Title: Workman v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Stephenson, S.J. 
 
TIMOTHY GLEN WORKMAN 
 
v.  Record No. 052411  
OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
November 3, 2006 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether evidence discovered 
by the defendant after trial and before sentencing was 
exculpatory in nature and should have been disclosed to 
Timothy Glen Workman (“Workman”) by the Commonwealth prior to 
trial. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
 
Workman was an agent for the United States Drug 
Enforcement Administration ("DEA") on temporary assignment in 
Roanoke, Virginia.  While off-duty, he was involved in an 
altercation with Keith E. Bailey ("Bailey") and James A. 
Bumbry, II (“Bumbry”).  Workman shot and killed Bailey.  
Although he claimed that he acted in self-defense, Workman was 
charged with first-degree murder and use of a firearm in the 
commission of murder.  A jury acquitted him of murder and use 
of a firearm in the commission of murder; however, the jury 
found Workman guilty of voluntary manslaughter.  The trial 
court sentenced Workman to six years and nine months in prison 
in accordance with the jury's verdict; however, the trial 
court suspended one year and nine months of the sentence. 
 
On the evening preceding the early morning shooting, 
Workman had been drinking alcoholic beverages at the bar of a 
restaurant.  When the restaurant closed in the early morning 
hours, Workman accompanied a woman he had met at the bar, 
Melissa Booth (“Booth”), to her car in the parking lot.  While 
they were sitting in Booth's car, another car came beside them 
facing the same direction.  Bailey and Bumbry, who had been in 
the restaurant that evening, were in the adjacent car.  They 
motioned for Booth to roll down her window.  Workman testified 
that Booth "seemed kind of alarmed or confused, who are these 
guys, why are they pulling up beside me."  Nonetheless, Booth 
rolled down her window.  Bailey and Bumbry questioned why 
Booth was with Workman.  The verbal exchange escalated when 
Workman "flipped the finger" to Bailey and Bumbry in response 
to their comments.  Both Bailey and Bumbry left their car.  
Workman testified that he heard Bailey say, "I'll fucking kill 
you, you bitch."  At that time, Workman retrieved a pistol 
from his ankle holster and put it in his right rear pocket.
 
Booth saw Workman transfer the gun at which time Workman 
identified himself to Booth as "a cop."  When Workman opened 
the passenger side door of Booth's car, he saw Bailey "at the 
end of the trunk coming straight at [him] yelling" that he 
 
2
knew Booth and that Workman did not have "any business in 
[Booth's] vehicle." 
 
Workman responded by telling Bailey to "get [his] ass 
back in the car."  According to Workman, Bailey was undeterred 
and grabbed Workman by the throat and pinned him against the 
open passenger side door.  Workman testified that as he was 
being assaulted by Bailey, he saw Bumbry coming toward the two 
men from the front of the car.  Workman said that Bumbry was 
"draw[ing] a small frame automatic [weapon] from his pocket" 
and that the weapon was "coming towards the back of 
[Workman's] head." 
 
According to Workman, at this point in the struggle, he 
drew his own weapon and "began to raise it" hoping that Bailey 
would step back and Workman could confront Bumbry.  But Bailey 
grabbed Workman's gun and the two men struggled for the weapon 
while falling toward the passenger seat of the car.  Workman 
testified that he told Bailey that he was "a cop" but the 
struggle for the gun continued.  Workman stated that "[w]ith 
one man coming behind [him] with a gun, at that time [he] 
figured [he] had nothing else to do.  So [he] tried pulling 
the trigger."  The first shot missed Bailey.  As they fell 
into Booth's car, Workman shot two more times because Bailey 
was "kind of on top of [him]" and "pull[ed] the trigger one 
more time" as the fight continued.  When Bailey finally fell 
 
3
to the pavement, Workman saw Bumbry and Booth drive away in 
their cars. 
 
