Title: State v. Gutierrez-Fuentes

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 120,339 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
GELDY GUTIERREZ-FUENTES, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
 
The general rule is that an issue not asserted before the trial court cannot be raised 
for the first time on appeal, though there are three recognized exceptions if, in its 
discretion, the appellate court believes the exception is justified under the facts of a 
particular case. One of these exceptions is when consideration of the theory is necessary 
to prevent the denial of fundamental rights. The right to a speedy trial is a fundamental 
right. 
 
2. 
 
Before invoking one of the limited exceptions, an appellate court must also 
determine whether the unpreserved issue is amenable to resolution on appeal. Even if a 
discretionary exception would support a decision to review a new claim, an appellate 
court has no obligation to do so. 
 
 
 
 
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3. 
 
 
Aggravated burglary under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5807(b)(1) prohibits a person 
from entering, without authority, any dwelling in which there is a human being, with the 
intent to commit a felony, theft, or sexually motivated crime therein. 
 
4. 
 
Regarding authority to enter in an aggravated burglary prosecution, a close 
question may arise when the State does not present direct evidence about the defendant's 
and the victim's property interests in the residence where an aggravated burglary occurs. 
But circumstantial evidence can sufficiently support a finding that someone lacks 
authority to enter a residence. 
 
5. 
 
The hearsay exception in K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-460(a) allows admission of a 
statement previously made by a person who is present at the hearing and available for 
cross-examination.  
 
6. 
 
When an out-of-court interpreter is utilized, there is more than one statement for 
separate consideration under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-460(a):  first, the out-of-court foreign 
language statement, in that foreign language; and second, the out-of-court English 
language interpretation of the out-of-court foreign language statement. Because language 
is complex, a one-to-one correspondence between words or concepts in different 
languages is not always possible. Each statement, as uttered, must be separately 
considered for admissibility. The English interpretation does not serve as a conduit for 
admissibility of the foreign language statement. 
 
3 
 
 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 59 Kan. App. 2d 70, 477 P.3d 1041 (2020). 
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; DEBORAH HERNANDEZ MITCHELL, judge. Opinion filed April 29, 
2022. Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is affirmed in part and reversed in 
part. Judgment of the district court is affirmed.  
 
Randall L. Hodgkinson, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the 
briefs for appellant.  
 
Matt J. Maloney, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Marc Bennett, district attorney, 
and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
WILSON, J.:  Geldy Gutierrez-Fuentes petitioned this court for review of three 
issues after the Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions for aggravated battery, 
aggravated burglary, and criminal threat. He argues (1) that his constitutional right to a 
speedy trial was violated, (2) that there was insufficient evidence to support his 
aggravated burglary conviction, and (3) that the district court erred by admitting out-of-
court statements of an interpreter over defense hearsay objections. We affirm his 
convictions.  
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Gutierrez-Fuentes moved in with the victim, D.S., in late June 2016. After an 
argument in early October 2016 which resulted in Gutierrez-Fuentes grabbing D.S. by the 
throat and shoving her, D.S. told Gutierrez-Fuentes she did not want to be with him 
anymore and he needed to move out of the apartment. In compliance, Gutierrez-Fuentes 
 
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gathered some of his belongings, but when D.S. asked him to return the key to the 
apartment, he claimed he had lost it.  
 
A few days after the split, D.S. was in the apartment behind a door locked with a 
deadbolt. The deadbolt could not be unlocked from the outside. Because Gutierrez-
Fuentes had not returned the key, D.S. took extra precautions to secure her apartment and 
placed a chair behind the door. That day, Gutierrez-Fuentes returned to the apartment, 
knocked on the window, and asked D.S. to talk with him. She refused and did not give 
him permission to enter the apartment. In response, Gutierrez-Fuentes broke through the 
front door, went into the apartment, grabbed D.S., and started hitting her. Gutierrez-
Fuentes told D.S. that if she was not going to be with him, he would kill her. D.S. blacked 
out. When she regained consciousness, she found help in the apartment upstairs, where 
one of her neighbors called 911.  
 
Officer Dane Myers responded to the assault call. He found D.S. covered in blood 
and being consoled by a neighbor. He was not able to speak directly with D.S. at that 
time because of a language barrier. Officer Myers concluded the apartment door had been 
forced open, because wood chips were lying on the ground and the deadbolt was still in a 
locked position.  
 
An ambulance took D.S. to the hospital, where a staff interpreter facilitated a 
conversation between D.S. and Officer Myers. At trial, Officer Myers gave testimony 
outlining this conversation with D.S.  
 
 
5 
 
 
D.S. was examined by forensic nurse Tracy Hess. Through the services of a staff 
interpreter, D.S. gave information to Hess. At trial, Hess gave testimony outlining this 
conversation with D.S.  
 
Officer Rick Peña, who speaks both English and Spanish and therefore needed no 
interpreter, communicated directly with D.S. at the hospital and testified at trial about this 
conversation with D.S. The information Peña provided was consistent with the trial 
testimony given by D.S., Myers, and Hess.  
 
Gutierrez-Fuentes, like D.S., does not speak English. He tried to turn himself in at 
the police station on October 5, 2016—the same day as the attack—but he was turned 
away. Charges were filed against him on October 31, 2016. Gutierrez-Fuentes was 
arrested on February 3, 2017, and tried on August 20, 2018.  
 
 
The jury convicted Gutierrez-Fuentes on two separate counts of aggravated 
battery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of criminal threat. He was 
sentenced to a controlling 82 months in prison. He timely appealed. 
 
 
Before the Court of Appeals panel, Gutierrez-Fuentes argued that his 
constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated, there was insufficient evidence for 
his aggravated burglary conviction, the district court had allowed inadmissible hearsay 
evidence, and the district court erred when it instructed the jury on the elements of 
aggravated battery. The panel affirmed the district court, and Gutierrez-Fuentes seeks 
review of only the first three issues.  
 
