Title: Brady v. State Ballot Law Commission

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12979 
 
HELEN BRADY  vs.  STATE BALLOT LAW COMMISSION & others.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     July 10, 2020. - August 3, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Election, Ballot, Validity of nomination papers.  Secretary of 
the Commonwealth.  Constitutional Law, Elections. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on May 5, 2020. 
 
 
The case was reported by Kafker, J. 
 
 
Christopher A. Kenney for the petitioner. 
Elizabeth Kaplan, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
respondents. 
 
Gerald A. McDonough for the interveners. 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  This appeal concerns a decision of the State 
Ballot Law Commission (SBLC) preventing Helen Brady from 
appearing on the September 1, 2020, State primary election 
                                                          
 
1 Secretary of the Commonwealth; and Massachusetts 
Democratic Party and Leon Arthur Brathwaite, II, interveners. 
2 
 
 
ballot for the Republican nomination for the office of United 
States representative for the Ninth Congressional District in 
Massachusetts.  The SBLC, acting upon the objection of Leon 
Arthur Braithwaite, II, a registered voter in the Ninth 
Congressional District and the vice-chair of the Massachusetts 
Democratic State Committee, struck all of the certified 
signatures that Brady had secured from voters in an effort to 
appear on the ballot. 
Following this court's allowance of the electronic 
collection of signatures on nomination papers in Goldstein v. 
Secretary of the Commonwealth, 484 Mass. 516, 531-532 (2020), 
Brady, with the aid of a software application provided by a 
third-party vendor, had gathered all of her voter signatures 
electronically.  There is no question that she had collected the 
required minimum number of signatures.  Nor is there a question 
that the signatures were legitimate.  Nonetheless, according to 
the SBLC, the process Brady utilized failed to comply with 
formal electronic signature requirements outlined by the court 
in the Goldstein decision (Goldstein process), as well as with 
an "advisory" issued by the Secretary of the Commonwealth 
(Secretary) in response to the Goldstein decision.  In brief, 
the SBLC ruled that Brady departed from the Goldstein process by 
failing to submit the "native" electronic document signed by the 
voter to local election officials for certification.  Instead, 
3 
 
 
she submitted a document that differed from the native 
electronic document, albeit in form only, not substance.  Also, 
the SBLC concluded that Brady failed to abide by the Secretary's 
advisory when she had voters sign her nomination papers 
electronically by applying a computer mouse, stylus, or finger 
to a separate box provided for that purpose, rather than 
directly on the signature line itself. 
Brady challenged the SBLC's ruling in the Superior Court, 
but then moved to consolidate that action with an existing 
petition that she, along with three other candidates seeking to 
appear on the State primary ballot, had filed in the county 
court.  Given the time sensitive nature of the appeal, with the 
Secretary needing to finalize the State primary ballot by July 
14, 2020, to meet a federally mandated deadline,2 the single 
justice consolidated the matters and reserved and reported them 
to the full court.3  On July 13, 2020, following expedited 
                                                          
 
 
2 By Federal law, ballots must be transmitted to military 
and overseas voters no later than forty-five days in advance of 
the election.  See 52 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(8)(A). 
 
 
3 Notwithstanding the consolidation of the two matters, the 
only issue before the court concerns Brady's appeal from the 
SBLC's decision.  The three other candidates to the underlying 
petition -- Caroline Colarusso, Julie Hall, and Rayla Campbell 
-- are not parties to this appeal.  The petition was dismissed 
as moot by the single justice as to Colarusso and Hall after 
they qualified for and were placed on the primary ballot.  
Campbell pursued a separate appeal before the full court, which 
is pending. 
4 
 
