Title: Superintendent-Dir. of Assabet Valley Reg’l Sch. Dist. v. Speicher

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11563 
 
SUPERINTENDENT-DIRECTOR OF ASSABET VALLEY REGIONAL VOCATIONAL 
SCHOOL DISTRICT  vs.  ANN MARIE SPEICHER. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     May 5, 2014. - September 11, 2014. 
 
Present:  Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. 
 
 
Arbitration, Authority of arbitrator, Judicial review, Award, 
School committee.  Education Reform Act.  Statute, 
Construction.  School and School Committee, Arbitration, 
Suspension from employment.  Public Employment, Suspension. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
May 18, 2011. 
 
 
The case was heard by Paul E. Troy, J., on motions for 
judgment on the pleadings. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Tim D. Norris for the plaintiff. 
 
Sheilah F. McCarthy for the defendant. 
 
Will Evans & Quesiyah S. Ali, for Massachusetts Teachers 
Association, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
SPINA, J.  In this case we are asked to decide whether an 
arbitrator exceeded his authority by reviewing the merits of a 
twenty-day suspension of a school librarian having professional 
2 
 
teacher status.  The librarian had been suspended for "conduct 
unbecoming" the librarian, pursuant to G. L. c. 71, § 42D.  The 
arbitrator applied a just cause standard of review and 
overturned the suspension on the ground that the school district 
failed to meet its burden of proof.  The school district filed 
an action to vacate the arbitrator's award under G. L. c. 150C, 
§ 11, and for declaratory relief under G. L. c. 231A.  A judge 
in the Superior Court denied the school district's motion for 
judgment on the pleadings, and allowed the librarian's cross-
motion for judgment on the pleadings, thereby confirming the 
arbitrator's award.  The school district appealed, and we 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court on our own motion.  
We hold that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority by 
reviewing the merits of the suspension.  We further hold that 
the proper standard of review is whether the district sustained 
its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the 
particular reason cited for the suspension.  We affirm the 
judgment of the Superior Court.1 
 
1.  Background.  The librarian, Ann Marie Speicher, had 
been employed as a school librarian for at least three 
consecutive school years by the Assabet Valley Regional School 
District (district) as of October 29, 2009.  As such, she was 
considered a "teacher" under G. L. c. 71, § 41, and entitled to 
                     
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief filed by the Massachusetts 
Teachers Association in support of Ann Marie Speicher. 
3 
 
professional teacher status under G. L. c. 71 § 42.  A district 
employee with professional teacher status may seek review of a 
suspension by following the arbitration procedures set forth in 
§ 42.  See G. L. c. 71, § 42D. 
 
The district superintendent, based on an investigation 
conducted by Speicher's principal, suspended Speicher without 
pay for twenty days for conduct deemed by the superintendent to 
be unbecoming a "teacher."  The superintendent determined that 
Speicher had vouched for a student's presence in the library for 
an amount of time in excess of the time the student actually was 
in the library -- time that otherwise would have constituted the 
student's unexcused absence from a classroom.  Before being 
suspended, Speicher was afforded all the procedural steps and 
safeguards set forth in G. L. c. 71, § 42D, including a 
predisciplinary meeting with the superintendent. 
 
Speicher sought review of the suspension by an arbitrator, 
pursuant to § 42D.2  The district maintained at arbitration that 
the scope of arbitration was limited to the question whether 
Speicher received the procedural due process safeguards set 
forth in § 42D, and not a review of the merits of her 
suspension.  Speicher, in contrast, contended that she was 
entitled to a review of the merits of the suspension decision, 
                     
 
2 The arbitration proceeded pursuant to statute, namely, 
G. L. c. 71, § 42D, and not pursuant to a collective bargaining 
agreement. 
4 
 
and that the standard of review should be "just cause."  The 
arbitrator conducted an evidentiary hearing, and he considered 
the merits of the suspension.  He made findings of fact and 
rulings of law.  He applied a "just cause" standard and 
concluded that the district had failed to sustain its burden of 
proof as to whether Speicher had in fact vouched for the 
student, as alleged.  He determined that Speicher's twenty-day 
suspension violated § 42D and must be rescinded, that Speicher 
should be made whole for all lost wages and benefits resulting 
from the suspension, and that all references to the suspension 
should be removed from her personnel file.  In confirming the 
arbitrator's award, the Superior Court judge concluded that the 
arbitrator was not shown to have exceeded his authority by 
reviewing the merits of the suspension, reasoning that nothing 
in § 42D prohibited the arbitrator from reviewing the 
superintendent's decision. 
 
