Title: Parma v. Pub. Util. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Parma v. Pub. Util. Comm., 86 Ohio St.3d 144, 1999-Ohio-141.] 
 
 
 
 
 
CITY OF PARMA ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF OHIO, 
APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Parma v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 144.] 
Telephone companies — Creation of new telephone area code designations in 
northeastern Ohio — Complaint challenging telephone company’s plan to 
achieve area code relief dismissed by Public Utilities Commission — 
Dismissal of complaint by commission reasonable and lawful, when. 
(No. 97-2222 — Submitted March 31, 1999 — Decided July 28, 1999.) 
APPEAL from the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, No. 97-650-TP-CSS. 
 
This appeal involves orders of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio 
(“commission”) in a proceeding brought by the city of Parma in which Orange 
Village and the city of Bedford Heights joined (collectively, “Parma”) against 
Ameritech Ohio (“Ameritech”).  Parma challenged Ameritech’s plan to achieve 
area code relief by creating a new 440 area code to occupy a portion of the 216 
area code territory in northeastern Ohio that remained after the earlier creation of a 
new 330 area code territory in the southeastern portion of the original 216 area 
code territory (the greater Akron-Canton and Youngstown areas).1  Parma asserted 
that the Ameritech plan to split the remaining 216 area code territory was unjust 
and unreasonable in violation of R.C. 4905.26 and would result in undue or 
unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in violation of R.C. 4905.35. 
 
After publishing notice and conducting hearings on Parma’s complaint, the 
commission issued its August 14, 1997 opinion and order in case No. 97-650-TP-
CSS, wherein it found no violation of R.C. 4905.26 or 4905.35 by Ameritech and 
dismissed the complaint.  Parma timely filed an application for rehearing, which 
was denied by the commission. 
 
2 
 
Parma appealed the commission’s orders to this court and Ameritech 
intervened as an appellee. 
 
The cause is before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
Henry W. Eckhart, for appellants. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Duane W. Luckey, Steven T. 
Nourse and Johnlander C. Jackson-Forbes, for appellee Public Utilities 
Commission of Ohio. 
 
Jon F. Kelly, for intervening appellee Ameritech Ohio. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  This appeal concerns telephone area code designations.  
Pursuant to Section 251(e)(1), Title 47, U.S.Code, the Federal Communications 
Commission (“FCC”) is vested with jurisdiction over the North American 
Numbering Plan (“NANP”).  The commission determined that Ameritech serves as 
the “Local Number or CO Code Administrator” under the NANP for the 216 and 
330 area codes (among others), and that Ameritech’s duties as CO Code 
Administrator include (1) the assignment of NXX codes (the three-digit telephone 
number prefixes that follow the three-digit area codes2) to telecommunication 
service providers, (2) the prediction of area code “exhaust,” and (3) the 
development of plans for area code relief. 
 
The case below involved a challenge to the second phase of a 
telecommunication industry plan to provide area code relief to northeastern Ohio.  
The first of two phases, approved in 1995, resulted in the splitting of the original 
216 area code territory and establishing a new 330 area code in its southeastern 
portions (the greater Akron-Canton and Youngstown areas).  The first phase was 
implemented promptly after the plan was approved.  The second phase involved 
the splitting of the portion of the 216 area code territory remaining after the first 
 
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split and designating a portion of that territory by yet another new area code 
number — the 440 area code territory. 
 
Implementation of the second phase of the plan was deferred, pending the 
approach of a condition in the remaining 216 area code territory known as area 
code “exhaust.”  “Exhaust” occurs when no more three-digit NXX prefixes remain 
in an area code for assignment to a telephone service provider (carrier). 
 
Acting in its capacity as CO Administrator, Ameritech projected that, absent 
any additional relief, the 216 area code remaining after the first split would exhaust 
as early as the second quarter of 1998.  Whereupon, Ameritech set about to 
develop a plan for implementation of the second phase of 216 area code relief, with 
input from telecommunication industry representatives, community leaders, 
governmental representatives, the staff of the commission, and the Ohio 
Consumers’ Counsel. 
 
The resultant second-phase plan left the city of Cleveland and close-by 
Cleveland suburbs or parts of suburbs in the 216 area code territory, with the 
farther-out areas being assigned a new 440 area code.  As a result, Parma and 
twelve other communities were split into a 216 area code and a 440 area code. 
 
On April 4, 1996, Ameritech held a press conference announcing the 
boundaries of a 216/440 area code territorial split.  The plan called for an optional 
or permissive dialing phase to begin August 16, 1997, and mandatory dialing to 
begin April 4, 1998. 
 
