Title: People v. Cox

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 90759-Agenda 5-January 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 								ANNE F. COX, Appellee.
								Opinion filed December 5, 2002.

	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Anne F. Cox, filed a motion to suppress evidence
seized by law enforcement personnel during a search of her car
and her person following a traffic stop. The circuit court of Wayne
County granted the motion. The appellate court affirmed. 318 Ill.
App. 3d 161. We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal
(177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the
judgment of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND
	On July 18, 1998, at approximately 2:21 a.m., Officer Matt
McCormick of the Fairfield police department stopped defendant's
vehicle because it did not have a rear registration light. At the time
of the stop, Officer McCormick called Deputy Dave Zola and
asked him to bring his canine, Tango, to the scene. Officer
McCormick did not smell cannabis in defendant's vehicle, nor did
he have other reasons to request Deputy Zola's assistance at the
scene.
	Deputy Zola arrived approximately 15 minutes later, while
Officer McCormick was writing the traffic ticket. Deputy Zola
walked Tango around defendant's vehicle, and Tango alerted to
the presence of drugs. The officers had defendant step out of the
vehicle. Officer McCormick searched the vehicle and found
"possible cannabis seeds and residue" on the floorboard. Deputy
Zola then conducted a "pat down" search of defendant and found
cannabis on her person. The officers arrested defendant for
possession of less than 2.5 grams of a substance containing
cannabis.
	Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence. Defendant
argued that the officers did not have probable cause to conduct the
canine sniff, and that the stop for a minor traffic violation was
unnecessarily and illegally long. The trial court granted the
motion, stating:
		"In the instant case, the officer made a traffic stop based
upon an observed traffic violation. There was no
testimony from the arresting officer that Defendant had a
past record, had been involved in drug related activities or
that either Defendant or the interior of the vehicle smelled
of marijuana or any other controlled substance. The[re]
was no outstanding warrant for Defendant's arrest. The
officer did not state that the search was the result of a
general plan or random pattern of canine searches during
traffic stops. In short, the officer's testimony revealed no
reasonable basis which would justify the walk around.
Moreover, if the walk around was invalid, then the
officers had no basis for a pat down search of Defendant;
she would have been released without arrest on the traffic
ticket."
	On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's
suppression order. 318 Ill. App. 3d 161. The appellate court
observed:
			"In this case, the officer lacked reasonable suspicion
sufficient to call the canine unit. At the motion-to-suppress hearing, Officer McCormick could point to no
fact that aroused his suspicion. Terry and its progeny
clearly establish that when an officer investigates based
on reasonable suspicion, he must be able to point to
articulable facts that gave rise to said suspicion." 318 Ill.
App. 3d at 167.
	This court granted the State's petition for leave to appeal.

ANALYSIS
	As noted above, the circuit court granted defendant's motion
to suppress evidence recovered during the search of her vehicle
and her person following the traffic stop. Generally, a motion to
suppress evidence presents mixed questions of law and fact: the
trial court first weighs the evidence and determines the facts
surrounding the complained-of conduct, after which it decides
whether, as a matter of law, these facts constitute an
unconstitutional seizure. People v. Thomas, 198 Ill. 2d 103, 108
(2001); People v. Shapiro, 177 Ill. 2d 519, 524 (1997). A
reviewing court accords great deference to the factual findings of
the trial court. Thomas, 198 Ill. 2d  at 108. However, the reviewing
court considers de novo the trial court's ultimate determination to
grant or deny the defendant's motion to suppress. Thomas, 198 Ill. 2d  at 108; People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 431 (2001).
	The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees the "right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures." U.S. Const., amend. IV. This provision applies to all
seizures of the person, including seizures that involve only a brief
detention short of traditional arrest. United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607, 614, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 2578 (1975); People v. Smithers, 83 Ill. 2d 430, 433-34
(1980). Reasonableness under the fourth amendment generally
requires a warrant supported by probable cause. People v. Flowers,
179 Ill. 2d 257, 262 (1997); People v. Long, 99 Ill. 2d 219, 227
(1983).
	In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868
(1968), the United States Supreme Court recognized a limited
exception to the traditional probable cause requirement. The Court
held that a police officer, under appropriate circumstances, may
briefly detain a person for questioning if the officer reasonably
believes that the person has committed, or is about to commit, a
crime. Terry, 392 U.S.  at 22, 20 L. Ed. 2d  at 906-07, 88 S. Ct.  at
1880; Flowers, 179 Ill. 2d  at 262; Smithers, 83 Ill. 2d  at 434.
	The conduct constituting the stop under Terry must have been
justified at its inception. Thomas, 198 Ill. 2d  at 109. A court
objectively considers whether, based on the facts available to the
police officer, the police action in detaining the defendant was
appropriate. To justify the intrusion, the police officer must be
able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences therefrom, reasonably warrant that
intrusion. Terry, 392 U.S.  at 20-21, 20 L. Ed. 2d  at 905-06, 88 S.
Ct. at 1879-80; Long, 99 Ill. 2d  at 227-28. While the facts
supporting the officer's suspicions need not rise to the level of
probable cause, they must be based on more than a mere hunch.
Thomas, 198 Ill. 2d  at 110.
