Title: Commonwealth v. Fulgiam

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11674 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  EARL T. FULGIAM 
(and thirteen companion cases1). 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 11, 2016. - May 5, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Lowy, & Budd, JJ.2 
 
 
Homicide.  Felony-Murder Rule.  Robbery.  Firearms.  Cellular 
Telephone.  Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, 
Probable cause.  Search and Seizure, Warrant, Probable 
cause.  Probable Cause.  Evidence, Fingerprints, Expert 
opinion, Prior misconduct, Relevancy and materiality.  
Witness, Expert.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, 
Warrant. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 21, 2011. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Peter M. Lauriat, J. 
 
 
 
Elizabeth Caddick for Earl T. Fulgiam. 
 
Esther J. Horwich for Michael T. Corbin. 
 
Zachary Hillman, Assistant District Attorney (John P. 
Pappas, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
                     
 
1 Six against Earl T. Fulgiam and seven against Michael T. 
Corbin. 
 
 
2 Justice Botsford participated in the deliberation on this 
case prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  On July 25, 2011, armed intruders entered the 
apartment occupied by the victims, Kevin Thomas, Jr., and Billie 
Marie Kee, who were robbed and killed.  In May, 2013, a Superior 
Court jury found the defendants, Earl T. Fulgiam and Michael T. 
Corbin, guilty as joint venturers of murder in the first degree 
of both victims based on the theories of deliberate 
premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony-murder 
with armed robbery as the predicate felony.  The defendants also 
were convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm and unlawful 
possession of a large capacity feeding device.3  On appeal, the 
defendants assert error in the admission of (1) certain cellular 
telephone records in violation of their rights under art. 14 of 
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and the Fourth and Sixth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution; (2) fingerprint 
cards attributed to the defendants without proper authentication 
or reliability; and (3) expert testimony related to the 
fingerprint analysis.  Corbin independently claims that repeated 
                     
 
3 The defendants' convictions of armed robbery of the 
victims were dismissed as duplicative and their convictions of 
unlawfully carrying a loaded firearm were filed with the 
defendants' consent.  The defendants were sentenced to 
consecutive terms of life without the possibility of parole; 
from four to five years on the firearm convictions, to be served 
from and after the sentences for murder; and from nine to ten 
years on the unlawful possession of a large capacity feeding 
device convictions, to be served concurrent with the firearms 
convictions. 
3 
 
 
references to gang affiliation created a substantial likelihood 
of a miscarriage of justice.  We affirm the convictions and 
decline to grant relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
Background.  We summarize the evidence as the jury could 
have found it, reserving additional facts for later discussion.  
On July 25, 2011, a couple who lived on the second floor of an 
apartment building on Hyde Park Avenue, in the Hyde Park section 
of Boston, awoke to the sound of gunshots at around 11:55 P.M.  
They heard between six and eight gunshots that the woman 
believed came from an apartment below.  The couple looked out of 
their bedroom window, and saw six or seven men running out of 
the entrance to their building.  The woman telephoned 911 at 
11:57 P.M.4 
 
The men split up.  Some of them ran straight across Hyde 
Park Avenue.  At that moment, a passenger in a vehicle 
approaching the victim's apartment building saw three men run in 
front of her vehicle; one of the men carried what looked like a 
white pillow case.  The men got into a grey or silver sedan so 
quickly that a man's foot was hanging outside the vehicle as it 
sped away.  None of the witnesses was able to give more than a 
general description of the men, except that one man was 
                     
 
4 This neighbor placed four cellular telephone calls to 911 
that evening.  Only the calls placed at 11:57 P.M. and 12:41 
A.M. are relevant here. 
4 
 
 
heavyset;5 the witnesses could only guess at the race or 
ethnicity of the men they observed. 
 
At 12:41 A.M. on July 26, 2011, Boston police responded to 
the scene and were directed to the victim's apartment.  They 
found a large watch on the floor near the front entrance to the 
building.  Kee, dressed in a bloody shirt and underwear, was 
found lying face down on the floor just inside the apartment.  
She had suffered four gunshot wounds and multiple stab wounds, 
and she was pronounced dead at the scene.  Kee's cause of death 
was gunshot wounds to the torso and injuries to the lungs, ribs, 
and spine. 
 
Thomas, dressed in a T-shirt, shorts, and socks, was found 
in the front bedroom, lying on his back over a pile of clothing; 
his legs were bound at the ankles with black wire.  He had 
suffered seven gunshot wounds and four stab wounds to his body, 
and he was pronounced dead at the scene.  Thomas's cause of 
death was gunshot wounds to the torso and neck. 
 
The victims' apartment had been ransacked.  Broken glass 
and blood were on the floor, clothes were strewn about, and the 
cabinets and drawers were open in the kitchen and bathroom.  
There were no signs of forced entry; the front door was ajar, 
with the lock intact, and the back doors were locked from the 
                     
 
5 Fulgiam's height and weight are listed on his State police 
fingerprint card as five feet, ten inches tall and 300 pounds. 
5 
 
 
inside.  Although the officers observed no "land line" telephone 
in the apartment, they did not recover any cellular telephones.  
A curling iron with its cord cut and two knives with brownish-
red stains were found near Kee's body.  The curling iron cord 
matched the wire that was used to bind Thomas's ankles. 
 
In the front bedroom, in a tall bureau, officers found a 
packet of photographs, two of which depicted Thomas with Fulgiam 
and Corbin, at Thomas's apartment, sitting on the couch in front 
of stacks of United States currency.  Near Thomas's body 
officers found a black backpack with what appeared to be a bag 
of marijuana inside. 
 
On July 27, 2011, a subsequent search of the basement 
revealed two plastic bags of what appeared to be "crack" 
cocaine, and two digital scales.  Based on the all of the 
evidence that the police officers had found during their 
investigation, they surmised that the assailants were likely 
known to the victims and that the murders were likely the result 
of a drug robbery. 
 
In the front yard, officers recovered a loaded nine 
millimeter semiautomatic pistol with a magazine and a loaded .38 
caliber silver revolver.  A diamond encrusted ring was found on 
Hyde Park Avenue. 
 
John Golden, Thomas's best friend, testified that Thomas 
sold large amounts of marijuana and cocaine.  On the day of the 
6 
 
 
murders, Golden saw approximately $5,000 in the bureau.  When 
Golden was shown the photograph depicting Thomas, Corbin, and 
Fulgiam with the bundles of cash, Golden estimated the amount to 
be between $12,000 and $13,000.  Police were able to determine 
the date of the photograph as May 11, 2011.  Golden also 
identified the watch and the ring that had been recovered as 
belonging to Thomas.  Golden described Thomas as being 
"paranoid," so much so that he insisted that even trusted 
friends call before coming to his apartment. 
 
On July 29, 2011, a latent print from the nine millimeter 
semiautomatic pistol recovered from the scene was 
"individualized," or matched, to Fulgiam.  Thirteen spent nine 
millimeter shell casings, eight spent nine millimeter bullets, 
and four bullet fragments were recovered from the scene and from 
the victims.  Analysis of the firearms revealed that the nine 
millimeter semiautomatic contained a magazine that held twenty 
rounds of ammunition; eight were recovered in the magazine.  All 
of the bullets, bullet fragments, and shell casings had been 
fired from the nine millimeter semiautomatic pistol. 
 
