Title: Osborn v. Emporium Videos

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Osborn v. Emporium Videos1993 WY 33848 P.2d 237Case Number: 92-141Decided: 03/11/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
Richard B. OSBORN, 

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.
 EMPORIUM VIDEOS; 
Arthur Greer, Owner; 

and Ron Sullivan, 
Manager/Agent, 

Appellees 
(Defendants).

Appeal from District 
Court, Natrona County, Dan Spangler, J.

Richard B. 
Osborn, pro se.

No appearance 
representing appellees.

Before MACY, 
C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT,* and GOLDEN, JJ.

* Retired January 1, 
1993.

URBIGKIT, Justice.

[¶1]      Challenging the 
propriety of the sua sponte dismissal of a complaint for failure to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted, Richard B. Osborn (Osborn) appeals the 
district court's order. We hold that the procedure used by the district court 
failed to provide adequate notice and opportunity to respond after the district 
court determined it would act on its own motion. We reverse and 
remand.

FACTS

[¶2]      Osborn filed his 
complaint in the District Court for the Seventh Judicial District, Natrona 
County, Wyoming alleging fraud and unfair trade practices in the sale of an 
"adult video." The video was purchased from Emporium Videos, a Casper, Wyoming 
retailer in "adult materials." The complaint identifies as defendants: Emporium 
Videos; the store owner, Arthur Greer (Greer), a Colorado resident; and the 
store manager, Ron Sullivan (Sullivan).1

[¶3]      Osborn averred 
that the description, contained on the video's box, inaccurately characterized 
the performance of "Busty Belle" (Belle) as the "star" of a video titled "Belle 
of the Ball." Osborn asserted that during the seventy-five minute length of the 
video, Belle appeared in scenes lasting only one and one-half minutes at the 
beginning of the video and seven to eight minutes at the end of the video. 
Specifically, Osborn contended the disparity between the impression given by the 
video's labeling and the actual role played by the featured performer 
constituted deceptive trade practices under Wyo. Stat. § 40-12-105(a) (Cum. 
Supp. 1992).2 Osborn's prayer for relief 
requested damages for the cost of the video, $29.95; the cost of medication 
required to treat an asthma attack "brought on by the stress and strain of being 
`ripped off,'" $55.79; compensation for suffering, $50,000; and punitive 
damages. Osborn acted pro se.3

[¶4]      Also acting pro 
se, Sullivan filed an answer on behalf of the "defendants." After service of 
process at his usual place of business, W.R.C.P. 4(d), Greer did not respond. 
Osborn, claiming Sullivan's answer was untimely and noting that a pro se 
defendant could not file an answer for another, filed for entry of default. 
W.R.C.P. 55. Sullivan, again acting pro se, filed an amended answer on behalf of 
all "defendants, who were properly served * * *."4 The district court responded by 
acting on its own motion to order a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted.5 The order dismissing the complaint 
reads as follows:

THE ABOVE MATTER having 
come before the Court upon its own Motion

THE COURT FINDS that the 
Complaint does not state a cause of action.

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED 
that the case be dismissed.

DATED this 29th day of 
May, 1992.

BY THE COURT:

[Signature]

JUDGE

Osborn filed a 
timely notice of appeal invoking this court's jurisdiction.

DISCUSSION

[¶5]      In Condict v. 
Lehman, 837 P.2d 81, 82 (Wyo. 1992), this court reiterated the standard of 
review utilized to consider the appeal of a dismissal under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) 
(hereinafter Rule 12(b)(6)):

The court must accept the 
facts as alleged in plaintiff's complaint as true, and view them in the light 
most favorable toward the appellant. Kautza v. City of Cody, 812 P.2d 143, 145 
(Wyo. 1991); Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell County Joint Powers Fire Board, 797 P.2d 1171, 1171 (Wyo. 1990). Appellant's pleadings must be liberally construed, and 
the court "will sustain a dismissal of a complaint only if it shows on its face 
that the plaintiff was not entitled to relief under any set of facts." Mostert 
v. CBL & Associates, 741 P.2d 1090, 1092 (Wyo. 1987). See also Johnson v. 
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. of Hartford, Conn., 608 P.2d 1299, 1302 (Wyo. 
1980).

