Title: State v. Worthy

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 2000-Ohio-428.] 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. WILLIAMS, APPELLEE. 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. WORTHY, APPELLEE. 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. SUFFECOOL, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Williams (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 513.] 
Criminal procedure — Sex offender registration — R.C. Chapter 2950 does not 
violate constitutional rights guaranteed by the Double Jeopardy, Bill of 
Attainder, and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Ohio 
Constitutions — R.C. Chapter 2950 does not violate rights enumerated in 
Section 1, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. 
(Nos. 99-286, 99-764 and 99-765 — Submitted January 12, 2000 — 
Decided April 28, 2000.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lake County, No. 97-L-191. 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Portage County, No. 97-P-0059. 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Stark County, No. 1998-CA-00101. 
 
I.  Case No. 99-286: Appellee Daniel Williams. 
 
In May 1986, appellee Daniel Williams pleaded guilty to one count of rape 
in violation of R.C. 2907.02 and one count of aggravated burglary in violation of 
R.C. 2911.11.  Williams was then sentenced to an indefinite term of seven to 
twenty-five years on each count, to be served concurrently.  In March 1997, 
 
 
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pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2950, authorities at the London Correctional Institution 
recommended a sex offender classification hearing for Williams, and that he be 
classified as a “sexual predator,” which would subject Williams to the registration 
and notification provisions of R.C. Chapter 2950. 
 
In April 1997, prior to his sex offender classification hearing and prior to his 
release from prison, Williams filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that R.C. Chapter 
2950 is unconstitutional as applied to him.  In its opinion, the trial court held that 
R.C. Chapter 2950 violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States 
Constitution and the Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio Constitution with regard to 
any sexual offender who was sentenced prior to January 1, 1997, the effective date 
of R.C. Chapter 2950.  The state appealed. 
 
In September 1998, prior to the decision of the Eleventh District Court of 
Appeals, this court issued its opinion in State v. Cook (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 
700 N.E.2d 570, in which we held that R.C. Chapter 2950 is not a violation of 
either the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution or the 
Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio Constitution.  The court of appeals affirmed the 
trial court’s judgment on the grounds that R.C. Chapter 2950 violates Section 1, 
Article I of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
II.  Case No. 99-764: Appellee Donald Worthy. 
 
 
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In March 1995, appellee Donald Worthy pleaded guilty to two counts of 
rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02, and one count of gross sexual imposition in 
violation of R.C. 2907.05.  The counts to which Worthy pleaded guilty involved 
child victims who were all under the age of thirteen.  Worthy was sentenced to an 
indefinite term of  ten to twenty-five years on each count of rape, and one year on 
the gross sexual imposition count, with all sentences running concurrently. 
 
In April 1997, the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction 
recommended that Worthy be adjudicated a “sexual predator” pursuant to R.C. 
Chapter 2950.  Prior to his sex offender classification hearing and his release from 
prison, Worthy filed a motion to dismiss the recommendation that he be declared a 
“sexual predator.”  The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that R.C. 
Chapter 2950 violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution 
and the Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio Constitution.  The state filed a timely 
appeal.  The court of appeals, relying on State v. Williams (Jan. 29, 1999), Lake 
App. No. 97-L-191, unreported, 1999 WL 76633, affirmed the judgment of the 
trial court. 
 
III.  Case No. 99-765: Appellant Paul D. Suffecool. 
 
In January 1983, appellant Paul D. Suffecool pleaded guilty to one count of 
statutory rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02, for raping a child under the age of 
thirteen.  The trial court sentenced Suffecool to an indeterminate term of 
 
 
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incarceration of seven to twenty-five years.  Suffecool also had prior convictions 
for the rape of a nineteen-year-old girl, and for the kidnapping of two teenagers. 
 
In March 1998, prior to Suffecool’s release from prison, a sex offender 
classification hearing was conducted pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2950.  At the 
hearing, the state introduced evidence relating to Suffecool’s convictions, a 
psychiatric evaluation, and statements made to police in which Suffecool admitted 
to having uncontrollable sexual urges for young girls.  Defense counsel introduced 
evidence that Suffecool had participated in numerous counseling programs while 
in prison.  The trial court adjudicated Suffecool as a “sexual predator.” 
 
Suffecool appealed his sexual predator classification to the Fifth District 
Court of Appeals.  Suffecool argued that R.C. Chapter 2950, inter alia, violates the 
Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States and Ohio Constitutions, and that R.C. 
Chapter 2950 is unconstitutionally vague.  The court of appeals held that R.C. 
Chapter 2950 is constitutional and affirmed the trial court’s decision. 
 
These cases are now before this court pursuant to the allowance of 
discretionary appeals. 
__________________ 
 
Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecuting Attorney, Vincent A. Culotta 
and Julie Mitrovich King, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant in case 
No. 99-286. 
 
 
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R. Paul LaPlante, Lake County Public Defender, and Vanessa MacKnight, 
Assistant Public Defender, for appellee in case No. 99-286. 
 
Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kelli K. 
Norman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant in case No. 99-764. 
 
Morganstern, MacAdams & DeVito Co., L.P.A., and Michael A. Partlow, for 
appellee in case No. 99-764. 
 
Robert D. Horowitz, Stark County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ronald Mark 
Caldwell, Chief Appellate Prosecuting Attorney; and Frederic R. Scott, for 
appellee in case No. 99-765. 
 
David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, and Robert L. Lane, Chief 
Appellate Public Defender, for appellant in case No. 99-765. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Edward B. Foley, pro hac vice, 
State Solicitor, David M. Gormley and Stephen P. Carney, Associate Solicitors, 
urging reversal for amicus curiae, Attorney General of Ohio in case Nos. 99-286 
and 99-764, and urging affirmance in case No. 99-765. 
 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Renee L. 
Snow, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging reversal for amicus curiae, 
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office in case No. 99-286. 
 
Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecuting Attorney, David P. Joyce, 
Geauga County Prosecuting Attorney, Thomas L. Sartini, Ashtabula County 
 
 
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Prosecuting Attorney, and Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecuting 
Attorney, urging reversal for amicus curiae, the Prosecuting Attorneys of the 
Eleventh Ohio Appellate District in case No. 99-286. 
 
Michael K. Allen, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula E. 
Adams, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio 
Prosecuting Attorneys’ Association in case Nos. 99-286 and 99-764. 
 
Gray & Duning and Donald E. Oda II, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, 
Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in case No. 99-286. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J.  In 1996, in an effort to protect the public, the General 
Assembly repealed and reenacted Ohio’s sex offender registration statute.  See 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 180, 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2560 (“H.B. 180”).  The General 
Assembly concluded that “[s]exual predators and habitual sex offenders pose a 
high risk of engaging in further offenses even after being released from 
imprisonment.”  R.C. 2950.02(A)(2).  H.B. 180 created more stringent sex 
offender classification, registration, and notification provisions within R.C. 
Chapter 2950. 
 
We have previously disposed of two challenges to the constitutionality of 
revised R.C. Chapter 2950.  In State v. Cook (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 700 
N.E.2d 570, certiorari denied (1999), 525 U.S. 1182, 119 S.Ct. 1122, 143 L.Ed.2d 
 
 
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116, we held that R.C. 2950.09(B) is not a retroactive law in violation of Section 
28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution, and that R.C. Chapter 2950 is not an ex post 
facto law in violation of Section 10, Article I of the United States Constitution as 
applied to conduct occurring prior to the effective date of H.B. 180. 
 
