Title: STATE v DONEY

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 81-70 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1981 STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, V S . DENNIS VIRGIL DONEY, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Twelfth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of H i l l Honorable B. W. Thomas, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Morrison, E t t i e n and Barron, Havre, Montana Chris R. Young argued, Havre, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana S h e r i Sprigg argued, A s s i s t a n t Attorney General, Helena, Montana Ronald W. Smith, County Attorney, Havre, Montana David R i c e argued, Deputy County Attorney, Havre, Montana Submitted: September 18, 1981 Decided : @ 2 0 ig8f F i l e d :DCT 2 0 1981 M r . J u s t i c e Fred J. Weber d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. A f t e r t r i a l by j u r y , d e f e n d a n t was c o n v i c t e d i n t h e T w e l f t h ~ u d i c i a l District Court, H i l l County, of aggravated a s s a u l t and attempted robbery. H e a p p e a l s t h e c o n v i c t i o n . W e a f f i r m . The f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s are p r e s e n t e d t o t h i s Court f o r review: 1. Whether t h e District Court e r r e d i n denying d e f e n d a n t ' s motion f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t of a c q u i t t a l . 2. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g to over- t u r n t h e j u r y ' s v e r d i c t of n o t g u i l t y of attempted d e l i b e r a t e homicide, b u t g u i l t y of t h e lesser included o f f e n s e of aggravated a s s a u l t and g u i l t y of attempted robbery. 3 . Whether t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g to commit t h e d e f e n d a n t to t h e c u s t o d y of t h e d i r e c t o r of t h e Department of I n s t i t u t i o n s . On February 1 7 1980 s h o r t l y af ter m i d n i g h t , t h r e e per- s o n s e n t e r e d t h e P a r k Hotel i n Havre. One of them, t h e d e f e n d a n t , wearing a l o n g , d a r k coat and a d a r k w e s t e r n h a t , became a b u s i v e to t h e n i g h t c l e r k who s a i d t h e r e were no rooms. H e s t r a d d l e d h e r c h a i r , r e p e a t e d l y pushing h e r down, t h r e a t e n i n g h e r and a c c u s i n g h e r of h a t i n g I n d i a n s . The c l e r k s a i d i f he harmed h e r , t h e p o l i c e would c a t c h him. The d e f e n d a n t r e p l i e d t h a t he could be a c r o s s t h e b o r d e r b e f o r e t h e p o l i c e knew what happened. H e t h e n grabbed t h e n i g h t c l e r k ' s hand and attempted t o remove h e r r i n g ; when he could n o t , he took o u t a p o c k e t k n i f e , t h r e a t e n e d to g e t t h e r i n g by c u t t i n g o f f h e r f i n g e r , and p r e s s e d t h e b l a d e a g a i n s t h e r f i n g e r , l e a v i n g a w h i t e mark. The n i g h t c l e r k f i n a l l y managed to rise whereupon t h e d e f e n d a n t s e i z e d h e r by t h e s h o u l d e r and stabbed h e r once i n t h e abdomen, i n £ l i c t i n g a wound t h a t r e q u i r e d s e v e r a l d a y s 1 h o s p i t a l i z a t i o n . When an e l d e r l y woman approached and o r d e r e d t h e d e f e n d a n t to " L e t t h a t g i r l a l o n e ," he turned toward h e r , and t h e n i g h t c l e r k f l e d . She r e t u r n e d w i t h h e l p , b u t h e r a s s a i l a n t had f l e d . The n i g h t c l e r k r e c a l l e d t h e d e f e n d a n t had worn a "smirky s m i l e " d u r i n g t h e a t t a c k , and o n c e , when she glanced a t h i s e y e s , t h e y appeared " g l a s s y " . The f o l l o w i n g a f t e r n o o n , d e f e n d a n t was a r r e s t e d i n t h e G r e a t F a l l s bus depot and r e t u r n e d to Havre, where he w a s charged w i t h attempted r o b b e r y and attempted d e l i b e r a t e homicide. Defendant i n d i c a t e d h i s i n t e n t i o n to r e l y on t h e d e f e n s e t h a t , due to mental d i s e a s e or d e f e c t , and due to h i s i n t o x i c a t e d and drugged c o n d i t i o n , he was incapable of forming t h e r e q u i s i t e men- t a l s t a t e . H e was s u b s e q u e n t l y t e s t e d and examined by a psycho- l o g i s t and a p s y c h i a t r i s t . T r i a l was held November 20, 1980. Defendant t e s t i f i e d t h a t , i n t h e t h r e e or f o u r days p r i o r to t h e i n c i d e n t , i n G r e a t F a l l s , Harlem and Havre, he had had almost no s l e e p , b u t had been d r i n k i n g s t e a d i l y and i n j e c t i n g "speed". H e a l s o claimed to have smoked one "angel d u s t " , or PCP-soaked, c i g a r e t t e i n H a r l e m t h e a f t e r n o o n preceding t h e i n c i d e n t , while h i s g i r l f r i e n d was i n Dodson. H e claimed to have smoked p a r t of a n o t h e r "angel d u s t " c i g a r e t t e i n Havre w i t h i n a few hours b e f o r e t h e a t t a c k upon t h e n i g h t c l e r k . Defendant t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had no r e c o l l e c t i o n of t h e a t t a c k , or even of being i n t h e P a r k Hotel. H e s a i d he blacked o u t a f t e r l e a v i n g a b a r and came to some t i m e l a t e r , many b l o c k s away. Defendant's g i r l f r i e n d and companion a t t h e t i m e of t h e P a r k Hotel i n c i d e n t c o r r o b o r a t e d h i s testimony to some e x t e n t . She r e c a l l e d t h e s l e e p l e s s days and n i g h t s , t h e heavy d r i n k i n g and t h e consumption of speed and o t h e r drugs. But s h e d i