Title: Ileana Whitt v. Eli Silverman

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

1The Silvermans are the lessors of the property at issue in this case. 
Although they were part of the initial group of defendants, they settled with the
plaintiffs during the pendency of the appeal below; therefore, they are no longer
parties to the case. 
Supreme Court of Florida
 
____________
No. SC95533
____________
ILEANA WHITT, etc., et al.,
Petitioners,
vs.
ELI SILVERMAN, et al.,
Respondents.
[May 3, 2001]
ANSTEAD, J.
We have for review Whitt v. Silverman,1 732 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. 3d DCA
1999), based on express and direct conflict with the decision in McCain v. Florida
Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 1992), and decisions that have applied
2See Springtree Properties, Inc. v. Hammond, 692 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1997);
Napoli v. Buchbinder, 685 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Dykes v. City of
Apalachicola, 645 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
-2-
McCain.2  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, §3 (b)(3), Fla. Const.  At issue in this
case is whether McCain’s foreseeability analysis applies in determining whether a
landowner operating a commercial gas station owes a duty of care to persons who
may be injured as a result of natural conditions or landscaping on the landowner’s
property, but where the injury actually occurs off the property.  Because we
conclude that a strict rule absolving a landowner of responsibility under the
circumstances presented here conflicts with our analysis in McCain, we quash the
ruling below.  
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS TO DATE
The essential facts are described by the Third District: 
     Defendant- appellees ("landowners") operate an Amoco service
station on Collins Avenue on Miami Beach.  While leaving the service
station premises in her car, service station customer Jean Simoneau
struck two pedestrians, killing one and injuring the other.
     Plaintiffs filed this personal injury action against the landowners,
among others.  Plaintiffs allege that the landowners had a dense stand
of foliage between their service station and the adjacent property. 
Plaintiffs say that the foliage impaired the driver's view of the sidewalk,
thus causing or contributing to the accident.  However, the foliage was
entirely on the landowner's property, and did not protrude into the
public way.  The trial court dismissed plaintiffs' claims for negligence
and violation of a Miami-Dade County ordinance.   
3Notwithstanding this holding, the court remanded the case to the trial court
as to the violation of the ordinance claim.  The parties do not contest this part of
the ruling by the district court in this review proceeding. 
-3-
Whitt, 732 So. 2d at 1107-08 (footnotes omitted).  The district court affirmed the
dismissal of the common law negligence claim, but reversed the dismissal of the
claim predicated upon the violation of a Miami-Dade County ordinance regulating
foliage.  See id.  With respect to the negligence claim, the Third District
acknowledged our ruling in McCain, but concluded that McCain did not apply, and
that McCain had no effect on earlier cases absolving landowners of responsibility
for any danger created by foliage growing on their property.  See id. at 1108.  The
district court applied the reasoning of a line of accident cases barring liability for
visual obstructions created by foliage growing on a landowner’s property that did
not protrude onto the public way.  See id.  The holding relied upon the so-called
“agrarian rule,” which provides that a “landowner has a right to use and enjoy his
property in any manner he sees fit.”  Id. (quoting Morales v. Costa, 427 So. 2d
297, 298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)).3   
LAW AND ANALYSIS
While we conclude that the district court’s application of a rule of no liability
under the circumstances presented is inconsistent with our analysis in McCain, we
must acknowledge there is a distinct lack of unanimity throughout the country
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regarding the appropriate duty, if any, that should be imposed on a landowner for
visual obstructions of an adjoining roadway caused by the location of foliage on the
landowner’s property.  See Kolba v. Kusznier, 599 A.2d 194, 196 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1991).  Many jurisdictions have imposed a reasonable duty of care on
landowners, similar to the rule announced in McCain, while others have continued
to apply an absolute rule of no liability for such conditions.  We conclude that the
application of an absolute rule under the circumstances presented here is
inconsistent with our prevailing negligence law and modern conditions.
AGRARIAN RULE
The so-called “agrarian rule” provides that a landowner owes no duty to
persons who are not on the landowner’s property and therefore a landowner is not
responsible for any harm caused to them by natural conditions on the land.  See
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 363(a) (1965); 5 Fowler V. Harper et al., The Law
of Torts § 27.19, at 308-09 (2d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1991); W. Page Keeton et al.,
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 57, at 390 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988). 
