Title: Harris v. Hilderbrand

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Harris v. Hilderbrand, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-3009.] 
 
 
  
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2023-OHIO-3009 
HARRIS, APPELLANT, v. HILDERBRAND, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Harris v. Hilderbrand, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-3009.] 
R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)—Immunity for employees of political subdivisions—
Reasonable minds could disagree regarding whether K-9 officer was 
manifestly acting outside scope of his employment during events leading up 
to his houseguest’s dog-bite injury. 
(No. 2022-0784—Submitted April 19, 2023—Decided August 30, 2023.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Jefferson County, 
No. 21 JE 0013, 2022-Ohio-1555. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, C.J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal from the Seventh District Court of Appeals, we 
determine whether a K-9 officer who is required to keep his canine partner with 
him in his home enjoys political-subdivision immunity from liability under R.C. 
2744.03(A)(6) if the dog bites a social guest at the officer’s home.  Essential to that 
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determination is whether the officer’s acts or omissions leading up to the incident 
were manifestly outside the scope of his employment or official responsibilities.  
We hold that the court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s partial denial 
of the officer’s motion for summary judgment and in holding that as a matter of 
law, the officer in this case was not manifestly acting outside the scope of his 
employment or official responsibilities during the events leading up to the dog bite.  
Based on the facts in this case, reasonable minds could disagree regarding whether 
the officer was acting outside the scope of his employment.  Therefore, we reverse 
the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the matter to the trial court. 
I.  Factual and Procedural Background 
A.  The dog-bite incident 
{¶ 2} Appellee, Dustin Hilderbrand, a Belmont County deputy sheriff and 
K-9 handler, hosted a cookout for friends at the home he shared with his fiancée, 
Kelcie Leonard, in August 2019.  Appellant, Allison Harris, attended the cookout, 
where she was bitten by Hilderbrand’s canine partner, Xyrem. 
{¶ 3} At the time of the incident, Hilderbrand had been in the K-9 unit for 
about 11 months.  As a member of the K-9 unit, he was required to keep Xyrem at 
his home.  James Zusak, the chief deputy sheriff of the Belmont County Sheriff’s 
Office, testified by affidavit as follows regarding the responsibilities of deputies in 
the K-9 unit: 
 
As a requirement of their position, K-9 deputies must keep 
and care for their dogs at their homes when they are off duty, and  
* * * supervise the conduct of the dog at all times.  The purpose of 
the arrangement is to solidify the bond between the deputy and the 
dog, so that they work well together while on duty.  The arrangement 
also allows the deputy and the dog to be on call and available as 
needed as a unit, and to ensure that the dog is continually supervised.  
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Keeping their dog[] in their home and caring [for] and supervising 
the dog is one of their duties as a K-9 deputy.  K-9 deputies are not 
permitted to work in that position if they are not willing or unable to 
keep and care for their dogs in their home. 
 
