Title: CVAS 2, LLC v. City of Fredericksburg

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Lemons, C.J, Goodwyn, Millette, Mims, McClanahan, and 
Powell, JJ., and Koontz, S.J. 
 
CVAS 2, LLC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  OPINION BY 
v. 
Record No. 140505 
 
   JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR.
 
                                  January 8, 2015 
CITY OF FREDERICKSBURG 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF FREDERICKSBURG 
Gordon F. Willis, Judge 
 
In this appeal we consider whether a circuit court had 
authority to enter a decree of sale of real estate pursuant to 
a locality's suit to collect delinquent real estate taxes and 
delinquent special assessments. 
I. 
Facts And Proceedings 
The City of Fredericksburg (the "City") created the 
Celebrate Virginia South Community Development Authority (the 
"CDA") in 2000 by resolution, and ratified and amended that 
resolution in 2005.  CVAS 2, LLC owns real estate located 
within the City's geographic area.  The City has levied that 
real estate with taxes, and the local governing body has levied 
that real estate with special assessments for the CDA's 
benefit.  CVAS 2 has not paid all these taxes and special 
assessments.  CVAS 2 has outstanding real estate taxes dating 
back to the 2012 fiscal year, and has outstanding special 
assessments dating back to the 2009 fiscal year. 
 
2 
On June 13, 2013, the City brought suit against CVAS 2.  
The City sought to have CVAS 2's real estate sold in order to 
collect CVAS 2's outstanding payments for the delinquent real 
estate taxes and special assessments.  The City's complaint and 
the City's motion for decree of sale cited Article 4 of Chapter 
39 of Title 58.1 as the basis for its complaint and the 
authority for the decree of sale.1 
CVAS 2 filed a motion to dismiss along with its amended 
answer.  The motion to dismiss asserted in relevant part that 
the City failed to comply with Code § 58.1-3965, and therefore 
its complaint could not result in a decree of sale to recover 
the delinquent real estate taxes and special assessments.  
After a hearing on the matter, the circuit court granted the 
City's motion for the sale of CVAS 2's real estate.  The court 
subsequently entered a decree of sale, in which the court 
(1) denied CVAS 2's motion to dismiss, (2) ordered that 
CVAS 2's real estate be sold in gross to pay "the taxes, 
penalties, interest, special assessments, fees, costs, and any 
                     
 
1 In its complaint, the City alleged that the action was 
"brought pursuant to Virginia Code §§ 58.1-3965 and 58.1-
3965.2, et seq."  In its motion for decree of sale, the City 
asserted that the case "was initiated upon the filing of that 
certain Complaint among the records of this Court citing all 
notices required by Virginia Code § 58.1-3965, et seq., having 
been complied with in this matter."  Later in that motion, the 
City specifically cited Code §§ 58.1-3965, 58.1-3965.2, and 
58.1-3969. 
 
3 
liens whatever thereon" pursuant to Code §§ 15.2-5158, 58.1-
3965, and 58.1-3969, and (3) appointed a special commissioner 
to oversee the sale of CVAS 2's real estate and to disburse the 
funds from that sale. 
CVAS 2 timely filed a petition for appeal with this Court.  
We granted CVAS 2's single assignment of error: 
1. The trial court erred in its construction of 
Virginia Code §§ 15.2-5158 and 58.1-3965(A) by 
ordering the sale of CVAS 2's [real estate] when taxes 
are less than two (2) years delinquent. 
II. Discussion 
A. 
Standard Of Review 
Whether this Court has jurisdiction of an appeal is a 
question of law we review de novo.  See Henderson v. Ayres & 
Hartnett, P.C., 285 Va. 556, 563, 740 S.E.2d 518, 521 (2013).  
Issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law we 
review de novo.  Commonwealth v. Herring, 288 Va. 59, 66, 758 
S.E.2d 225, 229 (2014). 
B. 
The City's Motion To Dismiss CVAS 2's Appeal To This Court 
Pursuant to Rule 5:4, the City filed a motion to dismiss 
CVAS 2's appeal to this Court on the basis that the circuit 
court's entry of the decree of sale was not a final order 
giving rise to this Court's jurisdiction under Code § 8.01-
670(A).  It is a familiar principle that a "court always has 
jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction."  Rutter v. 
 
4 
Oakwood Living Ctrs. of Va., Inc., 282 Va. 4, 13, 710 S.E.2d 
460, 464 (2011) (collecting cases) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
Final orders, as envisioned by Code § 8.01-670(A), are not 
the only types of orders giving rise to this Court's 
jurisdiction.  "[F]or [this] Court to have jurisdiction of [an] 
appeal, the order from which [a petitioner] appealed must be 
either a final order or an interlocutory order from which an 
appeal is statutorily authorized."  Comcast of Chesterfield 
Cnty., Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 277 Va. 293, 300, 672 
S.E.2d 870, 873 (2009).  Title 8.01 of the Code of Virginia 
establishes civil remedies and procedures.  The General 
Assembly has provided that, except in cases involving an 
administrative agency, the Virginia Workers' Compensation 
Commission, or domestic relations, which would vest 
jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals, this Court has 
jurisdiction of an appeal from an interlocutory decree or order 
"in any case on an equitable claim" in three enumerated 
situations, one of which applies here.  Code § 8.01-670(B)(2); 
see also Code § 17.1-405. 
The decree of sale from which CVAS 2 appeals is an 
interlocutory decree in a case on an equitable claim, even 
though that claim is statutory in nature.  The General Assembly 
has the power to define the statutory rights it creates to be 
 
5 
of a legal or equitable nature.2  See, e.g., Campbell v. Harmon, 
271 Va. 590, 597, 628 S.E.2d 308, 311 (2006) (Code § 8.01-31 
permits the beneficiary of a trust to file an "accounting in 
equity" against the trustee); City of Portsmouth v. City of 
Chesapeake, 232 Va. 158, 164, 349 S.E.2d 351, 354 (1986) 
(former Code § 15.1-1026 et seq., now Code § 15.2-3100 et seq., 
allowing cities to file suit to determine the boundary lines 
between them, conferred "only legal, not equitable, rights").  
The City filed suit against CVAS 2 to sell CVAS 2's real estate 
for delinquent real estate taxes and special assessments.  The 
statutory scheme upon which the City filed suit, and the 
authority relied upon by the circuit court to enter the decree 
of sale, was Article 4 of Chapter 39 of Title 58.1.  The 
General Assembly explained that "[p]roceedings under this 
article for . . . the sale of real estate on which county, 
city, or town taxes are delinquent shall be by bill in equity."  
Code § 58.1-3967 (emphasis added). 
                     
 
2 "There shall be one form of civil case, known as a civil 
action."  Rule 3:1.  This Rule "effectively abolish[es] the 
division of trial court dockets into legal and equity 
proceedings."  Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Norfolk S. Railway 
Co., 278 Va. 444, 454 n.3, 683 S.E.2d 517, 522 n.3 (2009).  
Despite this change to how pleadings are labeled and filed, 
this Rule does not abolish the existence of, and distinction 
between, legal and equitable claims.  Rule 3:1; VEPCO, 278 Va. 
at 454 n.3, 683 S.E.2d at 522 n.3. 
 
