Title: SSC Selma Operating Company, LLC v. Fikes

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel:05/19/2017
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2016-2017
____________________
1160080
____________________
SSC Selma Operating Company, LLC, d/b/a Warren Manor Health
and Rehabilitation Center, and SavaSeniorCare Administrative
Services, LLC
v.
Jackie Fikes
Appeal from Dallas Circuit Court
(CV-16-900053)
BOLIN, Justice.
SSC Selma Operating Company, LLC, doing business as
Warren 
Manor 
Health 
and 
Rehabilitation 
Center, 
and
SavaSeniorCare Administrative Services, LLC (hereinafter
1160080
collectively referred to as "the companies"), appeal from an
order of the Dallas Circuit Court denying their motion to
compel arbitration of a retaliatory-discharge claim filed
against them by Jackie Fikes.  We reverse and remand.
Facts
On March 4, 2016, Fikes sued the companies, seeking to
recover 
worker's 
compensation benefits 
pursuant 
to 
the 
Alabama
Workers' Compensation Act, § 25–5–1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975
("the worker's compensation claim"), and alleging that the
companies had discharged her from her employment in violation
of Ala. Code 1975, § 25–5–11.1, solely because she had filed
a 
claim 
for 
worker's 
compensation 
benefits 
("the
retaliatory-discharge claim").  Fikes specifically alleged
that on February 19, 2013, she suffered a work-related injury
when she attempted to lift a patient while working for the
companies as a certified nurse assistant; that she underwent
medical treatment for her work-related injury; and that she
returned to work under light-duty restrictions until March 4,
2014, at which time, she says, the companies wrongfully
terminated her employment. Fikes requested in the complaint
that the worker's compensation claim and the retaliatory-
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discharge claim be severed in order for the retaliatory-
discharge claim to be tried by a jury.  It does not appear
from the record that the trial court severed the claims.1  The
companies moved to compel arbitration of the retaliatory-
discharge 
claim 
pursuant 
to 
their 
employment-dispute-
resolution program 
(hereinafter 
"the 
EDR 
program") 
under 
which
Fikes had agreed to be bound. Fikes responded, arguing that
the retaliatory-discharge claim was not covered by the EDR
program.  On October 12, 2016, the trial court entered an
order denying the 
companies' motion to compel arbitration; the
companies appeal pursuant to Rule 4(d), Ala. R. App. P.
Standard of Review
"This Court's standard of review on an appeal
from a trial court's order granting or denying a
motion to compel arbitration is well settled. Bowen
v. Security Pest Control, Inc., 879 So. 2d 1139,
1141 (Ala. 2003). A direct appeal is the proper
procedure by which to seek review of such an order,
Rule 4(d), Ala. R. App. P., and this Court will
review de novo the trial court's grant or denial of
a motion to compel arbitration. Bowen, 879 So. 2d at
1141. The party seeking to compel arbitration has
the initial burden of proving the existence of a
contract calling for arbitration and proving that
the contract evidences a transaction involving
interstate commerce. Polaris Sales, Inc. v. Heritage
1On January 27, 2017, this Court entered an order denying
the companies' motion to stay the proceedings below in their
entirety pending this appeal.
3
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Imports, Inc., 879 So. 2d 1129, 1132 (Ala. 2003).
The party seeking to compel arbitration must present
some evidence tending to establish its claim. Wolff
Motor Co. v. White, 869 So. 2d 1129, 1131 (Ala.
2003). Once the moving party meets that initial
burden, the party opposing arbitration has the
burden of presenting evidence tending to show that
the arbitration agreement is invalid or that it does
not apply to the dispute in question. Bowen, 879 So.
2d at 1141. See also Title Max of Birmingham, Inc.
v. Edwards, 973 So. 2d 1050, 1052–53 (Ala. 2007)."
Alabama Title Loans, Inc. v. White, 80 So. 3d 887, 891–92
(Ala. 2011).
Discussion
At the outset, it is noted that neither the companies nor
Fikes disputes that the EDR program governs the arbitration of
employment disputes between the companies and its 
employees or
that the transaction--Fikes's employment by a company
operating in 
19 
states--involves interstate 
commerce. 
