Title: Anderson v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh Pa.

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-12108 
 
ODIN ANDERSON & others1  vs.  NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH PA & others.2 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     October 6, 2016. - February 2, 2017. 
 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, & Lowy, 
Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Consumer Protection Act, Insurance, Unfair or deceptive act, 
Offer of settlement, Damages.  Insurance, Settlement of 
claim.  Damages, Consumer protection case, Interest, 
Punitive.  Interest.  Judgment, Interest.  Practice, Civil, 
Judgment, Damages, Interest. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
March 13, 2003. 
 
 
The case was heard by Brian A. Davis, J., and motions to 
alter or amend the judgment were also heard by him. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
                                                        
1 Kerstin Anderson and Katarina Anderson, by her father and 
next friend, Odin Anderson. 
 
2 American International Group Technical Services, Inc., & 
AIG Claims Services, Inc. 
2 
 
 
 
 
Kathleen M. Sullivan for National Union Fire Insurance 
Company of Pittsburgh PA. 
 
Leonard H. Kesten (Richard E. Brody also present) for the 
plaintiffs. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  In this appeal, we consider the proper measure 
of punitive damages to be assessed against defendants who engage 
in unfair or deceptive insurance settlement practices in 
violation of G. L. c. 176D, § 3, and G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (3).  The 
plaintiffs -- Odin Anderson, his wife, and his daughter -- filed 
a personal injury action in the Superior Court for serious 
injuries Odin3 suffered after being struck by a bus owned by 
Partners Healthcare Systems, Inc. (Partners), that was being 
driven by one of its employees.  The plaintiffs filed a separate 
action, under G. L. c. 176D, and G. L. c. 93A, against Partner's 
insurers and claims representatives; proceedings in that action 
were stayed pending resolution of the underlying tort claims.  
After a trial, a Superior Court jury awarded Anderson $2,961,0004 
in damages in the personal injury action, and awarded his wife 
and daughter $110,000 each.  At a subsequent, jury-waived trial, 
a different Superior Court judge found that the insurers and 
claims representatives violated G. L. c. 93A and G. L. c. 176D 
by their "egregious," "deliberate or callously indifferent" 
                                                        
3 Because the plaintiffs share a last name, we refer to them 
by their first names. 
 
4 This amount was later reduced by forty-seven per cent 
based on the jury's finding of comparative negligence. 
3 
 
 
 
actions, "designed to conceal the truth, improperly skew the 
legal system and deprive the Andersons of fair compensation for 
their injuries for almost a decade."  Based on these findings, 
the judge concluded that the insurers' and claims 
representatives' "misconduct warrants the maximum available 
sanction . . . , both as punishment for what transpired and as a 
deterrent to similar conduct in the future."  He awarded the 
plaintiffs treble damages, using as the "amount of the judgment" 
to be multiplied the combined amount of the underlying tort 
judgment and the accrued postjudgment interest on that judgment.  
See G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (3); G. L. c. 176D, § 3 (9) (f) (where 
violation of G. L. c. 176D is wilful, damages are to be 
multiplied pursuant to G. L. c. 93A, § 9 [3]).  The Appeals 
Court affirmed the judgment of liability and the amount of the 
award of damages, in an unpublished memorandum and order issued 
pursuant to its rule 1:28.  See Anderson v. National Fire Ins. 
Co. of Pittsburgh PA, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 1117 (2015). 
 
We granted the defendants' application for further 
appellate review, limited to the issue whether postjudgment 
interest was included properly in the "amount of the judgment" 
to be multiplied under G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (3).  We conclude that 
in a case where the amount of actual damages to be multiplied 
due to a wilful or knowing violation of G. L. c. 93A or G L. 
4 
 
 
 
c. 176D are based on the amount of an underlying judgment, that 
amount does not include postjudgment interest. 
 
1.  Background.  On September 2, 1998, while crossing 
Staniford Street in Boston, Odin was struck and injured by a bus 
owned by Partners and operated by Partners' employee Norman 
Rice.  As a result of the collision, he sustained serious 
injuries, including a fractured skull and intracerebral 
hemorrhage, that ultimately required more than one year of 
medical treatment. 
 
