Title: Wagner, Vaughan, Mclaughlin & Brennan, P.A. v. Kennedy Law Group

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC08-1525 
____________ 
 
 
WAGNER, VAUGHAN, MCLAUGHLIN & BRENNAN, P.A., 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
KENNEDY LAW GROUP,  
Respondent. 
 
 
[April 7, 2011] 
CORRECTED OPINION 
 
QUINCE, J. 
 
The law firm of Wagner, Vaughan, McLaughlin, and Brennan seeks review 
of the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in Wagner, Vaughn, 
McLaughlin & Brennan, P.A. v. Kennedy Law Group, 987 So. 2d 741, 744 (Fla. 
2d DCA 2008), on the ground that the decision expressly and directly conflicts 
with the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in Perez v. George, Hartz, 
Lundeen, Flagg & Fulmer, 662 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), on a question of 
law.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  For the reasons stated 
below, we approve in part and quash in part the decision of the Second District. 
 
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
The underlying case involves the application of section 768.26, Florida 
Statutes (2005), the attorney fees provision of the Florida Wrongful Death Act (the 
Act), in a wrongful death action that settled before suit was filed and in which the 
survivors were represented by separate counsel.  The case stems from the deaths of 
Robert and Thelma Elmore as the result of an automobile accident that occurred in 
June 2005.  The Elmores were survived by three adult sons, Gary, Larry, and 
Robert.  In August 2005, Gary was appointed the sole personal representative of 
the Elmores’ estates, pursuant to a provision in the Elmores’ wills.  Larry and 
Robert both signed forms approving Gary’s appointment as the personal 
representative. 
 
Gary retained the Kennedy Law Group (KLG) to represent him in his 
capacity as personal representative.  KLG negotiated a settlement for the full 
proceeds of the accident tortfeasor’s bodily injury insurance policy and distributed 
the net proceeds to Gary, who in turn divided the proceeds equally among the three 
brothers on August 19, 2005. 
On August 17, 2005, an attorney from the law firm of Wagner, Vaughan, 
McLaughlin & Brennan, P.A. (the Wagner firm) wrote KLG to inform them that 
the Wagner firm represented Larry Elmore.  The Wagner firm also proposed a fee-
sharing arrangement between the law firms for a wrongful death action.  The 
 
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Wagner firm suggested that the two firms participate equally in handling the action 
and split the attorney’s fee for whatever recovery was obtained for Gary and Larry 
Elmore.  KLG did not respond to the letter. 
On the day that Larry received his share of the proceeds from the bodily 
injury settlement, the Wagner firm wrote to the attorney who represented the 
Elmores’ estates in the probate action.  The letter stated that Larry did “not approve 
of the distribution apportionment,” that Larry should have been given an 
opportunity to object to the apportionment of the funds in the probate court, and 
that the probate court was required to approve the disbursement of the funds from 
the settlement.  The Wagner firm also copied the letter to KLG and informed KLG 
that it did not have the authority to settle on behalf of Larry.  The Wagner firm 
requested that KLG immediately stop payment on the settlement checks and take 
no further action regarding the claim. 
The Wagner firm then filed a petition in the probate court seeking the 
removal of Gary as the personal representative and the return of the settlement 
proceeds to the trust account until Larry’s objections could be heard.  The probate 
court denied the petition as procedurally deficient, and the Wagner firm made no 
further objections to the distribution of the settlement proceeds.  Larry cashed his 
settlement check without taking any further action in the courts. 
 
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Shortly thereafter, KLG made a demand upon the Elmores’ automobile 
insurer for $2 million in uninsured motorist insurance proceeds.  The insurer 
requested pre-suit mediation.  On the morning of mediation, Robert Elmore 
retained the same Wagner firm attorney representing Larry to also represent him in 
the proceedings.  The Wagner firm and KLG accompanied the three Elmore 
brothers to the mediation, which produced a settlement of $1.23 million. 
The Wagner firm memorialized Larry and Robert’s position in a letter to 
KLG at the end of the day of the mediation.  The letter asserted that the case 
“could have and should have settled” higher than it did.  The letter also stated that 
Larry and Robert’s claims were worth more than Gary’s, but the two brothers were 
willing to approve the settlement in exchange for a one-third distribution of the 
proceeds to each brother.  The probate court approved the settlement, and the 
parties proceeded to an evidentiary hearing on attorney’s fees.  It was at this 
hearing that the probate court determined that the Wagner firm was not entitled to 
a portion of the attorney’s fee award because Larry and Robert did not have any 
competing claims with Gary.  The probate court issued an order awarding KLG the 
entire contingency attorney fee amount from the $1.23 million in settlement 
proceeds.  
The Wagner firm appealed the probate court order to the Second District 
Court, arguing that the lower court erred in awarding KLG the entire fee for three 
 
