Title: State of Florida v. James Anthony Jefferson

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC94630
____________
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Petitioner,
vs.
JAMES ANTHONY JEFFERSON,
Respondent.
[May 11, 2000]
PARIENTE, J.
The issue presented in this case is whether section 924.051(3), Florida
Statutes (Supp. 1996), enacted as part of the Criminal Appeal Reform Act of 1996
("the Act"), operates as a jurisdictional bar to appellate review of criminal appeals
that do not present either preserved or fundamental error.  The Third District in
Jefferson v. State, 724 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), denied the State's motion to
dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction, and certified the following question to be one
of great public importance:
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[1] UNDER SECTION 924.051(3), FLORIDA STATUTES (SUPP.
1996), IS THE FAILURE TO PRESERVE FOR APPEAL AN
ALLEGED SENTENCING ERROR THAT IS NOT
FUNDAMENTAL A JURISDICTIONAL IMPEDIMENT TO AN
APPEAL THAT SHOULD RESULT IN A DISMISSAL OF THE
APPEAL, OR [2] IS IT A NONJURISDICTIONAL BAR TO
REVIEW THAT SHOULD RESULT IN AN AFFIRMANCE?
Jefferson v. State, 724 So. 2d 105, 106-07 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).  We have
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  We answer the first part of the
certified question in the negative and the second part of the question in the
affirmative.
At oral argument in this case, the State conceded that section 924.051(3) is
not a limitation on the appellate courts' subject matter jurisdiction.  We agree with
this concession.  However, because this jurisdictional question has been raised in
the appellate courts since the passage of the Criminal Appeals Reform Act, we write
to explain why we agree with the State's concession of error.
In 1996, the Legislature enacted section 924.051 as part of the Criminal
Appeal Reform Act.  The statute provides in pertinent part:
(3) An appeal may not be taken from a judgment or order of a
trial court unless a prejudicial error is alleged and is properly preserved
or, if not properly preserved, would constitute fundamental error.  A
judgment or sentence may be reversed on appeal only when an
appellate court determines after a review of the complete record that
prejudicial error occurred and was properly preserved in the trial court
or, if not properly preserved, would constitute fundamental error.
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(4) If a defendant pleads nolo contendere without expressly
reserving the right to appeal a legally dispositive issue, or if a
defendant pleads guilty without expressly reserving the right to appeal
a legally dispositive issue, the defendant may not appeal the judgment
or sentence.
§ 924.051(3)-(4) (emphasis supplied).
The question before the Court is whether the first sentence of section
924.051(3) operates as a jurisdictional bar to review "unless a prejudicial error is
alleged and is properly preserved or, if not properly preserved, would constitute
fundamental error."  In Amendments to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure,
696 So. 2d 1103, 1104-06, 1138 (Fla. 1996), we adopted amendments to several
procedural rules in order to "harmonize" our rules with the Act, specifically with
sections 924.051(3) and (4).  In that opinion, we did not address the question of
whether the Act created a jurisdictional bar to appellate review.  See id. at 1104-06. 
Of the district courts that have subsequently confronted this issue, both the
First and Fourth Districts have concluded that the preservation requirements of
section 924.051 do not pose a jurisdictional bar to appellate review but instead
codify existing procedural bars to appellate review.  See Thompson v. State, 708
So. 2d 289, 292 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), review dismissed, 721 So. 2d 287 (Fla.
1998); Stone v. State, 688 So. 2d 1006, 1008 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 697
So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1997).  The Third District has aligned itself with the First and
1However, a footnote in the opinion on review indicates that the Third District disagrees
with these courts on the issue of "whether a defendant can appeal from a guilty plea in the absence
of one of the limited exceptions necessary for such an appeal set forth in Robinson v. State, 373
So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1979)."  Jefferson, 724 So. 2d at 106 n.1.  We disapproved of this portion of
Jefferson in Leonard v. State, No. SC93332, slip op. at 12 (Fla. May 11, 2000).
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Fourth Districts and concluded that section 924.051(3) does not constitute a
jurisdictional bar to review, at least for those defendants who did not plead guilty. 
See Jefferson, 724 So. 2d at 106.1 
In contrast, the Second District has concluded that these provisions constitute
a jurisdictional bar to review if the appeal does not present a preserved error that is
prejudicial or an unpreserved error that is fundamental.  See Bain v. State, 730 So.
2d 296, 304 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (en banc).  However, even the Second District has
questioned whether the Legislature has the constitutional authority to limit the
subject matter jurisdiction of appellate courts to hear criminal appeals.  See id. at
300.