On June 18, 1997, the city of Parma filed with the commission a complaint 
against Ameritech as CO Administrator, asserting that the second phase of the 216 
area code relief plan that split the city of Parma into two area codes was unjust and 
unreasonable in violation of R.C. 4905.26 and would result in undue or 
unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in violation of R.C. 4905.35.  Dates, times, 
and places for hearings on the complaint were established; notices of the hearings 
 
4 
were published in The Plain Dealer, a newspaper of general circulation in 
Cuyahoga County; and evidentiary hearings were held in Cleveland on July 21, 
1997, and in Columbus on July 23, 1997.  Following the hearings, the commission 
ruled against Parma and dismissed Parma’s complaint against Ameritech.  Parma 
has duly perfected its appeal to this court of the commission’s dismissal of Parma’s 
complaint. 
 
Adequacy of Notice 
 
Parma contends that the commission unlawfully and unreasonably failed to 
comply with the controlling notice provisions of R.C. 4905.26, thereby compelling 
this court’s reversal of the commission’s orders. 
 
R.C. 4905.26 is divided into two branches, which have different notice 
requirements.  From the record of the commission proceedings on appeal, it is clear 
that Parma’s complaint was brought under the first branch of R.C. 4905.26.  The 
first branch consists of the first two paragraphs of the statute and relates to a 
complaint “against any public utility, by any person, firm, or corporation * * *.”  
(Emphasis added.)  This branch, as it was worded at the time of this case,3 
provided that, if the commission finds that reasonable grounds for the complaint 
are stated, it shall set a time for hearing and shall notify the complainant and the 
public utility thereof.  It also provided for publication of notice of the hearing and a 
statement of the matters complained of.  This branch of the statute required that the 
notice be published in a newspaper of general circulation in each county in which 
the complaint had arisen and that publication be made not less than fifteen nor 
more than thirty days before the hearing. 
 
The commission in its July 11, 1997 attorney examiner’s entry set the date, 
time, and place for the hearing, set forth the form of the notice to be published (in 
which the matters complained of were described), and ordered that: 
 
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“The Secretary of the Commission should cause publication of the 
following legal notice to appear for two consecutive weeks in a newspaper 
published, and of general circulation, within Cuyahoga County, Ohio.  Publication 
should be made in a section other than the legal notice section of the newspaper.” 
 
The notice, in fact, was published in The Plain Dealer and met all of the 
statutory notice requirements contained in R.C. 4905.26, save one. 
 
The one statutory requirement not met was that publication occur not less 
than fifteen nor more than thirty days prior to the date of the hearing.  The notice 
was published on July 17 and 18, 1997. Since the hearing was scheduled for July 
21, 1997, publication occurred less than fifteen days prior to the hearing date, 
being at most four days prior to the hearing.  Moreover, publication occurred on 
two consecutive days, rather than on two consecutive weeks, as ordered by the 
commission.  However, there was no statutory requirement in the first branch of 
R.C. 4905.26 for more than a one-time publication. 
 
Parma argues that it has been deprived of due process and that we should 
reverse the commission, because the publication of notice of the hearing did not 
strictly comport with the requirements of R.C. 4905.26.  In support of that 
argument, Parma cites four decisions in which we reversed the commission for 
defective or deficient notice of proceedings before it. 
 
The first two cases involved notices in rate proceedings brought under R.C. 
4909.18 and 4909.19:  Commt. Against MRT v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1977), 52 Ohio 
St.2d 231, 6 O.O.3d 475, 371 N.E.2d 547, and Assn. of Realtors v. Pub. Util. 
Comm. (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 172, 14 O.O.3d 409, 398 N.E.2d 784.  Neither case 
involved the notice period.  Both cases involved determinations by the court that 
the published notices failed to adequately describe new services or conditions on 
the provision of services that were included in the proposed tariffs submitted for 
commission approval in the respective rate cases. 
 
6 
 
Nor did the other two cases cited by Parma involve the notice period.  Allnet 
Communications Serv., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 115, 512 
N.E.2d 350, involved a reversal of a commission dismissal of a complaint filed 
under R.C. 4905.26 without notice and a hearing required by the statute after a 
commission finding of “reasonable grounds” for the complaint.  Ohio Bell Tel. Co. 
v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 145, 593 N.E.2d 286, involved reversal 
of a commission order in a complaint case brought under R.C. 4905.26 in which no 
hearing was held, contrary to the provisions of the statute. 
 
