Title: In re O.E.M.

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
2021-NCSC-120 
No. 471A20 
Filed 29 October 2021 
IN THE MATTER OF: O.E.M. 
 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order terminating 
respondent-father’s parental rights entered on 21 August 2020 by Judge Kimberly 
Gasperson-Justice in District Court, Transylvania County. Heard in the Supreme 
Court on 30 August 2021. 
 
No brief filed for petitioner-appellee Transylvania County Department of Social 
Services. 
 
Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP, by Rebecca C. Fleishman and Beth Tyner 
Jones, for appellee Guardian ad Litem. 
 
Richard Croutharmel for respondent-appellant father. 
 
 
Earls, Justice. 
 
¶ 1 
 
In this case, we decide whether the trial court had jurisdiction to enter an order 
terminating respondent-father’s parental rights in his child, O.E.M. (Oscar).1 The 
party seeking termination, the Transylvania County Department of Social Services 
(DSS), failed to verify its motion in the cause for termination as required under 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1104 (2019). Nevertheless, after conducting a hearing, the trial court 
 
1 Oscar is a pseudonym which is used for ease of reading and to protect the identity of 
the juvenile. 
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terminated respondent-father’s parental rights.  
¶ 2 
 
The precise question before us is whether DSS’ failure to verify its motion 
deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction to conduct termination 
proceedings. In In re T.R.P., this Court held that a party’s failure to verify a petition 
alleging that a juvenile was neglected was a fatal jurisdictional defect. 360 N.C. 588, 
588 (2006). Although In re T.R.P. addressed a party’s failure to verify a juvenile 
petition, we hold today that the requirement contained in subsection 7B-1104 is also 
jurisdictional as applied to a motion in the cause for termination. Accordingly, we 
conclude that DSS’ failure to verify its motion in the cause deprived the trial court of 
subject matter jurisdiction, and we vacate the order terminating respondent-father’s 
parental rights in Oscar. 
I. 
Analysis 
¶ 3 
 
DSS filed a properly verified juvenile petition alleging that Oscar was a 
neglected and dependent juvenile on 27 November 2018. The petition alleged that 
Oscar’s mother2 lacked “knowledge of normal child development” and had exhibited 
“delusional” behavior at the hospital after giving birth, and that respondent-father 
lacked “essential items for the juvenile” in his residence and had a pending criminal 
charge for assault on a female. Both parents admitted to frequent marijuana usage. 
 
2 Oscar’s mother, who was ultimately deemed incompetent and provided with an 
appointed guardian ad litem to represent her at the termination hearing, did not appeal the 
order terminating her parental rights.  
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The trial court entered an order granting DSS nonsecure custody of Oscar and, after 
a hearing, an order adjudicating Oscar to be a dependent and neglected juvenile. Both 
parents entered into case plans with DSS. Respondent-father complied with some 
elements of his case plan and did participate in occasional visits with Oscar, but he 
continued to use marijuana and engaged in further acts of domestic violence.  
¶ 4 
 
On 25 March 2020, DSS filed a motion in the cause seeking termination of both 
parents’ parental rights on the grounds of neglect pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(1), willful failure to make reasonable progress in correcting the conditions 
leading to Oscar’s removal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2), and incapability 
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6). DSS failed to verify this motion.3 On 3 June 
2020, the trial court conducted a termination hearing. On 21 June 2020, the trial 
court entered an order concluding that DSS had proven all three grounds and 
terminating both parents’ rights in Oscar.  
¶ 5 
 
On appeal, respondent-father does not challenge the findings of fact or 
conclusions of law contained in the termination order. Rather, the sole basis for 
 
3 We acknowledge that the motion was filed at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic 
and shortly after emergency orders establishing modified court procedures were entered. See 
e.g., Order of the Chief Justice Emergency Directives 1 to 2 (13 March 2020), 
https://www.nccourts.gov/covid-19 (encouraging judges to grant additional accommodations 
to parties, witnesses, attorneys, and others with business before the courts who are at a high 
risk of severe illness from COVID-19.”); see also Order of the Chief Justice Extending Court 
System Deadlines (19 March 2020), https://www.nccourts.gov/covid-19. However, there is 
nothing in the record to suggest that DSS’ failure to verify its motion in the cause was in any 
way related to difficulties caused by the pandemic or any related accommodations, and 
counsel has made no argument or representation to that effect before this Court. 
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respondent-father’s appeal is DSS’ failure to verify its motion for termination. It is 
undisputed that DSS did not verify its motion as required under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1104. 
The parties disagree as to what consequences arise from this omission. Because the 
parties’ dispute centers on their competing interpretations of our holding in In re 
T.R.P., we begin with a brief examination of our decision in that case.  
A. In In re T.R.P., this Court established that a statutory mandate to verify 
a juvenile petition before filing creates a jurisdictional requirement. 
¶ 6 
 
