-degree 
murder of Margaret Torres.  The following facts come from this Court’s opinion in 
Bogle’s direct appeal: 
Margaret Torres (the victim) was the sister of Katie Alfonso and 
stayed at Alfonso’s house four or five nights a week.  In June 1991, 
Bogle met Alfonso and shortly thereafter he moved in with Alfonso 
and the victim.  Bogle and the victim did not get along and Alfonso 
eventually asked Bogle to move out.  The following week [on 
September 1, 1991], Bogle, Alfonso, the victim, and another person 
went out together and things seemed to be going better.  During the 
outing, however, Bogle and the victim began to argue again.  
Subsequently, Alfonso and the victim refused to allow Bogle into 
Alfonso’s house.  Bogle then broke through the screen door of 
Alfonso’s house, grabbed Alfonso’s neck to push her out of the way, 
grabbed the victim’s arm to remove the telephone from her hand as 
she tried to call 911, pulled the telephones out of the kitchen and 
bedroom, and took clothing from the house.  As he left the house, 
Bogle told the victim that she would not live to tell about it if she 
called the police and pressed charges.  In response to the victim’s 
uncompleted call to 911, a deputy sheriff arrived shortly after Bogle 
left.  The deputy referred the matter to the state attorney’s office.  
Several days later, Bogle called Alfonso and again threatened the 
victim, stating that, if the victim pressed charges, she would not live 
to tell about it. 
 
About two weeks later [on September 12, 1991], Bogle called 
Alfonso to ask if he could come over to her house.  The victim was 
out for the evening.  When Alfonso told Bogle that he could not come 
over, he became furious and hung up.  Later that night, Bogle and the 
victim ran into each other at a bar called Club 41.  Witnesses saw 
 
 
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them talking briefly.  Witnesses also noticed that Bogle was clean and 
had no noticeable injuries of any kind when he arrived at Club 41.  
The victim left Club 41 at about 1 a.m.; Bogle left approximately five 
minutes later.  About forty-five minutes after that, Bogle approached a 
car outside Club 41 and asked for a ride.  At that time, his forehead 
was scratched, his clothes were dirty, and his crotch was wet. 
 
The next day, the victim’s nude and badly beaten body was 
found outside an establishment [“Beverage Barn”] located next to 
Club 41.  Her head had been crushed with a piece of cement, and she 
had died of blows to the head.  Additionally, she had semen in her 
vagina and trauma to her anus consistent with sexual activity that was 
likely inflicted before death.  The DNA extracted from the semen was 
consistent with Bogle’s DNA (12.5% of Caucasian males could have 
contributed the semen), and a pubic hair found on the crotch area of 
Bogle’s pants matched the victim’s. 
 
Bogle put on no evidence in his defense.  The jury found him 
guilty of burglary of Alfonso’s home with force, retaliation against the 
victim as a witness to that burglary, and first-degree murder of the 
victim.  A penalty phase proceeding was held on the first-degree 
murder conviction, and the jury recommended death by a seven-to-
five vote.  The trial judge, however, granted a new penalty phase 
proceeding after determining that improper rebuttal evidence had been 
presented by the State. 
 
At the second penalty phase proceeding, the State presented the 
same evidence it relied on in the guilt phase.  Bogle put on eight 
witnesses who testified that Bogle had been subjected to physical and 
mental abuse as a child, had used drugs at his father’s urging from the 
time he was five or six years old, was under the influence of alcohol at 
the time of the murder, had a personality disorder and suffered from 
some mental disturbance at the time of the murder, was kind to others, 
and had been injured in an automobile accident a week before the 
murder.  The jury recommended death by a ten-to-two vote.  The trial 
judge subsequently sentenced Bogle to death, finding four aggravating 
circumstances: (1) previous conviction of a violent felony (burglary 
with force on Alfonso and the victim two weeks before the murder); 
(2) the murder was committed while engaged in the commission of a 
sexual battery; (3) the murder was committed for the purpose of 
avoiding arrest; and (4) the murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel 
(HAC).  In mitigation, the trial judge gave some weight to the 
statutory factor of impaired capacity but stated that substantial 
 
 
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impairment had not been proven; gave substantial weight to Bogle’s 
family background; little weight to his alcohol and drug abuse; gave 
some weight to his good conduct during trial; gave some, but not a 
great deal, of weight to his kindness to others; and gave no weight to 
his involvement in an automobile accident.  Bogle also received 
consecutive sentences of life in prison for the burglary-with-assault-
or-battery conviction and five years in prison for the retaliation-
against-a-witness conviction. 
 
Bogle v. State, 655 So. 2d 1103, 1105-06 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 978.  
We affirmed Bogle’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal.  Id. at 1110.1 
 
In July 2000, Bogle filed an amended motion to vacate his conviction and 
sentence and subsequently filed amendments and a supplement thereto.  Following 
an evidentiary hearing,2 the trial court, on October 25, 2011, denied Bogle’s 
amended motions to vacate his conviction and sentence.3  
                                          
 
 
1.  Bogle raised the following six claims on direct appeal: (1) the office of 
the state attorney for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit should have been prevented 
from prosecuting Bogle after one of Bogle’s attorneys went to work for that office; 
(2) the trial court erroneously prevented the penalty phase jury from considering 
critical evidence regarding scratches to his face; (3) the trial judge erroneously 
refused to give a specially requested penalty phase jury instruction; (4) the 
aggravating factors were unsupported; (5) the HAC jury instruction was 
unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, and arbitrary and capricious; and (6) his 
sentence of death was disproportionate.  Id. at 1106-09. 
 
 
2.  The evidentiary hearing was conducted on June 9-13, 2008, November 
30-December 1, 2009, and August 23-24, 2010. 
 
 
3.  On September 23, 2013, we granted Bogle’s motion to relinquish 
jurisdiction, in part, for the purpose of pursuing any claims pertinent to the alleged 
newly discovered evidence of an August 20, 2013, letter from the United States 
Department of Justice (DOJ).  According to this letter, the DOJ reviewed the work 
of Agent Malone, who conducted the microscopic hair analysis and testified at 
 
 
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ANALYSIS 
APPEAL OF THE ORDER DENYING RULE 3.851 MOTION 
 
Bogle raises the following seven claims on appeal: (1) he was denied due 
process and full and fair postconviction proceedings; (2) the trial court erred in 
denying his claim that he was deprived of his due process rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment and his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth 
Amendments because the State withheld evidence that was material and 
exculpatory in nature and/or presented false and misleading evidence and/or 
argument; (3) the trial court erred in denying his claim that he was denied effective 
assistance of counsel at the guilt phase in violation of the Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments; (4) the trial court erred in denying his claim that he was 
denied an adequate adversarial testing at the penalty phase of his trial in violation 
of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments; (5) the trial court erred in 
denying his claim that newly discovered evidence shows that his conviction is 
unconstitutionally unreliable; (6) the trial court erred in denying his claim that his 
trial counsel had a conflict of interest which violated his rights under the Fifth, 
                                          
 
Bogle’s trial.  On remand, the trial court granted Bolge’s motion for mitochondrial 
DNA.  Bogle then filed a successive motion to vacate his conviction and sentence.  
On February 17, 2014, the trial court found that it lacked jurisdiction and 
accordingly held Bogle’s successive motion in abeyance until appellate 
proceedings conclude. 
 
