Title: Force v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co.

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2014 WI 82 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP2402   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Hailey Marie-Joe Force, a/k/a Hailey Marie-Joe 
Dziewa, a  
minor, by her Guardian Ad Litem, Joseph J. 
Welcenbach, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
The Estate of Billy Joe Force, by its Special  
Administrator, 
          Plaintiff, 
     v. 
American Family Mutual Insurance Company, 
Jeffrey A. Brown  
and Regent Insurance Company, 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
------------------------------------------------ 
Mehgan Force, a minor, by her Guardian ad Litem, 
Jason  
Oldenburg, and Lauren Force, a minor, by her 
Guardian ad  
Litem, Jason Oldenburg, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
     v. 
American Family Mutual Insurance Company and 
Jeffrey A.  
Brown, 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
Regent Insurance Company, 
          Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS   
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 18, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 15, 2014 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit    
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha  
 
JUDGE: 
J. Mac Davis 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
PROSSER, J., concurs. (Opinion filed.)   
 
DISSENTED: 
ROGGENSACK, ZIEGLER, GABLEMAN, JJJ., dissent. 
(Opinion filed.) 
ZIEGLER, J., dissent. (Opinion filed.)   
 
 
2 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants, there were briefs by Joseph 
J. Welcenbach and Welcenbach Law Offices, S.C., Milwaukee, and 
Jason R. Oldenburg and The Previant Law Firm, S.C., Milwaukee, 
and oral argument by Joseph J. Welcenbach. 
 
For 
the 
defendant-respondent 
American 
Family 
Mutual 
Insurance Company and Jeffrey A. Brown, there was a brief by 
James C. Ratzel, Leslie A. Schunk, and Ratzel & Associates, LLC, 
Brookfield, and oral argument by Leslie A. Schunk. 
 
For the defendant-respondent Regent Insurance Company there 
was a brief by Donald H. Piper, Jon D. Monson, and Piper & 
Schmidt, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Donald H. Piper.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Susan R. Tyndell, Peter 
M. Young, D. James Weis, and Habush Habush & Rottier, S.C., 
Rhinelander, on behalf of the Wisconsin Association for Justice.  
 
 
 
 
2014 WI 82
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2012AP2402 
(L.C. No. 
2011CV3151 & 2012CV417) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Hailey Marie-Joe Force, a/k/a Hailey Marie-Joe 
Dziewa, a minor, by her Guardian Ad Litem, 
Joseph J. Welcenbach, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
The Estate of Billy Joe Force, by its Special  
Administrator, 
 
          Plaintiff, 
 
     v. 
 
American Family Mutual Insurance Company, 
Jeffrey A. Brown and Regent Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
----------------------------------------------- 
 
Mehgan Force, a minor, by her Guardian ad 
Litem, Jason Oldenburg, and Lauren Force, a 
minor, by her Guardian ad Litem, Jason 
Oldenburg, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
American Family Mutual Insurance Company and 
Jeffrey A. Brown, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 22, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
Regent Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Waukesha 
County, J. Mac Davis, Judge.  Reversed and remanded.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is an appeal of a 
judgment of the circuit court for Waukesha County, J. Mac Davis, 
Judge, granting summary judgment in favor of Jeffrey Brown, 
American Family Mutual Insurance Company, and Regent Insurance 
Company (collectively the defendants).  The part of the judgment 
at issue here dismissed the consolidated actions of Hailey 
Marie-Joe Force, Mehgan Force, and Lauren Force, collectively 
the minor children of Billy Joe Force, the deceased, against the 
defendants.     
¶2 
The court of appeals certified the action to this 
court pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61.   
¶3 
The issue before the court is:  Can minor children 
recover for the wrongful death of their father under Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.04(2) (2011-12),1 when the deceased leaves behind a spouse 
who was estranged from the deceased and who is precluded from 
recovering for the wrongful death? 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
3 
 
¶4 
Linda Force, the deceased's spouse in the instant 
case, is precluded from recovery for her husband's wrongful 
death because the circuit court dismissed her claim, concluding 
that she has no compensable damages under the wrongful death 
statute; this dismissal of Linda Force's wrongful death claim 
was not appealed.   
¶5 
In the instant case, Linda Force did not receive any 
financial support from the deceased from the time of their 
separation in 1997 to the deceased's death in 2008.  Their long 
separation with no communication for many years was evidence 
that there was no interaction or affection between the spouses.  
The circuit court concluded that the unique facts of the instant 
case demonstrate that the deceased's spouse had no claim for 
damages for her husband's wrongful death under the wrongful 
death statutes.  The dismissal of Linda Force's wrongful death 
claim is not before us.    
¶6 
The defendants argue that because the deceased's 
spouse is still living, she is a "surviving spouse" under the 
statutes; that her recovery for the wrongful death of her 
husband is zero; and that consequently the deceased's minor 
children do not have any set-aside from the surviving spouse's 
recovery.   
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
4 
 
¶7 
The defendants rely on the statutory hierarchy of 
beneficiaries created by Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2).2  The first 
class of beneficiaries is the surviving spouse, with a set-aside 
from his or her recovery for minor children "in recognition of 
the duty and responsibility of a parent to support minor 
children." 
 
If 
there 
is 
a 
"surviving 
spouse," 
other 
beneficiaries do not have a cause of action for wrongful death.  
If there is no "surviving spouse," the cause of action passes to 
the next beneficiary in the statutory hierarchy.   
¶8 
We disagree with the defendants' interpretation of the 
statutes. We conclude that in order to avoid an absurd, 
unreasonable result contrary to the legislative purposes of the 
wrongful death statutes, Wis. Stat. §§ 895.03 and 895.04(2), we 
construe the statutes under the unique facts of the instant case 
to allow the minor children to recover even though the 
deceased's spouse in the instant case is alive and does not 
                                                 
2 Steinbarth 
v. 
Johannes, 
144 
Wis. 2d 159, 
164, 
423 
N.W.2d 540 
(1988) 
("[Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§] 
895.04(2) . . . establishes 
a 
hierarchy 
of 
beneficiaries . . . ."); Cincoski v. Rogers, 4 Wis. 2d 423, 425, 
90 N.W.2d 784 (1958) ("The statutes . . . designate preferences 
according to the relationship to the deceased. . . . [T]he 
nonexistence of the preferred beneficiary or beneficiaries is 
essential to a right of action by or in behalf of other 
beneficiaries.  The action must be brought by or for the 
wrongful death in the order of preference fixed by the 
statute."); Anderson v. Westfield Ins. Co., 300 F. Supp. 2d 726 
(W.D. Wis. 2002) ("[T]he ability to recover under Wisconsin's 
wrongful death statute is similar to intestate succession, 
namely, a claimant has standing only if no other beneficiary 
higher in the hierarchy has standing."). 
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
5 
 
(according to the circuit court) recover any damages for the 
deceased husband's wrongful death.   
¶9 
Our result comports with the dual legislative purposes 
of the wrongful death statutes: (1) to impose liability on the 
wrongdoer; and (2) to protect relational interests, especially 
the interests of the deceased's minor dependent children.  
¶10 The 
statutory 
interpretation 
advocated 
by 
the 
defendants would contravene these fundamental purposes of the 
wrongful death statutes by barring any wrongful death claim by 
Linda Force and the minor children, along with all lower-tier 
beneficiaries.   
¶11 The defendants call for the unfair, unreasonable 
outcome that the Wisconsin legislature sought to avoid by 
enacting the first wrongful death statute in 1857:  the 
wrongdoer would be immune from liability and no compensation 
would be recovered by the deceased's relatives who would have 
recovered had the deceased lived.  The interpretation of 
"surviving spouse" should avoid such unreasonable, absurd 
results.   
¶12 We examine the meaning of the phrase "surviving 
spouse" in Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2), in the unique fact scenario 
presented in this case.3  The words "surviving" and "spouse" are 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.04 uses various phrases to refer to 
the primary beneficiary of a wrongful death recovery:  "[i]f the 
deceased leaves surviving a spouse," "if no spouse or domestic 
partner survives," and "surviving spouse."  All refer to the 
same person.  We use the phrase "surviving spouse" to refer to 
each of these statutory phrases.  The case law has done 
similarly. 
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
6 
 
commonly used words.  The text of the wrongful death statute 
does not define who is or is not a "surviving spouse."       
¶13 To interpret and apply the phrase "surviving spouse" 
in the wrongful death statutes, we examine the text of the 
wrongful death statutes using various interpretive aids. In 
interpreting words in a statutory text, we do more than focus on 
the dictionary definition of each word.  Interpretive aids such 
as the legislative purpose, prior Wisconsin case law and case 
law from other jurisdictions, and statutory history help guide 
our interpretation of the phrase "surviving spouse."     
¶14 The legislative purposes are clear: impose liability 
on the tortfeasor and allow recovery by the deceased's relatives 
who would have recovered had the deceased lived.  Our case law 
demonstrates that courts interpret the wrongful death statutes 
to apply to the unique fact situation presented by a case in 
order to meet the legislative purposes, rather than apply a 
strict literal interpretation of the phrase "surviving spouse."  
Sister state case law similarly recognizes that a lower-tier 
beneficiary 
can 
maintain 
a 
claim 
even 
if 
a 
higher-tier 
beneficiary is alive, when the unique facts would otherwise 
contravene the purposes of the wrongful death statutes.   
¶15 The statutory history of the wrongful death statutes 
demonstrates that the legislature has explicitly protected the 
rights of minor children to recover for wrongful death and left 
interpretation of the term "surviving spouse" to the courts in 
unique and specific fact situations.  
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
7 
 
¶16 Upon 
examining 
the 
statutory 
text 
with 
these 
interpretive aids, we conclude that the phrase "surviving 
spouse" in Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2) does not always simply mean 
any living spouse of the deceased.  The meaning of the phrase 
"surviving spouse" has been elucidated by scrutinizing unique 
fact situations to define "surviving spouse" in accord with the 
legislative purposes of the wrongful death statutes, rather than 
considering only the literal meaning of the phrase "surviving 
spouse."   
¶17 For the reasons set forth, we interpret the phrase 
"surviving spouse" in the present case as not including Linda 
Force, the deceased's estranged spouse who, as a result of the  
circuit court's dismissal of her wrongful death claim (which was 
not appealed), is barred from recovery under Wis. Stat. 
§§ 895.03 and 895.04(2).  If Linda Force is not a "surviving 
spouse" under the statute, the parties do not dispute that the 
minor children have a cognizable claim as lineal heirs.  As 
lineal heirs of the deceased, the children would be first in 
line for any recovery for the wrongful death of their father.   
¶18 We conclude that the circuit court erred in granting 
the defendants summary judgment against the minor children and 
erred in dismissing the minor children's causes of action 
against the defendants for wrongful death.  The minor children 
in the present case have a cause of action against the 
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
8 
 
defendants for wrongful death as if Linda Force were not alive 
at the death of the deceased.4 
¶19 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit 
court against the children and in favor of the defendants and 
remand the matter to the circuit court for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with this opinion.   
¶20 To assist the reader, here is a table of contents to 
this opinion: 
Introduction:  ¶¶1-20. 
I. 
The facts and procedural history are not in dispute:  
¶¶21-26. 
II. We review a grant of summary judgment independently of 
the circuit court, using the same methodology as the 
circuit court:  ¶¶27-31. 
III. The statutory text provides some support for the 
defendant's 
interpretation, 
but 
in 
unique 
fact 
situations, the defendant's interpretation may not be 
a reasonable one:  ¶¶32-55.  
IV. The interpretation and application of the wrongful 
death statutes should be in accord with the explicit 
legislative purposes: (1) to render a wrongdoer liable 
when an injured party dies and (2) to compensate for 
the loss of a relational interest caused by the 
                                                 
