Title: SCOTT KERBS, an individual and as a partner in the Kerbs Four Bar Ranch Partnership, KIP KERBS, an individual and as a partner in the Kerbs Four Bar Ranch Partnership, CARL KERBS and NADENE KERBS, individually, as husband and wife, and as partners in the Kerbs Four Bar Ranch Partnership, and KERBS FOUR BAR RANCH, a Wyoming Partnership v. EUGENE W. WALCK, JR.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

SCOTT KERBS, an individual and as a partner in the Kerbs Four Bar Ranch Partnership, KIP KERBS, an individual and as a partner in the Kerbs Four Bar Ranch Partnership, CARL KERBS and NADENE KERBS, individually, as husband and wife, and as partners in the Kerbs Four Bar Ranch Partnership, and KERBS FOUR BAR RANCH, a Wyoming Partnership v. EUGENE W. WALCK, JR.2010 WY 53229 P.3d 974Decided: 04/27/2010
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
SCOTT 
KERBS, an individual and as a partner in the Kerbs Four Bar Ranch Partnership, 
KIP KERBS, an individual and as a partner in the Kerbs Four Bar Ranch 
Partnership, CARL KERBS and NADENE KERBS, individually, as husband and wife, and 
as partners in the Kerbs Four Bar Ranch Partnership, and KERBS FOUR BAR RANCH, a 
Wyoming Partnership,

 
 
Appellants

(Defendants),

 
 
v.

 
 
EUGENE 
W. WALCK, JR.,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Carbon County

The 
Honorable Norman E. Young, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

 
 
Daniel 
B. Frank, Frank Law Office, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

 
 
William 
M. MacPherson and Brandon W. Snyder, MacPherson, Kelly & Thompson, LLC, 
Rawlins, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Snyder.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

After 
a bench trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of Eugene W. Walck, 
Jr., ruling that the Kerbs Ranch1 had wrongfully interfered with 
Mr. Walck's water rights.  The 
Kerbs Ranch appeals.  We will 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
The 
Kerbs Ranch presents these three issues:

 
 

1.    
Did 
the trial court err in awarding damages to Mr. Walck for lost crop production 
that was not caused by Kerbs Ranch?

 
 

2.    
Did 
the trial court err in awarding damages to Mr. Walck for lost crop production 
for Kerbs Ranch asserting its rightful share of water in commonly-owned ditches 
when the parties' water rights were of equal priority?

 
 

3.    
Did 
the trial court err in calculating the amount of damages based on the Farm 
Service Agency's county-wide average when evidence was presented showing that 
Mr. Walck's historical hay and pasture crop production was only 68.5 percent of 
the county-wide average?

 
 
Mr. 
Walck contends that the district court's conclusions of law were correct, and 
that its findings of fact, including its damages calculations, were not clearly 
erroneous.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
The 
Kerbs Ranch is located in Carbon County, Wyoming, a few miles west of the town 
of Saratoga.  Mr. Walck's ranch 
is immediately west of the Kerbs Ranch.  
Jack Creek, a tributary of the North Platte River, winds its way in a 
northeasterly direction through Mr. Walck's ranch, then through the Kerbs 
Ranch.  Both ranches use irrigation 
water from Jack Creek to produce hay that is used as winter feed for 
cattle.

 
 
In 
the spring of 2002, due to drought conditions and low water levels, the State of 
Wyoming regulated the North Platte River in response to the Federal Bureau of 
Reclamation's call to fulfill its water rights for Pathfinder Reservoir.  This was commonly referred to as the 
"Pathfinder Call."  Pathfinder's 
water rights date back to 1904, so when the North Platte came under regulation, 
pre-1904 water rights could still be fulfilled, while post-1904 water rights 
generally could not.  As a tributary 
to the North Platte, Jack Creek was subject to the Pathfinder Call.  Both Mr. Walck and the Kerbs Ranch 
have some pre-1904 water rights, which were fulfilled, and some post-1904 water 
rights, which were not. 

