Title: Erwin v. Bryan

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Erwin v. Bryan, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-2202.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-2202 
ERWIN, ADMR., APPELLEE, v. BRYAN ET AL.; SWOGER ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Erwin v. Bryan, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-2202.] 
Civ.R. 15 — Name of party unknown — Pursuant to Civ.R. 15(D), a complaint 
against a party whose name is unknown must describe the defendant and a 
summons containing the words “name unknown” must be personally 
served on the defendant — Civ.R. 15(D) does not authorize a claimant to 
designate defendants using fictitious names as placeholders in a complaint 
filed within the statute-of-limitations period and then identify, name, and 
personally serve those defendants after the limitations period has elapsed. 
(No. 2009-0580 — Submitted January 12, 2010 — Decided May 25, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Tuscarawas County, 
No. 08-CA-28, 2009-Ohio-758. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
1. Pursuant to Civ.R. 15(D), a complaint against a party whose name is unknown 
must describe the defendant and a summons containing the words “name 
unknown” must be personally served on the defendant. 
2. Civ.R. 15(D) does not authorize a claimant to designate defendants using 
fictitious names as placeholders in a complaint filed within the statute-of-
limitations period and then identify, name, and personally serve those 
defendants after the limitations period has elapsed. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} Civ.R. 15(D) provides that when a plaintiff does not know the 
name of a defendant, the defendant may be designated in a complaint by any 
name and description.  It also provides, however, that a plaintiff must aver in the 
complaint that the name of the defendant could not be discovered, that the 
summons issued contain the words “name unknown,” and that a copy of the 
summons be personally served on the defendant. 
{¶ 2} Civ.R. 15(D) cannot be used to prosecute this action against 
William V. Swoger, D.O., and his professional corporation, Union Internal 
Medicine Specialties, Inc. (“UIMS”), because at all times relevant to this 
proceeding the claimant, Cora Erwin, knew Swoger’s name.  Even if she did not 
know his name, the effort to use Civ.R. 15(D) to designate Swoger and UIMS as 
John Doe defendants did not meet the requirements of the rule in that the 
description of the John Doe defendants did not provide sufficient identification to 
permit a copy of the summons containing the words “name unknown” to be 
personally served upon Swoger or UIMS.  And, in fact, no summons containing 
the words “name unknown” was ever issued or personally served. 
{¶ 3} Rather, Cora attempted to use Civ.R. 15(D) to name, without 
adequately describing, John Doe defendants; she did not request that summons 
issue containing the words “name unknown”; nor did she serve such a summons 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
on any party. After the two-year statute of limitations for wrongful death had 
expired, Cora learned during the discovery deposition of Joseph E. Bryan, M.D., 
of Swoger’s possible culpability.  Cora then amended the complaint to add 
Swoger and UIMS, whom she identified as two of the John Doe defendants 
named in the original complaint.  This, however, is an improper use of the rule.  
Pursuant to Civ.R. 15(D), a complaint against a party whose name is unknown 
must describe the defendant and a summons containing the words “name 
unknown” must be personally served on the defendant. 
{¶ 4} To construe the rule to allow the use of placeholders for 
unidentified defendants would eliminate the statute of limitations for every cause 
of action.  That is not the purpose of Civ.R. 15(D), and any indication that such a 
use is sanctioned by the court is disavowed.  The Rules of Civil Procedure are 
promulgated to govern the procedural aspects of litigation.  Establishing state 
policy, including imposing a statute of limitations for a cause of action such as 
wrongful death, is the province of the legislative, not the judicial, branch of 
government.  Neither the Rules of Civil Procedure nor our case law ought be 
interpreted or understood to set policy or change existing statutes of limitation for 
causes of action. 
{¶ 5} For these reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, 
and the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of 
Swoger and UIMS is reinstated. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 6} On June 29, 2004, 52-year-old Russell Erwin awoke after midnight 
appearing feverish and disoriented, and he began to convulse.  His wife, Cora, 
called 9-1-1.  Paramedics responded, found Erwin unconscious, and transported 
him to Union Hospital, where he entered the intensive care unit (“ICU”) as a 
patient of Joseph E. Bryan, M.D, who was on call at the hospital at that time.  
Because Erwin remained unconscious and seizing, Bryan ordered him sedated. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
{¶ 7} Bryan also sought a consultation by William V. Swoger, D.O., to 
evaluate Erwin’s intermittent airway obstruction, and, in his report, Bryan noted 
that Erwin had a family history of deep venous thrombosis and pulmonary 
embolism.  However, Bryan’s impression was that Erwin suffered from alcohol 
withdrawal syndrome. 
{¶ 8} Swoger inserted a breathing tube for Erwin because of the upper 
airway obstruction, which Swoger believed had been caused by the sedation and 
Erwin’s unresponsiveness. Cora, a housekeeping employee at the hospital, 