Booth testified that she did not know Bailey or Bumbry 
but had seen them earlier that night in the bar.  She stated 
that she saw Workman with a gun but did not see Bailey with a 
weapon.  Further, she testified that she did not know whether 
Bumbry had a gun.  Two bystanders each testified that they 
witnessed an argument between Bailey and Workman and that 
Bailey was choking Workman by his throat.  They heard shots 
and saw both Bumbry and Booth drive away. 
 
Forensic evidence revealed that four shots were fired 
from Workman's gun with one lodging in the car seat and three 
others making close-range "contact" wounds to Bailey's body.  
Bailey's hands tested positive for the presence of gunpowder 
residue.  Furthermore, DNA testing revealed the presence of 
Workman's flesh under Bailey's fingernails.  Blood alcohol 
analysis revealed that both Workman and Bailey were 
intoxicated at the time of the altercation. 
 
Workman was indicted for first-degree murder and use of a 
firearm in the commission of murder.  Workman’s counsel filed 
a motion for discovery and inspection and for exculpatory 
evidence and a motion for a bill of particulars.  The trial 
court entered an order requiring the Commonwealth to provide 
all information to which the defendant was entitled pursuant 
 
4
to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  Following the 
discovery order and in exchange for the defendant’s 
withdrawing his motion for a bill of particulars, the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney "opened" the entire file to the 
defendant and his counsel for review. 
 
At trial, the central issue was whether Workman acted in 
self-defense, which depended in part upon whether Bumbry 
possessed a weapon as he approached Workman and Bailey.  
Workman testified that Bumbry was armed; Bumbry testified that 
he was not. 
 
After the trial but prior to sentencing, Workman learned 
for the first time of previously undisclosed evidence that he 
maintains could have been used to impeach the credibility of 
Bumbry and that supports the contention that Workman acted in 
self-defense.  The undisclosed evidence was a pre-trial 
statement made by Jerry Lee Mackey, Jr. (“Mackey”) to 
Detective M. E. Meador ("Meador") of the Roanoke City Police 
Department and Officer Kenneth Garrett ("Garrett") of the 
Roanoke City Police Department who was also cross-designated 
as a DEA agent.  Mackey stated that a man, later identified as 
George T. Fitzgerald (“Fitzgerald”), told him that Bumbry 
tried to pass a gun to Bailey during the altercation in the 
parking lot and that Bumbry "fled the scene with the weapon."  
After learning of Mackey’s pre-trial statement, Workman’s 
 
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private investigator, Peter W. Sullivan (“Sullivan”), 
interviewed Mackey and learned of two recent incidents 
witnessed by Mackey when Bumbry had used a firearm in 
altercations with others.   One incident took place at a 
nightclub called "Ghost of Hollywood."  Mackey reported that 
he saw Bumbry shooting at people with a .40 caliber Desert 
Eagle pistol.  Mackey personally witnessed another recent 
shooting incident at "Iris' Barbershop" where Bumbry had 
"several guns" and was shooting at a man named J. D. Kasey.  
Additionally, Mackey’s statements led to the discovery of a 
pre-trial statement by Fitzgerald that Bumbry recently fired a 
gun at Fitzgerald.  Workman filed a motion for a new trial 
based upon the discovery of this undisclosed exculpatory 
information. 
 
The trial court denied Workman’s request for a new trial.  
The trial court characterized Mackey’s first statement as 
inadmissible hearsay that did not meet the Brady materiality 
test.  Nonetheless, the trial court stated that it was 
exculpatory evidence that should have been disclosed because 
it reasonably would have led to Mackey’s subsequent 
statements.  However, the trial court held that Mackey’s other 
statements were cumulative evidence that were not material 
under Brady.  Finally, the trial court concluded that 
Fitzgerald’s statement would have resulted in "a separate 
 
6
trial within a trial" and noted that it was Fitzgerald who was 
found guilty of maliciously wounding Bumbry.  For these 
reasons, the trial court concluded that Workman’s claims did 
“not rise to a reasonable probability that the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.” 
 
