Title: Smith v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

HEADNOTE — Criminal Law & Procedure — Custodial Interrogations
When an officer, in the process of executing a search warrant at the Petitioner’s residence,
showed the contraband discovered in the residence to the Petitioner, and declared to other
officers in the Petitioner’s presence that “I am going to arrest everybody here,” including the
Petitioner’s girlfriend, the officer’s actions did not constitute an interrogation as
contemplated by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 102
September Term, 2009
THOMAS SMITH
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
  
 
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia 
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbera, 
JJ.
Opinion by Greene, J.
Murphy, J., joins in the judgment only.
Filed:   May 17, 2010
In this case we are asked to determine whether the Petitioner’s (“Thomas Smith” or
“Smith”)  statement to police that the “[drugs are] all mine,” made during the execution of
a search warrant at Smith’s residence, was a product of police interrogation.  For purposes
of this opinion, we shall assume, without deciding, that Smith was in custody for purposes
of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), at the time he
made the statement to the police.   Our focus is on the question of whether the lead
1
investigator’s act of showing Smith the contraband that the officers recovered from Smith’s
bedroom, coupled with the officer’s announcement to the other officers present in the
residence that everyone was to be arrested, amounted to interrogation, within the meaning
of Miranda, under the circumstances of this case.  For reasons that we shall explain in this
opinion, we shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals holding that there was
At the suppression hearing, the State conceded that at the time Smith made the
1
incriminating statement he was in custody for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), and that the only issue in the case was “whether or
not Smith was being interrogated.”  Neither the State nor the defense presented argument on
the issue of custody under Miranda to the suppression court, and the suppression hearing
judge concluded that custody had been established.  See Smith v. State, 186 Md. App. 498,
523, 974 A.2d 991, 1005 (2009).  In addition, the State purported to concede, when the case
was before the intermediate appellate court, that Smith was in custody under Miranda when
he made the incriminating statement.  In  Miranda, the United States Supreme Court set forth
the meaning of “custodial interrogation,” i.e., “questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way.”  384 U.S. at 444, 86 S. Ct. at 1612, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 706.  “[T]o
protect a suspect’s Fifth Amendment right from the ‘inherently compelling pressures’ of
custodial interrogation,” the Supreme Court set forth “warnings that law enforcement
personnel must deliver to a suspect before undertaking any custodial interrogation.”  State
v. Luckett, ___ Md. ___, ___ A.2d ___, ___(2010) (No. 122, September Term, 2010) (filed
April 14, 2010), slip op. at 16 (quoting Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1219, 175
L.Ed.2d 1045, 1052 (2010) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S.Ct. at 1624, 16 L.Ed.2d
at 719)).  
no violation of Miranda.
I.
Smith’s trial was held in the Circuit Court for Carroll County on charges of
manufacturing crack cocaine, possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, and
possession of crack cocaine.  The Circuit Court judge denied Smith’s motion to suppress the
evidence.  After a trial, the jury returned verdicts of guilty of possession with intent to
distribute crack cocaine and possession of crack cocaine.  Smith was found not guilty of
manufacturing crack cocaine.  The court imposed a sentence of fourteen years’ incarceration
and suspended all but five years, with three years of supervised probation.  
Smith noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed the
judgment of the trial court.  Smith v. State, 186 Md. App. 498, 549-50, 974 A.2d 991 (2009). 
Subsequently, Smith filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which we granted, to consider the
following questions:
1.
Did the Court of Special Appeals err in affirming the
judgment based on a ground conceded by the State at
trial and on appeal and not discussed by the Court or
parties at oral argument?
2.
Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that
Petitioner was not in custody for purposes of Miranda
where a police SWAT team raided [Smith]’s apartment,
handcuffed [Smith] and his guests, and blocked the
entrance and exit while a search of [Smith]’s apartment
was conducted?
3.
Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that
[Smith] was not subject to interrogation where a law
2
enforcement official, knowing [Smith]’s desire to protect
his girlfriend, confronted [Smith] with incriminating
evidence and declared his intention to arrest [Smith]’s
girlfriend?
