Title: Commonwealth v. Dew

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13356 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ANTHONY DEW. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 8, 2023. - June 15, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel.  Due Process of Law, 
Assistance of counsel.  Practice, Criminal, Assistance of 
counsel.  Attorney at Law, Conflict of interest, Attorney-
client relationship.  Conflict of Interest. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 11, 2015. 
 
A motion for a new trial, filed on September 20, 2021, was 
heard by Janet L. Sanders, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
Edward B. Gaffney for the defendant. 
Adam Murphy, of New York (Catherine Logue, of New York, 
also present) for NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., 
& another. 
Ana M. Francisco (Mirian Albert also present) for Council 
on American-Islamic Relations -- Massachusetts & others. 
Paul B. Linn, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
Stanley Donald, pro se, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
2 
 
 
 
WENDLANDT, J.  The defendant, Anthony J. Dew, is a Black 
man of the Muslim faith.  Indigent and facing multiple felony 
charges, the defendant was appointed counsel who openly posted, 
on his social media account, his vitriolic hatred of and bigotry 
against persons of the Muslim faith; his unabashed anti-Muslim 
rants were matched only by his equal scorn for and racism 
against Black persons.  Some of these postings occurred while 
counsel was representing the defendant.  Indeed, counsel's 
intolerance and prejudice seeped into his representation of the 
defendant.  At least twice, counsel chastised the defendant for 
wearing religious garb, demanding that the defendant not wear 
"that shit" again; once, he refused to speak to the defendant 
because the defendant was wearing a kufi prayer cap in 
contravention of counsel's directive.  At their final meeting, 
counsel advised the defendant to accept a plea deal, which the 
defendant did.  Several years later, counsel's bigotry came to 
the attention of the Committee for Public Counsel Services 
(CPCS), which suspended him for no less than one year as a 
result.  After learning of counsel's anti-Muslim, racist 
postings, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea and obtain a new trial on the ground that his court-
appointed counsel had an actual conflict of interest. 
 
We conclude that the conflict of interest inherent in 
3 
 
counsel's bigotry against persons of the defendant's faith and 
race, which manifested during counsel's representation of the 
defendant, deprived the defendant of his right to effective 
assistance of counsel -- a right upon which our entire system of 
criminal justice depends to ensure a "fair trial."  See Gideon 
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).  See also Lavallee v. 
Justices in the Hampden Superior Court, 442 Mass. 228, 235 
(2004), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 
(1984).  No additional showing of "prejudice" is required.  The 
motion judge's conclusion to the contrary was in error; we now 
vacate the defendant's convictions and remand for a new trial.1 
 
1.  Background.  The following facts, found by the motion 
judge, are largely undisputed.2  The defendant is a Black man of 
the Muslim faith.  In March 2015, the defendant was indicted on 
nineteen charges, including five counts of trafficking a person 
for sexual servitude, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 50 (a) 
 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the Council 
on American-Islamic Relations -- Massachusetts, the Muslim 
Justice League, Lawyers for Civil Rights, Massachusetts Black 
Women Attorneys, the Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, the 
Hispanic National Bar Association, Citizens for Juvenile 
Justice, and the Justice Resource Institute; NAACP Legal Defense 
& Educational Fund, Inc., and the New England Innocence Project; 
and Stanley Donald. 
 
 
2 "In examining the defendant's claim that his counsel was 
ineffective, we accept the motion judge's subsidiary findings of 
fact absent clear error."  Commonwealth v. Smiley, 431 Mass. 
477, 481 (2000), citing Commonwealth v. Yesilciman, 406 Mass. 
736, 743 (1990). 
4 
 
(trafficking charges); and one count of rape, in violation of 
G. L. c. 265, § 22 (b) (rape charge).3  In February 2016, Richard 
Doyle was appointed to represent the defendant. 
 
During one of the first encounters between the defendant 
and Doyle, the defendant was wearing a kufi prayer cap.  Doyle 
demanded that the defendant remove his religious garb, 
instructing him, "Don't come in this room like that ever."4  At a 
meeting approximately two weeks later, Doyle left without 
speaking with the defendant upon seeing that the defendant again 
was wearing a kufi.  Doyle again met with the defendant at the 
court house shortly before the scheduled trial date in May 2016.  
At this meeting, Doyle chastised the defendant, in front of a 
 
 
3 The defendant was also indicted on two counts of assault 
and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, in violation of 
G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b); one count of assault and battery, in 
violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13A; one count of a second and 
subsequent offense of possession of a class A substance with 
intent to distribute, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32 (b); 
six counts of distributing a class A substance, in violation of 
G. L. c. 94C, § 32 (a); and three counts of distributing a class 
B substance, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (a). 
 
