Title: State ex rel. Merritt v. Industrial Commission

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Merritt v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-4379.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-4379 
THE STATE EX REL. MERRITT, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Merritt v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No.  
2020-Ohio-4379.] 
Workers’ compensation—Temporary-total disability compensation—Industrial 
commission’s order failed to specifically state what evidence the 
commission relied on in reaching its conclusion—Court of appeals’ 
judgment reversed and limited writ issued ordering commission to enter a 
new order. 
(No. 2020-0350—Submitted July 21, 2020—Decided September 11, 2020.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 18AP-234, 2020-
Ohio-682. 
________________ 
Per Curiam. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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{¶ 1} Appellee Industrial Commission denied the request of appellant, 
Christopher T. Merritt, for temporary-total-disability (“TTD”) compensation 
because the commission found that Merritt had violated his employer’s drug-free-
workplace policy, thereby voluntarily abandoning his employment.  Asserting that 
the commission had abused its discretion, Merritt asked the Tenth District Court of 
Appeals for a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to conduct a new hearing.  
The Tenth District denied the writ.  Merritt has filed a timely appeal in which, 
among other arguments, he asserts that the commission’s order fails to set forth the 
evidence that the commission relied on to conclude that his failed drug test was the 
reason for his termination. 
{¶ 2} A voluntary abandonment of employment that severs the cause-and-
effect relationship between the claimant’s industrial injury and his wage loss 
renders the claimant ineligible for TTD compensation.  State ex rel. McCoy v. 
Dedicated Transport, Inc., 97 Ohio St.3d 25, 2002-Ohio-5305, 776 N.E.2d 51,  
¶ 36-38.  An involuntary termination can constitute a voluntary abandonment of 
employment if the employee is terminated for violating a written, clearly defined 
work rule that the employee knew or should have known was a dischargeable 
offense.  Id. at ¶ 8, citing State ex rel. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 72 
Ohio St.3d 401, 402-403, 650 N.E.2d 469 (1995). 
{¶ 3} In an order granting or denying benefits to a claimant, the commission 
must “specifically state what evidence has been relied upon, and briefly explain the 
reasoning for its decision.”  State ex rel. Noll v. Indus. Comm., 57 Ohio St.3d 203, 
567 N.E.2d 245 (1991), syllabus; see also State ex rel. Mitchell v. Robbins & Myers, 
Inc., 6 Ohio St.3d 481, 483-484, 453 N.E.2d 721 (1983) (the commission “must 
specifically state which evidence and only that evidence which has been relied upon 
to reach [its] conclusion, and a brief explanation stating why the claimant is or is 
not entitled to the benefits requested”).  “The failure to comply with Noll ‘is 
equivalent to an abuse of discretion.’ ”  State ex rel. Gemind v. Indus. Comm., 82 
January Term, 2020 
 
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Ohio St.3d 457, 460, 696 N.E.2d 1025 (1998), quoting State ex rel. Ranomer v. 
Indus. Comm., 71 Ohio St.3d 134, 137, 642 N.E.2d 373 (1994). 
{¶ 4} In State ex rel. Cline v. Abke Trucking, Inc., 137 Ohio St.3d 557, 
2013-Ohio-5159, 1 N.E.3d 409, ¶ 18, we determined that the commission had 
“failed to specifically state the evidence relied upon or explain the reasoning behind 
its decision that [the injured worker] had voluntarily abandoned his employment 
* * *, thus making him ineligible for temporary-total-disability compensation.”  
We stated:  
 
Without more, the order violates Noll. 
We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and issue a 
limited writ of mandamus returning the matter to the commission to 
issue a new order that specifically states the evidence relied upon 
and briefly explains its reasoning consistent with Noll. 
 