{¶ 4} Also in attendance at the cookout were Harris’s boyfriend, Thomas 
Riedel, who was also a Belmont County deputy sheriff, and a third couple, Carrie 
and Andrew Chesonis.  All of the attendees testified by deposition in this case. 
{¶ 5} Hilderbrand and his guests were drinking alcoholic beverages at the 
cookout.  At some point before dinner, Carrie Chesonis asked for a demonstration 
of Xyrem’s abilities, so Hilderbrand demonstrated to the guests three things that 
Xyrem had been trained to do.  First, he had the dog sniff a small item, and then he 
threw it into the yard for the dog to find.  Harris testified that Hilderbrand yelled at 
Xyrem and had possibly used the dog’s shock collar to shock him when he seemed 
to lose interest in finding the item.  Hilderbrand testified that he administered a 
vibration through the collar, not a shock, and that he did that only to stop Xyrem 
from sniffing another dog.  Riedel testified that Hilderbrand was randomly firing 
off commands to Xyrem. 
{¶ 6} Second, Hilderbrand retrieved contraband from his police vehicle—
illegal drugs used for training—and hid it in his yard.  Xyrem found the contraband 
upon Hilderbrand’s command.  Leonard testified that she had never seen 
Hilderbrand hide drugs in their yard before this incident. 
{¶ 7} Third, Hilderbrand demonstrated that Xyrem has been trained to bark 
when Hilderbrand says a phrase including the words “Belmont County Sheriff’s 
Office.”  He later testified that this command is often said as part of a longer 
warning that he has been trained to give a suspect before he gives a separate 
command to Xyrem to bite the suspect. Hilderbrand described the full warning as, 
“Belmont County Sheriff’s Office.  Show me your hands, come out now, or I’m 
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going to send my dog in and you’ll get bit.”  On the evening of the incident, 
Hilderbrand gave only the command, “Belmont County Sheriff’s Office.”  Leonard 
testified that Xyrem’s behavior always changes when he hears that command, and 
Carrie Chesonis testified that the command changed Xyrem’s behavior that 
evening.  According to Leonard’s testimony, upon hearing the command that day, 
Xyrem lunged at a door to the house and started barking.  She also testified that 
prior to the day of the cookout, Hilderbrand had never given the command with 
guests present and she had only seen him give the command a few times before. 
{¶ 8} Hilderbrand also had three other dogs, and the guests played with 
them, too.  Riedel testified that Hilderbrand at one point poured some beer on a 
cement area for Xyrem to lap up.  Hilderbrand denied that assertion, explaining in 
his testimony that it was one of his other dogs he had given beer to. 
{¶ 9} Hilderbrand estimated that after about an hour, he removed Xyrem’s 
shock collar and took him inside the house to eat his dinner in his kennel.  After 
about 45 minutes to an hour, Xyrem was let back outside without his shock collar. 
{¶ 10} Andrew Chesonis then asked Hilderbrand whether he could put the 
collar on himself to experience a shock.  Andrew put the collar on his arm, and 
Hilderbrand administered a shock at the lowest setting.  Andrew asked to be 
shocked again.  Andrew later testified that Hilderbrand was administering the 
second shock when Xyrem approached Harris, who was in the yard setting up a 
game, and bit her chest.  Riedel testified that Hilderbrand later told him that his first 
response had been to activate the shock collar but then he had realized that the collar 
was not on Xyrem.  Hilderbrand testified that after Xyrem bit Harris, he 
commanded Xyrem to lie down, he lay down beside Xyrem, holding the dog by the 
scruff of his neck, and Xyrem made no further attempts to bite Harris. 
{¶ 11} Harris received medical care for her wound that evening and later 
had surgery to repair the damage.  At the time of her deposition, she was scheduled 
to have further surgery. 
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B.  The trial court 
{¶ 12} Harris sued Hilderbrand, asserting a claim for common-law 
negligence and a claim under Ohio’s dog-bite statute, R.C. 955.28, which imposes 
strict liability for injuries caused by a dog in certain situations.  Both Hilderbrand 
and Harris moved for summary judgment on both claims.  The trial court granted 
Hilderbrand’s motion in part. 
{¶ 13} The trial court acknowledged that Hilderbrand was required to keep 
Xyrem at his home but concluded that the dog is meant to be used for police work 
and that Hilderbrand is not immune from liability for injuries caused by the dog 
when it is used for entertainment or amusement.  The court analogized the situation 
to a police officer’s passing around the officer’s loaded service firearm at a party.  
The court stated that it was not finding that no immunity exists but was “simply 
overruling the Motion for Summary Judgment on that issue [and] leaving it for the 
Jury to decide.” 
{¶ 14} The trial court granted Hilderbrand’s motion for summary judgment 
as to the strict-liability claim.  The court determined that under R.C. 955.28(B), 
strict liability is triggered by keeping or harboring a dog that bites someone.  The 
court held that Hilderbrand was immune from liability related to the strict-liability 
statute because under that statute, the behavior of the keeper of the dog is not an 
element of the claim.  Rather, the court noted, liability attaches to the person merely 
for harboring the dog, and since Hilderbrand’s employment required him to harbor 
the dog, the immunity statute operated to grant him immunity from liability for 
harboring the dog. 
C.  The court of appeals 
{¶ 15} Pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(C), Hilderbrand appealed the trial court’s 
judgment denying him summary judgment on Harris’s negligence claim.  That 
statute provides that “[a]n order that denies a political subdivision or an employee 
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of a political subdivision the benefit of an alleged immunity from liability * * * is 
a final order.” 
{¶ 16} Harris did not file a notice of cross-appeal, but she did assert in her 
brief in response to Hilderbrand’s brief that the trial court had erred in granting 
Hilderbrand summary judgment on her strict-liability claim. 
{¶ 17} The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment denying 
Hilderbrand summary judgment on the negligence claim.  It determined that the 
bite occurred approximately an hour after Hilderbrand had Xyrem do the 
demonstrations for his guests, and it noted that there was nothing in the way the 
dog was behaving before the bite that would have indicated he might bite someone. 
{¶ 18} The court considered the implications if it were to hold that summary 
judgment was not appropriate in this case, writing: 
 