	In addition to the requirement that the conduct constituting the
stop be justified at its inception, the police officer's action must be
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified
the interference in the first place. Terry, 392 U.S.  at 19-20, 20 L. Ed. 2d  at 905, 88 S. Ct.  at 1879. As the Court emphasized in
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 238, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325 (1983) (plurality opinion), "an investigative
detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary
to effectuate the purpose of the stop." The State bears the burden
of showing that a seizure based on reasonable suspicion was
sufficiently limited in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions
of an investigative seizure. Royer, 460 U.S.  at 500, 75 L. Ed. 2d  at
238, 103 S. Ct.  at 1326 (plurality opinion); People v. Brownlee,
186 Ill. 2d 501, 519 (1999).
	The standard for determining the reasonableness of a Terry
investigatory stop has been codified in our Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/107-14 (West 1998)). Thomas,
198 Ill. 2d  at 109, Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d  at 518. The same standard
is applied in determining the propriety of an investigatory stop
under article I, section 6, of the 1970 Illinois Constitution (Ill.
Const. 1970, art. I, §6). Thomas, 198 Ill. 2d  at 109, citing People
v. Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d 226, 241-45 (1984) (the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures under the Illinois Constitution
is measured by the same standards as are used in defining the
protections contained in the fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution).
	When a police officer observes a driver commit a traffic
violation, the officer is justified in briefly detaining the driver to
investigate the violation. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d  at 433; Brownlee,
186 Ill. 2d  at 517. The officer may perform some initial inquiries,
check the driver's license, and conduct a speedy warrant check.
People v. Ortiz, 317 Ill. App. 3d 212, 220 (2000); People v.
Easley, 288 Ill. App. 3d 487, 491 (1997); People v. Koutsakis, 272
Ill. App. 3d 159, 163 (1995). If no further suspicion is aroused in
the officer following these inquiries, the traffic stop should go no
further. Ortiz, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 220; Easley, 288 Ill. App. 3d at
491; Koutsakis, 272 Ill. App. 3d at 163. The officer should issue
a warning ticket or a citation, as appropriate, and allow the driver
to leave. Koutsakis, 272 Ill. App. 3d at 164.
	Turning to the present case, the State notes that Officer
McCormick stopped defendant's vehicle because it did not have
a rear registration light. The State maintains that Officer
McCormick was justified in initiating the traffic stop. The State
also maintains that the dog sniff of defendant's vehicle was proper
since Deputy Zola and his dog, Tango, arrived at the scene while
Officer McCormick was writing the traffic ticket.
	Defendant notes that Officer McCormick called Deputy Zola
to the scene at the time that Officer McCormick initiated the
traffic stop. Officer McCormick did not have any reason to believe
that defendant's vehicle contained a controlled substance.
According to defendant, the dog sniff was impermissible because
Officer McCormick's decision to call Deputy Zola to the scene
was not based on a reasonable and articulable suspicion that
defendant's vehicle contained a controlled substance. Defendant
also notes that the State failed to present evidence regarding
Tango's training and reliability. Defendant maintains only an alert
by a trained dog constitutes probable cause to search a vehicle.
Defendant concludes that an alert by Tango could not provide the
officers with probable cause to search her vehicle.
	While we agree with the State's contention that Officer
McCormick properly initiated the traffic stop, we disagree with the
State's further contention that the dog sniff of defendant's vehicle
was justified. We note that Officer McCormick did not smell
marijuana in defendant's vehicle. Officer McCormick did not have
any reason to suspect that defendant's vehicle contained a
controlled substance. In sum, Officer McCormick did not have any
reason to request Deputy Zola's assistance at the scene. Rather
than conducting an inquiry into the circumstances of the traffic
violation, and issuing defendant a warning ticket or citation,
Officer McCormick broadened the scope of the traffic stop to
include a drug investigation.
	The State maintains, however, that the dog sniff of
defendant's vehicle was justified because Deputy Zola arrived at
the scene while Officer McCormick was writing the traffic ticket.
We disagree. We note that Deputy Zola arrived at the scene
approximately 15 minutes after the initial traffic stop. While we
will not impose a rigid time limitation on the duration of a traffic
stop, we are concerned with the duration of the traffic stop in the
present case. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605, 615, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1575 (1985) ("While it is
clear that 'the brevity of the invasion of the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests is an important factor in determining
whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on
reasonable suspicion,' United States v. Place, supra, at 709, we
have emphasized the need to consider the law enforcement
purposes to be served by the stop as well as the time reasonably
needed to effectuate those purposes"). We have examined the
record and find that it is devoid of circumstances which would
justify the length of the detention. Rather, the record leads us to
conclude this was a routine traffic stop, which should have
resulted in a correspondingly abbreviated detention. See People v.
Luna, 322 Ill. App. 3d 855, 859 (2001) ("An officer may not stall
at the scene of a traffic stop until a drug-sniffing dog arrives and
creates probable cause to conduct a search of a vehicle"); People
v. Ruffin, 315 Ill. App. 3d 744 (2000); People v. Smith, 315 Ill.
App. 3d 772 (2000); Koutsakis, 272 Ill. App. 3d at 164 ("An
officer's authority to investigate a traffic violation may not become
a subterfuge in order to obtain other evidence merely based on the
officer's suspicion"). Officer McCormick should have issued a
traffic citation or warning ticket to defendant expeditiously. Had
he done so, defendant would have left the scene of the traffic stop
prior to the arrival of the canine unit.