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reasons.  First, the Wagner firm asserted that the Act does not provide for fees 
incurred if the case settles before suit is filed.  Second, the Wagner firm argued that 
there was a conflict of interest between Gary and his brothers that precluded KLG 
from collecting attorney’s fees for work done for Larry and Robert.  Third, the 
Wagner firm contended that it did not have to show that Larry and Robert had a 
competing claim in order to be entitled to fees under the Act.  The Second District 
concluded that none of these arguments merited reversal.  See Wagner, Vaughn, 
McLaughlin & Brennan, P.A. v. Kennedy Law Group, 987 So. 2d 741, 744 (Fla. 
2d DCA 2008). 
The Second District held that even though the wrongful death action settled 
prior to the filing of a suit, section 768.26, Florida Statutes (2005), did not preclude 
the award of attorney fees to the personal representative’s counsel.  Id. at 745-46.  
The Second District explained that pre-suit negotiations are an important part of 
wrongful death litigation and that section 768.26 does not limit recoverable fees to 
those incurred subsequent to filing suit.  The Second District also cited this Court’s 
decision in Wiggins v. Estate of Wright, 850 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 2003), in which this 
Court approved the Fourth District’s decision in In re Estate of Catapane, 759 So. 
2d 9 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), and its method for allocating attorney’s fees in a 
wrongful death action.  Because this Court approved the decision in Catapane, in 
which the insurers had offered the limits of coverage before counsel filed a 
 
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wrongful death action, the Second District reasoned that “there is no question that 
section 768.26 applies to provide for fees incurred even in cases that settle before 
suit is filed.”  Wagner, 987 So. 2d at 746. 
The Second District also concluded that the other survivors did not have 
competing interests with Gary that would preclude the attorney fee award to the 
personal representative’s counsel.  The court explained that the Wagner firm’s 
objection to the apportionment of the bodily injury settlement would have 
established a conflict of interest, had it been pursued.  However, the court noted, 
Larry had abandoned his objection to the apportionment after his petition to 
remove Gary as personal representative was dismissed.  Further, neither Larry nor 
Robert objected to the amount or the apportionment of the settlement and had 
waived any objection by accepting their equal shares.  Id.  
Finally, the Second District concluded that the probate court did not abuse 
its discretion in declining to award the Wagner firm a share of the attorney’s fees 
because the Wagner firm did not perform any work on any aspect of the case in 
which KLG had a conflict of interest.  The court explained that the survivors’ 
counsel was required to show a competing interest in order to be entitled to share 
of attorney fees, which it had not shown.  Id. at 746-47. 
The Wagner firm sought review by this Court based on direct conflict with 
the decision of the Third District in Perez v. George, Hartz, Lundeen, Flagg & 
 
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Fulmer, 662 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), which also involved the allocation of 
attorney’s fees in the settlement of a wrongful death action.  In a footnote in Perez, 
the Third District concluded that section 768.26 was not applicable because 
“[t]here was no action for wrongful death filed or litigated in this case.”  Id. at 364 
n.4.   We granted review on the basis of this conflict as to the applicability of 
section 768.26.  For the reasons explained below, we approve in part and quash in 
part the decision in Wagner. 
ANALYSIS 
 
The Florida Wrongful Death Act (the Act), which encompasses sections 
768.16 to 768.26 of the Florida Statutes, provides that it is the public policy of the 
State of Florida to shift the losses resulting when wrongful death occurs from the 
survivors of the decedent to the wrongdoer.  § 768.17, Fla. Stat. (2005).  The Act is 
designed to substitute the financial resources of the wrongdoer for the resources of 
the decedent, in an attempt to meet the financial obligations of the decedent, Ellis 
v. Humana of Fla., Inc., 569 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), and to prevent a 
tortfeasor from evading liability for his or her misconduct when such misconduct 
results in death, Variety Children’s Hosp. v. Perkins, 445 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1983).  
The Act also eliminates the multiplicity of suits that resulted from each survivor 
bringing an independent action and avoids survivors racing to get the first 
judgment.  See In re Estate of Catapane, 759 So. 2d 9, 11 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).  By 
 
