Title: YOUNG v. HAC, LLC d/b/a BENHAM'S

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

YOUNG v. HAC, LLC d/b/a BENHAM'S2001 WY 5024 P.3d 1142Case Number: 00-187Decided: 05/31/2001
 APRIL TERM, A.D. 2001

                                                        

                                                 
JASON A. 
YOUNG,                                                  

 Appellant(Plaintiff),

v.

HAC, LLC 
d/b/a BENHAM'S,

Appellee(Defendant).

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable David B. Park, Judge 

Representing 
Appellant:

Frank R. 
Chapman and Thomas A. Valdez of Beech Street Law Office, Casper, Wyoming.

 Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
T. Holscher of Schwartz, Bon, Walker & Studer, Casper, 
Wyoming.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ.

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 [¶1]           
In this 
personal injury action, Appellant Jason A. Young (Young) alleged Appellee HAC, 
LLC (HAC), negligently caused the personal injuries that Young suffered when 
assaulted by another customer while both patronized HAC's business.  A jury returned a verdict finding that 
HAC was not negligent.  During 
trial, Young had attempted to enter into evidence the sworn statement of the 
customer who had assaulted Young and caused his injuries.  Young appeals the jury verdict alleging 
that the trial court erred when it ruled that the assaulting customer's sworn 
statement was hearsay that was inadmissible as a statement against interest, 
W.R.E. 804(b)(3), or under the catchall exception, W.R.E. 804(b)(6).  We hold that the trial court did not err 
in ruling the sworn statement inadmissible.

ISSUES

[¶2]           
Young 
presents this sole issue for our review:

1.  Did the District Court commit reversible 
error by barring the sworn statement of Travis Kidd to be admitted into evidence 
as an exception to the hearsay rule?

HAC 
believes the issue is:

Is a 
sworn statement by an assailant admissible in its entirety under W.R.E. 
804(b)(3) or W.R.E. 804(b)(6) when that assailant has already been sentenced for 
the assault and when the party taking the statement intentionally chooses not to 
preserve the assailant's testimony for trial through a 
deposition?

FACTS

[¶3]           
HAC 
operates a restaurant and tavern called Benhams. On February 18, 1995, Young and 
friends were at Benhams to hear a band.  
Travis Kidd was also there with his girlfriend and friends. Kidd, 
apparently upset with his girlfriend, was disruptive, abusive, and 
threatening.  After telling his 
group that he was going to hit the next person that walked by, Kidd attacked 
Young as Young walked by on his way out of the establishment, severely injuring 
him.  Kidd was charged with and 
sentenced for aggravated assault. 

[¶4]           
On March 
7, 1997, Young filed suit against HAC, and HAC filed cross-claims against 
Kidd.  Trial was set for May 24, 
1999.  HAC's suit against Kidd was 
dismissed in January of 1998.  Kidd 
gave a sworn statement to Young's attorney on July 8, 1997.  Although Kidd's attorney was present 
during the making of the sworn statement, HAC's attorney had not been notified 
and was not present.  The civil 
trial was rescheduled for March 13, 2000, and on February 24, 2000, Young issued 
a trial subpoena for Kidd.  Kidd 
could not be located, and the subpoena was not served.  

[¶5]           
On March 
10, 2000, Young notified HAC that Kidd was unavailable as a witness and Young 
intended to read Kidd's sworn statement into evidence at trial.  HAC objected, and, on March 14, after 
trial had begun, the trial court heard oral arguments on the issue.  Ruling from the bench, the court 
analyzed the application of W.R.E. 804(b)(3) and (6), and found it relevant that 
Young had failed to take Kidd's deposition.  The trial court denied admission of the 
sworn statement. The jury returned a verdict finding HAC had not been 
negligent.  This appeal 
followed.

DISCUSSION

Standard of 
Review

[¶6]           
Admission 
of evidence, including the admission of hearsay, is within the sound discretion 
of the trial court; we will not disturb evidentiary rulings unless the appellant 
demonstrates a clear abuse of discretion.  
Brown v. Michael Pryor, M.D., P.C., 954 P.2d 1349, 1350 (Wyo. 
1998).  

