Title: Individual Subpoenaed to Appear at Waukesha County John Doe Case No. 2003 JD 001 v. J. Mac Davis

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2005 WI 70 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP1804-W 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Individual Subpoenaed 
to Appear at Waukesha County John Doe Case No. 
2003 JD 001,  
          Petitioner, 
     v. 
The Honorable J. Mac Davis, Presiding John Doe 
Magistrate, and the State of Wisconsin,  
          Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 9, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 31, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha   
 
JUDGE: 
J. Mac Davis   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner there were briefs by Stephen P. Hurley, 
Marcus J. Berghahn and Hurley, Burish & Milliken, S.C., Madison, 
and Harold Harlowe and Hal Harlowe & Associates, S.C., Madison, 
and oral argument by Stephen P. Hurley and Harold Harlowe. 
 
For the Respondents there was a brief by Julie M. Gay, 
Waukesha and oral argument by Julie M. Gay. 
 
 
2005 WI 70
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP1804-W  
(L.C. No. 
03 JD 1) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Individual  
Subpoenaed to Appear at Waukesha County  
John Doe Case No. 2003 JD 001,  
 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
The Honorable J. Mac Davis, Presiding  
John Doe Magistrate, and the State of  
Wisconsin,  
 
          Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 9, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
PETITION for a supervisory writ of prohibition.  The writ 
of prohibition is granted and the cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   The court of appeals 
certified 
this 
matter 
to 
this 
court 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 809.611 to determine whether Judge J. Mac Davis, 
acting as a John Doe judge, has either the statutory or inherent 
authority to require counsel for a John Doe witness to take an 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-
02 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2004AP1804-W   
 
2 
 
oath of secrecy when the John Doe proceedings were already 
subject to a secrecy order, and whether counsel's refusal to 
take such an oath can be the basis for disqualifying counsel 
from representing a witness at the John Doe proceeding.2   
¶2 
We conclude that a John Doe judge does not have either 
the statutory or inherent authority to require a witness's 
counsel to take an oath of secrecy when the John Doe proceedings 
are already subject to a secrecy order.  Accordingly, we hold 
that the John Doe judge's decision in the instant case to 
disqualify counsel for declining to take a redundant secrecy 
                                                 
2 The 
court 
of 
appeals, 
in 
certifying 
the 
writ 
of 
prohibition, posed the following four issues: 
1. 
Does a John Doe judge have authority, either 
statutory or inherent, to require a John Doe witness's 
counsel to take a secrecy oath? 
2. 
Is counsel's refusal to take the oath a basis for 
disqualifying counsel from representing a witness at 
the John Doe proceeding? 
3. 
If a John Doe judge has the authority to require 
counsel to take an oath of secrecy and the authority 
to disqualify counsel if counsel declines to do so, 
what is the proper procedure and what are the factors 
a John Doe judge should consider before disqualifying 
counsel? 
4. 
How does a witness's Wis. Stat. § 968.26 (2001-
2002) right to counsel at the John Doe proceeding 
balance against a John Doe judge's authority to 
require an oath of secrecy and to disqualify counsel 
for declining to take the oath? 
State ex rel. Individual Subpoenaed to Appear at Waukesha County 
John Doe Case No. 2003 JD 001 v. The Honorable J. Mac Davis, No. 
2004AP1804-W, Certification Mem. (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2004).   
No.  2004AP1804-W   
 
3 
 
oath was unwarranted.  We grant the writ of prohibition and 
remand the cause for further proceedings. 
I 
¶3 
The facts are sparse and undisputed.  This particular 
John Doe proceeding was initiated in April 2003.  In June 2004, 
the Witness3 was subpoenaed to appear before the Honorable J. Mac 
Davis, the John Doe judge.  Two attorneys accompanied the 
Witness.  These two attorneys had apparently represented the 
Witness for two years in matters related to this particular John 
Doe proceeding.  Also present at the June 2004 John Doe 
proceeding were two police officers, the court reporter, and the 
district attorney for Waukesha County. 
¶4 
When this John Doe proceeding was initiated in 2003, 
Judge Kathryn Foster, the John Doe judge, ordered that the 
proceedings be kept secret.  The order, entered by Judge Foster 
on April 3, 2003, read in relevant part: 
[N]o witness/attorney representing the witness at this 
John Doe proceeding shall reveal to any other person, 
the questions asked of that witness, the answers 
given, or any other matters observed or heard within 
the secret John Doe proceeding.   
¶5 
Judge 
Davis, 
the 
judge 
to 
whom 
the 
John 
Doe 
proceedings were assigned, instructed everyone at the June 2004 
proceeding about the order of secrecy.  He then provided to the 
                                                 
