Title: Garnica v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

KERRY JOHN GARNICA v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2011 WY 85Case Number: No. 10-0233Decided: 05/26/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2011

 
 

KERRY 
JOHN GARNICA,Appellant (Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee (Plaintiff).

 
 
 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Appellate Counsel; and David E. 
Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Westling.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Meri Geringer, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Justin A. Daraie, Assistant Attorney 
General.  Argument by Ms. 
Geringer.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      After two 
episodes of domestic violence against his ex-wife, Kerry Garnica was charged 
with two counts of unlawfully touching a household member for a third or 
subsequent time in the past ten years, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-501 
(b) and (f)(ii) (LexisNexis 2007).  
After a jury trial, the jury found Garnica guilty of both counts.  Before sentencing, however, the court 
allowed the State to amend its Information by correcting the statutory 
citation.  The court sentenced 
Garnica under the enhanced sentencing provisions.

 
 
[¶2]      We affirm 
Garnica's conviction, but reverse his sentence and remand for 
resentencing.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]      Garnica raises 
two issues before this Court:

 
 

1.            
The 
trial court committed reversible error by allowing amendment of the Information 
after the jury had entered into deliberations, withdrawing a jury instruction 
from the jury and replacing it with a new instruction, despite the objection of 
[Garnica].

2.            
The 
trial court imposed an illegal sentence and thereby committed reversible 
error.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      Because the 
domestic violence episodes that precipitated this case are not entirely germane 
to the appeal, we will only briefly detail the two episodes.  On February 14, 2009, Garnica and his 
then wife began to argue in their home.  
The argument escalated, and Garnica began to hit his wife in the 
head.  In turn, she struck Garnica 
with a television remote.  He then 
spat on her numerous times.  Several 
months later, on July 16, 2009, an argument erupted in the parking lot of the 
Casper Walgreen's store.  Garnica 
followed his wife to the store, and they began arguing at the store's 
entrance.  Garnica pushed and 
slapped his wife before he drove away.

 
 
[¶5]      We turn to the 
procedural side of this case, with which Garnica takes issue on appeal.  On July 28, 2009, Garnica was charged by 
Information in Natrona County Circuit Court with two counts of unlawfully 
touching a household member for a third or subsequent time in the past ten 
years, in violation of the battery statute.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-501(b) and 
(f)(ii) (LexisNexis 2007).  That 
same day, the court issued a warrant for Garnica's arrest.  Garnica was apprehended on October 27, 
2009, whereafter he waived his preliminary hearing and was bound over to 
district court.  On February 5, 
2010, Garnica pleaded not guilty to both counts.

 
 
[¶6]      Garnica was tried 
by jury on April 12-14, 2010.  After 
the case was submitted to the jury for deliberation, the jury posed a question 
to the district court: "Is spitting considered unlawful touch under the contents 
of Wyoming Statutes ?"  The court's 
answer to this question is irrelevant on appeal but, while considering that 
question, the court noticed that the State's Information was 
inaccurate.

 
 
[¶7]      Specifically, the 
court noticed that the Information's second count charged Garnica with unlawful 
touching pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-501(b) (LexisNexis 2007) and used 
language from that subsection as it existed prior to the July 1, 2009, statutory 
amendments.  However, the second 
incident of abuse to which that count related occurred 15 days after the amendment to the battery 
statute became effective.  The 
revised subsection (b) no longer included the unlawful touching language, as a 
means of committing a battery.  That 
language now exists under subsection (g).  
See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-501(b) and (g)(i) (LexisNexis 2009); 2009 Wyo. Sess. Laws, 379-380, 
583.  Thus, the State should have 
cited to § 6-2-501(g)(i) for the second count of unlawful 
touching.

 
 
[¶8]      The jury was 
released due to the quandary facing the court, and the next morning the court 
heard argument on the matter before the jury reconvened.  After the arguments were presented, the 
court allowed the State to amend its Information by changing the subsection 
lettering.  Additionally, Jury 
Instruction 8a replaced Instruction 8.  
The new instruction cited the appropriate statutory subsection, and the 
court noted the new instruction in open court before the 
jury.

