Title: Whitehead v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
CHARLENE MARIE WHITEHEAD 
 
v.  Record No. 080775     OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
JUNE 4, 2009* 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals 
erred in affirming the multiple convictions of Charlene Marie 
Whitehead (“Whitehead”) for receiving stolen property and the 
revocation of Whitehead’s prior suspended sentences on 
unrelated offenses based in part upon the convictions at issue 
in this appeal. 
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
On December 22, 2005, police officers from the City of 
Danville entered an apartment in Danville with warrants to 
arrest Whitehead and Jamil A. Walden (“Walden”), the father of 
Whitehead’s child.  The officers had also received a tip from 
an informant indicating that property stolen from numerous 
motor vehicles was being kept in the apartment.  After forcing 
entry into the apartment, the officers arrested Whitehead and 
Walden.  Upon entry, they observed a variety of computer 
equipment, cellular telephones, and compact discs in plain 
view around the apartment, and discovered numerous bags 
                     
* Revised October 22, 2009. 
containing miscellaneous other personal property in a closet 
and in dresser drawers. 
 
Five days after her arrest, Whitehead gave police a 
signed statement, in which she described the thefts committed 
by Walden.  Whitehead said she knew Walden was breaking into 
cars, stealing property, and bringing it back to the 
apartment, and that Walden “was stealing to try and support me 
and our daughter.”  The statement also listed some of the 
stolen items, with comments from Whitehead as to their 
ownership or origins, and Whitehead’s admission that Walden 
was helping pay the rent and bills at the house.  
I knew that Jamil stealing was wrong.  I used to 
fuss and yell at Jamil about stealing and 
bringing the stuff in the house, but it seemed 
like the only way we could get by.  My only 
concern is taking care of and being with my 
daughter, and that’s the only reason I allowed 
this to go on in my house.  I was scared that 
social services would take my child if I could 
not keep a roof over her head. 
 
 
While the rental agreement for the apartment listed both 
Whitehead and Walden as co-tenants, Walden’s was the only 
signature on the agreement.  Mack R. Eatmon, Sr., the 
“maintenance man” for the apartment complex, confirmed that 
Whitehead resided at the apartment, was present there “mostly 
everyday” or “off and on everyday,” and that on one or two 
occasions he had collected rent payments for the apartment 
from Whitehead. 
 
2
 
At trial in the Circuit Court for the City of Danville, 
Whitehead recanted the substance of her statement, claiming 
she did not know Walden was “breaking into cars,” and that all 
she knew was that Walden “use to come back [to the apartment] 
with a bunch of stuff.  Sometimes he come back with money.”  
However, on cross-examination, Whitehead conceded she knew 
that the items Walden brought back to the apartment did not 
belong to him.  Walden, who pled guilty to the thefts and 
testified on Whitehead’s behalf, claimed she was not involved 
in the thefts and that he never gave her any of the stolen 
items.  However, Whitehead did stipulate that these items were 
all stolen from various owners’ vehicles and had been 
identified by their respective owners when the items were 
claimed at the police station. 
 
The trial court “merged” Whitehead’s 40 indictments into 
32 counts of receiving stolen property,1 and convicted her on 
each of the 32 counts.  At a later sentencing hearing, 
Whitehead was sentenced under the first six counts to five 
years’ imprisonment with four years suspended on each count, 
for a total of 30 years’ imprisonment with 24 years suspended, 
and the trial court withheld sentencing on the other 26 counts 
conditioned on 25 years of good behavior. 
                     
