Title: Kanzler v. Renner

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Kanzler v. Renner1997 WY 65937 P.2d 1337Case Number: 96-60Decided: 05/23/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

SHARON H. KANZLER, formerly 
known as Sharon H. Ball,

Appellant(Plaintiff), 

v. 

DAVID RENNER, 

Appellee(Defendant).

Appeal from the District Court, Laramie 
County

The Honorable Edward L. Grant, 
Judge

Representing 
Appellant:

Jane A. Villemez, 
Cheyenne.

Representing 
Appellee:

Terry L. Armitage, 
Cheyenne.

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, 
GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Sharon 
Kanzler, a former dispatcher with the Cheyenne Police Department, appeals from 
the summary judgment which was entered in favor of appellee, police officer 
David Renner, on Kanzler's claim of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.

[¶2]      We 
reverse.

[¶3]      Appellant Kanzler 
states two issues: 

1. Whether the 
defense of qualified immunity shields a police officer from suit for outrageous 
conduct outside the scope of his duties.

2. Whether evidence 
of physical attack, persistent harassment and severe emotional injury requires a 
jury decision on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.

[¶4]      Appellee Renner 
presents the issues in this way:

I. Was appellee 
David Renner, defendant below, entitled to summary judgment in his favor as a 
matter of law, concerning the cause of action for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress?

II. Was appellee 
David Renner, defendant below, entitled to summary judgment in his favor as a 
matter of law, based upon the affirmative defense of qualified 
immunity?

FACTS

[¶5]      Kanzler was 
employed by the City of Cheyenne Police Department from July 12, 1982, through 
August 14, 1991, as a police dispatcher. During her employment with the Police 
Department, Kanzler developed a friendship with Renner, a police officer also 
employed by the Cheyenne Police Department. Kanzler claims that beginning in 
mid-March of 1991, and continuing for a period of approximately six weeks, 
Renner's conduct toward her changed and he engaged in behavior that was both 
offensive and unwelcome.

[¶6]      The first 
identified deviation in behavior occurred at approximately 4:00 a.m. one morning 
in mid-March when Kanzler was driving home from work. According to Kanzler, as 
she drove toward her home, a car approached her from behind at a high rate of 
speed. Kanzler stopped when she realized that she was being followed by a squad 
car. As the car passed her, she noticed that it was driven by Renner. When she 
pulled into her driveway, Renner drove around her car and squealed to a stop in 
front of her house. By that time, she had run to her front door and Renner 
called out to her, "Hey, Babe, come here." Kanzler was frightened and she 
responded by locking herself inside the house. When Kanzler arrived at work the 
next night, she found a note from a dispatcher stating Renner had logged her 
speeding.

[¶7]      Within the next 
few days, Kanzler noticed Renner's squad car parked down the street from her 
house when she arrived home from work shortly after 4:00 a.m. When she got out 
of her car, Renner sped toward her. Kanzler again hurried into the house and 
locked the door behind her. Renner stopped for several seconds in front of her 
house as she peered out the window, and then sped off.

[¶8]      Following this 
incident, Kanzler claims that Renner started coming into the radio room where 
she worked more frequently than he had in the past. She states that he would sit 
close to her and stare at her for long periods of time while she was attempting 
to do her radio dispatch job.

[¶9]      Kanzler also 
claims that Renner asked her when they were going to go to Fort Collins so that 
she could teach him to two-step. Kanzler acknowledges that she and defendant 
Renner had gone to Fort Collins in the past, but she states that she advised 
Renner that they were not going to go to Fort Collins again and that she did not 
want to teach him to two-step. Later that night, Kanzler claims that Renner 
approached her, grabbed her, pulled her body up next to his, and started to slow 
dance. She told him to leave her alone and pushed him 
away.

[¶10]   On one occasion, Renner put his arm 
around Kanzler while she was talking with another officer and pulled her to him. 
She knocked his arm away, said "don't," and left the room. On another occasion, 
she walked to the back door to tell her boyfriend, Officer Greg Ball, goodnight, 
and Renner's squad car was parked behind her car. As she turned to go back into 
the building, Renner called to Kanzler that he had a question to ask her. 
Kanzler responded "What are you trying to do? You know I'm involved with 
somebody else," at which point Renner said, "Have a nice life," and sped 
off.

