Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Nicks

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Nicks, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-600.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-600 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. NICKS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Nicks,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-600.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Multiple disciplinary violations — Chemical 
dependence — Two-year suspension, partially stayed on conditions. 
(No. 2009-1544 — Submitted November 4, 2009 — Decided February 25, 2010.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 09-016. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, J. Michael Nicks of Galena, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0073608, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 2001.  
Relator, Disciplinary Counsel, and respondent stipulated to the facts and 
misconduct alleged in relator’s complaint.  A three-member panel of the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline also heard testimony on the cause, 
issued findings of fact and conclusions of law, and made a recommendation.  The 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
board adopted the panel’s findings and also adopted the panel’s recommendation 
that we suspend respondent’s license to practice law for two years, staying the last 
18 months on conditions. 
{¶ 2} The parties have not objected to the board report; we ordered 
respondent to show cause why we should not adopt the board’s recommendation.  
On review, we find that respondent committed the cited violations of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct and that the recommended sanction is appropriate. 
Misconduct 
Count I – The Seibel Matter 
{¶ 3} In November 2006, Larry Seibel hired respondent to represent him 
in the administration of his mother’s, Dorothy Seibel’s, estate.  Respondent and 
Seibel entered into a fee agreement by which respondent would receive three 
percent of the value of the Seibel estate.  The agreement also required probate 
court approval prior to the payment of any attorney fees. 
{¶ 4} In February 2007, respondent asked Seibel for a check for one half 
of respondent’s attorney fees, and Seibel provided respondent with a check for 
$7,428.32.  Respondent immediately cashed the check without obtaining the 
required approval from the probate court and later filed an application for 
payment of attorney fees, asking the court to approve the full amount that he had 
already been paid, $7,428.32.  The court issued an order, but declined to approve 
the full amount and ordered that respondent be paid only $5,000.  After learning 
that the court had approved only $5,000 of the $7,400 fee request, respondent did 
not inform Seibel, nor did he make a refund to the estate. 
{¶ 5} Respondent met with Seibel again on June 17, 2007, to resolve the 
estate tax return.  Seibel signed the estate tax return and gave respondent a check 
for the payment of the estate taxes, but respondent did not file the estate tax 
return, nor did he forward the check for payment of the estate taxes.  As a result, 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
the estate was assessed a $2,834.75 late-payment penalty and $657.04 in interest 
charges. 
{¶ 6} At the same June 2007 meeting, respondent asked Seibel for a 
second advance on his attorney fees, and Seibel gave him a check for $3,714.16.  
Again, respondent did not file with the probate court the required application for 
approval of the payment of those attorney fees prior to accepting them.  Instead, 
he immediately endorsed and cashed the check. 
{¶ 7} During respondent’s representation of Seibel, there were several 
times when he failed to return Seibel’s phone calls.  In addition, the probate court 
issued two reminders for respondent to file an accounting on the estate.  After the 
probate court issued a notice of past-due account to both respondent and Seibel on 
December 13, 2007, respondent met with Seibel to discuss the matter.  At the time 
of this meeting, respondent’s law license had been suspended for failure to 
comply with attorney-registration requirements for the 2007-2009 biennium, but 
respondent did not inform Seibel of the suspension.1  Rather, respondent advised 
Seibel on how to obtain an extension of time to file his overdue account.  
Respondent admitted that as of the date of the hearing before the panel, he had not 
repaid to the estate the fees taken without probate court approval or the interest 
and late-payment penalty that had been charged to the estate. 
{¶ 8} Respondent stipulated and the board concluded that respondent’s 
conduct in Count I violated the following Rules of Professional Conduct: 1.3 (a 
lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a 
client), 3.4(c) (a lawyer shall not knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules 
of a tribunal), 8.4(c) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving fraud, deceit, 
dishonesty, or misrepresentation), 8.4(d) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct 
                                                          
