Title: Chaney v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Jeffrey Chaney v. State of Maryland, No. 91, September Term 2006
Before a restitution order is granted, Section 11-603 of the Criminal Procedure Article 
requires that the victim of the crime or the State request restitution and that competent 
evidence supporting the amount of the restitution order be presented to the trial court.  In 
this case, because the record demonstrates that no request for restitution was made and no 
competent evidence was presented to support the amount of restitution, the restitution 
order must be vacated.  
In the Circuit C ourt for Ba ltimore City
Case # 204365003
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 91
September Term, 2006
______________________________________
JEFFREY CHANEY
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
______________________________________
Raker
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Wilner, Alan M. (Retired,
specially assigned),
Rodowsky, Lawrence F.  (Retired,
specially assigned),
                      
   JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Wilner, J.
______________________________________
Filed:    March 14, 2007
Following his conviction by a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of
second degree assault, appellant was sentenced to ten years imprisonment, all but five
years of which were suspended in favor of supervised probation for five years.  Among
the conditions attached to the probation were that appellant pay restitution to the victim in
the amount of $5,000 within thirty months after his release from prison and that, upon his
release, he become either employed full-time or enrolled as a full-time student.  In this
appeal, appellant contends that those two conditions attached to his probation are illegal.  
We shall conclude that neither condition constitutes an illegal sentence for
purposes of Maryland Rule 4-345(a), allowing a court to correct an “illegal sentence” at
any time and without regard to waiver.  Because of procedural lapses on appellant’s part,
we shall not address his complaint about the employment condition.  We shall, however,
exercise our discretion under Maryland Rule 8-131(a), address the restitution condition,
and order that condition to be stricken on the ground that there was no request for
restitution, no evidence to support the order, and, as a result, imposition of that condition
constitutes plain error.  
The facts underlying the offenses, which occurred on November 2, 2004, may be
quickly summarized, as they have but tangential relevance to the issues now before us. 
The 78-year-old victim, Ernest Shiflett, was standing just outside his garage watching
some workmen repair a sewer line adjacent to his home when appellant drove up, spoke
briefly with the backhoe operator, then approached Shiflett, identified himself as a State
construction inspector, handed Shiflett a business card, and told Shiflett that there were a
1 The card suggested that appellant was a self-employed carpenter, which he later
asserted to be the case, rather than a State inspector.  Shiflett said that he did not look at the
card but simply put it in his pocket.
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lot of violations on the job and that he could shut the job down.1  Shiflett knew appellant,
having been friends with his father. They engaged in a brief conversation, during which
appellant turned and accused two of the nearby workmen of not doing their job properly. 
At that point, Shiflett, believing that appellant was drunk and looking for trouble, asked
him several times to leave.  According to Shiflett, appellant threatened to “tear [Shiflett]
apart with [his] bare hands,” whereupon Shiflett procured a baseball bat from his garage,
because he was afraid that the younger and heavier appellant would hurt him.
There was some dispute as to what occurred next.  Shiflett said that appellant
initially retreated down the driveway but then turned and came back.  Shiflett again
demanded that he leave, and when appellant threatened to “rip me to pieces,” Shiflett
drew the bat back but claimed that he did not swing it.  Appellant grabbed the bat, threw
Shiflett to the ground, hit him in the back of the head with the bat, and was preparing to
hit him again when two of the workmen intervened.  Appellant was able to escape their
grasp, get into his car, and flee.  A bystander confirmed some of Shiflett’s account but
said that Shiflett had swung the bat at appellant after instructing him to leave, that he lost
his balance, and that appellant then grabbed the bat and hit Shiflett in the head twice with
it.  The next day, appellant appeared at a police station and claimed that he had been
assaulted by Shiflett, and he testified to that effect at trial.  By finding appellant guilty of
2 The motion stated that it was filed “pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-345(b) to
modify or reduce the sentence passed in the above referenced matters . . . .”   At one time,
section (b) of the Rule dealt with a motion for modification filed within 90 days after
sentence.  In 2004, that provision was moved to section (e), however.  Rule 4-345(b) now
provides for the court’s revisory power over a sentence in case of fraud, mistake, or
irregularity, none of which were alleged in the motion.  Nor did the motion allege that the
restitution order was “illegal” for purposes of Rule 4-345(a).  Given the caption and
substantive allegations of the motion, we shall assume that it was, in fact, filed pursuant
to section (e).
