Title: Huang v. Ma

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13325 
 
BIPING HUANG & another1  vs.  JING MA & another.2 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     December 7, 2022. - February 2, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Broker, What constitutes relation, Commission.  Frauds, Statute 
of.  Contract, With broker, Implied, Performance and 
breach.  Damages, Breach of contract, Loss of profits.  
Practice, Civil, Summary judgment. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
August 1, 2017. 
 
The case was heard by Janice W. Howe, J., on a motion for 
summary judgment. 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
Charles G. Devine, Jr. (Lei Zhao Reilley also present) for 
the plaintiffs. 
John D. Leone for the defendants. 
Stephen M. Perry, for Massachusetts Association of 
Realtors, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
1 WinPlus Realty Group, LLC. 
 
2 Xinhang Sun. 
2 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  Biping Huang and her wholly owned real estate 
brokerage firm, WinPlus Realty Group, LLC (collectively, Huang) 
sued two former clients, Xinhang Sun and Jing Ma (clients), for 
breach of contract.  Huang alleges that she and the clients 
orally agreed in May 2016 that she would be the exclusive broker 
for one year for their purchase of a new home in Winchester and 
would receive a commission upon the purchase of the new home.  
In exchange, Huang promised to use "reasonable efforts" to help 
the clients find and purchase the home, including by 
"assist[ing] in locating properties, . . . arrang[ing] showings, 
analyz[ing] financing alternatives, giv[ing] advice concerning 
real estate practices and procedures, assist[ing] in 
negotiations, arrang[ing] inspections . . . , and coordinat[ing] 
activities throughout the process."  The contract also provided 
that, as part of this exclusive arrangement, the clients would 
"refer" to Huang "all potentially acceptable real property" they 
identified and would "notify other real estate agents" of the 
arrangement. 
Although Huang performed substantial services pursuant to 
this contract between May 2016 and February 2017, the clients 
identified a home on their own.  Then, without referring Huang 
to the listing or notifying the selling broker of the exclusive 
buyer's arrangement, they purchased the home, using as their 
3 
 
buyer's agent another agent of the brokerage firm that 
represented the seller.  After the purchase, the clients 
terminated their relationship with Huang via e-mail, recognizing 
the work she did for them and sending her an Amazon gift card by 
way of apology. 
 
The motion judge allowed the defendants' motion for summary 
judgment, as there was no written agreement for brokerage 
services.  The Appeals Court reversed, because there is an 
express exemption to the Statute of Frauds for real estate 
brokers.  Huang v. RE/MAX Leading Edge, 101 Mass. App. Ct. 150, 
151-152 (2022).  As "Sun and Ma [did] not otherwise challenge 
the enforceability of the agreement, nor [did] they argue that 
Huang will be unable to prove breach and damages," the Appeals 
Court also "vacate[d] so much of the judgment as grant[ed] 
summary judgment to Sun and Ma on Huang's claim related to the 
buyer's agent agreement."  Id.  A dissenting justice disagreed, 
as he concluded that the case law provided that a broker may 
only recover as a matter of law on "such a claim for a 
commission if the contract on which [the broker relies] contains 
a clear statement that the broker is entitled to receive a 
commission . . . regardless of whether the broker played any 
role in effecting the desired sale or purchase."  Id. at 166 
(Englander, J., dissenting in part).  As the alleged contract 
4 
 
did not contain such an express term, the dissent would have 
affirmed summary judgment.  Id. 
 
We granted further appellate review to clarify the law in 
cases involving breach of an exclusive real estate broker 
agreement.  Taking the facts in the light most favorable to 
Huang, we conclude that an enforceable contract was created, the 
clients committed a breach of it, and Huang was entitled to her 
expectation damages.  Therefore, the judge should have denied 
summary judgment.3 
 
Background.  1.  Home search.  Huang is a licensed real 
estate broker in Woburn.  At the time that the events giving 
rise to this litigation began, the clients, a married couple, 
lived in a condominium in Winchester, but they were looking to 
sell their property and buy a house. 
 
