Title: In re Times and Seasons, LLC

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

2011 VT 76













In re Times and Seasons, LLC Act
250 Reconsideration (2010-154)
 
2011 VT 76
 
[Filed 08-Jul-2011]
 
NOTICE:  This opinion is
subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision
before publication in the Vermont Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme Court, 109
State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in order that
corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.
 
 
2011 VT 76
 
No. 2010-154
 
In re Times and Seasons, LLC 
Act 250 Reconsideration
Supreme Court
 
On Appeal from
    
Environmental Court 
 
 
 
January Term, 2011
 
 
 
 
Thomas
  S. Durkin, J.
 
David L. Grayck of Cheney, Brock &
Saudek, P.C., Montpelier, for Appellant.
 
William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and Thea J. Schwartz,
Assistant Attorney General, 
  Montpelier, for Appellee State of
Vermont. 
 
Geoffrey H. Hand, Rebecca E. Boucher, and Elizabeth H.
Catlin of Shems Dunkiel Raubvogel &
  Saunders PLLC, Burlington, for Appellee Town of
Royalton Planning Commission.
 
 
PRESENT:  Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and
Burgess, JJ.
 
 
¶ 1.            
JOHNSON, J.  Applicant Times and Seasons,
LLC, appeals from the Environmental Court's grant of summary judgment to the
Natural Resources Board and corresponding denial of applicant's Act 250 permit
application to construct and operate a gift shop and deli with related
improvements on Dairy Hill Road in the Town of Royalton.  Applicant
argues that it may avail itself of the definition of "primary agricultural
soils" in 10 V.S.A. § 6001(15) amended during the course of its litigation
to secure compliance with criterion 9(B), 10 V.S.A. § 6086(a)(9)(B),
the only Act 250 criterion for which it has not received approval.  We
disagree and therefore affirm.  
¶ 2.            
In 2004, applicant first sought approval under Act 250 to construct an
approximately 4,800-square-foot gift shop and deli project on Dairy Hill Road
in Royalton, near the Joseph Smith Birthplace Memorial.  Both the District
3 Environmental Commission (District Commission) and the former Environmental
Board denied the application.  The Board found that the application failed
to satisfy Act 250 criteria 8, 9(B), and 10.  
¶ 3.            
Criterion 9(B), 10 V.S.A. § 6086(a)(9)(B), at
that time required that the project would "not significantly reduce the
agricultural potential of the primary agricultural soils," or, if a significant
reduction existed, that four subcriteria set forth in 10 V.S.A. §
6086(a)(9)(B)(i)-(iv) were satisfied.[1] 
10 V.S.A. § 6086(a)(9)(B) (1997).  The Board
found that there were 2.8 acres of primary agricultural soils on the 7.3-acre
project site and that the project would significantly reduce the agricultural
potential of 1.9 acres of these primary agricultural soils.  Finding this
loss of two-thirds of the primary agricultural soils on the site to be a
significant reduction under the statute, the Board next concluded that
applicant failed to carry its burden of proof as to all four subcriteria. 

¶ 4.            
Applicant appealed the decision here.  We affirmed in part and
reversed in part the Board's permit denial in In re Times and Seasons, LLC,
2008 VT 7, 183 Vt. 336, 950 A.2d 1189.  Although we reversed the Board's
determination regarding criterion 10, we held that the Board did not err in
concluding that the project application failed to comply with criterion 8 or
criterion 9(B) and thus properly denied the permit under Act 250.[2]  Id. ¶¶ 10,
16, 20, 23.  With regard to criterion 9(B), we determined that the
Board correctly concluded that the project as proposed would have an impact on
approximately 1.9 of the 2.8 acres of primary agricultural soils at the site
and that applicant failed to meet the four subcriteria of 9(B).  Id. ¶¶ 16, 20.  We denied applicant's motion for
re-argument on March 14, 2008.
¶ 5.            
During the course of that litigation, a statutory amendment to
10 V.S.A. § 6001(15) changed the definition of "primary
agricultural soils" at issue in criterion 9(B).  2005,
No. 183 (Adj. Sess.), § 6.  On August 29, 2008, applicant filed a
reconsideration request with the District Commission pursuant to 10 V.S.A. §
6087(c), which allows an applicant to apply for reconsideration within six
months of a final Act 250 permit application denial if the applicant certifies
that the deficiencies causing the denial have been corrected.  On
reconsideration, applicant claimed compliance with criteria 8 and 9(B). 
The District Commission found that the project complied with criterion 8. 