To initiate the process for terminating a parent’s parental rights in a juvenile, 
the party seeking termination must file a petition or may, if the child is already the 
subject of a pending abuse, neglect, or dependency proceeding, file a motion in the 
cause for termination. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1104 (2019). Subsection 7B-1104 provides that 
“[t]he petition [for termination], or motion pursuant to [N.C.G.S. §] 7B-1102, shall be 
verified by the petitioner or movant.” Id. (emphasis added). The significance of the 
phrase “shall be verified" is the sole issue before us in this case.  
¶ 7 
 
In In re T.R.P., we examined an analogous statutory provision requiring that 
a petition alleging a juvenile to be abused, neglected, or dependent “shall be . . . 
verified before an official authorized to administer oaths.” 360 N.C. at 591 (quoting 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-403(a) (2005)). In that case, the Wilkes County Department of Social 
Services (WCDSS) filed a juvenile petition alleging that a juvenile was neglected, but 
the petition “was neither signed nor verified by the Director of WCDSS or any 
authorized representative thereof.” Id. at 589. After the trial court entered an order 
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granting legal custody of the juvenile to WCDSS and physical custody to the juvenile’s 
father, the respondent-mother appealed, contending that “the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction to enter the challenged review order because the juvenile petition was 
not verified as required by law.” Id. The Court of Appeals agreed with respondent-
mother and vacated the custody order for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In re 
T.R.P., 173 N.C. App. 541 (2005). In a 4-3 decision, this Court affirmed the decision 
of the Court of Appeals. 
¶ 8 
 
The majority began by describing the General Assembly’s expansive authority 
to “within constitutional limitations, [ ] fix and circumscribe the jurisdiction of the 
courts of this State.” In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. at 590 (quoting Bullington v. Angel, 220 
N.C. 18, 20 (1941)). According to the majority, when the legislature requires a party 
“follow a certain procedure” to invoke the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction, a 
trial court lacks authority to act if the party fails to follow that procedure. Id. (quoting 
Eudy v. Eudy, 288 N.C. 71, 75 (1975)). Thus, the majority recognized the general rule 
that “for certain causes of action created by statute, the requirement that pleadings 
be signed and verified ‘is not a matter of form, but substance, and a defect therein is 
jurisdictional.’ ” Id. (quoting Martin v. Martin, 130 N.C. 27, 28 (1902)). The majority 
found ample reason to extend this general rule to causes of action created by North 
Carolina’s juvenile code. 
¶ 9 
 
According to the majority, “verification of a juvenile petition is no mere 
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ministerial or procedural act.” Id. at 591. Instead, the majority reasoned that in a 
proceeding which “frequently results in DSS’ immediate interference with a 
respondent's constitutionally-protected right to parent his or her children,” id. at 
591–92, the verification requirement serves as a “vital link in the chain of proceedings 
carefully designed to protect children at risk on one hand while avoiding undue 
interference with family rights on the other,” id. at 591. The majority emphasized 
“[t]he gravity of a decision to proceed and the potential consequences of filing a 
petition” alleging that a juvenile is abused, neglected, or dependent. Id. at 592. In 
light of 
the magnitude of the interests at stake in juvenile cases 
and the potentially devastating consequences of any errors, 
the General Assembly's requirement of a verified petition 
is a reasonable method of assuring that our courts exercise 
their power only when an identifiable government actor 
“vouches” for the validity of the allegations in such a 
freighted action. 
Id. In addition, the majority noted that “for more than twenty years our Court of 
Appeals has consistently held that subject matter jurisdiction over juvenile actions is 
contingent upon verification of the petition,” and that the General Assembly had 
never amended the relevant provisions of the juvenile code to modify or abrogate this 
holding. Id. at 594. 
B. The verification requirement is jurisdictional with regard to both 
petitions and motions in the cause filed pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1102. 
¶ 10 
 
Although In re T.R.P. did not directly address the statute or circumstances at 
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issue in this case, both parties agree In re T.R.P. is relevant. According to respondent-
father, the exact same reasons which compelled this Court to hold that the 
verification requirement contained in N.C.G.S. § 7B-403(a) was jurisdictional should 
compel us to hold that the verification requirement contained in N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1104—which mirrors subsection 7B-403(a) in providing that a petition or motion 
“shall be verified”—is also jurisdictional. The appellee, Oscar’s guardian ad litem 
(GAL), acknowledges that under In re T.R.P., the verification requirement contained 
in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1102 is jurisdictional with regards to a petition for termination of 
parental rights. Nonetheless, the GAL contends that In re T.R.P. does not control 
when, as in this case, the party seeking termination initiates termination proceedings 
with the filing of a motion in the cause. In this circumstance, the GAL argues, and 
the dissent agrees, that the verification requirement should be treated as a merely 
“procedural” requirement and that DSS’ failure to verify its motion does not 
dispossess the trial court of the jurisdiction it obtained when DSS filed a properly 
verified petition to have Oscar adjudicated neglected and dependent. We reject this 
argument for three reasons.  
1. The statutory text of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1104 does not support drawing any 
distinction between petitions and motions in the cause regarding 
application of the verification requirement. 
¶ 11 
 
