Title: People v. Botruff

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 94334-Agenda 3-May 2003.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. PAUL 							
E. BOTRUFF, Appellee.
Opinion filed September 23, 2004. 
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:
	This case concerns postcommitment provisions of the Sexually
Violent Persons Commitment Act (Act) (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq.
(West 2000)). Following the completion of his sentence for criminal
sexual assault, respondent was committed to the Department of
Human Services (Department). In connection with a mandatory
reexamination procedure under the Act, he requested the appointment
of an independent evaluator. The circuit court of Warren County
denied the request, and respondent appealed. A divided appellate
court reversed (331 Ill. App. 3d 486), holding that: (1) section 25(e)
of the Act (725 ILCS 207/25(e) (West 2000)), requiring a circuit
court to appoint an independent evaluator upon an indigent
respondent's request, applies to postcommitment proceedings; and (2)
section 65(b)(1) of the Act (725 ILCS 207/65(b)(1) (West 2000)),
prohibiting a respondent from attending a limited probable cause
hearing, is unconstitutional. We reverse the decision of the appellate
court.

I. BACKGROUND
	The Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act took effect on
January 1, 1998. Pub. Act 90-40, eff. January 1, 1998. The Act
authorizes the civil commitment of persons deemed sexually violent.
725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 2000). Section 15 of the Act allows the
State to petition the court for the civil commitment of sexually violent
persons. 725 ILCS 207/15(b) (West 2000). The court then conducts
a hearing "to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that
the [individual] is a sexually violent person." 725 ILCS 207/30(b)
(West 2000). Section 5(f) of the Act defines a "[s]exually violent
person" as:
			"a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent
offense, has been adjudicated delinquent for a sexually violent
offense, or has been found not guilty of a sexually violent
offense by reason of insanity and who is dangerous because
he or she suffers from a mental disorder that makes it
substantially probable that the person will engage in acts of
sexual violence." 725 ILCS 207/5(f) (West 2000).
	Respondent in this case pleaded guilty to criminal sexual assault
and served approximately two years and eight months in prison.
Criminal sexual assault is an enumerated sexually violent offense under
the Act (see 725 ILCS 207/5(e) (West 2000)). The State successfully
petitioned for respondent's civil commitment.
	Following a civil commitment, the Department must conduct a
reexamination of the committed person's mental condition within six
months of the initial commitment, and additional reexaminations must
occur in at least 12-month intervals. 725 ILCS 207/55(a) (West
2000). The purpose of these reexaminations is to determine whether
the committed person has progressed enough to be conditionally
released or discharged. 725 ILCS 207/55(a) (West 2000). At the time
of each reexamination, the committed person receives written notice
of the right to petition the court for discharge. 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(1)
(West 2000). The notice must contain a waiver of rights. 725 ILCS
207/65(b)(1) (West 2000). If the committed person does not waive
the right to petition for discharge, the court conducts a probable cause
hearing to determine if facts exist to warrant a hearing on the issue of
whether respondent remains a sexually violent person. 725 ILCS
207/65(b)(1) (West 2000). Section 65(b)(1) further provides that the
committed person has the right to an attorney at the probable cause
hearing, but the respondent is not entitled to be present at the
probable cause hearing. 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(1) (West 2000).
	Respondent's initial reexamination occurred in August 1999.
Based on the examining doctor's report, the State moved for a
directed finding against respondent on the issue of probable cause
Respondent then moved for appointment of an independent evaluator.
The motion was granted. Respondent ultimately stipulated to the
examining experts' reports. Based on those reports, the court granted
the State's motion for a directed finding.
	Respondent's next reexamination occurred in September 2000.
Respondent did not waive his right to petition for discharge, and the
court therefore conducted a probable cause hearing. While respondent
was statutorily prohibited from attending the hearing pursuant to
section 65(b)(1) of the Act (725 ILCS 207/65(b)(1) (West 2000)), an
attorney appeared on respondent's behalf and requested the
appointment of an independent evaluator. The court denied
respondent's request. The court reasoned:
			"I think in order for Mr. Botruff to be independently
[evaluated] there must be at least some basis for the Court to
order such an independent [evaluation] other than just that he
would like to be [evaluated] by another party; that there is
something in the report of the [expert] that indicates to me he
is perhaps somehow biased or skewed or not accurately
reporting the results of the examination, or that there are
some other factors that the [expert] has not considered in the
report."