A detective learned that the victims' cellular telephones 
had not been recovered, so he requested and obtained traces on 
both.  Thomas's cellular telephone records showed that a certain 
cellular telephone number was listed in Thomas's telephone 
records for July 25, 2011.  Police learned that this telephone 
7 
 
 
had been stolen that afternoon between 4:30 P.M. and 5:30 P.M.  
The owner told police that he did not recognize Thomas's 
cellular telephone number or the number later identified as 
Fulgiam's cellular telephone number, both of which were listed 
in his call detail records for July 25, 2011.  The Commonwealth 
issued administrative subpoenas for Fulgiam's cellular telephone 
call detail records and for a cellular telephone number ending 
in 2898, which was later connected to Corbin.6  The police 
discovered that Corbin and Thomas had been in contact, via short 
message service messages (text messages), or telephone calls, 
several times on July 25, 2011.  Fulgiam and Corbin also had 
been in telephonic contact that day. 
 
On August 8, 2011, two detectives interviewed Fulgiam at 
his home.  At this time the police had not sought an arrest 
warrant for Fulgiam.  Fulgiam told the detectives that he and 
Thomas had known one another since the early to mid-2000s, and 
that he knew Thomas very well.  Fulgiam admitted that he and 
Thomas were in the drug business together and that he would meet 
                     
 
6 Fulgiam's call detail and subscriber information was 
originally obtained through an administrative subpoena, 
discussed infra, issued on August 4, 2011.  On August 16, 2011, 
additional administrative subpoenas issued for both Fulgiam and 
Corbin's subscriber and call detail information.  Both Fulgiam 
and Corbin's cellular telephone records information, including 
call detail information records, subscriber information, cell 
site location information (CSLI), and, for Corbin, the content 
of text messages, were subsequently obtained through a court 
order pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006), also discussed 
infra. 
8 
 
 
with Thomas one or two times per month, at one of their homes to 
conduct business.  He estimated that it had been about one month 
since he had last met with Thomas, but could not remember 
whether it had been at his home or at Thomas's home.  He last 
communicated with Thomas via text message on July 17.  Fulgiam 
had Thomas's cellular telephone number, and he stated that he 
changed his own cellular telephone number two weeks prior7 
because a woman had been stalking him.  Fulgiam was not aware of 
Thomas having disputes with anyone and noted that Thomas had a 
lot more money than he did.  Fulgiam opined that whoever killed 
Thomas had to have been close to him. 
 
The two detectives interviewed Corbin at his home on August 
10, 2011.  At that time, he was not under arrest.  One of the 
detectives had previously been in telephonic contact with 
Corbin,8 who agreed to meet with the detectives.  Corbin told the 
detectives that he had known Thomas since Corbin was thirteen 
years old.  Corbin was equivocal about when his last 
communication with Thomas occurred; he first said it had been a 
                     
 
7 The murders occurred exactly two weeks before the day of 
Fulgiam's interview. 
 
 
8 Corbin's cellular telephone account was not listed in his 
name, nor did the address given match where Corbin was living at 
the time of his interview with police.  Corbin's cellular 
telephone service provider, Metro PCS, is an advance pay company 
which offers a plan providing thirty days of service for a 
monthly fee of forty dollars.  The company does not conduct a 
credit check or verify customer's identification information. 
9 
 
 
month prior, but later said it could have been weeks or days 
before Thomas was killed.  He stated that the last time he was 
in Thomas's apartment was on May 1, 2011, but that he had been 
in the apartment many times.  Corbin mentioned that Thomas was 
not a showy guy, and that he had a watch and ring, but only wore 
them on the weekends.  He also noted that Thomas was a smart and 
careful person and that one had to inform Thomas before coming 
to his home. 
 
On September 14, 2011, police learned that fingerprint 
analysts had individualized to Corbin's right thumbprint a 
latent print found on the curling iron that had been recovered 
from the victim's home.  On October 27, 2011, pursuant to a 
search warrant, detectives seized Corbin's cellular telephone 
ending with the number 2898 (2898 number) and discovered 
photographs of Fulgiam, as well as both Fulgiam and Thomas's 
numbers programmed into the contact list.  That same day, the 
police obtained arrest warrants for Corbin and Fulgiam. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Admission of cellular telephone records.  
a.  Fulgiam's claim.  On August 15, 2011, after a review of 
Thomas's cellular telephone records, the Commonwealth sought and 
received a court order, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006) 
(§ 2703[d] order), for the historical cell site location 
10 
 
 
information (CSLI)9 and other cellular telephone account 
information for several cellular telephone numbers that were in 
contact with Thomas's cellular telephone on July 25, 2011, the 
day of the murder.  Under the authority of the § 2703(d) order, 
the Commonwealth obtained Fulgiam's CSLI for the period from 
July 20, 2011, through July 30, 2011. 
 
A review of the CSLI associated with Fulgiam's cellular 
telephone number revealed that on the evening of July 25, 2011, 
Fulgiam's cellular telephone activated a cell tower located at 
an address which is located directly behind the victim's 
apartment, six times between 11:30 P.M. and 11:55 P.M.  The last 
time Fulgiam's cellular telephone activated the cell tower at 
that location was the same time that the neighbors awoke to 
gunshots and two minutes before one of them telephoned 911 the 
first time. 
 
Fulgiam argues that the Commonwealth improperly obtained 
the CSLI for his cellular telephone without probable cause and 
that, in any event, the application for the § 2703(d) order was 
                     
 
9 "[CSLI] 'refers to a cellular telephone service record or 
records that contain information identifying the base station 
towers and sectors that receive transmissions from a [cellular] 
telephone.'"  Commonwealth v. Estabrook, 472 Mass. 852, 853 n.2 
(2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 231 
n.1 (2014) (Augustine I), S.C., 470 Mass. 837 and 472 Mass. 448 
(2015).  "'Historical' CSLI refers to CSLI relating to and 
generated by cellular telephone use that has already occurred at 
the time of the order authorizing the disclosure of such data."  
Augustine I, supra. 
11 
 
 
insufficient to show that his CSLI would be "relevant and 
material to an ongoing criminal investigation."10  18 U.S.C. 
§ 2703(d).  We disagree. 
 
i.  Standard of review.  In Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 
Mass. 230, 232 (2014) (Augustine I), S.C., 470 Mass. 837 (2015), 
we concluded that government-compelled production of CSLI by 
cellular telephone service providers was a search in the 
                     
 
10 Fulgiam also argues that the Commonwealth relied on 
information obtained by an invalid administrative subpoena 
issued on August 4, 2011, pursuant to G. L. c. 271, § 17B, to 
support its August 15, 2011, application for a § 2703(d) order.  
We agree that this administrative subpoena was of questionable 
validity where it was signed on behalf of the assistant district 
attorney by an administrative assistant.  Section 17B requires 
strict compliance with the provision that such administrative 
subpoenas are issued by attorneys general or district attorneys.  
See Commonwealth v. Feodoroff, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 725, 727 (1997) 
(common-law exception to § 17B's requirement, which allows 
assistant attorneys general and assistant district attorneys to 
sign such subpoenas).  However, the information that the 
Commonwealth obtained pursuant to the August 4 subpoena did not 
prejudice Fulgiam.  See id. at 728.  By August 8, 2011, the 
police already had connected Fulgiam to his cellular telephone 
account when Fulgiam met with detectives and provided his 
cellular telephone number to them.  Based on this knowledge, the 
police were able to connect Fulgiam's cellular telephone number 
to the stolen cellular telephone, as the police already had the 
call detail records for that account.  The only information that 
the police were able to obtain through the August 4 subpoena 
that was not already in their possession was the fact that 
Fulgiam's cellular telephone had contact with Corbin's cellular 
telephone on July 25, 2011.  However, even without the 
connection to Corbin, the Commonwealth's application for a 
§ 2703(d) order contained sufficient facts showing that 
Fulgiam's cellular telephone information would be relevant and 
material to the ongoing criminal investigation.  Consequently, 
the information the Commonwealth obtained from Fulgiam's 
cellular telephone account from the August 4 subpoena did not 
create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
12 
 
 
constitutional sense, requiring a warrant under art. 14 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  We determined, however, 
that the warrant requirement was a "new" rule applicable only to 
those cases where the defendant raised the warrant issue before 
or during the trial and the defendant's conviction was not final 
at the time that Augustine I was decided.  See id. at 257.  
Although Fulgiam's case was on direct appeal when Augustine I 
was decided, he did not challenge the sufficiency of the 
§ 2703(d) order as a basis for access to his CSLI either before 
or during the trial.  Therefore, we review to determine "whether 
the unobjected-to admission of the CSLI evidence that was 
obtained without a search warrant created a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice."  Commonwealth v. Broom, 
474 Mass. 486, 493 (2016). 
 