Commentators trace the ancient origins of this rule to times when much land was
unsettled or uncultivated, and the burden of inspecting it and putting it in a safe
condition by the owner would have been unduly onerous and out of all proportion
to any harm likely to result.  See Keeton et al., supra, § 57, at 390; see also Evans
4Historically, another consideration cited in support of the rule has been the
distinction between “action” and “inaction,” or “misfeasance” and “nonfeasance.” 
See Sprecher v. Adamson Companies, 636 P.2d 1121, 1125 (Cal. 1981) (citing
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314), and a traditional limitation of the liability of
landowners only to persons who come upon the property.  Misfeasance exists
when a defendant contributes to the creation of the risk whereas nonfeasance arises
when a defendant merely fails to intervene on a plaintiff’s behalf.  See id. at 1126. 
In the latter situation, no duty was imposed on a landowner except where a special
relationship existed between the plaintiff and defendant.  See id.  Such a
relationship has been recognized between landowners and persons injured while on
the landowner’s property.  Traditionally, persons on a landowner’s premises are
grouped into one of three categories: (1) trespassers; (2) licensees; and (3) invitees,
and the duty imposed on landowners for injuries to these people is determined by
the injured person’s classification.  Of course, no such classification exists for
persons injured while off the land of a landowner.  
5Comment b of section 363 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts defines
“natural condition of the land” as a “condition of land that has not been changed by
any act of a human being.”  This same comment provides that “trees or plants
planted or preserved, and changes in the surface by excavation or filling,
irrespective of whether they are harmful in themselves or become so only because
of the subsequent operation of natural forces,” are considered artificial rather than
natural conditions.  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 363, cmt. b.  
-5-
v. Southern Holding Corp., 391 So. 2d 231, 233 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (Schwartz, J.,
dissenting) (citing Roberts v. Harrison, 28 S.E. 995 (Ga. 1897)).  The rule was
predicated upon a perceived public policy that “a landowner has a right to use and
enjoy his property in any manner he sees fit.”  Morales v. Costa, 427 So. 2d 297,
298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).4  Early supporters of the rule also reasoned that because a
natural condition is by definition one which no human being created, a landowner
was free from any duty to change or maintain it in order to prevent harm.5  See
Irrespective of the distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance,
commentators and courts alike have traditionally imposed a duty on landowners for
injuries to persons outside of the land caused by artificial conditions.  See, e.g.,
Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 364, 368.  The parties here do not contest the
issue of whether the foliage was a natural or artificial condition.  However, some
courts have stated that when this is disputed, a question of fact arises that must be
resolved before it can be determined whether a duty arises.  See Spears v.
Blackwell, 666 N.E.2d 974, 977 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). 
6See, e.g., Coburn v. City of Tucson, 691 P.2d 1078, 1080-81 (Ariz. 1984)
(stating that landowner has no duty to use land so as to protect travelers); Pedigo v.
Smith, 395 So. 2d 615, 616 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (adhering to the view that in the
absence of a violation of a statute regulating the removal or height of trees, there is
no common law duty on a landowner to maintain his property in a condition so that
a motorist approaching a public highway intersection has a clear view of other
traffic and intersection traffic signals); Evans v. Southern Holding Corp., 391 So.
2d 231, 232 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (same); Ziemba v. Mierzwa, 566 N.E.2d 1365,
1365 (Ill. 1991) (holding that a landowner has no “duty to maintain his property in
such a manner that his driveway is visible to travelers on an adjacent roadway”);
Pyne v. Witmer, 512 N.E.2d 993, 997 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (holding that landowners
had no duty to remove foliage from their property so motorists approaching
intersection could see other approaching motorists); Fritz v. Parkison, 397 N.W.2d
714, 717 (Iowa 1986) (finding landowner owed no duty to motorist where
landowner planted trees but trees did not obstruct traveled way); Bohn v. Racette,
236 P. 811, 812-13 (Kan. 1925) (holding that landowner is not liable for collision on
adjoining highway caused by hedges obstructing view); Sierra-Melendez v. Brown,
410 So. 2d 258 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that absent statute, landowner
-6-
Sprecher v. Adamson Companies, 636 P.2d 1121, 1125 (Cal. 1981).   
