Title: Coalson v. Canchola

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
VICTORIA COALSON 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 130837 
 
 
  JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  February 27, 2014 
VICTOR CANCHOLA 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Bruce D. White, Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the circuit court erred 
in remitting a jury’s award of punitive damages. 
Background 
On March 1, 2011, Victoria Coalson (Coalson) and Michael 
Stemke (Stemke) each filed lawsuits in the Circuit Court of 
Fairfax County against Victor Canchola (Canchola) seeking 
compensatory and punitive damages for personal injuries 
sustained in an automobile accident.  The circuit court 
consolidated Coalson’s and Stemke’s actions. 
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury awarded Coalson 
$5,600 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages 
against Canchola.  Stemke received $14,000 in compensatory 
damages and $100,000 in punitive damages.  The circuit court 
entered a final order on January 11, 2013, but the court 
suspended the order for fourteen days to give the parties an 
opportunity to file post-trial motions and submit an amended 
final order if they wished.  Canchola filed a post-trial motion 
for remittitur of both punitive damages awards, arguing that the 
 
2 
awards were excessive under Virginia law and the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The circuit court found that Canchola’s conduct was 
egregious.  Nevertheless, it noted “a significant disparity” 
between the plaintiffs’ compensatory damages awards, although 
both punitive damages awards were the same.  Based on this 
disparity, it concluded that Coalson’s award was arbitrarily 
made.  The circuit court remitted Coalson’s punitive damages to 
$50,000.  While it recognized that “[t]here is no bright line or 
formula to be applied[,]” the court reduced the award to “less 
than a ten percent ratio.” 
The circuit court entered an order granting Canchola’s 
motion for remittitur regarding Coalson’s punitive damages award 
on February 8, 2013.  On February 28, 2013, the court entered an 
amended final order reflecting its remittitur ruling, noting 
Coalson’s acceptance under protest, summarizing the proceedings, 
denying Coalson’s motion to reconsider and awarding post-
judgment interest.  Coalson filed a notice of appeal with the 
circuit court on March 21, 2013.1 
                     
1 Rule 5:9(a) states that a party must file her notice of 
appeal within 30 days of entry of the trial court’s final order.  
Rule 5:5(b) provides for an extension of time to file a notice 
of appeal if the trial court “modifie[s]” its final order.  The 
rule also states that “the time for filing the notice of appeal 
shall be computed from the date of final judgment entered 
following such modification.”  Rule 5:5(b).  The circuit court’s 
February 8, 2013 order granting Canchola’s motion for remittitur 
 
3 
  
Facts 
 
At approximately 6:30 p.m. on February 15, 2009, Canchola 
was driving and talking on his cellular telephone when he 
attempted to turn left at an intersection on Waxpool Road in 
Loudoun County.  He turned in front of a vehicle driven by 
Coalson, who had the right of way and was unable to stop before 
colliding with the passenger door of Canchola’s vehicle.  
Coalson and her passenger, Stemke, suffered minor injuries. 
 
Canchola, who was intoxicated at the time of the accident, 
had an extensive record of driving while intoxicated.  Between 
1991 and 1997, Canchola was convicted six times of driving while 
intoxicated and once of driving with a suspended license.  In 
1996, his driver’s license was revoked.  In 2004, he was 
convicted yet again of driving while intoxicated in California.  
 
The night before the accident, Canchola stayed at a hotel 
in Ashburn, Virginia, with his girlfriend Lori Rudegeair 
(Rudegeair), who was visiting from Pennsylvania.  At brunch in 
Alexandria on the day of the accident, Canchola drank several 
                                                                 
modified the original judgment and tolled the thirty-day time 
limit, but it was not a final order because Coalson could still 
exercise her right to accept remittitur under protest pursuant 
to Code § 8.01-383.1.  See Ragan v. Woodcroft Village 
Apartments, 255 Va. 322, 327, 497 S.E.2d 740, 743 (1998) 
(defining “final order or judgment” as “one that disposes of the 
whole subject of the case and gives all relief contemplated”).  
On February 28 the circuit court entered an amended final 
judgment noting Coalson’s acceptance under protest, and Coalson 
filed her notice within thirty days of the February 28 order, 
making her notice timely. 
 