The 
only
issue before this Court is whether Fikes met her burden of
demonstrating that her retaliatory-discharge claim was not
covered under the EDR program. The relevant portions of the
document establishing the EDR program state:
"Your decision to accept employment or to continue
employment with the [companies] constitutes your
agreement to be bound by the EDR Program. Likewise,
the [companies] agree[] to be bound by the EDR
Program. This mutual agreement to arbitrate claims
means that both you and the [companies] are bound to
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use the EDR Program as the only means of resolving
employment related disputes and to forego [sic] any
right either may have to a jury trial on issues
covered by the EDR Program.
"....
"The EDR Program is the process for resolving most
workplace disputes between you and the [companies],
including but not limited to, disputes concerning
legally protected rights such as freedom from
discrimination, retaliation or harassment.
"....
"Disputes covered under the EDR Program pertain to
claims such as discipline, discrimination, fair
treatment, harassment, termination and other legally
protected rights [i.e., 'such as freedom from
discrimination, 
retaliation 
or 
harassment'--as
stated in the prior paragraph].
"Disputes not covered under the EDR Program relate
to worker's compensation, unemployment benefits,
health, welfare and retirement benefits, and claims
by the [companies] for injunctive relief to protect
trade secrets and confidential information."
(Emphasis added.)
Fikes, relying solely on the provision concerning
disputes "not covered" under the EDR program, argues that the
plain language of the provision is unambiguous and expressly
provides that an employment dispute that "relate[s] to
worker's compensation" is not covered under the EDR program. 
Specifically, she argues that the retaliatory-discharge claim
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is related to the worker's compensation claim because she has
to demonstrate that the companies terminated her employment
because she filed a claim for worker's compensation benefits.
The companies, on the other hand, argue (1) that the EDR
program specifically covers employment-related disputes
concerning termination and legally protected rights such as
freedom from retaliation; (2) that a retaliatory-discharge
claim is not in the nature of a worker's compensation claim;
and (3) that the obvious and clear intention of the EDR
program is to exclude as arbitrable claims by the companies
for 
injunctive 
relief 
to 
protect 
trade 
secrets 
and
confidential information, as well as claims that are governed
by 
special 
statutes–-claims 
typically 
handled 
administratively
and 
limited 
in 
their 
potential 
recoveries, 
i.e., 
specifically,
worker's compensation benefits are governed by the Alabama
Workers' Compensation Act, and claims seeking such benefits
are typically tried before a circuit court judge without a
jury, § 25–5–81, Ala. Code 1975; unemployment-compensation
benefits 
are 
governed 
by 
the 
Alabama 
Unemployment 
Compensation
Act, Ala. Code 1975, § 25–4–1 et seq.; and an employee-
welfare-benefit plan, pension plan, or retirement plan is
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governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974. The companies further argue that, even if the scope of
the arbitration agreement that is part of the EDR program is
not clear, any ambiguities therein as to its scope must be
resolved in favor of arbitration.  We agree. 
In Koullas v. Ramsey, 683 So. 2d 415, 416-17 (Ala. 1996),
this Court stated:
"The 
strong 
federal 
policy 
favoring 
the
enforceability of arbitration contracts is designed
to place arbitration agreements on the same footing
as 
any 
other 
contract. 
Allied–Bruce 
Terminix
Companies v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 115 S. Ct. 834,
130 L. Ed.2d 753 (1995). Like any other contract, an
arbitration agreement must be enforced in accordance
with its terms; both federal and state courts have
consistently recognized that the duty to arbitrate
is a contractual obligation and that a party cannot
be required to arbitrate any dispute that he or she
has not agreed to arbitrate. AT & T Technologies,
Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S.
643, 106 S. Ct. 1415, 89 L. Ed.2d 648 (1986); A.G.
Edwards & Sons v. Clark, 558 So. 2d 358 (Ala. 1990).
Whether an arbitration agreement applies to a
dispute between the parties is to be determined by
the language of the contract entered into by the
parties. 
Blount 
Int'l, 
Ltd. 
v. 
James
River–Pennington, Inc., 618 So. 2d 1344 (Ala. 1993).
