Title: Attorney Grievance v. Bellamy

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Attorney Grievance Commission v. Denise Leona Bellamy, Misc. Docket AG Nos. 6 & 13, 
September Term 2016 
 
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION — DISCIPLINE — DISBARMENT — 
Respondent, Denise Leona Bellamy, violated Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional 
Conduct 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.15, 1.16, 3.3, 3.4, 8.1, and 8.4.  These violations stemmed 
from Respondent’s misconduct resulting in seven separate complaints against her.  
Respondent added to her misconduct by obstructing the disciplinary process through 
repeatedly failing to respond to Bar Counsel, and, in one instance, directly refusing to 
provide lawfully requested information.  The sanction is disbarment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
 
Misc. Docket AG Nos. 6 & 13 
 
September Term, 2016 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE  
COMMISSION OF MARYLAND 
 
v. 
 
DENISE LEONA BELLAMY 
 
 
 
 
Barbera, C.J., 
 
Greene 
Adkins 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty,     
         
 
               JJ. 
 
 
Opinion by Barbera, C.J. 
 
 
Filed:  June 21, 2017 
 
 
 
 
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County 
Case No. CAE16-18400 
 
     CAE16-25921 
Argued:  April 3, 2017 
 
 
 
 
 The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, acting through Bar Counsel, 
filed two Petitions for Disciplinary or Remedial Action against Respondent, Denise Leona 
Bellamy, in connection with seven separate complaints filed against her.  Bar Counsel later 
moved to consolidate the two petitions for judicial hearing, post-hearing proceedings, and 
disposition, and we granted that motion.  Pursuant to Maryland Rules 19-722(a) and 19-
727, this Court transmitted both cases to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County and 
designated the Honorable John Paul Davey to conduct an evidentiary hearing and make 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Respondent failed to respond to the charges filed against her, and therefore the 
hearing judge entered an Order of Default on October 19, 2016.  A hearing was held on 
December 2, 2016.  Respondent did not appear at the hearing and has not presented any 
evidence or arguments on her behalf at any point throughout these proceedings.   
Bar Counsel filed Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and presented 
the Commission’s case before the hearing judge.  The hearing judge granted Bar Counsel’s 
request for admission of facts and genuineness of documents and treated the factual 
assertions included therein as established.  On January 23, 2017, the hearing judge signed 
an Order adopting Bar Counsel’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.  
Respondent has filed no exceptions. 
 
We summarize here those findings of fact and conclusions of law.   
I 
The Hearing Judge’s Findings of Fact 
Respondent’s Prior Disciplinary History 
2 
 
 
Respondent was admitted to the Maryland Bar on December 13, 2005.  She was 
suspended from the practice of law in Maryland by consent for a period of ninety days, 
beginning October 11, 2012, due to a prior disciplinary proceeding in which she was found 
to have violated Rules 1.3, 1.15, and 1.16(d) of the former Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of 
Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”).1  It was determined in that proceeding that Respondent, 
after being discharged in two matters, failed to return retainer fees to which she was not 
entitled.  Respondent was reinstated to the practice of law on January 15, 2013. 
 
On March 24, 2016, Respondent was temporarily suspended for failure to pay her 
annual assessment to the Client Protection Fund of Maryland.  She remained suspended as 
of the filing date of the two Petitions for Disciplinary or Remedial Action that are before 
us in this proceeding. 
Complaint of Cindy Kamara 
 
On or about April 2, 2014, Cindy Kamara hired Respondent to represent her in a 
civil matter before the District Court sitting in Prince George’s County.  They executed a 
retainer agreement, and Ms. Kamara paid Respondent $500.  Respondent did not deposit 
that money into an attorney trust account and did not maintain records pursuant to former 
Maryland Rule 16-606.1.  Instead, she converted the money to her own use before earning 
it.  Respondent did little to no work in connection with the case, failing to enter her 
                                                          
 
1 Effective July 1, 2016, the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct 
(“MLRPC”) were renamed The Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct 
(“MARPC”) and re-codified, without substantive change, in Title 19 of the Maryland 
Rules.  Because we judge Respondent’s conduct against the extant law at the time of her 
actions, we refer to the MLRPC throughout. 
3 
 
appearance on behalf of Ms. Kamara or file an action on her behalf.  Respondent failed to 
return Ms. Kamara’s phone calls in May and June 2014 and, after arranging to meet Ms. 
Kamara in July, canceled the meeting and failed to reschedule.  On or about October 29, 
2014, Ms. Kamara demanded a refund.  Respondent never refunded the retainer fees and 
never gave Ms. Kamara her client file. 
 