6 
As the City's case is a "case on an equitable claim" and 
does not involve an administrative agency, the Virginia 
Workers' Compensation Commission, or domestic relations, this 
Court has jurisdiction to resolve this appeal from the 
interlocutory order "[r]equiring . . . title of property to be 
changed."  Code § 8.01-670(B)(2).  We therefore deny the City's 
motion to dismiss CVAS 2's appeal. 
C. 
Localities, Community Development Authorities, And The 
Imposition Of Taxes And Assessments On Real Estate 
This appeal requires us to address how different 
governmental entities may levy and collect certain taxes and 
assessments on real estate.  In particular, five statutory 
provisions allowing for such action are implicated in this 
dispute.  "Because we do not read statutes in isolation, and 
because statutes dealing with a specific subject must be 
construed together in order to arrive at the object sought to 
be accomplished," we first review these relevant statutes so 
that we can more readily resolve the issues on appeal.  Bailey 
v. Loudoun Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 288 Va. 159, 169-70, 762 
S.E.2d 763, 765 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
1. 
How A Locality May Levy And Collect Taxes On Real Estate 
In compliance with the Constitution of Virginia, the 
General Assembly directs that certain real estate "shall be 
assessed for local taxation in accordance with the provisions 
 
7 
of [Chapter 32 of Title 58.1, Code § 58.1-3200 et seq.,] and 
other provisions of law."  Code § 58.1-3200; see also Va. 
Const. art. X, § 4.  In Code § 58.1-3965, the General Assembly 
established the method for a locality to collect delinquent 
taxes by selling the subject real estate.3  In relevant part, 
the "officer charged with the duty of collecting taxes for the 
locality" must abide by the following: 
When any taxes on any real estate in a locality are 
delinquent on December 31 following the second 
anniversary of the date on which such taxes have 
become due . . . such real estate may be sold for the 
purpose of collecting all delinquent taxes on such 
property. 
Code § 58.1-3965(A).  This provision contains two aspects 
important to this appeal.  First, the locality may not bring 
suit to collect delinquent taxes on real estate until the 
December 31 two years after the real estate taxes became due.  
Second, the suit to collect such delinquent taxes may be 
enforced through the sale of the real estate upon which the 
delinquent taxes were levied. 
Also, the General Assembly allows a city to reduce the two 
year delay in Code § 58.1-3965(A) to a single year.  That is, a 
city – but not a county or town - may pass an ordinance 
allowing it to file suit, for the purposes of having real 
                     
 
3 A "[l]ocality" may be either a county, city, or town.  
Code § 15.2-102. 
 
8 
estate sold to collect delinquent taxes on such property, on 
the December 31 one year after such outstanding taxes become 
due.  Code § 58.1-3965.1. 
2. 
How A Locality May Levy And Collect Special Taxes On 
Behalf Of A Community Development Authority 
Localities may, "by ordinance or resolution[,] create a 
community development authority."  Code § 15.2-5155(A).  The 
General Assembly has provided numerous powers to any community 
development authority created by a locality.  See Code §§ 15.2-
5114; 15.2-5158.  In order "to finance the services and 
facilities provided by the authority," one such power is the 
ability to "[r]equest annually that the locality levy and 
collect a special tax on taxable real property within the 
development authority's jurisdiction."  Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3).  
Thus, the community development authority may not levy and 
collect the special tax itself, but may request that the 
locality do so on its behalf.  Then, once the locality receives 
the revenues from the special tax, those revenues are directed 
to "be paid over to the development authority for its use 
pursuant to this chapter."  Id. 
The General Assembly has established the following method 
for a locality to collect such special taxes: 
 
9 
The special taxes shall be collected at the same time 
and in the same manner as the locality's taxes are 
collected, and the proceeds shall be kept in a 
separate account and be used only for the purposes 
provided in this chapter. 
Id.  The parties dispute how the statutory phrase "at the same 
time and in the same manner" operates.  "As this statutory 
language is neither ambiguous nor absurd, we conclude that it 
means exactly what it says."  Bailey, 288 Va. at 173, 762 
S.E.2d at 768; see also Sheppard v. Junes, 287 Va. 397, 403, 
756 S.E.2d 409, 411 (2014). 
"[I]n the same manner" means that a special tax must be 
collected in accordance with the procedural provisions that 
govern the collection of "the locality's taxes."  That is, how 
a special tax is collected is determined by the manner in which 
"the locality's taxes" are collected.  Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3). 
"[A]t the same time" must mean something different than 
"in the same manner."  To reason otherwise contravenes our 
repeated admonition of making any portion of a statute 
meaningless or surplusage.  See, e.g., Idoux v. Helou, 279 Va. 
548, 554, 691 S.E.2d 773, 776 (2010).  The preposition "at" in 
this phrase is "used as a function word to indicate [a] 
position in time."  Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary 136 (1993).  The position in time to which this 
phrase relates is when the locality collects "the locality's 
taxes."  That is, when a special tax is collected is determined 
 
10 
by the time when "the locality's taxes" are collected.  Code 
§ 15.2-5158(A)(3). 
The General Assembly coupled the collection of special 
taxes under Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3) to the collection of "the 
locality's taxes."  This general phrase – "locality's taxes" – 
does not specify what type of tax the locality must use as a 
prerequisite to collect special taxes, and therefore the 
locality may choose to what tax it wishes to attach the 
collection of special taxes.  Then, whatever tax the locality 
chooses to be the prerequisite for collecting special taxes in 
any given situation will govern the "at the same time and in 
the same manner" analysis. 
This case is illustrative.  The City sought to collect 
delinquent real estate taxes as the type of "locality's taxes" 
serving as the prerequisite necessary to collect delinquent 
special taxes.  Delinquent real estate taxes are collected 
pursuant to Code § 58.1-3965.  Thus, our analysis of the 
statutory phrase "at the same time and in the same manner" in 
Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3) is necessarily related to Code § 58.1-
3965 for purposes of the City's appeal.  Consequently, when a 
Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3) special tax is collected ("at the same 
time") is dictated by Code § 58.1-3965, so that the City can 
collect delinquent special taxes only at the time when the City 
properly seeks to collect delinquent real estate taxes under 
 
11 
Code § 58.1-3965.  Further, how a Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3) 
special tax is collected ("in the same manner") is governed by 
Code § 58.1-3965, thereby allowing, in pertinent part, the City 
to sell the subject real estate to recover delinquent special 
taxes.  See Code § 58.1-3965(A). 
3. 
How A Local Governing Body May Levy And Collect A Special 
Assessment On Behalf Of A Community Development Authority 
As part of the powers the General Assembly afforded to all 
community development authorities, a development authority has 
the ability to have a "special assessment . . . imposed by the 
local governing body" in order to "[f]inance the services and 
facilities [the development authority] provides to abutting 
property within the district."  Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5).  As 
with special taxes, the community development authority does 
not have the power to levy and collect the special assessment 
itself.  Instead, the local governing body must levy and 
collect such a special assessment on the development 
authority's behalf.4  Then, once the locality receives the 
revenues from the special assessments "which the locality 
elects to impose upon [a development authority's] request," 
those revenues are directed to "be paid over to the development 
authority for its use under this chapter."  Id. 
                     
