Title: Attorney Grievance v. Smith

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Patrick Joseph Smith
AG No. 27, September Term 2007
Headnote:  The sanction of a six month suspension is imposed for an attorney’s actions of
impersonating a police officer and intimidating a witness in relation to his representation of
a client.  This conduct constituted violations of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct
(“MRPC”) 3.4(a), 8.4(a)-(d) and Maryland Rule 16-701(i).
 
                                 
Circuit Court for Mo ntgomery C ounty
Case No . 22528 -M
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
AG No. 27
September Term 2007
Attorney Grievance Commission of
Maryland
v.
Patrick Joseph Smith
Bell, C. J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Eldridge, John C.
(retired, specially assigned) 
Cathell, Dale R.
(retired, specially assigned),
                      JJ.
Opinion by Cathell, J.
Filed: June 13, 2008
1 Petitioner filed a petition with this Court initiating disciplinary proceedings against
Patrick Smith, pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-751(a) regarding petitions for disciplinary or
remedial action which states, in part, that:  “Bar Counsel shall file a Petition for Disciplinary
or Remedial Action in the Court of Appeals.”  
2 The relevant provisions of the MRPC state:
“Rule 3.4.  Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel.
A lawyer shall not:
(a) unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or unlawfully
alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential
evidentiary value.  A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do
any such act . . . .
“Rule 8.4. Misconduct.
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a)  violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so
through the acts of another;
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice
. . . .”  
On August 20, 2007, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, petitioner, by
Melvin Hirshman, Bar Counsel, and Dolores O. Ridgell, Assistant Bar Counsel, filed a
petition for disciplinary action1 against Patrick J. Smith, respondent, for multiple violations
of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC).  The petition alleged that
respondent, based upon his actions related to his representation of Joshua Teague, had
violated MRPC 3.4 and 8.4(a)-(d). 2  
Pursuant to Md. Rule 16-752 (a) this Court assigned the matter to Judge Ronald B.
Rubin of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County to conduct a hearing and to make
findings of fact and conclusions of law.  
3 Smith was arrested on February 19, 2004, on charges of impersonating a police
officer, intimidating a witness and obstructing justice.  On February 23, 2004, Smith
demanded a speedy trial.  Smith’s criminal trial commenced April 26, 2005, 425 days after
his arrest.  After a bench trial, on April 27, 2005, Smith was convicted of impersonating a
police officer and intimidating a witness.  Smith was acquitted of obstructing justice.
Smith’s convictions were reversed in an unreported opinion by the Court of Special
Appeals on the ground that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial had been violated.
Smith v. State, No. 1437, September Term, 2005 (May 4, 2007).  The State did not appeal
by way of a petition of certiorari to the Court of Appeals.  On October 5, 2007, the “State
entered all of the charges filed against Mr. Smith as Nolle Prosequi [(Md. Rule 4-247)] in
the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland.” 
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On January 3, 2008, an evidentiary hearing was held before the hearing judge.  On
January 30, 2008, Judge Ronald Rubin of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County entered
his Memorandum Opinion in which he found that the above violations of the MRPC  had
occurred and the fact that Smith’s criminal convictions3 were reversed did not preclude these
violations.  The record was transferred from the hearing judge to this Court for oral
argument.  Pursuant to Md. Rule 16-758(b), respondent filed with this Court exceptions and
recommendations to the hearing judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Facts 
Respondent was admitted to the Bar of Maryland in 1979 and maintains his practice
of law as a sole practitioner in his office located in Rockville, Maryland.  He was admitted
to the Bar of the District of Columbia in 1979 and to the Bar of Georgia in 1978, in which
state his status currently is inactive.  He is also a member of the bars of the federal courts in
Maryland and the District of Columbia.
Judge Rubin’s findings and conclusions are, in part, as follows:
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“Findings of Fact
1.
Patrick  Joseph  Smith  (‘Smith’)  was  born on March 13, 1948[,] in 
Lawrence, Massachusetts.  He is the 5th of 15 children.
2.
Smith  is  married  and  is  the  father of two children.  Mrs. Smith is a
long-standing employee of a federal law enforcement agency.  One child is an
attorney practicing in New York City.  The other child is in graduate school.
3.
Smith  received  his  undergraduate  degree  in  1970 from Merrimack
College, North Andover, Massachusetts[,] and his juris doctorate in 1978 from
the Potomac School of Law, Washington, D.C.
. . .
5.
From March 1986 to the present . . . .  His practice is concentrated in 
the areas of personal injury and criminal defense.  Previously,  he worked with
a number of leading members of the bar . . . .
6.
Smith has represented defendants in over 2,000 criminal matters and 
has dealt honorably with state and federal prosecutors and judges.  Apart from
the instant matter, Smith has not been the subject of any filed complaints or
attorney grievance proceedings.
7.
In addition to his legal practice, Smith has devoted substantial time and
energy to public service.  From May 1990 through June 1991, Smith was
Special Counsel to the United States Sentencing Commission and was
instrumental in developing alternatives to federal imprisonment.  In 1992,
Smith received a Citation from the Governor of Maryland for his work in Law
in the Public Schools.  1n 1996, Smith received a Citation from the Governor
of Maryland for his work on the Task Force on Sentencing and Sentencing
Alternatives. 
