Title: Neuro-Communication Services v. Cincinnati Insurance Co.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Neuro-Communication Servs., Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4379.] 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-4379 
NEURO-COMMUNICATION SERVICES, INC., v. CINCINNATI INSURANCE 
COMPANY ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Neuro-Communication Servs., Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., Slip 
Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4379.] 
Insurance—Contract interpretation—Term “direct loss” in commercial insurance 
policy requires that there be physical loss or damage to covered property—
Audiology-practice owner’s policy does not cover its loss of income due to 
closure during shutdown ordered by governor at beginning of COVID-19 
pandemic—Direct physical loss or damage to property does not arise from 
general presence of COVID-19 in community, presence of COVID-19 on 
surfaces at a premises, or presence on a premises of a person infected with 
COVID-19. 
(No. 2021-0130—Submitted February 8, 2022—Decided December 12, 2022.) 
ON ORDER from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, 
Eastern Division, Certifying a Question of State Law, No. 4:20-cv-01275-BYP. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2 
________________ 
BRUNNER, J. 
{¶ 1} This case comes to us as a certified question from the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio.  In the underlying litigation, the 
plaintiff—respondent, Neuro-Communication Services, Inc. (“Neuro”)—argues 
that its commercial insurance policy entitles it to recover income it lost after it was 
forced to cease almost all operations for the first several weeks of the COVID-19 
(“Covid”) pandemic.  Its insurers, defendants-petitioners, Cincinnati Insurance 
Company, Cincinnati Casualty Company, and Cincinnati Indemnity Company 
(collectively, “Cincinnati”), moved to dismiss the suit or, in the alternative, to have 
the federal court certify a question of state law to this court.  See S.Ct.Prac.R. 
9.01(A) (providing that we may answer a question of law certified to us by another 
court in an “order finding there is a question of Ohio law that may be determinative 
of the proceeding and for which there is no controlling precedent in the decisions 
of this Supreme Court”). 
{¶ 2} Neuro’s policy is governed by Ohio law and provides coverage for a 
“direct ‘loss’ ” to certain property.  The federal court concluded that whether this 
provision covers a claim based on Covid-related business shutdowns is a question 
of Ohio law for which there is no controlling precedent from this court.  It also 
observed the significance of the question, as a large number of suits seeking 
coverage under the same or similar language are pending in state and federal courts 
across Ohio, making an authoritative answer to the question desirable.  The federal 
court therefore certified the question to this court, and we agreed to answer it.  We 
now answer it in the negative. 
I. Background 
{¶ 3} On March 9, 2020, the governor of Ohio declared a state of emergency 
in Ohio due to the outbreak of Covid.  See Executive Order 2020-01D, available at 
https://governor.ohio.gov/media/executive-orders/executive-order-2020-01-d 
 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
3 
(accessed Nov. 26, 2022) [https://perma.cc/NX6D-6BFN].  The order authorized 
personnel from state departments “to coordinate the State response to COVID-19, 
and to assist in protecting the lives, safety, and health of the citizens of Ohio.”  Id.  
It also required the director of the Ohio Department of Health (“Health Director”) 
to “create and require the use of diagnostic and treatment guidelines and provide 
those guidelines to health care providers [and] institutions.”  Id.  In addition, it 
required the Health Director to “issue guidelines for private businesses regarding 
appropriate work and travel restrictions, if necessary.”  Id. 
{¶ 4} Over the next several weeks, the Health Director issued a number of 
orders, two of which are particularly relevant here.  First, on March 17, 2020, the 
Health Director issued an order stating that “all non-essential or elective surgeries 
and procedures that utilized [personal protective equipment] should not be 
conducted.” 
 
Director’s 
Order 
non-essential 
surgery, 
available 
at 
https://coronavirus.ohio.gov/resources/public-health-orders/directors-order-non-
essential-surgery-3-17-2020 (accessed Nov. 26, 2022).  Then, on March 22, 2020, 
the Health Director issued an order requiring “all individuals currently living within 
the State of Ohio * * * to stay at home” and stating that “[a]ll persons may leave 
their homes or place of residence only” to participate in activities, businesses, or 
operations as permitted in the order.  Director’s Stay-at-Home Order at ¶ 1, 
available at https://coronavirus.ohio.gov/static/publicorders/DirectorsOrderStay 
AtHome.pdf (accessed Nov. 26, 2022).  This order also required all nonessential 
businesses to “cease all activities” except as specifically identified in the order, and 
it imposed conditions on essential businesses and operations.  Id. at ¶ 2.  We refer 
to these two orders collectively as the “Shutdown Orders.” 
