Title: Wyoming Nat. Abortion Rights Action League v. Karpan

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Wyoming Nat. Abortion Rights Action League v. Karpan1994 WY 119883 P.2d 382Case Number: 94-8, 94-9Decided: 10/31/1994The original decision is cited as 1994 WY 84, 881 P.2d 281.  There is an additional dissent that is cited at 1994 WY 119, 883 P.2d 382.  The complete decision will be found at both cites on this database.Supreme Court of Wyoming
WYOMING NATIONAL ABORTION RIGHTS ACTION LEAGUE; Wyoming 
National Organization for Women; Jane Courage; Dr. Brent A. Blue; Dr. Jacques 
Roux; Sharon Breitweiser; Rebecca L. Archer; Lori Bowdler; and Rev. Warren 
Murphy,

Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

Kathy 
KARPAN, Secretary of State, State of Wyoming; Unseen Hands Prayer Circle 
Political Action Committee; Kathy Helling; Richard R. Larson; and Alan C. 
Stauffer,

Appellees 
(Defendants).

PLANNED 
PARENTHOOD OF WYOMING; Campbell County Voices for Choice; Carbon County 
Coalition for Choice; Converse County Coalition for Choice; Fremont County 
Pro-Choice Network; Teton County Coalition for Choice; and Cindy 
Chace,

Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

Kathy 
KARPAN, Secretary of State, State of Wyoming,

Appellee 
(Defendant).

Appeal 
from District Court, Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, 
J.

Representing 
Appellants:

Kate 
M. Fox of Burgess, Davis & Cannon, Cheyenne, Kathryn Kolbert and Simon 
Heller, the Center for Reproductive Law & Policy, New York City, for 
appellant Wyoming Nat. Abortion Rights Action League.

Robert 
M. Shively of Murane & Bostwick, Casper, Roger Evans and Carole Chervin, 
Planned Parenthood Federation of America, New York City, for appellant Planned 
Parenthood of Wyoming.

Representing 
Appellees:

Joseph 
B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., Michael L. Hubbard, and Rowena L. Heckert, Senior Asst. 
Attys. Gen., for appellee Kathy Karpan, Secretary of State, State of 
Wyo.

Richard 
H. Honaker of Honaker, Hampton & Newman, Rock Springs, for appellee Unseen 
Hands Prayer Circle Political Action Committee, Richard R. Larson, and Alan C. 
Stauffer.

Richard 
L. Williams and Barry G. Williams of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, 
Casper, for appellee Kathy Helling.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., THOMAS, MACY,* and TAYLOR, JJ., and 
CARDINE,** 
J. (Retired).

* 
Chief Justice at time of oral argument.

** 
Retired July 6, 1994.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1]      The major concern 
in these consolidated cases is whether this court should order that an 
initiative measure not be placed on the general election ballot because of its 
potential unconstitutionality, if enacted. Embraced within this question are 
issues relating to the existence of a justiciable controversy; the 
unconstitutionality vel non of the proposed initiative measure; the 
constitutional invalidity of the measure because the title and summary do not 
clearly express its subject, and the body of the initiative contains more than a 
single subject; and whether the correct election year was selected for the 
purpose of tabulating the required number of signatures. Recognizing a split of 
authority with respect to the existence of a justiciable controversy, we hold 
that, if enacted, the measure would not be unconstitutional in its entirety 
under current federal standards. It follows that it should be included in the 
general election ballot unless one or more of the alternative grounds urged by 
the appellants is valid. We further hold that the title of the measure is 
sufficient; it does not contain more than one subject; and the correct general 
election year was applied to tabulate the required number of signatures. We 
affirm the decision of the district court in denying relief by its Order of 
Dismissal.

[¶2]      The appellants in 
these consolidated cases essentially represent the pro-choice stance with 
respect to abortion. They state that the issues are:

A. 
Does a pre-enactment challenge to a ballot initiative present a justiciable 
controversy under the Wyoming Constitution?

B. 
Do the ballot initiative's title and summary fail to clearly express the bill's 
subject as required by Wyo. Const. art. III § 24?

C. 
Does the challenged ballot initiative violate the single subject rule expressed 
in Wyo. Const. art. III § 24 and Wyo. Stat. § 22-24-105?

D. 
Was the Secretary of State's use of the number of voters in the 1990 election 
rather than the 1992 election a violation of the requirement at Wyo. Const. art. 
III § 52(c) that signatures be obtained from 15% "of those who voted in the 
preceding general election?"

[¶3]      The appellees, 
other than the Secretary of State, represent the pro-life stance. The pro-life 
faction sets forth the issues in this way:

1. 
Is a pre-enactment challenge to the substantive constitutionality of legislation 
proposed by a ballot initiative justiciable where the proposed legislation could 
have been enacted by the legislature itself?

2. 
If such a pre-enactment challenge is justiciable, can Appellants, under the 
facial challenge rule, show that the legislation proposed by this initiative, in 
its entirety, is unconstitutional in every conceivable 
application?

3. 
Does the legislation proposed by the challenged ballot initiative violate the 
single subject rule of Art. 3, § 24 of the Wyoming 
Constitution?

4. 
Are Appellants' contentions relating to the title and summary of the proposed 
bill, including their single subject rule contention, barred by the applicable 
statute of limitations?

5. 
Does Art. 3, § 52(c) of the Wyoming Constitution require the petition filed with 
the Secretary of State to have been signed by qualified voters equal in number 
to 15 percent of those persons who voted in the 1992 general election or 15 
percent of those persons who voted in the 1990 general election, where, prior to 
the 1992 general election, the petition had been signed by qualified voters 
equal in number to 15 percent of those who voted in the 1990 general 
election?

[¶4]      A separate brief 
was filed by Kathy Helling, in which the issues are articulated in this 
way:

1. 
Should a court in Wyoming intervene in the political process of initiative 
law-making to impose constitutional orthodoxy upon an as-yet-unenacted 
measure?

2. 
Does the record support Appellants' claim that the challenged ballot initiative 
was deceptive to the signatories and would deceive voters in the general 
election?

3. 
Does the record support Appellants' challenge to the number of signatures 
required in order to place the initiative on the 1994 
ballot?

[¶5]      The Secretary of 
State adopts the same issues as those set forth by the pro-choice 
faction.

