Title: IN THE INTEREST OF: CSC, a minor V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE INTEREST OF: CSC, a minor V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 106118 P.3d 970Case Number: C-04-12Decided: 08/30/2005

APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 

IN THE 
INTEREST OF:

CSC, a 
minor,

Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 

THE 
STATE OFWYOMING,

Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal from the 
JuvenileCourtofCampbellCounty

 
 
The 
Honorable Dan R. Price, II, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

 
 

            
Ken Koski, State Public Defender; and Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate 
Counsel. 

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

 
 

            
Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Dee Morgan, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and 
BURKE, JJ.

 
 

KITE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]      CSC, a minor, 
appeals from the juvenile court's1 order adjudging him guilty of 
aiding and abetting in the commission of first-degree sexual assault.  CSC entered a conditional plea of 
guilty2 to the charge, reserving his right 
to appeal the juvenile court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence.  On appeal, CSC contests the denial of 
his suppression motion and contends that the juvenile court should not have 
accepted his guilty plea because it was not supported by a sufficient factual 
basis.  Although CSC raises two 
interesting issues of constitutional magnitude, after a careful review of the 
record and the law pertaining to these issues, we conclude that the juvenile 
court did not err by accepting CSC's guilty plea or denying his motion to 
suppress.  We, therefore, 
affirm.
            

 
 

ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]      CSC articulates 
the issues on appeal as follows:

 
 

 

 

The State offers a 
similar statement of the appellate issues:

 
 

I.          
Did the juvenile court err in accepting appellant's factual basis to 
support his delinquency adjudication for aiding and abetting first degree sexual 
assault?

 
 

II.          
Did the juvenile court abuse its discretion when it denied appellant's 
motion to suppress the statements he made to law enforcement officers at his 
high school?

 
 

FACTS

 
 

[¶3]      On February 20, 
2004, 16-year-old CSC, his male friends (KM, CH, WD, and MJ), and the female 
victim (AA) decided to skip their classes at CampbellCountyHigh 
School in Gillette.  They went to CSC's house and began 
drinking alcohol.  AA became 
intoxicated, and KM and MJ helped her into the master bedroom, where KM and AA 
engaged in sexual intercourse.  
 

 
 

[¶4]      After KM and AA 
had been alone in the bedroom for approximately 20 minutes, KM came out and 
informed the others that AA had vomited on him.  CSC and the others took AA to the shower 
and washed her off.  They then put 
her in a clean bed, and CSC cleaned the soiled bedding.  AA awoke later in the day, and MJ took 
her home.  AA's uncle realized she 
was intoxicated and took her to the Gillette Police Department.  The police transported her to the 
hospital, and medical tests confirmed that AA had consumed alcohol and engaged 
in sexual intercourse on that day.  

 
 

[¶5]      On February 23, 
2004, police officers went to the Gillette high school and requested that school 
officials call CSC to the office.  
CSC was directed to a large conference room where two investigators from 
the Campbell County Sheriff's Department, a Gillette police detective, a school 
resource officer, and a school official were gathered.  Sheriff Department Investigator Tony 
Seeman questioned CSC about the events that occurred at CSC's home on February 
20, 2004.    

 
 

[¶6]      On February 27, 
2004, CSC was arrested and charged with aiding and abetting in the commission of 
first-degree sexual assault.  The 
statements he made during the February 23rd interview were important 
evidence against him.  CSC denied 
the charge and filed a motion to suppress his statements.  After a hearing, the juvenile court 
denied the motion.  

 
 

[¶7]      CSC subsequently 
entered a conditional guilty plea, pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2),3 but reserved his right to appeal 
the juvenile court's denial of his motion to suppress.  At his change of plea hearing, the 
juvenile court heard testimony from CSC and a statement from the prosecution 
about the events of February 20, 2004.  
The juvenile court concluded there was a sufficient factual basis for 
CSC's guilty plea and accepted it. 

 
 

[¶8]      The juvenile 
court entered an order of disposition on July 15, 2004, sentencing CSC to the 
Wyoming Boys' School in Worland for a an indefinite period of time not to exceed 
his twenty-first birthday.  
The court suspended that placement and placed him on probation 
for a term not less than six (6) nor more than eighteen (18) months. CSC then 
filed a timely notice of appeal.  

