Title: PEOPLE OF MI V KEITH RICHARD PHILLIPS

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

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Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED AUGUST 7, 2003  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 121545  
KEITH RICHARD PHILLIPS,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
PER CURIAM  
A jury convicted defendant of first- and second-degree  
criminal 
sexual 
conduct. 
MCL 
750.520b(1)(b)(i),  
750.520c(1)(b)(i).  In the Court of Appeals, defendant argued  
that the circuit court erred by denying his motion for new  
trial on the basis that the court had denied him his  
statutory right to a polygraph examination.  The Court of  
Appeals held that defendant had forfeited his right to the  
examination.  We affirm defendant’s conviction for reasons  
other than those stated by the Court of Appeals.  
 
 
I  
On a September afternoon, a police officer on patrol in  
a rural area of Calhoun County noticed a car parked near the  
end of an isolated road. When he stopped to investigate, he  
saw defendant and the victim in the back seat of the vehicle,  
both unclothed below the waist.  Defendant appeared to be  
significantly older than the victim.  When they realized that  
they were being observed, defendant rapidly removed his hand  
from between the complainant’s legs.  After having given them  
time to dress, the officer spoke with each person privately.  
The fourteen-year-old victim told the officer that defendant  
had digitally penetrated her. In addition, the sixty-seven­
year-old defendant admitted that he “shouldn’t have been  
messing around with her.”  The officer advised defendant of  
his Miranda1 rights. After acknowledging that he understood  
those rights, defendant told the officer that he had digitally  
penetrated the victim.2  
1 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d  
694 (1966).  
2 The second count of the information, charging criminal 
sexual conduct in the second-degree, was based on the age of 
the complainant and the fact that she lived in the same 
household as defendant. 
At the time of the offense, 
defendant and his wife were in the process of adopting the 
complainant.  On appeal,  defendant claimed that insufficient  
evidence existed to show that he and the complainant were 
members of the same household.  The Court of Appeals rejected 
this argument.  
2  
Before trial, defendant invoked MCL 776.21(5), which  
provides:  
A defendant who allegedly has committed a 
crime under [MCL 750.520b to 750.520e and MCL 
750.520g] shall be given a polygraph examination 
orlie detector test if the defendant requests it.  
The test was scheduled, but defendant apparently canceled it.  
A second test was scheduled, but the polygraph examiner  
refused to conduct the test without a medical release from  
defendant’s doctor because of defendant’s heart condition.  
Defendant did not raise the polygraph issue further before  
trial.  
After the jury had begun its deliberations, defendant  
objected to the failure to provide the polygraph examination.  
He demanded a polygraph test regardless of the outcome of the  
trial. After his conviction, defendant filed a motion for a  
new trial and demanded a polygraph examination. The circuit  
court denied the motion. Defendant appealed by right to the  
Court of Appeals.  
Noting that no Michigan case had addressed whether a  
defendant can invoke, during trial, the right to a polygraph  
examination, the Court of Appeals turned to its earlier  
decision in People v Sterling, 154 Mich App 223; 397 NW2d 182  
(1986).
 There, the Court observed that a person who has  
“allegedly” committed a criminal-sexual-conduct offense is  
entitled to a polygraph examination under MCL 776.21(5). At  
3  
 
the time the defendant in Sterling requested a polygraph  
examination, he had already been convicted. Thus, he was no  
longer simply charged with an offense and was not entitled to  
the examination.  
In this case, the Court of Appeals recognized that,  
unlike the defendant in Sterling, the instant defendant asked  
for the examination before the jury rendered its verdict.  
Nevertheless, the Court held that the defendant had forfeited  
his right to a polygraph test. The Court viewed the ability  
to obtain a polygraph examination as a pretrial right that is  
extinguished when jeopardy attaches. The Court stated:  
The purpose for affording individuals accused 
of criminal sexual conduct a right to a polygraph 
exam is to provide a means by which accused  
individuals 
can 
demonstrate 
their 
innocence, 
thereby obviating the necessity of a trial. We 
believe that once the trial has commenced and  
jeopardy has attached, that purpose has been  
extinguished and a defendant no longer has a right 
to a polygraph test pursuant to MCL 776.21(5). If  
a defendant wishes to exercise his right to a 
polygraph test, he must make his motion to the 
court before trial. Otherwise, the person’s guilt 
or innocence will be resolved at trial. [251 Mich 
App 100, 107; 649 NW2d 407 (2002).]  
The Court further stated that to permit a defendant to raise  
this issue in the trial court for the first time after the  
trial has begun is tantamount to creating an “appellate  
parachute.” Id. at 108.  
II  
This case requires us to consider the meaning of MCL  
4  
 
