Title: Winnebago County v. J.M.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2018 WI 37 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP619 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the matter of the mental commitment of J.M.: 
 
Winnebago County, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
J. M., 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 372 Wis. 2d 834, 890 N.W.2d 49 
(2016 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 18, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 7, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Winnebago 
 
JUDGE: 
Karen L. Seifert 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
A.W. BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
and an oral argument by Colleen D. Ball, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent, there was a brief and oral 
argument by James A. Kearney, assistant corporation counsel.   
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of National 
Disability Rights Network by Kendall W. Harrison, Bryan J. 
Cahill, Allison W. Reimann, and Godfrey & Kahn, S.C., Madison.
 
 
2018 WI 37
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP619 
(L.C. No. 
2015ME617) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the matter of the mental commitment of J.M. 
 
 
 
Winnebago County, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
J. M., 
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
APR 18, 2018 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   This review involves a 
Chapter 51 commitment-extension proceeding.  The unpublished 
decision of the court of appeals affirmed an order of the 
circuit court for Winnebago County, Karen L. Seifert, Judge, 
No. 
2016AP619   
 
2 
 
denying J.M.'s motion for post-disposition relief.1  J.M. seeks 
relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.    
¶2 
Three questions are presented to this court:   
¶3 
First, does J.M. have a statutory right to effective 
assistance of counsel at a Chapter 51 commitment-extension 
proceeding, and if so, what standard should apply in evaluating 
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel?   
¶4 
Second, did the failure of J.M.'s trial counsel to 
object to, prevent the admission of, or request a curative 
instruction regarding evidence presented to the jury of J.M.'s 
status as a prisoner (including J.M.'s wearing prison garb) 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel?   
¶5 
Third, 
is 
J.M. 
entitled 
to 
a 
new 
Chapter 
51 
commitment-extension proceeding in the interest of justice 
because the jury was repeatedly exposed to evidence of J.M.'s 
status as a prisoner and the circuit court gave conflicting jury 
instructions? 
¶6 
We respond as follows to these questions:  
¶7 
First, J.M. had a statutory right to effective 
assistance of counsel in his Chapter 51 commitment-extension 
hearing.  The legislature has provided that the subject of every 
civil commitment proceeding is entitled to be "represented by 
adversary counsel."  Wis. Stat. § 51.20(3) (2015-16).2  When the 
                                                 
1 Winnebago Cnty. v. J.M., No. 2016AP619, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2016). 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2016AP619   
 
3 
 
legislature provides the right to be "represented by counsel," 
the 
legislature 
intends 
that 
right 
to 
include 
effective 
assistance of counsel.  In re M.D.(S)., 168 Wis. 2d 995, 1004, 
485 N.W.2d 52 (1992).  The standard set forth in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), is the correct standard for 
evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a 
commitment-extension hearing. 
¶8 
Second, given the overwhelming evidence presented by 
Winnebago County at the commitment-extension proceeding, J.M. 
has not shown that a reasonable probability exists that the 
result of the proceeding would have been different had his trial 
counsel's performance not been allegedly deficient regarding 
J.M.'s appearance in prison garb. 
¶9 
Third, J.M. has not established that he is entitled to 
a new trial under Wis. Stat. § 751.06 on the ground that his 
wearing of prison garb during the trial so distracted the jury 
"that the real controversy [was] not [] fully tried," and 
justice 
was 
miscarried. 
 
Moreover, 
the 
circuit 
court's 
conflicting jury instructions likewise do not entitle J.M. to a 
new trial in the interest of justice. 
¶10 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
I 
No. 
2016AP619   
 
4 
 
¶11 The facts are undisputed for purposes of this review.3  
On November 20, 2014, J.M. was involuntarily committed for a 
period of one year pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 51.20.  In 2015, 
Winnebago County filed a petition to extend J.M.'s commitment.  
J.M. requested and received a jury trial on the petition. 
¶12 Prior to trial, J.M.'s counsel asked the Wisconsin 
Resource Center (where J.M. was being held) to ensure that J.M. 
wore civilian clothes on the day of the trial on his petition.  
Despite his counsel's request and for reasons not in the record, 
J.M. appeared at his jury trial dressed in prison garb, 
shackled, and accompanied by two uniformed guards from the 
Department of Corrections.  J.M.'s trial counsel did not seek a 
continuance when J.M. appeared in his prison garb but did 
persuade the circuit court to have J.M.'s shackles removed.4  
¶13 During voir dire, J.M.'s trial counsel drew attention 
to J.M.'s prison garb: 
The kind of apparel that [J.M.'s] wearing, he's an 
inmate of the Wisconsin Correctional system, but this 
                                                 
