Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Robert Zapf

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2019 WI 83 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP2514-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Robert Zapf, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
Robert Zapf, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ZAPF 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 10, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 29, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
      
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the respondent-appellant, there were briefs filed by 
Richard J. Cayo, Stacie H. Rosenzweig, and Halling & Cayo, S.C., 
Milwaukee. There was an oral argument by Richard J. Cayo.  
 
For the complainant-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Gregg Herman and Office of Lawyer Regulation, Milwaukee. There 
was an oral argument by Gregg Herman. 
 
 
 
2019 WI 83
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP2514-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Robert Zapf, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Robert Zapf, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 10, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding.   Complaint dismissed.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Former Kenosha County District Attorney 
Robert D. Zapf appeals the report of Referee Dennis J. Flynn, 
who concluded that Attorney Zapf had committed two counts of 
professional misconduct and recommended that his license to 
practice law in Wisconsin be suspended for one year and that his 
resumption of the practice of law be subject to certain 
conditions. 
¶2 
After hearing oral argument and carefully reviewing 
this matter, we conclude that all three counts alleged against 
No. 
2016AP2514-D   
 
2 
 
Attorney Zapf must be dismissed.  The Office of Lawyer 
Regulation (OLR) failed to demonstrate by clear, satisfactory, 
and convincing evidence, as required by Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 
22.16(5), that Attorney Zapf violated the three ethical rules 
identified in its complaint.  Because we dismiss the OLR's 
complaint in its entirety, we do not require Attorney Zapf to 
pay the costs of this proceeding. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶3 
Attorney Zapf was admitted to the practice of law in 
this state in 1974.  After serving as an assistant district 
attorney for approximately six years, he was initially elected 
as the Kenosha County District Attorney in 1980 and served from 
1981 to 1989.  After a substantial period in private practice, 
he was appointed to the position of district attorney in 2005 
and was reelected to continue serving in that position until he 
retired in January 2017.   
¶4 
In 1985, during Attorney Zapf's first period as 
district attorney, he was publicly reprimanded for communicating 
with a party who was represented by counsel and for failing to 
disclose information to defense counsel.  In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Zapf, 126 Wis. 2d 123, 375 N.W.2d 654 
(1985).   
¶5 
Attorney Zapf testified in this proceeding that the 
1985 reprimand affected him deeply and caused him to take steps 
over the remaining course of his career to ensure that evidence 
was turned over.  He instituted a broad open-file policy in the 
Kenosha County District Attorney's office that, as acknowledged 
No. 
2016AP2514-D   
 
3 
 
by the grievant in this matter, amounts to the prosecution 
permitting defense attorneys to inspect the prosecution's entire 
file with the exception of work product generated by the 
prosecuting attorneys.  Attorney Zapf even placed a copy machine 
in the district attorney's office on which defense counsel could 
copy portions of the prosecution files without charge.   
¶6 
Summarizing the referee's findings of fact in this 
proceeding is not an easy task.  No section of the referee's 
report contains a precise listing of the facts as the referee 
found them.  While the report does contain a section entitled 
"FACTS," in that section the referee simply recites the 
testimony given by the various individuals at the evidentiary 
hearing without identifying which assertions he accepted as true 
and which he did not.1  In addition, there is a stipulation of 
facts that the parties prepared and that was received into 
evidence.  There are facts stated throughout the discussion 
section of the referee's report.  This opinion will summarize 
the facts as the referee appears to have found them by gleaning 
them from the discussion section of the report. 
                                                 
1 Even in the "FACTS" section, the referee acknowledges that 
the facts set forth in that part of the report may not be fully 
accurate: 
The facts are as presented in the testimony and 
exhibits.  Here some of the facts will be noted, but 
if they differ from the actual testimony and exhibits, 
then the actual testimony and exhibits are relied upon 
by the Referee and are controlling.   
No. 
2016AP2514-D   
 
4 
 
¶7 
At least with respect to the broad outlines of the 
underlying facts, there does not appear to be any dispute.  This 
disciplinary proceeding arises out of the actions of a Kenosha 
Police Department (KPD) officer, Kyle Baars.  On April 14, 2014, 
Officer Baars assisted in transporting Markese Tibbs to a KPD 
police station.  At that point Tibbs was a suspect in a homicide 
that had occurred earlier that day.2 3  During the transportation 
or subsequent booking of Tibbs, Officer Baars came into 
possession of Tibbs' Illinois identification card.  Officer 
Baars kept the Illinois ID card on his person at the end of his 
shift on April 14.   
                                                 
2 The stipulation and the referee fail to note that the 
homicide, in which Anthony Edwards was killed, took place during 
what Edwards believed would be a drug transaction.  As Attorney 
Zapf testified at the evidentiary hearing, Joseph Brantley and 
Tibbs set up the purported transaction as a way to rob Edwards 
of money and marijuana.  Brantley shot Edwards as he was sitting 
in the driver's seat of his vehicle.  Edwards drove his vehicle 
away but shortly thereafter crashed it into a home.  The 
passenger in Edwards' vehicle, J.L., identified Brantley and 
Tibbs as the robbers and Brantley as the shooter.   
3 The referee does not note the fact that Tibbs had a 
connection to an ongoing investigation of a previous robbery 
that had occurred at the Shenanigan's liquor store.  According 
to the stipulation in this case, a .22 caliber pistol had been 
recovered by the police in a getaway vehicle after the 
Shenanigan's robbery.  One of the two suspects in the robbery, a 
man known as "Montriel," had been previously arrested at 1208 
59th Street in Kenosha, but the other robber, identified as 
"Cali," had not been arrested.  When Officer Baars arrived at 
the residence at the same address on 59th Street on April 14, 
2014, after the police had tracked the two homicide suspects 
there, he observed that one of the suspects, Tibbs, resembled 
the individual named "Cali" that had been involved in the 
Shenanigan's robbery.   
No. 
2016AP2514-D   
 
5 
 
¶8 
When Officer Baars started his shift the following 
morning, he was directed to assist in a second search of the 
residence at 1208 59th Street and was informed that the search 
was for handguns, ammunition, casings, and clothing.4   
¶9 
What happened during that second search on April 15, 
2014, is not as clear.  What is important for purposes of this 
opinion is what the officers other than Officer Baars knew about 
his conduct during the search and what part of that knowledge 
they shared with the police chief and with Attorney Zapf.  That 
will be addressed below. 
¶10 Officer Baars searched one of the bedrooms, where he 
found a blue backpack.  Officer Baars alerted the other officers 
that he had located a backpack and that inside of it was a 
bullet.  (The bullet was a .22 caliber bullet, not a .32 caliber 
bullet that matched the weapon used in the homicide of Anthony 
Edwards.)  Officer Baars later recalled, and the referee seems 
to have found, that when the other officers entered the bedroom, 
he also handed the Tibbs ID to one of the detectives (Detective 
Traxler).  After looking at the ID, Detective Traxler told 
Officer Baars that the .22 bullet and the ID should be placed 
back into the backpack and collected as evidence.  Officer Baars 
                                                 
4 The stipulation and the referee ignore the undisputed fact 
that at the time of the arrest of Tibbs and Joseph Brantley on 
April 14, 2014, KPD officers conducted a search of the residence 
on 59th Street in which the two men had been found.  The 
officers, 
who 
apparently 
did 
not 
include 
Officer 
Baars, 
discovered a .32 caliber handgun and a quantity of marijuana 
that had been stolen from Edwards. 
No. 
2016AP2514-D   
 
6 
 
followed the detective's order.  He did not inform Detective 
Traxler or any other officer that the ID had not been found 
initially in the backpack and that it had been in his possession 
from the day before.  There is no evidence in the record that 
Detective Traxler or any of the other officers knew the source 
of the ID at that time.  KPD Officer Brandie Pie photographed 
the backpack and its contents and then collected them as 
evidence.   
¶11 From the very beginning of the description of the 
April 15, 2014 search, the referee concludes that Officer Baars 
had intentionally planted the ID (and maybe the bullet): 
Officer Baars did not advise any other KPD officers 
there that he had possession of the Illinois ID card 
and perhaps also the .22 caliber bullet on entering 
the residence before participating in the search.  
What this meant is that Officer Baars had planted the 
Illinois ID card and perhaps the .22 caliber bullet as 
evidence in a homicide investigation.   
¶12 We need to pause the factual recitation at this point 
for some clarification.  The referee at this early point in the 
recitation of facts concludes that Officer Baars "planted" the 
ID and perhaps the bullet.  The term "planted" could be 
understood to mean different things.  It could be used simply as 
a substitute for "placed," which would not necessarily connote 
malicious intent, or it could mean "negligently placed," which 
would connote a lack of care but not an intentional act.  
Finally, as seems to be most often the case, "planted" could be 
understood to connote an intentional placing of an item with an 
intent to implicate someone in a crime under false pretenses.  
No. 
2016AP2514-D   
 
