Title: SKINNER v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

SKINNER v. STATE2001 WY 10233 P.3d 758Case Number: 00-100Decided: 10/30/2001This opinion replaces the opinion published in Skinner v. State, 2001 WY 89, on October 2, 2001, which was withdrawn by court order on October 30, 2001.

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2001

                                                                                                
     

BRAD 
SKINNER, 

Appellant(Defendant),

v.

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING, 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable David B. Park, Judge

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Tina 
Kerin, Assistant Appellate Counsel 

 Representing 
Appellee:

Gay 
Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kimberly A. Baker, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director of the Prosecution 
Assistance Program; and Carrie A. Kelly, Mia J. Mikesell, and Shawn Matlock, 
Student Interns

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

            
KITE, Justice. 

[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from Brad Skinner's conviction of aggravated assault and battery in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2001).1  Mr. Skinner was sentenced to life in 
prison pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-201 (LexisNexis 2001),2 the habitual criminal law.  He seeks review of his conviction based 
on six alleged errors committed during trial.  Finding no reversible error, we 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2]      Mr. Skinner 
presents these issues for our review:

            
I.  Was Appellant prejudiced by the inclusion on the jury of a 
jury member who was deaf and who did not hear and understand all the proceedings 
in Appellant's Aggravated Assault trial?

            
II.  Did the trial court err 
in allowing a juror who had inappropriately conducted his own investigation to 
remain on the jury and was Appellant deprived of his constitutional right to 
trial by jury by the jury misconduct?

            
III.  Did the trial court err 
in allowing the improper battered wom[a]n's syndrome testimony of Thad Davidson, 
and improper character evidence of Appellant?

            
IV.  Was Appellant deprived 
of his right to be present at a critical stage of the proceedings by not being 
allowed to attend the hearing concerning the jury 
misconduct?

            
V.  Did the state 
impermissibly coerce and threaten the alleged victim, resulting in unreliable 
testimony, and was the alleged victim given legal advice that forced her to 
testify untruthfully, in violation of Appellant's due process 
rights?

            
VI.  Did the trial court err 
in not permitting evidence of the alleged victim's methamphetamine use and 
withdrawal?

The 
State of Wyoming rephrases the issues as:

            
I.  Was [the juror], who wore a hearing aid, unable to hear 
material portions of the trial, thereby prejudicing 
Appellant?

            
II.  Did the district court 
err by permitting [the juror] to remain on the jury after the juror contacted 
defense counsel in violation of the court's order?

            
III.  Did the district court 
err in permitting Witness Thad Davidson to testify regarding attributes of 
battered or assaulted women?

            
IV.  Was Appellant deprived 
of his right to be present at every critical stage of the proceedings when he 
was not present at the hearing in chambers regarding [the juror's] attempt to 
communicate with defense counsel?

            
V.  Was Appellant's right to 
due process of law infringed by the actions of the state in inducing the victim, 
. . . Appellant's wife, to testify against him?

            
VI.  Did the district court 
abuse its discretion when it sustained the state's objection to questioning of 
the victim regarding her use of methamphetamine?

FACTS

[¶3]      This appeal 
involves a domestic violence dispute which occurred on March 3, 1999, when Mr. 
Skinner and his wife (the victim) went to The Lounge, a Casper bar.  Earlier that evening, Mr. Skinner had 
consumed one beer, and the victim had consumed sufficient alcohol to become 
intoxicated.  Mr. Skinner became 
aware the victim had some money in her possession, and he wanted to know where 
it came from, thus initiating an argument.  
He began to yell at his wife and asked her to return a hunting knife he 
had previously given her.  She 
obliged, but the altercation continued.  
Eventually, the couple proceeded home with a stop at a drive-through 
window to purchase more alcohol.

[¶4]      The victim 
testified that, once they arrived home, Mr. Skinner took hold of her hair and 
shirt and she slapped and hit him while yelling for help.  Mr. Skinner proceeded to put his knee in 
her stomach and his hand over her mouth and nose.  They continued fighting as they entered 
their home.  The victim testified 
that, while Mr. Skinner turned around to close the door, she dialed 911 and laid 
down the telephone without her husband's knowledge.  The dispatcher heard a male screaming 
and a female crying.  The dispatcher 
could also hear the female being slapped, the female pleading for her assailant 
to stop, and the male threatening, "I'll kill you now."  The dispatcher never heard a knife 
mentioned during the telephone call.  
The fighting continued and, according to the victim's testimony, Mr. 
Skinner threw her up against the wall, held her there, and head-butted her.  The victim asked for her knife back, and 
Mr. Skinner took the knife out of his pocket with one hand while keeping the 
other hand on her neck.

[¶5]      Soon thereafter, 
two police officers knocked on the door, and, when no one responded, they kicked 
in the door.  Upon Mr. Skinner's 
arrest, an officer searched him and found a knife in his front pants 
pocket.  While the officers were at 
the apartment, the victim told them that Mr. Skinner held the open knife to her 
throat.  Subsequently, the officers 
took a taped statement from the victim in which she restated her 
accusations.  

[¶6]      The victim 
testified that, while Mr. Skinner was released on bond, he asked her not to tell 
anybody that he had held a knife to her throat and not to tell the whole 
truth.  The victim testified that, 
in a subsequent fight over the substance of her impending testimony, Mr. Skinner 
threatened to kill her, held a baseball bat to her neck, and punched her giving 
her a black eye.

