Title: BALYNDA KAY FOSTER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

BALYNDA KAY FOSTER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 8224 P.3d 1Case Number: S-09-0056Decided: 01/28/2010
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
BALYNDA 
KAY FOSTER,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Carbon County

The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Kerin.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham M. Smith, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Smith.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]    Following a jury trial, 
Balynda Kay Foster (the appellant) was convicted of numerous drug-related 
crimes.  The appellant appeals the 
convictions, alleging that the district court abused its discretion by admitting 
two letters into evidence and alleging that cumulative error occurred.  Finding no abuse of discretion in 
admitting the letters into evidence and finding that no cumulative error 
occurred, we will affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]    1.  Did the district court abuse its 
discretion when it admitted into evidence letters purportedly written by the 
appellant and the appellant's accomplice?

 
 
2.  Did cumulative error occur warranting 
reversal of the appellant's convictions?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]    The facts of this case 
are relatively simple and straightforward.  
On October 29, 2007, the appellant was charged with eleven counts of 
drug-related offenses, including possession of a controlled substance, 
possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, and delivery of a 
controlled substance.1  Following a jury trial, the appellant 
was convicted of eight of the eleven counts and she was subsequently 
sentenced.2  The appellant filed a timely notice of 
appeal alleging that the district court abused its discretion when it admitted 
into evidence two letters purportedly written by the appellant and the 
appellant's accomplice (Mr. Walsh) and that cumulative error occurred during 
trial.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Did 
the district court abuse its discretion when it admitted into evidence letters 
purportedly written by the appellant and appellant's 
accomplice?

 
 
[¶4]               
Generally, decisions regarding the admissibility of evidence are 
entrusted to the sound discretion of the district court.  We afford considerable deference to the 
district court's decision and, as long as a legitimate basis exists for the 
district court's ruling, it will not be reversed on appeal.  Under the abuse of discretion standard, 
our primary consideration is the reasonableness of the district court's 
decision.  The burden of 
establishing an abuse of discretion rests with the appellant.  

 
 
If 
we find that the district court erred in admitting the evidence, we must then 
determine whether or not the error affected [the appellant's] substantial 
rights, providing grounds for reversal, or whether the error was harmless.  The error is harmful if there is a 
reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more favorable to [the 
appellant] if the error had never occurred.  To demonstrate harmful error, [the 
appellant] must prove prejudice under circumstances which manifest inherent 
unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the public sense of fair 
play.  

 
 

Proffit 
v. State, 
2008 WY 103, ¶ 12, 191 P.3d 974, 977-78 (Wyo. 2008) (quoting Humphrey v. State, 2008 WY 67, ¶¶ 44-45, 
185 P.3d 1236, 1249 (Wyo. 2008)) (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted).

 
 
[¶5]    The appellant takes issue 
with the admission of two letters, one purportedly written by the appellant and 
the other purportedly written by Mr. Walsh.  We will address the admission of each of 
the letters in turn.  As to the 
admission of the letter purportedly written by the appellant, the appellant 
makes two arguments supporting her claim that the district court improperly 
admitted it into evidence.  First, 
the appellant argues that there was insufficient foundation to show that 
Lieutenant Bisceglia had sufficient familiarity with the appellant's handwriting 
to make a lay identification of it.  
Second, the appellant argues that Lieutenant Bisceglia acquired her 
familiarity with the appellant's handwriting for purposes of litigation, in 
violation of W.R.E. 901(b)(2).

 
 
[¶6]    We begin our analysis with 
W.R.E. 901, which sets forth the basic requirements of authentication and 
identification of evidence.  It 
reads in pertinent part: 

 
 
(a)   General provisions.  The requirement of 
authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is 
satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in 
question is what its proponent claims. 

 
 
(b)   Illustrations.  By way of illustration 
only, and not by way of limitation, the following are examples of authentication 
or identification conforming with the requirements of this 
rule:

 
 
(1)   Testimony of Witnesses with 
Knowledge.  Testimony that a matter is what it is claimed to 
be;

 
 
(2)   Nonexpert Opinion on Handwriting.  
Nonexpert opinion as to the genuineness of handwriting, based upon familiarity 
not acquired for purposes of the litigation;

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
[¶7]    This Court has rarely 
addressed the level of familiarity required for a lay witness to testify to the 
genuineness of a person's handwriting, as described in W.R.E. 901(b)(2).  See Epperson v. State, 600 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Wyo. 1979) (finding, without much analysis, that a wife was sufficiently 
familiar with her husband's handwriting to be able to authenticate its 
genuineness).  Fortunately, W.R.E. 
901 is identical to its federal counterpart, F.R.E. 901.  "When this Court construes court rules 
that are virtually identical to their federal counterparts, relevant federal 
authority is persuasive."  Walters v. State, 2008 WY 159, ¶ 13, 197 P.3d 1273, 1277 (Wyo. 2008). 

