Title: Commonwealth v. Dabney

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12349 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  KENYA DABNEY. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     November 6, 2017. - February 13, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ. 
 
 
Trafficking.  Deriving Support from Prostitution.  Rape.  
Assault and Battery.  Jury and Jurors.  Practice, Criminal, 
Jury and jurors, Voir dire, Instructions to jury.  
Evidence, Impeachment of credibility.  Witness, 
Impeachment. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on February 4, 2015. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Linda E. Giles, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
David Rangaviz, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
the defendant. 
 
Nicholas Brandt, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Emma Quinn-Judge & Zoraida Fernandez, for Massachusetts 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers & others, amici curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  The defendant was convicted by a Superior 
Court jury of human trafficking, deriving support from 
prostitution, rape, and two counts of assault and battery.  On 
appeal, he argues that, during voir dire, the judge improperly 
prevented his attorney from asking members of the venire whether 
they would expect an innocent defendant to testify.  He also 
contends that the evidence presented was insufficient to sustain 
a conviction of human trafficking, and that the judge's 
instruction to the jury regarding the human trafficking charge 
was inadequate.  The defendant claims further that the judge 
erred in allowing the introduction of certain records and then 
retroactively ordering them to be redacted, which prevented 
defense counsel from using the records for impeachment purposes. 
 
We conclude that the judge did not abuse her discretion in 
limiting defense counsel's questioning during voir dire, the 
evidence against the defendant was legally sufficient, the jury 
instructions were proper, and there was no abuse of discretion 
in the judge's evidentiary ruling.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
convictions.1 
                     
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the 
Massachusetts Association Of Criminal Defense Lawyers, National 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Charles Hamilton 
Houston Institute for Race and Justice, and Criminal Justice 
Institute. 
3 
 
 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  We recite the facts the jury 
could have found, reserving certain details for later 
discussion. 
 
i.  Commonwealth's case.  The victim and the defendant met 
in approximately June, 2014, and started dating a few months 
later.  The two began living together in a house in Chelsea 
belonging to "Uncle Otis," a friend of the defendant; they also 
sometimes stayed in a house in Revere.  Around the time the 
victim and the defendant started dating, the defendant 
encouraged the victim to begin prostituting herself.  He told 
her that it "would be good money because [she] was a beautiful 
person."  At some point before she met the defendant, the victim 
had engaged in prostitution in Chelsea.2 
 
Shortly after the defendant's suggestion, the victim began 
prostituting herself on Pearl Street in Chelsea.  In exchange 
for a cash payment, she would perform sex acts in her clients' 
vehicles.  Together, the defendant and the victim determined the 
prices she would charge for various acts.  The defendant would 
accompany the victim to Pearl Street and would wait on the 
street or at a nearby bar for her to emerge from a client's 
automobile.  The victim gave all the money she earned from these 
                     
 
2 The record does not indicate any time frame for the 
victim's prior prostitution. 
4 
 
 
encounters to the defendant.  He used the money to buy drugs and 
alcohol for them to share. 
 
At some point after the victim had been engaging in 
prostitution, the defendant told the victim about a Web site 
called Backpage that they could use to advertise her services.  
The two used the victim's personal electronic mail address and 
telephone number to create a Backpage account.  They then posted 
advertisements, which included photographs of the victim's body, 
(without showing her face), a written description of her body, 
an "alias," and contact information.  The defendant took the 
photographs.  The victim and the defendant together determined 
the alias that the victim would use and wrote the description of 
her body.  The defendant used proceeds from the victim's 
prostitution to buy a prepaid credit card that they used to pay 
for the Backpage advertisements. 
 
The defendant told the victim that she was to notify him 
every time she received a telephone call from a client in 
response to the Backpage advertisement.  He also occasionally 
listened to the calls.  Often, these clients would meet the 
victim at the house in Revere where she and the defendant 
sometimes stayed.  The defendant would wait in another room 
while the victim was with a client "in case [she] needed to 
scream for him."  This arrangement continued for several months.  
At the time, the victim also was working at a fast food 
5 
 
 
restaurant; the defendant was unemployed.  In November or 
December, 2014, after a gap in their relationship "for a day or 
two," the defendant asked the victim to stop using the Backpage 
site.  She did so and also changed her telephone number. 
 
At some point during the week of December 7, 2014, the 
defendant punched the victim in the face because she had not 
given him all of the money she had earned from prostitution.  
The victim had a black eye, but did not seek medical treatment.  
She did not call the police because the defendant "apologized 
and said it wouldn't happen again." 
 
Approximately one week later, on December 13, 2014, the 
defendant hit the victim's head with his open hand.  Later that 
night, the victim, the defendant, the victim's mother, and Uncle 
Otis were at the house in Revere; the defendant and the victim 
used cocaine and heroin.  Sometime after midnight, the victim 
and the defendant went to a bar, where he told her that she was 
"on [her] own."  The victim understood this to mean that they 
were no longer in a relationship, and left the bar. 
 
The victim then went to Pearl Street to prostitute herself. 
She saw two clients.  Thereafter, she encountered the defendant 
on the part of Pearl Street where he ordinarily had waited for 
her when she met with clients.  The defendant yelled at her and 
demanded to know why it had taken her so long to return.  She 
responded, "why are you over here, you said I was on my own." 
6 
 
 
 
The defendant punched the victim in the face, threw her to 
the ground, and kicked her, while continuing to yell.  He 
grabbed her and told her that they were going home.  He insisted 
that the victim was lying to him about the clients she had met 
with that night and the amount of money she had received.  He 
continued to punch her, throw her against walls, choke her, and 
beat her, as he dragged her toward a taxicab stand.  The victim 
continued to protest that she thought their relationship had 
ended.  The defendant responded, "you're going with me and 
that's it." 
 