 
4 The motion judge found that, at this meeting, Doyle said 
"not to wear that shit in a courtroom."  The record supports 
that Doyle made this statement; however, at the hearing on his 
motion, the defendant testified that Doyle made the statement 
not to "wear that shit in court at all" at a later meeting 
during which he advised the defendant to accept the plea offer 
and said, "Don't come in this room like that ever," at this 
initial meeting.  Accordingly, we defer to the motion judge's 
finding as to Doyle's statements; however, the additional 
finding as to when the statements were made was clearly 
erroneous.  See Smiley, 431 Mass. at 481. 
5 
 
court officer, not to wear "that shit" -– an apparent reference 
to the defendant's kufi -- in court.  Doyle also advised the 
defendant to accept a plea offer and informed him that any 
attempt to seek new appointed counsel would likely be futile on 
the eve of trial. 
 
In June 2016, the defendant pleaded guilty to all but the 
rape charge as part of a plea agreement pursuant to which the 
prosecutor agreed to dismiss the rape charge.5  The trial judge 
conducted a colloquy during which the defendant stated that he 
was satisfied with counsel's representation and that no one had 
pressured him into pleading guilty.  As was recommended in the 
agreement, the trial judge sentenced the defendant to concurrent 
terms of from eight to ten years in State prison for four of the 
five counts of trafficking a person for sexual servitude, in 
violation of G. L. c. 265, § 50 (a), and the count charging a 
 
 
5 The prosecutor summarized the facts supporting the charges 
as follows:  "The [d]efendant . . . organiz[ed] and r[an] a 
human trafficking and drug distribution operation . . . out of 
two apartments in Dorchester . . . [between] sometime in 2014 
and January 15, 2015."  The defendant allegedly attempted to 
recruit one victim "to work for him as a prostitute," offering 
to provide her housing and heroin.  The prosecutor alleged that 
the defendant assaulted this victim and that the defendant had 
multiple persons "prostituting for him" in exchange for illegal 
drugs.  A search of the defendant's home pursuant to a search 
warrant, the prosecutor described, led to the discovery of 
several items, including heroin, a digital scale, and certain 
"indicia of prostitution."  The prosecutor considered it "a 
strong case for the government" because, inter alia, the 
complaining witnesses were willing to testify. 
6 
 
second and subsequent offense of possession of a class A 
substance with intent to distribute, in violation of G. L. 
c. 94C, § 32 (b).  On the remaining counts, the judge sentenced 
the defendant to seven years of probation from and after his 
incarceration. 
 
Unbeknownst to the defendant, from at least 2014 through 
2017, including during the time Doyle represented the defendant, 
Doyle made and shared6 numerous racist and bigoted public7 
postings on his social media account, reflecting prejudice 
against Black persons and persons of the Muslim faith.  These 
posts, which we set forth in the margin,8 included a variety of 
anti-Muslim slurs and statements calling for violence against 
and celebrating the death of persons of the Muslim faith,9 posts 
 
 
6 A "shared" post occurs when a user shares on his or her 
own page (or "Feed") a post originally written and posted by 
someone else; shared posts can be preceded by the user's own 
commentary.  See Facebook Help Center, How Do I Share a Post I 
See on My Feed on Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/help 
/163779957017799 [https://perma.cc/NX9V-RFAL]. 
 
 
7 Doyle's account was "public"; accordingly, his posts were 
available to anyone using the social media platform regardless 
of whether Doyle had designated the viewer as a "friend."  
Additionally, CPCS determined that some of Doyle's approximately 
700 "friends" were former clients. 
 
 
8 We include descriptions of the posts because Doyle's own 
words best capture the depth of his bigotry. 
 
 
9 Doyle's anti-Muslim posts included the following: 
 
1.  A shared post of a photograph of a pig with engorged 
 
7 
 
mocking Black individuals,10 and comments, some apparently made 
 
testicles, captioned, "Dear Muslims . . . Kiss our big 
bacon balls"; 
 
2.  A post stating, "I just became a bigger Hockey fan 
. . . I guess Canadians want to protect their citizens, I 
wish our government would . . . ," accompanying a 
photograph of a Canadian hockey announcer, with a 
quotation:  "If hooking up one raghead terrorist prisoner's 
testicles to a car battery to get the truth out of the 
lying little camel shagger will save just one Canadian life 
then I . . ."; 
 
3.  A shared post of a picture of a pointing military 
officer, captioned, "You tell those goat fuckers with the 
laundry on their heads that it's wash day, and we're 
bringing the fucking Maytag!"; 
 
4.  Doyle's statement, "Allah be praised.  Go meet your 72 
fat, smelly virgins, asshole," accompanying a shared post 
of a video recording apparently depicting the death of a 
man while attempting to use an explosive device, with a 
description saying, "When goat fuckers use mortar hahaha"; 
 
5.  A shared post stating, "In Islam, you have to die for 
Allah.  The God I worship died for me"; 
 
6.  A shared post depicting a cartoon figure of a man 
sitting at a desk, captioned, "Let's not jump to 
conclu. . . aaaaand it's Muslims"; and 
 
7.  A shared post of a drawing of a man stating, "When 
liberals aren't busy bashing peaceful Christians, they're 
making excuses for Muslims cutting people's heads off." 
 
