Title: Raleigh Avenue Beach Association v. Atlantic Beach Club, Inc.,et al.

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Atlantis holds title to beach property that is located in the Diamond Beach neighborhood, a residential area of approximately three blocks by nine blocks. The area contains the only beach in Lower Township facing the Atlantic Ocean. The Atlantis property extends to the mean high water line from a bulkhead running north/south along the western boundary of the property. The distance from the bulkhead to the mean high water line is about 342 feet. Persons using the beach for recreational purposes cross over the bulkhead by walking on a boardwalk pathway that traverses the dunes and curves southward to the beach. The pathway was approved by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) in a 1986 permit issued pursuant to the Coastal Area Facility Review Act (CAFRA). The dry sand beach area lies beyond the dunes and extends to the mean high water line. La Vida del Mar Condominiums (La Vida) is a four-story, twenty-four-unit building which stands immediately to the west of the bulkhead along the western boundary of the Atlantis property. Other residential complexes sit to the south and west of La Vida. Seapointe Village is located to the north of La Vida and includes a six-story hotel and more than five hundred residential units. Seapointe occupies the beach property to the north of the Atlantis beach. As a condition of its CAFRA permit, issued to Seapointe when the development was constructed, the Seapointe beach was open to the public. Seapointe sells daily, weekly, and seasonal beach passes at rates approved by the DEP. Public access through Seapointe s beach along the water s edge is free-of-charge. The United States Coast Guard owns the property to the south of the Atlantis beach. That property is closed to the public from April 1 through August 15. Until 1996, the beach on the Atlantis property was open to the public free-of-charge. Access was required by the La Vida CAFRA permit issue when La Vida was constructed. In the summer of 1996, Atlantis established a private beach club which then began to limit public access to its beach by charging substantial fees. In June 2002, Tony Labrosciano was issued a summons for trespassing when he attempted to leave the wet sand area and walk across the Atlantis beach property to his home. In July 2002, Atlantis filed an Order to Show Cause and Verified Complaint seeking an injunction to restrain Labrosciano and others from accessing the Atlantis property and a judicial declaration that Atlantis is not required to provide the public with access to or use of any portion of its property or the adjacent ocean. The Raleigh Avenue Beach Association, which consists of residents of the Diamond Beach neighborhood, filed a complaint against Atlantis, the State of New Jersey and others. The Association claimed that Atlantis was in violation of the public trust doctrine. The Association sought free public access through the Atlantis property to the beach and access to a sufficient amount of dry sand above the mean high water line to permit the public to enjoy the beach and beach-related activities. The Association s action was subsequently consolidated with the Atlantis action. In September 2003, the trial court held that the public was entitled to a right of horizontal access to the ocean by means of a three-foot-wide strip of dry sand and to limited vertical access to the ocean by way of the path from the bulkhead through the dunes on the property. The court stated that the public trust doctrine did not apply to permit the DEP to regulate the use of the beach area. Atlantis was prohibited from charging a fee or otherwise restricting the right of the public to horizontal or vertical ocean access. The State and the Association appealed. The Appellate Division held that Atlantis could not limit vertical or horizontal public access to its dry sand beach area nor interfere with the public s right to free use of the dry sand for intermittent recreational purposes. Atlantis could charge a fee to members of the public who used its beach for an extended period of time. The opinion also held that Atlantis is required to provide customary lifeguard services for the public. The appellate panel remanded to the DEP the issue of the appropriate fee to be charged for beach use. On remand, Atlantis submitted an application and the DEP issued an interim beach badge schedule setting fees at $3 per day, $15 per week, $40 per month, and $55 per season. This Court granted Atlantis petition for certification. HELD: On application of the factors in Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass n to the circumstances of this case, the Atlantis upland sands must be available for use by the general public under the public trust doctrine; the broad scope of the DEP s authority includes jurisdiction to review fees proposed by Atlantis for use of its beach; the decision of the Appellate Division is affirmed. The law we are asked to interpret in this case the public trust doctrine derives from the English common law principle that all of the land covered by tidal waters belongs to