Title: State v. Brown

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
NO. 6
SEPTEMBER TERM, 1999
STATE OF MARYLAND
v.
JAMES T. BROWN, JR.
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Karwacki, Robert L. (Retired, 
Specially Assigned)
JJ.
Opinion by Bell, C.J.
FILED:   July 28, 1999
That rule reads in relevant part:
1
“(a) Trial Date in Circuit Court.-  (1) The date for trial in the circuit court shall
be set within 30 days after the earlier of the appearance of counsel or the first
appearance of the defendant before the circuit court pursuant to Rule 4-213,
and shall be not later than 180 days after the earlier of those events.  When a
case has been transferred from the District Court because of a demand for jury
trial, and an appearance of counsel entered in the District Court was
automatically entered in the circuit court pursuant to Rule 4-214(a), the date
of the appearance of counsel for purposes of this Rule is the date the case was
docketed in the circuit court.  On motion of a party, or on the court's initiative,
and for good cause shown, the county administrative judge or that judge's
designee may grant a change of a circuit court trial date.”
 
Maryland Code (1971, Repl Vol. 1996), Article 27, § 591 provides: 
2
"(a) Setting the date. -- The date for trial of a criminal matter in a circuit court:
“(1) Shall be set within 30 days after the earlier of: 
“(i) The appearance of counsel; or 
“(ii) The first appearance of the defendant before
the circuit court, as provided in the Maryland
Rules; and 
“(2) May not be later than 180 days after the earlier of those
events. 
"(b) Changing the date. -- On motion of a party or on the court's initiative and
for good cause shown, a county administrative judge or a designee of that
judge may grant a change of the circuit court trial date. 
"(c) Court rules. -- The Court of Appeals may adopt additional rules of
We granted certiorari in the case sub judice, on the petition of the State, see 353 Md.
268, 725 A.2d 1067 ( 1999),  to determine whether the Circuit Court for Baltimore City erred
in refusing to dismiss the charges against James T. Brown, Jr., the respondent, where,
although the postponement that resulted in a trial date beyond the 180 day period, mandated
by Maryland Rule 4-271,  and its statutory counterpart,  Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.
1
Vol.), Art. 27, §591,  was found  by the administrative judge or his designee to be for good
2
practice and procedure for the implementation of this section in circuit courts."
 
2
cause, sixteen months elapsed between the respondent’s arraignment in the circuit court and
his actual trial.    In refusing to dismiss, the trial court reasoned that the administrative judge
found good cause for each of the postponements, that none of those findings was an abuse
of discretion and that the respondent did not establish that he was prejudiced by the delay.
A contrary result was reached by the  Court of Special Appeals, which reversed the judgment
of the circuit court.  That court  held that, “under the circumstances of this case, the delay
between postponement and ultimate trial date was inordinate, in violation of the requirements
of Rule 4-271 and §591.” Brown v. State, 124 Md.App.245, 247, 721 A.2d 269, 270 (1998).
We shall reverse the judgment of the intermediate appellate court.
I.
In February 1996, the respondent was arrested and charged with third degree sexual
offense, fourth degree sexual offense, and assault.   He was arraigned in the Circuit Court
for Baltimore City on June 25, 1996, at which time his initial trial date of September 25,
1996 was set.   On that date, both counsel were ready to proceed, but there was no judge
available to hear the case.    Consequently, the administrative judge, having found good
cause to do so,  rescheduled the trial for  December 12, 1996.   Because, on that date, the
judge assigned to hear the case was involved in a continuing jury trial, the trial scheduled for
that date was  postponed by the administrative judge, for good cause,  and reset to February
3
18, 1997, a date beyond the 180 day limit.    Trial did not proceed on February 18, however,
for, once again, the judge to whom the case was assigned was involved in a continuing jury
trial.  Finding that reason sufficient  good cause to postpone the trial, the administrative
judge set a new trial date of March 5, 1997.
On March 5, 1997, in addition to the trial judge being involved in another trial,
defense counsel was otherwise engaged.   Therefore,  good cause for postponement was
found and the case was rescheduled for March 31, 1997, but not before the respondent had
filed, and the court had denied,  a motion to dismiss “criminal charges for violation of
defendant’s speedy trial, due process and Hicks rights.”   Unavailability of a courtroom and
of the prosecutor due to  maternity leave were the bases for the good cause finding resulting
in the postponement of the March 31, 1997 trial date.  