2.  Statutory framework.  General Laws c. 71, § 42D, the 
teacher suspension statute, states: 
 
"The superintendent may suspend any employee of the 
school district subject to the provisions of this section.  
The principal of a school may suspend any teacher or other 
employee assigned to the school subject to the provisions 
of this section.  Any employee shall have seven days 
written notice of the intent to suspend and the grounds 
upon which the suspension is to be imposed; provided, 
however, that the superintendent may, for good cause, 
require the immediate suspension of any employee, in which 
case the employee shall receive written notice of the 
immediate suspension and the cause therefor at the time the 
suspension is imposed.  The employee shall be entitled (i) 
5 
 
to review the decision to suspend with the superintendent 
or principal if said decision to suspend was made by the 
principal; (ii) to be represented by counsel in such 
meetings; [and](iii) to provide information pertinent to 
the decision and to the employee's status. 
 
 
"No teacher or other employee shall be suspended for a 
period exceeding one month, except with the consent of the 
teacher or other employee, and no teacher or other employee 
shall receive compensation for any period of lawful 
suspension. 
 
 
"No teacher shall be interrogated prior to any notice 
given to him relative to the suspension unless the teacher 
or other employee is notified of his right to be 
represented by counsel during any such investigation.  A 
suspended teacher or other employee may seek review of the 
suspension by following the arbitration procedures set 
forth in [§ 42, the teacher dismissal statute].  Nothing in 
this section shall be construed as limiting any provision 
of a collective bargaining agreement with respect to 
suspension of teachers or other employees."  (Emphasis 
added.) 
 
 
General Laws c. 71, § 42, the teacher dismissal statute, 
states: 
 
"A principal may dismiss or demote any teacher or 
other person assigned full-time to the school, subject to 
the review and approval of the superintendent; and subject 
to the provisions of this section, the superintendent may 
dismiss any employee of the school district. . . . 
 
 
"A teacher with professional teacher status, pursuant 
to [§ 41], shall not be dismissed except for inefficiency, 
incompetency, incapacity, conduct unbecoming a teacher, 
insubordination or failure on the part of the teacher to 
satisfy teacher performance standards developed pursuant to 
[§ 38] of this chapter or other just cause. 
 
 
"A teacher with professional teacher status may seek 
review of a dismissal decision within thirty days after 
receiving notice of his dismissal by filing a petition for 
arbitration with the commissioner. . . . 
 
 
"At the arbitral hearing, the teacher and the school 
district may be represented by an attorney or other 
6 
 
representative, present evidence, and call witnesses and 
the school district shall have the burden of proof.  In 
determining whether the district has proven grounds for 
dismissal consistent with this section, the arbitrator 
shall consider the best interests of the pupils in the 
district and the need for elevation of performance 
standards. . . . 
 
 
"The arbitral decision shall be subject to judicial 
review as provided in [c. 150C]."  (Emphases added.) 
 
 
Sections 42 and 42D as quoted above reflect amendments made 
by the Education Reform Act of 1993 (act) to provide for 
arbitration of dismissals and suspensions, among the many other 
features of the act.  See St. 1993, c. 71, §§ 44, 47. 
 
3.  Discussion.  The district contends that the plain 
language of G. L. c. 71, § 42D, which contains no standard of 
review, contemplates only arbitral review of the procedures 
followed by the superintendent in cases of teacher suspension, 
and not arbitral review of the merits of the suspension.  
Speicher argues that notwithstanding the absence of a standard 
of review in § 42D, the language of that statute that affords 
suspended employees "review of the suspension" means that she 
was entitled to arbitral review of the merits of her suspension.  
Speicher further contends that the arbitrator correctly employed 
a "just cause" standard of review because it was reasonable to 
do so where § 42D is silent as to the standard of review. 
 
