Title: Simpson v. Superior Court

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

87 Ariz. 350 (1960) 351 P.2d 179 Helen P. SIMPSON, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF The State of ARIZONA, IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF PIMA, and Herbert F. Krucker, Judge thereof, Respondent, and Donald H. Simpson, a/k/a Don H. Simpson, Real Party in Interest. No. 7046. Supreme Court of Arizona. April 13, 1960. *351 William H. McBratney, Conner, Jones & Murphy by James M. Murphy, Tucson, for petitioner. Udall & Udall, Tucson, for respondents. BERNSTEIN, Justice. This prohibition proceeding presents the question whether on an application to modify a divorce decree the superior court has jurisdiction to reduce the support and maintenance payments for the wife where these payments were fixed in a separation agreement which is incorporated but not merged in the decree. On August 13, 1956, Helen P. Simpson (hereinafter called the "wife") and Donald H. Simpson (hereinafter called the "husband"), who were then married but living apart, entered into a "Property Settlement Agreement" (hereinafter called the "Agreement") which, among other things, divided the community property and provided that the husband pay to the wife "as and for her support and maintenance" a fixed sum per month. These payments, scheduled since August 1958 in the sum of $1,350 per month, are to "terminate only on the death of either party." Paragraph 13 of the Agreement provides: On September 13, 1956, the Superior Court of Pima County entered a decree of divorce in an action commenced by the wife, and ordered On January 15, 1960, the Superior Court, on application of the husband and after a hearing, made a minute entry which ordered that the divorce decree be modified "reducing the amount of support payments to the Plaintiff [wife] from $1,350 per month to $800 per month." Thereafter, the wife petitioned this Court for an original writ of prohibition to restrain the superior court from taking any further proceedings in this matter and to declare as a nullity the order modifying the divorce decree. This Court has heretofore issued an alternative writ of prohibition staying all further proceedings in the superior court. We hold, first, that a writ of prohibition is a proper remedy herein if the superior court was without jurisdiction to modify the support payments provided in the original decree. Cummings v. Lockwood, 84 Ariz. 335, 327 P.2d 1012; cf. Van Ness v. Superior Court, 69 Ariz. 362, 213 P.2d 899. In Cummings v. Lockwood, supra, a permanent writ of prohibition was issued against the superior court which had revised alimony payments contained in a divorce decree which this Court held could not be modified. The application for the writ was not considered untimely even though the petitioner there, as here, waited until after the superior court had held a hearing and had modified the decree. *354 The power of a superior court to direct the husband in a divorce proceeding to support the wife is contained in Article 2, Chapter 3 of Title 25 of our statutes. A.R.S. § 25-315 empowers the court "in its discretion" to require the husband to pay as alimony money necessary "for support and maintenance of the wife" during pendency of an action for divorce. Subdivision A of A.R.S. § 25-319 permits the court in the final judgment of divorce to "direct the husband to pay to the wife such amounts as are necessary for support and maintenance of the wife * * * as may be necessary or proper." Under A.R.S. § 25-321 "[t]he court may from time to time after entry of final judgment, on petition of either party, amend, revise and alter the portions of the decree which relate to payment of money for the support and maintenance of the wife * * * as may be just * * *." The above provisions make it clear that, at least in the absence of an agreement between the parties, the court has full power, subject to review on appeal by this Court (A.R.S. § 25-351), to fix, and thereafter under proper circumstances to modify, the amount of the payments to be made by the husband for the support and maintenance of the wife. Similarly, where the parties have entered into an agreement which is incorporated and merged in the decree, the court may modify the support provisions for the wife. See Gillespie v. Gillespie, 74 Ariz. 1, 242 P.2d 837. Indeed, no action may be maintained on a contract which is deemed to have been merged in the divorce decree. See Glassford v. Glassford, 76 Ariz. 220, 262 P.2d 382; Gillespie v. Gillespie, supra. The wife contends that the superior court did not have power to modify the support payments in the decree; first, because the Agreement survived the decree, and, second, because the support payments are part of a property settlement and do not constitute alimony. We shall discuss each of these points in the context of this prohibition proceeding, which limits our inquiry to determining whether the superior court exceeded its jurisdiction by entering the order under review. On the first point, we think it perfectly clear that the agreement did not merge in the decree. The parties expressly provided that the "Agreement shall not be merged in any decree or judgment * * * but shall exist apart and aside from any decree of court and be binding upon the parties hereto * * *." The decree. which made the Agreement "a part hereof", did not even purport to supersede the Agreement but merely "approved, ratified and confirmed" it. Thus, the instant Agreement is significantly different from the agreements involved in the Glassford and Gillespie cases, supra, because the agreements there did not provide, expressly or *355 impliedly, that they should survive, rather than be merged in, the decree. The wife urges that because the Agreement survived the decree, the court was without jurisdiction to modify the support provisions stipulated in the Agreement. The superior court did not, however, modify the Agreement; it modified the decree. Accordingly, the power of the court to modify the Agreement is not presented in this prohibition proceeding. Even if it is assumed that the superior court could not modify the Agreement, it does not follow that the court was likewise without power to modify the decree or even those portions of the decree which incorporated