Because our answer to the third question is that Smith was not subjected to interrogation, we
need not, and do not, answer questions numbered one and two.  
II.
We review the Circuit Court’s ruling on the motion to suppress and “consider only the
facts and information contained in the record of the suppression hearing.”  Longshore v.
State, 399 Md. 486, 498, 924 A.2d 1129, 1135 (2007).  “The factual findings of the
suppression court and its conclusions regarding the credibility of testimony are accepted
unless clearly erroneous.”  Prioleau v. State, 411 Md. 629, 638, 984 A.2d 851, 856 (2009)
(quoting Rush v. State, 403 Md. 68, 82-83, 939 A.2d 689, 697 (2008)).  The foregoing
notwithstanding, we “undertake our own independent constitutional appraisal of the record
by reviewing the law and applying it to the facts of the present case.”  Id.  (internal citations
omitted).
Smith did not testify at the suppression hearing.  Corporal Scott Peter, who led the
investigation, and Detective James Pullen testified.  These two officers, along with two other
law enforcement officers, participated in the execution of the search warrant at Smith’s
residence, located at 16 Pennsylvania Avenue, Apartment 13, Westminster, Carroll County. 
Prior to the officers’ entry into the premises, according to the record of the suppression
hearing, “a SWAT team had secured everyone” by placing the occupants, Smith, his
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girlfriend Kathy Magruder, Alan Magruder, and Heather Myers, in restraints.  Smith was
restrained with “flex cuffs” and initially detained in the “living room/dining area.”  Kathy
Magruder, Alan Magruder, and Heather Myers were restrained also with “flex cuffs,” but
detained outside the apartment on the balcony.  During the search, Smith, while in handcuffs,
was permitted to remain in the apartment, but was instructed to sit on the living room sofa. 
During the search of Smith’s apartment, his guests remained outside on the balcony.  One of
the law enforcement officers, Officer Angela Anderson, “posted” herself at the front door,
apparently to control traffic in and out of the apartment while the other three officers
conducted the search.
Corporal Peter searched the kitchen and recovered what he suspected to be crack
cocaine from a glass bowl inside the microwave.  Corporal Peter and Detective Pullen
recovered from inside a sock drawer, in the only bedroom in the apartment, a plastic bag
containing what they suspected to be an ounce of crack cocaine.  
During direct examination by the prosecutor, Corporal Peter explained his actions
upon viewing the plastic bag of suspected crack cocaine recovered from the bedroom drawer:
I secured it.  I took it.  At that time, I had walked by Smith and
showed Mr. Smith what it was and basically told - - made an
announcement to the other officer that we were going to arrest
[sic] that was in the premise at that time and people who was
[sic] seen going in and out of the premise also.
Further, on cross-examination, Corporal Peter pointed to additional details
surrounding his interaction with Smith.  The corporal testified:
4
Q
Demonstration [sic] if you could, sir, with this baggie
that I have.  If you would, show me how you
demonstrated or how you showed this to Mr. Smith?  Mr.
Smith was seated on the sofa?
A
He was standing in the hallway when it happened.
Q
He was standing?
A
I believe so, yes.
Q
He was not seated at the sofa?
A
No, he wasn’t.  He was standing in the hallway between
the bedroom and the living room.
Q
Okay but previously he was seated on the edge of the
sofa.
A
He had been on the sofa yes.
Q
In fact on the arm of the sofa?
A
I don’t know if it was the arm of the sofa, but he was
sitting on the little sofa there.
Q
So, your testimony is he is standing at some point.  Could
you show me, if you would, demonstrate to me how you
showed the baggie to him?
A
I had it in my hand, I walked by, showed it to him
(indicating) found this in your room, kept going and
advised other officers there everyone is under arrest. 
Saw everyone going out of the apartment, I am going to
arrest everybody here.
To clarify what he meant by “I am going to arrest everybody here,” Corporal Peter
explained that he was referring to “the subjects. . . that had been detained also, which would
5
have been Kathy MacGruder, Heather Meyers and Alan MacGruder, [who] were out on the
front balcony of the apartment.”  He further stated that he “had watched them go in and out
of the apartment while . . . doing pre-raid surveillance of the location.”
