Title: MacInnis v. Wilson

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Affirmed January 20, 1960.
Petition for rehearing denied February 17, 1960.
*283 Lynn Moore, Springfield, argued the cause and filed a brief for appellants.
Ralph Hillier, Eugene, argued the cause for respondent. *284 Husband & Johnson, Eugene, filed a brief for respondent.
Before McALLISTER, Chief Justice, and ROSSMAN, O'CONNELL and HARRIS, Justices.
Lynn Moore, Springfield, for the petition.
No appearance contra.
Before McALLISTER, Chief Justice, and ROSSMAN, O'CONNELL and HARRIS, Justices.
AFFIRMED.
HARRIS, J. (Pro Tempore)
This is a suit in equity to enforce specifically an oral agreement allegedly made between plaintiff's decedent, Lettie Good,[*] (hereinafter referred to as "Lettie") and defendant Wilson's decedent, Dora Belle Martin (hereinafter referred to as Dora), that Dora would leave to Lettie all her property at the time of her death if Lettie would come to live with Dora for the remainder of her life.
The suit seeks to have certain real and personal property of the approximate value of $18,000, comprising Dora's estate, impressed with a trust in the hands of defendant executor in favor of Lettie. Defendant Maynard Wilson is the executor of Dora's estate, and the other defendants are legatees and devisees under Dora's will; the defendant Alta Bernhardt being the residuary and principal beneficiary under the will. The court entered a decree awarding to Lettie all the distributable property and assets of Dora's estate, excepting certain specific bequests herein mentioned, which were allowed to stand.
All the defendants have appealed. However, since plaintiff has not entered a cross-appeal in regard to the specific bequests, the controversy in this court is really between Lettie's personal representative and *285 the residuary beneficiary under the will, Alta Bernhardt.
1-3. There is no dispute between the parties concerning applicable law. Such a contract as alleged is lawful. However, it must be proved by clear, concise, convincing and satisfactory evidence. Tigglebeck v. Russell et al., 187 Or 554, 563, 567, 213 P2d 156, and cases therein cited. Moreover, the contract must be fair, reasonable and just in its terms. Magness v. Magness, 148 Or 44, 33 P2d 1005. Also strict performance by the promisee must be established. Losey v. O'Hair, 160 Or 63, 83 P2d 493. Likewise, the rendition of the services must have been wholly referable to the contract and solely predicated thereon, and the services must have been of such a character and of such peculiar value to the promisor as not to be established or compensable by any pecuniary standard. Brennen v. Derby et al., 124 Or 574, 265 P 425.
Defendant's sole assignment of error is as follows:
The only question, therefore, to be decided on this appeal is whether the plaintiff has proved the existence of the alleged contract, and performance thereof on her part, by a preponderance of the evidence of a character the law demands in such cases and announced in the foregoing decisions of this court.
*286 In 1942 when Dora's husband passed away, she was 68 years old. She had great concern about living alone. Dora made offers to other relatives to compensate them if they would come and live with her. As a result of one offer, Dora's niece, Margaret Groff, lived with her for about a year after Dora's husband died. When circumstances made it impossible for Margaret to further live with Dora, Dora's brother came and lived with her until he died in 1945. Each of these individuals was promised compensation. The exact nature thereof is in dispute. However, the evidence clearly establishes that Dora had great fear of living alone, and as a result thereof on occasions she would even go to the home of neighbors to sleep. The evidence indicates Dora expressed a belief she would outlive her assets and only a small estate would be available for distribution.
When Dora's brother died in 1945, contact was made with Lettie, who was Dora's niece and who, at the time, had a steady, lucrative position in the hotel industry in California. The evidence discloses Lettie had extensive experience in the hotel industry.
Early in 1946 Lettie resigned her position and moved into Dora's home in Creswell, Oregon, where she remained for 11 years until Dora's death in April, 1957. Lettie swore this resulted from Dora's offer to leave her property to Lettie. After joining Dora, Lettie engaged in substantial employment, and the living expenses and housework were shared by the two women.
The critical period in connection with determining the matter of the contractual relationship, if any, between the two women is that following the death of Dora's brother in 1945. Two disinterested and unimpeached witnesses corroborated Lettie relative to *287 the alleged agreement. Mrs. Ethel Runyan testified as follows:
Mrs. Oleta Heaton gave the following testimony:
The trial judge who saw and heard the witnesses seemed impressed by Mrs. Heaton's testimony. In his memorandum opinion he stated:
So far as indicated by the record, after Dora's brother died the sole relative of hers who was ready, able and willing to spend the remaining years with Dora was Lettie.
It seems improbable that Lettie would have resigned a well-paying position in California, given up her career in hotel work, and changed her entire mode of living simply to have "a roof over her head." We mention this because the evidence indicates the two women shared their living expenses and the housework after Lettie came to live with Dora. It also appears that Lettie, although continuing to support herself after coming to Creswell, was forced to give up certain employment that conflicted with her living arrangements with Dora.
