Title: Donald Urban v. David Grasser

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2001 WI 63 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-0933 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Donald Urban and Susan Urban,  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
v. 
David Grasser and Heritage Mutual Insurance 
Company  
 
Defendants-Respondents, 
John Alden Life Insurance Company,  
 
Defendant.  
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 14, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
November 29, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha 
 
JUDGE: 
Mary Kay Wagner-Malloy 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
WILCOX, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
Dissented: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
BRADLEY, J., joins dissent. 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiffs-appellants there were briefs 
by David P. Wilk, Robert L. Jaskulski and Domnitz & Mawicke, 
Kenosha, and oral argument by David P. Wilk. 
 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief 
by Arthur P. Simpson and Simpson & Deardorff, S.C., Milwaukee, 
and oral argument by Arthur P. Simpson. 
 
 
2001 WI 63 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No.  99-0933 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Donald Urban and Susan Urban, 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
 
v. 
 
David Grasser and Heritage Mutual 
Insurance Company, 
 
 
Defendants-Respondents, 
 
John Alden Life Insurance Company, 
 
 
Defendant. 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Kenosha 
County, Mary Kay Wagner-Malloy, Circuit Court Judge.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
WILLIAM 
A. 
BABLITCH, 
J.   Plaintiff 
Donald 
Urban 
(Urban) appeals a circuit court decision concluding that 
defendant David Grasser (David) was entitled to recreational 
immunity under Wis. Stat. § 895.52 (1995-96).1  Urban was 
crossing David's property to use his boat, which was located on 
                     
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1995-96 version unless otherwise indicated.   
FILED 
 
JUN 14, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 99-0933 
 
2 
an adjacent property.  David's father, Paul Grasser (Paul) owned 
the adjacent property.  Paul held an easement for ingress and 
egress over David's property pursuant to a written agreement 
between them and had granted permission to Urban to use David's 
property in accessing his boat.  David's property constituted 
the only legal means available for Urban to access his boat.  A 
dog jumped out at him.  Urban fled and jumped from David's 
property onto a next-door neighbor's concrete driveway, injuring 
himself.  Urban sued David, and David claimed recreational 
immunity. 
¶2 
The issue is whether the facts of this case give rise 
to recreational immunity for David.  We conclude that the facts 
entitle David to immunity and that no exceptions to immunity 
apply.  Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's decision. 
I 
¶3 
On July 19, 1997, Urban purchased a boat from Paul.  
The boat was docked at a boat slip on Paul's property.  After 
Urban purchased the boat, he intended to dock the boat at 
another location.  However, because Urban needed time to secure 
the other location, Paul agreed that Urban could temporarily 
dock the boat on his property.  Paul did not charge Urban for 
the use of the boat slip. 
¶4 
A 
description 
of 
the 
property 
is 
necessary 
to 
understand Urban's use of the property and the occurrence of his 
injury.  The property at issue was a rectangular parcel of 
property 
that 
was 
divided 
into 
two 
separate 
lots 
of 
approximately equal size.  One lot occupied the western half of 
No. 99-0933 
 
3 
the property and was owned by David; the other lot occupied the 
eastern half and was owned by Paul.  David's property was 
bordered to the west by a street.  Paul's property was bordered 
to the east by waterfront, which is where the boat slips were 
located.  To get to his new boat, Urban was required to park his 
automobile on the street, walk across David's property, and walk 
across Paul's property to the boat slip. 
¶5 
To the north of both David and Paul's properties was a 
concrete driveway that was owned by a neighbor.  The driveway 
declined from west to east while the property owned by David and 
Paul remained level.  Consequently, from west to east, David and 
Paul's property was at a gradually higher level than the 
neighboring driveway.  A retaining wall separated the driveway 
from David and Paul's properties.  The top of this wall remained 
level with David and Paul's properties, but the bottom of the 
wall declined from west to east in the same manner as the 
driveway.   
¶6 
Prior to 1981, Paul owned all of the property at issue 
in this case.  In 1981, however, David contracted with Paul to 
purchase the western portion of the property.  The contract 
granted a perpetual easement to Paul over a portion of David's 
property and provided as follows: 
 
The land [the property conveyed to David] shall be 
subject to a perpetual easement in favor of Vendor 
[Paul and his wife] over the south 10 feet of the west 
110 feet as [sic] and for ingress and egress and to a 
perpetual easement over the entire parcel except the 
110 west feet thereof and said easement for ingress 
and egress, said easement to allow Vendors free use of 
No. 99-0933 
 