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assault, the jury obviously credited Shiflett’s version.
Because there was no request for any pre-sentence investigation, none was made;
the trial ended on a Friday, and sentencing took place the following Monday, June 13,
2005.  Although Mr. Shiflett was in court and orally presented a victim impact statement,
there was no request for, and no discussion of, restitution.  The State informed the court at
sentencing that appellant had a criminal history that included convictions for resisting
arrest, battery, malicious destruction of property, kidnapping, and a sexual offense.  After
hearing from Mr. Shiflett and from appellant, the court imposed the sentence noted.  
Appellant was presented with, and signed, the probation order and a separate judgment of
restitution.  He filed this appeal on June 27, 2005.
Three days later – within the time allowed under Maryland Rule 4-345(e) but after
the appeal was filed – appellant filed a motion for modification and reduction of sentence
in which he complained specifically about the restitution order.2  He pointed out that there
had been no request for restitution and no evidentiary basis for the $5,000 award. 
Appellant made no specific complaint about the employment/student condition, although
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he did allege that he had built a substantial construction business, had several jobs
pending, and was prepared to present evidence of his business.  He asked that the
sentence be reduced or suspended and that the court vacate the order of restitution.  On
July 14, 2005, the court denied the motion without a hearing.  No appeal was taken from
that ruling.  We granted certiorari with respect to the June 27 appeal from the judgment,
prior to any proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals, to consider whether the two
conditions constitute an “illegal sentence” that may be corrected notwithstanding
appellant’s failure to object to them in a timely manner in the Circuit Court.
Waiver
The State’s principal response to appellant’s complaints is that, because appellant
made no complaint about the two conditions when they were imposed and, by signing the
order of probation, consented to them, he waived his right to complain about the
conditions on appeal.  See Maryland Rule 8-131(a).  Appellant regards the two conditions
as “illegal,” however, and, quoting from Walczak v. State, 302 Md. 422, 427, 488 A.2d
949, 951 (1985), he urges that “when the trial court has allegedly imposed a sentence not
permitted by law, the issue should ordinarily be reviewed on direct appeal even if no
objection was made in the trial court.”  See also Goff v. State, 387 Md. 327, 875 A.2d 132
(2005).  
A criminal sentence may be deficient and subject to being vacated on appeal for a
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variety of reasons.  Through its adoption of what is now Maryland Rule 4-345 and
through its decisional jurisprudence, this Court has created two categories of deficiency
and has treated those categories differently.  Maryland Rule 4-345(a) permits a court to
“correct an illegal sentence at any time.”  If a sentence is “illegal” within the meaning of
that section of the rule, the defendant may file a motion in the trial court to “correct” it,
notwithstanding that (1) no objection was made when the sentence was imposed, (2) the
defendant purported to consent to it, or (3) the sentence was not challenged in a timely-
filed direct appeal.  That is the thrust of Walczak, Goff, and a dozen other cases.  The
sentence may be attacked on direct appeal, but it also may be challenged collaterally and
belatedly, and, if the trial court denies relief in response to such a challenge, the defendant
may appeal from that denial and obtain relief in an appellate court.  
The scope of this privilege, allowing collateral and belated attacks on the sentence
and excluding waiver as a bar to relief, is narrow, however.  We have consistently defined
this category of “illegal sentence” as limited to those situations in which the illegality
inheres in the sentence itself; i.e., there either has been no conviction warranting any
sentence for the particular offense or the sentence is not a permitted one for the
conviction upon which it was imposed and, for either reason, is intrinsically and
substantively unlawful.  See Evans v. State, 389 Md. 456, 463, 886 A.2d 562, 565 (2005);
Baker v. State, 389 Md. 127, 133, 883 A.2d 916, 919 (2005); Randall Book Corp. v. State,
316 Md. 315, 321-23, 558 A.2d 715, 718-19 (1989).  As we made clear in Randall Book
3 An unlawful sentence may be challenged in a proceeding under the Maryland
Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act, CP §§ 7-101 through 7-204, but relief in such an
action may be denied if the petitioner intelligently and knowingly failed to present the
challenge at trial or on direct appeal.  See CP § 7-106(b).  Such a sentence may also be
challenged through habeas corpus or coram nobis proceedings, but, with exceptions not
relevant here, no appeal lies from the denial of relief in those proceedings.  See CP § 7-
107(b).  The full right to seek appellate relief where the nature of the alleged illegality
does not fall within the first category of “illegal sentence” lies only where the challenge is
made in the trial court and on direct appeal.
