Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Medley

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Medley, 104 Ohio St.3d 251, 2004-Ohio-
6402.] 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. MEDLEY. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Medley, 104 Ohio St.3d 251, 2004-
Ohio-6402.] 
Judges – Misconduct – 18-month suspension with six months stayed — Ex parte 
communications – Failing to uphold the integrity of the judiciary – Failing 
to promote public confidence in the judiciary – Conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice. 
(No. 2004-0082 — Submitted June 29, 2004 — Decided December 8, 2004.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 02-79. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J. 
{¶1} 
Respondent, Judge William S. Medley, Attorney Registration No. 
0031001, is the judge of the Gallia County Court of Common Pleas, Probate 
Division.  He was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1980. 
{¶2} 
Between October 2002 and August 2003, relator, Disciplinary 
Counsel, charged respondent with six counts of violations of the Code of Judicial 
Conduct that occurred while respondent was the sole judge on the Gallipolis 
Municipal Court.  A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline heard the cause and received comprehensive stipulations of fact, 
testimony, and exhibits.  The panel dismissed Counts II and V, leaving Counts I, 
III, IV, and VI to be decided. 
{¶3} 
The board found no violations in Counts I and IV and dismissed 
those counts.  It did, however find that respondent had violated the Code of 
Judicial Conduct and the Code of Professional Responsibility based on the facts 
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2 
proven concerning Counts III and VI.  The board recommended that respondent 
be suspended for a period of 18 months, with six months of the suspension stayed. 
{¶4} 
Relator filed objections to the report and recommendations of the 
board.  Relator argues that respondent’s actions in Count I constituted violations 
of the Code of Judicial Conduct or the Code of Professional Responsibility and 
that Count I should not have been dismissed. 
{¶5} 
Respondent also filed objections to the board’s report and 
recommendations.  Although the panel and the board found no violation of DR 1-
102(A)(4), which prohibits conduct involving deceit or misrepresentation, 
respondent disputes the implication that his actions outlined in Count III, or his 
defense of them, involved misrepresentation.  He contends that even if we 
conclude that he engaged in improper ex parte communications, “his lack of 
personal motive, initiation, or substantive conversations should mitigate [sic] in 
favor of rejecting the Board’s recommended sanction.”  Moreover, he takes issue 
with the board’s conclusion in Count VI that the procedure he followed in small-
claims court, as discussed infra, involved unethical conduct. 
{¶6} 
Our review of Counts I, III, and VI follows. 
Count I—Acceptance of Guilty Plea and 
Dismissal of Other Charges in the 
Absence of Counsel 
{¶7} 
In 2000, Brandon Jordan was arrested and arraigned on charges of 
speeding, in violation of R.C. 4511.21(D)(1); driving under the influence, in 
violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1);  possession of drug paraphernalia, in violation of 
R.C. 2925.14(C)(1); and carrying a concealed weapon, in violation of R.C. 
2923.12.  It was not typical in the Gallipolis Municipal Court for the city solicitor, 
who prosecuted criminal offenses, to appear at arraignments, and neither counsel 
for the city nor counsel for the defense was present at Jordan’s arraignment.  
During that proceeding, respondent misadvised Jordan of the maximum sentences 
January Term, 2004 
3 
allowed by law for the charged offenses, generally understating the maximum 
possible duration of a jail sentence and the maximum fines authorized by statute.  
He then requested that Jordan enter a plea. 
{¶8} 
Jordan asked the court whether he would be required to return to 
court at a later date if he pleaded not guilty and was advised that he would be 
required to appear.  Jordan then admitted that he had been carrying a knife in his 
vehicle and explained his reason.  Having heard only Jordan’s version of the 
circumstances, respondent dismissed, sua sponte, the charge of carrying a 
concealed weapon, telling Jordan, “Alright.  You know, I don’t even have any 
problem with throwing it out.”   Without the benefit of counsel, Jordan then 
entered a guilty plea to the remaining charges.  Respondent advised him of his 
rights, accepted his plea, and sentenced him. 
{¶9} 
Thereafter Jordan obtained counsel and moved the court to vacate 
his sentence or, in the alternative, to stay execution of the sentence.  Respondent 
denied the motion.  On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the judgment and 
remanded the cause to the trial court. 
