Title: Lockhart v. State

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

257 Ind. 349 (1971)
274 N.E.2d 523
EDWARD LOCKHART
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 1270S302.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed November 9, 1971.
*350 Mrs. Harriette Bailey Conn, Public Defender of Indiana, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Darrell K. Diamond, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
GIVAN, J.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the trial court overruling appellant's verified petition to withdraw a plea of guilty and set aside a judgment of conviction. The appellant had been charged with the crime of inflicting physical *351 injury while engaged in the commission of a robbery as defined in Burns Ind. Stat., 1956 Repl., § 10-4101. Appellant entered a plea of guilty to the lesser included offense of robbery. Subsequently he submitted his verified petition to withdraw his plea of guilty and set aside the judgment of conviction, the denial of which is the basis for this appeal.
Appellant along with two co-defendants had been arrested and charged as above indicated. All three defendants gave incriminating statements following their arrest. Appellant's co-defendants entered pleas of guilty and in so doing made statements implicating the appellant. After hearing the statements of his co-defendants the appellant entered his plea of guilty. At the hearing on his plea he was asked by the trial judge if he had been threatened or if any promises had been made to him in order to get him to plead one way or the other. To this question the appellant answered "no." He further stated that he had consulted with his attorney and understood the nature of the charge.
The appellee raises the question in this case that the appellant has not complied with all of the requirements of our Rule PC 1(C); however the appellee suggested that the appeal nevertheless be handled as a PC 1 proceeding. With this we agree. See Langley v. State (1971), 256 Ind. 199, 267 N.E.2d 538, 25 Ind. Dec. 118.
We now turn to the contentions of the appellant.
Appellant first contends that the confessions taken by the police were illegally obtained. It is appellant's claim that the illegality "rests upon confession under fear of an impending life sentence, which fear was influential upon juvenile co-defendants as upon defendant Lockhart, appellant herein * * *." There was no confession of the appellant introduced in evidence other than his in court plea of guilty. It thus appears appellant is attempting to argue that his guilty plea was not entered voluntarily and freely in view of the prior confessions.
*352 Appellant also contends that his plea of guilty was involuntary due to the fear of an impending life sentence. Where, as here, the appellant is alleging that he has been denied his constitutional rights and that such a denial has led to an involuntary plea of guilty, the trial court must examine the facts and determine whether or not the plea of guilty was in fact entered voluntarily, knowingly and freely. A situation very similar to the case at bar was presented to the Supreme Court of the United States in Brady v. U.S. (1970), 397 U.S. 742, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747, 90 S. Ct. 1463. In that case the defendant had entered a plea of guilty after a co-defendant had given a confession and entered a plea of guilty, and was-known by the defendant to be available to testify against him. The defendant argued that this situation coerced him to enter a plea of guilty. He further contended that the death penalty provision sof the statute under which he was charged also operated to coerce his plea of guilty. The Supreme Court of the United States, beginning at page 749, made the following observations:
We agree with the above language and hold that it is equally applicable to the case at bar. The Supreme Court in Brady, at page 751, continued:
In the case at bar the fears of the appellant brought about by the surrounding circumstances cannot be considered the *354 type of coercion which would require the trial court to permit withdrawl of the guilty plea. Under the circumstances the appellant was simply placed in a situation where he was required to make a judgment as to the best course of action for him to take. We cannot say that his decision to plead guilty constituted an involuntary situation simply because of the existence of overwhelming evidence and the threat of a life sentence.
It was certainly within the discretion of the prosecuting attorney to recommend a lesser charge in exchange for appellant's guilty plea. Taylor v. State (1968), 251 Ind. 236, 236 N.E.2d 825, 14 Ind. Dec. 303. Appellant's acceptance of this opportunity to enter a plea to a lesser included offense was not rendered involuntary because of the threat of the greater offense.
Appellant also states that his own confession operated as a coercive force inducing him to enter a plea of guilty. The Supreme Court of the United States in McMann v. Richardson (1970), 397 U.S. 759, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763, 90 S. Ct. 1441, pages 768 and 769, stated:
Appellant also contends that his plea was not entered freely and voluntarily because he did not understand the nature of the charge against him, and although he was represented by counsel he claims the trial court should have gone into extended interrogation of him to determine whether or not he in fact understood the nature of the charge.
An examination of the record in this case discloses the following exchange between the judge and the defendants, including the appellant:
Three days later the appellant was brought into court for sentencing on his plea. At that time the following exchange occurred between the court and the appellant:
From the above exchange it is quite clear the appellant was represented by counsel and had been advised as to the nature of the charge and the consequences of his plea of guilty. The fact that three days after having entered his plea the appellant still indicatd to the court that he did not wish to change his previous plea is further indication that his plea was entered freely and voluntarily, and that he had a full understanding of the consequences.
At the hearing on his petition to withdraw his plea of guilty and set aside his judgment of conviction the appellant had the burden of proof to show his plea of guilty was not entered voluntarily, knowingly and freely. Penn v. State (1961), 242 Ind. 359, 177 N.E.2d 889. We see nothing in this record to overcome the presumption that the trial court acted properly in denying appellant's petition. Dobson v. State (1961), 242 Ind. 267, 177 N.E.2d 395.
*358 Although we find in this case that the admonitions and questions by the trial court were sufficient to ascertain that the appellant had entered his plea voluntarily, we point out the procedure used by the trial court could be improved upon. In Boykin v. Ala. (1969), 395 U.S. 238, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274, 89 S. Ct. 1709, the Court stated, beginning at page 243:
Footnote 7 above indicated reads as follows:
Even though as in the case at bar a defendant is represented by competent counsel, it is highly recommended that the trial court make the best possible record which may serve at future times to demonstrate that the accused was afforded all pertinent constitutional rights.
In the case at bar we hold the trial court did not err in overruling appellant's verified petition to withdraw his plea of guilty and set aside the judgment of conviction.
The trial court is, therefore, affirmed.
*359 Arterburn, C.J., and Hunter and Prentice, JJ., concur; DeBruler, J., dissents with opinion.
DeBRULER, J.
I dissent from the majority opinion wherein it states that the record of the arraignment is adequate to show that the appellant entered a plea of guilty "freely and understandingly" as required by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274, and by cases in this Court, Loucks v. State (1938), 213 Ind. 108, 11 N.E.2d 694.
A plea of guilty constitutes a waiver of several of appellant's federal and state constitutional rights: (1) The privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Art. 1, § 14 of the Indiana Constitution. (2) The right to trial by jury as guaranteed by Art. 1, § 13 of the Indiana Constitution. (3) The right to confront his accusers as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Art. 1, § 13 of the Indiana Constitution.
In Boykin v. Alabama, supra, the United States Supreme Court held that a waiver of these rights may not be inferred from a silent record. The issue then, is whether the arraignment record in this case demonstrates that appellant freely and knowingly waived these rights by pleading guilty. The only portion of the record relevant is as follows:
Before we could find that appellant waived these rights the record would have to show that he was advised that he possessed such rights. There is no such showing in this case.
It is the duty of the trial court to make it appear on the record that a criminal defendant was properly advised of his rights and freely and understandingly waived them by pleading guilty, and he cannot assume the defendant has obtained this information from some other source.
NOTE.  Reported in 274 N.E.2d 523.