8.
From  1992  through  1998, Smith  served on the Executive Advisory
Board of the Vietnam Veterans Institute, which provides health care services
to wounded war veterans.
9.
Smith has been active in the Bar Association of Montgomery County,
Maryland.  From 1989 through 1990, Smith was Chair of the Mentor Program
for New Practitioners.  In 1992, he received the Pro Bono Service Award.
From 1998 to the present, Smith has been a member of the Victims Rights
Foundation.  Smith also has been instrumental in developing public television
programs on law in Montgomery County and, in 1990, received a Certificate
from the Maryland State Bar Association in Citizenship and Law-Related
Education for his work with Maryland public schools.
10.
Smith has received recognition from numerous civil and public service
programs, including his work on public housing for elderly and disabled
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residents, business development in the City of Rockville and fire safety.
11.
Smith   has  an  exemplary   reputation  in   the  legal  and  professional
community for honesty, veracity, and good character. . . .
12.
On October 3, 2003, the Montgomery County Police arrested Joshua 
Teague (‘Teague’) for allegedly assaulting Andrew Simpson after a DC 101
radio station event in ‘Shantytown,’ located in Silver Spring, Maryland.
According to the police report, the alleged assault was witnessed by Officer J.
Gloss and Jeremie Simpson, a cousin of Andrew Simpson.
13.
Smith was retained by Teague on December 11, 2003.  Smith had no 
prior relationship of any kind with Teague.  Smith appeared with Teague at
arraignment on December 12, 2003.  Teague told Smith that he was innocent
and had not assaulted Andrew Simpson.  Throughout the time Smith
represented Teague, Teague maintained his innocence and refused to plead
guilty to any charges arising out of the alleged assault on Andrew Simpson.
14.
Smith  received  discovery  from the Office of the State’s Attorney on
December 17, 2003. As noted above, the police report listed Officer Gloss and
Jeremie Simpson as eyewitnesses to the alleged assault on Andrew Simpson.
15.
Smith learned from Teague in mid-December 2003 that an individual
named Ken Kelly had been videotaping the events at Shantytown on the night
in question.  According to Teague, the video taken by Mr. Kelly showed an
unprovoked assault by either Andrew or Jeremie Simpson on an individual
named Gus Gamino.  Smith asked Teague to secure a copy of the videotape
from Mr. Kelly.
16.  
Teague obtained a copy of the videotape from Mr. Kelly and gave it to
Smith.  After viewing the videotape, which showed an assault on Gamino,
Smith told Teague to attempt to have Gamino file assault charges against
Andrew Simpson.  Teague later assured Smith that Gamino would seek
criminal charges.  No later than the week before Teague’s trial, scheduled for
February 18, 2004, Teague told Smith: ‘that 100 percent that it would be done,
so I never told him [Smith] that it wasn’t done.’  Although Smith believed
Teague, Smith did not verify the information he learned from Teague with
respect to Gamino pressing criminal charges against Andrew Simpson.
17.  
Smith contacted the Assistant State’s Attorney assigned to the Teague
prosecution to advise him of the existence of the tape.  The prosecutor agreed
to meet with Smith and Teague to view the videotape.  The prosecutor also
agreed to have Office Gloss present at the meeting.
18.  
At the February 12, 2004 meeting with the prosecutor (which Officer
Gloss did not attend) Smith, Teague, and the prosecutor watched the tape of
the assault on Gamino.  The prosecutor agreed that Smith could use the
videotape at Teague’s trial, that he would stipulate to its admissibility and
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asked Smith for a copy.  Smith had the videotape copied at a professional
facility and personally delivered it to the Office of the State’s Attorney on the
morning of February 13, 2004.
19.  
Shortly after delivering the videotape, Smith received a telephone call
from the prosecutor, who accused Smith of tampering with the videotape and
withdrew his agreement as to the videotape’s admissibility.
20.  
The  Court  has  carefully   viewed  the   videotape  of  the  assault  on
Gamino.  The Court has also carefully considered the testimony of Smith and
the prosecutor.  The Court finds, based on the credible evidence of record, that
the prosecutor in fact accused Smith on February 13, 2004 of altering the
videotape and that the prosecutor, when he leveled this charge, had no factual
basis whatsoever for contending that the videotape had been altered by Smith
or anyone else.  Smith was deeply angered and upset by the prosecutor’s
charge that he altered the videotape.
21.  
The prosecutor called Smith at  11:00  a.m.  on  February 17, 2004 to
advise Smith he was seeking an emergency hearing before the Administrative
Judge with respect to his contention Smith had altered the videotape.  The
prosecutor also told Smith that he was taking this matter to Bar Counsel.
22.  
On February 17, 2004, at 2:17 p.m., Smith spoke with Teague.  During
this call, Smith asked Teague if Gamino had filed charges against Andrew
Simpson.  Teague told Smith that Gamino had in fact gone to the
Commissioner.
23.  