While Corporal Peter explained that his reason for displaying the crack cocaine to
Smith was to “show[] him what [had been] found and what [Smith] was going to be arrested
for,” the corporal admitted that he did not show Smith all the evidentiary items found in the
apartment.  Corporal Peter’s testimony also revealed that because of his “familiarities” with
Smith, he knew that Smith and Kathy Magruder were boyfriend and girlfriend. 
“[A]lmost instantaneous[ly]” or “[s]econds” after Corporal Peter announced his
intention to arrest Smith and his guests, according to Detective Pullen and Corporal Peter,
respectively, Smith said, with regard to the drugs that had been displayed to him, “it is all
mine.”  Smith made that admission of ownership at least twice, and at the time that he uttered
the statement he had not been read any Miranda warnings.  At the suppression hearing,
Corporal Peter was asked to give his impression as to why Smith acknowledged
responsibility for the drugs found in his bedroom.  According to Corporal Peter, Smith made
the admission because “he saw that [the police] were going to arrest his girlfriend . . . [and] 
he wanted to protect [her].”
After Smith made his incriminating statement, he and his three guests were formally
arrested and transported to the station for booking.  Upon completing the search of Smith’s
apartment, Corporal Peter left a copy of the search warrant and inventory of the seized items
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“on the table . . . above the microwave” in the kitchen.  He indicated on the search warrant
return that the “location of [the] search warrant was unoccupied and [that a] copy [of the
inventory was] left in [a] conspicuous location.”
At the suppression hearing, the prosecutor and defense counsel argued their respective
positions on whether Smith’s incriminating statement was the product of police interrogation. 
The State maintained that it was not, and the defense contended that it was.  The suppression
judge denied Smith’s motion to suppress.  The judge stated in relevant part:
Well, no question, I think everyone concedes that at the
time the statement was made, the defendant was in custody.  The
issue then was there any interrogation?  And I find that based
upon the facts as testified to, there is no evidence there was any
interrogation.  Certainly showing someone evidence in and of
itself, I don’t think there was any invitation to respond.  I don’t
think that there is anything here that would suggest, I didn’t hear
anything, that would suggest that this was done in any type of
taunting fashion.
I think that just showing someone the evidence followed
by the statement that everybody is going, I don’t think that that
invites any response.  I think that if defendant says anything at
that point, it is certainly unsolicited and at his own [peril].  
In affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court, the Court of Special Appeals
concluded that Smith was not in custody under Miranda until after his formal arrest and that
Corporal Peter’s announcement, which preceded his formal arrest, did not constitute
interrogation.  Smith, 186 Md. App. at 539, 974 A.2d at 1020.  As pointed out at the
beginning of this opinion, we need not, and do not, decide the issue of custody.  On the
record before us, it is clear that Corporal Peter’s announcement and actions in showing Smith
7
the drugs recovered during the search of his apartment did not amount to interrogation or the
functional equivalent of interrogation.
III.
Smith maintains that the announcement that everyone present at the apartment would
be arrested, in conjunction with the presentment of some of the incriminating evidence
found, constituted interrogation.  Borrowing language from the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U. S. 291, 301, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1689-90, 64
L. Ed. 2d 297, 308 (1980) (footnotes omitted), Smith contends that “any words or actions on
the part of the police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect” amounts to interrogation, and that Smith’s
response, it’s “all mine,” should have been suppressed.  Smith offers as further support for
his position the cases of Drury v. State, 368 Md. 331, 793 A.2d 567 (2002), and
Commonwealth v. Rubio, 540 N.E.2d 189 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989).