 
 
6 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL SPEEDY TRIAL 
 
 
Gutierrez-Fuentes first argues that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was 
violated because he was held in jail for 18 months before being brought to trial. He 
argues that the panel's analysis of the issue was deficient and that a full review and 
application of the constitutional speedy trial test would show his rights have been 
violated and his convictions need to be reversed.  
 
Preservation 
 
A defendant has both a statutory and constitutional right to a speedy trial. While 
clearly related, they are two separate rights with different tests and different burdens. See 
K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-3402 (setting forth the number of days after arraignment by which 
trial must begin to avoid dismissal of charges); State v. Owens, 310 Kan. 865, 869, 451 
P.3d 467 (2019) (outlining the constitutional balancing test of the Barker factors adopted 
by this court). In this appeal, Gutierrez-Fuentes asserts that he made a timely objection—
before his case was concluded in the district court—that his constitutional right to a 
speedy trial was violated, and thus he preserved this issue for appellate review. 
Accordingly, our first task is to determine whether Gutierrez-Fuentes actually preserved a 
claim that his constitutional right to speedy trial was violated. 
 
 
The answer is not easy to ascertain. The record shows that neither Gutierrez-
Fuentes nor any of his attorneys specifically objected to the court that his constitutional 
right to a speedy trial had been violated. Nor was a motion to dismiss filed on the basis 
 
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that the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated. Again, this 
highlights the difference between a defendant's statutory right and constitutional right to a 
speedy trial. The State has the burden of meeting the statutory speedy trial time 
requirement, and the defendant does not have to assert the right. State v. Dreher, 239 
Kan. 259, 260, 717 P.2d 1053 (1986). However, in terms of a defendant's constitutional 
speedy trial right, neither the United States nor the Kansas Constitutions impose specific 
time requirements for bringing a criminal defendant to trial, which is why courts utilize 
the constitutional balancing test of the Barker factors. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 
514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972). An effective review of the constitutional 
right often requires consideration in context of both trial delay and any prejudice to the 
defendant that may have resulted from that delay. Such an analysis of the constitutional 
requirements is more complex than simply counting days. A defendant benefits from 
ensuring the facts supporting the Barker factors are considered by the district court. 
Otherwise, those facts will not be included in the appellate court's contextual analysis, 
because appellate courts do not make findings of fact. In other words, the defendant also 
carries a burden to establish the Barker factors. State v. Queen, 313 Kan. 12, 16, 482 P.3d 
1117 (2021) ("[Defendant] has not argued . . . that he could meet his burden to establish 
any of [the Barker] factors".). So, we look further. If evidence was presented by the 
defense from which the court made fact-findings relevant to the alleged violation of 
Gutierrez-Fuentes' constitutional speedy trial rights, the objection may be preserved even 
if the court did not find that the evidence sufficiently supported the objection or the 
motion. 
 
 
Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and section 10 of the 
Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights guarantee defendants the right to a speedy trial.  
 
 
8 
 
 
"The test to determine whether an accused has been afforded a speedy trial was 
set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972). 
Barker identified four factors to be considered when a claim of unconstitutional denial of 
a speedy trial is asserted:  the length of the delay, the reason for delay, the defendant's 
assertion of the right, and prejudice to the defendant. Kansas adopted the Barker four-
point test in State v. Otero, 210 Kan. 530, 532-33, 502 P.2d 763 (1972). [Citation 
omitted.]" State v. Jamison, 248 Kan. 302, 306-07, 806 P.2d 972 (1991). 
 
 
In weighing the Barker factors, the court must consider them together along with 
any other relevant circumstances, because none of the factors alone is sufficient to find a 
violation. However, the length of the delay could be determinative of the claim, because 
"[u]ntil there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for 
inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance." State v. Rivera, 277 Kan. 109, 113, 
83 P.3d 169 (2004). 
 
 
Turning to the record, we observe: 
 
(1) Defendant did not articulate a constitutional speedy trial objection. While 
defendant filed a document early in the case that he was asserting his right to a speedy 
trial, he based that assertion on a specific number of days, which indicates a reference to 
the speedy trial statute rather than the constitutional right. Then, despite his early 
assertion, defendant later explicitly agreed to some continuances. After that, defendant 
and his counsel objected to any further delays. However, the proactive assertion that one 
objects to further delay is not the same as claiming that a right—either statutory or 
constitutional—has been violated.  
 
 
9 
 
 
(2) Defendant identifies no hearing during which evidence was presented on a 
claim that his constitutional right had been violated. Because no specific assertion was 
made of a constitutional violation, the district court, in turn, neither addressed the Barker 
factors nor made a fact determination as to whether those factors would weigh in favor of 
Gutierrez-Fuentes or the State. Because the defendant did not identify to the trial court 
the days that lapsed between Gutierrez-Fuentes' arrest and trial, the court did not make a 
finding as to whether that lapse was presumptively prejudicial. No evidence was 
presented concerning reasons for the delay. No evidence was presented on any prejudice 
to the defendant that may have resulted from the delay. Without a pretrial or posttrial 
motion to dismiss based on an alleged violation of his constitutional right to a speedy 
trial, the district court was not able to make the necessary factual findings and 
determination to resolve the issue. Our standard of review relies on the district court's 
factual findings, which we only review for substantial competent evidence. Owens, 310 
Kan. at 868. Fact-finding is simply not the role of appellate courts. State v. Nelson, 291 
Kan. 475, 488, 243 P.3d 343 (2010). 
 
 
Considering all of this, we find that the record below does not support a claim that 
Gutierrez-Fuentes asserted a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial before 
the district court. Consequently, we find that this issue was not preserved. The panel 
below came to the same conclusion. Despite this finding, however, the panel continued, 
opting to consider the merits of Gutierrez-Fuentes' constitutional speedy trial issue under 
one of our limited exceptions which allows review of an unpreserved issue.   
 