 
 
[¶8]    Federal courts have construed 
F.R.E. 901(b)(2) liberally to admit into evidence a wide spectrum of handwritten 
evidence authenticated by lay witness testimony as to familiarity with the 
handwriting.  See United States v. Apperson, 441 F.3d 1162, 1200-01 (10th Cir. 2006) (finding sufficient basis for witness to testify 
to the authentication of handwriting on a letter by testifying that "based upon 
his long-standing association with [the appellant], he was familiar with his 
handwriting"); United States v. 
Tipton, 964 F.2d 650, 654-55 (7th Cir. 1992) (witness could authenticate 
documents purportedly written by appellant because witness "was familiar with 
[appellant]'s handwriting and signature as a result of observing . . . documents 
[appellant] prepared"); United States v. 
Barker, 735 F.2d 1280, 1283 (11th Cir. 1984) (Witnesses who were co-workers 
of the appellant could authenticate writing on checks as that of appellant's 
because they "testified they were familiar with the [appellant]'s handwriting 
and stated in their opinions it matched or was similar to the handwriting on the 
checks.").  Authenticating 
handwriting through familiarity by a lay witness "requires nothing more than 
familiarity of some sort on the part of the witness with the handwriting of the 
person who, according to the witness, either did or did not pen the signature or 
writing in issue."  5 Christopher B. 
Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 9:4, at 345 (3d ed. 
2007).  Moreover, familiarity with 
handwriting need not come from personally witnessing the person sign a document. 
 "Other categories of experience 
can, however, demonstrate familiarity, such as seeing signatures on writings 
purporting to be those of the alleged author when the circumstances would 
indicate that they were genuine."  
United States v. Scott, 270 F.3d 30, 50 (1st Cir. 2001).  The 
Advisory Committee Notes to F.R.E. 901(b)(2) provide examples of how a witness 
may become familiar with handwriting in order to testify to its 
authenticity:

 
 
Example 
(2).  Example (2) states 
conventional doctrine as to lay identification of handwriting, which recognizes 
that a sufficient familiarity with the handwriting of another person may be 
acquired by seeing him write, by exchanging correspondence, or by other means, 
to afford a basis for identifying it on subsequent occasions.  McCormick § 189.  See also California Evidence Code 
§ 1416. . . .

 
 
[¶9]    In this case, Lieutenant 
Bisceglia testified that the reason she was able to identify the handwriting on 
the first letter as that of the appellant was because she, "as lieutenant of the 
jail, receive[s] the requests and grievances from the inmates.  And [the appellant] has a particular 
type of writing that is easy to identify."  
Lieutenant Bisceglia acquired her familiarity with the appellant's 
handwriting by reading it repeatedly, which the Advisory Committee Notes to 
F.R.E. 901(b)(2) recognize as creating adequate familiarity as foundation to 
testify.  We find no reason to come 
to a different result under W.R.E. 901(b)(2).  Accordingly, the State sufficiently 
authenticated the letter and the district court did not abuse its discretion 
when it admitted the letter into evidence. 

 
 
[¶10]  We now turn to appellant's argument that 
the district court abused its discretion in admitting the letter purportedly 
written by the appellant because, according to the appellant, Lieutenant 
Bisceglia acquired her familiarity with the appellant's handwriting for purposes 
of litigation.  Specifically, the 
appellant argues that, as an employee of the State, Lieutenant Bisceglia is an 
agent of the State, and because the State is a party to the prosecution of the 
appellant, that without a showing by the State to the contrary, this Court must 
assume that Lieutenant Bisceglia's familiarity with the handwriting on the 
letter must have come from preparing for litigation.

 
 
[¶11]  We again rely on federal authority for 
guidance.  Federal case law does not 
support the appellant's broad assertion that simply being a State agent and 
acting as a lay witness to authenticate handwriting automatically amounts to 
becoming familiar with the handwriting for purposes of litigation as 
contemplated by F.R.E. 901(b)(2).  
In United States v. Scott, 270 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2001), after analyzing the rationale behind F.R.E. 901(b)(2), 
the court found that an IRS agent did not become familiar with the defendant's 
handwriting for purposes of litigation.  The IRS agent in Scott became familiar with Scott's 
handwriting over the course of several years as an agent investigating Scott for 
various criminal tax offenses.  Id. at 50.  The IRS agent's familiarity came from, 
among other things, viewing several letters, past court pleadings, signature 
cards used to open bank accounts, checks and tax returns, all written by Scott, 
as well as witnessing Scott sign a document in his presence.  Id. at 48.  Scott argued that the IRS agent's 
testimony that certain documents contained Scott's handwriting was inadmissible 
under F.R.E. 901(b)(2) because the agent became familiar with Scott's 
handwriting through his criminal investigation of Scott.  The First Circuit rejected this argument 
stating that the IRS agent

 
 
became 
familiar with Scott's handwriting over the course of several years, and he did 
so not for the purpose of testifying, but instead for the purpose of solving a 
crime.  Scott was perfectly entitled 
to argue to the jury that [the IRS agent's] interest in securing a conviction 
colored [the IRS agent's] perception of Scott's handwriting.  That possibility, however, did not 
require the district court to exclude the evidence under Rule 
901(b)(2).

 
 

Id. 
at 50 (internal citations omitted).

 
 
[¶12]  Lieutenant Bisceglia testified as to how 
she became familiar with the letters, and specifically how she was able to 
identify the handwriting on the first letter as the appellant's.  When asked how she was familiar with the 
two letters in question, Lieutenant Bisceglia stated 

 
 
They 
came across my desk because they were found by deputies in the jail.  I am not sure exactly where these two 
were found, because it was kind of an ongoing problem.  They would hide letters in different 
places, and the deputies would find them, and they would come up to my 
desk.  