4 
glasses of champagne.  Afterward, Canchola and Rudegeair walked 
to a nearby pub, and Canchola drank two rounds of his favorite 
drink combination, a vodka martini and light beer.  They left 
the pub sometime after 3:30 p.m. when a police officer called 
Canchola to inform him that a vehicle Canchola had reported 
missing was located in Leesburg, Virginia.  Because Canchola 
slurred his speech while speaking to the police officer, the 
officer advised Canchola not to drive when he came to pick up 
the vehicle. 
 
Despite the warning, Canchola drove Rudegeair’s car to 
Leesburg.  He stopped approximately a block from where he was 
supposed to meet the officer and had Rudegeair drive the rest of 
the way.  After Canchola finished speaking to the officer and 
claiming the vehicle, which was found in good condition, and 
after having been warned by the officer not to drive, Canchola 
left the scene as Rudegeair’s passenger.  They drove a short 
distance, waited for a few minutes and returned to Canchola’s 
vehicle after the police officer left.  Canchola then drove his 
vehicle to another bar.  Rudegeair followed in her car.  There, 
Canchola drank at least two rounds of the vodka and light beer 
combination and three additional shots of liquor within a short 
period of time. 
 
Canchola and Rudegeair left the bar to return to the hotel 
in separate vehicles.  As Canchola approached the intersection 
 
5 
where he was to turn left into the hotel entrance, he began a 
conversation on his cellular telephone.  He was engaged in that 
conversation when he turned left in front of the vehicle driven 
by Coalson.  According to uncontradicted testimony of an expert 
toxicologist, Canchola’s blood alcohol content was almost twice 
the legal limit at the time of the accident. 
 
After Coalson collided with Canchola, Canchola removed his 
vehicle from the scene of the accident, parked it and left in 
Rudegeair’s vehicle.  He was subsequently arrested upon 
returning to the hotel.  Canchola urged Rudegeair not to tell 
anyone that he had been driving his vehicle when the accident 
occurred.  Rudegeair initially lied to police but later told the 
truth under oath. 
Analysis 
 
Coalson argues that the circuit court erred in remitting 
her punitive damages award because the circuit court’s decision 
was based upon comparing her punitive damages award to Stemke’s 
punitive damages award and upon the proportionality of her 
punitive damages award in relation to her compensatory damages 
award.  Coalson asserts that proportionality is not the only 
consideration in determining the excessiveness of punitive 
damages under Virginia law and that a higher ratio between 
compensatory and punitive damages was proper in this case due to 
“the egregiousness of [Canchola’s] conduct and the potential 
 
6 
harm that could have resulted from his actions.”  Coalson 
emphasizes that neither this Court nor the United States Supreme 
Court has created a “bright-line test.”  Although she does not 
base her appeal on constitutional grounds, Coalson maintains 
that Virginia’s remittitur analysis for punitive damages is 
“framed in, and derived from” federal constitutional law.  
Consequently, she urges the Court to consider “potential harm” 
as well as actual harm in reinstating the jury’s punitive 
damages award. 
 
Canchola contends that the circuit court properly 
considered and applied all of the remittitur factors and 
constitutional guidelines before granting his motion.  He 
disputes Coalson’s assertion that the Court should consider 
“hypothetical damages” she could have sustained.  He argues that 
considering what could have happened is not supported by this 
Court’s jurisprudence and would require a jury to engage in 
improper speculation.  Canchola claims that in evaluating the 
reprehensibility of his actions, the proper focus should be on 
his conduct at the time of the accident, not on “every unsavory 
act [he] committed over time.”  According to Canchola, Coalson 
places too much emphasis on punishment and reprehensibility and 
ignores proportionality. 
“The purpose of punitive damages is to provide ‘protection 
of the public, . . . punishment to [the] defendant, and . . . a 
 