 
 
"Generally, the court does not address even constitutional issues for the first time 
on appeal. Within its discretion, however, the appellate court may do so if the party trying 
to raise a new issue shows a recognized exception to the general rule. Those exceptions 
are: 
 
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'(1) [T]he newly asserted claim involves only a question of law arising on 
proved or admitted facts and is finally determinative of the case; (2) the 
claim's consideration is necessary to serve the ends of justice or to 
prevent the denial of fundamental rights; or (3) the district court's 
judgment may be upheld on appeal despite its reliance on the wrong 
ground or reason for its decision.' [Citations omitted.]" State v. Harris, 
311 Kan. 371, 375, 461 P.3d 48 (2020). 
 
 
The right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 
515, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972). It is under this exception that the panel 
reviewed the issue. However, before invoking one of the limited exceptions, an appellate 
court must also determine whether the unpreserved issue is amenable to resolution on 
appeal. State v. Allen, 314 Kan. 280, 281, 497 P.3d 566 (2021). Even then, the decision to 
review an unpreserved claim under an exception is a prudential one; the court necessarily 
exercises discretion. Despite an exception supporting review of a new claim, an appellate 
court has no obligation to do so. State v. Gray, 311 Kan. 164, 170, 459 P.3d 165 (2020). 
Since Gutierrez-Fuentes did not assert this constitutional theory before the trial court and 
the necessary factual findings were never made, we hold the panel abused that discretion 
because Gutierrez-Fuentes' constitutional speedy trial claims require factual development 
out of our reach as an appellate court. We reverse the panel and decline to review 
Gutierrez-Fuentes' unpreserved constitutional speedy trial claim.  
  
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE ON AGGRAVATED BURGLARY 
 
 
Next, Gutierrez-Fuentes argues there was insufficient evidence to support his 
aggravated burglary conviction because the State did not prove that he was legally 
unauthorized to be in the apartment.  
 
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Preservation 
 
 
Sufficiency of the evidence issues are not constrained by a preservation 
requirement; "'[t]here is no requirement that a criminal defendant challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence before the trial court to preserve it for appeal.'" State v. 
Chavez, 310 Kan. 421, 425, 447 P.3d 364 (2019).  
 
Standard of review 
 
 
When sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in criminal cases, the appellate 
court must review all the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution to 
determine if a rational fact-finder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Appellate courts do not reweigh evidence, resolve evidentiary 
conflicts, or make witness credibility determinations. State v. Frye, 294 Kan. 364, 375, 
277 P.3d 1091 (2012).  
 
Discussion 
 
 
 
The State charged Gutierrez-Fuentes with aggravated burglary under K.S.A. 2016 
Supp. 21-5807(b)(1), which prohibits a person from entering, without authority, any 
dwelling in which there is a human being, with the intent to commit a felony, theft, or 
sexually motivated crime therein. The question turns on Gutierrez-Fuentes' legal 
authority to be in the apartment where the crime occurred.  
 
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Gutierrez-Fuentes primarily relies on State v. Vasquez, 287 Kan. 40, 194 P.3d 563 
(2008), to support his argument. In Vasquez, a husband successfully argued that there was 
insufficient evidence to support his aggravated burglary charge when he entered his 
marital home. The Vasquez court acknowledged that the victim wanted nothing to do 
with the defendant:  she asked him to stay away, she moved some of his belongings out 
of the house, she was divorcing him, and she may have been planning to file a petition for 
a protection from abuse order. But there was no actual evidence that he was legally 
unauthorized to enter the marital home. Vasquez, 287 Kan. at 59-60.  
 
 
Gutierrez-Fuentes argues that his case is like Vasquez. Even though the apartment 
was not a marital home, he and D.S. had been living together for around four months 
before she told him she was ending the relationship and wanted him to leave. He points 
out that the record does not, with specificity, demonstrate what kind of legal interest D.S. 
had in the apartment, such as a rental agreement or some other ownership interest that 
would allow her legally to exclude him.  
 
 
The panel distinguished this case from Vasquez. Instead, it chose to apply this 
court's more recent holding in State v. Williams, 308 Kan. 1439, 430 P.3d 448 (2018). In 
Williams, this court acknowledged that a "close question exists" when the State does not 
present direct evidence about the defendant's and the victim's property interests in the 
residence where an aggravated burglary occurs, but that circumstantial evidence can 
sufficiently support a finding that someone lacks authority to enter a residence. 308 Kan. 
at 1446.  
 
 
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The Williams court explained how there was circumstantial evidence that the 
victim had to give permission for the defendant to enter and that the defendant recognized 
her right to exclude him. The victim had taken back the defendant's key, which suggests 
she had the right to give and revoke permission. The defendant also called the victim and 
talked about dropping by, which suggests he did not think he had a right to demand 
access to the residence. The victim also refused to let him in when he knocked on the 
door, and the defendant eventually broke the door open to gain entry. 308 Kan. at 1446-
47.  
 
 
The facts in Williams align closely with those in the present case. Not only did 
D.S. tell Gutierrez-Fuentes to move out, but Gutierrez-Fuentes' actions in gathering his 
things and leaving indicate recognition that D.S. had the authority to make such a 
demand. This authority was reinforced when D.S. asked for Gutierrez-Fuentes' key, and 
he told her that he had lost the key rather than telling her the key was his and she had no 
right to ask for it. More, Gutierrez-Fuentes' act of knocking on the window and trying to 
persuade D.S. to allow him to enter was an implicit recognition that she had the authority 
to refuse his request. All of this is circumstantial evidence suggesting that D.S. did, in 
fact, have authority to revoke his access to the residence and that his forcible entry was 
without authority. Based on the evidence, and when viewed in a light most favorable to 
the State, a rational fact-finder could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Gutierrez-
Fuentes entered the apartment without authority.  
 
