Title: Am. Booksellers Found. for Free Expression v. Cordray

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Am. Booksellers Found. for Free Expression v. Cordray, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-149.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-149 
AMERICAN BOOKSELLERS FOUNDATION FOR FREE EXPRESSION ET AL. v. 
CORDRAY, ATTY. GEN., ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Am. Booksellers Found. for Free Expression v. Cordray,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-149.] 
R.C. 2907.31(A) as applied to electronic communications is limited to personally 
directed communications such as instant messages, person-to-person e-
mails, and postings in private chat rooms. 
(No. 2009-0609 — Submitted October 20, 2009 — Decided January 27, 2010.) 
ON ORDER from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
Certifying Questions of State Law, Nos. 07-4375 and 07-4376. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶ 1} Pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. 18.6, we accepted the following questions 
of state law certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit: 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
{¶ 2} 1.  Is the Attorney General correct in construing R.C. 2907.31(D) 
to limit the scope of R.C. 2907.31(A), as applied to electronic communications, to 
personally directed devices such as instant messaging, person-to-person e-mails, 
and private chat rooms?  
{¶ 3} 2.  Is the Attorney General correct in construing R.C. 2907.31(D) 
to exempt from liability material posted on generally accessible websites and in 
public chat rooms? 
{¶ 4} For the reasons that follow, we answer each question in the 
affirmative. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 5} Respondents, 
American 
Booksellers 
Foundation 
for 
Free 
Expression, Association of American Publishers, Inc., Freedom To Read 
Foundation, National Association of Recording Merchandisers, Ohio Newspaper 
Association, Sexual Health Network, Inc., Video Software Dealers Association, 
Web Del Sol, and Marty Klein (collectively, "American Booksellers") filed a 
lawsuit in 2002 seeking to enjoin the enforcement of R.C. 2907.01(E) and (J).  
The district court granted a preliminary injunction.  Bookfriends, Inc. v. Taft 
(S.D.Ohio 2002), 223 F.Supp.2d 932, 945.  Before the appeal could be heard, the 
General Assembly amended the statute.  The new statute, R.C. 2907.31(A), 
provides: 
{¶ 6} "(A) No person, with knowledge of its character or content, shall 
recklessly do any of the following: 
{¶ 7} "(1) Directly sell, deliver, furnish, disseminate, provide, exhibit, 
rent, or present to a juvenile, a group of juveniles, a law enforcement officer 
posing as a juvenile, or a group of law enforcement officers posing as juveniles 
any material or performance that is obscene or harmful to juveniles; 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
{¶ 8} "(2) Directly offer or agree to sell, deliver, furnish, disseminate, 
provide, exhibit, rent, or present to a juvenile, a group of juveniles, a law 
enforcement officer posing as a juvenile, or a group of law enforcement officers 
posing as juveniles any material or performance that is obscene or harmful to 
juveniles; 
{¶ 9} "(3) While in the physical proximity of the juvenile or law 
enforcement officer posing as a juvenile, allow any juvenile or law enforcement 
officer posing as a juvenile to review or peruse any material or view any live 
performance that is harmful to juveniles." 
{¶ 10} The term "harmful to juveniles" is defined in R.C. 2907.01(E).  It 
provides: 
{¶ 11} "(E) 'Harmful to juveniles' means that quality of any material or 
performance describing or representing nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, 
or sado-masochistic abuse in any form to which all of the following apply: 
{¶ 12} "(1) The material or performance, when considered as a whole, 
appeals to the prurient interest in sex of juveniles. 
{¶ 13} "(2) The material or performance is patently offensive to prevailing 
standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is suitable for 
juveniles. 
{¶ 14} "(3) The material or performance, when considered as a whole, 
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, and scientific value for juveniles." 
{¶ 15} R.C. 2907.31(D) states that the prohibitions of R.C. 2907.31(A) 
apply to electronic forms of communication.  It provides: 
{¶ 16} "(D)(1) A person directly sells, delivers, furnishes, disseminates, 
provides, exhibits, rents, or presents or directly offers or agrees to sell, deliver, 
furnish, disseminate, provide, exhibit, rent, or present material or a performance to 
a juvenile, a group of juveniles, a law enforcement officer posing as a juvenile, or 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
a group of law enforcement officers posing as juveniles in violation of this section 
by means of an electronic method of remotely transmitting information if the 
person knows or has reason to believe that the person receiving the information is 
a juvenile or the group of persons receiving the information are juveniles. 
{¶ 17} "(2) A person remotely transmitting information by means of a 
method of mass distribution does not directly sell, deliver, furnish, disseminate, 
provide, exhibit, rent, or present or directly offer or agree to sell, deliver, furnish, 
disseminate, provide, exhibit, rent, or present the material or performance in 
question to a juvenile, a group of juveniles, a law enforcement officer posing as a 
juvenile, or a group of law enforcement officers posing as juveniles in violation of 
this section if either of the following applies: 
{¶ 18} "(a) The person has inadequate information to know or have reason 
to believe that a particular recipient of the information or offer is a juvenile. 
{¶ 19} "(b) The method of mass distribution does not provide the person 
the ability to prevent a particular recipient from receiving the information." 
{¶ 20} The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and in Am. 
