Title: ALLSTATE INSUR CO V ROBERT DANIEL MCCARN

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JUNE 11, 2002  
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 118266  
ROBERT DANIEL MCCARN, a Minor; 
ERNEST WARD MCCARN; PATRICIA 
ANN MCCARN,  
Defendants,  
and  
NANCY S. LABELLE, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of 
KEVIN CHARLES LABELLE, Deceased,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
CAVANAGH, J.  
This is an action for declaratory judgment.  Allstate  
Insurance Company seeks a determination of its obligation to  
indemnify its insureds in connection with an underlying  
wrongful death suit stemming from the shooting death of Kevin  
LaBelle.  
We hold that the shooting death of Kevin LaBelle was  
“accidental” and, thus, an “occurrence” as defined in the  
insurance policy at issue.  Consequently, an “occurrence”  
gives rise to Allstate’s liability under the policy.  
Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and  
remand to the Court of Appeals to decide whether the criminal  
acts exception in this policy excludes coverage.  
I  
This case arises out of the death of sixteen-year-old  
Kevin LaBelle on December 15, 1995, at the home of defendants  
Ernest and Patricia McCarn, where their grandson, then  
sixteen-year-old defendant Robert McCarn, also resided.  On  
that day, Robert removed from under Ernest’s bed a shotgun  
Robert’s father had given him the year before.  The gun was  
always stored under Ernest’s bed and was not normally loaded.  
Both Robert and Kevin handled the gun, which Robert believed  
to be unloaded.  When Robert was handling the gun, he pointed  
it at Kevin’s face from approximately one foot away. Robert  
pulled back the hammer and pulled the trigger and the gun  
fired, killing Kevin.  
2  
Nancy LaBelle, representing Kevin’s estate, brought the  
underlying action against Robert and his grandparents, Ernest  
and Patricia McCarn, who had a homeowners insurance policy  
with 
plaintiff 
Allstate.  Allstate brought the present action,  
seeking a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to  
indemnify defendants Robert, Ernest, or Patricia McCarn.  
Plaintiff 
and 
defendants 
moved 
for 
summary 
disposition 
in  
the declaratory action. The trial court granted defendants’  
motions for summary disposition and denied plaintiff’s,  
holding 
that 
the 
events constituted an “occurrence” within the  
meaning of Allstate’s policy.  The trial court also held that  
Robert 
McCarn’s 
conduct was not intentional or criminal within  
the meaning of Allstate’s policy.  
Allstate 
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed  
the trial court in an unpublished opinion.1
 The Court  
attempted to apply our recent decisions in Nabozny v  
Burkhardt2 and Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Masters3 and concluded  
that “Robert’s intentional actions created a direct risk of  
harm that precludes coverage.”  
Defendant LaBelle sought leave to appeal.  We granted  
leave.  
1 Issued October 3, 2000 (Docket No. 213041).  
2 461 Mich 471; 606 NW2d 639 (2000).  
3 460 Mich 105; 595 NW2d 832 (1999).  
3  
II  
In determining whether Allstate must indemnify the  
McCarns, we examine the language of the insurance policies and  
interpret their terms pursuant to well-established Michigan  
principles of construction. Masters at 111.  
An insurance policy must be enforced in accordance with  
its terms.  Id. If not defined in the policy, however, we  
will interpret the terms of the policy in accordance with  
their “commonly used meaning.” Id. at 112, 114.  
The McCarns’ homeowners insurance policy provides in  
pertinent part:  
Subject 
to 
the 
terms, 
conditions 
and  
limitations of this policy, Allstate will pay 
damages which an insured person becomes legally 
obligated to pay because of bodily injury or 
property damage arising from an occurrence to which 
this policy applies, and is covered by this part of 
the policy.  
According to the plain meaning of the policy, liability  
coverage for damages arises from an “occurrence.”  The term  
“occurrence” is defined in the insurance policy as: “an  
accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to  
substantially the same general harmful conditions during the  
policy 
period, 
resulting in bodily injury or property damage.”  
Our task, therefore, is to determine whether the case  
before us involved an “accident.”  
4  
 
 
III  
In the instant case, the policy defines an occurrence as  
an accident, but does not define what constitutes an accident.  
In similar cases where the respective policies defined an  
occurrence as an accident, without defining accident, we have  
examined the common meaning of the term.  In such cases, we  
have repeatedly stated that “‘an accident is an undesigned  
contingency, a casualty, a happening by chance, something out  
of the usual course of things, unusual, fortuitous, not  
anticipated and not naturally to be expected.’”  Masters at  
114, quoting Arco Ind Corp v American Motorists Ins Co, 448  
Mich 395, 404-405; 531 NW2d 168 (1995)(opinion of Mallett,  
J.); Auto Club Group Ins Co v Marzonie, 447 Mich 624, 631; 527  
NW2d 760 (1994); Metropolitan Property & Liability Ins Co v  
DiCicco, 432 Mich 656, 670; 443 NW2d 734 (1989).  
Accidents are evaluated from the standpoint of the  
insured, not the injured party.  Masters at 114, n 6. 
In  
Masters, we held that “the appropriate focus of the term  
‘accident’ must be on both ‘the injury-causing act or event  
and its relation to the resulting property damage or personal  
injury.’” Id. at 115, quoting Marzonie at 648 (Griffin, J.,  
concurring) (emphasis in original).  
We also stated that “‘an insured need not act  
unintentionally’ in order for the act to constitute an  
5  
 
