Title: State of Florida v. Luis Manuel Estevez

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. 93,467
____________
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Petitioner,
vs.
LUIS MANUEL ESTEVEZ,
Respondent.
[November 24, 1999]
ANSTEAD, J.
We have for review Estevez v. State, 713 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998),
based upon the following certified question of great public importance:
DOES THE ABSENCE OF A SPECIFIC FINDING BY
THE JURY ON THE VERDICT FORM THAT THE
DEFENDANT IS GUILTY OF COCAINE
TRAFFICKING IN AN AMOUNT OF 400 GRAMS OR
MORE, IN THE FACE OF UNCONTROVERTED
EVIDENCE THAT THE AMOUNT AT ISSUE
EXCEEDED 400 GRAMS, PRECLUDE IMPOSITION
OF A MINIMUM MANDATORY SENTENCE UNDER
SECTION 893.135?
1The form contained separate provisions for the jury's findings as to the conspiracy charge.
-2-
We have jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  For the following reasons, we
answer the certified question in the affirmative and approve the decision of the
district court.
PROCEEDINGS TO DATE
Respondent, Luis Manuel Estevez, was charged by information with
trafficking in cocaine in excess of 400 grams and with conspiracy to traffic in
cocaine.  Under the provisions of section 893.135, Florida Statutes (1995), the
trafficking statute, it is unlawful to possess twenty-eight grams or more of cocaine. 
In addition, the mandatory minimum sentences to be imposed under the statute are
dependent upon the amount of cocaine involved.  The statute mandates a fifteen-
year minimum sentence if the amount involved exceeds 400 grams.  
At Estevez' trial, evidence was presented of his violation of section 893.135
and that the amount of cocaine involved exceeded 400 grams.  Before the jury
retired for deliberations, the court discussed the proposed verdict form with the
parties and the jury.  The proposed form contained a space for the jury to indicate
that it found the defendant guilty of trafficking in cocaine as charged in the
information, and alternatively, a space for the jury to indicate that it found the
defendant not guilty of that charge.1  In addition, the form contained a line where the
2The parties consented to the crossing out of the line in the verdict form and the trial
judge's modified instructions.  
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jury could indicate that "the defendant is guilty of cocaine trafficking," followed by
several specific categories as to the amount of cocaine involved and a space next to
each for the jury to indicate its finding as to the amount. 
After conferring with both parties, the trial judge crossed out "the defendant
is guilty of cocaine trafficking" language, and explained to the jury that the form
should now be easier to understand, while reminding the jurors that they still had to
find the amount of cocaine involved by checking one of the choices provided:
     What the attorneys and I just did, we went over there
and it [jury instruction] didn't read well. And we crossed
out one sentence to make it easier for you to understand.  
     Count one reads:
     We the jury find as follows: The defendant in this case,
and check on one of two things.  The defendant is guilty
of Trafficking in Cocaine.  That's Count One in the
information.  Or the defendant is not guilty.  Those are the
two choices here.  
     And now if you believe that he is guilty of Trafficking
in Cocaine as charged, then you will check A., more than
four hundred grams, or B. more than two hundred grams,
but less than four hundred grams, or C. more than twenty-
eight grams but less than two hundred grams; or D.,less
than twenty-eight grams, and then E., the defendant is
found guilty of attempted trafficking in cocaine as a lesser
included charge.2  
After deliberations, the jury returned a verdict finding Estevez guilty of trafficking in
3The record does not reflect why the judge who presided over the trial had been replaced
by a substitute judge to accept the jury's verdict.  
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cocaine as charged in the information and not guilty of conspiracy to traffic.  The
verdict form reflects that although the jury checked off the space indicating "guilty
of trafficking in cocaine as charged," it did not check on the verdict form the amount
of cocaine involved.
A different judge than the one who presided at trial received the jury's
verdict.3  The substitute judge accepted the verdict and discharged the jury.  Shortly
thereafter, during sentencing discussions between the judge and the attorneys,
defense counsel examined the verdict form and discovered that the jury had not
indicated on the verdict form the amount of cocaine involved in the offense. 