 
Gutierrez-Fuentes also asserts that he had authority to be in the apartment pursuant 
to K.S.A. 58-2501, which states:  "Any person in the possession of real property with the 
assent of the owner is presumed to be a tenant at will, unless the contrary is shown . . . ." 
But this statute governs the relationship and responsibilities between landlords and 
 
14 
 
 
tenants; a relationship we cannot ascertain based on the lack of evidence in the record. 
Moreover, the same facts that constitute circumstantial evidence showing his absence of 
authority to be present in the apartment for purposes of the above discussion also provide 
circumstantial evidence to rebut the presumption he was ever a tenant at will. The actions 
of D.S. and Gutierrez-Fuentes indicate he understood he was a guest of D.S. and living 
there only with her permission and not because he was a tenant or co-tenant. Gutierrez-
Fuentes cites no additional authority to support his position on this point. His argument 
fails. 
 
INTERPRETER STATEMENTS AS HEARSAY 
 
 
In his last issue for review, Gutierrez-Fuentes argues that the district court 
erroneously admitted testimony given by Officer Myers and forensic nurse Hess about 
statements D.S. made to them through one or more unidentified interpreters while they 
were at the hospital. In addressing this issue of first impression, the panel interpreted the 
relevant hearsay statute to determine that there is a "language conduit" between the 
interpreter and D.S. so that statements of D.S. to Myers and Hess through the interpreter 
should be attributed as D.S.'s direct statements without an additional layer of hearsay. 
Even if this is incorrect and the district court erroneously allowed inadmissible hearsay, 
the panel determined that any error was harmless.  
 
Preservation 
 
 
Gutierrez-Fuentes objected to the testimony of Myers and Hess about these 
statements on hearsay grounds and obtained a continuing objection. By doing so, he 
 
15 
 
 
preserved this issue for appellate review. See State v. Mattox, 305 Kan. 1015, 1035, 390 
P.3d 514 (2017).  
 
Standard of review  
 
 
This court reviews a trial court's determination of hearsay admissibility for an 
abuse of discretion. Discretion may be abused if (1) no reasonable person would take the 
view adopted by the trial court; (2) the action is based on an error of law; or (3) the action 
is based on an error of fact. State v. Hillard, 313 Kan. 830, 838, 491 P.3d 1223 (2021). 
To the extent this court must interpret K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-460, its review is unlimited. 
State v. Davey, 306 Kan. 814, 820, 397 P.3d 1190 (2017).  
 
Discussion 
 
 
K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-460 states that:  
 
"Evidence of a statement which is made other than by a witness while testifying 
at the hearing, offered to prove the truth of the matter stated, is hearsay evidence and 
inadmissible . . . ."  
 
 
Given the arguments before us, we limit our analysis to a single exception to the 
hearsay rule, K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-460(a): 
 
"(a) Previous statements of persons present. A statement previously made by a 
person who is present at the hearing and available for cross-examination with respect to 
the statement and its subject matter, provided the statement would be admissible if made 
by declarant while testifying as a witness." 
 
 
16 
 
 
 
Gutierrez-Fuentes' specific objections are over the testimony of both Myers and 
Hess about their conversations with D.S. at the hospital, as facilitated by an interpreter 
supplied by the hospital. He argues that it should be the interpreter testifying about the 
statements made by D.S. rather than the officer or nurse who could not understand D.S.'s 
statements directly.  
 
Gutierrez-Fuentes objects to testimony about D.S.'s hospital statements on the 
grounds of hearsay. He claims that the interpretation given by the hospital interpreter 
provides an additional level of hearsay. Without the interpreter's testimony at trial, and 
without an exception to the hearsay rule, the statements made by D.S. in Spanish to the 
hospital interpreter cannot be admitted into evidence, even if D.S. is in court during trial 
to testify about them. 
 
Recognizing the hearsay exception in K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-460(a), which allows 
admission of a statement previously made by a person who is present at the hearing and 
available for cross-examination, the district court overruled the hearsay objections and 
stated that Gutierrez-Fuentes could cross-examine D.S. regarding her hospital statements 
and the accuracy of those statements as conveyed by Myers and Hess. We note here that 
while the concurrence understands the district court's comments about D.S. being 
available for cross-examination as a conclusion relating to both levels of hearsay, it does 
not find any endorsement from the State for the exception found in K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 
60-460(a), thus it would not discuss it. We disagree because at trial the State argued it 
was following the rules of hearsay "because [D.S] will be present to be cross-examined 
about these statements." We acknowledge that this is not an artfully-made argument and 
it does not precisely reference K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-460(a). But we are inclined to find it 
was enough to preserve the argument today and allow us to address it now. It is clear 
 
17 
 
 
K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-460(a) was both the hearsay exception the State was relying on in 
its contention it was "following the rules of hearsay" and the hearsay exception the 
district court relied on at trial. 
 
 
Ultimately, the panel sided with the district court and determined that the hospital 
statements were D.S.'s statements, despite the use of the interpreter; they were not the 
statements of the interpreter. Therefore, there was no extra layer of hearsay, they fall 
under the existing hearsay exception, and the statements were admissible. Gutierrez-
Fuentes argues that the panel amended the statute and added a new exception for 
"language conduit" witnesses, the creation of which should fall only to the Legislature.  
 
 
Because Kansas courts have not previously addressed this issue, both parties turn 
to outside jurisdictions to support their arguments.  
 
 
Gutierrez-Fuentes relies on State v. Morales, 173 Wash. 2d 560, 573-74, 269 P.3d 
263 (2012), where the Washington Supreme Court decided that the hearsay rule applied 
at least in certain situations involving an interpreter. In that case, the Morales court 
affirmed that the State had failed to prove the defendant had been read his rights; without 
the testimony of the interpreter, the State—through the testimony of an officer—could 
only show that the officer had asked the interpreter to read the required warning. He 
could not say that the interpreter did so. 173 Wash. at 573-74.  
 
The State cites authority from the Georgia Court of Appeals which describes a 
"language conduit," stating that "[u]nder the so-called 'language conduit' rule, '[a]bsent a 
motive to mislead, distort or some other indication of inaccuracy, when persons speaking 
different languages rely upon a[n interpreter] as a conduit for their communication, the 
 
18 
 
 
statements of the [interpreter] should be regarded as the statements of the persons 
themselves without creating an additional layer of hearsay.'" Lopez v. State, 281 Ga. App. 
623, 625, 636 S.E.2d 770 (2006). 
 