[¶7]      On direct 
examination, the victim stated that she could not remember whether or not Mr. 
Skinner had held the knife to her throat.  
During the victim's cross-examination, the trial judge appointed her 
independent counsel reasoning that was necessary because the cross-examination 
concerned whether she had made a false report to the police and whether she had 
been forced to lie or was afraid of going to jail as a result of her 
testimony.  With the advice of 
independent counsel, the victim testified that Mr. Skinner had indeed placed a 
knife at her throat and threatened to kill her.  Mr. Skinner never challenged the fact 
that the domestic altercation had occurred, but rather he insisted he never held 
a knife to the victim's throat.

[¶8]      Mr. Skinner was 
charged with aggravated assault and battery in violation of § 
6-2-502(a)(iii).  At arraignment, he 
pleaded not guilty.  Prior to trial, 
the victim had written a notarized letter to the trial judge disclaiming her 
allegations that Mr. Skinner threatened her with a knife.  As a result, on July 29, 1999, the state 
filed a motion for detention of a material witness.  The state argued the letter written by 
the victim indicated she was attempting to avoid service in order to refrain 
from testifying against her husband.  
The motion was granted, and the victim was arrested and incarcerated 
throughout Mr. Skinner's trial.  
Additionally, although the record is unclear as to the basis for the 
charge, the victim was charged with avoiding service of a subpoena pursuant to 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-306 (LexisNexis 2001).

[¶9]      On August 3, 
1999, a jury found Mr. Skinner guilty of aggravated assault and battery.  On October 6, 1999, the same jury found 
Mr. Skinner to be a habitual criminal due to his eight previous felony 
convictions, and the court sentenced him to a term of life in prison.  Mr. Skinner appeals his conviction to 
this court.

DISCUSSION

A.        Juror 
Misconduct

[¶10]   Mr. Skinner contends he was 
deprived of his right to a fair and impartial jury due to improper juror conduct 
in the interim period between the initial trial and the habitual sentencing 
phase of the trial.  After the 
verdict in the initial trial was announced, a juror contacted the court by 
letter and came into the defense counsel's office unannounced to personally 
inquire about a specific issue raised at trialwhy the victim was forced to 
testify against her husband.  The 
defense counsel briefly responded to the juror's inquiry and explained that he 
had tried to make it clear to the jury why the victim was arrested and forced to 
testify.  The defense counsel 
immediately informed the trial court of the contact.

[¶11]   The following morning, the trial 
court held proceedings in chambers in the presence of the juror, the prosecutor, 
and the defense counsel.  The trial 
court appropriately admonished the juror and then sought and received assurance 
by the juror that he could be fair and base his decision regarding the habitual 
sentencing phase on only evidence produced in the courtroom.  The trial court gave a cursory 
explanation to the juror that the victim was being held as a material witness 
and, in certain circumstances, a wife can be forced to testify against her 
husband.3  However, the trial court made it clear 
that his explanation addressed an issue that had already been determined in the 
initial trial proceeding and should have no effect on the habitual criminal 
proceeding.  The state objected to 
the juror remaining on the juror panel, but the defense counsel did not.  The trial court concluded the contact 
was harmless and overruled the state's objection.

[¶12]   The law is well settled that it is 
improper for a juror to have any out-of-court communications with witnesses, the 
court, parties, or counsel concerning a case.  Distad v. Cubin, 633 P.2d 167, 
182 (Wyo. 1981).  Nor can a juror 
make any attempt to obtain additional evidence other than what is presented in 
the courtroom.  
Id.

"There 
are many obvious reasons for not allowing jurors to supplement the knowledge of 
the subject-matter of investigation obtained in court from the evidence 
produced, by pursuing personal and private investigation out of the presence of 
the court, during the trial. . . .This would not only be 
irregular, but it would necessarily result in permitting the inquiry by jurors 
to go beyond the control of the court and beyond the established rules of 
evidence, and into irrelevant and immaterial matters."

McCoy v. 
Clegg, 36 
Wyo. 473, 257 P. 484, 498 (1927) (quoting American Brake Shoe and Foundry 
Company v. Jankus, 121 Ill. App. Ct. 267, 1905 WL 2095, at *3 
(1905)).

[¶13]   In the instant case, once the trial 
court was informed of the improper juror contact, it promptly held a 
hearing.  The trial court followed 
the appropriate procedure as set forth in Sisneros v. City of Laramie, 
773 P.2d 933, 936 (Wyo. 1989) (quoting United States v. Hornung, 848 F.2d 1040, 1045 (10th  Cir. 1988) (some citations 
omitted)):

"When a 
trial court is apprised of the fact that extrinsic influence may have tainted 
the trial, the proper remedy is a hearing to determine the circumstances of the 
improper contact and the extent of the prejudice, if any, to the defendant.  The court's questioning of a juror who 
is the recipient of extraneous information is limited to the circumstances and 
nature of the improper contact, as Fed.R.Evid. 606(b) precludes the court from 
delving into the subjective effect of the contact on the juror's 
decision-making.  Accordingly, an 
objective test should be applied in making an assessment of whether the 
defendant was prejudiced by the extraneous information.  The court should assess the 
"possibility of prejudice" by reviewing the entire record, analyzing the 
substance of the extrinsic evidence and comparing it to that information of 
which the jurors were aware.'  
United States v. Weiss, 752 F.2d 777, 783 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 474 U.S. 944, 106 S. Ct. 308, 88 L. Ed. 2d 285 
(1985)."