3 All persons called to appear before a John Doe judge are 
referred to as "witnesses."  The specific witness relevant to 
this case will be referred to as "the Witness." 
No.  2004AP1804-W   
 
4 
 
Witness a written "Admonishment to John Doe Witness," and read 
the Admonishment into the record.  
¶6 
The relevant portion of the Admonishment to the John 
Doe Witness was read into the record as follows: 
THE COURT:   . . . You are appearing before a John Doe 
proceeding, ordered to be convened and conducted by 
myself, the Honorable J. Mac Davis, Circuit Court 
Judge, Waukesha County, Wisconsin. 
Under Wisconsin law John Doe proceedings may be 
secret, and this one is.  You are admonished and 
directed to maintain this secrecy, and to inform no 
one of the questions asked of you, the answers given 
by you, or any other matters observed or heard during 
this John Doe proceeding, with the exception of your 
own attorney, if you have one.  You obviously do.  
Violations of this secrecy order may be punished as 
contempt of court.  Do you understand? 
THE WITNESS:  Yes.  
¶7 
After reading the Admonishment, thereby reaffirming 
the secrecy order, Judge Davis required the Witness to swear and 
sign an oath of secrecy.  The text of the oath was as follows: 
I hereby solemnly swear that I will keep any evidence 
received in this John Doe Proceeding secret to the 
best of my ability, and will disclose it to no one 
other than other sworn agents of the Proceedings.  SO 
HELP ME GOD. 
The Witness responded to the oral secrecy oath, saying, "So help 
me God."  The Witness then signed a copy of the oath.  Judge 
Davis 
then 
administered 
the 
statutory 
oath 
required 
of 
witnesses: "Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth so help you God."4  The Witness complied. 
                                                 
4 Wis. Stat. § 906.03. 
No.  2004AP1804-W   
 
5 
 
¶8 
Judge 
Davis 
then 
addressed 
the 
Witness's 
two 
attorneys, asking one of them, "Do you understand that you are 
also under an obligation and order of this Court to not disclose 
what happens in the John Doe proceedings.  You can, of course, 
discuss it with your co-counsel and client but not with others; 
is that clear in your mind?"  The attorney responded, "Yes."  
Judge Davis then asked the attorneys to take the same oath of 
secrecy; both attorneys declined. 
¶9 
The Witness asserts that Judge Davis lacks authority 
to require an oath of secrecy from the Witness's attorneys, 
although both attorneys stated that they would comply with the 
secrecy order.  The Witness contends that when there is already 
a lawful secrecy order in place, the additional requirement of a 
secrecy oath from the Witness's attorneys is not necessary to 
carry out a John Doe judge's statutory mandate.  In addition to 
arguing redundancy, the Witness argues that the oath of secrecy 
from the Witness's attorneys would impair the attorney-client 
relationship.  
¶10 The John Doe judge and the State assert that given the 
importance of secrecy to John Doe proceedings, a John Doe 
judge's inherent authority must allow the judge to require 
secrecy oaths of a witness's counsel even when a secrecy order 
is in place.  Judge Davis explained the purpose of the secrecy 
oath at the June 2004 proceeding, saying, "In order to protect 
and enforce [the original secrecy order] in a practical fashion 
it is important to let the people involved know that [the 
proceeding] is under an order of secrecy.  And one of the best 
No.  2004AP1804-W   
 
