Title: Moore v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

In the Circuit Court for St. Mary’s County
Criminal Action K04-68
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 143
September Term, 2004
JONATHAN GEORGE MOORE
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
JJ.
Opinion by Raker, J.
Filed:   August 11, 2005
1Unless otherwise indicated, all future statutory references will be to Md. Code (2002,
2004 Cum. Supp.), Criminal Law Article.
The question we must decide in this case is whether a person who downloads onto a
computer visual representations of a minor engaged in obscene acts or sexual conduct
violates Md. Code (2002, 2004 Cum. Supp.), § 11-207(a)(3) of the Criminal Law Article1
proscribing the “use [of] a computer to depict or describe a minor engaging in an obscene
act, sadomasochistic abuse, or sexual conduct.”  We shall answer that question in the
negative and reverse.
I.
Moore was indicted by the Grand Jury for St. Mary’s County in a two count
indictment, alleging violations of § 11-207(a)(3) and § 11-208(a) respectively.  Count I
alleged that Moore had “us[ed] a computer to depict and describe a minor engaging in an
obscene act, sadomasochistic abuse, and sexual conduct” in violation of § 11-207(a)(3).
Count II alleged that Moore “knowing[ly] possess[ed] a film, videotape, photograph, and
other  visual representation depicting an individual under the age of 16 years . . . engaged in
sexual conduct” in violation of § 11-208(a).
Before the Circuit Court on June 21, 2004, Moore entered a plea of not guilty and
proceeded on an agreed statement of facts.  The State read the following agreed statement
of facts into the record:
2
“[O]n or about October 7, 2003 a search and seizure warrant
was served on the defendant’s residence located at apartment
1012 Valley Court, Lexington Park, Saint Mary’s County.  The
defendant, Jonathan G. Moore, was present when the warrant
was served.  He would be identified as the gentleman on my left.
Upon entering the home, Detective Hall read Mr. Moore his
Miranda rights.  Mr. Moore acknowledged that he understood
his rights and voluntarily waived those rights.  The detective
located a computer in the residence, which the defendant
identified as being his computer.  The defendant then voluntarily
assisted the detectives in examining the computer.  The
defendant opened a file under My Documents named ‘Cuts’,
quote unquote.  The detective observed numerous photographic
images in this file which included females who appeared to be
under the age of 16.  One file showed a female who appeared to
be approximately three to five years old being penetrated in her
vagina by a penis from an adult male.  The defendant then
opened the Windows Media Player on his computer, which
listed numerous video files.  He stated he knowingly down
loaded from a web site named Kazza, K-A-Z-Z-A, dot com.
3
Detectives then viewed the video file, and I will describe one of
them, I think [defense counsel] and I agreed there are several
others of this ilk, rather than go through them all.  I will describe
one of them.  It was titled ‘Four Year Old Refusal Come Shot.’
The three second video shows an adult male ejaculating on the
face and mouth of a nude white female who appears to be three
to four years old.
“A further search of the residence revealed computer
printouts near the defendant’s bed.  Many of the images on the
printouts were females who appeared to be under the age of 16
and engaged in sexual intercourse and various sex acts.
“The defendant stated he printed those pictures from
various web sites.  A green, unlabeled floppy disc was also
recovered from the home.  The disc contained a file named
‘cuts.’  Inside the file were 11 photographs, some of which
showed females who appeared to be under age of 16 years old
engaged in sexual intercourse and various sex acts.
“The computer and other described items were seized by
the detective.  The computer case sent to the Computer Crimes
Unit of the Maryland State Police Crime Lab where it was
4
examined by a computer technician.  An examination of the
defendant’s computer revealed it had two hard drives.  An
examination of the first hard drive revealed the following, 47
images of individuals who appeared to be under the age of 16
engaged in sexual intercourse and various sex acts, 32 images of
individuals who appeared to be under the age of 16 in various
stages of undress.
“Examination of the second hard drive revealed the
following, 28 images of individuals who appeared to be under
the age of 16 engaged in sexual intercourse and various sex acts,
13 images of individuals who appeared to be under the age of 16
and in various stages of undress, 11 video clips showing
individuals who appeared to be under the age of 16 and engaged
in intercourse and various sex acts.