 
The Lopez rationale fits within "[t]he basic premise of the language conduit theory 
. . . that an interpreter is a neutral party whose translation does not add or detract meaning 
from the speaker's words. The interpreter can be thought of 'as a machine into which one 
language enters and another language exits.'" Comment, Invisible Touch: Analyzing the 
Language Conduit Theory Through the Lens of Translation and Interpreting Principles, 
88 UMKC L. Rev. 771, 777 (2020). In that sense, the interpreter is just a tool used to 
facilitate communication. Absent a showing of dysfunction, it is reliable. 
 
 
The panel explicitly adopted the language conduit rule, holding that except in 
unusual circumstances, an interpreter is "'no more than a language conduit and therefor 
[the] translation' is viewed as the declarant's own." 59 Kan. App. 2d at 84 (citing United 
States v. Cordero, 18 F.3d 1248, 1253 [5th Cir. 1994]. It applied various factors to the 
present case to determine that the record contained no evidence—or argument—of a 
motive by the interpreter to mislead Myers or Hess, and the statements interpreted were 
consistent with the testimony provided at trial. Therefore, the panel attributed the 
statements directly to D.S. without the additional layer of hearsay. 
 
 
To assist in our analysis of the issue, it is helpful to consider the events as they 
occurred at the hospital, focusing on the D.S./Myers exchange, though the D.S./Hess 
exchange would have been essentially the same. Before any discussion began, an injured 
D.S., presumably knowing only Spanish, said nothing. At the same time, Myers, 
 
19 
 
 
presumably knowing only English, said nothing. Someone summoned an interpreter. That 
person arrived and spoke to Myers in English and spoke to D.S. in Spanish.  
 
Myers asked a question in English and listened to the hospital interpreter speak 
Spanish to D.S. Without knowing Spanish, Myers had to assume the interpreter was 
conveying a reasonable facsimile of what he had just said in English. Myers then listened 
to D.S. reply in Spanish. Myers then listened in English to what the interpreter told him 
D.S. had just said. Meanwhile, D.S. did not understand what the interpreter and Myers 
were saying in English. And so on. The interpreter may have been completely accurate. 
However, neither Myers nor D.S. knew enough to correct or applaud the interpreter's 
efforts. 
 
We do not know whether Myers' assumption about the accuracy of the 
interpretation at the hospital was well-placed, and at trial Gutierrez-Fuentes had no way 
of testing its accuracy or reliability because the interpreter did not testify. The State 
asserts that the interpreter is just a tool, a conduit, unless there is some evidence of taint, 
such as a conflict of interest or insufficient understanding of the language. Our record is 
silent on those matters.  
 
To demonstrate why the reliability of the hospital interpreter's separate statements 
may be important, one must have some understanding of how language works. Consider 
the "telephone game." Three or more players form a circle. The game begins with one 
person whispering a detailed and specific message to the next person in the circle. The 
second person then whispers precisely the same message to the third person—and so on 
until you get to the last person, who announces the message out loud. The game is fun 
and interesting because the first person is often surprised by the message as relayed by 
 
20 
 
 
the last person. Almost always, the message has changed—sometimes slightly, 
sometimes dramatically—despite each player's best efforts to keep it the same. It is a 
game which reminds us that language is a complicated enterprise and communication is 
rarely perfect. Yet in the game, everyone is speaking the same language. 
 
The State argues that the "conduit argument" is strengthened by the fact that both 
D.S. and Myers are testifying, so they can testify at trial to what they said in the hospital. 
But this begs the question. Memories fade, sometimes people are motivated to 
exaggerate, and it is possible the memories of both D.S. and Myers have adopted the 
message from the interpreter and not from each other. After all, neither of them knew 
what the other said in the hospital. They simply trusted that the interpreter was telling the 
truth and communicating the message accurately—just as in the telephone game, with the 
added layer of complication provided by two languages. Notably, the complexity of 
communication is only complicated further by the judgment decisions every interpreter 
must make in changing the message from one language to another and then back again, 
even in good faith. "Languages have unique nuances, and mastering their ebb and flow is 
an art form that takes time, exposure, and practice. The translator or interpreter thus 
'recodes and transmits a message received from another source.' Because the message is 
recoded, not simply each word as a unit, end results may differ." 88 UMKC L. Rev. at 
773. 
 
We are not persuaded by the conduit theory. Instead, we identify two persons 
making statements when an interpreter is utilized: the witness, who made out-of-court 
foreign language statements; and the language interpreter, who made out-of-court foreign 
and English language statements. See United States v. Charles, 722 F.3d 1319, 1324 
(11th Cir. 2013) (finding two sets of statements were made by two different declarants 
 
21 
 
 
when an out-of-court interpreter was used). The inherent differences in languages mean 
that interpreters do not always convey a "one-to-one correspondence between words or 
concepts in different languages," the interpreter is a "declarant" of her out-of-court 
statements, and the defendant must have an opportunity to confront such a declarant 
about those statements if they are submitted for the truth of what was said. 722 F.3d at 
1324-25. This is true even with an ethical, experienced, and well-intended interpreter. 
 
The State concedes that D.S.'s out-of-court statements were hearsay. Those 
hearsay statements, made in Spanish, would have been admissible at trial because D.S. 
was present and subject to cross-examination. K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-460(a). Likewise, 
the truth of the interpreter's out-of-court statements is important. Those statements, as 
uttered, must be separately considered for admissibility. The English interpretation does 
not serve as a "conduit" for admissibility of the foreign language statement.  
 
Because no valid exception to their inadmissibility was asserted, the interpreter's 
statements under these facts were inadmissible hearsay. Gutierrez-Fuentes was not 
required to trust the hospital interpreter's understanding of the source and target 
languages, the interpreter's motives, or the interpreter's reliability. His hearsay objection 
should have been sustained. 
 