The first problem with the GAL’s argument is that it is entirely inconsistent 
with the text of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1104. “The goal of statutory interpretation is to 
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determine the meaning that the legislature intended upon the statute's enactment.” 
State v. Rankin, 371 N.C. 885, 889 (2018). “When the meaning is clear from the 
statute's plain language, we ‘give effect to the plain meaning of the statute, and 
judicial construction of legislative intent is not required.’ ” In re J.E.B., 376 N.C. 629, 
2021-NCSC-2, ¶ 11 (quoting Winkler v. N.C. State Bd. of Plumbing, 374 N.C. 726, 730 
(2020)). Because “[t]he intent of the General Assembly may be found first from the 
plain language of the statute,” Lenox, Inc. v. Tolson, 353 N.C. 659, 664 (2001), we 
typically “begin[ ] with an examination of the plain words of the statute,” Correll v. 
Div. of Soc. Servs., 332 N.C. 141, 144 (1992). 
¶ 12 
 
In In re T.R.P., we concluded that the phrase “shall be verified” supplied 
“unambiguous statutory language [which] mandates our holding” that the General 
Assembly intended the verification requirement to be jurisdictional. 360 N.C. at 594. 
The GAL does not ask us to overrule In re T.R.P., and we see no cause to disturb a 
well-reasoned opinion which itself reaffirmed a longstanding legal principle. Thus, 
we are “bound by prior precedent[ under ] the doctrine of stare decisis.” Bacon v. Lee, 
353 N.C. 696, 712 (2001). Under In re T.R.P., the phrase “shall be verified” as used in 
the various provisions of our juvenile code imposes a jurisdictional requirement. 
Therefore, the argument that the verification requirement is jurisdictional when 
applied to a “petition” but procedural when applied to a “motion pursuant to [N.C.G.S. 
§] 7B-1102” is irreconcilable with the text of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1104, unless In re T.R.P. 
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is to be overruled.  
¶ 13 
 
The plain words of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1104 make clear that the General Assembly 
did not intend for the verification requirement to operate differently for a petition for 
termination as compared to a motion in the cause. The qualifier “shall be verified” 
modifies both “[t]he petition” and “motion pursuant to [N.C.G.S. §] 7B-1102” in the 
same way without drawing any distinction between the two. The phrase “shall be 
verified” does not mean one thing when it modifies “[t]he petition” and another when 
it modifies “motion.” The General Assembly knows how to attach distinct legal 
consequences to different acts or omissions described in a single statute. See, e.g., 
N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 41 (2019) (providing for different consequences when a claim is 
dismissed without prejudice by stipulation, dismissed without prejudice by the court, 
or dismissed involuntarily upon motion of the defendant). In this case, the General 
Assembly chose not to make any distinction.  
¶ 14 
 
The dissent advances various policy arguments in support of its contention 
that it is inappropriate to treat the words “shall be verified” as jurisdictional in this 
context. Notwithstanding the substance of those arguments, the dissent makes no 
effort to reconcile them with the text and structure of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1104 and the 
binding precedent we established in In re T.R.P. Absent any indication that the 
legislature intended the phrase “shall be verified” to have one meaning in one place 
and an entirely different meaning in another place—and as long as In re T.R.P. 
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remains good law—we are bound to give effect to the words the legislature chose to 
deploy. This Court is not at liberty to treat the verification requirement as 
jurisdictional in one context and procedural in another. Doing so would require us to 
“read into a statute language that simply is not there.” N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. 
Co., Inc. v. Lunsford, 2021-NCSC-83, ¶ 22 (cleaned up).  
2. Treating the verification requirement as jurisdictional in the context 
of a motion in the cause serves important constitutional interests. 
¶ 15 
 
The second problem with the GAL’s argument is that it ignores the concerns 
which underpinned our holding in In re T.R.P. and which are no less present when a 
party initiates a termination proceeding via a motion in the cause. According to the 
GAL, it is appropriate to treat the verification requirement as jurisdictional when a 
termination petition is filed because, in that circumstance, the verification 
requirement “assur[es] that our courts exercise their power only when an identifiable 
government actor ‘vouches’ for the validity of the allegations in such a freighted 
action.” However, the GAL contends that treating the verification requirement as 
jurisdictional is redundant when a motion for termination is filed regarding a child 
already subject to an abuse, neglect, or dependency proceeding because in this 
circumstance the movant “ha[s] already vouched for the validity of the allegations 
underlying the TPR motion.”  
¶ 16 
 
As we recognized in In re T.R.P., the legislature’s choice to require a party to 
verify its filing before beginning a juvenile proceeding “is a minimally burdensome 
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limitation on government action, designed to ensure that a [DSS] intervention that 
has the potential to disrupt family bonds is based upon valid and substantive 
allegations before the court's jurisdiction is invoked.” 360 N.C. at 598. The same holds 
true for a termination proceeding regardless of the manner in which the proceeding 
begins.4  
¶ 17 
 
