Title: The People v. Collier Gillyard

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 168  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Collier Gillyard,
            Appellant.
Steven F. Molo, for appellant.
Britta Gilmore, for respondent.
PIGOTT, J.:
This case concerns two incidents in which defendant
impersonated a police officer.  During the first incident,
defendant displayed a badge, claimed to be a police officer and
demanded that the victim pay him money.  When the victim
resisted, he pushed the victim against the wall, brandished a
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No. 168
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pair of handcuffs and threatened to use them.  As a result, the
victim, accompanied by defendant, withdrew money from an ATM and
gave it to defendant.
The second incident occurred about a month later when
defendant was driving and pulled alongside a moving taxi cab.  He
displayed a badge and motioned to the cab driver to pull over. 
When the cab driver complied, defendant and an accomplice
approached the cab and acted as if they were conducting a traffic
stop.  Wearing a badge around his neck, defendant demanded the
cab driver's ID, claiming the cab driver was intoxicated and had
hit his vehicle.  Two police officers on routine patrol came upon
the scene and, finding it suspicious, pulled over.  After talking
to the cab driver, the officers approached defendant and his
accomplice, and asked whether they were carrying badges.  When
the accomplice leaned forward to reach beneath his seat, the
officers removed them from the car.  Inside the car, the police
recovered two fake badges and a pair of toy handcuffs.  Defendant
was arrested and charged with robbery in the second degree (Penal
Law § 160.10 [1]), grand larceny in the fourth degree (Penal Law
§ 155.30 [6]) and criminal impersonation in the first and second
degrees (Penal Law §§ 190.26 [1]; 190.25 [3]), arising out of the
two incidents.
Prior to trial, the court granted the People's Molineux
application to allow testimony regarding defendant's possession
of a handcuff key on January 23, 2006 -- several weeks after the
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No. 168
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incidents, to show his identity and to prove the fact that he had
access to handcuffs.  The key was discovered by a corrections
officer in a search of defendant at the time he was incarcerated
at Riker's Island while awaiting trial on this case.  Possession
of such a key by a prisoner is a violation of Department of
Correction rules, and of Penal Law 205.20 (1). 
In opposition to the People's motion, defense counsel
had argued that the evidence was of no relevance to the case and
that it was simply being offered to prejudice the jury.  The
prosecutor argued that it was relevant as it showed defendant
"has access to handcuffs" and went to defendant's identity. 
However, defense counsel was willing to stipulate to identity. 
At trial, over defense counsel's objections, the court allowed
testimony that defendant was found in possession of the handcuff
key while at the detention center. 
Defendant was convicted of robbery in the second degree
(Penal Law § 160.10 [1]), grand larceny in the fourth degree
(Penal Law § 155.30 [6]) and criminal impersonation in the first
and second degrees (Penal Law §§ 190.26 [1]; 190.25 [3]). 
Thereafter, defendant made a motion to set aside the
verdict arguing that he was deprived of a fair trial by the
court's admission of the handcuff key evidence.  He also claimed
that a statement made by the prosecutor during summation was
improper as that evidence was not allowed in by the court during
trial.  Supreme Court denied the motion finding, among other
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things, that the evidence showed that defendant had "access" to
the type of weapon or tool alleged to have been used, and that it
was admissible to establish the defendant's involvement in the
charged crime.  In the court's view, the evidence that defendant
was familiar with, and had access to, handcuffs corroborated the
victims' accounts.   
The Appellate Division affirmed holding that the
evidence of the handcuff key was properly admitted into evidence
to demonstrate defendant's access to and familiarity with
handcuffs, which were involved in both crimes.  In the Appellate
Division's view, the lapse of time of the discovery of the key
was not so great as to render this evidence excessively remote. 
Moreover, the court held that its probative value exceeded its
prejudicial effect, which was minimized by the court's
instructions.  The court also considered defendant's arguments
concerning the prosecutor's summation and summarily rejected
them.
In this Court, defendant argues that Supreme Court
erred in admitting evidence of the handcuff key to show
"familiarity and access" to the tools of the charged crime.  He
argues that "familiarity and access" should not be recognized as
an exception to the Molineux Rule. 
Long ago, in People v Molineux (168 NY 264 [1901]),
this Court held that there are instances when evidence of
uncharged crimes may be used to prove guilt of the offense
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No. 168
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charged.  We articulated that such evidence may be admitted in
circumstances "when [the evidence] tends to establish (1) 
motive; (2) intent; (3) absence of mistake or accident; (4) a
common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more
crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to
establish the others; [or] (5) the identity of the person charged
with the commission of the crime on trial" (id. at 293). 
Acknowledging that this list was not exhaustive, we established
the rule that evidence of defendant's other crimes is admissible
only if probative of some fact at issue other than the
defendant's criminal propensity (see People v Rojas, 97 NY2d 32,
37-40 [2001]).  The rule reflects the importance of an accused
being judged only on relevant, probative evidence, rather than on
the basis of propensity to commit crime (see id. at 36-37).  The
balancing of probative value against potential prejudice is
entrusted to the trial court's discretion (People v Ventimiglia,
52 NY2d 350, 359-360 [1981]).
We agree with defendant that his familiarity with using
handcuff keys has little relevance to the case.  During the first
incident, although defendant threatened the complainant that he
was going to handcuff him, he never used the handcuffs on him. 
Although the evidence could arguably be relevant to show that he
was convincing as a police officer, the complainant, in the first
incident, testified that he knew that defendant wasn't a police
officer and that he was being "scammed".  During the second
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No. 168
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incident, involving the cab driver, handcuffs were not even
involved; the police merely discovered them under the seat of the
car during a search.  Therefore, the evidence's "limited
probative value when compared to its potential for prejudice and
the unacceptable danger that the jury might condemn defendant
because of his past criminal behavior and associations and not
because he is guilty of the offense charged" makes this evidence
inadmissible (id. at 108) (People v Richardson, 137 AD2d 105 [3d
Dept 1988]).  
Despite the fact that key was admitted in error in this
case, we find the error harmless.  An error may be found harmless
where "the proof of defendant's guilt, without reference to the
error, is overwhelming" and where there is no “significant
probability ... that the jury would have acquitted the defendant
had it not been for the error” (People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230,
241-242 [1975]).  Regarding the first incident, the People
presented the complainant's uncontested account of the robbery
and his identification of defendant as the perpetrator.  That
testimony was corroborated by a surveillance video from the ATM
vestibule that depicted defendant waiting while the victim
withdrew cash.  
As it pertains to the second incident, the victim
offered a first-hand account of defendant's impersonation of a
police officer, including his display of a fake badge and his
demand that the driver pull over.  The arresting police officer,
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No. 168
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who observed the fake police stop, testified as to how defendant
and his accomplice positioned themselves and their vehicle as if
they were police officers.  These testimonial accounts were
corroborated by the discovery of the fake handcuffs and badges in
defendant's vehicle.  Thus, proof of defendant's guilt relative
to both incidents was overwhelming and there is no significant
probability that the verdict would have been different if the
court excluded the evidence of the handcuff key.
We further find that, although the prosecutor's
statement during summation was improper, this single good faith
error was not so prejudicial as to require a mistrial (see
Crimmins, 36 NY2d at 237).  The court issued a curative
instruction, reminding the jury that the prosecutor's argument
was merely her recollection of the testimony. 
The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *  * 
Order affirmed.  Opinion by Judge Pigott.  Judges Ciparick,
Graffeo, Read, Smith and Jones concur.  Chief Judge Lippman took
no part.
Decided November 23, 2009