 
 
[¶9]      The jury resumed 
deliberations and found Garnica guilty of twice unlawfully touching his wife, a 
household member, in a rude, insolent, or angry manner.  These were Garnica's third and fourth 
domestic violence convictions in the last ten years, with the first two 
occurring in 2003 and 2004.  
Accordingly, the two counts relating to this case were enhanced to 
felonies pursuant to § 6-2-501(f)(ii), and on June 22, 2010, the court sentenced 
Garnica to consecutive 2 to 5-year terms of imprisonment.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶10]   Garnica argues on appeal that the 
district court abused its discretion by permitting the State to amend its 
Information after the case was submitted to the jury, thereby leaving him no 
opportunity to defend against a new crime.  
Specifically, Garnica argues that the late amendment prejudiced his case 
by affecting the way he prepared for trial and his decision to testify, and by 
requiring a change in the instructions which placed undue emphasis on 
Instruction 8a.

 
 
[¶11]   The State counters that Garnica's 
argument must fail on appeal because the revised Information merely changed the 
lettering currently designating the subsection associated with the second of 
Garnica's two charged offenses.  
According to the State, the elements of the crime were not altered.  Also, the State contends that Garnica 
was continually aware of the charges against him, and his trial strategy 
remained entirely applicable to the original Information.  Ultimately, Garnica was not prejudiced 
by the court's ruling, according to the State.

 
 
[¶12]   W.R.Cr.P. 3(e) "vests the district 
court with wide discretion in granting or denying a motion to amend an 
information."  Temen v. State, 2009 WY 25, ¶ 11, 
201 P.3d 1139, 1142 (Wyo. 2009).

 
 
[W]e 
review the trial court's decision by applying our abuse of discretion 
standard.  In deciding whether or 
not the trial court abused its discretion, this court must "determine whether 
the trial court could reasonably conclude as it did and whether any facet of its 
ruling was arbitrary or capricious."

 
 

Wilkening 
v. State, 2005 
WY 127, ¶ 23, 120 P.3d 680, 687 (Wyo. 2005) (quoting Burton v. State, 2002 WY 71, ¶ 44, 
46 P.3d 309, 320 (Wyo. 2002)).

 
 
[¶13]   The original Information in this 
case reads as follows:

 
 
That 
[Garnica] late of the County aforesaid, on or about the 16th day of July, 2009,  did unlawfully touch another in a rude, 
insolent or angry manner, and upon conviction [Garnica] will be convicted of 
a third or subsequent offense against any other household member  within the 
previous ten  (10) years, in 
violation of W.S. 1977, as amended, §6-2-501(b) and (f)(iii).  [Emphasis added.]

 
 
Prior 
to July 1, 2009, the emphasized language would have been found in subsection (b) 
of § 6-2-501:  "A person is guilty 
of battery if he unlawfully touches another in a rude, insolent or angry manner 
or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-501(b) (LexisNexis 
2007).

 
 
[¶14]   The second incident of abuse 
occurred 15 days after the battery statute had been amended.  The 2009 amendments newly designated the 
unlawful touching theory of battery to be an "unlawful contact," and relocated 
that theory to the newly created subsection (g) under the same statute.  See § 6-2-501(b) and (g)(i).  Thus, the State also should have cited 
to § 6-2-501(g)(i) for the second count of unlawful touching, which states: 
 "A person is guilty of unlawful 
contact if he: (i) Touches another person in a rude, insolent or angry manner 
without intentionally using sufficient physical force to cause bodily injury to 
another[.]"

 
 
[¶15]   The Wyoming Rules of Criminal 
Procedure dictate the extent to which the State may amend an information after 
the jury has retired for deliberation:

 
 
(e)  Amendment of Information or 
citation.  The court may permit an information or citation to be 
amended; 

.

            
(2)  Whether or not the defendant 
consents:

            
            
.

            
(B)  At any time before verdict or finding if no additional or 
different offense is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not 
prejudiced.

 
 
W. 
R.Cr.P. 3(e)(2)(B).

 
 
[¶16]   During trial, Garnica objected to 
the State's motion to amend the Information.  In accordance with the Wyoming Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, and as the State points out, the reasonableness of the 
granted motion depends upon two factors: (1) whether the amendment resulted 
in the charging of an additional or different offense, and (2) whether 
permitting the amendment prejudiced Garnica's substantial rights.  See W.R.Cr.P. 3(e).

 
 
[¶17]   In taking a look at these two 
factors, we cannot say that the trial court committed reversible error.  First, technical alterations to an 
information do not necessarily have the effect of charging a different crime for 
purposes of W.R.Cr.P. 3(e), and as we have said before, common sense must 
prevail over technicalities when evaluating an information and amendments 
thereto.  Spagner v. State, 2009 WY 12, ¶ 23, 
200 P.3d 793, 802 (Wyo. 2009).

