Title: Clark v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
JEROME D. CLARK,
Defendant Below-
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF DELAWARE,
Plaintiff Below-
Appellee.
§
§
§  Nos. 347, 2001 and 362, 2001
§  (Consolidated)
§
§  Court Below—Superior Court
§  of the State of Delaware,
§  in and for New Castle County
§  Cr.A. No. VN97-11-0904-04
§  Cr. ID 9711003630
§
Submitted: January 15, 2002
  Decided:
April 1, 2002
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and BERGER, Justices.
O R D E R
This first day of April 2002, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs
and the record below, it appears to the Court that:
(1)
The defendant-appellant, Jerome D. Clark, pleaded guilty in
1998 to one count of Robbery in the Second Degree.  The Superior Court
sentenced Clark to five years at Level V imprisonment, suspended after one
year for four years of decreasing levels of supervision.  In January 2001,
Clark was arrested on new criminal charges and, as a result, a violation of
probation (VOP) report was filed against him.  Clark appeared with his
appointed counsel at the VOP hearing in July 2001.  At the start of the
hearing, Clark requested a continuance so that his family could retain private
2
counsel for him.  The Superior Court denied the continuance request.  Clark
requested in the alternative that he be permitted to represent himself at the
hearing, which the Superior Court permitted him to do. Clark was found
guilty of his fourth violation of probation (VOP).  The Superior Court
sentenced him, effective July 12, 2001, to a period of one year, two months,
and nineteen days at Level V imprisonment, with credit given for 135 days
previously served.  Clark now appeals from that judgment.
(2)
In his opening brief on appeal, Clark raises the following three
issues: (1) his appointed counsel below was ineffective and had a conflict of
interest; (2) given his appointed counsel’s conflict of interest, the Superior
Court erred in refusing to grant Clark a continuance on the day of the VOP
hearing in order to allow Clark time to obtain new counsel; and (3) he was
denied due process because he was arrested in January 2001 and was not
afforded a hearing until July 2001.  We have considered Clark’s contentions
and find them to be without merit.
(3)
In his opening brief, Clark complains that his counsel was
ineffective for failing to file a motion to dismiss the VOP charges.
Ordinarily, this Court will not consider claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel for the first time on direct appeal unless the claim was raised first to
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the trial court.1  Clark did raise vague complaints about his counsel’s
performance to the Superior Court at the VOP hearing, which the Superior
Court rejected.  To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
Clark must establish: (a) that defense counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness; and (b) that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of
the case would have been different.2  As explained further below, we find no
error in counsel’s refusal to file a motion to dismiss on the ground of
unnecessary delay.  Therefore, we reject Clark’s allegation of ineffective
assistance of counsel.
(4)
Furthermore, we find no error in the Superior Court’s refusal to
grant Clark a continuance on the morning of the scheduled hearing in order
to retain substitute counsel.  As the Superior Court correctly noted, Clark
had had sufficient time prior to the hearing to retain substitute counsel.  The
record reflects in fact that the VOP hearing initially had been scheduled in
February, but the Superior Court postponed it at Clark’s request so that
Clark at that time could retain new counsel.  Given Clark’s prior opportunity
                                                
1 Wright v. State, 513 A.2d 1310, 1315 (Del. 1986).
2 Outten v. State, 720 A.2d 547, 551-52 (Del. 1998) (citing the standard set forth
in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)).
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to retain counsel, we find no abuse of the Superior Court’s discretion in
refusing Clark’s last minute request for a further continuance.3
(5)
Finally, we find no merit to Clark’s claim that his due process
rights were violated because there was unnecessary delay in scheduling the
VOP hearing.  The record reflects that Clark was arrested on the VOP
charge in January 2001.  The VOP hearing was scheduled for February but
was continued at Clark’s request so that he could retain substitute counsel.
The hearing was then rescheduled for March but then was postponed by the
Court until April.  In April, the State was granted a continuance due to the
absence of a witness.  Thereafter, the hearing was rescheduled and was held
in July.
(6)
For a criminal complaint to be dismissed pursuant to Superior
Court Criminal Rule 48 due to unnecessary delay, we have held that the
delay, unless of constitutional dimensions, must be attributable to the
prosecution and must have prejudiced the defendant in some measurable
way.4  The record reflects that less than three months of the six-month delay
in this case was attributable to the prosecution. Some of the delay was
caused by Clark himself and other delay was necessitated by the Superior
                                                
3 See Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997, 1018 (Del. 1985).
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Court’s schedule.  Furthermore, a six-month delay is not sufficiently long
enough to be presumptively prejudicial, and Clark has made no attempt to
articulate any specific prejudice he suffered as a result of the delay.
Accordingly, we reject Clark’s contention that the Superior Court should
have dismissed his case for unnecessary delay.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the
Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Randy J. Holland
Justice
                                                                                                                                                
4 State v. Harris, 616 A.2d 288, 291 (Del. 1992).