 
4 The "[g]overning body" of the locality may be either "the 
board of supervisors of a county, council of a city, or council 
of a town."  Code § 15.2-102. 
 
12 
The General Assembly has established the following method 
for a local governing body to collect such special assessments: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any 
assessments made pursuant to this section may be made 
effective as a lien upon a specified date, by 
ordinance, but such assessments may not thereafter be 
modified in a manner inconsistent with the terms of 
the debt instruments financing the improvements. 
Id.  Unlike a special tax for the benefit of a community 
development authority under Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3), this 
provision provides that a special assessment for the benefit of 
a community development authority must be collected as a lien.  
Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5). 
Moreover, the method in which a delinquent special 
assessment is collected differs significantly from the method 
in which a delinquent special tax is collected.  Unlike Code 
§ 15.2-5158(A)(3), which relates to special taxes, Code § 15.2-
5158(A)(5), which relates to special assessments, contains no 
reference to being collected at the same time and in the same 
manner as the locality's taxes are collected.  Thus, unlike a 
special tax, a special assessment "may be made effective as a 
lien upon a specified date, by ordinance."  Code § 15.2-
5158(A)(5).  There is no requirement that the special 
assessment must be collected when the locality's taxes are 
collected, or that it be collected under the procedures 
governing the locality's collection of taxes.  Consequently, a 
 
13 
special assessment need not be collected "at the same time and 
in the same manner" as another type of locality's taxes, 
including, for example, real estate taxes under Code § 58.1-
3965.  Simultaneously, however, a suit to collect delinquent 
special assessments under Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5) lacks the 
authority set forth in Code § 58.1-3965(A) to sell the real 
estate in order to collect the delinquent special assessment. 
4. 
Additional Methods To Collect Special Taxes And Special 
Assessments 
Finally, the General Assembly has provided additional 
methods to expedite the collection of special taxes or special 
assessments: 
In addition to the authority provided by 
subsection A of § 58.1-3965, a locality may provide, 
as part of any ordinance[:] 
(ii) to levy special taxes or special assessments on 
real property within any district covered by the 
community development authority or on abutting 
property within the district, that proceedings be 
instituted to sell any such real property when any 
special tax or special assessment described under 
subdivision A 3 or A 5 of [Code] § 15.2-5158 imposed 
on the property is delinquent on the first anniversary 
of the date on which the tax or assessment became due. 
Code § 58.1-3965.2 (paragraph break added).  This provision 
permits localities to expedite the collection of delinquent 
obligations by shortening the period of delinquency required 
before selling the subject real estate from two years to one 
year.  Thus, the locality may provide "as part of any 
 
14 
ordinance" that a suit to collect delinquent special taxes or 
special assessments may result in real estate being sold so 
long as the suit is filed on or after one year from when the 
special tax or special assessment became due.  Code § 58.1-
3965.2(ii) (emphasis added). 
Such an ordinance, as pertaining to special taxes, would 
separate the collection of special taxes from the default 
requirement under Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3) that the locality's 
collection of special taxes must be "at the same time" when the 
locality collects another type of "locality's taxes."  Code 
§ 58.1-3965.2(ii). 
Additionally, such an ordinance, as pertaining to special 
assessments, would bring the locality's collection of special 
assessments under the umbrella of Article 4 of Chapter 39 of 
Title 58.1.  Such an ordinance would authorize the sale of the 
subject real estate to collect a special assessment under Code 
§ 58.1-3965, which, as addressed, is not permitted by the plain 
language of Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5).  Code § 58.1-3965.2(ii). 
D. 
The City's Suit Against CVAS 2: Collection Of Delinquent 
Real Estate Taxes 
Having laid out the statutory framework relevant to the 
City's suit, we now turn to whether the circuit court erred in 
entering the decree of sale. 
 
15 
The City's suit against CVAS 2 sought, in part, collection 
of delinquent real estate taxes.  As discussed, the sale of 
real estate for the collection of delinquent real estate taxes 
by the City is governed by Code § 58.1-3965.  The earliest a 
suit can be brought to collect outstanding real estate taxes is 
the December 31 two years following the anniversary of when the 
taxes became due.  Code § 58.1-3965(A).  The City has not 
passed an ordinance under Code § 58.1-3965.1 reducing this time 
requirement to the December 31 one year following the 
anniversary of when the taxes became due. 
CVAS 2's delinquent real estate taxes date back to the 
2012 fiscal year.  The City's local ordinances provide that its 
fiscal year ends on June 30, and that all real estate taxes for 
any given fiscal year are due in two installment payments, the 
first on November 15 and the second on May 15.  Fredericksburg 
City Code §§ 2-491; 70-93.  The City has further explained to 
this Court that its fiscal year ends prior to the end of the 
calendar year, so that the 2012 fiscal year began on July 1, 
2011 and ended on June 30, 2012.  Thus, CVAS 2's first 
delinquent installment payment on its 2012 taxes occurred on 
November 15, 2011. 
The December 31 two years following the anniversary of 
November 15, 2011 is December 31, 2013.  Thus, the City's suit, 
filed on June 13, 2013, to collect those delinquent real estate 
 
16 
taxes was premature and requires dismissal of the City's 
complaint as to the delinquent real estate taxes.  See Code 
§ 58.1-3965(A). 
A suit to sell real estate to collect delinquent taxes on 
that property is purely a creature of statute.  See Lester 
Group, Inc. v. Little, 238 Va. 54, 57, 381 S.E.2d 3, 5 (1989) 
("The power of a governmental entity to sell land for non-
payment of taxes is not a common law power, but arises entirely 
from statute." (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted)).  A party's ability to "enforce" such a statutory 
right "rest[s] upon compliance with the statute."  Isle of 
Wight Materials Co. v. Cowling Bros., 246 Va. 103, 105, 431 
S.E.2d 42, 43 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  Because the City did not strictly comply with the 
time period in Code § 58.1-3965(A) allowing for such a suit to 
be brought, the City had no authority under that statute to 
bring suit to sell CVAS 2's real estate as a means to collect 
delinquent real estate taxes dating back to November 15, 2011.  
See Lester Group, 238 Va. at 57, 381 S.E.2d at 5. 
E. 
The City's Suit Against CVAS 2: Collection Of Delinquent 
"Special Assessments" 
The City's suit against CVAS 2 also sought, in part, 
collection of delinquent "special assessments." 
 