d n o t r e c a l l d e f e n d a n t ' s p o s s e s s i n g o r mentioning PCP; n o r d i d s h e recall going t o Dodson while d e f e n d a n t remained i n Harlem, t h e a f t e r n o o n of February 1 6 , 1980. She d i d recall d e f e n d a n t ' s being " r e a l l y m e l l o w " and "not hyped up" immediately p r i o r to h i s a s s a u l t upon t h e n i g h t c l e r k . She a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t when t h e c l e r k t o l d d e f e n d a n t she had no rooms, he assumed it was because h e was an I n d i a n and asked h e r , a white g i r l , to go i n and a s k i f t h e r e were rooms. It was a f t e r t h e c l e r k t o l d t h e g i r l t h e r e were no rooms t h a t t h e a s s a u l t o c c u r r e d . Defendant's g i r l f r i e n d d i d n o t h e a r him t h r e a t e n t h e n i g h t c l e r k ' s l i f e ; i n d e e d , t h e o n l y person who t e s t i f i e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t had t h r e a t e n e d to k i l l t h e n i g h t c l e r k w a s t h e n i g h t c l e r k h e r s e l f . The p s y c h o l o g i s t , D r . S t i n e f o r d , t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had examined d e f e n d a n t a t f o u r d i f f e r e n t times and a d m i n i s t e r e d s i x tests designed to determine IQ, b r a i n damage and emotional/ p s y c h o l o g i c a l p a t t e r n s and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h e s u b j e c t . The tests i n d i c a t e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t h a s a normal I Q and no a p p a r e n t b r a i n damage, b u t t h a t he does have a tendency toward d e p r e s s i o n , h o s t i l e a c t i n g - o u t of f e e l i n g s , and con£ l i c t with a u t h o r i t y . The r e s u l t s of one test, a s e q u e n t i a l - p i c t u r e - a r r a n g e m e n t test, on which d e f e n d a n t ' s performance was s i g n i f i c a n t l y below average ( 1 7 t h p e r c e n t i l e ) , l e d D r . S t i n e f o r d to conclude t h a t d e f e n d a n t h a s a " s p e c i f i c d e f i c i t " i n a b i l i t y to a n t i c i p a t e t h e consequen- ces of h i s own b e h a v i o r . T h i s d e f i c i t could r e s u l t i n d e f e n d a n t ' s i n a b i l i t y to have a c o n s c i o u s o b j e c t t o engage i n conduct w i t h an understanding of its probable r e s u l t s , par- t i c u l a r l y i n f a i r l y complex s i t u a t i o n s . D r . S t i n e f o r d conceded t h a t h i s c o n c l u s i o n s d i d n o t t a k e i n t o account t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a s e . A s a r e s u l t , D r . S t i n e f o r d d i d n o t e x p r e s s an o p i n i o n as t o whether or n o t t h e d e f e n d a n t was a b l e to a n t i c i p a t e t h e con- sequences of h i s a s s a u l t on t h e h o t e l c l e r k . When asked to e x p r e s s an o p i n i o n on t h e e f f e c t of d r u g s upon t h e a c t i o n s of t h e d e f e n d a n t , D r . S t i n e f o r d admitted t h a t , because of " t h e l a c k of i n f o r m a t i o n about t h e e x a c t d r u g s , t h e amount of d r u g s taken i n t o M r . Doney's p e r s o n , w i t h o u t a blood test and a scan to v e r i f y t h a t h e took any d r u g s a t a l l , a d e f i n i t e o p i n i o n based on s c i e n t i f i c e v i d e n c e , f o r m e , is n o t p o s s i b l e .I1 D r . E a r l e , a p s y c h i a t r i s t who examined d e f e n d a n t , is fami- l i a r w i t h PCP/angel d u s t . H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e d r u g ' s c l i n i c a l u s e as an a n e s t h e t i c was d i s c o n t i n u e d because it sometimes caused sudden, u n p r e d i c t a b l e e p i s o d e s of v i o l e n t and d e s t r u c t i v e b e h a v i o r , d u r i n g which p a t i e n t s could act w i t h o u t a c o n s c i o u s o b j e c t and w i t h o u t awareness of t h e i r conduct. H e concluded t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s b i z a r r e , v i o l e n t conduct and h i s " g l a s s y " e y e s were s u g g e s t i v e of a n g e l d u s t , and t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s t e s t i m o n y coupled w i t h h i s b e h a v i o r i n d i c a t e d a " r e a s o n a b l e p r o b a b i l i t y " t h a t PCP w a s involved. D r . Earle conceded t h a t such b e h a v i o r could also b e r e l a t e d to l a c k of s l e e p , t h e use of a l c o h o l , and an a n t i - s o c i a l p e r s o n a l i t y . H e admitted t h a t he had no test r e s u l t s and no e v i d e n c e o t h e r t h a n d e f e n d a n t ' s t e s t i m o n y and b e h a v i o r to i n d i c a t e t h a t d e f e n d a n t had taken PCP. A f t e r some n e g o t i a t i o n , t h e j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s were a c c e p t e d w i t h o u t o b j e c t i o n by e i t h e r s i d e . Defendant moved f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t of a c q u i t t a l on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t t h e "uncontroverted" e v i d e n c e of d e f e n d a n t ' s mental d e f e c t and drug i n t o x i c a t i o n a t t h e t i m e t h e o f f e n s e was com- m i t t e d showed t h a t d e f e n d a n t was i n c a p a b l e of forming t h e r e q u i s i t e mental state. The c o u r t concluded t h a t t h e r e was suf- f i c i e n t d i s a g r e e m e n t as to d e f e n d a n t ' s mental s t a t e t o j u s t i f y s e n d i n g t h e matter to t h e jury. Defendant t h e n e n t e r e d an o b j e c t i o n to t h e v e r d i c t forms o f f e r e d t o t h e jury. The