Title: Lancaster v. Fairfield Cty. Budget Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

CITY OF LANCASTER, APPELLANT, v. FAIRFIELD COUNTY BUDGET COMMISSION ET 
AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as Lancaster v. Fairfield Cty. Budget Comm. (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 242.] 
Taxation — Income tax — Apportioning Undivided Local Government Fund and 
Undivided Local Government Revenue Assistance Fund — Phrase “the 
legislative authority of the city, located wholly or partially in the county, 
with the greatest population” in R.C. 5747.53(A) and 5747.63(A), 
construed. 
The phrase in R.C. 5747.53(A) and 5747.63(A), “the legislative authority of the 
city, located wholly or partially in the county, with the greatest population,” 
refers to the most populous city with any territory within the county. 
(No. 97-1814 — Submitted June 10, 1998 — Decided September 30, 1998.) 
APPEAL from Board of Tax Appeals, Nos. 96-D-1241 and 96-D-1242. 
 
In Fairfield County, the Undivided Local Government Fund (“ULGF”) and 
the Undivided Local Government Revenue Assistance Fund (“ULGRAF”) had 
been allocated according to the statutory method as prescribed in R.C. 5747.51 and 
5747.62.  In 1996, the Fairfield County Budget Commission sought to adopt the 
alternative method and formula for ULGF and ULGRAF apportionment as 
authorized by R.C. 5747.53 and 5747.63.  The commission passed a motion 
adopting the alternative method and formula and then distributed the motion to the 
political subdivisions in Fairfield County for approval. 
 
Pursuant to R.C. 5747.53 and 5747.63, the transition to the alternative 
method and formula must be approved by “the board of county commissioners; the 
legislative authority of the city, located wholly or partially in the county, with the 
greatest population; and a majority of the boards of township trustees and 
legislative authorities of municipal corporations, located wholly or partially in the 
 
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county, excluding the legislative authority of the city with the greatest population.” 
R.C. 5747.53(A) and 5747.63(A). 
 
The commission treated the Columbus City Council as “the legislative 
authority of the city, located wholly or partially in the county, with the greatest 
population.”  The commission chose Columbus because, based on the Ohio 
Department of Development’s 1992 population estimates, Columbus had the 
greatest total population of all cities located in Fairfield County.  The parties agree 
that Columbus had a total population of 642,987 with 701 residents living in 
Fairfield County, and that the city of Lancaster had a total population of 35,342, all 
of whom lived in Fairfield County. 
 
The board of county commissioners, a majority of the political subdivisions, 
and the city of Columbus approved the alternative method and formula as adopted 
by the commission.  Lancaster did not approve the alternative apportionment 
method.  Lancaster appealed the commission’s ULGF and ULGRAF 
apportionment to the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”).  On appeal, the parties 
stipulated that the only issue to be decided by the BTA was “whether the alternate 
methods of distributing the Undivided Local Government and the Undivided Local 
Government County Budget Assistance Funds as adopted by the Fairfield County 
Budget Commission on April 8, 1996 were approved by ‘the legislative authority 
of the city, located wholly or partially in the county with the greatest population,’ 
pursuant to R.C. 5747.53(A) and 5747.63(A).” 
 
Lancaster also argued before the BTA that Columbus did not approve the 
alternative formula as adopted by the commission.  According to Lancaster, the 
resolution passed by Columbus did not mirror the alternative formula adopted by 
the other Fairfield County political subdivisions.  Thus, Lancaster argued, because 
Columbus failed to adopt the same formula as the other entities, the measure failed 
and the commission must revert to the statutory method of apportionment. 
 
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The BTA held that Columbus was the city with the greatest population for 
purposes of approving the ULGF and ULGRAF apportionment and that Columbus 
had indeed approved the alternative apportionment method as adopted by the other 
Fairfield County political subdivisions. 
 
The cause is before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
John R. Varanese,  for appellant. 
 
