Title: Wong v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC15-2192 
____________ 
 
FRANCIS WONG,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Respondent. 
 
[March 2, 2017] 
 
LEWIS, J. 
 
Petitioner Francis Wong seeks review of the decision of the Second District 
Court of Appeal in Wong v. State, 184 So. 3d 1122 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015), on the 
basis that it expressly and directly conflicts with the decision of this Court in State 
v. Heathcoat, 442 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 1983), on a question of law.1  We have 
                                          
 
 
1.  Wong also contends that the decision below was in conflict with the 
decisions of other district courts in Calhoun v. State, 721 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 1998), Gainer v. State, 633 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), Hubbard v. 
State, 411 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), dismissed, 424 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 
1982), and LeRetilley v. Harris, 354 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).  In light of 
conflict with our decision in Heathcoat, 442 So. 2d 955, we need not address 
whether conflict exists with these decisions. 
 
 
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jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  Further, we accepted jurisdiction.  
Wong v. State, No. SC15-2192, 2016 WL 934487, *1 (Fla. Mar. 9, 2016).  We 
now quash the decision below. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Wong was convicted of two counts of lewd or lascivious molestation against 
a victim less than twelve years of age, § 800.04(5)(b), Fla. Stat., three counts of 
lewd or lascivious molestation against a victim between twelve and sixteen years 
of age, § 800.04(5)(c)(2), Fla. Stat., and one count of lewd or lascivious battery 
against a victim less than sixteen years of age, § 800.04(4)(b), Fla. Stat.  With 
regard to the five lewd or lascivious molestation counts, the final amended 
information filed alleged that Wong “did intentionally touch in a lewd or lascivious 
manner the genitals and/or genital area” of each of three victims—P.C., C.C., and 
S.N.—over the course of differing time periods from 2000 to 2011.2  In addition, 
with regard to a lewd or lascivious battery count involving S.N., the information 
alleged Wong “plac[ed] the victim’s penis in his mouth . . . .”   
                                          
 
 
2.  Aside from section 800.04(5)(b) reclassifying the offense as a life felony 
in 2005, see ch. 2005-28, § 5, Laws of Fla.; ch. 2008-182, § 3, Laws of Fla., the 
three statutes Wong was charged with violating did not change throughout the 
relevant time periods. 
 
 
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During trial, each victim testified that Wong had at least once grabbed or 
rubbed the victim’s penis, making skin-to-skin contact for at least ten seconds.  In 
addition, S.N. testified that Wong placed S.N.’s penis in his mouth.   
 
On the second day of trial, November 20, 2013, the trial court conducted the 
only jury charge conference of the case.  During this conference, the following 
exchange between the Court and the attorneys occurred: 
 
[State:]  Are you asking for any lessers? 
 
 
[Defense Counsel:]  Let me look at them. 
 
 
[State:]  There aren’t any category one. 
 
 
[Defense Counsel:]  No. 
 
 
[State:]  There’s cat two lessers, but I don’t have my book out 
in front of me what they are. 
 
 
The Court:  These are the witnesses that were supposed to be 
here this morning? 
 
 
[Defense Counsel:]  Yes, Your Honor.  [Wong’s sister] cannot 
make it.  She’s in the hospital. 
 
 
The Court:  Okay. 
 
 
[State:]  I just found this out today. 
 
 
The Court:  Only.  Here’s the verdict form.  The verdict. 
 
 
[State:]  Okay. 
 
 
 
The Court:  If you find the defendant guilty as charged in the 
information or not guilty, if you return a verdict of guilty, it should be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  If you find no offense has been 
 
 
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proven beyond a reasonable doubt or—only one verdict may be 
returned. 
 
 
[State:]  May I approach? 
 
 
The Court:  Yes. 
 
 
[State:]  I’ll grab yours, [defense counsel.] 
 
 
[Defense Counsel:]  Your Honor, I’m looking at 11.8, 
committing unnatural act and lascivious act.  11.8.  I don’t know if 
[the State] has a copy of that. 
 
