Title: In re LeSage

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13041 
 
ROBERT LeSAGE, petitioner. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 5, 2021. - August 10, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Sex Offender.  Constitutional Law, Sex offender, Trial by jury, 
Speedy trial.  Due Process of Law, Sex offender, 
Commitment.  Practice, Civil, Sex offender, Jury trial, 
Civil commitment. 
 
 
 
Petition filed in the Superior Court Department on July 9, 
2015. 
 
A motion for a jury-waived trial or release pending a jury 
trial, filed on July 13, 2020, was heard by Beverly J. Cannone, 
J. 
 
A proceeding for interlocutory review was heard in the 
Appeals Court by Sabita Singh, J.  The Supreme Judicial Court on 
its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
Mary P. Murray for the Commonwealth. 
John S. Day for the petitioner. 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  The issue before us is whether, in proceedings 
pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 9 (§ 9), for discharge from civil 
2 
 
commitment as a sexually dangerous person, the Commonwealth's 
exercise of its statutory right to demand a jury trial 
constitutes a substantive due process violation in light of the 
suspension on jury trials because of the COVID-19 pandemic.  The 
Commonwealth appeals from a Superior Court judge's order 
concluding that the Commonwealth's exercise of its statutory 
right to demand a jury trial violated the petitioner's 
substantive due process rights and allowing the petitioner's 
motion for a bench trial over the Commonwealth's objection.  We 
conclude that the Commonwealth's exercise of its statutory right 
to demand a jury trial is narrowly tailored to its legitimate 
and compelling interest of protecting the public from sexually 
dangerous persons and that the delay resulting from the COVID-19 
pandemic has not yet transformed the Commonwealth's exercise of 
this right into conduct that shocks the conscience.  
Accordingly, the judge erred in concluding that the petitioner's 
substantive due process rights were violated.  We reverse.1 
Background.  Over a period of decades, the petitioner, 
Robert LeSage, sexually assaulted at least thirty children.  In 
1975, the petitioner repeatedly sexually assaulted a fourteen 
year old boy (victim).  In 1976, he killed the victim after the 
victim threatened to reveal the sexual assaults to police.  The 
 
1 Because we reverse, we need not address whether a virtual 
jury-waived trial would be lawful. 
3 
 
petitioner subsequently fled to Iowa and changed his name.  
There, he sexually assaulted several boys, including his 
stepson.  He was arrested in Iowa in 1983, at which time he 
admitted to killing the victim. 
The petitioner was returned to Massachusetts, where he 
pleaded guilty to offenses relating to the victim.  The 
petitioner pleaded guilty to three counts of rape of a child 
under sixteen years of age and one count of manslaughter, 
reduced from a charge of murder in the first degree.  He served 
concurrent sentences of from eighteen to twenty years.  Near the 
end of the petitioner's prison sentence in March 2001, the 
Commonwealth moved to commit the petitioner as a sexually 
dangerous person.  A jury unanimously found the petitioner to be 
a sexually dangerous person, and he was committed to the 
Massachusetts Treatment Center (treatment center).  The 
petitioner previously has filed three petitions for discharge 
pursuant to § 9.  In April 2006, the first petition was tried 
before a jury.  The jury found that the petitioner remained 
sexually dangerous.  Following the petitioner's appeal, the 
judgment was reversed and remanded for a new trial.  See LeSage, 
petitioner, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 566, 572-573 (2010) (reversing 
judgment and remanding for new trial on ground that record 
failed to establish that testifying psychologist met statutory 
requirements for designation as qualified examiner).  In 2011, 
4 
 
on retrial, a jury found that the petitioner remained sexually 
dangerous.  See LeSage, petitioner, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 1116 
(2015) (affirming after retrial).  The petitioner withdrew a 
second petition before trial.  He subsequently filed a third 
petition in 2012, after which a jury found that he remained 
sexually dangerous in May 2015. 
 
On July 9, 2015, the petitioner filed the § 9 petition at 
issue in this proceeding.  A jury trial in August 2018 resulted 
in a mistrial because the jury could not reach a verdict.  The 
matter was scheduled for retrial in March 2020, but was 
continued indefinitely because of the COVID-19 pandemic and the 
resulting suspension of jury trials in Massachusetts. 
 
The petitioner subsequently filed a motion for a bench 
trial or, in the alternative, release pending a jury trial.  The 
Commonwealth opposed this motion.  After a nonevidentiary 
hearing via video conferencing, a Superior Court judge granted 
the petitioner's motion to proceed with a bench trial over the 
Commonwealth's objection, holding that it was unconstitutional 
for the Commonwealth to exercise its right to demand a jury 
trial. 
 