[¶6]      A motion to 
dismiss will be granted only if the pleadings disclose with certainty the 
impossibility of proving a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fiscus v. 
Atlantic Richfield Company, 742 P.2d 198, 202 (Wyo. 1987). "Dismissal is a 
drastic remedy, and is sparingly granted." Mostert, 741 P.2d  at 1092. "A motion 
to dismiss, even though sparingly granted, is the proper method for testing the 
legal sufficiency of the allegations and will be sustained when the complaint 
shows on its face that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief." Mummery v. 
Polk, 770 P.2d 241, 243 (Wyo. 1989).

[¶7]      A motion under 
Rule 12(b)(6) is read in conjunction with W.R.C.P. 8 which establishes the 
requirements for pleading a claim. 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. 
Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil 2d § 1356 (1990). W.R.C.P. 8 
provides, in pertinent part:

(a) Claims for 
relief. - A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an 
original claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim, shall contain: 
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's 
jurisdiction depends, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim 
needs no new grounds of jurisdiction to support it; (2) a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a 
demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks. Relief in the alternative 
or of several different types may be demanded.

* * * * * *

(d) Effect of failure 
to deny. - Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is 
required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are admitted when not 
denied in the responsive pleading. Averments in a pleading to which no 
responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as denied or 
avoided.

(e) Pleading to be 
concise and direct; consistency.

(1) Each averment of a 
pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No technical forms of pleading or 
motions are required.

(2) A party may set forth 
two or more statements of a claim or defense alternately or hypothetically, 
either in one count or defense or in separate counts or defenses. When two or 
more statements are made in the alternative and one of them if made 
independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the 
insufficiency of one or more of the alternative statements. A party may also 
state as many separate claims or defenses as the party has regardless of 
consistency and whether based on legal or on equitable grounds or on both. All 
statements shall be made subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 
11.

(f) Construction of 
pleadings. - All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial 
justice.

"Only when the 
pleading fails to meet this liberal standard is it subject to dismissal under 
Rule 12(b)(6)." 5A Wright & Miller, supra, § 1356 at 296. "The role of a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not to assess the likelihood of recovery; rather, it is 
merely to determine whether a claim for which relief can be granted has been 
stated." Coones v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 848 P.2d 783 (Wyo. 
1993).

[¶8]      When a complaint 
alleges fraud, W.R.C.P. 9(b) states a particularity requirement:

Fraud; mistake; condition 
of the mind. - In all averments of 
fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be 
stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of 
mind of a person may be averred generally.

The 
particularity requirement of W.R.C.P. 9(b) does not render the general 
principles of W.R.C.P. 8 inapplicable; instead, the two rules are read in 
conjunction to create a proper balance. 5 Wright & Miller, supra, § 1298.6

[¶9]      The litigant 
acting pro se is entitled to "a certain leniency" from the more stringent 
standards accorded formal pleadings drafted by lawyers; however, the 
administration of justice requires reasonable adherence to procedural rules and 
requirements of the court. Apodaca v. Ommen, 807 P.2d 939, 943 (Wyo. 
1991).

[¶10]   While the language of W.R.C.P. 12 
does not specifically authorize a sua sponte motion, the practice has been 
adopted by some federal courts under F.R.C.P. 12.7 In Apodaca, this court suggested 
its approval of the concept permitting a sua sponte motion to dismiss a 
complaint under circumstances where a recognizable claim has not been stated. 
Apodaca, 807 P.2d  at 941 n. 3 (citing Pugh v. Parish of St. Tammany, 875 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1989) and 5A Wright & Miller, supra, § 1357 at 301 n. 3). 
However, because the Apodaca court was considering the validity of motions to 
dismiss made by defendants in that proceeding, no discussion of the proper 
procedure for such a sua sponte action was presented.

