Title: State ex rel. Beisly v. Hon. Perigo

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
STATE ex rel. BOB T. BEISLY II, 
) 
 
 
 
Relator, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
vs. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC94030 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY  
) 
PERIGO, 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
Respondent.  
) 
 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN PROHIBITION 
Opinion issued August 18, 2015 
 
Bob T. Beisly II (hereinafter, “Relator”), the defendant in the action below, seeks 
a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from taking any further action in Wilma 
Jean Irwin’s (hereinafter, “Irwin”) wrongful death suit, other than to dismiss it with 
prejudice.  Relator contends Irwin’s suit is time-barred by section 537.100, RSMo 2000.1  
This Court holds the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Relator’s 
motion to dismiss because the doctrine of equitable estoppel forecloses Relator from 
relying on the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense due to the fraudulent 
concealment of his wrongdoing.  The preliminary order in prohibition is quashed. 
 
 
                                                 
1 All statutory references are to RSMo 2000. 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
On July 15, 2009, Relator’s estranged wife, Belinda Beisly (hereinafter, “the 
decedent”), was found dead inside her home from multiple gunshot wounds to her head 
and chest.  Her death was ruled a homicide.  Decedent’s homicide remained unsolved 
until February 8, 2013, when the state charged Relator and Jeremy Maples (hereinafter, 
“Maples”) with the decedent’s murder.  The felony complaint alleged Maples committed 
first-degree murder by shooting decedent, and it charged Relator with aiding and 
encouraging Maples in committing the decedent’s murder. 
On February 13, 2013, Irwin, the decedent’s mother, filed a wrongful death action 
against Relator and Maples.  Irwin alleged Maples shot and killed the decedent in 
exchange for money received from Relator.  Irwin’s petition further alleged Maples and 
Relator kept their arrangement from being discovered from law enforcement and the 
decedent’s family by:  (1) disguising the nature of the decedent’s death by staging it to 
look like a home invasion and using a weapon that could not be traced; (2) lying to law 
enforcement; (3) destroying evidence; and (4) denying their involvement in the 
decedent’s death.    
Relator filed a motion to dismiss Irwin’s petition, arguing her claim was time-
barred by section 537.100, the wrongful death statute of limitations, because it was filed 
more than three years after the decedent’s death.  Irwin filed suggestions in opposition, 
arguing Relator and Maples fraudulently concealed their wrongdoing as alleged in her 
petition.  Irwin stated this conduct made it impossible for her to identify perpetrators and 
name defendants, which were prerequisites to maintaining a civil suit.  Irwin also alleged 
3 
 
Relator and Maples should be estopped from relying on the statute of limitations as a 
defense due to their fraudulent concealment of their wrongdoing.   
The circuit court acknowledged the general rule that a wrongful death action 
accrues when the decedent dies.  However, the circuit court found it should not construe 
the wrongful death statutes so strictly so as to avoid their purposes.  The circuit court 
overruled Relator’s motion, reasoning that to allow the wrongdoers to escape civil 
liability on the basis of the statute of limitations in this case was “shocking to the 
conscience.”   
Relator sought a writ of prohibition in the court of appeals.   After opinion by that 
court, this Court granted transfer pursuant to Mo. Const. art V, sec. 10.  
Standard of Review 
This Court has jurisdiction to issue original remedial writs.  Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 
4.  “Prohibition is a discretionary writ that only issues to prevent an abuse of judicial 
discretion, to avoid irreparable harm to a party, or to prevent exercise of 
extrajurisdictional power.”  State ex rel. Schwarz Pharma, Inc. v. Dowd, 432 S.W.3d 764, 
768 (Mo. banc 2014).  A writ of prohibition “is the appropriate remedy to prevent a lower 
court from proceeding on an action barred by the statute of limitations.”  State ex rel. 
Holzum, 342 S.W.3d 313, 315 (Mo. banc 2011). 
Wrongful Death Statute of Limitations 
 
Relator argues he is entitled to a writ of prohibition that will prohibit the circuit 
court from taking any further action in the underlying case other than to enter an order 
dismissing Irwin’s suit with prejudice, because the action is time-barred by section 
4 
 
537.100.  Relator claims none of the tolling provisions in section 537.100 apply to 
Irwin’s cause of action.   
Section 537.080.1 sets forth the cause of action for wrongful death and delineates 
who is entitled to sue for damages.  Section 537.100 states that every action brought 
pursuant to section 537.080 “shall be commenced within three years after the cause of 
action shall accrue.”  Section 537.100 contains explicit tolling exceptions:  (1) if the 
plaintiff is unable to serve an absent defendant with service of process and (2) if the 
plaintiff files a voluntary non-suit or if the plaintiff’s judgment is reversed and remanded 
on appeal.  These exceptions do not apply to toll Irwin’s cause of action. 
Irwin argues Relator’s success at concealing his wrongdoing caused the accrual of 
her wrongful death claim to be delayed.  Irwin claims she was unable to file suit until she 
discovered who was responsible for the decedent’s death, and this did not occur until 
Relator and Maples were arrested for the decedent’s murder.   
Accrual Distinct from Tolling 
The terms “accrual” and “tolling” are distinct legal principles that often produce 
the same outcome.  Generally, “[a] cause of action accrues … when the right to sue 
arises.”  Hunter v. Hunter, 237 S.W.2d 100, 103 (Mo. 1951).  Accrual also triggers the 
running of the statute of limitations.  Id.  Tolling, on the other hand, occurs when a party 
shows facts that act to remove or interrupt the bar of the statute of limitations to a cause 
of action.  2 Mo. Practice Series, Methods of Practice: Litigation Guide, §5.9 (4th ed. 
2002).  Thus, while every cause of action has a time of accrual, not every cause of action 
5 
 