4 In light of our holding, we need not and do not address 
the children's equal protection constitutional claim that if 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2) bars their claim absent recovery by the 
surviving spouse, the statute is unconstitutional.   
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
9 
 
wrongful death, especially the interests of the minor 
children of the deceased:  ¶¶56-68. 
V. 
The Wisconsin case law and case law from other states 
reveal that "surviving spouse" does not always simply 
mean any spouse who survives the deceased:  ¶¶69-110. 
VI. The statutory history of the wrongful death statutes 
demonstrates 
that 
the 
legislature 
has 
explicitly 
protected the rights of minor children to recover for 
wrongful death and left interpretation of the phrase 
"surviving spouse" to the courts in unique and 
specific fact situations:  ¶¶111-125. 
Conclusion:  ¶¶126-129. 
I 
¶21 The facts and procedural history of this case are 
undisputed for purposes of this appeal.  Billy Joe Force, the 
deceased, was driving a motor vehicle for his employer.  He died 
when his vehicle collided with a motor vehicle driven by Jeffrey 
Brown, the individual defendant.   
¶22 The deceased's estranged spouse, Linda Force, and his 
three nonmarital minor children, Hailey, Mehgan, and Lauren,5 
each sought compensation from Jeffrey Brown, the individual 
defendant; American Family, the insurer of Brown's vehicle; and 
Regent Insurance Company, the insurer of Billy Joe Force's 
                                                 
5 The complaint refers to Lauren Force as both "Lauryn" and 
"Lauren."  We use "Lauren," as the circuit court, court of 
appeals, and briefs do. 
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
10 
 
employer.  The allegation is that Brown's negligence caused 
Billy Joe Force's death.6   
¶23 Billy Joe Force and Linda Force were married in 1995 
or 1996 and separated after six months of marriage.  They never 
were legally separated or divorced.  They did not have any 
children together.  Billy Joe Force had three children with two 
women who were not his wife.  Linda Force has no legal 
obligation to support these three minor children. 
¶24 At the time of the motor vehicle accident in 2006, 
Linda Force lived in New York; Billy Joe Force lived in 
Wisconsin.  During the five years before his death in 2006, 
Linda Force had no contact with Billy Joe Force.  Billy Joe 
                                                 
6 Linda Force, the estranged spouse of the deceased, and 
Hailey Marie-Joe Force, Billy's youngest daughter, initiated one 
action seeking wrongful death damages.   
Linda Force raised claims for wrongful death both as a 
surviving spouse and as special administrator for the estate of 
the deceased.   
Hailey made two claims:  first, that she was entitled to 
"an independent, cognizable claim for relief of her own" for 
damages arising out of the death of her father; and second, that 
in the absence of an independent claim, she was entitled to a 
"statutorily protected interest under [Wis. Stat.] Sec. 895.04 
as a child of the deceased with whose support the deceased was 
legally charged."   
Mehgan and Lauren initiated their own action, seeking 
wrongful death damages.  They claimed that the defendant 
driver's negligence deprived them of their father's "aid, wages, 
economic 
benefits, 
assistance, 
society, 
comfort 
and 
companionship."  They did not claim an offset from the recovery 
of Linda Force. 
The cases were consolidated by the circuit court, pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 895.04(3), on March 30, 2012.  
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
11 
 
Force never provided any pecuniary support to Linda Force from 
1997 until his death in 2008. 
¶25 The circuit court granted summary judgment to the 
defendants, concluding, inter alia, that Linda Force, as a 
surviving, estranged spouse, had no compensable damages under 
the wrongful death statute and that none of the three children 
had a cause of action for wrongful death.7 
¶26 The three minor children appealed the dismissal of 
their actions.  Linda Force has not appealed the dismissal of 
her personal claim for damages for wrongful death.  
II 
¶27 We review a grant of summary judgment independently of 
the circuit court, using the same methodology as the circuit 
court.8  Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of 
material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.9   
¶28 The material facts are undisputed in the present case 
and the resolution of the dispute between the three minor 
children and the defendants turns on a question of law, that is, 
the interpretation and application of the wrongful death 
statutes to these undisputed facts.  The interpretation and 
application of a statute to undisputed facts are ordinarily 
                                                 
7 A survival claim by the estate of the deceased is not 
before us. 
8 Park Bank v. Westburg, 2013 WI 57, ¶36, 348 Wis. 2d 409, 
832 N.W.2d 539.   
9 Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).   
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
12 
 
questions of law that this court determines independently of the 
circuit court, although it benefits from the circuit court's 
analysis.10  We also benefit from the analysis of the court of 
appeals in its certification memorandum in the present case.11   
¶29 To interpret and apply the phrase "surviving spouse" 
used in the wrongful death statute, we examine the text of the 
statute.  
¶30 In examining the statutory text, however, we do more 
than focus on a dictionary definition of each word.  Words are 
given meaning to avoid absurd, unreasonable, or implausible 
results and results that are clearly at odds with the 
legislature's purpose.12  We scrutinize the words in view of the 
                                                 
10 Showers Appraisals, LLC v. Musson Bros., 2013 WI 79, ¶21, 
350 Wis. 2d 509, 835 N.W.2d 226. 
11 Lornson v. Siddiqui, 2007 WI 92, ¶13, 302 Wis. 2d 519, 
735 N.W.2d 55. 
12 Alberte v. Anew Health Care Servs., Inc., 2000 WI 7, ¶10, 
232 Wis. 2d 587, 592, 605 N.W.2d 515; Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 
WI 76, ¶32, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659; Teschendorf v. 
State Farm Ins. Cos., 2006 WI 89, ¶¶15, 18, 32, 293 Wis. 2d 123, 
717 N.W.2d 258.  
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
13 
 
purpose of the statute.13  We consider the meaning of words in 
the context in which they appear.14  The definition of a word or 
phrase can vary in different circumstances.15  Different fact 
scenarios may require different interpretations of the text, 
because words cannot anticipate every possible fact situation.16  
"[R]easonable minds can differ about a statute's application 
                                                 
13 State v. Hanson, 2012 WI 4, ¶17, 338 Wis. 2d 243, 255, 
808 N.W.2d 390, 396 ("Context and [statutory] purpose are 
important in discerning the plain meaning of a statute.  We 
favor an interpretation that fulfills the statute's purpose.") 
(citations omitted); Klemm v. Am. Transmission Co., LLC, 2011 WI 
37, ¶18, 333 Wis. 2d 580, 798 N.W.2d 223 ("An interpretation 
that fulfills the purpose of the statute is favored over one 
that undermines the purpose."); Lagerstrom v. Myrtle Werth 
Hosp.-Mayo Health System, 2005 WI 124, ¶51, 285 Wis. 2d 1, 700 
N.W.2d 201 
(examining 
"legislative 
goals" 
to 
interpret 
a 
statute); Alberte, 232 Wis. 2d 587, ¶10 (courts need not adopt a 
literal or usual meaning of a word when acceptance of that 
meaning would thwart the obvious purpose of the statute); United 
Wis. Ins. Co. v. LIRC, 229 Wis. 2d 416, 425-26, 600 N.W.2d 186 
(Ct. App. 1999) ("Fundamental to an analysis of any statutory 
interpretation is the ascertainment and advancement of the 
legislative purpose.").  
14 Alberte, 232 Wis. 2d 587, ¶10 ("While it is true that 
statutory interpretation begins with the language of the 
statute, it is also well established that courts must not look 
at a single, isolated sentence or portion of a sentence, but at 
the role of the relevant language in the entire statute."); 
Seider, 236 Wis. 2d 211, ¶43 (contextual approach is not new); 
Klemm, 333 Wis. 2d 580, ¶18 ("The statutory language is examined 
within the context in which it is used."). 
15 Sauer v. Reliance Ins. Co., 152 Wis. 2d 234, 241, 448 
N.W.2d 256 (Ct. App. 1989). 
16 Northrop 
v. 
Opperman, 
2011 
WI 
5, 
¶22 
n.8, 
331 
Wis. 2d 287, 795 N.W.2d 719; Teschendorf, 293 Wis. 2d 123, ¶20. 
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
14 
 
when the text is constant but the circumstances to which the 
text may apply are kaleidoscopic."17 
¶31 We also examine our case law interpreting the statute18 
and the statutory history of the statute to determine the 
meaning of words.19   
III 
¶32 This court has declared that there is no common-law 
action for wrongful death; the right to bring suit is purely 
statutory.20  
                                                 
17 Seider, 236 Wis. 2d 211, ¶43. 
18 Nowell v. City of Wausau, 2013 WI 88, ¶21, 351 Wis. 2d 1, 
838 N.W.2d 852; Juneau County Star-Times v. Juneau County, 2013 
WI 4, ¶66, 345 Wis. 2d 122, 824 N.W.2d 457; State v. Davison, 
2003 WI 89, ¶61, 263 Wis. 2d 145, 666 N.W.2d 1. 
19 "Statutory history encompasses the previously enacted and 
repealed provisions of a statute. By analyzing the changes the 
legislature has made over the course of several years, we may be 
assisted in arriving at the meaning of a statute. Therefore, 
statutory history is part of the context in which we interpret 
the words used in a statute."  Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 
2008 WI 52, ¶22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581 (citations 
omitted).  See, e.g., LaCount v. General Cas. Co., 2006 WI 14, 
¶31, 288 Wis. 2d 358, 709 N.W.2d 418; VanCleve v. City of 
Marinette, 2003 WI 2, ¶6, 258 Wis. 2d 80, 655 N.W.2d 113; State 
v. Byers, 2003 WI 86, ¶¶22-27, 263 Wis. 2d 113, 665 N.W.2d 729; 
Hughes v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 197 Wis. 2d 973, 980-84, 542 
N.W.2d 148 (1996).  
20 Cogger v. Trudell, 35 Wis. 2d 350, 353, 151 N.W.2d 146 
(1967).  We need not re-examine this issue in the instant case. 
For a discussion of a common-law action for wrongful death, 
see, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 925 cmt. k;  John 
Fabian Witt, From Loss of Services to Loss of Support:  The 
Wrongful Death Statutes, the Origins of Modern Tort Law, and the 
Making of the Nineteenth-Century Family, 25 Law & Soc. Inquiry 
717 (2000); Wex S. Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 
Stan. L. Rev. 1043 (1965).   
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
15 
 
¶33 We turn first to the text of the wrongful death 
statutes, Wis. Stat. §§ 895.03 and 895.04(2).   
¶34 Wisconsin's wrongful death statute was first enacted 
in 1857.21  The present statute retains the 1857 statutory 
framework:  
                                                 
21 The 1857 statute, ch. 71, Laws of 1857, had two sections, 
the first explaining the prerequisites for a claim, and the 
second explaining who may bring the action and who may recover 
damages: 
§ 1.  That whenever the death of a person shall be 
caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default, and the 
act, neglect or default is such as would (if death had 
not ensued) have entitled the party injured to 
maintain an action and recover damage in respect 
thereof; then and in every such case, the person who, 
or the corporation which would have been liable, if 
death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for 
damages, notwithstanding the death of the person 
injured, 
and 
although 
the 
death 
may 
have 
been 
occasioned under such circumstances as constitute an 
indictable offence; Provided, That such action shall 
be brought for a death caused in this State, and in 
some court established by the constitution and laws of 
the same. 
§ 2.  Every such action shall be brought by and in the 
name of the personal representative of such deceased 
person; and the amount recovered shall belong and be 
paid over to the husband or widow of such deceased 
person, if such relative survive him or her; but if no 
husband or widow survive the deceased, the amount 
recovered shall be paid over to his or her lineal 
descendants, and to his or her lineal ancestors in 
default of such descendants; and in every such action 
the jury may give such damages, not exceeding $5,000, 
as they shall deem fair and just in reference to the 
pecuniary injury resulting from such death to the 
relatives of the deceased specified in this section; 
Provided, Every such action shall be commenced within 
two years after the death of such deceased person. 
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
16 
 
