Title: LINDGREN v BOARD OF TRUSTEES

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 13323 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F MONTANA 1976 W E S L E Y A. LINDGREN, Petitioner and Appellant, BOARD O F TRUSTEES, HIGH S C H O O L DISTRICT NO. 1, FERGUS C O U N T Y , and D O L O R E S C O L B U R G , SUPERINTENDENT O F PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, Respondents and Respondents. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Peter Meloy , Judge presiding . Counsel of Record: For Appellant : McKittrick and Duffy, Great F a l l s , Montana D. Patrick McKittrick argu&d, Great F a l l s , Montana For Respondents: Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Smith, Smith and Sewell, Helena, Montana Chadwick H. Smith argued, Helena, Montana Submitted: October 20, 1976 Decided: OEC 2 2 1976 Filed: DEC 2 2 1976 M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This is a n appeal from a judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Lewis and Clark County. The judgment affirmed a d e c i s i o n of t h e Supreintendent of P u b l i c I n s t r u c t i o n , upholding t h e d e c i - s i o n of t h e County Superintendent of Schools, Fergus County, i n t h e m a t t e r of t h e d i s m i s s a l of Wesley A. Lindgren by t h e Board of Trustees of School D i s t r i c t No. 1, Fergus County. Appellant was employed a s an i n d u s t r i a l a r t s and math t e a c h e r a t Fergus County High School. H e had had teaching c o n t r a c t s w i t h Fergus County School D i s t r i c t No. 1 f o r f o u r t e e n consecutive y e a r s and was a t e n u r e t e a c h e r . On A p r i l 2 , 1973, t h e Board of T r u s t e e s of School District No. 1, h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o a s t h e T r u s t e e s , o f f e r e d a p p e l l a n t a c o n t r a c t t o t e a c h f o r t h e 1973-74 school year; he signed and r e t u r n e d t h e c o n t r a c t on A p r i l 30, 1973. On A p r i l 1 4 , 1973, a p p e l l a n t was a r r e s t e d and charged with t h e v i o l a t i o n s of d r i v i n g while under t h e i n f l u e n c e of i n - t o x i c a t i n g l i q u o r ( t h i r d o f f e n s e ) and d r i v i n g without a v a l i d d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e . H e plead g u i l t y t o t h e s e charges. Imposition of sentence was d e f e r r e d f o r one year upon c o n d i t i o n t h a t appel- l a n t complete t h e Alcohol R e h a b i l i t a t i o n and Treatment Program a t t h e s t a t e h o s p i t a l a t Galen and t h e r e a f t e r r e g u l a r l y a t t e n d meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous f o r a period of one year. These c o n d i t i o n s w e r e s a t i s f i e d and on March 7 , 1975 a p p e l l a n t w a s allowed t o withdraw h i s g u i l t y p l e a and t h e charges w e r e dismissed. O n August 13, 1973 t h e Trustees resolved t h a t a l e t t e r of d i s m i s s a l be s e n t t o a p p e l l a n t based upon h i s being "con- v i c t e d " f o r d r i v i n g while under t h e i n f l u e n c e of i n t o x i c a t i n g l i q u o r and d r i v i n g without a v a l i d d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e . A letter of d i s m i s s a l and n o t i f i c a t i o n of hearing was dispatched t o appel- l a n t by t h e chairman of t h e Board of Trustees. The Trustees convened on August 27, 1973, and a p p e l l a n t appeared and submitted t o t h e Trustees a proposal asking them t o consider a w r i t t e n agreement which would allow him t o con- t i n u e teaching. This hearing was recessed u n t i l August 29, 1973. When t h e p a r t i e s f a i l e d t o reach an agreement a t t h e second hearing, t h e Trustees moved t h a t a hearing be held on September 4 , 1973. O n August 31, 1973, t h e chairman of t h e Trustees addressed a l e t t e r t o a p p e l l a n t amending t h e grounds f o r a p p e l l a n t ' s d i s m i s s a l , l i s t i n g a d d i t i o n a l b a s i s f o r d i s m i s s a l , and o f f e r - ing a p p e l l a n t a d d i t i o n a l t i m e f o r preparation t o m e e t t h e new charges. The Trustees convened on September 4 , 1973, and upon motion adopted and r a t i f i e d t h e amended and consolidated n o t i c e f o r dismissal. Appellant appeared before t h e Trustees on September 4 , 1973, and objected t o t h e amended letter of dismissal. H e de- manded t h a t hearing be based upon t h e i n i t i a l l e t t e r of dismissal dated August 15, 1973. Appellant withdrew from t h e hearing when t h e Trustees indicated t h e hearing would be based upon t h e charges contained i n t h e amended letter of d i s m i s s a l . Subsequent t o a p p e l l a n t ' s withdrawal, t h e Trustees resolved t h a t a p p e l l a n t was dismissed, based upon charges contained i n t h e amended l e t t e r of dismissal. Appellant appealed h i s dismissal t o t h e County Super- intendent of Schools and requested a determination l i m i t i n g t h e scope of t h e hearing. The County Superintendent of Schools ordered t h e scope of t h e hearing t o include those charges set f o r t h i n t h e amended l e t t e r of dismissal and s e t t h e hearing f o r September 2 1 , 1973. O n September 18, 1973, a p p e l l a n t p e t i t i o n e d t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Fergus County, f o r a w r i t of p r o h i b i t i o n , w r i t of mandate o r o t h e r appropriate w r i t r e s t r a i n i n g t h e County Superintendent of Schools from proceeding t o hearing on t h e charges. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t issued, and subsequently dismissed, an a l t e r n a - t i v e w r i t of mandate and p r o h i b i t i o n d i r e c t e d t o t h e County Superintendent of Schools and t h e Trustees. Appellant p e t i t i o n e d t h i s Court f o r a w r i t of super- v i s o r y c o n t r o l on September 26, 1973, and asked t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t order dismissing t h e a l t e r n a t i v e w r i t be overruled. This Court dismissed t h e p e t i t i o n , Lindgren v. D i s t r i c t Court, 162 Mont. 548, 514 P.2d 767. The County Superintendent of Schools heard a p p e l l a n t ' s appeal on October 2, 1974, and affirmed t h e Trustees' d e c i s i o n t o dismiss appellant. Appellant appealed t o t h e S t a t e Superintendent of Public I n s t r u c t i o n who entered a d e c i s i o n holding t h e r e was s u b s t a n t i a l evidence supporting t h e f i n d i n g s of t h e County Superintendent of Schools based upon t h e amended letter of dismissal. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t of Lewis and Clark County affirmed t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e S t a t e Superintendent of Schools and from t h a t f i n a l judg- ment Lindgren appeals and presents two i s s u e s f o r review: 1. Did t h e Board of Trustees of High School D i s t r i c t No. 1, Fergus County, dismiss a p p e l l a n t i n accordance with t h e laws of t h e S t a t e of Montana? 2. Was t h e r e s u b s t a n t i a l evidence on t h e record t o support t h e finding a p p e l l a n t was incompetent and u n f i t t o teach under h i s 1973-74 school c o n t r a c t ? T h e f i r s t a l l e g a t i o n of e r r o r concerns t h e procedural manner i n which a p p e l l a n t was dismissed from h i s teaching d u t i e s . Section 75-6107, R.C.M. 1947, s e t s f o r t h t h e a p p l i c a b l e law i n Montana p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e d i s m i s s a l of a teacher under c o n t r a c t : "The t r u s t e e s of any d i s t r i c t may dismiss a teacher before t h e e x p i r a t i o n of h i s employment c o n t r a c t f o r immorality, u n f i t n e s s , incompetence, o r v i o l a t i o n of t h e adopted p o l i c i e s of such t r u s t e e s . Any t e a c h e r who has been dismissed may i n w r i t i n g w i t h i n t e n (10) days appeal such d i s m i s s a l t o t h e county superintendent; following such appeal a hearing s h a l l be held w i t h i n t e n (10) days. I f t h e county superintendent, a f t e r a hearing, determines t h a t t h e d i s m i s s a l by t h e t r u s t e e s was made without good cause, he s h a l l o r d e r t h e t r u s t e e s t o r e i n s t a t e such t e a c h e r and t o compensate such teacher a t h i s c o n t r a c t amount f o r t h e t i m e l o s t during t h e pending of t h e appeal." Section 75-5930, R.C.M. 1947, provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : "No business s h a l l be t r a n s a c t e d by t h e t r u s t e e s of a d i s t r i c t u n l e s s it i s t r a n s a c t e d a t a r e g u l a r meeting o r a properly c a l l e d s p e c i a l meeting." See: Wyatt v. School D i s t r i c t No. 104, 148 Mont. 83, 417 P.2d It i s a p p e l l a n t ' s contention t h e T r u s t e e s ' a c t of d i s - m i s s a l is l e g a l l y i n e f f e c t i v e . H e reaches t h i s conclusion by construing t h e T r u s t e e s ' i n i t i a l letter of d i s m i s s a l i n combin- a t i o n with t h e amended and consolidated letter of d i s m i s s a l as a s i n g l e n o t i c e t o dismiss. Appellant argues t h a t s e c t i o n 75- 5930, R.C.M. 1947, r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e amended letter of d i s m i s s a l "be t r a n s a c t e d a t a r e g u l a r meeting o r property c a l l e d s p e c i a l meeting" of t h e Trustees. Appellant concludes t h e attempt t o discharge him is void s i n c e t h e amended letter of d i s m i s s a l was merely adopted and r a t i f i e d by t h e T r u s t e e s r a t h e r than being t r a n s a c t e d a t t h e meeting. W e f i n d t h i s argument without m e r i t . The i n i t i a l letter of d i s m i s s a l n o t i f i e d a p p e l l a n t he was dismissed and t h a t h i s s e r v i c e s would n o t be used during t h e 1973-74 school year. This i n i t i a l letter based a p p e l l a n t ' s d i s - m i s s a l on t h e s e grounds: " * * * This a c t i o n i s taken because of your conviction on J