7 
warning and example to deter him and others from committing like 
offenses.’”  Huffman v. Love, 245 Va. 311, 315, 427 S.E.2d 357, 
361 (1993) (quoting Baker v. Marcus, 201 Va. 905, 909, 114 
S.E.2d 617, 620 (1960)).  This Court has observed that punitive 
damages are meant to warn, not to compensate the plaintiff.  Doe 
v. Isaacs, 265 Va. 531, 539, 579 S.E.2d 174, 179 (2003).  A 
punitive damages award is generally left to the jury’s 
discretion because there is no set standard for determining the 
amount of punitive damages.  Worrie v. Boze, 198 Va. 533, 544, 
95 S.E.2d 192, 201 (1956). 
To justify remittitur, a jury’s award must be so excessive 
that it shocks the conscience of the trial court, indicating 
that the jury’s decision was motivated by “passion, corruption 
or prejudice.”  Condominium Servs., Inc. v. First Owners’ Ass’n 
of Forty Six Hundred Condo., Inc., 281 Va. 561, 580, 709 S.E.2d 
163, 175 (2011) (quoting Smithey v. Sinclair Refining Co., 203 
Va. 142, 146, 122 S.E.2d 872, 875-76 (1961)).  When a trial 
court considers whether to remit a jury’s punitive damages 
award, its review of the punitive damages award should consider 
the “reasonableness between the damages sustained and the amount 
of the award and the measurement of punishment required, whether 
the award will amount to a double recovery, the proportionality 
between the compensatory and punitive damages, and the ability 
 
8 
of the defendant to pay.”  Poulston v. Rock, 251 Va. 254, 263, 
467 S.E.2d 479, 484 (1996) (citations omitted). 
In evaluating whether punitive damages were properly 
remitted, this Court performs a de novo review, examines the 
record independently and gives “substantial weight” to the trial 
court’s action.  Baldwin v. McConnell, 273 Va. 650, 657, 643 
S.E.2d 703, 706 (2007) (quoting Poulston, 251 Va. at 263, 467 
S.E.2d at 484). 
 
The circuit court reduced the amount of Coalson’s punitive 
damages award because the jury awarded the same amount in 
punitive damages to Coalson as it did to Stemke despite their 
different compensatory damages awards.  Also, the circuit court 
ruled that the 1:17.86 ratio between Coalson’s compensatory and 
punitive damages was too high. 
We have not previously addressed whether it is proper to 
compare punitive damages awards in evaluating excessiveness.  
However, in Allied Concrete Co. v. Lester, 285 Va. 295, 312, 736 
S.E.2d 699, 708 (2013), this Court held that a trial court may 
not compare verdicts to evaluate the excessiveness of 
compensatory damages.  Likewise, in John Crane, Inc. v. Jones, 
274 Va. 581, 595, 650 S.E.2d 851, 858 (2007), the Court declined 
to compare verdicts in determining whether compensatory damages 
were excessive. 
 
9 
 
We hold that the same rationale stated in John Crane, Inc. 
is true regarding comparing punitive damages awards:  
“[Comparing verdicts] is not probative of whether a verdict is 
excessive; rather that determination must be made based on the 
facts and circumstances of each case.”  Id.  The circuit court’s 
consideration of Coalson’s and Stemke’s relative ratios of 
compensatory damages to punitive damages as a basis for granting 
remittitur was error.  See Allied Concrete Co., 285 Va. at 312, 
736 S.E.2d at 708.2 
 
We agree with the circuit court that Canchola’s conduct was 
egregious.  Canchola was driving while intoxicated and without a 
license, which had been revoked because of previous instances of 
driving while intoxicated.  Despite having at least seven 
convictions for driving while intoxicated on his record, 
Canchola drove on several occasions on the day of the accident 
while drinking alcohol throughout the day.  He ignored a police 
officer’s warning not to drive and engaged in deception so that 
the officer would not discover he was driving, after which he 
drank even more and then attempted to drive again.  After 
causing an accident that could have resulted in serious 
                     
2 We note that federal courts sometimes compare verdicts to 
evaluate whether punitive damages are excessive as a matter of 
federal constitutional law.  See, e.g., Saunders v. Branch 
Banking & Trust Co. of Va., 526 F.3d 142, 154 (4th Cir. 2008) 
(comparing punitive damages awards in other Fair Credit 
Reporting Act cases). 
 