recognized Swoger and observed him caring for her husband.  On the basis of his 
examination and his discussion with Bryan, Swoger diagnosed Erwin as suffering 
from acute respiratory failure.  His report concluded: “Critical care time was 80 
minutes.  Thanks for allowing [me] to participate in his care. I will follow him in 
the ICU setting and give further advice as warranted.” 
{¶ 9} Bryan continued to treat Erwin for alcohol withdrawal syndrome, 
and as hospital staff ceased sedating him, Erwin regained consciousness, and the 
breathing tube was removed.  When Erwin’s condition improved, Paul W. 
McFadden, M.D., his family doctor, assumed responsibility for his care.  
McFadden discharged Erwin from the hospital on July 6, 2004, and prepared a 
report in which he indicated a diagnosis of seizures secondary to alcoholic 
withdrawal.  In his report, McFadden noted that “Dr. Swoger was consulted who 
assisted in helping manage the respirator.” 
{¶ 10} While recovering at home the next week, Erwin continued to 
experience fatigue and complained of nausea.  On July 15, 2004, his wife heard a 
loud noise coming from another room and discovered Erwin convulsing on the 
floor.  She called 9-1-1, but when paramedics arrived, they found him 
unresponsive and without a pulse.  They transported him to Union Hospital, 
where attempts at resuscitation proved unsuccessful.  Cora alleges that an autopsy 
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
revealed a massive and fatal pulmonary thromboembolism with evidence of both 
recent and organizing peripheral thromboemboli. 
{¶ 11} On July 10, 2006, a few days before the expiration of the statute of 
limitations for wrongful death, Cora, individually and as administrator of her 
husband’s estate, filed a complaint against Bryan, his professional corporation, 
the Union Hospital Association, “John Doe, M.D. No. 1 through 5 (whose real 
names and addresses are unknown at the time of filing this Complaint despite 
Plaintiffs’ Best and Reasonable Efforts to Ascertain Same),” and the professional 
corporations of each John Doe, M.D., alleging that the medical providers 
negligently failed to timely diagnose and treat Erwin for the pulmonary embolism, 
resulting in his death.  Significantly, no John Doe defendant was personally 
served with a summons containing the words “name unknown” before the 
expiration of the statute of limitations. 
{¶ 12} On September 21, 2006, Cora received the Union Hospital medical 
records.  In his deposition on February 7, 2007, Bryan revealed that he had 
consulted with Swoger to evaluate Erwin’s respiratory status and that he and 
Swoger understood that Swoger would manage Erwin’s critical care. 
{¶ 13} Thereafter, on June 29, 2007, Cora moved to amend her complaint 
to substitute Swoger and UIMS, for John Doe, M.D., and John Doe, M.D., 
Professional Corporation, asserting that she had only recently learned of Swoger’s 
role in her husband’s care during the discovery deposition of Bryan. She served 
the summons and complaint on Swoger and UIMS on June 29, 2007. 
{¶ 14} The trial court granted leave to amend the complaint, and Cora 
filed an amended complaint.  A week later, she filed an affidavit of Joseph 
Caprini, M.D., who averred that he had reviewed Erwin’s medical records and 
that in his professional opinion Union Hospital, Bryan, and Swoger breached the 
standard of care and caused the alleged injuries. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
{¶ 15} The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Swoger and 
UIMS, finding that the claims were time-barred and that Civ.R. 15(D) did not 
apply. 
{¶ 16} On appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeals reversed, holding 
that a plaintiff who is unaware of the culpability of a particular person at the time 
of filing the complaint may rely on Civ.R. 15(D) to designate a defendant by a 
fictitious name, explaining that “a person’s name may be ‘known’ to a plaintiff, 
but be ‘unknown’ as a defendant for purposes of litigation.” Erwin v. Bryan, 
Tuscarawas App. No. 08-CA-28, 2009-Ohio-758, ¶ 36.  Based on this reasoning, 
the court concluded that until Cora deposed Bryan, “she had no reason to believe 
that Swoger’s conduct was potentially negligent.”  Id. at ¶ 37. 
{¶ 17} Swoger and UIMS appealed that decision to this court, contending 
that Cora’s first amended complaint does not relate back to the filing of the 
original complaint and is therefore barred by the two-year statute of limitations 
for wrongful-death actions.  They further contend that Civ.R. 15(D) does not 
permit her to designate Swoger by a fictitious name because she knew both his 
name and his involvement in her husband’s care at the time she filed the original 
complaint.  Instead, they maintain that she had a duty to identify all potential 
tortfeasors prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, and that her lack of 
diligence in seeking counsel, obtaining medical records, and determining 
Swoger’s potential culpability has resulted in her complaint being time-barred. 
{¶ 18} In this court, Cora maintains that the first amended complaint 
naming Swoger and UIMS relates back to her timely filed original complaint.  
She asserts that a plaintiff does not know the name of a defendant for purposes of 
Civ.R. 15(D) until the plaintiff knows of the culpability of that party.  She notes 
that she did not have all of her husband’s medical records at the time she filed her 
complaint, and she argues that even after receiving those records, “not even a 
clairvoyant could have predicted that Dr. Swoger could be held responsible” until 
January Term, 2010 
7 
 
