Title: IN RE WRIGHT

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

In re Wright1999 WY 100983 P.2d 1227Case Number: 98-294Decided: 07/12/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming

IN 
THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF SHAWN T. WRIGHT, AN EMPLOYEE OF 
WYOMING ANALYTICAL LABORATORIES, INC.: STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING 
WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellant (Respondent),

v.

SHAWN T. WRIGHT, Appellee 
(Petitioner).

 

                                 

 

Appeal from the District Court 
of Albany County Honorable Jeffrey

A. Donnell, 
Judge

  

 

 Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; John W. 
Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Gerald W. Laska, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General; and Bernard P. Haggerty, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument by 
Mr. Haggerty, representing appellant.

 George Santini, Cheyenne, WY., representing 
appellee.

 

    
Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and HILL, 
JJ.

 

    
HILL, Justice.

   
[¶1]      After an expedited hearing, the Medical 
Commission (the Commission) found that Appellee Shawn Wright should be awarded 
compensation for tests conducted to determine whether there was a causal 
connection between his current condition and his initial injury. However, the 
Commission found that these tests established that his current malady was not 
work-related and, therefore, future claims for the same injury were not 
compensable. On appeal, the district court held that the Medical Commission was 
without statutory authority to hold an expedited procedure. As a result, the 
district court reversed the Medical Commission's order, and remanded the matter 
for a full evidentiary hearing. Appellant Wyoming Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Division (the Division) then appealed the matter to this Court. We 
find that Wright clearly waived his procedural claims by his failure to object 
to the expedited procedure and by virtue of his subsequent participation. 
Consequently, we reverse the district court's order and reinstate the order of 
the Medical Commission with clarification.

 

                               
ISSUES

 

   [¶2]   The Division phrases the issue as 
follows:

 

The Medical Commission decided the contested case in 
an expedited proceeding according to its Rules. The Employee did not 
object.

 

            A. 
Was the Medical Commission's decision within its statutory 
authority?

 

  Appellee Shawn Wright (Wright) divides 
this issue into three parts:

 

1. Did the Medical Commission exceed its jurisdiction 
and authority by failing to adhere to the contested case procedures mandated 
under the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act?

 

2. Does the Medical Commission have statutory 
authority to convert a trial-type contested case hearing into an expedited 
proceeding?

 

3. Does the Medical Commission have jurisdiction to 
prospectively deny claims for workers' compensation 
benefits?

 

    
                            FACTS

 

  [¶3]      After receiving a compensable injury in 
1995,1 Wright underwent an MRI in December 
of 1996 to determine whether there was an intercranial cause for his continuing 
problems relating to the use of his right arm. Thereafter, Wright was referred 
to Dr. Bennett for neuropsychological testing in April of 1997. The results of the MRI were normal, and Dr. Bennett 
concluded that Wright's condition was not related to a brain injury. Thus, the 
tests demonstrated no causal relationship between Wright's current complaints 
and his 1995 injury.

 

  [¶4]      Wright submitted two claims to the 
Division for the MRI in December of 1996. The first was a hospital bill for 
$839.00, and the second, a $162.00 charge from the radiologist. The Division 
denied these claims, stating the results of the MRI demonstrated it was not 
connected to the original injury. Wright objected, and the matter was referred by the Division to the 
Medical Commission.

 

  [¶5]      In its referral, the Division requested 
a small claims hearing because the amount at issue was less than $2,000.00. 
Wright utilized his opportunity to object, arguing that the small claims venue 
was inappropriate because future claims he intended to file relating to his 
present injury would exceed the $2,000.00 limit.  The Medical Commission heeded Wright's 
objection and issued an order converting the small claims proceeding into a 
contested case hearing.

 

  [¶6]      The Medical Commission then issued a 
scheduling order which stated that:

 

6. Upon request of a party or on the Commission's own 
motion, a medically contested case may be expedited if the case 
i[s]:

 

            (i) a matter in 
which there are no disputed issues of material fact; or

 

            (ii) a matter in 
which the parties agree to an expedited proceeding.

 

 

  [¶7]      Following the submission of disclosure 
statements by both parties, the Medical Commission issued an Order Expediting 
Case, pursuant to Chapter 11, Section 1 of the Rules of the Medical Commission. 
The order provided the parties ten days to request reconsideration of the 
decision to expedite. Neither party objected, and thereafter Wright filed 
additional exhibits with the Commission. The exhibits filed by Wright contained 
medical reports concerning consultations and treatments subsequent to the claims 
filed with the Division. The record does not indicate which, if any, of these 
charges were filed as claims.