is subject to tolling.  Further, if a cause of action has not accrued, there is nothing to toll, 
because an event or circumstance cannot interrupt or remove that which has never started. 
Accrual and Wrongful Death Actions 
“In determining whether an applicable statute of limitation bars recovery, it is 
necessary to establish when that cause of action accrued.”  Jepson v. Stubbs, 555 S.W.2d 
307, 311 (Mo. banc 1977).  Section 537.100 does not define “accrue” for purposes of the 
wrongful death statute of limitations.  In Coover v. Moore, 31 Mo. 574, 576 (Mo. 1862), 
this Court stated the cause of action under the wrongful death statute accrued “at the 
death.”  In Kennedy v. Burrier, 36 Mo. 128 (Mo. 1865), this Court explained more fully:   
We think the cause of action accrued whenever the defendant’s liability 
became perfect and complete. Whenever the defendant had done an act 
which made him liable in damages, and there was a person in esse to whom 
the damages ought to be paid and who might sue for and recover the same, 
then clearly the cause of action had accrued as against him.  When, then, 
did this liability take place?  Evidently at the death of [decedent] … and the 
statute commenced running from that time. 
 
Kennedy, 36 Mo. at 130.  See also Cummins v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 66 S.W.2d 
920, 929 (Mo. banc 1933) (finding the statute provides for one cause of action that 
accrues at the time of death), and Nelms v. Bright, 299 S.W.2d 483, 487 (Mo. banc 1957) 
(accord). 
This Court addressed the issue of whether a wrongful death cause of action 
accrued and caused the statute of limitations to begin to run at the time of death or upon 
the discovery of the identity of the alleged tortfeasor in Frazee v. Partney, 314 S.W.2d 
915 (Mo. 1958).  In Frazee, a family was involved in an accident caused by another 
6 
 
vehicle swerving into its lane when the driver fell asleep at the wheel in October 1954.  
There was no contact between the cars, but the family’s car went down an embankment 
and overturned several times.  The mother and one of the children died as a result of the 
accident. The other driver did not stop immediately and, when he did, he did not see 
anyone, so he continued on his way, unaware there had been an accident.  The family did 
not learn the driver’s identity until March 1956.  Frazee, 314 S.W.2d at 917.   
 
The family filed a wrongful death suit against the driver in September 1956.  The 
petition alleged the defendant “fraudulently, intentionally, deliberately, willfully, 
maliciously, and of his spite absented himself and concealed his identity from the 
plaintiffs and all other persons …” from the time of the accident until March 1956.  The 
driver argued the family’s suit was barred by the statute of limitations, which at that time 
was one year.  This Court addressed two issues:  (1) whether the driver’s acts operated to 
toll or extend section 537.100’s limitations period and (2) when the family’s cause of 
action accrued.  Id. at 917. 
 
With respect to tolling, this Court determined the wrongful death statute contained 
a special statute of limitation.  Accordingly, section 516.280’s fraudulent concealment 
tolling provision did not apply.  Id. at 919.  This Court explained, “This [C]ourt has 
uniformly held that where a statute of limitation is a special one, not included in the 
general chapter on limitations, the running thereof cannot be tolled because of fraud, 
concealment or any other reason not provided in the statute itself.”  Id. (quoting State ex 
rel. Bier v. Bigger, 178 S.W.2d 347, 351 (Mo. banc 1944)).  In reaching this conclusion, 
this Court also examined the legislature’s intent, including the fact that the legislature had 
7 
 
twice enacted specific tolling exceptions in the wrongful death statute, but those 
exceptions did not extend to the driver’s fraudulent concealment conduct.  Id. at 920.   
 
In addressing the family’s argument that its cause of action did not accrue until it 
learned the identity of the wrongdoer, this Court recognized the case turned on an 
inability to discover the identity of the defendant and not on the existence of a cause of 
action.  Id.  While this Court was cognizant of the family’s difficulty in serving an 
unknown defendant, this Court stated, “We are construing the positive terms of a statute 
which starts the limitation in motion from the ‘accrual’ of the cause of action, not from 
the time when one may be effectively commenced.”  Id. at 921.  This Court held that “the 
cause of action for wrongful death accrues at the death.”  Id.  The family’s cause of 
action accrued in October 1954 when the mother and child died.  The petition filed in 
September 1956 was time-barred.  The Court recognized its holding resulted in a 
hardship after it was “forced to construe the cold, clear words of the statute.”  Id. 
 
Relator contends Frazee is directly on point and disposes of this writ because 
Irwin’s claim accrued when the decedent died, and there is no dispute her claim was filed 
beyond the three-year statutory period.  Irwin disagrees, maintaining Frazee was decided 
wrongly and should no longer be followed because of holdings in two subsequent 
wrongful death cases.   
In O’Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. banc 1983), this Court held an 
unborn, viable fetus was a “person” under the wrongful death statute.  O’Grady, 654 
S.W.2d at 906-07.  This Court explained the wrongful death act was “designed to mend 
the fabric of the common law, not to weaken it.”  Id. at 908.  This Court rejected the 
8 
 
argument that the wrongful death statute had to be construed strictly and, instead, applied 
the statute’s language “with a view to promoting the apparent object of the legislative 
enactment.”  Id. at 907-08 (quoting United Air Lines, Inc. v. State Tax Comm’n, 377 
S.W.2d 444, 451 (Mo. banc 1964)).  This Court recognized its duty “to perceive the 
import of major legislative innovations and to interweave the new legislative policies 
with the inherited body of common law principles.”  Id. at 908 (quoting Moragne v. 
States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 392, 90 S. Ct. 1772, 1783, 26 L.Ed.2d 339 
(1970)).  This Court also set forth three basic objectives the wrongful death statute was 
enacted to achieve:  (1) “to provide compensation to bereaved plaintiffs for their loss;” 
(2) “to ensure that tortfeasors pay for the consequences of their actions;” and (3) “to deter 
harmful conduct which might lead to death.”  Id. at 909.   
 
