Title: Milwaukee Journal Sentinel v. DOA

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2009 WI 79 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP1160 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel and Patrick Marley, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
     v. 
Wisconsin Department of Administration and 
Stephen E. Bablitch, 
          Defendants, 
American Federation of State, Municipal and 
County Employees, Council 24, Wisconsin State 
Employees Union, 
          Intervenor-Appellant. 
 
------------------------------------------------ 
 
Lakeland Times and Gregg Walker, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
     v. 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources and 
Debra Martinelli, 
          Defendants, 
American Federation of State, Municipal and 
County Employees, Council 24, Wisconsin State 
Employees Union, 
          Intervenor-Appellant, 
Wisconsin Science Professionals, AFT Local 3272 
and Wisconsin Professional Employees Council, 
Local 4848, AFT-Wisconsin, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
          Intervenors. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 15, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 15, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
William C. Foust   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
2 
For the intervenor-appellants there were briefs (in the 
court of appeals) by Kurt C. Kobelt and Lawton & Cates, S.C., 
Madison, and oral argument by Kurt C. Kobelt. 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents there were briefs (in the 
court of appeals) by Jennifer L. Peterson, Robert J. Dreps, and 
Godfrey & Kahn S.C., Madison, and oral argument by Robert J. 
Dreps. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by April Rockstead Barker 
and Liebmann, Conway, Olejniczak & Jerry, S.C., Green Bay, on 
behalf of the American Legislative Exchange Counsel. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Lucy A. Dalglish 
Arlington, Va., and Eric G. Barber and Perkins Coie LLP, 
Madison, on behalf of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the 
Press, American Society of Newspaper Editors, Associated Press, 
Radio-Television 
News 
Directors 
Association, 
Society 
of 
Professional Journalists, Wisconsin Broadcasters Association, 
Wisconsin Freedom of Information Council, and the Wisconsin 
Newspaper Association. 
 
 
 
 
2009 WI 79
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2007AP1160  
(L.C. Nos. 
2005CV3569 & 2005CV3923) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel and Patrick Marley, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Department of Administration and 
Stephen E. Bablitch, 
 
          Defendants, 
 
American Federation of State, Municipal and 
County Employees, Council 24, Wisconsin State 
Employees Union, 
 
          Intervenor-Appellant. 
 
---------------------------------------------- 
 
Lakeland Times and Gregg Walker, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources and 
Debra Martinelli, 
 
          Defendants, 
 
American Federation of State, Municipal and 
County Employees, Council 24, Wisconsin State 
Employees Union, 
 
          Intervenor-Appellant, 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 15, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
2 
Wisconsin Science Professionals, AFT Local 3272 
and Wisconsin Professional Employees Council, 
Local 4848, AFT-Wisconsin, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
 
          Intervenors. 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Dane 
County, C. William Foust, Judge.  Affirmed and cause remanded to 
the circuit court. 
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   This case comes to us 
on certification from the court of appeals.  The certified 
questions are:   
(1) Whether courts have jurisdiction to review 
legislative action to determine if that action was 
sufficient to amend the Public Records Law; and  
(2) If so, whether the action taken by the 
legislature 
in 
ratifying 
a 
collective 
bargaining 
agreement between the Wisconsin State Employees Union 
(WSEU)1 and the State of Wisconsin was sufficient to 
amend the Public Records Law.2   
¶2 
The court of appeals posed these questions in order to 
determine 
whether 
a 
provision 
in 
a 
ratified 
collective 
                                                 
1 WSEU is a labor organization that represents approximately 
21,000 employees of the State of Wisconsin, including 5,000 
Department of Corrections employees and 1,200 parole agents. 
2 When we grant a certification, we acquire jurisdiction of 
the entire case, not merely the issues certified by the court of 
appeals.  State v. Stoehr, 134 Wis. 2d 66, 70, 396 N.W.2d 177 
(1986); see also Wis. Stat. § 808.05(2) (2005-06); Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.61 (2005-06).  All further references to the 
Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2005-06 version unless otherwise 
noted.   
No. 
2007AP1160   
 
3 
 
bargaining agreement, Article 2/4/4, between the WSEU and the 
State, which purported to prohibit the disclosure to the press 
of the names of WSEU-represented employees, modified the Public 
Records Law, Wis. Stat. § 19.31 et seq.  
¶3 
We conclude that courts have jurisdiction to review 
whether 
the 
legislature's 
ratification 
of 
a 
collective 
bargaining agreement under Wis. Stat. § 111.92(1)(a), without 
introducing a companion bill to specifically amend the Public 
Records Law, is sufficient to effect a change in that law.  We 
so conclude because courts have jurisdiction to determine the 
meaning of statutes, here § 111.92(1)(a), and of constitutional 
provisions, here Article IV, Section 17(2) of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.3  We also conclude that ratification of the 
collective bargaining agreement was insufficient to amend the 
Public Records Law because Article 2/4/4 of the collective 
bargaining agreement was not "introduce[d] in a bill or 
companion bills" within the meaning of § 111.92(1)(a), as that 
meaning is driven by the requirements of Article IV, Section 
17(2) 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
 
Accordingly, 
the 
ratification of the collective bargaining agreement did not 
create an exception to the Public Records Law.  Additionally, we 
conclude that Wis. Stat. § 111.93(3) does not support WSEU's 
                                                 
3 Article IV, Section 17(2) of the Wisconsin Constitution 
states:  "No law shall be enacted except by bill.  No law shall 
be in force until published." 
No. 
2007AP1160   
 
4 
 
assertion that Article 2/4/4 supersedes the disclosure provision 
of the Public Records Law, Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a).4 
¶4 
Finally, we affirm the circuit court's application of 
the balancing test, which it appears the circuit court applied 
to the WSEU members as a group because that is how the issue was 
argued to the circuit court.  However, we do not decide what our 
conclusion would be if, on remand, individual record subjects 
intervene and request the circuit court to apply the balancing 
test to them, individually.    
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶5 
This 
case 
consists 
of 
two 
actions 
that 
were 
consolidated in the circuit court5 due to the identity of the 
legal issues presented.  In the first case, Patrick Marley, a 
reporter from the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel (Journal Sentinel), 
made an open records request to the Legislative Audit Bureau for 
                                                 
4 The parties also dispute whether the language of Article 
2/4/4, if it is capable of constituting an exception to the 
Public Records Law, unambiguously prohibits disclosure of the 
names in this case.  If it is ambiguous, the newspapers argue 
that extrinsic evidence shows that it was not intended to 
prohibit the disclosure of WSEU-represented employees' names 
alone.  The newspapers further argue that if Article 2/4/4 is 
allowed to operate as an exception to the Public Records Law, it 
will violate their equal protection and due process rights.  
Because we conclude that Article 2/4/4 is not an exception to 
the Public Records Law, we need not address these arguments.  
Walgreen Co. v. City of Madison, 2008 WI 80, ¶2, 311 Wis. 2d 
158, 752 N.W.2d 687 (noting that when resolution of one issue is 
dispositive, we need not reach other issues raised by the 
parties); Jankee v. Clark County, 2000 WI 64, ¶105, 235 Wis. 2d 
700, 612 N.W.2d 297 (same). 
5 The Honorable C. William Foust of Dane County Circuit 
Court presided over the consolidated action. 
No. 
2007AP1160   
 
5 
 
the names of state employees who had been deactivated from the 
list of those permitted to drive state-owned vehicles.  The 
Department of Administration (DOA) ultimately disclosed some of 
the requested names, but it refused to release the names of 
employees represented by WSEU.  The DOA refused in part because 
of Article 2/4/4 of the state's collective bargaining agreement 
with WSEU.  Article 2/4/4 provides in relevant part: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of [§§] 19.31-19.36 and 
230.13 Wis. Stats. and any applicable Federal laws, 
the Employer will not release any information relating 
to 
the 
names, 
addresses, 
classifications, 
social 
security numbers, home addresses or home telephone 
numbers of employees covered by this Agreement to 
labor unions, labor organizations, local unions or the 
press except for Council 24 and the local union 
treasurer for the purpose of local membership list, 
unless required to do so by the Wisconsin Employment 
Relations Commission or a court of law.6 
In response to the DOA's withholding of the WSEU-represented 
employees' names, the Journal Sentinel commenced an action 
against the DOA, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 19.37(1)(a),7 seeking 
mandamus to order disclosure of the requested names. 
¶6 
In the second case, Greg Walker, an editor for the 
Lakeland Times, made an open records request to the Department 
of Natural Resources (DNR) for the salary information of DNR's 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. §§ 19.31 through 19.36 contain provisions 
of the Public Records Law. 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 19.37(1)(a) provides in pertinent part:  
"If an authority withholds a record or a part of a record or 
delays granting access to a record or part of a record after a 
written request for disclosure is made, the requester may pursue 
. . . an action for mandamus asking a court to order release of 
the record." 
No. 
2007AP1160   
 
6 
 
employees working at its Rhinelander and Woodruff facilities.  
The DNR provided the names and salary information of 127 of the 
relevant employees, but withheld the names of 95 others.  The 
employees whose names were withheld were represented by three 
Unions, one of which was WSEU.  As was the case in the first 
action, the DNR withheld the WSEU-represented employees' names 
pursuant 
to 
Article 
2/4/4 
of 
the 
collective 
bargaining 
agreement.  In response, the Lakeland Times sued the DNR seeking 
mandamus 
to 
compel 
disclosure 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.37(1)(a). 
¶7 
WSEU and other unions8 intervened, with WSEU's primary 
basis for intervening being the newspapers' challenge to the 
legal effect of Article 2/4/4 of the collective bargaining 
agreement.  Since disclosure of the WSEU-represented employees' 
names in both cases depended on the legal effect of Article 
2/4/4, the parties agreed to consolidate the actions.   
¶8 
After consolidation, the newspapers and WSEU filed 
cross-motions for summary judgment.  In resolving these motions, 
the circuit court focused on the following three issues:  (1) 
whether 
the 
legislature's 
ratification 
of 
the 
collective 
bargaining agreement, without introducing companion legislation, 
amended the Public Records Law; (2) if not, whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 111.93(3) nevertheless caused Article 2/4/4 of the collective 
bargaining agreement to supersede the Public Records Law because 
                                                 
8 The other unions were the Wisconsin Science Professionals 
and the Wisconsin Professional Employees Council. 
No. 
2007AP1160   
 
7 
 
precluding disclosure of the names of employees affected safety 
and therefore was a "condition of employment"; and (3) if not, 
whether the balancing test precluded disclosure. 
¶9 
The parties initially briefed and argued the first and 
second issues.  On October 13, 2006, relying on the court of 
appeals' decision in Board of Regents of the University of 
Wisconsin System v. Wisconsin Personnel Commission, 103 Wis. 2d 
545, 309 N.W.2d 366 (Ct. App. 1981), the circuit court concluded 
that the legislature's ratification of the collective bargaining 
agreement, without enacting companion legislation expressly 
amending the Public Records Law as required by Wis. Stat. 
§ 111.92(1)(a), did not create an exception to the Public 
Records Law.   
¶10 The circuit court reasoned that ratification of the 
collective bargaining agreement was insufficient to amend the 
Public Records Law because the Joint Committee on Employment 
Relations (JCOER) did not comply with the requirements of Wis. 
Stat. § 111.92(1)(a) that are necessary in order to amend an 
existing law.  The court noted that § 111.92(1)(a) clearly 
requires JCOER to "introduce in a bill or companion bills . . . 
that portion of the tentative [collective bargaining] agreement 
which requires legislative action for implementation, such as 
. . . any proposed amendments, deletions or additions to 
existing law."  Because JCOER took no such action, the 
legislature did not create an exception to the Public Records 
Law.  
No. 
2007AP1160   
 