In January 2020, before the scheduled date of the retrial, 
the petitioner was evaluated by two qualified examiners pursuant 
to § 9.  One of those examiners opined that the petitioner no 
longer is sexually dangerous, while the other opined that he 
5 
 
remains sexually dangerous.  A community access board2 (CAB), 
comprised of five licensed psychologists, unanimously opined 
that the petitioner remains sexually dangerous.  The petitioner 
is eighty years old and suffers from serious health problems.  
He is unable to ambulate and uses a wheelchair. 
The Commonwealth filed a petition in the Appeals Court 
pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 118, appealing from the order and 
requesting that a single justice report this matter and stay the 
proceedings in the Superior Court or, in the alternative, vacate 
the Superior Court judge's order granting the petitioner's 
motion for a bench trial.  The single justice granted the 
Commonwealth leave to file an interlocutory appeal from the 
Superior Court judge's order, ordered an expedited appeal, and 
stayed the Superior Court judge's order.  The Commonwealth filed 
its notice of appeal, and we transferred the case to this court 
on our own motion. 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  On appeal, we review 
any conclusions of law de novo.  See Kitras v. Aquinnah, 474 
Mass. 132, 139, cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 506 (2016).  The motion 
 
2 Under G. L. c. 123A, § 6A, the community access board 
(CAB) must "conduct annual reviews of and prepare reports on the 
current sexual dangerousness of all persons at the treatment 
center, including those whose criminal sentences have not 
expired."  The CAB consists of a panel of three Department of 
Correction employees and two psychologists appointed by the 
Commissioner of Correction.  Id.  See G. L. c. 123A, § 1; 
Johnstone, petitioner, 453 Mass. 544, 547-548 (2009). 
6 
 
judge's decision that it was unconstitutional for the 
Commonwealth to exercise its right to a jury trial in a § 9 
proceeding during the COVID-19 pandemic is a conclusion of law, 
and accordingly, we review the decision de novo.  See id. 
2.  The statute.  We begin by providing background on the 
relevant statutory scheme.  "Where the Commonwealth contends 
that a prisoner who was previously convicted of a qualifying 
sexual offense is a sexually dangerous person as defined in 
G. L. c. 123A, § 1, it may file a petition seeking to civilly 
commit the individual following his or her release from 
custody."3  Chapman, petitioner, 482 Mass. 293, 299-300 (2019), 
citing G. L. c. 123A, § 12 (a)-(b).  "The Legislature enacted 
G. L. c. 123A to protect the public from sex offenders who have 
 
3 Under G. L. c. 123A, § 1, a sexually dangerous person is 
defined as "any person who has been (i) convicted of or 
adjudicated as a delinquent juvenile or youthful offender by 
reason of a sexual offense and who suffers from a mental 
abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person 
likely to engage in sexual offenses if not confined to a secure 
facility; (ii) charged with a sexual offense and was determined 
to be incompetent to stand trial and who suffers from a mental 
abnormality or personality disorder which makes such person 
likely to engage in sexual offenses if not confined to a secure 
facility; or (iii) previously adjudicated as such by a court of 
the commonwealth and whose misconduct in sexual matters 
indicates a general lack of power to control his sexual 
impulses, as evidenced by repetitive or compulsive sexual 
misconduct by either violence against any victim, or aggression 
against any victim under the age of [sixteen] years, and who, as 
a result, is likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury on 
such victims because of his uncontrolled or uncontrollable 
desires." 
7 
 
a mental disease or defect and who, following expiration of 
their criminal sentences, may still pose a danger to the public 
and therefore may require commitment to the treatment center, 
where they may avail themselves of treatment for their 
disorders."  Commonwealth v. Pariseau, 466 Mass. 805, 811 
(2014).  See Commonwealth v. Knapp, 441 Mass. 157, 159 (2004) 
(in enacting G. L. c. 123A, Legislature found "the danger of 
recidivism posed by sex offenders . . . to be grave and that the 
protection of the public from these sex offenders is of 
paramount interest to the government" [citation omitted]).  Cf. 
Noe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 5340 v. Sex Offender Registry 
Bd., 480 Mass. 195, 196 (2018) (sex offender registration law is 
"designed to protect the public from the danger of recidivism 
posed by sex offenders" [quotation and citation omitted]). 
"The [sexually dangerous person] statute balances this 
public safety concern with specific provisions designed to 
protect a defendant's liberty interests."  Pariseau, 466 Mass. 
at 811.  The "primary objective" of G. L. c. 123A is "to care 
for, treat, and, it is hoped, rehabilitate the sexually 
dangerous person, while at the same time protecting society from 
this person's violent, aggressive, and compulsive behaviors."  
Sheridan, petitioner, 412 Mass. 599, 604 (1992).  Commitment 
under G. L. c. 123A "is civil and rehabilitative in nature 
rather than criminal and punitive."  Commonwealth v. Travis, 372 
8 
 
