Title: Hopkins v. Delaware

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DEREK HOPKINS,  
 
Defendant-Below,  
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
Appellee. 
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No.  102, 2022 
 
Court Below:  Superior Court of 
the State of Delaware 
 
Cr. ID No. K2001012867 
Submitted:  November 16, 2022 
Decided:  February 20, 2023 
 
 
Before VALIHURA, VAUGHN, and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Zachary A. George, Esquire, Hudson Jones Jaywork & Fisher, Dover, Delaware, for 
Appellant, Derek Hopkins. 
 
Brian L. Arban, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for 
Appellee.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VAUGHN, Justice: 
2 
 
 
The Defendant-Below, Appellant, Derek Hopkins, appeals from his 
convictions in Superior Court for Drug Dealing, Disregarding a Police Officer’s 
Signal, Conspiracy in the Third Degree, Resisting Arrest, Illegal Possession of a 
Controlled Substance (2 counts), Driving While Suspended or Revoked, Reckless 
Driving, Failure to Transfer Title and Registration, Unreasonable Speed, and Failure 
to Stop at a Stop Sign.  He was also found “responsible” for possession of 
marijuana.1  He makes three claims.  First, he claims that the Superior Court abused 
its discretion by refusing to accept a plea agreement offered by the State and the 
defense on the morning of trial.  Second, he claims that the Superior Court erred as 
a matter of law by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal as to the charge of 
Drug Dealing.  Finally, he claims that the cumulative effect of the errors was to 
prejudice his substantial rights, requiring the convictions to be vacated.   We find no 
merit to the defendant’s claims and affirm.   
 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
On January 21, 2020, around 10 p.m., Delaware State Police Officers Brian 
Holl and Lloyd McCann were patrolling the area of Frederica, Delaware in an 
unmarked SUV.  They observed the defendant driving a Ford Crown Victoria on 
 
1 “[S]imple possession of a personal use quantity of marijuana is a civil, not criminal, offense.”  
State v. Murray, 158 A.3d 476, 479 (Del. Super. 2017); see 16 Del. C. § 4764(c)(1).  It is our 
understanding that, in cases involving marijuana possession as a civil violation, a court will find 
an individual “responsible” or “not responsible.” 
3 
 
Bowers Beach Road.  They ran the tag number of the defendant’s vehicle and 
discovered that the vehicle’s title and registration had not been properly transferred.   
Trooper Holl, the driver of the police vehicle, activated his emergency lights and 
attempted to stop the defendant’s vehicle.  The defendant failed to comply and 
attempted to flee at a high rate of speed.  He continued to travel at a high rate of 
speed, running through several stop signs.  Finally, he lost control of his vehicle and 
crashed into a cement porch at a residence.  When the officers exited their unmarked 
SUV and approached the defendant’s vehicle, he attempted to pull away in reverse.  
Trooper Holl then broke the driver’s door window with his baton.  Officer McCann 
unlocked the driver’s side door, removed the defendant from the vehicle and, despite 
the defendant’s resistance, secured him with handcuffs.  A female passenger was 
also taken into custody. 
 
Upon the defendant’s arrest, Officer McCann conducted a search of his 
person.  The officer found two bags containing a green leafy substance, suspected 
and later confirmed to be marijuana, and a prescription pill bottle containing a white 
rock substance, suspected and later confirmed to be crack cocaine.  The cocaine 
weighed in at 1.3 grams.  Officer McCann also found $573 cash in the defendant’s 
pocket.  The defendant stated to Officer McCann that the substances belonged to 
him, but signed a Notice of Forfeiture form indicating that the money was not his. 
4 
 
 
Heroin was also found in the vehicle.  A bundle2 of heroin was discovered in 
the “back passenger floorboard area.”3  Bags containing the heroin were labeled 
“Armany AX.”4  When asked about this labeling, Officer McCann explained:  “It’s 
common for packaged heroin to have a -- it’s stamped, but it’s the brand . . . of the 
heroin.”5  The following day, Trooper Holl discovered bags of heroin bearing the 
label “Hell Cat”6 in the back seat of his vehicle where the defendant’s female 
passenger had been the previous evening.  She was charged with possession of the 
“Hell Cat” heroin.  No drug paraphernalia of the kind used to ingest drugs was found 
in the vehicle or on the defendant’s person. 
 
