Title: Craver-Farrell v. Anderson

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, and 
Koontz, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice 
 
LYNN CHERYL DALE CRAVER-FARRELL,  
ADMINISTRATRIX C.T.A. OF THE ESTATE 
OF DORIS M. DALE, DECEASED 
                                            OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 950793 
SENIOR JUSTICE HENRY H. WHITING 
                                           March 1, 1996 
GLADYS C. ANDERSON AND RALPH L. ANDERSON 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH 
 
L. Cleaves Manning, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the presumption of 
survivorship provided in Code § 6.1-125.5(A) applies to funds 
formerly held in joint bank accounts, but no longer so held at 
the time of the death of one of the parties to those accounts. 
 
Since the survivors to the former joint accounts in issue 
prevailed in the trial court, we consider the evidence in the 
light most favorable to them.  That evidence appears in the 
following summary of their testimony. 
 
Ralph L. Anderson and Gladys C. Anderson, his wife, were 
close friends of Harvey LeRoy Dale, Jr., and Doris M. Dale, his 
wife, for a number of years before Mr. Dale's death in August 
1990.  The Dales had a daughter, Lynn Cheryl Dale Craver-Farrell, 
a resident of western Canada, from whom they were estranged. 
 
Six or seven months before his death, Mr. Dale asked Mr. 
Anderson to "look out for [Mrs. Dale]" after his death.  Shortly 
after Mr. Dale's death following a lengthy illness, Mr. Anderson 
told Mrs. Dale that her husband had asked him "to assist her as 
well as [he] could," and Mrs. Dale "was very well pleased about 
this situation." 
 
Although the Andersons never gave Mrs. Dale any investment 
 
 
 
 
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or financial advice, they provided substantial assistance to her 
for more than a year while Mrs. Dale was living at home following 
her husband's death.  During this period, Mrs. Dale converted her 
four individual bank accounts and a bank certificate of deposit 
into multiple party accounts aggregating over $260,000 in her 
name and that of Mrs. Anderson, each of them being authorized 
signatories (the Dale-Anderson joint accounts).  Mrs. Anderson 
testified that this was done to assist Mrs. Dale "in whatever she 
wanted me to do."  Although Mrs. Anderson filled out checks drawn 
on these accounts, Mrs. Dale signed each one.  Later, Mrs. Dale 
added Mr. Anderson's name to one of the Dale-Anderson joint 
accounts. 
 
Mrs. Anderson testified that Mrs. Dale had repeatedly 
advised her that the money in the Dale-Anderson joint accounts 
was to be used for Mrs. Dale's benefit during her life, and that 
at Mrs. Dale's death, the funds "were to be used by my husband 
and myself, they were to go to us." 
 
Mrs. Dale fell and injured her leg in January 1992.  
Thereafter, Mrs. Dale was hospitalized or living in a nursing 
home until her death in December 1992.  After Mrs. Dale was 
injured, Mrs. Anderson began filling out and signing all checks 
drawn on the Dale-Anderson joint accounts.  The Andersons also 
took charge of Mrs. Dale's house and caused Mrs. Dale's mail to 
be sent to their house. 
 
From January 14 through May 4, 1992, Mrs. Anderson 
 
 
 
 
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transferred the balances in four of the five Dale-Anderson joint 
accounts (the transferred Dale-Anderson joint accounts) to three 
joint bank accounts and one joint bank certificate of deposit, 
all solely in the Andersons' names (the Anderson joint accounts). 
 Mrs. Anderson testified that Mrs. Dale had asked her to make 
these transfers "because she figured there was still some way 
that [Craver-Farrell] could get her money and she wouldn't have 
any money." 
 
There was no question in the Andersons' minds that these 
funds belonged to Mrs. Dale during her lifetime.
1  Neither the 
funds, nor interest accumulating thereon, were used while Mrs. 
Dale was alive, either for the benefit of Mrs. Dale or the 
Andersons.  Instead, the Andersons paid Mrs. Dale's expenses from 
the remaining Dale-Anderson joint account. 
 
On January 16, 1992, Mrs. Dale executed a general power of 
attorney naming Mrs. Anderson as her attorney in fact.  On 
February 3, 1992, Mrs. Dale executed a will leaving all her 
property to Craver-Farrell and nominating Mrs. Anderson as 
executor of her estate.  In both instruments, Mrs. Dale 
designated Mr. Anderson as Mrs. Anderson's successor. 
 
Using the general power of attorney, the Andersons sold Mrs. 
Dale's car for $7,200 on August 31, 1992, and deposited the 
 
    
1In the absence of clear and convincing evidence of Mrs. Dale's 
intent to give these funds to the Andersons during Mrs. Dale's 
lifetime, the funds would have belonged to Mrs. Dale during her 
lifetime under the provisions of Code § 6.1-125.3(A). 
 
 
 
 
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proceeds in one of the Anderson joint accounts.  Claiming that 
Mrs. Dale had given her a number of articles of personal 
property, Mrs. Anderson removed items from Mrs. Dale's house both 
before and after her death. 
 
