Title: People v. Enis

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 86636-Agenda 6-May 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
        ANTHONY ENIS, Appellant. 
Opinion filed November 22, 2000.
JUSTICE BILANDIC delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, Anthony Enis, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Lake County dismissing his post-conviction petition
without an evidentiary hearing. Because defendant was sentenced to death for the underlying murder conviction, his appeal
lies directly to this court. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a)). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the dismissal of defendant's
post-conviction petition.

BACKGROUND
A. Criminal Trials


Defendant was indicted for the murder of Merlinda Entrata. A jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder.
Defendant was sentenced to death. On direct appeal to this court, we reversed defendant's conviction and sentence, based
on the prosecutor's improper cross-examination of defendant, and remanded the matter for a new trial. People v. Enis, 139 Ill. 2d 264 (1990).
On retrial, defendant was convicted of Entrata's murder and sentenced to death. On direct review, we affirmed defendant's
conviction and sentence. People v. Enis, 163 Ill. 2d 367 (1994). Defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari was denied.
Enis v. Illinois, 516 U.S. 827, 133 L. Ed. 2d 50, 116 S. Ct. 94 (1995).
The evidence presented against defendant on retrial is discussed in this court's opinion on direct appeal. See Enis, 163 Ill. 2d  at 375-84. We provide a brief summary here.
The victim, Merlinda Entrata, was the complainant in a criminal sexual assault case against defendant that was set to begin
trial on August 17, 1987. Defendant had pled not guilty to the sexual assault charge and had been released on a personal
recognizance bond. On August 10, 1987, shortly before 7 a.m., police found Entrata's body in the hallway of her Waukegan
apartment building. She had sustained multiple close-range gunshot wounds to the head.  
Prosecution witnesses identified defendant as the man they saw in the parking lot outside the victim's building on the
morning of the shooting. Clara Burk testified that she saw defendant, who was wearing sunglasses, pursue Entrata from the
parking lot into the apartment building. Defendant was carrying a box that resembled a lunch box. Dan Thacker testified
that he saw a man running after Entrata in the parking lot. The man, whose description fit defendant, was wearing white
gloves, white sunglasses and dark clothing, and was carrying a metal lunch box. Richard Hanson identified defendant as the
man he saw running in the parking lot. The man was wearing white gloves and white sunglasses. As he ran, the metal box
he was carrying fell open and a gun fell out of the box. Sylvia Barrett also saw defendant in the parking lot on the morning
of the shooting. Defendant was wearing a dark-blue jumpsuit. In addition, John Twardy saw a man run through the parking
lot, drop something, and retrieve it. Twardy lost sight of the man, and then saw a red or maroon car drive away. Twardy
testified that the vehicle owned by defendant's girlfriend, Diane Gonzales, was similar to the car he saw leaving the parking
lot. Within two hours of the shooting, police found Gonzales' car parked outside defendant's apartment. The hood of the
car was warm. Unlike the other cars in the area, there was no dew on Gonzales' car.
A jury found defendant guilty of Entrata's murder. Defendant waived a jury at sentencing. The trial court determined that
defendant was eligible for the death penalty in that he murdered the victim because she would have been a witness against
him in a criminal prosecution (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(8)), and that there were no mitigating factors
sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty. The trial court sentenced defendant to death. On direct appeal, we
affirmed defendant's conviction and death sentence. Enis, 163 Ill. 2d 367.


B. Post-Conviction Proceedings


On June 14, 1995, defendant filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The circuit court appointed counsel to
represent defendant in the post-conviction proceedings. The trial court subsequently granted attorney Robert Hauser leave
to file an appearance as additional counsel in the post-conviction proceedings. In August 1996, Hauser directed a subpoena
to the Waukegan police department, calling for the production of the "entire police file pertaining to Anthony Enis and/or
Melissa Entratta [sic]." The circuit court granted the State's motion to quash the subpoena.
On November 27, 1996, defendant, through counsel, filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he
was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial and sentencing. Defendant attached numerous affidavits and other
documents to the amended petition. On April 17, 1997, the State filed a motion to dismiss the amended petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that defendant's claims are barred by the doctrines of res judicata and waiver, and are otherwise
unsupported by the record or affidavit.
On April 25, 1997, defendant filed a motion for substitution of judge, alleging that certain rulings and comments by Judge
Christopher Starck demonstrated prejudice against defendant. Defendant subsequently filed an amended motion for
substitution of judge, with supporting affidavit, containing essentially the same allegations. Defendant's amended motion
was transferred for disposition to Judge Stephen Walter, who denied the motion.
On October 17, 1997, the circuit court granted defendant leave to file a supplement to the amended petition for post-conviction relief. In this supplement, defendant argued that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise, on direct
appeal, the issue of trial counsel's ineffectiveness. The State responded with a motion to dismiss the supplement.
On November 4, 1998, the circuit court dismissed defendant's petition for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary
hearing. The circuit court ruled that the claimed instances of ineffective assistance of trial counsel involved matters of trial
strategy, were not supported by affidavit, could have been raised on direct review, or were already considered on direct
review. The circuit court also ruled that there were no meritorious claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
On appeal, defendant challenges the orders of the circuit court dismissing his post-conviction petition without an
evidentiary hearing, granting the State's motion to quash the subpoena directed to the Waukegan police department, and
denying his motion for substitution of judge.

ANALYSIS
A. Post-Conviction Hearing Act


The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 1998)) provides a remedy for criminal defendants
who claim that a substantial violation of their constitutional rights occurred at the proceedings which resulted in their
convictions, when such a claim was not, and could not have been, previously adjudicated. People v. Johnson, 191 Ill. 2d 257, 268 (2000). Issues that were decided on direct appeal are barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and issues that could
have been raised on direct appeal, but were not, are deemed waived. People v. Cloutier, 191 Ill. 2d 392, 397 (2000);
Johnson, 191 Ill. 2d  at 268. Waiver is not implicated, however, where a defendant's post-conviction claim relies on
evidence dehors the record. People v. Holman, 164 Ill. 2d 356, 362, 376 (1995). The petitioner is entitled to a hearing on
his post-conviction claims only where the allegations of the petition, supported by the trial court record and accompanying
affidavits, make a substantial showing of a violation of a constitutional right. Cloutier, 191 Ill. 2d  at 397; People v. Hobley,
182 Ill. 2d 404, 427-28 (1998). All well-pleaded facts in the petition and in any accompanying affidavits are taken as true.
People v. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 491, 503 (1998). The sufficiency of the allegations contained in a post-conviction petition are
reviewed de novo. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 388-89 (1998).
With these principles in mind, we consider whether the circuit court erred in dismissing defendant's post-conviction
petition without an evidentiary hearing. Although defendant's petition raises numerous claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel at trial, sentencing, and on direct appeal, we consider only those claims that defendant has raised in this appeal. See
177 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7).

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel


In order to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a defendant must satisfy the two-pronged Strickland
test: a defendant must allege facts which demonstrate that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have
been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 698, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068
(1984); People v. Wilson, 191 Ill. 2d 363, 370 (2000). A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome, namely, that counsel's deficient performance rendered the result of the trial unreliable or the
proceeding fundamentally unfair. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 104 S. Ct.  at 2068; People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 93 (1999). There is a strong presumption that counsel's performance falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 694-95, 104 S. Ct.  at 2065. The failure to satisfy either
the deficiency prong or the prejudice prong of the Strickland test precludes a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 699, 104 S. Ct.  at 2069; Wilson, 191 Ill. 2d  at 370.
Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are also evaluated under the Strickland test. People v. Childress, 191 Ill. 2d 168, 175 (2000). A defendant who claims that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an issue on appeal
must allege facts demonstrating that such failure was objectively unreasonable and that counsel's decision prejudiced
defendant. If the underlying issue is not meritorious, then defendant has suffered no prejudice. Childress, 191 Ill. 2d  at 175.
We address individually each of defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

1. Opening Statement


Defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective because he made promises to the jury in his opening statement that he did
not keep. In his opening statement, counsel indicated that the evidence would show that Merlinda Entrata reported the
sexual assault days after it allegedly occurred; that at the time of Entrata's murder, defendant was with Diane Gonzales, his
then girlfriend, now his wife; and that R.C. Burton, defendant's landlord, told police officers that as he left for work at 6:30
a.m. on the day of the murder, Gonzales' car was parked outside defendant's apartment. Defendant argues that no testimony
or other evidence was introduced to establish these propositions.
Defendant raises the foregoing claim as a matter separate and distinct from his claim that his counsel was ineffective for
failing to call certain witnesses at trial, including those witnesses who could have established some of the propositions
listed above. We therefore view defendant's claim as a challenge only to the propriety of counsel's opening. Defendant,
however, cites to nothing outside the trial court record in support of this claim. Accordingly, this issue could have been
raised on direct review. The issue is therefore waived. See Johnson, 191 Ill. 2d  at 268; People v. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d 326,
365 (1997).