 
 
[State:]  Of the category two? 
 
 
The Court:  Here’s weighing the evidence. 
 
 
[State:]  May I approach? 
 
 
The Court:  Yeah.  How much time do you think you need for 
closing? 
 
 
[Defense Counsel:]  45 minutes to an hour. 
 
 
[State:]  We would go probably on the low side of that total.  If 
he wants 45, we’ll take 45. 
 
 
The Court:  30 and 15?  Something like that? 
 
 
[State:]  We can do that. 
 
 
[Defense Counsel:]  She gets 30, I get 15?  I’m just kidding. 
 
 
Your Honor, I don’t know if the State’s in agreement with me 
on this, category two of a lesser is committing natural—unnatural and 
lascivious act.  I think the evidence does support a lesser of this 
charge.  Defendant is charged, the act was unnatural and lascivious, 
and unnatural means not in accordance with nature or with normal 
feelings of behavior, and lascivious, we’ve got the same as lascivious.  
I would ask for this instruction also to be given as a lesser. 
 
 
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The Court:  I don’t have to give a lesser for category two. 
 
 
[Defense Counsel:]  I understand.  I’m asking you.  I’m 
pleading. 
 
 
The Court:  I’m going to give your witnesses until 4 o’clock.  
I’ve been waiting for 25 minutes now. 
 
 
[Defense Counsel:]  May I go make a phone call? 
 
(Emphasis added.)  The exchange then transitioned to a discussion concerning 
some of the defense’s upcoming witnesses and limiting their testimony insofar as it 
concerned character.  No further discussion occurred with regard to the jury 
instructions.  The defense eventually rested and the trial court went into recess 
until the next morning.  During the third and final day of trial, the State and 
defense presented closing remarks.   
Following closing remarks, the trial court instructed the jury.  The judge did 
not instruct the jury with regard to the offense of unnatural and lascivious act.  See 
§ 800.02, Fla. Stat. (“A person who commits any unnatural and lascivious act with 
another person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree . . . .”).3  The copy of 
instructions that went into the jury room also did not contain such instructions.  
Wong did not reassert his objection to the lack of the requested instructions at that 
time. 
                                          
 
 
3.  Section 800.02 has remained the same at all relevant times. 
 
 
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After deliberating, the jury found Wong guilty of all six counts.  In so 
finding, the jury returned a special verdict form in which it specifically found that 
Wong touched the genitals or genital area of each victim with regard to each count 
and that Wong did “encourage, force or entice the penis of S.N. to penetrate the 
defendant’s mouth.”  The trial court ultimately sentenced Wong to life 
imprisonment for both counts involving a victim under the age of twelve years old 
and fifteen years’ imprisonment for each of the other counts.   
On appeal before the Second District, Wong challenged the trial court’s 
failure to include the jury instructions he had requested for each count pertaining to 
the lesser included offense of unnatural and lascivious act.  Wong, 184 So. 3d at 
1123.  The State contended that Wong failed to preserve his claim for appeal.  
Specifically, the State asserted that the exchange between the trial court and 
defense counsel during the charge conference was insufficient to satisfy the 
contemporaneous objection rule because counsel failed to obtain a specific ruling 
or object further.  Id. at 1125 n.4.   
The Second District affirmed.  Id. at 1126.  The district court held that Wong 
failed to preserve his claim for appeal because “the trial court did not rule on the 
request and defense counsel did not object to the court’s failure to give the 
instruction.”  Id.  It further explained that “the standard is whether the trial court 
clearly, explicitly, and unequivocally denied the request.”  Id.  Judge Wallace, 
 
 
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however, concluded that Wong’s request and the trial court’s response were 
sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal without a subsequent objection.  Id. at 
1133 (Wallace, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).  Judge Wallace further 
noted that if the issue was preserved for appeal, the State conceded that the trial 
court erred in failing to include such instructions for each charge.  Id. at 1128, 
1133.  Wong petitioned for review in this Court, and this review follows. 
ANALYSIS 
Where the facts are undisputed, whether an issue is properly preserved for 
appellate review is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.  See Aills v. 
Boemi, 29 So. 3d 1105, 1108 (Fla. 2010).  Requests for jury instructions in a 
criminal trial are governed by section 918.10, Florida Statutes, which provides: 
918.10 Charge to jury; request for instructions.— 
 
(1) At the conclusion of argument of counsel, the court shall 
charge the jury.  The charge shall be only on the law of the case and 
must include the penalty for the offense for which the accused is being 
charged. 
 
