Title: Dolgencorp, LLC v. Spence

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 09/30/2016
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2016
____________________
1150124
____________________
Dolgencorp, LLC
v.
Michelle Spence
Appeal from Autauga Circuit Court
(CV-14-900138)
MURDOCK, Justice.
Dolgencorp, LLC ("Dolgencorp"), appeals from a judgment
entered on a jury verdict in the amount of $100,000 in favor
of Michelle Spence in her action filed in the Autauga Circuit
1150124
Court seeking damages arising from her arrest 
for 
shoplifting. 
We reverse and remand.
I.  Facts
The evidence at trial showed the following.  On April 16,
2013, Spence went to the Dollar General discount store located
on McQueen Smith Road in Prattville to purchase some paper
towels, toilet paper, mineral oil, and hair spray.  Spence's
cousin, Kody Atchison, accompanied Spence to the store.  
1
Cindy Welch was the manager working at the Dollar General
store that day.  Welch and Spence did not know each other
before that day, even though Spence was a regular shopper at
that particular Dollar General store.
Spence got a shopping cart outside the store.  She placed
her purse in the compartment of the cart where the child seat
is located, and she entered the store.  Welch testified that
she was stocking merchandise when she saw Spence enter the
store.  Welch continued to watch Spence as Spence walked
toward the health-and-beauty-aid section.
Cindy Welch, the store manager, testified that she did
1
not recall anyone being with Spence, but both Spence and
Atchison testified that Atchison was with Spence. 
2
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Once Spence reached an aisle of health and beauty
products, she picked up a container of mineral oil.  The
evidence is conflicting as to what occurred next.  Welch
testified that she witnessed Spence place the mineral oil in
her purse, which was open.  Spence testified that she placed
the mineral oil in the compartment of the cart near her purse.
Welch testified that she began to "suspect" that Spence was up
to something so she specifically watched Spence as she walked
to the next aisle.  Spence selected a container of hair spray.
According to Spence, she placed the hair spray in the top
compartment of the cart.  Spence admitted that the hair-spray
container was not visible in the cart, but she stated that
this was because it had rolled to the side of her purse and
then became sandwiched between the back of the cart and her
purse.  Welch testified that she was standing right over
Spence's shoulder and she watched Spence place the hair-spray
container in her open purse and then close the purse by
zipping it.  Spence testified that this was not possible
because the purse was too small to hold the containers of
mineral oil and hair spray and that the zipper on the purse
3
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was broken.  Spence stated at trial that she no longer had the
purse because she threw it away at some point.
Spence testified that as soon as she put the hair spray
into her cart Welch grabbed her by the arm "and hollered,
'You're trying to conceal that.'"  Spence stated that she
responded by picking up the hair spray and saying:  "What are
you talking about?  This hair spray?  I'm not trying to
conceal anything.  I plan to pay for everything I get today
and I've got more shopping to do."  Spence testified that
Welch took the hair spray from her, then handed it back to
her.  Spence testified that Welch continued to yank her arm
and told her:  "You better not try to leave here ... you have
to stay here.  ...  I'm calling the police."  Spence stated
that Welch then "just took off" for the store office.  Spence
and Atchison followed Welch toward the front of the store and
stood there while Welch went into the office and telephoned
the police.  Spence testified that there were several people
in the store at this time and that Welch's handling of the
situation embarrassed and humiliated her.  
Approximately 15 or 20 minutes later, two Prattville
police officers arrived at the Dollar General store.  Welch
4
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gave the police officers an oral statement of her version of
what had happened.  Spence requested that the officers review
the videotape of the incident, but she was told that there was
no video.   The officers arrested Spence at approximately
2
3 p.m.; she was taken to the police station in city hall.
Welch remained in the store and continued working, while
arranging for someone else to oversee the store while she went
to the police station.  Welch arrived at city hall between
4 p.m. and 5 p.m., at which time she signed a complaint
alleging theft of property against Spence.  A magistrate judge
signed the complaint shortly thereafter.  Spence was taken to
jail at approximately 5 p.m. 
Spence unsuccessfully attempted to contact her mother
regarding bail.  Spence then contacted Atchison to come down
to the police station to see what could be done about getting
her released from jail.  Cpt. Larry Nixon, the jail
warden/administrator, testified that Spence would have been
released from jail that same day if $500 cash had been paid to
the magistrate judge by 5 p.m., but no payment was submitted. 
Nixon also testified that when Spence's purse was inventoried
No video of the incident was submitted at trial.
2
5
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it was found to contain $229.37 in cash.  Spence spent the
night in jail with eight other inmates in a large holding
cell.  The following day Atchison posted a cash bond of $150
(a reduction approved by the magistrate judge), and Spence was
released.
The charges against Spence were dismissed after two court
appearances because no witnesses appeared to testify against
her.  Welch quit working for Dolgencorp not long after the
incident -- namely at the end of May 2013 -- in order to move
to Ferriday, Louisiana, to be with her husband, who had
cancer.  Based on the testimony at trial and the briefs of the
parties to this Court, it is undisputed that Welch did not
tell anyone at Dolgencorp about the incident involving Spence
before she left employment with the company.