It is undisputed [that] a part of a K-9 officer’s duty is to house and 
take care of the canine.  Being at the cookout, gave the dog a chance 
to acclimate to people in different situations and bond in the family 
unit.  Requiring Xyrem to live with [Hilderbrand] and to be a part 
of [Hilderbrand’s] household facilitates and promotes the business 
of the Belmont County Sheriff’s Department.  It ensures [that] 
Xyrem can be around people and learn how to properly behave in 
diverse human settings while at the same time be trained for his job 
of narcotic detection and apprehension.  To hold otherwise would 
essentially mean [Hilderbrand] is not permitted to have house guests 
or must lock up the canine every time he has a guest.  To prohibit an 
officer to have house guests if they are a K-9 unit would result in 
fewer officers accepting the official responsibilities of and 
becoming a K-9 unit.  K-9 units are a valuable tool to police 
departments and our communities.  Also, to require the dog to be 
January Term, 2023 
 
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locked up any time a K-9 officer may have guests could have serious 
implications on how the dog reacts to people in real life situations 
when on the job.  Foreclosing immunity in a situation such as this 
will keep otherwise capable officers from becoming a K-9 officer 
and could have training implications on the dog being around others 
in the field.  Furthermore, the claim here is mere common law 
negligence.  Being “manifestly outside” the scope of his official 
responsibilities is a high standard.  The facts of this case indicate, as 
a matter of law, [Harris] cannot meet that burden. 
 
2022-Ohio-1555, 191 N.E.3d 1143, ¶ 35. 
{¶ 19} The court concluded that there were no issues of material fact in the 
case, and it held: “Although this was an unfortunate situation, reasonable minds can 
find only one conclusion, i.e., [Hilderbrand] is entitled to immunity as a matter of 
law because there is nothing tending to show that he was acting manifestly outside 
the scope of his official responsibilities at the time of the incident.”  Id. at ¶ 36. 
{¶ 20} As for the strict-liability claim, the appellate court found that Harris 
had not timely filed a notice of cross-appeal, and further, that the ruling regarding 
strict liability was not a final, appealable order.  The court pointed out that R.C. 
2744.02(C) deems as a final order an order that denies a political subdivision or an 
employee of a political subdivision the benefit of an alleged immunity from liability 
and that a grant of immunity is not a final, appealable order when other issues 
remain.  Id. at ¶ 40-41.  The court held that Harris’s attempt to cross-appeal did not 
invoke its jurisdiction.  Id. at ¶ 39. In dicta, the court went on to discuss the claim 
“in the interest of justice and thoroughness,” and it purported to affirm the trial 
court’s judgment as to that claim.  Id. at ¶ 42, 50. 
{¶ 21} Harris appealed, and this court agreed to consider the following two 
propositions of law: 
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Proposition of Law No.1: An off-duty deputy sheriff who is 
a K-9 handler should not be entitled to immunity from a claim of 
common law negligence for an attack by his K-9 of a third-party 
guest at his personal residence simply because he is required to 
harbor and keep the K-9 at his home.  Rather, whether immunity 
exists should be a question for the jury when there are disputed 
issues of fact as to whether the officer is acting manifestly outside 
the scope of his employment. 
Proposition of Law No. 2: An off-duty deputy sheriff who is 
a K-9 handler should not be entitled to immunity from a claim for 
strict liability under O.R.C. 955.28(B) for an attack by his K-9 of a 
third-party guest at his personal residence simply because he is 
required to harbor and keep the K-9 at his home. 
 
