Title: State v. Wayerski

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2019 WI 11 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP1083-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Gary Lee Wayerski, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 378 Wis. 2d 739, 905 N.W.2d 843  
(2017 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 7, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 5, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dunn 
 
JUDGE: 
William C. Stewart, Jr., and Maureen D. Boyle 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ZIEGLER, J. concurs and dissents, joined by 
ROGGENSACK, C.J. (opinion filed). 
KELLY, J. concurs and dissents, (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Edward J. Hunt and Hunt Law Group, S.C., Milwaukee.  
There was an oral argument by Edward J. Hunt. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Donald V. Latorraca, assistant attorney general, and Brad D. 
Schimel, attorney general.  There was an oral argument by Donald 
V. Latorraca. 
 
 
 
2019 WI 11
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2015AP1083-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2011CF186) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Gary Lee Wayerski, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
FEB 7, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Modified 
and, as modified, affirmed.   
 
¶1 
REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   Gary Wayerski seeks review 
of the court of appeals'1 decision affirming the circuit court's2 
denial of his postconviction motion.   
                                                 
1 State v. Wayerski, No. 2015AP1083-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2017). 
2 The Honorable William C. Stewart, Jr., of the Dunn County 
Circuit Court presided over the jury trial and entered the 
judgment of conviction.  The Honorable Maureen D. Boyle presided 
over the postconviction hearings and entered the order denying 
Wayerski's postconviction motion. 
No. 
2015AP1083-CR   
 
2 
 
¶2 
Wayerski was charged with and convicted of 16 felonies 
based upon allegations that over several months he had repeated 
sexual contact with two juveniles, J.H. and J.P., and exposed 
them to pornography.  Wayerski was found guilty by a jury of the 
following crimes:  (1) two counts of child enticement in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.07(3)(2015-16);3 (2) two counts of 
exposing genitals or pubic area in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.10(1); (3) two counts of exposing a child to harmful 
material in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2)(a); (4) two 
counts of causing a child over the age of 13 to view/listen to 
sexual activity in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.055(2)(b); and 
(5) eight counts of sexual assault of a child by a person who 
works or volunteers with children in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.095(3). 
¶3 
Wayerski filed a postconviction motion, asserting 
claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, circuit court 
errors, and a claim that the State violated its Brady4 
obligations.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  The 
circuit court denied Wayerski's postconviction motion.   
                                                 
3 Wayerski committed and was charged with the offenses when 
the 2009-10 statutes were in effect.  The portions of the 
statutes relevant to this appeal are materially unchanged from 
the current 2015-16 version and therefore all subsequent 
references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2015-16 version. 
4 Pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), 
suppression by the State of material evidence favorable to a 
defendant violates due process.   
No. 
2015AP1083-CR   
 
3 
 
¶4 
The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
denial of Wayerski's postconviction motion.5  Wayerski now seeks 
review of the denial of his ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim6 and the denial of his Brady claim.   
¶5 
Wayerski claims that his trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to question him about a purported confession that he 
gave to John Clark, a government witness who testified on 
rebuttal.  We assume without deciding that trial counsel's 
performance was deficient, in accordance with the first prong of 
the ineffective assistance of counsel analysis.  However, even 
if trial counsel's performance was deficient, we conclude that 
there was no prejudice to Wayerski under the second prong of the 
analysis.  Thus, we conclude there was no ineffective assistance 
of counsel. 
¶6 
Wayerski also alleges that the State violated his due 
process 
rights 
under 
Brady 
when 
it 
failed 
to 
disclose 
impeachment evidence about Clark's pending charges in Chippewa 
County.  We conclude that there was no Brady violation.  While 
evidence of Clark's pending charges was favorable to Wayerski as 
impeachment of Clark's testimony and the State suppressed the 
                                                 
5 The court of appeals remanded the matter to the circuit 
court solely to correct an error in the judgment of conviction. 
Wayerski, No. 2015AP1083-CR, ¶2 n.5. 
6 At the court of appeals Wayerski's ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim had two parts.  Wayerski's ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim as it relates to his trial counsel's 
failure to seek a mistrial in response to the admission of 
pornographic materials is not before us. 
No. 
2015AP1083-CR   
 
4 
 
evidence, Wayerski failed to show that the evidence was 
material.  In analyzing whether the State suppressed evidence 
under the second component of the Brady analysis, we return to 
the principles of Brady and ask only whether the evidence was 
suppressed by the State, rather than the revisionary version of 
Brady that our court has adopted in the past.  Therefore, we 
modify and, as modified, affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals.   
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶7 
In 
July 
2011, 
the 
State 
filed 
a 
criminal 
complaint against Wayerski, which charged nine felony counts.  
In September 2012, the State was granted leave to file a second 
amended information which charged 16 felony counts.  
¶8 
The allegations against Wayerski are summarized as 
follows.  In February 2011, Wayerski, who was the police chief 
of the Village of Wheeler and a part-time police officer for the 
Village of Boyceville, offered to act as a "mentor" to 16-year-
old J.P. after J.P. admitted to breaking into a church.   
¶9 
Wayerski began his "mentorship" with J.P. by taking 
him on "ride-alongs" in his squad car and talking to him about 
his sexual experiences.  Wayerski invited J.P. to his apartment 
where he had J.P. take off his shirt and pants so that Wayerski 
could see his "muscle tone" and assist in his physical fitness.  
During subsequent visits Wayerski touched J.P.'s genitals, 
claiming that it was also for workout purposes.   
¶10 Between March 2011 and July 16, 2011, J.P. alleged that 
Wayerski masturbated him on more than 20 occasions while they 
No. 
2015AP1083-CR   
 
5 
 
watched pornography.  J.P. also claimed that Wayerski made him 
perform other sexual activities based on Wayerski's sexual 
interests and fetishes.  One night in particular, Wayerski made 
J.P. ejaculate onto an oval-shaped turquoise plate so that 
Wayerski could "weigh his sperm."   
¶11 In March 2011, Wayerski issued 17-year-old J.H. a 
disorderly conduct ticket.  Wayerski told J.H. that if he 
completed his community service and stayed out of trouble for 
six months, the incident would be removed from his record.  Like 
J.P., 
J.H. 
recounted 
going 
on 
several 
"ride-alongs" 
in 
Wayerski's 
squad 
car 
before 
being 
invited 
to 
Wayerski's 
apartment.  Wayerski also offered to help J.H. improve his 
physical fitness.  J.H. described specific sexual activities 
that Wayerski made him perform, based on Wayerski's sexual 
interests, including watching pornography with Wayerski while 
Wayerski masturbated him.   
¶12 Additionally, the juveniles detailed how, on occasion, 
Wayerski would invite both of them to his apartment at the same 
time for overnight stays.  During these overnight stays, 
Wayerski would allow the juveniles to drink alcohol.  The 
juveniles also claimed that during one of these overnight stays 
Wayerski simultaneously masturbated both of them while they 
watched on-demand pornography together.  Lastly, the juveniles 
alleged that Wayerski threatened to send them to "juvie" or jail 
if they ever told anyone about the sexual contact or about 
watching pornography at Wayerski's apartment.  
No. 
2015AP1083-CR   
 
6 
 
¶13 Early in the morning on July 16, 2011, after staying 
overnight at Wayerski's apartment, the juveniles got into an 
argument with Wayerski about his cable bill and the amount of 
money spent watching on-demand pornography.  The juveniles left 
Wayerski's apartment on foot and walked several miles to a 
friend's house.  When J.H.'s father picked the juveniles up from 
their friend's house, they told him that some "weird stuff had 
been happening for a while" at Wayerski's apartment, and that 
Wayerski had "molested" them.  J.H.'s father stated that he 
could tell the juveniles had been drinking alcohol.  Later that 
day, the juveniles went to law enforcement to report their 
allegations. 
¶14 Eau 
Claire 
County7 
Sheriff's 
Detective 
Kuehn 
interviewed J.P. and J.H. separately.  Detective Kuehn obtained 
and 
executed 
a 
search 
warrant 
for 
Wayerski's 
apartment.  
Detective Kuehn recovered the following items:  multiple 
computers, alcohol, the oval-shaped turquoise plate that J.P. 
referenced, and a cable bill containing charges for on-demand 
pornographic films.   
¶15 Wayerski's jury trial lasted from October 8 to 
October 12, 2012.  The State called J.H. and J.P. as its primary 
witnesses.  In addition, the State called the parents of J.H. 
and J.P. to corroborate the juveniles' story about their 
                                                 
7 To avoid a conflict of interest because of Wayerski's 
position as a police officer and police chief in villages in 
Dunn County, the case was assigned to Eau Claire County. 
No. 
2015AP1083-CR   
 
7 
 
frequent contact with Wayerski and their overnight stays at his 
apartment.  The jury also heard testimony from Sarah Zastrow-
Arkens, a DNA analyst from the Wisconsin State Crime Laboratory.  
Arkens testified that semen from the oval-shaped turquoise plate 
in Wayerski's apartment showed a male profile which matched 
J.P.'s DNA.  Arkens further testified that the statistical 
likelihood that the sample from the plate belonged to anyone 
other than J.P. was one in 28 quintillion.  Detective Kuehn 
testified that he interviewed the juveniles and their demeanor 
was 
consistent 
with 
prior 
victims 
of 
sexual 
assault.  
Additionally, several other law enforcement officers testified 
about their involvement in the case.  
¶16  Wayerski's general defense was that the juveniles had 
fabricated the allegations because Wayerski was part of a drug 
investigation involving people connected with J.P. and J.H.  
Wayerski disputed the number of "ride-alongs" he had with J.P. 
and J.H. and the number of times the juveniles visited his 
apartment.  Wayerski called four witnesses at trial who claimed 
that after Wayerski's arrest, J.P. said he was lying and that 
the allegations were a "set up" or a joke.   
¶17 Clark, an inmate who occupied a Chippewa County jail 
cell near Wayerski for six to eight weeks, testified for the 
State on rebuttal.  Clark testified that Wayerski had admitted 
to masturbating the juveniles, watching pornography with the 
juveniles, and allowing the juveniles to drink alcohol.  Clark 
testified that he did not ask for, or receive, any benefit for 
testifying against Wayerski.  Instead, Clark testified that he 
No. 
2015AP1083-CR   
 
8 
 
had reported the comments to a sergeant at the jail and to 
Detective Kuehn because "[t]hey're kids. I think that says it 
all."  On the stand, Clark admitted to the jury that he had been 
convicted of 20 crimes, including some felonies. 
¶18 Wayerski's trial counsel recalled Wayerski to the 
stand after Clark's rebuttal testimony.  However, trial counsel 
did not ask Wayerski about the purported confession.  Instead, 
trial counsel asked several questions that Wayerski insisted he 
ask, including the number of inmates in jail that Wayerski had 
been in contact with and whether inmates had access to the 
media.8   
¶19 The jury saw a substantial amount of evidence, 
including pornographic photographs from Wayerski's computer, 
pornography searches, photos of J.H. and J.P. that Wayerski 
captured on his phone, and messages from Wayerski's computer and 
cellphone.  The pornographic materials on Wayerski's computer 
reflected an interest in young males between the ages of 16 and 
20 
and 
included 
pictures 
arranged 
under 
titles 
labelled 
"milking," "punish," "spanking," and "stances."  At trial, 
Wayerski admitted to these types of sexual interests.  In both 
their trial testimony and in their initial interview with 
Detective Kuehn, J.P. and J.H. described contact consistent with 
these types of sexual interests.   
                                                 
8 The questions asked by Wayerski's trial counsel raised an 
implication that Clark had access to various forms of media when 
he was in jail, and that the details he knew about Wayerski's 
case could have come from those outside sources. 
No. 
2015AP1083-CR   
 
9 
 
¶20 A jury found Wayerski guilty of all 16 felony counts 
and he was subsequently sentenced to a total of 14 years of 
initial confinement and 16 years of extended supervision.  After 
his trial, Wayerski discovered that Clark had been charged with 
three crimes against children in Chippewa County one month prior 
to Wayerski's trial:  (1) one count of soliciting a child in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.08; and (2) two counts of sexual 
intercourse with a child 16 or older in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.09.9  The prosecutor assigned to Wayerski's case admitted 
that he had discovered Clark's pending charges a few days prior 
to Wayerski's trial through a basic check of  Consolidated Court 
Automation Programs (CCAP).10  After discovering these charges, 
the prosecutor obtained a copy of the Chippewa County complaint11 
and, after reviewing it, decided that Clark's pending charges 
did not affect the veracity of his prior statements given to 
Detective Kuehn.  Therefore, the prosecutor did not disclose the 
pending charges or criminal complaint to Wayerski's trial 
counsel.   
                                                 
