Title: State v. Ford

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

626 So. 2d 1338 (1993)
STATE of Florida, Petitioner,
v.
Rufus FORD, Respondent.
No. 79220.

Supreme Court of Florida.
November 10, 1993.
*1340 Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Stephen A. Baker and Peggy A. Quince, Asst. Attys. Gen., Tampa, for petitioner.
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Stephen Krosschell, Asst. Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, for respondent.
HARDING, Justice.
We have for review Ford v. State, 592 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), which expressly construes the constitutional right to confrontation[1] and expressly conflicts with Hernandez v. State, 597 So. 2d 408, 409 n. 2 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution.
This case presents three issues: (1) whether a judge must have express statutory authority or a rule of court to employ a procedure that deviates from a defendant's right of face-to-face confrontation in a criminal trial, (2) whether the trial court's admission of a child witness's videotaped testimony in a homicide case violated the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation, and (3) if the admission of the child witness's videotaped testimony violated the defendant's right to confrontation, whether the defendant is entitled to a new trial.
First, we hold that absent appropriate authority[2] a trial court in a criminal case may employ a procedure if necessary to further an important public policy interest. In this case, though, the procedure employed was improper, and we find that the trial court erred in admitting the child witness's testimony by way of videotape. However, we disapprove the district court's holding *1341 that the improper admission of a child witness's testimony is an automatic basis for reversal.
Second, we hold that the videotaped testimony lacked sufficient indicia of reliability. Thus, the trial court should not have admitted the videotaped testimony.
Finally, we hold that the violation of the defendant's right to confrontation by admission of the videotaped testimony is subject to the harmless error analysis and that the error in this case was harmful. Therefore, we approve the reversal of the judgment and order the case remanded for a new trial.
We adopt the district court's rendition of the facts, which were set out as follows:
Ford, 592 So. 2d  at 271-75. The jury convicted Ford of first-degree murder, and the trial judge sentenced him to life imprisonment without possibility of parole for twenty-five years.
On appeal, the district court reversed the conviction and held that the trial court improperly admitted the child witness's videotaped testimony. The district court found that sections 92.53 and 92.54, Florida Statutes (1989), did not allow the trial court to admit the videotape of the child witness's testimony because the Legislature had restricted the procedures under those sections to cases involving child abuse and sexual abuse victims or witnesses. Id. at 275. The district court also held that section 92.55, Florida Statutes (1989), did not authorize the introduction of the child witness's videotaped testimony because the statute was nonoperative in that the Legislature did not establish procedures to present the videotaped testimony of a child who is a witness or victim in a criminal, civil, or juvenile proceeding. Id.
In addition, the district court held that even if section 92.55 authorized the videotaping of a child witness's testimony in a homicide case, the procedures used in the instant case violated the defendant's right to confrontation under Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 111 L. Ed. 2d 666 (1990). Ford, 592 So. 2d  at 275. The district court found that the trial court's actions fell short of the Craig requirements because the child was not given an oath, defense counsel did not have adequate opportunity to cross-examine the child, and there was no finding that the child's statements were trustworthy. Id. Because of these shortcomings, the district court found that the trial court's procedures violated Ford's right to confront the witness against him.
In Hernandez the Third District Court of Appeal expressly disagreed with the Ford court's holding that the trial court erred in permitting the state to present the videotaped testimony of the child witness in the absence of an enabling statute or other authority and certified conflict on that issue. Hernandez, 597 So. 2d  at 409 n. 2. The Third District held that even without an enabling statute or rule, the trial court properly permitted two children who witnessed a murder to testify by way of closed-circuit television. Id. at 409. The court held that the testimony did not violate the defendant's right of face-to-face confrontation because it furthered the important public policy considerations of protecting the child witness from severe emotional harm and because there were sufficient *1345 indications that the testimony would be reliable. Id. at 409-10.
The first issue in the instant case is whether the trial court had the authority to employ a procedure not expressly authorized by law or by rule of court. We agree with the district court that sections 92.53 and 92.54 do not apply to the instant case because the Legislature has limited the procedures under those statutes to cases involving child abuse or sexual abuse. Further, we recognize that section 92.55 was nonoperative because there was no enabling action or Court rule that put the statute into effect.