7 
 
The use of the term "plant" in the stipulation in this case is 
not always clear.  On the other hand, although the referee does 
not specify which connotation he was employing, it appears that 
he meant the term to mean the intentional planting of false 
incriminating evidence.   
¶13 As 
will 
become 
clear 
below, 
ultimately 
it 
was 
discovered that Officer Baars did, in fact, place the .22 
caliber bullet into the backpack and hand the ID to Detective 
Traxler with the intent to connect the bullet, the ID, and the 
backpack to Tibbs.  What is important for purposes of this 
disciplinary case, however, is what was known at what time about 
the events that unfolded during the search on April 15, 2014.  
To describe Officer Baars' actions as "planting" the ID and the 
bullet implies that it was an established fact from the outset.  
Although we know now, with the benefit of hindsight, that those 
items were, in fact, "planted" by Officer Baars, we must be 
careful not to conflate that later acquired knowledge with the 
knowledge of the participants at the time (or in the subsequent 
months). 
¶14 The referee, however, relied on his description of the 
April 15, 2014 events as the "planting" of evidence to form 
inferences about what the KPD officers and Attorney Zapf knew or 
should have known during the relevant time periods. 
¶15 The state initiated separate criminal cases against 
Tibbs and Brantley related to the Edwards homicide.  Attorney 
Zapf was the prosecuting attorney on those cases, which remained 
pending in the fall of 2014.  Attorney Terry Rose represented 
No. 
2016AP2514-D   
 
8 
 
Tibbs.  Attorney Christopher Glinski represented Brantley.  The 
state also filed a separate criminal complaint against Tibbs for 
his involvement in the Shenanigan's robbery.  Attorney Zapf was 
not involved in that case. 
¶16 The jury trial in the case against Tibbs involving the 
Shenanigan's robbery commenced on October 28, 2014.5  There is no 
dispute that while that trial was occurring, Officer Baars had 
at least two conversations with KPD Detective Jason Kenesie, who 
was one of the lead investigators for both the Shenanigan's 
robbery and the Edwards homicide.  The stipulation in this case 
provided that during these conversations, Officer Baars told 
Detective Kenesie that he had "improperly placed" Tibbs' 
Illinois ID and possibly the .22 caliber bullet into the blue 
backpack that had been found during the April 15, 2014 search.  
¶17 The referee acknowledged that the stipulation used the 
term "improperly placed."  That term does not mean that Officer 
Baars admitted to Detective Kenesie in October 2014 that he had 
intentionally planted the ID and possibly the bullet.  The 
referee, however, equated "improperly placed" with "planted."  
Having inferred that Officer Baars had admitted planting 
evidence, the referee inferred that Detective Kenesie should 
have immediately questioned Officer Baars as a suspect in the 
commission of a crime involving planting evidence.  
                                                 
5 Officer Baars apparently was not subpoenaed for and did 
not testify in Tibbs' trial regarding the Shenanigan's robbery.   
No. 
2016AP2514-D   
 
9 
 
¶18 Neither Officer Baars nor Detective Kenesie testified 
at the evidentiary hearing in this disciplinary proceeding.  
Attached to the stipulation in this case, however, was an 
internal police report, dated January 15, 2015, prepared by 
Detective Kenesie, which we shall reference as "the Kenesie 
Report."6  This is the only evidence in the record to support the 
statement in the stipulation regarding what Officer Baars told 
Detective Kenesie.  The Kenesie Report paints a different 
picture than the referee's inference that Officer Baars had 
admitted planting evidence. 
¶19 According 
to 
the 
Kenesie 
Report, 
Officer 
Baars 
initially told Detective Kenesie that "he had screwed up and 
made a mistake."  Officer Baars stated that during the search he 
had discovered the blue backpack with the bullet inside and that 
at some point while reviewing the contents of the backpack, he 
had placed Tibbs' ID, which he still had with him from the day 
before, into the backpack.  When he announced the discovery of 
the backpack, Detective Traxler advised him that the backpack, 
the bullet, and the ID were to be collected as evidence.  
Officer Baars acknowledged that he had allowed the ID to be 
collected as evidence even though he knew it was not originally 
in the backpack.  When Detective Kenesie asked him, however, 
whether he had left the ID in the backpack on purpose or if he 
had wanted to plant it as evidence, Officer Baars responded that 
                                                 
6 This report was not shared with Attorney Zapf until after 
the events that underlie this disciplinary case. 
No. 
2016AP2514-D   
 
10 
 
he had not and that it had been a mistake.  The Kenesie Report 
further stated that while meeting with Detective Kenesie, 
Officer Baars was emotional and had tears in his eyes.   
¶20 Detective Kenesie advised other KPD officers about 
Officer Baars' statements.  Detective Kenesie and another 
detective then met again with Officer Baars.  During that 
meeting the two detectives determined that Officer Baars needed 
to write a supplemental police report about his actions during 
the search.   
¶21 Officer Baars prepared an initial draft of the 
supplemental report and gave it to Detective Kenesie.  In this 
first draft, Officer Baars stated that during the search of the 
bedroom, he had emptied the contents of various bags onto a 
dresser or television to inspect the contents.  At one point he 
located the blue backpack, which contained a smaller caliber 
round of ammunition.  He then announced the find of the backpack 
with the bullet, which caused Detective Traxler and other 
officers to enter the bedroom.  According to this first draft of 
the report, Officer Baars recalled that he gave one of the 
officers the ID, but he did not remember from where he had 
retrieved the ID before doing so.  After Detective Traxler 
stated that the ID and the bullet should be collected as 
evidence, Officer Baars placed the ID and the bullet into the 
front pocket of the backpack and returned the backpack to the 
floor so Officer Pie could photograph the location of the 
backpack and its contents.  In this first draft, Officer Baars 
acknowledged that he had not advised any of the other officers 
No. 
2016AP2514-D   
 
11 
 
that he had been in possession of the ID when he had entered the 
residence and that it had not been found in the backpack.  This 
first draft did not indicate in any way that Officer Baars had 
also initially placed the bullet into the backpack.   
¶22 According to the Kenesie Report and the stipulation, 
Detective Kenesie reviewed the initial draft and shared it with 
another officer.  They both felt that it left more questions 
than it answered so Detective Kenesie directed Officer Baars to 
redo the report.  Officer Baars prepared a second draft of the 
supplemental report.  Detective Kenesie felt that this draft 
also lacked clarity, and he directed Officer Baars to prepare a 
third draft.   
¶23 The third draft was dated November 11, 2014, and will 
be referenced as the "11/11/14 supplemental report."  The 
stipulation states that this third draft "disclosed Baars['] 
planting the ID card but did not disclose planting a bullet."  
The third draft, however, never uses any form of the word 
"plant" and does not describe Officer Baars' actions in placing 
the ID into the backpack in any truly different way than the 
first two drafts.  The third draft does say that Officer Baars 
found the bullet in the backpack and announced its discovery to 
other officers, who came into the room.  It states that Officer 
Baars believes he then gave Tibbs' ID to Detective Traxler, who 
directed that the ID and the bullet should be collected as 
evidence.  The 11/11/14 supplemental report then states, like 
the prior versions, that Officer Baars placed the bullet and the 
ID into the backpack and returned it to the place where he had 
No. 
2016AP2514-D   
 
12 
 
found it so that it could be photographed and taken into 
evidence.   
¶24 According to the Kenesie Report, Detective Kenesie 
felt that the 11/11/14 supplemental report was still confusing, 
did not completely explain the facts, and contained the 
officer's opinions about why he took certain actions that should 
not be included in a police report.  Nonetheless, Detective 
Kenesie and another detective determined that this third draft 
would be submitted as written.  Detective Kenesie subsequently 
brought the report to the supervising officer, who signed it.  
Detective Kenesie intended to have Officer Baars sign the report 
later that day, but he was not on duty that day.   
¶25 A few days later, Detective Kenesie met with Officer 
Baars for the purpose of having him sign the 11/11/14 
supplemental report.  Officer Baars was extremely distraught and 
told Detective Kenesie that he was questioning himself about the 
ID.  He then asked Detective Kenesie, "What if the bullet is the 
real issue?"  When Detective Kenesie asked Officer Baars to 
explain, he stated that while he was struggling with the 
situation, could not remember exactly what had happened, and had 
been having "false memories," he felt that he might have brought 
the bullet, as well as the ID card, into the residence on the 
day of the search.  When asked about having "false memories," 
Officer Baars said that he had been remembering things that he 
knew had not happened and gave an example to Detective Kenesie.  
When Detective Kenesie directly asked Officer Baars if he had 
brought the bullet into the residence and placed it into the 
No. 
2016AP2514-D   
 