4 
the easement area for themselves and those to whom 
they shall lease boat slips in the city of Kenosha 
harbor and guests.  Purchasers shall also have the 
right to use of the land covered by the west easement 
provided it does not interfere with the easement 
rights of Vendors and their lessees. 
The easement over David's property constituted the only legal 
means available for Paul, his guests, and lessees of the boat 
slips to access Paul's property and the boat slips.  
¶7 
On the day that he purchased the boat, Urban, along 
with members of his family, made several trips from his 
automobile to the boat slip, crossing David's property each 
time.  Urban slept on the boat that night.  The next day, July 
20, 1997, he again accessed the boat several times by using the 
same route. 
¶8 
During the early evening of July 20, 1997, Urban was 
walking back from the boat slip when he noticed a dog on David's 
property.  The dog, a boxer named Baby, was owned by David.  The 
dog began growling and barking at Urban and then proceeded to 
chase him.  Although the dog was chained to a tree on David's 
property, Urban did not notice the chain, and he began running 
to the north.  Without stopping or looking back, Urban jumped 
from the property onto the concrete driveway.  At the point 
where he jumped, the property was about ten feet higher than the 
driveway.  The parties do not contest that Urban jumped from 
David's property.  Urban seriously injured his heel when he 
landed. 
¶9 
Urban and his wife (plaintiffs) filed a complaint 
against David and his insurers, Heritage Mutual and John Alden 
No. 99-0933 
 
5 
Life Insurance Company.  In the complaint, the plaintiffs 
alleged two causes of action.  First, they alleged that, 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 174.02(1), David was strictly liable 
for damages caused by the dog.  Second, they alleged that David 
was "negligent in the care, custody, control supervision, and/or 
shelter" of the dog "in failing to keep the dog, by leash or 
other means." 
¶10 David and Heritage Mutual (defendants)2 moved for 
summary judgment, arguing that David was immune from liability 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 895.52, the recreational immunity 
statute.  The circuit court granted the defendants' motion.  The 
plaintiffs appealed, and we accepted the court of appeals' 
certification on all issues raised by the plaintiffs before the 
court of appeals.  However, because we conclude that the 
recreational immunity statute applies to deny recovery to the 
plaintiffs in this case, we need not reach the remaining issues. 
II 
¶11 We address only whether the facts of this case give 
rise to recreational immunity and entitle David to summary 
judgment.  We deliberately state the issue differently than that 
posed by the court of appeals in its certification.  The court 
of appeals presented the issue as follows:  "This case asks 
whether a property owner, holding a servient property interest, 
may claim recreational immunity for injuries suffered by persons 
                     
2 John Alden Life Insurance Company was not part of the 
summary judgment motion and accordingly is not part of this 
appeal.  
No. 99-0933 
 
6 
who used the easement to cross the property as the guest of the 
easement holder, the dominant property interest."   
¶12 Although the court of appeals correctly framed the 
issue, we conclude that our statement of the issue is more 
appropriate because it emphasizes the intensely fact-driven 
nature of recreational immunity cases.  Circuit courts, the 
court of appeals, and this court have wrestled with recreational 
immunity since the legislature first provided for such immunity 
under the law.  We have all been frustrated by the seeming lack 
of basic underlying principles in our efforts to state a test 
that can be easily applied.  The principle that the purpose of 
the legislation is to encourage landowners to open their 
property to recreational users has provided only limited 
usefulness. 
¶13 We conclude that we can do little more than repeat 
what has been stated continually in prior cases, that is, that 
each case requires an examination of all the circumstances 
surrounding the activity, keeping in mind the legislative 
purpose.  We have identified a number of those aspects:  the 
intrinsic nature of the activity, the purpose of the activity, 
the consequences of the activity, and the intent of the user.  
See Sievert v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 190 Wis. 2d 623, 
631, 528 N.W.2d 413 (1995); Linville v. City of Janesville, 184 
Wis. 2d 705, 716, 516 N.W.2d 427 (1994).  An examination of 
prior cases interpreting Wis. Stat. § 895.52 also leads us to 
conclude that there are at least two other factors to take into 
No. 99-0933 
 
7 
account:  the nature of the property and the intent (or lack 
thereof) of the property owner.  
¶14 The nature of the property can give us insight into 
the nature of the activity.  See Linville, 184 Wis. 2d at 717; 
Nelson v. Schreiner, 161 Wis. 2d 798, 802, 469 N.W.2d 214 (Ct. 
App. 1991) ("Actions whose intrinsic nature are recreational and 
are conducted at a public facility or service dedicated to 
exercise, relaxation or pleasure may be recreational activities 
without 
further 
proof 
of 
the 
actor's 
mental 
purpose.").  
Likewise, the intent of the owner can give us important 
perspective.  In most cases, it would seem to make little sense 
to give an owner recreational immunity when in fact the owner 
does not intend to open the property to recreation, and even 
more so, when the owner takes positive steps to prevent 
recreational use.  See Minnesota Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Paper 
Recycling of LaCrosse, 2001 WI 64, ¶25, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___.   
¶15 None of the factors enumerated above, viewed in 
isolation, are determinative.  In any given case, one or more 
factors may have greater weight, but all should be looked at in 
their totality. 
III 
¶16 We review a grant of summary judgment using the same 
methodology as the circuit court.  Meyer v. Sch. Dist. of Colby, 
226 Wis. 2d 704, 708, 595 N.W.2d 339 (1999).  Summary judgment 
is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
No. 99-0933 
 