Despite its dated origins, many courts have continued to apply the agrarian
rule to bar actions in changed conditions, including those based on claims that
natural or artificial conditions on a landowner’s private property constituted an
unsafe condition and obstructed the view of motorists.6  One rationale for adhering
bordering roadway owes no duty to motorists); Barnes v. Stone-Quinn, 606
N.Y.S.2d 485, 486 (App. Div. 1993) (finding landowner has no common law duty
to control vegetation on property for benefit of motorists). 
7The distinction between artificial and natural conditions is rooted in times
when land was mostly unsettled and uncultivated, and the landowner was shielded
from liability because he could not be expected to keep account of and remedy all
of the conditions arising from purely natural causes on his land.  See Mahurin v.
Lockhart, 390 N.E.2d 523 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979).  The distinction has also been
linked to a perceived substantive difference between the concepts of nonfeasance
and misfeasance with the creation of artificial conditions being placed in the
misfeasance category as distinct from simply leaving natural conditions alone. 
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to the rule in these cases has been that motorists are in a better position to prevent
accidents than landowners, and thus motorists, rather than landowners, should be
charged with the duty to anticipate and avoid such accidents.  See, e.g., Bassett v.
Edwards, 30 So. 2d 374, 376 (Fla. 1947) (holding it was the duty of both drivers to
observe foliage at an intersection and to operate their vehicles as required under
prevailing conditions because every user of a highway is required to exercise
reasonable care for his own safety and protection). 
The traditional rule was initially developed and applied only to natural
conditions on a landowner’s property, and not to artificial ones created by the
landowner.7  Consistent with that distinction, for example, the authors of sections
364 and 368 respectively of the Restatement (Second) of Torts would impose a
duty on landowners for injuries to persons and travelers on adjacent lands and
8Section 364 provides: 
A possessor of land is subject to liability to others
outside of the land for physical harm caused by a
structure or other artificial condition on the land, which
the possessor realizes or should realize will involve an
unreasonable risk of such harm, if 
(a) the possessor has created the condition, or
(b) the condition is created by a third person with
the possessor’s consent or acquiescence while the land is
in his possession, or
(c) the condition is created by a third person
without the possessor’s consent or acquiescence, but
reasonable care is not taken to make the condition safe
after the possessor knows or should know of it.  
Section 368 provides:
A possessor of land who creates or permits to remain
thereon an excavation or other artificial condition so near
an existing highway that he realizes or should realize that it
involves an unreasonable risk to others accidentally
brought into contact with such condition while traveling
with reasonable care upon the highway, is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to persons who
(a) are traveling on the highway, or
(b) forseeably deviate from it in the ordinary course
of travel.
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highways caused by the placement of artificial conditions on a landowner’s
property.8  However, some courts have criticized attempts to construct a rule of
liability predicated solely upon the distinction between artificial and natural
conditions.  See, e.g., Sterling v. Weinstein, 75 A.2d 144, 147 (D.C. 1950);
9It specifically provides: “[N]either a possessor of land, nor a vendor, lessor,
or other  transferor, is liable for physical harm caused to others outside of the land
by a natural condition of the land.”   
-9-
Mahurin, 390 N.E.2d at 524 (Ill. App. 1979); Hasapopoulos v. Murphy, 689
S.W.2d 118 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Rowe v. McGee, 168 S.E.2d 77, 79 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1969); Harvey v. Hansen, 445 A.2d 1228, 1231 (Pa. Super. 1982). 
URBAN V. RURAL LANDS
Courts have also drawn a distinction in application of the “agrarian rule”
based on location of the property in an urban or rural setting.  These courts have
reasoned that adhering to a no liability rule may be appropriate in rural areas,
although there is no valid basis for its continued use in urban and other developed
areas where artificial landscaping or other conditions may be more likely to impact
traffic safety.  See Mahurin, 390 N.E.2d at 692-93; Hasapopoulos, 689 S.W.2d at
120; Barker v. Brown, 340 A.2d 566, 569 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975).  These decisions
are reflected in the views of the Restatement where section 363(1) of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes the traditional rule of no liability,9 while
section 363(2) imposes a duty on possessors of land in urban areas.  Specifically,
section 363(2) provides: “A possessor of land in an urban area is subject to liability
to persons using a public highway for physical harm resulting from his failure to
exercise reasonable care to prevent an unreasonable risk arising from the condition
10The comment on subsection (2) of section 363 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts reads: 
e. Trees. The rule stated in Subsection (2) is an exception which
has developed as to trees near a public highway.  It requires no more
than reasonable care on the part of the possessor of the land to
prevent an unreasonable risk of harm to those in the highway, arising
from the condition of the trees.  In an urban area, where traffic is
relatively frequent, land is less heavily wooded, and acreage is small,
reasonable care for the protection of travelers on the highway may
require the possessor to inspect all trees which may be in such
dangerous condition as to endanger travelers.  It will at least require
him to take reasonable steps to prevent harm when he is in fact aware
of the dangerous condition of the tree.  
