Title: State v. Moore

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed:  July 11, 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Petitioner on Review,
	v.
ROBERT MOORE, III,
Respondent on Review.
(CC 9612-49561; CA A96947; SC S46609)
	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted November 3, 2000.
	Jonathan H. Fussner, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause for petitioner on review.  With him on the
briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D.
Reynolds, Solicitor General.
	Robin A. Jones, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the
cause for respondent on review.  With her on the briefs was David
E. Groom, State Public Defender.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
and Riggs, Justices.**
	DURHAM, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
	*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Clifford L. Freeman, Judge. 159 Or App 144, 978 P2d 395 (1999).
	**Van Hoomissen, J., retired on December 31, 2000, and did
not participate in the decision of this case; Kulongoski, J.,
resigned June 14, 2001, and did not participate in the decision
of this case; De Muniz and Balmer, JJ., did not participate in
the consideration or decision of this case.
	DURHAM, J.
A Multnomah County jury convicted defendant of assault
in the fourth degree, ORS 163.160, (1) and three counts of
recklessly endangering another person, ORS 163.195. (2)  Defendant
appealed, arguing that the trial court's decision to admit
hearsay statements made by a witness who did not testify at trial
violated defendant's right to "meet the witnesses face to face"
under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, (3) and his
right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him" under the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (4)  Reviewing
the case en banc the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that,
under this court's case law, the hearsay evidence was
inadmissible because the state had failed to produce the
declarant or demonstrate that she was unavailable to testify. 
State v. Moore, 159 Or App 144, 150-51, 978 P2d 395 (1999).  
	The state petitioned for review.  The state concedes
that the Court of Appeals correctly applied this court's existing
case law under Article I, section 11, but asks this court to
reexamine and discard the "unavailability" requirement in that
precedent in light of recent United States Supreme Court
decisions and other policy arguments.  Because the state has not
demonstrated that this court's previous decisions incorrectly
interpret Oregon constitutional law, we decline to abandon the
unavailability rule described in those decisions.  Accordingly,
we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
	The record discloses the following facts.  On Christmas
Day 1996, defendant, his fiancé, Olea, their daughter, and
defendant's daughter from a previous marriage traveled from
Tualatin to Gresham to visit defendant's ex-wife.  Olea drove the
car, and defendant, who had been drinking, rode in the back seat
with the children.  Defendant and Olea were arguing.  
	What happened next is the factual issue in the case. 
Olea did not testify at trial.  The only direct testimony from an
eyewitness was defendant's testimony.  According to defendant,
Olea pulled into a convenience store parking lot, and defendant
tried to grab the car keys.  Defendant testified that he
accidentally hit Olea in the face with his elbow.  Olea then
jumped out of the moving vehicle.  Defendant tried to climb into
the front seat to stop the vehicle, and the vehicle came to rest
in a landscaped island in the parking lot.  A man pulled
defendant from the vehicle, and two men held defendant to the
ground until the police arrived.  
	The state alleged that defendant had assaulted Olea
while she was driving, thus endangering the passengers in the
car.  Three witnesses testified in court for the prosecution.  As
noted, Olea was not one of them.  Deborah Narro stated that Olea
ran into the store, crying, shaking, and shouting, "He's taking
my kids, and he's been drinking."  Olea had a red mark on her
face, Ms. Narro testified.  Jose Narro described the same
incident and observations.  Mr. Narro testified that he
approached defendant as defendant stepped out of the car. 
According to Mr. Narro, defendant tried to hit him, and Mr. Narro
and another man pinned defendant to the ground until Officer
Hucke of the Gresham Police Department arrived.
	Officer Hucke testified that, when he arrived at the
scene, defendant was intoxicated.  Hucke placed defendant in his
patrol car and interviewed Olea inside the store.  He noted that
Olea was "extremely distraught" and that there was a red mark on
her face near her eye.  Hucke also testified that Olea told him
that she had been driving when she was struck with a Christmas
package and that, at some point, she also had been punched.
	At the pretrial hearing on his motion in limine, and
again at trial, defendant objected to admission of Olea's hearsay
statements, arguing that (1) at least some of the statements did
not qualify for admission under OEC 803(2) (5) (the excited
utterance exception to the hearsay rule); and (2) admission of
the hearsay evidence would violate defendant's right to
confrontation under the state and federal constitutions because
the state had not produced the witness or demonstrated that she
was unavailable to testify.  The state conceded that it had not
attempted to establish that Olea was unavailable, but argued that
it did not need to make that showing.  The trial court agreed
with the state and admitted the statements under OEC 803(2). 
	Defendant appealed, raising the same arguments. 
Because the constitutional issue disposed of all the disputed
hearsay statements, the Court of Appeals began with that issue. 
State v. Moore, 159 Or App at 147-48.  The majority concluded
that this court's case law -- specifically State v. Campbell, 299
Or 633, 705 P2d 694 (1985), and State v. Kitzman, 323 Or 589, 920
P2d 134 (1996) -- required the state to demonstrate the witness's
unavailability.  Id. at 150.  Because the state had failed to