“The defendant was interviewed at his house himself and
gave a voluntary statement to the detectives.  He stated that he
downloaded the material from a web site named Kazza dot com,
he stated he had not distributed the material to anyone nor has
he engaged in making any pictures from the videos himself.  He
stated he began down loading the child pornography from late
5
August of 2003 and that he used it for his own sexual
gratification.  The parties agreed to stipulate that the — a finder
of fact would determine the age of all of the individuals on the
pictures and videos and were engaged in sexual intercourse and
sexual acts would be under 16 years old.
“The State is not alleging the defendant was involved in
the taking — in the taking of the pictures or videos recovered.
The State is not alleging the defendant distributed any of the
recovered images or videos or that the defendant did possess
them with the intent to distribute them.
“The computer which contained the aforementioned
images or photos and images were recovered from the
defendant’s residence which was located in Saint Mary’s
County.”
Moore moved for a judgment of acquittal as to Count I, arguing that his conduct was
not prohibited by § 11-207(a)(3).  The court denied the motion and found Moore guilty of
both counts in the indictment.  The court reasoned that the ordinary, plain meaning of the
statutory language proscribed the conduct at issue and that Moore’s acts fell within the
intended scope of the statute.  The court merged the two counts for sentencing purposes and
2Moore has not appealed his conviction of possession of child pornography under §
11-208.
6
sentenced Moore to a term of three years incarceration on Count I, with all but nine months
suspended.2
Moore noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  Before that court
considered the case, we granted certiorari on our own initiative to consider the following
question: 
“Does a person who downloads visual representations of a
minor engaged in obscene acts or sexual conduct from a
computer violate Md. Crim Law, § 11-207(a)(3)’s proscription
against ‘us[ing] a computer to depict or describe a minor
engaging in an obscene act, sadomasochistic abuse or sexual
conduct?’”
385 Md. 511, 869 A.2d 864 (2005).
II.
Under § 11-207(a)(3), a person may not “use a computer to depict or describe a minor
engaging in an obscene act, sadomasochistic abuse, or sexual conduct . . . .”  To resolve the
issue before us, we must interpret the phrase “to use a computer to depict or describe.”
Interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and, therefore, we review de novo the
decision of the Circuit Court.  See Collins v. State, 383 Md. 684, 688, 861 A.2d 727, 730
(2004).  The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent
of the Legislature.  Piper Rudnick v. Hartz, 386 Md. 201, 218, 872 A.2d 58, 68 (2005).  In
7
ascertaining legislative intent, we first examine the plain language of the statute, and if the
plain language of the statute is unambiguous and consistent with the apparent purpose of the
statute, we give effect to the statute as it is written.  Id.
When there is more than one reasonable interpretation of a statute, the statute is
ambiguous.  Comptroller v. Phillips, 384 Md. 583, 591, 865 A.2d 590, 594 (2005).  If the
statutory language is ambiguous, we resolve that ambiguity in light of the legislative intent,
considering the legislative history, case law, and statutory purpose.  See id.  We consider not
only the ordinary meaning of the words, but also how that language relates to the overall
meaning, setting, and purpose of the act.  See Deville v. State, 383 Md. 217, 223, 858 A.2d
484, 487 (2004).  We take into account the history of the statute, the evils or mischief the
Legislature sought to remedy, and the “prevailing mood of the legislative body with respect
to the type of criminal conduct involved.”  Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 436, 639 A.2d
675, 678 (1994) (quoting Randall Book Corp. v. State, 316 Md. 315, 327, 558 A.2d 715, 721
(1989)).  We seek to avoid construction of a statute that is unreasonable, illogical, or
inconsistent with common sense.  See Gwin v. MVA, 385 Md. 440, 462, 869 A.2d 822, 835
(2005).  We construe a statute as a whole so that no word, clause, sentence, or phrase is
rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory.  Phillips, 384 Md. at 591, 865
A.2d at 594.
8
III.