 
‘accident’ and therefore an ‘occurrence.’” Id.  
Where an insured does act intentionally, “a problem  
arises ‘in attempting to distinguish between intentional acts  
that can be classified as “accidents” and those that cannot.’”  
Id.  
In Masters at 115-116, we applied the following standard  
from Justice Griffin’s concurrence in Marzonie at 648-649.  
[A] determination must be made whether the 
consequences of the insured’s intentional act  
“either were intended by the insured or reasonably 
should have been expected because of the direct 
risk of harm intentionally created by the insured’s 
actions.  When an insured acts intending to cause 
property damage or personal injury, liability 
coverage should be denied, irrespective of whether 
the resulting injury is different from the injury 
intended.  Similarly, . . . when an insured’s 
intentional actions create a direct risk of harm, 
there can be no liability coverage for any 
resulting damage or injury, despite the lack of an 
actual intent to damage or injure.”  [Emphasis in 
original.]  
What this essentially boils down to is that, if both the act  
and the consequences were intended by the insured, the act  
does not constitute an accident.  On the other hand, if the  
act was intended by the insured, but the consequences were  
not, the act does constitute an accident, unless the intended  
act created a direct risk of harm from which the consequences  
should reasonably have been expected by the insured.  
As to the perspective from which the analysis should be  
made, the question is not whether a reasonable person would  
6  
have expected the consequences, but whether the insured  
reasonably 
should 
have 
expected 
the 
consequences.  
Accordingly, an objective foreseeability test should not be  
used in the present context.  Rather, the analysis must be  
that, to avoid coverage, the consequence of the intended act,  
which created a direct risk of harm, reasonably should have  
been expected by the insured.  
The policy language dictates whether a subjective or  
objective standard is to be used.4
 However, the policy  
language here does not indicate whether a subjective or  
objective standard is to be used. Because “[t]he definition  
of accident should be framed from the standpoint of the  
insured . . . ,” Masters at 114, and because, where there is  
doubt, the policy should be construed in favor of the insured,  
id. at 111, we conclude that a subjective standard should be  
used here.  Further, in Masters, this Court, faced with  
similar policy language, concluded that there is no coverage  
where the insured intended his action, and the consequences of  
this intended action “either were intended by the insured or  
4 For example, a policy that excludes coverage of bodily 
injury that is expected “from the standpoint of the insured,” 
dictates a subjective standard, Metropolitan Property &  
Liability Ins Co v DiCicco, companion case to Allstate Ins Co  
v Freeman, 432 Mich 656, 709; 443 NW2d 734 (1989), just as a 
policy that covers bodily injury not expected “by the 
insured,” also dictates a subjective standard, Fire Ins  
Exchange v Diehl, 450 Mich 678, 685; 545 NW2d 602 (1996).  
7  
  
 
reasonably should have been expected because of the direct  
risk of harm intentionally created by the insured’s actions.”  
Id. at 115.  
In our judgment, the language “by the insured” modifies  
both “intended” and “expected.”  Therefore, there is no  
coverage where the consequences of the insured’s act were  
either “intended by the insured” or “reasonably should have  
been expected by the insured.” 
The language, “by the  
insured,” indicates that a subjective standard should be used  
here. Fire Ins Exchange v Diehl, 450 Mich 678, 685; 545 NW2d  
602 (1996). Although, “[n]egligence alone is not sufficient  
to prevent the death from being an accident within the meaning  
of the policy,” Collins v Nationwide Life Ins Co, 409 Mich  
271, 277; 294 NW2d 194 (1980), when the acts of the insured  
rise to the level of a “direct risk of harm intentionally  
created”—a level of culpability only slightly lower than  
intentionally acting to produce an intended harm–coverage is  
precluded, where the insured reasonably should have expected  
the 
harm, 
as 
the 
situation is virtually indistinguishable from  
intentionally causing the harm.  
Further, the “direct risk of harm” must have been  
“intentionally created by the insured’s actions.”  This  
language shows that the Masters test is not objective.  On the  
contrary, the inquiry is entirely subjective–did the insured  
8  
 
