Title: Neiman v. LaRose

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Neiman v. LaRose, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-2471.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-2471 
NEIMAN ET AL. v. LAROSE, SECY., ET AL. 
LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF OHIO ET AL. v. LAROSE, SECY., ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Neiman v. LaRose, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-2471.] 
Redistricting—Original actions under Ohio Constitution, Article XIX, Section 
3(A)—The March 2, 2022 congressional-district plan does not comply with 
Ohio Constitution, Article XIX, Section 1(C)(3)(a) and is invalid—Within 
30 days, the General Assembly must pass a new congressional-district plan 
that complies in full with the Ohio Constitution. 
(Nos. 2022-0298 and 2022-0303—Submitted June 14, 2022—Decided July 19, 
2022.) 
ORIGINAL ACTIONS filed pursuant to Ohio Constitution, Article XIX,  
Section 3(A). 
__________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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Per Curiam. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
{¶ 1} On January 14, 2022, this court held that the congressional-district plan 
passed by the General Assembly and signed by the governor in November 2021 was 
invalid in its entirety.  Adams v. DeWine, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-89, __ N.E.3d 
__, ¶ 5, 102.  We held that the plan unduly favored the Republican Party and 
disfavored the Democratic Party in violation of Article XIX, Section 1(C)(3)(a) of 
the Ohio Constitution and that it unduly split Hamilton, Cuyahoga, and Summit 
Counties in violation of Article XIX, Section 1(C)(3)(b).  Adams at ¶ 5, 102.  We 
ordered the General Assembly to adopt a new plan that complied with Article XIX 
and that “[was] not dictated by partisan considerations.”  Adams at ¶ 102. 
{¶ 2} Under Article XIX, Section 3(B)(1), the General Assembly had 30 days 
in which to pass a new plan.  The General Assembly failed to pass a plan within that 
time, so under Section 3(B)(2), respondent Ohio Redistricting Commission was 
required to adopt a new plan.  The redistricting commission adopted a new plan on 
March 2, 2022.  For purposes of this opinion, we call that plan the “March 2 plan.” 
{¶ 3} Two sets of petitioners have filed original actions challenging the 
March 2 plan.1  We hold that the March 2 plan unduly favors the Republican Party 
and disfavors the Democratic Party in violation of Article XIX, Section 1(C)(3)(a).  
We order the General Assembly to pass a new congressional-district plan that 
complies with the Ohio Constitution, as required under Article XIX, Section 
3(B)(1). 
 
1. The petitioners in case No. 2022-0298 are 12 individual voters: Meryl Neiman, Regina C. Adams, 
Bria Bennett, Kathleen M. Brinkman, Martha Clark, Susanne L. Dyke, Carrie Kubicki, Dana Miller, 
Holly Oyster, Constance Rubin, Solveig Spjeldnes, and Everett Totty (“the Neiman petitioners”).  
The petitioners in case No. 2022-0303 are the League of Women Voters of Ohio, the A. Philip 
Randolph Institute of Ohio, and eight individual voters: Bette Evanshine, Janice Patterson, Barbara 
Brothers, John Fitzpatrick, Janet Underwood, Stephanie White, Renee Ruchotzke, and Tiffany 
Rumbalski (“the League petitioners”). 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Article XIX’s remediation process 
{¶ 4} Article XIX, Section 3(B)(1) provides that if this court determines that 
any congressional-district plan is invalid, the General Assembly “shall pass” a 
congressional-district plan that complies with the Constitution.  As we noted in 
Adams, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-89, __ N.E.3d __, at ¶ 97, Section 3(B)(1) 
mandates both the timing and substance of any new plan.  Section 3(B)(1) provides 
that the General Assembly must pass a plan “not later than the thirtieth day after 
the last day on which an appeal of the court order could have been filed or, if the 
order is not appealable, the thirtieth day after the day on which the order is issued.”  
And the plan “shall remedy any legal defects in the previous plan identified by the 
court but shall include no changes to the previous plan other than those made in 
order to remedy those defects.”  Id. 
{¶ 5} If the General Assembly does not timely pass a remedial plan, “the 
Ohio redistricting commission shall be reconstituted and reconvene and shall adopt 
a congressional district plan” in accordance with the Constitution.  Id. at Section 
3(B)(2).  Again, the Constitution “mandates both the timing and substance of the 
commission’s actions.”  Adams at ¶ 98.  Section 3(B)(2) states, “The commission 
shall adopt that plan not later than the thirtieth day after the deadline described [in 
Section 3(B)(1)],” and such plan “shall remedy any legal defects in the previous 
plan identified by the court but shall include no other changes to the previous plan 
other than those made in order to remedy those defects.” 
B.  The General Assembly did not pass a remedial plan 
{¶ 6} We issued our decision in Adams on January 14, 2022.  On February 
2, Blake Springhetti, an employee of the House Republican caucus and a drawer of 
the plan that we invalidated in Adams, id. at ¶ 15-17, sent an email with the subject 
line “Proposed Plan Information” to respondent Speaker of the House Robert Cupp.  
The email included attachments with what appear to be maps of proposed 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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congressional districts.  On February 5, the Senate scheduled committee hearings 
for congressional redistricting.  Those committee hearings were canceled, and the 
General Assembly did not vote on or pass a new congressional-district plan by the 
February 13 deadline for passing a plan under Article XIX, Section 3(B)(1). 
{¶ 7} House Speaker Cupp later said that because of the 90-day referendum 
period for new laws, he believed the legislature did not have enough time to enact 
a new plan before the May 3, 2022 primary election.2  He pointed out that any plan 
adopted by the commission would instead become effective immediately and 
therefore allow Ohio to maintain the May 3 primary date regarding the election of 
members to Congress. 
C.  President of the Senate Huffman introduces a plan to the commission 
{¶ 8} As a result of the General Assembly’s failure to act, the responsibility 
for congressional redistricting transferred to the commission on February 14.  On 
February 21, Springhetti sent an email with the subject line “Congressional Plan 
Information” to the office of Auditor of State Keith Faber, a commission member.  
The email again included attachments with what appear to be maps of proposed 
congressional districts. 
{¶ 9} On February 22, the commission first met to discuss congressional 
redistricting.  House Speaker Cupp said that he and the other commission cochair, 
Senator Vernon Sykes, had asked their staffs to begin working together to draft a 
proposed congressional-district plan.  The commission also announced that it 
would schedule hearings so that members of the public could testify about proposed 
plans that they had submitted to the commission.  The commission held those 
hearings on February 23 and 24.  On February 22, Dr. Kosuke Imai, a statistics 
 
2. A plan passed by the General Assembly would have become effective immediately if it were passed 
as emergency legislation with sufficient bipartisan support.  See Ohio Constitution, Article II, Section 
1d. 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
5 
expert retained by the League petitioners, submitted his own plan to the 
commission. 
{¶ 10} On February 25, respondent President of the Senate Matt Huffman 
sent letters to the other commission members advising them that Ray DiRossi, an 
employee of the Senate Republican caucus and a drawer of the plan that we 
invalidated in Adams, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-89, __ N.E.3d __, at ¶ 15-18, 
was available to meet with the other commission members.  House Speaker Cupp 
sent a similar letter inviting the other commission members to work with 
Springhetti.  On Sunday, February 27, DiRossi and Springhetti met with the staffs 
of the commission’s two Democratic Party members, Senator Sykes and House 
Minority Leader Allison Russo.  Senator Sykes later described that meeting as a 
“one way communication” because, in his view, Democratic staffers shared their 
ideas at the meeting but the Republican map drawers were not as forthcoming.  
Senate President Huffman disagreed with Senator Sykes’s characterization of the 
meeting. 
{¶ 11} Regardless, Senator Sykes and House Minority Leader Russo both 
indicated that during the meeting, DiRossi and Springhetti did not share any 
proposed plans with the Democratic staffers.  Another commission member, 
respondent Secretary of State Frank LaRose, acknowledged that he had first viewed 
a “working draft” of a new congressional-district plan on February 27—the same 
day as the Republican map drawers’ meeting with the Democratic staffers.  And on 
the same date, Secretary LaRose texted Auditor Faber a screen shot of a district 
plan that was very similar to the plan that the commission later adopted on March 
2. 
{¶ 12} When the commission met again on Tuesday, March 1, Senate 
President Huffman introduced a proposed congressional-district plan.  House 
Minority Leader Russo said that because she had received a copy of the proposal 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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just a short time before the meeting, she had had only a few minutes to review it.  
House Minority Leader Russo had several questions about the proposal. 
{¶ 13} First, she asked why the proposal combined Cincinnati with Warren 
County instead of keeping Cincinnati within a district entirely within Hamilton 
County.  She also asked whether the proposal addressed this court’s concern in 
Adams about carving out Hamilton County’s Black population from surrounding 
neighborhoods.  In response, Senate President Huffman said that pursuant to Article 
XIX, Section 3(B)(2), “we”—presumably referring to himself, House Speaker 
Cupp, and their map drawers—had tried to remedy the defects identified by this 
court in Adams and that the new plan comported with this court’s decision.  “After 
that,” he said, “there are still policy preferences and choices that commission 
members make.”  He said that although House Minority Leader Russo may prefer 
that Cincinnati be contained within a district entirely within Hamilton County, 
“[w]e think this is a better version of the map.”3  He further said that racial data was 
not used when drawing the proposal. 
{¶ 14} Second, House Minority Leader Russo asked why proposed Districts 
5 and 9 in northwest Ohio were drawn the way they were and, more specifically, 
why Lucas County was not drawn into a more compact district with Lorain County.  
Among other things, Senate President Huffman said that District 9 remained 
unchanged from the original map “because the court did not comment” on that 
district and “the constitutional charge” was to remedy the defects that this court 
identified in its opinion in Adams. 
{¶ 15} Third, House Minority Leader Russo asked why portions of Franklin 
County in proposed District 15 were combined with far-away counties rather than 
 