Accordingly, 
a mere showing of improper communication is not sufficient; prejudice must also 
be shown.  The record is clear that improper juror conduct occurred in 
this case; therefore, the analysis is focused on whether prejudice 
resulted.

[¶14]   In Smith v. 
Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982), the United States Supreme Court stated:

These cases demonstrate that due process does not require a 
new trial every time a juror has been placed in a potentially compromising 
situation. Were that the rule, few trials would be constitutionally acceptable. 
The safeguards of juror impartiality, such as voir 
dire and protective instructions from the trial judge, are not infallible; 
it is virtually impossible to shield jurors from every contact or influence that 
might theoretically affect their vote. Due process means a jury capable and 
willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it, and a trial judge 
ever watchful to prevent prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of 
such occurrences when they happen.

In the hearing conducted by the trial court, the juror 
stated that he could be fair and impartial and would base his decision solely on 
the evidence presented in the courtroom.  Most importantly, the information the juror 
sought and received pertained to only the initial proceeding, which had been 
completely resolved.  
His inquiry into why the victim had been arrested and compelled to 
testify against her husband had absolutely no influence on the remaining 
habitual criminal proceeding wherein the only issue to be determined was whether 
Mr. Skinner had been convicted of previous felonies.  Therefore, Mr. 
Skinner could not have been prejudiced by the extraneous information the juror 
learned through his inquiries to the defense counsel and the trial court.

[¶15]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-203(b) 
(LexisNexis 2001)4 evidences the legislative intent that the same 
jury shall decide both the underlying charged felony and whether the defendant 
is a habitual criminal.  The trial court followed the proper procedure 
and was assured of the lack of prejudice, a conclusion to which we defer.  The trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in allowing the juror to remain empanelled during the 
habitual criminal proceeding. 

B.        
Hearing-Impaired Juror 

[¶16]   Mr. Skinner claims he was prejudiced 
because the same juror described above was hard of hearing and not certain he 
heard all the testimony and argument in the courtroom.  "When seeking 
reversal based on the inability of a juror to hear evidence, a defendant must 
demonstrate prejudice, i.e., that the juror failed to hear material parts of the 
trial."  Sorensen v. State, 6 P.3d 657, 661-62 (Wyo. 
2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 818 (2001); see also Belondon v. City of 
Casper, 456 P.2d 238, 242 (Wyo. 
1969).

[¶17]   Mr. Skinner relies on the letter to the 
trial judge following the first phase of the trial wherein the juror made the 
following statement, "I should mention here that [I] am slightly ancient (81) 
and my hearing is not good, so I might have missed some things in the 
courtroom."  
Principally, Mr. Skinner claims the juror made clear through his 
inquiries to the court and the defense counsel that he did not understand why 
the victim was in jail, which, according to Mr. Skinner, was a material part of 
the trial.  Mr. 
Skinner argues the juror's failure to understand that the victim was testifying 
under threat of prosecution was material because it went directly to her 
credibility and was essential to his defense.  However, on its face, this claim challenges 
the level of understanding by the juror rather than his hearing impairment.  The juror wanted to 
know why the victim was in jail and how a wife could be forced to testify 
against her husband indicating he had heard those facts at trial.  The following 
responses demonstrate he heard the trial proceedings on this issue.

[THE JUROR]:  Well, what made me think was there was a 
woman testifying against her husband.  You were forcing her.  No question in -- 
in my mind, but you were forcing her to do it.  She didn't want to do it, the way it looked 
to me.  Is that 
right or wrong?

. . . .

[THE JUROR]:  That's what it seemed to me.  That's the reason I 
questioned it.  
That's the reason the whole thing has been in my mind, because I thought 
she was being forced to testify against her husband.  And I didn't think 
that was legal.

These statements suggest the juror's informed understanding that the victim 
was forced to testify and only disclose his understanding of the law may not 
have been accurate.

[¶18]   Based on the facts before us, we cannot 
conclude the juror's hearing was so impaired as to make him incapable of 
performing his duties as a juror.  The juror admitted having a slight hearing 
problem during voir dire; however, the defense counsel did not make an objection 
for cause.  
Upon realizing the juror wore a hearing aid, the prosecutor asked him if 
he was able to hear most of what the victim had said, to which he replied, 
"[m]ost of it."  
If Mr. Skinner questioned the juror's ability to hear, he failed to 
object and cannot now rely on that reason as impeding his right to a fair 
trial.  In 
addition, the voir dire examination reflects that the juror answered each 
question presented to him without apparent difficulty in hearing.

[THE PROSECUTOR]:  What about the fact the victim 
in this case has been arrested as a material witness and has been made to 
testify today?  
Would you hold that against the State?

[THE JUROR]:  No.

            
. . . .

[THE PROSECUTOR]:  And would you view the 
testimony of the victim differently than you would another person because of her 
situation?

            
. . . .

[THE JUROR]:  No.  