 
 
With 
less rainfall and less irrigation water than usual, Mr. Kerbs took actions to 
get the water he felt he was entitled to receive.  In his words, "I . . . did what I had to 
do."  Additional details about the 
actions taken by Mr. Kerbs will be set forth in the discussion 
section.  For now it is sufficient 
to note two details.  First, based 
on his actions, Mr. Kerbs was convicted of unlawful water use and tampering 
with a headgate, a misdemeanor pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-3-614 
(LexisNexis 2001).  Second, 
Mr. Walck claims that Mr. Kerbs's actions wrongfully deprived him of the 
irrigation water he was entitled to receive.  That is the root of the litigation 
before us now.

 
 
Mr. 
Walck filed suit in 2004, pleading eighteen causes of action against the Kerbs 
Ranch.  The Kerbs Ranch filed an 
answer, along with six counterclaims against Mr. Walck.  Many of these claims and counterclaims 
were resolved through mediation, and the rest went to trial.  Following a bench trial, the district 
court issued a thorough and detailed Judgment and Order, ruling in favor of 
Mr. Walck on some claims and in favor of the Kerbs Ranch on others.  The Kerbs Ranch's appeal is limited to 
the district court's rulings on claims that it wrongfully interfered with Mr. 
Walck's water rights.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
We 
apply a well-established standard of review to a district court's judgment after 
a bench trial:

 
 
The 
factual findings of a judge are not entitled to the limited review afforded a 
jury verdict.  While the findings 
are presumptively correct, the appellate court may examine all of the properly 
admissible evidence in the record.  
Due regard is given to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the 
credibility of the witnesses, and our review does not entail weighing disputed 
evidence.  Findings of fact will not 
be set aside unless the findings are clearly erroneous.  A finding is clearly erroneous when, 
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire 
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed.  We review a district 
court's conclusions of law de novo on appeal.

 
 

Springer 
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 
944 P.2d 1173, 1175-76 (Wyo. 1997) (internal citations omitted).  We assume that the evidence of the 
prevailing party is true, and give that party every favorable inference that can 
fairly and reasonably be drawn from that evidence.  Harber v. Jensen, 2004 WY 104, 
¶ 7, 97 P.3d 57, 60 (Wyo. 
2004).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
A 
preliminary issue raised by the Kerbs Ranch is that the district court failed to 
specify whether Mr. Walck's claims "sounded in negligence or an intentional 
tort such as conversion."  This 
Court has considered several cases involving wrongful interference with water 
rights over the years, but never found it necessary to fit such claims into any 
specific tort category.  See, e.g., Stoner v. Mau, 11 Wyo. 366, 72 P. 193 
(1903); Gustin v. Harting, 20 Wyo. 1, 
121 P. 522 (1912); Wallis v. Luman, 
625 P.2d 759 (Wyo. 1981).  In Van Buskirk v. Red Buttes Land and Live 
Stock Co., 24 Wyo. 183, 199, 156 P. 1122, 1126 (1916), we observed that 
"there can be no doubt that at common law, and under the code prescribing civil 
remedies, there would be a right of action for damages for a wrongful 
interference with a water right to the injury of the owner thereof."  Consistent with that basic formulation, 
the district court ruled that the Kerbs Ranch wrongfully interfered with 
Mr. Walck's water rights, to his injury.  The record in this case leaves no doubt 
that the district court, and the Kerbs Ranch, fully understood the nature of 
Mr. Walck's claims.

 
 
With 
the general contention out of the way, we turn to the details of 
Mr. Walck's claims against the Kerbs Ranch.  We will start with claims relating to 
irrigation ditches on the north side of Jack Creek, then consider claims 
relating mostly to irrigation ditches on the south side of Jack Creek.  Finally, we will review the district 
court's damages calculations.