The allegations underlying a juvenile abuse, neglect, or dependency petition 
may overlap with, but are necessarily not the same as, the allegations underlying a 
motion for termination regarding the same juvenile. A trial court’s decision to 
terminate a parent’s parental rights depends upon evidence of the parent’s conduct 
subsequent to an initial adjudication of the juvenile as abused, neglected, or 
dependent. See In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 716 (1984) (“The petitioner seeking 
termination bears the burden of showing by clear, cogent and convincing evidence 
that such neglect exists at the time of the termination proceeding.”) (emphasis added); 
see also In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. 372, 385 (2019) (“[T]he extent to which a parent has 
reasonably complied with [a] case plan provision is, at minimum, relevant to the 
determination of whether that parent's parental rights in his or her child are subject 
 
4 The dissent acknowledges that In re T.R.P. establishes that a failure to verify 
“pleadings and petitions commencing an action and their amendments thereto” is a 
jurisdictional defect, but suggests that a motion in the cause does something different. Yet, 
in this context, a motion in the cause for termination serves the exact same function as a 
petition for termination: It is what a party files in order to “commenc[e]” a termination 
proceeding, which is separate and distinct from an underlying juvenile proceeding. 
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to termination for failure to make reasonable progress.”) (emphasis added).  
¶ 18 
 
For example, in this case, DSS’ motion to terminate respondent-father’s 
parental rights included new allegations that he had “made minimal efforts to 
complete his case plan,” “failed to demonstrate benefit from services directed toward 
remediating the issues that led to the child being placed out of [his] home,” “fail[ed] 
. . . to make regular inquiry with regard to the minor child and aggressively work 
toward reunification,” and failed to “show[ ] the ability to refrain from the use of 
controlled substances and he is unlikely to quit the use of said substances even with 
substance abuse treatment and medications.” None of this was known at the time the 
original juvenile petition was verified. The trial court could not have determined that 
grounds existed to terminate respondent-father’s parental rights without entering 
findings of fact addressing these allegations. It is in no way redundant to require DSS 
to verify a new motion containing new allegations regarding a parent’s conduct which 
could not possibly have been included in an initial abuse, neglect, or dependency 
petition. 
¶ 19 
 
Further, the stakes for a parent are considerably higher in a termination 
proceeding than in an abuse, neglect, or dependency proceeding. Although the latter 
carries with it “the potential to disrupt family bonds,” In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. at 598, 
the former may result in the permanent severance of the parent-child relationship 
and the extinguishment of an individual’s constitutional status as a parent. Of course, 
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the “paramount importance of the child's best interest and the need to place children 
in safe, permanent homes within a reasonable time” weigh heavily throughout every 
phase of a juvenile proceeding. Id. at 601 (quoting In re R.T.W., 359 N.C. 539, 549–
50 (2005)). Yet our juvenile code also incorporates the protections afforded to all 
parents under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., In re 
E.B., 375 N.C. 310, 316 (2020).5 The General Assembly chose to mandate that DSS 
verify the allegations underpinning an action seeking to interfere with the parent-
child relationship. This choice helps ensure that the State appropriately balances its 
interest in expeditiously achieving permanency for at-risk juveniles with its interest 
in not improperly abrogating North Carolinians’ constitutionally guaranteed 
parental rights and not subjecting juveniles to the disruption occasioned by a 
termination proceeding except when necessary. These concerns are present 
regardless of whether DSS has filed a petition for termination or a motion in the 
cause.  
3. A trial court’s jurisdiction to conduct an abuse, neglect, or dependency 
proceeding does not automatically extend to a termination proceeding. 
¶ 20 
 
Finally, we reject the GAL’s argument that DSS’ filing of a properly verified 
 
5 N.C.G.S. § 7B-1100(2) provides that one purpose of Article 11 is “to protect all 
juveniles from the unnecessary severance of a relationship with biological or legal parents.” 
(Emphasis added.) The General Assembly did not intend for—and the constitution does not 
allow—courts to disregard the procedural protections afforded to biological and legal parents, 
which protect both the parents’ constitutional parental rights and juveniles from 
“unnecessary severance” of the parent-child relationship. 
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petition alleging Oscar was neglected and dependent vests the trial court with 
jurisdiction to terminate respondent-father’s parental rights. According to the GAL, 
we need not treat the verification requirement as jurisdictional when DSS files a 
motion for termination after previously filing a properly verified juvenile petition, 
because the trial court need not “re-establish” the jurisdiction it possessed over the 
underlying juvenile proceedings. This argument is inconsistent with our precedents 
and with the jurisdictional provisions of the juvenile code.  
¶ 21 
 
A petitioner or movant must satisfy distinct requirements to vest a trial court 
with jurisdiction to conduct a juvenile proceeding on the one hand and a termination 
proceeding on the other. Compare N.C.G.S. § 7B-200(b) (listing certain jurisdictional 
requirements for abuse, neglect, and dependency proceedings) with N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1101 (listing certain jurisdictional requirements for termination proceedings).6 A trial 
court’s authority to adjudicate a child abused, neglected, or dependent does not confer 
upon the court the authority to terminate that child’s parents’ parental rights. See 
In re A.L.L., 376 N.C. 99, 105 (2020) (“[A] trial court lacks jurisdiction over a 
termination petition if the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101 have not been met, 
 