However, over defense counsel's objection, and despite the lack of an express jury
finding as to the amount of cocaine involved, the judge sentenced Estevez to serve a
fifteen-year mandatory minimum term for trafficking in cocaine in excess of 400
grams.   
On appeal, the Third District reversed and held that "[b]efore a defendant can
be subject to a minimum mandatory sentence pursuant to section 893.135(1)(b), the
verdict form must contain a finding that the defendant committed the crime
prohibited by the minimum mandatory sentencing statute."  Estevez, 713 So. 2d at
-5-
1040 (citing State v. Tripp, 642 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 1994); State v. Overfelt, 457 So.
2d 1385 (Fla. 1984); and Streeter v. State, 416 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)). 
Concluding that it could not determine whether the jury had exercised its inherent
power to pardon the defendant by failing to make a specific finding as to the amount
of cocaine, the court "reluctantly reversed" the mandatory minimum sentence and
remanded for imposition of a guidelines sentence.  See id.  However, concerned
about the uncontroverted evidence of the amount of cocaine involved in the instant
case, the Third District certified the aforementioned question of great public
importance to this Court.  See id.
ANALYSIS
The defendant here was charged with violating section 893.135(1)(b)(1),
Florida Statutes (1995).  It provides:
Any person who knowingly sells, purchases,
manufactures, delivers, or brings into this state, or who is
knowingly in actual or constructive possession of, 28
grams or more of cocaine, as described in s.
893.03(2)(a)(4)., or of any mixture containing cocaine, but
less than 150 kilograms of cocaine or any such mixture,
commits a felony of the first degree, which felony shall be
known as "trafficking in cocaine."  If the quantity
involved:
     a.  Is 28 grams or more, but less than 200 grams, such
person shall be sentenced pursuant to the sentencing
guidelines and pay a fine of $50,000.
     b.  Is 200 grams or more, but less than 400 grams,
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such person shall be sentenced pursuant to the sentencing
guidelines and pay a fine of $100,000.
     c.  Is 400 grams or more, but less than 150 kilograms,
such person shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum
term of imprisonment of 15 calendar years and pay a fine
of $250,000.  
We begin our analysis by recognizing that this Court has expressly held that the jury
is the fact finder charged with the obligation of determining the quantity of cocaine
involved in cocaine trafficking under this statute.  See State v. Weller, 590 So. 2d
923, 927 (Fla. 1991).  
In Weller, we explained:
     In this review, Weller also argues that the trial court
erred in refusing to instruct the jury on all three of the
trafficking offenses that involve twenty-eight or more
grams of cocaine.  At first blush, we would be inclined to
disagree, since all of these offenses are first-degree
felonies.  We previously have stated that offenses are not
"lesser" if they carry the same penalty.  State v. Carpenter,
417 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 1982).  Yet, we are constrained to
find error here, because the three offenses in question
carry different minimum penalties, despite their shared
status as first-degree felonies.  As noted earlier, Florida
law provides for a greater mandatory minimum sentence
and a greater fine, determined by the quantity of the
substance involved in the offense.   Compare §
893.135(1)(b) with § 893.135(4), Fla. Stat. (1983).  In
other words, the two offenses of conspiring to traffic in
amounts less than 400 grams are necessarily lesser
included offenses of the crime with which Weller was
charged.
     Thus, before the trial court can impose sentence on a
4Section 775.087(1), Florida Statutes (1983), provides:
Unless otherwise provided by law, whenever a person is charged
-7-
defendant when enhancements of this type are authorized,
the trial court must inform the jury that the minimum
mandatory punishment for the offense is greater
depending upon the quantity of the substance involved. 
The jury then must determine from the evidence adduced
at trial the quantity of contraband involved in the
commission of the offense, in effect advising the court as
to the appropriate minimum penalty.
     Thus, the requested instructions on the amounts less
than 400 grams should have been given so the appropriate
minimum mandatory sentence could have been imposed,
based on the jury's determination of the amount of cocaine
involved.  The trial court erred in determining otherwise.
590 So. 2d at 927 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).  Under our analysis in
Weller, the jury's factual finding on the quantity of cocaine involved controls the
minimum sentence that may be imposed.  Imposition of a mandatory minimum
sentence under section 893.135 is improper when a jury does not determine the
specific quantity of cocaine involved.  See id.; Rickman v. State, 642 So. 2d 846,
846 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).  