 
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Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments; and (7) the trial court erred in denying his 
claim that he was denied a fair trial due to prosecutorial misconduct. 
I.  Due Process and Full and Fair Postconviction Proceedings 
A.  Motion to Disqualify 
 
Bogle contends that the postconviction court, Judge Wayne Timmerman, 
erred in denying his motions to disqualify.  Prior to the evidentiary hearing, the 
trial court denied Bogle’s motion to disqualify—based on the defense’s 
expectation to call Judge Timmerman’s wife—as legally insufficient.  Bogle 
sought review of the order denying his renewed motion to disqualify, and this 
Court dismissed Bogle’s petition, finding that “[b]ecause neither Judge 
Timmerman nor his wife were material witnesses, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Bogle’s renewed motion to disqualify.”  Bogle v. State, 10 
So. 3d 631 (Fla. 2009) (table).  We do not disturb our prior finding that neither 
Judge Timmerman nor his wife were material witnesses in this case.  Therefore, we 
affirm the postconviction court’s denial of the motions to disqualify.4   
 
                                          
 
 
4.  The record does not support Bogle’s assertion that Marcia Turley 
provided to the adoption attorney (who shared office space with Judge Timmerman 
when he was in private practice) that the father of her baby was Guy Douglas and 
that she was afraid that Douglas had killed Torres.  We also reject Bogle’s claim 
that the trial court erred in denying his motions to take Judge Timmerman’s 
deposition.   
 
 
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B.  Refusal of Questioning and Testimony 
 
Bogle claims that the trial court committed several errors in precluding 
certain questioning and testimony at the evidentiary hearing.  We affirm trial court 
determinations of evidence admissibility “absent a showing of abuse of discretion.”  
Randolph v. State, 853 So. 2d 1051, 1062 (Fla. 2003).  Bogle argues that the trial 
court erred in refusing to allow the defense to impeach Agent Michael Malone and 
Steve Robertson, who reviewed Malone’s work in this case, through questioning 
concerning acts of alleged misconduct.  We find that the trial court properly 
sustained the objections.  See Farinas v. State, 569 So. 2d 425, 429 (Fla. 1990) 
(“Evidence of particular acts of misconduct cannot be introduced to impeach the 
credibility of a witness.”).   
Additionally, we reject Bogle’s claim that the trial court erred in refusing to 
allow questioning of Karen Cox, who was the prosecutor in Bogle’s case, 
pertaining to any alleged prosecutorial misconduct in other cases.5  We also find 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding Dr. Terry Melton’s 
testimony on hair comparison because Dr. Melton was not qualified.  See Simmons 
v. State, 934 So. 2d 1100, 1117 (Fla. 2006) (“A trial judge has the discretion to 
                                          
 
 
5.  We also conclude that the trial court properly found the unrelated case 
irrelevant as to State witness Patricia Bencivenga. 
 
 
 
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determine if a witness’s qualifications render him or her an expert, and this 
determination will not be overturned absent clear error.”).   
 
Contrary to Bogle’s claim, the trial court also did not err in precluding the 
questioning of Marcia Turley about her fear of Guy Douglas.  Bogle’s counsel was 
permitted to ask Turley “Is it fair to say you were scared of Guy Douglas?” and, 
“Was your fear of Mr. Douglas related to the fact that he made the threat 
immediately following the murder of Margaret Torres, was that partially why you 
were afraid of him?”  Turley responded to both questions in the affirmative.  We 
therefore deny relief on this claim.6 
C.  Denials of Postconviction Discovery Requests 
 
 
Bogle claims the trial court violated his due process rights by denying his 
postconviction discovery requests involving access to inmates’ jail calls, access to 
the Florida offender DNA database, and errors and false testimony committed by 
Malone since Bogle’s trial.  The ruling of a postconviction court on a motion for 
discovery is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Floyd v. State, 18 So. 3d 432, 
446 (Fla. 2009).  The trial court found and we agree that Bogle’s requests 
involving both inmates’ jail calls and the Florida offender DNA database were 
                                          
 
 
6.  Additionally, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in limiting Brian Bogle’s testimony, that the trial court properly sustained the 
State’s objection during Gary Turley’s testimony, and that Bogle has not 
demonstrated that the trial court reversibly erred in precluding the questioning of 
trial counsel regarding Roger Kelly’s deposition. 
 
 
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overly broad without any specificity.  In fact, it appears the defense was on a 
fishing expedition.  Additionally, the trial court properly denied the request 
concerning Malone because it was improper impeachment material.  We conclude 
that Bogle has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.  See Farinas, 569 So. 2d at 
429.   
II.  Brady and Giglio Claims 
 
Bogle contends that the trial court erred in denying his Brady7 and Giglio8 
claims.  This Court, in Franqui v. State, 59 So. 3d 82 (Fla. 2011), articulated the 
standard of review for Brady and Giglio claims as follows: 
Brady requires the State to disclose material information within its 
possession or control that is favorable to the defense.  To demonstrate 
a Brady violation, the defendant has the burden to show (1) that 
favorable evidence, either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) was 
willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State, and (3) because the 
evidence was material, the defendant was prejudiced.  To meet the 
materiality prong of Brady, the defendant must demonstrate “a 
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the 
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”  “. . . 
[M]ateriality under Brady requires a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.”  [For t]he materiality inquiry . 
. . [“]the question is whether ‘the favorable evidence could reasonably 
be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine 
confidence in the verdict.’ ”  “It is the net effect of the evidence that 
must be assessed.”  “Although reviewing courts must give deference 
to the trial court’s findings of historical fact, the ultimate question of 
whether evidence was material resulting in a due process violation is a 
                                          
 
 
7.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).   
 
8.  Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
 
 
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mixed question of law and fact subject to independent appellate 
review.” 
 
In order to prove a Giglio violation, “a defendant must show 
that (1) the prosecutor presented or failed to correct false testimony; 
(2) the prosecutor knew the testimony was false; and (3) the false 
evidence was material.”  If the first two prongs are established, the 
false evidence is deemed material if there is any reasonable possibility 
that it could have affected the jury’s verdict.  The State must then 
“prove that the false testimony was not material by demonstrating it 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Under the harmless error 
test, the State must prove “ ‘there is no reasonable possibility that the 
error contributed to the conviction.’ ” 
Both Giglio and Brady claims present mixed questions of law 
and fact.  Thus, as to findings of fact, [the Court] defer[s] to the lower 
court’s findings if they are supported by competent, substantial 
evidence.  “[T]his Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the 
trial court on questions of fact, likewise of the credibility of the 
witnesses as well as the weight to be given to the evidence by the trial 
court.”  We review the trial court’s application of the law to the facts 
de novo.   
 