 
 
            
North of Jack Creek

 
 
On 
the north side of Jack Creek there are two irrigation ditches at issue in this 
appeal.  The headgate of the Forney 
No. 2 Ditch is upstream on Jack Creek, and the headgate of the D. McPhail 
Ditch is downstream.  The two 
ditches run nearly parallel, and very close together, for approximately five 
miles across Mr. Walck's ranch.  
Then, near the border with the Kerbs Ranch, the Forney No. 2 Ditch goes 
through a flume and crosses over the D. McPhail Ditch.  After that, the D. McPhail Ditch remains 
on Mr. Walck's ranch, while the Forney No. 2 Ditch crosses onto the Kerbs 
Ranch, running at a slightly lower elevation than the other 
ditch.

 
 
Water 
in the D. McPhail Ditch is split between Mr. Walck and the Kerbs Ranch.2  The Forney No. 2 Ditch supplies 
irrigation water only to the Kerbs Ranch.  
However, the Kerbs Ranch was not actually using the D. McPhail Ditch, and 
had not done so for over fifty years.  
Instead, it sent its water from both the D. McPhail Ditch and the Forney 
No. 2 Ditch through Forney No. 2, which is apparently larger and 
easier to maintain.  Despite this 
long-standing practice, the Kerbs Ranch had never applied for permission to 
change its point of diversion or means of conveyance from the D. McPhail Ditch 
to the Forney No. 2 Ditch, as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 41-3-114.3  The Kerbs Ranch received permission in 
1994 for a temporary diversion from the D. McPhail Ditch to the Forney No. 2 
Ditch, but that permission was effective only during the 1994 irrigation 
season.  

 
 
As 
noted above, in 2002 Jack Creek was subject to the Pathfinder Call on the North 
Platte River.  On or around April 
12, 2002, the water commissioner placed notices on the headgates of the Forney 
No. 2 and D. McPhail Ditches, informing those with water rights in the ditches 
that, until May 1, they could take water through the ditches only to the extent 
of their pre-1904 water rights.  Mr. 
Kerbs saw the notices, but did not adjust the headgates so that the 
D. McPhail and Forney No. 2 Ditches each took the allocated amount of 
water.  Instead, as he explained it, 
"I took our D. McPhail water that we're entitled to in the Forney [No. 2] 
as I'd customarily done."  

 
 
On 
April 25, Mr. Kerbs noticed that the water in the Forney No. 2 Ditch "was 
way down."  Following the ditch 
upstream, he found that the headgates of the Forney No. 2 and D. McPhail Ditches 
had been adjusted by the water commissioner, with locks and chains put in place 
so that they could not be readjusted.  
He confronted the commissioner, who told Mr. Kerbs that he was not 
entitled to take his D. McPhail water through the Forney No. 2 Ditch, and the 
headgates had been locked and chained to stop him from doing that.  According to Mr. Kerbs, the 
headgates were chained and locked in a position that did not allow the Kerbs 
Ranch to take its full allocation of water, but the water commissioner was not 
responsive to his complaints.

 
 
Whether 
in the correct amount or not, water was flowing in the D. McPhail Ditch during 
May of 2002.  But as Mr. Kerbs 
explained:

 
 
I 
had no way of getting it out of the D. McPhail [Ditch], so I went into the ranch 
supply store and bought a culvert and a slide gate and went up and installed the 
culvert and slide gate in the ditch to take water out of the D. McPhail and drop 
it into Forney [No. 2] so we could get our water.

 
 
Mr. Kerbs 
also placed a canvas dam in the D. McPhail Ditch to help divert its water into 
the Forney No. 2 Ditch. 

 
 
Mr. 
Kerbs installed the culvert and dam at or near the spot where the Forney No. 2 
Ditch crosses over the D. McPhail Ditch.  As noted before, from that point the 
D. McPhail Ditch remains on Mr. Walck's ranch on higher ground, while the 
Forney No. 2 crosses into the Kerbs Ranch on lower ground.  Mr. Walck owns 23 acres of land below 
the D. McPhail Ditch and above the Forney No. 2 Ditch.  By taking water out of the D. McPhail 
Ditch and placing it into the Forney No. 2 Ditch, Mr. Kerbs effectively 
prevented Mr. Walck from irrigating those 23 acres.