10 
injuries, Canchola fled the scene and asked his girlfriend to 
lie about his involvement. 
The jury was instructed that it could award Coalson damages 
to compensate her for her injuries, including bodily injuries, 
pain and mental anguish, inconvenience and medical expenses.  
The court further instructed the jury that if it awarded Coalson 
compensatory damages, it could also award punitive damages if it 
found that Canchola “acted under circumstances amounting to a 
willful and wanton disregard for the plaintiffs’ rights.”  The 
punitive damages instruction clearly stated that the purpose of 
punitive damages was to punish Canchola and to “prevent others 
from acting in a similar way.” 
Coalson’s punitive damages are reasonably related to her 
actual damages and to the degree of necessary punishment, which 
in this case is great.  See Philip Morris Inc. v. Emerson, 235 
Va. 380, 414, 368 S.E.2d 268, 287 (1988).  “Given the clear 
determination of the basis for each award and the ample evidence 
supporting each award, our independent review of the record does 
not suggest double recovery in this case.”  Baldwin, 273 Va. at 
659, 643 S.E.2d at 707.  The ratio of Coalson’s compensatory 
damages to punitive damages awarded by the jury is 1:17.86.  
This is high, but given the reprehensible and dangerous nature 
of Canchola’s conduct, it is not “unreasonable or strikingly out 
of proportion.”  Id.; Poulston, 251 Va. at 263, 467 S.E.2d at 
 
11 
484.  The court expressly stated that the parties did not 
present evidence on Canchola’s ability to pay.3  See Condominium 
Servs., 281 Va. at 581, 709 S.E.2d at 175 (“[A defendant who has 
failed to present evidence of his ability to pay at trial] 
cannot prevail before this Court on [his] claim that the amount 
of punitive damages would be oppressive.”). 
Canchola’s conduct was egregious enough to warrant a 
punitive damages award, and the amount of punitive damages 
awarded by the jury does not shock the Court’s conscience.  
Virginia precedent indicates that the circuit court should not 
have remitted the punitive damages award. 
It is not clear from the record whether the circuit court 
granted Canchola’s motion for remittitur on state law or federal 
constitutional law grounds.  Thus, we will analyze the award 
considering relevant federal constitutional law as well. 
 
The United States Supreme Court has prescribed three 
guidelines for appellate courts to use in reviewing whether 
punitive damages are so excessive as to violate a defendant’s 
right to due process: “(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the 
defendant’s misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or 
potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive 
damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive 
                     
3 Canchola acknowledged the same in his motion for 
remittitur and during oral argument before the circuit court. 
 
12 
damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized 
or imposed in comparable cases.”  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 
v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003).  The Supreme Court has 
further provided factors for evaluating the first guideline, 
which is the most important of the three: 
[W]hether[] the harm caused was physical as opposed to 
economic; the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to 
or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; 
the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the 
conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated 
incident; and the harm was the result of intentional 
malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident. 
Id. at 419. 
These considerations weigh against remittitur on due 
process grounds.  Virginia certainly has an interest in 
promoting public safety through prevention and deterrence of 
driving while intoxicated.  See BMW of North America, Inc. v. 
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) (“[T]he federal excessiveness 
inquiry appropriately begins with an identification of the state 
interests that a punitive award is designed to serve.”).  
Although the collision was an accident, Canchola deliberately 
chose to drive while severely intoxicated, which resulted in 
physical injury.  Canchola’s determined persistence to drive 
while intoxicated and his reckless disregard for the safety of 
others is evidenced by his seven prior driving while intoxicated 
convictions and by his behavior on the day of the accident.  See 
id. at 576-77 (“[E]vidence that a defendant has repeatedly 
 