¶ 6.            
In its reconsideration application, applicant contended that the amended
definition of primary agricultural soils governed the District Commission's
reconsideration of criterion 9(B).  It argued that its projectalthough
unchangednow complied with criterion 9(B) because the soils on its site did
not fall under the new definition of primary agricultural soils.  The
District Commission applied the amended definition and found that applicant's
project still failed to satisfy criterion 9(B).  Specifically, it found
that, even if it applied the amended definition, there were 2.8 acres of
primary agricultural soils at the project site and the project would
significantly reduce the agricultural potential of 1.9 acres of primary
agricultural soils.  Applicant presented no evidence on the four
subcriteria of 9(B) and thus failed to satisfy them.  The District
Commission therefore denied the application. 
¶ 7.            
Applicant appealed that denial to the Environmental Court.  It did
not claim that it had revised its initial application to comply with criterion
9(B).  Rather, as before the District Commission, applicant contended that
its Act 250 permit application was entitled to approval because the proposed
project satisfied criterion 9(B) as result of the statutory amendment to
10 V.S.A. § 6001(15) changing the definition of primary
agricultural soils.  On summary judgment, the court denied applicant's
application.  It found that applicant failed to remedy the deficiencies in
its original application concerning criterion 9(B).  It also found that on
reconsideration of the original application pursuant to 10 V.S.A. § 6087,
applicant could not avail itself of the new definition, amended during the
course of litigation, to secure compliance with criterion 9(B).  This
appeal followed.  
¶ 8.            
Applicant again argues that it is entitled to take advantage of the
amended definition of primary agricultural soils in
10 V.S.A. § 6001(15) to comply with criterion 9(B) on its
application for reconsideration pursuant to 10 V.S.A. § 6087(c); it thus claims
that the Environmental Court's denial of applicant's application on summary
judgment should be reversed and remanded.  We review summary judgment
rulings de novo, applying the same standard as the Environmental Court.  In
re Eustance Act 250 Jurisdictional Op., 2009 VT 16, ¶ 14, 185 Vt. 447,
970 A.2d 1285.  Summary judgment is appropriate
when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and any party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  V.R.C.P. 56(c)(3). 

