Title: Jamestown Terminal Elevator, Inc. v. Knopp

State: north-dakota

Issuer: North Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

246 N.W.2d 612 (1976) JAMESTOWN TERMINAL ELEVATOR, INC., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Herbert KNOPP, Defendant and Appellee. Civ. No. 9228. Supreme Court of North Dakota. October 15, 1976. *613 Nilles, Hansen, Selbo, Magill & Davies, Fargo, for plaintiff and appellant; argued by Stephen W. Plambeck, Fargo. Hjellum, Weiss, Nerison, Jukkala & Vinje, Jamestown, for defendant and appellee; argued by Gerald W. Jukkala, Jamestown. ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice. This appeal is from an order of the Stutsman County District Court quashing a levy and execution and forbidding the sheriff from offering for sale certain real property located in that county. The issue on appeal is whether a judgment lien on the property of a joint tenant may be enforced subsequent to the death of the judgment debtor. A judgment was entered and docketed on October 1, 1974, in Stutsman County District Court, in favor of Jamestown Terminal Elevator, Inc. and against Herbert Knopp. Mr. Knopp died unexpectedly on November 5, 1974, leaving no estate to probate. All his property had been held in joint tenancy with his wife Rachel, and had been so held since its acquisition. On January 27, 1976, a Writ of Execution was issued to the Sheriff of Stutsman County by the Clerk of District Court of that county. Pursuant to this Writ, on January 28, 1976, the sheriff levied upon certain real property in Stutsman County which Herbert and Rachel Knopp had held in joint tenancy on the date the judgment for the elevator was docketed. On April 9, 1976, following a motion by Rachel Knopp, the Honorable M. C. Fredricks, Judge of the Fourth Judicial District Court, found that, upon Herbert Knopp's death, the joint tenancy property passed to Rachel "free of all claims of creditors" and ordered that the levy and execution be quashed and the sheriff be prohibited from offering the property for sale. A surviving joint tenant obtains the deceased joint tenant's interest in jointly held real property, not from the deceased joint tenant's estate, but by reason of the original joint tenancy deed. Schlichenmayer v. Luithle, 221 N.W.2d 77, 83 (N.D.1974); In Re Kaspari's Estate, 71 N.W.2d 558, 564 (N.D.1955). A joint tenancy may be described as a life estate with each joint tenant having a contingent remainder in feethe contingency being based upon survival of the other joint tenant or tenants. Ziegler v. Bonnell, 52 Cal. App. 2d 217, 126 P.2d 118, 119 (1942). As this right of survivorship stems from the original conveyance in joint tenancy, it is a right prior in time to a creditor's judgment lien. It is a right of which there is notice, presuming the joint tenancy deed is properly recorded. Section 47-19-45, N.D.C.C. The right of survivorship is in the whole interest conveyed by the original joint tenancy deed, not merely in the deceased joint tenant's moiety. This concept may perhaps be clarified by referring to Blackstone: Severance of a joint tenancy interest in real property may be accomplished by partition. In Re Larendon's Estate, 439 Pa. 535, 266 A.2d 763, 42 A.L.R.3d 1107 (1970); Underwood v. Otwell, 269 N.C. 571, 153 S.E.2d 40 (1967). Severance may be accomplished also by alienation. Schimke v. Karlstad, 87 S.D. 349, 208 N.W.2d 710 (1973); Keokuk Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Desvaux, 259 Iowa 387, 143 N.W.2d 296 (1966). Sale under execution upon a judgment lien will likewise sever the joint tenancy. Frederick v. Shorman, 259 Iowa 1050, 147 N.W.2d 478 (1966); In Re King's Estate, 261 Wis. 266, 52 N.W.2d 885 (1952); Rauer's Collection Co. v. Higgins, 87 Cal. App. 2d 248, 196 P.2d 803 (1948). The crucial issue in this case is whether a judgment lien against a joint tenant's interest in real property is, of itself, sufficient to operate as a severance of the joint tenancy. We hold that it is not. It is our view that since the judgment debtor died before the sale under execution of his interest in the joint tenancy estate, his surviving joint tenant became the sole owner