{¶ 22} Because the second proposition of law is not properly before this 
court for lack of a final, appealable order and the lack of a timely filed notice of 
cross-appeal in the court of appeals, we do not address its merit.  We now turn to 
the remaining proposition of law. 
II.  Law and Analysis 
A.  Standard of review 
{¶ 23} This court’s review of cases involving a grant of summary judgment 
is de novo.  Transtar Elec., Inc. v. A.E.M. Elec. Servs. Corp., 140 Ohio St.3d 193, 
2014-Ohio-3095, 16 N.E.3d 645, ¶ 8.  “ ‘Summary judgment may be granted when 
“(1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence 
that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence 
most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment 
January Term, 2023 
 
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is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party.” ’ ”  McConnell v. Dudley, 158 
Ohio St.3d 388, 2019-Ohio-4740, 144 N.E.3d 369, ¶ 18, quoting M.H. v. Cuyahoga 
Falls, 134 Ohio St.3d 65, 2012-Ohio-5336, 979 N.E.2d 1261, ¶ 12, quoting Temple 
v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977). 
{¶ 24} The determination “whether an employee [was] acting within the 
scope of employment is a question of fact to be decided by the jury.”  Ohio Govt. 
Risk Mgt. Plan v. Harrison, 115 Ohio St.3d 241, 2007-Ohio-4948, 874 N.E.2d 
1155, ¶ 16. “Only when reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion does the 
issue regarding scope of employment become a question of law.”  Osborne v. Lyles, 
63 Ohio St.3d 326, 330, 587 N.E.2d 825 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
B.  R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(a)—Immunity for political-subdivision employees 
{¶ 25} With exceptions not relevant here, under Ohio’s political-
subdivision-immunity statutory scheme, an employee of a political subdivision is 
immune from liability for injury or loss caused by his or her acts or omissions unless 
“[t]he employee’s acts or omissions were manifestly outside the scope of the 
employee’s employment or official responsibilities,” R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(a). 
C.  The statutory language 
1.  “Manifestly” 
{¶ 26} We must determine whether the court of appeals correctly 
determined that as a matter of law, Hilderbrand did not manifestly act outside the 
scope of his employment.  The term “manifestly” is not defined in R.C. Chapter 
2744.  Statutory terms that are not defined by the legislature are accorded their 
common, everyday meaning.  R.C. 1.42; State v. Morgan, 153 Ohio St.3d 196, 
2017-Ohio-7565, 103 N.E.3d 784, ¶ 21.  In Whaley v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of 
Commrs., 92 Ohio St.3d 574, 578, 752 N.E.2d 267 (2001), this court looked to a 
dictionary definition of the term “manifestly” in determining the meaning of the 
phrase “manifestly outside the scope of [the employee’s] employment” in a duty-
to-defend case involving an employee of a political subdivision: “Webster’s Third 
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New International Dictionary (1986) 1375, defines the word ‘manifestly’ as 
‘plainly, obviously.’ ” 
{¶ 27} Therefore, the inquiry in this case is whether Hilderbrand was 
plainly and obviously acting outside the scope of his employment prior to Xyrem’s 
biting Harris. 
2.  “Scope of employment” 
{¶ 28} R.C. Chapter 2744 also does not define “scope of employment.”  In 
Theobald v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 111 Ohio St.3d 541, 2006-Ohio-6208, 857 N.E.2d 
573, ¶ 15, a case involving a statute that provides immunity for state employees 
unless the employee’s actions were manifestly outside the scope of employment, 
this court wrote: “For purposes of personal immunity * * *, a state employee acts 
within the scope of employment if the employee’s actions are ‘in furtherance of the 
interests of the state.’  Conley v. Shearer (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 284, 287, 595 
N.E.2d 862.  Thus, a state employee’s duties should define the scope of 
employment.”  This court added in Theobald that an employee’s actions are 
