Title: Dykstra v. Property Valuation & Review

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 90-566



Frank and Ann Dykstra                        Supreme Court


     v.                                      On Appeal from
                                             Property Valuation
                                               & Review Division
Property Valuation
  & Review Division                          March Term, 1991


 Elizabeth Koitto, Chair

Kevin E. Brown of Langrock Sperry & Wool, Middlebury, for plaintiffs-
  appellants

Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and Jacqueline A. Hughes, Special
  Assistant Attorney General, Montpelier, for defendant-appellee


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.



     GIBSON, J.   Frank and Ann Dykstra appeal from an order of the State
Board of Appraisers directing them to repay to the State $3,354.07 in tax
benefits previously received under the Working Farm Tax Abatement Program
(WFTAP), 32 V.S.A. {{ 3764-3775.  We affirm.
     The Dykstras enrolled their 267-acre New Haven farm in WFTAP beginning
April 1, 1989, and thereafter leased the property to their son Andrew to
operate as a farm.  On April 12, 1990 they conveyed all but 10.11 acres to
Joseph W. Devall, who was not a farmer within the meaning of 32 V.S.A. {
3764(5).  Mr. Devall continued the lease to Andrew Dykstra, who continued to
operate the farm.  On May 4, 1990, the director of the Division of Property
Valuation and Review notified the Dykstras that the sale to Devall triggered
conversion of the property to nonfarm use within the meaning of { 3764(2). (FN1)
Although continuing the lease to Andrew Dykstra for farming purposes
allowed the new owner to retain the property's eligibility for WFTAP, the
Dykstras had "convey[ed] property enrolled in the program by deed" and none
of the exceptions in { 3764(2) applied to their case.   Since the property
had been "converted to nonfarm use," the director sought repayment of the
benefits the Dykstras had received.  See 32 V.S.A. { 3774(a).  The Dykstras
appealed the Division's order to the State Board of Appraisers, which
affirmed the ruling, and the present appeal followed.
     The parties do not differ on the effect of a sale of enrolled property
under a literal reading of { 3764(2)(B).  A property is converted to nonfarm
use unless one of the stated exceptions applies.  The exceptions provision
of { 3764(2) states in relevant part:
           Notwithstanding the preceding, it shall not be
         considered a conversion to nonfarm use:

             (A) to convey property enrolled in the program to a
         farmer who maintains the property's status as eligible
         property.

(Emphasis added.)  Since Joseph W. Devall was not a "farmer," the exception
on its face did not apply to the transaction, and therefore, under { 3764(2)
the property was deemed converted to nonfarm use.
     The Dykstras argue that the result of this literal reading of the
statute is irrational, since nonfarmers may enroll property that is leased
to a farmer for a term of three years or more in the WFTAP program under {
3764(3).  They argue that since a nonfarmer may partake in the WFTAP program
via leasing to a farmer, conveyance from one owner leasing "eligible
property" to another owner leasing the same property in the same manner
should not trigger a conversion to nonfarm use.
     We disagree that a statute distinguishing farmer transferees of
enrolled property from nonfarmer transferees is necessarily irrational.
Legislative enactments enjoy a presumption of validity, and "if any reason-
able policy or purpose for the legislative classification may be conceived
of, the enactment will be upheld."  Andrews v. Lathrop, 132 Vt. 256, 259,