Welch had started working for Dolgencorp in December
2011. She testified that Dolgencorp trained its employees
through the use of videos that, among other things, explained
Dolgencorp's 
Standard 
Operating 
Procedures 
("SOPs").
Dolgencorp employees also were given an electronic copy of
Dolgencorp's employment handbook.  Employees signed an
acknowledgment form in which they attested that they had read
6
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and understood all information contained in the employment
handbook.  Welch signed an acknowledgment on December 5, 2011,
at the outset of her employment with Dolgencorp, and she
signed another one on April 13, 2013, three days before the
incident involving Spence.
Welch testified that during her training she learned
about a four-step approach  for handling 
suspected shoplifters
know as "ASAP."  The ASAP approach is contained in
Dolgencorp's "Shoplifting Prevention SOP."  Welch testified
that she did not remember specifically ever seeing a written
document that discussed the proper way to deal with a
shoplifter, although she stated that she did read everything
she attested to reading (by signing acknowledgment forms)
during her training and employment. 
Welch further testified that the first step in the four-
step ASAP approach was to "approach" the subject.  The second
step was to "smile" from approximately five feet away.  The
third step was to "ask" a "face-saving" question.  The fourth
step was to "proactively" offer assistance.  A portion of the
policy also states:  "[I]f the customer produces the
merchandise the employee is not to accuse them of stealing or
7
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attempt to detain them."  Another portion of Dolgencorp's
shoplifting SOP states:  "[T]he best deterrent is customer
service.  Never engage in verbal accusation with anyone
suspected of shoplifting.  Never touch anyone suspected of
shoplifting or touch his or her personal belongings."  The SOP
states that, if possible, a store manager should give the
suspected shoplifter an opportunity to pay for the items in
question before seeking assistance from law-enforcement
authorities.
Welch admitted that she did not follow Dolgencorp's
shoplifting SOP on April 16, 2013.  She stated that she
believed that the SOP provided "guidelines" on how to handle
shoplifting situations, that the "procedures may not 
fit 
every
situation," and that in "different situations you 
do 
different
things." Welch also admitted, however, that no one at
Dolgencorp told her that she did not have to follow the SOP in
every situation.  
Dolgencorp's district manager for the store at which
Welch was working conducted an annual performance review of
Welch in 2012.  Welch's overall performance-review score was
"good."  The performance review concluded: 
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"Store conditions have greatly improved upon every
visit to [store no.] 9090.  Cindy works very hard
and she needs to ensure all people in her store are
working as hard as she is.  Last year's shrink
results[ ] were unacceptable and Cindy has made a
3
good effort to change the current cycles trend. 
Cindy is a real team player and I look forward to
working with him [sic] more in the future."
Welch testified that district managers discussed improving
"shrinkage" with store managers at least once a year.  
On June 23, 2014, Spence sued Dolgencorp and Welch.  She
asserted claims of invasion of privacy, defamation, false
imprisonment, and negligent and wanton training.  Dolgencorp
filed its answer on October 16, 2014, denying all allegations. 
On June 15, 2015, Spence filed an amended complaint in which
she added claims asserting malicious prosecution and assault
and battery against Dolgencorp and Welch.  Dolgencorp filed
its answer to the amended complaint on July 7, 2015.  
Spence never perfected service of her complaint on Welch.
On the first day of trial, Spence moved to dismiss Welch from
the action, and the trial court granted the motion. The trial
court's written order stated simply:  "Oral Motion to Dismiss
Cindy Welch, granted."  
The term "shrink results" refers to loss of inventory as
3
a result of shoplifting.
9
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On July 21, 2015, following a two-day trial, the jury
returned a general verdict in favor of Spence and against
Dolgencorp in the amount of $100,000 in compensatory damages.4
The trial court entered a judgment on the jury's verdict the
same day.  
On August 14, 2015, Dolgencorp filed a "Renewed Motion
for Judgment as a Matter of Law Post-Judgment and Motion for
a New Trial."  On September 28, 2015, the trial court denied
Dolgencorp's motion.  Dolgencorp appealed to this Court on
October 27, 2015.
II.  Analysis
Dolgencorp first presents arguments as to why it believes
the trial court erred in failing to enter a judgment as a
matter of law ("JML") on the claims asserted by Spence.
Dolgencorp argues in the alternative that it was entitled to
a new trial.  Our conclusions regarding the arguments
Dolgencorp presents in favor of a JML pretermit the need to
discuss Dolgencorp's arguments regarding its motion for a new
trial.
Spence's wanton-training claim was not submitted to the
4
jury.
10
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A.  Did Welch's Dismissal from the Action Affect Spence's
Claims Based on the Doctrine of Respondeat Superior?
Dolgencorp first contends that, because Spence's claims
against 
Dolgencorp's 
employee, 
Welch, 
were 
dismissed,
Dolgencorp was entitled to a JML as to all of Spence's claims
against Dolgencorp based on the doctrine of respondeat
superior.  We disagree.  
This Court has held: 
"'[W]hen [a] principal and his agent are sued in [a]
joint action in tort for misfeasance or malfeasance
on the part of the servant, and his liability for
the conduct of said servant is under the rule of
respondeat superior, a verdict in favor of the
servant entitles the master to have the verdict
against him set aside.'"