13 
engaged in prohibited conduct while knowing or suspecting that 
it was unlawful would provide relevant support for an argument 
that strong medicine is required to cure the defendant’s 
disrespect for the law.”).  Furthermore, a defendant’s conduct 
that endangers many is more reprehensible than conduct that only 
endangers a few.  Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 
357 (2007).  Canchola puts other drivers at risk every time he 
drinks and drives. 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that ratios between 
actual or potential harm and punitive damages should generally 
be within single digits to satisfy due process requirements.  
State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425.  Nevertheless, it has also 
recognized that higher ratios may be constitutional where a 
defendant’s actions are exceptionally reprehensible but result 
in small economic damage.  See id. (reaffirming that there are 
no “rigid benchmarks” and indicating that courts should consider 
each case “based upon the facts and circumstances of the 
defendant’s conduct and the harm to the plaintiff”); see also 
Saunders, 526 F.3d at 154 (citing federal appellate court 
decisions upholding higher ratios).  Driving while intoxicated 
could result in death, and it was fortunate that Coalson and 
Stemke suffered relatively minor injuries.  “While the circuit 
court observed what it took to be a significant disparity 
between the punitive award and the compensatory award, that 
 
14 
contrast ‘dissipates when one considers the potential loss to 
[Coalson] . . . .’”  TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 
U.S. 443, 449-51, 462 (1993) (upholding a ratio of 1:526). 
In upholding a ratio of 1:80 in Saunders, the Fourth 
Circuit observed that rigidly adhering to a single digit ratio 
in all cases could sometimes prevent punitive damages from 
fulfilling their purposes of punishment and deterrence.  526 
F.3d at 154.  For this reason, the court determined that 
remitting the punitive damages award in that case “would leave 
little deterrent or punitive effect.”  Id.  The 1:17.86 ratio in 
this case is not excessive, for Canchola has demonstrated a need 
for stronger medicine to cure his disrespect for the law. 
Additionally, a comparison of criminal and civil penalties 
for habitually driving while intoxicated and for driving with a 
revoked license supports the jury’s punitive damages award.  The 
Commonwealth punishes repeated instances of driving while 
intoxicated by increasing fines and mandatory sentences.  See 
Code §§ 18.2-266 and -270.  In addition to the statutory scheme 
for punishing driving while intoxicated, the legislature has 
prescribed punishments for habitual offenders in the form of 
license revocation, mandatory safety courses and increasing 
penalties for driving without a license.  See, e.g., Code §§ 
46.2-389 (mandatory revocation of license upon conviction of 
driving while intoxicated); 46.2-355.1 (mandatory participation 
 
15 
in safety course upon second offense of driving with revoked 
license); 46.2-391 (mandatory three-year revocation for multiple 
convictions of driving while intoxicated); see also § 46.2-357 
(minimum one year and maximum five years’ imprisonment for 
felony offense of driving with revoked license while 
intoxicated).  These penalties demonstrate the seriousness with 
which Virginia views the act of driving while intoxicated with a 
suspended or revoked license.  See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 428 
(noting that criminal penalties are less useful for determining 
the precise amount of a punitive damages award).  Upon 
consideration of the constitutional guidelines provided by the 
United States Supreme Court, we conclude that the jury’s 
punitive damages award is not excessive under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Conclusion 
Therefore, we hold that the circuit court erred in granting 
Canchola’s motion for remittitur because Coalson’s punitive 
damages award was not excessive under Virginia law nor did it 
offend Canchola’s due process rights.  Accordingly, the judgment 
of the circuit court will be reversed, the jury verdict awarding 
Coalson $100,000 in punitive damages will be reinstated, and 
final judgment will be entered on the verdict. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
 
 
16 
JUSTICE McCLANAHAN, dissenting. 
 
The jury awarded Coalson $100,000 in punitive damages, 
which was nearly 18 times the amount of her compensatory damage 
award of $5,600.  I would affirm the judgment of the circuit 
court ordering remittitur of a portion of the punitive damages 
and reducing the award to $50,000, still almost 9 times the 
amount of compensatory damages. 
While not expressly overruling this Court’s precedent, the 
majority opinion makes clear that the “reasonableness between 
the damages sustained and the amount of the award” as well as 
“the proportionality between the compensatory and punitive 
damages,” Baldwin v. McConnell, 273 Va. 650, 658, 643 S.E.2d 
703, 706 (2007), are hardly relevant to the circuit court’s 
consideration of whether to remit a portion of a punitive 
damages award. What is also clear is that the majority affords 
little weight to the circuit court’s action, rather than the 
“substantial weight” the circuit court is due.  Id. at 657, 643 
S.E.2d at 707 (quoting Poulston v. Rock, 251 Va. 254, 263, 467 
S.E.2d 479, 484 (1996)). 
 