The defendant’s indictment occurred during the public health and judicial 
emergencies caused by COVID-19.  During that time, emergency restrictions on 
judicial branch activity were in effect and jury trials were not being held.   The 
emergency declarations were rescinded on July 13, 2021, and the Superior Court 
began to address the significant backlog of cases which were then pending.  The 
defendant’s trial was scheduled for Monday, October 18, 2021, and Thursday, 
October 14, 2021, was established as a plea-by-appointment deadline.  In other 
 
2 Officer McCann, who testified about the discovery of this heroin in the vehicle, described a 
bundle of heroin as a collection of nine to thirteen bags of heroin which are wrapped together, 
usually with a rubber band. 
3 App. to Opening Br. at A-280. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at A-285. 
5 
 
words, any plea agreement between the State and the defendant was required to be 
presented to the court by October 14, and a plea agreement tendered after that date 
was subject to rejection by the court as untimely.  
 
In addition to this case, the defendant had two other outstanding cases, one 
which included drug charges and one which included drug and weapons charges.  
They were also scheduled for trial for October 18.  The State offered a plea 
agreement to the defendant a week before the plea-by-appointment deadline that 
would have resolved all three of the defendant’s cases with a recommended sentence 
of three years at Level V.  This plea offer was not accepted by the defendant.  At a 
pretrial conference on Friday, October 15, the Superior Court assigned this case as 
the one that would go forward for trial on October 18, with the other two cases being 
given new trial dates.  Negotiations between defendant’s counsel and the State 
continued past the October 14 deadline and into the weekend.  These continued 
negotiations resulted in the State making a new plea offer that would resolve this 
case and the other drug case with a recommendation for a sentence involving only 
probation.  The new offer did not include the drugs and weapons case and left it 
unresolved, to be discussed at a later time. 
 
On the morning scheduled for trial, the State and defense counsel appeared 
before the judge who was calling the criminal trial calendar and informed him of the 
new plea offer made after the plea-by-appointment deadline.  Defense counsel 
6 
 
indicated that he believed the defendant would be receptive to the plea offer, but that 
he had been unable to speak with him that morning before appearing in court.  The 
court expressed frustration with the parties for this and rejected the plea offer, 
explaining: 
And, again, in the COVID scenario, I’ve had a hundred 
something jurors get thrown in today.  And the parties 
need to come to grips with that and they need to 
understand that and they need to take that seriously when 
we’re handling these matters . . . .  I’ve got to worry about 
the State’s concerns, the defendant’s concerns the jurors 
and the court system’s concerns as a whole, and we need 
to make sure that these deadlines are worked . . . .  I’m 
hearing the parties got together, did more negotiating over 
this weekend, decided they were going to resolve matters 
that would take this case off the calendar.  And that’s not 
acceptable.7 
 
 
Later that morning, defense counsel and the State met with the assigned trial 
judge in chambers.  During this office conference, the court informed the parties that 
the earlier rejection of the plea offer would not be changed or reconsidered.  The 
trial judge explained: 
And let me just make this clear.  The case is regarding the 
Court’s discretion to accept a late plea, and based on the 
principle that the Court has to manage its docket, and the 
Court cannot effectively manage its docket if counsel do 
not follow the directives of the Court.  The Court has made 
it clear countless times to counsel that we have a plea-by-
appointment deadline that has been in effect now for a 
number of months, and, particularly, in the context of the 
pandemic, and requiring jurors to expose themselves to 
 
7 App. to Opening Br. at A-182. 
7 
 
danger by coming out and serving, which they have been 
doing, that we must abide by that plea-by-appointment 
deadline.  If the Court begins to allow that deadline just to 
be disregarded, and then plea negotiations to continue after 
the plea-by-appointment deadline, then the Court loses 
control over its docket.8 
 
The court further reiterated that there existed no rule of law that mandated that plea 
agreements must be accepted by the court, especially in cases when they are 
presented outside the established deadlines. 
 
