Title: Hoar v. Great Eastern Resort Management

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
PATRICIA STONE HOAR, AS 
GUARDIAN OF THOMAS HOAR 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 972334 
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRY L. CARRICO
 
 
 
November 6, 1998 
GREAT EASTERN RESORT MANAGEMENT, 
INC., t/a MASSANUTTEN SKI RESORT 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALBEMARLE COUNTY 
Joshua L. Robinson, Judge Designate 
 
 
On January 19, 1992, Thomas Hoar (Thomas) suffered 
disabling brain damage in a skiing accident on a ski trail 
maintained at a ski area near Harrisonburg by Great Eastern 
Resort Management, Inc., t/a Massanutten Ski Resort 
(Massanutten).  In a motion for judgment alleging 
negligence on the part of Massanutten, Thomas’s wife and 
guardian, Patricia Stone Hoar (the Guardian), sought 
recovery of damages for Thomas’s injuries.  A jury returned 
a verdict in the Guardian’s favor in the amount of 
$6,170,563.00.  Upon motion of Massanutten, the trial court 
set the verdict aside and entered judgment in favor of 
Massanutten.  We awarded the Guardian this appeal and 
granted Massanutten’s assignments of cross-error.  
 
At the outset, Massanutten raises a question 
concerning the standard we should apply in reviewing the 
judgment of the trial court.  Massanutten argues that when 
a trial court sets aside a jury verdict, the verdict is not 
entitled to the same weight as one that has been approved 
by the court.  Mann v. Hinton, 249 Va. 555, 556-57, 457 
S.E.2d 22, 23 (1995).  Massanutten also asserts that the 
jury verdict in this case is entitled to little or no 
weight because it was in the exact amount of Thomas’s 
special damages.  When such a verdict is returned, 
Massanutten says, “it bespeaks a compromise . . ., the 
integrity of the jury’s finding on liability is suspect, 
and the . . . finding on liability is impeached.”  Ford 
Motor Co. v. Bartholomew, 224 Va. 421, 433-34, 297 S.E.2d 
675, 681-82 (1982).  Further, Massanutten maintains, the 
trial court was of opinion there was no evidence to support 
the verdict in any event.  Additionally, Massanutten says, 
neither party seeks a new trial.  “Under these 
circumstances,” Massanutten concludes, “the standard of 
review should focus on whether there is evidence to support 
the trial court’s action entering judgment for Massanutten 
rather than whether there is evidence to support the jury 
verdict.” 
 
However, it is the established rule that “[e]ven 
though the trial court [has] set the verdict aside, we 
[will] state the facts and reasonable inferences to be 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the [party] 
who prevailed before the jury.”  Stump v. Doe, 250 Va. 57, 
 
2
58, 458 S.E.2d 279, 280 (1995).  See also Griffett v. Ryan, 
247 Va. 465, 467, 443 S.E.2d 149, 150 (1994).  “[A]nd if 
there is any credible evidence in the record that supports 
the verdict, we must reinstate that verdict and enter 
judgment thereon.”  Id.
 
Stated in the light most favorable to the Guardian, 
the evidence shows that on January 17, 1992, two days 
before Thomas’s accident, Massanutten opened to the public 
a new, more advanced ski trail, known as “Diamond Jim.”1  
This trail was built in a heavily wooded area by a “cut and 
fill” process, which is used when a ski run does not follow 
the natural “fall line” of a hill or mountain.  According 
to an expert witness called by the Guardian, “[t]he fall 
line of a hill or a slope is the direction a ball would 
roll if you were to let it go and it rolled slowly [or] the 
direction water would flow if left to itself.”  
 