[¶11]   Finally, Kanzler claims that Renner 
attacked her in a utility closet in the dispatch room on May 1, 1991. According 
to Kanzler, Renner followed her into the closet and pulled the door shut behind 
him. The light was not on. Renner grabbed Kanzler and pulled her to him. She 
pushed away from him and the door flew open. Renner "took a stance" and pulled 
the door shut. Kanzler states that she was very scared and angry and that she 
attempted to call for help on a portable radio that was inside the closet. As 
she reached for the radio, Renner tried to grab it away from her, and she 
managed to escape from the closet. Kanzler's co-worker, Sue Pexton, was 
approximately eight feet away from the closet. Pexton has stated that she saw 
Renner follow Kanzler into the closet and that she heard a click on the radio 
and a commotion in the closet. She does not know what actually occurred inside 
the closet, but she noted that Kanzler was visibly upset when she returned to 
her dispatch console. Kanzler asserts that later that night, Renner approached 
her console where she was sitting with her feet propped up, asked her what was 
wrong, and rubbed his crotch against her leg.

[¶12]   Kanzler was sufficiently upset by 
the events that evening that she was unable to complete her shift. She reported 
the incidents involving Renner to Chief Patterson and Lieutenant Powell the next 
morning, and it was agreed that she should take the next four days off. Kanzler 
returned to work her regularly scheduled shift on May 6, but she again became 
too emotionally distraught to finish her shift, fearful that she would come in 
contact with Renner. Kanzler began to see a counselor, and was diagnosed as 
suffering from depression and post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of the 
incidents at work. Kanzler used up all her sick and vacation leave, and then 
took leave without pay. She resigned from the police department on August 14, 
1991, never having returned to work.

[¶13]   On February 19, 1993, Kanzler filed 
suit in Federal District Court against Renner and the City of Cheyenne. She 
asserted claims of sexual harassment against both defendants under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),1 and claims against the City alone 
for denial of equal protection and wrongful termination of her employment in 
violation of state public policy. Kanzler also asserted a claim against Renner 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the same facts 
underlying her sexual harassment claim. The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Renner on both the Title VII claim and the state tort 
claim. Ball v. City of Cheyenne, 845 F. Supp. 803, 813-14 (D.Wyo. 1993). 
Kanzler proceeded to trial against the City on her Title VII claim based on 
hostile environment sexual harassment. After a bench trial, the court entered 
judgment in favor of the City on May 18, 1994. The court concluded that Kanzler 
failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence the elements of proof 
necessary to her claim, and that even if she had, her case against the City 
would fail because the City reacted promptly and appropriately to her 
allegations once reported.

[¶14]   Kanzler appealed the grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Renner to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Ball v. Renner, 54 F.3d 664 (10th Cir. 1995). The court upheld the grant 
of summary judgment on the Title VII claim because Renner exercised no 
supervisory/managerial authority over Kanzler and hence could not be considered 
Kanzler's "employer" so as to incur liability under Title VII. Id. at 
668. With respect to the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, the 
Tenth Circuit recognized the evolving nature of the tort, the fact that it is a 
state law cause of action, and that the district court did not have the benefit 
of the later-decided Wyoming Supreme Court case of Wilder v. Cody Country 
Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211 (Wyo. 1994), when it ruled on Kanzler's 
claim. Consequently, the court reversed the summary judgment on the claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, ordering dismissal of the claim 
"without prejudice to its reassertion before a state tribunal." Ball, 54 F.3d  at 665.

[¶15]   On August 22, 1995, Kanzler filed a 
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against Renner in state 
district court. The district court granted Renner's motion for summary judgment 
on January 10, 1996, on the grounds that 1) Renner was entitled to qualified 
immunity, and 2) Renner's conduct was not sufficiently outrageous to present a 
jury question. Kanzler timely appeals the district court's 
order.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶16]   Summary judgment is appropriate 
where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. W.R.C.P. 56; Wilder v. Cody Country 
Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 216 (Wyo. 1994). A material fact is one 
which if proven would establish or refute one of the essential elements of a 
cause of action or defense which has been asserted. Id. This court 
evaluates the propriety of summary judgment using the same standards and 
materials used by the district court, affording no deference to the district 
court's decisions on issues of law. Id. We look at the record from a 
viewpoint most favorable to the party opposing the motion, allowing that party 
all reasonable inferences which may be fairly drawn from the record. Id. 
Summary judgment is inappropriate to resolve factual disputes, and our review 
does not entail weighing disputed evidence. Id.

DISCUSSION

A. Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress

[¶17]   Kanzler contends that Renner's 
actions constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress. In Wyoming, we 
have adopted the Restatement formulation of the tort of intentional infliction 
of emotional distress:

§ 46. Outrageous 
Conduct Causing Severe Emotional Distress

(1) One who by 
extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe 
emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional 
distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily 
harm.