 
briefing and oral argument, we vacated the SBLC decision and 
ordered the Secretary to place Brady's name on the ballot, 
concluding that the electronic filing process utilized by Brady 
complied with the substance of the material requirements of the 
Goldstein decision.  We now issue this opinion to explain fully 
the court's reasoning. 
Background.  1.  The Goldstein decision.  On April 17, 
2020, the court issued the decision in Goldstein, granting 
several forms of equitable relief to candidates seeking to 
collect voter signatures on nomination papers as required to 
appear on the State primary election ballot.  In recognition of 
the extraordinary restrictions on in-person contact during the 
COVID-19 pandemic, the court (1) reduced the number of required 
certified signatures by fifty percent (50%), (2) extended the 
deadlines for certain candidates to submit signed nomination 
papers to local election officials for certification and then 
file certified signatures with the Secretary, and (3) ordered 
the Secretary to allow for the submission of nomination papers 
with electronic signatures, not just wet-ink original signatures 
("wet" signatures).  Goldstein, 484 Mass. at 529-532. 
Regarding the last item, the court adopted and outlined an 
electronic signature collection process that had been 
recommended as a compromise solution by the Secretary and viewed 
with favor by the candidates in that case: 
5 
 
 
"[C]andidates seeking to be on the ballot for the September 
1 primary election [are] allowed to scan and post or 
otherwise distribute their nomination papers online.  
Voters may then download the image of the nomination papers 
and either apply an electronic signature with a computer 
mouse or stylus, or print out a hard copy and sign it by 
hand.  The signed nomination paper can then be returned to 
the candidate, or a person working on the candidate's 
behalf, either in electronic form (by transmitting the 
'native' electronic document or a scanned paper document) 
or in paper form (by hand or mail).  The candidates will 
still have to submit the nomination papers to local 
election officials in hard copy paper format, but the 
proposed process will alleviate the need for, and the risk 
associated with, obtaining 'wet' signatures.  The Secretary 
is ordered forthwith to provide clear guidance to 
prospective candidates as to how this electronic signature 
collection process may be accomplished effectively, 
although candidates need not await that guidance to get 
started."  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Goldstein, 484 Mass. at 531-532. 
Four days later, on April 21, 2020, the Secretary issued an 
"advisory" concerning the collection of signatures in light of 
the Goldstein decision, which provided, in relevant part: 
"The voter can sign by either a) using a computer mouse or 
stylus applied to the signature line of the nomination 
paper screen image to sign their actual original signature 
in person and in real time or b) printing out the 
transmitted nomination paper and affixing their original 
signature by hand ('wet signature')" (emphasis added). 
 
 
2.  Brady's nomination papers.  Following the issuance of 
Goldstein, Brady retained the services of a third-party vendor, 
VenueX Media, LLC (VenueX), to assist her in collecting 
electronic signatures from registered voters in the Ninth 
Congressional District.  Having anticipated the potential 
benefit to collecting signatures electronically during the 
6 
 
 
COVID-19 pandemic, VenueX had been working to develop a software 
application for that purpose.  Once the court allowed for that 
possibility, VenueX finalized the application, with some 
modifications to comply with the Goldstein process, and made it 
available to candidates.  All told, forty candidates in 
Massachusetts utilized VenueX's application, including 
Democrats, Republicans, and Independents.4  Brady, for her part, 
used it to collect all of her signatures; she did not collect 
any wet signatures. 
 
The application worked as follows.  VenueX created a unique 
webpage for Brady ("www.nominationpapers.com/helenbrady"), which 
consisted of an image of the back and front of her nomination 
papers.  Brady solicited voters to visit the webpage by sending 
them a link via Facebook, Twitter, e-mail, or other means.  
Voters could access the webpage by "clicking" on that link using 
any device connected to the Internet, such as a cell phone, 
tablet, desktop computer, or laptop.  Once on the webpage, 
voters could see an image of Brady's nomination papers, 
containing her name and address, as well as the elected office 
                                                          
 
 
4 While it is undisputed that forty candidates utilized 
VenueX's application, it is not evident from the record how many 
of them actually submitted signatures for certification that 
were collected using the application or, if they did, how many 
such signatures they submitted.  At least three candidates who 
used the application qualified to appear on the ballot.  No 
objections were filed to their nomination papers with the SBLC. 
7 
 
 
she was seeking, her party affiliation, and the date of the 
State primary election.  There was also a green-colored block 
over the first voter signature line on the image of the 
nomination papers, which read "SIGN HERE."  When voters clicked 
on that block, they were directed to a box elsewhere on the 
webpage, where they could use a stylus, mouse, or finger to sign 
their name.  There were also boxes on the webpage where voters 
typed in their name, e-mail address, telephone number, street 
address, city or town, State, and ZIP code.  Upon signing and 
entering the other data, voters would then click on another 
green-colored block on the webpage, which read "Submit," and the 
process would be complete.  Voters could then download a copy of 
the nomination papers they submitted, which came in the form of 
a Portable Document Format, or .pdf5 (first nomination papers).  
On the face of the first nomination papers, the voter's 
signature was visible on the line where the green "SIGN HERE" 
block had previously appeared, along with the date and time of 
the submission and the voter's address.  A .pdf copy of the 
                                                          