The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed Workman's 
conviction in an unpublished opinion.  After a petition for 
rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc were denied, 
Workman filed a notice of appeal to this Court.  We granted 
the appeal on the sole issue of whether the Commonwealth’s 
failure to provide Workman with exculpatory evidence about 
Bumbry deprived Workman of a fair trial under Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and its progeny so as to require 
reversal of Workman’s conviction. 
II.  EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE 
 
Workman alleges that the Commonwealth erroneously denied 
him the exculpatory evidence we will refer to as "Mackey I" 
wherein Mackey told Detective Meador and Officer Garrett on 
February 15, 2002, that Bumbry tried to pass Bailey a gun in 
the restaurant's parking lot.  As Meador and Garrett 
interviewed Mackey on a homicide unrelated to the Workman 
case, Mackey said: 
“So uh also on a DEA matter, at the Ole Charley’s 
Restaurant, uh, JAMES, JAMES II BUMBRY, JAMES 
BUMBRY, II, uh was with KEITH, what’s his last 
 
7
name.  He’s the one . . . tried to pass KEITH a 
gun and the officer, DEA had to respond, whatever 
happened and JAY II, . . . all that JAY II fled 
the scene with the weapon. . . . I got that 
information over the phone from several uh people 
that’s been out there in the streets, just 
calling friends, reliable friends, . . . said.” 
Meador told the lead investigator on the Workman case, 
Detective Shawn Lukacs (“Lukacs”) of the Roanoke City Police 
Department, about Mackey’s statement.  Meador told Lukacs that 
Mackey refused to provide the source of the information.  
Garrett indicated that the interview was tape-recorded.  
Mackey, however, told Workman’s private investigator, 
Sullivan, that he told the police that Fitzgerald was his 
source. 
Lukacs interviewed Mackey in mid-March 2002 on a separate 
case; however, Mackey did not provide Lukacs with additional 
information on the Workman case.  Significantly, Lukacs’ 
testimony does not indicate if he asked Mackey questions 
regarding the Workman case.  In fact, Mackey told Sullivan 
that no one from the police department or the prosecutor’s 
office followed up with him to learn more information 
regarding Bailey's shooting. 
Lukacs knew the contents of Mackey I, however, it did not 
become a part of Workman’s investigative case folder.  After 
the defense received the DEA’s permission to interview 
Garrett, Garrett did not disclose Mackey I to the defense.  
 
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Garrett was only permitted by the DEA to answer questions that 
were asked in writing.  There is no indication in the 
transcripts that Garrett was asked any questions about 
exculpatory evidence.  In fact, the first time Garrett 
mentioned Mackey I to anyone was when he spoke with Sullivan 
after Workman’s trial.     
In summary, the evidence shows that Meador, Lukacs and 
Garrett all had knowledge of Mackey I, however, it was not 
disclosed to Workman prior to trial.  Additionally, there is 
no indication that the prosecutor had actual knowledge of 
Mackey I.  In fact, the Commonwealth emphasized in its closing 
argument before the jury that there was “no corroboration for” 
Workman’s claim that Bumbry was coming at him with a gun 
during the incident.  Workman asserts that if the Commonwealth 
had properly turned over the exculpatory statement of Mackey 
I, it would have led to additional exculpatory statements 
including "Mackey II," "Mackey III," and "Fitzgerald I."   
Mackey II includes two statements that Mackey made to 
Sullivan on November 20, 2002.  First, Mackey stated that 
Bumbry always carried a gun and that he had access to several 
guns.  In fact, Mackey saw Bumbry with guns “very often, all 
the time, in clubs and just on the block hanging.”  Second, 
Mackey personally observed James Bumbry with a gun shooting at 
individuals on two separate occasions.  Mackey was at the 
 