6 
 
ways to enforce that is to ask for an oath whereby they 
acknowledge in a formal fashion that they are under the 
obligation, and will comply."   
¶11 In 
enforcing 
the 
secrecy 
oath, 
Judge 
Davis 
acknowledged that the right to counsel is an important right and 
that under the John Doe statute a witness has a right to 
counsel.  
¶12 Because the attorneys refused to take the oath of 
secrecy, Judge Davis disqualified them from representing the 
Witness.   
¶13 In response to the disqualification of counsel, the 
Witness sought a supervisory writ of prohibition from the court 
of appeals pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.51.5  The purpose of the 
writ is to prohibit Judge Davis from requiring the Witness's 
counsel to take the secrecy oath.  The court of appeals in turn 
certified the matter to this court.  Pending the resolution of 
this case, the court of appeals has stayed further enforcement 
of the Witness's subpoena.  
 
                                                 
5 Pursuant to an order issued by the court of appeals, the 
State was made a respondent in this case along with Judge Davis.  
When the petition for the writ of prohibition was filed, it too 
became part of the sealed record.  A reporter from the Milwaukee 
Journal Sentinel filed a request to see the petition.  To 
represent the interests of the executive branch in whether to 
unseal the petition for writ of prohibition, the State was 
brought into this case as a respondent.  Because nothing in the 
petition disclosed materials essential to the secrecy of the 
John Doe proceeding, the petition for a writ of prohibition was 
unsealed. 
No.  2004AP1804-W   
 
7 
 
II 
¶14 We first determine the applicable standard of review.  
The Witness has petitioned for a writ of prohibition on the 
ground that the John Doe judge exceeded his authority by 
requiring the Witness's counsel to take an oath of secrecy when 
there was already a secrecy order in effect. 
¶15 A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy that 
normally will not issue except in the absence of other adequate 
remedies.6  As a remedy, writs of prohibition are often used in 
connection with John Doe proceedings.7  Neither party challenges 
whether a writ of prohibition is the proper procedure to test 
the John Doe judge's authority in the present case.  Rather, the 
parties dispute whether, based on the facts of this case, the 
court should issue the writ here. 
¶16 A writ of prohibition is the appropriate remedy "to 
restrain the exercise of judicial functions outside or beyond 
the jurisdiction of a court, or an official acting in a judicial 
capacity, 
where 
great 
hardship 
would 
otherwise 
result."8  
                                                 
6 State ex rel. Rogers v. Burton, 11 Wis. 50, [*51], 52, 
[*53]  (1860). 
7 See, e.g., State ex rel. Unnamed Person No. 1 v. State, 
2003 WI 30, 260 Wis. 2d 653, 660 N.W.2d 260; State ex rel. 
Klinkiewicz v. Duffy, 35 Wis. 2d 369, 151 N.W.2d 63 (1967); 
State ex rel. Niedziejko v. Coffey, 22 Wis. 2d 392, 126 
N.W.2d 96 
(1964); 
State 
ex 
rel. 
Jackson 
v. 
Coffey, 
18 
Wis. 2d 529, 118 N.W.2d 939 (1963); State ex rel. Kowaleski v. 
District Court, 254 Wis. 363, 372, 36 N.W.2d 419 (1949), 
overruled on other grounds by State ex rel. Jackson v. Coffey, 
18 Wis. 2d 529, 537, 118 N.W.2d 939 (1963). 
8 Klinkiewicz, 35 Wis. 2d at 375-76. 
No.  2004AP1804-W   
 
8 
 
Accordingly, if the court or a John Doe judge is properly 
exercising powers and jurisdiction, a writ will not issue.9 
¶17 In the instant case, the requested writ of prohibition 
will issue if the John Doe judge acted in excess of his powers.  
Whether a John Doe judge has exceeded his or her powers is a 
question of law that this court determines independently.10   
III 
¶18 In Wisconsin, a John Doe proceeding is initiated under 
Wis. Stat. § 968.26.  That statute reads in relevant part as 
follows: 
John Doe proceeding.  If a person complains to a judge 
that he or she has reason to believe that a crime has 
been committed within his or her jurisdiction, the 
judge shall examine the complainant under oath and any 
witnesses produced by him or her and may, and at the 
request of the district attorney shall, subpoena and 
examine other witnesses to ascertain whether a crime 
has been committed and by whom committed.  The extent 
to which the judge may proceed in the examination is 
within the judge's discretion.  The examination may be 
adjourned and may be secret.  Any witness examined 
under this section may have counsel present at the 
examination but the counsel shall not be allowed to 
examine 
his 
or 
her 
client, 
cross-examine 
other 
witnesses or argue before the judge.  If it appears 
probable from the testimony given that a crime has 
been committed and who committed it, the complaint may 
be reduced to writing and signed and verified; and 
                                                 