ii.  Analysis.  Because Fulgiam does not have the benefit 
of Augustine I, the Commonwealth only had to meet the standard 
set forth in § 2703(d) in order to obtain Fulgiam's CSLI.  See 
Broom, 474 Mass. at 492.  Section 2703(d) requires that an order 
"shall issue only if the governmental entity offers specific and 
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, 
or the records or other information sought, are relevant and 
material to an ongoing criminal investigation."  The 
Commonwealth met that burden. 
13 
 
 
 
The application recited the following facts that, taken 
together, established reasonable grounds to believe that 
Fulgiam's CSLI was "relevant and material" to the ongoing 
investigation into the Thomas and Kee murders.  First, based on 
the review of Thomas's cellular telephone records, the police 
were aware that Thomas's cellular telephone was involved in an 
ongoing text message dialog with the stolen cellular telephone 
between 11:05 P.M. and 11:32 P.M. on the night of the murders 
and that the stolen cellular telephone was in contact with 
Fulgiam's cellular telephone twice that day.  Fulgiam's last 
communication with the stolen cellular telephone was a text 
message sent at 11:37 P.M., at or near the time of the murders.  
At 11:57 P.M., shortly after this last contact between Fulgiam's 
cellular telephone and the stolen cellular telephone, the police 
received the first 911 call for a disturbance at the victims' 
apartment.  Second, Fulgiam had admitted to police that he knew 
Thomas and that they were in the drug business together.  Based 
on the affiant's training and experience, that business 
connection, the lack of forced entry into the apartment 
(suggesting that the victims knew the assailants), and the 
ransacked condition of the crime scene placed Fulgiam's cellular 
telephone records squarely within the realm of information 
"relevant and material" to the ongoing investigation into the 
murder of the victims.  Thus, Fulgiam cannot demonstrate that 
14 
 
 
the § 2703(d) order was invalid and that as a consequence, the 
Commonwealth's access to his CSLI created a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See Broom, 474 Mass. at 
493. 
 
b.  Corbin's claims.  Using the § 2703(d) order issued on 
August 15, the Commonwealth obtained Corbin's cellular telephone 
subscriber and call detail information, CSLI, and text messages 
for the period from July 20 through July 30, 2011.  Corbin, like 
Fulgiam, did not challenge the Commonwealth's access to these 
records either before or during the trial.  On appeal, however, 
Corbin argues that the Commonwealth's access to and use of these 
records at trial was unlawful on statutory and constitutional 
grounds, and that his trial counsel was constitutionally 
ineffective in failing to file a motion to suppress the records.  
More specifically, Corbin claims that (1) the application for 
the § 2703(d) order (§ 2703[d] application) failed to make the 
required showing that the records were "relevant and material" 
to an ongoing criminal investigation; and (2) the access to and 
use of the content of his text messages at trial was improper 
because the § 2703(d) application failed to establish probable 
cause to believe "that a particularly described offense has 
been, is being, or is about to be committed, and that [the 
content of the text messages being sought] will produce evidence 
of such offense or will aid in the apprehension of a person who 
15 
 
 
the applicant has probable cause to believe has committed, is 
committing, or is about to commit such offense" as required by 
18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) and art 14.11  Augustine I, 467 Mass. at 256, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Connolly, 454 Mass. 808, 825 (2009).  
These claims fail. 
 
i.  Standard of review.  Where, as here, the defendant has 
been convicted of murder in the first degree, we review his 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to determine whether 
the alleged lapse created a "substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice," a standard more favorable to the 
defendant than the constitutional standard otherwise applied 
under Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974).  
Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 681-682 (1992), S.C., 469 
Mass. 447 (2014).  We focus more broadly on whether there was 
error and, if so, whether any such error "was likely to have 
influenced the jury's conclusion."  Id.  If the defendant's 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is based on the 
failure to file a motion to suppress, he must "show that the 
motion to suppress would have been successful, and that failing 
to bring such a motion . . . created a substantial likelihood of 
a miscarriage of justice."  Commonwealth v. Banville, 457 Mass. 
530, 534 (2010). 
                     
 
11 Corbin does not challenge the use of his cellular 
telephone CSLI at trial. 
16 
 
 
 
If the failure to file a motion to suppress resulted from 
counsel's tactical decision not to do so, the defendant must 
demonstrate that this strategic choice was "manifestly 
unreasonable" when made (quotations and citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 664, 674 (2015).  Here, 
however, the record is unclear as to whether counsel's decision 
was tactical, as the defendant did not file a motion for new 
trial on this ground, clarifying the record on trial counsel's 
reason for his choice. 
 
ii.  Likelihood of success on the motion to suppress.  
Because the analysis of the likelihood of success on a motion to 
suppress the subscriber and call detail information is governed 
by a legal standard that is different from that applicable to 
text messages, we consider each category of information 
separately. 
 
A.  Subscriber and call detail information.  To secure a 
§ 2703(d) order allowing access to subscriber and call detail 
information, the application must establish "specific and 
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that the [information sought is] relevant and material 
to an ongoing criminal investigation."  18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).  
Corbin argues that the Commonwealth's application was 
insufficient to meet this test.  We disagree. 
17 
 
 
 
The § 2703(d) application, reciting a series of calls and 
text messages between Thomas and Corbin on the day of the 
murders,12 was more than sufficient to establish that Corbin's 
subscriber and call detail information was "relevant and 
material" to the investigation into the murders of Thomas and 
Kee.  Id.  The application included information that (1) Thomas 
and Corbin personally knew one another; (2) there appeared to be 
no forced entry at the crime scene, suggesting the victims knew 
the assailants; (3) the crime scene had been ransacked and, 
based on the affiant's training and experience, the murders 
appeared to be a result of a drug robbery; (4) drug dealers tend 
to communicate via cellular telephone to coordinate drug 
purchases; and (5) on the day of the murders, Corbin's cellular 
telephone number had multiple telephonic communications, 
including text messages, with both Fulgiam and Thomas.  Given 
these facts, a motion to suppress on this ground was 
demonstrably lacking in merit.  Thus, Corbin has failed to meet 
his burden to establish that the failure to file a motion to 
suppress the use of the subscriber and call detail information 
created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
                     
12 After securing Thomas's cellular telephone records, the 
police focused their investigation on the calls to and from 
Thomas's cellular telephone.  The Commonwealth had associated 
Corbin with his cellular telephone account prior to its 
§ 2703(d) application and used such information in the 
application. 
18 
 
 
 
B.  Text messages.  Corbin argues that counsel was 
ineffective in failing to file a motion to suppress the content 
of the text messages where the Commonwealth obtained access 
without a warrant under 18 U.S.C. § 2073(a) and art. 14.  We 
agree that, on both statutory and constitutional grounds, a 
warrant was required to obtain access to the content of Corbin's 
text messages and that a motion to suppress challenging the 
Commonwealth's access on these grounds likely would have been 
successful. 
 