{¶ 5} Neuro owns and operates an audiology practice in northeast Ohio 
under the name Hearing Innovations.  Neuro provides hearing and balance services 
to its patients, many of whom are elderly.  On March 22, 2020, the American 
Academy of Audiology’s Executive Committee stated that audiology practices are 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
4 
nonessential businesses and recommended that such practices shut their doors.  In 
response to the Shutdown Orders, Neuro therefore ceased almost all of its 
operations, starting on March 23, 2020.  It began to resume its operations on May 4, 
2020. 
{¶ 6} Neuro holds an “all-risk” commercial-property insurance policy 
issued by Cincinnati.  It submitted a claim under the Building and Personal Property 
Coverage Form of the policy seeking coverage for the revenue it lost as a result of 
its complying with the Shutdown Orders. 
{¶ 7} The general-coverage provision of the Building and Personal Property 
Coverage Form provides that Cincinnati will pay “for direct ‘loss’ to Covered 
Property at the ‘premises’ caused by or resulting from any Covered Cause of Loss.”  
The term “loss” is defined as “accidental physical loss or accidental physical 
damage.”1  “Covered Causes of Loss” is defined as “direct ‘loss’ unless the ‘loss’ 
is excluded or limited” in that part of the policy. 
{¶ 8} The Building and Personal Property Coverage Form also contains a 
coverage extension for business income (“Business Income Extension”).  
Section A.5.b.1 provides: “[Cincinnati] will pay for the actual loss of ‘Business 
Income’ * * * you sustain due to the necessary ‘suspension’ of your ‘operations’ 
during the ‘period of restoration’.  The ‘suspension’ must be caused by direct ‘loss’ 
to property at a ‘premises’ caused by or resulting from any Covered Cause of Loss.”  
“Period of restoration” is defined as “the period of time that * * * [b]egins at the 
time of direct ‘loss’ [and] [e]nds on the earlier of: (1) [t]he date when the property 
at the ‘premises’ should be repaired, rebuilt or replaced with reasonable speed and 
 
1. The covered “premises” are Neuro’s offices in Boardman and Youngstown.  The policy identifies 
various types of property that qualify as “Covered Property,” including the buildings in which 
Neuro’s offices are located, permanent fixtures and machinery in the buildings, and furniture and 
equipment belonging to Neuro in the buildings.  It also specifically identifies property that does not 
constitute Covered Property. 
 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
5 
similar quality; or (2) [t]he date when business is resumed at a new permanent 
location.” 
{¶ 9} Three other coverage extensions are also relevant: 
• 
Extra Expense Coverage Extension.  Section A.5.b.2 provides, “[Cincinnati 
will pay for] necessary expenses you sustain * * * during the ‘period of 
restoration’ that you would not have sustained if there had been no direct 
‘loss’ to property caused by or resulting from a Covered Cause of Loss.” 
• 
Civil Authority Coverage Extension.  Section A.5.b.3 provides, “When a 
Covered Cause of Loss causes damage to property other than Covered 
Property at a ‘premises’, [Cincinnati] will pay for the actual loss of 
‘Business Income’ and necessary Extra Expense you sustain caused by 
action of civil authority that prohibits access to the ‘premises.’ ” 
• 
Extended Business Income Coverage Extension.  Section A.5.b.6 provides 
that if a “suspension” of operations entitling Neuro to coverage under the 
Business Income Extension occurs, Cincinnati will also “pay for the actual 
loss of ‘Business Income’ [the insured] sustain[s] and Extra Expense [the 
insured] incur[s]” after “ ‘operations’ are resumed.” 
{¶ 10} Cincinnati denied Neuro’s claim.  It stated that the general-coverage 
provision does not cover the claim, because the claim “does not involve direct, 
physical loss to property at [Neuro’s] premises caused by a Covered Cause of 
Loss.”  Similarly, it stated that the claim does not fall within the extensions for 
business income and extra expense, because those provisions require that there be 
“direct physical loss or damage” to Covered Property and there was “no evidence 
of any such physical loss or damage.” 