c o u r t found t h a t t h e j u r y would be ade- q u a t e l y i n s t r u c t e d and t h e v e r d i c t forms would g i v e them t h e p r o p e r a l t e r n a t i v e s to c o n s i d e r . The j u r y found d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y of attempted r o b b e r y and n o t g u i l t y of attempted d e l i b e r a t e homicide, b u t g u i l t y of t h e lesser included o f f e n s e of aggravated a s s a u l t . S u b s e q u e n t l y d e f e n d a n t moved f o r a new t r i a l and a l t e r n a - t i v e l y f o r judgment n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e v e r d i c t . The motions were d e n i e d . Defendant t h e n r e q u e s t e d t h a t t h e c o u r t , i n c o n s i d e r i n g whether to add to t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s s e n t e n c e under t h e p e r s i s t e n t f e l o n y and mandatory minimum s e n t e n c e s t a t u t e s , t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t t h e e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t i n g s i g n i f i c a n t impairment of d e f e n d a n t t s mental c a p a c i t y a t t h e t i m e of t h e commission of t h e crime. The defen- d a n t also r e q u e s t e d t h a t t h e c o u r t commit him because of h i s men- t a l d i s e a s e or d e f e c t , as provided i n s e c t i o n s 46-14-311 and 46-14-3121 MCA. The c o u r t denied d e f e n d a n t ' s r e q u e s t t h a t he be committed. Judgment was e n t e r e d on December 8 , 1980, s e n t e n c i n g defen- d a n t t o t h e Montana S t a t e P r i s o n f o r two ten-year terms to be s e r v e d c o n c u r r e n t l y . The mandatory minimum s e n t e n c e s f o r per- s i s t e n t f e l o n y o f f e n d e r and o f f e n s e i n v o l v i n g use of a dangerous weapon were suspended and withheld r e s p e c t i v e l y p u r s u a n t to t h e p r o v i s i o n s of s e c t i o n 46-18-222( 2 ) , MCA, based upon t h e c o u r t t s f i n d i n g t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s mental c a p a c i t y a t t h e t i m e of t h e commission of t h e o f f e n s e was s i g n i f i c a n t l y impaired a l t h o u g h not so impaired as t o c o n s t i t u t e a d e f e n s e t o t h e p r o s e c u t i o n . Defendant a p p e a l s h i s c o n v i c t i o n and h i s s e n t e n c e to t h i s C o u r t . The f i r s t i s s u e r a i s e d by d e f e n d a n t is whether t h e District Court e r r e d i n denying h i s motion f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t o f a c q u i t t a l . Defendant relies p r i m a r i l y upon s e c t i o n 46-14-102, MCA, which states: "Evidence t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t s u f f e r e d from a mental d i s e a s e or d e f e c t is a d m i s s i b l e whenever it is rele- v a n t to prove t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t d i d or d i d n o t have a state of mind which is an element of t h e o f f e n s e .'I and s e c t i o n 45-2-203, MCA, which states i n r e l e v a n t p a r t : " . . . An i n t o x i c a t e d or drugged c o n d i t i o n may be t a k e n i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a mental state which is an element of t h e o f f e n s e ." Defendant m a i n t a i n s t h a t D r . S t i n e f o r d I s testimony proved defen- d a n t s u f f e r e d from a mental d e f e c t which precluded h i s forming t h e r e q u i s i t e mental state and D r . Earlet s testimony e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t a c t e d under t h e i n f l u e n c e of PCP, w i t h o u t c o n s c i o u s purpose or awareness. According to d e f e n d a n t , when t h e S t a t e r e s t e d its case w i t h o u t answering t h e e x p e r t s o r r e b u t t i n g t h e i r proof of d e f e n d a n t ' s mental d e f e c t and h i s drugged, psycho- t i c s t a t e , it f a i l e d to meet its burden of proving mental state beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt. Defendant a r g u e s t h a t because he r a i s e d a r e a s o n a b l e doubt about mental s t a t e , which was " u n c o n t r o v e r t e d " by f u r t h e r e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d by t h e S t a t e , d e f e n d a n t was e n t i t l e d to a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t of a c q u i t t a l , and t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n denying h i s motion f o r such d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t . W e d i s a g r e e . I n e f f e c t d e f e n d a n t is arguing t h a t t h e judge must make a f a c t u a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n whether t h e S t a t e h a s f a i l e d to prove an element of each of t h e crimes charged beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , and, i f he so f i n d s , t h a t he must t a k e t h e c a s e away from t h e j u r y and a c q u i t t h e d e f e n d a n t . T h i s is n o t t h e l a w i n Montana. T h i s Court h a s r e p e a t e d l y s t a t e d t h a t i n c r i m i n a l cases a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t or motion to d i s m i s s should o n l y be g i v e n where t h e r e is no e v i d e n c e on which a j u r y could base a c o n v i c t i o n . S t a t e v White (1980) Mon t . , 605 P.2d 191, 194-1951 37 St.Rep. 84, 88; S t a t e v. Thompson ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 176 Mont. 150, 155, 576 P.2d 1105, 1108. The d e f e n d a n t is e n t i t l e d to an a c q u i t t a l i f r e a s o n a b l e men could n o t conclude from t h e e v i d e n c e t a k e n i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e to t h e p r o s e c u t i o n t h a t g u i l t h a s been proven beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt. S t a t e v. White Water (Cause N o . 