Title: Lorusso v. Members Mut. Ins. Co.

State: texas

Issuer: Texas Supreme Court

Document:

603 S.W.2d 818 (1980) Consuelo Serna LORUSSO, Petitioner, v. MEMBERS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Respondents. No. B-8503. Supreme Court of Texas. July 30, 1980. Ben A. Endlich and Bruce J. Ponder, El Paso, for petitioner. Scott, Hulse, Marshall & Feuille, Stephen B. Tatem, Jr., Phillip Bowen, El Paso, for respondents. *819 BARROW, Justice. Consuelo Serna Lorusso sued respondents, Armando Valdez, Jr. and Members Mutual Insurance Company, to recover damages for personal injuries sustained in a collision between her car and a car operated by Valdez. The Lorusso car was insured by Members Mutual for liability insurance including uninsured motorist coverage and it was alleged by Lorusso that Valdez was uninsured. Members Mutual filed a third-party action against Valdez for indemnity. The trial court, over objection by Lorusso, allowed Valdez and Members Mutual six peremptory challenges each. A take-nothing judgment was rendered on the jury verdict which found that the percentage of negligence proximately causing the occurrence was Lorusso 80 percent and Valdez 20 percent. See Article 2212a, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Ann. The court of civil appeals held that the trial court erred in granting the defendants twelve peremptory challenges because no antagonism existed between these two defendants in a matter that would concern the jury. However, that court, with one justice dissenting, held that the record did not show that this error caused or probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment as required for a reversal under Rule 434.[1] The trial court judgment was accordingly affirmed. 580 S.W.2d 72. The questions before us are: (1) whether the harmless error rule applies to this asserted error and, if so; (2) whether the error complained of amounted to such a denial of the rights of Lorusso as was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment in the case so as to authorize a reversal by the court of civil appeals under Rule 434 and by this Court under Rule 503. In answering these questions we assume, without deciding, that the court of civil appeals correctly held that the trial court erred in granting six peremptory strikes each to Valdez and Members Mutual.[2] We hold that the harmless error rule applies to the error in granting defendants six peremptory challenges each. We agree with the holding of the court of civil appeals that Lorusso did not meet the burden required for a reversal under Rule 434 and Rule 503. We therefore affirm the judgment of that court. Rule 503, which was adopted by this Court in 1941, and remains as a viable part of our Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in part: The obvious purpose of this rule was to abolish the then existing rule of presumed prejudice whereby the prevailing party had the burden of proving that the complaining party was not prejudiced by the error. See Calvert and Perin, Is the Castle Crumbling? Harmless Error Revisited, 20 S.Tex.L.J. 1 (1979); Calvert, The Development of the Doctrine of Harmless Error in Texas, 31 Tex.L.Rev. 1 (1952). The language of the rule is clear and direct. The rule recognizes that a litigant is not entitled to a perfect trial for, indeed, few trials are perfect. In recognition of this fact, the harmless error rule establishes a sound and common sense policy of not *820 reversing a judgment unless the error or errors can be said to have contributed in a substantial way to bring about the adverse judgment. See King v. Skelly, 452 S.W.2d 691, 696 (Tex.1970). The rule by its very terms applies to all errors in that it draws no distinction as to the type of errors involved in its requirement for reversal. Furthermore, we have specifically held that Rule 503 applies to errors in the granting of the number of peremptory challenges. In Retail Credit Company v. Hyman, 316 S.W.2d 769 (Tex.Civ.App. Houston 1958, writ ref'd), it was held that if the court erred in denying each of the two complaining defendants six peremptory challenges, such error would be held harmless unless the appellants proved to the reviewing court that the error was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment as required by Rule 434. It was further held that to determine whether any error caused the rendition of an improper judgment, the reviewing court must look to the whole record of the trial. This application of the harmless error rule was expressly approved by this Court in Tamburello v. Welch, 392 S.W.2d 114 (Tex.1965), where it was held that the trial court erroneously required the two defendants to share six strikes. After pointing out that Rules 434 and 503 provide that no judgment shall be reversed and a new trial ordered for an error of law committed in the court of the trial unless the appellate court is of the opinion that the error was reasonably calculated to and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment, we