Title: State v. Page

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Page (98-558 & 99-013); 171 Vt. 110; 757 A.2d 1038 

[Filed 26-May-2000]
[Motion for Reargument in 98-558 Denied 19-Jul-2000]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of  Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                            Nos. 98-558 & 99-013

State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.	                                         District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 2, Franklin Circuit

William Page	                                 December Term, 1999

    and

In re William Page	                         On Appeal from
                                                 Franklin Superior Court

                                                 December Term, 1999

Michael S. Kupersmith, J.

Diane C. Wheeler, Franklin County Deputy State's Attorney, St. Albans, for 
  Plaintiff/Respondent-Appellee.

Robert Appel, Defender General, and William A. Nelson, Appellate Attorney, 
  Montpelier, for Defendant/Petitioner-Appellant.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       DOOLEY, J.,  Defendant William Page appeals from the district court's
  order revoking his  probation and re-sentencing him to a term of
  six-to-fifteen years imprisonment, all suspended but  fourteen years, and
  also appeals the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
  Defendant  argues that:(1) the district court lacked jurisdiction to order
  adult probation or imprisonment because 

 

  retransfer of the criminal charge from family court to district court was
  not authorized by the transfer  statute; (2) he  was not subject to the
  terms and conditions of his probation while in custody, before 
  commencement of his probationary term; and (3) the delay in the issuance of
  findings denied him  due process of law.  We affirm.

       On May 25, 1993, defendant, then almost sixteen years of age, was
  charged with sexual  assault, aggravated assault, and kidnaping.  On
  October 29, 1993, on defendant's motion, the judge   transferred the sexual
  assault and kidnaping charges to family court.  The charge of aggravated 
  assault remained pending in district court.  On December 22, 1993, the
  parties agreed to and signed a  complex plea agreement detailing how the
  pending charges were to be resolved in family and district  court.

       The agreement provided for the kidnaping case to remain in family
  court, the aggravated  assault case to be transferred to family court, and
  the sexual assault case to be re-transferred to  district court.  Defendant
  admitted the aggravated assault and kidnaping charges in family court and 
  was placed in the custody of the State on juvenile probation.  Defendant
  pled guilty to the sexual  assault charge in district court and was
  sentenced to "not less than six (6) nor more than fifteen (15)  years in
  the custody of the Commissioner of Corrections, all suspended except six
  (6) years to serve,"  and probation.  Defendant commenced service of his
  sentence on the day the parties entered into the  agreement.  The probation
  order, which defendant signed, agreeing to its terms, contained Special 
  Condition 15: "Defendant to complete sex offender treatment, to include
  residential treatment if  necessary, to the satisfaction of the probation
  officer."

       On June 6, 1994, defendant was admitted to the Whitney Academy, a
  residential treatment  program for adolescent male sex offenders who are
  intellectually challenged, in East Freetown, 

 

  Massachusetts.  In the years between defendant's admission to Whitney and
  his discharge on April 1,  1997, he made minimal progress.  Throughout that
  time, he collected photographs of children and  secreted other residents'
  coats to use for sexual arousal and gratification.  He deceived treatment 
  professionals and other members of his sex offender group, and engaged in
  self-injury.  He lacked  sincere empathy for his victims.  When presented
  with the threat of being returned to prison in  Vermont, defendant's level
  of cooperation would improve.  However, his defiance and lack of 
  compliance with the treatment persisted.  The Director of Clinical Services
  and other staff members  concluded that defendant presented a significant
  risk to re-offend.  As a result, defendant was  discharged from Whitney
  Academy with a  recommendation that he receive further sexual offender 
  treatment.  Defendant was returned to Vermont and incarcerated at Northwest
  State Correctional  Center.

       On June 5, 1997, defendant's probation officer filed a
  probation-violation complaint in  district court, alleging that defendant
  had violated Condition 15 of his probation terms by not  completing
  sex-offender treatment to the satisfaction of the probation officer.  A
  merits hearing was  held on October 1 and 2, and November 6, 1997.  On
  November 6, 1998, defendant filed a habeas  corpus petition alleging that
  the court's failure to issue a timely decision on the violation of
  probation  charge denied him due process of law.(FN1)  On November 11,
  1998, the court issued a decision  finding defendant in violation of
  Condition 15 of his probation order.  The superior court denied the  habeas
  corpus petition as moot.  The district court denied a motion to dismiss
  because the 

 

  decision was untimely.  The district court revoked probation and
  resentenced defendant to six-to-fifteen years in prison, all suspended
  except fourteen years and probation.

       Defendant first argues that because the "retransfer" of the sexual
  assault charge from family  court to district court was not authorized by
  the transfer statute, the district court lacked jurisdiction  to order
  adult probation or imprisonment.  Pursuant to 3 V.S.A. §5506(a), transfers
  from family to  adult court are allowed "if the child had attained the age
  of 10 but not the age of 14 at the time the act  was alleged to have
  occurred."   Defendant was fifteen years old at the time the act was
  alleged to  have occurred.  

       Defendant relies upon State v. Charbonneau, 154 Vt. 373, 376, 576 A.2d 1253, 1255 (1990),  in which this Court reversed a district court
  conviction of a juvenile for simple assault because the  case was
  retransferred to district court from family court without statutory
  authority.  There are three  distinctions between Charbonneau and this
  case: (1) defendant did not agree to the transfer in  Charbonneau; here it
  was part of a plea agreement; (2) defendant was tried for the offense in
  the  district court; here, he pled guilty; and (3) the offense in
  Charbonneau, simple assault, is not one  which is authorized for transfer
  to district court prior to adjudication, see 33 V.S.A. § 5506(a); sexual 
  assault is such an offense, see id.  We believe the first distinction is
  critical.

       The central premise of defendant's argument is that a violation of the
  transfer statute deprives  the transferee court of jurisdiction, and, as a
  result, defendant can now void the transfer despite the  fact that he
  agreed to it, benefitted from it and pled guilty to the offense.  We
  disagree that the  transferee court lacks jurisdiction.  The district court
  has jurisdiction over a criminal charge that a  fifteen-year-old committed
  sexual assault.  See 4 V.S.A. § 439 (district court has jurisdiction over 
  felonies); 13 V.S.A. § 3252(a) (sexual assault is a felony punishable by up
  to twenty years 

 

  imprisonment); 33 V.S.A. § 5502(a)(1)(B) (for offenses listed in § 5506(a),
  juvenile over fourteen  years of age "shall be subject to criminal
  proceedings as in cases commenced against adults"); §  5506(a)(10) (listing
  sexual assault); State v. Buelow, 155 Vt. 537, 540, 587 A.2d 948, 950
  (1990)  (criminal court has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases
  involving persons between fourteen and  sixteen who are charged with
  certain serious crimes).  An improper transfer to district court may be  an
  error if properly raised and preserved, but we do not believe it deprives
  the district court of  jurisdiction.  Thus, "a plea of guilty operates as a
  waiver of procedural shortcomings, insofar as such  defects are subject to
  waiver."  State v. Armstrong, 148 Vt. 344, 346,