10 Doyle's racist posts included the following: 
 
1.  A shared post of a poster for the movie "The WaterBoy," 
with the name and face of Colin Kaepernick, a Black 
football player and civil rights activist; 
 
2.  A shared post of a collage of three photographs -- one 
of Black men wearing shirts with the words, "Trump & 
Republicans Are Not Racist," one of a Black man in a "Make 
 
8 
 
at a State court house,11 seemingly referring to Doyle's clients 
as "thugs"12 and suggesting that Doyle's nonwhite clients were 
criminals.13 
 
America Great Again" hat, and one of two Black men wearing 
cowboy hats and a shirt and bandana with the confederate 
flag -- captioned, "5 minutes after Trump legalizes weed in 
all 50 states"; and 
 
3.  A shared post of two photographs, one depicting Black 
men posing with guns captioned, "Don't glorify shooting 
people," and the other showing distraught Black men 
captioned, "Then cry like a bitch when someone you love 
gets shot." 
 
 
11 Some posts indicate that Doyle's "check in" location was 
a State court house.  "A . . . check in is a post linked to a 
location . . . ."  John, How to Check in on Facebook from a 
Desktop or Mobile Device, Bus. Insider (Apr. 29, 2019), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/guides/tech/how-to-check-in-on-
facebook [https://perma.cc/9WHS-5FAE]. 
 
 
12 The term "thug" has been described by one linguist as a 
"nominally polite way of using the N-word."  The Racially 
Charged Meaning Behind the Word "Thug," NPR (Apr. 30, 2015), 
https://www.npr.org/2015/04/30/403362626/the-racially-charged-
meaning-behind-the-word-thug [https://perma.cc/34K5-VD4C]. 
 
 
13 Doyle's court house posts included the following: 
 
1.  Doyle's statement referencing winning a trial for a 
seventy-six year old Italian national stopped for speeding, 
followed by Doyle's comment stating, "I can walk away from 
this one without feeling dirty.  Doesn't happen much," and 
Doyle's reply of "Hell yeah" to a comment asserting, "U 
love bathing in the filth, as long as it's green"; 
 
2.  Doyle stating, "Beat another gun case today," followed 
by a comment stating, "It was someone else's shotgun.  
Client not a bad guy," and Doyle's response 
"Absofuckinglutely right, Chief!  Job security in the 
Roxbury District Court" to a comment that stated, "Don't 
worry he'll be retaining you again soon"; 
 
9 
 
 
In 2017, CPCS investigated a complaint against Doyle and 
concluded, based on the social media posts, that Doyle violated 
his duty of loyalty to his Muslim and "other non-Caucasian" 
clients; CPCS suspended Doyle from criminal case assignments for 
a period of one year and required Doyle to take ethics and 
cultural competency courses.14 
 
The defendant was unaware of Doyle's bigotry until 2021, 
well after his agreement to the plea deal, when he was shown 
Doyle's posts; prior to that time, the defendant did not 
attribute Doyle's comments regarding the defendant's religious 
garb to racism or to animus against persons of the Muslim faith.  
 
 
3.  Doyle's statement, "Not Guilty.  Firearm.  Makes you 
feel a whole lot safer, huh?"  along with a series of 
comments in which Doyle stated, "I went to the dark side," 
"Between you and me, he should stop gang-banging," and "He 
wanted his cell phones (with business contacts, no doubt) 
and his baseball hats back.  I told him to go home and 
Jerry off. . . .  Jerk off, that is"; 
 
4.  A "check in" by Doyle at "Suffolk County Superior 
Court," stating, "Poor, misguided children," and a comment 
by Doyle stating, "Waaaaaahhhhhh!!!!!!"; 
 
5.  A "check in" by Doyle from "Suffolk County Courthouse," 
stating, "Assorted thugs and bad guys"; and 
 
6.  Doyle's statement, "Yesterday, a 21 y.o. punk client 
told me:  'I don't like your attitude, Doyle,'" followed by 
Doyle's comments saying, "I told him to come back with a 
new lawyer or a toothbrush," and ". . . soap on a rope for 
a going away present . . . ." 
 
 
14 Doyle died in March 2021, before the defendant filed his 
motion for a new trial. 
10 
 
After learning of the posts, the defendant filed a motion for a 
new trial and for leave to withdraw his guilty pleas; he 
claimed, inter alia, that Doyle had an actual conflict of 
interest and thus Doyle's representation of him violated his 
right to the effective assistance of counsel under art. 12 of 
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and the Sixth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution. 
 
After an evidentiary hearing, the motion judge denied the 
motion.  She concluded that absent a showing of prejudice or 
"any showing that [Doyle's] views affected [his] representation 
of the defendant," the defendant was not entitled to withdraw 
his guilty plea.15  Rejecting the defendant's argument that 
 
 
15 Applying the usual framework to assess claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, which requires determination 
"whether there has been serious incompetency, inefficiency, or 
inattention of counsel -- behavior of counsel falling measurably 
below that which might be expected from an ordinary fallible 
lawyer -- and, if that is found, then, typically, whether it has 
likely deprived the defendant of an otherwise available, 
substantial ground of defence," Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 
Mass. 89, 96 (1974), the motion judge found no evidence to 
suggest that the defendant was coerced into accepting the plea 
or that the plea offer was unreasonable.  Notably, the 
trafficking charges carried a minimum sentence of five years in 
State prison and a maximum sentence of twenty years.  G. L. 
c. 265, § 50 (a).  The rape charge, which was dismissed pursuant 
to the parties' plea deal, would have carried a term of "not 
more than twenty years" in State prison.  G. L. c. 265, 
§ 22 (b).  See Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 468 Mass. 174, 183 
(2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Clarke, 460 Mass. 30, 47 (2011), 
abrogated in part by Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342 
(2013) (typically prejudice prong requires showing that "there 
is a reasonable probability that a different plea bargain . . . 
 
