Title: State v. Lindsey

State: washington

Issuer: Washington Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 
 
No. 14–0773 
 
Filed June 24, 2016 
 
 
STATE OF IOWA, 
 
 
Appellee, 
 
vs. 
 
MAR’YO D. LINDSEY JR., 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals. 
 
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, 
Kellyann M. Lekar (motion to suppress), David F. Staudt (trial and 
sentencing), Judges. 
 
 
A high school student seeks further review of a court of appeals 
decision affirming the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained 
from a search by a public school official.  DECISION OF COURT OF 
APPEALS AND JUDGMENT OF DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, for appellant. 
 
 
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Tyler J. Buller, Assistant 
Attorney General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and Peter 
Blink, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee. 
 
 
2 
APPEL, Justice. 
 
In this case, we consider whether a search of a high school 
student’s football equipment bag by a school official violated the 
constitutional limitations on searches and seizures under the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of 
the Iowa Constitution.  The district court found that the school official 
had reasonable grounds to search the bag.  The court of appeals 
affirmed.  We granted further review.  For the reasons expressed below, 
we affirm. 
 
I.  Background Facts and Procedure. 
 
On August 30, 2013, Mar’yo Lindsey Jr. was playing football for 
Dunkerton High School, Dunkerton, Iowa.  The game was held in 
Riceville, Iowa.  Lindsey brought his school-issued equipment bag with 
him to Riceville.  Football players use their equipment bags to transport 
their gear to sporting events.  Lindsey placed the equipment bag, which 
had his name marked on it, in the team’s locker room upon arrival at 
Riceville. 
 
Unfortunately, Lindsey was badly injured during the game.  The 
Dunkerton school superintendent, James Stanton, called an ambulance 
to take Lindsey to the hospital.  While paramedics were getting Lindsey 
ready for transport, Lindsey told Stanton to give his bag to a friend and 
to not let anybody else other than his friend have the bag or “mess with 
it.”  Lindsey repeated this admonition several times. 
 
Stanton asked head football coach Jonathan Steffen to take the 
bag back to Dunkerton.  Steffen placed the bag on a table in the 
commons area of the Dunkerton lunchroom for the superintendent.  
Stanton then moved the bag, placing it on the floor, and heard a metallic 
sound.  Stanton believed the sound was that of a firearm hitting the 
3 
surface of the floor.  At this point, he unzipped the bag, found a blue 
backpack inside it, opened that bag, and discovered a long-barreled 
handgun along with a bag which appeared to contain marijuana, rolling 
papers, and other drug paraphernalia.  The superintendent secured the 
bag and called law enforcement. 
 
Lindsey was subsequently charged with possession of a firearm as 
a felon, carrying a weapon on school grounds, carrying a weapon, and 
possession of a controlled substance.  Lindsey pled not guilty.  Lindsey 
filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in the equipment bag.  He 
claimed the search of his equipment bag violated his right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures under the Iowa and United States 
Constitutions. 
 
A hearing was held on the motion to suppress.  At the hearing, 
Stanton testified about the evening of August 30.  He stated that at the 
time of the injury, a number of people assembled on the field—the 
athletic directors from both Riceville and Dunkerton, the ambulance 
personnel from Riceville, and one of the game officials.  Lindsey was put 
in a cervical collar and placed on a backboard to prevent further injury.  
At that time, Lindsey said, “[P]lease make sure that Keota gets my bag.  
Don’t let anybody but Keota have my bag.”  Keota was a fellow student 
on the football team.  Stanton further testified that the school had a 
policy in place and posted on the two main entry doors of the school 
building that all bags are subject to search.  Stanton testified that he 
became suspicious when Lindsey stated that he did not want anyone else 
to take his bag. 
 
Stanton instructed Steffen to make sure that Stanton got the bag 
when they got back to Dunkerton.  According to Stanton, when he 
arrived at Dunkerton, the bag was sitting on the table in the commons.  
4 
Stanton testified that he picked up the bag and set it on the floor.  When 
he did so, there was a “very discernable loud clunk.”  Stanton testified 
that he had a lot of experience with firearms as a hunter and collector, 
and he owned one pistol.  When the bag hit the ground and made the 
sound, Stanton testified he was “one hundred percent sure” when the 
bag hit the floor “[t]hat it was a gun.”  Stanton testified he was aware 
that prior to that date Lindsey had been suspended from school for 
possession of drug paraphernalia and that he had some weapons 
charges from activities not related to school. 
 
After Stanton heard the loud clunk, he opened the equipment bag.  
Inside the bag was a backpack.  Inside that bag was some drug 
paraphernalia and the gun.  Stanton inspected the gun.  The gun was 
loaded. 
 
Coach Steffen also testified at the suppression hearing.  Steffen 
testified that when football players go to away games, each player has a 
big red equipment bag that is used to hold their shoulder pads, helmets, 
cleats, and other equipment.  Steffen stated that when he attended to 
Lindsey on the field, “it seemed that it was going to be a pretty serious 
injury” and that Lindsey’s statement that he wanted “a certain kid” to get 
the bag and that “nobody would mess with it . . . kind of raised a red 
flag.” 
 
Steffen testified that after Lindsey was placed in the ambulance, 
Stanton told him to get the bag and not let one of the kids grab it before 
they left.  As a result, Steffen stated he grabbed the bag after the game, 
took it onto the school bus, and placed it on a seat next to his wife.  On 
the bus ride home, the coach received a telephone call from Lindsey, who 
again inquired about his bag and directed that the bag be given only to a 
specific friend.  Upon arrival at Dunkerton, Steffen placed the bag in the 
5 
commons area in the lunch room.  When Stanton arrived, he told Steffen 
he planned to search the bag.  Steffen later saw the results of the search.  
Steffen stated he was aware that Lindsey was involved with possession of 
firearms and that he had been “in juvenile detention or something” for a 
while as a result. 
 
The district court denied the motion to suppress.  After canvassing 
the facts, the district court noted that the parties agreed that State v. 
Benjegerdes was the applicable Iowa appellate court decision to the issue 
presented in this case.1  No. 09–1230, 2011 WL 3925411 (Iowa Ct. App. 
Sept. 8, 2011).  The district court noted that the analysis in Benjegerdes 
relied primarily on the United States Supreme Court case of New Jersey 
v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S. Ct. 733, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1985).  
Benjegerdes, 2011 WL 3925411, at *3. 
 
The district court concluded that under T.L.O. the court should 
consider whether the search was justified at its inception and then 
whether the scope of the search was reasonable.  According to the court, 
both prongs were met.  The court reasoned that the search was 
reasonable from the inception because of Lindsey’s unusual insistence 
that his bag be given to no one other than a specific friend as he lay 
injured on the field and in the phone call to the coach afterwards.  
Further, the court cited the distinctive metal sound Stanton heard when 
the bag hit the ground as supporting the search.  The district court 
concluded there was particularized suspicion under the totality of 
circumstances. 
1Under Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.904(2)(c), unpublished decisions of 
the court of appeals do not constitute binding authority on appeal.  The parties’ 
agreement that the applicable Iowa appellate decision was Benjegerdes, however, helps 
define the issues actually before the district court and properly before us on appeal. 
                                      
 
6 
 
The court next turned to examine the scope of the search.  The 
court reasoned that the scope of the search was justified given the 
reasons that gave rise to the search in the first place.  In particular, the 
examination of the backpack inside the equipment bag was reasonable 
as the likely place to find the suspected firearm.  While the court 
recognized Lindsey had a limited expectation of privacy in his equipment 
bag, such an interest was outweighed by the need to prevent the 
introduction of weapons into the school. 
 
Lindsey appealed.  We transferred the case to the court of appeals, 
which affirmed.  We granted further review.  We now affirm. 
 
II.  Standard of Review. 
 
We review alleged violations of the right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures de novo.  State v. Tague, 676 
N.W.2d 197, 201 (Iowa 2004).  In conducting our de novo review, we 
independently evaluate the totality of the circumstances as shown by the 
entire record.  State v. Kurth, 813 N.W.2d 270, 272 (Iowa 2012). 
 