I.  Warrant requirement for access under § 2703(a).  Access 
to the "contents of wire or electronic communications in 
electronic storage" is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a), which 
provides that "[a] governmental entity may require the 
disclosure by a provider of electronic communication service[13] 
of the contents of a wire or electronic communication, that is 
in electronic storage in an electronic communications system for 
one hundred and eighty days or less only pursuant to a warrant 
. . . (in the case of a State court, using State warrant 
procedures) by a court of competent jurisdiction" (emphases 
supplied).  Because it is undisputed that Corbin's "electronic 
communications" (text messages) met the temporal requirement of 
                     
 
13 The Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 
(2006), defines an electronic communication service as "any 
service which provides users thereof the ability to send or 
receive wire or electronic communications."  18 U.S.C. 
§ 2510(15) (2006).  See 18 U.S.C. § 2711. 
19 
 
 
§ 2703(a), the dispositive issue is whether this content was 
held in "electronic storage" by "a provider of electronic 
communication service."  Id. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the warrant requirement of 
§ 2703(a) does not apply to Corbin because text messages are 
held by a provider of a "remote computing service"14 rather than 
an "electronic communication service" and that, as a 
consequence, access may be obtained without a warrant under 
§ 2703(b).  We reject the Commonwealth's argument because we 
agree with the defendant that the text messages at issue here 
were held by a provider of an "electronic communication service" 
for less than 180 days, which triggered the warrant 
requirement.15 
                     
 
14 A "remote computing service" is defined as "the provision 
to the public of computer storage or processing services by 
means of an electronic communications system."  18 U.S.C. 
§ 2711(2) (2006).  In practice, this phrase is understood to 
refer to the use of "remote computers [to] store extra files or 
process large amounts of data" by commercial customers.  See 
Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a 
Legislator's Guide to Amending It, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1208, 
1213-1214 (2004). 
 
 
15 General Laws c. 271, § 17B, is the analog to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2703(a), which treats the government's access to the content 
of electronic communications in a different manner from 
noncontent information.  Both laws demand a higher standard of 
proof, beyond "relevant and material to an ongoing criminal 
investigation," 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), to access the content of 
electronic communications.  Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) 
(allowing access to content of electronic communications stored 
in electronic communications service for 180 days or less only 
pursuant to warrant), with G. L. c. 271, § 17B (specifically 
20 
 
 
 
Although the Supreme Court has not defined "electronic 
communication service" as used in § 2703(a), we adopt the 
approach in Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892 
(9th Cir. 2008), overruled on other grounds sub nom. City of 
Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 560 U.S. 756 (2010), where the court's 
analysis focused on the actual services offered to the consumer 
to determine whether the entity is a provider of "electronic 
communication service" or "remote computing service."  See id. 
at 900, 901.  Relying on the plain language of the statute, the 
Quon court concluded that the definition of "electronic 
communications service" as "any service which provides users . . 
. the ability to send or receive wire or electronic 
communications[,]" 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2006), applied "[o]n 
its face" to the text messaging service at issue in that case.  
Id. at 901.  That same logic applies here to the text message 
service provided by Corbin's cellular telephone carrier. 
 
This interpretation is consistent with the heightened 
protection for the content of electronic communications.  In 
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014), the United States 
Supreme Court held that police officers must secure a search 
warrant prior to searching a cellular telephone, as modern 
cellular telephones contain "vast quantities of [digital] 
                                                                  
excluding access to content of electronic communications from 
statute). 
21 
 
 
personal information."  Id. at 2485.  See United States v. 
Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 286 (6th Cir. 2010) (electronic mail 
messages "require[] strong protection under the Fourth 
Amendment; otherwise, the Fourth Amendment would prove an 
ineffective guardian of private communication, an essential 
purpose it has long been recognized to serve").  A search of the 
content of text messages implicates similar privacy interests.  
Just as the government may not intercept private telephone calls 
or written communications without a warrant, we conclude that 
the Commonwealth may not obtain the content of text messages 
without a warrant.  See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 
114 (1984) (warrantless searches of letters and other sealed 
packages is presumptively unreasonable); Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 
II.  Warrant requirement under art. 14.  Because the United 
States Supreme Court has yet to decide whether access to the 
content of text messages requires compliance with the warrant 
requirement of § 2703(a), we consider the issue under art. 14, 
as articulated in Augustine I.  We conclude that a warrant was 
required to obtain access to the content of Corbin's text 
messages.  Access to the content of a text message constitutes a 
search requiring a showing of probable cause which in this 
context means "probable cause to believe 'that the particularly 
described offense has been, is being, or is about to be 
22 
 
 
committed, and that [the text message content being sought] will 
produce evidence of such offense or will aid in the apprehension 
of a person who the applicant has probable cause to believe has 
committed, is committing, or is about to commit such offense.'"  
Augustine I, 467 Mass. at 256, quoting Connolly, 454 Mass. at 
825. 
 
A warrant with probable cause was required because Corbin 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of his 
text messages.  "The measure of the defendant's [reasonable] 
expectation of privacy is (1) whether the defendant has 
manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of 
the search, and (2) whether society is willing to recognize that 
expectation as reasonable."  Commonwealth v. Montanez, 410 Mass. 
290, 301 (1991).  See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., 
concurring).  As the Commonwealth notes, the defendant did not 
file a motion for a new trial or a motion to suppress, and for 
that reason, the judge did not hold an evidentiary hearing to 
determine whether Corbin had a subjective expectation of privacy 
in the contents of the text messages from the 2898 number.  The 
record, however, establishes that Corbin had a subjective 
expectation of privacy in the content of his text messages.  See 
Montanez, supra at 301. 
 
As mentioned above, Corbin provided the police with his 
cellular telephone number prior to his arrest.  At trial he 
23 
 
 
offered the CSLI associated with the cellular telephone account 
as evidence that he was not in Hyde Park on July 25, 2011, 
implicitly claiming ownership of the cellular telephone account; 
and the cellular telephone associated with the 2898 number was 
seized from Corbin pursuant to a search warrant prior to his 
arrest.  Moreover, the Commonwealth consistently attributed the 
cellular telephone account to Corbin.  See Commonwealth v. 
Augustine, 472 Mass. 448, 452 n.6 (2015) (Augustine II) 
(cellular telephone owned by another treated as belonging to 
defendant where he paid bills and used it exclusively).  To be 
sure, the fact that a defendant's name is not listed as the 
subscriber of the account could diminish his subjective 
expectation of privacy.  However, on the facts of this case, 
Corbin's implicit acknowledgment of ownership satisfied his 
burden.  See Commonwealth v. Genest, 371 Mass. 834, 836 (1977) 
(defendant has burden to show reasonable expectation of 
privacy). 
 
Similarly, Corbin had an objectively reasonable expectation 
of privacy in his text messages.  In Augustine I, 467 Mass. at 
255, we recognized an objectively reasonable expectation of 
privacy in a defendant's CSLI records.  We further stated "that 
the nature of cellular telephone technology and CSLI and the 
character of cellular telephone use in our current society 
render the third-party doctrine of [United States v.] Miller[, 
24 
 
 
425 U.S. 435 (1976),] and Smith [v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 
(1979),] inapposite."  Augustine I, supra at 245.  The same 
result applies here with respect to the content of text messages 
stored on a cellular telephone service provider's servers. 
 
Because we conclude that probable cause was required to 
obtain the content of Corbin's text messages, we next consider 
whether the application established the requisite probable cause 
for access to Corbin's text messages.  See id at 256. 
 