{¶ 11} Neuro then filed suit in the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Ohio, alleging that Cincinnati had breached the Business 
Income Extension as well as the Extra Expense, Civil Authority, and Extended 
Business Income Extensions by refusing to provide coverage for its claim.  See 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6 
Neuro-Communication Servs., Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., N.D.Ohio No. 4:20-cv-
01275-BYP.  Neuro also seeks to certify a nationwide class of insureds holding 
similar policies that have also been denied coverage for losses related to the 
pandemic.  Overall, the complaint alleges that the Shutdown Orders caused Neuro 
to suffer a direct physical loss to its property by requiring it to temporarily suspend 
most of its operations and lose access to its property for business purposes. 
{¶ 12} Cincinnati moved to dismiss the suit or, in the alternative, to certify 
a question of state law concerning the application of the policy to this court under 
S.Ct.Prac.R. 9.03(A).  The federal court granted Cincinnati’s motion for 
certification and certified the following question:   
 
Does the general presence in the community, or on surfaces at a 
premises, of the novel coronavirus known as SARS-CoV-2, 
constitute direct physical loss or damage to property; or does the 
presence on a premises of a person infected with COVID-19 
constitute direct physical loss or damage to property at that 
premises? 
 
We agreed to answer the question.  162 Ohio St.3d 1427, 2021-Ohio-1202, 166 
N.E.3d 29. 
II. Analysis 
{¶ 13} In interpreting a contract, we seek “to give effect to the intent of the 
parties to the agreement.”  Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-
Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256, ¶ 11.  We review an insurance contract as a whole, 
Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. CPS Holdings, Inc., 115 Ohio St.3d 306, 2007-Ohio-4917, 
875 N.E.2d 31, ¶ 7, and we presume that its language reflects the parties’ intent, 
Kelly v. Med. Life Ins. Co., 31 Ohio St.3d 130, 509 N.E.2d 411 (1987), paragraph 
one of the syllabus.  When contractual language is clear, we look no further than 
 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
7 
the writing itself to determine the parties’ intent.  Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line 
Co., 53 Ohio St.2d 241, 246, 374 N.E.2d 146 (1978). 
{¶ 14} The certified question we agreed to answer asks us to determine 
whether three factual scenarios involve “direct physical loss or damage to 
property.”  162 Ohio St.3d 1427, 2021-Ohio-1202, 166 N.E.3d 29.  That exact 
language does not appear in the policy, but for present purposes we understand it 
to refer to the general-coverage provision and the Business Income Extension.  As 
noted above, both provisions include the term “direct ‘loss,’ ” and the term “loss” 
is defined as “accidental physical loss or accidental physical damage.”  In our view, 
this language is clear and unambiguous and does not encompass any of the three 
factual scenarios identified in the certified question. 
{¶ 15} Cincinnati argues that the policy’s definition of the term “loss” as 
“accidental physical loss or accidental physical damage” necessarily requires that 
there be some physical damage to Neuro’s property.  To be “physical,” it asserts, 
there must be an “actual, tangible physical alteration” of property.  According to 
Cincinnati, neither the temporary presence of virus particles in the air or on surfaces 
nor the temporary presence of an infected person on Neuro’s property involves any 
such physical damage or loss to any part of the premises.  Cincinnati contends that 
these scenarios instead cause only a loss of use of a premises for the purpose of 
conducting business operations, and it argues that a loss of use is not covered. 
{¶ 16} Neuro disagrees and argues that the term “loss” includes a loss of 
use.  It points to dictionary definitions of the terms “physical” and “loss” and argues 
that they support reading the term “physical loss” as including the loss of the ability 
to use the physical space of its offices for business purposes.  For example, the term 
“physical” can mean simply “material,” “substantive,” or “having an objective 
existence, as distinguished from imaginary or fictitious,” and the term “loss” can 
mean “deprivation” and “no longer having something or having less of it than 
before.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8 
{¶ 17} We agree with Cincinnati.  The definition of the term “loss” is clear: 
for coverage to be provided, there must be loss or damage to Covered Property that 
is physical in nature.  Such loss or damage does not include a loss of the ability to 
use Covered Property for business purposes. 
