Title: State v. Rector

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2023 WI 41 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP1213-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross-Appellant, 
     v. 
Corey T. Rector, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 23, 2023   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 12, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha   
 
JUDGE: 
Jason A. Rossell   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed an opinion concurring in part 
and dissenting in part, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., and ROGGENSACK, 
J., joined. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-cross-appellant, there were 
briefs filed by Winn S. Collins, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the briefs was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. 
There was an oral argument by Winn S. Collins, assistant 
attorney general.  
 
For the defendant-appellant-cross-respondent, there were 
briefs filed by Andrew R. Hinkel, assistant state public 
 
 
2 
defender. There was an oral argument by Andrew R. Hinkel, 
assistant state public defender.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Katie R. York, 
appellate division director, with whom on the brief was Kelli S. 
Thompson, state public defender, for the Wisconsin State Public 
Defender.  
 
 
 
 
2023 WI 41 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2020AP1213-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2018CF840) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Corey T. Rector, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 23, 2023 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed an opinion concurring in part 
and dissenting in part, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., and ROGGENSACK, 
J., joined. 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Kenosha 
County, Jason A. Rossell, Judge.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
JILL J. KAROFSKY, J.   This case determines whether 
Corey 
Rector 
must 
comply 
with 
sex 
offender 
registration 
requirements for life under Wis. Stat. § 301.45(5)(b)1. (2021-
22).1  Wisconsin's sex offender registration statute requires 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2021-22 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2020AP1213-CR   
 
2 
 
lifetime registration when a "person has, on 2 or more separate 
occasions, been convicted . . . for a sex offense."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.45(5)(b)1.  We are tasked with interpreting the phrase 
"separate occasions," and we determine that, in the context of 
this statute, the plain and ordinary meaning of "separate 
occasions" does not refer solely to the number of convictions.  
Consequently, the circuit court did not err by ordering Rector 
to register as a sex offender for fifteen years rather than 
until his death because his five convictions for possession of 
child pornography were filed in a single case and occurred 
during the same hearing.  We also hold that the circuit court 
did not err in finding Rector ineligible to participate in the 
Earned Release Program (ERP). 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
The State filed a criminal complaint charging Rector 
with ten counts of possession of child pornography in violation 
of Wis. Stat. § 948.12(1m) after seizing over 1,000 offending 
images and videos in Rector's possession.  During a single 
hearing, Rector pled guilty to five out of ten counts of 
possession of child pornography.2  The circuit court3 sentenced 
Rector to eight years initial confinement and ten years of 
extended supervision on each of the five counts to be served 
                                                 
2 Pursuant to the plea agreement, the other five counts of 
possession of child pornography were dismissed and the State 
agreed not to issue any additional charges based on the other 
discovered images. 
3 The Honorable Jason A. Rossell of the Kenosha County 
Circuit Court presided. 
No. 
2020AP1213-CR   
 
3 
 
concurrently and ordered Rector to comply with sex offender 
registration requirements for fifteen years.  The court found 
Rector ineligible to participate in the ERP, in relevant part 
because the offense was not a "substance abuse crime." 
¶3 
The Department of Corrections (DOC) requested the 
circuit court amend the Judgment of Conviction (JOC) because it 
believed Wis. Stat. § 301.45(5)(b)1. required Rector to register 
as a sex offender for life.  The circuit court denied the motion 
to amend the JOC, determining that § 301.45(5)(b)1. did not 
require lifetime registration because the convictions did not 
occur on "separate occasions."  The State cross-appealed the 
denial of the motion to amend. 
¶4 
Rector also filed a postconviction motion to amend the 
JOC on the basis that the court improperly determined he was not 
eligible to participate in the ERP.  The circuit court denied 
Rector's motion for two reasons: (1) the circuit court explained 
that it only authorizes eligibility to participate in the ERP 
when substance abuse "directly goes to the criminogenic factor 
that caused the crime" and that was not the case here; and (2) 
the circuit court was concerned that participation in the ERP 
could lead to release before the defendant had served the 
statutory minimum sentence.  Rector filed an appeal challenging 
the denial of his motion to amend the JOC. 
¶5 
The court of appeals certified the cross-appeal 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 because, in its view, the 
plain 
meaning 
of 
"separate 
occasions" 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 301.45(5)(b)1. appears to conflict with this court's decisions 
No. 
2020AP1213-CR   
 
4 
 
in State v. Wittrock, 119 Wis. 2d 664, 350 N.W.2d 647 (1984), 
and State v. Hopkins, 168 Wis. 2d 802, 484 N.W.2d 549 (1992).  
We 
accepted 
certification 
and 
consequently 
also 
took 
jurisdiction over Rector's appeal. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
¶6 
We begin by addressing the State's cross-appeal 
regarding 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 301.45(5)(b)1. 
and 
determine 
that 
convictions based on charges filed in a single case and 
occurring during the same hearing have not occurred on "2 or 
more separate occasions."  Therefore, the circuit court did not 
err in requiring Rector to comply with registration requirements 
for only 15 years.  We then address Rector's appeal and 
determine that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise 
its discretion in finding Rector ineligible to participate in 
the ERP. 
A.  Sex Offender Registration Requirements 
¶7 
When a person is ordered to comply with sex offender 
registration 
requirements, 
Wisconsin's 
statutes 
offer 
two 
options for how long those requirements extend——15 years or 
until the offender's death.  Wisconsin Stat. § 301.45(5)(a) 
governs when a person must comply with registration requirements 
for 15 years, and § 301.45(5)(b) governs when a person must 
comply for life.  Sections 301.45(5)(b)1., 1m., and 2. require 
lifetime registration when applicable criteria are met.  Section 
301.45(5)(b)3. gives a circuit court discretion to otherwise 
order lifetime registration.  We note that this opinion does not 
address § 301.45(5)(b)3., and as such it does not affect a 
No. 
2020AP1213-CR   
 
5 
 
circuit 
court's 
discretion 
to 
otherwise 
order 
lifetime 
registration. 
¶8 
We must interpret Wis. Stat. § 301.45(5)(b)1. to 
determine whether a person who has been convicted on multiple 
counts of possession of child pornography filed within a single 
case and whose convictions occurred during the same hearing must 
comply with the sex offender registration requirements for life.  
This is a question of statutory interpretation that we review de 
novo.  State v. Forrett, 2022 WI 37, ¶5, 401 Wis. 2d 678, 974 
N.W.2d 422. 
¶9 
In addressing Wis. Stat. § 301.45(5)(b)1., we first 
discern its plain meaning based on the language and context of 
the statute.  We next address this court's prior decisions in 
Wittrock and Hopkins, which interpreted similar language in Wis. 
Stat. § 939.62, and explain why those decisions do not dictate 
our interpretation of § 301.45(5)(b)1. in this case. 
1.  The Plain Meaning of Wis. Stat. § 301.45(5)(b)1. 
¶10 "Statutory interpretation begins with the language of 
the statute.  If the meaning of the statute is plain, we 
ordinarily stop the inquiry."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. 
for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 
(quotations omitted).  In discerning plain meaning, we use the 
"common, ordinary, and accepted meaning" of words and give 
"technical 
or 
specially-defined 
words 
or 
phrases" 
their 
"technical or special definitional meaning."  Id.  Both context 
and structure of a statute are important to meaning, and 
No. 
2020AP1213-CR   
 
6 
 
"[s]tatutory language is read where possible to give reasonable 
effect to every word, in order to avoid surplusage."  Id., ¶46. 
¶11 Wisconsin Stat. § 301.45(5)(b)1. reads:  
(b) A person who is covered under sub. (1g)(a), (b), 
(bm), (c), (d), (dd), (dp) or (e) shall continue to 
comply 
with 
the 
[sex 
offender 
registration] 
requirements of this section until his or her death if 
any of the following applies: 
1. The person has, on 2 or more separate occasions, 
been convicted or found not guilty or not responsible 
by reason of mental disease or defect for a sex 
offense, or for a violation or the solicitation, 
conspiracy or attempt to commit a violation, of a 
federal law, a military law, a tribal law or a law of 
any state that is comparable to a sex offense. 
We are asked to determine what it means to be convicted "on 2 or 
more separate occasions."4  The State argues that a person meets 
the criteria of being convicted "on 2 or more separate 
occasions" when that person has been convicted of two or more 
offenses.  Rector argues that a person fails to meet the 
criteria of being convicted "on 2 or more separate occasions" 
when that person is convicted based on charges filed in a single 
case, and the convictions occur during the same hearing.  
According to Rector, the State's interpretation of the statute 
reads out the phrase "separate occasions" altogether.  We agree 
with Rector that the plain and unambiguous meaning of the phrase 
"separate occasions," given the context of § 301.45(5)(b)1., 
means that convictions based on charges filed in a single case 
                                                 
4 The parties do not dispute that Rector was convicted of a 
sex offense, which is defined to include "a violation . . . of 
s. . . . 948.12."  Wis. Stat. § 301.45(1d)(b). 
No. 
2020AP1213-CR   
 
7 
 
and occurring during the same hearing do not constitute 
convictions on "separate occasions." 
¶12 We begin by defining the phrase "separate occasions."  
"Separate" means "set or kept apart: disunited."  Separate, The 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1645 (3d 
ed. 1992).  An "occasion" is "an event or a happening; an 
incident"; or a "time at which an event occurs."  Occasion, The 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1250 (3d 
ed. 1992).  Taken together, a separate occasion is an incident 
or time at which an event occurred, which is set apart from 
another incident or time at which a different event occurred.   
¶13 The relevant portion of Wis. Stat. § 301.45(5)(b)1. 
says that a person must comply with registration requirements 
until his or her death if "[t]he person has, on 2 or more 
separate 
occasions, 
been 
convicted . . . for 
a 
sex 
offense . . . ."  It is clear from the sentence structure that 
the "2 or more separate occasions" phrase is modifying the 
conviction for a sex offense rather than the commission of a sex 
offense.  The statute refers to one who has "been convicted" for 
a sex offense on separate occasions rather than one who "has 
committed" a sex offense on separate occasions.  Furthermore, 
the 
statute 
is 
generally 
focused 
on 
various 
possible 
dispositions of a case——referencing conviction, a finding of not 
guilty or not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect, 
a reversed conviction, or a reversed finding of not guilty or 
not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect——rather 
than making any reference to the details surrounding the 
No. 
2020AP1213-CR   
 
8 
 
commission of an offense.  As such, a person must comply with 
registration requirements for life if the event of conviction 
occurred at two or more separate (set apart) times. 
¶14 Given the above framework, we must determine whether 
the convictions in this case——which were filed in a single case 
and occurred during the same hearing——constitute convictions on 
"separate occasions."  The common understanding and use of the 
phrase 
"separate 
occasions" 
makes 
clear 
that 
Rector's 
convictions fall outside the scope of § 301.45(5)(b)1.   
¶15 Rector offers an illustrative example of the common 
usage of separate occasions in his briefing: if a person goes to 
the store and buys two apples, one right after the other, have 
they purchased apples on two separate occasions?  No.  Clearly, 
the transactions happened on one occasion.  Conversely, if a 
person said they purchased apples on two separate occasions, it 
is evident that the apple-purchaser took two trips to the store. 
¶16 The 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
also 
recently 
considered the ordinary meaning of the word "occasion" in Wooden 
v. United States, determining that "occasion" commonly refers to 
an "event, occurrence, happening, or episode" which "may itself 
encompass multiple, temporally distinct activities."  142 S. Ct. 
1063, 1069 (2022).  The Court offered the occasion of a wedding, 
which often includes a ceremony, cocktail hour, dinner, and 
dancing, as an example of one occasion with various activities 
that take place at different times.  Id.  In the context of 
criminal behavior, the Court held that an "occasion" "may, in 
common usage, include temporally discrete offenses."  Id. at 
No. 
2020AP1213-CR   
 
9 
 
1070.  More specifically the court determined that, "[Wooden's] 
one-after-another-after-another burglary of ten units in a 
single storage facility occurred on one 'occasion.'"  Id. at 
1069.  The United States Supreme Court's analysis is, of course, 
not binding on this court in matters of state statutory 
interpretation, but the analysis is a persuasive example of the 
common understanding of the term "occasion." 
¶17 Wisconsin Stat. § 301.45(5)(b)1.'s use of the term 
"separate" 
to 
modify 
"occasions" 
further 
assists 
us.  
Convictions that are filed in a single case and pronounced 
within the same hearing are not significantly "set apart" or 
"disunited," and so are not "separate occasions."  On the 
contrary, when a court pronounces convictions from the same case 
in a single hearing, those convictions are united by both 
temporal proximity and by the same case filing.  
¶18 Given the common and ordinary understanding of the 
phrase "separate occasions" as shown through examples and 
dictionary definitions, we hold that Rector's convictions did 
not take place on "separate occasions."  Like different apples 
purchased during the same trip to the store, or different 
activities occurring at the same wedding, Rector's multiple 
convictions occurred during the same "occasion." 
¶19 In contrast, the State fails to offer any textual 
reading which gives effect to the phrase "separate occasions."  
The State reads the statute as if it required a person to comply 
with lifetime registration if that "person has twice been 
convicted."  But the statute actually reads if a "person has, on 
No. 
2020AP1213-CR   
 