Larry Terry Contractors, Inc. v. Bogle, 404 So. 2d 613, 614
(Ala. 1981) (quoting Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Maddox,
236 Ala. 594, 600, 183 So. 849, 853 (1938)).  The difficulty
with Dolgencorp's argument is that, in this case, there was no
adjudication of the merits of Spence's claims against
Dolgencorp's employee, Welch.  As noted, Spence herself moved
to dismiss her claims against Welch because she had been
unable to effect service on Welch.5
The dismissal appears to have been without prejudice.
5
Rule 41(a)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., expressly states that,
"[u]nless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under
11
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Dolgencorp concedes that it appears that Spence's claims
against Welch were dismissed without prejudice, see note 5,
supra, but it contends that "the fact that Spence voluntarily
dismissed Welch before trial, and then tried her claims
against 
Spence's 
principal, 
Dolgencorp, 
to 
a 
verdict, 
operates
as res judicata such that the dismissal of Welch necessarily
was with prejudice."  Dolgencorp fails to explain, however,
why the fact that Spence tried her direct claims against one
defendant to a conclusion somehow operates in "bootstrap"
fashion to create a "res judicata" bar of her separate claims
against another (much less how any such alleged res judicata
bar of Spence's claims against Welch could somehow, in
circular fashion, then come back to undo the very adjudication
of the claim against Dolgencorp that would be the basis of
such a res judicata bar in the first place).  Nothing in our
rules of procedure requires, under penalty of a res judicata
bar, that a plaintiff must try in the same action his or her
claims against two different defendants arising out of the
same transaction or occurrence.  
this paragraph is without prejudice." 
12
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Even if the claims against Welch had been expressly
dismissed by the trial court "with prejudice" as, for example,
a sanction for some procedural or discovery failure on
Spence's part (which they were not), there still would have
been no adjudication of the factual merits of the nature
required to undermine a claim against Welch's employer based
on the doctrine of respondeat superior.  As Spence correctly
notes, Welch obtained a judgment "because of a legal principle
related to the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure.  The effect
... is not an adjudication of the facts of Welch's misconduct
on behalf of Dolgencorp." 
Welch's dismissal did not affect Spence's ability to
pursue her separate claims against Dolgencorp based on a
theory of respondeat superior.  Under the circumstances
presented, if Spence could prove negligence on the part of a
Dolgencorp employee, then she would have a basis for recovery
against Dolgencorp on a respondeat superior theory.  The trial
court, therefore, did not err in declining to enter a JML in
favor of Dolgencorp on the basis that it had previously
dismissed Spence's claims against Dolgencorp's employee,
Welch.
13
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B.  Spence's Assault and Battery Claim
Dolgencorp contends that it cannot be held liable for
Welch's alleged assault and battery under the doctrine of
respondeat superior because there is no evidence indicating
that Welch was acting within the line and scope of her
employment when she allegedly grabbed Spence's arm and shook
it.
"The plaintiff in an action alleging assault and battery
must prove '(1) that the defendant touched the plaintiff;
(2) that the defendant intended to touch the plaintiff; and
(3) that the touching was conducted in a harmful or offensive
manner.'"  Harper v. Winston Cty., 892 So. 2d 346, 353 (Ala.
2004) (quoting Ex parte Atmore Cmty. Hosp., 719 So. 2d 1190,
1193 (Ala. 1998)).
"An 
employer 
is 
liable 
for 
the 
intentional 
torts
of its employee if:  (1) the employee's acts are
committed in furtherance of the business of the
employer; (2) the employee's acts are within the
line and scope of his employment; or (3) the
employer participated in, authorized, or ratified
the tortious acts.  Potts v. BE&K Constr. Co., 604
So. 2d 398, 400 (Ala. 1992).  This Court has stated
that tortious acts furthered an employer's business
where, for example, a defendant undertaker refused
to release the body of the plaintiff's husband until
the plaintiff had paid for services rendered, Levite
Undertakers Co. v. Griggs, 495 So. 2d 63 (Ala.
1986), and where the defendant used threatening or
14
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abusive behavior in an attempt to coerce the
plaintiff into dropping his claim, National Security
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Bowen, 447 So. 2d 133 (Ala.
1983).  In contrast, where a co-employee defendant's
behavior is aimed at 'satisfying [the co-employee's]
own lustful desires,' this Court has held that 'no
corporate purpose could conceivably be served.'
Busby [v. Truswal Sys. Corp.], 551 So. 2d [322,] 327
[(Ala. 1989)].  ...
"An employee's tortious acts occur within the
scope of his employment if the acts are 'so closely
connected with what the servant is employed to do
and so fairly and reasonably incidental to it, that
they may be regarded as methods, even though quite
improper ones, of carrying out the objectives of the
employment.'  Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts 503
(5th ed. 1984).  In Big B, Inc. v. Cottingham, 634
So. 2d 999, 1002 (Ala. 1993), this Court held that
there was sufficient evidence that a store manager
who falsely imprisoned a customer suspected of
shoplifting was acting within the scope of his
employment 
because 
preventing 
shoplifting 
was
closely related to his employment as a store
manager.  In contrast, where the store manager
forced the customer to perform a sexual act with
him, this Court has held that the manager was acting
outside the scope of his employment.  Id. at 1002;
see also Hendley v. Springhill Mem'l Hosp., 575 So.