The State counters that, even assuming that Smith was in custody for purposes of
Miranda, Corporal Peter’s act of showing Smith what he had recovered during the search and
his statement to fellow officers that everyone was to be arrested did not constitute
interrogation.  According to the State, Smith’s statement claiming ownership of the drugs
was a classic “blurt,” and not a product of interrogation.  Further, the State contends that in
order for Corporal Peter’s action and statement to be interrogation, relying on Innis, 446 U.S.
at 302, 100 S. Ct. at 1690, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 308, they “must reflect a measured compulsion
8
above and beyond that inherent in custody itself.”  In other words, the State asserts that,
without more, no reasonable law enforcement officer would believe that by announcing that
everyone on the premises will be arrested and showing the suspect the evidence recovered
would likely elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.  Thus, the State concludes that
Drury, 368 Md. 331, 793 A.2d 567, is factually distinguishable because, unlike the defendant
in Drury, Smith was not removed from his home for the express purpose of questioning, no
evidence of drugs was used in the questioning of Smith, and Corporal Peter did not reveal
to Smith that what was recovered during the search was shown to Smith for the purpose of
questioning him.  In addition, according to the State, Rubio is distinguishable because, unlike
the defendant in Rubio, Smith was not subject to police confrontation, implicit questioning,
or “a purposeful technique calculated to obtain incriminating evidence.” 
Recently this Court pointed out that not every question posed to a suspect in custody
or in a defendant’s presence by a law enforcement officer constitutes interrogation.  Prioleau,
411 Md. at 639, 984 A.2d at 857.  In Prioleau, 411 Md. at 651, 984 A.2d at 864, we held that
the statement “What’s up, Maurice?,” made by a law enforcement officer to the suspect, did
not constitute actual interrogation or the functional equivalent of interrogation under the
circumstances of that case, regardless of whether the  statement was a question or a greeting. 
We explained that every meeting between a law enforcement officer and a suspect should not
be considered an interrogation.  Prioleau, 411 Md. at 639, 984 A.2d at 857.  Further, we
pointed out that the critical inquiry is “whether the police officer, based on the totality of the
9
circumstances, knew or should have known that the [words spoken or actions taken] were
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.”  Prioleau, 411 Md. at 643, 984 A.2d
at 860 (internal citations omitted). 
The United States Supreme Court, in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct.
1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980), acknowledged that “the functional equivalent of interrogation
can occur even if the defendant is not asked a single question.”  Prioleau, 411 Md. at 646,
984 A.2d at 861.  In Innis, the defendant made an incriminating statement in response to a
conversation that he overheard between police officers who were transporting the suspect to
the police station.  446 U.S. at 295, 100 S. Ct. at 1687, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 304.  In explaining the
concept of custodial interrogation, the Innis Court said:  
[T]he Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in
custody is subjected to either express questioning or its
functional equivalent.  That is to say, the term “interrogation”
under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also
to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than
those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response from the suspect.  The latter portion of this definition
focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather
than the intent of the police.  This focus reflects the fact that the
Miranda safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in custody
with an added measure of protection against coercive police
practices, without regard to objective proof of the underlying
intent of the police.  A practice that the police should know is
reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a
suspect thus amounts to interrogation.  But, since the police
surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results
of their words or actions, the definition of interrogation can
extend only to words or actions on the part of the police officers
that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an
10
incriminating response.
Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-02, 100 S. Ct. at 1689-90, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 307-08 (footnotes omitted).
In the present case, we are not persuaded that Corporal Peter should have known that
his action and words would likely evoke an incriminating response from Smith.  It was not
reasonably foreseeable that Smith would admit ownership of the drugs in response to
Corporal Peter’s announcement to arrest everybody and his display of the drugs, anymore
than it was reasonably foreseeable that Smith would blurt out a confession to exonerate his
girlfriend.  Smith was standing in the hallway of his apartment when Corporal Peter
displayed the drugs.  He did not stop in front of Smith in order to elicit a statement from him;
rather, Corporal Peter walked past Smith, and as he continued walking, he announced to
other officers present to place everybody under arrest.  The corporal’s actions did not
demonstrate conduct calculated to elicit an incriminating statement.