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statute, the personal representative is the only party with standing to bring a 
wrongful death action to recover damages for the benefit of the decedent’s 
survivors and the estate.  § 768.20, Fla. Stat. (2005); see also Wiggins v. Estate of 
Wright, 850 So. 2d 444, 446 (Fla. 2003).  The survivors may not bring separate 
legal actions and are required to participate in the single legal action filed by the 
estate.  Wiggins, 850 So. 2d at 446.  However, the survivors are still entitled to be 
represented by counsel of their choice.  Id. at 449. 
In analyzing the provisions of the Act, this Court has stated that it “is guided 
by the Legislature’s general intent that the remedial provisions of the wrongful 
death statute should be liberally, rather than strictly or narrowly, construed.  While 
the general rule is that statutes in derogation of the common law are strictly 
construed, the general rule of strict construction does not, in Florida, apply to a 
remedial statute in derogation of the common law.”   BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. 
v. Meeks, 863 So.2d 287, 290 (Fla. 2003); see also § 768.17, Fla. Stat. (2005) 
(“Sections 768.16-768.26 are remedial and shall be liberally construed.”). 
Section 768.26 of the Act, which is entitled “Litigation Expenses,” provides: 
Attorneys’ fees and other expenses of litigation shall be paid by the 
personal representative and deducted from the awards to the survivors 
and the estate in proportion to the amounts awarded to them, but 
expenses incurred for the benefit of a particular survivor or the estate 
shall be paid from their awards. 
 
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§ 768.26, Fla. Stat. (2005).  The Wagner firm argues that the plain language of this 
section makes it applicable only where a wrongful death suit has been filed, and 
not where there is a pre-suit settlement.  The Wagner firm cites the Third District’s 
decision in Perez v. George, Hartz, Lundeen, Flagg & Fulmer, 662 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 
3d DCA 1995), to support this argument.  
Perez involved the settlement of a wrongful death action brought by the 
surviving parents of a minor child who had been killed in a car accident.  The 
divorced parents retained counsel separately and signed agreements with their own 
counsel.  In pre-suit mediation, the mother’s attorneys obtained a $500,000 
settlement for the estate.  Both parents were subsequently named as co-personal 
representatives of the child’s estate.  The mother’s attorneys sought a one-third 
contingency fee from the entire proceeds of the settlement.  The Third District 
concluded that the mother’s attorneys were not entitled to a fee from the father 
because he had not signed a contract with them for legal services.  The court held 
that the mother’s attorneys were only entitled to a fee award of one-third of the 
proceeds received by the mother under the contingency fee agreement signed by 
her.  However, pertinent to the instant case, the Third District also concluded that 
section 768.26 did not apply because “[t]here was no action for wrongful death 
filed or litigated in [the] case.”  Id. at 364 n.4. 
 
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Other Florida courts, including this Court, have not restricted section 768.26 
to circumstances where a lawsuit has been filed or litigated.  In fact, other Florida 
courts have repeatedly applied the statute to pre-suit settlements obtained by 
counsel.  See, e.g., Wiggins v. Estate of Wright, 850 So. 2d 444, 445 (Fla. 2003) 
(applying section 768.26 in a wrongful death case where counsel “negotiated a 
settlement of the estate’s claim with the hospital”); Perris v. Estate of Perris, 764 
So. 2d 870, 870-71 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (stating that the case “concerns the 
computation of attorney’s fees in a wrongful death action” where the “case was 
settled for the total policy limits of $125,000”); In re Estate of Catapane, 759 So. 
2d 9, 10 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (“It was unnecessary for [survivors] to file a 
wrongful death action as the [uninsured motorist] insurer offered its limits of 
$100,000 and the liability insurer offered its limits of $30,000.”). 
This application of the statute is consistent with the stated legislative intent 
that the Act be “liberally construed.”  § 768.17, Fla. Stat. (2005).  Additionally, 
this furthers the public policy favoring settlement of disputes without litigation 
where possible.  Thus, we agree with the Second District that section 768.26 
applies even in those circumstances where a wrongful death claim is settled pre-
suit and disapprove the Third District’s decision in Perez to the extent that it holds 
that the statute does not apply where no action for wrongful death has been filed or 
litigated. 
 