Today we are asked to determine whether R.C. Chapter 2950 violates 
constitutional rights guaranteed by the Double Jeopardy, Bill of Attainder, and 
Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions, and whether 
R.C. Chapter 2950 violates rights enumerated in Section 1, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution.  For the following reasons, we hold that R.C. Chapter 2950 is 
constitutional. 
I.  History and Overview of Sex Offender Registration Laws. 
 
A.  Origins of Current Sex Offender Registration Laws. 
 
Although sex offender registration statutes have been in effect for many 
years, see, e.g., former R.C. Chapter 2950, 130 Ohio Laws 669, it was not until 
1994 that sex offender laws were updated to the form that now exists.  On July 29, 
1994, a seven-year-old New Jersey girl, Megan Kanka, was raped and murdered 
after a convicted sex offender moved into the house across the street from Megan, 
and lured her into his house by promising Megan that she could see his new puppy.  
See Weston, Megan’s Law Familiarity Complicates Jury Selection (Jan. 13, 1997), 
N.N.J. Record at A4.  In response to this horrible crime and what was deemed by 
 
 
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the New Jersey legislature as a legislative emergency, New Jersey enacted 
“Megan’s Law,” a sex offender registration statute that includes a public 
notification provision.  N.J. Stat.Ann. 2C:7-1 et seq.; see, also, Zolper, State Again 
Tightens Megan’s Law Notification—Heeds Court Order to Protect Sex Offenders’ 
Privacy Rights (Mar. 24, 2000), N.N.J. Record at A3. 
 
After the enactment of Megan’s Law, Congress in 1994 passed the Jacob 
Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration 
Act, Section 14071, Title 42, U.S.Code (“Jacob Wetterling Act”).  Under the Jacob 
Wetterling Act, Congress recognized two classes of sex offenders, “predators” and 
those convicted of a sexually violent offense or a crime against a minor.  Sections  
14071(a)(3)(A) through (C), Title 42, U.S.Code. The Jacob Wetterling Act also 
mandates that the states either adopt sex offender registration laws, or lose funding 
under the Public Health and Welfare Code.  Sections 14071(g)(1) and (2), Title 42, 
U.S.Code.  The Act further authorizes the release of information collected under 
state registration programs to law enforcement agencies where the sex offender 
resides, and requires immediate transmission of information to the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation.  Section 14071(b)(2), Title 42, U.S.Code. 
 
In its original version, the Jacob Wetterling Act permitted, but did not 
require, state agencies to notify appropriate communities about sex offenders.  
Former Section 14071(d)(3), Title 42, U.S.Code.  In 1996, however, Congress 
 
 
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amended the Act to require community notification when a registered sex offender 
moved into the neighborhood.  Former Section 14071(d)(2) (now Section 
14071[e][2], Title 42, U.S.Code).  Since enactment of the Jacob Wetterling Act, all 
fifty states have passed some form of sex offender registration law.  See People v. 
Ross (1996), 169 Misc.2d 308, 309, 646 N.Y.S.2d 249, 250, fn. 1 (listing sex 
offender registration laws enacted in all fifty states). 
 
B.  Sex Offender Registration Laws in Other States. 
 
Although all fifty states have enacted a sex offender registration law, the 
laws vary significantly in what sex offenses are covered, registration and 
notification procedures, and the process of assessment used to determine sex 
offender status.  See Note, Who are the People in Your Neighborhood? Due 
Process, Public Protection, and Sex Offender Notification Laws (1999), 74 
N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1451, 1459-1460.  In addition to the common registration and 
notification provisions, some states such as California and Texas are considering 
more extreme methods of addressing repeat sex offenders.  Id. at 1460, fn. 42. 
 
The major differences among sex offender registration laws are found in the 
registration and notification provisions.  For instance, the laws differ with regard to 
retroactive application.  Fifteen states and the District of Columbia have adopted 
laws that are fully retroactive, applying to all sex offenders regardless of the date 
of their offense.  See Note, “Megan’s Laws” Reinforcing Old Patterns of Anti-Gay 
 
 
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Police Harassment (1999), 87 Geo.L.J. 2431, 2467-2473.  Twenty-nine states have 
partially retroactive laws that, generally, apply to all sex offenders under some 
form of criminal supervision on the effective date of the particular statute.  Id.  The 
remaining states apply sex offender registration laws to sex offenses committed on 
or after the effective date of their statute.  Id. 
 
The scope of community notification also varies among the states.  Several 
states have no community notification provisions.  Id.  Other states will release 
information only upon request, when the information concerns high-risk offenders, 
or when dissemination of information is necessary for public protection.  Id.  In 
addition, the Internet is being used more frequently for the dissemination of sex 
offender data.  According to a United States Department of Justice report, over half 
of the states have, or are planning to develop, an Internet site for public access to 
sex offender registries.  See United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics Fact Sheet, Summary of State Sex Offender Registry Dissemination 
Procedures (August 1999), at 1. 
 
C.  R.C. Chapter 2950. 
 
Ohio first enacted a sex offender registration statute in 1963.  See former 
R.C. Chapter 2950, 130 Ohio Laws 669.  In 1996, the General Assembly revised 
R.C. Chapter 2950 as part of H.B. 180.  The classification provisions in R.C. 
2950.09 became effective on January 1, 1997, and the registration and notification 
 
 
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requirements contained in R.C. 2950.04, 2950.05, 2950.06, 2950.10, and 2950.11 
became effective July 1, 1997.  Although we provided a comprehensive review of 
R.C. Chapter 2950 in State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d at 406-409, 700 N.E.2d at 574-
576, we find it necessary to discuss the requirements contained in R.C. Chapter 
2950 in the context of the constitutional challenges presented in these appeals. 
 
In revising R.C. Chapter 2950, it was the stated intent of the General 
Assembly to “protect the safety and general welfare of the people of this state.”  
R.C. 2950.02(B).  In the opinion of the General Assembly, the classification, 
registration, and notification requirements in H.B. 180 are a “means of assuring 
public protection.”  Id.  To support its conclusion that the provisions of H.B. 180 
were necessary, the General Assembly advanced several findings. 
 
The General Assembly found that if the public is provided notice and 
information about sexual predators, habitual sex offenders, and other individuals 
convicted of sexually oriented offenses as defined in R.C. 2950.01, the citizens can 
inform and prepare themselves and their children for the release from confinement 
of a sex offender.  R.C. 2950.02(A)(1).  Dissemination of information is deemed to 
be justified because sexual predators and habitual sex offenders pose a high risk of 
recidivism, and protection of the public from these types of sex offenders is of 
“paramount governmental interest.”  R.C. 2950.02(A)(2).  The General Assembly 
further concluded that a “person who is found to be a sexual predator or a habitual 
 
 
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sex offender has a reduced expectation of privacy because of the public’s interest 
in public safety and in the effective operation of government.”  R.C. 
2950.02(A)(5). 
 
Revised R.C. Chapter 2950 is separated into three sets of provisions.  The 
first, which took effect on January 1, 1997, established a new classification system 
for convicted sex offenders.  Under R.C. 2950.09, a sentencing court must 
determine whether a sex offender is a habitual sex offender, a sexual predator, or a 
sexually oriented offender. 
 