17 
1. 
Special Taxes Are Different From Special Assessments 
Despite the City and CVAS 2 repeatedly acknowledging that 
the City was seeking to collect special assessments, both 
parties argued before the circuit court whether CVAS 2's real 
estate could be sold under Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3), which 
governs collection of delinquent special taxes, as opposed to 
Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5), which governs collection of delinquent 
special assessments.  And the circuit court, citing Code 
§ 15.2-5158 in support of its authority to enter the decree of 
sale, necessarily relied upon Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3) because, 
as previously addressed, Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5) does not 
provide authority to sell real estate. 
This confusion between special taxes and special 
assessments, and what statutory provisions are applicable to 
each type of obligation, persists on appeal.  In briefs 
submitted to this Court, the City now refers to the delinquent 
special assessments as "special tax assessments," and argues 
that Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3) remains the governing statute.  For 
its part, CVAS 2 has resisted this change in nomenclature and 
continues to assert in briefs submitted to this Court that the 
special assessments were indeed special assessments and not 
 
18 
special taxes, but has corrected its error and now argues that 
special assessments are governed by Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5).5 
During oral argument, the City assured this Court that no 
practical difference exists between special taxes and special 
assessments.  We disagree.  The General Assembly gave these 
words particular and fixed meanings in the statutory scheme 
pertaining to community development authorities, and we must 
give different effect to these different statutory provisions.  
PKO Ventures, LLC v. Norfolk Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 286 
Va. 174, 183, 747 S.E.2d 826, 831 (2013). 
Longstanding jurisprudence has distinguished between 
special taxes and special assessments.  See 1 William Herbert 
Page & Paul Jones, A Treatise on the Law of Taxation by Local 
and Special Assessments § 4, at 4 (1909) (defining a special 
assessment, when used in this context, as "a charge upon 
                     
 
5 Of course, judicial estoppel prohibits a party "from 
taking inconsistent positions within a single action."  Lofton 
Ridge, LLC v. Norfolk S. Railway, 268 Va. 377, 381-82, 601 
S.E.2d 648, 650-51 (2004).  However, a party cannot concede the 
law.  Cofield v. Nuckles, 239 Va. 186, 194, 387 S.E.2d 493, 498 
(1990).  Further, a party's mistaken belief as to what statutes 
govern a particular set of facts does not bind this Court on 
appeal, nor does such an error prohibit this Court from 
establishing how a statutory scheme correctly operates or from 
applying the correct statutes to the set of facts before it.  
See Virginia Marine Res. Comm'n v. Chincoteague Inn, 287 Va. 
371, 388-89, 757 S.E.2d 1, 10 (2014); Wright v. Commonwealth, 
278 Va. 754, 760 n.3, 685 S.E.2d 655, 658 n.3 (2009); see also, 
e.g., PS Business Parks, L.P. v. Deutsch & Gilden, Inc., 287 
Va. 410, 420-22, 758 S.E.2d 508, 513-14 (2014). 
 
19 
property, imposed by proper authority, usually in return for 
special benefits conferred upon such property by an improvement 
of a public character for the expense of making which the 
assessment is levied"); id. § 7, at 11-13 (further defining 
what constitutes a special assessment); id. § 35, at 59-62 
(distinguishing a tax, which is a "recurring charge" that "is 
levied for the purpose of raising revenue for paying the 
expenses of the government," from a special assessment, which 
is only levied "occasionally" and for purposes of paying for 
the "special benefits conferred upon" the property owner); id. 
§ 50, at 86 (noting that one definition of "special tax" is 
"that of a tax analogous to the general tax, but devoted to a 
specific purpose and not to be used for the general expenses of 
the public corporation which levies it"). 
In the context of community development authorities, the 
General Assembly has acted in accordance with this longstanding 
law by distinguishing between a special tax and a special 
assessment.  On the one hand, a special tax must come as an 
"annual[]" "[r]equest" by the community development authority 
for the locality to "levy and collect" that tax so as to 
"finance the services and facilities provided by" the 
development authority.  Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3).  On the other 
hand, a special assessment arises from "improvements" to "the 
services and facilities" provided "to abutting property within 
 
20 
the district" under the development authority's oversight, and 
must comply with "the laws pertaining to assessments under 
Article 2 ([Code §] 15.2-2404 et seq.)" as well as other 
expressly detailed requirements.  Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5).6 
                     
 
6 Justice McClanahan correctly observes that Code § 15.2-
5158(A)(5) mentions both "assessments" and "taxes."  However, a 
close reading of this statutory provision reveals that the 
reference to "taxes" is inadvertent and does not alter our 
conclusion that special assessments under Code § 15.2-
5158(A)(5) are treated differently from special taxes under 
Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3) and real estate taxes under Code § 58.1-
3965. 
 
Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5) contains five sentences.  The 
first, third, fourth, and fifth sentences are all substantive 
provisions and provide, respectively:  that every community 
development authority has the power to request imposition of 
special assessments; how special assessments shall be made 
effective; how special assessments shall be implemented; and 
how revenues collected from special assessments shall be 
disposed.  In each of these sentences, the General Assembly 
uses only the terms "special assessment" or "assessments." 
 
The second sentence of Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5) is not 
substantive, but establishes certain requirements for "[a]ll 
assessments [imposed] pursuant to this section."  (Emphasis 
added.)  As part of those requirements, the second sentence 
first references "the laws pertaining to assessments under 
Article 2 ([Code] § 15.2-2404 et seq.) of Chapter 24," and then 
provides three additional requirements.  In setting forth these 
three additional requirements, Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5) refers to 
"taxes or assessments." 
 
This passing reference to "taxes" in the second sentence 
does not alter the scope of Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5).  The second 
sentence provides requirements only for "[a]ll assessments," 
not taxes, and does not modify the fact that the other four 
sentences apply only to assessments.  Further, the reference to 
"taxes" is inadvertent.  The first phrase of the second 
sentence invokes Article 2 of Chapter 24, Code § 15.2-2404 et 
seq.  In turn, Article 2 of Chapter 24 pertains to taxes and 
assessments for local improvements as imposed by localities, 
unrelated to community development associations.  In 
incorporating the requirements of Article 2 of Chapter 24 to 
 
 
21 
2. 
Determining Whether An Obligation Is A Special Tax Or 
Special Assessment Is A Mixed Question Of Law And Fact 
Determining whether a particular obligation levied against 
real estate is a special tax or a special assessment under the 
Code requires evaluating the specific obligation imposed 
relative to the different statutory definitions.  Recognizing 
this as the correct analysis, we respectfully but necessarily 
disagree with our colleagues in concurrence and dissent who 
contend that the City's resolution governing the CDA answers 
                                                                 
apply only to special assessments imposed under Code § 15.2-
5158(A)(5), the General Assembly inadvertently included the 
"tax" term from Article 2 of Chapter 24 when setting forth the 
three additional requirements that special assessments must 
satisfy when imposed pursuant to Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5). 
 
Thus, Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5) only governs special 
assessments requested by a community development authority.  
Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3) only governs special taxes requested by 
a community development authority.  Code § 58.1-3965 only 
governs taxes on real estate.  These three provisions govern 
three different types of obligations.  Although the dividing 
line between these types of obligations is not always clear or 
defined with the most precise language, the General Assembly 
has enacted a scheme whereby different obligations are governed 
by different procedures.  This is an exceptional situation in 
which we must recognize that the word "tax," as used in a 
portion of a single sentence of Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5), appears 
to be a legislative scrivener's error.  Our holding is 
necessary to avoid the absurd result of dismantling the General 
Assembly's carefully crafted statutory scheme distinguishing 
between these different obligations.  Idoux, 279 Va. at 554, 
691 S.E.2d at 776 ("[N]o part [of a statute] will be treated as 
meaningless unless absolutely necessary." (emphasis added)); 
Covel v. Town of Vienna, 280 Va. 151, 158, 694 S.E.2d 609, 614 
(2010) (construing a statute so that the law is "incapable of 
operation" is an absurd result (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); see also Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 
723-24 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 
22 
the question.  To the extent a locality's resolution or 
ordinance purports to limit a community development authority's 
powers, such a fact only addresses whether the relevant 
governmental authority acted within its scope of authority when 
levying a particular obligation.  It does not answer the wholly 
separate question of what that obligation is under the Code. 
As such, whether an obligation is a special tax or a 
special assessment for purposes of the Code is a mixed question 
of law and fact.  See Smyth County Cmty. Hosp. v. Town of 
Marion, 259 Va. 328, 336, 527 S.E.2d 401, 405 (2000).  The 
factual predicate for such a determination in this case is 
poorly developed.  The circuit court – understandably, in light 
of the parties' confusion of the issue – failed to make factual 
findings germane to whether the obligation in question is a 
special tax or a special assessment.  Moreover, the parties did 
not brief the issue before the circuit court, and provided only 
a cursory discussion of the issue before this Court. 
Considering the insufficiency of the record in this 
regard, and the parties' continuing disagreement about this 
fundamental aspect of the case, we decline to make a factual 
finding ourselves.  See Bailey, 288 Va. at 181, 762 S.E.2d at 
773 ("[W]e are a court of review, not of first view." (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted)).  However, we need not 
decide the issue, nor must we remand the case to develop such 
 
23 
factual findings, because the circuit court erred as a matter 
of law in entering the decree of sale regardless of whether the 
delinquent special assessments are categorized as special taxes 
or special assessments under the Code.  See D.R. Horton, Inc. 
v. Board of Supervisors, 285 Va. 467, 471-75, 737 S.E.2d 886, 
888-90 (2013) (addressing each of the appellant's alternative 
legal arguments as applied to the same set of facts). 
3. 
Analysis Of The "Special Assessments" As Special Taxes 
The collection of a delinquent "special tax" on behalf of 
a community development authority is governed by Code § 15.2-
5158(A)(3).  A suit to collect outstanding special taxes must 
be brought "at the same time" as when "the locality's taxes are 
collected."  Id. 
The City chose delinquent real estate taxes to be the type 
of "locality's taxes" to which the collection of these 
particular delinquent special taxes was coupled by operation of 
Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3).  Consequently, when those special taxes 
may be collected is dictated by when the City could collect 
such delinquent real estate taxes.  And as established, the 
City could not bring suit under Code § 58.1-3965(A) to sell 
CVAS 2's real estate in order to collect the delinquent real 
estate taxes, which dated back to November 15, 2011, until 
December 31, 2013.  Further, the City has not adopted an 
ordinance pursuant to Code § 58.1-3965.2(ii) allowing for it to 
 
24 
expedite and collect delinquent special taxes independent from 
its collection of another type of delinquent "locality's 
taxes."  Thus, the City could not bring suit on June 13, 2013 
to collect the delinquent special assessments dating back to 
the 2009 fiscal year, even if they are in fact special taxes 
under the Code.7 
A suit to sell real estate to collect special taxes on 
that property is purely a creature of statute.  See Lester 
Group, 238 Va. at 57, 381 S.E.2d at 5.  A party's ability to 
"enforce" such a statutory right "rest[s] upon compliance with 
the statute."  Isle of Wight Materials, 246 Va. at 105, 431 
S.E.2d at 43 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
Thus, because the City did not strictly comply with the time 
period in Code §§ 15.2-5158(A)(3) and 58.1-3965(A) allowing for 
                     
 
7 Justice Powell contends that the delinquent special taxes 
could have been collected under Code § 58.1-3965, which is a 
general provision governing "any taxes on any real estate," as 
a matter of course.  This reading unnecessarily renders 
meaningless the "at the same time and in the same manner" 
language of Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3), which is a specific 
provision governing the collection of special taxes. 
 
Absent an ordinance adopted pursuant to Code § 58.1-
3965.2(ii), a special tax can only be collected "at the same 
time" when another type of "locality's tax[]" is collected.  
Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3).  A special tax cannot be collected 
independent of collecting another "locality's tax[]" simply by 
invoking Code § 58.1-3965.  See Idoux, 279 Va. at 554, 691 
S.E.2d at 776 ("[N]o part [of a statute] will be treated as 
meaningless unless absolutely necessary."); Peerless Ins. Co. 
v. County of Fairfax, 274 Va. 236, 244, 645 S.E.2d 478, 483 
(2007) (holding that specific statutes prevail over general 
statutes). 
 
25 
such a suit to be brought, the City had no authority under 
those statutes to bring suit to sell CVAS 2's real estate as a 
means to collect delinquent special taxes.  See Lester Group, 
238 Va. at 57, 381 S.E.2d at 5. 
4. 
Analysis Of The "Special Assessments" As Special 
Assessments 
The collection of a delinquent "special assessment" on 
behalf of a community development authority is governed by Code 
§ 15.2-5158(A)(5).  Delinquent special assessments may be 
collected as a lien upon the property if the locality has 
passed an ordinance allowing for special assessments to be made 
effective in such a manner.  Id.  As discussed, however, the 
plain language of Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5) does not invoke the 
authority under Code § 58.1-3965(A) to sell real estate subject 
to a special assessment.  And the City has not adopted an 
ordinance pursuant to Code § 58.1-3965.2(ii) allowing for it to 
file suit to have CVAS 2's real estate sold to collect 
delinquent special assessments pursuant to Article 4 of Chapter 
39 of Title 58.1, Code § 58.1-3965 et seq. 
A suit to collect delinquent special assessments is purely 
a creature of statute.  See Lester Group, 238 Va. at 57, 381 
S.E.2d at 5.  A party's ability to "enforce" such a statutory 
right "rest[s] upon compliance with the statute."  Isle of 
Wight Materials, 246 Va. at 105, 431 S.E.2d at 43 (internal 
 