 
 
As 
noted above, Lieutenant Bisceglia then testified that the reason she was able to 
identify the handwriting on the first letter as the appellant's was because she, 
"as lieutenant of the jail, receive[s] the requests and grievances from the 
inmates.  And [the appellant] has a 
particular type of writing that is easy to identify."  We find that F.R.E. 901(b)(2) would not 
bar Lieutenant Bisceglia from authenticating the letter, and we find no reason 
to conclude otherwise under W.R.E. 901(b)(2).  The Lieutenant did not obtain her 
familiarity with the appellant's handwriting for the purpose of  litigation.

 
 
[¶13]  As to the letter purportedly written by 
Mr. Walsh, the appellant argues that the district court improperly admitted it 
into evidence because the State failed to offer sufficient proof that the letter 
was in Mr. Walsh's handwriting and also failed to show that Lieutenant Bisceglia 
was sufficiently familiar with Mr. Walsh's handwriting to authenticate the 
letter.  However, it appears from 
the record that the authentication of this letter came not under W.R.E. 
901(b)(2), but instead under W.R.E. 901(b)(1), through proof that it was what it 
was purported to be.  The following 
colloquy occurred between the prosecutor and Lieutenant Bisceglia relating to 
the authentication of the letter purportedly written by Mr. Walsh: 

 
 
Q.  [By Prosecutor] And [Exhibit] Number 
2.  Are you familiar with State's 
2?

 
 
A.   [By Lieutenant Bisceglia]  Yes.  From [Mr. Walsh].

 
 
Q.  And how do you know 
that?

 
 
A.   I remember this one because we 
actually had the camera, because he hid it in the gym behind the mats we have in 
the gym.  And we found it when we 
actually went back and looked on the videos to see where it came 
from.

 
 
The 
appellant argues that no testimony was offered to show that Mr. Walsh authored 
the letter, and she questions whether someone else could have in fact written 
the letter, even though she does not point to any specific person.  However, the testimony provided by 
Lieutenant Bisceglia makes clear that her knowledge and familiarity with the 
letter came not from her familiarity with Mr. Walsh's handwriting, but instead 
from watching him on a video camera place the letter where it was found.  This testimony is sufficient to lay a 
foundation for its admission under W.R.E. 901(b)(1), as a witness with 
knowledge.  The appellant's 
arguments as to whether or not Mr. Walsh actually wrote the letter goes not to 
foundation for admission, but rather to the weight of the evidence.  5 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. 
Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 9:2, 
at 333-34 (3d ed. 2007) ("The fact that a matter satisfies the authentication 
requirement and is received in evidence does not mean that the trier of fact is 
bound either to conclude that the matter is in fact authentic or that it has the 
significance in the case the proponent suggests. . . . [T]he jury remains free 
to reject the matter in question on the ground that it is not authentic, or to 
accept it as authentic while according it little or no weight in the 
case.").  In the context of the 
instant case, there is no likelihood, or even a suggestion, of the involvement 
of someone else who may have written the letter.  Accordingly, the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in admitting it into evidence. 

 
 
Did 
cumulative error occur warranting reversalof the appellant's 
convictions?

 
 
[¶14]  
The appellant points to numerous instances during the trial in which 
she claims error occurred, and asserts that when considered together, those 
instances of error constitute cumulative reversible error.  Some of the instances to which the 
appellant points as error were contemporaneously objected to at trial, and 
others were not.  Consequently, the 
alleged errors followed by objections are reviewed for an abuse of discretion, 
while those instances to which no objection was made must be reviewed for plain 
error.  Proffit, 2008 WY 103, ¶ 12, 191 P.3d  at 
977-78.  With respect to an abuse of 
discretion standard of review, we have noted that "[a] trial court's decision . 
. . is entitled to considerable deference, and will not be reversed on appeal 
unless the appellant demonstrates a clear abuse of discretion.  [A]s long as there exists a legitimate 
basis for the trial court's ruling, that ruling will not be disturbed on 
appeal.'"  Wimbley v. State, 2009 WY 72, ¶ 10, 208 P.3d 608, 611 (Wyo. 2009) (quoting Leyva 
v. State, 2007 WY 136, ¶ 17, 165 P.3d 446, 452 (Wyo. 2007)) (internal 
citation omitted).  Moreover, under 
the abuse of discretion standard, "[e]rror is prejudicial if there is a 
reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more favorable to the 
defendant if the error had not been made."  
Reay v. State, 2008 WY 13, ¶ 
8, 176 P.3d 647, 650 (Wyo. 2008).  

 
 
[¶15]  Alternatively, "[t]o prove plain error, 
[the appellant] must demonstrate:  (1) that the record clearly reflects the 
alleged error, (2) that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated, and 
(3) that the violation adversely affected a substantial right of [the 
appellant]'s to his material prejudice."  
Bloomer v. State, 2009 WY 77, 
¶ 18, 209 P.3d 574, 592 (Wyo. 2009).  
"In cases applying the plain error standard, we have written that error 
is prejudicial when a reasonable probability exists, absent the error, that the 
appellant may have enjoyed a more favorable verdict.'"  Britton v. State, 2009 WY 91, ¶ 15 
n.3, 211 P.3d 514, 517 n.3 (Wyo. 2009) (quoting Guy v. State, 2008 WY 56, ¶ 9, 184 P.3d 687, 692 (Wyo. 2008)).