The next two trial dates, June 19, 1997, and July 11, 1997, were postponed  because
no judge was available to hear the case.   On the next trial date, October 22, 1997, the
prosecutor was informed that defense counsel was involved in another trial and, in reliance,
called off its witnesses.  The administrative judge found that to be good cause and, thus,
postponed  the trial to October 24, 1997; the respondent’s trial commenced on October 28,
1997.  
On none of the occasions prior to the critical postponement, the one that resulted in
a trial date beyond the 180 day limit, did the respondent agree  to a change in trial date under
State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 403 A.2d 356, on motion for reconsideration, 285 Md. 334, 403
A.2d 368 (1979).  And, before the commencement of trial, the respondent renewed his
4
motion to dismiss, again alleging that the statute and the rule, as well as his speedy trial
rights had been violated.    That motion having been denied, the case was presented to the
jury, which returned verdicts of conviction of third degree sexual offense, fourth degree
sexual offense, and common law assault.    Following sentencing,  the respondent noted an
appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  In that court, the respondent asserted that both his
speedy trial rights under the  United States Constitution and his rights under Maryland Rule
4-271 and §591 were infringed.   Finding merit in the respondent’s argument as to the rule
and the statute, the intermediate appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial court.  It
declined to reach the constitutional issues, the respondent had raised, however.
Acknowledging our previous case law, the Court of Special Appeals, characterized the issue
as, “whether there was inordinate delay between the pertinent postponement and the ultimate
trial date necessitating dismissal of appellant's criminal charges.”  Brown, 124 Md.App. at
247, 721 A.2d at 270.    It  held that Rule 4-271 and § 591 were violated, reasoning: 
“Just as the State may not use the nol pros procedure as a vehicle to avoid the
requirements of § 591 and Rule 4-271, the circuit courts may not avoid those
requirements by assigning trial dates that have no practical meaning. In a case
such as this, involving no extenuating circumstances whatsoever, the serial
postponements of trial due to the unavailability of the court is the equivalent
of the failure to assign any trial date. Thus, we will consider the length of
delay between the critical postponement and the ultimate trial date. Under the
particular circumstances of this case, and our holding is so limited, that delay
was inordinate as a matter of law.” 
Id. at 257, 721 A.2d at 275.   Thus, the court remanded the case to the trial court with
instructions to dismiss the charges.   
As indicated, the State sought certiorari, arguing essentially that “the Court of Special
 We noted that “[section 591's] enactment manifested the legislature's recognition of
3
the detrimental effects to our criminal justice system which result from excessive delay in
5
Appeals erred in analyzing the period of delay following the critical postponement by giving
no deference to the administrative judge’s good cause determinations and by otherwise
treating the case as one where nothing was done following the critical postponement.”
Because we think it important that we clarify the application of the Hicks rule, where there
is a delay in bringing the defendant to trial after the grant of a postponement, for good cause,
resulting in a trial date beyond the 180 day limit, we granted the State’s petition.
To explain why it is that we side with the State, it is necessary that we revisit Hicks
and Frazier,  focusing particularly on their rationales, as well as those cases decided
subsequent to Frazier, in  which the boundaries of the extent of delay component of the good
cause requirement were explored.
II.
a.
In Hicks, this Court gave effect to the Legislative intent, embodied in § 591 and
recognized by this Court when it promulgated Maryland Rule 746, the predecessor of Rule
4-271,  that cases in the circuit court be disposed of promptly, by holding “that Rule 746 is
mandatory and that dismissal of the criminal charges is the appropriate sanction where the
State fails to bring the case to trial within the 120-day period [then applicable] prescribed by
the rule and where "extraordinary cause" [the then applicable standard] justifying a trial
postponement has not been established.”  285 Md. at 318, 403 A.2d at 360.   To reach that
3
scheduling criminal cases for trial and in postponing scheduled trials for inadequate reasons.”
Hicks v. State, 285 Md. 310, 316, 403 A.2d 356, 359 (1979).    To highlight the problem
underlying enactment of § 591, we quoted from Guarnera v.  State, 20 Md. App. 562, 573-74
318 A.2d 243, 248-49 (1974): 
"Postponement of cases from dates scheduled for trial is one of the major
factors contributing to delay in the administration of justice, civil as well as
criminal. Courts and court supporting services spend substantial time 'spinning
their wheels', in rescheduling cases. Available court time is lost. The time of
attorneys and witnesses is lost. Witnesses themselves are lost. Those who are
not are put to severe inconvenience as well as actual loss, and end up in
despair at the frustrations of being involved in the trial of a case in the courts.
The very image of the judicial system is in serious jeopardy. Public confidence
in the courts as instruments of the people is impaired. Judges and lawyers
cannot blame the 'system', for they are the people who run that system. 