The federal government and almost every state in the country have enacted laws
related to child pornography.  See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758, 102 S. Ct. 3348,
3355, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1113 (1982) (stating that “virtually all of the States and the United States
have passed legislation proscribing the production of or otherwise combating ‘child
pornography’”); Outmezguine v. State, 97 Md. App. 151, 162, 627 A.2d 541, 546 (1993),
aff’d 335 Md. 20, 641 A.2d 870 (1994) (noting that by 1982, the federal government and
forty-seven states had enacted statutes specifically addressing child pornography).  The
Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of
children constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance.” Ferber, 458 U.S. at
757, 102 S.Ct. at 3355.  In Ferber, the Court discussed extensively the danger of child
pornography and the detrimental effect it has on children.  The Court stated as follows:
“The distribution of photographs and films depicting sexual
activity by juveniles is intrinsically related to the sexual abuse
of children in at least two ways.  First, the materials produced
are a permanent record of the children's participation and the
harm to the child is exacerbated by their circulation.  Second,
the distribution  network for child pornography must be closed
if the production of material which requires the sexual
exploitation of children is to be effectively controlled.  Indeed,
there is no serious contention that the legislature was unjustified
in believing that it is difficult, if not impossible, to halt the
exploitation of children by pursuing only those who produce the
photographs and movies.  While the production of pornographic
materials is a low-profile, clandestine industry, the need to
market the resulting products requires a visible apparatus of
distribution.  The most expeditious if not the only practical
method of law enforcement may be to dry up the market for this
9
material by imposing severe criminal penalties on persons
selling, advertising, or otherwise promoting the product.
Thirty-five States and Congress have concluded that restraints
on the distribution of pornographic materials are required in
order to effectively combat the problem, and there is a body of
literature 
and 
testimony 
to 
support 
these 
legislative
conclusions.”
Id. at 759-60, 102 S.Ct. at 3355-56 (footnotes omitted).
In Maryland, two statutes target child pornography specifically.  Section 11-207(a),
provides as follows:
“(a) Prohibited. — A person may not:
“(1) cause, induce, solicit, or knowingly allow a minor to
engage as a subject in the production of obscene matter or a
visual representation or performance that depicts a minor
engaged as a subject in sadomasochistic abuse or sexual
conduct;
“(2) photograph or film a minor engaging in an obscene
act, sadomasochistic abuse, or sexual conduct;
“(3) use a computer to depict or describe a minor
engaging in an obscene act, sadomasochistic abuse, or sexual
conduct;
 “(4) knowingly promote, distribute, or possess with the
intent to distribute any matter, visual representation, or
performance that depicts a minor engaged as a subject in
sadomasochistic abuse or sexual conduct; or
“(5) use a computer to knowingly compile, enter,
transmit, make, print, publish, reproduce, cause, allow, buy, sell,
receive, exchange, or disseminate any notice, statement,
advertisement, or minor's name, telephone number, place of
residence, physical characteristics, or other descriptive or
identifying information for the purpose of engaging in,
facilitating, encouraging, offering, or soliciting unlawful
sadomasochistic abuse or sexual conduct of or with a minor.”
10
A violation of this section is a felony, and, upon conviction, the defendant is subject to
imprisonment not exceeding ten years and a fine for the first offense, and imprisonment not
exceeding twenty years and a fine for each subsequent violation.  § 11-207(b).
Possession of child pornography is prohibited by § 11-208(a), which provides as
follows:
“(a) Prohibited. — A person may not knowingly possess a film,
videotape, photograph, or other visual representation depicting
an individual under the age of 16 years:
“(1) engaged as a subject of sadomasochistic abuse;
“(2) engaged in sexual conduct; or
“(3) in a state of sexual excitement.”
Violation of this section is a misdemeanor.  § 11-208(b).  Upon conviction, the defendant is
subject to imprisonment not exceeding one year and a fine for the first offense, and
imprisonment not exceeding two years and a fine for each subsequent offense.  Id.
Before this Court, Moore argues that his conduct of downloading the prohibited
materials onto his computer did not violate § 11-207(a)(3) because the statute criminalizes
the creation of obscene materials using a computer, not mere possession of such materials
obtained through the use of a computer.  Moore argues that the statute is ambiguous because
the operative word “depict” is subject to two or more reasonable meanings.  He concedes that
one interpretation includes simply using a computer to download an image generated by
someone else and posted on the Internet.  He asserts, however, that “use a computer to depict
or describe” also means to create the visual representation.  Moore then argues that the
legislative history indicates that the General Assembly did not intend to criminalize the
11
downloading and mere possession of child pornography under § 11-207, that having been
covered by § 11-208(a).
The State argues that the statute is unambiguous and that there is no need to consider
legislative intent in enacting the statute.  The State maintains that the plain language of the
statute proscribes the use of a computer to download child pornographic images.  Even if the
statute were ambiguous, the State contends that the legislative history indicates that the
Legislature intended the scope of § 11-207 to be expansive, thus separately criminalizing
Moore’s conduct.