 
 
[¶16]  Finally, because we are reviewing the 
alleged errors for cumulative error, we have stated:

 
 
The 
purpose of evaluating for cumulative error is "to address whether the cumulative 
effect of two or more individually harmless errors has the potential to 
prejudice the defendant to the same extent as a single reversible error."  McClelland v. State, 2007 WY 57, ¶ 27, 
155 P.3d 1013, 1022 (Wyo. 2007).  In 
conducting a cumulative error evaluation, we consider only matters that we have 
determined to be errors.  Id.  We will reverse a conviction only when 
"the accumulated effect [of the errors] constitutes prejudice and the conduct of 
the trial is other than fair and impartial."  Id. (quoting Alcala v. State, 487 P.2d 448, 462 (Wyo. 
1971)).

 
 

Guy, 
2008 WY 56, ¶ 45, 184 P.3d  at 701.

 
 
[¶17]  The instances in which the appellant 
claims error occurred are:  (1) the 
district court's refusal to provide a limiting instruction following statements 
made by the prosecutor; (2) admission of irrelevant and prejudicial evidence; 
(3) improper questioning and argument by the prosecutor; and (4) improper 
vouching.  We will address each of 
these in turn, determining first whether error occurred, and then whether 
cumulative error occurred. 

 
 
Limiting 
or Curative Instruction 

 
 
[¶18]  The appellant first argues that error 
occurred when the district court refused to provide a limiting instruction after 
it sustained defense counsel's objection to statements made by the prosecutor 
during closing argument.  The 
following excerpt is the focus of this particular claim of error, during which 
the prosecutor is referring to a witness's testimony: 

 
 
[Prosecutor]: 
 But because of that at a real young 
age, his life was changed.  He will 
be a felon, and he testified as a felon.  
He fights now with alcohol and an [sic] methamphetamine addiction.  But his testimony -- you observed his 
candor on the witness stand -- was painful; it was truthful; and it described 
the hell 

 
 
[Defense 
Counsel]:  Objection, Your 
Honor.  That's an exclusive province 
of the jury on the truthfulness or not truthfulness of the 
testimony.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  The objection is 
sustained.

 
 
[Prosecutor]:  You heard his testimony, and you can 
evaluate that.

 
 

Prior 
to defense counsel's closing argument, he requested "a limiting instruction on 
the truthful comment that was made --,"3 and the district court responded: 
"The objection was sustained.  There 
will be no more instructions."  We 
find it unnecessary to determine whether the failure to provide a limiting or 
curative instruction was error because, even if it was, the appellant has failed 
to demonstrate any resulting prejudice.  
"A trial court is given wide latitude in instructing the jury and, as 
long as the instructions correctly state the law and the entire charge covers 
the relevant issue, reversible error will not be found."  Black v. State, 2002 WY 72, ¶ 5, 46 P.3d 298, 300 (Wyo. 2002).  The 
general jury instructions already contained an instruction to the jury that it 
was "to determine the credibility of all witnesses who testify before you, and 
from such evidence and testimony, to determine the issues of fact in this 
case."  Moreover, a proper objection 
was made in which the defense counsel adequately explained the reasoning for the 
objection, which acted not only as a legal basis for the judge to sustain the 
objection, but also contemporaneously reminded the jury that it was "[the] 
exclusive province of the jury [to determine] the truthfulness or not 
truthfulness of the testimony."  Any 
further instruction in this regard was unnecessary.  Accordingly, we find no error for not 
providing a limiting or curative instruction. 

 
 

Irrelevant 
Evidence

 
 
[¶19]  The second error that the appellant 
points to is the district court's admission into evidence of what the appellant 
claims to be "irrelevant [and] prejudicial evidence."  Specific instances of alleged error are: 
 (1) testimonial evidence of minor 
witness's drug use, drug testing, and past crimes; (2) testimony from a State's 
witness that she "came to know" the appellant in prison; and (3) testimony from 
Lieutenant Bisceglia that the appellant was an inmate in the 
jail.

 
 
[¶20]  The appellant points to W.R.E. 401 and 
402 as the clear and unequivocal rules of law that were violated by the 
admission of this testimony.  W.R.E. 
401 provides that "[r]elevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of 
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence."  W.R.E. 402 provides in 
pertinent part that "[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible . . . ."  The appellant claims that the admission 
of the above-mentioned testimony (see 
supra ¶ 19) violated these rules because it is not "relevant to any element 
of any crime charged against [the appellant]."  Generally speaking, "[t]he test of 
relevancy is one of reasonableness and common sense, liberally applied to favor 
admissibility rather than the exclusion of evidence."  Callen v. State, 2008 WY 107, ¶ 17, 192 P.3d 137, 144 (Wyo. 2008).  Contrary 
to the appellant's argument, we have upheld the admission of evidence as 
relevant even in situations when it does not directly "prove or disprove an 
element of any crime charged."  Trusky v. State, 7 P.3d 5, 12 (Wyo. 
2000) (upholding the admission of evidence unrelated to an element of a crime 
charged because it was relevant to the veracity of the witness's 
testimony).  With these general 
principles in mind, we will address each of the alleged admissions of irrelevant 
evidence. 

 
 

1.    
Testimonial 
evidence of minor witness's drug use, drug testing, and past 
crimes

 
 
[¶21]  As to the testimony from the minor 
witness relating to the minor's past methamphetamine use, the appellant points 
to several instances during the State's questioning of this witness where error 
allegedly occurred.  The first 
occurred during direct examination of the minor witness by the prosecutor. 

 
 
Q. [By Prosecutor]  Between . . . January of 2007 until the 
time that you were arrested, describe your addiction to methamphetamine.  