The application established a personal relationship between 
Thomas and Corbin, that Corbin was in telephonic contact with 
both Thomas and Fulgiam on the day of the murders, and that the 
circumstances of the murders suggested a connection to drugs.  
Although the fact that Thomas and Corbin may have used their 
cellular telephones to communicate with each other on the day of 
the murders elevated their relationship to a matter of 
importance in the investigation, it did not, without more, 
justify intrusion into the content of that communication.16  In 
                     
 
16 On July 25, 2011, between 2:15 P.M. and 7:27 P.M., Corbin 
and Thomas exchanged the following text messages: 
 
 
Thomas:  "What hapnd bro i need that" 
 
 
"I need 2 c u like yesterday i have 2 get a whip manana n i 
 
def need that bread i would appreciate if u didnt hold me 
 
up" 
 
 
"This is what i didnt want 2 happen we discussed this b4 
 
bro straightn me first remember dnt make it bad bro" 
 
25 
 
 
contrast to Fulgiam, nothing in the application indicated a drug 
connection between Corbin and Thomas, such that Corbin might 
have a motive for murder.  Other than the cellular telephone 
communication between Thomas and Corbin, the application failed 
to recite any facts that might have implicated Corbin in the 
crimes or suggested that the content of his text messages would 
aid in the apprehension of a suspect in the murders. See 
Augustine I, 467 Mass. at 256.  Given these shortcomings in the 
application, we conclude that the Commonwealth failed to 
establish the requisite probable cause and, therefore, 
improperly obtained the content of Corbin's text messages. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that, in any event, Corbin lacked 
standing to challenge the access to the content of the text 
messages because the cellular telephone account was held under a 
                                                                  
 
Corbin:  "Bro u know i do what i can 2 get u first but i 
 
called u.  I cant hold these niggers up." 
 
 
Thomas:  "n my bread u feel me wit out me it neva would 
 
have been there 2 flip anything" 
 
 
"U cant hold anyone up when its not there bread thats free 
 
money i should have mine off the top than play with urs not 
 
mine bro we talkd about this ur flip" 
 
 
Corbin:  "I see u going through some thing cause we never 
 
kicked it like this.  im going 2 put as much 2gether 4 u 
 
not in 2 long" 
 
 
Thomas:  "Good look lol naw cause someone did somethng 
 
simular just cause i say im somewhre u cant assumd my 
 
schedule or do ur own thng thats all im tryna say talk" 
 
 
"2 you when u come bro" 
26 
 
 
fictitious name or held by someone other than Corbin.  "A 
defendant has standing either if [he] has a possessory interest 
in the place searched or in the property seized or if [he] was 
present when the search occurred."  Commonwealth v. Williams, 
453 Mass. 203, 208 (2009).  The Commonwealth argues that the 
defendant has not made the requisite showing that he had a 
possessory interest in the cellular telephone account for the 
2898 number because Corbin did not move for a new trial and file 
an affidavit averring such a possessory interest in the account, 
or present any affirmative evidence showing such an interest.  
However, the Commonwealth consistently has asserted that the 
listed account holder for the 2898 number was Corbin.  In its 
§ 2703(d) application, the Commonwealth associated the 2898 
number with Corbin.  Throughout the trial the Commonwealth 
asserted that Corbin sent the text messages it offered in 
evidence, and it offered Corbin's CSLI to show that there was no 
activity on his cellular telephone during the murders.  
Moreover, a detective testified that another detective was in 
telephonic contact with Corbin using the 2898 number.  Finally, 
the cellular telephone associated with the 2898 number was 
seized from Corbin and searched pursuant to search warrant.17  
                     
 
17 The Commonwealth obtained Corbin's cellular telephone 
pursuant to a search warrant on October 27, 2011; however, it 
previously had obtained the content of his text messages 
pursuant to its August 15 § 2703(d) application. 
27 
 
 
Given these facts, Corbin has standing to challenge the 
warrantless search of the content of the text messages sent from  
the 2898 number.18  See Williams, supra at 208. 
 
Last, we reject the Commonwealth's argument that customers 
of cellular service providers such as Metro PCS, which are 
advance-pay services, assume the risk that the content of 
information stored on its servers will be disclosed to third 
parties.  To support its argument, the Commonwealth notes that 
companies such as Metro PCS do not conduct credit checks or 
verify the identity of its customers, and that as a consequence, 
customers who engage the services of such companies have a less 
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy.  In determining a 
subscriber's reasonable expectation of privacy, we decline to 
distinguish between those who choose not to submit to a credit 
check, or do not have credit, or are not the named account 
                     
 
18 Corbin established standing here, in part, through his 
implicit acknowledgment of ownership of the cellular telephone 
account associated with the 2898 number, prior to and during 
trial.  We note that a defendant, connected to a cellular 
telephone account with a cellular telephone service provider 
under an assumed name, will not automatically have standing to 
challenge the search of the information relating to the cellular 
telephone account.  Such a defendant, as here, must establish 
both standing and a reasonable expectation of privacy in order 
to challenge such a search.  See Commonwealth v. Williams, 453 
Mass. 203, 207-208 (2009).  Additionally, we acknowledge that 
the posture of this case made the determination of standing and 
reasonable expectation of privacy more difficult.  The better 
practice is to assert this claim through a motion for a new 
trial and present affirmative evidence to support a defendant's 
entitlement to challenge such a search. 
28 
 
 
holder on a cellular telephone account and those customers who 
identify themselves or have established credit. 
 
iii.  Substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
We now ask whether the admission of the text messages, which 
could have been suppressed, created a substantial likelihood of 
a miscarriage of justice and "likely . . . influenced the jury's 
conclusion." Williams, 453 Mass. at 205, quoting Wright, 411 
Mass. at 682.  We conclude that it did not. 
 
Corbin's defense was that he was innocent and that Thomas, 
as a high level drug dealer, was in a dangerous business.  
Corbin claimed that many people knew Thomas was a drug dealer 
and, for that reason, he was a target for drug robbery.  
Corbin's argument that the content of his text messages was the 
only evidence from which the jury could find a motive and 
opportunity for Corbin to commit the murders is belied by the 
record.  Much of the information about Thomas's status as a high 
level drug dealer came in through other evidence.19 
 
In addition, based on evidence wholly independent of the 
text messages, Corbin's involvement in the murders was not a 
                     
 
19 Thomas's best friend testified that Thomas was selling "a 
few thousand dollars" worth of marijuana per week and 
approximately $4,000 or $5,000 worth of cocaine per week.  
Additionally, that friend testified that it was common in the 
drug business for a higher level dealer to supply drugs to 
"street-level" dealers for sale, and the jury heard evidence 
that Fulgiam admitted to being in the drug business with Thomas 
and that Thomas had a lot more money than Fulgiam. 
29 
 
 
close question.  The discovery of Corbin's fingerprint on the 
barrel of the curling iron found near Kee's body was highly 
inculpatory, as was the evidence of Corbin's telephonic contact 
with Fulgiam, Thomas, and the stolen cellular telephone on the 
day of the murders.  The inference that Corbin was in possession 
of the cellular telephone stolen a few hours before the murders, 
and that he used this telephone to contact Thomas on multiple 
occasions, including within two hours of the murders, also was 
highly inculpatory.  The jury also heard evidence that Thomas, 
Corbin, and Fulgiam were involved in the drug business together 
and that the murders were likely connected to a drug robbery.  
Moreover, although we recognize that trial counsel was faced 
with the task of downplaying the impact of the text messages 
once they were admitted in evidence, he affirmatively used this 
content in his closing argument to establish that (1) Thomas had 
a significant amount of drugs and money in his apartment most of 
the time; (2) Thomas was a "tempting" target for robbery; and 
(3) the nature of Thomas's business was such that persons other 
than Corbin could have a motive to kill Thomas.  Against the 
backdrop of this highly incriminating evidence, we cannot say 
that the jury's exposure to Corbin's text messages likely 
influenced the jury's verdict.  Therefore, Corbin cannot meet 
his burden to establish that trial counsel's failure to file a 
30 
 
 
motion to suppress the content of his text messages created a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
2.  Fingerprint analysis.  The Commonwealth presented the 
following evidence to prove its contention that the fingerprint 
analysis placed both defendants at the scene of the crime during 
the murders.  Although police criminalists were able to obtain 
several latent fingerprints20 from items at the scene, 
ultimately, only five latent prints were individualized21 to 
defendants.  Four latent prints were recovered from the magazine 
of the nine millimeter semiautomatic pistol, and one thumbprint 
was recovered from the barrel of the curling iron found near 
Kee's body. 
 