{¶ 18} In particular, we reject Neuro’s argument based on the various 
dictionary definitions of the terms “physical” and “loss.”  Specifically, by defining 
“loss” as a particular type of loss—“accidental physical loss or accidental physical 
damage” (emphasis added)—the policy distinguishes between losses to Covered 
Property that are physical and those that are nonphysical.  In our view, a loss of use 
of a physical space falls into the latter category.  As another court in Ohio 
considering materially identical policy language recently put it, “[a] loss of use 
simply is not the same as a physical loss.”  Santo’s Italian Café, L.L.C. v. Acuity 
Ins. Co., 15 F.4th 398, 402 (6th Cir.2021).  “It is one thing for the government to 
ban the use of a bike or a scooter on city sidewalks; it is quite another for someone 
to steal it.”  Id. 
{¶ 19} Our conclusion on this point is strengthened by the definition in 
Neuro’s policy of the term “period of restoration.”  As noted above, the Business 
Income Extension provides coverage during the “period of restoration,” which 
begins when a “direct ‘loss’ ” occurs and ends “on the earlier of: (1) [t]he date when 
the property at the ‘premises’ should be repaired, rebuilt or replaced * * * ; or (2) 
[t]he date when business is resumed at a new permanent location.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  The policy’s use of the terms “repaired, rebuilt or replaced” contemplates 
that the “direct ‘loss’ ” at issue involves some sort of physical alteration of Covered 
Property.  Quoting dictionary definitions of these terms, Neuro argues that they 
require the period to be measured in relation to the time it takes for its property to 
be “restored either to its prior condition or to a ‘sound or healthy state’—in other 
words[,] put back to its intended use.”  In our view, this stretches the terms 
“repaired, rebuilt or replaced” too far.  Resuming normal business operations did 
 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
9 
not require any Covered Property to be “repaired, rebuilt or replaced.”  It required 
only that the Shutdown Orders be lifted.  See Santo’s at 403 (“What the restaurant 
needed was an end to the ban on in-person dining, not the repair, rebuilding, or 
replacement of any of its property”). 
{¶ 20} Neuro also asserts that other policies now issued by Cincinnati 
include language specifically excluding losses caused by viruses.  The absence of 
such an exclusion in Neuro’s policy, it argues, is therefore an indication that a 
“direct ‘loss’ ” to Covered Property can occur even in the absence of a physical 
alteration of that property.  We disagree.  The parol-evidence rule prohibits us from 
considering other agreements containing virus exclusions.  Under that rule, we may 
not consider such evidence for the purpose Neuro seeks to use it here—to create 
ambiguity in the contract.  See Shifrin v. Forest City Ents., Inc., 64 Ohio St.3d 635, 
638, 597 N.E.2d 499 (1992) (“If no ambiguity appears on the face of the instrument, 
parol evidence cannot be considered in an effort to demonstrate such an 
ambiguity”). 
{¶ 21} Neuro also points to its policy’s Ordinance or Law exclusion, which 
provides that there is no coverage for any loss caused by “the enforcement of or 
compliance with any ordinance or law * * * [r]egulating the * * * use * * * of any 
building or structure.”  The exclusion also specifically states that it “applies whether 
‘loss’ results from * * * [a]n ordinance or law that is enforced even if the building 
or structure has not been damaged.”  (Emphasis added.)  According to Neuro, this 
statement makes clear that a loss that does not involve a physical alteration of a 
building can qualify as a covered “loss.”  We see little relevance in this provision, 
however, because it refers only to the “building or structure.”  The policy provides 
coverage when there is a “direct ‘loss’ to Covered Property” (emphasis added), not 
just when there is a direct loss to the building or structure.  As a result, the fact that 
coverage for losses caused by certain ordinances or laws is excluded even when the 
“building or structure” has not been physically damaged tells us little about whether 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10 
a “direct ‘loss’ to Covered Property” must include a physical alteration of the 
property. 
{¶ 22} Neuro also cites court decisions issued before the Covid pandemic 
that it argues stand for the proposition that a direct physical loss does not require a 
physical alteration of property.  See Murray v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 203 
W.Va. 477, 480-481, 492-493, 509 S.E.2d 1 (1998) (finding direct physical loss to 
house when boulders falling from property behind house had caused extensive 
damage to two neighboring houses and additional boulders were predicted to fall, 
rendering undamaged house uninhabitable); Gregory Packaging, Inc. v. Travelers 
Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., D.N.J. No. 2:12-cv-04418, 2014 WL 6675934, *3-6 (Nov. 