As defined, a “habitual sex offender” is a person who has been “convicted of 
or pleads guilty to a sexually oriented offense and who previously has been 
convicted of or pleaded guilty to one or more sexually oriented offenses.”  R.C. 
2950.01(B).  A “sexual predator” is “person who has been convicted of or pleaded 
guilty to committing a sexually oriented offense and is likely to engage in the 
future in one or more sexually oriented offenses.”  R.C. 2950.01(E).  A sexually 
oriented offender is a person who has committed a “sexually oriented offense” as 
defined in R.C. 2950.01(D), and does not meet the definition of either a habitual 
sex offender or sexual predator. 
 
There are two ways in which a sex offender may be classified as a sexual 
predator.  First, if a person is convicted of or has pleaded guilty to a sexually 
violent offense on or after January 1, 1997, and also is convicted of or has pleaded 
 
 
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guilty to a sexually violent predator specification alleged in the indictment, count 
in the indictment, or information charging the sexually violent offense, the sex 
offender is automatically classified as a sexual predator.  R.C. 2950.09(A).  
Otherwise, the sexual predator classification will attach only after a court holds a 
sex offender classification hearing in which the offender is entitled to 
representation by counsel, to testify on his/her own behalf, and to call and cross-
examine witnesses.  R.C. 2950.09(B)(1) and (C)(2). 
 
In determining whether a sex offender is a sexual predator, a judge shall 
consider all relevant factors to determine whether the individual is likely to engage 
in future sex offenses.  See R.C. 2950.09(B)(2).  These factors include, but are not 
limited to, the offender’s age and prior criminal record, the age of the victim, 
whether the sex offense involves multiple victims, whether the offender used drugs 
or alcohol to impair the victim of the sex offense, whether the offender completed 
a sentence for any conviction, whether the offender participated in any available 
program for sex offenders, any mental disease or disability of the offender whether 
the offender engaged in a pattern of abuse or displayed cruelty toward the victim, 
and any other behavioral characteristics that contribute to the sex offender’s 
conduct.  R.C. 2950.09(B)(2)(a) through (j). 
 
The court shall make the determination that a sex offender is a sexual 
predator only if its conclusion is supported by clear and convincing evidence.  R.C. 
 
 
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2950.09(B)(3).  The sex offender and the prosecutor may appeal the court’s 
determination of whether the offender is a sexual predator.  Id.  An offender who 
has been adjudicated a sexual predator may also petition the trial court, after the 
expiration of an applicable period of time, to obtain an entry indicating that the 
offender is no longer a sexual predator.  R.C. 2950.09(D).  Pursuant to R.C. 
2950.09(D), the court shall not enter an order with regard to a petition unless the 
court determines by clear and convincing evidence that the offender is no longer 
likely to commit further sex offenses. 
 
The second set of provisions in R.C. Chapter 2950 is the registration and 
address verification provisions.  The registration provision, R.C. 2950.04, applies 
to all three classifications of sex offenders and became effective on July 1, 1997.  
The registration requirements apply to offenders who are sentenced on or after the 
effective date regardless of when the offense occurred, and to habitual sex 
offenders required to register immediately prior to the effective date.  R.C. 
2950.04(A)(1) through (4).  Any person required to register must do so with the 
county sheriff within seven days of entering a county in which the offender will be 
domiciled or temporarily reside for more than seven days.  Id.  The offender must 
provide a current home address, the name and address of the offender’s employer, 
a photograph, and any other information required by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation.  R.C. 2950.04(A) and (C).  Persons adjudicated as sexual predators 
 
 
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must also provide the license plate number of all motor vehicles either owned by 
the offender or registered in the offender’s name.  R.C. 2950.04(C)(2). 
 
Pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2950, sex offenders must also periodically verify 
their current home address.  Sexually oriented offenders must verify their address 
with the sheriff in the county where they reside or are temporarily domiciled 
annually for ten years.  R.C. 2950.06(B)(2) and 2950.07(B)(3).  Habitual sex 
offenders must verify their addresses annually for twenty years.  R.C. 
2950.06(B)(2) and 2950.07(B)(2).  Sexual predators must register and verify their 
addresses every ninety days for life or until the offender is no longer classified as a 
sexual predator.  R.C. 2950.06(B)(1) and 2950.07(B)(1).  Failure to adhere to the 
registration and verification provisions will result in criminal penalties.  R.C. 
2950.06(G)(1) and 2950.99. 
 
The last set of provisions in R.C. Chapter 2950 addresses community 
notification procedures.  The community notification provisions apply to all 
individuals who have been adjudicated sexual predators.  R.C. 2905.10(A).  The 
community notification provisions also apply to individuals determined to be 
habitual sex offenders upon whom the court has imposed the notification 
requirements.  R.C. 2950.10(A) and 2950.11(F). 
 
Once the offender registers, the sheriff must notify certain law enforcement 
officials, adjacent neighbors, and other neighbors designated by the Attorney 
 
 
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General, within seventy-two hours of the registration.  R.C. 2950.11(D)(1).  
Executive directors of the public services agency, superintendents of the board of 
education, appointing or hiring officers of each chartered non-public school, 
preschool programs, child day-care centers, and institutions of higher learning 
within the specified notification area must receive notice from the sheriff with 
whom the offender registered within seven days of registration.  R.C. 
2950.11(D)(2).  Additionally, certain victims are to be notified when specified 
offenders change their address if the victim makes a request to be notified.  R.C. 
2950.10(A)(2).  The notice shall include the offender’s name, address, the sexually 
oriented offense to which the offender pleaded guilty or of which the offender was 
convicted, and a statement that the offender has been adjudicated a sexual predator 
or a habitual sex offender.  R.C. 2950.11(B)(1) through (4). 
II.  Constitutionality of R.C. Chapter 2950. 
 
As an initial matter, it must be noted that statutes enacted in Ohio are 
presumed to be constitutional.  See State ex rel. Jackman v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court 
of Common Pleas (1967), 9 Ohio St.2d 159, 161-162, 38 O.O.2d 404, 405-406, 
224 N.E.2d 906, 908-909.  This presumption of constitutionality remains unless it 
is proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislation is clearly unconstitutional.  
See Roosevelt Properties Co. v. Kinney (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 7, 13, 12 OBR 6, 11, 
 
 
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465 N.E.2d 421, 427.  Therefore, we begin with the presumption that R.C. Chapter 
2950 is constitutional. 
 
A.  Section 1, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
The courts of appeals in Williams and Worthy held that R.C. Chapter 2950 is 
an unconstitutional law in violation of Section 1, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.  
The decisions derive from the conclusion that R.C. Chapter 2950 impinges upon 
the natural law rights of privacy, favorable reputation, the acquisition of property, 
and the ability to pursue an occupation.  See, e.g., State v. Williams (Jan. 29, 1999), 
Lake App. No. 97-L-191, unreported, 1999 WL 76633.  We first address whether 
Section 1, Article I of the Ohio Constitution is a self-executing provision that 
provides such protection, or whether reliance upon this constitutional provision 
without other enabling legislation is misplaced. 
 
Section 1, Article I of the Ohio Constitution provides that “[a]ll men are, by 
nature, free and independent, and have certain inalienable rights, among which are 
those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and 
protecting property, and seeking and obtaining happiness and safety.”  The 
language of Section 1, Article I is a broad statement limiting the power of our state 
government to interfere with certain rights of individuals.  The question posited is 
whether the words of Section 1, Article I are so broad as to be aspirational ideals 
 
 
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that require enabling legislation to be practically applied, or whether the language 
is sufficiently definite to make Section 1, Article I self-executing. 
 