81-112, d e c i d e d October 1 3 , 1 9 8 1 ) ; S t a t e v. Perez ( 1 9 5 2 ) , 126 Mont. 1 5 , 1 8 , 243 P.2d 309, 310-311. The d e c i s i o n whether to g r a n t a motion to d i s m i s s lies w i t h i n t h e sound d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l c o u r t , s e c t i o n 46-16-403, MCA, and w i l l b e d i s t u r b e d on a p p e a l o n l y when abuse of t h a t d i s c r e t i o n is shown. White Water, s u p r a ; S t a t e v. Hart ( 1 9 8 1 ) , Mon t . f 625 P.2d 21, 28, 38 St.Rep. 133, 139; S t a t e v. Smith ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mon t . 609 P.2d 696, 698, 37 St.Rep. 583, 586. Nor is a j u r o r r e q u i r e d t o a c c e p t as t r u e t h e t e s t i m o n y of an e x p e r t , even @ though t h a t t e s t i m o n y is u n r e b u t t e d . The weight to be g i v e n t h e t e s t i m o n y of t h e e x p e r t w i t n e s s , and t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of such t e s t i m o n y is f o r t h e jury. S t a t e v. Hardy ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mon t . I 604 P.2d 792, 796, 37 St.Rep. 1, 5; S t a t e v. OIDonnell ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 159 Mont. 138, 144, 496 P.2d 299, 303. I n t h i s case while both e x p e r t w i t n e s s e s p r e s e n t e d testi- mony which could have l e d t h e j u r y to f i n d t h a t d e f e n d a n t was i n c a p a b l e of forming t h e r e q u i s i t e mental s t a t e , t h e y so q u a l i f i e d t h e i r t e s t i m o n y t h a t t h e j u r y could w e l l have d i s r e - garded it. Both e x p e r t s s t a t e d t h e y had no way of knowing how much PCP or o t h e r d r u g s ( i f any) t h e d e f e n d a n t had i n g e s t e d . D r . S t i n e f o r d d i d n o t state t h a t h i s tests proved d e f e n d a n t was inca- p a b l e of a n t i c i p a t i n g t h e consequences of h i s conduct , o n l y t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t 1 s poor performance i n a s i n g l e picture-sequence- arrangement test i n d i c a t e d t h a t he would p r o b a b l y have d i f f i c u l t y a n t i c i p a t i n g consequences i n complex sequences. D r . Earle a d m i t t e d t h a t any of s e v e r a l o t h e r f a c t o r s i n c l u d i n g s l e e p l e s s n e s s , d r u n k e n n e s s o r an a n t i - s o c i a l d i s p o s i t i o n could have l e d to d e f e n d a n t ' s v i o l e n t o u t b u r s t a g a i n s t t h e n i g h t c l e r k . W e do n o t f i n d t h e q u a l i f i e d and e q u i v o c a l t e s t i m o n y of t h e e x p e r t s w a r r a n t s a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t . N o r was t h a t t e s t i m o n y " u n c o n t r o v e r t e d " as claimed by d e f e n d a n t . There was ample testi- mony from which t h e j u r y could have concluded t h a t d e f e n d a n t had n o t t a k e n PCP o r was n o t e x p e r i e n c i n g a PCP-induced v i o l e n t s p e l l . D e f e n d a n t ' s g i r l f r i e n d could recall no mention of PCP, a1 though s h e seemed to have known a b o u t , even shared , t h e o t h e r d r u g s he had taken. She d i d n o t remember t a k i n g a s i d e t r i p to Dodson and l e a v i n g d e f e n d a n t i n H a r l e m where, a c c o r d i n g to him, h e smoked PCP i n h e r absence. There w a s also e v i d e n c e from which t h e j u r y could have concluded t h a t d e f e n d a n t was f u l l y r a t i o n a l and aware of h i s conduct. The g i r l f r i e n d remembered d e f e n d a n t 1 s a s k i n g - h e r to a s k f o r a room a f t e r he had been r e f u s e d , to see i f t h e c l e r k had denied him a room because he was an I n d i a n . The n i g h t c l e r k r e c a l l e d d e f e n d a n t ' s s a y i n g he could g e t across t h e b o r d e r to Canada b e f o r e t h e p o l i c e knew what had happened. I n l i g h t of t h e obvious material q u e s t i o n s of f a c t which were u n r e s o l v e d , and t h e broad d i s c r e t i o n a r y powers of t h e t r i a l c o u r t , we f i n d t h a t t h e ~ i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e n i a l of d e f e n d a n t ' s motion f o r d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t was e n t i r e l y p r o p e r . The second i s s u e r a i s e d by d e f e n d a n t is whether t h e District Court e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g to o v e r t u r n t h e j u r y ' s v e r d i c t o f n o t g u i l t y of attempted d e l i b e r a t e homicide b u t g u i l t y of t h e lesser included o f f e n s e of aggravated a s s a u l t and g u i l t y of a t t e m p t e d robbery. Defendant a r g u e s t h a t t h e r e w a s n o t s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e s u f f i c i e n t to s u p p o r t t h e j u r y ' s v e r d i c t . H e relies upon t h e claim t h a t because t h e d e f e n d a n t had proven h i s i n a b i l i t y to form t h e n e c e s s a r y mental s t a t e by a preponderance of e v i d e n c e ( i .e., c o n v i n c i n g " u n c o n t r o v e r t e d " e x p e r t t e s t i m o n y ) it was incumbent upon t h e S t a t e t o overcome t h e e v i d e n c e submitted by t h e d e f e n d a n t b y proving h i s s a n i t y o r c a p a c i t y , as w e l l as t h e e x i s t e n c e of m e n t a l state, beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt. I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e , as we have s t a t e d above, t h e e x p e r t e v i d e n c e was n e i t h e r convincing n o r u n c o n t r o v e r t e d ; n o r w a s t h e j u r y r e q u i r e d t o g i v e it more weight t h a n any o t h e r testimony. Defendant s i m p l y d i d n o t c l e a r l y e s t a b l i s h t h a t he s u f f e r e d from a mental d e f e c t or was s o drugged or i n t o x i c a t e d as to be i n c a p a b l e o f forming t h e n e c e s s a r y mental s t a t e . It is f o r t h e j u r y to d e c i d e whether t h e S t a t e h a s proven each of t h e e l e m e n t s of t h e crimes charged beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , u n l e s s t h e r e is no e v i - d e n c e upon which t h e y can base a c o n v i c t i o n , which is c e r t a i n l y n o t t h e case h e r e . I n t h e second p l a c e , t h e j u r y w a s f u l l y i n s t r u c t e d on (1) t h e S t a t e ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to prove each and e v e r y e l e m e n t of each crime charged beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt; ( 2 ) t h e j u r y ' s d u t y t o a c q u i t t h e d e f e n d a n t i f they e n t e r t a i n e d any r e a s o n a b l e doubt upon any f a c t o r e l e m e n t n e c e s s a r y to c o n s t i t u t e t h e crime c h a r g e d ; and ( 3 ) t h e f a c t t h a t no burden of proof or d i s p r o o f w i t h r e s p e c t t o any element of t h e o f f e n s e s charged rests upon t h e d e f e n d a n t . It is s u f f i c i e n t t h a t t h e S t a t e prove beyond a reaso- n a b l e doubt t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h e mental state t h a t is an essen- t i a l e l e m e n t of each of t h e o f f e n s e s charged. I m p l i c i t i n t h e j u r y ' s c o n v i c t i o n is its c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t possessed t h e r e q u i s i t e mental state, and t h e r e f o r e had t h e c a p a c i t y to form t h a t mental state. The S t a t e h a s m e t t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of Montana l a w . C l e a r l y , t h e j u r y decided t h a t , i n l i g h t of a l l t h e e v i d e n c e , t h e S t a t e had m e t its burden of proof as to attempted r o b b e r y and aggravated a s s a u l t b u t n o t attempted d e l i b e r a t e hom ic i d e . The United S t a t e s Supreme Court and t h i s Court have b o t h s t a t e d t h a t a c o n v i c t i o n cannot be o v e r t u r n e d when t h e e v i d e n c e , viewed i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e to t h e p r o s e c u t i o n , would allow any r a t i o n a l trier of f a c t t o f i n d t h e e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t s o f t h e crime beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t . Jackson v. v i r g i n i a (19791, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S e c t . 2781, 2789, 6 1 L.Ed.2d 560, 573. See also S t a t e v. R o d r i p e z ( 1 9 8 1 ) Mon t . , 628 P.2d 280, 283, 38 S t - R e p . 578F1 5781; S t a t e v. Brubaker (1981) Mont . 625 P.2d 78, 8 1 , 38 St.Rep. 432, 436. On appeal t h i s C o u r t views t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e to t h e pre- v a i l i n g p a r t y ( t h e S t a t e ) i n t h e District Court, S t a t e v. Pascgo ( 1 9 7 7 ) t 1 7 3 Mont. 121, 125, 566 P.2d 802, 805. W e f i n d t h a t t h e r e w a s s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e , f u l l y sup- p o r t e d by adequate i n s t r u c t i o n s , f o r t h e j u r y r e a s o n a b l y to con- v i c t t h e d e f e n d a n t . The second r e a s o n d e f e n d a n t g i v e s i n s u p p o r t of its charge t h a t t h e District Court e r r e d i n denying a judgment not- w i t h s t a n d i n g v e r d i c t o r , a l t e r n a t i v e l y , a new t r i a l , is t h a t t h e v e r d icts are incons is t e n t , i r r e c o n c i l a b l e and c o n t r a r y to l a w . Defendant m a i n t a i n s t h a t t h e o n l y p o s s i b l e r e a s o n f o r a c q u i t t a l on t h e charge of attempted d e l i b e r a t e homicide w a s t h e j u r y ' s f i n d i n g t h a t due t o mental d i s e a s e or d e f e c t , and h i s drugged, i n t o x i c a t e d c o n d i t i o n , d e f e n d a n t was i n c a p a b l e of forming t h e mental s t a t e , proof of which is e s s e n t i a l to c o n v i c t i o n . According to d e f e n d a n t , t h i s f i n d i n g should p r e c l u d e c o n v i c t i o n of aggravated a s s a u l t and attempted robbery s i n c e a1 1 t h e acts o c c u r r e d d u r i n g t h e time t h a t d e f e n d a n t was drugged, and h i s mental d e f e c t is a c o n t i n u i n g d i s a b i l i t y . The q u e s t i o n of i n c o n s i s t e n c y of v e r d i c t s is complicated b y t h e c o u r t 1 s r e f u s a l ( o v e r d e f e n d a n t ' s o b j e c t i o n ) of a v e r d i c t form which s t a t e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t was found n o t g u i l t y of a t t e m p t e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide due to mental d i s e a s e or d e f e c t , b u t was found g u i l t y of t h e lesser included o f f e n s e of aggravated - a s s a u l t . Defendant had argued t h a t , w i t h o u t t h i s v e r d i c t form, i f t h e j u r y a c q u i t t e d d e f e n d a n t of attempted d e l i b e r a t e homicide b u t c o n v i c t e d him of t h e lesser included o f f e n s e of aggravated a s s a u l t ( a s u l t i m a t e l y t h e y d i d ) t h e r e would be no way of knowing t h e r e a s o n f o r t h e a c q u i t t a l . S e c t i o n 46-14-201(2), MCA, p r