"Absent proof of one of the grounds specified in G. L. 
c. 150C, § 11, a reviewing court is 'strictly bound by the 
arbitrator's factual findings and conclusions of law, even if 
7 
 
they are in error.'"  School Comm. of Lowell v. Robishaw, 456 
Mass. 653, 660-661 (2010), quoting School Comm. of Pittsfield v. 
United Educators of Pittsfield, 438 Mass. 753, 758 (2003).  One 
such ground for vacating an award is that the arbitrator 
exceeded his authority.  G. L. c. 150C, § 11 (a) (3).  Where, as 
here, "the source of authority to arbitrate . . . is a statute, 
and not an agreement, judicial review of an arbitrator's 
interpretation of the meaning of the authorizing statute . . . 
and the scope of his or her authority thereunder is broader and 
less deferential than in cases involving judicial review of an 
arbitrator's decision relating to similar issues arising out of 
an agreement of the parties."  Atwater v. Commissioner of Educ., 
460 Mass. 844, 856-857 (2011).  See School Dist. of Beverly v. 
Geller, 435 Mass. 223, 229 (2001) (Cordy, J., concurring). 
 
We begin our analysis with perhaps two of the most familiar 
rules of statutory construction.  First, "a statute must be 
interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature 
ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and 
approved usage of the language, considered in connection with 
the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be 
remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that 
the purposes of its frames may be effectuated," Registrar of 
Motor Vehicles v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liab. 
Policies & Bonds, 382 Mass. 580, 585 (1981), quoting Board of 
8 
 
Educ. v. Assessor of Worcester, 368 Mass. 511, 513 (1975); and 
second, "[t]he statutory language itself is the principal source 
of insight into the legislative purpose."  Registrar of Motor 
Vehicles v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liab. Policies & 
Bonds, supra, citing Hoffman v. Howmedica, Inc., 373 Mass. 32, 
37 (1977). 
 
Turning to the statute, § 42D provides that any employee 
who has been suspended thereunder may seek "review of the 
suspension."  The statute further specifies that the form of 
review is "arbitration," and the "procedures" for seeking review 
are "set forth in [§ 42]."  Section 42 contains the phrase 
"review of a dismissal decision," and no one suggests that a 
"review" under § 42 means anything but full arbitral review of 
the merits of the dismissal.  The word "review" (by arbitration) 
was added to both §§ 42 and 42D by the act.  Where the word 
"review" appears in these related sections of the same statutory 
enactment, it should be given the same meaning in both sections.  
See Hallett v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 431 Mass. 66, 
69 (2000) ("Where words in a statute are used in one part of a 
statute in a definite sense, they should be given the same 
meaning in another part of the statute").  In this context 
"review of the suspension" means review of the decision to 
suspend.  Stated otherwise, and contrary to the district's 
9 
 
argument, it means review of the merits of the suspension as 
well as the procedures followed to reach the decision. 
 
Moreover, we said in Atwater v. Commissioner of Educ. that 
"the changes to the dismissal process for teachers with 
professional teacher status reflect a legislative judgment that 
it was in the public interest to 'depoliticize[e] and 
streamlin[e] the dismissal process by requiring that contested 
dismissals proceed directly to arbitration.'"  460 Mass. at 856, 
quoting Geller, 435 Mass. at 225 n.1 (Cordy, J., concurring).  
The same reasoning applies to suspensions, particularly where 
dismissals and suspensions were addressed at the same time by 
the Legislature.  We note that arbitration of the merits of a 
suspension would further the legislative goal of depoliticizing 
the disciplinary process, whereas disallowing arbitration of a 
suspension would have the opposite effect. 
 