10 
 
2 or more separate occasions, been convicted . . . ."  By 
ignoring "separate occasions" the State renders it surplusage.  
However, "[s]tatutory language is read where possible to give 
reasonable effect to every word, in order to avoid surplusage."  
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  The legislature used the phrase 
"separate occasions."  We must attempt to give effect to every 
word, and as such, we hold that when a person is convicted based 
on charges filed in a single case during the same hearing, then 
those convictions have not occurred on "separate occasions."5  
2.  Wittrock, Hopkins, and Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2) 
¶20 Although the meaning of the statute is clear from its 
text, the State 
argues that our reading of Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.45(5)(b)1. should be informed by this court's prior 
interpretation of the term "separate occasions" in the context 
of the criminal repeater statute, § 939.62(2), which reads as 
follows:  
The actor is a repeater if the actor was convicted of 
a 
felony 
during 
the 
5-year 
period 
immediately 
preceding the commission of the crime for which the 
actor presently is being sentenced, or if the actor 
was convicted of a misdemeanor on 3 separate occasions 
during that same period, which convictions remain of 
record and unreversed. 
                                                 
5 The facts of this case——where Rector's convictions were 
filed in a single case and occurred during the same hearing——
provide a sufficient basis to determine that the convictions did 
not occur on separate occasions.  We leave for another day 
whether or not convictions that only meet one of those two 
conditions have occurred on separate occasions. 
No. 
2020AP1213-CR   
 
11 
 
We addressed the term "occasions" within this criminal repeater 
statute in two cases: State v. Wittrock, 119 Wis. 2d 664 and 
State v. Hopkins, 168 Wis. 2d 802. 
¶21 In the first case, Wittrock was sentenced as a 
repeater after pleading guilty to misdemeanor charges and having 
previously been convicted of three misdemeanors within the 
preceding five years.  Wittrock, 119 Wis. 2d at 665.  Wittrock 
had been convicted of two of his prior misdemeanors on the same 
day during the same hearing, although the conduct that gave rise 
to 
each 
conviction 
occurred 
on 
separate 
days 
and 
was 
indisputably not part of the same course of conduct.  Id. at 
666.  Wittrock argued that the phrase "convicted of a 
misdemeanor on 3 separate occasions" required three separate 
court appearances in order to qualify as a repeater.  Id.  The 
court ultimately disagreed and affirmed Wittrock's sentence.  
Id. 
¶22 The court in Wittrock determined that the word 
"occasion," 
as 
used 
within 
§ 939.62, 
was 
ambiguous, 
and    
defined 
the 
plain 
meaning 
of 
"occasion" 
as 
"happening, 
incident."  Id. at 670-71 (quoting Webster's New Collegiate 
Dictionary 794 (1977)).  Then, with little analysis of the 
surrounding words of the statute, the court held that the term 
is ambiguous in the context of the repeater statute because the 
"incident" referred to could be either the "incident" of the 
commission of the crime or the "incident" of conviction.  Id.  
Determining the language to be ambiguous, the court then looked 
to legislative intent——and particularly the legislative history 
No. 
2020AP1213-CR   
 
12 
 
and purpose of the repeater statute——as was an accepted approach 
to statutory interpretation at the time.6  Id. at 671.  The court 
turned to a law review article which recapped the author's 
involvement on the advisory committee which worked on the 1949 
revisions to the criminal code, including relevant revisions to 
the criminal repeater statute.  Id. at 671-73 (referencing 
William A. Platz, The 1949 Revision of the Wisconsin Code of 
Criminal Procedure, 1950 Wis. L. Rev. 28).  The court also 
reviewed the 1949 committee comment on the repeater statute.  
Id. at 673.  The court concluded that both sources reflected the 
committee's intent to shift focus from prior sentences onto 
prior crimes and to focus on the quantity of crimes rather than 
the time of conviction.  Id. at 673-74. 
¶23 Finally, the court determined that the purpose of 
repeater statutes, "[r]egardless of the particular phraseology," 
"is to serve as a warning to first offenders.  Id. at 675.  The 
infliction of more severe punishment for a repeater is based 
upon his persistent violation of the law after conviction for 
previous infractions."  Id. (quoting State v. Midell, 40 Wis. 2d 
516, 527, 162 N.W.2d 54 (1968)).  The court determined that the 
legislative history and purpose of the statute were not 
consistent with a reading of the term "occasion" which referred 
to the timing of the conviction.  Id. at 673-74.  As a result, 
                                                 
6 We have since clarified that, "[j]udicial deference to the 
policy choices enacted into law by the legislature requires that 
statutory interpretation focus primarily on the language of the 
statute."  See State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 
2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  
No. 
2020AP1213-CR   
 
13 
 
the court concluded that convictions for misdemeanors within the 
same hearing, but based on criminal activity that occurred 
independent of each other and on separate days, were convictions 
on "separate occasions."  Id.  The court explicitly left open 
the question of whether convictions based on criminal activity 
committed as part of the same course of conduct constitute 
convictions on "separate occasions."  Id. at 668. 
¶24 In Hopkins, the court addressed the question left open 
in Wittrock: whether multiple misdemeanors committed within the 
same course of conduct constituted convictions on "separate 
occasions" under the repeater statute.  Hopkins, 168 Wis. 2d at 
805-08.  The court held that the ambiguous term "occasion" 
referred to the number of the defendant's convictions and not to 
the criminal acts giving rise to such convictions.  Id. at 805, 
807-10.  The court in Hopkins again relied heavily on the 
underlying purpose of the repeater statute.  Id. at 811-13. 
¶25 While the operation of the criminal repeater statute 
appears to be settled,7 it does not follow that such operation is 
                                                 
7 The legislature made changes to Wis. Stat. § 939.62 at 
various times since this court's decisions in Wittrock and 
Hopkins and did not make any changes to the "separate occasions" 
language, indicating possible legislative acquiescence in the 
court's interpretation within the context of that statute.  See 
Estate of Miller v. Storey, 2017 WI 99, ¶51, 378 Wis. 2d 358, 
903 N.W.2d 759 ("legislative inaction in the wake of judicial 
construction of a statute indicates legislative acquiescence").  
The concurrence/dissent misfires when it attacks the 
majority for pointing out inconsistencies in the Wittrock and 
Hopkins 
decisions 
without 
overruling 
those 
cases.  
Concurrence/dissent, ¶85.  We reiterate that this case is not 
about whether to overrule Wittrock and Hopkins but whether we 
No. 
2020AP1213-CR   
 
14 
 
necessarily transposed onto the sex offender registration 
statute.  Prior interpretation by this court may be helpful in a 
plain meaning analysis when the court has defined a legal term 
of art or addressed the context of a closely related statute.8  
See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶45-46.  This is sometimes referred 
to 
as 
the 
"prior-construction" 
canon 
of 
statutory 
interpretation.  See Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortg. Corp., 580 U.S. 
82, 95-96 (2017).  However, the court's decisions in Wittrock 
and Hopkins do not dictate our decision in this case for three 
reasons: (1) Wittrock and Hopkins were not merely defining the 
term "occasion" but analyzing what the term referred to in the 
unique context of the criminal repeater statute; (2) neither 
"occasions" nor "separate occasions" are terms of art; and (3) 
Wisconsin's sex offender registration statute, 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.45, and criminal repeater statute, § 939.62, are not so 
closely related as to dictate a singular usage of the term.  We 
more fully explain each of these reasons in turn. 
a.  Context and Legislative History 
¶26 The court in Wittrock was not grappling with the plain 
meaning of the term "occasion" in isolation.  Rather the court 
                                                                                                                                                             
should extend those cases' interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 939.62 
to a different statute. 
8 The 
concurrence/dissent 
confusingly 
claims 
that 
the 
majority opinion "holds, at least implicitly, that prior 
construction 
is 
irrelevant 
to 
plain 
meaning."  
Concurrence/dissent, ¶56.  On the contrary, we explicitly 
recognize that prior-construction is relevant to plain meaning 
in certain circumstances. 
No. 
2020AP1213-CR   
 
15 
 
was determining what the term "occasion" meant within the 
context 
of 
the 
criminal 
repeater 
statute. 
 
The 
court's 
dictionary 
definition 
of 
the 
term 
"occasion"——"happening, 
incident"——is consistent with the definition we present above.  
Wittrock, 119 Wis. 2d at 670 (quoting Webster's New Collegiate 
Dictionary 794 (1977)).  The bulk of Wittrock's analysis 
attempts to discern whether "occasion" refers to the incident of 
the commission of the crime or the incident of conviction.  Of 
import, any analysis in Wittrock where we tried to resolve the 
ambiguity of "occasion" is irrelevant here since we recognize 
that "occasion" in Wis. Stat. § 301.45(5)(b)1. unambiguously 
refers to the incident of conviction. 
¶27 Additionally, the Wittrock analysis focuses on the 
legislative history and purpose of the criminal repeater 
statute, which is entirely different than the legislative 
history and purpose of the sex offender registration statute.  
As to the sex offender registration statute's legislative 
history, the State argues that there are three documents 
relevant to our analysis: (1) a DOC report in the statute's 
drafting file, (2) a DOC fiscal estimate for the statute, and 
(3) a Legislative Council memorandum discussing a related, but 
different statute.  We decline to give much weight to these 
sources.  These three sources are less persuasive than the 
Wittrock sources——a law review article penned by a drafter of 
the statute and a committee comment——because they differ in 
No. 
2020AP1213-CR   
 
16 
 
form, authorship, and clarity with which they demonstrate 
legislative intent.9  We consider each source in turn. 
¶28 First, the DOC report is not a reliable indicator of 
legislative intent.  Legislators are not bound to follow, or 
even consider, a DOC report when drafting and enacting a 
statute.  Additionally, the DOC report does not comment on the 
meaning of "separate occasions."   
¶29 The other two pieces of legislative history are 
equally unenlightening.  A DOC fiscal estimate references "two 
or more separate sexual assault convictions" and a Legislative 
Council memorandum references a situation where a person "has 
committed crimes . . . on two or more occasions."  DOC, Fiscal 
Estimate – 1995 Session for 1995 Wis. S.B. 182 (May 25, 1995); 
Wis. Legis. Council Staff, Information Memorandum 96-18 3 (July 
12, 1996).  Not only do these two sources appear to work against 
each other, with one source referencing convictions and the 
other the commission of crimes, but more importantly, neither 
source reflects or addresses the language actually implemented 
in Wis. Stat. § 301.45(5)(b)1.  At bottom, these three sources 
fail to illuminate our reading of the statute.   
                                                 
9 Perhaps recognizing the significant differences between 
the three sources in this case and the sources in Wittrock, the 
concurrence/dissent contends that one might draw reasonable 
inferences from the three proffered sources that are "analogous" 
to 
the 
inferences 
drawn 
by 
this 
court 
in 
Wittrock.  
Concurrence/dissent, ¶101.   The concurrence/dissent argues we 
should be bound to the history-based interpretation in Wittrock 
because of those analogous inferences.  This proposition runs 
contrary to this court's customary approach to statutory 
interpretation. 
No. 
2020AP1213-CR   
 
17 
 
¶30 In 
summary, 
the 
portions 
of 
Wittrock——and 
by 
extension, Hopkins——that are inconsistent with our analysis are 
all based on considerations that are irrelevant or inapplicable 
in the current context.  Although the legislative history in 
Wittrock may have clarified the intent of the legislature 
regarding the criminal repeater statute, the legislative history 
of Wis. Stat. § 301.45(5)(b)1. offers no analogous level of 
clarity.  
b.  Terms Of Art 
¶31 Neither 
Wittrock 
nor 
Hopkins 
treated 
the 
term 
"occasion" or the phrase "separate occasions" as a legal term of 
art.  A phrase can at times take on a specialized meaning that 
differs from its common, ordinary meaning, becoming a term of 
art.10  If a phrase has taken on a specialized legal meaning, 
then this court should attempt to discern that specialized 
meaning, and prior judicial interpretations of the same phrase 
can be a helpful tool in discerning that specialized meaning.11  
                                                 
10 A term of art is "[a] word or phrase having a specific, 
precise meaning in a given specialty, apart from its general 
meaning in ordinary contexts."  Term of Art, Black's Law 
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). 
11 See Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1) ("All words and phrases shall 
be construed according to common and approved usage; but 
technical words and phrases and others that have a peculiar 
meaning in the law shall be construed according to such 
meaning."); see also Mueller v. TL90108, LLC, 2020 WI 7, ¶19, 
390 Wis. 2d 34, 938 N.W.2d 566 ("The statutes themselves do not 
define the relevant terms.  However, the [relevant] statutory 
terms . . . are technical phrases with specific and distinct 
meaning in our common law, and we therefore give them their 
accepted legal meaning."). 
No. 
2020AP1213-CR   
 
18 
 
The Wittrock and Hopkins courts considered the word "occasion" 
ambiguous in the context of the repeater statute and sought to 
define the ordinary meaning within that context, primarily by 
looking to the legislative history and purpose of the statute.  
We likewise believe the phrase "separate occasions" is not a 
legal term of art, but should be given its plain, ordinary 
meaning.  Because the phrase is not a legal term of art, it is 
of limited value for us to look to a case that defines the same 
phrase but does so under a different statute and pays particular 
attention to the legislative history and purpose of that 
statute.12 
c.  Closely Related Statutes 
¶32 Finally, Wis. Stat. § 301.45(5)(b)1. is not so closely 
related to § 939.62(2) that the court must interpret all words 
and phrases in a singular way to avoid confusion or absurd 
results.  This represents the primary point of contention 
between 
our 
reading 
of 
the 
statute 
and 
the 
concurrence/dissent's. 
 