11 
 
nonetheless he was entitled to withdraw his plea because Doyle 
had an actual conflict of interest in representing Black, Muslim 
individuals, the judge explained that defense counsel and his or 
her client need not "share the same worldview," that "criminal 
defense attorneys often have to represent people who in their 
opinion have committed reprehensible acts," and that "a lawyer 
who expresses racist views in his personal life" is not 
"presumed ineffective any time that he or she represents a 
client of color."16  The defendant timely appealed, and this 
court granted his application for direct appellate review. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  "[W]e review a 
judge's denial of a defendant's motion for a new trial to 
determine whether there has been a significant error of law or 
other abuse of discretion."  Commonwealth v. Tate, 490 Mass. 
501, 505 (2022), quoting Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 487 Mass. 
370, 374 (2021).  "Where an evidentiary hearing is conducted on 
a motion for a new trial, we 'accept the [judge's] findings 
where they are supported by substantial evidence in the record,' 
 
could have been negotiated at the time").  The defendant does 
not challenge this conclusion on appeal. 
 
 
16 The judge found "[p]erhaps most important" that "the 
defendant himself did not draw a connection between Doyle's 
expressed distaste for his wearing a kufi and any advice that 
Doyle gave him in accepting a plea," concluding that "no matter 
how disturbing Doyle's personal views were, there [was] no 
indication in the factual record . . . that they influenced 
Doyle's representation of the defendant." 
12 
 
and we 'defer to the judge's assessment of the credibility of 
witnesses.'"  Tate, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 488 
Mass. 597, 600 (2021).  However, we "make an independent 
determination as to the correctness of the judge's application 
of constitutional principles to the facts as found."  Caldwell, 
supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 460 Mass. 199, 205 
(2011). 
 
b.  Effective assistance of counsel.  It is difficult to 
overstate the essential importance of the right to counsel17 in 
our adversary system of criminal justice.  See United States v. 
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653 (1984) (accused person's right to 
counsel "is a fundamental component of our criminal justice 
system").  The procedural and substantive safeguards that define 
our criminal justice system and are designed to assure that the 
accused receives fair proceedings and a fair trial largely would 
 
 
17 The fundamental right to counsel has "deep roots in 
Massachusetts history":  "[a]s early as the 1790s, this court 
began appointing defense counsel for defendants in capital cases 
tried before it."  Carrasquillo v. Hampden County Dist. Courts, 
484 Mass. 367, 371 & n.4 (2020), citing Commonwealth v. Hardy, 2 
Mass. 303, 303 (1807).  The right to counsel is secured both by 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which 
provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence," and by art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights, which provides that "every subject shall have a right 
. . . to be fully heard in his defense by himself, or his 
counsel at his election."  We have often noted that art. 12 
provides "greater safeguards" than those provided by the Sixth 
Amendment.  See Commonwealth v. Hodge, 386 Mass. 165, 169 
(1982). 
13 
 
be for naught if the accused were left to fend for him- or 
herself without the assistance of counsel to navigate and 
exercise his or her rights.  Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-345.  See 
Cronic, supra at 653-654 ("Of all the rights that an accused 
person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the 
most pervasive for it affects his ability to assert any other 
rights he may have" [citation omitted]; counsel's assistance is 
"the means through which the other rights of the person on trial 
are secured").  The right to be heard, and even the right to a 
trial itself, "would be, in many cases, of little avail if it 
did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel."  Powell v. 
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).  See Cronic, supra at 653 
n.8, quoting Powell, supra at 69 (accused person "requires the 
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against 
him").18 
 
"The very premise of our adversary system of criminal 
 
 
18 See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 307 (1973) ("The 
function of counsel as a guide through complex legal 
technicalities long has been recognized by this Court"); 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31 (1972) ("The assistance 
of counsel is often a requisite to the very existence of a fair 
trial").  See also Commonwealth v. Leiva, 484 Mass. 766, 779 
(2020) ("The right to counsel is critical to secure a 
defendant's right to a fair trial"); Abodeely v. County of 
Worcester, 352 Mass. 719, 723 (1967) ("The defence and trial of 
a criminal case today is a complicated and time-consuming 
business.  If we are to provide proper prosecution we must also 
provide appropriate defence under the Constitution as it has 
been interpreted"). 
14 
 
justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will 
best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted 
and the innocent go free."19  Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 
862 (1975).  "Unless the accused receives the effective 
assistance of counsel, 'a serious risk of injustice infects the 
[criminal] trial [process] itself.'"20  Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656, 
quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 343 (1980).  See 
United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309 (1973), quoting Johnson 
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-463 (1938) (right to counsel 
"minimize[s] the imbalance in the adversary system" and 
"embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the 
average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to 
protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to 
take his life of liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented 
by experienced and learned counsel").  In short, lawyers in 
criminal cases are "necessities, not luxuries."  Cronic, supra 
 
 
19 See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) ("The 
system assumes that adversarial testing will ultimately advance 
the public interest in truth and fairness"); Gardner v. Florida, 
430 U.S. 349, 360 (1977) (plurality opinion) (affirming "belief 
that debate between adversaries is often essential to the truth-
seeking function of trials"). 
 