Corporal Peter testified that his purpose in showing Smith the drugs was to inform
him of why he was being arrested and that he ordinarily shows all suspects the contraband
recovered during a drug arrest.  This testimony was not rebutted.  In addition, Corporal Peter
testified that there were no attempts by the police to question Smith about any of the evidence
recovered as a result of the search.  Moreover, according to the corporal, his announcement
to place everyone under arrest was not directed at Smith, but rather was an instruction to his
fellow officers to arrest all individuals on the premises.  
The facts and circumstances of this case are unlike those in Drury.  In that case, we
11
held that the statements that Drury made prior to being advised of his Miranda rights resulted
from the functional equivalent of interrogation within the meaning of Innis.  Drury, 368 Md
at 337, 793 A.2d at 571.  While in police custody, a police officer “made a statement to
[Drury] and displayed the tire iron [allegedly used in a burglary] and [stolen] magazines,”
under circumstances where Drury “had been brought to the police station for the express
purpose of questioning and, in fact, had been told so by Corporal Whaley.”  Id.  We
explained:
It appears to us that the only reasonable conclusion that can be
drawn from the foregoing facts is that the officer should have
known, in light of his having told [Drury] that he was being
brought in for questioning, that putting the evidence before
[Drury] and telling him that the items were going to be
fingerprinted was reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating
response from him.  The only plausible explanation for the
officer’s conduct is that he expected to elicit a statement from
[Drury].    
Id. 
In Drury we also pointed out that “the police conduct in th[at] case was not routine
police procedure nor ‘innocuous comment.’” Drury, 368 Md. at 341, 793 A.2d at 573. 
Specifically, we underscored that “Corporal Whaley’s actions were aimed at invoking an
incriminating remark.”  Id.  The facts and circumstances in the present case are more
analogous to those in Williams v. State, 342 Md. 724, 679 A.2d 1106 (1996).  While under
arrest and in response to Williams’ inquiry about why he was arrested, the police informed
Williams that he was under arrest for two murders.  Williams, 342 Md. at 759, 679 A.2d at
12
1124.  After Williams was given his Miranda rights, he invoked his right to remain silent and
requested an attorney.  Id.  While the police officers were gathering their papers, one of them
told Williams to remove his earring, and Williams responded, “you can’t get me.  I’ll just say
a girl gave me the card.”  Id.  One of the police officers made the comment that “[t]his is
going to work” and again told Williams that he was charged with two murders.  Id.  Williams
next said, “I know I’m never getting out.”  Id.  
We held that the statements mentioned above were not the result of interrogation
because the words and actions of the police after the Miranda warnings were given were not
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.  Williams, 342 Md. at 760, 679 A.2d at
1125.  We pointed out that the officers, in gathering their papers and telling Williams to
remove his earring, were engaged in “routine procedures that the officers could hardly be
expected to anticipate would prompt an incriminating statement.”  Williams, 342 Md. at 760-
61, 679 A.2d at 1125.  Likewise, in Vines v. State, 285 Md. 369, 402 A.2d 900 (1979), we
held that there was no interrogation in violation of Miranda.  Vines was arrested in his
residence during the execution of a search warrant and subsequently taken to the police
station for booking.  Vines, 285 Md. at 372, 402 A.2d at 901.  He was advised of his Miranda
rights, and he invoked his right to remain silent.  Id.  After advisement of his Miranda rights
and after booking, he was taken to the roll call room where, displayed on a table, was the
contraband that the police had recovered from Vines’s home pursuant to the search warrant. 
Vines, 285 Md. at 372, 402 A.2d at 901-02.  He was given a copy of the search warrant,
13
including the inventory of the property seized, and told that “this is what was recovered from
[your] house during the raid.”  Vines, 285 Md. at 373, 402 A.2d at 902.  Following the
officer’s comments, Vines said, “it was his stuff” and asked “what he could do to help
himself out.”  Id.   