3. As petitioners have pointed out in their briefs, in the proposed maps that Springhetti emailed to 
House Speaker Cupp on February 2 and to Auditor Faber on February 21, District 1 was wholly 
within Hamilton County.  In Senate President Huffman’s March 1 proposal, however, District 1 
straddled two counties and combined Cincinnati with Warren County. 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
7 
the neighboring counties of Delaware or Union Counties.  Senate President 
Huffman responded that a “phenomenon” of drawing compact districts is that 
ultimately a district will be made up of the “left over” parts of other districts, which 
he referred to as a “Frankenstein district.”  Senate President Huffman suggested 
that proposed District 15 was one such district but that the plan had nevertheless 
remedied the defects identified by this court in Adams. 
{¶ 16} Fourth, House Minority Leader Russo asked why proposed District 
7 combined the western and southern suburban areas of Cuyahoga County with 
dissimilar counties to the south, which included Amish Country, rather than 
creating a more compact district by combining the Cuyahoga County areas with 
areas to the west or east of Cuyahoga County.  Senate President Huffman responded 
that regarding northeast Ohio, the proposed plan had, for the most part, created very 
compact districts and that the Polsby-Popper scoring method had rated the proposal 
as just as compact or more compact than a plan that had been proposed by Senate 
Democrats.4  For example, he noted that the proposed new District 13, which he 
described as a “[D]emocratic drawn district,” would include all of Summit County, 
which was “what the court specifically provided.”  He acknowledged that proposed 
District 7 “is a little like [the] 15th where it’s made up of parts,” but he also noted 
that it included two whole counties and was drawn so that the plan complied with 
this court’s directive in Adams not to split Cuyahoga County into more than two 
districts. 
{¶ 17} After commission members discussed whether a bipartisan vote was 
required to adopt a new plan, the commission agreed to meet again the following 
day. 
 
 
 
4. The Polsby-Popper score is a statistical method accepted by political scientists for measuring the 
compactness of a district. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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D.  The commission adopts the March 2 plan 
{¶ 18} At the beginning of the March 2 meeting, Senator Sykes moved the 
commission to adopt a congressional-district plan proposed by the Senate 
Democrats that consisted of eight Republican and seven Democratic districts.  After 
the commission voted five to two along party lines to reject the proposal, Senate 
President Huffman moved the commission to adopt his plan, which included two 
“slight changes” from the map that he had introduced the day before. 
{¶ 19} House Minority Leader Russo proposed an amendment to Senate 
President Huffman’s plan that she believed would make the plan comply with this 
court’s decision in Adams and not unduly favor Republicans and disfavor Democrats.  
Her amendment included four proposals: (1) changing Districts 1 and 8 so that 
District 1, which included Cincinnati, would be wholly within Hamilton County and 
District 8 would include Warren County, (2) swapping territory in northwest Ohio in 
Districts 5 and 9 to make District 9 more compact and not a toss-up district, (3) 
modifying Districts 3, 4, and 15 in central Ohio to create a more compact District 15 
that would have a partisan index “slightly above the toss-up range” (presumably more 
in favor of Democrats) and better link more “cohesive” communities, and (4) 
modifying Districts 7 and 11 in Cuyahoga County so that District 7 would become a 
Democratic-leaning toss-up district. 
{¶ 20} Senate President Huffman opposed the proposed amendment and 
opined that the standards set forth in Article XIX, Sections 1(C)(3)(a) and 
1(C)(3)(b) did not apply to the commission at that stage of the redistricting process.  
House Speaker Cupp said, among other things, that the proposed amendment would 
not solve any of the alleged problems with Senate President Huffman’s proposal.  
For example, he noted that in Senate President Huffman’s proposal, District 15 
stretched from Columbus to western Ohio “because it was a remnant of other 
changes.”  But House Minority Leader Russo’s proposed changes to District 15, 
House Speaker Cupp said, would make District 4 less compact.  House Speaker 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
9 
Cupp also said that Senate President Huffman’s proposal complied with our 
decision in Adams, particularly because it no longer split Hamilton County twice. 
{¶ 21} House Minority Leader Russo asked that the commission “take a 
day” to attempt to reach a bipartisan compromise and avoid further court 
intervention, but the commission voted five to two along party lines to reject her 
amendment.  Without further discussion, the commission also voted five to two, 
again along party lines, to adopt Senate President Huffman’s proposal as the new 
congressional-district plan. 
E.  Petitioners file motions to enforce this court’s judgment and for leave to 
amend their complaints 
{¶ 22} A few days after the commission adopted the March 2 plan, the 
petitioners in the Adams litigation filed motions to enforce this court’s January 14, 
2022 order, arguing that the March 2 plan violated Article XIX, Sections 1(C)(3)(a) 
and 1(C)(3)(b) of the Ohio Constitution.  See Supreme Court case No. 2021-1428 
(Mar. 4, 2022); Supreme Court case No. 2021-1449 (Mar. 7, 2022).  In response, 
Senate President Huffman and House Speaker Cupp argued, among other things, that 
this court lacked jurisdiction to grant the requested relief.  See Supreme Court case 
No. 2021-1428 (Mar. 8, 2022); Supreme Court case No. 2021-1449 (Mar. 10, 2022).  
The petitioners then filed motions for leave to amend their complaints to add the 
commission as a party and to add new claims.  See Supreme Court case No. 2021-
1428 (Mar. 11, 2022); Supreme Court case No. 2021-1449 (Mar. 11, 2022).  On 
March 18, we denied the motions to enforce as procedurally improper, noting that 
we had not retained jurisdiction to review any remedial district plan and that the 
petitioners could not, through a motion to enforce, challenge the validity of the March 
2 plan.  We also denied the motions for leave because the petitioners had improperly 
sought to add new claims that arose after final judgment.  Adams v. DeWine, 166 
Ohio St.3d 1431, 2022-Ohio-871, 184 N.E.3d 111; League of Women Voters of Ohio 
v. Ohio Redistricting Comm., 166 Ohio St.3d 1432, 2022-Ohio-871, 184 N.E.3d 112. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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F.  Petitioners file new complaints 
{¶ 23} Less than a week after we denied the postjudgment motions in the 
Adams litigation, two new lawsuits were filed in this court challenging the March 
2 plan.  The first case, case No. 2022-0298, was filed by the Neiman petitioners.  
The second case, case No. 2022-0303, was filed by the League petitioners.  In the 
complaints in both cases, the petitioners named four respondents: Secretary LaRose 
in his official capacity as secretary of state, House Speaker Cupp in his official 
capacity as House speaker, Senate President Huffman in his official capacity as 
Senate president, and the commission. 
{¶ 24} The Neiman petitioners requested a highly expedited scheduling 
order so that this court could resolve their claims before the May 3 primary election.  
Although the League petitioners also sought an expedited scheduling order, they 
did not seek relief for the 2022 election.  Secretary LaRose, Senate President 
Huffman, and House Speaker Cupp opposed petitioners’ requests to expedite the 
cases.  Among other arguments, Senate President Huffman and House Speaker 
Cupp argued that they needed time to engage in meaningful discovery pertaining 
to petitioners’ experts.  On March 29, we issued a scheduling order that expedited 
these matters but set briefing and evidence deadlines past the May 3 primary date.  
166 Ohio St.3d 1452, 2022-Ohio-1016, 184 N.E.3d 138.  We also consolidated the 
two cases.  Id. 
{¶ 25} The parties submitted evidence by April 25 and completed briefing 
on June 1.  As evidence, the parties filed five new expert reports relating to the 
March 2 plan and a voluminous number of documents—many in response to 
petitioners’ discovery requests.  Although House Speaker Cupp and Senate 
President Huffman retained an expert to review the documents produced by one of 
petitioners’ experts, they did not depose any of petitioners’ experts. 
{¶ 26} On May 3, Ohio held a primary election that included voting for 
candidates in congressional districts drawn under the March 2 plan. 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
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III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  The burden and standard of proof 
{¶ 27} In Adams, we held that the first congressional-district plan was 
presumptively constitutional because it was passed as legislation by the General 
Assembly.  Adams, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-89, __ N.E.3d __, at ¶ 26.  Although 
the March 2 plan was adopted by the commission, it is also entitled to a presumption 
of constitutionality.  See League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting 
Comm., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-65, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 76 (holding that a 
General Assembly–district plan adopted by the commission was presumptively 
constitutional).  Accordingly, as in Adams, petitioners have the burden of proving 
that the March 2 plan violates the Constitution.  See Adams at ¶ 26.  In Adams, we 
assumed that petitioners’ challenge was subject to the highest standard of proof: 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at ¶ 29.  We do not defer to the commission 
on questions of law.  See id. at ¶ 28. 
B.  The commission had to remedy the original congressional-district plan’s 
defects 
{¶ 28} Article XIX, Section 1(C)(3) of the Ohio Constitution states that if 
the General Assembly passes a congressional-district plan by a simple majority in 
each house, it “shall not pass a plan that unduly favors or disfavors a political party 
or its incumbents,” Section 1(C)(3)(a), and “shall not unduly split governmental 
units,” Section 1(C)(3)(b).  Senate President Huffman, House Speaker Cupp, 
Senator Rob McColley, and Representative Jeff LaRe assert that Section 1(C)(3) 
refers to a plan passed by the General Assembly, not to a plan adopted by the 
commission.5  They argue that Section 1(C)(3) does not apply to remedial plans 
 