2d 547 (Ala. 1990) (holding that a hospital is not
liable for the unauthorized sexual touching by an
agent)."
Ex parte Atmore Cmty. Hosp., 719 So. 2d at 1194.
Under Spence's version of the incident, Welch's method of
confronting Spence about Spence's alleged attempt to shoplift
store merchandise may have been improper, but Welch clearly
was carrying out an objective of her employment, i.e., she was
15
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attempting to prevent loss of inventory from the store she
managed.  Moreover, Dolgencorp had made it clear to Welch in
her 2012 performance evaluation and training reminders from
district managers that excessive shoplifting from the store
was unacceptable.  Viewed in this light, Welch's actions also
furthered Dolgencorp's business.  Welch's actions did not
involve attempting to satisfy personal desires; she was
attempting to carry out her duties as a store manager, albeit
in a manner not condoned by Dolgencorp's SOP.  Therefore,
there is evidence indicating that Welch was acting within the
line and scope of her employment and that her actions
furthered Dolgencorp's business.  Accordingly, Dolgencorp
could be held liable for Welch's alleged assault and battery,
and the trial court did not err in submitting that claim to
the jury.
C.  Spence's Negligent-Training Claim
Dolgencorp contends that Spence failed to present
substantial evidence in support of her negligent-training
claim against Dolgencorp.  Specifically, Dolgencorp contends
that Spence failed to present any evidence indicating that its
SOP for shoplifting was inadequate in any way or that
16
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Dolgencorp failed to communicate effectively its shoplifting
SOP to Welch.  Although we are inclined to agree with the
former proposition, we cannot agree with the latter. 
Spence did not contend at trial, and she does not assert
on appeal, that Dolgencorp's shoplifting SOP was 
inadequate 
or
improper.  Instead, she argues that Dolgencorp failed to
communicate its SOP effectively to Welch.  Although this Court
expresses no opinion on the merits of this argument, we cannot
say that the record is so devoid of evidence in support of it
that the trial court erred to reversal in submitting Spence's
negligent-training claim to the jury.  Welch testified that
her training occurred during "Christmastime" when "it 
was 
very
busy."  She explained her training as "do a little training
... stock a truck ... do whatever to help in the store because
it [was] December.  It was busy."  When questioned as to
whether she had ever been "trained by Dolgencorp on the proper
way to stop a shoplifter," Welch answered:  "I don't remember
-- I don't recall seeing this, no."   The record indicates
6
The reference to not having seen "this" apparently is a
6
reference to Dolgencorp's written policies.  Welch testified
that she provided an electronic signature in connection with
the video training provided by Dolgencorp; she testified that
she never saw the actual policies and procedures in print.
17
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that Welch could not recall being trained as to other aspects
of Dolgencorp's shoplifting policy, including the requirement
that the store manager write a detailed statement about the
alleged shoplifting incident and that evidence relating to
such an occurrence be sealed inside a Dolgencorp bag and
maintained pending criminal proceedings.  Welch further
testified that she was "following the number one rule of any
retail business and that is to protect the assets of the
store."  She testified that Dolgencorp never spoke with her
about her interpretation of the policies and procedures for
handling shoplifters.  She further testified that it was her
understanding that the shoplifting SOP provided "guidelines"
for store managers that she could decide to follow or not. 
Additional 
evidence 
supporting 
the 
submission 
of 
Spence's
negligent-training claim to the jury included evidence
indicating that the store manager who succeeded Welch had been
employed with Dolgencorp for a period of more than two years
but had never seen a copy of Dolgencorp's shoplifting SOP
until a few hours before his deposition.  
Again, this Court offers no comment on the ultimate
merits of the negligent-training claim.  Dolgencorp argues on
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appeal only that there was not sufficient evidence of
negligent training in the first place to have submitted the
claim to the jury.  Because we cannot agree with this
proposition, we decline to hold the trial court in error for
having done so.
D.  Spence's False-Imprisonment Claim
Dolgencorp contends that Spence failed to present
substantial evidence in support of her claim of false
imprisonment.  Dolgencorp's argument hinges on its contention
that Welch had probable cause to detain Spence after believing
she witnessed Spence conceal store merchandise in her purse.
"False imprisonment consists in the unlawful detention of
the person of another for any length of time whereby he is
deprived of his personal liberty."  § 6-5-170, Ala. Code 1975.
"A merchant, pursuant to § 15–10–14(a) and (c), [Ala. Code
1975,] is given the statutory right to detain a person if he
has probable cause for suspecting that items from his store
19
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have been unlawfully taken."   Whitlow v. Bruno's, Inc., 567
7
So. 2d 1235, 1238-39 (Ala. 1990).  
Probable cause has been defined as "'"'[a] reasonable
ground for suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief
that the person accused is guilty of the offense charged.'"'" 