On February 17, 2004, at 2:40 p.m., Smith, acting on the information
he had received from Teague, attempted to call Andrew Simpson to advise him
that assault charges had been leveled against him by Gamino.  Smith’s intent
was to cause Andrew Simpson to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege when
he appeared to testify at Teague’s trial.
24.  
When Smith looked at the police report, he mistook Jeremie Simpson
as the alleged victim of the assault by Teague.  Smith compounded this error
when he dialed the telephone number for Jeremie Simpson that was listed near
his name on the first page of [the] police report.  The call was answered by
voice mail at the home of Simpson’s parents.  Smith made a split-second
decision and left the following message on the voice mail recording: ‘Yeah,
this is Sergeant Graham with the Montgomery County Police, Seven Locks
Station, trying to reach Jeremie Simpson because we have a warrant for his
arrest for assault in the first degree committed on October third.  Please give
us a call . . . to arrange a surrender.  Thank you.’ 
25.  
Smith intentionally misrepresented his identity.  He did so because he
knew that the recipient of the message likely would ignore it if Smith used his
true name.  Smith wanted the recipient to call the police department number
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Smith left in the message to confirm the existence of the warrant ‘so that when
he came to court the next day he’s under charges.’  Smith used Sgt. Graham’s
name because ‘he is the one who is behind the desk window almost every day
of the week over there at Seven Locks where you surrender. . . .’
26.  
Smith made no effort to disguise his voice, which has a distinctive
New England accent.  Smith provided a telephone number Smith knew had
been assigned to the Montgomery County Police Department.  Smith wanted
Simpson to call the Montgomery County Police to confirm that charges had
been lodged against Simpson.
27.  
When he received the voice mail message, Jeremie Simpson called the
prosecutor, who advised that there was no warrant for his arrest.  Jeremie
Simpson appeared for Teague’s trial on February 18, 2004.
28.  
Jeremie Simpson’s father also attempted to call the number Smith ha[d]
left in the message.  The number did not ‘go through’ so his father called the
general Seven Locks number and left a message for Sgt. Graham.
29.  
On February 18, 2004, Smith and the prosecutor appeared before the 
Administrative Judge.  The prosecutor told the Administrative Judge about the
allegedly altered videotape and the voice mail message left by Smith.
Teague’s case was continued until April 26, 2004.
30.  
Smith met with the prosecutor shortly after the hearing before the
Administrative Judge.  The prosecutor advised Smith to ‘get a lawyer.’  Smith
was arrested on February 19, 2004.
31.  
For reasons  not entirely clear, Smith’s criminal trial did not commence
until April 26, 2005, which was 425 days after his arrest.  After a bench trial,
Smith was convicted of impersonating a police officer and intimidating a
witness.  Smith was acquitted of obstructing justice.
32.  
In  an  unreported  opinion, Smith’s  convictions  were reversed by the
Court of Special Appeals on the ground that his Sixth Amendment right to a
speedy trial had been violated.  Smith v. State, No. 1437, September Term,
2005 (May 4, 2007).  The State did not seek review in the Court of Appeals by
way of a petition of certiorari.  Thereafter, the State’s Attorney terminated the
criminal action against Smith by way of a nolle prosequi.  Maryland Rule 4-
247.
33.  
Smith  testified  at  the  hearing  before  this Court, credibly, that he is
genuinely remorseful for his actions.  The Court finds that Smith appreciates
the gravity of his improper conduct.
34.  
Smith  has committed no ethical violations since February 17, 2004.  
The Court finds that Smith is highly unlikely to violate his ethical obligations
in the future.
35.  
Smith’s conduct in contacting Simpson was motivated, in part, by his
4 “[T]he  [prohibited conduct]  includes  any  attempt  to  corruptly influence
. . . or impede a witness in the discharge of his duty . . . or impede the due
administration of justice.  [I]f the action of appellant was intended to influence
. . . or impede . . . it would be prohibited conduct. . . .  Because no direct or
express evidence of appellant’s intent to influence . . . or impede . . . a witness
appears on the record, we must look to the circumstances surrounding the
incident and the natural and inevitable consequences of the action.  
‘The natural and inevitable consequence of an act may be
considered in deducing the intention of the actor . . . .’
“We think . . . that appellant’s intent must be judged in light of the
circumstances  attending  his  actions,  including their natural and inevitable
consequences.”  (Emphasis added.)  (Emphasis in original omitted.)
Lee v. State, 65 Md.App. 587, 592-94, 501 A.2d 495, 498 (1985) (quoting Smith v. United
States, 274 F. 351 (8th  Cir. C.A. 1921)).
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anger at the prosecutor’s allegation that Smith had tampered with the
videotape.  It also was motivated, in part, by his desire to represent his client,
Teague, who steadfastly maintained his innocence, and Smith’s honest belief
that the prosecutor was acting unreasonably in his charging decisions.
36.  
Smith was not motivated by greed or a desire simply to win at any cost.
Smith honestly believed, albeit incorrectly, that a warrant had been issued in
connection with the assault on Gamino.  Smith did not intend, subjectively, to
dissuade Simpson from appearing for Teague’s trial, although he appreciates
that, objectively, his conduct likely could have caused that result.”4 
“Conclusions of Law
1.
