Title: State v. Jaramillo

State: arizona

Issuer: Arizona Supreme Court

Document:

152 Ariz. 394 (1987) 733 P.2d 279 STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Robert Lopez JARAMILLO, Appellant. Nos. 6287 and CR-86-0061-PC. Supreme Court of Arizona. February 17, 1987. Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen., William J. Schafer III, Chief Counsel, Criminal Div., Greg A. McCarthy, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. Hirsch & Saltsman by Gordon K. Clevenger, Apache Junction, for appellant. GORDON, Chief Justice. Robert Lopez Jaramillo (defendant), Lino Flores, and Pete Moreno were charged with the first-degree murder of and deadly assault by a prisoner on a fellow inmate at the Arizona State Prison on January 3, 1984. Pursuant to separate but identical plea agreements, all three individuals pled guilty to first-degree murder and the state dropped the deadly assault charge. The trial judge imposed sentences of life imprisonment without possibility of parole for 25 years, with sentences to run consecutive to any sentences already being served. Defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief seeking to vacate his guilty plea. The trial court denied the defendant's requested relief after holding an evidentiary hearing. Defendant's motion for rehearing also was denied. We granted defendant's petition for review and have jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 5(3); A.R.S. §§ 13-4031, -4033, and -4035; and Rules 31.19 and 32.9(c), 17 A.R.S. Rules of Crim.Proc. I In his petition for post-conviction relief, defendant gave two reasons for arguing that he did not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently enter his guilty plea. First, he alleged that he was under the influence of approximately fourteen benadryl tablets at *395 the change-of-plea proceeding. Second, he alleged that he was pressured into accepting the plea agreement because of what might happen if the matter went to trial. Flores and Moreno based on their prior records would almost certainly receive the death sentence if they were to be found guilty at trial, and the trial judge would be under psychological pressure to sentence defendant to death if Flores and Moreno received the death sentence because defendant actually stabbed the victim while Flores and Moreno only held the victim. Additionally, defendant alleged that his plea was improper per se because it was part of a "package deal" with Flores and Moreno.[1] He cited State v. Solano, 150 Ariz. 423, 724 P.2d 42 (App. 1985), in which the court of appeals held that package-deal plea bargains offered to multiple defendants violate Rule 17.4, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, and public policy. Id. at 425-26, 724 P.2d at 44-45. Defendant also proferred an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel argument based on his attorney's alleged refusal to honor defendant's request made after the change-of-plea proceedings but prior to sentencing to withdraw his guilty plea. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial judge declined to vacate defendant's plea, concluding: Minute Entry dated December 4, 1985. Defendant thereafter filed a motion for rehearing limited to the applicability of the court of appeals' decision in Solano. The trial court denied defendant's motion. Defendant then filed an Anders brief and separately brought to our attention the fact that the court of appeals' decision in Solano was before us on review. II This court recently vacated the court of appeals' Solano decision in State v. Solano, 150 Ariz. 398, 724 P.2d 17 (1986). There the court declined to invalidate all package-deal plea agreements as coercive per se and held that the trial court must conduct an inquiry into the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a plea *396 was unduly coerced or voluntarily given.[2] When conducting its inquiry, the trial court should consider the following factors: 1) whether the prosecutor acted in good faith and the inducement to plead was proper; 2) whether there is a factual basis for the plea in terms of supportable evidence and proportionality of sentence; 3) whether the promise of leniency to a co-defendant significantly influenced the defendant's decision to plead guilty; and 4) whether any other relevant factor impermissibly influenced the defendant's decision to plead guilty. Solano, 150 Ariz. at 402, 724 P.2d at 21; see State v. Tietjens, 729 P.2d 914, 916 (1986). We have reviewed the record with the above factors in mind and conclude that the defendant voluntarily accepted the package-deal plea agreement.[3] III In his affidavit dated November 29, 1984, defendant alleged that after entering into the plea agreement, "I told my attorney that I wanted to withdraw my guilty plea.... My attorney told me that it was too late to withdraw my plea.... At the time of my sentencing, I again told my attorney that I wanted to withdraw my plea, but he told me that it was too late to do so." Defendant alleges that his attorney acted ineffectively by not forwarding defendant's request to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing. This issue was explored at the evidentiary hearing, where the following colloquy occurred between defendant and his attorney:[4] Transcript of evidentiary hearing, 50-51 (October 25, 1985). Attorney Callahan was also asked about defendant's request to withdraw the plea. Id. at 101-02, 110-11. Although