In resolving this issue, the district court found it instructive to refer to this
Court's line of cases interpreting section 775.087, Florida Statutes, dealing with the
reclassification and minimum sentence imposition for crimes involving the
possession or use of a weapon or firearm.4  Our cases interpreting section 775.087
with a felony, except a felony in which the use of a weapon or
firearm is an essential element, and during the commission of such
felony the defendant carries, displays, uses, threatens, or attempts
to use any weapon or firearm, or during the commission of such
felony the defendant commits an aggravated battery, the felony for
which the person is charged shall be reclassified as follows:
     (a)  In the case of a felony of the first degree, to a life felony.
     (b)  In the case of a felony of the second degree, to a felony of
the first degree.
     (c)  In the case of a felony of the third degree, to a felony of the
second degree.
-8-
have required a specific jury finding that a defendant used a firearm or weapon in
the commission of an offense before a trial court may enhance the defendant's
sentence or apply a mandatory minimum sentence for the defendant's use of a
firearm or weapon in the commission of the offense.  See Tucker v. State, 726 So.
2d 768 (Fla. 1999); State v. Hargrove, 694 So. 2d 729, 730 (Fla. 1997); State v.
Tripp, 642 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 1994); State v. Overfelt, 457 So. 2d 1385, 1386 (Fla.
1984).  In this line of cases, we expressly rejected the proposition that a jury finding
as to the presence of a firearm is not required where the evidence on that issue is not
controverted at trial.
THIS CASE
In the instant case, the State argues that when the evidence as to quantity is
uncontroverted, the jury should not be allowed to "pardon" the defendant by failing
to make a specific finding as to the amount of cocaine involved.  The State points
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out that this Court acknowledged in State v. Benitez, 395 So. 2d 514, 516-17 (Fla.
1981), the mandatory nature of section 893.135, which only allows the trial judge to
deviate from the statute's mandatory minimum sentences under circumstances where
the defendant is willing to cooperate with law enforcement authorities in
apprehending other drug traffickers.  Importantly, however, while section 893.135
limits a trial judge in sentencing once a specific conviction is secured, none of its
provisions obviates the jury's inherent power to "pardon" a defendant by convicting
the defendant of a lesser offense.  See, e.g., Amado v. State, 585 So. 2d 282, 283
(Fla. 1991); Potts v. State, 430 So. 2d 900, 903 (Fla. 1982); State v. Abreau, 363
So. 2d 1063, 1064 (Fla. 1978); Date v. State, 528 So. 2d 547, 547-48 (Fla. 3d DCA
1988).  
Further, as noted above, we have expressly rejected the same argument when
advanced in firearm possession cases.  For example, in Hargrove, the Fourth
District, much like the Third District here, "reluctantly reversed" the imposition of a
mandatory minimum sentence.  See 694 So. 2d at 730.  Noting that it could not
understand the necessity for a jury finding of "use of a firearm" in a case where the
defendant made no attempt to deny the shooting alleged in the information, the
Fourth District certified a question which this Court rephrased as follows:
WHEN A DEFENDANT CHARGED WITH
-10-
COMMITTING A CRIME WITH THE USE OF A
FIREARM DOES NOT CONTEST ITS USE AND
INSTEAD DEFENDS ON THE GROUND THAT HE
WAS INSANE WHEN HE USED THE FIREARM,
AND THE RECORD IS CLEAR BEYOND ANY
DOUBT THAT DEFENDANT DID ACTUALLY USE
THE FIREARM, MAY THE SENTENCING JUDGE
IMPOSE THE MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCE
FOR USE OF A FIREARM WITHOUT A SPECIFIC
FINDING OF THAT FACT BY THE JURY? 
Id.  On review, answering the certified question in the negative and approving the
reversal of the mandatory sentence, this Court held:
Our decision in Overfelt encompasses cases where the
evidence of use of a firearm is unrebutted.  There must be
a specific finding by the jury.  Even where the use of a
firearm is uncontested, the overriding concern of Overfelt
still applies: the jury is the fact finder, and use of a firearm
is a finding of fact.  If the State wishes to guard against
the recurrence of a situation such as in the instant case, it
is in a position to do so:  it has the right to propose an
interrogatory on the verdict form asking whether or not
the jury finds the defendant guilty of a crime involving use
of a firearm.