	Moreover, were we to accept the State's contention that the
dog-sniff test was permissible, we would be endorsing a drug-sniff
test at every stop for a traffic violation. Again, we note that Officer
McCormick called Deputy Zola to the scene when Officer
McCormick first initiated the traffic stop. At that time, Officer
McCormick did not have any reason to call Deputy Zola to the
scene. Officer McCormick did not testify that he smelled
marijuana in the vehicle. Officer McCormick did not testify that
he saw any object in the vehicle that led him to suspect defendant
possessed a controlled substance. Officer McCormick did not
testify that defendant appeared nervous or that defendant's
answers to questions he posed aroused his suspicions. In sum,
Officer McCormick did not have "specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences therefrom,"
reasonably warranted an extended detention of defendant's
vehicle, and the ensuing drug-sniff test. He did not have even a
hunch that defendant was engaged in criminal activity to support
the call to Deputy Zola. Given these circumstances, if we held that
Officer McCormick was justified in calling the canine unit, we
would clearly support the view that police officers can resort to the
use of canine units at every traffic stop.
	We conclude that the dog-sniff test of defendant's vehicle was
impermissible. Officer McCormick did not have "specific and
articulable facts" justifying the call to Deputy Zola for assistance
and the subsequent dog-sniff test of defendant's vehicle. Further,
defendant's detention, considered in light of the scope and purpose
of the traffic stop, was overly long. Accordingly, we find that the
circuit court properly suppressed the evidence recovered by the
police.
	Because of our resolution, we need not consider defendant's
argument that the alert by Tango did not give the police probable
cause to search defendant's vehicle. See People v. Campbell, 67 Ill. 2d 308 (1977) (the use of trained dogs as a follow-up
investigative technique to partially corroborate information
received is a permissible procedure, and the ensuing alerts by the
dogs, in light of the information available to police, gave the
police probable cause to arrest defendants). Also, we have
analyzed the issues in this case in terms of the dog-sniff test of
defendant's vehicle. We note that defendant was in the vehicle at
the time the police conducted the dog-sniff test and that the police
recovered the cannabis from defendant's person, not from the
vehicle. Again, because of our resolution of this cause, we need
not consider whether it was appropriate for the police to conduct
the dog-sniff test with defendant inside the vehicle. See People v.
Fondia, 317 Ill. App. 3d 966 (2000). We simply note that other
considerations may factor in a search of a driver's person as
opposed to a search of the driver's vehicle. Cf. United States v. Di
Re, 332 U.S. 581, 92 L. Ed. 210, 68 S. Ct. 222 (1948) (search of
an occupant of an automobile); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 143 L. Ed. 2d 408, 119 S. Ct. 1297 (1999) (search of an
automobile passenger's purse).

CONCLUSION
	For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the appellate
court is affirmed.
Appellate court judgment affirmed.
 
	JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting:
	I strongly disagree with the majority's conclusion that
defendant was subjected to an illegal detention. In fact, the
majority's entire discussion of the length of the detention is
inappropriate. The issue raised by the State-and the issue upon
which we granted the State's PLA-is whether a canine sniff of a
lawfully detained vehicle is a "search" under the Illinois
Constitution. The majority affirms the appellate court not on this
basis, but on the majority's spontaneous realization that the 15-minute traffic stop was unnecessarily and illegally long.
	Although the principle is never stated in the opinion, the
majority is apparently relying on the rule that a court of review can
affirm on any basis supported by the record, regardless of the
reasons given by the trial court. See People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144, 205 (1999). My response is twofold. First, defendant has
never properly pursued this theory. She did not raise the issue in
her motion to suppress. The only issue raised in the motion was
that the search of her vehicle was illegal because the officer had no
reason to believe that defendant had drugs or weapons.
Accordingly, the issue of whether defendant was subjected to an
illegal detention is waived. See People v. Coleman, 129 Ill. 2d 321, 340 (1989) (issues not raised in the motion to suppress are
waived). The only time that the issue was mentioned was in
defendant's closing argument to the trial court on the motion to
suppress. Nevertheless, the trial court specifically declined to
reach the issue, and defendant did not raise the issue in either the
appellate court or this court as a ground upon which the trial
court's decision could be sustained. As the appellee in the
appellate court and the supreme court, defendant was entitled to
raise any arguments in support of the trial court's judgment, even
if they were not directly ruled upon by the court. People v.
Monroe, 118 Ill. 2d 298, 300 (1987). Defendant did raise an
alternative argument to support the trial court's judgment, but did
not raise the illegal-detention issue. Whether this is because the
issue is waived or is meritless is not clear. However, it is possible
that defendant did not raise the argument because she is aware of
the second part of the Monroe rule, which holds that any points
advanced in support of the trial court's ruling must have a
sufficient factual basis before the trial court. See Monroe, 118 Ill. 2d  at 300.