 
 
A.  [By Witness]  It was horrible.  It got completely out of hand.  I did stuff that I never thought I could 
do in my life.  It ruined my 
relationship with my family; most of all, my little sister, which we are really 
close now.  But that is what gives 
me the strength to stay sober every day is my sister and my 
family.

 
 
The 
appellant did not object to this testimony, so we review its admission for plain 
error.  As evidenced by the passage 
above, the record is clear as to the challenged testimony.  The appellant claims that this testimony 
was improper because it was irrelevant, but we have allowed a witness's 
credibility to be bolstered on direct examination to soften the blow of 
cross-examination.  Strickland v. State, 2004 WY 91, ¶ 22, 
94 P.3d 1034, 1046 (Wyo. 2004).  
That is what happened here.  
The appellant even acknowledges in her brief that, given that the State 
had charged the appellant with "the serious crime of delivering a controlled 
substance to a minor; . . . the credibility of [the minor witness] was crucial 
to the State's case."  Nonetheless, 
the appellant argues that the effect of this allegedly improper questioning was 
exacerbated by the prosecutor mentioning the negative implications of 
methamphetamine use in his closing argument.  In reference to the minor witness's 
testimony, the prosecutor stated:

 
 
And 
you have the ability to see why a person would come in here and try to stop 
it.  Try to stop what? Try to stop 
methamphetamine, a situation that [the minor witness] indicated is hell on 
earth.  Lost dreams, shattered 
lives, hopelessness, loss of conscience.  
You lose your conscience.  
You steal things in order to satisfy your methamphetamine 
habit.

 
 
And 
the road to hell is paved with good intentions.  And certainly methamphetamine leads you 
to that same hell, also, most probably, to prison, which you have seen so many 
people testify that have felony records here.

 
 
The 
appellant argues that these statements amount to a "community outrage" argument, 
which this Court has stated is reversible prosecutorial misconduct.  Strange v. State, 2008 WY 132, ¶¶ 6-12, 
195 P.3d 1041, 1043-48 (Wyo. 2008).  
However, the concerns we expressed in Strange in overturning the appellant's 
conviction in that case do not exist here.  
Specifically, in Strange, we 
were concerned with presentation of testimony, evidence and argument which 
"appeal to the jury's sense of duty to help local law enforcement by convicting 
[the appellant]."  Id. at ¶ 6, at 1044 (quoting Gayler v. State, 957 P.2d 855, 861 (Wyo. 
1998)).  In that case, we cited nine 
instances where the prosecutor elicited testimony or commented personally about 
the prevalent methamphetamine problem in the county where the appellant was 
tried, as well as the negative effects that the drug has on the person taking 
the drug and the community as a whole.  
Id. at ¶ 8, at 1044-47.  We noted that "most, if not all, of the 
information presented is simply irrelevant to any of the issues being 
tried."  Id. at ¶ 9, at 1047.  Conversely, the minor witness's 
testimony and the prosecutor's statements in this case were relevant to the 
credibility of the witness.  Rather 
than being an attempt to "appeal to the jury's sense of duty to help local law 
enforcement by convicting [the appellant]," the prosecutor's statements in this 
case were more of an inartful description of the facts that should make the 
witness credible.  Id. at ¶ 6, at 1044.  Thus, we do not find that the testimony 
or the prosecutor's comments violated any clear rule of law.  Consequently, the appellant has failed 
to show plain error in relation to these statements.  

 
 
[¶22]  The appellant also claims error occurred 
when the prosecutor elicited testimony on redirect examination of the minor 
witness regarding the minor witness passing drug tests as part of his 
probation.  The appellant objected 
to this testimony as being irrelevant because it did not relate to an element of 
the crimes charged.  The objection 
was overruled.  Because the 
appellant made a timely contemporaneous objection, we review the admission of 
the testimony for an abuse of discretion.  
Proffit, 2008 WY 103, ¶ 12, 
191 P.3d  at 977.  Considering the 
testimony by itself, it is likely irrelevant, but doing so ignores the context 
and circumstances surrounding the question.  The appellant's argument of relevancy 
ignores the fact that the testimony was being used to rehabilitate the 
credibility of the minor witness.4  On cross-examination, defense counsel 
questioned the minor witness about his probation and whether it had been 
violated and revoked as a result of a pending driving while under the influence 
charge.  This was a clear attempt to 
discredit the minor witness's credibility.  
In an attempt to rehabilitate the credibility of the minor witness, the 
following exchange occurred during redirect examination: 

 
 
Q. [By Prosecutor] On probation -- while you are 
on probation, you are tested for controlled substances; is that 
correct?

 
 
A.  [By Minor Witness]  Correct.  I get tested every two weeks and 
whenever they show up to my house and give me a mouth 
swab.

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
Q. And how have those come 
out?

 
 
A.  Negative.

 
 
In 
context, it is clear that the State was using this testimony to rehabilitate the 
minor witness's credibility as it related to his behavior while he had been on 
probation.  The defense counsel 
"opened the door" to such testimony by trying to discredit the minor witness's 
credibility through questioning relating to probation violations.  See Lawrence v. State, 2007 WY 183, ¶ 
14, 171 P.3d 517, 521 (Wyo. 2007) ("[A] defendant may open the door to 
otherwise inadmissible testimony when he inquires about a particular subject,' 
including evidence of prior criminal misconduct.") (quoting Gayler, 957 P.2d at 858).  Accordingly, the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony. 

 
 
[¶23]  The final alleged error also occurred 
during the minor witness's redirect examination, when he testified that he 
committed burglaries while he was using methamphetamine.  The appellant did not object to this 
testimony, so we review it for plain error.  Proffit, 2008 WY 103, ¶ 12, 191 P.3d  at 
978.  The appellant argues that this 
testimony was improper because it is irrelevant and also because it is improper 
to question a witness about prior offenses.  The appellant relies on Ramirez v. State, 994 P.2d 970 (Wyo. 
2000) and Taylor v. State, 2001 WY 
13, 17 P.3d 715 (Wyo. 2001), arguing that those cases prohibit the admission of 
any details relating to a witness's prior convictions.  However, reliance on these cases is 
misplaced because they do not stand for that proposition in this context.  Ramirez dealt with the right of a 
testifying defendant to explain his prior offenses by testifying to the details 
thereof.  Ramirez, 994 P.2d  at 970.  We found no abuse of discretion by the 
district court in sustaining an objection, when the defendant began testifying 
to the details of his previous offenses.  
Id. at 974.  In Taylor, we held that error occurred when 
a prosecutor sought testimony from a defendant regarding details of his prior 
offenses, beyond the details allowed under W.R.E. 609.5  Taylor, 2001 WY 13, ¶ 22, 17 P.3d  at 
723.  The appellant has failed to 
explain how these cases apply in the current situation except to argue that we 
did not draw a distinction in Ramirez 
and Taylor between a testifying 
defendant and witness.  In both Ramirez and Taylor, the question was what facts 
about a crime are admissible where that crime is being presented to impeach a 
witness.  Here, the situation 
appears to have been the State attempting to make the appellant's conduct look 
worse by showing that methamphetamine made a witness commit burglaries.  Thus, the appellant has not demonstrated 
what clear rule of law was violated, and has failed to prove plain error.      

 
 
2.  Testimony from a State's witness that she 
"came to know" the appellant in prison

 
 
[¶24]  The appellant argues that error occurred 
when a State's witness testified that she "came to know" the appellant "in 
prison."  Specifically, the 
appellant claims that this testimony was irrelevant and improper uncharged 
misconduct evidence.  There was no 
contemporaneous objection to this testimony; however, the appellant claims that 
defense counsel requested notice of the State's intent to use W.R.E. 404(b) 
evidence, which rule the appellant argues encompasses this testimony, and that 
the State failed to notify the appellant that it intended to disclose that the 
appellant was "in prison."  We 
acknowledge previous cases where we have said that a pre-trial demand for notice 
of intent to use W.R.E. 404(b) evidence may act as a continued objection to such 
evidence at trial.  See Trevino v. State, 2006 WY 113, ¶ 17, 
142 P.3d 214, 219 (Wyo. 2006); Howard v. 
State, 2002 WY 40, ¶ 23, 42 P.3d 483, 491 (Wyo. 2002).  Thus, the review of such evidence could 
arguably be for an abuse of discretion, not plain error.  However, the appellant has failed to 
make any cogent argument showing that this particular evidence is in fact W.R.E. 
404(b) evidence or make any argument supporting an abuse of discretion standard 
of review.  Regardless, we find it 
unnecessary to determine the appropriate standard of review because the result 
remains the same under either standard of review.  A review of the record indicates the 
following exchange on direct examination between the prosecutor and the 
witness:

 
 
Q. [By Prosecutor]  Did you ever have contact with an 
individual by the name of Balynda Foster [the appellant]?

 
 
A.  [By Witness]  Yes, sir, I did.

 
 
Q. And tell us about how you came to know that 
person.

 
 
A.  I met her in 
prison.

 
 
Q. And is Ms. Foster in the courtroom here 
today?

 
 
A.  Yes.

 
 
Q. Would you identify - - 

 
 
A.  She's with the defense 
attorney.

 
 
Q. Can you identify her by 
clothing?

 
 
A.  She's wearing a black 
outfit.

 
 
[Prosecutor]:  Your Honor, would you let the record 
reflect identification of the defendant?

 
 
THE 
COURT:  So 
noted.

 
 
The 
record makes clear that the testimony was foundation for the witness's 
identification of the appellant.  
"Identity is always an element of the crime charged, and must be proven 
by the prosecution.  Identity is, 
therefore, always a material issue.  
Consequently, if evidence of uncharged misconduct tends to prove identity 
of the perpetrator of the charged crime, it is generally admissible."  Ferguson v. State, 2007 WY 157, ¶ 18, 
168 P.3d 476, 481 (Wyo. 2007) (internal citations omitted).  Even assuming arguendo that the testimony was 
inadmissible, the appellant has failed to make any argument indicating how or to 
what degree she was prejudiced by its admission.  Because this testimony was foundational 
for identification of the appellant, and because the appellant has failed to 
explain how she was prejudiced by its admission, the appellant has failed to 
prove either plain error or an abuse of discretion.