In the cut and fill process, the side of a hill or 
mountain is cut away to form one side of a ski run and the 
excavated soil is used to fill in the opposite side to make 
the run even and to double its width.  In the area of 
Diamond Jim where Thomas was injured, the cut and fill 
                     
1 Ski trails are marked according to their relative 
difficulty at each ski resort.  Green circles indicate the 
trails that are the easiest, blue squares the more 
 
3
process created a “drop-off,” having a vertical drop of 
some thirty feet, on the left side of the downhill ski run.2  
The bottom of the drop-off contained rocks and logs.  The 
drop-off also had a double fall line, meaning that the 
hypothetical ball “wouldn’t go straight down the middle of 
[the ski] run [but] would taper off [to the bottom of the 
drop-off].”  The cut and fill process also left a gap 
between the left edge of the ski run and the tree line, 
which bordered the remainder of the run on both sides, 
eliminating a “visual cue to the skier that this is the 
edge of the trail, don’t go over here.”3
 
The groomed area of the ski run had a snow depth of 
two feet.  The snow surface was “very hard packed” and the 
ground was “extremely hard.”  A “berm” of snow, one foot 
higher than the groomed area, ran along the left edge of 
the run and the snow tapered off to a depth of only a few 
inches at the bottom of the drop-off. 
                                                             
difficult, and black diamonds the most difficult at the 
particular ski area.  
2 The drop-off was variously described by the Guardian’s 
witnesses as “very steep,” “a sheer drop-off,” “a 30-foot 
cliff,” and “a hidden drop-off.”  A Massanutten witness 
said the grade of the drop-off was “only slightly steeper” 
than the “steeper area . . . on the main run.” 
3 In the area where the tree line is interrupted, there are 
two individual trees just off the edge of the trail, one 25 
inches in circumference and the other 22 inches. 
 
4
 
Prior to Thomas’s accident, Massanutten had ordered 
and received a shipment of bright orange “warning barrier 
fencing” for use on Diamond Jim.  At the time of the 
accident, Massanutten had installed fence posts in the area 
where Thomas was injured, but had not yet attached the 
bright orange fencing; the fencing was installed “a couple 
days later.”4  
 
As a result of his brain injury, Thomas is incompetent 
and was unable to testify.  A friend, George Archer Marston 
(Marston), a civil engineer who accompanied Thomas to the 
Massanutten ski resort on the occasion in question, 
testified as a witness for the Guardian.  According to 
Marston’s testimony, he and Thomas, both experienced 
skiers, purchased lift tickets and began skiing about 9:00 
a.m. on January 19, 1992.  After warming up on some of the 
easier slopes, they took a chair lift to Diamond Jim.  At 
the time, Diamond Jim had been groomed to its left edge, 
permitting skiers to ski all the way to that edge.  In 
addition, snowmaking machinery was blowing snow across the 
ski run, blinding skiers using the right side of the run.  
                     
4 The jury was instructed that evidence of Massanutten’s 
post-accident erection of a fence on the poles installed 
pre-accident “is not received as evidence that 
[Massanutten] was negligent.”  
 
5
Also, there were “moguls” in the center of the ski run, but 
none on the edges.5   
 
Thomas and Marston skied down the left side of Diamond 
Jim without incident.  They then took the chair lift for a 
second trip down Diamond Jim.  After skiing about halfway 
down the run, they stopped at a sign marked “slow,” below 
which the slope steepened, and talked for a couple of 
minutes.  Thomas decided to ski down the left side of the 
run and, not “going fast,” skied to the left laterally 
across the slope, with Marston following.  
 
Marston stated that shortly before Thomas reached the 
edge of the slope, he “caught an edge and lost his 
balance,[6] bent at the knees and kind of sat down on the 
back of his skis and then slid off the edge of the slope 
out of . . . sight.”  Marston skied “right up to the edge 
expecting to find [Thomas] adjacent to the slope, maybe six 
to eight feet below the edge of the slope,” but instead 
“found this very steep, large vertical drop.”  Thomas was 
lying between two logs at the bottom of the drop, “probably 
laterally a hundred feet away from [Marston and] over 30 
                     
5 A witness described a “mogul” as “a mound that is usually 
created by skiers skiing down a steep area and cutting 
small hills into the side of the hill.” 
6 “Catching an edge” refers to the situation that may result 
when, in making a turn, a skier tilts his skis and the 
 
6
feet vertically below [him].”  Thomas was unconscious and 
bleeding from his nose, mouth, and one ear. 
 
Marston also testified that on his first trip down 
Diamond Jim on the morning of January 19, he did not see 
the steep drop-off.  Marston stated further that, when he 
went to see what had happened when Thomas slid out of 
sight, he had to ski “right up to the edge[,] . . . 
probably three to five feet from the edge,” before he 
realized the extent of the drop-off. 
 