• The statute states the conditions under which a 
wrongdoer is liable for wrongful death.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.03.  
• The statute lists the persons who may bring a wrongful 
death action.  Wis. Stat. § 895.04(1).  
• The statute enumerates the persons to whom the amount 
recovered belongs.  Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2). 
¶35 Sections 895.03 and 895.04 are viewed in pari materia, 
having been created together and relating to the same topic.22  
¶36 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.03 states the conditions under 
which a wrongdoer is liable for wrongful death.  It is 
straightforward, clear, and easy to read.  It is largely 
unchanged since the creation of the wrongful death cause of 
action in 1857.   
¶37 The legislature has declared in every iteration of the 
wrongful 
death 
statute 
since 
1857, 
including 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 895.03, that "in every such case" in which a wrongdoer has 
caused death, the wrongdoer is "liable to an action for damages" 
as if death had not ensued.  Thus, the legislature has 
proclaimed that a wrongdoer should be liable for a wrongful 
death when the injured party could have maintained an action and 
recovered damages from the defendant, had the injured party 
survived.   
¶38 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.03 states in full: 
                                                 
22 See Waranka v. Wadena, 2014 WI 28, ¶3, 353 Wis. 2d 619, 
847 N.W.2d 324. 
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
17 
 
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by a 
wrongful act, neglect or default and the act, neglect 
or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, 
have entitled the party injured to maintain an action 
and recover damages in respect thereof, then and in 
every such case the person who would have been liable, 
if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action 
for damages notwithstanding the death of the person 
injured; provided, that such action shall be brought 
for a death caused in this state (emphasis added). 
¶39 No one disputes that the conditions set forth in Wis. 
Stat. § 895.03 that make a wrongdoer liable for wrongful death 
are met in the instant case.   
¶40 Wisconsin Stat. 895.04(1) lists the persons who may 
bring a wrongful death action: 
(1) An action for wrongful death may be brought by the 
personal representative of the deceased person or by 
the person to whom the amount recovered belongs.23 
¶41 In the present case, the wrongful death actions were 
brought by the personal representative and by persons claiming 
to be the persons to whom the amount recovered for wrongful 
death belongs.  No one disputes that the proper persons have 
brought the instant actions. 
¶42 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.04(2) enumerates the persons to 
whom the amount recovered for wrongful death belongs.  Unlike 
Wis. Stat. §§ 895.03 and 895.04(1), § 895.04(2) is a dense and 
                                                 
23 Allowing someone other than the personal representative 
to assert a claim was added to the statute in 1913.  Ch. 186, 
Laws of 1913.  See also § 1, ch. 548, Laws of 1949 (permitting 
an individual to bring a wrongful death action even if the 
individual would also have a survival claim as administrator of 
the estate; amendment supersedes Schilling v. Chicago, N. Shore 
& Milwaukee R. Co., 245 Wis. 2 173, 13 N.W.2d 594 (1944)).  
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
18 
 
difficult statute to read and understand.  It has evolved to its 
present language by repeated legislative amendments. 
¶43 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.04(2) creates a hierarchy of 
persons to whom the amount recovered belongs.24  The first class 
of beneficiaries is the "surviving spouse," with a set-aside for 
minor children "in recognition of the duty and responsibility of 
a parent to support minor children."  The second class is lineal 
heirs. 
¶44 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.04(2) reads as follows: 
(2) If the deceased leaves surviving a spouse or 
domestic partner under ch. 770 and minor children 
under 18 years of age with whose support the deceased 
was legally charged, the court before whom the action 
is pending, or if no action is pending, any court of 
record, in recognition of the duty and responsibility 
of a parent to support minor children, shall determine 
the amount, if any, to be set aside for the protection 
of such children after considering the age of such 
children, the amount involved, the capacity and 
integrity 
of 
the 
surviving 
spouse 
or 
surviving 
domestic partner, and any other facts or information 
it may have or receive, and such amount may be 
impressed by creation of an appropriate lien in favor 
of 
such 
children 
or 
otherwise 
protected 
as 
                                                 
24 Steinbarth, 144 Wis. 2d at 164 ("[Wisconsin Stat. §] 
895.04(2) . . . establishes 
a 
hierarchy 
of 
beneficiaries . . . ."); Cincoski, 4 
Wis. 2d at 
425 ("The 
statutes . . . designate 
preferences 
according 
to 
the 
relationship to the deceased. . . . [T]he nonexistence of the 
preferred beneficiary or beneficiaries is essential to a right 
of action by or in behalf of other beneficiaries.  The action 
must be brought by or for the wrongful death in the order of 
preference fixed by the statute."); Anderson, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 
729 ("[T]he ability to recover under Wisconsin's wrongful death 
statute is similar to intestate succession, namely, a claimant 
has standing only if no other beneficiary higher in the 
hierarchy has standing.").   
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
19 
 
circumstances may warrant, but such amount shall not 
be in excess of 50% of the net amount received after 
deduction of costs of collection.25  If there are no 
such surviving minor children, the amount recovered 
shall belong and be paid to the spouse or domestic 
partner of the deceased; if no spouse or domestic 
partner survives, to the deceased's lineal heirs as 
determined by s. 852.01; if no lineal heirs survive, 
to the deceased's brothers and sisters.26  If any such 
relative dies before judgment in the action, the 
relative next in order shall be entitled to recover 
for the wrongful death.27  A surviving nonresident 
alien spouse or a nonresident alien domestic partner 
                                                 
25 This provision was adopted in substantially this form in 
1962, making the surviving spouse the primary beneficiary and 
granting the minor children a set-aside.  See ch. 649, Laws of 
1961.  See ¶¶111-125, infra, which discuss the statutory history 
of this section. 
Changes subsequent to the 1962 amendment added additional 
beneficiaries 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 895.04(2) 
but 
did 
not 
substantially change the structure of the provision.  For 
example, the legislature added the words "and domestic partners" 
alongside the word "spouse."  2009 Wis. Act 28, § 3269.  
26 See chs. 164, 581, Laws of 1907 (adding "but if no 
husband or widow or lineal descendant or ancestor survive the 
deceased, the amount recovered shall be paid over to the 
brothers and sisters").  Brothers and sisters were added 
apparently in response to Brown v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 102 
Wis. 137, 77 N.W. 748 (1898) (because the statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 4256 (1898), permitted recovery only for the spouse or lineal 
descendants and ancestors of the deceased, brothers and sisters 
could not recover).   
27 See § 1, ch. 263, Laws of 1931.  
The provision relating to the death of a relative before 
judgment in a wrongful death action was added, apparently in 
response to Woodward v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 23 Wis. 400 
(1868) (holding that the wrongful death action terminated when 
deceased's surviving spouse died before judgment).  See Eleason 
v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 254 Wis. 134, 140, 35 N.W.2d 301 
(1948) (holding that the 1931 amendment controlled over previous 
cases holding that wrongful death actions terminated with the 
death of the holder of the claim).   
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
20 
 
under ch. 770 and minor children shall be entitled to 
the benefits of this section.28  In cases subject to s. 
102.29 this subsection shall apply only to the 
surviving spouse's or surviving domestic partner's 
interest in the amount recovered.  If the amount 
allocated to any child under this subsection is less 
than $10,000, s. 807.10 may be applied.  Every 
settlement in wrongful death cases in which the 
deceased leaves minor children under 18 years of age 
shall be void unless approved by a court of record 
authorized to act hereunder (emphasis and footnotes 
added). 
¶45 There is a difference between a wrongful death claim 
and a survival claim.  A wrongful death claim, as we explain 
above, compensates the deceased's relatives for the damages they 
suffer as a result of the deceased's death.29  A survival claim 
                                                 
28 See § 1, ch. 226, Laws of 1911 (amending the statute to 
state explicitly that "non-resident alien surviving relatives 
shall be entitled to the benefits of this section").  The 1911 
provision relating to aliens was apparently inserted in response 
to McMillan v. Spider Lake Sawmill & Lumber Co., 115 Wis. 332, 
91 N.W. 979, 980-81 (1902), in which the court held that 
nonresident alien citizens of foreign countries were not 
entitled to recover under the wrongful death statute.  The 
spouse in McMillan was a Canadian citizen and did not reside in 
the United States.  The McMillan court asserted that the 
legislature did not intend this cause of action to convey 
benefits and recovery to nonresidents.   
Three years later, the legislature again amended the 
statute to limit nonresident alien relatives to a surviving 
spouse and minor children, stating that only "a nonresident 
alien surviving wife and minor children shall be entitled to the 
benefits of this section."  § 1, ch. 35, Laws of 1915. 
29 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.04(4) provides as follows: 
(4) Judgment for damages for pecuniary injury from 
wrongful death may be awarded to any person entitled 
to bring a wrongful death action.  Additional damages 
not to exceed $500,000 per occurrence in the case of a 
deceased minor, or $350,000 per occurrence in the case 
of 
a 
deceased 
adult, 
for 
loss 
of 
society 
and 
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
21 
 
compensates the estate of the deceased (or persons who paid 
expenses on behalf of the estate) for damages suffered by the 
deceased between the time of the injury and the time of death.30    
¶46 The personal representative may bring both a wrongful 
death claim and a survival claim, but the beneficiaries 
receiving the damages recovered under the two claims may be 
different.31  "[T]he right to sue under the wrongful death 
statute must be distinguished from the ownership of the 
recovery.  Because the [wrongful death] action is granted by 
                                                                                                                                                             
companionship may be awarded to the spouse, children 
or parents of the deceased, or to the siblings of the 
deceased, if the siblings were minors at the time of 
the death. 
30 "The survival action is brought by the representative of 
the deceased for personal injury damages suffered by the 
deceased prior to his death.  The damages accrue to the estate 
of the deceased."  Prunty v. Schwantes, 40 Wis. 2d 418, 422, 162 
N.W.2d 34 (1968).   
See also Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 312, 294 
N.W.2d 437, 463 (1980) (quoting Koehler v. Waukesha Milk Co., 
190 Wis. 52, 56, 208 N.W. 901 (1926)): 
The cause of action for the [deceased]'s pain and 
suffering which . . . passes to a decedent's estate[ ] 
is separate and distinct from this wrongful death 
action.  The estate's action is for the wrong to the 
injured person; the wrongful death action belongs to 
named beneficiaries for their pecuniary loss; the 
latter action begins where the former ends.  "It is 
not a double recovery, but a recovery for a double 
wrong."  
31 Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 310. 
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
22 
 
statute, 
ownership 
of 
the 
recovery 
is 
limited 
to 
the 
beneficiaries designated under the statute."32     
¶47 In order to determine whether a beneficiary exists who 
may recover under a wrongful death claim, the court has 
frequently grappled with disputes regarding the interpretation 
of 
the 
wrongful 
death 
statute's 
hierarchical 
beneficiary 
structure.33  The legislature did not anticipate numerous fact 
                                                 