A constitutional provision is self-executing when it is complete in itself and 
becomes operative without the aid of supplemental or enabling legislation.  In re 
Protest Filed by Citizens for the Merit Selection of Judges, Inc. (1990), 49 Ohio 
St.3d 102, 104, 551 N.E.2d 150, 152.  Likewise, a constitutional provision is not 
self-executing if its language, duly construed, cannot provide for adequate and 
meaningful enforcement of its terms without other legislative enactment.  State ex 
rel. Russell v. Bliss (1951), 156 Ohio St. 147, 151-152, 46 O.O. 3, 5, 101 N.E.2d 
289, 291.  Stated more succinctly, the words of a constitutional provision must be 
sufficiently precise in order to provide clear guidance to courts with respect to their 
application if the provision is to be deemed self-executing. 
 
The constitutions of other states reflect Section 1, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution.  We consider the judicial interpretations of those states in the absence 
of Ohio precedent.  See State ex rel. Durbin v. Smith (1921), 102 Ohio St. 591, 
599, 133 N.E. 457, 459. 
 
The Vermont Constitution provides that “all persons are born equally free 
and independent, and have certain natural, inherent, and unalienable rights, 
amongst which are the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, 
possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and 
 
 
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safety.”  Chapter 1, Article I, Vermont Constitution.  The Supreme Court of 
Vermont has held that this provision does not create enforceable rights and is not 
self-executing, but rather “expresses fundamental, general principles * * * that 
infuse the rights of individuals and powers of government specified elsewhere in 
the constitution.”  Shields v. Gerhart (1995), 163 Vt. 219, 224, 658 A.2d 924, 928.  
The court has never declared an Act of the Vermont legislature unconstitutional 
solely because it violated Chapter 1, Article I of the Vermont Constitution.  See 
Benning v. State (1994), 161 Vt. 472, 476-477, 641 A.2d 757, 759. 
 
Section 4, Article II of the New Mexico Constitution states that “[a]ll 
persons are born equally free, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable 
rights, among which are the rights of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of 
acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and of seeking and obtaining safety 
and happiness.”  The New Mexico courts have held that although its citizens enjoy 
rights to life, liberty, property, and happiness, the vague references in Section 4, 
Article II are insufficient without enabling legislation to warrant judicial 
enforcement.  See Blea v. Espanola (App.1994), 117 N.M. 217, 221, 870 P.2d 755, 
759, certiorari denied (1994), 117 N.M. 328, 871 P.2d 984. 
 
In language virtually identical to that of the Ohio Constitution, the California 
Constitution provides that “[a]ll people are by nature free and independent and 
have inalienable rights.  Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, 
 
 
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acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, 
happiness, and privacy.”  Section 1, Article I, California Constitution.  The 
California courts have held that these rights are not absolute in the individual and 
will yield when the public welfare and common good so demand.  See Natl. Org. 
for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Gain (1979), 100 Cal.App.3d 586, 598, 161 
Cal.Rptr. 181, 187; Ex Parte Moffett (1937), 19 Cal.App.2d 7, 14, 64 P.2d 1190, 
1194. 
 
In addition to Vermont, New Mexico, and California, numerous other states 
with constitutional provisions similar to Section 1, Article I have not construed 
their provisions to be a sole basis for challenging legislation.1  The reason for such 
a construction is that the language contained in these states’ constitutional 
provisions is not sufficiently complete so that courts would have a standard that 
could be routinely and uniformly applied.  Cf., e.g., Sepe v. Daneker (1949), 76 
R.I. 160, 168, 68 A.2d 101, 105.  Against this backdrop, we now analyze Section 
1, Article I of the Ohio Constitution to determine whether its language is self-
executing. 
 
Section 1, Article I of the Ohio Constitution describes rights inherent in the 
individual to be free and happy—rights that the government is to hold inalienable.  
Yet, we have never held rights of property or rights of liberty to be completely free 
from government restraint.  Accordingly, the “natural law” rights outlined in 
 
 
21
Section 1, Article I will, at times, yield to government intrusion when necessitated 
by the public good.  The issue we must decide is whether this language gives us a 
methodology to determine how to accord protection to these rights. 
 
“Natural law” rights, in and of themselves, are of no legal force.  Rather, it is 
the laws enacted by legislatures that define the rights of the individual.  As noted 
by the United States Supreme Court, if “the Legislature of the Union, or the 
Legislature of any member of the Union, shall pass a law, within the general scope 
of their constitutional power, the Court cannot pronounce it to be void, merely 
because it is, in their judgment, contrary to the principles of natural justice.  The 
ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard.”  Calder v. Bull (1798), 
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399, 1 L.Ed. 648, 654 (Iredell, J., concurring).  In order for a 
court of law to enforce any right, there must be a fixed standard to ensure equal 
and uniform application.  Id. 
 
The language in Section 1, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, in many ways, 
mirrors the precatory words of the Declaration of Independence (“We hold these 
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by 
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty 
and the pursuit of Happiness”) and in the state constitutions previously mentioned.  
Similar to the language in the Declaration of Independence and other state 
constitutions, the language in Section 1, Article I of the Ohio Constitution is not an 
 
 
22
independent source of self-executing protections.  Rather, it is a statement of 
fundamental ideals upon which a limited government is created.  But it requires 
other provisions of the Ohio Constitution or legislative definition to give it 
practical effect.  This is so because its language lacks the completeness required to 
offer meaningful guidance for judicial enforcement. 
 
This lack of completeness can best be demonstrated by comparing Section 1, 
Article I to other provisions of the Ohio Constitution.  For example, Section 2, 
Article I provides that “no special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted, 
that may not be altered, revoked, or repealed by the general assembly.”  Likewise, 
Section 14, Article I states that the “no warrant shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be 
searched and the person and things to be seized.”  The shared characteristic of 
these two provisions is that they provide express limitations on government (no 
special privileges or immunities, no warrants shall issue), accompanied by a 
standard through which the courts can enforce the limitation (that may not be 
revoked, but upon probable cause).  It is the absence of a precise standard subject 
to judicial enforcement that precludes Section 1, Article I from being a self-
executing provision.  See In re Protest, 49 Ohio St.3d at 104, 551 N.E.2d at 152. 
 
Section 1, Article I declares that all men are “free and independent,” and that 
the rights of life, liberty, property, and happiness are inalienable.  This 
 
 
23
constitutional provision, however, does not indicate how these rights are subject to 
judicial enforcement.  All of the aforementioned guarantees are not inalienable in 
the most strict sense of the term.  It is beyond doubt that the rights of property can 
be infringed upon through, for example, the power of eminent domain.  See, e.g., 
Section 19, Article I, Ohio Constitution.  Both life and liberty are subject to the 
criminal laws of this state.  Happiness is such a broad concept that no court could 
ever adequately protect every individual’s happiness without transgressing the 
happiness of another.  We find the standards for judicial enforcement of these 
rights not in Section 1, Article I, but in other provisions of the Ohio Constitution, 
laws passed by the General Assembly, and in the mandates of the United States 
Constitution. 
 