 "When the Legislature has expressed the will of the people [in § 591] by
saying that the date established for the trial of a criminal case shall not be
postponed except for extraordinary cause, and has denied all judges but the
administrative head of the court authority to exercise even that curtailed
power, the message should be loud and clear to the bench, the bar, parties,
witnesses, and to the public, that trials must not and will not be postponed for
ordinary reasons. 
"And all to whom this message has been sent must understand that it makes
not the slightest difference whether a continuance requested is the fifth, the
third, or the very first -- the reasons for it must satisfy the administrative judge
that they meet the test of extraordinary cause. All persons concerned with the
trial of a criminal case in the courts of Maryland must be held to know that,
barring good cause of an extraordinary nature, the case will go to trial on the
date scheduled. And all persons concerned must be entitled to rely upon that
knowledge."  Id. at 316-17, 403 A.2d at 360.
6
result, we analyzed the statute and the rule, concluding  that every postponement of a circuit
court criminal trial date was required to be granted by the administrative judge or his
designee and only upon a showing of the requisite cause.  See id. at 315-18, 403 A.2d at 359-
60.    We were clear, however, as to the purpose of § 591 and Rule 746, which we stated was
7
to set a time limit for the trial of a criminal case. See id. at 318, 403 A.2d at 360.  
Accordingly, we stated that the dismissal sanction was applicable only when the case was
not tried within that time limit and not postponed in accordance with § 591 and Rule 746;
it was inapplicable to violations of § 591 and Rule 746 which did not prevent the case from
being tried within the prescribed time period. See id. at 318, 320,  403 A.2d at 360, 362.  The
Hicks Court also made clear that § 591 and Rule 746 were not intended to be codifications
of the constitutional speedy trial right but stand "on a different legal footing." 285 Md. at
320, 403 A.2d 361-62.   
On motion for reconsideration, this Court confirmed and amplified its initial decision
in Hicks and, in addition, held that it would be given prospective effect.   It also identified
two circumstances in which the dismissal sanction would not apply for a violation of the
rule:
“First, in addition to the requirement that, absent extraordinary cause, criminal
cases at the circuit court level be tried within 120 days of the appointment or
waiver of counsel or after the appearance of counsel under Rule 723, Rule 746
also requires that the act of setting this trial date be done within 30 days. Of
course, as long as the case is tried within the 120-day deadline, the purpose of
the rule and the statute upon which it is based, namely having the case tried
promptly, will be accomplished, even if the setting of that trial date is not done
within 30 days. In other words, the legislative purpose underlying § 591 and
Rule 746 will in no way be advanced by holding that dismissal is the
appropriate sanction for violation of the 30-day requirement. For this reason,
we do distinguish between the 120-day requirement and the 30-day
requirement. While the 30-day requirement is mandatory for those persons
involved in setting the trial date, we hold that dismissal of the criminal case is
not an appropriate sanction for violation of the 30-day provision. 
“A second circumstance where it is inappropriate to dismiss the criminal
charges is where the defendant, either individually or by his attorney, seeks or
8
expressly consents to a trial date in violation of Rule 746. It would, in our
judgment, be entirely inappropriate for the defendant to gain advantage from
a violation of the rule when he was a party to that violation. In this respect, the
situation is analogous to the well-established principle that a criminal
defendant who seeks or expressly consents to a mistrial, even though the
required "manifest necessity" standard for the mistrial may have been absent,
cannot take advantage of his own act and prevent a retrial on double jeopardy
grounds. See, e.g., United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 96 S. Ct. 1075, 47
L.Ed.2d 267 (1976); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 484-485, 91 S. Ct.
547, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971); Jourdan v. State, 275 Md. 495, 508, {*336} 341
A.2d 388 (1975); Cornish v. State, 272 Md. 312, 318-319, 322 A.2d 880
(1974).”
Id. at 335-6, 403 A.2d at 369.      
b.
In State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 470 A.2d 1269 (1984), interpreting Hicks, this Court
concluded: “when there are several orders by the administrative judge postponing a criminal
trial, and one of those orders has the effect of postponing the trial beyond the 180-day
deadline, it is the latter order with which a judge hearing a motion to dismiss is concerned.
The critical order by the administrative judge, for purposes of the dismissal sanction, is the
order having the effect of extending the trial date beyond 180 days.”  298 Md. at 428, 470
A.2d at 1272.   See Dorsey v. State, 349 Md. 688, 701, 709 A.2d 1244, 1250 (1998); State
v. Parker, 347 Md. 533, 540-41, 702 A.2d 217, 220-21 (1995); Rosenbach v. State, 314 Md.