13 
 
backpack, Officer Baars responded that he had not and was not 
saying that he had.  Officer Baars said that he remembered at 
some point having looked at a .22 caliber bullet and asking 
himself 
how 
such 
a 
small 
object 
could 
kill 
something.  
Nonetheless, although he said that he did not remember initially 
placing the bullet into the backpack, he was concerned that he 
might have done that.  Officer Baars subsequently told Detective 
Kenesie that he would not sign the 11/11/14 supplemental report 
as it currently existed and that he wanted to rewrite it.  
Detective Kenesie decided that Officer Baars should not rewrite 
the report yet again.  The 11/11/14 supplemental report was 
turned over to a police captain, apparently for inclusion in the 
police file.   
¶26 Based on his belief that it was clear from the 
beginning that the ID and possibly the bullet had been planted 
by Officer Baars, the referee makes additional inferences 
regarding the preparation of the three drafts of the report.  
Although the stipulation specifically stated that Detective 
Kenesie had rejected the first two drafts of the supplemental 
report because they had "lacked clarity," the referee determines 
that a reading of those reports does not support that 
No. 
2016AP2514-D   
 
14 
 
conclusion.7  He infers from the fact that Detective Kenesie 
assisted Officer Baars concerning the preparation of three 
different drafts of the report and the fact that Detective 
Kenesie failed to treat Officer Baars as a criminal suspect by 
reading him his Miranda8 rights, that Detective Kenesie and other 
KPD officers were engaged in a "blatant attempt to control 
damage to the KPD regarding the crime of a criminal police 
officer who was acting during that crime as a KPD officer."    
The referee further draws a "strong inference" of a "cover-up of 
police wrongdoing" from the fact that the report was signed by a 
supervisor, but not by Officer Baars.   
¶27 On January 9, 2015, Detective Kenesie and two other 
KPD supervisory officers requested a meeting with Attorney Zapf.  
The referee describes this meeting in his report as follows:  
"On 9 January 2015, KPD Officers Kenesie, Hagen and Larson told 
Attorney Zapf that KPD Officer Baars had planted an Illinois ID 
card and possibly a .22 caliber bullet as evidence during the 
                                                 
7 Quoting the stipulation, the referee also states that 
Detective Kenesie initially rejected the third draft of the 
supplemental report because it did not mention the planting of 
the .22 caliber bullet.  He seems to use this quotation as 
additional evidence that Detective Kenesie knew all along that 
the bullet had been planted.  The quoted passage from the 
stipulation on which the referee relied for this finding, 
however, was merely describing the contents of the third draft; 
it was not purporting to say that Detective Kenesie rejected the 
third draft (i.e., the 11/11/14 supplemental report) or that the 
reason he did so was the failure to mention the "planting" of 
the bullet.   
8 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
No. 
2016AP2514-D   
 
15 
 
execution of a search warrant in the Tibbs and Brantley homicide 
case."   
¶28 The only evidence in the record regarding this meeting 
are Attorney Zapf's testimony and the stipulation.  None of the 
KPD 
officers 
who 
attended 
the 
meeting 
testified 
at 
the 
evidentiary hearing in the disciplinary case.  The stipulation 
states that the KPD officers informed Attorney Zapf that Officer 
Baars "had placed Tibbs' Illinois identification card into the 
blue backpack and possibly a .22 caliber bullet during the 
search of the 59th Street residence."  The stipulation did not 
say that Officer Baars had intentionally "planted" the ID or the 
bullet.  The "placing" of the items into the backpack could have 
been negligence, could have been a result of Officer Baars' 
uncertainty as to what to do after Detective Traxler had ordered 
the ID card to be collected as evidence, or it could have been 
an intentional planting.  A statement that Attorney Zapf was 
told about one or more items being placed, however, does not 
demonstrate that Attorney Zapf knew for a fact that the items 
had been "planted."  Indeed, Attorney Zapf testified that he was 
not told that Officer Baars had "planted" the ID card.  Attorney 
Zapf further testified that he had been told at this meeting 
that Officer Baars had said that he had placed the ID into the 
backpack, but Officer Baars also indicated that the handling of 
the ID had been a mistake or an oversight.  Attorney Zapf also 
specifically testified that he had been told during the 
January 9, 2015 meeting that Officer Baars had spoken of "false 
No. 
2016AP2514-D   
 
16 
 
memories" about the bullet, but had explicitly denied having 
placed the bullet into the backpack.   
¶29 At the end of the January 9, 2015 meeting, Attorney 
Zapf directed the officers to provide him with a written report 
regarding what they had told him.  The officers did not prepare 
their own report.  On January 21, 2015, Detective Kenesie 
submitted 
Officer 
Baars' 
11/11/14 
supplemental 
report 
to 
Attorney Zapf's office.  The referee infers further cover-up 
from the fact that the officers did not prepare their own report 
and that Attorney Zapf did not follow up when he did not receive 
such a report.   
¶30 According to his testimony at the evidentiary hearing, 
on January 9, 2015, the Kenosha Chief of Police, John Morrissey, 
also learned for the first time9 of the fact that Officer Baars 
had apparently mishandled evidence and placed Officer Baars on 
                                                 
9 The referee finds the statement that the chief of police 
first learned of this situation on January 9, 2015, after 
returning from a vacation, to be incredible because he cannot 
believe that the chief of police would have been unaware for 
over two months that one of his officers had engaged in the 
criminal conduct of "planting" evidence.  There is nothing in 
the record, however, to support an inference that Chief 
Morrissey had learned of "planting" evidence even as of January 
9, 2015, or to support an inference that he had learned of any 
sort of mishandling of evidence by Officer Baars prior to 
January 9, 2015.   
No. 
2016AP2514-D   
 
17 
 
administrative leave pending the completion of an internal 
affairs investigation.10 
¶31 On January 18, 2015, one day before an administrative 
hearing about his conduct, Officer Baars resigned from the 
Kenosha Police Department.  Chief Morrissey's testimony about 
the resignation is the sole source in the record of evidence 
about Officer Baars' resignation.  He testified that Officer 
Baars gave him a short note of resignation, which said only that 
he was resigning from the police department for "personal 
reasons."  Chief Morrissey further testified that when he asked 
Officer Baars whether his resignation was due to the search 
incident, Officer Baars refused to explain his reasons for 
resigning beyond referencing the "personal reasons" stated in 
his resignation note.   
¶32 On January 19, 2015, Chief Morrissey met with Attorney 
Zapf.  Once again, the referee finds that "again [Attorney Zapf] 
was given information about the planting of evidence by KPD 
Officer Baars."  There is no evidence in the record, however, 
that Chief Morrissey gave Attorney Zapf any information about 
the "planting" of evidence.  The only evidence in the record 
                                                 
10 In addition to the Kenesie Report that was completed on 
January 15, 2015, a different KPD officer conducted an internal 
affairs investigation pursuant to the police chief's directive 
and prepared an internal affairs report dated January 28, 2015.  
There is no dispute that neither the Kenesie Report nor the 
January 28, 2015 internal affairs report were provided to 
Attorney Zapf until after the events at issue in this 
disciplinary proceeding. 
No. 
2016AP2514-D   
 
18 
 
about the content of this meeting comes from the testimony of 
Chief Morrissey and Attorney Zapf.  Chief Morrissey testified 
that he did not discuss the facts of the search with Attorney 
Zapf because he believed that his officers had done this during 
the January 9, 2015 meeting.  Chief Morrissey did inform 
Attorney Zapf that Officer Baars had resigned and asked him for 
an opinion about whether Officer Baars could be charged with 
misconduct in office.  According to Chief Morrissey, Attorney 
Zapf could not offer an opinion about the applicability of the 
misconduct in office statute because he had not yet received any 
report from the police department about what had occurred during 
the search.  Chief Morrissey further testified that Attorney 
Zapf told him that, regardless of whether criminal charges 
ultimately could be issued against Officer Baars if the facts so 
dictated, Attorney Zapf would need a written report from the 
KPD, which would need to be provided to the defense attorneys 
for Tibbs (Attorney Rose) and Brantley (Attorney Glinski).   
¶33 On January 21, 2015, Detective Kenesie did submit 
Officer Baars' 11/11/14 supplemental report to Attorney Zapf's 
office.  As Attorney Zapf had been told during the January 9, 
2015 meeting, the 11/11/14 supplemental report spoke of Officer 
Baars "placing" the ID card into the backpack.  It did not say 
that Officer Baars had "planted" the ID card, and it said 
nothing about the bullet having been introduced into the 
backpack by Officer Baars.  The referee calls the 11/11/14 
supplemental report a "false and unauthorized" report.  He 
infers that the submission of this "false" report by the KPD to 
No. 
2016AP2514-D   
 