3 On November 20, 2017, J.M. filed a motion to strike 
certain facts asserted by Winnebago County during oral argument 
before this court.  On December 6, 2017, Winnebago County filed 
a response stating that it concurs with J.M.'s request that this 
court not consider any facts stated by Winnebago County during 
oral argument that are not part of the record. 
J.M.'s motion is granted.  Facts asserted by Winnebago 
County during oral argument that do not appear in the record are 
not considered by the court in resolving the instant case. 
4 J.M. was required to wear a stun belt around his ankle, 
but the stun belt was not visible to the jury. 
No. 
2016AP619   
 
5 
 
isn't a criminal case, as the judge had advised you, 
this is one involving a mental commitment for him.  
Does anyone feel because of the fact that he's an 
inmate with the correctional system that they wouldn't 
be able to give a fair opinion or evaluate things 
fairly?  
¶14 J.M.'s trial counsel once again addressed J.M.'s 
prison garb during opening statements: 
As I mentioned earlier, [J.M.] is an inmate of the 
Wisconsin correctional system.  He was transferred to 
the Wisconsin Resource Center right next to the 
Winnebago Mental Health Institute and he's receiving 
treatment and care there.  It's my understanding that 
he's likely or they developed plans to try to transfer 
him back into the regular community of prisoners in 
one of the facilities here in the state, that's the 
goal they try to reach and that's what he's in prison 
for or what he's involved in, that's really not our 
affair, but should commitment be imposed upon [J.M.]  
¶15 After opening statements, the County called two expert 
witnesses to testify.  Both had met with and evaluated J.M.  
¶16 First, the County called Dr. Marshall Bales, a medical 
doctor board certified in general psychiatry.  Dr. Bales based 
his testimony on the following:  (1) an examination of J.M. that 
took place on November 11, 2015; (2) a review of J.M.'s 
treatment records; and (3) a discussion with correctional 
officers who had interacted with J.M. 
¶17 Dr. Bales testified at trial that J.M.'s diagnoses 
were 
schizophrenia 
and 
antisocial 
personality 
disorder.  
Further, Dr. Bales testified that "[i]t was abundantly clear" 
after meeting J.M. for a brief time that J.M. is severely 
mentally ill.   
No. 
2016AP619   
 
6 
 
¶18 During his testimony, Dr. Bales twice reiterated that 
he terminated the evaluation of J.M. early because J.M.'s 
behavior made Dr. Bales fear for his safety.  Dr. Bales also 
testified that it was his opinion, based upon J.M.'s treatment 
records, that if J.M.'s involuntary commitment expires, J.M. 
will stop taking his medication and will become more delusional 
and dangerous. 
¶19 Second, the County called Dr. Barbara Waedekin, a 
psychiatrist employed by the Wisconsin Resource Center.  Dr. 
Waedekin had served as J.M.'s treating psychiatrist since March 
28, 2014, and saw J.M. approximately 19 to 20 times before the 
instant 
Chapter 
51 
commitment-extension 
proceeding. 
 
Dr. 
Waedekin 
based 
her 
opinions 
on 
the 
following: 
(1) 
her 
interactions with J.M.; (2) a review of his treatment records; 
and (3) communications with other staff at Wisconsin Resource 
Center who interacted with him. 
¶20 Dr. Waedekin testified that J.M. has a substantial 
disorder of thought, mood, and perception that grossly impairs 
his behavior, judgment, and capacity to recognize reality.  She 
testified that J.M. believes that he is the "Lord God Jesus 
Christ Omnipotent" and that he wants his records at the 
Department of Corrections to reflect that identity.  Dr. 
Waedekin further testified that J.M. denies having hepatitis 
despite a positive blood test because he claims his blood is 
mixed with Jeffrey Dahmer's.  
¶21 Dr. Waedekin offered several examples 
of J.M.'s 
violent behavior, including charging doors, attempting to grab 
No. 
2016AP619   
 
7 
 
staff through the trap door in his cell, spitting at staff, and 
throwing things.  She described one particular instance when she 
met with J.M. to advise him that an extension of his commitment 
was being requested.  When she brought up J.M.'s medication 
during that meeting, he became agitated and began yelling at 
her: 
He stated that he was my Lord, God Jesus Christ, he 
addressed me by my first name and he kept saying he 
was damming [sic] me.  He also was yelling that I was 
lying. 
He continued to get more and more agitated, stood up, 
and was approaching me such that the PCT [patient care 
technician] told him he had to leave, that he had to 
go through the door with him and out of the office. 
¶22 Dr. Waedekin further testified that during this 
interaction, J.M. was very menacing and threatening towards her 
and that J.M. had been deemed one of the most dangerous 
individuals at the facility by one of the guards because he had 
a volatile anger that could erupt without warning.  Dr. Waedekin 
explained that although J.M. was responding well to treatment, 
he would "become more violent" if he did not take his medication 
and that J.M. was unlikely to take his medication without an 
order to do so. 
¶23 In contrast, J.M. testified that he had calmed down 
and that the instances Dr. Waedekin described had happened when 
he was "still very angry."  J.M. stated his belief that he was 
not mentally ill or dangerous and that the experts' conclusions 
were "opinions, not facts."  Furthermore, J.M. confirmed on the 
stand that he was "Jesus the Lord" and elaborated on this 
No. 
2016AP619   
 