[¶11]   A review of federal precedent 
discloses a reasoned approach to sua sponte dismissals.8 In Ricketts v. Midwest Nat. Bank, 
874 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1989), the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit reviewed, in detail, the general procedure required for a sua 
sponte dismissal by the federal courts. After a determination of proper 
jurisdiction under the substantiality doctrine, Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 
681-82, 66 S. Ct. 773, 775-76, 90 L. Ed. 939 (1946), the jurisdiction of federal 
courts to dismiss sua sponte is limited by procedural rules. Ricketts, 
874 F.2d  at 1183. F.R.C.P. 4(a) has been consistently interpreted to require 
that a summons be issued and served before a complaint may be dismissed. Id. 
(citing Nichols v. Schubert, 499 F.2d 946, 947 (7th Cir. 1974); Dear v. Rathje, 
485 F.2d 558 (1973), aff'd 532 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1976); and Vina v. Hub 
Electric Co., 480 F.2d 1139, 1140 (7th Cir. 1973)). Subsequent decisions have 
required that a plaintiff be given notice and an opportunity to respond before 
dismissal of the complaint on the court's motion. Ricketts, 874 F.2d  at 1183 
(citing Bryan v. Johnson, 821 F.2d 455, 457-58 (7th Cir. 1987)). See also 
Jefferson Fourteenth Associates v. Wometco de Puerto Rico, Inc., 695 F.2d 524, 
526 (11th Cir. 1983); Franklin v. State of Or., State Welfare Division, 662 F.2d 1337, 1341 (1981), aff'd in part and rev'd in part 745 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 
1984); and 5A Wright & Miller, supra, § 1357.

[¶12]   The leading federal decision on 
sua sponte dismissals under F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) is Tingler v. Marshall, 716 F.2d 1109 (6th Cir. 1983). The Tingler court reviewed the sua sponte 
dismissal of a complaint on its merits, so federal jursidiction was not in 
question.9 The court found four reasons why a 
sua sponte dismissal under F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) is not favored. First, the 
action places the court in the role of a proponent rather than an independent 
observer. Second, plaintiffs are prejudiced because, unlike when a motion to 
dismiss is filed by a defendant, the plaintiff is given no opportunity to amend 
the complaint or make legal arguments against dismissal. Pro se plaintiffs, 
unskilled in legal pleadings, are more likely to suffer acute prejudice. Third, 
dismissal without service of process and notice is unfair to defendants because 
the sua sponte action of the court deprives the defendants of the opportunity to 
participate in the litigation process and places them in the position of having 
to chose: whether to not participate in an appeal and risk an adverse decision; 
or, whether to participate in the appeal and make arguments based upon matters 
not in the factual record. Fourth, the sua sponte dismissal ultimately 
wastes judicial resources. The dismissal creates an opportunity for appeal based 
upon an incomplete record of pleadings and orders resulting in an inability to 
make a factual decision on the merits and limiting the appellate court to 
decisions on broad legal grounds. Tingler, 716 F.2d  at 1111.

[¶13]   Using its supervisory power, the 
Tingler court outlined a five-step procedure for dismissal of complaints, sua 
sponte:

(1) allow service of the 
complaint upon the defendant; (2) notify all parties of [the court's] intent to 
dismiss the complaint; (3) give the plaintiff a chance to either amend his 
complaint or respond to the reasons stated by the district court in its notice 
of intended sua sponte dismissal; (4) give the defendant a chance to respond or 
file an answer or motions; and (5) if the claim is dismissed, state [the 
court's] reasons for the dismissal.

Id. at 1112.10

[¶14]   In an exercise of this court's 
supervisory powers, Wyo. Const. art. 5, § 2, we adopt the federal approach to 
sua sponte dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) including the five-step process 
outlined in Tingler. This process assures proper notice and opportunity to be 
heard, see Torrey v. Twiford, 713 P.2d 1160 (Wyo. 1986), and promotes a policy 
of deciding cases on their merits which is consistent with the general tenor of 
our procedural rules. See Hill v. Zimmerer, 839 P.2d 977, 981 (Wyo. 1992). 
Restricting sua sponte dismissals is also consistent with the requirement 
of the Wyoming Constitution to maintain an open court system:

All courts shall be open 
and every person for an injury done to person, reputation or property shall have 
justice administered without sale, denial or delay.