Mass. 238, 248 (1977).  See Commonwealth v. Bruno, 432 Mass. 
489, 500-501 (2000) (Legislature intended to establish remedial 
scheme, and scheme has not been shown to be so punitive as to 
negate Legislature's intent).  See also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 
U.S. 346, 363 (1997) (indefinite detention is not punitive where 
it is done to further legitimate nonpunitive government 
objective, such as protecting public). 
After the Commonwealth files a petition under G. L. 
c. 123A, § 12, seeking to commit an individual civilly following 
his or her release from custody, a judge must then determine 
whether probable cause exists to believe that the individual is 
sexually dangerous.  See G. L. c. 123A, § 12 (c).  After 
hearing, if a judge finds probable cause to believe that the 
individual is sexually dangerous, the individual shall be 
committed temporarily to the treatment center for examination 
and diagnosis by two qualified examiners4 for a period not 
exceeding sixty days.  See G. L. c. 123A, § 13 (a).  Within 
forty-five days, the examiners must provide the judge with a 
written report opining whether the individual is sexually 
dangerous and should be committed to the treatment center.  Id.  
The Commonwealth then has fourteen days to file a petition for 
 
4 A qualified examiner must be a licensed psychiatrist or 
psychologist who "has had two years of experience with diagnosis 
or treatment of sexually aggressive offenders and is designated 
by the commissioner of correction."  G. L. c. 123A, § 1. 
9 
 
trial to determine whether the petitioner indeed is sexually 
dangerous.5  See G. L. c. 123A, § 14 (a).  Either party may 
demand that the case be tried by a jury.  Id. 
The individual remains confined to the treatment center 
through the duration of the trial.  See id.  If the jury 
unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual 
is sexually dangerous, the person is committed to the treatment 
center for an indefinite term of between one day and the 
remainder of the person's natural life "until discharged 
pursuant to the provisions of [§] 9."  G. L. c. 123A, § 14 (d). 
At issue in this case is the application of § 9.  Section 9 
entitles any person who has been committed to the treatment 
center as a sexually dangerous person to file a petition for 
examination and discharge once every year.  The Department of 
Correction also may file a petition at any time if it believes 
that a committed individual no longer is sexually dangerous.  
See G. L. c. 123A, § 9.  A petitioner has a right to a speedy 
hearing.  Id.  Prior to the discharge hearing, the petitioner is 
again examined by two qualified examiners, who conduct 
 
5 A trial must be held within sixty days of the 
Commonwealth's filing of the petition for trial, unless good 
cause for delay is shown or justice so requires.  See G. L. 
c. 123A, § 14 (a).  In practice, it is rare that a trial takes 
place within sixty days.  In many cases, a year or more may 
elapse before a trial is scheduled.  See Chapman, petitioner, 
482 Mass. 293, 301 (2019). 
10 
 
evaluations and report whether the petitioner remains sexually 
dangerous.  See id.  In the hearing, "either the petitioner or 
the commonwealth may demand that the issue be tried by a jury."  
Id.  See Johnstone, petitioner, 453 Mass. 544, 548 (2009).  For 
the Commonwealth to proceed to trial in a discharge proceeding 
under § 9, at least one of the two qualified examiners must 
opine that the petitioner remains sexually dangerous.  See 
Johnstone, petitioner, supra at 553.  See also G. L. c. 123A, § 
9.  If both qualified examiners recommend discharge, then the 
petitioner must be released.  See Chapman, petitioner, 482 Mass. 
at 294; Johnstone, petitioner, supra at 545. 
Unlike with the initial trial after a finding of probable 
cause, the statute provides no specific timeline under which a 
hearing or a discharge trial must be held.  See Chapman, 
petitioner, 482 Mass. at 302 ("Although [§ 9] calls for a 
'speedy hearing' on discharge petitions, it does not set a 
deadline to hold such a hearing").  In practice, it often takes 
years for a discharge petition to be scheduled for trial, 
"during which time the petitioner must remain civilly 
committed."  Id.  See Trimmer, petitioner, 375 Mass. 588, 590 
(1978) (§ 9 "clearly does not set an express time limitation 
within which the court must hold a reexamination hearing"; 
rather, "[t]he one-year period . . . fixes a limitation on the 
11 
 
number of hearings which [a sexually dangerous person] may 
request"). 
The qualified examiners' reports, as well as the annual 
reviews by the CAB, are admissible at trial on the petition for 
discharge.  G. L. c. 123A, § 9.  Unless the trier of fact 
determines that the petitioner remains sexually dangerous, the 
petitioner must be discharged.  See id.; Commonwealth v. Fay, 
467 Mass. 574, 585 n.13, cert. denied, 574 U.S. 858 (2014) (on 
petition for discharge "Commonwealth must again prove [the 
petitioner's] dangerousness"); Commonwealth v. Nieves, 446 Mass. 
583, 595 (2006) (on judicial review of petitioner's status, 
"Commonwealth must prove that [petitioner] continues to be a 
sexually dangerous person"). 
3.  Substantive due process rights.  "Substantive due 
process prohibits governmental conduct that 'shocks the 
conscience' or infringes on rights 'implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty'" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. G.F., 479 
Mass. 180, 191 (2018).  The right to be free from physical 
restraint is a "paradigmatic fundamental right."  Knapp, 441 
Mass. at 164.  Civil confinement "implicates a liberty interest, 
and therefore, due process protections apply."  Pariseau, 466 
Mass. at 808, quoting Commonwealth v. Blake, 454 Mass. 267, 276-
277 (2009) (Ireland, J., concurring).  Accordingly, we "must 
examine carefully the importance of the governmental interests 
12 
 