Smith did not intentionally misrepresent to Simpson that a warrant had
been issued for Simpson’s arrest.  Although the statement was false, Smith
acted under the mistaken (albeit woefully misguided) belief that Gamino ha[d]
gone to the Commissioner, pressed charges, and that an arrest warrant for
Simpson had been issued.  Smith would not have made the telephone call had
he not honestly believed the warrant had been issued.  See Attorney Grievance
Comm[’n] v. Jaseb, 364 Md. 464, 476-77, [773 A.2d 516] (2001).  Smith did
intend that Simpson be unavailable to the State by reason of an invocation of
Simpson’s Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination.
Smith did not intend to cause Simpson to fail to appear at Teague’s trial.
Smith’s conduct did not cause Simpson to be unavailable, either by failing to
5  In his Memorandum Opinion n.6, Judge Rubin stated: 
“Jeremie Simpson testified at Smith’s criminal trial only after acknowledging,
in response to questions by the prosecutor, that he remained at risk for being
charged with a felony. . . .  Hence, Simpson’s legal jeopardy was not
imaginary.  Nevertheless, insofar as the record discloses, the State’s Attorney
ultimately elected not to prosecute Simpson for his role in the assault on
Gamino . . . .”
6  “The  plain  language  of  MRPC  3.4(a)  requires  actual  obstruction.   As 
               written, the rule does not by its terms reach ‘attempts.’ . . .”  
Memorandum Opinion n.8 citing 
In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 20 L.Ed.2d 117
(1968); and Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sheinbein, 372 Md. 224, 261-84, 812 A.2d 981,
1002-16 (2002).  
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appear or by invoking his Fifth Amendment rights.5  Smith’s conduct in this
regard did not actually interfere with the administration of justice, the
operation of the [Office of the State’s Attorney], or actually obstruct the
State’s access to evidence.  Hence, the foregoing conduct, standing alone, did
not violate MRPC 8.4(a)-(d).  See Attorney Grievance Comm[’n]  v. Kalil,
[402] Md. [358], [] 936 A.2d 854 ([]2007).  Nor did it violate MRPC 3.4.6
2.
Smith, however, did  deliberately  and  intentionally misrepresent his
identity to Simpson when he left the voicemail message.  His representation
that he was Sgt. Graham was false and Smith knew it at the time of the call.
Attorney Grievance Comm[’n] v. Siskind, 401 Md. 41, 67-70[, 930 A.2d 328,
343-45] (2007).  As Judge Harrell aptly noted in Siskind, ‘words spoken by an
attorney who knows they were untrue involves an inherent intent to deceive.’
Id. at 70[, 930 A.2d at 345].  Hence, Smith’s conduct in falsely representing
himself as a police officer violated MRPC 8.4(a), (c) and (d).  Attorney
Grievance Comm[’n] v. Harris, [403] Md. [142], [939 A.2d 732] []([]2008)];
Attorney Grievance Comm[’n] v. Hekyong Pak, 400 Md. 567, 606-08[, 929
A.2d 546, 569-70] (2007); Attorney Grievance Comm[’n] v. Sweitzer,  395
Md. 586, 594[, 911 A.2d 440, 445] (2006); Attorney Grievance Comm[’n] v.
White, 354 Md. 346, 363-64[, 731 A.2d 447, 456-57] (1999).  Cf. Attorney
Grievance Comm[’n] v.  Floyd, 400 Md. 236, 251-54[, 929 A.2d 61, 69-71]
(2007)[,] (intentional concealment of a material fact may violate MRPC Rule
8.4(c) if there is an intent to mislead).
3.
With  respect   to   MRPC   8.4(b),  the  Court  concludes  that  Smith
committed a criminal act that reflects adversely on his fitness as a lawyer.  The
‘something more’ tying the criminal act to fitness to practice law that was
missing in Attorney Grievance Comm[’n] v. Post, 350 Md. 85, 95-98[, 710
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A.2d 935, 939-41] (1998), is satisfied in this case because of the false
representation by Smith to a State’s trial witness in a criminal prosecution that
he was a police officer. [Md. Code (2003),] § 3-502 of the Public Safety
Article (‘A person may not, with fraudulent design . . . falsely represent that
the person is a police officer.’); [Md. Code (2002),] § 9-305 of the Criminal
Law Article (‘A person may not, by . . . corrupt means, to try to influence . . .
[] a witness.’).  See Attorney Grievance Comm[’n] v. White, 354 Md. at 362-
63[, 731 A.2d at 456-57].  Cf. Attorney Grievance Comm[’n] v. Mininsohn,
380 Md. 536, 566-68[, 846 A.2d 353, 371-72] (2004) (distinguishing Post).
The fact that Smith’s criminal convictions were reversed does not preclude
finding a violation of MRPC 8.4(b), or any other applicable provisions of the
MRPC.  Attorney Grievance Comm[’n] v. Garland, 345 Md. 383, 394-95[,
692 A.2d 465, 470-71] (1997).”
“Mitigation
“The Court finds that Smith has proven the following mitigating factors
by a preponderance of the credible evidence.  See Attorney Grievance
Comm[’n] v. Lawson, 401 Md. 536, 585-86[, 933 A.2d 842, 870] (2007);
Attorney Grievance Comm[’n] v.  Floyd, 400 Md. 236, 258-59[, 929 A.2d 61,
73-74] (2007); Sweitzer, 395 Md. at 598-99, 911 A.2d at 447-48; Attorney
Grievance Comm[’n] v.  Guida, 391Md. 33, 55-56[, 891 A.2d 1085, 1098-99]
(2006); Attorney Grievance Comm[’n] v.  Glenn, 341 Md. 448, 488-89[, 671
A.2d 463, 482-83] (1996):
1.