As the victim and the defendant were entering a taxicab, 
two police officers arrived in response to a 911 call that a 
neighbor had placed; the neighbor had been awakened when he 
heard a woman screaming and reported that two women were 
fighting.3  As the officers approached, the defendant held a 
switchblade to the victim's side and told her that if she said 
anything to the police officers about the incident, he would 
kill her.  The officers interviewed the victim and the defendant 
separately, but the victim was afraid and did not tell them what 
had happened.  The victim said that she had been fighting with 
another woman and that she did not want to press charges.  The 
                     
 
3 The caller did not see the faces of the people involved in 
the fight.  A bystander also reported that she heard a woman 
screaming, but did not see the people involved. 
7 
 
 
officer interviewing the victim noticed that she had a bruise 
under her eye that appeared to be "several days old and yellow," 
but did not observe any fresh injuries.  The officers did not 
see anyone else nearby.  They left, and the victim and the 
defendant took a taxicab back to Uncle Otis's house.  The 
victim's mother was staying at the house that night and inquired 
about the victim's injuries.  Because the defendant was in the 
room when she did so, the victim lied and said that she had been 
"jumped" by two women. 
 
After the victim's mother had gone to bed, the defendant 
pushed the victim into the bathroom and pulled off her pants and 
underwear, while the victim repeatedly protested.  The defendant 
forced his hands into her vagina.  He said that he was going to 
kill her with his switchblade, and "tried" to stab her side and 
her leg until the knife broke.  He then ordered the victim to 
sit on the living room couch and continued to hit her.  When the 
victim asked to share some of the cigarette the defendant was 
smoking, he put the cigarette out on her face, again accused her 
of lying, and repeated that he was going to kill her. 
 
The victim managed to run into the bedroom where her mother 
was sleeping, and woke her mother up.  The victim was "crying 
very hard."  Her mother then confronted the defendant.  He 
responded that he no longer wanted to be in a relationship with 
the victim, and asked if she was going to call the police.  The 
8 
 
 
victim and her mother did not call the police, because they did 
not want Uncle Otis to "get in trouble and lose his house."  The 
victim slept that night in the same room with her mother. 
 
When the victim woke up the next morning, the defendant and 
his belongings were gone.  Her mother arranged for a relative to 
take the victim to the hospital.4  While the victim was at the 
hospital, an officer of the Chelsea police department 
interviewed her.  He noticed that the victim had a swollen eye, 
scratches and marks on her neck, puncture wounds on her leg, an 
abrasion near her hip, and a burn mark on her face.  The officer 
subsequently arrested the defendant.5 
 
ii.  Defendant's case.  The defendant called a nurse who 
served as a medical consultant to explain the contents of the 
victim's hospital records.  The nurse had not treated the victim 
and had not met with her prior to testifying.  The nurse 
explained that, based on the victim's computerized tomography 
(CT) scan, the doctors had concluded that the victim was 
suffering from swelling on the frontal bone of her skull, but 
                     
 
4 The victim received treatment for her injuries but 
declined a sexual assault examination, saying that she was in 
too much pain. 
 
 
5 The defendant tried to telephone the victim several times 
after the assault, but she did not answer.  While the defendant 
was in pretrial detention, however, the victim sent him a letter 
saying, "what was done was not my doing."  The letter also asked 
the defendant to telephone her and said that she had never loved 
anyone as much as she loved him. 
9 
 
 
had no brain injury.  The victim also had a deformity or chip 
fracture of her jaw bone, without swelling or bruising in that 
area.  The victim had swelling, bruising, and internal bleeding 
on her forehead, near her eyes, and on her nose and chin, and 
complained of lower back pain.  The records indicated that the 
victim told the treating physicians that she had not lost 
consciousness during the incident, and contained no indication 
of any stab wounds or treatment for stab wounds.  The hospital 
records stated that the victim had a burn on her cheek, but 
there was no indication that she was treated for a cigarette 
burn.  The nurse opined that the mark on the victim's cheek 
"could" be a cigarette burn, but that it did not look like the 
cigarette burns she had seen in her own experience; based on the 
photographs taken by the investigating officer, the mark was 
superficial, had an irregular shape, and looked several days 
old.  At the hospital, the victim had complained of blurred 
vision, but her vision test revealed entirely normal results 
with textbook acuity. 
 
b.  Procedural history.  A grand jury returned indictments 
against the defendant for eleven charges.  He was indicted on 
charges of human trafficking, in violation of G. L. c. 265, 
§ 50 (a), and deriving support from prostitution, in violation 
of G. L. c. 272, § 7, for the period from September 1 to 
December 14, 2014.  He also was indicted on two counts of 
10 
 
 
assault and battery, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13A.  For 
the incident on the evening of December 13 and the early morning 
hours of December 14, 2014, the defendant was indicted on 
charges of rape, G. L. c. 265, § 22; assault and battery by 
means of a dangerous weapon (a lit cigarette and a knife), G. L. 
c. 265, § 15A; assault by means of a dangerous weapon (a knife), 
G. L. c. 265, § 15B (b); strangulation, G. L. c. 265, § 15D (a); 
assault and battery, G. L. c. 265, § 13A; and intimidation of a 
witness, G. L. c. 268, § 13B. 
 
The defendant moved unsuccessfully to have the human 
trafficking charge dismissed, arguing that the Commonwealth did 
not present sufficient evidence to the grand jury, and that the 
human trafficking statute was unconstitutionally vague as 
applied to him. 
 