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 363 cmt. e (1965).  This exception can be
narrowly read to apply only to cases where dead or rotting trees fall on the roadway
and cause harm.  See Driggers v. Locke, 913 S.W.2d 269, 272 (Ark. 1996) (stating
that “[c]omment e. to that section [§ 363(2)] makes it clear that the danger
contemplated is that resulting not from the presence of the trees but from their
condition, i.e., the probability that they may break and fall on the highway”). 
However, at least one case has specifically refused to interpret it so narrowly.  See
Zapata v. Kariyaparambil, No. 14-96-00901-CV, 1997 WL 566222, at *3 (Tex.
App. 1997) (specifically relying on this comment to impose on a landowner a duty
of care to prevent his trees from blocking the view of a stop sign).   
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of trees on the land near the highway.”10  Several courts have expressly adopted
section 363(2).  See, e.g., Valinet v. Eskew, 574 N.E.2d 283, 285 (Ind. 1991) (“We
agree that the differing duties placed on owners of land with respect to differing
demographics [referring to the urban/rural distinction] is correct.  We therefore
adopt § 363 of the RESTATEMENT.”); see also Zapata v. Kariyaparambil, 1997
WL 566222, at *3. 
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McCAIN V. FLORIDA POWER
In contrast to the rather narrow focus of the so-called agrarian rule, this
Court in McCain attempted to restate the general principles of negligence law and
clarify the role that foreseeability plays in evaluating the duty and proximate cause
elements of a common law negligence claim.  In this context, we noted that
although foreseeability relates to both duty and proximate cause, it does so in
different ways: 
The duty element of negligence focuses on whether the defendant's
conduct foreseeably created a broader "zone of risk" that poses a
general threat of harm to others.  The proximate causation element, on
the other hand, is concerned with whether and to what extent the
defendant's conduct foreseeably and substantially caused the specific
injury that actually occurred.  In other words, the former is a minimal
threshold legal requirement for opening the courthouse doors, whereas
the latter is part of the much more specific factual requirement that
must be proved to win the case once the courthouse doors are open. 
As is obvious, a defendant might be under a legal 
duty of care to a
specific plaintiff, but still not be liable for negligence because
proximate causation cannot be proven.
McCain, 593 So. 2d at 502-03 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).  On the
question of duty, we explained:
Foreseeability clearly is crucial in defining the scope of the general
duty placed on every person to avoid negligent acts or omissions. 
Florida, like other jurisdictions, recognizes that a legal duty will arise
whenever a human endeavor creates a generalized and foreseeable risk
of harming others.  As we have stated:
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Where a defendant's conduct creates a foreseeable zone
of risk, the law generally will recognize a duty placed
upon defendant either to lessen the risk or see that
sufficient precautions are taken to protect others from the
harm that the risk poses.  
Id. at 503 (footnote omitted) (quoting Kaisner v. Kolb, 543 So. 2d 732, 735 (Fla.
1989)) (alteration in original).  The Court also noted that every risk need not be set
out in a statute or by case law in order to give rise to a duty of care:
[E]ach defendant who creates a risk is required to exercise prudent
foresight whenever others may be injured as a result.  This requirement
of reasonable, general foresight is the core of the duty element.  For
these same reasons, duty exists as a matter of law and is not a factual
question for the jury to decide:  Duty is the standard of conduct given
to the jury for gauging the defendant's factual conduct.  As a corollary,
the trial and appellate courts cannot find a lack of duty if a foreseeable
zone of risk more likely than not was created by the defendant.
Id.  Finally, as to the element of proximate cause, we explained:
[F]oreseeability is concerned with the specific, narrow factual details
of the case, not with the broader zone of risk the defendant created.
. . . .