19 
 
Attorney Zapf, with the expectation that it would be shared with 
defense counsel for Tibbs and Brantley, was part of the KPD's 
"intentional cover-up of evidence of police misconduct."  The 
referee also adversely infers that Attorney Zapf was part of 
this cover-up because he should have known when he received this 
report that it was not "direct regarding the issue of planting 
evidence and [was] incomplete as to the resignation of [Officer 
Baars] from the KPD."   
¶34 On January 26, 2015, Attorney Zapf sent identical 
letters to Attorney Rose and Attorney Glinski.  The letters were 
copied to the judges for both the Tibbs (Judge Mary Wagner) and 
the Brantley (Judge Bruce Schroeder) criminal cases.  The 
letters simply stated that enclosed with the letter was 
"additional miscellaneous discovery."  The letter then listed 
six 
enclosed 
documents, 
one 
of 
which 
was 
the 
11/11/14 
supplemental report.  Having already inferred that Attorney Zapf 
knew both that Officer Baars had planted evidence and that the 
11/11/14 supplemental report was false and incomplete because it 
did not explicitly say so, the referee further inferred that the 
failure of Attorney Zapf to explain the significance of the 
11/11/14 supplemental report was an intentional attempt to hide 
or downplay the evidence.   
¶35 Attorney Glinski testified in this matter that he 
received the January 26, 2015 letter and the enclosed 11/11/14 
supplemental report, but he did not understand the significance 
of the report.  Attorney Rose claimed in his testimony that he 
never received the January 26, 2015 letter and that he never 
No. 
2016AP2514-D   
 
20 
 
checked the electronic docket for Tibbs' criminal case, which 
would have alerted him to the existence of that letter.   
¶36 After the January 26, 2015 letter had been sent, Tibbs 
pled guilty to felony murder and agreed to testify against 
Brantley.  Attorney Zapf then notified Attorney Glinski that 
Tibbs should be added to the state's witness list in the 
Brantley case.   
¶37 On Monday, February 23, 2015, the Brantley trial 
commenced.  A third co-defendant, Brandon Horak, testified that 
he had made arrangements for the purchase of marijuana from 
Edwards, but that the arrangements had been a setup by himself, 
Brantley and Tibbs to rob Edwards of the marijuana.  On 
Thursday, February 26, 2015, Attorney Zapf called Officer 
Brandie Pie to testify.  She testified that she had assisted in 
the collection of evidence during the April 15, 2014 search of 
the 59th Street home.  Attorney Zapf did not ask about the 
backpack, the ID, or the bullet during his direct examination.  
On cross-examination, however, Attorney Glinski did ask about 
the collection of the backpack with the ID card and bullet 
inside.  Tibbs also testified during the state's case earlier 
that day.  When asked about the backpack, Tibbs denied that it 
belonged to him and denied any knowledge of a .22 caliber 
bullet.   
¶38 Before 
closing 
arguments 
the 
following 
morning, 
Attorney Zapf advised Attorney Glinski and Judge Schroeder that 
there had been problems regarding the collection of the 
backpack, the ID and the bullet, and that Attorney Glinski 
No. 
2016AP2514-D   
 
21 
 
appeared to be operating under a misconception about those 
items.  He also advised defense counsel for the first time that 
Officer Baars had resigned.  The OLR alleged that the following 
statement by Attorney Zapf to the court during this discussion 
was false: 
What I would understand subsequently, although I don't 
have personal knowledge, and I don't have anything in 
documentation, 
that 
as 
a 
result 
of 
the 
misunderstanding or how those items got into the 
backpack or into evidence, Officer Baars resigned from 
the police department.  I don't know anything about 
discipline.  I don't know anything about prior 
history, but Officer Baars resigned as a result, in 
part, I would say, as a result of his handling or 
mishandling of evidence at the crime scene, or the 
shooting of the residence at 1208 59th Street (sic). 
In his conclusions of law, the referee broke down this statement 
into a number of constituent parts that he found to be false.  
His findings will be addressed in the analysis of his legal 
conclusions below. 
¶39 The referee does not include the following facts in 
his report, but they are acknowledged in the stipulation or are 
otherwise 
not 
contested. 
 
After 
Attorney 
Zapf 
made 
his 
disclosure on the morning of the fifth day of the Brantley 
trial, he and Attorney Glinski jointly telephoned Officer Baars.  
During that call, for the first time Officer Baars admitted 
having brought both the ID card and the .22 caliber bullet to 
the scene of the search and planting them in the backpack.  He 
also admitted that his resignation had been "related partially 
to his investigation of this case [i.e., Brantley's case]."  
After the court learned of Officer Baars' admissions, it 
No. 
2016AP2514-D   
 
22 
 
recessed the trial so that defense counsel could review the KPD 
internal affairs report and Officer Baars' employment file and 
prepare for testimony by Officer Baars.  When the Brantley trial 
resumed on March 2, 2015, Attorney Glinski called Officer Baars 
as a defense witness.  Officer Baars testified that he had 
planted both the ID card and the .22 caliber bullet in the 
backpack, and that he had resigned from the KPD as a result of 
his actions during the execution of the search warrant.  
Attorney Zapf stipulated that the defense had not learned about 
Officer Baars having planted the .22 caliber bullet until the 
morning of February 27, 2015.  Despite the jury hearing this 
evidence, it still found Brantley guilty as charged.   
¶40 Brantley filed a postconviction motion seeking a new 
trial 
on 
the 
grounds 
that 
the 
prosecution 
had 
withheld 
exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S 
83 (1963).  The circuit court denied the motion, finding that 
evidence that Officer Baars had planted an ID card and a .22 
caliber bullet was not exculpatory, relevant, or a Brady 
violation.   
¶41 As soon as Officer Baars had testified in the Brantley 
case (even before the jury returned its verdict), Attorney Zapf 
referred the matter to the Milwaukee County District Attorney's 
Office, which ultimately charged Officer Baars with felony 
misconduct in office.  Officer Baars pled guilty to that charge 
and was convicted.   
¶42 Tibbs also filed a postconviction motion asking for 
plea withdrawal.  In response to the motion, Attorney Zapf 
No. 
2016AP2514-D   
 
23 
 
advised the court that Tibbs should be allowed to withdraw his 
guilty plea.  After Attorney Rose conducted discovery and 
obtained the testimony of Attorney Zapf and various KPD 
officers, Tibbs withdrew his motion and allowed his conviction 
and sentence to stand.   
REFEREE'S LEGAL CONCLUSIONS 
¶43 Based on the facts he found and the inferences he 
drew, the referee concluded that the OLR had proven the 
allegations in Count 1 and Count 3.  He concluded that the OLR 
had not proven the allegations of a violation in Count 2. 
Count 
1—Violation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.23(1)(h) 
and 
SCR 20:8.4(f) 
¶44 Count 1 of the OLR's complaint alleged that Attorney 
Zapf had violated the Wisconsin criminal discovery statute, Wis. 
Stat. § 971.23(1)(h), as enforced via SCR 20:8.4(f).  The 
discovery statute provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
(1) 
WHAT A DISTRICT ATTORNEY MUST DISCLOSE 
TO A DEFENDANT.  Upon demand, the 
district 
attorney 
shall, 
within 
a 
reasonable time before trial, disclose 
to the defendant or his or her attorney 
and permit the defendant or his or her 
attorney 
to 
inspect 
and 
copy 
or 
photograph 
all 
of 
the 
following 
materials and information, if it is 
within 
the 
possession, 
custody 
or 
control of the state:  
* * *  
(h) Any exculpatory evidence. 
¶45 The referee concluded that the OLR had proven by 
clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that Attorney Zapf 
No. 
2016AP2514-D   
 
