Title: State v. Strong

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
 
No. 121,865 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
SHAMEKE CAESAR STRONG, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1.  
 
To be legally appropriate, a jury instruction must fairly and accurately reflect the 
applicable law. 
 
2.  
 
K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5705(e) provides a mandatory, albeit rebuttable, 
presumption of a defendant's intent to distribute when that defendant is found to have 
possessed specific quantities of a controlled substance. 
 
3.  
While courts generally have authority to determine whether a statute is 
unconstitutional, this power of judicial review is not unlimited. The separation of powers 
doctrine embodied in the Kansas constitutional framework requires the court exercise 
judicial review only when the constitutional challenge is presented in an actual case or 
controversy between the parties. Under this case-or-controversy requirement, parties 
must show (among other factors) that they have standing. Standing is the right to make a 
legal claim. To have such a right, a party generally must show an injury in fact; absent  
 
 
2 
 
 
 
that injury, courts lack authority to entertain the party's claim. In this respect, standing is 
both a requirement for a case or controversy, i.e., justiciability, and a component of this 
court's subject matter jurisdiction. 
 
4. 
To establish an injury in fact sufficient to raise a constitutional challenge to a 
statute, a party must show that the statute affected the party's rights. Generally, if there is 
no constitutional defect in the application of the statute to a litigant, the litigant does not 
have standing to argue that it would be unconstitutional if applied to third parties in 
hypothetical situations. 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 61 Kan. App. 2d 31, 499 P.3d 481 (2021). 
Appeal from Riley District Court; JOHN F. BOSCH, judge. Opinion filed April 14, 2023. Judgment of the 
Court of Appeals affirming the district court is affirmed. Judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
 
Hope E. Faflick Reynolds, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause, and Jennifer 
C. Roth, of the same office, was with her on the briefs for appellant.  
 
David Lowden, deputy county attorney, argued the cause, and Barry R. Wilkerson, county 
attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the briefs for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by  
 
WALL, J.:  Shameke Caesar Strong challenges his conviction for possession with 
intent to distribute a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a school under K.S.A. 2022 
Supp. 21-5705. A subsection of that same statute provides for a rebuttable presumption of 
intent to distribute if a defendant possesses 3.5 grams or more of methamphetamine. 
K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5705(e)(2). In other words, under subsection (e)(2), a jury must 
presume that a defendant who possessed at least 3.5 grams of methamphetamine did so  
 
 
3 
 
 
 
with the intent to distribute it, unless the defendant can rebut the presumption with 
affirmative evidence to the contrary. See State v. Holder, 314 Kan. 799, 805, 502 P.3d 
1039 (2022). 
 
At Strong's trial, the State presented evidence that Strong possessed more than 11 
grams of methamphetamine. But rather than instructing the jury on the mandatory 
presumption in K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5705(e)(2), the district court provided a slightly 
modified version of a pattern jury instruction, PIK Crim. 4th 57.022 (2013 Supp.). The 
district court's instruction informed the jury that if the evidence showed Strong possessed 
3.5 grams or more of methamphetamine, then the jury could, but was not required to, 
presume Strong intended to distribute the controlled substance.  
 
Like two other cases decided this day, Strong's appeal raises a claim of 
instructional error and a constitutional challenge to K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5705(e)(2). See 
State v. Slusser, 317 Kan. ___ (No. 121,460, this day decided); State v. Martinez, 317 
Kan. ___ (No. 121,204, this day decided). Like the defendants in Martinez and Slusser, 
Strong argues the district court's instruction was legally inappropriate because it was 
inconsistent with the mandatory presumption in K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5705(e). Also like 
the defendants in Martinez and Slusser, Strong argues the mandatory presumption in 
K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5705(e) unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof to the 
defendants.  
 
We agree with Strong that the district court's instruction was erroneous because it 
did not accurately describe K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5705(e)'s mandatory presumption. But 
we hold that the instructional error does not require reversal of Strong's conviction 
because he fails to convince us the verdict would have been different but for the error.  
 
As to Strong's constitutional challenge to K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5705(e)'s 
mandatory presumption, our court lacks jurisdiction over the issue. Granted, courts 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
generally have authority to determine whether a statute is unconstitutional. But the power 
of judicial review is not unlimited. The separation of powers doctrine embodied in the 
Kansas constitutional framework requires that the court exercise review only when the 
issues are presented in an actual case or controversy between the parties. Under this case-
or-controversy requirement, parties must show (among other factors) that they have 
standing. A party has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute only when it 
adversely impacts the party's rights. We hold that Strong lacks standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5705(e)(2)'s mandatory presumption because it 
was not applied to him. Thus, it could not have adversely impacted his rights. 
 
Finally, Strong argues his sentence is unconstitutional under both the state and 
federal Constitutions because the district court judge, rather than a jury, determined his 
criminal history. But we hold that Strong's challenges to the constitutionality of his 
sentence are foreclosed by our precedent, and Strong provides no compelling reason for 
us to depart from that precedent. Thus, we affirm Strong's convictions. 
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
In October 2018, police executed a search warrant for a residence located within 
1,000 feet of a school in Manhattan. During the search, Strong exited a bedroom inside 
the house. When the police searched that bedroom, they found mail addressed to Strong 
(but with a delivery address different than the residence being searched), a digital scale, 
and a zippered sunglasses case. Inside the sunglasses case, officers found a plastic baggie 
containing 10.24 grams of methamphetamine; another plastic baggie containing 1.4 
grams of methamphetamine; and 15 to 20 clean, empty plastic baggies.  
 
 
At Strong's trial, Detective Michael Parr, who participated in the search of the 
residence, testified. Based on his experience, Detective Parr explained that methampheta-
mine users generally have only a small amount of methamphetamine with them at a time, 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
usually around 1 gram. Methamphetamine dealers, on the other hand, will usually have a 
larger amount, which they will break down into smaller amounts to sell individually.  
 
 
Strong testified in his defense. He said he did not live at the residence law 
enforcement searched, and he went there only to use the shower because of problems 
with the water main at his house. He brought his mail and a bag containing some clothes 
and hygiene products with him. But he denied knowing about the sunglasses case 
containing methamphetamine found in the bedroom.  
 