"In the event of an ambiguity or uncertainty
over the applicability of an arbitration clause,
federal policy dictates that it be resolved in favor
of arbitration. Allied–Bruce. However, this Court
will not stretch the language of a contract to apply
to matters that were not contemplated by the parties
when they entered the contract. Seaboard Coast Line
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1160080
R.R. v. Trailer Train Co., 690 F. 2d 1343 (11th Cir.
1982). To determine whether the arbitration clause
applies to this dispute, we must consider the intent
of the parties, as it is expressed in the language
of the ... contract."
It is apparent from the language of the document
establishing the EDR program that the intent of the program is
to 
submit 
to 
arbitration those 
employment-related disputes 
the
plaintiff would ordinarily be entitled to have resolved by a
jury trial, i.e., disputes sounding in tort, as opposed to
those disputes that are governed by specific statutes and are
typically limited in their recovery.  In the case at hand, it
is well settled that although a retaliatory-discharge claim
brought pursuant to §  25-5-11.1 arises out of a worker's
compensation factual setting, the claim is nevertheless a 
tort
action and is governed by the general rules of tort law. 
Jackson Cty. Hosp. v. Alabama Hosp. Ass'n Trust, 619 So. 2d
1369 (Ala. 1993).  In Jackson County Hospital, this Court
explained the relationship between a retaliatory-discharge
claim and a worker's compensation claim:
"[T]he [Alabama's Workers' Compensation] statute has
no special provisions tying  the [retaliatory-
discharge] claim to damages relating to workers'
compensation benefits; on the contrary, a plaintiff
who brings a claim under § 25-5-11.1 can be awarded
damages under the general law of torts.  Caraway v.
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1160080
Franklin Ferguson Mfg. Co., 507 So. 2d 925 (Ala.
1987).  See, also, Continental Eagle Corp. v.
Mokzrycki, 611 So. 2d 313 (Ala. 1992)(mental anguish
and loss of wages compensable 'under the general law
of torts and, thus, under Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-
11.1.'  611 So. 2d at 315).  The award of such
damages could entail proof of damage or harm and
could entail jury trials, which are nonexistent in
traditional workers' compensation actions....      
                     
"We note that claims that do 'arise under'
workers' 
compensation 
laws 
are 
generally 
for
occupational 
diseases 
and 
accidental 
injuries
resulting from one's employment. The § 25-5-11.1
action for retaliatory discharge operates to protect
an employee who files a traditional worker's
compensation claim but, in so doing, does not itself
become 
a 
'worker's 
compensation' 
action. 
We
therefore hold that the retaliatory discharge claim
is in the nature of a traditional tort, albeit one
that is applied in the specialized circumstances of
a worker's compensation claim, and thus does not
arise 'under' our workers' compensation law for
purposes 
of 
the 
general 
liability 
insurance
provision in this case."
619 So. 2d at 1371.
Likewise 
here, 
claims 
that 
"relate 
to" 
worker's
compensation laws 
"are 
generally 
for 
occupational diseases 
and
accidental injuries resulting from one's employment," as
opposed to claims alleging retaliatory discharge.  The two
claims–-a workers' compensation claim and a tort claim--are
mutually exclusive, in part, by virtue of their limited
recoveries. See, e.g., Robert W. Lee & Steven W. Ford, Alabama
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1160080
Workers' Compensation Law and Handbook § 1.04 (2d ed.
2004)(internal citations omitted)("In a tort claim, all
damages that can be proven can be awarded (i.e., pain and
suffering, actual lost wages, lost earning capacity, punitive
damages, loss of consortium, disfigurement, loss of enjoyment
of life, medical bills, etc.).  In a workers' compensation
claim in Alabama, however, three benefits are available: (1)
lifetime medical coverage for all reasonable and necessary
medical expenses that are related to the on-the-job injury and
provided by 
the 
authorized doctor; (2) compensation based upon
injuries to scheduled members of the body, or upon loss of
earning 
capacity; 
and 
(3) 
payment 
of 
vocational 
rehabilitation
expenses, if appropriate.").
