Title: Stundon v. Sterling

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Stundon v. Sterling1987 WY 58736 P.2d 317Case Number: 87-12Decided: 05/06/1987Supreme Court of Wyoming
Robin 
STUNDON, Appellant (Plaintiff)

 
 
v.

 
 
Dave 
STERLING, Greg Barry, Gary Krause, and Abel Rivera, Appellees 
(Defendants)

 
 
Philip 
P. Whynott and Linda Steiner Lewis, for Appellant.

 
 
Glenn 
Parker and James Applegate of Hirst & Applegate, for Appellees.  

 
 
Before 
Brown, C.J., and Thomas, Cardine, Urbigkit and Macy, JJ.  

 
 
BROWN, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1.]     The district court 
granted summary judgment to defendants, co-employees of plaintiff, in this suit 
alleging culpable negligence. We will affirm.

 
 
[¶2.]     In this case, Robin 
Stundon was injured when the brake system on a school bus she was driving 
failed, and the bus rolled down an incline into another school bus. Thereafter, 
she brought suit claiming that the mechanics who service the buses were culpably 
negligent in that they knew that the parking brake needed adjustment, had failed 
to repair the brake, and yet allowed her to drive the bus. On November 26, 1986, 
the district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, co-employees 
of plaintiff. On appeal, appellant claims that a genuine issue of material fact 
as to culpable negligence exists which precludes granting of a summary 
judgment.

 
 
[¶3.]     Because Ms. Stundon was 
covered by worker's compensation, she may recover against her co-employees only 
if she shows that they were culpably negligent. § 27-12-103, W.S. 1977. This 
court has said that culpable negligence is "willful and serious misconduct." 
Barnette v. Doyle, Wyo., 622 P.2d 1349, 1362 (1981). See also, 
Bettencourt v. Pride Well Service, Inc., 735 P.2d 722 (Wyo. 1987). "In 
order to prove that an actor has engaged in willful misconduct, one must 
demonstrate that he acted with a state of mind that approaches intent to do 
harm." Bryant v. Hornbuckle, Wyo., 728 P.2d 1132, 1136 (1986), citing 
Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 34 (5th ed. 1984).

 
 
[¶4.]     This court's standard 
for reviewing the propriety of summary judgment is well established. England 
v. Simmons, Wyo., 728 P.2d 1137 (1986). The initial burden is on the movant 
to show that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Fiedler v. 
Steger, Wyo., 713 P.2d 773 (1986). Once that showing is made, it is 
incumbent upon the party opposing the motion to come forward with specific facts 
to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Bettencourt v. Pride 
Well Service, Inc., supra; and Bryant v. Hornbuckle, supra. 
Conclusory affidavits are insufficient and specific facts must be shown. 
Blackmore v. Davis Oil Company, Wyo., 671 P.2d 334 
(1983).

 
 
[¶5.]     In this case, Ms. 
Stundon alleged in her complaint that the mechanics were culpably negligent in 
intentionally allowing bus No. 8 to be used, knowing that the parking brake was 
not in order. The defendants' affidavits, submitted in support of their motion 
for summary judgment, indicated that none of them knew that the parking brake 
was not working when Ms. Stundon took the bus. These materials are sufficient to 
meet the movant's burden and to make a prima facie showing that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact as to knowledge.

 
 
[¶6.]     However, the affidavits 
presented by Stundon in opposition, which rely upon violations of statutory 
duties and school district regulations, are conclusory, lack specific facts, and 
thus do not meet her burden of showing there is a genuine issue of material fact 
as to culpable negligence.

 
 
[¶7.]     Therefore, the trial 
court properly determined that there was no genuine issue as to culpable 
negligence, and the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

 
 
[¶8.]     
Affirmed.