2. Failure to Call Witnesses
Defendant next claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to present the testimony of several witnesses that would
have rebutted the State's case in chief and that would have fulfilled promises made to the jury in defense counsel's opening
statement. These witnesses include Moselle Williams, Michael Melius, R.C. Burton, Kathleen Jackson, Roy Norvell,
Joseph Caliendo, David Asma, and Dr. Solomon Fulero.
Guiding our review of defendant's claim is the principle that decisions concerning whether to call certain witnesses on a
defendant's behalf are matters of trial strategy, reserved to the discretion of trial counsel. People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418,
432 (1999); People v. Reid, 179 Ill. 2d 297, 310 (1997). Such decisions enjoy a strong presumption that they reflect sound
trial strategy, rather than incompetence (People v. Wiley, 165 Ill. 2d 259, 289 (1995)), and are, therefore, generally immune
from claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (Reid, 179 Ill. 2d at 310). This is not the case, however, where counsel's
strategy was so unsound that no meaningful adversarial testing was conducted. West, 187 Ill. 2d at 432-33; Reid, 179 Ill. 2d 
at 310.

Moselle Williams
Defendant claims that Moselle Williams, had he been called as a witness at trial, would have testified that he drove
Merlinda Entrata to the police station six days after the alleged sexual assault. Defendant argues that Entrata's delay in
reporting the alleged assault, and other evidence that the sexual assault case against defendant was weak, negates
defendant's motive for murdering Entrata.
The issue of counsel's failure to present evidence as to Entrata's delay in reporting the alleged sexual assault is barred by
the doctrine of res judicata. On retrial, defendant's counsel attempted to elicit testimony from former Assistant State's
Attorney Steven Simonian that Entrata did not report the alleged sexual assault until May 4, 1987, six days after its alleged
occurrence. The State objected, citing a pretrial ruling which restricted the introduction of evidence relating to the sexual
assault case. The trial court sustained the objection. On direct appeal, defendant argued that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to raise this issue in a post-trial motion and preserve it for review. Defendant further argued, on direct appeal, that
the trial court's exclusion of this evidence was plain error. Enis, 163 Ill. 2d  at 403, 406. We rejected both arguments. We
held that, assuming arguendo trial counsel was ineffective, the result of the trial would not have been different had counsel
preserved this claim. Enis, 163 Ill. 2d  at 407. We also held that the exclusion of such evidence was not plain error and did
not deprive defendant of a fundamentally fair trial. Enis, 163 Ill. 2d  at 403-04. Defendant cannot obtain post-conviction
relief merely by rephrasing a claim which was previously addressed on direct appeal. See Evans, 186 Ill. 2d  at 103; People
v. Williams, 186 Ill. 2d 55, 62 (1999).
Defendant also claims that Williams would have testified that Entrata told him that she could not identify her attacker. In
support of this claim, defendant attached to his post-conviction petition a copy of an unsigned, unsworn, untitled report that
defendant identifies as investigation notes from "Consolidated Investigation Services." An investigation note, dated
February 4, 1988, states that contact was made that day with Williams, who stated that Entrata had told him that she was
sexually assaulted by a person wearing a mask and gloves and that she could not identify her attacker.
A claim that trial counsel failed to investigate and call a witness must be supported by an affidavit from the proposed
witness. People v. Johnson, 183 Ill. 2d 176, 192 (1998); People v. Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d 148, 163 (1994). In the absence of
such an affidavit, a reviewing court cannot determine whether the proposed witness could have provided testimony or
information favorable to the defendant, and further review of the claim is unnecessary. Johnson, 183 Ill. 2d  at 192;
Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d  at 163. Defendant has failed to support his claim with an appropriate affidavit from Williams.    
Even if we considered the February 4, 1988, investigation note, in lieu of an affidavit, defendant has failed to demonstrate
that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of defendant's trial would have been different had counsel presented
Williams' testimony. As this court stated on direct appeal, the evidence overwhelmingly proved defendant's guilt. Enis,
163 Ill. 2d  at 403. Williams' proposed testimony would not have impeached or otherwise discredited the testimony of the
three prosecution witnesses who identified defendant as the man they observed in the parking lot outside the victim's
apartment building on the morning of the murder. Further, whatever identification problems the State might have
encountered in its prosecution of defendant for the alleged sexual assault of Entrata, that case was, in fact, set to begin trial
on August 17, 1987. Williams' testimony would not have negated defendant's motive for murdering Entrata on August 10,
1987. We therefore reject defendant's claim.
We also reject defendant's related claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise, on direct appeal, trial
counsel's ineffectiveness for not calling Williams as a witness. As discussed above, the underlying issue has no merit.
Accordingly, defendant has suffered no prejudice due to appellate counsel's failure to raise this issue on appeal. See
Childress, 191 Ill. 2d  at 175.

Michael Melius


Defendant next claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to call as a witness Michael Melius, former public
defender for Lake County, who represented defendant in the sexual assault case. According to Melius' affidavit, defense
counsel did not interview him prior to defendant's retrial. Melius states that he would have testified that the sexual assault
case was defensible; that he had advised defendant that there was a good chance of a not-guilty finding; that defendant was
a cooperative client; and that defendant never expressed any hostility toward Entrata. The gist of defendant's claim is that
Melius' testimony would have "blunted" the State's suggested motive for the murder, i.e., because defendant expected a
favorable outcome in the sexual assault case, there was no need to murder Entrata.
In deciding an ineffectiveness claim, the reasonableness of counsel's conduct must be judged on the facts of the particular
case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 690, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 695, 104 S. Ct.  at 2066. In the
present case, defendant's counsel had available to him a record of Melius' testimony at defendant's first trial. See Enis, 139 Ill. 2d  at 275-76. Melius testified, in relevant part, that statements Entrata made to police indicated that she recognized her
attacker as defendant, whom she knew from her place of employment, and that Melius believed he told defendant that the
outcome of the sexual assault case depended largely on the credibility of Entrata. Enis, 139 Ill. 2d  at 275-76. Defendant's
counsel could have reasonably determined that Melius' testimony would reinforce, rather than "blunt," the State's
suggested motive for the murder of Entrata. Accordingly, counsel's decision not to call Melius was not deficient. Assuming
counsel's decision was deficient, defendant has failed to demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome
of the trial would have been different. Melius' proposed testimony, like that of Moselle Williams, would not have negated
defendant's motive for murdering Entrata. Nor would his testimony have called into doubt the testimony of the three
eyewitnesses who identified defendant. In the absence of a showing of prejudice, the trial court properly rejected
defendant's claim.
The trial court also properly rejected defendant's related claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise, on
direct appeal, trial counsel's ineffectiveness for not calling Melius as a witness. Because the underlying issue has no merit,
defendant has suffered no prejudice due to appellate counsel's failure to raise this issue on direct appeal. See Childress, 191 Ill. 2d  at 175.