5. Senator McColley and Representative LaRe were not named as parties in the original complaints.  
They filed a motion for leave to file an amended notice of their substitution, notifying the court that 
they had been appointed to the commission to replace Senate President Huffman and House Speaker 
Cupp, who are no longer members of the commission.  To the extent the commission is a party, 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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adopted by the commission and that Article XIX permits all commission-adopted 
plans to unduly favor a political party and unduly split governmental units.  We 
reject this argument. 
{¶ 29} The commission’s constitutional duty is to adopt a congressional-
district plan to replace the original, invalidated plan.  That duty arises under Article 
XIX, Section 3(B)(2), which requires the replacement plan to “remedy any legal 
defects in the previous plan identified by the court.”  The legal defects in the 
original congressional-district plan were the commission’s failure to comply with 
Section 1(C)(3)(a) and Section 1(C)(3)(b).  See Adams at ¶ 41-71, 84-93.  The 
commission was required to fix those problems. 
{¶ 30} Contrary to the arguments of Senate President Huffman, House 
Speaker Cupp, Senator McColley, and Representative LaRe, this court’s order that 
the commission correct the General Assembly’s noncompliance with Section 
1(C)(3)(a) and Section 1(C)(3)(b) does not effectively rewrite Section 1(C)(3).  The 
commission’s constitutional duty arises under Section 3(B)(2), not Section 1(C)(3).  
According to Article XIX, Section 3(B)(2), the commission may not ignore the 
legal defects in the original congressional-district plan that this court identified.  
Indeed, the commission has a constitutional duty to remedy the defects in the 
previous plan. 
{¶ 31} Senate President Huffman, House Speaker Cupp, Senator McColley, 
and Representative LaRe argue that requiring the commission to remedy the 
General Assembly’s noncompliance with Section 1(C)(3) would incentivize “the 
minority party” to vote against a plan.  They contend that the language of Article 
XIX was intended to establish a “safety valve of sorts” by allowing the commission 
 
Senator McColley and Representative LaRe asked to be substituted for their predecessors on the 
commission.  The court granted Senator McColley and Representative LaRe’s motion.  166 Ohio 
St.3d 1523, 2022-Ohio-1887, 188 N.E.3d 179.  Senate President Huffman, House Speaker Cupp, 
Senator McColley, and Representative LaRe filed a joint merit brief in this matter. 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
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to adopt a remedial plan without being constrained by the anti-gerrymandering 
provisions that had applied to the General Assembly.  But under that interpretation, 
if the majority-party members of the General Assembly and the commission want 
to avoid the anti-gerrymandering requirements of Article XIX, Section 1(C)(3), 
they can simply refuse to comply with those requirements when adopting both an 
original plan and a remedial plan.  In other words, the majority party in the General 
Assembly could simply ignore the anti-gerrymandering requirements when 
adopting an original plan, knowing that if this court rejects that plan and if the duty 
to adopt a legislative-districting plan is transferred to the commission, then the 
commission would be free to adopt a plan that likewise disregards the anti-
gerrymandering requirements that were overwhelmingly approved by Ohio voters.  
The result would be the absence of any incentive to comply with Article XIX, 
Section 1(C)(3) of the Ohio Constitution.  No constitutional language suggests that 
the voters who approved Article XIX intended to allow the prohibitions against 
partisan favoritism and unduly splitting governmental units to be avoided so easily. 
C.  Article XIX, Section 1(C)(3)(a) 
{¶ 32} In Adams, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-89, __ N.E.3d __, at ¶ 40, we 
explained that Section 1(C)(3)(a)’s requirement that a plan not unduly favor or 
disfavor a political party or its incumbents “does not prohibit a plan from favoring 
or disfavoring a political party or its incumbents to the degree that inherently results 
from the application of neutral criteria, but it does bar plans that embody partisan 
favoritism or disfavoritism in excess of that degree—i.e., favoritism not warranted 
by legitimate, neutral criteria.”  We held that the evidence overwhelmingly showed 
that the original congressional-district plan violated that standard.  Id. at ¶ 41, 69, 
71.  As discussed below, similar evidence presented in these cases shows that the 
March 2 plan also unduly favors the Republican Party and unduly disfavors the 
Democratic Party in violation of Article XIX, Section 1(C)(3)(a) of the Ohio 
Constitution. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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1.  Misunderstanding the applicable standard 
{¶ 33} To start, it is notable that Senate President Huffman and House 
Speaker Cupp do not believe that the commission is required to refrain from unduly 
favoring one political party over the other.  At the March 2 meeting, Senate President 
Huffman explained at length his belief that the commission is not constrained by the 
standard set forth in Article XIX, Section 1(C)(3)(a) of the Ohio Constitution.  This 
fact alone shows that he, as the main proponent of the March 2 plan, was not 
operating with the goal of proposing a plan that did not unduly favor the Republican 
Party.  Moreover, the drafters of the March 2 plan—DiRossi and Springhetti—
ensured that any changes in partisan favoritism from the original, invalidated plan to 
the March 2 plan would be minimal when they wrongly viewed Article XIX, Section 
3(B)(2)’s requirement to remedy the defects to be unnecessary or even 
unwarranted—despite our invalidation of the original plan “in its entirety,” id. at ¶ 5, 
due to its systemic bias and our statement that the plan “defies correction on a simple 
district-by-district basis,” id. at ¶ 96. 
2.  Expected performance 
{¶ 34} In Adams, we began by examining how the two major political 
parties were expected to perform under the original plan.  Id. at ¶ 42.  We relied on 
the expert evidence that had been submitted showing that Republicans were likely 
to win 80 percent of the seats (i.e., 12 out of 15) under that plan, despite receiving 
only about 53 percent of the vote in recent statewide elections.  Id. at ¶ 47-50.  We 
concluded that the original plan was a statistical outlier, exhibiting significant bias 
in favor of the Republican Party.  Id. 
{¶ 35} The parties have now submitted evidence showing that the March 2 
plan is only slightly less favorable to the Republican Party (or more favorable to 
the Democratic Party) than the original plan.  The March 2 plan has five 
Democratic-leaning districts and ten Republican-leaning districts.  But three of the 
five Democratic-leaning districts have Democratic vote shares very close to 50 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
15 
percent (52.15, 51.04, and 50.23 percent).  Dr. Christopher Warshaw, an associate 
professor of political science at George Washington University who has written 
about elections and partisan gerrymandering, calculates—with a variety of methods 
and data sets—that Democrats will likely still win only three seats under the March 
2 plan in an average election.  Dr. Jonathan Rodden, a professor of political science 
at Stanford University with expertise in the analysis of fine-grained geospatial data 
sets, including election results, predicts that it is most likely that Democrats will 
win four seats—only a one-seat improvement from the original plan.  Senate 
President Huffman and House Speaker Cupp do not dispute these projections. 
{¶ 36} The March 2 plan creates just three seats with Democratic vote 
shares over 52 percent (and one of those is at 52.15 percent).  By contrast, all the 
Republican-leaning seats comfortably favor Republican candidates.  The most 
competitive Republican-leaning district has a 53.32 percent Republican vote share.  
Thus, the best-case projected outcome for Democratic candidates under the March 
2 plan is that they will win four—roughly 27 percent—of the seats.  Considering 
that Democratic candidates have received about 47 percent of the vote in recent 
statewide elections, this probable outcome represents only a modest improvement 
over the invalidated plan.  Indeed, according to Dr. Imai, any plan in which 
Democratic candidates are likely to win fewer than six seats is considered a 
statistical outlier. 
3.  Comparisons focusing on urban counties 
{¶ 37} In Adams, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-89, __ N.E.3d __, we also 
were persuaded by evidence showing that the original plan maximized the number 
of Republican-leaning districts by “cracking” and “packing” Democratic voters in 
several urban counties.  Id. at ¶ 53-54, 58, 61.  We noted substantial evidence 
showing that the original plan contained districts in Ohio’s three largest 
metropolitan areas that were shaped not by neutral political geography but by an 
effort to “pack” and “crack” Democratic voters—resulting in more districts in 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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which Republican candidates were strongly favored or at least competitive.  Id. at 
¶ 56-62. 
{¶ 38} Petitioners have presented similar evidence concerning the March 2 
plan.  With respect to the Cincinnati area, Dr. Imai concludes that the March 2 plan 
has no safe Democratic seat in Hamilton County.  Dr. Imai compared the partisan 
vote share of the district that each precinct in Hamilton County is assigned to in the 
March 2 plan against the vote share of each precinct’s assigned district in each of 
the 5,000 simulated plans he created.  His analysis shows that the simulated plans 
would expect voters in Cincinnati and a large area of northern Hamilton County to 
be included in a Democratic-leaning district.  As shown in the map below, the 
March 2 plan draws a district line directly through the Democratic area, carving it 
into two districts—one of which, as in the original plan, connects Cincinnati to 
mostly rural Warren County through a narrow strip of land. 
 