of the real property. This results from the nature of a joint tenancy estate. Ziegler v. Bonnell, supra; Musa v. Segelke & Kohlhaus Co., 224 Wis. 432, 272 N.W. 657 (1937); 48 C.J.S. Joint Tenancy § 4, p. 928 (1947); 20 Am.Jur.2d Cotenancy and Joint Ownership § 21, p. 115 (1965). The surviving joint tenant does not take the interest of the deceased joint tenant; rather, the contingent remainder vests in the survivor because the contingency (survival of the cotenant) has been met. The deceased joint tenant had, essentially, a life estate which no longer exists, a power in himself and his judgment creditor to sever which was never exercised and lapsed upon death, and a contingent remainder which never vested. See Ziegler v. Bonnell, supra; Blackstone, supra. The elevator claims that the joint tenancy property should be available to the judgment creditor subsequent to the death of the judgment debtor because of Section 28-20-06(1), N.D.C.C. which reads: The facts we have before us are nearly identical to those in the Wisconsin case of Musa v. Segelke & Kohlhaus Co., supra. In that case, the judgment creditor claimed that its rights in joint tenancy property, under a judgment lien, were not to be defeated by the death of the judgment debtor, relying upon the following statute: Although the above emphasized language in Wis.Stat. § 272.14 (1935) seems to be even more inclusive than the phrase "any real property of the decedent" in Section 28-20-06(1), N.D.C.C., the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that, upon the death of the judgment debtor, no interest remained upon which the creditor could enforce its judgment by execution. North Dakota's statute must be interpreted with reference to the intent of the North Dakota Legislature in adopting it. While some states have statutorily abolished the right of survivorship, our legislature has specifically recognized the estate in joint tenancy. Our legislature has distinguished between "joint tenancy interests" and "interests in common": In In Re Kaspari's Estate, supra, 71 N.W.2d at p. 564, quoting 48 C.J.S. Joint Tenancy § 1 b, p. 910, this court said that the right of survivorship is the distinctive characteristic of such a tenancy. Counsel for the elevator points out that a statute must "be construed liberally, with a view to effecting its objects and to promoting justice." Section 1-02-01, N.D.C.C. But the question still remainsWhat are the objectives of Section 28-20-06(1)? We believe that those objectives must be considered in light of the recognition on the part of the legislature of different interests in property. Since the joint tenancy was never severed and since Herbert Knopp did not survive his cotenant, the only interest that ever vested in him was a life estate. The elevator argues that Section 28-20-06(1) should be construed in light of subsection 2 of that same section, which reads: The elevator contends that since that subsection requires a levy prior to death to permit sale of the personal property after death to satisfy the debt, it follows that since this was not specified in conjunction with real property, that sale under execution of the joint tenant's interest need not precede a cotenant's death to permit sale of the cotenant's interest after death to satisfy the cotenant's debt. The reason personal property must be levied upon in order to preserve this power is that a levy is necessary for a lien to attach to personal property, while merely docketing the judgment creates a lien on real property. Finch, Van Slyck & McConville v. Jackson, 57 N.D. 17, 220 N.W. 130 (1928); Winslow v. Klundt, 51 N.D. 808, 201 N.W. 169 (1924). In light of the fact that the estate in joint tenancy, along with its peculiar characteristics, was recognized in common law, and has been statutorily recognized in *616 North Dakota since statehood, and joint tenancies have been widely utilized in this state, we are reluctant to find that Section 28-20-06(1), N.D.C.C., without explicit reference to joint tenancies, was meant to alter the nature of that estate. For the reasons stated herein, the order appealed from is affirmed. SAND, PAULSON, PEDERSON and VOGEL, JJ., concur.