24 
 
had violated the discovery statute "by failing to fully disclose 
information in his possession or otherwise available to him to 
the defense in both the Tibbs and Brantley homicide cases 
regarding former Officer Baars' misconduct in planting evidence 
at the scene of a homicide investigation, including the fact 
that 
Baars 
had 
resigned 
from 
the 
KPD 
because 
of 
his 
misconduct . . . ."  The referee further concluded, although not 
explicitly, that the violation of the discovery statute, by 
itself, constituted a violation of SCR 20:8.4(f), which states 
that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to "violate a 
statute, supreme court rule, supreme court order, or supreme 
court decision regulating the conduct of lawyers."  The referee 
did not provide any analysis to support this conclusion of a 
violation of the ethical rule.  He did not provide a distinct 
analysis of whether Attorney Zapf's failure to disclose was 
negligent or intentional.  In other places in his report, 
however, the referee did state that he found Attorney Zapf's 
conduct to have been intentional. 
Count 2—Violation of SCR 20:3.4(b) 
¶46 The referee concluded that the OLR had not proven that 
Attorney Zapf's examination of Officer Brandie Pie had violated 
SCR 20:3.4(b), which states that a lawyer shall not "falsify 
evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or 
offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law."   
¶47 The referee stated that the OLR's theory was that 
Attorney Zapf had failed to provide clarifying information at 
the end of the afternoon of the fourth day of trial when Officer 
No. 
2016AP2514-D   
 
25 
 
Pie testified on cross-examination by the defense that she had 
collected and photographed the backpack, the ID card, and the 
.22 caliber bullet.  The referee concluded that Attorney Zapf's 
disclosure to defense counsel and the court the following 
morning before any further proceedings in the trial was a timely 
action to correct or complete the record regarding the location, 
collection, and identification of the ID card and the bullet.  
Referee Flynn noted that Attorney Zapf had not personally asked 
about those items.  Thus, his disclosure the following morning 
was effectively the first time that he could correct the 
impression 
created 
by 
Officer 
Pie's 
testimony 
on 
cross-
examination.  The referee found that this disclosure satisfied 
Attorney Zapf's obligations under SCR 20:3.4(b). 
Count 3—Violation of SCR 20:3.3(a)(1) 
¶48 The referee concluded that the OLR had proven by 
clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that Attorney Zapf 
had violated SCR 20:3.3(a)(1)11 by making false statements of 
fact to a tribunal in his disclosure to the trial court on the 
morning of Day 5 of the Brantley trial.  The referee broke down 
Attorney 
Zapf's 
statement 
into 
a 
number 
of 
constituent 
assertions, the truthfulness of which he analyzed individually. 
¶49 First, 
the 
referee 
characterizes 
Attorney 
Zapf's 
statement to the court as asserting that he had no personal 
                                                 
11 SCR 20:3.3(a)(1) provides:  "A lawyer shall not knowingly 
make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to 
correct a false statement of material fact or law previously 
made to the tribunal by the lawyer." 
No. 
2016AP2514-D   
 
26 
 
knowledge about the entire episode involving Officer Baars.  The 
referee states that the stipulation shows that Attorney Zapf did 
have personal knowledge about Officer Baars' conduct because, as 
the referee inferred, Attorney Zapf was told by the supervisory 
KDP officers in the January 9, 2015 meeting and by Chief 
Morrissey during the January 19, 2015 meeting that Officer Baars 
had planted evidence and that he had resigned because of the 
planting of evidence.  Thus, the referee concludes that this 
assertion by Attorney Zapf, as the referee characterized it, was 
false.   
¶50 Next, 
the 
referee 
characterizes 
Attorney 
Zapf's 
statement as claiming that he had no documentation about Officer 
Baars' actions.  The referee acknowledges that Attorney Zapf had 
no written documentation other than the 11/11/14 supplemental 
report that he had provided to defense counsel, but the referee 
still labels this assertion, as he characterizes it, as being 
intentionally misleading and not truthful because Attorney Zapf 
did have oral reports from KPD officers about Officer Baars' 
misconduct.   
¶51 Third, 
the 
referee 
characterizes 
Attorney 
Zapf's 
statement as having claimed that he did not know that Officer 
Baars had resigned because of his misconduct of planting 
evidence in the backpack.  The referee concludes that this 
assertion was not truthful because Attorney Zapf "knew, as of 19 
January 2015, that officer Baars had resigned and the theory 
that the resignation was related to the evidence planting 
misconduct was a reasonable inference even though Officer Baars 
No. 
2016AP2514-D   
 
27 
 
did not give Chief Morrissey any definitive statement of the 
reason for his resignation."  In other words, the referee 
concludes 
this 
assertion 
of 
knowledge, 
as 
the 
referee 
characterizes it, was not truthful because Attorney Zapf should 
have known that it was reasonable to infer that Officer Baars 
had resigned because he had planted evidence.   
¶52 Fourth, the referee reads Attorney Zapf's statement as  
including an assertion that he had no knowledge about any prior 
discipline being imposed on Officer Baars.  The referee 
concludes that this assertion was truthful.   
¶53 Fifth, 
the 
referee 
interprets 
Attorney 
Zapf's 
statement as including an assertion that he had no knowledge 
about "prior history."  The referee does not view this as prior 
history about Officer Baars, but rather as saying that Attorney 
Zapf had no knowledge about the prior history of the evidence 
planting by Officer Baars.  For the reasons noted above 
regarding the two meetings with KPD personnel, the referee finds 
this assertion, as he characterizes it, to be untrue.   
¶54 Finally, the referee characterizes Attorney Zapf's 
statement as including an assertion that he had no opinion about 
the reason why Officer Baars had resigned.  The referee does not 
find this to be false because it was an opinion rather than a 
statement of fact.   
REFEREE'S RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO SANCTIONS AND COSTS 
¶55 The 
OLR's 
complaint 
initially 
sought 
a 
90-day 
suspension, and its counsel reaffirmed that request in his 
closing argument.  Attorney Zapf's counsel did not make a 
No. 
2016AP2514-D   
 
28 
 
specific 
recommendation 
as 
to 
sanction, 
arguing 
at 
the 
conclusion of the evidentiary hearing that the OLR had failed to 
prove any of the three charged counts and therefore that the 
complaint should be dismissed in its entirety.   
¶56 The referee, who clearly viewed this matter as a 
massive conspiracy by the KPD as well as an egregious exercise 
in hiding police criminal conduct by Attorney Zapf, recommended 
that the court suspend Attorney Zapf's license for "at least 1 
year."  The referee did not cite any prior disciplinary 
decisions as support for his recommendation.  He did believe 
that the fact that Attorney Zapf had been disciplined in 1985 
for also failing to disclose exculpatory evidence was a 
"disturbing" aggravating factor.  The referee stated that he 
believed that Attorney Zapf's conduct had stemmed from "an 
effort to win regardless of the rights both sides in the matter 
have to fundamental fairness in the trial."  Although the 
referee acknowledged earlier in his report that even at the time 
of Attorney Zapf's disclosure on Day 5 of the Brantley trial, 
Attorney Zapf did not know about the "cover-up" engaged in by 
the KPD (as the referee believes), he faults Attorney Zapf for 
failing to act as the "gatekeeper" to ensure that the defense 
knew about what had occurred in the planting of evidence by 
Officer Baars and the subsequent cover-up by the KPD.  The 
referee further indicated that Attorney Zapf's untruthful 
statements to the court when he ultimately did disclose 
compounded the misconduct. 
No. 
2016AP2514-D   
 
29 
 
¶57 The referee recommended that the court impose two 
conditions on Attorney Zapf's reinstatement and resumption of 
the practice of law.  First, the referee recommended that the 
court require Attorney Zapf to undergo 25 hours of continuing 
legal education that focused on the duties of a prosecutor.  
Second, the referee recommended that the court condition 
Attorney Zapf's license on never again acting as a prosecutor.   
¶58 The referee also recommended that Attorney Zapf be 
ordered to pay the full costs of this disciplinary proceeding.  
The OLR's supplemental statement of costs indicates that the 
total 
costs 
of 
this 
case, 
through 
oral 
argument, 
were 
$17,937.79. 
ANALYSIS OF APPELLATE ARGUMENTS 
Count 
1-Violation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.23(1)(h) 
and 
SCR 20:8.4(f) 
¶59 This 
count 
alleges 
that 
Attorney 
Zapf 
violated 
SCR 20:8.4(f), which, among other things, makes it professional 
misconduct to violate a statute regulating the conduct of 
attorneys.  In this instance, the statute regulating the conduct 
of attorneys that Attorney Zapf allegedly violated was the 
Wisconsin criminal discovery statute, Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1), 
the relevant text of which is set forth in paragraph 44 above.  
¶60 Attorney Zapf's primary argument on appeal regarding 
Count 1 is that the OLR and the referee are expanding the scope 
of the ethical rules to require a prosecutor to disclose more 
than is required under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  
Attorney Zapf asserts that this court rejected that the duty to 
No. 
2016AP2514-D   
 