 
 
A 
failure to cite the statute or an incorrect citation of the statute which the 
defendant is alleged to have violated is not fatal nor does it require a 
reversal of the case, but bears only upon the question whether the defendant was 
confused to the point that he did not know the crime with which he was charged 
and was prejudiced in his defense.

 
 

Capwell 
v. State, 686 P.2d 1148, 1154 (Wyo. 1984).  
Accordingly, it does not constitute "playing the judicial equivalent of 
gotcha' " and will not warrant reversal when the State seeks to correct a truly 
harmless charging error.  Spagner, ¶ 23, 200 P.3d  at 
802.

 
 
[¶18]   Here, the State did not charge 
Garnica with a different crime by amending the Information  the State was 
simply correcting a mechanical error.  
It is our conclusion that, because of the 15-day lapse from the time the 
statute was amended to the second of Garnica's domestic violence offenses, the 
State's citations to subsection (b) instead of subsection (g) was a mere 
oversight.  Furthermore, Garnica 
made no claim at trial that due to the State's original reference to subsection 
(b) in Count II, he believed the State was charging him with "intentionally, 
knowingly, or recklessly cause(ing) bodily injury to another person by use of 
physical force."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-2-501(b).  In fact, the 
record reflects the contrary because the language in the original Information 
clearly alleged a crime based on rude, insolent, or angry touching.  Also, the parties stipulated to jury 
instructions outlining elements based on the "rude, insolent, or angry" 
terminology.  The State's amendment 
did not alter the substantive language of the Information, and it did not change 
the elements of the crime.  Thus, 
common sense dictates that the State merely corrected a clerical error, and as a 
result, Garnica was not prejudiced by the Amended Information because in it, he 
was not charged with a new crime.  See Tyner v. State, 2011 WY 60, ___ P.3d 
___ (Wyo. 2011).

 
 
[¶19]   As a final matter before leaving 
this issue, Garnica points out that the district court's written judgment and 
sentence does not actually reflect the Amended Information and Jury Instruction 
8a.  The Judgment and Sentence 
refers to Count II as charging a violation of § 6-2-501(b) instead of 
(g)(i)  obviously, a clerical error by the court.  We remand to the district court to 
correct that error.

 
 
[¶20]   In his second and last issue, 
Garnica argues that the district court imposed an illegal sentence and thereby 
committed reversible error.  More 
precisely, Garnica argues that the Wyoming legislature clearly intended a 
difference between battery and unlawful contact, and while unlawful contact may 
be used to enhance the penalty for a battery, it cannot be enhanced to a 
felony.

 
 
[¶21]   Our rules about statutory 
interpretation are very clear:

 
 
The 
interpretation of statutes is a question of law to be reviewed de novo. 
French v. Amax Coal West, 960 P.2d 1023, 1027 (Wyo. 1998). "The 
fundamental rule we invoke in the interpretation of a statute is that we must 
ascertain, if possible, what the legislature intended by the language it used." 
McCreary v. Weast, 971 P.2d 974, 979 (Wyo. 1999). 

 
 
Our 
review of statutory 
interpretation begins with an inquiry into the ordinary and obvious 
meaning of the words employed by the legislature according to the manner in 
which those words are arranged. Id.; Sheridan Commercial Park, Inc. v. 
Briggs, 848 P.2d 811, 815 
(Wyo.1993). If more than one reasonable interpretation exists, we 
resort to general principles of statutory construction. Moncrief v. Wyoming State Bd. of 
Equalization, 856 P.2d 440, 444 
(Wyo.1993) (quoting Parker Land and Cattle Co. v. Wyoming Game and Fish 
Com'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1044 
(Wyo.1993)). When the legislature has spoken in 
unambiguous terms, however, "we are bound to the results so expressed." State 
ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Bergeron, 948 P.2d 1367, 1369 
(Wyo.1997).

 
 
Platte Development Co. v. Wyoming Environmental 
Quality Council, 966 P.2d 972, 974 
(Wyo. 1998). We construe the statute as a whole, 
giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe together all 
parts of the statute in pari materia. Matter of Lyles, 957 P.2d 843, 846 (Wyo. 
1998).

 
 
Vineyard v. Jenkins, 983 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Wyo. 1999).