Smith has no prior disciplinary record.
2.
Smith  and  his  counsel  cooperated  fully  and  completely  with  Bar
Counsel and this Court.
3.
Smith  is  genuinely  remorseful  and  appreciates  both  the wrongful
nature of his conduct as well as the gravity.
4.
Smith  did  not  seek  or  obtain  any personal benefit by reason of the
misconduct.  His motive, albeit misguided, was to serve the interests of his
client, whom he genuinely believed was not receiving fair treatment.
5.
Smith  enjoys  an  excellent  reputation  in  the  legal  community  for
honesty, integrity, professional competence, reliability, and client satisfaction.
6.
The misconduct was of extremely short duration and did not result in
any actual harm to the administration of justice.  There is no credible evidence
of risk to the public in allowing Smith to continue to practice law.
7.
Throughout his entire legal career, Smith has volunteered his time and
legal skills to many non-profit and public causes for the betterment of his
community, as well as performing pro bono work for individual clients and the
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bar as a whole.
8.
The conduct in issue occurred on February 17, 2004, nearly four years
ago.  Hence, it is relatively remote in time.  There is no evidence of any
misconduct after February 17, 2004.  Smith’s continuing to practice law
presents no credible risk of harm to the public.
9.
Smith . . . suffered  the  humiliating  consequences  of  a  very  public
criminal prosecution.  Despite the publicity on television and in newspapers
resulting from Smith’s criminal prosecution, Smith remains highly regarded
in the Montgomery County legal community.
10.
The  Court  finds  that  the  ‘trigger’  or  the  ‘root cause’ for Smith’s 
conduct was the intemperate accusation leveled against him by the prosecutor
– that Smith had altered the videotape showing the violent beating of Gamino
by Andrew Simpson.  See Attorney Grievance Comm[’n] v.  Vanderlinde, 364
Md. 376, 413-14[, 773 A.2d 463, 484-86] (2001).  Cf. Attorney Grievance
Comm[’n] v.  Tomanio, 362 Md. 483, 498[, 765 A.2d 653, 661-62] (2001)
(‘the state of mind of the attorney at the time of the violation [is] important in
the context of mitigation.’); Attorney Grievance Comm[’n] v.  Sheridan, 357
Md. 1, 29[, 741 A.2d 1143, 1158] (1999) (‘We agree with Respondent that his
state of mind at the time he violated the ethical rules is important in the context
of mitigation.’).”  (Some alterations in original.)  (Some footnotes omitted.) 
Discussion
A.  Standard of Review
It is clear that “[t]his court has original and complete jurisdiction over attorney
disciplinary proceedings.”  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Tayback, 378 Md. 578, 585, 837
A.2d 158, 162 (2003); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Blum, 373 Md. 275, 293, 818 A.2d
219, 230 (2003); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Harris, 371 Md. 510, 539-40, 810 A.2d
457, 474-75 (2002); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gavin, 350 Md. 176, 189, 711 A.2d 193,
200 (1998); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Adams, 349 Md. 86, 93, 706 A.2d 1080, 1083
(1998); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Glenn, 341 Md. 448, 470, 671 A.2d 463, 473 (1996);
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kent, 337 Md. 361, 371, 653 A.2d 909, 914 (1995); Attorney
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Grievance Comm’n v. Powell, 328 Md. 276, 287, 614 A.2d 102, 108 (1992).  Under our
independent review of the record, we must determine whether the findings of the hearing
judge are based on clear and convincing evidence.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Monfried,
368 Md. 373, 388, 794 A.2d 92, 100 (2002); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Alison, 349 Md.
623, 629, 709 A.2d 1212, 1214-15 (1998) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kemp,
335 Md. 1, 9, 641 A.2d 510, 514 (1994)).  We conduct an independent review of the record,
accepting the hearing judge’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous.  Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Garfield, 369 Md. 85, 97, 797A.2d 757, 763 (2002); Attorney Grievance Comm’n
v. Wallace, 368 Md. 277, 288, 793 A.2d 535, 542 (2002); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Garland, 345 Md. 383, 392, 692 A.2d 465, 469 (1997).  We review the conclusions of law
essentially de novo.   Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. McLaughlin, 372 Md. 467, 493, 813
A.2d 1145, 1160 (2002); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Dunietz, 368 Md. 419, 428, 795
A.2d 706, 711 (2002).  Accordingly, this Court has the ultimate authority to decide whether
a lawyer has violated the professional rules.  Garland, 345 Md. at 392, 692 A.2d at 469;
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Breschi, 340 Md. 590, 599, 667 A.2d 659, 663 (1995).
