Title: Matter of Nyquist

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Matter of Nyquist1994 WY 25870 P.2d 360Case Number: 93-129Decided: 03/14/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
In 
the Matter of the Workers' Compensation Claim of Tim J. NYQUIST.

OLSTEN 
TEMPORARY SERVICES, 

Appellant 
(Petitioner/Employer)

v.

STATE 
of Wyoming, ex rel., Wyoming WORKERS' COMPENSATION DIVISION, 

Appellee 
(Respondent Objector-Defendant).

Appeal 
from the District Court, Albany County, Arthur T. Hanscum, 
J.

 

Representing 
Appellant:

George 
Santini, Cheyenne.

Representing 
Appellee:

Joseph 
B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Kenneth E. Spurrier, 
Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne. 

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      This appeal 
arises from an administrative agency decision affirmed by the district court. 
Olsten Services (Olsten) asserted that it was not afforded notice or an 
opportunity to be heard before worker compensation benefits were paid to an 
injured employee. Believing that the error of the Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Division (Division) left Olsten only one appropriate remedy, Olsten did not 
contest the benefit payments and instead sought to avoid charges to its 
experience rating for benefit payments made to the employee. Olsten contended 
that WYO. STAT. § 27-14-603(e) permits nonchargeability in this situation. The 
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) determined that the statute did not 
authorize its agency to order nonchargeability.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      Appellant 
presents these issues:

I. 
Should an employer which loses its opportunity to defend claims made against its 
experience rating due to the mistake of the Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Division also be forced to bear the cost of that mistake?

II. 
Is there a remedy for employers who are denied the right to a hearing due to the 
mistakes of the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division?

III. 
Where an employer has been materially prejudiced in its defense of claims due to 
its detrimental reliance upon a determination entered by the Division, does 
estoppel bar the Division from objecting to a stipulated settlement and award of 
benefits which does not charge the employer's experience rating?

[¶4]      Appellee states 
the issues as:

A. 
Whether the hearing officer has authority, pursuant to W.S. § 27-14-603(e), to 
order the Division to charge benefits to an industrial class as a whole rather 
than a single employer?

B. 
Whether the employer waived any claim for relief based upon W.S. § 
27-14-603(e)?

C. 
Whether the hearing officer properly concluded that no statutory basis afforded 
Appellant relief from an agency error resulting in denial of procedural due 
process?

D. 
Whether there is an adequate remedy for employers who allege mistakes by the 
Division in its rate setting functions?

[¶5]      The OAH's 
decision was based upon statutory interpretation, and it is that conclusion of 
law which is considered by this court. The germane issue is:

Whether 
WYO. STAT. § 27-14-603(e) (1991) authorizes the Office of Administrative 
Hearings to order the Worker's Compensation Division not to charge the benefits 
paid to an injured employee against the employer's experience 
rating.

[¶6]      Olsten employed 
Timothy J. Nyquist as a temporary construction worker. While assigned to a 
project at the Buttrey Food Store in Laramie, Wyoming, Nyquist contended he was 
injured on September 17, 1991. He reported a lower back injury to the Division 
on September 20, 1991. Olsten disputed Nyquist's claim on September 23, 1991, 
the claim was denied by the Division on November 8, 1991, and Olsten received 
notification of this denial. Four days later, on November 12, 1991, the Division 
reversed itself and granted benefits to Nyquist after receiving a letter from 
Nyquist's doctor that the injury was not due to any preexisting condition. It is 
disputed whether the Division failed to notify Olsten of its reconsideration and 
subsequent reversal.

[¶7]      Olsten learned in 
February, 1992, that benefits were being paid to Nyquist. On February 26, 1992, 
Olsten contacted the Division, objected to the payments, requested its 
experience rating not be charged and inquired why a hearing had not been 
granted. The Division notified Olsten on March 30, 1992, that all charges 
against its experience rating would be nonchargeable until resolution of the 
matter. Finding Olsten's objection was timely, the Division ordered Olsten's 
requested hearing.

[¶8]      Before the 
hearing, Nyquist and Olsten agreed by stipulation and settlement agreement "that 
Nyquist was injured in a series of compensable injuries, but no single employer 
can be determined to be chargeable for the injuries." The settlement agreement 
also stated: "The parties further stipulate that benefits charges as a result of 
claims made for the September 17, 1991 injury should be distributed in 
accordance with the provision of § 27-14-603(e), W.S. 1977 (1991 Replacement), 
within the general industrial classification and not chargeable to Olsten's 
experience rating." The agreement was not signed by the Division.

[¶9]      The agreement was 
presented to OAH along with a proposed Order Approving Stipulation and 
Settlement Agreement. In a letter dated June 2, 1992, OAH notified counsel 
for the Division that the proposed settlement involved application of WYO. STAT. 
§ 27-14-603(e), and entitled the Division to an opportunity to request a hearing 
on that issue. When no objection or request for a hearing was received by the 
June 9, 1992 deadline, the order was entered on June 10, 1992. The following 
day, the Division moved to vacate the order approving the stipulation agreement. 
This motion was granted on June 15, 1992, and a hearing was set for August 4, 
1992.