9 Clark was ultimately convicted of:  (1) one count of 
causing a child over the age of 13 to view/listen to sexual 
activity in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.055(1); and (2) two 
counts of sexual intercourse with a child 16 or older in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.09. 
10 CCAP is an internet accessible case management system 
provided by Wisconsin Circuit Court Access program. State v. 
Bonds, 2006 WI 83, ¶6, 292 Wis. 2d 344, 717 N.W.2d 133. 
11 The record is unclear as to exactly how the prosecutor 
obtained a copy of the complaint. 
No. 
2015AP1083-CR   
 
10 
 
¶21 Wayerski 
filed 
a 
postconviction 
motion 
asserting 
claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, circuit court 
errors, and a claim that the State violated its Brady 
obligations by not disclosing Clark's pending charges.  The 
circuit court held a hearing on Wayerski's postconviction motion 
and heard testimony from Wayerski and his trial counsel.   
¶22 As to the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
that is before this court, Wayerski's trial counsel testified 
that he could not think of a reason why he did not ask Wayerski 
about Clark's testimony regarding a purported confession.  
Wayerski's trial counsel admitted that, with "the benefit of 
20/20 hindsight," he should have asked Wayerski about the 
alleged confession.  However, Wayerski's trial counsel noted 
that Wayerski had been talking into his ear during the entire 
trial, and that he had recalled Wayerski to the stand to ask him 
several questions that Wayerski directed him to ask.  Wayerski 
testified that, had he been asked at trial, he would have denied 
giving a confession to Clark.   
¶23 While the circuit court acknowledged that Wayerski's 
trial 
counsel 
"probably" 
should 
have 
given 
Wayerski 
an 
opportunity to deny Clark's allegations, one more denial by 
Wayerski would not have changed the outcome of the trial because 
of the overwhelming amount of evidence.  Therefore, the circuit 
court found that Wayerski had an opportunity to present his 
defense and that his trial counsel "provided the representation 
that he was [constitutionally] required to provide."  
No. 
2015AP1083-CR   
 
11 
 
¶24 Regarding 
Wayerski's 
Brady 
claim, 
trial 
counsel 
testified that he recalled performing a CCAP search on Clark, 
but that he was probably concentrating on Clark's convictions.  
Wayerski's trial counsel testified that he could not recall with 
"one hundred percent specificity" whether he performed any CCAP 
searches of Clark or whether he relied upon information provided 
to him by the State.  The circuit court ordered supplemental 
briefing on several issues and after two more hearings denied 
Wayerski's motion.  
¶25 The circuit court found that the State failed to 
disclose Clark's pending charges.  However, citing Randall, the 
circuit court found that the failure to inform Wayerski of the 
pending charges was harmless error because there was compelling 
evidence of Wayerski's guilt apart from Clark's testimony, 
including the juveniles' testimony and the DNA evidence.  State 
v. Randall, 197 Wis. 2d 29, 539 N.W.2d 708 (Ct. App. 1995).  
Further, the circuit court noted that the jury had been alerted 
to Clark's criminal history and that his credibility had been 
called into question. 
¶26 Wayerski filed a notice of appeal on six issues, only 
two of which he raises on appeal to this court.  The court of 
appeals affirmed the circuit court's denial of Wayerski's 
postconviction motion. See State v. Wayerski, No. 2015AP1083-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶2 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2017).  The 
court of appeals determined that "Wayerski failed to demonstrate 
that his trial attorney's assistance prejudiced his defense on 
the surrebuttal testimony" and that there was no Brady violation 
No. 
2015AP1083-CR   
 
12 
 
because it was not "'an intolerable burden on the defense' to 
search CCAP for the State witness's available pending charges."  
See Wayerski, No. 2015AP1083-CR, ¶2. 
¶27 As to Wayerski's ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, the court of appeals declined to address the deficiency 
prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel analysis.  
Instead, the court of appeals analyzed the prejudice prong and 
concluded that Wayerski failed to show prejudice for several 
reasons.  First, Clark's credibility was already questioned when 
the jury was alerted to the fact that he was an inmate in jail 
and that he had been convicted of 20 crimes, including some 
felonies.  Second, the court of appeals noted that there was 
never any doubt that Wayerski claimed he was innocent.  Wayerski 
also called four witnesses at trial who testified that they 
heard J.P. recant the allegations.  Finally, the court of 
appeals reasoned that the evidence of Wayerski's guilt was 
"overwhelming," including:  the juveniles' consistent, detailed 
testimony, the substantial evidence recovered in Wayerski's 
apartment, and the parents' testimony about time the juveniles 
spent with Wayerski. 
¶28 As to Wayerski's Brady claim, the court of appeals, 
like the circuit court, looked to the Randall case.  Randall, 
197 Wis. 2d 29.  The court of appeals reasoned that the basis of 
Randall was to avoid placing an "intolerable burden" on the 
defense to extensively search for hard-to-secure evidence.  
Wayerski, No. 2015AP1083-CR, ¶55. 
No. 
2015AP1083-CR   
 
13 
 
¶29 However, the court of appeals noted that at the time 
Randall was decided, "'comb[ing] the public records' for the 
criminal record of every witness disclosed before trial entailed 
a trip to a physical site, usually the courthouse (or 
courthouses), to sift through potentially vast paper records." 
Wayerski, No. 2015AP1083-CR, ¶55 (citing Randall, 197 Wis. 2d at 
38).  The court of appeals reasoned that since Randall, CCAP has 
"facilitated efficient use of court resources and greater access 
to court information by the public," allowing wide access to 
those records via the internet.  Id. (quoting State v. Bonds, 
2006 WI 83, ¶47, 292 Wis. 2d 344, 717 N.W.2d 133).  The court of 
appeals held that because it was not an intolerable burden on 
Wayerski's trial counsel to search CCAP for Clark's pending 
criminal charges, the pending charges were not "suppressed" 
under Brady.  
¶30 In the alternative, the court of appeals held that 
even if it assumed that the evidence was suppressed, Wayerski 
failed to show a reasonable probability of a different result 
had 
the 
pending 
charges 
been 
disclosed. 
 
Wayerski, 
No. 
2015AP1083-CR, ¶57.  The court of appeals concluded that 
nondisclosure of the record was not prejudicial because Clark 
was already impeached and there was "very compelling evidence" 
of guilt even apart from Clark's testimony.  Therefore, the 
charges were not "material" pursuant to Brady. 
¶31 Wayerski presents two claims to this court for review: 
(1) whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
No. 
2015AP1083-CR   
 
14 
 
question him about a purported confession that he gave to Clark; 
and (2) whether the State violated its Brady obligation.12   
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶32 "Under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution, a criminal defendant is guaranteed 
the right to effective assistance of counsel."  State v. 
Balliette, 2011 WI 79, ¶21, 336 Wis. 2d 358, 805 N.W.2d 334 
(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984)).  
The same right is guaranteed under Article I, Section 7 of the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
 
Whether 
a 
defendant 
was 
denied 
effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of fact and 
law.  State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶21, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 
N.W.2d 305.  The factual circumstances of the case and trial 
counsel's conduct and strategy are findings of fact, which 
will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous.  Id.  "Whether 
counsel's performance satisfies the constitutional standard for 
ineffective assistance of counsel is a question of law, which we 
review de novo."  Id.  To demonstrate that counsel's assistance 
was ineffective, the defendant must establish that counsel's 
                                                 
12 On appeal, Wayerski also alleged that there was a 
violation 
of 
the 
criminal 
discovery 
statute, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.23(1).  The court of appeals declined to address this 
argument because Wayerski had not properly developed the issue. 
Wayerski, No. 2015AP1083-CR, ¶54 n.9.  Wayerski did not raise 
this issue in his petition for review to this court and 
therefore we will not address it.  See Preisler v. General Cas. 
Ins. Co., 2014 WI 135, ¶3, 360 Wis. 2d 129, 857 N.W.2d 136 
(holding that this court "decline[s] to consider issues not 
raised in petitions for review"). 
No. 
2015AP1083-CR   
 
15 
 
performance was deficient and that the deficient performance was 
prejudicial.  State v. Breitzman, 2017 WI 100, ¶37, 378 
Wis. 2d 431, 904 N.W.2d 93 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).  
If the defendant fails to satisfy either prong, we need not 
consider the other.  Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). 
¶33 Whether trial counsel performed deficiently is a 
question of law we review de novo.  Breitzman, 378 Wis. 2d 431, 
¶38.  To establish that counsel's performance was deficient, the 
defendant must show that it fell below "an objective standard of 
reasonableness."  See Thiel, 264 Wis. 2d 571, ¶19.  
¶34 Whether any deficient performance was prejudicial is 
also a question of law we review de novo.  See State v. Domke, 
2011 WI 95, ¶33, 337 Wis. 2d 268, 805 N.W.2d 364.  To establish 
that deficient performance was prejudicial, the defendant must 
show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.  A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." 
Id., ¶54 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).   
¶35 With 
respect 
to 
Wayerski's 
Brady 
claim, 
we 
independently review whether a due process violation has 
occurred, but we accept the trial court's findings of historical 
fact unless clearly erroneous.  State v. Lock, 2012 WI App 99, 
¶94, 344 Wis. 2d 166, 823 N.W.2d 378.  A defendant has a due 
process right to any favorable evidence "material either to 
guilt or to punishment" that is in the State's possession, 
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, including any evidence which may impeach 
No. 
2015AP1083-CR   
 
16 
 
one of the State's witnesses.  Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 
150, 154 (1972).  A Brady violation has three components:  (1) 
the evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either 
because it is exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence must 
have 
been 
suppressed 
by 
the 
State, 
either 
willfully 
or 
inadvertently; and (3) the evidence must be material.  See State 
v. Harris, 2004 WI 64, ¶15, 272 Wis. 2d 80, 680 N.W.2d 737 
(citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999).   
¶36 The materiality requirement of Brady is the same as 
the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis.  See United 
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).  Evidence is not 
material under Brady unless the nondisclosure "was so serious 
that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed 
evidence would have produced a different verdict."  Strickler, 
527 U.S. at 281.   
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Wayerski's Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim 
¶37 Wayerski 
contends 
that 
trial 
counsel 
performed 
deficiently because he failed to question Wayerski about giving 
a purported confession to Clark.  Wayerski further asserts that 
trial counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial because 
Wayerski's silence, in the eyes of a jury, was tantamount to an 
admission of guilt.   
¶38 We assume without deciding that trial counsel's 
performance 
was 
deficient 
under 
the 
first 
prong 
of 
the 
ineffective assistance of counsel analysis.  However, pursuant 
to the second prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel 
No. 
2015AP1083-CR   
 
17 
 
analysis, we conclude that there was no prejudice to Wayerski.  
Therefore, we conclude that there was no ineffective assistance 
of counsel.   
¶39 To establish that his trial counsel's deficient 
performance was prejudicial, Wayerski must show that "there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  
A 
reasonable 
probability 
is 
a 
probability 
sufficient 
to 
undermine confidence in the outcome."  Domke, 337 Wis. 2d 268, 
¶54 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).  "We examine the 
totality of the circumstances to determine whether trial 
counsel's errors," in the context of Wayerski's entire case, 
deprived him of a fair trial.  Id.  When we consider whether 
Wayerski was prejudiced by his trial counsel's deficient 
performance, we examine Wayerski's ability to present his 
defense, the other evidence presented that undermined Clark's 
credibility, and the overwhelming evidence against Wayerski.   
¶40 First, there was never any doubt that Wayerski claimed 
that he was innocent.  Wayerski denied the juveniles' claims on 
direct and cross-examination.  Wayerski called four witnesses to 
testify in support of his defense that the juveniles set him up 
because of his involvement in an ongoing drug investigation.  
The jury had an opportunity to fully consider and reject 
Wayerski's defense to the allegations.   
¶41 Second, Clark's credibility had already been called 
into question when he testified.  The jury heard that Clark had 
been convicted of 20 crimes, including some felonies.  Further, 
No. 
2015AP1083-CR   
 
18 
 
the questions asked by Wayerski's trial counsel called into 
question whether Clark heard the details of the offenses from 
Wayerski or from his access to media at the Chippewa County 
jail.   
¶42 Lastly, as the prior courts acknowledged, the evidence 
against 
Wayerski 
was 
overwhelming. 
 