said: We then held that the burden of the complaining party to establish reversible error under Rule 503 would be met by showing that the trial was "materially unfair." This was done under the record in that case by demonstrating that the evidence in the case was sharply conflicting. Tamburello involved a pure swearing match between the two drivers without any corroborating physical facts for either witness. We held that under these circumstances, the granting of only three jury strikes to a party resulted in a materially unfair trial. In Perkins v. Freeman, 518 S.W.2d 532 (Tex.1974), we held that where the trial court had erroneously granted the defendant-father six peremptory challenges and the intervenors-paternal grandparents six peremptory challenges while the plaintiff-mother had only six strikes in her child custody case, this error was calculated to cause the trial to be materially unfair. The judgment was accordingly reversed and remanded under the Tamburello test. The Court did not expressly discuss the harmless error test which was approved in Tamburello. Nevertheless, it is apparent that, as pointed out by Perkins, the record there clearly satisfied the test required under Rule 503. The 1,374 page statement of facts was before the Court and demonstrated that this was a bitterly contested child custody case in which twenty-six witnesses testified, and their testimony sharply conflicted, regarding the best interest of the little girl in question. In this situation, it was materially unfair to give one party six strikes and the two aligned parties twelve strikes. The Tamburello test was recently applied in Patterson Dental Co. v. Dunn, 592 S.W.2d 914 (Tex.1979). We held that the trial court erred under Article 2151a, Tex. Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann., in giving each of the four defendants six peremptory challenges while the plaintiff was given only six challenges. We expressly recognized the Tamburello requirement that the complaining party show that the trial which resulted in the judgment against him was "materially unfair." In considering how this is met, we said: Although there was no statement of facts in the record, we said that it was abundantly clear from other parts of the record that the trial was hotly contested. We then held that in these circumstances, a disparity of strikes between sides of as much as four-to-one resulted in a materially unfair trial as a matter of law. In Dunn, we cited with approval Roy L. Martin & Associates, Limited v. Renfro, 483 S.W.2d 845 (Tex.Civ.App. San Antonio 1972, writ ref'd n. r. e.), where the court applied the harmless error test to determine that the trial court's error in granting excessive peremptory challenges required a remand. We conclude that the harmless error rule applies in determining whether the error of the trial court in giving each of the two defendants six peremptory challenges was such as to require a reversal of the take-nothing judgment. We turn now to the question of whether the record before us meets this test. We recognize the impossibility of prescribing a specific test for determining whether any error, be it the improper admission or exclusion of evidence, improper argument, or the giving or depriving of a party of the proper number of peremptory challenges, "was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment." Such a determination necessarily is a judgment call entrusted to the sound discretion and good senses of the reviewing court. It is clear, however, that such a judgment call must be determined from an evaluation of the whole case. Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Reese, 584 S.W.2d 835 (Tex.1979). In any event, there is nothing in the clear language of Rule 503 which would justify a return to the expressly discarded doctrine of "presumed harm." A test which would require the prevailing party to demonstrate that harm did not result from an error is nothing more than application of the presumed harm doctrine. To apply such a test would require repeal, or at least amendment, of Rule 503. This has not been done directly and should not be done by implication. A statement of facts in the traditional sense was not brought forward by Lorusso, the complaining party. All that was filed was a partial statement of facts which shows that Lorusso objected to the trial court's action in permitting each of the two defendants six peremptory challenges. It contains none of the testimony given at the trial. Thus, all we know about the cause of the collision is shown by the pleadings. According to the allegations in Lorusso's petition, the collision occurred when she attempted a left turn in front of the on-coming Valdez vehicle. The jury verdict is in the transcript and from it we learn the following: All twelve jurors found that in attempting to turn left when the Valdez vehicle was an immediate hazard, Lorusso had failed to yield the right-of-way and that she had failed to keep a proper lookout on the occasion in question. Eleven