9
"Ghost of Hollywood" where Bumbry pulled out a .40 caliber 
firearm and began shooting at Mackey and his friends. Mackey 
was also at "Iris’ Barbershop" when Bumbry and J.D. Kasey 
began arguing.  After leaving Iris’, Bumbry returned with 
several guns and with his friend Timmy Cunningham.  Mackey was 
getting his hair cut at Iris’ when Bumbry ran out of Iris’ and 
started shooting at Kasey. 
Mackey III includes two additional statements that Mackey 
made to Sullivan on November 20, 2002.  First, Mackey stated 
that Bumbry shot Fitzgerald.  Mackey did not have personal 
knowledge of this shooting because he was in jail at the time 
of the incident.  According to Mackey, Bumbry and Fitzgerald 
“had words” and were “supposed to had got in a fist fight,” 
without guns.  After picking up Timmy Cunningham and Shawn 
Hogney and on his way to fight Fitzgerald at Melrose Park, 
Bumbry stopped at a stoplight.  Mackey said that Bumbry 
“pulled out a gun and somebody out of the car with, umm, 
[Fitzgerald] started shooting” and Bumbry was shot in the 
head.  Second, Mackey directly identified Fitzgerald as his 
source of Mackey I.  Mackey said that Fitzgerald told him 
that:  Bumbry “pulled out a gun, tried to pass Keith [Bailey] 
the gun, and the [DEA] agent shot [Bailey], and [Bumbry] sped 
off and left, left the scene.”  Mackey also indicated that 
 
10
Fitzgerald was at the restaurant the night Bailey was killed 
and thought Bumbry was carrying a gun. 
Mackey III led Workman's investigator to interview 
Fitzgerald.  On November 30, 2002, Sullivan visited Fitzgerald 
in the Roanoke City Jail to verify that Fitzgerald had a 
conversation with Mackey regarding the Workman case.  
Fitzgerald refused to identify someone present at the 
restaurant who could testify that Bumbry had a gun.  Then, on 
April 9, 2003, Sullivan visited Fitzgerald at the Bland 
Correctional Facility trying to again find out who called 
Fitzgerald from the restaurant stating that Bumbry had a gun.  
While Fitzgerald did not disclose his source, Fitzgerald did 
tell Sullivan that Bumbry had previously threatened and shot 
at Fitzgerald.  Sullivan subsequently learned that Officer J. 
W. Michael with the Roanoke City Police Department had taken 
Fitzgerald’s written statement ("Fitzgerald I") with respect 
to the shooting between Fitzgerald and Bumbry. 
Fitzgerald stated in Fitzgerald I that on November 9, 
2001, Bumbry had an altercation with Fitzgerald’s associate at 
the Z-Mart on Melrose Avenue, in Roanoke.  Later that day, 
Fitzgerald and some friends were in a car stopped at a red 
light.  A vehicle occupied by Bumbry, Tim Cunningham, and 
others came beside Fitzgerald’s vehicle.  Fitzgerald saw 
“Bumbry stick his arm out the window thats when I ducked and I 
 
11
heard some 7 shots.” Officer Michael stated Fitzgerald’s 
videotaped statement could not be found, however, a written 
transcription admitted as Defendant’s Exhibit 4 in post-trial 
motions provides:  “[Bumbry] rolled down the rear window and 
shot out of that, as well.  Fitzgerald admitted that there 
were shots fired from his car, but did not know who fired 
them.”  Officer Michael testified that Fitzgerald’s videotaped 
statement and his written statement would have gone to the 
records division at the police department.  Fitzgerald was 
later tried and convicted of maliciously wounding Bumbry in 
Roanoke City Circuit Court.  At Workman’s trial, Bumbry 
testified that he was involved in a shooting incident in which 
he was shot in the head, however, he did not identify 
Fitzgerald as the shooter. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
Our analysis must begin with consideration of the 
evidence we have identified herein as "Mackey I."  Workman 
maintains that the Commonwealth was required under Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and its progeny to disclose this 
statement and further that disclosure would have led to the 
evidence we have identified herein as Mackey II, Mackey III, 
and Fitzgerald I. 
 
In Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280-81 (1999), the 
Supreme Court of the United States stated: 
 
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In Brady, this Court held "that the 
suppression by the prosecution of evidence 
favorable to an accused upon request violates due 
process where the evidence is material either to 
guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good 
faith or bad faith of the prosecution."  373 U.S. 
at 87.  We have since held that the duty to 
disclose such evidence is applicable even though 
there has been no request by the accused, United 
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976), and 
that the duty encompasses impeachment evidence as 
well as exculpatory evidence, United States v. 
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985).  Such evidence 
is material "if there is a reasonable probability 
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the 
defense, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different."  Id., at 682; see also Kyles v. 
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-434 (1995).  Moreover, 
the rule encompasses evidence "known only to 
police investigators and not to the prosecutor."  
Id. at 438.  In order to comply with Brady, 
therefore, "the individual prosecutor has a duty 
to learn of any favorable evidence known to the 
others acting on the government's behalf in this 
case, including the police."  Kyles, 514 U.S. at 
437. 
 
There are three components of a violation of the rule of 
disclosure first enunciated in Brady:  a) The evidence not 
disclosed to the accused "must be favorable to the accused, 
either because it is exculpatory," or because it may be used 
for impeachment; b) the evidence not disclosed must have been 
withheld by the Commonwealth either willfully or 
inadvertently; and c) the accused must have been prejudiced. 
Id. at 281-82.  Stated differently, "[t]he question is not 
whether the defendant would more likely than not have received 
a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its 
 
13
absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial 
resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence."  Kyles v. 
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995).  "[A] constitutional error 
occurs, and the conviction must be reversed, only if the 
evidence is material in the sense that its suppression 
undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial."  United 
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985). 
Clearly, the withheld evidence including that which 
Workman maintains the Mackey I statement would have led to 
must be considered to be favorable to him for impeachment of 
Bumbry and contradiction of one of the Commonwealth's primary  
themes in the case, namely, that Bumbry was unarmed.  
Additionally, it is not contested that the evidence was not 
disclosed to Workman.  Therefore, materiality of the evidence 
in question becomes an issue for consideration. 
In Kyles, the Supreme Court of the United States made 
several holdings concerning the test of materiality.  First, 
"a showing of materiality does not require demonstration by a 
preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would 
have resulted ultimately in the defendant's acquittal (whether 
based on the presence of reasonable doubt or acceptance of an 
explanation for the crime that does not inculpate the 
defendant.)”  Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434.  Second, materiality is 
not a sufficiency of the evidence test.  "A defendant need not 
 
14
demonstrate that after discounting the inculpatory evidence in 
light of the undisclosed evidence, there would not have been 
enough left to convict."  Id., at 434-45.  Third, a harmless 
error analysis is unnecessary once materiality has been 
determined.  Id. at 435.  Fourth, suppressed evidence must be 
"considered collectively, not item by item."  Id. at 436.  
Upon consideration of these factors, a reviewing court is 
charged with the responsibility of determining if the 
suppression of evidence "undermines confidence in the outcome 
of the trial."  Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678. 
The trial court held that Mackey I did not meet the 
materiality test because it was "mired in hearsay, opinion and 
conjecture" and inadmissible.  The trial court further held 
that the statement should have been disclosed to Workman and 
that its disclosure would have led to Mackey's statement about 
Fitzgerald.  However, the trial court held that the Fitzgerald 
statement "does not rise to a reasonable probability that the 
result of the proceeding would have been different."   
 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that both the Mackey 
I and the Fitzgerald I statements were inadmissible.  Although 
the Court of Appeals did not mention Mackey II and III, it 
further held that "[n]o evidence tended to show that the 
prosecutor or the police had undisclosed information about 
Bumbry's specific acts of violence and propensity toward 
 
15
violence."  As a consequence, the Court of Appeals affirmed 
the conviction stating, "We hold that the record supports the 
trial judge's finding that the evidence failed to establish 
materiality in the constitutional sense." 
 
We disagree with the trial court and the Court of 
Appeals.  First, while Mackey I may not have been admissible 
for the truth of the matter asserted, it was admissible for a 
different reason.  See Winston v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 564, 
591, 604 S.E.2d 21, 36 (2004).  In particular, pursuant to 
Kyles, Mackey I was admissible to discredit the police 
investigation. 
 