Finally, although not as consequential as dismissals, 
suspensions are nonetheless serious enough to warrant review, as 
they can have significant future consequences.  Here, in 
addition to her twenty-day suspension, Speicher was warned that 
any further misconduct would result in dismissal.  For these 
reasons, we conclude that the arbitrator acted within his 
authority when he considered the merits of Speicher's 
suspension. 
10 
 
 
We next turn to the standard of review.  The standard of 
review is a question of law.  If the arbitrator applied an 
incorrect standard of review, that error generally is not 
reviewable.  See School Comm. of Lowell v. Robishaw, 456 Mass. 
at 660.  However, because the issue of the correct standard of 
review has been briefed fully by parties, is a matter of public 
importance, and is likely to recur, we address it.  See Smith v. 
McDonald, 458 Mass. 540, 543 n.4 (2010).  The parties have 
observed correctly that § 42D does not contain a standard of 
review.  However, § 42D has incorporated by specific reference 
those portions of § 42 that govern the arbitral procedure for 
reviewing dismissals of school district employees.  This is an 
appropriate legislative procedure.  See 1A N.J. Singer & J.D. 
Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 22:25 (7th 
ed. 2012); 2B Singer & Singer, supra at §§ 51:7, 51:8.  It is 
not without complication.  "A statute of specific reference 
incorporates provisions as they exist at the time of adoption, 
without subsequent amendments, unless a legislature has 
expressly or by strong implication shown its intention to 
incorporate subsequent amendments with the statute.  In the 
absence of such intention, subsequent amendment of the referred 
statute has no effect on the reference statute."  2B Singer & 
Singer, supra at § 51:8 (footnotes omitted).  See Salem & 
Beverly Water Supply Bd. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 26 Mass. 
11 
 
App. Ct. 74, 77-78 (1988).  Here, the arbitral procedure of § 42 
was specifically incorporated by reference in § 42D by St. 1993, 
c. 71, § 47.  Section 42 has since been amended, but the 
amendment does not relate to the subject matter of this appeal, 
and the amendment does not take effect until September 1, 2016.  
See St. 2012, c. 131, § 3. 
 
The arbitral procedures of § 42 in turn incorporate the 
standard of review set forth within that section, which places 
the burden of proof on the school district.  Section 42 further 
provides that when determining whether the district has met its 
burden of proof, the arbitrator must focus upon the "grounds for 
dismissal consistent with this section." 3  Thus, the permissible 
grounds for dismissal under § 42 also are incorporated by 
reference into the arbitral procedures set forth in § 42, and 
they apply to suspensions under § 42D.  The grounds for 
discipline enumerated in § 42, are "inefficiency, incompetency, 
incapacity, conduct unbecoming a teacher, insubordination or 
failure on the part of the teacher to satisfy teacher 
performance standards developed pursuant to [§ 38] of this 
                     
 
3 Section 42, fifth par., states that, "[i]n determining 
whether the district has proven grounds for dismissal consistent 
with this section, the arbitrator shall consider the best 
interests of the pupils in the district and the need for 
elevation of performance standards."  Arbitrators also should 
consider these factors when reviewing suspensions pursuant to 
§ 42D. 
12 
 
chapter or other just cause" (emphases added).4  In the context 
of § 42, the enumerated grounds for discipline constitute just 
cause for discipline, in addition to "other just cause."  See 
Geller, 435 Mass. at 233 (Cordy, J., concurring).  Thus, when 
reviewing a suspension, the statute requires an arbitrator to 
determine (1) whether the district sustained its burden of 
proving that the teacher committed the conduct alleged, and (2) 
whether the conduct alleged is serious enough to meet an 
enumerated ground providing just cause for suspension, i.e., not 
trivial misconduct.  See School Comm. of Lexington v. Zagaeski, 
469 Mass. 104, 117 (2014), citing Geller, 435 Mass. at 231 n.7 
(Cordy, J., concurring).  The statute does not, however, empower 
an arbitrator to substitute his judgment for that of the 
superintendent as to the level of discipline that is warranted, 
according to some generalized notion of "just cause."  See 
Zagaeski, supra at 115-116; Geller, supra at 231, 234 (Cordy, 
J., concurring). 
 
Here, the arbitrator did not act in excess of his authority 
by reviewing the merits of Speicher's suspension and concluding 
that the district had not met its burden of proving the alleged 
just cause for suspension. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
                     
 
4 Although these grounds apply to suspensions as well as 
dismissals, the seriousness or egregiousness of the misconduct 
or omission necessarily will affect the nature and degree of the 
discipline.