 
 
5 As described by the company that purports to have invented 
the Portable Document Format, or .pdf, it "is now an open 
standard, maintained by the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO).  PDF documents can contain links and 
buttons, form fields, audio, video, and business logic.  They 
can be signed electronically, and you can easily view PDF files 
on Windows or Mac OS using the free Acrobat Reader DC software."  
See Adobe Acrobat, What is PDF?, https://acrobat.adobe.com/us/en 
/acrobat/about-adobe-pdf.html [https://perma.cc/QX28-6Y2X]. 
8 
 
 
first nomination papers was also automatically sent by e-mail 
message to the voter, as a form of "receipt."6 
 
When voters clicked "Submit," however, the first nomination 
papers were not, in fact, submitted to Brady or her campaign.  
Instead, the data entered on the webpage by each voter was 
transmitted to a database maintained by VenueX.  The captured 
data included the submission date and time; the voter's name, e-
mail address, telephone number, street address, city or town, 
State, and ZIP code; a link to an image of the voter's 
signature, which was stored in the "cloud"7; the unique Internet 
protocol (IP) address of the device the voter used to submit the 
nomination paper; and a unique identification number for each 
submission.  Brady and her campaign had access to the database 
for purposes of tracking the submissions as they were collected, 
but they could not alter or download the content.  Nor could 
                                                          
 
 
6 Voters could have downloaded the first nomination papers 
from the webpage, printed them out, signed them with a wet 
signature, and returned them to Brady's campaign.  Presumably, 
they also could have printed out the .pdf of the first 
nomination papers bearing their electronic signature, and 
returned it to Brady's campaign.  However, no voters submitted 
nomination papers to Brady's campaign in either of those ways.  
Nor does it appear that there was any direction provided on the 
webpage that would have prompted voters to do so. 
 
 
7 The "cloud" refers to cloud computing, a type of remote 
electronic data storage.  See Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, 468 
Mass. 512, 536 (2014) (Lenk, J., dissenting). 
9 
 
 
they access the stored images of the voter signatures.  Only 
VenueX had that level of access. 
 
The final step in the process occurred when VenueX provided 
Brady's campaign with a second version of the signed nomination 
papers, which were created by importing the data from the 
database, including the stored image of the voter's signature 
(second nomination papers).  The second nomination papers, which 
were also in .pdf form, would then be electronically transferred 
to Brady's campaign in a folder, whereupon they could be printed 
out en masse and submitted to location election officials for 
certification.  The second nomination papers were not identical 
to the first nomination papers.  As with the first nomination 
papers, the second contained Brady's name and address, her 
Republican party affiliation, and the elected office she was 
seeking, but this information now appeared in a different font 
in all upper case letters, whereas it appeared in upper and 
lower case letters in the first.  The second nomination papers, 
like the first, also included the voter's signature on the line 
where the green "SIGN HERE" block had previously appeared, but, 
unlike the first, did not include the date and time of 
submission.  The typewritten name of the voter also was inserted 
on the second nomination papers on the line next to the voter's 
signature, which was not the case on the first.  Otherwise, the 
10 
 
 
first nomination papers and second nomination papers were the 
same.8 
 
As a result of the Goldstein decision, Brady needed at 
least 1,000 certified voter signatures to appear on the 
Republican State primary ballot -- fifty percent (50%) of the 
amount required by statute.  See G. L. c. 53, § 44.  Ultimately, 
local election officials in towns and cities in the Ninth 
Congressional District certified 1,066 of her signatures, which 
Brady then filed with the Secretary by the applicable June 2, 
2020, deadline. 
 