Leithead v. American Colloid 
Co., 721 P.2d 1059, 1065 (Wyo. 1986) 
(quoting RESTATEMENT, SECOND, TORTS § 46(1) (1965)). To recover for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must prove that the 
defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous and that the defendant 
intentionally or recklessly caused the plaintiff to suffer severe emotional 
harm. R.D. v. W.H., 875 P.2d 26, 31 (Wyo. 1994) (citing Leithead, 
721 P.2d at 1065-66). When presented with a motion for summary judgment, the 
court, as a matter of law, makes preliminary determinations regarding the 
outrageousness of the conduct and the severity of the emotional distress. The 
court's role is explained in the comments to the 
Restatement:

h. Court and 
jury. It is for the court to 
determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant's conduct may reasonably 
be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery, or whether it is 
necessarily so. Where reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury, subject to 
the control of the court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the 
conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in 
liability.

* * * * * 
*

j. Severe 
emotional distress. * * * It is for 
the court to determine whether on the evidence severe emotional distress can be 
found; it is for the jury to determine whether, on the evidence, it has in fact 
existed.

RESTATEMENT, supra, § 46 cmts. h, 
j.

[¶18]   Outrageous conduct is defined as 
conduct which goes "beyond all possible bounds of decency," and which is 
"regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." 
RESTATEMENT, supra, § 46 cmt. d. In both Leithead and Wilder we recognized that 
certain conduct in the employment context may rise to the level of 
outrageousness necessary to provide a basis of recovery for the tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Leithead, 721 P.2d  at 1066; 
Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 223-24. Our first task is to determine whether the pattern 
of behavior alleged, when it occurs in the workplace, satisfies the 
outrageousness element of the tort.

[¶19]   We are in accord with numerous 
jurisdictions which have determined that inappropriate sexual conduct in the 
workplace can, upon sufficient evidence, give rise to a claim of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.2 In reaching this decision, we find 
persuasive this pronouncement from the Utah Supreme Court:

It is worth stating 
forcefully that any other conclusion would amount to an intolerable refusal to 
recognize that our society has ceased seeing sexual harassment in the work place 
as a playful inevitability that should be taken in good spirits and has awakened 
to the fact that sexual harassment has a corrosive effect on those who engage in 
it as well as those who are subjected to it and that such harassment has far 
more to do with the abusive exercise of one person's power over another than it 
does with sex. See, e.g., Louise F. Fitzgerald, Science v. Myth: The Failure of 
Reason in the Clarence Thomas Hearings, 65 S.Cal.L.Rev. 1399, 1399 (1992); Carol 
Sanger, The Reasonable Woman and the Ordinary Man, 65 S.Cal.L.Rev. 1411, 1415 
(1992).

Retherford v. AT & T Communications 
of Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949, 978 (Utah 1992).3

[¶20]   Recent decisions reveal widely 
varying and inconsistent attitudes regarding the severity of sexual misconduct 
required for a showing of outrageousness. See, e.g., Fisher v. San Pedro 
Peninsula Hosp., 214 Cal. App. 3d 590, 262 Cal. Rptr. 842, 858 (1989) (sexual 
harassment in the workplace is by its very nature outrageous conduct as it 
exceeds all bounds of decency usually tolerated by a decent society); DeShiro 
v. Branch, No. 96-800-CIV-T-17E, 1996 WL 663974 at [*]26 (M.D.Fla. Nov. 4, 
1996) (factors that command the attention of the courts on this issue are the 
presence of both physical and verbal abuse and the pervasiveness of the 
harassment); Bryant v. Better Business Bureau of Greater Md., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 720, 748 (D.Md. 1996) (abuse of a position of authority may lend itself 
to a determination that conduct is outrageous); Phillips v. J.P. Stevens 
& Co., Inc., No. 3:92CV00094, 1995 WL 794200 at [*]12 (M.D.N.C. May 1, 
1995) (only serious and pervasive harassment is sufficient to support a claim); 
Lang v. Seiko Instruments USA, Inc., No. CIV. A. 96-5398, 1997 WL 11301 
at [*]4 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 14, 1997) (claim for outrageous conduct in the employment 
context requires sexual harassment plus some sort of retaliation). This 
disparity is due in large part to the vague, subjective, and value-laden concept 
of "outrageousness," and the highly fact-specific inquiry required of the 
courts. See Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the 
Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by 
Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM. L.REV. 41, 51 (1982); Krista J. Schoenheider, 
Comment, A Theory of Tort Liability for Sexual Harassment in the 
Workplace, 134 U. PA. L.REV. 1461, 1483 (1986); Mae C. Quinn, Note, The 
Garden Path of Boyles v. Kerr and Twyman v. Twyman: An Outrageous Response to 
Victims of Sexual Misconduct, 4 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 247, 253 (1995). 
Nevertheless, we are able to discern several recurring factors that courts have 
used to assist in the determination of whether particular conduct in the 
workplace is sufficiently outrageous to survive a preliminary 
motion.