Huang alleges (and the clients dispute) that on May 22, 
2016, she and the clients entered into an oral exclusive buyers' 
agency agreement.  According to Huang, she would provide the 
assistance described above, and upon the clients' purchase of a 
new home, Huang would be entitled to two to 2.5 percent of the 
sale price, via a fifty percent split of the listing fee with 
the listing agent, or the clients' direct payment of two percent 
of the sales price if there were no listing fee.  As the 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the 
Massachusetts Association of Realtors. 
5 
 
agreement was exclusive, the clients also agreed to refer 
potential homes to Huang and to notify brokers of such homes of 
the exclusive agency relationship.  The contract term was for 
one year.4 
 
Huang showed the clients at least ten properties in 
Winchester between May 2016 and February 2017.  She arranged the 
showings, assisted the clients with mortgage applications, and 
provided them market analyses and recommendations.  The clients 
made offers on four homes but ultimately did not purchase any of 
the four.  The parties also discussed Huang extending a bridge 
loan of around $100,000 to the clients to purchase one of the 
properties.  Although Huang's husband prepared a cashier's 
check, the loan was never made. 
 
On February 18, 2017, the clients made an offer on a home 
on Bridge Street in Winchester for $999,000, without notifying 
Huang.  The offer was accepted the same day.  RE/MAX Leading 
Edge (RE/MAX) represented both the sellers and the buyers 
through different agents.  According to a RE/MAX representative, 
the RE/MAX agent asked the clients if they were working with a 
buyer's agent, and they informed her that they were not. 
 
4 According to amicus briefing, these terms are typical of 
such agreements, although they are usually set out in writing. 
6 
 
 
The clients terminated their relationship with Huang on 
February 20, 2017, sending her the following message in Chinese 
via e-mail: 
"We have decided to hire an American agent at Re/Max to buy 
a house.  Because that house has not yet been listed on the 
market, they would not agree to have you contact them as 
our buyer's agent on our behalf.[5]  Therefore we really are 
very sorry.  After all you have shown us many houses, 
responded to every request from us, and left no questions 
from us unanswered.  We have prepared an Amazon gift card 
for you.  It is merely a token of our appreciation and we 
cannot express our gratitude enough.  Please accept it." 
 
The clients then closed on the new house on May 15, 2017, 
and sold their condominium on April 26, 2018. 
 
2.  Procedural history.  On August 1, 2017, Huang sued the 
clients, alleging breach of the exclusive buyer's agency 
agreement.6  The clients moved for summary judgment on July 27, 
2018.  The judge granted the motion because there was no written 
agreement.  The Appeals Court vacated the grant of summary 
judgment, recognizing that the Statute of Frauds has an express 
 
5 In its response to Huang when she complained about 
RE/MAX's actions, a RE/MAX representative wrote not only that 
the clients did not inform RE/MAX about Huang's arrangement, but 
also that "[i]t is not a brokerage or RE/MAX Leading Edge policy 
with respect to buyers['] agents being able to show new 
construction listings." 
 
6 Huang also alleged breach of a seller's agency agreement, 
as Huang was also asked to assist in selling their existing 
home, and sued RE/MAX for several business torts.  In addition, 
the clients brought a counterclaim that Huang had engaged in 
unfair business practices, which the parties stipulated to 
dismiss without prejudice prior to the appeal. 
7 
 
exemption for contracts involving compensation for real estate 
broker services.7  Huang, 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 154, citing G. L. 
c. 259, § 7.  Thus, a written agreement was not required to 
create an enforceable contract.  The Appeals Court further 
concluded that the remedy for breach of an exclusive real estate 
buyer's broker contract, like other contracts, is the payment of 
expectation damages -- in this case, the lost commission.  
Huang, supra at 163.  A dissenting justice disagreed on the 
ground that an exclusive brokerage agreement does not allow for 
recovery of a commission unless the contract contains a "clear 
statement" providing for recovery regardless of whether the 
broker played any role in bringing about the desired sale or 
purchase.  Id. at 166 (Englander, J., dissenting in part). 
 
This court granted the clients' application for further 
appellate review, limited to the issue dividing the Appeals 
Court:  what remedy is available for breach of an exclusive 
agency contract in these circumstances. 
Discussion.  "Our review of a decision on a motion for 
summary judgment is de novo."  HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Morris, 
490 Mass. 322, 326 (2022), quoting Berry v. Commerce Ins. Co., 
 
7 The Appeals Court also affirmed the motion judge's 
dismissal of Huang's claim regarding the seller's agency 
agreement, as well as the dismissal (at an earlier stage of 
litigation) of her claims against RE/MAX and its owner, Paul 
Mydelski.  Huang, 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 164-165.  These rulings 
are outside the scope of the present review. 
8 
 
488 Mass. 633, 636 (2021).  The moving party is entitled to 
summary judgment if, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party, "there is no material issue of 
fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law."  HSBC Bank USA, N.A., supra.  As Huang is the 
nonmoving party, we present and review the facts in the light 
most favorable to her. 
 