[¶6]      The issues in 
this case are substantially pure issues of law. The essential fact is the text 
of the proposed initiative measure, and it is attached as Appendix A. To the 
extent that other facts are significant, we will incorporate them in our 
discussions of the several issues.

[¶7]  A conclusion that no justiciable 
controversy is present would resolve this case and demand its dismissal. We 
articulated the necessary elements for a justiciable controversy under our 
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, WYO. STAT. §§ 1-37-101 to 115 (1988) in 
Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574, 578 (Wyo. 1974) (quoting from Sorenson v. City of Bellingham, 80 Wn.2d 547, 496 P.2d 512, 517 
(1972)):

"First, 
a justiciable controversy requires parties having existing and genuine, as 
distinguished from theoretical, rights or interests. Second, the controversy 
must be one upon which the judgment of the court may effectively operate, as 
distinguished from a debate or argument evoking a purely political, 
administrative, philosophical or academic conclusion. Third, it must be a 
controversy the judicial determination of which will have the force and effect 
of a final judgment in law or decree in equity upon the rights, status or other 
legal relationships of one or more of the real parties in interest, or, 
wanting these qualities be of such great and overriding public moment as to 
constitute the legal equivalent of all of them. Finally, the proceedings 
must be genuinely adversary in character and not a mere disputation, but 
advanced with sufficient militancy to engender a thorough research and analysis 
of the major issues." (Emphasis supplied [by Brimmer 
court].)

[¶8]      Application of 
these elements leads us to conclude that the first is met because both the 
pro-life parties and the pro-choice parties have current, concrete rights or 
interests relating to this controversy. Our judgment, either allowing the 
initiative to be included on the ballot, or precluding its inclusion, would 
effectively operate upon the factual dispute between these parties. Thus, the 
second element is satisfied. As to the third element, our determination will 
have the force and effect of a final judgment upon the rights, status, or other 
legal relationships of the real parties in interest. See Rocky Mountain Oil 
& Gas Ass'n v. State, 645 P.2d 1163 (Wyo. 1982) (holding that if a declaratory judgment will not end 
the controversy, it is not proper). We also perceive this matter as one 
involving great and overriding public moment. See Washakie County Sch. Dist. 
No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824, 
101 S. Ct. 86, 66 L. Ed. 2d 28. There can be little question here that these 
proceedings are sufficiently "genuinely adversary in character" as to satisfy 
the fourth element of the Brimmer test. The parties quite vigorously 
support their own position and oppose the contrary stance with equal vigor. 
Indeed, we can judicially notice that this is an issue of deep, bitter, and 
sometimes violent debate throughout this country.

[¶9]      We hold there is 
nothing in our law relating to justiciability that would inhibit the 
consideration of this case. See Reiman Corp. v. City of Cheyenne, 838 P.2d 1182 (Wyo. 1992). This conclusion is compatible with the policy 
proclamation found in WYO. STAT. § 1-37-107, which states that specific 
enumerations do not limit or restrict the exercise of the general powers 
conferred under the act.

[¶10]   We acknowledge that the power of 
the electorate to enact laws through the initiative process is of "equal 
dignity" to the power of the legislature to adopt statutes. An apt statement of 
this concept is found in 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 118 
(1953):

Through 
the initiative the people are a coordinate legislative body with co-extensive 
legislative power, exercising the same power of sovereignty in passing on 
measures as that exercised by the legislature in passing laws. Statutes enacted 
by the people directly under the initiative are of equal dignity with those 
passed by the legislature, for the result is the same in either 
case.

See 
also Queen Creek Land & Cattle Corp. v. Yavapai County Bd. of 
Supervisors, 
108 Ariz. 449, 501 P.2d 391 
(1972); Iman v. Bolin, 98 Ariz. 358, 404 P.2d 705 
(1965). In Wyoming, a measure adopted through the initiative process enjoys a 
superior status because it is not subject to veto and, while it may be amended 
at any time, it cannot be repealed by the legislature within two years of its 
effective date. WYO. CONST. art. 3, § 52(f). The only proscriptions with respect 
to the adoption of measures by initiative and referendum are found in Article 3, 
Section 52(g) of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming, which 
states:

The 
initiative shall not be used to dedicate revenues, make or repeal 
appropriations, create courts, define the jurisdiction of courts or prescribe 
their rules, enact local or special legislation, or enact that prohibited by the 
constitution for enactment by the legislature.

[¶11]   In our sister jurisdictions that 
have constitutional provisions for the initiative process, the majority of 
courts have ruled that a controversy over the constitutionality of an initiative 
is justiciable only after it has been enacted. These courts clearly have held 
that any pre-election challenge to the constitutionality of an initiative does 
not present a justiciable controversy under any circumstances. Tilson v. 
Mofford, 153 Ariz. 468, 737 P.2d 1367 (1987); Iman, 98 Ariz. 358, 404 P.2d 705; McKee v. City of 
Louisville, 200 Colo. 525, 616 P.2d 969 (1980); Associated Taxpayers of Idaho, Inc. v. Cenarrusa, 
111 Idaho 502, 725 P.2d 526 
(1986); Bowe v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 320 Mass. 230, 69 N.E.2d 115 (1946); Anderson v. Byrne, 62 N.D. 218, 242 N.W. 687 (1932); Barnes v. Paulus, 36 Or. App. 327, 588 P.2d 1120 (1978); State ex rel. Althouse v. City of 
Madison, 79 Wis.2d 97, 255 N.W.2d 449 (1977). The majority rule usually is 
explained by the prohibition against "advisory opinions."

[¶12]   In some of those jurisdictions, 
pre-enactment challenges are justiciable and can be the subject of judicial 
review if the initiative addresses subject matter that is excluded from or 
proscribed by the initiative process as delineated in the constitutional 
measure. See, e.g., Whitson v. Anchorage, 608 P.2d 759 (Alaska 1980) (where municipal charter amendment in initiative was in 
conflict with state statute); Boucher v. Engstrom, 
528 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1974) (where initiative would have permitted the passage of a 
local or special law); Convention Center Referendum 
Committee v. Dist. of Columbia Bd. of Elections and Ethics, 441 A.2d 889 
(App.D.C. 1981) (where initiative would have permitted the appropriation of 
funds); Bowe, 69 N.E.2d 115 (where court held it had 
the authority to enforce the constitutional exclusions to the initiative 
process).