1. Abuse of 
power. RESTATEMENT, SECOND, TORTS, supra, § 46 cmt. e ("extreme and 
outrageous character of the conduct may arise from an abuse by the actor of a 
position, or a relation with the other, which gives him actual or apparent 
authority over the other, or power to affect his interests."); Bryant v. 
Better Business Bureau of Greater Md., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 720, 747 (D.Md. 
1996); Crump v. P & C Food Markets, Inc., 154 Vt. 284, 576 A.2d 441, 448 
(Vt. 1990).

2. Repeated 
incidents/pattern of harassment. Boyle v. Wenk, 378 Mass. 592, 392 N.E.2d 1053, 1056 (Mass. 1979) ("Repeated harassment * * * may compound the 
outrageousness of incidents which, taken individually, might not be sufficiently 
extreme to warrant liability"); Howard v. Town of Jonesville, 935 F. Supp. 855, 861-62 (W.D.La. 1996); Howard Univ. v. Best, 484 A.2d 958, 986 
(D.C.App. 1984).

3. Unwelcome 
touching/offensive, non-negligible physical contact. Bryant v. Better 
Business Bureau of Greater Md., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 720, 747 (D.Md. 1996) 
("there is something fundamentally different about conduct which involves * * * 
touching areas of the female anatomy which are generally considered off-limits 
to anyone other than a consensual sexual partner or a physician"); Hogan v. 
Forsyth Country Club Co., 79 N.C. App. 483, 340 S.E.2d 116, 120 (N.C. App. 
1986).

4. Retaliation 
for refusing or reporting sexually-motivated advances. Shaffer v. 
National Can Corp., 565 F. Supp. 909, 916 (E.D.Pa. 1983) (situation where 
the future success of a person's employment depends on the performance of sexual 
favors goes far beyond the ambit of insults or demeaning remarks); Retherford 
v. AT & T Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 978 (Utah 
1992).

[¶21]   Viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to Kanzler, we find that at least two of the factors set out 
above are present. First, she alleges repeated incidents over a period of 
several weeks in which Renner stared at her, followed her, and subjected her to 
sexually-motivated advances and physically intimidating behavior, each 
escalating in intensity and severity. Second, she alleges unwelcome, 
non-negligible physical contact wherein Renner touched and hugged her even after 
she repeatedly rebuffed his advances, and ultimately confined her in a closet 
and rubbed his crotch against her leg. Kanzler has alleged conditions and 
circumstances which are beyond mere insults, indignities and petty oppressions 
and which, if proved, could be construed as outrageous. At the very least, 
reasonable persons could differ in their conclusions as to whether Renner's 
conduct was extreme and outrageous. Consequently, it is for a jury to determine 
whether Renner's conduct was sufficiently outrageous to result in 
liability.

[¶22]   We next turn to the second element 
of the tort, whether Kanzler has suffered severe emotional distress. Emotional 
distress includes "all highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, 
horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, 
disappointment, worry, and nausea." RESTATEMENT, supra, § 46 cmt. j. The 
Restatement requires that the emotional distress be "so severe that no 
reasonable man could be expected to endure it." Id.

[¶23]   Kanzler testified that she was 
frightened and anxious after the closet incident. She presented evidence that 
shortly after that time, she consulted Carolyn Bartlett, a licensed clinical 
social worker, who diagnosed and began treating Kanzler for post-traumatic 
stress disorder. At the same time, Kanzler's family practitioner, Michael 
Herber, M.D., diagnosed and began treating her for anxiety and depression due to 
the incidents at work. The City of Cheyenne requested an independent evaluation 
from Leonard Medoff, Ph.D., a forensic psychologist, who confirmed that the 
closet incident triggered a post-traumatic stress disorder. Kanzler testified 
that she continues to have problems. The evidence presented by Kanzler, 
consisting of her own testimony and including the diagnoses and opinions of 
three experts, is sufficient to create a jury issue on the severity of her 
emotional distress.