Even if, however, Section 1, Article I was self-executing, the General 
Assembly has not violated its declaration.  The court of appeals in Williams held 
that R.C. Chapter 2950 infringes upon the right of privacy, the right to acquire 
property, the right to pursue an occupation, and the right to a favorable reputation.  
When we examine the precedent of both this court and the United States Supreme 
Court with regard to rights of privacy, we find that the courts of appeals were 
incorrect. 
 
In reviewing legislation that impacts the rights guaranteed by Section 1, 
Article I, the legislation will be upheld if it bears a real and substantial relation to 
 
 
24
the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, and if the legislation is not 
arbitrary or unreasonable.  See Benjamin v. Columbus (1957), 167 Ohio St. 103, 
110, 4 O.O.2d 113, 117, 146 N.E.2d 854, 860.  Questions of reasonableness within 
the meaning of Section 1, Article I “are questions which are committed in the first 
instance to the judgment and discretion of the legislative body, and, unless the 
decisions of such legislative body on those questions appear to be clearly 
erroneous, the courts will not invalidate them.”  (Citations omitted.) Id.  The 
question we must answer, then, is whether R.C. Chapter 2950, which is an exercise 
of the police power, is clearly unreasonable legislation that does not promote the 
welfare and safety of the people of this state. 
 
We have suggested the answer to the question in State v. Cook, where we 
compared R.C. Chapter 2950 to a Kansas statute that was upheld by the United 
States Supreme Court in Kansas v. Hendricks (1997), 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 
2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501.  The Kansas statute permitted involuntary commitment of 
sex offenders.  In comparing the two statutes, we held that R.C. Chapter 2950 is 
“far less restrictive and burdensome” than the Kansas statute.  Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 
at 422, 700 N.E.2d at 585.  We also stated that, with regard to R.C. Chapter 2950, 
the “General Assembly struck a balance between the privacy expectations of the 
offender and the paramount governmental interest in protecting members of the 
public from sex offenders.”  Id. at 413, 700 N.E.2d at 579.  Taken in this context, 
 
 
25
we hold that R.C. Chapter 2950 is reasonable legislation because, although it 
impacts the lives of convicted sex offenders, the statute addresses legitimate 
governmental interests without a detrimental effect on individual constitutional 
rights. 
 
We have stated that the right to privacy under Section 1, Article I runs 
parallel to those rights of privacy guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.  Direct Plumbing Supply Co. v. Dayton (1941), 138 
Ohio St. 540, 545, 21 O.O. 422, 424, 38 N.E.2d 70, 72.  Further, when evaluating 
rights under Section 1, Article I, we find useful federal court interpretations of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  See State ex rel. Heller v. Miller (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 6, 
8, 15 O.O.3d 3, 4, 399 N.E.2d 66, 67.  After reviewing both our own precedent and 
that from the federal courts, we hold that R.C. Chapter 2950 does not violate a 
convicted sex offender’s right of privacy. 
 
The right to privacy has been described as “the right to be let alone; to live 
one’s life as one chooses, free from assault, intrusion or invasion except as they 
can be justified by the clear needs of the community living under a government of 
law.”  Time, Inc. v. Hill (1967), 385 U.S. 374, 413, 87 S.Ct. 534, 555, 17 L.Ed.2d 
456, 481 (Fortas, J., dissenting); see, also, Housh v. Peth (1956), 165 Ohio St. 35, 
39, 59 O.O. 60, 62, 133 N.E.2d 340, 343.  As Justice Brandeis observed, the right 
to privacy is “the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by 
 
 
26
civilized men.”  Olmstead v. United States (1928), 277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S.Ct. 
564, 572, 72 L.Ed. 944, 956 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  Yet the right to privacy is 
not absolute.  See State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Akron (1994), 70 
Ohio St.3d 605, 608, 640 N.E.2d 164, 167.  Privacy of the individual will yield 
when required by public necessity.  Time, Inc., 385 U.S. at 413, 87 S.Ct. at 555, 17 
L.Ed.2d at 481. 
 
The courts of appeals held that the notification provisions of R.C. Chapter 
2950 violate a sex offender’s right of privacy.  The information disseminated to the 
public, however, is a public record, R.C. 2950.11(E), and the right to privacy 
encompasses only personal information and not information readily available to 
the public.  See Russell v. Gregoire (C.A.9, 1997), 124 F.3d 1079, 1094, citing 
Whalen v. Roe (1977), 429 U.S. 589, 599, 97 S.Ct. 869, 876, 51 L.Ed.2d 64, 73. 
 
R.C. 2950.11(B) requires that public notice include the sex offender’s name 
and address, the sexually oriented offense to which the offender was convicted or 
to which the offender pleaded guilty, and a statement that the offender has been 
adjudicated a sexual predator, and that, as of the date of the notice, the court has 
not entered a determination that the offender is no longer a sexual predator, or that 
the offender is a habitual sex offender.  An individual’s conviction has always been 
considered a public record.  Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d at 413, 700 N.E.2d at 579.  
Further, the convicted sex offender’s classification and other information are 
 
 
27
subject to disclosure because they are contained in a record required by law to be 
kept by a governmental agency, see State ex rel. Milo’s Beauty Supply Co. v. State 
Bd. of Cosmetology (1977), 49 Ohio St.2d 245, 3 O.O.3d 374, 375, 361 N.E.2d 
444, 445, and no evidence has been produced that a convicted sex offender’s 
interest in non-disclosure of this information outweighs the government’s interest 
in disclosure.  Cf. Nixon v. Admr. of Gen. Serv. (1977), 433 U.S. 425, 465, 97 S.Ct. 
2777, 2801, 53 L.Ed.2d 867, 905. 
 
Nor does the fact that the government is required to actively disseminate 
information collected from convicted sexual offenders, rather than merely allowing 
the public access, impact the right to privacy.  Active distribution, as opposed to 
keeping open the doors to government information, is a distinction without 
significant meaning.  The information at issue is a public record, and its 
characteristic as such does not change depending upon how the public gains access 
to it.  We hold, therefore, that R.C. Chapter 2950 does not infringe upon a 
convicted sex offender’s right to privacy. 
 
The courts of appeals also held that R.C. Chapter 2950 infringes upon the 
right to acquire or protect property, the right to pursue an occupation, and the right 
to a favorable reputation.  We respectfully disagree. 
 
There is nothing in the community notification provisions in R.C. Chapter 
2950 that hampers the right to seek out or acquire property.  Notification is based 
 
 
28
upon the geographic area around the offender’s residence.  R.C. 2950.11(A)(1) 
through (9).  Thus, before the community can be notified, the offender must have 
obtained a temporary or permanent residence, and the right to acquire property has 
not been implicated. 
 
Likewise, the right to pursue an occupation has not been violated by R.C. 
Chapter 2950.  Every individual has the right to pursue a lawful occupation free 
from government interference unless the public good so requires.  See Butchers’ 
Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City Live-Stock, 
Landing & Slaughter-House Co. (1884), 111 U.S. 746, 757, 4 S.Ct. 652, 660, 28 
L.Ed. 585, 591.  There is no express language in the provisions of R.C. Chapter 
2950, however, that prohibits convicted sex offenders from pursuing an 
occupation.  The assertion that R.C. Chapter 2950 enables private citizens to bar a 
convicted sex offender from obtaining a job, or to prohibit the acquisition of 
property is, based upon the record before us, mere speculation.  It cannot be 
presumed that the receipt of public information will compel private citizens to 
lawlessness.  Further, even if some private citizens impermissibly interfere with a 
convicted sex offender’s rights, the offender may seek redress through this state’s 
tort and criminal laws.  R.C. Chapter 2950 does not remove an offender’s access to 
the courts to seek redress for harms committed by other citizens. 
 