 
intentionally create a direct risk of harm? 
In this case,  
there was no intentional creation of a direct risk of harm  
because 
of 
the 
undisputed evidence that Robert McCarn believed  
he was pulling the trigger of an unloaded gun.  
The dissent is incorrect in concluding that this Court  
adopted an objective test in Masters. As previously stated,  
in our judgment, the language “by the insured” modifies both  
“intended” and “expected,” indicating a subjective test. A  
subjective test is not only consistent with Masters and  
Nabozny, it is the required test, based on the language the  
Masters Court adopted from Marzonie. Accordingly, we are not  
abandoning the rule established in Masters, as the dissent  
contends; rather, we are simply adhering to this rule.  See  
post at 9, n 6.  
Applying these principles to the present case, viewed  
from the standpoint of the insured, we hold that Kevin  
LaBelle’s death was an “accident,” thus an “occurrence,”  
covered under the insurance policy. We agree with plaintiff  
that Robert intended to point the gun at Kevin and pull the  
trigger.  However, Robert believed the gun was not loaded.  
Robert had no intention of firing a loaded weapon. No bodily  
injury would have been caused by Robert’s intended act of  
pulling the trigger of an unloaded gun.  
9  
The dissent states:  
What is the direct risk of harm consonant with  
pulling the trigger of a firearm?  The obvious risk  
is that the weapon, if loaded, might discharge and 
cause an injury. In my view, the evidence adduced 
at the summary disposition stage warrants the 
conclusion that the insured should have reasonably 
expected the consequences of his intentional act. 
[Slip op at 13.]  
We agree that this case does not present a question of  
fact. The fact that Robert believed the gun was unloaded is  
a matter about which there is no genuine issue of material  
fact.  This is because there is nothing in the record to  
reasonably support a conclusion that, contrary to Robert’s  
testimony that he believed the gun was unloaded, he  
consciously believed the gun was loaded, or even contemplated  
that there was any possibility that it was loaded when he  
pulled 
the 
trigger. 
 
Even plaintiff, the insurer, acknowledged  
that Robert believed the firearm was unloaded when he pulled  
the trigger:  
McCarn’s 
subjective, 
although 
erroneous, 
belief that the firearm was not loaded does not  
alter the fact that he picked up the gun, pointed 
it, pulled back the hammer and pulled the trigger.  
Further, Robert made statements at his deposition to  
support his belief that the gun was not loaded: Robert and  
Kevin were “horsing around” with the gun as they had done on  
previous 
occasions; 
Robert was surprised when the gun actually  
fired; and, immediately following the discharge of the gun,  
10  
  
Robert called 911.  Thus, there is nothing to reasonably  
indicate that Robert entertained knowledge that the gun might  
have been loaded.  
In short, it would be speculation to suggest that Robert  
intentionally shot his friend or was conscious of a  
nontheoretical possibility that a shell was in the gun when he  
pulled the trigger.  Clearly, such speculation cannot suffice  
to establish even a genuine issue of material fact, let alone  
to conclude that Robert’s intended act of pulling the trigger  
of an unloaded gun intentionally created a direct risk of  
harm.  
The dissent goes to great lengths to show that under an  
objective standard, the insured should have reasonably  
expected the consequences.  We simply cannot agree because the  
language of the test adopted in Masters requires us to  
subjectively analyze what Robert thought when he pulled the  
trigger.  Robert thought he was pulling the trigger of an  
unloaded gun.5  
5 The dissent asserts that this opinion makes “the 
insured’s subjective belief regarding the status of the gun 
definitive.” Post at 12.  While this is not inaccurate, this  
should not be confused with making the insured’s own  
assertions of his subjective belief definitive.  A subjective 
test does not require courts to simply accept uncritically the 
insured’s own assertions regarding his subjective belief. 
Instead, 
courts 
must 
examine 
the 
totality 
of 
the  
circumstances, including the reasonableness or credibility of 
the insured’s assertions, evidence of "other acts," evidence 
(continued...)  
11  
 
 
Robert McCarn may have been negligent in failing to see  
if the gun was loaded before he pulled the trigger,  
particularly because he was the last person to use the gun  
weeks earlier for target practice.  However, the issue of  
negligence is not before us.  As we stated in Collins, the  
negligence of the insured in acting as he did is not enough to  
prevent an incident from being an accident if the consequence  
of the action (e.g., shot coming from a gun) should not have  
reasonably been expected by the insured.6  
While it may be considered quite obvious that Robert’s  
conduct was careless and foolish, it was negligence that  
5(...continued) 
concerning the faculties or the maturity of the insured, 
evidence concerning relationships between an insured and a 
victim of an injury, and so forth.  In this case, there is 
simply no evidence to suggest that the insured intended shot 
to be discharged from this gun when he pulled its trigger.  
Further, that the insured can now logically explain how 
the accidental shooting most likely occurred, i.e., that the 
insured forgot to unload the gun the last time he used it, 
does not transform an otherwise accidental shooting into an 
intentional creation of a direct risk of harm.  Merely because 
one can explain, after the fact, how an insured’s actions 
inexorably led to certain consequences does not mean that that 
insured reasonably should have expected those consequences. 
If that were true, the only covered occurrences would be 
inexplicable ones.  
6 The dissent asserts that Robert’s prior use of the gun 
should be considered in deciding whether Robert should have 
reasonably anticipated the harm caused. However, at most, the 
prior use of the gun would establish Robert was negligent.  In  
Michigan, the test is not whether the insured was negligent, 
but whether the insured should have reasonably expected the 
consequence.  
12  
simply did not rise to the level that he should have expected  
to result in harm.  Otherwise, liability insurance coverage  
for negligence would seem to become illusory.  We must be  
careful not to take the expectation of harm test so far that  
we eviscerate the ability of parties to insure against their  
own negligence.7  
The problem, as we see it, with the dissent’s opinion is  
that it undermines the ability of insureds to protect  
themselves against their own foolish or negligent acts.  If  
courts are to review the acts of insureds for “objective  
reasonableness,” as the dissent proposes, the very purpose of  
insurance would be compromised as insureds would find it  
increasingly difficult to recover on claims arising from  
injuries set in motion by foolhardy conduct on their own part  
or on the part of their families.  However, the impetus for  
insurance is not merely, or even principally, to insure  
oneself for well thought out and reasoned actions that go  
7 The dissent refers to Robert’s nolo contendere plea to 
manslaughter. Slip op at 3. However, given that such a no­
contest plea does not have the effect of an admission for any 
other proceeding than the one in which it is entered, MCR 
2.111(E)(3), that plea has no legal relevance to this case. 
Regardless, even if we assume Robert’s guilt of manslaughter 
in connection with this case, that does not change the fact 
that the shooting was an accident.  Similarly, the dissent 
refers to Robert having smoked marijuana, slip op at 3, n 3, 
but this has no serious relevance to the issues at hand.  
Smoking marijuana did not affect the establishment of intent 
by Robert.  
13  
 