(2) All charges to the jury shall be delivered orally and shall 
be taken by the court reporter, transcribed, and filed. 
 
(3) At or after the close of the evidence, a party may file 
written requests that the court instruct the jury on the law as stated in 
the requests.  The court shall inform counsel of its proposed action on 
the requests before their arguments to the jury. 
 
 
 
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§ 918.10, Fla. Stat. (2013).  Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.390(d) 
specifically governs the preservation of claims for appellate review with regard to 
jury instructions: 
(d)  Objections.  No party may raise on appeal the giving or 
failure to give an instruction unless the party objects thereto before the 
jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to 
which the party objects and the grounds of the objection.  Opportunity 
shall be given to make the objection out of the presence of the jury. 
 
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.390(d).  This rule has been the subject of many cases, including 
Heathcoat, 442 So. 2d 955. 
In Heathcoat, defense counsel requested a jury instruction on the defense of 
intoxication and explained the grounds for the request: 
THE COURT:  What do you want on the record as your 
objections to instructions as given? 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  At this time, I would request for 
Heathcoat, the instruction on intoxication on the following grounds:  
That all four counts of the information are specific intent crimes. 
 
The evidence from the victim, Vera Batton, testified or it was 
read from the deposition in impeachment, that my client was highly 
intoxicated, that she had never seen him this intoxicated before. 
 
She also testified that she had known John for some period of 
time and had specifically socialized with he and his girl friend, and I 
will quote from Page 7, beginning at Line 11, of her deposition, which 
I had to use for impeachment: 
 
“Had you ever seen John before intoxicated? 
 
 
 
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“Answer:  I have seen—I have saw him drinking, but I have 
never seem him that intoxicated well to that degree.  I saw him drink a 
beer.” 
 
Therefore, with the introduction of intoxication, I would request 
that instruction. 
 
THE COURT:  Let’s take care of that, Bob. 
 
[STATE:]  Basically, the same argument we interposed before, 
that being that he is trying to introduce deposition testimony on direct 
testimony, then on cross, then again on redirect. . . . 
 
Id. at 956.  Ultimately, the jury was not instructed with the requested instruction.  
Without quoting the judge’s denial, we simply noted that “[d]efense counsel failed 
to object to the judge’s denial of the requested instruction.”  Id.   
Against those facts, we held that a further objection was not required by 
either rule 3.390(d) or other precedent because the objectives of the 
contemporaneous objection rule “are accomplished when the record shows clearly 
and unambiguously that a request was made for a specific instruction and that the 
trial court clearly understood the request and just as clearly denied the request.”  
Id.  We further explained that “there was a timely request for [an intoxication 
defense jury] instruction, the judge fully understood the reasons for and nature of 
the instruction, and that with full understanding, he denied the request.”  Id. at 957.   
We fully agree with Wong that the decision below is in conflict with 
Heathcoat—holding that a similar request for instructions was insufficient for 
preservation purposes.  Specifically, trial counsel requested a category two 
 
 
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permissive lesser included offense instruction, specifically referring the trial court 
and the State to Florida Standard Jury Instructions (Criminal) 11.8, Unnatural and 
Lascivious Act.4  Next, trial counsel explained that the charging document and 
evidence supported the giving of the instruction: 
 
[Defense Counsel:]  Your Honor, I’m looking at 11.8, 
committing unnatural act and lascivious act.  11.8.  I don’t know if 
[the State] has a copy of that. 
 