Franqui, 59 So. 3d at 101-02 (citations omitted). 
A.  Information Regarding an Accomplice  
First, the trial court found that Bogle failed to show that the State possessed 
and failed to disclose information regarding Guy Douglas that was favorable to the 
defense.  The record reveals a handwritten note composed by prosecutor Karen 
Cox which states: “talk to re: Guy Douglas confessed to being involved.”  Above 
the statement was the name “Marcia Baurle”9 and “Guy Douglas 92-7731 Capias.”  
We conclude that Bogle met his burden of showing under Brady that this note is 
                                          
 
 
9.  Marcia Baurle is also known as Marcia Turley. 
 
 
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favorable, exculpatory evidence that was suppressed by the State.  At the 
evidentiary hearing, Cox had no recollection of a witness telling her at trial that 
Douglas was involved in the murder.  Cox interpreted the note to mean that she 
was supposed to talk to somebody about whether or not Douglas confessed.  Cox 
believed that the information was probably not provided by Marcia Turley; Cox 
did not recall speaking with Turley.  Cox testified that had any other person 
confessed to the murder, she would have immediately turned it over to the defense.  
Turley testified at the evidentiary hearing that when Douglas told her Bogle 
was brought in for questioning relating to Torres’s murder, Douglas told Turley he 
was not worried because he was with her on the night in question.  When Turley 
refuted his assertion, Douglas told her she did not need to say anything other than 
he was with her all night or they would be lucky to find Turley’s body.  Jeanne 
Bratton, Turley’s sister, testified that subsequent to the murder, Turley told Bratton 
that Douglas’s clothes were bloody.  The trial court found Bratton to have little 
credibility. 
The record also reveals an interoffice memorandum dated October 7, 1991, 
in which an employee of victim assistance for the State Attorney’s Office wrote to 
Cox regarding the Bogle case: 
Katie Alfonso called today stating (she is sister of Vic) she spoke with 
a person named Andy, who was at bar with Bret[t] and a person 
named Guy, anyway seems Andy is telling people 2 were involved, 
Brett and Guy left the bar together. 
 
 
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At the evidentiary hearing, Cox had no recollection of what led her to believe that 
“Andy” was involved in the murder.  Katie Alfonso testified at the evidentiary 
hearing that she did not recall speaking to “Andy,” and that no one with first-hand 
knowledge told her two people were involved.  Alfonso recalled a rumor 
circulating which suggested more than one person was involved because the crime 
was “so horrible.”  She further testified that she could have related the rumor to the 
memo’s author.  Bogle’s trial counsel did not recall the memo.  
We conclude that Bogle has demonstrated under Brady that the message 
from Alfonso regarding “Andy” is favorable, exculpatory evidence that was 
suppressed by the State.  We observe that Bogle has not shown in postconviction 
any additional evidence pertaining to “Andy.”  As to Cox’s handwritten note, 
Bogle’s trial counsel believed that Douglas murdered Torres, and the defense 
investigated Douglas.   
The trial court found that the disclosure of Cox’s handwritten note and the 
memorandum relating a rumor of multiple persons involved in the murder do not 
create a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.  We agree.  We find that the evidence offered against Bogle at trial was 
strong: Bogle threatened Torres’s life if she called the police concerning Bogle’s 
breaking into Alfonso’s house about 11 days before Torres’s murder; Bogle 
repeated his threat several days later; Bogle left Club 41 in clean clothes about five 
 
 
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minutes after Torres left on the night of the murder; Bogle was seen in dirty clothes 
with his crotch wet approximately forty-five minutes later; and the DNA extracted 
from the semen in Torres’s vagina was consistent with Bogle’s DNA.  We 
conclude that the note and memorandum, which were suppressed by the State, 
were not material because there is not a reasonable probability that, had the note 
and memo been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.  In other words, there is no probability sufficient to undermine our 
confidence in the outcome.  Accordingly, we deny this Brady claim as it relates to 
the note and memorandum.10 
As an additional Brady claim, Bogle refers to another handwritten note 
which references Bogle and provides for Gary Turley to be “brought over.”  Cox 
and Detective Larry Lingo both acknowledged at the evidentiary hearing that they 
wrote parts of the note.  Gary Turley, Marcia Turley’s husband, testified at the 
evidentiary hearing that he observed Douglas driving Torres away from Club 41 on 
the night of the murder.  Mr. Turley stated that he later saw Douglas’s truck parked 
at the Beverage Castle11 without any occupants.  He also acknowledged a prior 
                                          
 
10.  We also deny Bogle’s claim that because Cox possessed information of 
Douglas’s confession and that more than one person was involved in the murder, 
she argued falsely at trial that the investigation was clear that Bogle killed Torres. 
 
 
11.  Presumably, the establishment Gary referred to was the “Beverage 
Barn.”  
 
 
 
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statement in which he admitted that the truck he saw parked at the establishment 
might not have belonged to Douglas.  He also testified that after the murder, his 
wife told him about Douglas’s threatening her to provide him an alibi.  The trial 
court found that Mr. Turley—who is serving a life sentence, has thirty-three felony 
convictions, and admitted to disliking Douglas—lacked credibility.  We conclude 
that Bogle is not entitled to relief on this Brady claim.12   
B.  Grand Jury Testimony 
Bogle asserts another Brady violation regarding the State’s failure to 
disclose the grand jury testimony to the defense.  In denying this claim, the trial 
court found that any impeachment value would have been minor.  Because “there 
is no pretrial right to inspect grand jury testimony,” a Brady violation has not been 
demonstrated.  Brookings v. State, 495 So. 2d 135, 137 (Fla. 1986). 
C.  Jeffrey Tapp 
 
Bogle also claims a Brady violation based on the State’s failure to disclose 
State witness Jeffrey Trapp’s criminal record and that Trapp admitted to violating 
his probation without consequences from the State.  At Bogle’s trial, Trapp 
testified that he was at the Red Gables Bar on the night of the murder, which his 
                                          
 
12.  We also reject Bogle’s Brady claim which relies on a September 7, 
1992, note showing that Judge Wayne Timmerman returned Cox’s phone call.  
Bogle failed to raise below his Giglio claim relating to his assertion that Detective 
Lingo did not confirm Douglas’s alibi; thus, this claim is procedurally barred.  See 
Green v. State, 975 So. 2d 1090, 1105 (Fla. 2008). 
 
 
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probation forbade as a condition of community control.  We find that no Brady 
violation has been established because we agree with the trial court that Bogle has 
not shown that Trapp’s probation conditions were in effect on the night in 
question. 
D.  Agent Malone 
Bogle also contends that the State violated Brady by failing to furnish F.B.I. 
Agent Malone’s bench notes to the defense.  The trial court found that the notes 
were insufficient to undermine confidence in the proceedings and were unlikely to 
produce an acquittal on retrial because the notes have “minimal” value to the 
defense.  At trial, Malone, an expert in hair and fibers, testified that one Caucasian 
pubic hair (Q-18) recovered from the debris of Bogle’s pants was microscopically 
indistinguishable from Torres’s pubic hair (K-6).  This finding was consistent with 
Malone’s report and confirmed by an examiner.  Malone’s bench notes, however, 
stated that Q-18 equaled K-7, which referred to Torres’s head hair sample.  Malone 
testified at the evidentiary hearing that this was a transcription error: his bench 
notes should have said that Q-18 equaled K-6.  We find that no Brady violation has 
been demonstrated because Bogle has failed to establish that trial counsel 
attempted to obtain and the State suppressed Malone’s notes.  See Peede v. State, 
955 So. 2d 480, 497 (Fla. 2007) (finding no Brady violation where the defense 
could have obtained the information in question with reasonable diligence). 
 