  
  
776.21(5).  Statutory interpretation is a question of law that  
we review de novo.  People v Jones, 467 Mich 301, 304; 651  
NW2d 906 (2002); Lesner v Liquid Disposal, Inc, 466 Mich 95,  
99; 643 NW2d 553 (2002).  When construing a statute, our  
primary goal is “to ascertain and give effect to the intent of  
the Legislature.” People v Pasha, 466 Mich 378, 382; 645 NW2d  
275 (2002); People v Wager, 460 Mich 118, 123 n 7; 594 NW2d  
487 (1999). To do so, we begin by examining the language of  
the statute. Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare Sys, 465 Mich 53,  
60; 631 NW2d 686 (2001). If the statute’s language is clear  
and unambiguous, we assume that the Legislature intended its  
plain meaning and the statute is enforced as written.3 People  
v Stone, 463 Mich 558, 562; 621 NW2d 702 (2001).  Stated  
differently, “a court may read nothing into an unambiguous  
statute that is not within the manifest intent of the  
Legislature as derived from the words of the statute itself.”  
Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp, 466 Mich 57, 63; 642 NW2d 663  
3 The Legislature may have had other reasons for drafting 
this provision in the manner in which it did.  If the results  
of a polygraph examination indicate that a defendant might not 
have committed the crime, a victim could reconsider her  
identification testimony. For the same reason, a prosecutor 
could reconsider the decision to prosecute or offer a plea 
bargain.  On the other hand, a defendant might use the results 
to convince character witnesses to testify on his behalf. 
Even if convicted, favorable polygraph results may help a 
defendant reconcile with his family or friends. We are also  
mindful that the results of a polygraph examination are 
admissible in a motion for new trial. People v Barbara, 400 
Mich 352, 411-414; 255 NW2d 171 (1977).  
5  
 
 
(2002). “Only where the statutory language is ambiguous may  
a court properly go beyond the words of the statute to  
ascertain legislative intent.”  Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward,  
460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119 (1999).  
III  
While the Court of Appeals reached the correct result in  
this case, it did so for the wrong reason.  MCL 776.21(5)  
extends the right to demand a polygraph examination only to a  
defendant “who allegedly has committed” an enumerated  
criminal-sexual-conduct violation.  The status of being an  
alleged perpetrator does not dissipate until the verdict.4  
Because the statute does not otherwise provide for a time  
limit within which to exercise the right, under the clear and  
unambiguous language of MCL 776.21(5), the right is lost only  
when the presumption of innocence has been displaced by a  
finding of guilt, i.e., when an accused is no longer  
“alleged” to have committed the offense.5  
The Court of Appeals reasoning that defendant forfeited  
his statutory right to a polygraph examination was erroneous.  
4  “Upon conviction the presumption of innocence has 
disappeared, and the presumption of guilt prevails.” DeLong  
v Muskegon Co Bd of Supervisors, 111 Mich 568, 570; 69 NW 1115 
(1897).  
5  Had the Legislature intended that the right to a 
polygraph examination be limited to a pretrial procedure, it 
could have clearly so stated. People v Rogers, 140 Mich App 
576, 580; 364 NW2d 748 (1985).  
6  
 
 
 
Forfeiture is the failure to timely assert a right.  People v  
Carter, 462 Mich 206, 216; 612 NW2d 144 (2000); People v  
Carines, 460 Mich 750, 762 n 7; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).  Because  
defendant 
asserted 
his 
statutory 
right 
during 
jury  
deliberations, while he was still alleged to have committed  
the offense, he did not fail to timely assert the right.  
Although the Court of Appeals reasoning is erroneous,  
defendant is not entitled to a new trial or to the  
administration 
of 
a 
polygraph examination.  In cases involving  
preserved, 
nonconstitutional 
error, 
a 
defendant 
must  
demonstrate, “‘after an examination of the entire cause,’”  
that it “is more probable than not that the error was outcome  
determinative.” People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495-496; 596  
NW2d 607 (1999).  The reviewing court must examine the nature  
of the error and assess its effect “‘in light of the weight  
and strength of the untainted evidence.’”  Id. at 495  
(citation omitted).  
Given the strength of the prosecution’s case, it is not  
more probable than not that the error was outcome­
determinative.  The police officer saw defendant remove his  
hand from between the victim’s legs, and the victim told the  
officer that defendant had digitally penetrated her. In  
addition, defendant confessed to the crimes charged and  
provided a complete and detailed description of his conduct  
7  
  
and his relationship to the victim.  Further, even if  
defendant had taken and passed a polygraph test, the results  
would not have been admissible at trial. People v Ray, 431  
Mich 260, 265; 430 NW2d 626 (1988); People v Barbara, 400 Mich  
352, 364; 255 NW2d 171 (1977).  Moreover, this defendant did  
not place his request before the court until after the close  
of proofs and, thus, any test results would have been  
immaterial to his defense.  Therefore, defendant has not  
demonstrated 
that 
the failure to administer the polygraph test  
was outcome-determinative.  
IV  
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of  
Appeals for the reasons set forth in this opinion.  MCR  
7.302(G)(1).  
Maura D. Corrigan 
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr.  
8  
 