6 In addition, there is a difference between the requirements for establishing the 
jurisdiction of a court to act as a general matter and the requirements for establishing that 
a court may exercise its jurisdiction in a particular case. Thus, as In re T.R.P. recognized, 
even if a trial court is generally a proper forum for adjudicating the status of a child because 
the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 7B-200(b) or N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101 have been met, a particular 
court may lack jurisdiction over a particular child because other jurisdictional prerequisites 
have not yet been satisfied. 
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even if there is an underlying abuse, neglect, or dependency action concerning that 
juvenile in the district in which the termination petition has been filed.”). If a 
petitioner or movant fails to meet all of the requirements for establishing the court’s 
jurisdiction over a termination proceeding, then the court lacks jurisdiction to 
conduct a termination proceeding, regardless of whether the trial court previously 
exercised jurisdiction over the child for other purposes.  
¶ 22 
 
The GAL’s reliance on a recent decision from this Court in support of its 
argument on this issue is misplaced. In its brief, the GAL points to language from our 
decision in In re K.S.D-F., where we stated that “[j]urisdiction arises upon the filing 
of ‘a properly verified juvenile petition’ and extends ‘through all subsequent stages of 
the action.’ ” 375 N.C. 626, 633 (2020) (quoting In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. at 593). The 
GAL contends that In re K.S.D-F. means that once a trial court obtains jurisdiction 
over a juvenile through the filing of a properly verified juvenile petition, the trial 
court’s jurisdiction continues up through and including a termination proceeding. 
However, the GAL’s interpretation of this language misconstrues both In re K.S.D-F. 
and the provisions of the juvenile code we addressed in that case. 
¶ 23 
 
In In re K.S.D-F., the respondent-mother asserted that the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction to terminate her parental rights because DSS did not lawfully have 
custody of the children at the time it filed its motion for termination. Id. at 632. If the 
respondent-mother’s assertion was correct, DSS would have lacked standing to file a 
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termination motion under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1103(a)(3) (2019), and the trial court would 
have lacked jurisdiction to conduct termination proceedings. Id. According to the 
respondent-mother, when the trial court had, in an earlier proceeding, “determined 
that a permanent plan for custody and guardianship with [foster parents] was in the 
children's best interests and awarded custody and guardianship to the [foster 
parents],” the trial court’s jurisdiction over the children ceased. Id. at 633. Thus, the 
respondent-mother claimed that the trial court lacked the legal authority to enter a 
subsequent order placing the children back in DSS custody and by extension that 
DSS lacked standing to file a termination motion. 
¶ 24 
 
We rejected the respondent-mother’s argument, noting that when the trial 
court entered an order placing the children with foster parents, “[t]he trial court 
specifically retained jurisdiction and provided that further hearings could be brought 
upon a motion by any party.” Id. Therefore, when DSS subsequently filed a motion to 
reopen proceedings, the trial court did possess the authority to place the children in 
DSS custody. Id. at 633–34. Because the trial court did have jurisdiction to enter the 
nonsecure custody order, DSS legally had custody of the juveniles, such that DSS 
“had standing to file the motion to terminate respondents’ parental rights” which 
vested “the trial court [with] jurisdiction over the termination action.” Id. at 635.  
¶ 25 
 
Nothing in In re K.S.D-F. suggested that the trial court’s jurisdiction over an 
underlying abuse, neglect, or dependency proceeding was sufficient, standing alone, 
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to establish the court’s jurisdiction over a subsequent termination proceeding. 
Indeed, our reasoning in In re K.S.D-F. is predicated on the assumption that 
jurisdiction does not continue from the underlying juvenile proceeding to a 
subsequent termination proceeding. If the GAL’s theory is correct, there would have 
been no reason for this Court to reach the question of whether DSS had standing to 
file a motion to terminate the respondent-mother’s parental rights in In re K.S.D-F. 
because the trial court indisputably had jurisdiction to conduct the underlying 
juvenile proceedings after DSS filed a properly verified petition alleging the juvenile 
was neglected. We would have had no reason to decide whether there existed an 
independent basis for the trial court’s authority to enter an order terminating the 
respondent-mother’s parental rights.  
¶ 26 
 
There is nothing anomalous about requiring a party to establish that the trial 
court possessed jurisdiction to conduct a termination proceeding even when the court 
previously had jurisdiction to conduct a juvenile proceeding—it is simply what our 
juvenile code requires. See, e.g., In re J.M., 797 S.E.2d 305, 307 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016) 
(holding that the Durham County District Court “lacked jurisdiction to hear the 
termination of parental rights petition” even though the court previously exercised 
jurisdiction in an underlying juvenile proceeding, because “none of the[ independent 
jurisdictional] requirements were met”). Accordingly, we reject the GAL’s argument 
that the trial court in this case possessed subject matter jurisdiction to terminate 
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respondent-father’s parental rights in Oscar notwithstanding DSS’ failure to verify 
its motion for termination. 
II. 
Conclusion 
¶ 27 
 
