Title: Marley v. Bank of New York

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-12684 
 
ROBERT P. MARLEY  vs.  BANK OF NEW YORK1 & others.2 
 
 
January 9, 2020. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.  
Mortgage, Foreclosure.  Notice, Foreclosure of mortgage.  
Massachusetts Soldiers' & Sailors' Civil Relief Act. 
 
 
 
The petitioner, Robert P. Marley, filed a petition in the 
county court, pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, challenging orders 
issued by the Land Court in connection with a servicemember 
proceeding under the Massachusetts Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil 
Relief Act (MSCRA).  Marley also asserted affirmative defenses 
to foreclosure of his property and claims against the 
respondents under various statutes, rules of professional 
                     
1 The Bank of New York Mellon (bank), formerly known as The 
Bank of New York, appeared and moved to dismiss the petition and 
counterclaim.  The bank represents that it is the trustee for 
the certificateholders of CWMBS, Inc., CHL Mortgage Pass-Through 
Trust 2004-29, Mortgage Pass Through Certificates, Series 2004-
29. 
 
2 Korde & Associates, P.C., and Shellpoint Mortgage 
Servicing.  Korde & Associates, P.C., has appeared for itself 
and two attorneys associated with the firm and moved to dismiss 
the petition and counterclaim.  NewRez LLC, formerly known as 
New Penn Financial, LLC, doing business as Shellpoint Mortgage 
Servicing (Shellpoint), also has appeared and moved to dismiss 
the petition and counterclaim. 
 
 
The petitioner also named the Land Court as a respondent.  
The court is a nominal party only.  See S.J.C. Rule 2:22, 422 
Mass. 1302 (1996). 
2 
 
 
 
conduct, and the common law.  A single justice of this court 
dismissed the petition, including all requests for relief.  We 
affirm.3 
 
 
Background.  This case arises out of a promissory note and 
mortgage that Marley signed in 2004 encumbering property in 
Lynnfield.  In 2018, The Bank of New York Mellon (bank) filed a 
complaint in equity in the Land Court under the MSCRA to 
determine whether Marley is entitled to foreclosure protections 
under the Federal Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA), 50 
U.S.C. §§ 3901-4043.  See St. 1943, c. 57, as amended through 
St. 1998, c. 142.  The bank also filed a mortgagee's affidavit.  
See HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Matt, 464 Mass. 193, 197 n.7 (2013) 
(Matt) ("Land Court requires all parties filing a servicemember 
complaint to submit a mortgagee's affidavit"). 
 
 
In accordance with the MSCRA, the Land Court issued an 
order of notice to Marley and "to all persons entitled to the 
benefit of the [SCRA]" that, according to the docket, was to be 
served, recorded, and published in the Lynnfield Villager, the 
Lynnfield Weekly News, and The Daily Item.  The notice 
instructed Marley that if he is or recently has been in active 
military service, and if he objects to the foreclosure on that 
basis, he should appear and file an answer.  As the MSCRA 
provides: 
 
"The publication of a copy of said notice once not less 
than twenty-one days before the return day in a newspaper 
designated by the court, and the mailing of a copy thereof 
by registered mail not less than fourteen days before the 
return day to each defendant named in the [servicemembers 
complaint], shall be sufficient service of said notice, 
unless the court otherwise orders, provided however that 
prior to the return day fixed in said notice a copy thereof 
shall be recorded in each registry of deeds and city or 
town clerk's office in which such mortgage is recorded." 
 
St. 1943, c. 57, § 1.  The SCRA protects both servicemember 
mortgagors and mortgagees.  "As to foreclosures involving 
nonservicemember mortgagors, the [SCRA] contemplates a benefit 
to mortgagees through the issuance of a judicial decree that 
such a mortgagor is not entitled to the protections of the 
                     
 
3 After the case was argued, the court received an amicus 
brief from Grace C. Ross, together with a motion to file her 
brief late, which was opposed by Shellpoint.  Nothing in the 
amicus brief changes our analysis. 
3 
 
 
 
SCRA[,] . . . ensuring that a foreclosure will not subsequently 
be rendered invalid for failure to provide the protections of 
the SCRA to anyone so entitled."  Matt, 464 Mass. at 201. 
 