 
The jury found Strong guilty of possession with intent to distribute within 1,000 
feet of a school and possession of drug paraphernalia. The district court sentenced Strong 
to a controlling sentence of 186 months' imprisonment. Strong appealed, and the Court of 
Appeals panel affirmed his convictions and sentence. State v. Strong, 61 Kan. App. 2d 
31, 499 P.3d 481 (2021).  
 
 
We granted Strong's petition for review and ordered the parties to provide 
supplemental briefing on whether Strong has standing to challenge the constitutionality 
of K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5705(e)(2). And we heard oral argument from the parties on 
December 12, 2022. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
I. 
The District Court Committed Instructional Error, but this Error Does Not Warrant 
Reversal of Strong's Conviction for Possession with Intent to Distribute a Controlled 
Substance Within 1,000 Feet of a School 
 
Strong first raises a claim of instructional error. His claim focuses on Instruction 
No. 6, which told the jury it could, but did not have to, presume Strong intended to 
distribute methamphetamine, if he possessed at least 3.5 grams: 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
"You may presume that a person had the intent to distribute methamphetamine 
when the person possessed 3.5 grams or more. You may consider this presumption along 
with all other evidence in the case. You may accept or reject it in determining whether 
the State has met the burden to prove the required criminal intent of the Defendant. This 
burden never shifts to the Defendant." 
 
Instruction No. 6 generally reflects the language of the pattern jury instruction PIK 
Crim. 4th 57.022. The pattern instruction cites K.S.A. 21-5705(e) as its legal authority, 
and it provides a fill-in-the-blank inference that the jury "may accept or reject": 
 
 
"If you find the defendant possessed (450 grams or more of marijuana) (3.5 
grams or more of heroin) (3.5 grams or more of methamphetamine) (100 dosage units or 
more containing insert name of controlled substance) (100 grams or more of insert name 
of any other controlled substance), you may infer that the defendant possessed with intent 
to distribute. You may consider the inference along with all the other evidence in the 
case. You may accept or reject it in determining whether the State has met the burden of 
proving the intent of the defendant. This burden never shifts to the defendant." PIK Crim. 
4th 57.022. 
 
 
The key difference between Instruction No. 6 and the pattern instruction is the use 
of the word "presume." Instruction No. 6 told the jury it "may presume" an intent to 
distribute and it "may consider this presumption along with all the other evidence in the 
case." In contrast, the pattern instruction states that the jury "may infer" an intent to 
distribute and it "may consider the inference along with all the other evidence." PIK 
Crim. 4th 57.022. 
 
But Strong's argument is not based on the discrepancy between Instruction No. 6 
and PIK Crim. 4th 57.022. Rather, Strong argues Instruction No. 6 was legally 
inappropriate because it did not accurately reflect K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5705(e). He 
argues that the statute creates a mandatory presumption while Instruction No. 6 described 
the presumption in permissive terms. 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
 
A. Relevant Legal Framework and Standard of Review 
 
 
Appellate courts follow a multi-step process when reviewing instructional error 
issues. First, the court decides whether the issue was properly preserved below. Second, 
the court considers whether the instruction was legally and factually appropriate. Third, 
upon a finding of error, the court determines whether that error is reversible. State v. 
Douglas, 313 Kan. 704, 709, 490 P.3d 34 (2021). Whether the instructional error was 
preserved will affect the reversibility inquiry in the third step of this analysis. State v. 
McLinn, 307 Kan. 307, 317, 409 P.3d 1 (2018).  
 
 
Strong did not object to the instruction he now challenges, so any error will be 
reviewed for clear error. Douglas, 313 Kan. at 710. And Strong does not challenge the 
factual appropriateness of the instruction. Instead, he argues only that the instruction was 
legally inappropriate. Our appellate review is unlimited when deciding whether the jury 
instruction fairly and accurately reflects the applicable law. State v. Plummer, 295 Kan. 
156, 161, 283 P.3d 202 (2012). Even if the instruction is legally inappropriate, that error 
will require reversal under the clear-error standard only if Strong firmly convinces us the 
jury would have reached a different verdict if the error had not occurred. Douglas, 313 
Kan. at 710. 
 
B. The Court of Appeals Panel Erred in Holding Instruction No. 6 Was Legally 
Appropriate 
 
In addressing Strong's instructional challenge, the Court of Appeals panel held that 
Instruction No. 6 was legally appropriate. Strong, 61 Kan. App. 2d at 40-41. The panel 
interpreted K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5705(e) as providing for a permissive inference or 
presumption, rather than a mandatory one. Thus, the panel held that Instruction No. 6 
accurately describes the statutory presumption of intent. 61 Kan. App. 2d at 38, 41. The 
 
 
8 
 
 
 
panel also reasoned that Instruction No. 6 is based on PIK Crim. 4th 57.022, and this 
court has strongly recommended the use of pattern instructions. 61 Kan. App. 2d at 40-41 
(citing State v. Butler, 307 Kan. 831, 847, 416 P.3d 116 [2018] [Kansas Supreme Court 
strongly recommends use of PIK instructions]). 
 
Strong argues the Court of Appeals panel erred in concluding that Instruction No. 
6 is legally appropriate, and we agree. As noted, the panel held that Instruction No. 6 
accurately reflects the law because K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5705(e) "creates a permissive 
presumption, not a mandatory one as Strong argues." Strong, 61 Kan. App. 2d at 41. But 
after the panel issued its decision in Strong's case, we subsequently held that K.S.A. 2022 
Supp. 21-5705(e) calls for a mandatory, albeit rebuttable, presumption. Holder, 314 Kan. 
at 805; State v. Valdez, 316 Kan. 1, 8-9, 512 P.3d 1125 (2022). And we held that the 
permissive instructions given in those cases, though based on PIK Crim. 4th 57.022, were 
not legally appropriate because they did not fairly and accurately reflect the mandatory 
presumption set forth in K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5705(e). Holder, 314 Kan. 799, Syl. ¶ 4; 
Valdez, 316 Kan. at 8-9. 
 