Harmlessness 
 
 
Even though the district court improperly admitted hearsay evidence, the inquiry 
does not end. The error might be harmless. The erroneous admission is harmless if it does 
not implicate a defendant's constitutional rights and there is no reasonable probability the 
error affected the trial's outcome considering the entire record. State v. Chapman, 306 
 
22 
 
 
Kan. 266, 276, 392 P.3d 1285 (2017). Gutierrez-Fuentes has not argued that his 
constitutional rights have been implicated by the admissions.  
 
 
The only argument made by Gutierrez-Fuentes about how this evidentiary error 
affected the trial's outcome is that the panel failed to appreciate the "persuasive content of 
statements purported to be made closer in time to the alleged crime." It is true that a jury 
might find more reliable what D.S. said at the hospital than what she said at trial, even if 
only because memory fades over time.  
 
Considering the entire record, however, there is no reasonable probability this 
evidentiary error affected the trial's outcome. As the panel correctly notes, the challenged 
testimony was also admitted through unchallenged witnesses. Officer Peña spoke directly 
with D.S. at the hospital, without the use of an interpreter, and his testimony about her 
statements at the hospital is consistent with the testimony of Myers and Hess. Further, 
while the jury may have found what D.S. said at the hospital more reliable than what she 
said during trial—as argued by the defense—its relative value is offset by her lengthy 
testimony at trial about all the same facts relayed to the jury through Peña, Myers, and 
Hess. 
 
 
We hold that the erroneous ruling on this hearsay objection was harmless.  
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The 
judgment of the district court is affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
23 
 
 
 
* * * 
 
LUCKERT, C.J., concurring:  I write separately on one issue:  Whether the district 
court judge erred in categorically admitting all testimony from Officer Dane Myers and 
forensic nurse Tracy Hess about statements a language interpreter made to them 
concerning things D.S. said while at the hospital for treatment. I join the majority on all 
other aspects of today's decision.  
 
On the language interpreter issue, I agree with the majority's conclusions that 
(1) the district court erred in admitting the interpreter's statements and the Court of 
Appeals erred in affirming the admission of this testimony and (2) the erroneous 
admission of the testimony was harmless error. But my reasons for finding error differ 
from those of my colleagues.  
 
I would hold that the State failed to preserve the argument it makes on appeal. It 
contends the statements of the interpreter are not hearsay under the language conduit 
theory applied by courts in some other states and adopted by the Court of Appeals panel 
in this case. See State v. Gutierrez-Fuentes, 59 Kan. App. 2d 70, 84, 477 P.3d 1041 
(2020). The State asks us to adopt the theory as explained in Lopez v. State, 281 Ga. App. 
623, 625, 636 S.E.2d 770 (2006). That decision's holding requires factual determinations 
about the interpreter's motive and about other issues that might impact the accuracy of the 
interpretation. But the State failed to establish a factual foundation to make those 
determinations. Plus, it failed in its appellate briefing to explain how the theory could 
apply given Kansas' hearsay statute, K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-460. Given those failures, the 
 
24 
 
 
State has not preserved its arguments about the language conduit theory and appellate 
courts should not consider the State's theory for the first time on appeal.  
 
A brief recap of the evolution of the parties' arguments explains why I reach these 
conclusions. At trial, Geldy Gutierrez-Fuentes' attorney objected on hearsay grounds 
when Officer Myers began to testify about the statements D.S. made through an 
interpreter. Gutierrez-Fuentes' attorney then argued the language interpreter should be 
testifying because the officer was "testifying to what another person is telling him about 
what a third person is saying. It's pure hearsay." He reiterates that argument on appeal. 
 
Gutierrez-Fuentes' position finds broad support in cases decided before codes of 
evidence were adopted for use in federal and most state courts, including those in Kansas. 
Under those cases, "'[a] person conversing with a third person through an interpreter is 
not qualified to testify to the other person's statements, because he knows them only 
through the hearsay of the interpreter. Ordinarily, therefore, the third person's words 
cannot be proved by anyone except the interpreter himself.'" Saavedra v. State, 
297 S.W.3d 342, 345 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (quoting 2 Wigmore on Evidence § 812[3] 
[2d ed. 1923]).  
 
Kansas' statutory definition of hearsay follows this common law view. Under 
Kansas' code of evidence and its definition of hearsay, out-of-court statements made for 
the truth of the matter asserted are hearsay that are excluded from evidence unless one of 
the statutory hearsay exceptions applies. These exceptions are set out in 31 provisions. 
K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-460. At trial, everyone tacitly accepted that D.S. and the 
interpreter uttered the objected-to statements outside the courtroom. And the State made 
no argument that it offered either D.S.'s or the interpreter's statements for a reason other 
 
25 
 
 
than the truth of the matter asserted. The district court judge then determined the 
evidence was hearsay.  
 
No one at trial explicitly discussed the implications of K.S.A. 60-463, which 
addresses admissibility in the context of multiple hearsay—often called hearsay within 
hearsay. Here, multiple hearsay is at issue because the State asked the officer (and, later 
in the trial, the forensic nurse) to testify to two layers of statements:  (1) Those made by 
D.S. to the interpreter and (2) those made by the interpreter to the officer and nurse.  
 
 
K.S.A. 60-463 allows a judge to admit multiple hearsay only if a hearsay 
exception applies to each layer of statements. State v. Brown, 285 Kan. 261, 279, 173 
P.3d 612 (2007), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Williams, 306 Kan. 175, 392 
P.3d 1267 (2017). Thus, to analyze the validity of Gutierrez-Fuentes' objection, the 
district court needed to determine if each layer of the objected-to statements (1) 
constituted hearsay and, (2) if so, if an exception applies.  
 
The State argued that D.S. "can corroborate the correct translation, that's why it's 
the State's position that it goes to weight and credibility and not admissibility under 
hearsay because she will be present to corroborate the statements that were translated." 
The State also tried to argue why the statements were reliable based on factors like who 
employed the interpreter. Gutierrez-Fuentes' attorney objected, saying no evidence 
supported those contentions.  
 