 
Only mortgagors who assert that they are entitled to rights 
under the SCRA may appear in servicemember proceedings.  See 
Matt, 464 Mass. at 194.  Marley does not assert such rights.  
Nonetheless, he informed the Land Court of his claim that the 
bank is not the lawful holder of the promissory note or 
mortgage, that the bank lacked standing to file the 
servicemember complaint, and that the Land Court therefore 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction of the matter.  In response, 
a Land Court judge issued an order providing that the 
"Mortgagee's Affidavit filed with the Servicemembers Complaint 
is sufficient to establish the plaintiff's standing.  See [G. L. 
c. 244, § 35B (f)].  The defendant's letter is not sufficient to 
put standing at issue in the face of the affidavit.  For the 
foregoing reasons, the defendant's submission is not accepted 
for filing."  See Matt, 464 Mass. at 199 (in servicemember 
proceeding, error to accept nonservicemember's filings or to 
permit nonservicemember to appear). 
 
 
Marley next filed a petition in the county court, pursuant 
to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  As he did in the Land Court, he claimed 
generally that the bank lacked standing to bring the 
servicemember complaint, and that the Land Court therefore 
exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing an order for notice of the 
impending foreclosure proceeding.  In addition, the petition 
raised various defenses to foreclosure and asserted a multicount 
complaint, denominated as a "counterclaim," against the 
respondents.  The single justice neither erred nor abused her 
discretion in dismissing the petition. 
 
 
Discussion.  A request for extraordinary relief, under 
G. L. c. 211, § 3, properly is denied where, as here, a 
petitioner fails to demonstrate "both a substantial claim that a 
violation of the party's substantive rights occurred below, and 
that this error cannot be corrected through the ordinary 
appellate process."  Commonwealth v. Clerk of the Boston Div. of 
the Juvenile Court Dep't, 432 Mass. 693, 697 (2000).  It is well 
established that, "[w]here a petitioner can raise his claim in 
the normal course of trial and appeal, relief will be denied."  
Foley v. Lowell Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't, 398 Mass. 800, 
802 (1986). 
 
 
As we said in Matt, "a servicemember proceeding cannot 
affect the rights or interests of nonservicemembers," and so 
4 
 
 
 
nonservicemembers have "no interest in the proceeding."  Matt, 
464 Mass. at 199.  Such proceedings are not part of the 
foreclosure process and "are not determinative of any issue 
beyond the extent of such defendants' rights under the SCRA, if 
any."  Id. at 204.  The order of notice issued by the Land Court 
in this case is largely identical to the statutory form of 
notice, and identifies the bank only as one "claiming to be the 
holder of a mortgage."  See id. at 202.  With respect to 
Marley's claim that publication of the notice in local 
publications was improper, the statute authorizes service, 
publication, and recording of the notice.  St. 1943, c. 57, § 1.  
Marley did not establish a substantial claim that the Land Court 
violated his substantial rights in connection with the 
servicemember proceeding. 
 
 
With respect to the myriad of other claims and affirmative 
defenses to foreclosure and the eight-count "counterclaim" 
asserted against the respondents, Marley failed to demonstrate 
the absence of adequate alternative remedies.  See Planned 
Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 406 Mass. 
701, 706 (1990).  Although we recognize that the claims he 
raises could not be asserted as "counterclaims" in the 
servicemember proceeding, see Matt, 464 Mass. at 204, Marley's 
principal remedy is to litigate the claims and affirmative 
defenses in the trial court, "in any separate action challenging 
a foreclosure or a mortgagee's right to foreclose," id.4  General 
Laws c. 211, § 3, does not provide an alternative route to the 
ordinary course of trial and appeal, and the single justice 
properly dismissed the claims and defenses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
Robert Marley, pro se. 
 
Thomas O'Neill for Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing LLP & 
another. 
 
Joseph P. Calandrelli, for Korde & Associates, was present 
but did not argue. 
 
Grace C. Ross, pro se, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
                     
4 The record indicates that Marley has commenced two actions 
in the Superior Court, both of which were removed to the United 
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, 
challenging various aspects of the bank's authority to foreclose 
on his mortgage.