Roy E. Hart, Fairfield County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J.  Lancaster is convinced that the General Assembly could not have 
intended that Columbus, with far fewer citizens to be affected by a decision 
relating to Fairfield County than Lancaster, have such a significant say in that 
county’s financial affairs.  But, because the words used by the General Assembly 
are only understandable as disfavoring Lancaster’s position, this court must apply 
those words without assessing Lancaster’s public policy concerns. 
I 
 
In its first proposition of law, Lancaster argues that the phrase “the 
legislative authority of the city, located wholly or partially in the county, with the 
greatest population” is ambiguous.  According to Lancaster, the word “or” in the 
statute “is a disjunctive particle that marks an alternative, generally corresponding 
to either, as in either this or that.” (Emphasis sic.)  Thus, Lancaster would have us 
read the statute as referring to two alternate political subdivisions: (1) the city 
located wholly in the county with the greatest population, and (2) the city located 
partially in the county with the greatest population.  Yet Lancaster offers this 
possible reading while acknowledging that it fails grammatically because, by any 
reading, the General Assembly intended to refer to only one city.  The grammatical 
failure of the proffered version is then the springboard for Lancaster’s asking this 
 
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court to reform the statute.  Lancaster asks this court, based on the supposed 
ambiguity, to look beyond the words in order to conform to Lancaster’s preferred 
public policy of favoring the city with the most citizens affected.  According to 
Lancaster, “[a]s Columbus has no stake in a statutory allocation, it is inconceivable 
that the General Assembly intended that it play such a pivotal role in the approval 
of an alternate formula in Fairfield County.” 
 
We reject Lancaster’s reading of the statutory language.  Lancaster discerns 
ambiguity only by a contorted reading of the phrase at issue.  When construing 
statutes, “[w]ords and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to 
the rules of grammar and common usage.” R.C. 1.42. “Statutes and contracts 
should be read and understood according to the natural and most obvious import of 
the language, without resorting to subtle and forced constructions * * *.” Slingluff 
v. Weaver (1902), 66 Ohio St. 621, 627, 64 N.E. 574, 576. 
 
The phrase “located wholly or partially in the county” is a participial phrase 
that modifies the noun “city.”  See, e.g., Strunk & White, The Elements of Style (3 
Ed.1979) 13.  The city identified in this phrase may be located wholly in the 
county or it may be located partially in the county so long as it has the greatest 
population of all cities located in the county.  When read in context, this phrase 
conveys one meaning: of all the cities in the county, the city with the greatest 
population casts one of the three approval votes whether that city is located wholly 
or partially in the county. 
 
The texts of R.C. 5747.53 and 5747.63 express the General Assembly’s 
intent; thus, we must interpret the statutes as written and cannot resort to other 
forms of statutory construction.  R.C. 1.49.  In Slingluff, the court explained this 
now well-settled rule of statutory interpretation: 
 
“But the intent of the lawmakers is to be sought first of all in the language 
employed, and if the words be free from ambiguity and doubt, and express plainly, 
 
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clearly, and distinctly the sense of the lawmaking body, there is no occasion to 
resort to other means of interpretation.  The question is not what did the general 
assembly intend to enact, but what is the meaning of that which it did enact.  That 
body should be held to mean what it has plainly expressed, and hence no room is 
left for construction.”  Slingluff v. Weaver, 66 Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574, 
paragraph two of the syllabus. 
 
The court further explained this rule in Provident Bank v. Wood (1973), 36 
Ohio St.2d 101, 105-106, 65 O.O.2d 296, 298, 304 N.E.2d 378, 381: 
 
“It is a cardinal rule that a court must first look to the language of the statute 
itself to determine the legislative intent. * * * If that inquiry reveals the statute 
conveys a meaning which is clear, unequivocal and definite, at that point the 
interpretive effort is at an end, and the statute must be applied accordingly.”  
(Citations omitted.) 
 
Lancaster’s interpretation forces a construction which is contrary to “the 
natural and most obvious import of the language” used by the General Assembly.  
Accordingly, we hold that the phrase in R.C. 5747.53(A) and 5747.63(A), “the 
legislative authority of the city located wholly or partially in the county, with the 
greatest population,” refers to the most populous city in the county with any 
territory within the county.  Our conclusion that the statutes are unambiguous 
restricts us from entertaining Lancaster’s public policy argument. 
II 
 
In its second proposition of law, Lancaster argues that the Columbus City 
Council failed to approve the alternative formula in the proper form as adopted by 
the commission.  Lancaster argues that “[a]nything short of a complete restatement 
would result in the approval of something other than Appellee’s ULGF alternate 
formula.”  According to Lancaster, Columbus’s resolution purporting to adopt the 
alternative method and formula partially and incorrectly restated the formula; thus 
 
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Columbus did not approve the alternative formula.  After reviewing the record 
before us, we find Lancaster’s argument to be unpersuasive. 
 