advanced and the extent to which they are served by the 
challenged regulation."  Bruno, 432 Mass. at 503, quoting Moore 
v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977). 
Government conduct that infringes on a fundamental right is 
subject to strict scrutiny.  See Bruno, 432 Mass. at 503.  To 
comply with the requirements of substantive due process and 
satisfy strict scrutiny, government conduct that infringes on a 
fundamental right must be narrowly tailored to further a 
compelling and legitimate government interest.  See Matter of 
E.C., 479 Mass. 113, 119 (2018); Aime v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 
667, 673 (1993).  "[W]e . . . go beyond the language of the 
statute to determine whether its apparent intent is constrained 
by the requirements of due process under the State or Federal 
Constitutions."  Sheridan, petitioner, 422 Mass. 776, 778 
(1996). 
"Civil commitment of people who potentially pose a threat 
to public safety does not violate substantive due process, as 
long as that commitment takes place according to proper 
procedures and evidentiary standards."  G.F., 479 Mass. at 196.  
Here, we conclude that the government's exercise of its 
statutory right to a jury trial, even in the context of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, has not infringed upon the petitioner's 
fundamental right to be free from restraint.  The delay caused 
by the pause on jury trials has not yet transformed the 
13 
 
Commonwealth's exercise of this statutory right into conduct 
that shocks the conscience. 
a.  Legitimate government interest.  It is well settled 
that the government has both a legitimate and compelling 
interest at stake in "protect[ing] the public from harm by 
persons likely to be sexually dangerous."  Knapp, 441 Mass. at 
164.  See G.F., 479 Mass. at 192 ("[I]t is beyond question that 
[the Commonwealth] has a compelling interest in protecting the 
public from sexually dangerous persons" [citation omitted]); 
Bruno, 432 Mass. at 504 (requirements of G. L. c. 123A "reflect 
the Legislature's concern with protecting the public from harm 
by persons who are soon to be released and who are likely to be 
sexually dangerous").  We now consider whether the 
Commonwealth's exercise of its statutory right to demand a jury 
trial is narrowly tailored to furthering this interest given the 
delay in jury trials caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.  We 
conclude that it is. 
b.  Extent to which jury trial furthers government 
interest.  The motion judge concluded that the Commonwealth's 
interest in a jury trial does not sufficiently outweigh the 
petitioner's interest in a swift trial and possible release.  
The motion judge further concluded that it is the Commonwealth, 
not the public, that has an interest in the case being heard by 
a jury.  On appeal, the Commonwealth contends that juries play 
14 
 
an important function in deciding whether individuals continue 
to pose a danger to the public and whether confinement for 
treatment is required.  The Commonwealth further argues that the 
Legislature recognized as much when it amended G. L. c. 123A to 
include a statutory right to a jury trial after this court held 
that a petitioner has no constitutional right to a jury trial in 
the context of a civil commitment.  See Gagnon, petitioner, 416 
Mass. 775, 778 (1994). 
The petitioner argues that although the Commonwealth has a 
compelling interest in maintaining public safety, the 
Commonwealth's insistence on a jury trial does not serve this 
interest.  Specifically, he reiterates the motion judge's 
reasoning that a jury trial would not serve the public's 
interest in accurate outcomes because a bench trial would be 
equally fair and accurate.  The petitioner further argues that 
if a jury trial were necessary to protect the public, the 
Legislature would have mandated jury trials in this context, as 
it did for capital cases.6 
 
6 Under G. L. c. 263, § 6, the Legislature has excepted 
capital cases from those in which a defendant may opt to waive a 
jury trial:  "Any defendant in a criminal case other than a 
capital case . . . may . . . waive his right to trial by jury 
. . . ."  We have concluded that it is reasonable for the 
Legislature to treat defendants in capital cases differently 
from other defendants because a conviction of murder in the 
first degree carries a uniquely severe penalty.  See 
Commonwealth v. Francis, 450 Mass. 132, 135 (2007), S.C., 477 
Mass. 582 (2017).  See also Commonwealth v. Waweru, 480 Mass. 
15 
 