 
 
Mr. 
Walck claimed that Mr. Kerbs took all of the water out of the D. McPhail 
Ditch.  He testified unequivocally 
that "no water was allowed to pass beyond that dam to irrigate lands that I have 
down ditch from that point."  In 
response to the question of how that damaged him, Mr. Walck explained 
succinctly, "no water, no crop."  
Mr. Kerbs testified that he did not take all of the water out of the 
D. McPhail Ditch: 

 
 
There 
was always some water going past there.  
[Mr. Walck's] 23 acres below would be entitled to three-tenths of a 
foot of water, and I never shut it off exactly tight.  I don't  I don't know exactly how much 
water was going behind there, because I had no way of measuring it.  But there was some water going  
trickling past.  I used the amount 
of water that we're entitled to at that pipe by the measuring flume that was 
upstream.  It's 85 or 90 feet as I 
recall.

 
 
The 
district court apparently found Mr. Walck's testimony more persuasive, and made 
this finding of fact:

 
 
18.  The dam and outlet pipe in the D. 
McPhail Ditch harmed Plaintiff.  
After the dam was placed in the ditch in 2002, Plaintiff's 23-acre field 
below the dam and outlet pipe received very little or no water.  In 2002, the 23-acre field produced no 
hay crop due to this dam.

 
 
The 
Kerbs Ranch disputes this finding of fact.  
Applying the appropriate standard of review, we will affirm it unless, 
after reviewing all of the evidence, we conclude it is clearly 
erroneous.

 
 
The 
record suggests several reasons that the district court might find the testimony 
of Mr. Walck more credible than that of Mr. Kerbs.  Mr. Walck stated plainly that the dam 
allowed no water to pass.  
Mr. Kerbs testified that the trickle of water going past the dam 
supplied all of the water Mr. Walck was entitled to receive.  However, Mr. Kerbs admitted that he did 
not really know how much water was trickling past the dam, and he had no way to 
measure it.  Because he did not know 
the amount, it was reasonable for the district court to discount Mr. Kerbs's 
testimony that Mr. Walck was getting his full amount.  This finding of fact is not clearly 
erroneous.

 
 
The 
district court also found that the dam and culvert remained in place, and 
continued to divert the water from the D. McPhail Ditch to the Forney No. 2 
Ditch, throughout the 2002 and 2003 irrigating seasons.  In slightly altered form, it also 
remained there during the 2004 irrigating season.  These findings are also supported by 
evidence in the record.

 

Based 
on those findings, the district court concluded that the "Defendants violated 
Wyoming law when they installed an outlet pipe and dam in the D. McPhail Ditch 
in order to change the means of conveyance of their D. McPhail water."  That conclusion is fully consistent with 
Wyoming law.  The Kerbs Ranch's 
diversion of water from the D. McPhail Ditch to the Forney No. 2 Ditch 
violated Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-3-114, which prohibits the water rights owner 
from changing the point of diversion or means of conveyance without permission 
from the State.  Even before this 
statutory provision existed, Wyoming law prohibited changes in the point of 
diversion or means of conveyance "when the change will injure others."  Groo v. Sights, 22 Wyo. 19, 30, 134 P. 269, 272 (1913).

 
 
The 
Kerbs Ranch's primary claim relating to these findings and conclusions is that 
the district court's decision elevates Mr. Walck's water rights over the Kerbs 
Ranch's water rights, even though their rights are of equal priority.  The Kerbs Ranch bases this claim on the 
district court's Finding of Fact 17, which it characterizes as follows:  "The trial court recognized that 
Plaintiff received his allocation for his 23-acre field, but it was not enough." 

 
 
This 
is a mischaracterization of the district court's decision.  Finding of Fact 17, in its entirety, 
reads as follows:

 
 
17.  Defendants contend that they have made 
an effort to ensure that the Plaintiff receives his portion of the D. McPhail 
water below their outlet pipe and dam.  
However, allowing merely .33 cfs (Plaintiff's technical portion of the D. 
McPhail water) to proceed down the ditch to be applied to Plaintiff's 23 acres 
is not efficient use of water nor is it enough to fulfill his right upon 
reaching the point of use.