In all significant respects, this case is indistinguishable from our decision in 
In re T.R.P. As in In re T.R.P., the party which sought a judicial order addressing the 
status of a juvenile failed to comply with a requirement that the filing be verified 
contained in a provision of North Carolina’s juvenile code. As in In re T.R.P., the trial 
court entered an order notwithstanding this deficiency. The only salient difference is 
that in this case, DSS filed a motion rather than a petition. However, this difference 
is not legally significant. Subsection 7B-1104 draws no distinction between the 
verification requirement as it applies to petitions and motions in the cause filed 
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1102. The interests the verification requirement serve do 
not vary with the manner in which a termination proceeding is initiated. A trial 
court’s jurisdiction to conduct an underlying abuse, neglect, or dependency 
proceeding does not automatically provide the court with jurisdiction to conduct a 
termination proceeding.  
¶ 28 
 
Accordingly, the verification requirement contained in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1104 is 
jurisdictional as applied to both a petition for termination and a motion for 
termination. Because DSS failed to verify its motion for termination of respondent’s 
parental rights, “the trial court ha[d] no power to act.” In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. at 598. 
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Therefore, we vacate the trial court order terminating respondent’s parental rights 
in Oscar and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
VACATED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice BARRINGER, dissenting. 
 
¶ 29 
Ending a parent-child relationship is a decision the court 
must weigh carefully, mindful of constitutional protections 
and statutory safeguards. Those safeguards, however, are 
to be applied practically so that the best interests of the 
child—the polar star in controversies over child neglect and 
custody—are the paramount concern. 
 
In re L.M.T., 367 N.C. 165, 173 (2013); see also In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 109 
(1984). 
¶ 30 
 
Here, not only does the majority’s result disregard this paramount concern, but 
the majority does so by ignoring the legislature’s stated policy goals with respect to 
termination of parental rights, the plain language of the relevant statutes, and the 
statutory scheme of the Juvenile Code. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
¶ 31 
 
In this matter, the Transylvania County Department of Social Services (DSS) 
filed a verified juvenile petition alleging the neglect and dependency of Oscar on 27 
November 2017. Subsequently, the trial court adjudicated Oscar a neglected and 
dependent juvenile. Then, in the same cause, DSS filed a motion for termination of 
parental rights on 25 March 2020 pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1102(a). However, the 
motion was not verified. After a hearing on the termination-of-parental-rights 
motion, the trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights by order entered on 
21 August 2020. 
IN RE O.E.M. 
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Barringer, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
¶ 32 
 
No one complained of the lack of verification at any time before the trial court. 
Respondent’s sole basis for his appeal of the termination-of-parental-rights order is 
that “[t]he trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to terminate [respondent’s] 
parental rights because [DSS] failed to verify its termination[-]of[-]parental[-]rights 
motion in the cause as required by N.C.[G.S.] § 7B-1104.” 
¶ 33 
 
The legislature has expressly “declare[d] as a matter of legislative policy with 
respect to termination of parental rights” four purposes of Article 11 of the Juvenile 
Code in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1100. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1100 (2019). As relevant to this matter, 
the legislature established that the “general purpose of [Article 11] is to provide 
judicial procedures for terminating the legal relationship between a juvenile and the 
juvenile’s biological or legal parents when the parents have demonstrated that they 
will not provide the degree of care which promotes the healthy and orderly physical 
and emotional well-being of the juvenile,” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1100(1), and “the further 
purpose of [Article 11 is] to recognize the necessity for any juvenile to have a 
permanent plan of care at the earliest possible age, while at the same time 
recognizing the need to protect all juveniles from the unnecessary severance of a 
relationship with biological or legal parents,” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1100(2). 
¶ 34 
 
Therefore, the clear statutory language instructs us to interpret the statutes 
as setting forth judicial procedures—not subject matter jurisdictional requirements. 
To comply with this statutory mandate, we must construe statutes in Article 11 to 
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Barringer, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
set forth judicial procedures unless the plain language of the statute indicates it is a 
jurisdictional requirement. 
¶ 35 
 
Additionally, in almost all situations, making a judicial procedure a 
requirement for the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction directly contradicts the 
text of Article 11: that juveniles should receive a permanent plan of care at the 
earliest possible age. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1100(2). Challenges to jurisdiction, unlike 
judicial procedures, can be raised for the first time on appeal and, if successful, render 
the underlying proceeding void ab initio. In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. 588, 590, 595 (2006). 
¶ 36 
 