Following this Court’s previous directives, the circuit 
court employed the proper analysis in considering Canchola’s 
motion for remittitur.  In reaching its decision, the circuit 
court explained, 
 
17 
I did take into consideration the Virginia 
Supreme Court factors; reasonableness 
between the damages sustained and the  
amount of the award, the measurement of 
punishment required, whether the award will 
amount to a double recovery, the 
proportionality between the compensatory 
and punitive damages, and the ability of 
the Defendant to pay, such that there is 
any evidence on those items for me. 
 
These are precisely the factors this Court has repeatedly 
instructed circuit courts to consider.  See Baldwin, 273 Va. at 
658, 643 S.E.2d at 707 (judicial review upon motion for 
remittitur “requires” consideration of the following: 1. 
reasonableness between damages sustained and amount of award; 
2. measurement of punishment required; 3. whether award will 
amount to double recovery; 4. proportionality between the 
compensatory and punitive damages; and 5. ability of defendant 
to pay); see also Condominium Servs., Inc. v. First Owners’ 
Ass’n of Forty Six Hundred Condo., Inc., 281 Va. 561, 580, 709 
S.E.2d 163, 175 (2011); Poulston, 251 Va. at 263, 467 S.E.2d at 
484. 
 
Upon consideration of these factors, the circuit court 
concluded the punitive damages award to Coalson was excessive in 
relation to her compensatory damages.  Finding the award 
“arbitrary,” the court noted it was “troubling to [it] that 
there is a significant disparity between the compensatory damage 
award for one Plaintiff, and the compensatory damage award for 
 
18 
the other Plaintiff,” while the “punitive damage award, in each 
of the cases, is one hundred thousand dollars.”  Furthermore, 
“considering the proportionality between the compensatory and 
the punitive damage award[ ]” to Coalson, the circuit court 
found the almost 1-to-18 ratio disproportionate and excessive, 
particularly in light of the 1-to-7 ratio the compensatory 
damages bore to the punitive damages in the verdict for Stemke.1 
The amount of the circuit court’s remittitur was certainly 
consistent with prior precedent.  This Court has found a 
proportionality of punitive damages 2.5 times the compensatory 
damages an acceptable ratio, Poulston, 251 Va. at 263, 467 
S.E.2d at 484; Condominium Servs., Inc., 281 Va. at 580, 709 
S.E.2d at 175, as well as a proportionality of punitive damages 
approximately 6.6 and 6.7 times the compensatory damages, Philip 
Morris, Inc. v. Emerson, 235 Va. 380, 414, 368 S.E.2d 268, 287 
(1988).  In Stemke’s case, the punitive damages awarded were 
approximately 7 times his compensatory damages, which the 
circuit court found reasonable.  In light of the ratios of 
punitive to compensatory damage awards previously found 
acceptable by this Court and the ratio found acceptable by the 
circuit court in Stemke’s case, which involved the same accident 
and conduct of the defendant, I believe the circuit court 
                     
1 While the circuit court found Coalson’s award excessive, 
it denied the motion for remittitur of Stemke's award. 
 
19 
properly ordered the remittitur of a portion of Coalson’s 
punitive damages and reduction of her award from an amount that 
was nearly 18 times her compensatory damages to an amount that 
was nearly 9 times her compensatory damages. 
 
I disagree that it was error for the circuit court to 
consider the punitive and compensatory damages awarded to Stemke 
in determining the reasonableness between the damages sustained 
by Coalson and the amount of her punitive damage award.  The 
compensatory damages awarded to Stemke were 2.5 times more than 
the compensatory damages awarded to Coalson, yet, as the circuit 
court observed, the punitive damages awarded to each were the 
same, leading the circuit court to conclude the amount of 
punitive damages awarded to Coalson was arbitrary rather than 
bearing a reasonable relation to the compensatory damages and 
the punishment required.  See Stubbs v. Cowden, 179 Va. 190, 
201, 18 S.E.2d 275, 280 (1942)(“The damages awarded should bear 
some reasonable proportion to the real damages sustained and to 
the measure of punishment required; otherwise, they indicate 
prejudice or partiality.”).2  As compared to Stemke’s punitive 
damage verdict, which was a little over 7 times the compensatory 
                     
2 The requirement that the punitive damages bear a 
reasonable relationship to the actual damages has led this Court 
to remand an award of punitive damages to the circuit court for 
reconsideration when it has reversed a portion of the 
compensatory damages.  Little v. Cooke, 274 Va. 697, 719, 652 
S.E.2d 129, 142 (2007). 
 