Wesson v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 38 So. 3d 746, 751 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2009) (quoting Eidson v. Olin Corp., 527 So. 2d
Sections 15–10–14(a) and (c), Ala. Code 1975, provide:
7
"(a) A peace officer, a merchant or a merchant's
employee who has probable cause for believing that
goods held for sale by the merchant have been
unlawfully taken by a person and that he can recover
them by taking the person into custody may, for the
purpose of attempting to effect such recovery, take
the person into custody and detain him in a
reasonable manner for a reasonable length of time.
Such taking into custody and detention by a peace
officer, merchant or merchant's employee shall not
render such police officer, merchant, or merchant's
employee criminally or civilly liable for false
arrest, false imprisonment or unlawful detention.
"....
"(c) A merchant or a merchant's employee who
causes such arrest as provided for in subsection (a)
of this section of a person for larceny of goods
held for sale shall not be criminally or civilly
liable for false arrest or false imprisonment where
the merchant or merchant's employee has probable
cause for believing that the person arrested
committed larceny of goods held for sale."
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1283, 1285 (Ala. 1988), quoting in turn Parisian Co. v.
Williams, 203 Ala. 378, 383, 83 So. 122, 127 (1919)). 
"Alabama law requires that 'the existence of probable cause is
to be judged in light of the facts as they appeared when the
underlying action was filed.'"  Gunter v. Pemco Aeroplex,
Inc., 646 So. 2d 1332, 1334 (Ala. 1994) (quoting Fina Oil &
Chem. Co. v. Hood, 621 So. 2d 253, 257 (Ala. 1993)).  "'"The
question [of probably cause] is not whether the [falsely
imprisoned] plaintiff was guilty of the thing charged, but
whether the ... defendant acted in good faith on the
appearance of things."'"  Wesson, 38 So. 3d at 751 (quoting
Eidson, 527 So. 2d at 1285).
Dolgencorp argues that "the evidence clearly established
that Welch had probable cause to suspect Spence of shoplifting
and to call the police and report the same."  Dolgencorp notes
that Welch testified that she saw Spence place a container of
mineral oil into her open purse and thereafter drop a
container of hair spray into the purse and then zip the purse
closed.  Dolgencorp adds that Spence testified that the hair
spray was not visible in her cart because it was underneath
the purse.
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The problem with Dolgencorp's argument is that what Welch
did and did not see is in dispute.  Typically, "probable cause
is a jury question in false arrest cases."  Frison v.
Delchamps Store No. 11, 507 So. 2d 478, 480 (Ala. 1987)
(citing Bank of Cottonwood v. Hood, 227 Ala. 237, 241, 149 So.
676, 679 (1933)).  "'If the facts on the issue of probable
cause are not in dispute, whether such facts amount to
probable cause is a question of law for the courts.'" Eidson,
527 So. 2d at 1285 (quoting Hanson v. Couch, 360 So. 2d 942,
945 (Ala. 1978) (emphasis added)).
The facts here are in dispute.  Although Welch testified
that she witnessed Spence place merchandise in her purse,
Spence and Atchison testified that Spence placed the items in
her cart, that the purse was too small to hold the
merchandise, and that the zipper on the purse was broken and
the purse could not be closed.  If the testimony presented by
Spence and Atchison was believed by a jury, and/or the jury
found Welch's testimony not credible, then there would be a
basis for a finding that Welch lacked probable cause to
believe Spence was guilty of shoplifting.  Because of the
22
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conflicting evidence, the trial court did not err in allowing
Spence's false-imprisonment claim to go to the jury.
E.  Spence's Malicious-Prosecution Claim
Dolgencorp contends that Spence failed to present
substantial evidence to support her claim of malicious
prosecution.  Specifically, Dolgencorp argues that Welch had
probable cause to sign the complaint charging Spence with
theft of merchandise and that Welch lacked malicious intent in
doing so.  
"The plaintiff in a malicious prosecution case
must prove each of the following elements:  1) that
a prior judicial proceeding was instigated by the
defendant 2) without probable cause and 3) with
malice; 4) that that prior proceeding was terminated
in the plaintiff's favor; and 5) that the plaintiff
suffered damage[] as a result of that prior
proceeding."
Whitlow, 567 So. 2d at 1237.
"'In determining probable cause for the
initiation of civil proceedings, all that
is 
necessary 
is 
that 
the 
claimant
reasonably believe that there is a chance
that his claim may be held valid upon
adjudication.'
"[Boothby Realty Co. v. Haygood,] 269 Ala. [549] at
553, 114 So. 2d [555] at 558 [(1959)].  '[T]he
existence of probable cause is to be judged in light
of the facts as they appeared when the underlying
action was filed.'  Fina Oil & Chem. Co. v. Hood,
621 So. 2d 253, 257 (Ala. 1993).  '"The question is
23
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not whether the ... plaintiff [claiming malicious
prosecution] was guilty of the thing charged, but
whether the ... defendant acted in good faith on the
appearance of things."'  Eidson v. Olin Corp., 527
So. 2d 1283, 1285 (Ala. 1988) (quoting Birwood Paper
Co. v. Damsky, 285 Ala. 127, 134–35, 229 So. 2d 514,
521 (1969)) ....