Trial by jury then proceeded.  During the trial, Trooper Holl and Officer 
McCann testified about the events surrounding the defendant’s arrest.  Officer 
McCann testified to a number of points relevant to the drug dealing charge: 
• Drug dealers do not usually have drug paraphernalia—
the “kind to ingest drugs”9—with them. 
• No such drug paraphernalia was found in the 
defendant’s vehicle. 
• “[D]rug dealers usually have a larger amount of 
currency in smaller denominations”10 and the 
defendant’s money included “one $1 bill, one $2 bill, 
12 $5 bills, 23 $10 bills and 14 $20 bills.”11 
• “[I]t’s common for drug dealers to separate themselves 
from funds that are a profit of drug sales.”12 
• “[I]n my experience, drug dealers are those that are 
selling drugs for any kind of profit.  They usually have 
a larger quantity of narcotics, usually multiple variants 
of narcotics, as well as some sort of digital scale to be 
 
8 Id. at A-169. 
9 Id. at A-281. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at A-286. 
8 
 
used with any kind of drug paraphernalia associated 
with those that are actually selling the narcotics.”13 
• Officer McCann “use[d] force to pull [the defendant] 
out of the car”14 and after being laid on the ground with 
his hands underneath of his body, the defendant’s 
hands had to be physically pulled behind his back so 
that he could be handcuffed, as the defendant “would 
not comply with [Officer McCann’s] verbal commands 
to put his hands behind his back.”15 
• 1.3 grams of cocaine is “more than a user amount”16 
and, in Officer McCann’s experience, users of cocaine 
usually do not possess quantities over one gram. 
• Officer McCann did not know how much 1.3 grams of 
cocaine would cost or how much cocaine a person 
could get for $50. 
• Officer McCann “think[s]”17 the amount of cocaine 
typically bought by users “all depends on how much 
money the person that wants to buy the drugs has.”18 
• When crack cocaine is sold, the dealer will break a 
piece off of the rock, and that piece “could be as small 
as a piece of sand.”19 
• Crack cocaine is usually consumed by smoking, and 
some methods involve use of a cigarette or crack pipe. 
• Officer McCann “assum[ed]”20 cocaine could be 
ingested orally, but he “never had anyone say that they 
ingest crack cocaine by eating it or swallowing it.”21 
 
Officer McCann explained that he “can’t testify to [the defendant’s] intent[,]”22 and 
 
13 Id. at A-281. 
14 Id. at A-277. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at A-289. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at A-290. 
20 Id. at A-286. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at A-287. 
9 
 
further explained, “No, I mean I’m not in his head.  But the totality of the 
circumstances with drugs, money, and him fleeing from the police, you could 
conclude that there was drug sales.”23 
 
At the conclusion of the State’s case, defense counsel moved for judgment of 
acquittal as to the drug dealing charge.  The drug dealing count charged the 
defendant with knowingly delivering or possessing with intent to deliver cocaine.  
Defense counsel argued that there was a “decidedly insufficient amount of evidence 
to submit [the charge] to the jury on the issue of intent to deliver.”24  The motion 
was denied. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
We review a court’s rejection of a plea agreement for abuse of discretion.25  
“Abuse of discretion occurs when, among other things, the trial judge has ‘ignored 
recognized rules of law or practice so as to produce injustice.’”26 
This Court reviews the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de novo.27  
Specifically, this Court examines whether any rational trier of fact, viewing the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most 
 
23 Id.  Officer McCann elaborated:  “Without him stating, yes, I’m a drug dealer, yes, I do not 
know.”  Id. 
24 Id. at A-297. 
25 Berryman v. State, 897 A.2d 767, 2006 WL 954242, at *2 (Del. Apr. 11, 2006) (ORDER). 
26 Longford-Myers v. State, 213 A.3d 556, 558 (Del. 2019) (quoting Edwards v. State, 925 A.2d 
1281, 1284 (Del. 2007)) (citations omitted). 
27 Ways v. State, 199 A.3d 101, 106 (Del. 2018). 
10 
 
favorable to the State, could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of 
all the elements of the crime.28  “For the purposes of this inquiry, this Court does not 
distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence[,]”29 and in cases involving 
purely circumstantial evidence, the State need not “disprove every possible innocent 
explanation[.]”30 
DISCUSSION 
 