[THE PROSECUTOR]:  Okay.  Do each of 
you understand the reasons why the victim of domestic violence may not want to 
testify?

            
. . . .

[THE JUROR]:  I suppose.

The record further reflects that, when the jury was polled 
by the defense at the conclusion of the case, the juror was again satisfactorily 
responsive.  
Absent a more definitive showing of prejudice due to the juror's 
inability to hear, we conclude there was no error.

C.        
Defendant's Presence at Critical Stage of the Proceedings

[¶19]   Next, Mr. Skinner argues he was 
deprived of his right to be present at a critical stage of the proceedings by 
not being allowed to attend the trial court's hearing concerning the juror 
misconduct described above.  As previously explained, a juror was 
questioned as to his communications with the defense counsel after the verdict 
in the initial proceeding was announced but prior to the habitual criminal 
proceeding.  
Only the trial judge, the defense counsel, the prosecutor, and the juror 
were present for the hearing, and the defense counsel lodged no objection to the 
defendant's absence.  
"The question of whether a defendant had the right to be present at a 
specific phase of his trial is an issue of law and, as such, is subject to de novo review."  Seeley v. 
State, 959 P.2d 170, 175 (Wyo. 
1998).

[¶20]   The Sixth Amendment and the due process 
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
guarantee an accused the right to be present during every stage of the criminal 
proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to 
the fairness of the procedure.  959 P.2d  at 177.  Article 1, Section 
10 of the Wyoming Constitution "is even more explicit in its guarantee to an 
accused of the right of presence at trial."  Maupin v. State, 
694 P.2d 720, 722 (Wyo. 
1985) ("In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to defend 
in person").

[¶21]   "The right to be present at trial stems 
in part from the fact that by his physical presence the defendant can hear and 
see the proceedings, can be seen by the jury, and can participate in the 
presentation of his rights."  Bustamante v. 
Eyman, 456 F.2d 269, 274 (9th Cir. 1972); see also Maupin, 694 P.2d  at 723.  These constitutional guarantees are 
incorporated into Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-202 (LexisNexis 2001) and W.R.Cr.P. 
43(a), which provide that a defendant shall be present "at every stage of the 
trial." Seeley, 959 P.2d  at 177.  "However, the due 
process right to be present is not unequivocal.  The defendant's presence is not required when 
it would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow.'"  Id.  (quoting Snyder v. 
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1934)).

[¶22]   We have previously stated that 
constitutional error is not established when a defendant is absent during bench 
conferences on legal questions.  Sandy v. State, 
870 P.2d 352, 359 (Wyo. 
1994); W.R.Cr.P. 43(c)(3).  However, even the state concedes in this case 
the issues addressed at the hearing were more than purely questions of lawthey 
were fact-finding inquiries into what communications occurred between the juror 
and the defense counsel.  We cannot conclude the hearing was a "minor 
occurrence" which did not necessitate Mr. Skinner's presence.  See United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 527 (1985) (the United States Supreme Court held the absence of 
defendants during an inquiry into a juror's concern about one of the defendant's 
sketching jurors was a minor occurrence which did not violate the Fifth 
Amendment).  
The hearing discussed facts in controversy and law that was applicable to 
the initial phase of the case, and the failure to allow Mr. Skinner to be 
present was error.

[¶23]   As we stated in Seeley, the absence of a defendant during a conference 
with the court, even though of constitutional proportion, is subject to a 
harmless error analysis.  959 P.2d  at 178.

Before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, 
the court must be able to declare its belief that the error was harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  
In determining whether reversible error occurred, we ask if the 
defendant's absence created any reasonable possibility of prejudice.  The State must show 
that an error can pass muster under this standard.  

Id. (citations omitted).  In light of the entire record, we are 
convinced Mr. Skinner's absence from the hearing was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt, as his absence from the hearing did not create any reasonable 
possibility of prejudice.

[¶24]   Although he is not obligated to 
establish prejudice, Mr. Skinner insists prejudice resulted because he was not 
able to advise his counsel whether to ask questions of the juror, he could have 
asked his counsel to explain the proceedings and their significance, and he 
could have conferred with his counsel regarding what course of action should 
have been suggested to the court.  Given the fact that this juror's questions 
indicated he was sympathetic to Mr. Skinner in that he did not believe the 
victim should have been forced to testify, it is unlikely Mr. Skinner's presence 
would have resulted in the defense counsel taking any different action than he 
did.  Perhaps 
more importantly, the hearing at issue was conducted after the guilt phase of 
the trial and before the habitual criminal proceeding.  Therefore, Mr. 
Skinner's absence did not create any reasonable possibility of prejudice.  The narrow inquiry 
addressing the juror's confusion over an issue during the previous proceeding 
could not affect the juror's consideration of whether Mr. Skinner had been 
previously convicted of additional feloniesthe matter at issue in the final 
phase of the proceedings.  We conclude the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.

D.        Improper 
Battered-Woman-Syndrome Testimony

[¶25]   In its case-in-chief, the state called 
an expert witness to testify regarding the battered woman syndrome.  Mr. Skinner argues 
a portion of the testimony was inadmissible because the expert referenced 
patterns in domestic violence situations and how a batterer's anger and violence 
often escalates.  
Mr. Skinner complains this testimony implied to the jury that he had 
acted in conformity with the profile of a batterer and, in fact, held a knife to 
his wife's throat.

Evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of the 
trial court and include determinations of the adequacy of foundation and 
relevancy, competency, materiality, and remoteness of the evidence.  This court will 
generally accede to the trial court's determination of the admissibility of 
evidence unless that court clearly abused its discretion.

Solis v. State, 981 P.2d 34, 36 (Wyo. 1999) (citation omitted); see also 
Trujillo v. State, 2 P.3d 567, 571 (Wyo. 2000).  We have described the standard of an abuse of 
discretion as reaching the question of the reasonableness of the trial court's 
choice.  Griswold v. State, 2001 WY 14, ¶7, 17 P.3d 728, ¶7 (Wyo. 
2001).  
Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are 
conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means exercising sound judgment 
with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so 
arbitrarily or capriciously.  Id.  "In the absence of 
an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the trial court's 
determination."  
Id.  The burden is on the defendant to 
establish such abuse.  
Trujillo, 2 P.3d  at 571.

If the trial court erred by admitting evidence, we then 
must ascertain whether the error affects any substantial rights of the accused, 
providing grounds for reversal, or whether it is harmless.  The harmless error 
standard is set out in W.R.A.P. 9.04:

Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not 
affect substantial rights shall be disregarded by the reviewing court.

See also W.R.Cr.P. 52.  An error is harmful if there is a reasonable 
possibility that the verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant if 
the error had never occurred. To demonstrate harmful error, the defendant must 
show prejudice under "circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and 
injustice, or conduct which offends the public sense of fair play."  Johnson v. State, 790 P.2d 231, 232 (Wyo. 
1990).

Solis, 981 P.2d  at 36 (some citations omitted); see also Ryan v. State, 988 P.2d 46, 52-53 (Wyo. 1999).

[¶26]   In Ryan, 
this court addressed the propriety of allowing an expert to testify, under the 
scope of the battered woman syndrome, as to the characteristics of batterers and 
the type of conduct they tend to exhibit.  In particular, the expert explained to the 
jury the concept of "separation violence," in which an escalation of violence 
occurs because perpetrators of domestic violence feel a loss of power and 
control over their partners when the partners are planning to leave or have left 
the relationship.  
988 P.2d  at 53.  In Ryan, the 
expert then testified about the common characteristics of batterers.  Id.  The court recognized the expert did not 
specifically state that, because the defendant was violent, he acted in 
conformity therewith on the night of the murder; rather, the expert subtly and 
impliedly invited the jury to group the defendant among other batterers to 
determine his conduct.  988 P.2d  at 55.

[¶27]   Although battered-woman-syndrome 
testimony is admissible and helpful to the jury, it must not run afoul of W.R.E. 
404(a) which provides in pertinent part:  "Evidence of a person's character or a trait 
of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in 
conformity therewith on a particular occasion."  When battered-woman-syndrome testimony is 
raised by the state in its case-in-chief and relates to a defendant, as it did 
in the instant case, the "testimony draws close to commenting directly on what 
likely happened' and looks like character evidence after all.'"  Ryan, 988 P.2d  at 55 (quoting Christopher B. Mueller 
& Laird C. Kirkpatrick, 3 Federal Evidence § 637 (2d ed. 1994)).  Evidence concerning 
a defendant's involvement demands close scrutiny under the character evidence 
rules.  Id.  "This is so even if reference to the 
defendant may only be inferred from the testimony."  Id.

[¶28]   The expert in the instant case 
testified as to the general characteristics and conduct of batterers, with 
particular focus on the tendency for violence to escalate over time.  We discussed this 
concept in Ryan and stated:

Finding guilt by reference to common characteristics of a 
class of individuals to which one belongs raises the specter of profile 
evidence.  
Profile or syndrome evidence is developed through expert testimony and 
tends to classify people by their shared physical, emotional, or mental 
characteristics. . . . Translated into the battering spouse 
context, a profile is a compilation of characteristics repeatedly seen in those 
who batter their spouses. 

Id.  
We continued:

While our research has not disclosed any case dealing 
specifically with battering spouses, other jurisdictions in different contexts 
have dealt with similar attempts to construct a criminal profile for the purpose 
of proving conduct in conformity therewith.  Those jurisdictions that have considered 
profiles of battering parents, pedophiles, rapists, and drug couriers 
unanimously agree that the prosecution may not offer such evidence in its 
case-in-chief as substantive evidence of guilt.  These cases generally articulate three 
evidentiary bases for excluding evidence tending to establish that the defendant 
fits a particular profile: 1) relevancy; 2) probative value substantially 
outweighed by prejudicial effect; and 3) impermissible character evidence.

Id.  We recognized that, although profile evidence may be 
relevant, the danger of unfair prejudice has generally been found to outweigh 
the probative value, and the profile evidence is often an impermissible attack 
on the defendant's character.  988 P.2d  at 56.  Therefore, in Ryan we held the expert's testimony regarding 
separation violence was inadmissible because it was introduced for the purpose 
of proving the defendant committed the act in contrast to his assertion that the 
victim committed suicide.  Id.

[¶29]   The expert in the instant case did not 
directly reference the particular character traits of Mr. Skinner.  He did, however, 
explore the general cycle of violence, the shortened period of remorse, the 
escalation of violence, and the patterns of control.  The use of profile 
testimony has been examined in the following way:

Strictly speaking, the data offered to create a social 
framework are not  
"character evidence," since they do not pertain to "a person's character or a trait of his character."  Rather, the research describes the behavior 
of groups or other 
persons.  Yet 
the purpose of offering character evidence is similar to the purpose of 
introducing social frameworks: to provethat is, to make "more probable or less 
probable"that an individual acted in conformity with an established 
pattern.  By 
definition, knowledge of the general pattern of an individual's behavior (i.e., 
his or her character)like knowledge of the general pattern of behavior in 
persons in the groups to which he or she belongsallows one to recalculate the 
probabilities that the person acted in a certain way on a given occasion.  The policy concern 
that gave rise to a rule barring the admissibility of evidence of an 
individual's "characteristic" behavior applies with equal force to the use of 
information on behavior characteristic of the groups to which he or she belongs: 
individuals should be accountable for their specific acts and not for their 
general proclivities.  

Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 
73 Va. L. Rev. 559, 581 (1987).  The following aptly describes the most 
appropriate guideline:

            
However firm the libertarian values barring the admission of character 
evidence, modern evidence law, as exemplified by the Federal Rules, contains 
several important exceptions allowing the introduction of character 
evidence.  In 
criminal proceedings, the defendant may offer evidence of his or her own 
character and, if this occurs, the prosecution may offer character evidence in 
rebuttal.  The 
defendant also may offer evidence of the victim's character, and if this occurs, 
the prosecution again may offer character evidence in rebuttal.  In either civil or 
criminal proceedings, any party may offer evidence of the character of a 
witness.  In 
addition, the prohibition against character evidence operates only when that 
evidence is used to prove that a person "acted" in conformity with his or her 
character on a particular occasion.  Character evidence may be admissible for many 
other purposes such as proof of knowledge, intent, or preparation.

            
The rule against character evidence, therefore, suggests a bar to some, 
but by no means all, applications of social frameworks.  Where traditional 
forms of character evidence are prohibited, social frameworks also should be 
barred; where traditional forms of character evidence are allowed, there is no 
reason to prohibit social frameworks. 

Id. at 581-82.  The introduction of the battered woman 
syndrome should not be a prosecutorial tool to covertly allow expert testimony 
regarding the dynamics and propensities of batterers intended to show a 
defendant acted in conformity therewith during the incident at issue.  

[¶30]   In this case, the assault itself was 
undisputed.  
Mr. Skinner did not first open the door to character testimony, and the 
testimony did not have an alternate proper evidentiary purpose such as intent or 
motive.  Mr. 
Skinner argues the only purpose of the expert testimony regarding the behavior 
of a batterer was to leave the implication that, because he had a history of 
battering his wife, he had, in fact, threatened his wife with a knife, thus 
constituting aggravated assault.  Under these circumstances, the profile 
testimony is inadmissible.

[¶31]   Applying the harmless error analysis, 
we cannot discern from the record a reasonable possibility that the verdict 
might have been more favorable to Mr. Skinner if the error had never 
occurred.  The 
expert's testimony, while discussing the pattern of escalating violence, did not 
suggest the escalation would typically include the use of a deadly weapon, such 
as a knife.  
The victim ultimately testified, confirming her initial statement to the 
police at the time of the assault, that Mr. Skinner had threatened her with a 
knife.  The 
jury also heard about Mr. Skinner's additional assault on his wife after his 
arrest and the threats he made against her if she testified at trial that he had 
used a knifea fact that most likely persuaded the jury he had done so.  The knife was also 
found in his pocket.  
There was ample evidence from which the jury could conclude the knife was 
used without drawing any indirect inference from the expert's profile testimony 
which covered only seven pages of the more than 530 pages of transcript.  In closing 
argument, the state did not unduly reference the objectionable testimony.  See Ryan, 988 P.2d  at 57.  Instead, the 
prosecutor made only two brief remarks regarding the expert's testimony, and 
neither referenced the profile-of-batterers testimony.  Rather, the remarks 
were directed at the victim's behavior which is entirely appropriate.  See 988 P.2d  at 55, 57.  We conclude the error did not affect Mr. 
Skinner's substantial rights and, therefore, was harmless.

E.        Coercion 
and Threats to Alleged Victim

[¶32]   Mr. Skinner insists his right to due 
process of law was infringed by the victim's testimony, and he presents three 
bases for our review.  
First, Mr. Skinner contends the state impermissibly coerced and 
threatened the victim, resulting in unreliable testimony.  Next, he argues he 
did not receive proper notice that the victim was detained as a material 
witness.  
Finally, Mr. Skinner maintains the victim was denied medical treatment, 
she was suffering from withdrawal, her home was burglarized, and her pregnant 
cat died while she was incarcerated.  According to Mr. Skinner, the totality of 
these circumstances leads to the conclusion that he was denied his right to due 
process of law because the victim was coerced and could not testify freely and 
truthfully.  
Whether Mr. Skinner's right to due process of law has been violated is an 
issue of law which we review de novo.