As Dr. Imai explained, “in Hamilton County, the [March 2] plan turns one safe 
Democratic district into a toss-up district by cracking Democratic voters.” 
{¶ 39} Dr. Jowei Chen, an associate professor of political science at the 
University of Michigan who has published academic papers on legislative 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
17 
redistricting and political geography, concluded that the districts in Hamilton 
County are outliers in terms of both compactness and partisanship.  He found that 
the March 2 plan’s Cincinnati district has a higher Republican vote share than 84.2 
percent of the simulated plans’ districts containing Cincinnati.  The March 2 plan 
achieves this result by connecting Cincinnati to Warren County instead of adjacent 
areas in Hamilton County.  Dr. Chen notes that the March 2 plan’s District 1 is less 
compact than the vast majority of simulated districts, having a lower Polsby-Popper 
score than 96.9 percent of the simulated districts containing Cincinnati.  Dr. Imai 
reached a similar conclusion regarding the compactness of the March 2 plan’s 
District 1: it is far less compact than expected based on his simulated plans. 
{¶ 40} With respect to the Columbus area, Dr. Imai’s simulated plans would 
expect all of Franklin County and parts of Delaware County and Fairfield County 
to belong to Democratic-leaning districts.  But according to Dr. Imai, the March 2 
plan packs Democrats into District 3 and cracks the rest into other districts, 
including District 15—which encompasses downtown Columbus and stretches into 
Shelby County, as shown in the map below. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
18 
Dr. Imai concludes that this allowed the commission to create an additional 
Republican district beyond what would be expected. 
{¶ 41} Dr. Chen states that the two Columbus districts in the March 2 plan 
are more favorable to Republican candidates than the majority of those in his 
simulated plans: District 3 is more heavily Democratic than 89.6 percent of the 
simulated plans’ districts containing the most Columbus population, while District 
15 is more heavily Republican than 99.4 percent of the simulated plans’ districts 
containing the second-highest Columbus population.  Dr. Chen states that District 
15 is also less compact than nearly every simulated district with the second-highest 
Columbus population.  Dr. Imai similarly found District 15 to be far less compact 
than expected based on his simulated plans.  Dr. Chen concludes that the two 
Columbus districts were engineered to create a more Republican-friendly outcome, 
achieved in part by sacrificing the compactness of District 15. 
{¶ 42} Finally, with respect to the Cleveland area, Dr. Chen concludes that 
the Cleveland-based district in the March 2 plan is more heavily Democratic than 
98.8 percent of the simulated plans’ Cleveland-based districts, while the district 
with the second-highest Cuyahoga County population is more Republican than 100 
percent of the simulated plans’ districts with the second-highest Cuyahoga County 
population.  All of Dr. Chen’s simulated plans have one safe Democratic district 
based in Cleveland and a second competitive or Democratic-leaning district that 
includes parts of Cuyahoga County.  In contrast, the March 2 plan packs Democrats 
into District 11, making District 7 safely Republican.  Both districts, according to 
Dr. Chen, “are significantly less geographically compact than the vast majority of 
their geographically analogous districts in the simulated plans.” 
{¶ 43} Dr. Imai submitted an example plan (which was also submitted to 
the commission on February 22) showing a more compact treatment of all three of 
Ohio’s largest urban areas and containing six districts favoring Democrats.  
According to Dr. Imai, his example plan shows it is possible to apply Article XIX 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
19 
of the Ohio Constitution to Ohio’s political geography without favoring the 
Republican Party to the degree the March 2 plan does. 
{¶ 44} In Adams, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-89, __ N.E.3d __, at ¶ 62, we 
held that the original plan contained oddly shaped districts in each of Ohio’s three 
largest metropolitan areas and that the “inescapable conclusion” was that those 
districts were “the product of an effort to pack and crack Democratic voters.”  As 
the above expert analyses demonstrate, those problems persist in the March 2 plan. 
4.  Additional comparisons 
{¶ 45} Dr. Imai compared the partisan vote shares of the March 2 plan’s 
districts with those of his 5,000 simulated plans and concluded that the three most 
competitive Democratic-leaning districts in the March 2 plan are much less 
Democratic-leaning than almost all of the Democratic-leaning districts in his 
simulated plans.  One of those districts in the March 2 plan has a Republican vote 
share that is 1.9 standard deviations above the median Republican vote share of the 
comparable districts in the simulated plans and has a Republican vote share that is 
higher than the Republican vote share in 86.6 percent of the simulated plans’ 
counterpart districts.  The other two districts have Republican vote shares that are 
2.8 and 3.5 standard deviations above the median for comparable districts in the 
simulated plans and are higher than 99.75 percent of the simulated plans’ 
counterpart districts. 
{¶ 46} Dr. Imai also identified two districts that are slightly Republican-
leaning toss-up districts under the simulated plans yet are safely Republican under 
the March 2 plan.  These districts (District 10 and District 15) have Republican vote 
shares that are 3.4 and 5.5 standard deviations above the median of comparable 
simulated districts.  And he analyzed the districts at the extremes of vote share for 
each party, concluding that the two most-Democratic districts (District 3 and 
District 11) are packed, having lower Republican vote shares than counterpart 
districts in the simulated plans.  By contrast, the most-Republican districts are less 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
20 
packed, containing lower Republican vote shares than expected based on the 
simulated plans.  This analysis leads Dr. Imai to conclude that the March 2 plan 
favors Republicans “by turning Democratic-leaning districts into toss-up districts 
while making slightly Republican-leaning districts into safe Republican districts.” 
{¶ 47} Dr. Chen similarly compared the March 2 plan to his 1,000 simulated 
plans, leading him to conclude that the March 2 plan “is an extreme partisan outlier, 
both at a statewide level and with respect to the partisan characteristics of its 
individual districts.”  As noted above, according to Dr. Chen, the most-Democratic 
district in the March 2 plan (District 11 in Cleveland) is more heavily Democratic 
than 98.8 percent of the most-Democratic districts in each of Dr. Chen’s 1,000 
simulated plans.  The second-most-Democratic district in the March 2 plan (District 
3 in Columbus) is more heavily Democratic than 90.4 percent of the second-most-
Democratic districts in each of the simulated plans.  In comparison, the most-
Republican district (District 2 in southern Ohio) is less heavily Republican than 
90.1 percent of the most-Republican districts in Dr. Chen’s simulated plans. 
{¶ 48} According to Dr. Chen, these characteristics “are consistent with an 
effort to favor the Republican Party by packing Democratic voters into a small 
number of districts that very heavily favor the Democratic party.”  Dr. Chen 
concludes that by allocating more Democratic voters to the most partisan districts, 
the March 2 plan allocates fewer Democratic voters to other districts, making them 
more Republican.  Dr. Chen notes that four districts in the March 2 plan have higher 
Republican vote shares than 95 percent of their counterpart districts in the simulated 
plans, making them unusually safe Republican districts due to the packing of 
Democratic voters into Districts 2, 3, and 11. 
{¶ 49} Using the definition of “competitive” promoted by the proponents of 
the original congressional-district plan (i.e., having a partisan vote share between 
46 and 54 percent), Dr. Chen further concludes that the March 2 plan is a statistical 
outlier.  See Adams, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-89, __ N.E.3d __, at ¶ 19.  The 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
21 
March 2 plan has nine “safe Republican” districts (one more than the original plan), 
which is more than the number of safe-Republican districts in 97 percent of Dr. 
Chen’s 1,000 simulated plans.  The March 2 plan includes two safe-Democratic 
districts (the same as the original plan), which is fewer than the number of safe-
Democratic districts in 95 percent of the simulated plans. 
{¶ 50} Finally, Dr. Chen notes that the March 2 plan is less compact than 
all 1,000 of his simulated plans under the Polsby-Popper and Reock metrics.6 
{¶ 51} Dr. Imai’s and Dr. Chen’s comparison analyses show that the March 
2 plan’s significant favoritism of the Republican Party did not result from the 
application of neutral map-drawing criteria. 
5.  Other measures of partisan bias 
{¶ 52} In Adams, we credited expert analysis showing that the original plan 
unduly favored the Republican Party and disfavored the Democratic Party.  __ Ohio 
St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-89, __ N.E.3d __, at ¶ 63-66.  Petitioners have presented 
similar evidence showing that the March 2 plan likewise unduly favors the 
Republican Party. 
{¶ 53} Dr. Rodden concluded that a 3 percent statewide shift in favor of 
Democrats (bringing them to 50 percent of the statewide vote) would lead to 
Democrats winning, at most, five seats (i.e., 33 percent of the seats) under the 
March 2 plan.  A 3 percent shift in favor of Republicans (bringing them to 56 
percent of the statewide vote) would lead to Republicans winning 13 seats (i.e., 87 
percent of the seats).  Dr. Rodden also calculated that the March 2 plan has an 
 
6.  The Reock score is a method accepted by political scientists to measure the compactness of a 
district. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
22 
efficiency gap of 10 percent, which he says is relatively high in comparison to 
alternative plans he considered.7 
{¶ 54} Dr. Rodden further points out that the March 2 plan treats 
Republican and Democratic incumbents differently.  Of 12 Republican incumbents, 
ten are in safe Republican-leaning districts, one is in a nominally Democratic-
leaning district that retains about 70 percent of the population of his previous 
district, and one did not seek reelection.  By contrast, of the four Democratic 
incumbents, two are in safe Democratic-leaning districts, one is in a district with a 
bare Democratic majority with only about half of the residents of the new district 
having been residents of her previous district, and one did not seek reelection. 
{¶ 55} Finally, Dr. Warshaw submitted three charts comparing the 
congressional-district plan that was in effect from 2011 through 2020, the 
invalidated plan, and the March 2 plan.  Applying several social-science metrics to 
a variety of data sets, Dr. Warshaw shows that the March 2 plan is nearly as biased 
as last decade’s plan and the invalidated plan.  This evidence supports the 
conclusion that the March 2 plan unduly favors the Republican Party. 
6.  Petitioners have satisfied their burden 
{¶ 56} Petitioners have satisfied their burden by showing beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the March 2 plan unduly favors the Republican Party in 
violation of Article XIX, Section 1(C)(3)(a) of the Ohio Constitution.  Comparative 
analyses and other metrics show that the March 2 plan allocates voters in ways that 
unnecessarily favor the Republican Party by packing Democratic voters into a few 
dense Democratic-leaning districts, thereby increasing the Republican vote share 
of the remaining districts.  As a result, districts that would otherwise be strongly 
Democratic-leaning are now competitive or Republican-leaning districts.  In 
 