We agree with the Commonwealth that juries play an 
important function in deciding whether individuals previously 
found to be sexually dangerous continue to pose a danger to the 
public and whether confinement for treatment is required.  
Indeed, the role juries play in c. 123A proceedings is similar 
to the role that juries play in criminal proceedings.  See 
Pariseau, 466 Mass. at 812 (judge may look to criminal context, 
although not controlling, for guidance in civil commitment 
cases).  Both this court and the United States Supreme Court 
have recognized the important role juries play in our criminal 
justice system. 
"[T]he public has an interest in having a criminal case 
heard by a jury, an interest distinct from the defendant's 
interest in being tried by a jury of his [or her] peers."  
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 383 (1979).  The 
Supreme Court has long recognized society's interest in a jury 
trial.  Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 311 (1930).  
"[T]he jury serves the critical function of introducing into the 
process a lay judgment, reflecting values generally held in the 
community, concerning the kinds of potential harm that justify 
the State in confining a person for compulsory treatment."  
 
173, 193 (2018) (prohibiting defendants in capital cases from 
waiving their right to jury trial is policy matter suitable for 
legislative consideration). 
16 
 
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).  We similarly have 
recognized that juries act as the "repository of the community's 
conscience."  Commonwealth v. Connolly, 356 Mass. 617, 628, 
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 843 (1970).  See Commonwealth v. Howard, 
469 Mass. 721, 750 (2014), S.C., 479 Mass. 52 (2018), quoting 
Commonwealth v. McDermott, 393 Mass. 451, 458 (1984) ("[t]he 
jury should reflect the community's conscience in determining 
what constitutes an extremely cruel or atrocious killing"). 
A defendant in a Federal criminal case does not have a 
constitutional right to a bench trial.  See Singer v. United 
States, 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965).  Similarly, a defendant in a 
capital case under Massachusetts law has no right to a bench 
trial.  See G. L. c. 263, § 6.  This court has upheld G. L. 
c. 263, § 6, on equal protection and due process challenges, 
reasoning that the Legislature reasonably concluded that a jury, 
as the "conscience of the community, rather than one person," 
should make decisions when a person's life is at stake.  See 
Commonwealth v. Francis, 450 Mass. 132, 135-136 (2007), S.C., 
477 Mass. 582 (2017). 
We recognize that, unlike defendants in capital cases, a 
petitioner in a § 9 proceeding does not have a constitutional 
right to a jury trial.  See Gagnon, petitioner, 416 Mass. at 
778.  This is because a sexually dangerous person's commitment 
is not criminal or penal in nature.  See id.  Instead, the 
17 
 
statute "was enacted 'with the dual aims of protecting the 
public against future antisocial behavior by the offender, and 
of doing all that can be done to rehabilitate him [or her].'"  
Commonwealth v. Barboza, 387 Mass. 105, 111, cert. denied, 459 
U.S. 1020 (1982), quoting Commonwealth v. Knowlton, 378 Mass. 
479, 483 (1979). 
Although a petitioner does not have a constitutional right 
to a jury trial, both parties, as discussed supra, have a 
statutory right to demand a jury trial pursuant to § 9.  This is 
because many of the concerns that exist in a criminal proceeding 
exist in the civil commitment context.  Relevant here is the 
jury's role in protecting the public interest by acting as the 
community's conscience.  The public's interest in jury trials is 
protected only by the government's ability to demand a jury 
trial over the petitioner's objection.  We therefore conclude 
that the Commonwealth's exercise of its statutory right to a 
jury trial advances the Commonwealth's legitimate and compelling 
interest of protecting the public. 
We are not persuaded by the petitioner's argument that a 
bench trial is required in the current circumstances because the 
Legislature has not mandated jury trials.  Although the statute 
allows for bench trials, this is by no means "an implied 
exclusion" of jury trials where the statute also explicitly 
gives both parties the right to demand a jury trial.  Skawski v. 
18 
 
Greenfield Investors Prop. Dev. LLC, 473 Mass. 580, 588 (2016), 
quoting Bank of Am., N.A. v. Rosa, 466 Mass. 613, 619 (2013).  
See Commissioner of Correction v. Superior Court Dep't of the 
Trial Court for the County of Worcester, 446 Mass. 123, 124 
(2006) ("Statutory language should be given effect consistent 
with its plain meaning.  Where, as here, that language is clear 
and unambiguous, it is conclusive as to the intent of the 
Legislature"). 
Moreover, a lack of a constitutional right to a jury trial 
does not foreclose a statutory right to a jury trial.  In 
Barboza, 387 Mass. at 113 n.6, although we concluded that the 
petitioner did not have a constitutional right to a jury trial, 
we did not examine whether he had a statutory right to a jury 
trial.  That a jury trial is not required constitutionally in a 
§ 9 proceeding does not diminish the Commonwealth's statutory 
right to demand a jury trial nor does it have any impact on our 
analysis whether the Commonwealth's exercise of this right 
violates due process in these circumstances.  To the contrary, 
the Legislature's act of amending the statute in 1994 to give 
both the Commonwealth and the petitioner the right to demand a 
jury trial suggests its recognition of the critical role a jury 
plays in § 9 discharge petitions, despite the lack of a 
constitutional requirement.  See G. L. c. 123A, § 9.  Indeed, 
the day after we decided the Gagnon case, in which we held that 
19 
 