[¶24]   We hold that Kanzler has presented 
sufficient evidence to support her claim that Renner intentionally or recklessly 
subjected her to outrageous conduct which caused her severe emotional harm. 
Additionally, we find this case presents genuine issues of material fact about 
whether Renner acted in the way Kanzler alleges. Such questions, which revolve 
around the credibility of the parties, are properly resolved by the trier of 
fact, not the court. Therefore, summary judgment is 
reversed.

B. Qualified 
Immunity

[¶25]  
 Kanzler contends that the 
district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Renner on the 
basis of qualified immunity. Under the common law, police officers have never 
been granted absolute immunity for their actions. Blake v. Rupe, 651 P.2d 1096, 1107 (Wyo. 1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1208, 103 S. Ct. 1199, 75 L. Ed. 2d 442 (1983) (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 1218, 18 L. Ed. 2d 288 (1967)). Rather, police officers enjoy only a limited 
immunity from tort liability. DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643, 647 (Wyo. 
1986).

[¶26]   The standard of qualified immunity 
established under our common law is distinct from the federal standard.4 In Darrar v. Bourke, we 
reviewed the factors which would entitle a peace officer to qualified immunity 
from a tort suit brought pursuant to state law: 1) the officer was acting within 
the scope of his or her duties; 2) the officer was acting in good faith; 3) the 
officer's acts were reasonable under the circumstances; and 4) the officer's 
acts were discretionary duties and not merely operational or ministerial duties. 
910 P.2d 572, 575-76 (Wyo. 1996). "It is one thing to say qualified immunity is 
available to peace officers * * * it is quite another to determine 
whether officers in a particular case are entitled to qualified immunity." 
Darrar, at 577. Renner is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of 
qualified immunity only if he establishes that while acting within the scope of 
his duties, he performed his discretionary duties reasonably and in good 
faith.

[¶27]   The preliminary inquiry is whether 
Renner was acting within the scope of his duties. When an official acts outside 
the scope of his authority, he acts individually and not in his official 
capacity and, therefore, he cannot claim the protection of qualified immunity. 
Oyler v. State, 618 P.2d 1042, 1047 (Wyo. 1980). The fact that an 
official was at work or on duty does not in itself establish that he was acting 
within his authority. See Jung-Leonczynska v. Steup, 782 P.2d 578, 582 
(Wyo. 1989).

[¶28]   In his summary judgment materials, 
Renner bases his entitlement to qualified immunity on the federal standard, 
stating that he acted in good faith at all times and violated no clearly 
established law. However, Renner fails to recognize that whether a public 
officer acted within his or her authority is a threshold inquiry under either 
the common law qualified immunity test or the federal Harlow test.5 Renner presents no evidence in his 
summary judgment materials to establish that he was acting within his authority. 
Certainly, the sexual misconduct alleged by Kanzler and taken as true for 
summary judgment purposes cannot be within the scope of any public officer's 
duties and is not the type of conduct that is shielded from liability under the 
doctrine of qualified immunity. On the record before us, we find no basis for 
the district court's determination that Renner was entitled to qualified 
immunity; as a result, we reverse. Darrar, 910 P.2d  at 
577.

CONCLUSION

[¶29]   We hold that, as a matter of law, 
Kanzler presented sufficient evidence in support of her claim of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, based on inappropriate sexual conduct by a 
co-employee in the workplace, to survive Renner's motion for summary judgment. 
Further, we hold that Renner has not shown he is entitled to qualified immunity. 
Finally, this case presents genuine issues of material fact about whether Renner 
acted in the way Kanzler alleges. These questions are not appropriately resolved 
by a summary judgment. Therefore, the district court's order is reversed and the 
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

Footnotes

1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 
2000e-17.