 
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E.  Testimony Regarding Bogle’s Pants in Evidence 
 
Bogle asserts in his next Brady claim that the State suppressed the fact that 
Bogle’s pants were placed in a drying shed after Detective Lingo’s collection of 
the pubic hair and that Detective Lingo removed evidence from the evidence room 
to conduct an investigation.  Bogle relies on a Hillsborough County Sheriff’s 
Office disciplinary report stating that Ronald Cashwell, a Crime Scene Technician, 
“placed damp clothing into Evidence without first ascertaining that the articles 
were sufficiently dried.”  A written request for discipline noted that Cashwell:  
should have taken extreme caution to insure that the pants were dry 
since crucial evidence could have been obtained and used to assist in 
the prosecution of the suspect.  Instead, the pants could have become 
molded and the evidence severely damaged or destroyed. 
 
In detailing the events, Cashwell made a written statement that “[t]he items placed 
in the shed are unable to be separate[d] from each other and could contaminate 
each other and the shed was full of other evidence drying.”   
 
At trial, F.B.I. Agent Malone was asked whether anyone else came “into 
contact with the pants from the time that they were put into property until the time 
that you took them out to collect this evidence.”  Malone answered, “No, they were 
sealed when I checked them out.”  Malone was not asked whether anyone else 
came into contact with the pants throughout the whole time they were in evidence.  
Thus, the disciplinary report, which indicates that a Crime Scene Technician 
 
 
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removed the pants from the evidence room after Malone collected the hairs, is 
consistent with Malone’s trial testimony. 
 
Bogle has not shown that the State suppressed evidence of contamination.  
The disciplinary report and Cashwell’s statement on which Bogle relies do not 
show that any evidence was actually contaminated but convey that the evidence 
could have been contaminated or destroyed.  Malone testified at the evidentiary 
hearing that he found no evidence of contamination on the hairs retrieved from 
Bogle’s pants and that the disciplinary report did not cause him to change his 
opinion of the match.  Even if Bogle met the first two prongs of Brady, showing 
favorable evidence and suppression, the materiality prong has not been satisfied.  
Accordingly, we find that Bogle has failed to establish a Brady violation. 
 
Bogle additionally claims that prosecutor Cox violated Giglio because she 
knew Detective Lingo’s testimony about the pants was false and misleading.  The 
trial court denied this claim, finding the testimony unclear but not false.  The trial 
court reasoned that there was no evidence presented that anyone touched the pants 
between the time they were sealed and placed in the evidence room until the pants 
were examined by Detective Lingo.  Because we agree that Detective Lingo did 
not testify falsely, we deny this Giglio claim. 
 
 
 
 
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F.  DNA Analysis 
 
Bogle also claims that Dr. Harold Deadman’s trial testimony that he 
conducted restriction fragment length polymorphism (RFLP) DNA analysis in this 
case was false, violating Giglio.  We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Dr. 
Deadman’s testimony that he was “a supervisor” in the unit indicated that multiple 
people were involved in the DNA analysis and was not false or misleading.  
Therefore, we deny this Giglio claim.  
 
Bogle also asserts a Brady claim because the defense did not receive a copy 
of the FBI file concerning the RFLP DNA testing.  Bogle maintains that the file 
could have been used to challenge Dr. Deadman’s credibility, the DNA analysis, 
and the investigation.  The trial court found the value of the impeachment evidence 
disclosed in Dr. Deadman’s file minimal and concluded that Bogle failed to 
demonstrate that the result of the proceeding would have been different had Dr. 
Deadman’s file been disclosed.13  After carefully reviewing the record, we 
conclude that even if the FBI file was suppressed and favorable to the defense, the 
materiality prong under Brady has not been met.  Therefore, we affirm the trial 
court’s denial of relief on this claim. 
 
                                          
 
 
13.  Contrary to Bogle’s argument, the trial court did not employ an 
improper standard. 
 
 
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G.  Bogle’s Injuries 
 
Bogle raises a final Giglio claim alleging that prosecutor Cox knowingly 
argued falsely that the lacerations on Bogle’s face could only be from the struggle 
with Torres because Cox was aware of Bogle’s car accident.  We agree with the 
trial court that the prosecutor argued reasonable inferences in light of the evidence 
presented.  We therefore deny relief on this Giglio claim.   
III.  Ineffective Assistance of Guilt Phase Counsel 
Bogle contends that the trial court erred in denying his claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel during the guilt phase.  Following the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), this Court 
explained that for ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be successful, two 
factors must be established: 
First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the 
lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably 
competent performance under prevailing professional standards.  
Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be 
demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the 
proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined. 
 
Bolin v. State, 41 So. 3d 151, 155 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Maxwell v. Wainwright, 
490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986)).  Because both prongs of Strickland present 
mixed questions of law and fact, this Court employs a mixed standard of review, 
deferring to the trial court’s factual findings that are supported by competent, 
 
 
- 20 - 
substantial evidence, but reviewing the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo.  
Dennis v. State, 109 So. 3d 680, 690 (Fla. 2012). 
 
Bogle claims that his trial counsel failed to investigate his September 6, 
1991, car accident.  Specifically, Bogle asserts that trial counsel was deficient in 
failing to review medical records and photographs, speak with anyone who 
observed Bogle between the accident and the murder, retain an expert, and present 
evidence that he was physically incapable of committing the murder.  The trial 
court denied this claim, observing that Bogle failed to provide any evidence at the 
evidentiary hearing that the car accident injury rendered him physically incapable 
of committing the murder. 
 
At trial, no witnesses testified to observing any injuries on Bogle before he 
left Club 41 except Phillip Alfonso who saw a scar on Bogle’s right side which 
Bogle claimed was from an accident.  At the evidentiary hearing, Mary McFarland, 
who married Bogle on death row, testified that Bogle had injuries to his face a day 
before the murder and opined that there was no way Bogle was capable of 
committing the acts as alleged.  Bogle’s mother testified that the car accident 
punctured Bogle’s lung, that he had a tube in his side, he had broken some of his 
ribs, his face was “all messed up . . . [on h]is forehead,” and he was sore.  She 
believed that she informed Bogle’s trial counsel of photographs taken of Bogle at 
the hospital.  Bogle’s prior postconviction counsel obtained photographs pertaining 
 
 
- 21 - 
to Bogle’s car accident from Bogle’s civil lawyer.  Bogle’s trial counsel did not 
recall possessing Bogle’s hospital photographs.  Dr. Edward Willey, a forensic 
pathologist, testified at the evidentiary hearing that the lacerations Bogle sustained 
from the car accident most likely would not have healed completely within ten 
days.  However, on cross-examination, Dr. Willey could not exclude the possibility 
that a preexisting laceration reopened on the day of the murder. 
 
Even if guilt phase counsel was deficient in failing to effectively show that 
some of Bogle’s scratches originated from his accident, we conclude that Bogle 
has not demonstrated prejudice.  Bogle had motive to kill Torres and had 
threatened her life.  Bogle’s DNA was consistent with DNA found in the victim’s 
vagina.  A pubic hair found near the crotch of Bogle’s pants matched Torres.  
Bogle has not established that counsel’s showing his scratches were sustained in a 
car accident would have undermined confidence in the outcome of his case.  
Therefore, counsel’s failure to make such a showing was not prejudicial, and we 
deny relief on this claim. 
 