Defendants contend that Lettie did not possess knowledge of Dora's assets in 1946 when she accepted the offer to come to Creswell. However, Lettie knew Dora owned her own home and that she had sufficient property in addition thereto to support herself.
We now come to the execution of the will mentioned *291 in earlier paragraphs, which Lettie claimed contravened her agreement with Dora.
For approximately seven years after Lettie's arrival in Creswell, the relationship between the two women was reasonably harmonious. In 1953 Dora broke her arm and thereafter suffered other infirmities of a person of advanced age. Religious differences were likewise the cause of dissension. Relations between the women deteriorated to the extent they generally lived apart, although under the same roof.
Sometime before the execution of the will in question, Dora had executed a deed to the home property in favor of Lettie. This deed was not delivered to Lettie, but was destroyed by Dora shortly before the execution of the will.
In June, 1956, about eight months prior to Dora's passing, she was bedridden in the home of her niece, Alta Bernhardt, in Bremerton, Washington. Mrs. Bernhardt's attorney, James Arthur, of Bremerton, was called and prepared a will for Dora. By virtue of the will, Lettie was given a life estate in the home property and $4,000, payment of which was spread over a period of four years. Dora then provided for small bequests to other relatives and a $500 bequest to her church (these relatives and the church were named defendants below and are appellants here), and the residue of Dora's estate was devised and bequeathed to Alta Bernhardt.
Mr. Arthur, the Bremerton attorney, was called as a witness and originally testified that before he prepared the will in question Dora had stated to him she wanted to change her will. His statement is as follows:
After the court expressed interest in the matter of "changing the will," however, the witness altered his testimony as follows:
However, it is significant that the first provision in the will which Attorney Arthur drew for Dora is as follows: "First, I hereby revoke all former wills made by me."
It will be noted that defendants' witness Grace Harris made the following statement in response to a question put to her by the court as follows:
Prior to testifying to the foregoing, Mrs. Harris had stated that in 1956, while Dora was in her final illness, she had visited Dora in the hospital. She further swore:
In weighing the evidence and passing on the issues in this case, we believe it is significant that Dora waited until within eight months prior to her passing to execute her last will (or "change her will"), and that this last will was executed at the time, place and under the circumstances and conditions disclosed by the record.
Mr. Arthur, who had been Mrs. Bernhardt's attorney for 12 years, further testified as follows:
We do not believe the statement Mr. Arthur claims Dora made squares with the evidence, which clearly supports the fact that the housework and household expenses were shared equally by the two women.
3, 4. While the will in question contravened the oral contract entered into between the two women, it is to be noted that the will did contain a devise and bequest in favor of Lettie. This in itself is considered corroborative proof of the alleged contract.
6. Defendants complain because the trial court, contrary to the theory alleged by Lettie, allowed certain small specific bequests to other persons, heretofore mentioned, to stand. Defendants claim that the court made a new contract for the parties, and thus attempted to compromise the claim of Lettie and the other legatees by "not only making a contract, but also a will." Since we hold in favor of Lettie relative to the agreement, she is the only one who could complain of the court's ruling in allowing the specific bequests mentioned to stand. Lettie has not cross-appealed, and the matter is, therefore, not before us for decision.
Defendants further contend that oral contracts to devise and bequeath are not enforced where services are capable of appraisal or subject to pecuniary estimate, but the promisee shall be left to his remedy at law. However, the services performed by Lettie consisted of the giving of her society and companionship, the value of which things is not susceptible of pecuniary estimate.
In Tiggelbeck v. Russell et al., supra, at p 568, the court held:
In weighing the testimony and arriving at the conclusions herein reached, we have not overlooked statements in the record that would indicate Dora believed that she owed no legal obligation to Lettie.
7, 8. From the foregoing we find that the agreement between Dora and Lettie has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence of the character demanded and referred to in the authorities heretofore cited. We also find that Lettie substantially complied with all the terms of the contract on her part to be performed. She lived with Dora for 11 years and relieved her of the great fear she had of being alone. The services Lettie rendered were, in our opinion, wholly referable to the contract and solely predicated thereon, and the services were of such character and of such value to Dora as not to be estimated or compensable by any pecuniary standard. The decree appealed from is, therefore, affirmed, without costs to any party.
PETITION DENIED.
*296 HARRIS, J. (Pro Tempore)
It has been brought to our attention by defendants' petition for rehearing that in our opinion we used the phrase "* * * a preponderance of the * * *" (evidence). The use of this term was inadvertent and constitutes surplusage. The phrase is hereby ordered deleted from the two places where it is found in the opinion.
The petition for rehearing is denied.
[*]  The case was originally filed in the name of Lettie Good, plaintiff. Lettie Good died in December, 1958, and subsequently Judith A. MacInnis, Administratrix with Will Annexed of the Estate of Lettie V. Good, was substituted in this court as plaintiff-respondent.