III.  Discussion. 
 
A.  Introduction.  The primary issue in this case is whether 
reasonable suspicion existed at the inception of the search.  Although 
Lindsey concedes that the district court discussed the appropriate legal 
concepts, he maintains the court misapplied them.  According to 
Lindsey, the inception of the search occurred in Riceville when the 
superintendent “requested that the head coach collect the defendant’s 
bag for search at a later time.”  Lindsey asserts that the school officials 
did not have reasonable suspicion to seize his bag at Riceville.  According 
to Lindsey, all he did was ask that a specific student be given his bag 
and that no one mess with it.  That, according to Lindsey, is simply 
insufficient to rise to the level of reasonable suspicion. 
7 
 
According to Lindsey, the district court erred in its reasonable-
suspicion analysis when it considered the clang of metal that occurred 
after the equipment bag was seized and transported to Lindsey’s home 
school.  What happened after the seizure—specifically the metallic clang 
heard by Stanton—is irrelevant to the question of whether the seizure of 
the equipment bag in Riceville was lawful in the first place.  Lindsey 
claims that supporting the search based on him asserting “a number of 
times that he did not want anyone to ‘mess’ with his stuff” is tantamount 
to permitting searches whenever anyone refuses to consent to a search. 
 
The State presents a layered counter-argument.  First, the State 
argues that the transportation of the bag from Riceville to Dunkerton was 
not a seizure.  According to the State, the equipment bag was moved as 
part of routine student activity and that the doctrine of in loco parentis 
authorized the school to move a student’s belongings back from an away 
football game.  Second, the State argues the transport of the equipment 
bag did not violate Lindsey’s reasonable expectation of privacy or 
materially interfere with a possessory interest. 
 
B.  Applicable United States Supreme Court Framework.  Iowa 
is no stranger to questions regarding constitutional rights in public 
school settings.  In State v. Bartels, we upheld the conviction of a teacher 
who taught German in school in violation of a statute prohibiting the 
teaching of any language except English to students below eighth grade.  
191 Iowa 1060, 1074, 181 N.W. 508, 515 (1921).  The Supreme Court, 
relying upon Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S. Ct. 625, 67 L. Ed. 
1042 (1923), reversed.  Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 409, 411, 43 S. Ct. 
628, 629–30, 67 L. Ed. 1047, 1050–51 (1923).  In Meyer, the Supreme 
Court struck down a similar Nebraska statute as violating the liberty 
interests of teachers and parents under the Due Process Clause of the 
8 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403, 43 S. Ct. at 628, 67 
L. Ed. at 1047; see also Bartels, 262 U.S. at 409, 43 S. Ct. at 629, 67 
L. Ed. at 1050 (addressing statutes from Iowa, Nebraska, and Ohio). 
 
Almost fifty years later, the Supreme Court considered another 
case involving the constitutional rights of students from Iowa.  In Tinker 
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, the United States 
Supreme Court reversed a district court opinion dismissing a complaint 
brought by students challenging a school’s prohibition of wearing black 
armbands on its property to protest the Vietnam War.  393 U.S. 503, 
514, 89 S. Ct. 733, 740, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731, 742 (1969).  In memorable 
language, the Supreme Court declared that “[i]t can hardly be argued 
that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights . . . at 
the schoolhouse gate.”  Id. at 506, 89 S. Ct. at 736, 21 L. Ed. 2d at 737.  
While Tinker is a seminal case, it dealt solely with the First Amendment 
rights of students.  Id. at 505–06, 89 S. Ct. at 736, 21 L. Ed. 2d at 737. 
 
The question of whether students were protected from unlawful 
searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment remained an open 
one for many years.  The United States Supreme Court addressed this 
important issue in T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 333, 105 S. Ct. at 738, 83 
L. Ed. 2d at 729.  In T.L.O., a teacher discovered a student and a 
classmate smoking cigarettes in a school lavatory in violation of a school 
rule.  Id. at 328, 105 S. Ct. at 735, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 726.  They were taken 
to the principal’s office, where an assistant vice principal demanded to 
see the student’s purse.  Id. at 328, 105 S. Ct. at 735–36, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 
726.  Upon opening the purse, the assistant vice principal found a 
package of cigarettes and rolling papers associated with smoking 
marijuana.  Id. at 328, 105 S. Ct. at 736, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 726.  The 
assistant vice principal searched the purse more thoroughly and found 
9 
some marijuana, a pipe, plastic bags, a substantial amount of money, an 
index card with a list of students who owed the student money, and two 
letters implicating her in marijuana dealing.  Id.  As a result of the 
discovered contraband and a subsequent confession, the state brought 
delinquency charges against T.L.O. in juvenile court.  Id. at 329, 105 
S. Ct. at 736, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 726.  T.L.O. sought to suppress the 
evidence found in her purse as well as the later confession as fruits of an 
unlawful search.  Id.  The New Jersey Supreme Court suppressed the 
search, and the state appealed to the United States Supreme Court.  Id. 
at 330–31, 105 S. Ct. at 736–37, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 727–28.   
 
The Supreme Court first determined that the strictures of the 
Fourth Amendment apply to activities of civil authorities, including 
school officials.  Id. at 336–37, 105 S. Ct. at 740, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 731.  It 
rejected the notion that public schools merely exercise delegated parental 
authority conferred upon them by individual parents, but instead 
emphasized that school officials “act in furtherance of publicly mandated 
educational and disciplinary policies.”  Id. at 336, 105 S. Ct. at 740, 83 
L. Ed. 2d at 731. 
 
The Supreme Court next turned to consider what searches by 
school officials might be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 
337, 105 S. Ct. at 740, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 731.  The Supreme Court 
declared that a determination of reasonableness requires “balancing the 
need to search against the invasion which the search entails.”  Id. 
(quoting Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 537, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 1735, 18 
L. Ed. 2d 930, 940 (1967)). 
 
With respect to the student’s interest in privacy, the T.L.O. Court 
noted that “searches of closed items of personal luggage are intrusions 
on protected privacy interests.”  Id. at 337, 105 S. Ct. at 740, 83 
10 
L. Ed. 2d at 732.  The Supreme Court stated, however, that “an 
expectation of privacy must be one that society is ‘prepared to recognize 
as legitimate.’ ”  Id. at 338, 105 S. Ct. at 741, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 732 
(quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3200, 82 
L. Ed. 2d 393, 402 (1984)).  The Court recognized that students in 
schools have legitimate interests in privacy.  Id. at 339, 105 S. Ct. at 
741, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 733.  The Court observed students might lawfully 
bring to school “highly personal items [such] as photographs, letters, and 
diaries,” but also may carry with them “articles of property needed in 
connection with extracurricular or recreational activities.”  Id.   
 
Balanced against the student’s interest in privacy, however, the 
Supreme Court recognized “the substantial interest of teachers and 
administrators in maintaining discipline in the classroom and on school 
grounds.”  Id.  The Court emphasized that “maintaining security and 
order in the schools requires a certain degree of flexibility in school 
disciplinary procedures,” including “preserving the informality of the 
student–teacher relationship.”  Id. at 339–40, 105 S. Ct. at 742, 83 
L. Ed. 2d at 733. 
 
Having recognized the student’s interest in privacy and the school’s 
interest in maintaining discipline, the Supreme Court proceeded to 
balance the interests.  Id. at 340, 105 S. Ct. at 742, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 733.  
The Court declared that searches in the school setting require some 
modification of the level of suspicion required.  Id.  While the Court noted 
that “probable cause and the requirement of a warrant bear on the 
reasonableness of a search . . . in certain limited circumstances neither 
is required.”  Id. at 340–41, 105 S. Ct. at 742, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 733–34 
(quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 493 U.S. 266, 277, 93 S. Ct. 
2535, 2541, 37 L. Ed. 2d 596, 605 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring)).  The 
11 
Supreme Court determined that in the school setting probable cause is 
not required for a search, but instead, a school search requires 
“reasonableness, under all the circumstances.”  Id. at 341, 105 S. Ct. at 
742, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 734.  In order for a search to meet this requirement, 
the search must be (1) justified at the time of its inception and (2) 
reasonable in terms of the scope of the search.  Id. at 341, 105 S. Ct. at 
742–43, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 734. 
 
Having established this framework to analyze school searches, the 
Supreme Court recognized that the reasonable grounds standard applied 
by the New Jersey Supreme Court in suppressing the evidence in the 
case was “not substantially different.”  Id. at 343, 105 S. Ct. at 743–44, 
83 L. Ed. 2d at 736.  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that the state 
court’s application of the standard “reflect[ed] a somewhat crabbed 
notion of reasonableness.”  Id. at 343, 105 S. Ct. at 744, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 
736. 
 