Unlike in the "duty" context, the question of foreseeability as it
relates to proximate causation generally must be left to the fact-finder
to resolve.  Thus, where reasonable persons could differ as to whether
the facts establish proximate causation--i.e., whether the specific injury
was genuinely foreseeable or merely an improbable freak--then the
resolution of the issue must be left to the fact-finder.
Id. at 503-04.  We have subsequently applied our analysis in McCain to a variety of
factual contexts.  See, e.g., Springtree Properties, Inc. v. Hammond, 692 So. 2d
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164 (Fla. 1997) (holding trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of
restaurant owner in suit arising out of automobile accident in front of restaurant and
issue of foreseeability should have been left to jury).  
Importantly, subsequent decisions in accident cases resulting from visual 
obstructions to motorists have recognized and applied McCain’s foreseeability
analysis to determine whether the landowner owed a duty of care and whether that
duty was breached in a particular instance.  See Napoli v. Buchbinder, 685 So. 2d
46, 47 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (holding that plaintiff’s wrongful death action alleging
that design of parking lot and placement of stop sign which contributed to accident
created a material question of fact as to whether defendant’s alleged negligence
placed plaintiff in a foreseeable zone of risk); Dykes v. City of Apalachicola, 645
So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (holding that the test to determine whether city was
liable for trees and bushes which allegedly contributed to an accident was whether
defendant’s conduct created a “foreseeable zone of risk”).  Hence, it appears that
McCain has been applied in most instances as we intended, as a restatement of the
law of negligence.
EVALUATION OF DUTY OF LANDOWNERS
Rather than strictly adhering to the agrarian rule, we note that some
jurisdictions have applied an analysis similar to that set out in McCain in
11The majority did recognize two limited exceptions to the rule of no duty,
including situations where the “obstruction protrudes onto public property” and
“where [the] obstructions . . . are in violation of some statute.”  391 So. 2d at 233.
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determining a defendant landowner’s duty with respect to alleged obstructions to
vision in place on a landowner’s property.  See Sprecher v. Adamson Cos., 636
P.2d 1121, 1124 (Cal. 1981) (“[T]he courts are moving toward jettisoning the
common law rule in its entirety and replacing it with a single duty of reasonable care
in the maintenance of property.”  In fact, a review of Florida cases as well as those
of other jurisdictions reflects a movement consistent with McCain toward imposing
a duty on landowners in some circumstances for injuries caused by natural or
artificial conditions by either creating exceptions to the no liability rule, see Evans v.
Southern Holding Corp., 391 So. 2d 231, 232 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), or by
completely abrogating it.
EVANS
In Evans, the majority opinion of the Third District refused to recognize a
duty on the part of the landowners to maintain their property free of unsafe
obstructions to the views of motorists and others who might be endangered by the
obstructions.11  In a dissenting opinion, Judge Schwartz challenged the majority’s
duty analysis: 
In my judgment, the facts of this case raise a triable issue as to
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whether the defendant-landowner breached a duty of care which
should be, and in fact has been, recognized by the law of Florida. 
That duty is the one referred to, albeit in a negative fashion, in Hardin
v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 128 Fla. 631, 175 So. 226 (1937), which
is cited by the court.  At 175 So. 228, it was said:
there is no liability on the part of a landowner to persons
injured outside his lands (which includes persons on
adjacent highways), unless the owner has done or
permitted something to occur on his lands which he
realizes or should realize involves an unreasonable risk of
harm to others outside his land, and therefore imposes on
him, as an owner or possessor of the land, the duty of
abating or obviating the use or condition from which the
risk is encountered.  
See, Cook v. Martin, 330 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), cert.
denied, 339 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 1976).
The majority suggests that the imposition of liability in this case
would be improperly contrary to "the traditional rule that the owner of
land is under no affirmative duty to remedy conditions of purely
natural origin upon his land and impose upon a landowner for the
benefit of motorists using a public street the duty to maintain his
property so that the motorist's view of intersecting traffic is not
obstructed."  I disagree with this position.  In the first place, it was
affirmatively alleged and demonstrated below that at least part of the
obstruction to view was caused by the existence of "large trailers,
vans, construction equipment, and outdoor toilets" near the
intersection.  If negligently created or permitted to exist, this decidedly
non-"purely natural" defect, see, 2 Restatement (Second) of Torts §
363 Comment b (1965), would give rise to liability under the firmly
established principle embodied in 2 Restatement (Second) of Torts §
364 (1965):
     Creation or Maintenance of Dangerous Artificial
Conditions
A possessor of land is subject to liability to others
outside of the land for physical harm caused by a
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structure or other artificial condition on the land, which
the possessor realizes or should realize will involve an
unreasonable risk of such harm, if
     (a) the possessor has created the condition, or
     (b) the condition is created by a third person with the
possessor's consent or acquiescence while the land is in
his possession, or
     (c) the condition is created by a third person without
the possessor's consent or acquiescence, but reasonable
care is not taken to make the condition safe after the
possessor knows or should know of it. [note 1]
[note1] It is significant that Hardin cites the
original version of this section of the
Restatement with approval. 175 So. at 227.  