[¶33]   Pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 46.3,5 the victim was detained as a material 
witness.  The 
state petitioned the court for her detention as a material witness on the 
following bases:  
Mr. Skinner and the victim were observed together while he was released 
on bond, thereafter the victim filed a notarized letter indicating she had lied 
about Mr. Skinner's use of the knife, the state made several unsuccessful 
attempts to serve the victim, and the state had an overriding concern that she 
was avoiding service in order to refrain from testifying against her 
husband.  The 
victim was also charged with avoiding service of a subpoena in violation of § 
6-5-306.

[¶34]   Mr. Skinner primarily relies on Raphael v. State, 994 P.2d 1004 (Alaska 2000), in which the Alaska Supreme Court held the coercion 
of a witness is a violation of the defendant's right to due process when the 
witness' statements are used against the defendant at trial.  However, in Raphael, the victim was incarcerated, and the trial 
court "conveyed the strong impression that [the victim's] release from 
imprisonment was conditioned not only on whether she 
testified, but on how she testified."  994 P.2d  at 
1009.  
Specifically, the trial court said, "And she's 
going to beonce the testimony is done, then we'll revisit it.  And she gives 
testimony and we'll revisit the case, and presumably let hershe'll be able to 
be released."  
Id.  The court recognized that 
"[i]ncarceration is a necessary remedial tool in a judge's arsenal when 
attempting to secure a recalcitrant witness's testimony"; however,  "when a witness can 
reasonably interpret a trial court's decision to imprison her as an attempt to 
influence the substance of her testimony, as the 
record indicates was the case here, the risk that the witness may not testify 
freely and truthfully is too great."  994 P.2d  at 1010.  Moreover, the court 
found the psychological effect of placing the victim's children in protective 
custody without a proper custody hearing was even more coercive than her own 
incarceration.  
Id.  The Alaska Supreme Court held the trial court 
and the prosecutor's treatment of the victim had a coercive effect on her 
testimony which resulted in a violation of the defendant's due process 
right.  994 P.2d  at 1011.

[¶35]   We find the parallels of the instant 
case to Raphael to be less than "uncanny," as 
alleged by Mr. Skinner.  The record does not support the claim that 
the victim was coerced into testifying favorably for the state.  Rather, the 
prosecutor instructed her to testify truthfully and told her she would in turn 
be released from incarceration as explained in the following trial excerpt:

Q         You 
are here today because of a subpoena that the State served on you; is that 
correct?

A         
Yes.

Q         And 
is it fair to say that you are a little reluctant to testify today?

A         
Yes.

Q         You 
and I have met to discuss this case, haven't we?

A         
Yes.

Q         And 
there are charges pending against you now for avoiding service; isn't that 
correct?

A         
That's correct.

Q         
Okay.  
And you and I have made an agreement that if you testify truthfully, that 
those charges will be dismissed; is that correct?

A         
That's correct.

Q         And 
is it your understanding or your desire to testify truthfully today?

A         
Yes, it is.

Mr. Skinner asks this court to give significant weight to 
the following emphasized testimony given by the victim on cross-examination:

Q         Ms. 
Skinner, we talked yesterday about a deal you made with the State.  Do you remember 
that?

A         
Yes, sir.

Q         
Okay.  
With every deal, there's also usually a counter threat; is that 
correct?

A         
Yes, sir.

Q         
What was that threat made by the State to you?

A         
There wasn't a threat made.  There was just -- when the trial is over, 
she'll have me released from jail, if I testify honestly.

            
. . . .

Q         
Okay.  
Now, what -- did you know what they meant when they said the truth?

A         
Yes.

Q         And 
what was that?

A         The 
whole truth and nothing but the truth.  So help me God, I will tell the truth.

Q         The 
truth as to what?  
You knew what they wanted you to testify to, didn't you?

A         
Yes, they want the truth.

Q         And did they give you any hints of what that truth 
was?

A         What I told them to begin with was 
the truth.

Q         What you told who?

A         What I told the police 
officers.

(Emphasis added.)  We have expanded the scope of the dialogue 
beyond that relied upon by the defense in order to provide an accurate context 
for the testimony.  
The victim's testimony reveals she planned to testify to the truth, as 
she understood it.  
"[J]uries, not appellate courts, should determine the credibility of 
witnesses who are party to prosecution agreements."  Kerns v. State, 920 P.2d 632, 637 (Wyo. 
1996).  The 
jury had the opportunity to assess the victim's testimony, which initially 
included a lack of memory as to the events in question followed by testimony 
which was consistent with her preliminary report to the police officers.  In light of the 
totality of the victim's testimony, the jury returned a unanimous verdict.  We will not 
second-guess the jury's credibility determination.

[¶36]   Mr. Skinner further asserts his due 
process right was affected because neither he nor his counsel was notified that 
the victim had been detained as a material witness until after she had been 
arrested.  In 
Kerns, this court concluded the failure to disclose 
the fact that law enforcement had arrested a witness because she was attempting 
not to testify was not a constitutional error.  920 P.2d  at 638.  We reach the same 
conclusion in this instance. 

[¶37]   Mr. Skinner claims, apparently 
continuing to rely on Raphael, that the victim's 
testimony in which she claimed that, while she was incarcerated, she was denied 
medical treatment and suffered from alcohol withdrawal somehow establishes a 
violation of his right to due process.  Even assuming he can make the connection 
between these facts and his right to due process, the record does not provide a 
sufficient basis to establish these facts or their relation to coercive 
testimony.  
Absent a record that clearly reflects factual indications of coercion, we 
have no basis for review.  Likewise, Mr. Skinner points to the victim's 
claims that her home was burglarized and her pregnant cat died.  All these 
circumstances may affect the victim's ability to testify truthfully, which the 
defense counsel attacked fully on cross-examination.  Ultimately, 
however, the victim's credibility was an issue for the jury to consider.  We conclude there 
was no error committed.