3.  Objection before the SBLC.  By law, registered voters 
from the district in which a candidate is seeking nomination 
have three days from the filing deadline with the Secretary to 
file objections to nomination papers with the SBLC.  See G. L. 
c. 55B, § 5.  On June 5, 2020, Braithwaite filed an objection, 
claiming that Brady failed to comply with the Goldstein process 
because the voters who signed her nomination papers did not 
return, and she did not submit, the "native" electronic 
document.  In addition, he claimed that Brady failed to comply 
with the Secretary's advisory because the voters had not signed 
by applying a computer mouse or stylus to the signature line on 
                                                          
 
8 The placement and size of the voter's signature was also 
slightly different on the second nomination papers, but the 
signature nonetheless appeared on the signature line in both 
versions of the nomination papers. 
11 
 
 
the image of Brady's nomination papers.  Braithwaite maintained 
that, on either ground, all 1,066 of Brady's certified 
signatures had to be declared invalid.9 
 
On June 16, 2020, the SBLC held a hearing on Braithwaite's 
objections, at which only one witness, the founder of VenueX, 
testified.  Subsequently, on June 26, 2020, the SBLC issued a 
decision and written statement of reasons, striking all 1,066 of 
Brady's signatures on the grounds advanced by Braithwaite.  In 
addition, the SBLC ruled that the process utilized by Brady 
violated public policy by storing images of voter signatures 
without their consent and without adequate measures to protect 
against the fraudulent application of those signatures to other 
documents (i.e., documents other than the nomination papers).  
At the same time, the SBLC acknowledged that there was no 
evidence that any voter's signature was applied to any document 
other than Brady's nomination papers, and credited the testimony 
of VenueX's founder that no such misapplication had occurred.  
The SBLC also credited the testimony of VenueX's founder, and 
acknowledged that there was no evidence to contradict, that all 
1,066 voters had, in fact, signed, or at least made some mark, 
with a computer mouse, stylus, or finger in the signature box on 
                                                          
 
 
9 Braithwaite also raised various other objections to 
approximately 117 of Brady's certified signatures.  The SBLC, 
however, chose not to adjudicate those objections, and 
Braithwaite has waived them on appeal. 
12 
 
 
Brady's webpage before clicking "Submit."  But see note 8, 
supra. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Compliance with the Goldstein process.  
The relevant facts concerning the electronic signature gathering 
process utilized by Brady are not in dispute.  The only 
question, therefore, is one of law:  whether the electronic 
signature process Brady utilized complied with the requirements 
set out in Goldstein.  In making such determination, we owe no 
deference to the SBLC.  The court defined the emergency 
electronic signature procedures for the September primary 
election itself.  We are therefore interpreting our own 
decision, not the general election laws within the special 
expertise of the SBLC.  Compare Swift v. AutoZone, Inc., 441 
Mass. 443, 450 (2004) ("In general, we grant substantial 
deference to an interpretation of a statute by the 
administrative agency charged with its administration" [citation 
omitted]).  Our review of the question is thus de novo.  See 
Capezzuto v. State Ballot Law Comm'n, 407 Mass. 949, 952 (1990) 
("conclusions of law to be drawn from [the] facts are subject to 
independent judicial review"). 
 
As we undertake our review, we remain mindful of several 
important principles.  First and foremost, the constitutional 
rights to run for office and to vote for a candidate who has 
satisfied the requirements to stand for office are fundamental.  
13 
 
 
See Goldstein, 484 Mass. at 524 (for "240 years since the 
adoption of our Declaration of Rights in 1780, art. 9 [of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights] has served to protect the 
'fundamental' and 'intertwine[d]' rights of candidates to gain 
access to the ballot and of voters to cast their ballots as they 
see fit" [citation omitted]).  They are essential to the proper 
functioning of our democracy.  As we recognized in Goldstein, 
the pandemic posed a unique threat to the exercise of these 
fundamental rights and required us to apply strict scrutiny to 
the existing statutory signature gathering requirements.  See 
id. at 524-525.  In the end, we declared the existing signature 
requirements unconstitutional during the pandemic and granted 
extraordinary equitable relief to preserve and protect art. 9 
rights, cutting in half the minimum number of signatures 
required and allowing some form of electronic signature 
gathering.  See id. at 526 (existing "signature requirements 
. . . in this time of pandemic are unconstitutional as applied 
to the plaintiffs, and other similarly situated candidates").  
In so doing, we recognized that some technological adaptation 
was required to address the emergency, and a certain amount of 
flexibility was required to avoid constitutional difficulties.  
See id. (existing "signature requirements, which may only impose 
a modest burden on candidates in ordinary times, now impose a 
severe burden on, or significant interference with, a 
14 
 