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However, resolution of this issue does not end our review of this case.  We 
must also determine how the fees authorized by section 768.26 are to be 
apportioned when survivors are represented by separate counsel, as were the 
brothers in the instant case.  The Second District concluded that the Wagner firm 
was not entitled to any portion of the contingency fee because the firm “did not 
perform work on any aspect of the case in which KLG had a conflict of interest.”  
Wagner, 987 So. 2d at 746.  The Second District explained that while there was a 
potential conflict of interest between Larry and Robert and the personal 
representative’s counsel, no actual conflict arose because Larry and Robert never 
objected to the amount or the apportionment of the uninsured motorist settlement 
obtained by counsel.  Id.  The Second District further concluded that the Wagner 
firm had to show that Larry and Robert had a competing claim in order to be 
entitled to attorney’s fees under the Act.  We find the Second District’s reading of 
the statute to be too restrictive on this point and inconsistent with our previous 
decision in Wiggins v. Estate of Wright, 850 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 2003).   
Section 768.26 provides that attorney’s fees and other expenses of litigating 
a wrongful death action are to be paid by the personal representative and deducted 
from the awards to the survivors and the estate in proportion to the amounts 
awarded to them.  Counsel for the personal representative is only required to have 
a contingent fee contract with the personal representative who prosecutes the case 
 
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for the benefit of all survivors and the estate.  See In re Estate of Catapane, 759 So. 
2d 9, 11 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).  Thus, counsel for the personal representative 
potentially may be compensated out of the entire recovery to the estate.  However, 
where counsel for the personal representative cannot represent a survivor because 
of a conflict of interest, counsel is not entitled to a fee on that survivor’s portion of 
the recovery.  Id.  Further, a survivor creates a competing claim when he or she 
chooses to be represented by separate counsel, which is the survivor’s right.  
Wiggins, 850 So. 2d at 449.  The Act only limits the number of lawsuits that may 
be filed in a wrongful death case, not the number of attorneys who may represent 
the survivors. 
In Wiggins, we approved of and adopted the Catapane procedure for the 
allocation of attorney’s fees when there are survivors with competing interests who 
are represented by separate counsel.  Wiggins, 850 So. 2d at 450.  Under this 
procedure, “a trial court determines the attorneys’ fee awards by compensating the 
personal representative’s attorney out of the total settlement proceeds, reduced by 
the amount necessary to reasonably compensate the other survivors’ attorneys for 
their services in representing those survivors in the proceedings.”  Id.  Where it can 
be demonstrated that one attorney played a greater role in securing a total award in 
a wrongful-death action in which the decedent’s survivors were represented by 
more than one attorney due to competing interests, a larger fee may be proper for 
 
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that attorney.  Id.  When survivors have competing claims and are represented by 
separate attorneys, the attorney’s fees from the wrongful-death suit should be 
awarded in a manner commensurate with the attorney’s work, providing for the 
proportional payment of attorney’s fees by all the survivors out of their respective 
awards.  Id.  In no instance, however, should a survivor be penalized for hiring 
separate counsel by having to pay a fee for recovery of the same amount twice.  Id.  
Wiggins involved the estate of a woman who was survived by her husband, 
her two minor children with that husband, and her two minor children from a 
previous marriage.  As personal representative and surviving spouse, the husband 
retained an attorney on a contingency fee basis to institute a wrongful death claim 
on behalf of the survivors and the estate against the hospital where the wife died.  
The two children from the prior marriage retained their own attorney to look after 
their interests as surviving beneficiaries.  Counsel for the personal representative 
negotiated a settlement with the hospital, which the court and all parties approved.  
However, counsel for the personal representative proposed a distribution plan that 
favored the husband and his two children and did not compensate the children from 
the prior marriage on par with the children from the current marriage.  The attorney 
for the children from the prior marriage opposed the distribution plan on her 
clients’ behalf.  The trial court rejected the proposed inequitable plan and instead 
ordered that the survivors receive equal shares of the settlement.  Wiggins, 850 So. 
 
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2d at 445.  However, the trial court awarded counsel for the personal representative 
a full fee based on his agreement with the husband and calculated the percentage of 
the fee based on the entire settlement paid to the estate.  The children’s attorney 
sought to be awarded a portion of this fee, but the trial court determined that her 
fee should come solely from her clients out of their net share of the proceeds, 
which had been reduced by the payment of the fee to counsel for the personal 
representative.  On appeal, the Fifth District affirmed this ruling.  Id. at 446.  We 
accepted review based on conflict with Catapane on the issue of allocation of fees. 
We approved the holding in Catapane and quashed the decision in Wiggins.  
Id. at 450.  In reaching our decision, we explained that the Wiggins court had 
ignored the potential conflict of interest that is created when survivors hire separate 
counsel to prosecute a claim for the damages that each is entitled to under the 
statute.  850 So. 2d at 448.  Florida’s wrongful death statute focuses on the loss 
suffered by survivors of the decedent and creates a separate entitlement to damages 
for each survivor.  Id. at 446.  Thus, “the potential for conflict between the 
competing interests of the individual beneficiaries” is “ever present” in a wrongful 
death claim.  Id. at 449.   
In the instant case, Larry and Robert chose to be represented by separate 
counsel, indicating a lack of “commonality of interest” among the Elmores’ 
survivors.   See id. at 448 (noting that a single attorney may be able to represent the 
 