A plain language interpretation of K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5705(e) supports our 
holding in Holder and Valdez. The guiding principle in statutory interpretation is that 
legislative intent governs if that intent can be ascertained. Bruce v. Kelly, 316 Kan. 218, 
224, 514 P.3d 1007 (2022). In ascertaining legislative intent, courts begin with the 
statute's plain language, giving common words their ordinary meaning. If, however, the 
statute's language is ambiguous, courts may consult canons of construction to resolve the 
ambiguity. 316 Kan. at 224. "The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is 
determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language 
is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole." Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 
U.S. 337, 341, 117 S. Ct. 843, 136 L. Ed. 2d 808 (1997); see also O'Donoghue v. Farm 
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 275 Kan. 430, 433, 66 P.3d 822 (2003) (in construing statutes, 
courts should construe words and phrases according to context and approved use of 
 
 
9 
 
 
 
language). Furthermore, even when a statute is plain and unambiguous, the doctrine of in 
pari materia applies, meaning courts should consider not only the words themselves but 
also their context to bring various provisions of an act into workable harmony, if 
possible. Bruce, 316 Kan. at 224. 
 
We begin our plain language interpretation with the statute's use of the term 
"rebuttable presumption." As we explained in Holder, evidentiary devices such as 
presumptions and inferences exist along a continuum. 314 Kan. at 804. On one end, there 
is the permissive inference, which allows, but does not require, the jury to infer the 
elemental fact once the State has proved the predicate fact, and which places no burden of 
any kind on the defendant. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314, 105 S. Ct. 1965, 85 L. 
Ed. 2d 344 (1985); Holder, 314 Kan. at 804 (citing Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 
U.S. 140, 156-57, 99 S. Ct. 2213, 60 L. Ed. 2d 777 [1979]). On the other end, there is the 
mandatory presumption, which "'instructs the jury that it must infer the presumed fact if 
the State proves certain predicate facts.'" Holder, 314 Kan. at 804 (quoting Francis, 471 
U.S. at 314). 
 
Mandatory presumptions can be further divided into two camps—conclusive and 
rebuttable—with different legal effects. Holder, 314 Kan. at 804-05.  
 
"'A conclusive presumption removes the presumed element from the case once the State 
has proved the predicate facts giving rise to the presumption. A rebuttable presumption 
does not remove the presumed element from the case but nevertheless requires the jury to 
find the presumed element unless the defendant persuades the jury that such a finding is 
unwarranted.'" 314 Kan. at 804-05 (quoting Francis, 471 U.S. at 314 n.2).  
 
In State v. Harkness, 252 Kan. 510, Syl. ¶ 12, 847 P.2d 1191 (1993), we limited 
the use of the term "mandatory presumption" to what the Francis Court dubbed a 
"conclusive presumption." See Holder, 314 Kan. at 805. But we still defined a rebuttable 
 
 
10 
 
 
 
presumption as an evidentiary device that requires the jury to find the presumed element 
(in this case, the intent to distribute) once the State proves the predicate fact (in this case, 
possession of at least 3.5 grams of methamphetamine) unless the defendant rebuts the 
presumption with affirmative evidence to the contrary. Harkness, 252 Kan. 510, Syl. 
¶ 13. Thus, despite the shift in terminology, rebuttable presumptions are still, by 
definition, mandatory. And we presume the Legislature was aware of this definition when 
it first enacted K.S.A. 21-5705(e) in 2012. See Ed DeWitte Ins. Agency v. Financial 
Assocs. Midwest, 308 Kan. 1065, 1071, 427 P.3d 25 (2018) (courts presume Legislature 
acts with full knowledge about statutory subject matter, prior and existing law, and 
judicial decisions interpreting prior and existing law and legislation); L. 2012, ch. 
150, § 9. 
 
K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5705(e) also provides that "there shall be" a rebuttable 
presumption of intent to distribute. Viewed in isolation, the term "shall" can be 
ambiguous because it is susceptible to multiple meanings, including "must," "should," or 
even "may," depending on the context. See State v. Raschke, 289 Kan. 911, 920-22, 219 
P.3d 481 (2009) (recognizing "shall" can be either mandatory or directory depending on 
context); see also Black's Law Dictionary 1653 (11th ed. 2019) ("shall" may mean "[h]as 
a duty to; more broadly, is required to," "[s]hould," "[m]ay," [w]ill," or "[i]s entitled to"). 
But reading the statutory language together, as a whole, there is nothing to suggest the 
Legislature intended the statutory presumption to be permissive. Instead, reading "there 
shall be" in conjunction with "rebuttable presumption" (which, again, refers to a type of 
mandatory presumption) indicates the statutory presumption is mandatory. See 289 Kan. 
at 921 (in interpreting the word "shall," "'[e]ach case must stand largely on its own facts, 
to be determined on an interpretation of the particular language used'"); see also Bruce, 
316 Kan. at 224 (quoting Othi v. Holder, 734 F.3d 259, 265 [4th Cir. 2013] ["'"To 
determine a statute's plain meaning, we not only look to the language itself, but also the 
specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a 
whole."'"]).  
 
 
11 
 
 
 
 
Thus, K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5705(e)'s plain language provides for a mandatory, 
albeit rebuttable, presumption. Such a presumption requires or compels the jury to draw 
a certain conclusion (an intent to distribute) based on a proven fact or set of facts 
(possession of at least 3.5 grams of methamphetamine), unless the defendant provides 
evidence contrary to that conclusion. See Holder, 314 Kan. at 805; see also State v. 
Slusser, 317 Kan. at ___, slip op. at 18 ("A presumption . . . is a rule of law that requires 
the fact-finder to draw a certain conclusion from a proven fact or set of facts in the 
absence of contrary evidence."). K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5705(e)'s presumption is not only 
mandatory but also implies a shifting of the burden of proof from the State to the 
defendant. See Holder, 314 Kan. at 805 (K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5705[e]'s statutory 
presumption implies "some burden shifting, although the operative impact in a given case 
would depend on the jury instructions as a whole."). 
 