	Based on the examining expert's report, the court found that
respondent remained a sexually violent person and that no probable
cause existed to warrant a hearing on the issue. Respondent appealed,
and the appellate court reversed, holding that section 25(e) of the Act
mandates that an independent evaluator be appointed at any hearing
under the Act upon the request of an indigent respondent, and to
avoid equal protection concerns, a court must grant an indigent
respondent's request for appointment of an independent evaluator
during postcommitment proceedings. 331 Ill. App. 3d at 491. The
appellate court also held that section 65(b)(1), prohibiting respondent
from appearing at the probable cause hearing, was unconstitutional.
331 Ill. App. 3d at 494.
	The dissenting justice reasoned that the plain language of section
25(e) indicates that it applies solely to initial commitment hearings.
331 Ill. App. 3d at 495 (Lytton, P.J., dissenting). In addition, Justice
Lytton stated that due to the limited nature of a section 65(b)(1)
hearing, defendant's presence would have added nothing and,
therefore, his due process rights were not infringed. 331 Ill. App. 3d
at 497-98 (Lytton, P.J., dissenting).
	We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R.
315(a).

II. ANALYSIS
A. Appointment of an Independent Evaluator
	The State argues that the appellate court erroneously determined
that the mandatory appointment of an independent evaluator provision
of section 25(e) is applicable to a committed person who is subject to
reexamination under section 55(a). Section 25(e) of the Act provides,
in part, as follows:
			"Whenever the person who is the subject of the petition is
required to submit to an examination under this Act, he or
she may retain experts or professional persons to perform an
examination. *** If the person is indigent, the court shall,
upon the person's request, appoint a qualified and available
expert or professional person to perform an examination ***
and participate in the trial on behalf of an indigent person."
725 ILCS 207/25(e) (West 2000).
	Section 55(a), in addition to providing for periodic reexamination
of persons committed under the Act, states, in relevant part:
		"At the time of a reexamination under this Section, the
person who has been committed may retain or, if he or she is
indigent and so requests, the court may appoint a qualified
expert or a professional person to examine him or her."
(Emphases added.) 725 ILCS 207/55(a) (West 2000).
 	According to the State, section 25(e) pertains to a person's rights
at the time of the original petition for civil commitment, while section
55(a) involves a respondent's rights upon reexamination, after the
person has been civilly committed. Respondent counters that, when
section 55(a) is read in light of section 25(e), the intent of the
legislature is unclear. Respondent argues that section 25(e) requires
the appointment of an independent examiner upon an indigent
person's request "whenever" the person is subject to an examination.
According to respondent, there is nothing in the statute to prove
definitively that the legislature intended section 25(e) to apply solely
to precommitment proceedings and section 55(a) to apply solely to
postcommitment proceedings.
	As the issue before us is a matter of statutory construction, our
review is de novo. Sylvester v. Industrial Comm'n, 197 Ill. 2d 225,
232 (2001). The primary objective of this court in construing the
meaning of a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of
the legislature. Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook,
191 Ill. 2d 493, 503-04 (2000). All other rules of statutory
construction are subordinate to this cardinal principle. Henrich v.
Libertyville High School, 186 Ill. 2d 381, 387 (1998). The intent of
the legislature can be best determined by examining the language of
the statute. In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (2000). The statutory language
is to be given its plain, ordinary and popularly understood meaning.
Union Electric Co. v. Department of Revenue, 136 Ill. 2d 385, 397
(1990).