Upon the Andersons' refusal to qualify as the executor or 
successor executor of Mrs. Dale's estate, Craver-Farrell 
qualified as administratrix c.t.a. of the estate.  In that 
capacity, Craver-Farrell brought this action against the 
Andersons to recover the proceeds from the sale of Mrs. Dale's 
car, the items of personal property Mrs. Anderson had removed 
from Mrs. Dale's house, and the funds traceable to the 
transferred Dale-Anderson joint accounts and now held by the 
Andersons. 
 
The Andersons filed an answer denying the substance of the 
plaintiff's claims and also filed a counterclaim seeking to 
recover the amounts of Mrs. Dale's funeral bill and other bills 
they had paid from the remaining Dale-Anderson joint account 
following Mrs. Dale's death. 
 
After hearing the evidence and argument of the parties in a 
bench trial, the trial court advised the parties that it would 
dismiss the counterclaim and require the Andersons to pay the 
plaintiff the proceeds from the sale of Mrs. Dale's car and to 
return certain items of the personal property Mrs. Anderson had 
removed from Mrs. Dale's house.  After receiving briefs on the 
issue of the Dale-Anderson joint accounts, the trial court later 
 
 
 
 
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entered judgment "in favor of [the Andersons] on the Central 
Fidelity Bank account . . . , the Dominion Bank money market 
account . . . , the Cenit Bank certificate of deposit . . . , the 
Commerce Bank savings account . . . , and the Dominion Bank 
checking account . . . ."  These accounts are the transferred 
Dale-Anderson joint accounts and the Dale-Anderson joint account 
that remained on the date of Mrs. Dale's death.  The plaintiff 
appeals that portion of the judgment dealing with the transferred 
Dale-Anderson joint accounts. 
 
Code § 6.1-125.5(A) provides in pertinent part that "[s]ums 
remaining on deposit at the death of a party to a joint account 
belong to the surviving party . . . as against the estate of the 
decedent unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a 
different intention at the time the account is created."  
(Emphasis added.)  Since the transferred Dale-Anderson joint 
accounts had been closed prior to Mrs. Dale's death, the 
plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in applying the 
statutory presumption of survivorship. 
 
On the other hand, citing Higgins v. Bowdoin, 238 Va. 134, 
140, 380 S.E.2d 904, 907-08 (1989), in which we applied the 
statutory presumption to an account subject to the statutory 
provisions, the Andersons claim that the trial court correctly 
applied Code 6.1-125.5(A).  We agree with the plaintiff. 
 
Higgins is inapplicable to this case because the amount in 
the Higgins joint account remained on deposit at the death of one 
 
 
 
 
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party to the account.  Instead, the principles of Bennet v. First 
& Merchants National Bank, 233 Va. 355, 360, 355 S.E.2d 888, 890-
91 (1987), apply here.  In Bennet, the contested funds no longer 
remained on deposit in a joint account subject to Code § 6.1-
125.5(A) when one of the parties thereto died.  For that reason, 
we refused to apply the statutory presumption in Bennet. 
 
The Andersons assert that Bennet can be distinguished on its 
facts.  First, they note the evidence in Bennet of the decedent's 
good relationships with the parties who would have received the 
funds if the statute did not apply.  The Andersons then contrast 
that evidence with Mrs. Anderson's testimony of Mrs. Dale's 
estranged relationship with Craver-Farrell and of Mrs. Dale's 
intent that Craver-Farrell receive none of the funds traceable to 
the Dale-Anderson joint accounts on Mrs. Dale's death. 
 
We do not think that this distinction affects the question 
whether Code § 6.1-125.5(A) applies in this case.  Our discussion 
of those relations in Bennet was material only in considering 
whether the survivor had sustained her burden of showing a gift 
of the joint investment.
2  Id. at 361, 355 S.E.2d at 891-92. 
                     
    
2Without citation of any authority, the Andersons make a 
passing reference in their brief to Mrs. Dale's intention "to make 
a gift of the funds to Mr. and Mrs. Anderson."  However, our 
review of the entire record fails to disclose a contention at 
trial by the Andersons that Mrs. Dale made an inter vivos gift of 
the funds traceable to the former Dale-Anderson joint accounts.  
Accordingly, we will not address this contention, made for the 
first time on appeal.  Snyder-Falkinham v. Stockburger, 249 Va. 
376, 381, 457 S.E.2d 36, 39 (1995); Eason v. Eason, 204 Va. 347, 
351-52, 131 S.E.2d 280, 283 (1963). 
 
 
 
 
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Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred in 
applying the presumption provided in Code § 6.1-125.5(A).  
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment awarding the Andersons 
the principal amounts of the transferred Dale-Anderson joint 
accounts held by the Andersons at the time of Mrs. Dale's death. 
 We will remand the case with instructions to determine the 
interest that has accrued on these amounts since Mrs. Dale's 
death and to enter a new order awarding judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff for the principal amounts and accrued interest. 
 
Reversed and remanded.