Id. at 730-31.  The Court further noted that the clearest way for the jury to make the
necessary finding that a firearm was used is to have a specific question or special
verdict form.  See id. at 731.  In Tucker, we reiterated Hargrove's finding and held
that "an enhanced sentence should be upheld if based on a jury verdict which
specifically refers to the use of a firearm, either as a separate finding or by the
-11-
inclusion of a reference to a firearm in identifying the specific crime for which the
defendant is found guilty."  726 So. 2d at 772.  
Recently, in Jones v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1215 (1999), the United States
Supreme Court interpreted the federal carjacking statute to require separate jury
findings under a penalty scheme similar to that involved herein.  In its opinion, the
Court emphasized the importance of the role of the jury when its fact finding role is
directly related to the severity of the punishment to be imposed:
     McMillan [v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986)], then,
recognizes a question under both the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the jury guarantee of
the Sixth:  when a jury determination has not been
waived, may judicial factfinding by a preponderance
support the application of a provision that increases the
potential severity of the penalty for a variant of a given
crime?  The seriousness of the due process issue is
evident from Mullaney [v. Wilbur's] [421 U.S. 684
(1975)] insistence that a State cannot manipulate its way
out of [In re] Winship, [397 U.S. 358 (1970)] and from
Patterson [v. New York's], [432 U.S. 197 (1977)]
recognition of a limit on state authority to reallocate
traditional burdens of proof;  the substantiality of the jury
claim is evident from the practical implications of
assuming Sixth Amendment indifference to treating a fact
that sets the sentencing range as a sentencing factor, not
an element. [Note 6]
[Note 6]. The dissent repeatedly chides us
for failing to state precisely enough the
principle animating our view that the
carjacking statute, as construed by the
-12-
Government, may violate the Constitution. 
See post at 1229, 1235-1236, 1237.  The
preceding paragraph in the text expresses
that principle plainly enough, and we re-state
it here:  under the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury
trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any
fact (other than prior conviction) that
increases the maximum penalty for a crime
must be charged in an indictment, submitted
to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.  Because our prior cases suggest
rather than establish this principle, our
concern about the Government's reading of
the statute rises only to the level of doubt,
not certainty.  
     Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, the
constitutional proposition that drives our
concern in no way "call[s] into question the
principle that the definition of the elements of
a criminal offense is entrusted to the
legislature."  Post, at 1236 (internal quotation
marks omitted).  The constitutional
guarantees that give rise to our concern in no
way restrict the ability of legislatures to
identify the conduct they wish [to]
characterize as criminal or to define the facts
whose proof is essential to the establishment
of criminal liability.  The constitutional
safeguards that figure in our analysis concern
not the identity of the elements defining
criminal liability but only the required
procedures for finding the facts that
determine the maximum permissible
punishment; these are the safeguards going to
the formality of notice, the identity of the
factfinder, and the burden of proof.
-13-
     The terms of the carjacking statute illustrate very well
what is at stake.  If serious bodily injury were merely a
sentencing factor under § 2119(2) (increasing the
authorized penalty by two thirds, to 25 years), then death
would presumably be nothing more than a sentencing
factor under subsection (3) (increasing the penalty range
to life).  If a potential penalty might rise from 15 years to
life on a nonjury determination, the jury's role would
correspondingly shrink from the significance usually
carried by determinations of guilt to the relative
importance of low-level gatekeeping:  in some cases, a
jury finding of fact necessary for a maximum 15-year
sentence would merely open the door to a judicial finding
sufficient for life imprisonment.  It is therefore no trivial
question to ask whether recognizing an unlimited
legislative power to authorize determinations setting
ultimate sentencing limits without a jury would invite
erosion of the jury's function to a point against which a
line must necessarily be drawn.