 
20 Relevant to the issues presented by this case, the right 
to effective assistance of counsel attaches well before trial 
and applies to the plea-bargaining process.  See Commonwealth v. 
Fernandes, 390 Mass. 714, 715 (1984) ("the plea is valid only 
when the defendant offers it . . . with the advice of competent 
counsel").  See also Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162 (2012) 
(right to counsel "extends to the plea-bargaining process"). 
15 
 
at 653, quoting Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.  See Gideon, supra (it 
is "an obvious truth" that "in our adversary system of criminal 
justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a 
lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is 
provided for him").21 
 
c.  Conflict of interest.  Given the primacy of counsel 
towards the realization of fair proceedings and a fair trial in 
our adversarial system, the constitutional guarantee entitles an 
accused person "to the untrammeled and unimpaired assistance of 
counsel free of any conflict of interest and unrestrained by 
commitments to others" and other causes (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Hodge, 386 Mass. 165, 167 (1982).  See 
 
 
21 Because of the special value we place on the role of 
counsel in ensuring that the accused receives the benefits of 
the procedural and substantive safeguards that define our 
criminal justice system, the "constitutional guarantee of the 
assistance of counsel 'cannot be satisfied by mere formal 
appointment.'"  Lavallee, 442 Mass. at 235, quoting Avery v. 
Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940).  Instead, the constitutional 
right to counsel "entitle[s] a defendant to the effective 
assistance of counsel" (emphasis added).  Commonwealth v. 
Perkins, 450 Mass. 834, 850 (2008), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Martinez, 425 Mass. 382, 387 (1997).  See Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 686, quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 
(1970) (right to counsel in criminal case is "right to the 
effective assistance of counsel").  In other words, "[a]n 
accused is entitled to be assisted by an attorney, whether 
retained or appointed, who plays the role necessary to ensure 
that the trial is fair."  Lavallee, supra, quoting Strickland, 
supra at 685.  "To hold otherwise, 'could convert the 
appointment of counsel into a sham and nothing more than a 
formal compliance with the Constitution's requirement that an 
accused be given the assistance of counsel.'"  Cronic, 466 U.S. 
at 654, quoting Avery, supra. 
16 
 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 ("Counsel's function is to assist 
the defendant, and hence counsel owes the client a duty of 
loyalty . . ."); Commonwealth v. Perkins, 450 Mass. 834, 850 
(2008) (defendant must "be able to seek the advice and guidance 
of his attorney and . . . to rely on the undivided loyalty of 
his counsel to present the defense case with full force and 
zealousness" [citation omitted]).  See also Commonwealth v. 
Leiva, 484 Mass. 766, 779 (2020) ("That foundational proposition 
tying partisan advocacy to just results demands an accused's 
access to defense counsel who projects [t]he manifest appearance 
of a believer in the defendant's chosen plea of 'not guilty' 
. . . and delivers on the constitutional guaranty that a 
defendant need not stand alone against the State at any stage of 
the prosecution . . . where counsel's absence might derogate 
from the accused's right to a fair trial" [quotations and 
citations omitted]). 
 
Accordingly, "under art. 12, if a defendant establishes an 
actual conflict of interest,[22] he is entitled to a new trial 
 
 
22 An actual conflict of interest arises where "the lawyer 
has a competing interest or responsibility that 'will materially 
interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in 
considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that 
reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client.'"  
Perkins, 450 Mass. at 851-852, quoting Comment [4] to Mass. R. 
Prof. C. 1.7, 426 Mass. 1330 (1998).  See Perkins, supra at 854 
(counsel had actual conflict of interest where he agreed to wear 
wireless microphone during trial permitting documentary producer 
 
17 
 
without a further showing; he need not demonstrate that the 
conflict adversely affected his lawyer's performance[23] or 
resulted in actual prejudice," Commonwealth v. Mosher, 455 Mass. 
811, 819 (2010); the standard from Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 
Mass. 89, 96 (1974),24 which generally governs ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims, is inapt because, where counsel 
has an actual conflict of interest, the criminal trial process 
"loses its character as a confrontation between adversaries," 
Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656-657.  See id., quoting United States ex 
rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied sub nom. Sielaff v. Williams, 423 U.S. 876 (1975) ("While 
a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are 
expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither 
is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators").  See 
also Commonwealth v. Valentin, 470 Mass. 186, 196 (2014) (such 
 
to record interactions, including privileged discussions, with 
defendant).  See also Commonwealth v. Mosher, 455 Mass. 811, 820 
n.19 (2010) ("Courts frequently consult standards laid out in 
applicable codes of professional ethics in considering whether 
an actual conflict exists").  The analysis whether an actual 
conflict arose is case-specific.  See Commonwealth v. Cousin, 
478 Mass. 608, 618 (2018), S.C., 484 Mass. 1042 (2020) ("We look 
to the attendant facts and circumstances surrounding the claimed 
actual conflict"). 
 