Id. at ¶ 18-19. 
{¶ 5} The body of the commission’s order denying Merritt’s TTD-
compensation request states, in its entirety: 
 
The order of the District Hearing Officer, issued 09/23/2016, 
is vacated. 
It is the order of the Staff Hearing Officer that the Injured 
Worker’s C-86 Motion [motion for TTD compensation], filed 
07/18/2016, is denied. 
The Staff Hearing Officer denies temporary total disability 
compensation from 08/19/2015 through the date of hearing, as not 
substantiated by the evidence on file. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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The Staff Hearing Officer finds Injured Worker was 
terminated on 08/24/2015 for violation of the Employer’s drug-free 
workplace policy after testing positive for marijuana from his 
random drug screen on 08/12/2015. 
The Staff Hearing Officer finds, as Injured Worker was 
terminated for violation of a written work rule for which Injured 
worker had knowledge that violation of same would result in 
termination, that Injured Worker voluntarily abandoned his 
employment, as of the date of his termination on 08/24/2015. 
The Staff Hearing Officer additionally finds no evidence that 
Injured Worker has returned to the workforce in any capacity since 
his termination on 08/24/2015. 
The Staff Hearing Officer, accordingly, finds that the 
requested temporary total disability compensation from 08/19/2015 
through the present is denied.  Any overpayment which occurs as a 
result of this order is declared such, and is to be recouped pursuant 
to R.C. 4123.511(K). 
All evidence on file has been reviewed and considered in making 
this finding. 
 
{¶ 6} Because the order does not specifically state what evidence the staff 
hearing officer relied on to reach the conclusion that Merritt was terminated for 
violating his employer’s drug-free workplace policy, thereby voluntarily 
abandoning his employment, it does not comply with Noll and Mitchell.  
Accordingly, as in Cline, we reverse the Tenth District’s judgment and grant a 
limited writ of mandamus ordering the commission to vacate its prior orders, further 
consider Merritt’s claim, and enter a new order that (1) specifically states what 
evidence the commission has relied on in reaching its conclusion and (2) briefly 
January Term, 2020 
 
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explains the reason for the commission’s decision, in conformity with Noll and 
Mitchell. 
Judgment reversed 
and limited writ granted. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH, FISCHER, and DONNELLY, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by DEWINE, J., and joined in 
part by STEWART, J. 
STEWART, J., dissents and would deny the writ on the basis that there is no 
confusion as to what evidence the Industrial Commission relied on in making its 
decision. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 7} Because I do not agree that appellant, Christopher T. Merritt, has 
demonstrated entitlement to a writ of mandamus compelling appellee Industrial 
Commission to enter a new order that explains the reasons for its decision and 
specifies the evidence supporting it, I dissent and would affirm the judgment of the 
Tenth District Court of Appeals. 
{¶ 8} I recognize that in a line of cases beginning with State ex rel. Mitchell 
v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 6 Ohio St.3d 481, 483-484, 453 N.E.2d 721 (1983), and 
continuing with State ex rel. Noll v. Indus. Comm., 57 Ohio St.3d 203, 206, 567 
N.E.2d 245 (1991), we held that the Industrial Commission and its hearing officers 
have a duty enforceable in mandamus to specifically state which evidence has been 
relied upon to reach their conclusion and to include a brief explanation stating why 
the claimant is or is not entitled to the benefits requested.  We relied on this caselaw 
as recently as last year.  State ex rel. Pacheco v. Indus. Comm., 157 Ohio St.3d 126, 
2019-Ohio-2954, 132 N.E.3d 670, ¶ 16.  But I would not apply it here. 
{¶ 9} First, there is no doubt about the reason for the commission’s 
decision—the staff hearing officer expressly found that Merritt had been terminated 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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from his employment for violating his employer’s drug-free-workplace policy and 
therefore had voluntarily abandoned his employment.  Nor are the parties confused 
about what evidence the staff hearing officer relied on.  Merritt himself points to 
the positive drug test, the drug-free-workplace policy, and the termination notice as 
the basis of the staff-hearing officer’s decision—he just does not agree that this 
evidence supports a finding that he was terminated for using marijuana (rather than 
for some other, unspecified reason). 
{¶ 10} Further, Merritt did not argue in the court of appeals or in his opening 
brief to this court that the staff hearing officer’s order insufficiently set forth its 
reasoning for making that finding or failed to cite the evidence supporting the 
finding that he had voluntary abandoned his employment.  He also did not object 
to the magistrate’s decision on that basis.  And Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv) provides that 
the failure to object to an alleged error in a magistrate’s decision results in a 
forfeiture of the alleged error on appeal. 
{¶ 11} In fact, Merritt did not question the sufficiency of the commission’s 
order in this regard until he filed his reply brief in this court.  His belated argument 
denied the commission the opportunity to respond.  This is why we generally will 
not consider an argument raised for the first time in a reply brief. State ex rel. Sands 
v. Culotta, 157 Ohio St.3d 387, 2019-Ohio-4129, 137 N.E.3d 74, ¶ 9, citing State 
v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio-4034, 19 N.E.3d 900, ¶ 18. And 
nothing in this case justifies our departure from this rule. 
{¶ 12} Moreover, because the precedential value of the holding in Mitchell 
and its progeny has been severely undercut, if not eliminated, by subsequent 
developments in the law, we should resist its application here. 
{¶ 13} When we decided Mitchell and held that the commission is required 
to state its reasoning and specify the evidence on which it relied in granting or 
denying workers’ compensation benefits, we explained that these duties were 
imposed by statute.  6 Ohio St.3d at 484, 453 N.E.2d 721.  However, two years 
January Term, 2020 
 