9 Kowaleski, 254 Wis. at 372; Peter B. v. State, 184 
Wis. 2d 57, 68-69, 516 N.W.2d 746 (Ct. App. 1994). 
10 State v. Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d 721, 733, 546 N.W.2d 406 
(1996) ("This court accepted certification . . . in order to 
clarify the roles and delineate the authority of both judges and 
prosecutors in a John Doe proceeding.  These are questions of 
statutory 
interpretation 
which 
this 
court 
reviews 
de 
novo . . . ."). 
No.  2004AP1804-W   
 
9 
 
thereupon a warrant shall issue for the arrest of the 
accused.  Subject to s. 971.23, if the proceeding is 
secret, the record of the proceeding and the testimony 
taken shall not be open to inspection by anyone except 
the district attorney unless it is used by the 
prosecution at the preliminary hearing or the trial of 
the accused and then only to the extent that it is so 
used. . . .  
¶19 A John Doe proceeding is an independent investigatory 
tool used to ascertain whether a crime has been committed, and 
if so, by whom.11  John Doe proceedings have a long history in 
Wisconsin.  This court has previously discussed John Doe 
proceedings in detail;12 we will not restate that discussion 
here.  
¶20 An important aspect of a John Doe proceeding is 
secrecy.13  A John Doe judge has the "power to determine whether 
the examination will be secret."14  Secrecy may assist the fact- 
finding process.  It keeps information from a target who might 
consider fleeing; prevents a suspect from collecting perjured 
testimony for the trial; prevents those interested in thwarting 
the inquiry from tampering with testimony or secreting evidence; 
and renders witnesses more free in their disclosures.15 
                                                 
11 Unnamed Person No. 1, 260 Wis. 2d 653, ¶22. 
12 See, e.g., State v. Washington, 83 Wis. 2d 808, 266 
N.W.2d 597 (1978). 
13 See Wis. Stat. § 968.26 ("The examination . . . may be 
secret."); 
Wis. 
Family 
Counseling 
Servs. 
v. 
State, 
95 
Wis. 2d 670, 291 N.W.2d 631 (Ct. App. 1980). 
14 Washington, 83 Wis. 2d at 822; Niedziejko, 22 Wis. 2d 392 
at 398. 
15 Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d at 736; Betty Brown, The Wisconsin 
District Attorney and the Criminal Case 5 (2d ed. 1975). 
No.  2004AP1804-W   
 
10 
 
¶21 The parties do not dispute the validity of the secrecy 
order or that the secrecy order was in effect at all times 
relevant to this case.  A proper secrecy order (like the one in 
the instant case) covers questions asked, witnesses' answers, 
transcripts of the John Doe proceeding, and any exhibits that 
might be produced.16  The scope of a proper secrecy order also 
encompasses "other matters observed or heard . . . at a [secret] 
John Doe Proceeding."17 
¶22 The narrow question presented in the instant case is 
whether a John Doe judge has the authority to require a 
witness's counsel to take an oath of secrecy when a secrecy 
order covering the proceedings is already in effect.  We need 
not and do not address the authority of a John Doe judge to 
require a witness's counsel to take an oath of secrecy when no 
secrecy 
order 
has 
been 
entered 
covering 
the 
John 
Doe 
proceedings.   
¶23 A John Doe judge's authority stems both from the 
statutes and from powers inherent to a judge.18  
¶24 Statutory powers afforded a court are not necessarily 
afforded a John Doe judge.19  We therefore examine the statutory 
powers of a John Doe judge found in Wis. Stat. § 968.26 to 
                                                 