8 
 
¶11 Regarding 
the 
second 
issue, 
the 
circuit 
court 
concluded that Article 2/4/4's prohibition on disclosure of the 
employees' names did not constitute a "condition of employment" 
under 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 111.93(3); therefore, that contractual 
provision did not supersede the disclosure requirement of the 
Public Records Law, Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a).   
¶12 Because the circuit court concluded that ratification 
of the collective bargaining agreement did not cause Article 
2/4/4 to become an exception to the Public Records Law, the 
parties briefed and argued application of the balancing test.  
The circuit court granted the newspapers' motions for summary 
judgment.  The circuit court concluded that the public interests 
favoring 
disclosure 
set 
forth 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.32(1) 
outweighed any countervailing public interests in precluding 
disclosure.  Accordingly, the circuit court issued mandamus 
ordering disclosure of the employees' names.9 
¶13 The WSEU appealed.10  The court of appeals certified 
the 
appeal, 
which 
we 
accepted 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 808.05(2).11  We now affirm and remand to the circuit court. 12   
                                                 
9 In the circuit court's May 7, 2007 mandamus order, the 
circuit court also awarded the plaintiffs statutory damages, 
attorney fees and costs totaling $64,200 pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.37(2).  This award is not part of the appeal before us. 
10 Neither the DOA, the DNR nor the other unions who 
intervened 
along 
with 
WSEU 
appealed 
the 
circuit 
court's 
decision. 
No. 
2007AP1160   
 
9 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶14 "We review a summary judgment decision independently, 
employing the same methodology as the circuit court," but 
benefitting from its analysis.  Blunt v. Medtronic, Inc., 2009 
WI 16, ¶13, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 760 N.W.2d 396 (citing Acuity v. 
Bagadia, 2008 WI 62, ¶12, 310 Wis. 2d 197, 750 N.W.2d 817).  The 
interpretation of statutes and the Wisconsin Constitution and 
                                                                                                                                                             
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 808.05(2) provides in relevant part:  
"The supreme court may take jurisdiction of an appeal or any 
other proceeding pending in the court of appeals if:  . . . [i]t 
grants direct review upon certification from the court of 
appeals prior to the court of appeals hearing and deciding the 
matter . . . ." 
12 The procedural posture of this case is worth noting.  
Here, the newspapers' public records requests were denied by the 
record custodians (the DOA and DNR).  This action was commenced 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 19.37(1)(a).  Under § 19.37(1)(a), when 
a record request is denied by the record custodian, the 
requester is entitled to seek judicial review by pursuing 
mandamus to order disclosure of the records.  Id.  
Where a record request is granted——i.e., the record 
custodian determines that it will disclose the record and the 
person whose records are at issue (the record subject) opposes 
release of the records——the record subject proceeds under Wis. 
Stat. § 19.356.  Because the custodian refused to disclose the 
requested records in the case before us, we do not interpret and 
apply the provisions of § 19.356.  Instead, because this is an 
action pursued under Wis. Stat. § 19.37(1) by the record 
requesters (the newspapers) whose requests were denied, judicial 
review, and therefore application of the balancing test by the 
reviewing court, applies with respect to every record requested.  
Wis. Newspress, Inc. v. Sch. Dist. of Sheboygan Falls, 199 
Wis. 2d 769, 780, 546 N.W.2d 143 (1996) (noting, in a case where 
a record request was denied by the record custodian, that "the 
balancing test must be applied in every case in order to 
determine whether a particular record should be released"). 
No. 
2007AP1160   
 
10 
 
their applications to undisputed facts present questions of law 
that we review independently.  County of Dane v. LIRC, 2009 WI 
9, ¶14, 315 Wis. 2d 293, 759 N.W.2d 571 (citing Watton v. 
Hegerty, 2008 WI 74, ¶6, 311 Wis. 2d 52, 751 N.W.2d 369; Marder 
v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 2005 WI 159, ¶19, 
286 Wis. 2d 252, 706 N.W.2d 110) (interpreting and applying 
statutes independently of the circuit court and court of 
appeals); Village Food & Liquor Mart v. H&S Petroleum, Inc., 
2002 WI 92, ¶7, 254 Wis. 2d 478, 647 N.W.2d 177 (citing State v. 
City of Oak Creek, 2000 WI 9, ¶18, 232 Wis. 2d 612, 605 N.W.2d 
526) (interpreting and applying the Wisconsin Constitution 
independently of the circuit court and court of appeals).  
Finally, application of the balancing test for disclosure of 
public 
records 
is 
a 
question 
of 
law 
that 
we 
review 
independently.  Wis. Newspress, Inc. v. Sch. Dist. of Sheboygan 
Falls, 199 Wis. 2d 768, 784, 546 N.W.2d 143 (1996). 
B. 
As Otherwise Provided by Law 
¶15 Under 
the 
Public 
Records 
Law, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.35(1)(a), "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, any 
requester has a right to inspect any record."  (Emphasis added.)  
WSEU 
argues 
that 
the 
legislature's 
ratification 
of 
the 
collective 
bargaining 
agreement 
causes 
Article 
2/4/4's 
prohibition on the disclosure of employees' names to the press 
to become "otherwise provided by law," within the meaning of 
that phrase in § 19.35(1)(a) of the Public Records Law.   
¶16 In response, the newspapers argue that the legislature 
failed to comply with certain requirements of Wis. Stat. 
No. 
2007AP1160   
 
11 
 
§ 111.92(1)(a) as part of its ratification of the collective 
bargaining agreement, and that this failure prevented Article 
2/4/4 from becoming an exception to the Public Records Law.  The 
newspapers 
assert 
that 
§ 111.92(1)(a) 
requires 
JCOER 
to 
"introduce in a bill or companion bills . . . that portion of 
the tentative agreement which requires legislative action for 
implementation, such as . . . any proposed amendments, deletions 
or additions to existing law."  The amicus in support of the 
newspapers' position also argues that the ratification of the 
collective bargaining agreement was insufficient to satisfy 
Article IV, Section 17(2) of the Wisconsin Constitution.  
¶17 The parties do not dispute that no companion bills 
were introduced to amend the Public Records Law at the time of 
the collective bargaining agreement's ratification.  However, 
WSEU argues that Wis. Stat. § 111.92(1)(a) sets forth a "rule of 
proceeding," compliance with which courts have no jurisdiction 
to review, thereby precluding judicial review of whether a 
companion bill was required.  Alternatively, WSEU argues that 
even 
if 
courts 
have 
jurisdiction 
to 
review 
legislative 
compliance with § 111.92(1)(a), the procedures surrounding the 
legislature's 
ratification 
of 
the 
collective 
bargaining 
agreement were sufficient, by themselves, to cause Article 2/4/4 
of that agreement to amend the Public Records Law.   
1. 
Court jurisdiction to review  
¶18 WSEU first argues that we do not have jurisdiction to 
review 
the 
legislature's 
compliance 
with 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 111.92(1)(a) because it sets forth a legislative "rule of 
No. 
2007AP1160   
 
12 
 
proceeding." 
 
Article 
IV, 
Section 
8 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution states in pertinent part that "[e]ach house may 
determine the rules of its own proceedings."  Rules of 
proceeding have been defined as those rules having "to do with 
the process the legislature uses to propose or pass legislation 
or how it determines the qualifications of its members."  
Custodian of Records for the LTSB v. State, 2004 WI 65, ¶30, 272 
Wis. 2d 208, 680 N.W.2d 792.  We have interpreted Article IV, 
Section 8 to mean that the legislature's compliance with rules 
of proceeding is exclusively within the province of the 
legislature, because "a legislative failure to follow [its own] 
procedural rules is equivalent to an ad hoc repeal of such 
rules, which the legislature is free to do at any time."  Id., 
¶28.  Accordingly, courts will not intermeddle in purely 
internal legislative proceedings, even when the proceedings at 
issue are contained in a statute.  State ex rel. La Follette v. 
Stitt, 114 Wis. 2d 358, 364, 338 N.W.2d 684 (1983). 
¶19 Here, 
we 
need 
not 
decide 
whether 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 111.92(1)(a) is a rule of legislative proceeding because a 
statute's 
terms 
must 
be 
interpreted 
to 
comply 
with 
constitutional directives.  Accordingly, even if the statute 
might otherwise be characterized as a legislative rule of 
proceeding, we may interpret the statute and apply it to the 
legislative action to determine whether that action complies 
with the relevant constitutional mandates.  Marbury v. Madison, 
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); Stitt, 114 Wis. 2d at 367; 
McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 411-12, 50 N.W. 185 (1891).   
No. 
2007AP1160   
 
13 
 
¶20 Therefore, because both Wis. Stat. § 111.92(1)(a) and 
Article IV, Section 17(2) require the legislature to take 
additional actions to amend existing law or to create new law,13 
and we have jurisdiction to interpret the Wisconsin Constitution 
and the Wisconsin Statutes, we have the authority to evaluate 
legislative compliance with § 111.92(1)(a).  Stitt, 114 Wis. 2d 
at 367.  Accordingly, we reject WSEU's argument in this respect, 
and proceed to determine whether the legislature complied with 
§ 111.92(1)(a) in light of the Wisconsin Constitution.14 
                                                 
13 In Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System 
v. Wisconsin Personnel Commission, 103 Wis. 2d 545, 309 N.W.2d 
366 (Ct. App. 1981), the court of appeals invalidated certain 
provisions of collective bargaining agreements under Wis. Stat. 
§ 111.92(1)(a) because those agreements were not "accompanied by 
subsequently adopted companion bills that in any respect 
modified the conflicting provisions of" the statutes to which 
they were addressed.  Id. at 557.  That is a similar fact 
situation to the facts of this case.  However, the court in 
Board of Regents raised this issue sua sponte, and did not 
consider whether judicial review might have been foreclosed 
because § 111.92(1)(a) constituted a rule of proceeding.  As a 
result, the court also did not consider the constitutional 
implications of § 111.92(1)(a) raised here.  We agree with the 
result reached in Board of Regents.  However, whether provisions 
in a collective bargaining agreement amend published statutes 
simply because the collective bargaining agreement was ratified 
by the legislature presents a more complicated question than 
statutory interpretation of § 111.92(1)(a).   
14 Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent conflates ratification 
of the collective bargaining agreement with legislating to amend 
an existing statute.  Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent, ¶30.  
Her analysis misses the mark.  Although we agree with the Chief 
Justice that 2003 Wisconsin Act 319 validly ratified the 
collective bargaining agreement, the real question is whether 
the legislature took the additional actions required by both 
Wis. Stat. § 111.92(1)(a) and Article IV, Section 17(2) of the 
Wisconsin Constitution to make Article 2/4/4 of the collective 
bargaining agreement a "law."   
No. 
2007AP1160   
 