Bryan “began to deflect blame toward others during his deposition.”  She urges 
the court to hold that a defendant in a medical-malpractice action is “known” for 
purposes of Civ.R. 15(D) when the actionable conduct could have been 
sufficiently understood to permit the plaintiff to obtain an affidavit of merit from 
a medical expert. 
{¶ 19} Cora and amicus curiae Ohio State Bar Association suggest that a 
contrary holding will result in every health-care provider mentioned in a patient’s 
medical records being named in medical-malpractice actions.  However, pursuant 
to Civ.R. 10(D)(2), an affidavit of merit is required to establish the adequacy of a 
medical complaint, and the failure to file an affidavit of merit renders it subject to 
dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  See 
Fletcher v. Univ. Hosps. of Cleveland, 120 Ohio St.3d 167, 2008-Ohio-5379, 897 
N.E.2d 147, ¶ 13.  The affidavit-of-merit requirement thus prevents the filing of 
medical claims that are not supported by an expert’s opinion, and it deters filing 
actions against all medical providers who cared for a patient. 
{¶ 20} Accordingly, in this case, we focus our attention on the use of 
Civ.R. 15(D) to name a John Doe defendant in a complaint and to later amend 
that complaint after the expiration of the statute of limitations to identify and 
serve a new party to the action. 
Amendment Where the Name of a Defendant is Unknown 
{¶ 21} Civ.R. 15(D) provides: “When the plaintiff does not know the name 
of a defendant, that defendant may be designated in a pleading or proceeding by 
any name and description. When the name is discovered, the pleading or 
proceeding must be amended accordingly. The plaintiff, in such case, must aver in 
the complaint the fact that he could not discover the name. The summons must 
contain the words ‘name unknown,’ and a copy thereof must be served personally 
upon the defendant.”  (Emphasis added.)   
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
{¶ 22} As we explained in State ex rel. Law Office of Montgomery Cty. 
Pub. Defender v. Rosencrans, 111 Ohio St.3d 338, 2006-Ohio-5793, 856 N.E.2d 
250, ¶ 23, “To interpret court rules, this court applies general principles of 
statutory construction.  * * * Therefore, we must read undefined words or phrases 
in context and then construe them according to rules of grammar and common 
usage.”  If a court rule is unambiguous, we apply it as written.  State ex rel. Potts 
v. Comm. on Continuing Legal Edn. (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 452, 456, 755 N.E.2d 
886. 
{¶ 23} According to its unambiguous language, Civ.R. 15(D) provides 
that a plaintiff may designate a defendant in a complaint by any name and 
description when the plaintiff does not know the name of that party.  Thus, Civ.R. 
15(D) does not permit a plaintiff to designate a defendant by a fictitious name 
when the plaintiff actually knows the name of that defendant.  Further, when a 
plaintiff designates a defendant by a fictitious name, Civ.R. 15(D) requires that 
the plaintiff provide a description of the defendant in the pleadings and aver in the 
complaint the fact that the plaintiff could not discover the name.  The rule also 
directs that the summons contain the words “name unknown” and be personally 
served on the defendant. 
{¶ 24} We previously construed Civ.R. 15(D) in Varno v. Bally Mfg. 
Co. (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 21, 19 OBR 18, 482 N.E.2d 342, holding that “the 
application of Civ.R. 15(D) is limited to those cases in which the defendant’s 
identity and whereabouts are known to the plaintiff, but the actual name of the 
defendant is unknown.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 24. We explained: “Civ.R. 
15(D) is clear; the complaint must sufficiently identify the unknown defendant so 
that personal service can be obtained upon filing the lawsuit.”  Id. 
{¶ 25} Our holding in Varno has been superseded on other grounds by an 
amendment to Civ.R. 3(A), but it should be noted that Civ.R. 15(D) has not been 
January Term, 2010 
9 
 