Both 
the 
State 
and 
the 
concurrence/dissent rely on the prior-construction canon to say 
                                                 
12 The concurrence/dissent appears to claim that any word or 
phrase that has been authoritatively construed in a particular 
context becomes a legal term of art that must forevermore be 
given that construction.  Concurrence/dissent, ¶67.  This court 
has never defined the concept of a legal term of art that 
broadly and doing so would severely limit the legislature's 
ability to use common language in its common and ordinary sense.  
Putting that aside, we emphasize that the definition of 
"occasion" that we employ is consistent with the definition used 
in Wittrock and Hopkins.  Neither case offers a separate 
technical definition for the phrase "separate occasions" that we 
could apply in this case. 
No. 
2020AP1213-CR   
 
19 
 
that the interpretations of Wittrock and Hopkins should be 
incorporated into Wis. Stat. § 301.45(5)(b)1.  The prior-
construction canon is an articulation of the principle that when 
a particular phrase has been given authoritative construction by 
the 
courts, 
it 
is 
to 
be 
understood 
according 
to 
that 
construction.  Although this principle is at its strongest when 
the court is interpreting a reenactment of the same statute, it 
has also been applied to interpretations of related statutes——
although, as the concurrence/dissent concedes, "with less 
force."  See concurrence/dissent, ¶66 (quoting Antonin Scalia & 
Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 
322).13 
¶33 We begin by acknowledging that members of this 
majority have previously voiced their position that canons of 
construction are tools in a toolbox of statutory interpretation 
and should not be seen as inflexible rules of construction that 
override the plain meaning of otherwise unambiguous statutes.14  
This position hardly "degrades" or "demeans" the canons, as 
supporters 
of 
their 
use 
have 
spoken 
similarly. 
 
See 
concurrence/dissent, ¶¶80, 82; See also, e.g., Neil M. Gorsuch, 
Lecture, Of Lions and Bears, Judges and Legislators, and the 
                                                 
13 Despite this concession, the concurrence/dissent charges 
ahead, applying the canon with full force in this case.  In 
fact, that opinion relies so heavily on this single canon that 
it fails to engage in a plain meaning analysis of the words of 
the text beyond application of the canon. 
14 See James v. Heinrich, 2021 WI 58, ¶76, 397 Wis. 2d 517, 
960 N.W.2d 350 (Dallet, J., dissenting). 
No. 
2020AP1213-CR   
 
20 
 
Legacy of Justice Scalia, 66 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 905, 917 
(2016) (referring to the use of canons as "judges pull[ing] from 
the same toolbox"). 
¶34 In this case, however, we need not debate the general 
usefulness of canons of construction because even viewed as the 
concurrence/dissent presents, the prior-construction canon does 
not aid in our analysis here for two reasons.  First, no single 
canon of construction will always take precedence over all other 
principles of construction.15  And second, the canon does not 
govern in this case.  Absent the use of a "term of art," the 
prior-construction canon only governs if the different statutes 
at issue are "closely related."  On this point everyone appears 
to agree.  See concurrence/dissent, ¶¶94, 107.   
¶35 "Statutes are closely related when they are in the 
same chapter, reference one another, or use similar terms."  
State v. Reyes Fuerte, 2017 WI 104, ¶27, 378 Wis. 2d 504, 904 
N.W.2d 773.  Here the two statutes do not fit the definition of 
closely related.  It is undeniable that the two statutes reside 
in different chapters governing different subject matter.  There 
are no cross references between § 301.45 and § 939.62, and the 
statutes do not rely on each other or otherwise interact.   
                                                 
15 In fact, there is a canon for that——the "Principle of 
Interrelating Canons," which suggests that "[n]o canon of 
interpretation is absolute.  Each may be overcome by the 
strength 
of 
differing 
principles 
that 
point 
in 
other 
directions."  See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: 
The Interpretation of Legal Texts 59. 
No. 
2020AP1213-CR   
 
21 
 
¶36 The State insists that since both statutes reference 
convictions on "separate occasions," they use "similar terms" 
and are thus closely related.16  We disagree because the 
legislature's limited use of general terms is hardly enough on 
its own to make the statutes closely related.   
¶37 As an illustrative example, contrast this case with 
the related statutes in Bragdon v. Abbott, in which The United 
States Supreme Court applied the prior-construction canon.  524 
U.S. 624 (1998).  Bragdon interpreted the provision of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) which defines disability 
as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits 
one or more of the major life activities of such individual."  
See id. at 630.  In interpreting that definition, the Court 
looked to how courts and agencies had applied the definition of 
"handicapped individual" in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.  Id. 
at 631.  The court noted that the entire definition in the ADA 
"is drawn almost verbatim" from the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.  
Id.  Furthermore, the ADA included a statutory provision 
directing that "nothing in this chapter shall be construed to 
apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under Title V 
                                                 
16 The concurrence/dissent also says that "the justification 
for applying the canon seems particularly strong when the phrase 
at 
issue 
seldom 
appears 
in 
the 
Wisconsin 
statutes."  
Concurrence/dissent, ¶94.  This statement appears entirely 
unsupported by any authority on the prior-construction canon and 
the opinion fails to explain why this would be so. 
No. 
2020AP1213-CR   
 
22 
 
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973" which created a direct link 
between those Acts.17  Id. at 631-32. 
¶38 There is no such direct link between the sex offender 
registration statute and the criminal repeater statute.  Each 
uses the phrase "separate occasions," but the surrounding 
structure and language of each statute is far from identical.  
For example, Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2) looks to "the 5-year period 
immediately preceding the commission of the crime for which the 
actor presently is being sentenced," while § 301.45(5)(b)1. does 
not include a time period and does not refer separately to the 
current conviction, but simply looks to whether a person "has, 
on two or more separate occasions, been convicted."18  Unlike the 
ADA in Bragdon, which not only included a nearly identical 
definition from the Rehabilitation Act, but also directly 
referenced that same act, nothing about the language used in 
Wis. Stat. § 301.45(5)(b)1. indicates that the legislature 
looked to or copied Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2).  
                                                 
17 See also United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 
2319, 2329 (2019) where the Court applied a consistent meaning 
to terms used in two statute's definitions of "crime of 
violence."  Both statutes were within the criminal code and the 
definitions 
had 
"almost 
identical" 
language. 
 
Id. 
 
The 
referenced definitions shared over 25 identical consecutive 
words. 
18 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.62(2) also uses the language "which 
convictions 
remain 
of 
record 
and 
unreversed," 
while 
§ 301.45(5)(b)1. uses different language to accomplish a similar 
end, and provides that "[a] conviction or finding of not guilty 
or not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect that 
has been reversed, set aside or vacated is not a conviction or 
finding for purposes of determining . . . whether a person has 
been convicted on 2 or more separate occasions."   
No. 
2020AP1213-CR   
 
23 
 
¶39 The primary link between the two statutes is their 
practical application, namely that both statutes may be relied 
upon during the sentencing of a criminal defendant.  And 
although the phrase "separate occasions" will be applied 
differently 
depending 
on 
whether 
the 
defendant 
is 
being 
sentenced as a criminal repeater under § 939.62(2) or is being 
required 
to 
comply 
with 
registration 
requirements 
under 
§ 301.45(5)(b)1., any inconsistency or confusion is outweighed 
by the clear and plain meaning of § 301.45(5)(b)1.   
¶40 Even in its strongest form, the prior-construction 
canon merely creates a presumption that the legislature intended 
to incorporate the court's prior interpretation of a word or 
phrase in closely related statutes.  But that presumption is not 
meant to counteract our oft-quoted principle that "statutory 
language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning" 
and "if the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop 
the inquiry."  See State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane 
Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.19  The 
presumption is meant to add clarity, not sow confusion.  In 
other words, fundamentally, we must presume that the legislature 
means what it says.  See Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. 
Co., 2009 WI 27. ¶14 n.9, 316 Wis. 2d 47, 767 N.W.2d 652.  
                                                 
19 One might also find an articulation of this principle in 
the 
"ordinary-meaning 
canon," 
which 
Scalia 
and 
Garner 
characterize 
as 
"the 
most 
fundamental 
semantic 
rule 
of 
interpretation."  See Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at 69. 
No. 
2020AP1213-CR   
 
24 
 
¶41 Given that Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.45(5)(b)1. does not 
require Rector to comply with registration requirements for life 
because he was convicted of five offenses all within a single 
case and during the same hearing, and thus was not convicted on 
"2 or more separate occasions," the circuit court did not err 
when it required registration for only 15 years. 
B.  Rector's Crimes 
¶42 Having explained our reasoning and dispensed with the 
counter arguments, we should be done with our analysis.  
However, before concluding, we are compelled to respond to the 
concurrence/dissent's accusations charging that this opinion 
omits the details of the images found in Rector's possession and 
in doing so both "trivializes heinous crimes against children" 
and ignores the statutory purpose of public protection.  See 
concurrence/dissent, ¶¶57, 107.  Neither accusation holds water.  
This opinion omits the details of the images not to trivialize 
Rector's crimes but rather because the seriousness of Rector's 
crimes is irrelevant to the question of statutory interpretation 
before us.  As to the statutory purpose, we attempt to honor 
that purpose by deferring to the legislature's policy decisions 
as expressed in the words of the statute. 
¶43 In cases such as this, which involve serious criminal 
conduct perpetrated against innocent and vulnerable victims, 
attorneys and judges must balance the need for addressing the 
facts of the case with the victim's interest in privacy, 
sensitivity, and respect.  Achieving this balance can be 
challenging.  Undoubtedly, there are cases where a description 
No. 
2020AP1213-CR   
 
25 
 
of an assault is relevant and significant to the question at 
issue.  Clearly, this is not that case.  Here we are faced with 
a straight-forward question of statutory interpretation.  As 
such, the details of the content of the images discovered in 
Rector's possession are irrelevant.  Instead, the only relevant 
facts are the circumstances surrounding Rector's convictions, as 
sufficiently detailed in this opinion.20 
¶44 There is no disagreement in this case that Rector's 
crimes were serious.  The statutory language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.45(5)(b)1., however, does not hinge on whether this court 
concludes that Rector's crimes were serious.  It is undisputable 
that all sex offenses covered by the sex offender registration 
statutory scheme are heinous in nature, thus necessitating the 
use of the registry for the protection of the public.  However, 
within that scheme, the legislature, not this court, made policy 
decisions regarding which offenders are categorically required 
to comply with registration requirements for life and which are 
required to comply for 15 years.21  Our job is to faithfully 
interpret the words of the statute in order to discern the 
                                                 
20 Conversely, an example of a legal question that may 
necessitate some description of the assaults is if we were asked 
to determine if the content of the images constituted child 
pornography.  It is undisputed in this case that the images 
constitute child pornography. 
21  In addition to requiring lifetime registration for those 
convicted of a sex offense on two or more separate occasions, 
Wis. Stat. § 301.45(5)(b)1m. also lists specific crimes for 
which a single violation requires the offender to comply with 
registration requirements for life.  Possession of child 
pornography could have been, but was not, included on that list. 
No. 
2020AP1213-CR   
 
26 
 
legislature's policy choice, not to impose our own policy 
choices. 
¶45  Nonetheless, our colleagues accuse this opinion of 
endangering "some of the most vulnerable members of the public."  
Concurrence/dissent, ¶99.  That is simply not the case.  
Importantly, nothing in this opinion undermines the ability of a 
circuit court to order an offender to comply with registration 
requirements for life, even if the offender is not otherwise 
required by the statutes to register for longer than fifteen 
years under Wis. Stat. § 301.45(5)(b)3.  Said differently, this 
opinion does not give any sex offender blanket protection from 
lifetime registration.   
¶46 In Rector's case, the State did not ask the circuit 
court to order that Rector comply with registration requirements 
for life under § 301.45(5)(b)3.  The State only requested 
lifetime registration under § 301.45(5)(b)1., and that is the 
only legal question we address today.  It is irresponsible to 
suggest that we are endangering vulnerable members of the public 
by narrowly addressing the legal issue before us.  
C.  Eligibility For The Earned Release Program 
¶47 We now turn to Rector's appeal challenging the circuit 
court's finding that Rector was ineligible to participate in the 
ERP.  We review the circuit court's sentencing decision to deny 
a defendant participation in the ERP for an erroneous exercise 
of discretion.  Wis. Stat. § 973.01(3g) ("the court shall, as 
part of the exercise of its sentencing discretion, decide 
whether the person being sentenced is eligible or ineligible to 
No. 
2020AP1213-CR   
 
27 
 
participate in the earned release program.").  A court has 
erroneously exercised its discretion if it imposes sentence 
"without the underpinnings of an explained judicial reasoning 
process," State v. Loomis, 2016 WI 68, ¶30, 371 Wis. 2d 235, 881 
N.W.2d 749 (quoting McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 278, 182 
N.W.2d 512 (1971)), or if it holds a "predisposition . . . so 
specific or rigid so as to ignore the particular circumstances 
of the individual offender."  State v. Ogden, 199 Wis. 2d 566, 
573, 544 N.W.2d 574 (1996). 
¶48 Rector argues that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion because it employed a "preconceived 
policy of sentencing that is 'closed to individual mitigating 
factors.'" 
 