o v i d e s : "When t h e d e f e n d a n t is a c q u i t t e d on t h e ground t h a t due to a mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t he could n o t have a p a r t i c u l a r state of mind t h a t is an e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t o f t h e o f f e n s e charged, t h e v e r d i c t and t h e judgment s h a l l so s t a t e . " Defendant now a r g u e s t h a t h i s proof of i r r e c o n c i l a b l e v e r d i c t s is hampered by h i s and t h e c o u r t ' s ignorance of t h e r e a s o n f o r t h e v e r d i c t of n o t g u i l t y of d e l i b e r a t e homicide, and t h e r e f o r e t h e District Court e r r e d i n denying d e f e n d a n t 1 s motion for judgment n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g v e r d i c t or, a l t e r n a t i v e l y , f o r a new t r i a l . W e a g r e e w i t h d e f e n d a n t t h a t t h e j u r y ' s r e a s o n s f o r f i n d i n g d e f e n d a n t n o t g u i l t y of attempted d e l i b e r a t e homicide m i g h t have been clearer had t h e above v e r d i c t form been included w i t h t h e o t h e r s . W e do n o t a g r e e t h a t its m i s s i o n p r e j u d i c e s t h e d e f e n d a n t so as to r e q u i r e t h e District Court judge t o over- t u r n t h e j u r y ' s v e r d i c t or g r a n t a new t r i a l . "The test f o r d e c l a r i n g a mistrial was s t a t e d by t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court i n u n i t e d S t a t e s v. Perez ( 1 8 2 4 ) , 22 U.S. ( 9 Wheat.) 579, 580, 6 L.Ed 165: " ' t h e law h a s i n v e s t e d C o u r t s of j u s t i c e w i t h t h e a u t h o r i t y to d i s c h a r g e a j u r y from g i v i n g any v e r d i c t , whenever, i n t h e i r o p i n i o n , t a k i n g a l l t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n , t h e r e is a m a n i f e s t n e c e s s i t y f o r t h e act, o r t h e e n d s of p u b l i c j u s t i c e would o t h e r w i s e be d e f e a t e d . They are to e x e r c i s e a sound d i s c r e t i o n on t h e s u b j e c t . . . [Tlhe power o u g h t t o be used w i t h t h e g r e a t e s t c a u t i o n , under u r g e n t c i r c u m s t a n c e s , and f o r v e r y p l a i n and o b v i o u s c a u s e s ; . . . I 11 S t a t e v. Close ( 1 9 8 1 ) , Mont. I 623 P.2d 940, 945-46, 38 St.Rep. 177, 1 8 3 . Our f u n c t i o n on a p p e a l is to d e t e r m i n e whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t abused its d i s c r e t i o n i n n o t g r a n t i n g a mistrial. United S t a t e s v . J o r n (19711, 400 U.S. 470, 9 1 S.Ct. 547, 27 L.Ed.2d 543; S t a t e v . Close, 623 P.2d a t 946, 38 St.Rep. a t 183. I f t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s r e a s o n a b l y j u s t i f y t h e v e r d i c t , t h i s C o u r t must assume t h e e x i s t e n c e of e v e r y f a c t which t h e j u r y r e a s o n a b l y could have deduced from a l l t h e e v i d e n c e . S t a t e v. Meader ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mon t . 601 P.2d 386, 392, 36 St.Rep. 1747, 1755. Here, t h e v e r d i c t of n o t g u i l t y of attempted d e l i b e r a t e homicide could have r e s u l t e d from t h e f a i l u r e of t h e S t a t e to make its proof as w e l l as from t h e s u c c e s s of t h e d e f e n s e of mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t . N o one b u t t h e n i g h t c l e r k t e s t i f i e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t t h r e a t e n e d h e r l i f e ; indeed d e f e n d a n t ' s g i r l f r i e n d and t h e e l d e r l y l a d y both t e s t i f i e d to n o t h e a r i n g such a t h r e a t . The k n i f e was small, t h e wound n o t major. The j u r y r e a s o n a b l y c o u l d have concluded t h e S t a t e proved beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt t h a t d e f e n d a n t meant to f r i g h t e n and i n j u r e t h e n i g h t c l e r k , b u t n o t t h a t he meant to k i l l h e r . I n a d d i t i o n , even i f t h e j u r y d i d f i n d d e f e n d a n t n o t g u i l t y o f attempted d e l i b e r a t e homicide due to mental d i s e a s e or d e f e c t , t h e v e r d i c t s are n o t n e c e s s a r i l y i n c o n s i s t e n t , f o r t h e j u r y could have b e l i e v e d d e f e n d a n t c a p a b l e of a n t i c i p a t i n g t h a t h i s a c t i o n s would c a u s e f e a r and i n j u r y , b u t i n c a p a b l e of a n t i c i p a t i n g t h a t t h e y m i g h t cause d e a t h . There is case l a w i n Montana which, while based on e a r l i e r l a w , is r e l e v a n t to t h e q u e s t i o n whether a j u r y could r e a s o n a b l y have concluded d e f e n d a n t was precluded by mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t from f o r m u l a t i n g a c o n s c i o u s purpose to k i l l , y e t was s t i l l c a p a b l e of f o r m u l a t i n g a c o n s c i o u s purpose to f r i g h t e n or i n j u r e . I n S t a t e v. McKenzie ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mon t . I 608 P.2d 428, 453, 37 St.Rep. 325, 351, t h i s Court s t a t e d : "The p r e s c r i b e d mental state of ' p u r p o s e l y or knowinglyv a p p l i e s to each element of t h e crime of d e l i b e r a t e homicide. S e c t i o n 94-2-103(1) and ( 2 ) R.C.M. 1947. To be g u i l t y of d e l i b e r a t e homicide, t h e r e f o r e , one must e i t h e r have t h e purpose to k i l l or know t h a t it was h i g h l y p r o b a b l e t h a t h i s a c t i o n s would r e s u l t i n t h e d e a t h of a n o t h e r human being. While l e g a l i n s a n i t y