In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Seiden, 373 Md. 409, 818 A.2d 1108 (2003), we
stated:
“‘It is well established that “[t]his Court has original
jurisdiction over attorney disciplinary proceedings.”  Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Dunietz, 368 Md. 419, 427, 795 A.2d
706, 710-11 (2002) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Snyder, 368 Md. 242, 253, 793 A.2d 515, 521 (2002)); Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Harris, 366 Md. 376, 388, 784 A.2d 516,
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523 (2001); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gavin, 350 Md.
176, 189, 711 A.2d 193, 200 (1998); Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Adams, 349 Md. 86, 93, 706 A.2d 1080, 1083
(1998); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Glenn, 341 Md. 448,
470, 671 A.2d 463, 473 (1996); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Kent, 337 Md. 361, 371, 653 A.2d 909, 914 (1995); Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Powell, 328 Md. 276, 287, 614 A.2d 102,
108 (1992). . . .  Furthermore, “[a]s the Court of original and
complete jurisdiction for attorney disciplinary proceedings in
Maryland, we conduct an independent review of the record.”
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Garfield, 369 Md. 85, 97, 797
A.2d 757, 763 (2002) (quoting Snyder, 368 Md. at 253, 793
A.2d at 521 (citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Garland, 345
Md. 383, 392, 692 A.2d 465, 469 (1997))).
“‘In our review of the record, “[t]he hearing judge’s
findings of fact will be accepted unless we determine that they
are clearly erroneous.” Garfield, 369 Md. at 97, 797 A.2d at 763
(quoting Snyder, 368 Md. at 253, 793 A.2d at 521 (citations
omitted)).  See also Dunietz, 368 Md. at 427-28, 795 A.2d at
711 (“The hearing judge’s findings of fact ‘are prima facie
correct and will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous.’”)
(quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Zdravkovich, 362 Md.
1, 21, 762 A.2d 950, 960-61 (2000)); Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Monfried, 368 Md. 373, 388, 794 A.2d 92, 100
(2002) (“Factual findings of the hearing judge will not be
disturbed if they are based on clear and convincing evidence.”).
We recently reiterated the definition of clear and convincing
evidence in Harris, 366 Md. at 389, 784 A.2d at 523 (quoting
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mooney, 359 Md. 56, 79, 753
A.2d 17, 29 (2000)), when we said:
“The requirement of ‘clear and convincing’
or ‘satisfactory’ evidence does not call for
‘unanswerable’ or ‘conclusive’ evidence.  The
quality of proof, to be clear and convincing, has
also been said to be somewhere between the rule
in ordinary civil cases and the requirement of
criminal procedure–that is, it must be more than
a mere preponderance but not beyond a
reasonable doubt.  It has also been said that the
term ‘clear and convincing’ evidence means that
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the witnesses to a fact must be found to be
credible, and that the facts to which they have
testified are distinctly remembered and the details
hereof narrated exactly and in due order, so as to
enable the trier of the facts to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the
precise facts in issue. Whether evidence is clear
and convincing requires weighing, comparing,
testing, and judging its worth when considered in
connection with all the facts and circumstances in
evidence.” [Emphasis added.]
[Mooney,] 359 Md. at 79, 753 A.2d at 29 (quoting Berkey v.
Delia, 287 Md. 302, 320, 413 A.2d 170, 178 (1980) (citing
Whittington v. State, 8 Md.App. 676, 679 n. 3, 262 A.2d 75, 77
n. 3 (1970))).  We recently explained in Dunietz that “[a]s to the
hearing judge’s conclusions of law, ‘our consideration is
essentially de novo.’”  Dunietz, 368 Md. at 428, 795 A.2d at 711
(quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Thompson, 367 Md.
315, 322, 786 A.2d 763, 768 (2001) (quoting Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v.Briscoe, 357 Md. 554, 562, 745 A.2d
1037, 1041 (2000))).’”
Seiden, 373 Md. at 414-16, 818 A.2d at 1111-12 (quoting Harris, 371 Md. at 539-40, 810
A2d. at 474-75).
As indicated, respondent filed exceptions to the hearing judge’s Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.  We shall adopt Judge Rubin’s  findings and conclusions and hold that
they are not clearly erroneous and are based on clear and convincing evidence.   
B.  Respondent’s Exceptions
Respondent makes two specific exceptions to the hearing judge’s Conclusions of Law
and they only related to MRPC 8.4(b)-(d).  This Court is not persuaded.  
Smith’s Exceptions in relevant part state:
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“Respondent excepts to the Court’s Conclusions of Law with respect
to ¶2 and ¶3.  Respondent submits that the Court’s finding that his conduct was
criminal is a conclusion unsupported by the facts of the case. . . .  Respondent
excepts to the Court’s conclusion that he violated MR[PC] 8.4 (a), (b), (c) and
(d).  As his grounds, Respondent submits that although he represented his
identity to the witness to be that of Sergeant Graham when he left the
voicemail message, he was not attempting to achieve an untoward or wrongful
purpose.  Respondent testified that he did not attempt to disguise his voice
when he left message. . . .  He testified that he wanted the witness to come to
court under charges the following day. . . .  Respondent did not intend for the
witness not to appear in Court. . . .  Respondent intended that the witness
appear for Court, be advised of his rights to have a lawyer, that he was under
charges and would incriminate him[self] and be unavailable to testify until his
case was resolved resulting in Respondent’s case getting postponed and
probably put in a better posture. . . .  He did not intend to keep the witness
from appearing in Court. . . .