14 
 
2. 
Constitutional requirements 
¶21 We begin by examining whether, under the relevant 
constitutional provisions, Article 2/4/4 is a "law."  As we have 
previously explained, an act of the legislature that is not 
authorized by the constitution is not a law.  State ex rel. 
Martin v. Zimmerman, 233 Wis. 16, 21, 288 N.W. 454 (1939).  
Here, the operative provision of the Wisconsin Constitution, 
Article IV, Section 17(2),15 provides that "[n]o law shall be 
enacted except by bill" and that "[n]o law shall be in force 
until published."  Accordingly, in order for the legislature to 
create a law, the proposed law must be enacted by bill and it 
also must be published.  Zimmerman, 233 Wis. at 19 (concluding 
that official publication is a necessary component to creating a 
law).   
                                                 
15 The portion of Article IV, Section 17(2) of the Wisconsin 
Constitution stating that "[n]o law shall be in force until 
published" was created in 1977.  Prior to 1977, the requirement 
that laws be published before they have force and effect was 
contained 
in 
Article 
VII, 
Section 
21 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, which has since been repealed.  See Niagara of 
Wis. Paper Corp. v. DNR, 84 Wis. 2d 32, 49, 268 N.W.2d 153 
(1978) (noting that Article IV, Section 17 was "formerly Art. 
VII, sec. 21").  Article VII, Section 21 read in pertinent part 
as follows:  "[N]o general law shall be in force until 
published."   
Our 
discussion 
relying 
on 
State 
ex 
rel. 
Martin 
v. 
Zimmerman, 233 Wis. 16, 288 N.W. 454 (1939), and other pre-1977 
case law, relates to Article VII, Section 21.  However, because 
the underlying purpose of the publication requirement is the 
same with respect to the issues we consider here, that case law 
applies with equal force to the current publication requirement 
contained in Article IV, Section 17(2). 
No. 
2007AP1160   
 
15 
 
 
 
a. 
Enacted by bill 
¶22 The first requirement of Article IV, Section 17(2) is 
that the matter be enacted by bill.  We address two contentions 
in this respect.  First, WSEU argues that the provisions of 
Article 2/4/4 of the collective bargaining agreement were 
enacted by bill because a bill, 2003 Senate Bill 565, was 
introduced 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
ratifying 
the 
collective 
bargaining agreement.  Upon passage, Senate Bill 565 became 2003 
Wisconsin Act 319, which was published on May 28, 2004.  Second, 
Amicus OSER argues that Article 2/4/4 was incorporated by 
reference into a validly enacted law based on the ratifying 
bill's reference to the collective bargaining agreement.  In 
response to both of these contentions, the newspapers argue that 
in order to amend an existing law, the terms of Article 2/4/4 
needed to be expressed in an enacted bill.16  We address these 
arguments in turn. 
 
 
i. 
2003 Wisconsin Act 319 
¶23 Before 
ratification 
of 
the 
collective 
bargaining 
agreement, JCOER conducted a public hearing on the agreement.  
After JCOER voted to approve the agreement, JCOER introduced 
2003 Senate Bill 565, which was submitted to the legislature.  
                                                 
16 The 
legislature's 
own 
directive 
requires 
that 
all 
"proposed amendments, deletions or additions to existing law" be 
included in the ratifying bill.  Board of Regents, 103 Wis. 2d 
at 557-58 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 111.92(1)(a)). 
No. 
2007AP1160   
 
16 
 
The bill as passed by the legislature and signed by the governor 
provides in pertinent part: 
The people of the state of Wisconsin, represented 
in senate and assembly, do enact as follows: 
 
Section 1.  Agreement ratified.  The legislature 
ratifies the tentative agreement negotiated for the 
2003-05 biennium between the state of Wisconsin, the 
office 
of 
state 
employment 
relations, 
and 
the 
Wisconsin State Employees Union . . ., as approved by 
the employees of the professional social services 
collective 
bargaining 
unit 
and 
approved 
and 
recommended by the joint committee on employment 
relations, and authorizes the necessary expenditure of 
moneys for implementation . . . .  The director of the 
office of state employment relations shall file an 
official copy of the agreement, certified by the co-
chairpersons of the joint committee on employment 
relations, with the secretary of state.  No formal or 
informal agreement between the parties that is not a 
part of the official copy is deemed to be approved by 
the legislature under this act. 
That 2003 Wisconsin Act 319 was later published is not in 
dispute.  The parties further agree that no other bill relating 
to WSEU's collective bargaining agreement was enacted by the 
Wisconsin Legislature. 
¶24 We conclude that the mere enactment of 2003 Senate 
Bill 565 and publication of 2003 Wisconsin Act 319 was not 
sufficient to cause the provisions of Article 2/4/4 of the 
collective bargaining agreement to become a law enacted by bill 
under Article IV, Section 17(2) of the Wisconsin Constitution.  
Nowhere in 2003 Wisconsin Act 319 does any reference to the 
Public Records Law or Article 2/4/4 appear.  Nothing in Act 319 
purports to amend any published statutes.  Act 319 contains no 
language which might put the citizens of Wisconsin on notice 
No. 
2007AP1160   
 
17 
 
that the Public Records Law is being amended.  Although the 
constitutionally required language, "The people of the state of 
Wisconsin, represented in senate and assembly, do enact as 
follows:," see Wis. Const. art. IV, § 17(1), appears in Act 319 
itself, that language precedes an Act which purports to do no 
more than ratify the collective bargaining agreement between 
WSEU and the State.  As a result, Article 2/4/4 remains a 
provision contained in a contract.   
¶25 If a right is given to the public by statute, such as 
the right to seek disclosure of public records, the legislature 
generally may take that right away through legislative action in 
compliance with constitutional mandates.  However, since Article 
2/4/4 of the collective bargaining agreement was not enacted by 
bill, it remains a contractual provision.  It is not "law" under 
Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a) that is an exception to the Public 
Records Law.   
 
 
ii. incorporation by reference 
¶26 Amicus OSER, arguing in support of WSEU, anticipates 
our concern with respect to the constitutional requirement that 
laws be enacted by bill.  In response, OSER argues that because 
2003 Wisconsin Act 319 references the collective bargaining 
agreement, and the collective bargaining agreement contains 
Article 2/4/4, Article 2/4/4's prohibition on the disclosure of 
the employees' names is a statutory amendment incorporated by 
reference.   
¶27 We acknowledge that, under certain circumstances, 
incorporation by reference may be effective to work a change in 
No. 
2007AP1160   
 
18 
 
the law.  See, e.g., George Williams College v. Village of 
Williams Bay, 242 Wis. 311, 316, 7 N.W.2d 891 (1943) (discussing 
doctrine of "legislation by reference"); Gilson Bros. Co. v. 
Worden-Allen Co., 220 Wis. 347, 352-53, 265 N.W. 217 (1936) 
(noting one statute's necessarily implied adoption of limits 
contained in another statute).  However, our cases recognizing 
incorporation 
by 
reference 
have 
generally 
dealt 
with 
incorporating the provisions of other published statutes.  See 
Williams Bay, 242 Wis. at 316; Gilson Bros., 220 Wis. at 352-53.  
In those instances, the constitutional procedures set forth in 
Article IV, Section 17(2) would presumably be satisfied.  That 
is not the case here.   
¶28 OSER cites State v. Wakeen, 263 Wis. 401, 57 N.W.2d 
364 (1953), which dealt with Wis. Stat. § 151.06 (1953).  
Section 151.06(1) (1953) defined the term "drug" in part as 
"[a]rticles 
recognized 
in 
the 
official 
United 
States 
Pharmacop[]eia, 
official 
Homeopathic 
Pharmacop[]eia 
of 
the 
United States, or official National Formulary, or any supplement 
to any of them, intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, 
mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease in man or other 
animals."  That is, the legislature incorporated by reference 
federal government documents defining the word "drug." 
¶29 Wakeen is distinguishable.  First, Wis. Stat. § 151.06 
(1953) was not challenged in regard to non-compliance with the 
constitutional procedures necessary to enacting a law, as is the 
case here.  Id. at 407.  Instead, § 151.06 (1953) was challenged 
as an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the Wisconsin 
No. 
2007AP1160   
 
19 
 
Legislature to the entities responsible for publishing the 
United States Pharmacopeia.  Id.  Second, § 151.06 (1953) 
expressly stated that it was adopting the definitions of "drug" 
contained in the referenced document.  Id. at 404.  Here, 
nothing in 2003 Wisconsin Act 319 states that it is expressly 
adopting an exception to the Public Records Law by ratifying 
Article 2/4/4, much less adopting any amendment to any statute.  
Accordingly, because there was actually a reference to the 
specific document being incorporated in the statute itself, and 
the purpose of incorporation was apparent on the statute's face, 
§ 151.06 (1953)'s reference to the federal government document 
could arguably be said to have been enacted by bill.   
¶30 However, 
although 
we 
discuss 
the 
constitutional 
requirements implicated here and their potential effect in 
Wakeen, the documents referenced by Wis. Stat. § 151.06 (1953) 
in Wakeen did not constitute the type of "law" implicated by 
Article IV, Section 17(2) of the Wisconsin Constitution in the 
first place.  As we noted in Wakeen, "[t]he publications 
referred to in the statute [were] not published in response to 
any delegation of power, legislative or otherwise, by the 
statute. . . .  [Instead,] these books [had] been recognized as 
standards by the congress of the United States and by the 
legislatures of all forty-eight states, at least, as far as the 
United States Pharmacopeia [was] concerned."  Id. at 411-12 
(emphasis added); see also 50 Op. Att'y Gen. 107, 111 (1961) 
(noting that Wakeen was "concerned with the establishment of 
No. 
2007AP1160   
 
20 
 
standards by reference," not incorporation of sources being 
given the force of law (emphasis added)). 
¶31 Here, Article 2/4/4 is not being characterized as a 
"standard" being incorporated by reference in 2003 Wisconsin Act 
319.  Instead, WSEU is arguing that Article 2/4/4 is "law," such 
that its prohibition on the disclosure of WSEU-represented 
employees' names is "otherwise provided by law," and therefore 
an express exception to the Public Records Law pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 19.35(1)(a).  However, in order to create a law, Article 
2/4/4 of the collective bargaining agreement must have been 
enacted in a manner sufficient to satisfy Article IV, Section 
17(2).  It was not. 
b. 
Publication 
¶32 Publication is the other requirement of Article IV, 
Section 17(2).  Nearly, 150 years ago, we noted the purpose of 
the constitutional publication requirement is 
the protection of the people, by preventing their 
rights and interests from being affected by laws which 
they had no means of knowing.  But all are bound by, 
and are bound to take notice of public statutes. . . .  
[If the publication requirement is not enforced,] it 
is manifest that the object of this clause of the 
constitution is in a great measure defeated.  And the 
people are liable to act blindly with reference to 
their most important interests, and to have their 
rights sacrificed by the operation of laws which they 
are bound to know, but have no means of knowing.  Such 
a result is in conflict with the first duty which a 
state owes to its people. 
Clark v. City of Janesville, 10 Wis. 119 (*136), 141-42 (*181) 
(1859).  General notice to the public of laws by which all will 
be 
bound 
is 
the 
policy 
that 
drives 
publication. 
 
