Title: Dodge v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Dodge v. State1997 WY 162951 P.2d 383Case Number: 96-308Decided: 12/31/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

John 
Daniel DODGE, Jr., Appellant (Defendant),

v.

The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 

 

 

Appeal from the District Court, Fremont County, Nancy 
J. Guthrie, J.

 

Ronald P. Jurovich of 
Messenger & Jurovich (argued), Thermopolis, for 
Appellant.

 William U. Hill, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, 
Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; 
and Bryan A. Skoric, Assistant Attorney General (argued), for 
Appellee.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

 

LEHMAN, Justice. 

[¶1]      Appellant John 
Daniel Dodge, Jr. pled guilty to three counts of taking indecent liberties with 
a child in violation of W.S. 14-3-105 and was sentenced to a term of sixteen to 
twenty years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary. Dodge presents a single issue on 
appeal:

 

Whether the district court committed reversible error 
by abusing its discretion in sentencing John D. Dodge, Jr. to eight to ten years 
each for three violations of W.S. 14-3-105, counts II and III to run 
concurrently and consecutive to count I, resulting in a sentence of sixteen to 
twenty years in the Wyoming Penitentiary.

 

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      In May 1994, 
Dodge temporarily moved into the Colorado home of his childhood friend, Bruce 
Gutzke. Dodge spent a considerable amount of time with Gutzke's two daughters; 
and, when he obtained his own apartment two weeks later, they helped him move in 
and arrange his furniture. Soon after, Dodge and the older daughter, J.G., who 
was 15 years old at the time, began having sexual relations. Dodge was 39 years 
old. Over the course of the next two months, Dodge and J.G. had sexual 
intercourse twenty to thirty times. Dodge ceased having sexual relations with 
J.G. after J.G.'s mother found the two in bed together on July 4, 
1994.

 

[¶4]      In June 1994, 
J.G. accompanied Dodge on two trips from Colorado to Thermopolis, Wyoming. 
During the course of these trips, Dodge pulled off the highway on three separate 
occasions and had sexual intercourse with J.G., twice in Carbon County and once 
in Fremont County. J.G.'s parents reported these incidents to the Wyoming 
authorities in early 1995. On October 9, 1995, Dodge was formally charged in 
Fremont County with one count of taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties 
with a child, in violation of W.S. 14-3-105. On January 19, 1996, Dodge was 
charged in Carbon County with two counts of second degree sexual assault in 
violation of W.S. 6-2-303(a)(ii). Dodge entered into a plea agreement on June 4, 
1996, whereby the Carbon County charges were reduced to two counts of taking 
indecent liberties with a child. The Carbon County charges then were 
consolidated with the Fremont County charge.

 

[¶5]      A presentence 
investigation report was prepared; and, on September 18, 1996, Dodge pled guilty 
to three counts of taking immoral or indecent liberties with a child in 
violation of W.S. 14-3-105.1 The court sentenced Dodge to a term 
of eight to ten years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary for each count, with the 
sentences for Counts II and III to be served concurrently to each other and 
consecutively to Count I. Dodge timely appeals the Judgement and 
Sentence.

 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

[¶6]      When a criminal 
sentence is within the limits set by the legislature, as here, the sentence will 
not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion. Smith v. State, 922 P.2d 846, 848 (Wyo. 1996).

 

A 
court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the 
bounds of reason under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been 
an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could 
reasonably conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an 
error of law committed by the court under the 
circumstances.

 

Id. (quoting Wright v. 
State, 670 P.2d 1090, 1092 (Wyo. 1983)). In assessing the reasonableness of the 
sentence, consideration is to be given to the crime and its circumstances and 
the character of the criminal. Wright v. State, 670 P.2d  at 
1092.

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶7]      Dodge asserts 
that the district court abused its discretion when it sentenced him to a total 
of sixteen to twenty years in prison for three counts of taking indecent 
liberties with a minor. He contends that his sentence is disproportionate to 
sentences imposed on other defendants convicted of the same crime, and he urges 
us to evaluate his sentence in light of the Eighth Amendment proportionality 
test set forth in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3011, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983):

 

[A] court's proportionality analysis under the Eighth 
Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of 
the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on 
other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for 
commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.