	This brings me to my second point. There is no factual basis
in the record upon which the majority could conclude that
defendant suffered an illegal detention. Defendant has the burden
of proof on a motion to suppress that alleges an illegal search or
seizure. People v. Williams, 164 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (1994). Defendant's
attorney did not elicit any testimony showing that defendant was
unlawfully detained longer than was necessary to process a traffic
ticket. The only question about the length of traffic stops came
when defendant's attorney was questioning Officer McCormick
about a different traffic stop. Defendant's motion to suppress was
heard at the same time as another motion to suppress raising the
same issue in a different case. The same attorney represented both
defendant and the other defendant. When questioning Officer
McCormick about the other traffic stop, the attorney asked him
how long it normally took him to write a ticket. Officer
McCormick's response was, "it varies; on average, 10 to 12
minutes, 15 minutes." The attorney did not ask him any further
questions. The attorney did not ask why it varied, what the process
involved, how long each part of the process took, or whether the
officer was interrupted when writing out either of the tickets at
issue. In defendant's case, Officer McCormick testified that the
canine unit arrived approximately 15 minutes after the traffic stop
commenced, while he was still writing the ticket. Thus, there is
simply no basis in the record to conclude that defendant was
illegally detained longer than was necessary to process the ticket.
Indeed, the only way to reach such a conclusion is for the majority
to determine sua sponte that Officer McCormick was lying. This
is apparently what the majority has done when it asserts:
			"The State maintains, however, that the dog sniff of
defendant's vehicle was justified because Deputy Zola
arrived at the scene while Officer McCormick was writing
the traffic ticket. We disagree." Slip op. at 5-6.
The majority never explains what leads it to conclude that Officer
McCormick was not being truthful, unless it is asserting that it
simply knows more than the police know about how long a traffic
stop should take.
	When justifying its decision, the majority subtly and
improperly shifts the burden of proof to the State. The majority
states that, "we have examined the record and find that it is devoid
of circumstances which would justify the length of the detention."
Slip op. at 14. In other words, defendant did not have to prove that
the stop was illegally and unnecessarily long. Rather, the State had
to prove that the stop was sufficiently short. This is an improper
reallocation of the burden of proof. The defendant had the burden
to show that the detention was illegal, and she never attempted to
do so.
	The majority essentially draws a constitutional line in the sand
at 15 minutes. If the traffic stop takes 15 minutes or more, the
detention is illegal unless the State can justify the length of the
detention. Interestingly, in one of the cases relied upon by the
majority, United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605,
105 S. Ct. 1568 (1985), the United States Supreme Court refused
to set the limit of a permissible traffic stop at 20 minutes:
		"The Court of Appeals' decision would effectively
establish a per se rule that a 20-minute detention is too
long to be justified under the Terry doctrine. Such a result
is clearly and fundamentally at odds with our approach in
this area." Sharpe, 470 U.S.  at 686, 84 L. Ed. 2d  at 615,
105 S. Ct.  at 1575.
Rather, the Court concluded, the inquiry must be made case-by-case and must consider whether the police pursued their
investigation in a diligent and reasonable manner. Sharpe, 470 U.S.  at 686-87, 84 L. Ed. 2d  at 615-16, 105 S. Ct.  at 1575-76.
Here, the majority has pointed to no facts developed in the trial
court that would lead it to conclude that Officer McCormick did
not process the traffic stop in a reasonable and diligent manner.
Instead, the majority bases its conclusion solely on the time-15
minutes-thus establishing an even more restrictive per se rule than
the one the Supreme Court rejected in Sharpe.
	Finally, the majority never explains how its decision is
consistent with the Supreme Court's recent decision in Atwater v.
City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 149 L. Ed. 2d 549, 121 S. Ct. 1536 (2001). In Atwater, the Supreme Court held that the fourth
amendment did not prohibit warrantless arrests for minor traffic
violations that are punishable only by a fine. In that case, Atwater
was stopped for failing to wear a seat belt and failing to secure a
small child riding in the front seat. Each offense carried a penalty
of a fine between $25 and $50. When the officer asked Atwater for
her driver's license and proof of insurance, she told him that she
did not have them because her purse had been stolen the day
before. The officer told her that he had heard that story before,
handcuffed her, placed her in the squad car, and took her to the
police station. Once there, the police took her mug shot,
inventoried her possessions, and placed her in a jail cell for an
hour before she was taken before a magistrate and released on
$310 bond. Atwater, 532 U.S.  at 324, 149 L. Ed. 2d  at 558-59, 121 S. Ct.  at 1542. Texas law authorizes arrests for minor offenses
such as these, although the law also provides for citations to be
issued in lieu of arrests. Atwater sued the city under 42 U.S.C.
§1983, alleging that the police had violated her fourth amendment
right to be free from unreasonable seizures. Atwater, 532 U.S.  at
325, 149 L. Ed. 2d  at 559, 121 S. Ct.  at 1542. The district court
granted summary judgment to the city, and the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that an arrest for
a first-time seat belt offense was an unreasonable seizure under the
fourth amendment. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari and, in a 5-4 decision, reversed the Fifth Circuit. The
Supreme Court held that, "[i]f an officer has probable cause to
believe that an individual has committed even a very minor
criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the
Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender." Atwater, 532 U.S.  at 354,
149 L. Ed. 2d  at 577, 121 S. Ct.  at 1557. Atwater did not deny that
she had committed the seatbelt violation, and while the arrest and
booking were inconvenient to her, the process was not so
extraordinary as to violate the fourth amendment. The dissent
pointed out that the majority opinion would necessarily mean that,
if a police officer arrests a person for a minor traffic violation, the
officer would have a right to search the entire passenger
compartment, including any purse or package inside, and also to
impound the car and inventory all of its contents. Atwater, 532 U.S.  at 371-72, 149 L. Ed. 2d  at 589, 121 S. Ct.  at 1567
(O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, JJ.).