Id. 
at 
571 
(quoting 
State 
v. 
Martin, 
100 
Wis. 2d 326, 327, 302 N.W.2d 58 (Ct. App. 1981)). 
¶49 In Ogden, we remanded for resentencing because the 
circuit court denied the defendant Huber release22 for child care 
purposes based on an impermissible preconceived sentencing 
policy.  Id. at 572.  The circuit court stated that it did not 
allow Huber privileges for child care except in "extreme 
circumstances" because "number one, it is all too often abused.  
Somebody becomes real interested in a child only after they have 
been sentenced to jail . . . ."  Id.  Thus, the circuit court in 
Ogden not only espoused a preconceived sentencing policy, but 
used generalized references to the likelihood of abuse and other 
                                                 
22 Huber release grants leave privileges to county jail 
prisoners for purposes such as employment, healthcare, attending 
to family needs, and more.  See Wis. Stat. § 303.08. 
No. 
2020AP1213-CR   
 
28 
 
defendants' past involvement with their children to justify its 
decision 
rather 
than 
assessing 
the 
defendant's 
specific 
relationship and involvement with her child and her likelihood 
of abusing Huber privileges. 
¶50  The record before us is distinguishable from Ogden.  
In this case, the circuit court set forth a sentencing policy 
that 
inherently 
relied 
on 
individualized 
factors——namely, 
whether substance abuse goes "to the criminogenic factor that 
caused the crime."  The circuit court went on to explain: "So if 
there's an operating while intoxicated case or maybe a domestic 
violence case in which alcohol was used or in some way, shape[,] 
or form the substance abuse was the reason for the crime."  The 
circuit court explicitly explained that it approves eligibility 
for the ERP if substance abuse "was a reason for the crime" but 
"[i]n this case it's a possession of child pornography."  This 
is sufficient to show that the circuit court was not "closed to 
individual mitigating factors."   Id. at 571.  The court simply 
found that Rector's individual mitigating factors did not 
warrant eligibility in the ERP.  The circuit court did not 
erroneously 
exercise 
its 
discretion 
by 
denying 
Rector 
eligibility for participation in the ERP.  Because we affirm the 
circuit court's decision on these grounds, we do not address the 
circuit court's other grounds for denying eligibility. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶51 We affirm the circuit court's order denying the 
State's request to amend the JOC as Wis. Stat. § 301.45(5)(b)1. 
does 
not 
require 
that 
Rector 
comply 
with 
registration 
No. 
2020AP1213-CR   
 
29 
 
requirements until his death.  Rector's five convictions for 
possession of child pornography were filed in a single case and 
occurred during the same hearing.  Consequently, the convictions 
did not occur on separate occasions.  We also affirm the circuit 
court's order denying Rector's request to amend the JOC as the 
circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
 
No.  2020AP1213-CR.rgb 
 
1 
 
 
¶52 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring in part, 
dissenting in part).   
Where once certain words in an Act of Parliament have 
received a judicial construction in one of the 
Superior Courts, and the Legislature has repeated them 
without any alteration in a subsequent statute, I 
conceive that the Legislature must be taken to have 
used them according to the meaning which a Court of 
competent jurisdiction has given to them. 
Ex Parte Campbell, (1870) L.R. 5 Ch. App. 703, 706 (Eng.). 
¶53 The primary issue in this case turns on the meaning of 
the phrase "2 or more separate occasions."  Under Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.45(5)(b)1. (2019–20)1 ("the repeat sex offender statute"), 
a person who has "been convicted" of "a sex offense" on "2 or 
more separate occasions" must register as a sex offender for 
life.  Corey T. Rector was convicted of five sex offenses, 
stemming from the same case.  The State argues each conviction 
constitutes a "separate occasion," requiring Rector to register 
as a sex offender for life.  Rector contends convictions entered 
in close temporal proximity or in the same case are not 
"separate occasions."  The majority erroneously rejects the 
State's construction in favor of Rector's. 
¶54 The prior-construction canon readily resolves this 
issue.  See generally Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading 
Law:  The Interpretation of Legal Texts 322 (2012).  Under this 
canon, when judicial constructions "have settled the meaning of 
an existing statutory provision, repetition of the same language 
                                                 
1 Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent references to the 
Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019–20 version. 
No.  2020AP1213-CR.rgb 
 
2 
 
in 
a 
new 
statute" 
addressing 
similar 
subject 
matter 
presumptively incorporates these constructions.  See Bragdon v. 
Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 645 (1998) (citing Lorillard v. Pons, 434 
U.S. 575, 580–81 (1978)).  Shortly before the enactment of the 
repeat sex offender statute, and in an analogous context, this 
court held multiple convictions each constitute a "separate 
occasion," even if the convictions occur in the same case or 
stem from the same course of conduct.  State v. Hopkins, 168 
Wis. 2d 802, 805, 484 N.W.2d 549 (1992); see also State v. 
Wittrock, 119 Wis. 2d 664, 666, 350 N.W.2d 647 (1984).  This 
background informs a reasonable person's understanding of the 
language in the repeat sex offender statute.  See State v. 
Yakich, 
2022 
WI 8, 
¶35, 
400 
Wis. 2d 549, 
970 
N.W.2d 12.  
Applying the canon, this court should hold Rector was convicted 
of "a sex offense" on "2 or more separate occasions"; therefore, 
he is required to register as a sex offender for life.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 301.45(5)(b)1.   
¶55 Application 
of 
the 
prior-construction 
canon 
is 
supported by other indicators of meaning.  Its application is 
consistent with a statutorily defined purpose of the sex-
offender registry.  See Wis. Stat. § 301.001 (explaining one 
purpose of the registry is to protect the public); see also 
Scalia 
& 
Garner, 
Reading 
Law, 
at 
217 
("A . . . purpose 
clause . . . is a permissible indicator of meaning.").  Its 
application is also consistent with this court's decision in 
State ex rel. Kaminski v. Schwarz a few years after the 
enactment of the repeat sex offender statute.  See 2001 WI 94, 
No.  2020AP1213-CR.rgb 
 
3 
 
¶33 n.8, 245 Wis. 2d 310, 630 N.W.2d 164.  Additionally, 
extrinsic sources confirm this plain-meaning analysis.  See 
James v. Heinrich, 2021 WI 58, ¶26, 397 Wis. 2d 517, 960 
N.W.2d 350 
(explaining 
extrinsic 
sources 
are 
sometimes 
considered to confirm a plain-meaning analysis (citing State ex 
rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶51, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110)).   
¶56 The majority commits at least three errors that cause 
it to incorrectly conclude the prior-construction canon is 
inapplicable.  First, the majority holds, at least implicitly, 
that prior construction is irrelevant to plain meaning.  Second, 
the majority insinuates the canon's application is inapposite 
because, in its view, the prior decisions on which the canon's 
application is predicated were wrongly decided——although the 
majority does not overrule them.  Lastly, the majority suggests 
the presence of trivial differences between two statutes 
presents a compelling reason to disregard the canon.  The 
majority is wrong on each count.  I respectfully concur in part 
and dissent in part.2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶57 The majority omits from its opinion a thorough 
description of the facts, dismissing the heinous nature of 
Rector's crimes as "irrelevant" and scrapping statutory purpose 
from its purportedly plain meaning analysis.  See majority op., 
                                                 
2 The majority correctly concludes the circuit court did not 
err in denying Rector's request to participate in the Earned 
Release Program.  Accordingly, I join paragraphs 47 through 50 
of the majority opinion. 
No.  2020AP1213-CR.rgb 
 
4 
 
¶¶42–43 
(holding 
the 
seriousness 
of 
Rector's 
crimes 
is 
"irrelevant").  Contrary to the majority's position, "[i]t 
is . . . customary for any judicial opinion to relay the facts 
of the case"——sometimes even when the relevance of particular 
facts is debatable.3  Becker v. Dane County, 2022 WI 63, ¶89, 403 
Wis. 2d 424, 
977 
N.W.2d 390 
(Rebecca 
Grassl 
Bradley, 
J., 
dissenting).  Rector's crimes illustrate why the State's 
                                                 
3 Relevancy is often in the eye of the beholder.  In Doubek 
v. Kaul, we considered whether Daniel Doubek's misdemeanor 
conviction for disorderly conduct constituted a crime of 
domestic violence, thereby prohibiting him from owning a 
firearm.  2022 WI 31, 401 Wis. 2d 575, 973 N.W.2d 756.  In a 
unanimous opinion, this court concluded the crime did not, as a 
matter of law, constitute domestic violence.  Id., ¶1.  Justice 
Jill J. Karofsky opened her concurring opinion with the 
following description of the crime: 
Late in the evening on August 21, 1993, Doubek's 
estranged wife was in her home alone with their four-
year-old daughter.  While talking with her sister on 
the phone, the line suddenly went dead.  Minutes 
later, Doubek broke through the front door, punching a 
hole in the glass so he could unlock it from the 
inside.  Without his wife's permission, Doubek entered 
her home armed with a 2x4 slab of lumber.  Raising the 
2x4 above his head, he told his wife she "was dead."  
She asked her husband to leave and then went to the 
door, yelling out to her neighbors for help.  Doubek 
threatened that if she did not move away from the 
door, he would "let her have it."  The two eventually 
went outside to avoid waking their young daughter.  
Once outside, Doubek told his wife he did not care 
what would happen to him if he killed her, even if it 
meant he lost custody of their daughter.  About 30 
minutes later, Doubek left. 
Id., ¶23 (Karofsky, J., concurring).  Notably, Justice Karofsky 
relayed this detailed description of Doubek's crime despite the 
impossibility of preserving the victims' anonymity.  Doubek's 
estranged wife and daughter were identified publicly.  Justice 
Karofsky 
acknowledged 
the 
majority 
opinion 
was 
"legally 
correct," rendering her entire opinion unnecessary.  Id., ¶25.   
No.  2020AP1213-CR.rgb 
 
5 
 
proffered interpretation is consistent with the statutory 
purpose of protecting the public——particularly children.  See 
infra Section III.A. 
¶58 In 2018, the National Center for Missing and Exploited 
Children reported to the Wisconsin Department of Justice that 
Rector, a middle-aged man, may possess child pornography.  
Police executed a search warrant at Rector's home, and, as the 
majority notes, "[t]he State . . . seiz[ed] over 1,000 offending 
images and videos in Rector's possession."4  Majority op., ¶2.  
The State contextualizes Rector's crimes in its opening brief: 
[T]en 
videos 
contained 
graphic 
and 
disturbing 
recordings of child pornography with multiple sexual 
assaults of children, including:  (1) an adult male 
having anal intercourse with a prepubescent female; 
(2) an adult male having sexual intercourse with a 
prepubescent female; (3) an adult male appearing to 
perform oral sex on a female toddler; (4) an adult 
male performing oral sex on a prepubescent female's 
anus and the child performing oral sex on the adult; 
(5) a bondage recording of a naked prepubescent female 
performing oral sex on an adult male with the child 
bound in rope and wearing a leather collar; (6) a 
prepubescent female performing oral sex on an adult 
male with the child spitting out ejaculation fluid; 
(7) a prepubescent female performing oral sex on an 
adult male with the adult ejaculating onto the child's 
mouth and chin; (8) a nude prepubescent female rubbing 
her vagina with a toothbrush before inserting it in 
her anus; (9) a prepubescent female child masturbating 
her vaginal and anus area; and (10) a pubescent female 
exposing her breast, vagina, and anus to the camera. 
Rector himself——not his attorney——told the circuit court he 
"wasn't the one who was violating" the dignity of the children 
                                                 