In a criminal case, the prosecutor must “ ‘make timely 
disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known 
to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the 
accused or mitigates the offense.’ ”  Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437 
(1984) (citations omitted).  In fact, "the prosecutor remains 
responsible for gauging [the] effect [of undisclosed evidence] 
regardless of any failure by the police to bring favorable 
evidence to the prosecutor’s attention.”  Id. at 421.  More 
specifically, "the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn 
of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the 
government’s behalf in the case, including the police.”  Id. 
at 437.  In this case, the Commonwealth concedes that the 
investigators’ knowledge of Mackey I was chargeable to the 
 
16
Commonwealth.  Furthermore, the trial court’s discovery order 
plainly mandated disclosure of such information. 
 
In Kyles, the Supreme Court held that evidence concerning 
the reliability of police investigations may be admissible.  
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 446.  The Court favorably cited Bowen v. 
Maynard, 799 F.2d 593, 613 (10th Cir. 1986) ("A common trial 
tactic of defense lawyers is to discredit the caliber of the 
investigation or the decision to charge the defendant, and we 
may consider such use in assessing a possible Brady 
violation.").  The Court also favorably cited Lindsey v. King, 
769 F.2d 1034, 1042 (5th Cir. 1985) (awarding new trial of 
prisoner convicted in Louisiana state court because withheld 
Brady evidence "carried within it the potential . . . for the 
. . . discrediting . . . of the police methods employed in 
assembling the case."). 
 
Workman could have used Mackey I to discredit the police 
investigation by attacking the “thoroughness and even the good 
faith of the investigation” by failing to adequately follow up 
on Mackey I.  Kyles, 514 U.S. at 445. Detective Meador was 
interviewing Mackey on an unrelated crime when he learned of 
Mackey I.  Officer Garrett was present as well.  Meador 
subsequently shared the contents of Mackey I with Detective 
Lukacs, the lead investigator on Workman’s case.  Neither 
 
17
Lukacs, Meador, nor Garrett further investigated Mackey's 
statement. 
 
Additionally, the police officers did not inform the 
prosecutor of Mackey I and the transcript of Mackey I was not 
in the investigative file on Workman.  Had this information 
been known to Workman, he could “have attacked the reliability 
of the investigation in failing even to consider” Mackey I’s 
import.  Kyles, 514 U.S. at 446.  Mackey I would have been a 
powerful tool for the defense not for its truth but rather to 
support its contention that police investigation was 
inadequate because it failed to further investigate 
conflicting evidence regarding Bumbry’s contention that he did 
not have a gun at the scene of the shooting. 
 
Having determined that Mackey I was admissible and was 
material in every sense under Brady and its progeny, we must 
consider what would have reasonably been discovered from 
proper disclosure.  It is quite clear that Workman's 
investigator, Sullivan, when apprised of Mackey I after jury 
verdict but before sentencing, interviewed Mackey and 
discovered Mackey's personal knowledge of two recent "shoot 
outs" involving Bumbry (Mackey II).  Clearly, there was 
nothing inadmissible about Mackey's firsthand observations of 
Bumbry discharging firearms in Mackey's presence.  
Additionally, Sullivan was led to Fitzgerald, who recounted 
 
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another recent shooting incident, which he personally 
observed, where Bumbry discharged a firearm.  There was 
nothing inadmissible about Fitzgerald recounting his personal 
knowledge of Bumbry's use and discharge of a firearm. 
 
As we have stated, Mackey I was admissible to attack the 
reliability of the police investigation.  But even if not 
admissible, admissibility at trial is not the final arbiter of 
any Brady violation. 
Evidence may be material under Brady even 
though it is inadmissible.  When assessing the 
materiality of inadmissible evidence, we apply 
the general Brady test and "ask only . . . 
whether the disclosure of the evidence would have 
created a reasonable probability that the result 
of the proceeding would have been different."  
Because of the requirement that the outcome of 
the proceeding be affected, we often consider 
whether the suppressed, inadmissible evidence 
would have led to admissible evidence. 
United States v. Sipe, 388 F.3d 471, 485 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(citing Felder v. Johnson, 180 F.3d 206, 212 (5th Cir. 1999)); 
see also United States v. Gil, 297 F.3d 93, 104 (2nd Cir. 
2002) (" '[I]nadmissible evidence may be material under 
Brady.' ") (quoting Spence v. Johnson, 80 F.3d 989, 1005 n.14 
(5th Cir. 1996); Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 703 (11th 
Cir. 1999) (“Inadmissible evidence may be material if the 
evidence would have led to admissible evidence.”); Coleman v. 
Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105, 1116 (9th Cir. 1998) (“To be 
material, evidence must be admissible or must lead to 
 