 
candidate's right to gain access to the September 1 primary 
ballot").  See also id. at 533 (Kafker, J., concurring) ("it is 
the in-person aspect of the [existing] signature requirement 
that renders it unduly burdensome in light of the current 
pandemic and quarantine, as this requirement presents public 
safety risks for both the campaign and individual signatories" 
[emphasis in original]). 
A second principle underlying our Goldstein decision was 
the temporally limited, emergency nature of its relief.  
Recognizing the unpredictable force and duration of the 
emergency, the equitable relief granted in Goldstein, including 
the particular electronic signature gathering process it 
authorized, only applied during a finite period of time and to a 
finite group of candidates.  See id. at 518 ("We emphasize that 
the declaration we make and the equitable relief we provide is 
limited to the [September 1, 2020] primary election in these 
extraordinary circumstances . . .").  It was emergency relief 
tailored to the emergency itself. 
It was also the product of a necessarily expedited 
proceeding.  The petition was filed on April 8, 2020, and 
decided nine days later, without the benefit of any lower court 
proceedings.  While the court asked the parties to address the 
logistics of, and potential problems with, collecting and 
verifying electronic signatures, with an eye toward adopting a 
15 
 
 
more comprehensive process, it quickly became clear that it 
would not be possible to do so in such short order.  Id. at 531 
("submissions have convinced us that there are too many issues 
and unanswered questions to allow us confidently to impose a 
remedy that would transform a nomination system that required 
'wet' signatures into one that permitted a broad range of 
electronic signatures").  Instead, the court adopted a "modest 
means" of electronic signature gathering put forward as a last-
minute compromise by the Secretary, id., despite the "awkward, 
multistep process" it involved, id. at 535 (Kafker, J., 
concurring).  In an effort to avoid the type of dispute we are 
now forced to resolve here, we also asked and expected the 
Secretary to provide further follow-up guidance to candidates 
regarding the implementation of the electronic signature 
gathering process that his office had proposed.  The guidance 
that was provided, however, was quite limited, indeed 
unnecessarily so. 
Finally, as discussed at length in the concurrence in 
Goldstein, see id. at 532-538, we remain convinced that the 
legislative and executive branches, not the courts, are best 
suited for enacting a comprehensive electronic signature 
collection process, a process that was long overdue even before 
the pandemic.  With all that said, we now turn to the challenge 
to Brady's signature gathering process. 
16 
 
 
 
We start by noting what is not being challenged.  At the 
heart of our Goldstein decision were certain essential 
requirements.  First, we cut in half the number of certified 
signatures that a candidate was required to gather, with that 
number being reduced to 1,000 for those seeking Congressional 
office, like Brady.  It is undisputed here that over 1,000 
registered voters in the Ninth Congressional District signed, or 
at least made some mark, in the signature box on Brady's webpage 
and then clicked on the box that read "Submit," thereby 
conveying support for Brady's appearance on the September 
primary ballot. 
We also sought in Goldstein to ensure that the signature 
gathering process produced legitimate signatures.  There is no 
dispute that all of the signatures gathered by Brady are 
legitimate.10  There is no evidence or suggestion of fraud or 
impropriety.  Moreover, not one of the 1,066 registered voters 
who purportedly signed Brady's nomination papers came forward 
and denied having done so.  Nor was there even a suggestion that 
any voter had made such a claim.  In short, there is no dispute 
that Brady satisfied the essential substantive requirements of 
the Goldstein decision. 
                                                          
 
 
10 As previously noted, see note 9, supra, Braithwaite had 
asserted objections to certain specific signatures gathered by 
Brady, but the SBLC did not adjudicate those objections, and 
Braithwaite has waived them on appeal. 
17 
 