would have c o m p l e t e l y exonerated d e f e n d a n t from r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r h i s c r i m i n a l c o n d u c t , t h e diminished c a p a c i t y d e f e n s e could be used i n a c r i m i n a l homicide case to show, f o r example . . . t h a t a l t h o u g h d e f e n d a n t knew t h e n a t u r e and q u a l i t y of t h e act ( t h e a s s a u l t . . .) and knew t h a t it was wrongv and so w a s n o t i r r e s p o n s i b l e under t h e l e g a l i n s a n i t y test, 'he lacked mental c a p a c i t y to form t h e i n t e n t to k i l l . . . A d e f e n d a n t t h e n , due t o m e n t a l d i s e a s e or d e f e c t p r e c i u d i n g him from f o r - -- Z n g t h e i n t e n t t o c o m m i t c r i m i n a l homicide, mlght b e -- found g u i l t y -- o f t h e - r i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e o f - rG v a t e d a s s a u l t . S e e , S t a t e v. Booth ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 30 0r.App. 351, 567 P.2d 559, 561-62." (Emphasis added. ) W e are u n w i l l i n g to second-guess t h e j u r y i n t h e s e f a c t u a l matters. There w a s ample e v i d e n c e to s u p p o r t any of s e v e r a l f i n - d i n g s which would have r e s u l t e d i n t h e v e r d i c t r e n d e r e d , w i t h o u t i n c o n s i s t e n c y . The District Court d i d n o t abuse its d i s c r e t i o n i n denying d e f e n d a n t v s motion f o r judgment n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g ver- d i c t o r , a l t e r n a t i v e l y , f o r a new t r i a l . The t h i r d i s s u e is whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g to c o m m i t t h e d e f e n d a n t to t h e c u s t o d y of t h e d i r e c t o r o f t h e Department of I n s t i t u t i o n s . The s t a t u t e s governing c o n v i c t i o n and s e n t e n c i n g r e f e r to s e v e r a l l e v e l s of mental impairment, each of which allows f o r d i f f e r e n t t r e a t m e n t of a d e f e n d a n t . Because t h e s e s t a t u t e s are e a s i l y confused i n t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n , and because t h i s case i n v o l v e s c o n s i d e r a t i o n of s e v e r a l of them, we w i l l d i s c u s s them now: 1) A d e f e n d a n t who was demonstrably and i n c o n t e s t a b l y i n c a p a b l e of having t h e mental s t a t e which is an element of t h e o f f e n s e charged, whether because of mental d i s e a s e or d e f e c t ( s e c t i o n 46-14-1021 MCA) or because of h i s i n t o x i c a t e d o r drugged c o n d i t i o n ( s e c t i o n 45-2-203, MCA) , may n o t be c o n v i c t e d of t h e o f f e n s e charged. The S t a t e h a s f a i l e d to prove t h e e x i s t e n c e of m e n t a l s t a t e beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t . A d e f e n d a n t who is a c q u i t t e d on t h e ground t h a t , due to a m e n t a l d i s e a s e or d e f e c t , he could n o t have a mental s t a t e which is an e s s e n t i a l element of t h e o f f e n s e c h a r g e d , s h a l l be com- m i t t e d by c o u r t o r d e r to t h e c u s t o d y of t h e s u p e r i n t e n d e n t of W a r m S p r i n g s S t a t e H o s p i t a l . S e c t i o n 46-14-301, MCA. T h i s s e c t i o n , which is mandatory i n wording, d o e s n o t i n d i c a t e what t h e c o u r t must do when a d e f e n d a n t charged w i t h s e v e r a l crimes is a c q u i t t e d of one o r more crimes due to mental d i s e a s e or d e f e c t , b u t is c o n v i c t e d of one or more crimes p u n i s h a b l e by imprisonment. I f we conclude t h a t e v e r y p a r t i a l a c q u i t t a l a t t r i - b u t a b l e to mental d i s e a s e or d e f e c t mandates commitment t o W a r m S p r i n g s , t r i a l judges soon w i l l be c a u g h t between s t a t u t e s man- d a t i n g commitment and t h o s e mandating imprisonment, when b o t h are a p p l i c a b l e . The l e g i s l a t u r e could n o t have intended to create s u c h a dilemma. T h e r e f o r e , " a c q u i t t a l " w i t h i n t h e meaning of s e c t i o n 46-14-301, MCA, must mean t o t a l a c q u i t t a l , such t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t would be r e l e a s e d b u t f o r t h e commitment p r o v i s i o n t h e r e i n . 2 ) A f t e r a d e f e n d a n t h a s been c o n v i c t e d , he may s e e k com- mitment to t h e c u s t o d y of t h e d i r e c t o r of t h e Department of I n s t i t u t i o n s f o r a d e f i n i t e p e r i o d of t i m e n o t to exceed t h e maximum p r i s o n s e n t e n c e he could have r e c e i v e d . Before such com- mitment w i l l be o r d e r e d , d e f e n d a n t must prove to t h e s a t i s f a c - t i o n of t h e s e n t e n c i n g c o u r t t h a t " a t t h e t i m e of t h e commission of t h e o f f e n s e of which he was c o n v i c t e d he was s u f f e r i n g from a m e n t a l d i s e a s e or d e f e c t which rendered him unable to a p p r e c i a t e t h e c r i m i n a l i t y of h i s conduct o r to conform h i s conduct to t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of l a w . " S e c t i o n s 46-14-311 and 46-14-312, MCA. The s e n t e n c i n g judge is n o t l i m i t e d t o a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of e v i - d e n c e p r e s e n t e d a t t h e t r i a l . A d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e e x i s t e n c e o f mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t under t h e s e s e c t i o n s rests w i t h i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e s