25, 2014) (finding direct physical loss when ammonia gas had made facility “unfit 
for normal human occupancy and continued use”); Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Hardinger, 131 Fed.Appx. 823 (3d Cir.2005) (finding that direct physical loss 
would occur if contamination of house’s well-water supply with e-coli bacteria 
made house uninhabitable); TRAVCO Ins. Co. v. Ward, 715 F.Supp.2d 699, 703, 
707-711 (E.D.Va.2010), aff’d, 504 Fed.Appx. 251 (4th Cir.2013) (finding direct 
physical loss when toxic gases released by defective drywall had rendered home 
uninhabitable); W. Fire Ins. Co. v. First Presbyterian Church, 165 Colo. 34, 36-39, 
437 P.2d 52 (1968) (finding direct physical loss when gasoline had accumulated 
around and under church and both gasoline and gasoline vapors had infiltrated and 
contaminated church’s foundation, halls, and rooms, resulting in its being rendered 
uninhabitable and highly dangerous); Widder v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 82 
So.3d 294 (La.App.2011) (finding direct physical loss when lead-paint dust had 
migrated into home’s walls, rendering it uninhabitable until gutted and remediated); 
Matzner v. Seaco Ins. Co., Mass.Super. No. CIV. A. 96-0498-B, 1998 WL 566658, 
*3-4 (Aug. 12, 1998) (finding direct physical loss when carbon-monoxide buildup 
caused by old pipe’s blocking chimney rendered unit in apartment building 
uninhabitable); see also Essex Ins. Co. v. BloomSouth Flooring Corp., 562 F.3d 
 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
11 
399, 401-402, 404-406 (1st Cir.2009) (finding “physical injury to tangible 
property” when chemical odors had emanated from newly installed carpet at 
commercial offices and caused headaches and other ill effects, requiring 
replacement of the carpet and other remedial work). 
{¶ 23} We are not persuaded that these cases are analogous to the present 
case.  As an initial matter, both TRAVCO and Essex involved policies expressly 
providing coverage for loss of use.  See TRAVCO at 702, 708; Essex at 401, 406.  
Moreover, although the decisions cited by Neuro either reject or do not apply the 
principle that direct physical loss requires a physical alteration of property, the 
cases all involved an entirely different degree of harm.  In each case, the property 
at issue was rendered uninhabitable due to a condition that was hazardous to human 
health.  As a practical matter, the condition made the properties wholly inaccessible. 
{¶ 24} The harm here is different.  While shut down, Neuro’s premises 
“contained no hazardous flaw, akin to the threat of falling rocks or seepage of 
poisonous fumes, which would be just as threatening to one person as to one 
hundred,” Cosmetic Laser, Inc. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 554 F.Supp.3d 389, 409 
(D.Conn.2021).  Neuro’s premises were not wholly uninhabitable.  Instead, they 
were unsafe only to the extent that they served as an indoor space in which people 
could gather and Covid could be transmitted.  See id. at 409 (“in the COVID era, 
being indoors is dangerous only insofar as other individuals share the space”).  
Therefore, Neuro’s loss of the use of its premises for business purposes during the 
shutdown is not akin to the total loss of access to the properties at issue in the cases 
cited by Neuro.2 
 
2. Neuro also cites cases involving contaminated food products.  See Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Gold Medal 
Ins. Co., 622 N.W.2d 147, 152 (Minn.App.2001) (finding coverage when cereal oats had been 
tainted by pesticide); Marshall Produce Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 98 N.W.2d 280, 
293-294, 256 Minn. 404 (1959) (finding coverage when food items had been barred from sale due 
to exposure to smoke from fire); Netherlands Ins. Co. v. Main St. Ingredients, L.L.C., 745 F.3d 909, 
916-917 (8th Cir.2014) (finding coverage when instant oatmeal had been recalled because it 
incorporated dried milk exposed to salmonella).  Gen. Mills and Netherlands are unhelpful for the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
12 
{¶ 25} We thus conclude that the term “direct ‘loss’ ” requires that there be 
some loss or damage to Covered Property that is physical in nature, and any 
potential exception to this rule for situations like those presented in Murray, 
Gregory, and the other cases cited above does not apply here.  The term “direct 
‘loss’ ” does not include Neuro’s Covid-related loss of the use of its offices for 
business purposes. 
