Title: State v. Gomes. Concurring Opinion by J. Acoba, with whom J. Duffy joins [pdf]. ICA Opinion, filed 03/23/2005 [pdf], 107 Haw. 253. Concurring Opinion by J. Acoba, with whom J. Duffy joins [pdf]. S.Ct. Order Granting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 04/12/2005 [pdf], 107 Haw. 84. S.Ct. Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, filed 06/22/2005 [pdf], 107 Haw.

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T

 

 

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STATE OF HAWAI'I, gi =
Plaintiff-Appellee-Respondent, Ais
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. eF i
Sie 2
RONALD GOMES, 3B e =f
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 3] =
a

No. 26466

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CR. NO. 91-0374(2))

MAY 26, 2005

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, AND NAKAYAMA, JJ.; AND ACOBA, J.,
CONCURRING SEPARATELY, WITH WHOM DUFFY, J., JOINS

OPINION OF THE COURT BY LEVINSON, J.
On April 6, 2005, the defendant~appellant-petitioner
Ronald Gomes filed an application for a writ of certiorari,

requesting that we review the published opinion of the

filed on March 23, 2005 (the

Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA)
ICA’s opinion), affirming the March 8, 2004 order of the circuit
court of the second circuit, the Honorable Shackley F. Raffetto
presiding, denying Gones’s petition to correct illegally imposed

sentence and conviction, pursuant to Hawai'i Rules of Penal

Procedure (HRPP) Rule 35.
In his application, Gomes merely states that he “hereby

seeks to raise these issues in the Supreme Court of the State of

Hawaii.”
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on April 12, 2005, we granted certiorari solely to

clarify the issue of whether relief under Apprendi v, New Jersev,

530 U.S. 466 (2000), may be afforded on collateral attack. In

accordance with the decision of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Sanchez-
Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664 (9" Cir. 2002), we conclude that it may

not. We express no opinion at this time, however, regarding the
applicability of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in

United States vs Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005), to this court's
analysis of the viability of our statutory extended term
sentencing schene, as elucidated in State v. Kaua, 102 Hawai'i 1,
72 P.3d 473 (2003), and State v. Rivera, 106 Hawai'i 146, 102
P.3d 1044 (2004). Accordingly, we hold that the ICA erred in
reaching the merits of Gomes’s Apprendi claim, but we
nevertheless affirm the ICA’s published opinion for the reasons

stated in this opinion.

1. BACKGROUND
As a preliminary matter, we adopt the following
unchallenged factual background, in abbreviated form, as set

forth in the ICA’s opinion:

Gomes was charged by complaint [in Cr. No. 91-0374 (21)
with Sonus] Assault. an the First Degree, Hawaii Revised
Statutes (HRS) § 707-730 (Supp. 1992), and Murder in the
Second Degree, HRS § 707-7015 (Supp. 1992), allegedly
Committed on {November 24, 1991], on the island of Maul. At
the tine of the alleged offense, ‘Gomes was in the company of
Lucie Gonzalez (Gonzalez) and James Houdasheldt
(Woudashelde

"After jaitially pleading not guilty, Gomes changed his
plea on the murder charge to pale contendere, or “no
Eontest," on June 26, 1992.” In exchange for the change of
plea, the prosecution dropped the sexual assault charge.

 

 

 

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State v. Gomes, 79 Hawai'i 32, 33, 897 P.2a 959, 960 (1995)
(footnotes omitted). Ultimately, the suprene court...»
vacate(d] the judgnent of conviction [and] remand[ed} to’ the
cirevit court for issuance of an order granting Gomes’ s HRPE
Rule 32(d) notion to withdraw his pole contendere pleal.]
Gongs, 79 Hawai'i at 40, 697 P.2d at 967,

‘on remand, and purauant to « Jury's verdict, the
circuit court convicted Gomes of the charged offence of

ymual assault in the first degree and the included offense

Of reckless manslaughter. At the July 2, 1996 sentencing
hearing, the circuit court first entertained the state's
Sune 27, 1996 motion for extended terms of imprisonment, in
Which the State had alleged that Gones was 2 "multiple
Offender” under HRS § 706-662(4) (a) (Supp. 1992)... ~The
Gizcuit court noted that the State’s motion was predicated
tupon the proposition that Gomes was a “multiple offender.”
‘The circuit court commented, "He is being sentenced for two
or more felonies. No question about that”... (T]he
Circuit court granted the State's motion, and sentence:
Gones accordingly to concurrent, extended terns of life with
the possibility of parole for the sexual assault and twenty
years for the manelaughter.