IV.
A.
Section 11-207 does not define the phrase “use a computer to depict or describe.”  As
with all legislation in this sensitive area that lies outside the protection of the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution, the conduct to be prohibited must be defined
adequately by the statute, as written or authoritatively construed.  See Ferber, 458 U.S. at
764, 102 S.Ct. at 3358.
Moore’s interpretation of the statutory phrase “use a computer to depict or describe”
as “use a computer to create” is consistent with the ordinary usage of “depict” and
“describe.”  “Depict” is defined as either “to form a likeness of by drawing or painting” or
“to represent, portray, or delineate in other ways than in drawing or painting.”  Webster’s
12
Third New International Dictionary 605 (1961) [hereinafter “Webster’s’]; see also Kelly v.
William Morrow & Co., 231 Cal. Rptr. 497, 500 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (quoting Webster’s);
Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English Language 683 (1952) [hereinafter
“Funk & Wagnalls”] (defining “depict” as “[t]o portray or picture, as in words; describe or
represent vividly” and “to portray or paint in colors”).  “Describe” means “to represent by
words written or spoken for the knowledge or understanding of others.”  Webster’s, supra,
at 610; see also Funk & Wagnalls, supra, at 687 (defining “describe” as “[t]o give the
characteristics of, as in words or by signs, so that another may form a mental image or idea”).
The definitions indicate that the terms denote creative acts.  Artists and artisans form
a likeness by drawing or painting—they depict.  Poets, narrators, and orators represent,
portray, or delineate—they depict—and represent by words—they describe.  A person who
photographs or films pornographic images of a child, who captures such images directly into
a computer by means of a digital camera or who first translates a motion picture or
photograph of such images into a computer file is engaged in a creative act even though the
perverse, heinous, and cruel nature of this creative act differentiates it from the creative acts
that society values and tolerates.
To the contrary, the State’s interpretation of “use a computer to depict or describe”
as “use a computer to download” does not accord with the ordinary usages of depict and
describe.  The definition of “download” is different than the definitions of “depict” and
“describe.”  “Download” means to transfer or copy a file.  See Darrel Ince, A Dictionary of
13
the Internet 98 (2001) (defining “download” as “[t]he copying of a file or collection of files
from one computer to another”); The Random House Dictionary of the English Language
590 (2d ed. 1987) (defining “download” as “to transfer (software, data, character sets, etc.)
from a distant to a nearby computer, from a larger to a smaller computer, or from a computer
to a peripheral device”).  The definition of “download” makes clear that to download is a
different act than to depict and describe.  The person who captures an image directly into a
computer by means of a digital camera or who first converts the motion picture or
photograph into a computer file has depicted that image.  The person who downloads that
image merely has copied and saved the file—i.e. has taken possession of the file.
The grammatical form of “depict or describe” further evidences that the meaning of
the statute is to use a computer to create, not to use a computer to download.  Section 11-
207(a)(3) states “to use a computer to depict or describe,” employing the verb forms of
“depict” and “describe.”  Moore’s interpretation of “depict or describe” as “to create”
conforms with the verb forms of the terms.  The State’s interpretation conforms with the use
of depict or describe either in the passive form, such as “that depict” or “that describe,” or
in the nominalized form (i.e. as abstract nouns), such as “depiction” or “description.”  See
Joseph M. Williams, Style: Ten Lessons in Clarity & Grace 43-44 (4th ed. 1994) (discussing
nominalizations).  The person who downloads a picture transfers and copies a depiction or
a file that depicts—the image already has been depicted when the person downloads it.  The
act of downloading is covered by § 11-208, which prohibits a person from knowingly
14
possessing a “visual representation depicting an individual under the age of 16 years”
(emphasis added).  Section 11-208 prohibits the possession of an image that already has been
depicted, or created.  Thus, the possession statute employs the nominalized, gerund form of
the verb depict.  See id.