8 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law."  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) (1997-98). 
 Resolution of this case requires an interpretation of the 
recreational immunity statute and its application to undisputed 
facts.  Interpretation of this statute presents a question of 
law that we decide de novo, while benefiting from the circuit 
court's analysis.  Meyer, 226 Wis. 2d at 708. 
¶17 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.52(2)(b) provides in relevant 
part 
that 
"no 
owner . . . is 
liable 
for . . . any 
injury 
to . . . a person engaging in a recreational activity on the 
owner's property . . . ."  Pursuant to this statute, David 
claims that he is immune from liability for Urban's injury.   
¶18 We must first determine whether David is an "owner" 
under the statute.  Wisconsin Stat. § 895.52(1)(d) defines 
"owner" as "a person, including a governmental body or nonprofit 
organization, that owns, leases or occupies property."  In this 
case, it is undisputed that David owned the property adjacent to 
Paul's property.  Although Paul held an easement over David's 
property, Paul's interest in the property did not require David 
to relinquish ownership of his property.  "An easement creates 
two distinct property interests: the dominant estate, which 
enjoys the privileges granted by an easement; and the servient 
estate, which permits the exercise of those privileges."  
Atkinson v. Mentzel, 211 Wis. 2d 628, 637, 566 N.W.2d 158 (Ct. 
App. 1997).  Title to the property, however, does not pass to 
the dominant owner; only the right to pass over it is granted.  
No. 99-0933 
 
9 
Hunter v. McDonald, 78 Wis. 2d 338, 344, 254 N.W.2d 282 (1977). 
 The dominant owner does not obtain an estate in the property, 
but only a right to use the land not inconsistent with the 
general property of the servient owner.  Id.  Thus, David is an 
"owner" under the statute.  
¶19 We next determine whether Urban was "engaging in a 
recreational 
activity 
on 
[David's] 
property." 
 
This 
determination requires application of the statutory definition 
of "recreational activity" to Urban's activity.  This definition 
states:   
 
"Recreational activity" means any outdoor activity 
undertaken for the purpose of exercise, relaxation or 
pleasure, including practice or instruction in any 
such activity.  "Recreational activity" includes, but 
is 
not 
limited 
to, 
hunting, 
fishing, 
trapping, 
camping, picnicking, exploring caves, nature study, 
bicycling, 
horseback 
riding, 
bird-watching, 
motorcycling, 
operating 
an 
all-terrain 
vehicle, 
ballooning, 
hang 
gliding, 
hiking, 
tobogganing, 
sledding, 
sleigh 
riding, 
snowmobiling, 
skiing, 
skating, water sports, sight-seeing, rock-climbing, 
cutting or removing wood, climbing observation towers, 
animal training, harvesting the products of nature and 
any other outdoor sport, game or educational activity, 
but does not include any organized team sport activity 
sponsored by the owner of the property on which the 
activity takes place.   
Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(g).  
¶20 However, before we can apply this definition, we must 
first resolve a dispute between the parties concerning the scope 
of Urban's activity.  The issue is whether Urban's activity on 
Paul's property should be factored into our determination.  The 
plaintiffs argue that any activity undertaken by Urban on Paul's 
No. 99-0933 
 
10
property is immaterial to our determination.  They assert that 
we must only examine Urban's activity on David's property, and 
in this respect, we must conclude that Urban's mere act of 
walking, without more, cannot support a finding of recreational 
activity.  In contrast, the defendants argue that Urban's 
activity on David's property must be considered in light of his 
activity on Paul's property, and when considering the activity 
in this manner, it must be regarded as walking to access his 
boat.  We agree with the defendants.  
¶21 Our examination looks at Urban's activities on both 
properties because the activities are "inextricably connected." 
 This connection is evidenced, in the first instance, by the 
fact that Urban had to cross David's property because it was the 
only legal means available for Urban to access his boat.  In 
Hupf v. City of Appleton, 165 Wis. 2d 215, 221, 477 N.W.2d 69 
(Ct. 
App. 
1991), 
the 
court 
recognized 
that 
a 
walk 
is 
"inextricably connected" to another activity when that person 
walks by the "only available avenue" from the activity.  In such 
instances, the Hupf court reasoned that the walk should have the 
same immune or non-immune status of its connected activity.  Id. 
 This reasoning suggests that it is appropriate for a court, 
under similar facts, to consider the activity that is connected 
to the walk in determining whether the walk is a "recreational 
activity."  Even though Hupf only involved one property owner, 
we conclude that its reasoning applies equally to this case.  
See also Lasky v. City of Stevens Point, 220 Wis. 2d 1, 7-8, 582 
N.W.2d 64 (Ct. App. 1998) (suggesting that the reasoning from 
No. 99-0933 
 
11
Hupf would have been applicable if the plaintiff had been 
walking on the "only available avenue"). 
¶22 The connection between the walk and the use of the 
boat is also evidenced by the fact that Urban's use of David's 
property to access his boat resulted from permission from Paul. 
 Paul held a dominant interest in an easement over David's 
property, and he exercised his rights under the terms of the 
easement agreement by granting permission to Urban.  Urban then 
utilized David's property within the terms of the easement 
agreement.  These facts provide additional support for our 
conclusion that the walk was inextricably connected to the 
activity on Paul's property.  As a result, we will consider 
Urban's activity on Paul's property in our determination.   
¶23 It is important to note that we do not conclude that 
every walk and its related activity must be considered together. 
The walk and the related activity will only be considered 
collectively when it can be shown, under facts similar to this 
case or to Hupf, that the activities are inextricably connected.3 
¶24 We now turn to the question of whether the facts of 
this case give rise to the conclusion that Urban's walk on 
                     