Bogle also claims his guilt phase counsel was deficient for failing to present 
Everett Smith’s testimony relating to events on September 1, 1991.  According to 
Bogle, Smith’s testimony would have undermined motive for Bogle to kill Torres.  
In denying this claim, the trial court found that Smith’s testimony would have had 
little substantive or impeachment value.  At the evidentiary hearing, Smith testified 
 
 
- 22 - 
that neither Katie Alfonso nor Torres expressed any fear while being around Bogle, 
even when he was violent, and described a September 1, 1991, incident 
demonstrating this lack of fear.  We find that Smith’s testimony would not have 
undermined Bogle’s motive to kill Torres and conclude that trial counsel was not 
deficient for failing to present Smith’s testimony at trial. 
Bogle additionally claims that trial counsel was deficient for failing to 
present the deposition of Roger Kelly, who passed away before trial.  Bogle asserts 
that Kelly’s deposition establishes that on the night in question, Torres was 
dancing with a man other than Bogle and arguing with Guy Douglas.  The trial 
court denied this claim, finding that the deposition could not legally be introduced 
as substantive evidence.  We agree.  Because Kelly’s deposition was not 
admissible as substantive evidence, we deny Bogle’s claim that his trial counsel 
was deficient in this regard.  See State v. Contreras, 979 So. 2d 896, 911 (Fla. 
2008) (“[A] deposition that is taken pursuant to rule 3.220 is only admissible for 
purposes of impeachment and not as substantive evidence.”) (citing Rodriguez v. 
State, 609 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 1992)).  Moreover, the deposition was not admissible as 
substantive evidence under Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). 
 
Bogle also claims that his trial counsel was deficient in failing to 
demonstrate that the hair comparison in this case was unreliable and flawed, failing 
 
 
- 23 - 
to acquire Agent Michael Malone’s bench notes, and failing to retain an expert.  At 
trial, Malone concluded as follows: 
In the debris reported as being from Mr. Bogle’s pants, I was able to 
find one Caucasian pubic hair which microscopically matched the 
pubic hairs of Margaret Torres.  In other words, it was 
microscopically indistinguishable from her’s [sic] and, therefore, I 
concluded this one pubic hair from the pants was consistent with 
coming from Margaret Torres. 
 
Malone acknowledged, on cross-examination, that the pubic hair was naturally 
removed, that there was no way to determine how long the hair had been removed, 
and that hair comparisons do not constitute a basis for absolute personal 
identification.   
 
At the evidentiary hearing, Bogle proffered the deposition of mitochondrial 
DNA expert Dr. Terry Melton who criticized Malone for using potentially 
misleading words and making conclusions without conducting DNA testing on the 
sample.  Dr. Melton did not state whether she would have been available to testify 
at Bogle’s trial, nor did she know whether, at that time, labs were conducting 
mitochondrial DNA testing on hairs for criminal defense attorneys.  The 
evidentiary hearing also revealed that studies relating to mitochondrial DNA and 
the proficiency of hair microscopic analysis were unavailable at that time.  The 
trial court did not give Dr. Melton’s testimony great weight.   
 
Steven Robertson, an expert in the field of hair analysis and comparison, 
concluded at the evidentiary hearing that Malone’s trial testimony matching 
 
 
- 24 - 
Torres’s pubic hair and the hair from Bogle’s pants was not inconsistent with his 
lab report, but was inconsistent with Malone’s bench notes.  Robertson determined 
that Malone testified “fairly” and within the bounds of his expertise.  We conclude 
that Bogle has not demonstrated that the defense’s failure to obtain Malone’s 
bench notes was outside the broad range of reasonably competent performance 
under prevailing professional standards at the time of trial.  See Long v. State, 118 
So. 3d 798 (Fla. 2013).  In addition, Bogle failed to present evidence that a 
mitochondrial DNA expert, such as Dr. Melton, or a microscopic hair analysis 
expert, would have been available to testify at trial, or in the preparation thereof.  
Accordingly, we deny relief on this claim. 
 
Bogle next claims that his trial counsel was deficient in failing to request a 
Frye14 hearing to challenge the DNA evidence and show that the F.B.I. did not 
follow accepted testing procedures.  A Frye hearing determines whether an 
expert’s scientific opinion is admissible.  Zack v. State, 911 So. 2d 1190, 1197 
(Fla. 2005).  To be admissible, an expert opinion must be based on techniques that 
have been generally accepted by the relevant scientific community and found to be 
reliable.  Id. (citing Frye, 293 F. at 1014).  However, Frye is only utilized where 
the science at issue is new or novel.  Id. at 1198.  In denying this claim, the trial 
                                          
 
 
14.  Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 
 
- 25 - 
court determined that Bogle failed to show that the RFLP DNA evidence would 
have been inadmissible at trial had counsel requested a Frye hearing. 
 
At the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Randell Libby, an expert in human molecular 
genetics and forensics DNA analysis, testified that RFLP was not generally 
accepted in 1992; instead, RFLP was reviewed on a case-by-case basis.  Although 
Dr. Libby maintained that there were inconsistencies in Bogle’s case which raise a 
concern about the possibility of contamination or something else producing an 
inconsistent result, Dr. Libby could not identify any problems with the chain of 
custody, nor did he have direct knowledge of improper evidence storage causing 
degradation of evidence.  Dr. Libby could not recall any previous case where he 
testified and the evidence was ruled inadmissible.  Dr. Libby said he would have 
testified at a Frye hearing in this kind of case in 1991 and 1992.   
 
Dr. Deadman opined at the evidentiary hearing that F.B.I. procedures 
employed in 1991 and 1992 for RFLP DNA examinations produced “very reliable” 
results and that F.B.I. lab procedures in RFLP DNA analysis in this case were 
generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.  Dr. Martin Tracey, an 
expert in population genetics and DNA analysis, saw no indication of 
contamination, having reviewed Dr. Deadman’s RFLP analysis in this case.  Based 
on our review of the record, we conclude that Bogle has not demonstrated that trial 
 
 
- 26 - 
counsel was deficient for failing to request a Frye hearing.  Therefore, we affirm 
the trial court’s denial of relief. 
 
In his final claim of ineffective assistance of guilt phase counsel, Bogle 
contends that his trial counsel was deficient in failing to impeach Phillip and 
Tammy Alphonso and Jeffrey Trapp.  The Alphonsos did not testify at the 
evidentiary hearing.  As noted above, Bogle has not established that Trapp’s 
community control condition was still in effect on the night of the murder.  We 
therefore deny relief, concluding that Bogle has not demonstrated that his trial 
counsel was deficient. 
IV.  Ineffective Assistance of Penalty Phase Counsel 
Bogle claims that his trial counsel was also ineffective during the penalty 
phase.  To be entitled to relief on this claim, Bogle must show that his attorney’s 
performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his 
defense.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  “In the penalty phase context, ‘the question 
is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer . . . 
would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances did not warrant death.’ ”  Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 771 (Fla. 
2004) .  “We do not require a defendant to show ‘that counsel’s deficient conduct 
more likely than not altered the outcome’ of his penalty proceeding, but rather that 
he establish ‘a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in [that] outcome.’ ” 
 
 
- 27 - 
Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 44 (2009) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-
94).   
This Court has stated that trial counsel has a duty to investigate mitigation.   
“In reviewing a claim that counsel’s representation was ineffective based on a 
failure to investigate or present mitigating evidence, the Court requires the 
defendant to demonstrate that the deficient performance deprived the defendant of 
a reliable penalty phase proceeding.”  Simmons v. State, 105 So. 3d 475, 503 (Fla. 
2012) (quoting Hoskins v. State, 75 So. 3d 250, 254 (Fla. 2011)).  When this Court 
reviews a trial court’s resolution of a Strickland claim, we defer to the trial court’s 
factual findings, but review de novo the trial court’s legal conclusions.  Id. 
A.  Challenging the Aggravating Factors 
Bogle claims that his trial counsel was deficient in failing to present any 
evidence challenging the prior violent felony and avoid arrest aggravating factors 
relating to September 1, 1991.  The evidence at trial showed that on that day Bogle 
and Torres argued, Bogle broke through Katie Alfonso’s screen door, pushed Katie 
out of the way, and grabbed Torres’s arm to remove the telephone from her hand 
as she tried to call 911.  Bogle, on two separate occasions, threatened Torres that if 
she pressed charges, she would not live to tell about it.  
 