In ruling on the arguments, the district court judge explicitly found the interpreter's 
statements were hearsay and thus rejected the State's non-hearsay argument. But the 
judge implicitly accepted the State's contention that he could admit the statements 
 
26 
 
 
because D.S. could corroborate the statements; the judge noted that D.S. would testify 
and could be cross-examined about the accuracy of the interpretation. Yet no one argued 
what hearsay exception this fell under. And Kansas has no general catchall exceptions for 
reliability of hearsay or for hearsay that others can corroborate. See K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 
60-460(a)-(ee). 
 
 
On appeal, the State makes a different argument. For the first time, it raises the 
language conduit theory to argue the language interpreter's statements are not hearsay. As 
I have discussed, that assertion ignores the statutory hearsay definition in K.S.A. 2020 
Supp. 60-460, which applies to all out-of-court statements offered for the truth of the 
matter asserted. The State does not explain why the statement does not meet this 
definition. I, like my colleagues in the majority, agree with the district court judge's 
conclusion that the interpreter's statements were hearsay. The interpreter made 
declarations about what D.S. said and the State offered the interpreter's declarations for 
the truth of the matter asserted—that is, that D.S. made those statements. 
 
Without discussion of why the interpreter's statements do not meet the definition 
of hearsay in K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-460, the State cites Lopez v. State, 281 Ga. App. 623, 
625, 636 S.E.2d 770 (2006), to support its argument. In Lopez, the Georgia Court of 
Appeals held that "'[a]bsent a motive to mislead, distort or some other indication of 
inaccuracy, when persons speaking different languages rely upon a translator as a conduit 
for their communication, the statements of the translator should be regarded as the 
statements of the persons themselves without creating an additional layer of hearsay.'" 
281 Ga. App. at 625 (quoting Cassidy v. State, 149 S.W.3d 712, 715 [Tex. App. 2004] 
abrogated on other grounds by Wall v. State, 184 S.W.3d 730 [Tex. Crim. App. 2006]).  
 
 
27 
 
 
This brings us to the procedural point that reveals the State's failure to preserve its 
argument about the language conduit theory, which it raises for the first time on appeal. 
Again, I reach my conclusion the State failed to preserve its argument for two reasons.  
 
The first reason arises because the Lopez holding requires the presence of certain 
factual predicates before the language conduit theory can be applied. Those predicates 
include establishing that the interpreter had no motive to mislead or distort and that 
nothing else suggests inaccuracy in the interpretation. 281 Ga. App. at 625. Finding 
motive (or the lack thereof) and judging circumstances that might impact the accuracy of 
an interpretation are inherently factual determinations. The State began to argue some 
indicia of reliability. But when Gutierrez-Fuentes' attorney accurately argued no evidence 
supported the contentions, the State did not make another effort to lay a foundation. Nor 
did the State ask the district court judge to make any findings, and the judge made none. 
 
When these factual predicates have not been established or found at the trial court 
level, appellate courts in other jurisdictions have refused to apply the theory for the first 
time on appeal. These courts recognize that the proponent of the theory, which in this 
case was the State, has the obligation to establish at trial the foundation for applying the 
language conduit theory and to request findings sufficient for appellate review. See, e.g., 
State v. Rodriguez-Castillo, 345 Or. 39, 50-51, 188 P.3d 268 (2008) (noting [1] State did 
not argue language conduit theory before the trial court, [2] neither defendant nor State 
presented any evidence on factors, and [3] trial court had no chance to rule on factors, 
which meant appellate court was "not in a position to rule as a matter of law" on theory's 
applicability under that state's residual hearsay exception); Saavedra, 297 S.W.3d at 348-
49 (discussing burden proponent of evidence bears in establishing reliability of 
interpretation before language conduit theory applies). These holdings align with Kansas 
 
28 
 
 
law, which requires proponents of hearsay evidence to establish the foundational basis for 
applying a hearsay exception. See State v. Johnson-Howell, 255 Kan. 928, 935, 881 P.2d 
1288 (1994), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Jefferson, 287 Kan. 28, 194 P.3d 
557 (2008). 
 
Unlike these courts and Kansas' general rule, the Court of Appeals panel scoured 
the record to see whether it revealed a motive for the interpreter to mislead or distort or 
any other indication of the interpretation's inaccuracy. Gutierrez-Fuentes, 59 Kan. App. 
2d at 84-85. But appellate courts are not finders of fact and should not consider an issue 
raised for the first time on appeal if doing so requires making factual findings. When an 
appellate court engages in fact-finding, it abuses its discretion. See generally State v. 
Allen, 314 Kan. 280, 284, 497 P.3d 566 (2021) ("An appellate court abuses its discretion 
to take up a newly raised issue if deciding its merits would require the court to make 
factual findings such as credibility determinations, resolving evidentiary conflicts, and 
reweighing evidence. These are typically tasks an appellate court may not perform when 
the factual issues could have been fully litigated before the appeal.").  
 
Here, the State failed to preserve the issue it asserts on appeal and has thus 
established no basis for introducing the interpreter's statements. Given that, the Court of 
Appeals should not have considered application of the language conduit theory nor 
should this court.  
 
The second reason the appellate courts should not address the language conduit 
theory is that the State in its appellate brief made no effort to discuss the doctrinal 
underpinning of the Lopez holding. Yet the statutory structure of the hearsay rule on 
 
29 
 
 
which its holding is based differs in an important respect—the definition of hearsay—
from the definition in Kansas.  
 
To explain, we must look beyond Lopez itself because it fails to explain its 
rationale. Instead, it merely quotes and adopts the holding of the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals in Cassidy, 149 S.W.3d at 715. Cassidy, also cited by the State, explains its 
holding rests on "'the theory that the interpreter serves as an agent of, or a language 
conduit for, the declarant.'" 149 S.W.3d at 715. Another Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
decision—Saavedra, 297 S.W.3d at 344-49—provides a fuller explanation of the 
rationale and discusses the roots of the language conduit theory in common law and the 
way the theory fits with the Federal Rules of Evidence and Texas' evidence rules, which 
follow the federal rules.  
 