 
 
On 
first reading, this might be read to suggest that the Kerbs Ranch was required 
to send Mr. Walck even more water than he was technically entitled to 
receive.  That changes when the 
finding is placed in context.  

 
 
The 
Kerbs Ranch contended that an effort was made to provide Mr. Walck his 
water.  However, in Finding of Fact 
18, the district court stated plainly that Mr. Walck "received very little or no 
water."  Apparently the district 
court believed that the Kerbs Ranch's effort to provide water was not 
successful.  The key finding is that 
Mr. Walck did not get the water he was entitled to 
receive.

 
 
Finding 
of Fact 17 must also be read in light of the fact that the Kerbs Ranch was not 
entitled to divert any water from the D. McPhail Ditch to the Forney No. 2 
Ditch.  In other words, the Kerbs 
Ranch was legally required to leave the entire flow of the D. McPhail Ditch 
in the D. McPhail Ditch.  It 
violated that requirement, regardless of how little or how much water was left 
to trickle down to Mr. Walck.  In 
this context, the district court's finding does not indicate that Mr. Walck 
was entitled to more than 0.33 c.f.s., but rather, that the Kerbs Ranch was not 
entitled to divert any of the water from the D. McPhail Ditch into the 
Forney No. 2 Ditch.  Contrary to the 
Kerbs Ranch's claim, the district court did not elevate Mr. Walck's water 
rights over those of the Kerbs Ranch.

 
 
We 
are satisfied that none of the district court's findings of fact with regard to 
the north side of Jack Creek are clearly erroneous.  We are equally satisfied that its 
conclusions of law are sound.  

 
 
            
South of Jack Creek

 
 
As 
noted above, on April 26, 2002, the water commissioner adjusted the headgates of 
the Forney No. 2 Ditch and the D. McPhail Ditch and placed chains and locks on 
them to prevent tampering.  The 
commissioner also adjusted, chained, and locked the headgate of the Forney Ditch 
Company Ditch, which is on the south side of Jack Creek with a headgate 
downstream from the Forney No. 2 Ditch and upstream of the D. McPhail 
Ditch.  Notices were attached to all 
three headgates indicating that they were under regulation until May 1, 
2002.

 
 
On 
the morning of May 1, Mr. Kerbs noticed that the three headgates were still 
chained and locked, despite the fact that the regulation had expired.  As he testified,

 
 
I 
went back that evening with the bolt cutters.  And the locks and chains were still on 
those headgates with expired notices, and I knew legally they were not supposed 
to be there.  So I cut an end link 
of chain off of each chain, laid the lock and chain by the headgate, and opened 
up the headgates and started irrigating as I would in a normal 
year.

 
 
Also 
on May 1, Mr. Walck met with the water commissioner to express concern that he 
was not receiving the water he was entitled to receive through several of his 
irrigation ditches.  In response, 
the water commissioner placed a new call for regulation on Jack Creek, to begin 
on the afternoon of May 1.  It is 
undisputed that Mr. Kerbs had not received notice of the new call for regulation 
on Jack Creek on May 1, when he cut the chains on the headgates.4  Mr. Kerbs testified that he first 
learned of the new call on May 8 or 9.

  

On 
May 7, the water commissioner returned to the headgates on the Forney No. 2, D. 
McPhail, and Forney Ditch Company Ditches, and discovered that the chains had 
been cut and the headgates adjusted to take more water.  Based on the new call on Jack Creek, the 
commissioner readjusted the headgates, and again chained and locked them.  On May 14, the commissioner and Mr. 
Walck found that the chains had again been cut, and the headgates 
readjusted.  This time, however, the 
headgates of the Forney Ditch Company Ditch and the D. McPhail Ditch had been 
shut off, letting no water into the two ditches shared by Mr. Walck and the 
Kerbs Ranch, but allowing more water to flow downstream to another irrigation 
ditch that served only the Kerbs Ranch.  
The commissioner did not reopen these headgates again until May 21.  His reason for waiting a week is not 
clear from the record, but Mr. Walck testified that the water commissioner 
contacted the sheriff, suggesting that the headgates may have been left closed 
to accommodate a criminal investigation.