In Howell v. Murphy, 844 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. App. W.D. 1992), the plaintiffs 
appealed the dismissal of their wrongful death suits as time-barred against a man who 
tortured and murdered their loved ones, then concealed evidence of his crimes for more 
than five years after their deaths.  Howell, 844 S.W.2d at 43-44.  In reversing and 
remanding the case, the court of appeals found O’Grady “announced a major shift in its 
interpretation of Missouri’s wrongful death statute.”  Id. at 46.  After setting forth the 
three-fold purpose of the wrongful death statute announced in O’Grady, the Western 
District concluded, “The reasoning in Frazee is superseded by O’Grady.”  Id.  The court 
distinguished Frazee’s finding that it was not concerned with the existence of a cause of 
action but, rather, the inability to discover the identity of the wrongdoer.  The Howell 
9 
 
court stated it was “concerned with the question of the existence of the cause of action.”  
Id. 
 
The Howell plaintiffs presented evidence that their loved ones were presumed 
missing, but not dead, until their body parts were discovered or the defendant pleaded 
guilty to causing their deaths and reported specific dates of death.  Id. at 45.  Thus, the 
plaintiffs had no choice but to wait before asserting a wrongful death action because the 
law contained a statutory presumption of life for missing persons.  Accordingly, the 
plaintiffs could not assert any action within a five-year period until they had facts to 
overcome the statute’s presumption.  Id. at 47.  The Western District held that, given the 
defendant’s concealment of the bodies and the statute’s presumption that the victims were 
only missing and not dead, the wrongful death statute of limitations “was tolled until the 
plaintiffs could, by reasonable diligence, ascertain they had an action.”  Id.  
 
Irwin contends Howell’s reasoning is compelling and should control the outcome 
here.  Irwin argues that when Relator and Maples concealed their participation in the 
decedent’s murder, they made it impossible for her to enforce her rights in a timely 
manner.  Conversely, Relator maintains Howell is distinguishable and that Frazee 
remains good law despite Howell’s statement to the contrary.   
While this Court agrees with Howell’s statement that O’Grady announced a major 
shift in its interpretation of Missouri’s wrongful death statute, this Court finds Howell 
erroneously determined this Court’s holding in O’Grady superceded Frazee.  “Generally, 
this Court presumes, absent a contrary showing, that an opinion of this Court has not 
been overruled sub silentio.”  State v. Honeycutt, 421 S.W.3d 410, 422 (Mo. banc 2013).  
10 
 
“Sub silentio is defined as ‘without notice being taken or without making a particular 
point of the matter in question.’”  Id. (quoting Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary 2279 (1976)).  “If the majority chooses to overrule [a case] it is far preferable 
to do so by the front door of reason rather than the amorphous back door of sub silentio.”  
Id. (quoting Keller v. Marion Cnty. Ambulance Dist., 820 S.W.2d 301, 308 (Mo. banc 
1991) (Holstein, J., dissenting)).  O’Grady did not discuss the wrongful death statute of 
limitations or cite Frazee for any proposition of law.  Further, Frazee and O’Grady are 
factually and legally dissimilar.  O’Grady was concerned with the definition of “person” 
for purposes of pursuing a wrongful death claim, while Frazee addressed whether the 
wrongful death statute of limitation could be tolled.  Frazee remains good law, and 
Howell’s statement to the contrary should no longer be followed. 
 
Relator alleges Frazee controls the outcome here.  In both Frazee and the instant 
case, the parties had knowledge of the decedents’ deaths and the wrongfulness of the 
deaths.  What the aggrieved parties did not know was the identity of the tortfeasors.  
What distinguishes Frazee from this case is Irwin’s claim that equitable estoppel 
forecloses Relator from asserting the wrongful death statute of limitations as a defense to 
her suit due to the fraudulent concealment of his wrongdoing. 
Equitable Estoppel 
A basic common law maxim, deeply rooted in this country’s jurisprudence and older than 
the country itself, is that no person shall take advantage of or benefit from his or her 
wrong.  Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 232, 79 S. Ct. 760, 762, 
3 L.Ed.2d 770 (1959).  “[T]his principle has been applied in many diverse classes of 
11 
 
cases by both the law and equity courts and has frequently been employed to bar 
inequitable reliance on statutes of limitations.”  Id. at 232-33.  The principle of equitable 
estoppel was described in Glus: 
[W]here one party has by his representation or his conduct induced the other party 
to a transaction to give him an advantage which it would be against equity and 
good conscience for him to assert, he would not in a court of justice be permitted 
to avail himself of the advantage …. [T]he general doctrine is well understood and 
is applied by courts of law as well as equity where the technical advantage thus 
obtained is set up and relied on to defeat the ends of justice or establish a dishonest 
claim. 
 
Glus, 359 U.S. at 234 (quoting Union Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 80 U.S. 222, 233, 20 
L.Ed. 617 (1871)). 2     
“The purpose of the doctrine of equitable estoppel is to prevent a party from taking 
inequitable advantage of a situation he or she has caused.”  Weiss v. Rojanasathit, 975 
S.W.2d 113, 120 (Mo. banc 1998).  “A party is estopped to plead the statute of 
                                                 
2 Judge Russell’s dissenting opinion finds Glus distinguishable because the dissent 
believes there was nothing in the legislative history of the federal statute to indicate 
equitable estoppel would not be applicable, and counsel made no compelling argument to 
the contrary.  Judge’s Russell’s dissenting opinion then states the legislative history of 
section 537.100 indicates the General Assembly’s intent to not include a fraudulent 
concealment exception.  The dissenting opinion strongly adheres to the concept of 
legislative acquiescence or inaction to support its position.  The dissenting opinion claims 
that because the legislature has not amended section 537.100 to include any fraudulent 
concealment exception after this Court’s decision in Frazee, the legislature’s inaction is 
conclusive no matter what factual or legal scenario is presented later.  This Court has held 
that, while legislative inaction is “not conclusive of legislative approval, such inaction 
can be considered.”  South Metro. Fire Prot. Dist. v. City of Lee’s Summit, 278 S.W.3d 
659, 669 n.11 (Mo. banc 2009).  Further, this Court has cautioned, “it is speculative to 
infer legislative approval from legislative inaction.”  Med. Shoppe Int’l, Inc. v. Dir. of 
Revenue, 156 S.W.3d 333, 334 (Mo. banc 2005).   
 