show that Olea was not available to testify at trial, the Court
of Appeals held that the trial court had erred in admitting the
hearsay statements.  Id. at 150-51.  Two judges dissented,
arguing that the Court of Appeals was not bound by Campbell and
its progeny because Campbell was based on an incorrect
interpretation of federal law.  Id. at 151.  We allowed the
state's petition for review to address the unavailability
requirement discussed in Campbell.
	Campbell concerned the admissibility of hearsay
statements reported by the mother of a three-year-old declarant
who was the alleged victim of sexual abuse.  299 Or at 635.  The
trial court allowed the mother to repeat statements that her
daughter had made regarding the alleged abuse and admitted the
statements under OEC 803(24), the residual hearsay exception. 
The child did not testify, and the state did not demonstrate that
the child was unavailable to testify.  Although this court held
that some of the statements were admissible under OEC 803(18a),
the exception for complaints of sexual misconduct, the court
reversed, stating: 
	"[B]efore any out-of-court declaration of any available
living witness may be offered against a defendant in a
criminal trial, the witness must be produced and
declared incompetent by the court to satisfy either
Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, or
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution." 
Id. at 652 (footnote omitted).
	The court reached that result under Article I, section
11, on "independent and separate state grounds."  Id. at 648. 
However, the court applied the two-part test that the United
States Supreme Court had enunciated in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 US
56, 100 S Ct 2531, 65 L Ed 2d 597 (1980).  299 Or at 648.  In
Ohio v. Roberts, the Supreme Court stated:
"The Confrontation Clause operates in two separate
ways to restrict the range of admissible hearsay. 
First, in conformity with the Framers' preference for
face-to-face accusation, the Sixth Amendment
establishes a rule of necessity.  In the usual case   
* * *, the prosecution must either produce, or
demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose
statement it wishes to use against the defendant. * * *
"The second aspect operates once a witness is
shown to be unavailable. * * * [T]he Clause
countenances only hearsay marked with such
trustworthiness that 'there is no material departure
from the reason of the general rule.' * * * 
"The Court has applied this 'indicia of
reliability' requirement principally by concluding that
certain hearsay exceptions rest upon such solid
foundations that admission of virtually any evidence
within them comports with the 'substance of the
constitutional protection.' * * *
"In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present
for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation
Clause normally requires a showing that he is
unavailable.  Even then, his statement is admissible
only if it bears adequate 'indicia of reliability.' 
Reliability can be inferred without more in a case
where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception.  In other cases, the evidence must be
excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness."
Id. at 65-66 (citations and footnotes omitted).  In Campbell,
this court "adopt[ed] the reasoning of the Supreme Court of the
United States in determining what constitutes unavailability of a
hearsay declarant and what constitutes adequate indicia of
reliability of hearsay declarations to satisfy our state
constitutional confrontation clause."  299 Or at 648. (6)  Applying
that two-part test in Campbell, the court concluded that the
state had violated the defendant's right to meet the witness face
to face because the state had not demonstrated that the declarant
was unavailable or incompetent to testify.  Id. at 651-52.
		Since Campbell, this court has continued to apply that
two-part test when a defendant alleges that the admission of
hearsay violates his or her right to meet a witness face to face
under Article I, section 11.  See State v. Kitzman, 323 Or at
602-05 (exception for complaints of sexual misconduct; holding
that defendant had right to confront witnesses at pretrial
availability hearing); State v. Wilson, 323 Or 498, 514, 918 P2d
826 (1996) (penal interest exception; declarant unavailable
because declarant asserted constitutional right not to testify
against himself); State v. Nielsen, 316 Or 611, 622-24, 853 P2d
256 (1993) (penal interest exception; finding declarant
unavailable because state had demonstrated good-faith but
unsuccessful effort to obtain declarant's testimony); State v.
Barkley, 315 Or 420, 429-31, 846 P2d 390 (1993) (exception for
statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment;
"'unavailability' prong" of test was not barrier to admission of
evidence, because declarant had testified at trial, under oath,
subject to cross-examination); State v. Cornell, 314 Or 673, 682,
842 P2d 394 (1992) (exception for coconspirator statements;
coconspirator was unavailable because he had asserted his right
not to testify against himself); State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119,
138-42, 806 P2d 92 (1991) (exceptions for complaints of sexual
misconduct and statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis
or treatment; record supported court's finding that declarants
were incompetent to testify and that state had made good faith
effort to obtain declarants' testimony); State v. Moen, 309 Or
45, 62, 786 P2d 111 (1990) (exceptions for statements made for
purposes of medical treatment and excited utterance; declarant
was unavailable because she was murder victim).  The evidentiary
rules that applied in Barkley, Cornell, Stevens (medical
treatment exception), and Moen did not require the declarant to
be unavailable to render the hearsay admissible.  This court,
however, still required the state to demonstrate unavailability,
consistent with the two-part test described in Campbell.
		After Roberts, the United States Supreme Court modified
its Confrontation Clause analysis.  In United States v. Inadi,