The defendant first claims that the Superior Court abused its discretion by 
rejecting the parties’ late plea agreement.31  He contends that the State’s making of 
a revised offer after the plea-by-appointment deadline had passed, an offer not 
available to the defendant on or before the plea-by-appointment date, constituted 
good cause to accept the plea agreement on the morning of trial.32 
Superior Court Criminal Rule 11(e)(3) states: “Time of Plea Agreement 
Procedure.  Except for good cause shown, notification to the court of the existence 
of a plea agreement shall be given at the arraignment or at such other time, prior to 
trial, as may be fixed by the court.”33   “A defendant has no constitutional right to 
 
28 Id. at 106-07; Gronenthal v. State, 779 A.2d 876, 879 (Del. 2001). 
29 Ways, 199 A.3d at 107 (quoting Cline v. State, 720 A.2d 891, 892 (Del. 1998)). 
30 Monroe v. State, 652 A.2d 560, 567 (Del. 1995). 
31 Opening Br. at 15. 
32 Id. 
33 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 11(e)(3) (emphasis in original). 
11 
 
have the court accept a plea agreement.[34]  Trial courts have significant control over 
and discretion in the management of their dockets and the scheduling of cases.”35 
The morning of trial, after being informed of the updated plea offer, the 
judicial officer calling the criminal trial calendar asked the State three times to 
provide a reason as to why the plea offer was not discussed before the plea-by-
appointment deadline.  The State explained that over the weekend defense counsel 
had broached the possibility of negotiating a plea agreement for this case and the 
other drug case, and leaving the third case, the drugs and weapons case, which 
carried mandatory time, for another day.  This was an approach that had not been 
considered before.  The State indicated that it was willing to consider this approach 
and over the weekend made the above-described offer to resolve this case and the 
other case involving drug charges.   
A similar discussion occurred in an office conference with the trial judge.  The 
trial judge asked for a demonstration as to whether some kind of “change in 
circumstances . . . prevented the State from making this offer before the plea-by-
appointment deadline[.]”36  The trial judge reiterated:  “can anyone offer me any 
 
34 Berryman v. State, 897 A.2d 767, 2006 WL 954242, at *2 (Del. Apr. 11, 2006) (ORDER) 
(quoting Slade v. State, 746 A.2d 277, 2000 WL 140039, at *1 (Del. Jan. 24, 2000) (citation 
omitted)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
35 Berryman, 2006 WL 954242 at *2 (quoting Washington v. State, 844 A.2d 293, 295 (Del. 2004)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
36 App. to Opening Br. at A-170. 
12 
 
reason why this couldn’t have occurred before the plea-by-appointment deadline?”37  
After hearing responses from both the State and the defendant’s counsel, which were 
similar to those given to the judge calling the criminal calendar, the court stated that 
the previous ruling on the matter would remain intact. 
 
It appears that the revised plea offer evolved from continued negotiations of 
the parties after expiration of the plea-by-appointment deadline, and not from any 
new or unexpected developments in this case.  We understand the logic of the 
defendant’s contention – that he was denied a probationary plea for two cases that 
was not available to him until after the plea-by-appointment deadline had passed.38  
Both of the Superior Court Judges involved, however, explored with counsel the 
reasons why the revised plea offer was made after expiration of the plea-by-
appointment deadline, and both concluded that no good cause existed for the 
untimely plea offer.  After carefully considering the defendant’s argument, our 
conclusion is that the Superior Court acted within its broad discretion in deciding 
that good cause did not exist to justify accepting an untimely plea agreement.  No 
abuse of discretion occurred.  Accordingly, we reject the defendant’s first claim. 
 
The defendant’s second claim that the Superior Court’s denial of his motion 
for judgment of acquittal was error.39  We disagree.  The evidence, viewed in the 
 
37 Id. 
38 Opening Br. at 15-16. 
39 Id. at 22. 
13 
 
light most favorable to the State, is sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of drug dealing.40   
 
The defendant claims that he could not be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt 
on the drug dealing charge “because there is no evidence to support a finding that 
[he] had the requisite state of mind – intent to deliver the cocaine found in his 
possession.”41  He argues that Officer McCann’s testimony “contort[ed] the facts” 
to support a bias against the defendant; that the cocaine did not weigh enough to be 
on a tier schedule; that it was not packaged in multiple bags; that police did not 
observe any drug sales; that he did not admit possessing the cocaine with the intent 
to deliver it; and that his flight was not probative of an intent to sell the cocaine 
because he was in possession of illegal substances.42 
 