Id.  
No. 
2007AP1160   
 
21 
 
Accordingly, if some action is argued to be sufficient to 
constitute publication, that action must be evaluated in light 
of the purpose publication seeks to achieve, i.e., was the 
public provided with sufficient notice of the law that is being 
enacted or amended. 
¶33 We have addressed methods by which the constitutional 
publication requirement may be satisfied: 
While it is true that the employment of the art of 
printing is the best means of publication, still 
publication 
cannot 
be 
confined 
to 
the 
limited 
signification of mere printing, but comprehends the 
exercise 
of 
additional 
labor 
and 
skill. 
 
This 
provision implies a discretion to be exercised in the 
method of publication; for instance,——that the general 
laws which cannot be in force until published, shall 
be published in the public journals, that being the 
most speedy method; or in pamphlet form, that being 
more 
convenient 
for 
many 
purposes; 
or 
even 
by 
proclamation at the door of the court house in each 
county . . . .  All these would be different forms of 
publication, and all would answer the constitutional 
requirement . . . . 
Sholes v. State, 2 Pin. 499, 511-12 (Wis. 1850) (emphasis in 
original).  It is apparent from this discussion that the 
legislative branch, which has been vested with the legislative 
power under the Wisconsin Constitution, has discretion in 
choosing how to comply with the publication requirement.  
However, it is also apparent that, despite this discretion, the 
legislature may not ignore the constitutional publication 
requirement 
altogether. 
 
While 
we 
are 
conscious 
of 
the 
substantial deference we owe to the other independent branches 
of 
government 
in 
the 
exercise 
of 
their 
constitutional 
responsibilities, 
we 
are 
also 
conscious 
of 
our 
own 
No. 
2007AP1160   
 
22 
 
responsibility to determine whether the provisions of the 
Wisconsin Constitution have been followed. 
¶34 WSEU argues17 that the publication of 2003 Wisconsin 
Act 319, which ratified the collective bargaining agreement, 
satisfies the publication requirement with respect to Article 
2/4/4.  Alternatively, WSEU argues that the public hearings 
conducted by JCOER prior to introducing 2003 Senate Bill 565 to 
the legislature were sufficient to constitute publication.  
However, although it is true that the public may have had the 
opportunity for input in the ratification of the agreement at 
the public hearings, and some citizens may thereby have been put 
on notice of the collective bargaining agreement's terms, the 
mere fact of a public hearing is insufficient to satisfy the 
constitutional requirement of publication.  This is so because 
the purpose of publication is to give sufficient notice to the 
general public that the legislature has enacted new law.  Clark, 
                                                 
17 WSEU 
did 
not 
directly 
address 
the 
constitutional 
requirement of publication in its briefs.  Instead, WSEU's 
arguments regarding the extent to which Article 2/4/4 is enacted 
"law" relate more to whether individual legislators were aware 
of Article 2/4/4's content at the time they voted on 2003 
Wisconsin Act 319.  However, Article IV, Section 17(2)'s 
publication requirement does not exist to promote that end.  
Instead, publication is required for "the protection of the 
people, by preventing their rights and interests from being 
affected by laws which they had no means of knowing."  Clark v. 
City of Janesville, 10 Wis. 119 (*136), 141-42 (*181) (1859) 
(emphasis added).  Furthermore, counsel for WSEU did address the 
constitutional publication issue at oral argument, and further 
arguments on this point were contained in the amicus brief 
submitted by OSER, as well as in the newspapers' brief 
responding to OSER's brief.  
No. 
2007AP1160   
 
23 
 
10 Wis. 141-42 (*181).  A hearing does not accomplish this 
purpose.   
¶35 Furthermore, nothing in 2003 Wisconsin Act 319, once 
published, put the citizens of Wisconsin on notice that a 
document to which Act 319 referred, i.e., the collective 
bargaining agreement, amended the Public Records Law.  All that 
Act 319 says is that the legislature is ratifying a collective 
bargaining agreement; it makes no references to any changes to 
existing law.  Accordingly, because the publication requirement 
is meant to avoid the situation where "the people . . . have 
their rights sacrificed by the operation of laws which they are 
bound to know, but have no means of knowing," id. at 142 (*181), 
and this situation would likely result if WSEU's argument were 
accepted here, we conclude that Article 2/4/4 of the collective 
bargaining agreement was not published in accord with the 
constitutional 
requirement 
of 
Article 
IV, 
Section 
17(2).  
Accordingly, because Article 2/4/4 was never enacted by bill or 
published as required by Article IV, Section 17(2) of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, Article 2/4/4 never became "law," a 
necessary prerequisite for it to come within Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.35(1)(a)'s exception to disclosure. 
3. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 111.92(1)(a) 
¶36 Finally, 
we 
interpret 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 111.92(1)(a).  
Section 111.92(1)(a) provides in relevant part: 
Any tentative agreement reached between the office, 
acting for the state, and any labor organization 
representing a collective bargaining unit specified in 
s. 111.825(1) or (2)(a) to (e) shall, after official 
No. 
2007AP1160   
 
24 
 
ratification by the labor organization, be submitted 
by the office to the joint committee on employment 
relations, which shall hold a public hearing before 
determining its approval or disapproval.  If the 
committee approves the tentative agreement, it shall 
introduce in a bill or companion bills, . . . that 
portion of the tentative agreement which requires 
legislative action for implementation, such as . . . 
any proposed amendments, deletions or additions to 
existing law. 
¶37 The provision on which the newspapers focus is Wis. 
Stat. § 111.92(1)(a)'s requirement that JCOER "shall introduce 
in a bill or companion bills . . . that portion of the tentative 
agreement which requires legislative action for implementation, 
such as . . . any proposed amendments, deletions or additions to 
existing law."  WSEU admits that JCOER did not introduce a bill 
or companion bill that identifies Article 2/4/4 as amending the 
Public Records Law.  Nevertheless, WSEU asserts that the Act 
ratifying the collective bargaining agreement, 2003 Wisconsin 
Act 319, was sufficient to cause Article 2/4/4 to become a law.   
¶38 We begin by noting that Wis. Stat. § 111.92(1)(a) is 
not ambiguous; it is expressed in mandatory terms.  Section 
111.92(1)(a) requires that if a collective bargaining agreement 
is to amend an existing law, JCOER "shall" introduce a bill for 
"that portion" of the agreement that amends existing statutes.  
JCOER is also to accompany any proposed amendment to current 
statutes 
with 
an 
"informative 
message 
of 
concurrence 
recommending passage of such legislation without change."  Bd. 
of Regents, 103 Wis. 2d at 557.  It is undisputed that JCOER 
introduced no companion legislation or message recommending 
amendment to the Public Records Law.   
No. 
2007AP1160   
 
25 
 
¶39 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 111.92(1)(a) 
assures 
that 
the 
legislature and the public will be fully informed of the effect 
of legislative actions when the legislature chooses to amend an 
existing law as part of its ratification of a collective 
bargaining agreement to which the State is a party. The 
statutory requirement of a separate bill that effects changes in 
the law has constitutional ramifications because Article IV, 
Section 17(2) of the Wisconsin Constitution also addresses the 
action that is necessary to create a law.   
¶40 Article IV, Section 17(2) provides that "[n]o law 
shall be enacted except by bill" and that "[n]o law shall be in 
force until published."  As we have explained above, a bill that 
is sufficient to satisfy Article IV, Section 17(2) must give 
notice 
to 
the 
public 
of 
the 
contents 
of 
the 
proposed 
legislation, and when the bill is passed, the session laws for 
that term of the legislature will contain that notice.  That was 
not done here.     
¶41 Our interpretation of the term "bill or companion 
bills" 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 111.92(1)(a) 
is 
driven 
by 
these 
constitutional considerations because § 111.92(1)(a) cannot be 
interpreted in a manner that would place it in conflict with the 
requirements of Article IV, Section 17(2) of the Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
 
Stated 
otherwise, 
were 
we 
to 
interpret 
§ 111.92(1)(a) as obviating the requirements of Article IV, 
Section 17(2) in regard to creating a law, we would cause 
§ 111.92(1)(a) 
to 
become 
unconstitutional 
through 
our 
interpretation.  However, when interpreting a statute, we do so 
No. 
2007AP1160   
 
26 
 
in a manner that will not create constitutional conflicts.  See 
Kenosha County Dep't of Human Servs. v. Jodie W., 2006 WI 93, 
¶50, 293 Wis. 2d 530, 716 N.W.2d 845 (citing State v. Hezzie, 
219 Wis. 2d 848, 862, 580 N.W.2d 660 (1998)) (reasoning that 
statutes 
are 
interpreted 
with 
a 
presumption 
of 
constitutionality). 
 
We 
follow 
that 
maxim 
of 
statutory 
construction here.  Accordingly, we conclude that the Act by 
which the collective bargaining agreement was ratified was 
insufficient to amend the Public Records Law.   
C. 
Condition of Employment 
¶42 Having determined that the legislative ratification of 
the WSEU collective bargaining agreement containing Article 
2/4/4 was insufficient to amend the Public Records Law, we now 
proceed to determine whether Article 2/4/4's prohibition on the 
disclosure of WSEU-represented employees' names may nevertheless 
be enforced under Wis. Stat. § 111.93(3), as a "condition of 
employment," thereby superseding the Public Records Law's 
disclosure requirement.   
¶43 Wisconsin Stat. § 111.93(3) provides in pertinent 
part: 
[I]f a collective bargaining agreement exists between 
the employer and a labor organization representing 
employees 
in 
a 
collective 
bargaining 
unit, 
the 
provisions of that agreement shall supersede the 
provisions of civil service and other applicable 
statutes . . . related to wages, fringe benefits, 
hours, and conditions of employment . . . . 
No. 
2007AP1160   
 
27 
 
WSEU contends that the agreement not to disclose employees' 
names falls within the term, "conditions of employment," in 
§ 111.93(3).  
¶44 The 
term 
"conditions 
of 
employment," 
although 
frequently used in the Wisconsin Statutes, is not defined either 
in Wis. Stat. ch. 111 or elsewhere.  In ascertaining the meaning 
of undefined terms, "statutory language is interpreted in the 
context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a 
whole."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 
2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  The ejusdem 
generis canon of statutory construction, which uses context to 
elicit meaning from statutory language, provides that "when 
general words follow specific words in the statutory text, the 
general words should be construed in light of the specific words 
listed."  State v. Quintana, 2008 WI 33, ¶27, 308 Wis. 2d 615, 
748 N.W.2d 447 (citing Adams Outdoor Adver., Ltd. v. City of 
Madison, 2006 WI 104, ¶62 n.15, 294 Wis. 2d 441, 717 N.W.2d 
803).  Therefore, the general word or phrase usually will 
encompass the same types of matters as the specific words.  Id. 
¶45 The court of appeals, in applying the ejusdem generis 
canon to Wis. Stat. § 111.93(3), has concluded that because the 
term "conditions of employment" "is linked with such terms as 
'wages,' 'rates of pay,' 'hours,' 'fringe benefits,' 'hiring,' 
'promotion,' 'compensation' and 'tenure[,]' . . . [t]he term 
'conditions 
of 
employment' 
. . . 
generally 
connotes 
pay, 
benefits and other matters which directly affect the interests 
of employees."  Dep't of Employment Relations v. Bldg. Trades 
No. 
2007AP1160   
 