Looking at the facts of the case, the Court found two searches—
one that yielded the cigarettes and a second that produced the marijuana 
and other evidence of involvement with drugs.  Id. at 343–44, 105 S. Ct. 
at 744, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 736.  With respect to the first search, the Court 
noted that T.L.O. was accused of smoking, which she denied.  Id. at 345, 
105 S. Ct. at 744, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 737.  Her purse was an obvious place 
to look for cigarettes.  Id. at 345–46, 105 S. Ct. at 745, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 
737.  The Court noted that the assistant vice principal’s conclusion that 
cigarettes might be in her purse was not an “inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’ ” but was “the sort of ‘common-
sense conclusio[n] about human behavior’ upon which ‘practical 
people’—including government officials—are entitled to rely.”  Id. at 346, 
105 S. Ct. at 745, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 737 (first quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 
12 
U.S. 1, 27, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1883, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 909 (1968); and then 
quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695, 
66 L. Ed. 2d 621, 629 (1981)). 
 
The search for cigarettes yielded not only cigarettes but also rolling 
papers associated with marijuana use which gave rise to the reasonable 
belief that T.L.O. was carrying marijuana as well as cigarettes in her 
purse.  Id. at 347, 105 S. Ct. at 745–46, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 738.  This 
suspicion justified further examination of her purse.  Id. at 347, 105 
S. Ct. at 746, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 738. 
 
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented in part.  
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, asserted that the only 
content to the reasonableness standard of the majority was that it was 
different from the probable cause standard established by the Fourth 
Amendment.  Id. at 354, 105 S. Ct. at 749, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 743 (Brennan, 
J., concurring part and dissenting in part).  Justice Brennan conceded 
that school authorities could conduct the search of student belongings 
without a warrant.  Id. at 355–56, 105 S. Ct. at 750, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 744.  
He strongly objected, however, to casting aside the probable cause 
requirement.  Id. at 357, 105 S. Ct. at 751, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 745.  
 
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall and in part by Justice 
Brennan, filed a dissent in part that took issue with the sweep of the 
majority opinion.  Id. at 371, 105 S. Ct. at 758, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 754 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Justices Stevens 
and Marshall thought the standard enunciated by the majority would 
allow, for example, searches for curlers or sunglasses to enforce a dress 
code.  Id. at 377, 105 S. Ct. at 762, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 758.  Further, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court appeared to have applied the very same 
standard of the majority, and Justice Stevens argued that the state 
13 
court’s application was the correct approach.  Id. at 382–85, 105 S. Ct. at 
764–66, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 761–63. 
 
Since T.L.O., the Supreme Court has decided only a few search and 
seizure cases involving students and school authorities.  In Vernonia 
School District 47J v. Acton, the Supreme Court upheld a high school 
policy authorizing random drug testing of all student athletes.  515 U.S. 
646, 648, 664–65, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2388, 2396, 132 L. Ed. 2d 564, 571, 
582 (1995).  The Court concluded that student athletes have a lesser 
expectation of privacy with respect to medical examinations and 
compliance with rules of conduct established for a given sport.  Id. at 
657, 115 S. Ct. at 2392–93, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 577.  The Court found that 
legitimate privacy expectations are less for student athletes who routinely 
lack privacy in locker rooms and there is “an element of ‘communal 
undress’ inherent in athletic participation.”  Id. at 657, 115 S. Ct. at 
2392–93, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 577 (quoting Schaill v. Tippecanoe Cty. Sch. 
Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1318 (7th Cir. 1988)). 
 
The decision in Vernonia emphasized a combination of factors, 
including the lesser expectation of privacy of student athletes and the 
unobtrusiveness of the particular method of drug testing at issue.  Id. at 
657–58, 115 S. Ct. at 2392–93, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 577–78.  Finally, the 
Court noted that the trial court found that at the high school in question, 
“ ‘a large segment of the student body . . . was in a state of rebellion,’ 
that ‘[d]isciplinary actions had reached “epidemic proportions,” ’ and that 
‘the rebellion was being fueled by alcohol and drug abuse as well as by 
the student’s misperceptions about the drug culture.’ ”  Id. at 662–63, 
115 S. Ct. at 2395, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 580 (quoting Acton v. Vernonia Sch. 
Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1357 (D. Or. 1992)). 
14 
 
Justice O’Connor, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, 
dissented.  Id. at 666, 115 S. Ct. at 2397, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 583 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting).  They objected to the policy as a general 
search and therefore contrary to precedent and the philosophy of the 
Framers.  Id. at 667, 669–70, 115 S. Ct. at 2397–99, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 
583–85.  Justice O’Connor also criticized the choice of the school to focus 
its suspicionless drug testing on athletes.  Id. at 685, 115 S. Ct. at 2406, 
132 L. Ed. 2d at 595.  She found it unreasonable to target student 
athletes, who were selected apparently for purposes of legal strategy, 
without factual support in the record for that distinction.  Id. 
 
A 
mandatory 
drug 
test 
of 
all 
students 
participating 
in 
extracurricular activities was upheld in Board of Education of 
Independent School District No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 838, 122 S. Ct. 
2559, 2569, 153 L. Ed. 2d 735, 749–50 (2002).  The Earls Court stated 
that although students participating in extracurricular activities were not 
all subject to the same privacy intrusions as athletes, extracurricular 
activities were nonetheless subject to substantial regulation.  Id. at 831–
32, 122 S. Ct. at 2565–66, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 745–46.  Because of the 
substantial regulation, students affected by the extracurricular drug 
testing policy had a diminished expectation of privacy.  Id. at 832, 122 
S. Ct. at 2566, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 745–46.  As in Vernonia, the Court 
emphasized the limited nature of the intrusion and the findings of fact of 
the trial court that the school in question had a drug problem.  Id. at 
834–35, 122 S. Ct. at 2567, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 747. 
 
Justice Ginsburg, along with Justices Stevens, O’Connor, and 
Souter, dissented.  Id. at 842, 122 S. Ct. at 2571, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 752 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Justice Ginsburg noted that although 
students participating in competitive extracurricular activities were 
15 
targeted, the underlying rationale applied to all school children.  Id. at 
844, 122 S. Ct. at 2572, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 753–54.  She further found 
extracurricular activities, though voluntary, were in fact part of the 
schools educational program.  Id. at 845, 122 S. Ct. at 2573, 153 
L. Ed. 2d at 754.  Justice Ginsburg then distinguished the random 
provision of urine samples in Vernonia, noting that athletes have a 
reduced expectation of privacy and a special susceptibility to injury 
caused by use of illegal drugs, none of which were involved in Earls.  Id. 
at 853–54, 122 S. Ct. at 2577, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 759. 
 
Finally, in Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding, the 
Supreme Court considered the validity of a search of the person and 
property of a thirteen-year-old female student suspected of possessing 
contraband including prescription-strength drugs.  557 U.S. 364, 368–
69, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2637–38, 174 L. Ed. 2d 354, 360 (2009).  School 
officials discovered a day planner belonging to Redding that contained 
knives and a cigarette.  Id. at 368, 129 S. Ct. at 2368, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 
360.  Redding admitted the day planner was hers, but said she had 
loaned the day planner to a friend and that none of the items inside it 
were hers.  Id.  The assistant principal then confronted her with several 
over-the-counter pain relievers and stated he had received a report that 
Redding was supplying pills to students in violation of school policy.  Id.  
Redding denied the allegations and agreed to allow school officials to 
search her backpack.  Id.  No contraband was found.  Id.  The assistant 
principal then had a female school official search Redding’s clothing and 
perform a strip search.  Id. at 369, 129 S. Ct. at 2638, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 
360.  No pills were found.  Id. 
 
The Supreme Court applied the reasonableness standard of T.L.O. 
to determine the validity of the search.  Id. at 375, 129 S. Ct. at 2642, 
16 
174 L. Ed. 2d at 364.  The Court indicated that reliable information to 
support a search in the context of school authorities was information 
that raises “a moderate chance of finding evidence of wrongdoing,” a 
lesser standard than the “fair probability” required for a Terry2-type 
search by law enforcement.  Id. at 371, 129 S. Ct. at 2639, 174 L. Ed. 2d 
at 362 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 
2332, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 548 (1983)). 
 