7.  The efficiency gap measures the difference between the parties’ respective “wasted votes” (i.e., 
the number of votes above the 50 percent plus 1 that a party needs to win an election), divided by 
the total number of votes cast. 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
23 
addition, the March 2 plan carves districts around the state’s largest cities to 
combine Democratic voters in those areas with Republican voters in rural areas, 
thereby creating more Republican-leaning districts. 
{¶ 57} Senate President Huffman, House Speaker Cupp, Senator McColley, 
and Representative LaRe offer little in response to petitioners’ evidence.  They start 
by questioning the idea that experts can assist the court in determining whether a 
plan complies with the standards set forth in Article XIX, Section 1(C)(3)(a).  They 
argue that if the commission were “required to measure the constitutionality of its 
plans using a specific mathematical test or compactness score, it would have been 
included in [Article XIX].”  But, as we have already concluded, expert analysis is 
probative of whether a plan unduly favors or disfavors a political party in violation 
of Section 1(C)(3)(a).  See Adams, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-89, __ N.E.3d __, 
at ¶ 42-66.  And expert analysis is a tool equally as available to respondents as it is 
to petitioners.  There is no rationale to support disregarding the expert analysis 
submitted by petitioners. 
{¶ 58} Senate President Huffman, House Speaker Cupp, Senator McColley, 
and Representative LaRe nevertheless argue that even if we consider petitioners’ 
evidence, it is “conflicting and contradictory.”  They give two examples.  First, they 
argue that all of Dr. Imai’s simulated plans included eight or nine Republican-
leaning districts while most of Dr. Chen’s simulated plans included ten Republican-
leaning districts.  Second, they criticize the example plan that Dr. Imai submitted 
to the commission because it included nine Republican-leaning districts, even 
though most (80 percent) of his simulated plans included only eight Republican-
leaning districts.  The fact that the experts have identified a range of probable 
Republican-leaning seats (rather than a definitive number), they say, shows that the 
experts’ “ ‘math’ is unreliable.”  These criticisms are unfounded.  Even though Dr. 
Imai and Dr. Chen predict different seat allocations depending on the methods of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
24 
analysis and data sets used, their analysis remains probative of whether the March 
2 plan unduly favors or disfavors a political party. 
{¶ 59} Senate President Huffman, House Speaker Cupp, Senator McColley, 
and Representative LaRe also assert that Dr. Imai has put his “thumb on the scale” 
and “gam[ed] the math” by using data from six statewide federal elections from 
2012 to 2020 (referred to in Adams as the “FEDEA dataset”) to predict that 
Republicans should expect to win eight, or maybe nine, seats.  See Adams at ¶ 19, 
48-49.  They cite to the analysis of their own expert, Sean P. Trende, who is the 
senior elections analyst for RealClearPolitics, a company that produces a political 
website, and a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute focusing on 
American politics.  His analysis shows that when different data sets are applied to 
Dr. Imai’s simulation program, more than eight or nine Republican seats can be 
expected.  Trende’s analysis, however, does not undermine the reliability of Dr. 
Imai’s projections.  Dr. Imai explained that he used the FEDEA dataset because 
that was the data set the General Assembly had used in assessing the plan it passed.  
Senate President Huffman, House Speaker Cupp, Senator McColley, and 
Representative LaRe have not shown and cannot show that Dr. Imai’s analysis has 
been manipulated to derive a particular result favorable to petitioners’ cases. 
{¶ 60} As a final matter, Senate President Huffman, House Speaker Cupp, 
Senator McColley, and Representative LaRe claim that we should not rely on 
petitioners’ evidence, because there has not been time for full discovery, 
particularly the cross-examination of petitioners’ experts.  This argument, too, is 
not based on sound reasoning.  The scheduling order in these cases required the 
parties to file evidence within 25 days of this court’s entry.  166 Ohio St.3d 1452, 
2022-Ohio-1016, 184 N.E.3d 138.  Depositions of petitioners’ experts could have 
been taken during that time. 
 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
25 
D.  Article XIX, Section 1(C)(3)(b) 
{¶ 61} Article XIX, Section 1(C)(3)(b) of the Ohio Constitution provides 
that when the General Assembly passes a congressional-district plan by a simple 
majority, it “shall not unduly split governmental units, giving preference to keeping 
whole, in the order named, counties, then townships and municipal corporations.”  
In Adams, we explained that “the splitting of a governmental unit may be ‘undue’ 
if it is excessive or unwarranted.”  __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-89, __ N.E.3d __, 
¶ 83.  We held that the original congressional-district plan unduly split Hamilton, 
Cuyahoga, and Summit Counties.  Id. at ¶ 5, 77.  The evidence showed that the 
original plan did not need to split Hamilton and Cuyahoga Counties twice and that 
it did not need to split Summit County at all.  Id. at ¶ 84-93.  The original plan’s 
excessive splitting of these counties resulted in noncompact districts that could not 
be explained by neutral redistricting criteria and served no purpose other than to 
confer a significant partisan advantage on the political party that drew the districts.  
Id. at ¶ 77, 88, 93.  Petitioners argue that the March 2 plan, too, unduly splits 
counties in violation of Section 1(C)(3)(b). 
{¶ 62} As an initial matter, we reject the League petitioners’ argument that 
District 15 violates Section 1(C)(3)(b) because it splits five counties.  Section 
1(C)(3)(b) prohibits the excessive or unwarranted splitting of individual 
governmental units, see Adams at ¶ 83; it does not limit the number of partial 
governmental units a single district may include.  The League petitioners do not 
argue that the splitting of any of the individual counties in District 15 was 
unwarranted.  Rather, they argue that the partial governmental units should not be 
part of District 15. 
{¶ 63} Petitioners fail to develop any other arguments supporting their 
claim that the March 2 plan violates Section 1(C)(3)(b).  They focus on the fact that 
Districts 1 and 15 pair urban areas with rural areas and that those districts have 
relatively poor compactness scores.  In Adams, we recognized that the pairing of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
26 
urban and rural areas and poor compactness scores could be problematic 
consequences of unduly splitting certain counties.  See id. at ¶ 77, 84-93.  But under 
Section 1(C)(3)(b), petitioners must show, as a threshold matter, that the splitting 
itself—i.e., not just the effects of the splits—is “excessive or unwarranted.”  Adams 
at ¶ 83.  Without that threshold showing, petitioners are merely repeating their claim 
that the plan unduly favors or disfavors a political party in violation of Section 
1(C)(3)(a). 
{¶ 64} The Adams petitioners showed that the original plan split Hamilton, 
Cuyahoga, and Summit Counties an excessive number of times.  See id., __ Ohio 
St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-89, __ N.E.3d __, at ¶ 87 (crediting evidence that “splitting 
Hamilton County into three districts is ‘statistically anomalous’ ”); ¶ 90 (noting that 
Summit County need not be split at all); ¶ 91 (noting that only 8 of Dr. Imai’s 5,000 
simulated plans split Cuyahoga County twice).  Petitioners in these cases again 
challenge the splitting of Hamilton County, but unlike the original plan, the March 
2 plan splits Hamilton County only once (as it must, due to population 
requirements).8  Unlike in Adams, petitioners have not identified evidence showing 
that the splitting of the counties in District 1 or 15 is inherently excessive or 
unwarranted.  Petitioners’ arguments address only the manner in which the March 2 
plan splits certain counties.  That concern (presented alone, as petitioners have done) 
relates only to whether the plan unduly favors or disfavors a political party under 
Section 1(C)(3)(a). 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 65} For the foregoing reasons, the March 2 plan does not comply with 
Article XIX, Section 1(C)(3)(a) of the Ohio Constitution and is therefore invalid.  
By operation of Article XIX, Section 3(B)(1), within 30 days, the General 
Assembly must pass a plan that complies with the Constitution.  If the General 
 
8. Hamilton County’s population (830,639 as of the most recent federal decennial census) is too 
large to be contained in a single congressional district. 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
27 
Assembly fails to do so, Article XIX, Section 3(B)(2) will require the commission 
to adopt a constitutional plan within 30 days of the General Assembly’s failure. 
Relief granted. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and DONNELLY and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
BRUNNER, J., concurs, with an opinion. 
KENNEDY and DEWINE, JJ., dissent, with an opinion. 
FISCHER, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
_________________ 
 
BRUNNER, J., concurring. 
{¶ 66} I fully concur in the majority opinion.  I write separately to respond 
to the first dissenting opinion, which takes the position that the congressional-
district plan passed by the Ohio Redistricting Commission on March 2, 2022 
(“March 2 plan”), is lawful because it “reasonably attempts to maximize 
competitive seats,” dissenting opinion of Kennedy and DeWine, JJ., ¶ 91.  That 
position is not supported by the record.  And endorsing respondents’ abuse of the 
legislative privilege is unjustifiable. 
{¶ 67} In Rucho v. Common Cause, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S.Ct. 2484, 2500, 204 
L.Ed.2d 931 (2019), the United States Supreme Court stated that creating a “fair” 
redistricting plan is difficult because the word “fair” may mean different things to 
different people.  The interpretation of the word “fair” depends on the goal of the 
drafters—i.e., whether their goal is to prioritize the creation of competitive districts, 
to create proportionality, or to adhere to “traditional” redistricting criteria.  Id.  
However, those goals sometimes conflict.  For example, “making as many districts 
as possible more competitive” could lead to a high degree of disproportionality.  Id.  
In reaching the conclusion that the March 2 map was designed to prioritize 
competitive districts and is therefore constitutional, the first dissenting opinion falls 
short, not determining whether the underlying record supports that conclusion. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
28 
{¶ 68} Maximizing competitive districts was the publicly stated goal behind 
the plan passed by the General Assembly and signed by the governor in November 
2021 (“the first plan”).  See Adams v. DeWine, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-89, __ 
N.E.3d __, ¶ 17-19, 22.  But the first plan was not created in the public eye.  
Respondents9 created it entirely in private. 
{¶ 69} During discovery in Adams, the petitioners requested evidence 
concerning the creation of the first plan—including, for example, evidence 
substantiating who was drafting the plan, what instructions were given to the map 
drawers, and how the respondents were analyzing a district’s competitiveness.  But 
respondent President of the Senate Matt Huffman and respondent Speaker of the 
House Robert Cupp broadly invoked legislative privilege to avoid responding to 
any inquiry regarding legislators’ statements and decisions during the creation of 
the plan.  The petitioners in Adams objected to the respondents’ invocation of 
legislative privilege at depositions and in their merit briefs.  Unfortunately, the highly 
expedited nature of that case prevented the issue of legislative privilege from being 
fully litigated. 
{¶ 70} Senate President Huffman and House Speaker Cupp later sought to 
rely on assertions about some of the very same subjects over which they had invoked 
legislative privilege.  For example, as support for the claim that the first plan 
prioritized competitive districts, Senate President Huffman and House Speaker Cupp 
 