At the time of the accident, Partners and Rice were insured 
under primary and excess policies issued by National Union Fire 
Insurance Company of Pittsburgh PA.  American International 
Group Claims Services, Inc., the primary insurer, and American 
International Group Technical Services, Inc., the excess 
insurer, were responsible for adjusting claims on these 
policies. 
 
The plaintiffs, through counsel, sought to reach a 
settlement agreement with the defendants.  The defendants 
rejected the plaintiffs' demand for settlement and declined to 
enter into settlement negotiations.  As a result, in May, 2001, 
the plaintiffs filed a personal injury action against Partners 
and Rice, claiming negligent operation of a motor vehicle, 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, and loss of 
consortium.  In March, 2003, the plaintiffs filed a separate 
5 
 
 
 
action against all of the defendants under G. L. c. 176D, § 3, 
and G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (3), alleging wilful and egregious failure 
to conduct a reasonable investigation of the plaintiffs' claims, 
and failure to effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable 
settlement, notwithstanding that liability had become 
"reasonably clear" by the time the plaintiffs filed their 
initial complaint.  Proceedings in the second action were 
stayed, on the parties' joint motion, pending resolution of the 
underlying tort action. 
Trial in the tort case took place in June and July of 2003.  
The jury found that Odin had suffered $2,961,000 in damages but 
that he was comparatively negligent for forty-seven per cent of 
his injuries, thereby reducing the award of damages to 
$1,569,330.5 Judgment entered for Odin on July 10, 2003, in the 
amount of $2,244,588.93; the total amount included costs and 
mandatary prejudgment interest, as required under G. L. c. 231, 
§ 6B, of approximately $450,000. 
The defendants appealed to the Appeals Court from certain 
evidentiary rulings and from the judge's instructions on 
comparative negligence.  In August, 2008, the Appeals Court 
affirmed the judgment, Anderson v. Rice, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 1114 
                                                        
5 The jury also awarded $110,000 each to Kerstin and 
Katarina, Odin's wife and daughter.  In April, 2007, the parties 
reached an agreement to settle the loss of consortium claims, 
and Kerstin and Katarina each received $204,569.13. 
6 
 
 
 
(2008), and we thereafter denied the defendants' application for 
further appellate review, see 452 Mass. 1107 (2008).  In 
December, 2008, the defendants paid the amount of the damages 
due to Odin on the underlying tort judgment, as well as the five 
years of statutorily-mandated postjudgment interest accrued on 
that judgment between its date of entry in the Superior Court 
and the issuance of the Appeals Court's opinion.  The amount 
ultimately paid to Odin totaled $3,252,857.80, which included 
$1,284,243.17 in postjudgment interest. 
In September, 2013, a second Superior Court judge conducted 
a ten-day jury-waived trial on the G. L. c. 176D and G. L. 
c. 93A action.  His decision containing findings of fact, 
rulings of law, and an order for judgment issued in April, 2014.  
The judge found that the defendants violated G. L. c. 176D, 
§ 3 (9) (d), by failing to "conduct a reasonable investigation 
. . . based on all available evidence," including by suppressing 
unfavorable evidence and offering fictitious evidence; failing 
to "effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlement of claims 
in which liability . . . ha[d] become reasonably clear"; and 
pursuing an unreasonable appeal of the underlying personal 
injury judgment.  The judge also concluded that the defendants' 
violations of G. L. c. 176D had been wilful and egregious, 
warranting an award of punitive damages under G. L. c. 93A, 
§ 9 (3).  The judge determined that the amount to be multiplied 
7 
 
 
 
under G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (3), was double the amount of the 
underlying personal injury judgment that had entered in 2003, 
combined with the postjudgment interest that had accrued between 
the date of entry and the date of the defendants' payment in 
2008. 
The parties filed motions to modify the judgment, pursuant 
to Mass. R. Civ. P. 59 (e), 365 Mass. 827 (1974).  The 
plaintiffs asserted that the judge's doubling of the amount of 
the underlying 2003 judgment was inconsistent with his stated 
purpose to impose "maximum available sanctions."  They argued 
that the maximum award of punitive damages available under G. L. 
c. 93A, § 9 (3), is three times the amount of the judgment 
rendered in the underlying tort action.  The defendants argued, 
by contrast, that the judge improperly included postjudgment 
interest in the amount to be multiplied.  In June, 2014, the 
judge issued an amended judgment that increased the amount of 
the punitive damages to three times the amount of the underlying 
judgment.  He also rejected the defendants' "unduly restrictive 
view" of punitive damages under G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (3), and 
retained the postjudgment interest in the amount to be 
multiplied.6 
                                                        
