Title: Boisvert v. Harrington

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Boisvert v. Harrington (99-523); 173 Vt. 285; 796 A.2d 1102

[Filed 25-Jan-2002]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of  Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                No. 1999-523

Julie A. Boisvert	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.	                                         Bennington Superior Court

Ronald and Sheila Harrington	                 November Term, 2000

Richard W. Norton, J.

Mary Welford, Manchester, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Jonathan M. Cohen, Bennington, for Defendants-Appellees.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       SKOGLUND, J.   Mother Julie A. Boisvert appeals from an order of the
  superior court  denying her motion to terminate a guardianship over her
  minor son, Kelsey Harrington,  and ordering  an evidentiary hearing on the
  issue.  Mother contends: (1) the guardianship was  freely revocable  and,
  therefore, the court erred in ordering an evidentiary hearing; and (2) the
  court violated her  constitutional rights as a parent, and her
  constitutional right to due process.  We affirm. 

       This case concerns a twelve year old boy whose grandparents have
  served as his court-ordered guardians since he was thirteen months old. 
  The underlying facts are not well developed  because the matter was
  appealed before an evidentiary hearing, as ordered by the probate and 
 
 

  superior courts, could occur.  Certain facts, however, are undisputed.  The
  child was born in  November 1988.  Mother was not married to the child's
  father and he has since died.  In January  1990, mother petitioned the
  probate court to appoint her mother and step-father, Sheila and Ronald 
  Harrington, as guardians for the boy.  Finding that a transfer of custody
  was "in the best interest of  the child," the court granted the petition. 
  In 1996, mother was incarcerated for two months.  Since  that time, the boy
  has resided primarily with the Harringtons, and has not had contact with
  mother  since August 1997.  Mother  acknowledges that after her release
  from prison, she abducted the minor  and was charged with custodial
  interference.  

       We note, as well, the extensive probate court record in this case
  (which we may judicially  notice) which contains numerous status reports
  and two psychological evaluations by a court-appointed clinical
  psychologist, one submitted to the court in January 1998 and a second in
  August  1999.  These records evidence a high level of family conflict and a
  troubled relationship between the  minor and mother, resulting in a court
  order requiring that visits between the minor and mother be  supervised. 

       In February 1999, mother moved again to terminate the guardianship. 
  She argued that  because she had consented to the guardianship under 14
  V.S.A. § 2645(4), it should be freely  revocable without the necessity of
  an evidentiary hearing or any showing that revocation was in the  best
  interests of the minor. (FN1)  The probate court ruled that termination of
  the guardianship was  governed by 14 V.S.A. § 3003 and §  3004, which
  require a hearing to determine if the parent is then 

 

  the proper person to have care and custody of the child. (FN2)   The
  probate court thus denied the  request for automatic revocation and ordered
  an evidentiary hearing.  Mother appealed to the  superior court,  which
  upheld the decision of the probate court, ruling that the probate court has 
  "inherent authority over a guardianship created under its authority . . .
  regardless if the guardianship  was a voluntary or involuntary one."  The
  court concluded that the original guardianship order had  found mother to
  be "unsuitable," and thus the hearing procedures for terminating a
  guardianship  under § 3003 and §  3004 were appropriate.  This appeal
  followed.

       Before we address the merits of the appeal, we clarify the basis for
  our jurisdiction.   Following its decision, the superior court remanded the
  case to the probate court to conduct an  evidentiary hearing.  Thus, there
  is no final judgment in the case because that decision did not  resolve the
  controversy between the parties.  See Huddleston v. Univ. of Vt., 168 Vt.
  249, 251,