. . . . 
 
 
[Defense Counsel:] . . . 
 
Your Honor, I don’t know if the State’s in agreement with me 
on this, category two of a lesser is committing natural – unnatural and 
lascivious act.  I think the evidence does support a lesser of this 
charge.  Defendant is charged, the act was unnatural and lascivious, 
and unnatural means not in accordance with nature or with normal 
feelings of behavior, and lascivious, we’ve got the same as lascivious.  
I would ask for this instruction also to be given as a lesser. 
 
The trial court immediately responded, “I don’t have to give a lesser for category 
two.”  Ultimately, the trial court did not include the requested instructions in its 
instructions to the jury and defense counsel did not voice further objection. 
                                          
 
 
4.  With regard to standard jury instructions, an oral request on the record is 
sufficient for purposes of preservation.  See Holley v. State, 423 So. 2d 562, 564 
(Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (“We hold, however, that the requirement of written jury 
instructions is inapplicable when a Florida standard jury instruction is requested on 
the record.”); see also Pieczynski v. State, 516 So. 2d 1048, 1050 (Fla. 3d DCA 
1987) (citing Holley, 423 So. 2d 562). 
 
 
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We would conclude that the trial court “clearly understood [Wong’s] 
position, and further argument or objection would have been futile.”  Thomas v. 
State, 419 So. 2d 634, 636 (Fla. 1982).  Indeed, in this case, further argument and 
objection that occurred immediately after the trial court’s declaration were futile, 
as the judge simply changed the subject: 
[Defense Counsel:]  I understand.  I’m asking you.  I’m pleading. 
 
The Court:  I’m going to give your witnesses until 4 o’clock.  I’ve 
been waiting for 25 minutes now. 
 
Following that exchange and the trial court’s subsequent failure to give the 
requested instruction, we do not agree that the trial court’s statement, “I don’t have 
to give a lesser for category two,” in response to the request and the subsequent 
failure to instruct were not a clear denial of a specific request.   
Nevertheless, the decision below held that Wong failed to preserve his jury 
instruction request for appellate review.  In so holding, the district court quoted the 
correct language for the standard, “[T]he objectives of [the contemporaneous 
objection] rule are satisfied ‘when the record shows clearly and unambiguously 
that a request was made for a specific instruction and that the trial court clearly 
understood the request and just as clearly denied the request.’ ”  Wong, 184 So. 3d 
at 1124 (alterations in original) (quoting Bryant v. State, 932 So. 2d 408, 410 (Fla. 
2d DCA 2006)).  However, in application, the decision below departed from that 
standard by imposing a higher standard.  Specifically, the district court held that 
 
 
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the issue was not preserved because the trial court failed to make an explicit ruling 
and Wong failed to subsequently further object.  See id. at 1125-26 (“Although the 
dissent focuses primarily on the adequacy of the request, the adequacy of the 
request itself has no bearing on our holding.  Instead, it is defense counsel’s failure 
to object in the absence of an explicit ruling on the request that results in  
waiver. . . .  Rather, the standard is whether the trial court clearly, explicitly, and 
unequivocally denied the request.”).   
Not only did the higher standard imposed by the district court in this case 
conflict with Heathcoat, but it was contrary to nearly uniform Florida precedent.  
See Spurlock v. State, 420 So. 2d 875, 877 (Fla. 1982) (“The trial judge was aware 
of petitioner’s objection regarding jury instructions and had an opportunity to rule 
thereon.  The missing ‘magic words’ do not concern us because the necessary 
substance was present.”); Thomas, 419 So. 2d at 636 (“[I]t is not necessary to say, 
‘I object,’ and state the grounds therefor where the record shows, clearly and 
unambiguously, that the request was made and that the trial court clearly 
understood the request and, just as clearly, denied that specific request.”); Bryant, 
932 So. 2d at 410 (holding request preserved “despite the fact that counsel 
arguably did not specifically protest the trial court’s denial of that request”); Henig 
v. State, 820 So. 2d 1037, 1039-40 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Rodriguez v. State, 789 
So. 2d 513, 514 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); Gainer, 633 So. 2d at 481; Rigdon v. State, 
 