	Just as in Atwater, defendant in this case committed an
infraction that was punishable only by a fine. See 625 ILCS
5/12-201(c) (West 2000) (requiring rear registration light); 625
ILCS 5/16-104 (West 2000) (violations of provisions of the
Vehicle Code for which no specific penalty is provided are petty
offenses); 730 ILCS 5/5-1-17 (West 2000) (petty offense is
punishable by a fine only). Further, just as in Atwater, the police
officer had statutory authority to arrest defendant. See 725 ILCS
5/107-2(1)(c) (West 2000) (police officer may arrest someone
when "[h]e has reasonable grounds to believe that the person is
committing or has committed an offense"); 625 ILCS 5/16-102
(West 2000) ("The State Police shall patrol the public highways
and make arrests for violation of the provisions of this Act").
Thus, Officer McCormick clearly had the statutory right to arrest
defendant for the traffic offense. If he would have done so, he
could have searched defendant incident to the arrest and conducted
an inventory search of the vehicle. This would not have violated
defendant's fourth amendment rights. Atwater, 532 U.S.  at 354-55,
149 L. Ed. 2d  at 577, 121 S. Ct.  at 1657-58.
	Thus, current fourth amendment jurisprudence in Illinois is
that the fourth amendment is not violated if the police conduct a
full custodial arrest of a defendant for a minor traffic offense
punishable only by a fine, but the fourth amendment is violated if
the police take 15 minutes to write the traffic ticket. Unfortunately,
the majority opinion leaves the police with no other choice but to
conduct full custodial arrests of people for minor traffic violations
if it appears that it will take 15 minutes to process the traffic stop.
Since 15 minutes is now presumptively unreasonable if the police
cannot explain why the stop took 15 minutes, a police officer who
hears the majority's fourth amendment timer ticking will have to
take the person into custody if he wants to avoid having the
seizure declared unlawful. Therefore, not only is the new 15-minute per se rule of dubious legality in light of Sharpe, it will
create more problems than it will solve.
	Curiously, after affirming on the basis that defendant was
unlawfully detained for 15 minutes, the majority goes on to
address the canine-sniff issue. The discussion of this issue is dicta
because the majority has already determined that the evidence
needed to be suppressed because of an unlawful seizure.
Generally, this court will not "engage in speculative analysis or
*** render an advisory opinion *** where, as in the instant case,
such analysis or opinion is not necessary for the disposition of the
cause." Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 470 (1997).
However, because there are serious flaws in this part of the
majority opinion, and the majority never makes clear that its
discussion is dicta, I will address the issue too.
	The majority opinion on the canine-sniff issue is based not on
the law, but on the following nonlegal rationale: "[W]ere we to
accept the State's contention that the dog-sniff test was
permissible, we would be endorsing a drug-sniff test at every stop
for a traffic violation." Slip op. at 6. This is a statement of policy,
not of constitutional law. When the issue is analyzed within the
proper legal and constitutional framework, the proper result is
obvious.
	We granted leave to appeal in this case to determine whether
the appellate court erred in concluding that the Illinois
Constitution requires that the police have a reasonable, articulable
suspicion of criminal activity before conducting a canine sniff of
a lawfully detained vehicle. The appellate court based its decision
on the Illinois Constitution because it recognized that the issue
was foreclosed under the fourth amendment by the United States
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696,
707, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110, 121, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2644-45 (1983). See
318 Ill. App. 3d at 165. In Place, the Supreme Court held that a
canine sniff is not a search within the meaning of the fourth
amendment. Apparently believing that the Illinois Constitution
provides greater protection in this regard, the appellate court held
that the Illinois Constitution requires that the police have a
reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity before they
may conduct a canine sniff. 318 Ill. App. 3d at 165.
	In affirming, the majority never states whether it agrees with
the appellate court's analysis. The majority cites some general
boilerplate language on Terry stops and mentions both the United
States and Illinois Constitutions. However, it never makes clear if
its holding is based on either or both. In fact, the one analytical
paragraph of this section of the majority opinion contains no law
whatsoever. See slip op. at 6-7.
	The majority's rationale is stated in a single paragraph that is
remarkable both for what it does and does not say. What it says is
that the holding is driven entirely by the desired result. The only
insight into the majority's thinking is the nonlegal explanation
that, "[W]ere we to accept the State's contention that the dog-sniff
test was permissible, we would be endorsing a drug-sniff test at
every stop for a traffic violation." Slip op. at 6. After stating this
premise, the majority explains that the police did not have a
reasonable articulable suspicion that defendant was engaging in
criminal activity. What the paragraph does not say is how the
majority arrived at this result. The majority concludes this lone
analytical paragraph by once again explaining, "if we held that
Officer McCormick was justified in calling the canine unit, we
would clearly support the view that police officers can resort to the
use of canine units at every traffic stop." Slip op. at 7.
	The majority fails to address the crucial threshold question of
whether a canine sniff is a search. This question must be answered
because if a canine sniff is not a search, then what authority would
require the police to have either probable cause or a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity before conducting one? Critiquing
the majority's analysis is difficult because there is no analysis to
critique. Because the majority has given no reasons for its
decision, this portion of the dissent will focus on what I believe to
be the proper analysis under the relevant case law. Also, I will
address the defendant's arguments and explain why the appellate
court's analysis is flawed.