On direct appeal (S.C. No. 20010) from the July 5,
1996 judgment of Conviction and sentence, . - . (E]pe
fopreme court(,] .., via summary disposition order, . .
affirmed. State J, Gomes, to. 20010, 90 Hawai's 472, 979
P.24 66 (Haw. fled October 7, 1998)’ (S00) - .

‘On July 7, 1995, Gomes,'. . . Dio aay initiated 8.7.7.
No. 99-0008(2), with a motion to’ correct or reduce sentence
brought “pursuant to {HRPP] Rule 35." . . . On July 30,
1989, the circuit court summarily denied Gomes’ s motion{.]

 

 

 

 

   

 

 

 

 

Continuing pre sel,] - . - (Gomes) appealed) (8.c.
No. 22774). . the cireust court's denial of his motion to
correct or feduce sentence(.) .

‘The suprene court sumarily affirmed the circuit
court's denial of Gones’s motion to correct or reduce:
Sentence, concluding that "(1) the circuit court did not err
in allowing Gomes to be convicted of both sexual assault in
the first degree in viclation of HRS § 707-730 and
manslaughter in vielatson of HRS § 707-702; ané (2) the
Gitcule court did not err fo imposing extended terns of
Smprisonment pursuant to HRS § 706-6824) -”

Nor 22974, 99 hawal's 352, 3 P+34 50 (hw. £Lded June Zr
2060) (S00).

On October 5, 2000, Gomes, still pio ae, filed a
petition for writ of habeas compua in the federal district
Court (Civil No. 00-00652 SoM-BMK)...- Gomes argued for
the fixst time that hie prison terns were unconstitutionally
extended because the factual bases therefor had not been
Gharged and had been found by o judge instead of jury,
citing the recent Apprendi: v/ New Jersey, 520 U.8. ¢66,' 120
S.ct..2348, 147 L.fa2d 435 (2000), State vs Tafova, 91
Hawai" 261, 982 #.24 890 (1999), ‘and other elated cases.

(on March 21, 2003, the federal district court denied
Gomes’ s habsas coimus petition{,) . . . conelud{ing) that

 

 
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“che Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar Gones’ convictions
for mansiaughter and sexual assavlt(,)" . . + {and holding]
Chet Gones's extended terms were “not illegal.”. . . [The
federal district court explained:

 

comes! Auarendi/Tafova argument was not raised in his
Sppeel to the Hawaii Suprene Court. As the F & R [the
Ragistrate’e findings and recommendation) noted, Gones
Mas required fo exhaust his state court remedies. See
Beursic, § 2254(b) (1). After a de novo review of the
Fecord, the court agrees with the F & R that Gomes did
fot exhaust his administrative renedies as to his
Roprendi/tateva argument. Gomes has not demonstrated
Bhat he cannot bring (an RPP) Rule 40 motion in the
Reweil state courte: Accordingly, and for the reasons
Set forth in the Fé R, which the court adopts, the
Court dismisses Gomes” Aporendi/Tafava argunent based
Sauhis failure to exhaust his stare judicial remedies.

 

 

on April 21, 2003, Gomes filed a "Notice of
Corticrari= to the Onited States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth cireust. . +. On July 28, 2003, the Ninth Circuit
Feplied: “the request fora certificate of appealability is
Genieds gee 26 U.S.C. $ 2253(e) (2)-"

 

 

fon becenber 22, 2003, Gomes, continuing pro ae, filed
the petition underlying this appesl, a “Petition te Correct
Illegally imposed Sentence and Conviction Pursuant to Hawais
Appellate [sic] Frocedire Rule 35."()] Gomes eeserted that
ME"state and federal constitutional rights to due process
and against double jeopardy had been vielated, “when
petitioner convicted [sic] of Sexual Assault in the First
Begree after these charges had been dropped in an earlier
ples sgreenent.” “Furthermore,” Goses averred, "the Court
Greed when sentencing petitioner to an Extended Term of
{hearceratson in bothe [sic] the conviction of Sexual
Assault in the First Degree, as well as the conviction of