¶ 9.            
We reach the same result as the Environmental Court because our vested
rights doctrine prevents applicant on reconsideration from availing itself of
the definition amended during the course of litigation and relying solely on
the change in law to correct the deficiencies causing its Act 250 permit
denial.  Applicant contends that it has a vested right to have the amended
definition apply to its reconsideration application.  It emphasizes
that the submission of an application for reconsideration is a "vesting event"
that entitles applicant to all law in effect at that time.  Applicant
therefore suggests that the deficiencies leading to its initial denial may be
corrected on reconsideration simply by the favorable change in law, rather than
by changes to the project itself.  Applicant, however, misinterprets our
vested rights doctrine as it applies to an Act 250 reconsideration application.
¶ 10.         When
an Act 250 permit application is denied, 10 V.S.A. § 6087(c) allows an
applicant to apply for reconsideration within six months of the denial. 
The statute requires that the Act 250 permit denial must "contain the specific
reasons for denial," and, correspondingly, an applicant's reconsideration
application must "include an affidavit . . .
that the deficiencies have been corrected."  10 V.S.A. §
6087(c).  The reconsideration application pursuant to
§ 6087(c) offers an applicant the opportunity to revisit only those
aspects of the application that led to denial of the permit.  That is, the
reconsideration process allows an applicant to maintain the benefit of initial
affirmative findings made on the original application and to receive additional
review only in those areas found deficient.  A reconsideration application
is thus a continuation of the original Act 250 permit application.  
¶ 11.         Accordingly,
the submission of a reconsideration application is not a separate vesting
event.  Contrary to applicant's proposed interpretation, an applicant on
reconsideration may not simultaneously take advantage of the laws in effect at
the time of the initial application and those in effect at the time of the
reconsideration applicationit is not a two-way street.  To decide
otherwise would be contrary to our vested rights doctrine, which allows the
applicant on reconsideration to maintain the advantage of favorable findings
when laws or regulations have changed unfavorably.  See In re Paynter
2-Lot Subdivision, 2010 VT 28, ¶ 9, 187 Vt. 637, 996 A.2d 219 (mem.) (explaining that town may not apply to submitted permit
application zoning ordinance adopted after filing of application); cf. Smith
v. Winhall Planning Comm'n, 140 Vt. 178, 181-82, 436 A.2d 760, 761-62
(1981) (holding that zoning regulations in effect when application was filed
govern application, not subsequently enacted amendments).
¶ 12.         We
have adopted the minority rule that a permit applicant gains a vested right in
the governing laws and regulations in existence when a complete permit
application is filed.  Paynter 2-Lot Subdivision,
2010 VT 28, ¶ 9 (citing Smith, 140 Vt. at 181-82, 436 A.2d at 761). 
Applicant therefore has a vested right to the laws in effect at the time of its
original Act 250 permit application for the deli and gift shop project. 
See In re Molgano, 163 Vt. 25, 33, 653 A.2d 772, 776-77 (1994) (holding
that developer has vested right to zoning laws in effect at time of proper
zoning permit application); In re Taft Corners Assocs., 160 Vt. 583,
593-94, 632 A.2d 649, 655 (1993) (holding vested right in town plan in effect
at time of original Act 250 umbrella permit); cf. In re Ross, 151 Vt.
54, 57-58, 557 A.2d 490, 492 (1989) (holding that where amendment to town plan
was pending, Act 250 application must be complete for rights under old plan to
vest and new application must comply with new town plan).  These laws
include the conditions and criteria set forth in 10 V.S.A. § 6086 and related
definitions set forth in 10 V.S.A. § 6001 in effect at the time
of applicant's initial submission of its Act 250 permit
application.    
¶ 13.         Our adoption of the minority rulevesting rights under existing
regulations and laws as of the time when the proper application is filedwas
not without careful thought and analysis.  See Smith, 140
Vt. at 181-82, 436 A.2d  at 761.  The
considerations that drove our choice included practicality of administration,
avoidance of extended litigation and maneuvering, and certainty in the law and
its administration.  Id.  Allowing an applicant to take
advantage of favorable changes in the law on reconsideration would run counter
to these principles.  And now, as then, we conclude that holding an
applicant to the laws in effect at the time of initial application is the more
equitable approach in the long run.  See id. at
182, 436 A.2d  at 761.   
¶ 14.         We
are also mindful of the policy of 1 V.S.A. § 213, which provides that acts
of the General Assembly, except those regulating practice in court, relating to
the competency of witnesses or to amendments of process or pleadings, shall not
affect a suit begun or pending at the time of their passage.  Just as this
provision protects applicants from newly adopted ordinances, regulations, or
laws unfavorable to an already-submitted permit application, see, e.g., In
re Preseault, 132 Vt. 471, 474, 321 A.2d 65, 66 (1974), so too it prevents
an applicant from selectively taking advantage of favorable changes in the law
on reconsideration, which is merely the continuation of the original permit
application. 
                  
¶ 15.         Nor
do applicant's additional arguments persuade us that it is entitled to have the
amended definition applied to its reconsideration application.  Applicant
cites cases from the Environmental Board and the Environmental Court applying
laws, rules, or town plans changed after an applicant commenced the permitting
process where the change in law made the application of Act 250 less
restrictive on the applicant.  We are not bound by, and, indeed, do not
defer to, Environmental Board and Environmental Court precedent that conflicts
with our established vested rights doctrine and the principles that underlie
it.  Cf. In re Village Assocs. Act 250 Land Use
Permit, 2010 VT 42A, ¶ 7, ___ Vt. ___, 998 A.2d 712 (explaining that we
review issues of law or statutory interpretation de novo). 
Similarly, applicant's arguments challenging the Environmental Court's reliance
on Eustance Act 250 Jurisdictional Op., 2009 VT 16, and In re
Eastview at Middlebury, Inc., 2009 VT 98, 187 Vt. 208, 992 A.2d 1014, carry
no weight, as we rely on our own analysis to reach this decision.  Cf. Eustance Act 250 Jurisdictional Op., 2009 VT 16,
¶ 14 (explaining that we review summary judgment rulings de novo).  
 
¶ 16.         Therefore,
an application for reconsideration, and the required correction of deficiencies
in the original on reconsideration, cannot rely on a favorable change in law.
 See 10 V.S.A. § 6087(c).  On reconsideration, applicants must
demonstrate through changes to the project itself that the deficiencies
identified in the permit application's denial have been corrected.  To take
advantage of the change in law, applicant must begin the Act 250 permit process
anew.         
Affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
FOR THE COURT:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Associate
  Justice
 
 

[1] 
This statute has since been amended.  See 2005, No. 183
(Adj. Sess.), § 7.
 
[2] 
While that appeal was pending, applicant constructed a building on the project
site of approximately the same size and in approximately the same footprint,
with a substantially similar floor plan.  Because applicant represented
that the sole purpose of this building is to produce maple syrup, which was
deemed to qualify as farming, it was exempt from Act 250 jurisdiction.