30 
 
disclose was broader under the Wisconsin discovery statute than 
under Brady in In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Riek, 2013 
WI 81, 350 Wis. 2d 684, 834 N.W.2d 384.  In that case, Sharon 
Riek, an assistant district attorney in Racine County, was 
assigned to prosecute a marijuana possession case against Tyrone 
Smith.  Another passenger in Smith's vehicle, Isaiah Simpson, 
confessed at a revocation hearing for Smith that the marijuana 
in the vehicle had belonged to him, not Smith.  Smith's defense 
counsel 
obviously 
was 
aware 
of 
Simpson's 
confession.  
Approximately one month later, Simpson met with District 
Attorney Michael Nieskes and again confessed that the marijuana 
at issue had belonged to him.  District Attorney Nieskes wrote a 
very short note indicating that Simpson had said the marijuana 
was his.  Assistant District Attorney Riek was aware of the 
conversation between District Attorney Nieskes and Simpson, but 
she testified that she was unaware of the note until later.  
Smith's counsel later learned that Simpson had spoken with 
District Attorney Nieskes, and he requested copies of any 
information Simpson had provided to the District Attorney's 
office.  At that point, Assistant District Attorney Riek found 
the note from District Attorney Nieskes in a pile of papers on 
her desk and sent a copy of it to Smith's counsel. 
¶61 The OLR charged Attorney Riek with violating both 
SCR 20:3.8(f)(1)12 and Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(h), as enforced via 
                                                 
12 SCR 20:3.8(f)(1) provides as follows:   
(continued) 
No. 
2016AP2514-D   
 
31 
 
SCR 20:8.4(f).  The OLR appealed the referee's recommendation 
that all counts be dismissed.  It argued in this court that a 
prosecutor's disclosure obligations under SCR 20:3.8(f)(1) were 
broader than the disclosure obligations imposed by Brady and its 
progeny.  This court rejected that argument.  Riek, 350 
Wis. 2d 684, ¶29 ("We reject the OLR's proffered interpretation 
of SCR 20:3.8(f)(1).").  The court further held that District 
Attorney Nieskes' note was not material under SCR 20:3.8(f)(1) 
because the defense already knew from the revocation hearing 
that Simpson had claimed ownership of the marijuana. 
¶62 Based on the proposition that the discovery statute 
incorporates all of the elements outlined in Brady, including 
that the undisclosed evidence was material, Attorney Zapf argues 
that he did not violate the discovery statute here because the 
evidence was not material.  He relies on the following facts to 
show the lack of materiality.  He asserts that he was orally 
told in the January 9, 2015 meeting that an officer had 
inadvertently "mishandled evidence" during a search.  The 
                                                                                                                                                             
(f) A 
prosecutor, 
other 
than 
a 
municipal 
prosecutor, in a criminal case or proceeding that 
could result in the deprivation of liberty shall: 
(1) make timely disclosure to the defense of all 
evidence or information known to the prosecutor that 
tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates 
the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, 
disclose 
to 
the 
defense 
and 
the 
tribunal 
all 
unprivileged 
mitigating 
information 
known 
to 
the 
prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of 
this responsibility by a protective order of the 
tribunal; . . . . 
No. 
2016AP2514-D   
 
32 
 
mishandled evidence discussed at that time, however, was only 
the ID card, which Attorney Zapf concluded was not material 
because Tibbs' identity was not at issue in his case and 
therefore the ID had no bearing on his guilt or innocence.  
Attorney Zapf acknowledges that the supervisory officers also 
told him about Officer Baars' strange discussion of having false 
memories of possibly introducing a bullet to the search 
location, but he emphasizes that the officers said Officer Baars 
expressly denied having planted the bullet.  Moreover, Attorney 
Zapf says that he reasonably concluded that any information 
about a .22 caliber bullet was not material since the weapon 
used to kill Edwards had been a .32 caliber handgun. 
¶63 Attorney Zapf also argues that the proceedings in the 
two criminal cases following his disclosure prove that the 
disclosure of neither piece of evidence was material.  In 
Brantley's case, the jury heard Officer Baars confess to 
planting both the ID card and the bullet, but the jurors still 
found Brantley guilty.  Thus, the lack of disclosure clearly did 
not affect the outcome of that trial.  Similarly, after 
conducting discovery, Tibbs withdrew his motion to rescind his 
guilty plea, which, according to Attorney Zapf, shows that Tibbs 
concluded that Officer Baars' confession would not change the 
outcome of his case. 
¶64 In response, the OLR starts from the premise that 
Officer Baars engaged in "criminal actions" that constituted 
No. 
2016AP2514-D   
 
33 
 
"serious police misconduct."13  From that basis, it argues that, 
of course, the defense should have been made aware of the 
information. 
¶65 The OLR faults Attorney Zapf for focusing only on the 
specific pieces of evidence——the ID card and the .22 caliber 
bullet——and failing to acknowledge that the act of planting 
evidence, by itself and regardless of what items were planted, 
was exculpatory information that should have been disclosed.  It 
points out that the referee properly took this wider view of 
what should have been disclosed.  Noting that Referee Flynn 
previously served as a circuit court judge, it argues that his 
determination 
that 
"police 
misconduct" 
always 
constitutes 
exculpatory evidence per se that should be disclosed "should be 
given great deference."   
¶66 The 
OLR 
then 
proceeds 
to 
distinguish 
the 
Riek 
decision.  It points out that in Riek, unlike in the present 
case, 
the 
defense 
was 
already 
aware 
of 
the 
exculpatory 
information (Simpson's confession of owning the marijuana), and 
what was not disclosed (District Attorney Nieskes' note) was 
duplicative.  On the other hand, according to the OLR, what was 
disclosed by Attorney Zapf (namely, the 11/11/14 supplemental 
                                                 
13 The OLR's brief does not distinguish between what Officer 
Baars ultimately admitted to doing (i.e., planting evidence) and 
what he initially told Detective Kenesie that he had done, which 
was making a mistake in allowing Detective Traxler to have a 
wrong impression of the source of the ID and in allowing the ID 
to be collected as evidence in connection with the backpack. 
No. 
2016AP2514-D   
 
34 
 
report) was vague and could not be understood without knowing 
the background of Officer Baars' discussion with his superior 
officers, which Attorney Zapf did not disclose until Day 5 of 
the Brantley trial.  The OLR argues that the undisclosed 
information here, Officer Baars' planting of evidence, was not 
duplicative of information the defense already knew nor was it 
irrelevant.  It points to the testimony of both Attorney Rose 
and Attorney Glinski that this information would have been 
important to them and would have altered their strategies in 
representing their respective clients. 
¶67 Neither party's analysis of this count is on the 
money.  First, Attorney Zapf reads our decision in Riek too 
broadly.  When we said in that case that a prosecutor's 
obligation to disclose was limited to the contours of Brady and 
its progeny, we were interpreting only a prosecutor's obligation 
under SCR 20:3.8(f)(1).  Riek, 350 Wis. 2d 684, ¶¶25-36.  We did 
not hold in that case that a prosecutor's obligation under the 
Wisconsin discovery statute, as enforced via SCR 20:8.4(f), was 
entirely congruent with the obligation as set forth in Brady.   
¶68 Indeed, in a case cited in neither party's brief in 
this court, a fact that is of some moment, as explained below, 
we specifically acknowledged that there are certain differences 
between the Wisconsin criminal discovery statute and Brady.  See 
State v. Harris, 2004 WI 64, 272 Wis. 2d 80, 680 N.W.2d 737.  In 
that case the prosecution did not disclose until after Harris 
had pled guilty that the victim, B.M.M., only several weeks 
before making allegations against Harris, had made an allegation 
No. 
2016AP2514-D   
 
35 
 
that her grandfather had sexually assaulted her on two occasions 
by touching her in a manner similar to the manner she claimed 
Harris had followed.  This court characterized this information 
as exculpatory impeachment evidence and ruled that the failure 
to disclose this exculpatory impeachment evidence did not 
violate Harris's constitutional rights under Brady because the 
United States Supreme Court in United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 
622, 633 (2002), had held that there is no constitutional right 
of a defendant to receive impeachment evidence, even if 
exculpatory, prior to entry of a plea bargain.  See Harris, 272 
Wis. 2d 80, ¶23. 
¶69 We did not, however, rule that the same analysis 
applied to the claim that the prosecution had violated the 
criminal discovery statute.  We concluded that the analysis 
under the discovery statute was somewhat different because of 
the wording of the statute, although we did use the Brady 
framework for parts of the analysis.  In particular, we said 
that "§ 971.23(1)(h) requires, at a minimum, that the prosecutor 
disclose 
evidence 
that 
is 
favorable 
to 
the 
accused 
if 
nondisclosure of the evidence undermines confidence in the 
outcome of the proceeding."  Id., ¶27.  With respect to the 
specific evidence that had not been disclosed, we concluded that 
although the evidence did not have to be disclosed pursuant to 
Brady 
because 
Harris 
had 
pled 
guilty, 
the 
exculpatory 
impeachment evidence should have been disclosed under the 
Wisconsin discovery statute because the evidence cast doubt on 
the credibility of the victim, who was the state's primary 
No. 
2016AP2514-D   
 