In Dillard's, Inc. v. Gallups, 58 So. 3d 196, 199 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2010), the Court of Civil Appeals addressed a
similar argument by an employee regarding whether a
retaliatory-discharge claim was arbitrable by virtue of the
following description in the parties' agreement of the types
of claims required to be arbitrated:
"'Personal injuries except those covered by workers'
compensation or those covered by an employee welfare
benefit plan, pension plan or retirement plan which
are subject to the Employee Retirement Income
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Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) other than claims for
breach 
of 
fiduciary 
duty 
(which 
shall 
be
arbitrable).
"'Retaliation for filing a protected claim for
benefits 
(such 
as 
workers' 
compensation) 
or
exercising 
your 
protected 
rights 
under 
any
statute.'" 
 
The employee argued that the two provisions created an
ambiguity 
because 
his 
retaliatory-discharge 
claim 
was
arbitrable under the second provision, yet excluded under the
first provision. The employee specifically argued that the
retaliatory-discharge claim was excluded under the first
provision because, according to him, the claim arose under the
Alabama Workers' Compensation Act.  Relying, in part, on this
Court's decision in Jackson County Hospital, the Court of
Civil Appeals rejected the employee's argument:
"Our 
supreme 
court 
has 
determined 
that, 
although
a retaliatory-discharge action 'operates to protect
an employee who files a traditional workers'
compensation claim ..., [it] does not itself become
a "workers' compensation" action.' Jackson County
Hosp., 619 So. 2d at 1371. The issue in Jackson
County Hospital was whether the Alabama Hospital
Association Trust ('the Trust') was required to
defend Jackson County Hospital ('the Hospital')
against 
a 
retaliatory-discharge 
claim 
brought
against the Hospital. Id. at 1370. Although the
opinion does not make it clear, the agreement
between the Trust and the Hospital must have
excluded workers' compensation claims from those
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claims the Trust was required to defend. Id. at
1370-71. ...
".... 
"... Based on ... Jackson County Hospital,
therefore, we hold that the trial court erred in
c o n c l u d i n g  
t h a t  
[ t h e  
e m p l o y e e ' s ]
retaliatory-discharge claim could not be arbitrated
because it fell under the first of the two relevant
above-quoted provisions in the [agreement]. A
retaliatory-discharge claim does not arise under the
Workers' Compensation Act such that it falls within
the exclusion 
stated in the [agreement] for
'[p]ersonal 
injuries 
... 
covered 
by 
workers'
compensation.'"
58 So. 3d at 201-04.  See also Gibson v. Staffco, L.L.C., 63
So. 3d 1272, 1274 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010)("Recently, this court
[in Dillard's, Inc. v. Gallups] held that, in the context of
the arbitrability of claims, a claim of retaliatory discharge
does not fit within a contractual exclusion from arbitration
for workers' compensation claims."). 
Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the
trial court erred in denying the companies' motion to compel
arbitration of Fikes's retaliatory-discharge claim.  When the
language of the document establishing the EDR program is
viewed as a whole, it is apparent that the intent of the
program is to include as arbitrable those employment-related
disputes the employee would be entitled to have resolved by a
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jury trial, as opposed to those disputes that are governed by
special 
statutes 
and 
limited 
in 
their 
potential recovery--such
as claims arising under a workers' compensation act. Stated
differently, when viewed in its proper context, a retaliatory-
discharge claim asserted by an employee participating in the
EDR program is not "related to" disputes concerning workers'
compensation laws, which are governed solely by the workers'
compensation act, and, thus, is governed by the general rules
of tort law.  Even assuming, arguendo, that an uncertainty or
a latent ambiguity exists in the language of the document
establishing 
the 
EDR 
program 
concerning covered 
and 
noncovered
disputes, it is well settled that federal policy "dictates
that [any uncertainty or ambiguity] be resolved in favor of
arbitration."  Koullas, 683 So. 2d at 417.  "[A]ny doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved
in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the
construction of the contract language itself or an allegation
of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability." Moses
H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24–25 (1983).
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Conclusion
Fikes has failed to demonstrate that her retaliatory-
discharge claim is not covered by the EDR program.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order denying the
companies' motion to compel arbitration of that claim and
remand this case to the trial court for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Stuart, C.J., and Parker, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ.,
concur.
Murdock and Shaw, JJ., concur in the result.
14