Ultimately, the jury found the defendant guilty of human 
trafficking, deriving support from prostitution, rape, and two 
counts of assault and battery, one for the punching incident 
between December 1 and 10, 2014, and one for the events on the 
evening of December 13 and the early morning hours of December 
14, 2014.  He was acquitted of the other charges.  The defendant 
timely appealed, and we allowed his petition for direct 
appellate review. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The defendant argues that the judge erred 
in prohibiting defense counsel from asking most of the members 
11 
 
 
of the venire whether they would expect an innocent defendant to 
testify, because the question was proper and useful in revealing 
juror bias.  The defendant also maintains that the evidence was 
not sufficient to support his conviction of human trafficking 
because there was no indication that he forced or coerced the 
victim into prostitution, and that the judge's instruction on 
that offense was insufficient to convey to the jury the 
statute's proper meaning.  In addition, the defendant argues 
that the judge erred in denying his motion to use Backpage 
records to impeach the victim, and in ordering that the records 
be redacted in such a way that they could not be used for 
impeachment purposes, even though the Commonwealth earlier had 
introduced unredacted copies of the records. 
 
a.  Questioning of the venire on the defendant's right not 
to testify.  i.  Empanelment.  At trial, the defendant moved for 
attorney-conducted voir dire.  The judge permitted the attorneys 
the "opportunity to ask reasonable follow-up questions" based on 
anything "see[n], hear[d], or read about the juror."  The judge 
began jury selection by asking the entire venire several 
questions, including three that are statutorily required: 
(1) "Do any of you not understand that in a criminal case, 
the defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty?"; 
 
(2) "Do any of you not understand that in a criminal case, 
the prosecution has the burden of proving the defendant is 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?"; and 
 
12 
 
 
(3) "Do any of you not understand that in a criminal case, 
the defendant does not have to present any evidence in his 
or her own behalf?" 
 
See G. L. c. 234A, § 67A.  Thereafter, at sidebar, the judge 
questioned each potential juror individually.  One of the 
questions she posed was, "The defendant in a criminal trial has 
the absolute right not to testify.  If this defendant chooses 
not to testify, would you hold that against him in any way?"  
After the judge finished her questioning, she allowed the 
attorneys to pose follow-up questions. 
 
In response to the judge's question on a defendant's right 
not to testify, the first member of the venire said he would not 
hold it against the defendant if the defendant chose not to 
testify.  Defense counsel then asked, "The judge asked you about 
the possibility of the defendant not testifying.  If someone was 
innocent, would you expect that they would testify or would not 
testify?"  The juror responded, "No, either way."  When that 
juror stepped away, the judge commented that defense counsel had 
asked redundant questions, and told him "not [to] ask the same 
question that [she] ask[ed]."  The first juror was empanelled. 
 
In response to the same question from the judge, the second 
potential juror also indicated that he would not hold it against 
the defendant if the defendant chose not to testify.  Defense 
counsel then asked, "The judge mentioned that the defendant has 
the right not to testify.  Would you expect that if someone was 
13 
 
 
innocent, that they would testify or not necessarily?"  The 
juror responded "Well, he don't have the right to, so he don't 
have to testify."  When that juror stepped away, the judge noted 
that defense counsel's question was redundant.  Counsel 
responded that a colleague had told him that the phrasing he had 
employed was a useful addition because a potential juror might 
not fully comprehend the judge's more abstract question.  The 
judge said that she would "engage in an experiment" and also 
would permit defense counsel to ask whether the juror would 
expect an innocent defendant to testify, in order to determine 
if jurors gave different responses to the two questions.  The 
second juror was empanelled. 
 
The next three potential jurors were excused for cause 
before defense counsel had an opportunity to pose his version of 
the question on a defendant's right not to testify.  In response 
to the judge's question, the sixth juror stated that he would 
not hold it against the defendant if the defendant chose not to 
testify.  Defense counsel then asked, "Would you expect that a 
defendant who is innocent would testify, whether he has to or 
not?" and the juror responded, "No, not necessarily."  The juror 
was empanelled. 
 
The seventh potential juror also responded to the judge's 
question by saying that she would not hold it against the 
14 
 
 
defendant if he did not testify.  During defense counsel's 
subsequent questioning, the following exchange took place: 
Defense counsel:  "Regardless of whether the defendant 
has a right to testify or not, would you expect that 
an innocent defendant would testify?" 
 
The juror:  "I would think, but I don't -- I'd be open 
to hearing or not hearing.  I don't know if that makes 
sense." 
 
The judge:  "I'm not sure I understand." 
 
The juror:  "You're asking if he is claiming he's 
innocent --" 
 
The judge:  "You have to keep your voice up a little 
bit." 
 
The juror:  "Oh, I'm sorry.  If you're claiming that 
he is innocent and he did testify, do I have -- I'm 
sorry." 
 
The judge:  "Put the question to her again, I think 
she's confused by the question." 
 
Defense counsel:  "If he was innocent, would you 
expect that he probably would testify?" 
 
The juror: "Yes." 
 
Defense counsel:  "How come?" 
 
The juror:  "Just to defend himself and he would have 
probable cause." 
 
The judge asked the potential juror to step away, and then noted 
that she had realized why she initially did not like counsel's 
question.  She commented that it was a "commitment question," in 
that it asked jurors to commit to a particular position by 
planting in a juror's mind the idea that the defendant was 
15 
 
 
actually innocent and therefore should testify.  She explained 
that, although a defendant is presumed innocent, "[t]he issue is 
whether [the Commonwealth] can prove [its] case beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Innocence is not an issue in this case."6  The 
judge did not permit defense counsel thereafter to ask his form 
of the question, but did offer to excuse the juror for cause.  
Counsel agreed that the juror should be excused, and asked the 
judge to note his objection. 
 
ii.  Attorney conducted voir dire.  "[P]art of the 
guarantee of a defendant's right to an impartial jury is an 
adequate voir dire to identify unqualified jurors."  Morgan v. 
Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992).  See G. L. c. 234A, § 67A 
(voir dire is designed "to learn whether the juror is related to 
either party or has any interest in the case, or has expressed 
or formed an opinion, or is sensible of any bias or prejudice").  
The scope of voir dire, however, "is in the sound discretion of 
the trial judge and will be upheld absent a clear showing of 
abuse of discretion."  Commonwealth v. Gray, 465 Mass. 330, 338, 
                     
 
6 See Anderson v. State, 161 Ga. App. 816, 816 (1982) (trial 
judge did not err in declining to permit defense attorney to ask 
whether jurors "would still expect the defendant to take the 
stand and testify as to his innocence" even if they knew that 
defendant did not have burden of proving his innocence, because 
question "sought to have the jurors prejudge how they might view 
the defendant's failure to testify"). 
16 
 
 
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 628 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Perez, 460 Mass. 683, 689 (2011). 
 