9.  In the complaints in Supreme Court case Nos. 2022-0298 and 2022-0303, petitioners named four 
respondents: Secretary LaRose in his official capacity as secretary of state, House Speaker Cupp in 
his official capacity as House speaker, Senate President Huffman in his official capacity as Senate 
president, and the commission.  Senator McColley and Representative LaRe were not named as 
parties in the original complaints.  They filed a motion for leave to file an amended notice of their 
substitution, notifying the court that they had been appointed to the commission to replace Senate 
President Huffman and House Speaker Cupp, who are no longer members of the commission.  To 
the extent the commission is a party, Senator McColley and Representative LaRe asked to be 
substituted for their predecessors on the commission.  This court granted Senator McColley and 
Representative LaRe’s motion.  166 Ohio St.3d 1523, 2022-Ohio-1887, 188 N.E.3d 179.  Senate 
President Huffman, House Speaker Cupp, Senator McColley, and Representative LaRe filed a joint 
merit brief in this matter. 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
29 
asserted in their merit brief in Adams that Ray DiRossi, an employee of the Senate 
Republican caucus and a drawer of that first plan, “testified that he was instructed to 
create maps in compliance with Article XIX [of the Ohio Constitution], and which 
included more competitive districts than Ohio’s current congressional plan.”  But the 
portion of DiRossi’s deposition they cited for this point is disingenuously circular, 
lacking any substance to support their contention: DiRossi testified that he was aware 
that “President Huffman made public commentary about the importance of having 
competitive districts.”  (Emphasis added.)  That is not evidence of what instructions 
legislators gave to DiRossi as the first plan was created. 
{¶ 71} The respondents in Adams, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-89, __ 
N.E.3d __, pointed to nothing else in the record to support the assertion that DiRossi 
had been instructed to create competitive districts or to convincingly establish that 
maximizing competitiveness had been the overall goal of legislators when the first 
plan was created.  In finding that the plan violated Article XIX, Sections 1(C)(3)(a) 
and (b) of the Ohio Constitution, we reviewed the record and concluded that the 
respondents’ competitiveness rationale was a “post hoc rationalization.”  Adams at 
¶ 45. 
{¶ 72} The dissenting opinion in Adams accepted the respondents’ 
unsupported assertion that the plan had been designed to create competitive districts 
and would have approved the plan on the ground that the competitiveness rationale 
was reasonable.  Id. at ¶ 167-186 (Kennedy, Fischer, and DeWine, JJ., dissenting).  
In doing so, however, it pointed to nothing in the record concerning the actual 
creation of the first plan.  Id. at ¶ 167-170 (Kennedy, Fischer, and DeWine, JJ., 
dissenting).  The law, as expressed by the dissent in Adams, is not supported by the 
record.  No underlying evidence supports the premise that the respondents had 
designed the first plan to maximize competitive districts. 
{¶ 73} In drawing the March 2 plan, respondents made minimal changes 
from the first plan.  When petitioners sought discovery into the behind-closed-doors 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
30 
work on the March 2 plan, respondents again invoked legislative privilege.  The 
record therefore provides no more support for the idea that the March 2 plan was 
designed to maximize the number of competitive districts than it did for the first plan. 
{¶ 74} Notwithstanding this, the first dissenting opinion reasserts what was 
stated in the dissenting opinion in Adams, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-89, __ 
N.E.3d __.  It asserts that the March 2 plan “reasonably attempts to maximize 
competitive seats,” dissenting opinion of Kennedy and DeWine, JJ., at ¶ 91, but it 
again points to nothing in the record supporting that assertion.  The dearth of evidence 
in the record to support respondents’ arguments is due to respondents’ own decision 
to invoke legislative privilege.  Bare reliance by the dissent on the statements in 
respondents’ briefs is insufficient to constitute law. 
{¶ 75} There is yet another fundamental problem with the first dissenting 
opinion.  It is well established in Ohio that a litigant may not abuse a privilege by 
using it as both a sword and a shield.  It is patently unfair to invoke a privilege during 
discovery and then waive it selectively to gain an evidentiary foothold to the 
detriment of the party seeking the discovery.  See Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P. 
v. Givaudan Flavors Corp., 127 Ohio St.3d 161, 2010-Ohio-4469, 937 N.E.2d 533, 
¶ 41; State v. Houck, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 09-CA-08, 2010-Ohio-743, ¶ 38; see 
also In re Lott, 424 F.3d 446, 454 (6th Cir.2005), quoting  United States v. Bilzerian, 
926 F.2d 1285, 1292 (2d Cir.1991) (“To be sure, litigants cannot hide behind the 
privilege if they are relying upon privileged communications to make their case.  
‘[T]he attorney-client privilege cannot at once be used as a shield and a sword’ ” 
[brackets added in Lott]). 
{¶ 76} Courts in other jurisdictions have rejected attempts by legislators to 
use the legislative privilege as both a sword and a shield in redistricting litigation.  
See Favors v. Cuomo, 285 F.R.D. 187, 212 (E.D.N.Y.2012) (“once the [legislative] 
privilege is invoked, the Court should not later allow the proponent of the privilege 
to strategically waive it to the prejudice of other parties”); Commt. for a Fair & 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
31 
Balanced Map v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections, N.D.Ill. No. 11 C 5065, 2011 WL 
4837508, at *11 (Oct. 12, 2011); Singleton v. Merrill, N.D.Ala. Nos. 2:21-cv-1291, 
2021 WL 5979516, at *8 (Dec. 16, 2021) (rejecting legislators’ defense of 
redistricting plan because it “depend[ed] on their assertions about their intent and 
motives during the legislative process, [and] they [invoked the legislative privilege 
to] refuse to participate in any discovery that would allow the * * * plaintiffs to 
challenge those assertions”). 
{¶ 77} This issue has not been raised until now.  The first dissenting opinion 
does not have a discussion of either the scope of the legislative privilege or the way 
it may be used.  Allowing respondents to invoke the legislative privilege to prohibit 
discovery into officials’ goals in the creation of the first plan and the March 2 plan, 
and then allowing respondents to rely on bare assertions about those subjects in 
defense of those plans, is an invitation to parties to avail themselves of this abuse of 
power in the future.  This court should ensure that discovery is available in cases like 
this so that the court can meaningfully judge whether a party’s arguments about what 
they designed a plan to do can be tested by evidence in the record or are instead 
simply post hoc rationalization.  This court should not accept a party’s abuse of 
legislative privilege, particularly when that party uses it to create a contrived 
evidentiary basis in support of a legal argument.  To look the other way—as the 
dissent did in Adams, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-89, __ N.E.3d __, and as the first 
dissenting opinion does again here, creates the risk that Ohio’s constitutional 
requirements for drawing congressional districts can be effectively avoided and 
thereby defeated by an abuse of legislative privilege. 
{¶ 78} For these reasons, I offer this concurring opinion while also joining 
the majority opinion. 
_________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
32 
KENNEDY and DEWINE, JJ., dissenting. 
{¶ 79} These cases are about an election that will not be held until 2024.  
The new complaints filed in this court protest the congressional-district plan 
adopted by the Ohio Redistricting Commission on March 2, 2022 (“the March 2 
plan”) in response to the majority’s decision in Adams v. DeWine, ___ Ohio St.3d 
___, 2022-Ohio-89, ___ N.E.3d ___, which invalidated the plan that had been 
passed by the General Assembly in November 2021 (“the first plan”). 
{¶ 80} In Adams, the majority held that the first plan violated Article XIX, 
Section 1(C)(3)(b) of the Ohio Constitution because that plan unduly split 
governmental units—specifically, Hamilton, Cuyahoga, and Summit Counties.  Id. 
at ¶ 5.  In these cases, the majority admits that the March 2 plan does not excessively 
split any county.  Majority opinion, ¶ 64.  We agree.  We disagree, however, with 
the majority’s conclusion that the March 2 plan is invalid because it violates Article 
XIX, Section 1(C)(3)(a) of the Ohio constitution for “ ‘unduly favor[ing] or 
disfavor[ing] a political party or its incumbents.’ ”  Majority opinion at ¶ 28, 
quoting Article XIX, Section 1(C)(3) of the Ohio Constitution.  Therefore, we 
would hold that the March 2 plan is constitutional and order its use for the 2024 
primary and general elections.  Because the majority does otherwise, we dissent. 
{¶ 81} While the March 2 plan is new, there is little that could be considered 
“new information” in the majority opinion.  The majority applies the same faulty 
analysis that it used in Adams and therefore fails to present “any workable standard 
about what it means to unduly favor a political party.”  Adams at ¶ 107 (Kennedy, 
Fischer, and DeWine, JJ., dissenting).  The majority clings to proportionality, 
which appears in Article XI of the Ohio Constitution but not in Article XIX, the 
relevant provision in this case.  Nevertheless, as the dissenting opinion in Adams 
explains, the majority believes that the partisan breakdown should “roughly equate 
to what would happen under a system of proportional representation.”  Id. at ¶ 108.  
By making policy rather than applying the law, id. at ¶ 110, the majority “wrest[s] 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
33 
from the political branches of our government the authority that rightly belongs to 
them,” id. at ¶ 111. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
{¶ 82} Despite the far-off relevance of another redistricting plan, the 
majority rushed these cases to completion.  The majority’s scheduling order for 
these cases sacrificed a robust discovery process in exchange for a speedy result.  
As we wrote in our opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part as to the 
scheduling order, “[t]his case most likely will turn on the credibility of expert 
testimony,” and “25 days is insufficient” time for discovery, given the need to 
schedule depositions for numerous fact and expert witnesses.  166 Ohio St.3d 1452, 
2022-Ohio-1016, 184 N.E.3d 138, ¶ 5 (Kennedy, Fischer, and DeWine, JJ., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Each side filed its evidence on April 25, 
leaving no time to depose the other’s experts, and we are left with a discovery 
process that has produced a large amount of information but little critical analysis.  
In our opinion, we advocated for a 25-day period after expert reports were 
exchanged so that each side could conduct further discovery.  Id. at ¶ 28.  And as 
we predicted, the 25-day discovery time left no time to depose experts or to 
challenge the bases on which those experts made their decisions.  While it is easy 
to see what has been lost due to the truncated discovery period, it is far more 
difficult to see what has been gained.  The 2022 election cycle is set.  Consequently, 
there was no need to cut discovery short and hurry these cases along.  This truncated 
discovery period enables the majority to cherry-pick its preferred expert evidence, 
without the adverse parties being able  to test the reliability of that evidence through 
cross-examination.  None of the normal procedural safeguards that facilitate truth 
finding are present in these cases, despite the majority outsourcing its entire 
analysis to expert testimony that exists in a vacuum. 
{¶ 83} The majority holds that the March 2 plan is “slightly less favorable 
to the Republican Party (or more favorable to the Democratic Party) than the [first] 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
34 
plan.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 35.  The majority guesstimated in Adams, ___Ohio 
St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-89, ___ N.E.3d ___, at ¶ 47, that Republicans would win 12 
of Ohio’s 15 Congressional seats under the first plan.  Under the March 2 plan, the 
majority concludes that there are five Democratic-leaning districts and ten 
Republican-leaning districts.  Majority opinion at ¶ 16.  Because we would have 
held that the first plan did not unduly favor Republicans and was constitutional, we 
conclude that the March 2 plan, which the majority admits is less favorable to 
Republicans than the March 2 plan, is also constitutional. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Does the commission’s plan have to comply with Article XIX, Section 
1(C)? 
{¶ 84} Respondents argue that these cases are easily resolved because a plan 
adopted by the commission need not comply with any of the requirements of Article 
XIX, Section 1(C)(3) of the Ohio Constitution.  They argue that the admonitions in 
Article XIX, Section 1(C) apply only to plans passed by the General Assembly.  
For example, Section 1(C)(3)(a) states that the “general assembly shall not pass a 
plan that unduly favors or disfavors a political party or its incumbents.”  (Emphasis 
added.) 
{¶ 85} Although respondents raise a serious argument, we are mindful of 
the “ ‘cardinal principle of judicial restraint—if it is not necessary to decide more, 
it is necessary not to decide more.’ ”  State ex rel. LetOhioVote.org v. Brunner, 123 
Ohio St.3d 322, 2009-Ohio-4900, 916 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 51, quoting PDK 
Laboratories, Inc. v. United States Drug Enforcement Administration, 362 F.3d 
786, 799 (C.A.D.C.2004) (Roberts, J., concurring in part and in judgment).  Indeed, 
this dissenting opinion will not address this issue because, whether it was required 
to or not, the March 2 plan satisfies the requirements of Article XIX, Section 
1(C)(3)(a) and (b) of the Ohio Constitution.  So, it is unnecessary to decide more. 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
35 
B.  The March 2 plan complies with Section 1(C)(3)(b) 
{¶ 86} As we explained in Adams, the first plan complied with Article XIX, 
Section 1(C)(3)(b).  Adams, ___Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-89, ___ N.E.3d ___, at 
¶ 216 (Kennedy, Fischer, and DeWine, JJ., dissenting).  Accordingly, we agree with 