Wisconsin Stat. 895.04(5) provides: 
(5) If the personal representative brings the action, 
the personal representative may also recover the 
reasonable cost of medical expenses, funeral expenses, 
including the reasonable cost of a cemetery lot, grave 
marker and care of the lot.  If a relative brings the 
action, 
the 
relative 
may 
recover 
such 
medical 
expenses, funeral expenses, including the cost of a 
cemetery lot, grave marker and care of the lot, on 
behalf of himself or herself or of any person who has 
paid or assumed liability for such expenses. 
32 Weiss v. Regent Props., Ltd., 118 Wis. 2d 225, 230, 346 
N.W.2d 766 (1984) (citations omitted) (citing Nichols v. U.S. 
Fid. & Guar. Co., 13 Wis. 2d 491, 497, 109 N.W.2d 131 (1961)).  
See also 2 The Law of Damages in Wisconsin § 16.15 at 16-18 
(Russell M. Ware et al. eds. 2014) ("Because the purpose of 
allowing damages for wrongful death is to compensate the 
deceased's relatives for their loss, wrongful death damages do 
not become a part of the deceased's estate.").   
33 The courts have reached various outcomes based on the 
facts of each case. 
Cases holding for the lower-tier beneficiary to recover: 
• Steinbarth v. Johannes, 144 Wis. 2d 159, 423 
N.W.2d 540 (1988) (holding that a spouse who 
intentionally killed the deceased is not a 
"surviving spouse" and that the children hold the 
claim as lineal heirs); 
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
23 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
• Krause v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 14 Wis. 2d 666, 112 
N.W.2d 134 (1961) (holding that although the 
spouse died shortly after the deceased, the 
children held the claim, because satisfying the 
purposes of the statute required that the phrase 
"surviving spouse" not mean the spouse of the 
deceased who is living at the time of the death 
of the deceased, but rather the "spouse of the 
deceased living when the action was commenced"); 
• Lasecki v. Kabara, 235 Wis. 645, 294 N.W. 33 
(1940) (holding that although the children did 
not have an independent claim of action against 
their father for the wrongful death of their 
mother, 
when 
the 
mother 
herself 
died, 
the 
wrongful death that claim she held went to her 
children). 
Cases holding against the lower-tier beneficiary: 
• Cogger v. Trudell, 35 Wis. 2d 350, 359, 151 
N.W.2d 146 (1967) (holding that the deceased's 
spouse who negligently killed the spouse is a 
surviving spouse, and that their children have no 
claim); 
• Hanson v. Valdivia, 51 Wis. 2d 466, 475, 187 
N.W.2d 151 
(1971) 
(holding 
that 
when 
the 
deceased's spouse alleged to be responsible for 
the death survived, the minor surviving children 
"do not have a cause of action for the wrongful 
death of one of their parents when the [deceased] 
is survived by his or her spouse, and the fact 
that the surviving spouse was responsible for the 
death does not create a new cause of action in 
the children"); 
• Woodward v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 23 Wis. 400 
(1868) (holding that when the deceased's husband 
died while pursuing a wrongful death claim 
against the defendant, the husband's wrongful 
death claim cannot survive his death), superseded 
by statute as stated in Eleason v. Western Cas. & 
Sur. Co., 254 Wis. 134, 139, 35 N.W.2d 301 
(1948). 
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
24 
 
scenarios in its enactment of the wrongful death statute, and 
the courts have had to fill the gaps in the statute.  
¶48 To determine the meaning of the phrase "surviving 
spouse" in the unique fact scenario of the instant case, we must 
fill the gap in the statute.  In enacting Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.04(2), the legislature did not anticipate the fact 
scenario presented in the instant case in which a long-time 
estranged spouse does not obtain a divorce, has no recoverable 
damages on the death of the deceased husband, and has no legal 
obligation to support nonmarital minor children of the deceased.   
¶49 In referring to a "surviving spouse" and creating a 
hierarchical structure of beneficiaries in the wrongful death 
statute, the legislature envisioned an intact marriage with 
minor marital children whom both the deceased and the deceased's 
spouse were obliged to support.  Indeed, "[a] careful reading of 
the entire section [895.04(2)] makes it clear that the trial 
court in an attempt to protect the children must work from the 
amount recovered by the spouse who is charged with the support 
of the minor children."34   
¶50 The defendants argue that the statutory hierarchy of 
beneficiaries bars the minor children in the present case from 
asserting a claim for wrongful death because the deceased left a 
                                                                                                                                                             
• Bowen v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 2012 WI App 29, 
¶19, 340 Wis. 2d 232, 811 N.W.2d 887 (holding 
that a primary beneficiary under the wrongful 
death statutes could not waive his claim and pass 
it on to a secondary beneficiary). 
34 Cogger, 35 Wis. 2d at 358. 
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
25 
 
living spouse, and the surviving spouse, Linda Force, cannot 
claim any damages for wrongful death according to the circuit 
court.  
¶51 The defendants rest their position on a literal 
interpretation of the phrase "surviving spouse":  
• Linda Force is the spouse of the deceased;  
• she is still living;  
• as an estranged spouse she cannot, according to the 
circuit court's dismissal of her claim, recover 
damages any for pecuniary loss and loss of society and 
companionship; 
• the minor children's share is limited under the 
statute to a set-aside from the surviving spouse's 
recovery; and  
• because Linda Force's recovery is zero, the minor 
children's set-aside is also zero. 
¶52 The defendants' reading of the statute is not without 
support in the text, but the defendants' interpretation is not 
necessarily a reasonable reading of the phrase "surviving 
spouse" in unique fact situations.   
¶53 First, the statute does not define who is or is not a 
surviving spouse.35   
¶54 Second, the text of Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2) does not 
expressly state that minor children are barred from recovery 
when a surviving spouse fails to recover any damages.  Rather, 
                                                 
35 Steinbarth, 144 Wis. 2d 159. 
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
26 
 
§ 895.04(2) provides that minor children get a set-aside from 
the surviving spouse's recovery and recover as lineal heirs if 
no surviving spouse exists.   
¶55 A study of the text demonstrates that we are unable to 
discern the answer to our inquiry in the present case by a mere 
examination of the words of Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2) isolated from 
interpretive aids.  We next look for assistance from the 
legislative pronouncement of the purposes of the wrongful death 
statutes. 
IV 
¶56 The minor children's position that they should recover 
under 
the 
wrongful 
death 
statutes 
is 
supported 
by 
the 
legislative 
purposes 
advanced 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 895.03 
and 895.04(2).  
¶57 The legislature has declared in Wis. Stat. §§ 895.03 
and 895.04(2) that the purposes of the wrongful death statutes 
are (1) to hold wrongdoers liable for damages upon death of an 
injured person, and (2) to compensate relatives of the injured 
party for the losses caused by the wrongful act.  A holding that 
the minor children cannot maintain a wrongful death claim in the 
instant case would contravene those fundamental purposes.  The 
wrongdoers would escape liability and the minor children would 
not be compensated for their losses.   
¶58 The purposes of the wrongful death statutes have 
existed since the law's enactment in 1857.  The wrongful death 
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
27 
 
statute was enacted to correct a perceived injustice at common 
law providing no cause of action for wrongful death.36     
¶59 As the Prosser & Keeton treatise explains, the common-
law rule had perverse "intolerable" consequences: "The result 
was that it was cheaper for the defendant to kill the plaintiff 
than to injure him, and that the most grievous of all injuries 
left the bereaved family of the victim, who frequently were 
destitute, without a remedy."37   
                                                 
36 See Rudiger v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry. 
Co., 94 Wis. 191, 68 N.W. 661 (1896):  
It was the obvious purpose of this statute to reverse 
this rule of law, and to provide that the right of 
action should survive, as in case of damages to 
property, and, of course, be liable to be prosecuted 
by or against an executor. . . . The statute under 
consideration was enacted to supply the manifest 
defect in the law as it thus existed, and to provide a 
remedy against the wrongdoer, if death ensued in 
consequence of his negligent or wrongful act (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
According to Blackstone, when a husband or father was 
injured or killed, the wife or child could not recover.  3 
William Blackstone, Commentaries *142-43.  As the seminal 
English case Baker v. Bolton, Eng. Rep. (1808) 1 Camp. 493; 10 
R.R. 734, noted, "in a civil court the death of a human being 
could not be complained of as an injury . . . ." 
The common-law rule barring claims for wrongful death was 
criticized by the second Justice Harlan in Moragne v. States 
Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).  The Moragne Court 
observed that the common-law rule against wrongful death claims 
was criticized as "barbarous" and set forth no "persuasive, 
independent justification" for distinguishing between two claims 
claiming a breach of the same primary duty to the injured party 
simply because the injured party happened to die in one instance 
and not the other.  Moragne, 398 U.S. at 381-82. 
37 Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 127, at 945 (5th ed. 1984). 
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
28 
 
¶60 In 1846, Parliament passed Lord Campbell's Act, which 
sidestepped the common law and created a statutory right of 
action for surviving spouses, children, and parents, as well as 
other lineal descendants.38   
¶61 States too adopted laws recognizing a statutory right 
of action for wrongful death.   
¶62 In Wisconsin, the wrongful death statute enacted in 
1857 was an almost verbatim copy of the New York wrongful death 
statute,39 which itself was copied nearly word for word from Lord 
Campbell's Act.40  
¶63 A New York court explained that the New York statute 
extended the principle of liability to a wrongdoer who causes 
the death of another and gave the right to damages to 
representatives of the deceased.41 
¶64 Wisconsin courts have echoed these general principles 
as the driving purposes behind the wrongful death statutes.  
                                                 
38 For a discussion of the evolution of the rules governing 
wrongful death suits in England and the United States, see Wex 
S. Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 Stan. L. Rev. 1043 
(1965). 
39 Compare ch. 71, Laws of 1857, with N.Y. Laws of 1847, ch. 
450.  See also Whiton v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 21 Wis. 305, 
308 (1867) (noting that New York and Wisconsin employ "the same 
statute"). 
40 See John Fabian Witt, From Loss of Services to Loss of 
Support: The Wrongful Death Statutes, the Origins of Modern Tort 
Law, and the Making of the Nineteenth-Century Family, 25 Law & 
Soc. Inquiry 717, 734 (2000). 
41 Baker v. Bailey, 16 Barb. 54, 60, 1852 WL 5345 (N.Y. Gen. 
Term. 1852). 
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
29 
 
First, "[t]he injustices and hardships resulting from the common 
law principles in wrongful death cases caused the legislature to 
create statutory remedies and liability."42  
¶65 Second, "[t]he purpose of the wrongful death statute 
is to compensate for the loss of the relational interest 
existing between the beneficiaries and the deceased."43   
¶66 In 1961 the legislature explicitly protected the 
interests of minor children of the deceased "in recognition of 
the duty and responsibility of a parent to support minor 
children."44  
¶67 In 
contrast 
to 
these 
purposes, 
the 
defendants' 
interpretation of the wrongful death statutes liberates the 
alleged wrongdoer from all liability for the wrongful death in 
the instant case.  According to the defendants, the liability of 
the wrongdoer for the deceased's death in the present case is 
zero and no relative of the deceased, including his minor 
children, recovers any amount.  If we accept the defendants' 
reasoning, the wrongdoer in the instant case gets a windfall at 
                                                 
42 Cogger, 35 Wis. 2d at 353. 
43 Chang v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 182 Wis. 2d 549, 
560-61, 514 N.W.2d 399 (1994) (internal quotation marks and 
quoted source omitted). 
44 See ¶¶42-49 and accompanying notes, supra. 
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
30 
 
the 
expense 
of 
the 
deceased's 
surviving 
dependent 
minor 
children.45   
¶68 The 
defendants' 
interpretation 
contravenes 
the 
legislative purposes and produces an unfair, unreasonable, or 
absurd result that the legislature could not have intended. 
V 
¶69 We turn to case law to assist us in interpreting the 
phrase "surviving spouse" within the context of the wrongful 
death statutes.   
¶70 In several cases, the court has employed a literal 
interpretation of the phrase "surviving spouse," holding that a 
spouse living at the time of the wrongful death is a "surviving 
spouse" under the wrongful death statutes.46  In other cases 
courts have not read the phrase literally.47  No prior case is 
directly on point, but we can derive principles from the case 
law that inform our resolution of the instant case.   
¶71 We begin with Cogger v. Trudell, 35 Wis. 2d 350, 353, 
151 N.W.2d 146 (1967), a lead case governing to whom a recovered 
                                                 