During her testimony, a fingerprint analyst explained that 
latent print analysts compare the latent prints recovered from 
crime scenes to known prints, i.e., fingerprint impressions 
taken in a controlled setting, either in ink or on a scanner.  
Insofar as relevant here, police produced a card, known as a 
"ten-print" card, which includes the ten fingerprint 
                     
 
20 A latent print is "a fingerprint that generally can't be 
seen right away, and [one] would need further processing in 
order for it to be seen." 
 
 
21 Individualization is "when a latent print examiner comes 
to a conclusion that there is a sufficient amount of detail of 
quality and quantity of those details between the latent print 
and the known fingerprint to arrive at that conclusion, to 
establish that the latent print originated from the known print 
or that donor." 
31 
 
 
impressions, the name of the person who is being fingerprinted, 
typically a signature of that person, and other identifying 
information, such as date of birth and address.  Police latent 
print analysts access the known prints through certain 
databases.  The latent print analysts use a method known as 
analysis, comparison, evaluation, and verification, or ACE-V, to 
compare the latent prints recovered to known prints. 
 
With respect to Corbin's fingerprint, the analyst explained 
that she began by using the ACE-V methodology to determine that 
the latent print had sufficient quality and quantity of detail 
for comparison purposes.  Next, she obtained possible matches 
through a fingerprint database, including the ten-print card of 
Corbin that was maintained by the State police and created on 
July 7, 2005.22  Finally, after performing the ACE-V methodology 
again, the analyst "individualized the right thumb" of Corbin to 
the latent print recovered from the curling iron. 
 
With respect to Fulgiam's fingerprints, four of seven 
latent fingerprints that were recovered from the magazine of the 
nine millimeter semiautomatic pistol were individualized to him.  
The analyst explained, over objection, that she generated the 
Fulgiam's known ten-print card, maintained by the State police 
and created on July 18, 2011, for comparison with the recovered 
                     
 
22 Corbin's ten-print card was admitted in evidence over 
objection. 
32 
 
 
latent prints.23  Next, applying the ACE-V methodology, she 
individualized the four latent prints to Fulgiam. 
 
a.  Ten-print cards.  The defendants argue that the judge 
erred in admitting the ten-print cards under the business 
records exception to the hearsay rule.  See G. L. c. 233, § 78; 
Mass. G. Evid. § 803(6)(A) & note (2017).  More specifically, 
the defendants argue that because the statements underlying the 
ten-print card were made by persons having no business duty to 
report the information accurately, the statements fall outside 
the scope of the business records exception to the hearsay rule.  
We disagree. 
 
The business records exception to the hearsay rule 
provides, in relevant part:  "a writing or record, . . . made as 
a memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence or 
event, shall not be inadmissible in any civil or criminal 
proceeding as evidence of the facts therein stated because it is 
transcribed or because it is hearsay or self-serving."  G. L. 
c. 233, § 78.  A record falls within the scope of the business 
records exception to the hearsay rule, set forth in § 78, "if 
the judge finds that it was (1) made in good faith; (2) made in 
the regular course of business; (3) made before the action 
                     
 
23 As discussed infra, both Corbin and Fulgiam vigorously 
contested the assertion that the ten-print cards associated with 
them actually contained their fingerprints because the ten-print 
cards lacked certain identifying information, including both 
Corbin and Fulgiam's signatures. 
33 
 
 
began; and (4) the regular course of business to make the record 
at or about the time of the transaction or occurrences 
recorded."  Beal Bank, SSB v. Eurich, 444 Mass. 813, 815 (2005), 
citing DiMarzi v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 389 Mass. 85, 105 
(1983).  If such findings are made, the record "is presumed to 
be reliable and therefore admissible."  Wingate v. Emery Air 
Freight Corp., 385 Mass. 402, 406 (1982). 
 
This presumption, however, does not automatically extend to 
the out-of-court statements made by a secondary source that the 
record preparer relies on when creating the record.  The 
essential element underlying the presumption of reliability is 
the theory that "entries in these records are routinely made by 
those charged with the responsibility of making accurate entries 
and are relied on in the course of doing business."  Id.  Where 
the person providing information to the preparer is unconnected 
to the business, and thus is under no business duty to provide 
accurate information, this essential element is lost.  Although 
§ 78 provides that preparer's personal knowledge (or lack 
thereof) goes to the record's weight, not its admissibility, 
this provision does not negate the requirement that, where the 
information contained within the record is offered for its 
truth, the source from which the preparer obtained the 
information "must carry the same indicia of reliability, arising 
34 
 
 
from regularity and business motives, that bring his own act of 
recording the information within the statutory exception."  Id. 
 
To demonstrate that the preparer's hearsay source bears the 
same indicia of reliability as the preparer, the proponent need 
not produce each speaker.  Beal Bank, SSB, 444 Mass. at 816.  
Rather, the proponent need only present evidence demonstrating 
that the hearsay source "reported the information as a matter of 
business duty or business routine."  Wingate, 385 Mass. at 406.  
Such was the case in Beal Bank, SSB, where the proponent bank 
introduced, as its own business record, a printout of a report 
produced and provided to it by the bank's loan servicing agent 
(agent).  Beal Bank SSB, supra at 816.  In determining that the 
judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the document as 
a business record, we noted that because the agent serviced the 
bank's loans pursuant to a contract, the bank manager's 
testimony regarding the records was sufficient to support the 
admission of the documents.  Id. at 817.  Key to this 
determination was the existence of a business relationship 
between the bank and it agent.  We noted, "this is not a case 
where the bank is simply receiving information from another 
business.  Rather, [the agent] is the bank's servicing agent; it 
has a business duty [to accurately report] the information to 
the bank; and the bank routinely accesses and relies on that 
information."  Id. 
35 
 
 
 
In this case, the Commonwealth introduced two ten-print 
cards created by the State police, each of which bore ten 
fingerprints and identifying information associated with the 
defendants.24  As a threshold matter, we determine that the ten-
print cards meet the statutory requirements under the business 
records exception.25  The admissibility of the identifying 
information provided by the persons being fingerprinted and 
reflected on the ten-print card, however, is not so easily 
established.  Unlike in Beal Bank, SSB, here, the persons being 
fingerprinted had neither a contractual obligation nor a 
business duty to provide accurate and reliable identifying 
information.  Thus, the protections that "arise[] from 
regularity and business motives,"  Wingate, 385 Mass. at 406, 
are inapplicable here. 
                     
 
24 Specifically, one of the ten-print cards reflected 
Corbin's name, aliases, date of birth, sex, race, place of 
birth, height, weight, eye and hair color, and Social Security 
number.  The other reflected Fulgiam's name, date of birth, sex, 
race, place of birth, height, weight, and eye and hair color.  
Neither ten-print card reflected the signature of the person 
fingerprinted, although the ten-print card provides space for 
such information. 
 
