Title: Ex Parte Cassady

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

486 So. 2d 453 (1986)
Ex parte Ronnie CASSADY
(Re Ronnie Cassady v. State of Alabama).
84-615.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
January 10, 1986.
Linda S. Perry, Mobile, for petitioner.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen. and Gerrilyn V. Grant, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
MADDOX, Justice.
Petitioner Ronnie Cassady was indicted in Mobile County on three separate charges of selling illicit drugs, in violation of Code 1975, § 20-2-70, the Alabama Uniform Controlled Substances Act. The charges were consolidated for trial and the jury convicted Cassady on all three counts. The trial court, based on the jury's recommendation, assessed a fine of $25,000 per conviction and sentenced petitioner to life imprisonment because of his status as a habitual offender under Code 1975, § 13A-5-9.
Cassady claims that his trial on these charges breached a negotiated plea agreement with the Mobile County District Attorney's Office reached in an earlier proceeding, and that the indictments on these charges should have been dismissed pursuant to the terms of that agreement.
Prior to deciding this issue, the Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the cause to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to determine the extent of the plea bargaining agreement. The trial court found that Cassady and his attorney believed that a plea of guilty to six cases which were pending against Cassady would constitute a full and *454 final settlement of all cases which could be brought against him for all crimes he committed before April 4, 1983, the date of the sentencing hearing. In other words, Cassady understood that he would not be tried for the present charges; however, the trial court also determined that the district attorney's office was not aware that these three charges were pending against Cassady until April 14, 1983. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that, based on these facts, these charges could not have been the subject of negotiations between Cassady's counsel and the district attorney, and that the agreement was void because there was no "meeting of the minds." 486 So. 2d 449. We find the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals to be erroneous, and we reverse.
We make this determination based upon what transpired at Cassady's initial sentencing hearing. We set out a substantial portion of the record of that proceeding in order to show why we are of the opinion that the state and Cassady entered into a plea bargain agreement which was accepted by the trial judge at that time:
A succinct statement of the law of this state regarding plea bargains is contained in Ex parte Yarber, 437 So. 2d 1330, 1335 (Ala.1983). In that case, this Court stated:
While we recognize that, in an ordinary case, we would accord much weight to the findings of fact made by a trial court on questions such as were here involved, we believe the record of the initial sentencing hearing here shows, as a matter of fact and law, that a plea bargain agreement had been reached between the state and the defendant, and expressly accepted and approved by the trial judge. At that hearing, as is shown by the portion of the transcript quoted above, Cassady's counsel stated, as follows:
The State did not object to this interpretation of the plea bargain made by defendant's counsel. Consequently, we hold that the trial court, by accepting Cassady's plea of guilty, necessarily accepted the plea bargain as it was explained by Cassady's attorney. At that time, the attorney's statement was the only evidence of the contents of that agreement presented to the court, and, thus, it represented the agreement that the court was accepting. By remaining silent, the State, at least implicitly, agreed not to prosecute Cassady for the drug charges involved here, if he pleaded guilty to the charges then before the trial court.
The court's admonition to the defendant to "shape up" while serving the sentence imposed upon him also indicates that the sentencing judge contemplated that all prior *456 offenses were included in the plea bargain, because his admonition obviously referred to conduct of the defendant in the future.
This Court has on other occasions been confronted with the problem presented by this case, that is, whether the state and the defendant actually had entered into a plea bargain agreement, and we take this opportunity to point out a suggested solution of the matter.
The problem involved here could have been easily avoided had the plea agreement been written and all the terms and conditions made a part of the writing. If parties would reduce their plea agreements to writing, and present them to the trial court prior to sentencing, rather than afterward, as was done here, resolution of cases questioning the existence or contents of plea agreements would be greatly facilitated. The record would also show whether or not the trial court had accepted the plea agreement.
REVERSED AND RENDERED.
TORBERT, C.J., and FAULKNER, JONES, ALMON, SHORES, BEATTY, ADAMS and HOUSTON, JJ., concur.