8 
 
belief, claiming, "I was born from the house of the Lord, it's 
the house that I came from and that's who I am."  He also 
testified that he had the ability to damn people.  
¶24 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a), the jury was 
instructed to determine (1) whether J.M. was mentally ill; (2) 
whether J.M. was a danger to himself or others; and (3) whether 
J.M. was a proper subject for treatment by "clear, satisfactory 
and convincing evidence."5  Following deliberation, the jury 
unanimously found that J.M. was mentally ill, a danger to 
himself or others, and a proper subject for treatment.  Based 
upon these findings, the circuit court ordered a 12-month 
extension to J.M.'s commitment.  
¶25 J.M. then filed a post-disposition motion for a new 
commitment-extension hearing based on ineffective assistance of 
counsel, or alternatively, in the interest of justice.  J.M. 
contended that his trial counsel was ineffective because his 
trial counsel failed to arrange to have J.M. appear in civilian 
clothing and failed to request a jury instruction directing that 
J.M.'s status as a prisoner had no bearing on the commitment-
extension proceeding.6  Alternatively, J.M. requested a new trial 
                                                 
5 The petitioner, the County in the instant case, has the 
burden of proving all required facts by clear and convincing 
evidence.  Wis. Stat. § 51.20(13)(e). 
6 The motion alleged that J.M.'s trial counsel called the 
Wisconsin Resource Center about obtaining civilian clothes for 
J.M to wear during trial, but for some unknown reason, J.M.'s 
counsel did not follow up on the matter.   
No. 
2016AP619   
 
9 
 
under Wis. Stat. § 751.06 because his appearance in prison garb 
distracted the jury from the real controversy at hand. 
¶26 The 
circuit 
court 
concluded 
that 
J.M. 
had 
not 
satisfied the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), to establish ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  Also applying the Strickland test, the 
court of appeals affirmed the order of the circuit court, 
holding in part that even if his trial counsel's performance was 
deficient, J.M. was not prejudiced by counsel's allegedly 
deficient performance.  For the reasons set forth, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
II 
¶27 We first address whether the grant of a statutory 
right to counsel in Wis. Stat. § 51.20(3) is a grant of a right 
to effective assistance of counsel.  We determine this question 
of statutory interpretation independently of the circuit court 
and court of appeals, In re Commitment of Franklin, 2004 WI 38, 
¶5, 
270 
Wis. 2d 271, 
677 
N.W.2d 276, 
and 
conclude 
that 
§ 51.20(3) grants a right to effective assistance of counsel. 
¶28 Next, we address the legal standard to be applied for 
evaluating the ineffective assistance of counsel claim in this 
Chapter 51 proceeding.  Determining the legal standard for 
evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is a 
question of law that an appellate court decides independently, 
benefiting from the analyses of other courts.  See Megal Dev. 
Corp. v. Shadof, 2005 WI 151, ¶8, 286 Wis. 2d 105, 705 
No. 
2016AP619   
 
10 
 
N.W.2d 645; State v. McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d 463, 474-75, 561 
N.W.2d 707 (1997).  
¶29 We conclude, as did the court of appeals, that the 
applicable standard for evaluating the ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim in the instant case is the two-prong standard 
announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984):  A 
movant must demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient 
and that the movant was prejudiced by counsel's deficient 
performance.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.   
¶30 The first prong of Strickland requires the movant to 
show specific acts or omissions by counsel that fall "outside 
the 
wide 
range 
of 
professionally 
competent 
assistance."  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.   
¶31 The second prong of Strickland requires the movant to 
demonstrate "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence 
in the outcome.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.7  In some cases the 
                                                 