Ms. Kamara filed a complaint against Respondent with the Attorney Grievance 
Commission.  Bar Counsel three times forwarded the complaint with a request for 
information, but Respondent never replied.  A Commission investigator later hand-
delivered all three of Bar Counsel’s letters to Respondent.  Respondent told the investigator 
she would contact Bar Counsel that day but did not do so, and she has never contacted Bar 
Counsel regarding the Kamara matter. 
Complaint of Eraina Dixon 
 
On or about October 31, 2014, Respondent and Eraina Dixon executed a retainer 
agreement, in which Respondent agreed to represent Ms. Dixon in her petition for legal 
guardianship of her grandson in order to pursue his enrollment in her local public school.  
Ms. Dixon paid Respondent a retainer fee of $750, which Respondent converted to her own 
use before earning it, failing to deposit it in a client trust account or maintain financial 
records.  Respondent did little to no work on the case, failing to enter her appearance or 
file any court documents in the matter.  Although she told Ms. Dixon that she had prepared 
an affidavit for her, Respondent never provided such a document to Ms. Dixon.  
Respondent ignored Ms. Dixon’s many attempts to contact her throughout the Fall.  On 
December 29, 2014, Respondent e-mailed Ms. Dixon promising to meet with her in two 
4 
 
days, but failed to meet with Ms. Dixon on the appointed day.  Ms. Dixon eventually 
discharged Respondent and requested a refund.  Respondent failed to refund the retainer 
fee or give Ms. Dixon her client file.   
 
On July 21, 2015, Ms. Dixon filed a complaint against Respondent with the 
Attorney Grievance Commission.  Respondent ignored Bar Counsel’s multiple attempts to 
contact her regarding the complaint and never replied to the request for information.  
Complaint of Yolanda Curtis 
 
In or about August 2014, Yolanda Curtis retained Respondent to represent her as 
plaintiff in a suit in the District Court sitting in Prince George’s County, seeking recovery 
of Ms. Curtis’s home rental security deposit arising from a previous tenancy.  Respondent 
told Ms. Curtis that her fee would be approximately $1,000 to $3,000 and would be 
deducted from the recovery in the action.  Respondent did not explain to Ms. Curtis the 
basis of this fee nor did she execute a written agreement regarding the fee with Ms. Curtis.   
 
On or about September 5, 2014, Respondent failed to appear in court in Ms. Curtis’s 
action and a judgment was entered against Ms. Curtis.  Respondent filed a “Motion to 
Vacate the Judgment and Set the Matter back in for Trial”, claiming that she had not 
received notice of an alleged time change in the hearing.  The court granted the motion and 
set a new date for the hearing.  Respondent was late to court for that hearing.  Nevertheless, 
the court entered judgment in favor of Ms. Curtis and against defendant Earl White, Jr., in 
the amount of $1,054, costs of $68, and attorney’s fees of $1,375, coming to a total payment 
due from defendant of $2,497. 
 
Mr. White contacted Respondent seeking to satisfy the judgment.  Roughly three 
5 
 
weeks later Respondent replied, stating that Ms. Curtis had authorized her to accept the 
judgment on behalf of Ms. Curtis.  Mr. White paid Respondent, who then converted the 
money to her own use without informing Ms. Curtis that the judgment had been satisfied.  
Respondent falsely advised Mr. White that she had filed a notice of satisfaction with the 
court, and she ignored his subsequent attempts to contact her with a request that she file 
the notice of satisfaction.  Mr. White eventually asked the court to enter a notice of 
satisfaction, which it did on March 30, 2015. 
Meanwhile, unaware that Mr. White had satisfied the judgment, Ms. Curtis filed a 
Request for Garnishment of Mr. White’s wages.  She then learned that Mr. White had paid 
the judgment.  On July 6, 2015, Ms. Curtis filed a complaint with the Attorney Grievance 
Commission against Respondent.  Bar Counsel made multiple attempts to contact 
Respondent and request information regarding this matter, and, though in one instance 
Respondent signed the return receipt on Bar Counsel’s message, she never replied to Bar 
Counsel. 
Complaint of Angela D. Alsobrooks, State’s Attorney for Prince George’s County 
 
On or about February 20, 2004, United States Park Police conducted a traffic stop 
of Respondent and performed a Standardized Field Sobriety Test, which Respondent failed.  
She was arrested and charged with Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”) and other 
violations including speeding, driving on an expired license and driving with a suspended 
registration.  She pleaded guilty before the United States District Court for the District of 
Maryland and was sentenced to supervised probation with additional conditions of 
probation. 
6 
 
 
On March 31, 2013, Maryland State Police found Respondent in her vehicle, 
crashed into a roadside ditch.  Respondent failed a field sobriety test and was charged with 
DUI, reckless driving, and driving on a suspended license.  On March 20, 2014, 
Respondent appeared in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County on those charges, 
and, when asked by the court whether she had any prior criminal convictions, she lied, 
replying “no” despite her previous DUI conviction.  She pleaded guilty and was sentenced 
to unsupervised probation before judgment. 
 