In matters arising under the Juvenile Code, the legislature by enacting 
statutes has established the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction. In re K.J.L., 363 
N.C. 343, 345 (2009). It is the legislature—not the courts—that “can, within the 
bounds of the Constitution, set whatever limits it wishes on the possession or exercise 
of that jurisdiction.” In re J.M., 377 N.C. 298, 2021-NCSC-48, ¶ 15 (quoting In re 
M.I.W., 365 N.C. 374, 377 (2012)). As enacted by the legislature, the trial court “has 
exclusive, original jurisdiction over any case involving a juvenile who is alleged to be 
abused, neglected, or dependent,” N.C.G.S. § 7B-200(a) (2019), and once obtained, 
“jurisdiction shall continue until terminated by order of the [trial] court or until the 
juvenile reaches the age of [eighteen] years or is otherwise emancipated, whichever 
occurs first,” N.C.G.S. § 7B-201(a) (2019). Thus, “[w]hen the district court is 
exercising jurisdiction over a juvenile and the juvenile’s parent in an abuse, neglect, 
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2021-NCSC-120 
Barringer, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
or dependency proceeding, a person or agency specified in [N.C.]G.S. [§] 7B-1103(a) 
may file in that proceeding a motion for termination of the parent’s rights in relation 
to the juvenile.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1102(a) (2019). 
¶ 37 
 
As recognized by this Court in In re T.R.P., “the provisions in Chapter 7B 
establish one continuous juvenile case with several interrelated stages, not a series 
of discrete proceedings.” 360 N.C. at 593. Therefore, as it relates to verification, “[a] 
trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction over all stages of a juvenile case is established 
when the action is initiated with the filing of a properly verified petition.” Id. 
(emphasis added); see also In re K.S.D.-F., 375 N.C. 626, 633 (2020) (“Jurisdiction 
arises upon the filing of a properly verified juvenile petition and extends through all 
subsequent stages of the action.” (cleaned up)). 
¶ 38 
 
Further, the legislature has limited the trial court’s jurisdiction as to 
termination of parental rights by enacting N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101, which states as 
follows: 
§ 7B-1101 Jurisdiction 
 
The court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear 
and determine any petition or motion relating to 
termination of parental rights to any juvenile who resides 
in, is found in, or is in the legal or actual custody of a county 
department of social services or licensed child-placing 
agency in the district at the time of filing of the petition or 
motion. The court shall have jurisdiction to terminate the 
parental rights of any parent irrespective of the age of the 
parent. Provided, that before exercising jurisdiction under 
this Article, the court shall find that it has jurisdiction to 
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Barringer, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
make a child-custody determination under the provisions 
of G.S. 50A-201, 50A-203, or 50A-204. The court shall have 
jurisdiction to terminate the parental rights of any parent 
irrespective of the state of residence of the parent. 
Provided, that before exercising jurisdiction under this 
Article regarding the parental rights of a nonresident 
parent, the court shall find that it has jurisdiction to make 
a child-custody determination under the provisions of G.S. 
50A-201 or G.S. 50A-203, without regard to G.S. 50A-204 
and that process was served on the nonresident parent 
pursuant to G.S. 7B-1106. Provided, further, that the clerk 
of superior court shall have jurisdiction for adoptions under 
Chapter 48 of the General Statutes. 
 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101 (2019); see also In re A.L.L., 376 N.C. 99, 105 (2020) (“[A] trial 
court lacks jurisdiction over a termination petition if the requirements of N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-1101 have not been met, even if there is an underlying abuse, neglect, or 
dependency action concerning that juvenile in the district in which the termination 
petition has been filed.”). 
¶ 39 
 
Thus, the Juvenile Code, its articles, and statutes, as previously recognized by 
this Court, all establish that jurisdiction in this matter is vested with the trial court 
upon the filing of the juvenile petition and continues uninterrupted until the 
juvenile’s majority, emancipation, or a trial court’s order even for termination of 
parental rights if the legislature’s enactment regarding jurisdiction, N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1100, is satisfied. 
¶ 40 
 
Here, DSS failed to verify a motion for termination of parental rights that it 
filed in a pending juvenile abuse, neglect, and dependency proceeding. But DSS had 
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Barringer, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
already verified the juvenile petition underlying the action, and there is no contention 
that the trial court lacked jurisdiction under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101. While this Court 
has held that the verification requirement for a juvenile petition alleging abuse, 
neglect, or dependency pursuant to N.C.G.S § 7B-403(a) was jurisdictional in In re 
T.R.P., 360 N.C. at 588, this appeal involves an unverified motion filed pursuant to 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1102(a) in the abuse, neglect, or dependency cause. Thus, to the extent, 
our prior caselaw has held that pleadings and petitions commencing an action and 
their amendments thereto are jurisdictional defects “for certain causes of action 
created by statute,” id. (citing Martin v. Martin, 130 N.C. 19, 20 (1902)1 (discussing 
an unverified amendment to a complaint in a divorce action)), they do not resolve the 
issue before this Court now. 
¶ 41 
 
Further, nothing about the statutory language or statutory scheme supports 
the view that verification of a motion for termination of parental rights in a pending 
juvenile case is required for the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction. “In 
construing statutory language, ‘it is our duty to give effect to the words actually used 
in a statute and not to delete words used or to insert words not used.’ ” In re B.O.A., 
372 N.C. 372, 380 (2019) (quoting Lunsford v. Mills, 367 N.C. 618, 623 (2014)). Here, 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1104 is entitled “Petition or motion” and makes no reference to 
 