However, the trial court's use of the unauthorized procedure in this case does not automatically entitle the defendant to a new trial.[3] A trial court may implement a procedure not expressly authorized by this Court or otherwise authorized by law if the procedure is necessary to further an important public policy interest. Cf. Ashley v. State, 265 So. 2d 685, 692 (Fla. 1972) ("[T]o be a valid basis for a new trial it is incumbent upon a defendant to establish that [the procedure] denied him due process of law."). The policy reason in this case is the State's interest in protecting a child witness from the trauma of testifying in the presence of a defendant accused of killing her parent. We conclude that the trial court did not commit a per se reversible error by resorting to an unauthorized procedure to protect the child witness.
In addition, we note that the trial court had the inherent authority to act to protect the child witness. "All courts in Florida possess the inherent powers to do all things that are reasonable and necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of their jurisdiction, subject to valid existing laws and constitutional provisions." Roger A. Silver, The Inherent Power of the Florida Courts, 39 U.Miami L.Rev. 257, 263 (1985). A court's inherent powers include its ability to protect witnesses. See State ex rel. Gore Newspapers Co. v. Tyson, 313 So. 2d 777, 782 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), overruled on other grounds by English v. McCrary, 348 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1977). Thus, the trial court could have relied on its inherent powers to use an unauthorized procedure that would have protected the child witness in the instant case.
Turning to the second issue, however, we hold that the procedure the trial court employed in the instant case violated Ford's constitutional right to face-to-face confrontation under Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 110 S. Ct. 3157. A defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation is not absolute. The U.S. Supreme Court held in Craig that "a defendant's right to confront accusatory witnesses may be satisfied absent a physical, face-to-face confrontation at trial only where denial of such confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy and only where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured." Id. at 850, 110 S. Ct.  at 3166. Despite the compelling policy reason to deviate from the defendant's right of confrontation in the instant case, we find that the procedure employed was improper and that the trial court erred in allowing the child witness to testify by way of videotape.
In determining whether an alternative procedure to a face-to-face confrontation was necessary to further an important public policy the Supreme Court held that:
Id. at 855, 110 S. Ct.  at 3168. The finding of the necessity to take testimony by an alternative *1346 procedure must be case-specific to determine (1) whether the use of the alternative procedure is necessary to protect the welfare of the particular child and (2) whether the child witness would be traumatized by the presence of the defendant. Id. at 855-56, 110 S. Ct.  at 3168-69.
The first determination is whether the use of the alternative procedure is necessary to protect the welfare of the child. Although the instant case is not a child abuse case, as Craig was, we find that the holding and rationale in Craig apply. The State has a traditional interest in protecting the emotional and mental welfare of children in child abuse and sexual abuse cases from the trauma of testifying in the defendant's presence. See Glendening v. State, 536 So. 2d 212, 218 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 907, 109 S. Ct. 3219, 106 L. Ed. 2d 569 (1989). We find that the State has the same interest in protecting children who witness the violent death of a parent from the trauma of testifying in a defendant's presence. The trial court made a case-specific finding that the child witness would suffer "at the very least, moderate emotional or mental harm" if required to testify in the presence of the defendant.[4] The trial court based its finding on expert testimony and its own observations that the child witness had a negative reaction to the possibility of testifying in the presence of the defendant. Therefore, we find that the trial court showed the necessity of providing an alternative procedure in taking the child's testimony to the face-to-face confrontation with the defendant.[5]
The second question in applying Craig to the instant case is whether the child witness's videotaped testimony has sufficient indicia of reliability. The Supreme Court identified the elements that generally satisfy the reliability purpose of the Confrontation Clause: (1) the defense is given a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine a witness to probe and expose infirmities in the witness's testimony, such as forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion; (2) the witness testifies under oath; and (3) the trier of fact has the opportunity to examine the witness's demeanor as the witness testifies. Craig, 497 U.S.  at 847, 110 S. Ct.  at 3164.