Wyo. Const. art. 
1, § 8.

[¶15]   The application of the Tingler 
approach to the present facts reveals a lack of notice and opportunity to be 
heard. While service of process did occur prior to the district court's sua 
sponte dismissal, the record does not disclose that the district court 
provided Osborn with any notice of its anticipated dismissal motion. At the time 
of the district court action, Sullivan had filed his answer.11 In response, Osborn had applied 
for a default judgment, which was the only motion pending before the district 
court.

[¶16]   Without notice of the district 
court's intent to dismiss, Osborn was also denied any opportunity to either 
amend the complaint or respond to the district court's concerns regarding the 
sufficiency of the pleading. Tingler, 716 F.2d  at 1112. Finally, the failure of 
the district court to state the reasons for the dismissal would require this 
court to provide purely conjectural support to uphold the action.

CONCLUSION

[¶17]   The sensible and efficient use of 
judicial resources demands our adherence to settled principles of an open court 
and due process. When courts concerned with dockets and workloads override the 
ability of the public to access justice, the supervisory powers of this court 
must be utilized to uphold our constitutional and procedural safeguards. We must 
always seek to avoid, for the sake of our individual liberties, conferring 
unbridled discretionary power on the judiciary.

[¶18]   Reversed.

MACY, Chief Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶19]   This Court does not have the 
capacity to right every subjectively perceived wrong. All members of society 
must cope with life's disappointments, indignities, and failures. See Skane v. 
Star Valley Ranch Association, 826 P.2d 266 (Wyo. 1992).

[¶20]   Our decision in Apodaca v. Ommen, 
807 P.2d 939 (Wyo. 1991), is unmistakably clear:

This court has indicated 
that a certain leniency is accorded to anyone acting pro se; however, the proper 
administration of justice requires reasonable adherence to the rules and 
requirements of the court. There is no more basic requirement in the rules than 
that a complaint must state a cause of action. Likely, Apodaca has confused the 
standards applied to a pro se litigant in a state civil action with the less 
stringent standards applied to pro se litigants in actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983.

807 P.2d  at 943 
(citations omitted).

[¶21]   We do not need to be concerned with 
"leniency" in this case. Osborn's failure to state a claim does not arise 
because of an inept selection of language or his lack of learning the law: It 
arises because the facts of Osborn's case simply cannot be forged into a claim 
or controversy. It does not take a "licensed attorney" to figure that 
out.

[¶22]   It is prudent to 
remember:

"One of the elements 
necessary to establish actionable fraud is that the fact which is represented or 
concealed have materiality. [Citations.]" McCamon v. Darnall Realty, Wyo., 444 P.2d 623, 625 (1968).

Reynolds v. 
Tice, 595 P.2d 1318, 1321-22 (Wyo. 1979). The plaintiff's belief of the fact 
represented or misrepresented must be reasonable. Garner v. Hickman, 709 P.2d 407, 410 (Wyo. 1985). If Osborn got "ripped off" (as he worded his pleadings), 
it was not because of fraud or "bait and switch" or some other act by the 
defendants. It is crystal clear from the complaint's face that the real culprit 
was Osborn's endogenous salaciousness - a condition which can cause one to 
purchase a video which is touted, or "puffed," in words which pictures simply 
cannot equal (the obverse of "one picture is worth a thousand 
words!").

[¶23]   I do not disagree with embracing 
the criteria found in Tingler v. Marshall, 716 F.2d 1109 (6th Cir. 1983). 
However, to apply that criteria to these circumstances, and reverse, is to 
accept the concept of sua sponte dismissals of complaints (when they are 
genuinely warranted) and then immediately throw the rule out the window. 