jurors, with one abstaining, found that she failed to make proper application of her brakes. Each of these negligent acts was found to be a proximate cause. All jurors refused to find that Valdez had kept an improper lookout, but eleven found that he was driving at a negligent rate of speed. The jurors unanimously *822 found that Lorusso had not sustained any damages as a result of the alleged injuries. There is nothing in the pleadings or verdict of the jury to indicate that the case was "sharply contested" on either liability or damages. The record here does not show how the parties exercised their challenges, i. e., whether all were exercised, or whether there were double strikes. A photostat copy of what purports to be a "List of Jurors" with "Plaintiff's Strikes" indicated thereon is in the transcript. This copy shows a list of 30 names, six of which are drawn through, and eleven are numbered. A check of these names with the jurors who signed the verdict indicates that these eleven served on the jury, although where the twelfth juror came from is not shown. It is significant that the six challenges purportedly made by Lorusso were all made in the first twenty-four names. Also, it is seen that ten jurors were selected from the first twenty-four names. See Rule 292. It cannot properly be said that this jury list demonstrates that Lorusso was harmed by the trial court's error in permitting each of the two defendants six peremptory challenges. We conclude from the limited record brought forward that Lorusso failed to establish that the error in the number of peremptory challenges granted defendant resulted in a "materially unfair" trial so as to require a reversal under Rule 503. We affirm the judgment of the court of civil appeals. Dissenting opinion by STEAKLEY, J., in which DENTON, CAMPBELL and SPEARS, JJ., join. STEAKLEY, Justice, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. Consuelo Serna Lorusso sued Armando Valdez, Jr., for personal injuries resulting from an automobile accident. She joined her insurance carrier, Members Mutual, alleging that Valdez was uninsured and thus, as to this, invoked her policy coverage. Members Mutual filed a third party action against Valdez for indemnity. Before selection of the jury, Lorusso, who was allowed six peremptory jury challenges, objected to the allowance by the trial court of six peremptory challenges each to Valdez and Members Mutual, the two parties aligned on the opposing side. The following extract from the trial of the cause was brought forward: There is included in the transcript a list of thirty jurors. The names of six jurors on the list are marked through; whether they were dismissed on the basis of a challenge for cause, or were subject to the exercise of a peremptory challenge by one or more of the parties, cannot be determined. The list also indicates eleven jurors who were selected. The verdict, however, is signed by twelve jurors; the name of one of the twelve does not appear on the list of jurors. Upon trial the jury found that both Lorusso and Valdez were negligent in certain respects and apportioned the percentage of negligence that proximately caused the occurrence 80% to Lorusso and 20% to Valdez. The jury also answered "None" to the issue inquiring if Lorusso suffered any injuries or damages. Based on the jury verdict, the trial court rendered a take-nothing judgment against Lorusso. I agree with the writing and determination by the Court of Civil Appeals in both the majority and dissenting opinions that no antagonism existed between Valdez and Members Mutual with respect to a question the jury would decide, and that the allowance of six strikes each to them was error. The question upon which the Court of Civil Appeals divided, and upon which we granted writ of error, is whether under the appellate record, and as required by Rule 503, Tex.R.Civ.P., "the error ... amounted to such a denial of the rights of [Lorusso] as was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment in the case." The Court of Civil Appeals ruled that it did not. 580 S.W.2d 72. We have written in the two contexts in which the problem of allocating peremptory strikes arises, i. e., where there is antagonism between litigants on the same side of the docket, see Patterson Dental Company v. Dunn, 592 S.W.2d 914 (Tex.1980) and Tamburello v. Welch, 392 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. 