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Corp., any other deficiency in the sentence that may be grounds for an appellate court to
vacate it – impermissible considerations in imposing it, for example -- must ordinarily be
raised in or decided by the trial court and presented for appellate review in a timely-filed
direct appeal.  The sentence may not be attacked belatedly and collaterally through a
motion under Rule 4-345(a), and, subject to the appellate court’s discretion under
Maryland Rule 8-131(a), the defendant is not excused from having to raise a timely
objection in the trial court.3
There is nothing intrinsically illegal about either condition here.  Restitution in the
amount of $5,000 is permitted as a condition of probation upon a conviction for second
degree assault, as is maintaining full-time employment or student status, and appellant
does not seem to contend otherwise.  His complaint is that those conditions were
inappropriate in this case, in large part because no evidentiary foundation was laid to
support them, but, even if so, that does not make the conditions intrinsically illegal.  At
best, it would require that this Court, in a timely-filed direct appeal, vacate them, if (1) the
complaint about them was preserved for appellate review, or (2) we choose to exercise
4 Compare Wilson v. State, 227 Md. 99, 175 A.2d 775 (1961), Biles v. State, 230
Md. 537, 187 A.2d 850 (1963), Gleaton v. State, 235 Md. 271, 201 A.2d 353 (1964), and
Costello v. State, 237 Md. 464, 206 A.2d 812 (1965) with State v. Kanaras, 357 Md. 170,
742 A.2d 508 (1999), Herrera v. State, 357 Md. 186, 742 A.2d 517 (1999), Greco v.
State, 347 Md. 423, 701 A.2d 419 (1997), and Fuller v. State, supra,      Md.       ,      
A.2d        (2007).  
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the discretion we have under Maryland Rule 8-131(a) to consider an issue not raised in or
decided by the trial court.  
Not only did appellant make no objection when the trial court announced the two
conditions as part of the probation, but, as noted, when presented with the written order of
probation and the judgment of restitution, he signed them and thereby facially consented
to their terms.  It is true that appellant later raised an objection to both conditions in a
timely-filed motion to modify the sentence, but he failed to appeal from the denial of that
motion.  Whether an appeal would properly lie from such a ruling is therefore not before
us.4  What we have before us in this appeal, therefore, is a complaint never presented to
the trial court about a sentence, or part of a sentence, that is not “illegal” within the
meaning of Maryland Rule 4-345(a).  Ordinarily, and routinely, we would hold the
complaint waived and refuse to address it.
This Court does have discretion under Maryland Rule 8-131(a) to address an issue
that was not raised in or decided by the trial court, however.  It is a discretion that
appellate courts should rarely exercise, as considerations of both fairness and judicial
efficiency ordinarily require that all challenges that a party desires to make to a trial
5 We also note that an objection was, in fact, made to the restitution order in the
motion to modify the sentence, but, because no appeal was taken from the denial of that
motion, we cannot address the issue in that context.  By regarding the order as plain error
and addressing it pursuant to Rule 8-131(a), we avoid the prospect of a belated appeal
under the Post Conviction Procedure Act, which serves no one’s interest.
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court’s ruling, action, or conduct be presented in the first instance to the trial court so that
(1) a proper record can be made with respect to the challenge, and (2) the other parties
and the trial judge are given an opportunity to consider and respond to the challenge.  
In this case, we shall exercise our discretion to consider appellant’s challenge to
the restitution order, but not to the employment condition.  We shall consider the
restitution issue because (1) it constitutes plain error, and (2) it transcends this case; it is
one that may affect hundreds of cases that flow through our criminal and juvenile courts
and that implicates important Constitutional and statutory rights, and guidance is needed.5 
The deficiency in the employment condition alleged here by appellant can be addressed if,
upon his release from prison, he is charged with a violation of that condition.  Present
guidance is not needed with respect to that condition.