19
admissible evidence.”); United States v. Phillip, 948 F.2d 
241, 249 (6th Cir. 1991) ("Certainly, information withheld by 
the prosecution is not material unless the information 
consists of, or would lead directly to, evidence admissible at 
trial for either substantive or impeachment purposes."). 
 
The reliance of the trial court and the Court of Appeals 
on Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1 (1995) and Soering v. 
Deeds, 255 Va. 457, 499 S.E.2d 514 (1998) is misplaced.  In 
Wood, the habeas corpus petitioner maintained that the 
prosecution improperly withheld the results of a polygraph 
exam.  516 U.S. at 2.  The polygraph exam was not admissible 
under state law.  Id. at 6.  The petitioner could point to no 
admissible evidence that knowledge of the polygraph testing 
results would have revealed.  Id. at 6-7.  The Supreme Court 
labeled as "speculation" that the disclosure of inadmissible 
evidence would have led to admissible evidence.  Similarly, in 
Soering, the inadmissible evidence in question raised no more 
than an abstract, "'mere possibility that an item of 
undisclosed information might have helped the defense.'"  255 
Va. at 465, 499 S.E.2d at 518 (quoting United States v. Agurs, 
427 U.S. 97, 109-10 (1976).  Here, by contrast, Workman 
proffers admissible evidence that would have been discovered 
if he had known of Mackey I. 
 
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The Commonwealth maintains that its agents are only 
required to disclose what they knew at the time and that they 
did not know of Mackey II and III and Fitzgerald I.  The 
evidence is not contested that Meador, Garrett, and Lukacs 
knew of Mackey I even if the prosecutor did not.  As the 
previously cited cases demonstrate, it is not necessary that 
the Commonwealth know what would have been discovered if 
proper disclosure of Mackey I had been made. 
 
Additionally, the Commonwealth maintains that Workman's 
Brady claims fail because if Workman had exercised reasonable 
diligence, Workman could have discovered Mackey I on his own.  
The Commonwealth notes that Garrett interviewed Mackey, 
Workman interviewed Garrett and Garrett testified at trial.  
Based on these factors, the Commonwealth submits that if 
Workman "exercised reasonable diligence" in interviewing 
Garrett, Workman "could have located" Mackey I, 
"notwithstanding the absence of the information in the 
Commonwealth's file."  This argument ignores Workman's 
reasonable reliance upon the Commonwealth's "open file" 
response to his discovery motion.  In Strickler, the Supreme 
Court stated that "if a prosecutor asserts that he complies 
with Brady through an open file policy, defense counsel may 
reasonably rely on that file to contain all materials the 
State is constitutionally obligated to disclose under Brady."  
 
21
527 U.S. at 283.  Consequently, under Strickler, Workman 
cannot be faulted for relying on the Commonwealth's open file 
policy and cannot, on these facts, be found to have failed to 
exercise reasonable diligence. 
 
Workman's claim of self-defense would have been 
significantly aided by knowledge of Mackey I, II, and III and 
Fitzgerald I.  We have very recently held: 
In Virginia, the rule in criminal cases is that, 
when a defendant adduces evidence of self-
defense, proof of specific acts is admissible to 
show the character of the victim for turbulence 
and violence, even when the defendant is unaware 
of such character.  Barnes v. Commonwealth, 214 
Va. 24, 25-26, 197 S.E.2d 189, 190 (1973); Stover 
v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 789, 794, 180 S.E.2d 
504, 508 (1971).  When admissible, such evidence 
bears upon the questions of who was the aggressor 
or what was the reasonable apprehension of the 
defendant for his safety. 
 
