Title: Kim v. Rosenthal

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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SJC-11752 
 
SARAH S. KIM  vs.  LLOYD ROSENTHAL.1 
 
 
March 2, 2016. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. 
 
 
 
Sarah S. Kim appeals from a judgment of a single justice of 
this court denying her petition for relief pursuant to G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, and her complaint for relief in the nature of 
certiorari and mandamus pursuant to G. L. c. 249, §§ 4, 5 
(collectively, petition).  We affirm. 
 
 
In November, 2012, the respondent, Lloyd Rosenthal, 
commenced a summary process action against Kim in the District 
Court.  Kim's condominium unit had been foreclosed upon, and 
Rosenthal was the new owner.2  The court ruled in Rosenthal's 
                                                 
 
1 The Appellate Division of the District Court, Northern 
District, was also named as a respondent.  The court is a 
nominal party only.  S.J.C. Rule 2:22, 422 Mass. 1302 (1996).  
Similarly, the numerous other individuals and organizations 
named as respondents who were not parties to the summary process 
action from which this proceeding stems are not proper 
respondents. 
 
 
2 The proceedings that led, eventually, to the summary 
process action began in 2007, when the trustees of the 
condominium trust commenced an action to establish a lien on 
Sarah Kim's unit for unpaid common expenses.  See Trustees of 
Mill Creek Condominium Trust v. Kim, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 1114 
(2010).  After Kim's unit was subsequently foreclosed upon, the 
trustees properly secured a new certificate of title as required 
by the law governing registered land.  See Trustees of Mill 
Creek Condominium Trust v. Kim, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 1105 (2014). 
2 
 
favor, and Kim appealed to the Appellate Division of the 
District Court, which affirmed the judgment.  Kim then filed her 
petition in the county court, stating that she was seeking 
relief from the Appellate Division decision and also that she 
"prays the Honorable Court to review and correct errors made in 
the Superior Court (for Suffolk County); the Land Court, and the 
Appeals Court, resulting in unwarranted loss of [her] two real 
properties."  The single justice denied the petition without a 
hearing. 
 
 
The crux of Kim's argument, as best we can discern from the 
record before us, appears to be that the attorney or attorneys 
who represented the plaintiff in the proceedings that led to the 
foreclosure of Kim's condominium committed "egregious . . . 
fraud[]."  In Kim's view, that purported fraud rendered void any 
judgments that led to the current situation.  Essentially, she 
appears to be arguing that the judgment against her in the 
summary process action is void because the underlying 
foreclosure is void. 
 
 
Relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, is properly denied "where 
there are adequate and effective routes . . . by which the 
petitioning party may seek relief."  Greco v. Plymouth Sav. 
Bank, 423 Mass. 1019, 1019 (1996).  Similarly, "[r]elief in the 
nature of mandamus is extraordinary, and is granted in the 
discretion of the court where no other relief is available."  
Murray v. Commonwealth, 447 Mass. 1010, 1010 (2006), citing 
Forte v. Commonwealth, 429 Mass. 1019, 1020 (1999).  See 
Picciotto v. Appeals Court (No. 2), 457 Mass. 1002, 1002, cert. 
denied, 562 U.S. 1044 (2010), quoting G. L. c. 249, § 4 
("certiorari relief designed to correct errors 'not otherwise 
reviewable by motion or by appeal'").  The petitioner bears the 
burden to allege and demonstrate the absence or inadequacy of 
other remedies.  See, e.g., Russell v. Nichols, 434 Mass. 1015, 
1016 (2001).  Kim has not met, and cannot meet, this burden 
where she had another adequate and effective avenue for seeking 
relief:  she could have appealed from the Appellate Division 
decision to the Appeals Court.  Indeed, Kim appealed from some 
of the judgments that preceded the summary process action, and 
to the extent that the issues she raises here relate to those 
proceedings, she had an opportunity to raise those issues in the 
earlier appeals.  See note 2, supra. 
 
3 
 
 
The single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in 
denying relief.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
Sarah S. Kim, pro se. 
 
                                                 
 
3 Two days prior to oral argument, Kim filed a "verified 
motion to stay the proceeding(s) or dismiss the petition without 
prejudice pursuant to principle governing standing and subject 
matter jurisdiction; and the court's inherent authority."  That 
motion is denied.  The claims raised therein appear to relate to 
the proceedings that led, eventually, to the summary process 
action that is at the root of this current appeal.  They are 
not, in other words, properly before the court as a part of 
Kim's G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition.  Kim is free to pursue those 
claims in the trial court.