45 This case does not address the survival action of the 
deceased's estate.  See Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1)(am)7.  Survival 
actions are different from wrongful death actions.  See supra 
¶¶45-46.     
46 See, e.g., Hanson, 51 Wis. 2d 466; Cogger, 35 Wis. 2d at 
354-55; Bowen, 340 Wis. 2d 232. 
47 See, e.g., Steinbarth, 144 Wis. 2d at 165; Xiong ex rel. 
Edmondson v. Xiong, 2002 WI App 110, 255 Wis. 2d 693, 648 
N.W.2d 900.   
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
31 
 
wrongful death award belongs when a living spouse may not be 
able to recover damages and children seek to recover.  
¶72 In Cogger, Darla Trudell was killed in a car accident. 
She was the passenger; her husband, Joseph Trudell, was the 
driver.  The two minor Trudell children sued their father, as 
well as the driver of the other car.   
¶73 The father, being one of the defendants in the 
wrongful death suit, could not bring a claim for wrongful death 
on his own behalf against himself.  The children argued that 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2), as amended in 1962,48 gave the children 
equal status with the surviving spouse, and thus, the fact that 
the father was alive did not bar their claim.   
¶74 The Cogger court held that Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2) 
created a "series of priorities with regard to the ownership of 
a cause of action for wrongful death" and that these priorities 
were not changed by the 1962 amendment, which added the 
provision allowing a court to determine an amount to be set 
aside for the minor children from the surviving spouse's 
recovery.49  
¶75 The Cogger court rejected the children's argument that 
the 1962 amendment creating a set-aside for minor children had 
put both the surviving spouse and the surviving children in the 
first priority class.50  Rather, the court stated:  "A careful 
                                                 
48 Ch. 649, Laws of 1961 (enacted Jan. 30, 1962). 
49 Cogger, 35 Wis. 2d at 354-55. 
50 The Cogger court explained: 
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
32 
 
reading of the entire section makes it clear that the trial 
court . . . must work from the amount recovered by the spouse 
who is charged with the support of the minor children."51  
¶76 Looking to case law construing the pre-1962 wrongful 
death statutes, the court concluded that both before and after 
the 1962 amendment, "[t]he beneficiaries and their preferred 
status are as follows:  First, the spouse; second, a child or 
children; third, the parents.  Thus the nonexistence of the 
preferred beneficiary or beneficiaries is essential to a right 
of action by or in behalf of other beneficiaries."52  
¶77 Even though one of the two children in Cogger was not 
the child of the surviving spouse, the Cogger court assumed that 
the surviving spouse had an obligation to support both children 
and interpreted the statute as specifically addressing minor 
children supported by the surviving spouse.53   
                                                                                                                                                             
The general plan of the statute was not changed.  It 
was only amended to allow the courts to deal with the 
proceeds which would otherwise go to the surviving 
spouse in such a way as to protect the dependent 
children. 
We believe that if the legislature had intended to 
create a cause of action in the surviving children in 
situations where previously none had existed, it would 
have done so in a more direct and clear manner.   
Cogger, 35 Wis. 2d at 356-57. 
51 Id. at 358 
52 Id. at 355 (quoting Cincoski, 4 Wis. 2d at 425). 
53 Id. at 357. 
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
33 
 
¶78 Cogger has been invoked in several cases to bar a 
minor child's recovery when the surviving spouse who had the 
obligation to support the children was allegedly responsible in 
some way for the wrongful death.  Perhaps the result of these 
cases may be explained by the fact that holding for the children 
who were supported by the surviving spouse could indirectly 
inure to the benefit of the surviving spouse who caused the 
death.  
¶79 In Hanson v. Valdivia, 51 Wis. 2d 466, 187 N.W.2d 151 
(1971), the minor children of the surviving spouse and the 
deceased were barred from bringing suit for the deceased 
parent's wrongful death when the surviving parent allegedly 
caused the wrongful death. 
¶80 The Hanson court relied on Cogger, stating that 
"surviving children do not have a cause of action for the 
wrongful death of one of their parents when the [deceased] is 
survived by his or her spouse, and the fact that the surviving 
spouse was responsible for the death does not create a new cause 
of action in the children."  Hanson, 51 Wis. 2d at 475. 
¶81 A second case, Bowen v. American Family Insurance Co., 
2012 WI App 29, 340 Wis. 2d 232, 811 N.W.2d 887, held that even 
when the surviving spouse expressly waives the wrongful death 
claim, the Cogger rule still applies and the child has no 
recovery.   
¶82 In Bowen, the deceased died while a passenger in a car 
driven by her spouse when the car collided with another car.  An 
adult child of the deceased and the spouse argued that even if 
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
34 
 
the Cogger rule applied, the court should look to the spouse's 
express disclaimer of his wrongful death claim to pass the claim 
on to the adult child. 
¶83 The court of appeals declared that the living spouse 
was a "surviving spouse," even though the spouse did not wish to 
pursue a claim and did not want to be a "surviving spouse."54 
¶84 The Cogger decision and its progeny are informative, 
but Cogger is not dispositive in the present case.  The Cogger 
court did not consider the fact situation presented in the 
instant case, in which the deceased's spouse is not negligent in 
causing the death, has no obligation to support the deceased's 
minor children, and (according to the circuit court) cannot 
recover damages for wrongful death  under any circumstances.55 
¶85 A third case that adheres to Cogger and informs our 
decision in the present case is Xiong ex rel. Edmondson v. 
Xiong, 2002 WI App 110, 255 Wis. 2d 693, 648 N.W.2d 900.   
¶86 Mai Xiong died as a passenger in a car driven by Nhia 
Xiong.  Mai Xiong and Nhia Xiong were the parents of minor and 
adult children.  The Xiong children brought a wrongful death 
action against their father, Nhia Xiong.  The circuit court 
dismissed 
the 
children's 
action 
because 
Nhia 
Xiong 
was 
responsible for Mai Xiong's death and, pursuant to Cogger, could 
not recover in a wrongful death claim.  The Xiong children 
                                                 
54 Bowen, 340 Wis. 2d 232, ¶¶13-14. 
55 In Cogger, the living spouse apparently may have pursued 
his own independent claim against the other driver.  Cogger, 35 
Wis. 2d at 358. 
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
35 
 
argued that the parents were not married, and thus, that their 
father was not a "surviving spouse." 
¶87 On appeal, the court of appeals observed that there 
was no evidence of any official marriage of the parents, in 
Laos, Thailand, or Wisconsin.56  Nonetheless, the court valued 
the unique facts over the literal interpretation of "surviving 
spouse" and determined that the word "spouse" in the wrongful 
death statute could include a "putative spouse."  The court of 
appeals assessed the unique facts surrounding the relationship 
between the parents and used its "equity powers" to recognize 
the relationship as sufficient to establish Nhia Xiong as the 
"surviving spouse" for the purposes of the wrongful death 
statute.57   
¶88 The court of appeals in the Xiong case then applied 
Cogger and concluded that a surviving spouse existed and the 
children could not recover.58 
¶89 Cogger and its progeny at first blush seem to preclude 
the children's recovery in the instant case.  
¶90 On closer examination, however, Cogger and its progeny 
are, as we explained previously, factually distinguishable from 
the present case.  They therefore are not dispositive.  Linda 
Force did not contribute in any manner to the injury and death 
                                                 
56 Xiong, 255 Wis. 2d 693, ¶¶14-16.  The father did not 
submit any evidence contradicting the children's assertion that 
the marriage was not valid or recognized at law.  Id., ¶18. 
57 Xiong, 255 Wis. 2d 693, ¶¶20-21. 
58 Id., ¶25. 
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
36 
 
of the deceased.  Rather, the circuit court concluded that she 
cannot recover because of her estrangement from the deceased.  
Because Linda Force has no support obligations to the deceased's 
minor children, she will not benefit if the children recover 
damages for wrongful death.   
¶91 Furthermore, Xiong buttresses the minor children's 
position in the instant case.  Xiong teaches that courts 
interpret Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2) in line with the unique fact 
situation and the purposes of the wrongful death statutes, 
rather than in line with formal compliance with laws governing 
the formation of a marriage.   
¶92 In Xiong, the parties treated each other as husband 
and wife, and the court concluded that they should be treated as 
married under the wrongful death statutes even though no proof 
of a formal marriage at law existed.   
¶93 In the instant case, the parties were estranged for 
over a decade.  Adhering to the teaching of Xiong and examining 
the unique relationship of the parties in the present case 
dictate that the long-time estranged relationship not be treated 
as a marriage and that Linda Force not be considered a 
"surviving spouse" under Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2).  
¶94 Additional support for the children's position comes 
from Steinbarth v. Johannes, 144 Wis. 2d 159, 423 N.W.2d 540 
(1988).   
¶95 Steinbarth, like Xiong, relied on the unique facts 
rather than the formality of the legal relationship.  Steinbarth 
teaches that under unusual circumstances in which the purposes 
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
37 
 
of the statutes would not be met, the phrase "surviving spouse" 
excludes a living spouse and the children may recover damages 
under the wrongful death statutes. 
¶96 In Steinbarth, the husband allegedly intentionally 
shot and killed his wife.  The deceased wife's adult children 
(the husband's stepchildren) sued the husband for wrongful 
death.  Using a literal interpretation of the statute rendering 
the husband a "surviving spouse," the circuit court and court of 
appeals concluded that the adult children's wrongful death claim 
was barred under Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2) (1985-86).59  The supreme 
court reversed.   
¶97 The Steinbarth court was persuaded that statutes 
prohibiting an intentional killer from benefiting from the crime 
aided in interpreting the phrase "surviving spouse" in the 
wrongful death statute.60  The Steinbarth court held "that a 
spouse who 'feloniously and intentionally' kills his or her 
spouse is not a surviving spouse for purposes of [the wrongful 
death statutes], and is treated as having predeceased the 
decedent so that the cause of action may accrue to the next 
designated beneficiary."61  
                                                 
59 Steinbarth, 144 
Wis. 2d at 165.  The statute in 
Steinbarth is substantially identical to the present statute in 
the relevant provisions. 
60 Id. at 166-167 (e.g., life insurance, beneficiary under 
contract, joint tenancy). 
61 Id. at 167-68 (emphasis added). 
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
38 
 
¶98 The Steinbarth court noted that the unique facts of 
the case dictated the outcome.  The court reasoned that an 
alternative holding would create an "anomalous result" that 
"[t]he legislature could not have intended."62   
¶99 The Steinbarth court distinguished Cogger.  Cogger 
involved a surviving spouse who negligently caused the wrongful 
death; no basis existed in Cogger for stopping a surviving 
spouse who unintentionally but negligently caused the spouse's 
death from seeking wrongful death benefits for the loss of the 
spouse from a more negligent wrongdoer.63   
¶100 On the other hand, in Steinbarth, the "surviving 
spouse," a felonious and intentional killer, could not "under 
any conceivable circumstance seek recovery under the wrongful 
death statute for the loss of the decedent."64  Unlike Cogger and 
its progeny, the surviving spouse in Steinbarth had no claim 
against a third-party wrongdoer or any ability to recover for 
wrongful death of the deceased. 
¶101 The instant case does not align precisely with Cogger, 
Hanson, Bowen, Xiong, or Steinbarth.  Nevertheless, these cases 
support the conclusion that under the unique facts of the 
instant case, the claim of the minor children should prevail.   
¶102 The case law demonstrates that the meaning of the 
phrase "surviving spouse" has been elucidated by scrutinizing 
                                                 