As the Texas court explained, the language conduit theory evolved from a 
common-law hearsay rule that recognized interpreters often function as an agent of the 
declarant. Saavedra, 297 S.W.3d at 345 (quoting 2 Wigmore on Evidence § 812[4]). 
With the advent of the Federal Rules of Evidence, federal courts recognized the common 
law agent-interpreter theory could still be applied under Federal Rule of Evidence 
801(d)(2)(C) and (D). Saavedra, 297 S.W.3d at 347. The Texas court cited a federal case 
decided soon after the rules were adopted—United States v. Da Silva, 725 F.2d 828 (2d 
Cir. 1983). The Da Silva court held that "'[p]rovided the interpreter has a sufficient 
capacity, and there is no motive to misrepresent, the interpreter is treated as the agent of 
the party and the statement is admitted as an admission unless circumstances are present 
which would negate the presumption of agency.'" 725 F.2d at 831-32 (quoting 4 J. 
Weinstein & M. Berger, Evidence ¶ 801(d)(2)(C)[01], at 801-158 n. 34 [1981], and citing 
6 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1810[2], at 376 [Chadbourn rev. ed. 1976]). 
 
30 
 
 
 
Lopez and the State also cite, but do not discuss or quote People v. Gutierrez, 916 
P.2d 598 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995). It, too, applies the language conduit theory in the context 
of an agency exception to the hearsay rule. The Colorado court cited Colorado Rule of 
Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) (admission of party; coconspirator), which it noted is "identical to 
Fed. R. Evidence 801(d)(2)(E)." Citing federal caselaw, the court noted "a growing 
majority of jurisdictions now allows admission of translated testimony in appropriate 
circumstances assuring its reliability, on the theory that the interpreter serves as an agent 
of, or a language conduit for, the declarant." 916 P.2d at 600.  
 
Understanding that this interpreter-agency theory creates the rationale for the cases 
cited by the State leads to my conclusion that the State failed to adequately explain how 
the theory can be applied under Kansas law. That is because Federal Rule of Evidence 
801 and state rule patterned on it define hearsay in a manner different from the definition 
in the Kansas Code of Evidence. The federal rule excludes certain statements from the 
definition of hearsay even if made outside court and offered for the truth of the matter 
asserted. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d) ("A statement that meets the following conditions is not 
hearsay."). These include statements defined in Rule 801(d)(2)(C), (D), and (E), which 
relate to statements made by a party's agent, one acting under a party's authorization, or 
one conspiring with a party—the circumstances federal courts have applied to interpreters 
unless facts suggest otherwise. Da Silva, 725 F.2d at 831. State courts with codes of 
evidence modeled after the federal rules, including Texas, have sometimes used the same 
analysis. See Saavedra, 297 S.W.3d at 347-49 (citing Tex. R. Evid. 801[e]). And it is this 
Texas analysis that supports Lopez. See Lopez, 281 Ga. App. at 625 (quoting Cassidy, 
149 S.W.3d at 715); 149 S.W.3d at 715 (citing Tex. R. Evid. 801[e] and citing Gutierrez, 
916 P.2d 598 [in turn citing Colo. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E)]).  
 
31 
 
 
 
The Kansas Code of Evidence does not exclude out-of-court statements offered for 
the truth of the matter asserted from the definition of hearsay regardless of the 
trustworthiness of the circumstances in which the statements are made. See K.S.A. 2020 
Supp. 60-460. The theoretical basis in Cassidy and Lopez for saying the interpreted 
statement is not hearsay thus does not exist in Kansas law. Instead, K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 
60-460 excludes hearsay unless an exception applies. The State consequently needed to 
propose a hearsay exception justifying the admission of the interpreter's statements into 
evidence. But it cites no exception in its appellate brief. It thus failed to meet its burden 
and failed to preserve the issue for appellate review. See State v. Raskie, 293 Kan. 906, 
919, 269 P.3d 1268 (2012) (holding defendant failed to brief hearsay exceptions and 
inadequate briefing led to waiver of argument). 
 
Even so, the majority chooses to discuss whether K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-460(a) 
applies. While I understand one could read the district court judge's comments about D.S. 
being available for cross-examination as a conclusion relating to both levels of hearsay, I 
do not read either the State's trial arguments or its appellate arguments as proffering that 
exception as a path to admission of the evidence. Rather, the State's arguments and the 
ruling relate to trustworthiness and credibility (which in Kansas is not alone a basis for 
admission of evidence) and to whether the interpreter's statements are hearsay (although 
the State never addresses the Kansas definition). Unlike the majority, I would not discuss 
an exception not cited by the State.  
 
I also recognize that some courts have followed a different analytical path for 
applying the language conduit theory than the path followed in Cassidy and Lopez (see 
Saavedra, 297 S.W.3d at 347-49 [gathering cases]). But I would not analyze any other 
 
32 
 
 
path than the Cassidy/Lopez one without allowing the parties to brief the alternative. See 
State v. Toothman, 310 Kan. 542, 547, 448 P.3d 1039 (2019) ("'[W]hen "an appellate 
court raises a new issue sua sponte, counsel for all parties should be afforded a fair 
opportunity to brief the new issue and to present their positions to the appellate court 
before the issue is finally determined."'"). 
 
In sum, I would hold the district court erred in admitting the interpreter's 
statements because the State has yet to establish a hearsay exception allowing its 
admission. And I would hold the Court of Appeals abused its discretion in addressing the 
language conduit theory when the State had not laid the foundation for its application and 
had failed to adequately brief the issue. I thus agree with the majority that both the Court 
of Appeals and the district court judge erred, although I do not join the majority's 
rationale. And, like my colleagues in the majority, I would hold the district court's error 
was harmless.  
 
BILES, J., joins the foregoing concurrence.