As to the "natural" condition caused by the growth of weeds,
the supposed rule of non-liability is based upon a notion concerning
the right to the unrestricted use of one's land which was founded upon
conditions in an overwhelmingly agricultural society and which has
therefore long outlived its raison d'etre.  See, e. g., Roberts v.
Harrison, 101 Ga. 773, 28 S.E. 995 (1897).  I see no reason in
modern-day life for a blanket rule of law insulating a landowner under
all circumstances from responsibility for entirely foreseeable
consequences, see, Gibson v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc., 386 So.
2d 520 (Fla. 1980), caused by a negligent failure to eliminate
obstructions from his property.  As several modern decisions have
indicated, I would hold that, on the present record, a jury question has
been presented on this theory of the case as well.  See, Wisher v.
Fowler, 7 Cal. App. 3d 225, 86 Cal. Rptr. 582 (1970); Salomone v.
Boulanger, 32 Conn. Supp. 115, 342 A.2d 61 (Super. Ct. 1975); 2
Restatement (Second) of Torts s 363(2) (1965), and caveat and
comment on subsection (2); compare, Rodgers v. Ray, 10 Ariz. App.
119, 457 P.2d 281 (1969), questioned in Hall v. Mertz, 14 Ariz. App.
24, 480 P.2d 361 (1971).
The Florida case cited by the court for its contrary conclusion,
Bassett v. Edwards, 158 Fla. 848, 30 So. 2d 374 (1947) does not
involve an action against the landowner at all.  More important, it
embodies concepts of proximate causation, intervening cause, and
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contributory negligence which no longer obtain in our state.  Gibson v.
Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc., supra; Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d
431 (Fla. 1973); see, Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River
County, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979) (liability for intersection accident
arising from negligent maintenance of traffic control device).
Finally, the court states that reversal "entails the right in every
intersectional collision case for the motorists to charge and litigate
before a jury whether the jury thinks the landowner's use of his land is
reasonable."  So be it.  Subject, as in every case, to appropriate
superintendence by the court when there is no liability as a matter of
law, the determination of whether reasonable care has been exercised
in a specific situation is just what juries do and what, under our
system, they are for.  See, Holley v. Mt. Zion Terrace Apartments,
Inc., 382 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).  Every day, juries decide
whether a landowner has negligently maintained his premises so as
legally to cause injury to persons located on the property.  I do not
believe that the Republic would fall if they were allowed to make the
same decisions as to persons on the adjoining highway.
Evans, 391 So. 2d at 233-34 (Schwartz, J., dissenting).  We conclude that the
views expressed by Judge Schwartz are consistent with those we subsequently
expressed in McCain and are helpful to our analysis of the issue presented to us
today.  
We note that other courts have sometimes applied the same McCain-like
reasoning advocated by Judge Schwartz to certain motorist obstruction cases and
imposed a corresponding duty on landowners under the particular circumstances
presented.  For instance, in Hamric v. Kansas City S. Ry., 718 S.W.2d 916 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1986), a case dealing with an obstructed view of both drivers as a result
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of tall and thick stands of weed growing on the side of the road, the court wrote:
“We hold this case should be governed by the rule that the owner or occupier of
premises abutting a highway has a duty to exercise reasonable care not to
jeopardize or endanger the safety of motorist[s] using the highway as a means of
passage and the owner or occupier is liable for injuries that proximately resulted
from his negligent acts in this respect.”  Id. at 918; see also Zapata v.
Kariyaparambil, 1997 WL 566222, at *3 (applying same rule to landowners whose
trees blocked the view of a stop sign and resulted in an accident).  