Dr. James Broderson (Dr. Broderson), a dentist who had 
skied at the Massanutten resort many times, was called as a 
witness by Massanutten.  He skied down Diamond Jim on the 
morning of January 19, 1992, just ahead of Thomas.  Dr. 
Broderson stopped approximately twenty feet downhill from 
the “slow” sign to make sure the course was clear before he 
“head[ed] on down.”  He observed Thomas skiing toward the 
left side of the slope, then trying “to initiate a turn to 
the right” but either catching an edge or crossing his 
skis, and falling forward “[o]ut of control.” 
 
After Thomas was carried away, Dr. Broderson went to 
the bottom of the drop-off where Thomas had been lying to 
look “for some evidence of how it was that [Thomas] got 
                                                             
uphill edge catches the snow and causes him to lose his 
balance. 
 
7
hurt.”  There, Dr. Broderson found what appeared to be “an 
impact zone with a log.”  There was “[e]ither skin” or 
“maybe a little fiber something . . . that looked like he 
had . . . hit . . . there.” 
 
Dr. Broderson had seen “numerous tumbles like 
[Thomas’s where] no one had been hurt, so [he] didn’t think 
[Thomas] would be hurt from what [he] saw.”  Dr. Broderson 
explained, however, that he had “never been over to that 
edge and looked over.”  He thought that the ski “slope 
possibly continued out” and was approximately “level,” that 
“you could probably ski around [the left side] like you did 
on the right side,” where there was “a little easier way to 
go down the slope.”  He “didn’t realize there was an 
embankment”; he “knew there was a little drop-off, but 
. . . had no idea it was like what it was there.” 
 
Dr. Gregory O’Shanick, a specialist in brain injuries, 
began treating Thomas in June of 1994.  Dr. O’Shanick 
testified that the object which produced the injuries 
suffered by Thomas “would have to be something that was 
hard, something that was firm, that was not yielding.” 
 
At trial, the Guardian based her case for liability 
solely on the proposition that Massanutten was negligent in 
failing to warn skiers of the existence of the drop-off.  
In setting aside the jury verdict, the trial court, while 
 
8
approving the jury’s finding in favor of Thomas on  
assumption of risk and contributory negligence, ruled:  (1) 
that without expert testimony “as to what was the standard 
of care in the industry,” a lay jury could not “decide what 
would be an unreasonable risk”; (2) that there was no 
evidence to demonstrate that, had a warning been provided, 
it “would . . . have made any difference”; and (3) that 
there was no showing “that it was more probable . . . that 
the injury occurred after [Thomas] went over the bank than 
before.” 
Expert Testimony
 
At trial, the Guardian presented the testimony of 
Richard Penniman (Penniman), an expert in skiing safety.  
The Guardian asked Penniman whether he was familiar with 
“the skier’s code of responsibility.”  Upon receiving an 
affirmative answer, the Guardian asked Penniman whether 
there was “a written ski operator’s responsibility.”  
Massanutten objected to the question, and the trial court 
responded that “[t]he standard of care in the industry may 
be a relevant matter for the jury to consider,” and allowed 
the Guardian to proceed.  Penniman replied that there was 
no operator’s responsibility code. 
 
The Guardian then asked Penniman if he had “an opinion 
whether a warning was necessary in the area where Tommy 
 
9
Hoar went off” the ski slope.  Massanutten objected to the 
form of the question, and the trial court sustained the 
objection.  The Guardian did not rephrase the question or 
pursue the matter further but made a proffer of the 
testimony Penniman would have given.  Nor did the Guardian 
object when Massanutten later produced expert testimony 
concerning whether the Diamond Jim trail was marked 
appropriately. 
 
The Guardian now maintains that she “was not required 
to produce expert testimony as to the standard of care of 
ski area operators in the ski industry.”  She says that 
“[w]hether a ski area ought to alert skiers to potential 
hazards or obstacles on a ski slope” is a matter “as to 
which [jurors] are as competent to form an opinion as the 
witness.” 
 