Similarly, § 11-207(a) uses the passive form of depict in two other provisions.  A
person may not “cause, induce, solicit, or knowingly allow a minor to engage as a subject in
the production of obscene matter or a visual representation or performance that depicts a
minor . . . .”  § 11-207(a)(1) (emphasis added).  A person may not “knowingly promote,
distribute, or possess with the intent to distribute any matter, visual representation, or
performance that depicts a minor . . . .”  § 11-207(a)(4) (emphasis added).  These two
provisions do not concern the creation of child pornography, but rather proscribe the
recruitment of children for such offensive material or the distribution of child pornography
that has been created.  As such, the statute employs the passive voice to describe that which
results from the recruitment and that which is distributed.  In contrast, § 11-207(a)(3) governs
the creation of child pornography by computer and thus uses the active forms of depict and
describe.
The Illinois legislature has articulated this distinction between the verb “depict” and
the nominalizations “depiction” or “depicting.”  Illinois proscribes child pornography in 720
Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11-20.1 (2005).  The Illinois provision parallel to § 11-207(a)(2) and (3)
defines child pornography as when a person “films, videotapes, photographs, or otherwise
15
depicts or portrays by means of any similar visual medium or reproduction or depicts by
computer any child . . . .”  720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11-20.1(a)(1) (emphasis added).  That crime
constitutes a Class 1 felony.  Id. at 5/11-20.1(c).  The Illinois possession provision defines
child pornography as when a person “with knowledge of the nature or content thereof,
possesses any film, videotape, photograph or other similar visual reproduction or depiction
by computer of any child . . . .”  Id. at 5/11-20.1(a)(6) (emphasis added).  That crime
constitutes a Class 3 felony.  Id. at 5/11-20.1(c).  Thus, Illinois employs the verb “depict” for
its version of § 11-207(a)(2) and (3) and the nominalization “depiction” for its version of §
11-208.  In 5/11-20.1(f), Illinois defines these two terms as follows:
“(4) ‘Depict by computer’ means to generate or create, or cause
to be created or generated, a computer program or data that,
after being processed by a computer either alone or in
conjunction with one or more computer programs, results in a
visual depiction on a computer monitor, screen, or display.
“(5) ‘Depiction by computer’ means a computer program or data
that, after being processed by a computer either alone or in
conjunction with one or more computer programs, results in a
visual depiction on a computer monitor, screen, or display.”
Under these definitions, a person who creates the computer program or data “depicts by
computer,” and thus violates the Illinois version of § 11-207(a)(3).  A person who downloads
a program possesses a “depiction by computer,” and thus violates the Illinois version of § 11-
208(a).  The Illinois statute is instructive in that it illustrates that legislatures are aware of the
distinctions between “depict” and “depiction.” 
16
We conclude that the plain language of the statutory terms “to depict or describe” is
unambiguous.  The plain meaning of “use a computer to depict or describe” is to use a
computer to create, not to use a computer to download.  We hold that a person who
downloads visual representations of a minor engaged in obscene acts or sexual conduct does
not violate the proscription of § 11-207(a)(3) against “us[ing] a computer to depict or
describe a minor engaging in an obscene act, sadomasochistic abuse, or sexual conduct.”
Accordingly, the Circuit Court erred in finding that Moore violated § 11-207(a)(3).
B.
Our conclusion is bolstered by the legislative history of § 11-207(a)(3).  In 1978,
Congress passed Pub. L. No. 95-225, the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253.  The federal law punished the inducement or employment of
minors to engage in sexually explicit conduct “for the purpose of producing any visual or
print medium depicting such conduct” if the visual or print medium was intended for
interstate or foreign commerce.  Id.; see also Outmezguine, 97 Md. App. at 159-60, 627 A.2d
at 545.  The federal act represented a recognition of the interstate nature of the traffic in child
pornography and the failure of most states to target child pornography.  See Outmezguine,
97 Md. App. at 160, 627 A.2d at 545. 
Three months after Congress passed the federal act, the Maryland General Assembly
enacted the first Maryland statute to address child pornography.  See 1978 Md. Laws, Chap.
573.  The Maryland statute was codified as Md. Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol., 1978 Cum.
17
Supp.), Art. 27, § 419A, and is found currently at § 11-207 of the Criminal Law Article.  The
statutory language and the legislative history of the initial Maryland child pornography
statute suggest that the Legislature was targeting the child pornography industry, i.e., the
creators and distributors of the material.  The statute made it a felony to solicit, cause, induce,
or knowingly permit a person under sixteen to engage as a subject in the production of
obscene matter, or to photograph or film a person under sixteen engaged in an obscene act.