The Court found there was sufficient reliable information to justify 
the search of Redding’s backpack and outer clothing, but not for the 
strip search which exposed Redding’s breasts and pelvic area.  Id. at 
373–77, 129 S. Ct. at 2641–43, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 363–65.  The Supreme 
Court recognized that “distinct elements of justification on the part of 
school authorities for going beyond a search of outer clothing and 
belongings” were required due to the high level of both “subjective and 
reasonable societal expectations of personal privacy” implicated by a 
strip search.  Id. at 374, 129 S. Ct. at 2641, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 364. 
 
C.  Court Cases Applying the Federal Framework. 
 
1.  Expectation of privacy when participating in athletics.  T.L.O. 
generally established that the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution provides school students with a limited expectation of 
privacy in the school setting and that searches based upon individualized 
suspicion must be reasonable.  469 U.S. at 341, 105 S. Ct. at 742, 83 
L. Ed. 2d at 734.  Vernonia then clarified that in the context of random 
drug searches “[l]egitimate privacy expectations [of students] are even 
less with regard to student athletes.”  515 U.S. at 657, 115 S. Ct. at 
 
2Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968) (holding stop 
and frisk searches reasonable). 
                                      
 
17 
2392, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 5773 (majority opinion); see Joye v. Hunterdon 
Cent. Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ., 826 A.2d 624, 642 (N.J. 2003).  Yet, 
Vernonia did not involve a search based on individualized suspicion, but 
instead a random search which was minimally intrusive in light of the 
communal nature of group athletic activity.  515 U.S. at 657, 115 S. Ct. 
at 2392–93, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 577.  Thus, under the Supreme Court’s 
approach to the Fourth Amendment student athletes still retain some 
expectation of privacy, but in at least some contexts—such as random 
drug testing—that expectation may be diminished under all the facts and 
circumstances.  See Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 301 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(holding student athletes have very limited expectation of privacy). 
 
2.  History of prior infractions.  In this case, it was undisputed that 
school authorities had knowledge that the student had a prior history of 
drug infractions and a weapons charge.  To what extent is a prior history 
of discipline relevant in determining the reasonableness of a search of a 
student bag for drugs or contraband? 
 
There is some authority for the proposition that a history of prior 
infractions is not, in and of itself, sufficient to support a search of a 
student without other factors.  See M.M. v. Anker, 477 F. Supp. 837, 
841–42 (E.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 607 F.2d 588, 589 (2d Cir. 1979).  In Anker, the 
court indicated that mere past involvement in theft was not sufficient 
3Two state supreme courts have declined to follow Vernonia under state 
constitutional search and seizure provisions.  See Theodore v. Del. Valley Sch. Dist., 836 
A.2d 76, 90, 96 (Pa. 2003) (invalidating school district drug and alcohol testing policy 
for extracurricular activities under article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution); 
York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200, 178 P.3d 995, 1006 (Wash. 2008) (en banc) 
(invalidating suspicionless drug testing under article I, section 7 of the Washington 
Constitution). 
                                      
 
18 
cause, in and of itself, for a strip search of the student to recover missing 
property.  Id. at 842. 
 
Additionally, when prior infractions are used to justify a search 
there must be a linkage between the past violations and the wrongdoing 
sought to be discovered.  For instance, in Commonwealth v. Damien D., 
the student’s history of truancy did not provide reasonable suspicion for 
a search for contraband because there was no relationship between 
absence from the classroom and drug infractions.  752 N.E.2d 679, 683 
(Mass. 2001). 
 
In most cases, however, the history of prior disciplinary problems 
is combined with other factors to provide a reasonable basis for the 
search.  For example, in Cornfield v. Consolidated High School District No. 
230, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld a 
search of a student with a past history of illicit activities when, among 
other things, a bus driver had smelled marijuana from the direction 
where the student was seated on the bus, the student had told a teacher 
he was constantly thinking about drugs, the student had reportedly said 
he was dealing drugs and would test positive for marijuana, and he had 
a bulge in his pants when he had previously declared that he had 
“crotched” drugs during a police raid of his mother’s house.  991 F.2d 
1316, 1322–23 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 
Similarly, in State ex. rel. Galford v. Mark Anthony B., the court 
found reasonable suspicion sufficient to initially justify a search when a 
student with a prior history of burglary was found to have had access as 
a janitor’s assistant to an empty classroom where $100 had been stolen 
from a teacher’s purse.  433 S.E.2d 41, 42, 45 (W. Va. 1993).  The scope 
of the search, however—which included pulling down the student’s 
19 
underwear in a bathroom for inspection—was unreasonable in light of 
the relatively modest danger arising from a mere theft.  Id. at 48–49. 
 
Another illustrative case is Coffman v. State, 782 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 1989).  In that case, the court upheld the search of a student—
who had a history of three or four disciplinary events—who was in the 
hallway when he should have been in class and told the school officials 
that he was returning from a parking lot where there had been recent 
thefts.  Id. at 250.  When the student was confronted, he placed a book 
bag behind himself, and when the school officials obtained possession of 
the bag, he lunged after it.  Id. at 250–51.  Further, in State ex rel. 
Juvenile Department of Washington County v. DuBois, the court 
considered the search of a student known to have brought weapons to 
the school on other occasions.  821 P.2d 1124, 1125 (Or. Ct. App. 1991).  
Two other students reported that they had seen the student with a gun 
the day before and had heard the student was bringing the gun to school 
on the day in question.  Id.  Recognizing that probable cause might be 
required under article I, section 9 of the Oregon Constitution, the court 
found it unnecessary to reach the question because under the 
circumstances even the higher standard was met.  Id. at 1127. 
 
3.  Furtive movements or other suspicious indicia.  In this case, the 
school authorities believed the student’s comments gave rise to a 
reasonable suspicion that his equipment bag might contain something 
he did not want school officials to find.  The question arises whether 
such behavior qualifies as furtive acts supporting reasonable suspicion, 
or whether the comments were mere assertions of the right to privacy. 
 
An illustrative case is T.S. v. State, 100 So. 3d 1289 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2012).  In that case, a student carried her book bag in the halls 
during the school day, contrary to school rules.  Id. at 1290.  She was 
20 
allowed to leave the bag in the school counselor’s office, which she did.  
Id.  Several times during the day the student sought and was denied 
access to the bag.  Id.  The school counselor wondered why she wanted 
access to the bag and decided to conduct a search.  Id. 
 
The Florida court held the search was invalid.  Id. at 1292.  It 
noted the student involved had no history of illegal activity, the search 
was based on a mere hunch, and there were many innocent explanations 
for the student’s behavior.  Id.  Several other Florida cases have reached 
similar conclusions under varied fact patterns.  See R.S.M. v. State, 911 
So. 2d 283, 284–85 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (noting lack of reasonable 
suspicion when student reached “towards his pockets and then jerk[ed] 
his hands back”); S.V.J. v. State, 891 So. 2d 1221, 1222–24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2005) (holding when a student looked startled and put her purse 
under her arm, and there was no prior complaint about drug use or 
other infractions involving student, the state did not have articulable 
facts sufficient to support search); A.H. v. State, 846 So. 2d 1215, 1216 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (holding an untrained teacher’s belief that 
something was not right with the student was insufficient to justify a 
search). 
 
In In re William G., the California Supreme Court considered 
whether there was sufficient particularized suspicion to search a student 
who appeared to attempt to hide a calculator case when approached by 
school authorities.  709 P.2d 1287, 1289 (Cal. 1985) (en banc).  The 
California court declared that the student’s 
“furtive gestures” in attempting to hide his calculator case 
from [a school official’s] view cannot, standing alone, furnish 
sufficient cause to search.  Similarly, [the student]’s demand 
for a warrant did not create a reasonable suspicion upon 
which to base the search. 
21 
Id. at 1297 (citations omitted).  Further, the court noted, 
Such conduct merely constitutes [the student]’s legitimate 
assertion of his constitutional right to privacy and to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures. . . .  If a student’s 
limited right of privacy is to have any meaning, his attempt to 
exercise that right—by shielding a private possession from a 
school official’s view—cannot itself trigger a “reasonable 
suspicion.” 
Id. at 1297–98 (emphasis added). 
 