Finally, the Fifth District has not directly passed on the jurisdictional
question; however, it has focused directly on unpreserved sentencing errors,
affirming sentences in all appeals presenting unpreserved sentencing errors for
appellate review.  See, e.g., Maddox v. State, 708 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998),
approved in part, disapproved in part, SC92805, SC93000, SC93207, SC93966
(Fla. May 11, 2000); Calloway v. State, 718 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Parks
2This constitutional provision contrasts with other provisions of the constitution that do
provide the Legislature with the power to define the jurisdiction of the courts, such as the power
to define the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over appeals from bond validations and the actions
of statewide agencies, see art. V, § 3(b)(2), Fla. Const., the district courts' appellate review of
administrative actions, see art. V., § 4(b)(2), Fla. Const., the appellate jurisdiction of the circuit
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v. State, 719 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998), review granted, 727 So. 2d 909
(Fla. 1999).
We find it is clear from the language of section 924.051(3) that the
Legislature intended to condition reversal of a conviction on the existence of either
an error that was preserved and prejudicial or an unpreserved error that constitutes
fundamental error.  However, we do not find from the statutory language utilized
that the Legislature clearly intended to limit the appellate courts' subject matter
jurisdiction in the area of criminal appeals.
Wherever possible, statutes should be construed in such a manner so as to
avoid an unconstitutional result.  See, e.g., State v. Mitro, 700 So. 2d 643, 645 (Fla.
1997); Walker v Bentley, 678 So. 2d 1265, 1267 (Fla. 1996); State v. Stalder, 630
So. 2d 1072, 1076 (Fla. 1994); Gray v. Central Fla. Lumber Co., 104 Fla. 426, 451,
140 So. 320, 323 (1932).  Although the constitution grants appellate courts
jurisdiction to review criminal appeals in the appellate courts, this constitutional
grant does not authorize the Legislature to impose restrictions on these jurisdictional
powers.  See art. V, § 4(b), Fla. Const.2  "While constitutional jurisdiction cannot be
courts, see art. V, § 5(b), Fla. Const., and the general jurisdiction of the county courts, see art. V,
§ 6(b), Fla. Const.
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restricted or taken away, it can be enlarged by the Legislature in all cases where
such enlargement does not result in a diminution of the constitutional jurisdiction of
some other court, or where such enlargement is not forbidden by the Constitution." 
South Atlantic S.S. Co. v. Tutson, 139 Fla. 405, 190 So. 675, 682 (1939) (quoting
Harry E. Prettyman, Inc. v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 92 Fla. 515, 525, 109 So.
442, 445 (1926)).  Thus, the Legislature could not constitutionally limit the appellate
courts' subject matter jurisdiction to hear criminal appeals.  
Article V, section 4(b), which grants the district courts' jurisdiction to hear
criminal appeals, also grants criminal defendants a constitutional right to an appeal. 
See id.; Amendments, 696 So. 2d at 1104.  In a previous opinion upholding the
Criminal Appeals Reform Act against constitutional attack, this Court stated that
we believe that the legislature may implement this constitutional right
and place reasonable conditions upon it so long as they do not thwart
the litigants' legitimate appellate rights.  Of course, this Court continues
to have jurisdiction over the practice and procedure relating to appeals.
Id. at 1104-05 (emphasis supplied) (footnote omitted).  Because the Florida
Constitution does not give the Legislature the authority to restrict the subject matter
jurisdiction of the appellate courts to hear criminal appeals, to the extent that section
924.051(3) could be read as an attempt to restrict the subject matter jurisdiction of
3Further, language in the Staff Analysis suggests that the Legislature understood that
appellate jurisdiction is defined by the Florida Constitution and the Florida Rules of Appellate
Procedure, although the staff analysis also indicates the mistaken belief that the right to appeal
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the appellate courts in a manner not authorized by the constitution, the provisions
would be unconstitutional.  See South Atlantic, 139 Fla. at 422, 190 So. at 682. 
Thus, construing these ambiguous provisions as a jurisdictional bar would run
counter to the important principle that statutes should be construed to avoid an
unconstitutional result.
Further, in construing a statute that is susceptible to more than one
interpretation, it is often helpful to refer to legislative history in order to ascertain
the Legislature's intent.  See Magaw  v. State, 537 So. 2d 564, 566 (Fla. 1989); see
also 2A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 48.04 (6th ed.
2000).  Before enactment of the Act, the contemporaneous objection rule posed a
procedural bar that generally prevented defendants from raising issues on appeal
that had not been first presented to the trial court, absent fundamental error.  See
generally Pomeranz v. State, 703 So. 2d 465, 470 (Fla. 1997); Castor v. State, 365
So. 2d 701, 703 (Fla. 1978).  The Staff Analysis of the Act supports the
interpretation that the purpose of these provisions was to codify the
contemporaneous objection requirement, rather than to restrict the jurisdiction of the
appellate courts:3
was purely statutory, rather than protected by the Florida Constitution.  See Fla. H.R. Comm. on
Crim. Just., CS for HB 211 (1996) Staff Analysis 2 (March 26, 1996); Fla. S. Jud. Comm., CS for
SB 2 (1996), Staff Analysis 2-3 (Nov. 16, 1995).  