For this claim, Bogle relies on the evidentiary hearing testimony of Everett 
Smith, who detailed his version of the events on September 1.  As noted above, we 
 
 
- 28 - 
found that Smith’s testimony would not have undermined Bogle’s motive to kill 
Torres and that trial counsel was not deficient for failing to present Smith’s 
testimony during the guilt phase.  We additionally conclude that trial counsel was 
not deficient for failing to present Smith’s testimony during the penalty phase.   
B.  Investigating and Presenting Mitigation Evidence 
Bogle next claims his trial counsel was deficient in the investigation and 
presentation of mitigation evidence.  At the second penalty phase, through the 
testimonies of a psychiatrist and seven witnesses consisting of Bogle’s family and 
friends, the defense established that: 
Bogle had been subjected to physical and mental abuse as a child, had 
used drugs at his father’s urging from the time he was five or six years 
old, was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the murder, had 
a personality disorder and suffered from some mental disturbance at 
the time of the murder, was kind to others, and had been injured in an 
automobile accident a week before the murder. 
 
Bogle, 655 So. 2d at 1105.15  In analyzing the mitigation evidence, the trial court:  
gave some weight to the statutory factor of impaired capacity but 
stated that substantial impairment had not been proven; gave 
substantial weight to Bogle’s family background; little weight to his 
alcohol and drug abuse; gave some weight to his good conduct during 
trial; gave some, but not a great deal, of weight to his kindness to 
others; and gave no weight to his involvement in an automobile 
accident.   
 
                                          
 
15.  In addition to the psychiatrist, Bogle’s penalty phase counsel also 
retained a psychologist for mitigation purposes.  Both experts evaluated Bogle 
prior to the penalty phase.  We reject Bogle’s claims that his counsel failed to 
provide critical information to his expert and request any psychological testing. 
 
 
- 29 - 
Id. at 1105-06. 
 
We observe that the postconviction evidentiary hearing included some of the 
same witnesses who testified at the second penalty phase and that much of the 
evidence was cumulative.  See Troy v. State, 57 So. 3d 828, 835 (Fla. 2011) (“[A] 
defendant’s claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because of 
counsel’s failure to present mitigation evidence will not be sustained where the 
jury was aware of most aspects of the mitigation evidence that the defendant 
claims should have been presented.”).  Bogle’s forensic psychologist concluded at 
the evidentiary hearing that Bogle had a significant mental illness and that he was 
under the influence of mental or emotional disturbance in some form at the time of 
the murder.   
 
We reject Bogle’s characterization that he presented substantial mitigation in 
postconviction and conclude that Bogle has not established prejudice under 
Strickland.  We note that, in this case, the trial court found that the following 
aggravating factors were applicable: prior violent felony, the murder was 
committed while engaged in the commission of a sexual battery, avoid arrest, and 
HAC.  See Gonzalez v. State, 136 So. 3d 1125, 1167 (Fla. 2014) (“HAC and prior 
violent felony are among the weightiest aggravators in Florida’s statutory 
scheme.”).  Because we conclude that Bogle has not established that his trial 
 
 
- 30 - 
counsel was ineffective as to investigating and presenting mitigation evidence, we 
deny relief.16     
V.  Newly Discovered Evidence 
 
Bogle claims that the trial court erred in denying his claim of newly 
discovered evidence.  This Court has set forth a two-prong test that a defendant 
must satisfy in order to obtain relief in cases involving newly discovered evidence: 
 
To obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a 
defendant must meet two requirements.  First, the evidence must not 
have been known by the trial court, the party, or counsel at the time of 
trial, and it must appear that the defendant or defense counsel could 
not have known of it by the use of diligence.  Second, the newly 
discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably 
produce an acquittal on retrial.  See Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 
521 (Fla. 1998) (Jones II).  Newly discovered evidence satisfies the 
second prong of the Jones II test if it “weakens the case against [the 
defendant] so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt as to his 
culpability.”  Jones II, 709 So. 2d at 526 (quoting Jones v. State, 678 
So. 2d 309, 315 (Fla. 1996)).  If the defendant is seeking to vacate a 
sentence, the second prong requires that the newly discovered 
evidence would probably yield a less severe sentence.  See Jones v. 
State, 591 So. 2d 911, 915 (Fla. 1991) (Jones I). 
 
Marek v. State, 14 So. 3d 985, 990 (Fla. 2009).  The postconviction court must 
consider the effect of the newly discovered evidence, in addition to all of the 
admissible evidence that could be introduced at a new trial.  Swafford v. State, 125 
So. 3d 760, 775-76 (Fla. 2013).  Bogle’s claim of newly discovered evidence 
                                          
 
 
16.  We expressly reject Bogle’s contention that his trial counsel was 
deficient for failing to speak to his family members and friends and for failing to 
secure Brian Bogle’s live testimony during the penalty phase.   
 
 
- 31 - 
consists of Y-STR17 DNA testing of Torres’s fingernails.  The State conducted 
postconviction STR DNA testing from the vaginal swabs and Torres’s underwear.   
A.  Testing of Torres’s Fingernails 
 
In 2007, the underside of Torres’s fingernail clippings from both hands were 
swabbed for Y-STR testing.  A male profile was obtained, which appeared to be a 
mixture consistent with at least two male DNA present—one major and one minor 
contributor—at all seventeen markers.  Bogle’s expert was unable to identify the 
genetic material source of the DNA or when it was deposited.  Bogle’s experts 
excluded Bogle as a contributor to the mixture detected from the fingernails.  
 
We agree with the trial court’s finding that Bogle has satisfied the first prong 
of Jones II.  Regarding the second prong, as stated by the trial court, the absence of 
Bogle’s DNA beneath Torres’s fingernails is relevant to counter the State’s 
argument that Bogle’s “fresh” scratches were caused by Torres during their 
struggle.  It certainly cannot be said, however, that this evidence establishes that 
the contributor to this DNA mixture was actually the person who murdered Torres.  
Moreover, it cannot be determined whether Bogle’s DNA was present on Torres’s 
fingernails at her death, approximately sixteen years before they were swabbed.  
We conclude that the trial court correctly found that this evidence is not of such a 
nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial. 
                                          
 
 
17.  “STR” stands for short tandem repeat.  
 