	Because all provisions of a statutory enactment are viewed as a
whole (Bubb v. Springfield School District 186, 167 Ill. 2d 372, 382
(1995)), words and phrases should not be construed in isolation, but
must be interpreted in light of other relevant provisions of the statute
(Sylvester, 197 Ill. 2d  at 232; Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191
Ill. 2d at 504). Each word, clause and sentence of the statute, if
possible, must be given reasonable meaning and not rendered
superfluous. A.P. Properties, Inc. v. Goshinsky, 186 Ill. 2d 524, 532
(1999). Accordingly, in determining the intent of the legislature, the
court may properly consider not only the language of the statute, but
also the reason and necessity for the law, the evils sought to be
remedied, and the purpose to be achieved. People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36, 42 (2000). In construing a statute, we also presume that the
General Assembly, in its enactment of legislation, did not intend
absurdity, inconvenience or injustice. Michigan Avenue National
Bank, 191 Ill. 2d  at 504. "Statutes must be construed in the most
beneficial way which their language will permit so as to prevent
hardship or injustice, and to oppose prejudice to public interests."
Mulligan v. Joliet Regional Port District, 123 Ill. 2d 303, 313 (1988).
	A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that where there
exists a general statutory provision and a specific statutory provision,
either in the same or in another act, both relating to the same subject,
the specific provision controls and should be applied. Knolls
Condominium Ass'n v. Harms, 202 Ill. 2d 450, 459 (2002). It is
apparent that section 25(e) is a general provision that applies to all
proceedings under the Act when a committed individual "is required
to submit to an examination." See, contra, In re Ottinger, 333 Ill.
App. 3d 114, 118 (2002) (section 25(e) pertains to proceedings on the
petition under section 15 of the Act, not to proceedings under sections
55, 60, and 65). Section 55(a), by its plain language, specifically
applies to periodic reexamination proceedings mandated by the Act
and, thus serves as a gateway to petitions for discharge under section
65. Here, section 55(a) more specifically addresses the appointment
of an independent examiner in periodic reexamination proceedings
and, therefore, controls over the more general provision of section
25(e).(1) Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court was not required
to appoint an independent evaluator; rather, it was a matter of
discretion under section 55(a). The question thus becomes whether
the trial court abused its discretion.
	Respondent argues that the trial court's decision violates equal
protection by applying the law in a way that respondent, as an indigent
person, was denied the use of an independent examiner in a situation
where a nonindigent respondent would not have been denied. The
Constitution, however, does not require states to provide identical
rights, but merely protects against invidious discrimination among
classes of individuals. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612, 41 L. Ed. 2d 341, 352, 94 S. Ct. 2437, 2444 (1974). In Moffitt, the United
States Supreme Court stated:
		"[T]he fact that a particular service might be of benefit to an
indigent defendant does not mean that the service is
constitutionally required. The duty of the State under our
cases is not to duplicate the legal arsenal that may be
privately retained by a criminal defendant in a continuing
effort to reverse his conviction, but only to assure the
indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to present his
claims fairly in the context of the State's appellate process."
Moffitt, 417 U.S.  at 616, 41 L. Ed. 2d  at 354, 94 S. Ct.  at
2447.
	When analyzing legislation under equal protection, the level of
scrutiny applied depends on the type of legislative classification at
issue. Classifications based on race or national origin or affecting
fundamental rights are strictly scrutinized (McLean v. Department of
Revenue, 184 Ill. 2d 341, 354 (1998). Intermediate scrutiny applies to
discriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy. In re
Detention of Samuelson, 189 Ill. 2d 548, 561-62 (2000). In all other
cases, the court employs the highly deferential "rational basis" test.
Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar, 174 Ill. 2d 1, 33 (1996).
As the statutory provisions assailed by defendant are not based on
race, national origin, sex or illegitimacy, nor do they implicate
fundamental rights, the case at hand falls into this latter category. See
Samuelson, 189 Ill. 2d  at 562. Under the rational basis test, the court
inquires whether the method or means employed in the statute to
achieve the stated goal or purpose of the legislation is rationally
related to that goal. Samuelson, 189 Ill. 2d  at 562. If any set of facts
can reasonably be conceived to justify the classification, it must be
upheld. In re A.A., 181 Ill. 2d 32, 38 (1998). Whether a rational basis
exists for a classification is a question of law, subject to de novo
review. A.A., 181 Ill. 2d  at 38.