 
 
3.  Testimony from Lieutenant Bisceglia that 
the appellant was an inmate in the jail

 
 
[¶25]  The appellant argues that error occurred 
when the district court permitted one of the State's witnesses to testify that 
the appellant was currently an inmate in the jail.6  Specifically, the appellant argues that 
testimony by Lieutenant Bisceglia that the appellant "was in jail while pending 
trial was totally irrelevant."  
There were timely objections made with respect to this testimony, so its 
admission is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  A review of the record with respect to 
this argument indicates a similar situation as the previous issue in that 
proving Lieutenant Bisceglia's familiarity with the appellant was necessary and 
relevant in order to show Lieutenant Bisceglia's ability to identify the 
appellant's handwriting.  In order 
to lay an adequate foundation for Lieutenant Bisceglia to be able to testify as 
to whose handwriting was on the letters, it was necessary to show how Lieutenant 
Bisceglia came to acquire such knowledge.  
It just so happened that Lieutenant Bisceglia's knowledge was acquired as 
a result of her employment as a jailer while the appellant was an inmate.  Furthermore, while we recognize that 
evidence of incarceration of a defendant could be prejudicial, the appellant in 
this case has failed to demonstrate unfair prejudice.7  By the nature of the case, the jury was 
aware that the appellant was charged with eleven drug-related crimes.  Surely, it was not a big surprise to the 
jury to find that the appellant had been in jail as a result.  We will not presume prejudice, and we 
therefore cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in admitting 
this testimony.

 
 
Improper 
Questioning and Argument by the Prosecutor

 
 
[¶26]  The third instance that the appellant 
points to as error related to questions during Mr. Walsh's testimony and 
comments made by the prosecutor during rebuttal closing argument relating to Mr. 
Walsh's testimony.  Because there 
was no objection to either incident, we review for plain error.  As to the first prong of the plain error 
test, the record is clear as to the challenged testimony.  The record indicates that during 
cross-examination, the prosecutor had the following exchange with Mr. Walsh: 

 
 
Q. [By Prosecutor]  I was just making sure.  Now, as far as the $2,100 cash that was 
contained in a cigarette case, if [the appellant] indicated that that was her 
money, would she be telling the truth?

 
 
A.  [By Mr. Walsh]  Depends on how you look at it.  I gave her that 
money.

 
 
Q. If she said her father gave her that money for 
rent, would that be true?

 
 
A.  That would not be true. . . 
.

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
Q. [By Prosecutor]  So you were around the residence on May 
15th; is that correct?

 
 
A.  [By Mr. Walsh]  I was around the residence on May 15th. 

 
 
Q. I'm going to ask you a question.  At about 10:15 that night, did an 
individual with Louisiana plates pick you up at 705 Ferris Court 
--

 
 
A.  No, sir, it did 
not.

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
Q. [By Prosecutor]  Did -- were you picked up by that 
vehicle?

 
 
A.  [By Mr. Walsh]  I was not.  I was still working on my 
pickup.

 
 
Q. If the officers who were surveilling you said 
that [Mr. Walsh] got in the vehicle and drove away, would those officers be 
incorrect?

 
 
A.  They would be 
lying.

 
 
Q. They would be lying?

 
 
A.  They would be.

 
 
During 
rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor stated that Mr. Walsh had "an 
extremely good reason not to tell the truth in this case; because he is in love 
and he is love in [sic] with [the appellant], and he will do anything he 
can."  The prosecutor went on to 
discuss Mr. Walsh's testimony relating to the $2,100 stating:  "And the $2,100 was admitted by the 
[appellant] that she it had [sic] in her own possession and it was her 
money.  Someone is lying about the 
money.  You will have to chose [sic] 
whether it's the paramour or the [appellant] in this 
case."

 
 
[¶27]  The clear rule of law in question is the 
general prohibition against "asking any witness whether another witness has 
lied."  Proffit v. State, 2008 WY 114, ¶ 16, 193 P.3d 228, 236 (Wyo. 2008).  The 
record clearly reflects that the prosecutor violated this clear rule of law with 
the above questioning of Mr. Walsh.  
Thus, the first two prongs of the plain error test are met.  The next question then is to determine 
whether this error was prejudicial.  
We previously stated:

 
 
To 
evaluate the prejudice of improper "were-they-lying" questions, courts weigh 
several factors: 1) the severity and pervasiveness of the misconduct; 2) the 
significance of the misconduct to the central issues in the case; 3) the 
strength of the State's evidence; 4) the use of cautionary instructions or other 
curative measures; and 5) the extent to which the defense invited the 
misconduct. 

 
 

Talley 
v. State, 
2007 WY 37, ¶ 16, 153 P.3d 256, 262 (Wyo. 2007).  Here, although no curative instruction 
was given, the State presented other witness testimony and evidence to support 
its case and the improper conduct was not pervasive.  Moreover, we have stated that "a 
defendant cannot open the door' to the type of improper questioning used by the 
prosecutor in this case.  However, . 
. . a defendant's invitation or instigation is a relevant consideration in 
assessing the prejudice element."  
Id. at ¶ 15, at 261.  The appellant's theory in this case, at 
least in part, appeared to be that Mr. Walsh was responsible for the crimes with 
which she was charged.  In an 
attempt to support that theory, the defense called Mr. Walsh as a witness, after 
which the State challenged his version of the story with that of other 
witnesses' versions of the story.  
The appellant, by opening the door' to this line of questioning, 
minimized the prejudice that may be assigned to it.  In addition, the prosecutor lightened 
any prejudicial effect by reminding the jury in closing argument that it was the 
jury's task to determine these credibility issues.  In light of all the factors, we do not 
find the "were-they-lying" questions and comments in this case to be prejudicial 
to such an extent as to require reversal.  