[¶13]   The Supreme Court of Arizona stated its 
rationale in this way:

Just as under the separation of powers doctrine the courts 
are powerless to predetermine the constitutionality of the substance of 
legislation, so also they are powerless to predetermine the validity of the 
substance of an initiated measure.

* * * * * *

In the absence of any constitutional or statutory directive 
to the contrary, the proper place to argue about the potential impact of 
an initiative is in the political arena, in speeches, newspaper articles, 
advertisements and other forums. The constitutionality of the interpretation or 
application of the proposed amendment will be considered by this court only 
after the amendment is adopted and the issue is presented by litigants whose 
rights are affected.

Tilson, 153 Ariz. at 470, 473, 737 P.2d  at 1369, 1372 (citations 
omitted, emphasis added). This emphasized language suggests that Arizona might 
make room for a pre-enactment adjudication of the constitutionality of an 
initiative, but only if judicial action was directed by state constitutional or 
statutory law. Whitson, 608 P.2d 759; Boucher, 528 P.2d 456; Bowe, 69 N.E.2d 115.

[¶14]   In some jurisdictions, the 
constitutionality vel non of a proposed initiative measure is perceived as 
justiciable on the premise that the electorate has no right to enact an 
unconstitutional law. In State ex rel. Harper v. 
Waltermire, 213 Mont. 425, 691 P.2d 826, 828-29 (1984), the Supreme Court of Montana, while recognizing that 
"the initiative power should be broadly construed to maintain the maximum power 
in the people," invalidated the measure before it as an attempt by the 
electorate to "circumvent their Constitution by indirectly doing that which 
cannot be done directly." The Supreme Court of California, declaring improper a 
proposed initiative that would have allowed redistricting more than once during 
the ten-year period following the federal census, stated the proposition in this 
way:

A statutory initiative is subject to the same state and 
federal constitutional limitations as are the Legislature and the statutes which 
it enacts.

Legislature of State of Cal. v. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d 658, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781, 669 P.2d 17, 26-27 (1983). To the same effect are Hessey v. 
Burden, 615 A.2d 562 (D.C.App. 1992); Stumpf v. 
Lau, 108 Nev. 826, 839 P.2d 120 (1992) (where initiative placing term limits on United States 
Congressman or Senator from Nevada was held violative of the federal 
constitution); In Re Petition No. 349, 838 P.2d 1 
(Okla. 1992) (where a similar petition to initiative at issue in this case was 
kept off the ballot because it violated the federal constitution); City of Newark v. Benjamin, 144 N.J. Super. 58, 364 A.2d 563 (1976) (where general rule against pre-election review is abrogated if 
initiative is facially invalid or initiative fails to meet statutory 
requirements). As early as 1934, the Supreme Court of Florida, addressing a 
constitutional amendment, succinctly articulated this rationale:

If a proposed amendment to the state Constitution by its 
terms specifically and necessarily violates a command or limitation of the 
Federal Constitution, * * * the prescribed legal procedure for submitting such a 
proposed amendment to the electorate * * * may be enjoined at the suit of proper 
parties in order to avoid the expense of submission, when the amendment, if 
adopted, would palpably violate the paramount law and would inevitably be futile 
and nugatory and incapable of being made operative under any conditions or 
circumstances.

Gray v. Winthrop, 115 Fla. 721, 156 So. 270, 272 (1934).

[¶15]   We acknowledge the political pragmatism 
of the majority view. In part, that hinges upon a recognition that the issue may 
be mooted by the failure to adopt the proposed initiative. Still, we perceive no 
difference between the situation in which an initiative may violate a command or 
limitation of the state or federal constitution and one in which the 
constitutional provision, as interpreted and applied, is violated.

[¶16]   It is clear, and the pro-life faction 
does not substantially disagree, that the proposed initiative entitled "Wyoming 
Human Life Protection Act" is partially unconstitutional under federal 
standards. In Section 35-6-102 of the proposed initiative, abortion is 
prohibited and, in conjunction with provisions of existing law, it would be 
criminalized. This without regard to the doctrine of Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973), and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1992). The provisions 
directly contravene the rule of those cases.

[¶17]   In Roe, the 
Supreme Court of the United States ruled that state criminal statutes 
prohibiting abortions at any stage of pregnancy except to save the mother's life 
are unconstitutional under the federal constitution. The fundamental right of 
privacy was declared to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. The 
mother's right to privacy, including abortion, and the interest of the state in 
safeguarding health, maintaining medical standards, and protecting potential 
lives were balanced in a framework of trimesters. Roe represents the legal status quo with respect to 
federal constitutionality, and we cannot predict any change in that rule based 
upon the history to this time.

[¶18]   There was substantial speculation about 
the possibility of a new case overruling or undercutting the principles 
articulated in Roe. Casey ended this speculation and upheld the rule of Roe to the effect that a state may not prohibit a woman 
from making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy prior to viability 
of the fetus. The trimester framework was replaced by an undue burden test for 
the purpose of evaluating abortion restrictions prior to viability. Viability 
was defined as the earliest point at which the state's interest is 
constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on non-therapeutic 
abortions. Under federal law, it is the point in time at which the realistic 
possibility exists of maintaining and nourishing life outside the womb.

[¶19]   Because the initiative at issue is 
contrary to the ruling of the Supreme Court of the United States in Roe, recently reaffirmed in Casey, logic dictates that a justiciable controversy is 
present in the same way that one would be present if the language of the 
constitution were challenged directly. A ruling by this court on such a 
constitutional issue should not be perceived as simply an advisory opinion. The 
dynamics of the situation are different from that in which the constitutionality 
of an initiative proposition has not been previously adjudicated.

[¶20]   We hold that an initiative measure that 
contravenes direct constitutional language, or constitutional language as 
previously interpreted by the highest court of a state or of the United States, 
is subject to review under the declaratory judgment statutes. That scenario 
satisfies the elements articulated in Brimmer and, 
if such a measure were clearly unconstitutional, there would be no purpose in 
submitting it to the electorate under the initiative process. The initiative 
process was designed and intended for a different purpose than simply providing 
a formal straw vote.

[¶21]   It is this proposition that the 
pro-choice faction relies upon in seeking to inhibit the initiative from the 
general election ballot. Their argument encompasses the claim that there is a 
burden on the electoral process if voters address time, thought, and 
deliberation to legislation, the adoption of which is a hollow act. They also 
argue that the effort is a waste of state time and money in preparing the ballot 
and submitting it to the electorate.