There 
was 
detailed, 
consistent testimony from J.H. and J.P. and testimony from the 
juveniles' 
parents 
corroborating 
the 
amount 
of 
time 
the 
juveniles spent with Wayerski doing "ride-alongs" and at 
Wayerski's apartment.  J.H.'s father also testified about what 
occurred when he picked the juveniles up from their friend's 
house on the morning of July 16, 2011.  The jury heard testimony 
from Detective Kuehn who described the juveniles' demeanor as 
consistent with that of sexual assault victims in prior cases he 
had investigated.  Detective Kuehn also testified about the 
items recovered from Wayerski's apartment, including the oval-
shaped 
turquoise 
plate, 
the 
cable 
bill 
for 
on-demand 
pornography, vodka, and the contents of Wayerski's computer.  In 
addition, the jury heard from a DNA analyst who testified that 
the semen on the oval-shaped turquoise plate matched J.P.'s DNA 
profile and that the likelihood the sample belonged to anyone 
other than J.P. was one in 28 quintillion.   
¶43 Therefore, we conclude that even if Wayerski's trial 
counsel's performance was deficient for failure to question him 
about the purported confession he gave to Clark, the deficiency 
was 
not 
prejudicial, 
and 
thus 
there 
was 
no 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel.   
No. 
2015AP1083-CR   
 
19 
 
B.  Wayerski's Brady Claim  
¶44 Wayerski additionally seeks review of the denial of 
his Brady claim.  We conclude that the evidence was favorable to 
Wayerski, satisfying the first component of the Brady analysis.  
We conclude that the State suppressed the evidence under the 
second component of the Brady analysis.  We renounce and reject 
judicially created limitations on the second Brady component 
that find evidence is suppressed only where:  (1) the evidence 
was in the State's "exclusive possession and control"; (2) trial 
counsel could not have obtained the evidence through the 
exercise 
of 
"reasonable 
diligence"; 
or 
(3) 
it 
was 
an 
"intolerable burden" for trial counsel to obtain the evidence.  
Finally, we conclude there was no Brady violation because 
Wayerski failed to demonstrate that the evidence was material, 
the final component of the Brady analysis.   
1.  The Evidence Was Favorable to Wayerski 
¶45 Applying the first component of the Brady analysis, 
the evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either 
because it is exculpatory or impeaching.  See Harris, 272 
Wis. 2d 80, ¶15 (citing Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82).  The 
State concedes that evidence of Clark's pending charges was 
favorable to Wayerski to impeach Clark.  We agree and accept the 
State's concession.   
2.  The Evidence Was Suppressed by the State 
¶46 Turning to the application of the second Brady 
component, Wayerski must demonstrate that the evidence was 
suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently.  Id.   
No. 
2015AP1083-CR   
 
20 
 
The State argues that it did not suppress evidence of Clark's 
pending charges for the following reasons, which we reject in 
turn:  (1) the evidence was not in the "exclusive possession and 
control" of the State; (2) Wayerski's trial counsel could have 
exercised "reasonable diligence" to obtain the evidence; and (3) 
there was no "intolerable burden" on Wayerski's trial counsel to 
obtain the evidence himself.  We apply the principles espoused 
in Brady and its progeny and conclude that the State suppressed 
evidence of Clark's pending charges, including the Chippewa 
County criminal complaint.   
a.  Exclusive Possession and Control 
¶47 The State argues that for evidence to be suppressed 
under Brady, the evidence must be within the "exclusive 
possession and control" of the State.  See State v. Sarinske, 91 
Wis. 2d 14, 280 N.W.2d 725 (1979); State v. Amundson, 69 
Wis. 2d 554, 230 N.W.2d 775 (1975).  This "exclusive possession 
and control" limitation is rooted in Justice Fortas' concurrence 
in Giles:  "[i]f [the State] has in its exclusive possession 
specific, concrete evidence which is not merely cumulative or 
embellishing and which may exonerate the defendant or be of 
material importance . . . the State is obliged to bring it to 
the attention of the court and the defense."  Giles v. Maryland, 
386 
U.S. 
66, 
100-102 
(1967) 
(Fortas, 
J., 
concurring).  
"Exclusive possession" is not defined in Giles, nor is there any 
No. 
2015AP1083-CR   
 
21 
 
related analysis.  Id.  It is noteworthy that Justice Fortas 
never mentions "control" in his concurrence.13  Id.    
¶48 Wisconsin 
courts 
first 
applied 
the 
concept 
of 
exclusive possession to the Brady analysis in Cole.  State v. 
Cole, 50 Wis. 2d 449, 184 N.W.2d 75 (1971).  The Cole court held 
that information known to the defense regarding the type of car 
and gun involved in the defendant's arrest was not within the 
"exclusive possession" of the State, and therefore the State did 
not suppress the information.  Id. at 457.  Thereafter, this 
court limited the State's duty to disclose to include only 
favorable, material information within the State's "exclusive 
possession or control."  Nelson v. State, 59 Wis. 2d 474, 479, 
208 N.W.2d 410 (1973).  The Nelson court did not further define 
the new "exclusive possession or control" limitation nor did the 
court apply it.14   
                                                 
13 For an in-depth discussion on Wisconsin's use of the 
exclusive possession and control limitation, see Leslie Thayer, 
The Exclusive Control Requirement:  Striking Another Blow to the 
Brady Doctrine, 2011 Wis. L. Rev. 1027, 1041-2.   
14 Nelson involved the issue of whether the defendant had an 
obligation to request exculpatory evidence for Brady to apply.  
Nelson v. State, 59 Wis. 2d 474, 486, 208 N.W.2d 410 (1973).  In 
Agurs, the Supreme Court expanded Brady to include an obligation 
for the State to turn over favorable, material evidence even 
absent a defendant's request for information. United States v. 
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976). 
No. 
2015AP1083-CR   
 
22 
 
¶49 Post-Nelson, 
Wisconsin 
courts 
have 
applied 
an 
"exclusive possession and control"15 limitation to the Brady 
suppression component.  In analyzing whether evidence is in the 
"exclusive possession and control" of the State, the courts have 
shifted the focus away from the State's obligation to turn over 
favorable evidence to whether the defense should have or could 
have obtained the withheld evidence.  See, e.g., Sarinske, 91 
Wis. 2d 14 (holding that information regarding a car's short 
circuit was not in the State's exclusive control where a witness 
with that information was available to the defense, who failed 
to question the witness); Amundson, 69 Wis. 2d 554 (holding that 
a report withheld by the State was not in its "exclusive 
possession and control" where the author of the report was 
called as a defense witness); State v. Calhoun, 67 Wis. 2d 204, 
226 N.W.2d 504 (1975)(holding that summaries of witnesses' 
statements to police withheld by the State were not within the 
State's 
"exclusive 
possession 
and 
control" 
because 
those 
witnesses were available for questioning by the defense).  
Wisconsin is the only state to apply this "exclusive possession 
and control" limitation to the second component of Brady.   
                                                 
15 The language of the limitation varies from "exclusive 
possession" in Calhoun, "exclusive possession and control" in 
Amundson, and "exclusive control" in Sarinske. See State v. 
Calhoun, 67 Wis. 2d 204, 226 N.W.2d 504 (1975); State v. 
Amundson, 69 Wis. 2d 554, 230 N.W.2d 775 (1975); State v. 
Sarinske, 91 Wis. 2d 14, 280 N.W.2d 725 (1979). 
No. 
2015AP1083-CR   
 
23 
 
¶50 There is no express support in the United States 
Supreme Court's Brady jurisprudence for the limitation that only 
favorable, material evidence in the "exclusive possession and 
control" of the State must be turned over to satisfy the due 
process obligations enunciated in Brady.16  This limitation 
further thwarts the purpose of the State's obligation under 
Brady:  to prevent the State from withholding favorable, 
material evidence that "helps shape a trial that bears heavily 
on the defendant" and "casts the prosecutor in the role of an 
architect of a proceeding that does not comport with the 
standards of justice."  Brady, 373 U.S. at 87-88.  We hereby 
overrule the holding set forth in Nelson, 59 Wis. 2d 474, and 
its progeny that favorable, material evidence is only suppressed 
under Brady where the withheld evidence is in the State's 
"exclusive possession and control."   
 
b.  Reasonable Diligence 
¶51 The court of appeals and the State also rely upon a 
Seventh Circuit case for the proposition that evidence is not 
suppressed by the State under the second component of Brady when 
it is available to the defendant "through the exercise of 
                                                 
16 A 1986 Wisconsin "Opinion of the Attorney General" states 
that "[n]either the Giles plurality nor the Brady majority 
mentions the [S]tate's exclusive possession of exculpatory 
evidence as the controlling factor.  Rather, both Brady and 
Giles characterize materiality as the criterion triggering the 
duty to disclose exculpatory evidence." 75 Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. 
62, 66 (1986).   
No. 
2015AP1083-CR   
 
24 
 
reasonable diligence."  Carvajal v. Dominguez, 542 F.3d 561, 567 
(7th Cir. 2008).17  Federal courts are currently divided as to 
whether a defendant's ability to acquire favorable, material 
evidence through "reasonable diligence" or "due diligence" 
forecloses a Brady claim.  Although half of the federal courts 
of 
appeals 
have 
affirmed 
application 
of 
the 
"reasonable 
diligence" or "due diligence" limitation,18 the other half of 
federal courts of appeals have determined that the "reasonable 
diligence" and "due diligence" limitations are not doctrinally 
supported and undermine the purpose of Brady.19  The United 
                                                 
17 In Carvajal, the Seventh Circuit held that because 
several officers were available to be questioned about their 
possibly differing accounts of events, the defendant did not 
exercise "reasonable diligence," and therefore there was no 
suppression under Brady. Carvajal v. Dominguez, 542 F.3d 561, 
567 (7th Cir. 2008).   
18 See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 790 F.3d 550, 561-62 
(4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Roy, 781 F.3d 416, 421 (8th 
Cir. 2015); United States v. Brown, 650 F.3d 581, 588 (5th Cir. 
2011); Ellsworth v. Warden, 333 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2003)(en 
banc).   
19 See, e.g., Dennis v. Secretary, Pennsylvania Dep't of 
Corr., 834 F.3d 263, 292 (3rd Cir. 2016)(en banc)("[o]nly when 
the government is aware that the defense counsel already has the 
material in its possession should it be held to not have 
'suppressed' it in not turning it over to the defense"); Lewis 
v. Connecticut Comm'r of Corr., 790 F.3d 109, 121-22 (2d Cir. 
2015)("a due diligence requirement plainly violate[s] clearly 
established federal law under Brady and its progeny"); United 
States v. Tavera, 719 F.3d 705 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v. 
Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 2000); Banks v. Reynolds, 54 
F.3d 1508, 1517 (10th Cir. 1995)("the prosecution's obligation 
to turn over the evidence in the first instance stands 
independent of the defendant's knowledge.  'If the prosecution 
possesses evidence that, in the context of a particular case is 
obviously exculpatory, then it has an obligation to disclose it 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP1083-CR   
 
