Title: McCarty v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

McCarty v. State1994 WY 115883 P.2d 367Case Number: 93-147Decided: 10/25/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
Charles John 
McCARTY,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The STATE of 
Wyoming,

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, Washakie County, John Brackley, J.

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Leonard D. Munker, State 
Public Defender, and Deborah Cornia, Appellate Counsel, Cheyenne.

Representing 
Appellee:

Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. 
Gen., Sylvia L. Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., and D. Michael Pauling, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Cheyenne.

 

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE,* MACY,** and TAYLOR, 
JJ.

* Retired July 6, 
1994.

** Chief Justice 
at time of oral argument.

TAYLOR, Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant 
contends the district court erred when it accepted his guilty plea to a charge 
of aggravated assault and battery without following the requirements of the 
Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure. Appellant also argues the district court 
abused its discretion in failing to grant a motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
prior to sentencing. On other matters, appellant claims the district court erred 
in denying a motion for appointment of substitute counsel and failed to grant 
adequate credit for time served in presentence incarceration.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellant submits 
these issues:

ISSUE I

Did the trial court err 
by failing to comply with the conditions of Rule 11 when it accepted the 
Appellant's guilty plea?

ISSUE II

Did the trial court abuse 
its discretion in not allowing the Appellant to withdraw his guilty plea prior 
to sentencing?

ISSUE III

Did the trial court abuse 
its discretion by denying the Appellant the right to substitute appointed 
counsel?

ISSUE IV

Did the trial court err 
in not granting presentence incarceration credit against the appellant's minimum 
and maximum sentence?

[¶4]      The State of 
Wyoming restyles the issues as:

I. Whether any challenge 
to the trial court's substantial compliance with W.R.Cr.P. 11 should be barred 
as untimely and, to the extent that court departed from the rule, whether such 
should be deemed harmless?

II. Whether the trial 
court properly denied appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea?

III. Whether the trial 
court properly refused to appoint substitute counsel for appellant?

IV. Whether the trial 
court properly credited appellant for all [presentence] 
incarceration?

 

II. 
FACTS

[¶5]      In the early 
morning hours of October 24, 1991, Charles John McCarty (McCarty) went to the 
residence of his former girlfriend, Karma Andricci (Andricci), in Worland, 
Wyoming. Armed with a rifle, McCarty waited outside for Andricci to leave for 
work. At about 5:30 a.m., Andricci left her home to move her brother's car. 
After Andricci parked her brother's car, she noticed McCarty crouched near 
another vehicle. McCarty first pointed the rifle at Andricci and then lunged at 
her when she tried to flee. McCarty struck Andricci in the back of the head with 
the stock of the rifle, knocked her to the ground and began to choke her. When 
McCarty struck Andricci, the cartridge magazine fell out of the rifle. As 
McCarty tried to find the cartridge magazine, Andricci fled inside the 
house.

[¶6]      Hearing the 
commotion, Andricci's brother, John Dalton (Dalton), ran outside. McCarty 
pointed the rifle at Dalton and shouted, "John, don't do it." Dalton then heard 
a clicking sound as McCarty pulled the trigger. The rifle misfired. Unarmed, 
Dalton ran to safety and McCarty fled. The police discovered McCarty hiding near 
some vehicles in the area. McCarty was disarmed and placed under arrest. Tests 
revealed the firing pin of the rifle had struck the bullet in the chamber twice, 
but it had not fired.

[¶7]      McCarty was 
charged with two counts of aggravated assault and battery. On January 3, 1992, 
in an initial arraignment proceeding, the district court summarized the 
constitutional rights to which McCarty was entitled. McCarty acknowledged that 
he understood his rights, had received a copy of the Information, had read it 
and had discussed it with his attorney. The district court described the charges 
against McCarty and the potential penalties for those crimes. McCarty 
acknowledged that he understood the charges and the potential penalties. 
McCarty, assisted by counsel, entered pleas of not guilty.

[¶8]      On March 13, 
1992, pursuant to a request made at the initial arraignment, another arraignment 
proceeding was held so McCarty could enter additional pleas to both counts of 
not guilty by reason of mental deficiency at the time of the alleged crime. Also 
on March 13, 1992, the district court ordered that the Information be amended to 
clarify that count one was a charge of aggravated assault and battery for the 
attack on Andricci in violation of Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-502(a)(ii) 
(1988).

