Title: Theisz v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12559 
 
MATTHEW THEISZ  vs.  MASSACHUSETTS BAY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY. 
 
 
December 12, 2018. 
 
 
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority.  Massachusetts Tort 
Claims Act.  Governmental Immunity.  Assault and Battery.  
Negligence, Bus, Employer, Governmental immunity.  
Practice, Civil, Presentment of claim under Massachusetts 
Tort Claims Act, Interlocutory appeal, Affirmative defense, 
Waiver. 
 
 
 
The plaintiff, Matthew Theisz, commenced this action 
against the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) 
and Derek Smith, an MBTA bus driver, alleging that Smith 
assaulted him.  In the complaint, Theisz asserted two claims 
against the MBTA:  negligent hiring, training, and supervision; 
and vicarious liability.  The MBTA answered Theisz's complaint 
and then subsequently filed a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, arguing that Theisz had failed to adequately present 
the negligence claim as required by the Massachusetts Tort 
Claims Act (act).  See G. L. c. 258, § 4.  The MBTA also claimed 
that it was immune from liability for the vicarious liability 
claim pursuant to G. L. c. 258, § 10 (c), because the claim 
arises out of an intentional tort. 
 
 
A judge in the Superior Court allowed the motion in part 
and denied it in part.  The judge agreed with the MBTA that it 
was immune from the vicarious liability claim and allowed the 
motion as to that claim.  With respect to the negligence claim, 
he agreed with the MBTA that the presentment letter was 
inadequate, but he concluded that the MBTA had waived the 
defense of defective presentment by failing to assert it with 
the specificity and particularity required by Mass. R. Civ. P. 9 
(c), 365 Mass. 751 (1974).  He therefore denied the motion as to 
2 
 
 
that claim.  The MBTA appeals and, in doing so, argues that its 
appeal, which is interlocutory, is proper pursuant to the 
doctrine of present execution.  We transferred the case to this 
court on our own initiative.1 
 
 
Background.  In his complaint, Theisz alleged the 
following.  On March 3, 2015, at approximately 10:45 P.M., Smith 
was operating an MBTA bus in Lynn.  At a bus stop, Theisz asked 
Smith for directions.  Smith got off the bus and attacked 
Theisz, causing serious and permanent injuries.  In August 2015, 
Theisz sent a presentment letter to the MBTA in which he claimed 
that Smith had attacked and seriously injured him.  The MBTA did 
not respond.  Theisz then filed his complaint, alleging therein 
that he had provided the MBTA with notice of his claim pursuant 
to the act.  In its answer to the complaint, the MBTA generally 
denied the allegation that Theisz had notified it of his claims.  
The MBTA also stated, as an affirmative defense, that Theisz 
"failed to make proper presentment of [his] claim pursuant to 
G. L. c. 258, § 4." 
 
 
In its motion for judgment on the pleadings, the MBTA 
argued that Theisz's presentment letter was inadequate because 
it failed to notify the MBTA of the negligence claim that Theisz 
included in his complaint.  Rather, the letter, in the MBTA's 
view, merely described an incident that amounted to an 
intentional act, liability for which the MBTA would be immune.  
The judge agreed, concluding that the only allegation included 
in the presentment letter was that of an intentional tort for 
which the MBTA is immune from liability.  See Tambolleo v. West 
Boylston, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 526, 532 (1993) (presentment letter 
inadequate where it only apprised defendant of claim arising out 
of intentional tort).  The judge went on to note, however, that 
because presentment is a condition precedent to establishing 
liability under the act, the MBTA needed to deny Theisz's 
assertion of proper presentment "specifically and with 
particularity," pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 9 (c).  He 
concluded that the MBTA had failed to do this and therefore 
waived its defense of defective presentment.  See Martin v. 
Commonwealth, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 526, 532-533 (2002) (assertion 
of "boilerplate defenses" does not meet rule 9 [c] particularity 
                                                 
 
1 The appeal relates only to the negligence claim.  The 
judge's decision to allow the MBTA's motion as to the vicarious 
liability claim is not a part of this appeal.  The plaintiff 
also asserted three claims against the driver, Derek Smith.  
Those claims remain pending in the trial court and are similarly 
not a part of this appeal. 
3 
 
 
requirement).  On this basis, he denied the MBTA's motion for 
judgment on the pleadings as to the negligence claim. 
 