 
Instead, the dispute concerns specific issues of form, 
particularly the language in Goldstein providing that the 
"signed nomination paper [could] be returned [by the voter] to 
the candidate, or a person working on the candidate's behalf, 
. . . in electronic form (by transmitting the 'native' 
electronic document or a scanned paper document)" (emphasis 
added).  Goldstein, 484 Mass. at 531.  According to the court's 
ruling, the candidate, or someone acting on the candidate's 
behalf, was then authorized to print the native electronic 
document out and submit it in "hard copy paper format" to local 
election officials for certification.  Id. 
According to Braithwaite and the SBLC, the native 
electronic documents in the process utilized by Brady were the 
first nomination papers:  the .pdf the voter could download, and 
also received as an attachment to an e-mail message, after 
electronically signing and submitting the nomination papers.  As 
Braithwaite and the SBLC point out, however, voters did not 
return the first nomination papers to Brady.  Nor did Brady, or 
anyone acting on her behalf, print them out and submit them to 
local election officials in hard copy paper format.  Instead, 
Brady utilized VenueX's application to collect the data and 
signature entered by the voter in the process of creating the 
first nomination papers, imported them to another version of the 
nomination papers (what we have referred to as the second 
18 
 
 
nomination papers), and then printed that version out in hard 
copy paper format and submitted it to local election officials.  
This, according to Braithwaite and the SBLC, violates the 
Goldstein process and necessitates striking all of Brady's 
certified signatures. 
 
We begin our analysis with the language of the Goldstein 
process itself.  The phrase "'native' electronic document" was 
regrettably not defined in the decision or in the Secretary's 
advisory.11  Yet, as utilized in Goldstein, it seems reasonably 
clear that the court was referring to the original electronic 
document signed and electronically transmitted by the voter.  In 
the process utilized by Brady, that would seem to refer to the 
first nomination papers, as Braithwaite and the SBLC suggest.  
No doubt, had the version of the nomination papers downloaded by 
the voter after clicking "Submit," or the version that was 
automatically sent to the voter as a form of receipt, been sent 
to the candidate or someone acting on her behalf, and then 
submitted to the local election officials, this requirement of 
                                                          
 
 
11 The phrase "native file format" is common and refers to 
"a method used by the computer operating system or file 
management to arrange data.  For example, when you save a 
Microsoft Word document, the data in the file is customized and 
optimized to be read in Microsoft Word.  These files have the 
.doc or .docx file extension."  See Computer Hope, Native file 
format, https://www.computerhope.com/jargon/n/natifile.htm 
[https://perma.cc/94WK-DDEJ]. 
19 
 
 
Goldstein would have been satisfied in form as well as 
substance. 
 
According to Braithwaite and the SBLC, the only way a voter 
could legally return the nomination papers electronically under 
Goldstein would be to transmit the native electronic document or 
a scanned paper document.  Although we disagree with this 
contention, we recognize that our decision could have been 
clearer.  Our reference to the "one modest means" of electronic 
signature gathering proposed by the Secretary was not intended 
to be exclusive.  The decision does not state that the voter 
"must" or "shall only" return the nominations papers 
electronically by transmitting either the native electronic 
document or a scanned paper document.  The use of the word "can" 
was intentional, and the words "'native' electronic document" 
and "scanned paper document" were intended as obvious 
permissible examples of the ways in which the nomination papers 
could be transmitted electronically by voters.  Again, however, 
we recognize that this point could have been made more clearly 
by prefacing the parenthetical with the express words, "for 
example," or even the Latin abbreviation, "e.g."  Of course, the 
court's recognition of some limited variation on what was 
permissible does not mean that the nomination papers can be 
transmitted any which way, or that the particular process Brady 
used was proper.  For further guidance on resolving this 
20 
 
 
question, we are again informed by the fundamental principles of 
election law. 
 