Massanutten contends, on the other hand, that under 
Burch v. Grace Street Building Corp., 168 Va. 329, 340, 191 
S.E. 672, 677 (1937), the Guardian is estopped from taking 
a position inconsistent with one she assumed previously.  
Massanutten says that having “attempted to create a factual 
issue of the standard of care . . . by trying to elicit 
. . . testimony from [her] expert Penniman” concerning the 
existence of the duty to warn, the Guardian “is not 
 
10
permitted now to take the inconsistent position that the 
same duty exists as a matter of law.” 
 
The Guardian’s present position that expert testimony 
was not required to establish the duty to warn is not 
inconsistent with, but alternative to, her unsuccessful 
attempt to establish the duty through expert testimony.  It 
is not unusual in the trial of a case for a litigant to 
find himself blocked in an effort to establish a point in a 
certain manner and then have to resort to a different 
approach to make the point.  
 
It is the rule in Virginia that a litigant “may plead 
alternative facts and theories of recovery” and “state as 
many separate claims or defenses as he has regardless of 
consistency.”  Rule 1:4(k).  See also Code § 8.01-281(A); 
Cooper v. Horn, 248 Va. 417, 423, 448 S.E.2d 403, 406 
(1994).  We perceive no reason why the considerations 
supporting this rule should not also support a litigant’s 
shift to an alternative position in a situation like the 
present case.7  
                     
7 Massanutten cites Smith v. Settle, 254 Va. 348, 492 S.E.2d 
427 (1997).  There, the plaintiffs elicited expert 
testimony to create factual issues of the existence of the 
defendant’s duties and then took the position that the same 
issues were matters of law, suitable for jury instructions.  
Here, the Guardian was unsuccessful in her attempt to 
elicit expert testimony and only then took the position 
 
11
 
Citing Rule 5:25, Massanutten also contends that by 
failing to object to Massanutten’s use of expert testimony 
to describe the standard of care and by trying to elicit 
such testimony herself, the Guardian has failed to preserve 
an objection to Massanutten’s use of expert testimony at 
trial.  However, the Guardian is not complaining of 
Massanutten’s use of expert testimony but of the trial 
court’s ruling that she was required to produce expert 
testimony to establish a standard of care.  Her assignment 
of error on the point states that the trial court erred in 
setting the verdict aside “on the grounds that expert 
testimony was required to prove whether the drop-off . . . 
posed an unreasonable risk of injury as to which 
[Massanutten] had a duty to warn.” 
 
Next, Massanutten argues that “the introduction of 
expert testimony concerning the standard of care with 
respect to ski slope operators’ duty to warn was 
appropriate and, indeed, required in this case.”  We 
disagree. 
 
In Board of Supervisors v. Lake Services, Inc., 247 
Va. 293, 440 S.E.2d 600 (1994), we said: 
 
Expert testimony is inadmissible regarding 
“matters of common knowledge” or subjects “such that 
                                                             
that such testimony was not required.  Hence, Smith v. 
Settle is inapposite. 
 
12
[persons] of ordinary intelligence are capable of 
comprehending them, forming an intelligent opinion 
about them, and drawing their own conclusions 
therefrom.”  Thus, when the question presented can be 
resolved by determining what precautions a reasonably 
prudent person would have taken under like 
circumstances, no expert testimony is required or 
permitted. 
 
 
Further, expert testimony is admissible only when 
specialized skill and knowledge are required to 
evaluate the merits of a claim.  Issues of this type 
generally arise in cases involving the practice of 
professions requiring advanced, specialized education, 
such as engineering, medicine, and law, or those 
involving trades that focus upon scientific matters, 
such as electricity and blasting, which a jury cannot 
understand without expert assistance. 
 
Id. at 297, 440 S.E.2d at 602 (citations omitted). 
 
Here, the issue, as framed by one of the instructions 
granted below, was whether Massanutten, in the exercise of 
ordinary care, was obligated to warn skiers of an unsafe 
condition that was not open and obvious.  This was not a 
complicated or technical issue, and its resolution did not 
require specialized skill or knowledge.  Rather, it 
concerned matters of common knowledge that jurors, with the 
application of a reasonable amount of common sense, are as 
competent of understanding and deciding as the expert 
witness.  Indeed, as Kenneth Hess (Hess), Massanutten’s 
assistant ski area manager, put it in his testimony:  
“Common sense tells you that you ought to tell people that 
 
13
there’s a problem on a ski slope that’s not easily 
identifiable.”  
 