[¶10]   On August 3, 1992, Nyquist and 
Olsten entered into another settlement agreement. It stipulated that Nyquist 
"was injured in a work-related accident at the Buttrey Store * * * while working 
for Olsten on September 17, 1991 * * * sustained a compensable injury * * * and 
may receive benefits * * *." The agreement retained the issue of the employer's 
experience rating and was signed by the Division's attorney.

[¶11]   OAH entered an order approving the 
stipulation to pay Nyquist's claims and ordered that all proceedings before OAH 
specifically pertaining to the issue of Nyquist's entitlement to benefits were 
terminated. OAH retained jurisdiction of the remaining contest between Olsten 
and the Division and, on August 4, 1992, heard the case for determining the 
chargeability of the employer's experience rating for compensation paid to the 
employee. OAH determined there was not any statutory basis that provided for it 
to order that an employer's experience rating not be assessed for payments to an 
injured employee. OAH concluded the Division was entitled to a judgment on the 
pleadings as a matter of law and granted its motion. The district court affirmed 
OAH's decision, and this appeal followed.

Standard 
of Review

[¶12]   It is well established that our 
judicial review of agency decisions is as a reviewing court of the first 
instance and we accord no deference to the district court's decision. 
Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 662 P.2d 878, 882 (Wyo. 
1983). See also, Parker Land & Cattle Co. v. Wyo. Game & Fish 
Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993). It is a question of law whether the 
statute authorizes OAH to determine nonchargeability against an employer's 
experience rating. Our review of an agency's conclusion of law is governed by 
WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c) (1990). If the conclusion of law is in accordance with 
law, it is affirmed; if it is not in accordance with law, it is to be corrected. 
Parker, 845 P.2d  at 1042.

Statutory 
Interpretation

[¶13]   WYO. STAT. § 27-14-603(e) 
states:

Notwithstanding 
W.S. 27-14-201, in those proceedings in which the entitlement of a worker to 
benefits for successive compensable injuries is established but no single 
employer can be determined to be chargeable for the injuries, the division shall 
distribute the benefit charge to employers within the general industrial 
classification in which the employee was engaged at the time his most recent 
claim arose.

[¶14]   In construing a statute, we first 
determine whether the statutory language is clear or ambiguous. Parker, 
845 P.2d  at 1043. We look to its language and, if clear, we give the words their 
plain and ordinary meaning. Parker, 845 P.2d  at 1043; and Keene v. 
State, 812 P.2d 147, 150 (Wyo. 1991). Statutory language is clear if 
reasonable persons are able to agree as to its meaning with consistence and 
predictability. Parker, 845 P.2d  at 1043.

[¶15]   Olsten believes this statutory 
provision applies to these facts because of "material prejudice." When the 
Division paid benefits without affording it notice and an opportunity to be 
heard, Olsten asserts the passage of time materially prejudiced its ability to 
defend against Nyquist's claim. Olsten contends an appropriate remedy is to 
apply the statutory provision, WYO. STAT. § 27-14-603(e), under these 
circumstances. It argues that OAH's exclusive jurisdiction to make factual 
determinations of the validity and amount of compensation payable necessarily 
authorizes OAH to determine whether or not particular payments made are 
chargeable against an employer's experience rating or should be charged to 
employers within the general industrial classification. We disagree. WYO. STAT. 
§ 27-14-602(b) sets forth the types1 of disputes which may be decided by 
OAH and does not include a directive to hear disputes between the employer and 
the Division about charges to experience ratings. As an administrative agency, 
OAH enjoys only those powers expressly conferred by statute. Jackson v. State 
ex rel. Workers' Comp., 786 P.2d 874, 878 (Wyo. 1990).

[¶16]   WYO. STAT. § 27-14-603(e) is not 
ambiguous and clearly instructs the Division, not OAH, to charge benefits 
against the industrial classification in only one specific situation: where the 
series of injuries which entitles the employee to benefits does not permit 
determination of which single employer is to be charged. Those are not the facts 
of this case. Olsten was granted the opportunity for a hearing before OAH to 
contest any benefits to the employee, but chose to stipulate to the payment of 
benefits for one injury suffered while an employee of Olsten.

[¶17]   On these facts, there is no basis 
to fashion relief under WYO. STAT. § 27-14-603(e). Contrary to Olsten's 
assertion that it is left without a remedy, the Division states there is an 
adequate remedy for employers who allege Division mistakes caused the employer's 
experience rating to be improperly charged. Olsten may petition the Division to 
remove any charges from its experience rating which arose as a result of the 
Division's own neglect, mistake or inadvertence pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 
27-14-201 (1991). If the Division improperly fails to rectify the errors, Olsten 
has a judicial remedy under WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(a) (1990).

[¶18]   Affirmed.

Footnotes

1 In 1992, WYO. STAT. § 27-14-602 (1991) was amended and directed the new 
office of administrative hearings to designate hearing examiners and conduct 
contested cases under Wyoming's Workers' Compensation Act. 1992 WYO. SESS. LAWS, 
ch. 30 § 2. WYO. STAT. § 27-14-602(b) directs the hearing examiner to determine 
employer objections to the compensability of the injury or death resulting from 
injury; the right of the employee to receive compensation; the amount of 
compensation; or amounts or procedures claimed for medical or hospital care. 
Further, if a health care provider objects to the amount paid under this act, 
the employee may request referral to a hearing examiner who shall set the case 
for hearing at the earliest opportunity.