4 Given its definition of relevancy, it is unclear why the 
majority notes the State "seiz[ed] over 1,000 offending images 
and videos."  Rector was charged with ten offenses and convicted 
of five.  See majority op., ¶2 & n.2. 
No.  2020AP1213-CR.rgb 
 
6 
 
in these videos because he was not the one performing the sexual 
assaults.5 
 
Rector 
acknowledged 
merely 
that 
he 
"possibly . . . re-victimized" them "even though they don't 
know" that he possessed the videos.   
¶59 The State charged Rector with ten counts of possession 
of child pornography contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 948.12(1m), 
(3)(a), and 939.50(3)(d) (2017–18).  As the majority notes, the 
parties agree that possession of child pornography is a "sex 
offense" for the purpose of sex-offender registration.  Majority 
op., ¶11 n.4 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 301.45(1d)(b) (2021–22)).  
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Rector pled guilty to five counts, 
and the other five counts were dismissed.  The State agreed not 
to issue additional charges related to materials discovered 
during the same search and to dismiss a separate, unrelated 
matter.  During the plea colloquy, Rector was asked for his plea 
to each count individually.  After Rector said "guilty" for the 
fifth time, the circuit court accepted his pleas, found Rector 
"guilty . . . in Counts 1 through 5," and entered the judgment 
of conviction. 
¶60 At the sentencing hearing, the circuit court asked 
whether sex-offender registration was required.  The prosecutor 
was unsure, so the court relied on a pre-sentence investigation 
report, which recommended registration for 15 years.  The court 
accepted this recommendation.  The court also sentenced Rector 
                                                 
5 The Honorable Jason A. Rossell, Kenosha County Circuit 
Court, presided. 
No.  2020AP1213-CR.rgb 
 
7 
 
to eight years of initial confinement and ten years of extended 
supervision on each count to be served concurrently. 
¶61 The Department of Corrections (DOC) later moved the 
circuit court to amend the judgment of conviction to require 
Rector to register as a sex offender for life.  The DOC 
explained lifetime registration was required under the repeat 
sex offender statute because Rector was convicted of multiple 
sex 
offenses 
and 
each 
conviction 
constituted 
a 
separate 
occasion.  The DOC referenced a 2017 Attorney General opinion, 
in which the Attorney General construed the phrase "on 2 or more 
separate occasions" in Wis. Stat. § 301.46(2m)(am) (2017–18), a 
closely related statute enacted at the same time as the repeat 
sex offender statute.  See Opinion of Wis. Att'y Gen. to Jon E. 
Litscher, Sec'y of the Wis. DOC, OAG-02-17 (Sept. 1, 2017).  
Section 301.46(2m)(am) addresses circumstances under which a 
government agency is required to notify local law enforcement 
upon the release of a sex offender into the community.  The 
Attorney General concluded the number of "separate occasions" is 
"the number of convictions, including multiple convictions 
imposed at the same time and based on the same complaint."  Id., 
¶2.   
¶62 Rector objected, and the circuit court denied DOC's 
motion, reasoning Rector's sex offense convictions did not occur 
on different occasions.  The court concluded the phrase 
"separate occasions" in the repeat sex offender statute is 
ambiguous.  It then performed a "fresh analysis" to resolve the 
No.  2020AP1213-CR.rgb 
 
8 
 
ambiguity, rather than examining how this court has construed 
that phrase in an analogous statute.   
¶63 Rector appealed the circuit court's decision denying 
him eligibility for an Earned Release Program, and the State 
cross-appealed on the sex-offender registration issue.  The 
court of appeals certified the appeals to this court.  The court 
of appeals noted this court held, in a similar context, "the 
phrase 'separate occasions' . . . meant each separate conviction 
even when multiple convictions occurred in the same proceeding, 
at the same time[.]"  State v. Rector, No. 2020AP1213-CR, 
unpublished certification, at 2 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2021).  
It emphasized that if this court were to deny certification, the 
court of appeals would be "tasked with defining the same phrase" 
that this court "already defined" in two of its decisions.  Id.  
This court accepted certification.  
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶64 The State's cross-appeal requires this court to 
construe 
the 
repeat 
sex 
offender 
statute. 
 
Statutory 
construction is a question of law subject to this court's 
independent review.  See State v. McKellips, 2016 WI 51, ¶29, 
369 Wis. 2d 437, 881 N.W.2d 258 (citing Shannon E. T. v. Alicia 
M. V.M., 2007 WI 29, ¶31, 299 Wis. 2d 601, 728 N.W.2d 636). 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Application of the Prior-Construction Canon Requires Rector 
to Register as a Sex Offender for Life. 
¶65 The repeat sex offender statute provides: 
(b) 
A person who is covered under sub. (1g) (a), (b), 
(bm), (c), (d), (dd), (dp) or (e) shall continue to 
No.  2020AP1213-CR.rgb 
 
9 
 
comply with the requirements of this section until 
his or her death if any of the following applies: 
1. The 
person 
has, 
on 
2 
or 
more 
separate 
occasions, been convicted or found not guilty 
or not responsible by reason of mental disease 
or defect for a sex offense, or for a 
violation, or the solicitation, conspiracy or 
attempt to commit a violation, of a federal 
law, a military law, a tribal law or a law of 
any state that is comparable to a sex offense.  
A conviction or finding of not guilty or not 
responsible by reason of mental disease or 
defect that has been reversed, set aside or 
vacated is not a conviction or finding for 
purposes of determining under this subdivision 
whether a person has been convicted on 2 or 
more separate occasions. 
Wis. Stat. § 301.45(5)(b)1. (emphasis added). 
¶66 The State's argument is grounded in the prior-
construction canon, which holds that "[i]f a . . . phrase has 
been authoritatively interpreted by the highest court in a 
jurisdiction, . . . a later version of that act perpetuating the 
wording is presumed to carry forward that interpretation."  
Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 322.  Even more broadly, "the 
canon . . . applies (though with less force) to interpretations 
of the same wording in related statutes."  Id.; see also Shambie 
Singer, 3A Sutherland Statutes & Statutory Construction § 67:3 
n.52 (8th ed. last updated Nov. 2022) ("The prior construction 
canon of statutory interpretation teaches that if courts have 
settled the meaning of an existing provision, the enactment of a 
new 
provision 
that 
mirrors 
the 
existing 
statutory 
text 
indicates, as a general matter, the new provision has that same 
meaning."  (citing Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortg. Corp., 137 
S. Ct. 553 (2017))); Bryan A. Garner et al., The Law of Judicial 
No.  2020AP1213-CR.rgb 
 
10 
 
Precedent 
346 
(2016) 
(explaining 
"when 
a 
legislature 
incorporates provisions of an older law into a new law" after 
the older law has been construed, the new law presumptively 
receives the same construction).  As the United State Supreme 
Court stated:  "In adopting the language used in the earlier 
act, Congress 'must be considered to have adopted also the 
construction given by this Court to such language, and made it a 
part of the enactment.'"  Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 
16 (1948) (quoting Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144, 153 (1924)). 
¶67 The 
prior-construction 
canon 
stems 
from 
the 
precedential nature of common law jurisprudence:  once a phrase 
has been authoritatively construed in a particular context, it 
acquires a particular meaning in a "technical legal sense"——even 
if the phrase has a different meaning in common parlance.  
Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 324.  For example, the word 
"person" in common parlance means a "human being," but in a 
legal document, it likely also "denotes a corporation" or "other 
entity[.]"  Id. at 73.  Contrary to the majority's view, a 
phrase does not have to be a "legal term of art" prior to its 
initial construction——it becomes one through its construction.  
See, e.g., majority op., ¶25 (citing Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
¶¶45–46); see also id., ¶31.  "The bar is unquestionably 
justified in relying on a decision (even a single decision) of 
the jurisdiction's highest court regarding the meaning of a 
certain word or phrase that is repeated in a later statute."  
Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 325.  Unfortunately, "[c]ourts 
as well as advocates have been known to overlook technical 
No.  2020AP1213-CR.rgb 
 
11 
 
senses of ordinary words——senses that might bear directly on 
their decisions."  Id. at 74.  The majority opinion presents a 
prime example. 
¶68 The State discusses a different basis for the prior-
construction canon:  reasonable people "presume that the 
legislature acts with full knowledge of existing statutes and 
how the courts have interpreted them."  Mallow v. Angove, 148 
Wis. 2d 324, 330, 434 N.W.2d 839 (Ct. App. 1988) (citing C.L. v. 
Edson, 140 Wis. 2d 168, 181, 409 N.W.2d 417 (Ct. App. 1987)).  
Although this "fanciful presumption of legislative knowledge,"6 
is not the soundest basis for the canon, this court has long 
invoked it: 
All statutes are presumed to be enacted by the 
legislature with full knowledge of the existing 
condition 
of 
the 
law 
and 
with 
reference 
to 
it, . . . they are therefore to be construed in 
connection with and in harmony with the existing law, 
and as a part of a general and uniform system of 
jurisprudence, that is, they are to be construed with 
a reference to the whole system of law of which they 
form a part. 
Wis. Carry, Inc. v. City of Madison, 2017 WI 19, ¶62 n.44, 373 
Wis. 2d 543, 892 N.W.2d 233 (quoting Town of Madison v. City of 
Madison, 269 Wis. 609, 614, 70 N.W.2d 249 (1955)) (ellipsis in 
the original). 
 
¶69 The practical implications of the prior-construction 
canon are the same, at least in this case, regardless of the 
rationale for the canon:  "the meaning and effect of statutes 
are to be determined in connection, not only with the common 
                                                 
6 Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:  The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 324 (2012). 
No.  2020AP1213-CR.rgb 
 
12 
 
law, . . . and the constitution, but also with reference to 
other statutes . . . and the decisions of the courts."  Town of 
Madison, 269 Wis. at 614 (quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 362) 
(ellipses in the original). 
¶70 The State notes the phrase at issue, "2 or more 
separate occasions," is materially identical to a phrase 
appearing in another statute, Wis. Stat. § 939.62 (1991–92) 
("the repeat offender statute").  That statute enhanced the 
penalty for "repeaters."  In relevant part, it defined a 
repeater as a person "convicted of a misdemeanor on 3 separate 
occasions" during the 5-year period immediately preceding the 
commission of the crime for which the person was presently being 
sentenced.  § 939.62(2) (1991–92) (emphasis added). 
¶71 In 1984 and again in 1992, this court construed the 
phrase "3 separate occasions" in the repeat offender statute.  
In State v. Wittrock, the defendant was convicted of disorderly 
conduct in 1977.  119 Wis. 2d at 666.  In 1980, he was convicted 
of two counts of disorderly conduct in one case, stemming from 
separate events.  Id.  In 1981, he was charged with various 
crimes.  Id. at 665.  The issue was whether the two disorderly 
conduct convictions from the 1980 case constituted separate 
occasions, even though the convictions arose from one case.  Id. 
at 666–67.   
¶72 The arguments in Wittrock mirrored the arguments 
advanced in this case.  The State argued each conviction 
constituted a separate occasion.  Id. at 667.  In contrast, the 
No.  2020AP1213-CR.rgb 
 
13 
 
defendant argued "3 separate occasions" meant three separate 
court appearances.  Id.   
¶73 This court deemed "separate occasions" ambiguous, 
consulted legislative history, and considered public policy 
implications.  Id. at 671–75.  The majority in this case does 
not reconcile its holding that the phrase "separate occasions" 
is plain with this court's previous holding in Wittrock that the 
phrase is ambiguous.  At a minimum, the phrase is also ambiguous 
in the repeat sex offender statute. 
¶74 After declaring "separate occasions" ambiguous, this 
court held each disorderly conduct conviction constituted a 
separate occasion.  Id. at 674.  It explained the statute 
focuses on the "quantity of crimes," not the "time of 
conviction." 
 
Id. 
 
Accordingly, 
the 
disorderly 
conduct 
convictions were separate occasions even though they were 
adjudicated in the same case.7  Notably, this court held open 
                                                 
7 The majority suggests this court's consideration of 
"legislative intent" in Wittrock is indicative of the "accepted 
approach to statutory interpretation at the time."  Majority 
op., ¶22.  It cites no authority for this proposition, but it 
does state in a footnote, "[w]e have since clarified that, 
'[j]udicial deference to the policy choices enacted into law by 
the legislature requires that statutory interpretation focus 
primarily on the language of the statute.'"  Id., ¶22 n.6 
(quoting State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 
WI 58, 
¶44, 
271 
Wis. 2d 633, 
681 
N.W.2d 110) 
(second 
modification in the original).   
Reality is more nuanced.  At the time Wittrock was decided, 
"ascertainment of legislative intent" was "the frequently-stated 
goal of statutory interpretation," but "our cases generally 
adhere[d] to a methodology that relie[d] primarily on intrinsic 
sources of statutory meaning and confine[d] resort to extrinsic 
sources of legislative intent to cases in which the statutory 
language 
[wa]s 
ambiguous." 
 