The State’s Attorney’s Office for Prince George’s County, upon discovering the 
falsehood, filed a motion to strike the judgment; the motion was granted.  The State’s 
Attorney also notified Bar Counsel of this matter, who docketed a complaint against 
Respondent and sent a letter to her home and office notifying her and seeking information.  
Respondent requested a ten-day extension of time to respond, which was granted.  
Respondent failed to respond before the extended deadline. 
Complaint of Beverly Christina Bradley-Topping 
 
Ms. Bradley-Topping retained Respondent to represent her in the filing of a divorce 
action and paid a retainer fee of $2,145.  Respondent converted this fee to her own use 
before earning it, did not deposit it into a client trust fund, and did not maintain an 
accounting.  Respondent filed a complaint for divorce on behalf of Ms. Bradley-Topping 
on October 27, 2014, without first discussing with her the grounds for divorce or providing 
her with a draft of the complaint.  After the document was filed, Ms. Bradley-Topping 
contacted Respondent and asked her to amend the grounds for divorce to “desertion”.  
Respondent told Ms. Bradley-Topping that she would amend the complaint but never did 
7 
 
so. 
 
Respondent failed repeatedly to communicate with Ms. Bradley-Topping.  She 
scheduled phone calls with Ms. Bradley-Topping on November 17, November 22, and 
December 11, 2014, yet failed to call her client as promised.  Meanwhile, the court set a 
scheduling conference for March 3, 2015.  Respondent delayed until the day before that 
conference to inform Ms. Bradley-Topping of it. 
 
The court then entered a Scheduling Order, which Respondent repeatedly violated.  
She failed to provide required documents by the deadline, failed to file a Joint Statement 
of Marital and Non-marital Property by the deadline, failed to respond to discovery or 
inform Ms. Bradley-Topping of the discovery requests, and failed to timely contact the 
assigned Court Appointed Mediator.  Opposing counsel filed, and the court granted, a 
Motion to Compel Discovery and/or for Sanctions.  Respondent never provided discovery, 
causing the court to enter an order of sanctions against Ms. Bradley-Topping for $693.  
Respondent never informed her client of the motion to compel or the sanctions entered 
against her. 
 
Respondent continued her pattern of failing to respond to Ms. Bradley-Topping’s 
requests for information, told Ms. Bradley-Topping that she had prepared a draft settlement 
agreement though she had not done so, and took no steps to settle the matter despite Ms. 
Bradley-Topping’s wishes.  She delayed until the day before the merits hearing to inform 
Ms. Bradley-Topping of the hearing and advise her that she would need to bring a witness. 
 
After the merits hearing, the court granted a limited divorce and ordered Respondent 
to submit a proposed Judgment of Limited Divorce Order.  Respondent prepared a draft 
8 
 
order and shared it with Ms. Bradley-Topping, who stated that it was “imperative that [her] 
proper grounds be reflected” in the order (i.e., desertion) and asked Respondent to strike 
the $693 owed to the opposing party, stating that she had “no knowledge what this fee 
[was] for.”  Respondent, however, filed the proposed order with no material changes. 
 
Ms. Bradley-Topping discharged Respondent on July 30, 2015, and requested that 
she withdraw her appearance, refund the retainer fee, and provide Ms. Bradley-Topping 
with her client file.  Respondent did none of those things. 
 
Ms. Bradley-Topping filed a complaint against Respondent with the Attorney 
Grievance Commission.  Bar Counsel twice requested information from Respondent 
regarding the complaint, but Respondent failed to reply.  On November 20, 2015, Bar 
Counsel issued a subpoena to obtain Respondent’s bank records, and later a Commission 
investigator made contact with Respondent, requesting the name of her current bank.  
Respondent refused to answer, stating:  “You’re the investigator, you figure it out.” 
Complaint of Courtney Smith Lamar 
 
On May 27, 2015, Ms. Lamar signed a retainer agreement with Respondent in 
connection with a complaint for divorce filed against Ms. Lamar.  The parties agreed to an 
hourly rate of $250, and Ms. Lamar paid Respondent a retainer of $1,800.  Respondent 
committed to providing monthly billing invoices but never provided them.  Respondent 
failed to deposit this money into an attorney trust account, did not maintain records of the 
fee, and converted the fee to her own use before earning it. 
 
At some point during Respondent’s representation, Ms. Lamar sought reconciliation 
with her husband.  Respondent promised she would send a letter to opposing counsel 
9 
 
regarding the possibility of reconciliation, but she never did so.  Respondent filed an 
Answer and a Certificate Regarding Discovery, and entered her appearance in the case.  
Respondent thereafter failed to perform any meaningful work in the action.  Respondent 
failed to reply to Ms. Lamar’s requests for information, failed to notify her about or respond 
to discovery requests, and failed to respond to four attempts by the court to contact 
Respondent to clear court dates.  The court then set a scheduling conference, and 
Respondent failed to inform Ms. Lamar of the conference or prepare a financial statement 
in advance of the conference.   
 