{¶ 26} Moreover, with respect to the three factual scenarios identified in the 
certified question, we conclude that direct physical loss or damage to property does 
not arise from (1) the general presence of Covid in the community, (2) the presence 
of Covid on surfaces at a premises, or (3) the presence on a premises of a person 
infected with Covid. 
{¶ 27} The certified question as to the first and third scenarios is relatively 
straightforward to answer.  The general presence of Covid in the community and 
the presence on a premises of a person infected with Covid clearly do not involve 
any physical alteration of Covered Property. 
{¶ 28} The answer to the certified question as to the second scenario—the 
presence of Covid on surfaces at a premises—may seem less obvious, but once 
analyzed, it is not appreciably different.  The parties dispute whether the fact that 
Covid particles may exist on property only temporarily makes a difference, 
debating the application of a decision of the Eighth District Court of Appeals.  See 
Mastellone v. Lightning Rod Mut. Ins. Co., 175 Ohio App.3d 23, 2008-Ohio-311, 
884 N.E.2d 1130, ¶ 68 (8th Dist.) (holding that mold on house’s exterior did not 
constitute direct physical loss, because its presence was temporary and could be 
removed from siding without altering house’s structural integrity).  We express no 
 
same reason that the cases involving uninhabitable properties are unhelpful: the food products were 
entirely unusable.  See Gen. Mills at 150; Netherlands at 911-912.  And Marshall and Netherlands 
involved policies containing language different from the language at issue here.  See Marshall at 
410 (covering “loss or damage”); Netherlands at 914 (covering “[p]hysical injury to tangible 
property, including all resulting loss of use of that property”). 
 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
13 
opinion on that disagreement because regardless of whether Covid particles exist 
on property only temporarily, the mere existence of Covid particles on Covered 
Property does not involve any physical alteration of the property.  See Verveine 
Corp. v. Strathmore Ins. Co., 184 N.E.3d 1266, 1276, 499 Mass. 534 (2022) (“mere 
‘presence’ [of the virus] does not amount to loss or damage to the property”). 
{¶ 29} Finally, we note that the conclusion we reach here is consistent with 
the clear trend in the law in other jurisdictions.  Many other state and federal courts 
considering insurance claims for business losses due to Covid and related shutdown 
orders have concluded that the mere loss of use of a premises does not constitute a 
direct physical loss.  See, e.g., Uncork & Create, L.L.C. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 27 
F.4th 926, 933-934 (4th Cir.2022) (citing decisions of United States Court of 
Appeals for Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh 
Circuits applying various states’ laws); Wakonda Club v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am., 
973 N.W.2d 545, 554 (Iowa 2022), fn. 5 (citing state-court decisions).  A few courts 
have reached conclusions that support Neuro’s position.  See, e.g., Huntington 
Ingalls Industries, Inc. v. Ace Am. Ins. Co., 2022 VT 45, __ A.3d __, ¶ 42, 48; 
Ungarean v. CNA & Valley Forge Ins. Co., __ A.3d __, 2022 Pa.Super. 204, 2022 
WL 17334365, *5-10 (2022).  But many of them are trial courts, which are subject 
to appellate review, and at least two of the main decisions Neuro relies on have 
since been vacated, see Henderson Rd. Restaurant Sys., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 
513 F.Supp.3d 808 (N.D.Ohio 2021), vacated and remanded sub nom. In re Zurich 
Am. Ins. Co., 6th Cir. No. 21-0302, 2021 WL 4473398 (Sept. 29, 2021); North State 
Deli, L.L.C. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., N.C.Super.Ct. No. 20-CVS-02569, 2020 WL 
6281507 (Oct. 9, 2020), rev’d, 2022-NCCOA-455, 875 S.E.2d 590 
(N.C.App.2022). 
III. Conclusion 
{¶ 30} For the above reasons, we answer the certified question in the 
negative. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
14 
So answered. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FISCHER, DEWINE, and STEWART, JJ., 
concur. 