12 
 
limitations only if that party made positive efforts to avoid the bringing of the suit against 
her or misled the claimants.”  Id.  To apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel to bar a 
defendant’s statute of limitations defense, the defendant must have acted affirmatively to 
induce the plaintiff to delay bringing the action.  Id.3 
Several states have cited Glus’ equitable estoppel principles to prevent a defendant 
from asserting the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense in wrongful death 
actions when that defendant has committed fraud to conceal his or her actions.4  See 
Arbutina v. Bahuleyan, 75 A.D.2d 84, 86 (1980) (acknowledging the well-recognized 
legal principle that, when a defendant, by a deception, has caused a plaintiff to delay suit 
                                                 
3 Judge Russell’s dissenting opinion cites Weiss as an example of this Court’s judicial 
restraint in strictly construing a statute of limitations by deferring to the legislature’s 
pronouncement and rejecting an equitable estoppel argument.  However, a close reading 
of Weiss demonstrates this Court analyzed the merits of the plaintiff’s equitable estoppel 
argument.  While this Court ultimately rejected the plaintiff’s estoppel claim, it was 
because there was no showing the doctor acted affirmatively to induce the plaintiff to 
delay filing her lawsuit.  Weiss, 975 S.W.2d at 121.  Accordingly, it was the plaintiff’s 
failure to plead the proper elements of equitable estoppel that caused her claim to fail, not 
this Court’s unwillingness to apply equitable estoppel to statutes of limitation.   
 
4 Judge Russell’s dissenting opinion criticizes the principal opinion for relying upon 
multiple cases from other jurisdictions, yet it relies upon a secondary source, THEODORE 
SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND 
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 277 (Pomeroy, ed., 2d ed. 
1874, reprint 2012), as “considerable historical precedent” for the proposition that courts 
have long rejected the creation of an equitable exception to the statute of limitations.  
Sedgwick’s generic musings about this topic may be informative.  However, they are 
considerably less persuasive than Missouri’s sister states, that, under similar statutory 
frameworks, have seen fit to apply the long-standing doctrine of equitable estoppel to 
prevent a wrongdoer from benefiting from his or her own fraud, even when their statutes 
do not contain an express exception. 
 
13 
 
on a known cause of action until the statute of limitations has run, the courts will apply 
the doctrine of estoppel to prevent an inequitable use of the statute as a defense); Krueger 
v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., 305 N.W.2d 18, 25 (N.D. 1981) (finding estoppel could apply to 
wrongful death actions because it operates to preclude one guilty of wrongdoing from 
asserting the statute of limitations as a defense); First Interstate Bank of Fort Collins, 
N.A. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 744 P.2d 1197, 1200-01 (Colo. 1987) (recognizing the “long 
history at common law of disapprobation of fraud” and holding wrongful death statute of 
limitations does not begin to run in face of fraudulent concealment, stating, “To hold 
otherwise would allow tortfeasors, by virtue of knowing and intentional fraudulent 
conduct, to defeat the basic purpose of the wrongful death statute - protecting the 
interests of those who, through no fault of their own, must ‘bear the burden of such tragic 
events.’”); and Muller v. Thaut, 430 N.W.2d 884, 893 (Neb. 1988) (citing several cases 
discussing the maxim that one may not assert the statute of limitations to take advantage 
of one’s own wrongdoing and concluding that fraudulent concealment, if proved by the 
plaintiff, estops the defendant from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense to 
plaintiff’s wrongful death action). 
Other jurisdictions applied the common law maxim regarding fraud vitiating any 
assertion of the statute of limitations in wrongful death actions, although without citation 
to Glus.  See, e.g., Geisz v. Greater Baltimore Med. Ctr., 545 A.2d 658, 668-69 (Md. 
1988) (recognizing an “ancient maxim that no one should profit by his own conscious 
wrong is too deeply imbedded in the framework of our law to be set aside by legalistic 
distinction[s]” between statutes of limitation, and concluding estoppel based on 
14 
 
fraudulent concealment could forestall the wrongful death statute of limitations if pleaded 
and proven); DeCosse v. Armstrong Cork Co., 319 N.W.2d 45, 50-52 (Minn. 1982) 
(acknowledging “a person should not be permitted to shield himself behind the statute of 
limitations where his own fraud has placed him.  He should not be permitted to profit by 
his own wrong, and it would strike the moral sense strangely to permit him to do so …. 
Fraud is bad, it should not be permitted to go unchecked anywhere, and justice should 
always be able to penetrate its armor” and holding wrongful death actions are subject to 
tolling where a cause of action is concealed fraudulently); Cox v. Upjohn Co., 913 
S.W.2d 225, 231 (Tex. App. 1995) (explaining “fraud vitiates whatever it touches” and to 
permit a defendant to invoke the wrongful death statute of limitations after concealing his 
or her wrongdoing “would make the statute a means of encouraging rather than 
preventing fraud”); Baker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 39 Cal. App. 3d 315, 324, (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1974) (stating, “To hold that by concealing fraud, or by committing fraud in such a 
manner as to conceal it until after the party committing the fraud could plead the statute 
of limitations to protect itself, is to make the law which was designed to prevent fraud the 
means by which it is successful and secure.”); and Krevitz v. City of Philadelphia, 648 
A.2d 353, 357 (Pa. 1994) (holding a defendant is estopped from invoking the bar of a 
statute of limitations “[w]here, ‘through fraud or concealment, the defendant causes the 
plaintiff to relax his vigilance or deviate from his right of inquiry’ ….”).   
Further, there are cases that specifically apply these common law maxims and 
equitable estoppel to prevent defendants who have committed murders from relying on 
the wrongful death statute of limitations as a defense when sued civilly.  See Brookshire 
15 
 