 
- 32 - 
B.  Testing of the Vaginal Swabs and Torres’s Underwear 
 
Patricia Bencivenga, a crime laboratory analyst for the Florida Department 
of Law Enforcement (FDLE), conducted STR DNA testing on the four wood sticks 
of the vaginal swabs in Bogle’s case, on the swab packaging, and on Torres’s 
underwear.  Bencivenga obtained a mixture DNA profile of only two profiles: a 
major contributor was male and a small contributor which matched Torres.  The 
major male contributor was then run through the Combined DNA Index System 
(CODIS), which made a hit on Bogle.  After conducting DNA testing on a known 
Bogle profile, Bencivenga concluded that the major contributor was consistent 
with Bogle’s profile and the minor was consistent with Torres’s profile.   
 
At all thirteen areas tested, Bogle’s DNA profile matched the DNA of the 
major male contributor on the vaginal swabs.  The frequency of the occurrence of 
that profile is approximately 1 in 45 quadrillion Caucasians, one in 8.1 quintillion 
African-Americans, and 1 in 81 quadrillion Southeastern Hispanics.18  After 
conducting DNA testing on Torres’s underwear, Bencivenga found a profile of a 
mixture at one area: one of Torres and one consistent with Bogle’s profile.  Guy 
Douglas was excluded in postconviction as the source of the foreign DNA profile 
                                          
 
 
18.  Dr. Libby, testifying for the defense, computed the statistical probability 
with considering the common alleles as Caucasians as 1 in 43,000.  The trial court 
found that Dr. Libby was not as credible as Bencivenga. 
 
 
- 33 - 
from the vaginal swabs and excluded as a contributor to the mixed DNA profile 
obtained from Torres’s underwear.19 
 
The trial court found that because the prosecution’s evidence that Torres was 
murdered during a sexual assault was “very strong,” evidence that Bogle’s DNA 
profile was the sole match to the semen found on the vaginal swabs and her 
underwear was “highly relevant and highly prejudicial.”  We conclude that it is 
significant that Bogle’s DNA profile matched the DNA of the major male 
contributor on the vaginal swabs from Torres.  We note that Detective Lingo 
testified that Bogle denied having sex with Torres in his interview on or about 
September 14, 1991.  Bogle, therefore, has not demonstrated that he is entitled to 
relief on his claim of newly discovered evidence.20   
VI.  Conflict of Interest 
 
Bogle asserts that the trial court erred in denying his claim that his trial 
counsel had conflicts of interest which violated his right to present a defense and to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses.  In denying this claim, the trial court found 
                                          
 
19.  Contrary to Bogle’s suggestion that the trial court directed that 
Douglas’s DNA sample be acquired, the record reveals that Douglas voluntarily 
provided a DNA sample. 
 
 
20.  We reject Bogle’s unsupported claims that the results of the State’s STR 
DNA testing conducted in postconviction is inadmissible and that Detective Lingo 
tampered with evidence.  Bogle has not shown that there is a probability that 
someone tampered with evidence.  See Armstrong v. State, 73 So. 3d 155, 171 
(Fla. 2011). 
 
 
- 34 - 
that Bogle failed to show that there was an actual conflict of interest that adversely 
affected his representation. 
 
In Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980), the United States Supreme 
Court held that “the possibility of conflict is insufficient to impugn a criminal 
conviction.  In order to demonstrate a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights, a 
defendant must establish that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his 
lawyer’s performance.”  Here, Bogle contends that the Public Defender’s Office 
representation of Guy Douglas, Jeffrey Trapp, and Margaret Torres created an 
impermissible conflict of interest.  We deny relief on this claim because Bogle has 
failed to show that an actual conflict of interest existed.   
VII.  Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 
Bogle asserts that the trial court erred in denying his claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct.21  We agree with the trial court’s determination that this claim is 
procedurally barred.  See Spencer v. State, 842 So. 2d 52, 60 (Fla. 2003) (“We 
conclude that Spencer’s substantive claims of prosecutorial misconduct could and 
                                          
 
 
21.  Bogle complains of the prosecutor’s reference to the FBI Crime 
Laboratory as “the greatest crime laboratory in the world.” He also complains of 
statements that law enforcement “did everything they could in this case,” 
“followed every lead,” and that the investigation was “very thorough” and “didn’t 
contradict what was already clear.” Bogle also complains of the statement, “[y]ou 
can’t judge this man [Bogle] or expect this man to behave within the confines of 
the ordinary person.  You can’t expect a person who is capable of doing what he 
did to Margaret Torres to act as you would expect an ordinary human being to act,” 
and “[i]t’s not like a pubic hair in the crotch of the pants he [Bogle] was wearing.” 
 
 
- 35 - 
should have been raised on direct appeal and thus are procedurally barred from 
consideration in a postconviction motion.”).    
 
Bogle additionally argues that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to 
object to the alleged prosecutorial misconduct.  Bogle relies on Ruiz v. State, 743 
So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla. 1999), in which we reversed a defendant’s convictions and 
sentences due to the trial being “permeated by egregious and inexcusable 
prosecutorial misconduct.”  We conclude that the prosecutor’s comments in this 
case were fair comments on the evidence presented at trial.  Accordingly, we deny 
relief on this claim.  See Spann v. State, 985 So. 2d 1059, 1068 (Fla. 2008) 
(providing that counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to object to a fair 
comment which is based on the evidence presented during trial). 
HABEAS PETITION 
 
In the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Bogle claims that his appellate 
counsel was ineffective on direct appeal for failing to raise: (1) a due process claim 
regarding the felony-murder jury instruction with the underlying felony of sexual 
battery; (2) a due process claim pertaining to the trial court’s refusal to instruct the 
jury on hair analysis; (3) that the trial court erred in instructing and considering 
inapplicable aggravating factors; (4) that the trial court’s admission of gruesome 
photographs violated his constitutional rights; (5) that the trial court violated the 
principles of Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), and Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 
 
 
- 36 - 
U.S. 393 (1987); and (6) a prosecutorial misconduct claim.  Aside from his various 
claims of ineffectiveness on the part of appellate counsel, Bogle raises a claim that 
Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 
U.S. 584 (2002). 
I.  Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel  
 
Consistent with the Strickland standard, to grant habeas relief based on 
ineffectiveness of appellate counsel, this Court must determine:  
first, whether the alleged omissions are of such magnitude as to 
constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency falling measurably 
outside the range of professionally acceptable performance and, 
second, whether the deficiency in performance compromised the 
appellate process to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the 
correctness of the result. 
 
Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. 1986). 
A.  Felony-Murder Instruction 
 
Bogle contends that his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to claim 
that the trial court erred regarding the jury instruction on felony murder.  Bogle 
acknowledges that his trial counsel did not object to the instruction.  The 
indictment charged Bogle with first-degree murder under theories of both 
premeditation and felony-murder, with the underlying felony of sexual battery.  
The trial court instructed the jury under both theories and the jury rendered a 
general verdict.  On direct appeal, we determined that the aggravator “committed 
 
 
- 37 - 
while engaged in the commission of a sexual battery” was proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Bogle, 655 So. 2d at 1108.   
 
Bogle has failed to demonstrate that it was fundamental error for the trial 
court to instruct the jury on felony murder when he was properly charged under 
that theory and the evidence was sufficient to support the commission of the 
underlying offense.  Consequently, appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective 
for failing to raise a nonmeritorious claim.  Kokal v. Dugger, 718 So. 2d 138, 142 
(Fla. 1998).  Accordingly, we deny relief on this claim. 
B.  Requested Jury Instruction on Hair Analysis 
 
Bogle claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue 
that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the following requested jury 
instruction on hair analysis: 
[1.] Hair evidence must meet the following requirement: the 
circumstances must be such that the hair could have been transferred 
between the victim and defendant only at the time that the crime was 
committed. 
[2.] Hair analysis and comparison are not absolutely certain and 
reliable.  Although hair comparison analysis may be persuasive, it 
does not result in identifications of absolute certainty. 
 