 
 
wrong, but to insure oneself for foolish or negligent actions  
that go wrong.  Indeed, it is obviously the latter that are  
more likely to go astray and to precipitate the desire for  
insurance.  Under the dissent’s approach, however, only the  
former actions would be clearly covered “accidents,” or, at  
least, would clearly avoid disputes over coverage with  
insurers  
Further, under the dissent’s approach, only occurrences  
that were truly unexplainable would be covered “accidents.”  
For, in retrospect, a sufficiently diligent insurer could  
almost always determine the physical cause of an accident,  
tracing it back to some prior conduct by the insured that  
should have been performed differently. 
Actions have  
consequences, 
and 
with 
sufficient 
effort, 
a 
connection 
between  
an occurrence and a prior action on the part of the insured  
can invariably be identified.  However, merely because, in  
retrospect, an insurer is able to identify such a connection,  
does not mean that what took place was not an “accident.”  If  
one is driving too fast on a highway, not intending to but  
nonetheless causing an accident, it can hardly be denied that  
what has resulted is an accident despite the fact that it  
might be traceable to “objectively unreasonable” conduct by  
the insured, i.e. driving too fast on a highway.  
14  
IV  
Contrary to what our dissenting colleagues state, we are  
not abandoning or calling into question the rule from Masters  
in any way. The facts of this case are distinguishable from  
Masters and Nabozny, where we held that specific acts failed  
to qualify as accidents under the respective insurance  
policies.  In Nabozny, the plaintiff broke his ankle during a  
fight when the insured tripped him.  The insured, while not  
intending to break the plaintiff’s ankle, did intend to fight  
with him.  This and the effort to trip during the fight was  
the creation of a direct risk of physical harm that should  
have caused the insured to reasonably expect the consequences  
that ensued.  Thus, we concluded that the injury was not an  
accident.  
In Masters, the insured and his son intentionally set a  
fire, intending to cause damage in their clothing store only,  
but that ultimately destroyed not just their store, but also  
a neighboring building.  We held that the applicable insurance  
policy, 
which 
precluded coverage for intentional acts, did not  
provide coverage under the circumstances.  Our reason was  
that, when the insured acted by starting a fire, it is  
irrelevant that the consequence, which was burning property,  
was different in magnitude from that intended.  
15  
 
 
 
 
The 
difference 
between this case and Nabozny and Masters,  
however, is that here, while the act was intended, the result  
was not.8  Thus, unlike in Nabozny, Robert should not have  
reasonably expected the consequences that ensued from his act  
because his intended act was merely to pull the trigger of an  
unloaded gun. 
Similarly, unlike Masters, where the  
consequence 
of 
the 
act was intended, here the consequence—shot  
leaving the gun—was not intended.  Furthermore, even if one  
used some variation on a foreseeability test, no bodily harm  
could have been foreseen from Robert’s intended act, because  
he intended to pull the trigger of an unloaded gun, and, thus,  
it was not foreseeable, indeed it was impossible, under the  
facts as Robert believed them to be, that shot would be  
discharged.
 Therefore, we cannot say Robert should have  
expected the unfortunate consequences of his act.  The  
8 The dissent contends that “[t]here is no such  
‘difference’ among these three cases.  Rather, in both Masters  
and Nabozny, the insureds made precisely the same claim as 
presented here–that they did not intend the result of their  
deliberate acts.”  Post at 8 (emphasis in original).  What the  
dissent is missing is that the insureds in Masters and Nabozny  
did intend the results of their deliberate acts–the fire and  
the tripping; they just did not intend the magnitude of those 
results–the burning down of the neighboring building and the 
broken ankle.  So, again, this case is different from Masters  
and Nabozny because there the insureds did intend the results  
of their deliberate acts, while here the insured did not  
intend 
the 
result–the firing of shot–of his deliberate act–the 
shooting of a gun that he believed to be unloaded.  
16  
discharge of the shot was an accident and entitled to coverage  
unless a policy exclusion applies.  
V  
Allstate 
maintains 
that 
Robert 
McCarn’s 
actions  
constitute a criminal act that, under the policy’s criminal  
acts exclusion, negates Allstate’s duty to indemnify the  
insureds.
 The Court of Appeals did not reach this issue  
because it concluded that Robert’s actions created a direct  
risk of harm that precluded coverage.  We remand this case to  
the Court of Appeals to decide this issue.  
VI  
We hold today that Kevin LaBelle’s death was an  
“accident,” 
and 
thus 
an “occurrence,” covered under the policy  
because Robert did not intend or reasonably expect that his  
actions, pointing and pulling a trigger of an unloaded gun,  
would cause any bodily injury to Kevin LaBelle.  We reverse  
the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to the Court  
of Appeals to decide whether the criminal-acts exception in  
this policy excludes coverage.  
KELLY, TAYLOR, and MARKMAN, JJ., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.  
17  
___________________________________ 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
No. 118266  
ROBERT DANIEL MCCARN, a Minor; 
ERNEST WARD MCCARN; PATRICIA 
ANN MCCARN,  
Defendants,  
and  
NANCY S. LABELLE, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of 
KEVIN CHARLES LABELLE, Deceased,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
YOUNG, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
I agree with the majority that this case should be  
remanded to the Court of Appeals so that the applicability of  
the intentional act and criminal act policy exclusions can be  
decided.  However, I respectfully dissent from that portion of  
the majority opinion that concludes that the policy provides  
indemnity coverage because the majority finds that the  
shooting incident here constituted an “accident” and thus an  
“occurrence” under the policy.  The majority essentially  
 