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Florida courts have traditionally held that questions not timely
raised and ruled upon in the trial court will not be considered on
appeal.  This policy, often cited as the "contemporaneous objection
rule," is intended to give trial judges an opportunity to address
objections made by counsel in trial proceedings and to correct errors
accordingly.  The primary purpose of the rule is to ensure that
objections are made when the recollections of witnesses are freshest
and not years later in a subsequent trial or a post-conviction relief
proceeding.  "Delay and unnecessary use of the appellate process result
from a failure to cure early that which must be cured eventually."
. . . .
In an effort to enforce the contemporaneous objection rule, the
bill expressly prohibits a court from reversing a judgment or sentence
on appeal, unless the court determines that a prejudicial error occurred
that was properly preserved in the trial court, but allows courts to
reverse on the basis of "fundamental errors," despite the failure of
defense counsel to object in the trial court.  
Fla. H.R. Comm. on Crim. Just., CS for HB 211 (1996) Final Staff Analysis 3, 5
(March 26, 1996) (emphasis supplied) (citations omitted).
In addition, a comparison of the pre-filed version of the bill and various
amendments of the bill to the version of section 924.051(3) ultimately enacted
further supports the conclusion that interpreting the Act as a codification of the
contemporaneous objection requirement, rather than a restriction on the subject
matter jurisdiction, is consistent with the actual legislative intent.  The original bill
prefiled in the House and Senate provided:
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(5) Jurisdiction of an appellate court over an appeal is
substantive and must be satisfactorily demonstrated by the appellant
before the court can consider the merits of the appeal.  When appellate
jurisdiction is challenged, all other appellate proceedings in the case
are stayed until the challenge is resolved.
Fla. HB 211, § 4 (1995) (prefiled); Fla. SB 2, § 4 (1995) (prefiled).  This language
would have created a two-step procedure whereby a defendant must demonstrate,
before briefing on the merits, that the appeal presents a cognizable issue.  The
Legislature specifically struck this language from the bill.
In enacting the Act, the Legislature was attempting to streamline the appellate
process and increase judicial efficiency.  See Fla. S. Jud. Comm., CS for SB 2
(1995) Staff Analysis 4-5 (rev. Nov. 16, 1995); see also Denson v. State, 711 So. 2d
1225, 1228 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).  Construing section 924.051(3) as presenting a
jurisdictional bar to review would not further the purpose of increasing judicial
efficiency because in many cases it would effectively require appellate courts to
examine the entire trial record twice--once in response to the State's motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and then again when a decision is made on the
merits.  A two-step process would almost inevitably increase and certainly would
not decrease judicial labor.  
Further, section 924.051(3) provides that a defendant may not appeal "unless
a prejudicial error is alleged and is properly preserved or, if not properly preserved,
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would constitute fundamental error."  Outside of the sentencing context, the
question of whether fundamental error exists generally requires an examination of
the record as a whole.  Cf. Crump v. State, 622 So. 2d 963, 972 (Fla. 1993)
(concluding after a review of the entire record that error was not fundamental).  This
necessity is in fact specifically envisioned within the language of section
924.051(3), which requires appellate courts to conduct "a review of the complete
record."  Although determining whether an error has been preserved is less complex
than determining whether that error is fundamental, appellate cases routinely involve
multiple issues that may include both preserved and unpreserved error.
After considering the language of the Act and the legislative history of section
924.051(3), we conclude that construing this statute as merely codifying the existing
procedural bars to appellate review both upholds the statute's constitutionality and is
consistent with the actual legislative intent in passing the Act.  Nothing in our
opinion today circumvents the requirement codified in the Act that in order to
constitute reversible error, the error must first either be preserved for review or
amount to fundamental error.
Finally, we note that even though we do not interpret the Act as posing a
jurisdictional bar to appellate review, the appellate courts still retain the power to
summarily address appeals.  For example, Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.315
4For the reasons expressed in our opinion in Leonard v. State, No. SC93332, slip op. at
11-12 (Fla. May 11, 2000), we note that it would be helpful for appellate courts to include a
citation to our opinion in Maddox v. State, Nos. SC92805, SC93000, SC93207, SC93966 (Fla.
May 11, 2000), when they are summarily affirming an appeal after finding that an unpreserved
sentencing error does not constitute fundamental error. 
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provides that after service of the initial brief, or the answer brief if a cross-appeal
has been filed, "the court may summarily affirm the order to be reviewed if the court
finds that no preliminary basis for reversal has been demonstrated."  Thus, in those
appeals presenting unpreserved errors that are not considered fundamental, appellate
courts have the authority to summarily affirm the conviction and sentence.4 
Accordingly, we accept the State's concession of error and answer the first
part of the rephrased certified question in Jefferson in the negative and the second
part of the certified question in the affirmative.
It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., and SHAW, ANSTEAD, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
WELLS, J., concurs in result only.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified Great
Public Importance
Third District - Case No. 3D97-2110 
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(Dade County)
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, James W. Rogers, Assistant Attorney
General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Terri Leon-Benner, Assistant Attorney General, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida,
for Petitioner
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Andrew Stanton, Assistant Public
Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, Florida,
for Respondent