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after this court decided Noll, the General Assembly repealed those statutes, former 
R.C. 4123.515 and 4123.518.  See Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107, 145 Ohio Laws, Part II, 
2990, 2991.  And a third statute cited in Mitchell, R.C. 4121.36(B), at most requires 
the commission to issue a written opinion. 
{¶ 14} In State ex rel. Ochs v. Indus. Comm., we recognized that the statutes 
undergirding the holding in Mitchell and Noll had been repealed.  Ochs, 85 Ohio 
St.3d 674, 675, 710 N.E.2d 1126 (1999).  However, rather than deciding that 
Mitchell and its progeny had been abrogated by the General Assembly, the court 
held that, like the commission, the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation must explain 
its decision because reviewing mandamus actions involving workers’ 
compensation claims is easier when the bureau states its reasoning and specifies the 
evidence on which it relied.  Ochs at 675-676.  That holding, however, conflicts 
with the long-established principle that “[i]n proceedings in mandamus a court 
cannot create a legal duty,” Davis v. State ex rel. Pecsok, 130 Ohio St. 411, 200 
N.E. 181 (1936), paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 15} Although we have not overruled Mitchell, Noll, and Ochs, we have 
nonetheless declined to extend their holding in mandamus cases reviewing orders 
from the State Teachers Retirement Board, State ex rel. Pipoly v. State Teachers 
Retirement Sys., 95 Ohio St.3d 327, 2002-Ohio-2219, 767 N.E.2d 719, ¶ 18; the 
School Employees Retirement Board, State ex rel. VanCleave v. School Emps. 
Retirement Sys., 120 Ohio St.3d 261, 2008-Ohio-5377, 898 N.E.2d 33, ¶ 26; and 
the Ohio Public Employees Retirement Board, State ex rel. Cydrus v. Ohio Pub. 
Emps. Retirement Sys., 127 Ohio St.3d 257, 2010-Ohio-5770, 938 N.E.2d 1028, 
¶ 14-17. 
{¶ 16} In each of these cases, we noted the axiom that “ ‘in mandamus 
proceedings, the creation of the legal duty that a relator seeks to enforce is the 
distinct function of the legislative branch of government, and courts are not 
authorized to create the legal duty enforceable in mandamus.’ ” (Emphasis deleted 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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in Cydrus.)  Cydrus at ¶ 15, quoting Pipoly at ¶ 18; accord VanCleave at ¶ 24.  
Because no statute required that these agencies’ orders state the reasons for their 
decisions or specify the evidence on which they relied, we could not impose those 
requirements on the agencies by judicial fiat in a mandamus case.  As we explained 
in VanCleave, “[a]lthough it may be preferable from a policy standpoint that a 
retirement board explain its reasoning for its decision, the General Assembly is the 
final arbiter of public policy.”  Id. at ¶ 27. 
{¶ 17} In Cydrus, we also rejected the argument that terminating disability-
retirement benefits without specifying the reasons “violates the separation-of-
powers doctrine by abrogating the plenary power of the judiciary to provide a 
meaningful review of the board’s decision,” id. at ¶ 22.  We explained: 
“[A]dministration of justice is not impeded by the lack of a statute or rule requiring 
the board to explain the reasons for its denial or termination of disability-retirement 
benefits.  Reviewing an administrative record in a mandamus proceeding in such a 
case is ‘not any more burdensome than reviewing a summary judgment entered by 
a trial court without a detailed opinion.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 23, quoting Pipoly at ¶ 21. 
{¶ 18} “In framing the Ohio Constitution, the people of this state conferred 
on the General Assembly the legislative power.”  Toledo v. State, 154 Ohio St.3d 
41, 2018-Ohio-2358, 110 N.E.3d 1257, ¶ 26.  And as we have long recognized, 
“ ‘[t]he creation of a legal duty is a distinctive function of the legislative branch of 
government.  The most that a court can do in mandamus is to command the 
performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an 
office, trust, or station, when a clear right to such performance is presented.’ ”  State 
ex rel. Stanley v. Cook, 146 Ohio St. 348, 365, 66 N.E.2d 207 (1946), quoting 
Davis, 130 Ohio St. at 424, 200 N.E. 181.  For these reasons, if the holding in 
Mitchell and its progeny is no longer required by statute, it is not enforceable in 
mandamus. 
January Term, 2020 
 