7 The standard announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668 (1984), has not been modified or supplanted.  See 
Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203 (2001) ("[O]ur 
holding in Lockhart [v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993),] does not 
supplant the Strickland analysis.").   
The Strickland analysis has frequently been applied in 
Wisconsin cases.  See, e.g., State v. Dillard, 2014 WI 123, ¶95, 
358 Wis. 2d 543, 573, 859 N.W.2d 44; State v. Domke, 2011 WI 95, 
¶41, 337 Wis. 2d 268, 805 N.W.2d 364 (citing State v. Carter); 
State v. Carter, 2010 WI 40, ¶23, 324 Wis. 2d 640, 782 
N.W.2d 695.   
No. 
2016AP619   
 
11 
 
court has stated that the Strickland test for prejudicial 
performance by counsel is whether counsel committed errors that 
were so serious "as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a 
trial whose result is reliable."8  If J.M. does not show that a 
reasonable probability exists that the result of the proceeding 
would be different (i.e., that he was deprived of a fair trial 
whose result is reliable), the court need not determine whether 
the performance was deficient.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.  We 
conclude that the second prong of Strickland (the prejudice 
prong) has not been met in the instant case. 
¶32 A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under 
Strickland is a mixed question of fact and law:  findings of 
fact will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous, 
but the ultimate determination of whether trial counsel's 
performance was deficient and whether the movant suffered 
prejudice 
are 
questions 
of 
law 
that 
an 
appellate 
court 
determines independently.  State v. Carter, 2010 WI 40, ¶19, 324 
Wis. 2d 640, 782 N.W.2d 695.  We conclude that J.M. failed to 
show that a reasonable probability exists that the result of the 
proceeding would be different.  He cannot show that he was 
deprived of a fair trial whose result is reliable. 
¶33 Finally, whether to grant a party a new trial in the 
interest of justice, the third question presented, is a question 
that an appellate court decides independently, benefiting from 
                                                 
8 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; State v. Jenkins, 2014 WI 59, 
¶37, 355 Wis. 2d 180, 848 N.W.2d 786. 
No. 
2016AP619   
 
12 
 
the analyses of other courts that have considered the issue.  
Morden v. Cont'l AG, 2000 WI 51, ¶88, 235 Wis. 2d 325, 611 
N.W.2d 659.  We conclude that a new trial in the interest of 
justice is not warranted.   
III 
¶34 The first issue presented is whether the grant of a 
statutory right to counsel in Wis. Stat. § 51.20(3) is a grant 
of a statutory right to effective counsel and, if so, whether a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should be evaluated 
using the Strickland standard.  We conclude that § 51.20(3) 
grants a statutory right to effective counsel and that the 
Strickland standard applies to J.M.'s claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel in the instant Chapter 51 proceeding. 
¶35 To determine whether Wis. Stat. § 51.20(3) grants a 
right to effective counsel in Chapter 51 involuntary commitment 
proceedings, we look to the language of the statute.  Pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 51.20(3), "the court shall assure that the 
subject individual is represented by adversary counsel" at the 
time of the filing of the petition for commitment.9  This court 
has concluded that when the legislature provides the right to be 
                                                 
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 51.20(3) provides: 
(3) Legal counsel.  At the time of the filing of the 
petition the court shall assure that the subject 
individual is represented by adversary counsel by 
referring the individual to the state public defender, 
who shall appoint counsel for the individual without a 
determination of indigency, as provided in s. 51.60. 
No. 
2016AP619   
 
13 
 
"represented by counsel," the legislature intends that right to 
include effective assistance of counsel.  See In re M.D.(S)., 
168 Wis. 2d 995, 1004, 485 N.W.2d 52 (1992).  Accordingly we 
conclude that § 51.20(3) establishes a statutory right to 
effective assistance of counsel.10  
¶36 Next, we must determine the standard to apply to the 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the instant 
Chapter 51 proceeding.  J.M. proposes a modified Strickland 
standard,  essentially arguing that prejudice should be presumed 
upon a showing of deficient performance. 
¶37 Strong legal support exists for our denying J.M.'s 
proposal and instead applying the Strickland analysis in the 
instant Chapter 51 proceeding.  
¶38 First, the liberty interests of a movant at stake in 
the involuntary commitment proceeding are similar to the liberty 
interests of a movant in criminal proceedings.  The similarity 
of liberty interests involved in these proceedings, namely that 
an institutionalized person is subject to state control and 
direction (here medical treatment) that the institutionalized 
person claims is not warranted under the law, supports applying 
the same standards for evaluating ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims in criminal proceedings and in involuntary 
commitment proceedings.     
                                                 
10 Winnebago County agrees with J.M. and the court of 
appeals that the right to counsel necessarily includes the right 
to effective assistance of counsel. 
No. 
2016AP619   
 