a petitioner has no constitutional right to a jury trial in a 
§ 9 discharge proceeding, the Legislature amended the statute to 
allow the Commonwealth and the petitioner to demand a jury 
trial.  See G. L. c. 123A, § 9, as appearing in St. 1993, c. 
489, § 7 (approved January 14, 1994, and effective April 14, 
1994). 
c.  Extent to which the Commonwealth's exercise of its 
right to a jury trial is narrowly tailored.  We now consider 
whether the Commonwealth's exercise of its statutory right to a 
jury trial, when COVID-19 has temporarily paused all jury trials 
in Massachusetts, is narrowly tailored to furthering the 
government's compelling and legitimate interest in protecting 
the public.  The motion judge concluded that, given the delay, 
the Commonwealth's invocation of its statutory right was not 
narrowly tailored to further its interests.  The judge reasoned 
that the Commonwealth "holds all the cards" in terms of 
prolonging the delay in light of the petitioner's waiver of a 
jury trial.  This, the judge concluded, shocks the conscience, 
such that the petitioner's substantive due process rights have 
been violated. 
The Commonwealth argues that the judge erred because, where 
the Commonwealth is not at fault for the delay and where its 
insistence on a jury trial is guaranteed by statute and reflects 
public safety interests recognized by the Legislature, its 
20 
 
exercise of the right to demand a jury trial is not "egregiously 
unacceptable, outrageous, or conscience-shocking."  Amsden v. 
Moran, 904 F.2d 748, 754 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 
1041 (1991).  The petitioner counters that the Commonwealth's 
exercise of its right to demand a jury trial is not narrowly 
tailored to protect the petitioner's fundamental liberty 
interest in timely adjudication of his petition because of the 
COVID-19 pause on jury trials. 
First, we note that in making this argument, the petitioner 
conflates the interests at stake in the strict scrutiny test.  
The Commonwealth's exercise of its right to demand a jury trial 
must be narrowly tailored to its legitimate interest of 
protecting the public, not to the petitioner's right to a timely 
adjudication of his petition.  We balance the delay, and the 
resulting liberty deprivation to the petitioner, against these 
government interests.  The length of the delay, although 
important, is only part of the due process consideration. 
There is no question that absent the circumstance of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, the Commonwealth's exercise of its statutory 
right to demand a jury trial is narrowly tailored to furthering 
its legitimate interest in protecting the public.  The 
petitioner has been found to be sexually dangerous beyond a 
reasonable doubt three times, most recently in May 2015.  The 
Commonwealth has a strong interest in retrying the petitioner 
21 
 
and doing so in front of jurors that serve as the conscience of 
the community.  We "shall not override the legislative mandate 
without a compelling constitutional basis."  Sheridan, 
petitioner, 422 Mass. at 780. 
Accordingly, we focus our analysis on whether the length of 
the delay caused by the pandemic has reached an extent that 
"shocks the conscience" such that the Commonwealth's exercise of 
its right to demand a jury trial is no longer narrowly tailored 
to its legitimate interest.  See Fay, 467 Mass. at 583.  We 
conclude that although some length of delay ultimately would 
shock the conscience, the delay resulting from the pandemic has 
not yet risen to the level of a due process violation.  The 
petitioner filed the petition at issue in 2015.  The 
Commonwealth demanded a jury trial, which ended in a mistrial as 
a result of a deadlocked jury in August 2018.  The trial was 
rescheduled for March 2020, and on that date it was postponed 
due to the COVID-19 pandemic.  On July 13, 2020, the petitioner 
filed a motion for a bench trial or, alternatively, release 
pending a jury trial.  Although this petition had been filed in 
2015, and the petitioner has been committed to the treatment 
center for approximately six years, the delay at issue is 
limited to the thirteen-month period from July 2020, when the 
petitioner asserted his due process rights and moved for a bench 
trial, until now.  The petitioner did not contest the delay on 
22 
 
due process grounds before this.  See Commonwealth v. DeBella, 
442 Mass. 683, 690-691 (2004) (petitioner cannot claim prejudice 
suffered from delays when he or she has caused or acquiesces in 
delays). 
The government's conduct, in this case, is not "in and of 
itself . . . egregiously unacceptable, outrageous, or 
conscience-shocking."  Amsden, 904 F.2d at 754.  It is the 
COVID-19 pandemic that is responsible for the delay at issue 
here, not the Commonwealth.  See Desrosiers v. Governor, 486 
Mass. 369, 378 (2020) (COVID-19 is naturally caused).  To date, 
this court has concluded that delays due to the pandemic 
uniformly are to be excluded from statutory time limits on 
pretrial detention under G. L. c. 276, §§ 58A and 58B,7 as well 
as speedy trial computations under Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (2), 
378 Mass. 909 (1979).  See Commonwealth v. Lougee, 485 Mass. 70, 
72-73 (2020) ("immediate and uniform action across the entire 
court system was needed to prevent the spread of the coronavirus 
and to avoid the inefficiencies and inconsistencies that would 
 