475 US 387, 106 S Ct 1121, 89 L Ed 2d 390 (1986), the Court held
that the Sixth Amendment did not require the government to show
that a nontestifying coconspirator was unavailable before the
court could admit the coconspirator's out-of-court statements. 
The Court stated that Roberts had not established a general
Confrontation Clause test and limited the unavailability rule
described in Roberts to the hearsay exception applicable in that
case -- the exception for admission of prior testimony.  Id. at
392-94.
		Six years later, in White v. Illinois, 502 US 346, 112
S Ct 736, 116 L Ed 2d 848 (1992), the United States Supreme Court
held that the prosecution need not produce or demonstrate the
unavailability of a declarant whose statements are admissible
under the spontaneous declaration and medical examination
exceptions to the hearsay rule.  The Court explained that:  
		"[In Roberts], we used language that might suggest
that the Confrontation Clause generally requires that a
declarant either be produced at trial or be found
unavailable before his out-of-court statement may be
admitted into evidence.  However, we think such an
expansive reading of the Clause is negated by our
subsequent decision in Inadi * * *." 
Id. at 353.  "[W]here proffered hearsay has sufficient guarantees
of reliability to come within a firmly rooted exception to the
hearsay rule," the Court concluded, "the Confrontation Clause is
satisfied."  Id. at 356.
	This court has noted the United States Supreme Court's
departure from Roberts, but has continued to apply the two-part
test from Roberts to its analysis of confrontation issues under
Article I, section 11.  See e.g., Barkley, 315 Or at 429-31
(examining availability of declarant in course of Article I,
section 11, analysis, but noting that, under White, Sixth
Amendment does not require unavailability); Cornell, 314 Or at
682, 682 n 15 (noting that, under Sixth Amendment, state need not 
demonstrate unavailability before introducing coconspirator
statements, but examining unavailability under Article I, section
11).
This court ordinarily determines whether it can resolve
a case on a subconstitutional basis before undertaking any
constitutional analysis.  See Leo v. Keisling, 327 Or 556, 560,
964 P2d 1023 (1998) (stating that court considers
subconstitutional bases for decision before addressing
constitutional issues).  In this case, however, defendant
concedes that some of the hearsay testimony would be admissible
under OEC 803(2), if not for the confrontation problem.  We agree
and, therefore, proceed to consider the state constitutional
issue.  See State v. Kennedy, 295 Or 260, 262, 666 P2d 1316
(1983) (stating that court analyzes state constitutional claims
before considering federal constitutional claims). (7)  
	In Campbell, this court held that Article I, section
11, requires the state to produce available witnesses before the
state may use the witnesses' out-of-court statements in a
criminal proceeding.  This court adopted the United States
Supreme Court's reasoning regarding the purposes and values
protected by the confrontation right, as reflected in the United
States Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause case law up to that
point.  "[O]n independent and separate state grounds," this court
implicitly concluded that Article I, section 11, reflected those
same purposes and values.  Campbell, 299 Or at 648. 
Consequently, this court applied the same two-part test 
including the unavailability requirement  that the United
States Supreme Court applied in Roberts. 
	The state acknowledges that this court's interpretation
of Article I, section 11, does not change simply because the
United States Supreme Court has modified its interpretation of a
corresponding provision of the federal constitution.  See State
v. Caraher, 293 Or 741, 749, 653 P2d 942 (1982) ("When this court
gives Oregon law an interpretation corresponding to a federal
opinion, our decision remains the Oregon law even when federal
doctrine later changes.").  Instead, the state argues that the
court should align the Oregon rule with the federal rule because
there are no reasons unique to Oregon for departing from the
federal interpretation, and the federal rule, in the state's
view, is preferable from a policy standpoint because it focuses
on the reliability of trial evidence. 
	This court has stated that it remains "willing to
reconsider a previous ruling under the Oregon Constitution
whenever a party presents to us a principled argument suggesting
that, in an earlier decision, this court wrongly considered or
wrongly decided the issue in question."  Stranahan v. Fred Meyer,
Inc., 331 Or 38, 54, 11 P3d 228 (2000).  More specifically, the
court will entertain arguments "that either present new
information as to the meaning of the constitutional provision at
issue or that demonstrate some failure on the part of this court
at the time of the earlier decision to follow its usual paradigm
for considering and construing the meaning of the provision in
question."  Id.  In this case, the state asserts that the court
wrongly considered the issue because the court did not
independently examine the text, context, or history of the Oregon
provision when it adopted the unavailability rule and that the
court wrongly decided the issue because the current federal rule
is the "better" rule.
	We are not persuaded that this court's analysis and
conclusion in Campbell is flawed for the reasons that the state
asserts.  In considering the state's claims, we bear in mind this
court's methodology for constitutional interpretation.  See
Priest v. Pearce, 314 Or 411, 415-16, 840 P2d 65 (1992)
(explaining that interpretation of original constitutional
provision requires examination of wording of provision,
historical circumstances that led to its creation, and case law
concerning provision).
	First, the court in Campbell, in discussing Roberts,
noted that courts do not read the wording of the federal
Confrontation Clause literally.  Campbell, 299 Or at 648.  Such a
reading would exclude all out-of-court statements made by
declarants who are not available at trial, and courts
