Title: Ridgeway v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Darrin Bernard Ridgeway v. State
September Term, 2001,  No. 102
[Issue: When a trial court erroneously sentences the defendant for a crime for which the
defendant was acquitted, may the trial court, pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-345, recall the
parties to vacate the illegal sentence and re-sentence the defendant.  Held: Maryland Rule 4-
345(a) is implicated when the initial sentence is illegal.  An illegal sentence my be corrected
at any time; the sentencing court’s decision to recall the parties was necessary to correct the
illegal sentence and the subsequent sentences for crimes for which the defendant was
convicted were legally imposed.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 102
September Term, 2001
DARRIN BERNARD RIDGEWAY
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Raker and Wilner, JJ., concur
Filed:   May 8, 2002
We are tasked to clarify the scope of authority that Maryland Rule 4-345 vests in the
trial court to correct illegal sentences.  The petitioner, convicted of two counts of first degree
assault and three counts of reckless endangerment, was initially (and erroneously) sentenced
for five counts of first degree assault.  Having been advised of the error, the trial judge
recalled the parties, vacated the sentences for three of the first-degree assault charges and
imposed sentences for three reckless endangerment counts.  The petitioner requests that this
Court consider whether the actions taken by the trial court were legal pursuant to Rule 4-345.
I.
Background
At 4:00 a.m. on July 22, 1998, the petitioner, Darrin Bernard Ridgeway, discharged
a twelve-gauge shotgun three times into a mobile home in Laurel, Maryland.  Two
individuals, Richard Morgan Kinney and Beth Hanning, were struck in the legs as they slept.
Three young girls also were present in the trailer home at the time of the shooting; although
terrified by the shotgun blasts, they were not injured in the attack.
The petitioner alleged that the shooting was in retaliation for a kidnaping and assault
initiated a few weeks earlier by three men, known to him as Man, Shawn and Pete, who
accused the petitioner of stealing Seven Thousand Dollars worth of crack cocaine from them.
The petitioner reported the assault to the Howard County Police Department on July 11,
1998, and explained to the authorities that his assaulters were involved in a drug distribution
organization.  The petitioner also gave additional information about several other people
involved in the selling of crack cocaine, including disclosing to police officials that one of
the victims, Richard Morgan Kinney, often allowed the three men to use his trailer home and
2
car for the distribution of drugs.
During the interim between the assault allegedly inflicted upon the petitioner and the
petitioner’s attacks on the trailer home and its occupants, the petitioner stayed with two
friends who ultimately testified that he informed them of his intention to kill the men who
had kidnaped and threatened him.  The friends also testified that the petitioner came to them
after the shootings of July 22, 1998 and informed them of his actions, specifically that the
petitioner fired a shotgun through the front door of an apartment that he believed the three
men used, and then went to Kinney’s trailer and fired three times into it. 
Among other related charges, the petitioner was indicted for five counts of first degree
assault and five counts of reckless endangerment related to the two adults and three children
in Kinney’s trailer home.  On October 27, 1999, following a jury trial in the Circuit Court for
Howard County, the petitioner was convicted of two counts of first degree assault (for the
assault on Richard Morgan Kinney and Beth Hanning) and three counts of reckless
endangerment (one for each girl in the vicinity of the shotgun blast ). 
At the subsequent sentencing hearing on April 20, 2000, the trial judge imposed
consecutive sentences on five counts of first degree assault.  The judge stated, in relevant
part: 
All right, sentence is as follows: As to count one, Mr. Kinney –
I’m satisfied that Mr. Kinney was in the drug business.  He
associated with drug people and, uh, that’s how Mr. Ridgeway
knew him and knew about his trailer.  But even Mr. Kinney,
even Mr. Kinney is entitled to be protected from being shot
down in the middle of the night.  So as to count one, the
1
The trial judge indicated that some of the confusion may have resulted from the fact
that the charges on the verdict sheet were reversed from the order in which the counts
appeared in the indictment.  The counts in the indictment were grouped with respect to each
victim, beginning with all charges for assault, reckless endangerment, etc. against Kinney and
progressing to the charges against Hanning and the three young girls.  The counts in the
verdict sheet, however, were grouped with respect to each crime and progressed from the
least severe charges to the most severe charges, irrespective of the victim against whom the
crime was perpetrated.  
