Title: Griffin v. Gregory

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

355 So. 2d 691 (1978)
David G. GRIFFIN
v.
Welton GREGORY.
SC 2501.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
January 27, 1978.
*692 Barry N. McCrary, of Dixon, Wooten, Boyett, McCrary & Thornton, Talladega, for appellant.
William M. Acker, Jr., Birmingham, Tom Radney, Alexander City, Henry C. Chappell, Jr., Montgomery, for appellee.
MADDOX, Justice.
In this personal injury action, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant counter-claimant for the sum of $60,000. The original plaintiff appeals, claiming the trial court erred in:
The accident occurred on Alabama Highway 21 in Coosa County. Plaintiff, David Griffin, was travelling north in a Volkswagen. Defendant, Welton Gregory, was going south in a Chevrolet. Each party claimed the other had crossed the center line. The jury obviously believed Gregory's version of the facts.
Plaintiff Griffin claims that the trial judge erred in refusing to permit, over defendant's objection, a truck operator, who was also a garage mechanic, to give his opinion as to the "portion on the Volkswagen which was hit by the Chevrolet." Whether a particular witness will be permitted to testify as an expert is largely discretionary with the trial court, whose discretion will not be disturbed on appeal except for abuse. Hagler v. Gilliland, 292 Ala. 262, 292 So. 2d 647 (1974).
The trial judge permitted a state trooper to give, over objection, his opinion as to the point of impact of the automobiles. Here again, whether a particular person will be permitted to testify as an expert is largely discretionary. We find no reversible error here. In Madison v. State, 40 Ala.App. 62, 109 So. 2d 749 (1958), a highway patrolman was permitted to give a conclusion as to the point of impact based on his personal observation as a "shorthand rendering of a collective fact." That is what happened here.
Griffin objected to the introduction of a diagram, admittedly not prepared in court, but which the witness identified as a drawing which correctly portrayed and depicted the highway, the position of two vehicles at the time of collision, and subsequent thereto.
Griffin claims the diagram was inadmissible and argues in brief:
Suffice it to say that in Catrett v. State, 25 Ala.App. 331, 146 So. 287 (1933), the Court noted:
Here, there was testimony that the diagram correctly portrayed the scene. In his objection to the admission of the diagram, counsel for plaintiff stated, ". . . why don't the defendants take the blackboard there and draw a scene instead of all this . . ." Obviously, a diagram or model, whether prepared in court or out of court, must fairly and accurately portray what it purports to portray and must be relevant and material. Defendant's complaint during trial that the diagram was not drawn on the blackboard was without merit. The deficiency noted in Catrett is not present here. There was no error in admitting the diagram into evidence. As this Court said in James v. Mizell, 289 Ala. 84, 265 So. 2d 866 (1972):
Griffin claims that because there was evidence of rain and high winds, and that he was driving a Volkswagen, and the defendant testified that he was on the wrong side of the road, that "the jury could infer from the evidence, and had a right to do so, that the Volkswagen was blown from its straight course of travel without any fault on the part of the plaintiff." In the first place, there was no written request for an instruction on the legal consequences of an act of God. Secondly, there was no evidence that an act of God, as defined in Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions, § 28.18, was the proximate cause of the accident. There was no error here.
Griffin's argument that the jury verdict of $60,000 for the defendant-counter-claimant was excessive is without merit. There was evidence that Gregory had actual medical expenses of $10,339.45, that he underwent an extensive and painful rehabilitation process and would be permanently disabled. The trial court heard the evidence, *694 observed the witness, and refused to grant a new trial. The verdict is not excessive. R. C. Bottling Co. v. Sorrells, 290 Ala. 187, 275 So. 2d 131 (1973).
Griffin claims the trial court should have granted a mistrial because of remarks made by Gregory's counsel during closing arguments, as follows:
No prejudicial error to reverse is shown here. The trial judge took immediate action to instruct the jury to disregard the argument. Griffin's argument that the remarks were ineradicable is without merit.
The judgment is due to be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C. J., and JONES, SHORES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.