[¶9]      On May 4, 1992, 
McCarty appeared at a change of plea proceeding. The district court verified 
that McCarty was satisfied with representation of his counsel and that he was 
not under the influence of alcohol or drugs or unable to understand the 
proceedings because of any mental illness or deficiency. The district court also 
inquired:

THE COURT: All right. At 
that previous arraignment, you were advised of your constitutional rights and 
your right to trial. As a matter of fact, the matter was set to begin trial 
today; is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: 
Yes.

THE COURT: Do you wish 
this Court to go over any of those, to advise you again with regard to your 
constitutional rights?

THE DEFENDANT: No, your 
Honor.

McCarty also 
waived a re-reading of the charges or potential penalties.

[¶10]   The district court ascertained that 
McCarty had reviewed the terms of a proposed order, which memorialized the terms 
of the plea agreement reached by McCarty and the State. McCarty admitted that he 
had reviewed the terms of the plea agreement, in detail, with his attorney. The 
district court explained that under the plea agreement, the aggravated assault 
and battery charge for the attack on Dalton had been dismissed and replaced with 
a reckless endangerment charge and the penalty for that crime was up to one year 
in jail. McCarty entered a guilty plea to one count of reckless endangerment and 
a guilty plea to one count of aggravated assault and battery.

[¶11]   During the proceedings, the 
district court specifically inquired about McCarty's ability to understand the 
consequences of his change of pleas:

THE COURT: Do you think 
you understand the nature of these proceedings?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 

THE COURT: Do you think 
you understand what you're doing today?

THE DEFENDANT: 
Pardon?

THE COURT: Do you think 
you understand what's going on here today and what you are doing?

THE DEFENDANT: 
Yes.

THE COURT: Have you been 
able to understand what your attorney has told you?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your 
Honor.

THE COURT: [Defense 
Counsel], based upon your contacts with your client in this matter, do you have 
an opinion as to whether or not he understands the nature of these proceedings 
and the consequences of his plea here today?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, I 
do, your Honor.

THE COURT: What is that 
opinion?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I 
believe that he does understand the nature of the proceedings.

The district 
court determined that the two guilty pleas had been entered 
voluntarily.

[¶12]   A factual basis was established by 
the county attorney's presentation of a summary of the evidence that would have 
been presented at trial against McCarty. At one point, McCarty began 
equivocating about the accuracy of the factual summary based on his claim that 
he had no recollection of any of the events surrounding his crimes. The district 
court then conducted additional examination to assure the accuracy of the 
factual presentation and the voluntary nature of the change of pleas. The 
district court asked whether McCarty had discussed all possible defenses with 
his counsel. McCarty replied that he and his counsel had "talked at length" 
about possible defenses. McCarty reiterated that he did, indeed, wish to enter 
pleas of guilty to the two counts contained in the plea agreement.

[¶13]   On the reckless endangerment 
conviction, the district court sentenced McCarty to one year in the county jail. 
On the aggravated assault and battery charge, the district court deferred 
further action and placed McCarty on five years supervised probation as a 
first-time offender under Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-301 (1987 & Cum.Supp. 1994). 
Among the specific conditions of probation, McCarty was prohibited from 
initiating "any contact, directly or indirectly, in writing or otherwise, with 
the victims or the victims' family members." He was also prohibited from 
purchasing or having any firearms in his physical possession or 
control.

[¶14]   On March 22, 1993, the State filed 
a petition to revoke McCarty's probation based on alleged violations of the 
conditions of his probation. The State alleged that McCarty had mailed a 
birthday greeting card and a letter to Andricci. The State also alleged that 
McCarty had in his possession a .22 caliber rifle with a homemade 
silencer.

[¶15]   Following a hearing, the district 
court revoked McCarty's probation. The district court found that McCarty had 
violated the terms of his probation when he contacted Andricci by mailing her a 
greeting card and a letter. Furthermore, the district court found that McCarty 
had violated his probation by having a firearm in his possession.

[¶16]   Before the district court imposed 
sentence, McCarty filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea to the aggravated 
assault and battery charge. McCarty also demanded that his counsel be permitted 
to withdraw, so new counsel could be appointed to represent him. Both motions 
were denied by the district court. The district court sentenced McCarty to a 
term of incarceration for not less than five years nor more than seven years at 
the Wyoming State Penitentiary.