 

  [¶8]      The Commission served the parties with 
its decision on August 29, 1997. The Commission found that the MRI and the 
neuropsychological testing were compensable, as they were reasonable and 
necessary to rule out causation as to the compensable injury and Wright's 
current complaints. However, the Commission found that the additional procedures 
were not compensable, stating:

 

Any and all claims by Shawn Wright for a MRI of the 
brain and neuropsychological testing by Thomas L. Bennett, Ph. D. shall be 
calculated and paid at the rates provided by the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Act and the Rules and Regulations of the 
Objector/Defendant. Any and all claims for additional testing or treatment of 
his right upper extremity tremors is not compensable under the Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Act.

 

One day prior to service of 
the Commission's order, Wright filed a second notice of additional exhibits 
containing medical reports from recent consultations. Upon receiving the 
Commission's decision, Wright filed a timely notice for reconsideration, 
claiming newly discovered evidence as found in his latest exhibits, and charging 
error as a matter of law in the denial of claims which had not yet been filed 
with the Division. On September 24, 1997, Wright filed another notice of 
additional exhibits containing his most recent medical 
reports.

 

  [¶9]      Two days later, Wright filed a petition 
for judicial review. In his brief to the district court, he raised the following 
issues:

 

1. Does the Medical Commission have jurisdiction to 
prospectively deny claims for workers' compensation 
benefits?

 

2. Did the Medical Commission exceed its jurisdiction 
by ruling on matters which had not been referred to it for contested case 
determination?

 

3. Does the Medical Commission have statutory 
authority to convert a contested case into an expedited 
proceeding?

 

4. Did the Medical Commission by hearing this matter 
as an expedited proceeding violate the contested case provisions of the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act?

 

The district court did not 
address Wright's issues designated 1, 2, and 3, nor did it address the 
Division's argument that Wright's claims were waived. Instead, the district 
court found that the dispositive issue was the Commission's lack of statutory 
authority to conduct expedited proceedings. The district court, therefore, 
reversed and remanded the case for a full evidentiary hearing. The Division 
appeals from this order.

  

                         
STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

  [¶10] 
  Generally, review of an 
appeal from an administrative decision is governed by the provisions of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(C) (LEXIS 1999), which directs a reviewing court to 
"[h] old unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be * * * [i] n excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or 
lacking statutory right[.]" Russell v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Division, 944 P.2d 1151, 1155 (Wyo. 1997). In this case, however, 
the Division claims that we need not reach the substance of Wright's claims 
because Wright waived his right to challenge the expedited 
procedure.

 

  [¶11] 
  While the question of 
waiver is often one of fact, when the facts and circumstances relating to the 
subject are admitted or clearly established, waiver becomes a question of law. 
28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver § 174, at 864-65 (1966); see also 
Intermountain Brick Company v. Valley Bank, 746 P.2d 427, 431 (Wyo. 1987). We 
review rulings on questions of law de novo. Pohl v. The Bailey Company, ___ P.2d 
___, 1999 WL 325953 (Wyo. May 25, 1999) at *3; Mortenson v. Scheer, 957 P.2d 1302, 1305 (Wyo. 1998). Moreover, when considering an appeal from a district 
court's review of agency action, we accord no special deference to the district 
court's conclusions but review the case as if it had come directly to us from 
the administrative agency. Matter of Fisher, 914 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Wyo. 
1996).

 

                          
   DISCUSSION

 

                               
Waiver

 

  [¶12] 
  The Division maintains that 
Wright waived his right to challenge the Commission's expedited procedure. We 
agree.

 

  [¶13] 
  Waiver is " `the 
intentional relinquishment of a known right and must be manifest in some 
unequivocal manner. § " Amax Coal West, Inc. v. Wyoming State Board of 
Equalization, 896 P.2d 1329, 1333 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting Jackson State Bank v. 
Homar, 837 P.2d 1081, 1086 (Wyo. 1992) and Baldwin v. Dube, 751 P.2d 388, 392 
(Wyo. 1988)). In the scheduling order issued to the parties, Wright was notified 
that the contested case could be converted into an expedited procedure. When 
this potential change came to be, Wright was specifically notified of the time 
in which he could object to the Commission's decision.