Finally, by way of cross-error, Massanutten contends 
that the trial court erred in refusing to exclude testimony 
of the Guardian’s expert witness, Penniman, to the effect 
that Massanutten had created “a gap in the cut and fill 
line” and “a recess of the trees [so that the] trees now 
are way, way back away from where the edge of the fill is 
[and] the skier no longer has the visual cue that this is 
the edge of the trail.” 
 
Massanutten argues that Penniman’s testimony that “the 
skier no longer has the visual cue” was inadmissible 
because it was based upon an assumption not supported by 
the record, i.e., that “the edge [of the ski trail] was not 
visible.”  Massanutten also says that this assumption was 
contradicted by the Guardian’s own witness, Marston, who 
testified that he “could tell where [he] thought the edge 
of the slope was . . . from where [he was] standing at the 
slow sign.” 
 
However, Penniman’s testimony concerning “the visual 
cue” was not based upon an unsupported assumption but upon 
his personal observations, made on two visits to the ski 
slope, and from his having “skied at Massanutten . . . 
during [his] investigation of [Thomas’s] accident.”  And, 
 
14
although Marston, the Guardian’s witness, said he could 
tell where he thought the edge was from where he had 
stopped near the “slow” sign, he stated that he did not 
realize “the extent of that drop-off . . . until [he] skied 
right up to the edge” and found “this very steep, large 
vertical drop.” 
 
But even if Penniman’s testimony varied from 
Marston’s, it does not follow that Massanutten was entitled 
to have Penniman’s version excluded.  Thomas is the real 
party plaintiff in this case, and he did not testify.  
Hence, this situation is not subject to the rule of Massie 
v. Firmstone, 134 Va. 450, 114 S.E. 652 (1922), that a 
litigant’s “statements of fact and the necessary inferences 
therefrom are binding upon him.”  Id. at 462, 114 S.E. at 
656.  Rather, Thomas is entitled to the benefit of the 
corollary enunciated in Massie v. Firmstone that “when two 
or more witnesses introduced by a party litigant vary in 
their statements of fact, such party has the right to ask 
the court or jury to accept as true the statements most 
favorable to him.”  Id.
Primary Negligence 
 
Massanutten cites Whitfield v. Cox, 189 Va. 219, 
52 S.E.2d 72 (1949), where we said that “[t]he owner 
or proprietor of a place of [business has the] duty 
 
15
. . . to exercise reasonable care for [his invitee’s] 
safety and protection — such care as would be 
exercised by an ordinarily careful and prudent person 
in the same position and circumstances.”  Id. at 223, 
52 S.E.2d at 73-74.  Massanutten then states that 
“[i]n order to prove negligence, [the Guardian] had to 
demonstrate that Massanutten clearly departed from the 
accepted standard of care followed by ordinary, 
prudent ski slope operators of similar slopes.” 
 
Massanutten cites testimony by Marston that he 
had “seen trails out West that ‘have probably steeper 
vertical drops than this off the edge, but they are 
always either clearly marked or they are clearly 
visible.’”  Massanutten then asserts that, here, “the 
uncontradicted evidence of [the Guardian’s] and 
Massanutten’s witnesses [was] that the day was clear, 
the edge was visible from 100 feet, it created a 
horizon[8], and there was a known drop-off of some 
unknown dimension.”  Thus, says Massanutten, “because 
                     
8 The significance of Massanutten’s reference to a “horizon” 
is that Marston testified a skier would see a horizon while 
“going from the right side [of the ski slope] over to the 
left side” and that the horizon is “a key giveaway,” 
telling the skier he “can’t continue to see the terrain 
because of the steepness of the slope.” 
 
16
the condition was ‘clearly visible,’ there was no need 
for . . . [a] warning.” 
 