Similarly, in Langen v. Rushton, 360 N.W.2d 270 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984), the
plaintiffs alleged that the owners of a shopping center had allowed various trees to
grow on a median of the shopping center’s entrance which obstructed the view of
oncoming traffic and contributed to the accident at issue.  Relying on the rule that
landowners must maintain their land so as not to injure users of abutting streets, the
court found it was “entirely foreseeable that a serious accident [could] occur
between a customer entering or exiting from the parking lot and a highway
motorist.”  Id. at 273.  Therefore, the court concluded that “as a matter of law,
defendant ha[d] a duty to the traveling public to provide motorists leaving its
parking lot with an unobstructed view of oncoming traffic.”  Id. at 275.  Again, in
Ziemba v. Mierzwa, 566 N.E.2d 1365 (Ill. 1991), the court applied a McCain
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analysis before ultimately concluding that a landowner owed no duty to maintain his
property in such a manner that his driveway would be visible to travelers on an
adjacent roadway.  See Ziemba, 566 N.E.2d at 1368; see also Guy v. State, 438
A.2d 1250, 1255 (Del. Super. Ct. 1981) (holding that in action where plaintiffs
alleged that the condition of adjacent property interfered with the safety of travelers
upon the roadway by allowing tall growths of vegetation to obstruct the view of an
intersection, a question of fact arose as to whether the defendants realized or
should have realized that planting corn up to the shoulder of the road would involve
an unreasonable risk of harm).  
BAILEY DRAINAGE DISTRICT V. STARK
Interestingly, on at least one previous occasion, we have also rejected the
contention that defendants should not be liable because the foliage obstructing a
motorist’s view were of natural origin.  See Bailey Drainage District v. Stark, 526
So. 2d 678 (Fla. 1988).  In Stark, the personal representative of the estate of the
deceased motorist filed suit against Broward County and the Bailey Drainage
District alleging that the motorist’s’ view at the intersection was impeded by plant
growth (brush and weeds) on the sides of the road which obstructed the driver’s
vision.  On appeal, this Court held that “[w]here a governmental entity knowingly
maintains an intersection right-of-way which dangerously obstructs the vision of
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motorists using the street in a manner not readily apparent to motorists, it is under a
duty to warn of the danger or make safe the dangerous condition.”  Id. at 681.  As
part of its analysis, the court wrote: “We reject the contention that the petitioners
cannot be liable because the brush and weeds were a naturally occurring condition,
not planted by the petitioners.”  Id.  Moreover, the opinion concluded: 
[I]t is irrelevant whether the brush and weeds are actually located on
the governmental entity’s right-of-way or on privately owned property
adjacent to the right-of-way.  The relevant inquiry is whether the brush
and weeds, wherever located, obstruct the view of motorists, creating
a danger which is not readily apparent.  
Id. at 681-82.  Although Stark dealt with a governmental entity’s duty, it clearly
reflects this Court’s concern with the dangers that may inhere in the obstruction of
a motorist’s view and more importantly, our rejection of the view that no liability
could arise simply because an obstruction is natural in character.
DUTY OF MOTORISTS
The landowner here asserts that if this Court recognizes any duty on his part,
landowners will in essence be delegated the role of insurers for motorists using their
adjoining roadways and that imposing this duty will relieve motorists of their
established duty of care.  However, as has been noted quite often, the imposition of
a duty is nothing more than a threshold requirement that if satisfied, merely opens
the “courthouse doors.”  McCain, 593 So. 2d at 502.  Once this duty is satisfied,
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an injured party must still prove the remaining elements of a negligence claim,
including the much more specific proximate cause requirement.  See Sprecher, 636
P.2d at 1130 (Richardson, J., concurring) (agreeing to impose duty of care on
landowners, yet recognizing that it would be exceedingly difficult to imagine how
defendant could have corrected condition and therefore predicting defendant would
most likely not be found liable).  Hence, the burden remains with a claimant to
establish the elements of a negligence claim against a defendant-landowner before
being entitled to recover damages.  Moreover, the imposition of a duty of care
upon landowners will not relieve motorists of a duty because in Florida, even if a
landowner breaches her duty of care, a plaintiff’s award will be offset by the
percentage of fault attributable to him in comparison to the fault of others, including
the landowner.  See Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1983).  As pointedly
noted by Judge Schwartz in Evans, jurors perform such tasks daily in tort cases. 
Evans, 391 So. 2d at 234 (Schwartz, J., dissenting) (noting that “the determination
of whether reasonable care has been exercised in a specific situation is just what
juries do and what, under our system, they are for”).