1965); and where, as here, there is no antagonism, see Perkins v. Freeman, 518 S.W.2d 532 (Tex.1974). In Perkins we wrote: Id. at 534. It is to be noted that the record in Perkins v. Freeman included a statement of facts upon a review of which the Court of Civil Appeals did not find that the error in the award of peremptory challenges probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. Cited was Rule 434. However, no reference was made to the statement of facts in the opinion of this Court reversing the judgments of the trial court and of the Court of Civil Appeals, and remanding the cause for a new trial. In stating the threshold question in Patterson Dental Company v. Dunn, i. e., whether there was antagonism on the same side, we commented, "Where no antagonism exists, each side must receive the same number of strikes." Cited were Perkins v. Freeman, and intermediate court decisions to the same effect. Referring to Tamburello, we wrote: 592 S.W.2d 914 at 921. In Tamburello, we commented that the harmless error rule undoubtedly applies where a party is denied the number of peremptory challenges to which he is entitled; we recognized, however, that an appellant will usually be unable to show that an improper judgment probably resulted from an error of this nature. We also noted that the parties not given the challenges to which they were entitled made no attempt to give their reasons for wishing to challenge three of the jurors who served on the case, and did not offer any proof indicating that the individuals named by them were biased, prejudiced, or failed to render an impartial verdict. Finally, we said that the proper approach to the question of harm is whether the denial of jury challenges to which the party is entitled resulted in a materially unfair trial; and we held that it did. Perkins v. Freeman then followed by saying in the non-antagonism context that an award of excess peremptory challenges results in an unequal advantage so materially unfair as to require a reversal of the judgment. So we reach the present case. From the record, including unchallenged statements in the briefs of the parties, see Rules 419 and 496, we can determine the following: Among other things, the jury found that Lorusso failed to keep a lookout; that she failed to make a proper application of the brakes of her vehicle; that she began to turn left when the vehicle driven by Valdez was within the intersection or approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard. As previously noted, the jury assessed 80% of the negligence to Lorusso and 20% to Valdez. Contrariwise, we cannot determine how the parties exercised their challenges, i. e., whether all were exercised, or whether there were double strikes. Nor can we determine if there were any challenges for cause or, if so, by whom and whether sustained or denied. The inference can perhaps be fairly drawn that Valdez and Members Mutual used their strikes from these statements by the parties. Lorusso in her application for writ of error argued: There was no challenge to the assertion that Valdez and Members Mutual utilized "twice as many strikes" beyond the following in the answer of Valdez and Members Mutual to the application for writ: Since we do not have a complete state of facts, we do not know the factual circumstances surrounding the occurrence in question; and we cannot evaluate the evidence favorable or unfavorable to the respective parties. Nor can we determine if Lorusso suffered injuries or damages contrary to the jury finding that she did not. It is the burden of an appealing party claiming reversible error in the award of peremptory challenges to bring forward a record sufficiently complete to demonstrate that the error probably resulted in a materially unfair trial. This conclusion should not be presumed from the fact of the error, standing alone, and necessarily must be determined in the light of the record available to the appellate court. This does not mean that a complete statement of facts is prerequisite in all instances. In Patterson v. Dunn, supra, we ruled that a disparity of strikes of as much as 4-to-1 results in a materially unfair trial as a matter of law. We did so in the absence of a statement of facts demonstrating that the non-complaining party would otherwise have been entitled to a judgment or that the case was not seriously disputed on its facts. The 2-to-1 disparity here where there was no antagonism presents the same situation of harm to Lorusso that was recognized in Dunn, the plaintiff, in Patterson v. Dunn. Consistent with Patterson v. Dunn and Perkins v. Freeman, I would hold under the record here that the allowance by the trial court of six peremptory challenges each to Valdez and Members Mutual who were non-antagonistic parties on the defensive side of the docket, while allowing Lorusso, the plaintiff, only six peremptory challenges, resulted in a materially unfair trial requiring a reversal of the judgments below, and a remand of the cause for another trial. DENTON, CAMPBELL and SPEARS, JJ., join in this dissent. [1] All references to rules are to Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. [2] Members Mutual was aligned with Valdez insofar as both desired a jury finding that Lorusso's own negligence was the cause of the collision. However, Members Mutual was aligned with Lorusso insofar as both sought to show that Valdez's negligence was a proximate cause of the collision. [3] Rule 434, which applies to a review by the court of civil appeals, contains the same language. [1] The references are to Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.