3 The dissent asserts that our opinion offers no logical 
stopping point.  We disagree.  Our conclusion is strictly based 
on the uniqueness of the properties at issue in this case, in 
light of the landlocked nature of Paul's property and the 
existence of an easement.  The hypotheticals raised by the 
dissent do not reflect the same unique connection shared by the 
properties in this case.  See dissent at ¶57. 
No. 99-0933 
 
12
David's property was "recreational activity" within the meaning 
of the statute. 
¶25 The definition of "recreational activity" contains 
three parts: 
 
(1) a broad definition stating that a recreational 
activity is "any outdoor activity undertaken for the 
purpose of exercise, relaxation or pleasure," (2) a 
list 
of 
28 
specific 
activities 
denominated 
as 
recreational, and (3) a second broad definition, 
directing that a recreational activity can be "any 
other outdoor sport, game or educational activity."  
Sievert, 190 Wis. 2d at 629. 
 
¶26 As stated in Minnesota Fire, 2001 WI 64, ¶10, "we must 
construe the first part's broad definition in light of the 
second part's list of 28 specific recreational activities, and 
the third part's broad definition providing that a recreational 
activity is 'any other outdoor sport, game or educational 
activity.'" (citation omitted).  
¶27 The sole purpose of Urban's walk over David's property 
was to gain access to his boat to use for recreational purposes. 
 Throughout the weekend, including the day on which his injury 
occurred, he carried various items from his automobile to the 
boat for purposes of cleaning it and preparing it for future 
trips.  Indeed, preparing the boat in this manner is one part of 
using the boat for pleasure and recreation.  During this time, 
he and his family members also crossed David's property to 
partake in a party on the boat.  In addition, Urban crossed the 
property to practice driving his boat for a short time on the 
day he was injured.  This particular activity - driving the boat 
No. 99-0933 
 
13
- is specifically enumerated in the definition of "recreational 
activity" as "water sports."  On the whole, these activities 
were undertaken for relaxation or pleasure.  Urban's walk was 
recreational because Urban needed to cross the property to 
engage in recreational activities on his boat.  David's property 
was the only legal means available to access the boat.  The walk 
was an integral part of these activities.  
¶28 We recognize that Urban's walking is not immediately 
identifiable as one of the 28 listed activities.  However, an 
activity does not need to fall within the direct terms of the 
definition to be characterized as a "recreational activity."  
See Sievert, 190 Wis. 2d at 629-30.  Instead, as noted in 
Sievert, the legislature expressly stated that this definition 
is 
"intended 
merely 
to 
provide 
examples 
of 
activities 
constituting 
recreational 
activities 
and 
that 
'where 
substantially similar circumstances or activities exist' the 
legislation should be construed liberally to protect the 
property owner."  Id. at 630 (citing 1983 Wis. Act 418, § 1).  
As enumerated in Sievert, we adopted the following test in 
Linville, 184 Wis. 2d 705, to determine whether an activity is 
"substantially similar": 
 
[T]he test "considers the purpose and nature of the 
activity in addition to the [property] user's intent." 
 "The test requires examination of all aspects of the 
activity. 
 
The 
intrinsic 
nature, 
purpose 
and 
consequence of the activity are relevant.  While the 
injured person's subjective assessment of the activity 
is relevant, it is not controlling.  Thus, whether the 
injured 
person 
intended 
to 
recreate 
is 
not 
No. 99-0933 
 
14
dispositive, . . . but why [the person] was on the 
property is pertinent." 
Sievert, 190 Wis. 2d at 631 (quoting Linville, 184 Wis. 2d at 
716) (second and third alterations in original) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 
¶29 We conclude that, under this test, Urban's activity on 
David's property is substantially similar to the activities 
listed under the definition.  After his purchase of the boat was 
completed, Urban continued to walk across David's property to 
access his boat, and the consequence of his crossing the 
property was the use of his boat for recreation.  Urban stated 
that he purchased the boat solely for recreation and that he had 
to cross David's property to carry out this goal.  Indeed, while 
on David's property, Urban was not exercising or throwing a ball 
or engaging in activities of this nature.  However, our 
examination looks at all aspects of the activity, including the 
reason the person was on the property.  In this case, Urban's 
acts and statements indicate that his only reason for being on 
David's property was to access his boat for recreation. 
¶30 We also note that extending immunity to David in this 
instance would fulfill the legislative purpose behind the 
recreational immunity statute.  This legislative purpose seeks 
"to encourage property owners to allow use of their lands for 
recreational activities by removing the potential for liability 
arising out of negligence actions brought against them by 
persons who use the land for such recreational purposes."  
Verdoljak v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 200 Wis. 2d 624, 635, 547 
No. 99-0933 
 