 
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621 So. 2d 475, 478 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Fernandez v. State, 570 So. 2d 1008, 
1010 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Flint v. State, 463 So. 2d 554, 555-56 (Fla. 2d DCA 
1985); Hubbard, 411 So. 2d at 1314-15.5 
Our research yielded just one case in which a jury instruction request for a 
lesser included offense was not preserved, Walker v. State, 473 So. 2d 694, 697-98 
(Fla. 1st DCA 1985).  There, the First District concluded that defense counsel’s 
request was insufficient and defense counsel failed to object when the jury was 
instructed.  See id.  Defense counsel referenced verdict forms, but not specific jury 
instructions: 
DEFENSE COUNSEL:  All right.  The other thing I wanted to ask the 
Court was on your verdict forms on your lesser included, I would ask 
                                          
 
 
5.  See also Floyd v. State, 850 So. 2d 383, 400 (Fla. 2002); Franqui v. State, 
804 So. 2d 1185, 1195-96 (Fla. 2001); Higgs v. State, 948 So. 2d 1024, 1025 (Fla. 
2d DCA 2007); Arthur v. State, 717 So. 2d 193, 194 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Holland 
v. State, 634 So. 2d 813, 816 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Hicks v. State, 622 So. 2d 14, 
17 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); Hewitt v. State, 575 So. 2d 273, 274 (Fla. 4th DCA 
1991); De Parias v. State, 562 So. 2d 434, 435 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); cf. Carpenter 
v. State, 785 So. 2d 1182, 1199 (Fla. 2001) (significant charge conference 
discussion); Davenport v. State, 429 So. 2d 1352, 1353 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) 
(“Appellant’s attorney then specifically asked that the record reflect his objection 
to the court’s apparent refusal to give the instruction on battery.”); Rivers v. State, 
425 So. 2d 101, 103-05 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (comparing specificity of various 
requests for instructions throughout proceedings, but ultimately finding request 
marginally preserved despite ineptness of language).  But cf. Marquard v. State, 
850 So. 2d 417, 433 (Fla. 2002) (holding challenge to instruction not preserved in 
context of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel where trial court sustained 
objection to certain instructions during charge conference, trial court later read the 
instructions anyway, and trial counsel failed to object to trial court’s breach of 
charge conference agreement). 
 
 
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the Court to include also the lesser included on Page 101 of the 
improper exhibition of a weapon and verdict form—or the lesser 
included on 102, discharging a firearm in public. 
 
THE COURT:  I’m not going to give them.  Anything further 
gentlemen?  Any specific instructions? 
 
Id. at 698.  The First District concluded that “[d]efense counsel’s comments were, 
at best, a request for an instruction, and did not constitute an objection to the 
court’s failure to give the requested instruction.  Certainly such comments did not 
satisfy the requirement that counsel state distinctly the matter to which he objects 
and the grounds of his objection.”  Id.  Although we believe the First District may 
have reached the correct result in Walker because it concerned a request for a 
verdict form rather than a jury instruction, we disapprove of any extraneous 
discussion in Walker to the extent that it conflicts with this opinion. 
Finally, we also address two of the reasons the district court and the State 
asserted in support of their respective positions.  First, the district court suggested 
that counsel’s response to the trial court’s ruling indicates the trial court failed to 
make a ruling: 
Taken in context, when defense counsel stated, “I understand,” 
the most logical interpretation is that he acknowledged and agreed 
with the court’s general statement of law that instructing the jury on 
category two lesser is not mandatory.  We know this to be the case 
because defense counsel continued, “I’m asking you. I’m pleading.”  
Defense counsel obviously understood that there was no ruling by the 
court to this point because he continued to ask and even “plead” to the 
court for a favorable ruling.  Drawing any other conclusion from the 
record would be impermissible speculation into the undisclosed 
 
 
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mental processes of defense counsel.  There was no further discussion 
of the matter, there was no ruling by the court on the request, and 
there was no contemporaneous objection. 
 