14 
 
¶39 Second, the court has applied the Strickland standard 
in other cases involving important liberty interests.  For 
example, the court has applied Strickland to ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims in involuntary termination of 
parental rights cases.  See In re M.D.(S)., 168 Wis. 2d at 1003 
(citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 763-64 (1982)).11   
¶40 Third, the Strickland standard has been known to and 
applied by both the bench and the bar for more than 30 years.  
Strickland, 
466 
U.S. 
668 
(1984); 
State 
v. 
Harvey, 
139 
Wis. 2d 353, 407 N.W.2d 235 (1987) (adopting Strickland).  Thus, 
                                                 
11 In Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), the United 
States Supreme Court recognized the formidable task faced by 
parents 
in 
defending 
themselves 
against 
the 
involuntary 
termination of their parental rights: 
The State's ability to assemble its case almost 
inevitably dwarfs the parents' ability to mount a 
defense. No predetermined limits restrict the sums an 
agency may spend in prosecuting a given termination 
proceeding. The State's attorney usually will be 
expert on the issues contested and the procedures 
employed at the factfinding hearing, and enjoys full 
access to all public records concerning the family. 
The State may call on experts in family relations, 
psychology, 
and 
medicine 
to 
bolster 
its 
case. 
Furthermore, the primary witnesses at the hearing will 
be the agency's own professional caseworkers whom the 
State has empowered both to investigate the family 
situation and to testify against the parents.  Indeed, 
because the child is already in agency custody, the 
State even has the power to shape the historical 
events that form the basis for termination.  
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 763-66. 
No. 
2016AP619   
 
15 
 
the Strickland standard would be easier for the bench and bar to 
apply in a variety of cases than a new standard.   
¶41 Fourth, the Strickland standard carries with it a 
developed body of case law that will aid courts in the efficient 
and timely resolution of claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  See In re Henry B., 159 A.3d 824, 827 (Me. 2017) 
(noting the advantages of applying the Strickland standard to 
involuntary commitment proceedings). 
¶42 Also, 
despite 
Strickland's 
roots 
in 
criminal 
proceedings, this court12 and courts in other jurisdictions13 have 
not limited Strickland to criminal cases.  Our decision to apply 
the Strickland standard to resolve claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel in commitment proceedings is in accord 
with jurisdictions that have considered the issue. 
¶43 Indeed, neither the parties nor our research has 
revealed any jurisdiction that currently applies a standard 
                                                 
12 See, e.g., In re M.D.(S)., 168 Wis. 2d 995, 1004, 485 
N.W.2d 52 (1992) (applying Strickland to ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims in termination of parental rights cases); In 
re Commitment of Thayer, 2001 WI App 51, ¶14, 241 Wis. 2d 417, 
626 N.W.2d 811 (applying Strickland to a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel in a ch. 980 civil commitment proceeding). 
13 See, for example, the following cases applying Strickland 
in commitment proceedings:  Pope v. Alston, 537 So. 2d 953, 956-
57 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988); Matter of Carmody, 653 N.E.2d 977, 
983-84 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); Jones v. State, 477 N.E.2d 353, 
356-357 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); In re B.T.G., 784 N.W.2d 792, 799 
(Iowa Ct. App. 2010); In re Henry B., 159 A.3d 824, 827 (Me. 
2017); Matter of J.S., 401 P.3d 197, ¶¶18-19 (Mont. 2017); In re 
Protection of H.W., 85 S.W.3d 348, 355-56 (Tex. App. 2002); 
Matter of Chapman, 796 S.E.2d 843, 849-50 (S.C. 2017).  
No. 
2016AP619   
 
16 
 
different than Strickland to claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel in commitment proceedings.14  
¶44 In contrast, the modified Strickland standard proposed 
by J.M. could encourage the proliferation of ineffective 
assistance of counsel challenges and delay the permanency 
necessary to stabilize a mentally ill individual's treatment in 
a safe environment.  See, e.g., In re Henry B., 159 A.3d at 827. 
¶45 Accordingly, we adopt the Strickland standard for 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised in Chapter 51 
involuntary commitment proceedings. 
IV 
¶46 We next determine whether in the instant case J.M. is 
entitled to a new commitment-extension proceeding on the ground 
of ineffective assistance of counsel.  We conclude that J.M. is 
not entitled to a new commitment-extension proceeding because he 
has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by his trial 
counsel's allegedly deficient performance. 
¶47 In order to be entitled to a new trial, J.M. must 
satisfy the two-prong test announced in Strickland.  First, J.M. 
must show that trial counsel's performance was so poor as to 
                                                 