 
Had the claim been raised, appellate counsel would have been required to 
prove the following three elements: 
(1) the special instruction was supported by the evidence; (2) the 
standard instruction did not adequately cover the theory of defense; 
and (3) the special instruction was a correct statement of the law and 
not misleading or confusing.  
 
 
- 38 - 
 
Stephens v. State, 787 So. 2d 747, 756 (Fla. 2001) (footnotes omitted).   This 
criteria has not been demonstrated.  We conclude that Bogle has not shown that the 
trial court abused its discretion in denying the requested jury instruction.  See 
Hudson v. State, 992 So. 2d 96, 112 (Fla. 2008) (providing that a trial court’s 
denial of special jury instruction is reviewed for abuse of discretion).  Thus, 
appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless issue.  
Kokal, 718 So. 2d at 142.   
C.  Inapplicable Aggravating Factors 
 
Bogle contends that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to claim 
that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on, and in improperly considering, 
inapplicable aggravating factors.  However, on direct appeal, Bogle raised a claim 
that the aggravators were inapplicable, which we decided adversely to him.  Bogle, 
655 So. 2d at 1108-09.  As a result, this claim is procedurally barred.  See Bryan v. 
Dugger, 641 So. 2d 61, 65 (Fla. 1994). 
D.  Autopsy Photographs 
 
Bogle claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue 
that the trial court erred in admitting autopsy photographs.  As to the admissibility 
of photographs: 
This Court has long followed the rule that photographs are admissible 
if they are relevant and not so shocking in nature as to defeat the value 
of their relevance.  Where photographs are relevant, “then the trial 
 
 
- 39 - 
judge in the first [instance] and this Court on appeal must determine 
whether the gruesomeness of the portrayal is so inflammatory as to 
create an undue prejudice in the minds of the jury and [distract] them 
from a fair and unimpassioned consideration of the evidence.”  We 
have consistently upheld the admission of allegedly gruesome 
photographs where they were independently relevant or corroborative 
of other evidence. 
 
Looney v. State, 803 So. 2d 656, 669-70 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Czubak v. State, 570 
So. 2d 925, 928 (Fla. 1990)).  Autopsy photographs may be admissible when used 
to “illustrate the medical examiner’s testimony and the [victim’s] injuries.”  Pope 
v. State, 679 So. 2d 710, 713-14 (Fla. 1996).  The admission of the photographs is 
within the trial court’s discretion and will only be reversed when an abuse of 
discretion is shown.  Harris v. State, 843 So. 2d 856, 864 (Fla. 2003). 
 
Trial counsel raised objections as to the admission of autopsy photographs.  
The trial court admitted four photographs while excluding the others for being too 
gruesome and duplicitous.  The medical examiner opined that Torres died from 
blunt impact head trauma with skull fractures and lacerations of the brain after 
being struck seven times by a stone.  The medical examiner utilized the admitted 
photographs for his testimony in explaining Torres’s injuries.  We conclude that 
Bogle has failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting 
the autopsy photographs.  Thus, appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for 
failing to raise a meritless issue.  Kokal, 718 So. 2d at 142.   
 
 
 
- 40 - 
E.  Trial Court’s Prevention of Mitigation Evidence 
 
Bogle additionally claims that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to 
claim that the trial court prevented the presentation of mitigation evidence in 
violation of Lockett, 488 U.S. 586, and Hitchcock, 438 U.S. 393.  Bogle relies on 
one question that his trial counsel sought to ask of mental health expert Dr. Arturo 
Gonzalez: “Were you able to substantiate [Bogle’s] drug use from his own family 
members prior to September 12, 1991?”  The State raised a relevance objection, 
which the trial court sustained.  Because counsel for Bogle did not make a proffer 
to the trial court or offer to make a proffer, the issue was unpreserved.  See 
Blackwood v. State, 777 So. 2d 399, 410-11 (Fla. 2000); Lucas v. State, 568 So. 2d 
18, 22 (Fla. 1990).  Because appellate counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise 
issues that were not preserved for appeal, Groover v. Singletary, 656 So. 2d 424, 
425 (Fla. 1995), we deny relief on this claim. 
F.  Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 
In his final claim of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel, Bogle claims that 
his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct.  This claim attempts to reargue claims of prosecutorial misconduct 
that were already raised in his postconviction motion.  See Swafford v. Dugger, 
569 So. 2d 1264, 1266 (Fla. 1990) (“Allegations of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel may not be used to evade the rule against using habeas corpus as 
 
 
- 41 - 
a second appeal.”).  Because trial counsel did not object to the prosecutor’s 
comments, appellate counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise issues which 
were not preserved for appeal.  Groover, 656 So. 2d at 425.   
II.  Florida’s Capital Sentencing Scheme 
Bogle asserts that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional 
under Ring, 536 U.S. 584, and Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).  Bogle’s 
first-degree murder conviction and sentence of death were final in 1995, before the 
Supreme Court decided Ring.  We acknowledge that Hurst v. Florida, in which the 
United States Supreme Court found Florida’s death penalty scheme defective to the 
extent that a jury must at least “make a specific factual finding with regard to the 
existence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances,” supporting a death sentence 
in order to preserve the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, is an extension of 
Ring.  136 S. Ct. at 622.  Bogle is not, however, entitled to Hurst relief because 
Hurst does not apply retroactively to cases that were final before Ring was 
decided.  See Asay v. State, 41 Fla. L. Weekly S646, S652 (Fla. Dec. 22, 2016).  
Therefore, we deny relief on this claim.22 
 
                                          
 
 
22.  We deny Bogle’s remaining claims, which should have been raised on 
direct appeal or in his postconviction motion.  See Wyatt v. State, 71 So. 3d at 112 
n.20. 
 
 
- 42 - 
CONCLUSION 
 
In light of the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s denial of relief on 
Bogle’s amended motion to vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and 
sentence of death, and we deny Bogle habeas relief. 
 
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, J., concurs. 
LABARGA, C.J., and LEWIS, CANADY, and POLSTON, JJ., concur in result. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion. 
LAWSON, J., did not participate. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
PARIENTE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
For the reasons set forth in my concurring in part and dissenting in part 
opinion in Asay23 and elaborated on in Gaskin,24 I would grant Bogle a new 
penalty phase under Hurst.25 
 
Accordingly, I dissent from the majority’s conclusion to affirm Bogle’s 
sentence of death. 
 
 
 
                                          
 
 
23.  Asay v. State, 41 Fla. L. Weekly S646 (Fla. Dec. 22, 2016). 
 
24.  Gaskin v. State, No. SC15-1884 (slip op. issued Fla. Jan. 19, 2017). 
 
25.  Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016); see Hurst v. Florida, 
136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). 
 
 
- 43 - 
Two Cases:  
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Hillsborough County,  
Wayne S. Timmerman, Judge - Case No. 291991CF012952000AHC 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus  
 
Linda McDermott and Martin J. McClain of McClain & McDermott, P.A., Estero, 
Florida, 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Candance M. 
Sabella, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
for Appellee/Respondent