“Respondent’s attempt to advise the witness of the pendency of a
charge against him for assault may have been ill conceived but was not
criminal.  Respondent provided a telephone number which had been assigned
to the Montgomery County Police Department.  He left the name of a readily
identifiable police officer which could be confirmed by a single return
telephone call.  The Court correctly found that Respondent did not
intentionally misrepresent to the witness that a warrant had been issued for his
arrest.  Respondent mistakenly believed that the warrant had been issued for
his arrest.  As the Court noted, Respondent would not have made the phone
call had he not honestly believed that the warrant had been issued.
Respondent’s actions were not intended to mislead anyone that a witness
should not appear for court.  Respondent knew that the witness had established
a relationship with the prosecuting attorney.  Respondent did nothing to impair
the relationship or availability of any witness in the case of State of Maryland
v. Joshua Teague.  Respondent’s conduct stemmed from his desire to insure
that the witness would take action to contact law enforcement officers to
confirm and corroborate the existence of a charging document.  As such,
Respondent intended to achieve a valid and legitimate purpose.
. . .
“As noted . . . respondent did not act with any wrongful or dishonest
intent.  He did not intend to violate any Rule of Professional Conduct.
Respondent did not intend to engage in any conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation and did not intend to engage in conduct
7 Smith’s criminal trial commenced April 26, 2005, 425 days after his arrest.  After
a bench trial, on April 27, 2005, Smith was convicted of impersonating a police officer and
intimidating a witness.  Smith was acquitted of obstructing justice.
Smith’s convictions were reversed in an unreported opinion by the Court of Special
Appeals on the ground that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial had been violated.
Smith v. State, No. 1437, September Term, 2005 (May 4, 2007). 
-15-
prejudicial to the administration of justice.  The Court properly noted that
Respondent’s actions were not motivated by greed or a desire to win at any
cost. . . .  Respondent honestly believed that a warrant had been issued in
connection with the assault by the witness.  Respondent did not intend,
subjectively, to dissuade the witness from appearing for trial.
. . .
“Respondent’s conduct was motivated, in part, by his anger at the
prosecutor’s allegation that Respondent had tampered with the videotape.  It
also was motivated, in part, by his desire to represent his client who steadfastly
maintained his innocence, and Respondent’s honest belief that the prosecutor
was acting unreasonably in his charging decisions. . . .”  (Emphasis added.)
In his Respondent’s Exceptions to the Memorandum Opinion and Recommendations,
Smith specifically admits his violations of MRPC 8.4(b)-(d).  Regardless of whether
respondent’s conduct was successfully prosecuted criminally7 does not derogate the fact that
the violation occurred, as noted supra.  Respondent’s exceptions are denied.      
Sanction
We shall now consider the appropriate sanction for respondent’s misconduct.  In the
case at bar, the Attorney Grievance Commission, through Bar Counsel, recommends that
respondent be disbarred. 
For the following reasons, petitioner recommends disbarment:
“The trial court found that Respondent, with fraudulent design, falsely
represented that he was a police officer, in violation of §3-502 of the Public
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Safety Article, M aryland Code Annotated, and, by corrupt means, tried to
influence a witness, in violation of  §9-305 of the Criminal Law Article,
Maryland Code Annotated, and that Respondent thereby engaged in criminal
conduct that adversely reflected on his honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as
a lawyer in other respects, in violation of [] [MRPC] 8.4(b).  The trial
[hearing] Court also found that this same conduct involved dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation, in violation of MRPC 8.4(c), and conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice, in violation of M RPC 8.4(d). . . .
Disbarment is, therefore, the appropriate sanction.”  
Respondent asserts that no further sanctions or actions are required, citing in part the
trial judge’s “findings based on the evidence and the Rules:”
“Among these findings was that the Respondent and his family have already
suffered public humiliation . . . and that Respondent is extremely and sincerely
remorseful[] for his conduct. . . .  Moreover, Respondent received no personal
gain or benefit from his actions. . . .  Respondent’s misconduct was, by the trial
court’s account, of extremely short duration and did not result in any harm to
the administration of justice and there is no credible risk to the public in
allowing Respondent to continue to practice law. . . .  Respondent continues
to enjoy an excellent reputation in the legal community for honesty, integrity,
professional competence, reliability and client satisfaction. . . .  He has no prior
or subsequent disciplinary record. . . .
“Based on [the trial judge’s] findings and in consideration of the
mitigating factors proven at trial, Respondent requests leniency with regard to
his actions subject to this proceeding.  Respondent hereby suggests that there
is no basis for any additional sanctions or actions by this Court.  As the
evidence amply suggests, the Respondent poses no danger to the public.  As
such, no further discipline is necessary or warranted.”