F.         
Evidence of the Victim's Alleged Use of and Withdrawal from 
Methamphetamine

[¶38]   Mr. Skinner contends the court erred in 
sustaining an objection at trial on the basis of relevancy.  The defense counsel 
asked the victim the specific question:  "Do you use methamphetamine?"  This inquiry 
followed the questioning of the victim as to whether she was an alcoholic and 
whether she was suffering withdrawal, to which she responded in the 
affirmative.  
At trial, the defense counsel responded to the prosecutor's objection to 
relevancy and stated:

Your honor, the relevance is that if she is going through 
all kinds of withdrawal and having pressure put on her by the State, her choices 
in deciding to testify for the State are very limited.  She has been 
through everything possible by the State.  And if she is withdrawing from 
methamphetamine, I think everybody in the legal community here knows that 
withdrawal from methamphetamine is severe.

The court sustained the objection.  On appeal, Mr. 
Skinner argues the victim's methamphetamine use and possible withdrawal are 
relevant to her credibility and competency as a witness.  Particularly, Mr. 
Skinner claims, "If [the victim] was in drug withdrawal, it is extremely likely 
that she would say anything in order to get out of jail."  The burden is on 
the defendant to establish the trial court's evidentiary ruling was an abuse of 
discretion.  Trujillo, 2 P.3d  at 571.

[¶39]   Mr. Skinner did not make an offer of 
proof at trial stating whether the victim actually used methamphetamine; was 
suffering from methamphetamine withdrawal; and, if so, to what extent it would 
affect the accuracy of her testimony.  "In the context of evidentiary rulings at 
trial, this court has long adhered to the doctrine that a sufficient offer of 
proof is necessary so that we are adequately apprised of the nature of the 
excluded testimony."  
Hermreck v. State, 956 P.2d 335, 338 (Wyo. 
1998);  see also  Sidwell v. State, 
964 P.2d 416, 420 (Wyo. 
1998).

This requirement enables the trial court to be fully 
advised in the exercise of its discretion regarding the admission of evidence 
and allows the reviewing court to determine if prejudicial error resulted from 
the exclusion of the proffered testimony.  Assertions and speculation in an appellate 
brief in no way take the place of an explicit offer of proof:

We suggest there is only one prudent way for an offer of 
proof to be made a[t] trial.  The attorney who seeks to offer evidence, 
which has been refused or to which an objection has been upheld, should take the 
initiative.  
The offer of proof should then take the form of counsel's eliciting the 
proposed testimony directly from the witness, or entering the tangible evidence 
in the record, all outside of the hearing of the jury.

Hermreck, 956 P.2d  at 338 (quoting Rudolph 
v. State, 829 P.2d 269, 275 (Wyo. 
1992)).  We 
conclude our appellate review was impeded due to the absence of an offer of 
proof and a clear indication in the record as to what the victim's testimony 
would have revealed.  
Consequently, Mr. Skinner failed to establish the trial court abused its 
discretion.

CONCLUSION

[¶40]   While errors were made in the trial of 
this case, a review of the complete record convinces us that Mr. Skinner 
received a fair trial and the verdict would have been unchanged had the errors 
not occurred.

[¶41]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1Section  6-2-502(a)(iii) 
provides:

(a)  A person is guilty of aggravated 
assault and battery if he:

            
. . .

(iii)  Threatens to use a drawn deadly 
weapon on another unless reasonably necessary in defense of his person, property 
or abode or to prevent serious bodily injury to another . . .

2 Section 6-10-201 
provides:

(a)  A person is [a] habitual criminal 
if:

            
(i)  He is convicted of a violent felony; and

            
(ii)  He has been convicted of a felony on two (2) or more 
previous charges separately brought and tried which arose out of separate 
occurrences in this state or elsewhere.

(b)  [A] habitual criminal shall be 
punished by imprisonment for:

            
(i)  Not less than ten (10) years nor more than fifty (50) 
years, if he has two (2) previous convictions;

            
(ii)  Life, if he has three (3) or more previous 
convictions.

3We note that it 
appears from the record before us that the victim did not invoke a spousal 
privilege not to testify against her husband; consequently, the issue of whether 
one spouse may be compelled to testify against another under these circumstances 
is not before us and is not herein addressed by this court.

4Section 6-10-203(b) 
provides:

(b)  The trial on the charged felony shall 
proceed as in other cases, but the jury shall not be informed of the previous 
convictions.  
If the defendant is convicted of the charged felony and does not plead 
guilty to the charge of the previous convictions, he shall be tried immediately 
by the same jury or judge on the charge of the previous convictions.

5W.R.Cr.P. 46.3 provides 
in pertinent part:

            
If, upon application filed by the state or the defendant and supported by 
oath or affidavit, it appears that the testimony of a person is material in a 
criminal proceeding, and if it is shown that it may become impracticable to 
secure the presence of the person by subpoena, a judicial officer may order the 
arrest of the person . . . .