6 The judge awarded the plaintiffs punitive damages in the 
amounts of $9,758,573.40 to Odin and $613,707.39 each to Kerstin 
and Katarina.  Of that amount, approximately $4.2 million was 
8 
 
 
 
 
2.  Discussion.  The statutory framework governing the 
plaintiffs' claims is well established.  See Rhodes v. AIG 
Domestic Claims, Inc., 461 Mass. 486, 494-495 (2012) (describing 
interplay between related G. L. c. 176D, § 3 [9] [f], and G. L. 
c. 93A, § 9 [3], claims).  An insurance company commits an 
unfair claim settlement practice if it "[f]ail[s] to effectuate 
prompt, fair and equitable settlements of claims in which 
liability has become reasonably clear."  G. L. c. 176D, 
§ 3 (9) (f).  "[A]ny person whose rights are affected by another 
person violating the provisions of [G. L. c. 176D, § 3 (9) (f),] 
is entitled to bring an action to recover for the violation 
under G. L. c. 93A, § 9" (quotations omitted).  See Rhodes, 
supra at 494.  If the fact finder concludes that an insurer has 
failed to effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement, 
causing injury, the plaintiff is entitled to the greater of 
actual damages or statutory damages of twenty-five dollars.  
G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (3).  Where an insurer's action was "willful 
or knowing" (or, as here, both), the judge must award multiple 
damages.  Id.  General Laws c. 93A, § 9 (3), requires that the 
judge "shall" award punitive damages of "up to three but not 
less than two times" the actual damages in the underlying 
action.  The statute further provides that "[f]or the purposes 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
attributable to the trebling of approximately $1.4 million in 
postjudgment interest. 
9 
 
 
 
of this chapter, the amount of actual damages to be multiplied 
by the court shall be the amount of the judgment on all claims 
arising out of the same and underlying transaction or 
occurrence." (emphasis supplied).  Id. 
 
The question before us is whether "the amount of the 
judgment" that serves as the measure of "actual damages" to be 
doubled or trebled under G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (3), includes the 
amount of any postjudgment interest that accrued on that 
judgment before it was paid.  In examining this issue we 
consider (a) the plain language of G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (3); (b) 
the nature of pre- and postjudgment interest; and (c) the 
purpose of the punitive damages available under the statute. 
 
a.  Statutory language.  As with every statutory analysis, 
our interpretation of G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (3), begins with the 
plain language of the statute.  See International Fid. Ins. Co. 
v. Wilson, 387 Mass. 841, 853 (1983).  "All the words of a 
statute are to be given their ordinary and usual meaning, and 
each clause or phrase is to be construed with reference to every 
other clause or phrase without giving undue emphasis to any one 
group of words, so that, if reasonably possible, all parts shall 
be construed as consistent with each other so as to form a 
harmonious enactment effectual to accomplish its manifest 
purpose."  Worcester v. College Hill Props., LLC, 465 Mass. 134, 
139 (2013), quoting Selectmen of Topsfield v. State Racing 
10 
 
 
 