 
  
                                          
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v
 No. 121545  
KEITH RICHARD PHILLIPS,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
MARKMAN, J. (concurring).  
I would deny leave to appeal because I agree with the  
Court of Appeals that the purpose of MCL 776.21(5) is  
essentially to “provide a means by which accused individuals  
can demonstrate their innocence, thereby obviating the  
necessity of a trial.” 251 Mich App 100, 107; 649 NW2d 407  
(2002).1
 Here, where defendant requested a polygraph  
1  However, because I can envision circumstances in which 
a 
polygraph 
examination conducted after the beginning of trial 
might affect the course of the trial, and because I believe 
that this is also within the contemplation of MCL 776.21(5), 
I disagree with the Court of Appeals that a request for a 
polygraph examination must necessarily precede the trial.  
examination 
after 
the 
jury 
had 
already 
begun 
its  
deliberations, such an examination could no longer have any  
effect on the prosecutor in exercising his charging judgment,  
any effect on defense counsel in fashioning a defense  
strategy, any effect on the magistrate in binding over  
defendant, any effect on the jury in assessing defendant’s  
guilt, and any effect on the trial judge in administering the  
trial or in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence.  
Moreover, this is defendant’s third request in this case  
for a polygraph examination.  His two earlier requests were  
granted by the court, but an examination was never  
administered in either instance because of decisions by  
defendant not to proceed.  I do not read MCL 776.21(5) as  
precluding the trial court, in its conduct of the trial, from  
taking cognizance of either the timing or the repetitiveness  
of a defendant’s request for a polygraph examination.  
Finally, I do not understand how the majority can  
conclude that the trial court’s failure to grant defendant’s  
motion for a polygraph examination, although error, was  
nonetheless harmless error because defendant “has not  
demonstrated 
that 
the failure to administer the polygraph test  
was outcome-determinative.” Ante at 8. How can a defendant  
ever demonstrate that an error pertaining to inadmissible  
2  
 
polygraph evidence was outcome-determinative?2  
By my proposed denial of leave to appeal, I would obtain  
the same result as the majority, which in turn has obtained  
the same result as the Court of Appeals.  
Stephen J. Markman  
2 
 The majority references the “strength of the  
prosecution’s case” here in finding harmless error. Ante at  
7.
 Is this the standard for assessing errors under MCL 
776.21(5)?  Is there some class of cases in which, despite 
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt and a judicial 
determination of the sufficiency of evidence, a conviction 
nonetheless is subject to reversal under MCL 776.21(5) on the 
ground that the prosecution’s case is of insufficient  
“strength?”  
3  
___________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
No. 121545  
KEITH RICHARD PHILLIPS,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
KELLY, J. (concurring in result).  
I concur in the result only.  
I agree that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that  
defendant forfeited his right to a polygraph examination by  
requesting an examination after the close of proofs.  MCL  
776.21(5) extends to defendants accused of certain crimes the  
right to obtain a polygraph examination.  That right is  
extinguished if a defendant is found guilty before exercising  
it.  It is not extinguished, as the Court of Appeals found, at  
the moment jeopardy attaches.  
I also agree with the majority that the error did not  
adversely affect the outcome of defendant's trial.  Defendant  
would not have been able to introduce the results of a  
polygraph examination. Moreover, he has not argued that the  
denial of this statutory right prejudiced his defense.  
However, I do not agree that the denial of his right was  
necessarily harmless. Defendant might have used a favorable  
polygraph examination result at a postconviction stage. For  
example, he might have used it in a motion for new trial, to  
urge a more lenient sentence or for a lower level placement by  
the Department of Corrections.  
Not only has defendant not asserted these claims, he has  
not requested a polygraph examination in his application for  
leave to appeal.  Accordingly, he has neglected to seek the  
relief to which he might be entitled.  Therefore, I would  
vacate the portion of the Court of Appeals opinion that  
addresses defendant's claim under MCL 776.21, but deny  
defendant's request for a directed verdict or a new trial.  
Marilyn Kelly 
Michael F. Cavanagh  
2