 

  [¶14] 
  Unlike his response to the 
small claims procedure, Wright remained silent and fully participated in the 
expedited proceeding, filing at least two sets of exhibits without any complaint 
as to the procedure. Neither did he request oral argument - an option provided 
to the parties in an expedited case. Finally, his motion for reconsideration to 
the Commission also failed to raise any objection to the expedited procedure. In 
other words, Wright had the right and the opportunity to object to an expedited 
procedure; he knew he had that right, and the record is positive in reflecting 
his intent to relinquish that right. "These are the requisite elements of a 
waiver or estoppel."  Herring v. 
Welltech, Inc., 660 P.2d 361, 366 (Wyo. 1983).  Consequently, unless Wright can 
demonstrate that his claim comes within an exception to the waiver rule, he is 
estopped from asserting this issue on appeal.

 

  [¶15] 
  Wright argues that the 
Commission's failure to provide a trial-type hearing, as mandated under the 
Wyoming Administrative Procedures Act, is a jurisdictional error which cannot be 
waived.  It is true that we will 
consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal if it is a jurisdictional 
issue or an issue of such a fundamental nature that [it] must be considered. " 
Pohl, 1999 WL 325953 at *3; WW Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Cheyenne, 956 P.2d 353, 356 (Wyo. 1998). It is only subject matter jurisdiction, however, which 
evades waiver on appeal.  Platte 
Development Company v. Wyoming Environmental Quality Council, 966 P.2d 972, 974 
(Wyo. 1998); Routh v. State, ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 952 P.2d 1108, 1114 (Wyo. 1998) (distinguishing between the ability to waive 
personal jurisdiction as opposed to subject matter 
jurisdiction).

 

  [¶16] 
  Subject matter jurisdiction 
is the power to hear and determine cases of a certain class.  French v. Amax Coal West, 960 P.2d 1023, 
1029 (Wyo. 1998). Wright does not dispute that his claim was properly identified 
as a medically contested case. A medically contested case is precisely the 
subject matter jurisdiction conferred on the Commission by the legislature. Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-616;2 see also Pohl, 1999 WL 325953 at *4 
(claim that Medical commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction over medically 
contested case considered for first time on appeal). Therefore, the subject 
matter jurisdiction exception to waiver does not apply 
here.

 

  [¶17] 
  Nor can Wright avoid waiver 
by claiming his objections at the district court level rise to a substantive 
challenge to the expedited procedure. Wright correctly notes that due to an 
agency's inability to address claims relating to the constitutionality of 
enabling statutes and agency rules, we will consider those issues raised for the 
first time on appeal. Pohl, supra.; Armed Forces Co-op. Insuring Association v. 
Department of Insurance, 622 P.2d 1318, 1332-33 (Wyo. 1980). 
However,

 

Notwithstanding this principle, a petitioner cannot 
obtain review of procedural errors in the administrative process that were not 
raised before the agency merely by alleging that every such error violates due 
process. "Due process" is not a talismanic term which guarantees review in this 
court of procedural errors correctable by the administrative 
tribunal.

 

Reid v. Engen, 765 F.2d 1457, 1461 (9th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added); Gilbert v. National Transportation 
Safety Board, 80 F.3d 364, 367 (9th Cir. 1996). The flaw in Wright's argument is 
his failure to recognize that, had Wright raised his procedural concerns, the 
Commission had the power and authority to rectify any procedural infirmity by returning the matter to a 
full evidentiary hearing.

 

  [¶18] 
  As discussed above, Wright 
was given the opportunity to object but did not do so. The Commission has 
adopted a procedure to be used in an expedited case, and the rules are available 
to the litigants. Thus, Wright knew exactly the process he would receive and the 
rights he waived in agreeing to the expedited procedure.  Moreover, Wright's active participation 
in the proceedings invited the Commission to exercise the authority he now 
claims to be beyond statutory allocation. Because Wright abandoned the 
opportunity to allow the agency to remedy alleged procedural defects, he waived 
both his claim regarding the statutory basis for the Commission's actions and 
his procedural due process claim.

 

  [¶19] 
  Wright contends that this 
case is controlled by our holding in Jackson v. Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Division, 786 P.2d 874 (Wyo. 1990). There, we held that the hearing examiner not 
only exceeded statutory authority, but failed to provide due process in granting 
summary judgment in a contested case procedure.3 We specifically found that Jackson 
had demonstrated a prejudicial denial of due process because the record revealed 
a need for crossexamination of the witnesses. Therefore, the hearing examiner 
precluded Jackson's ability to fully develop facts material to the disposition 
of his case. " Id. at 878.