An effort to disown property, however, might give rise to reasonable 
suspicion.  In In re Murray, school authorities received a tip that a 
student might have something in his book bag that should not be there.  
525 S.E.2d 496, 497 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).  When asked about his book 
bag, the student falsely stated the bag was not his.  Id. at 498.  
According to the court, the false denial when coupled with the tip was 
sufficient to support a search of the book bag.  Id. at 499.  The court 
stated the search was based upon “the sort of ‘common-sense 
conclusio[n] about human behavior’ upon which ‘practical people’—
including government officials—are entitled to rely.”  Id. (quoting T.L.O., 
469 U.S. at 346, 105 S. Ct. at 745, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 737 (majority 
opinion)). 
 
There are some cases, however, where furtive gestures, if 
sufficiently suggestive, may provide reasonable suspicion for a search of 
a student.  In the pre-T.L.O. case of State v. Young, a student appeared to 
jump up and put something down and then “ran his hand in his pants.”  
216 S.E.2d 586, 588 (Ga. 1975).  The court found this curious behavior 
and an “obvious consciousness of guilt” sufficient to support a search.  
Id. at 593.  A dissent noted, however, that the furtive gestures would be 
insufficient to support a search based on probable cause.  Id. at 601 
(Gunter, J., dissenting). 
22 
 
D.  Iowa Caselaw.  The parties have not directed our attention to 
Iowa caselaw applying the individualized reasonable suspicion approach 
of T.L.O. in a school setting.  We have, however, considered the validity of 
a random locker search in State v. Jones, 666 N.W.2d 142, 143 (Iowa 
2003).  In Jones, the school had an annual winter break locker cleanout 
designed to prevent accumulation of trash and school supplies and to 
prevent violations of laws related to weapons and drugs.  Id. at 144.  
Students were provided with notice that lockers would be checked with 
the student present.  Id.  Jones, however, did not follow the protocol and 
failed to show up for the cleanout.  Id.  School officials opened and 
searched Jones’s locker and found marijuana in the outside pocket of a 
coat in the locker.  Id.  We held that while Jones had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in his school locker, the search was not invalid 
under the circumstances presented.  Id. at 148, 150.   
 
In sustaining the search in Jones, we determined that the 
approach in Earls presented the proper framework for analysis and not 
the individualized approach of T.L.O.  Id. at 146.  Under Earls, a court 
considers (1) “the nature of the privacy interest” at stake, (2) “the 
character of the intrusion,” and (3) “the nature and immediacy of the 
[school]’s concerns and the efficacy of the [search p]olicy in meeting 
them.”  Earls, 536 U.S. at 830, 832, 834, 122 S. Ct. at 2565–67, 153 
L. Ed. 2d at 744, 746–47 (majority opinion); Jones, 666 N.W.2d at 146.  
After analyzing these factors, we upheld the random search conducted 
pursuant to the established school district policy.  Jones, 666 N.W.2d at 
150. 
 
E.  Discussion. 
 
1.  Introduction.  We begin by analyzing the case under the T.L.O. 
framework, which the parties agreed in the district court provides the 
23 
proper framework for analysis.  In evaluating this search under the 
applicable framework provided by T.L.O., we must engage in a two-step 
process.  The first question is whether at the inception of the search 
“there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up 
evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the 
rules of the school.”  T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341–42, 105 S. Ct. at 743, 83 
L. Ed. 2d at 734–35.  The second question is whether the scope of the 
search was “reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not 
excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the 
nature of the infraction.”  Id. at 342, 105 S. Ct. at 743, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 
735. 
 
2.  Reasonableness of the search or seizure at its inception.  In this 
case, there is a substantial issue regarding when the search or seizure of 
the equipment bag occurred.  The State suggests that the mere loading of 
the bag onto the bus and transporting it back to the home high school 
was not a seizure because this is exactly what would have happened to 
the bag after Lindsey’s injury if school authorities had no suspicion of 
illicit activity. 
 
The State also suggests that because Lindsey was engaged in an 
athletic event, he had a reduced—perhaps even nonexistent—legitimate 
expectation of privacy in his school-issued equipment bag.  It raises, 
among other things, the doctrine of in loco parentis, which, according to 
the State, suggests that a student athlete at an away game has no 
expectation of privacy in a bag used to carry athletic equipment.4 
 
4The Supreme Court in T.L.O. rejected the in loco parentis doctrine—which 
literally means “in place of a parent”—the theory that the Fourth Amendment does not 
apply to a school official’s search of a student through parental delegation, just as it 
does not apply to a parent’s search of their child.  T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336, 105 S. Ct. at 
740, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 731; see generally 5 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure, 
                                      
 
 
24 
 
Yet, we conclude there is no need to address the issue of precisely 
when the search or seizure began or whether Lindsey had a reduced 
expectation of privacy in connection with a search of an equipment bag 
based on individualized suspicion because he was participating in an 
athletic event.5  We conclude that even if the seizure occurred when 
Lindsey’s equipment bag was placed on the bus by school officials, and 
even assuming Lindsey had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his 
equipment bag under T.L.O. standards, school officials had a reasonable 
basis for the seizure and subsequent search under the Fourth 
Amendment as construed by the United States Supreme Court. 
 
In considering the proper result in this case, we recognize that 
application of the T.L.O. amorphous standards “require[] great care to 
avoid abuse.”6  Gerald S. Reamey, New Jersey v. T.L.O.: The Supreme 
§ 10.11(a), at 593–97 (5th ed. 2012), [hereinafter LaFave].  According to LaFave, the 
doctrine “is frequently used only as a slogan” and has become “a substitute for 
analysis.”  LaFave, § 10.11(a), at 597.  Yet, in Vernonia and in Earls the Supreme Court, 
while not reestablishing the applicability of in loco parentis to school searches, 
nonetheless emphasized the role of educational institutions as guardians and providers 
of tutelage.  See Earls, 536 U.S. at 830–31, 122 S. Ct. at 2565, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 745; 
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665, 115 S. Ct. at 2396, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 582. 
 
5While this lessened expectation of privacy has been applied by the Supreme 
Court in the context of random drug testing of student athletes, the search of the blue 
backpack within Lindsey’s equipment bag is arguably distinguishable as it does not 
implicate exposures of the body so central in the Vernonia analysis and, additionally, 
involves a particularized individual search under T.L.O. and not a generalized search. 
 
6See Jenkins v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821, 827 (11th Cir. 1997) 
(“[N]ot only does the language used by the [T.L.O.] Court to announce a legal standard 
regarding the permissible scope of a reasonable school search lack specificity but, it 
appears, purposefully so.” (Footnote omitted.)); Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 886 
(6th Cir. 1991) (noting that the reasonableness standard of T.L.O. has left courts “either 
reluctant or unable to define what type of official conduct” is prohibited).  The 
amorphous and open-ended nature of the T.L.O. analysis has been frequently noted in 
the academic literature.  See Neal I. Aizenstein, Casenote, Fourth Amendment—Searches 
by Public School Officials Valid on ‘Reasonable Grounds’, 76 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 
898, 923 (1985) (noting the reasonable grounds standard lacks authority and promotes 
inconsistency in caselaw); David C. Blickenstaff, Strip Searches of Public School 
Students: Can New Jersey v. T.L.O. Solve the Problem?, 99 Dick. L. Rev. 1, 44–45 (1994) 
_____________________ 
 
25 
Court’s Lesson on School Searches, 16 St. Mary’s L.J. 933, 948–49 
(1985).  We recognize the importance of ensuring that the T.L.O. test is 
not applied in a fashion to give school authorities a carte blanche in all 
settings and circumstances.  Yet, we also recognize that under T.L.O., the 
Supreme Court has moved away from a rule-based search and seizure 
jurisprudence toward a case-by-case method that will often turn on a 
careful and meticulous analysis of the facts of the case.  See Konop 
ex rel. Konop v. Nw. Sch. Dist., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1196 (D.S.D. 1998) 
(noting that the T.L.O. holding is “difficult in its application” because of 
its fact intensive nature). 
 