Continuing, Massanutten submits that it is 
irrelevant that “someone else may have marked the 
trail differently.”  The issue, Massanutten states, 
“is whether evidence exists to prove that Massanutten 
clearly departed from the accepted standard of care 
followed by ordinary, prudent ski slope operators of 
difficult courses when it did not mark the plainly 
visible edge of a trail beyond which skiers knew they 
should expect conditions they ‘may need to avoid.’” 
Such evidence, Massanutten concludes, “does not 
exist,” and, “[b]ecause there is no conflict of 
evidence on this question, the judgment for 
Massanutten must be affirmed.” 
 
However, there was a conflict in the evidence on 
the question whether the “condition” existing “off the 
edge” was plainly visible.  As Massanutten stresses, 
Marston, the Guardian’s witness, said he could tell 
where he thought the edge was from where he had 
stopped near the “slow” sign.  And Massanutten’s 
expert witness, Larry D. Heywood (Heywood), testified 
it was his opinion “that the edge of the run . . . 
where [Thomas] went off was visible from around 100 
 
17
feet.”  But Dr. Broderson, Massanutten’s witness, who 
also had stopped near the “slow” sign, stated that he 
thought the ski slope possibly “continued out” and was 
approximately “level,” providing an “easier way to go 
down the slope.”  And Penniman, the Guardian’s expert 
witness, stated that “the skier no longer has the 
visual cue that this is the edge of the trail.”  This 
conflict in the evidence presented a typical issue for 
jury determination. 
 
On a similar point, citing an instruction granted 
below, Massanutten points out that an occupant of 
premises has a duty to warn of an unsafe condition 
unless the “condition is open and obvious to a person 
using ordinary care for his own safety.”  Massanutten 
repeats what Marston said about seeing the edge from 
where he stopped at the “slow” sign and about a 
horizon being “a key giveaway” that there is “steep 
terrain” beyond it.  Massanutten then opines that, 
with this information available, “it is readily 
apparent that ‘a person using ordinary care for his 
own safety’ would have avoided skiing near the edge.” 
 
Here again, however, Massanutten is unwilling to 
recognize there was a conflict in the testimony 
relating to whether the condition existing off the 
 
18
edge of the ski trail was plainly visible, a conflict 
that necessarily encompasses the question whether the 
condition was open and obvious.  That question, 
therefore, was also a matter for jury determination.
 
Furthermore, there was a direct conflict in the 
evidence resulting from the “battle of the experts” 
over the crucial issue whether Massanutten should have 
given warning of the existence of the drop-off, and 
this conflict alone was sufficient to make a jury 
issue of Massanutten’s negligence.  The Guardian’s 
expert witness, Penniman, testified that the “hidden 
drop-off” constituted a “dangerous area” and that, 
according to “the practice and custom in the ski 
industry,” a warning in the form of “a simple bamboo 
and rope fence,” costing about $10, was needed to 
“inform the skier . . . you don’t want to go here.” 
 
On the other hand, Massanutten’s expert witness, 
Heywood, testified that “the Diamond Jim run was 
maintained and marked appropriately [in conformity] 
with the custom and practice” of the ski industry and, 
accordingly, that it was not necessary “to put any 
type of marking on [the drop-off].”  Heywood further 
opined that, according to custom and practice, marking 
of the drop-off was unnecessary because “skiers are 
 
19
aware that there are edges to the run” and that “[o]ff 
the edge . . . is a variety of things, trees, stumps, 
rocks, whatever.”9
 
Finally, there was a dispute concerning the 
purpose of the bright orange “warning barrier fencing” 
Massanutten had ordered and received but, at the time 
of Thomas’s accident, had not yet attached to the 
already-in-place fence posts in the area of the drop-
off.  Hess, Massanutten’s assistant ski area manager, 
testified that the purpose of the fencing was “[t]o 
retain snow on the slope.”  However, before Diamond 
Jim was opened to the public, a letter written by the 
engineer employed in the construction of Diamond Jim 
to the slope designer on the project stated that 
“[f]encing of the high visibility, portable type will 
need to be installed at various locations to direct 
                     
9 Citing Atlantic Rural Exposition, Inc. v. Fagan, 195 Va. 
13, 77 S.E.2d 368 (1953), Massanutten questions the 
propriety of the Guardian’s use of Penniman’s testimony to 
prove the existence of a duty to warn.  Massanutten says 
that the testimony “only compared Massanutten with other 
facilities and custom and practice” and that “comparison 
with what others may do is not the question.”  See id. at 
25, 77 S.E.2d at 374.  However, it should not escape notice 
that Massanutten presented precisely the same character of 
testimony on the same subject through its expert witness,  
Heywood.  Hence, Massanutten will not be heard to complain.  
See Hoier v. Noel, 199 Va. 151, 155, 98 S.E.2d 673, 676 
(1957).  
 