 
1 The trial court combined several of the indictments for 
thefts that were part of the same transaction. 
 
3
 
On the same day as her sentencing hearing, Whitehead 
appeared before a different judge of the Danville Circuit 
Court, who was asked by the Commonwealth to revoke the 
suspension of Whitehead’s prior sentences for previous 
convictions of receiving stolen property.2  Whitehead pled 
guilty to violating her probation, and the court received 
evidence of her new convictions and heard evidence of other 
probation violations, including the failure to maintain 
contact with her probation officer and the failure to make 
restitution for her prior offenses.  The trial court revoked 
its prior suspension, and sentenced her to 17 years, 4 months 
of imprisonment with 12 years, 4 months suspended, for a total 
of 5 years in addition to her sentences on her new 
convictions. 
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed both the new convictions 
and the revocation order in an unpublished opinion.  Whitehead 
v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1699-06-3 (Mar. 25, 2008).  Citing 
Whitehead’s statement to police, her testimony at trial, and 
the affidavits of the theft victims, the Court of Appeals held 
that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s 
                     
 
2  Whitehead had previously been convicted of receiving 
stolen property under 13 indictments, and on May 9, 2005 had 
been sentenced on those convictions to a total of 18 years’ 
imprisonment, with all 18 years suspended.  The suspension was 
conditioned on Whitehead’s completion of three years of 
probation, payment of restitution, and maintenance of good 
behavior for five years. 
 
4
finding that Whitehead received the stolen property.  Id., 
slip op. at 5.  Additionally, the Court of Appeals held that 
the evidence of the stolen items found in the apartment and 
Whitehead’s admission that she knew the items did not belong 
to Walden supported the conclusion that “a rational trier of 
fact could conclude that [Whitehead] either received stolen 
property from Walden or aided in concealing property he 
stole.”  Id.  Finally, because Whitehead conceded the 
propriety of the trial court’s revocation assuming her new 
convictions were affirmed, the Court of Appeals also affirmed 
the revocation order.  Id., slip op. at 6. 
 
We awarded Whitehead an appeal, limited to the following 
three assignments of error: 
1. 
The Court of Appeals erred in ruling the trial court 
was not clearly erroneous in finding the evidence 
sufficient to prove Whitehead received the stolen 
property.   
 
2. 
The Court of Appeals erred in ruling the trial court 
was not clearly erroneous in finding the evidence 
sufficient to prove Whitehead aided in concealing 
stolen property. 
 
3. 
The Court of Appeals erred in ruling the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in finding reasonable 
cause to violate. 
 
 
II.  Analysis 
 
A. 
Receipt of Stolen Property 
 
 
5
 
Whitehead first contends that the evidence introduced by 
the Commonwealth at trial was insufficient to convict her of 
receiving stolen property. 
When analyzing a challenge to the sufficiency 
of the evidence, this Court reviews the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prevailing party at trial and considers any 
reasonable inferences from the facts proved.  
The judgment of the trial court will only be 
reversed upon a showing that it “is plainly 
wrong or without evidence to support it.” 
 
Wilson v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 19, 27, 630 S.E.2d 326, 330 
(2006) (quoting Code § 8.01-680) (citation omitted). 
 
Whitehead was found guilty of 32 counts of violating Code 
§ 18.2-108, which at the time of Whitehead’s convictions3 
stated:  “If any person buy or receive from another person 
. . . any stolen goods or other thing, knowing the same to 
have been stolen, he shall be deemed guilty of larceny 
thereof, and may be proceeded against, although the principal 
offender be not convicted.”  Code § 18.2-108 (2004).  This 
Court has previously established that to prove this offense by 
showing receipt, the Commonwealth must demonstrate that the 
property was “previously stolen by some person other than the 
accused; that the accused received the [property] from such 
other person; that at the time he received [the property] he 
                     
 
3 Whitehead was convicted at a hearing on May 24, 2006.  
Subsequent amendments to Code § 18.2-108 in 2008 made 
additions and alterations not relevant to this appeal.  See 
2008 Acts ch. 578. 
 