Comm'n, 324 Mass. 309, 312–313 (1949).  Although the "[w]ords 
and phrases" of the statutory text "shall be construed according 
to the common and approved usage of the language," "technical 
words and phrases and such others as may have acquired a 
peculiar and appropriate meaning in law shall be construed and 
understood according to such meaning."  G. L. c. 4, § 6, Third.  
Where "the language is clear and unambiguous, it is conclusive 
as to the intent of the Legislature."  Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust 
Co. v. Fitchburg Capital, LLC, 471 Mass. 248, 253 (2015). 
In common understanding, a "judgment" is "a legal decision; 
an order or sentence given by a judge or law court"; or "a debt, 
resulting from a court order."  Webster's New Universal 
Unabridged Dictionary 990 (2d ed. 1983).  This is consistent 
with the more technical, legal definition of a "judgment" as a 
"court's final determination of the rights and obligations of 
the parties in a case."  Black's Law Dictionary 970 (10th ed. 
2014).  See Shawmut Community Bank, N.A. v. Zagami, 419 Mass. 
220, 225 (1994), quoting Gibbs Ford, Inc. v. United Truck 
Leasing Co., 399 Mass. 8, 11 (1987) ("the term 'judgment' refers 
to the final adjudicating act of the judge 'disposing of all 
claims against all the parties to the action'"). 
 
The statutory language in question here, "the amount of the 
judgment," does not provide any express guidance as to whether 
the "judgment" to be multiplied for wilful or knowing misconduct 
11 
 
 
 
encompasses postjudgment interest.  Nor is this question 
clarified elsewhere in the statute.  Where, as here, the meaning 
of the statutory language is "sufficiently ambiguous to support 
multiple, rational interpretations, . . . we look to the cause 
of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied 
and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the 
purpose of its framers may be effectuated" (citations and 
quotations omitted).  Kain v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 
474 Mass. 278, 286 (2016). 
 
b.  Nature of pre- and postjudgment interest.  As the 
Legislature has enacted two statutes mandating the payment of 
interest on judgments, see G. L. c. 231, § 6B (prejudgment 
interest); G. L. c. 235, § 8 (postjudgment interest), we turn to 
them for guidance.7  See Connors v. Annino, 460 Mass. 790, 796 
(2011), quoting Canton v. Commissioner of the Mass. Highway 
Dep't, 455 Mass. 783, 791–792 (2010) (we attempt to "construe 
statutes that relate to the same subject matter as a harmonious 
whole and avoid absurd results").  See, e.g., Canton, supra 
(construing differing provisions of Massachusetts Environmental 
                                                        
7 In common usage, "interest" is defined as "money paid for 
the use of money."  Webster's New Universal Unabridged 
Dictionary 956 (2d ed. 1983).  In legal understanding, 
"interest" is "compensation . . . allowed by law for the use or 
detention of money, or for the loss of money by one who is 
entitled to its use."  Black's Law Dictionary 935 (l0th ed. 
2014).  Interest is thus, by its nature, an amount charged and 
owed that is distinct from the amount of the principal. 
12 
 
 
 
Protection Act).  "If the language of the statute is 'fairly 
susceptible [of] a construction that would lead to a logical and 
sensible result' . . . we will construe [it] so 'as to make [it 
an] . . . effectual piece[] of legislation in harmony with 
common sense and sound reason.'"  Commonwealth v. Williams, 427 
Mass. 59, 62, (1998), quoting Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 16 
Mass. App. Ct. 251, 254 (1983). 
 
With respect to prejudgment interest, G. L. c. 231, § 6B, 
provides that, in a tort case involving personal injury or 
damage to property, "there shall be added by the clerk of court 
to the amount of damages interest thereon . . . from the date of 
commencement of the action." (emphasis supplied).  Because 
prejudgment interest is "added . . . to the amount of damages," 
it becomes an integral part of the amount of the judgment 
itself.  See, e.g., R.W. Granger & Sons v. J & S Insulation, 
Inc., 435 Mass. 66, 84 (2001) (prejudgment interest forms part 
of underlying judgment and therefore is multiplied in computing 
award under G. L. c. 93A); City Coal Co. of Springfield, Inc. v. 
Noonan, 424 Mass. 693, 695 (1997), S.C., 434 Mass. 709 (2001) 
(prejudgment interest forms part of judgment for purpose of 
calculating postjudgment interest).  Prejudgment interest is 
included in the judgment because it compensates the prevailing 
party for the time value of money accrued before resolution of 
the legal dispute, and thus represents an "integral component of 
13 
 
 
 
compensatory damages."  Smith v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. 
Auth., 462 Mass. 370, 376 (2012). 
 