15
N.W.2d 602 (1996).  Granting immunity in this case encourages 
David and others similarly situated to allow people to cross 
over their land to engage in recreational activities.  Thus, the 
legislative purpose would be served. 
¶31 In addition, the intent of the landowner with respect 
to the use of his property is helpful.  David's easement to Paul 
provided an "easement to allow Vendors [and guests of the 
vendors] free use of the easement area for themselves and those 
they shall lease boat slips in the city of Kenosha harbor and 
guests."  This easement evinces at the very least no intent to 
restrict the use of the property to non-recreational activities. 
 In light of the broadness of the language, it appears to 
anticipate that recreational activity could occur. 
¶32 In light of all of the above, we conclude that Urban's 
walking on David's property was "recreational activity," which 
gives rise to recreational immunity. 
IV 
¶33 We now examine whether any exceptions to recreational 
immunity apply.  In this case, the plaintiffs first argue that 
immunity should not apply because Urban was Paul's "social 
guest," 
and 
therefore, 
the 
exception 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 895.52(6)(d) applies.  This section provides that immunity 
does not apply if: 
 
The death or injury occurs on property owned by a 
private property owner to a social guest who has been 
expressly and individually invited by the private 
property owner for the specific occasion during which 
the death or injury occurs, if the death or injury 
occurs on any of the following: 
No. 99-0933 
 
16
 
. . .  
2. Residential property. 
Wis. Stat. § 895.52(6)(d).  The plaintiffs argue that Urban was 
Paul's social guest because Paul specifically invited Urban on 
his land to use the boat slip.  In addition, the plaintiffs 
assert that, because this exception applies to Paul, it should 
similarly apply to David, despite the fact that David did not 
invite Urban on his property. 
¶34 This social guest exception was enacted in 1984 as 
part of 1983 Wisconsin Act 418.  This exception came about after 
this court's decision in LePoidevin v. Wilson, 111 Wis. 2d 116, 
330 N.W.2d 555 (1983).  In LePoidevin, a property owner sought 
immunity under Wis. Stat. § 29.68 (1975) for injuries to a 
person who dove from a pier into shallow water on the owner's 
property.  Id. at 119.  The injured person had been specifically 
invited on the property by the owner's son to swim.  Id. at 118-
19.  We concluded that the owner could not gain immunity from 
liability because the injured person was a social guest who had 
been specifically invited onto the property.  Id. at 131-32.  We 
also noted that the property owner had "not opened his land to 
the 'public' generally nor ha[d] he given permission to one or 
more members of the 'public' to use the land for recreational 
purposes.  He opened his land to a social guest who was invited 
onto the land."  Id. at 131.  
¶35 The legislative history of 1983 Wisconsin Act 418 
indicates that this social guest exception was included to 
ensure that a property owner does not gain immunity under 
No. 99-0933 
 
17
circumstances similar to LePoidevin.4  Indeed, the language of 
the social guest exception mirrors language from LePoidevin.  
This case, however, does not involve circumstances similar to 
LePoidevin where the injured person was a social guest who was 
expressly and individually invited onto the property.  Instead, 
Urban was granted permission by Paul to use the property.  Such 
permissive entrants are outside the ambit of this exception.  
See Waters v. Pertzborn, 2001 WI 62, ¶40, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___ (citing Ervin v. City of Kenosha, 159 Wis. 2d 464, 
475, 464 N.W.2d 654 (1991)).  
 
¶36 Finally, we address whether the "profit" exception 
under Wis. Stat. § 895.52(6)(a) applies.  This section provides 
that immunity will not apply for property owners who profit from 
another's recreational use of their property.  Specifically, 
this section provides in relevant part: 
 
                     
4 Specifically, a letter contained in the drafting record 
for this act notes that "[i]t is equally clear that the proposed 
legislation is not intended to cover the case where a landowner 
specifically invites a guest over as per [LePoidevin]."  Letter 
from John R. Zillmer, Redford & Zillmer, to Ruth Reinl, Office 
of Senator David Helbach 4 (Oct. 11, 1983).    
We recognize that, in enacting 1983 Wis. Act. 418, the 
legislature "intended to overrule any previous Wisconsin supreme 
court decisions interpreting section 29.68 of the statutes if 
the decision is more restrictive than or inconsistent with the 
provisions of this act."  1983 Wis. Act 418, § 1.  Our 
application of LePoidevin v. Wilson, 111 Wis. 2d 116, 330 N.W.2d 
555 (1983), however, is limited only to the extent that its 
facts are illustrative of the legislature's intent on what 
factual situations are to be included under the social guest 
exception.   
No. 99-0933 
 
18
Subsection (2) does not limit the liability of a 
private property owner . . . whose property is used 
for a recreational activity if any of the following 
conditions exist: 
 
(a) The private property owner collects money, 
goods or services in payment for the use of the 
owner's property for the recreational activity during 
which the death or injury occurs, and the aggregate 
value of all payments received by the owner for the 
use 
of 
the 
owner's 
property 
for 
recreational 
activities during the year in which the death or 
injury occurs exceeds $2,000.   
Wis. Stat. § 895.52(6)(a).  Under this section, a landowner is 
not immune if two conditions exist.  "First, the owner collects 
money, goods or services in payment for the use of the owner's 
property for the recreational activity during which the injury 
occurs."  Douglas v. Dewey, 154 Wis. 2d 451, 458, 453 N.W.2d 500 
(Ct. App. 1990).  "Second, the aggregate value of all payments 
received by the owner for the use of his or her property for 
recreational activities during the year in which the injury 
occurs exceeds [$2,000]."  Id. at 458-59. 
¶37 In Douglas, the court of appeals recognized that the 
legislature specifically adopted a pecuniary-benefit approach, 
which places duties and obligations upon owners of property when 
the owners receive a pecuniary benefit from users of their 
property.  Id. at 461.  The court also noted that the 
legislature's intent to adopt this approach was indicated in 
1983 Wis. Act 418, which stated that the act intended to limit 
the liability of property owners "'under circumstances in which 
the owner does not derive more than a minimal pecuniary 
benefit.'"  Id. (quoting 1983 Wis. Act 418, § 1).  These 
No. 99-0933 
 