See 1978 Md. Laws, Chap. 573.  The bill file contains a letter from an Assistant Attorney
General describing the bill as “legislation which is designed to prohibit the production and
distribution of [child pornography] within the boundaries of this State . . . complement[ing]
the federal bill.”  Additionally, a member of the National Conference of State Legislatures
testified before a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee detailing the steps being
taken by states across the country to criminalize and “to prosecute those responsible for using
children in obscene materials and selling them for profit.”
In New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 102 S. Ct. 3348, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1113 (1982), the
United States Supreme Court reviewed a New York child pornography statute that prohibited
material depicting sexual conduct by a child under sixteen, rather than merely “obscene”
material.  See id. at 750-51, 102 S.Ct. at 3351.  The Court upheld the statute, holding that the
First Amendment permits a state to proscribe the distribution of sexual materials involving
minors without regard to an obscenity standard.  See id. at 760-61, 102 S.Ct. at 3356-57.
18
Congress responded to Ferber by enacting Pub. L. 98-292, the Child Protection Act
of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251 to 2254.  See Outmezguine, 97 Md. App. at 164, 627 A.2d at 547.
That law amended the 1977 law, inter alia, to include depictions of “sexually explicit
conduct” that need not be legally obscene and to redefine “minor” to include children ages
sixteen and seventeen.  See id.
The Maryland Legislature responded to Ferber with a series of amendments to Art.
27, § 419A.  See Outmezguine, 97 Md. App. at 164, 627 A.2d at 547.  In 1985, the General
Assembly increased the fine under the statute from $15,000 to $25,000 and expanded the
reach of the statute beyond obscene matters to include the knowing promotion, distribution,
or possession with the intent to distribute of “any matter or other visual representation, which
depicts a child engaged as a subject in sexual conduct.”  See 1985 M d. Laws, Chap. 494;
Outmezguine, 97 Md. App. at 164-65, 627 A.2d at 547-48.  As it had done with the
promotion and distribution provisions in 1985, the Legislature subsequently expanded the
reach of the provision outlawing the photographing or filming of children beyond “obscene”
matter to specifically include children engaged in “sexual conduct.”  See 1986 Md. Laws,
Chap. 112; Outmezguine, 97 Md. App. at 165, 627 A.2d at 548.  In 1989, the Legislature
expanded each provision of the child pornography statute to include children ages sixteen and
seventeen.  See 1989 Md. Laws, Chap. 398; Outmezguine, 97 Md. App. at 165, 627 A.2d at
548.
3The Legislature also amended Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27 § 419A to
add a section proscribing the compilation and transmission of data about minors for the
purpose of inducing children to engage in unlawful sexual conduct or sadomasochistic abuse.
See 1996 Md. Laws, Chap. 443;  Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27 § 419A(e).  That
provision is now § 11-207(a)(5).
The Legislature did not need to specify computers in the provision prohibiting the
distribution of child pornography, because Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27 §
419A(d), now § 11-207(a)(4), proscribed the promotion, distribution, or possession with
intent to distribute of “any matter or other visual representation or performance.”  That
provision includes computers.
19
Simple possession of child pornography was not a crime in Maryland until 1992.  In
1992, the Legislature enacted Md. Code (1957, 1992 Rep. Vol., 1992 Cum. Supp.), Art 27
§ 419B, making it a misdemeanor to “knowingly possess any film, videotape, photograph,
or other visual representation depicting [a minor] engaged as a subject of sadomasochistic
abuse or in sexual conduct, or in a state of sexual excitement.”  See 1992 Md. Laws, Chap.
443.  The crime was punishable by a fine or not more than one year imprisonment, or both,
for a first offense, and a fine or not more than two years imprisonment, or both, for a second
or subsequent offense.  Id.  This section became § 11-208 of the Criminal Law Article.
Until 1996, the proscriptions against child pornography in Maryland made no
reference to the use of computers.  The Legislature amended § 419A(c) to read as follows:
“Every person who photographs, films, or by means of computer depicts or describes a minor
engaging in an obscene act or engaging in sexual conduct or sadomasochistic abuse” is guilty
of a felony.  1996 Md. Laws, Chap. 443 (emphasis added).3
4The constitutionality of the proscription of computer writings containing child
pornography is not at issue in this case.