u l y 16, 1973 f o r d r i v i n g while under t h e i n f l u e n c e of i n t o x i c a t i n g l i q u o r , t h i r d conviction, and d r i v i n g without a v a l i d d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e . I n a d d i t i o n t h e s e f a c t s p l a c e you i n v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 75-6108, R.C.M. 1947, a s amended which r e q u i r e s t h a t 'any teacher under c o n t r a c t with a d i s t r i c t s h a l l : conform t o and enforce t h e laws * * * . " I Our initial discussion concerns the basis upon which the trustees determined appellant should be dismissed. In the district court record we find the minutes of the August 13, 1973 Trustees' regular meeting. In these minutes appears this subtitle: "LETTER OF DISMISSAL TO BE SENT TEACHER: Trustee Swift moved seconded by Trustee Tresch that a letter of dismissal be forwarded to Wesley Lindgren, teacher in Fergus High School, because of a D.W.I. and driving without a valid license and conviction on both counts. The motion carried. " We conclude from this record that on August 13, 1973 at a regular meeting of the Trustees, it was resolved that appellant be dis- missed from his 1973-74 teaching duties on the basis of appel- lant's above mentioned violations. Next, we determine whether the basis for dismissal util- ized by the Trustees is legally sufficient for dismissal. Under section 75-6107, R.C.M. 1947, the dismissal of a teacher under contract requires a showing of immorality, unfitness, incompetence, or violation of the adopted policies of the Trustees. The initial letter of dismissal failed to substantiate any causal relationship between appellant's violations and his performance of teaching duties. This Court does not find, as a matter of law, that vio- lations for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor and driving without a valid driver's license are tantamount to "immorality, unfitness, incompetence, or violation of the adopted policies of such trustees." Absent such showing, the discharge of appellant amounted to a breach of contract. Hovland v. School Dist. No. 52, 128 Mont. 507, 278 P.2d 211. Respondent Trustees contend appellant's dismissal should be upheld based upon the amended and consolidated letter of dis- missal which states: "Since charges were initially brought against Mr. Lindgren, additional information has come to the board. For this reason, amended and consolidated notice for dismissal is given. "The causes are: 'immorality, unfitness, in- competence, and failure to conform to and enforce the laws * * *.' (See sections 75-6107 and 75-6108, Revised Codes of Montana.) These causes grow out of Mr. Lindgren's arrest for DWI and driving without a valid Montana driver's license on April 14, 1973 and his conviction thereupon on July 16, 1973. In addition, the charges stem from Mr. Lindgren's performance as a teacher in his school, par- ticularly as to his poor relationship with students, his lack of willingness to make ade- quate plan preparation, his failure to accept responsibility in the school, his lack of interest in the students, his failure to maintain adequate class supervision and discipline, his poor example to students, his failure to convey skills possessed by him to his students as he should, his failure to take proper care of the classroom and the property placed in his charge, and his arrival at school in a disheveled appear- ance, smelling of alcoholic beverages." Respondents argue the clear and unequivocal ratification of the amended and consolidated letter of dismissal is proper. Furthermore, they contend appellant was not prejudiced by the amended notice of dismissal. Respondents cite the holding of the district court as authority for the proposition that "so long as there is notice and opportunity for hearing the Board can amend its charges for dismissal prior to hearing as was done here". We do not agree. The additional charges alleged in the amended and con- solidated letter of dismissal are derived from information which was available to the trustees at the time of the drafting of the initial letter of dismissal and at the time the Trustees accepted a new contract of employment for the 1973-74 year on April 30, 1973. This Court has already concluded the initial letter of dismissal did not establish legally adequate grounds for dismissal. To recognize the amended letter of dismissal as adequate in law would amount to submitting appellant to the burden of establishing the invalidity of charges propounded for the purpose of remedying legally inadequate charges. he Court concludes appellant incurred substantial legal prejudice when required to meet these additional charges. In view of our determination of appellant's first issue, further discussion regarding the sufficiency of the evidence is unnecessary. The judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause remanded for the determination of emoluments due appellant pursuant to statute and case authority4 -- Justice oncur : 9 kbn. Jack Green, sitting in place of Mr. Justice Wesley Castles.