[¶22]   Both the federal and the state 
constitutions require our compliance with federal constitutional law on issues 
preserved within the federal domain.1 This concept, 
we hold, brings the issue within the language of Article 3, Section 52(g) of the 
Constitution of the State of Wyoming providing that:

The initiative shall not be used to * * * enact that 
prohibited by the constitution for enactment by the legislature.

The proposed initiative makes no allowance for a woman's 
pre-viability decision with respect to a non-therapeutic abortion. If it were 
adopted, it could not withstand challenges under the rule of Roe and Casey, and it 
clearly would be unconstitutional under those standards. This does not end the 
case, however.

[¶23]   State funding of abortions specifically 
was addressed in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 97 S. Ct. 2376, 53 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1977). The Supreme Court of the United States held that 
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not demand that a 
state participating in the medicaid program pay expenses incident to 
non-therapeutic abortions for indigent women. Other provisions exist in the 
proposed initiative, particularly Section 35-6-117, that prohibit the 
appropriation of state funds for abortions except for cases of sexual assault, 
incest, and pregnancies detrimental to the health of the mother. This proposed 
section in the initiative is the same in substance as the current section and 
would be constitutional within the parameters of Maher. In addition, other provisions exist addressing a 
prohibition of civil liability for refusal to perform abortion and the necessity 
for reporting abortion.

[¶24]   The Supreme Court of Florida has held 
that it is necessary to find a measure unconstitutional in its entirety in order 
to proscribe its submission to the electorate, saying

when a proposal of the nature here involved is assaulted on 
the ground that it violates the Constitution, the courts will not interfere if 
upon ultimate approval by the electorate such proposal can have a valid field of 
operation even though segments of the proposal or its subsequent applicability 
to particular situations might result in contravening the organic law. In other 
words, if an examination of the proposed amendment reveals that if adopted it 
would be legally operative in part, even though it might ultimately become 
necessary to determine that particular aspects violate the Constitution, then 
the submission of such a proposal to the electorate for approval or disapproval 
will not be restrained.

Dade County v. Dade County League of 
Municipalities, 104 So. 2d 512, 515 (Fla. 1958) (citations omitted).

[¶25]   In South Carolina, a proposed municipal 
ordinance was attacked on the grounds it was facially defective, rather than on 
constitutional grounds. The Supreme Court affirmed a decision of the circuit 
court holding that it was facially defective and the town could not be required 
to submit it to the voters. With respect to the concept of facial 
unconstitutionality, the Court said:

Courts recognizing the propriety of pre-election review 
will not interfere with the submission of an initiated ordinance to the 
electorate if the initiated ordinance can be construed to be legally operative 
in part, even though ultimately a court might need to determine which aspects of 
the initiated ordinance are invalid. Dade County, 
104 So. 2d  at 515.

Hilton Head Island v. Expressway Opponents, 307 S.C. 449, 415 S.E.2d 801, 805 (1992).

[¶26]   The logic and rationale from the 
Supreme Court of Florida and the Supreme Court of South Carolina are pertinent 
and compelling. We hold that an initiative, attacked as facially 
unconstitutional, must be unconstitutional in toto 
before we could foreclose its inclusion in the ballot for a vote of the 
people.

[¶27]   Under our constitution, and the federal 
constitution as interpreted, there are aspects of the Wyoming Human Life 
Protection Act that are constitutional. Given that fact, and the prospect of 
severability, this court cannot, by a pre-enactment ruling, declare the proposed 
bill unconstitutional. It follows that it should be included on the 1994 general 
election ballot and voted upon by the people. A legislative measure adopted 
either by the legislature or by the people through the initiative process 
carries with it a presumption of constitutionality under our law. Consequently, 
in the absence of any prior adjudication with respect to the other provisions of 
the initiative, we do not perceive our authority under the Uniform Declaratory 
Judgments Act to reach those issues.

[¶28]   We are not persuaded by the pro-life 
argument that, like a legislative bill, an initiative cannot be reviewed until 
it is enacted. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes stated for the Supreme Court of the 
United States, "litigation cannot arise until the moment of legislation is 
passed." Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 228, 29 S. Ct. 67, 70, 53 L. Ed. 150, 159 (1908). There is a difference, however, between 
the initiative process and the normal legislative process. Once the initiative 
has been submitted to the voters in the petition drive, its language cannot be 
changed. For the purpose of knowing what the final form of the measure will be, 
the proposed initiative settles that question. Consequently, ripeness of the 
initiative issue is not the same problem for purposes of judicial review as 
ripeness of a legislative measure might be. The latter can be amended at any 
point in the legislative process up until its final enactment. This is not true 
regarding an initiative.

[¶29]   Since we hold that a justiciable 
controversy exists and the initiative is not foreclosed from the ballot because 
it is not totally unconstitutional, we turn to the claims of the pro-choice 
faction that the initiative is defective in terms of its title and the inclusion 
of more than one subject in the body of the initiative. The pro-choice faction 
contends that, in both respects, the initiative violates the provisions of 
Article 3, Section 24 of the Wyoming Constitution which reads:

Bill to contain only one subject, which shall be expressed 
in title. - No bill, except general appropriation bills and bills 
for the codification and general revision of the laws, shall be passed 
containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title; 
but if any subject is embraced in any act which is not expressed in the title, 
such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be so 
expressed.

The assumption of this argument is that the language of 
Article 3, Section 52(g) which forecloses the use of the initiative to "enact 
that prohibited by the constitution for enactment by the legislature" invokes 
the provisions of Article 3, Section 24 of the constitution. Logic supports that 
position and, for purposes of resolving this case, we assume that the initiative 
must comply with the requirements for a valid legislative bill.

[¶30]   The pro-life faction argues that the 
issues relating to the single-subject rule and whether the title clearly 
expresses the substantive contents of the initiative are not before us. They 
rely on WYO. STAT. § 22-24-122 (1992), which provides:

Any person aggrieved by any determination made by the 
secretary of state or by the attorney general may bring an action in the 
district court of Laramie county to have the determination reviewed by filing 
application within thirty (30) days of the date on which notice of the 
determination was given.