In explaining the basis for our holding that there was no interrogation in violation of
Miranda, we focused on the officer’s statements and action communicated to Vines.  Vines
was given a copy of the search warrant containing the inventory of the property taken.  This
was done “in compliance with [the] Maryland Rule[s] . . . [which] provided that an officer
taking property under a search warrant shall make a written inventory of the property taken”
and furnish  a copy of the search warrant and inventory to the person from whom the property
was taken. Vines, 285 Md. at 377, 402 A.2d at 904.  Consistent with the Maryland Rules, the
officer made a “true statement that this was what was recovered from Vines’ house during
the raid.”   Vines, 285 Md. at 378, 402 A.2d at 904.  Giving Vines a copy of the warrant
containing the inventory, “coupled with the simple factual statement by the police
[connecting the contraband to the inventory], was not tantamount to an ‘interrogation’ within
the meaning of Miranda.”  Vines, 285 Md. at 378, 402 A.2d at 904-05.  We also pointed out
in Vines that neither the police officer’s “display [to the suspect] of some of the property
taken” nor “a confrontation [between the police and the suspect] with some of the physical
evidence listed in the inventory” amounted to an “interrogation” in violation of Miranda. 
Vines, 285 Md. at 378, 402 A.2d at 905. 
14
Finally, Smith asserts that we should follow the Appeals Court of Massachusetts in
Rubio and hold that the display, to Smith, of the drugs seized from his bedroom was
tantamount to interrogation, thus implicating Miranda.  Rubio is factually distinguishable. 
Rubio entered his home during the police execution of a search warrant and was arrested. 
Rubio, 540 N.E.2d at 190.  He was confined to a kitchen chair and surrounded by several
police officers and questioned.  Rubio, 540 N.E.2d at 190-91.  According to Rubio’s
testimony, “Sergeant Regan . . . produced [a] pocketbook containing . . . cocaine and asked:
‘How [do] you explain this?’” Rubio, 540 N.E.2d at 191.  Further, according to Rubio, he
“did not know what the officers were talking about.”  Id.  Next, according to Rubio, “[h]e
was then ‘grabbed’ and had his face pushed.  One of the officers purportedly told [Rubio]:
‘This is yours.  This stuff here is yours.  Don’t lie to me.’”  Id.  As to his version surrounding
the police confrontation at the apartment, Rubio made no incriminating statements.  Id. 
Sergeant Regan recounted a slightly different version of the events.  While Rubio was
confined to the kitchen chair, one officer showed him “the search warrant and the cocaine
found in [a] jacket pocket.”  Rubio, 540 N.E.2d at 190.  After Rubio was arrested, Sergeant
Regan showed Rubio the cocaine (179.83 grams) found in a pocketbook recovered from a
bedroom closet.  Id.  “Upon seeing the cocaine [Rubio] stated: ‘It’s mine.  My . . . girlfriend
Tammy had nothing to do with it.’”  Id.  Then Rubio was given his Miranda warnings and
asked once again whether the cocaine was his.  Id.  He “responded by stating once again: ‘It
was mine.  It is not my girlfriend’s.’” Rubio, 540 N.E.2d at 190-91.  In holding that Rubio’s
15
admission to ownership of the cocaine in the pocketbook was the product of interrogation,
the court explained that the admission was “a verbal response to a purposeful technique
calculated to obtain information that could be used against the defendant.”  Rubio, 540
N.E.2d at 194.  The evidence recovered from the apartment was deliberately shown to Rubio
not “as part of the [ordinary] arrest [and custody] process,” but to force Rubio to “admit or
disclaim ownership.”  Id.
In the present case, there was no interrogation because an objective observer would
not reasonably infer that Corporal Peter’s statement or conduct was designed to elicit an
incriminating response.  Given that the purpose of providing Miranda warnings to a suspect
subject to custodial interrogation is to prevent “government officials from using the coercive
nature of confinement to extract confessions that would not be given in an unrestrained
environment,” Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 529-30, 107 S. Ct. 1931, 1937, 95 L. Ed. 2d
458, 468 (1987), the facts of this case do not warrant application of the Miranda rule.  In
short, Smith was subjected to neither “express questioning [n]or its functional equivalent.” 
Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01, 100 S. Ct. at 1689, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 307-08.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. 
PETITIONER TO PAY THE COSTS
IN THIS COURT AND IN THE
COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS.  
Judge Murphy joins in the judgment only.
16