 
25 The Commonwealth's witness, a State police trooper, 
testified that the ten-print records were maintained in the 
State police's identification unit, located in Sudbury, and 
confirmed that such records were typically produced, entered, 
and maintained for administrative purposes in good faith, in the 
ordinary course of business of the State police.  The trooper 
also confirmed that the ten-print cards were created prior to 
the commencement of the case. 
36 
 
 
 
Here, the officer who creates the ten-print card has a duty 
to ensure that the person who is being fingerprinted is 
accurately identified.  Otherwise, such cards would have little 
value to law enforcement.  Moreover, G. L. c. 268, § 34A, 
states:  "[w]hoever knowingly and willfully furnishes a false 
name or Social Security number to a law enforcement officer or 
law enforcement official following an arrest shall be punished 
by a fine or not more than $1,000 or by imprisonment in a house 
of correction for not more than one year or by both such fine 
and imprisonment."  Therefore, based on the officers' duty to 
ensure the ten-print cards are created with accurate 
information, and the arrestees' legal obligation to provide 
accurate information, we conclude that the identifying 
information on the cards is reliable and brings the identifying 
evidence reflected on the ten-print card within the scope of the 
business records exception to the hearsay rule.  See Wingate, 
385 Mass. at 406. 
 
The defendants argue that the ten-print cards do not fall 
within the scope of the business records exception to the 
hearsay rule because the Commonwealth failed to present evidence 
that the person taking the fingerprints verified the identities 
of the persons fingerprinted.  See United States v. Vigneau, 187 
F.3d 70, 77 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1172 (2000) 
(admission of sender's name, address, and telephone number 
37 
 
 
reflected on Western Union "To Send Money" form for truth was 
error where Western Union did not have practice of verifying 
such information).  Although we agree that verification may be a 
best practice, we conclude that the presence or absence of 
independent verification bears on the weight of the record 
rather than its admissibility under the business records 
exception.  In addition, the defendants point out that important 
information, including signatures of the person taking the 
fingerprints, and signatures of the persons being fingerprinted 
are missing.  These issues also go to the weight, which may be 
subject to intense scrutiny on cross-examination, rather than 
the admissibility of the evidence. 
 
We are also not persuaded by Corbin's argument that the 
ten-print cards were inadmissible because the Commonwealth 
presented testimony from a witness who did not actually take or 
maintain the ten-print cards.  Section 78 makes clear, as has 
this court, that the admissibility of a document under the 
business records exception does not turn on the personal 
knowledge of the record's preparer.  See Wingate, 385 Mass. at 
406, quoting G. L. c. 233, § 78 ("'personal knowledge by the 
entrant or maker' is a matter affecting the weight [rather than 
the admissibility] of the record").  Accordingly, we conclude 
38 
 
 
that the ten-print were properly admitted under the business 
records exception to the hearsay rule.26 
 
Last, the defendants argue that the admission of the ten-
print cards violated the right of confrontation as guaranteed by 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 
12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  We disagree.  
The Supreme Court of the United States has made clear that the 
confrontation clause "guarantees a defendant the opportunity to 
confront any person, in the 'crucible of cross examination,' 
whose 'testimonial' statements are introduced against him."  
Commonwealth v. Siny Van Tran, 460 Mass. 535, 552 (2011), 
quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52, 61 (2004).  
Similarly, art. 12 "commands that 'every subject shall have a 
right . . . to meet the witnesses against him face to face.'"  
Commonwealth v. Amirault, 424 Mass. 618, 628 (1997), quoting 
art. 12.  "It is the testimonial character of any item of 
evidence that triggers the confrontation right, notwithstanding 
its admissibility under statute, State rule, or a common-law 
hearsay exception."  Siny Van Tran, 460 Mass. at 552, citing 
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 323 (2009).  
However, "[m]ost of the hearsay exceptions covered statements 
                     
 
26 Because of our conclusion, we need not address Corbin's 
argument that trial counsel's failure to object to the validity 
of the ten-print card constituted ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
39 
 
 
that by their nature were not testimonial -- for example, 
business records or statements in furtherance of a conspiracy."  
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 324, citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56.  
The Court clarified, "[b]usiness and public records are 
generally admissible absent confrontation not because they 
qualify under an exception to the hearsay rules, but because -- 
having been created for the administration of an entity's 
affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or proving some 
fact at trial -- they are not testimonial."  Melendez-Diaz, 
supra. 
 
Fingerprint records are nontestimonial because they are 
created for the "administration of an entity's affairs" rather 
than to establish or prove some fact at trial.  Commonwealth v. 
Weeks, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 5 (2010).  See Melendez-Diaz, 557 
U.S. at 324.  Here, the trooper testified that ten-print cards 
are created in the ordinary course of business in good faith, 
and Corbin and Fulgiam's ten-print cards were created prior to 
the commencement of the trial.  The ten-print cards were 
business records under G. L. c. 233, § 78.  Because the ten-
print cards are business records, we conclude that the admission 
of the ten-print cards did not violate the defendants' right to 
confront witnesses against them protected by the Sixth Amendment 
and art. 12. 
40 
 
 
 
b.  Testimony of fingerprint analyst.  The defendants 
challenge the admission of the Commonwealth's fingerprint expert 
witness testimony on several grounds.  The defendants first 
argue that the Commonwealth's expert witness improperly 
testified to the result of her fingerprint analysis in absolute 
terms, stating that she had individualized the defendants' 
fingerprints to prints found at the scene of the crime.  
According to the defendants, the introduction of expert 
fingerprint testimony stating the results of fingerprint 
analysis in absolute terms is inconsistent with recent science 
questioning the accuracy and reliability of fingerprint analysis 
and the ACE-V methodology.  Because the defendants did not 
object to this aspect of the testimony at trial, our inquiry is 
whether any error created a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  Wright, 411 Mass. at 682. 
 
We have on several occasions addressed the issue of the 
ACE-V methodology and expert testimony based on it.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Gambora, 457 Mass. 715, 724-728 (2010), and 
Commonwealth v. Patterson, 445 Mass. 626, 641-655 (2005).  In 
Gambora, supra at 724, we discussed in great depth a 2009 report 
published by the National Research Council for the National 
Academy of Sciences (NAS Report), which raised several issues 
regarding the reliability of certain aspects of the ACE-V 
41 
 
 
methodology and the expert testimony that relies upon it.27  The 
central issue raised in the NAS Report was "the need to prevent 
overstatement of the accuracy of fingerprint comparisons, and 
for additional research."  Commonwealth v. Joyner, 467 Mass. 
176, 181 (2014), quoting Gambora, supra at 726.  Although we 
stated that "courts historically have found fingerprint evidence 
to be admissible," Joyner, supra at 180, quoting Patterson, 445 
Mass. at 644, we also noted that "[t]estimony to the effect that 
a latent print matches, or is 'individualized' to, a known 
                     
 
27 In Gambora we stated: 
 
 
"The [NAS] report does not appear to question the 
underlying theory which grounds fingerprint identification 
evidence; as the report states, there is scientific 
evidence supporting the theory that fingerprints are unique 
to each person and do not change over a person's 
life. . . . However, the NAS report adds, '[u]niqueness and 
persistence are necessary conditions for friction ridge 
identification [i.e., fingerprint identification] to be 
feasible, but those conditions do not . . . guarantee that 
prints from two different people are always sufficiently 
different that they cannot be confused, or that two 
impressions made by the same finger will also be 
sufficiently similar to be discerned as coming from the 
same source'" (citations omitted). 
 
Commonwealth v. Gambora, 457 Mass. 715, 724-725 (2010), citing 
National Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the 
United States, A Path Forward 143-144 & n.34 (2009) (NAS 
Report).  Moreover, we stated that although the NAS Report does 
not draw the conclusion that fingerprint evidence lacks such 
reliability that courts should no longer deem it admissible, the 
report does "stress the subjective nature of the judgments that 
must be made by the fingerprint examiner at every step of the 
ACE-V process, including an examiner's ultimate conclusion that 
a latent print is 'individualized' to a specific, identified, 
known print."  Gambora, supra at 725, citing NAS Report at 139, 
141. 
42 
 
 
print, if it is to be offered, should be presented as an 
opinion, not a fact, and opinions expressing absolute certainty 
about, or the infallibility of, an 'individualization' of a 
print should be avoided."  Gambora, supra at 729 n.22. 
 