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 

            
Factual 
Basis

 
 

[¶9]      CSC claims the 
juvenile court erred when it found there was a sufficient factual basis for his 
plea of guilty to the crime of aiding and abetting in the commission of 
first-degree sexual assault.  We 
review the procedure utilized to accept a guilty plea as a whole.  Van Haele v. State, 2004 WY 59, ¶11, 90 P.3d 708, 711 (Wyo. 2004).  "Our 
inquiry determines if the [juvenile court] sufficiently described the nature of 
the charges, including the possible penalties; informed the defendant of the 
right to representation; informed the defendant of the rights waived by a guilty 
plea; and obtained a factual basis for the plea."  Mehring v. State, 860 P.2d 1101, 1106 
(Wyo. 1993).  See also, Sami v. State, 2004 WY 23, ¶9, 85 P.3d 1014, 1017 (Wyo. 2004).   

 
 

[¶10]   W.R.Cr.P. 11(f) articulates the 
factual basis requirement for acceptance of a guilty plea.  That rule states:

 
 

(f)                 
Determining accuracy of 
plea. --  Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea 
of guilty, the court should not enter a judgment upon such plea without making 
such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the 
plea.

 
 

Rule 11 does not require 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant is guilty or a complete 
description of the elements of the crime before the juvenile court may accept 
his guilty plea.  Sami, ¶9.  See also, Van Haele, ¶26.  Instead, the court must determine 
whether: 1) the defendant's acts fell within the conduct prohibited by law and, 
2) at the time of the guilty plea, the defendant understands his conduct was 
criminal.  Sami, ¶9.   See also, Barnes v. State, 951 P.2d 386, 389 
(Wyo. 1998).  

 
 

[¶11]   A sufficient factual basis for a 
guilty plea may be found in "the defendant's testimony and admissions and/or the 
state's presentation of evidence."  
Sami,  ¶10.  The juvenile court may also "draw 
inferences from the defendant's admissions or the evidence presented by the 
state to satisfy all elements of the crime to which the defendant is pleading 
guilty."  Id. (citing Rude v. State, 851 P.2d 15, 18 
(Wyo. 1993)). See also, 
Van Haele, ¶¶13, 26;  Anderson v. State, 2002 WY 46, ¶32, 43 P.3d 108, 120 (Wyo. 2002).

 
 

[¶12]   CSC pled guilty to aiding and 
abetting in the commission of first-degree sexual assault, in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 6-1-201 and 6-2-302(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2003).  In order to be convicted of the crime, 
CSC must have:  1) aided, abetted, 
encouraged, hired, commanded or procured KM; 2) to inflict sexual intrusion upon 
AA, who was physically helpless; 3) while he knew or reasonably should have 
known that she was physically helpless; and 4) without AA's consent to the 
sexual intrusion.  Sections 6-1-201, 
6-2-302(a)(iii).

 
 

[¶13]   At the change of plea hearing, CSC 
testified that he and his friends, including KM and AA, decided to skip school 
on February 20, 2004.  They went to 
CSC's house, where they found some liquor, engaged in a "chugging contest", and 
watched television.  CSC testified 
that, after the chugging contest, AA was acting "goofy" and "buzzed."  The prosecutor stated that the other 
boys told police that AA was quite intoxicated after the chugging contest.  

 
 

[¶14]   CSC testified that AA stumbled into 
his mother's bedroom with KM and MJ's help.  CSC saw KM start "messing with" AA and 
left them alone in the bedroom.  CSC 
subsequently returned to the bedroom and witnessed KM kissing AA and removing 
her shirt and underwear.  He 
testified that AA slapped KM's hand away and said "no" and "not yet."  CSC was amused by KM's actions and 
testified that he knew that KM intended to have sexual intercourse with AA.  KM asked CSC for a condom and CSC went 
outside to his truck to get one for him.  
Approximately 20 minutes later, KM came out of the bedroom and told the 
others that AA had vomited on him.  
CSC and the other boys carried AA to the shower and washed her.  They toweled her off and placed her in a 
clean bed.  CSC removed the soiled 
bedding from the master bed.  