Jones, 119 S. Ct. at 1224.  In Jones, the Court noted that a contrary ruling would
give rise to serious constitutional concerns.  The Supreme Court's reasoning in Jones
is very similar to our reasoning in Weller, where we held that, in essence, the
alternative provisions of section 893.135 are lesser included offenses that must be
submitted to the jury.  Obviously, under the provisions of section 893.135 and its
punishment scheme, the jury's role is critical.  See Weller.  
In the instant case, the jury was instructed that it could alternatively find
Estevez guilty of a number of lesser included offenses, including: (1) possession of
cocaine; (2) trafficking in the amount of 28 to 200 grams; (3) trafficking in the
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amount of 200 to 400 grams; and (4) attempted trafficking.  To accept the State's
position on this issue would, in essence, impair the jury's inherent power to pardon
and, more precisely, its power to find the defendant guilty of one of these lesser
offenses.  More importantly, it would invade the jury's historical function as fact
finder.  See Weller.  
Here, it appears that the original trial judge and the parties involved intended
for the jury to make an express finding as to the amount of cocaine involved as
mandated by Weller.  Unfortunately, the substitute judge, apparently misinterpreting
the original trial judge's alteration of the verdict form, accepted the jury's incomplete
verdict, which made no express reference to the amount of cocaine.  Because the
jury did not make an express finding that Estevez trafficked in cocaine in an amount
of 400 grams or more, we agree with the district court that the trial judge improperly
imposed the mandatory minimum sentence for cocaine trafficking under section
893.135.  In short, trial judges are not free to "direct a verdict" as to the amount of
cocaine involved in a trafficking offense, even where the evidence presented by the
State as to the amount is not controverted.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we answer the certified question in the affirmative and hold that
even in cases where the evidence is uncontroverted, the jury must still expressly
-15-
determine the amount of cocaine involved before the relevant mandatory minimum
sentence under the trafficking statute can be imposed.  Accordingly, we approve the
district court's decision and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent
herewith.
It is so ordered.
SHAW, PARIENTE and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
HARDING, C.J., concurs with an opinion.
QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion, in which WELLS, J., concurs.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
HARDING, C.J., concurring.
While I agree with the conclusion reached by the majority, I find it necessary
to further clarify the precedent the majority addresses.  In addition to its theory of a
jury pardon, the State relies heavily on the language of Overfelt, where the district
court stated and we agreed that "[b]efore a trial court may enhance a defendant's
sentence or apply the mandatory minimum sentence for use of a firearm, the jury
must make a finding that the defendant committed the crime while using a firearm
either by finding him guilty of a crime which involves a firearm or by answering a
specific question of a special verdict form. . . ."  State v. Overfelt, 457 So 2d. 1385,
1387 (Fla. 1984) (emphasis added) (quoting Overfelt v. State, 434 So. 2d 945, 948
-16-
(Fla. 4th DCA 1983)).  The State relies on this language to reach the conclusion that
the jury form in the instant case was sufficient.  This conclusion is misguided. 
Overfelt was a case where the trial judge reclassified the defendant's conviction at
sentencing from attempted third-degree murder to a felony of the second degree,
pursuant to the enhancement provisions of section 775.087(1), Florida Statutes
(1983), even though at trial the jury made no finding as to whether the defendant
possessed a firearm.  Upon review, this Court held that the trial judge's actions were
impermissible.  In Tucker, we further clarified Overfelt and other related decisions
and held that the first prong of Overfelt (where a defendant is found guilty of a crime
which involves a firearm) is only satisfied if the verdict form itself contains an
"express reference" to the specific crime with which the defendant is being charged. 
See Tucker v. State, 726 So. 2d 768, 772 (Fla. 1999).  An enhancement based on a
mere reference to the charges in the information, without an explicit finding by the
jury, does not reach the level that Tucker mandates and is contrary to the long-
standing principles of jury autonomy and independence.
QUINCE, J., dissenting.
I disagree with the majority and would uphold the sentence imposed by the trial
-17-
court.  In its analysis of State v. Hargrove, 694 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1997), the majority
fails to address an important distinction set forth in the case.  Hargrove was charged
with first-degree murder by shooting the victim with a firearm, but he was convicted
of second-degree murder.  The trial court imposed the mandatory minimum sentence
because the crime was committed with a firearm.  The Second District Court of
Appeal affirmed the conviction but overturned the mandatory minimum sentence.