manifestly outside the scope of employment if the actions are “self-serving or have 
no relationship to the employer’s business.”  Id. at ¶ 28. 
D.  Reasonable minds could disagree 
{¶ 29} As noted above, we must view the evidence most strongly in favor 
of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment was made.  Viewing 
the evidence most strongly in favor of Harris, reasonable minds could differ as to 
whether Hilderbrand’s acts or omissions were obviously outside the scope of his 
employment during the events leading up to Xyrem’s biting Harris. 
{¶ 30} It is undisputed that Hilderbrand’s position as a K-9 deputy sheriff 
for the Belmont County Sheriff’s Office required him to keep Xyrem in his home.  
The issue here is whether Hilderbrand’s acts and omissions in handling Xyrem prior 
to his canine partner’s biting a social guest were manifestly outside the scope of his 
employment. 
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{¶ 31} According to at least one deposed witness, Hilderbrand was 
responding to the request of a guest when he decided to demonstrate what Xyrem 
had been trained to do.  Hilderbrand introduced Xyrem into a situation in which 
multiple people were consuming alcohol, including himself, the K-9 handler.  There 
is a factual dispute as to whether Hilderbrand let Xyrem or another dog drink beer 
that had been poured on the sidewalk. 
{¶ 32} While Xyrem was wearing his shock collar, Hilderbrand worked 
Xyrem by giving him commands to find contraband and to bark and lunge at a door 
to the house.  After the demonstration was complete, Xyrem was taken inside the 
house and fed dinner.  Approximately an hour later, Xyrem, without his shock 
collar, was let back outside, where he had previously been responding to work 
commands.  Riedel testified that Hilderbrand said that his first reaction when 
Xyrem bit Harris was to activate his shock collar. 
{¶ 33} Considering the evidence in a light most favorable to Harris, we hold 
that reasonable minds could disagree as to whether Hilderbrand was obviously 
acting in a manner that did not further the interests of the Belmont County Sheriff’s 
Office prior to Xyrem’s biting Harris. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 34} Harris’s second proposition of law is not properly before us.  As to 
the first proposition of law, whether an employee was manifestly acting outside the 
scope of his or her employment is ordinarily a question for a jury.  “Only when 
reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion does the issue regarding scope of 
employment become a question of law.”  Osborne, 63 Ohio St.3d at 330, 587 
N.E.2d 825 (plurality opinion).  Reasonable minds could differ regarding whether 
Hilderbrand was manifestly acting outside the scope of his employment during the 
events leading up to Harris’s injury.  Therefore, we reverse the Seventh District 
Court of Appeals’ judgment on the negligence claim, and we remand the matter to 
the trial court for further proceedings. 
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Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded to the trial court. 
FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER, and DETERS, JJ., 
concur. 
_________________ 
 
Bordas & Bordas, P.L.L.C., and James G. Bordas III, for appellant. 
Krugliak, Wilkins, Griffiths & Dougherty Co., L.P.A., Matthew P. Mullen, 
John P. Maxwell, and Kyle W. Rea; and Isaac, Wiles, Burkholder & Teetor, L.L.C., 
for appellee. 
Friedman, Gilbert & Gerhardstein, Alphonse A. Gerhardstein, and M. 
Caroline Hyatt, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Association for Justice. 
Ennis Britton Co., L.P.A., Hollie F. Reedy, and Pamela A. Leist, urging 
affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio School Boards Association. 
Gwen E. Callender, urging affirmance for amici curiae Fraternal Order of 
Police of Ohio, Inc., Buckeye State Sheriff’s Association, Inc., and Ohio 
Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc. 
Green & Green, Lawyers, and Jared A. Wagner, urging affirmance for 
amicus curiae Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys. 
_________________