R.C. Burton
As his next claim, defendant alleges that counsel was ineffective for failing to present the testimony of R.C. Burton,
defendant's landlord. Burton was hospitalized during the time of defendant's second trial, and the trial court granted
defendant leave to take Burton's evidence deposition. Counsel ultimately decided, however, to proceed without Burton's
testimony. According to defendant, Burton would have testified that, at 6:30 a.m. on August 10, 1987, he saw Diane
Gonzales' maroon car in the parking lot outside defendant's apartment. This vehicle, therefore, could not have been the
vehicle seen leaving the parking lot outside Entrata's apartment building that morning.
Defendant has failed to support this claim with the necessary affidavit from Burton. See Johnson, 183 Ill. 2d  at 192.
Although defendant states in his reply brief that Burton is deceased and not "now" available, it remains unclear whether
defendant could have obtained an affidavit from Burton in November 1996 when defendant filed his amended post-conviction petition. Defendant argues that, notwithstanding the absence of an affidavit from Burton, it was "established" in
the first trial that Burton would testify that the maroon vehicle was parked outside defendant's apartment on the morning of
the murder. Defendant mischaracterizes Burton's testimony.
At defendant's first trial, the State called Burton as a witness. On cross-examination by defense counsel, the following
exchange occurred:
"Q. When you left for work on the morning of August 10th at 6:30 in the morning, that maroon car that belonged to Tony
and Diane was still parked in the parking space, wasn't it?
A. I can't say for sure whether it was or was not.
* * *
Q. Do you remember having a conversation with the Lieutenant Stevenson on that day?
A. Yes.
* * *
Q. Did you tell-isn't it true you told Lieutenant Stevenson on that date that when you left for work this morning at about
6:30 you noticed a maroon car which Enis drives still in the driveway this morning when you left at 6:30?
A. I don't know whether I said that or not."
On redirect, the prosecutor asked Burton whether he remembered talking to an investigator from the public defender's
office on February 7, 1988. Although Burton was not sure of the date, he thinks he told investigators that he could not
testify as to whether the maroon car was parked behind the building when Burton left for work on the morning of August
10, 1987. Officer Stevenson subsequently testified that Burton told him that the maroon car was parked behind defendant's
apartment that morning. Thus, contrary to defendant's contention on appeal, it was not "established" in the first trial that
Burton would testify on retrial that the maroon vehicle was parked outside defendant's apartment on the morning of the
murder.
Assuming that Burton's testimony on retrial was "established" in the first trial, as defendant claims, and that Burton would
have testified consistent with his conversation with Officer Stevenson, defendant has waived review of this issue by failing
to raise counsel's ineffectiveness on direct appeal. See Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d  at 365. Defendant maintains, however, that his
appellate counsel was ineffective as a result. A defendant who argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing
to raise a particular issue on appeal must show that the failure to raise that issue was objectively unreasonable and that the
decision prejudiced defendant. Childress, 191 Ill. 2d  at 175; Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d  at 365. We must determine, therefore,
whether defendant's underlying claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel would have been successful if raised on
direct appeal. See Childress, 191 Ill. 2d  at 175.
Testimony by Burton that Gonzales' car was parked behind defendant's apartment on the morning of the murder would
have been subject to impeachment based on Burton's inconsistent statements to investigators and his sworn testimony at
the first trial. In addition, there was evidence introduced on retrial tending to establish that the maroon vehicle had been
moved on the morning of the murder. See Enis, 163 Ill. 2d  at 384. Thus, Burton's testimony would not have gone
unrebutted. Finally, three prosecution witnesses made in-court identifications of defendant. Based on this record, defendant
has failed to make a substantial showing that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of defendant's trial would
have been different had defendant's counsel introduced Burton's testimony.
Defendant has, accordingly, also failed to make a substantial showing that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise, on direct review, trial counsel's ineffectiveness in not calling Burton as a witness. See Childress, 191 Ill. 2d  at 175.

