Title: Poillot v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC15-1691 
____________ 
 
CLAUDIO J. POILLOT,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Respondent. 
 
[September 8, 2016] 
 
POLSTON, J. 
 
Claudio J. Poillot seeks review of the decision of the Fifth District Court of 
Appeal in State v. Poillot, 173 So. 3d 1070 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (holding that 
deviation from work release program establishes a prima facie case for escape), on 
the ground that it expressly and directly conflicts with the decision of the Second 
District in State v. Williams, 918 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (holding that 
deviation from work release program does not establish a prima facie case for 
escape), on a question of law.1  For the reasons described below, we approve the 
                                          
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. 
 
 
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decision in Poillot and disapprove of the decision in Williams to the extent it is 
inconsistent with this decision.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
Claudio J. Poillot was convicted of a felony and sentenced to 48 months in 
the State of Florida Department of Corrections (“DOC”).  On the date of the instant 
offense, July 29, 2014, Poillot was in state custody housed at the Kissimmee 
Community Center.  As part of a work release program, Poillot began employment 
with a construction company, JS & Son Construction Services.  The work release 
program permitted Poillot to work outside of the correctional facility from 6:00 
a.m. to 6:00 p.m., Monday through Saturday.  Poillot, 173 So. 3d at 1071.  “On 
July 29, 2014, he left the Kissimmee Community Work Release Center and timely 
reported to work at JS & Son Construction.  Shortly thereafter, Poillot left his place 
of employment without permission and was unaccounted for until he timely 
returned to the work release center before 6:00 p.m., at which time he was placed 
under arrest for escape.”  Id. at 1072.    
 
Poillot was charged by amended information with escape pursuant to section 
944.40, Florida Statutes.  Subsequently, Poillot filed a motion to dismiss pursuant 
to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4).  Id. at 1071-72.  After a hearing 
on the motion, the trial court granted Poillot’s motion to dismiss, and the State 
timely appealed.  Id.  
 
 
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The Fifth District reversed, “[c]oncluding that the undisputed material facts 
are legally sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.”  Id. at 1071.  “In 
determining whether the State sufficiently demonstrated a prima facie case of 
escape under section 944.40 in the context of this case, [the Fifth District] also 
examine[d] section 945.091, Florida Statutes (2014), which authorizes the DOC to 
extend the limits of a prisoner’s confinement.”  Id. at 1072.  The Fifth District 
discussed that the language in section 945.091(1)(b) shows that work release is 
merely an extension of the place of confinement, so that a prisoner may still be 
regarded as “confined” even though not physically present in a state or county 
correctional facility.  Id. at 1073.  The Fifth District concluded that “the work-
release program was an extension of Poillot’s confinement, and his deviation from 
the program in the manner asserted by the State establishes a prima facie case for 
escape.”  Id.  Therefore, the Fifth District found that “the trial court erred in 
dismissing the amended information.”  Id.  
II.  ANALYSIS 
Poillot argues that he was absent from work, not escaping from confinement 
as contemplated by the applicable statute.  Additionally, Poillot argues that the 
Fifth District’s statutory interpretation violates due process and the applicable 
statute should be construed as requiring either knowledge or notice in order to 
sustain an escape charge.  Specifically, he argues that even though he may have 
 
 
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been in violation of the rules of the work release program when he left his place of 
employment without permission, and his privilege to participate in the program 
may have been withdrawn, he still must have been aware of or notified of his 
termination from employment or revocation from the work release program in 
order to sustain the charge of escape.  We disagree.2 
Section 944.40, Florida Statutes, provides that a prisoner who escapes 
confinement commits a second-degree felony: 
Any prisoner confined in any prison, jail, private correctional 
facility, road camp, or other penal institution, whether operated by the 
state, a county, or a municipality, or operated under a contract with 
the state, a county, or a municipality, working upon the public roads, 
or being transported to or from a place of confinement who escapes or 
attempts to escape from such confinement commits a felony of the 
second degree . . . .  
§ 944.40, Fla. Stat. (2014).  
 
Additionally, section 945.091, Florida Statutes, authorizes the DOC to 
extend the limits of a prisoner’s confinement: 
(1)  The department may adopt rules permitting the extension of the 
limits of the place of confinement of an inmate as to whom there is 
reasonable cause to believe that the inmate will honor his or her trust 
by authorizing the inmate, under prescribed conditions and following 
investigation and approval by the secretary, or the secretary’s 
designee, who shall maintain a written record of such action, to leave 
the confines of that place unaccompanied by a custodial agent for a 
prescribed period of time to: 
                                          
 
 
2.  Our standard of review is de novo.  See Hopkins v. State, 105 So. 3d 470, 
472 (Fla. 2012).  
 
 
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 . . .  
(b)  Work at paid employment, participate in an 
education or a training program, or voluntarily serve a 
public or nonprofit agency or faith-based service group in 
the community, while continuing as an inmate of the 
institution or facility in which the inmate is confined, 
except during the hours of his or her employment, 
education, training, or service and traveling thereto and 
therefrom. . . .  
 . . .  
(4)  The willful failure of an inmate to remain within the extended 
limits of his or her confinement or to return within the time prescribed 
to the place of confinement designated by the department shall be 
deemed as an escape from the custody of the department and shall be 
punishable as prescribed by law. 
§ 945.091, Fla. Stat. (2014) (emphasis added). 
 
Under section 945.091(4), an inmate on authorized work release can be 
guilty of escape under section 944.40 in at least two different ways:  (1) by 
willfully failing to remain within the extended limits of his or her confinement; or 
(2) by willfully failing to return within the time prescribed to the place of 
confinement.  See Atwell v. State, 739 So. 2d 1166, 1167 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). 
In this case, pursuant to section 945.091, the work release program was an 
extension of the limits of Poillot’s confinement, and he was still confined when he 
was working as part of a work release program at JS & Son Construction.  See § 
945.091(1)(b), Fla. Stat.  When Poillot left his place of employment without 
permission, he willfully failed to remain within the extended limits of his 
 
 
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confinement and would be guilty of escape pursuant to one of the manners 
described in section 945.091(4).  Additionally, contrary to Poillot’s assertion, 
Poillot need not be aware of the changed conditions of his employment status with 
the work release program in order to sustain an escape charge.  As explained 
earlier, an escape charge requires (1) willfully failing to remain within the 
extended limits of his confinement, or (2) willfully failing to return within the time 
prescribed to the place of confinement.  § 945.091(4), Fla. Stat.  Poillot’s 
knowledge that he was actually terminated from JS & Son Construction after 
leaving without permission does not change the fact that he willfully escaped from 
confinement, as defined by statute. 
Accordingly, pursuant to the applicable statutes, an inmate is still confined 
when he is working as part of a work release program, and leaving without 
permission would subject the inmate to a charge of escape.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
We approve the decision in Poillot and disapprove of the decision in 
Williams to the extent it is inconsistent with this decision. 
It is so ordered.  
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, and PERRY, 
JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
 
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Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions  
 
 
Fifth District - Case No. 5D15-353 
 
 
(Osceola County) 
 
James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Steven Neale Gosney, Assistant Public 
Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; Wesley Harold Heidt, 
Bureau Chief, and Kristen Lynn Davenport, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona 
Beach, Florida,  
 
 
for Respondent