 
 

[¶15]   It is clear that CSC aided, 
abetted, and/or encouraged KM to engage in sexual intercourse with AA.  He knew that KM intended to have sexual 
intercourse with AA and provided KM with the condom and the place to accomplish 
the act.  In addition, the record 
confirms that CSC knew or reasonably should have known that AA was physically 
helpless and did not consent to the sexual intrusion.  He witnessed AA participate in the 
chugging contest and saw her stumble as she was being helped into the 
bedroom.  The other boys indicated 
that AA was intoxicated when she went into the bedroom with KM.  CSC saw KM remove AA's clothes, and 
there is no indication that AA assisted in, or consented to, removing her 
clothes.  Moreover, CSC saw AA slap 
KM's hand away and say, "no" and "not yet" when KM was attempting to remove her 
underwear.  CSC's testimony and the 
prosecution's statement, together with the juvenile court's reasonable 
inferences, were sufficient to satisfy the factual basis requirement of Rule 
11(f).  The juvenile court did not, 
therefore, err by accepting CSC's guilty plea.

 
 

            

Motion to 
Suppress

 
 

[¶16]   CSC claims the juvenile court erred 
when it denied his motion to suppress the statements he made during the 
interview in the school conference room.  
In particular, he claims that the police violated his constitutional 
rights by failing to apprise him of his rights in accordance with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).  
Our resolution of this issue turns on whether or not CSC was "in custody" 
when he was interviewed by the authorities.

 
 

[¶17]   We review a juvenile court's legal 
ruling on a motion to suppress evidence de novo, giving deference to the 
trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  Hannon v. State, 2004 WY 8, ¶12, 84 P.3d 320, 328 (Wyo. 2004); Gunn v. State, 
2003 WY 24, ¶5, 64 P.3d 716, 719 (Wyo. 2003).  This Court considers the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the juvenile court's decision because that court is in 
the best position to "assess the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the 
evidence, and make the necessary inferences, deductions, and conclusions' at the 
hearing on the motion."  Meek v. State, 2002 WY 1, ¶8, 37 P.3d 1279, 1282 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting Frederick 
v. State, 981 P.2d 494, 497 (Wyo. 
1999).

 
 

[¶18]   Under Miranda and its progeny, a suspect must 
be informed of his constitutional rights, including the rights to remain silent 
and to have the advice of an attorney, if he is questioned while in 
custody.  Miranda, 384 U.S.  at 458; Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434; 120 S. Ct. 2326; 147 L. Ed. 2d 405 (2002); Oregon v. 
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495; 97 S. Ct. 711; 50 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1977) (per curiam).  See also, Pena v. State, 2004 WY 115, ¶7, 98 P.3d 857, 862 (Wyo. 2004); Hannon, 
¶¶40-41.  When the authorities make 
the proper advisements, statements made by a suspect while in custody are 
admissible into evidence.  Gunn, ¶7.  The corollary of this rule is that 
"[s]tatements made during custodial interrogation must be excluded upon a 
showing that the defendant was not advised of his Miranda rights."  Id.  
See also, Dickerson, 530 U.S. 
at 434.  Nevertheless, "this Court 
adheres to the principle that the rights recognized in Miranda, including the right to counsel, 
apply only in the context of 
custodial interrogation."  Hannon, ¶41 (emphasis added).  In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court 
defined "custodial interrogation" as "questioning initiated by law enforcement 
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his 
freedom of action in any significant way."  
Miranda, 384 U.S. 
at 444.   

 
 

[¶19]   The determination of whether a 
suspect is "in custody" when questioned is made by considering the totality of 
the circumstances of the interrogation.  
Gunn, ¶9;  Hannon, ¶42.  See also, J.F. Ghent, Annotation, 
What Constitutes "Custodial Interrogation" Within Rule of Miranda v. Arizona 
Requiring that Suspect be Informed of His Federal Constitutional Rights Before 
Custodial Interrogation, 31 A.L.R. 3d 565, § 2[c] (1970).  In resolving the custodial status of a 
suspect we consider "whether a reasonable man in [the suspect's] position would 
have considered himself to be in police custody."  Gunn, ¶9 (quoting Glass v. State, 853 P.2d 972, 976 
(Wyo. 1993)).  See also, Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 158 L. Ed. 2d 938 (2004).  The United States Supreme Court more 
fully described the judicial query in Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S. Ct. 457, 133 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1995) (citations omitted):

 
 

"Two 
discrete inquiries are essential to the determination:  first, what were the circumstances 
surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a 
reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the 
interrogation and leave.  Once the 
scene is set and the players' lines and actions are reconstructed, the court 
must apply an objective test to resolve the ultimate inquiry:  was there a formal arrest or restraint 
on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest."  (internal quotation marks 
omitted).