CONCLUSION
Judge Schwartz’ reasoning in Evans and our reasoning in McCain and Stark
are consistent with the trend in other jurisdictions that conditions on a landowner’s
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property resulting in injuries or damages to a plaintiff off the landowner’s premises
should be evaluated by the established principles of negligence law.  See Napoli;
Dykes.  In accordance with that reasoning we agree that there is no justification for
the rigid application of an absolute rule of no liability under circumstances like
those presented here:
As to the "natural" condition caused by the growth of weeds,
the supposed rule of non-liability is based upon a notion concerning
the right to the unrestricted use of one's land which was founded upon
conditions in an overwhelmingly agricultural society and which has
therefore long outlived its raison d'etre.  See, e. g., Roberts v.
Harrison, 101 Ga. 773, 28 S.E. 995 (1897).  I see no reason in
modern-day life for a blanket rule of law insulating a landowner under
all circumstances from responsibility for entirely foreseeable
consequences, see, Gibson v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc., 386 So.
2d 520 (Fla. 1980), caused by a negligent failure to eliminate
obstructions from his property.  As several modern decisions have
indicated, I would hold that, on the present record, a jury question has
been presented on this theory of the case as well.  See, Wisher v.
Fowler, 7 Cal. App. 3d 225, 86 Cal. Rptr. 582 (1970); Salomone v.
Boulanger, 32 Conn. Supp. 115, 342 A.2d 61 (Super. Ct. 1975); 2
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 363(2) (1965), and caveat and
comment on subsection (2); compare, Rodgers v. Ray, 10 Ariz. App.
119, 457 P.2d 281 (1969), questioned in Hall v. Mertz, 14 Ariz. App.
24, 480 P.2d 361 (1971).
Evans, 391 So. 2d at 233-34 (Schwartz, J., dissenting).  We conclude that an
inquiry as to the liability of a landowner under the circumstances presented here of
a commercial business in an urban area specifically relying on the frequent coming
and going of motor vehicles should be guided by a foreseeability analysis, which,
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as we have frequently stated, is governed by our pronouncements in McCain.  In
the instant case, the landowners were the owners of a commercial establishment, a
service station, which by its very nature involves a continuous flow of traffic
entering and exiting the premises for the commercial benefit of the landowners.  In
addition, it is undisputed that the landowners had exclusive control over the foliage
and landscaping on the business premises, and it does not appear that it would
have been unduly burdensome for the landowners to have maintained this foliage
consistent with the safe egress and ingress of vehicles attracted to the business and
persons affected thereby.  
Accordingly, we conclude that under our analysis in McCain, the
landowners’ conduct here created a foreseeable zone of risk posing a general threat
of harm toward the patrons of the business as well as those pedestrians and
motorists using the abutting streets and sidewalks that would reasonably be
affected by the traffic flow of the business.  Notwithstanding this conclusion, of
course, cases like this must be subjected to a factual determination of whether the
landowners actually breached their duty under the particular circumstances and
whether the accidental death or injury was a proximate result of any breach of that
duty.  In other words, although we conclude that the landowners had a duty of
care, a discrete factual analysis and determination is required to determine the
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landowner’s’ alleged responsibility in each case.   
For the forgoing reasons, we quash the decision of the district court of
appeal and remand for further proceedings consistent herewith.
It is so ordered.  
SHAW, HARDING, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
WELLS, C.J., dissents with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
WELLS, C.J., dissenting.
Although the majority view is appealing, I am concerned about the extensive
exposure to liability which this decision will now cast upon all real property owners,
including homeowners.  This issue is further complicated by the necessity of
apportionment under Fabre v. Marin, 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993), which will now
be involved in many more automobile cases.
I conclude that this situation is better addressed by county or municipal
ordinance rather than by a change in the common law of negligence.
Therefore, I would affirm the district court’s decision.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Direct Conflict
Third District - Case Nos. 3D98-560 & 3D97-3525 
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(Dade County)
Todd R. Schwartz of Ginsberg & Schwartz, Miami, Florida; and Ratiner, Reyes &
O’Shea, P.A., Miami, Florida,
for Petitioners
Scott A. Cole and Helen Lee Miranda of Josephs, Jack & Gaebe, P.A., Miami,
Florida,
for Respondents