	First, I will briefly note what is not at issue in this case. There
is no question that the detention of defendant's vehicle was proper.
The officer observed defendant committing a traffic violation, and
therefore had a lawful basis to detain her. Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
434 U.S. 106, 109, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331, 336, 98 S. Ct. 330, 332
(1977). What is at issue here is whether the police, during the
course of a lawful traffic stop, may conduct a canine sniff of the
vehicle to detect the presence of narcotics.
	The important threshold question of whether a canine sniff is
a search under the fourth amendment was answered by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983).(1) In that case, the police seized a
suspected drug courier's luggage at an airport and transported it to
another airport so that it could be subjected to a canine sniff. The
luggage was detained for 90 minutes. The Court held that the
detention was unreasonably long, but also held that the canine
sniff was not a search under the fourth amendment:
		"We have affirmed that a person possesses a privacy
interest in the contents of personal luggage that is
protected by the Fourth Amendment. [Citation.] A 'canine
sniff' by a well-trained narcotics detection dog, however,
does not require opening the luggage. It does not expose
noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden
from public view, as does, for example, an officer's
rummaging through the contents of the luggage. Thus, the
manner in which information is obtained through this
investigative technique is much less intrusive than a
typical search. Moreover, the sniff discloses only the
presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item. Thus,
despite the fact that the sniff tells the authorities
something about the contents of the luggage, the
information obtained is limited. This limited disclosure
also ensures that the owner of the property is not
subjected to the embarrassment and inconvenience
entailed in less discriminate and more intrusive
investigative methods.
			In these respects, the canine sniff is sui generis. We are
aware of no other investigative procedure that is so
limited both in the manner in which the information is
obtained and in the content of the information revealed by
the procedure. Therefore, we conclude that the particular
course of investigation that the agents intended to pursue
here-exposure of respondent's luggage, which was
located in a public place, to a trained canine-did not
constitute a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment." Place, 462 U.S.  at 707, 77 L. Ed. 2d  at
120-21, 103 S. Ct.  at 2644-45.
	The appellate court found Place dispositive of the issue under
the fourth amendment, but held that the sniff was a search under
the Illinois Constitution. The court, however, did not explain why
it construed our state constitution as providing greater protection
in this regard.
	The appellate court is correct that we are free to construe our
state constitution as providing greater protection than comparable
provisions in the federal constitution. People v. Mitchell, 165 Ill. 2d 211, 217 (1995). Nevertheless, the appellate court ignored the
analysis we have set forth for determining when we will depart
from a "lockstep" construction. As we have repeatedly stated,
"[w]e must find in the language of our constitution, or in the
debates and the committee reports of the constitutional
convention, something which will indicate that the provisions of
our constitution are intended to be construed differently than are
similar provisions in the Federal Constitution ***." People v.
Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d 226, 245 (1984). We extensively analyzed this
issue in both Mitchell and Tisler and concluded that the search and
seizure provision of our state constitution was not intended to be
broader than that in the fourth amendment. See Mitchell, 165 Ill.
2d at 217-22; Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d  at 241-45.(2)
	Our only recent departure from a lockstep construction of our
search and seizure provision was in People v. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d 60 (1996), in which we held that we would not extend the holding
of Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 94 L. Ed. 2d 364, 107 S. Ct. 1160 (1987), to our state constitution. Krull extended the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule to searches based on
statutes later declared unconstitutional. In Krueger, we noted the
historical importance of our state exclusionary rule and stated that
it had always been understood to bar evidence gathered under the
authority of an unconstitutional statute. We found that the critical
flaw in Krull was that it would allow for a grace period for
unconstitutional search and seizure legislation, possibly lasting for
several years, during which our citizens' constitutional rights
could be violated with impunity. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d  at 74-75.
Accordingly, we held that such a grace period would be
incompatible with our state exclusionary rule as we have always
construed it. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d  at 74-75.
	Here, the concerns that caused us to depart from lockstep in
Krueger are not present, nor has defendant or the majority
explained why the Mitchell/Tisler analysis would not apply to this
case. Rather, defendant argues that the Fifth District was correct
in following out-of-state cases in which the courts declined to
follow Place and held that canine sniffs were searches under their
state constitutions. See State v. Pellicci, 133 N.H. 523, 580 A.2d 710 (1990); People v. Dunn, 77 N.Y.2d 19, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 563 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1990); Commonwealth v. Johnston, 515 Pa. 454,
530 A.2d 74 (1987); Pooley v. State, 705 P.2d 1293 (Alaska
1985). None of these courts, however, follow the same analysis
that we do in determining whether to construe a provision of our
constitution more broadly than its federal counterpart. In these
cases, the courts chose not to apply the Place rationale to their
state constitutions. However, they did not first look to the intent of
the framers of their respective state constitutions. Thus, I believe
that the appellate court erred in following these cases rather than
the Mitchell/Tisler analysis.