14 In In re Mental Health of K.G.F., 29 P.3d 485 (Mont. 
2001), the Montana Supreme Court rejected the Strickland 
standard in civil commitment proceedings and instead applied a 
five-factor analysis to determine whether counsel had provided 
effective assistance.  This case has since been overruled and 
the Montana Supreme Court now applies the Strickland standard to 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims in civil commitment 
proceedings.  Matter of J.S., 401 P.3d 197 (Mont. 2017). 
No. 
2016AP619   
 
17 
 
deny him effective counsel.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  This 
prong requires a showing of specific acts or omissions by 
counsel that fall "outside the wide range of professionally 
competent assistance."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.   
¶48 Second, 
J.M. 
must 
demonstrate 
"a 
reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 
result 
of 
the 
proceeding 
would 
have 
been 
different."  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.   
¶49 A 
reasonable 
probability 
under 
the 
Strickland 
prejudice prong is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  This 
statement of the prejudice prong corresponds with another oft-
quoted statement from Strickland about the prejudice prong, 
namely that the defendant was prejudiced if he or she was 
deprived of a fair trial whose result is reliable.  Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 694. 
¶50 Because J.M. has not shown he was prejudiced by trial 
counsel's performance, this court need not determine whether 
counsel's performance was deficient. 
¶51 J.M. argues that his trial counsel was ineffective 
during trial for not objecting to J.M.'s appearance in prison 
garb and to "other references" to J.M.'s status as an inmate, 
and for failing to request a curative instruction.  In support 
of this claim, J.M. relies on cases that indicate that constant 
No. 
2016AP619   
 
18 
 
reminders to the jury that the defendant is an inmate undermine 
fair fact-finding and due process.15  
¶52 The key case upon which J.M. relies is Estelle v. 
Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976), in which the United States 
Supreme Court explained that the accused's prisoner status may 
be a continuing unfair influence on a jury: 
[T]he constant reminder of the accused's condition 
implicit in such distinctive, identifiable attire may 
affect a juror's judgment.  The defendant's clothing 
is so likely to be a continuing influence throughout 
the trial that, not unlike placing a jury in the 
custody of deputy sheriffs who were also witnesses for 
the prosecution, an unacceptable risk is presented of 
impermissible factors coming into play.  
Estelle, 425 U.S. at 504-05.   
¶53 J.M. highlights this language from Estelle because it 
suggests that a defendant's clothing alone could constitute 
prejudice.  In the instant case, not only did J.M. wear prison 
garb during the proceeding, but he was accompanied by uniformed 
                                                 
15 See, e.g., Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 569 (1986) 
("[T]he sight of a security force within the courtroom might 
under certain conditions 'create the impression in the minds of 
the jury that the defendant is dangerous or untrustworthy.'") 
(quoted source omitted); People v. Hernandez, 247 P.3d 167, 173 
(Cal. 2011) (while a deputy standing by a defendant on a witness 
stand is not a "human shackle," it is potentially prejudicial); 
State v. Champlain, 2008 WI App 5, ¶22, 307 Wis. 2d 232, 744 
N.W.2d 889 (a defendant cannot be compelled to appear before a 
jury wearing an armband taser). 
J.M. also relies upon an opinion by the Wisconsin Attorney 
General that the same principles that govern ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims in criminal proceedings should 
apply to Chapter 51 proceedings as well.  71 Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. 
183, 184-85 (1982) (OAG 58-82). 
No. 
2016AP619   
 
19 
 
guards during the proceeding and while he was on the witness 
stand.   
¶54 We conclude that J.M. failed to demonstrate that a 
reasonable probability exists that the result of his Chapter 51 
commitment-extension proceeding would have been different had 
trial counsel's conduct not been deficient as alleged.  We 
therefore need not decide whether counsel's alleged deficiencies 
constitute deficient performance under Strickland.  
¶55 In 
determining 
whether 
there 
is 
a 
reasonable 
probability of a different result, the reviewing court considers 
all the evidence in the record.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.  
The court of appeals accurately described the evidence as 
overwhelmingly 
in 
favor 
of 
continuing 
J.M.'s 
commitment.  
Winnebago Cnty. v. J.M., No. 2016AP619, unpublished slip op., 
¶16 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2016).16 
¶56 At the commitment-extension proceeding, two medical 
doctors specializing in psychiatry, Dr. Bales and Dr. Waedekin, 
testified in support of extending J.M.'s commitment.  Both 
doctors were of the opinion "to a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty" that (1) J.M. was mentally ill; (2) J.M. was a danger 
to himself or others; and (3) J.M. was a proper subject for 
treatment.  The experts based their opinions on personal 
interactions with J.M. as well as reviews of his treatment 
                                                 
16 "[A] verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the 
record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one 
with overwhelming record support."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696. 
No. 
2016AP619   
 