First, we find the record shows that defense counsel had a full and fair opportunity to question the child witness about the facts surrounding Sybil's death and the child's prior inconsistent statements to the police and to Dr. Kuehnle. The record does not support the district court's conclusion that the trial court severely limited cross-examination to the point that it resulted in "no cross-examination at all." See Ford, 592 So. 2d  at 275. The trial court's written order required only that each questioner ask as few *1347 questions as possible in the interest of justice and that the questions be asked in a "gentle, patient and non-aggressive manner."[6] The Confrontation Clause guarantees only "an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish." Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S. Ct. 292, 294, 88 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1985) (per curiam). Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated that the trial judge retains a wide latitude "to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness's safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant." Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1435, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1986). We find that the trial court's written order placed reasonable limits that were necessary because of the child's emotional and mental maturity. We also find on the facts of this record that the examination conducted under these limitations provided Ford's counsel with a full and fair opportunity to question the child.
Although we find that the defendant had a full and fair opportunity to question the child witness, we nonetheless find that the reliability element of Craig was not satisfied. Craig also requires that the witness testify under oath. Children are not required to testify under oath in Florida,[7] but the trial court may allow a child to testify if the child understands "the duty to tell the truth or the duty not to lie." § 90.605(2), Fla. Stat. (1989). In the instant case, the child witness was not given an oath before giving her testimony, nor was there any inquiry to determine if the child knew the importance of telling the truth at the time of the videotaped testimony.
We recognize that on April 13, 1990, the trial court found the child competent to testify. Both Dr. Kuehnle and Dr. Krop, the defense expert, found the child competent to testify, so the record shows that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the child competent. But the determination of the child's competency at one particular point in time is not enough to satisfy the reliability prong of Craig. The trial court's determination of the child's competency on April 13, 1990, did not remove the court's duty to inquire at the videotaping of the testimony on April 25, 1990, whether the child understood the duty to tell the truth or not to lie. As the United States Supreme Court noted in Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 740, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2664, 96 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1987), "the determination of competency is an ongoing one for the judge to make based on the witness's actual testimony at trial."
To allow a child to testify, a trial judge must find that the child "has sufficient intelligence to receive a just impression of the facts about which he or she is to testify and has sufficient capacity to relate them correctly, and appreciates the need to tell the truth." Lloyd v. State, 524 So. 2d 396, 400 (Fla. 1988). Although the finding of competency on April 13, 1990, could indicate that the trial judge determined that the child understood her duty to tell the truth, the record indicates no such finding or determination. Because the determination of competency is ongoing, questions about the child's competency  and thus her recognition of the need to testify truthfully  should have arisen during an attempt to take the child's testimony on April 23, 1990. On that date, the child refused to talk about the incident, then sucked her thumb and crawled into a fetal position. On April 25, when the child testified on videotape, there was no determination that she remained competent to testify.
*1348 The importance of impressing on the child witness the "duty to tell the truth" is underscored by the child's many inconsistent statements about Sybil's death. The conflicting accounts the child witness gave about her mother's death made it incumbent on the trial judge to insure that the child witness knew she had a duty to tell the truth. The child first told the police in November 1987 that Sybil committed suicide. When police reopened the investigation in December 1988, the child responded to police investigators' prodding and leading questions by saying that Ford shot Sybil twice and that Ford cut Sybil with a knife. The physical evidence did not support what the child told the police. Dr. Kuehnle testified that in therapy the child continued to tell different versions of the events. In addition, the child gave conflicting reports or was unable to respond at all when she was questioned in judicial proceedings. On the first attempt to videotape the child's testimony during the trial, the child crawled into a fetal position and sucked her thumb. Two days later, the child testified on videotape that Ford pushed Sybil down the stairs and against the stove. She further testified that Ford followed Sybil upstairs, loaded the shotgun, and shot Sybil. Dr. Kuehnle testified that the child had not previously stated the details of Ford pushing Sybil down the stairs and against the stove or of Ford loading the gun. The result of the child witness's changing versions of Sybil's death without the trial court impressing on the child the importance of telling the truth and without a proper determination of the child's competency to testify is that the videotaped testimony is not reliable. Thus, the reliability prong of Craig is not satisfied.
A third indicator of reliability addressed in Craig is whether the trier of fact has the opportunity to examine the witness's demeanor as the witness testifies. We find it unnecessary to address this issue. The problems with the reliability of the child's testimony are so serious that the fact that the jury had the opportunity to observe the child's demeanor on the videotape would not change the analysis of the child's understanding of the need to tell the truth.