Prior to 2014, judges had discretion not to permit 
attorneys to engage in direct questioning of potential jurors.  
See Commonwealth v. Gee, 6 Cush. 174, 178 (1850) ("The counsel 
of a party has no right personally to interrogate the jurors, 
with a view of showing their bias or prejudice by facts drawn 
out by a cross-examination, or something very like it").  In 
2014, however, the Legislature amended G. L. c. 234, § 28, such 
that, upon request, attorneys and self-represented parties in 
the Superior Court now have the right to question potential 
jurors during voir dire.  See St. 2014, c. 254, § 2.7  Although 
"the empanelment process takes somewhat longer when attorneys 
participate in voir dire, the consensus is that [attorney 
participation in voir dire] has improved the process of jury 
selection.  As a result, judges and attorneys should have 
greater confidence that the jurors who are ultimately empaneled 
are more likely to be impartial."8  Supreme Judicial Court 
                     
 
7 In 2016, this section was recodified as G. L. c. 234A, 
§ 67D.  St. 2016, c. 36, § 4. 
 
 
8 Our committee on juror voir dire, which was convened soon 
after the statute was enacted, observed that forty-four per cent 
of Superior Court judges had been permitting some form of 
attorney-conducted voir dire prior to the enactment, and "while 
[G. L. c.] 254 would push attorney involvement further, it could 
be implemented without radical changes to the judges' current 
 
17 
 
 
Committee on Juror Voir Dire, Final Report to the Justices, at 5 
(July 12, 2016) (SJC Committee Report).  Nonetheless, while 
trial judges must permit attorney-conducted voir dire upon 
request, the scope of such questioning remains in the discretion 
of the judge.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 234A, § 67D (2) ("The court 
may impose reasonable limitations upon the questions and the 
time allowed during such examination, including, but not limited 
to, requiring pre-approval of the questions"). 
 
To implement the statutory requirement, the Superior Court 
adopted Standing Order 1-15 (effective Feb. 2, 2015), which 
"fully preserves the discretionary authority of the trial judge 
with respect to the examination and selection of jurors in each 
case . . . while permitting attorneys and self-represented 
parties a fair opportunity to participate in voir dire so as to 
identify inappropriate bias."  The standing order requires 
judges, in deciding which questions to allow, to give "due 
regard" to the goals of selecting fair and impartial jurors, 
conducting jury selection with "reasonable expedition," and 
"respecting the dignity and privacy of each potential juror."  
Id.  See SJC Committee Report, supra at 11. 
                                                                  
approaches to jury selection in civil and criminal cases."  
Supreme Judicial Court Committee on Juror Voir Dire, Final 
Report to the Justices, at 3 (July 12, 2016) (SJC Committee 
Report). 
18 
 
 
 
Superior Court Rule 6, which was put in place after 
Standing Order 1-15, provides guidance to judges when making 
determinations regarding attorney-conducted voir dire.  A trial 
judge may "impose reasonable restrictions on the subject matter, 
time, or method of attorney or party voir dire."  Rule 6(3)(f) 
of the Rules of the Superior Court.  Pursuant to rule 6(3)(e), 
attorneys may not ask questions that (1) are "framed in terms of 
how the juror would decide this case (prejudgment), including 
hypotheticals that are close/specific to the facts of this 
case"; (2) "seek to commit juror(s) to a result, including, 
without limitation, questions about what evidence would cause 
the juror(s) to find for the attorney's client or the party"; 
(3) have "no substantial purpose other than to argue an 
attorney's or party's case or indoctrinate"; (4) concern the 
outcome of "prior cases where the person has served as a juror, 
including the prior vote(s) of the juror or the verdict of the 
entire jury"; or (5) "specifically reference what is written on 
a particular juror's confidential juror questionnaire" while in 
the presence of other jurors. 
 
By contrast, trial judges "should generally approve a 
reasonable number of questions" concerning (1) "the prospective 
juror's background and experience pertinent to the issues 
expected to arise in the case"; (2) "preconceptions or biases 
relating to the identity of the parties or the nature of the 
19 
 
 
claims or issues expected to arise in the case";9 (3) the juror's 
"willingness and ability to accept and apply pertinent legal 
principles as instructed"; and (4) "information on subjects that 
controlling authority has identified as preferred subjects of 
inquiry, even if not absolutely required."  Rule 6(3)(c) of the 
Rules of the Superior Court.  Further, if a party or attorney 
wishes to inquire about potential jurors' political views, 
voting patterns, party preferences, or religious beliefs or 
affiliations, the litigant first must explain to the judge's 
satisfaction "how the inquiry is relevant to the issues, may 
affect the juror's impartiality, or may assist in the proper 
exercise of peremptory challenges."  Rule 6(3)(d) of the Rules 
of the Superior Court. 
 
There is no dispute in this case that defense counsel 
sought to ask his particular form of the question on the 
defendant's right not to testify in an effort to reveal juror 
bias, an entirely appropriate line of inquiry.  That the 
question was well intentioned and directed to proper subject 
matter, however, does not necessarily mean that the judge's 
                     
 
9 Superior Court Rule 6 explicitly encourages judges to 
consider whether proposed questions or methods may assist in 
identifying explicit or implicit bias.  Rule 6(3)(g) of the 
Rules of the Superior Court.  This court also has endorsed "Best 
Practices for Jury Selection" proposed by the Committee on Juror 
Voir Dire, that encourage the same considerations.  See Best 
Practices For Jury Selection (July 20, 2016); SJC Committee 
Report, supra at 11. 
20 
 
 
decision not to permit it was error.  In addition to discretion 
to exclude inappropriate topics, judges have broad discretion 
with regard to the specific question or language used to probe 
appropriate subject matter.  See Addendum A(1) to the Rules of 
the Superior Court ("The trial judge may, in the exercise of 
discretion, require attorneys and self-represented parties to 
submit the specific language of the proposed questions for pre-
approval").10  This discretion encompasses a judge's ability to 
                     