473,  478, 551 A.2d at 462   (1999).
This Court pointed out in Frazier, that “the requirement in § 591 and Rule 746 that
there be "good cause" for a postponement of the trial date to a new date beyond the 180 day
deadline has two components: 1. there must be good cause for  not commencing the trial on
9
the assigned trial date; 2. there must be good cause for the extent of the delay.” Frazier,
supra, at 448, 470 A.2d at 1282-83.   The determination of good cause, we made clear, was
entrusted to the sound discretion of the County Administrative judge, see id. at 450, 470
A.2d at 1283 (quoting Guarnera v. State, 20 Md. App. 562, 573, 318 A.2d 243, cert. denied,
272 Md. 742 (1974), quoted with approval in Hicks, 285 Md. at 317, 403 A.2d at 360), the
exercise of which being subject to review only for abuse. See id. at 450, 470 A.2d at 1284
(citing Hughes v. State, 288 Md. 216, 229, 421 A.2d 69 (1980)).   The burden of
demonstrating a clear abuse of discretion is on the party challenging the discretionary ruling
on the postponement motion.  See Hughes v. State, supra, 288 Md. at 229, 421 A.2d 69;
Jackson v. State, 214 Md. 454,  459, 135 A.2d 638, 640 (1957).    Accordingly, we held that,
“with regard to both components of the "good cause" requirement in § 591 and Rule 746, the
trial judge (as well as an appellate court) shall not find an absence of good cause unless the
defendant meets the burden of demonstrating either a clear abuse of discretion or a lack of
good cause as a matter of law.”  Frazier, 298 Md. at 454, 470 A.2d at 1286.  When the extent
of the delay component of the good cause determination is at issue, the question for the
reviewing court is “[whether] the period of time until a new trial date, represented a clear
abuse of discretion.” Id. at 462, 470 A.2d at 1290.
Only the extent of the delay component of the good cause requirement is implicated
in this case; however, we are required to clarify whether the applicable period is from the
date of the critical postponement to the date of the reset trial date or from the date of the
critical postponement to the actual commencement of trial.   The State  argues that it is the
10
former, noting the emphasis in the cases is on the postponement that results in a change of
trial date beyond the 180 day limit, and on the purpose of the applicable rule and statute. 
The respondent, on the other hand, maintains that it is the latter, finding support for that
position in Rosenbach.  
 c.
Shortly after Frazier was decided, we issued our opinion in Farinholt v. State, 299
Md. 32, 472 A.2d 452 (1984).    There, the defendant was arraigned in the circuit court on
May 6, 1981, therefore, the 180 day period for trying his case expired on November 2, 1981.
See id. at 34, 472 A.2d at 453.  His first trial date, set for August 10, 1981, was postponed
to  September 23, 1981. See id.  When the case was called for trial on that date, the
defendant’s  attorney, in the defendant’s presence, addressed the court as follows: 
“We formally ask the Court to continue this case, and for reasons we would
indicate to the Court that it came to my attention very late yesterday that there
was another witness who was unavailable, who I would believe to be
absolutely essential in preparation of his defense. I would anticipate the
witness probably will be available some time next week. For that reason I
think that it is incumbent on me on Mr. Farinholt's behalf to ask for a
continuance. We would be waiving our right to trial within 180 days under the
Hicks decision, also waive our right to speedy trial in the interim period, as
long as it takes to set the case back in. I am going down to assignment and set
the case in as quickly as possible; however, I doubt very seriously the case will
be able to be set within the 180 days."  
Id. at 35-36; 472 A.2d at 453.   Subsequent questioning by the court demonstrated that the
absent witness was the defendant’s co-defendant, who had been tried separately, was
awaiting sentence and refused to testify until he had been sentenced, and that the defendant
agreed with counsel’s representation. See id. at 35, 472 A.2d at 453.    On October 27, the
11
next trial date, the defendant again requested a postponement, noting the continued
unavailability of his co-defendant as a witness. See id. at 36-7, 472 A.2d at 454.   He also
acknowledged ‘"that previously we waived Hicks and speedy trial,  [and] indicated that the
new trial date would probably be in February 1982,” id., a date beyond the 180 day limit.
The court granted the postponement and scheduled the trial for November 18, 1981.   Trial
did not proceed on that date, however, because the State sought and received a
postponement.  See id. at 37, 472  A.2d at 454.  The case was finally called for trial on
January 8, 1982, at which time the defendant moved to dismiss for violation of  § 591 and
Rule 4-271, which the trial court granted. See id. at 38, 472 A.2d at 454-55.