28 
 
Negotiating Comm, 2003 WI App 178, ¶27, 266 Wis. 2d 512, 669 
N.W.2d 499 (citing Wis. Stat. § 111.32(9)(a); Wis. Stat. 
§ 111.375(1); Wis. Stat. § 111.84(1)(c) and (e); § 111.93(2) and 
(3)).   
¶46 The court of appeals also addressed the meaning of 
"conditions of employment" in Madison Teachers, Inc. v. WERC, 
218 Wis. 2d 75, 580 N.W.2d 375 (Ct. App. 1998).  There, the 
parties agreed that "conditions of employment" for a teacher in 
a classroom environment included "matters such as the quality 
and safety of the work environment, the work load for the time 
allotted, the stressfulness of assignments, and the potential 
for disciplinary problems with students."  Id. at 89; see also 
Blackhawk Teachers' Federation Local 2308 v. WERC, 109 Wis. 2d 
415, 442, 326 N.W.2d 247 (Ct. App. 1982) (concluding that the 
possibility of discipline or censorship is related to a 
teacher's working conditions). 
¶47 In light of Madison Teachers, WSEU argues that Article 
2/4/4's prohibition on the disclosure of names is a "condition 
of employment," superseding the Public Records Law's disclosure 
requirement as set forth in Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a), because it 
relates to the "safety of the work environment."  Madison 
Teachers, 218 Wis. 2d at 89.  WSEU contends that because 
disclosure of the WSEU-represented employees' names has the 
potential to subject some of the employees, such as those 
working for the Department of Corrections, to retaliation or 
harassment from individuals with whom they interact, Article 
2/4/4's prohibition relates to conditions of employment.   
No. 
2007AP1160   
 
29 
 
¶48 In response, the newspapers contend that the question 
is not whether Article 2/4/4 of the collective bargaining 
agreement relates to "conditions of employment."  Rather, the 
question is whether the "other applicable statutes," which are 
purportedly superseded by the provisions of a collective 
bargaining agreement, relate to "conditions of employment."  We 
agree that this is a more reasonable interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. § 111.93(3) when the statute is read as a whole and the 
term "conditions of employment" is not taken out of context.  
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 (concluding that the context in 
which statutory terms are used is important to ascertaining 
statutory meaning).   
¶49 Read as a whole, Wis. Stat. § 111.93(3) instructs that 
"the provisions of [the collective bargaining] agreement shall 
supersede the provisions of civil service and other applicable 
statutes . . . related to wages, fringe benefits, hours, and 
conditions of employment whether or not the matters contained in 
those statutes, rules, and policies are set forth in the 
collective 
bargaining 
agreement." 
 
§ 111.93(3). 
 
Section 
111.93(3) plainly states that it is the statutory provision that 
is being superseded by the collective bargaining agreement that 
must relate to "conditions of employment."  The Public Records 
Law's disclosure requirement, Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a), however, 
relates to informing the public about the affairs of government 
through the provision of public records.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.31.  That is, § 19.35(1)(a) does not relate to conditions 
of employment as that term is used in § 111.93(3). 
No. 
2007AP1160   
 
30 
 
¶50 Under the Bldg. Trades definition of "conditions of 
employment," Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a) is not among the statutes 
that relate to "'wages,' 'rates of pay,' 'hours,' 'fringe 
benefits,' 'hiring,' 'promotion,' 'compensation' and 'tenure.'"  
Bldg. Trades, 266 Wis. 2d 512, ¶27.  Instead, § 19.35(1)(a) of 
the Public Records Law relates more generally to the public's 
right to disclosure of public records.  See Wis. Stat. § 19.31.  
Accordingly, we conclude that § 19.35(1)(a) is not among the 
"other applicable statutes" within the purview of Wis. Stat. 
§ 111.93(3).  
¶51 In addition to the other arguments addressed above, 
the newspapers contend that the policy of promoting the public 
interest is served by their interpretations of both the Public 
Records Law and statutory collective bargaining procedures.  The 
newspapers begin with Wis. Stat. § 111.80(1), which relates to 
collective bargaining procedures and provides: 
The public policy of the state as to labor relations 
and collective bargaining in state employment . . . 
recognizes that there are 3 major interests involved:  
that of the public, that of the employee and that of 
the employer.  These 3 interests are to a considerable 
extent interrelated.  It is the policy of this state 
to protect and promote each of these interests with 
due regard to the situation and to the rights of the 
others. 
The newspapers contend that § 111.80(1) requires that the "major 
interest" of the public must be considered, in addition to the 
interests of the employees and employers who are parties to the 
collective bargaining agreement.  Although it is true that 
Article 2/4/4 of the collective bargaining agreement prohibits 
No. 
2007AP1160   
 
31 
 
disclosure of employees' names to the press, not the public, 
"[i]f we are to have an informed public, the media must serve as 
the eyes and ears of that public. . . .  [I]f the media is 
denied access to the affairs of government, the public for all 
practical purposes is denied access as well."  State ex rel. 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Showers, 135 Wis. 2d 77, 81, 398 N.W.2d 154 
(1987).  Accordingly, Article 2/4/4's prohibition on disclosure 
to the press is effectively a prohibition on disclosure to the 
public, and therefore affects a "major interest" of the public.  
¶52 Under the Public Records Law itself, the public has a 
very strong interest in becoming an informed electorate through 
the disclosure of public records.  Wis. Stat. § 19.31.  Section 
19.31 states the following: 
In recognition of the fact that a representative 
government is dependent upon an informed electorate, 
it is declared to be the public policy of this state 
that all persons are entitled to the greatest possible 
information regarding the affairs of government and 
the official acts of those officers and employees who 
represent them.  Further, providing persons with such 
information is declared to be an essential function of 
a representative government and an integral part of 
the routine duties of officers and employees whose 
responsibility it is to provide such information.  To 
that end, [the Public Records Law] shall be construed 
in every instance with a presumption of complete 
public 
access, 
consistent 
with 
the 
conduct 
of 
governmental business.  The denial of public access 
generally is contrary to the public interest, and only 
in an exceptional case may access be denied. 
§ 19.31.  We have recognized this provision as "one of the 
strongest declarations of policy to be found in the Wisconsin 
Statutes," Zellner v. Cedarburg School District, 2007 WI 53, 
No. 
2007AP1160   
 
32 
 
¶49, 300 Wis. 2d 290, 731 N.W.2d 240 (citing Munroe v. Braatz, 
201 Wis. 2d 442, 549 N.W.2d 451 (Ct. App. 1996)).   
¶53 In light of these express statutory policies, we 
cannot accept WSEU's argument that parties may, through the 
collective bargaining process, contract away the public's rights 
under Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a).  To hold otherwise would be 
contrary to the public interest, and would have the potential to 
eviscerate the Public Records Law through private agreements.  
Accordingly, under Wis. Stat. § 111.93(3)'s plain language, and 
the express policies of the Public Records Law and statutory 
collective bargaining procedures, § 111.93(3) does not cause 
Article 
2/4/4 
of 
the 
collective 
bargaining 
agreement 
to 
supersede § 19.35(1)(a).  Therefore, the Public Records Law's 
presumption of access to these records applies. 
D. 
The Balancing Test 
¶54 We have concluded that Article 2/4/4 is not an 
exception to the Public Records Law because its provisions are 
not "otherwise provided by law" within the meaning of Wis. Stat. 
§ 19.35(1)(a) and because Wis. Stat. § 111.93(3) does not cause 
Article 2/4/4 to supersede § 19.35(1)(a).  Accordingly, the 
balancing test must be applied to determine whether disclosure 
of the WSEU-represented employees' names can be precluded.  See 
Linzmeyer v. D.J. Forcey, 2002 WI 84, ¶11, 254 Wis. 2d 306, 646 
N.W.2d 
811 
(citing 
Wis. 
Newspress, 
199 
Wis. 2d 
at 
776) 
(concluding that in "the absence of a statutory or common law 
exception, the presumption favoring release can [] be overcome 
No. 
2007AP1160   
 
33 
 
[only] when there is a public policy interest in keeping the 
records confidential"). 
¶55 The balancing test involves balancing the public 
interest in disclosure against the public interest in non-
disclosure.  Wis. Newspress, 199 Wis. 2d at 786-88.  This test 
should be applied when the record custodian has refused to 
produce the record, in order to evaluate the merits of the 
custodian's decision.  Id.   
¶56 When courts balance the public interest in disclosure 
against the public interest in non-disclosure, generally there 
will be no "blanket exceptions from release."  Linzmeyer, 254 
Wis. 2d 306, ¶10 (citing Woznicki v. Erickson, 202 Wis. 2d 178, 
183, 549 N.W.2d 699 (1996)).  Accordingly, the balancing test 
must be applied with respect to each individual record.  Wis. 
Newspress, 199 Wis. 2d at 780 (concluding that "the balancing 
test must be applied 'on a case-by-case basis' . . . in order to 
determine whether a particular record should be released." 
(quoting Law Offices of William A. Pangman & Assoc. v. Stigler, 
161 Wis. 2d 828, 840, 468 N.W.2d 784 (Ct. App. 1991))); Hempel 
v. City of Baraboo, 2005 WI 120, ¶62, 284 Wis. 2d 162, 699 
N.W.2d 551 (concluding that the balancing test does not create a 
"blanket rule excepting the disclosure of any . . . personnel 
records[;] . . . [e]ach request will lead to a fact-intensive 
inquiry"); State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 28 Wis. 2d 672, 682, 
137 N.W.2d 470 (1965) (concluding that the determination of when 
"harm to the public interest would justify refusal to permit 
No. 
2007AP1160   
 
34 
 
inspection . . . is . . . best . . . left to case-by-case 
decision[s]"). 
¶57 Here, it appears that the circuit court applied the 
balancing test to the WSEU members as a group because that is 
the manner in which WSEU presented the issue to the circuit 
court.  For example, the circuit court related: 
Many of the employees represented by WSEU whose names 
were not disclosed are employed by the Department of 
Corrections 
and 
supervise 
inmates 
or 
criminal 
defendants 
on 
probation, 
parole 
or 
extended 
supervision.  Those employees are concerned about 
retaliation or harassment at the hands of these 
offenders who bear animosity toward the DOC employee.  
For these reasons, WSEU's counsel writes, "Many Agents 
take extraordinary measures to prevent offenders they 
supervise to know their correct names and home 
addresses 
or 
any 
other 
identifying 
information."  . . .  
 
I am confused by WSEU's argument.  WSEU says that 
many DOC agents take extraordinary measures to keep 
their correct names from offenders.  I see two 
possibilities.  A given offender either knows her 
agent by the correct name or the offender knows the 
agent 
by 
some 
other 
name. 
 