26 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  The City, being the 
party asserting the statutory right which has been challenged, 
has the burden of proving compliance with the statutory scheme.  
See Moore v. Commonwealth, 155 Va. 1, 15, 155 S.E. 635, 639 
(1930); see also, e.g., Glasser & Glasser, PLC v. Jack Bays, 
Inc., 285 Va. 358, 369-71, 741 S.E.2d 599, 605 (2013) (party 
asserting the statutory right to enforce a mechanic's lien has 
the burden of naming all necessary parties so as to comply with 
the statutory scheme). 
CVAS 2 challenged the City's ability to file suit to 
collect the delinquent special assessments, and the City failed 
to establish that it complied with the statutes actually 
pertaining to the collection of special assessments.  Because 
the City has not shown that it has strictly complied with Code 
§§ 15.2-5158(A)(5) or 58.1-3965.2 allowing for it to bring suit 
to collect delinquent special assessments, the City has not 
established authority under those statutes to bring suit to 
sell CVAS 2's real estate as a means to collect the delinquent 
special assessments.  See Lester Group, 238 Va. at 57, 381 
S.E.2d at 5. 
III. Conclusion 
The General Assembly has established a comprehensive 
statutory scheme affording localities, local governing bodies, 
and community development associations the ability to levy and 
 
27 
collect real estate taxes, special taxes, and special 
assessments owed to a governmental entity by a property owner, 
including the right to sell the subject real estate.  However, 
the governmental authority must act pursuant to, and in 
compliance with, that statutory scheme in order to bring suit 
to collect such delinquent obligations. 
We reverse the circuit court's judgment because the City 
failed to act in compliance with the relevant statutory 
provisions.  With the City having no basis for relief under 
those statutes, the circuit court lacked authority to order the 
sale of CVAS 2's real estate.  We will vacate the decree of 
sale and dismiss the City's suit against CVAS 2. 
Reversed, vacated, and dismissed. 
 
JUSTICE McCLANAHAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
While I agree with the majority opinion on the initial 
jurisdictional issue, I disagree with it on the merits and 
would affirm the circuit court.  First, as addressed in the 
concurring opinion, it is undisputed that the subject 
delinquent obligation on CVAS 2's real property is a "special 
assessment" under Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5). Second, the special 
assessment is a form of taxation on real estate, based on both 
the express language of subsection (A)(5) of the statute 
(describing the obligation alternatively as a levy of "taxes or 
 
28 
assessments") and the treatment of the subject by this Court.  
Third, because the special assessment on CVAS 2's property is a 
real estate tax, and it is more than two years past due, the 
property can be sold for the delinquent taxes pursuant to Code 
§ 58.1-3965, as the circuit court held. 
 
CVAS 2 admitted in its answer to the City's complaint that 
the levy was a special assessment, which is exclusively 
controlled by subsection (A)(5) of Code § 15.2-5158 (not 
subsection (A)(3) of the statute).  Moreover, the City's 
September 13, 2005 resolution governing the Celebrate Virginia 
South Community Development Authority ("CDA") expressly 
authorized the imposition of special assessments pursuant to 
Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5), not a "special tax" under subsection 
(A)(3) of the statute.  The resolution then sets forth the 
methodology to be used in levying the special assessment on 
"the parcels [of land] in the CDA so that there is a rational 
relationship between the assessments and the benefit received 
from public improvements by each parcel."  This provision is in 
keeping with the express requirement under Code § 15.2-
5158(A)(5) that such "taxes or assessments may be imposed upon 
abutting land which is later subdivided in accordance with the 
terms of the ordinance forming the district, in amounts which 
do not exceed the peculiar benefits of the improvements to the 
abutting land as subdivided."  In this case, the "taxes or 
 
29 
assessments" levied pursuant to subsection (A)(5) were for the 
purpose of financing the debt on bonds issued by the CDA to 
fund its improvements in the district.  Id. 
 
As indicated above, the "special assessment," which is the 
sole subject of Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5), is described therein as 
the levy of "taxes or assessments."1  In so describing the 
                     
 
1 Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5)states as follows: 
 
  
A. Each community development authority created under this 
article, in addition to the powers provided in Article 3 (§ 
15.2-5110 et seq.) of Chapter 51 of this title, may: 
 
. . . . 
 
 
5. Finance the services and facilities it provides to 
abutting property within the district by special assessment 
thereon imposed by the local governing body. All assessments 
pursuant to this section shall be subject to the laws 
pertaining to assessments under Article 2 (§ 15.2-2404 et seq.) 
of Chapter 24; provided that any other provision of law 
notwithstanding, (i) the taxes or assessments shall not exceed 
the full cost of the improvements, including without limitation 
the legal, financial and other directly attributable costs of 
creating the district and the planning, designing, operating 
and financing of the improvements which include administration 
of the collection and payment of the assessments and reserve 
funds permitted by applicable law; (ii) the taxes or 
assessments may be imposed upon abutting land which is later 
subdivided in accordance with the terms of the ordinance 
forming the district, in amounts which do not exceed the 
peculiar benefits of the improvements to the abutting land as 
subdivided; and (iii) the taxes or assessments may be made 
subject to installment payments for up to 40 years in an amount 
calculated to cover principal, interest and administrative 
costs in connection with any financing by the authority, 
without a penalty for prepayment. Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, any assessments made pursuant to this section 
may be made effective as a lien upon a specified date, by 
ordinance, but such assessments may not thereafter be modified 
 
 
30 
special assessment, the legislature did not establish two 
different schemes under subsection (A)(5) for imposing a local 
levy on properties located within a particular district in 
order to fund the improvements undertaken by a community 
development authority.  Rather, subsection (A)(5) makes 
provision for financing such improvements only through one type 
of levy specifically tied to the costs of the improvements and 
the "peculiar" benefits conferred upon the properties by those 
improvements - whether the levy is called a tax or an 
assessment.2  Id.; see also Code § 15.2-2404 (establishing 
                                                                 
in a manner inconsistent with the terms of the debt instruments 
financing the improvements. All assessments pursuant to this 
section may also be made subject to installment payments and 
other provisions allowed for local assessments under this 
section or under Article 2 of Chapter 24. All revenues received 
by the locality pursuant to any such special assessments which 
the locality elects to impose upon request of the development 
authority shall be paid over to the development authority for 
its use under this chapter, subject to annual appropriation, 
and may be used for no other purposes. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
 
2 By contrast, the local levy authorized under subsection 
(A)(3) of Code § 15.2-5158 as a "special tax" to finance the 
services and facilities provided by the community development 
authority contains no limit based on the benefit of the 
authority's improvements.  Rather, it sets a limit that is tied 
to the assessed fair market value of the taxable real estate in 
the district ($.25 per $100 of assessed fair market value of 
each parcel). 
 
Subsection (A)(3) is not controlling in this case, in 
light of the provisions and application of subsection (A)(5).  
I note my agreement, however, with the concurring opinion's 
interpretation of the phrase "at the same time and in the same 
 
 
31 
similar authority for local governments to impose "taxes or 
assessments" on properties located in a particular area in 
order to fund a variety of permitted improvements that would 
specifically benefit those properties). 
 
The description of the special assessment authorized under 
Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5) as the levy of "taxes or assessments" is 
consistent with the general definition of the term "special 
assessment": "[t]he assessment of a tax on property that 
benefits in some important way from a public improvement."  
Black's Law Dictionary 140 (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added). 
 