Recognizing the difficulties, we nonetheless reach the conclusion 
that the seizure and search in this case met T.L.O. standards.  We reach 
this conclusion because the seizure of Lindsey’s bag was not based 
merely on his history of involvement with drugs and guns or merely upon 
somewhat suspicious or ambiguous furtive gestures.  While there is 
substantial caselaw, for instance, that furtive gestures alone may not be 
enough to justify a search or seizure of a student bag, most of the cases 
with a combination of history and suspicious actions on the part of the 
student sustain such government action.  It may be under some 
(noting differences among courts in applying T.L.O. standards to strip searches); Martin 
R. Gardner, Student Privacy in the Wake of T.L.O.: An Appeal for an Individualized 
Suspicion Requirement for Valid Searches and Seizures in the Schools, 22 Ga. L. Rev. 
897, 920 (1988) [hereinafter Gardner] (noting the abandonment of rule-based search 
and seizure jurisprudence for a case-by-case analysis of reasonableness); Sunil H. 
Mansukhani, School Searches After New Jersey v. T.L.O.: Are There Any Limits?, 34 U. 
Louisville J. Fam. L. 345, 360–61 (1996) (noting T.L.O.’s reasonableness standard fails 
to provide clear test); Stephen F. Shatz et al., The Strip Search of Children and the 
Fourth Amendment, 26 U.S.F. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1991) (noting vague reasoning and a lack of 
stated standards in T.L.O.).  Given the nature of the test, we recognize the words of 
caution of Judge Posner that “[t]here is almost no legal outcome that a really skillful 
legal analyst cannot cover with a professional varnish.”  Richard A. Posner, Foreward: A 
Political Court, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 31, 52 (2005). 
_____________________ 
26 
circumstances that mere history or questionable behavior or conduct is 
not enough to support a search.  But here, both history and suspicious 
conduct are present.  See R.B. v. State, 975 So. 2d 546, 548 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2008) (holding a history of drug use and a furtive gesture 
provided sufficient suspicion to justify a search). 
 
Further, the suspicious statement here was not in any way caused 
by school officials but was volunteered by Lindsey.  This is not a case 
where a student, in response to an action by school officials, seeks to 
prevent a threatened invasion of privacy as occurred in In re William G., 
709 P.2d at 1289; see also State v. Zelinske, 779 P.2d 971, 975 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 1989) (stating refusal to consent cannot authorize a warrantless 
search), overruled on other grounds by State v. Bedolla, 806 P.2d 588, 
595 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Gilmour, 901 P.2d 894, 896 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1995) (noting that “if both consent and refusal to consent provided 
bases for officers to conduct searches, there would be no circumstances 
under which officers could not search”).  According to Stanton, Lindsey—
when on his back at the football field—volunteered the words to the effect 
of “please make sure that Keota gets my bag.”  Stanton further reported 
that Lindsey said, “Don’t let anybody but Keota have my bag.”  Coach 
Steffen largely confirmed Stanton’s account, noting that Lindsey “was 
pretty concerned about his bag and making sure that . . . a certain kid 
would get the bag for him and that nobody would mess with it.”  As 
noted by Steffen, Lindsey’s unprompted concern about his bag “raised a 
red flag.” 
 
Unlike in In re William G. or the consent cases, here the student 
affirmatively and without any prompting by school officials made his 
request that responsibility for his bag be given to a specific student.  His 
comments were not designed to prevent officials from taking action, but 
27 
were instead an affirmative request that officials hand over his bag to a 
specific student.  Under the circumstances, Lindsey’s statements sought 
to control who gained possession of his bag, but did not assert privacy 
rights against an imminent threat of government intrusion as in In re 
William G.  See 709 P.2d at 1289. 
 
Additionally, the request was not a mildly suspicious comment 
with lots of alternative innocuous explanations like when a student asks 
to retrieve a temporarily impounded bag at the administration office.  See 
T.S., 100 So. 3d at 1290; see also S.V.J., 891 So. 2d at 1222.  Given 
Lindsey’s potentially serious injury on the football field, it was truly odd 
for him to be worried about who grabbed his equipment bag to return it 
to school.  Lindsey’s volunteered request raised eyebrows considering his 
history of drug abuse and firearm violations. 
 
Under T.L.O., the standard generally applicable to support a 
particularized search or seizure of a student bag is not probable cause.  
469 U.S. at 341, 105 S. Ct. at 742, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 734.  Instead, a 
search or seizure must be reasonable under the circumstances.  Id.  As 
the Court later stressed in Redding, there must be at least “a moderate 
chance of finding evidence of wrongdoing.”  557 U.S. at 371, 129 S. Ct. at 
2639, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 362 (majority opinion). 
 
Although drawing the line between a hunch and reasonable 
suspicion as required is often difficult, we conclude that in this case 
school officials were operating on a “ ‘common-sense conclusio[n] about 
human behavior’ upon which ‘practical people’—including government 
officials—are entitled to rely.”  T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 346, 105 S. Ct. at 745, 
83 L. Ed. 2d at 737 (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418, 101 S. Ct. at 695, 
66 L. Ed. 2d at 629).  When Lindsey, a person who had been suspended 
from school for drug activity and had firearm charges in the past, 
28 
expressed unprompted and unusual concern about his equipment bag 
when lying on the football field with a potentially serious injury, school 
authorities reasonably saw at least a yellow flag, if not a red flag, 
indicating there was a fair chance that this troubled youth had drugs or 
guns in the equipment bag. 
 
3.  Scope of search.  We now turn to the question of the 
reasonableness of the scope of the search.  Under applicable federal law, 
a search is permissible in scope “when the measures adopted are 
reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively 
intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the 
infraction.”  Id. at 342, 105 S. Ct. at 743, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 735.  As 
indicated above, school authorities had sufficient reason to believe the 
equipment bag might contain drugs or a gun based on Lindsey’s history 
of involvement in drugs and guns and his curious concern about the 
equipment bag when immobilized on the football field with a potentially 
serious injury.  When the school officials opened the bag and found 
another bag within, it was reasonable for school officials to look in the 
second bag since drugs or guns could reasonably be stored in it.  
Further, the fact the superintendent heard a loud thud when the bag hit 
the floor while the superintendent was preparing to conduct the search 
provided an additional reason to search in the second bag.  The search 
was not excessively intrusive in light of the objectives of the search. 
 
It is, of course, true that the search and seizure led to the 
discovery of a gun in the blue backpack.  Lindsey claims that the loud 
clunk when the equipment bag hit the floor was hardly cause for 
thinking a gun was within the bag and that any such conclusion would 
be a wildly speculative hunch, not reasonable suspicion.  The State’s 
alternative stand-alone argument is that even if there was not reasonable 
29 
suspicion to search the equipment bag based on the statements by 
Lindsey, the loud clunk—when combined with knowledge of Lindsey’s 
past 
involvement 
with 
guns—gave 
school 
authorities 
sufficient 
particularized suspicion at that time to search the equipment bag.  The 
school superintendent, who owned a handgun, claimed that after he 
heard the noise he was “one hundred percent certain it was a gun.”   
 
The parties have cited no authority with similar facts.  We have 
uncovered one case that is somewhat instructive.  In In re Gregory M., a 
school security officer heard a metallic thud when a student put a bag 
down on a shelf.  627 N.E.2d 500, 501 (N.Y. 1993).  The security guard 
proceeded to feel the outside of the bag, which revealed a gun-like object 
in the bag.  Id.  A school official then opened the bag and found the gun.  
Id.  The New York court concluded that based solely on the metallic thud, 
the security officer did not have reasonable suspicion under T.L.O. to 
search the bag but that a feel of the outside of the bag was a minimal 
intrusion that was reasonable even with the lack of particularized 
reasonable suspicion and was supportable under T.L.O.  Id.  Once the 
security officer felt the contours of the gun-like object, the security officer 
then at that point had sufficient particularized suspicion to support the 
further search of the bag.  Id. 
 
In light of our resolution of this case, however, we need not reach 
the issue of whether the loud thud was an insufficient basis for the 
search or was fruit of an unlawful seizure.  Instead, we conclude that 
reasonable suspicion under T.L.O. existed prior to the loud thud and that 
the loud thud merely provided additional reason to press the search into 
the blue backpack contained within the equipment bag. 
 
4.  Applicability of analysis under the Iowa Constitution.  In this 
case, Lindsey cites both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 8 of 
30 
the Iowa Constitution in support of his claim.  A conclusory reference to 
the Iowa Constitution was raised below.  On appeal, however, Lindsey 
agrees that the standard established by T.L.O. and its progeny provide 
the relevant framework for analysis under the Iowa Constitution.7  
Because Lindsey has not suggested an independent standard under the 
Iowa Constitution, we apply the federal framework for the purpose of this 
case but reserve the right to apply that framework in a fashion different 
from federal caselaw.  State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 383–84 (Iowa 2014); 
State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767, 771–72 (Iowa 2011); State v. Bruegger, 
773 N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009). 
 