"'Because 
malicious 
prosecution
actions are not favored in the law, at the
trial of the malicious prosecution action
[the plaintiff] would have a strict burden
of proving a negative -– i.e., the complete
absence of ... probable cause for [the
defendant] 
to 
bring 
the 
[underlying]
action.  [The plaintiff's] failure to prove
the absence of probable cause would result
in a judgment in favor of [the defendant]
as a matter of law.  For purposes of
summary judgment, the converse of [the
plaintiff's] burden of proof may be stated
as follows: If there are any undisputed
facts of record establishing that [the
defendant] had probable cause to bring the
former action ... against [the plaintiff],
then [the plaintiff] cannot recover for
malicious prosecution and summary judgment
is appropriate.
"'"If the facts on the issue of
probable cause are not in dispute, whether
such facts amount to probable cause is a
question of law for the courts."  Hanson v.
Couch, [360 So. 2d 942], 945 [(Ala. 1978)];
Gulf States Paper Corp. v. Hawkins, 444
So. 2d 381 (Ala. 1983).
"'The test that this Court must apply
when reviewing the lack-of-probable-cause
element in a malicious prosecution case in
which summary judgment has been granted to
a defendant is as follows:  Can one or more
24
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undisputed facts be found in the record
below 
establishing 
that 
the 
defendant 
acted
in good faith on the appearance of things
as they existed when the suit was filed,
based upon direct evidence, or upon
circumstantial 
evidence 
and 
inferences 
that
can reasonably be drawn therefrom?  If so,
then summary judgment in favor of the
defendant on the plaintiff's malicious
prosecution count would be appropriate.'
"Eidson, 527 So. 2d at 1285–86 ....
"'Malice in a malicious prosecution
action has been defined as whatever is done
willfully 
and 
purposely, 
whether 
the 
motive
is to [injure the] accused, to gain some
advantage to the prosecutor, or through
mere wantonness or carelessness, if at the
same time wrong and unlawful within the
knowledge of the actor.
"'Malice may be inferred from the want
of probable cause, or from defendant's
conduct, where such conduct will admit of
no other reasonable construction.'"
Willis v. Parker, 814 So. 2d 857, 863-64 (Ala. 2001) (quoting
Dillon v. Nix, 55 Ala. App. 611, 613–14, 318 So. 2d 308, 310
(Ala. Civ. App. 1975) (some emphasis omitted and some emphasis
added)).  
Dolgencorp emphasizes that, in an action alleging
malicious prosecution, probable cause is to be assessed from
the subjective view of the defendant.  See, e.g., Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Goodman, 789 So. 2d 166, 174 (Ala. 2000)
25
1150124
(stating that, "[i]n malicious prosecution cases, 'probable
cause' is defined as 'such a state of facts in the mind of the
prosecutor as would lead a man of ordinary caution and
prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong
suspicion that the person arrested is guilty'" (quoting
Delchamps, Inc. v. Morgan, 601 So. 2d 442, 445 (Ala. 1992)). 
Dolgencorp argues that, from her viewpoint, Welch had reason
to believe that Spence was attempting to steal merchandise
because Spence concealed the merchandise in her purse. 
Dolgencorp in particular argues that this Court's 
reasoning in
Morgan supports its position on probable cause as it relates
to the malicious-prosecution claim.
In 
Morgan, 
Lela 
Morgan 
sued 
Delchamps, 
Inc.
("Delchamps"), and a Delchamps employee, Larry Mims, alleging
malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and assault and
battery stemming from an incident in which Mims accused Morgan
of attempting to steal a package of cigarettes from a
Delchamps grocery store.  Regarding probable cause, the Court
explained:
"The question ... is not whether Morgan was in fact
guilty of the charge of shoplifting, but whether
Mims in fact saw events that would lead him to
believe that she was guilty.  S.S. Kresge Co. [v.
26
1150124
Ruby], 348 So. 2d [484] at 488 [(Ala. 1977)].  Mims
testified that on the day Morgan was arrested for
shoplifting, he saw her enter the store, pick up a
package of cigarettes from the cigarette carousel,
and walk toward the rear of the store.  He testified
that he had noticed that this was a pattern for
shoplifters.  He further testified that he then
followed Morgan and that when he was in a position
where he was facing her he saw her place the
cigarettes in the pocket of her pants and that he
had no doubt at that time that she had placed the
cigarettes in her pocket.  (R. 127.)  It is
undisputed that Morgan had a pack of Winston
cigarettes in her pants pocket, which was visible
through the fabric of her pants, while she was in
the store.  She maintained that all Mims saw was a
partial pack of cigarettes; Mims maintains that it
was 'a complete package,' a 'perfectly square box
package.'  (R. 128.)  Because the question before
the court was one of probable cause and was
therefore dependent on Mims's subjective belief,
even if Mims's belief that Morgan had a complete
pack of cigarettes in her pocket was subsequently
shown to be incorrect, the question should not have
been submitted to the jury.  The fact that Morgan
was acquitted of the charge does not prove that
Delchamps lacked probable cause to arrest her.
Piggly Wiggly Alabama Co. v. Rickles, 212 Ala. 585,
103 So. 860 (1925). 
"....