Disclosure 
of 
the 
employees' names in this case changes nothing for the 
first offender.  I fail to see how disclosure to the 
second offender creates any danger, since the second 
offender only knows the agent by some other name. 
¶58 We do acknowledge that the circuit court may have 
considered each record request individually, but that is not 
apparent from its written decision.  It may be that the circuit 
court's analysis was primarily guided by the parties' briefs for 
and 
against 
the 
cross-motions 
for 
summary 
judgment.  
Alternatively, it may be that the factual record before the 
circuit court was not sufficiently developed with respect to 
No. 
2007AP1160   
 
35 
 
each individual record request, such that it was not feasible 
for the circuit court to apply the balancing test individually. 
¶59 Nevertheless, to the extent the circuit court applied 
the balancing test to WSEU members in the manner WSEU requested, 
we affirm that application.  We note that there is a strong, 
legislatively-created 
presumption 
in 
favor 
of 
disclosure.  
Hempel, 284 Wis. 2d 162, ¶28.  Although WSEU argues that there 
is no public interest served by disclosure of these records, we 
reject this argument, noting that  
[t]he 
public 
records law reflects a legislative 
determination 
that 
the 
public 
interest 
favors 
inspection of public records. . . .  The law was 
intended to be a means by which citizens could more 
effectively 
monitor 
the 
activities 
of 
government. . . .  There can thus never be occasion 
for finding "no public interest" in disclosure of such 
documents; the interest is legislatively presumed. 
Milwaukee Journal v. Call, 153 Wis. 2d 313, 321, 450 N.W.2d 515 
(Ct. App. 1989) (citing Hathaway v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1, 116 
Wis. 2d 388, 397, 342 N.W.2d 682 (1984); Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Breier, 89 Wis. 2d 417, 438, 279 N.W.2d 179 (1979); Michael J. 
Fitzgerald, 
Public 
Access 
to 
Law 
Enforcement 
Records 
in 
Wisconsin, 68 Marq. L. Rev. 705, 714 (1985)).  That is, our 
determination does not hinge on whether there is some interest 
sufficient to justify disclosure.  The legislature has already 
answered that question.  Id.  Instead, the inquiry is "whether 
the strong presumption favoring access and disclosure is 
overcome by some even stronger public policy favoring limited 
access or nondisclosure."  Hempel, 284 Wis. 2d 162, ¶28 (citing 
No. 
2007AP1160   
 
36 
 
Linzmeyer, 254 Wis. 2d 306, ¶11; Woznicki, 202 Wis. 2d at 192-
93). 
¶60 Here, 
WSEU's 
arguments 
in 
this 
respect 
relate 
primarily to employees of the Department of Corrections, parole 
agents and DNR wardens.  Specifically, WSEU argues that the 
release of these employees' names will lead to potential 
embarrassment, as well as endangering these employees by making 
it possible for individuals with whom they have interacted in 
the past to track them down and cause them harm.  According to 
WSEU, these concerns present policies sufficient to overcome the 
strong presumption in favor of disclosure of these records. 
¶61 We reject 
WSEU's arguments for several reasons.  
First, these names are already publicly available in a 269-page 
alphabetical directory, so it is difficult to contemplate how 
release of the names here will actually change anything.18  
Accordingly, the fact that the names are already publicly 
available weakens any argument WSEU sets forth that disclosure 
here will detrimentally affect the employees to an extent that 
the publicly available directories have not already.   
¶62 Second, we have held in the past that the potential 
for embarrassment is not a basis for precluding disclosure.  
Zellner, 300 Wis. 2d 290, ¶50 ("[T]he public interest in 
protecting individuals' privacy and reputation arises from the 
public effects of the failure to honor the individual's privacy 
                                                 
18 We acknowledge that WSEU is currently pushing to have 
these directories removed from public availability, but that is 
not the current situation with respect to these names.   
No. 
2007AP1160   
 
37 
 
interests, 
and 
not 
the 
individual's 
concern 
about 
embarrassment." (quoting Linzmeyer, 254 Wis. 2d 306, ¶31)). 
¶63 Finally, we note that the safety concerns set forth by 
WSEU with respect to correctional employees, parole agents and 
DNR wardens in general, when examined as a group, are not 
concerns different from those faced by other groups of employees 
of the State of Wisconsin.  Nearly all public officials, due to 
their profiles as agents of the State, have the potential to 
incur the wrath of disgruntled members of the public, and may be 
expected to face heightened public scrutiny; that is simply the 
nature of public employment.  Wis. Newspress, 199 Wis. 2d at 787 
(citing State ex rel. Bilder v. Township of Delavan, 112 Wis. 2d 
539, 557, 334 N.W.2d 252 (1983); Wis. State Journal v. Univ. of 
Wis.-Platteville, 160 Wis. 2d 31, 41, 465 N.W.2d 266 (Ct. App. 
1990)) ("[A] prominent public official, or an official in a 
position of authority, should have a lower expectation of 
privacy regarding his or her employment records."); see also 
Zellner, 300 Wis. 2d 290, ¶53 ("The public [] has an interest in 
knowing how the government handles disciplinary actions of 
public 
employees. . . .  
'All 
officers 
and 
employees 
of 
government are, ultimately, responsible to the citizens, and 
those citizens have a right to hold their employees accountable 
for the job they do.'" (quoting Linzmeyer, 254 Wis. 2d 306, 
¶28)). 
¶64 We note that this public need for heightened scrutiny 
of public officials as a result of public employment has been 
expressly recognized with respect to police officers, who, as a 
No. 
2007AP1160   
 
38 
 
group, share many of the same safety concerns advanced here by 
WSEU on behalf of correctional officers, parole agents and DNR 
wardens, yet their records are still generally subject to 
disclosure under the Public Records Law.  See State ex rel. 
Journal/Sentinel, Inc. v. Arreola, 207 Wis. 2d 496, 515, 558 
N.W.2d 670 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing Wis. Newspress, 199 Wis. 2d 
at 
788; 
Wis. 
State Journal, 160 Wis. 2d at 41) ("When 
individuals 
accept 
positions 
as 
police 
officers, 
they 
necessarily relinquish certain privacy rights and must be 
subject to public scrutiny. . . .  As a result of their public 
employment, 
police 
officers 
have 
a 
lower 
expectation 
of 
privacy.").    
¶65 As a result, accepting WSEU's safety-based arguments 
as exempting the entire group of WSEU's members here casts too 
broad a net, given the presumption of access to public records 
No. 
2007AP1160   
 
39 
 
set out in Wis. Stat. § 19.31.19  See Kroeplin v. DNR, 2006 WI 
App 227, ¶43, 297 Wis. 2d 254, 725 N.W.2d 286 (rejecting the 
proffered reason for denying access to public records because it 
was not a reason "specific to the particular documents in th[e] 
case" 
and 
instead 
appeared 
to 
"apply 
generally 
to 
all 
disciplinary records").  
¶66 Accordingly, we reject WSEU's arguments when applied 
to the WSEU members as a group and conclude that the public 
policy favoring disclosure is not overcome here by a more 
compelling public policy favoring non-disclosure.  We therefore 
affirm the circuit court's application of the balancing test 
                                                 
19 We do not imply that the safety concerns of record 
subjects are always, or even often, inadequate to preclude 
disclosure, just that the safety concerns advanced here by WSEU 
are insufficiently particularized to preclude disclosure under 
the balancing test in this instance.  To the contrary, safety 
concerns implicated by the disclosure of public records have 
been expressly recognized by the legislature as a basis for 
precluding disclosure in certain instances.  Specifically, Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 19.35(1)(am) 
notes 
that, 
in 
situations 
where 
an 
individual record requester is seeking "personally identifiable 
information" pertaining to himself or herself (i.e., the record 
requester is also the record subject), the records sought will 
not 
be 
subject 
to 
disclosure 
if 
their 
disclosure 
would 
"[e]ndanger an individual's life or safety."  § 19.35(1)(am)2.b.  
Furthermore, 
where 
disclosure 
of 
records 
relating 
to 
correctional officers and employees of certain other facilities 
would endanger those employees' safety, disclosure of those 
records 
is 
precluded. 
 
§ 19.35(1)(am)2.c. 
 
Although 
§ 19.35(1)(am) does not apply here because the records sought 
are being sought not by the record subjects, but by third party 
newspapers, those statutory provisions may be considered as part 
of the balancing test applied to the records of individual 
record subjects. 
No. 
2007AP1160   
 
40 
 
concluding that when these records are reviewed as a group, they 
should be released. 
¶67 As we noted above, it does not appear that the circuit 
court applied the balancing test individually to each employee's 
record.  Accordingly, we do not opine on what the result would 
be if individual WSEU members intervene on remand and request 
the circuit court to examine the circumstances attendant to the 
release of individual names.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶68 We conclude that courts have jurisdiction to review 
whether 
the 
legislature's 
ratification 
of 
a 
collective 
bargaining agreement under Wis. Stat. § 111.92(1)(a), without 
introducing a companion bill to specifically amend the Public 
Records Law, is sufficient to effect a change in that law.  We 
so conclude because courts have jurisdiction to determine the 
meaning of statutes, here § 111.92(1)(a), and of constitutional 
provisions, here Article IV, Section 17(2) of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  We also conclude that ratification of the 
collective bargaining agreement was insufficient to amend the 
Public Records Law because Article 2/4/4 of the collective 
bargaining agreement was not "introduce[d] in a bill or 
companion bills" within the meaning of § 111.92(1)(a), as that 
meaning is driven by the requirements of Article IV, Section 
17(2) 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
 
Accordingly, 
the 
ratification of the collective bargaining agreement did not 
create an exception to the Public Records Law.  Additionally, we 
conclude that Wis. Stat. § 111.93(3) does not support WSEU's 
No. 
2007AP1160   
 
41 
 
assertion that Article 2/4/4 supersedes the Public Records Law's 
disclosure requirement, Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a). 
¶69 Finally, we affirm the circuit court's application of 
the balancing test, which it appears the circuit court applied 
to the WSEU members as a group because that is how the issue was 
argued to the circuit court.  However, we do not decide what our 
conclusion would be if, on remand, individual record subjects 
intervene and request the circuit court to apply the balancing 
test to them, individually.   
By the Court.—The decision of the circuit court is affirmed 
and the cause remanded to the circuit court. 
 
 
No.  2007AP1160.awb 
 
1 
 
¶70 ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   (concurring). 
 
I 
write 
separately to concur with the mandate of the majority.  I reach 
the same conclusion but rest on a different analysis. 
¶71 Before delving into the question of whether the 
collective bargaining agreement is a law, it is necessary to 
address a threshold question: whether Wis. Stat. § 111.92(1)(a) 
sets 
forth 
a 
rule 
of 
legislative 
proceedings. 
 
 
If 
§ 111.92(1)(a) is a rule of legislative proceeding then the 
doctrines of separation of powers and comity prevent the court 
from intervening to enforce the statute.  If it is not a rule of 
proceeding, then we are free to interpret and apply the statute. 
¶72 I agree with the dissent that this is a close case, 
and that "there is no simple way of distinguishing in close 
cases between a rule of legislative proceeding and a rule 
relating to non-procedural matters."  See dissent, ¶100.  The 
dissent therefore weighs the interests involved.   
¶73 It acknowledges that several significant factors weigh 
in favor of concluding that this is not a rule of legislative 
proceeding: "fairness requires notice"; "the public policy 
embodied in Wis. Stat. § 111.92(1)(a) . . . is best served when 
the bill pinpoints the parts of a collective bargaining 
agreement that modify existing law"; and "transparency in 
government [is] a dominant public policy in this state."  
Dissent, ¶¶101-103. 
¶74 Nevertheless, the dissent also observes that several 
other 
factors 
provide 
a 
counter-balance. 
Ultimately, 
it 
No.  2007AP1160.awb 
 
2 
 
concludes that the balance tips in favor of the court's 
restraint.  Dissent, ¶107.   
¶75 I see the balance differently.  In a close case, I 
conclude that the weighty public policies of notice and 
transparency in government tip the scale.  I would therefore 
determine that Wis. Stat. § 111.92(1)(a) is not a rule of 
legislative proceeding, and the court may intervene to examine 
whether its conditions were met.  
¶76 I turn then to the statute to determine whether the 
collective bargaining agreement was properly ratified.  Wis. 
Stat. § 111.92(1)(a) provides in part: 
If the [joint committee on employment relations] 
approves the tentative agreement, it shall introduce 
in a bill or companion bills, . . . that portion of 
the tentative agreement which requires legislative 
action for implementation, such as . . . any proposed 
amendments, deletions or additions to existing law. 
The portion of the collective bargaining agreement that provides 
that the State will not release employee information to the 
press creates an amendment to the open records law.  Thus, I 
must determine whether the legislature followed the dictates of 
Wis. Stat. § 111.92(1)(a) when it ratified the agreement.   
¶77 I determine that it did not.  Nothing in 2003 Wis. Act 
319 explicitly sets forth any portion of the tentative agreement 
at all.  Certainly, nothing in the text of the Act sets forth an 
amendment to the public records statute requiring legislative 
action.  I thus determine that the directives in Wis. Stat. 
§ 111.92(1)(a) were not met to the extent that 2003 Wis. Act 319 
attempted to provide an amendment to the public records law. 
No.  2007AP1160.awb 
 
3 
 
Like the majority, I ultimately conclude that because Wis. Stat. 
§ 111.92(1)(a) was not satisfied, the records are to be 
released. 
¶78 Accordingly, I respectfully concur.     
 