The pro-life faction concedes that the pro-choice faction 
brought this action for declaratory injunctive relief within thirty days of the 
determination by the Secretary of State of the numerical sufficiency of the 
signatures. The pro-life faction contends, however, that thirty-day period began 
to run when the title, summary, and text of the proposed initiative had been 
"approved, printed, and circulated," which occurred in August of 1991. We do not 
accept this reading of the statute. A rule that the thirty-day period of 
limitations begins to run with respect to each of the preliminary matters, when 
it is completed, would result in "piecemeal" litigation. This court does not 
condone that approach. See Matter of Paternity of 
JRW, 814 P.2d 1256 (Wyo. 1991); 
CLS v. CLJ, 693 P.2d 774 (Wyo. 1985); 
Manners v. Manners, 706 P.2d 671 (Wyo. 1985). 
We hold that the pro-choice advocates brought their action for declaratory and 
injunctive relief as to all issues within the thirty-day period following the 
determination by the Secretary of State that the initiative qualified for the 
ballot. That is a timely action under the statute.

[¶31]   We have defined two purposes for the 
provisions found in Article 3, Section 24 of our constitution. The first is to 
prevent the fraud or surprise that could result if provisions contained in the 
body of a bill were not reflected in a general way in the title itself. The 
constitution demands that the title give a reader general information about the 
contents and provisions which will be found in the bill if the reader continues 
with the entire text. We have tempered this requirement, in the legislative 
context, by concluding that the title need not outline specifically every single 
textual provision or specific aspect of the bill but, instead, only "reasonable 
adherence" is required. Brinegar v. Clark, 371 P.2d 62, 66 (Wyo. 
1962). See also Morrow v. Diefenderfer, 384 P.2d 601 (Wyo. 1963); 
State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local No. 946 v. City of 
Laramie, 437 P.2d 295 (Wyo. 1968). 
The reader must be given, by the title, general notice of what the bill 
regulates or proscribes. See Smith v. Hansen, 386 P.2d 98, 99-100 (Wyo. 
1963).

[¶32]   The second purpose of Article 3, 
Section 24 of the Constitution is to prevent what we have described as 
"logrolling" or "piggybacking." These terms allude to the combination in the 
same bill or initiative of unrelated and separate subjects that have nothing to 
do with the subject of the original legislation. That policy was articulated in 
1893 in this language of our court:

[I]t was designed to prevent incongruous and diverse 
legislation in one bill, to make fruitless the practice known as "log rolling," 
and to banish hodge-podge legislation from the statute books; to render futile 
the grouping together in an omnibus bill a number of distinct legislative 
measures, each of which could not pass on its own merits, but which, with the 
aid of its own adherents, and those advocating the other measures, would become 
a law.

In re Fourth Judicial District, 4 Wyo. 133, 144, 32 P. 850, 852 (Wyo. 
1893).

[¶33]   In applying this constitutional 
standard to the initiative before us, we conclude that every provision in the 
initiative is germane to the subjects expressed in the title. See In re Fourth Judicial District. The initiative 
creates a new paragraph (7) providing a definition for "unborn child"; it amends 
the definitions of "abortion," "conception," and "pregnancy," found in the 
current statute; it strikes current language to the effect that an abortion 
cannot be performed after viability and replaces that language with language 
providing, after conception, an abortion may be performed only if the mother's 
life is in danger; it provides affirmative defenses to the charge of abortion if 
the pregnancy is the result of sexual assault or incest and has been reported to 
law enforcement personnel; it provides procedures for the pregnant woman and the 
physician to follow; it specifies abortion will not be funded by the state; and 
it provides for an effective date of February 9, 1993. We hold that the title of 
the initiative adequately expresses the substantive provisions included within 
the body of the initiative.

[¶34]   With respect to the contention that the 
initiative violates the single subject rule, our reading of the initiative does 
not lead to that conclusion. It is correct that an initiative must not contain 
separate and distinct subjects in the same bill. See In 
re Fourth Judicial District. The district court concluded that the purpose 
of the initiative is to discourage abortions, which is reflected in the short 
title of the bill, the "Wyoming Human Life Protection Act." We agree with the 
district court because we read the language of the initiative, criminalizing 
abortion in most instances and withholding state funding for abortions under 
certain circumstances, to fit within the single-subject rule. Those features are 
two methods by which the drafters of the initiative intended to achieve their 
goal of "protecting human life." In its decision letter, the district court 
stated, "the initiative does not `embrace two or more dissimilar and discordant 
subjects,' but presents a means to achieving a desired end." See Fire Fighters Local No. 946, 437 P.2d  at 303. We 
adopt this ruling.

[¶35]   There is left for resolution only the 
issue posed by the pro-choice parties that the Secretary of State improperly 
invoked the 1990 election as the "preceding general election" to establish the 
number of "qualified registered voters" so that 24,646 signatures were required 
to qualify the initiative for the ballot. The Secretary of State had determined 
that the petition complied with the constitutional and statutory provisions, and 
the initiative petition was approved on December 4, 1992, pursuant to a letter 
dated December 8, 1992. That determination led to the filing of this action on 
December 28, 1992 by the pro-choice parties pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 
22-24-122.

[¶36]   In challenging the determination by the 
Secretary of State, the pro-choice parties contended they were aggrieved 
because, among other reasons, the petition did not contain the required number 
of appropriate signatures. They point to the record which demonstrates 
signatures submitted after November 3, 1992, the date of the general election in 
that year, were counted by the Secretary of State. Their contention is that the 
inclusion of such signatures made the 1992 general election the "preceding 
general election" and that, in view of the number of votes cast in 1992, 30,540 
signatures were required for these petitions.

[¶37]   The pro-life parties insist that 1990 
is the correct general election, arguing that all but three of the 36,362 
signatures submitted were obtained prior to the date of the 1992 election and, 
thus, the votes cast in the 1990 general election furnish the proper base for 
applying the constitutional formula. The district court agreed with this 
position, stating in its opinion letter, "the Secretary of State reasonably used 
15% of the qualified voters in the 1990 General Election - at the time the 
voters signed these petitions, 1990 was the `preceding general election' for all but a de minimis number of votes." We justify the decision, 
but on a different premise from that used by the Secretary of State or the 
district court.

[¶38]   The statutes adopted to implement the 
initiative process set forth in Article 3, Section 52 of the Constitution 
provide, in pertinent part, as follows:

(a) Petitions may be filed with the secretary of state if 
signed by a sufficient number of qualified registered voters as required by the 
Wyoming constitution.