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survivors when all of the survivors have a “commonality of interest” as to 
prosecuting a wrongful death claim and in distributing the recovery).  Under the 
Act, Larry and Robert were entitled to be represented by counsel of their choice.  
See id. at 449.  Further, their counsel was entitled to reasonable compensation for 
the services rendered.  Id. 
Under the Second District’s holding in this case, survivors would be 
deprived of the right to hire their own counsel unless they were willing to pay 
double fees from their recovery, i.e., one fee to the counsel hired by the personal 
representative and another to their separate counsel with whom they have a 
contractual obligation.  We roundly condemned this outcome in Wiggins.  Id. at 
450 (“In no instance, however, should a survivor be penalized for hiring separate 
counsel by having to pay a fee for recovery of the same amount twice.”). 
The Second District also ruled that the Wagner firm was not entitled to a 
share of the attorney’s fees because they “did not perform work on any aspect of 
the case in which KLG had a conflict of interest.”  Wagner, 987 So. 2d at 743.  The 
Second District concluded that there was no conflict of interest between Larry and 
Robert and KLG because the brothers never objected to the amount or the 
apportionment of the uninsured motorist insurance settlement.  Id. at 746.  As we 
noted above, this reading of the Act is unduly restrictive and unfairly impinges on 
a survivor’s right to hire separate counsel. 
 
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Additionally, under the Second District’s ruling the survivors’ separate 
attorney would not be entitled to a fee from the settlement even if he or she made a 
pivotal contribution to recovering that settlement, if the survivors had not asserted 
an actual competing claim.  Under the method we approved in Wiggins, attorney’s 
fees from a wrongful death suit are to be awarded in a manner commensurate with 
the attorneys’ work.  850 So. 2d at 450.   As we explained in Wiggins, in those 
circumstances where “all of the survivors have a commonality of interest and a 
single attorney can represent those interests,” id. at 448, that single attorney will be 
entitled to attorney’s fees based on the entire recovery.  However, where there is 
no commonality of interest among the survivors, the personal representative’s 
attorney cannot represent all of the survivors without their consent.  Id. at 450 
(citing Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4-1.7, which prohibits an attorney from 
representing adverse interests unless specific requirements are met, including that 
each affected client gives informed consent to such representation).  Further, in 
those circumstances where survivors have competing claims and are represented 
by separate attorneys, the fee payable to the personal representative’s attorney and 
the survivors’ separate counsel will be determined by the work performed by each.  
For example, where two competing survivors are represented by separate attorneys 
throughout the litigation and both successfully prosecute a claim to judgment, then 
the fees should ordinarily be awarded out of the survivors’ respective recoveries.  
 
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Id.  However, if it can be demonstrated that one attorney played a greater role in 
securing the total award, a larger fee may be proper.  Id.  We concluded that the 
attorney who had represented the competing survivors in Wiggins was entitled to 
attorney’s fees for the services she rendered in securing a greater portion of the 
settlement for those survivors.  Id. at 449.  However, we also explained that it was 
unclear what part this attorney had played in securing the overall settlement.  We 
noted that if her services were limited to securing an increase in the competing 
survivors’ recovery over that proposed by the personal representative’s attorney, 
then her fee might have to be adjusted accordingly.  Id. at 449-50.  
In the instant case, it is unclear what part, if any, the Wagner firm played in 
securing the overall settlement.  There is also no record evidence that the Wagner 
firm secured any increase in the settlement recovery for Larry and Robert.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the personal representative’s attorney KLG should 
be compensated out of the total settlement proceeds, reduced by the amount 
necessary to reasonably compensate the Wagner firm for the work they performed 
in representing Larry and Robert in the proceedings.  See Wiggins, 850 So. 2d at 
450. 
CONCLUSION 
 
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For the reasons expressed above, we approve in part and quash in part the 
Second District’s decision in Wagner and remand for proceedings to determine 
reasonable compensation for the survivors’ attorneys. 
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, 
JJ., concur. 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Second District - Case No. 2D07-910 and 2d07-941 
 
 
(Hillsborough County) 
 
Joel D. Eaton and Stephen F. Rosenthal of Podhurst Orseck, P.A., Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Steven L. Hearn and Jeanne A. McLean of Steven L. Hearn, P.A., Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent