Title: Saarinen v. Hall

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: 09/01/2017
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 SPECIAL TERM, 2017
_________________________
1160066
_________________________
Bobby Saarinen and Chris Williams
v.
Louis Hall
Appeal from Franklin Circuit Court
(CV-15-900091)
SELLERS, Justice.
This Court granted Bobby Saarinen and Chris Williams
permission to appeal, pursuant to Rule 5, Ala. R. App. P.,
from an interlocutory order of the Franklin Circuit Court
1160066
denying their motion for a summary judgment in Louis Hall's
personal-injury action against them.
In May 2014, Hall was injured while operating a power saw
at his place of employment, a plant owned by Williams
Manufacturing, Inc. ("Williams Manufacturing").  Hall sued
Williams Manufacturing, as well as his co-employees Saarinen
and Williams, who were in 2014 and still are supervisory
employees 
at 
Williams 
Manufacturing ("the 
co-employees").  
The
record indicates that Williams is the owner of Williams
Manufacturing and that Saarinen is the plant manager.
In his complaint, Hall asserted theories of negligence,
"willfulness," and "recklessness."  Williams Manufacturing
moved to dismiss the claims against it, asserting that Hall's
exclusive remedy was under the Alabama Workers' Compensation
Act, § 25-5-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975.  The trial court
granted Williams Manufacturing's motion and dismissed Hall's
claims against it.  Subsequently, Hall amended his complaint
to allege that the co-employees had "caused or allowed the
removal of a guard from the saw made the basis of this suit,"
had "fail[ed] to install a safety guard provided for the saw,"
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1160066
and had "fail[ed] to replace the unguarded saw with a new
guarded saw."
The co-employees filed a motion for a summary judgment. 
In support, they pointed to § 25-5-11, Ala. Code 1975. 
Section 25-5-11(a) provides, in relevant part:
"If the injury ... for which compensation is payable
under Articles 3 or 4 of [the Workers' Compensation
Act] was caused under circumstances also creating a
legal liability for damages on the part of any party
other than the employer, ... the employee ... may
bring an action against the other party to recover
damages for the injury ..., and the amount of the
damages shall be ascertained and determined without
regard to [the Workers' Compensation Act].  If a
party, other than the employer, is ... an ...
employee of the same employer, ... the injured
employee ... may bring an action against ... [the]
person ... only for willful conduct which results in
or proximately causes the injury ...."
(Emphasis added.)  See also Padgett v. Neptune Water Meter
Co., 585 So. 2d 900, 901 (Ala. 1991) ("Section 25–5–11(a)
provides that actions may be maintained against those parties
that may be jointly liable with the employer, provided that if
the other party is a coemployee, then his actions, in order to
give rise to liability, must be willful.").
Section 25-5-11(b) provides: "If personal injury ... to
any employee results from the willful conduct, as defined in
subsection (c) herein, of any ... employee of the same
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employer ..., the employee shall have a cause of action
against the person ...."  As is relevant to this appeal, § 25-
5-11(c)(2) defines "willful conduct" as follows:
"The willful and intentional removal from a machine
of a safety guard or safety device provided by the
manufacturer of the machine with knowledge that
injury or death would likely or probably result from
the removal; provided, however, that removal of a
guard or device shall not be willful conduct unless
the removal did, in fact, increase the danger in the
use of the machine and was not done for the purpose
of repair of the machine or was not part of an
improvement or modification of the machine which
rendered 
the 
safety 
device 
unnecessary 
or
ineffective."
In their summary-judgment motion, the co-employees
established that, on the day he was injured, Hall was
operating a power saw manufactured by Kalamazoo Industries,
Inc.  During depositions, the saw was described as a "straight
cut-off saw."  Although it is not entirely clear, photographs
in the record appear to depict a saw with a round blade.  Hall
states in his appellee's brief that he used the saw to cut
aluminum pipe, that "[t]he blade is above the table and the
operator pulls it down by hand to cut the pipes on the table,"
and that, "[a]fter the cut takes place, the blade is spring
loaded to return to the 'up' position."
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1160066
The 
saw, 
which 
was 
purchased 
used 
by 
Williams
Manufacturing, was manufactured with a guard covering a
portion of the blade; Hall, however, did not think the guard
was adequate.  According to Hall's appellee's brief, "the
guard on [the] saw did not fully cover the blade when the saw
had finished cutting and sprung back to the 'up' position," at
which point "the blade would be exposed by about 1 ½ inches." 
At 
Hall's 
request, 
someone 
at 
Williams 
Manufacturing 
installed
an additional guard.  Hall testified as follows during
deposition:
"Q. [The saw] had that orange guard on it that's
depicted in these pictures, correct?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And later on, at your request, they added this
silver guard.
"A. Yeah.
"Q. And I assume that was supposed to cover more of
the blade; is that right?
"A. It was supposed to have.
"Q. Okay. But your testimony is that the blade would
come down below the silver guard, correct -- 
"A. Correct.
"Q. -- when you were cutting or after you'd cut, I
suppose?
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"A. After. After the saw went back up.
"Q. Okay. Then did the -- when the saw went back up,
did the silver guard cover the blade?
"A. Not completely, no."
After Hall's injury, Williams Manufacturing replaced the
saw with a power saw manufactured by a different Company --
DeWalt.  Hall testified during deposition that, before he was
injured, Williams Manufacturing had already purchased the saw
that eventually replaced the saw that injured Hall.  He
testified that the replacement saw had been delivered at least
a month before his injury but had not been installed because,
he was told, Williams Manufacturing was too busy to change out
the saws.  As Hall points out, the co-employees' motion for a
summary judgment states that, "[w]hen Hall asked the [co-
employee] defendants when they were going to replace the saw
on which he was working, they said when they were less busy." 
Hall also points to Saarinen's testimony indicating that
Williams Manufacturing was "in the middle of [its] busy
season" and that "we were making rounds and reminding
everybody that just because we were busy, we didn't want to
lose focus on safety, [and] we didn't want people to do
anything to injure themselves and get hurt."  According to
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1160066
Hall, he would not have been injured if he had been using the
DeWalt saw because, he says, "it had a full wrap around
guard."  The trial court denied the co-employees' summary-
judgment motion.  Thereafter, pursuant to Rule 5(a), Ala. R.
App. P., the trial court certified the following controlling
question of law for this Court's consideration:
"Is the presence of another saw on the premises that
had 
not 
been 
installed 
and 
[that] 
was 
not
manufactured by the manufacturer of the saw in
question the equivalent of the removal of a safety
guard under Alabama Code [1975,] § 25-5-11(c)(2)?"
This Court granted the co-employees' request for 
permission to
appeal from the trial court's interlocutory order denying
their summary-judgment motion.
Hall argues that the failure to replace the Kalamazoo saw
in question with the newer DeWalt saw, which allegedly had a
superior guard, was "tantamount to [the] removal of a safety
guard under § 25-5-11(c)(2)."
"[T]his Court has, on limited occasions, liberally
interpreted the concept of 'removal' within the
context of § 25–5–11(c)(2). In Bailey v. Hogg, 547
So. 2d 498, 500 (Ala. 1989), this Court held that
the 'failure to install' a safety device provided by
the manufacturer equated to the intentional and
willful 'removal' of a safety device. Likewise, in
Harris v. Gill, 585 So. 2d 831, 837 (Ala. 1991),
this Court held that the act of 'bypassing' an
original safety device by installing an alternative
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safety device equated with the intentional and
willful 'removal' of a safety device. Finally, in
Moore v. Reeves, 589 So. 2d 173, 178–79 (Ala. 1991),
we held that the 'failure to maintain and/or repair
a safety guard' equated with the intentional and
willful 'removal' of a safety guard."
Cumbie v. L&A Contracting Co., 739 So. 2d 1099, 1102 (Ala.
1999).
In the present case, there is no evidence indicating that
the co-employees failed to install a guard provided by the
manufacturer of the saw that injured Hall or that they failed
to maintain or repair the guard provided.  Moreover, although
an additional guard was installed on the saw, that guard was
not "an alternative safety device" in that the original guard
was not bypassed.1  
"To permit all actions based on negligence that
'pertains to safety or adds to the plaintiff's risk'
would be contrary to the intent of the legislature.
Hallmark[ v. Duke, 624 So. 2d [1058], 1062 [(Ala.
1993)]. We adhere to the view that '§ 25–5–11(c)(2)
cannot be construed to allow a co-employee action in
every situation where an employee is injured on the
job and that any change in the limited right of
action provided for in § 25–5–11(c)(2) must be left
to the legislature.' Lane v. Georgia Cas. & Sur.
Co., 670 So. 2d 889, 892 (Ala. 1995)."
1We note that the portion of the record upon which Hall
relies in asserting that the co-employees added a guard to the
saw suggests that someone named "Nevell" added the guard.  We
also note that Hall does not assert that the addition of the
second guard rendered the saw less safe.
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Cumbie, 739 So. 2d at 1103–04.
The 
Court 
declines 
to 
extend 
the 
definition 
of
willfulness in § 25-5-11(c)(2) to encompass the circumstances
involved in the present case.  Accordingly, we answer the
specific question certified by the trial court in the
negative.  Under the facts in this case, the failure to
install another, presumably safer, saw that was present on the
premises but that had not been put into operation and that was
manufactured by a different manufacturer than the saw that
injured the plaintiff is not the equivalent of the removal of
a safety guard so as to constitute willful conduct under § 25-
5-11(c)(2).  Cf. Wadsworth v. Jewell, 902 So. 2d 664, 669
(Ala. 2004) (failure to provide an employee with an ergonomic
keyboard, even though the employer had access to ergonomic
keyboards, did not constitute the removal of a safety device
provided by the manufacturer of the computer the employee was
using when the injury occurred).2  The judgment of the trial
2The Court does not express an opinion as to whether the
failure to install an allegedly safer machine that is present
on the premises and made by the same manufacturer as the
machine that injured an employee might come within the
operation of § 25-5-11(c)(2).
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court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Stuart, C.J., and Parker, Shaw, Main, and Wise, JJ.,
concur.
Bolin and Bryan, JJ., concur in the result. 
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