Title: McLemore v. INTERNATIONAL UNION, ETC.

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

88 So. 2d 170 (1956)
Burl McLEMORE
v.
INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AIRCRAFT AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA, C. I. O., an unincorporated organization, et al.
8 Div. 814.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
February 2, 1956.
Rehearing Denied June 21, 1956.
*171 Horace C. Wilkinson, Birmingham, and Julian Harris and Norman W. Harris, Decatur, for appellant.
Adair & Goldthwaite, Atlanta, Ga., Harold A. Cranefield, Detroit, Mich., and Sherman B. Powell, Decatur, for appellees.
MERRILL, Justice.
Plaintiff McLemore sued the defendant Unions and one Michael Volk, alleging that they prevented him from working at his job at the copper plant in Decatur, by means of unlawful picketing and committing an assault and battery on him. The jury awarded a verdict of $8,000. Defendants filed a motion for a new trial which was granted, and it is from that ruling that this appeal is taken.
In the language of the trial judge, "the pivotal question raised by the motion for a new trial is whether the arguments of one of plaintiff's attorneys complained of, constituted such prejudicial error as to require a new trial". The questioned argument was not objected to at the time of its utterance; thus, no part of same was reported by the court reporter. The matter was presented on the hearing of the motion for a new trial by three affidavits; one by an attorney for the defendants, one by the plaintiff and one by one of plaintiff's attorneys, Mr. Horace C. Wilkinson.
We quote from amended ground 88 of the motion for the new trial, which adequately shows the matters complained of:
The body of Mr. Wilkinson's affidavit is as follows:
The appellant's first contention is that "the verdict of the jury was not contrary to the evidence and was not excessive and hence was not the result of improper argument". This same argument was made in the case of Williams v. City of Anniston, 257 Ala. 191, 58 So. 2d 115, 117, wherein we said:
Applying this test, as did the trial judge to the facts in the instant case, we are unable to say that the questioned argument might not have influenced the verdict.
It is also contended that the action of the trial judge in granting the motion for a new trial on the ground of improper argument was a determination that there was no merit in any other ground of the motion, including grounds that the verdict was excessive, was the result of bias or prejudice, or was contrary to the evidence. This argument cannot prevail. A determination by the trial judge that one ground for a motion for a new trial has merit, is not, without more, a determination that all other grounds of the motion are without merit. We said in the case of Rhodes v. Roadway Express Co., 261 Ala. 14, 73 So. 2d 740, 742,
It is next contended that the questioned argument was provoked by improper argument of opposing counsel and that it was retaliatory and in reply to such improper argument. The finding of the trial judge in this regard, was in part as follows:
We think the above finding is supported by the evidence. The fact that Negroes attended the Union meetings and participated in picketing was brought out not by the defendants but by the plaintiff. Likewise, the copy of the Union's Constitution, which was in evidence, was introduced by the plaintiff and not by the defendants.
Appellants next contend that "since defendants interposed no objection to the argument at the time it was made, and therefore speculated on the verdict of the jury, they should not be heard to complain of the argument." It is true as a general rule, improper argument of counsel does not constitute grounds for a new trial unless there is timely objection or a motion to exclude, a ruling thereon by the court and an exception thereto, or a refusal by the Court to make a ruling. However, *174 as stated in Anderson v. State, 209 Ala. 36, 95 So. 171, 179,
Two of our most recent cases which recognize the existence of the quoted exception are Washington v. State, 259 Ala. 104, 65 So. 2d 704, and Jackson v. State, 260 Ala. 641, 71 So. 2d 825.
We are impressed by a statement of the trial judge in his opinion on the motion for the new trial where he stated
We are at the conclusion as was the trial judge, that the argument here complained of should not have been indulged. In the case of Loeb v. Webster, 213 Ala. 99, 104 So. 25, 27, this Court stated:
The position of a trial judge is such that he is better able than we to ascertain the extent to which improper arguments may have on the minds of jurors. It is the duty of the trial court on motion to set aside a verdict and grant a new trial if the judge has a definite and well considered opinion that such improper argument was prejudicial to the extent that its harmful influence was not or could not be eradicated. Certainly the trial judge in the instant case deemed it necessary under the circumstances to grant a new trial. And because he saw and heard the parties, observed the jurors and their reaction, presumption is indulged in favor of his ruling granting or refusing a new trial. 2 Ala. Digest, Appeal and Error.
We are convinced that under the circumstances existing in this case, that the argument of counsel was "`"so grossly *175 improper and highly prejudicial, that its evil influence and effect could not be eradicated from the minds of the jury by any admonition from the trial judge"'". National Biscuit Co. v. Wilson, 256 Ala. 241, 54 So. 2d 492, 497; Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Gambrell, 262 Ala. 290, 78 So. 2d 619.
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
LAWSON, SIMPSON, STAKELY, GOODWYN and MAYFIELD, JJ., concur.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., dissents.