Title: Wilson v. Board of Education of Brandywine School District

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
TANISHA WILSON, 
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 277, 2010 
 
Appellant Below- 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
v. 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
 
 
§ 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 
§ 
C.A. No. 09A-10-010 
THE BRANDYWINE SCHOOL 
§ 
DISTRICT and BRANDYWINE 
§ 
 
SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
§ 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Appellees Below- 
§ 
 
Appellees. 
§ 
 
Submitted:  August 27, 2010 
   Decided:  September 13, 2010 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
This 13th day of September 2010, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
Appellant Tanisha Wilson appeals the Superior Court’s judgment 
affirming the decision of the Brandywine School District Board of Education (the 
“Board”) to terminate Wilson’s employment as a teacher on the grounds of neglect 
of duty and willful and persistent insubordination.  Wilson raises two arguments on 
appeal.  First, Wilson contends that the Board’s decision was not supported by 
substantial evidence.  Second, Wilson contends that the Board erred as a matter of 
law in accepting the hearing officer’s recommendation to terminate Wilson’s 
 2
employment when the hearing officer did not articulate a legal standard for neglect 
of duty.  We find no merit to Wilson’s arguments and affirm. 
(2) 
The Brandywine School District employed Wilson from 2003 to 2009 
as a tenured elementary school teacher at Forwood Elementary School 
(“Forwood”).  Because Wilson performed poorly in the areas of organization, 
management, and teacher-student interaction, Wilson was placed on a formal 
improvement plan in 2006. 
(3) 
On January 13, 2009, Enid Holly VanSuch (“VanSuch”), the principal 
of Forwood, began a formal evaluation of Wilson.  After VanSuch evaluated 
Wilson, she recommended that another improvement plan be implemented to 
address Wilson’s performance.  VanSuch completed a Formative Feedback Form 
containing the results of her evaluation.  VanSuch repeatedly asked Wilson to sign 
and return the form, as required by the Delaware Performance Appraisal System 
(“DPAS II”).  After initially failing to respond to VanSuch’s requests, Wilson 
finally confronted VanSuch at her office.  Wilson shouted at VanSuch and 
indicated that she would not cooperate with her. 
(4) 
VanSuch and Wilson ultimately developed a new individual 
improvement plan, which contained various goals and deadlines.  Wilson failed to 
meet the deadlines on at least eight occasions, failed to complete tasks required by 
the plan, and disregarded at least one meeting.  After observing Wilson in the 
 3
classroom, VanSuch completed another Formative Feedback Form.  Although 
DPAS II required Wilson to sign and return the form within five days, Wilson did 
not return it for almost one month, even after VanSuch repeatedly requested it. 
(5) 
By letter dated April 23, 2009, VanSuch informed Wilson that she 
would recommend to the Board that Wilson’s employment be terminated based on 
Wilson’s neglect of duty arising from her failure to sign and return the Formative 
Feedback Form and Wilson’s willful and persistent insubordination due to her 
noncompliance with deadlines and documentation requests required by the 
improvement plan. 
(6) 
On May 11, 2009, the Board approved VanSuch’s recommendation to 
terminate Wilson’s employment.  At Wilson’s request, an evidentiary hearing was 
held before an impartial hearing officer.  The hearing officer found that the 
termination for neglect of duty and willful and persistent insubordination was 
justified.  The hearing officer also found that Wilson’s failure to comply with the 
improvement plan constituted neglect of duty and that Wilson’s actions toward 
VanSuch constituted willful and persistent insubordination.  The hearing officer 
also found that Wilson’s refusal to sign and return the Formative Feedback Form 
was evidence of either neglect of duty or willful and persistent insubordination.  
The Board accepted the hearing officer’s report and recommendation to terminate 
Wilson’s employment.  Wilson appealed her termination to the Superior Court.  
 4
The Superior Court concluded that the Board’s decision was supported by 
substantial evidence and affirmed.  This appeal followed. 
(7) 
When reviewing a decision of the Board, 14 Del. C. § 1414 provides 
that “[t]he Court shall decide all relevant questions of law and all other matters 
involved, and shall sustain any board action, findings and conclusions supported by 
substantial evidence.”  This Court has defined substantial evidence as “such 
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion.”1  This Court has explained that Board findings should be set aside 
only if “the record clearly contains no substantial evidence supporting findings of 
the Board.”2  We review errors of law de novo.3 
(8) 
Wilson contends that the Board’s decision was not supported by 
substantial evidence.  The record supports the Board’s decision.  Specifically, there 
was substantial evidence in the record showing that Wilson failed to sign and 
return the Formative Feedback Forms in a timely manner, Wilson failed to actively 
participate in her improvement plan, and Wilson failed to comply with the 
requirements of her improvement plan.  Wilson has failed to show that “the record 
clearly contains no substantial evidence” supporting the Board’s finding.4   
                                          
 
1 Person-Gaines v. Pepco Holdings, Inc., 981 A.2d 1159, 1161 (Del. 2009) (quoting Olney v. 
Cooch, 425 A.2d 610, 614 (Del. 1981)); Bd. of Educ., Laurel Special Sch. Dist. v. Shockley, 155 
A.2d 323, 327 (Del. 1959). 
2 Shockley, 155 A.2d at 327. 
3 Chubb v. State, 961 A.2d 530, 535 (Del. 2008). 
4 See Shockley, 155 A.2d at 327. 
 5
(9) 
Wilson also contends that the Board erred as a matter of law in 
accepting the hearing officer’s recommendation to terminate Wilson when the 
hearing officer did not articulate a legal standard for neglect of duty.  Although it is 
preferable for the legal standard to be stated, “it is enough if the record . . . includes 
a ‘fair statement of the conclusions of the Board,’ as well as ‘the facts material to 
show the grounds for those conclusions.’”5 This Court has defined neglect of duty 
to mean “the failure to do something that is required to be done in connection with 
a person’s employment.”6 
(10) Here, the hearing officer’s report adopted by the Board contains a fair 
statement of the facts material to show the grounds for concluding that Wilson’s 
conduct amounted to neglect of duty and insubordination.7  We find that the 
Board’s findings and conclusions are supported by substantial evidence and free of 
legal error.  Accordingly, the judgment of the Superior Court upholding the 
decision of the Board must be affirmed. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                          
 
5 Conway & Conway v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 1998 WL 283393, *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 20, 
1998) (quoting Searles v. Darling, 83 A.2d 96, 98 (Del. 1951)). 
6 Mack v. Kent County Vocational Tech. Sch. Dist., 1987 WL 11466, *1 (Del. May 20, 1987). 
7 See id.