Title: Short v. Dept. of Services for Children, Young & Their Families

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
RAYMOND L. SHORT,  
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
Respondent Below, 
 
§   No. 201, 2009 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   Court Below—Family Court 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§   of the State of Delaware, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   in and for New Castle County 
DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES  
§   File No. 08-11-10 
FOR CHILDREN, YOUTH &  
§   Petition No. 08-36427 
THEIR FAMILIES, 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
Petitioner Below,  
 
§  
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
    Submitted:  September 9, 2009 
 
 
 
 
       Decided:  September 29, 2009 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Family Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Deborah I. Gottschalk, Esquire, Community Legal Aid Society, Inc., 
Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant. 
 
 
Craig R. Fitzgerald, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
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The respondent-appellant, Raymond L. Short, Sr. (“Short”), appeals 
from a Family Court final judgment terminating his parental rights in his 
son, Raymond Short, Jr. (“Raymond Jr.”).1  On appeal, Short argues only 
that the Family Court erred in determining that any of the statutory 
prerequisites for terminating parental rights enumerated in title 13, section 
1103(a) of the Delaware Code were present.  The petitioner-appellee, 
Department of Services for Children, Youth & their Families (“DFS”) and 
the Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) argue that:  the Family 
Court only had to find one of the section 1103(a) factors to terminate Short’s 
parental rights; and DFS established all five section 1103(a)(5) factors by 
clear and convincing evidence.  We find no merit to Short’s arguments.     
Facts 
 
Raymond Jr. was born in July 2004.  At that time, Short was 
incarcerated.  Raymond Jr. spent the first year and a half of his life in the 
homes of various maternal and paternal relations in New York and 
Delaware.  Short was released from incarceration in April 2005.  Raymond 
Jr.’s mother (the “Mother”) had issues with DFS regarding one of her other 
children, and as a result, Short and the Mother acceded to DFS’ request that 
Raymond Jr. be placed under guardianship.  Raymond Jr. was placed in the 
                                          
 
1 We assigned pseudonyms to the parties, sua sponte, under Supreme Court Rule 7(d). 
 
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care of Denise Darrow, a family friend, in January 2005.  Both the Mother 
and Short moved in and out of incarceration over the next few years. 
During the time Raymond Jr. was under the guardianship of Darrow, 
he spent much of his time with maternal relatives.  During part of that time, 
Short lived with those relatives and provided some care for Raymond Jr., but 
he never provided “primary support.” 
 
DFS received reports that Darrow was neglecting the child, and DFS 
petitioned the Family Court for custody of Raymond Jr.  On March 7, 2008, 
the Family Court transferred custody of Raymond Jr. to DFS, which placed 
Raymond Jr. in foster care.  On April 9, 2008, the Family Court held an 
adjudicatory hearing, at which Short told the court that he was living with 
his mother in New York.  DFS advised the court that it would schedule a 
home visit to evaluate the suitability of placing Raymond Jr. with his 
paternal grandmother in New York.   
On May 7, 2008, the Family Court held a review hearing, which Short 
failed to attend.  At that hearing, DFS entered Short’s reunification case plan 
into evidence.  That case plan provided for Short to work towards 
reunification with his son by: (1) getting a job, (2) obtaining safe and stable 
housing, (3) undergoing a substance abuse evaluation, and (4) complying 
with all court orders.  Raymond Jr.’s  DFS caseworker testified that she was 
 
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unable to discuss the reunification plan with Short because he failed to 
contact DFS or provide DFS with any contact information.  That caseworker 
also testified that DFS had scheduled visitation for Short on April 17, 2008, 
but Short never showed up. 
 
On August 12, 2008, the Family Court held another review hearing.  
Again, Short did not appear.  DFS reported that Short’s mother’s home in 
New York was not an acceptable placement for Raymond Jr.  DFS also 
noted that Short had an outstanding capias against him.  Short’s counsel 
informed the court that Short had entered into a job placement program and 
was seeking housing.  At the hearing, the Family Court determined that 
Short was not actively working towards reunification with his son.   
 
On November 18, 2008, the Court scheduled a permanency hearing.  
Short did not attend that hearing either.  Raymond Jr.’s caseworker testified 
that she had not had any contact with Short since April 2008.  Another DFS 
worker testified that Short had had no contact with Raymond Jr. since the 
child entered DFS custody.  The next day, the Family Court ordered a 
change in goal to termination of parental rights.  On March 10, 2009, the 
Family Court held a termination hearing, at which Short did appear.  After 
taking testimony (including Short’s) and hearing arguments, the Family 
Court issued an order terminating Short’s parental rights.  
 