v. Burkhart, 283 P. 571, 578 (Okla. 1929) (finding fraudulent concealment was an 
implied exception to the wrongful death statute of limitations against murder, explaining 
a party who concealed material facts that prevented the discovery of the wrong or fact 
that cause of action accrued is not allowed to take advantage of that wrong by pleading 
the statute, the purpose of which is to prevent wrongdoing and fraud); Overstreet v. 
Kentucky Cent. Life Ins. Co., 950 F.2d 931, 936 (4th Cir. 1991) (applying equitable 
estoppel due to fraudulent concealment to Virginia’s wrongful death statute of limitations 
because to do otherwise would lead to unjust results, such as “enabl[ing] a murderer to 
escape civil liability by concealing his identity or the nature of his crime until the 
expiration of the period of limitations.”); Friedland v. Gales, 509 S.E.2d 793, 798 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 1998) (holding murderer’s intentional concealment of identity as perpetrator 
equitably estopped him from asserting statute of limitations as a defense to wrongful 
death action); and Bernoskie v. Zarinsky, 781 A.2d 52, 57 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2001) (applying equitable tolling to a plaintiff’s wrongful death action filed forty years 
after decedent’s death, finding “a murderer who escapes detection and apprehension has 
no equitable claim to the repose from the threat of litigation that statutes of limitation are 
designed to provide”).5 
                                                 
5 Irwin also cites Collins v. Sotka, 692 N.E.2d 581 (Ohio 1998), Fulton Cnty. Adm’r v. 
Sullivan, 753 So.2d 549 (Fla. 1999), and Allred v. Chynoweth, 990 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 
1993) to support her equitable estoppel claim.  None of these cases aid Irwin’s argument 
because they applied either the discovery ruling or a tolling mechanism.  In Collins, the 
court applied the discovery rule, not fraudulent concealment or equitable tolling, to the 
plaintiff’s action.  Collins, 692 N.E.2d at 585.  In Sullivan, although discussing the 
inequities of permitting a wrongdoer to benefit from his or her own fraud, the court 
ultimately relied on a Georgia statute that expressly tolled the wrongful death statute of 
16 
 
 
Relator argues this Court must reject Irwin’s argument because this Court lacks 
the constitutional authority pursuant to the separation of powers provision contained in 
Missouri Constitution article II, section 1 to create an equitable estoppel exception to the 
wrongful death statute of limitations.6  Relator cites cases wherein this Court held that 
statutes of limitations may only be suspended or tolled by specific enactments of the 
legislature, and the courts are not empowered to extend those exceptions.  See, e.g., 
Sanders v. Ahmed, 364 S.W.3d 195, 205 (Mo. banc 2012) (holding only the legislature 
can place limits on the causes of actions it creates and to do “otherwise would be to tell 
the legislature it could not legislate”).  
Relator does not address any of the cases Irwin cited from other jurisdictions, 
explaining that the common law maxim that one cannot benefit from his or her fraud is a 
notion that is older than the country itself.  Missouri’s adoption of these common law 
maxims predates Glus.  See Perry v. Strawbridge, 108 S.W. 641, 642-43 (Mo. 1908), 
(reiterating the basic principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, 
                                                                                                                                                             
limitations for fraud.  Sullivan, 753 So.2d at 552.  In Allred, the court applied Utah law to 
hold the “exceptional circumstances” version of the discovery rule tolled wrongful death 
statute of limitations against a murderer who confessed to the crime ten years after the 
death because “application of the general rule would be irrational or unjust” regardless of 
any showing defendant prevented discovery of the cause of action.  Allred, 990 F.2d at 
532. 
  
6 Mo. Const. art. II, sec. 1 states:   
The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct departments 
– the legislative, executive and judicial – each of which shall be confided to 
a separate magistracy, and no person, or collection of persons, charged with 
the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of those departments, 
shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except 
in the instances in this constitution expressly directed or permitted. 
 
17 
 
or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to 
acquire property by his own crime.  These maxims are adopted by public policy, and 
have their foundation in universal law administered in all civilized countries.”) (quoting 
Box v. Lanier, 79 S.W. 1042, 1045 (Tenn. 1904)).  This Court acknowledged these 
common law maxims were adopted expressly as Missouri law and later codified by 
section 1.010, the common law reception statute.7  Id. at 644.  The Perry court 
considered, and ultimately rejected, the notion that these common law maxims were 
“either expressly or impliedly changed or modified” by statute or that the common law 
either repealed, changed or modified them.  Id.  
Section 1.010 expressly provides that “all acts of the general assembly, or laws, 
shall be liberally construed, so as to effectuate the true intent and meaning thereof.”  This 
comports with this Court’s instruction in O’Grady that the wrongful death act be 
construed so as “to perceive the import of major legislative innovations and to interweave 
                                                 