16 State v. O'Connor, 77 Wis. 2d 261, 279, 252 N.W.2d 671 
(1977). 
17 Unnamed Person No. 1, 260 Wis. 2d 653, ¶62. 
18 Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d at 738. 
19 State ex rel. Jackson v. Coffey, 18 Wis. 2d 529, 536, 118 
N.W.2d 939 (1963). 
No.  2004AP1804-W   
 
11 
 
determine whether the statute authorizes a John Doe judge to 
require a witness's attorney to take an oath of secrecy.   
¶25 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.26 explicitly states that a John 
Doe examination may be secret, but provides no indication as to 
how that secrecy is to be achieved.20  Section 968.26 contains no 
mention of secrecy-related oaths or secrecy orders.  
¶26 A John Doe judge's powers are not, however, limited to 
those enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 968.26.21  We next examine 
whether a John Doe judge has inherent authority to require a 
                                                 
20 The Wisconsin Jury Instructions Special Materials address 
secrecy orders in John Doe proceedings: 
C. Order of Secrecy 
[ADD THE FOLLOWING IF A SECRET JOHN DOE PROCEEDING HAS 
BEEN AUTHORIZED.] 
"Under Wisconsin law, a circuit court judge may order 
that a John Doe proceeding be secret.  That has been 
done in this case.  You are ordered to maintain the 
secrecy of this John Doe proceeding and to inform no 
one, other than your attorney if you have one, of the 
questions asked of you, the answers given by you, or 
any other matters observed or heard during this 
proceeding.  Violation of this secrecy order may be 
punished as a contempt of court. 
"You are now being given a copy of the Order of 
Secrecy.  Do you acknowledge receipt of this Order of 
Secrecy?" 
Wis JI——Criminal SM-12 (1999).  This instruction and a written 
copy of the order of secrecy were given to the Witness and the 
Witness's 
counsel 
in 
this 
case 
prior 
to 
Judge 
Davis's 
administration of the secrecy oath to the Witness and attempted 
administration of the secrecy oath to the Witness's counsel. 
21 Unnamed Person No. 1, 260 Wis. 2d 653, ¶54; Cummings, 199 
Wis. 2d at 735-36.  
No.  2004AP1804-W   
 
12 
 
witness's counsel to take an oath of secrecy when there is a 
secrecy order in effect.  A John Doe judge's inherent authority 
stems from a John Doe judge's judicial office.22  This court has 
held that the inherent authority of a John Doe judge "includes 
those powers necessary to fulfill the jurisdictional mandate."23  
Thus, a John Doe judge's inherent authority has been construed 
to 
include 
the 
authority 
to 
issue 
subpoenas, 
adjourn 
proceedings, take possession of subpoenaed records, adjudicate 
probable cause, and issue and seal search warrants.24  In short, 
a John Doe judge's inherent power encompasses all powers 
necessary for the John Doe judge to "carry out his or her 
responsibilities with respect to the proper conduct of John Doe 
proceedings."25  While a John Doe judge's powers are broad, they 
are not unlimited.26   
¶27 This court recently examined a John Doe judge's 
inherent authority to disqualify counsel for a conflict of 
interest.27  State ex rel. Unnamed Person No. 1 v. State arose 
                                                 
22 Unnamed Person No. 1, 260 Wis. 2d 653, ¶54 (citing Wis. 
Family Counseling Servs. v. State, 95 Wis. 2d 670, 675-76, 291 
N.W.2d 631 (Ct. App. 1980)). 
23 Unnamed Person No. 1, 260 Wis. 2d 653, ¶55; Cummings, 199 
Wis. 2d at 736. 
24 Unnamed Person No. 1, 260 Wis. 2d 653, ¶54 (citing 
Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d at 735-36; State v. Kielisch, 123 Wis. 2d 
125, 131, 365 N.W.2d 904 (Ct. App. 1985)). 
25 Unnamed Person No. 1, 260 Wis. 2d 653, ¶55. 
26 Custodian of Records v. State, 2004 WI 65, ¶10, 272 Wis. 
2d 208, 680 N.W.2d 792. 
27 Unnamed Person No. 1, 260 Wis. 2d 653, ¶¶54-55. 
No.  2004AP1804-W   
 