In Laws v. State, this Court stated the following regarding proof of “intent to 
distribute:” 
[T]his Court held that an “intent to distribute” may be 
established through evidence of an additional element 
beyond mere possession.  This additional element may 
include:  (i) an admission by the defendant that the drugs 
were not for personal use; (ii) expert testimony about the 
amount or type of packaging generally used by sellers vs. 
users; or, (iii) some other credible evidence.43 
 
 
40 See Ways v. State, 199 A.3d 101, 106-07 (Del. 2018); Gronenthal v. State, 779 A.2d 876, 879 
(Del. 2001). 
41 Opening Br. at 23 (emphasis in original). 
42 Id. at 26. 
43 Laws v. State, 840 A.2d 641, 2003 WL 22998850, at *1 (Del. Dec. 18, 2003) (ORDER) (citing 
Cline v. State, 740 A.2d 891, 892-93 (Del. 1998)) (footnote omitted). 
14 
 
Officer McCann provided testimony, without objection, as an expert.  He testified 
that the defendant carried $573 on his person in denominations of $20 and under and 
drug dealers often have large sums of money in small denominations; the defendant 
claimed the money was not his, and drug dealers often try to “separate themselves” 
from drug profits;44 1.3 grams of cocaine was “more than a user amount[;]”45 the 
defendant did not possess drug paraphernalia and drug dealers usually do not have 
drug paraphernalia with them; the defendant possessed more than one kind of drug, 
as drug dealers often do; and the defendant resisted arrest.46  This evidence, viewed 
in the light most favorable to the State, was more than sufficient to justify a rational 
trier of fact’s finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for drug dealing.47 
 
The defendant’s third claim is that cumulative error occurred in the court 
below.  In light of our decisions that no abuse of discretion occurred with respect to 
the rejection of the late plea agreement and that no error occurred with respect to the 
denial of the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, we find that no 
cumulative error occurred. 
 
44 App. to Opening Br. at A-286. 
45 Id. at A-289. 
46 Trooper Holl also testified to the fact that the defendant resisted arrest. 
47 See Ways v. State, 199 A.3d 101, 106-07 (Del. 2018); Gronenthal v. State, 779 A.2d 876, 879 
(Del. 2001). 
15 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Superior Court is 
AFFIRMED. 
 
 
16 
 
TRAYNOR, Justice concurring: 
 
Although I agree with my colleagues that Hopkins’ convictions should be 
affirmed, I write separately to express my misgivings over the strength of the 
prosecution’s evidence on the charge of drug dealing.  In the context of this case, 
that charge required proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Hopkins possessed 
cocaine with the intent to deliver it.  If not for the deferential standard applicable to 
motions for judgment of acquittal, I would have grave reservations about the 
adequacy of the proof of Hopkins’ intent.  In my view, Officer McCann’s testimony, 
admittedly unrebutted by Hopkins, that the quantity of cocaine Hopkins possessed—
1.3 grams—was “more than a user”48 amount, but one gram would not be, is suspect.  
Moreover, the logic of the officer’s testimony that Hopkins’ claim that the money 
found in Hopkins’ back pocket was not his and Hopkins’ lack of cooperation are 
indicative of drug dealing instead of simple possession is puzzling.  And finally, the 
officer’s lack of familiarity with the street value of the cocaine seized from 
Hopkins49 calls into question his expertise in this area. 
 
But we are left with the fact that Hopkins did not challenge Officer McCann’s 
expertise or object to any of the opinions he offered.  I therefore reluctantly conclude 
 
48 App. to Opening Br. at A289.  The basis for the officer’s opinion that a crack-cocaine user 
would not typically possess more than one gram was that he had “stopped a lot of users and they 
usually don’t have more than a gram on them.”  Id.   
49 When asked if he knew the “cost[]” of 1.3 grams of cocaine, the officer candidly 
acknowledged that he had “no idea.”  Id. 
17 
 
that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of 
fact could rely on Officer McCann’s expert opinion—based on his largely 
unchallenged interpretation of the evidence seized incident to Hopkins’ arrest—and 
find Hopkins guilty of drug dealing beyond a reasonable doubt.