	In my opinion, this court should hold that a canine sniff is not
a search under article I, section 6, of our state constitution. As
noted, Place held that a canine sniff of lawfully detained luggage
at an airport is not a search. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the
Place holding in United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122-24,
80 L. Ed. 2d 85, 100-01, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1661-62 (1984), and
broadly construed it as providing that police investigatory methods
that only disclose the presence or absence of contraband do not
implicate the fourth amendment. Prior to Place, this court had
already held that a canine sniff of baggage at an airport did not
implicate the fourth amendment because people cannot have a
justifiable expectation of privacy in the smell of contraband in a
container exposed to the public. People v. Campbell, 67 Ill. 2d 308, 316 (1977).(3)
	Recently, the United States Supreme Court has specifically
stated that a canine sniff of a vehicle is a not a search. In City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333, 121 S. Ct. 447 (2000), the Supreme Court held invalid a checkpoint
procedure that had as its primary purpose the detection of
narcotics. The Supreme Court held that the detentions violated the
fourth amendment because their primary purpose was to uncover
evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing. City of Indianapolis,
531 U.S.  at 48, 148 L. Ed. 2d  at 347-48, 125 S. Ct.  at 458.
Importantly, however, the Court specifically held that the use of
canines to sniff the vehicles at the checkpoints did not turn the
unlawful seizures into unlawful searches:
			"It is well established that a vehicle stop at a highway
checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. [Citation.] The fact that officers walk
a narcotics-detection dog around the exterior of each car
at the Indianapolis checkpoints does not transform the
seizure into a search. [Citation.] Just as in Place, an
exterior sniff of an automobile does not require entry into
the car and is not designed to disclose any information
other than the presence or absence of narcotics. [Citation.]
Like the dog sniff in Place, a sniff by a dog that simply
walks around a car is 'much less intrusive than a typical
search.' [Citations.] Rather, what principally distinguishes
these checkpoints from those we have previously
approved is their primary purpose." City of Indianapolis,
531 U.S.  at 40, 148 L. Ed. 2d  at 342-43, 125 S. Ct.  at 453.
	Additionally, several lower federal courts have considered
whether canine sniffs of lawfully detained vehicles are searches
and have concluded that Place applied. For instance, in United
States v. Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d 200 (10th Cir. 1990), the
court held that canine sniffs of vehicles lawfully detained at a
roadblock were not searches. In that case, the sniff was of the
exterior of a vehicle that was lawfully detained on a public
highway. The court first noted that there is a lesser expectation of
privacy in a vehicle than in a home or one's bodily integrity. See
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116, 1130, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 3084 (1976). The court then explained
that, when the odor of narcotics escapes from a vehicle, society
does not recognize a reasonable privacy interest in the airspace
containing the incriminating odor. Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d  at
205. See also, e.g., United States v. $404,905.00 in U.S. Currency,
182 F.3d 643, 647 (8th Cir. 1999) (canine sniff of U-Haul stopped
for speeding not a search); United States v. Glinton, 154 F.3d 1245, 1257 (11th Cir. 1998) (canine sniff of lawfully detained
vehicle not a search); United States v. Seals, 987 F.2d 1102, 1106
(5th Cir. 1993) (canine sniff of lawfully detained vehicle not a
search; thus, individualized suspicion of drug-related activity not
required).
	For the same reasons that these courts have rejected the
argument that a canine sniff of a lawfully detained vehicle is not
a search under the fourth amendment, this court should reject
defendant's argument that the canine sniff of her vehicle violated
article I, section 6, of our state constitution. A search occurs when
an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider
reasonable is infringed. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.  at 113, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at
94, 104 S. Ct.  at 1656. A person cannot have a justifiable
expectation of privacy in the odors emanating from his car on a
public highway (Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d at 205), and the desire
to conceal the odor of contraband is not a protectable expectation
of privacy (Campbell, 67 Ill. 2d at 316). Because a canine sniff is
not a search, we should reject the appellate court's conclusion that
the police need a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before
they may conduct a canine sniff of a lawfully detained vehicle.
Instead, the majority affirms the appellate court decision without
giving a single defensible legal rationale for its decision.
	Defendant argues that the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94, 121 S. Ct. 2038 (2001), mandates an affirmance in this case. I disagree. In
Kyllo, agents of the federal government believed that the
defendant was growing marijuana in his home. Indoor marijuana
growth requires the use of high-intensity heat lamps. The agents
used a thermal imaging device to scan the defendant's home to
determine the amount of heat in different parts of the house. The
device detects infrared radiation emitted from the house. The
agents studied the scan and noted that the roof over defendant's
garage was noticeably warmer than the rest of the house. The
agents acquired a search warrant and discovered a marijuana-growing operation involving more than 100 plants. Kyllo, 533 U.S. 
at 29-30, 150 L. Ed. 2d  at 99-100, 121 S. Ct.  at 2041.
	The Supreme Court held that the use of the thermal imaging
device was a search under the fourth amendment and was thus
presumptively unreasonable without a warrant. Kyllo, 533 U.S.  at
40, 150 L. Ed. 2d  at 106, 121 S. Ct.  at 2046. Kyllo is
distinguishable, however, because the Court's concern was in the
use of advanced technology to reveal the intimate details of a
private home. The Court held that in the home "all details are
intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying
government eyes." (Emphasis in original.) Kyllo, 533 U.S.  at 37,
150 L. Ed. 2d  at 104, 121 S. Ct.  at 2045. Additionally, the Court
began its analysis by stating that, " 'At the very core' of the Fourth
Amendment 'stands the right of a man to retreat into his own
home and there be free from unreasonable government
intrusion.' " (Kyllo, 533 U.S.  at 31, 150 L. Ed. 2d  at 100, 121 S. Ct.  at 2041-42, quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505,
511, 5 L. Ed. 2d 734, 739, 81 S. Ct. 679, 683 (1961)), and
concluded it by stating that the fourth amendment "draws 'a firm
line at the entrance to the house' " (Kyllo, 533 U.S.  at 40, 150 L. Ed. 2d  at 106, 121 S. Ct.  at 2046, quoting Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573, 590, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 653, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1382
(1980)).
