Title: In re Margaret Susan P.

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

In re Margaret Susan P.  (98-145); 169 Vt. 252; 733 A.2d 38

[Filed 14-May-1999]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter  of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 98-145

In re Margaret Susan P.	                          Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
     		                                  Chittenden Superior Court

                                                  January Term, 1999

Linda Levitt, J.

Michael S. Gawne of Brown, Cahill, Gawne & Miller, P.C., St. Albans, for 
  Appellant.

Kurt M. Hughes of Murdoch & Hughes, Burlington, for Appellee.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       DOOLEY, J.  This case requires us to define the rights of access of an
  adult adoptee to  adoption records under the recently-enacted Vermont
  Adoption Act, Title 15A of Vermont  Statutes Annotated.   The context of
  our decision is a request by an adult adoptee to examine and  photocopy the
  file on her relinquishment and adoption held by the private adoption agency
  that  placed her with an adoptive family.  Both the Chittenden Probate
  Court and the Chittenden  Superior Court denied this request, holding the
  adoptee was entitled only to a summary of the  information in the file.  We
  conclude that the probate or superior court can order the relief the 
  adoptee requests if it finds that the balance of statutory factors supports
  disclosure.  We also  conclude that the summary provided to the adoptee in
  this case was insufficient to comply with 

 

  the applicable statute.  We reverse and remand for further proceedings
  consistent with this  opinion.

       Plaintiff Daphne Gawne was born on March 25, 1951 in Burlington while
  her birth mother  was a resident at the Elizabeth Lund Home, now the
  defendant, Lund Family Center.   Plaintiff's  birth mother ultimately
  relinquished her to the Elizabeth Lund Home, which then placed her with 
  Blaise and Katherine Kent.  The Chittenden Probate Court formalized the
  Kents' adoption of  plaintiff on May 31, 1952.

       Plaintiff first began to seek information related to her adoption in
  the 1980's.  Since the  deaths of her adoptive mother in 1987 and her
  adoptive father in 1990, she has attempted to gain  information regarding
  her adoption from both defendant and the probate court.  In June 1995, 
  plaintiff visited defendant and requested to inspect or obtain a copy of
  all files in its possession  relating to her or her adoption.  Defendant
  refused this request.  Plaintiff filed a petition for  disclosure of
  information with the Chittenden Probate Court in August of 1997 pursuant to
  the  relevant provisions of the Vermont Adoption Act, 15A V.S.A. §§
  6-104(e), 6-112(a).  Plaintiff's  birth mother consented to disclosure of
  the information plaintiff requested.  Her putative father  consented to the
  disclosure as long as identifying information pertaining to him was
  deleted.  The  court denied the petition, although it did order defendant
  to provide a more detailed summary of  the records in its possession.  The
  superior court affirmed the probate court decision by granting  summary
  judgment for defendant.

       This is an unusual case.  By June 1997, when the probate court
  released its file to her,  plaintiff was aware of virtually all information
  about her birth family and her adoption.  She knew  the identity and
  location of her birth mother and that of the man her birth mother
  identified as her 

 

  birth father.  She had received extensive information from defendant about
  her adoption.   Defendant drew the line, however, at giving plaintiff
  complete access to its file on her and her  adoption. 

       It is also an unusual case because the information already disclosed
  to plaintiff shows  serious irregularities in the placement of plaintiff
  with her adoptive parents and in the steps to the  finalization of the
  adoption.  Because of these irregularities, the Elizabeth Lund Home opposed 
  the adoption when it finally came before the Chittenden Probate Court in
  1952.  Its main reasons  were that:  (1) the placement with the adoptive
  parents was based on friendship with Elizabeth  Lund Home staff and not on
  an objective home study; (2) because of their age and other factors,  the
  adoptive parents were not eligible to adopt babies placed by the home under
  the existing  policies of the home; and (3) the adoptive parents moved to
  another state shortly after the  placement, and that state refused to
  supervise the placement.  After taking evidence, the probate  court
  approved the adoption over the objection of the Elizabeth Lund Home and the
  Commissioner  of the Vermont Department of Social Welfare.

       We point out the unusual nature of the dispute to emphasize what is at
  issue in this appeal.  Although plaintiff may want to learn more about
  herself and her birth parents, her main interest  is in knowing how
  defendant and its employees acted in taking the relinquishment from her
  birth  mother and discharging its obligations as custodian up until the
  time she was adopted.  We are,  therefore, not dealing primarily with the
  privacy interests of birth parents, adoptees or adoptive  parents. 
  Instead, we are considering the privacy interests of a private adoption
  agency.

       On appeal, plaintiff makes a number of claims about the merits of the
  superior court  decision and about the procedure the court employed in
  reaching its decision.  We discuss the 

 

  merits below.  Before we reach the merits, we consider one other appeal
  issue - whether Judge  Linda Levitt should have been disqualified from
  hearing the case -- because it goes to the integrity  of the adjudicatory
  process.

                          I.  Motion to Disqualify

       Plaintiff moved to disqualify Judge Linda Levitt on February 15, 1998,
  about a month  after defendant filed a motion for summary judgment in
  Chittenden Superior Court.  Her primary  grounds were that Judge Levitt is
  an adoptive mother who "might hold positions typical of  adoptive mothers
  and cannot easily set aside a potential predisposition against disclosure."  
  Plaintiff also cited that when defendant appealed to Chittenden Superior
  Court, defendant failed  to appear and plaintiff moved for a default
  judgment.  Rather than acting on the motion, Judge  Levitt directed the
  clerk to notify the attorney for defendant of the pendency of the appeal
  and to  send the attorney a copy of the notice of appeal and statement of
  questions.  Once defendant  appeared in the action through counsel, Judge
  Levitt denied the motion for a default judgment.

       The motion to disqualify was referred to the Administrative Judge for
  Trial Courts who  designated Judge Dean Pineles to rule on it.  See
  V.R.C.P. 40(e)(3) (motions to disqualify are  decided by Administrative
  Judge or his designee).   Judge Pineles denied the motion, ruling that 
  plaintiff's concerns were "speculative in nature" and that plaintiff failed
  to make a clear and  affirmative showing of bias or prejudice.  On appeal,
  plaintiff makes the same arguments she  made to the administrative judge.

       Plaintiff's motion to disqualify is based on Canon 3E of the Code of
  Judicial Conduct,  which requires a judge to disqualify herself "in a
  proceeding in which the judge's impartiality  might reasonably be
  questioned."  See A.O. 10, Canon 3E(1).  Plaintiff argues that because 

 

  studies show that adoptive parents are often hostile to an adoptee
  acquiring information about birth  parents or the adoption, Judge Levitt
  should have disqualified herself from this dispute about an  adoptee's
  access to adoption information.

       We addressed the standard of review for disqualification decisions in
  State v. Putnam, 164  Vt. 558, 560-61,