(b) Petitions for an initiative shall be submitted to the 
secretary of state for verification within the eighteen (18) month period 
following the date the first set of petition forms are provided to the sponsors. 
Any petition not submitted within the eighteen (18) month period is void for all 
purposes.

WYO. STAT. § 22-24-115 (1992).

(a) Within not more than sixty (60) days of the date the 
petition is filed, the secretary of state shall review it and shall notify the 
committee whether the petition was properly or improperly filed. The petition 
shall be determined to be improperly filed if: 

(i) There is an insufficient number of signatures of 
qualified registered voters;

(ii) The subscribers were not resident in at least 
two-thirds of the counties of the state.

WYO. STAT. § 22-24-116 (1992).

[¶39]   The petition and its filing have been 
defined by this court as follows:

While the constitution provides it shall not be filed 
unless it has the requisite signatures, we construe the legislative version to 
mean that the petition is initially deposited with the Secretary in order that 
it may be reviewed for adequacy to determine whether there are the required 
number of signatures from two-thirds of the state's counties and the subscribers 
are qualified registered voters.

Thomson v. Wyoming In-Stream Flow Committee, 651 P.2d 778, 782 (Wyo. 1982).

[¶40]   The record establishes that on February 
18, 1992, 28,436 signatures were filed with the Secretary of State. This number 
exceeded the required number by 3,790. The Secretary of State then determined 
that the initiative would not be on the November, 1992 ballot because 3,818 
signatures were rejected, thus, making it "impossible for the petition drive to 
obtain the required 24,646 signatures, even if the rest of the petitions were 
verified at 100%. The pro-life parties then proceeded to obtain additional 
signatures and to achieve certification.

[¶41]   On June 15, 1993, the Secretary of 
State issued a certification with respect to the signature submissions. That 
certificate demonstrates that 36,359 people signed the petition prior to the 
general election on November 3, 1992, and only three people signed it subsequent 
to that date. The certification also establishes that 35,744 signatures were 
submitted prior to November 3, 1992, and only 618 were submitted after that 
date. In addition, it demonstrates that 391 signatures, which were submitted 
after November 3, 1992, were included in the count to reach the required total 
of 24,646. It is also clear that 2,571 signatures were submitted before November 
3, 1992, but were never counted by the Secretary of State.

[¶42]   The certification is explained by the 
affidavit of the Secretary of State dated August 9, 1993. The Secretary of State 
advised that she had participated in the definition of "preceding general 
election" in August of 1990 at the request of sponsors of the Triple Trailers 
Initiative. The question presented in this latter initiative was whether the 
target number of signatures should be adjusted after the 1990 election. In the 
affidavit, the Secretary of State says:

We interpreted this clause as referring to the election 
preceding the beginning of the petition drive. Thus, we decided the signature 
target would be based on the 1988 general election and would not be adjusted 
even though the initiative drive extended beyond the 1990 general election.

The Secretary of State's interpretation does not fit the 
language this court used in addressing the initiative process. We said:

The application * * * [was] approved October 20, 1980. At 
that time, on the basis of the 1978 general election, the number of signatures 
required would have been 21,345. However, by the time the sponsors made their final submission of the accumulated petitions on 
December 11, 1981 (some had been delivered in earlier months), the last general 
election had been held in November 1980, so the number of qualified voter 
signatures required had increased to 27,154.

Wyoming In-Stream Flow, 651 P.2d  at 783 (emphasis added).

[¶43]   We are satisfied that Wyoming In-Stream Flow correctly identified the 
appropriate general election as the one preceding the time the accumulated 
petitions are submitted to the Secretary of 
State.

[¶44]   It is clear that signatures were 
submitted both before and after the 1992 general election and some submitted 
after that election were used to arrive at the 24,646 required number. If we 
were to accept the definition by the Secretary of State as to the point in time 
for establishing the pertinent election, we would not honor what this court said 
in Wyoming In-Stream Flow. Instead, we hold the date 
of the final submission of the petition is the date that controls the 
determination of which prior general election will be used to calculate the 15 
percent signature requirement for the petition.

[¶45]   In this particular instance, the 
petition included 2,571 signatures submitted prior to the 1992 election, but not 
counted in arriving at the 24,646 signatures. If the counting process were 
continued appropriately, the Secretary of State would exclude from the count the 
391 signatures that were submitted after the 1992 general election, but would 
determine if at least 391 signatures from the 2,571 that were not counted were 
valid. The number of valid signatures submitted to the Secretary of State before 
the 1992 election would justify the declaration that the petition was properly 
filed in accordance with WYO. STAT. § 22-24-116 (1992), if that total achieved 
24,646. If that total were not reached, the Secretary of State would declare the 
initiative improperly filed because it would be impossible for the number to 
achieve the 30,540 that would be required based upon the votes cast in the 1992 
general election.

[¶46]   The trial judge was satisfied that the 
requisite signatures to meet the 1990 general election requirement were 
available. Since the review process in the office of the Secretary of State 
evidenced a validity of signatures at a 75.3 percent rate, statistically, 1,937 
of the 2,571 uncounted signatures would be valid. That number substantially 
exceeds the required number of 391 for purposes of the validity of this 
initiative. Therefore, we assume that the petitions the pro-life parties 
presented achieve the required 24,646 signatures, and those signatures were 
presented to the office of the Secretary of State prior to the 1992 general 
election. This leads to a conclusion that the petition is properly filed 
allowing it to be presented on the 1994 general election ballot.

[¶47]   We leave open the possibility that the 
pro-choice parties can demonstrate the invalidity of this presumption by showing 
that, in fact, the petitions filed prior to the general election of 1992 did not 
encompass the required number of signatures. Obviously, that effort must be 
undertaken promptly because, if it is not, the petition will be on the 1994 
general election ballot.

[¶48]   In this instance, we hold that the 
certification properly could be made relying upon the general election of 1990, 
but limited to only those signatures submitted prior to November 3, 1992. On 
that premise, the 391 signatures submitted after November 3, 1992 should not be 
included to reach the required total of 24,646, but the 2,571 submitted before 
November 3, 1992, which never were counted by the Secretary of State, should be 
included. As we have noted previously, the count may be subject to challenge, 
but that must be done promptly.