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benefits must be actual, not merely potential.  Id.  All 
indirect pecuniary benefits, as well as direct pecuniary 
benefits, received by the property owner for the use of the 
property must be considered.  Id. at 462. 
¶38 The plaintiffs argue that this exception applies to 
eliminate recreational immunity for David because Paul's overall 
pecuniary benefit was over $2,000.  This pecuniary gain came 
from the sale of the boat.  Urban purchased the boat for $4,000. 
 The plaintiffs assert that Urban's use of the slip was part of 
the consideration in the sale of the boat.  The plaintiffs 
further contend that, because Paul would be denied immunity in 
this respect, David should similarly be denied immunity.  
However, in this case, this exception does not apply.   
¶39 The record does not provide any evidence to show that 
Paul's permission to use the boat slip helped to secure the sale 
of the boat or had any effect on the overall cost of the boat.  
Indeed, Urban suggested that the cost of the slip was included 
in the boat sale, but he also stated that Paul told him "no 
problem" and did not charge him directly for the use of the 
slip.  Regardless, even if Paul had received such a benefit in 
the sale of his boat, the benefit gained for the use of the boat 
slip would have been only a minimal pecuniary gain.  Further, 
there are no facts in the record to suggest that David received 
any benefit.  David is entitled to immunity. 
¶40 In summary, we conclude that the facts of this case 
give rise to recreational immunity for David.  The circuit court 
properly granted summary judgment to the defendants. 
No. 99-0933 
 
20
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is 
affirmed. 
No. 99-0933.jpw 
 
1 
¶41 JON P. WILCOX, J. (concurring).  I agree with the 
majority's conclusion that Wis. Stat. § 895.52 (1995-96)5 confers 
immunity upon David Grasser.  However, for the reasons expressed 
in my dissent to Minnesota Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Paper 
Recycling of LaCrosse, 2001 WI 64, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d 
___, I do not join the majority's conclusion that courts 
examining whether a particular activity falls within the scope 
of § 895.52 must consider the nature of the property on which 
the activity occurs and the subjective intent of the property 
owner to open his or her property to recreational activity.  See 
majority op. at ¶13.  
¶42 Section 895.52 is plain on its face.  It provides that 
"no owner and no officer, employe or agent of an owner is liable 
for the death of, any injury to, or any death or injury caused 
by, a person engaging in a recreational activity on the owner's 
property."  Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2)(b).  This broad grant of 
immunity applies to all "real property and buildings, structures 
and improvements thereon."6  Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(f).  Nothing 
in the statute further qualifies the type of property to which 
§ 895.52 immunity attaches.  
¶43 Until recently, this court recognized as much:   
 
The unambiguous language of the recreational use 
statute 
sets 
the 
following 
precondition 
for 
                     
5 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1995-96 version unless otherwise indicated.  
6 Section 895.52 also applies to "the waters of the state, 
as defined under s.144.01(18)."  Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(f).  
No. 99-0933.jpw 
 
2 
immunitythat the injury be to or caused by "a person 
engaging in a recreational activity on the owner's 
property . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2)(b).  There 
is no language [in § 895.52] that conditions immunity 
upon affirmative acts on the part of the owner to 
grant permission or otherwise "open" land.  The 
legislature has made it clear that previous decisions 
by 
Wisconsin 
courts 
that 
are 
more 
restrictive, 
implying a requirement that lands be "open," are 
overruled. 
Verdoljak v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 200 Wis. 2d 624, 634-35, 547 
N.W.2d 602 (1996).  Therefore, this court traditionally has held 
that § 895.52 conditions immunity upon the nature of the 
property user's activity, not on the nature or "openness" of the 
property.  Id. at 631; Sievert v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 
190 Wis. 2d 623, 632, 528 N.W.2d 413 (1995). 
¶44 Nonetheless, the majority posits that the scope of 
§ 895.52 recreational immunity is unclear and is guided by a 
"seeming lack of basic underlying principles."  Majority op. at 
¶12.  This conclusion, in itself, is rather curious in light of 
the fact that the legislature distinctly explained the basic 
principles underlying § 895.52:  "The legislature intends by 
[§ 895.52] to limit the liability of property owners toward 
others who use their property for recreational activities 
. . . .  [T]his legislation should be liberally construed in 
favor of property owners to protect them from liability."  1983 
Wis. Act 418 (act creating § 895.52).   But the majority 
believes that its professed confusion regarding the principles 
underlying § 895.52 permits it to inject its view of what the 
law should say.  Consequently, it acknowledges two recent court-
created limits on the type of property to which § 895.52 applies 
No. 99-0933.jpw 
 
