Title: In Re Moskaluk

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                           Nos. 91-070 & 91-071


In re Michael Moskaluk                       Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
                                             Chittenden Superior Court

                                             March Term, 1991


Frank G. Mahady, J.

E.M. Allen, Defender General, and Henry Hinton, Appellate Attorney,
  Montpelier, and Michael Moskaluk, pro se, Burlington, for petitioner-
  appellant

Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and David E. Tartter, Assistant
  Attorney General, Montpelier, for respondent-appellee


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


     DOOLEY, J.   Petitioner, Michael Moskaluk, who is held under two
extradition warrants, brought a habeas corpus action in Chittenden Superior
Court and was denied relief.  We affirm that denial.
     On August 2, 1990, petitioner was arrested in Vermont and held as a
fugitive from justice from the state of Louisiana.  On September 6, 1990, he
was served with a governor's extradition warrant.  He challenged that by
petition for habeas corpus on October 2, 1990 and prevailed when the
superior court found that the documents failed to show that he was present
in Louisiana when the offense was committed.  The Governor of Louisiana
supplied additional documents and again requested extradition.  Petitioner
was again arrested on a Governor's warrant, and this time was unsuccessful
in obtaining release below.
     On November 2, 1990, before the court acted on the Louisiana request, a
detainer arrived from the state of Texas.  That was followed by a request
for extradition from the Governor of Texas, and on November 16, 1990, the
Governor of Vermont issued a warrant on this request.  Petitioner attacked
this warrant in the Chittenden Superior Court.  The action was joined with
the attack on the second Louisiana warrant and was similarly unsuccessful.
     Petitioner, appearing through counsel and pro se, raises a number of
challenges to the superior court's denial of relief.  We first consider
those claims that are raised with respect to the Louisiana warrant or with
respect to both warrants; followed by consideration of claims applicable
only to the Texas warrant.
                                    I.
     The Louisiana documents contain a demand for extradition bearing a
machine-stamped signature of the Governor and Secretary of State.  The
demand was based on a request made by the First Assistant District Attorney
of Orleans Parish, showing petitioner is charged with illegal possession of
stolen property worth over $500.  The request is supported by an affidavit
of a police officer, made before a judge, detailing the facts supporting the
charge.  The affidavit alleges that petitioner, while in Louisiana, sold
about $500,000 worth of Audubon prints knowing that they had been stolen
from the Louisiana State Museum.  The request is also supported by an
information and an arrest warrant.
     Petitioner challenged the Louisiana extradition on four grounds in the
trial court:  (1) because the court had granted habeas corpus based on the
papers submitted with the original demand, the second demand was barred by
res judicata; (2) the signatures of the Governor and Secretary of State of
Louisiana are deficient because they were made by machine; (3) if
petitioner's confession is excluded, there is insufficient showing that
petitioner committed the offense; and (4) there is no showing of
identification.  On appeal, he reasserts these grounds and adds that his
defeat below was caused by ineffective assistance of counsel and the
interference of Vermont prison officials.
     The first Louisiana demand was found defective because it did not show
that petitioner committed the alleged offense in Louisiana and left that
state.  See In re Ropp, 149 Vt. 269, 271, 541 A.2d 86, 88 (1988).  The
affidavit supporting the second demand clearly corrects that deficiency.
Petitioner argues that it does so based on facts well-known when the first
demand was made and, therefore, the second demand is barred by res
judicata.  Whatever the facts surrounding the resubmission of the Louisiana
demand, res judicata does not apply in extradition proceedings.  See Collins
v. Loisel,