62 Id. at 167. 
63 Id. at 168. 
64 Id. at 169. 
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
39 
 
unique fact situations to define "surviving spouse" in accord 
with the legislative purposes of the wrongful death statutes, 
rather than considering only the literal meaning of the phrase 
"surviving spouse."  Linda Force, like the spouse in Steinbarth, 
is 
barred 
from 
recovering 
for 
wrongful 
death 
under 
any 
circumstances, according to the circuit court.  To hold against 
the children here would allow a wrongdoer to escape liability 
and deprive relatives of recovery for their loss, simply because 
of an unusual fact scenario.   
¶103 Courts in other jurisdictions that have wrongful death 
laws similar to Wisconsin's placing children in a secondary 
beneficiary class,65 when confronted with unique facts, have held 
that the secondary beneficiaries have a claim even when the 
primary beneficiary may exist.  Courts have allowed ameliorating 
common-law principles to apply to fill in a legislature's 
unintended gaps in a wrongful death statute.  
¶104 The case Evans v. Atlantic Cement Co., 272 So. 2d 538, 
541 (Fla. Ct. App. 1973), is a typical example of a court 
looking to the unique factual circumstances to fulfill the 
underlying purpose of the wrongful death statute.  In Evans, the 
court held that a woman who lived with the deceased for nine-
and-a-half years and had children with him, and for whom the 
decedent provided support, could maintain an action for wrongful 
                                                 
65 See Stuart M. Speiser & James E. Rooks, Jr., Recovery for 
Wrongful Death § 3:3 & n.2 (4th ed. 2005) (noting that in some 
jurisdictions children are among the primary beneficiary class, 
while in others, listed in the footnote, children are designated 
secondary beneficiaries behind the surviving spouse). 
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
40 
 
death although she was not literally a "surviving spouse" of the 
deceased.  The deceased was survived by a surviving spouse and 
another child from a different marriage who, under Florida law, 
could maintain a wrongful death action.   
¶105 The court reasoned that it had to construe the statute 
in the context of the unique facts of the case in order to avoid 
a result contrary to the purposes of the wrongful death statute:  
[T]he preference given by statute to a spouse over a 
child presupposes the existence of a family, including 
a parent-child relationship, in the survivors.  When 
the statutes are examined entire, the conclusion 
cannot 
be 
reasonably 
reached 
that 
these 
class 
priorities were intended by the legislature to be 
applied where the fundamental family relationships 
have been legally destroyed. . . . It is unreasonable 
to conclude the legislature intended that dependent 
children or other family members be left without 
support or remedy, in favor of strangers to them. 
. . . .  
[W]e believe the literal wording of the statute [is] 
applicable 
where 
fundamental 
family 
relationships 
still 
obtain. 
However, 
where . . . the 
family 
relationships have ruptured or divided . . . it is 
proper to allow the additional classes to intervene.66   
¶106 Other 
state 
courts 
have 
permitted 
secondary 
beneficiaries to recover damages  when the deceased's spouse is 
still alive.  They have done so on a variety of grounds.   
¶107 For example, in Foster v. Jeffers, 813 S.W.2d 449 
(Tenn. App. 1991), the Tennessee court of appeals held that when 
a spouse still living after the death of the deceased 
                                                 
66 Evans v. Atlantic Cement Co., 272 So. 2d 538, 541 (Fla. 
Ct. App. 1973).  
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
41 
 
affirmatively 
waives 
his 
or 
her 
claim, 
the 
secondary 
beneficiaries (in that case, the deceased's nephews) can collect 
the proceeds from the wrongful death action.67  The Foster court 
reasoned that a secondary beneficiary, who would otherwise be 
barred from a claim by the existence of a surviving spouse, must 
be able to pursue a claim "to keep alive the decedent's cause of 
action" and to achieve the statutory purpose of ending the 
regime in which "it was more economical to kill someone than to 
merely inflict a nonfatal injury."68  Although Wisconsin courts 
have explicitly rejected this waiver approach to the wrongful 
death 
statute,69 
Foster 
is 
instructive, 
standing 
for 
the 
proposition that sister states with hierarchical beneficiary 
structures permit secondary beneficiaries to collect even when 
primary beneficiaries are still alive, in order to fulfill the 
purposes of the statute in unusual or unique fact situations. 
¶108 Georgia courts have similarly held that in some 
circumstances, secondary beneficiaries can recover damages when 
the deceased's spouse is still alive.  In Brown v. Liberty Oil & 
Refining Corp., 403 S.E.2d 806 (Ga. 1991), the Georgia Supreme 
Court held that although the deceased's spouse was still alive 
and prior interpretations of the statute had barred children's 
                                                 
67 Foster v. Jeffers, 813 S.W.2d 449 (Tenn. App. 1991); but 
see Bowen, 340 Wis. 2d 232, ¶¶13-15 (rejecting this waiver rule 
in Wisconsin). 
68 Foster, 813 S.W.2d at 452. 
69 Bowen, 340 Wis. 2d 232, ¶¶13-15 (rejecting this waiver 
rule in Wisconsin). 
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
42 
 
wrongful death claims when there was a surviving spouse,70 in the 
unique fact scenario of the case in which the surviving spouse 
abandoned the children and could not be located, "the factual 
circumstances of this case demand the exercise of [equity] 
powers to preserve the rights of the minor children."71  The 
Georgia courts have subsequently applied this holding to other 
unusual fact scenarios to hold that secondary beneficiary 
children can recover damages for wrongful death even when the 
deceased's spouse is still alive.72 
¶109 Although these cases are not dispositive of the 
instant case and do not present a unified theory, they are 
informative in teaching that state courts have recognized that 
secondary wrongful death beneficiaries can bring claims in 
unique fact scenarios in which barring such claims would 
undermine or contradict the wrongful death statutes' purposes of 
punishing wrongdoers and compensating the deceased's relatives. 
¶110 In sum, Wisconsin case law and case law from other 
jurisdictions supports the children's claim in the present case.   
VI 
¶111 Finally, we examine the statutory history.  We have 
explored statutory history previously in our discussion of the 
text, the legislative purposes, and the case law.  The statutory 
                                                 
70 See Mack v. Moore, 345 S.E.2d 338 (Ga. 1986). 
71 Brown v. Liberty Oil & Ref. Corp., 403 S.E.2d 806, 808 
(Ga. 1991). 
72 Emory Univ. v. Dorsey, 429 S.E.2d 307 (Ga. App. 1993). 
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
43 
 
history shows that the legislature has repeatedly amended the 
classes of potential beneficiaries.  It appears from the 
statutory history that when a court excluded a class from being 
a beneficiary, often the legislature would amend the wrongful 
death statute to include the class.73   
¶112 For our purposes, amendments in 1961 and 1962 are key 
in the statutory history, because they directly addressed the 
right of minor children to recover for wrongful death. 
¶113 Before 1961, the statute made the spouse the primary 
beneficiary and the children secondary beneficiaries as lineal 
heirs of the deceased: 
The amount recovered shall belong and be paid to the 
spouse of the deceased; if no spouse survives, to the 
deceased's lineal heirs as determined by section 
237.01; if no lineal heirs survive, to the deceased's 
brothers and sisters.  If any such relative dies 
before judgment in the action, the relative next in 
order shall be entitled to recover for the wrongful 
death.  A surviving nonresident alien wife and minor 
children shall be entitled to the benefits of this 
section. 
Wis. Stat. § 331.04(2) (1959-60). 
¶114 The 
1961 
amendment 
switched 
the 
order 
of 
the 
beneficiaries, placing the children as primary beneficiaries and 
the surviving spouse as a secondary beneficiary.  If there were 
                                                 
73 See, e.g., chs. 164, 581, Laws of 1907 (permitting 
recovery for brothers and sisters, superseding Brown, 102 Wis. 
137); ch. 226, Laws of 1911 (permitting nonresident aliens to 
recover, superseding McMillan, 115 Wis. 332); § 1, ch. 263, Laws 
of 1931 (allowing beneficiaries in the hierarchy to recover if a 
higher beneficiary died, superseding Woodward, 23 Wis. 400). 
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
44 
 
no minor children, the surviving spouse recovered.  The 
legislature amended the statute in 1961 to read as follows: 
If the deceased leaves surviving a spouse, and minor 
children with whose support he was legally charged, 
said minor children shall be entitled to an amount as 
fixed by the circuit court . . . ; said benefits to be 
used for the support of such child or children during 
their minority, and after the youngest child reaches 
21 years of age, the balance, if any, shall be divided 
equally among said children surviving.  The remainder 
of the amount recovered or the amount recovered if 
there are no such surviving minor children shall 
belong 
and 
be 
paid 
to 
the 
spouse 
of 
the 
deceased . . . . 
Ch. 285, Laws of 1961 (enacted July 27, 1961). 
¶115 The bill drafting file does not reveal the backstory 
of this amendment, but the language makes clear that the 
legislature intended to favor minor children whom the deceased 
was legally charged to support over a surviving spouse.     
¶116 A 1962 amendment reveals the legislature's second 
thoughts about the newly adopted 1961 hierarchy.  The bill 
drafting file of the 1962 amendment also does not reveal the 
backstory of this amendment. 
¶117 The 1962 amendment, adopted about six months after the 
1961 amendment, returned the surviving spouse to primary 
beneficiary status but protected the minor children by creating 
a set-aside from the surviving spouse's recovery.  This 
amendment 
supports 
the 
defendant's 
interpretation 
of 
the 
wrongful death statute that the children are not in the primary 
class of beneficiaries. 
¶118 The 1962 amendment reads as follows: 
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
45 
 
If the deceased leaves surviving a spouse, and minor 
children under 18 years of age with whose support he 
was legally charged, the court before whom an action 
is pending, or if no action is pending, any court of 
record, in recognition of the duty and responsibility 
of a parent to support his minor children, shall 
determine the amount, if any, to be set aside for the 
protection of such children after considering the age 
of such children, the amount involved, the capacity 
and integrity of the surviving spouse, and any other 
facts or information it may have or receive, and such 
amount may be impressed by creation of an appropriate 
lien in favor of such children or otherwise protected 
as circumstances may warrant, but such amount shall 
not be in excess of 50 per cent of the net amount 
received after deduction of costs of collection.  If 
there are no such surviving minor children, the amount 
recovered shall belong and be paid to the spouse of 
the deceased . . . . 
Ch. 649, Laws of 1961 (enacted Jan. 30, 1962).   
¶119 This 1962 amendment gave the courts discretion to 
consider how much the set-aside for the minor children would be, 
considering "the age of such children, the amount involved, the 
capacity and integrity of the surviving spouse, and any other 
facts or information [they] may have or receive."  The 
legislature made clear that the statute was enacted to protect 
the spouse but also to recognize "the duty and responsibility of 
a parent to support his minor children."   
 