the sovereign held in trust for the people to use. In 1984, in Matthews, this Court clearly articulated the concept already implicit in our case law, that reasonable access to the sea is integral to the public trust doctrine. That leaves the question raised in this case: whether use of the dry sand ancillary to use of the ocean for recreation purposes is also implicit in the rights that belong to the public under the doctrine. Matthews states unequivocally that a bather s right in the upland sands is not limited to passage and that reasonable enjoyment of the foreshore and the sea cannot be realized unless some enjoyment of the dry sand area is also allowed. It follows, then, that use of the dry sand has long been a correlate to use of the ocean and is a component part of the rights associated with the public trust doctrine. (pp. 17-20) Matthews established the framework for application of the public trust doctrine to privately-owned upland sand beaches. The Matthews approach begins with the general principle that public use of the upland sands is subject to an accommodation of the interests of the owner, and proceeds by setting forth four criteria for a case-by-case consideration in respect of the appropriate level of accommodations: a) location of the dry sand area in relation to the foreshore, b) extent and availability of publicly-owned upland sand area, c) nature and extent of the public demand, and d) usage of the upland sand land by the owner. (pp. 22) We turn now to an application of the Matthew factors to the circumstances of this case in order to determine what privately-owned upland sand area will be available and required to satisfy the public s rights under the public trust doctrine. Based on the circumstances in this case and on application of the Matthews factors, we hold that the Atlantis upland sands must be available for use by the general public under the public trust doctrine. In so holding we highlight the longstanding public access to and use of the beach, the La Vida CAFRA permit condition, the documented public demand, the lack of publicly-owned beaches in Lower Township, and the type of use by the current owner as a business enterprise. (pp. 23-30) CAFRA regulates activities in the coastal zone by requiring developers/property owners to obtain a permit from the DEP before undertaking the construction, relocation, or enlargement of any building or structure and all site preparation therefore, the grading, excavation or filling on beaches or dunes, including residential development, commercial development, industrial development, and public development. We agree with the Appellate Division that the boardwalk pathway over the dunes to the Atlantis beach qualifies as a development, thereby triggering the DEP s CAFRA jurisdiction over related use of the beach and ocean. We find jurisdiction also in the DEP s general power to promote the health, safety, and welfare of the public. We hold that the broad scope of the DEP s authority includes jurisdiction to review fees proposed by Atlantis for use of its beach. (pp. 31-32) For the reasons expressed in this opinion, the decision of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED. JUSTICE WALLACE, dissenting, in which JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO joins, would reverse and reinstate the judgment of the trial court but would expand horizontal access to a ten-foot-wide strip above the high water mark. JUSTICES LONG, LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI, and ALBIN join in CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ s opinion. JUSTICE WALLACE filed a separate dissenting opinion in which JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO joins. Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ATLANTIS BEACH CLUB, INC. f/k/a CLUB ATLANTIS ENTERPRISE, Defendant-Appellant, and SEAPOINTE VILLAGE ASSOCIATION and LOWER TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendants, and THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Defendant-Respondent. ATLANTIS BEACH CLUB, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TONY LABROSCIANO, individually and on behalf of those similarly situated and TOWNSHIP OF LOWER, Defendants, and THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Defendant-Respondent. Argued January 19, 2005 Decided July 26, 2005 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 370 N.J. Super. 171 (2004). Robert J. Gilson argued the cause for appellant (Youngblood, Corcoran, Lafferty, Hyberg & Waldman and Riker, Danzig, Scherer, Hyland and Perretti, attorneys; Chad M. Sherwood, on the briefs). Stephanie A. Brand, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent State of New Jersey (Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General, attorney; Patrick DeAlmeida, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel; Brian Weeks, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Stuart J. Lieberman argued the cause for respondent Raleigh Avenue Beach Association (Lieberman & Blecher, attorneys). Andrew J. Provence argued the cause for amici curiae American Littoral Society, Inc. and Raritan Baykeeper, Inc. (Ansell Zaro Grimm & Aaron, attorneys; Gordon