[¶49]   To summarize, we hold that a 
justiciable controversy is presented to the court and, since the initiative 
proposed would not be totally unconstitutional under current law, it should be 
on the general election ballot. We find no merit in the contentions of the 
pro-choice parties regarding the title of the initiative, the incorporation of 
more than one subject in the language of the initiative, nor in the failure to 
achieve the required number of signatures according to the constitutional 
formula. With respect to the time for identifying the required number of 
signatures, we hold that the time is established by the date on which the 
petitions are initially deposited with the Secretary of State in order to make a 
determination as to the validity of the signatures and representation from 
two-thirds of the state's counties. In this instance, that preceded the 1992 
general election, and the required number of signatures will be determined by 
the 1990 general election.

[¶50]   The judgment of the district court is 
affirmed.

TAYLOR, J., files a concurring opinion.

MACY, J., and CARDINE, J. 
(Retired), will dissent; dissenting opinions to be filed at a later 
date.

 

APPENDIX A

A BILL

FOR

AN ACT to amend W.S. 35-6-101, 35-6-102, 35-6-106, 
35-6-107(a)(v) and by creating a new paragraph (vii), and 35-6-117 relating to 
abortions; specifying when abortions may be performed and providing for 
affirmative defenses; providing definitions; providing procedures; specifying 
when appropriated funds may be used for abortions; and providing for an 
effective date.

Be It Enacted by the People of the State of Wyoming:

Section 1. W.S. 35-6-101, 35-6-102, 35-6-106, 
35-6-107(a)(v) and by creating a new paragraph (vii), and 35-6-117 are amended 
to read:

35-6-101. Short title; definitions.

(a) THIS ACT SHALL BE KNOWN AND MAY BE CITED AS THE 
"WYOMING HUMAN LIFE PROTECTION ACT."

(b) As used in the act, unless the context otherwise 
requires:

(i) "Abortion" means an act, 
procedure, device or prescription administered to or prescribed for a pregnant 
woman by any person with knowledge of the pregnancy, including the pregnant 
woman herself, with the intent of producing the premature expulsion, removal or 
termination of a human embryo or fetus, except that in cases in which the 
viability of the embryo or fetus is threatened by continuation of the pregnancy, 
early delivery after viability by commonly accepted obstetrical practices shall 
not be construed as an abortion THE USE OR PRESCRIPTION OF ANY INSTRUMENT, 
MEDICINE, DRUG OR ANY OTHER SUBSTANCE OR DEVICE WITH THE INTENT TO TERMINATE THE 
PREGNANCY OF A WOMAN KNOWN TO BE PREGNANT, EXCEPT TO SAVE THE LIFE OR PRESERVE 
THE HEALTH OF AN UNBORN CHILD, TO REMOVE A DEAD UNBORN CHILD, OR TO DELIVER AN 
UNBORN CHILD PREMATURELY BY ACCEPTED MEDICAL PROCEDURES IN ORDER TO PRESERVE THE 
HEALTH OF BOTH THE MOTHER AND THE UNBORN CHILD;

(ii) "Accepted medical procedures" means procedures of the 
type and performed in a manner and in a facility which is equipped with 
surgical, anaesthetic, resuscitation and laboratory equipment sufficient to meet 
the standards of medical care which physicians engaged in the same or similar 
lines of work in the community would ordinarily exercise and devote to the 
benefit of their patients;

(iii) "Conception" means the foundation FUSION of the ovum 
by the spermatozoa A HUMAN SPERMATOZOAN WITH A HUMAN OVUM;

(iv) "Hospital" means those institutions licensed by the 
state department of health and social services as hospitals;

(v) "Physician" means any person licensed to practice 
medicine in this state;

(vi) "Pregnant" or "PREGNANCY" means that FEMALE 
REPRODUCTIVE condition of a woman who has a human embryo 
or fetus within her as the result of HAVING AN UNBORN CHILD IN THE MOTHER'S 
BODY, BEGINNING WITH conception;

(vii) "UNBORN CHILD" MEANS AN INDIVIDUAL ORGANISM OF THE 
SPECIES HOMO SAPIENS FROM CONCEPTION UNTIL BIRTH;

(vii)(viii) "Viability" means 
that stage of human development when the embryo or 
fetus UNBORN CHILD is able to live by natural or life-supportive systems 
outside the womb of the mother according to appropriate medical judgment;

(viii)(ix) "Woman" means any 
female person;

(ix) The singular where used herein includes the plural, 
the plural includes the singular, and the masculine includes the feminine or 
neuter, when consistent with the intent of this act and when necessary to effect 
its purpose;

(x) "Minor" means a pregnant woman under the age of 
eighteen (18), but does not include any woman who:

(A) Is legally married;

(B) Is in active military service; or 

(C) Has lived apart from her parents or guardian, has been 
financially independent and has managed her own affairs for at least six (6) 
months prior to a proposed abortion;

(xi) "Parents" means both parents of a minor if they are 
both living, or one (1) parent of the minor if only one (1) is living or if the 
second parent cannot be located through a reasonably diligent effort;

(xii) "This act" means W.S. 35-6-101 through 35-6-118.

35-6-102. Life protective measures; affirmative 
defenses.

(a) An abortion shall not be 
performed after the embryo or fetus has reached viability except when necessary 
to preserve the woman from an imminent peril that substantially endangers her 
life or health, according to appropriate medical judgment. EXCEPT AS 
PROVIDED IN SUBSECTION (b) OF THIS SECTION, NO PERSON SHALL PERFORM AN ABORTION 
UPON A PREGNANT WOMAN UNLESS HER ATTENDING PHYSICIAN:

(i) REASONABLY DETERMINES, IN HIS MEDICAL JUDGMENT, THAT 
HER LIFE WOULD BE ENDANGERED IF THE UNBORN CHILD WERE CARRIED TO FULL TERM; 
AND

(ii) RECORDS, EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER THE ABORTION, THE 
BASIS FOR HIS DETERMINATION IN THE WOMAN'S MEDICAL RECORD.

(b) IT IS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO ANY CHARGE UNDER 
SUBSECTION (a) OF THIS SECTION THAT:

(i) THE PREGNANCY IS THE RESULT OF A SEXUAL ASSAULT, AS 
DEFINED BY W.S. 6-2-301, WHICH IS REPORTED TO A LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY BEFORE 
THE ABORTION;

(ii) THE PREGNANCY IS THE RESULT OF INCEST, AS DEFINED BY 
W.S. 6-4-402, AND THE INCIDENT IS REPORTED TO A LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY BEFORE 
THE ABORTION.