 
 
 
adulterates any consistent or coherent application of the  
standards set forth by this Court just two terms ago in  
Masters1 and later applied in Nabozny2 concerning the  
differentiation between an accident and an intentional act.  
The majority’s effort to distinguish the facts of this case  
from Masters and Nabozny are hollow and simply debases the  
clear standard set forth in those opinions.  
I believe that the application of the definition of the  
term “accident” we recently announced in Masters and Nabozny,  
in which we construed identical policy language, requires an  
objective view of the insured’s actions.  
Under the facts of this case, the insured should have  
reasonably 
expected 
the consequences created by pointing a gun  
at another and pulling the trigger without checking to verify  
that it was unloaded. Accordingly, I would affirm summary  
disposition in favor of plaintiff.  
I. ADDITIONAL FACTS  
According 
to 
Robert 
McCarn’s 
deposition 
testimony, 
he 
and  
Kevin LaBelle went to McCarn’s house after school.  At some  
point in the afternoon,3 McCarn retrieved his .410 shotgun  
1  Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Masters, 460 Mich 105; 595  
NW2d 832 (1999).  
2 Nabozny v Burkhardt, 461 Mich 471; 606 NW2d 639 (2000).  
3 
 Before retrieving the shotgun, McCarn testified that 
(continued...)  
2  
 
 
from under his grandfather’s bed.  Both boys handled the  
weapon.  
LaBelle and McCarn argued over crackers; LaBelle had the  
crackers and refused to share them with McCarn when asked to  
do so. 
Attempting to frighten LaBelle into sharing the  
crackers,4 McCarn intentionally pointed the shotgun at LaBelle  
with the barrel being approximately one foot away from  
LaBelle’s face.  McCarn again asked LaBelle for the crackers,  
but LaBelle declined to share them.  McCarn pulled the hammer  
back, pretended to pull the trigger “a couple” times, and then  
actually pulled the trigger.  The weapon discharged and  
LaBelle was killed.  As a result of the death, McCarn pleaded  
nolo contendere to manslaughter, MCL 750.321.  
In both his statement to the police and his deposition  
testimony, McCarn stated that he thought the gun was unloaded  
and would simply “click” when the trigger was pulled.  McCarn  
acknowledged, however, that he did not check the gun to verify  
3(...continued) 
he and LaBelle got something to eat after school, went to a 
friend’s house for ten minutes, smoked “[o]ne joint and a 
bowl” of marijuana, watched videos, and played with a guinea 
pig and a hedgehog.  
4 While earlier in his testimony, McCarn denied pointing 
the gun at LaBelle with the intention of frightening him, 
stating that he was “just playing,” he also admitted that he 
thought the anticipated clicking sound “would be frightening” 
to LaBelle. Later on in his testimony, McCarn admitted that 
he was “attempting to frighten” LaBelle “into giving [him] the 
crackers.”  
3  
that it was unloaded before pulling the trigger.  McCarn  
stated that he had owned the gun “for at least a year” before  
the shooting and had successfully completed a gun safety  
course.  He also admitted that he had last used the gun  
without 
his 
grandparent’s 
permission 
for 
target 
practice 
weeks  
before the shooting. On this prior occasion, McCarn was “in  
a hurry” to put the gun away because he did not want his  
grandparents to catch him using the weapon without their  
supervision. McCarn could not recall if he had unloaded the  
shotgun in his hurry to put the weapon away.  
II. MASTERS AND NABOZNY  
The policy language in this case and in Masters and  
Nabozny are identical. Each policy provided coverage for an  
“occurrence,” which was later defined as an “accident.”  
Accident was not further defined.  
A. MASTERS  
Masters involved an intentionally set fire that had the  
unintended result of destroying nearly a block of business  
establishments.  As in this case, the policy in Masters  
provided 
coverage 
for an “occurrence,” which was later defined  
in the policy as “an accident.” 460 Mich 113. The insureds  
claimed that the event was an accident because, although the  
fire in their business premises was deliberately set, they did  
not intend to damage the adjoining buildings.  
4  
 