Kathleen Jackson


Defendant also claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to call Kathleen Jackson as a witness at trial. In his post-conviction petition, defendant states that Jackson, who lived in an apartment building adjacent to Entrata's building, would
have testified that, on August 10, 1987, at approximately 6:15 to 6:20 a.m., she was in an elevator in her building, along
with a black male. The man was in his early twenties and was wearing white sunglasses. Defendant also alleges that
Jackson would testify that defendant was not the man she saw in the elevator. Defendant argues that Jackson's testimony
would have rebutted the testimony of prosecution witnesses who identified defendant as the man in the parking lot outside
Entrata's building on the morning of August 10, 1987.
Although defendant failed to support this claim with an affidavit from Jackson, her testimony is sufficiently documented in
this court's opinion on direct review of defendant's first conviction. See Enis, 139 Ill. 2d  at 279-82. Therefore, on direct
review of defendant's second conviction, defendant could have raised the issue of trial counsel's ineffectiveness for failing
to call Jackson as a witness. We agree with the State that defendant has waived review of this issue. See Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d 
at 365. Defendant also contends, however, that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this claim on direct
appeal. We therefore consider whether this claim of trial counsel's ineffectiveness would have been successful if it had
been raised on direct review. See Childress, 191 Ill. 2d  at 175.
At defendant's first trial, the State moved in limine to preclude defendant from introducing Jackson's testimony. The trial
court granted the State's motion. On direct review to this court, defendant challenged the trial court's in limine order. We
held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in barring Jackson's testimony. Enis, 139 Ill. 2d  at 281-82. We observed
that "[t]here is nothing connecting the person Jackson saw with the crime, nor does it necessarily follow that her testimony
would have cast doubt over the identification of defendant as the offender." Enis, 139 Ill. 2d  at 282. Defendant cannot now
argue that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to press for the admission of Jackson's testimony, where this court
previously held the exclusion of such testimony to be nonprejudicial. See Evans, 186 Ill. 2d  at 103 (holding, in the context
of post-conviction review, that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to evidence and argument which was
previously found on direct appeal to be nonprejudicial). Because defendant's underlying ineffective assistance of counsel
claim would not have been successful if raised on direct appeal, we reject defendant's claim that appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to raise this claim.
Roy Norvell
The record reveals that the State called Roy Norvell as a witness during its case in chief, but that defense counsel moved to
bar Norvell's testimony. The State expected that Norvell would testify that, three days before the murder, he saw a car in
the victim's parking lot that "look[ed] like" the maroon car belonging to defendant's girlfriend. The trial court agreed with
defense counsel that Norvell's testimony was too speculative and irrelevant and barred Norvell from testifying. In his post-conviction petition, however, defendant claims that Norvelle would have testified that, on or about August 8, 1987, he saw
a black male wearing white sunglasses in the parking lot for Entrata's apartment, and that in a photographic lineup, he
identified another individual, not the defendant, as the man in the white sunglasses. Defendant argues that Norvell's
testimony would have rebutted the testimony of Clara Burk and that counsel was ineffective for failing to call Norvell as a
defense witness.
Defendant has failed to support this claim with the necessary affidavit from Norvell. See Johnson, 183 Ill. 2d  at 192.
Instead, defendant relies on a report from the Waukegan police department documenting an interview with Norvell on
August 17, 1987. Defendant also relies on a handwritten report that defendant attributes to Joseph Caliendo, an investigator
for the Lake County public defender, which documented a meeting with Norvell on November 9, 1987. In his brief before
this court, defendant also cites to the affidavit of Jed Stone, one of defendant's trial attorneys. Even if we consider these
documents in lieu of an affidavit from Norvell, none of the documents support defendant's contention that Norvell's
testimony would have rebutted Burk's testimony.
Burk testified, in relevant part, that she saw defendant for the first time on the evening of August 8, 1987, two days prior to
the murder, as she was driving through the parking lot of the victim's apartment complex. Defendant suddenly stepped off
the curb in front of Burk's car, causing her to brake. Defendant and Burk looked directly at each other. Defendant was
wearing white sunglasses. On the morning of August 10, 1987, Burk recognized the man pursuing Entrata as the man she
saw two days earlier in the parking lot. Enis, 163 Ill. 2d  at 378-79.
According to the police report on which defendant relies, Norvell stated that, on August 7, 1987, between 6 a.m. and 6:15
a.m., he observed a burgundy car, with one occupant, parked directly behind his car in the parking lot for the apartment
complex where Entrata lived. At 8 a.m., the burgundy car and its occupant were still in the lot. Norvell advised the building
manager, Mary Greener. Greener and Norvell went to the parking lot and approached the burgundy car. Greener knocked
on the passenger window, and the driver, a black male, rolled down the window. Greener asked the driver a few questions.
Norvell said the driver appeared nervous. The police report indicates that Norvell was unable to make a positive photo
identification of the driver. Caliendo's report, however, indicates that Norvell did identify an individual, presumably
someone other than defendant. Caliendo's report also indicates that Norvell could not identify the vehicle he saw, except to
say that the car was either red or blue.
These reports do not support defendant's contention that Norvell would testify that a different black man wearing white
sunglasses was seen in the vicinity of the victim's apartment two or three days before the murder. Rather, Norvell's
testimony, if consistent with the reports on which defendant relies, would establish only that a black male, other than
defendant, was seen in a burgundy, red or blue vehicle in the parking lot three days before the murder. The affidavit of Jed
Stone adds nothing to defendant's claim. Stone's affidavit indicates only that he did not consult with defendant as to the
decision not to call Norvell. Based on this record, defendant has failed to make a substantial showing that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to call Norvell as a witness.
Defendant has likewise failed to make a substantial showing that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise, on
direct appeal, this issue of trial counsel's ineffectiveness. A defendant suffers no prejudice from appellate counsel's failure
to raise an issue on direct appeal where the underlying issue is not meritorious. Childress, 191 Ill. 2d  at 175.
Joseph Caliendo and David Asma
Defendant claims that trial counsel was also ineffective for failing to subpoena Joseph Caliendo and David Asma,
investigators for the Lake County public defender. Defendant attached to his post-conviction petition the affidavits of
Caliendo and Asma. Defendant argues that the testimony of Caliendo and Asma would have impeached the identification
testimony of Clara Burk, Richard Hanson, and Sylvia Barrett.
Defendant's claims relating to the impeachment of Burk and Hanson were not raised in defendant's pro se post-conviction
petition, in his amended petition, or in the supplement to his amended petition. Accordingly, these claims are waived. See
725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 1998); People v. Moore, 189 Ill. 2d 521, 544 (2000). We consider only defendant's claim that
counsel was ineffective for failing to call Caliendo or Asma to impeach Barrett's identification testimony.
The affidavits of both Asma and Caliendo indicate that they would testify that on February 4, 1988, they interviewed
Barrett. At that time, Barrett stated that she could not remember the color of the sunglasses that the man she saw in the
parking lot on August 10, 1987, was wearing; that she did not see the man carrying anything, nor was she aware of whether
the man was wearing gloves; that she was not sure that the man in the photograph that she selected was the man she saw in
the parking lot; that the man in the photograph "most closely resembled" the man in the parking lot; and that the police
stated, following her identification of defendant in a photographic lineup, "Yeah, that is the guy."
Asma also states in his affidavit that he would testify that he interviewed Barrett on February 18, 1988, following her
testimony at a hearing prior to defendant's first trial. Barrett advised Asma and assistant public defender David Brodsky
that she did not recognize defendant, who was seated at counsel's table, as the man she saw in the parking lot on August
10, 1987. Finally, Asma states that he would testify that, on March 8, 1988, Asma and Brodsky spoke to Barrett by
telephone. Barrett told them that she was not sure of the color of the sunglasses; that she does not remember who suggested
to her the actual color of the sunglasses; and that, at the February 18, 1988, hearing, defendant looked totally different from
the man in the parking lot and the man she selected out of the photographic lineup.
The record discloses that Barrett testified at the second trial that she did not recall whether the man she saw in the parking
lot was wearing sunglasses or gloves. Therefore, the proposed testimony of Caliendo and Asma, that Barrett said she did
not remember the color of the sunglasses and was not aware if the man was wearing gloves, would not have impeached her
testimony. In addition, Barrett was never questioned at the second trial as to whether the man she saw in the parking lot had
anything in his hands. The proposed testimony of Caliendo and Asma, that Barrett said she did not see the man carrying
anything, would not have impeached her testimony.
With respect to Asma's proposed testimony that Barrett stated that defendant looked totally different on February 18, 1988,
from the man in the parking lot, the record reveals that defense counsel cross-examined Barrett on this matter. Barrett
testified, however, that she did recognize defendant at the February 18, 1988, hearing. Counsel tried to impeach Barrett
with her testimony from defendant's first trial in which she admitted that, on February 18, 1988, she did not recognize
defendant and that defendant "looked basically different" on that day. Barrett, however, did not recall giving this testimony.
The parties stipulated to Barrett's testimony from the first trial, and this stipulation was read to the jury. Defendant has
failed to demonstrate how counsel's decision to perfect the impeachment of Barrett by way of stipulation, rather than with
Asma's live testimony, is objectively unreasonable.
The only other matter to which Asma and Caliendo would have testified is that Barrett said she picked the photograph of
the person that most closely resembled the man she saw in the parking lot and that police acknowledged, "that is the guy."
Even if we concluded that counsel's failure to call Asma or Caliendo on this point was deficient, defendant has failed to
demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had Barrett's
testimony been impeached in this way. Two other witnesses made in-court identifications of defendant. Clara Burk testified
that defendant was the man she saw pursue Entrata from the parking lot into the building on August 10, 1987, and Richard
Hanson also testified that defendant was the man he saw running in the parking lot that morning. On this record, defendant
cannot demonstrate prejudice. Further, it follows that defendant cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by appellate
counsel's failure to raise this issue of trial counsel's ineffectiveness. See Childress, 191 Ill. 2d  at 175.
Dr. Solomon Fulero
Defendant next claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to call Dr. Solomon Fulero as an expert witness on the
unreliability of eyewitness testimony. At defendant's first trial, the State moved in limine to preclude Dr. Fulero's
testimony. The trial court granted the motion. On direct review to this court, we held that the expert testimony would not
have aided the trier of fact in reaching its conclusion, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr.
Fulero's testimony. Enis, 139 Ill. 2d  at 288-89. Of the several "misconceptions" about eyewitness testimony to which Dr.
Fulero would have testified, only one had any relevance to defendant's case. That misconception involved jurors' beliefs
that the more confident a witness appears to be while testifying, the more likely the witness is to be accurate in the
identification. Enis, 139 Ill. 2d  at 289. Although witness confidence may have been a factor in the case, we did not believe
that this factor alone demanded that defendant receive a new trial. Enis, 139 Ill. 2d  at 289. We also cautioned against the
overuse of expert testimony, explaining:
"Such testimony, in this case concerning the unreliability of eyewitness testimony, could well lead to the use of expert
testimony concerning the unreliability of other types of testimony and, eventually, to the use of experts to testify as to the
unreliability of expert testimony. So-called experts can usually be obtained to support most any position. The determination
of a lawsuit should not depend upon which side can present the most or the most convincing expert witnesses. We are
concerned with the reliability of eyewitness expert testimony [citations], whether and to what degree it can aid the jury, and
if it is necessary in light of defendant's ability to cross-examine eyewitnesses. An expert's opinion concerning the
unreliability of eyewitness testimony is based on statistical averages. The eyewitness in a particular case may well not fit
within the spectrum of these averages. It would be inappropriate for a jury to conclude, based on expert testimony, that all
eyewitness testimony is unreliable." Enis, 139 Ill. 2d  at 289-90.
Defendant argues in his post-conviction petition that, as indicated in Dr. Fulero's affidavit, the doctor could have testified
at defendant's second trial not only regarding the misconception of witness confidence as a predictor of the accuracy of
identification, but also regarding the difficulty of cross-racial identifications. The offers of proof made at defendant's first
trial did not touch on cross-racial identification problems. Defendant, who is black, alleges in his post-conviction petition
that of the five eyewitnesses who testified for the State, four were white. The State does not dispute the accuracy of this
allegation.
In light of this court's holding that the exclusion of Dr. Fulero's testimony at defendant's first trial was proper, and our
admonition against the overuse of expert testimony, we conclude that counsel's decision not to seek additional opinions
from Dr. Fulero, beyond those several opinions disclosed in the first trial, was not deficient. Even if counsel's decision was
objectively unreasonable, defendant has failed to make a substantial showing that he suffered resulting prejudice.
Three witnesses identified defendant as the man seen in the parking lot on the morning of August 10, 1987. Even if all
three witnesses are white, Dr. Fulero's affidavit does not indicate that cross-racial identifications are necessarily inaccurate
or that the eyewitness testimony of these particular witnesses is necessarily suspect. Moreover, defendant's counsel capably
placed the issue of the fallibility of the testimony of the State's eyewitnesses before the jury. On cross-examination and in
closing argument, defendant's counsel aggressively explored the question of the accuracy and reliability of the witnesses'
identification of defendant, as well as the witnesses' overall credibility. Counsel also argued that misidentification is a
common occurrence in every day life. On this record, we cannot say that there is a reasonable probability that the jury's
verdict would have been different had Dr. Fulero testified.(1) Accordingly, we reject defendant's claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel, as well as his related claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
3. Failure to Introduce Evidence From Illinois Crime Laboratory
As his next post-conviction claim, defendant asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present testimony or
other evidence that there was no blood on defendant's clothing, that defendant's fingerprints did not match those found at
the crime scene, and that there was no other physical evidence connecting defendant to the crime. Defendant supports this
claim with copies of reports from the Northern Illinois Police Crime Laboratory, which set forth the results of various tests
and analyses performed in connection with this case.
The record discloses that defendant's counsel, in his opening statement, called attention to the lack of physical evidence in
the State's case. Counsel told the jury that there would be no fingerprint evidence, no blood evidence, and no footprint
evidence linking defendant to the crime. Counsel elaborated on this theme in his opening, stating, in part, that "no police
officer, no laboratory technician, no evidence technician, no chemist can come into this courtroom to say that there's any
evidence that any lead, barium, antimony, copper, things discharged from a gun by gas after firing, were found on any of
[defendant's] clothing." In closing argument, counsel continued his attack on the lack of physical evidence presented by the
State. Counsel argued to the jury that, despite evidence of extensive blood splattering at the crime scene, the victim's blood
was not found on defendant, on his clothing, on his shoes, on his possessions, or inside Gonzales' car.
Counsel's decision to challenge the State's lack of physical evidence, rather than calling a member of the police crime
laboratory to testify, was a matter of trial strategy and was not deficient. Accordingly, appellate counsel was not ineffective
for failing to raise, on direct appeal, these allegations of trial counsel's ineffectiveness.
4. Failure to Object to Testimony and
 Photographic Evidence
Defendant next claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the identification testimony of Dan Thacker,
to the evidence that Merlinda Entrata took additional security measures at her apartment shortly after the alleged sexual
assault, and to the State's impeachment of its own witness, John Twardy.
Defendant could have raised each of these claims on direct review. We thus agree with the State that defendant has waived
review of these issues. See Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d  at 365. Defendant maintains, however, that his appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to raise these claims of trial counsel's ineffectiveness. Accordingly, we must determine whether these
claims would have succeeded, had they been raised on direct appeal. See Childress, 191 Ill. 2d  at 175.