both parties raised the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial judge failed to express his opinion on the matter in his minute entry dated December 4, 1985. Assuming from defendant's affidavits and the above-quoted evidentiary proceedings that defendant actually requested his attorney to withdraw his plea, rather than merely asking a "what if" question, we must decide whether the attorney's subsequent failure to honor his client's request resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel. The test for ineffective assistance of counsel is two-pronged: the defendant must prove that counsel's performance was deficient and that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. State v. Fisher, 730 P.2d 825, 827 (1986). We need not address the prongs in any order, and the defendant must prove both elements to succeed on his claim. State v. Salazar, 146 Ariz. 540, 541, 707 P.2d 944, 945 (1985). We will first examine the prejudice prong of the test. A defendant is prejudiced by his attorney's deficient performance if there exists a reasonable probability that, but for his attorney's unprofessional errors, results of the proceedings would have been different. Fisher, at 829. "Reasonable probability" is "less than `more likely than not' but more than `mere possibility.'" Id. To prove prejudice here, Jaramillo must prove that if his attorney had informed the trial judge that his client wished to withdraw his plea, it was more than "mere possibility" that the trial judge would have granted the request. From our review of the record, we conclude that it is very unlikely, and certainly not more than merely possible, that the trial judge would have permitted the defendant to withdraw his plea at the time of sentencing. Defendant's three reasons for wanting to withdraw his plea he was *398 under the influence of drugs at the change-of-plea proceeding, he was pressured into accepting the plea agreement because he was concerned that Flores and Moreno would receive the death sentence if the matter went to trial, and his plea was improper per se because it was part of a package deal were all addressed and rejected by the trial judge. Also, the trial judge at the change-of-plea proceeding expressly warned all three men as follows: Transcript of change-of-plea proceeding, 6 (April 5, 1984) (emphasis added). Additionally, the trial judge asked at the sentencing proceeding whether defendant had anything to say before the sentence was imposed; defendant declined to make a statement. Evidence is nonexistent as to why the trial judge would have granted defendant's request to withdraw his plea. Defendant's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel argument is meritless. IV We have reviewed the record for fundamental error as mandated by A.R.S. § 13-4035. Having found none, we affirm the judgment and sentence of the trial court. FELDMAN, V.C.J., and CAMERON and HOLOHAN, JJ., concur. HAYS, J., participated in the determination of this matter but retired before this opinion was filed. [1] The record is unclear on whether the three plea agreements were part of a package deal. The plea agreements, although identical, did not state that acceptance of one agreement was contingent on acceptance of all three agreements. Also, each man was given an opportunity to withdraw his plea, and no statements made at the change-of-plea proceeding by either the trial judge, the prosecuting attorney, or the defendant, Flores, Moreno, or their counsel, suggest that defendant's plea was part of a package deal. At the evidentiary hearing on post-conviction relief, the issue of whether the three individuals had entered into a package deal was raised repeatedly. Moreno's attorney testified: "It has been described by others as being a package deal. I personally do not remember it being such." When cross-examined, he said: "Again, I don't have any independent recollection of it being a package deal. Conversations with co-counsel and from reading the pleadings that you have filed indicate to me that it was." Flores' attorney could "not recall the plea offer being contingent upon all three accepting the plea agreement." Defendant testified that his attorney told him that his plea agreement was part of a package deal. When asked whether "it [was] your understanding that [the plea] was contingent upon everyone accepting it", defendant's attorney replied, "Yes." When asked whether "there was a requirement that all three plead or none plead", the deputy county attorney answered, "Yes. I anticipated it as a package agreement. I did not wish to try one of them without all of them." He later replied affirmatively when asked whether "the offer you eventually made to the defendants was a package deal." We will assume without deciding that defendant's plea was part of a package deal. [2] Although I dissented in Solano and would disallow the use of package deals, I apply the law as decided by a majority of my brethren. [3] We have reviewed the record and conclude that evidence sufficiently supports the trial court's findings that defendant did not enter his plea while under the influence of drugs and that defendant was not improperly pressured into entering his plea because of what might happen if the matter went to trial. [4] Defendant's attorney at the change-of-plea and sentencing proceedings was Dwight P. Callahan. Defendant's attorney at the subsequent evidentiary hearing was Gordon Clevenger.