After repeated attempts by Ms. Lamar to contact Respondent, on November 10, 
2015, Respondent finally sent Ms. Lamar a message.  Ms. Lamar then discharged her and 
requested a refund and her client file.  Despite having been fired by her client, Respondent 
appeared in court for the scheduling conference on November 12, 2015, and failed to 
withdraw from the case.  She failed to refund her retainer fee or provide the client file. 
 
On November 17, 2015, Ms. Lamar filed a complaint with the Attorney Grievance 
Commission regarding this conduct.  Bar Counsel sent a letter to Respondent and she 
requested a ten-day extension of time to reply, which was granted, but Respondent failed 
to reply. 
Complaint of Allwell Onwubuche 
 
Respondent represented a client in divorce and custody proceedings brought by 
plaintiff Allwell Onwubuche in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County.  On August 
7, 2015, Respondent appeared on behalf of her client, and proffered to the court that Mr. 
Onwubuche had engaged in a physical altercation with her client, during which Mr. 
10 
 
Onwubuche shoved the parties’ child.  Respondent stated that her client then called the 
police, and that she had a copy of the police report.  Respondent was aware at the time that 
the police report contained no mention of Mr. Onwubuche shoving the child.  His attorney 
requested a copy of the police report, but Respondent refused to produce it.  In response, 
Mr. Onwubuche filed a complaint against Respondent with the Attorney Grievance 
Commission.  Bar Counsel forwarded the complaint to Respondent and twice requested 
information, but Respondent never replied. 
The Hearing Judge’s Conclusions of Law 
 
Based upon the record and the above-summarized findings of fact, the hearing judge 
adopted Bar Counsel’s proposed conclusions of law, concluding by clear and convincing 
evidence that Respondent violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.15, 1.16, 3.3, 3.4, 8.1, 
and 8.4.   
II 
 
Standard of Review 
“In attorney discipline proceedings, this Court has original and complete jurisdiction 
and conducts an independent review of the record.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Good, 
445 Md. 490, 512 (2015) (citation omitted).  The Court will accept the hearing judge’s 
findings of fact unless clearly erroneous.  Id.  If no exceptions are filed, this Court may 
treat the facts as conclusively established.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kwarteng, 411 
Md. 652, 659-60 (2009); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Lee, 390 Md. 517, 525 (2006).  
The Court reviews the hearing judge’s legal conclusions de novo.  Good, 445 Md. at 512.   
 
11 
 
III 
We summarize below the hearing judge’s conclusions of law and, upon our 
independent review of the record, affirm the hearing judge on nearly all matters, parting 
company on only three issues.   
MLRPC 1.1 
 
MLRPC 1.1 provides that: “A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a 
client.  Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and 
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”  An attorney’s representation may 
be incompetent where that attorney has failed to take necessary, fundamental steps to 
further clients’ cases, Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Garrett, 427 Md. 209, 222-23 (2012), 
or has failed to provide legal services required of a client and failed to appear in court for 
scheduled proceedings.  See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gisriel, 409 Md. 331, 
369-70 (2009); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Harris, 366 Md. 376, 403 (2001).  
Neglecting a client’s case, failing to answer discovery requests, failing to file opposition 
motions, failing to enter an appearance, and arriving late to a hearing may also constitute 
incompetent representation.  See, e.g., Kwarteng, 411 Md. at 658; Attorney Grievance 
Comm’n v. Steinberg, 395 Md. 337, 362, 367 (2006). 
 
The hearing judge concluded, and we agree, that Respondent failed to provide 
competent representation to Ms. Kamara, Ms. Dixon, Ms. Curtis, Ms. Bradley-Topping, 
and Ms. Lamar.  In the Curtis matter, Respondent failed to appear at a scheduled hearing, 
causing the court to enter judgment against her client.  She then was late to the hearing 
once the matter was reset.  After receiving the $2,497 judgment, Respondent failed to file 
12 
 
a notice of satisfaction, inform her client, or remit the funds to her client.  In the Bradley-
Topping matter, Respondent failed to respond to her client for weeks or months at a time.  
On two occasions she waited until the day before to inform her client of key proceedings.  
She failed to respond to discovery requests and ignored court orders.  Her discovery failures 
caused sanctions to be ordered against her client.  In the Lamar matter, Respondent failed 
to respond to discovery requests, and failed to inform her client of the scheduling 
conference or prepare a financial statement for the conference.  She failed to respond to 
numerous attempts by Ms. Lamar to contact her, eventually prompting Ms. Lamar to 
discharge her. 
MLRPC 1.2 
 
 
MLRPC 1.2(a) requires a lawyer to “abide by a client’s decisions concerning the 
objectives of the representation and, when appropriate . . . consult with the client as to the 
means by which they are to be pursued.”  An attorney’s failure to prosecute her client’s 
case, combined with a failure to communicate with the client about the status of the case, 
may constitute a violation of this rule.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Reinhardt, 391 
Md. 209, 220 (2006).  Failure to make any significant effort to recover damages for a client 
may also constitute a violation of the rule.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Fox, 417 
Md. 504, 531 (2010).   
 
The hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated Rule 1.2(a) in the Kamara, 
Dixon, Bradley-Topping, and Lamar matters.  We agree.  Respondent failed utterly to take 
any significant steps in the Kamara and Dixon matters, failing even to enter her appearance 
in those matters.  In the Dixon matter, she failed to prepare and file an affidavit pursuant 
13 
 
to her client’s wishes, preventing Ms. Dixon from enrolling her grandson in school.  In the 
Bradley-Topping matter, she failed to abide by her client’s objective of including desertion 
as grounds for divorce and failed to amend the complaint when her client requested that 
she do so.  After entering her appearance on behalf of Ms. Lamar, Respondent neglected 
the matter and then failed to withdraw her appearance in the case after her client requested 
that she do so.   
All of these actions and inactions were obvious failures to abide by her clients’ 
wishes in their representation.   
MLRPC 1.3 
 
Rule 1.3 requires that attorneys act with reasonable diligence and promptness in 
representing a client.  Neglect and inattentiveness to a client’s interests, repeated failure to 
communicate, and failure to provide an accounting for fees may violate the rule.  See, e.g., 
Gisriel, 409 Md. at 371.  Because Respondent provided essentially no representation in the 
Kamara and Dixon matters and was neither diligent nor prompt in pursuing the Curtis, 
Bradley-Topping, and Lamar matters, the hearing judge concluded that the same acts that 
violated Rule 1.1 also violated Rule 1.3.  We agree.  Respondent’s egregious pattern of 
neglect and inattentiveness to her clients’ interests and attempts to communicate with her 
demonstrated a lack of diligence that violates Rule 1.3.   
MLRPC 1.4 
 
Rule 1.4 provides that: 
(a) A lawyer shall: 
(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect 
to which the client’s informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(f), is required 
14 
 
by these Rules; 
(2) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter; 
(3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information;  
 
. . . .  
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to 
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. 
 
 
A failure to surrender documents to which the client is entitled may violate Rule 
1.4(a)(3), Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Edib, 415 Md. 696, 718 (2010), and an attorney’s 
failure to inform the client of discovery sanctions or respond to numerous case-status 
requests may constitute a violation of Rules 1.4(a) and (b).  Attorney Grievance Comm’n 
v. Brown, 426 Md. 298, 321-22 (2012). 
 
We affirm the hearing judge’s conclusions of law that Respondent violated Rule 
1.4(a) in the Kamara, Dixon, Curtis, Bradley-Topping, and Lamar matters.  Respondent 
maintained a chronic pattern of failure to keep those clients informed as to the status of 
their cases, ignoring their multiple attempts to contact her regarding their litigation, and 
frequently arranging meetings and then canceling or simply failing to meet.  In the Curtis 
matter, Respondent failed to inform her client that she had received payment of the 
judgment.  In the Dixon, Bradley-Topping, and Lamar matters, she failed to surrender 
client files after she was discharged and those clients requested their documents. 
 
Respondent violated Rule 1.4(b) in the Bradley-Topping and Lamar matters by 
failing to notify those clients of discovery requests or respond to those requests.  In the 
Bradley-Topping matter, Respondent failed to inform her client of the motion to compel 
and the discovery sanctions entered against her client due to Respondent’s negligence.  In 
the Lamar matter, Respondent failed to provide a billing invoice at any point during her 
15 
 
roughly five months of representation. 
MLRPC 1.5 
 
Rule 1.5(a) provides that: 
A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable 
fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses.  The factors to be considered in 
determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following: 
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions 
involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; 
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the 
particular employment will preclude other employment of the lawyer; 
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; 
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained; 
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; 
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; 
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers 
performing the services; and 
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
 
In order to be reasonable, fees must be commensurate with the legal services provided.  
See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Chapman, 430 Md. 238, 275-76 (2013).   
 
Because Respondent performed little or no meaningful work in the Kamara, Dixon, 
Bradley-Topping, and Lamar matters, we affirm the hearing judge’s finding that 
Respondent’s fees were incommensurate and unreasonable.  Respondent took fees of $500 
from Ms. Kamara, $750 from Ms. Dixon, $2,145 from Ms. Bradley-Topping, and $2,000 
from Ms. Lamar.  In the Kamara and Dixon matters, Respondent performed essentially no 
work at all, and in both the Bradley-Topping and the Lamar matters, Respondent failed to 
provide fundamental services, including participating in discovery and mediation and 
responding to motions by the opposing party.  In the Lamar matter, Respondent provided 
some services initially but then abandoned the case.  We agree with the hearing judge that 
16 
 
in all of those matters, the fees were unreasonable considering the minimal, or nonexistent, 
work Respondent performed for her clients.   
 