[T]he 
core of our inquiry must reach "the question of reasonableness of the choice 
made by the trial court."  Vaughn 
v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998).  "Judicial discretion is a composite of 
many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means 
a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously."  Id. (quoting Byerly v. Madsen, 
41 Wash. App. 495, 704 P.2d 1236, 1238 (1985)); Basolo, 907 P.2d [348] 
at 353 [Wyo. 1995]. We must ask ourselves whether the district court could 
reasonably conclude as it did and whether any facet of its ruling was arbitrary 
or capricious.  

Carlton 
v. Carlton, 997 P.2d 1028, 1031 (Wyo. 2000).

W.R.E. 804

[¶7]           
W.R.E. 
804 states in relevant part:

(a) 
Definition of unavailability. -- "Unavailability as a witness" includes 
situations in which the declarant:

****

(5) 
Is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable to 
procure his attendance by process or other reasonable 
means.

****

(b) 
Hearsay exceptions. -- The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule 
if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:

****

(3) 
Statement Against Interest. -- A statement which was at the time of its making 
so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far 
tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a 
claim by him against another, that a reasonable man in his position would not 
have made the statement unless he believed it to be true.  A statement tending to expose the 
declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not 
admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the 
trustworthiness of the statement.

****

(6) 
Other Exceptions. -- A statement not specifically covered by any of the 
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as 
evidence of a material fact;  (B) 
the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any 
other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and 
(C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best 
be served by admission of the statement into evidence.  However, a statement may not be admitted 
under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party 
sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party 
with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the 
statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the 
declarant.

[¶8]           
Young 
contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to consider 
Kidd's exposure to civil liability when assessing the evidence as a statement 
against interest and when it decided that the statement did not meet the 
trustworthiness requirements of W.R.E. 804(b)(6), the catchall exception.  HAC contends that although the court 
properly ruled on the merits, Young's failure to depose Kidd precludes admission 
of a sworn statement that has not been subject to cross-examination.  We first address W.R.E. 804's 
availability requirement.

A.  Availability

[¶9]           
Compliance 
with W.R.E. 804(a) is required before the hearsay exceptions of W.R.E. 804(b) 
can be applied.  We will not 
determine if the substantive requirements of W.R.E. 804(b) were met, unless the 
threshold eligibility of the unavailability request is demonstrated.  Williams v. Collins Communications, 
Inc., 720 P.2d 880, 886 (Wyo. 1986).  
In its ruling from the bench, the trial court did not decide whether 
Young's attempts to subpoena Kidd complied with W.R.E. 804(a), and, because we 
affirm on other grounds, we need not consider the issue on our own.  The trial court did consider Young's 
failure to depose Kidd as a factor that weighed against admitting the sworn 
statement under either of the two exceptions.

[¶10]       
Under 
the federal rules, an obligation to obtain a deposition exists pursuant to F.R.E 
804(a)(5), which states:

(a) 
Definition of unavailability.  
"Unavailability as a witness" includes situations in which the 
declarant

            
****

(5) is 
absent from the hearing and the proponent of a statement has been unable to 
procure the declarant's attendance (or in the case of a hearsay exception 
under subdivision (b)(2), (3), or (4), the declarant's attendance or 
testimony) by process or other reasonable means.

(emphasis 
added).  See also United States 
v. Olafson, 213 F.3d 435, 442 n.3 (9th 
Cir. 2000).  Federal courts 
interpret the emphasized phrase as requiring an attempt to depose a witness, or 
the court will not find the witness is unavailable and consider admission under 
the the exceptions in subdivision (b)(2), (3), or (4).  Under Wyoming's rules, W.R.E. 804(a)(5) 
no longer includes this phrase, and we need not consider whether Young had an 
obligation to depose Kidd before attempting to introduce his statement under 
W.R.E. 804(b)(3).  We agree, 
however, that the lack of opportunity for cross-examination such as would have 
been available by deposition may be a factor the trial court can properly 
consider for admitting statements under the catchall exception, W.R.E. 
804(b)(6).  Although deposition 
testimony is also considered hearsay, it may be admissible under either the 
rules of civil procedure or W.R.E. 804(b)(1).  Brown, 954 P.2d  at 1351.  

