Title: Butcher v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
LEONARD P. BUTCHER, 
 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 283, 2005 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Kent County 
§  Cr. ID. 0403022988 
§   
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: November 8, 2006 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: November 22, 2006 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, and JACOBS, 
Justices, and NOBLE, Vice Chancellor,1 constituting the Court en banc. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 22nd day of November 2006, upon consideration of the parties’ 
briefs, oral argument, record on appeal, and the Superior Court’s report 
following remand, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Leonard Butcher, filed this appeal 
following his conviction and sentence for delivery of a controlled substance.  
After hearing oral argument, we remanded this matter to the Superior Court 
to conduct an adequate in camera hearing to determine whether the informer 
                                                 
1 Sitting by designation pursuant to Del. Const. art. IV, § 12 and Supr. Ct. R. 2 and 4. 
 
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used by the State had information that could materially aid Butcher’s 
mistaken identity defense. 2   
(2) 
In Butcher I, 3 we noted that the purpose of a Flowers hearing4 
is to determine whether the State’s privilege to withhold the identity of its 
informant is outweighed by the defendant’s right to prepare his defense.5  In 
cases like Butcher’s, where the informer participated in, but was not a party 
to, the illegal transaction, disclosure of the informer’s identity is required 
only if the trial judge determines that the informer’s testimony is material to 
the defense.6  We noted that the most suitable method for accomplishing the 
balancing of these competing interests is for the trial judge to interview the 
informer in person and in camera.  
(3) 
If the physical presence of the informer is not possible, the 
informer may testify under oath via telephone or video conference.  If the 
options of having the trial judge interview the informer under oath in camera 
are not viable, then as a last resort, the trial judge may direct the State to 
                                                 
2 Butcher v. State, 906 A.2d 798 (Del. 2006) (“Butcher I”). 
3 The underlying facts in this case are set forth more fully in the Court’s opinion in 
Butcher I and are incorporated by reference. 
4 See Flowers v. State, 316 A.2d 564 (Del. Super. 1973), which outlines the in camera 
procedure to be followed by the trial judge in determining whether a confidential 
informer’s identity should be disclosed to the defense. 
5 Butcher I, 906 at 802. 
6 Id. at 803. 
 
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obtain an affidavit from the informer for the trial judge’s in camera review.  
We remanded Butcher’s case for another in camera hearing because the 
informer had not testified at the first hearing, either in person, by telephone, 
by video conference, or by affidavit. 
(4) 
The sealed record on remand reflects that the Superior Court 
conducted the second in camera hearing on September 21, 2006.  The trial 
judge, the confidential informer, a court reporter, the prosecuting attorney, 
Trooper Voshell, and a law clerk were all present at the hearing.  The trial 
judge solicited questions in advance from both the prosecution and defense.  
Neither Butcher nor his counsel was present at the hearing.   
(5) 
At the second in camera hearing, the trial judge conducted all 
of the questioning.  After hearing the informer’s sworn testimony, the trial 
judge concluded that the informer would be unable to provide testimony that 
would materially aid the defense.  In fact, the informer was positive that 
Butcher was the man who sold drugs to Trooper Voshell.  Because the 
informer could not provide testimony that would aid the defense and because 
disclosure of the informer’s identity could create danger for the informer and 
possibly adversely affect on-going police investigations, the trial judge 
concluded that the State’s interest in protecting the informer’s identity 
outweighed any interest of Butcher’s. 
 
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(6) 
In Butcher I, we described and approved the preferable 
procedure for in camera hearings, which is prescribed by many of the United 
States Circuit Courts.  That procedure excludes counsel for both parties as 
well as the defendant and the police officers.7  The trial judge questions the 
confidential informer in the presence of the court reporter and no one else.   
(7) 
On remand in Butcher’s case, the trial judge took notice of the 
preferable procedure that had been outlined by this Court.  Nevertheless, the 
trial judge allowed the prosecutor and Trooper Voshell to be present during 
the in camera hearing.  The trial judge explained that he permitted Trooper 
Voshell and the prosecutor to be present in the event he needed to elicit 
further information from either of them.  The trial judge described this action 
as an exercise of his discretion under Delaware Rule of Evidence 509(c)(2).8   
(8) 
The prosecutor and Trooper Voshell could have remained 
available in the courthouse on the day of the in camera hearing without 
being present during the hearing.  Under the circumstances of this case, 
where the credibility of the undercover officer’s identification of Butcher 
was at issue, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to permit the 
undercover officer to be present during the in camera questioning of the 
                                                 
7 See id. at 801, n.30 (collecting cases). 
8 In Rule 509(c)(2) the words “have the right” were substituted for the words “be 
permitted” in the last line to indicate that the presence of counsel or parties at an in 
camera hearing is discretionary with the trial court.  See Del. R. Evid. 509 cmt. (2006). 
 
5
confidential informer.  Notwithstanding this error, there was no prejudice to 
Butcher, because the record supports the trial judge’s conclusion that the 
confidential informer did not have any information that was material to 
Butcher’s defense.  Accordingly, we affirm the trial judge’s ruling denying 
Butcher’s motion to compel. 
 
(9) 
The other issue raised in Butcher’s appeal is a challenge to the 
trial judge’s denial of his motion to suppress, on which we deferred ruling in 
Butcher I.   The record reflects that prior to trial, Butcher filed a motion in 
limine to exclude evidence of any in-court or out-of-court identification of 
him as the person who sold crack cocaine to Trooper Voshell.  Butcher 
argued that Voshell had viewed a single photograph of him within 45 
minutes to an hour after the drug transaction and that the single photograph 
“lineup” was impermissibly suggestive and created a substantial likelihood 
of mistaken identification at trial.  After conducting a hearing at which the 
two police officers involved in the undercover transaction testified, the trial 
judge denied the motion to suppress, holding that, under the totality of the 
circumstances, Voshell’s view of a single photograph of Butcher was not 
impermissibly suggestive. 
 
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(10) This Court reviews the denial of a motion to suppress evidence 
pursuant to an abuse of discretion standard.9 An identification procedure will 
not pass constitutional muster where it is “so impermissibly suggestive as to 
give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”10 
The factors the United States Supreme Court has set forth when considering 
the reliability of an identification include the opportunity of the witness to 
view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, 
the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal, the level of 
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of 
time between the crime and the confrontation.11 In this case, the record 
supports the trial judge’s finding that Voshell’s identification of Butcher was 
sufficiently reliable under the totality of the circumstances.   
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
9 Hicks v. State, 631 A.2d 6, 8 (Del. 1993). 
10 Younger v. State, 496 A.2d 546, 550 (Del. 1985) (quoting Simmons v. United States, 
390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968)).  
11 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).  See also Richardson v. State, 673 
A.2d 144, 148 (Del. 1996).