20
the flow of traffic and to indicate possible hazards.” 
(Emphasis added.)  
 
Massanutten devotes a vague footnote to this 
subject in which it says that the Guardian 
“juxtapositions” Massanutten’s ordering of the fencing 
with the letter from the construction engineer “to 
infer that Massanutten had planned, but not yet 
erected, warning fencing at the area of the drop-off.”  
Not suprisingly, the Guardian does exactly what 
Massanutten accuses her of.  She argues, and we think 
justifiably so, that “[t]he jury was entitled to infer 
from this evidence that Massanutten obtained and used 
this bright orange fencing to warn skiers to maintain 
a safe distance away from dangerous areas, that it 
intended to do so at the drop-off on Diamond Jim, and 
that it was negligent for failing to do so in this 
instance.”  
Causation 
 
As noted previously, with respect to the issue of 
causation, the trial court made two rulings.  First, the 
court ruled that there was no evidence to demonstrate that, 
had a warning been provided, it “would . . . have made any 
difference.”  Second, the court ruled that there was no 
 
21
showing “that it was more probable . . . that the injury 
occurred after [Thomas] went over the bank than before.”  
 
Concerning the trial court’s first ruling, Penniman, 
the Guardian’s expert witness, was asked “[w]hat good” a 
warning would have been to a skier in Thomas’s situation.  
Penniman responded that “a fence or a rope barricade tells 
[skiers] that the ski area doesn’t want them over there 
. . . that it’s hazardous . . . [s]o they behave 
differently”; “[t]hey aren’t as inclined to get close to 
that edge”; they “usually approach it much more 
cautiously”; and if they lose balance, “instead of trying 
to regain their balance . . . they will just fall and let 
themselves come to a stop rather than fight it.” 
 
Thomas, of course, was unable, because of his 
disability, to tell the jury whether, had a warning been 
provided, he would have heeded it in the manner suggested 
by Penniman.  Nor could anyone have spoken for Thomas.  But 
“[f]requently material facts are not proven by direct 
evidence.  A verdict may be properly based upon reasonable 
inferences drawn from the facts.  If facts are present from 
which proper inferences may be drawn this is sufficient.”  
Northern Virginia Power Co. v. Bailey, 194 Va. 464, 470, 73 
S.E.2d 425, 429 (1952).  Here, from the circumstances that 
were proven below, and “[a]ccording to the ordinary 
 
22
experience of mankind,” the jury was “warranted in the 
conclusion that [Thomas’s] injury would not have occurred 
had [a warning] been given.”  Southern Ry. Co. v. Whetzel, 
159 Va. 796, 807, 167 S.E. 427, 430 (1933).  See also 
Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Lassiter, 193 Va. 360, 370, 68 S.E.2d 
641, 647 (1952). 
 
Concerning the trial court’s ruling with respect to 
the issue whether Thomas’s injury occurred before or after 
he “went over the bank,” the issue could be disposed of 
easily by reference to an admission made by Massanutten in 
a memorandum supporting its motion to set aside the 
verdict:  “Although we know that the injury must have 
occurred after Mr. Hoar fell and went over the edge, there 
is no evidence to show in more detail how or why he hit his 
head so as to cause the brain injury.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Aside from the admission, Dr. Broderson’s testimony 
showed clearly that Thomas’s injury occurred after he “went 
over the bank.”  Dr. Broderson was asked: “[W]hen [Thomas] 
fell forward, where was he in relation to the edge of the 
trail?”  Dr. Broderson replied that Thomas “was actually 
over — slightly over the embankment from the time he fell.” 
 