 
 
No.  2007AP1160.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶79 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
C.J. (dissenting). 
 
The 
newspapers (the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel and the Lakeland 
Times) argue that this court should interpret and apply Wis. 
Stat. § 111.92(1)(a) to determine whether legislation ratifying 
a collective bargaining agreement complies with § 111.92(1)(a).  
The newspapers' argument requires this court to determine 
whether 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 111.92(1)(a) 
sets 
forth 
a 
rule 
of 
legislative proceeding, that is, a rule establishing procedural 
requirements falling within Article IV, Section 8 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  Article IV, § 8 provides that "[e]ach 
house may determine the rules of its own proceedings."  
¶80 If Wis. Stat. § 111.92(1)(a) is a rule of proceeding 
under the Wisconsin Constitution, the doctrine of separation of 
powers and the principle of comity apply, and the courts will 
not enforce § 111.92(1)(a): "If the legislature fails to follow 
self-adopted procedural rules in enacting legislation, and such 
rules are not mandated by the constitution, courts will not 
intervene to declare the legislation invalid."1   
                                                 
1 State ex rel. La Follette v. Stitt, 114 Wis. 2d 358, 365, 
338 N.W.2d 684 (1983).   
See also 1 Norman J. Singer Statutes and Statutory 
Construction § 7.4, at 609-11 (6th ed. 2002) ("The decisions are 
nearly unanimous in holding that an act cannot be declared 
invalid 
for 
failure 
of 
a 
house 
to 
observe 
its 
own 
rules. . . . The legislature by statute or joint resolution 
cannot bind or restrict itself or its successors to the 
procedure to be followed in the passage of legislation."); 
Charles Luce, Judicial Regulation of Legislative Procedure in 
Wisconsin, 1941 Wis. L. Rev. 439, 453-54 ("The court will not 
invalidate an act because it appears that the respective houses 
of the legislature have not complied with their own rules in 
passing it."). 
No.  2007AP1160.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶81 If Wis. Stat. § 111.92(1)(a) is not a rule of 
proceeding under the Wisconsin Constitution, the court will 
interpret and apply § 111.92(1)(a) to the fact situation 
presented. 
¶82 The 
majority 
opinion 
concludes 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 111.92(1)(a) was not satisfied in the present case and that 
the records must be released.  See majority op., ¶¶37-41.  I 
reach a different conclusion.  I conclude that § 111.92(1)(a) 
sets forth a rule of proceeding under the Wisconsin Constitution 
and courts should not intervene to enforce § 111.92(1)(a).     
¶83 Wisconsin Stat. § 111.92(1)(a) provides in relevant 
part that if the Joint Committee on Employment Relations 
approves a tentative agreement between the State and a labor 
organization, the Committee "shall introduce in a bill or 
companion bills . . . that portion of the tentative agreement 
which requires legislative action for implementation, such 
as . . . any proposed amendments, deletions or additions to 
existing law."  This requirement about the content of a bill 
relating to a collective bargaining agreement is not mandated by 
the constitution.     
¶84 The 
Joint 
Committee on Employment Relations did 
introduce a bill relating to the collective bargaining agreement 
at issue in the present case.  The bill became law as 2003 Act 
319.  The Act ratified the tentative collective bargaining 
agreement, providing as follows in pertinent part:  
The 
legislature 
ratifies 
the 
tentative 
agreement 
negotiated for the 2003-05 biennium between the state 
of 
Wisconsin, 
the 
office 
of 
state 
employment 
relations, 
and 
the 
Wisconsin 
State 
Employees 
No.  2007AP1160.ssa 
 
3 
 
Union . . . . The director of the office of state 
employment relations shall file an official copy of 
the agreement, certified by the cochairpersons of the 
joint committee on employment relations, with the 
secretary of state. 
¶85 The newspapers contend that the Act is invalid as a 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 111.92(1)(a) to the extent the Act 
attempts to ratify the portion of the collective bargaining 
agreement that amends the public records law.  The Act, they 
argue, does not explicitly set forth that portion of the 
agreement that requires legislative action.  
¶86 As is obvious from the text of the Act, nothing in the 
Act 
explicitly 
sets 
forth 
any 
portion 
of 
the 
tentative 
collective bargaining agreement at all, let alone any portion 
that requires legislative action. The Act does not refer to any 
statute; it does not refer to the public records statute; and it 
does not explicitly exempt information about state employee 
records from press access.  The Act merely refers to and 
ratifies the collective bargaining agreement as a whole and 
requires that the agreement be filed with the Secretary of 
State.       
¶87 I answer the issue presented, guided by these three 
legal principles:   
(1) Courts have the authority to review legislative acts to 
determine whether they conflict with the United States or 
Wisconsin constitution.   
(2) Courts have the authority to interpret statutes and 
apply them to the facts presented.  
No.  2007AP1160.ssa 
 
4 
 
(3) "[T]he legislature's adherence to rules or statutes 
prescribing legislative procedure is a matter entirely within 
legislative control and discretion, not subject to judicial 
review unless the legislative procedure is mandated by the 
constitution."2  If the legislature fails to follow self-imposed 
procedural rules, including a procedural rule in the form of a 
statute, the legislature is viewed as accomplishing "an implied 
ad hoc repeal of such rules."3           
¶88 Because the first and third legal principles above 
relate to the Wisconsin constitution, I set forth the three 
relevant Wisconsin constitutional provisions. 
                                                 
2 State ex rel. La Follette v. Stitt, 114 Wis. 2d 358, 365, 
338 N.W.2d 684 (1983) (holding that 1983 Wisconsin Act 3 is 
valid although the enactment procedure may have violated Wis. 
Stat. § 13.49). 
Wisconsin has long followed this rule.  See McDonald v. 
State, 80 Wis. 407, 412, 50 N.W. 185 (1891) ("We think no court 
has ever declared an act of the legislature void for non-
compliance with the rules of procedure made by itself, or the 
respective branches thereof, and which it or they may change or 
suspend at will."); State ex rel. Hunsicker v. Board of Regents, 
209 Wis. 83, 86, 244 N.W. 618 (1932) ("It is a well settled 
principle of law that a statute will not be held void because 
the legislature did not follow its own rules in the passage of 
the act.  This is on the theory that the legislature has the 
power to change its rules at any time." (citations omitted)); 
Outagamie County v. Smith, 38 Wis. 2d 24, 39, 155 N.W.2d 639 
(1968) ("This court is without authority to intermeddle in 
matters of legislative concern. It is a well settled principle 
of 
Wisconsin 
constitutional 
law 
that 
one 
branch 
of 
the 
government has no authority to compel a co-ordinate branch to 
perform functions of judgment and discretion that are lawfully 
delegated to it by the constitution."). 
3 Stitt, 114 Wis. 2d at 365. 
No.  2007AP1160.ssa 
 
5 
 
• 
No law shall be enacted except by bill.  Wis. 
Const. art. IV, § 17(2). 
• 
No law shall be in force until published.  Wis. 
Const. art. IV, § 17(2). 
• 
Each house may determine the rules of its own 
proceedings.  Wis. Const. art. IV, § 8.4  
¶89 2003 Act 319 satisfies the first two constitutional 
provisions; it does not run afoul of Article IV, Section 17(2).  
It was enacted by a bill, namely 2003 Senate Bill 565.  It was 
published on May 28, 2004.   
¶90 Nothing in the Wisconsin Constitution requires that a 
bill 
ratifying 
a 
collective 
bargaining 
agreement 
contain 
language other than the language required to be in all acts 
under Article IV, Section 17(1).5  Nor does anything in the 
Wisconsin Constitution forbid the legislature from enacting a 
                                                 
4 For a discussion of the ten Wisconsin Constitution 
provisions relating to the procedure the legislature is to 
observe in enacting a statute, see Charles Luce, Judicial 
Regulation of Legislative Procedure in Wisconsin, 1941 Wis. L. 
Rev. 439. 
5 Article IV, Section 17(1) of the Wisconsin Constitution 
imposes the requirement that "[t]he style of all laws of the 
state 
shall be 'The people of the state of Wisconsin, 
represented in senate and assembly, do enacted as follows:".  
This language appears in 2003 Wisconsin Act 319.   
No.  2007AP1160.ssa 
 
6 
 
law 
referring 
to 
an 
extrinsic 
document.6 
 
Insofar 
as 
§ 111.92(1)(a) sets forth requirements about the content of a 
bill ratifying a collective bargaining agreement, it imposes a 
statutory 
limitation 
upon 
a 
legislative 
act 
ratifying 
a 
collective bargaining agreement that is not set forth in the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  
¶91 I now turn to the third Wisconsin constitutional 
provision relating to the right of each house to determine the 
rules of its own proceedings.  A court decides whether Wis. 
                                                 
6 In State v. Wakeen, 263 Wis. 401, 57 N.W.2d 364 (1953), 
for example, the court reviewed a statute regulating the 
distribution of "drugs" and defining the word "drug" in relevant 
part as "[a]rticles recognized in the official United States 
Pharmacopoeia, official Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United 
States, or official National Formulary, or any supplement to any 
of them, intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, 
treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals."  
Wakeen, 263 Wis. at 404 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 151.06).  Wakeen 
contended that the statute represented "an unlawful delegation 
of legislative authority to the private organizations located 
outside of the state which compile the publications referred to 
[in the statute]," particularly insofar as the statute defined 
"drugs" to include "articles listed in future supplements"——that 
is, documents not yet in existence——to the publications listed 
in the statute.  Wakeen, 263 Wis. at 406-07.  The court 
concluded that the statute did not represent a delegation of 
legislative authority and was constitutionally valid.  See 
Wakeen, 263 Wis. at 411-12.   
In Walgreen Co. v. City of Madison, 2008 WI 80, ¶20, 311 
Wis. 2d 158, 752 N.W.2d 687, this court interpreted and applied 
Wis. Stat. § 70.32(1), providing in part that "[r]eal property 
shall be valued by [a property] assessor in the manner specified 
in the Wisconsin property assessment manual provided under 
s. 73.03(2a) . . . ."  The property assessment manual is a 
document that the Department of Revenue prepares, amends from 
time to time, and publishes in electronic form and on the 
Internet.  Wis. Stat. § 73.03(2a).  It does not appear that the 
text of the property assessment manual may be found in any 
legislative act. 
No.  2007AP1160.ssa 
 
7 
 
Stat. § 111.92(1)(a) is a "rule of proceeding" under Article IV, 
Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution.7  The court has used the 
phrase "rules of its own proceedings" under Article IV, Section 
8 interchangeably with the phrases "rules governing how [the 
legislature] operates" and "the legislature's procedural rules."8   
¶92 Neither the parties nor the amici curiae furnish a 
good definition or description of what is meant by the 
constitutional phrase "a rule of its own proceedings."  This 
omission 
is 
not 
surprising. 
 