 
6
knew [it] had been stolen; and that he received [it] with 
dishonest intent.”  Reaves v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 443, 449, 
65 S.E.2d 559, 563 (1951).  Whitehead does not challenge the 
Commonwealth’s proof that the property was stolen, but assigns 
error to the trial court’s holding that the evidence was 
sufficient to prove she received the stolen property or aided 
in its concealment. 
The Commonwealth has never contended that Whitehead was 
involved in the actual theft of items from the various 
vehicles, or that she physically received the stolen items 
from Walden.  Instead, the Commonwealth premised its argument 
as to receipt upon a concept of “constructive receipt,” 
because Whitehead received benefits flowing from the sale of 
the stolen goods.  In her statement to police, Whitehead 
conceded that Walden was “stealing to try to support me and 
our daughter,” and that Walden “was helping pay the rent and 
bills at the house” with money he obtained by selling the 
property he had stolen.  Based on this evidence, the 
Commonwealth argued, 
this is a case in reference not to her actually 
stealing the items but receiving those items as 
Mr. Walden was bringing them back to the 
apartment and then not only allowing it to go 
on, but I guess getting fruit in reference to 
that, having her bills paid as toward whatever 
items was stolen and they could get any money 
for it. 
 
7
 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals accepted this 
proposition, noting that Whitehead admitted that “the proceeds 
of the thefts were used to support her and the couple’s 
child.”  Whitehead, Record No. 1699-06-3, slip op. at 5.  
Based on this admission, the Court of Appeals concluded that 
“[t]he trial court had sufficient information to find 
[Whitehead] knew that the items she received from Walden were 
stolen.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 
On appeal before this Court, the Commonwealth maintains 
that Whitehead’s acceptance of the proceeds of the thefts 
committed by Walden constituted receipt for the purposes of 
Code § 18.2-108.  In support of this theory of constructive 
receipt, the Commonwealth cites People ex rel. Briggs v. 
Hanley, 123 N.E. 663, 664 (N.Y. 1919), in which the Court of 
Appeals of New York sustained a conviction for receiving 
stolen property when the defendant accepted loan proceeds she 
knew her boyfriend had obtained using stolen stock 
certificates as collateral. 
 
However, we have never recognized this manner of receipt 
for the purposes of this offense in our decisions.  
Furthermore, such a manner of receipt does not fall within the 
plain meaning of Code § 18.2-108.  On this point, the 
distinction between the Virginia statute and the New York 
statute is significant.  While the version of Virginia Code 
 
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§ 18.2-108 in effect at the time of the alleged offenses made 
it a crime to “buy or receive from another person . . . any 
stolen goods or other thing,” the relevant New York statute 
addresses “Criminal possession of stolen property,” and 
provides that a person commits that offense “when he knowingly 
possesses stolen property, with intent to benefit himself or a 
person other than an owner thereof.”  N.Y. Penal Law § 165.40 
(Consol. 2009) (emphasis added).4  The “benefit” element of the 
New York statute is not a part of the Virginia statute.  The 
Court of Appeals was plainly wrong in holding that Whitehead 
“received” the property merely because she benefited from the 
proceeds of its sale. 
In addition to its reliance on Whitehead’s “constructive 
receipt” of benefits, the Commonwealth argues, for the first 
time on appeal, that Whitehead received the stolen property 
itself under the doctrine of constructive possession.  With 
regard to the receipt element of the offense of receiving 
stolen property, we have established that “[w]hile reception 
of the stolen goods by the accused must be substantially 
proven, actual physical handling by [her] is not necessary.  
It is well settled that constructive possession is 
                     
 
4 The language of the New York statute applied in People 
ex rel. Briggs is different from that featured in current N.Y. 
Penal Law § 165.40.  See 123 N.E. at 664 (quoting former N.Y. 
Penal Law § 1308).  However, the legislative history notes to 
N.Y. Penal Law § 165.40 state that the substance of that 
statute is derived in part from former N.Y. Penal Law § 1308. 
 