3
sentence is five years in the Department of Corrections.  Now
we get to all the innocent people.  Count five, as to Beth Ann
Hanning, the sentence is ten years, that sentence to run
consecutive to the count one.  As to nine, as to count nine, that’s
as to little Erica Kirkbirde, the sentence is ten years in the
Department of Corrections, that sentence to run consecutive to
count five.  Sentence is as to count thirteen, count thirteen is
little Erica Tyler-Thornburg, the sentence is ten years to run
consecutively to the sentence imposed in count nine.  As to
count seventeen, that’s little. . . Danielle Tyler- Thornburg . . .
the sentence is ten years in the Department of Corrections, that
sentence to run consecutive to the sentence imposed in count
thirteen.  And as to count twenty-two, the malicious destruction
of property, the Court will suspend the imposition of sentence
generally. The Court regards the other counts as to second
degree and reckless endangerment as merged.  Total of forty-
five years to be served in the Department of Corrections. 
After the sentence was imposed, the petitioner was advised of his post-trial rights and the
parties were excused.  Upon discovering a discrepancy between the verdict sheet and the
commitment record, the clerk’s office notified the trial judge of the error.  Three hours after
the parties were dismissed, the trial judge recalled the parties to correct the apparent error.1
The court had imposed sentences for the first degree assault charges with respect to each of
the children who were in the trailer when the petitioner shot into the trailer home.  The jury,
4
however, had acquitted the petitioner of these charges.   The court explained that it regarded
“the imposition of sentence in a count for which Mr. Ridgeway was found not guilty to be
an illegal sentence.”  Therefore, to correct the illegal sentence, the court struck the three ten-
year consecutive sentences for first degree assault upon the young girls and imposed three
five-year consecutive sentences for each count of reckless endangerment for the young girls.
Defense counsel noted an objection to any re-sentencing on the reckless endangerment
counts.
The petitioner appealed his sentences on the reckless endangerment counts to the
Court of Special Appeals arguing that the new sentences amounted to an increase from zero
years to five years for each count in violation of Rule 4-345.  The Court of Special Appeals
disagreed and affirmed the sentences imposed by the Circuit Court.  See Ridgeway v. State,
140 Md. App. 49, 779 A.2d 1031 (2001).  The petitioner sought, and we granted, a writ of
certiorari to consider the propriety of the trial judge’s imposition of five-year sentences for
each of petitioner’s three reckless endangerment  convictions after the vacatur of the prior
ten-year sentences for each first degree assault.
II.
Discussion
A court’s revisory power with respect to the sentencing of a criminal defendant is
provided in Maryland Rule 4-345, which states in part: 
(a) Illegal sentence.  The court may correct an illegal sentence
at any time.
(b) Modification or reduction – Time for.  The court has
revisory power and control over a sentence upon a motion filed
5
within 90 days after its imposition (1) in the District Court, if an
appeal has not been perfected, and (2) in a circuit court, whether
or not an appeal has been filed.  Thereafter, the court has
revisory power and control over the sentence in case of fraud,
mistake, or irregularity, or as provided in section (e) of this
Rule.  The court may not increase a sentence after the sentence
has been imposed, except that it may correct an evident mistake
in the announcement of a sentence if the correction is made on
the record before the defendant leaves the courtroom following
the sentencing proceeding.  
The dispute in this case, and the decisional issue before this Court, is whether the trial
judge’s correction of the petitioner’s sentence was pursuant to subsection (a) or subsection
(b) of Rule 4-345.  This distinction is of obvious significance because, as the Rule itself
states, an illegal sentence may be corrected at any time, while correcting a mistake in a
sentencing order that results in an increased sentence may only occur “before the defendant
leaves the courtroom following the sentencing proceedings.”  Rule 4-345(a) and (b). 
The petitioner argues that when the trial court recalled the parties after the initial
sentencing hearing, it was modifying a “mistake in the announcement of a sentence” pursuant
to subsection (b) of the Rule.  The petitioner claims that he was, in essence, sentenced to zero
years of imprisonment for the three reckless endangerment convictions initially, but that his
sentence was increased to a total of fifteen years after the court’s recall of the parties.
Because the petitioner had left the courtroom following the initial sentencing proceeding, the
Rule, the petitioner claims, prohibited the subsequent increase in the sentence.  
The State argues, and the Court of Special Appeals agreed, that subsection (b) was
inapplicable under the circumstances of this case because when the trial court recalled the
6
parties, it was correcting an illegal sentence pursuant to subsection (a) rather than modifying
the petitioner’s sentence pursuant to subsection (b).  
We agree with the State and affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. 