FOOTNOTES

1 The original complaint 
identifies the store manager as a "John Doe." Sullivan was served the initial 
summons and complaint, at the video store, and identified in the service return. 
Subsequently, Osborn filed an amendment to the complaint naming Sullivan as a 
defendant in his capacity as "manager/agent" of the store.

2 Wyo. Stat. § 40-12-105, 
in pertinent part, provides:

(a) 
A person engages in a deceptive trade practice unlawful under this act when, in 
the course of his business and in connection with a consumer transaction, he 
knowingly:

* * 
* * * *

(iii) Represents that 
merchandise is of a particular standard, grade, style or model, if it is 
not;

* * 
* * * *

(xiv) Employs "bait and 
switch" advertising which consists of an offer to sell merchandise which the 
seller does not intend to sell, which advertising is accompanied by one (1) or 
more of the following practices:

(A) 
Refusal to show the merchandise advertised;

(B) 
False disparagement in any respect of the advertised merchandise or the terms of 
sale;

(C) 
Requiring undisclosed tie-in sales or other undisclosed conditions to be met 
prior to selling the advertised merchandise;

(D) 
Knowingly showing or demonstrating defective merchandise which is unusable or 
practicable for the purpose set forth in the advertisement;

(E) 
Accepting a deposit for the merchandise and subsequently charging the buyer for 
a higher priced item without his consent; or

(F) 
Willful failure to either make deliveries of the merchandise or to make a refund 
therefor.

3 Osborn's penchant to 
seek legal redress to enforce his perception of his rights has been demonstrated 
to the district court and before this court. See Osborn v. Manning, 817 P.2d 889 
(Wyo. 1991); Osborn v. Manning, 812 P.2d 545 (Wyo. 1991); Osborn v. Manning, 798 P.2d 1208 (Wyo. 1990); Osborn v. Pine Mountain Ranch, 766 P.2d 1165 (Wyo. 1989); 
Osborn v. Warner, 694 P.2d 730 (Wyo. 1985).

4 The adequacy of the 
service of process upon the business entity, "Emporium Videos," or its owner, 
Greer, was never raised nor litigated in the district court. Appellees did not 
file a brief in this court and sanctions were imposed. W.R.A.P. 7.11. The case 
has been heard on the expedited docket based on the pro se brief of the 
appellant.

5 W.R.C.P. 12(b) states, 
in pertinent part:

Every defense, in law or 
fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, 
cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading 
thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option 
of the pleader be made by motion: * * * (6) failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted[.]

6 Professors Wright and 
Miller illustrate the appropriate balance between Rule 8 and Rule 9(b) with a 
pleading seeking to have a conveyance set aside on the ground that: "Defendant 
C.D. on or about * * * conveyed all his property, real and personal to defendant 
E.F. for the purpose of defrauding plaintiff and hindering and delaying the 
collection of the indebtedness evidenced by the note above referred to." 5 
Wright and Miller, supra, § 1298 at 624. This example is from Official Form 13 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which is expressly declared to be 
sufficient. Id.

7 W.R.C.P. 12(b) is 
identical to F.R.C.P. 12(b).

8 This court has 
previously acknowledged that we give great weight to federal precedent 
interpreting procedural rules which are similar to those adopted in Wyoming. 
Bitlis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 421 n. 15 (Wyo. 1990) (collecting 
cases).

9 The dismissal in Tingler 
was also not based upon the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) which permits the 
federal courts to dismiss in forma pauperis claims which are frivolous. See 
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 
(1989).

10 The United States 
Supreme Court has not ruled on the "permissible scope, if any, of sua sponte 
dismissals" under F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). Neitzke, 490 U.S.  at 330 n. 8, 109 S. Ct.  at 
1834 n. 8. The court has expressed its approval of the "sound judicial practice" 
evidenced by the exercise of supervisory power in Tingler. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147 n. 5, 106 S. Ct. 466, 470-71 n. 5, 88 L. Ed. 2d 435 
(1985).

11 The fact that Sullivan 
was not a licensed attorney precluded him from effectively answering for either 
the store, as a business entity, or the owner. Melehes v. Wilson, 774 P.2d 573 
(Wyo. 1989).