7 Section 1.010 provides:  
The common law of England and all statutes and acts of parliament made 
prior to the fourth year of the reign of James the First, of a general nature, 
which are not local to that kingdom and not repugnant to or inconsistent 
with the Constitution of the United States, the constitution of this state, or 
the statute laws in force for the time being, are the rule of action and 
decision in this state, any custom or usage to the contrary notwithstanding, 
but no act of the general assembly or law of this state shall be held to be 
invalid, or limited in its scope or effect by the courts of this state, for the 
reason that it is in derogation of, or in conflict with, the common law, or 
with such statutes or acts of parliament; but all acts of the general assembly, 
or laws, shall be liberally construed, so as to effectuate the true intent and 
meaning thereof. 
18 
 
the new legislative policies with the inherited body of common law principles.”  
O’Grady, 654 S.W.2d at 908. 
Relator argues certain statutory construction principles preclude this Court’s 
application of the common law maxims and equitable estoppel to the wrongful death 
statute of limitations.   Relator claims Missouri courts are prohibited from engrafting 
exceptions onto special statutes of limitations that would toll the running thereof based on 
fraud, concealment, or any other conduct not stated explicitly in the statute, citing Frazee.  
However, tolling and accrual are distinct legal concepts from the application of 
fraudulent concealment as a form of equitable estoppel, which forecloses a defendant 
from pleading the statute of limitations as a defense.  The application of equitable 
estoppel does nothing to engraft a tolling mechanism or otherwise extend the statute of 
limitations beyond what is stated expressly in the statute.  The cause of action still 
accrues at the decedent’s death, and the statute of limitations begins to run at that time.  
Equitable estoppel does not toll the running of the statute.  Rather, it forecloses the 
wrongdoer, who concealed his or her actions fraudulently, from asserting the defense.  
Therefore, this Court has not run afoul of its constitutional duties by reaching this 
holding. 
This Court holds the application of common law maxims precluding one from 
benefitting from his or her own fraud and application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel 
bars Relator from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense to Irwin’s cause of 
action.  In so doing, this Court follows the dictates of O’Grady by interweaving 
legislative policies with the inherited body of common law principles so as to reach a 
19 
 
remedial purpose ensuring that tortfeasors be held liable for the consequences of their 
actions and cannot benefit from their own fraud.  This approach is supported by caselaw 
from many other jurisdictions, which have addressed this precise issue.  Relator’s 
interpretation of the wrongful death statute of limitations not only contravenes the 
purposes set forth in O’Grady, it seeks to reward fraudulent concealment, the destruction 
of evidence, and the very act of murder.  This Court cannot fathom that the legislature’s 
intent when enacting the wrongful death statute of limitations was to permit tortfeasors to 
evade liability for causing wrongful deaths so long as the tortfeasor could conceal their 
wrongdoing until the statute of limitations expired, while other torfeasors, guilty of the 
same conduct, except for the fortuity that it merely caused injury instead of death, would 
be held liable for damages.  Such a reading of section 537.100 would lead to an absurd 
and illogical result.8 
Conclusion 
 
The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Relator’s motion to 
dismiss Irwin’s wrongful death suit because the doctrine of equitable estoppel forecloses 
Relator from relying on the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense due to his 
                                                 
8 This Court recognizes the holding in this case differs from that in Boland v. Saint Luke’s 
Health Sys., Inc., --- S.W.3d --- (No. SC93906) (Mo. banc 2015), handed down this same 
day.  Boland is predicated upon a civil factual pattern wherein the defendants filed a 
motion to dismiss while Beisly is predicated upon a criminal factual pattern and seeks 
writ relief. 
20 
 
fraudulent concealment of his wrongdoing.  The preliminary order in prohibition is 
quashed.9 
______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   GEORGE W. DRAPER III, JUDGE 
 
Stith and Teitelman, JJ., and Gabbert, Sp.J., concur; Fischer, J., dissents in separate 
opinion filed; Russell, J., dissents in separate opinion filed; Fischer and Wilson, JJ., 
concur in opinion of Russell, J. Breckenridge, C.J., not participating. 
                                                 
9 It should be noted that this Court’s historical treatment of special judges accords their 
votes the same weight as the regular members of this Court.  See Rule 11.02 (providing, 
“A judge or commissioner so transferred, during the period designated, shall have the 
same powers and responsibilities as a judge of the court or district to which he [or she] is 
transferred”). 
  
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI ex rel.  
 
 
) 
BOB T. BEISLY II,  
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
Relator, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC94030 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY PERIGO, 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
Respondent.  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION 
 
 
I concur in the dissenting opinion of the Honorable Mary Russell.  I write 
separately to explain regretfully that today the Supreme Court of Missouri has issued 
conflicting opinions and my view of how this could have and should have been avoided.   
 
This Court granted transfer of State of Missouri ex rel. Bob T. Beisly II, v. The 
Honorable Timothy Perigo and Sally Boland, et al. v. Saint Luke's Health System, Inc., et 
al. on the same date.1  Rule 83.04.  Boland involves a direct appeal, and Beisly involves a 
petition seeking a writ of prohibition, but the legal issues regarding the wrongful death 
                                                          
 
1 The Southern District opinion in Beisly expressly recognized that it was in conflict with the 
Western District's opinion in Boland.  See attached Appendix A, pages 11-14.   
2 
 
statute of limitation are the same.  The Honorable Patricia Breckenridge recused in this 
case, and the Honorable Anthony Rex Gabbert was assigned as a special judge.2   
 
In my view, this Court should not have issued the majority opinion in this case that 
is contrary to the position taken by a majority of the regular members of this Court in 
Boland, especially as the majority in this case was only possible with the assistance of a 
special judge from the Court of Appeals, Western District.  Rather, this Court should 
have retransferred the case to the Court of Appeals, Southern District, whose previous 
opinion in this case faithfully adhered to this Court's precedent and the position now 
taken by a majority of this Court's regular members in Boland.  The opinion from the 
Court of Appeals, Southern District is attached as Appendix A to this opinion.   
The rules governing transfer of cases from the court of appeals after opinion are 
84.04, 84.05 and 84.06.  Rule 83.04 provides in pertinent part: "case may be transferred 
by order of this Court on application of a party for any reasons specified in Rule 83.02 or 
for the reason that the opinion filed is contrary to a previous decision of an appellate 
court of this state."   
 