amended.1  Further, nowhere in our decision in Amerine v. Haughton Elevator Co. 
(1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 57, 537 N.E.2d 208, in which we suggested that Varno had 
been negated by the amendment to Civ.R. 3(A), did we overrule the holding in 
Varno that Civ.R. 15(D) applies only when the plaintiff has identified but does 
not know the actual name of the defendant.  Rather, Amerine stands only for the 
proposition that a plaintiff may benefit from the one-year period allowed in Civ.R. 
3(A) to perfect personal service upon the fictitiously named defendant if the 
plaintiff has otherwise complied with Civ.R. 15(D) in filing the complaint.  
Amerine, 42 Ohio St.3d at 58; see also LaNeve v. Atlas Recycling, Inc., 119 Ohio 
St.3d 324, 2008-Ohio-3921, 894 N.E.2d 25, ¶ 15 (holding that an amended 
complaint substituting the real name for a fictitiously named defendant does not 
relate back to the filing of the original complaint if the summons does not contain 
the words “name unknown” and is not personally served). 
{¶ 26} The construction of Civ.R. 15(D) that we articulated in Varno 
accords with the principle that a plaintiff has the duty to identify the negligent 
party once an injury has been discovered and the claim has accrued.  As we 
explained in Flowers v. Walker (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 546, 550, 589 N.E.2d 1284, 
“The identity of the practitioner who committed the alleged malpractice is one of 
the facts that the plaintiff must investigate, and discover, once she has reason to 
                                                          