the majority today that the March 2 plan also complies with Section 1(C)(3)(b).  
There was no undue splitting of counties in the first plan, and there is no undue 
splitting of counties in the March 2 plan. 
C.  The March 2 plan complies with Section 1(C)(3)(a) 
{¶ 87} We continue to disagree with the majority’s approach to determining 
whether a redistricting plan “unduly favors” one political party.  It is true that 
Article XIX leaves undefined what it means to “unduly favor” a party.  In Adams 
at ¶ 40, the majority held that the requirement in Article XIX, Section 1(C)(3)(a) 
that a plan not unduly favor or disfavor a political party or its incumbents does not 
prohibit a plan from favoring one party but that it does prohibit “favoritism not 
warranted by legitimate, neutral criteria.”  But in Adams, the majority chose one 
type of criteria—proportional representation, which does not exist in Article XIX—
as the baseline against which partisan favoritism is measured.  That is, the majority 
requires that the share of winning districts for each party should match the 
proportion of the popular vote for each party in a particular group of previous 
elections. 
{¶ 88} The problem with the majority opinion’s analysis that there is no 
such requirement in Article XIX.  In Article XI, which applies to General Assembly 
redistricting, proportionality is something the commission is instructed to attempt, 
and Article XI, Section 6 of the Ohio Constitution provides the formula for the 
commission to apply.  But there is nothing in Article XIX that establishes 
proportionality as an aspirational goal, much less a requirement.  “The majority 
simply substitutes its own sense of fairness for the text of Article XIX.”  Adams at 
¶ 144 (Kennedy, Fischer, and DeWine, JJ., dissenting).  In substituting our own 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
36 
sense of fairness for that of the governmental body that is constitutionally assigned 
the duty to create the redistricting plan, the majority goes beyond the judicial power 
granted to this court in Article 4 of the Ohio Constitution.  Id. at ¶ 150. 
{¶ 89} When passing a congressional-district plan as part of a simple 
majority vote, the General Assembly must prepare “an explanation of the plan’s 
compliance with” Article XIX, Section 1(C)(3)(a) through (c).  Ohio Constitution, 
Article XIX, Section 1(C)(3)(d).  As for the first plan, the General Assembly wrote, 
“The plan contain[ed] six Republican-leaning districts, two Democratic-leaning 
districts, and seven competitive districts”; only one district paired incumbents, and 
they were members of the Republican party; “[t]he plan split[] only twelve counties 
and only fourteen townships and municipal corporations”; and “visual inspection 
of the congressional district plan demonstrate[d] that it dr[ew] districts that [were] 
compact.”  2021 Sub.S.B. No. 258, Section 3, 733-734, available at https://search-
prod.lis.state.oh.us/solarapi/v1/general_assembly_134/bills/sb258/EN/05/sb258_0
5_EN?format=pdf (accessed July 8, 2022) [https://perma.cc/DF75-WC9K]. 
{¶ 90} There is nothing in the Constitution that precludes map makers from 
seeking to maximize competitive districts, and such a goal does not cause undue 
favoritism.  And, as we opinion stated in Adams, ___Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-
89, ___ N.E.3d ___, the range of plus or minus 4 percent of 50 percent is within the 
bounds of the map drawers’ constitutional mandate.  Id. at ¶ 178 (Kennedy, Fischer, 
and DeWine, JJ., dissenting).  We further explained: “The General Assembly, this 
state’s policymaking body, chose that range.  We have no authority or competence 
to monitor the dividing line between competitive and not.”  Id. at ¶ 177. 
{¶ 91} The March 2 plan is again oriented toward competitiveness.  As 
explained by Sean P. Trende, a senior elections analyst for RealClearPolitics who 
tracks, analyzes, and writes about elections, the plan features two noncompetitive 
districts favoring Democrats (Districts 3 and 11) and six noncompetitive districts 
favoring Republicans (Districts 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 12).  The other districts are 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
37 
competitive in the same way we decided was acceptable in regard to the first plan—
within 4 percentage points of 50 percent.  There are seven such districts in the new 
plan: District 1 (50.7 percent Democrat), District 7 (54 percent Republican), 
District 9 (52.8 percent Democrat), District 10 (52.2 percent Republican), District 
13 (53 percent Democrat), District 14 (53 percent Republican), and District 15 (53.9 
percent Republican).  The March 2  plan meets the standard that we found to be 
acceptable in Adams—i.e., it reasonably attempts to maximize competitive seats. 
{¶ 92} The commission’s choice to focus on creating competitive districts 
where they are possible is consistent with Article XIX, Section 1(C)(3)(a) and its 
requirement that districts do not unduly favor a political party or its incumbents.  
“Competitive districts are widely considered a laudable objective, the sort of 
objective voters desire; they do not unduly favor or disfavor political parties but 
allow the electorate to elect.” id. at ¶ 163 (Kennedy, Fischer, and DeWine, JJ., 
dissenting).  The majority, on the other hand, prioritizes guaranteed outcomes over 
competitive elections.  There is no constitutional basis for such a choice. 
{¶ 93} Given the political geography of Ohio, when the neutral map-
drawing rules of Article XIX, Section 2 are followed, certain results are likely.  The 
map-drawing rules in Section 2 are based on representation by geographical area; 
those rules are not designed to create districts of the likeminded.  We have the same 
representatives as our neighbors but not necessarily the same representatives as 
those who think like us.  The adoption of Article XIX did not make Ohio the only 
state in the union to guarantee a proportion of congressional seats for each party 
based on historical vote totals from past political races. 
{¶ 94} This court is not an equal partner with the General Assembly and the 
commission when it comes to redistricting.  A plan passed by the General Assembly 
or adopted by the commission does not automatically come to this court for our 
blessing.  Our role is limited and is triggered only when someone protests a plan.  
We are not involved in the policy determination of the best way to achieve the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
38 
requirements of Article XIX, Section 1(C)(3)(a).  We are limited to exercising 
judicial power, which is “the right to determine actual controversies arising 
between adverse litigants, duly instituted in courts of proper jurisdiction.”  Muskrat 
v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361, 31 S.Ct. 250, 55 L.Ed. 246 (1911). 
{¶ 95} It is not for us to decide how we would draw a congressional-district 
map.  Instead, “our precedent in redistricting cases applies a strong presumption 
that a plan is constitutional.”  Adams, ___Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-89, ___ 
N.E.3d ___, at ¶ 150 (Kennedy, Fischer, and DeWine, JJ., dissenting), citing Wilson 
v. Kasich, 134 Ohio St.3d 221, 2012-Ohio-5367, 981 N.E.2d 814, ¶ 22, superseded 
by constitutional amendment as stated in League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio 
Redistricting Comm., ___ Ohio St. 3d ___, 2022-Ohio-65, ___ N.E.3d ___. 
{¶ 96} But the outcome of these cases today demonstrates that the majority 
has once again assumed an oversized role in the process of drawing a congressional-
district map by perpetuating its own standard of what constitutes “unduly favoring” 
a political party.  The majority faults the commission for not following that 
standard.  But in reality, there is only one standard that matters.  The majority 
clearly has a number of Democrat congressional seats in mind, and any plan that 
does not result in that number will be deemed unconstitutional and therefore 
invalid. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 97} We agree with the majority that the March 2 plan meets the 
requirements of Article XIX, Section 1(C)(3)(b) of the Ohio Constitution.  But we 
dissent because the majority continues to require proportional representation, which 
does not exist as a requirement anywhere in Article XIX.  We would hold that the 
March 2 plan complies with Article XIX, Section 1(C)(3)(a) of the Ohio 
Constitution and that that plan should apply to the 2024 primary and general 
elections. 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
39 
_________________ 
FISCHER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 98} I fully join the other dissenting opinion.  I write to expound on a few 
points of particular importance. 
I.  Petitioners have not proven their cases beyond a reasonable doubt 
{¶ 99} As noted in the majority opinion, the challenges of the petitioners in 
these cases are “subject to the highest standard of proof: proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”  Majority opinion, ¶ 27. 
{¶ 100} But petitioners do not even meet the lower clear-and-convincing-
evidence burden of proof or the even lower preponderance-of-the-evidence burden 
of proof.  In any event, petitioners have not satisfied their burden of showing 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the March 2 plan unduly favors the Republican 
Party in violation of Article XIX, Section 1(C)(3)(a) of the Ohio Constitution. 
{¶ 101} In Section II(A) of their merit brief, respondents Senate President 
Huffman, Senator Rob McColley, Representative Jeff LaRe, and Speaker of the 
House Robert Cupp set forth a detailed argument pointing out numerous flaws in 
the evidence that is relied on in the majority opinion.  In the interest of brevity, I 
will not reprint that argument here; however, respondents have both identified 
numerous flaws in the experts’ reports relied on in the majority opinion and raised 
significant doubts as to whether petitioners have presented a full mathematical 
analysis.  These flaws and incomplete analyses directly attack the majority opinion.  
The majority opinion not only sidesteps respondents’ points but also faults 
respondents for failing to depose petitioners’ experts within the limited time that 
this court provided for discovery.  Majority opinion at ¶ 60. 
{¶ 102} In doing so, the majority opinion turns the burden of proof on its 
head.  Respondents have no burden of production in these cases.  Instead, it is 
incumbent upon petitioners to prove their cases beyond a reasonable doubt.  League 
of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
40 
Ohio-65, ___ N.E.3d ___¶ 78-79, citing Wilson v. Kasich, 134 Ohio St.3d 221, 
2012-Ohio-5367, 981 N.E.2d 814, ¶ 20-21; see also Adams v. DeWine, __ Ohio 
St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-89, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 26.  Respondents have raised more than 
reasonable doubts, regardless of whether petitioners’ experts could have or should 
have been deposed.  Indeed, those and other reasonable doubts are further explored 
in the other dissenting opinion.  In concluding otherwise, the majority opinion 
seems to ultimately apply some lesser burden of proof, even though it purports to 
apply the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden of proof.  Because petitioners have 
not satisfied their burden of proof, I must respectfully dissent from the majority 
opinion. 
II.  The procedure used in these cases is fundamentally flawed 
{¶ 103} In addition, I have deep concerns regarding the process used by this 
court to decide these cases.  These cases arose under our exclusive, original 
jurisdiction pursuant to Article XIX, Section 3(A) of the Ohio Constitution.  
Despite the fact that we are the “trial court” in these cases, this court has subjected 
these cases to an unnecessarily compressed schedule.  This compressed schedule 
negatively impacted our decision-making process in two ways.  First, the timeline 
limited the type and quality of evidence that this court could consider in making its 
decision.  By forgoing the standard discovery process, this court was forced to 
(1) consider only the unexamined assertions of the parties’ experts and (2) rely on 
stipulated evidence.  The lack of adversarial hearings here has prevented this court 
from hearing direct testimony and cross-examination.  This complete absence of 
adversarial proceedings has deprived this court and the citizens of Ohio of the legal 
crucible that provides everyone—including members of the bench, the bar, and the 
public—with the best view of the evidence.  There is an old saying: “bad facts make 
bad law.”  That saying might be slightly altered here: “a bad understanding of a 
case makes a bad decision.” 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
41 
{¶ 104} Second, the compressed timeframe has resulted in a lack of 
transparency, which is particularly concerning given the high-profile nature of 
these cases and the fact that they seem to be of great interest to all Ohioans.  It 
would have been very easy for this court to schedule some public hearings at which 
the parties could have presented their cases, including direct testimony and cross-
examination, and this court could have received a full picture of the evidence.  
These hearings could have been broadcast for all Ohioans to see, just as all our oral-
argument sessions are.  There is absolutely no reason for this court’s failure to hold 
such public hearings. 
{¶ 105} This court’s failure to hold even one hearing in these cases 
undoubtedly raises concerns among the public regarding this court’s lack of 
transparency, and one might wonder why such concerns have not been voiced in 
the media.  Regardless, if this court is to strike a constitutionally enacted and 
mandated congressional plan, it should do so in the light of day, providing Ohioans 
with a meaningful opportunity to understand not just all the evidence before this 
court but also this court’s decision-making process in such an important matter. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 106} This court’s misguided rush to decide these cases has resulted in an 
unnecessary and truncated procedure that has effectively tied this court’s hands and 
rendered it unable to make a fully informed decision.  Given the evidence before 
this court, petitioners have failed to satisfy their burden of showing beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the March 2 plan unduly favors the Republican Party in 
violation of Article XIX, Section 1(C)(3)(a) of the Ohio Constitution. 
{¶ 107} Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
_________________ 
 