 
 
 
 
The Court of Appeals applied a subjective standard in  
assessing whether the insured arsonists expected or intended  
to burn properties other than their own.  This Court reversed.  
We first gave “accident” its customary, ordinary meaning as an  
“undesigned contingency, a casualty, a happening by chance,  
something not anticipated, . . . and not naturally to be  
expected.” Id. at 114. 
Having defined accident, we  
nevertheless recognized the difficulty of categorizing cases  
in which the action giving rise to the harm was intended even  
though the consequences were not.  We unanimously held that an  
insured’s intentional actions precluded coverage even though  
the insureds claimed not to have intended the consequences of  
their actions where the insured “reasonably should have  
expected” the harm the insured’s acts created.  We adopted  
this objective standard from Justice GRIFFIN’S concurrence in  
Auto Club Group Ins Co v Marzonie, 447 Mich 624, 648-649; 527  
NW2d 760 (1994):  
In such cases, a determination must be made 
whether 
the 
consequences 
of 
the 
insured’s  
intentional act either were intended by the insured 
or reasonably should have been expected because of  
the direct risk of harm intentionally created by 
the insured’s actions.  When an insured acts  
intending to cause property damage or personal 
injury, liability coverage should be denied, 
irrespective of whether the resulting injury is 
different from the injury intended. 
Similarly,  
. . . when an insured’s intentional actions create  
a direct risk of harm, there can be no liability  
coverage for any resulting damage or injury,  
despite the lack of an actual intent to damage or  
5  
 
 
injure. [Masters, 460 Mich at 115-116 (Emphasis 
added.)]  
Granting summary disposition to the insurer, this Court  
held that, because the Masters intended to cause harm, “[i]t  
is irrelevant whether the harm that resulted, damage to the  
clothing store and surrounding businesses, was different from  
or exceeded the harm intended, minor damage to the clothing  
inventory.” Id. at 116-117. 
We later applied this same  
objective test in Nabozny.  
B. NABOZNY  
Similarly, in Nabozny, the plaintiff was injured in a  
fight with the insured.  The policy at issue was identical to  
the one in Masters and this case, and provided coverage for an  
“occurrence,” which, in turn, was defined as “an accident”.  
461 Mich 474.  As in the present case, the insured claimed  
that the injury he caused was a covered occurrence because he  
did not intend to break the plaintiff’s ankle.  We unanimously  
rejected that argument, holding:  
In this case, Mr. Burkhardt apparently did not 
intend to break Mr. Nabozny's ankle.  However, it 
is plain that in tripping someone to the ground in 
the course of a fight, Mr. Burkhardt reasonably  
should have expected the consequences of his acts  
because of the direct risk of harm created.  This  
precludes a finding of liability coverage under the 
terms of this policy.  In other words, the injury 
did not result from an "accident."  
Moreover, Mr. Burkhardt's testimony that he 
did not intend to "break any bones" does not assist 
him.  In our quote from Marzonie, Justice GRIFFIN  
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
cited Piccard, which explained:  
“[W]here 
a 
direct 
risk 
of 
harm 
is  
intentionally created, and property damage or 
personal injury results, there is no liability 
coverage 
even 
if 
the 
specific 
result 
was  
unintended.  It is irrelevant that the character of  
the harm that actually results is different from 
the character of the harm intended by the insured.”  
It is clear from the facts, as stated by the 
insured, that injury reasonably should have been 
expected.  Therefore, it is irrelevant that the 
broken ankle was not the specific harm intended by 
the insured.  [Id. at 480-481 (citations omitted).]  
It is worth reemphasizing that in both Masters and  
Nabozny the policy language we construed was identical to the  
policy language contained in the present case.  Here, like  
Masters and Nabozny, the insured engaged in a deliberate act  
but claimed that the resulting unintended consequences  
rendered the event an accident.  In both Masters and Nabozny,  
this Court rejected this argument and held that there was no  
covered “occurrence” because the insured reasonably should  
have 
expected 
the 
consequences 
of 
his 
intentional 
actions—even  
when 
the 
insured 
himself did not anticipate such consequences.  
Thus, in Masters and Nabozny we declined to view the  
expectation of the injury from the subjective perspective of  
the insureds in making the determination whether an accident  
occurred.  
C. THE MAJORITY’S MISAPPLICATION OF MASTERS AND NABOZNY  
The majority erroneously states that the “difference”  
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
between the present case and Masters and Nabozny “is that  
here, while the act was intended, the result was not.” Slip  
op at 16.  There is no such “difference” among these three  
cases.  Rather, in both Masters and Nabozny, the insureds made  
precisely the same claim as presented here—that they did not  
intend the result of their deliberate acts. Robert intended  
to pull the trigger of his shotgun, but he testified that he  
did not intend to cause any physical injury to his friend.  
The question for the purpose of coverage is whether the  
shooting can be considered an accident because Robert should  
not have reasonably expected the consequences when he  
intentionally aimed his shotgun at the head of his friend,  
cocked the hammer, and pulled the trigger.  
The purported difference between this case and Masters  
and Nabozny has been created by the majority, which has  
imposed a different construction of the phrase “intentional  
act.”  As stated in Masters, this Court unanimously adopted an  
objective test of intentionality: an intentional act causing  
injury is not an accident if the insured actually intended the  
harm or if the harm should reasonably have been expected.5  
5  To reiterate, the Masters standard is as follows: “[A] 
determination must be made whether the consequences of the 
insured’s 
intentional act ‘either were intended by the insured 
or reasonably should have been expected because of the direct  
risk 
of 
harm 
intentionally created by the insured’s actions.’” 
The 
majority 
attempts to avoid applying an objective standard, 
(continued...)  
8  
 