 
23 By contrast, a defendant asserting an actual conflict of 
interest under the Sixth Amendment must show that the conflict 
"adversely affected" counsel's representation, although 
"prejudice" need not be shown.  See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349-350. 
 
 
24 See note 15, supra. 
18 
 
errors "render the adversary process itself presumptively 
unreliable" such that "a criminal trial [is] fundamentally 
unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or 
innocence" [quotations and citations omitted]); Commonwealth v. 
Goewey, 452 Mass. 399, 403 & n.3 (2008) ("relief can be granted 
without consideration of the merits of the defendant's 
underlying claims" in "limited class of cases" in which "the 
attorney abdicated his responsibility as the defendant's 
advocate"). 
 
A defense counsel makes countless choices, on and off the 
record, to protect a defendant's rights, and we rely on 
counsel's zealous advocacy, unimpeded by a conflict of interest, 
to ensure that no person is punished without fair proceedings; 
when a counsel's professional judgment is impaired by an actual 
conflict of interest, every action, and inaction, is called into 
question, and we cannot be confident that the outcome of the 
proceedings is fair and just.  "[T]he effect of the conflict on 
the attorney's representation of the defendant is likely to be 
pervasive and unpredictable, while the difficulty of proving it 
may be substantial, 'particularly as to things that may have 
been left not said or not done by counsel.'"  Mosher, 455 Mass. 
at 819, quoting Hodge, 386 Mass. at 170.  In other words, "[i]t 
is impossible to know what different choices [a nonconflicted] 
counsel would have made, and then to quantify the impact of 
19 
 
those different choices on the outcome of the proceedings."  
Commonwealth v. Francis, 485 Mass. 86, 101 (2020), cert. denied, 
141 S. Ct. 2762 (2021), quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 
548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006).  See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 
475, 490-491 (1978) (conflict bears on what "the advocate finds 
himself compelled to refrain from doing" and so is "difficult to 
judge intelligently" because "to assess the impact of a conflict 
of interests on the attorney's options, tactics, and decisions 
in plea negotiations would be virtually impossible," requiring 
"unguided speculation"). 
 
In such circumstances, the conflict has "infect[ed] the 
defendant's representation to the point where 'prejudice is 
"inherent in the situation," such that no impartial observer 
could reasonably conclude that the attorney is able to serve the 
defendant with undivided loyalty.'"  Commonwealth v. Cousin, 478 
Mass. 608, 617 (2018), S.C., 484 Mass. 1042 (2020), quoting 
Mosher, 455 Mass. at 819-820.  See Perkins, 450 Mass. at 850 
(defendant "must be able to rely on the undivided loyalty of his 
counsel" [citation omitted]).  See also Commonwealth v. Goldman, 
395 Mass. 495, 508, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 906 (1985) 
("Counsel's undivided loyalty to the client is crucial to the 
integrity of the entire adversary system").  Accordingly, 
"[w]here the defendant's counsel has labored under an actual 
. . . conflict, . . . we are unwilling to put a defendant 'to 
20 
 
the burden, perhaps insuperable, of probing the resolve and the 
possible mental conflict of counsel.'"25,26  Mosher, supra at 819, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Cobb, 379 Mass. 456, 461 (1980), vacated 
sub nom. Massachusetts v. Hurley, 499 U.S. 809 (1980), appeal 
dismissed, 382 Mass. 690 (1981).  See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658 
 
 
25 We have acknowledged an actual conflict of interest -- 
requiring no showing of prejudice -- in several circumstances.  
See Commonwealth v. Leslie, 376 Mass. 647, 653 & nn.11, 12, 13 
(1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 910 (1979).  An actual conflict 
of interest exists when the attorney represents a codefendant 
with inconsistent or contradictory lines of defense.  See id. at 
653 n.11, citing Commonwealth v. Bolduc, 375 Mass. 530, 540-543 
(1978); Bolduc, supra at 540-541 ("The joint representation of 
clients with conflicting interests is a denial of Sixth 
Amendment rights").  Similarly, a conflict exists when the 
attorney maintains an attorney-client or direct and close 
personal relationship with a material prosecution witness.  See 
Leslie, supra at 653 n.13, citing Commonwealth v. Smith, 362 
Mass. 782 (1973); Smith, supra at 784 ("An attorney representing 
both the defendant and a prosecution witness who is awaiting 
sentence may be hindered in the cross-examination of the 
witness").  And we have found that a conflict exists when the 
attorney has business or personal reasons for preferring a 
verdict unfavorable to the defendant.  See Leslie, supra at 653 
n.12, citing United States v. Hurt, 543 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 
1976), and People v. Corona, 80 Cal. App. 3d 684, 719-727 
(1978); Hurt, supra at 166 (appellate counsel argued rehearing 
while being sued by trial counsel for libel as to appellate 
argument); Corona, supra at 704, 719-720 (trial counsel's 
literary contract "called for . . . holding a lengthy and 
sensational trial at any price . . . to increase the financial 
potential of the acquired publication rights," and to forgo 
defenses of mental incompetence or legal insanity). 
 