25 
 
States Supreme Court has yet to opine whether this limitation on 
the suppression component of the Brady analysis is appropriate.  
This court has never analyzed a Brady claim through the lens of 
"reasonable diligence" and we decline to adopt that requirement 
now, due to its lack of grounding in Brady or other United 
States Supreme Court precedent.   
c.  Intolerable Burden 
¶52 Lastly, the court of appeals, citing to Randall, 
imposed an "intolerable burden" standard:  for favorable, 
material evidence to be suppressed under Brady it must be an 
"intolerable burden" for the defense to obtain the information.  
Randall, 197 Wis. 2d 29.  In Randall, the court of appeals held 
that the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were violated where 
the State failed to disclose a witness's pending charges even 
though the charges were "a matter of public record" and 
therefore not in the "exclusive control" of the State.  Id. at 
37-38.  The court of appeals explained: 
[I]t places an intolerable burden on the defense; 
namely, to continually comb the public records to see 
if any of the State's witnesses are facing pending 
criminal charges. The burden should rightly rest with 
the 
State 
to 
provide 
such 
updated 
information, 
particularly in light of a specific discovery request 
for the criminal records of the State's witnesses, as 
was present in this case.  
                                                                                                                                                             
to defense counsel . . . .'" (quoted source omitted)).  See also 
In re Sealed Case No. 99-3096 (Brady Obligations), 185 F.3d 887, 
896 (D.C. Cir. 1999)(rejecting the State's argument that there 
was no Brady violation because information was available to the 
defense through "reasonable pre-trial preparation"). 
No. 
2015AP1083-CR   
 
26 
 
Id. at 38.  The Randall court acknowledged that the State has 
"an ongoing duty to disclose to the defense exculpatory and 
inculpatory evidence that the State has in its possession, 
including evidence that applies only to the credibility of a 
witness."  Id. at 37.20 
¶53 Here, the court of appeals reasoned that "there is 
little doubt that it is not 'an intolerable burden' for the 
defense to obtain information on a witness's pending criminal 
charges" due to the availability of CCAP.  Wayerski, No. 
2015AP1083-CR, ¶56.  Because Clark's pending charges were 
available for Wayerski's trial counsel to see on CCAP, the court 
of appeals reasoned that the information was not "suppressed" 
under Brady.21   
¶54 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
improperly 
applied 
the 
"intolerable burden" standard from Randall to determine whether 
the State had suppressed evidence under the second component of 
Brady.  As the State conceded in its brief, neither this court 
nor the United States Supreme Court has used an "intolerable 
                                                 
20 Notwithstanding, the Randall court concluded that the 
failure to disclose the witness's pending prosecution was 
harmless error because the evidence of the defendant's guilt was 
"very compelling," the witness was arrested and charged after he 
offered to testify, and the witness was impeached at trial when 
he admitted that he had a criminal record.  State v. Randall, 
197 Wis. 2d 29, 38-39, 539 N.W.2d 708 (Ct. App. 1995).     
21 The court of appeals did not address the issue of 
suppression of the Chippewa County criminal complaint, a 
document in the State's possession and not available to the 
defense on CCAP.   
No. 
2015AP1083-CR   
 
27 
 
burden" standard when assessing whether a Brady violation has 
occurred.  We overrule Randall, 197 Wis. 2d 29, to the extent 
that it requires an "intolerable burden" on the defense as a 
prerequisite to a Brady violation.   
¶55 The United States Supreme Court has underscored the 
special responsibility of the prosecutor in the search for truth 
in a criminal trial.  See, e.g., Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 
696 (2004); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439-40 (1995); 
Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281.  In a more recent case exploring the 
scope of both the prosecution and the defense's responsibilities 
in locating exculpatory evidence, the United States Supreme 
Court stated that:  "[a] rule thus declaring 'prosecutor may 
hide, defendant must seek' is not tenable in a system 
constitutionally bound to accord defendants due process." Banks, 
540 U.S. at 696.  The "exclusive possession and control," 
"reasonable diligence," and "intolerable burden" limitations 
distort the original Brady analysis and the purpose behind the 
prosecutorial obligations enunciated in Brady.   
d.  The Application of Brady 
¶56 We return to the original inquiry under Brady:  
whether there was "suppression" by the prosecution, irrespective 
of good or bad faith.  Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.  The United States 
Supreme Court has not defined the term "suppression" as set 
forth in the second component of the Brady analysis.  However, 
the United States Supreme Court has discussed suppression in 
terms of withholding evidence.  Id.  ("A prosecution that 
withholds evidence on demand of an accused which, if made 
No. 
2015AP1083-CR   
 
28 
 
available, would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty 
helps shape a trial that bears heavily on the defendant."); see 
also Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 469 (2009) ("when the State 
withholds from a criminal defendant evidence that is material to 
his guilt or punishment, it violates his right to due process"); 
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 451 ("assessing the significance of the 
evidence withheld").   
¶57 The United States Supreme Court has also discussed 
suppression in terms of the nondisclosure of evidence.  See 
Cone, 556 U.S. at 470 ("favorable evidence is subject to 
constitutionally mandated disclosure"); Banks, 540 U.S. at 693 
(referring to "Brady disclosure obligations"); Kyles, 514 U.S. 
at 441 ("disclosure of the suppressed evidence to competent 
counsel 
would 
have 
made 
a 
different 
result 
reasonably 
probable"); Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281 ("'Brady violation' is 
sometimes used to refer to any breach of the broad obligation to 
disclose exculpatory evidence"); U.S. v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 
(1976)(referring to the obligation under Brady as a prosecutor's 
"constitutional duty of disclosure").  
¶58 Therefore, pursuant to the United States Supreme 
Court's Brady jurisprudence, suppression is nondisclosure or the 
withholding of evidence from the defense.  The prosecutor's 
mindset or 'passivity' is irrelevant to this suppression 
inquiry.  As the United States Supreme Court has reasoned, "the 
prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of 
disclosure," Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108, and that "is as it should 
be.  Such disclosure will serve to justify trust in the 
No. 
2015AP1083-CR   
 
29 
 
prosecutor . . . [a]nd it will tend to preserve the criminal 
trial, as distinct from the prosecutor's private deliberations, 
as the chosen forum for ascertaining the truth about criminal 
accusations."  Kyles, 514 U.S. at 439-40.  
¶59 Applying Brady and its progeny to Wayerski's claim, 
the prosecutor suppressed evidence of Clark's pending charges, 
including the Chippewa County criminal complaint, when he failed 
to disclose the information to Wayerski's trial counsel.  The 
prosecutor not only withheld information regarding Clark's 
pending charges from Wayerski's trial counsel, which he learned 
of just days before trial, he also withheld the criminal 
complaint, which he was able to quickly obtain prior to 
Wayerski's trial.22  While the pending charges were posted on 
CCAP at some point within the month prior to Wayerski's trial, 
the criminal complaint was not.23  If Wayerski's trial counsel 
had discovered the pending charges, he would have had to take 
extra steps to promptly secure the complaint from Chippewa 
County.   
¶60 In this case, the prosecutor's private deliberations 
on whether to disclose the evidence of Clark's pending charges 
                                                 
22 There is no record as to how the prosecutor obtained the 
Chippewa County criminal complaint.  However, one thing is 
certain, he did not obtain it via a public CCAP search, as the 
concurrences seem to allege.   
23 CCAP 
does 
not 
provide 
public 
access 
to 
criminal 
complaints, party filings, investigatory materials, and other 
court documents.   
No. 
2015AP1083-CR   
 
30 
 
became the forum for ascertaining the truth, rather than 
Wayerski's trial.  The State suppressed evidence, in violation 
of the second component of Brady, when it withheld or failed to 
disclose evidence of Clark's pending charges, including the 
Chippewa County criminal complaint.    
3.  The Evidence Was Not Material 
¶61 Lastly, in order for the defendant to prevail on the 
third component of the Brady analysis, the suppressed evidence 
must be material.  See Harris, 272 Wis. 2d 80, ¶15 (citing 
Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82).  "The evidence is material only 
if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been 
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different."  Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.  Wayerski 
alleges that the evidence against him at trial did not reach an 
irreparable tipping point until Clark testified about the 
purported confession.  Wayerski argues that the State gained a 
strategic advantage because his trial counsel could not impeach 
Clark about Clark's purported reason for testifying and his 
potential interest in the outcome of the case.   
¶62 We conclude that the suppressed evidence was not 
material.  There is no reasonable probability that, had evidence 
of Clark's pending charges been disclosed, the result of the 
proceedings would have been different.  As noted above, in its 
case-in-chief 
the 
State 
provided 
compelling 
evidence 
of 
Wayerski's guilt.  The jury heard consistent, detailed testimony 
from the juveniles, the juveniles' parents, Detective Kuehn, and 
an analyst who testified that a DNA sample taken from the plate 
No. 
2015AP1083-CR   
 
31 
 
in 
Wayerski's 
apartment 
showed 
a 
one-in-28-quintillion 
likelihood of belonging to anyone other than J.P.  All of this 
evidence was presented prior to Clark's rebuttal testimony about 
an alleged jailhouse confession from Wayerski.  Further, Clark 
was impeached with his 20 prior convictions.  Therefore, we 
conclude that Wayerski cannot demonstrate that, had evidence of 
Clark's pending charges been disclosed, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  Since the evidence was 
not material, Wayerski's Brady claim must fail.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶63 On petition to this court, Wayerski sought review of 
the denial of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim and 
the denial of his Brady claim. 
¶64 We assume without deciding that Wayerski's trial 
counsel's performance was deficient.  Notwithstanding, we 
conclude that Wayerski failed to show that his trial counsel's 
deficient 
performance 
was 
prejudicial. 
 
Thus, 
Wayerski's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails. 
¶65 We conclude that although the evidence of Clark's 
pending charges was favorable to Wayerski and the State 
suppressed the evidence, it was not material and therefore there 
was no Brady violation.  Furthermore, in analyzing whether the 
State suppressed evidence under the second component of the 
Brady analysis, we return to the principles of Brady and ask 
only whether the evidence was suppressed by the State.  We 
overrule Nelson, 59 Wis. 2d 474, and its progeny which hold that 
the State only suppresses favorable, material evidence when the 
No. 
2015AP1083-CR   
 
32 
 
evidence is in the State's "exclusive possession and control."  
We also overrule Randall, 197 Wis. 2d  29, to the extent that it 
requires 
an 
"intolerable 
burden" 
on 
the 
defense 
as 
a 
prerequisite to a Brady violation.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
modified and, as modified, affirmed. 
 
No.  2015AP1083-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
¶66 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring in part, 
dissenting in part).  I agree with the result the majority 
reaches.  However, I do not join the majority opinion, but 
concur and write separately because the majority opinion chooses 
to upend longstanding legal principles that have served to 
properly cabin the judicially-created Brady doctrine.1  Because 
the majority concludes that there is no prejudice, it need not 
go further.  But inexplicably, it unnecessarily reaches beyond 
the prejudice issue and proceeds to topple over five decades of 
Brady law.  While the majority claims to "return to the original 
inquiry under Brady," majority op., ¶56, it does not, and 
instead departs from the large body of case law that developed 
the well-rooted doctrine.  Brady, a doctrine now 55 years old, 
should not be so confused or reinvented. 
¶67 First, in its claim to "return to the original inquiry 
under Brady," the majority selectively chooses certain language 
from Brady and ignores the body of law that has been relied upon 
in the 55 years since Brady.  A Brady violation occurs where: 
(1) evidence is favorable to the defendant because it is either 
exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence is suppressed by the 
prosecution willfully or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice 
resulted.  Critically though, courts have consistently concluded 
that in a Brady context, the prosecution must exclusively 
possess and control the evidence in order for the prosecution to 
                                                 
1 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
No.  2015AP1083-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
have "suppressed," or withheld,2 Brady evidence.  The prosecution 
does not exclusively possess or control that which is in the 
public domain.  Thus, the prosecution cannot be deemed to have 
"suppressed" or withheld such evidence.  In eschewing any 
requirement that the prosecution be in "exclusive possession and 
control" of the subject materials, the majority significantly 
departs from Brady and 55 years of precedent. 
¶68 The majority also fails to heed any consideration to 
the distinction between Brady and other means of discovery, such 
as Wis. Stat. § 971.23, which might impose similar production 
requirements on the prosecution but which may have different 
penalties for failing to comply.  The Brady doctrine must not be 
conflated with other statutory obligations, open file policies3 
or judicial preference.  The prosecution, under Brady, is not 
required to disclose exculpatory or impeaching evidence that 
might somehow later be construed as useful to the defense but 
was otherwise available to the defense.  While the majority's 
preference is that this evidence should have been disclosed, its 
                                                 