 
29
 
Likewise, R.C Chapter 2950 does not impair the right to a favorable 
reputation.  A favorable reputation is not a protected liberty interest.  See Paul v. 
Davis (1976), 424 U.S. 693, 711-712, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 1165-1166, 47 L.Ed.2d 405, 
420; see, also, Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d at 413, 700 N.E.2d at 579.  As we stated in 
Cook, “ ‘an allegation that government dissemination of information or 
government defamation has caused damage to reputation, even with all the 
attendant emotional anguish and social stigma, does not in itself state a cause of 
action for violation of a constitutional right. * * * ’  Further, ‘the harsh 
consequences [of] classification and community notification * * * come not as a 
direct result of the sexual offender law, but instead as a direct societal consequence 
of [the offender’s] past actions.’ ” (Citations omitted.) Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d at 413, 
700 N.E.2d at 579.  Accordingly, we hold that R.C. Chapter 2950 does not violate 
the rights enumerated in Section 1, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
B.  Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States and Ohio Constitutions. 
 
The defendants argue that R.C. Chapter 2950 violates the Double Jeopardy 
Clauses contained in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and in 
Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.  Specifically, the defendants argue 
that R.C. Chapter 2950 runs afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause because it inflicts 
a second punishment upon a sex offender for a singular offense.  It is argued that 
the registration and notification requirements are disproportionate measures 
 
 
30
imposed after a criminal sentence has been served, and, therefore, a second 
punishment is imposed. 
 
The Double Jeopardy Clause states that no person shall “be subject for the 
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”  Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution; see, also, Section 10, Article I, Ohio Constitution.  
Although the Double Jeopardy Clause was commonly understood to prevent a 
second prosecution for the same offense, the United States Supreme Court has 
applied the clause to prevent a state from punishing twice, or from attempting a 
second time to criminally punish for the same offense.  See Kansas v. Hendricks, 
521 U.S. at 369, 117 S.Ct. at 2085, 138 L.Ed.2d at 519; Witte v. United States 
(1995), 515 U.S. 389, 396, 115 S.Ct. 2199, 2204, 132 L.Ed.2d 351, 361.  The 
threshold question in a double jeopardy analysis, therefore, is whether the 
government’s conduct involves criminal punishment.  Hudson v. United States 
(1997), 522 U.S. 93, 101, 118 S.Ct. 488, 494, 139 L.Ed.2d 450, 460. 
 
This court, in Cook, addressed whether R.C. Chapter 2950 is a “criminal” 
statute, and whether the registration and notification provisions involved 
“punishment.”  Because Cook held that R.C. Chapter 2950 is neither “criminal,” 
nor a statute that inflicts punishment, R.C. Chapter 2950 does not violate the 
Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions.  We dispose 
of the defendants’ argument here with the holding and rationale stated in Cook. 
 
 
31
 
C.  Bill of Attainder Clause of the United States Constitution. 
 
The defendants also argue that R.C. Chapter 2950 is an unconstitutional bill 
of attainder in violation of Section 10, Article I of the United States Constitution.2  
The Bill of Attainder Clause is violated, the defendants argue, because R.C. 
Chapter 2950 inflicts punishment without a judicial trial.  For reasons already 
enumerated, we hold that the Bill of Attainder Clause has not been violated by 
R.C. Chapter 2950. 
 
As defined by the United States Supreme Court, a bill of attainder is “a law 
that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an identifiable 
individual without provision of the protections of a judicial trial.”  Nixon, 433 U.S. 
at 468, 97 S.Ct. at 2803, 53 L.Ed.2d at 907, citing United States v. Brown (1965), 
381 U.S. 437, 445, 447, 85 S.Ct. 1707, 1713-1714, 14 L.Ed.2d 484, 491; see, also, 
State ex rel. Matz v. Brown (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 279, 280, 525 N.E.2d 805, 806.  
Thus, a bill of attainder is a law that (1) inflicts punishment, (2) without a judicial 
trial, (3) upon an identifiable individual.  See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 468, 97 S.Ct. at 
2803, 53 L.Ed.2d at 907.  R.C. Chapter 2950 fails to meet all three elements and is 
not, therefore, a bill of attainder. 
 
As previously discussed, R.C. Chapter 2950 does not inflict punishment.  
Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d at 417, 700 N.E.2d at 581.  Also, before a sex offender is 
classified as either a sexual predator or a habitual sex offender, a judicial hearing is 
 
 
32
conducted either at the time of trial for the underlying sex offense, or at a separate 
sex offender classification hearing.  See R.C. 2950.09(A) and 2950.09(B)(1).  
Accordingly, there is no legislative infliction of punishment without a judicial trial. 
 
Nor does R.C. Chapter 2950 apply to an identifiable individual.  In 
discussing this element, the United States Supreme Court stated that “arguing that 
an individual or defined group is attainted whenever he or it is compelled to bear 
burdens which the individual or group dislikes * * * removes the anchor that ties 
the bill of attainder guarantee to realistic conceptions of classification and 
punishment.  [This] view would cripple the very process of legislating, for any 
individual or group that is made subject to adverse legislation can complain that 
the lawmakers could and should have defined the relevant affected class at a 
greater level of generality.”  (Citations omitted.)  Nixon, 433 U.S. at 470, 97 S.Ct. 
at 2804, 53 L.Ed.2d at 908.  Moreover, even if a legislative Act specifically refers 
to a specific individual or group, the Bill of Attainder Clause is not automatically 
implicated.  Id. at 472, 97 S.Ct. at 2805, 53 L.Ed.2d at 909.  A further inquiry is 
necessary to determine if punishment has been inflicted.  Id. 
 
The fact that R.C. Chapter 2950 applies only to convicted sex offenders does 
not render the statute sufficiently specific within the meaning of the Bill of 
Attainder Clause.  R.C. Chapter 2950 applies to a far broader class of individuals 
than the legislation at issue in Nixon.  Even if, however, we believed the specificity 
 
 
33
element to be satisfied, R.C. Chapter 2950 does not inflict punishment without a 
judicial trial.  Thus, the statute cannot be found to violate the Bill of Attainder 
Clause of Section 10, Article I of the United States Constitution.  See Id. 
 
D.  Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions. 
 
The defendants further contend that R.C. Chapter 2950 violates their right to 
equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.  The defendants argue that there is no rational basis in 
distinguishing between current sex offenders and sex offenders who were not 
incarcerated as of the effective date of the statute.  It is also argued that application 
of the “clear and convincing” standard to pre-H.B. 180 offenders and not future 
offenders involves both a suspect class and fundamental rights.  We find these 
arguments to be unpersuasive. 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that 
“[n]o State shall * * * deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”  The Equal Protection Clause prevents states from treating 
people differently under its laws on an arbitrary basis.  Harper v. Virginia State Bd. 
of Elections (1966), 383 U.S. 663, 681, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 1089, 16 L.Ed.2d 169, 181 
(Harlan, J., dissenting).  “Whether any such differing treatment is to be deemed 
arbitrary depends on whether or not it reflects an appropriate differentiating 
 
 
34
classification among those affected; the clause has never been thought to require 
equal treatment of all persons despite differing circumstances.”  Id. 
 