e n t e n c i n g judge. I f t h e mental d i s e a s e or d e f e c t d e s c r i b e d i n s e c t i o n 46-14-311, MCA, is found, t h e judge must o r d e r t h e commitment d e s c r i b e d i n s e c t i o n 46-14-312(2). Such a f i n d i n g and s u b s e q u e n t commitment a f f e c t s s e n t e n c i n g o n l y , not c o n v i c t i o n ; it i n v o l v e s a s t a n d a r d of impairment and c o n s i d e r a t i o n of e v i d e n c e which are or may be d i f f e r e n t from t h o s e involved i n t h e c o n v i c t i o n . S e c t i o n 46-14-312(1) 1 MCA, p r o v i d e s t h a t i f t h e mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t d e s c r i b e d i n s e c t i o n 46-14-311, MCA, is n o t found by t h e s e n t e n c i n g judge, d e f e n d a n t s h a l l be sentenced a s provided i n T i t l e 46, c h a p t e r 18. 3 ) A f t e r d e f e n d a n t h a s been found n o t to s u f f e r from a m e n t a l d i s e a s e or d e f e c t , t h e e x i s t e n c e of which would have r e s u l t e d i n h i s commitment, under s e c t i o n 46-14-312, MCA, t h e c o u r t may still c o n s i d e r whether d e f e n d a n t ' s mental c a p a c i t y a t t h e t i m e of t h e commission of t h e o f f e n s e was so " s i g n i f i c a n t l y impaired" as t o b r i n g him w i t h i n t h e e x c e p t i o n to mandatory mini- mum s e n t e n c i n g p r o v i s i o n s i n s e c t i o n 46-18-222. The d e g r e e of impairment contemplated i n t h i s s e c t i o n is n o t s i g n i f i c a n t enough t o c o n s t i t u t e a d e f e n s e to t h e p r o s e c u t i o n , or to r e q u i r e c o m m i t - ment to t h e c u s t o d y of t h e Department of I n s t i t u t i o n s . It is to b e c o n s i d e r e d s e p a r a t e l y from c o n v i c t i o n and from any claims made under s e c t i o n s 46-14-311 and 46-14-312, MCA. It is o n l y a p p l i - c a b l e to b r i n g a c o n v i c t e d d e f e n d a n t under t h e e x c e p t i o n s set f o r t h i n s e c t i o n 46-18-222, MCA. I n t h e case a t b a r , t h e j u r y found t h a t t h e S t a t e had pro- ven beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h e mental states n e c e s s a r y to a c o n v i c t i o n of aggravated a s s a u l t and a c o n v i c t i o n o f attempted robbery. Defendant a r g u e s t h a t , because t h e v e r d i c t o f n o t g u i l t y of attempted d e l i b e r a t e homicide must have been due t o t h e j u r y ' s d e c i d i n g t h a t d e f e n d a n t s u f f e r e d from a mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t , d e f e n d a n t must be committed under s e c t i o n 46-14-301(1), MCA. A s w e have s t a t e d above, t h e r e is ample c r e d i b l e e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e n o t g u i l t y v e r d i c t f o r r e a s o n s o t h e r t h a n mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t . Furthermore, d e f e n d a n t w a s - n o t a c q u i t t e d w i t h i n t h e meaning of s e c t i o n 46-14-301(1), MCA; he w a s c o n v i c t e d o f a lesser included o f f e n s e , aggravated a s s a u l t , and a s e p a r a t e o f f e n s e , a t t e m p t e d robbery. S e c t i o n 46-14-301(1), MCA, r e f e r s t o total a c q u i t t a l due t o mental d i s e a s e or d e f e c t . Its purpose is t o p r e v e n t t h e immediate release i n t o s o c i e t y of d e f e n d a n t s who pose a t h r e a t to themselves or o t h e r s p e r h a p s because of t h e v e r y m e n t a l d i s e a s e or d e f e c t which n e c e s s i t a t e d t h e i r a c q u i t t a l . S e c t i o n 46-14-301(1), MCA, d o e s n o t mandate d e f e n d a n t ' s commit- ment to t h e s u p e r i n t e n d e n t of W a r m S p r i n g s under t h e circumstan- ces of t h i s case. Defendant m a i n t a i n s t h a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g judge e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s r e q u e s t t h a t he be committed to t h e c u s t o d y o f t h e d i r e c t o r of t h e Department of I n s t i t u t i o n s p u r s u a n t to t h e p r o v i s i o n s of s e c t i o n s 46-14-311 and 46-14-312, MCA. There is no merit i n d e f e n d a n t ' s p o s i t i o n . It is t r u e t h a t , i f t h e judge had found t h a t d e f e n d a n t s u f f e r e d from a mental disease or d e f e c t w i t h i n t h e meaning of s e c t i o n 46-14-311, MCA, he would have been r e q u i r e d to c o m m i t d e f e n d a n t to t h e c u s t o d y of t h e d i r e c t o r of t h e Department of I n s t i t u t i o n s . But t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n whether d e f e n d a n t does s u f f e r from such mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t l i e s w i t h i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e s e n t e n c i n g judge, a f t e r h i s eva- l u a t i o n of t h e t r i a l e v i d e n c e and any o t h e r e v i d e n c e he may deem n e c e s s a r y . The s e n t e n c i n g judge was n o t persuaded t h a t d e f e n d a n t s u f f e r e d from a mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t w i t h i n t h e meaning of s e c t i o n 46-14-311, MCA. H e a c t e d w e l l w i t h i n h i s d i s c r e t i o n i n denying d e f e n d a n t ' s r e q u e s t t h a t he be committed p u r s u a n t to sec- t i o n 46-14-312(2), MCA. The t r i a l judge was n o t i n e r r o r i n denying d e f e n d a n t ' s r e q u e s t t h a t he be committed r a t h e r t h a n imprisoned. Af f irmed . W e concur: Chief J u s t i c e M r . J u s t i c e John C. Sheehy: I c o n c u r i n t h e r e s u l t .