Instruction No. 6 deviates from K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5705(e) because the 
instruction does not accurately describe the operation and legal effect of the mandatory 
rebuttable presumption in the statute. Rather than telling the jury "there shall be" a 
presumption of intent to distribute if the defendant possessed at least 3.5 grams of 
methamphetamine, Instruction No. 6 told the jury it "may" presume an intent to distribute 
based on that evidence. The instruction also told the jury it "may accept or reject" the 
presumption in deciding whether the State had met its burden. Finally, it told the jury that 
the burden of proof never shifts to the defendant. This last phrase in particular is 
inconsistent with a mandatory rebuttable presumption, which shifts the burden of proof to 
defendant once the State establishes the predicate fact—that defendant possessed at least 
3.5 grams of methamphetamine. In short, Instruction No. 6 is legally improper because it 
describes a permissive presumption or inference, rather than the mandatory rebuttable 
presumption in the plain language of the statute.  
 
 
 
12 
 
 
 
Of course, when deciding whether a defendant intended to distribute a controlled 
substance, jurors may still draw reasonable inferences from the trial evidence. More 
specifically, the jury may reasonably infer an intent to distribute based on a defendant's 
possession of a large quantity of narcotics. See, e.g., Holder, 314 Kan. at 806 ("[A] 
defendant's possession of a large quantity of narcotics certainly may support an inference 
that the defendant intended to distribute the narcotic."). And if such an inference is 
reasonably grounded in evidence, the prosecutor may also encourage the jury to make 
this inference. Nothing in this opinion, or in Holder, Valdez, Martinez, or Slusser, should 
be taken to suggest otherwise.  
 
When viewed in isolation, one might argue that Instruction No. 6 is legally 
appropriate because it simply recites this basic evidentiary principle—that jurors may 
draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. But jury instructions "must always fairly 
and accurately state the applicable law." (Emphasis added.) Plummer, 295 Kan. at 161. 
And while jurors remain free to make reasonable inferences from the evidence, 
Instruction No. 6 fails to incorporate the mandatory presumption in K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 
21-5705(e)(2). Thus, the instruction is incomplete and legally inappropriate because it 
does not "fairly and accurately state the applicable law." (Emphasis added.) 295 Kan. 
at 161.  
 
The State believes Instruction No. 6 accurately reflects the statutory presumption 
in K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5705(e) when read in conjunction with the evidentiary rules set 
forth in K.S.A. 60-415 and K.S.A. 60-416. The former statute provides:  "If two 
presumptions arise which are conflicting with each other the judge shall apply the 
presumption which is founded on the weightier consideration of policy and logic. If there 
is no such preponderance both presumptions shall be disregarded." K.S.A. 60-415. The 
latter statute provides:  "A presumption, which by a rule of law may be overcome only by  
 
 
13 
 
 
 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt . . . shall not be affected by K.S.A. 60-414 or 60-415 
and the burden of proof to overcome it continues on the party against whom the 
presumption operates." K.S.A. 60-416. 
 
According to the State, K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5705(e)'s statutory presumption 
conflicts with the presumption of innocence. See K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5108(b) ("A 
defendant is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty."); State v. Ross, 310 Kan. 216, 
221, 445 P.3d 726 (2019) ("Every criminal defendant has a constitutional right to the 
presumption of innocence."). And the State correctly points out the presumption of 
innocence may be overcome only by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See K.S.A. 2022 
Supp. 21-5108(a) (State has burden to prove defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt); State v. Colbert, 26 Kan. App. 2d 177, 180, 987 P.2d 1110 (1999) (State required 
to overcome presumption of innocence through proof beyond a reasonable doubt). Thus, 
the State reasons that Instruction No. 6 was drafted to acknowledge that the presumption 
of innocence is founded on weightier considerations of policy and logic under K.S.A. 60-
415, and the burden to overcome that presumption cannot be lowered or shifted under 
K.S.A. 60-416.  
 
But assuming, without deciding, that the statutory presumption in K.S.A. 2022 
Supp. 21-5705(e) conflicts with the presumption of innocence, neither K.S.A. 60-415 nor 
K.S.A. 60-416 establish that a permissive instruction (like Instruction No. 6) is legally 
appropriate. K.S.A. 60-415 simply provides that a district court shall determine which of 
two conflicting presumptions should be applied in a particular case. And K.S.A. 60-416 
simply provides that K.S.A. 60-415 is inapplicable to the presumption of innocence. 
Nothing in either statute makes it legally appropriate to draft a jury instruction that 
describes a statutory presumption in a way that deviates from the applicable statute.  
 
In sum, the plain language of K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5705(e)(2) provides for a 
mandatory (albeit rebuttable) presumption of intent to distribute when a defendant is 
 
 
14 
 
 
 
found to have possessed at least 3.5 grams of methamphetamine. Once the State proves 
defendant possessed at least 3.5 grams of methamphetamine, the statute requires the jury 
to presume defendant intended to distribute the controlled substance unless the defendant 
proves otherwise. See Holder, 314 Kan. at 805. But Instruction No. 6 described the 
statutory presumption in permissive, rather than mandatory, terms and informed the jury 
that the burden of proof never shifts to the defendant. The instruction does not accurately 
describe the operation and legal effect of a mandatory rebuttable presumption. Thus, 
Instruction No. 6 is not legally appropriate because it does not fairly and accurately state 
the applicable law in K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5705(e). The panel erred in concluding 
otherwise, likely because it did not have the benefit of our subsequent decisions in 
Holder and Valdez.  
 
C. The Instructional Error Does Not Require Reversal 
 
Having concluded that the instruction was not legally appropriate, we next 
consider whether this error warrants reversal of Strong's conviction for possession with 
intent to distribute a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a school. For reasons 
discussed below, we hold it does not.  
 
Because Strong did not object to the instruction, the clear-error standard governs 
our reversibility analysis. Under that standard, we must reverse Strong's conviction if we 
are firmly convinced the jury would have reached a different verdict if the instructional 
error had not occurred. State v. Timley, 311 Kan. 944, 955, 469 P.3d 54 (2020). Strong 
has the burden to establish clear error. 311 Kan. at 955.  
 
Upon review of the entire record, Strong has not firmly convinced us that the 
verdict would have changed but for the instructional error. If the district court had given a 
legally appropriate instruction that mirrored K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5705(e)(2)'s 
mandatory presumption, such an instruction would have required the jury to find that 
 
 
15 
 
 
 
Strong intended to distribute the methamphetamine found in the bedroom. Such an 
instruction would have been more prejudicial to Strong than the permissive instruction 
given to the jury. 
 