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{¶ 19} However, it is necessary to resolve that issue only if we decide that 
Merritt’s challenge to the sufficiency of the staff hearing officer’s order is properly 
before the court despite its being raised for the first time in his reply brief.  Because 
in my view that challenge comes too late, I would address only the question that 
Merritt preserved for our review: Is the commission’s order supported by some 
evidence?   
{¶ 20} In this case, Merritt knew that his employer, appellee New Avenues 
to Independence, Inc., had a workplace rule subjecting him to drug testing and that 
he could be terminated if testing revealed his use of an illegal drug.  New Avenues 
had him tested, and it terminated his employment within days of learning he had 
tested positive for using marijuana.  Merritt does not dispute that he violated the 
workplace rule or that his positive drug test was a valid basis to terminate his 
employment.  And the positive drug test and the termination occurred so close in 
time to permit the inference of cause and effect: Merritt was terminated because he 
violated New Avenues’ drug-free-workplace policy. 
{¶ 21} Further, Merritt’s termination notice indicated that he was 
“discharged.”  It does not give any justification for terminating him, but it does say 
that he was “[e]ligible for re-hire after 6 months per the DFSP policy.”  Merritt 
concedes that there is no evidence that New Avenues has a “DFSP” policy, and the 
language on the discharge notice is consistent with New Avenues’ drug-free-
workplace policy (i.e., DFWP), which states that New Avenues “will decline to 
extend a final offer of employment to any applicant with a verified positive test 
result, and the applicant may not re-apply with [New Avenues] for a period of six 
(6) months.”  The termination notice therefore informed Merritt that because he had 
had a positive drug test, he could not reapply for his job until six months had passed.  
There would have been no reason to include this information if he were not fired 
for illegal drug use. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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{¶ 22} All of this constitutes at least “some” evidence supporting the staff 
hearing officer’s finding that Merritt voluntarily abandoned his employment.  And 
“ ‘[w]here the record contains some evidence to support the commission’s findings, 
there has been no abuse of discretion and mandamus will not lie.’ ”  State ex rel. 
Seibert v. Richard Cyr, Inc., 157 Ohio St.3d 266, 2019-Ohio-3341, 134 N.E.3d 
1185, ¶ 17, quoting State ex rel. Kroger Co. v. Stover, 31 Ohio St.3d 229, 232, 510 
N.E.2d 356 (1987). 
{¶ 23} Because Merritt seeks the extraordinary remedy of a writ of 
mandamus, he bears the burden of establishing that the commission has the clear 
legal duty to do as he asks.  State ex rel. McKee v. Union Metal Corp., 150 Ohio 
St.3d 223, 2017-Ohio-5541, 80 N.E.3d 491, ¶ 11.  He has failed in that burden.  
Rather than reverse the court of appeals on a new argument that neither the 
commission nor the court of appeals had the opportunity to address in the first 
instance, I would affirm the court of appeals.  Because the majority rules otherwise, 
I dissent. 
 
DEWINE, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
 
STEWART, J., concurs in part in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Nager, Romaine & Schneiberg, Co., L.P.A., Jerald A. Schneiberg, and C. 
Bradley Howenstein, for appellant. 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Eric J. Tarbox, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio. 
_________________