{¶10} The panel found that respondent had improperly assumed the roles 
of both the prosecutor and defense counsel, as well as that of the court, in 
disposing of the charges against Jordan.  It determined that respondent had, in 
effect, unilaterally negotiated and accepted a plea bargain in the absence of 
counsel for the city.  It found that respondent’s actions violated Canons 1 (a judge 
shall uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary); 2 (a judge shall act 
at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and 
impartiality of the judiciary); 3(B)(7) (a judge shall not initiate, receive, permit or 
consider communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties or 
their representatives concerning a pending or impending proceeding); and 4 (a 
judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all the judge’s 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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activities); and DR 1-102(A)(5) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice). 
{¶11} The board, however, concluded that these facts did not 
demonstrate a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct or the Code of 
Professional Responsibility.  It concluded that “if a violation were found on this 
count, it would serve to unduly restrict municipal court judges in their daily 
administration of justice given the real life pressures of docket management.”  In 
contrast, relator contends that respondent’s conduct was improper even though 
relator acknowledges that respondent’s conduct was “motivated by his desire to 
expedite the process.” 
{¶12} We agree with relator and the board that respondent’s conduct was 
not the product of malevolent intent.  Nevertheless, the proper administration of 
justice required the respondent to respect the prosecutor’s absence at arraignment 
proceedings.  It was not appropriate to dispose of some criminal charges against 
the defendant in exchange for a guilty plea to other charges, without first 
affording the prosecution an opportunity to be heard.  To do so compromises the 
integrity of the adversarial process upon which our criminal-justice system is 
based.  See In re Judges of  Cedar Rapids Municipal Court  (1964), 256 Iowa 
1135, 1137, 130 N.W.2d 553 ( “While procedures in the handling of minor 
offenses may understandably be informal to a considerable extent, a fair 
opportunity for each side to present its case must be afforded”);  In re Cox 
(Me.1989), 553 A.2d 1255, 1258, citing United States v. Werker (C.A.N.Y.1976), 
535 F.2d 198, 203 (“undue participation in the plea bargaining process taints the 
public’s perception of the trial judge”); and In re Inquiry Concerning Clayton 
(Fla.1987), 504 So.2d 394, 395 (“Except under limited circumstances, no party 
should be allowed the advantage of presenting matters to or having matters 
decided by the judge without notice to all other interested parties”). 
January Term, 2004 
5 
{¶13} We therefore find that the conduct described in Count I violated 
the judicial Canons charged. 
Count III— Collection Case 
{¶14} In 1998, an action on an account was filed by Holzer Hospital 
Foundation, Inc. (“Holzer”) against Roger Watson, a local official and two-term 
chair of the county political party of which respondent was a member.  On June 
11, 1998, Holzer moved, in writing, for a default judgment.  Respondent entered a 
default judgment against Watson in the amount of $6,342.79. 
{¶15} On June 17, 1998, respondent issued an order that recited that 
Watson had “orally applied for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(B),” 
rescinded the June 11, 1998 default judgment, and provided Watson 28 days to 
answer the complaint.  Respondent entered this order despite the fact that the 
Civil Rules do not provide for an oral motion for Civ.R. 60(B) relief unless made 
during a hearing or trial and require service of a written Civ.R. 60(B) motion upon 
other parties who have appeared.1 
{¶16} Respondent stipulated that Watson did not submit a written motion 
requesting relief from judgment.  Watson testified that he talked to respondent on 
the telephone and told him that he had never received a copy of the complaint. 
{¶17} Despite having received relief from the default judgment, Watson 
did not file an answer within the 28 days provided by the court, and on March 1, 
1999, Holzer filed another motion for default judgment.  Respondent set a pretrial 
conference for April 9, 1999.  Watson did not appear.  On April 11, 1999, 
respondent entered a second default judgment against Watson. 
                                                 
1. Civ.R. 7(B) provides that an application for an order is to be made “by motion which, unless 
made during a hearing or a trial, shall be made in writing.”  The motion “shall state with 
particularity the grounds therefor, and shall set forth the relief or order sought.”   Civ.R. 5(A) 
provides that every written motion must be served upon each party who has appeared in the action. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶18} On February 6, 2002, Holzer filed a praecipe instructing the Clerk 
of the Gallipolis Municipal Court to prepare a certificate of judgment based on the 
1999 default judgment.  The certificate was prepared and filed that same day.  