20
The Legislature included the words “or describe” in the 1996 amendment to ensure
that the provision included pornographic texts.4  During the 1995 legislative session, the
session before the Legislature passed the amendment adding computers, the Senate passed
Senate Bill 22.  Senate Bill 22 added nearly identical language as was added in the 1996
session, except that Senate Bill 22 added “depict,” not “depict or describe.”  See “Bill
Analysis” in the bill file for Senate Bill 133.  Senate Bill 22 received an unfavorable report
from the House Judiciary Committee.  Id.  
The bill passed in the 1996 session originally did not include the words “or describe.”
The bill file contains a September 4, 2005 draft of Senate Bill 133, which indicates that the
bill originally was identical to Senate Bill 22.  The drafter added by hand the words “or
describe.”  This addition apparently stemmed from comments made by a reviewer written on
the “Session of 1996 L[egislative] R[eference] Request Form.”  On September 6, the
reviewer noted as follows: “Does (c) apply only to visual depiction (i.e. picture) or could it
also be text that is pornographic (i.e. a story).  I think you may want to clarify it.”  The
Request Form indicates that the drafter noted this suggestion on September 25.  The
September 28 draft of the bill included this new language.  The Senate adopted the bill in its
revised form, and the House adopted the change following the Conference Committee.  See
“Conference Committee Report.”  
5Section 11-208 does not specify computers, but instead encompasses computers
within the term “other visual representation.”  See Rutledge v. State, 745 So.2d 912, 917
(Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (construing a child pornography statute prohibiting possession of a
“photographic or other visual reproduction” to include images stored on computers, computer
disks, and the Internet); State v. Cohen, 696 So.2d 435, 438 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)
(stating that the fact “[t]hat pornographic images of children are scanned into a computer
rather than pressed onto the pages of a magazine, or that the images are stored on a hard drive
rather than in a shoebox, does not change the fact that a defendant possesses pornographic
representations of actual children”); Perry v. Commonwealth, 780 N.E.2d 53, 55 (Mass.
2002) (concluding that the legislature’s use of the broad term “visual material” in its child
pornography statute was intended to encompass computer images and asserting that “[i]t
matters not that the scene is captured in bytes rather than on conventional film”); State v.
Howell, 609 S.E.2d 417, 421 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that the defendant’s opening and
saving of computer images of child pornography constituted criminal possession of those
images).  Section 11-208 applies to unopened computer files containing visual
representations of child pornography notwithstanding the fact that computer hardware and
software may be required to render the image visible.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (2005) (defining
“visual depiction” to include “undeveloped film and videotape, and data stored on computer
disk or by electronic means which is capable of conversion into a visual image”); Perry, 780
N.E.2d at 56 (reasoning that any distinction based on how the pornographic images are stored
or communicated is immaterial given the harm the statute was enacted to address);
Commonwealth v. Hinds, 768 N.E.2d 1067, 1074 (Mass. 2002) (interpreting prohibited
possession of a “depiction by computer” of child pornography to include not only computer
files that are disseminated or reduced to hard copies, but also unopened files on a hard drive);
People v. Fraser, 704 N.Y.S.2d 426, 429-30 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (finding that graphic
images stored on the defendant’s computer fell within the statutory prohibition against
possessing photographs of child pornography despite the fact that a computer graphic image
is visible to the unaided eye only when processed through a computer).
21
In 2002, as a result of the Code Revision, Art. 27, § 419A(b) through (g) was repealed
and reenacted as § 11-207 of the Criminal Law Article and Art. 27, § 419B was repealed and
reenacted as § 11-208.5  The relevant provision of § 11-207 contained two changes from §
419A.  First, § 419A(c) was divided into two sections—“photograph and film” and “use a
computer to depict or describe” were separated into § 11-207(a)(2) and (3) respectively.
Second, the term “by means of a computer” was replaced with the term “use a computer.”
22
See 2002 M d. Laws, Chap. 26.  As pointed out by the Revisor’s Note, § 11-207 was derived
from Art 27, § 419A without substantive change.  Id.