If, on the other hand, the district court offered no instruction on the intent to 
distribute, the State still presented compelling evidence to support the jury's finding that 
Strong intended to distribute the methamphetamine in his possession. The evidence 
showed Strong possessed a total of 11.64 grams of methamphetamine. Detective Parr 
testified that methamphetamine users typically carry small quantities, usually around 
1 gram. In contrast, methamphetamine dealers usually have a larger quantity. 
 
The methamphetamine was also divided into two plastic baggies:  one containing a 
larger amount and one containing about 1 gram. Detective Parr testified that based on his 
training and experience the smaller bag had originally come from the larger bag, which is 
how dealers usually break down their supply for individual sales. Detective Parr also 
found it significant that there was a digital scale and multiple new, clean plastic baggies 
near the controlled substances found in the bedroom. He testified that digital scales are 
commonly used in drug trafficking. And, according to Detective Parr, if a personal user 
of methamphetamine has empty baggies on them, then those baggies will usually be 
coated in residue from the methamphetamine. 
 
Also, Strong's defense did not focus on the intent-to-distribute element of the 
crime. Thus, he did not show or argue that the methamphetamine was intended for 
personal use. Instead, his defense focused on whether he possessed the methampheta-
mine—another element of the offense. And Strong testified the methamphetamine was 
not his at all. Thus, the State's evidence establishing Strong's intent to distribute was 
essentially uncontroverted. 
 
 
 
16 
 
 
 
In Valdez, we found an instructional error was harmless for similar reasons. There, 
the district court gave an instruction patterned after PIK Crim. 4th 57.022, and we held 
the instruction was not legally appropriate because it did not fairly and accurately reflect 
the statutory presumption in K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5705(e)(2). Valdez, 316 Kan. at 8-9. 
But we held that the district court did not commit clear error by giving the instruction. 
For one, the district court's permissive instruction was more favorable than an instruction 
patterned after the statutory presumption. 316 Kan. at 9-10. And the State had presented 
ample evidence that the defendant intended to distribute, including evidence showing that 
Valdez had possessed over 15 grams of methamphetamine, along with a digital scale with 
white residue, empty plastic baggies, and a text message discussing a potential narcotics 
transaction. 316 Kan. at 3, 10. 
 
Strong tries to distinguish his case from Valdez. He points out that Riley County 
police recovered less than the 15 grams of methamphetamine recovered in Valdez. And 
the State did not introduce any text messages from Strong implicating him in a drug 
transaction. Finally, Strong notes that unlike Valdez, there is no evidence the digital scale 
recovered from the bedroom had any white residue on it.  
 
At best, Strong's argument indicates that the State's evidence supporting 
defendant's intent to distribute in Valdez was not identical in all respects to the evidence 
presented at Strong's trial. But in both matters, the State presented ample evidence of 
defendant's intent to distribute, including evidence other than the weight of the metham-
phetamine in defendants' possession. And again, Strong did not attempt to controvert this 
evidence as part of his defense. Thus, we conclude that Strong has not met his burden to 
show the district court committed clear error by giving Instruction No. 6.  
 
 
 
17 
 
 
 
II. Strong Does Not Have Standing to Challenge the Constitutionality of K.S.A. 2022 
Supp. 21-5705(e) 
 
Strong next argues K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5705(e) is facially unconstitutional 
because it violates a defendant's federal due process right to have the State prove every 
element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Strong claims the statute imposes a 
mandatory rebuttable presumption which impermissibly shifts the burden of persuasion 
on the element of intent to the defendant. See Francis, 471 U.S. at 314 (mandatory 
presumption is unconstitutional if it relieves the State of its burden of persuasion on an 
element of an offense). 
 
The Court of Appeals panel rejected Strong's argument and concluded that the 
statute was constitutional. The panel held that K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5705(e)'s statutory 
presumption "creates a permissive inference telling the jury it may infer intent to 
distribute if the State proves the defendant possessed the requisite weight of the drug." 
Strong, 61 Kan. App. 2d at 38. It further held that the provision did not violate due 
process because the inference was justified by reason and common sense. 61 Kan. App. 
2d at 38; see also Francis, 471 U.S. at 314-15 ("A permissive inference violates the Due 
Process Clause only if the suggested conclusion is not one that reason and common sense 
justify in light of the proven facts before the jury."). 
 
 
On review, Strong argues the Court of Appeals panel erroneously held that K.S.A. 
2022 Supp. 21-5705(e) was constitutional. And he specifically challenges the panel's 
conclusion that the statute creates a permissive presumption or inference rather than a 
mandatory rebuttable presumption. But before we can consider the merits of Strong's 
constitutional challenge to K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5705(e), we must first address the 
threshold question of whether Strong has standing to challenge the statute.  
 
 
 
18 
 
 
 
A. Standard of Review and Relevant Legal Framework 
 
While courts generally have authority to determine whether a statute is 
unconstitutional, this power of judicial review is not unlimited. The separation of powers 
doctrine embodied in the Kansas constitutional framework requires the court exercise 
judicial review only when the constitutional challenge is presented in an actual case or 
controversy between the parties. Gannon v. State, 298 Kan. 1107, 1119, 319 P.3d 1196 
(2014). Under this case-or-controversy requirement, parties must show (among other 
factors) that they have standing. Standing is the "right to make a legal claim." 298 Kan. at 
1121. To have such a right, a party generally must show an "injury in fact"; absent that 
injury, courts lack authority to entertain the party's claim. See 298 Kan. 1122-23 
(Standing "is a component of subject matter jurisdiction."); see also In re A.A.-F., 310 
Kan. 125, 135, 444 P.3d 938 (2019) ("Kansas courts have authority—in other words, the 
judicial power—to hear only those matters over which they have jurisdiction."). In this 
respect, standing is both a requirement for a case or controversy, i.e., justiciability, and a 
component of this court's subject matter jurisdiction. Gannon, 298 Kan. at 1122-23.  
 
To establish an injury in fact sufficient to raise a constitutional challenge to a 
statute, a party must show that the statute affected the party's rights. State v. Coman, 294 
Kan. 84, Syl. ¶ 3, 273 P.3d 701 (2012); see Ulster, 442 U.S. at 154-55 ("A party has 
standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute only insofar as it has an adverse 
impact on his own rights."). "As a general rule, if there is no constitutional defect in the 
application of the statute to a litigant, he does not have standing to argue that it would be 
unconstitutional if applied to third parties in hypothetical situations." 442 U.S. at 155; see 
Coman, 294 Kan. at 90. 
 