36 
 
witness, and the lack of disclosure undermined our confidence in 
the outcome of Harris's criminal case, given the circuit court's 
acceptance of Harris's offer of proof that he would not have 
pled guilty if he had known the undisclosed evidence. 
¶70 In 
addition, 
in 
Harris 
we 
also 
considered 
the 
difference in timing under Brady versus under the Wisconsin 
discovery statute.  While Brady is not violated if there is 
delayed disclosure, even during a trial, so long as the 
disclosure comes soon enough to allow the defense to use the 
information, the discovery statute requires disclosure "within a 
reasonable time before trial."  Thus, this court ruled that 
Brady's timing requirement could not be imported into the 
statutory analysis because the statute imposed a broader 
obligation than the United States Constitution.  Harris, 272 
Wis. 2d. 80, ¶37.  We concluded that the statute required 
exculpatory evidence to be disclosed sufficiently prior to trial 
such that there remains "sufficient time for its effective use" 
at trial, even if the defendant ultimately pleads guilty.  Where 
Harris had pled guilty two weeks prior to his scheduled trial 
date, this court concluded that disclosure had been required 
prior to the date of his plea because he could not have 
effectively used the information at trial if disclosure occurred 
after that point.  Id., ¶38. 
¶71 We need not and do not decide in this case the full 
and precise ways in which the contours of Brady and Wisconsin's 
discovery statute either overlap or diverge.  We are not 
reviewing 
either 
Mr. 
Tibbs' 
criminal 
conviction 
or 
Mr. 
No. 
2016AP2514-D   
 
37 
 
Brantley's.  What we are determining is whether the OLR has 
proven by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that 
Attorney Zapf engaged in professional misconduct by violating 
SCR 20:8.4(f).  Thus, unlike in a criminal case, where the focus 
is on the information and materials in the state's possession, 
we must focus on what information or materials Attorney Zapf had 
in his possession.  We conclude for multiple reasons that 
Attorney Zapf did not violate SCR 20:8.4(f).   
¶72 First, we consider whether Attorney Zapf should have 
disclosed the fact that, as he alleges he understood the 
situation at the time, Officer Baars had made a mistake in 
placing the ID card into the backpack once he had given it to 
Detective Traxler and the detective, operating under that 
misimpression, had ordered that the ID card be photographed and 
collected as evidence. 
¶73 We begin with the words of the section of the 
discovery statute that the OLR alleges Attorney Zapf violated.  
Boiled to its essence, the statute requires district attorneys 
to disclose to criminal defendants or their attorneys, within a 
reasonable time prior to trial, information or materials that 
are within the possession, custody or control of the state and 
that qualify as "exculpatory evidence."  In Harris, we defined 
exculpatory evidence as evidence "that is favorable to the 
accused if nondisclosure of the evidence undermines confidence 
in the outcome of the proceeding."  Harris, 272 Wis. 2d 80, ¶27. 
¶74 We have no difficulty concluding that the mere 
placement of the ID card into the backpack, if done by Officer 
No. 
2016AP2514-D   
 
38 
 
Baars through a mistake or even with negligence, was not 
exculpatory evidence the nondisclosure of which undermines our 
confidence in the outcome of either Tibbs' or Brantley's 
criminal case.  The ID belonged to Tibbs so it had no bearing on 
Brantley's case.  It also was not exculpatory as to Tibbs 
because, as Attorney Zapf points out, there was no question of 
Tibbs' identity in the case alleging his involvement in the 
homicide of Edwards.  Thus, Attorney Zapf could not have 
violated 
the 
discovery 
statute, 
thereby 
also 
violating 
SCR 20:8.4(f), by failing to disclose that Officer Baars had 
"placed" the ID card into the backpack.  In any event, Attorney 
Zapf did disclose that fact when he sent the 11/11/14 
supplemental report to defense counsel and the two circuit 
courts because that report specifically said that Officer Baars 
had "placed" the ID card into the backpack. 
¶75 What about the bullet?  Until Officer Baars admitted 
that he had planted the bullet during his telephone conversation 
on the fifth day of the Brantley trial, there is no evidence 
that supports a finding of fact that Attorney Zapf knew that 
Officer Baars had "placed" the bullet into the backpack.  Even 
the referee acknowledges that at most Attorney Zapf was told 
that Officer Baars had "possibly" introduced the bullet into the 
backpack.  Even if Attorney Zapf had been clearly told that 
Officer Baars had definitely introduced the bullet into the 
backpack, through a mistake or through negligence, the analysis 
would be the same as for the ID card.  The bullet that killed 
Edwards was a .32 caliber bullet.  The gun that fired that 
No. 
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bullet was recovered from the residence on 59th Street the day 
before the search in which Officer Baars was involved.  Thus, 
the presence of a .22 caliber bullet had no relevance to Tibbs' 
or Brantley's involvement in Edwards' homicide, and the failure 
to disclose the introduction of that bullet does not undermine 
in any way our confidence in Tibbs' conviction following the 
entry of his guilty plea or in Brantley's conviction following 
his trial. 
¶76 The OLR, however, focuses on the referee's findings 
that the relevant figures in the KPD knew that Officer Baars had 
"planted" the ID card (and possibly the bullet) and that 
Attorney Zapf knew or should have known that same fact from his 
interactions with them (his meeting with the officers on January 
9, 2015, his meeting with Chief Morrissey on January 19, 2015, 
and his receipt of the allegedly false and incomplete 11/11/14 
supplemental report).  The OLR argues that, whether or not the 
ID card and the bullet themselves were exculpatory, the fact 
that the ID card (and possibly the bullet) had been planted was 
exculpatory because it would have allowed the defense to argue 
to a jury that the police investigation had been tainted. 
¶77 The answer to this argument is that we are deciding 
whether Attorney Zapf, not the state, violated SCR 20:8.4(f) by 
personally violating the discovery statute.  In Riek, we 
concluded that in order for a district attorney to be found to 
have violated his/her obligations to disclose evidence under 
SCR 20:3.8(f)(1), the OLR must prove by clear, satisfactory, and 
convincing evidence not only that the attorney failed to 
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40 
 
disclose 
evidence 
that 
should 
have 
been 
disclosed 
under 
applicable law, but also that the attorney's failure to disclose 
was more than carelessness or negligence on the part of the 
attorney.  Riek, 350 Wis. 2d 684, ¶45.   
¶78 In this case, the OLR failed to prove that Attorney 
Zapf's conduct met both of those standards.  First, to the 
extent that the referee infers that Attorney Zapf had actual 
knowledge that Officer Baars had intentionally planted evidence 
at some point prior to Officer Baars' admission of that fact, we 
determine that any such finding is clearly erroneous.  The 
referee does make statements that could be considered findings 
of fact that during the January 9, 2015 meeting, Detective 
Kenesie and the other KPD officers told Attorney Zapf that 
Officer Baars had "planted" the ID card (and possibly the 
bullet).  There is, however, no place in the record where this 
statement is made.  As noted above, none of the police officers 
involved in that meeting testified at the evidentiary hearing in 
this case.  The only participant in the meeting who did testify 
was Attorney Zapf, and he did not say that he had been told that 
Officer Baars had "planted" evidence.  He testified that the 
officers said that Officer Baars had spoken of making a 
"mistake," had denied planting the ID card, and had made 
confusing statements about having had "false memories" of 
possibly having brought the bullet to the scene of the search.   
¶79 As the trier of fact, the referee was entitled to 
accept or reject Attorney Zapf's denial of having been told that 
the ID had been planted, but the only way that the referee could 
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have found that the KPD officers told Attorney Zapf during the 
January 9, 2015 meeting that the ID card had been "planted" by 
Officer Baars was to infer that fact.  Such an inference, 
however, must be a reasonable one based on the evidence.  It 
cannot simply be the referee's speculation. 
¶80 The problem with the referee's inference that Attorney 
Zapf had actual knowledge of the planting of evidence is that 
there is no evidence on which it can be reasonably based.  The 
only way that the referee appears to have been able to reach 
that inference was to stack it on top of a long series of 
underlying inferences regarding what Officer Baars communicated 
to Detective Kenesie, what Detective Kenesie and other KPD 
officers knew based on Officer Baars' statements, what Chief 
Morrissey knew of Officer Baars' conduct, and what Detective 
Kenesie and others did to "falsify evidence" and to "cover-up" 
Officer Baars' "planting" of evidence.  Although we have 
questions about these inferences by the referee as they relate 
to 
the 
actions 
of 
the 
police 
department, 
we 
need 
not 
definitively determine whether those inferences are clearly 
erroneous.  Even if the KPD had knowledge that Officer Baars had 
done something more than just made a mistake, to make the 
ultimate inference that Attorney Zapf also learned that fact 
from Detective Kenesie at the January 9, 2015 meeting there 
would have to be some basis in the record to make that inference 
reasonable.  There simply is no basis in this record to jump to 
that conclusion, so any finding to that effect is clearly 
erroneous. 
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¶81 The referee also asserts that Attorney Zapf should 
have known from what was communicated to him and from the 
incomplete nature of the 11/11/14 supplemental report that 
Officer Baars had "planted" the evidence and that he therefore 
had an obligation under the discovery statute to disclose that 
information to counsel for Tibbs and Brantley.  The referee, 
however, acknowledges that Attorney Zapf had no knowledge at the 
time of what the referee, in hindsight, infers was manipulation 
of reports, lying, evidence falsification, and a cover-up by the 
KPD.  An assertion that Attorney Zapf should have drawn the same 
inferences as the referee did at a later time with information 
that was not available to Attorney Zapf does not constitute 
clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence of an ethical 
violation by Attorney Zapf. 
¶82 The referee also faults Attorney Zapf for basing his 
analysis of whether he was required to disclose the introduction 
of the ID (and possibly the bullet) into the backpack on the 
materiality of those items to the prosecution of Tibbs and 
Brantley under Brady.  As we have just determined, however, one 
cannot on this record make a finding that Attorney Zapf had 
actual knowledge that the ID card (and possibly the bullet) had 
been "planted."  In the absence of knowledge of "planting," the 
analysis becomes much more complex, especially where the charge 
in this case is that Attorney Zapf violated the discovery 
statute.  We note that neither the referee nor the OLR 
acknowledged the case law which holds that there are differences 
in analysis under the discovery statute and Brady.  The referee 
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43 
 