3 
and, in doing so, shifts the statutory precondition for 
recreational immunity from the nature of the property user's 
activity to the nature of the property on which the activity 
occurs. 
¶45 To be sure, the majority frames these limits as a list 
of factors courts must consider in examining the nature of an 
activity, rather than as restrictions on the type of property to 
which § 895.52 applies.  Regardless of how the majority spins 
this issue, however, the result is the same:  Courts may 
withhold recreational immunity from property owners who own what 
the courts deem to be "non-recreational property."  Thus, the 
type of property to which § 895.52 immunity attaches is no 
longer defined by § 895.52, but instead, by the courts.  
¶46 As I explained in my dissent to Minnesota Fire, I will 
not join the majority in ignoring the clear legislative 
directive in § 895.52.  Accordingly, while I concur in the 
majority's disposition of the case at hand, I do not join the 
majority in recognizing the new judicially-legislated limits on 
the types of property to which § 895.52 immunity extends.   
 
 
No. 99-0933.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶47 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE (dissenting).  
Today's decision extends immunity for recreational activity on 
one owner's property to the owner of adjacent property that the 
injured plaintiff walked across in order to get to his 
automobile after leaving the land upon which he engaged in 
recreational activity.  Because I conclude that this extension 
of immunity is not justified under Wis. Stat. § 895.52, I 
dissent. 
¶48 The facts of this case show that the plaintiff, Donald 
Urban, was injured while walking on the property of defendant 
David Grasser.  The plaintiff walked across David Grasser's land 
to get back to the plaintiff's automobile after having worked on 
his boat.  The plaintiff's boat activities, which occurred on 
property owned by Paul Grasser, are "recreational activities" on 
Paul Grasser's land within Wis. Stat. § 895.52(1)(g) and (2)(b). 
¶49 Under the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2)(b), 
"no owner is liable for . . . any injury to . . . a person 
engaging in a recreational activity on the owner's property."  
Paul Grasser is immune from liability under the statute for 
injury to the plaintiff, who engaged in a recreational activity 
on Paul Grasser's property.  Paul Grasser may also arguably be 
immune from liability under the statute for injury to the 
plaintiff for any recreational activity in which the plaintiff 
engaged on Paul Grasser's easement. 
¶50 The statute does not, however, extend recreational 
immunity to David Grasser, the owner of the servient estate, the 
No. 99-0933.ssa 
 
2 
property subject to the easement.7  The statute grants an owner 
immunity from liability only for an injury to "a person engaging 
in a recreational activity on the owner's property."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.52(2)(b) (emphasis added).  The plaintiff was not injured 
while engaging in a recreational activity on David Grasser's 
property.  The majority opinion implicitly agrees with this 
position and therefore rewrites Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2)(b). 
¶51 The 
majority 
opinion 
has 
rewritten 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 895.52(2)(b), apparently adding the words shown in boldface to 
grant an owner of property immunity from liability for an injury 
to "a person engaging in a recreational activity on the owner's 
property and to a person engaging in a recreational activity on 
another person's property when the activity on the owner's 
property is inextricably connected to the recreational activity 
on the other person's property." 
¶52 Applying 
the statute 
as 
rewritten, 
the majority 
opinion concludes that David Grasser is entitled to share Paul 
Grasser's recreational immunity because the plaintiff's walking 
on David Grasser's property is "inextricably connected" to the 
recreational activity of boating that had occurred on Paul 
Grasser's property.  This nebulous concept of "inextricably 
connected" that extends recreational immunity to a second 
                     
7 The existence of an access easement between David and Paul 
Grasser 
provides 
no 
support 
for 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
conclusion that the two men share recreational immunity.  The 
majority opinion cites no authority to support the idea that 
statutory immunity from tort liability of the owner of a 
dominant estate is shared by the owner of the servient estate. 
No. 99-0933.ssa 
 
3 
property owner as a result of a recreational activity that 
occurs on adjacent property has no basis in the recreational 
immunity statute.  
¶53 In reading the statute the way it does, the majority 
opinion suggests that it is fulfilling the purpose of the 
statute to encourage property owners to open their property for 
recreational activity.8  I disagree. 
¶54 First, whether the purpose of the recreation immunity 
statute is to open land for recreation is open to question.  The 
"opening the land" purpose is no longer expressed in the 
statute.  The 1983 amendments to the recreational immunity 
statute apply to the present case and contain no references to 
opening the land or giving or granting permission to enter the 
land as had earlier statutes.  The purpose of the 1983 statute 
was to limit the liability of property owners toward others who 
use the property for recreational activities.  The 1983 amended 
statute does not purport to grant immunity only to those owners 
who open their land for recreational activity.9 
                     
8 See majority op. at ¶12. 
See also Minnesota Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Paper Recycling 
Co., 2001 WI 64, ¶¶60-61, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ 
(Wilcox, J., dissenting). 
9 Verdoljak v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 200 Wis. 2d 624, 632-33, 
635, 547 N.W.2d 602 (1996). 
See also Minnesota Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Paper Recycling 
Co., 2001 WI 64, ¶¶60-61, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ 
(Wilcox, J., dissenting). 
No. 99-0933.ssa 
 