Upon the question of who was the aggressor, 
the issue is what the victim probably did, and 
evidence of recent acts of violence toward third 
persons ought to be received, if connected in 
time, place, and circumstance with the crime, as 
to likely characterize the victim's conduct 
toward the defendant.  Randolph v. Commonwealth, 
190 Va. 256, 265, 56 S.E.2d 226, 230 (1949).  See 
Burford v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 752, 766-67, 20 
S.E.2d 509, 515 (1942); Rasnake v. Commonwealth, 
135 Va. 677, 697-98, 115 S.E. 543, 549-50 (1923). 
McMinn v. Rounds, 267 Va. 277, 281, 591 S.E.2d 694, 697 
(2004).  Here, Workman was deprived of introducing evidence of 
three recent incidents involving Bumbry firing weapons at 
others.  Most certainly, such evidence has the potential to be 
 
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powerful impeachment of Bumbry's statement at trial that he 
did not have a gun at the scene and his denial that he "had 
been involved with a criminal offense involving firearms . . . 
[or had been] [p]ulling a firearm on somebody?  Pointing a gun 
at somebody?"  Additionally, it comprised evidence of 
Workman's reasonable apprehension for his safety and evidence 
of who was the aggressor in this altercation. 
 
The credibility of Bumbry versus that of Workman was a 
significant issue at trial.  The prosecution and the Court of 
Appeals in its opinion place great emphasis upon Bumbry's 
testimony.  Their emphasis demonstrates how critical 
impeachment evidence was to Workman's case. 
 
The Commonwealth maintains that there was evidence before 
the jury that Bumbry had displayed a weapon and even pointed 
the weapon at a Deputy Sheriff four years before the incident 
in this case.  The Commonwealth argues that further evidence 
of Bumbry's possession and use of weapons would have been 
cumulative.  However, the Commonwealth discounted the incident 
as isolated and not recent.  The more recent incidents 
represented by Mackey II and III and Fitzgerald I had the 
potential to powerfully contradict the Commonwealth's argument 
to the jury.  We do not consider these incidents to be 
cumulative in nature. 
 
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We hold that the Commonwealth breached its duty under 
Brady and its progeny to disclose the statement we have 
identified as Mackey I.  Furthermore, it was admissible to 
attack the reliability of the police investigation especially 
considering that no further investigation of the statement was 
made by police.  Even if inadmissible, Mackey I would have led 
to admissible evidence and consequently, was subject to 
disclosure.  The undisclosed evidence and the evidence that 
would have been discovered before trial were material.  The 
nondisclosure under the circumstances of this case undermines 
confidence in the outcome of the trial. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in denying 
Workman a new trial because of Brady violations.  We will 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reverse 
Workman's voluntary manslaughter conviction, and remand this 
case for retrial if the Commonwealth be so advised for an 
offense no greater than voluntary manslaughter. 
In Price v. Georgia, the Supreme Court considered whether 
the state of Georgia could retry an accused for murder after 
an earlier guilty verdict on the lesser included offense of 
voluntary manslaughter had been set aside because of an error 
at trial.  398 U.S. 323, 324 (1970).  The Supreme Court held 
that jeopardy for an offense does not continue after an 
 
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acquittal, "whether that acquittal is express or implied by a 
conviction on a lesser included offense when the jury was 
given a full opportunity to return a verdict on the greater 
charge."  Id. at 329; see Powell v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 512, 
545-46, 552 S.E.2d 344, 363 (2001).  Consequently, having been 
placed in jeopardy on the charge of murder and acquitted of 
murder by the jury, Workman may be retried only for an offense 
not greater than that upon which his conviction was based, 
namely, voluntary manslaughter. 
 
Accordingly, we will remand the case for a new trial on a 
charge no greater than voluntary manslaughter for the killing 
of Keith E. Bailey, if the Commonwealth be so advised. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
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