It is important to note that the Southern District's opinion in this case was not in 
conflict with an opinion of this Court, but was in conflict with the opinion in Boland as 
decided by the Court of Appeals, Western District.  Because a majority of this Court's 
regular members now have vacated and rejected the court of appeals' decision in Boland, 
                                                          
 
2 Judge Breckenridge was not recused from Boland and, therefore, participated in that case.  
Judge Gabbert is a judge on the Court of Appeals, Western District.    
3 
 
there remains no reason for this Court to issue an opinion in this case which quashes a 
writ of prohibition.   
In my view, there is no practical or legitimate reason to issue an opinion in Beisly 
which is in conflict with Boland on the same day and that required a special judge to 
garner a majority.  As noted, the proper approach would have been to retransfer, which 
requires a majority vote of the judges on the case.     
 
It is not lost on me that the majority opinion in this case ultimately quashes the 
writ of prohibition issued by the Court of Appeals, Southern District.  The quashing of 
that writ does not foreclose the defendant from filing yet another motion to dismiss.  It 
will then be up to Honorable Timothy Perigo to decide the precedential value of these 
conflicting opinions and, therefore, how the ultimate appeal of his decision in the 
underlying wrongful death action would be resolved on appeal by the Court of Appeals, 
Southern District, (which presumably will have original appellate jurisdiction) or by this 
Court if transfer were granted.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zel M. Fischer, Judge 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
Appendix A 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
 
9 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
STATE ex rel. BOB T. BEISLY II, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
Relator, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC94030 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY PERIGO, 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
Respondent.  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION 
 
While I am deeply troubled by the tragedy that occurred in this case, I must 
respectfully dissent.  In overruling the defendant’s motion to dismiss this case, the trial 
court found that it was “shocking to the conscience” to construe the wrongful death 
statutes in a manner that would allow a wrongdoer to escape civil liability merely by 
successfully concealing his identity until the limitations period ran. While I agree that the 
outcome I would reach here is regrettable, it is shocking to the legal conscience for this 
Court to use its equity powers to countermand the clear dictates of the legislature.  I 
write separately because, as this Court stated in Boland v. Saint Luke’s Health Sys., Inc., 
the doctrine of equitable estoppel may not be used to preclude application of section 
2 
 
537.100,1 Missouri’s special statute of limitations for wrongful death claims.  See --- 
S.W.3d --- (No. SC93906) (Mo. banc 2015). 
I agree with the majority that, because wrongful death is a purely statutory 
creature, the statute of limitations provisions that apply to claims generally are not 
applicable to a wrongful death claim. The fraudulent concealment exception set out in 
section 516.280 may not be applied to a wrongful death claim because such claims are 
governed by the special statute of limitations set out in section 537.100.  Section 537.100 
does not contain its own fraudulent concealment exception, and neither of its two tolling 
exceptions apply to this case. 
I also agree with the majority that this Court’s decision in Frazee v. Partney, 314 
 
 
S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1958) remains good law and is directly on point here. That decision 
found that a wrongful death claim accrues when the defendant’s liability is complete (i.e., 
at death) and there exists some person to whom the defendant is liable. Id. at 920-21. 
The majority reaffirms that holding and rightly finds that in this case, as in Frazee, the 
plaintiff’s cause of action accrued at the decedent’s death, regardless of the fact that in 
both cases the identity of the defendant was unknown at the time of death. 
Frazee, however, also held that: 
 
 
[W]here a statute of limitations is a special one, not included in the general 
chapter on limitations, the running thereof cannot be tolled because of 
fraud, concealment or any other reason not provided in the statute itself. . . . 
No other exceptions whatever are engrafted on that statute, and it is not the 
duty or the right of the courts to write new provisions into the statute. 
 
                                              
1 Statutory references are to RSMo 2000 if not otherwise indicated. 
3 
 
Id. at 919 (internal citations omitted). It is here that I respectfully disagree with the 
majority opinion insofar as it disregards this aspect of Frazee by holding that equitable 
estoppel bars the defendant from asserting the statute of limitations as an affirmative 
defense due to acts of fraudulent concealment.  The majority claims that this holding does 
not violate Frazee because:  
tolling and accrual are likewise distinct from the application of fraudulent 
concealment as a form of equitable estoppel, which forecloses a defendant 
from pleading the statute of limitations as a defense. The application of this 
doctrine does nothing to engraft a tolling mechanism or otherwise extend 
the statute of limitations beyond what is stated expressly in the statute.2 
 
 
As was held in Boland, this is a distinction without a real difference.  While it is true that 
equitable estoppel was not before this Court in Frazee, the phrase “[n]o other exceptions 
whatever are engrafted on that statute” must mean something.  Frazee at 919. Despite its 
discussion of the difference between equitable tolling and equitable estoppel, the majority 
neglects to mention that, in Frazee, this Court clearly stated that “[a] special statute of 
limitations must carry its own exceptions and we may not engraft others upon it.” Id. at 
919. And yet the majority unmistakably holds that equitable estoppel is now a de facto 
exception to section 537.100.3  There is no way to reconcile this with Frazee, and the 
majority effectively overrules that opinion of this Court. 
                                              
2 In support of its point, the majority cites numerous decisions from foreign jurisdictions and 
faults the relator here for failing to address these cases. However, because statutes of limitations 
are purely statutory, decisions from other states are irrelevant to the interpretation and 
application of section 537.100. 
3 The majority opinion premises its discussion of equitable estoppel on Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. 
Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 235 (1959), in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that 
equitable estoppel could toll the limitations period for a claim under the Federal Employers’ 
Liability Act.  Yet Glus was a federal case interpreting a federal statute.  As such, it is not strictly 
4 
 