We part company with the hearing judge in his conclusion that Respondent violated 
Rule 1.5 by charging an unreasonable contingency fee in the Curtis matter.  “[A]n 
agreement, reasonable when made, may become unreasonable in light of changed facts and 
circumstances. . . . the question of the reasonableness of a contingent fee agreement, or one 
with contingent features, must be revisited after the fee is quantified or quantifiable and 
tested by the factors enumerated in Rule 1.5(a).”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 
Pennington, 355 Md. 61, 74 (1999) (internal citations omitted).  Respondent did not have 
a written contingent fee arrangement with Ms. Curtis, and she gave a relatively wide range 
for her potential fee, from $1,000 to $3,000.  The judgment in the underlying case was 
broken into recovery for the home security deposit and attorney’s fees.  But whether the 
attorney’s fees portion of that judgment was unreasonable was not addressed in Bar 
Counsel’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the hearing judge made 
no factual finding or legal conclusion on that matter.  Moreover, Respondent’s actions 
suggest outright theft, rather than an improper fee arrangement.  Given the sparsity of the 
record on this subject, we are not persuaded that Respondent violated Rule 1.5 by charging 
an unreasonable fee in the Curtis matter.   
MLRPC 1.15 
 
Rule 1.15 provides that: 
(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a 
lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation separate from the 
lawyer’s own property.  Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained 
17 
 
pursuant to Title 16, Chapter 600 of the Maryland Rules, and records shall 
be created and maintained in accordance with the Rules in that Chapter. 
Other property shall be identified specifically as such and appropriately 
safeguarded, and records of its receipt and distribution shall be created and 
maintained.  Complete records of the account funds and of other property 
shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of at least five 
years after the date the record was created. 
. . . . 
(c) Unless the client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing, to a 
different arrangement, a lawyer shall deposit legal fees and expenses that 
have been paid in advance into a client trust account and may withdraw those 
funds for the lawyer’s own benefit only as fees are earned or expenses 
incurred. 
(d) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person 
has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. 
Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement 
with the client, a lawyer shall deliver promptly to the client or third person 
any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive 
and, upon request by the client or third person, shall render promptly a full 
accounting regarding such property. 
 
 
The hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated Rule 1.15(a) because she 
failed to create and maintain records as required by the Rules.2  Again, we agree.  
Respondent violated Rule 1.15(c) by failing to create and maintain records as required by 
the rule, and additionally by failing to deposit client fees into an attorney trust account.  In 
the Kamara, Dixon, Bradley-Topping, and Lamar matters, she used unearned portions of 
her clients’ money instead of holding those retainer fees in trust until earned.  In addition, 
Respondent violated Rule 1.15(d) by failing in each of those matters to return unearned 
retainer fees to her clients. 
 
In connection with the Curtis matter, Respondent violated Rule 1.15(a) and (d) by 
                                                          
 
2  At the time of Respondent’s misconduct, the accounting rules were codified at Maryland 
Rule 16-606.1, rather than the current codification at Title 19, Chapter 400 of the Maryland 
Rules. 
18 
 
receiving property from the defendant, Mr. White, in which her client had an interest, and 
then failing to inform Ms. Curtis or deliver the portion of the judgment to which Ms. Curtis 
was entitled. 
MLRPC 1.16 
 
Rule 1.16(d) provides: 
Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent 
reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as giving 
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other 
counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and 
refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned 
or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent 
permitted by other law. 
 
The failure to return unearned fees and client files following termination of the 
representation constitutes a violation of this rule.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Park, 
427 Md. 180, 193 (2012) (per curiam); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Rose, 391 Md. 101, 
111 (2006).  We affirm the hearing judge’s conclusion that Respondent violated Rule 
1.16(d) by failing to surrender client files and unearned fees in the Kamara, Dixon, Curtis, 
Bradley-Topping, and Lamar matters. 
MLRPC 3.3 
 
Rule 3.3(a) states that “[a] lawyer shall not knowingly . . . make a false statement of 
fact or law to a tribunal.”  We affirm the hearing judge’s conclusion that Respondent 
violated this rule in her DUI case through her false representations to the court.  Rule 3.3(a) 
is located under the heading entitled “Advocate”, which governs a lawyer’s conduct in 
representing her clients in the courts of this State.  But, “[t]his Court has not excluded from 
the application of MLRPC 3.3 those attorneys who represent themselves in litigation.”  
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Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Trye, 444 Md. 201, 217 (2015) (attorney who represented 
herself in her divorce proceedings violated Rule 3.3(a)) (citing Attorney Grievance 
Comm’n v. Myers, 333 Md. 440, 442-45 (1994) (finding a violation of MLRPC 3.3 where 
an attorney representing himself stated falsely to a District Court judge that he had no 
points on his driver’s license)).  Just as in Myers, Respondent was questioned by a judge 
whether she had prior convictions on her record, and she stated falsely that she did not.  As 
we held in Myers, this was a violation of Rule 3.3(a). 
MLRPC 3.4 
 
Rule 3.4 states that a lawyer shall not: 
(a) unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or unlawfully alter, 
destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary 
value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act; 
. . . . 
(c) knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for 
an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists; 
(d) in pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery request or fail to make 
reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request 
by an opposing party[.] 
 
The hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated Rule 3.4 in three matters: 
she violated Rule 3.4(a) by failing in the Onwubuche matter to provide a copy of the police 
report to Mr. Onwubuche’s counsel; she violated Rule 3.4(c) by failing to appear in court 
at a scheduled hearing in the Curtis matter; she again violated Rule 3.4(c) by failing to 
abide by the Scheduling Order in the Bradley-Topping matter; and also in the Bradley-
Topping matter, she violated Rule 3.4(d) by failing to comply with reasonable discovery 
requests.  See Steinberg, 395 Md. at 365-67 (finding that an attorney violated MLRPC 3.4 
after repeatedly delaying the discovery process, delaying depositions, and failing to provide 
20 
 
requested documents).  
We agree with the hearing judge that Respondent violated Rule 3.4(c) by failing to 
produce discovery in the Bradley-Topping matter even after the court entered a motion to 
compel discovery.  In refusing to provide the requested discovery, Respondent directly 
flouted the court’s order, and thus “knowingly disobey[ed] an obligation” she was bound 
to perform for the court, in violation of the rule.  MLRPC 3.4(c).  We also agree that 
Respondent violated Rule 3.4(d) by failing to comply with reasonable discovery requests 
in the Bradley-Topping matter.  The deliberate failure to produce documents in discovery 
or to appear for deposition in compliance with discovery requests and a court order is a 
violation of Rule 3.4(d).   
However, we disagree that Respondent violated Rule 3.4(a) in the Onwubuche 
matter.  While her behavior in not providing the police report per opposing counsel’s 
request was exceedingly unprofessional, the record indicates this was an informal request, 
not a discovery request, for what appears to be a public document.  Rule 3.4(a) makes it a 
violation to unlawfully obstruct access to evidence or alter, destroy, or conceal evidence.  
Bar Counsel has identified no law that Respondent violated through her poor behavior.  We 
have held that a lawyer’s withholding, without good reason, requested documents during 
discovery may violate Rule 3.4(a).  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ucheomumu, 450 
Md. 675, 704-05 (2016).  But, we are not persuaded that there is clear and convincing 
evidence in this record that Respondent’s failure to act was a violation of Rule 3.4(a).   
Likewise, we are not persuaded that Respondent violated Rule 3.4(c) when she 
failed to appear in court in the Curtis matter, later claiming that she had not received notice 
21 
 
of an alleged time change in the hearing.  This failure, as discussed above, demonstrated 
incompetence.  But whether this was a knowing act of disobedience to the tribunal’s 
order—rather than the nonperformance of an attorney with a chronic inability to fulfill her 
basic responsibilities—has not been made clear in the record.   
MLRPC 8.1 
 
Rule 8.1 provides that: 
[A] lawyer in connection with a bar admission application or in connection 
with a disciplinary matter, shall not: 
(a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or 
(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by 
the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a 
lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary 
authority[.] 
 
Letters from Bar Counsel requesting information concerning a complaint are lawful 
demands for information, and a knowing failure to respond to such a letter is a violation of 
Rule 8.1.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Fezell, 361 Md. 234, 248-49 (2000).  The 
hearing judge concluded, and we agree, that Respondent violated Rule 8.1(b) as to all seven 
complaints constituting this case.  Respondent failed to provide any substantive response 
to Bar Counsel’s reasonable requests for information in all seven matters.  In addition, 
Respondent directly refused to provide her banking institution’s name to Bar Counsel’s 
investigator when she stated “[y]ou’re the investigator, you figure it out.”   
MLRPC 8.4(b) 
Rule 8.4(b) provides that it is professional misconduct for an attorney to commit a 
criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a 
lawyer.  Absence of criminal prosecution does not necessarily mean Rule 8.4(b) has not 
22 
 
been violated.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Breschi, 340 Md. 590, 593-94 (1995).  
Comment 2 to the rule explains that not all illegal conduct reflects adversely on fitness to 
practice, but that, traditionally,  
the distinction was drawn in terms of offenses involving ‘moral turpitude.’    
. . . Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a 
lawyer should be professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate 
lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice. Offenses involving 
violence, dishonesty, or breach of trust, or serious interference with the 
administration of justice are in that category. 
 