Wong, 184 So. 3d at 1124.  However, this reliance on the response of counsel was 
error.  Not one of the decisions referred to above analyzed the reaction of defense 
counsel to inform the determination of whether the trial court understood the 
relevant request or issued a ruling.  Second, the State contends that Wong failed to 
preserve his claim because “[d]efense counsel never urged the court that it was 
required to give the instruction, even though [several First District opinions] held 
that the instruction was required as a permissive lesser included offense on similar 
facts.”  Ans. Br. at 21.  However, in every case referred to above, trial counsel did 
not present case law following the denial of their respective requests—they simply 
made a request.  Indeed, in Rigdon, 621 So. 2d 475, the district court considered 
and declined the same contention the State asserted here.  All that is required is 
that a specific request be made with reasoning set forth and that the judge 
understands the request and denies it. 
Therefore, consistent with uniform Florida legal precedent, we hold—once 
again—that a request for a lesser included offense jury instruction is preserved 
where trial counsel makes a specific request, trial counsel sets forth the required 
grounds for the request, the judge understands the request, and the judge denies the 
 
 
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request.  Although we always encourage a more detailed discussion that will better 
serve the machinery upon which our judiciary operates, nothing more is required.   
We further conclude that Wong clearly preserved the denial of his request 
for a permissive lesser included offense jury instruction.  Defense counsel referred 
to the Florida Standard Jury Instructions and requested a specific instruction, and 
clearly expressed all the required grounds: (1) the information contained the 
necessary elements; (2) there was evidence in the record to support the giving of 
the instruction; and (3) the instruction was listed as a permissive, category two 
instruction.  The State, apparently in agreement, did not make any contentions to 
the contrary.  Finally, the trial court made a ruling on the request: “I don’t have to 
give a lesser for category two.”  As evidenced by the omission of the requested 
instruction from the trial court’s actual instructions to the jury, the trial court’s 
statement was not a mere exercise in superfluity, but its ruling—a denial of the 
requested jury instructions.   
Because we conclude that Wong has sufficiently preserved his request for a 
lesser-included offense instruction, we now turn to the merits of his claim.  See 
Savoie v. State, 422 So. 2d 308, 312 (Fla. 1982) (“[O]nce this Court has 
jurisdiction of a cause, it has jurisdiction to consider all issues appropriately raised 
in the appellate process, as though the case had originally come to this Court on 
appeal.”).  As this question involves a legal determination based upon undisputed 
 
 
- 17 - 
facts as to whether a jury instruction is a permissive lesser included offense, our 
review is de novo.  See Khianthalat v. State, 974 So. 2d 359, 360-61 (Fla. 2008).   
The law is well settled on this issue.  “A permissive lesser included offense 
exists when ‘the two offenses appear to be separate [on the face of the statutes], but 
the facts alleged in the accusatory pleadings are such that the lesser [included] 
offense cannot help but be perpetrated once the greater offense has been.’ ”  
Sanders v. State, 944 So. 2d 203, 206 (Fla. 2006) (alterations in original) (quoting 
State v. Weller, 590 So. 2d 923, 925 n.2 (Fla. 1991)).  A defendant is entitled to an 
instruction on a permissive lesser included offense upon request where two 
conditions are met: “(1) the indictment or information must allege all the statutory 
elements of the permissive lesser included offense; and (2) there must be some 
evidence adduced at trial establishing all of these elements.”  Khianthalat, 974 So. 
2d at 361 (quoting Jones v. State, 666 So. 2d 960, 964 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)); see 
also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.510(b) (“Upon an indictment or information upon which the 
defendant is to be tried for any offense the jury may convict the defendant of: . . . 
(b) any offense which as a matter of law is . . . a lesser included offense of the 
offense charged in the indictment or information and is supported by the 
evidence.”).  When those conditions are met, this Court has held that the failure to 
give a requested permissive lesser included offense instruction constitutes 
reversible error.  See Amado v. State, 585 So. 2d 282, 283 (Fla. 1991).  Whether 
 
