Title: Rogers v. State

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

427 Nev, Advance Opinion @B
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

      
      
 
   
  
  
  
  
  
 
     
  
  
  
   
  
 
 
  

MICHAEL WAYNE ROGERS, No. 58854

Appellant, FI L E D
‘THE STATE OF NEVADA. ,
Respondent. uel 29 2011

Proper person appeal from an order of Ree

denying in part a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Donald M. Mosley, Judge.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded,

 

Michael Wayne Rogers, Indian Springs,
in Proper Person.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; David J. Roger,
District Attorney, and Steven S. Owens, Chief Deputy District Attorney,
Clark County,

for Respondent.

 

BEFORE DOUGLAS, HARDESTY and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

This case arises from an untimely post-conviction petition for
‘a writ of habeas corpus stemming from a conviction, pursuant to a guilty
plea, of three counts of sexual assault and three counts of sexual assault
with the use of a deadly weapon causing substantial bodily harm. In his
petition, appellant Michael Rogers claimed that the six sentences of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole for three of the six counts
were cruel and unusual punishment because Rogers was a juvenile when

M3995.

 
he committed his offenses. Rogers also claimed that the manner in which
the sentences were imposed, with every sentence to be served
consecutively, amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. The district,
court granted the petition in part, determining that the petition was
procedurally barred, but that new caselaw applied retroactively and
provided good cause to excuse the procedural default. ‘To correct the
sentences, the district court imposed three consecutive sentences of life
with the possibility of parole after 10 years had been served. In this
appeal, we consider whether the district court abused its discretion in
failing to appoint counsel to assist Rogers in the post-conviction
proceeding. Given the severity of the consequences, Rogers’ indigency,
and the difficulty of the issues presented related to the applicability and
scope of the holding in Graham v, Florida, 560 US. __, 190 8. Ct, 2011
(2010), we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in failing
to appoint counsel in the instant case,
FACTS:

In August 1988, Rogers, at 17 years of age, committed brutal
sexual offenses against two women. Pursuant to a guilty plea, Rogers was
convicted of three counts of sexual assault (counts 9, 4, 6) and three counts
of sexual assault with a deadly weapon causing substantial bodily harm
(counts 11, 12, 14). The district court sentenced Rogers to serve three
consecutive terms of life with the possibility of parole for counts 3, 4, and
6,1 and a total of six consecutive terms of life without the possibility of

‘Although the judgment of conviction did not so specify, for counts 3,
4, and 6, the term of parole eligibility began after serving a minimum of 5
years. 197 Nev. Stat., ch. 598, § 3, at 1626-27 (NRS 200.366(2)(b) (1988).

 

 
parole for counts 11, 12, and 14, to be served consecutively to the terms
imposed in counts 3, 4, and 6.

On September 22, 2010, Rogers filed a proper person post-
conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In his petition, Rogers
claimed that the sentences of life without the pos

 

ibility of parole for
counts 11, 12, and 14 were cruel and unusual punishment, Rogers also
claimed that the manner in which the sentences were imposed, with every
sentence to be served consecutively, amounted to cruel and unusual
punishment. Rogers claimed that the recent decision in Graham, 560 U.S.
at __, 130 8. Ct. at 2030, holding that the Constitution prohibits a
sentence of life without parole for a juvenile offender who did not commit
homicide, provided good cause to excuse his procedural default because the
‘claim was not available previously. See Bejarano v, State, 122 Nev. 1066,
1072, 146 P.3d 265, 270 (2006) (recognizing that good cause may be
established where the legal basis for a claim was not reasonably
available).

The State did not dispute that Graham applied retroactively
pursuant to the retroactivity analysis set forth in Colwell v, State, 118
Nev. 807, 59 P.3d 463 (2002), and would provide good cause in this case.
The State argued that the sentences of life without parole should be
automatically commuted to sentences of life with the possibility of parole
after 10 years.