"Because Morgan undisputedly had a visible pack
of cigarettes in her pocket, Mims could have
entertained 'an honest and strong suspicion' that
she had concealed store property. Therefore, the
malicious prosecution count should not have been
submitted to the jury."
Morgan, 601 So. 2d at 445 (emphasis added).
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1150124
Dolgencorp argues that, just as it did not matter in
Morgan for purposes of evaluating probable cause that Mims
might have been mistaken that Morgan had stolen a package of
cigarettes, in this case the fact that Welch may have been
mistaken as to whether Spence actually was attempting to steal
the mineral oil and hair spray is not the issue.  The issue is
whether Welch's subjective belief that Spence was attempting
to steal the items of merchandise was reasonable under the
circumstances.  Dolgencorp contends that it was.
The difficulty with the comparison to Morgan, however, is
that it was undisputed that Morgan had a package of cigarettes
in her pocket.  It is not undisputed in this case that Spence
had the mineral oil and the hair spray in her purse.  The
Morgan Court is clear, as was the Court in Willis and the
cases cited therein, that the element of probable cause in a
malicious-prosecution 
claim 
is 
only 
a 
matter 
for 
determination
by the court if the facts in consequence are undisputed. That
simply is not the case here.  
The element of malice is another matter.  Dolgencorp
notes that it is undisputed that Welch and Spence did not know
each other before their encounter.  Spence introduced no
28
1150124
evidence indicating that Welch acted out of ill will or a
desire for revenge or that she was trying to gain some kind of
advantage over Spence.  The evidence simply indicated that
Welch believed Spence was attempting to steal 
merchandise 
from
the store, and that is the reason she signed the complaint
against Spence.  
Spence essentially concedes that she did not introduce
any evidence of personal ill will or a desire for revenge on
Welch's part, but she argues that she did not have to.  She
cites Delchamps, Inc. v. Larry, 613 So. 2d 1235, 1239 (Ala.
1992), for the proposition that "[m]alice is an inference of
fact and may be inferred from the lack of probable cause or
from mere wantonness or carelessness."  Spence contends that
Welch was careless and that she should have made further
inquiry before prosecuting Spence because Spence had told
Welch she planned to pay for everything, she had showed Welch
the two items of merchandise, she had said she was not done
shopping, and Welch did not follow the Dolgencorp shoplifting
SOP by offering Spence the opportunity to pay for the items.
Spence's position is equivalent to arguing that Welch's
failure to follow Dolgencorp's SOP amounted to malice.  This
29
1150124
Court clarified in cases subsequent to Larry, however, that
carelessness is evidence of malice only "'if at the same time
[the act is] wrong and unlawful within the knowledge of the
actor.'"  Willis, 814 So. 2d at 863-64 (quoting Dillon v. Nix,
55 Ala. App. 611, 613–14, 318 So. 2d 308, 310 (Ala. Civ. App.
1975) (emphasis omitted)).  See also Goodman, 789 So. 2d at
174 (stating that "[m]alice is an inference of fact, and it
may be inferred from a lack of probable cause or from mere
wantonness or carelessness if the actor, when doing the act,
knows it to be wrong or unlawful" (emphasis added)).  And as
this Court held in Willis:  "'[M]alice may be inferred from
the want of probable cause, or from defendant's conduct, where
such conduct will admit of no other 
reasonable 
construction.'"
814 So. 2d at 864.  Based on the record presented, we cannot
conclude that Spence presented evidence sufficient to support
a finding of malice on Welch's part.  We conclude, therefore,
that  the trial court erred in submitting Spence's malicious-
prosecution claim to the jury.  
F.  Spence's Defamation Claim
Dolgencorp contends that Spence failed to present
substantial evidence to support her defamation claim.
30
1150124
Specifically, 
Dolgencorp 
states 
that 
Spence's 
defamation 
claim
is based on Welch's report to the police of the suspected
theft. Dolgencorp argues that Welch was entitled to a
qualified privilege under § 13A-11-161, Ala. Code 1975, for
reporting the suspected theft.  Under this privilege, Spence
had to present evidence of "actual malice" on Welch's part to
sustain the defamation claim.  Dolgencorp contends that there
is no evidence of "actual malice."  
"'The elements of a cause of action
for defamation are: 1) a false and
defamatory 
statement 
concerning 
the
plaintiff; 
2) 
an 
unprivileged 
communication
of that statement to a third party;
3) fault amounting at least to negligence
on the part of the defendant; and 4) either
actionability 
of 
the 
statement 
irrespective
of special harm or the existence of special
harm caused by the publication of the
statement.'"  
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Smitherman, 872 So. 2d 833, 840 (Ala.
2003) (quoting McCaig v. Talladega Publ'g Co., 544 So. 2d 875,
877 (Ala. 1989)).  Section 13A-11-161 provides, in pertinent
part:  "The publication of a fair and impartial report ... of
any charge of crime made to any judicial officer or body ...
shall be privileged, unless it be proved that the same was
published with actual malice."  This Court has explained:
31
1150124
"Actual malice as used in this statute refers to the
common law standard of malice rather than the
constitutional standard of malice as set out in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct.