  

  [¶20] 
  Wright's reliance on 
Jackson, however, is unavailing because waiver was not an issue in that case. 
Thus, our holding in Jackson does not apply to the facts before us. Moreover, 
unlike the claimant in Jackson, Wright does not point to any evidence which 
required clarification by cross-examination. Wright's failure to object to the 
expedited procedure prior to and during the proceeding, and his active 
participation in the proceedings, renders his claims on appeal waived. "This 
court has taken a dim view of a litigant trying a case on one theory and 
appealing it on another. " WW Enterprises, 956 P.2d  at 356; Enron Oil & Gas 
Company v. Freudenthal, 861 P.2d 1090, 1094 (Wyo. 1993); Epple v. Clark, 804 P.2d 678, 681 (Wyo. 1991). We will not condone the practice of actively and 
willingly participating in an agency proceeding, only to appeal the process when 
an adverse ruling is the result. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the 
district court ordering the Commission to conduct a full evidentiary 
hearing.

 

                         
Prospective Claims

 

  [¶21] 
  Wright contends that the 
Commission erred as a matter of law when it denied claims yet to be filed with 
the Division. He points to our recent decision, Daiss v. Division of Workers' 
Safety and Compensation, 965 P.2d 692 (Wyo. 1998) wherein we 
stated:

 

Neither the Act, the division's rules, nor Wyoming 
case law authorizes the medical commission to determine the compensability of a 
procedure when claims for the procedure have not been properly submitted or the 
procedure has not been the subject of a final determination by the division. 
Likewise, none of the above-mentioned sources authorizes a contested case 
hearing to be held on a request for approval of a proposed surgery. We conclude, 
therefore, that the medical commission properly determined that it lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction to decide whether the employee's proposed back 
surgery would be compensable.

 

Id. at 695 (emphasis added). 
Because this issue relates to subject matter jurisdiction, it is not waived. 
However, we find no reason to vacate the Commission's findings as to the matters 
properly before it.

 

  [¶22] 
  The record is unclear as to 
whether Wright submitted additional claims during the pendency of the 
proceeding. While he avers that he did not, in his brief he claims that the 
Medical Commission, in its written findings and conclusions, relied heavily upon 
the additional medical records and reports provided by Wright from health care providers . . . whose claims 
had been left undetermined pending the results of the hearing before the Medical 
Commission." We also note that the Commission found that Wright had presented 
additional outstanding bills" which rendered a small claims procedure 
inappropriate.

 

  [¶23] 
  To the extent that the 
Commission's ruling reaches the compensability of claims filed with the Division 
and presented to the Commission during the pendency of the hearing, the 
Commission's order is affirmed. This includes the Commission's finding that the 
MRI and the neuropsychological examination effectively ruled out the causation 
nexus between Wright's original injury and his current right upper extremity 
tremors.  However, the Commission 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over future claims. As a result, we find that 
the Commission's comments regarding 
future claims are merely a commentary on the res judicata effect of its 
ruling.

 

                             
CONCLUSION

 

  [¶24] 
  Wright waived all 
objections to the expedited procedure through his affirmative actions which 
deprived the Commission of the ability to correct any procedural error. We, 
therefore, affirm the order of the Medical Commission as it relates to all 
claims filed by Wright with the Division and presented to the Commission during 
the expedited procedure.

 

    

FOOTNOTES

1The 
underlying facts relating to Wright's original injury in 1995 and his claims for 
permanent partial disability benefits are set forth in Wright v. Wyoming 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, ___ P.2d ___, 1999 WL 262102 (Wyo. 
May 4, 1999) at *1.

  

2 §§ 
27-14-616. Medical commission; hearing panels; creation; membership; duties; 
rulemaking.

 

(a) The 
medical commission is created to consist of eleven (11) health care providers 
appointed by the governor as follows: . . .

 

    (b) . . . The duties of the 
commission shall be: . . .

 

(iv) To 
furnish three (3) members of the commission to serve as a medical hearing panel 
to hear cases referred for hearing. The division shall refer medically contested 
cases to the commission for hearing by a medical hearing panel. . . . Following 
referral by the division, the hearing examiner or medical hearing panel shall 
have jurisdiction to hear and decide all issues related to the written notice of 
objection filed pursuant to W.S. 27-14-601(k). . . . When hearing a medically 
contested case, the panel shall serve as the hearing examiner and shall have 
exclusive jurisdiction to make the final administrative determination of the 
validity and amount of compensation payable under this 
act.

   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-616 (LEXIS 1999) 
(emphasis added).

   

  3This holding was later modified in 
Neal v. Caballo Rojo, Inc., 899 P.2d 56, 58-59 (Wyo. 1995), where we found 
summary judgments are available in worker's compensation cases. See also Shaffer 
v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 960 P.2d 504, 506 (Wyo. 1998).