The third issue we address is whether the admission of the child's videotaped testimony, which violated Ford's right to confrontation, entitles Ford to a new trial. In State v. Clark, 614 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 1992), this Court held that an appellate court may apply the harmless error analysis where a defendant's right to confrontation was violated by the improper admission of a discovery deposition in a criminal trial. Id. Similarly, the harmless error analysis can be applied in the instant case. The harmless error test in Florida places
State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986).
Determining whether the admission of the videotaped testimony is harmless depends on a number of factors, including
Clark, 614 So. 2d  at 454-55 (quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S.  at 684, 106 S.Ct. at 1438). Examining the entire record and the content of the child's videotaped testimony, we find that the child's testimony was key to obtaining the conviction. The child was presented by the State as the only eyewitness to Sybil's death. In addition, the record shows that expert witnesses differed on whether the physical evidence demonstrated a suicide or homicide. Thus, the State did not meet its burden that "there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction." DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d  at 1135. Ford, therefore, is entitled to a new trial.
Accordingly, we approve the holding in the decision below and in Hernandez to the extent that it is consistent with this opinion. *1349 The district court's judgment of reversal is approved with directions that the case be remanded for a new trial.
It is so ordered.
BARKETT, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, SHAW, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
[1]  U.S. Const. amend. VI, and art. I, § 16, Fla. Const.
[2]  We do not reach the issue of the Legislature's power to implement these court procedures under the separation of powers doctrine. Art. II, § 3, Fla. Const.
[3]  This Court has not considered the issue of the presentation of a child witness or victim's testimony by way of videotape or closed-circuit television, except in the context of sections 92.53 and 92.54, Florida Statutes (1989). Consequently, we recommend that the Juvenile Court Rules Committee and the Criminal Procedure Rules Committee consider the issue raised by Ford v. State, 592 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), and Hernandez v. State, 597 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), and that the committees propose a rule that would allow for the protection of children and at the same time protect the right to confrontation as outlined by the United States Supreme Court in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 111 L. Ed. 2d 666 (1990).
[4]  The trial court's order dated April 17, 1990, states in pertinent part:

2. In addition to the testimony of Dr. Kathryn Kuehnle, who has provided therapy for "the Child" since early 1989, the Court has personally observed "the Child's" negative reaction to questions proposed to her regarding the possibility of her testifying in open Court in the presence of the Defendant.
The Court finds that there is a strong possibility that "the Child" might even be unable to testify if required to do so in open Court.
3. That to require "the Child" to testify in open Court would cause, at the very least, moderate emotional or mental harm, and in this Court's opinion, there is a strong possibility that such an "open Court" testimony requirement could possibly cause severe emotional harm to "the Child."
4. That the Defendant's right to confront the witness ("the Child") must give way to the stronger public policy of protecting the mental and emotional sensibilities of a child of such tender years.
We are concerned with the trial judge's lack of specificity in this order, particularly where the court found a "strong possibility" that face-to-face confrontation "could possibly cause" severe emotional harm. Trial courts should make their findings as specific as possible.
[5]  The Supreme Court declined to set a minimum threshold for showing of an emotional trauma to the child. The Court stated that "the trial court must find that the emotional distress suffered by the child witness in the presence of the defendant is more than de minimis, i.e., more than `mere nervousness or excitement or some reluctance to testify.'" Craig, 497 U.S.  at 856, 110 S. Ct.  at 3169 (quoting Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 530 A.2d 275, 289 (1987)). We conclude that the trial court met the threshold because the trial found more than a de minimis showing of trauma if the child was required to testify in the presence of the defendant. See Myles v. State, 602 So. 2d 1278, 1281 n. 4 (Fla. 1992) ("Moderate harm would satisfy the `more than de minimus' requirement of Craig.").
[6]  The trial court's order dated April 18, 1990, stated in pertinent part:

d. Each questioner shall ask as few questions as possible, such questioning to be as simple, relevant, and to the issues of this case as is possible, in the interest of justice.
e. Questions are to be asked in a gentle, patient, and non-aggressive manner, recognizing the tender years of the child.
f. Appropriate recesses are to be taken at intervals appropriate to children of tender years, as suggested by Dr. Kuehnle.
[7]  Section 90.605(2), Florida Statutes (1989), reads as follows:

(2) In the court's discretion, a child may testify without taking the oath if the court determines the child understands the duty to tell the truth or the duty not to lie.