	A defendant may be entitled to funds to hire an expert witness
where expert testimony is deemed "crucial" to a proper defense.
People v. Keene,169 Ill. 2d 1, 7-8 (1995). This is established when the
defendant shows that the expert services are "crucial" to "build a
defense" and the defendant's financial inability to obtain his own
expert will prejudice his case. People v. Lawson, 163 Ill. 2d 187, 220-22 (1994); Keene, 169 Ill. 2d  at 8.
	In the case at hand, nothing in the record demonstrates that
respondent's case was prejudiced or that the court would have found
differently had an independent examiner been provided. At the
hearing, the judge reviewed the State's tendered reevaluation report.
The court then invited "[a]ny comments with reference to the report."
Counsel for respondent offered no comments, objections, or
questions. The only position taken by respondent was to request an
independent evaluator to "rebut the findings [in the tendered report]."
Respondent's counsel provided the court with no reason or suggestion
as a possible basis to rebut the report. It is rational not to appoint an
independent evaluator when a respondent has shown no need for one,
especially during perfunctory reexamination proceedings where the
respondent has not affirmatively opted to petition for discharge.
Samuelson, 189 Ill. 2d  at 562; A.A., 181 Ill. 2d  at 38. Without more,
the court did not abuse its discretion by denying respondent's request
for an independent evaluation. Accordingly, we agree with the State
that respondent was not denied equal protection by the failure of the
court to appoint an independent evaluator. See People v. Sanchez,
169 Ill. 2d 472, 501 (1996) (no equal protection violation regarding
a court's failure to appoint an expert witness for an indigent
respondent).

B. Prohibition of Respondent from Attending Probable Cause
Hearing
	The State also claims that the appellate court erred in concluding
that the provision of section 65(b)(1), not allowing a respondent to
attend the probable cause hearing at the time of a periodic
reexamination, violates due process. The State maintains that, since
respondent is entitled to have an attorney represent him at this very
limited probable cause hearing, no constitutional infirmity exists.
According to respondent, his representation by an attorney at the
probable cause hearing was insufficient and due process mandates that
he be allowed to attend the hearing himself. In assessing these
arguments, we must be ever mindful of the well- established principles
that: (1) all statutes carry a strong presumption of constitutionality
(People v. Maness, 191 Ill. 2d 478, 483 (2000)); and (2) the party
challenging a statute bears the burden of clearly establishing the
constitutional infirmity (People v. Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d 104, 111
(1995)).
	Under section 65(b)(1), respondent had three options following
his periodic reexamination. First, he could have waived his right to a
hearing, essentially assenting to further commitment. 725 ILCS
207/65(b)(1) (West 2000). Second, he could have petitioned for
release and would have received a full probable cause hearing. 725
ILCS 207/65(b)(1) (West 2000). Finally, respondent could have done
nothing. 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(1) (West 2000). Respondent chose the
third option. When a respondent does not file a petition for discharge,
yet fails to waive the right to petition under section 65(b)(1), then the
probable cause hearing consists only of a review of the reexamination
reports and arguments on behalf of the parties and the respondent's
attendance is prohibited. 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(1) (West 2000).
	There are three factors used in determining what procedures are
required by the fourteenth amendment due process clause in specific
types of proceedings that implicate fundamental liberty interests: (1)
the private interest implicated by the official action; (2) the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used and
the probable value of the proposed additional or substitute safeguards;
and (3) the government's interest, including the function involved and
the administrative or fiscal burdens that would result from the
proposed additional or substitute safeguards. Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 335, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 33, 96 S. Ct. 893, 903 (1976).
These same factors are also used in determining what procedures are
required by the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill.
Const. 1970, art. I, §2. See People v. Gerke, 123 Ill. 2d 85, 90
(1988).
	Regarding the first factor, the private interest at stake here is
respondent's liberty interest. A committed person under the Act is
confined in a "secure facility" (725 ILCS 207/40(b)(2) (West 2000))
and cannot obtain a discharge without a favorable hearing in the
committing court. Therefore, the first factor weighs in favor of
respondent's position.
