Title: Lim v. Choi

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
MYRA K. LIM 
v.  Record No. 971884  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
June 5, 1998 
SOO MYUNG CHOI 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Dennis J. Smith, Judge 
 
 
At issue in this appeal is whether a memorandum 
written and signed by Myra K. Lim is sufficient to convey 
Lim’s interest in a certain parcel of real estate to Soo 
Myung Choi.  Because the memorandum does not contain any 
words or language demonstrating an intent to convey an 
interest in real estate, we find that the memorandum is not 
a valid deed.  Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of 
the circuit court. 
I. 
 
Lim and Choi acquired title to residential real estate  
(the Property) in Fairfax County as joint tenants with 
right of survivorship by a deed dated October 1, 1973.  On 
February 18, 1975, Lim wrote and signed the following 
memorandum (the Memorandum): 
 
To: Mr. Soo-Myung Choi 
 
Re: House at 3111 Graydon Street, Falls Church, 
Virginia, 22042 (Lot # 318, Sq. 6) 
 
 
 
I purchased the above property on October 1, 
1973, jointly with Mr. Soo-Myung Choi as a co-owner.  
However, I hereby state that the ownership of the 
above property belongs fully to Mr. Soo-Myung Choi, 
and that the above property is not a nature of thing 
for which I assume responsibility in paying mortgage. 
 
 
 
In the event that Mr. Soo-Myung Choi sells or 
rents the above house and needs my signature for the 
release, I will gladly and without delay respond to 
the occasion. 
 
 
 
I hereby make it clear that I shall not involve 
myself in the matter concerning financial gains or 
losses of the above house, and that all rights belong 
to Mr. Soo-Myung Choi alone.1
 
On May 25, 1982, Lim filed a bill of complaint 
requesting the court to partition the Property.  Choi 
responded by filing a cross-bill to quiet title, asserting 
that Lim had surrendered any interest in the Property when 
she signed the Memorandum.  Choi further alleged that he 
made all the mortgage payments on the Property.  In her 
answer to Choi’s cross-bill, Lim asserted that the 
Memorandum was invalid and denied most of the other 
allegations. 
By a decree of reference, the circuit court appointed 
a commissioner in chancery and directed the commissioner to 
hear evidence related to this cause.  The commissioner 
conducted a hearing on March 16, 1988.  At the hearing, Lim 
testified that she provided the funds for the down payment 
to purchase the Property as well as the settlement costs 
                     
1  Because Lim wrote the Memorandum in Korean, the 
above language is a translation of the original document. 
 
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and security deposit.  She further testified that she made 
payments on two mortgages on the Property until December 
1975.  With regard to the Memorandum, Lim stated that Choi 
forced her to write it by beating her and then threatening 
her with a gun. 
In contrast, Choi testified that Lim became a co-owner 
of the Property for the purpose of helping Choi obtain a 
loan since he did not otherwise qualify for one.2  Choi also 
stated that he has made all the mortgage payments since 
January 1975.3  Finally, Choi denied owning a gun and 
claimed that he did not use violence or threats to force 
Lim to execute the Memorandum. 
The commissioner filed his report in December 1994.  
In the report, the commissioner stated that neither party 
presented sufficient evidence to overcome the prima facie 
validity of the deed conveying the Property to them as 
joint tenants with right of survivorship.  Accordingly, the 
commissioner recommended that a decree be entered directing 
___________________ 
 
2  Both Lim and Choi testified that Lim signed both 
deed of trust notes, yet the record contains neither the 
notes nor the deeds of trust.  The record does, however, 
include a release of one mortgage to Choi. 
 
3  According to Choi, Lim sometimes made the mortgage 
payments in an effort to repay debts that she allegedly 
owed him. 
 
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the sale of the Property and also dismissing Choi’s cross-
bill. 
However, the chancellor ordered the commissioner to 
file a supplemental report and specifically requested the 
commissioner to amplify his findings of fact regarding the 
Memorandum’s validity.  The commissioner filed a new report 
on July 31, 1996, in which he found that “[t]he 
‘memorandum’ operated as a deed and served to quitclaim or 
release Ms. Lim’s interest in the property to Mr. Choi” and 
that sufficient consideration existed to support the 
transfer.  The commissioner also found that Lim failed both 
to allege and to prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that Choi obtained the Memorandum from her by duress.  
Thus, the commissioner recommended that the court dismiss 
Lim’s bill of complaint for partition and sustain Choi’s 
cross-bill to quiet title and to vest title to the property 
in him. 
 
Lim filed exceptions to the commissioner’s 
supplemental report; however, the chancellor entered a 
November 5, 1996 decree sustaining the commissioner’s 
findings.  Subsequently, on June 6, 1997, the chancellor 
entered a decree vesting title in the Property to Choi.  
Lim appeals. 
II. 
 