 
10 There is broad consensus among courts in other 
jurisdictions that judges have discretion over the wording, and 
not merely the subject matter, of voir dire questions.  See, 
e.g., Kasi v. Angelone, 300 F.3d 487, 509 (4th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 537 U.S. 1025 (2002) ("trial court has broad discretion 
in conducting the voir dire of the jury, and particularly in 
phrasing the questions to be asked" [quotations omitted and 
citation]); State v. Colon, 272 Conn. 106, 171-173 (2004), cert. 
denied, 546 U.S. 848 (2005) (trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in sustaining State attorney's objections to phrasing 
of defense counsel's statement during voir dire that "the 
presumption of innocence says you have to presume [the 
defendant] innocent, perfectly clean slate as he sits here" and 
"the jurors have to presume an accused person completely 
innocent of any wrongdoing," as judge provided defense counsel 
sufficient other questions to probe jurors' views regarding 
presumption of innocence [emphasis in original]); Dingle v. 
State, 361 Md. 1, 13 (2000) ("the trial court has broad 
discretion in the conduct of voir dire, most especially with 
regard to the scope and the form of the questions propounded"); 
State v. Parks, 324 N.C. 420, 423 (1989) ("while counsel may 
diligently inquire into a juror's fitness to serve, the extent 
and manner of that inquiry rests within the trial court's 
discretion"); Hyundai Motor Co. v. Vasquez, 189 S.W.3d 743, 755 
(Tex. 2006) ("Determining whether jurors' answers assume or 
ignore the evidence disclosed to them turns on the courtroom 
context, and perhaps the looks on their faces.  So, too, does 
the import of counsel's questions, and whether as phrased they 
seek external information or a preview of a potential verdict.  
 
21 
 
 
prevent posing questions that are likely to confuse, misinform, 
or mislead the jury because of their format or wording. 
 
We conclude that the judge did not abuse her discretion in 
precluding defense counsel from asking the particular question 
he sought to use.  See L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 
n.27 (2014).  That some potential jurors may expect a defendant 
to testify if he or she were innocent does not, without more, 
mean that they cannot or will not put aside that expectation and 
honor the defendant's rights after being properly instructed.  
Although the defendant correctly notes that counsel is not 
limited to questions that probe a juror's willingness to follow 
directions, and may inquire into a jurors' beliefs on relevant 
issues, a potential juror's expectation that a defendant will 
testify if innocent is often based on a lack of knowledge of the 
criminal justice system rather than on steadfast beliefs.  See 
Hopson v. Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 144, 153 (2008) ("To be 
sure, it is not surprising that jurors would want or expect a 
defendant to testify; any conscientious juror naturally would 
want all the help he or she could get in deciding a case.  It 
should not be grounds for a per se exclusion, therefore, when 
prospective jurors on voir dire indicate their wants or 
expectations in this respect" [quotations and citation 
                                                                  
The trial judge is in a better position to evaluate the 
reasonableness of both aspects -- the question and the answer"). 
22 
 
 
omitted]).  Because the wording of defense counsel's question 
could be seen by some potential jurors as asking the juror to 
disregard the defendant's constitutional right not to testify, 
the question did not properly elicit information that could 
demonstrate the juror's ability to be fair and impartial. 
 
The possibly confusing nature of counsel's question is 
evident from the replies of the seventh juror, which prompted 
the judge to preclude the question for the remainder of the voir 
dire.  In response to the question, "Regardless of whether the 
defendant has a right to testify or not, would you expect that 
an innocent defendant would testify?" the juror provided a 
series of confused answers:  "I would think, but I don't -- I'd 
be open to hearing or not hearing.  I don't know if that makes 
sense"; "You're asking if he is claiming he's innocent --"; and 
"If you're claiming that he is innocent and he did testify, do I 
have -- I’m sorry."  When the judge told counsel to pose the 
question again, he omitted the defendant's right not to testify 
altogether and simply asked, "If [the defendant] was innocent, 
would you expect that he probably would testify?" to which the 
juror's response remained unclear:  "Just to defend himself and 
he would have probable cause." 
 
Although the judge's decision to engage in an "experiment" 
may have been unconventional, her decision to revisit her prior 
ruling was not.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 22 Mass. 
23 
 
 
App. Ct. 274, 277 n.5 (1986) ("even if nothing unexpected 
happens at trial, the [trial] judge is free, in the exercise of 
sound judicial discretion, to alter a previous in limine 
ruling").  The record demonstrates that the judge was 
uncomfortable with defense counsel's question from the start, 
and precluded the question after the seventh juror's response 
showed that it might cause confusion.  The record does not 
support the defendant's suggestion that the judge decided to 
preclude the question because the experiment proved fruitful in 
revealing bias.  On this record, we conclude that the judge did 
not abuse her discretion in declining to allow defense counsel 
to continue posing this specific question, and instead choosing 
to probe potential juror bias on the question of the defendant's 
right not to testify with her own form of that question. 
 
b.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  The defendant argues that 
the Commonwealth did not present sufficient evidence to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of violating G. L. 
c. 265, § 50 (a), the so-called "human trafficking" or "sex 
trafficking" statute.  The defendant maintains that his actions 
could not constitute human trafficking because they did not 
involve force or coercion, and the victim willingly engaged in 
prostitution. 
 