Kalal, 
271 
Wis. 2d 633, 
¶43 
No.  2020AP1213-CR.rgb 
 
14 
 
whether convictions for crimes constituting a single course of 
conduct qualify as separate occasions.  Id. at 668.   
¶75 In State v. Hopkins, the defendant argued he was not a 
repeater because the conduct underlying two of his three prior 
convictions stemmed from events occurring on the same day.  168 
Wis. 2d at 807.  Specifically, the defendant was arrested for 
possession of cocaine and then gave officers a false name.  Id.  
He was convicted of both possession of cocaine and obstructing 
an officer.  Id.  Following reasoning similar to Wittrock's, 
this court held the defendant was a repeater because "[t]he 
'occasion' referred to in the statute is the occasion of 
conviction for each of the three crimes.  Thus, all that is 
required by the statute is that a defendant be convicted of 
three misdemeanors within the five-year period."  Id. at 805.  
                                                                                                                                                             
(citations omitted).  Additionally, the test for ambiguity 
employed in Wittrock is effectively the same test this court 
currently employs.  Compare id., ¶47 ("The test for ambiguity 
generally keeps the focus on the statutory language:  a statute 
is ambiguous if it is capable of being understood by reasonably 
well-informed persons in two or more senses."  (citations 
omitted)), with State v. Wittrock, 119 Wis. 2d 664, 669–70, 350 
N.W.2d 647 (1984) ("This court has often stated that the 
threshold question to be addressed by this court when construing 
a statute is whether the statutory term is ambiguous.  A 
statutory term is deemed ambiguous if reasonable persons could 
disagree as to its meaning.  However, whenever a case such as 
this reaches the court, it naturally follows that the parties 
will obviously disagree as to the term's meaning.  The court, 
then, will look to the language of the statute itself to 
determine whether well-informed persons should become confused 
as to a term's meaning.  Primary recourse is to statutory 
language itself.  When this court looks at the language utilized 
in . . . [the repeat offender statute] the statute must be 
interpreted on the basis of the plain meaning of its terms."  
(citations omitted)). 
No.  2020AP1213-CR.rgb 
 
15 
 
Accordingly, "each conviction for a misdemeanor constitutes a 
separate occasion[.]"  Id.  This court emphasized that "it is 
the number of convictions that is important rather than when the 
crimes were committed."8  Id.  
 
¶76 The State argues 
Wittrock and Hopkins construed 
"separate 
occasions" 
to 
have 
a 
particular 
meaning, 
and 
reasonable people understand the repetition of that phrase in 
related and subsequently enacted statutes to bear the same 
                                                 
8 In Hopkins, this court rejected a surplusage argument 
nearly identical to the surplusage rationale the majority 
adopts.  See majority op., ¶¶11, 19.  As this court explained: 
[The defendant] next contends that this court is bound 
by his interpretation of the statute by [the rule 
that] . . . [s]tatutes should be construed so that 
effect 
is 
given 
to 
each 
word . . . . 
 
[The 
defendant's] argument . . . is that a finding that a 
person can be a repeater based on two or more 
misdemeanors arising out of a single course of conduct 
renders 
surplusage 
the 
phrase 
"on 
3 
separate 
occasions."  [The defendant] . . . maintains that if 
the legislature had intended that the number of prior 
convictions would define a repeater, its use of the 
phrase "on 3 separate occasions" was unnecessary.  The 
legislature could have merely said "convicted of 3 
misdemeanors." 
. . . . 
[W]e disagree that our interpretation fails to give 
effect to every word in the statute.  In this opinion, 
we have concluded that each entry of conviction 
against a defendant constitutes a separate occasion 
for purposes of the repeat offender statute.  Thus, 
contrary to . . . [the defendant's] assertions, our 
interpretation of the statute gives meaning to the 
phrase "on 3 separate occasions." 
State v. Hopkins, 168 Wis. 2d 802, 813–14, 484 N.W.2d 549 
(1992).  The majority does not reconcile its surplusage 
rationale with Hopkins. 
No.  2020AP1213-CR.rgb 
 
16 
 
meaning.  Wittrock and Hopkins therefore collectively inform how 
a reasonable person interprets the repeat sex offender statute, 
considering 
these 
cases 
were 
decided 
shortly 
before 
the 
enactment of that statute.  Specifically, Wittrock was decided 
in 1984 and Hopkins in 1992.  In 1995, the court of appeals 
applied the rule articulated in these cases.  See State v. 
Koeppen, 195 Wis. 2d 117, 126 n.4, 536 N.W.2d 386 (Ct. App. 
1995) ("A conviction of a misdemeanor on three separate 
occasions only requires convictions of three prior misdemeanors, 
not three separate court appearances."  (citing Wittrock, 119 
Wis. 2d at 674)).  In mid-1996, the repeat sex offender statute 
and its companion, Wis. Stat. § 301.46(2m)(am), were created by 
the same act, and both statutes use the phrase "separate 
occasions."  1995 Wis. Act 440, §§ 72, 75.  Given this timing, 
the State emphasizes "[u]nder . . . [the prior-construction] 
canon[,] . . . 'separate occasions' receives its accepted legal 
meaning 
under 
the 
Wittrock-Hopkins 
interpretation." 
 
A 
discussion of this series of events is conspicuously absent from 
the majority opinion, which treats the repeat sex offender 
statute as if it were enacted before Wittrock and Hopkins. 
 
¶77 In contrast, Rector rejects the prior-construction 
canon.  Rector seems to take issue with the very idea that prior 
construction is relevant to plain meaning.  He also seems to 
argue Wittrock and Hopkins were wrongly decided, theorizing this 
court over-relied on legislative history.  Additionally, he 
argues the canon is inapplicable because the cases construed, in 
his view, a materially different statute.   
No.  2020AP1213-CR.rgb 
 
17 
 
 
¶78 Instead of applying the prior-construction canon, 
Rector primarily argues that multiple convictions occur on the 
same occasion unless they are separated by a temporal lapse.  He 
quotes an abrogated Seventh Circuit decision:  "the term 
'occasion' incorporates a temporal distinction, 
i.e., one 
occasion cannot be simultaneous with another."   United States 
v. Hudspeth, 42 F.3d 1015, 1023 n.16 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc), 
abrogated on other grounds by Shepard v. United States, 544 
U.S. 13 (2005).  At points, Rector suggests the issue is not so 
much timing as whether the convictions result from the same 
underlying case.   
¶79 The prior-construction canon resolves this case.  In 
Wittrock and Hopkins, this court authoritatively construed the 
phrase "separate occasions."  In Wittrock, this court held that 
two convictions adjudicated in the same case constitute separate 
occasions.  119 Wis. 2d at 666.  Similarly, in Hopkins, this 
court held convictions for two crimes committed in close 
temporal 
proximity 
constitute 
separate 
occasions: 
 
"The 
'occasion' referred to in the statute is the occasion of 
conviction for each of the three crimes.  Thus, all that is 
required by the statute is that a defendant be convicted of 
three misdemeanors within the five-year period."  168 Wis. 2d at 
805.  Shortly after Hopkins, the legislature used the phrase 
"separate 
occasions" 
in 
another 
statute 
governing 
repeat 
offenders:  the repeat sex offender statute.  Applying the 
prior-construction canon, each of Rector's five sex offense 
No.  2020AP1213-CR.rgb 
 
18 
 
convictions 
constitutes 
a 
separate 
occasion, 
even 
though 
Rector's pleas were accepted during the same court proceeding.   
¶80 Contrary to Rector's argument, the prior-construction 
canon is relevant to plain meaning but the majority degrades its 
utility.  See Majority op., ¶20 (declaring "the meaning of the 
statute is clear from its text" and only after that declaration 
considering the State's prior-construction argument); see also 
id., ¶9 ("[W]e first discern . . . [the repeat sex offender 
statute's] plain meaning based on the language and context of 
the 
statute. 
 
We 
next 
address 
this 
court's 
prior 
decisions . . . and explain why those decisions do not dictate 
our interpretation . . . in this case.").   
¶81 Although the majority admits "[p]rior interpretation 
by this court may be helpful in a plain meaning analysis," its 
analysis eschews the canon altogether.  See id., ¶25 (citing 
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶45–46).  For example, it holds 
Wittrock is "irrelevant" because, in the majority's view, the 
repeat sex offender statute is "unambiguous[]," but that 
reasoning incorrectly presumes the prior-construction canon 
applies only to resolve an ambiguity.  Id., ¶26.  The majority 
says the canon is at odds with "our oft-quoted principle that 
'statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted 
meaning[.]'"  Id., ¶40 (quoting Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45).  
By truncating the principle espoused in Kalal, the majority 
misrepresents that case, which actually reads:  "Statutory 
language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, 
except that technical or specially-defined words or phrases are 
No.  2020AP1213-CR.rgb 
 
19 
 
given their technical or special definitional meaning."  Kalal, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45 (citations omitted). 
¶82 In other cases, some members of the majority have 
demeaned the canons of construction as mere tools in a 
"toolbox"——"extrinsic source[s]," the utility of which is 
limited to "clearing up confusing or ambiguous text."  James, 
397 Wis. 2d 517, ¶23 n.12 (quoting the dissent).  Previously, 
this court unequivocally rejected this view.  Id. (noting some 
justices' 
disparagement 
of 
the 
canons 
exposes 
a 
"[f]undemental[] . . . misunderstand[ing of] how to interpret 
legal texts").  The denigration of traditional canons for 
interpreting legal texts infects the majority opinion.   
¶83 Like many other canons, prior construction is a source 
of plain meaning, having been applied by "the best legal 
thinkers . . . for centuries."  Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 
xxix.  Common law jurisdictions throughout the world have 
applied the prior-construction canon for a long time.  See, 
e.g., 
Campbell, 
5 
Ch. 
App. 
at 
706. 
 
Its 
conventional 
application, over a long period, makes it an intrinsic source.  
"Neither written words nor the sounds that the written words 
represent have any inherent meaning.  Nothing but convention and 
contexts cause a symbol or sound to convey a particular idea."  
Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at xxvii.  The prior-construction 
canon is part of "a generally agreed-on approach to the 
interpretation of legal texts."  Id.  It and other canons are 
"helpful, neutral guides," "grounded in experience developed by 
reason and tend to a better administration of justice than 
No.  2020AP1213-CR.rgb 
 
20 
 
leaving interpretation in each case to feelings of policy on the 
part of the tribunal[.]"  Id. at 61 (quoting 3 Roscoe Pound, 
Jurisprudence 506 (1959)).  The majority's "marginalization" of 
this well-established canon "flies in the face of centuries of 
jurisprudence" and is "far outside of the judicial mainstream."  
See James, 397 Wis. 2d 517, ¶23 n.12. 
¶84 The majority also demonstrates a misunderstanding of 
the prior-construction canon by adopting Rector's attack on the 
reasoning of Wittrock and Hopkins.  See, e.g., majority op., ¶22 
("[W]ith little analysis of the surrounding words of the 
statute, the court held that the term is ambiguous[.]"); id., 
¶25 n.7 (explaining the majority intends to "point[] out 
inconsistencies in the Wittrock and Hopkins decisions").  Even 
assuming the cases were wrongly decided, they changed the 
background against which the repeat sex offender statute was 
enacted.  The legislature presumptively relied on these cases, a 
point reasonable people expect to inform legal meaning.  The 
legislature is not required to predict which of this court's 
cases may someday be overturned.  
¶85 The majority stops short of overturning Wittrock and 
Hopkins despite insinuating they were wrongly decided, creating 
inconsistency in the law——a prime reason to discard a decision.  
See State v. Roberson, 2019 WI 102, ¶50, 389 Wis. 2d 190, 935 
N.W.2d 813 (explaining this court can overturn precedent if 
"there is a showing that the precedent has become detrimental to 
coherence and consistency in the law" (quoting Bartholomew v. 
Wis. Patients Comp. Fund & Compcare Health Servs. Ins., 2006 WI 
No.  2020AP1213-CR.rgb 
 
21 
 
91, ¶33, 293 Wis. 2d 38, 717 N.W.2d 216)).  The majority offers 
no principled reason——none——to justify why the number of 
occasions is calculated differently in two statutes using the 
same phrase in analogous contexts.  The majority claims the 
repeat offender statute is "unique," but the majority's mere 
declaration does not make it so.  See Majority op., ¶25.  
Limiting cases to their facts without justification is not legal 
reasoning. 
¶86 The majority claims "any inconsistency or confusion" 
stemming from its holding "is outweighed by the clear and plain 
meaning" of the repeat sex offender statute.  Id., ¶39; see also 
id., ¶30 ("In summary, the portions of Wittrock——and by 
extension, Hopkins——that are inconsistent with our analysis are 
all based on considerations that are irrelevant or inapplicable 
in 
the 
current 
context."). 
 
