Title: Com. v. Davis

State: pennsylvania

Issuer: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Document:

318 Pa. Superior Ct. 507 (1983) 465 A.2d 669 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Hiram DAVIS, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted May 20, 1983. Filed September 9, 1983. Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied February 2, 1984. *509 Robert B. Mozenter, Philadelphia, for appellant. Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellee. Before HESTER, BROSKY and BECK, JJ. BROSKY, Judge: This is a direct appeal from judgment of sentence imposed subsequent to convictions for knowing and intentional possession and delivery of a controlled substance. Appellant raises two issues for our review. First, he argues that the evidence was insufficient. Second, he contends that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel due to the lack of a pre-trial motion for the discovery of the identity and testimony of an informant. We find no merit in either of these arguments and, accordingly, affirm. The opinion of the trial court accurately summarizes the evidence in this case. The trial court also stated correctly the standard to be applied to insufficiency of evidence issues. In light of the above, we have no hesitation in agreeing with the trial court that, "Here, the evidence produced at trial was sufficient to establish that defendant violated the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act by possessing and delivering heroin." Appellant argues that his trial counsel afforded him ineffective assistance of counsel by not making a pre-trial *513 motion for the discovery of the identity and testimony of the informant. In Commonwealth v. Carter, 427 Pa. 53, 233 A.2d 284 (1967), the Supreme Court of this Commonwealth chose to approve of certain language appearing in the United States Supreme Court case of Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S. Ct. 623, 1 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1957).[1] Writing for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Justice Roberts first adopted the general proposition that, under certain circumstances, the informant's identity must be disclosed. Justice Roberts also adopted the general standard by which these matters were to be decided. Commonwealth v. Carter, supra, 427 Pa. at 59, 233 A.2d at 287, quoting Roviaro v. U.S., supra, 353 U.S. at 60-2, 77 S. Ct. at 628-9. We find that weighing the facts of this case results in nondisclosure. This conclusion is reached because no convincing *514 argument is presented as to what defenses might have been aided by the informant's availability. In appellant's brief "the possible significance of the informer's testimony" is detailed. We fail to see how any of the elements could have been "helpful to the defense." The informant's use of heroin and the identity of the other individuals present at the meeting are not tied to any theory of defense. Also, since the informant did not testify at trial, there was no point in examining him on "his character for truth and veracity." Similarly, there was no "incriminating testimony" by informant to "refute." Finally, as the facts outlined in the first section make clear, the informant was not "the only witness" to the March 10 transaction. As presented to us on appeal this case is distinguishable from those cases in which the information to be obtained from the defendant was linked to a specific defense theory. In Carter the defense sought to present a defense of mistaken identity. Also, in Commonwealth v. Pritchett, 225 Pa.Super. 401, 312 A.2d 434 (1973), the informant had potential relevance to an entrapment defense. Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 238 Pa.Super. 22, 364 A.2d *515 702 (1975) (Spaeth, J., dissenting) the informant might have been helpful to a specific denial defense. In the case before us, no such utility of the informant to a theory of defense is put forth. "A mere allegation that the informant's testimony might be helpful does not suffice." Commonwealth v. Pritchett, supra, 225 Pa.Super. at 407, 312 A.2d at 438. In this connection, it should be made clear what it is that we find absent here. In coming to a resolution of this issue we have kept in mind the following language in Pritchett. Commonwealth v. Pritchett, Id. There is a point between "a mere allegation that the informant's testimony might be helpful" and predicting "exactly what the informant would say on the stand." The former asks too little of defendant and the latter too much. That point between the two constituting what defendant can be asked to reasonably suggest is a nexus between a defense theory and the informant's potential helpfulness in establishing that defense. That is the essential element that is totally lacking in appellant's argument. Thus, had counsel sought pre-trial discovery relating to the informant, he would have had to present a defense theory which might plausibly be aided by the informant. Commonwealth v. Pritchett, supra, 225 Pa.Super. at 410-11, 312 A.2d at 439. *516 Had trial counsel presented no more convincing an argument as to the usefulness of the informant to the defense than has been presented on appeal, we have no doubt that the discovery motion would not have been granted.[2] The discovery motion having no arguable merit, counsel will not be found ineffective for not making it. Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, 372 A.2d 687 (1977). Judgment of sentence is affirmed. [1] Roviaro had been decided on federal law, rather than on constitutional grounds. As such, it was not binding on state courts. [2] It is not the proper function of this court to devise defense theories for appellant that would have made informant's identity and testimony "helpful." We are bound to decide this case on the arguments presented by appellant. These arguments, as we have noted, are unpersuasive.