III. 
DISCUSSION

[¶17]   Initially, we must address the 
State's contention that McCarty's appeal of his guilty plea to aggravated 
assault and battery is untimely. McCarty was placed on probation under the 
first-time offender program created by Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-301 which provides, in 
pertinent part:

(a) If a person who has 
not previously been convicted of any felony is charged with or found guilty of 
or pleads guilty to any misdemeanor except any second or subsequent violation of 
W.S. 31-5-233 or any similar provision of law, or any felony except murder, 
sexual assault in the first or second degree or arson in the first or second 
degree, the court may, with the consent of the defendant and the state and 
without entering a judgment of guilt or conviction, defer further proceedings 
and place the person on probation for a term not to exceed five (5) years upon 
terms and conditions set by the court. The terms of probation shall 
include that he:

* * * * * *

(ii) Conduct himself in a 
law-abiding manner;

* * * * * *

(iv) Conform his conduct 
to any other terms of probation the court finds proper; * * *

* * * * * *

(c) If the defendant 
violates a term or condition of probation at any time before final discharge, 
the court may:

(i) Enter an adjudication 
of guilt and conviction and proceed to impose sentence upon the defendant if he 
previously pled guilty to or was found guilty of the original charge for which 
probation was granted under this section; * * *

* * * * * *

(d) Discharge and 
dismissal under this section shall be without adjudication of guilt and is not a 
conviction for any purpose.

(Emphasis 
added.)

[¶18]   At the time the district court 
deferred further action on the aggravated assault and battery charge and placed 
McCarty on probation, no sentence, in the traditional sense, was imposed. Wyo. 
Stat. § 7-13-301(d). In Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 422 (Wyo. 1990), 
we noted:

A criminal defendant upon 
whom a court has imposed a sentence cannot reject that sentence. The court has 
the power to force that sentence on the criminal defendant. Under W.S. 7-13-301, 
since the criminal defendant's consent is required, the criminal defendant is 
free to reject the tender of probation without entry of judgment. If this 
disposition were truly a sentence, then the criminal defendant could not reject 
it.

We conclude that 
under Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-301, this appeal was timely since it was filed after a 
judgment and sentence was imposed by the district court for the crime of 
aggravated assault and battery.

[¶19]   A guilty plea must be "knowing and 
voluntary." Parke v. Raley, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 113 S. Ct. 517, 523, 121 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1992). The validity of a guilty plea is tested by determining 
"whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the 
alternative courses of action open to the defendant." North Carolina v. 
Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S. Ct. 160, 164, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970). Accord 
Mehring v. State, 860 P.2d 1101, 1109 (Wyo. 1993) and Osborn v. 
State, 806 P.2d 259, 271 (Wyo. 1991). A guilty plea incorporates a waiver of 
three constitutional rights: the privilege against self-incrimination; the right 
to a jury trial; and the right to confront one's accusers. Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1712, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 
(1969).

[¶20]   The procedure utilized to accept a 
guilty plea is reviewed by this court as a whole. Smith v. State, 871 P.2d 186, 187 (Wyo. 1994). "Our inquiry determines if the district court 
sufficiently described the nature of the charges, including the possible 
penalties; informed the defendant of the right to representation; informed the 
defendant of the rights waived by a guilty plea; and obtained a factual basis 
for the plea." Mehring, 860 P.2d  at 1106 (emphasis added). These 
procedural requirements are intended to assure that the individual facing the 
criminal charges is not misled into an unintentional waiver of substantial 
rights. Id.

[¶21]   The change of plea proceeding 
occurred under the revised Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became 
effective March 24, 1992. W.R.Cr.P. 11(b) directs, in pertinent part, that the 
defendant be informed of certain rights and consequences from the entry of a 
guilty plea:

(b) Advice to 
Defendant. - * * * [B]efore accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to 
a felony or to a misdemeanor when the defendant is not represented by counsel, 
the court must address the defendant personally in open court and, unless 
the defendant has been previously advised by the court on the record and in the 
presence of counsel, inform the defendant of, and determine that the 
defendant understands, the following:

(1) The nature of the 
charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by 
law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law and other 
sanctions which could attend a conviction including, when applicable, the 
general nature of any mandatory assessments (such as the surcharge for the Crime 
Victim Compensation Account), discretionary assessments (costs, attorney fees, 
restitution, etc.) and, in controlled substance offenses, the potential loss of 
entitlement to federal benefits. * * *

* * * * * *

(2) The defendant has the 
right to be represented by an attorney at every stage of the proceeding and, if 
necessary, one will be appointed to represent the defendant;