This 
reasoning 
erroneously 
presupposes that prior construction is irrelevant to plain 
meaning.  Applying the canon would preserve plain meaning and 
prevent a wholly unnecessary inconsistency.  See Scalia & 
Garner, Reading Law, at 324.  The canon recognizes that a 
precedential construction imbues a phrase with meaning it might 
otherwise not have.  By disregarding the canon, the majority 
fosters incoherence and complexity while spawning confusion.  
See Barrass v. Aberdeen Steam Trawling & Fishing Co., [1933] 
A.C. 402, 412 (Eng.) (explaining the prior-construction canon is 
"a salutary rule and one necessary to confer upon Acts of 
Parliament that certainty which, though it is often lacking, is 
always to be desired").   
No.  2020AP1213-CR.rgb 
 
22 
 
¶87 Notwithstanding the conflict created by its decision 
in this case, the majority declines to overturn Wittrock and 
Hopkins because the meaning of the phrase "separate occasions" 
in the repeat offender statute "appears to be settled[.]"  
Majority op., ¶25.  The majority presumes the legislature has 
"possibl[y]" "acquiesce[d]" to the Wittrock-Hopkins construction 
because the legislature has made changes to the repeat offender 
statute since those cases were decided "and did not make any 
changes to the 'separate occasions' language[.]"  Id., ¶25 n.7 
(citing Estate of Miller v. Storey, 2017 WI 99, ¶51, 378 
Wis. 2d 358, 903 N.W.2d 759).  The majority then holds that just 
because the meaning "appears to be settled [in the repeat 
offender statute], it does not follow that such operation is 
necessarily transposed onto the . . . [repeat sex offender] 
statute."  Id., ¶25.  Whatever illegitimate theory the majority 
invokes to support its creation of legal inconsistency cannot 
justify its decision to mutate fixed meaning in a closely 
related statute.   
¶88 The irony of upholding Wittrock and Hopkins based on 
legislative acquiescence is totally lost on the majority.  
According to the majority, the fixed meaning of a statute can 
change 
if 
this 
court 
misconstrues 
the 
statute 
and 
the 
legislature, over some undefined period, does not amend the text 
to correct the error.  Although the conventional application of 
the misguided doctrine would conclude legislative acquiescence 
confirms the holdings of Wittrock and Hopkins, the majority 
disagrees with the analysis in each case.  The majority does not 
No.  2020AP1213-CR.rgb 
 
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explain how the fixed meaning of a statute can change based on 
its text remaining unchanged.  See Estate of Miller, 378 
Wis. 2d 358, ¶99 (Kelly, J., concurring/dissenting).  The 
Wisconsin Constitution sets forth procedures for changing the 
law.  Absent from them is any manner by which a law can be, in 
effect, 
amended 
through 
legislative 
inaction. 
 
Unlike 
legislative acquiescence, prior construction is premised on an 
event prior to a law's enactment imbuing a phrase used in the 
law with meaning.  Legislative acquiescence is premised on a 
non-event——the mere passage of time——changing a law's fixed 
meaning.   
¶89 The 
majority 
professes 
inaction 
can 
imbue 
a 
misconstrued statute with a new meaning.  If the majority is 
correct, surely this court's construction of a phrase could also 
imbue meaning into that phrase when it is later used in a new 
statute.  In fact, to conclude that when the legislature does 
not act, it is making a reasoned decision to endorse a 
particular construction is much more suspect than to suppose the 
legislature considers the definitive construction of a phrase by 
the state's highest court when it uses that phrase in a new 
statute. 
 
See 
id., 
¶97 
("[A]ttributing 
significance 
to 
legislative inaction depends on an overweening, court-centric 
view of our relationship to the other branches of government.  
If this interpretive device is to function, it requires a belief 
that the legislature carefully attends to everything we say, 
rigorously compares our pronouncements to its own understanding 
of the statutory corpus, compiles a list of disagreements, and 
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privileges corrective measures over everything else on its 
crowded legislative calendar.").  A legislative drafter is 
obviously interested in the legislation being construed in 
accordance with the drafter's expectations, and for that reason, 
drafters often consider how phrases have been construed by 
courts.  See Wisconsin Bill Drafting Manual § 2.03(2)(a) (2023–
24) (advising drafters at the Legislative Reference Bureau to 
consider whether a word or phrase is defined "in case law"). 
¶90 Rector's argument that the statutes are materially 
different, which the majority adopts, is patently wrong.  As the 
majority notes, both the repeat sex offender statute and the 
repeat 
offender 
statute 
"may 
be 
relied 
upon 
during 
the 
sentencing of a criminal defendant"——and specifically, a repeat 
offender.  See Majority op., ¶39.  Contradicting itself, the 
majority declares the only similarity between the statutes lies 
in their use of the same language.  Id., ¶36 ("[T]he 
legislature's limited use of general terms is hardly enough on 
its own to make the statutes closely related.").  While the 
majority insists these statutes are sufficiently dissimilar to 
reject the prior-construction canon, its description of these 
alleged differences is particularly opaque.  
¶91 "[W]hen a statute uses the very same terminology as an 
earlier statute——especially in the very same field, such as 
securities law or civil—rights law——it is reasonable to believe 
that the terminology bears a consistent meaning."  Scalia & 
Garner, Reading Law, at 323.  "One might even say that the body 
of law of which a statute forms a part——especially if that body 
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has been codified——is part of the statute's context."  Id.; see 
also Strenke v. Hogner, 2005 WI 25, ¶28, 279 Wis. 2d 52, 694 
N.W.2d 296 ("A statute must be interpreted in light of the 
common law and the scheme of jurisprudence existing at the time 
of its enactment."  (citing State v. Hansen, 2001 WI 53, ¶19, 
243 Wis. 2d 328, 627 N.W.2d 195)).  Notably, the United States 
Supreme Court rejected the trivial-differences approach the 
majority employs.  See United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. __, 139 
S. Ct. 2319, 2329 (2019) (citing Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 
U.S. 478, 484 (1990)). 
¶92 The repeat sex offender statute uses the "very same 
terminology"——"separate 
occasions"——as 
the 
repeat 
offender 
statute and both statutes deal with similar subject matter.  
Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 323.  That one states "2 or 
more separate occasions" and the other "3 separate occasions" is 
irrelevant.  See State v. Anderson, 2014 WI 93, ¶41, 375 
Wis. 2d 337, 851 N.W.2d 760 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting) ("I 
start with the statutes, the one governing . . . [not guilty by 
reason 
of 
insanity] 
and 
the 
other 
governing 
involuntary 
intoxication.  The two are closely related.  They have 
distinctive features but also share certain legal similarities; 
violation of each might be proven by similar facts.").  In one 
treatise on statutory construction, examples of similar subject 
matters 
are 
discussed 
at 
a 
high 
level 
of 
generality:  
"securities law or civil—rights law[.]"  Scalia & Garner, 
Reading Law, at 323.  The two statutes in this case are part of 
the same body of law.  The purpose of both is self-evidently to 
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protect the public from repeat offenders and both impact 
sentencing. 
¶93 The majority contradicts its own reasoning that the 
statutes are different by holding the similarity in language 
between the statutes is immaterial because "separate occasions" 
was not a legal term of art at the time it was construed in 
Wittrock.  See Majority op., ¶31.  The question, though, is not 
whether "separate occasions" had or has an accepted meaning in 
common parlance but whether this court's precedent changes that 
otherwise accepted meaning in a particular context.  It 
obviously does.    
¶94 The phrase "separate occasions" is not especially 
common in the Wisconsin statutes.  Statutes can be closely 
related based on "similar" phraseology and subject matter, and 
the justification for applying the canon seems particularly 
strong when the phrase at issue seldom appears in the Wisconsin 
statutes.  Compare State v. Reyes Fuerte, 2017 WI 104, ¶27, 378 
Wis. 2d 504, 904 N.W.2d 773 ("Statutes are closely related when 
they are in the same chapter, reference one another, or use 
similar terms.  Being within the same statutory scheme may also 
make two statutes closely related."  (citation omitted)), with 
majority op., ¶35 ("It is undeniable that the two statutes 
reside in different chapters governing different subject matter.  
There are no cross references between . . . [the two statutes], 
and the statutes do not rely on each other or otherwise 
interact."). 
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¶95 Aside from the repeat sex offender statute, its 
companion, Wis. Stat. § 301.46(2m)(am), and the repeat offender 
statute, the phrase appears in only three other statutes, one of 
which imposes a penalty enhancer for certain repeat domestic 
abusers.  See Wis. Stat. § 939.621(1)(b) (defining as a 
"domestic abuse repeater" any "person who, during the 10-year 
period immediately prior to the commission of the crime for 
which the person is presently being sentenced if the convictions 
remain of record and unreversed, was convicted on 2 or more 
separate occasions of a felony or a misdemeanor for which a 
court imposed a domestic abuse surcharge under s. 973.055 (1), a 
felony or a misdemeanor for which a court waived a domestic 
abuse surcharge pursuant to s. 973.055 (4), or a felony or a 
misdemeanor that was committed in another state but that, had it 
been committed in this state, would have subjected the person to 
a domestic abuse surcharge under s. 973.055 (1) or that is a 
crime of domestic abuse under the laws of that state" (emphasis 
added)); Wis. Stat. § 939.22(21) (defining a "[p]attern of 
criminal gang activity" in the Wisconsin Criminal Code); Wis. 
Stat. § 174.02(3)(a)1. (defining the circumstances under which a 
court may order a dog killed).  In the six statutes in which the 
phrase "separate occasions" appears, four protect the public 
from repeat offenders.  The majority, therefore, is wrong to 
suggest "separate occasions" is a "general term[.]"  See 
Majority op., ¶36 ("[T]he legislature's limited use of general 
terms is hardly enough on its own to make the statutes closely 
related.").   
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28 
 
 
¶96 Application of the prior-construction canon is also 
consistent with a textually-expressed purpose of the sex-
offender registry, which the majority disregards:  Protecting 
the public, and particularly children.  See Wis. Stat. § 301.001 
("The purposes of this chapter and chs. 302 to 304 are to 
prevent delinquency and crime by an attack on their causes; to 
provide a just, humane and efficient program of rehabilitation 
of offenders; and to coordinate and integrate corrections 
programs with other social services.  In creating the department 
of corrections, chs. 301 to 304, the legislature intends that 
the state continue to avoid sole reliance on incarceration of 
offenders 
and 
continue 
to 
develop, 
support 
and 
maintain 
professional community programs and placements.").  Textually-
expressed purpose is a legitimate indication of plain meaning.  
See Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 217. 
 
¶97 The 2017 Attorney General opinion examined the purpose 
of the sex-offender registry, and specifically, of Wis. Stat. 
§ 301.46.  The Attorney General noted § 301.46 "reflects the 
Legislature's concern with offenders' potential danger to the 
public.  The number of convictions, not court proceedings, best 
measures that risk."  OAG-02-17, ¶14; see also Kaminski, 245 
Wis. 2d 310, ¶41 (explaining the purpose of the act creating the 
repeat sex offender statute was "to protect the public and 
assist law enforcement" and "related to community protection" 
(quoting State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶¶21–22, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 
605 N.W.2d 199)).  A person convicted of multiple sex offenses 
is no less dangerous than he would otherwise be solely because 
No.  2020AP1213-CR.rgb 
 
29 
 
the convictions occurred in the same case.  See OAG-02-17, ¶15.  
Perhaps a person who is convicted of a sex offense and later 
commits a second sex offense is more dangerous than someone 
convicted of two sex offenses in one case because the person 
clearly did not use the first conviction as an opportunity for 
rehabilitation.  The majority does not, however, require the 
commission of an offense to take place after the first 
conviction.  The majority does not hold that a person who 
commits crimes after already having been convicted is a 
repeater.  Instead, the majority holds that a person convicted 
at two different times and in two different proceedings is a 
repeater, while a person convicted of multiple offenses close in 
time during one proceeding is not.  That holding is not required 
by the text of the statute and is divorced from the statutory 
purpose. 
 