 
1.  Respondent was suspended on December 3, 2007, and his law license was reinstated on April 
29, 2008.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice), and 8.4(h) (a lawyer shall not 
engage in conduct that adversely reflects upon fitness to practice law). 
{¶ 9} Although respondent stipulated that his conduct also violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 (a lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client), the 
board concluded that  respondent’s conduct did not violate that rule.  The board 
noted, “ ‘Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 requires a lawyer to “provide competent representation 
to a client.”  “Competent representation” under the rule requires “the legal 
knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the 
representation.” ’ ” Quoting Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Lawson, 119 Ohio St.3d 58, 
2008-Ohio-3340, 891 N.E.2d 7419, ¶ 46.  The board also noted that this court has 
also stated that “competent representation” means that “the lawyer must apply the 
knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the 
representation.”  (Emphasis added.)   Disciplinary Counsel v. Lentes, 120 Ohio 
St.3d 431, 2008-Ohio-6355, 900 N.E.2d 167, ¶ 13. 
{¶ 10} The board concluded that Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 focuses on whether a 
lawyer is competently prepared to handle a legal matter and found that respondent 
possessed the requisite experience to be regarded as competent to handle probate 
matters.  Moreover, the board concluded that there was no evidence that any of 
the work completed by respondent in the Seibel estate was not prepared in 
accordance with applicable legal standards.  We agree and accept these findings 
of misconduct. 
Count II – The Graham Matter 
{¶ 11} In July 2006, Donald Graham hired respondent to represent him in 
the administration of his wife’s estate and paid him a $500 fee.  On January 13, 
2008, the probate court issued a citation requesting that respondent file a report of 
distribution and evidence of the recording of a certificate of transfer.  The court 
scheduled a status conference on February 20, 2008, to address the issue, but 
respondent failed to respond to the court’s citation and failed to appear at the 
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
status conference.  As a result, the court scheduled a show-cause hearing in March 
2008, at which he failed to appear.  The probate court issued an order in March 
2008 finding respondent in contempt.  In January 2009, respondent filed a motion 
to reopen the estate, and the probate court approved the filing of the report of 
distribution and found that respondent’s actions cured the contempt. 
{¶ 12} Respondent stipulated and the board concluded that respondent’s 
conduct in Count II violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, 8.4(d), and 8.4(h). 
{¶ 13} Again, although respondent stipulated that the conduct also 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.1, the board concluded that respondent’s conduct did not 
violate the rule.  The board stated that it was unable to conclude by clear and 
convincing evidence that respondent violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 simply by his 
failure to timely file the required report of distribution.  We agree and accept 
these findings of misconduct. 
Sanction 
{¶ 14} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the duties violated by the lawyer in question and 
sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  Before making a final 
determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
listed in Section 10 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on 
Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”). Lake Cty. Bar Assn. v. Troy, 121 Ohio St.3d 51, 
2009-Ohio-502, 901 N.E.2d 809, ¶ 11. 
{¶ 15} We have identified respondent's breaches of duties owed to his 
clients, the legal profession, and the judicial system.  In respondent’s case, the 
board found two aggravating factors.  The board found that respondent’s 
misconduct involved multiple offenses, BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(d), and that 
respondent failed to make restitution, BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(i). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
{¶ 16} The board found three mitigating factors.  First, the board found 
that respondent has no prior disciplinary record, BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a).  
Second, the board found that respondent cooperated fully in the disciplinary 
process, BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(d).  Finally, the board found that respondent’s 
chemical dependence was a mitigating factor, BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g), 
because the evidence supported the following requisites of that rule:  (1) a 
diagnosis of a chemical dependence by a qualified health-care professional or 
alcohol/substance-abuse counselor, (2) a determination that the chemical 
dependence contributed to cause the misconduct, (3) a certification of successful 
ongoing compliance with an approved treatment program, and (4) a prognosis 
from a qualified alcohol/substance-abuse counselor that respondent will be able to 
return to competent, ethical professional practice under specified conditions.  The 
board further found that respondent fully acknowledged the wrongful nature of 
his conduct and fully accepted responsibility for the consequences of his 
misconduct. 
{¶ 17} As for respondent’s chemical dependence, the parties stipulated 
that respondent was diagnosed as suffering from chemical dependence based on 
his addiction to marijuana, alcohol, and cocaine.  Respondent had completed a 
partial hospitalization program and an intensive outpatient chemical-dependence 
program. Respondent had also entered into a five-year contract with the Ohio 
Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”).  Respondent is in compliance with his 
contract and currently in treatment with psychologist John A. Tarpey, Ph.D.  
Moreover, respondent entered a one-year aftercare program. 
{¶ 18} Respondent had a relapse in December 2008, but had maintained a 
sustained, uninterrupted period of sobriety from December 12, 2008, to at least 
the time of the stipulations.  Dr. Tarpey and Carolyn Sellers, a licensed social 
worker and chemical-dependence counselor, stated her opinion that respondent’s 
chemical dependence contributed to the cause of his misconduct, that 
January Term, 2010 
7 
 
respondent’s prognosis was positive, and that he could return to the competent, 
ethical practice of law so long as he continued his treatment, complied with his 
OLAP contract, and maintained his sobriety.  In addition, Stephanie Krznarich, a 
licensed social worker with OLAP, testified in mitigation that respondent’s 
compliance was “going very, very well.”  She also testified that in her opinion, 
respondent’s chemical dependence contributed to cause his misconduct.  She also 
testified that with continued treatment, medications, and monitoring, he should be 
able to successfully return to the practice of law. 
{¶ 19} The board adopted the stipulated sanction that respondent’s license 
to practice law be suspended for 24 months with the last 18 months stayed on the 
following conditions:  (1) that respondent remain in compliance with his five-year 
OLAP contract, (2) that respondent pay $9,634.27 in restitution to the Seibel 
estate or the beneficiaries thereof, as ordered by the Probate Court of Licking 
County, (3) that respondent’s practice be monitored in accordance with Gov.Bar 
R. V(9) by an attorney designated by relator for the period of respondent’s stayed 
suspension, (4) that respondent not engage in any further misconduct during the 
entire 24-month suspension, and (5) that respondent pay the costs of the 
prosecution of this action. 
Review 
{¶ 20} Regarding sanctions in similar cases, we find Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Greco, 107 Ohio St.3d 155, 2005-Ohio-6045, 837 N.E.2d 369, to be instructive.  
In that case, the attorney neglected clients, deceived clients, and was slow to 
refund unearned retainers.  Greco experienced similar chemical dependence and 
also successfully completed treatment programs and cooperated with the 
disciplinary process.  We suspended the lawyer's license for two years but stayed 
18 months of the suspension on condition that the lawyer receive assistance in his 
recovery from chemical dependence. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
{¶ 21} Accordingly, we accept the board’s recommendation.  Respondent 
is therefore suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for two years, with 18 
months of the suspension stayed on the conditions listed above.  If respondent 
fails to comply with the terms of the stay, the stay will be lifted, and respondent 
will serve the entire two years.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Robert R. Berger, 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
J. Michael Nicks, pro se. 
______________________