13 
 
out of a John Doe proceeding convened to investigate possible 
illegal campaign activity.28  A single law firm represented 
several witnesses subpoenaed to testify at the same John Doe 
proceeding.29  The terms of the secrecy order prevented the 
witnesses' attorneys from securing conflict of interest waivers 
or consent forms from their clients because the attorneys could 
not disclose clients' names to the other clients.30 
¶28 Citing the conflict of interest, the John Doe judge 
ordered the attorneys disqualified.  This court held that the 
disqualification was within the John Doe judge's inherent 
authority to ensure procedural fairness, saying: 
It is the John Doe judge's responsibility to ensure 
procedural fairness, and matters such as attorney 
conflicts 
of 
interest 
may indeed 
interfere 
with 
procedural fairness . . . [under SCR 20:1.7] "[w]here 
the conflict is such as clearly to call in question 
the 
fair 
or 
efficient 
administration 
of 
justice . . . ."  Accordingly, we conclude that a John 
Doe judge must have the authority to disqualify 
counsel, and may permit argument by counsel when 
necessary to ensure procedural fairness.31 
¶29 The same concerns regarding ordered proceedings and 
procedural fairness are not implicated under the facts of the 
present case.  Both counsel for the Witness agreed that they 
were bound by, and would abide by, the court's secrecy order.  
                                                 
28 Id., ¶3. 
29 Id., ¶¶6-10. 
30 Id. 
31 Id., ¶55 (citation omitted). 
No.  2004AP1804-W   
 
14 
 
The Witness asserts that requiring the oath of secrecy from the 
attorneys does not perform any function above and beyond the 
secrecy order already in effect.     
¶30 The John Doe judge viewed the secrecy oath as "a 
proper and wise procedure to impress upon individuals their 
obligations . . . ."  The John Doe judge viewed the oath as a 
more formal means of reinforcing secrecy.  The John Doe judge 
thus recognized that the secrecy oath does not add to the 
secrecy of the proceedings or change the remedies available for 
violation of the secrecy order.  We agree with the John Doe 
judge about the effect of an oath of secrecy under the 
circumstances of the instant case.   
¶31 The 
secrecy 
oath 
in 
the 
instant 
case 
is 
not 
substantively or procedurally different from the secrecy order.  
Imposing a secrecy oath on the Witness's counsel has no 
practical effect on the secrecy of the proceedings or the 
obligations of counsel in the instant case when a secrecy order 
was in effect.  We therefore must conclude that the secrecy oath 
requested of the attorneys was surplusage and requiring it was 
not, under the facts of this case, a power necessary to fulfill 
the John Doe judge's jurisdictional mandate or to carry out his 
responsibilities with respect to the proper conduct of the John 
Doe proceeding. 
¶32 Because there is no need for a secrecy oath when a 
secrecy order is already in effect, a John Doe judge does not 
have statutory or inherent power to require a witness's counsel 
to take an oath of secrecy.  Although a John Doe judge has the 
No.  2004AP1804-W   
 
15 
 
power to conduct John Doe proceedings in secret and has the 
authority to issue an order to that effect, a John Doe judge 
need not have the corollary power to require a secrecy oath from 
a witness's counsel when a secrecy order is already in effect.   
¶33 Accordingly, we conclude that the John Doe judge erred 
as a matter of law in the present case by requiring the oath of 
secrecy from the Witness's counsel when a secrecy order was in 
effect.  A John Doe judge does not have either the statutory or 
inherent authority to require a witness's counsel to take an 
oath of secrecy when the John Doe proceedings are already 
subject to a secrecy order.  We hold that the John Doe judge's 
decision in the instant case to disqualify the Witness's counsel 
for declining to take a redundant secrecy oath was unwarranted.    
 
¶34 For the reasons set forth, we grant the writ of 
prohibition and remand the cause for further proceedings.  
By the Court.—The writ of prohibition is granted and the 
cause is remanded. 
 
 
No.  2004AP1804-W   
 
 
 
1