On review, this Court approved the Second District's holding.  However, this
Court distinguished cases like Hargrove, where the defendant is convicted of a lesser
included offense without a specific finding, and cases that involve a verdict of "guilty
as charged."  See id. at 731(recognizing that Hargrove did not involve a verdict of
guilty as charged, where the charge was a crime using a firearm, and that such a
verdict would specifically incorporate a finding that the crime involved a firearm). 
While this Court in Hargrove continued to reason that a specific jury question was the
clearest way to get a finding that would support an enhancement, a specific jury
question was not required under State v. Overfelt, 457 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 1984).  We
said Overfelt only requires "a clear jury finding."  Hargrove, 694 So. 2d at 731.  Thus,
"the mandatory minimum can be based on jury verdicts which specifically refer to the
use of a firearm, or to the information where the information contained a charge of a
crime committed with the use of a firearm."  Id.  (emphasis added and citations
5The nature of a pure jury pardon was discussed by Justice Shaw in his dissent in State v.
Wimberly, 498 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 1986):
     The ultimate exercise of the jury pardon power is a not guilty
verdict rendered contrary to the law and evidence, thus expressing
the jury's refusal to enforce a law of which it disapproves.  Such
verdicts are significant in a democracy as a barometer of public       
opinion and as an augur of the course of future law.  The historic
trial of John Peter Zenger of Colonial New York for libeling the
royal governor was such an instance.  The jury's not guilty verdict,
-18-
omitted).
The trial court imposed the mandatory minimum in this case because the jury
returned a verdict finding Estevez guilty of trafficking in cocaine as charged in Count
I of the information.  Hargrove and Overfelt require either a specific jury finding or a
verdict referring specifically to the information.  This case offers the latter.  From the
indictment to the verdict, this matter involved trafficking in cocaine in excess of 400
grams; the amount of cocaine was not disputed or refuted at trial.  Thus, without any
evidence to the contrary, the jury deliberated the guilt or innocence of the defendant
based on this amount of cocaine.  It was under these circumstances that the jury
returned its verdict.  In light of these facts, the verdict should be interpreted in accord
with the indictment and is sufficient to support the imposition of the mandatory
minimum.
This is not a situation where the jury was attempting to exercise its ultimate
power to pardon.5  If that were the case, the jury could have found Estevez not guilty
contrary to the law and the evidence, reflected public repudiation of
extant law on libeling public officers and portended the American
Revolution and the right to a free press embodied in the first
amendment to the United States Constitution.  This type of jury
pardon is constitutionally grounded on the right to a jury trial and
the finality of a jury verdict.  Our judicial system is able to tolerate
such aberrations because they are rare and we have no remedy for
an absence of public support of the law short of abrogating the
constitutional right to a jury trial and the bar against twice being
placed in jeopardy for the same offense.  Such verdicts are
essentially political judgments, not based on the evidence.
Id. at 932 (Shaw, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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or guilty of a lesser included offense by marking another line on the jury form. 
However, the jury issued a "clear jury finding" that Estevez was guilty of drug
trafficking as charged in the information.  Because the information charged Estevez
with being in possession of 400 grams or more of cocaine, the trial court was correct
in sentencing Estevez to the mandatory minimum as prescribed by section
893.135(1)(b)c, Florida Statutes (1997).  
Finally, I disagree with the majority's disposition of this matter.  Since, under
the majority's analysis, there was some ambiguity concerning the proper verdict, I
would remand this case to the trial court for a new trial.  See United States v. Barrett,
870 F.2d 953, 955 (3d Cir. 1989)(quoting from 1 Edward J. Devitt & Charles B.
Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions § 18.05, at 584 (3d ed. 1977), for
the proposition that "[w]hen a jury is instructed on a lesser-included offense and it
-20-
returns a general verdict of guilty, the verdict is fatally ambiguous and the case will be
remanded for new trial"). 
WELLS, J., concurs.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified Great
Public Importance
Third District - Case No. 97-1376 
(Dade County)
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Maya Saxena, Assistant Attorney General,
Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
for Petitioner
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Maria E. Lauredo, Assistant Public
Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, Florida,
for Respondent