1.  Contract formation and breach.  When the facts are 
considered in the light most favorable to Huang, there is 
sufficient evidence to conclude that a contract was formed and 
that a breach occurred in the instant case, entitling Huang to 
her expectation damages.  As a preliminary matter, and as 
recognized by both the majority and dissent of the Appeals 
Court, a real estate brokerage contract need not be in writing 
to be enforceable.  The Statute of Frauds expressly states that 
it "shall not apply to a contract to pay compensation for 
professional services of . . . a licensed real estate broker or 
real estate salesman acting in their professional capacity."  
G. L. c. 259, § 7.  Thus, oral agreements with brokers are 
permitted. 
In the instant case, according to Huang, the parties orally 
agreed that in return for providing various services to help the 
clients find and purchase a new home (including assistance in 
identifying, visiting, and inspecting the properties; 
9 
 
negotiating the price and financing of the properties; 
understanding real estate practices and procedures; and 
coordinating other activities from the beginning to the end of 
the purchase process), Huang was to serve as the clients' 
exclusive buyer's agent and was entitled to be paid a fee upon 
the ultimate purchase of a home.8  We thus have a reciprocal 
exchange of benefit and detriment constituting consideration, 
and therefore an enforceable contract.  See Miller v. Cotter, 
448 Mass. 671, 684 n.16 (2007), citing Marine Contrs. Co. v. 
Hurley, 365 Mass. 280, 286 (1974) ("reciprocal exchange of 
benefit and detriment constitutes consideration"); Cottage St. 
Methodist Episcopal Church v. Kendall, 121 Mass. 528, 529-530 
(1877) ("To constitute such consideration, there must be either 
a benefit to the maker of the promise, or a loss, trouble or 
 
8 As required by regulation, Huang and the clients also 
signed the Massachusetts Mandatory Licensee Consumer 
Relationship Disclosure form, "clearly disclos[ing] the 
relationship of the broker . . . with the prospective 
purchaser."  254 Code Mass. Regs. § 3.00(13)(a) (2005).  That 
agreement defined a buyer's agent as follows:  "A buyer can 
engage the services of a real estate agent to purchase property 
and the real estate agent is then the agent for the buyer who 
becomes the agent's client.  This means that the real estate 
agent represents the buyer.  The agent owes the buyer undivided 
loyalty, reasonable care, disclosure, obedience to lawful 
instruction, confidentiality and accountability, provided, 
however, that the agent must disclose known material defects in 
the real estate.  The agent must put the buyer's interests first 
and negotiate for the best price and terms for their client, the 
buyer." 
10 
 
inconvenience to, or a charge or obligation resting upon, the 
party to whom the promise is made"). 
 
According to Huang, as part of the arrangement, the parties 
also expressly agreed that the clients would refer all 
potentially acceptable property to Huang and to notify other 
brokers of the exclusive agency.  Taking the evidence in the 
light most favorable to Huang, the clients did not inform Huang 
about the RE/MAX listing, nor inform RE/MAX about their 
arrangement with Huang, all in violation of the express terms of 
the oral agreement.  Instead, RE/MAX ended up as both buyer's 
and seller's agent in the purchase of the new home, again, in 
violation of Huang's exclusive right to serve as the buyer's 
agent.9  Upon the purchase of the home, RE/MAX received the 
commission that Huang was contractually entitled to receive if 
she had been the buyer's agent. 
Therefore, in the light most favorable to Huang, the 
parties made reciprocal obligations establishing consideration 
and an enforceable contract.  Huang complied with her 
contractual obligations, until performance was prevented by the 
clients' breach.  Finally, the clients committed a breach of 
their obligations to utilize Huang as their exclusive buyer's 
 