The district court found that Rogers’ petition was untimely,
but that the decision in Graham applied retroactively and provided good
cause for claims arising from Graham. The district court determined that
Rogers’ sentences for counts 11, 12, and 14 should be commuted to life

sentences with the possibility of parole after 10 years. The district court

 

 
did not specifically address Rogers’ claim that the consecutive sentences
also constituted cruel and unusual punishment under Graham. On
December 2, 2010, after entering the oral decision on the petition, but
before entering a written decision on the petition, the district court
entered an amended judgment of conviction, providing for sentences of life
with the possibility of parole for counts 11, 12, and 14, The amended
judgment of conviction, however, did not reference the sentences for the
vadly weapon enhancements for counts 11, 12, and 142
DISCUSSION

Rogers’ petition was untimely filed, see NRS 84.726(1),° and
was a second post-conviction petition pursuant to NRS 34.810(2)" Thus,
Rogers was required to demonstrate good cause and prejudice to overcome
the procedural default. NRS 34.726(); NRS 34.810(3). ‘This court has

“It is unclear from the record whether the district court intentionally
omitted the deadly weapon enhancements, whether the district court
intended the amendment to be read to include life terms with the
possibility of parole for the deadly weapon enhancements for counts 11,
12, and 14, or whether the district court simply made a clerical error in
omitting the deadly weapon enhancements. It is likewise unclear how the
‘Nevada Department of Corrections has interpreted the amended judgment
of eonvietion.

‘Even assuming that the deadline for filing a habeas corpus petition
commenced on January 1, 1993, the date of the amendments to NRS
Chapter 34, Rogers’ petition was filed more than 17 years after the
effective date of NRS 34.726, See 1991 Nev. Stat., ch. 44, §§ 5, 33, at 75-
76, 92; Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 874-75, 34 P.3d 519, 529 (2001).

‘See Rogers v, State, Docket No. 24266 (Order Dismissing Appeal,
August 25, 1993),

 

 

 
ome ab

 

recognized that good cause may be established where the legal basis for a
claim was not reasonably available to be raised in a prior, timely petition.
‘Bejarano, 122 Nev. at 1072, 146 P.3d at 270.

NRS Chapter 34 does not mandate the appointment of counsel
in post-conviction proceedings except as provided for by NRS 34.820,
requiring the appointment of counsel for the first post-conviction petition
for a writ of habeas corpus filed by a petitioner sentenced to death

However, NRS 34.750(1) provides for the discretionary appointment of

 

post-conviction counsel and sets forth the following factors that the court

may consider in making its determination to appoint counsel: the

 

petitioner's indigency, the severity of the consequences to the petitioner,
the difficulty of the issues presented, whether the petitioner is unable to
[comprehend the proceedings, and whether counsel is necessary to proceed
with discovery.

Applying the relevant factors, we conclude that the district
court abused its discretion in denying the petition without appointing
counsel for the reasons discussed below. Rogers moved for the

appointment of counsel and claimed that he was indigent. The

 

‘consequences in the instant case are severe, as Rogers is required to serve
fat least six consecutive terms of life imprisonment.’ And most

°As noted earlier, it appears that the district court may have erred
in its manner of correcting the judgment of conviction, as sentences for the
deadly weapon enhancements for counts 11, 12, and 14 are absent from
the amended judgment of conviction. Thus, in the instant case, assuming
that Rogers was required to serve terms for the primary offenses and the
deadly weapon enhancements—a total of nine consecutive terms—Rogers
would have to serve a minimum of 75 years before being eligible for parole.
1977 Nev. Stat., ch. 598, § 3, at 1626-27 (NRS 200.366(2)(b) (1988)); 1981
Nev. Stat., ch. 780, § 1, at 2050 (NRS 193.165 (1988)); NRS 209.446(6).