Within days, Watson went to the courthouse to speak to respondent about 
removing the judgment lien, which was impeding his receipt of the proceeds of a 
real-property sale.  Watson testified that he had approached respondent on his 
own initiative while “aggravated” and “mad” and that respondent had said, “I’ll 
get it taken care of and it will be off before evening.”  Watson specifically 
acknowledged that Holzer’s counsel was not present during this exchange and 
that only he and respondent were present at the meeting. 
{¶19} Respondent prepared a journal entry, filed on February 13, 2002, 
representing that Watson had appeared in open court and requested that he be 
allowed to file an answer.  The entry continued: “[Watson] is given the right to 
file his answer instanter.  Set for pretrial—Remove any Default judgments.”  
Although Watson filed an answer that same day, the action remained pending 
without resolution throughout the remainder of respondent’s tenure as judge of 
the Gallipolis Municipal Court. 
{¶20} Relator alleged that this conduct exhibited violations of Canons 1, 
2, 3(B)(7), 3(B)(8) ( a judge shall dispose of all judicial matters promptly, 
efficiently, and fairly and comply with the guidelines set forth in the Rules of 
Superintendence), 3(E)(1) (a judge shall disqualify himself in a proceeding in 
which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned), 4, and 4(A) (a 
judge shall not allow family, social, political, or other relationships to influence 
the judge’s judicial conduct or judgment).  Relator further asserted violations of 
DR 
1-102(A)(4) 
(conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit 
or 
misrepresentation) and 1-102(A)(5). 
{¶21} With regard to Count III, the panel and the board found that the 
charged conduct did not violate Canons 3(E)(1) or 4(A) or DR 1-102(A)(4).  But 
January Term, 2004 
7 
respondent’s ex parte communications with Roger Watson and the undue delay in 
the disposition of Holzer’s claim were found to be violations of the remaining 
judicial Canons and Disciplinary Rules charged. 
{¶22} Watson testified that he had spoken with respondent three times in 
respondent’s office and once on the street about the Holzer claim.  He also 
recalled one conference call in which he communicated with respondent via 
speaker phone while counsel for Holzer was present.  He could not, however, 
remember when that conference call had occurred. 
{¶23} Respondent essentially concedes that he engaged in ex parte 
communications with Watson but argues that it was unfair and unsupported for 
the board to imply that respondent had lied or otherwise misrepresented the facts 
in connection with this count.   
{¶24} We note, however, that respondent represented in the court’s  
journal entry of February 13, 2002, that Watson had “appeared in open court”  
and requested the opportunity to file an answer.  This entry conveyed the false 
impression that Watson’s request had been made in a formal court proceeding.  
Watson testified that no mention of a hearing occurred at the meeting, which he 
stated occurred in respondent’s office rather than in court. 
{¶25} Similarly, the record supports the factual conclusion that the 
default-judgment creditor, Holzer, was not allowed an opportunity to be heard 
before the court entered the order, which, at best, constituted the grant of Civ.R. 
60(B) relief made pursuant to an oral, out-of-court, ex parte motion to “[r]emove 
any Default judgments.” 
{¶26} We therefore find that respondent’s conduct as described in Count 
III involved dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation in violation of DR 1-
102(A)(4), as well as violations of the judicial Canons with which he was 
charged. 
Count VI—Small-Claims Cases 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶27} While he was judge of the Gallipolis Municipal Court, respondent 
used the following procedure in debt-collection cases in small-claims court.  The 
court made available to prospective plaintiffs a preprinted complaint form for use 
in filing actions.  After a complaint was filed, the deputy clerk of the court entered 
a trial date on the printed complaint form.  The complaint was then sent to the 
named defendant by the court by certified mail. 
{¶28} Respondent would thereafter employ a second printed form that 
included a checklist of various dispositional options.  If the defendant failed to 
appear on the trial date, respondent would determine whether the defendant had 
been properly served.  If so, respondent would check another box on the prepared 
form indicating that the defendant had not answered the complaint and was 
therefore in default.  The box further stated that judgment is entered in the 
plaintiff’s favor, including an award of statutory interest and costs, in a sum equal 
to the amount demanded in the complaint. 