4 
¶55 One of the purposes of the 1983 amendments as 
evidenced in the legislative history was to do away with the 
great uncertainty in the recreational immunity law produced in 
this court's decisions.10  Yet the majority opinion creates new 
uncertainty.  Requiring an intensely fact-driven inquiry into 
whether a plaintiff's presence on one property is "inextricably 
connected" to recreational activity on a second property creates 
uncertainty. 
¶56 This 
sort 
of 
intensive 
fact-driven 
inquiry 
fundamentally changes the "open the land" purpose of the 
recreational immunity statute that the majority opinion is 
striving to achieve: If property owners' immunity from suit 
depends on a court's fact-driven inquiry rather than on the 
plain language of the statute, property owners have less 
incentive to open their property for recreational activities.  I 
do not think the legislature intended that Wis. Stat. § 895.52 
operate as such an unpredictable tool for defendants in personal 
injury cases. 
¶57 The new and nebulous judicially created concept of 
"inextricably 
connected" 
threatens 
to 
extend 
recreational 
immunity far beyond the plain language of the statute.  For 
example, the plaintiff in this case was walking across David 
Grasser's property to get his automobile, which was parked on 
the street.  Is the street or parking area on which the 
                     
10 See Minnesota Fire, 2001 WI 64, ¶61 n.7 (Wilcox, J., 
dissenting). 
No. 99-0933.ssa 
 
5 
plaintiff parked his automobile, an activity that was necessary 
to get to the boat, also inextricably connected to the 
recreational activity that occurred on the property of a 
different owner?  Is the owner of the street or the parking area 
entitled to recreational immunity for an injury that occurred 
while the plaintiff was going to or from his car?  What if the 
plaintiff parked a mile away and had to walk over several 
different properties to reach his boat: would each property 
owner along the journey be entitled to recreational immunity 
under 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
theory 
of 
an 
inextricable 
connection?  What about an injury that occurred at some point in 
the plaintiff's drive from home?  The majority opinion provides 
no sense of how distant in time or space the nonrecreational 
activity must be in order to extricate it from its connection to 
the 
recreational 
activity. 
 
As 
a 
result, 
the 
potential 
applications of this new theory of recreational immunity seem 
boundless. 
¶58 Because I see no logical stopping point for the 
majority's 
new theory, 
and 
because 
I 
do 
not 
think the 
legislature intended that the statute would provide such broad 
immunity for defendants in personal injury cases, I conclude 
that this case represents the stopping point for recreational 
immunity.   
¶59 David Grasser is not the owner of property on which a 
recreational activity occurred.  Accordingly, under the plain 
language of Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2)(b), David Grasser is not 
No. 99-0933.ssa 
 
6 
immune from liability for injury to the plaintiff, who was 
engaged in a recreational activity on another's property. 
¶60 This court should await clear guidance from the 
legislature before extending recreational immunity to adjacent 
property owners whose property the injured person walks across 
en route to or from a recreational activity on another's land.  
The nebulous concept of "inextricably connected to recreational 
activity" cannot be applied with any precision and expands 
recreational immunity far beyond the plain language of Wis. 
Stat. § 895.52.  
¶61 Finally, I join the chorus of voices on this court 
expressing frustration with trying to apply the current version 
of the recreational immunity statute clearly and consistently in 
the myriad fact situations that have arisen.11  More cases are in 
                     
11 Another issue is the disparity in language between Wis. 
Stat. § 895.52(2)(b), which grants an owner of property immunity 
under certain circumstances, and Wis. Stat. § 895.52(6)(d), 
which restores liability for social guests.   
Section 895.52(2)(b) grants immunity for any "injury to 
. . . a person engaging in recreational activity on the owner's 
property."  In contrast, Wis. Stat. § 895.52(6)(d) creates a 
social guest exception.  Subsection (6)(d) states that the 
liability of an owner (other than a government body or nonprofit 
organization) whose property is used for recreational activity 
is not limited under Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2) when the "injury 
occurs on property owned by a private property owner to a social 
guest." 
No. 99-0933.ssa 
 
7 
the pipeline.  I join the chorus requesting clarification from 
the legislature regarding the intended scope and application of 
the recreational immunity statute.12  I suggest the legislature 
might 
wish 
to 
reexamine 
the 
statute. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 13.83(1)(c)1 and 13.93(2)(d) (1999-2000). 
¶62 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶63 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
                                                                  
Thus, for recreational immunity, apparently an owner need 
only show that the injured person engaged in recreational 
activity on the owner's property.  It is arguable that whether 
the injury occurred on the owner's property is irrelevant.  If 
the injured person seeks to hold the owner liable under the 
social guest exception to recreational immunity, the statute 
might be interpreted to require that the injury occurred on the 
owner's property.  See Waters v. Pertzborn, 2001 WI 62, ¶50, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.  
12 See majority op. at ¶12.  See also Minnesota Fire, 2001 
WI 64, ¶¶37-44 (Bradley, J., concurring); id. at ¶72 (Wilcox, 
J., dissenting). 
No. 99-0933.ssa 
 
1