 
Discussion.  1.  Present execution.  In considering the 
MBTA's interlocutory appeal, we must first determine its 
propriety.  As previously noted, the MBTA claims that its appeal 
is proper pursuant to the doctrine of present execution.  In the 
context of claims of immunity from suit, we have held that the 
doctrine "applies in cases involving claims of immunity from 
suit pursuant to G. L. c. 258, § 10," as well as claims of 
defective presentment pursuant to G. L. c. 258, § 4.  Rodriguez 
v. Somerville, 472 Mass. 1008, 1009-1010 (2015).  This case 
represents the latter -- that is, a claim by the MBTA of 
defective presentment. 
 
 
In the Rodriguez case, the defendant, the city of 
Somerville, filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint 
on the basis that the plaintiff had failed to meet the 
presentment requirement pursuant to G. L. c. 258, § 4.  See id. 
at 1008.  The motion was denied, and the city appealed, arguing 
that the interlocutory appeal was proper pursuant to the 
doctrine of present execution.  See id. at 1010.  In concluding 
that the appeal was proper, we noted that "[t]he presentment 
requirement protects government officials from having to face 
unnecessary and potentially harassing litigation.  Allowing an 
appeal on the basis that presentment was deficient furthers that 
important public interest."  Id. 
 
 
Although the posture of the MBTA's appeal in this case 
differs somewhat from that of the Rodriguez case, the same 
"important public interest" is at stake.  In the Rodriguez case, 
as we have noted, the city was appealing from a judge's ruling 
that presentment was adequate.  Here, the MBTA appeals from a 
judge's ruling that it waived a particular affirmative defense, 
rather than directly from any ruling on the adequacy of 
presentment.  The affirmative defense, however, relates directly 
to the adequacy of presentment and, as such, to the issue of 
immunity from suit.  In both cases -- here as well as in the 
Rodriguez case -- the issue at the root of whether the appeal is 
subject to present execution, and whether it is therefore 
properly before us, is the same. 
 
 
Our conclusion that the MBTA's appeal is properly before us 
should not be viewed as an expansion of the doctrine of present 
execution, however, which we continue to recognize as a narrow 
exception to the general, very well-settled rule that "absent 
special authorization . . . an appellate court will reject 
4 
 
 
attempts to obtain piecemeal review of trial rulings that do not 
represent final disposition on the merits" (quotations and 
citation omitted).  Fabre v. Walton, 436 Mass. 517, 520-521 
(2002).  The purpose of the doctrine is to allow for "immediate 
appeal of an interlocutory order . . . if the order will 
interfere with rights in a way that cannot be remedied on appeal 
from the final judgment."  Id. at 521, and cases cited.  Here, 
the order denying the MBTA's motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, which is rooted in a claim of immunity from suit, 
fits within the doctrine. 
 
 
2.  Adequacy of pleading the affirmative defense.  Having 
determined that the MBTA's appeal is properly before us, we turn 
now to the issue whether the MBTA sufficiently pleaded its 
affirmative defense that presentment was inadequate.2  We agree 
with the judge that it did not. 
 
 
As the judge noted, proper presentment is a condition 
precedent governed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 9 (c).  "[P]resentment is 
a condition precedent to bringing suit" pursuant to G. L. 
c. 258, and a defendant must deny a plaintiff's averment of 
proper presentment specifically and with particularity pursuant 
to rule 9 (c) "or defective presentment is not an issue in the 
case."  Vasys v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 387 Mass. 51, 52 
(1982).  See Rodriguez, 472 Mass. at 1010 n.3.3  "A defendant who 
does contest compliance with conditions precedent must pinpoint 
the particular condition or conditions alleged to remain 
unsatisfied; a general denial does not raise the issue" 
(emphasis added).  J.W. Smith & H.B. Zobel, Rules Practice § 9.7 
(2d ed. 2006). 
 