	Thus, the Supreme Court's decision in Kyllo was based on the
heightened expectation of privacy one has in one's home. As I
have already noted, a person has a lesser expectation of privacy in
a vehicle than in a home or one's bodily integrity. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.  at 561, 49 L. Ed. 2d  at 1130, 96 S. Ct.  at 3084.
Further, the Supreme Court views the thermal imaging device as
something that reveals the intimate details of a home (Kyllo, 533 U.S.  at 37-38, 150 L. Ed. 2d  at 104, 121 S. Ct. at 2045), but a
canine sniff as something that reveals only the presence or absence
of contraband (Place, 462 U.S.  at 707, 77 L. Ed. 2d  at 121, 103 S.
Ct. at 2644). Thus, I disagree with defendant's assertion that Kyllo
mandates an affirmance in this case.
	I also disagree with the appellate court's holding (and the
majority's apparent implied holding) that canine sniffs should be
considered limited investigatory stops governed by Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). Terry allows
the police to briefly detain an individual when the officer
"observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be
afoot." Terry, 392 U.S.  at 30, 20 L. Ed. 2d  at 911, 88 S. Ct.  at
1884. Additionally, the officer is allowed, without a warrant, to
conduct a careful limited search of the person when his
observations reasonably lead him to believe that the person might
be carrying a weapon. The purpose of the "frisk" is to allow the
police, for their own safety and the safety of others, to determine
if the person is armed. Terry, 392 U.S.  at 27, 20 L. Ed. 2d  at 909,
88 S. Ct.  at 1883. The Court reached its decision by balancing the
need to search against the invasion the search entails. Terry, 392 U.S.  at 21, 20 L. Ed. 2d  at 905-06, 88 S. Ct.  at 1879-80, quoting
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930, 940, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 1735 (1967). As Professor LaFave has
noted, however, "there is no search-for-evidence counterpart to the
Terry weapons search, permissible on only a reasonable suspicion
that such evidence would be found." 4 W. LaFave, Search &
Seizure §9.5(g), at 300 (3d ed. 1996). See also Minnesota v.
Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334, 344, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1993) (sole justification for a Terry frisk is the
protection of the police officer and others, not to gather evidence);
People v. Flowers, 179 Ill. 2d 257, 263 (1997) (same); Arizona v.
Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328-29, 94 L. Ed. 2d 347, 356, 107 S. Ct. 1149, 1154 (1987) (refusing to recognize an intermediate type of
search between a plain-view inspection and a "full-blown search"
that would merely require a reasonable suspicion); Ybarra v.
Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 247, 100 S. Ct. 338,
343 (1979) (Terry cannot be understood to allow any search
whatever for anything but weapons); Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639, 661, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1414 (1989) (balancing test is appropriate only when
warranted by special needs beyond the normal need for law
enforcement). Thus, the majority's apparent belief that a canine
sniff for narcotics is a search that can be conducted on an officer's
mere reasonable suspicion impermissibly extends Terry to general
searches for evidence. Accordingly, because the Supreme Court
requires probable cause for warrantless searches of vehicles (see,
e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300, 143 L. Ed. 2d 408,
414-15, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 1300 (1999)), the majority has
unwittingly construed the search and seizure provision of our state
constitution as providing less protection than its federal
counterpart. The majority's opinion is thus wholly invalid and
subject to reversal by the United States Supreme Court.
	In sum, the answer to the question of whether a canine sniff
is a search leads to two possible outcomes. If a sniff is a search,
then the police need probable cause to conduct one. If a sniff is not
a search, then neither the fourth amendment nor article I, section
6, of the Illinois Constitution is implicated. There simply cannot
be a "reasonable suspicion" middle ground because the United
States Supreme Court has not expanded Terry to general searches
for incriminating evidence, as opposed to searches for weapons.
	The majority thus refuses to answer the threshold question,
because an answer cannot lead to its result. Instead, the majority
has issued a policy decision with no foundation in the law. The
majority bases its opinion solely on its desire not to see canine
sniffs allowed at every lawful traffic stop. Such an analysis begs
the question of whether either the United States or Illinois
Constitution forbids canine sniffs of lawfully detained vehicles.
Because the United States Supreme Court has held that a canine
sniff is not a search, and we have construed the search and seizure
provision of our state constitution in lockstep with its federal
counterpart, I am unable to see how either constitution would
forbid a canine sniff of a lawfully detained vehicle. Unfortunately,
the explanation is nowhere to be found in the majority opinion.
	JUSTICES FITZGERALD and GARMAN join in this dissent.
	 
	 
	 
1.      1This case is notably absent from the majority opinion.

2.      2The majority recognizes this very principle when it cites Tisler and
explains that "the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
under the Illinois Constitution is measured by the same standards as are
used in defining the protections contained in the fourth amendment to
the United States Constitution." Slip op. at 4. This principle is forgotten
as soon as it is cited.

3.      3Like Place, this decision is conspicuously absent from the majority
opinion.