1 Notably, as the dissent in In re T.R.P. observed, Martin was addressed by this Court 
prior to the adoption of notice pleading. In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. 588, 606 (2006) (Newby, J., 
dissenting). 
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Barringer, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
jurisdiction. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1104 (2019). Section 7B-1101, previously quoted herein 
and entitled “Jurisdiction,” which addresses jurisdiction for termination-of-parental-
rights motions, also contains no cross-reference to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1104 or reference to 
a verification requirement. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101. This Court has previously recognized 
that in these circumstances—when the legislature neither mentions jurisdiction in 
the statute at issue nor references it in the statute entitled “jurisdiction”—the 
legislature did not intend such statute’s requirements “to function as prerequisites 
for [trial] court jurisdiction.” In re D.S., 364 N.C. 184, 193–94 (2010).2 
¶ 42 
 
Finally, deeming verification of a motion in the cause a jurisdictional 
requirement in an abuse, neglect, or dependency proceeding cannot be justified. This 
Court addressed in In re T.R.P. the verification requirement for initiating “[a] 
juvenile abuse, neglect, or dependency action under Chapter 7B [that] may be based 
on an anonymous report.” 360 N.C. at 591. Unlike a juvenile petition, the filing of a 
termination-of-parental-rights motion in a juvenile abuse, neglect, or dependency 
 
2 While the majority acknowledges that In re T.R.P. did not address the statute and 
issue before this Court in this matter, it nevertheless relies solely on that opinion, deeming 
itself bound, while ignoring this Court’s other precedent like In re D.S. and other precedent 
on statutory construction. Such precedent cannot be reconciled with a reading that this 
Court’s construction in In re T.R.P. of N.C.G.S. § 7B-403(a) (2005) (“[T]he petition shall be 
drawn by the [DSS] director, verified before an official authorized to administer oaths, and 
filed by the clerk, recording the date of filing.”) mandates that anytime something “shall be 
verified,” it is a jurisdictional requirement. In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. at 591. In fact, In re T.R.P. 
acknowledges the contrary: “[F]or certain causes of action created by statute, the requirement 
that pleadings be signed and verified is not a matter of form, but substance, and a defect 
therein is jurisdictional.” Id. (cleaned up) (emphasis added). 
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Barringer, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
proceeding is frequently based on the underlying verified juvenile abuse, neglect, or 
dependency petition and subsequent conduct and course of dealings between the 
parents, DSS, the juvenile, and the guardian ad litem, much of which the trial court 
is privy to from hearings. Section 7B-906.1(a) states as follows: 
The [trial] court shall conduct a review hearing within 90 
days from the date of the initial dispositional hearing held 
pursuant to [N.C.]G.S. [§] 7B-901. Review hearings shall 
be held at least every six months thereafter. Within 
[twelve] months of the date of the initial order removing 
custody, there shall be a review hearing designated as a 
permanency planning hearing. Review hearings after the 
initial permanency planning hearing shall be designated 
as permanency planning hearings. Permanency planning 
hearings shall be held at least every six months thereafter 
or earlier as set by the court to review the progress made 
in finalizing the permanent plan for the juvenile, or if 
necessary, to make a new permanent plan for the juvenile. 
 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.1(a) (2019) 
¶ 43 
 
Further, there is no change in the status, physically or legally, between the 
parent and the juvenile upon the filing of a motion in the cause to terminate parental 
rights. In other words, it does not “result[ ] in DSS’[s] immediate interference with a 
respondent’s constitutionally-protected right to parent his or her children.” In re 
T.R.P., 360 N.C. at 591–92. Instead, the relationship between the parent and the 
juvenile does not change until an adjudicatory hearing—where the movant has the 
burden of proof; the rules of evidence for civil actions apply; and the trial court must 
take evidence, find facts based on clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, adjudicate 
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Barringer, J., dissenting 
 
 
 
the existence of grounds for termination pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111, and reduce 
to writing its findings and conclusions—and a dispositional hearing to determine 
“whether terminating the parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s best interest.” N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-1110(a) (2019); see N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109 to -1110. Thus, while the gravity of filing 
a termination-of-parental-rights motion is undeniable, there are no identifiable 
material consequences to the parent or the juvenile from the lack of verification of a 
motion for termination of parental rights in an abuse, neglect, or dependency 
proceeding over which the trial court is exercising jurisdiction over both a juvenile 
and the juvenile’s parent pursuant to a verified petition. Thus, unlike this Court in 
In re T.R.P., the majority reads into a legislative enactment, devoid of reference to 
jurisdiction, an intent to make a jurisdictional requirement without substantiating 
reasons. See In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. at 591. 
¶ 44 
 
In conclusion, the verification requirement set forth in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1104 for 
a motion for termination of parental rights filed in an abuse, neglect, or dependency 
proceeding where the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to a verified 
abuse, neglect, or dependency juvenile petition cannot and should not be deemed 
jurisdictional by this Court. Instead, it is a procedural requirement. 
Chief Justice NEWBY and Justice BERGER join in this dissenting opinion.