 

[¶8]      However, this 
court has adhered to the rule that we will not undertake a lengthy analysis 
under all three of the Solem criteria "except in cases where the mode of 
punishment is unusual or where the relative length of sentence to imprisonment 
is extreme when compared to the gravity of the offense." Oakley v. State, 715 P.2d 1374, 1379 (Wyo. 1986); Smith v. State, 922 P.2d  at 849. Our rule is in 
accord with the approach taken by the United States Supreme Court in Harmelin v. 
Michigan, where the court concluded that the Solem proportionality analysis is 
appropriate only "in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime 
committed and the sentence imposed leads 
to an inference of gross disproportionality." 501 U.S. 957, 1005, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2707, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).2

 

[¶9]      Dodge pled guilty 
to three counts of indecent liberties, for which he could have received a 
thirty-year prison sentence. W.S. 14-3-105(a), W.S. 7-13-201. The court imposed 
the maximum possible sentence for each count, ten years in prison. The court, 
however, ordered the two Carbon County charges to run concurrently to each 
other, and consecutively to the Fremont County charge, resulting in a total 
sentence of sixteen to twenty years.

 

[¶10]   Indecent liberties is a serious 
crime, by definition perpetrated against a minor. Longer sentences are 
appropriate in crimes of violence against the person as compared with crimes 
against property. Smith v. State, 922 P.2d  at 850. In this regard, we observe 
that Dodge's version of the events leading to the charges against him differs 
substantially from J.G.'s version. Dodge maintains the sexual relationship 
between he and J.G. was consensual and there were mutual feelings of love 
between the two. On the other hand, J.G. asserts that Dodge sexually assaulted 
her against her will. She says she was scared of Dodge and intimidated by his 
physical size, and that she accompanied 
Dodge on the trips to Wyoming only to keep her younger sister from going and 
being assaulted as J.G. had been. In addition, the presentence investigation 
report included victim impact statements which described the devastating effect 
of these crimes, not only on J.G., but on her whole family. A comparison of 
Dodge's crimes with his sentence does not give rise to an inference of gross 
disproportionality; therefore, a comparative analysis of his sentence with 
others in Wyoming or across the country is not required.

 

[¶11]   The same facts which inform our 
determination that a proportionality analysis is not required also support our 
decision that the district court did not otherwise abuse its discretion in 
sentencing Dodge. Dodge does not allege any suspicious procedural conduct, 
circumstances manifesting inherent unfairness or injustice, or conduct offensive 
to the public sense of fair play. Wright, 670 P.2d  at 1092. Dodge points out 
that he cooperated fully with the authorities; he is a first-time offender; and 
he showed remorse for his wrongdoing. 
Dodge also emphasizes the fact that he lived in Colorado, and the sexual 
relationship between him and J.G. was not illegal in Colorado. He believes these 
factors should have resulted in a lesser sentence.

 

[¶12]   Initially, we note that the 
presentence report and plea agreement contradict Dodge's claim that he did 
nothing illegal in Colorado; charges were pending in Colorado, but were dropped 
as part of the plea agreement. Further, a defendant's cooperation with 
authorities and remorse for his actions are appropriate factors to be considered 
when imposing sentence, but the court's obligation is to fairly consider the 
entire course of events as related to the character of the defendant and the 
circumstances of the crime. See Christy 
v. State, 731 P.2d 1204, 1205 (Wyo. 1987), and Wright, 670 P.2d  at 1092. The 
court had before it the presentence investigation report, to which Dodge offered 
no corrections or modifications. Additionally, the court heard statements from 
counsel for the State and Dodge, and from Dodge himself. The whole picture 
presented to the district court, much of which is described above, leads us to 
conclude the court's sentencing decision did not exceed the bounds of reason 
under the circumstances.

 

[¶13]   Affirmed.   

 

FOOTNOTES

1 W.S. 
14-3-105 (Rpl. 1994) provides in relevant part:

 

(a) Any 
person knowingly taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with any child * 
* * is guilty of a felony, and upon conviction shall be 
fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100.00) nor more than one thousand 
dollars ($1,000.00) or imprisoned in the penitentiary 
not more than ten (10) years, or both.

 

2 
Harmelin was a plurality opinion. Two justices in Harmelin would have limited 
proportionality review to capital cases. 501 U.S.  at 994, 111 S. Ct.  at 2701.