General Laws c. 265, § 50 (a), provides, in relevant part: 
24 
 
 
 
"Whoever knowingly:  (i) subjects, or attempts to 
subject, or recruits, entices, harbors, transports, 
provides or obtains by any means . . . another person 
to engage in commercial sexual activity . . . or 
causes a person to engage in commercial sexual 
activity . . . shall be guilty of the crime of 
trafficking of persons for sexual servitude . . . ."11 
 
The statute was enacted in 2011, when the Legislature recognized 
that the Commonwealth could not simply rely on Federal 
prosecutions to combat human trafficking, and needed to empower 
local authorities to assist.  See State House News Service 
(House Sess.), Nov. 15, 2011 (human trafficking statute was 
enacted "to make sure local law enforcement can devote their 
offices and resource[s] and not wait for [F]ederal 
intervention").  See also 2011 House Doc No. 3483, Senate Floor 
Debate, Nov. 14, 2011; House Approves Bill on Human Trafficking, 
Boston Globe, June 2, 2011 ("the human trafficking problem in 
Massachusetts is more likely to involve smaller bands of 
domestic groups rather than larger international slave 
trading. . . .  The [F]ederal government has laws against human 
trafficking, but often lacks resources to go after smaller 
offenders.  Prosecutors say the [S]tate law would make it easier 
to build cases that would fill in those enforcement gaps").  At 
                     
 
11 The human trafficking statute also applies to anyone who 
"(ii) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, 
as a result of a violation of clause (i)."  G. L. c. 265, 
§ 50 (a).  The jury were not instructed on this subclause, 
however, as the judge determined that it was inapplicable here. 
25 
 
 
that time, only three other States had not enacted some form of 
a human trafficking offense.  See State House News Service 
(Senate Sess.), Nov. 15, 2011; 2011 House Doc. No. 3808, Senate 
Floor Debate, Nov. 14, 2011.  While the statute clearly was 
enacted to fill a "gap," the Legislature also intended to 
"change the focus of police and prosecutors from targeting 
prostitutes to going after the men who pay for sex with them and 
the pimps who profit from the transactions."  See Gov. Patrick 
Signs Bill Against Human Trafficking, Associated Press, Nov. 21, 
2011.  See also 2011 House Doc. No. 3808, Senate Floor Debate, 
supra; State House News Service (Senate Sess.), supra; New Law 
Aims to Shut Down Sex Trade Traffickers, Telegram & Gazette, 
Nov. 22, 2011. 
 
Consistent with such Legislative intent, in Commonwealth v. 
McGhee, 472 Mass. 405 (2015), this court rejected the limited 
reading of the human trafficking statute that the defendant puts 
forth.  In that case, the court observed that "the Legislature 
has determined that whether a person being trafficked for sexual 
servitude has been forced or coerced into engaging in such 
activities is immaterial for purposes of ascertaining whether a 
criminal act has been committed."  Id. at 415.  The defendants 
in McGhee had argued that, without an element of force or 
coercion, the statute was unconstitutionally vague because it 
could apply even to the act of "merely assisting a consenting 
26 
 
 
adult prostitute."  Id. at 413.  The court explained that use of 
the word "knowingly" in the statutory language showed that the 
statute's "clear and deliberate focus . . . is the intent of the 
perpetrator, not the means used by the perpetrator to accomplish 
his or her intent."  Id. at 415.  Therefore, "'merely assisting' 
an adult consenting prostitute will still constitute the crime 
of sex trafficking in those circumstances where all of the 
statutory elements have been satisfied" (emphasis in original).12  
Id. at 416. 
 
Thus, here, the Commonwealth could meet its burden of 
proving that the defendant engaged in human trafficking by 
showing that he knowingly "subject[ed], or attempt[ed] to 
subject, or recruit[ed], entice[d], . . . transport[ed or] 
provide[d] . . . another person to engage in commercial sexual 
activity."  See G. L. c. 265, § 50 (a); McGhee, 472 Mass. at 
416.  Viewed in its entirety, and in the light most favorable to 
the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth's case presented sufficient 
evidence that the defendant's conduct violated the human 
trafficking statute.  The jury could have found that the 
defendant "enticed" and "recruited" the victim to engage in 
                     
 
12 The defendant argues that if the human trafficking 
statute applies to those who assist willing prostitutes, it is 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.  We have previously 
considered and rejected this argument.  See Commonwealth v. 
McGhee, 472 Mass. 405, 412-420 (2015). 
27 
 
 
prostitution because he told her that she was beautiful and 
would make "good money" from prostitution, controlled the terms 
of her client visits, encouraged her to advertise on Backpage, 
and helped her pay for and set up the Backpage account. 
 
The defendant contends that the statement in McGhee that 
the human trafficking statute does not require force or coercion 
was dicta, as it was undisputed that the victims in that case 
were coerced, and, in any event, according to the defendant, 
McGhee was wrongly decided.  He challenges the analysis in 
McGhee that, by contrast to the earlier-enacted Federal statute 
prohibiting human trafficking, 18 U.S.C. § 1591, the 
Massachusetts statute omits the element of force or coercion, 
which McGhee explained "reflect[s] a conscious decision by the 
Legislature to deviate from the standard embodied in the Federal 
statute" (citation omitted).  McGhee, 472 Mass. at n.8.  The 
defendant maintains that this omission was because, under the 
Federal statute, coercion is a "defined and narrow term of art" 
that encompasses only threats of serious harm or abuse of the 
legal process.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(2).  He suggests that 
the Massachusetts statute is more akin to another Federal 
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2422, which punishes anyone who "knowingly 
persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual to engage 
in prostitution," and that the omission of force or coercion 
from the language of the Massachusetts statute does not mean 
28 
 
 
that the Legislature intended to dispense with the element of 
coercion altogether. 
 
The defendant's interpretation of the statute is 
unconvincing.  Not only did the Legislature choose not to 
include the term "coercion" in the Massachusetts human 
trafficking statute, it also chose to omit the term "force," a 
term that does not have a specialized meaning under the Federal 
statute.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1591.  This suggests that the wording 
of the statute was not merely to avoid being constrained by the 
Federal definition of "coercion."  Additionally, if the primary 
concern of the Legislature were to avoid the narrow definition 
of "coercion" in the Federal statute, the Legislature could have 
enacted its own definition.  It did not do so. 
 