The defendants contend that the fingerprint expert witness 
failed to heed this court's cautionary advice and presented her 
findings based on her application of the ACE-V methodology to 
latent prints found on the scene as fact rather than opinion.  
We agree, but we are persuaded that the testimony did not create 
a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Wright, 
411 Mass. at 682. 
 
Fingerprint analysts testifying as expert witnesses must 
clearly frame their findings in the form of an opinion to avoid 
improper testimony.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 702 & note (2017).  
See also Joyner, 467 Mass. at 183 n.9 ("Gambora permits a 
fingerprint expert to opine on whether two fingerprints match," 
thus it is "helpful" to ask expert to testify as to his or her 
opinion).  Here, the analyst testified that individualization 
signifies that the print examiner has "come[] to the conclusion 
that there is a sufficient amount of quality and quantity of 
those details between the latent print and the known fingerprint 
. . . to establish that the latent [print] originated from the 
known print or that donor."  She testified on several occasions 
43 
 
 
that she individualized fingerprints of the defendants to latent 
prints found at the scene of the crime. 
 
However, portions of the analyst's testimony implicitly 
suggested the fallibility of fingerprint analysis.  Contrast 
Commonwealth v. Wadlington, 467 Mass. 192, 205 (2014) 
(fingerprint analyst improperly testified as to her belief of 
"no error rate in [her] area of science").  For example, she 
agreed that latent prints are obtained from an "uncontrolled 
setting," and that various factors, including pressure, can 
affect the way the fingerprint is recorded.  Moreover, as in 
Gambora, we note that the vigorous cross-examination of the 
analyst countered any possible misconception that 
individualization is infallible.  Specifically, defense counsel 
for Fulgiam questioned her on her inability to determine when 
the latent prints were deposited, and counsel highlighted the 
fact that fingerprints are "somewhat delicate."  Defense counsel 
for Corbin also questioned her on issues regarding the surface 
from which the latent print on the curling iron was taken and 
regarding the fact that the latent print recovered is not 
"exactly similar" to the known prints. 
 
Finally, the Commonwealth's evidence linking the defendants 
to the crime, separate and apart from the fingerprint evidence, 
was strong.  Thus, even though we conclude that the analyst's 
testimony regarding individualization was erroneously presented 
44 
 
 
as fact, we determine that the error did not create a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
The defendants also argue that the judge erred in allowing 
the analyst to testify that another fingerprint analyst had 
reviewed her work.28  According to the defendants, this testimony 
amounted to "improper vouching" and hearsay expert testimony. 
 
We are not persuaded that this testimony was error.  Expert 
testimony as to the opinions or conclusions of a second, 
nontestifying expert constitutes inadmissible hearsay.  See 
Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 460 Mass. 409, 421-422 (2011).  Here, 
the judge allowed the analyst's testimony that the other analyst 
"reviewed" her work, but did not allow testimony that the second 
analyst verified her work.29  The analyst testified as to the 
ACE-V process, wherein verification or review by another 
fingerprint analyst is a step in the process, and did not 
testify as to the second analyst's independent conclusions.  The 
                     
 
28 During the analyst's testimony, counsel for Fulgiam 
preemptively objected to any questioning by the Commonwealth 
regarding whether the analyst's findings were verified by 
another fingerprint examiner.  While the judge sustained the 
objection, the judge indicated that the witness would be allowed 
to testify that another fingerprint analyst reviewed her work. 
 
 
29 Despite the judge's ruling prohibiting the Commonwealth 
from questioning the analyst regarding whether another analyst 
verified her work, following the colloquy, the Commonwealth 
questioned whether her work was "verified."  After the analyst 
testified in the affirmative, Fulgiam objected.  The judge 
sustained the objection as to the use of the word "verified," 
but reiterated that he would allow the testimony regarding what 
the second analyst did when he examined the analyst's findings. 
45 
 
 
analyst's testimony stands in stark contrast to the expert 
testimony at issue in Whitaker, where the fingerprint analyst 
expert witness testified that two secondary analysts "concurred" 
with his conclusions regarding individualization.  Id. at 421.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the judge did not err in admitting 
the fingerprint analyst's testimony confirming that another 
fingerprint analyst reviewed her findings. 
 
Nonetheless, judges must use caution in allowing testimony 
regarding the verification step in ACE-V analysis, as 
"verifying" suggests that a nontestifying expert concurs with 
the testifying expert's conclusion.  Such testimony would be 
improper hearsay testimony.  See Commonwealth v. Chappell, 473 
Mass. 191, 202 (2015). 
 
3.  Gang references.  Corbin argues that the Commonwealth 
improperly and repeatedly referenced gang affiliation during the 
trial, despite the fact that the judge granted Fulgiam's motion 
in limine to exclude such references.  This argument has no 
merit.  Corbin merely speculates that the jury would conclude 
that the defendants were affiliated with gangs based on the 
neighborhoods in which the men grew up.30  Additionally, the 
prosecutor's closing argument was proper; there was testimony 
                     
 
30 During their interviews with detectives, Fulgiam and 
Corbin told the detectives that Fulgiam was originally from the 
Academy Homes Development in the Roxbury section of Boston, 
Corbin was from Humboldt Avenue in Roxbury, and Thomas was from 
Heath Street in the Jamaica Plain section of Boston. 
46 
 
 
that six or seven men were seen fleeing the victim's apartment 
building immediately after the witnesses heard gun shots.  It is 
within permissible bounds for the prosecutor to infer that a 
"team" of men committed the murders.  There was no error.  See 
Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 516-517 (1987). 
 
4.  Review pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  After a full 
review of the trial record, we affirm the convictions and 
decline to grant extraordinary relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
 
LOWY, J. (concurring).  I agree that the ten-print card 
qualifies for the business record exception to the rule against 
hearsay.  However, I write separately because the card in this 
case involves two levels of hearsay:  the ten-print card itself 
and the information provided by the individual to fill out the 
card.  I believe the court does not precisely address each 
level. 
 
The business records exception to the rule against hearsay 
allows information recorded for a business purpose and contained 
in a business record in evidence for its truth.  See Mass. G. 
Evid. § 803(6)(A) (2017).  This rule includes out-of-court 
statements:  if the statement is recorded for a business purpose 
and the individual making the statement does so for a business 
purpose, the statement is admissible for its truth.  See id.  If 
an out-of-court statement contained in a business record is not 
made pursuant to a business purpose, it still may be admissible 
if the out-of-court statement is recorded for a business purpose 
and the statement falls within another hearsay exception or 
exclusion.  As the majority points out, an arrestee's legal 
obligation does not equate with a business purpose. 
 
However, I believe that the information provided to fill 
out the ten-print card fell within the hearsay exclusion for an 
opposing party's statement.  Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(2)(a) 
(2017).  For the reasons stated by the court, including the 
2 
 
 
defendant's legal obligation to provide identifying information, 
the totality of the circumstances established a more than 
adequate basis for the judge to conclude -- as a preliminary 
question of fact on which admissibility depends and as a matter 
of conditional relevance -- that Corbin was the individual who 
provided the information.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 104(a), (b) 
(2017).  The ten-print card was properly admitted because the 
information in the ten-print card was admissible under an 
exclusion from the rule against hearsay, and the ten-print card 
was admissible as a business record.  Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 801(d)(2)(A); § 803(6)(A).