N. Litwin, of counsel). Carter H. Strickland, Jr., argued the cause for amicus curiae Citizens' Right to Access Beaches, Inc., (Mr. Strickland, Staff Attorney, attorney; Mr. Strickland and Susan J. Kraham, on the letter brief). CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ delivered the opinion of the Court. This case raises a question about the right of the public to use a 480-foot wide stretch of upland sand beach in Lower Township, Cape May County, owned by respondent Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., and operated as a private club. We hold today that, in the circumstances presented here, and on application of the factors set forth in Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass n, 95 N.J. 306, 326, cert. denied sub nom. Bay Head Improvement Ass n v. Matthews, 469 U.S. 821, 105 S. Ct. 93, 83 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1984), the public trust doctrine requires the Atlantis property to be open to the general public at a reasonable fee for services provided by the owner and approved by the Department of Environmental Protection. Anyone attempting to use, enter upon or cross over club property for any reason without club permission or who is not in possession of a valid tag and authorized to use such tag will be subject to prosecution, civil and or criminal[,] to the fullest extent permitted by law[,] including all costs and legal fees incurred by the club. Prior to the commencement of this litigation, the membership fee for new members and members who had joined the beach club in 2002 was set at $700 for the 2003 summer season. Members were entitled to eight beach tags per household. See footnote 3 Atlantis also sold Access Easements at $10,000 each, paid in cash. See footnote 4 Easement holders were required to pay an annual membership fee determined by dividing the actual costs associated with operating the beach club by the total number of members (both easement holders and yearly members) to arrive at the holder s proportionate share. According to a March 14, 2003 letter to members, the payment of membership fees or the purchase of an easement entitled them to use and enjoy the [club] facilities, which included uniformed private security personnel on club grounds, as well as lifeguards on duty from June 21 through September 1, 2003, seven days a week, between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. Insofar as is practicable, the path shall exit [the Atlantis] [p]roperty within the portion of the [p]roperty upon which the dunes are located. In no event shall the path cross the remaining portion of the [p]roperty other than along the northern boundary thereof or provide, without Atlantis consent, public access to any other portion of the [p]roperty, other than . . . [h]orizontal [a]ccess, landward of the mean high water line. In the court s view, the Public Trust Doctrine does not apply to permit the Department to regulate the use of the Beach Area. Finally, Atlantis was prohibited from charging a fee or otherwise restricting the right of the public to horizontal or vertical ocean access. The court determined, however, that the provision of such services as lifeguards, equipment, or other facilities by Atlantis would entitle the Beach Club, on application to and with the DEP s approval, to charge a commercially reasonable fee to members of the public who use the horizontal access to swim in the ocean. The court denied without prejudice the Atlantis application to amend its pleadings so as to assert a regulatory takings claim. The State and the Association appealed. See footnote 8 While the appeal was pending, by a March 9, 2004 letter Atlantis notified its members about the 2004 beach fee schedule. Returning members from 2003 were required, as in the prior year, to pay $700 for eight beach tags, whereas the easement price was increased from $10,000 to $15,000. On April 20, 2004, the State moved before the Appellate Division for a stay of the 2004 beach fees. The Appellate Division granted the State s motion on May 4, ordering that no beach fees could be charged pending oral argument in the matter and until further order of that court. The court also directed Atlantis to return to its members any payments made after January 1, 2004. On motion by Atlantis for clarification, and after oral argument, the Appellate Division issued an interim order on May 20, 2004. Pending opinion, the court granted [t]he public . . . vertical access to the beach . . . upon the boardwalk pathway which currently exists through the dunes on the subject property as an extension of Raleigh Avenue. The panel also found that [t]he public [had] the right to use all of the dry sand and complete horizontal access to the subject property, including the ocean. Atlantis was allowed to charge a reasonable and comparable fee for the use of its beach pursuant to a DEP-approved fee schedule covering daily, weekly, monthly, and seasonal tags, but only if the beach club provided lifeguard services comparable to municipally-provided services, beach clean-up with regular trash removal, and shower facilities. Atlantis could choose not to issue beach tags or to charge fees for service, in which case public access to the beach and ocean would remain open and free. On June 3, 2004, the Appellate Division issued its opinion. Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 370 N.J. Super. 171 (2004). The court reaffirmed the central premise of its Order that Atlantis cannot limit vertical or horizontal public access to its dry sand beach area nor interfere with the public s right to free use of the dry sand for intermittent recreational purposes connected with the ocean and wet sand. Id. at 176. As permitted under the Order, Atlantis could charge a fee to members of the public who remain on and use its beach for an extended period of time, as long as Atlantis cleans the beach, picks up trash regularly, and provides shower facilities. Ibid. The panel ruled further that Atlantis was required to provide customary lifeguard services for members of the public who use the ocean areas up to the mean high water line, regardless of whether those individuals remain on the Atlantis beach area or merely pass through. Ibid. Reasonable and comparable fees, approved by the DEP, would be allowed in an amount sufficient to cover operating costs, including an amount related to management services. Ibid. The court remanded to the DEP the issue of the appropriate fee to be charged for beach use, ordering the Department to approve a fee schedule by June 10, 2004, so as not to unduly interfere with the beach season beginning June 15, 2004. Id. at 194. On remand, Atlantis submitted an Application for General CAFRA Permit and, on June 10, 2004, the DEP issued an interim beach badge schedule setting fees at $3 per day, $15 per week, $40 per month, and $55 per season, effective immediately. Shortly thereafter, Atlantis filed a Notice of Petition for Certification and moved before the Appellate Division for a stay pending this Court s review of its Petition. The Appellate Division denied the motion by Order dated July 19, 2004, wherein the court further directed that all non-member beach badges must be transferable, that no photo identification requirement may be associated with non-member badges, and that no liability waiver may be required of anyone seeking a badge. On August 2, 2004, Atlantis moved before this Court for a stay of the Appellate Division s opinion and order pending certification. The Court denied the Atlantis motion on August 13, 2004, and granted certification on September 29, 2004. 181 N.J. 548 (2004). [Matthews, supra, 95 N.J. at 316-17 (citations and footnote omitted).] In Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 53 (E. & A. 1821), the first case to affirm and reformulate the public trust doctrine in New Jersey, the Court explained that upon the Colonies victory in the Revolutionary War, the English sovereign s rights to the tidal waters became vested in the people of New Jersey as the sovereign of the country, and are now in their hands. Arnold, supra, addressed the plaintiff s claim to an oyster bed in the Raritan River adjacent to his farm in Perth Amboy. Id. at 45. Chief Justice Kirkpatrick found that the land on which water ebbs and flows, including the land between the high and low water, belongs not to the owners of the lands adjacent to the water, but to the State, to be held, protected, and regulated for the common use and benefit. Id. at 49, 71. Early understanding of the scope of the public trust doctrine focused on the preservation of the natural water resources of New Jersey for navigation and commerce . . . and fishing, an important source of food. Neptune City, supra, 61 N.J. at 304. In Neptune City, supra, the Court extended public rights in tidal lands to recreational uses, including bathing, swimming and other shore activities. Id. at 309. We invalidated a municipal ordinance that required non-residents of Avon-by-the-Sea to pay a higher fee than the residents of Avon were required to pay to access and use the town s beaches. Id. at 310. The Court held: [A]t least where the upland sand area is owned by a municipality . . . and dedicated to public beach purposes, a modern court must take the view that the public trust doctrine dictates that the beach and the ocean waters must be open to all on equal terms and without preference and that any contrary state or municipal action is impermissible. Exercise of the public s right to swim and bathe below the mean high water mark may depend upon a right to pass across the upland beach. Without some means of access the public right to use the foreshore would be meaningless. To say that the public trust doctrine entitles the public to swim in the ocean and to use the foreshore in connection therewith without assuring the public of a feasible access route would seriously impinge on, if not effectively eliminate, the rights of the public trust doctrine. Archaic judicial responses are not an answer to a modern social problem. Rather, we perceive the public trust doctrine not to be fixed or static, but one to be molded and extended to meet changing conditions and needs of the public it was created to benefit. . . . . Precisely what privately-owned upland sand area will be available and required to satisfy the public s rights under the