(3) The defendant has the 
right to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea if it has already been 
made, the right to be tried by a jury and at that trial the right to the 
assistance of counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine adverse 
witnesses, the right to court process to obtain the testimony of other 
witnesses, and the right against compelled self-incrimination;

(4) If a plea of guilty 
or nolo contendere is accepted by the court there will not be a further trial of 
any kind, so that by pleading guilty or nolo contendere the defendant waives the 
right to a trial; and

(5) If the court intends 
to question the defendant under oath, on the record, and in the presence of 
counsel, about the offense to which the defendant has pleaded guilty, that the 
defendant's answers may later be used against the defendant in a prosecution for 
perjury or false statement.

(Emphasis 
added.) The district court is charged, by the language of W.R.Cr.P. 11(b), with 
making a determination that the defendant understands his rights and the 
consequences of his plea. Mehring, 860 P.2d  at 1108-09.

[¶22]   McCarty broadly challenges that the 
district court failed to follow the requirements of W.R.Cr.P. 11(b) during the 
change of plea proceeding. He initially asserts that the district court erred by 
failing to inform him of the elements of the crime of aggravated assault and 
battery. McCarty also finds error in the failure of the district court to advise 
him of his right to continue to plead not guilty, his right to court process to 
obtain witnesses for his defense, and the effect of a self-incrimination waiver. 
For these arguments, McCarty relies on a premise that he was impermissibly 
advised of his rights in installments which was a violation of our former 
Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure. Crawford v. State, 701 P.2d 1150, 1153 (Wyo. 1985). We find no error in the procedure used by the district 
court.

[¶23]   McCarty's arguments fail, in part, 
because he is ignoring the modification W.R.Cr.P. 11 makes to past practice. The 
language of W.R.Cr.P. 15(c)(1), Wyo.Rep. 578-584 P.2d XIX (1978), directed the 
district court accepting a guilty plea to address the defendant and inform him 
of the nature of the charge without condition. However, the present W.R.Cr.P. 
11(b) directs the court to personally address the defendant and, "unless 
the defendant has been previously advised by the court on the record and in the 
presence of counsel," inform the defendant of his rights, and determine 
that the defendant understands those rights. (Emphasis added.) The language of 
W.R.Cr.P. 11(b) no longer requires the district court to perfunctorily repeat 
information on rights and consequences which has previously been conveyed during 
arraignment or during other on the record proceedings in the presence of 
counsel. However, we continue to acknowledge that the "`better practice'" is to 
advise the defendant of his rights during the change of plea proceeding. 
Mehring, 860 P.2d  at 1108 (quoting 2 Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold 
H. Israel, Criminal Procedure, § 20.4(c) at 642 (1984)).

[¶24]   McCarty is correct that the 
district court did not list the elements of the charge of aggravated assault and 
battery during the change of plea proceeding. Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-502(a)(ii). 
However, McCarty acknowledged that he had previously been advised of the nature 
of the charges and the possible penalty. He specifically waived further 
advisement. McCarty also acknowledged during the change of plea proceeding that 
he had reviewed the terms of the plea agreement in detail with his 
counsel.

[¶25]   In Mehring, 860 P.2d  at 
1107-08, we examined whether a district court must inform the defendant of the 
elements of a charged crime prior to accepting a guilty plea. We held that a 
complete listing of the elements of the charged crime is not mandatory. 
Id. at 1108. "`[I]t may be appropriate to presume that in most cases 
defense counsel routinely explain the nature of the offense in sufficient detail 
to give the accused notice of what he is being asked to admit.'" Id. 
(quoting Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 647, 96 S. Ct. 2253, 2258, 49 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1976)). We also acknowledged that W.R.Cr.P. 11(b) incorporates the 
presumption that "a defendant's discussions with his counsel will include 
descriptions of the plea bargain and the elements of the offense." 
Mehring, 860 P.2d  at 1108.