2 The word "suppression" used throughout refers to the 
prosecution withholding evidence from the defense in a manner 
that precludes the defense from having access to the evidence.  
It is not to be confused with the judicial remedy of 
suppression. 
3 While there may be variations to the way prosecutors handle 
their offices' respective policies, one definition of an "open 
file policy" is as follows: "A case-specific policy in which 
prosecutors allow defense counsel to see (but not always to 
obtain copies of) all the documents in their file relating to 
the defendant."  Open-file discovery, Black's Law Dictionary 
1263 (10th ed. 2014).  The record does not reflect that in this 
case an open file policy was in place. 
No.  2015AP1083-CR.akz 
 
3 
 
disclosure is simply not required under Brady as it was 
otherwise available to the defense and the public at large.  In 
other words, the defense could have searched CCAP, just as the 
prosecution did, to discover the evidence's existence.  In no 
way did the prosecution——nor could the prosecution——"suppress" 
this evidence from the defendant's acquisition as it was 
otherwise available in the public domain. 
¶69 Second, instead of exercising judicial restraint, the 
majority takes this opportunity to engage in a legal analysis 
that imparts its unique view of Brady and overrules over 50 
years of Wisconsin precedent that interpreted Brady.  In taking 
the liberty to alter Wisconsin's Brady analysis, the majority 
stretches well beyond what the opinion should have decided.  The 
majority could have started and ended its Brady analysis by 
concluding that the defendant was not prejudiced.  I agree that 
there was no prejudice by this nondisclosure.  An abundance of 
evidence clearly supports the jury's guilty verdict regardless 
of the inmate's testimony.   
¶70 In my view, however, the majority opinion is an 
overreach.  It is a sea change in the application of Brady 
unmoored to fundamental limitations that underlie the doctrine.  
Brady violations occur only where (1) favorable evidence to the 
defense that is exculpatory or impeaching (2) is willfully or 
inadvertently suppressed by the prosecution (3) resulting in 
prejudice.  To be a violation, the prosecution must be found to 
have suppressed, or withheld, evidence of which it had exclusive 
possession and control.  Here, that simply is not the case. 
No.  2015AP1083-CR.akz 
 
4 
 
I 
¶71 I begin with Brady's judicially created history and 
evolution.  The United States Supreme Court first imposed a duty 
on 
the 
prosecution 
to 
disclose 
exculpatory 
evidence 
to 
defendants in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  In Brady 
the defendant testified that while he was present when a murder 
was committed, another person committed the murder.  Id. at 84.  
Prior to trial, defense counsel requested the prosecution allow 
him to examine the accomplice's out-of-court statements, which 
had not been disclosed to the defense.  Id.  The prosecution 
provided several such statements, but withheld one crucial 
statement in which the accomplice admitted to being the killer.  
Id.  The defendant was later convicted of first-degree murder 
and sentenced.  Id.  Following the verdict, the defense learned 
of the confession and moved for a new trial based upon the newly 
discovered evidence that the prosecution suppressed from their 
discovery.  Id. 
¶72 In Brady the Supreme Court concluded "suppression by 
the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request 
violates due process where the evidence is material either to 
guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith 
of the prosecution."  Id. at 87.  Importantly, the Court 
emphasized principles of fairness to the defendant and justice, 
further stating that "[s]ociety wins not only when the guilty 
are convicted but when criminal trials are fair," and that the 
ultimate end "is not punishment of society for misdeeds of a 
prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused."  
No.  2015AP1083-CR.akz 
 
5 
 
Id.  The Court also expressed its aversion for allowing a 
prosecutor to be an "architect of a proceeding that does not 
comport with the standards of justice" by withholding evidence 
which "would tend to exculpate" the defendant or reduce the 
defendant's sentence.  Id. at 88. 
¶73 The Court in Brady however ultimately concluded that 
the confession would not have exculpated the defendant, but that 
the confession could have reduced the defendant's sentence.  Id. 
at 88–90.  It thus affirmed the court of appeals' remand on the 
limited issue of sentencing.  Id. at 91.  While Brady 
established that favorable, material evidence that should have 
been revealed to the defense but instead is suppressed by the 
prosecution could be a due process violation, it left room for 
the doctrine to be further refined.  The Court did not expressly 
define materiality, establish whether exculpatory evidence was 
the only sort of evidence that would be deemed favorable under 
the doctrine, or define under what circumstances evidence is 
deemed to be suppressed by the prosecution.  The result was that 
case law further developed the parameters of the doctrine. 
¶74 In the wake of Brady, courts responded to the need to 
refine its application and scope.  In Giglio v. United States, 
405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972), the Supreme Court held that in 
addition to exculpatory evidence, the prosecution is required to 
disclose favorable, material evidence that could be used to 
impeach prosecution witnesses.  The Court concluded that 
impeachment evidence includes an agreement with a prosecution 
witness to testify for favorable treatment in the criminal 
No.  2015AP1083-CR.akz 
 
6 
 
justice system.  See id.  However, as the Court in Brady, the 
Court in Giglio did not define suppression or materiality, or 
further clarify the contours of the prosecution's duty to 
produce evidence under the Brady doctrine. 
¶75 In Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795 (1972), the 
Court stated that there was "no constitutional requirement that 
the prosecution make a complete and detailed accounting to the 
defense of all police investigatory work on a case."  The Court 
confirmed this idea in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 
& n.16 (1976) (quoting Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 98 (1967) 
(Fortas, J. concurring) (stating that "convictions ought [not] 
be 
reversed 
on 
the 
ground 
that 
information 
[is] 
merely 
repetitious, cumulative, or embellishing of facts otherwise 
known to the defense or presented to the court")).4 
¶76 In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985), the 
Court refined materiality under a Brady analysis, stating that 
evidence is material only "if there is a reasonable probability 
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different."  Id. at 682.  It 
further defined "reasonable probability" as "a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."  Id. 
¶77 My interpretation is not novel.  Federal courts in 
every circuit have considered whether the prosecution is deemed 
to have "suppressed" evidence.  Quite simply, the prosecution 
                                                 
4 Similarly, in Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995), 
the United States Supreme Court declined to use Brady to impose 
"an open file policy" on the prosecution. 
No.  2015AP1083-CR.akz 
 
7 
 
cannot suppress something that is available to the public.  
Courts have repeatedly rejected attempts to extend Brady to 
evidence that is available to the defense from sources other 
than the prosecution.  See, e.g., United States v. Roy, 
781 F.3d 416, 421 (8th Cir. 2015) (Brady not violated where the 
prosecution withheld information about the victim's lie to law 
enforcement because the information was a matter of public 
record in a published opinion of the Supreme Court of Arkansas); 
United States v. Georgiou, 777 F.3d 125, 140–41 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(no Brady violation where evidence of witness's mental health 
history and treatment was publicly available in transcript of 
plea hearing and defendant knew of the witness's guilty plea); 
United States v. Catone, 769 F.3d 866, 871-72 (4th Cir. 2014) 
(Brady not violated where the evidence was available to the 
public 
and 
could 
have 
been 
discovered 
through 
diligent 
investigation); United States v. Smith, 749 F.3d 465, 493 (6th 
Cir. 2014) (no violation under Brady where prosecution did not 
disclose two witnesses' exculpatory testimony because the 
testimony could have been discovered with due diligence); 
Cunningham v. Wong, 704 F.3d 1143, 1154 (9th Cir. 2013) (no 
Brady violation occurred despite prosecution's failure to 
disclose witness's medical records because defense knew that the 
witness had been shot and could have easily obtained the 
records); Hooks v. Workman, 689 F.3d 1148, 1180 (10th Cir. 2012) 
(no Brady violation where prosecution did not fully disclose 
witness's mental disability because the defense was put on 
notice by a prosecutor's memo and the defense could have spoken 
No.  2015AP1083-CR.akz 
 
8 
 
to the witness to obtain further information); Cobb v. Thaler, 
682 F.3d 364, 378–79 (5th Cir. 2012) (no Brady violation 
occurred despite the prosecution's failure to disclose evidence 
that charges were dropped against witness because defense had 
access to the information via a co-defendant's open case file); 
United States v. Hsu, 669 F.3d 112, 117 n.2 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(noting that exculpatory e-mails and bank records that would 
have impeached a prosecution witness would not violate Brady 
because if they existed, the defendant would have been aware of 
them and could have subpoenaed them); United States v. Celestin, 
612 F.3d 14, 22–23 (1st Cir. 2010) (no Brady violation occurred 
where a defendant knew of his own time and attendance records 
and 
had 
the 
opportunity 
to 
subpoena 
them); 
Carvajal 
v. 
Dominguez, 542 F.3d 561, 567-69 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that 
evidence is suppressed when "(1) the prosecution failed to 
disclose the evidence in time for the defendant to make use of 
it, and (2) the evidence was not otherwise available to the 
defendant through the exercise of reasonable diligence," and 
finding no Brady violation where witnesses were available to the 
defense for questioning); LeCroy v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 
421 F.3d 1237, 1267–68 (11th Cir. 2005) (no Brady violation 
where prosecution failed to disclose defendant's own medical and 
school records because defense could have acquired them by 
exercising reasonable diligence).5 
                                                 
5 Perhaps providing additional context will further an 
understanding of why federal case law does not otherwise lend 
support for the majority's interpretation of Brady.  Case law 
demonstrates that when information is publicly available or the 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP1083-CR.akz 
 
9 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
defense has notice of its existence, no Brady violation occurs.  
Of course these cases are dependent on their facts.  To cherry 
pick quotes from any such case, without more, does not do 
justice to the entirety of the Brady analysis.   
First, in Dennis v. Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections, 834 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc), the court 
concluded that the prosecution violated Brady because it 
withheld exculpatory physical evidence to which the defense had 
no access or ability to discover.  Id. at 285-96.  While the 
court expressed its distaste for placing a "due diligence" 
requirement on defendants, the court did not otherwise address 
what it might have done had the information been in the public 
domain.  Id. at 288–93.  Dennis is thus distinguishable from the 
case we decide today.  
Instructively, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit considered Brady a year earlier in United States 
v. Georgiou, 777 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2015).  There, the 
prosecution failed to disclose a bail report regarding the 
defendant's co-conspirator, along with the minutes from the co-
conspirator's arraignment and guilty plea.  Id. at 139.  Both 
the bail report and the minutes contained information regarding 
the co-conspirator's history of mental health issues and 
corresponding treatment.  Id.  The court held that there was no 
Brady violation regarding evidence of the co-conspirator's 
mental health history and treatment because the bail report and 
minutes were equally available to both the prosecution and 
defense.  Id. at 140-41.  The court there concluded that the 
defense "was in 'a position of parity with the government as far 
as access to this material.'"  Id. at 140 (quoting United States 
v. Jones, 34 F.3d 596, 600 (8th Cir. 1994)).  Since both the 
prosecution and defense had the same access to the evidence, the 
court held that the bail report and minutes were not suppressed 
by the prosecution under Brady.  Id. at 140-41.  Dennis neither 
mentions nor analyzes Georgiou, presumably because in Dennis the 
evidence was not in the public domain.   
Second, in United States v. Tavera, 719 F.3d 705 (6th Cir. 
2013), the court determined the prosecution violated Brady when 
it withheld exculpatory testimony of a potential witness.  Id. 
at 710-14.  Again, this information was available solely to the 
prosecution and withheld from the defense.  Id. at 711–13.  It 
was not otherwise publicly available so the court did not weigh 
in on that issue.  Id.  As a result, Tavera is not instructive 
as to the issue we now address.   
(continued) 
No.  2015AP1083-CR.akz 
 