DONNELLY, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
_________________ 
DONNELLY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 31} This court should answer questions of law certified by a federal court 
only if “there is a question of Ohio law that may be determinative of the proceeding 
and for which there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of this Supreme 
Court.” S.Ct.Prac.R. 9.01(A).  This court already has a well-established body of 
jurisprudence on basic contract interpretation.  The federal courts can seek guidance 
there to resolve the dispute between the parties to this case. 
{¶ 32} I would dismiss this certified question of state law as having been 
improvidently accepted, and I therefore dissent. 
_________________ 
Berger Montague, P.C., and Yechiel Michael Twersky; and Spangenberg, 
Shibley & Liber, L.L.P., and Nicholas A. DiCello, for respondent. 
Baker & Hostetler, L.L.P., Michael K. Farrell, Daniel M. Kavouras, and 
Rodger L. Eckelberry; and Litchfield Cavo, L.L.P., Daniel G. Litchfield, and 
Laurence J.W. Tooth, for petitioners. 
Reed Smith, L.L.P., James M. Doerfler, John N. Ellison, and Richard P. 
Lewis, in support of respondent for amicus curiae United Policyholders. 
Rutter & Russin, L.L.C., and Robert P. Rutter, in support of respondent for 
amicus curiae Francois, Inc. 
Jenner & Block, L.L.P., Gabriel K. Gillett, and Rebecca R. Fate, in support 
of respondent for amici curiae Restaurant Law Center and Ohio Restaurant 
Association. 
 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
15 
Wolterman Law Office, L.P.A., Matthew C. Metzger, and Steven R. 
Wolterman; and Markovits, Stock & DeMarco, L.L.C., Terence R. Coates, W.B. 
Markovits, Justin C. Walker, and Zachary C. Schaengold, in support of respondent 
for amici curiae Queens Tower Restaurant, Inc., d.b.a. Primavista and Taste of 
Belgium, L.L.C. 
Calfee, Halter & Griswold, L.L.P., and K. James Sullivan, in support of 
respondent for amici curiae SITE Centers Corp., Brentwood Healthcare 
Enterprises, L.L.C., and Strang Corporation. 
Rutter & Russin, L.L.C., Robert P. Rutter, and Robert A. Rutter, in support 
of respondent for amici curiae Steelial Welding & Metal Fabrication, Inc.; Ohio 
Hotel & Lodging Association; Scioto Society, d.b.a. Tecumseh Outdoor; Fish 
Furniture; Dayton Coatings Technology; and Somco, L.L.C., d.b.a. J3 Clothing 
Company. 
Plevin & Gallucci, Co., L.P.A., and Frank L. Gallucci III; Weisman, 
Kennedy & Berris Co., L.P.A., R. Eric Kennedy, Daniel P. Goetz, and Brian E. 
Roof; and Bashein & Bashein Co., L.P.A., W. Craig Bashein, and John P. Hurst, in 
support of respondent for amicus curiae Kanan Enterprises, Inc., d.b.a. King Nut 
and Brennan Industries, Inc. 
Susman Godfrey, L.L.P., William R.H. Merrill, Burton S. DeWitt, Seth 
Ard, and Marc M. Seltzer; DiCello, Levitt, Gutzler, L.L.C., Adam J. Levitt, 
Kenneth P. Abbarno, and Mark A. DiCello; the Lanier Law Firm, P.C., and Mark 
Lanier; and Burns, Bowen, Bair, L.L.P., and Timothy W. Burns, in support of 
respondent for amicus curiae Bridal Expressions, L.L.C. 
Crowell & Moring, L.L.P., Daniel W. Wolff, and Laura A. Foggan, in 
support of petitioners for amici curiae American Property Casualty Insurance 
Association and National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Drew H. Campbell, David K. Stein, and Anne 
Marie Sferra; and BatesCarey, L.L.P., and Adam H. Fleischer, in support of 
petitioners for amicus curiae State Automobile Mutual Insurance Company. 
Koehler Fitzgerald, L.L.C., and Timothy J. Fitzgerald, in support of 
petitioners for amicus curiae Ohio Insurance Institute. 
Carpenter, Lipps & Leland, L.L.P., Michael H. Carpenter, and Michael N. 
Beekhuizen, in support of petitioners for amicus curiae Nationwide Mutual 
Insurance Company. 
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