Dan Thacker


At his first trial, defendant moved the court in limine to bar any evidence relating to Dan Thacker's pretrial identification of
defendant. The trial court granted the motion. At defendant's second trial, the court indicated that it would not revisit in
limine rulings from the first trial. In his post-conviction petition, defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective for
failing to raise the court's in limine order from the first trial as a bar to Thacker's identification testimony in the second
trial. Defendant contends that his counsel "never bothered" to read the prior trial record and therefore failed to make the
appropriate objection.
The record discloses that defendant's counsel made this objection when the State, on retrial, raised the issue of the
permissible scope of Thacker's testimony. Counsel, however, later withdrew any objection to identification testimony from
Thacker. To the extent that defendant's claim is really an attack on counsel's decision to withdraw his objection, we
conclude that defendant has not demonstrated that counsel's decision was objectively unreasonable.
At defendant's first trial, Thacker testified on direct examination that, on August 10, 1987, at approximately 6:30 a.m., he
saw a woman in a white dress running across the parking lot and a black male wearing dark clothing, white gloves and
white sunglasses following the woman. Thacker provided a general description of the man, whom he later saw come out of
the building and walk across the parking lot. Defense counsel, on cross-examination, questioned Thacker about the lack of
detail in his description of the man he saw. Counsel also elicited testimony from Thacker that he could not make a positive
identification of the man he saw in the parking lot from the initial photo array shown to him by police, but that he picked
the photograph of the person who had the same general features. Defense counsel further questioned Thacker about the
second photo array he viewed. On redirect, Thacker testified that he also picked a photograph from the second photo array,
although he was not positive of his identification. Over defense counsel's objection, the State was allowed to examine
Thacker about the live lineup he viewed. Thacker testified that he identified defendant in the lineup, although he was not
"100 percent sure."
At defendant's second trial, the State sought clarification as to the permissible scope of Thacker's testimony. The State
argued that the type of testimony elicited from Thacker by defense counsel at the first trial was contrary to the trial court's
in limine order and should not be permitted on retrial. The trial court agreed. The record reflects a colloquy between the
prosecutor and defense counsel. Pursuant to their discussion, defense counsel withdrew his objection to Thacker's
identification testimony, but with the understanding that Thacker would testify not that defendant is the man he saw in the
parking lot, but that defendant merely fits the general description of the man he saw in the parking lot. Thacker testified
consistently therewith.
We conclude that counsel's decision to withdraw his objection to Thacker's identification testimony was a matter of trial
strategy and was not "so unsound that counsel entirely fail[ed] to conduct any meaningful adversarial testing." See Reid,
179 Ill. 2d  at 310. Even if counsel's decision was deficient, defendant has failed to demonstrate resulting prejudice where
three other witnesses identified defendant in court as the man they saw in the parking lot outside Entrata's apartment on the
morning of the murder.
Because defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel would not have succeeded had it been raised on direct
appeal, we reject defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. See Childress, 191 Ill. 2d  at 175.


Evidence of Security Measures at Victim's Apartment


At the first trial, the court granted defendant's in limine motion to bar evidence that the victim installed homemade security
devices in her apartment following the alleged sexual assault. As already noted, on retrial the court indicated that it would
not revisit in limine rulings from the first trial.
At the second trial, Zacarias Meana, Entrata's uncle, testified that, during the first week in May 1987, he helped his niece
move into a new apartment in the same complex where she had been living, and helped her install wooden poles to secure
the doors from the inside. Over the objection of defense counsel, photographs of Entrata's apartment, which showed the
make-shift security devices, were also introduced into evidence. Defendant's counsel later called to the trial court's
attention its in limine order from the first trial and argued that the introduction of evidence contrary to that order was a
ground for a mistrial. The trial court denied the motion for a mistrial.
Defendant claims, in his post-conviction petition, that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the trial court's prior in
limine order as a bar to the admission of this evidence. We conclude that defendant's claim is barred by the doctrine of res
judicata. On direct review from defendant's second conviction, defendant argued that the introduction of Meana's
testimony and the photographs of Entrata's apartment were irrelevant and prejudicial and should have been excluded. Enis,
163 Ill. 2d  at 404-05. We held that any error in the admission of this evidence was not a material factor in defendant's
conviction; that it did not deprive defendant of a fundamentally fair trial; and that it is not reversible error. Enis, 163 Ill. 2d 
at 404-05. Defendant cannot obtain post-conviction relief by rephrasing this issue as one of ineffective assistance of
counsel. See Evans, 186 Ill. 2d  at 103; Williams, 186 Ill. 2d  at 62.

John Twardy
Defendant also claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the State's impeachment of its own witness,
John Twardy, with inconsistent statements he made to police regarding the maroon car he saw leaving the parking lot on
the morning of the murder.
On direct review of defendant's second conviction, defendant argued that the State's improper bolstering of Twardy's
testimony amounts to plain error. We rejected this argument, holding that the evidence was not closely balanced and that
defendant was not deprived of a fundamentally fair trial. Enis, 163 Ill. 2d  at 402-03. Defendant also argued, on direct
review, that his counsel was ineffective for failing to properly preserve this issue for review on appeal. Enis, 163 Ill. 2d  at
405. We held that, assuming counsel was ineffective, the outcome of defendant's trial would not have been different had
counsel preserved this issue for review. Enis, 163 Ill. 2d  at 407. Accordingly, defendant's post-conviction claim is barred
by the doctrine of res judicata. See Williams, 186 Ill. 2d  at 62.

5. Right to Testify
Defendant next claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to consult with him about his right to testify, to prepare him
to give testimony, and to call him as a witness. According to defendant, after the State rested, counsel advised defendant at
that time that he would not be called to testify. Defendant states in his post-conviction affidavit that he would have testified
that he did not kill Merlinda Entrata, that he was prepared to proceed with the sexual assault case, and that he was confident
of being acquitted of that charge. The post-conviction affidavit of Jed Stone, defendant's counsel, indicates that Stone has
no recollection of specific conversations with defendant about his right to testify, but that it is Stone's practice to discuss
this issue in detail with his clients, at which time he makes a recommendation.
The decision whether to take the witness stand and testify in one's own behalf ultimately belongs to the defendant.
Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d  at 177. Defendant in the present case acknowledges that he was aware of his right to testify. Indeed,
defendant took the witness stand at his first trial. See Enis, 139 Ill. 2d  at 276-77. Nothing in the present record, however,
demonstrates that defendant, at any time, advised counsel of his desire or intention to testify. Moreover, upon learning at
trial that he would not be called as a witness, defendant failed to assert his right by informing the trial court that he wished
to testify. Thus, defendant acquiesced in counsel's view that defendant should not take the stand. In the absence of a
contemporaneous assertion by defendant of his right to testify, the trial court properly rejected this post-conviction claim.
See Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d at 177-78; People v. Brown, 54 Ill. 2d 21, 23-24 (1973). We similarly reject defendant's related
claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue on direct appeal.