 
1.  In Varno, we also held that “where a complaint is filed which designates certain defendants by 
fictitious names, the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations if the original complaint 
or an amended complaint substituting the actual names of the defendants is not personally served 
within the limitations period.”  Id., at the syllabus.  Subsequent to our decision in Varno, this court 
amended Civ.R. 3(A) to specify that “[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the 
court, if service is obtained within one year from such filing * * * upon a defendant identified by a 
fictitious name whose name is later corrected pursuant to Civ.R. 15(D).”  Thereafter, in Amerine v. 
Haughton Elevator Co. (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 57, 537 N.E.2d 208, we recognized that this 
amendment had “effectively negate[d] our holding in Varno,”  id. at 58, fn. 1., and stated that “the 
use of a fictitious name with subsequent correction, by amendment, of the real name of a 
defendant under Civ.R. 15(D) relates back to the filing of the original complaint and * * * service 
must be obtained within one year of the filing of the original complaint. Under Civ.R. 3(A), as 
amended, service does not have to be made on the formerly fictitious, now identified, defendant 
within the statute of limitations as long as the original complaint has been filed before expiration 
of the statute of limitations.”  Id. at 59. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
believe that she is the victim of medical malpractice.”  Once the claim has 
accrued, the failure of the plaintiff to learn the identity of an allegedly negligent 
party does not delay the running of the statute of limitations.  Id. 
{¶ 27} In promulgating Civ.R. 15(D), we did not relieve a plaintiff of the 
duty to indentify culpable parties, nor did we extend the two-year statute of 
limitations established by R.C. 2125.02(D)(1) for a wrongful-death claim 
premised on medical malpractice when a claimant has not timely identified 
culpable parties. 
{¶ 28} Notably, the Modern Courts Amendment of 1968, Section 5(B), 
Article IV, Ohio Constitution, empowers this court to create rules of practice and 
procedure for the courts of this state.  As we explained in Proctor v. 
Kardassilaris, 115 Ohio St.3d 71, 2007-Ohio-4838, 873 N.E.2d 872, Section 
5(B), Article IV “expressly states that rules created in this manner ‘shall not 
abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.’ ” Id. at ¶ 17.  “Thus, if a rule 
created pursuant to Section 5(B), Article IV conflicts with a statute, the rule will 
control for procedural matters, and the statute will control for matters of 
substantive law.”  Id. 
{¶ 29} The existence and duration of a statute of limitations for a cause of 
action constitutes an issue of public policy for resolution by the legislative branch 
of government as a matter of substantive law.  See Cundall v. U.S. Bank, 122 
Ohio St.3d 188,  2009-Ohio-2523, 909 N.E.2d 1244, ¶ 22; Howard v. 
Allen (1972), 30 Ohio St.2d 130, 137, 59 O.O.2d 148, 283 N.E.2d 167, quoting 
Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson (1945), 325 U.S. 304, 314, 65 S.Ct. 1137, 
89 L.Ed. 1628; see also State v. Slatter (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 452, 455, 20 O.O.3d 
383, 423 N.E.2d 100, fn.4 (“an indicant of substantive law is the magnitude of the 
change in public policy found in a rule or statute”). Cf. State v. Hughes (1975), 41 
Ohio St.2d 208, 70 O.O.2d 395, 324 N.E.2d 731, syllabus (invalidating court rule 
enlarging prosecution’s statutory right of appeal). 
January Term, 2010 
11 
 