 
26 Where no actual conflict exists, "an attorney's personal 
interests or obligations may still give rise to a 'potential' 
conflict," Mosher, 455 Mass. at 823, which requires reversal 
upon an additional showing of "material prejudice," Tate, 490 
Mass. at 509, quoting Commonwealth v. Shraiar, 397 Mass. 16, 20 
(1986). 
21 
 
(representation by conflicted counsel is "so likely to prejudice 
the accused that the cost of litigating [its] effect in a 
particular case is unjustified"). 
 
d.  Racist, anti-Muslim animus.  Doyle's animus against 
persons of the Muslim faith and his racism against Black 
persons, demonstrated by his social media posts (some of which 
were made at the court house while he was serving clients in his 
professional capacity), and manifest in his treatment of the 
defendant -- a Black, Muslim man -- during the representation, 
presented an actual conflict of interest in this case.27  Doyle's 
social media postings "exhibited an intensity of bias that 
cannot be squared with []neutral decision making," Ellis v. 
Harrison, 947 F.3d 555, 563 (9th Cir. 2020) (Nguyen, J., 
concurring), as his other overt acts during the representation 
confirm.  The defendant has shown that Doyle's biases infected 
his representation of the defendant.  The record developed by 
the defendant shows more than a few stray social media postings, 
or comments made in the wake of highly charged emotional or 
shocking events, untethered to Doyle's conduct during the 
 
 
27 We reference these manifestations, as does the defendant, 
to demonstrate the defendant's showing of an actual conflict of 
interest.  Because he has shown an actual conflict of interest, 
he need not show any prejudice, as discussed supra.  We need not 
reach the hypothetical question, raised by the concurring 
justice, whether, in the absence of this evidence, a 
hypothetical defendant would have met his or her burden to show 
an actual conflict. 
22 
 
defendant's representation.  See id. ("I do not suggest that 
every attorney who utters a racial epithet will be unable to 
adequately defend clients of a different race").  Instead, the 
defendant has shown a pattern of posts reflecting the intensity 
of Doyle's bias, coupled with a record that Doyle was unable to 
divorce his animus from his conduct as the defendant's counsel. 
 
Although we cannot know with certainty whether Doyle's 
actions or inactions during the course of the representation 
were "motivated by anything other than [the defendant's] best 
interest," Hodge, 386 Mass. at 168, on the record before us, we 
cannot credibly assume that Doyle's representation was not 
affected by his virulent anti-Muslim and racist views, see 
Ellis, 947 F.3d at 562 (Nguyen, J., concurring) (when defense 
counsel makes "discretionary decisions in disregard of the 
client's interests on account of counsel's racism, the 
cumulative effect will be to impair the defense, but there is no 
way to pinpoint how it does so").  Importantly, we cannot know 
whether an attorney who did not share the animus Doyle harbored 
for persons of the Muslim faith and Black persons would have 
negotiated a better plea agreement.  Nor can we know whether 
Doyle's other actions in the case were unaffected by his views 
regarding Black, Muslim individuals.  Where, as the record shows 
was the case here, counsel harbors a deep-seated animus for 
23 
 
persons of the defendant's race28 or religion, we cannot presume 
zealous advocacy; nor can we ask the defendant to prove how his 
counsel's bigotry might have affected the plea deal or otherwise 
impaired the representation, especially in view of the record 
that Doyle's bias reared its head in connection with his 
treatment of the defendant.29  There are "many invisible ways in 
which counsel's bias could have affected the [proceeding]," 
Ellis, supra at 563 (Nguyen, J., concurring), and the defendant 
need not engage in "a speculative inquiry into what might have 
occurred in an alternate universe" had he been appointed 
unbiased counsel, Francis, 485 Mass. at 101, quoting Gonzalez-
Lopez, 548 U.S. at 150. 
 
 
28 Notably, Gideon and other seminal cases involving the 
right to counsel were decided during the heart of the civil 
rights era, as courts considered the protection of a broad range 
of rights, including the right to equal protection of the law.  
See Henning, Race, Paternalism, and the Right to Counsel, 54 Am. 
Crim. L. Rev. 649, 649 & n.3 (2017), citing Neuborne, The 
Gravitational Pull of Race on the Warren Court, 2010 Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 59, 86 ("Decided during the heart of the Civil Rights era, 
[Gideon was] implicitly -- although not explicitly -- concerned 
about the way [B]lack defendants were treated in the criminal 
and juvenile justice systems . . .").  See also Chin, Race and 
the Disappointing Right to Counsel, 122 Yale L.J. 2236, 2239 & 
n.5 (2013) (collecting scholarship concluding that "Gideon was a 
race case" despite Gideon himself being white). 
 
