Title: City of Pensacola v. Owens

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

369 So. 2d 328 (1979)
CITY OF PENSACOLA, a Municipal Corporation, Petitioner,
v.
Kiplan Carlyle OWENS, Respondent.
No. 53795.

Supreme Court of Florida.
February 1, 1979.
Rehearing Denied April 27, 1979.
H. Edward Moore, Jr. of Sherrill & Moore, Pensacola, for petitioner.
William R. Davenport, Pensacola, for respondent.
HATCHETT, Justice.
We have for resolution a certified question: In an action for malicious prosecution, is it the function of the court or of the jury to determine the existence of probable cause?[1] Jurisdiction is pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution. Where the facts are undisputed, as is the case here, the court must determine probable cause.
The facts of the case and its history are set out in the First District Court of Appeal's opinion as follows:
Owens v. City of Pensacola, 355 So. 2d 1266, 1267 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
To resolve the issue in this case, we must examine Oosterhoudt v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 316 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), cert. denied, 333 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 1976). In Oosterhoudt, a woman entered a department *329 store intending to buy some writing materials. After purchasing an item, she picked up six felt writing pens and placed them between the bag containing the purchased item and her chest. After browsing in the store for a short time, she left the store. After she had gone about 15 feet, she started to return to the store. As she turned to go back into the store, she was approached by a security person who asked to examine the contents of the bag. As the shopper opened the bag, the pens that had been held between her body and the bag fell to the ground. The shopper offered to pay for the pens but payment was refused. She was later interviewed by another security officer who also refused her offer to pay for the pens. Police authorities were summoned, and the shopper was arrested and charged with petit larceny. The petit larceny charge was subsequently dismissed for lack of probable cause.
The shopper then filed a two-count complaint. The first count alleged false imprisonment, and the second count alleged malicious prosecution. The trial court found that the facts were not in dispute and entered final summary judgment in favor of the store.
The First District Court affirmed the trial court's entry of summary judgment on the false imprisonment count, relying on section 901.34, Florida Statutes (1975).[2] On the malicious prosecution count, it held that probable cause was a question for the jury and stated:
Oosterhoudt v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 316 So. 2d  at 584.
The majority view on this question is stated at pages 188-89 of 87 A.L.R.2d:
We first adopted what we now hold to be the law of Florida in Glass v. Parrish, 51 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 1951), where we stated at page 722:
This rule has prevailed in all cases except Oosterhoudt. Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Kincaid, 335 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); Stone v. Hamic, 189 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966). To the extent that it holds otherwise, we disapprove the decision in Oosterhoudt v. Montgomery Ward & Co.
Accordingly, the decision of the First District Court of Appeal is quashed and the case remanded to that court with directions that the trial court be affirmed.
It is so ordered.
ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, SUNDBERG and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur.
ENGLAND, C.J., concurs with an opinion.
ENGLAND, Chief Justice, concurring.
Under Florida law, the plaintiff in a malicious prosecution lawsuit[1] must establish a lack of probable cause for the criminal prosecution as an element of his proof,[2] and if he does then two things happen. First, the plaintiff is entitled to have the jury, not the judge, determine his claim for damages. Second, the burden shifts to the defendant to justify the institution of a judicial proceeding if the defendant chooses to put on evidence.
The question apparently certified to us is whether a trial judge may direct a verdict for the defendant at the end of plaintiff's case in this class of case on the ground that the plaintiff has failed to show an absence of the defendant's "probable cause" for filing suit. This question is simple enough, and I agree with my colleagues that it requires an affirmative answer. A trial judge can always direct a verdict against a plaintiff who fails to prove a material element of his case.
I also agree with my colleagues that the answer to this question resolves this lawsuit in the city's favor, for Owens failed to prove in his case that the City of Pensacola lacked probable cause to charge Owens with an obstruction of justice. The legal issue was not, I submit, whether the police officers had probable cause to arrest Owens. That would be relevant to a false arrest or a false imprisonment claim. The issue in a malicious prosecution suit is whether the suit was brought without a reasonable prospect of success  probable cause to charge the particular crime. Owens has not shown that the city's criminal charge lacked a probable foundation. Surely the fact that it was dismissed does not alone establish its improbability.
Having failed to prove a material element of his claim, Owens was subject to a directed verdict against him, and the trial judge properly aborted his lawsuit at the close of his presentation of evidence.
[1]  Neither false arrest nor false imprisonment is certified to us, as we view the record.
[2]  Reliance on the statute was not fully explained until Owens v. City of Pensacola, 355 So. 2d 1266.
[1]  I accept the majority's construction of the record to the effect that false arrest and imprisonment are not the issues certified.
[2]  See Glass v. Parrish, 51 So. 2d 717, 718 (Fla. 1951).