Obviously, the standard of reasonability is not a verbal formula 
that lends itself “to easy quantification, clear classification, or easily 
administered criteria.”  Barry C. Feld, T.L.O. and Redding’s Unanswered 
(Misanswered) Fourth Amendment Questions: Few Rights and Fewer 
Remedies, 80 Miss. L.J. 847, 896 (2011).8  Indeed, in T.L.O. itself, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court—where the case originated—used a standard 
very similar to that ultimately approved in T.L.O.  469 U.S. at 343, 105 
S. Ct. at 743–44, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 736; see State in re T.L.O., 463 A.2d 
934, 942 (N.J. 1983), rev’d, T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 348, 105 S. Ct. at 746, 83 
L. Ed. 2d at 738.  The United States Supreme Court, however, viewed the 
New Jersey court’s application as manifesting a “crabbed notion of 
 
7Lindsey does not cite, for instance, the dissents in T.L.O., courts of other states 
relying upon independent analysis of search and seizure requirements under state 
constitutions, or academic criticism of T.L.O. and its progeny. 
 
8For criticism of reasonability and balancing tests in search and seizure, see 
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 
393–95 (1974) (critiquing reasonableness and balancing), and Gardner, 22 Ga. L. Rev. 
at 919–25.  See also State v. Short, 851 N.W.2d 474, 485–86 (Iowa 2014). 
                                      
 
31 
reasonableness.”  T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 343, 105 S. Ct. at 744, 83 L. Ed. 2d 
at 736. 
 
In this case, the parties have litigated within the framework of 
federal caselaw.  We find the search falls within the general parameters 
of reasonableness as outlined in T.L.O.  Under our cases, when a party 
does not present an independent standard under Iowa law, we may still 
apply the federal standard more stringently than the federal caselaw.  
But the standard for whether the search of Lindsey’s equipment bag and 
the backpack within it was constitutionally permissible is whether the 
search has a moderate chance of uncovering wrongdoing.  We think that 
standard was met.  In this case we thus do not find an independent 
violation of article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.9 
IV.  Conclusion. 
 
For all the above reasons, the judgment of the district court is 
affirmed. 
 
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND JUDGMENT OF 
DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED. 
 
All justices concur except Mansfield and Waterman, JJ., who 
concur specially, and Wiggins, J., who dissents. 
 
 
 
9Other states have found independent violations of the right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures under their state constitutions.  For instance, the 
Oregon Supreme Court has emphasized that under article I, section 9 of the Oregon 
Constitution, the privacy protected “is not privacy that one reasonably expects but the 
privacy to which one has a right.”  See State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t of Clackamas Cty. v. 
M.A.D., 233 P.3d 437, 441 (Or. 2010) (en banc) (quoting State v. Howard, 157 P.3d 
1189, 1193 (Or. 2007)). 
                                      
 
32 
#14–0773, State v. Lindsey 
MANSFIELD, Justice (concurring specially). 
 
I join the court in affirming Lindsey’s conviction and sentence and 
the denial of his motion to suppress.  I also join the court’s opinion 
subject only to the following exception. 
I do not agree that an argument under article I, section 8 of the 
Iowa Constitution has been preserved.  It is true that Lindsey’s motion to 
suppress did mention “the Iowa Constitution” once (although not article 
I, section 8).  However, the district court’s ruling cited only the Fourth 
Amendment, and Lindsey did not seek to expand that ruling.  Moreover, 
on appeal Lindsey mentioned article I, section 8 only twice in passing in 
his brief and did nothing to develop a state constitutional argument.  
Further, at oral argument before the court of appeals, Lindsey’s counsel 
conceded that Lindsey’s appeal could be resolved “by examining the 
Fourth Amendment exclusively.”  Consequently, the court of appeals did 
not consider article I, section 8.  And in oral argument before our court, 
nobody talked about the Iowa Constitution.  This can be verified by 
listening to the publicly available recording.  Accordingly, I concur in the 
judgment and in the court’s opinion except as noted here. 
 
Waterman, J., joins this special concurrence. 
 
 
33 
#14–0773, State v. Lindsey 
WIGGINS, Justice (dissenting). 
As 
the 
majority 
acknowledges, 
the 
federal 
standard 
that 
determines whether the search of the equipment bag violated the Fourth 
Amendment is the one set forth in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 
105 S. Ct. 733, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1985) and Safford Unified School 
District No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 174 L. Ed. 2d 
354 (2009).  For evidence obtained by public school officials to be 
admissible under the Fourth Amendment, the search or seizure by which 
it was obtained must have been “justified at its inception” because the 
officials had “reasonable grounds” to suspect it would produce evidence 
of violations of the law or school rules.  T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341–42, 105 
S. Ct. at 742–43, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 734–35 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1, 20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 905 (1968)).  More 
specifically, before initiating the search or seizure, officials must have 
had sufficient reliable knowledge to support a reasonable belief they had 
a “moderate chance” of discovering evidence of wrongdoing.  Redding, 
557 U.S. at 370–71, 129 S. Ct. at 2639, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 361–62.  When 
school officials claim a search or seizure was justified based on 
individualized suspicion of a particular student, the court must assess 
whether they had sufficient reliable information to support such a belief 
concerning the particular student before the search or seizure occurred.  
Id. at 373–74, 129 S. Ct. at 2641, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 363. 
In holding the search and seizure of Lindsey’s equipment bag was 
justified at its inception, the majority concludes school officials were 
justified in believing they had a moderate chance of discovering evidence 
of wrongdoing inside it based on just two facts.  First, the superintendent 
knew Lindsey had a history of drug and gun infractions.  Second, after 
34 
being badly injured during a football game, Lindsey repeatedly requested 
that the superintendent give his equipment bag to one of his friends on 
the team and not to let anyone else mess with it as he was being prepped 
for transport via ambulance.10     
In my view, the majority fixates on Lindsey’s past to incorrectly 
conclude this reasonably innocuous conduct was actually suspicious 
conduct.  Consequently, the majority concludes reasonably innocuous 
conduct created the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify the search 
and seizure of the bag under T.L.O. and Redding.  In contrast, for the 
following reasons, I believe school officials had inadequate reasonably 
reliable information to believe they had a moderate chance of finding 
evidence of wrongdoing inside the equipment bag at the moment they 
seized it. 
First, the majority asserts the request Lindsey made to the 
superintendent was “truly odd” in light of his serious injury and not 
merely “a mildly suspicious comment with lots of alternative innocuous 
explanations.”  I disagree with this assessment.  Nothing about the 
request Lindsey made or the manner in which he made it amounted to 
“suspicious conduct” under the circumstances. 
As the Supreme Court has recognized, “schoolchildren may find it 
necessary to carry with them a variety of legitimate, noncontraband 
items . . . onto school grounds.” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339, 105 S. Ct. at 
741, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 733.  This legitimate need is in no way diminished 
when students participate in school activities on school grounds.  In that 
10Despite the quotes used in the majority and concurring opinions, the 
superintendent testified that he did not remember the statements Lindsey made well 
enough to quote them.  When asked what the gist of the statements Lindsey made was, 
he replied:  “It was just like I said, please make sure that Keota gets my bag. Please 
make sure that nobody else gets my bag.” 
                                      