6. Sentencing Hearing
Defendant next claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present the testimony of various
witnesses at both stages of his capital sentencing hearing.
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at a capital sentencing hearing are reviewed under the two-pronged Strickland
test. People v. Ward, 187 Ill. 2d 249, 261 (1999); Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 403. Thus, in the context of defendant's post-conviction claim, defendant must allege facts which demonstrate that counsel's performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, and that absent counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the sentencer would have
concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death. Ward, 187 Ill. 2d  at 261;
Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 403.
Eligibility Stage
Defendant alleges that his counsel failed to present evidence that would have rebutted the statutory aggravating factor under
which he was found eligible for the death penalty. The trial court found defendant eligible for the death penalty in that
defendant was 18 years or older at the time of the offense, and defendant murdered the victim, Merlinda Entrata, because
she was a witness against him in another criminal prosecution-the sexual assault case. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par.
9-1(b)(8). Other than a certified copy of defendant's birth certificate, the State presented no new evidence at the eligibility
stage, relying instead on the evidence presented at trial. Defendant's counsel presented no evidence. On direct appeal, we
held that the State proved defendant's eligibility beyond a reasonable doubt. Enis, 163 Ill. 2d  at 412.
Defendant now argues that counsel should have presented the testimony of Michael Melius and Moselle Williams, as well
as evidence that defendant suffers from a neuropsychological impairment. We have already determined in this appeal that
the proposed testimony of Melius and Williams would not have negated defendant's motive for murdering Entrata. We
therefore consider defendant's ineffectiveness claim only with respect to counsel's failure to investigate and present
evidence of neuropsychological impairment. As to this claim, defendant relies on the opinions of neuropsychologist Dr.
Michael Gelbort, whose affidavit and evaluations defendant attached to his post-conviction petition.
 Of the several findings and opinions contained in Dr. Gelbort's evaluations, only one speaks to the issue of defendant's
motivation for the murder of Entrata. Dr. Gelbort expresses his opinion that defendant, at the time of the murder, was
suffering from extreme emotional disturbance and that defendant would not have been motivated by a desire to silence the
victim. Rather, defendant would have acted in a deviant manner as a result of feeling emotional and psychological rejection
by the victim, leading to a loss of control, and that "[t]his would have resulted in [defendant's] using undue force in an
attempt to 'convince' [Merlinda Entrata] to change her mind and have a relationship with [him]."
Dr. Gelbort's opinion as to defendant's likely motivation for the murder is contrary to the record. Evidence established that
defendant shot Entrata four times at close range. Each shot defendant delivered was to Entrata's head. There were powder
burns on her temple. Entrata died from two of the gunshot wounds defendant inflicted. What Dr. Gelbort describes as
"undue force," the trial court aptly described as an "execution." In addition, there was no evidence adduced at the second
trial that defendant desired a relationship with Entrata, that she had rejected him, or that defendant had attempted on the
morning of August 10, 1987, or at any prior time to "convince" her to have a relationship with him. At the eligibility
hearing, defendant's counsel argued that one of many reasonable hypotheses for the murder is the spurned-lover hypothesis.
The trial court rejected this argument. On this record, we see no reasonable probability that the trial court would have been
persuaded that the murder of Entrata was a reaction to Entrata's alleged rejection of defendant. Thus, there is no reasonable
probability that the result of the eligibility proceeding would have been different had defendant's counsel presented
evidence of neuropsychological impairment.