In cases such as Strong's, in which the party is challenging the constitutionality of 
an evidentiary device such as an inference or presumption, the jury instructions will  
 
 
19 
 
 
 
generally determine what type of device was applied in a case, although courts may need 
to look to the relevant statute and related caselaw in interpreting those instructions. 
Ulster, 442 U.S. at 157 n.16.  
 
Whether a party has standing is a question of law over which this court has 
unlimited review. State v. Bodine, 313 Kan. 378, 385, 486 P.3d 551 (2021).  
 
B. Strong Lacks Standing to Challenge the Constitutionality of K.S.A. 2022 
Supp. 21-5705(e)'s Mandatory Rebuttable Presumption 
 
 
While not explicitly using the word "standing," the Court of Appeals panel 
effectively determined that Strong had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the 
statute because "[t]he jury instruction's discussion of the presumption of intent to 
distribute placed the statutory provision's presumption in front of the jury." Strong, 61 
Kan. App. 2d at 37. But the panel's holding is founded on its conclusion that the statute 
calls for a permissive presumption or inference. See 61 Kan. App. 2d at 38. If that were 
true, the jury instruction in Strong's case would have likely put the statutory presumption 
before the jury. But as discussed in Issue I, K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5705(e) provides for a 
mandatory (albeit rebuttable) presumption, not a permissive presumption or inference. 
See Holder, 314 Kan. at 805; Valdez, 316 Kan. at 8.  
 
 
In Martinez, 317 Kan. at ___, slip op. at 14, we held that defendant lacked 
standing to bring a facial challenge to K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5705(e) because the district 
court's instruction based on PIK Crim. 4th 57.022 described a permissive inference. In 
other words, the mandatory rebuttable presumption in K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5705(e) was 
never applied to Martinez. Thus, it could not have adversely impacted his rights, 
depriving Martinez of standing to raise his constitutional challenge. But the instruction in 
Strong's case is not identical to the instruction in Martinez. Here, instead of telling the  
 
 
20 
 
 
 
jury it "may infer" an intent to distribute and it may consider "this inference" along with 
all other evidence, Instruction No. 6 told the jury it "may presume" Strong's intent to 
distribute and it may consider "this presumption" along with all other evidence.  
 
 
But this difference in verbiage does not lead to a different outcome in Strong's 
case. Strong claims K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5705(e) is constitutionally defective because 
it provides for a mandatory presumption. He argues all mandatory presumptions 
(rebuttable or otherwise) are unconstitutional because they relieve the State of its burden 
to prove each element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. But here, Instruction No. 6 
did not describe a mandatory presumption. While it used the words "presume" and 
"presumption," it couched those words in permissive terms and clarified that the burden 
of proof never shifted to Strong. Because the constitutional defect Strong complains of 
was not applied to him through the jury instruction, he lacks standing to challenge the 
statute on those grounds. See Coman, 294 Kan. 84, Syl. ¶ 3 ("To challenge the 
constitutionality of a statute, the appellant must have been directly affected by the alleged 
defect."). 
 
 
Strong also argues he has standing to challenge K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5705(e)'s 
constitutionality not because the jury instruction put the statute's mandatory presumption 
before the jury, but rather because the prosecutor's closing argument did. During that 
argument, the prosecutor told the jury that Instruction No. 6 "says if [a person] has 3.5 
grams or more [of methamphetamine], you can presume that they had the intent to 
distribute." The prosecutor also argued that Strong "had over three times the amount that 
you're allowed to make a presumption on." And later he discussed the presumption of 
intent along with the presumption of innocence, explaining: 
 
 
 
21 
 
 
 
"Presumption or presumed is mentioned twice in the instructions. One instruction 
says you must presume the defendant to be not guilty. The other one is the instruction 
relating to the presumption that you can make with the amount of the methamphetamine 
when it tells you that you may presume that the person held it with intent to distribute." 
 
Based on these comments, Strong claims the prosecutor's argument described Instruction 
No. 6 to the jury in a manner consistent with the mandatory rebuttable presumption in 
K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5705(e)(2).  
 
 
We are not persuaded by Strong's argument. Strong's constitutional challenge rests 
on K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5705(e)'s provision for a mandatory, albeit rebuttable, 
presumption. But the prosecutor consistently used permissive language to describe the 
presumption of intent. He told the jury it "can" presume or it was "allowed" to presume 
Strong's intent to distribute if the evidence showed he possessed at least 3.5 grams of 
methamphetamine. This permissive language contrasts with the compulsory language the 
prosecutor used to describe the presumption of innocence. In discussing this presumption, 
he told the jury it "must" presume Strong is not guilty.  
 
 
Granted, on one occasion, the prosecutor stated that Strong possessed "over three 
times the amount [of methamphetamine] that a person is presumed to have [intended to] 
distribute[]." (Emphasis added.) This language could suggest the presumption is 
mandatory. See Francis, 471 U.S. at 316 (jury instruction using words "is presumed" was 
"cast in the language of command"). But placing that comment in context, the prosecutor 
did not give the overall impression that the presumption described in Instruction No. 6 
was mandatory. Rather, he repeatedly used permissive terminology to describe the 
evidentiary device, consistent with the express language in Instruction No. 6. See Bland 
v. Sirmons, 459 F.3d 999, 1015 (10th Cir. 2006) (presuming jury followed its written 
instructions even when the prosecutor misstated those instructions in closing argument). 
 
 
 
22 
 
 
 
 
It is also worth mentioning that Strong's arguments regarding the prosecutor's 
closing are readily distinguishable from the prosecutorial error claim raised in Slusser. 
There, the district court gave an instruction more closely patterned after PIK Crim. 4th 
57.022 , and this instruction permitted the jury to "infer" an intent to distribute if 
defendant possessed at least 3.5 grams of methamphetamine. But in closing argument, the 
prosecutor repeatedly described the evidentiary device as a "presumption" rather than a 
reasonable "inference," and we held that this argument constituted prosecutorial error 
when measured against the plain language of the jury instruction. Here, the instruction 
does not use the terms "inference/infer." And Strong does not take issue with the 
prosecutor's use of "presumption/presume" to describe the evidentiary device in the jury 
instruction. Thus, Strong's framing of the issue distinguishes this case from Slusser.  
 