9 By statute, a real estate broker may represent "more than 
one party to a real estate transaction" through separately 
"designated agents," provided both parties give "informed 
written consent."  G. L. c. 112, § 87AAA 3/4 (c). 
11 
 
agent; to refer listings, including the RE/MAX listing, to Huang 
as such exclusive buyer's agent; to inform other brokers of that 
relationship; and to pay Huang the commission owed to the 
buyer's agent upon the purchase of the home.  We therefore turn 
to the remedy provided for such a breach of an exclusive buyer's 
agent agreement. 
2.  Expectation damages.  An aggrieved party in a 
contractual dispute is entitled to damages that give it "the 
'benefit of the bargain,' that is, place the aggrieved party in 
roughly the same position in which it would have been had the 
party committing the breach complied with the contract."  275 
Wash. St. Corp. v. Hudson River Int'l, LLC, 465 Mass. 16, 28 
(2013).  See Selmark Assocs. v. Ehrlich, 467 Mass. 525, 543 
(2014), quoting Quinn Bros. v. Wecker, 414 Mass. 815, 817 (1993) 
("The fundamental premise of 'contract damages is that the 
aggrieved party should be put in as good a position as if the 
other party had fully performed'").  Expectation damages may 
include the "lost profits" to which a party would have been 
entitled.  Situation Mgt. Sys, Inc. v. Malouf, Inc., 430 Mass. 
875, 880 (2000) (Situation Mgt.).  See Huang, 101 Mass. App. Ct. 
at 156, quoting Randall v. Peerless Motor Car Co., 212 Mass. 
352, 380 (1912) ("loss of prospective profits as an element of 
damages for breach of contract . . . may be recovered when it 
appears to have been within the contemplation of the parties as 
12 
 
a probable result of breach").  See also Lattuca v. Cusolito, 
343 Mass. 747, 753 (1962) (exclusive real estate agent may 
recover "the amount of commissions which she might have earned 
on sales had she not been prevented from fully performing the 
contract"). 
In the instant case, again taking the facts in the light 
most favorable to Huang, as we are required to do, Huang could 
reasonably expect the benefit of the bargain she had struck with 
the clients had they also complied with their contractual 
obligations.  In particular, she was entitled to the 
compensation she had contracted to receive as the exclusive 
buyer's agent for the services she had provided in assisting 
them, given that they did successfully purchase a home.  Her 
compensation was to be a commission, a percentage of the 
purchase price.  There are numerous cases in the Commonwealth 
providing that the amount of a lost commission can be awarded as 
expectation damages for breach of an exclusive agency 
agreement.10  See Lattuca, 343 Mass. at 753; O'Malley v. Markus, 
 
10 Other jurisdictions have also ruled that a lost 
commission can be awarded as expectation damages for breach of 
an exclusive real estate agency agreement, although, as in 
Massachusetts, most cases concern sellers' agreements.  See 
Huang, 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 160-161 & n.14 (collecting cases).  
When considering a buyer's agency agreement, the Connecticut 
Appellate Court determined that a lost commission was an 
appropriate damages measure for breach, because it was "a 
commission the plaintiff would have earned if the defendants had 
continued to work with . . . the plaintiff's agents, as the 
13 
 
339 Mass. 766, 770 (1959); Samuel Nichols, Inc. v. Molway, 25 
Mass. App. Ct. 913, 915 (1987) (Molway) ("broker was entitled to 
its commission" when seller committed breach).  See also Malloy 
v. Coldwater Seafood Corp., 338 Mass. 554, 562-563 (1959) 
(recovery of commission for seafood sales allowed if exclusive 
agency was revoked in bad faith by principal); Wier v. American 
Locomotive Co., 215 Mass. 303, 310 (1913) ("measure of the 
plaintiff's damages [was] the usual commission on the list price 
of the taxicabs that were sold by the defendant, in violation of 
the [exclusive agency] contract"). 
 
We do not agree, as suggested by the dissent in the Appeals 
Court, that this would result in a broker receiving a commission 
from a transaction in which she played no role.  See Huang, 101 
Mass. App. Ct. at 166 (Englander, J., dissenting in part).  
Huang provided substantial services throughout the ten-month 
period in which the clients were searching for a home.  After 
benefiting from Huang's assistance and guidance -- including 
learning about what was available on the market at different 
price points and gaining experience in the negotiation process 
through assistance on prior failed bids -- the clients sought to 
avoid the detriment to which they had agreed, which was to refer 
the RE/MAX listing to her, to inform RE/MAX of their exclusive 
 
agreement required them to do."  William Raveis Real Estate, 
Inc. v. Zajaczkowski, 172 Conn. App. 405, 420 (2017). 
14 
 