 
 

   

 
 

[¶20]   Many factors may be relevant in 
determining whether a suspect has been subjected to "custodial interrogation" 
within the meaning of Miranda.  

 
 

Among these 
are:  (1) whether a suspect is 
questioned in familiar or neutral surroundings;  (2) the number of police officers 
present;  (3) the degree of physical 
restraint and whether it is comparable to those associated with a formal 
arrest;  and (4) the duration and 
character of the interrogation.   
See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel and Nancy J. King, 
Criminal Procedure § 6.6(c) at 527 (2nd ed.1999);  see also Wunder [v. state], 705 
P.2d [333], 335 [(Wyo. 1985)].   The 
nature of the interrogator, the nature of the suspect, the time and place of the 
interrogation, the progress of the investigation at the time of the 
interrogation, whether the suspect is informed that his detention would not be 
temporary, and the elapsed amount of time 
between questioning and the arrest may be important factors as well.  Wunder, 705 P.2d  at 335; J.F. 
Ghent, Annotation, What Constitutes "Custodial Interrogation" Within Rule 
of Miranda v. Arizona Requiring 
that Suspect be Informed of His Federal Constitutional Rights Before Custodial Interrogation, 31 
A.L.R.3d 565 (1970).  No one factor 
alone will necessarily establish custody for Miranda purposes, and not all 
factors will be relevant to a given case.

 
 

Gunn, ¶10.  See also, Hannon, ¶42.

 
 

[¶21]   The transcript of the motion to 
suppress hearing reveals the specifics of the interview in the instant 
case.  School officials called CSC 
to the administrative offices of the Gillette high school on February 23, 
2004.  Prior to the interview, the 
school resource officer telephoned CSC's mother and informed her that the 
officers were interested in questioning CSC about an automobile accident that 
also occurred on February 20, 2004, and she consented to the interview.  

 
 

[¶22]   The interview took place in a 
school conference room, which had two doors.  Two investigators from the Campbell 
County Sheriff's Department, a Gillette police detective, a uniformed school 
resource officer, and a school administrator attended CSC's interview.  However, one officer, Investigator 
Seeman, conducted almost all of the questioning.  

 
 

[¶23]   Investigator Seeman was not 
threatening or coercive during the interview.  He testified at the suppression hearing 
that he told CSC repeatedly during the interview that he did not have to talk to 
the officers, he was free to leave, and he was not under arrest.  The interview lasted approximately one 
hour and, during that time, CSC was not handcuffed or otherwise physically 
restrained.  Although the officers 
disputed his assertion, CSC testified that the resource officer sat in front of 
one of the doors, effectively blocking it.  
At the conclusion of the interview, the officers allowed CSC to leave the 
administrative office and return to class.  
Four days later, on February 27, 2004, CSC was arrested and charged with 
aiding and abetting in the commission of first-degree sexual assault.  

 
 

[¶24]   After hearing the evidence 
presented at the suppression hearing, the juvenile court judge made the 
following findings:

 
 

            
THE COURT:             
Well, the Court does have to in these situations look at the totality of 
the circumstances.  

 
 

            
I'm going to find that this was a noncustodial interview.  Now, it may have been a situation where 
the juvenile thought he had to be there, and at least initially he did.  The school called him 
down.

 
 

            
On the other hand, some of the other indicia of custodial interrogation 
wasn't there.  He wasn't taken to 
the police station.  He wasn't taken 
to a holding cell.  I mean, there 
may have been someone at the door.  
I guess that's not real clear in my mind from the testimony.  But apparently there were two doors 
even.  There were not 
restraints.  And it is clear he was 
not arrested at the conclusion of that interview.

