Title: McDougal v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ANDRE McDOUGAL,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
           Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 152, 2011 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0607023450 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
      Submitted: September 23, 2011 
         Decided: October 17, 2011 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 17th day of October 2011, upon consideration of the briefs of the 
parties and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Andre McDougal, filed an appeal 
from the Superior Court’s March 2, 2011 violation of probation (“VOP”) 
sentencing order.  We find no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record before us reflects that, in January 2008, a jury found 
McDougal not guilty of Murder in the First Degree and was hung on the 
lesser-included charges of Murder in the Second Degree and Manslaughter 
as well as two weapon charges.  In September 2008, on the day of his retrial, 
McDougal pleaded guilty to a single count of Manslaughter.  He was 
 
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sentenced to twenty years at Level V incarceration, to be suspended after 
three years for one year of Level III probation.  In January 2010, McDougal 
was found to have committed a VOP.  He was re-sentenced to seventeen 
years at Level V, to be suspended for seventeen years at Level IV, in turn to 
be suspended after six months for one year at Level III probation.  On March 
2, 2011, following a contested VOP hearing, McDougal again was found to 
have committed a VOP and was re-sentenced to seventeen years at Level V, 
to be suspended after fifteen years for two years at Level III probation.   
 
(3) 
In this appeal from his latest VOP sentence, McDougal claims 
that a) the Superior Court abused its discretion when it sentenced him to 
fifteen years at Level V; b) the public defender who represented him at the 
VOP hearing provided ineffective assistance due to a conflict of interest; and 
c) his due process rights were violated because the finding of a VOP was 
based upon hearsay evidence. 
 
(4) 
McDougal’s first claim is that the Superior Court abused its 
discretion when it revoked his probation and sentenced him to fifteen years 
at Level V.  Revocation of probation is within the broad discretion of the 
Superior Court.1  Once a VOP is established, the Superior Court may order 
the violator to serve any sentence that originally was suspended, less time 
                                                 
1 Brown v. State, 249 A.2d 269, 271-72 (Del. 1968). 
 
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served.2  A VOP sentence will not be reversed unless it exceeds the 
maximum permitted by law or was the result of vindictive or arbitrary action 
on the part of the sentencing judge.3   
 
(5) 
The transcript of the March 2, 2011 VOP hearing reflects that 
McDougal’s criminal record included convictions of first degree assault, 
weapon violations and escape after conviction, in addition to his 
manslaughter conviction.  Moreover, this was McDougal’s second VOP in 
connection with his manslaughter conviction.  Finally, McDougal’s VOP 
was based not only on a curfew violation, but also because he had been 
arrested on new drug and weapon charges.  As such, there was more than 
ample support for the Superior Court’s sentence.  In the absence of any 
evidence that McDougal’s VOP sentence exceeded the statutory maximum 
or resulted from an abuse of discretion on the part of the sentencing judge, 
we conclude that his first claim is without merit. 
 
(6) 
McDougal’s second claim is that the public defender who 
represented him at the March 2, 2011 VOP hearing provided ineffective 
assistance due to a conflict of interest.  McDougal bases this claim on the 
fact that, following his indictment on his new drug and weapon charges, the 
Office of the Public Defender was assigned to represent his co-defendant, 
                                                 
2 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §4334(c). 
3 Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 842-43 (Del. 1992). 
 
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who pleaded guilty to Possession of Heroin.  The record before us reflects 
that, at the time of McDougal’s VOP hearing, McDougal’s co-defendant had 
absconded from probation and did not appear as a witness.  Also, following 
the VOP hearing, the Office of the Public Defender filed a conflict letter in 
the Superior Court declining further representation of McDougal.4  The letter 
explained that, if McDougal should proceed to trial on his new drug and 
weapon charges, his co-defendant could be called as a witness, thereby 
creating a conflict for defense counsel.   
 
(7) 
This Court has held that a claim of ineffective assistance due to 
a conflict of interest must be supported by a demonstration of actual 
prejudice.5  McDougal has presented no evidence of “an actual conflict of 
interest adversely affect[ing] his lawyer’s performance,”6 nor do we find any 
such evidence in the transcript of the VOP hearing.  As such, we conclude 
that McDougal’s second claim also is unavailing.   
 
(8) 
McDougal’s third, and final, claim is that his due process rights 
were violated because the finding of a VOP was based upon hearsay 
evidence.  The United States Supreme Court has ruled that a VOP hearing is 
not a formal criminal trial and that, therefore, only minimal requirements of 
                                                 
4 Del. Rules of Prof. Cond., Rule 1.7(a). 
5 Lewis v. State, 757 A.2d 709, 717 (Del. 2000). 
6 Id. at 718. 
 
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due process must be observed.7  Following that precedent, this Court has 
determined that the formal rules of evidence are inapplicable to a VOP 
hearing8 and that hearsay is permissible.9   
 
(9) 
The transcript of McDougal’s March 2, 2011 VOP hearing 
reflects that the hearing was conducted in accordance with the procedures 
outlined in Superior Court Criminal Rule 32.1 and that he was afforded the 
due process to which he was entitled in a VOP proceeding.  We, therefore, 
conclude that McDougal’s third claim likewise is without merit. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
     
                                                 
7 Perry v. State, 741 A.2d 359, 362-63 (Del. 1999) (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 
778, 782 (1973)). 
8 Brown v. State, 249 A.2d 269, 272 (Del. 1968). 
9 Id.; Super. Ct. Crim. R. 32.1.