10 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
In fact, in United States v. Smith, 749 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 
2014), decided nearly ten months after Tavera, the court 
concluded that no Brady violation occurred.  Id. at 491-92.  
Evidence that the prosecution acquired by interviewing people 
the defense had hired was deemed to be readily available to the 
defense.  Id. at 493.  In other words, the defense had at least 
an equal opportunity, if not greater, to interview these 
potential witnesses.  Thus, there was no Brady violation when 
the prosecution did not turn over the interviews.  
Third, in Amado v. Gonzalez, 758 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2014), 
the court concluded that there was a Brady violation because the 
prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory impeachment evidence.  
Id. at 1134-35.  At issue was an undisclosed probation report 
that would have impeached the testimony of a prosecution 
witness.  Id. at 1138.  The prosecution had access to the 
probation report, and the defense did not.  See id. at 1135, 
1138.  There is no indication that the report was otherwise 
publicly available to the defense.  See id. at 1135.  The Ninth 
Circuit 
addressed 
the 
prosecution's 
burden 
to 
produce 
exculpatory evidence and expressed its aversion towards a 
stringent "due diligence" requirement on the defense, but 
seemingly, any diligence of the defense would not have resulted 
in discovery of this report.  See id. at 1136–38; see also Lewis 
v. Connecticut Comm'r of Corr., 790 F.3d 109, 121–22 (2d Cir. 
2015) (Brady violated because prosecution withheld evidence that 
was not publicly available; however, court noted no Brady 
violation occurs regarding "facts already within the defendant's 
purview"); In re Sealed Case No. 99-3096, 185 F.3d 887, 889–91, 
897 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Brady violated where prosecution admitted 
its failure to search for requested impeaching information that 
was not otherwise publicly available; Brady not violated 
regarding 
prior 
conviction 
records 
that 
were 
publicly 
available). 
In Cunningham v. Wong, 704 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2013), the 
court determined that no Brady violation occurred even though 
the prosecution failed to supply the defense with an autopsy 
report of the individual the defendant was alleged to have 
killed, along with the medical records of an eyewitness the 
defendant was alleged to have shot.  Id. at 1154.  The court 
held that no Brady violation occurred because the defense 
"possessed the 'salient facts'" that would have enabled it to 
access the medical records, and because the defense was 
"obviously aware" that the other individual had been killed and 
could have easily obtained the autopsy report.  Id.  Thus, the 
court held that "[t]here was no suppression of this easily 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP1083-CR.akz 
 
11 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
attainable evidence."  Id.  In Cunningham, Brady was not 
violated even though the exculpatory evidence was not publicly 
available but was nevertheless deemed to be readily obtainable 
by the defense.  See also United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 
623–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (Brady not violated because defendant not 
prejudiced 
by 
prosecution's 
suppression 
of 
police 
report 
errors). 
Fourth, in United States v. Quintanilla, 193 F.3d 1139 
(10th Cir. 1999), the court considered whether a Brady violation 
occurred where the prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory 
testimony obtained in an interview, but where the defense 
actually knew about the information before trial.  Id. at 1149.  
Prior to her trial, the defendant moved to adjourn because she 
wanted to obtain exculpatory testimony from a co-defendant whose 
separate trial was about to occur.  Id. at 1143–44.  After the 
district court denied the motion, yet before trial, the other 
defendant 
made 
a 
statement 
to 
law 
enforcement 
that 
was 
exculpatory for Quintanilla.  Id. at 1144.  The prosecution 
obtained that statement, but it did not release it to the 
defense.  Id.  The exculpatory statement was not otherwise 
publicly available.  Id.  However, because defense counsel had 
become aware of the statement before law enforcement conducted 
the interview, the court concluded there was no Brady violation.  
Id. at 1149.  Quintanilla does not address the situation where 
information is publicly available. 
Similarly, in Hooks v. Workman, 689 F.3d 1148 (10th Cir. 
2012), no Brady violation occurred even though the prosecution 
had much more detail about the defendant's mental well-being 
that was not reflected in the memorandum turned over to the 
defense.  Id. at 1179-80.  No Brady violation occurred, however, 
because the evidence was "made known and available to the 
defense prior to trial," and "Brady 'does not require the 
prosecution to divulge every possible shred of evidence that 
could 
conceivably 
benefit 
the 
defendant.'" 
 
Id. 
 
Also, 
"disclosure need not be 'in a specific form or manner.'"  Id. at 
1180.  The court had no difficulty concluding that the 
prosecution fulfilled its Brady obligation because the "memo 
disclosed 
enough 
of 
the 
conversation . . . to 
put 
counsel . . . on notice that favorable and possibly material 
evidence was available."  Id.  Hooks does not support the 
proposition that the prosecution suppresses evidence under Brady 
when information is publicly available.  See also Banks v. 
Reynolds, 54 F.3d 1508, 1511, 1516–17 (10th Cir. 1995) (Brady 
violated where, despite defense counsel's request, prosecution 
represented to defense counsel that no exculpatory evidence 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP1083-CR.akz 
 
12 
 
¶78 In line with every federal circuit, Wisconsin has 
historically followed Brady and its progeny.  This court first 
applied Brady in State v. Cathey, 32 Wis. 2d 79, 145 N.W.2d 100 
(1966).  There, the court held that due process was not denied 
where the prosecution failed to disclose a prosecution crime 
laboratory report and the report of a doctor who examined a 
sexual assault victim report.  Id. at 93.  The court in Cathey 
held that the reports would have been merely cumulative, and 
that defense counsel was aware of sufficient facts such that he 
could have discovered the reports had he requested them.  Id. at 
94. 
¶79 As 
the 
majority 
correctly 
points 
out 
but 
then 
inexplicably 
dispenses 
with, 
Wisconsin 
courts 
have 
since 
developed an "exclusive possession" doctrine as part of the 
Brady analysis.  Majority op., ¶¶47–50.  In State v. Cole, 50 
Wis. 2d 449, 184 N.W.2d 75 (1971), the court held that Brady was 
not violated where the prosecution did not disclose information 
regarding the kind of car and gun involved in the defendant's 
arrest.  Id. at 455-57.  Citing to Justice Fortas's concurrence 
in Giles (386 U.S. at 101), the court concluded that the 
information was not in the prosecution's exclusive possession, 
meaning that the prosecution could not have "suppressed" the 
information under Brady.  Cole, 50 Wis. 2d at 457 & n.10.  This 
court again referenced a need for the prosecution to have 
                                                                                                                                                             
existed even though the prosecution possessed significant and 
voluminous exculpatory evidence, much of which was not publicly 
available). 
No.  2015AP1083-CR.akz 
 
13 
 
"possession or control" under Brady in Nelson v. State, 59 
Wis. 2d 474, 479, 208 N.W.2d 410 (1973). 
¶80 Since Cole this court has applied exclusive possession 
and control by the prosecution as a requirement in a Brady 
analysis, echoing federal decisions limiting the definition of 
"suppressed" evidence to exclude situations where the defense 
has access to evidence from a source other than the prosecution.  
See, e.g., State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 555, 579–80, 329 
N.W.2d 386 
(1983) 
(concluding 
no 
Brady 
violation 
where 
prosecution failed to disclose evidence of parking ticket 
because defendant knew he had been ticketed and paid it, and 
thus prosecution did not have exclusive possession or control of 
evidence); State v. Sarinske, 91 Wis. 2d 14, 36, 280 N.W.2d 725 
(1979) (holding no Brady violation where the alleged exculpatory 
evidence was testimony from two defense witnesses, and thus was 
not in the exclusive control of the prosecution); McLemore v. 
State, 87 Wis. 2d 739, 751–52, 275 N.W.2d 692 (1979) (noting 
that Brady not violated where the defense had access to an 
undisclosed transcript of an American Polygraph Association 
hearing of charges against a polygraph examiner); State v. 
Amundson, 69 Wis. 2d 554, 573-74, 230 N.W.2d 775 (1975) (holding 
that the prosecution did not violate Brady where it did not 
furnish a report generated by a witness for the defense because 
the prosecution did not have exclusive possession or control of 
it). 
¶81 Thus, under Wisconsin law and in line with each 
federal circuit, a Brady violation occurs where: (1) favorable 
No.  2015AP1083-CR.akz 
 
14 
 
evidence 
that 
is 
material 
because 
it 
is 
exculpatory 
or 
impeaching; (2) is willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the 
prosecution; (3) resulting in prejudice to the defendant.  
Evidence is considered suppressed, or withheld, only where the 
prosecution is in exclusive possession or control of the 
evidence in question.  In the case now before the court, the 
prosecution would have no ability to suppress what is available 
as publicly accessible information on CCAP. 
¶82 The parties agree that the evidence of the charges and 
criminal complaint against Wayerski's cellmate were favorable to 
Wayerski, as the evidence was impeaching.  Assuming they are 
correct, that leaves only the issues of whether the prosecution 
suppressed the evidence and whether Wayerski was prejudiced.  
While the majority is correct with respect to prejudice, it errs 
significantly when overreaching to conclude that the prosecution 
suppressed the evidence in question.  Although the court's 
opinion could end with its determination that no prejudice 
resulted here, the majority subverts 50 years of law.  It 
specifically engages in sweeping change thereby overruling 
Nelson, majority op. ¶¶48–50, 65; rejecting the "reasonable 
diligence" test found in Carvajal, majority op., ¶51; and 
distinguishing State v. Randall, 197 Wis. 2d 29, 539 N.W.2d 708 
(Ct. App. 1995), majority op. ¶¶52-55, 65.  The majority does 
not actually restore Brady as it claims.  Rather, it upends 
decades of Wisconsin jurisprudence that previously applied Brady 
in lockstep with the vast majority of federal courts.  In so 
doing, it embraces an amorphous analysis, leaves less than clear 
No.  2015AP1083-CR.akz 
 
15 
 
how it reaches for its conclusion, and thus creates confusion 
rather than clarity. 
¶83 In analyzing Brady under its new inquiry, the majority 
ignores an abundance of Wisconsin and federal case law which 
defines when the prosecution has "suppressed" evidence contrary 
to Brady.  Despite precedent to the contrary, it then abruptly 
concludes 
that 
the 
prosecution 
violated 
Brady 
when 
it 
"suppressed" 
the 
criminal 
complaint 
despite 
information 
regarding it being publicly available on CCAP.  Majority op., 
¶¶46, 59 & n.22.   The majority is notably silent regarding its 
choice to disregard longstanding precedent regarding when 
"suppression" occurs under a Brady analysis.  The majority 
similarly makes no mention of how the prosecution could even 
begin to suppress, or withhold, information about charges which 
was otherwise publicly available on CCAP.6 
¶84 This newly-adopted definition of "suppression" does 
not comport with the majority of cases that have applied Brady. 
In reaching its holding, the majority ignores the circuit 
court's finding that the prosecution here initially learned of 
the pending charges against the witness by conducting a CCAP 
search.  From there, the prosecution obtained a copy of the 
                                                 
6 The majority seems to claim that I assert that the 
criminal complaint was available on CCAP.  That is incorrect.  
Information regarding the pending charges against the inmate was 
available electronically on CCAP, not the criminal complaint 
itself.  However, had the defense exercised any level of 
diligence after searching CCAP, it would have discovered the 
pending charges and been able to readily obtain the criminal 
complaint, as it was nevertheless a matter of public record. 
No.  2015AP1083-CR.akz 
 
16 
 
criminal complaint against the witness.  Maybe it would have 
been a preferred approach or otherwise required pursuant to an 
"open file policy" or discovery requests or obligations, that 
the prosecution disclose the impeaching evidence at issue, but 
those duties are distinct from any duty to disclose under Brady. 
¶85 This begins to highlight the inherent problem with the 
majority's approach.  Until today, for a Brady violation to 
occur, the exculpatory evidence would need to be in the 
exclusive control of the prosecution.  Under the majority's 
definition of "suppress," the prosecution would "suppress" 
exculpatory evidence when it withholds favorable and material 
information the defense does not actually possess, even if that 
information is of public record and could be readily discovered 
with a simple internet search via CCAP or some other means.  But 
even applying the majority's definition, how can the prosecution 
"suppress" something that is equally available to the defense as 
it is to the prosecution?  If there is some line of demarcation 
that would prevent such an absurd result from occurring, the 
majority fails to draw it.  The majority thus rewrites Brady and 
relevant discovery statutes not based on the rule of law, but on 
judicial preference.  It further fails to set forth how the 
prosecution might comply with its new Brady test.  Is the 
prosecution required to maintain an open file policy in each 
jurisdiction statewide?  Must it advertise such an open file 
policy to the defense in every case and regularly update the 
defense on the status of the prosecution's file?  Under the 
majority's new Brady test, even that may not be enough.  The 
No.  2015AP1083-CR.akz 
 