Under the Equal Protection Clause, a legislative distinction need only be 
created in such a manner as to bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state 
interest.  Clements v. Fashing (1982), 457 U.S. 957, 963, 102 S.Ct. 2836, 2843, 73 
L.Ed.2d 508, 515.  These distinctions are invalidated only where “they are based 
solely on reasons totally unrelated to the pursuit of the State’s goals and only if no 
grounds can be conceived to justify them.”  Id.; see, also, Heller v. Doe (1993), 
509 U.S. 312, 320, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 2642, 125 L.Ed.2d 257, 271; Am. Assn. of 
Univ. Professors, Cent. State Univ. v. Cent. State Univ. (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 55, 
58, 717 N.E.2d 286, 290.  This rational basis analysis is discarded for a higher 
level of scrutiny only where the challenged statute involves a suspect class or a 
fundamental constitutional right.  Clements, 457 U.S. at 963, 102 S.Ct. at 2843, 73 
L.Ed.2d at 515-516; see, also, Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. (1985), 473 U.S. 
432, 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L.Ed.2d 313, 320.  We must first determine 
whether the provisions of R.C. Chapter 2950 deserve a higher level of scrutiny 
than that provided by a rational basis review. 
 
“[A] suspect class is one ‘saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such 
a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of 
political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the 
 
 
35
majoritarian political process.’ ”  Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia 
(1976), 427 U.S. 307, 313, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2567, 49 L.Ed.2d 520, 525, quoting San 
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez (1973), 411 U.S. 1, 28, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 
1294, 36 L.Ed.2d 16, 40.  Moreover, the only classifications recognized as 
“suspect” are those involving race, alienage, and ancestry.  Id. at 312, 96 S.Ct. at 
2566, 49 L.Ed.2d at 524, fn. 4.  Sex offenders, therefore, are not a suspect class.  
See Cutshall v. Sundquist (C.A.6, 1999), 193 F.3d 466, 482; Artway v. Atty. Gen. 
of New Jersey (C.A.3, 1996), 81 F.3d 1235, 1267. 
 
Nor does R.C. Chapter 2950 implicate a fundamental constitutional right.  
Recognized fundamental rights include the right to vote, the right of interstate 
travel, rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
the right to procreate, and other rights of a uniquely personal nature.  Murgia, 427 
U.S. at 312, 96 S.Ct. at 2566, 49 L.Ed.2d at 524, fn. 3; see, also, Albright v. Oliver 
(1994), 510 U.S. 266, 272, 114 S.Ct. 807, 812, 127 L.Ed.2d 114, 122.  As 
discussed in Part II(A), supra, there is nothing in R.C. Chapter 2950 that infringes 
upon any fundamental right of privacy or any other fundamental constitutional 
right that has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court.  Because 
neither a suspect class nor a fundamental constitutional right is implicated by the 
provisions of R.C. Chapter 2950, a rational basis analysis is appropriate.  See 
Clements, 457 U.S. at 963, 102 S.Ct. at 2843, 73 L.Ed.2d at 515. 
 
 
36
 
Under the rational basis standard, we are to grant substantial deference to the 
predictive judgment of the General Assembly.  See Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. 
Fed. Communications Comm. (1997), 520 U.S. 180, 195, 117 S.Ct. 1174, 1189, 
137 L.Ed.2d 369, 391.  The state does not bear the burden of proving that some 
rational basis justifies the challenged legislation; rather, the challenger must 
negative every conceivable basis before an equal protection challenge will be 
upheld.  See Heller, 509 U.S. at 320, 113 S.Ct. at 2642, 125 L.Ed.2d at 271. 
 
The defendants argue that R.C. Chapter 2950 denies equal protection of the 
laws because the statute applies to those sex offenders who are currently 
imprisoned, and not to those sex offenders who were released from prison prior to 
the statute’s enactment date.  The General Assembly could have rationally 
concluded, for example, that the burdens associated with locating sex offenders 
would have created an administrative and fiscal challenge that would have 
rendered the statute practically inoperative.  See State v. Ward (1999), 130 Ohio 
App.3d 551, 566, 720 N.E.2d 603, 614.  Regardless of the potential reasons for the 
enactment of the statute, however, the defendants have failed to present any 
arguments that negate the reasons that produced R.C. Chapter 2950.  Accordingly, 
an equal protection challenge cannot be upheld.  Heller, 509 U.S. at 320, 113 S.Ct. 
at 2642, 125 L.Ed.2d at 271. 
 
 
37
 
It is also asserted that the use of the “clear and convincing” standard denies 
equal protection of the laws.  This is so, the defendants argue, because sex 
offenders who are charged in an indictment as a sexually violent predator are 
entitled to have a jury determine the specification by proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
 
As aptly noted by the Eighth District Court of Appeals, this argument 
“misstates R.C. Chapter 2950 because there is no ‘sexual predator specification’ 
contained in that chapter.  There is a ‘sexually violent predator specification’ 
contained in R.C. 2971.01(I) that applies to those who have been convicted of a 
sexually violent offense * * * and who are likely to commit another violent offense 
in the future.”  (Citations omitted.)  Ward, 130 Ohio App.3d at 567, 720 N.E.2d at 
614.  “Unlike the remedial aspects of a sexual predator determination, the 
provisions of the sexually violent predator specification are penalty provisions 
which enhance the offender’s sentence.”  Id. 
 
“Because there are punitive aspects of the sexually violent predator 
specification, the law requires that, like any other specification, those aspects be 
determined by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  This is in direct contrast to the 
nonpunitive notice and registration requirements [of R.C. Chapter 2950].”  Id.  
Since there are two separate classes of individuals under R.C. Chapter 2950 and 
R.C. 2971.01(I)—one class subject to civil law and the other subject to criminal—a 
 
 
38
rational basis exists to apply two different standards of review.  Accordingly, the 
defendant’s equal protection argument must fail.  See, e.g., Clements, 457 U.S. at 
963, 102 S.Ct. at 2843, 73 L.Ed.2d at 515. 
 
E.  Void for Vagueness. 
 
The defendants urge us to hold that R.C. Chapter 2950 is void for vagueness 
because the statute requires courts to find that a sex offender is likely to commit 
future offenses under a clear and convincing standard.  The defendants further 
argue that the statute is unconstitutionally vague because the statute does not 
provide adequate guidance regarding the application of the factors in R.C. 
2950.09(B)(2). 
 
The void-for-vagueness doctrine ensures that individuals can ascertain what 
the law requires of them.  See State v. Anderson (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 168, 171, 
566 N.E.2d 1224, 1226-1227.  In order to survive a void-for-vagueness challenge, 
the statute at issue must be written so that a person of common intelligence is able 
to determine what conduct is prohibited, and the statute must provide sufficient 
standards to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.  Chicago v. 
Morales (1999), 527 U.S. 41, 56-57, 119 S.Ct. 1849, 1859, 144 L.Ed.2d 67, 80; 
see, also, State ex rel. Rear Door Bookstore v. Tenth Dist. Court of Appeals (1992), 
63 Ohio St.3d 354, 358, 588 N.E.2d 116, 120.  A statute will not be declared void, 
however, merely because it could have been worded more precisely.  See Roth v. 
 