{¶29} Typically the court checked another box ordering the defendant to 
pay the judgment in full within 30 days.  This section of the form advised the 
defendant that if the judgment was not paid, the defendant would be required to 
appear at a hearing “to arrange payment” on a date filled in in advance on the 
form.  The text further advised that “[f]ailure to appear will result in a warrant for 
the arrest of the defendant(s).”  After the form was signed by respondent, it would 
be entered as a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. 
{¶30} Typically, if the defendant had not paid within 30 days and did not 
appear at the scheduled court hearing, another box would be checked indicating 
that the defendant had failed to appear for the hearing and ordering that a “warrant 
be issued for arrest of the defendant(s).”  When respondent checked this box and 
signed the form, a bench warrant would be provided to law enforcement for 
execution.  The bench warrant would set bond in the exact amount of the 
judgment, plus interest and costs, without allowing for the possibility of release 
January Term, 2004 
9 
upon payment of a ten percent bond.  Respondent acknowledged that “significant 
numbers” of judgment debtors were in fact arrested on these warrants, sometimes 
in counties hundreds of miles away, and were not released until they posted bail, 
often in the amount of their debt. 
{¶31} The procedure followed by respondent was efficient.  He testified 
that collections by the court increased from about $90,000 in 1993 to 
approximately $800,000 in 2003, with only one court staff member processing the 
claims.  As amounts were received by the court, the Gallipolis Municipal Court 
would issue checks to judgment creditors. 
{¶32} The panel found this procedure to be “offensive and wholly 
inappropriate.”  It concluded that a significant number of judgment debtors had 
been arrested on small-claims warrants although arrest is not an authorized 
method to collect judgments.  It questioned whether the constitutional rights of 
small-claims defendants had been infringed. 
{¶33} Accordingly, the panel found the actions of respondent equivalent 
to the operation of a free collection service for small-claims judgment creditors in 
violation of Canons 1 and 2 and DR 1-102(A)(5).  The board adopted the panel’s 
findings of fact and conclusions of law as to Count VI without additional 
comment. 
{¶34} Respondent claims that the procedure he followed was consistent 
with R.C. 1925.13(B) and 2705.02.2  He denies that the procedure he followed 
denied small-claims defendants their due-process rights. 
                                                 
2. (a) R.C. 1925.13(B) provides: 
 
(b) “If, within thirty days after judgment, the judgment is not satisfied and the parties have not 
otherwise agreed, the court, upon the request of the judgment creditor, shall order the judgment 
debtor to file, on a form prepared by the court, a list of the judgment debtor’s assets, liabilities, 
and personal earnings.  The form shall contain a notice that failure to complete the form and return 
it to the court within one week after receipt may result in a citation for contempt of court.  Any 
party who, with notice of the possible contempt citation, willfully fails to comply with the order of 
the court, may be cited for contempt of court as provided in Chapter 2705. of the Revised Code.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶35} We need not, however, express an opinion as to whether these 
litigants were denied constitutional rights in order to recognize that respondent 
fell short of his ethical obligations in managing small claims.  It is apparent that 
respondent approached small-claims suits with a predisposition in favor of 
plaintiff-creditors and a willingness to disregard established law governing the 
collection of judgments.  Respondent relieved judgment creditors of any 
obligation to enforce collection of their own judgments once granted. 3  Indeed, 
respondent told the panel, “There’s no sense having a small claims court if you 
give them a judgment and then you say now you can go out and collect.  * * * In 
Gallia County these people want results.  They want the court to work for them.  
Okay?  Judge in Columbus, judge in Cleveland, he can say, hey, you guys go out 
and collect this yourself.  Go get an attorney or here’s a pamphlet.  It doesn’t 
work that way.”  Notably, both the deputy clerk largely responsible for processing 
those claims and respondent himself acknowledged that the court had, in effect, 
accomplished a transfer of the responsibility of collecting judgments from 
judgment creditors to the court itself. 
{¶36} We note, however, that R.C. 1925.13(B), upon which respondent 
relies, provides for the court to take action to collect a small-claims judgment 
“upon the request of the judgment creditor,” not upon the court’s own initiative.  
                                                                                                                                     
 
(c) R.C. 2705.02 authorizes punishment for contempt under certain described circumstances.  