 
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the evidence of guilt pertaining to the greater offense is overwhelming makes no 
difference.  See id.  Finally, when a trial court reversibly errs in this fashion, the 
proper remedy is to vacate the judgment of guilt and order a new trial.  See id.; 
Horn v. State, 120 So. 3d 1, 3 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). 
Applying that law, we hold that Wong was entitled to the unnatural and 
lascivious act jury instructions he requested.  As trial counsel explained to the 
judge, the information alleged all of the elements of unnatural and lascivious act.  
Specifically, all six counts of the information in this case alleged that Wong made 
oral and skin contact with the sexual organ of another person.  Likewise, as trial 
counsel explained, there was some evidence to support those allegations—the 
testimony of the victims. 
Invariably, when the sexual conduct alleged did not include sexual 
intercourse, Florida courts have held that the offense of committing an unnatural 
and lascivious act is a category two permissive lesser included offense of both 
lewd or lascivious molestation and lewd or lascivious battery.  See Funiciello v. 
State, 179 So. 3d 388, 391 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (lewd or lascivious battery 
involving digital penetration); Horn, 120 So. 3d at 2 (lewd or lascivious 
molestation involving the defendant’s placement of his head between the victim’s 
exposed breasts); Sherrer v. State, 898 So. 2d 260, 261 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (lewd 
or lascivious molestation involving touching); see also Schuster v. State, 17 So. 3d 
 
 
- 19 - 
304, 304 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (affirming conviction of unnatural and lascivious act 
as a lesser-included offense of a charge of lewd or lascivious molestation for male 
to male sexual conduct); Leveille v. State, 927 So. 2d 1008, 1009-10 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2006) (affirming conviction of unnatural and lascivious act as a lesser-
included offense of lewd or lascivious battery involving penetration of a child’s 
vagina with an object).6  Furthermore, unnatural and lascivious act is listed as a 
category two permissive lesser included offense for both lewd or lascivious 
molestation and lewd or lascivious battery.  See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 
11.10(b); Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 11.10(c).  Here, Wong was charged with both 
lewd or lascivious battery and lewd or lascivious molestation.  Moreover, none of 
the charges involved sexual intercourse.  As a result, upon request, Wong was 
entitled to the unnatural and lascivious act instruction with regard to each count of 
the information.  The trial court was without discretion to rule otherwise.  See 
Khianthalat, 974 So. 2d at 361 (“Upon request, a trial judge must give a jury 
instruction on a permissive lesser included offense if the following two conditions 
are met: ‘(1) the indictment or information must allege all the statutory elements of 
                                          
 
 
6.  Although the State conceded that Wong was entitled to relief on the 
merits before the district court, the State now retracts that concession on the basis 
of a perceived conflict.  However, because the State’s allegation of conflict 
involves the application of the offense of unnatural and lascivious act to conduct 
involving sexual intercourse, we need not reach that question today.  This case 
does not involve sexual intercourse. 
 
 
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the permissive lesser included offense; and (2) there must be some evidence 
adduced at trial establishing all of these elements.’ ” (quoting Jones, 666 So. 2d at 
964)).  Wong is entitled to a new trial.  See Funiciello, 179 So. 3d at 389; Horn, 
120 So. 3d at 2. 
CONCLUSION 
 
In light of the express and direct conflict between the decision below and our 
decision in Heathcoat, we quash the decision below and remand to the district 
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. 
POLSTON, J., concurs in result. 
CANADY, J., dissents. 
LAWSON, J., did not participate. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Direct 
Conflict of Decisions  
 
 
Second District - Case No. 2D14-646 
 
 
(Lee County) 
 
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Dane Kristofor Chase, Special 
Assistant Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
 
 
- 21 - 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and John M. 
Klawikofsky, Bureau Chief, and Brandon Robert Christian, Assistant Attorney 
General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent