Title: Houston v. Knoedl

State: arkansas

Issuer: Arkansas Supreme Court

Document:

Mrs. Gaines HOUSTON, Trustee, The Pemberton
Trust Estate v. William and Mary KNOEDL

96-1531                                            ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered June 16, 1997


1.   Jury -- objections to jury instructions must be timely --
     appellant made only general objections -- objections made too
     late. -- In order to be timely, objections to jury
     instructions must be made either before or at the time the
     instructions are given; where the trial court is unable to
     ascertain from the record or abstract the specific objections
     to the remaining instructions made prior to the jury retiring
     to consider its verdict, these objections will not be
     addressed; here, appellant waited to make its objections and
     record concerning jury instructions until after the trial
     court gave the instructions and after counsel rendered closing
     arguments; the abstract failed to reveal where any hearing
     took place where appellant made specific objections to the
     instructions prior to the jury retiring to consider a verdict.
     
2.   Jury -- instruction arguments not preserved -- failure to move
     for directed verdict at end of appellees' case-in-chief
     constituted waiver -- motion must be specific. -- Appellant
     failed to preserve its instruction arguments because it did
     not properly move for a directed verdict at the end of
     appellees' case-in-chief and again at the close of all
     evidence; such failure constitutes a waiver; preservation of
     a sufficiency-of-evidence issue for appeal also requires that
     the party moving for directed verdict to state specific
     grounds upon which it seeks such relief; here, the appellees
     offered three separate causes of action against the appellant,
     and even though the trial court cautioned the appellant to be
     specific when making its directed-verdict motion, the
     appellant still failed to specify what evidence might have
     been omitted or elements not proved in each of appellees'
     three counts.

3.   Damages -- award alleged to be excessive -- standard of
     review. -- When an award of damages is alleged to be
     excessive, the supreme court reviews the proof and all
     reasonable inferences most favorably to the appellees and
     determines whether the verdict is so great as to shock the
     conscience of the court or demonstrate passion or prejudice on
     the part of the trier of fact.

4.   Damages -- appellees presented sufficient evidence to support
     award -- amount awarded not excessive. -- Where the appellees'
     evidence supported out-of-pocket expenses totalling $13,720;
     they presented evidence that, while they were forced to
     litigate this matter, they suffered stress, stomach problems,
     marital differences, and sought medical attention and the need
     of prescription drugs; they told the jury, without objection,
     that the appellant-trust representatives knew full well that
     the property had been deeded to the appellees, that the
     appellant had no interest in that disputed 1.6 acre tract, and
     that dismissal of all three of their ejectment suits reflected
     as much; the appellees submitted to the jury, again without
     objection, that the appellant's actions were malicious and
     were intended to interfere with the appellees' peaceful
     enjoyment of their property; and the appellant never attempted
     to disprove the damages presented by the appellees, the amount
     awarded by the jury was not excessive. 

5.   Appeal & error -- argument not raised below -- appellant
     barred from arguing new ground for first time on appeal. --
     The appellant's complaint that the trial court gave no
     instructions on punitive damages was not reached where the
     appellees properly requested and argued in closing arguments
     that punitive damages be awarded and the appellant never
     objected to that argument below, nor objected to the failure
     to give an instruction on the subject; appellant was barred
     from arguing a new ground for the first time on appeal for
     challenging the punitive-damage award. 

6.   Evidence -- survey properly admitted into evidence --
     engineer's testimony relevant and probative. -- Appellant's
     argument that the trial court erred in allowing an unfiled
     survey prepared by a civil engineer into evidence was without
     merit where the engineer testified that he physically
     conducted a survey of the subject property in 1978 and
     determined its boundaries and that he had not recorded the
     survey because that was not the practice at the time; having
     been qualified and shown previously to have established the
     boundaries of the property now claimed by the appellant, the
     engineer's testimony was relevant and probative in
     establishing the description of the grantor's deed of the
     subject property to the appellees.

7.   Evidence -- deeds of neighboring property could have been
     confusing to jury -- trial court did not abuse discretion in
     excluding deeds. -- Appellant's suggestion that the trial
     court erred in excluding deeds of surveyed property that the
     appellant argued surrounded the appellees' tract and showed
     that the surveyed boundary lines did not match, was without
     merit where the trial court excluded the proffered deeds
     because the appellant offered no one to establish the deeds'
     boundaries or descriptions or to show how such evidence
     disproved the legal description in the appellees' deed; the
     trial court believed the deeds of neighboring property would
     be confusing to the jury, since no witness was offered to plat
     or explain those deeds' relevance; the trial court did not
     abuse its discretion in so ruling.

8.   Evidence -- refusal to admit testimony within sound discretion
     of trial court -- no abuse of discretion found. -- The trial
     court's refusal to admit testimony of an employee from the
     assessor's office was not an abuse of discretion where an
     engineer had previously testified as to the location of the
     appellees' property using their deed and existing boundary
     markers, especially where the proposed witness did not know
     where the boundary markers were located, and did not know
     whether the deeds he used were accurate; the admission and
     exclusion of expert testimony is a matter which lies within
     the sound discretion of the trial court.


     Appeal from Lonoke Circuit Court; Lance L. Hanshaw, Judge;
affirmed.
     John I. Purtle, P.A. and William & Anderson, by:  Leon Holmes,
for appellant.
     The Henry Law Firm, P.A.,by:  David P. Henry, for appellees.

     Tom Glaze, Justice.
     This case involves a dispute over the ownership of a parcel of
land located in Lonoke County.  In 1938, the property belonged to
John Pemberton, who upon his death, devised it to his wife, Mary. 
In 1946, Mary Pemberton deeded 14.83 acres of the farm land to
Ralph and Mildred Pemberton.  Later, upon Ralph's and Mildred's
deaths, the farm acreage became the property of their daughter,
Mildred Pemberton Crow.  In August of 1993, Mildred conveyed 1.6
acres of the 14.83 acreage to William and Mary Knoedl who planned
to build their retirement home on it.  It is this conveyance that
is the focus of the present litigation.  
     When the Knoedls took possession of the 1.6 acre tract of
land, John McRae, a beneficiary of a previously established
Pemberton Trust, immediately informed Mr. Knoedl that the 1.6 acre
tract belonged to the Trust.  The Knoedls' and McRae's disagreement
over the disputed property resulted in the Pemberton Trust filing
an ejectment action against the Knoedls in the Pulaski County
Circuit Court.  That action was dismissed on August 26, 1994,
because of improper venue.  On November 2, 1994, the Trust filed
another ejectment action against the Knoedls, but this time in the
Lonoke County Circuit Court.  The Trust, however, subsequently
voluntarily dismissed their second suit without prejudice.  
     On December 20, 1995, the Knoedls filed suit in the Lonoke
County Circuit Court against the trustees of the Pemberton Trust
and John McRae (hereinafter the Trust), alleging slander of title,
malicious prosecution, and abuse of process, and requesting
compensatory and punitive damages.  The Trust answered, denying the
Knoedls' claims, and counterclaimed, again requesting damages and
asking that the trial court declare the Trust the owner of the
disputed property.
     At a jury trial on July 11, 1996, the trial court directed a
verdict in the Knoedls' favor on the Trust's counterclaim, and
allowed the Knoedls' case to be submitted to the jury.  The jury
returned a general verdict in the Knoedls' favor, and awarded them
$30,000 in compensatory and $75,000 in punitive damages.  After the
trial court denied the Trust's motions for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict and new trial, the Trust filed this timely appeal.  
     The Trust presents six points for reversal, but its first
three arguments are not preserved.  In each of the three arguments,
the Trust urges that the Knoedls' evidence was insufficient to
prove the Knoedls' allegations of slander of title, malicious
prosecution, and abuse of process; consequently, the Trust argues
the trial court erred in giving instructions to the jury regarding
those causes of action.  
     First, we note the Trust failed to make a timely objection to
the giving of the instructions.  In MIC v. Barrett, 313 Ark. 527,
855 S.W.2d 329 (1993), this court held that, in order to be timely,
objections to jury instructions must be made either before or at
the time the instructions are given.  The MIC court held that, even
though the parties agreed their objections were originally made at
an in-chambers hearing before the jury was charged, there was no
record of the hearing.  The court concluded as follows:
          Since we are not able to ascertain from the record
     or abstract the specific objections to the remaining
     instructions made prior to the jury retiring to consider
     its verdict, these objections will not be addressed.
Like in MIC, the Trust here waited to make its objections and
record concerning jury instructions until after the trial court
gave the instructions and after counsel rendered closing arguments. 
Our review of the abstract fails to reveal where any hearing took
place where the Trust made specific objections to the instructions
prior to the jury retiring to consider a verdict. 
     In addition, we mention, too, that the Trust failed to
preserve its instruction arguments because it did not properly move
for a directed verdict at the end of the Knoedls' case-in-chief and
again at the close of all evidence.  Such failure constitutes a
waiver.  See Ark. R. Civ. P. 50(a) and (e).  The intent of this
rule is to require a party testing the sufficiency of the evidence
first to submit the question to the trial court, thereby permitting
the court to make a ruling at the conclusion of all the evidence,
but prior to the verdict, thus, preserving the specific question
for appeal.  Willson Safety Products v. Eschenbrenner, 302 Ark.
228,