Title: Matter of Scott's Estate

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Matter of Scott's Estate1983 WY 7657 P.2d 361Case Number: 5765Case Number: 5765Decided: 01/28/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ESTATE OF JOHN E. SCOTT, DECEASED. JOHN E. SCOTT, JR., APPELLANT 
(EXECUTOR),

v.

RICHARD A. TOBIN, SPECIAL 
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF JOHN E. SCOTT, DECEASED, APPELLEE (PETITIONER), 
and EULAH ANN GRIEVE, APPELLEE (BENEFICIARY). No. 5765

Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

Harry E. 
Leimback, Casper, for appellant. 

R. Jerry Hand 
and J. Patrick Hand (argued) of Hand, Hand & Hand, P.C., Casper, and E.L. McCrary, Casper, on brief, for appellees.

Before ROONEY, C.J.,* and RAPER, THOMAS and BROWN, JJ., and 
JOHNSON, District Judge.

* Became Chief Justice on 
January 1, 1983.

ROONEY, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This case is before us 
a second time with the issue of whether or not the computations of the probate 
court were in accordance with the directions set forth in our previous opinion. 
In Re Estate of Scott, 
Wyo., 642 P.2d 1287 (1982). 
Specifically, we are requested to resolve the questions as to whether or not the 
probate court erred: (1) in its determination that appellant John E. Scott, 
Jr.'s mismanagement of, and misappropriation from, the estate amounted to 
$127,637.00; and (2) in directing the special administrator to proceed in 
district court against appellant for a debt incurred before the death of the 
deceased in the amount of $83,156.00 rather than 
$117,706.87.

[¶2.]     We reverse inasmuch as 
we find the probate court erred in both respects, and we remand for remaining 
probate proceedings.

[¶3.]     The issue presented is 
whether or not in remanding the case when it was first before us, we accepted 
that set forth in the special administrator's report and the accompanying 
accountings of Leo C. Riley, C.P.A., to the effect that:

"* * * it is next to 
impossible to segregate which expenses applied to estate versus J.E. Scott, 
Jr."

and

"* * * Due to the chaotic 
state of the records and the long period of time involved, we do not believe 
that a complete and accurate accounting in the usual sense is possible. Also, we 
do not belive [sic] that the records could be adequately 
reconstructed."

[¶4.]     Accepting that which 
the accountings were able to do, the probate court found that "the accountings 
filed by the Special Administrator and Mr. Leo Riley are accepted, proven and 
valid." Accordingly, we recognized in the first opinion in this case, 642 P.2d  
at 1292, that the figure of $117,706.87 could have "possibly been a debt owed by 
appellant to the testator before his death," and that the figure of $210,793.00 
(plus $3,495.00 setoff)1 represents the sum of: (1) that 
resulting from mismanagement or misappropriation; and (2) the "alleged" amount 
owed at the time of death. We recognized further that the probate court might 
desire to make adjustments pursuant to comments and notes to the accountings 
such as:

"If credit were given to 
Mr. Scott for property taxes and fees * * * the balance due from Mr. Scott would 
be reduced by $58,431 * * *."

"Accounting, legal and 
executor's fees totaling $13,176 paid by J.E. Scott, Jr. and claimed in the 
final accounting through February 28, 1977 are not shown as credits in our 
report because we could not find prior court approval for the expenditures. 
Should the Special Administrator, or the court, subsequently approve these fees, 
then the amount due the Estate from Mr. J.E. Scott, Jr. should be reduced by a 
like amount."

The order here 
appealed from reflects the refusal of the probate court to make such 
adjustments.

[¶5.]     The accountings filed 
by the special administrator and Leo C. Riley (and found by the probate court to 
be "proven and valid") used the figure of $83,156.00 as the debt of appellant to 
the estate as a starting point of Mr. Riley's accountings. However, this figure 
was accepted in the Riley accountings "per final estate accountings" of 
appellant before he was removed as executor. The figure came from the final 
financial statement prepared by Macy, Shamley and Associates, C.P.A.s, on behalf 
of appellant before he was removed as executor. In turn, the figure in the 
financial statements prepared by Macy, Shamley and Associates resulted from 
debits and credits2 to the original "alleged" 
death-debt figure of $117,706.87. The issue which may arise if the special 
administrator opts to bring an action in the district court to collect such debt 
is whether or not this "alleged" death-debt figure is a true amount of the death 
debt.

[¶6.]     Whatever fluctuations3 may have resulted in estate assets 
due to mismanagement of, or misappropriation by, appellant are not to be charged 
against or credited to the before-death debt. Rather, the final debit balance 
resulting from such fluctuations is to be set off by the probate court against 
appellant's inheritance from the estate. Since the $210,793.00 is the amount 
reached by adding the misappropriation or mismanagement debit to the amount of 
the "alleged" pre-death debt owed by appellant, and since the "alleged" 
pre-death debt is $117,706.87, the difference of $93,086.13 is the debit amount 
resulting from appellant's mismanagement or 
misappropriation.

[¶7.]     Accordingly, the amount 
to be charged against appellant's inheritance is $93,086.13 with interest at 10% 
per annum from August 13, 1979 and $3,495.00 with interest at 10% per annum from 
August 19, 1981, and if the charge exceeds the inheritance, the estate may take 
judgment for the deficiency. The estate is authorized to institute an action 
against appellant in the district court to collect the debt owed by appellant to 
the deceased at the time of his death and alleged to be $117,706.87. The orders 
and amended orders of the probate court pertaining thereto are modified 
accordingly.

ADDENDUM

[¶8.]     In response to the 
dissenting part of Justice Raper's opinion, in which he maintains the position 
taken by him when the case was first before us, I note that the constitutional 
provision referred to by him to buttress his position, i.e. Art. 5, § 10, 
Wyoming Constitution, was considered in Church v. Quiner, 31 Wyo. 222, 224 P. 1073 (1924), and In Re Stringer's Estate, 
80 Wyo. 426, 
345 P.2d 786 (1959), when the separate probate function of the district court 
was recognized years ago. The rationale there set forth is still valid 
today.

[¶9.]     In Gaunt v. Kansas 
University Endowment Association of Lawrence, Kansas, Wyo., 379 P.2d 825 
(1963), we noted that the district court is referred to in the Constitution in 
an inclusive sense, specifically referring to Art. 5, § 10, among others. We 
said at :

"As used in the 
constitutional and statutory provisions to which we have just referred, it is 
apparent the term `district court' is used in a broad or inclusive sense as if 
there were one district court in a given judicial district for several counties, 
and as if there were one district court 
in a given county for the several jurisdictions such as civil, criminal and 
probate." (Emphasis added.)

[¶10.]  Reversed and remanded for remaining 
probate proceedings.

FOOTNOTES

1 The sum of $3,495.00 
represents the value of estate furniture, fixtures, cars and trucks listed but 
not accounted for by appellant. The figure was treated separately from that 
resulting from other mismanagement or misappropriation.

2 The debits and credits 
to the original $117,706.87 by Macy, Shamley and Associates in arriving at the 
figure of $83,156.00 were similar to those later made by Riley 
accounting.

3 The Riley accountings 
reflected the fluctuations to have resulted from such debits as those resulting 
from improper disbursement of property taxes and assessments, legal fees, 
executor's fee, utilities, sewer plant, car, withdrawal of funds, etc., and from 
such credits as payments of state and federal taxes, of notes of the estate, of 
property taxes, of utilities and from deposits of personal assets into the 
estate, etc., - in short intermingling of personal and estate funds and 
accounts.

RAPER, Justice, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part.

[¶11.]  I concur in the $93,086.13 
computation.

[¶12.]  I have heretofore dissented from the 
decision of this court by which it creates a probate court separate from the 
district court and directs that a separate action be filed in the district court 
to recover money from the executor as the only way to enforce collection of a 
debt arising prior to the death of the decedent. See my concurring and 
dissenting opinion in In Re Estate of 
Scott, Wyo., 642 P.2d 1287 (1982). I have also 
strongly objected to the concept of a separate probate court in Matter of Estate of Harrington, Wyo., 
648 P.2d 556 (1982). I continue to dissent.

[¶13.]  To my reasons heretofore voiced, I add 
constitutional support. The Wyoming Constitution has, by two sections, abolished 
the probate court and transferred all of its functions to the district 
court:

[¶14.]  Section 10, Art. 5:

"The district court shall have original 
jurisdiction of all causes both at law and in equity and in all criminal cases, 
of all matters of probate and insolvency and of such special cases and 
proceedings as are not otherwise provided for. The district court shall also 
have original jurisdiction in all cases and of all proceedings in which 
jurisdiction shall not have been by law vested exclusively in some other court; 
and said court shall have the power of naturalization and to issue papers 
therefor. They shall have such appellate jurisdiction in cases arising in 
justices' and other inferior courts in their respective counties as may be 
prescribed by law. Said courts and their judges shall have power to issue writs 
of mandamus, quo warranto, review, certiorari, prohibition, injunction and writs 
of habeas corpus, on petition by or on behalf of any person in actual custody in 
their respective districts."

[¶15.]  Section 17, Art. 
21:

"Whenever this 
constitution shall go into effect, records and papers and proceedings of the 
probate court in each county, and all causes and matters of administration and 
other matters pending therein, shall pass into the jurisdiction and possession 
of the district court of the same county, and the said district court shall 
proceed to final decree or judgment order or other determination in the said 
several matters and causes, as the said probate court might have done if this 
constitution had not been adopted."

The majority is 
living in the past, ninety-three years behind the times. There is no probate 
court. The parties to this proceeding are already in the district court, which 
should proceed to dispose of all claims without the folderol of a useless 
separate action. As Justice Black once said in a different setting, "[w]hen 
precedent and precedent alone is all the argument that can be made to support a 
court-fashioned rule, it is time for the rule's creator to destroy it." Francis v. Southern Pacific Co., 333 U.S. 445, 471, 68 S. Ct. 611, 623, 92 L. Ed. 798 (1948) (dissenting opinion). This is the way I view the majority's 
citing of Gaunt v. Kansas University 
Endowment Ass'n of Lawrence, Kansas, Wyo., 379 P.2d 825 (1963); In Re Stringer's Estate, 80 Wyo. 426, 
345 P.2d 786 (1959); and Church v. 
Quiner, 31 Wyo. 222, 224 P. 1073 (1924).