¶120 Other than the 1961 and 1962 amendments, in recent 
years the legislature has left the wrongful death statutes 
largely intact in the wake of cases depriving or granting the 
children recovery in unusual fact situations.   
¶121 Cogger established that a surviving spouse, even one 
who was a wrongdoer in causing the deceased's death, remained a 
primary beneficiary despite cutting off the claims of the minor 
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
46 
 
children.74  After Cogger, the legislature took no action to 
amend the statute. 
¶122 Steinbarth established that a living spouse who 
intentionally kills the deceased cannot be a surviving spouse 
under the wrongful death statute, and the children can recover.75  
Again, the legislature took no action to amend the statute. 
¶123 According 
to 
the 
defendants, 
their 
position 
is 
supported by the legislature's failure to revise Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.04(2) after Cogger and other cases.  These cases barred 
secondary 
beneficiaries 
from 
recovering 
under 
certain 
circumstances. 
¶124 We are not persuaded that the legislative inaction 
supports the defendants.  Legislative inaction is ordinarily 
weak evidence of legislative acquiescence in or countenance of a 
judicial or executive branch interpretation.76 
¶125 Rather, the statutory history, including the 1961 and 
1962 amendments, teaches that the legislature has protected the 
interests of both the surviving spouse and the minor children 
                                                 
74 Cogger, 35 Wis. 2d at 354-55. 
75 Steinbarth, 144 Wis. 2d at 165-67. 
76 See Green Bay Packaging, Inc. v. DILHR, 72 Wis. 2d  26, 
36, 240 N.W.2d 422 (1976) ("[L]egislative inaction . . . has 
been called 'a week [sic] reed upon which to lean' and a 'poor 
beacon' to follow in construing a statute" (quoted source 
omitted)); Milwaukee Journal Sentinel v. City of Milwaukee, 2012 
WI 65, ¶43 n.21, 341 Wis. 2d 607, 815 N.W.2d 367 (noting that 
"cases 
have 
expressed 
skepticism 
about 
the 
meaning 
of 
legislative inaction") (citing Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, 
¶32, 274 Wis. 2d 220, 682 N.W.2d 405). 
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
47 
 
and that the legislature has left interpretation of the phrase 
"surviving spouse" to the courts when unanticipated fact 
scenarios have emerged. 
¶126 In the instant case, we must consider, as the 
statutory history instructs, the interests of both the surviving 
spouse and the children based on the facts at hand. 
* * * * 
¶127 For the reasons set forth, we interpret the phrase 
"surviving spouse" in the present case as not including Linda 
Force, the deceased's estranged spouse who, as a result of the 
circuit court's dismissal of her wrongful death claim (which was 
not appealed), is barred from recovery under Wis. Stat. 
§§ 895.03 and 895.04(2).  If Linda Force is not a "surviving 
spouse" under the statute, the parties do not dispute that the 
minor children have a cognizable claim as lineal heirs.  As 
lineal heirs of the deceased, the children would be first in 
line for any recovery for the wrongful death of their father.   
¶128 We conclude that the circuit court erred in granting 
the defendants summary judgment and erred in dismissing the 
minor children's causes of action against the defendants for 
wrongful death.  The minor children in the present case have a 
cause of action against the defendants for wrongful death as if 
Linda Force were not alive at the death of  the deceased.77 
                                                 
77 In light of our holding, we need not and do not address 
the children's equal protection constitutional claim that if 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2) bars their claim absent recovery by the 
surviving spouse, the statute is unconstitutional.   
No. 
2012AP2402   
 
48 
 
¶129 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit 
court against the children and in favor of the defendants and 
remand the matter to the circuit court for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with this opinion. 
By the Court.——The judgment and order of the circuit court 
are reversed. 
 
 
No.  2012AP2402.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶130 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  This is a case 
of statutory interpretation.  The seminal case on statutory 
interpretation in recent years is State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110. 
¶131 In Kalal, the court emphasized the importance of 
statutory text when it embraced the principle that a court's 
role is to determine what a statute means rather than determine 
what the legislature intended.  Id., ¶44.  The court said: 
It is . . . a solemn obligation of the judiciary to 
faithfully give effect to the laws enacted by the 
legislature, and to do so requires a determination of 
statutory meaning.  Judicial deference to the policy 
choices enacted into law by the legislature requires 
that statutory interpretation focus primarily on the 
language 
of 
the 
statute. 
 
We 
assume 
that 
the 
legislature's intent is expressed in the statutory 
language.  Extrinsic evidence of legislative intent 
may become relevant to statutory interpretation in 
some circumstances, but is not the primary focus of 
inquiry.  It is the enacted law, not the unenacted 
intent, that is binding on the public.  Therefore, the 
purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine 
what the statute means so that it may be given its 
full, proper, and intended effect. 
Id. 
¶132 The court explained that statutory interpretation 
begins with the language of the statute.  Id., ¶45.  "Statutory 
language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, 
except that technical or specially-defined words or phrases are 
given their technical or special definitional meaning."  Id. 
(citations omitted).  Then the court added: 
Context is important to meaning.  So, too, is the 
structure of the statute in which the operative 
language appears.  Therefore, statutory language is 
No.  2012AP2402.dtp 
 
2 
 
interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in 
isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the 
language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; 
and reasonably, 
to avoid absurd or unreasonable 
results.  
Id., ¶46 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
¶133 In my view, this case requires the court to confront 
head-on statutory language that, if applied literally, would 
produce an absurd or unreasonable result.   
¶134 Historically, courts have tried to avoid absurd or 
unreasonable results.  The year before Kalal, this court said in 
State v. Hamilton, 2003 WI 50, ¶38, 261 Wis. 2d 458, 661 
N.W.2d 832: "The court should not search for ambiguity.  It 
should enforce a clear statute."  However, "One of the few 
exceptions to this sound principle is that the court will seek 
to avoid a truly absurd or unreasonable result."  Id., ¶39 
(citing State v. Burkman, 96 Wis. 2d 630, 642, 292 N.W.2d 641 
(1980); State v. Mendoza, 96 Wis. 2d 106, 115, 291 N.W.2d 478 
(1980); Kayden Indus., Inc. v. Murphy, 34 Wis. 2d 718, 732, 150 
N.W.2d 447 (1967)). 
¶135 There are innumerable cases in which Wisconsin courts 
have repeated or actually invoked this exception. 
¶136 In Worachek v. Stephenson Town School District, 270 
Wis. 116, 124, 70 N.W.2d 657 (1955), the court stated: "This 
court has repeatedly held that a statute should not be construed 
so as to work an absurd result even when the language seems 
clear and unambiguous."  Id. (citing Connell v. Luck, 264 Wis. 
282, 58 N.W.2d 633 (1953); Laridaen v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 
No.  2012AP2402.dtp 
 
3 
 
259 Wis. 178, 47 N.W.2d 727 (1951); Pfingsten v. Pfingsten, 164 
Wis. 308, 159 N.W. 921 (1916)). 
¶137 In 
Isaksen 
v. 
Chesapeake 
Instrument 
Corp., 
19 
Wis. 2d 282, 289-90, 120 N.W.2d 151 (1963), the court stated:  
We are unable to conceive of any reason of policy 
which 
might 
lead 
the 
legislature 
to 
deny 
to 
shareholders so situated the remedy it had provided 
for others, and Chesapeake has not suggested any. 
 
 . . . . 
"It is always presumed, in regard to a statute, that 
no absurd or unreasonable result was intended by the 
legislature.  Hence if, viewing a statute from the 
standpoint of the literal sense of its language, it is 
unreasonable 
or absurd, an obscurity of meaning 
exists, calling for judicial construction." 
Id. (some citations omitted) (quoting Rice v. Ashland Cnty., 108 
Wis. 189, 192, 84 N.W. 189 (1900)). 
¶138 In Kayden Industries, Inc. v. Murphy, 34 Wis. 2d 718, 
732, 150 N.W.2d 447 (1967), the court stated: 
Where there is no ambiguity in the literal terms of 
the provision under consideration there is no room for 
judicial 
construction. . . .  
The 
only 
general 
exception to the above rule[] . . . is that the court 
may construe a provision whose meaning is clear if a 
literal application of the provision would lead to an 
absurd or unreasonable result. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
¶139 In Alberte v. Anew Health Care Services, Inc., 2000 WI 
7, ¶10, 232 Wis. 2d 587, 605 N.W.2d 515, the court stated: 
While it is true that statutory interpretation 
begins with the language of the statute, it is also 
well established that courts must not look at a 
single, isolated sentence or portion of a sentence, 
but at the role of the relevant language in the entire 
statute.  Moreover, courts have "'some "scope for 
adopting a restricted rather than a literal or usual 
No.  2012AP2402.dtp 
 
4 
 
meaning 
of 
its 
words 
where 
acceptance 
of 
that 
meaning . . . would thwart the obvious purpose of the 
statute."'"  When a literal interpretation produces 
absurd or unreasonable results, or results that are 
clearly at odds with the legislature's intent, "[o]ur 
task is to give some alternative meaning" to the 
words. 
Id. (brackets in original) (citations omitted). 
¶140 In Teschendorf v. State Farm Insurance Companies, 2006 
WI 89, ¶15, 293 Wis. 2d 123, 717 N.W.2d 258, the court stated:  
[I]f the meaning of the statute appears to be plain 
but that meaning produces absurd results, we may also 
consult legislative history.  The purpose in this 
situation is to verify that the legislature did not 
intend these unreasonable or unthinkable results.  
Because our purpose in these situations is grounded in 
open disbelief of what a statute appears to require, 
we are bound to limit our off-statute investigations 
to obvious aberrations. 
Id. (internal citations and explanatory parentheticals omitted).  
The court went on, "The reason to doubt a literal meaning of 
[the statute] is that it clashes with related statutes."  Id., 
¶24. 
¶141 In Gasper v. Parbs, 2001 WI App 259, ¶8, 249 
Wis. 2d 106, 637 N.W.2d 399, the court of appeals stated: 
[T]he plain language of a statute should not be 
construed in a manner that leads to absurd or 
unreasonable results.  State v. Yellow Freight Sys., 
Inc., 101 Wis. 2d 142, 153, 303 N.W.2d 834 (1981).  We 
presume that "the legislature intends for a statute to 
be interpreted in a manner that advances the purposes 
of the statute."  Verdoljak v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 
200 Wis. 2d 624, 635, 547 N.W.2d 602 (1996). 
Id. 
¶142 These 
principles 
were 
undoubtedly 
applied 
in 
Steinbarth v. Johannes, 144 Wis. 2d 159, 423 N.W.2d 540 (1988), 
where the court said: "A court will not ordinarily engage in 
No.  2012AP2402.dtp 
 
5 
 
statutory interpretation unless a statute is ambiguous.  A 
statute may be ambiguous and require judicial construction if 
the literal application of the language would lead to an absurd 
result."  Id. at 165 (citing DeMars v. LaPour, 123 Wis. 2d 366, 
370, 366 N.W.2d 891 (1985)).  Steinbarth, of course, interpreted 
the same statute now before the court. 
¶143 Courts try to avoid absurd results, but courts are not 
eager to disregard the seemingly clear language of a statute.  
This reluctance is salutary because it reflects the deference 
and respect of the judiciary for the policy choices of other 
branches of government. 
¶144 For judges, there is plenty of solid ground between 
judicial activism and judicial paralysis.  Our precedent 
provides guidance on when judges should act and when they should 
not. 
¶145 Absurd results are much more than undesirable results.  
Absurd results are aberrations that clash with the manifest 
purpose of a statute or related statutes (evidenced by statutory 
language) and cannot be explained as a rational exception to the 
statutory scheme.  Absurd results are usually unexpected.  They 
are different from harsh consequences because they are seldom 
the fault of an adversely affected party.  Instead, they almost 
always result from circumstances beyond the party's control.  
Absurd results produce hardship or unfairness that is quickly 
recognized and cannot be ignored. 
No.  2012AP2402.dtp 
 
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¶146 This case satisfies these standards, as is documented 
in the majority opinion.  We ought to act but also implore the 
legislature to rewrite the statute. 
¶147 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
 