historically have concluded that the framers did not intend that
result.  Campbell, 299 Or at 648.  This court applied the same
non-literal interpretation of the text of Article I, section 11,
in Campbell and in the court's previous Article I, section 11,
cases, which we discuss below.
	Second, as noted above, the court in Campbell
implicitly agreed with the United States Supreme Court's
evaluation of the historical purposes and values embodied in the
confrontation right, which the Roberts two-part test protected. 
In Roberts, the United States Supreme Court stated that the
confrontation right reflects "the Framers' preference for face-to-face accusation."  448 US at 65.  That historical preference
undergirds the unavailability requirement that Campbell
discussed.
	This court's cases that preceded Campbell demonstrate
the same understanding of the purposes of the confrontation right
and, particularly, the historical preference for face-to-face
confrontation that the United States Supreme Court discussed in
Roberts.  A number of early Oregon cases established that Article
I, section 11, did not preclude the state from using all hearsay
against a criminal defendant, even though the hearsay declarant
did not testify at trial.  In each of those cases the declarant
was unavailable to testify.  See, e.g., State v. Casey, 108 Or
386, 213 P 771 (1923) (declarant deceased); State v. Von Klein,
71 Or 159, 142 P 549 (1914) (declarants absent from state); State
v. Meyers, 59 Or 537, 117 P 818 (1911) (declarant absent from
state); State v. Walton, 53 Or 557, 99 P 431 (1909) (one
declarant deceased, one beyond jurisdiction of court); State v.
Bowker, 26 Or 309, 38 P 124 (1894) (declarant seriously ill and
physically unable to attend trial); State v. Saunders, 14 Or 300,
12 P 441 (1886) (declarant deceased), overruled on other grounds
by State v. Marsh, 260 Or 416, 490 P2d 491 (1971).  Given the
choice between excluding sufficiently reliable evidence or
admitting that evidence despite the defendant's inability to
confront the witness, the court chose the latter.  Necessity,
practicality, and public policy concerns motivated the court's
decisions.
	In later Oregon cases, this court continued to consider
the reliability of proffered hearsay only when confrontation, in
the classic sense, was impossible.  The case law continued to
focus on necessity as the justification for admitting hearsay
against a criminal defendant, once confrontation became
impossible.  In State ex rel Gladden v. Lonergan, 201 Or 163, 269
P2d 491 (1954), for example, the court stated that the 
	"essential purpose of confrontation * * * is to secure
for the accused the opportunity of cross-examination. 
However, it is recognized that there is a secondary
advantage to be gained by the personal appearance of
the witness before the court and jury where his
testimony is orally given.  This advantage is stated by
Professor Wigmore as follows: 'the judge and the jury
are enabled to obtain the elusive and incommunicable
evidence of a witness' deportment while testifying, and
a certain subjective, moral effect is produced upon the
witness.' 5 Wigmore, Evidence 3d ed 125, § 1395.
		"In 5 Wigmore, Evidence 3d ed 127, § 1396, the
authors states: 
			"'* * * [T]he secondary advantage * * * is an
advantage to be insisted upon whenever it can be
had.  No one has doubted that it is highly
desirable, if only it is available.  But it is
merely desirable.  Where it cannot be obtained,
the requirement ceases. * * *'"  
Id. at 173-74 (all emphasis, except last, added by Lonergan
court; last emphasis in original).   
	     In State v. Smyth, 286 Or 293, 593 P2d 1166 (1979), the
court explained: 
	"In our system a defendant is not tried on a dossier
compiled in prior hearings, no matter how fairly and
judiciously conducted.  His guilt must be established
at the trial by evidence that convinces a factfinder
beyond a reasonable doubt. * * *  As the United States
Supreme Court stated in Barber [v. Page, 390 US 719,
725, 88 S Ct 1318, 20 L Ed 2d 255 (1968)], '[t]he right
to confrontation is basically a trial right.  It
includes both the opportunity to cross-examine and the
occasion for the jury to weigh the demeanor of the
witness.'"  
Id. at 300.  To satisfy the confrontation right, the court
stated, the hearsay exception for prior testimony must be read
"to refer to circumstances of genuine necessity."  Id. at 301;
see also State v. Herrera, 286 Or 349, 355, 594 P2d 823 (1979)
("Before a prosecutor can use prior recorded testimony and thus
deprive a defendant of his right at trial to confront his
accusers face to face, he must first show the trial court that
use of the former testimony is a genuine necessity."). (8)
		The unavailability requirement described in Campbell
flows logically from those cases.  We conclude from the foregoing
that the state has not shown that this court's conclusion in
Campbell regarding Article I, section 11, is flawed because the
court insufficiently considered or misread the text, history, and
case law regarding that provision.  After reconsidering Campbell,
we decline to abandon the unavailability rule described in that
case.  The United States Supreme Court's subsequent shift in its
interpretation of the federal Confrontation Clause and the
state's policy arguments do not convince us that this court
"wrongly considered or wrongly decided" the unavailability issue
in Campbell.  Stranahan, 331 Or at 54.  Accordingly, we reaffirm
the unavailability requirement and the methodology articulated in
Campbell and subsequent cases.  Before the state may introduce
into evidence a witness's out-of-court declarations against a
criminal defendant, the state must produce the witness at trial
or demonstrate that the witness is unavailable to testify.
		In this case, the state conceded that it had not made a
good-faith effort to produce the witness at trial or to
demonstrate that the witness was not available to testify.  Given
that concession, the trial court erred in admitting the excited
utterance hearsay statements against defendant.
		The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.