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In considering this appeal, we adhere to the 
established standard of review regarding a chancellor’s 
decree which approves a commissioner’s report.  Such a 
decree will be affirmed “unless plainly wrong or without 
evidence to support it.”  Chesapeake Builders, Inc. v. Lee, 
254 Va. 294, 299, 492 S.E.2d 141, 144 (1997); see also  
Firebaugh v. Hanback, 247 Va. 519, 525, 443 S.E.2d 134, 137 
(1994).  Although a commissioner’s report does not carry 
the weight of a jury verdict, Code § 8.01-610, a chancellor 
should sustain it if the evidence supports the 
commissioner’s findings.  Hill v. Hill, 227 Va. 569, 576-
77, 318 S.E.2d 292, 296 (1984).  This rule “applies with 
particular force to the report’s factual findings which are 
based on evidence heard by the commissioner;” however, it 
does not apply to “pure conclusions of law” found in the 
commissioner’s report.  Chesapeake, 254 Va. at 299, 492 
S.E.2d at 144.  In accord with this standard of review, we 
hold that the chancellor in this case erred in sustaining 
the commissioner’s report concluding that the Memorandum 
constituted a valid, enforceable deed. 
The requirements for a deed are “competent parties, a 
lawful subject matter, a valuable consideration, apt words 
of conveyance, and proper execution.”  Morison v. American 
Ass’n., Inc., 110 Va. 91, 92, 65 S.E. 469, 470 (1909).  Lim 
 
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argues that the Memorandum lacks consideration and is, 
therefore, not a valid deed.  Choi, however, contends that 
the Memorandum’s language regarding Lim’s refusal to assume 
responsibility for the mortgage payments is an implied 
promise by Choi to continue paying the mortgage.  Thus, 
according to Choi, his implied assumption of the mortgage 
payments constitutes adequate consideration.  However, we 
do not need to decide whether adequate consideration exists 
because the Memorandum lacks any words or language 
demonstrating an intent to convey property and is, 
therefore, not a valid deed. 
A writing need not be in any particular form to 
constitute a deed.  Albert v. Holt, 137 Va. 5, 8, 119 S.E. 
120, 121 (1923).  Nonetheless, a document purporting to 
convey title must contain operative words manifesting an 
intent to transfer the property.  See Morison, 110 Va. at 
92-93, 65 S.E. at 470.  In Albert, this Court addressed the 
validity of a deed in which the grantors did “give, 
bargain, and sell” the property at issue.  Albert, 137 Va. 
at 7, 119 S.E. at 121.  The grantors argued that the deed 
lacked words of conveyance and was, therefore, defective.  
In rejecting that argument, this Court noted that while 
Code § 5162 (now Code § 55-48) used the term “grant” in 
providing the form for a deed of conveyance, it was not an 
 
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“indispensable requisite” to a valid deed.  Id. at 9, 119 
S.E. at 121.  Thus, the statutory form was not 
“invariable.”  Id. at 8, 119 S.E. at 121.  The Court then 
examined the deed’s language and found “the intention to 
‘grant’ . . . so manifest . . . that no other construction 
could be put upon it.”  Id. at 10, 119 S.E. at 122.  
Therefore, use of technical words or strict compliance with 
the form in Code § 55-48 is not necessary to effect a 
transfer if the language used “plainly shows” on the face 
of the document a clear intent to convey title.  Morison, 
110 Va. at 92, 65 S.E. at 470. 
To determine whether an intent to convey exists in the 
present case, we examine the Memorandum’s language, and, in 
doing so, construe that language liberally so as to give 
effect to the parties’ intention “if there are sufficient 
words to declare clearly and legally the maker’s meaning.”  
Albert, 137 Va. at 10, 119 S.E. at 122.  We find no words 
in the Memorandum indicating an intent by Lim to transfer 
her interest in the Property to Choi.  Rather, the 
Memorandum is replete with contemporaneous statements by 
Lim regarding her belief as to the Property’s current 
status.  Lim claims that Choi is the owner of the Property, 
that she is not responsible for the mortgage, and that she 
is not involved in any financial matters concerning the 
 
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Property.  However, unlike the deed at issue in Albert, at 
no point in the Memorandum does Lim express an intent, 
through words of conveyance or otherwise, to transfer her 
interest in the Property to Choi.  Thus, the Memorandum is 
void of any language indicating an intent to convey, and, 
finding no words of conveyance, we will not “rewrite [a] 
deed to express an intention that is otherwise 
indiscernible.”  Walker v. Bowman, 227 Va. 209, 214, 315 
S.E.2d 206, 209 (1984).  Accordingly, we hold that the 
Memorandum does not constitute a valid deed and does not, 
therefore, transfer Lim’s interest in the Property to Choi.4  
Lim and Choi continue to own the Property as joint tenants 
with right of survivorship. 
Thus, for the reasons stated, we will reverse the 
judgment of the circuit court and remand for entry of a 
decree of partition. 
Reversed and remanded. 
                     
4  Because we hold that the Memorandum is not a valid 
deed, we need not consider Lim’s assignment of error 
regarding the defense of duress. 
 
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