Title: Burnett v. Martin

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

405 So. 2d 23 (1981)
Johnny BURNETT, Jr., et al.
v.
James MARTIN, et al.
Robert J. CROSSLIN, Administrator of the Estate of Rebecca Frost Hill
v.
James MARTIN, et al.
Anthony McCARY, et al.
v.
James MARTIN, et al.
80-242, 80-242A and 80-242B.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 18, 1981.
William J. Baxley and Charles A. Dauphin of Baxley, Stuart, Ward & Dillard, Birmingham, for appellants.
Eugene D. Martenson of Huie, Fernambucq, Stewart & Smith, Birmingham, for appellees.
MADDOX, Justice.
The plaintiffs in this case were involved in an automobile accident with the defendants and brought separate lawsuits for the resulting damages. The suits were consolidated and tried by jury with judgment being rendered for the defendants. Plaintiffs now appeal and present two issues for our consideration. These issues are: Did the trial court's admission and subsequent withdrawal of evidence concerning certain blood-alcohol content tests unduly prejudice the plaintiffs' case? Did the trial court err in refusing to give certain jury instructions which were submitted by the plaintiffs on the issue of contributory negligence?
The pertinent facts are as follows. The plaintiffs' automobile, driven by Billy Joe Hill with Rebecca Frost Hill, Johnny Burnett *24 and Anthony McCary as passengers, was struck by the automobile of the defendants which was driven by Deputy Sheriff Jim Martin, who, at the time of the accident, was involved in a high speed chase of a third party. There was conflicting testimony as to whether the plaintiffs had run a stop sign at the intersection where the accident took place.
Shortly after the accident, the county coroner arrived and, after pronouncing Billy Joe Hill and Rebecca Hill dead, withdrew a blood sample from Billy Joe Hill. The blood sample was subsequently submitted to the Department of Forensic Sciences of the State of Alabama and an alcohol content analysis was conducted. The results of the analysis showed an alcohol content in the blood of Billy Joe Hill of .10 percent.
At trial, the defendant, over plaintiffs' objection, was allowed to place into evidence the results of this blood alcohol content test. At the close of the trial, however, the court decided the evidence of this test was inadmissible and made the following admonishment to the jury:
The plaintiff contends, however, that this instruction by the trial judge was not sufficient to cure the harm which the evidence of the blood alcohol content test had on his case. In brief, counsel for plaintiffs argues:
Plaintiffs' contention is not well taken. It is inherent and unavoidable in our trial system that certain evidence must be heard and considered in its entirety before the court can render judgment on its admissibility. This was one such instance. In view of the trial judge's curative instruction, we need not determine whether this evidence was, in fact, admissible, under the provisions of Code 1975, § 32-5-193, or under general evidence principles regarding the admissibility of scientific test results. See McGough v. Slaughter, 395 So. 2d 972 (Ala. 1981).
Whether the evidence was admissible or not, the general rule applicable in this area is that if evidence is admitted, but later deemed improper and excluded, the error is cured so long as the jury is instructed clearly and explicitly to disregard the evidence. Jordan v. State, 79 Ala. 9 (1885). We deem the instruction given by the court here to be of sufficient clarity and explicitness for the jury to disregard the evidence.
Additionally, the evidence and testimony of the blood alcohol content test were not the only evidence presented at trial concerning the possible intoxication of Billy Joe Hill. Several witnesses who arrived at the scene of the accident shortly after it occurred testified to the strong smell of alcohol in and around the plaintiffs' automobile. Among these was a member of the emergency rescue squad who testified to the strong smell of alcohol when he checked Billy Joe Hill's vital signs. Even had the evidence of blood alcohol content analysis been kept completely from the jury, there would still have been evidence to infer that Billy Joe Hill was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident. In light of this fact, whatever error arose out of the blood alcohol content analysis having been presented to the jury and then withdrawn, was harmless. Rule 45, A.R.A.P.
Plaintiffs' other contention concerns the trial court's refusal to give certain jury instructions which each plaintiff respectively submitted on the issue of contributory negligence and its effect on each individual plaintiff's right to receive a favorable verdict. Plaintiffs assert that the court's instruction in this regard lumped together their respective rights and did not sufficiently explain to the jury the law relating to the contributory negligence of a driver and the imputation of that negligence, if any, to the passengers of the same automobile.
Had plaintiff properly presented the question, this contention of the plaintiff very well might have had merit.
The instructions which the plaintiffs submitted on this issue are:
After refusing these instructions, the court instructed the jury, in pertinent part, as follows:
Because of the consolidation, the instructions requested by the plaintiff could have offered some clarity, especially in view of the fact that the cases were consolidated for trial; however, we refuse to reverse on this basis, because we determine that the issue was not properly preserved for our review.
At the conclusion of the court's instruction, the plaintiffs offered the following general objection:
In the case of Gardner v. Dorsey, 331 So. 2d 634, 637 (1976), this Court opined the following with regard to Rule 51:
After adopting this position, the Court went on to qualify this adoption by saying:
Gardner v. Dorsey, supra, p. 637.
The general rule thus established by Rule 51 which is subject to only limited exceptions is that not only must an objection to the trial court's refusal to give an instruction be made, but the objection must be made specifically and must be supported by grounds in order for review to be had in the appellate court. Lankford v. Redwing Carriers, Inc., 344 So. 2d 515 (Ala.Civ.App.1977), cert. den. 344 So. 2d 522 (Ala.1977).
The objection made by counsel for each plaintiff in this case was not sufficiently specific; no grounds for the objection were offered; nor is this case one in which the general rule established by Rule 51 should be avoided.
The plaintiff sets forth the following argument in his appellate brief:
The problem with this argument is that it should have first been offered at trial.
As plaintiffs correctly point out, because of the consolidation of the cases, the principles of law relating to the contributory negligence of the driver, and the imputation of that negligence to the passengers, were important, and had plaintiffs specifically pointed out to the trial judge what they now point out on appeal, we would probably be persuaded that they were entitled to a new trial, but those are not the facts. Cf. State of Alabama v. Idelle Burton, 403 So. 2d 912 (Ala.1981).
Under the facts of this case, we apply the requirements of Rule 51 and conclude that no prejudicial error was shown.
The judgments are due to be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C. J., and JONES, SHORES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.