The sentences for the three first degree assault convictions were illegal and properly vacated
pursuant to subsection(a) of Rule 4-345.  A court cannot punish a defendant for a crime for
which he or she has been acquitted.  Thus, the court’s re-sentencing on the reckless
endangerment counts was not to correct a mistake, but rather, it was to correct this illegal
sentence.  
As we have oft stated, the legality of a sentence may be determined at any time, even
on appeal. See Rule 4-345(a); see also State v. Kanaras, 357 Md. 170, 183-84, 742 A.2d 508,
516 (1999); State v. Griffiths, 338 Md. 485, 496, 659 A.2d 876, 882 (1995); Matthews v.
State, 304 Md. 281, 288, 498 A.2d 655, 658 (1985)(quoting Walczak v. State, 302 Md. 422,
427, 488 A.2d 949, 951 (1985)).  In Walczak v. State, 302 Md. 422, 488 A.2d 949 (1985),
we explained that, “when the trial court has allegedly imposed a sentence not permitted by
law, the issue should ordinarily be reviewed on direct appeal even if no objection was made
in the trial court.  Such review and correction of an illegal sentence is especially appropriate
in light of the fact that Rule 4-345(a) . . . provides that ‘[t]he court may correct an illegal
sentence at any time.’” Id. at 427, 488 A.2d at 951.   Thus, the trial court’s actions were well
within its authority as prescribed by Rule 4-345(a).  In fact, had the trial court not acted to
correct the illegal sentence, the Court of Special Appeals and this Court would have similar
7
authority to correct the petitioner’s sentence by vacating and remanding to the trial court for
resentencing.
The petitioner incorrectly attempts to apply our holding in State v. Sayre, 314 Md.
559, 552 A.2d 553 (1989), to the circumstances in his case.  The factual basis for the Sayre
holding is exemplary of that which was intended to be prohibited under subsection (b), and
a brief discussion of the differences will assist in distinguishing and clarifying the factual
predicate for rulings pursuant to subsections (a) and (b).  The defendant in Sayre was
convicted of assaulting a prison guard; at sentencing, the trial court inadvertently sentenced
the defendant to serve a five-year sentence “concurrent with,” rather than “consecutive to,”
the sentences he was already serving.  Id. at 560-61, 552 A.2d at 553-54.  The prosecutor
informed the court of the mistake within moments of the initial sentencing; the court
thereafter re-called the defendant to modify the sentence to run “consecutive to” any term he
was presently serving and explained that it had “meant to say consecutively” when the
sentence was first imposed.  Id. at 561, 552 A.2d at 554. 
Because, with respect to a modification – and particularly an increase – of a legal
sentence,  it is not always possible “to distinguish between an inadvertent slip of the tongue
and a true change of mind,” id. at 564, 552 A.2d at 555, and because we were “unwilling to
allow a procedure that [would] permit an inquiry of the sentencing judge’s subjective intent,”
id. at 565, 552 A.2d at 556, we held that “once sentence has been imposed, there can be no
2
At the time of the Sayre decision, Rule 4-345(b) provided that a “court may modify
or reduce or strike, but may not increase the length of, a sentence” once it has been imposed.
See Sayre, 314 Md. at 560, 552 A.2d at 553.  The Rule was thereafter amended, in 1992, to
permit a limited opportunity for a sentencing judge to correct the pronouncement of a
sentence, provided that the error was corrected on the record before the defendant left the
courtroom.  
8
inquiry into intention or inadvertence” under Rule 4-345(b).  Id.2 
Contrary to the case at hand, it is clear that the Sayre sentencing court attempted to
correct a mistake or a “slip of the tongue” rather than correct an illegal sentence because,
quite simply, the original sentence was not illegal.  Thus, the trial court in Sayre was bound
by Rule 4-345(b) and not Rule 4-345(a).  See Sayre, 314 Md. at 561-62 n.1, 552 A.2d at 554
n.1.  In the case sub judice, however, the trial court erroneously sentenced the petitioner for
crimes for which he was not convicted; additionally, the reckless endangerment convictions
were erroneously merged with non-existent first-degree assault “convictions.”  
We digress momentarily to comment on an argument primarily made to and addressed
by the Court of Special Appeals regarding the petitioner’s contention that the failure to
sentence the petitioner on the reckless endangerment counts amounted to a sentence of zero
years.  We agree with our  colleagues in the intermediate appellate court that the failure to
sentence for the reckless endangerment count, or the merger of that count with the first
degree assault count, does not amount to a sentence of zero years for reckless endangerment.