 
7 A criminal defendant may be subject to pretrial detention 
under G. L. c. 276, § 58A (3), if a judge finds by clear and 
convincing evidence that no conditions of release will 
reasonably assure the safety of the victim and the community.  
Similarly, under G. L. c. 276, § 58B, a defendant on pretrial 
release may have his or her release revoked if a judge finds 
that there is probable cause to believe the defendant committed 
a new crime, or clear and convincing evidence that the defendant 
violated the terms of release, and that no conditions of release 
will assure the safety of the community. 
23 
 
have resulted if trial judges had to make a separate decision 
and findings in each case as to whether a trial should be 
continued due to the COVID-19 pandemic").  In these 
circumstances, "trial continuances serve the ends of justice and 
outweigh the best interests of the public and the criminal 
defendant in a speedy trial."  Id. at 71.  This same reasoning 
applies to § 9 petitions. 
In G.F., 479 Mass. at 181-182, we considered a substantive 
due process challenge from an individual who had been committed 
to the treatment center for nearly seven years, based only on a 
finding of probable cause under G. L. c. 123A, § 12 (c), after 
three mistrials.  There, we concluded that it was not a 
substantive due process violation for the Commonwealth to pursue 
a fourth trial.  See id.  We reasoned that a mistrial does not 
indicate a failure of proof and that, given the possibility of 
the risk to public safety, the Commonwealth's decision to retry 
the individual for a fourth time was not an arbitrary use of 
government power.  See id. at 192.  However, we concluded that 
due process demanded that the individual be afforded an 
opportunity to seek supervised release before the fourth trial.  
Id. at 190.  We reasoned that the individual's continued 
confinement, "without a finding of sexual dangerousness beyond a 
reasonable doubt," violated his substantive due process rights.  
Id. 
24 
 
Unlike in G.F., this petitioner has been found to be 
sexually dangerous beyond a reasonable doubt three times.  
Further, the relevant period of commitment in this case, 
thirteen months, is far less than the seven years that the 
individual was held in G.F.  See id. at 181-182.  One mistrial 
does not suggest that the petitioner is no longer sexually 
dangerous.  See id. at 192.  Compare Bruno, 432 Mass. at 504 
(upholding temporary confinement of individual accused of being 
sexually dangerous prior to finding of probable cause).  The 
rule we established in G.F. that "[i]n the event of a mistrial, 
an individual who is the subject of [a sexually dangerous 
person] petition may seek release under the supervision of the 
Department of Probation pending retrial" applies where a 
petitioner has been committed based only on a finding of 
probable cause.  Id. at 197.  In G.F., we specifically reasoned 
that "[w]hile substantive due process permits limited 
confinement after a probable cause determination, it does not 
permit the Commonwealth to hold an individual indefinitely while 
repeatedly seeking a finding of sexual dangerousness" (emphasis 
added).  Id. at 196.  Accordingly, continuing commitment after a 
single mistrial where the petitioner previously has been found 
sexually dangerous three times does not violate the petitioner's 
due process rights and does not require that the petitioner be 
given the opportunity to seek release pending trial. 
25 
 
Nonetheless, we acknowledge that the constitutionality of 
the ongoing civil commitment rests on the individual being 
currently sexually dangerous and having the opportunity 
periodically to seek release on the ground that the individual 
is no longer sexually dangerous.  See Pariseau, 466 Mass. at 
813; Trimmer, petitioner, 375 Mass. at 591 (purpose of 
permitting petitions for discharge is to provide periodic 
redetermination whether person is sexually dangerous and to 
ensure early release as soon as petitioner is no longer sexually 
dangerous).  A "petitioner who suffers a significant delay in 
receiving a hearing may have an as-applied due process challenge 
to [§ 9], as such delay could conceivably stress the 
petitioner's right to avoid incarceration past the point of his 
or her dangerousness."  Dutil v. Murphy, 550 F.3d 154, 162 n.7 
(1st Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1213 (2009). 
In the event that the petitioner's trial is delayed for a 
more significant period of time, our due process balancing may 
tilt in favor of the petitioner.  At a certain point, as in 
G.F., due process would require that the petitioner be given the 
opportunity to seek supervised release while waiting for trial.8  
 