[¶26]   Our review of the colloquy between 
the district court and McCarty during the change of plea proceeding discloses 
that a sufficient description of the nature of the charge was provided to assure 
that McCarty was making a voluntary and intelligent choice to enter a plea of 
guilty to aggravated assault and battery. McCarty understood that he was 
originally charged with attempted murder for his attack on Andricci. He knew 
that charge had been dismissed and an aggravated assault and battery charge had 
been filed. McCarty received notice of this charge at his arraignment and by 
receipt of a written copy of the Information. The Information had been amended, 
prior to the change of plea proceeding, to reflect the proper statutory section 
in the charge. McCarty admitted during the change of plea hearing that his 
counsel explained the plea agreement to him and that he understood the nature of 
the charge. McCarty's counsel also affirmed that McCarty understood the nature 
of the proceeding and the consequences of a guilty plea. We hold that McCarty 
understood the nature of the charge and that he was sufficiently advised of the 
elements of the offense as required by W.R.Cr.P. 11(b)(1). Mehring, 860 P.2d  at 1108.

[¶27]   Next, McCarty argues that 
reversible error occurred when the district court failed to advise him during 
the change of plea proceeding of his right to persist in a not guilty plea, his 
right to court process to obtain witnesses for his defense, and the effect of a 
self-incrimination waiver. When we consider the totality of the circumstances, 
we do not find reversible error.

[¶28]   At his initial arraignment, the 
district court advised McCarty that he had a right to plead not guilty. The 
district court informed McCarty that if he persisted in that plea, a trial would 
be held where the State would be required to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. During the change of plea proceeding, when McCarty began to equivocate 
about the factual basis for the charge, the district court reiterated to McCarty 
that he did not have to enter a guilty plea at that time. McCarty affirmed that 
he wanted to enter the guilty plea. We hold McCarty was sufficiently informed of 
his right to persist in a not guilty plea. W.R.Cr.P. 11(b)(3).

[¶29]   During the initial arraignment 
proceeding, McCarty was also informed that if he elected to plead not guilty, 
his counsel would be able to cross-examine any witnesses presented by the State 
and that McCarty could present any favorable evidence that he might have in his 
defense. The district court cautioned McCarty that if he entered a plea of 
guilty he would be giving up the right to confront any witnesses that would have 
testified against him. McCarty was told that if he entered a guilty plea, there 
would be no trial. At the change of plea proceeding, McCarty admitted that he 
had previously been advised of his constitutional rights, including his right to 
trial. McCarty waived further advisement. During all proceedings, McCarty was 
represented by competent counsel. In light of the detailed advisements McCarty 
received on his right to trial, any error in failing to advise McCarty of his 
right to court process to obtain witnesses under W.R.Cr.P. 11(b)(3) was 
harmless. W.R.Cr.P. 11(h). 

[¶30]   At his initial arraignment, the 
district court advised McCarty that he had a right against self-incrimination. 
McCarty was also advised that the entry of a guilty plea would result in an 
admission in open court that he committed the crime of aggravated assault and 
battery. During the change of plea proceeding, the district court did not 
question McCarty under oath, on the record, in the presence of counsel. 
Therefore, there was no need to provide a warning for possible prosecution for 
making a false statement. W.R.Cr.P. 11(b)(5). Any failure to provide this 
advisement was harmless. W.R.Cr.P. 11(h). We hold McCarty made a voluntary and 
intelligent choice to waive his right against self-incrimination when he entered 
a plea of guilty.

[¶31]   Finally, McCarty contends the 
district court failed to ascertain that the plea was not the result of coercion, 
threats or promises apart from the plea agreement. W.R.Cr.P. 11(d) 
requires:

(d) Insuring that plea 
is voluntary. - The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, 
determining that the plea is voluntary and not the result of force or threats or 
of promises apart from a plea agreement. The court shall also inquire as to 
whether the defendant's willingness to plead guilty or nolo contendere results 
from prior discussions between the attorney for the state and the defendant or 
the defendant's attorney.

[¶32]   A colloquy with precise language 
inquiring about the voluntary nature of the plea may have given this record an 
improved "appearance." However, the district court specifically found that 
McCarty entered his plea to aggravated assault and battery voluntarily, "without 
any improper inducement or conditions and free from coercion." We hold the 
district court questioned McCarty and his counsel directly and with sufficient 
intensity to determine if the plea was voluntary. W.R.Cr.P. 11(d).

[¶33]   The record discloses that the 
procedure was sufficient to insure that McCarty was not misled into a waiver of 
any of his substantial rights. The discretionary means utilized by the district 
court to advise McCarty of his rights was not ideal. Mehring, 860 P.2d  at 
1108. However, this court has counseled that use of specific language is not a 
substitute for understanding.