1. 	ORS 163.160 provides in part:
"(1) A person commits the crime of assault in the
fourth degree if the person:
"(a) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes
physical injury to another; or
"(b) With criminal negligence causes physical
injury to another by means of a deadly weapon."

2. 	ORS 163.195 provides in part:
"(1) A person commits the crime of recklessly
endangering another person if the person recklessly
engages in conduct which creates a substantial risk of
serious physical injury to another person."

3. 	Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides in part:
		"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
have the right to public trial by an impartial jury in
the county in which the offense shall have been
committed; to be heard by himself and counsel; to
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, and to have a copy thereof; to meet the witnesses
face to face, and to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor * * *."
(Emphasis added.)

4. 	The Sixth Amendment provides in part:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, * * * and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence."
(Emphasis added.)

5. 	OEC 803 provides in part:
"The following are not excluded by ORS 40.455 [the
hearsay rule] even though the declarant is available as
a witness:
"* * * * *
"(2) A statement relating to a startling event or
condition made while the declarant was under the stress
of excitement caused by the event or condition."

6. 	Although Article I, section 11, of the Oregon
Constitution, does not use the term "confront," we refer to the
"right to meet the witnesses face to face" as a "confrontation
right" and describe the provision as a "confrontation clause."

7. 	Because we decide this case on state constitutional
grounds, we do not reach defendant's Sixth Amendment argument.

8.   Although most of the relevant case law concerns hearsay
exceptions, particularly prior testimony and dying declarations,
that traditionally have applied only when the declarant is
unavailable, the cases clearly discuss unavailability as a
constitutional requirement, not an evidentiary requirement.