B.  W.R.E. 804(b)(3), Statement Against 
Interest

[¶11]               
Hearsay is defined as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant 
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth 
of the matter asserted."  W.R.E. 
801(c). A "statement" is an oral or written assertion or nonverbal conduct 
intended as an assertion.  W.R.E. 
801(a).  The word "statement" means 
"a single declaration or remark," rather than "a report or narrative," so that 
when ruling on the admissibility of a narrative, we must break down the 
narrative and determine the separate admissibility of each "single declaration 
or remark."  State v. 
Phillips, 194 W.Va. 569, 461 S.E.2d 75, 91 (1995); see Williamson 
v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 114 S. Ct. 2431, 2434-35, 129 L. Ed. 2d 476 
(1994) (discussing hearsay in the context of F.R.E. 804(b)(3) exception for 
statements against interest).

Kolb v. 
State, 930 P.2d 1238, 1245-46 (Wyo. 1996).

[¶12]       
Here, 
Young presented Kidd's lengthy sworn statement to be read into evidence, and the 
trial court determined that because it contained a number of statements 
describing what other people believed and saw, it was inadmissible for lack of 
foundation.  Our review indicates 
that the record supports the trial court's view that nearly all of the sworn 
statement, which is well over twenty-five pages, primarily consists of 
statements that are not statements against interest, but are inadmissible 
narrative.  

[¶13]       
Considering 
the admissibility of each "single declaration or remark" as we must, we do see 
that Kidd admits that he assaulted Young; however, as Young acknowledges, Kidd 
admitted it after he had been tried and convicted for that crime.  Consequently, the only liability at 
stake was civil liability.  Young 
contends that the HAC's pending cross-claim against Kidd qualifies the entire 
statement as admissible as a statement against interest.  HAC contends that Kidd, having already 
admitted to criminal liability, which then became a matter of public record, did 
not increase his civil liability, but, instead, was actually attempting to enter 
an exculpatory statement.  See 
Johnson v. State, 930 P.2d 358 (Wyo. 1996).

[¶14]       
The 
record shows that the trial court received and considered written memorandum 
supporting each parties' arguments and heard oral argument.  Having considered written and oral 
argument, the trial court determined that the sworn statement was not a 
statement against interest and ruled it was inadmissible hearsay.  Our review indicates that the record 
supports the decision to exclude the entire sworn statement.  Although a single statement within the 
entire statement was an admission that he attacked Young, Kidd provided the 
entire statement to exculpate himself from liability, and it is not admissible 
under W.R.E. 804(b)(3), the statement against interest 
exception.

C.  W.R.E. 804(b)(6), the 
Catchall Exception

[¶15]       
Young 
contends that this statement met all requirements for admission.  HAC contends that Young failed to give 
HAC adequate notice that it intended to introduce the statement under this 
exception, failed to prove unavailability, and the trial court properly ruled 
the sworn statement did not possess circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness.  We have identified 
the following as requirements for admission under W.R.E. 804(b)(6): 

First, 
the declarant must be unavailable.  
Second, the adverse party must either have been given pretrial notice or 
a sufficient opportunity to prepare for and contest the admission of the 
hearsay.  Third, the truth of the 
matter asserted must be evidence of a material fact.  Fourth, the hearsay statement must be 
more probative than any other evidence which could be procured through 
reasonable efforts.  Fifth, and 
finally, the statement must be supported by circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness;  this may be 
established either through other corroborating evidence or by considering the 
motivation and/or behavior pattern of the declarant.

Johnson, 
930 P.2d  
at 366 (quoting Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 131-32 (Wyo. 
1981)).

[¶16]       
The 
record shows that the trial court did not admit this statement because of 
insufficient notice, and decided it failed trustworthiness requirements.  Because our review of the sworn 
statement indicates that it was neither worthy of trust nor necessary to 
effectuate justice, we need not decide whether the trial court properly decided 
the notice issue.     

[¶17]       
W.R.E. 
804(b)(6) applies only in rare and exceptional circumstances.  Here, the trial court was concerned 
about the lack of opportunity to cross-examine a hearsay statement that lacked 
foundation for its numerous statements about what other people saw and what Kidd 
believed HAC employees knew and had seen.  
It properly considered that Kidd was available for a deposition that 
would have provided the opportunity for cross-examination, and we would note 
that if Kidd's testimony was crucial to this case, Young should have deposed 
him.  These factors are sufficient 
reason to deny admission.  We find 
no abuse of discretion.

[¶18]       
We 
affirm the trial court's decision to exclude Kidd's sworn 
statement.