In City of Richmond v. Richmond-Petersburg Turnpike 
Authority, 204 Va. 596, 600, 132 S.E.2d 733, 736 (1963), this 
Court recognized that a special assessment like the one at 
issue here is most assuredly a tax on real estate.  There, the 
Richmond-Petersburg Turnpike Authority contended that, as a 
political subdivision of the Commonwealth, it was exempt from 
special assessments made against it by the City of Richmond for 
                                                                 
manner" in subsection (A)(3), which is the linchpin of the 
majority's analysis.  More specifically, I agree that this 
phrase is not in reference to Code § 58.1-3965, which sets 
forth the authority and outlines the procedure for a locality 
to effect a foreclose sale for delinquent real estate taxes. 
When the phrase is read in a proper context, it is apparent 
that the phrase only addresses the time and manner in which the 
"special tax" is to be collected "annually" by the locality as 
part of its routine procedure of billing and receiving payment 
of taxes - not the procedure governing a foreclosure sale when 
the taxes are delinquent.  Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3). 
 
32 
the construction of sidewalks abutting the Authority's 
properties.  The City countered that the Authority was only 
exempt from taxes, whereas the assessments at issue were not 
taxes.  Id. at 597, 132 S.E.2d at 733-34.  In holding for the 
Authority, the Court explained that "[c]ourts and text writers, 
generally, make a distinction between special assessments, or 
special taxes to pay for local improvements, and general tax 
levies for purposes of carrying on the government."  Id. at 
598, 132 S.E.2d at 734.  In that sense, "[t]he word 'taxes,'" 
in reference to general taxes, "is not synonymous with 
'assessments.'"  Id.  The Court nonetheless concluded that 
"[t]he levies here, whether they be called taxes or 
assessments, were taxes - maybe a special kind of taxes - that 
is, local taxes assessed and imposed as liens upon real estate 
of a political subdivision of the Commonwealth of Virginia."3  
                     
 
3 This distinction between special assessments and general 
taxes, as relates to the improvements for which they are 
levied, has been well summarized as follows: 
 
 
There is a distinction between public improvements, which 
benefit the entire community, and local improvements, which 
benefit particular real estate or limited areas of land.  The 
latter improvements are usually financed by means of special, 
or local, assessments.  These assessments are, in a certain 
sense, taxes.  But an assessment differs from a general tax in 
that an assessment is levied only on property in the immediate 
vicinity of some local municipal improvement and is valid only 
where the property assessed receives some special benefit 
differing from the benefit that the general public enjoys. 
Robert Kratovil, Real Estate Law § 690, at 465 (6th ed. 1974). 
 
33 
Id. at 600, 132 S.E.2d at 736 (emphasis added).  See City of 
Roanoke v. Fisher, 193 Va. 651, 654, 70 S.E.2d 274, 277 (1952) 
(identifying a "special assessment" to finance the cost of 
local improvements as "in reality a tax"); see also Illinois 
Central R.R. Co. v. Decatur, 147 U.S. 190, 197 (1893) 
(explaining distinction between "general taxes" as one form of 
levy on property and "special taxes or special assessments" as 
another, "both of [which] are properly called taxes"); City of 
Beckley v. Wolford, 140 S.E. 344, 345  (W. Va. 1927) (noting 
that it is "thoroughly established" that "special assessments 
are a species of taxation, and the authority to enforce them is 
a branch of the taxing power") (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted).  Accord: French v. Barber Asphalt Paving 
Co., 181 U.S. 324, 343-44 (1901)(adopting Judge Dillon's 
synthesis that the levy of "special assessments" is "a branch 
of the taxing power, or included within it"); Parsons v. 
District of Columbia, 170 U.S. 45, 55-56 (1898)(same).4 
                     
 
4 In light of such authority, it is understandable why the 
legislature chose to describe the "special assessment" under 
Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5) as a levy of "taxes or assessments."  
See also Code § 15.2-2404.  Completely ignoring this line of 
case law, however, the majority merely asserts that the 
legislature's description is "inadvertent."  Moreover, in doing 
so, the majority overlooks the salient point recognized by 
these cases that a special assessment like the one here is one 
form of a real estate tax - even if the legislature had not 
included the word "taxes" in describing it. 
 
34 
 
Finally, because the special assessment under Code § 15.2-
5158(A)(5) is a tax on real estate, it falls squarely within 
the purview of Code § 58.1-3965 for its collection by 
foreclosure sale when delinquent.  Code § 58.1-3965(A) states, 
in relevant part, that "[w]hen any taxes on any real estate in 
a locality are delinquent on December 31 following the second 
anniversary of the date on which such taxes have become due . . 
. such real estate may be sold for the purpose of collecting 
all delinquent taxes on such property."  (Emphasis added.)  In 
this case, it is undisputed that CVAS 2's special assessment 
was more than two years past due.  Accordingly, CVAS 2's 
property, on which the City levied the special assessment, was 
subject to a foreclosure sale for the delinquent taxes under 
Code § 58.1-3965. 
 
For these reasons, I would affirm the circuit court in 
ordering the sale of CVAS 2's property pursuant to Code § 58.1-
3965, and remand the case to the court for further proceedings. 
 
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE GOODWYN joins, concurring. 
 
Although I agree with the outcome of this case, I write 
separately because I disagree with the majority with regard to 
its analysis of Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3) and Code § 58.2-3965. 
 
As an initial matter, in my opinion the majority applies 
an incorrect standard of review in its analysis of the 
 
35 
ordinance at issue in this case.  The majority relies on Smyth 
County Community Hospital v. Town of Marion, 259 Va. 328, 336, 
527 S.E.2d 401, 405 (2000), where this Court held that 
“application of the requirements of [a statute] is a mixed 
question of fact and law.”  The issue in Smyth County Community 
Hospital was whether a property was used in a manner that 
“immediately and directly promote[d] the charitable purposes of 
the hospital,” thereby exempting that property from taxation.  
Id.  In other words, it was necessary for us to examine the 
facts before we could determine whether the law applied.  The 
question in the present case, however, is not whether the 
ordinance applies to CVAS 2’s property; rather, the question is 
what type of obligation is created by the ordinance. 
 
In support of its holding, the majority explains that 
“[d]etermining whether a particular obligation levied against 
real estate is a special tax or a special assessment under the 
Code requires evaluating the specific obligation imposed 
relative to the different statutory definitions.”  It is 
unclear, however, how such a determination requires any form of 
factual predicate.  Indeed, the majority fails to explain what 
factual findings, if any, a trial court could make that would 
be germane to the issue of whether the ordinance created a 
special tax or a special assessment. 
 
36 
 
In my opinion, determining the meaning of a statute or 
ordinance relative to other statutory definitions is the very 
definition of statutory interpretation.  Accordingly, the 
determination of what type of obligation this ordinance creates 
is clearly an issue of statutory interpretation subject to de 
novo review by this Court.  See Renkey v. County Bd., 272 Va. 
369, 373, 634 S.E.2d 352, 355 (2006) (recognizing that 
interpretation of an ordinance “is a pure question of law 
subject to de novo review by this Court”). 
 