relationship with Huang, and to pay her the buyer's agent fee 
upon the purchase of the home.  Awarding her such a fee after 
she had performed the services required of her would not provide 
her a windfall, but rather the value of the benefit set out in 
the contract.11  See Selmark Assocs., 467 Mass. at 543 ("contract 
damages should not exceed the value of the benefit of which 
[aggrieved party] was deprived"). 
We also decline to adopt a rule that precludes recovery of 
expectation damages unless the contract on which the broker 
relies contains a clear statement that "the broker is entitled 
to receive a commission . . . regardless of whether the broker 
played any role in effecting the desired sale or purchase." 
Huang, 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 166 (Englander, J., dissenting in 
part).  We will not create such an exception to the ordinary 
rules of contract formation, breach, and expectation damages.  
See Lattuca, 343 Mass. at 753; Molway, 25 Mass. App. Ct. at 915.  
 
11 At trial, of course, the clients may prove that RE/MAX 
would have refused to deal with them had they insisted on using 
Huang rather than a RE/MAX broker as the buyer's agent, and 
thus, no purchase would have occurred.  We do not address in 
this opinion the legal effect of such a finding if made at trial 
on the remedy to which Huang may be entitled.  For summary 
judgment purposes, this appears to be a material, disputed fact.  
The clients wrote in their e-mail message that RE/MAX "would not 
agree" to let them use Huang as their buyer's agent, but 
according to RE/MAX, the clients did not inform RE/MAX of the 
exclusive agency in the first place.  RE/MAX's response did 
also, however, include the somewhat cryptic statement that "[i]t 
is not a brokerage or RE/MAX Leading Edge policy with respect to 
buyers['] agents being able to show new construction listings." 
15 
 
This is a private transaction between private parties.  We 
"accord individuals broad powers to order their affairs through 
legally enforceable agreements."  Rawan v. Continental Cas. Co., 
483 Mass. 654, 665–666 (2019), quoting Beacon Hill Civic Ass'n 
v. Ristorante Toscano, Inc., 422 Mass. 318, 320 (1996).  See 
DeMarco v. DeMarco, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 618, 624 (2016), citing 
Knox v. Remick, 371 Mass. 433, 436–437 (1976) ("a signatory to 
an agreement is bound by its terms"). 
We do recognize, however, the legitimate concern that 
buyers and "sellers, unlike brokers, are involved in real estate 
transactions infrequently, perhaps only once in a lifetime, and 
are thus unfamiliar with their legal rights."  Tristram's 
Landing, Inc. v. Wait, 367 Mass. 622, 630 (1975) (Tristram's 
Landing).  See Currier v. Kosinski, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 106, 107 
(1987).  Importantly, the agreement here is not one where the 
specific terms have been left undefined to the detriment of an 
inexperienced client.  Contrast Tristram's Landing, supra at 
625; Des Rivieres v. Sullivan, 247 Mass. 443, 445 (1924).  Here, 
at least in the light most favorable to Huang, the buyers' and 
broker's respective obligations, including the requirements to 
refer houses identified by the buyers to the broker, to inform 
other brokers of the exclusive relationship with Huang, and to 
pay Huang the commission owed the buyers' agent upon the 
purchase of the home, were plainly and specifically set out in 
16 
 
the contract.  Thus, the contract has been presented "with 
enough specificity to alert [the buyers] to the situations in 
which [the buyers] can be liable."  Currier, supra.  In this 
context, the concern regarding an inexperienced buyer has been 
adequately addressed by the contract provisions themselves.12 
We also conclude that the case law that was the subject of 
the dispute between the majority and the dissent in the Appeals 
Court is distinguishable.  In these cases, the court was 
typically interpreting barebones contracts that simply provided 
that the agent was to serve as the exclusive representative of 
the seller of the property and would be paid upon the sale of 
the property.  See Bartlett v. Keith, 325 Mass. 265, 265 (1950) 
(contract stated only that agent had "exclusive sale" of 
property and addressed no other contingencies); Des Rivieres, 
247 Mass. at 445 (contract provided that "exclusive agent" would 
be paid "broker's commission . . . when a sale is consummated" 
and did not specify time limit for exclusive agency).  In 
 
