Title: Ex Parte Enzor

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

117 So. 2d 361 (1960)
Ex parte Leland ENZOR.
STATE of Alabama
v.
Leland ENZOR.
4 Div. 996.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
January 21, 1960.
Robt. B. Albritton, Albrittons & Rankin, Andalusia, for petitioner.
MacDonald Gallion, Atty. Gen., and John F. Proctor, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
MERRILL, Justice.
This is a petition by Leland Enzor for a writ of certiorari to Covington County Circuit Court, seeking a review of a proceeding whereby the petitioner was ordered to jail for contempt. Since he is not in prison, our review is by certiorari. Worley *362 v. Worley, 267 Ala. 71, 100 So. 2d 18; Jordan v. Jordan, 266 Ala. 386, 96 So. 2d 809.
Enzor, a qualified practicing attorney, was called before the Grand Jury of Covington County and asked the following question:
Enzor asserted that this statement was made to him by a client of his and his answer would violate the rule of privilege which exists as a result of this attorney-client relationship.
The circuit solicitor then filed a petition before Judge Smith praying that the petitioner be required to answer the question or be punished for contempt. A hearing was held on March 17, 1959, and testimony was taken. The judge ordered the petitioner to return to the grand jury room and answer the question. The petitioner refused and was thereupon adjudged to be in contempt and was committed to jail. He later made bond.
The judge found that there did exist an attorney-client relationship between the petitioner and his client at the time the conversation took place, but held that the communication was not a privileged one.
Tit. 7, § 438, provides:
It is agreed that this statute is but a declaration of the law on privileged communication between attorney and client previously administered by the courts. It is so stated in Guiterman, Rosenfield & Co. v. Culbreth, 219 Ala. 382, 122 So. 619.
The question for our decision is whether or not the communication was one which the law recognizes as being a privileged communication.
"The rule making communications between attorney and client privileged from disclosure does not ordinarily apply where the inquiry is confined to the fact of the attorney's employment, the name of the person employing him, and the terms of the employment." 58 Am.Jur., Witnesses, § 507. We have so held in regard to the fact of employment and the name of the client in Mobile & Montgomery Railway Co. v. Yeates, 67 Ala. 164; White v. State, 86 Ala. 69, 5 So. 674. But an exception is said to exist to the general rule. We quote again from 58 Am.Jur., Witnesses, § 507.
This exception is stated in the Annotation 114 A.L.R. 1321, at page 1325, and many cases are cited in support of the exception, which usually is based upon the circumstances of the particular case. The case nearest in point is Ex Parte McDonough, 170 Cal. 230, 149 P. 566, L.R.A.1916C, 593, Ann.Cas.1916E, 327. In the annotation following *363 this case in L.R.A.1916C at page 602, it is said:
In the McDonough case, the attorney had been employed by a number of clients. Some of them had been indicted for election of frauds in Alameda County, California. One or more of the attorneys' clients who had not been indicted furnished $10,000 as cash bail for the defendants who had been indicted. In subsequent proceedings before the Grand Jury, the identity of the client or clients who had furnished the cash bail was sought to be ascertained. The lower court there, as here, found that the relationship of attorney and client existed between the person or persons whose name was sought to be ascertained and the attorney who was being questioned, but held that the name of the client was not privileged. In reversing the lower court and holding that the identity of the client was privileged, the Supreme Court of California [170 Cal. 230, 149 P. 567] said:
The Attorney General argues that the McDonough case is "a thoroughly discredited view" and has been "impliedly overruled" by the Supreme Court of California in Brunner v. Superior Court of Orange County, 51 Cal. 2d 616, 335 P.2d 484. We cannot agree with either of these contentions. We have tried to read every case in which we found the McDonough case cited or discussed, and we think it is a recognized, established and reasonable exception to the general rule that the identity of a client is ordinarily not privileged.
The essential facts here are that the undisclosed client came to petitioner during a political campaign in which the circuit judge, the circuit solicitor, the sheriff and the probate judge were or had been candidates in contested races. This client had been an election official in the first primary and was to serve in the same capacity for the runoff. He told petitioner in confidence that a third party had offered to bribe him to violate the election laws, or that he had accepted a bribe to such end; and requested petitioner's legal opinion as to what he should do under the circumstances.
Petitioner advised the client to count the ballots correctly, but could not recall whether or not his client had been offered a bribe or had in fact taken one prior to the consultation.
If the client had already accepted the bribe, he had violated the law and the authorities seem to be uniform that, in such a case, the identity of the client would be privileged. The authorities are also in agreement that the privilege does not apply to communications in which advice is sought to cover future or contemplated crimes. 58 Am.Jur., Witnesses, § 516, p. 289; 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 285, p. 812.
This is a close case and has not been without difficulty in deciding, but we choose to follow the McDonough case in this delicate field of attorney-client relationship, and hold that under the circumstances *366 of this case, the privilege did attach, and petitioner correctly refused to answer the propounded question.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed and one is here rendered discharging the petitioner.
Reversed and rendered.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and LAWSON and STAKELY, JJ., concur.