(c) THE DEFENDANT'S BURDEN OF PRODUCING EVIDENCE UNDER 
PARAGRAPHS (b)(i) AND (b)(ii) OF THIS SECTION IS SATISFIED BY EVIDENCE THAT THE 
SEXUAL ASSAULT OR INCEST WAS REPORTED TO A LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY BEFORE THE 
ABORTION. IF THE DEFENDANT SATISFIES THE BURDEN OF PRODUCING EVIDENCE AS 
PROVIDED BY THIS SUBSECTION, THE BURDEN IS THEN UPON THE STATE TO DISPROVE THE 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.

(d) THE PREGNANT WOMAN SHALL NOT BE HELD CRIMINALLY LIABLE 
UNDER ANY STATUTE FOR PROCURING OR PARTICIPATING IN THE ABORTION OF HER UNBORN 
CHILD.

35-6-106. Persons not required to perform abortion; no 
civil liability for refusal; sanctions or discrimination for refusal forbidden. 
No person shall, in any way, be required to perform or 
participate in any abortion or in any act or thing which accomplishes or 
performs or assists in accomplishing or performing a human miscarriage, 
euthanasia or any other death of a human fetus or human embryo AN UNBORN CHILD. The 
refusal for any person to do so is not a basis for civil liability to any 
person. No hospital, governing board or any other person, firm, association or 
group shall terminate the employment of, alter the position of, prevent or 
impair the practice or occupation of, or impose any other sanction or otherwise 
discriminate against, any person who refuses to perform or participate in any 
abortion or in any act or thing which accomplishes, performs or assists in 
accomplishing or performing a human miscarriage, euthanasia or any other death 
of a human fetus or embryo AN UNBORN CHILD.

35-6-107. Forms for reporting abortions.

(a) The state office of vital records services shall 
establish an abortion reporting form which shall be used after May 27, 1977 for 
the reporting of every abortion performed or prescribed in this state. The form 
shall include the following items in addition to such other information as may 
be necessary to complete the form, but in no case shall information be required 
that would tend to disclose the identity of any individual participating in an 
abortion:

(v) the length and weight of the aborted fetus or embryo CHILD, when measurable;

(vii) THE ATTENDING PHYSICIAN'S REASON OR REASONS FOR 
PERFORMING THE ABORTION, AND, IF RELEVANT, THE BASIS FOR HIS MEDICAL JUDGMENT 
THAT THE PREGNANT WOMAN'S LIFE WOULD HAVE BEEN ENDANGERED IF THE UNBORN CHILD 
HAD BEEN CARRIED TO FULL TERM.

35-6-117. Use of appropriated funds 
for abortion prohibited; exceptions. No funds appropriated by the 
legislature of the state of Wyoming shall be used to pay for abortions except when the pregnancy is the result of incest as defined by 
W.S. 6-4-402 or sexual assault as defined by W.S. 6-2-301 if the assault is 
reported to a law enforcement agency within five (5) days after the assault or 
within five (5) days after the time the victim is capable of reporting the 
assault, or when the life of the mother would be endangered if the unborn child 
was carried to full term AN ABORTION IS PERFORMED PURSUANT TO THE PROVISION 
W.S. 35-6-102.

Section 2. If any provision, word, phrase, or clause of 
this Act or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the 
invalidity does not affect the provisions, words, phrases, clauses or 
application of this Act which can be given effect without the invalid provision, 
word, phrase, clause, or application, and to this end the provisions, words, 
phrases, and clauses of this Act are severable.

Section 3. This Act is effective February 9, 1993.

(END)

TAYLOR, Justice, concurring.

[¶51]   I reluctantly concur.

[¶52]   Reluctantly, because portions of the 
initiative, as written, violate principles of federal constitutional law 
announced by the Supreme Court of the United States. The sponsors and the 
opponents of the initiative admit the defects. Therefore, its submission to the 
electorate of Wyoming will result in little more than a costly and inefficacious 
sampling of opinion to be followed by further litigation if the initiative is 
passed.

[¶53]   Furthermore, this court is indulging in 
a questionable expediency to permit the initiative process to move forward. This 
court is presuming that a sufficient number of petition signatures exist. Prior 
to the general election of November 3, 1992, the supporters of the initiative 
presented the Secretary of State of the State of Wyoming with some petition 
signatures which were never counted. This court is applying a presumption to 
hold that a sufficient number of the 2,571 uncounted signatures are valid. The 
law requires that the Secretary of State make an empirical determination that 
petitions have been submitted which contain signatures from a sufficient number 
of "qualified registered voters." Wyo. Stat. § 22-24-116(a)(i) (1992). However, 
this court is making a theoretical determination that the signatures are valid 
based upon the statistical percentage of qualified signatures on the previously 
verified initiative petitions. The majority opinion correctly admits that these 
signatures are still subject to challenge. Practically, however, the time for 
such a challenge is limited. Therefore, the presumption this court is applying 
may only present another issue for further litigation if the initiative is 
passed.

[¶54]   Despite my concerns about the 
constitutionality of portions of the initiative, I believe the political debate 
would have been better served if this court had followed the majority rule and 
found that no justiciable controversy was present. There is profound wisdom in 
the separation of powers doctrines. By allowing the legislative process to be 
completed before judicial review is sought, our federal and state constitutions 
permit complete deliberation of important issues. I believe the initiative 
process should also be allowed to proceed without judicial review of substantive 
challenges to the proposed law.

[¶55]   In a democracy, the political process 
is fueled by debate. Debate presents the opportunity to obtain information, to 
offer opinions, and, ultimately, to persuade. Debate can take place in many 
forums. Our citizens debate in the mass media, in the halls of government, in 
the auditoriums of local communities, in the neighborhood coffee shops or in the 
living rooms of homes across the state. Whatever the forum, the goal of debate 
is to arrive at a reasoned decision. The voters of Wyoming will make a reasoned 
decision about this initiative. Notwithstanding the outcome, however, there will 
be unresolved issues because of the language of the initiative and today's 
decision. 

Footnotes

1 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 
2 provides:

This Constitution, and 
the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; * * * 
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding.

WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 37 
provides:

The State of Wyoming is 
an inseparable part of the federal union, and the constitution of the United 
States is the supreme law of the land.