Aggravation-Mitigation Stage


Defendant argues that his counsel was also ineffective at the second stage of his capital sentencing hearing for failing to
investigate and present available mitigation evidence regarding defendant's neurological impairment and social history.
Given the critical importance of mitigation evidence at a capital sentencing hearing, defense counsel has a duty to make a
reasonable investigation for potential sources of such evidence or must have a legitimate reason for failing to make a
particular investigation. People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500, 541 (1999); Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 510. If mitigating evidence
exists, counsel has a duty to introduce it in support of the defendant. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 510; People v. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d 65, 86 (1997). The failure, however, to offer mitigation evidence at a capital sentencing hearing is not itself sufficient to
show that counsel was ineffective. Counsel's decision whether to present a particular witness is generally a strategic choice
which cannot support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d  at 86. Before considering defendant's
claim, we review the evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing.
In aggravation, the State relied upon the evidence introduced at trial. The State also introduced evidence that on May 2,
1987, Merlinda Entrata confided to a hospital coworker that defendant, with whom she worked at a nursing home, had
raped her. Entrata said that although he wore a mask and gloves, defendant spoke to her after the attack, and that she
recognized his voice. There was also evidence that, after the alleged sexual assault, Entrata requested a shift change so that
she could work days, explaining to her supervisor that she had been raped. Entrata never returned to her job at the nursing
home.
The State also introduced evidence of prior inappropriate sexual conduct by defendant. In March 1981, when defendant was
14 years old, defendant asked an eighth-grade girl for a kiss. When she declined, defendant swung her to the ground,
slapped her in the face and head, and kissed her forcefully. As she left, defendant grabbed her buttocks and told her that he
wanted $10 or the same thing would happen the next day. The following year, defendant grabbed the breasts of a female
student during a high school swim class. The incident was reported to the dean and to police. In October 1984, when
defendant was 18 years old, defendant grabbed a female student by the arm as she was walking home from school and said
to her, "You're coming with me." Defendant pulled her along for a block and released her when someone called his name.
Later that day, defendant telephoned her and said that she should meet him behind the high school the next day or he would
get her. Less than three years later, while defendant was out on bond in the sexual assault case involving Merlinda Entrata,
defendant groped a female coworker and made comments that suggested he had been following her. The young woman
reported the incident to her manager.
The State also introduced defendant's juvenile record and criminal record as an adult. In September 1981, defendant was
adjudicated delinquent based on his involvement in the armed robbery and aggravated battery of the elderly proprietor of a
Waukegan laundromat. Defendant was 14 years old. Another older male was also involved. This individual used a butcher
knife from defendant's home during the robbery. Defendant completed his one-year probation.
In November 1983, defendant was arrested for robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery and theft. The charges arose out of
an incident in which defendant and others robbed a pizza delivery man. Although a gun was used, defendant was not the
gunman. Defendant, who was 17 years old at the time, pled guilty to theft. He was sentenced to 30 months' probation and
100 hours of community service. Defendant's reporting habits were poor and he had difficulty maintaining employment.
Defendant did, however, successfully complete probation.
In January 1984, defendant was arrested for disorderly conduct, following his refusal to obey police and leave the scene of a
fight. Defendant forfeited his bond and was subsequently found guilty. He was sentenced to 20 hours of public service.
In February 1984, defendant was arrested for criminal trespass to land when he remained at Waukegan East High School
after being told by the assistant principal to leave the building. Defendant pled guilty and was sentenced to one year of
conditional discharge and seven days in jail.
In October 1984, defendant was arrested for battery and disorderly conduct, although the State later entered a nolle
prosequi of these charges. In May 1987, defendant was arrested and charged with the sexual assault of Merlinda Entrata.
During an approximate two-year period ending August 15, 1990, defendant, while incarcerated at Pontiac Correctional
Center, committed six minor violations and two major violations, including intimidation, insolence, and disobeying orders.
In January 1991, defendant was transferred to the Lake County jail. Based on several violations, his adjustment was
described in the presentence investigation report as "poor."
In aggravation, the State also cited defendant's aggressive and violent conduct in school. Records establish that during the
3½ years that defendant attended Waukegan East High School, he received numerous suspensions. For example, in
November 1980, defendant was suspended for five days following an incident in which defendant, after being told to take
his seat, swung his hand at the teacher's face and said, "Boy was I tempted." In February 1982, defendant was suspended
for five days after telling a teacher, "If you were on my turf, I'd blow you away with a .45!" In February 1984, defendant
received a 10-day suspension for hitting a teacher.
Finally, the State relied on victim impact statements from Merlinda Entrata's family, expressing their grief and profound
loss.
In mitigation, defendant called as a witness, Janis Enis, defendant's older sister. Janis testified that defendant's family, i.e.,
his siblings and mother, decided that Janis would be their "spokesperson." Defendant's mother, however, was also present
at the sentencing hearing. In her brief testimony, Janis told the court that defendant was a loving brother and a good son;
that he has helped her and her siblings with problems; that he is talented, open and warm-hearted; and that she has, and will
continue to have, a relationship with him while he is incarcerated.
Defendant also introduced into evidence a sentencing report, compiled by clinical social worker, Jeffrey Eno. The report
describes defendant's difficult childhood. Defendant was one of five children raised by their mother in a single-parent
household. Defendant was closest to his older brother Larry; defendant never knew his father. At a young age, defendant
was responsible for his younger sister Debra. Due to financial and other circumstances the family frequently relocated. The
report acknowledges that defendant was suspended from Waukegan East High School 14 times, but also indicates that there
is no evidence that the recommended counseling ever took place. Eno also notes that defendant took the initiative and
negotiated terms and conditions under which he was permitted to return to school at Waukegan West High School. Under
the guidance of principal Billy Greer, defendant successfully completed high school. None of defendant's older siblings
completed high school.
The report comments favorably on defendant's current relationships with his family, including his wife, Diane Gonzales,
and his newborn daughter. The State argued in rebuttal that defendant's fatherhood is not a mitigating circumstance.
Defendant and Gonzales gave up their first child for adoption, and defendant fathered his newborn daughter while in
prison, the result of an obvious rule violation. According to Eno's report, the first child was given up for adoption because
of pressure from Gonzales' family, who did not approve of her relationship with a black man.
Eno's report concludes that defendant has adjusted well to prison life, noting that he has been inspirational and supportive
of fellow inmates; that he has developed an appreciation for self-expression through poetry and painting; that he has
pursued educational interests; and that he has remained committed to his religion. Attached to the report were photographs
of some of defendant's paintings. Defendant separately submitted samples of his poetry and lyrics.
Defendant spoke in allocution at the sentencing hearing. Defendant protested his innocence and expressed concern for his
wife and child. Defendant also expressed sorrow for the family of Merlinda Entrata. In responding to the State's evidence
of inappropriate sexual conduct, defendant stated, "I don't deny those incidents," although "there is two sides to every
story." In addition, defendant submitted a written statement to the trial court, in which defendant again protested his
innocence. Defendant stated that he has used his time in prison wisely; that he has focused on his religion; that he has taken
two courses and plans on teaching himself a foreign language; and that he has learned to paint. Defendant commented on
his difficult childhood and, in particular, the absence of a father. Defendant also recounted the difficult decision, and one
that he regrets, to give up his first child for adoption. He expressed his hope that his daughter will not grow up without a
father.
In addition to Eno's report, defendant submitted a psychological evaluation by Dr. Ronald Ganellen, who evaluated
defendant to assess the likelihood of defendant acting in a violent manner if sentenced to life in prison. Dr. Ganellen
concluded that defendant is able to understand and comply with the rules and regulations of prison life and that, in his
opinion, the likelihood of aggressive or violent behavior is low in the highly structured prison setting.
In further mitigation, defendant submitted numerous letters from a variety of individuals. Nine letters were from friends,
church members and ministers, expressing belief in defendant's innocence and commenting favorably on defendant's
character and religious faith. Seven letters were from staff members of the Lake County jail. Although one letter indicates
that defendant has not been a cooperative prisoner, the balance of the letters state that defendant has been disciplined only
for minor infractions and that defendant does not pose a threat. Five letters were from other death row inmates, describing
the beneficial impact defendant has had on their lives. Defendant also submitted a letter from the prison chaplain, who
remembers defendant as pleasant, friendly, respectful, warm and loving, with whom he enjoyed visiting. Finally, defendant
submitted letters from David Brodsky and Gerald Block, who represented defendant in his first trial, and James Chadd,
who represented defendant in his direct appeal following his first trial. These individuals described defendant as respectful,
courteous, intelligent, and understanding, with a capacity for rehabilitation.
In his closing argument, defense counsel focused on defendant's desire to learn, read and create, which counsel stated is the
"essential human condition." Counsel also elaborated on the love of family experienced by defendant, his ability to be
productive while in prison, the positive effect he has had on fellow inmates, and Dr. Ganellen's opinion that there is little
chance of defendant becoming violent if sentenced to life in prison. In summation, counsel argued:
"If you accept the premise, and I think it is founded in the truth, that the death penalty is the last and ultimate punishment
and should be reserved for the very few, for the cold and malignant hearted, for those for whom life in prison behind the
bars is no solution *** then Tony Enis ought not get a sentence of death. It is that straight forward. *** I'm telling you this
from my heart because it is the truth, and you have all of the evidence before you. If society's death penalty is reserved for
the worst, it is undeserved for this man.
* * *
Tony Enis is not a thing. He is a human being. He has been convicted of a terrible crime. *** But he is nonetheless a
precious, unique human being *** who can produce both beauty and feeling.
* * *
I beg you, please, please, Judge, perceive this man as a man worthy of redemption and spare his life ***."
In these post-conviction proceedings, defendant contends that his counsel was constitutionally deficient by failing to
investigate and present evidence of defendant's neuropsychological impairment, as described in Dr. Gelbort's evaluations,
and further evidence of defendant's social history.
In his evaluations, Dr. Gelbort states that, due to a neuropsychological impairment, defendant's conduct is less likely to
conform to societal norms and that he is less able than a normal individual to exercise self-control. Dr. Gelbort also states
that defendant's impairment may explain why his behavior has been maladaptive in the past and that such impairment
would have been present at the time of the murder. Dr. Gelbort further states that defendant's capacity to relate to women
developed in a deviant fashion and that defendant suffers from a Narcissistic Personality Disorder (Atypical). According to
Dr. Gelbort, incarceration can be the perfect treatment for a person with defendant's psychopathology and history. As
discussed earlier, Dr. Gelbort also expressed his opinion as to defendant's likely motivation for the murder.
In contrast to Dr. Gelbort's proposed testimony, which may suggest an explanation for defendant's conduct in murdering
Entrata, defendant, in both his oral and written statements, protested his innocence of the crime charged. In his written
statement defendant states that he will "never stop fighting to prove that fact." In allocution, defendant stated that, contrary
to what the trial court may have heard from witnesses, Merlinda Entrata's death was not at his hands.
The reasonableness of counsel's action may be judged with reference to a defendant's own statements. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d  at
96. In the present case, it would have been contradictory for defendant's counsel to present mitigation evidence that
explained why defendant committed the murder when defendant continued to maintain his innocence. Counsel cannot be
expected to present mitigation evidence that contradicts his client's protestations of innocence. Accordingly, counsel's
failure to do so is not deficient. See Evans, 186 Ill. 2d at 96-97; People v. Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d 472, 491 (1996); Holman,
164 Ill. 2d  at 373.
Defendant contends, however, that Dr. Gelbort's testimony also would have helped explain the aggravating evidence
presented by the State and that, under People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500 (1999), prejudice is apparent. We disagree.
In Morgan, counsel failed to present any evidence of neurological impairment and brain damage, even though such
evidence was readily available from family members, school records and the defendant's criminal file, and counsel was on
notice of the defendant's history of mental health problems. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 540-44. In contrast, here, the affidavits
of family members do not indicate that defendant suffers from some underlying medical or psychological condition.
Although defendant was referred to a clinical social worker for a psychological evaluation in 1984 as a condition of his
probation, the conclusion of the social worker, that defendant has an antisocial personality disorder, was called into doubt
by improper test scoring. In addition, the presentence investigation report states that the psychologist who evaluated
defendant upon his entering Pontiac Correctional Center determined that defendant was not in need of any mental health
treatment or counseling. Furthermore, counsel in the present case did obtain a psychological evaluation of defendant prior
to his sentencing hearing. Dr. Ganellen, who evaluated defendant, found "no signs of underlying psychosis, thought
disorder, or cognitive slippage present."
 Even if defendant's counsel were faced with some evidence that defendant was neurologically impaired, such evidence is
not inherently mitigating. The sentencer may view such information as either mitigating or aggravating, depending on
whether the evidence evokes compassion or demonstrates possible future dangerousness. See People v. Madej, 177 Ill. 2d 116, 139 (1997); People v. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d 372, 382 (1997). For this further reason, we will not deem counsel's
performance deficient.
Defendant also argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to present further evidence of his social history.
Defendant identifies several individuals who he contends could have provided mitigation testimony as to defendant's
difficult childhood, the negative influence of defendant's brother Larry, and defendant's respectful conduct toward prior
girlfriends.
A comparison of the testimony compiled by defendant on post-conviction, and the evidence introduced at defendant's
sentencing hearing, reveals that much of the new evidence is cumulative, or simply duplicative, of information presented to
the trial court. For example, the post-conviction affidavit of Gladys Hicks essentially duplicates her letter to defense
counsel, which was submitted in mitigation. Similarly, the post-conviction affidavit of Terry Atwater duplicates, in part, his
letter to defense counsel, which was also submitted in mitigation. Additional information contained in Atwater's affidavit
regarding defendant's difficult childhood and lack of a male role model are addressed in the presentence investigation
report, in defendant's written statement, and in Jeffrey Eno's report. The post-conviction affidavit of Billy Greer, former
principal of Waukegan West High School, contains information as to his relationship with defendant and defendant's
success at Waukegan West. This evidence was already before the trial court in the presentence investigation report, in
Eno's report, and in the testimony of Rose Santiago, one of defendant's probation officers. Greer's additional statements in
his affidavit expressing shock at learning of the charges against defendant is cumulative of similar statements contained in
the letters from friends and clergy which defendant submitted in mitigation at the sentencing hearing. Defense counsel was
not deficient for failing to provide cumulative evidence. See People v. Henderson, 171 Ill. 2d 124, 155 (1996).
The new, noncumulative evidence defendant has compiled indicates that defendant idolized his older brother Larry, who
was a negative role model; that defendant began to work part-time jobs at an early age; and that defendant's encounters
with the law began at age 9 when he was picked up for vandalism. The new evidence also indicates that when defendant
was growing up, the electricity was sometimes turned off for a day or two in the Enis home; that defendant did not always
have decent clothing and enough to eat; that defendant witnessed his mother being physically abused by her former
husband; that defendant's mother sometimes disciplined the children with a leather belt; and that there was a lot of
confusion and arguing in the home. There was also evidence that defendant was well-mannered and respectful with some of
his high school dates.
 The additional evidence defendant cites illustrating his difficult upbringing and the negative influence of his brother is not
necessarily mitigating. Evidence of a chaotic childhood, or that a defendant's upbringing caused him to become violent or
aggressive, can be considered in aggravation. See Childress, 191 Ill. 2d  at 179; Evans, 186 Ill. 2d  at 101; Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d  at 491; People v. Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d 258, 339 (1990). Moreover, defendant's counsel did present evidence of
defendant's social history. Jeffrey Eno's report, as well as defendant's own statements, provide significant detail on
defendant's background. Thus, this is not a situation where defendant's counsel completely overlooked this type of
potentially mitigating evidence.
Assuming, however, that counsel was deficient in failing to investigate and present this additional evidence, defendant must
still show prejudice to sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Prejudice must be assessed based on the totality
of the evidence. It is therefore improper to focus exclusively on the potential mitigating evidence. Rather, the nature and
extent of the evidence in aggravation must also be considered. People v. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509, 538 (1995).
In this case, the trial court was presented with evidence of the execution-style murder of the victim; evidence of defendant's
criminal conduct beginning at a young age; evidence of defendant's threats, intimidation and violence directed toward his
teachers; evidence of defendant's sexually aggressive, if not criminal, conduct toward women; and evidence of defendant's
periodic displays of intimidation and insolence while in prison. On this record, we do not believe that defendant has
succeeded in demonstrating prejudice by the failure of counsel to present additional evidence of defendant's social history.
People v. Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d 148 (1994), on which defendant relies, does not require a different result. In Thompkins,
we remanded the matter to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's post-conviction claim that his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence from the defendant's parents, siblings, children and
friends. The only witness to testify in mitigation was the defendant's wife. Although counsel submitted over 50 letters in
support of the defendant, most of them were from individuals who did not appear to know the defendant particularly well.
Thus, the additional affidavits the defendant submitted in support of his post-conviction claim were not duplicative of
evidence introduced at the defendant's sentencing hearing. We concluded that the live testimony of the affiants may have
provided a more complete portrayal of the defendant, rather than letters from persons who did not know defendant well.
We therefore remanded the matter for an evidentiary hearing on this issue. Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d  at 166-67.
In contrast, the mitigation evidence compiled by defendant in the present case largely duplicates or is cumulative of
evidence introduced at defendant's sentencing hearing. In addition, many of the letter writers state that they know defendant
well. Although the only witness to testify in support of defendant was his sister Janis Enis, she did so as spokesperson for
the Enis family. Furthermore, defendant was permitted to speak in allocution. He also submitted a written statement to the
court. Unlike Thompkins, we believe that the sentencing judge in the present case was provided with a complete portrayal
of defendant. Defendant's reliance on Thompkins is therefore misplaced. The trial court did not err in dismissing this claim
without an evidentiary hearing.