Restitution
Title 11 of the Criminal Procedure Article (CP) sets forth the various statutory
rights accorded to victims of crime, among which are the right to be notified of all court
proceedings that affect the interests of the victim (CP § 11-104), the right to attend any
such proceeding at which the defendant has a right to appear (CP § 11-102), and the right
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to request restitution (CP § 11-603).  In order to implement those rights, law enforcement
officers, judicial officials, and prosecutors are required to deliver to victims or their
representatives notification request forms and pamphlets describing the rights possessed
by victims and services available to them.  See CP, §§ 11-104 and 11-914(9) and (10).
Restitution is provided for in CP § 11-603.  As relevant here, § 11-603(a) allows a
court to enter a judgment of restitution if “as a direct result of the crime,” the victim (2)
suffered: “(i) actual medical, dental, hospital, counseling, funeral, or burial expenses or
losses; (ii) direct out-of-pocket loss; (iii) loss of earnings; or (iv) expenses incurred with
rehabilitation” or (3) incurred medical expenses that were paid by a governmental unit. 
Section 11-603(b) provides that a victim “is presumed to have a right to restitution under
subsection (a) of this section if: (1) the victim or the State requests restitution; and (2) the
court is presented with competent evidence of any item listed in subsection (a) of this
section.”
There appears to be some facial ambiguity in these two subsections.  Subsection
(a) purports to permit the court to order restitution for the enumerated expenses, even in
the absence of (1) a request for restitution by the State or the victim, and (2) any evidence
to support an award.  The specific requirement of a request and supporting evidence is
found in subsection (b) in the context of a presumption of entitlement.  Arguably, the
statute might be read as allowing a court, under subsection (a), to order restitution without
any request for it and without any evidence to support it so long as it is not applying the
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presumption stated in subsection (b).  In that regard, the statute is, at best, inartfully
drawn.  We are unwilling to read subsection (a) in such an unrestrained manner, because
to do so would not only raise serious due process issues but also contravene the rule of
lenity that is ordinarily applied when a penal statute is ambiguous.
An order of restitution entered in a criminal case, even when attached as a
condition of probation, is a criminal sanction –  part of the punishment for the crime. 
Goff v. State, 387 Md. 327, 338-40, 875 A.2d 132, 139-40 (2005); Williams v. State, 385
Md. 50, 58-59, 867 A.2d 305, 310 (2005); Grey v. Allstate Insurance Company, 363 Md.
445, 451, 769 A.2d 891, 895 (2001).  Although, as we pointed out in Grey, it has a
therapeutic and rehabilitative function with respect to the defendant, its predominant and
traditional purpose is to reimburse the victim for certain kinds of expenses that he or she
incurred as a direct result of the defendant’s criminal activity.  It is not a judicially
imposed gift to the victim, but reimbursement that the defendant, personally, must pay. 
Because restitution is part of a criminal sentence, as a matter of both Constitutional
due process and Maryland criminal procedure, such an order may not be entered unless
(1) the defendant is given reasonable notice that restitution is being sought and the
amount that is being requested, (2) the defendant is given a fair opportunity to defend
against the request, and (3) there is sufficient admissible evidence to support the request –
evidence of the amount of a loss or expense incurred for which restitution is allowed and
evidence that such loss or expense was a direct result of the defendant’s criminal
6 Defendants have a right under Maryland Rule 4-342(f) to allocute, which
includes the right “to present information in mitigation of punishment.” As a practical
matter, we do not see how it would be possible for a defendant to exercise that right, with
respect to restitution, if, at the time of allocution, the defendant is unaware that restitution
is being sought or of the amount that is being sought.
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behavior.  See People v. Valdez, 928 P.2d 1387, 1392-93 (Colo. App. 1996); Gilmore v.
State, 668 So.2d 1092 (Fla. App. 1996); Gilileo v. State, 923 So.2d 612, 614 (Fla. App.
2006); Hampton v. State, 141 P.3d 101, 105 (Wyo. 2006).6
This is not an onerous burden; indeed, it should be a relatively simple one. 