 
 
Improper 
Vouching

 
 
[¶28]  The fourth and final instance that the 
appellant asserts is error is a statement made by the prosecutor that the 
appellant alleges constituted improper vouching for the credibility of a 
witness.  The specific statement 
occurred during closing argument when the prosecutor said, "When we look at the 
credibility of that witness, she goes basically uncontradicted except for the 
cross-examination of defense counsel in that area.  It certainly did not overcome her 
candor, her honesty, and the pain and suffering which methamphetamine caused 
her."  No objection was made to this 
statement, so we review it for plain error.  The record is certainly clear as to the 
challenged testimony.  The clear 
rule of law applicable to this situation is the prohibition of vouching for the 
credibility of a witness.  See Conine v. State, 2008 WY 146, ¶ 17, 
197 P.3d 156, 162 (Wyo. 2008).  However, we do not find that the comments 
made by the prosecutor require reversal.  
We upheld a conviction where similar statements were made in Teniente v. State, 2007 WY 165, 169 P.3d 512 (Wyo. 2007).  In that case, 
during closing argument, the prosecutor said:

 
 
[W]e 
have one eyewitness, one eyewitness that stepped up to the plate February 18th, 
and said, I was there. This iswhat happened.'  A statement as, you know, he has stayed 
consistent with, a statement he testified to in Eddie's 
trial.

 
 

As 
you notice, when [Defense counsel] went to question him, he couldn't impeach him 
on any of his prior inconsistent statements because there weren't any. He has 
stayed consistent, ladies and gentlemen, even in the face of threats from his 
family, ostracism by his family.

 
 
He 
saw what happened, and he decided to step forward and tell the truth, even 
though the first time, it's against his very own brother, and now the second 
time, against his cousin. Courage.

 
 

Id. 
at ¶ 32, at 525.  In upholding the 
admissibility of these comments, we rejected the appellant's argument that these 
comments amounted to vouching, noting that the prosecutor "was arguing 
reasonable inferences, drawn from evidence introduced at trial, that [the 
witness's] testimony could be seen as reliable."  Id. at ¶ 33, at 525.  In stating that the witness's testimony 
went "basically uncontradicted" the prosecutor in the instant case pointed out 
the reasonable inference that she was not lying.  Because the appellant has failed to 
demonstrate a clear rule of law that was violated, plain 
error has not been shown. 

 
 
[¶29]  Under a cumulative error analysis, "we 
only consider matters that are determined to be errors."  McClelland v. State, 2007 WY 57, ¶ 27, 
155 P.3d 1013, 1022 (Wyo. 2007).  Of 
the alleged errors raised by the appellant, we find only one to be error:  the "were-they-lying" technique invoked 
by the prosecutor in relation to questions posed to Mr. Walsh.  However, as noted above, we do not find 
that colloquy sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal.   

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶30]  We conclude that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion when it admitted into evidence the letters purportedly 
written by the appellant and Mr. Walsh.  
The State properly authenticated the letter purportedly written by the 
appellant through testimony by Lieutenant Bisceglia based on her familiarity 
with the appellant's handwriting, which familiarity did not come from preparing 
for litigation.  Likewise, the State 
properly authenticated the letter purportedly written by Mr. Walsh based on 
Lieutenant Bisceglia's familiarity with the video which captured images of Mr. 
Walsh hiding the note in the location in which it was discovered.  Finally, cumulative error did not 
occur.  While it was improper for 
the State to utilize the "were-they-lying" technique, the appellant failed to 
demonstrate sufficient prejudice to amount to cumulative 
error.

 
 
[¶31]  Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The controlled substances in question included methamphetamine, 
marijuana, and cocaine. 

 
 

2The sentences for each count ranged from 180 days incarceration for the 
more minor offenses, up to 15 to 25 years incarceration for the more serious 
offenses.  

 
 

3Defense counsel requested a limiting instruction, but we note that a 
curative instruction was more appropriate given the relief requested.  A limiting instruction is generally used 
to instruct the jury to consider a piece of evidence only for a particular 
purpose.  See Williams v. State, ¶ 8, 99 P.3d 432, 
436 (Wyo. 2004) (stating that "[a limiting] instruction must inform the jury of 
the specific purpose for which they may consider the evidence").  Conversely, a curative instruction is 
used to cure potential harm caused by misconduct or errors of some kind during 
the trial.  See Warner v. State, 2001 WY 67, ¶ 21, 
28 P.3d 21, 28 (Wyo. 2001) ("Appropriate objections and subsequent curative 
instructions may cure an error at trial.").  In any case, the fact that a limiting 
instruction was requested rather than a curative instruction, does not change 
our analysis, nor does it change the result, because error did not occur for 
failing to provide either. 

 
 

4As we noted above, testimony can be relevant even when it does not help 
prove or disprove an element of a crime charged.  See supra ¶ 
20.

 
 

5We have stated that "Wyoming's rule is that a testifying defendant is 
required to give answers only as to whether he had been previously convicted of 
a felony, as to what the felony was, and as to when the conviction was 
had."  Ramirez, 994 P.2d  at 
973.

 
 

6This testimony was elicited in relation to the admission of the two 
letters discussed above.  See supra ¶¶ 
4-13.

 
 

7The appellant argues that if the testimony was truly being used as 
foundation for the admission of the letters, then there should have been a 
limiting instruction provided to admonish the jury that the testimony relating 
to the appellant's incarceration should only be used for foundation purposes and 
nothing else.  However, the 
appellant concedes that there was no request for such an instruction and without 
such a request, we will not weigh the question of whether it was error not to 
provide one.  Cazier v. State, 2006 WY 153, ¶ 34 n.6, 
148 P.3d 23, 34 n.6 (Wyo. 2006).