12 Concern about this bargaining inequality, particularly 
for buyers, has also resulted in legislative action requiring 
clarification and mandatory disclosure of the duties brokers owe 
their clients, and recognition of buyers', as well as sellers', 
agents.  See G. L. c. 112, § 87AAA 3/4; Olazábal, Redefining 
Realtor Relationships and Responsibilities:  The Failure of 
State Regulatory Responses, 40 Harv. J. on Legis. 65, 76-77 
(2003) (legislative reform in Massachusetts and other States has 
provided for creation and enforcement of new forms of agency 
representation, including buyers' agents). 
17 
 
Tristram's Landing, 367 Mass. at 623, the broker contract was 
not even exclusive. 
In this context, this court struggled with whether or how 
to fill the gaps in such sparsely worded arrangements and to 
resolve the disputes that arose when the seller identified a 
buyer without any assistance from the seller's broker.  The 
contract in the instant case, however, included very specific 
requirements for how the exclusive arrangement would function, 
including both Huang's obligations to the clients and how to 
address properties identified by the clients themselves -- they 
were required to refer the properties to Huang and notify other 
brokers of the exclusive arrangement.  We do not interpret these 
cases to require the clear statement that the dissenting Appeals 
Court justice described when the contract clearly sets out the 
respective obligations of the parties, as it does here, at least 
according to Huang. 
In addition, we emphasize that these cases not only 
involved different and less specific contractual language, but 
also predated the advent of buyers' agents, multiple listings, 
and the Internet's ubiquitous display of such listings to buyers 
and sellers, all of which have dramatically changed the 
marketplace in which such agreements are entered into and 
enforced.  See Nadel, Obstacles to Price Competition in the 
Residential Real Estate Brokerage Market, 18 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 
18 
 
90, 92 (2021) ("about half of buyers today are finding the home 
they buy themselves online [up from 2 percent in 1997]"); 
Olazábal, Redefining Realtor Relationships and Responsibilities:  
The Failure of State Regulatory Responses, 40 Harv. J. on Legis. 
65, 66-67 (2003) (explaining that prior to early 1990s, both 
agents essentially represented seller, as agent and subagent, 
and it was not until 1990s that concept of buyer's 
representative, with duty of undivided loyalty owed to buyer, 
was developed).  As ably explained by the amicus, the older 
cases addressed the responsibilities of sellers' agents under 
differently worded agreements formed in a "bygone" era well 
before multiple listings and buyers' agents became common.  
Indeed, it was not until 1993 that "the Board of Registration of 
Real Estate Brokers and Salespersons promulgated forms that for 
the first time recognized buyer agency in the Commonwealth." 
Our ruling today thus reflects not only the specific 
language of the exclusive buyer's agency arrangement to which 
the parties agreed in the instant case, but also the new 
realities of the Twenty-first Century residential real estate 
market, including not only the recognition of buyer's agents 
with defined duties but also the destabilizing effect of 
multiple listings and the ubiquitous display of such listings on 
the Internet on buyers, sellers, and brokers alike.  See 
Humphrey v. Byron, 447 Mass. 322, 326 (2006), quoting Wesson v. 
19 
 
Leone Enters., Inc., 437 Mass. 708, 720 (2002) ("in the 
commercial context, we have recognized that the notion of a 
lease as a conveyance 'no longer comports with the reality of 
the typical modern commercial lease'"); Stanley v. Ames, 378 
Mass. 364, 367 n.8 (1979), quoting B.N. Cardozo, The Nature of 
the Judicial Process 155 (1925) ("this branch of the law" ought 
to be placed "upon a basis more consistent with the realities of 
business experience"). 
Buyers of residential real estate may of course choose to 
attempt to find a house on their own, including drawing on the 
vast resources of the Internet, or they may seek the assistance 
of an exclusive broker, but if they choose the latter, they must 
abide by the express terms of their contractual agreement.  The 
broker must likewise comply with its contractual obligations and 
fulfill its significant statutory and regulatory duties to the 
client as well, which include undivided loyalty, reasonable 
care, disclosure, obedience to lawful instruction, 
confidentiality, and accountability. 
Conclusion.  It is a fundamental principle of contract law 
that, in the event of breach, "the injured party should be put 
in the position they would have been in had the contract been 
performed," if possible.  Situation Mgt., 430 Mass. at 880.  
Thus, if Huang can prove, as attested in her affidavit, that the 
clients committed a breach of an exclusive agreement under which 
20 
 
she would have been entitled to a commission, the clients may be 
liable for the amount of the lost commission.  The order 
granting the clients' motion for summary judgment is reversed, 
and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
So ordered.