Title: State ex rel. Durben v. Indus. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Durben v. Indus. Comm., 94 Ohio St.3d 395, 2002-Ohio-891.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. DURBEN, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
OHIO, APPELLEE, ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Durben v. Indus. Comm. (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 395.] 
Workers’ compensation — Claimant who leaves former position of employment 
for a new position does not forfeit temporary total disability 
compensation eligibility — Temporary total disability compensation 
ordered by Supreme Court in a manner consistent with State ex rel. Gay 
v. Mihm, when Industrial Commission has already ruled on the 
sufficiency of claimant’s medical evidence and did so in claimant’s 
favor. 
(No. 00-1736 — Submitted September 18, 2001 — Decided March 6, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 99AP-1038. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Appellant-claimant, David M. Durben, was industrially 
injured on January 18, 1999, while working for Ziegler Tire & Supply Company.  
Several days later, claimant attempted to work, but was unable to do so because of 
increasing back and leg pain.  On January 22, claimant took a doctor’s disability 
slip into work.  According to claimant, his supervisor became irate, swore at him, 
and told him to leave.  While claimant was recuperating, his supervisor called and 
told him to turn in his uniform and beeper. 
 
Claimant, at that point, was not sure if he still had a job at Ziegler. 
Therefore, when released to return to work on March 3, 1999, he took a job with a 
different employer.  Claimant was unable to finish the day because of pain. 
 
Claimant sought temporary total disability compensation (“TTC”) from 
appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio.  A district hearing officer awarded TTC 
from January 21, 1999 through March 2, 1999, based on the February 15 and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
March 22, 1999 C-84 Physician’s Reports Supplemental of Dr. Terrance A. 
Migliore.  TTC thereafter was denied because claimant “voluntarily resigned his 
employment with the named employer on 03/03/1999.”  That order was 
administratively affirmed. 
 
Claimant filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County, alleging that the commission had abused its discretion in 
denying TTC after March 3, 1999.  The court of appeals denied the writ, based on 
case law that held that voluntary departure from the former position of 
employment barred TTC. 
 
This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
 
After the court of appeals’ decision in this case, we decided State ex rel. 
Baker v. Indus. Comm. (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 376, 732 N.E.2d 355.  Baker 
changed TTC law by declaring that a voluntary departure from the former 
position of employment to another job did not foreclose compensation.  
Accordingly, our litigants do not dispute that claimant is eligible for TTC under 
Baker if all other requirements are met.  See State ex rel. Ramirez v. Indus. 
Comm. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 630, 23 O.O.3d 518, 433 N.E.2d 586 (setting forth 
criteria for TTC).  The question in this case is whether TTC should be ordered by 
this court in a manner consistent with State ex rel. Gay v. Mihm (1994), 68 Ohio 
St.3d 315, 626 N.E.2d 666, or whether the cause should be returned to the 
commission for further consideration.  In this instance, review favors the former. 
 
In many cases, a return will be the appropriate remedy.  That is because, 
under prior law, a finding of voluntary retirement ended the inquiry, negating the 
need to evaluate the sufficiency of the medical evidence. 
 
In our case, however, the commission has already ruled on the sufficiency 
of the claimant’s medical evidence—and did so in claimant’s favor—when it 
awarded TTC from January 21, 1999 to March 2, 1999, based on Dr. Migliore’s 
two C-84s, the later of which certified claimant as disabled until May 10, 1999.  
January Term, 2002 
3 
There is, moreover, no contrary medical evidence on file.  Claimant has thus 
satisfied his medical burden of proof. 
 
The commission points to several perceived deficiencies in its order, 
claiming that certain questions crucial to TTC entitlement were not addressed.  
This argument fails for the reasons stated above.  All of the questions posed by 
the commission were addressed in the C-84s, which, again, the commission 
accepted as persuasive for purposes of the immediately preceding period of TTC.  
Accordingly, TTC is payable from March 4, 1999 through April 2, 1999, the date 
of the original hearing in this matter. 
 
The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Stewart Jaffy & Associates Co., L.P.A., Stewart R. Jaffy, Marc J. Jaffy and 
Lynn S. Jaffy, for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Stephen D. Plymale, 
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. 
__________________