In short, we do not consider any of these four cases controlling with respect 
to this appeal because none of them dealt with the statutory notice period. 
 
In this case, the published notice provided a sufficient description of the 
substance of the complaint and notice was given and a hearing was held. The 
attorney examiner’s entry dated July 11, 1997, which was served on the parties, 
provided notice of the commission hearing.  Also, notice of the hearing was 
published in The Plain Dealer twice preceding the hearing, although the hearing 
was held less than fifteen days after publication.  Moreover, Parma fully and fairly 
participated in the hearings on the complaint.  The city of  Parma’s witness list 
indicates that ten days before the commencement of hearings, the city of Parma, by 
its attorney, participated in a July 10, 1997 prehearing conference in the complaint 
case.  And that same witness list, filed with the commission on July 17, 1997, 
indicates actual knowledge on the part of the city of Parma of the Cleveland 
hearing scheduled for July 21, 1997, and the Columbus hearing scheduled for July 
23, 1997. 
 
No party made any objection to the scheduling of the hearings or to the 
publication of notice prior to the filing of the application for rehearing after the 
conclusion of hearings and the commission’s issuance of its opinion and order on 
August 14, 1997.  By failing to raise an objection until the filing of an application 
 
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for rehearing, Parma deprived the commission of an opportunity to redress any 
injury or prejudice that may have occurred.  Wherefore, we do not accept Parma’s 
objections to the scheduling or publication of notice of the hearings. 
 
Indeed, as to the scheduling of the hearings, in the prayer of the complaint 
filed June 18, 1997, the city of Parma requested that the commission “ * * * set a 
full evidentiary hearing * * * on the issues raised in this complaint at the earliest 
possibility [sic] opportunity.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
In Worthington Hills Civic Assn. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 
11, 74 O.O.2d 40, 340 N.E.2d 411, we were faced with a number of claimed errors, 
including a challenge to the form of the notice of a water-rate-increase application.  
We noted that the challenger there assigned error to various actions and rulings of 
the commission, but failed to show “concomitant harm or prejudice.”  Id. at 12, 74 
O.O.2d at 41, 340 N.E.2d at 412.  In affirming the commission’s order, we said 
that we will not reverse an order of the commission because of an error, if such 
error did not prejudice the party seeking reversal, and we cited Cincinnati v. Pub. 
Util. Comm. (1949), 151 Ohio St. 353, 39 O.O. 188, 86 N.E.2d 10, and Ohio 
Edison Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1962), 173 Ohio St. 478, 20 O.O.2d 108, 184 
N.E.2d 70.  Id. at 13, 74 O.O.2d at 41, 340 N.E.2d at 412. 
 
The case of MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1988), 38 
Ohio St.3d 266, 527 N.E.2d 777, is similar to this appeal in that it involved a 
challenge to the adequacy of notice in a commission proceeding.  In that case we 
observed that the challenger, MCI, had in fact participated in the public hearing.  
We said: 
 
“If MCI had objections to the actions that were about to be implemented, it 
should have made its objections within that time frame and preferably in that 
forum.  Nothing in the record indicates that MCI was denied its right to be heard at 
these hearings * * *.”  Id., 38 Ohio St.3d at 269, 527 N.E.2d at 780. 
 
8 
 
We have previously held that this court will not reverse the commission for 
error when there has been substantial compliance with statutory notice 
requirements and the complaining party has not shown that it was prejudiced by 
the lack of strict compliance.  Ohio Bus Line, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1972), 29 
Ohio St.2d 222, 58 O.O.2d 428, 280 N.E.2d 907, and Valley Greyhound Lines, Inc. 
v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1947), 148 Ohio St. 603, 36 O.O. 236, 76 N.E.2d 608. 
 
Moreover, R.C. 4905.09 reads: 
 
“A substantial compliance by the public utilities commission with the 
requirements of Chapte[r] * * * 4905 * * * of the Revised Code is sufficient to 
give effect to all its rules, orders, acts, and regulations.  Such rules, orders, acts, 
and regulations shall not be declared inoperative, illegal, or void for an omission of 
a technical nature in respect to such requirements. * * * ”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Based on the foregoing, we reject Parma’s argument that it has been denied 
due process by virtue of the commission’s less than strict compliance with the 
notice publication requirements of R.C. 4905.26. 
 
Alternatives to the Planned Area Code Split 
 
Parma argues that there are potential alternatives to Ameritech’s proposed 
split of the 216 area code territory that could delay or possibly eliminate the need 
for the split. 
 