 
 
[¶22]   An offense committed under 
§ 6-2-501 provides for the enhancement of penalties up to a felony, if a 
household member commits multiple batteries.  The section reads as follows, in 
pertinent part:

 
 

(f)  A 
household member as defined by W.S. 35-21-102 who 
commits a second or subsequent battery against any other household member shall 
be punished as follows:

(i)  A 
person convicted upon a plea of guilty or no contest or found guilty of a second 
offense under this subsection against any other household member, after having 
been convicted upon a plea of guilty or no contest or found guilty of a 
violation of 
W.S. 6-2-501(a), (b), (e) through (g), 6-2-502, 6-2-503, 
6-2-504 or other substantially similar law of this or any other state, tribe or 
territory against any other household member within 
the previous five (5) years is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by 
imprisonment for not more than one (1) year, a fine of not more than one 
thousand dollars ($1,000.00), or both. Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, the term of probation imposed by a court under this paragraph may exceed 
the maximum term of imprisonment established for this offense under this 
paragraph provided the term of probation, together with any extension thereof, 
shall in no case exceed two (2) years;

(ii)  A 
person convicted upon a plea of guilty or no contest or found guilty of a third 
or subsequent offense under this subsection against any other household member, 
after having been convicted upon a plea of guilty or no contest or found guilty 
of a violation of W.S. 6-2-501(a), (b), (e) through 
(g), 6-2-502, 6-2-503, 6-2-504 or other substantially similar law of this or any 
other state, tribe or territory against any other household member within the 
previous ten (10) years is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not 
more than five (5) years, a fine of not more than two thousand dollars 
($2,000.00), or both.

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-501(f)(i) and (ii) (LexisNexis 
2009).

 
 
[¶23]   The State insists that upon close 
scrutiny of the statute, Garnica's arguments fall short.  Specifically, the State argues that 
because the term "battery" is given no exclusive definition by the statute, the 
penalty enhancement can apply even outside of a person causing bodily injury to 
another by use of physical force.  
The State argues a generalized use of the term battery in the penalty 
enhancement provision of the statute is applicable to all of the conduct 
described in subsections (b) and (g) of the statute, and compares the 
enhancement options for battery to those of simple assault.  However, this seems to be overreaching 
by the State.

 
 
[¶24]   The plain language of the statute 
is clear.  A conviction of 
§ 6-2-501(g) can be used to enhance a battery to a felony under operation 
of subsection (f)(ii) when it says, "A person convicted upon a plea of guilty or 
no contest or found guilty of a third or subsequent offense under this 
subsection against any other household member, after having been convicted upon 
a plea of guilty or no contest or found guilty of a violation of W.S. 
6-2-501(a), (b), (e) through (g)[.]"  
However, we do not believe that equates battery to unlawful contact for 
the purposes of sentence enhancement.  
Both of those terms are used purposefully in the statute and each is 
categorically defined, apart from the other.

 
 
[¶25]   The trial court mistakenly 
determined that there was an available enhancement under the statute with which 
Garnica was charged.  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-2-501(g).  In looking 
at the statute, the felony enhancement is actually contained in subsection 
(f)(ii).  To qualify for a felony, a 
person must be found guilty of a third or subsequent offense under (f)(ii).  This subsection can only refer to 
subsection (f).  Subsection (f) 
clearly states that only a person who commits a second or subsequent "battery" 
is subject to the enhancements enumerated in subsections (i) and (ii), and it 
does not include a person convicted of "unlawful contact."

 
 
[¶26]   Accordingly, the sentence imposed 
by the trial court was an improper interpretation of the statute and, thus, is 
an illegal sentence.  Unlawful 
touching, as it is used in § 6-2-501(g), can only be a misdemeanor and 
subject to the penalties in § 6-2-501(h):  "An unlawful contact under subsection (g) 
of this section is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 
six (6) months, a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00) or 
both."  Garnica was sentenced to 2 
to 5 years on Count II.1  We, therefore, remand to the district 
court for resentencing in accordance with this result.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶27]   The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in allowing amendment of the Information after the case was submitted 
to the jury, and Garnica suffered no prejudice.  However, the trial court imposed an 
illegal sentence regarding Count II.  
We, therefore, remand this case to the trial court for resentencing in 
accordance with this opinion.  
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 
  1The 
Judgment erroneously recites that Count II is a violation of § 6-2-501(b), which 
is contrary to the Amended Information.  
It should read § 6-2-501(g) and should be corrected on 
remand.