 
No.  2012AP2402.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶148 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (dissenting).   While 
the majority opinion reaches an appealing result as it permits 
the minor children of Billy Joe Force to maintain a claim for 
his wrongful death, I cannot join the opinion.  In my view, the 
majority opinion's conclusion that the statutory term "surviving 
spouse" does not mean a spouse who has survived the death of her 
husband because she was estranged from her husband at his death 
is 
not 
based 
on 
statutory 
construction 
and 
will 
create 
considerable mischief in the future.  Accordingly, I would 
affirm the circuit court, and I respectfully dissent.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶149 The underlying facts are not disputed or complicated.  
On December 12, 2008, Billy Joe Force died as a result of a 
motor vehicle accident.  At the time of his death, Billy was 
married to Linda Force.  However, Billy and Linda had been 
separated since 1996, and Billy had not provided any support to 
Linda since 1997.   
¶150 Billy and Linda had no children of their marriage.  
However, at his death, Billy had three minor children, born of 
two women, neither of whom he had married.  It is these three 
children who seek to maintain this wrongful death action against 
Jeffrey Brown, the driver of the other vehicle in the accident; 
his insurer, American Family Mutual Insurance Company; and 
No.  2012AP2402.pdr 
 
2 
 
Regent Insurance Company, the insurer of Billy's employer, for 
whom Billy was driving at the time of the accident.1  
¶151 The 
circuit 
court 
granted 
summary 
judgment 
of 
dismissal, concluding that:  (1) Linda survived Billy; (2) the 
children had no independent cause of action under Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.04(2); (3) Linda had no compensable damages; and (4) 
because Linda could not recover, no offset was available for the 
children.  The court of appeals certified the issue of whether 
children have an independent claim for relief under § 895.04 
when there is a surviving spouse, who has been estranged from 
the decedent for more than ten years and could not recover, 
thereby precluding any set aside for the children.2  We accepted 
certification.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶152 We are asked to construe the term "surviving spouse" 
in Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2).  Statutory interpretation presents a 
question of law for our independent review; however, we benefit 
from the circuit court's discussion.  Spiegelberg v. State, 2006 
WI 75, ¶8, 291 Wis. 2d 601, 717 N.W.2d 641.  When we construe a 
statute, we also consider our past interpretations of that 
                                                 
1 Because Billy was driving for his employer at the time of 
the accident, the employer could bring a third party liability 
action to recover money the employer may have paid on Billy's 
behalf.  See Wis. Stat. § 102.29; Adams v. Northland Equipment 
Co., 2014 WI 79, ¶4, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __.  Section 
102.29 claims are mentioned in Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2). 
2 Force v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2012AP2402, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. July 3, 2013).   
No.  2012AP2402.pdr 
 
3 
 
statute.  Schill v. Wis. Rapids Sch. Dist., 2010 WI 86, ¶49, 327 
Wis. 2d 572, 786 N.W.2d 177.   
B.  Wisconsin Stat. § 895.04(2) 
¶153 We are not writing on a clean slate as we interpret 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2) in the case now before us.  As the court 
of appeals correctly pointed out, our interpretation of Cogger 
v. Trudell, 35 Wis. 2d 350, 151 N.W.2d 146 (1967), precludes 
recovery for children when there is a surviving spouse who 
cannot recover.  Courts have followed Cogger with only one 
exception since 1967, Steinbarth v. Johannes, 144 Wis. 2d 159, 
423 N.W.2d 540 (1988).   
¶154 In 
Steinbarth, 
the 
husband 
feloniously 
and 
intentionally killed his wife, whose death was the basis for the 
children's wrongful death claim.  During our consideration of 
the children's claim, we reviewed Wis. Stat. § 852.01(2m) (1985-
86), which precluded one who feloniously and intentionally 
killed a decedent from recovering as an heir of the decedent.  
Id. at 166.  We noted that § 852.01(2m) (1985-86) treated the 
killer as having predeceased the decedent.3  Id.  We reasoned 
that the husband in Steinbarth should be treated consistent with 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 852.01(2m) (1985-86) provided:   
Requirement that heir not have intentionally 
killed the deceased.  (a) If any person who would 
otherwise be an heir under sub. (1) has feloniously 
and intentionally killed the decedent, the net estate 
not disposed of by will passes as if the killer had 
predeceased the decedent.   
No.  2012AP2402.pdr 
 
4 
 
the statutory directive of § 852.01(2m) (1985-86).4  In order to 
do so, we concluded that a husband who feloniously and 
intentionally killed his wife will be treated for purposes of a 
wrongful death claim as though he had predeceased his wife.  
Accordingly, there would be no surviving spouse under Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.04 and the children could maintain an action for wrongful 
death.  Id. at 167. 
¶155 In Steinbarth, we distinguished Cogger by noting that 
the spouse's death in Cogger was based on negligence and in 
Steinbarth, it was based on intent to kill.  We also noted a 
specific legislative directive about the status of one who kills 
his spouse for purposes of claims made relative to the death of 
the spouse.  Neither distinction is present here.  Linda had 
nothing to do with Billy's death, and there is no statutory 
directive, other than the wrongful death statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.04, that applies here.   
¶156 If I were writing for the majority, I would affirm the 
circuit court and fully describe how unfair the current statute 
is to children who have suffered significant damages due to the 
wrongful death of a parent, but who have no claim when the 
surviving spouse has no recovery.  By the 1961 amendments to 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2), the legislature made an attempt to 
independently protect children who suffered a loss because of 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 852.01(2m) was revised subsequent to 
Steinbarth v. Johannes, 144 Wis. 2d 159, 423 N.W.2d 540 (1988), 
and Wis. Stat. § 854.14 further addresses homicide and rights of 
inheritance.  The revisions are not relevant to our decision in 
Steinbarth or to my dissent. 
No.  2012AP2402.pdr 
 
5 
 
the wrongful death of a parent, but more is needed today to 
finish what the legislature then began.   
¶157 Instead of acknowledging that a claim for wrongful 
death is purely statutory and that at common law no such claim 
existed, Bowen v. American Family Insurance Co., 2012 WI App 29, 
¶10, 340 Wis. 2d 232, 811 N.W.2d 887, the majority opinion 
pretends that it is construing Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2) and 
creates a new claim.5  It interprets the statutory phrase, 
"surviving spouse," as not including Linda, Billy's spouse who 
survived him.  The majority justifies the result it reaches by 
relating that Linda and Billy have been estranged for ten years 
and that Linda could not prove wrongful death damages on her own 
behalf.6   
¶158 While the majority opinion's result is appealing, I 
cannot join the majority opinion's interpretation of the Wis. 
Stat. § 895.04(2) term "surviving spouse."  The methods employed 
to interpret § 895.04(2) comport with none of the legal 
principles that guide statutory interpretation.  See, e.g., 
State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, 
¶¶38-46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  Saying that 
§ 895.04(2) means whatever the majority wants it to mean will 
cause confusion and repetitive litigation.   
¶159 For 
example, 
is 
an 
estrangement 
of 
five 
years 
sufficient time to cause a spouse who survives the decedent to 
no longer be a "surviving spouse" under the majority opinion's 
                                                 
5 Majority op., ¶¶125-26. 
6 Majority op., ¶5.  
No.  2012AP2402.pdr 
 
6 
 
construction of Wis. Stat. § 893.04(2)?  Is two years long 
enough, if there has been absolutely no communication between 
the spouses?  Furthermore, how does the majority opinion line up 
with spousal intestate succession under Wis. Stat. ch. 852, 
which says nothing about a spouse's rights being limited due to 
the husband and wife being separated?  See Wis. Stat. § 852.01.     
¶160 Claims of the type now before us under Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.04(2) are commonly brought and commonly denied because of 
our decision in Cogger.7  We would assist children who attempt to 
bring wrongful death claims in the future by pointing out the 
unfairness 
the 
current 
statute 
creates 
and 
asking 
the 
legislature to consider revising 
§ 895.04(2), rather than 
creating a common law fix for the children in the present case 
and leaving all similarly situated children without a claim due 
to our interpretation of § 895.04(2) in Cogger.   
                                                 
7 See Bowen v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 2012 WI App 29, 340 
Wis. 2d 232, 811 N.W.2d 887 (father was a defendant and could 
not recover due to his contributory negligence in the accident 
that killed his wife; therefore, children had no claim); Xiong 
v. Xiong, 2002 WI App 110, 255 Wis. 2d 693, 648 N.W.2d 900 
(father drove vehicle in which mother was passenger who died 
after 
an 
accident; 
children 
had 
no 
claim); 
Anderson 
v. 
Westchester Fire Ins. Co., No. 94-1211-FT, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. 
Ct. 
App. 
Nov. 29, 
1994) 
(concluding 
that 
because 
stepmother survived the death of child's parent, child had no 
claim under Wis. Stat. § 895.04); Maki v. Kahler, No. 83-773, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 1984) (concluding 
that children had no claim based on Cogger).  Cogger has been 
cited 25 times in cases noted in Westlaw's database and probably 
many times that number in circuit court decisions from which no 
appeal was taken. 
No.  2012AP2402.pdr 
 
7 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶161 While the majority opinion reaches an appealing result 
as it permits the minor children of Billy Joe Force to maintain 
a claim for his wrongful death, I cannot join the opinion.  In 
my view, the majority opinion's conclusion that the statutory 
term "surviving spouse" does not mean a spouse who has survived 
the death of her husband because she was estranged from her 
husband at his death is not based on statutory construction and 
will create considerable mischief in the future.   
¶162 Accordingly, I would affirm the court of appeals and I 
respectfully dissent.   
¶163 I am authorized to state that Justices ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and MICHAEL GABLEMAN join this dissent. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2012AP2402.akz 
 
1 
 
¶164 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (dissent).  I join 
Justice Roggensack's dissent, but write separately to clarify 
that, had the majority been able to link the Force children's 
ability to recover with the language of the statute, and 
reconcile that text with our prior case law, see, e.g., Cogger 
v. Trudell, 35 Wis. 2d 350, 353, 151 N.W.2d 146 (1967), I would 
have joined the majority.  The majority was unable, however, to 
find a satisfactory, textual way to construe Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.04(2) so to allow the Force children to recover in a 
wrongful death action.  As a result, I am compelled to join 
Justice Roggensack's dissent. 
¶165 Justice Prosser concludes that the application of the 
statutory language produces an "absurd" result.  See Justice 
Prosser's concurrence, ¶133.  An unpalatable result is not the 
same as an absurd result.  We are to look to the text of the 
statute 
to 
determine 
whether 
relief 
is 
afforded 
to 
the 
litigants.  "In construing or interpreting a statute the court 
is not at liberty to disregard the plain, clear words of the 
statute."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 
2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (citation 
omitted).  It is not the role of the courts to "save" the 
legislative branch from the consequences of the laws it passes, 
or to create a remedy when the plain language of the statute 
does not afford relief. 
¶166 As a practical matter, the legislature cannot be 
expected to meaningfully reconsider legislation if the court 
usurps the role of the legislature in order to create a remedy 
No.  2012AP2402.akz 
 
2 
 
where none otherwise exists.  The long and complex history of 
the wrongful death statute provides support for the notion that 
the legislature should consider revision to provide relief when 
it should be due.  See majority op., ¶¶69-102 (discussing 
Steinbarth v. Johannes, 144 Wis. 2d 159, 423 Wis. 2d 540 (1988); 
Hanson v. Valdivia, 51 Wis. 2d 466, 187 N.W.2d 151 (1971); 
Cogger, 35 Wis. 2d 350; Bowen v. American Family Ins. Co., 2012 
WI App 29, 340 Wis. 2d 232, 811 N.W.2d 887; Xiong v. Xiong, 2002 
WI App 110, 255 Wis. 2d 693, 648 N.W.2d 900).  The majority's 
apparent difficulty in distinguishing these cases provides an 
apt illustration of the problem.  The court should not avoid the 
plain language of a statute in order to prevent unpleasant 
results.  In my view, legislative action is required. 
¶167 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. 
 
No.  2012AP2402.akz 
 
1