2 See, e.g., Fisher v. San Pedro 
Peninsula Hosp., 214 Cal. App. 3d 590, 262 Cal. Rptr. 842, 858 (1989); 
Howard Univ. v. Best, 484 A.2d 958, 985-86 (D.C.App. 1984); DeShiro v. 
Branch, No. 96-800-CIV-T-17E, 1996 WL 663974 at [*]3 (M.D.Fla. Nov. 4, 
1996); Howard v. Town of Jonesville, 935 F. Supp. 855, 861-62 (W.D.La. 
1996); Bryant v. Better Business Bureau of Greater Md., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 720, 747-48 (D.Md. 1996); Collins v. Willcox Inc., 158 Misc.2d 54, 
600 N.Y.S.2d 884, 885-86 (Sup.Ct. 1992); Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club 
Co., 79 N.C. App. 483, 340 S.E.2d 116, 121 (1986); Valerio v. 
Dahlberg, 716 F. Supp. 1031, 1040 (S.D.Ohio 1988); Lazarz v. Brush 
Wellman, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 417, 423 (E.D.Pa. 1994); Bennett v. CompUSA, 
Inc., No. 3:96-CV-0742-P, 1997 WL 10028 at [*]10 (N.D.Tex. Jan. 7, 1997); 
Retherford v. AT & T Communications of Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949, 978 (Utah 1992).

3 The term "sexual harassment" is 
susceptible of many definitions, and potentially encompasses a broad range of 
conduct. We use the term not to refer to Title VII sexual harassment, but in a 
more general sense, as did the Retherford court. See 844 P.2d  at 977-78. 
Conduct generally labeled sexual harassment can range from an "accidental" 
brushing against a woman's body or an unwanted touching or kissing to a physical 
assault such as rape. Sexual harassment also assumes verbal forms, such as 
suggestive remarks or derogatory comments or direct demands for sex. Krista J. 
Schoenheider, Comment, A Theory of Tort Liability for Sexual Harassment in 
the Workplace, 134 U. PA. L.REV. 1461, 1461-62 (1986). Such conduct may or 
may not be actionable under Title VII. For example, Title VII is limited in 
application to employers, and to establish hostile work environment sexual 
harassment a plaintiff must show a pattern of harassment motivated by 
plaintiff's membership in a protected group. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); Ball 
v. City of Cheyenne, 845 F. Supp. 803, 808-09 (D.Wyo. 
1993).

4 Renner argues that we should apply the 
qualified immunity test established in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982): "[G]overnment officials 
performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for 
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known." The Harlow test eliminates the subjective, "good faith" 
requirement. Harlow applies where the plaintiff has alleged a violation 
of federal statutory or constitutional rights. See, e.g., Lucero v. 
Mathews, 901 P.2d 1115, 1118 (Wyo. 1995) (alleged violation of Fourteenth 
Amendment due process and First Amendment); Abell v. Dewey, 870 P.2d 363, 
367 (Wyo. 1994) (alleged violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983). However, when analyzing 
qualified immunity for state common law tort claims, as compared with claims 
alleging a violation of "statutory or constitutional rights," we have 
consistently applied the factors enumerated in Darrar v. Bourke. See, 
e.g., Darrar, 910 P.2d 572, 575-77 (Wyo. 1996) (negligence action); Blake 
v. Rupe, 651 P.2d 1096, 1109 (Wyo. 1982) (various negligence and intentional 
tort claims); Oyler v. State, 618 P.2d 1042, 1053 (Wyo. 1980) (negligence 
action).

5 The issue in Harlow was the 
scope of immunity available to public officials in a suit for damages based on 
their official acts. Harlow, 457 U.S.  at 802, 102 S. Ct.  at 2729-30 
(emphasis added).

THOMAS, Justice, concurring 
specially.

[¶30]   I am in accord with the result of 
this case, because it appears to me that in addition to the sexual misconduct 
emphasized in the majority opinion, Renner essentially was stalking Kanzler. I 
have a concern, however, that our law in this area is not developing in a 
particularly cohesive manner, noting that two members of the Court dissented in 
Garcia v. Lawson, 928 P.2d 1164 (Wyo. 1996). This is such a potentially 
volatile tort that I think it is essential that we carefully craft its 
parameters.

[¶31]   All the trial bench can discern at 
this point is that if the ground for claiming intentional infliction of 
emotional distress is sexual misconduct, a decision to grant a summary judgment 
is full of risk. Yet, it would not be a good thing for the trial bench to 
abandon its role as a gatekeeper. Our adoption of the Restatement Second rule 
surely includes this comment:

h. Court and 
jury. It is for the court to 
determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant's conduct may reasonably 
be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery, or whether it is 
necessarily so. Where reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury, subject to 
the control of the court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the 
conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in 
liability.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. h 
(1965).

[¶32]   It is my hope that the trial bench 
and the bar in Wyoming will not read into this decision an arbitrary rule that 
in every case involving sexual misconduct reasonable men can differ as to 
whether the conduct is so extreme and outrageous as to justify recovery. I do 
not believe the Court so intends, but if I am mistaken, such a rule would be 
erroneous in my view.