 
39
United States (1957), 354 U.S. 476, 491, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1312, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498, 
1510-1511.  Mathematical precision has never been required.  See Boyce Motor 
Lines v. United States (1952), 342 U.S. 337, 340, 72 S.Ct. 329, 330-331, 96 L.Ed. 
367, 371. 
 
As an initial matter, it should be noted that the defendants are raising facial-
vagueness challenges to R.C. Chapter 2950.  Facial-vagueness challenges are 
generally allowed only where the statute is vague in all of its applications.  
Anderson, 57 Ohio St.3d at 173, 566 N.E.2d at 1228, fn. 2, citing Village of 
Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. (1982), 455 U.S. 489, 494-
495, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1191, 71 L.Ed.2d 362.  This means that the statute does not 
supply a definitive standard by which to determine what conduct is included and 
what conduct is excluded.  As will be discussed, R.C. Chapter 2950 does provide 
an adequate standard upon which to make a sexual predator determination.  
Accordingly, it is not impermissibly vague in all its applications, and a facial 
challenge will not be sustained.  Further, of the three defendants in these 
consolidated cases, only Suffecool could potentially raise an as-applied challenge 
to the statute.  The trial courts in both the Williams and Worthy cases declared R.C. 
Chapter 2950 unconstitutional prior to any sexual predator classification hearing.  
Williams and Worthy, therefore, cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as 
 
 
40
applied to others.  Cf. Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494-495, 102 S.Ct. 
at 1191, 71 L.Ed.2d at 369. 
 
As stated, a law will survive a void-for-vagueness challenge if it is written 
so that a person of common intelligence is able to ascertain what conduct is 
prohibited, and if the law provides sufficient standards to prevent arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement.  Morales, 527 U.S. at 56-57, 119 S.Ct. at 1859, 144 
L.Ed.2d at 80.  First, R.C. Chapter 2950 does not prohibit any conduct.  Its 
provisions merely establish remedial registration and notification requirements for 
those sex offenders adjudicated to be a habitual sex offender or a sexual predator.  
As noted by this court, remedial measures require less specificity to satisfy a void-
for-vagueness challenge than do criminal statutes.  Salem v. Ohio Liquor Control 
Comm. (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 244, 246, 63 O.O.2d 387, 388-389, 298 N.E.2d 138, 
140.  Second, R.C. Chapter 2950, on its face, does set forth sufficiently specific 
guidelines to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 
 
The defendants argue that use of the “clear and convincing” standard to 
make a finding that a sex offender is likely to commit future offenses is illogically 
vague.  We fail to understand, however, how the likelihood of future conduct and 
the burden of proof required to make that finding conflict in such a manner as to 
render the statute vague.  “This assessment of probability is both conceptually and 
practically distinct from the burden of proof.  A ‘burden of proof’ is the duty 
 
 
41
imposed * * * on the party who is legally required to persuade a trier of fact that 
the party is entitled to some form of legal redress.  In this case, the clear-and-
convincing-evidence standard require[s] the state to present evidence that would 
give the court a firm belief or conviction that [a] defendant [is] likely to commit 
another sexually oriented offense in the future.”  Ward, 130 Ohio App.3d at 569, 
720 N.E.2d at 616.  Therefore, we find nothing impermissibly vague about the use 
of the clear and convincing standard in R.C. Chapter 2950. 
 
In addition, R.C. Chapter 2950 provides guidelines for a court to make a 
sexual predator determination.  R.C. 2950.01(E) defines a “sexual predator” as “a 
person who has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to committing a sexually 
oriented offense and is likely to engage in the future in one or more sexually 
oriented offenses.”  The court is to make this determination upon the state’s 
presentation of clear and convincing evidence.  R.C. 2950.09(B)(3) and 
2950.09(C)(2).  R.C. 2950.09(B)(2) further provides factors that the court is 
required to consider in making a determination as to the sex offender’s probability 
of future conduct. 
 
R.C. Chapter 2950 is far different, for example, than the statute declared 
void in Morales.  In Morales, the United States Supreme Court declared an 
ordinance that gave police discretion to disperse groups of people if they are in a 
place without an apparent purpose, without defining what is an “apparent purpose,” 
 
 
42
to be unconstitutionally vague.  527 U.S. at 56-57, 119 S.Ct. at 1859, 144 L.Ed.2d 
at 80.  Here, R.C. Chapter 2950 provides factors to help define when an offender is 
“likely to engage in the future in one or more sexually oriented offenses,”  R.C. 
2950.01(E), and is more specific than the Morales ordinance. 
 
Even if the terms of R.C. 2950.09 are worded broadly, a certain level of 
broadness in the language of R.C. Chapter 2950 allows for individualized 
assessment rather than an across-the-board rule.  “Because each sexual-predator 
determination is fact-specific, the framework provided to the courts in the statute 
must be broadly worded to accommodate both the most common and most 
exceptional cases.”  State v. Avery (1998), 126 Ohio App.3d 36, 54, 709 N.E.2d 
875, 887.  By writing the statutory language to accommodate for individualized 
assessments, the General Assembly has not rendered R.C. Chapter 2950 
unconstitutionally vague.  Any abuses in the sex offender classification hearing or 
any misapplication of the factors in R.C. 2950.09(B)(2) to a particular individual 
can be cured through the appellate process.  See R.C. 2950.09(B)(3). We will not 
rule out the possibility that R.C. Chapter 2950 may be misapplied on an individual 
basis, but the statute is facially constitutional. 
III.  Conclusion. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that R.C. Chapter 2950 is constitutional 
on the grounds raised in these appeals.  We, therefore, reverse the judgments of the 
 
 
43
courts of appeals in case Nos. 99-286 and 99-764, and remand the causes to the 
trial courts for hearings consistent with the provisions of R.C. Chapter 2950.  We 
also affirm the judgment of the court of appeals in case No. 99-765. 
Judgments reversed and 
causes remanded 
in case Nos. 99-286 and 99-764. 
Judgment affirmed 
in case No. 99-765. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
FOOTNOTES: 
 
1. 
See, e.g., Sheppard v. Dowling (1900), 127 Ala. 1, 11-12, 28 So. 791, 
795; Cogan v. State Dept. of Revenue (Alaska 1983), 657 P.2d 396, 398; Nelson v. 
Boundary Cty. (App.1985), 109 Idaho 205, 211, 706 P.2d 94, 100; Atteberry v. 
State (1968), 84 Nev. 213, 218, 438 P.2d 789, 791; Ferraro v. Long Branch 
(1998), 314 N.J.Super. 268, 286, 714 A.2d 945, 954, disposition denied (1998), 
157 N.J. 541, 724 A.2d 801; Sepe v. Daneker  (1949), 76 R.I. 160, 168, 68 A.2d 
101, 105. 
 
2. 
In their briefs, the defendants argue that R.C. Chapter 2950 violates 
the Bill of Attainder Clause in Section 9, Article I of the United States 
 
 
44
Constitution.  Section 9, Article I, however, is only a limitation on the power of 
Congress to pass bills of attainder.  See Nixon v. Admr. of Gen. Serv. (1977), 433 
U.S. 425, 468, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 2803, 53 L.Ed.2d 867, 907, fn. 30.  The states are 
prohibited from passing bills of attainder by Section 10, Article I of the United 
States Constitution.  Id.