17 
 
majority fails to provide any meaningful guidance as to how the 
prosecution must now proceed in order to comply with, and what 
defense counsel should now expect, given Wisconsin's new 
variation of Brady.  The majority need not venture into this 
uncharted territory, but since it chose to do so, it should 
attempt to provide clarity.  It does not, and instead it 
provides confusion. 
¶86 The error of the majority's new definition of when the 
prosecution suppresses evidence is further highlighted by the 
presence of other rules governing discovery and disclosures, 
which likely carry less severe penalties than a Brady violation.  
For example, under Wis. Stat. § 971.23, both the prosecution and 
defendant have discovery and inspection obligations.  Under 
§ 971.23(1), upon demand within a reasonable time before trial, 
the prosecution is obligated to disclose or allow the defendant 
to inspect a variety of materials and information, including a 
list of all of the prosecution's witnesses, any written or 
recorded statements made by any prosecution witness, the 
criminal record of any prosecution witness, and any exculpatory 
evidence.  § 971.23(1)(d)–(f), (h).  If a party violates 
§ 971.23, the statute provides as follows: 
Sanctions for failure to comply.  (a)  The court 
shall exclude any witness not listed or evidence not 
presented for inspection or copying required by this 
section, unless good cause is shown for failure to 
comply. The court may in appropriate cases grant the 
opposing party a recess or a continuance. 
(b)  In addition to or in lieu of any sanction 
specified in par. (a), a court may, subject to 
sub. (3), advise the jury of any failure or refusal to 
disclose material or information required to be 
No.  2015AP1083-CR.akz 
 
18 
 
disclosed under sub. (1) or (2m), or of any untimely 
disclosure of material or information required to be 
disclosed under sub. (1) or (2m). 
§ 971.23(7m).  
¶87 As evidenced by Wis. Stat. § 971.23, rules that govern 
discovery exist apart from Brady, carrying with them different 
standards and different penalties for violations.7  Of course, a 
violation of Brady carries harsh penalties, including the 
judicial remedy of court-ordered suppression if the prosecution 
seeks to use the evidence it withheld, or even a new trial.  A 
Brady violation is so serious that a prosecutor may even face 
ethical charges for allegedly violating Brady.8  The majority 
thus imposes an unduly harsh burden on the prosecution in a 
manner that flies in the face of the Brady line of cases.  It 
further fails to clarify the contours of its new analysis, 
leading to potential confusion.  Brady was meant to occupy a 
specific and limited sphere.  Brady is a distinct obligation 
under the law.  Today the majority rewrites Brady to suit its 
personal preferences in order to conclude that the criminal 
complaint should have been turned over to the defense.  The 
majority creates Brady violations, which once were of a unique 
                                                 
7 In fact, the defendant here made a written request to the 
prosecution for materials and information under Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.23. 
8 The Office of Lawyer Regulation has prosecuted an 
assistant district attorney for alleged ethical violations for 
failure to comply with Brady and Wis. Stat. § 971.23.  See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings against Sharon A. Riek, 2013 WI 81, 350 
Wis. 2d 684, 834 N.W.2d 384 (per curiam). 
No.  2015AP1083-CR.akz 
 
19 
 
and fairly specific nature, in circumstances that are now 
undefined. 
II 
¶88 Equally perplexing is the majority's extensive reach 
to alter longstanding Wisconsin law where it had no need to so 
act.  The majority applies a prejudice analysis under Brady, 
concluding that the pending charges and criminal complaint 
against the witness were not prejudicial to the defendant.  
Majority op., ¶¶61-62.  It acknowledges that though the pending 
charges and criminal complaint would have served as impeachment 
evidence regarding the prosecution's witness, the prosecution 
nevertheless "provided compelling evidence of Wayerski's guilt."9  
Majority op., ¶62. 
¶89 Instead, the majority took it upon itself to recreate 
the Brady doctrine as it believed it should be.  It dispenses 
with the fundamental requirement that the prosecution not 
                                                 
9 While the majority correctly concludes that there was 
sufficient evidence to convict Wayerski regardless of the 
inmate's testimony, notably, the impeachment evidence the 
prosecution purportedly "suppressed" under Brady would also have 
been cumulative to the impeachment evidence that was offered at 
trial.  For example, the inmate was cross-examined with respect 
to his 20 prior convictions for misdemeanors and felonies.  In 
addition, the inmate was cross-examined with respect to his 
testimony of events being influenced by access to news reports 
and thus fabricated.  Thus, there was already evidence in the 
record that could have impeached the inmate.  See State v. 
Rockette, 2006 WI App 103, ¶41, 294 Wis. 2d 611, 718 N.W.2d 269 
(considering Brady and stating that "[i]mpeachment evidence 
is not material, and thus a new trial is not required when the 
suppressed impeachment evidence merely furnishes an additional 
basis on which to impeach a witness whose credibility has 
already been shown to be questionable"). 
No.  2015AP1083-CR.akz 
 
20 
 
"suppress," or withhold, evidence from the defense and instead, 
creates confusion as to when something as serious as a Brady 
violation occurs.  As a presumable first in the country, the 
majority creates a Brady violation even where the defense and 
the prosecution have equal access to evidence available to the 
public.  The principle underlying Brady is fairness to both the 
defendant and the prosecution.  As the Brady court stated, 
"Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when 
criminal trials are fair."  Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.  But the 
majority's new analysis veers too far from what Brady and its 
progeny demand, as the majority now requires the prosecution to 
produce any evidence, even if equally accessible to the defense. 
¶90 This court must keep in mind its constitutionally 
confined role.  I therefore question why, instead of relying on 
United States Supreme Court precedent, precedent from federal 
circuits, or our own corresponding jurisprudence, the majority 
now departs from the vast body of law that properly applies 
Brady.  Though the majority expressly overrules Nelson and its 
progeny in an attempt to "return to the original inquiry under 
Brady," majority op., ¶56, it fails to define the contours of 
this new Brady analysis, and thus creates confusion instead of 
supplying clarification.  That is not the court's role. 
¶91 As a result, I respectfully concur in part and dissent 
in part. 
¶92 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice PATIENCE 
DRAKE ROGGENSACK joins this opinion. 
 
No.  2015AP1083-CR.dk 
 
1 
 
¶93 DANIEL KELLY, J.   (concurring in part, dissenting in 
part).  I join all of the court's opinion except for the piece 
that turns a logical impossibility into a potential violation of 
our state and federal constitutions.  I refer, of course, to the 
proposition 
that 
the 
State 
"suppresses" 
publicly-available 
evidence if it does not proactively provide the information to 
the 
defendant. 
 
The 
State's 
passivity, 
however, 
cannot 
"suppress" information in the public domain, so there can be no 
Brady1 violation.  The court's contrary conclusion allows 
defendants to attack the constitutionality of their convictions 
with a logical error.  Because that cannot possibly vindicate 
any cognizable right, I do not join that part of the court's 
opinion. 
¶94 Most of the court's opinion, so far as it addresses 
the question of suppression, is devoted to dismissing over 40 
years of our opinions because they contain an analysis that 
Brady does not.  Perhaps the court is right, and our 
jurisprudence on this subject is not warranted and should be 
jettisoned as unfaithful to Brady's conclusion.  But there is 
another possibility.  Brady's holding, as is true of all 
holdings, arose out of the facts presented to the court.  
Subsequent cases will necessarily present variations on that 
fact pattern.  A reviewing court must determine whether those 
patterns are so closely analogous that Brady's reasoning 
controls the case's disposition.  It is quite possible that our 
                                                 
1 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
No.  2015AP1083-CR.dk 
 
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work over the last 40 years has been focused on discerning how 
greatly the facts of a case may vary before the Brady analysis 
does not apply.  That is to say, we may have been answering a 
question anterior to Brady's application.  And if that is true, 
it would be entirely unremarkable that "[t]here is no express 
support" for those analyses in the Supreme Court's opinion.  
Majority op., ¶50.  Actually, it would be nothing short of 
astounding if we were to find that Brady endogenously answered 
the exogenous question of its applicability.  Unsurprisingly, it 
didn't. 
¶95 Here is the anterior question we must ask before 
applying Brady:  Are the circumstances of the case such that the 
State's passivity can "suppress" evidence in the prosecutor's 
possession?  We must ask that question specifically because of 
Brady's holding, which was that "the suppression by the 
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request 
violates due process where the evidence is material either to 
guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad 
faith of the prosecution."  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 
(1963).  That holding rests on the unexplored assumption that 
the State's failure to produce information in its possession 
resulted in "suppression by the prosecution."  It is the 
responsibility of every post-Brady court to explore that 
assumption in light of the circumstances of each individual case 
before deciding whether Brady's prescription applies.  Our 
failure to accept that responsibility in this case pretermitted 
our analysis.  And because we did not complete that task, we 
No.  2015AP1083-CR.dk 
 
3 
 
concluded the State suppressed information in the public domain 
by the simple expedient of knowing it existed. 
¶96 The court says its analysis is motivated by a "return 
to the original inquiry under Brady," majority op., ¶56, but it 
exhibited no curiosity at all about the nature of that inquiry, 
to wit, the types of circumstances that could result in the 
suppression of evidence.  Broadly speaking, there are two——one 
active, the other passive.  The prosecution might take active 
measures to make evidence unavailable to the defendant by, for 
example, 
instructing 
a 
witness 
not 
to 
divulge 
certain 
information, or removing evidence to a location to which the 
defense has no access, or by affirmatively misleading the 
defense about the existence of that evidence.  The prosecution 
can achieve the same result passively, but only when the State 
has exclusive access to the information.  In that circumstance, 
the prosecutor suppresses evidence by failing to produce the 
information to the defense.  If the evidence is in the public 
domain, however, the prosecutor's passivity is incapable of 
suppressing it because its availability is entirely unaffected 
by the prosecutor's knowledge of its existence.  In other words, 
a prosecutor cannot suppress something he does not control. 
¶97 A little illustration can go a long way in describing 
why passivity cannot suppress information in the public domain.  
So let's consider a hypothetical case tried under two different 
circumstances.  In the first, the local newspaper published a 
story containing exculpatory evidence.  However, neither the 
defense nor the prosecution read the story prior to trial, and 
No.  2015AP1083-CR.dk 
 
4 
 
so neither was aware of the evidence.  In the second 
circumstance, everything is the same except that the prosecutor 
did read the story.  In both variants the witnesses are the 
same, the evidence is the same, the arguments are the same, and 
the verdicts are the same.  The only difference is a piece of 
publicly-available information residing in the prosecutor's mind 
in the second scenario that was absent in the first. 
¶98 After conviction in the first scenario, the defense 
would obviously have no basis for a Brady claim because the 
prosecution neither knew of, nor possessed, the exculpatory 
evidence.  But the opinion in this case would say the second 
variant causes a Brady violation unless the prosecutor sends a 
copy of the newspaper to defense counsel.  However, because the 
evidence was equally available to the parties, the prosecutor's 
knowledge 
of 
its 
existence 
is 
neither 
practically 
nor 
metaphysically capable of affecting the defense's ability to 
access it. 
¶99 And that brings the nature of the court's rule into 
sharper focus.  The court ruled that it is constitutionally 
unacceptable for the State to know something that the defendant 
does not.  So our conclusion today really isn't about the 
suppression of evidence; it is, instead, about differential 
knowledge of evidence.  That is to say, the court believes the 
differential knowledge of a piece of information in the public 
domain "casts the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a 
proceeding 
that 
does 
not 
comport 
with 
standards 
of 
justice . . . ."  Brady, 373 U.S. at 88.  Who knew that reading 
No.  2015AP1083-CR.dk 
 
5 
 
the newspaper with one's morning coffee could violate a 
defendant's constitutional rights?  Or that the extent of a 
prosecutor's ignorance of the world around him and the risk of a 
constitutionally-suspect conviction are inversely proportional? 
¶100 Brady does not require, nor even suggest, that we 
should concern ourselves with the differential knowledge of 
evidence to the exclusion of its suppression.  The Supreme Court 
based 
its 
reasoning 
on 
the 
assumption 
that, 
under 
the 
circumstances of that case, the prosecution's passivity combined 
with the parties' differential knowledge to suppress the 
evidence.  But nothing in its reasoning suggests that passivity 
will always have that effect.  Instead, Brady itself provides a 
good, real-life example of a specific type of circumstance in 
which passivity can cause suppression.  Messrs. Brady and Boblit 
were separately tried for murder.  Id. at 84.  Mr. Brady 
admitted his involvement in the crime, but claimed Mr. Boblit 
was the killer.  Id.  Prior to trial, Mr. Brady's counsel asked 
to see all of Mr. Boblit's extrajudicial statements.  Id.  The 
prosecution provided several, but omitted the one in which Mr. 
Boblit admitted he killed the victim.  Id.  The Supreme Court's 
opinion does not suggest Mr. Boblit's statement was available 
from any source other than the state.  Because the state 
controlled access to the information, the prosecutor's failure 
to fully respond to Mr. Brady's request put the evidence beyond 
the defendant's reach.  As a result, the prosecutor's passivity 
suppressed the exculpatory evidence.  Nothing in the Supreme 
Court's reasoning suggests the conclusion would be the same if 
No.  2015AP1083-CR.dk 
 