Courts 
and 
litigants 
have 
difficulty in some instances in distinguishing between a rule of 
proceeding and a rule governing a substantive matter.  There is 
no magic line always easily discernible between procedural rules 
and rules governing non-procedural matters.     
¶93 The newspapers argue that the language at issue in 
Wis. Stat. § 111.92(1)(a) relates to content, not procedure.  I 
agree that the statutory language requiring the Joint Committee 
on Employment Relations to "introduce in a bill . . . that 
portion of the tentative agreement which requires legislative 
action for implementation" governs the content of a bill: the 
statute clearly provides that a bill must contain that portion 
of the tentative agreement that requires legislative action, 
such as an amendment to existing law.  
¶94 Section 111.92(1)(a) does not, however, specify in 
what way a bill must set forth that portion of the tentative 
                                                 
7 Custodian of Records v. Wisconsin, 2004 WI 65, ¶29, 272 
Wis. 2d 208, 680 N.W.2d 792. 
8 Id., ¶¶28-29. 
No.  2007AP1160.ssa 
 
8 
 
agreement 
that 
requires 
legislative 
action. 
 
Section 
111.92(1)(a) is silent on the method of including that portion 
of the tentative agreement in a bill. 
¶95 The court of appeals in Board of Regents v. Wisconsin 
Personnel Commission, 103 Wis. 2d 545, 309 N.W.2d 366 (Ct. App. 
1981), repeatedly refers to Wis. Stat. § 111.92(1)(a)9 as setting 
forth a rule of legislative procedure, a method for legislative 
approval of a collective bargaining agreement.10  Nevertheless, 
the Board of Regents court of appeals treated Wis. Stat. 
§ 111.92's 
procedural 
requirements 
as 
binding 
on 
the 
legislature.  
The 
court of appeals stated that if the 
legislature intends to change a law by ratifying a collective 
                                                 
9 At the time the court of appeals decided the Board of 
Regents 
case, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 111.92(1)(a) 
was 
numbered 
as 
§ 111.92(1). 
10 The Board of Regents court of appeals stated that in 
§ 111.92(1), "[t]he legislature has chosen a method for approval 
of a collective bargaining agreement that assures it will be 
informed 
of 
intended 
changes 
in 
existing 
law, 
with 
the 
consequent opportunity to consider the merits of the changes in 
conjunction with its approval of the agreement. . . . The 
procedure 
avoids unfavored implied repeals or amendments, 
assures that specific legislative acts will control general 
acts, and also assures statutory harmony."  Board of Regents, 
103 Wis. 2d at 558. 
In Board of Regents the legislature had ratified a 
collective 
bargaining 
agreement 
granting 
the 
Personnel 
Commission discretionary authority to review the discharge of 
probationary employees.  This provision in the collective 
bargaining agreement conflicted with statutory provisions in 
Chapter 230 providing that a probationary employee had no right 
to appeal a discharge.  The Joint Committee on Employment 
Relations had not introduced a bill containing that portion of 
the collective bargaining agreement that would amend or add to 
existing law by granting the Personnel Commission discretionary 
authority to review the discharge of probationary employees. 
No.  2007AP1160.ssa 
 
9 
 
bargaining agreement, it must "comply with its own limiting 
approval procedure to effect this change."11   
¶96 The Board of Regents decision is, however, not helpful 
in deciding the present case.  The parties' briefs in Board of 
Regents did not address the applicability of Wis. Stat. 
§ 111.92(1)(a).12 
 
No 
party 
argued 
that 
if 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 111.92(1)(a) constitutes a rule of legislative procedure, the 
statute is not binding on the legislature and will not be 
enforced by the courts.  Nor did the court of appeals raise this 
issue sua sponte.  The court of appeals showed no awareness of 
the potential conflict between its analysis and prior case law 
holding that the courts do not enforce legislative compliance 
with self-adopted rules of legislative procedure.13   
¶97 It seems to me that the precise language to be 
inserted in the Act to satisfy the content requirement of 
§ 111.92(1)(a) may be viewed as a rule of legislative proceeding 
for the legislature to determine.  Why shouldn't the legislature 
(rather than a court) be able to decide whether exact language 
from the agreement must be reproduced in the bill?  Or whether a 
reference to the article and section of the agreement is 
sufficient?  Or whether a brief description of the portion of 
                                                 
11 Board of Regents, 103 Wis. 2d at 556.  See also id. at 
557-58. 
12 See Board of Regents, 103 Wis. 2d at 555 n.7. 
13 To the extent that the Board of Regents decision may be 
viewed as implying that a court will invalidate legislation when 
the legislature has violated a procedural statutory provision, 
this implication must be disavowed. 
No.  2007AP1160.ssa 
 
10 
 
the agreement at issue is adequate?  Cannot the legislature 
(rather than a court) also determine as a matter of procedure 
whether the statutory law to be modified by a collective 
bargaining agreement must be set forth in full (or described or 
identified by statutory number) in the bill?  Why can't the 
legislature (rather than a court) determine that a reference to 
and incorporation of the entire collective bargaining agreement 
is 
sufficient 
to 
satisfy 
the 
content 
requirement 
under 
§ 111.92(1)(a)?   
¶98 Anyone reading the collective bargaining agreement in 
the present case would know that the agreement adopts an 
exception to the public records statute.  Article 2/4/4 of the 
agreement ratified under 2003 Act 319 explicitly provides that 
"[n]otwithstanding the provisions of § 19.31-19.36 [the public 
records 
statute] . . . the 
Employer 
will 
not 
release 
any 
information relating to the names, addresses . . . of employees 
covered by this Agreement."  
¶99 Although it may be argued that it is for the court to 
interpret Wis. Stat. § 111.92(1)(a) and to hold the legislature 
to the court's interpretation of the precise language needed to 
satisfy the content requirement of § 111.92(1)(a), there is also 
a good argument that in so interpreting and applying the statute 
the court would encroach upon the legislature's right to 
determine the rules of its own proceedings.  Arguably, how the 
legislature must satisfy the content requirement of Wis. Stat. 
§ 111.92(1)(a) and how the legislature must make clear its 
No.  2007AP1160.ssa 
 
11 
 
intent to ratify provisions in a collective bargaining agreement 
that modify existing law are questions of legislative procedure. 
¶100 I 
acknowledge 
that 
there 
is 
no 
simple 
way 
of 
distinguishing in close cases between a rule of legislative 
proceeding and a rule relating to non-procedural matters under 
the Wisconsin constitution, and the instant case is a close 
case.  When a legislative act does not violate a constitutional 
provision and there is a reasonable doubt about whether an 
applicable statute presents a rule of legislative proceeding, I 
must weigh the various interests involved.     
¶101 As a member of the judicial branch, I am accustomed to 
the concept that the words of a statute should be followed and 
to the concept that fairness requires notice.  I would also be 
more comfortable if the legislature spelled out exactly what 
statutes it intends to modify when ratifying a collective 
bargaining agreement. "Such a procedure is endowed with the 
virtue of avoidance of complex judicial and administrative 
statutory construction designed to arrive at legislative intent, 
and minimizes the prospect of interpretive error."14    
¶102 I am therefore persuaded that the public policy 
embodied in Wis. Stat. § 111.92(1)(a) governing the content of a 
bill ratifying a collective bargaining agreement is best served 
when the bill pinpoints the parts of a collective bargaining 
agreement that modify existing law.  As the Board of Regents 
court of appeals recognized, § 111.92(1)(a) is designed to serve 
the important purpose of assuring that the legislature "will be 
                                                 
14 Board of Regents, 103 Wis. 2d at 558. 
No.  2007AP1160.ssa 
 
12 
 
informed of intended changes in existing law" and will have "the 
consequent opportunity to consider the merits of the changes in 
conjunction with its approval of [a collective bargaining] 
agreement"15 
¶103 I am also persuaded that the legislature has made 
transparency in government a dominant public policy in this 
state.  Wisconsin prides itself on open government proceedings 
and open public records.  Sunshine is a great disinfectant. 
¶104 These factors point to holding in favor of the 
newspapers' position. 
¶105 Factors 
exist, 
however, 
pointing 
in 
the 
other 
direction as well.  The legislature has used the same kind of 
language over several years to ratify collective bargaining 
agreements 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 111.92(1)(a). 
 
Thus 
the 
legislature 
apparently 
has 
concluded 
that 
§ 111.92(1)(a)'s 
requirement about the content of a bill ratifying a collective 
bargaining agreement may be satisfied by a reference to the 
agreement as a whole. 
¶106 The final factor is the weight to be accorded to each 
of the equal, coordinate three branches of government.  Just as 
there are realms of exclusive judicial power into which the 
legislative and executive branches should not enter, so too are 
there realms of legislative power that are exclusively in the 
legislature's domain.  The Wisconsin Constitution (and our case 
law) make clear that rules of legislative proceeding are the 
exclusive domain of the legislature.  
                                                 
15 Board of Regents, 103 Wis. 2d at 558.   
No.  2007AP1160.ssa 
 
13 
 
¶107 In considering all these factors in this close case, I 
conclude that the balance tips in favor of holding that a court 
should refrain from interfering with the legislature in the 
present case under the doctrine of separation of powers embodied 
in the Wisconsin Constitution and the principle of comity.  The 
legislature's 
adherence 
to 
rules 
or 
statutes 
prescribing 
legislative procedure (even those regarding the method for 
satisfying a statute regulating the content of a bill or act) is 
a matter entirely within legislative control and discretion, not 
subject to judicial review unless the legislative procedure is 
mandated by or violates the constitution.16   
¶108 It is not the role of the court to sit in judgment of 
the legislature when the legislature's own rules of procedure 
are at issue and the constitution has not otherwise been 
violated.  Respecting this limit on the court's authority, I 
                                                 
16 If a constitutional violation were involved, a court 
would interpret and apply the Act in accordance with the 
Constitution. 
 
Although 
the 
newspapers 
argue 
that 
the 
legislature has violated due process by not giving the public 
adequate notice of the contents of the Act, I am not persuaded 
by this argument, which has not generally been accepted by 
courts.  A brief by an amicus also argues that the constitution 
has been violated by the legislature's singling out the press in 
the collective agreement, but this argument has not been 
advanced or discussed by any of the parties. 
No.  2007AP1160.ssa 
 
14 
 
conclude that 2003 Wisconsin Act 319 is valid in full, even 
insofar as it ratifies that portion of the collective bargaining 
agreement amending the public records law. 
¶109 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
 
 
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