The defendant also posits that because the Legislature has 
not repealed the statutes that criminalize deriving support from 
prostitution (G. L. c. 272, § 7) and aiding and abetting 
prostitution (G. L. c. 272, § 53, and G. L. c. 274, § 2), the 
Legislature must have intended the human trafficking statute to 
target a more traditional, narrow set of crimes involving force 
or coercion, rather than simple encouragement.  The reading of 
the human trafficking statute in McGhee, however, did not make 
these other statutes superfluous.  As the court explained, the 
statute criminalizing deriving support from prostitution 
"plainly states that the conduct prohibited by that statute is 
29 
 
 
the sharing of proceeds earned by a known prostitute.  In 
contrast, under [the human trafficking statute], an individual 
who knowingly enables or causes another person to engage in 
commercial sexual activity need not benefit, either financially 
or by receiving something of value, from such conduct."  McGhee, 
472 Mass. at 416-417.  Additionally, the knowledge element of 
the deriving support statute is retrospective, because the crime 
occurs when proceeds of a past act of prostitution are shared, 
while the knowledge required by the human trafficking statute is 
prospective, as it relates to an individual's "anticipated 
engagement in commercial sexual activity."  Id. at 417. 
 
Moreover, the plain and ordinary meaning of the actus reus 
in the human trafficking statute does not, as the defendant 
contends, necessarily "connote[] some level of inducement, 
manipulation, or coercion."  For example, the dictionary 
definition of "entice" is to "incite," "instigate," "draw on by 
arousing hope or desire," "allure," "attract," "draw into evil 
ways," "lead astray," or "tempt."  Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary 757 (1993).  See Commonwealth v. Samuel 
S., 476 Mass. 497, 501 (2017) (we look to dictionary definitions 
as guide to plain or ordinary meaning of term).  None of these 
meanings implies force or coercion.  One may entice, for 
example, simply by making an attractive offer.  Similarly, to 
"recruit" means to "hire or otherwise obtain to perform 
30 
 
 
services," to "secure the services of" another, to "muster," 
"raise," or "enlist."  Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary 1899 (1993).  Such recruitment does not require force 
or coercion. 
 
In the same vein, nothing in the language of the human 
trafficking statute suggests that it excludes conduct aimed at 
victims who have engaged in prostitution in the past.  An 
individual who previously has worked as a prostitute nonetheless 
might decide to engage in a particular act of prostitution.  As 
the Commonwealth points out, the reading that the defendant 
would impose would lead to an absurd result, as the statute 
would then punish only "the first person who victimizes a person 
via sexual servitude."  The fact that, in this case, the victim 
had been engaged in prostitution during some unspecified period 
before she met the defendant does not insulate him.  Evidence 
introduced at trial showed that the victim returned to 
prostitution following the defendant's specific encouragement.  
Thus, the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction on 
the charge of human trafficking. 
 
c.  Jury instruction on human trafficking.  The defendant 
contends that the judge's instruction on human trafficking was 
inadequate.  On this charge, the judge instructed: 
 
"In order to prove the defendant guilty of this 
offense, the Commonwealth must prove the following two 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt:  first, that the 
31 
 
 
defendant subjected or attempted to subject, or 
recruited or enticed, harbored, transported, provided 
or obtained by any means, or attempted to recruit, 
entice, harbor, transport, provide or obtain by any 
means, [the victim], or caused [the victim] to engage 
in commercial sexual activity; and second, that the 
defendant did so knowingly." 
 
We discern no error in the judge's instruction.  The 
defendant takes issue with the judge's rejection of his proposal 
to include language stating that the defendant must have 
"enabled or caused" the victim's prostitution.  This argument 
relies on language in McGhee intended to clarify that the human 
trafficking statute "does not prohibit all interactions or 
associations between a prostitute and family members, friends, 
or social service organizations.  Rather, it forbids such 
individuals or entities from knowingly undertaking specified 
activities that will enable or cause another person to engage in 
commercial sexual activity."  McGhee, 472 Mass. at 418.  This 
reference to "enabling" or "causing" prostitution was a short-
hand means of describing the various ways in which a person may 
violate the human trafficking statute, as set forth in full in 
the judge's instruction. 
The defendant argues also that the judge erred in declining 
to give a proposed instruction that "[i]t is not enough to show 
that [the victim] worked as a prostitute and the defendant 
helped her do so; the Commonwealth must prove that he knowingly 
did at least one of the specific things listed above to make her 
32 
 
 
engage in commercial sexual activity."  The proposed instruction 
is duplicative of the judge's instruction, and merely requires 
the jury to consider all of the elements of the human 
trafficking statute.  That the judge declined to emphasize the 
elements of the human trafficking statute in the manner that the 
defendant preferred does not constitute error.  See Commonwealth 
v. Kelly, 470 Mass. 682, 688 (2015) ("Trial judges have 
considerable discretion in framing jury instructions, both in 
determining the precise phraseology used and the appropriate 
degree of elaboration" [quotations and citation omitted]). 
 
d.  Impeachment evidence.  The defendant argues that it was 
reversible error for the judge to bar him from using Backpage 
records to impeach the victim's testimony.  Prior to trial, the 
parties had stipulated to the authenticity of a number of 
Backpage records;13 these records included four Backpage 
advertisements depicting the victim, as well as invoices 
associated with those advertisements.  Four of the invoices, one 
for each of the four advertisements, were dated for periods 
prior to the defendant's arrest.  Twenty other invoices, 
                     
 
13 The stipulation provided:  "The parties stipulate that 
the Backpage records of [the victim] are true, authentic, and 
complete.  The parties waive objections to admittance of these 
records on authenticity grounds and state that they need not be 
obtained via a trial subpoena for admission at trial.  The 
parties do not waive objections to admissibility on any other 
grounds." 
33 
 
 
associated with one of these advertisements, were dated after 
the defendant had been arrested and was being held in pretrial 
detention. 
 