6 
 
Mr. Boblit's statement had been recounted in a newspaper story 
sitting on defense counsel's doorstep. 
¶101 Our precedents, the ones the court overrules today, 
have been asking the anterior question implicitly required by 
Brady's holding.  They use an "exclusive possession or control" 
diagnostic device to determine whether prosecutorial passivity 
could suppress evidence.  See, e.g., State v. Cole, 50 
Wis. 2d 449, 457, 184 N.W.2d 75 (1971) ("Certainly defendant was 
aware of the kind of car and gun involved in her arrest. 
Therefore, this information was not 'in the exclusive possession 
of the State.'"); State v. Sarinske, 91 Wis. 2d 14, 36, 280 
N.W.2d 725 (1979) ("Thus it appears the 'evidence' was not 
within the exclusive control of the state, and consequently 
there may have been no duty to disclose the evidence to the 
defendant even if the district attorney was aware of the 
electrical short circuit."). 
¶102 The clear majority of federal court of appeals 
circuits have been doing the same thing, although with a 
slightly different diagnostic device.  Of this majority, all but 
one ask whether the defendant, through the application of 
"reasonable 
diligence," 
could 
obtain 
the 
information 
not 
produced by the prosecutor.  This rubric accomplishes the same 
thing as our "exclusive possession or control" inquiry.  They 
both assess whether prosecutorial passivity could suppress 
evidence.  See, e.g., Carvajal v. Dominguez, 542 F.3d 561, 567 
(7th Cir. 2008) ("Evidence is 'suppressed' when (1) the 
prosecution failed to disclose the evidence in time for the 
No.  2015AP1083-CR.dk 
 
7 
 
defendant to make use of it, and (2) the evidence was not 
otherwise available to the defendant through the exercise of 
reasonable diligence."); United States v. Parker, 790 F.3d 550, 
561–62 (4th Cir. 2015) ("We examine this issue under the 
established principle that when 'exculpatory information is not 
only available to the defendant but also lies in a source where 
a reasonable defendant would have looked, a defendant is not 
entitled to the benefit of the Brady doctrine.'").2 
                                                 
2 A sampling of opinions from circuits that understand the 
state does not suppress publicly-available information by not 
producing it to the defense includes:  Lugo v. Munoz, 682 
F.2d 7, 10 (1st Cir. 1982) ("Since the information at issue here 
was 
available 
to 
the 
defense 
attorney 
through 
diligent 
discovery, we find that the prosecutor's omission was not 'of 
sufficient 
significance 
to 
result 
in 
the 
denial 
of 
the 
defendant's right to a fair trial.'" (quoting United States v. 
Agurs 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976))); United States v. Catone, 769 
F.3d 866, 
872 
(4th 
Cir. 
2014) 
("Accordingly, 
'[p]ublicly 
available information which the defendant could have discovered 
through reasonable diligence cannot be the basis for a Brady 
violation.'" (quoting United States v. Willis, 277 F.3d 1026, 
1034 (8th Cir. 2002))); Reed v. Stephens, 739 F.3d 753, 781 (5th 
Cir. 2014) ("A petitioner's Brady claim fails if the suppressed 
evidence was discoverable through reasonable due diligence."); 
United States v. Shields, 789 F.3d 733, 746–47 (7th Cir. 2015) 
("Evidence is suppressed when 'the prosecution fail[s] to 
disclose the evidence in time for the defendant to make use of 
it' and 'the evidence was not otherwise available to the 
defendant through the exercise of reasonable diligence.'" 
(quoting Ienco v. Angarone, 429 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2005))); 
United States v. Coplen, 565 F.3d 1094, 1097 (8th Cir. 2009) 
("'The government does not suppress evidence in violation of 
Brady by failing to disclose evidence to which the defendant had 
access through other channels.'" (quoting United States v. 
Zuazo, 243 F.3d 428, 431 (8th Cir. 2001))); Wright v. Sec'y, 
Fla. Dep't of Corr., 761 F.3d 1256, 1278 (11th Cir. 2014) 
("'When the defendant has equal access to the evidence[,] 
disclosure is not required' and 'there is no suppression by the 
government.'" (quoting Maharaj v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 432 
F.3d 1292, 1315 (11th Cir. 2005))); and United States v. Derr, 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP1083-CR.dk 
 
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¶103 The tests we and most of the federal court of appeals 
circuits have been using to diagnose the suppressive potential 
of prosecutorial passivity may or may not represent the ideal 
formulation of the inquiry.  But if we are really interested in 
State suppression of evidence, rather than mere differential 
knowledge of evidence, then surely we must engage in some such 
diagnosis before applying Brady's prescription.  Today, the 
court showed no interest in doing so. 
¶104 Dispensing with that diagnosis makes for a decidedly 
odd 
rule. 
 
But 
the 
oddity 
does 
not 
derive 
from 
our 
constitutions, nor is it born of Brady (even though the court 
purports to found its rule on Brady's language).  We own this 
idiosyncrasy, an idiosyncrasy that results from our failure to 
account for how passive suppression actually works.  Instead of 
exploring 
Brady's 
unspoken 
assumption, 
the 
court 
just 
recapitulated its holding, stating that the Supreme Court "has 
discussed 
suppression 
in 
terms 
of 
withholding 
evidence."  
Majority op., ¶56 (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 ("A prosecution 
                                                                                                                                                             
990 F.2d 1330, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("Brady provides no refuge 
to defendants who have knowledge of the government's possession 
of possibly exculpatory information, but sit on their hands 
until after a guilty verdict is returned.").  The Second Circuit 
has rejected the "reasonable diligence" test in favor of its own 
formulation:  "'[E]vidence is not considered to have been 
suppressed within the meaning of the Brady doctrine if the 
defendant or his attorney either knew, or should have known, of 
the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of that 
evidence.'"  United States v. Rowland, 826 F.3d 100, 113 (2d 
Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Paulino, 445 F.3d 211, 225 
(2d Cir. 2006)).  Nonetheless, this formulation is not as 
sweeping as the "differential knowledge" standard our court 
adopts today. 
No.  2015AP1083-CR.dk 
 
9 
 
that withholds evidence on demand of an accused" violates his 
constitutional obligations)).  Yes, it has.  But that doesn't 
advance the analysis because Brady addressed the "withholding" 
under circumstances that made the evidence unavailable to the 
defendant.  Consequently, our court's analysis simply begs the 
question implicit in Brady's holding. 
¶105 The court also offered a handful of cases that, it 
broadly hinted, have something to say about the duty to disclose 
publicly-available information.  They are unhelpful.  One of 
them, Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449 (2009), offers us no guidance 
here because it examined Brady's "materiality" requirement, not 
its "suppression" component.  The same is largely true of Kyles 
v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995), as well.  The Kyles Court broke 
no new ground with respect to Brady's suppression element, 
merely rehearsing the cases that have come before.  Instead, it 
concentrated 
almost 
exclusively 
on 
what 
makes 
evidence 
"material" within the meaning of Brady and whether the duty to 
disclose covers information known to the police but not the 
prosecutor.  As for Banks v. Dretke, the Court addressed Brady's 
suppression element no further than was necessary to dispose of 
the state's improbable argument that "the prosecution can lie 
and 
conceal 
and 
the 
prisoner 
still 
has 
the 
burden 
to . . . discover the evidence . . . ."  540 U.S. 668, 696 
(2004).  But we are addressing passive nondisclosure here, not 
active deceit.  The Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. 
Agurs addressed Brady's suppression element, but only to hold 
that 
the 
prosecution's 
disclosure 
obligation 
exists 
No.  2015AP1083-CR.dk 
 
10 
 
independently of a defendant's request for exculpatory evidence.  
427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976).  Because the circumstances there 
indicated the undisclosed evidence was not publicly available, 
its discussion does not touch the question we must answer.  Id. 
at 100-101.3  Likewise for Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 273 
(1999).  Therefore, none of these cases tell us anything about 
whether it is possible for the State to passively suppress 
publicly-available information. 
¶106 So I find myself agreeing with a clear majority of the 
federal court of appeals circuits (specifically, the 1st, 4th, 
5th, 7th, 8th, 11th, and D.C.) in concluding that, prior to 
applying Brady, we must diagnose whether the information the 
prosecutor did not produce was otherwise available to the 
defense.  Most of the federal opinions I cited post-date all the 
Supreme Court cases upon which our court relies for its 
conclusion.4  And yet none of the authoring circuits saw in those 
cases the portents my colleagues seem to see.  I may be joining 
a fellowship of error in agreeing with these circuits, for the 
Supreme Court might actually address this question someday and 
give us our comeuppance.  But that's better than being on the 
aggressive vanguard of an effort to arm defendants with a 
                                                 
3 The evidence was comparable to that at issue here (i.e., a 
criminal record).  However, what one may acquire today with a 
few keystrokes was effectively invisible and inaccessible to the 
public in 1976. 
4 All the cases, that is, that actually discussed Brady's 
suppression element.  I don't count Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449 
(2009), because the opinion discussed only the materiality 
component of the Brady analysis. 
No.  2015AP1083-CR.dk 
 
11 
 
logical fallacy with which to attack the constitutionality of 
their convictions. 
¶107 Alas, 
the 
court's 
effective 
holding 
is 
that 
a 
prosecutor suppresses evidence in the public domain simply by 
knowing it exists.  But unless we assume his solipsism, the 
prosecutor 
cannot 
suppress 
what 
he 
cannot 
control.  
Nevertheless, the new rule in Wisconsin is that a logical 
impossibility can make a conviction constitutionally suspect.  
The only other way to understand the court's decision is that 
the parties' differential knowledge of evidence can violate the 
Constitution without regard to suppression.  That, however, is 
not Brady's rule, and neither the parties nor the court have 
offered 
the 
slightest 
rationale 
for 
expanding 
the 
Brady 
principle so dramatically. 
* 
¶108 The evidence of pending charges against Mr. Clark was 
at all material times available on the Consolidated Court 
Automated Programs ("CCAP") system, a source of information more 
readily available than the local newspaper.  And upon learning 
of the complaint against Mr. Clark, defense counsel could have 
No.  2015AP1083-CR.dk 
 
12 
 
picked up the phone and asked for a copy.5  If he had been told 
"no," then he would have had a classic Brady claim:  "[T]he 
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an 
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is 
material either to guilt or to punishment . . . ."  Brady, 373 
U.S. at 87 (emphasis added).  But we'll never know because he 
never asked.  And he never asked because he never looked.6  
Perhaps this inaction would be remediable under Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), but it cannot say anything 
about whether the State violated the Constitution.  It was 
logically impossible for the prosecutor to suppress any of the 
evidence at issue in this case just by looking at it.  For these 
reasons, I respectfully join the court's opinion except for its 
discussion of Brady's "suppression" element. On that point, I 
respectfully dissent. 
                                                 
5 The court laments that "[i]f Wayerski's trial counsel had 
discovered the pending charges, he would have had to take extra 
steps to promptly secure the complaint from Chippewa County."  
Majority op., ¶59.  And what of it?  These intolerable "extra 
steps" would likely be nothing more than a phone call, something 
the prosecutor seems to have accomplished easily enough.  If 
something truly would have stood between him and the complaint 
(besides a phone call), he should have told us what it was so 
that we might evaluate its suppressive potential.  But we 
certainly should not suppose defense counsel was a potted plant, 
unable to stir himself enough to reach for information at his 
fingertips. 
6 If evidence of the complaint were not publicly available, 
the State would have been required to proactively offer it (had 
the information been material) under the Agurs rationale. 
No.  2015AP1083-CR.dk 
 
 
 
1