Our review of the legislative history of § 11-207 supports our conclusion that “use a
computer to depict or describe” means to use a computer to create.  First, the inclusion of “or
describes” in § 11-207(a)(3) indicates that the Legislature did not intend for the provision to
include the downloading of files.  It is clear that the recipient of a text file does not
“describe” the subject matter of the text when the recipient downloads the file.  Instead, the
author describes the subject matter by writing the text, and the recipient copies and transfers
the description onto the computer screen or drive.  For example, a person who downloads a
poem has not described a rose—the poet described the rose when writing the poem.  The act
of downloading a picture is more confusing because it involves an image within an
image—the picture itself and the projection of the image onto the computer screen.  The
photographer depicts a subject by creating an image—the photograph.  The recipient does
not depict the subject of the picture, but rather copies or transfers the photograph onto the
computer screen or drive.  A person who downloads a picture of a rose does not depict the
rose—the photographer depicts the rose when taking the picture.  The inclusion of “or
describe” thus elucidates the meaning of “depict” and further indicates that § 11-207(a)(3)
does not proscribe the act of downloading files.
Second, as we have noted, the Legislature did not intend to change the substance of
the statute when it bifurcated the following provision from the 1996 amended statute: “Every
23
person who photographs, films, or by means of computer depicts or describes a minor
engaging in an obscene act or engaging in sexual conduct or sadomasochistic abuse . . . is
subject to [a penalty].”  Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 419A(c) (emphasis
added).  The terms “photographs” and “films” are verbs describing creative acts—a person
takes a photograph or makes a film.  Unfortunately, there is no equivalent verb for the
creative act of depicting or describing by computer—a person cannot computer a computer.
For that reason, the Legislature was compelled to add the long phrase “or by means of
computer depicts or describes,” despite the fact that the wording does not parallel the
structure of “who photographs, films.”
The original placement of the phrase “by means of computers depicts or describes”
at the end of a list that included the creative verbs “photographs” and “films” indicates that
the Legislature intended the phrase to mean “to create by means of computers.”  A summary
of the proposed amendment contained in the bill file supports this conclusion.  A “Bill
Analysis” to Senate Bill 133 described the amendment as an expansion of the provision
relating to photography and film making.  The “Bill Analysis” summarized the bill as
follows:
“The bill expands a current child pornography law relating to
certain types of photographs and film to make it applicable to
computer generated images and descriptions of minors
engaging in obscene acts or sexual conduct.  Specifically, the
bill makes it a felony to depict or describe, by means of a
computer, a minor engaged in an obscene act or sexual
conduct.” (Emphasis added.)
6The New Jersey Supreme Court employed similar reasoning in State v. Sisler, 827
A.2d 274 (2003).  Sisler was arrested for printing child pornography from a computer and
charged with the violation of a statute similar to § 11-207(a)(2) and (3).  The New Jersey
provision provides as follows:
“Any person who photographs or films a child in a prohibited
sexual act or in the simulation of such an act or who uses any
device, including a computer, to reproduce or reconstruct the
image of a child in a prohibited sexual act or in the simulation
of such an act is guilty of a crime of the second degree.”
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:24-4b(4) (West 1995, 2005 Cum. Supp.).  As in Maryland, the clause
specifying computers was added as an amendment to the statute.  See Sisler, 827 A.2d at 277.
The New Jersey Supreme Court relied on the juxtaposition of “who uses any device,
including a computer, to reproduce or reconstruct” with “who photographs or films” to
conclude that “reproduce or reconstruct” means to create.  The court stated as follows:
“The disputed language, fairly read, merely describes the
computer-generation or other technological process that creates
the prohibited image that the original creator or that another
person, in turn, disseminates, possesses, or simply views. Stated
differently, we consider the word ‘reproduce’ alongside the
second-degree offenses to which it is held equivalent, including
‘photograph[ing] or film[ing] a child in a prohibited sexual
act[.]’ The Legislature coupled the offenses of photographing
and reproducing, indicating that they are of comparable gravity
and worthy of identical punishment. The term ‘reproduce’
thereby takes on a comparable meaning.”
Id. at 278.  The court then held that Sisler’s conduct did not fit within the statute.  See id. at
280.
24
Thus, the 1996 addition of the computer-related language with filming and photography
reasonably can be understood as a recognition by the Legislature that the computer was a new
technology which could be used to create child pornography.6
25
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR ST. MARY’S COUNTY, AS TO THE
C O N V I C T I O N  
U N D E R  
§ 
1 1 - 2 0 7,
REVERSED.  CASE REMANDED TO THAT
COURT FOR SENTENCING UNDER § 11-
208.  COSTS TO BE PAID BY ST. MARY’S
COUNTY.