20 
damage verdict, the jury verdict for Coalson against the same 
defendant for the same conduct amounted to nearly 18 times the 
verdict.  In other words, the jury punished Canchola more 
severely for the injuries sustained by Coalson than for the 
injuries sustained by Stemke arising from the same accident.  If 
not arbitrary, the award was based on partiality toward Coalson 
or prejudice against Canchola. 
 
This Court’s prior holdings that prohibit the comparison of 
jury verdicts awarding compensatory damages are not applicable.  
In John Crane, Inc. v. Jones, 274 Va. 581, 595, 650 S.E.2d 851, 
858 (2007) and Rose v. Jaques, 268 Va. 137, 159, 597 S.E.2d 64, 
77 (2004), this Court rejected the “average verdict rule,” which 
compares statewide or nationwide jury verdicts to reach an 
“average verdict,” because such a rule is not relevant to the 
extent of actual pain and suffering experienced by the 
plaintiff.  In Allied Concrete Co. v. Lester, 285 Va. 295, 312, 
736 S.E.2d 699, 708 (2013), the Court relied upon its holdings 
in John Crane and Rose to conclude that it was error for the 
trial court to compare injuries suffered by the plaintiffs.3  
However, the rationale that a verdict for one person’s pain and 
suffering is not a reasonable basis on which to judge the 
                     
3 As I stated in Allied Concrete, 285 Va. at 316 n.3, 736 
S.E.2d at 710 n.3 (McClanahan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part), I did not agree that the trial court in 
that case engaged in improper verdict comparison. 
 
21 
excessiveness of a verdict for another person’s pain and 
suffering can only apply when the issue involves the 
excessiveness of a compensatory damage award.  Ignoring the 
rationale of these holdings, the majority has adopted a bright-
line rule forbidding any comparison of verdicts, even when such 
a comparison is actually probative of the analysis and dictated 
by reason. 
Indeed, our own Court compares ratios found acceptable in 
other cases that involve not only different plaintiffs, but also 
different defendants, different conduct, and different types of 
actions entirely.  See Baldwin, 273 Va. at 659, 643 S.E.2d at 
707 (noting the punitive damage award approved in Poulston was 
two and one-half times the compensatory award); Condominium 
Servs., Inc., 281 Va. at 581, 709 S.E.2d at 175 (noting the 
punitive damage award in Poulston of 2.5 times the compensatory 
award and a punitive damage award in Philip Morris of 6.6 times 
the compensatory award).  In this case involving a single 
automobile accident and a consolidated trial, the circuit court 
compared the ratios as between two injured plaintiffs against 
one defendant who caused their injuries.  Arguably, then, the 
circuit court’s comparison of the verdicts in this case was more 
probative to the issue of reasonableness and proportionality, 
than the comparisons this Court has made to ratios in unrelated 
cases. 
 
22 
 
Presumably, we will “‘give substantial weight to the trial 
court’s action and affirm it, unless, from our view of the 
record, the trial court acted improperly.’”  Baldwin, 273 Va. at 
657, 643 S.E.2d at 706 (quoting Poulston, 251 Va. at 263, 467 
S.E.2d at 484).  Nevertheless, despite the circuit court’s 
faithful application of the law and the obvious disparity of 
ratios of compensatory to punitive damages between the Coalson 
and Stemke awards, each of which were based on the same conduct 
of Canchola, the majority finds the circuit court’s action 
improper.  In Allied Concrete, 285 Va. at 317, 736 S.E.2d at 
711, I expressed my belief that “for all practical purposes the 
last nail in the coffin of remittitur [of compensatory damages] 
has been driven.”  It appears that remittitur of punitive 
damages has suffered the same fate.