{¶ 30} We cannot, through a court rule, alter the General Assembly’s 
policy preferences on matters of substantive law, and Civ.R. 15(D) therefore may 
not be construed to extend the statute of limitations beyond the time period 
established by the General Assembly.  Instead, Civ.R. 15(D) is designed with the 
limited purpose of accommodating a plaintiff who has identified an allegedly 
culpable party but does not know the name of that party at the time of filing a 
complaint.  Thus, Civ.R. 15(D) does not authorize a claimant to designate 
defendants using fictitious names as placeholders in a complaint filed within the 
statute-of-limitations period and then identify, name, and personally serve those 
defendants after the limitations period has elapsed. 
{¶ 31} Accordingly, a plaintiff may use Civ.R. 15(D) to file a complaint 
designating a defendant by any name and designation when the plaintiff does not 
know the name of that defendant, provided that the plaintiff avers in the complaint 
that the name could not be discovered, the summons contains the words “name 
unknown,” and that summons is personally served on the defendant.  Although 
the plaintiff may designate a defendant whose name is unknown by “any name 
and description,” the complaint must nonetheless sufficiently identify that party to 
facilitate obtaining personal service on that defendant upon the filing of the 
complaint. 
Application of Civ.R. 15(D) 
{¶ 32} The complaint here does not satisfy the requirements of Civ.R. 
15(D). 
{¶ 33} First, Cora knew Swoger’s name at the time she filed the original 
complaint by virtue of her employment at Union Hospital, and she recognized 
him when he provided care to her husband.  She also knew that her husband’s 
death may have resulted from malpractice, her duty to investigate the identity of 
alleged tortfeasors arose at that time, and the two-year statute of limitations for 
wrongful-death actions controls the timeliness of the discovery of Swoger’s 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
 
alleged culpability.  Notably, Caprini, the expert who examined records for Cora, 
averred that his review of the medical records supported his opinion that Swoger 
acted negligently.  Because Cora knew Swoger’s name, she did not have the 
option to designate him as a John Doe defendant in the original complaint, 
notwithstanding the fact that she had not identified him as being responsible for 
her husband’s death. 
{¶ 34} Second, even if Cora had not known the names of Swoger or his 
professional corporation, UIMS, the original complaint did not provide a 
description that sufficiently identified either so that personal service could be 
obtained upon the filing of the complaint, as the rule directs.  Cora brought this 
action using the generic description of a doctor licensed in Ohio, whose actions 
caused her husband’s death, and that doctor’s professional corporation.  She 
therefore did not identify an individual or entity that could be personally served 
with the summons as contemplated by Civ.R. 15(D), nor did she attempt personal 
service on the fictitiously named defendants using descriptions provided in her 
complaint. 
{¶ 35} Accordingly, because she failed to comply with Civ.R 15(D), the 
amended complaint does not relate back to the timely filed original complaint, 
and Cora therefore did not commence her action against Swoger and UIMS before 
the statute of limitations expired. 
 
{¶ 36} Lastly, we have considered the views of our dissenting colleague 
and examined the authority on which he relies, Chief Justice Celebrezze’s 
dissenting opinion in Varno.  A careful reading of that dissent reveals that Chief 
Justice Celebrezze’s view comports with our interpretation of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  Notably, Chief Justice Celebrezze stated the following in his dissent: 
{¶ 37} “I agree that Civ.R. 15(D) will not save appellant's complaint as 
that rule is designed to afford relief for a plaintiff who ‘does not know, and is 
unable to discover, defendant's first name. He may file the action against 
January Term, 2010 
13 
 
defendant in defendant's last name and later amend in order to set forth 
defendant's full name.’  Staff Notes to Civ.R. 15(D).  Rule 15(D) is not found in 
the Federal Rules and is but a rule of convenience. Id.”  Varno, 19 Ohio St.3d at 
25, 482 N.E.2d 342 (Celebrezze, C.J.). 
{¶ 38} Thus, the former chief justice has squarely anticipated the issue 
presented in this case and recognized that Civ.R. 15(D) requires the identification 
of a potential defendant prior to filing the complaint.  Civ.R. 15(D) merely allows 
the complaint to be filed and service to made on an identified party whose name is 
not known. 
{¶ 39} However, recognizing that a claimant may not be able to identify 
all culpable parties at the time of filing a complaint, we point out that nothing in 
our opinion should be construed to prevent amendment of a timely filed complaint 
before the expiration of the statute of limitations.  See Civ.R. 15(A) (allowing a 
party to amend a pleading by leave of court); Civ.R. 21 (“Parties may be dropped 
or added by order of the court on motion of any party or of its own initiative at 
any stage of the action and on such terms as are just”); see also Darby v. A-Best 
Prods. Co., 102 Ohio St.3d 410, 2004-Ohio-3720, 811 N.E.2d 1117, ¶ 16, 36-37 
(holding that the trial court has discretion to refuse to allow amendment to add 
new party defendants when the plaintiff’s claims against them are, on their face, 
“wholly futile”).  Nor should this opinion be construed to limit application of 
Civ.R. 34(D), which permits a plaintiff, prior to the filing of an action, to file a 
petition for discovery to ascertain the identity of a potential adverse party, or R.C. 
2317.48, which authorizes an action to discover facts from a potential adverse 
party necessary to file a complaint. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 40} A claimant may use Civ.R. 15(D) to file a complaint designating a 
defendant by any name and designation when the plaintiff has identified but does 
not know the name of that party, provided that the plaintiff avers in the complaint 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
 