The commission considered the options presented by Parma’s expert witness 
and expressed the belief that they were deserving of further consideration.  
However, the commission concluded that, because of the exigencies of the fast-
approaching, already-scheduled conversion of 216 NPA telephone number prefixes 
to 440 NPA prefixes, it was not feasible to implement any of the proposed 
alternatives in the case before it. 
 
Moreover, the mere showing of the existence of alternatives to immediate 
splitting of an area code territory does not constitute a showing that splitting an 
 
9 
area code territory is unjust, unreasonable, unjustly discriminatory, or otherwise in 
violation of R.C. 4905.26 or 4905.35. 
 
In addition, we do not accept Parma’s argument that the commission erred 
by not enforcing strict compliance with the NPA Code Relief Planning and 
Notification Guidelines (1997) (“Guidelines”).4  In the first place, the Guidelines 
are merely what they are entitled — “guidelines” — and there is no requirement 
that an area code relief plan strictly conform to the Guidelines. 
 
Nevertheless, the requirements of the Guidelines were neither forgotten nor 
ignored; the Guidelines and their applicability were thoroughly reviewed by the 
commission.  The commission received extensive testimony on the applicability of 
the Guidelines, and the parties briefed the issues raised.  Parma simply disagreed 
with Ameritech and with the commission on the meaning of the Guidelines and 
their applicability.  We find that even though Ameritech’s area code relief plan did 
not strictly comport with the Guidelines, the commission’s approval of that plan 
did not constitute reversible error by the commission. 
 
Standard of Review by the Ohio Supreme Court 
 
Appeals of commission decisions are subject to the standard of review 
contained in R.C. 4903.13, which provides in part: 
 
“A final order made by the public utilities commission shall be reversed, 
vacated, or modified by the supreme court on appeal, if, upon consideration of the 
record, the court is of the opinion that such order was unlawful or unreasonable.” 
 
This court has consistently interpreted the statutory standard of review as 
follows: 
 
“In MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1988), 38 Ohio 
St.3d 266, 268, 527 N.E.2d 777, 780, we repeated our interpretations of this 
standard, stating: 
 
10 
 
“ ‘Under the “unlawful or unreasonable” standard specified in R.C. 4903.13, 
this court will not reverse or modify a PUCO decision as to questions of fact where 
the record contains sufficient probative evidence to show the PUCO’s 
determination is not manifestly against the weight of the evidence and is not so 
clearly unsupported by the record as to show misapprehension, mistake, or willful 
disregard of duty.  Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1983), 4 Ohio 
St.3d 91, 4 OBR 341, 447 N.E.2d 733; Columbus v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1979), 58 
Ohio St.2d 103, 12 O.O.3d 112, 388 N.E.2d 1237.’ ”  Ohio Edison Co. v. Pub. 
Util. Comm. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 555, 556, 589 N.E.2d 1292, 1294. 
 
Our review of the record indicates that sufficient probative evidence was 
adduced before the commission to show that its determinations were just and 
reasonable and not manifestly against the weight of the evidence.  Nor were they 
so clearly unsupported by the record as to show misapprehension, mistake, or 
willful disregard of duty.  Therefore, we find that the commission’s orders were 
lawful and reasonable under R.C. 4903.13, and they are hereby affirmed. 
Orders affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, P. BRYANT, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
PEGGY BRYANT, J., of the Tenth Appellate District, sitting for RESNICK, J. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. 
Ameritech did not seek commission approval of the creation, or boundaries, 
of the proposed new 440 area code territory, separate and apart from the complaint 
case.  Indeed, there is no legal requirement of commission approval under the laws 
of the state of Ohio.  The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) has 
exclusive jurisdiction over the United States portions of the North American 
Numbering Plan under Section 251(e)(1) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.  
However, at the indirect urging by Parma through Representative Dennis Kucinich, 
 
11 
Tenth Congressional District (Ohio), the FCC delegated its authority to the 
commission and requested the commission to review the proposed area code relief 
plan. 
2. 
Area codes are also known as “numbering plan areas” or NPAs. 
3. 
Shortly after the commission concluded the proceeding, the General 
Assembly amended R.C. 4905.26.  Amended R.C. 4905.26 took effect a mere five 
days after the commission journalized its September 24, 1997 entry on rehearing in 
the complaint case.  The amendment of the first branch of R.C. 4905.26 eliminated 
any requirement whatsoever of publication of notice. 
4. 
The Guidelines were adopted by an Industry Numbering Committee with the 
purpose of providing guidelines for NPA code relief planning activities.