Furthermore, there is Dr. Broderson’s testimony that 
he found what appeared to be “an impact zone with a log” 
and a substance that was “[e]ither skin” or “maybe a little 
 
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fiber something . . . that looked like [Thomas] had . . . 
hit . . . there.”  This testimony was sufficient to supply 
the final link in the chain of causation from Massanutten’s 
negligence to Thomas’s injury, permitting the jury to find 
from all the evidence that Thomas sustained his injury by 
striking the log after falling to the bottom of the drop-
off and not, as Massanutten hypothesizes, by striking “the 
hard packed snow which he would have struck when he tumbled 
head first at the edge.” 
Assumption of Risk and Contributory Negligence 
 
By way of cross-error, Massanutten contends that the 
trial court erred in failing to find as a matter of law 
that Thomas assumed the risk of injury and was guilty of 
contributory negligence.  With respect to assumption of 
risk, Massanutten engages in a discussion of the theory of 
inherent risks, a theory, as Massanutten acknowledges, 
“Virginia case law has not had an opportunity to develop” 
in skiing cases.  The courts of other jurisdictions, 
Massanutten says, have applied the theory and barred 
recovery for ski injuries where “the accident resulted from 
[risks] inherent [in skiing] and not from negligent 
operation of the course.”10
                     
10 The out-of-state cases cited by Massanutten are Swenson v. 
Sunday River Skiway Corp., 79 F.3d 204 (1st Cir. 1996) 
 
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However, the jury in this case was instructed 
according to familiar principles that if Thomas “fully 
understood the nature and extent of a known danger, and if 
he voluntarily exposed himself to it, he assumed the risk 
of injuring himself from that danger” and could not recover 
for his injuries.  The jury was also instructed that 
Massanutten had the duty of proving the defense of 
assumption of risk by the greater weight of the evidence. 
 
Massanutten makes no complaint about these 
instructions.  They constitute the law of the case, and 
they do not incorporate the theory of inherent risks.  
Accordingly, we will make our decision guided by the 
principles enunciated in the instructions independent of 
that theory. 
 
We agree with the trial court that whether Thomas 
assumed the risk of injury was a matter for the jury to 
determine.  Here, again, Massanutten asserts that there was 
no conflict concerning the subject.  Yet, there was dispute 
about practically every facet of the evidence relating to 
                                                             
(applying Maine statute, moguls held inherent risk of 
skiing); Connelly v. Mammoth Mt. Ski Area, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 
855 (Cal.Ct.App. 1995) (colliding with ski lift tower 
inherent risk of sport); O’Donoghue v. Bear Mt. Ski Resort, 
35 Cal.Rptr.2d 467 (Cal.Ct.App. 1994) (knowingly 
encountering off-trail obstacles inherent risk of skiing); 
Atwell v. New York, 645 N.Y.S.2d 658 (N.Y.App.Div. 1996) 
 
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whether Thomas fully understood the nature and extent of 
the danger and voluntarily exposed himself to it.  The 
standard to be applied in an assumption of the risk case 
“‘is a subjective one, of what the particular plaintiff in 
fact sees, knows, understands and appreciates.’”  Amusement 
Slides Corp. v. Lehmann, 217 Va. 815, 818-19, 232 S.E.2d 
803, 805 (1977) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 496D, Comment c (1965)).  These were matters peculiarly 
within the province of the jury and properly left to it for 
decision.  
 
We take the same view of the question of contributory 
negligence.  The standard here is an objective one, whether 
Thomas acted for his own safety as a reasonable person 
would have acted under similar circumstances.  See Artrip 
v. E.E. Berry Equip. Co., 240 Va. 354, 358, 397 S.E.2d 821, 
824 (1990).  The jury was so instructed.  The jury was also 
instructed that Thomas had the right to assume the premises 
were reasonably safe for his visit unless he knew or should 
have known of an unsafe condition or used the premises in a 
manner exceeding the scope of the invitation.  Considering 
the conflicting evidence in this case in light of these 
principles, we think reasonable minds could differ on the 
                                                             
(applying statute making berm at edge of trail inherent 
danger of skiing). 
 
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question whether Thomas acted for his own safety as a 
reasonable person would have acted.  Hence, the trial court 
did not err in submitting the question to the jury. 
For the reasons assigned, we will reverse the judgment 
of the trial court, reinstate the jury verdict, and enter 
final judgment thereon in favor of the Guardian. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
 
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