Victims are required to be notified, and presumably are notified, of their rights under the
law, including, in an appropriate case, the right to request restitution.  They are advised
that they may request restitution directly or may ask the prosecutor to request it on their
behalf.  They are reminded to keep bills and statements for expenses they incur so that
they can be presented to the court.  If a victim requests restitution, CP § 11-603(b) creates
a presumption that he or she is entitled to it, provided that “the court is presented with
competent evidence” of the items for which restitution is sought. CP § 11-615 relaxes
both the evidentiary burden and the hearsay rule with respect to restitution requests by
making written statements or bills for medical, dental, hospital, counseling, funeral, and
burial expenses admissible and legally sufficient evidence of the amount, fairness, and
reasonableness of the charges and the necessity of the services or material provided.  That
section also places on a defendant who challenges the fairness or reasonableness of the
charges or the necessity of the service the burden of proving that the amount is not fair or
7 The notification form contained in the record appears to be a five-copy form, one
copy each for the court clerk, the State’s Attorney, the detention center or State Division
of Correction, and the Division of Parole and Probation.  The fifth copy is for the victim,
and it appears that the instructions are on the back of that copy.  As only the first copy, for
the clerk, is in the record and would likely be placed in the court file, the record does not
and, under current practice, ordinarily would not reveal the instructions and information
actually given to the victim.  Although it would be helpful if the instructions and
information were, in some way, placed in the record so that, if any dispute or uncertainty
should arise, the court will have direct evidence of the advice given to the victim, the gap,
at least in this instance, may be filled by judicial notice.  CP § 11-104(c) requires the
prosecutor to send the notification request form described in CP § 11-914(10) and the
pamphlet described in § 11-914(9).  Sections 11-914(9) and (10) require that those forms
be developed by the State Board of Victim Services, a unit in the Governor’s Office of
Crime Control and Prevention.  Because the forms mandated by law to be sent are in the
nature of official documents prepared by a State agency and are readily available to the
public and to the Court, we may fairly take judicial notice of them.  The information
included on the reverse side of the notification request form sent to the victim contains a
statement that the victim has “the legal right” to “request restitution.”  The pamphlet is
even more explicit. It states that the victim has the right to request “payment of certain
crime-related costs” from the defendant if the defendant is found or pleads guilty, and
advises that the victim can “receive money to help pay for crime-related costs” by asking
the State’s Attorney to seek restitution from the court, saving receipts or copies of bills,
and including a request for restitution in a victim impact statement.  We may therefore
properly conclude that Mr. Shiflett had been informed that he had a right to seek
restitution in conformance with CP § 11-603.
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reasonable.
The record contains a certification by the State’s Attorney for Baltimore City that
the victim notification form and pamphlet required by what is now CP § 11-104 were sent
to “the victim.” Mr. Shiflett signed and returned the notification form, which contained a
request for “notice of all events related to this case and to the defendant/juvenile, as
allowed by law,” and a demand for “all the rights to which victims of crime are entitled.”7 
He was therefore aware of his right to seek restitution or to have the prosecutor seek it for
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him. 
Mr. Shiflett was present in court at sentencing, and, indeed, he informed the court
of the injuries he had suffered and their continuing impact – a deep wound to the top of
his head that required stitches, a concussion, daily severe headaches, and blurred vision in
one eye.  Although medical and hospital records pertaining to his treatment after the
attack were in evidence, none of them indicated what, if anything, either he or any
governmental agency paid for that treatment.  Other than the general “demand” for “all
the rights to which victims of crime are entitled” in the request for notification form, 
neither Mr. Shiflett nor the prosecutor made any written or oral request for restitution, and
neither of them presented any evidence of any expense or out-of-pocket loss incurred by
Shiflett or by any governmental agency on his behalf.  There was no discussion at all
regarding restitution until the court, in announcing sentence, stated that it would be a
condition of appellant’s probation.  It thus seems apparent, at least from the record, that
the order that appellant pay $5,000 in restitution as a condition of his probation was
pulled entirely out of thin air.  It had no evidentiary basis and appellant was never given
the opportunity, prior to its entry, to contest or defend against it.  It is for that reason that
the order was entered erroneously and must be vacated.
ORDER OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE
CITY THAT APPELLANT PAY RESTITUTION IN THE
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AMOUNT OF $5,000 AS A CONDITION OF PROBATION
VACATED; JUDGMENT OTHERWISE AFFIRMED;
COSTS TO BE PAID BY MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL
OF BALTIMORE.