Here, the plain language of the relevant ordinance 
unequivocally establishes that the obligation levied on the 
property is a special assessment.  The ordinance consistently 
refers to the obligation as a special assessment and never once 
refers to it as a tax of any sort.  Further, the ordinance 
specifically provides that the debt incurred by the CDA will be 
“covered by . . . special assessments pursuant to Virginia Code 
§ 15.2-5158(A)(5).”  The ordinance goes on to explain that the 
special assessments will levy a lien upon the property.  See 
City of Fredericksburg Resolution No. 05-87 (“[A]ll real 
property in the District may be subject to the lien of a 
special assessment to be established and levied by this 
Resolution”) (emphasis added).  Notably, under Code § 15.2-
5158(A)(5), only special assessments may be made effective as a 
lien upon property to be paid in installments. 
 
37 
 
Thus, it is readily apparent that the ordinance at issue 
in the present case created a special assessment.  Accordingly, 
the majority should have limited its analysis in this case to 
the application of Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5).  Indeed, I agree 
with the majority’s application of Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5).  
However, I believe that the majority’s analysis of Code § 15.2-
5158(A)(3), which only applies to special taxes, is unnecessary 
and is, therefore, obiter dicta.  See Harmon v. Peery, 145 Va. 
578, 583, 134 S.E. 701, 702 (1926) (“Obiter dicta are such 
opinions uttered by the way, not upon the point or question 
pending, . . . as if turning aside . . . from the main topic of 
the case to collateral subjects.” (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that I believe the majority’s 
analysis of Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3) is unnecessary, I feel 
compelled to address the majority’s application of the statute.  
As an initial matter, I agree with the majority’s basic premise 
that, as used in this statute, “at the same time” establishes 
when a special tax is collected and “in the same manner” 
establishes how a special tax is collected.  I further agree 
with the majority that “when a special tax is collected is 
determined by the time when ‘the locality's taxes’ are 
collected” and “how a special tax is collected is determined by 
the manner in which ‘the locality's taxes’ are collected.”  
 
38 
Thus, under this logic, Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3) allows a 
locality to collect special taxes when (i.e., “at the same 
time”) and how (i.e., “in the same manner”) that locality’s 
other taxes are collected. 
 
However, I believe the majority’s analysis goes awry when 
it creates a “prerequisite for collecting special taxes.” 
Nothing in the statute indicates any such prerequisite.  
Indeed, such an interpretation adds an additional procedural 
requirement to the collection of special taxes, thus running 
counter to the previously established definitions of “at the 
same time” and “in the same manner.”  Rather, the statute 
merely states that the locality must use the same procedural 
and temporal provisions that govern the collection of its other 
taxes.1 
 
Furthermore, the majority fails to give proper weight to 
the plain language of Code § 58.1-3965(A).  Special taxes under 
Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3) are levied on “taxable real property 
within the development authority's jurisdiction to finance the 
services and facilities provided by the authority.”  Code 
§ 58.1-3965(A) applies “[w]hen any taxes on any real estate in 
                     
 
1 I do, however, agree with the majority that a locality is 
allowed to choose which of its taxes will provide the necessary 
procedural and temporal provisions for the collection of 
special taxes. 
 
 
39 
a locality are delinquent on December 31 following the second 
anniversary of the date on which such taxes have become due.”  
(Emphasis added.)  As the special taxes described in Code 
§ 15.2-5158(A)(3) are clearly taxes on real estate, Code 
§ 58.1-3965(A) may be utilized to collect any sufficiently 
delinquent special taxes owed on the property, independent of 
whether there are any other delinquent real estate taxes due.2 
                     
 
2 Contrary to what the majority states, my interpretation 
of Code § 58.1-3965(A) does not render meaningless the “at the 
same time and in the same manner” language of Code § 15.2-
5158(A)(3).  Code § 58.1-3965(A) does not apply to the general 
collection of taxes on real estate; it only applies when 
certain conditions are met, i.e., when the taxes on real estate 
are sufficiently delinquent.  Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3), on the 
other hand, only applies to the general collection of special 
taxes; it makes no reference to the collection of delinquent 
special taxes.  Thus, the two statutes can be read 
harmoniously: Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3) applies to the normal 
collection of special taxes and Code § 58.1-3965(A) applies 
when those special taxes become delinquent.  See, e.g., L.F. v. 
Breit, 285 Va. 163, 178, 736 S.E.2d 711, 719 (2013)(“[T]wo 
statutes must be read ‘as a consistent and harmonious whole to 
give effect to the overall statutory scheme.’")(quoting Bowman 
v. Concepcion, 283 Va. 552, 563, 722 S.E.2d 260, 266 (2012)).  
See also City of Lynchburg v. English Constr. Co., 277 Va. 574, 
580, 675 S.E.2d 197, 200 (2009)(applying this doctrine to 
multiple statutes governing collection of taxes by localities). 
 
Furthermore, I note that nowhere does Code § 15.2-
5158(A)(3) state that “a special tax can only be collected ‘at 
the same time’ when another type of ‘locality's tax[]’ is 
collected,” as the majority insists.  (Emphasis added.)  
Indeed, such an approach necessarily renders the introductory 
clause of Code § 58.1-3965.2 meaningless.  Code § 58.1-3965.2 
specifically references Code § 58.1-3965 as providing the 
authority to initiate proceedings to sell property to collect 
delinquent special taxes.  Code § 58.1-3965.2 does not require 
that the authority provided by Code § 58.1-3965 be exercised in 
conjunction with Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3).  Thus, it is readily 
 
 
40 
 
The majority’s holding with regard to special taxes 
results in a curious taxing scheme.  It makes no sense to allow 
a property owner to disregard special taxes with impunity, so 
long as he continues to pay the requisite “locality’s taxes” on 
time.  Indeed, it is unclear how a locality could ever collect 
delinquent special taxes, absent the existence of the necessary 
“prerequisite” delinquent “locality’s taxes.”3 
 
In my opinion, the ordinance unequivocally created a 
special assessment under Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5).  As I agree 
with the majority’s analysis with regard to special 
assessments, I concur in the judgment reversing the decision of 
the trial court.  I disagree with the majority’s further 
analysis of the case under Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3).  If, 
however, the obligations levied on the property had actually 
                                                                 
apparent that the General Assembly did not intend for Code 
§ 15.2-5158(A)(3) to be the sole method by which a locality 
could collect special taxes. 
 
 
3 Under the majority’s interpretation of Code § 15.2-
5158(A)(3), not even the eventual sale of the property would 
necessarily allow a locality to collect the delinquent special 
taxes unless the locality was also able to collect the 
prerequisite “locality’s taxes” at the same time.  A 
particularly crafty property owner could time the sale of the 
property such that none of the prerequisite “locality’s taxes” 
were due at the time of sale.  As there is nothing in Code 
§ 15.2-5158(A)(3) that allows the locality to treat the 
delinquent special taxes as a lien upon the property, the 
locality is left with no way to collect the delinquent special 
taxes. 
 
41 
been special taxes under Code § 15.2-5158(A)(3), then, I would 
have affirmed the decision of the trial court.