R.C. 2705.03 provides that in cases under R.C. 2705.02 “a charge in writing shall be filed with the 
clerk of the court, an entry thereof made upon the journal, and an opportunity given to the accused 
to be heard, by himself or counsel.”  However, R.C. 2705.03 “does not prevent the court from 
issuing process to bring the accused into court, or from holding him in custody, pending such 
proceedings.”  
 
3.  Respondent acknowledged the availability of brochures in the courthouse summarizing small-
claims-court law.  One such brochure, prepared by the Ohio State Bar Foundation, summarizes 
available methods for the collection of small-claims judgments in Ohio, noting the availability of 
garnishment, attachment, and judgment liens on real estate.  It also advises small-claims judgment 
creditors, “Remember, you must take action to force payment of your judgment.  The court will 
not get your money for you –enforce your judgment – unless you take the required steps.”  
(Emphasis sic.)  Going to Court on Small Claims: A Guide to Bringing and Defending Suits on 
Small Claims in Ohio, Ohio State Bar Foundation (7th Ed.2001) 11. 
January Term, 2004 
11 
Moreover, respondent’s procedure circumvented the protections afforded by law 
to small-claims-courtjudgment debtors by making freedom from incarceration 
dependent upon payment in full of a small-claims judgment.4 
{¶37} In short, respondent failed to observe the high standards of conduct 
integral to preservation of the integrity and independence of the judiciary, in 
violation of Canon 1.  He acted in a manner unlikely to promote public 
confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary, in violation of Canon 2, and 
prejudiced the administration of justice, in violation of DR 1-102(A)(5).  Cf. In re 
Hammermaster (1999), 139 Wash.2d 211, 234, 985 P.2d 924 (“A judge’s primary 
function is the administration of justice, not the collection of fines”); In re 
Fuselier (La.2003), 837 So.2d 1257 (judge who instituted, authorized, and 
participated in a worthless-check program in which the court pursued collection in 
behalf of the creditor, created the appearance of impropriety, abused his judicial 
authority, and engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, 
thereby bringing the judicial office into disrepute). 
Sanction 
{¶38} In recommending a sanction for this misconduct, the panel 
considered the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of respondent’s case 
pursuant to the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and 
Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 
(“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  In regard to aggravation, the panel noted that respondent 
had been previously disciplined for judicial misconduct,5 that he had engaged in a 
                                                 
4.  The Ohio State Bar Foundation guide further advises creditors that they “will need both 
patience and persistence if it is necessary to take court action to collect [a] judgment” because the 
law “allows judgment debtors to keep certain items or assets * * * so that judgment debtors have 
the basics with which to support themselves.  Creditors cannot take these exempt items or assets.”  
Going to Court on Small Claims, supra, at 13-14. 
 
5. This court issued a public reprimand to respondent in Disciplinary Counsel v. Medley (2001), 
93 Ohio St.3d 474, 756 N.E.2d 104,  based on his conduct in picking up a newly arrested person at 
the police station, driving her home, and thereafter refusing to recuse himself from the case. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
pattern of misconduct, and that he had refused to acknowledge the wrongfulness 
of his actions.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(a), (c), and (g).  In mitigation, the 
panel found that respondent had not acted with a dishonest or selfish motive, that 
he has a reputation for good character and fair dealings, and that he cooperated 
fully in the disciplinary proceedings.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(b), (d), and 
(e).  The panel recommended an 18-month suspension with one year stayed. 
{¶39} Relator recommended an 18-month suspension, with six months 
stayed.  The board adopted this recommendation.  Initially respondent argued for 
a public reprimand only, acknowledging responsibility only for inefficiently 
handling the Watson collection case in Count III.  In this court he asks for a one-
year suspension with the entire suspension stayed. 
{¶40} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 187, 
191, 658 N.E.2d 237, we held that when an attorney engages in dishonest or 
fraudulent conduct in violation of DR 1-102(A)(4), “the attorney will be actually 
suspended from the practice of law for an appropriate period of time.”  Because 
respondent misrepresented facts in a journal entry as previously discussed in 
connection with Count III, an actual suspension is warranted based solely on that 
conduct. Cf. Disciplinary Counsel v. Hutchins, 102 Ohio St.3d 97, 2004-Ohio-
1805, 807 N.E.2d 303 (attorney’s fabrication of magistrate’s order in divorce 
action warranted six-month actual suspension). 
