Title: Hopping v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

708 So. 2d 263 (1998)
Darin S. HOPPING, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 89515.

Supreme Court of Florida.
February 19, 1998.
*264 Darin S. Hopping, Bonifay, Petitioner, pro se.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; James W. Rogers, Bureau Chief, Criminal Appeals; and Sonya Roebuck Horbelt, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM.
We have for review a decision addressing the following question certified to be of great public importance:
Hopping v. State, 674 So. 2d 905, 906 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We answer in the affirmative and quash Hopping.
Darin Hopping pled guilty to a third-degree felony and was sentenced to a term of thirty months' incarceration to be followed by eighteen months' probation. His probation was revoked in November 1991, and he was resentenced to thirty-six months' incarceration with thirty months and two days' credit for time served. Hopping mistakenly thought that his new sentence equaled sixty-six months,[1] thereby exceeding the sixty-month maximum for third-degree felonies.[2] He requested a sentence correction by filing a motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), which states:
The court responded with an order that had the practical import of doubling Hopping's original sentence:
Hopping filed a second rule 3.800 motion, seeking to correct the doubling, which was denied. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed, but certified the foregoing question regarding the availability of a rule 3.800 motion in the present context:
Hopping, 674 So. 2d  at 905.
Hopping argues that because the trial court can determine as a matter of law that his sentence has been unconstitutionally enhanced in violation of the double jeopardy clause, the matter is cognizable under rule 3.800. We agree.
In Davis v. State, 661 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 1995), we stated that
Id. at 1196. We reaffirmed Davis in State v. Callaway, 658 So. 2d 983 (Fla.1995), and explained:
Callaway, 658 So. 2d  at 988 (citations omitted)(emphasis added). In the instant case, it can be determined "as a matter of law without an evidentiary [hearing]" that Hopping's sentence was increased upon resentencing in violation of the double jeopardy clause. Thus, as Judge Benton concisely reasoned, the sentence should not be unreachable under a rule expressly intended to correct illegal sentences:
Hopping v. State, 674 So. 2d 905, 906 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)(Benton, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). We agree with Judge Benton's reasoning and conclude that our holding today does no violence to the rationale of Davis.
Based on the foregoing, we hold that where it can be determined without an evidentiary hearing that a sentence has been unconstitutionally enhanced in violation of the double jeopardy clause, the sentence is illegal and can be reached at any time under rule 3.800. Accordingly, we answer the certified question in the affirmative and quash the decision below.
It is so ordered.
KOGAN, C.J., OVERTON, SHAW, HARDING, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., and GRIMES, Senior Justice, concur.
[1]  Hopping was resentenced to an additional six months' incarceration.
[2]  Section 775.082(3)(d), Florida Statutes (1995) provides that "A person who has been convicted... may be punished ... [f]or a felony of the third degree, by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 5 years."
[3]  Troupe v. Rowe, 283 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1973) (prohibiting increasing a legal sentence once it has commenced on double jeopardy grounds).