 
Here, the majority fails to apply the objective Masters  
test of intentionality, instead substituting a subjective  
one.6  The majority states that “[w]e agree with plaintiff  
that Robert intended to point the gun at Kevin and pull the  
trigger.[7]
 However, Robert believed that the gun was not  
loaded.  Robert had no intention of firing a loaded weapon.  
No bodily injury would have been caused by Robert’s intended  
act of pulling the trigger of an unloaded gun.” Slip op at 9  
(emphasis added).  What the majority must justify, but cannot,  
5(...continued) 
urging that, in the Masters standard, “by the insured” 
modifies 
both 
“intended” 
and 
“expected.” 
This 
is  
grammatically 
incorrect. 
 
In 
fact, 
grammatically 
speaking, 
the 
phrases “intended by the insured” and “reasonably should have 
expected” modify “consequences.”  Therefore, the Masters  
standard unqualifiedly and grammatically requires an inquiry 
into the reasonableness of the insured’s expectations 
concerning the consequences of his intentional acts.  This is  
an objective inquiry, not, as the majority contends, a 
subjective one.  
It appears to me that this Court wisely chose to use an 
objective 
definition 
of accident in Masters because it creates  
a disincentive for collusion between an insured and a  
plaintiff. See Nabozny, supra at 479, n 10.  
6 This Court is free to abandon for sufficient reason its  
own precedent.  When it does so, it should do it openly and 
provide justification.  Here the majority abandons the rule it  
established in Masters after years of contradictory precedent 
without acknowledging (1) that it has done so or (2) why it is 
justified in doing so.  
7 I note that the majority would have no factual or legal 
basis for concluding otherwise, because defendant admitted 
that he intentionally aimed the gun, engaged the hammer and 
pulled the trigger in order to frighten his friend during 
their dispute over crackers.  
9  
 
 
 
is why we must consider his act of pointing a shotgun at  
another person and pulling the trigger from Robert’s  
subjective perspective.8  Under the Masters test, the question  
is whether the insured “reasonably” should have expected the  
consequence 
because 
of 
the 
direct 
risk 
of 
harm 
he  
intentionally created. However, the majority tautologically  
concludes as a matter of law that “Robert should not have  
reasonably expected the consequences that ensued from his act  
because his intended act was merely to pull the trigger of an  
unloaded gun.”9 Slip op at 16 (emphasis added).  
However,  
8 This insistence on viewing Robert’s act from his  
subjective perspective represents a critical flaw in the 
majority opinion. The majority declares that it must employ 
a subjective standard because this, as opposed to an objective 
standard, aids in construing the policy in favor of coverage. 
“[W]here there is doubt, the policy should be construed in 
favor of the insured . . . .” Slip op at 7.  
This 
is 
contrary to the rules of contract interpretation. 
Contracts, even insurance contracts, are construed according 
to their unambiguous terms.  It is only when there is an 
ambiguity in the policy language that provides a basis for 
using a rule of construction favoring coverage.  Masters,  
supra at 111. Because we considered the very contract term at 
issue here, “accident,” in Masters and Nabozny and found no  
ambiguity, the majority has no warrant to “construe” that term 
in any different fashion in this case.  
9 
 Yet another flaw in the majority opinion is that it 
attempts to divide the “intentional act” into components. 
Rather than view the act from the required perspective—the 
consequences reasonably expected when a direct risk of harm is 
created—the majority focuses on whether the insured intended 
to pull the trigger of an unloaded gun. Without basis, the 
majority subdivides the intentional act into two components, 
the voluntary act and the chain of events that the volitional 
(continued...)  
10  
 
 
what Robert’s reasonable expectations should have been, not  
what his actual subjective beliefs may or may not have been,  
are the focus of the Masters standard.  
The majority erroneously maintains that the test we  
articulated in Masters and Nabozny is a subjective one.  
However, the majority fails to explain our objective  
application of the test in both cases.  In addition, the term  
“reasonably” has consistently been construed as indicating an  
objective rather than a subjective standard.  In Allstate Ins  
Co v Freeman, 432 Mich 656; 443 NW2d 734 (1989), six justices,  
including the author of the current majority opinion, agreed  
that “‘reasonably be expected’ is unambiguous” and “requires  
application of an objective standard of expectation.”  432  
Mich 688.  In Fire Ins Exchange v Diehl, 450 Mich 678, 685;  
545 NW2d 602 (1996), the Court held that injury “‘neither  
expected nor intended by the insured’” required a subjective  
standard of expectation where the policy language did “not  
employ the term ‘reasonably.’” 
(Emphasis added.) 
The  
majority simply refuses to acknowledge that the test adopted  
in Masters and Nabozny utilizes the same language that has  
been construed by this Court as requiring an objective  
9(...continued) 
act sets into motion—the consequences.  The intentional act  
committed by Robert was that of pulling the trigger of a gun. 
That the gun was or was not loaded does not transform the 
nature of the insured’s volitional act.  
11  
 