{¶41} In addition, the facts proven in connection with Counts I and III 
demonstrate that respondent repeatedly engaged in ex parte communications with 
litigants. We note that we have in the past imposed a six-month actual suspension 
on a previously disciplined judge based on a single ex parte communication.  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Ferreri (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 456, 727 N.E.2d 908. 
{¶42} Moreover, on more than one occasion, respondent decided the 
merits of legal issues in both civil and criminal actions without first hearing from 
parties on both sides of those issues and in derogation of clear procedural rules.  A 
January Term, 2004 
13 
judge is charged with the responsibility of enforcing the rule of law, both 
substantive and procedural.  A judge may not blatantly disregard procedural rules 
simply to accomplish what he or she may unilaterally consider to be a speedier or 
more efficient administration of justice. 
{¶43} In view of the fact that multiple ethical violations have been 
proven, we suspend respondent from the practice of law in Ohio for 18 months 
and, pursuant to Gov.Jud.R. III(7)(A), concurrently suspend him, without pay, 
from his position as judge of the Probate Court of Gallia County.  We stay, 
however, the final six months of the suspension on condition that respondent 
commit no further misconduct.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, O’CONNOR and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶44} I concur with the ultimate disposition in this case – an 18-month 
suspension with the final six months stayed on the condition that respondent 
commit no further misconduct.  I dissent from the majority’s holding as to Count 
I.  I concur with it as to Count III and Count VI but would have instituted a more 
severe penalty on those counts.  Since I would have instituted no penalty as to 
Count I, the majority and I end up at the same place with regard to the total length 
of suspension. 
{¶45} This case contrasts what is acceptable (occasionally) in small-town 
practice from what is a manipulation of small-town practice.  Count I exemplifies 
the rough-around-the-edges, practical realities of being the lone municipal judge 
in a small county; Counts III and VI, on the other hand, demonstrate the 
corruptive nature of that singular power. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
{¶46} I agree with the board’s determination of Count I – the facts did 
not demonstrate a breach of the Code of Judicial Conduct or the Code of 
Professional Responsibility.  The judge erred, but in the heat of the moment and 
without malevolent intent.  His error was properly dealt with, and reversed, by the 
court of appeals. 
{¶47} Counts III and VI, however, do not involve well-intentioned but 
ham-handed attempts to run an efficient courtroom.  Those counts involve 
deliberate activity that was unquestionably improper and prejudicial to certain 
parties.  In Count III, respondent removed a judgment without giving the creditor 
an opportunity to be heard and willfully manipulated the record in the case.  Then, 
the action remained pending until respondent left the bench.  The episode smacks 
of favoritism. 
{¶48} Count VI reveals a thought-through plan to essentially revive 
debtors’ prisons.  Medley used as an excuse the expectations of the residents of 
Gallia County to have the court itself collect their small-claims judgments.  
Whatever their expectations, no citizen of any county can expect to have people 
jailed for failing to immediately pay their small-claims judgments.  Although 
Gallia County was settled by members of the French aristocracy, they’ve been 
here since 1790, which is long enough to know that America doesn’t work that 
way. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting. 
{¶49} I dissent from the sanction imposed in this case.  The majority 
suspends respondent from the practice of law in Ohio for 18 months and 
concurrently suspends him, without pay, from his position as judge of the Probate 
Court of Gallia County.  The majority then stays the final six months of the 
suspension on condition that respondent commit no further misconduct. 
January Term, 2004 
15 
{¶50} Although I recused myself from hearing or participating in 
Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Neill, 103 Ohio St.3d. 204, 2004-Ohio-4704, 815 
N.E.2d 286, I have read the decision of the court.  The majority in that case found 
that Judge O’Neill’s conduct warranted a two-year suspension with one year 
stayed on conditions. 
{¶51} 
In my view, Judge Medley and Judge O’Neill received 
substantially similar sanctions for fundamentally disparate conduct.  The conduct 
in O’Neill was far more egregious and involved substantially more dishonesty.  
Therefore, I find the majority’s decision to impose such similar sanctions to be 
unwarranted.  Rather, I would stay the final 12 months of respondent’s sanction 
on condition that respondent commit no further misconduct.  Therefore, I 
respectfully dissent. 
__________________ 
 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Joseph M. Caligiuri, 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
 
Montgomery, Rennie & Jonson, George D. Jonson and Ralph E. Burnham, 
for respondent. 
_______________________