that the name of the defendant could not be discovered and a summons containing 
the words “name unknown” is issued and personally served on the defendant.  
Although a plaintiff may designate a defendant whose name is unknown by any 
name and description, the complaint must nonetheless sufficiently identify that 
specific party so that personal service may be made upon its filing. 
{¶ 41} The appellate court decision did not account for the requirements 
of this rule.  Accordingly, that judgment is reversed, and the judgment of the trial 
court is reinstated. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, LANZINGER, and GRENDELL, JJ., 
concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
 
BROWN, C.J., not participating. 
 
DIANE V. GRENDELL, J., of the Eleventh Appellate District, sitting for 
CUPP, J. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 42} "In this case appellant unquestionably filed the complaint within 
the applicable statute of limitations.  The complaint was later amended to include 
the correctly identified defendants but was nevertheless served within one year 
after the original complaint was filed on the defendants originally named and 
those initially described as unknown.  Appellees received the exact same notice 
they would have received had appellant correctly named them in the original 
caption and then served them within the time provided for service in Civ.R. 3(A). 
{¶ 43} "I believe the majority's hypertechnical reading of our Civil Rules, 
to require service on unknown defendants within the statute of limitations, is 
unjustified, as such a construction imposes a greater hardship on a plaintiff who 
can not identify a defendant than on a plaintiff who can identify him.  Rule 3(A) 
January Term, 2010 
15 
 
allows service on a known defendant after the statute of limitations has run so 
long as it is served within one year of the complaint's filing (the action is deemed 
commenced at filing).  However, the majority's inconsistent application of the 
rules' interaction demands service on an unknown defendant prior to the running 
of the statute of limitations and makes no allowance for Civ.R. 3(A)'s post-filing 
period.  Clearly, Rule 15(C) was designed to assist plaintiffs by allowing 
amendments to relate back to the time of the original filing and was not intended 
to add yet another obstacle in the path to the courthouse.  'Because of relation 
back, the intervening statute of limitation does not interfere with the opportunity 
to amend.'  Staff Notes to Civ.R. 15(C)."  (Emphasis sic and footnote omitted.)  
Varno v. Bally Mfg. Co. (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 21, 25-26, 19 OBR 18, 482 N.E.2d 
342 (Celebrezze, C.J., dissenting). 
{¶ 44} I can't offer a more coherent or concise explanation as to why the 
court is as wrong today as it was in 1985.  I dissent. 
__________________ 
 
Paul W. Flowers Co., L.P.A., and Paul W. Flowers; and Becker & 
Mishkind Co., L.P.A., Ronald Margolis, and Jessica A. Perse, for appellee. 
 
Hanna, Campbell & Powell, L.L.P., and Rocco D. Potenza, for appellants. 
 
Marianna Brown Bettman, William K. Weisenberg, and Eugene P. 
Whetzel, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio State Bar Association. 
 
Rourke & Blumenthal, L.L.P., Jonathan K. Stoudt, and Michael J. Rourke, 
urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Association for Justice. 
 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Anne Marie Sferra, and Bridget Purdue Riddell, 
urging reversal for amici curiae Ohio State Medical Association, Ohio Hospital 
Association, and Ohio Osteopathic Association. 
______________________