"Election laws are framed to afford opportunity for the 
orderly expression by duly qualified voters of their preferences 
among candidates for office, not to frustrate such expression."  
Swift v. Registrars of Voters of Quincy, 281 Mass. 271, 277 
(1932).  See McCarthy v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 371 
Mass. 667, 683 (1977) ("The principal objective of election laws 
is to ensure that the public will may be expressed through the 
electoral process").  As we have previously explained, access to 
the ballot is a fundamental right, essential to the success of 
our democracy.  In cases like the present one, where someone 
seeks to enforce restrictions on that fundamental right, courts 
have been careful to distinguish between violations of form and 
violations of substance.  See, e.g., Robinson v. State Ballot 
Law Comm'n, 432 Mass. 145, 149-152 (2000) (no public purpose 
served by construing statute to prevent access to ballot merely 
because back of candidate's nomination paper was photocopied 
upside down); Garrison v. Merced, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 116, 117 
(1992) ("exceedingly technical arguments should not block access 
to the ballot").  The alleged violation here falls decidedly 
into the former category. 
 
To be clear, the process utilized by Brady was not ideal, 
and it would have been preferable had she simply collected and 
21 
 
 
submitted the first nomination papers.  At the end of the day, 
however, there was no substantive difference between the first 
nomination papers and the second.  As already noted, there were 
essentially three differences:  (1) on the second nomination 
papers, some words were printed in all upper case letters that 
had been printed in upper and lower case letters in a different 
font on the first nomination papers; (2) the date and time of 
submission appeared on the line next to the voter's signature on 
the first nomination papers, but not on the second; and (3) the 
voter's typewritten name, which had been entered by the voter 
prior to submission, appeared on the line next to the voter's 
signature on the second nomination papers, but not on the first.  
The differences are insubstantial, and they cannot justify 
removing a candidate from the ballot and frustrating the right 
of voters to have a choice of candidates for elected office. 
 
Both sets of nomination papers identified Brady's name and 
address, the office she was seeking to be elected to, the party 
whose nomination she was seeking, and the date of the election.  
There is no evidence here of a "bait and switch" scheme.  Cf. 
Arkuss vs. Galvin, Mass. Super. Ct., No. 02-1318A (Suffolk 
County Apr. 12, 2002) (complaint alleging that initiative 
petition signature collectors misled voters by placing cover 
page from one petition over signature page from different 
petition).  Nor is there any evidence of voter confusion.  Cf. 
22 
 
 
Garrison, 33 Mass. App. Ct. at 117 (failure to designate 
political party whose nomination was sought on nomination papers 
had potential to mislead voters and did not amount to "mere 
technical[]" omission).  To the contrary, as noted, it is 
undisputed that all 1,066 of the voters signed, or at least made 
some mark, in the signature box on Brady's webpage and then 
clicked on the box that read "Submit," thereby expressing their 
support for Brady's appearance on the September Republican 
primary ballot for the office of United States representative 
for the Ninth Congressional District. 
 
For these reasons, we conclude, as we did in our order of 
July 13, 2020, that the electronic signature gathering process 
utilized by Brady complied in substance with the material 
requirements of Goldstein. 
 
2.  Compliance with the Secretary's advisory.  We turn now 
to Braithwaite's alternative objection, and the SBLC's ruling, 
that all of Brady's certified signatures were invalid because 
the voters did not sign by applying a computer mouse or stylus 
to the signature line on the image of her nomination papers, as 
required by the Secretary's advisory.  This need not detain us 
long. 
 
The court in Goldstein directed the Secretary to "provide 
clear guidance to prospective candidates as to how [the] 
electronic signature collection process [outlined in the 
23 
 
 
decision] may be accomplished effectively, although candidates 
need not await that guidance to get started" (emphasis added).  
Goldstein, 484 Mass. at 532.  In so doing, the court was not 
somehow authorizing the Secretary to establish "regulations" or 
impose additional restrictions on candidates.  If that were the 
court's intent, it would have required candidates to await such 
guidance before proceeding.  Our hope was that the Secretary 
would provide helpful information to candidates as they pivoted, 
in the middle of a pandemic, from traditional wet signature 
collection to the new world of electronic signature collection.  
The guidance that was provided was quite limited, largely 
focusing on how the electronic signature could be applied.  
Regardless, the Secretary's advisory does not have the force of 
law, and any failure to comply with it on Brady's part does not 
invalidate her signatures. 
 