9
sufficient.”  Longman v. Commonwealth, 167 Va. 461, 465, 188 
S.E. 144, 145 (1936).  To establish constructive possession, 
the Commonwealth is required to “present evidence of acts, 
statements, or conduct by the defendant or other facts and 
circumstances proving that the defendant was aware of the 
presence and character of the [property] and that the 
[property] was subject to [her] dominion and control."  Bolden 
v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 144, 148, 654 S.E.2d 584, 586 (2008). 
However, whether Whitehead received the stolen property 
here by constructively possessing it is not properly before 
us, because the Commonwealth makes this argument for the first 
time on appeal.  It is true that “[w]e do not hesitate, in a 
proper case, where the correct conclusion has been reached but 
the wrong reason given, to sustain the result and assign the 
right ground.”  Eason v. Eason, 204 Va. 347, 352, 131 S.E.2d 
280, 283 (1963).  However, cases in which the party seeking 
affirmance failed to present the argument in the trial court, 
such that the trial court did not have an opportunity to rule 
on the argument, are not “proper cases” for the application of 
the doctrine.  Id.  This principle applies in criminal as well 
as civil cases.  Brown v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 414, 421 n.2, 
620 S.E.2d 760, 764 n.2 (2005).  Here, the Commonwealth did 
not argue constructive possession in the trial court or before 
 
10
the Court of Appeals.  Consequently, we will not consider the 
Commonwealth’s constructive possession argument here. 
B. 
Concealment of Stolen Property 
 
Whitehead next argues that the Court of Appeals erred in 
holding that the evidence was sufficient to convict her based 
upon aiding in the concealment of the stolen property.  After 
reviewing the trial record, the Court of Appeals held that in 
addition to proving Whitehead’s receipt of the property, the 
evidence introduced at trial “further supports the trial 
court’s finding of guilt” because it demonstrated that 
Whitehead, “who lived in an apartment filled with items she 
knew did not belong to Walden, was helping to conceal property 
that she knew was stolen.”  Whitehead, Record No. 1699-06-3, 
slip op. at 5. 
 
Proving that a defendant helped to conceal stolen 
property is an alternate means of establishing guilt under 
Code § 18.2-108.  To prove the offense by this method, the 
Commonwealth must show beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the 
property was previously stolen and (2) the defendant aided in 
concealing it (3) with knowledge that it was stolen and (4) 
with a dishonest intent.  Starks v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 48, 
54, 301 S.E.2d 152, 156 (1983). 
 
However, the record reveals that the Commonwealth failed 
to make any argument as to concealment at trial or before the 
 
11
Court of Appeals.  The first appearance of the concealment 
theory in the record is in the opinion of the Court of 
Appeals.  Because this argument was not made at trial, the 
Court of Appeals erred when it held that the evidence provided 
this additional rationale to support Whitehead’s convictions.  
Brown, 270 Va. at 421 n.2, 620 S.E.2d at 764 n.2, Eason, 204 
Va. at 352, 131 S.E.2d at 283; see also Commonwealth v. 
Shifflett, 257 Va. 34, 44, 510 S.E.2d 232, 237 (1999) (Court 
of Appeals may not “recast” the evidence to support an 
argument not made at trial). 
 
The Court of Appeals has previously observed that: 
An appellate court may affirm the judgment of a 
trial court when it has reached the right 
result for the wrong reason. However, 
[t]he rule does not always 
apply. . . .  [T]he proper 
application of this rule does not 
include those cases where, because 
the trial court has rejected the 
right reason or confined its decision 
to a specific ground, further factual 
resolution is needed before the right 
reason may be assigned to support the 
trial court's decision. 
 
Harris v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 670, 675-676, 576 S.E.2d 
228, 231 (2003), Blackman v. Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 633, 
642-643, 613 S.E.2d 460, 465 (2005) (“an appellee may argue 
for the first time on appeal any legal ground in support of a 
judgment so long as it does not require new factual 
 
12
determinations.”)  We agree with these holdings by the Court 
of Appeals. 
 