8 At this time, the Superior Court judge would be obligated 
"to conduct a hearing to determine, by clear and convincing 
evidence, whether there are conditions under which [the 
petitioner] may be released pending his retrial.  He must be 
released unless the Superior Court judge determines, by clear 
and convincing evidence, that no conditions can reasonably 
26 
 
We have not yet reached that point.  We are guided by our 
decision in Lougee, 485 Mass. at 83-84, that hearings were not 
required, as a matter of due process, to determine whether 
pretrial detainees could be released under supervision or other 
conditions.  Compare G.F., 479 Mass. at 197 (due process 
required hearing for person civilly committed for seven years 
pending finding of sexual dangerousness beyond reasonable 
doubt). 
There, we concluded that "[b]efore the pandemic . . . we 
never declared an automatic entitlement to such a hearing where 
the time limits were extended due to excludable delay or the 
good cause exception.  We see no reason to declare such an 
entitlement now, simply because the delay arises from a 
continuance ordered by this court for reasons of public health."  
Lougee, 485 Mass. at 83.  The same is true here, in the case of 
a § 9 discharge proceeding.  As discussed supra, "in practice it 
often takes years for a § 9 petition for discharge to be 
scheduled for trial, during which time the petitioner must 
remain civilly committed."  Chapman, petitioner, 482 Mass. at 
302.  The length of the delay in this case is not out of the 
ordinary, and the petitioner is not entitled to a hearing simply 
 
ensure public safety."  Commonwealth v. G.F., 479 Mass. 180, 203 
(2018). 
27 
 
because the delay arises from a continuance ordered by this 
court for reasons of public health. 
When Lougee was decided in June 2020, jury trials were 
scheduled to resume in the fall of that year.  We reasoned that 
unless jury trials were extended for "a far greater period of 
time," it would not be necessary to address the due process 
implications of the delay.  See Lougee, 485 Mass. at 84.  
Subsequently, jury trials were delayed further.  On May 1, 2021, 
however, the resumption of jury trials, including with juries of 
six and twelve, commenced, and as of this opinion, there are no 
further restrictions related to COVID-19 on where and how such 
trials are conducted.  Our most recent order regarding court 
operations under the exigent circumstances created by the COVID-
19 pandemic specified that "priority should continue to be given 
to trials in criminal and youthful offender cases and sexually 
dangerous person cases under G. L. c. 123A where, as applicable, 
the defendant, the juvenile, the person who filed the petition 
pursuant to [§ 9] or the person named in the petition filed 
pursuant to [G. L. c. 123A, § 12,] is in custody," and indeed, a 
jury trial in this case has now been scheduled for September 20, 
2021.  It has not yet been "a far greater period of time," and 
we need not revisit our conclusions in Lougee at this time.9  
 
9 We recently revisited our holding in Commonwealth v. 
Lougee, 485 Mass. 70, 84 (2020), in the context of a defendant 
28 
 
Given our most recent order and the progress of vaccination in 
the Commonwealth, we have good reason to believe that the delay 
in this case will not reach the point at which due process 
requires a hearing. 
Conclusion.  The Commonwealth's exercise of its statutory 
right to demand a jury trial, although a cause of delay in light 
of the pandemic, is narrowly tailored to further its compelling 
interest of protecting the public.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
judge's order allowing the petitioner's motion for a bench trial 
 
appealing from various orders regarding his pretrial detention 
status.  See Mushwaalakbar v. Commonwealth, 487 Mass. 627, 632 
(2021).  In Mushwaalakbar, we recognized that "[a]lthough delays 
due to the COVID-19 pandemic constitute excludable delay under 
[G. L. c. 276,] § 58A, see Lougee, [supra] at 72, the prolonged 
length of the delay may, in some cases, upset the careful 
balancing prescribed by the Legislature in § 58A."  Id.  We 
remanded the case for a determination whether the defendant's 
continued pretrial confinement violates due process.  Id. at 
634.  We further recognized that "[t]here is no bright-line 
limit to the permissible length of a pretrial detention, and 
thus judges must assess the permissible length of detention on a 
case-by-case basis."  Id. at 633.  The facts in Mushwaalakbar 
are distinguishable from the facts here.  There, the defendant 
had been held past his parole eligibility date if he were to be 
convicted and receive concurrent maximum sentences.  Id. at 628, 
629.  Further, the Commonwealth answered not ready for trial and 
filed a motion for the alleged victim's medical records at the 
last court date.  Id. 637.  Here, the thirteen-month delay is 
solely a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.  The petitioner is not 
held only on a finding of probable cause but rather has already 
been found sexually dangerous three times.  Additionally, jury 
trials have now resumed, both parties are ready for trial, and 
the Superior Court has ordered that § 9 trials take priority 
over other civil cases.  After a fact-specific analysis, we 
conclude that the petitioner's due process rights have not been 
violated. 
29 
 
over the Commonwealth's objection and remand the case for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.