¶98 The majority does not reconcile its dangerous holding 
with the dangerous problem the legislature addressed in the 
repeat sex offender statute.  As the State notes:   
[S]uppose . . . [a 
person 
other 
than 
Rector] 
downloaded child pornography to his home computer in 
County X and later that same day to his cellphone 
while in County Y.  Under this scenario, the State may 
charge this other person in two counties that may 
result in convictions in different courts on different 
days. 
According to the State, "[i]t is absurd that the two defendants 
face such differing periods of sex offender registration and 
reporting."  Although the State misunderstands the extraordinary 
No.  2020AP1213-CR.rgb 
 
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facts necessary to deem a result legally absurd,9 the logical 
implications of Rector's interpretation should give the majority 
pause in light of the sex-offender registry's purpose.  Rector 
is no less dangerous than the hypothetical sex offender in the 
State's scenario, yet the majority's holding places him on the 
registry for a much shorter period.  The majority's holding 
invites strategic pleading by the State; the majority would have 
required Rector to register as a sex offender for life had the 
prosecutor simply brought one count in one case and the 
remaining counts in another, with the cases being adjudicated on 
different days.  The majority's holding creates peculiar 
distinctions between similarly situated defendants. 
 
¶99 Rector possessed vile, evil imagery of children being 
sexually abused; having his crimes adjudicated in a single case 
does not mitigate the danger he poses.  Even assuming Rector and 
others like him have a "low" risk of reoffending——a point 
emphasized in an amicus brief by the State Public Defender——
three 
justices 
of 
this 
court 
have 
previously 
explained:  
"[P]arents of young children should ask themselves whether they 
should worry that there are people in their community who have 
'only' a 16 percent or an 8 percent probability of molesting 
young children——bearing in mind the lifelong psychological scars 
that such molestation frequently inflicts."10  State v. C.G., 
                                                 
9 See generally Secura Supreme Ins. v. Estate of Huck, 2023 
WI 21, 406 Wis. 2d 297, 986 N.W.2d 810 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, 
J., dissenting) (discussing the legal principle of absurdity). 
10 The study cited in the amicus brief found six percent of 
sex offenders reoffended by committing another sex offense over 
a 15-year period.  Joseph R. Tatar II & Anthony Streveler, Sex 
No.  2020AP1213-CR.rgb 
 
31 
 
2022 WI 60, ¶42, 403 Wis. 2d 229, 976 N.W.2d 318 (lead op.) 
(quoting Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 933–34 (7th Cir. 2016)).  
The majority impermissibly erases the statutory purpose of the 
sex-offender registry by constructing a rule removing Rector 
from the registry earlier than the law requires, apparently 
because the prosecutor used an efficient method to prosecute the 
multiple crimes Rector committed.  The majority's decision 
thereby endangers some of the most vulnerable members of the 
public. 
¶100 In contrast, application of the prior-construction 
canon would give effect to the statutory purpose of the sex-
offender registry while remaining consistent with this court's 
post-enactment precedent.  In 2001, this court unanimously cited 
Wis. Stat. § 301.46(2m) as requiring "DOC . . . to provide the 
police chief or sheriff with bulletins regarding any registrant 
who is about to be released from confinement if the registrant 
has been convicted of two or more sex offenses, or has been 
committed under Wis. Stat. Ch. 980."  Kaminski, 245 Wis. 2d 310, 
¶33 n.8.  This court equated convictions on "2 or more separate 
                                                                                                                                                             
Offender 
Recidivism 
After 
Release 
from 
Prison 
5 
(2015), 
https://doc.wi.gov/DataResearch/RecidivismReincarceration/Sexual
OffenderRecidivismReport.pdf.  The study utilized DOC's rather 
narrow definition of "sexual recidivism":  "Following an episode 
of incarceration with the WI DOC, to commit a sex offense that 
results in a new conviction and sentence to WI DOC custody or 
supervision."  Id. at 4.  This definition is problematic because 
many sex offenses do not result in a conviction.  See State v. 
Johnson, 2023 WI 39, ¶79, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __ (Karofsky, 
J., concurring) ("[A]ccording to data from the U.S. Department 
of Justice, as much as 86 percent of child sexual abuse may go 
unreported altogether."  (citing Dean G. Kilpatrick et al., 
Youth Victimization:  Prevalence and Implications 6 (2003))). 
No.  2020AP1213-CR.rgb 
 
32 
 
occasions" with convictions for "two or more sex offenses[.]"  
Id.  The majority silently withdraws this language from 
Kaminski, destabilizing yet another precedent.  See Friends of 
Frame Park, U.A. v. City of Waukesha, 2022 WI 57, ¶68, 403 
Wis. 2d 1, 
976 
N.W.2d 263 
(Rebecca 
Grassl 
Bradley, 
J., 
concurring) ("After the plain text of a statute, precedent is 
the most significant, the most ubiquitous, and the most powerful 
of the traditional tools of statutory construction."  (quoting 
Michael Sinclair, Traditional Tools of Statutory Interpretation 
13 (1942))).  The majority's holding cannot be reconciled with 
Kaminski. 
¶101 Extrinsic sources, referenced by the State, confirm 
the propriety of applying the prior-construction canon.11  The 
majority 
degrades 
them, 
even 
though 
it 
rationalizes 
its 
rejection of the canon because the repeat sex offender statute 
ostensibly 
carries 
an 
"entirely 
different . . . legislative 
history[.]"  Majority op., ¶27.  In a literal sense, all 
statutes have a different history, but the reasonable inferences 
that can be drawn from the legislative history of the repeat sex 
offender statute are analogous to those drawn by this court in 
Wittrock and Hopkins with regard to the repeat offender 
statute's history. 
                                                 
11 The majority insinuates this opinion elevates extrinsic 
sources above the letter of the law, but extrinsic sources 
simply confirm the plain-meaning analysis and their use for this 
purpose is well established in our jurisprudence.  Contra 
majority op., ¶27 n.9. 
No.  2020AP1213-CR.rgb 
 
33 
 
¶102 Three sources of legislative history are relevant.  A 
DOC report in the drafting file for the repeat sex offender 
statute recommended "lifetime registration requirements for any 
person convicted, or found not guilty [by reason] of mental 
disease or defect, of two (2) or more sexual offenses——repeat 
sex offenders."12  DOC, Sex Offender Community Notification:  
Proposed Program Components 6 (1994); see also id. at ii 
(recommending extending "registration requirements for repeat 
sex offenders (2 or more separate convictions) for life").  
Notably, the report uses the phrase "repeat sex offenders," 
while the word "repeater" is used throughout the repeat offender 
statute.  E.g., Wis. Stat. § 939.62(1) ("If the actor is a 
repeater . . . .").  The report, which was created before the 
                                                 
12 The majority declares this report "is not a reliable 
indicator of legislative intent.  Legislators are not bound to 
follow, or even consider, a DOC report when drafting or enacting 
a statute."  Id., ¶28.  We do not attempt to discern the 
mythical legislative "intent" underlying a statute but instead 
declare its meaning, which legislative history may be used to 
confirm.  The majority deems the law review article discussed in 
Wittrock a reliable historical source but it was published after 
the enactment of the relevant language in the repeat offender 
statute.  Obviously, it was not read by any legislators who 
voted on the matter.  See id., ¶27 (proclaiming this law review 
article a better source of legislative history). 
The majority displays a lack of familiarity with this 
court's binding precedent referencing this DOC report.  E.g., 
State ex rel. Kaminski v. Schwarz, 2001 WI 94, ¶¶53–55, 245 
Wis. 2d 310, 630 N.W.2d 164 (citing and quoting DOC, Sex 
Offender Community Notification:  Proposed Program Components 
(1994)); State v. C.G., 2022 WI 60, ¶29, 403 Wis. 2d 229, 976 
N.W.2d 318 (quoting State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶¶22, 25, 232 
Wis. 2d 561, 605 N.W.2d 199 (citing DOC, Sex Offender Community 
Notification, i, 1–2)).  The majority creates yet another 
inconsistency in the law, calling into question multiple 
decisions regarding the sex-offender registry. 
No.  2020AP1213-CR.rgb 
 
34 
 
text of the bill was drafted, is not the only source of 
legislative history to confirm the State's construction.  A DOC 
fiscal estimate (prepared after the bill's drafting) similarly 
noted the legislation would "expand[] registration time frames" 
for "individuals with two or more separate sexual assault 
convictions[.]"  DOC, Fiscal Estimate – 1995 Session for 1995 
Wis. S.B. 182 (May 25, 1995).  After enactment, an information 
memorandum prepared by the Legislative Council, in discussing 
the companion statute, noted: 
Act 440 requires DOC . . . to send a bulletin to local 
law enforcement officials if the agency is going to 
place or release into the community a person who:  
(a) is 
subject 
to 
sex 
offender 
registration 
requirements; 
and 
(b) 
has 
committed 
crimes 
or 
violations covered by the registration statute on two 
or more occasions. 
Wis. Legis. Council Staff, Information Memorandum 96-18 3 (July 
12, 1996).  The focus of the report, the estimate, and the 
memorandum is on the number of convictions, without regard to 
when the judgment of conviction was entered.  This focus 
supports the application of the canon, and nothing in the 
legislative 
history 
indicates 
members 
of 
the 
legislature 
understood the phrase "separate occasions" to have a different 
meaning than it was construed to have in Wittrock and Hopkins.  
See Wis. Legislature v. Palm, 2020 WI 42, ¶26, 391 Wis. 2d 497, 
942 N.W.2d 900 ("[T]he Legislative Reference Bureau never 
described the added language as changing . . . [the agency's] 
authority."). 
No.  2020AP1213-CR.rgb 
 
35 
 
B.  The Majority Establishes a Rudderless Rule of "I Know It 
When I See It." 
 
¶103 The majority holds that "when a person is convicted 
based on charges filed in a single case during the same hearing, 
then 
those 
convictions 
have 
not 
occurred 
on 
'separate 
occasions.'"  Majority op., ¶19.  It explicitly "leave[s] for 
another day whether . . . convictions that only meet one of 
those two conditions," i.e., convictions occurring in either "a 
single case" or at "the same hearing" but not both, "have 
occurred on separate occasions."  Id., ¶19 n.5.  The majority's 
holding resolves the issue in this case, but its reasoning 
leaves future cases in flux and subject to the court's whim 
rather than its judgment.   
 
¶104 The majority first focuses on temporal proximity in 
determining whether occasions are separate:  "a person must 
comply with registration requirements for life if the event of 
conviction occurred at two or more separate (set apart) times."  
Id., ¶13.  Leaving "set apart" without any definition, however, 
the majority proclaims "[c]onvictions that are filed in a single 
case 
and 
pronounced 
within 
the 
same 
hearing 
are 
not 
significantly 'set apart' or 'disunited,' and so are not 
'separate occasions.'"  Id., ¶17.  The majority then pivots to a 
different test for whether occasions are separate, which is not 
so much grounded in timing as whether the convictions stem from 
"the same case filing."  Id.  The majority never resolves this 
contradiction. 
 
¶105 What if a case involves two sex offenses and the first 
plea is accepted before a lunch break and the second after?  Are 
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36 
 
those convictions "united by . . . temporal proximity"?  See id.  
Could a prosecutor bring separate cases but have the guilty 
pleas entered within a few minutes of one another?  The 
majority's reasoning lacks clarity, leaving the impression of a 
"rule" grounded in nothing more than "I know it when I see it."  
See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., 
concurring) ("I have reached the conclusion . . . that under the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments criminal laws in this area are 
constitutionally limited to hard-core pornography.  I shall not 
today attempt further to define the kinds of material I 
understand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and 
perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so.  But I 
know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this 
case is not that.").13   
 
¶106 The vagueness in the majority's reasoning could be 
easily avoided with a clear holding grounded in traditional 
legal reasoning.  Instead, the majority says, in effect, "I know 
these weren't separate occasions.  Maybe in some future case 
I'll tell you what a separate occasion actually is." 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶107 The majority errs in rejecting the prior-construction 
canon's application in favor of muddling the well-settled 
meaning of "separate occasions," which this court decisively 
                                                 
13 Similarly unclear is the majority's wedding analogy.  See 
majority op., ¶16.  Of course a wedding could be an occasion, 
and obviously a wedding may have discrete events, e.g., a 
marriage ceremony and a reception.  That various things can 
happen 
during 
a 
single 
occasion 
does 
not 
dictate 
what 
constitutes a particular occasion. 
No.  2020AP1213-CR.rgb 
 
37 
 
construed nearly 40 years ago to mean "separate convictions" not 
"separate proceedings."  The legislature relied on this meaning 
when it later used the phrase in a closely related statute.  The 
majority repudiates the fixed meaning of the phrase at the 
expense of the textually-expressed purpose of the statute, and 
in derogation of this court's precedent.  Effectively rewriting 
the repeat sex offender statute, the majority trivializes 
heinous crimes against children, and its decision endangers some 
of the community's most vulnerable members.  I respectfully 
concur in part and dissent in part. 
¶108 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and Justice PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join 
this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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1