In this case, the offense of receiving stolen property 
may be proven in a number of different ways.  However, the 
proof requirements of each method are different.  A conviction 
based upon actual possession or constructive possession or 
aiding in concealment is predicated upon presentation of 
different facts that support the elements of the offense 
according to the method of proof selected by the Commonwealth.  
The method of proof selected by the Commonwealth in this case 
was a theory of “constructive receipt” based upon benefit 
received – in this case, the proceeds from Walden’s sale of 
the stolen property.  Such a method of proof is not available 
under Code § 18.2-108.  No other method of proof was the 
subject of argument or presentation of evidence at trial. 
Both the constructive possession and concealment methods 
of proof require presentation of facts that would not be 
necessary under other methods of proof supporting conviction 
for receipt of stolen property.  The Commonwealth clearly 
articulated its case for prosecuting Whitehead – constructive 
receipt.  Because the Commonwealth limited its method of proof 
at trial, Whitehead was not on notice to present evidence to 
rebut any other method of proof possible.  The Constitution of 
Virginia provides in pertinent part: “in criminal prosecutions 
 
13
a man hath a right to demand the cause and nature of his 
accusation, to be confronted with the accusers and witnesses, 
and to call for evidence in his favor.”  VA. CONST. art. I, 
§ 8.  To allow the Commonwealth to advance alternative methods 
of proof and conviction never argued in the trial court and 
requiring different elements of proof for the first time on 
appeal would deny Whitehead these rights. 
 
Because the evidence was insufficient to support 
Whitehead’s convictions under Code § 18.2-108, we will reverse 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming her 
convictions. 
C. 
Revocation of Suspended Sentence 
 
Finally, Whitehead challenges the trial court’s 
revocation of her suspended sentence for prior convictions of 
receiving stolen property, arguing that the trial court based 
its revocation upon the new convictions at issue in this 
appeal.  The Commonwealth responds by asserting that even 
without the new convictions, Whitehead was guilty of other 
probation violations that provided the trial court with 
sufficient grounds for revocation.  The Court of Appeals, 
noting that Whitehead conceded the propriety of the revocation 
should the new convictions be held valid, affirmed the 
revocation order based on its affirmance of the convictions.  
Whitehead, Record No. 1699-06-3, slip op. at 6. 
 
14
 
A trial court’s discretion to revoke the suspension of a 
previously imposed sentence is governed by Code § 19.2-306, 
which grants a trial court the authority to “revoke the 
suspension of sentence for any cause the court deems 
sufficient that occurred at any time within the probation 
period, or within the period of suspension fixed by the 
court.”  However, we have noted that 
[t]he cause deemed by the court to be sufficient 
for revoking a suspension must be a reasonable 
cause.  The sufficiency of the evidence to 
sustain an order of revocation is a matter 
within the sound discretion of the trial court.  
Its finding of fact and judgment thereon are 
reversible only upon a clear showing of abuse of 
such discretion.  The discretion required is a 
judicial discretion, the exercise of which 
implies conscientious judgment, not arbitrary 
action. 
 
Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 325, 327, 228 S.E.2d 555, 
556 (1976) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
 
Here, the record indicates that the trial court placed 
significant weight upon Whitehead’s new convictions in the 
revocation of the suspension of her prior sentences.  At the 
revocation hearing, the trial court stated, “I mean I fell all 
over myself giving you a break a year and a-half ago or a year 
ago, and you just started up within two months.  I mean I’m 
not personally offended.  It doesn’t surprise me that people 
do that, but you’ve done this to yourself and I’m sorry.”  It 
is clear that Whitehead’s new convictions played a substantial 
 
15
role in the trial court’s decision to revoke her suspended 
sentences and impose additional incarceration. 
 
It is true, as the Commonwealth contends, that the trial 
court had before it evidence of other probation violations by 
Whitehead, including failing to make restitution for the 
earlier thefts and failing to maintain contact with her 
probation officer.  However, because we have reversed her new 
convictions, and because those convictions were obviously 
influential at her revocation hearing, she is entitled to a 
new hearing. 
III.  Conclusion 
We hold that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming 
Whitehead’s convictions and consequently erred in affirming 
the trial court’s order of revocation of her probation.  
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals as to the 32 convictions for receiving stolen property 
and dismiss the indictments.  With regard to the revocation of 
previously suspended sentences, we will reverse the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals and the trial court and remand to the 
Court of Appeals with instructions to remand the matter to the 
trial court for a new revocation hearing. 
 
                               Reversed and final judgment 
in part, and remanded in part. 
 
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