The Commonwealth moved in limine to exclude evidence of 
Backpage invoices after the date of the defendant's arrest, 
arguing that those invoices had no bearing on the human 
trafficking charge and that evidence of any of the victim's 
subsequent sexual conduct would violate the rape shield statute.  
The judge denied the Commonwealth's motion, reasoning that such 
evidence would be relevant to the issue whether the victim was 
"enticed" into prostitution.  The judge also ruled that defense 
counsel would be allowed to ask the victim whether she had 
reposted an advertisement on Backpage after the defendant's 
arrest. 
 
On direct examination of the victim, the Commonwealth was 
allowed to admit the package of documents containing all of the 
Backpage advertisements and invoices, "[s]ubject to redaction."  
During cross-examination, the victim denied that she had 
reposted any advertisements on Backpage after the defendant was 
arrested.  Defense counsel believed that she was perjuring 
herself and sought to impeach her denial with the Backpage 
invoices from the period after the defendant's arrest.  He 
argued that the invoices showed that someone must have paid to 
have the advertisement reposted, and that the invoices had not 
34 
 
 
been generated automatically, because they were dated 
sporadically and depicted an "auto repost" box which was not 
checked.  He also maintained that the person who had reposted 
the advertisement likely was the victim, because the 
advertisement associated with the postarrest invoices displayed 
a telephone number that the victim had obtained only after the 
defendant had asked her to stop using Backpage, shortly before 
his arrest.  Additionally, the invoices dated after the 
defendant's arrest had a different electronic mail address from 
that on the invoices dated before his arrest, and the new 
electronic mail address contained the victim's married name. 
 
The judge denied defense counsel's request, noting that 
counsel could not impeach the victim with someone else's 
statement, and would need to call a Backpage employee to explain 
the contents of the invoices.  She commented that the Backpage 
invoices were "speculative at best" on the question whether, as 
the defendant argued, the victim had reposted the advertisement.  
The judge observed that the victim was not required to "figure 
them out herself," and noted that the defendant should have 
called a Backpage employee to explain the contents of the 
invoices in order to contradict the victim's testimony; simply 
"dangling a series of invoices in front of [the jury]" was 
35 
 
 
unfair.14  While defense counsel was permitted to ask about the 
victim's reposting of the advertisement, the judge explained, he 
would be "stuck with her answer."  The judge then sua sponte 
told the parties retroactively to redact the previously admitted 
Backpage records in conformity with her ruling. 
 
A witness generally may be impeached by contradiction with 
(1) the witness's own prior, inconsistent statement; (2) 
internal inconsistency in the witness's testimony; or (3) other 
conflicting evidence.  M.S. Brodin & M. Avery, Handbook of 
Massachusetts Evidence § 6.13 (2017).  See Mass. G. Evid. 
§§ 606, 613(a) (2017).  Because the invoices did not constitute 
statements by the victim, they could not be treated as her prior 
                     
 
14 The judge determined further that admission of the 
Backpage invoices from the time after the defendant's arrest 
would violate G. L. c. 233, § 21B, the rape shield statue.  With 
a few exceptions, that statute generally restricts the 
admissibility of evidence of "the reputation of a victim's 
sexual conduct" and "specific instances of a victim's sexual 
conduct."  We have recognized, however, that a "defendant may 
introduce evidence of the complaining witness's sexual conduct 
where that conduct is relevant to the complainant's bias or 
motive to fabricate."  Commonwealth v. Harris, 443 Mass. 714, 
721 (2005).  See Commonwealth v. Polk, 462 Mass. 23, 37–38 
(2012) ("where the rape shield statute is in conflict with a 
defendant's constitutional right to present evidence that might 
lead the jury to find that a Commonwealth witness is lying or 
otherwise unreliable, the statutory prohibition must give way to 
the constitutional right").  When offered for impeachment, the 
introduction of such evidence is within the discretion of the 
trial judge, bearing in mind "the important policies underlying 
the [r]ape-[s]hield statute" (citation omitted).  Harris, supra.  
Given our conclusion, we do not address whether the rape shield 
law would have precluded introduction of the invoices. 
36 
 
 
inconsistent statements for impeachment purposes.  See 
Commonwealth v. Evans, 438 Mass. 142, 157 (2002), cert. denied, 
538 U.S. 966 (2003) (memorandum could not be used to impeach 
witness with prior inconsistent statement because "the 
statement, as written, was not attributable to the [witness] 
with sufficient precision to be used for the intended purpose").  
Additionally, while the invoices could constitute independent 
contradictory evidence, a judge "has discretion to exclude 
relevant evidence on the ground that its probative value is 
outweighed by the risk of confusion or unfair prejudice."  
Commonwealth v. Rosario, 444 Mass. 550, 557 (2005).  Although 
the parties did stipulate to the authenticity of the records, 
the judge did not preclude their use for impeachment purposes on 
authenticity grounds.  Rather, she concluded that the invoices 
would be too confusing for the jury to make sense of without the 
testimony of a Backpage employee who could explain how Backpage 
issued its invoices, and other of its record-keeping practices, 
such that the meaning of the unchecked box on the invoices, and 
whether it necessarily meant a manual intervention by the person 
who posted the advertisement, was clear. 
 
The defendant points out, accurately, that a witness who 
perjures himself or herself opens the door to rebuttal of the 
false statements.  See Commonwealth v. Roderick, 429 Mass. 271, 
275 (1999).  Nevertheless, impeachment is not a "blank check," 
37 
 
 
and is limited by other rules of evidence.  See Commonwealth v. 
Durand, 475 Mass. 657, 662, (2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 259 
(2017) ("trial judges retain wide latitude to impose reasonable 
limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among 
other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues or 
interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant" 
[citation and alterations omitted]).  The trial judge was best 
situated to assess the extent to which the invoices might have 
been confusing to the jury.  See L.L., 470 Mass. at 185 n.27.  
We conclude that her ruling was not an abuse of discretion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.