Title: State v. Larson

State: utah

Issuer: Utah Supreme Court

Document:

758 P.2d 901 (1988) STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. David L. LARSON, Defendant and Appellant. No. 860492. Supreme Court of Utah. May 26, 1988. Robert W. Gutke, Logan, for defendant and appellant. David L. Wilkinson, Sandra Sjogren, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent. *902 HALL, Chief Justice: Defendant challenges the constitutionality of the minimum mandatory sentencing scheme of the child sodomy statute[1] on the grounds of equal protection, cruel and unusual punishment, and vagueness. He also challenges the propriety of his sentence for sexual abuse of a child. Defendant was charged with one count of sodomy[2] on his five-year-old stepdaughter and one count of sexual abuse[3] of his four-year-old stepdaughter. The offenses were committed in defendant's home, where the victims had resided since defendant's marriage to their mother five months previously. The offenses were committed in sequence on the same day and in the presence of both victims, at a time when their mother was away from the home. Defendant entered a plea of guilty to each offense as charged and sought to be placed on probation by virtue of his relationship as a stepparent. In a case of sodomy on a child committed by a stepparent, the court has the discretion to consider probation if certain statutorily enumerated circumstances are established by a preponderance of the evidence. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-406.5 (Supp. 1987) provides in part: At the time of sentencing, the trial court observed that defendant had failed to establish by a preponderance of evidence his eligibility for probation under all of the criteria required by section 76-5-406.5, namely, defendant had not assumed the role of stepfather for a continuous period of at least one year prior to committing the offense of sodomy, the offense of sexual abuse of a child was committed against another victim at the same time or during the same course of conduct, and the offenses were committed in succession in the presence of both victims. Therefore, the court appropriately concluded that defendant was ineligible for probation, and it did not err in imposing the minimum mandatory prison sentence of five years. Defendant contends that section 76-5-406.5 deprives him of equal protection in violation of both the federal and state constitutions because it arbitrarily permits a stepparent that has resided with the child victim for more than a year to be placed on probation, but denies the privilege of probation *904 to a stepparent that has resided with the victim a lesser period of time. Defendant asserts that there is no valid legislative purpose to be served by a distinction which treats similarly situated persons differently. However, we need not, and therefore do not, reach defendant's equal protection claim because he was not denied probation simply on the basis of the inadequacy of his status as a stepparent.[4] Rather, the trial judge based his decision on two other statutorily defined circumstances, namely, that defendant victimized both stepchildren during the same course of conduct[5] and that the offenses were committed in the presence of both children.[6] Subsection 76-5-406.5(1) expressly requires that in order to be considered for probation, a defendant must demonstrate his eligibility under all twelve of the criteria set forth therein. Defendant was unable to do so in the two specific categories just mentioned. The trial judge therefore did not err in imposing the minimum mandatory prison sentence. Defendant's contention that his minimum mandatory five-year sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment was previously addressed in State v. Bishop,[7] which decision is dispositive of that issue. There is nothing about defendant's sodomy conviction that distinguishes it from those in Bishop or in any way indicates that the harshness of the penalty is so disproportionate to the nature of the crime that it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Similarly, defendant's contention that the minimum mandatory sentencing scheme is unconstitutionally vague was decided in State v. Egbert,[8] which decision is dispositive of the issue here.[9] Defendant's remaining point on appeal is that he also received a minimum mandatory sentence of five years for the offense of sexual abuse of a child, whereas Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1(2) (Supp. 1987) provides for a sentence of one to fifteen years. The record reflects that at the time of sentencing, the trial judge correctly imposed a sentence of one to fifteen years for the offense of sexual abuse of a child. However, when the judgment was prepared, it reflected the sentence of the court to be as follows: It is thus necessary to remand for the purpose of correcting the judgment to reflect the actual sentence of one to fifteen years that was imposed. In all other respects, the judgment and sentences of the court are affirmed. HOWE, Associate C.J., and DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. STEWART, J., concurs in the result. [1] Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-403.1(2), 76-5-406.5 (Supp. 1987), 76-3-201 (Supp. 1986) (amended 1987); see also §§ 76-3-406, 77-27-9 (Supp. 1987). [2] In violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403.1(1) (Supp. 1987). [3] In violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1(1) (Supp. 1987). [4] See Hoyle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah 1980) (The constitutionality of a statute should be passed upon only when such a determination is essential to the decision in a case); see also Blum v. Stone, 752 P.2d 898 (Utah 1988). [5] Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-406.5(1)(d) (Supp. 1987). [6] Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-406.5(1)(f) (Supp. 1987). [7] 717 P.2d 261, 268-72 (Utah 1986). [8] 748 P.2d 558 (Utah 1987); see also State v. Gerrish, 746 P.2d 762 (Utah 1987). [9] See Egbert, 748 P.2d at 559 n. 2; Gerrish, 746 P.2d at 762; State v. Kaus, 744 P.2d 1375, 1376 (Utah 1987).