C. Motion to Quash Subpoena
Prior to filing his amended post-conviction petition, defendant directed a subpoena to the Waukegan police department,
calling for the production of "[t]he entire police file pertaining to Anthony Enis and/or Melissa Entratta [sic]." The circuit
court granted the State's motion to quash the subpoena. The court noted that defendant did not allege any discovery
violations by the State, and that a post-conviction petition is not a new discovery tactic. Defendant argues on appeal that the
trial court erred in granting the State's motion.
Because post-conviction proceedings afford only limited review, and because there exists the opportunity for abuse of the
discovery process, circuit courts must be cautious in the exercise of their inherent authority to order discovery. People ex
rel. Daley v. Fitzgerald, 123 Ill. 2d 175, 183 (1988). Where a defendant's discovery request has gone beyond the limited
scope of post-conviction proceedings and amounted to nothing more than a "fishing expedition," this court has upheld the
circuit court's denial of the defendant's discovery request. See Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d  at 370-71. Similarly, in determining
whether a defendant's request for a pretrial subpoena is justified, Illinois courts will consider whether, inter alia, the
defendant's application is made in good faith and whether it is intended as a general fishing expedition. People v.
Shukovsky, 128 Ill. 2d 210, 225 (1988). We believe the same concern applies when a circuit court is faced with a challenge
to a defendant's use of a subpoena in post-conviction proceedings.
Discovery was conducted in both of defendant's criminal trials. Defendant did not argue in the circuit court that a discovery
violation occurred. Defendant also did not claim a Brady violation. Rather, defendant simply argued that there may exist
something in the police file that police withheld, which could lead to exculpatory evidence. Under these circumstances we
conclude that defendant's subpoena was little more than a fishing expedition and that the circuit court did not abuse its
discretion in granting the State's motion to quash.
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 131 L. Ed. 2d 490, 115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995), on which defendant relies on appeal, does not
support his contention that the circuit court erred. In Kyles, the United States Supreme Court reversed a decision of the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit that rejected the defendant's claim for federal habeas corpus relief based on a Brady
violation. The opinion does not speak to the appropriate scope of discovery, or the requirements for issuance of a subpoena,
on post-conviction review. Accordingly, we reject defendant's contention of error.

D. Motion for Substitution of Judge
As a final matter, defendant contends that the circuit court improperly denied his motion for substitution of judge at post-conviction proceedings. In his motion for substitution, defendant alleged, in relevant part, that Judge Christopher Starck
agreed to allow Robert Hauser to file his appearance as additional counsel on behalf of defendant, so long as Hauser's fees
were not paid by Lake County; that Judge Starck commented that the subpoena to the Waukegan police department may be
"burdensome"; that Judge Starck refused to order the production of the entire police file; and that Judge Starck questioned
whether defendant had a right to respond to the State's motion to dismiss defendant's post-conviction petition. Defendant
argued that Judge Starck's comments and conduct indicate prejudice against defendant. The State opposed the motion.
After argument by the parties, Judge Stephen Walter, to whom defendant's motion for substitution of judge was transferred,
denied the motion. Judge Walter found that defendant's allegations were not supported by the record, or that the
complained-of conduct by Judge Starck did not evidence prejudice. We agree.
A defendant does not have an absolute right to substitution of judge at a post-conviction proceeding. Madej, 177 Ill. 2d  at
163; People v. Steidl, 177 Ill. 2d 239, 264 (1997). Rather, a defendant must demonstrate that he will be substantially
prejudiced if his motion for substitution is denied. Steidl, 177 Ill. 2d  at 264.
The record in the present case reveals that, contrary to the allegations in defendant's motion for substitution, Judge Starck
did not condition the filing of attorney Hauser's appearance on the payment of his fees from sources other than Lake
County. When Hauser first appeared before Judge Starck, Hauser volunteered that "the Capital Project will pay whatever
fees are involved *** so it won't cost the county." Judge Starck simply reiterated that arrangement when he granted Hauser
leave to file his appearance.
As to Judge Starck's refusal to order the Waukegan police department to produce its entire file, we have determined that
the court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State's motion to quash the subpoena. Moreover, the entry of an
adverse judgment, standing alone, is not evidence of judicial bias. People v. Hall, 157 Ill. 2d 324, 335 (1993). Judge
Starck's initial observation that compliance with the subpoena may be "burdensome" is also not indicative of prejudice.
Judge Starck ordered the parties to submit authority in support of their respective positions regarding the State's motion to
quash; he heard argument on the motion; and he ultimately granted the motion on grounds unrelated to whether compliance
with the subpoena would be burdensome.
 Finally, we do not believe that defendant's allegation that Judge Starck expressed uncertainty as to whether defendant had
a right to file a response to the State's motion to dismiss the post-conviction petition evidences bias. Judge Starck merely
requested that defendant provide authority to support his position. Such a routine request is not indicative of prejudice.
Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in denying defendant's motion for substitution of judge.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the circuit court of Lake County dismissing defendant's post-conviction
petition without an evidentiary hearing. We also affirm the order of the circuit court quashing the subpoena directed to the
Waukegan police department and the order of the circuit court denying defendant's motion for substitution of judge. We
further direct the clerk of this court to enter an order setting Thursday, March 15, 2001, as the date on which the sentence of
death, entered by the circuit court of Lake County, shall be carried out. Defendant shall be executed in the manner provided
by law. 725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West 1998). The clerk of this court shall send a certified copy of the mandate in this case to the
Director of Corrections, the warden of Tamms Correctional Center, and the warden of the institution where defendant is
confined.
Affirmed.
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree that Enis' murder conviction should not be disturbed. In my view, however, his sentence of death cannot be allowed
to stand. For the reasons set forth in my partial concurrence and partial dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the
Illinois death penalty law violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const.,
amends. VIII, XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2). Enis' sentence of death
should therefore be vacated, and the cause should be remanded to the circuit court for imposition of a sentence of
imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(j) (West 1998).
1.      1We have assumed, for purposes of evaluating defendant's post-conviction claim, that Dr. Fulero's testimony regarding
problems associated with cross-racial identifications would have been properly admitted at trial. We express no opinion,
however, as to whether such expert testimony generally aids the trier of fact in reaching its conclusion.