As this Court stated in Boland, the legislative history of section 537.100 is 
instructive. Prior to Frazee, the General Assembly twice amended section 537.100 to add 
a tolling provision for absconders and a one year savings provision to allow a new suit 
following dismissal without prejudice.  1905 Mo. Laws 137 (codified at section 2868, 
RSMo 1906); 1909 Mo. Laws 463 (codified at section 5429, RSMo 1909). After Frazee 
the General Assembly twice more amended section 537.100, first enlarging the limitations 
period from one year to two in 1967 and then to three years in 1979. 1967 Mo. Laws 665; 
1979 Mo. Laws 631. Yet the legislature has never seen fit to add a fraudulent 
concealment provision to section 537.100, despite the fact that such a provision, currently 
codified at section 516.280, has existed in Missouri for over 150 years. See Limitation: 
art. 8, sec. 3, RSMo 1836. 
This Court is bound to consider these intentional legislative choices and refrain 
from judicially amending section 537.100 even when, as here, the result is severe for the 
plaintiff. It is the job of the legislature, not this Court, to address exceptions to a special 
statute of limitations. And in the past when this Court has reached other harsh results in 
interpreting statutes of limitations, the General Assembly has acted to ameliorate those 
                                                                                                                                                  
relevant to the interpretation of section 537.100.  Moreover, in applying the doctrine of estoppel, 
the Court in Glus noted that:  
We have been shown nothing in the language or history of the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act to indicate that this principle of law, older than the country itself, 
was not to apply in suits arising under that statute.  Nor has counsel made any 
convincing arguments which might lead us to make an exception to the doctrine 
of estoppel in this case.   
Id. at 234.  Here, however, the legislative history of section 537.100 indicates the General 
Assembly did not intend fraudulent concealment as an exception to the wrongful death 
limitations period.  Further, legislative deference as well as adherence to this Court’s decision in 
Frazee are compelling arguments to decline to exercise equity powers in this case. 
5 
 
results. In Laughlin v. Forgrave, 432 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. banc 1968), this Court held that 
the plaintiff’s medical malpractice action was barred by the statute of limitations despite 
the claim that the injury – a foreign object left in the plaintiff’s back – could not have 
been discovered within the limitations period. Id. at 313. In 1976, the General Assembly 
amended the medical malpractice statute of limitations to add a discovery exception for 
claims where the injury was a foreign object left inside the body. 1976 Mo. Laws 767 
(codified as amended at section 516.105, RSMo 2000). In Weiss v. Rojanasathit, 975 
S.W.2d 113, 120 (Mo. banc 1998), this Court again strictly construed the medical 
malpractice statute of limitations and held that the discovery exception added in Laughlin 
was inapplicable to the plaintiff’s claim of failure to notify of test results that would have 
revealed the presence of cervical cancer.4  During the next legislative session, the General 
Assembly amended the medical malpractice statute of limitations and added a discovery 
exception for cases where the act of negligence is “negligent failure to inform the patient 
of the results of medical tests.” 1999 Mo. Laws 329. 
In rejecting the plaintiff’s argument for an extension of the discovery rule, this 
 
Court stated in Weiss that: 
 
This argument is appealing and has some force, so far as justice is 
concerned; in that respect the conclusion we reach is distasteful to us. But, 
the legislative branch of the government has determined the policy of the 
state and clearly fixed the time when the limitation period begins to run 
against actions for malpractice. This argument addressed to the court 
properly should be addressed to the General Assembly. Our function is to 
interpret the law; it is not to disregard the law as written by the General 
Assembly. 
 
 
                                              
4 Notably, in Weiss, this Court considered and rejected the plaintiff’s theory that equitable 
estoppel should preclude the defendant from asserting the statute of limitations.  Id. at 120. 
6 
 
Weiss, 975 S.W.2d at 121 (quoting Laughlin, 432 S.W.2d at 314). These cases reflect the 
overarching precedent that the legislature is in the best position to set Missouri policy on 
this issue.  See Hunter v. Hunter, 237 S.W.2d 100, 104 (Mo. 1951) (exceptions to 
statutes of limitations are matters of public policy for the General Assembly; exceptions 
are to be strictly construed and not enlarged by courts upon considerations of hardship.).5  
This result does not aim to reward fraudulent concealment. Rather, it merely recognizes 
that it is this Court’s role to interpret the law, not rewrite it. In that regard, I believe the 
plaintiff’s argument in this case is one better made to the General Assembly. 
Finally, and while I express no opinion about the doctrine of equitable estoppel’s 
application in other contexts, it is my view that this Court should not deploy discretionary 
equitable remedies in a manner contrary to a clear mandate of the legislature.  As this 
Court noted long ago: 
Equity Courts may not disregard a statutory provision, for where the 
Legislature has enacted a statute which governs and determines the rights 
of the parties under stated circumstances, equity courts equally with courts 
of law are bound thereby.  Equity follows the law more circumspectly in the 
interpretation and application of statute law than otherwise. 
 
Milgram v. Jiffy Equip. Co., 247 S.W.2d 668, 676-77 (Mo. 1952) (emphasis added) 
(internal citations omitted). The notion that all equitable maxims become a part of all 
                                              
5 There is considerable historical precedent for this view:   
It was at one time held in regard to these [statutes of limitations], that where by 
reason of the defendant’s fraud the existence of a cause of action was concealed, 
it would furnish an equitable exception to the express language of the statute.  
[B]ut the idea that implied and equitable exceptions, which the Legislature has not 
made, are to be engrafted by the courts on a statute of limitations is now generally 
abandoned.   
THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND 
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 277 (Pomeroy, ed., 2d ed. 1874, 
reprint 2012).   
7 
 
statutory schemes, unless expressly written out of the law by the legislature merely invites 
future reexamination by courts of otherwise settled areas of statutory interpretation. 
In conclusion, despite the fact that the outcome is “shocking to the conscience,” I 
would hold that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling the relator’s motion to 
dismiss the plaintiff’s wrongful death suit. 
 
 
 
 
Mary R. Russell, Judge