The purpose of sanctions in attorney grievance matters is not to punish the attorney
but to protect the public and to encourage other attorneys to comply with the Rules of
Professional Conduct and to maintain the integrity of the legal profession.  Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Angst, 369 Md. 404, 416, 800 A.2d 747, 754-55 (2002);  Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Hess, 352 Md. 438, 453, 722 A.2d 905, 913 (1999); Attorney
-17-
Grievance Comm’n v. Awuah, 346 Md. 420, 435, 697 A.2d 446, 454 (1997); Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Goldsborough, 330 Md. 342, 364, 624 A.2d 503, 513 (1993).  See
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Myers, 333 Md. 440, 447, 635 A.2d 1315, 1318 (1994)
(“[T]he public interest is served when this Court imposes a sanction which demonstrates to
members of the legal profession the type of conduct that will not be tolerated.”); see also
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Breschi, 340 Md. 590, 601, 667 A.2d 659, 665 (1995).  The
appropriate sanction to be imposed depends upon the particular facts and circumstances of
each case.  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. McClain, 373 Md. 196, 211, 817 A.2d 218, 227
(2003); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Glenn, 341 Md. 448, 484, 671 A.2d 463, 480 (1996);
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Powell, 328 Md. 276, 300, 614 A.2d 102, 114 (1992).
In McClain, supra, writing for the Court, Chief Judge Bell explained some of the
considerations in regard to the sanction.  He wrote:
“Relevant to the sanction decision is ‘the nature and gravity of
the violations and the intent with which they were committed.’
Likewise relevant are the attorney’s prior grievance history,
whether there have been prior disciplinary proceedings, the
nature of the misconduct involved in those proceedings and the
nature of any sanctions imposed, as well as any facts in
mitigation, the attorney’s remorse for the misconduct, and the
likelihood of the conduct being repeated.  As to the latter, we
have held that an attorney’s voluntary termination of the charged
misconduct, when accompanied by an appreciation of the
serious impropriety of that past conduct and remorse for it, may
be evidence that the attorney will not again engage in
such misconduct.”  (Citations omitted.)
McClain, 373 Md. at 211-12, 817 A.2d at 227-28.
-18-
In the case sub judice, the hearing court concluded, by clear and convincing evidence,
that respondent intentionally represented himself to be Sergeant Graham, knowing full well
that he was not.  Smith, by his conduct, violated MRPC 8.4(a), (c) and (d).  The evidence also
demonstrated that Smith, having represented himself to a State’s trial witness in a criminal
prosecution as a police officer, violated MRPC 8.4(b).  In his Memorandum Opinion n.10,
Judge Rubin stated:  “Manifestly, Smith had numerous lawful remedies available to him,
including meeting with the State’s Attorney or the Deputy State’s Attorney, as well as
bringing the matter to the prompt attention of the Administrative Judge or the Trial Judge.”
We agree.
In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Goodman, 381 Md. 480, 850 A.2d 1157 (2004),
Judge Greene stated for the Court:
“Here the evidence shows that Respondent intentionally and willfully
pretended to be [someone else] . . . in order to represent [a client]. . . . The
evidence was clear and convincing that Respondent intentionally committed
[this] act[], and this conduct reflected on his honesty, trustworthiness, and
fitness as a lawyer. . . .
. . .
“[The trial judge] found that Respondent engaged in intentional
misconduct.  That finding is supported by the record in this case. . . .  As
previously stated, ‘intentional dishonest conduct is closely entwined with the
most important matters of basic character to such a degree as to make
intentional dishonest conduct by a lawyer almost beyond excuse.  Honesty and
dishonesty are, or are not, present in an attorney’s character.’ . . .  Only in the
case of compelling extenuating circumstances ‘will we even consider imposing
less that the most severe sanction’ . . . .” 
Goodman, 381 Md.  at 497-99, 850 A.2d at 1167-68.  The mitigating factors presented in the
-19-
case at bar provide the Court with compelling extenuating circumstances.  
The record in this case is replete with mitigating evidence that induces us to impose
a lesser sanction than the disbarment suggested by petitioner.  This is the first disciplinary
proceeding for respondent in more than 24 years of his practice of law.  Since late 2003 to
early 2004, the time of his actions, indictment, arrest and subsequent nolle prosequi of the
charges that precipitated the case at bar, Mr. Smith has had no subsequent violation.  He did
not seek any personal benefit by reason of his actions.  We are persuaded that Mr. Smith’s
actions will likely not be repeated and we find that he similarly poses no future risk of harm
to the public.     
In light of these findings and the mitigating circumstances in the case sub judice, we
hold that a six (6) month suspension from the practice of law will suffice as an appropriate
sanction for respondent’s conduct, said suspension to commence 30 days after the filing of
this opinion.
 
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT
TO PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY
THIS COURT, INCLUDING THE
COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS,
-20-
PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE
16-761(b), 
FOR 
WHICH  
SUM
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR
OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE
COMMISSION 
OF 
MARYLAND
AGAINST  
PATRIC K  
J O SEPH
SMITH.