20 
 
history and records.  See supra ¶¶16-22 (describing the medical 
testimony). 
¶57 In contrast, J.M. presented no countervailing expert 
testimony to rebut the opinions of Dr. Bales or Dr. Waedekin.  
Instead, J.M. testified on his own behalf.  J.M. testified that 
he was not mentally ill or dangerous, that he had calmed down, 
and that the County's experts' conclusions were "opinions, not 
facts."  J.M. also testified that he identifies as "Jesus the 
Lord" and has the ability to damn people.    
¶58 Further, both doctors shared experiences of their 
interactions with J.M. that contradicted J.M.'s testimony that 
he was no longer a danger to himself or others and that he had 
calmed down.  Dr. Bales testified to terminating his evaluation 
of J.M. early because J.M.'s reactions caused him to fear for 
his safety.  This evaluation occurred just one day prior to the 
commitment-extension proceeding.  Dr. Waedekin also testified to 
being the subject of a menacing and threatening outburst that 
included being yelled at and "damned" by J.M. when she met with 
J.M. to advise him that an extension of his commitment was being 
requested. 
¶59 To 
prevail 
in 
the 
instant 
commitment-extension 
proceeding and obtain a continuation of J.M.'s confinement, 
Winnebago County had to prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that J.M. was (1) mentally ill; (2) a danger to himself or 
others; and (3) a proper subject for treatment.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 51.20(1)(a), (13)(e). 
No. 
2016AP619   
 
21 
 
¶60 The jurors were instructed to determine a witness's 
credibility based on the witness's conduct, appearance, and 
demeanor on the witness stand and 
all other facts and 
circumstances.  No reasonable jurors would have thought that the 
jury instructions directed them to base their credibility 
assessment on J.M.'s clothing.  Although in-person evaluation of 
witness credibility is important, we are not persuaded that the 
jury would have given different credence to J.M.'s testimony had 
he not worn prison garb.   
¶61 Given the testimony presented by the County and J.M., 
the jury's findings that J.M. was mentally ill, a danger to 
himself or others, and a proper subject for treatment were well-
supported by the evidence.  The evidence presented by Winnebago 
County supporting its position was overwhelming.  J.M. is unable 
to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result of the 
proceeding would have been different but for his trial counsel's 
allegedly deficient performance. 
V 
¶62 Lastly, we determine whether J.M. is entitled to a new 
commitment-extension proceeding in the interest of justice under 
Wis. Stat. § 751.06. 
¶63 Wisconsin Stat. § 751.06 permits this court to order a 
new trial "if it appears from the record that the real 
controversy has not been fully tried, or that it is probable 
that justice has for any reason miscarried . . . ."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 751.06.  This court's discretionary power pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 751.06 is to be "exercised sparingly and with great 
No. 
2016AP619   
 
22 
 
caution."  State v. Watkins, 2002 WI 101, ¶79, 255 Wis. 2d 265, 
647 N.W.2d 244.  
¶64 J.M. 
contends 
that 
because 
the 
jury 
received 
contradictory instructions on the burden of proof and because 
J.M. was in prison attire, the real controversy was not tried in 
the instant case.   
¶65 Before 
opening 
statements, 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously told the jury that Winnebago County was required to 
prove its case by the "greater weight of the credible evidence."  
No one pointed out the mistake.  At the end of testimony, 
immediately prior to jury deliberations, the circuit court 
orally correctly instructed the jury that Winnebago County had 
to prove all facts by "clear and convincing evidence."  The 
correct 
standard 
was 
also 
included 
in 
the 
written 
jury 
instructions; the circuit court is required to submit the 
written jury instructions to the jury. Wis. Stat. § 805.13(4).  
Under these circumstances, the conflicting jury instructions 
fail to raise sufficient qualms about the commitment-extension 
proceeding to justify this court's use of its discretionary 
power under Wis. Stat. § 751.06. 
¶66 Furthermore, as we explained above, J.M. was not 
prejudiced by his wearing of prison garb during his commitment-
extension proceeding.   
¶67 Accordingly, nothing in the record supports J.M.'s 
contention that the court should exercise its discretionary 
power under Wis. Stat. § 751.06 to grant a new trial on the 
No. 
2016AP619   
 
23 
 
ground that the real controversy was not fully tried.  The real 
controversy was fully tried.    
* * * * 
¶68 For the reasons set forth, we conclude that J.M. is 
not 
entitled 
to 
a 
new 
Chapter 
51 
commitment-extension 
proceeding.  
¶69 The legislature has granted a right to effective 
assistance of counsel in the Chapter 51 commitment-extension 
proceeding at issue.  Wis. Stat. § 51.20(3).  The Strickland 
standard is the correct standard to apply to the claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  J.M. did not demonstrate 
that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's allegedly deficient 
performance.   
¶70 Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals' decision 
that J.M.'s post-disposition motion was properly dismissed. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No.  2016AP619.awb 
 