By contrast, postjudgment interest "is not an element of 
compensatory damages."  Id.  Postjudgment interest serves to 
provide compensation to the prevailing party for delay in 
payment after a nonprevailing party's underlying obligation has 
been established.  See Chapman v. University of Mass. Med. Ctr., 
423 Mass. 584, 587 (1996) (postjudgment interest is not part of 
underlying claim).  Thus, the postjudgment interest statute, 
G. L. c. 235, § 8, provides that "[e]very judgment for the 
payment of money shall bear interest from the day of its 
entry . . ." (emphasis supplied).  See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. 
Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835-836 (1990) ("purpose of 
postjudgment interest is to compensate the successful plaintiff 
for being deprived of compensation for the loss from the time 
between the ascertainment of the damage and the payment by the 
defendant" [citation omitted]).  Put another way, in every 
context other than G. L. c. 93A, while prejudgment interest is 
added to a judgment and therefore forms an integral part of it, 
postjudgment interest is borne by the judgment and is separate 
and distinct from it. 
 
The plaintiffs urge that we read the requirement of G. L. 
c. 235, § 8, as indicating that, in the context of G. L. c. 93A, 
postjudgment interest is part of the judgment itself, subject to 
14 
 
 
 
doubling or trebling for wilful or knowing misconduct.  In our 
view, however, the language of the statute implies the opposite 
conclusion.  That a judgment "bears" interest suggests that 
interest is not an inherent part of the judgment itself but, 
rather, something accrued in addition.  See Black's Law 
Dictionary 183 (10th ed. 2014) (defining to "bear" as to 
"support or carry" or to "produce as yield").  That a judgment 
supports, carries, or produces interest indicates that the 
interest is separate and distinct from the judgment.  The 
statutory language is consistent with this common understanding 
of its words:  the Legislature chose not to include in the 
statute mandating postjudgment interest that such interest is to 
be "added . . . to the amount of damages," in direct contrast to 
the language it chose with respect to prejudgment interest.8  See 
G. L. c. 231, § 6B. 
 
The view that postjudgment interest is separate and 
distinct from the underlying amount of the damages is supported 
by statutory provisions and rules of civil procedure in other 
contexts, such as those governing the form of executions.  
                                                        
8 Although the issues confronting us were different, and the 
question of postjudgment interest was not the focus of the 
decisions, on two prior occasions we have treated postjudgment 
interest as properly excluded from the "amount of the judgment" 
for purposes of a multiplied damage calculation under G. L. 
c. 93A, § 9 (3).  See Rhodes v. AIG Domestic Claims, Inc., 461 
Mass. 486, 498-500 (2012); R.W. Granger & Sons v. J & S 
Insulation, Inc., 435 Mass. 66, 84 (2001). 
15 
 
 
 
General Laws c. 235, § 8, provides that an execution of a money 
judgment shall "specify the day upon which judgment is entered, 
and shall require the collection or satisfaction thereof with 
interest from the date of its entry."  Likewise, Mass. R. Civ. 
P. 54 (f), 382 Mass. 822 (1980), provides that "[e]very judgment 
for the payment of money shall bear interest up to the date of 
payment of said judgment" (emphasis supplied).9  If postjudgment 
interest were, like prejudgment interest, a part of the 
underlying amount of damages, there would be no need separately 
to specify both sums in an execution. 
 
c.  Purpose of punitive damages under G. L. c. 93A § 9 (3).  
We recognize, as we have previously, that multiple damages 
awarded under G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (3), are punitive in nature.  
See Rhodes, 461 Mass. at 498 ("There is general consensus among 
courts and commentators that the 1989 amendment [establishing 
the award of multiple damages] was intended to increase the 
potential penalties for insurers who engaged in unfair claim 
settlement practices"); id. at 503.  The statute is thus a 
"penal statute" akin to other statutes "designed to enforce the 
law by punishing offenders, rather than simply by enforcing 
                                                        
9 Rule 54 (f) of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, 
382 Mass. 822 (1980), provides that where an "execution or order 
directing the payment of [a] judgment" is issued, the amount of 
"interest from the date of entry of . . . judgment to the date 
of [the] execution or order shall . . . be computed by the 
clerk, and the amount of such interest shall be stated on the 
execution or order." 
16 
 
 
 
restitution to those damaged."  See Collatos v. Boston 
Retirement Bd., 396 Mass. 684, 686 (1986) (construing pension 
forfeiture statute). 
 