 
 

            
Even the juvenile testifies that he wasn't placed under arrest, that no 
one made any promises or tricks.  
Although, the tricks part is of no major consequence, but there were no 
promises made and he reports no threats.  
And the evidence would indicate that it was a nonthreatening atmosphere 
except for the extent that there were so many people present.  But it appears that substantially all 
the questioning was done by one person.

 
 

            
And I guess I have to give credence to his testimony, too.  I think it's believable that he says 
that he informed this juvenile that he was free to leave and didn't have to talk 
if he didn't want to.

 
 

            
So, I'm going to find that this was a noncustodial interrogation, that 
the statements therefore made by the juvenile during this time were voluntary 
and the motion to suppress should be denied.

 
 

[¶25]   Taking the facts in the light most 
favorable to the juvenile court's findings, we conclude that those findings were 
not clearly erroneous.  As in most 
cases where the determinative issue is whether or not a suspect was "in custody" 
when questioned, there are factors in this case weighing in favor of the 
conclusion that the encounter was custodial and factors which suggest that the 
encounter was noncustodial.  The 
factors supporting a determination that CSC was "in custody" during the 
interview included the fact that CSC was initially directed to come to the 
office by school officials.  In 
addition, an officer may have been blocking one of the doors during the 
interview.  CSC was outnumbered by 
authority figures, which suggests that the interrogation environment was 
somewhat coercive.   
Furthermore, CSC was a minor and was not accompanied by his mother or any 
other person who could provide him with moral support. 

 
 

[¶26]   On the other hand, any coercive 
elements of the interview were reduced by the fact that it took place at CSC's 
school, a location which was familiar to him, rather than at the police 
station.  Investigator Seeman 
questioned CSC about a couple of different matters, including a car accident 
that occurred on February 20th4 and the events that took 
place at his house that day.  
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, it is 
certainly reasonable to infer that Investigator Seeman initially viewed CSC as 
simply a witness to KM's alleged sexual assault of AA.  It was not until CSC made the 
incriminating statements regarding his conduct that he became a suspect himself. 
 

 
 

[¶27]   Furthermore, CSC was not handcuffed 
or otherwise physically restrained during the interview and at least one of the 
doors out of the conference room was unencumbered.  Investigator Seeman's demeanor 
throughout the interview was calm and respectful and he repeatedly and 
specifically assured CSC that he was not obligated to answer any questions, 
could leave at any time, and would not be arrested that day.  True to his word, Investigator Seeman 
allowed CSC to return to his class at the end of the interview, and he was not 
arrested until four days later.  
Considering the totality of the circumstances, we have to agree with the 
juvenile court that the interrogation of CSC was noncustodial.  

 
 

[¶28]   CSC contends that we should take 
his age into account in determining whether or not he was in custody at the time 
of the interrogation.  In other 
words, he argues that we should analyze the custody issue "through a standard 
adapted for juveniles, namely, a reasonable person in the child's 
position."  The Wyoming Supreme 
Court has never directly addressed whether a suspect's age should be considered 
in determining whether he was subjected to "custodial interrogation."     

 
 

[¶29]   Our analysis is guided by the 
United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Yarborough.  In that case, the Supreme Court 
reviewed a decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit regarding Yarborough's petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2254.  The Ninth Circuit 
ruled that the state court erred by refusing to consider Yarborough's youth and 
inexperience when determining whether or not he was "in custody" at the time of 
questioning.  Yarborough, 124 S. Ct.  at 2147.  The Supreme Court 
reversed the Ninth Circuit, ruling that federal law does not clearly mandate 
that a trial court consider a suspect's age or experience when making the 
determination of whether he was "in custody" for Miranda purposes.  Id. 
at 2151.

 
 

[¶30]   The United States Supreme Court 
emphasized the importance of applying an objective test to determine whether or 
not a suspect is in custody in order to further "the clarity of [Miranda's] 
rule' ensuring that the police need not guess as to [the circumstances] at 
issue before deciding how they may interrogate a suspect.'" Yarborough, 124 S. Ct.  at 2151 (quoting 
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 430, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1984)).  In other words, the test should not 
"place upon the police the burden of anticipating the frailties or 
idiosyncrasies of every person whom they question.'" Id. at 1248 (quoting Berkemer, 468 U.S. 
at 442 n. 35, which quoted "People v. P., 
21 N.Y.2d 1, 9-10, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225, 233 N.E.2d 255, 260 
(1967)).