public trust doctrine will depend on the circumstances. Location of the dry sand area in relation to the foreshore, extent and availability of publicly-owned upland sand area, nature and extent of the public demand, and usage of the upland sand land by the owner are all factors to be weighed and considered in fixing the contours of the usage of the upper sand. Today, recognizing the increasing demand for our State s beaches and the dynamic nature of the public trust doctrine, we find that the public must be given both access to and use of privately-owned dry sand areas as reasonably necessary. While the public s rights in private beaches are not coextensive with the rights enjoyed in municipal beaches, private landowners may not in all instances prevent the public from exercising its rights under the public trust doctrine. The public must be afforded reasonable access to the foreshore as well as a suitable area for recreation on the dry sand. The site is adjacent, and provides access points for residents and the public to the ocean beach, which is about 220 in width at the site.[ See footnote 9 ] The proposed development will have minimal impact on the beach, but as required under the policy on Dunes (7:7E-3.21), the remaining dunes must be reconstructed, replanted, and maintained. Provided an acceptable plan is submitted and implemented for dune enhancement and management, and provided walkovers to the beach are provided as discussed under the policies on Dunes (3.21) and Public Access to the Waterfront (8.11), and as required by conditions of this permit, this policy is met. Although the permit language is not without ambiguity, and the record is not clear in respect of the relationship between the developer/owner of La Vida and the owner of Atlantis, see supra at ___ (slip op. at 5 n.1), it may be inferred from this section of the permit that open access and use was ceded to the public by La Vida. Most telling, the permit describes access to a 220-foot strip of upland sand beach, not the foreshore. It is difficult to imagine that the DEP (or La Vida) anticipated anything other than public use of that area. That argument has not been made by any party, however; we, therefore, will not here consider the permit dispositive on the issue of public use. Suffice it to say that the Atlantis beach was used by the public for many years and that public access and, arguably, public use of 220 feet of ocean beach had been required as a condition of a CAFRA development permit. See footnote 10 From the summer of 1996 to May 4, 2004, Atlantis charged unregulated membership fees in varying amounts for access to and use of its beach. During the 2003 season, new members (and members who joined in 2002) paid $700 and received eight beach tags per household. In violation of the La Vida CAFRA permit, in the summer of 2003 Atlantis removed the public beach access sign at the western end of the Raleigh Avenue pathway extension and replaced it with a sign that read FREE Access to Gate Only. The gate was located at the end of the pathway at the bulkhead. Later that summer, contradictory signs at the gate read PUBLIC BEACH ACCESS and PUBLIC ACCESS ENDS HERE/MEMBERSHIP AVAILABLE AT GATE. The La Vida permit, however, required a landscaped public access pathway from the project site entrance down the center of Raleigh Avenue, and, according to the EIS and original site plan, a timber walkway over the bulkhead to the beach. The permit stated: Although this accessway is minimal, it is considered adequate due to the small scale of this project. Public parking has not been lost at this site . . . and on-street parking is available to the public on surrounding roads. The proposed pathway and walkover will provide reasonable access to the beach, provided public access signs (available from the [DEP]) are conspicuously located at the end of Raleigh Avenue pavement. Therefore, as a condition of this permit, within 30 days of issuance, submit for review and approval a site plan specifically showing the proposed location and detail of the public walkover structure, and the proposed location of public access signage (a l' x 2' metal sign available from the [DEP] on a standard metal signpost supplied by applicant), and construct the accessway improvements in accordance with the approved plan prior to occupancy of the structure. Maintenance and/or reconstruction of this walkway shall be the responsibility of the Homeowner s Association for the life of this project. On the one hand, guards hired by Atlantis have asked non-members to leave the beach, and violators have been prosecuted by Atlantis in municipal court. On the other hand, the DEP has issued notices of violation both to La Vida and to Atlantis because of the signage infractions, because a section of the dunes was destroyed by the Beach Club, and because structures were erected on the beach without CAFRA approval. The private beach property held by Atlantis is an area of undeveloped upland sand and dunes at the end of a street in a town that does not have public beaches. The owner, after years of public access and use, and despite a condition in the La Vida permit providing for access and, arguably use, decided