 
29 That the defendant here had a particularly thick skin and 
did not recognize Doyle's bigotry at the time is of no import.  
The standard for a conflict of interest is whether "no impartial 
observer could reasonably conclude that the attorney is able to 
serve the defendant with undivided loyalty."  Mosher, 455 Mass. 
at 819-820. 
24 
 
 
We recognize that "[c]riminal defense attorneys are 
accustomed to representing individuals who commit reprehensible 
acts, and we assume that they can set aside any personal 
distaste for such clients during the representation."30  Ellis, 
947 F.3d at 563 (Nguyen, J., concurring).  Here, however, Doyle 
did not leave his deep-seated bigotry at the court house door, 
despite his duty of loyalty to the defendant; to the contrary, 
consistent with his contemporaneous anti-Muslim, anti-Black 
social media postings and his court house "check ins," Doyle 
ordered the defendant to stop wearing his religious garb and 
refused to meet with the defendant, choosing instead to forgo 
the opportunity to discuss the merits of the criminal case, upon 
seeing that the defendant was wearing his kufi.  Our confidence 
that the defendant was afforded a constitutionally fair process 
is necessarily undermined.  See id. at 562 (Nguyen, J., 
concurring) ("A trial is fundamentally unfair if defense counsel 
harbors extreme and deep-rooted ill will toward the defendant on 
account of his race").  Given Doyle's treatment of the 
defendant, we conclude that the defendant has more than met his 
burden to establish that Doyle's representation of him was 
 
 
30 Doyle did not simply adhere to a different "worldview" or 
merely dislike the offenses the defendant was accused of 
committing.  Racism and bigotry -- here, disdain for persons 
because of their race and religion -- are different in kind from 
disapproval of a person's actions or opinions. 
25 
 
impaired by an actual conflict of interest.  See Commonwealth v. 
Shraiar, 397 Mass. 16, 20 (1986) (defendant bears burden to 
establish actual conflict of interest). 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The order denying the defendant's motion 
for a new trial is reversed.31  The defendant's convictions are 
vacated, the defendant is to be permitted to withdraw his guilty 
plea, and the case is remanded for a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
31 Because we hold that defense counsel had an actual 
conflict of interest mandating reversal, we need not address the 
defendant's alternative arguments that the appointment of Doyle 
violated his rights to equal protection and due process. 
CYPHER, J. (concurring).  The numerous, severe, and cruel 
racist and anti-Muslim social media posts and commentary by 
Attorney Richard Doyle recited by the court easily establish an 
actual conflict of interest that deprived the defendant of his 
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.  I 
agree with the court that no impartial observer reasonably could 
conclude that counsel was able to serve the defendant with 
undivided loyalty.  See Commonwealth v. Mosher, 455 Mass. 811, 
819-820 (2010). 
I write separately to emphasize that once an actual 
conflict has been established there is no need to prove that the 
actual conflict prejudiced the defendant.  There is a clear line 
between actual and potential conflicts of interest and Attorney 
Doyle's behavior toward the defendant, which, while adding 
context to the discussion, is not necessary to determine whether 
there was an actual conflict.  Cf. Ellis v. Harrison, 947 F.3d 
555, 563 (9th Cir. 2020) (Nguyen, J., concurring) ("I do not 
suggest that every attorney who utters a racial epithet will be 
unable to adequately defend clients of a different race").  
Where the defendant has demonstrated an actual conflict of 
interest, art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights 
requires neither a showing of prejudice nor a showing that the 
conflict adversely affected counsel's performance.  Commonwealth 
v. Holliday, 450 Mass. 794, 806 (2008).  See Commonwealth v. 
2 
 
Cousin, 478 Mass. 608, 617 (2018) (actual conflict requires no 
showing of prejudice by defendant because prejudice is 
inherent).  Compare Commonwealth v. Watkins, 473 Mass. 222, 235 
(2015) ("If a defendant establishes only a potential or tenuous 
conflict of interest, however, the conviction will not be set 
aside unless the defendant demonstrates that the conflict 
resulted in actual prejudice" [emphasis added]), with Mosher, 
455 Mass. at 819 (where defendant "establishes an actual 
conflict of interest, he is entitled to a new trial without a 
further showing"). 
I also write separately because the nature of this conflict 
and its potential scope require that we recognize that not only 
the defendant is affected.  Public confidence in the integrity 
of the criminal justice system is essential to its ability to 
function.  See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 49 (1992).  We 
must be aware of and concerned with the confidence of not just 
this defendant, and not just all Black and Muslim clients 
represented by Attorney Doyle, but rather all Black persons and 
members of the Muslim faith in our community, not simply those 
who have come into contact with the criminal justice system.  
See Commonwealth v. Goldman, 395 Mass. 495, 508 (1985) (defense 
counsel's undivided loyalty to client is crucial to integrity of 
entire adversarial system).  In fact, all of the people of the 
Commonwealth can be affected by a loss of confidence in the 
3 
 
justice system in circumstances such as these when they come to 
light.  The court's decision today serves to encourage us all 
that the court system is able to respond in a manner that 
strengthens that confidence.