The courts of our land do 
not function with scripts requiring each participant to perform his or her 
specific part in the same manner on each occasion. We should never mistake the 
presence of the printed or spoken word for comprehension. A ritualistic 
expression of verbiage, complete with legal terminology and excess, may provide 
a comfortable layer of support for technically demanding members of the bar, but 
would provide little real assurance that the accused actually understands what 
is about to be accomplished.

Id. at 1108-09.

[¶34]   When the totality of the 
circumstances is considered, there is no doubt that McCarty made a voluntary and 
intelligent choice to enter a guilty plea. His guilty plea was the result of a 
carefully bargained for plea agreement which included promises from the State 
not to pursue other charges and to request that pending federal prosecution be 
held in abeyance. McCarty admitted that his counsel had explained this agreement 
to him in detail and that they had discussed possible defenses at length. Faced 
with overwhelming evidence of guilt, McCarty made a carefully considered 
decision to plead guilty to aggravated assault and battery and gain the benefit 
of a treatment as a first offender.

[¶35]   In his second issue on appeal, 
McCarty contends the district court should have permitted him to withdraw his 
guilty plea to aggravated assault and battery. W.R.Cr.P. 32(d) governs the 
withdrawal of a guilty plea:

(d) Plea 
withdrawal. - If a motion for withdrawal of a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere is made before sentence is imposed, the court may permit withdrawal 
of the plea upon a showing by the defendant of any fair and just reason. At any 
later time, a plea may be set aside only to correct manifest 
injustice.

This court has 
determined that prior to sentencing, there is no absolute right to withdraw a 
plea of guilty. Triplett v. State, 802 P.2d 162, 165 (Wyo. 
1990).

[¶36]   The district court patiently 
listened to McCarty's reasons for withdrawing his guilty plea. Despite his on 
the record acceptance of the plea agreement, McCarty argued that the written 
order memorializing the plea agreement did not include his full understanding 
with the State. Without substance, McCarty also asserted that his counsel had 
withheld exculpatory evidence from him. McCarty maintained that as a result of 
counseling he had recently regained his memory of the incidents which lead to 
the charge of aggravated assault and battery and had discovered new evidence. 
McCarty argued that he could produce this evidence at trial and establish his 
innocence. When the district court asked for specific information, McCarty 
replied that he could not do that without new counsel.

[¶37]   McCarty filed his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea before sentence was imposed on the aggravated assault 
and battery charge. Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-301(d). Therefore, the district court, at 
its discretion, could have permitted withdrawal of the guilty plea if McCarty 
had demonstrated a "fair and just reason." Dichard v. State, 844 P.2d 484, 486 (Wyo. 1992). However, McCarty's "reasons" for withdrawing his plea were 
merely conclusive statements. The district court correctly noted that even after 
McCarty had supposedly regained his memory, it was not important until his 
probation was revoked. McCarty voluntarily entered a plea of guilty to 
aggravated assault and battery. The district court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Id. at 
486-87.

[¶38]   In his third issue, McCarty 
contends the district court erred when it denied a motion to permit his court 
appointed counsel to withdraw. McCarty said he had no confidence in his counsel. 
The record demonstrates that McCarty's counsel performed with a level of 
proficiency which exceeded the level of competent assistance. McCarty's argument 
was comprised of unsubstantiated conclusions. The district court did not abuse 
its discretion in denying the motion for withdrawal. Epperson v. State, 
637 P.2d 671, 673 (Wyo. 1981).

[¶39]   In his final issue, McCarty claims 
the district court failed to properly credit all the time served in presentence 
incarceration off the minimum and maximum sentences imposed for the aggravated 
assault and battery conviction. We agree with the State that the record simply 
does not support McCarty's contentions. The district court did not abuse its 
discretion in limiting the credit granted for time served in presentence 
incarceration. The district court properly granted credit for the time served 
after McCarty's arrest for violating his probation. Jones v. State, 771 P.2d 368, 372 (Wyo. 1989).

IV. 
CONCLUSION

[¶40]   While the decision to plead guilty 
is a profound one, every defendant is required to make important decisions once 
criminal proceedings have begun. Godinez v. Moran, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 113 S. Ct. 2680, 2686, 125 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1993). McCarty made a voluntary and 
intelligent choice to enter a guilty plea to aggravated assault and battery. 
Unfortunately, for him, he made another choice to violate the terms of his first 
offender probation. Despite technical deficiencies, the procedural safeguards 
employed in this case adequately guaranteed that due process and other 
constitutional rights were protected.

[¶41]   The judgment and sentence of the 
district court is affirmed.