Title: State v. Perry

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

223 Kan. 230 (1977)
573 P.2d 989
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee,
v.
DANIEL L. PERRY, Appellant.
No. 48,779

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed December 10, 1977.
Phillip S. Frick, of Foulston, Siefkin, Powers & Eberhardt, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellant.
James L. Linn, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Curt T. Schneider, attorney general, Vern Miller, district attorney, and Stephen M. Joseph, assistant district attorney, were with him on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MILLER, J.:
Daniel L. Perry appeals, following his conviction by a jury of aggravated robbery, K.S.A. 21-3427.
He raises but one point: that the trial court violated his constitutional rights when it instructed the jury, over his objection, that:
This instruction is taken from PIK Crim. 52.13. Defendant acknowledges in his brief and in oral argument that the instruction is a correct statement of the law, and he does not challenge the substance of the instruction.
Instead he argues, and not without support, that the Fifth Amendment right not to testify, enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, carries with it the correlative right to prevent the trial judge from singling out and emphasizing the accused's failure to testify, in the jury instructions; and that such an instruction, over defendant's objection, constitutes a "comment" on his failure to testify, and is prejudicial.
We have previously considered this or similar instructions, and we have held that the giving of such an instruction correctly states the law and is not erroneous. State v. Kowalec, 205 Kan. 57, 60, 468 P.2d 221; State v. McCoy, 160 Kan. 150, 161, 160 P.2d *231 238; State v. Olsen, 88 Kan. 136, 142, 127 Pac. 625. Long ago, in State v. Goff, 62 Kan. 104, 61 Pac. 683, we held that it was reversible error for a trial court to refuse to give such an instruction if requested by the defendant to do so. And recently, in State v. Quinn, 219 Kan. 831, 549 P.2d 1000, where a similar instruction was given over the objection of the defendant, we held that the instruction, when considered with others given, was adequate. In Quinn, however, the precise issue raised here was not asserted.
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that "No person ... shall be compelled in any Criminal Case to be a witness against himself ..." Similarly, section 10 of the Kansas Bill of Rights provides that "... No person shall be a witness against himself ..." Speaking of these constitutional provisions, Justice Fatzer, speaking for a unanimous court in State v. Faidley, 202 Kan. 517, 520, 450 P.2d 20, said:
The defendant premises his claim upon Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 14 L. Ed. 2d 106, 85 S. Ct. 1229, and a number of subsequent federal and state appellate court decisions which have extended the Fifth Amendment privilege. In Griffin, in conformity with a California statute, the trial court instructed the jury:
The accused did not testify. During closing argument, the prosecutor dwelt upon the accused's failure to testify, emphasizing that *232 the defendant would know various things, and the answers to questions which arose in the case, but that he had not seen fit to take the stand and deny or explain them. The United States Supreme Court held:
The court specifically reserved decision on whether an accused can require that the jury be instructed that his silence must be disregarded (Footnote 6, p. 615). That right has been afforded an accused in this state since the turn of the century. State v. Goff, supra.
A few courts have recently held that it is error of constitutional magnitude and a violation of a defendant's rights for a trial court, over defendant's objection, to give the instruction here involved, and thus to "comment" on an accused's silence. These include the Supreme Courts of Arkansas, Iowa, and Indiana, and the Courts of Appeal of Arizona and California.
A number of courts have held it improper (on non-constitutional grounds), to give such an instruction over defendant's objection, and hold that it should be given only upon defendant's request. An equal or larger number have found no constitutional or other error where the instruction is given over defendant's objection, or without defendant's request. Most courts have approved the giving of the instruction sua sponte. Multiple defendant cases, where one defendant requests the instruction and others object to it, have perplexed trial and appellate courts alike in those jurisdictions which base the propriety of the giving of the instruction upon the request or the objection of the accused.
The great majority of the courts do not recognize any constitutional right in this area, and most cases turn on statutory or other grounds. We found no decision holding that the instruction misstates the law. We have reviewed many of these opinions, but do not believe citations or lengthy discussions of all of them need be included here. The conflict is explored and many of the cases are cited in an annotation found at 18 A.L.R.3d 1335.
Though the instruction was not requested by either defendant, it was given sua sponte by the trial judge, and was cited as error *233 on appeal in United States v. Garguilo, 310 F.2d 249 (2d Cir.1962). Judge Friendly, speaking for the majority, says:
A constitutional challenge to such an instruction was raised in Aiuppa v. United States, 393 F.2d 597 (10th Cir.1968). Chief Judge Murrah discussed the issue as follows:
Another informative and persuasive discussion of the issue appears in State v. Rollins, 3 Ohio Op.3d 392, 49 Ohio App.2d 330, 361 N.E.2d 555 (1976), where the court said:
...............
We have not overlooked the eloquent summary of appellant's position as stated by Judge Lowe in his dissenting opinion in Pearson v. State, 28 Md. App. 196, 203-205, 343 A.2d 916, 920-922 (1975), cited in appellant's brief. Basically, the argument is that because a defendant has the right to choose whether to remain silent or not, he should have the correlative and tactical right to decide whether the court should or should not give the instruction. But even Judge Lowe agrees that the instruction is a *235 correct statement of the law, and that it is not error to give it at the defendant's request or, absent either a request or an objection, sua sponte.
The instruction does not violate either the plain language of the Fifth Amendment or the rule laid down in Griffin. The proscribed conduct  inferring guilt because of the accused's silence  is the precise wrong which the instruction seeks to prevent. We hold that the giving of the instruction, even over objection, is not constitutional error.
We next turn to our statute, K.S.A. 60-439, which reads as follows:
Clearly, the statute seeks to protect the defendant's privilege not to testify, and to prevent any adverse presumptions or inferences from arising because of the exercise of the privilege. The instruction seeks this same goal.
Is the instruction a "comment" on defendant's failure to testify, and thus violative of the statute? The advisory committee note to this statute reads:
Judge Gard, in his Kansas Code of Civil Procedure, has this comment:
The PIK Committee, in PIK Crim. 52.13, notes that the instruction "should not be given unless there is a specific request by the defendant."
The instruction given is not a prejudicial reference to defendant's *236 failure to testify, such as is targeted by the statute. It is not a comment upon defendant's silence tending to impair the privilege. It is a directive to the jury to ignore and not consider defendant's failure to testify in arriving at its verdict. The trial court is required by K.S.A. 22-3414 to instruct the jury, and it is the duty of the court to state clearly the principles of law applicable to the issues raised by the evidence in the case. The instruction given was applicable, germane, and accurate.
We hold that the instruction is not a "comment" proscribed by K.S.A. 60-439, but even so it is preferable that trial courts not give the instruction where there is but one defendant on trial and that defendant objects. Under the facts of this case we hold that the giving of the instruction was not prejudicial and is not reversible error.
The judgment is affirmed.