The motion proffered by the commission included a table showing the 
percentage of total funds each group of political entities was to receive.  The first 
paragraph following the table states that the eleven percent allocated to “Other 
Cites and Villages” is to be apportioned among the other cities and villages as 
shown in “Exhibit I.”  Exhibit I is a table showing each city and village and the 
share of the funds each is to receive. 
 
The resolution adopted by the Columbus City Council duplicates the table as 
found in the commission’s motion.  Immediately following the table, Columbus 
describes, in narrative form, how the eleven percent is to be apportioned among the 
“Other Cities and Villages.”  In Section 3 of the resolution, Columbus incorporates 
and makes part of its resolution the commission’s motion and all exhibits attached 
thereto.  Columbus apparently attempted to describe, in detail, how its share of the 
funds as an “other city” would be computed under the alternative apportionment 
method.  Based on an examination of the commission’s motion and Columbus’s 
resolution, we conclude that the resolution substantially mirrored the commission’s 
motion.  The BTA therefore did not err in deciding that Columbus properly 
approved the alternative method and formula as adopted by the other political 
subdivisions in Fairfield County. 
 
The decision of the BTA, being neither unreasonable nor unlawful, is 
affirmed. 
Decision affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur. 
 
RESNICK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
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PFEIFER, J., dissenting.  R.C. 5747.53(A) and 5747.63(A) are subject to a 
more reasonable interpretation, one that is clear and unforced, than that offered by 
the majority.  The statutes refer to the city with the largest population inside the 
county boundaries, whether or not the city is located wholly within the county 
boundaries.  It is inconceivable that the General Assembly could have meant 
anything else.  The statute can be read that way without being grammatically 
creative.  With apologies to Strunk & White, I will side with straight and right. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting. Because I favor an interpretation that 
is reasonable and gives effect to what I believe is the legislative intent of the 
statute, I must respectfully dissent.  I believe that the phrase in R.C. 5747.53 and 
5747.63, “the legislative authority of the city, located wholly or partially in the 
county, with the greatest population,” renders the statutes ambiguous.  Proof of its 
ambiguity is the fact that several counties in Ohio, the BTA, and now this court 
have interpreted the phrase in different ways. 
 
The majority’s strict grammatical analysis of the sentence ignores a more 
practical, common-sense interpretation that gives meaning to the purpose and 
intent of the statutes.  R.C. 5747.53 and 5747.63 allow a county to approve an 
alternative method of apportionment of funds.  The formula allots votes to certain 
groups or entities within that county that have an interest in obtaining those funds.  
These groups would include the county commissioners, township trustees, 
municipal corporations, and the city having the greatest population in the county, 
whether that city is located wholly or partially in the county. 
 
A strict grammatical approach, based upon the location of a participial 
phrase within the sentence, appears to defeat the purpose of the statutes and results 
in an unreasonable interpretation.  The city of Columbus with 701 residents in 
Fairfield County has more influence over Fairfield County’s apportionment of 
 
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government funds than does the city of Lancaster, which has 35,342 residents in 
the county.  According to the majority’s interpretation, Columbus meets the 
statutory description of “the city, located wholly or partially in the county, with the 
greatest population” because Columbus’s total population of 642,987, although 
only partially located in Fairfield County, is greater than Lancaster’s total 
population.  I do not believe that the General Assembly intended a city with a 
minimal population in a county to have a greater voice in the allocation of county 
funds than the most populous city located in that county. 
 
Other Ohio counties have followed the approach advocated by the city of 
Lancaster.  In Trumbull County, the city of Warren was designated as “the city, 
located wholly or partially in the county, with the greatest population,” although 
the city of Youngstown, with a greater total population than Warren, is located 
partially in Trumbull County but has fewer residents in the county than does the 
city of Warren.  Miami County designated the city of Piqua, although Huber 
Heights, with a population of only ten in Miami County, has a greater total 
population than does Piqua.  The city of Delaware had a population of 21,155 
wholly located in Delaware County in 1992.  The city of Columbus was partially 
located in Delaware County in 1992 but did not have any residents in the county.  
Delaware County designated the city of Delaware, although Columbus had a 
greater overall population of 642,987.  Clermont and Greene Counties have also 
followed this interpretation. 
 
It is implausible that the General Assembly intended the result reached by 
the majority.  There is a more reasonable and fair construction that would invite a 
just result and feasible execution of R.C. 5747.53 and 5747.63.  Therefore, I 
respectfully dissent. 
 
RESNICK, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.