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Family Court’s Decision 
 
The Family Court found that the statutory prerequisite for a 
termination of parental rights under title 13, section 1103(a)(5) had been 
met, because Short had “failed to plan” for his son.  The Family Court orally 
explained that it found Short “failed to plan” because:  
[Short] has not been participating in [the Family Court] 
proceedings until the very last couple of hearings because he 
realized at that point that his parental rights were in jeopardy.  
But at that point it was too little, too late.  He has provided no 
financial support to this child.  He has had no visitation with 
this child, no emotional support for the child, virtually nothing 
for the child since the child entered care….  [T]he [c]ourt finds 
that he has failed to plan adequately for the child’s physical 
needs or mental and emotional health and development….  The 
[c]ourt does find that … an appropriate case plan was drafted 
for Father by DFS.  It encompassed the elements that the Court 
expected would be on it to address Father’s issues[,] had Father 
engaged with DFS and followed the case plan, the [c]ourt has 
no doubt that he would have been reunified with his child, but 
he chose not to for various reasons. 
 
 
The Family Court went on to find that all five elements of title 13, 
section 1103(a)(5) had been established:  Raymond Jr. had spent over a year 
in DFS custody; Short had a history of neglect, abuse or lack of care for his 
son; Short was incapable of discharging parental responsibilities due to 
repeated incarceration; Short was unable to assume legal and physical 
custody and pay for his son’s support.  Lastly, a failure to terminate parental 
rights would result in emotional instability for Raymond Jr.  The Family 
 
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Court also determined that terminating Short’s parental rights was in 
Raymond Jr.’s “best interests” under title 13, section 722 of the Delaware 
Code. 
Standard of Review 
 
Before terminating a parent’s rights in a child, the Family Court must 
engage in a two-step analysis.2  First, the Family Court must find that one of 
the grounds for termination enumerated in title 13, section 1103(a) has been 
established.  Second, the Family Court must determine that the best interests 
of the child, as defined in title 13, section 722, weigh in favor of the 
termination.  Both steps require proof by clear and convincing evidence.3  
Short challenges only the first step of the Family Court’s analysis.  Whether 
DFS has established the statutory grounds to terminate parental rights is a 
legal issue that we review de novo.4 
Termination Grounds 
 
 
Grounds for the termination of parental rights exist where: (1) a parent 
has failed to plan adequately for the child physical needs or emotional 
                                          
 
2 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1103(a); Div. of Fam. Servs. v. Hutton, 765 A.2d 1267, 1271 
(Del. 2001). 
3 Div. of Fam. Servs. v. Hutton, 765 A.2d at 1271-72. 
4 See In re Heller, 669 A.2d 25, 29 (Del. 1995) (citing In re Stevens, 652 A.2d 18, 23 
(Del. 1995)). 
 
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health; and (2) the child has been in DFS custody for at least a year.5  Short 
does not present any reasoned argument negating the finding that he “failed 
to plan adequately” for Raymond Jr.’s “physical needs or mental and 
emotional health and development.”  As the Family Court found, Short’s 
repeated failure to cooperate with DFS, to work toward his case plan, or 
even to visit his son, established a failure to plan for Raymond Jr.   
The question then becomes whether DFS established any of the 
statutory grounds for termination.  Although the Family Court found that all 
five section 1103(a)(5) factors were present, one factor alone suffices to 
support termination.  Here, the Family Court found, under title 11, section 
1103(a)(5)(a)(1), that Raymond Jr. had been in DFS custody for over one 
year.   
This finding (that Raymond Jr. was in DFS custody for over one year) 
established a valid basis for termination and should end our inquiry.  Short 
argues, however, that although Family Court Rule 216 requires a 
                                          
 
5 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1103(a)(5):  The parent or parents of the child, or any person 
or persons holding parental rights over the child, are not able, or have failed, to plan 
adequately for the child's physical needs or mental and emotional health and 
development, and 1 or more of the following conditions are met:  
a. 
In the case of a child in the care of the Department or a licensed 
agency: 
 
1. 
The child has been in the care of the Department or licensed 
agency for a period of 1 year, or for a period of 6 months in the case of a 
child who comes into care as an infant, or there is a history of previous 
placement or placements of this child[.]  (emphasis added). 
 
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permanency hearing to be conducted “360 – 420 days” from the date a child 
enters DFS custody, that Rule is only a guideline that does “not trump [the] 
father’s due process right to a reasonable opportunity for reunification.”6  
That argument lacks merit.  Short relies on Waters v. Division of Family 
Services.7  In Waters, we held that a child’s right to a timely, i.e., within one 
year, permanency decision did not “trump” the due process rights of an 
unknown father who came forward after termination proceedings had 
commenced.  This Court reasoned that Due Process required that Waters be 
provided a meaningful case plan and reunification services before the 
Family Court could terminate his parental rights.8   
Waters is distinguishable.  Short was not an unknown father who 
came forward after termination proceedings had commenced.  Short had a 
case plan and DFS was willing to provide Short with reunification services.  
Short did not, however, begin making serious efforts at reunification until it 
was “too little, too late.”  Short’s failure does not elevate the Family Court’s 
strict application of the one year in DFS custody factor9  to a Due Process 
violation. 
                                          
 
6 Waters v. Div. of Fam. Servs., 903 A.2d 720, 727 (Del. 2006). 
7 Id. 
8 Id. (noting that reunification services are not required in cases of abandonment). 
9 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1103(a)(5)(a)(1). 
 
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Conclusion 
 
 
The judgment of the Family Court is affirmed.