                                                 
 
2 There is little question that presentment was inadequate, 
where the letter failed to notify the MBTA of the negligence 
claim that Theisz eventually asserted in his complaint.  Theisz 
himself does not appear to refute this. 
 
 
3 In the Rodriguez case, the city first stated its claim of 
defective presentment in its motion to dismiss.  See Rodriguez 
v. Somerville, 472 Mass. 1008, 1010 n.3 (2015).  The city then 
also raised it as an affirmative defense in its subsequent 
answer.  See id.  Although the city did not raise defective 
presentment in its answer "as specifically or as particularly as 
it could have," we concluded that the answer was sufficient in 
the circumstances, especially where the city had already clearly 
raised the issue in its motion to dismiss.  See id. 
5 
 
 
 
Paragraph fifteen of Theisz's complaint states that he 
"notified the Defendant of []his claim on August 3, 2015 by 
means of a presentment letter sent to the executive officer of 
the MBTA . . . within two (2) years of the date of the incident 
described in Plaintiff's complaint."  In its answer, the MBTA's 
response to paragraph fifteen provides a general denial -- 
"[t]he defendant denies the allegations contained in this 
paragraph" -- and its relevant affirmative defense asserts, in 
its entirety, that "[p]laintiff's claim should be dismissed as 
Plaintiff failed to make proper presentment of this claim 
pursuant to [G. L. c.] 258, § 4."  This is not the type of 
specific and particular denial called for by the rule. 
 
 
The MBTA argues that it did more than merely assert a 
general denial or a "boilerplate" defense that the complaint 
failed to state a claim.  While it might be accurate to say that 
the MBTA did something slightly more than merely state that the 
complaint failed to state a claim, by stating in the most 
generic way possible its position that Theisz failed to make 
proper presentment, that description of its defense still falls 
into the category of "boilerplate."  The MBTA's specific and 
particular position in its motion for judgment on the pleadings, 
as it is now on appeal, was that presentment was inadequate 
because Theisz's letter failed to notify the MBTA of the 
negligence claim that Theisz eventually raised in his complaint.  
That is something that the MBTA easily could have, and should 
have, stated in its affirmative defense.  Doing so would have 
met the requirement of the rule that a denial of performance of 
a condition precedent be made "specifically and with 
particularity."  Because the MBTA's affirmative defense, as 
pleaded, fell short of the requirement of the rule, the adequacy 
of presentment is "not an issue in the case."  Vasys, 387 Mass. 
at 52, citing Travers v. Travelers Ins. Co., 385 Mass. 811 
(1982). 
 
 
Finally, we note that, at oral argument, questions arose 
regarding the timing of certain filings in the trial court and 
whether the MBTA had intentionally "run out the clock," so to 
speak, thus precluding, for example, an opportunity for Theisz 
to remedy any defect in presentment.  At the court's invitation, 
the MBTA filed a postargument letter setting forth the relevant 
timeline, and Theisz filed a response.  The letters reflect, 
essentially, what is clear from the trial court docket:  Theisz 
filed his complaint on September 28, 2016, and served it on the 
MBTA on December 28, 2016; the MBTA filed its answer on February 
10, 2017, and its motion for judgment on the pleadings on June 
1, 2017.  Although a finding that the MBTA failed to plead its 
6 
 
 
affirmative defense specifically and with particularity pursuant 
to rule 9 (c) does not require a finding of prejudice, we note 
that the failure may in fact have prejudiced Theisz.  If in its 
answer the MBTA had pleaded its defense with the requisite 
specificity and particularity, Theisz would still have had time 
to provide proper presentment (by March 3, 2017, which would 
have been two years from the date of the incident).  In any 
event, even if there had been no prejudice, the judge was 
warranted in concluding that the MBTA had waived the affirmative 
defense of inadequate presentment by failing to plead it with 
the required specificity and particularity. 
 
 
The order allowing in part and denying in part the MBTA's 
motion for judgment on the pleadings is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
Roberto M. Braceras (Amy Bratskeir & Jennifer Minjung Lee 
Sage also present) for the defendant. 
 
David H. Rich (Benjamin J. Wish also present) for the 
plaintiff.