provisions of the Agreement by reference. The precise issue here presented was determined by the Court of Appeals of New York in Goldman v. Goldman, 282 N.Y. 296, 26 N.E.2d 265. There the husband and wife had entered into a separation agreement which was incorporated in the divorce decree entered by the court. Under New York law, the agreement did not merge in but survived the decree. Thereafter, on application of the husband, the trial court modified the divorce decree by reducing the amounts to be paid by the husband for the support of the wife and children. The Court of Appeals affirmed the modification, holding that whether the court could modify the agreement, it had the power to modify the decree. The Court distinguished the remedies available to enforce contractual obligations from the remedies provided by law to enforce the support provisions contained in the decree. The New York Court there stated: See also, Freeman v. Sieve, 323 Mass. 652, 84 N.E.2d 16; Howland v. Stitzer, 240 N.C. 689, 84 S.E.2d 167; Brady v. Hyman, Tex.Civ.App., 230 S.W.2d 342 and Hyman v. Brady, Tex.Civ.App., 230 S.W.2d 345. The holding in the Goldman case, supra, is in accord with the general rule that "where a court has the general power to modify a decree for alimony or support, the exercise of that power is not affected by the fact that the decree is based on an agreement entered into by the parties to the action" (109 A.L.R. 1068. See also, 166 A.L.R. 675; Lindey, Separation Agreements and Ante-Nuptial Contracts, § 31, subd. 8B). As noted above, the courts of this State retain power to modify the decree in so far as it relates to payments for the support and maintenance of the wife (see A.R.S. § 25-321). Further, the rule that the court in specifying support provisions in the original divorce decree is not bound by the agreement of the parties but will ascertain whether the agreement is fair and equitable (see Lindey, Separation Agreements *357 and Ante-Nuptial Contracts, § 31, subds. 7A, 7B; Smith v. Smith, 71 Ariz. 315, 227 P.2d 214; Roden v. Roden, 29 Ariz. 398, 242 P. 337, rehearing denied 29 Ariz. 549, 243 P. 413), is consistent with our holding herein that the survival of an otherwise valid separation agreement does not deprive the court of power to modify the decree. Nor does the fact that the parties have agreed not to petition the court for a modification of the decree affect the court's jurisdiction; for as stated in Gillespie v. Gillespie, supra, 74 Ariz. at page 6, 242 P.2d at page 840: See, to the same effect, 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 238, pages 1113-1114. The wife's second point is that the monthly payments for her support and maintenance are not alimony but are part of a property settlement and, accordingly, cannot be modified by the courts. The wife contends, first, that because the agreement provides that the payments are to continue during the joint lives of herself and her former husband, and are not to terminate upon her remarriage, the payments cannot properly be considered alimony. We reject this contention on two grounds. First, as was pointed out in Gillespie v. Gillespie, supra, 74 Ariz. at pages 5-6, 242 P.2d at page 840, the statutory provision which authorizes modification of divorce decrees (although headed by a title which includes the term "alimony") does not use the word "alimony" but refers to the wife's "support and maintenance," which are the same words as are used in the instant Agreement (See A.R.S. § 25-321). Second, we have been cited to, and have found, no authority which defines alimony so as to exclude from that term support payments which continue after the remarriage of the wife. On the contrary, "alimony" has been defined as an allowance for the wife's support and maintenance which may, in the case of permanent alimony, be ordered during her life or during the joint lives of the wife and husband. See Black's Law Dictionary, "Alimony"; Webster's New International Dictionary, "Alimony"; 3 Words and Phrases "Alimony"; Annotation, 48 A.L.R.2d 270; 17 Am.Jur., Divorce and Separation, §§ 560, 703; Gillespie v. Gillespie, supra, 74 Ariz. at page 5, 242 P.2d at page 839. We need not decide whether the wife's remarriage terminates the husband's duty under a divorce decree to make alimony payments, *358 because here the wife has not remarried. See Annotations, 48 A.L.R.2d 270, 318. The wife's second contention is that the support and maintenance provisions are part of a property settlement and, thus, cannot be amended by the court. We recognize the rule set forth in Gillespie v. Gillespie, supra, 74 Ariz. at page 5, 242 P.2d at page 839: Accord: Johnson v. Johnson, 46 Ariz. 535, 52 P.2d 1162; cf. Glassford v. Glassford, supra. A preliminary question, however, is whether the issue of the characterization of the support provisions as "alimony" or as a "property settlement" should be determined in this prohibition proceeding, which tests only the jurisdiction of the court below. We think not. The determination of such issue should be made in the first instance by the superior court. That court must take into consideration all the relevant factors, including the provisions of the agreement between the parties, the circumstances under which the agreement was made, the nature and value of the community and personal property owned by and divided between the parties, the original divorce proceedings and the terms of the divorce decree sought to be modified. See Johnson v. Johnson, supra; Wesson v. Wesson, Mo. App., 271 S.W.2d 214. This Court's review of an issue which involves such legal and factual considerations should be instituted by an appeal based upon a complete record. The following statement in Hough v. Hough, 26 Cal. 2d 605, 160 P.2d 15, 20, provides additional support for holding prohibition to be an inappropriate procedure for review of the question here involved: For the foregoing reasons we hold that the Superior Court of Pima County had *359 jurisdiction to modify the divorce decree herein by reducing the amount of support payments to the wife. The alternative writ of prohibition heretofore issued is ordered quashed. STRUCKMEYER, C.J., and PHELPS and JOHNSON, JJ., concur. UDALL, J., having disqualified himself, did not participate in the determination of this proceeding.