Booksellers Found. for Free Expression v. Strickland (S.D.Ohio 2007), 512 
F.Supp.2d 1082, 1106, the federal district court permanently enjoined the 
enforcement of R.C. 2907.31(D).  The court concluded that R.C. "2907.31(D)(1) 
is overbroad in violation of the First amendment" and "violates the strict scrutiny 
test of the First Amendment."  Id. at 1094 and 1097.  The court also concluded 
that "the phrase 'patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community 
with respect to what is suitable for juveniles' in [R.C.] 2907.31(E) is not 
unconstitutionally vague."  Id. at 1099.  The district court also concluded that R.C. 
2907.31(D)(1) does not violate the Commerce Clause.  Id. at 1105. 
{¶ 21} The case was appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.  
During its consideration of the appeal, the court determined that the relevant 
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
statutes are "susceptible of a construction by [this court] 'which might avoid in 
whole or in part the necessity for federal constitutional adjudication, or at least 
materially change the nature of the problem.' "  Bellotti v. Baird (1976), 428 U.S. 
132, 147, 96 S.Ct. 2857, 49 L.Ed.2d 844, quoting Harrison v. Natl. Assn. for the 
Advancement of Colored People (1959), 360 U.S. 167, 177, 79 S.Ct. 1025, 3 
L.Ed.2d 1152.  Accordingly, it certified the two questions set forth above to us, 
which we now answer. 
Analysis 
{¶ 22} R.C. 2907.31 generally prohibits the dissemination of matter that is 
harmful to juveniles.  The specific provisions before us address the dissemination 
of matter harmful to juveniles by "an electronic method of remotely transmitting 
information."  R.C. 2907.31(D).  A person cannot be convicted of disseminating 
matter harmful to juveniles by electronic means unless that person "knows or has 
reason to believe that the person receiving the information is a juvenile or the 
group of persons receiving the information are juveniles."  R.C. 2907.31(D)(1).  
This general scienter requirement is further qualified in R.C. 2907.31(D)(2), 
which states that a person does not violate R.C. 2907.31(D)(1) if "[t]he person has 
inadequate information to know or have reason to believe that a particular 
recipient of the information or offer is a juvenile" or if "[t]he method of mass 
distribution does not provide the person the ability to prevent a particular recipient 
from receiving the information.” 
{¶ 23} Based on the plain language of R.C. 2907.31(D), we answer both 
certified questions in the affirmative. 
{¶ 24} R.C. 2907.31(D) can be violated only when matter harmful to 
juveniles is transmitted to someone who the sender knows is a juvenile or has 
reason to believe is a juvenile.  The statute does not require that the sender know 
the recipient by name, but that the sender know or have reason to believe that the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
recipient is a juvenile.  Of particular significance, because the certified questions 
are based on the manner in which the Attorney General construes the statutes at 
issue, is a sentence in the Attorney General's brief in which he claims that R.C. 
2907.31(D)(2) "clarifies that a person who does not 'know or have reason to 
believe that a particular recipient of the information or offer is a juvenile' does not 
violate the statute upon transmitting harmful-to-juveniles material, even if a minor 
receives it."  We conclude that the scope of R.C. 2907.31(D) is limited to 
electronic communications that can be personally directed, because otherwise the 
sender of matter harmful to juveniles cannot know or have reason to believe that a 
particular recipient is a juvenile. 
{¶ 25} Pursuant to R.C. 2907.31(D)(2), R.C. 2907.31(D)(1) is not violated 
when matter harmful to juveniles is disseminated by a method of mass 
distribution that does not allow the sender to prevent the distribution to particular 
recipients.  Based on our understanding of generally accessible websites and 
public chat rooms, they are open to all, including juveniles, and current usage and 
technology do not allow a person who posts thereon to prevent particular 
recipients, including juveniles, from accessing the information posted.  The 
Attorney General stated in his brief that R.C. 2907.31(D)(2) "exempts from 
prosecution people who transmit material harmful to juveniles 'by means of a 
method of mass distribution' when the 'method of mass distribution does not 
provide the person the ability to prevent a particular recipient from receiving the 
information.' R.C. 2907.31(D)(2)(b)."  We conclude that a person who posts 
matter harmful to juveniles on generally accessible websites and in public chat 
rooms does not violate R.C. 2907.31(D), because such a posting does not enable 
that person to "prevent a particular recipient from receiving the information.” 
{¶ 26} The certified questions and the parties focus on particular types of 
electronic communications, namely, e-mail, instant messaging, private chat 
January Term, 2010 
7 
 
rooms, public chat rooms, and generally accessible websites.  Our answer is 
accordingly constrained by that focus and should not be construed as necessarily 
governing other types of electronic transmissions, whether currently in use or 
developed in the future. 
So answered. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal, L.L.P., Michael A. Bamberger, and 
Richard M. Zuckerman; Sirkin, Pinales & Schwartz, L.L.P., H. Louis Sirkin, and 
Jennifer M. Kinsley; and Carrie L. Davis, for respondents. 
Richard A. Cordray, Attorney General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Solicitor 
General, and Elise W. Porter, Assistant Solicitor; and Ron O’Brien, Franklin 
County Prosecuting Attorney, and Nick A. Soulas Jr., Assistant Prosecuting 
Attorney, for petitioners. 
______________________