See Ridgeway, 140 Md. App. at 61, 779 A.2d at 1038.  Again, in the case at bar, the trial
judge initially merged the reckless endangerment counts with the first-degree assault charges,
9
of which the defendant was not convicted.  The merger of petitioner’s charges is unlike the
situation with which we were presented in Fabian v. State, 235 Md. 306, 313, 201 A.2d 511,
515 (1964), where the defendant was convicted on three counts involving a warehouse break-
in but the judge only sentenced him on one of those counts.  We held that the failure to
impose a sentence on the two counts may be treated as a suspended sentence for purposes of
allowing the defendant to appeal those convictions. Id.  The trial court in the case sub judice
did not suspend sentence on the reckless endangerment counts altogether, nor did it sentence
the petitioner to zero years for those counts; rather the record in this case unequivocally
shows that the trial court (1) erroneously imposed a sentence based on the acquitted first-
degree assault counts and (2) erroneously, and arguably impossibly, merged the reckless
endangerment convictions with the counts of first-degree assault, for which the petitioner
was acquitted.  It is patently obvious that the court’s initial sentences constituted illegal
sentences and not merely a mistaken pronouncement of a legal sentence.  Thus, Rule 4-
345(a) is the applicable provision, as the sentencing court’s decision to recall the parties was
unequivocally and necessarily to correct the illegal sentence.  The petitioner’s subsequent
sentences for the reckless endangerment counts  were legally imposed.  We affirm the
judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS AFFIRMED WITH COSTS.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 102
September Term, 2001
______________________________________
DARRIN BERNARD RIDGEWAY
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
   JJ.
______________________________________
Concurring opinion by Wilner, J.,
in which Raker, J., joins
______________________________________
Filed:    May 8, 2002
I concur in the result.  I write separately because, although the Court reaches the right
result, it has not adequately addressed the issue actually raised by the petitioner.  
As a result of shooting into the trailer occupied by five persons – two adults and three
children –  Ridgeway was charged with five counts, each, of first degree assault, second
degree assault, attempted first degree murder, and reckless endangerment, and two counts
of malicious destruction of property (one over $300 and one under $300).  With respect to
the two adults, the jury convicted him of first and second degree assault and reckless
endangerment.  As to the three children, the jury acquitted him of the assaults and convicted
only of reckless endangerment.  It also convicted of malicious destruction of property under
$300.  Notwithstanding the acquittals on three of the first and second degree assault charges,
the court imposed five consecutive sentences for first degree assault – five years with respect
to the male adult victim and ten years each with respect to the female adult and the three
children.  The court suspended imposition of sentence on the malicious destruction of
property conviction and said that it regarded the other counts of second degree assault and
reckless endangerment as merged.
When apprised that Ridgeway had been acquitted of the assault charges with respect
to the children, the court struck the sentences imposed on those counts as illegal and entered
consecutive sentences of five years each on the reckless endangerment convictions.  In this
appeal, Ridgeway construes the court’s initial action as a merger of the reckless
endangerment convictions into the assault convictions and thus as a deliberate decision not
to impose any sentence on the former.  From that, he argues that, when the court later
-2-
imposed the five-year sentences, it was effectively increasing the sentences from zero to five
years, which, under the circumstances, Maryland Rule 4-345(b) forbids.
This Court finds no error in the reckless endangerment sentences, and I agree with that
conclusion.  It reaches that result, however, by treating the entire matter as simply the
correction of illegal sentences.  In so doing, it inappropriately collapses two different issues
into one.  Certainly, the striking of the three sentences imposed for assaulting the children
represented the correction of illegal sentences.  One cannot impose a sentence upon a charge
of which the defendant was acquitted.  That left the court with three reckless endangerment
convictions for which no sentence had yet been imposed.  To the extent that the court had
previously announced a merger of those convictions, no such merger could lawfully have
occurred as to the three counts involving the children, as there were no assault convictions
into which they could be merged.  That is a simple point, but it is one that should be made,
as it lies at the heart of Ridgeway’s argument.  At that point, the court could, if it wished,
have declined to enter any sentence on the reckless endangerment convictions.  It was not
compelled, as part of correcting the illegal sentences imposed on the assault convictions, to
do anything with respect to the reckless endangerment convictions. The imposition of lawful
sentences upon those three reckless endangerment convictions, therefore, was not part of or
justified by the correction of any illegal sentence but was simply the act of entering initial
sentences upon convictions for which no sentences had yet been imposed.  That is why the
sentences are lawful – the same as if the court had initially deferred imposing sentence on
-3-
those convictions.
Judge Raker has authorized me to state that she joins in this concurring opinion.