1 
 
¶71 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
the majority that the Strickland standard should be applied to 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims in ch. 51 involuntary 
commitment proceedings.  I further agree that the evidence is 
"overwhelmingly in favor of continuing J.M.'s commitment."  
Majority op., ¶55.  Accordingly, I also conclude that "J.M. is 
unable to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result 
of the proceeding would have been different but for his trial 
counsel's allegedly deficient performance."  Id., ¶61. 
¶72 However, I write separately to caution counsel in ch. 
51 cases regarding the effect that prison garb and uniformed 
guards may have on such a proceeding.  There is a dearth of case 
law surrounding ineffective assistance of counsel in the context 
of ch. 51 proceedings, making further guidance to the bench and 
bar alike beneficial.  Indeed, this case represents our first 
announcement that a potential ch. 51 committee is entitled to 
the effective assistance of counsel in the first instance. 
¶73 For the reasons set forth below, I urge ch. 51 counsel 
to be mindful of the unique effect that prison garb and 
uniformed 
officers 
could 
have 
on 
a 
proceeding 
where 
"dangerousness" is an element the county must prove.   
¶74 Although J.M.'s counsel had asked the Wisconsin 
Resource Center to ensure J.M. appeared for trial in civilian 
clothing, it failed to do so.  Despite J.M. being clothed in his 
prison uniform, counsel allowed the trial to continue without 
objection.  Majority op., ¶12. 
No.  2016AP619.awb 
 
2 
 
¶75 The United States Supreme Court has recognized that 
prison uniforms are "so likely to be a continuing influence 
throughout the trial that, not unlike placing a jury in the 
custody of deputy sheriffs who were also witnesses for the 
prosecution, an unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible 
factors coming into play."  Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 
505 (1976). 
¶76 Prison clothing is an "unmistakable indication[] of 
the need to separate a defendant from the community at large."  
Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 569 (1986).  It is "a sign that 
[a person] is particularly dangerous or culpable."  See id.  
Such attire thus sends a strong signal to a jury not only that a 
person is criminally guilty, but that a person is dangerous. 
¶77 In addition to wearing prison clothing, J.M. was 
accompanied throughout trial by two uniformed guards from the 
Department of Corrections.  See majority op., ¶12.  "[T]he sight 
of a security force within the courtroom might under certain 
conditions create the impression in the minds of the jury that 
the defendant is dangerous or untrustworthy."  Holbrook, 475 
U.S. at 569 (internal quotation omitted). 
¶78 The uniformed officers did not merely guard J.M. in 
the courtroom during the proceedings, but also flanked J.M. even 
as he testified from the witness stand.  See majority op., ¶53.  
The image of this guarded closeness has the potential to 
prejudice the jury.  See People v. Hernandez, 247 P.3d 167, 173-
74 (Cal. 2011) (explaining that although a deputy standing by a 
No.  2016AP619.awb 
 
3 
 
defendant on the witness stand is not a "human shackle," it is 
potentially prejudicial to the jury). 
¶79 The facts alleged here give rise to the "certain 
conditions" forewarned in Holbrook.  The combination of prison 
clothing and uniformed officers standing guard next to the 
witness stand may leave "the impression in the minds of the jury 
that the defendant is dangerous."  See Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 
569. 
¶80 These 
facts 
are 
particularly 
potent 
because 
dangerousness is an element that the county must prove in a ch. 
51 commitment proceeding.1  In re Helen E.F., 2012 WI 50, ¶20, 
340 Wis. 2d 500, 814 N.W.2d 179; Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)1.-2.  
When a person subject to a ch. 51 proceeding appears before the 
jury surrounded by uniformed guards and wearing prison garb, the 
dangerousness element could be established without a word from 
the county's attorney.  One look at a person in this condition 
may create a clear subtext:  this man is dangerous. 
¶81 Accordingly, although I join the majority opinion, I 
write separately to call attention to counsel's obligations in 
ch. 51 proceedings.  I urge counsel to be mindful of the 
potentially harmful effects of prison garb and uniformed guards 
when "dangerousness" is an element that must be proven. 
¶82 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
                                                 
1 In order to be subject to involuntary commitment pursuant 
to ch. 51, an individual must be (1) mentally ill; (2) a proper 
subject for treatment; and (3) dangerous to themselves or to 
others.  In re Helen E.F., 2012 WI 50, ¶20, 340 Wis. 2d 500, 814 
N.W.2d 179; Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)1.-2. 
No.  2016AP619.awb 
 
1