 
Maryland Code Annotated, Criminal Law § 7-104(a) (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol., 2016 
Supp.) deals with theft, and provides that a person may not willfully or knowingly obtain 
or exert unauthorized control over property if that person intends to deprive the owner of 
the property.  Persons convicted of theft of property worth at least $1000 are guilty of a 
felony under § 7-104(g)(1).  Section 7-113(a) provides that a fiduciary may not 
fraudulently and willfully appropriate money that the fiduciary holds in trust. 
We agree with the hearing judge’s conclusion that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(b) 
in the Curtis matter because she received the full judgment amount from the defendant and 
never remitted it to her client.  Respondent’s failure to inform her client of her receipt of 
the money supports the conclusion that Respondent intended to deprive Ms. Curtis of 
money that was rightly hers.   
MLRPC 8.4(c) 
 
Rule 8.4(c) provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.  We agree with the trial 
judge’s findings that Respondent repeatedly violated this rule.  In the Curtis matter, 
23 
 
Respondent dishonestly and deceitfully took possession of, and retained, the money 
judgment owed to her client and misrepresented to the defendant in that action (Mr. White) 
that Respondent had filed a notice of satisfaction in the case.  In the Dixon matter, 
Respondent represented to her client that she had drafted an affidavit when she had not 
done so.  In the Bradley-Topping matter, Respondent told her client that she would file an 
amended divorce complaint to include grounds of desertion, but she did not do so.  She 
also falsely told Ms. Bradley-Topping that she had prepared a draft settlement.  In regards 
to the Alsobrooks complaint, during her hearing on charges of driving under the influence, 
Respondent misrepresented to the court that she had no prior convictions. 
MLRPC 8.4(d) 
 
Rule 8.4(d) provides that it is professional misconduct for an attorney to engage in 
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.  Such conduct includes actions that 
reflect negatively on the legal profession and set a poor example for the public at large.  
See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Goff, 399 Md. 1, 22 (2007).  Conduct that tends to 
bring the legal profession into disrepute is also considered prejudicial to the administration 
of justice.  Rose, 391 Md. at 111.  Failure to appear in court when required to do so, neglect 
of client matters, and lack of competence may also violate the rule.  See, e.g., Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. Thomas, 440 Md. 523, 555-56 (2014).   
 
We affirm the hearing judge’s conclusion that Respondent’s conduct was prejudicial 
to the administration of justice, in violation of Rule 8.4(d).  Her behavior, involving 
persistent dishonesty and incompetence, undermines the legal profession’s reputation and 
the confidence of the public.  Respondent, moreover, wasted the courts’ time and her 
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clients’ time through her lack of preparation, diligence, and general nonperformance of her 
role as an advocate and an officer of the court.  Respondent’s failure to appear in the Curtis 
matter resulted in the court entering judgment, then later vacating its judgment and re-
setting the case for trial.  Respondent’s failure to engage in discovery in the Bradley-
Topping matter resulted in a motion to compel and discovery sanctions.  Last, 
Respondent’s utter failure to cooperate with Bar Counsel and its investigators, frustrating 
the disciplinary process, was prejudicial to the administration of justice.  Brown, 426 Md. 
at 323-25. 
MLRPC 8.4(a) 
 
Rule 8.4(a) provides that it is professional misconduct for an attorney to violate or 
attempt to violate the MLRPC.  Having concluded that Respondent violated multiple rules, 
the trial judge concluded that Respondent also violated Rule 8.4(a); we agree.  See Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. Foltz, 411 Md. 359, 411 (2009). 
IV 
The Sanction 
For the reasons set forth here, we entered a per curiam order on April 3, 2017, 
immediately disbarring Respondent.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bellamy, 452 Md. 
517 (2017).  Disbarment is the obvious sanction for Respondent’s repeated and egregious 
violations of the MLRPC.  Here, as in all such matters, “we are guided by our ‘interest in 
protecting the public and the public’s confidence in the legal profession.’” Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. Lewis, 437 Md. 308, 329 (2014) (quoting Attorney Grievance 
Comm’n v. Pennington, 387 Md. 565, 595 (2005)).  Consequently, “the purpose of attorney 
25 
 
disciplinary proceedings is not to punish the lawyer, but to protect the public as well as to 
deter other lawyers from engaging in similar misconduct.”  Pennington, 387 Md. at 596.   
 
As described at length above, Respondent violated numerous rules repeatedly and 
seemingly without remorse.  She failed utterly to cooperate with Bar Counsel in the 
disciplinary process.  And, she exhibited a disturbing pattern of dishonesty, individual 
instances of which could warrant disbarment on their own.  See, e.g., Attorney Grievance 
Comm’n v. Peters-Hamlin, 447 Md. 520, 547-49 (2016) (restating the proposition that 
disbarment ordinarily is the sanction for an intentional violation of MLRPC 8.4(c) 
(dishonesty)).  Accompanied, however, by so many violations of the MLRPC, the sanction 
here is abundantly clear—disbarment is the only appropriate outcome.