Even if that were not the case, the fact is that the 
process Brady utilized materially complied with the Secretary's 
advisory.  As described above, when voters visited Brady's 
webpage, they saw a green-colored block over the first voter 
signature line, which read "SIGN HERE."  When they clicked on 
that block, they were directed to a box elsewhere on the 
webpage, where they could use a stylus, mouse, or finger to sign 
their name.  This is the functional, if not literal, equivalent 
of signing by applying a computer mouse or stylus to the 
24 
 
 
signature line on the image of the nomination papers.  
Certainly, reasonable voters could not have been misled as to 
where their signatures were going to end up (i.e., on the 
signature line).  Moreover, that is where their signatures ended 
up, on both the first and second nomination papers.12 
 
3.  Public policy considerations.  Finally, we turn to the 
SBLC's conclusion that the process utilized by Brady violated 
public policy by allowing for the storage of images of voter 
signatures without their consent and without adequate measures 
to prevent those images from being applied to documents other 
than Brady's nomination papers.  As the SBLC noted in reaching 
this conclusion, unanswered questions regarding "cybersecurity 
related concerns" were one of the reasons cited by the court in 
Goldstein for not adopting a more comprehensive electronic 
                                                          
 
 
12 We note that, following the Goldstein decision, the 
Secretary entered into three separate agreements for judgment in 
the county court, which provided, under materially similar 
circumstances, that voters signing electronically would be 
deemed to have applied their signature directly on the 
applicable document if, among other things, "the voter engages 
in the physical act of signing their name . . . in a separate 
signature box that is made available by an act of the voter, 
such as a mouse click."  See Christian vs. Galvin, Supreme 
Judicial Ct., No. SJ-2020-0444 (Suffolk County June 29, 2020) 
(extending, and expanding upon, Goldstein process for nonparty 
candidates for Federal office); Better Future Project, Inc. vs. 
Galvin, Supreme Judicial Ct., No. SJ-2020-0483 (Suffolk County 
June 19, 2020) (same as to proponents of public policy ballot 
questions); Dennis vs. Galvin, Supreme Judicial Ct., No. SJ-
2020-0278 (Suffolk County Apr. 29, 2020) (same as to proponents 
of initiative petitions). 
25 
 
 
signature collection model.  See Goldstein, 484 Mass. at 531.  
The court continues to have those concerns.  There is no 
evidence, however, that any personal information (e.g., e-mail 
address or telephone number) or voter signatures have been 
misapplied or improperly disclosed.  In fact, the founder of 
VenueX testified without contradiction that no such thing has 
occurred.  Accordingly, we do not view our concerns as 
sufficient grounds for denying Brady access to the ballot.13 
 
As a precaution, however, we do hereby order Brady, VenueX, 
and all other persons and entities having possession of the data 
entered by voters in the process of signing Brady's nomination 
papers, including e-mail addresses, telephone numbers, and the 
images of signatures, to destroy the same forthwith.14  This 
order does not apply to the nomination papers that were filed by 
Brady or certified by local election officials, or any copies 
thereof.  Brady shall provide written certification of 
compliance with this order to the court within thirty days of 
the date of this decision.  The written certification shall 
                                                          
 
 
13 We note that in the three agreements for judgment into 
which the Secretary entered in the county court following the 
Goldstein decision, see note 12, supra, there were provisions to 
protect voters' personal information and signatures obtained 
during the electronic signature collection process. 
 
 
14 The SBLC and Secretary notified the court in a letter 
filed pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 16 (l), as amended, 386 Mass. 
1247 (1982), that they are not aware of any reason why the court 
cannot enter an order requiring the destruction of said data. 
26 
 
 
include the name of each person and entity known to have 
possession of the data and the steps Brady took to make sure 
that they destroyed it. 
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons stated, on July 13, 2020, we 
vacated the SBLC decision and ordered the Secretary to place 
Brady's name on the ballot for the State primary election.  As 
set forth more fully above, we further order the destruction, 
forthwith, of the data entered by voters in the process of 
signing Brady's nomination papers, and order Brady to file a 
written certification of compliance therewith with the court 
within thirty days of the date of this decision. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.