in 1996 to engage in a commercial enterprise -- a private beach club -- that kept the public from the beach. Atlantis recognizes that as a place of public accommodation, N.J.S.A. 10:5-5l, under the Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -42, it must provide membership opportunities to the general public without regard to race, creed, or color, Clover Hill Swimming Club v. Goldsboro, 47 N.J. 25, 33-35 (1966). See N.J.A.C. 7:7E-8:11(b)(5) (requiring establishments . . . [that] control access to tidal waters [to] comply with the Law Against Discrimination ). The Beach Club nonetheless asserts that it will lose one of the sticks in its bundle of property rights if it cannot charge whatever the market will bear, and, in setting fees for membership, decide who can come onto its property and use its beach and other services (lifeguards, trash removal, organized activities, etc.). But exclusivity of use, in the context here, has long been subject to the strictures of the public trust doctrine. In sum, based on the circumstances in this case and on application of the Matthews factors, we hold that the Atlantis upland sands must be available for use by the general public under the public trust doctrine. In so holding we highlight the longstanding public access to and use of the beach, the La Vida Cafra permit condition, the documented public demand, the lack of publicly-owned beaches in Lower Township, and the type of use by the current owner as a business enterprise. We also adopt the construct put forward by the Appellate Division in connection with an appropriate fee structure for use of the beach by the public. That issue, however, requires further discussion. CAFRA was enacted by the Legislature in 1973. In re Egg Harbor Assocs., 94 N.J. 358, 362 (1983). Although CAFRA is primarily an environmental protection statute, the powers delegated to DEP extend well beyond protection of the natural environment. Id. at 364. Specifically, CAFRA delegates powers to the DEP and requires it to adopt rules and regulations governing land use within the coastal zone for the general welfare. Ibid. The [L]egislature amended CAFRA in 1993, significantly expanding its jurisdiction. In re Protest of Coastal Permit Program Rules, 354 N.J. Super. 293, 310 (App. Div. 2002). RALEIGH AVENUE BEACH ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ATLANTIS BEACH CLUB, INC. f/k/a CLUB ATLANTIS ENTERPRISE, Defendant-Appellant, and SEAPOINTE VILLAGE ASSOCIATION and LOWER TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendants, and THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Defendant-Respondent. ATLANTIS BEACH CLUB, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TONY LABROSCIANO, individually and on behalf of those similarly situated and TOWNSHIP OF LOWER, Defendants, and THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Defendant-Respondent. JUSTICE WALLACE, JR., dissenting. I would reverse and reinstate the judgment of the trial court granting access to the ocean and an easement across the private sand area owned by the Atlantic Beach Club to access the beach at Seapointe. However, because a three-foot-wide strip would not easily allow for an adult and child to walk within that limited area, I would expand the horizontal access across defendant s property to a ten-foot-wide strip above the high water mark. [Encyclopedia of New Jersey 665-66 (Maxine N. Lurie & Marc Mappen eds., 2004).] We have interpreted the public trust doctrine to require broad public access to those lands that are held in public trust. Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 308-09 (1972) (noting that public trust doctrine dictates that when municipality owns upland sand, beach and ocean must be available on equal terms to entire public); Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 78 N.J. 174, 179-80 (1978) (noting that public trust doctrine requires that public have use and enjoyment of beaches owned by municipality). In Neptune City, supra, we recognized that [t]he public trust doctrine . . . should be molded and extended to meet changing conditions and needs of the public it was created to benefit. 61 N.J. at 309. RALEIGH AVENUE BEACH ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ATLANTIS BEACH CLUB, INC. f/k/a CLUB ATLANTIS ENTERPRISE Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED July 26, 2005 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Chief Justice Poritz CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice Wallace gently sloping area[] of sand or other unconsolidated material, found on all tidal shorelines, including ocean, bay and river shorelines . . . , that extend[s] landward from the mean high water line to either . . . [a] man-made feature . . . such as a retaining structure, seawall, bulkhead, road or boardwalk, . . . or [t]he seaward or bayward foot of dunes, whichever is closest to the bay, inlet or ocean waters. [N.J.A.C. 7:7E-3.22(a) (effective February 3, 1986); see also N.J.S.A. 13:19-3 (adopting DEP definition with non-substantive changes by amendment to CAFRA, L. 1993, c. 190).] We observe that the upland sand is today wider by some 122 feet, likely due to accretion.