 
 
With 
regard to Mr. Kerbs's shutting the headgates, the district court made this 
finding of fact:

 
 
27.  Had the Defendants not shut off the 
headgates, Plaintiff would have continued to receive his appropriation through 
the D. McPhail Ditch and the Forney Ditch Company Ditch from May 14, 2002 
through May 21, 2002.

 
 
This 
finding led to the district court's conclusion that the Kerbs Ranch unlawfully 
tampered with the headgates of the D. McPhail and Forney Ditch Company Ditches, 
thereby wrongfully depriving Mr. Walck of water to which he was legally 
entitled, and causing him injury.  

 
 
The 
Kerbs Ranch claims that the district court "improperly blamed Kerbs Ranch for 
the Water Commissioner's arbitrary act of shutting off the water to the parties' 
ditches from May 14 to May 21, 2002."  
However, the record provides no support for the insinuation that the 
water commissioner shut the headgates.  
There is evidence that Mr. Kerbs shut the headgates, including his 
admission that he had previously cut the chains and adjusted the headgates, and 
the fact that shutting the headgates to those ditches left more water for Mr. 
Kerbs to use in a lower ditch.  
Based on this evidence, the district court found that, "Although no one 
saw Defendant Scott Kerbs cut the chains the second time, it appears more likely 
than not that he did indeed do so."  

 
 
The 
Kerbs Ranch also suggests that, even if it was Mr. Kerbs who shut off the 
headgates, the water commissioner should have reopened them to give Mr. Walck 
his water.  However, the Kerbs Ranch has presented no authority supporting 
the assertion that the water commissioner had that duty, either at common law or 
under the applicable statutes.  Further, it has not explained how, in the 
circumstances of this case, the commissioner's action or inaction would relieve 
it of responsibility for Mr. Kerbs's tortious conduct.  We therefore 
reject this effort to shift the blame to the water commissioner. 

 
 

Next, 
the Kerbs Ranch seems to contend that Mr. Walck was at fault because he could 
have opened the headgates himself.  
It is true that a "plaintiff cannot recover for any losses which might 
have been prevented by reasonable efforts on his part."  Bader v. Mills & Baker Co., 28 Wyo. 
191, 198-99, 201 P. 1012, 1014 (1921) (regarding a plaintiff's duty to repair 
his irrigation ditches after they were damaged by the defendant).  However, 
"[o]nly reasonable efforts and expenditures are required under this rule. The 
test is, what would an ordinarily prudent man do under like circumstances?"  Id. at 199, 201 P.  at 1015.  When 
cross-examined at trial, Mr. Walck provided this explanation of why he did 
not open the headgates:

 
 
[Jack] 
Creek was under regulation, and I thought that there'd been crimes 
committed.  I didn't go any closer 
to the crime scene after that, and I figured that the water commissioner would 
be coming back to adjust when it was appropriate. . . . It was  
it appeared to be a crime had been committed since the state locks  the 
headgates had been chained, and since the [commissioner] told me he was calling 
the sheriff and asked me to call his boss, I thought that the matter was out of 
my hands.

 
 
Given 
his awareness that opening the headgates could be considered a criminal act, it 
would not have been reasonable or prudent for Mr. Walck to open them.  We also reject this attempt to shift the 
blame to Mr. Walck.

 
 

Finally, 
the Kerbs Ranch asserts that it cannot be held liable for shutting off the water 
in these two ditches, because shutting off the water provided no benefit to the 
Kerbs Ranch.  Based on Van 
Buskirk, 
24 Wyo. 183, 156 P. 1122, and the other wrongful interference with water rights 
cases discussed earlier, 
it is not clear that benefit to the defendant is a necessary element of such a 
claim.  We do not need to resolve 
that, however, because the record indicates that the Kerbs Ranch did 
benefit.  As Mr. Walck testified, 
when Mr. Kerbs shut the headgates to the D. McPhail and Forney Ditch 
Company Ditches  the ditches shared by Mr. Walck and the Kerbs Ranch  more 
water was allowed to flow down Jack Creek and into a lower irrigation ditch that 
provides water only to the Kerbs Ranch, not to Mr. Walck.