	Turning to the second factor, however, in light of the procedural
safeguards existing in the statute, the risk of an erroneous deprivation
is slight. Sections 55 and 65(b)(1) adequately protect a person's
liberty interest by explicitly providing for annual reexaminations, the
right to have an attorney represent the committed at the probable
cause hearing, and the right to petition for discharge at any time. 725
ILCS 207/55, 65 (West 2000). The right to petition for discharge is
fettered only in cases where a respondent has previously filed a
frivolous petition. See 725 ILCS 207/70 (West 2000). When a
frivolous petition has been filed, the court may dismiss subsequent
petitions without a hearing. 725 ILCS 207/70 (West 2000). Despite
a prior frivolous petition, however, if a subsequent petition contains
facts potentially showing a change in condition, a hearing still may be
ordered, thus protecting the respondent's liberty interest. 725 ILCS
207/70 (West 2000).
	Moreover, respondent's presence at the probable cause hearing
would have added nothing substantive (Mathews, 424 U.S.  at 335, 47 L. Ed. 2d  at 33, 96 S. Ct. at 903) to the proceedings, particularly
where neither the appellate court nor the respondent has illustrated
how respondent's presence at the hearing would have affected the trial
court's decision. Respondent, who was represented by counsel at the
probable cause hearing, was aware of the contents of the report and
had sufficient opportunity to consult with his counsel about the report
prior to the hearing. Respondent does not mention any specific
arguments that he was unable to rebut due to his absence.
Furthermore, pursuant to the Act, respondent would have had no
opportunity to testify or examine witnesses at the hearing.
	As for the third factor, we note that the parties' agree that
requiring respondent's attendance at a limited probable cause hearing
would impose both an additional administrative burden and an
additional monetary burden upon the State. We view those burdens as
relatively slight, however, and, thus, assign this factor little weight in
our analysis. Considering the factors in total, the risk of erroneously
depriving respondent of his liberty interest in this case does not
sufficiently outweigh the protective value of the procedural safeguards
present in the statutory scheme to overcome section 65(b)(1)'s
presumption of constitutionality (see Maness, 191 Ill. 2d at 483). See
Mathews, 424 U.S.  at 355, 47 L. Ed. 2d  at 33, 96 S. Ct.  at 903;
Gerke, 123 Ill. 2d  at 90.
	In an analogous case, the Wisconsin appellate court held that "the
stringent procedural safeguards of the initial commitment process
obviate the need for strict standards on recommitment and the
[statutory procedures] are constitutionally sufficient." In re Paulick,
213 Wis. 2d 432, 438, 570 N.W.2d 626, 629 (App. 1997). The
Wisconsin statute, similar to Illinois', provides that the "probable
cause hearing is a paper review of the reexamination report(s) with
argument that provides an opportunity for the committing court to
weed out frivolous petitions." Paulick, 213 Wis. 2d at 438-39, 570 N.W.2d  at 629; see also 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(1) (West 2000) (if the
committed person does not file a petition for discharge and fails to
waive the right to petition for discharge, then the probable cause
hearing consists only of a review of the reexamination reports and
arguments on behalf of the parties). In light of the foregoing, we must
agree with the State that respondent has failed to establish that section
65(b)(1)'s prohibition against his attending a limited probable cause
hearing for a post-commitment reexamination violated procedural due
process.
III. CONCLUSION
	For these reasons, we hold that the appointment of an
independent examiner in periodic examination proceedings is
controlled by section 55(a) of the act and is, therefore left to the
discretion of the circuit court. We further hold that respondent was
not denied equal protection by operation of section 55(a). Lastly, we
hold that section 65(b)(1) of the Act, prohibiting committed persons
from attending limited probable cause hearings, does not violate due
process. The appellate court judgment is, therefore, reversed and the
circuit court decision is affirmed.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.
1.               
       
We make no comment concerning the specific application of section 25(e) to other proceedings under the Act.