 
Because Strong has failed to show K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5705(e)'s mandatory 
presumption was applied to him, he lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of 
that statutory presumption. And because he lacks standing, we lack jurisdiction to hear 
his constitutional challenge.  
 
III. The Use of Strong's Prior Convictions to Enhance His Sentence Does Not Violate 
the State or Federal Constitutions 
 
 
Finally, Strong challenges the constitutionality of his sentence. The district court 
sentenced Strong pursuant to the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act, a graduated 
sentencing scheme which provides increasingly severe presumptive sentences for most 
convicted felons based on the severity level of the crime of conviction and the 
defendant's criminal history. A crime's severity level is determined by statute, and a 
defendant's criminal history score is calculated by considering and scoring the defendant's 
eligible prior convictions. See K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6810.  
 
 
 
23 
 
 
 
 
Strong's constitutional challenges to his sentence arise from K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 
21-6814(a). That statute authorizes the sentencing judge, rather than a jury, to determine 
the offender's criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence at the sentencing 
hearing. Strong argues the statute violates his jury-trial rights under section 5 of the 
Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. According to Strong, at the time our state 
Constitution was adopted, American common law required the State to prove the 
existence of prior convictions to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus this 
requirement became enshrined in section 5.  
 
We rejected an identical argument in State v. Albano, 313 Kan. 638, 487 P.3d 750 
(2021). There, we held section 5 does not guarantee defendants the right to have a jury 
determine the existence of sentence-enhancing prior convictions because no authority 
substantiates the claim that defendants had such a jury trial right at common law when 
the Kansas Constitution was adopted. 313 Kan. 638, Syl. ¶ 4. And the Court of Appeals 
panel correctly held that Strong's section 5 challenge failed under Albano. Strong, 61 
Kan. App. 2d at 41-42.  
 
On review, Strong invites us to reconsider Albano but provides no new arguments 
as to why the decision reached an incorrect result or why more good than harm will come 
by departing from this precedent. See McCullough v. Wilson, 308 Kan. 1025, Syl. ¶ 5, 
426 P.3d 494 (2018) ("An appellate court may decline to apply the doctrine of stare 
decisis if it is clearly convinced that the rule of law in issue was originally erroneous or is 
no longer sound because of changing conditions and that more good than harm will come 
by departing from precedent."). We thus decline Strong's invitation.  
 
 
Strong also argues that K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6814(a) violates his rights under the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as recognized in 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000). 
Apprendi held that "any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
 
 
24 
 
 
 
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 
530 U.S. at 490. But Apprendi recognized that prior convictions were an exception to this 
general rule. 530 U.S. at 490. Based on this exception, we have held that Apprendi does 
not apply where the sentence imposed was based in part on a defendant's criminal history 
score under the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act. State v. Ivory, 273 Kan. 44, Syl., 41 
P.3d 781 (2002). Applying Ivory, the Court of Appeals panel rejected Strong's federal 
constitutional challenge to his sentence. On review, Strong concedes his argument is 
foreclosed by Ivory, and he raises the issue only to preserve it for federal review.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We hold that Instruction No. 6 was legally inappropriate because it did not fairly 
and accurately reflect the mandatory rebuttable presumption set forth in K.S.A. 2022 
Supp. 21-5705(e), and the Court of Appeals panel erred by holding otherwise. 
Nevertheless, Strong failed to meet his burden to show this error requires reversal under 
the clear-error standard.  
 
We also hold that Strong lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of 
K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5705(e), depriving the appellate courts of jurisdiction over the 
challenge. We thus vacate the panel's holding that the statute is constitutional and do not 
reach the merits of Strong's challenge.  
 
While we disagree with the panel's rationale on these two issues, we nevertheless 
affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment affirming Strong's convictions. See State v. Brown, 
314 Kan. 292, 306-08, 498 P.3d 167 (2021) (affirming Court of Appeals' judgment as 
right for the wrong reason). 
 
Finally, Strong's constitutional challenges to his sentence are foreclosed by Albano 
and Ivory. We thus affirm the Court of Appeals' decision upholding Strong's sentence. 
 
 
25 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. Judgment of the district court is 
affirmed.  
 
* * * 
 
STEGALL, J., concurring:  Here is what is going on. In 1985, the United States 
Supreme Court held that a "mandatory rebuttable presumption is . . . unconstitutional" 
because it "relieves the State of the affirmative burden of persuasion on the presumed 
element by instructing the jury that it must find the presumed element unless the 
defendant persuades the jury not to make such a finding"—thereby amounting to 
"unconstitutional burden-shifting." Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 317-18, 105 S. Ct. 
1965, 85 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1985).  
 
Then, in 2012 the Kansas Legislature passed an amendment to K.S.A. 21-5705 
which contains the mandatory rebuttable presumptions at issue in this and related cases. 
The following year, the Pattern Instructions in Kansas committee had to draft an 
instruction to implement K.S.A. 21-5705. Confronted with an obvious constitutional 
dilemma, the committee substantively altered K.S.A. 21-5705 from a mandatory 
rebuttable presumption to a permissive inference. The committee presumably understood 
that mandatory rebuttable presumptions are suspect while permissive inferences are 
routine and are constitutionally permitted. See, e.g., State v. Kriss, 232 Kan. 301, 304-05, 
654 P.2d 942 (1982) ("'Because [a] permissive [inference] leaves the trier of fact free to 
credit or reject the inference and does not shift the burden of proof, it affects the 
application of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard only if, under the facts of the 
case, there is no rational way the trier could make the connection permitted by the 
inference. For only in that situation is there any risk that an explanation of the permissible 
inference to a jury, or its use by a jury, has caused the presumptively rational factfinder to 
make an erroneous factual determination.'"). 
 
 
26 
 
 
 
 
Following the PIK committee's work, it appears that—at least judging by the cases 
that have reached Kansas appellate courts—everyone involved at the trial court level 
(including prosecutors, defendants, and district court judges) has recognized the potential 
constitutional deficiencies in K.S.A. 21-5705 and has been satisfied to give juries the 
permissive inference instruction drafted by the PIK committee and contained in PIK 
Crim. 4th 57.022 (2013 Supp.). 
 
