Title: Norcross v. Pickrell Drilling Co.

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

202 Kan. 524 (1969)
449 P.2d 569
LEO NORCROSS, Appellant,
v.
PICKRELL DRILLING COMPANY, and FIDELITY AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Appellees.
No. 45,469

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed January 25, 1969.
J. Eugene Balloun, of Great Bend, argued the cause, and Lee Turner and Max E. Eberhart, both of Great Bend, were with him on the brief for appellant.
Jerry M. Ward, of Great Bend, argued the cause, and Tudor W. Hampton, Norman G. Bailey and Thomas J. Berscheidt, all of Great Bend, were with him on the brief for appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FROMME, J.:
Leo Norcross, claimant, appeals from an award by the district court under the workmen's compensation act. The principal question is whether the district court had the authority to amend a previous judgment and award.
A brief recital of the facts will present the issues. The claimant was injured on November 9, 1963, while employed by Pickrell Drilling Company, respondent, as an oilfield roughneck. The claimant was struck on the forehead while attempting to crank an engine and received a cut which required several stitches to close. He was not hospitalized. The day following the accident he began complaining *525 of headaches. Other psychopathic symptoms developed. His condition was diagnosed as an anxiety neurosis secondary to the physical injury.
The examiner found claimant suffered a four percent (4%) permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. He determined there were 94 weeks of permanent partial disability due the claimant as of September 13, 1965, and 321 weekly payments remaining to be paid at the rate of $3.13 per week. The disability was found to have commenced at the time of the accident. This award was approved by the director and the claimant appealed to the district court.
The district court heard the appeal and determined claimant was twenty percent (20%) temporarily partially disabled. The court did not specify the date that such disability commenced or the date from which payments should be figured. This first judgment and award was dated February 17, 1967. The award provided for 415 weekly payments.
The respondents previously had filed a motion asking the court to postpone entry of this judgment. The judgment and award was journalized and filed without hearing the respondents' motion. The journal entry was signed by the judge and by claimant's attorney. It contained a notation by the attorney for respondents to the effect they were unable to approve the same because the court's memorandum on which the journal entry was based failed to specify the date the disability commenced.
Before the motion was heard the claimant made demand for compensation under K.S.A. 44-512a and compensation was paid by respondents for the period of November 16, 1963, to August 5, 1967. This payment was made by respondents on August 11, 1967.
The motion was set down for argument and the district court entered a second judgment and award dated September 7, 1967. This judgment will be covered in detail later but its effect was to allow disability commencing September 1, 1965. The date of disability was set by this judgment almost two years after the accident occurred.
The claimant-appellant attacks this later judgment and award. He bases his attack upon the rule that post-trial motions are not authorized in workmen's compensation proceedings and a trial court cannot amend its judgment and change an award once it is entered.
The respondent-appellees counter by pointing out the trial court has a duty to make the record of a judgment speak the truth and *526 the later judgment was entered nunc pro tunc. The court merely supplied a date overlooked in the first judgment and award.
In Gray v. Hercules Powder Co., 160 Kan. 767, 165 P.2d 447, this court held:
These principles enunciated in Gray have been approved and applied in later cases. See Bushman Construction Co. v. Schumacher, 187 Kan. 359, 362, 356 P.2d 869.
However, it is true that a judgment as entered is one thing and the judgment as recorded may be quite a different thing. Because of error the record of the judgment may not be correct. In such case a trial court not only has the right but the duty to make the record speak the truth. This duty of the court is inherent and does not depend upon rules of procedure or lack of them. See Tafarella v. Hand, 185 Kan. 613, 347 P.2d 356, and cases cited p. 617 of the opinion.
The change in the record to make it speak the truth may be accomplished by an order nunc pro tunc. The function of such an order is to correct the record of a judgment by entering, now for then, an order previously made. It cannot be used to alter a judgment actually rendered. See Hoard v. Shelton, 201 Kan. 145, 439 P.2d 123, and cases cited at p. 153 of the opinion.
In the present case the trial court filed a written memorandum on which the judgment dated February 17, 1967, was based. The findings which relate to the duration of the disability therein are as follows:
..............
..............
The first judgement awarded compensation to claimant for 415 weeks of twenty percent (20%) temporary partial disability at the rate of $15.65 per week, or until further order of the director.
The second judgement and award, dated September 7, 1967, was based upon a second written memorandum by the trial court. It reads as follows:
"The accident took place in November 1963.
"He asked for treatment May 1966.
The second journal entry is not limited to correcting the record of a judgment previously rendered. The action taken by the court, as outlined in the memorandum, was to review and re-examine the evidence bearing upon the duration of the disability. It is apparent a different conclusion was reached after the later evaluation of the evidence.
For instance, in the first memorandum the court stressed the testimony of the claimant and of Mrs. Wetig, his landlady. The court pointed out that the testimony of claimant alone may be sufficient to support disability and that the duration of disability does not have to be shown by medical evidence. (See finding No. 6.)
The testimony of claimant and his landlady did support the finding the disability commenced immediately after the accident.
In the second memorandum the testimony of claimant and his landlady received passing comment by the court. More weight was given to the dates of treatment and the testimony of medical witnesses. The court referred to its action as amending the previous memorandum and judgment. This re-evaluation of the evidence was not for the purpose of determining the nature of the judgment previously rendered. It was to determine what judgment should have been rendered on February 17, 1967.
The respondent-appellees further contend the district court is not limited to entering an order nunc pro tunc. Based upon Fisher v. Rhoades Construction Co., which first appeared in 188 Kan. 792, 365 P.2d 1101, and later in 190 Kan. 448, 375 P.2d 771, they say a district court may make its findings more clear and specific and change the amount of the award in workmen's compensation cases.
*530 Examination of the Fisher cases will indicate they deal with the authority of a district court to reconsider its findings and award after remand. In such case the district court is authorized and limited by the directions given by this court in the opinion and mandate. The Fisher cases do not purport to modify the rules laid down in Gray v. Hercules Powder Co., supra. The Gray case is clearly distinguished in the Fisher cases.
An additional reason appears why we do not consider the second journal entry an order nunc pro tunc. The total amount of the award under the first judgment was reduced in the second journal entry.
The first award provided 415 weeks of compensation. Both parties considered the disability in the first award to have commenced at the time of the physical injury. Payments were made in response to the 512a demand from November 16, 1963.
In Magers v. Martin Marietta Corporation, 193 Kan. 137, 392 P.2d 148, it was held that under the workmen's compensation act weekly payments for disability cannot extend beyond eight years from the date of the injury. Under the first journal entry 415 weekly payments could have been made if commenced November 16, 1963. (One week after the accident.)
Under the later journal entry payments were to commence September 1, 1965. The number of payments was deleted in this journal entry and the payments were to be made "as provided by law, or until further order of the Director." It is apparent the effect of the second journal entry was to reduce the number of weekly payments possible under the eight year limitation. Only 327 weekly payments were possible if payments were to commence September 1, 1965.
The second journal entry was not an order nunc pro tunc. The award dated February 17, 1967, was formally made and entered. It became final and could not be modified thereafter by the district court.
The judgment is reversed with directions to vacate the order and award dated September 7, 1967, and reinstate the order and award dated February 17, 1967, which order and award must be interpreted as having determined the disability commenced on the date of the accident.