 
 
Also 
with regard to the Forney Ditch Company Ditch, the district court found 
that:

 
 
29. 
      On June 6, 
2002, Plaintiff found that Defendants had shut off two outlet pipes to his lower 
creek field.  Plaintiff further 
discovered that at that time Defendants were receiving ample water for 
irrigation and Plaintiff was only receiving a minimal 
amount.

 
 
The 
Kerbs Ranch claims that it was "merely attempting to bring water to the end of 
the ditch to receive their rightful appropriation."  It argues that, "Under the trial court's 
findings and conclusions, Kerbs Ranch, being at the end of the ditch must wait 
until Plaintiff, at the upper end of the ditch, fulfills his water rights."  Because its water rights are of equal 
priority with Mr. Walck's, the Kerbs Ranch again argues that the district court 
"elevated Plaintiff's right over the Kerbs Ranch's right."

 
 
The 
district court did not decide that the Kerbs Ranch had to let Mr. Walck take his 
full allotment of water before it got any.  
It found that the Kerbs Ranch was getting "ample water" while 
Mr. Walck was getting "a minimal amount."  This was unlawful precisely because 
Mr. Walck's water rights are of equal priority to those of the Kerbs 
Ranch.  If there was a shortage of 
water, the parties must share the shortfall equally.  Because their water rights are of equal 
priority, Mr. Kerbs was not entitled to take "ample water" while leaving 
Mr. Walck only "a minimal amount."

 
 
Having 
reviewed all of the evidence, we are convinced that the district court's 
findings of fact with regard to the ditches on the south side of Jack Creek are 
not clearly erroneous.  Its 
conclusions of law are sound, and will be affirmed.

 
 
            
Damages

 
 
The 
district court awarded Mr. Walck $13,917.95 as total damages for his reduced 
crop production during the years 2002, 2003, and 2004.  In calculating the damages for 2002, the 
district court relied on evidence provided by Mr. Walck that, according to 
the United States Department of Agriculture, historical average production in 
Carbon County is 1.4 tons of hay per acre.  
The Kerbs Ranch's only objection to the damages calculations is that the 
district court used the county-wide average, while Mr. Walck had testified 
that actual production on his ranch was consistently below the county-wide 
average.  In its brief, the Kerbs 
Ranch insists that "the trial court's entire calculation of damages was tainted 
by the use of the county-wide hay production average in the face of Plaintiff's 
own production records showing a decidedly lower hay 
productivity."

 
 
This 
argument is factually inaccurate because the district court did not use the 
county-wide average hay production figure of 1.4 tons per acre in its "entire 
calculation of damages," as suggested by the Kerbs Ranch.  Part of Mr. Walck's damages related to 
reduced pasturage, not reduced hay production, and the district court did not 
use the county-wide average hay production figure to calculate those 
damages.  Also, the district court 
used the county-wide average only to calculate the damages during 2002.  For 2003 and 2004, it used Mr. Walck's 
actual production figures.  For 
example, Finding of Fact 19 sets forth this calculation:

 
 
19.  In 2003, this [23 acre] field again 
produced no crop because Defendants left this dam in place [in the D. McPhail 
Ditch], despite the requests by Plaintiff to remove the dam.  Plaintiff's Exhibits 9 and 
10.  Plaintiff's production in other irrigated 
fields in 2003 was 1.135 ton per acre.  Therefore, the lost production amounted 
to $1,957.88 (23 acres x 1.135 tons per acre = 26.105 [tons] 
x $75.00 per ton = $1,957.88).

 
 
(Underlining 
in original, emphasis added.)

 
 
Even 
when the district court used the county-wide average hay production figure of 
1.4 tons per acre to calculate 2002 damages, it also recognized that 2002 
production was substantially below the historical average.  The information from the United States 
Department of Agriculture indicating county-wide average hay production of 1.4 
tons per acre also established that, due to drought conditions in 2002, 
county-wide average production was only 15% of the historical average.  Accordingly, in Finding of Fact 18, the 
district court presented this calculation:

 
 
18.  The dam and outlet pipe in the D. 
McPhail Ditch harmed Plaintiff.  
After the dam was placed in the ditch in 2002, Plaintiff's 23-acre field 
below the dam and outlet pipe received very little or no water.  In 2002, the 23-acre field produced no 
hay crop due to this dam.  The 
Plaintiff was damaged in the amount of $362.25 (23 acres x 1.4 ton per acre x 15% 
county average of normal production = 4.82 tons x $75.00 per 
ton).

  

(Emphasis 
added.)  

 
 
By 
reducing the county-wide average to account for the drought, the district court, 
in effect, calculated Mr. Walck's lost production to be 0.21 tons per acre (1.4 
tons per acre x 15% county average of normal production = 0.21 tons per 
acre).  Mr. Walck testified that his 
actual production in 2002 was approximately .27 tons per acre, higher than the 
county-wide average.  If we adjusted 
the district court's calculations by using actual production figures instead of 
county-wide averages, as the Kerbs Ranch advocates, Mr. Walck's total damages 
would actually be increased.  

  

This 
adjustment is unnecessary.  Mr. 
Walck did not appeal the district court's damages calculations.  Moreover, the amount of damages "is 
within the sound discretion of the jury or trial judge who tries the case, and 
we will not disturb the award unless it is shown to be so excessive or 
unreasonable as to indicate passion or prejudice on the part of the trial 
court."  Fitzsimonds v. Cogswell, 405 P.2d 785, 
787 (Wyo. 1965).  The damages 
calculated by the district court are not excessive or unreasonable, and contain 
no hint of passion or prejudice.  We 
are more inclined to agree with the district court's finding that the damages 
sought by Mr. Walck were "conservative and reasonable."  "Damages are reviewed as fact and are 
not reversed unless clearly erroneous."  
Alexander v. Meduna, 2002 WY 
83, ¶ 35, 47 P.3d 206, 217 (Wyo. 2002).  The Kerbs Ranch has failed to show that 
the district court's damages calculations are clearly 
erroneous.

 
 
Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1In this opinion, "the 
Kerbs Ranch" refers collectively to all of the Appellants, and "Mr. Kerbs" 
refers to Scott Kerbs.

 
 

2Third parties also 
own water rights in the irrigation ditches discussed in this case, but those 
rights are not at issue in this litigation, and we will refer to the allocations 
only as between Mr. Walck and the Kerbs Ranch.

 
 

3Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 41-3-114 provides, in pertinent part, that:

 
 

(a)           
Any person entitled 
to the beneficial use of water . . . who desires to change the point of 
diversion or means of conveyance, or both, shall file a petition 
with:

 
 

(i)             
The board of control 
if the use of the water has been adjudicated under a certificate of 
appropriation; 

 
 

(ii)            
The state engineer in 
all other cases.

 
 

4It is apparently 
because of Mr. Kerbs's lack of notice that Mr. Walck did not claim any 
damages relating to Mr. Kerbs's cutting the chains and adjusting the headgates 
on May 1.  In addition, we note that 
while Mr. Kerbs was convicted in the circuit court for unlawful use of 
water and tampering with the headgates on May 1, the district court reversed the 
conviction on appeal specifically because, on May 1 when he cut the chains, 
Mr. Kerbs knew that the Pathfinder Call had expired, and had not received 
any notice of the new call for regulation.  
In contrast, Mr. Kerbs had received notice of the Pathfinder Call on 
April 26 when he adjusted the headgates to take more water than he was entitled 
to receive, and his conviction for unlawful use of water and tampering with 
headgates on April 26 was affirmed.