and the OLR, however, urge us to discipline Attorney Zapf for 
failing to conduct a legal analysis that they also did not fully 
make.  There is simply no evidence to suggest that Attorney 
Zapf's analysis in the midst of the prosecution, to the extent 
it might have been erroneous, was the product of something more 
than negligence or carelessness.  See Riek, 350 Wis. 2d 684, 
¶45.  For that additional reason, the OLR also cannot meet the 
clear, satisfactory, and convincing standard for demonstrating a 
violation of SCR 20:8.4(f).  Accordingly, Count 1 must be 
dismissed. 
Count 2—Violation of SCR 20:3.4(b) 
¶83 The OLR does not appeal from the referee's conclusion 
that it failed to demonstrate a violation of SCR 20:3.4(b) in 
connection with Officer Pie's testimony.  We agree with the 
referee's conclusion that this count should be dismissed.  There 
is no evidence in this record that, even if Officer Pie gave 
false testimony, Attorney Zapf ever counseled or assisted her to 
do so.  Attorney Zapf never asked her any questions about the 
backpack, the ID card, or the .22 caliber bullet.  To the extent 
that Officer Pie answered questions about those items on cross-
examination that might have contributed to defense counsel 
having an inaccurate understanding of how those items had been 
found, Attorney Zapf took steps as soon as practicable to 
correct any misimpression defense counsel or the court may have 
had.   
 
 
No. 
2016AP2514-D   
 
44 
 
Count 3—Violation of SCR 20:3.3(a)(1) 
¶84 Attorney Zapf's argument on appeal regarding this 
count is simply that the referee's finding of a violation was 
based on an erroneous reading of certain of the factual 
assertions in his statement to the court on Day 5 of the 
Brantley trial and an erroneous belief regarding what Attorney 
Zapf knew at the time.  We agree that the referee's findings 
that certain of Attorney Zapf's statements were false were based 
on a mischaracterization of what Attorney Zapf actually said.  
Quite simply, Attorney Zapf did not make most of the factual 
statements that the referee found he did.  As to what he did 
say, it would be clearly erroneous to find that those statements 
were false. 
¶85 To understand how the referee's characterization of 
Attorney Zapf's statements in court or the false natures of 
those statements were clearly erroneous, it is helpful to set 
forth again what he actually said: 
What I would understand subsequently, although I don't 
have personal knowledge, and I don't have anything in 
documentation, 
that 
as 
a 
result 
of 
the 
misunderstanding or how those items got into the 
backpack or into evidence, Officer Baars resigned from 
the police department.  I don't know anything about 
discipline.  I don't know anything about prior 
history, but Officer Baars resigned as a result, in 
part, I would say, as a result of his handling or 
mishandling of evidence at the crime scene, or the 
shooting of the residence at 1208 59th Street (sic). 
¶86 First, the referee asserts that Attorney Zapf falsely 
told the court that he had no personal knowledge about the 
entire episode involving Officer Baars.  That is not what 
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2016AP2514-D   
 
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Attorney Zapf said.  He stated that he had no personal knowledge 
"that as a result of the misunderstanding or how those items got 
into the backpack or into evidence, Officer Baars resigned from 
the police department."  His claim of a lack of personal 
knowledge related to the reasons for Officer Baars' resignation, 
not to the episode as a whole.  The referee's finding of a 
falsity in this regard is therefore clearly erroneous. 
¶87 Second, the referee found that Attorney Zapf had 
claimed in the statement that he had no documentation about 
Officers Baars' actions.  Again, that is not what Attorney Zapf 
said.  As with his lack of personal knowledge, the lack of 
documentation referenced in the statement related to the reasons 
for Officer Baars' resignation from the police department, not 
to his conduct during the search or during the preparation of 
the drafts of the supplemental report.  The referee does not 
find that Attorney Zapf did, in fact, have documentation in his 
possession as to the reasons for Officer Baars' resignation.  
This claimed falsity is therefore also clearly erroneous. 
¶88 Third, the referee does track what Attorney Zapf said 
by asserting that his statement that he had no personal 
knowledge that Officer Baars had resigned because of his 
misconduct in planting evidence was untruthful.  The referee 
found this statement to be false because Attorney Zapf "knew" 
that Officer Baars had resigned and the theory that the 
resignation was due to the planting of evidence was a reasonable 
one.  Attorney Zapf, however, did not say to the court, that he 
did not have personal knowledge of the fact of Officer Baars' 
No. 
2016AP2514-D   
 
46 
 
resignation so that cannot have been a false statement.  He also 
did not say to the court that the theory about the resignation 
being due to the planting of evidence was an unreasonable one.  
What Attorney Zapf said is that he did not have personal 
knowledge as to whether that was the reason for Officer Baars' 
resignation.  The referee did not find that Attorney Zapf 
actually had such personal knowledge.  Therefore the finding of 
a false statement in this regard is clearly erroneous. 
¶89 Finally, the referee found that Attorney Zapf falsely 
asserted that he had no knowledge about the prior history of 
Officer Baars' planting of evidence during the April 15, 2014 
search.  Again, that is not what Attorney Zapf said.  He said 
that he "didn't know anything about discipline" and then 
immediately followed that statement by saying that he "didn't 
know anything about prior history."  It is clear from this 
context that Attorney Zapf's statement about a lack of knowledge 
about "prior history" related to a lack of knowledge about prior 
history of discipline.  Attorney Zapf did not say he had no 
knowledge at all about the April 15, 2014 execution of the 
search warrant or Officer Baars' subsequent conduct in this 
case.  Since the referee did not find that Attorney Zapf did, in 
fact, have knowledge about "prior history" of discipline imposed 
on Officer Baars, and the OLR has not shown by clear, 
satisfactory, and convincing evidence that Attorney Zapf did 
have such knowledge of "prior history," the referee's finding of 
falsity in this regard was also clearly erroneous. 
No. 
2016AP2514-D   
 
47 
 
¶90 When one parses what Attorney Zapf said to the court, 
there is no basis on which to say that the OLR has demonstrated 
by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that his 
statements constituted false statements of fact to a tribunal.  
Accordingly, Count 3 must be dismissed. 
¶91 Having determined that the OLR failed to meet its 
burden to prove each of the three counts, we conclude that the 
disciplinary complaint against Attorney Zapf must be dismissed.  
In light of the complete dismissal of the complaint, we do not 
require Attorney Zapf to pay any of the costs of this 
proceeding. 
¶92 IT IS ORDERED that the disciplinary complaint against 
Robert Zapf is dismissed. 
¶93 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no costs will be imposed. 
 
No. 
2016AP2514-D   
 
 
 
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