McTigue Colombo & Clinger, L.L.C., Donald J. McTigue, and Derek S. 
Clinger; and Elias Law Group, L.L.P., Abha Khanna, Ben Stafford, Jyoti Jasrasaria, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
42 
Spencer W. Klein, Harleen K. Gambhir, and Raisa Cramer, for petitioners in case 
No. 2022-0298. 
 
ACLU of Ohio Foundation, Inc., Freda J. Levenson, and David J. Carey; 
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Alora Thomas, and Julie A. Ebenstein; 
and Covington & Burling, L.L.P., Robert D. Fram, Donald Brown, David Denuyl, 
Janelle Lamb, James Smith, Sarah Suwanda, Alex Thomson, Kimberly Plumer, 
Rishi Gupta, Alexandra Widas, Anupam Sharma, and Yale Fu, for petitioners in 
case No. 2022-0303. 
 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Julie M. Pfeiffer, Jonathan D. Blanton, 
Michael A. Walton, and Allison D. Daniel, Assistant Attorneys General, for 
respondent Ohio Secretary of State Frank LaRose. 
 
Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, L.L.P., Phillip J. Strach, Thomas A. 
Farr, John E. Branch III, and Alyssa M. Riggins; and Taft Stettinius & Hollister, 
L.L.P., W. Stuart Dornette, Beth A. Bryan, and Philip D. Williamson, for 
respondents Senate President Matt Huffman, Speaker of the House Robert Cupp, 
Senator Robert McColley, and Representative Jeffrey LaRe. 
Dave Yost, Attorney General; and Organ Law, L.L.P., Erik J. Clark, and 
Ashley T. Merino, special counsel to Attorney General Dave Yost, for respondent 
Ohio Redistricting Commission. 
 
Chris Tavenor; and Hubay Dougherty, L.L.C., and Trent Dougherty, urging 
granting of relief for amici curiae, Ohio Environmental Council, Ohio Organizing 
Collaborative, Ohio Farmers Union, LEAD Ohio, Red Wine & Blue, OPAWL–
Building AAPI Feminist Leadership, Innovation Ohio, Ohio Coalition on Black 
Civic Participation/Ohio Unity Coalition, and Ohio Citizen Action. 
_________________