 
 
 
 
standard of inquiry.  
Without 
offering any rationale for doing so, the majority  
makes the insured’s subjective belief regarding the status of  
the gun definitive, as though no contrary conclusion were  
possible. The issue is whether, in intentionally creating a  
direct risk of harm—pulling the trigger of a shotgun without  
ascertaining if it was loaded—the insured should have  
reasonably expected the consequences. 
Given that the  
applicable standard is objective, the insured’s subjective  
belief is not controlling.  
Inexplicably, 
under 
the 
standard 
adopted 
by 
the 
majority,  
neither the holding nor the outcome in Masters or Nabozny  
could be sustained today.  
III. APPLICATION OF MASTERS AND NABOZNY  
In the present case, it is uncontested that Robert McCarn  
intentionally aimed the weapon at the victim, engaged the  
hammer, and pulled the trigger.10  Because he denied intending  
the actual injury, the event is an “occurrence” only if he  
should not have reasonably expected the consequences in light  
of the direct risk of harm intentionally created.  
The scope of the direct risk of harm created by an  
insured’s act is necessarily dependent upon the nature of the  
10 As such, the acts admitted by the insured constitute 
felonious assault, MCL 750.82.  
12  
 
 
intentional act and the facts and circumstances surrounding  
the event. The direct risk of harm created by intentionally  
throwing knives, for example, is far greater than the direct  
risk of harm created by intentionally throwing cotton balls.  
In each instance, the natural result of the voluntary act must  
be considered. See 9 Couch, Insurance, 3d, § 126:27, p 126­
53.  
What is the direct risk of harm consonant with pulling  
the trigger of a firearm?  The obvious risk is that the  
weapon, if loaded, might discharge and cause an injury.  In my  
view, the evidence adduced at the summary disposition stage  
warrants the conclusion that the insured should have  
reasonably expected the consequences of his intentional act.  
In his deposition testimony, McCarn testified that he  
consumed marijuana before taking the weapon out of storage. He  
also testified that he believed that the gun was unloaded and  
that he was “just playing” when he pulled the trigger of the  
weapon.  However, he later admitted that he intended to  
frighten LaBelle into parting with crackers.11  
11 The majority would prefer to minimize the insured’s 
admitted intent to cause harm—to commit a felonious assault.  
I do not. As we stated in Nabozny, “‘where a direct risk of 
harm 
is 
intentionally created, and property damage or personal 
injury results, there is no liability coverage even if the  
specific result was unintended. 
It is irrelevant that the  
character of the harm that actually results is different from  
the character of the harm intended by the insured.’”  461 Mich  
(continued...)  
13  
 
In addition, McCarn admitted that he did not check the  
status of the gun before pulling the trigger.  He also  
testified that the last time he used the gun, he put it away  
hurriedly and could not recall whether he unloaded the weapon  
before putting it away. Further, the insured admitted that he  
deliberately aimed the weapon one foot away from the victim’s  
face, engaged the hammer, and pulled the trigger in an effort  
to assault the victim.12  
As we noted in Nabozny, “it can be in the interest of an  
insured defendant to provide testimony that will allow an  
injured plaintiff to recover from the insurer rather than  
directly from the defendant.” Id., at 479, n 10. As stated,  
I do not believe that reasonable jurors could conclude that  
Robert’s stated beliefs about the harm he was creating were  
reasonable.  Inasmuch as the reasonableness of Robert’s  
expectations about the harm he created is the critical issue  
for the purpose of coverage under this policy, summary  
disposition in favor of plaintiff is appropriate.  Therefore,  
I believe that the majority errs in holding that the event was  
11(...continued) 
481, quoting Marzonie.  
12 The majority attempts to explain why Robert’s later 
testimony about his prior use of the shotgun is not  
dispositive. However, I cannot think of a single reason why 
all the defendant’s admissions should not be considered in  
deciding 
whether 
Robert 
should 
have 
reasonably 
anticipated 
the 
harm he caused in using his weapon.  
14  
an accident as a matter of law.  
CONCLUSION  
Because I believe that Robert reasonably should have  
expected the consequences of his actions in light of the  
direct risk of harm he created, I would affirm summary  
disposition in favor of plaintiff.13  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and WEAVER, J., concurred with YOUNG, J.  
13 As to the issue of how direct a harm the insured’s  
actions created, this would be a much closer question—and one 
requiring a trial—if evidence were presented that the insured 
had 
checked 
the 
gun 
and mistakenly (or negligently) determined 
that it was unloaded before pulling the trigger.  
15