 
 

[¶31]   We cannot overstate the importance 
of having an objective test to guide the police in determining a suspect's 
custodial status.  The police should 
not have to "get into" the mind of the suspect in order to determine if they are 
required to give Miranda warnings 
before questioning him.  Yarborough, 124 S. Ct.  at 2148-49.  
 It would be a great 
handicap to law enforcement to require them to speculate about the suspect's 
state of mind before deciding how they may interrogate him. 

 
 

[¶32]   Consequently, we are not compelled 
to alter our traditional objective test for determining a suspect's custodial 
status in order to take into account CSC's age.  Since he was 16 years old, CSC was not 
exceptionally young at the time of the interview.  Furthermore, he was told several times 
by Investigator Seeman that he did not have to answer his questions, could leave 
at any time, and was not under arrest.

 
 

[¶33]   We do note that Yarborough was a five to four decision, 
with Justice Kennedy writing for the narrow majority.  Justice O'Connor, who joined in the 
majority decision, also wrote a separate concurring opinion.  She specifically stated that "[t]here 
may be cases in which a suspect's age will be relevant to the Miranda custody' inquiry."  Yarborough, 124 S. Ct.  at 2152.  Justice O'Connor stated, however, that 
since Yarborough was near the age of majority when he was questioned, the trial 
court was not obligated to consider his age and experience in determining his 
custodial status.  Id.  

 
 

[¶34]   Following Justice O'Connor's 
reasoning, we acknowledge that there could be instances where the suspect is so 
young that his age must be considered by the police.  We do not, however, feel that it applies 
to 16-year-old CSC in this case, especially in light of the fact that he was 
repeatedly advised by Investigator Seeman that he was not under arrest, was not 
obligated to answer his questions, and could leave at any time. The juvenile 
court, therefore, correctly applied the objective test to determine whether CSC 
was in custody and properly concluded that the interview was noncustodial.  

 
 

[¶35]   There are, of course, legal 
contexts in which a suspect's subjective state of mind is relevant.  "For example, the voluntariness of a 
statement is often said to depend upon whether the defendant's will was 
overborne,' Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534, 83 S. Ct. 917, 9 L. Ed. 2d 922 (1963), a question that logically can 
depend on the characteristics of the accused.' Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973)." Yarborough, 124 S. Ct.  at 2151.  See also, Hannon, ¶¶ 50-51.  CSC does not, however, raise any issues 
requiring a subjective analysis of his individual characteristics.  In particular, he did not claim that his 
statements were coerced or that his will was overborne by the police during the 
interview.  

 
 

[¶36]   The juvenile court properly applied 
the objective test to determine CSC's custodial status during the interview and 
correctly concluded that he was not in custody.  Consequently, CSC's constitutional 
rights were not violated by the authorities' failure to apprise him of his Miranda rights before questioning him 
and the juvenile court did not err by refusing to suppress his statements.   

 
 

[¶37]   Affirmed.  

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1In accordance with Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 5-8-101 (LexisNexis 2003), the District Court for the Sixth 
Judicial District in Campbell County sat as the juvenile court in this matter. 

 
 

2In the context of a 
juvenile proceeding, the "conditional guilty plea" terminology is 
incorrect.  Under the Juvenile 
Justice Act (sometimes known as the Juvenile Court Act), which is codified at 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-6-201 (LexisNexis 2003), et seq., the juvenile either 
admits or denies the alleged delinquent conduct.  Thus, the term "conditional admission" 
would be more accurate in this context.

 
 

3           
Rule 11. Pleas

 
 
(a)       Alternatives. 

 
 
            
. . .

 
 
(2)       Conditional 
Pleas.  With the approval of the court and the consent of the attorney for the 
state, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere, 
reserving in writing the right, on appeal from the judgment to seek review of 
the adverse determination of any specified pretrial motion.  A defendant who prevails on appeal shall 
be allowed to withdraw the plea.  

 
 

4The 
authorities ultimately determined that CSC was not involved in the automobile 
accident that occurred on February 20, 2004.