 

 

 

 

+ On Decenber 22, 2003, when Gones filed his HRFP Rule 35 notion,
Rule 35 hed been amended s¢ of July 1, 2003 to provide, inter alia, thet “ial
Botion mace by a defendant to correct’ an illegal sentence sore than 90 days
Titer the sentence is imposed shall be made pursuant to Rule 40 of these
Silos." “WAP Rule 40(a) + a2 amended effective July 1, 2003, provides in
relevant pert

 

 

 

a | At ony time but not prior to final judgment, any
person nay Seek’ relief under the procedure set forth in this’ rule
From the judgnent of conviction, on the following grounds:

Gi "fhat the juagnent wae obtained of sentence imposed in
wiolation of the constitution Of the United States or of the State
oe Hawai ted

 

isi (.'.. except for a claim of i21ega1 sentence, an issue
is waived if the petitioner knowingly and understandingly failed
25 Thiue it ang it could have been reised before the trial, at the
Efialy en eppeal, (or) ins habeas corpus proceeding . »

 

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Manslaughter. Petitioner wae not a repeat offender which

could have given way to this sentence.” -
On March €, 2004, the circuit court denied Gomes’ s

petition(.] .. : Gomes filed his notice of this appeal on
Maren 22, 2004

 

ICA's opinion, slip op. at 2-10 (footnotes and sone quotation
signals omitted) (some brackets added and some in original).

On appeal, Gomes argued, inter alia, that he had been
unconstitutionally sentenced to an extended term of imprisonment
by a judge rather than a jury. ICA's opinion, slip. op. at 10.
‘The ICA resolved Gones’s argument as follows:

« « Gones essentially repeats his
arguments, “but here enhances in nit estimation by cases
Gecided since his weit of habeas cormus vas denied,

Sneluding Elakely ¥. Washington, 124°8.ce. 2531, 237

Cl * gine puprendi/tafova arguments (Gomes) makes on
appeal have since Deen foreciosed. Comare US. v. Sookex,
125'S.ce. 738, 749-80" (2008):

 

     

on the prenise,
‘that. the relevant
‘mandatory and impose
Binding requirements on ail sentencing judge:

If the (Federal Sentencing] Guidelines as currently
written could be read as nerely advisory provisions that
Feconended, rather than required, the selection of
particular sentences in response to differing sets of facts,
Their use would not implicate the Sixth Auenanent. we heve
ever doubted the authority of a judge to exercise broad
Giseretion in inposing a sentence within a statutory range.
See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481, 120°S.Ct. 2348, [147 L.Ed.24
435); Milliane v. Now york, 337 0.8. 24i, 246, 69 '8.cc.
1078, $3 Led. i537 (1943) Indeed, everyone agrees that
the Constitutional issues presented’ by these cases would
have been avoided entirely if Congress had eaitted fron the
[Sentencing Reform Act of 1964] the provisions that make the
Guidelines binding on district judges... For whens
Exiai Judge exercises his discretion to select s specific
Sentence within s defined Fange, the defendant has’ no right
toa jury determination of tne facts that the judge dens
Felevant.
ith HRS’ 706-6624) (a)

A convicted defendant may be subject to an
gxtended term of imprisonment under section

06-661, if the convicted defendant satisfies

one or nore of the following eriteri

 

 

    

 

 

 

 
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(4) The defendant is a multiple offender whose
ceininal actions were #0 extensive that a sentence of
SSprisonment for an extended term is necessary for
protection of the public. The court shall not make
Enis finding unles

(a) The defendant is being sentenced for
two or nore felonies oF is already under
Sentence of imprisonment for felony

(esphesie supplied.) ee also

Jey, 162-63, 102 P.3d 104, 1060-6

202" nawai's ‘1, 12-13, 72 P.3d 473, 7 Stake te

arvana, 10% Hawai'i $7,121, 63" P.34 405, 419 (app. 2002).

ICA's opinion, slip. op. at 11-14 (some ellipses points added and

 

 

106 Hawas't

 

  

 

some in original) (emphasis in original). On April 6, 2005,

 

Gomes timely filed an application for a writ of certiorari. On
April 12, 2005, we granted certiorari.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Appeals from the ICA are governed by HRS § 602-59(b)
(1993) ) whieh prescribes that an

application for writ of certiorari shall tersely state
EEigrounde which mist include (1) grave errors of law
Gr cf fect, oF (2) ebvicus inconsistencies in the
Sectsion of the intermediate appellate court with thet
Of the suprene court, federal decisions, or ite own
Sécieion, and the magnitude of such errors or
Sheonsistencies dictating the need fer further appeal.

Ince Jane Doe, Born on June 20, 1995, 95 Hawai'i 183, 189, 20

P.3d 616, 622 (2001).

     

IIT. Discussion

At the time of Gomes’s trial and sentencing, judge-
imposed extended term sentencing had not yet been called into
question by the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Apprendi. Gomes filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
the United States District Court for the District of Hawai‘
shortly after the Supreme Court ruled in Apprendi that “[o]ther
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the

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penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must
be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
530 U.S. at 490. Following the Hawai'i federal district court's
denial of Gones’s habeas corpus petition for failure to raise his
Apprendi/Tatova argument in his appeal to this court, Gomes filed
his second HRPP Rule 35 motion to correct an illegally imposed

 

sentence in the Hawai'i circuit court. The circuit court denied
Gomes's HRPP Rule 35 motion on the merits, and on appeal, the ICA
affirmed the circuit court’s denial of Gomes’s motion, also on
the merits. Before we can reach the merits of Gomes’s claim, we
must determine whether the ruling in Apprendi applies
retroactively to petitions collaterally attacking previously-
imposed sentences. In our view, it does not. Accordingly, we
hold that the ICA erred in reaching the merits of Gomes’s appeal
from the circuit court’s denial of his HRPP Rule 35 motion, but
we nonetheless affirm the ICA’s opinion on the grounds stated
herein.?

‘The Ninth Circuit held in Sanchez-Cervantes that the
new rule of criminal procedure announced in Apprendi does not
apply retroactively on initial collateral review. 282 F.3d at
671. The United States District Court for the District of
Hawai'i observed in Kaua v, Frank that review of Kaua’s habeas
sorpus petition was not a prohibited retroactive application of
Appiendi. “Because Apprendi’s new rule was announced before
Kaua’s state court judgment became final, the court is not faced

 

 

2 for an analysis of the impact of Apprendi and ite progeny on our
extended term sentencing achene, ase y 202 Hawai'i 1, 72 P.3d 473
(2003), and state vo Rivers, 106 Hawai 14¢, 102 F.3d 1G¢4 (2008)

7

 
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with the issue of whether Apprendi applies to 2 collateral review

of Kaua’s judgment. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310-13,
109 S.ct. 1060, 103 L.£d.2d 334 (1989)." Kava v. Frank, 350

F.Supp.2d 648, 853 n.1 (D. Haw. 2004). “While retroactive
application of Apprendi to initial petitions for collateral
review is barred, see United States v, Sanchez-Cervantes, 282
F.3d 664, 667 (9 Cir. 2002), that bar does not apply here.

[da at 653.
We note that this court addressed the merits of Kaua’s

 

Apprendi claim in his appeal of the denial of his HREP Rule 35
motion in State v. Kava, 102 Hawai'i at 13, 72 P.3d at 485. For
clarification, we emphasize that we reached the merits of Kaua’s
Apprendi claim because Apprendi was decided while Kaua’s direct
appeal was pending before this court. Therefore, because Kaua’s
appeal was not final prior to the announcement of the rule in
Apoxendi, our Apprendi analysis in State v. Kaua did not
constitute a retroactive analysis of Apprendi applicability on
collateral attack.

wapplication of constitutional rules not in existence
at the time a conviction became final seriously undermines the
principle of finality which is essential to the operation of our
criminal justice system.” Teague, 489 U.S. at 309, 109 S.Ct.
1060. We now adopt the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in
Sanchez-Cervantes, which evaluated the propriety of Apprendi’s
retroactive application within the framework of the Supreme
court’s decision in Teague.

in Teague vs Lane, the Supreme Court held that_new

constitutional Tulse of criminal procedure that had not been
Ghnounced at the tine the defendant's conviction became

 

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troactively on collateral review
sxceptions. These
tain kinds of

final cannot be applied
unless they {it within one of two nafs
‘exceptions exist if a new rule (1) “pla:
Brinary private individual conduct beyond the power of the
Griminal law-making authority to proseribe,” oF (2)
Spequires the coservance of those procedures that

implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Thus,
to apply the rule of Apprendi retroactively, we must
determine that Apprendi is a new rule of criminal procedure
that fits into one of Teague’ s exceptions:

Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d at 667. The Ninth Circuit held that
because “Apprendi neither decriminalized drug possession or drug

 

    

 

    

in’ ode:

 

 

conspiracies nor placed such conduct beyond the scope of the
state’s authority to proscribe[,] . . . the first [Teaguel
exception does not apply here.” Id, at 668. The Ninth Circuit
further held that Apprendi is not a “watershed rule(] of criminal
procedure” enabling it to be applied retroactively under Teaque's
second exception. Id. Inasmuch as “[t]he application of
Apprendi only affects the enhancement of a defendant's sentence
once he or she has already been convicted beyond a reasonable
doubt [,]” id. at 671, it does not fit within Teague’s limited
exceptions to the bar against retroactive application of new
constitutional rules of criminal procedure.

Moreover, the United States Courts of Appeal that have
addressed the issue have likewise held that Apprendi does not
apply retroactively on collateral attack. See In re Tatum, 233
F.3d 857, 858 (Sth Cir, 2000) (holding that the Supreme Court has
not expressly stated that the holding of Apprendi may be applied
retroactively on collateral review and denying defendant’s motion
for leave to file a “successive” motion to vacate sentence) ;
Talbott v. Indiana, 226 F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 2000) (“If the
Supreme Court ultimately declares that Apprendi applies
#4 POR PUBLICATION ***

retroactively on collateral attack, we will authorize successive
collateral review of cases to which Apprendi applies. Until then
prisoners should hold their horses and stop wasting everyone’ s

Sepulveda v. United States, 330
F.3d 55, 63 (1st Cir, 2003) ("We hold, without serious question,

 

time with futile applications.”

that Apprendi prescribes a new rule of criminal procedure, and
that Teague does not permit inferior federal courts to apply the
Apprendi rule retroactively to cases on collateral review.”);
United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139, 149-81 (4th Cir. 2001),
cert. denied, $34 U.S. 1032 (2001) (holding that Apprendi rule
does not apply retroactively on collateral review); United States
vs Moss, 252 F.3d 993, 997 (8th Cir. 2001), cert, denied, 534
U.S. 1097 (2002) (*[W]e hold today that Apprendi is not of
watershed magnitude and that Teague bars petitioners from raising
Apprendi claims on collateral review.”); McCov v, United States,
266 F.3d 1245, 1258 (11th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 906
(2002) (holding, inter alia, that defendant’s Apprendi claim is
barred by Teague’s non-retroactivity standard) .

In the present matter, Gones was sentenced and his
direct appeal became final years before the announcement of the
Supreme Court's rule in Apprendi. Therefore, by any construction
of Apprendi, Gomes’s sentence could not have been illegal at the
time the circuit court imposed it. Hence, there was no merit to
Gomes’s subsequent HRPP Rule 35 claim based on Apprendi, Apprendi
not having established a new rule of criminal procedure that fits
within one of Teague’s exceptions. That being the case, we hold
that the Apprendi rule, however it may be construed, is not

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controlling retroactively on collateral attack. Thus, the ICA
should not have reached the merits of Gomes’s

Apprendi/Tafoya claim.

TV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Apprendi does
not apply retroactively in this jurisdiction to cases on
collateral attack. Accordingly, we affirm the ICA’s opinion,
although on the grounds stated in this opinion. Me also affirm
the ICA's opinion with respect to the non-Apprendi-related points

of error that Gomes raised in his appeal.

on the writ: Li

Ronald Gones, “Baca Plalennn
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