710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964).  In Alabama, where a
communication 
concerning 
a 
private 
person 
is
protected by a qualified or conditional privilege,[8]
such a person cannot recover in a defamation action
unless that person can show that the communication
was made with actual or common law malice (shown by
evidence of previous ill will, hostility, threats,
other actions, former libels or slanders, and the
like, emanating from the defendant, or by the
violence of the defendant's language, the mode and
extent of the publication, and the like)."
Wilson v. Birmingham Post Co., 482 So. 2d 1209, 1213 (Ala.
1986).
"Ordinarily, '[t]he determination of whether a statement
is privileged is a question of law for the trial judge.'"
Wiggins v. Mallard, 905 So. 2d 776, 783 (Ala. 2004) (quoting
Atkins Ford Sales, Inc. v. Royster, 560 So. 2d 197, 200 (Ala.
1990)).  The Court has also observed, however, that "the
In Ex parte Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, 773
8
So. 2d 475, 477-78 (Ala. 2000), this Court stated that it
would
"henceforth use the term qualified privilege,
because, as we discuss and hold, the defense is not
subject to any condition but is simply subject to
the qualification, or limitation, that it suffices
against only claims for innocent or mistaken
defamation and not against claims for defamation
committed with actual malice."
32
1150124
determination of malice in defamation cases is particularly
within the province of the jury."  Cousins v. T.G. & Y. Stores
Co., 514 So. 2d 904, 906 (Ala. 1987).
Spence appears to concede that the qualified privilege
applies in this case, and indeed this Court previously has
applied it to situations in which store employees have
reported 
suspected 
shoplifters 
to 
law-enforcement 
authorities.
See, e.g., Cousins, supra; Tidwell v. Winn-Dixie, Inc., 502
So. 2d 747 (Ala. 1987).  Spence argues, however, that she did
introduce evidence of actual malice.  
Spence notes that Welch did not watch video surveillance
of the incident and did not allow Spence to pay for the items
as Dolgencorp's shoplifting SOP instructs.  In her argument
regarding her malicious-prosecution claim, Spence suggested
that those decisions by Welch were careless.  Now she suggests
that they demonstrate that Welch knew that her shoplifting
accusation was false.  Spence speculates that the reason Welch
persisted in her accusation despite knowing it was false was
that "ill will and hostility were actually at work." 
Importantly, however, Spence provides no basis for the
existence of such ill will.
33
1150124
Conversely, there is ample evidence indicating that the
reason Welch did not "investigate further" is that she
believed she had witnessed Spence's attempt to steal the
merchandise.  Welch repeatedly stated as much in her
testimony.  Welch testified:  "When she got to the aisle with
the hair spray, I was standing at the end of the aisle.  As
she was putting it in her purse and zipping it, I was right
over her shoulder looking.  I saw her put it in her purse and
zip her purse."  Again, Welch testified:  "I saw the items go
in her purse and the purse be [sic] zipped."  Yet again, when
Spence's counsel asked Welch how she knew that the items were
in Spence's purse, she testified:  "Because I saw her put them
in and zip the purse."
The record does not contain substantial evidence of
actual malice on Welch's part.  Therefore, the trial court
erred in submitting Spence's defamation claim to the jury.
G.  Good Count/Bad Count
"In the present case, the jury returned a
general verdict, without indicating which of the
various claims it based its verdict upon.  This
Court cannot presume that the verdict was based
solely upon the 'good' counts, i.e., the claims that
are supported by the evidence.  The jury could have
based 
its 
verdict, 
awarding 
compensatory 
and
punitive damages, solely upon the 'bad' counts,
34
1150124
i.e., the claims that are not supported by the
evidence. For this reason, we have no alternative
but to order a new trial."
Cook's Pest Control, Inc. v. Rebar, 28 So. 3d 716, 729 (Ala.
2009).
As in Rebar, the jury in this case returned a general
verdict without indicating which of Spence's various 
claims 
it
was returning the verdict upon.  We have determined that the
malicious-prosecution and defamation claims were improperly
submitted to the jury.  Therefore, we have in this appeal a
"good-count/bad-count" situation.  Dolgencorp submitted a
motion for a JML specifically directed to the various claims;
that motion was denied.  We cannot assume that the verdict was
based only on those of Spence's claims that were properly
submitted to the jury.  Accordingly, the judgment based on the
jury verdict for Spence must be reversed; we remand this case
for a new trial on Spence's claims that were properly
submitted to the jury, i.e., negligent training, invasion of
privacy, false imprisonment, and assault and battery.  See
e.g., Rebar, supra; Alfa Life Ins. Corp. v. Jackson, 906
So. 2d 143, 146 (Ala. 2005); and Waddell & Reed, Inc. v.
35
1150124
United Inv'rs Life Ins. Co., 875 So. 2d 1143, 1165-66 (Ala.
2003).
III.  Conclusion
We reverse the judgment for Spence and remand the case to
the trial court for the entry of a JML in favor of Dolgencorp
on Spence's claims of malicious prosecution and 
defamation 
and
for a new trial on Spence's remaining claims of negligent
training, 
invasion 
of 
privacy, 
false 
imprisonment, 
and 
assault
and battery.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Stuart, Bolin, Main, and Bryan, JJ., concur.
36