 

 

 
importantly, Rogers’ petition raised difficult issues relating to the
applicability and scope of Graham. While the district court correctly
determined that under Graham, the life-without-parole sentences for

 

counts 11, 12, and 14 amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in this
case,* the district court did not address whether multiple consecutive
sentences also amounted to cruel and unusual punishment under Graham.
‘This omission leaves unresolved the complicated issue of whether Graham
applies only to a sentence of a life without parole or whether Graham
applies to a lengthy sentence structure that imposes a total sentence that
is the functional equivalent of life without parole. Other courts addressing
Graham in cases involving juveniles and non-homicide offenses in which a
term-of-years sentence would amount to the functional equivalent of a life-
without-parole sentence have split on Graham's applicability. Compare
People v, Ramirez, 123 Cal. Rptr. 34 155 (Ct. App.) (declining to apply
Graham to a term-of-years sentence that amounted to 120 years to life),
petition for review granted, 255 P.3d 948 (Cal. 2011), and People_v.
Caballero, 119 Cal. Rptr. 34 920 (Ct. App.) (declining to apply Graham to a
term-of-years sentence that amounted to 110 years to life), petition for
review granted, 260 P.3d 179 (Cal. 2011), with U.S. v, Mathurin, No.

 

"We further note that NRS 176.025, as amended in 2011, specifically
precludes the imposition of a sentence of life without parole for a person
convicted of a non-homicide crime who was less than 18 years of age when
the crime was committed; the Legislature further determined that this
amendment applied retroactively. 2011 Nev. Stat., ch. 12, §§ 1, 2, at 19
(NRS 176.025(2)).

 

 
09-21075-CR, 2011 WL 2580775 (S.D. Fla. June 29, 2011) (applying
Graham to a mandatory-minimum sentence of 307 years), People v. J.LA.,
127 Cal. Rptr. 3d 141 (Ct. App.) (applying the principles of Graham to a
minimum term-of-years sentence of 56 years and applying proportionality
review under the United States and California constitutions), petition for
review granted, 260 P.3d 285 (Cal. 2011), People v, De Jesus Nunez, 125
Cal. Rptr. 3d 616 (Ct. App.) (applying the principles of Graham to a
minimum sentence of 175 years), petition for review granted, 256 P.3d 951
(Cal. 2011), and People v. Mendez, 114 Cal, Rptr. 34 870 (Ct. App. 2010)

(determining that Graham does not control but applying the principles of

 

Graham to a minimum term-of-years sentence of 84 years as well as

 

applying proportionality review under the United States and California
‘constitutions),7

CONCLUSION

‘The failure to appoint post-conviction counsel prevented a
meaningful litigation of the petition in the instant ease. Thus, we reverse

in part the district court's partial denial of appellant's petition and

‘We note that pursuant to California Rule of Court 8.1115, the
granting of review in several of the cases listed above superseded the
published opinion, and those opinions may not be relied upon. We provide
‘these citations only to illustrate the split in authority.

We express no opinion as to the merits of any claim that seeks to
apply Graham to a term-of-years sentence.

 

 
remand this matter for the appointment of counsel to assist Rogers in the
post-conviction proceedings. As part of these proceedings, the district
court shall clarify the sentences imposed in the amended judgment of

conviction.”

Deus lo J

Douglas

(An ee, . J.
Hardesty

Parraguirre

Rogers also claimed that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
present mitigating evidence at sentencing or having Rogers evaluated
prior to sentencing. The district court did not err in determining that
Graham did not provide good cause for these claims, as the legal and
factual bases for these claims were reasonably available to be raised in a
timely petition. See Bejarano, 122 Nev. at 1072, 146 P.3d at 270
(recognizing good cause where the legal and factual bases were not
reasonably available). As Rogers did not otherwise present good cause for
these claims, these claims were properly procedurally barred, and we
affirm this portion of the district court's decision.

 

*We have considered all proper person documents filed or received in
this matter. We conclude that Rogers is only entitled to the relief
described herein,