 
35 
context, students may need to transport “not only the supplies needed 
for their studies, . . . keys, money, and the necessaries of personal 
hygiene and grooming,” but also “articles of property needed in 
connection with extracurricular or recreational activities.”  See id.  Along 
with such necessary items, students may have perfectly legitimate 
reasons to carry with them “nondisruptive yet highly personal items as 
photographs, letters, and diaries.”  Id.   
In today’s world, I would add cellphones, tablets, and laptops to 
the list of items students may legitimately carry on school grounds.  
Among high schoolers today, cell phones are particularly ubiquitous.  Cf. 
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. ___, ___, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490, 189 
L. Ed. 2d 430, 447 (2014).  As the Supreme Court has noted, cell phones 
ordinarily contain “vast quantities of personal information.”  Id. at ___, 
134 S. Ct. at 2485, 189 L. Ed. 2d at 442.  Thus, many high schoolers 
ordinarily keep on their person or among their belongings on school 
grounds “a digital record of nearly every aspect of their lives—from the 
mundane to the intimate.”  Id. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 2490, 189 L. Ed. 2d 
at 447. 
I think the majority is incorrect to assert that Lindsey asking the 
superintendent to give his equipment bag to his friend and make sure 
nothing happened to it amounted to “suspicious conduct.”  This is 
particularly true in light of the fact that Lindsey had placed his backpack 
in his equipment bag at least for the duration of the football game.  Quite 
simply, it appears that everything Lindsey had with him—his backpack, 
schoolbooks, homework, clothes, shoes, wallet, cash, keys, cellphone, 
etc.—was in his equipment bag when he was injured.  Accordingly, in my 
view it would have been odd if Lindsey had not been concerned about 
what would happen to his equipment bag upon learning he had been 
36 
potentially severely injured and was being transported to the hospital.  
Whatever the equipment bag contained, it would have been perfectly 
natural for any high school student in his situation to want to ensure it 
was shielded from theft or intrusion and safely returned.  Even setting 
aside the potentially vast quantity of personal information the equipment 
bag may have contained, its contents were also likely worth a great deal 
of money, particularly in the eyes of a high schooler. 
Additionally, upon assessing the injury Lindsey suffered during the 
football game, the ambulance attendants placed Lindsey into a cervical 
collar and onto a backboard to prevent his further injury.  Thus, it was 
hardly “suspicious conduct” suggestive of wrongdoing for Lindsey to 
repeat his request that his equipment bag be given to his friend or fail to 
appreciate the potential seriousness of his injury.  Given the nature of 
his probable injury and the context in which it occurred,11 school 
officials reasonably should have understood it was unlikely Lindsey was 
thinking clearly before he was transported to the hospital.     
In short, Lindsey making the statements he made under the 
circumstances in which he made them did not amount to “suspicious 
conduct.”  Therefore, I conclude school officials lacked any reliable basis 
upon which to form a reasonable suspicion that Lindsey was engaged in 
wrongdoing before he was loaded into the ambulance.   
Because the statements Lindsey made before he was loaded onto 
the ambulance could not reasonably have been perceived to be 
suspicious under the circumstances, the only basis school officials had 
for suspecting he might have been engaged in wrongdoing while he was 
11Football is a contact sport widely acknowledged to be associated with 
concussions and head injuries. 
                                      
 
37 
being cared for on the field was his past conduct.  Standing alone, this 
was insufficient to justify a reasonable belief that officials had a 
“moderate chance” of discovering evidence of wrongdoing inside his 
equipment bag.  And at bottom, Lindsey’s history is really all the majority 
relies upon to find reasonable suspicion existed in this case.  The 
majority opinion all but admits that, were it not for his past suspension 
for drug activity and past firearm charges, school officials would not have 
reasonably seen a yellow flag or a red flag when Lindsey sought to ensure 
his equipment bag was delivered to his friend.  In the majority’s view, 
merely because he had been in trouble before, Lindsey’s being concerned 
about what happened to his belongings somehow indicated there was a 
“fair chance that this troubled youth had drugs or guns in the equipment 
bag.”   
Second, the majority supplies no adequate basis for its conclusion 
the affirmative requests Lindsey made were not an assertion of his 
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures 
without a warrant.  There can be no denying Lindsey had an absolute 
right to assert his constitutional right to be free from an unreasonable 
search or seizure of his equipment bag without a warrant until school 
officials actually had reasonable suspicion to search or seize it.  Lindsey 
had the ability to affirmatively assert that right at least until reasonably 
reliable information indicated school officials had a moderate chance of 
discovering evidence he was engaged in wrongdoing, even if he ultimately 
perceived a threat to his privacy at the hands of school officials only after 
being injured on the football field.  Yet the majority suggests the validity 
of any assertion of that right Lindsey might have attempted to make 
turns on whether school officials “caused” him to make it by affirmatively 
threatening to invade his privacy.  I believe the majority is incorrect to 
38 
distinguish the requests Lindsey made from an assertion of a 
constitutional right on the ground that he “volunteered” them.   
Instead of engaging with the content of the statements Lindsey 
made, the majority places too great an emphasis on the context in which 
he made them.  On the content front, the majority analysis is thin.  The 
majority asserts what Lindsey said did not amount to an assertion of a 
constitutional right in part because his statements “were not designed to 
prevent officials from taking action, but were instead an affirmative 
request that officials hand over his bag to a specific student.”  But if the 
statements Lindsey made were not designed to prevent officials from 
searching his equipment bag, why were they so suspicious?  And when 
Lindsey instructed school officials as to what he wanted done with his 
equipment bag, by implication did he not also instruct them as to what 
he did not want done with it?  The majority simply fails to explain what 
distinguishes the “affirmative request” Lindsey repeatedly made from an 
effective assertion of his constitutional right not to have school officials 
search or seize his equipment bag without a warrant. 
Two potentially troubling implications follow from the majority 
analysis.  First, the majority opinion suggests a student may invoke the 
right to be free from unreasonable warrantless searches and seizures 
only after school officials explicitly threaten to invade his or her privacy.  
Second, the majority opinion suggests that for a student to effectively 
assert the right to be free from unreasonable warrantless searches and 
seizures against school officials, only an explicit assertion expressed in 
precise terms will do. 
The majority implicitly acknowledges that, if the statements 
Lindsey made amounted to an assertion of a constitutional right, the 
search was unconstitutional.  As the majority opinion recognizes, 
39 
There are many reasons why a student might assert these 
rights, other than an attempt to prevent disclosure of 
evidence that one has violated a proscribed activity.  A 
student cannot be penalized for demanding respect for his or 
her constitutional rights.  
In re William G., 709 P.2d 1287, 1297–98 (Cal. 1985) (en banc).  
Nonetheless, the majority declines to provide any meaningful guidance as 
to just how explicit an assertion of the right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures must be in order to be effective in this context.  In 
contrast, in In re Warren G., the California Supreme Court concluded 
that right to be adequately invoked whenever a student attempts to 
shield a private possession from school officials: 
If a student’s limited right of privacy is to have any meaning, 
his attempt to exercise that right—by shielding a private 
possession from a school official’s view—cannot in itself 
trigger a “reasonable suspicion.”  A contrary conclusion 
would lead to the anomalous result that a student would 
retain a right of privacy only in those matters that he 
willingly reveals to school officials. 
Id.  Thus, if Lindsey instructed school officials to give the equipment bag 
to his friend because he desired to shield it from them, he arguably 
asserted his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches 
and seizures without a warrant.   
Because I part ways with the majority on the question of whether 
the statements Lindsey made could have created reasonable suspicion in 
the minds of school officials who knew about his past conduct, I need not 
delve further into the question of whether his statements amounted to an 
assertion of his right to be free from unreasonable searches or seizures 
without a warrant.  That is because school officials seized the equipment 
bag when they declined to heed Lindsey’s requests that it be given to his 
trusted friend and teammate.   
40 
When the head coach carried the equipment bag onto the bus back 
to Dunkerton and placed it onto the seat next to his wife, knowingly 
disregarding the requests Lindsey made, the bag was unquestionably 
seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  “A seizure occurs 
even when an unintended person or thing is the object of the detention 
or taking, but the detention or taking itself must be willful.”  Brower v. 
County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596, 109 S. Ct. 1378, 1381, 103 L. Ed. 2d 
628, 635 (1989) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  In this case, the 
facts clearly indicate the coach willfully grabbed the equipment bag and 
withheld it from the person Lindsey intended it to be entrusted to 
because the superintendent asked him to.  Indeed, there is no question 
the coach knew Lindsey did not want him to transport the equipment 
bag back to Dunkerton himself, as he personally heard Lindsey ask that 
it be given to his friend instead. 
As a result, by the time the superintendent heard the metallic 
sound coming from within the equipment bag in the lunchroom back in 
Dunkerton, the bag had already been seized within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment.  It therefore makes no difference whether the 
superintendent reasonably believed the sound he heard was created by a 
firearm coming into contact with the floor through the fabric of the bag 
or not.  Because the seizure of the equipment bag was not adequately 
justified at the moment of its inception, the ensuing search of the bag 
was unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and 
the fruits of that search should have been suppressed.  I would therefore 
reverse the judgment of conviction and remand for a new trial.