But then our court began to weigh in. First in State v. Holder, 314 Kan. 799, 502 
P.3d 1039 (2022), and State v. Valdez, 316 Kan. 1, 4, 512 P.3d 1125 (2022), and 
continuing today in Strong, Slusser, Martinez, and Bentley. State v. Strong, 317 Kan. ___ 
(No. 121,865, this day decided); State v. Slusser, 317 Kan. ___ (No. 121,460, this day 
decided); State v. Martinez, 317 Kan. ___ (No. 121,204, this day decided); State v. 
Bentley, 317 Kan. ___ (No. 123,185, this day decided). In the process, we have confused 
our broader jury instruction rules while steadfastly declining to reach the constitutional 
question at the heart of the matter. Here I will continue to explain my dissenting view—
though framed as a concurrence in the result—begun in Valdez. 316 Kan. at 28 (Stegall, 
J., concurring).  
 
Given the fact that, as noted above, the juries in these cases were all given the 
permissive inference instruction rather than an instruction containing the actual 
mandatory rebuttable presumption rule stated in K.S.A. 21-5705, we have been unable to 
reach the merits of the constitutionality of the statute. Instead, we have been mired in a 
debate over whether PIK Crim. 4th 57.022 is "legally appropriate." The result has created 
bizarre anomalies that cannot withstand a commonsense examination.  
 
After discussing the question of legal appropriateness in Holder (but not reaching 
the question because we relied instead on factual appropriateness), a majority of the court 
in Valdez held that PIK Crim. 4th 57.022 is not legally appropriate because it "does not 
 
 
27 
 
 
 
fairly and accurately reflect the statutory rebuttable presumption" contained in K.S.A. 
21-5705. 316 Kan. at 9. In response, I observed that the majority conclusion "throws into 
doubt a bedrock principle of how juries may consider evidence." 316 Kan. at 30 (Stegall, 
J., concurring). After all, how can a correct statement of the law be "legally 
inappropriate"? For example, are jurors no longer "permitted to draw reasonable 
inferences about intent from the amount of illegal drugs possessed by a defendant?" 316 
Kan. at 30 (Stegall, J., concurring). What about prosecutors? Would it be error for a 
prosecutor to tell "a jury it may infer a defendant intended to sell drugs due to the large 
quantity in evidence"? 316 Kan. at 30 (Stegall, J., concurring). 
 
Instead of comparing PIK Crim. 4th 57.022 to K.S.A. 21-5705 and asking only the 
myopic question of whether they match (obviously they do not), I proposed instead that 
"we ought to ask if the permissive inference instruction—standing alone—is a correct 
statement of the law." 316 Kan. at 31 (Stegall, J., concurring). And I answered, "[c]learly, 
it is . . . because permissive inferences are always lawful so long as the facts make such 
inferences reasonable." 316 Kan. at 31 (Stegall, J., concurring). 
 
In today's cases, in response to these concerns, the majority makes it clear that 
permissive inferences are still lawful. The majority observes that "the jury may 
reasonably infer an intent to distribute based on a defendant's possession of a large 
quantity of narcotics" and that "if such an inference is reasonably grounded in evidence, 
the prosecutor may also encourage the jury to make this inference." Strong, 317 Kan. 
at ___, slip op. at 12.  
 
Nevertheless, the majority insists that PIK Crim. 4th 57.022, while being a correct 
statement of the law, is still legally inappropriate because it "fails to incorporate the 
mandatory presumption" from K.S.A. 21-5705 and therefore it does not "fairly and 
accurately state the applicable law." Strong, 317 Kan. at ___, slip op. at 12. It is a 
consolation, I suppose, that the majority expressly preserves a longstanding evidentiary 
 
 
28 
 
 
 
rule by conceding that PIK Crim. 4th 57.022 is legally correct. Unfortunately, this 
conclusion only deepens the confusion with respect to rules pertaining to jury 
instructions. 
 
This is my takeaway—the rule created by the majority is that a legally correct jury 
instruction is not legally appropriate if it does not incorporate a statute that is almost 
certainly unconstitutional and is recognized as such by the PIK committee, by the parties 
to the underlying criminal litigation, and by the district court judges charged with giving 
the instructions. Such a rule cannot survive basic questioning.  
 
For example, what if our Legislature passed a statute that simply said, "In Kansas, 
there shall no longer be a presumption of innocence in criminal proceedings." Such a 
statute would be plainly and obviously unconstitutional. See State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 
570, 256 P.3d 801 (2011) (The right to a fair trial and presumption of innocence are 
guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.).  
 
Assume that because of this brazen unconstitutionality, the PIK committee decides 
not to draft a pattern instruction implementing the statute. Additionally, the prosecutors 
of the State know not to request an instruction based on the statute, and the district court 
judges understand such an instruction would almost guarantee a reversal. Are we really to 
think that this court, following the rule of law we pronounce today, would say that jury 
instructions are erroneous and do not "fairly and accurately state the applicable law" if 
they don't tell the jury that "in Kansas a criminal defendant is not presumed innocent until 
proven guilty"? This is the kind of outcome I imagine in the mind of Mr. Bumble (of 
Dickensian fame) when he declared, "If the law supposes that, . . . the law is a[n] ass." 
Dickens, Oliver Twist 451 (First Tor ed.:  1998 [1838]).  
 
 
 
29 
 
 
 
It seems to me the majority is hung up on the technical question of what is the 
"applicable law" in this instance. Being procedurally prevented from reaching an explicit 
holding that K.S.A. 21-5705 is formally declared unconstitutional has acted as the 
proverbial headlight to our frozen deer. We seem powerless—due to an overweening 
sense of procedural propriety—to take the commonsense step of simply acknowledging 
that of course the Constitution is also "applicable law." And that if the legal community 
charged with "getting it right" at the trial court level has uniformly decided not to give the 
jury a constitutionally questionable instruction (thereby also denying the possibility of 
appellate review), we shouldn't step in to declare an otherwise correct statement of the 
law is error simply because everyone below did the substantively correct thing. 
 
LUCKERT, C.J., joins the foregoing concurrence.