The trial judge included postjudgment interest in the 
amount to be trebled based on his determination that the 
"maximum available sanction" was warranted.  Thus, we consider 
the plaintiffs' contention that the "amount of the judgment" to 
be multiplied properly should include postjudgment interest, in 
order to discourage defendants from "holding the verdict money 
'hostage' during the appellate process" and to effectuate the 
legislative purpose of providing an additional, substantial 
sanction to discourage others from similar misconduct. 
 
For several reasons, we conclude that the plaintiffs' 
contention that the Legislature must have intended to include 
postjudgment interest in "the amount of the judgment to be 
multiplied" in order to protect injured parties against bad 
faith appeals by insurance companies is unwarranted.10  The 
                                                        
10 Relying on Boyer v. Bowles, 316 Mass. 90, 95 (1944), as 
did the Appeals Court, the plaintiffs argue that postjudgment 
interest, while not computed when a judgment is entered, is part 
of the judgment because it is definitively derived from a known 
mathematical calculation based on the amount of the initial 
award.  In 1944, this court observed that "the meaning of the 
final decree is plain.  Though not computed, the amount of 
interest to be paid was certain, on the principle that whatever 
can be made certain by mere arithmetic is already certain.  
Substantially the decree is as though the interest had been 
computed and stated, and added to the principal."  Id.  That 
case, however, predated the provision for multiple damages in 
17 
 
 
 
Legislature established the statutory twelve per cent 
postjudgment interest rate specifically to protect prevailing 
parties during the appellate process.  In addition, several 
other statutory and procedural means exist to discourage 
frivolous or bad-faith appeals.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 211A, § 15 
(costs and interest for delay caused by frivolous appeal); G. L. 
c. 231, § 6F (awards of costs, expenses, and attorney's fees as 
sanction for advancing claim or defense found to be 
"insubstantial, frivolous and not advanced in good faith"); 
Mass. R. A. P. 25, as appearing in 376 Mass. 949 (1979) (damages 
and interest where delay result of frivolous appeal).  These 
also include G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (3), itself, claims under which 
may be triggered by postjudgment conduct.  See Rhodes, 461 Mass. 
at 495 (considering postjudgment violations of c. 93A).  
Ultimately, we find it persuasive that the Legislature did not 
specify explicitly in the postjudgment interest statute that 
such interest is to be "added  . . . to the amount of damages," 
as it did with regard to prejudgment interest in G. L. c. 231, 
§ 6B. 
 
Moreover, under the rule of lenity, given the absence of an 
express textual provision or an indication of legislative 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
G. L. c. 93A § 9 (3), by more than forty years, and discussed 
both pre- and postjudgment interest.  The statement that the 
plaintiffs reference was made with regard to prejudgment 
interest. See Boyer, supra. 
18 
 
 
 
intent, G. L. c. 93A, § 9 (3), cannot be read implicitly to 
allow (or to require, as the multiplication of an award of 
damages for wilful misconduct is mandatory) doubling or trebling 
an award of postjudgment interest.  See Libby v. New York, N.H. 
& H.R.R., 273 Mass. 522, 525–526 (1930). 
 
In sum, the plaintiffs have advanced no reason other than 
further punishing a defendant whose violation was wilful or 
knowing to suggest that, in enacting G. L. c. 93A, the 
Legislature intended a departure from the treatment of 
postjudgment interest in other contexts.  We therefore decline 
to read into the statute an additional measure of punishment 
that the Legislature did not set forth explicitly.  Commissioner 
of Correction v. Superior Court Dep't of the Trial Court for the 
County of Worcester, 446 Mass. 123, 126 (2006) ("We do not read 
into the statute a provision which the Legislature did not see 
fit to put there, nor add words that the Legislature had an 
option to, but chose not to include"). 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The judgment is vacated, and the matter is 
remanded to the Superior Court for entry of a revised judgment, 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.