Aggrieved by the decision of the Court of Special Appeals, which reversed the
judgment of the circuit court, the defendant filed a petition for certiorari, which we granted.
He argued, in this Court, “that § 591 and Rule 746, including the dismissal sanction for
violation, are fully applicable to subsequent postponements even though an earlier order
postponing the trial beyond the 180-day deadline was in compliance with the statute and
rule.” Id. at 39, 472 A.2d at 455.  This Court found it unnecessary to review the merits of the
defendant’s challenge in view of the fact that the defendant had sought and expressly
consented to a trial date in violation of § 591 and Rule 746, see id. at 40-41, 472 A.2d at
455-56, explaining: 
"We need not decide whether the postponement on October 27, 1981,
complied with § 591 and Rule [4-271]. If it be assumed arguendo that the
October 27th postponement violated the statute and rule, either on the theory
that the postponement was not effected by the administrative judge or his
designee, or on the theory that good cause was lacking, the defendant could
12
gain no advantage from such violation." 
Id.  Nevertheless, we did address the issue that is presented in the case sub judice, as to
which we noted that “we agree with the State and the Court of Special Appeals that, after a
case has already been postponed beyond the 180-day period, either in accordance with § 591
and Rule 746, or upon the defendant's motion, or with the defendant's express consent, the
dismissal sanction has no relevance to subsequent postponements of the trial date unless the
defendant's constitutional speedy trial right has been denied.”  Id. at 40, 403 A.2d at 456. 
We concluded by reiterating what we said in Frazier, 298 Md. at 428, 470 A.2d at 1269, with
respect to the applicability of the dismissal sanction: 
"The dismissal sanction for violating § 591 and Rule 746 should only be
applied when it is needed, as a prophylactic measure,  to further the purpose
of trying a circuit court criminal case within 180 days. Once a postponement
beyond the 180-day deadline is ordered in accordance with § 591 and Rule
746 (or upon the defendant's motion or with his express consent), it would not
further this purpose to utilize the dismissal sanction for subsequent violations
of the statute and rule. The sanctions for such subsequent violations must be
ones of internal judicial administration, relating to circuit court personnel
and/or procedures." 
299 Md. at 41, 472 A.2d at 456 (citing Hicks, 285 Md. at 335, 403 A.2d at 368).
d.
Also relevant and consistent with the Hicks-Frazier-Farinholt approach are State
v.Bonev, 299 Md. 79, 472 A.2d 476 (1984) and State v. Brookins, 299 Md. 59, 472 A.2d 465
(1984).  In Brookins, the 180 day period expired on February 10, 1982, the defendants,
charged with armed robbery and other offenses,  having been arraigned in the circuit court,
13
and counsel’s appearance having been entered, on August 14, 1981. See Brookins, 299 Md.
at 60, 472 A.2d at 466.  On November 12, 1981, the first trial date, the parties were prepared
to proceed,  but no court was available. See id.   Consequently, the designated administrative
judge   rescheduled the case for February 24, 1982, fourteen days beyond the 180 day period.
See id. at 61, 472 A.2d at 466.  The case was postponed again on February 24  because there
was no courtroom available; however, it was placed on the “move list” and later called for
trial on March 8, 1982. See id.  The defendant’s  motion to dismiss for  violation of the Hicks
rule was granted by the trial judge, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed, holding that
there was good cause for the initial postponement, but not  the February postponement. See
id.  Reversing, we reiterated our holding in Frazier, that the “critical order by the
administrative judge, for purposes of the dismissal sanction, is the order having the effect of
extending the trial date beyond 180 days.” Id. (quoting Frazier, 298 Md. at 428, 470 A.2d
at 1272).    Noting that the critical date which resulted in a trial date beyond the 180 day
deadline was November 12, the date of the initial postponement, we concluded, as we had
in Farinholt, that “"after a case has already been postponed beyond the 180-day period, either
in accordance with  § 591 and Rule 746, or upon the defendant's motion, or with the
defendant's express consent, the dismissal sanction has no relevance to subsequent
postponements of the trial date unless the defendant's constitutional speedy trial right has
been denied.” Id. at 62, 472 A.2d at 467 (quoting Farinholt, 299 Md. at 40, 472 A.2d at 456).
At issue in  Bonev was the length of the delay between the initial trial date, November
16, 1981 and the actual trial date, March 1, 1982, which was beyond the 180 day limit. See
14
Bonev, 299 Md. 79, 81, 472 A.2d 476.  The designated administrative judge had found good
cause for the postponement "due to an excess buildup of cases awaiting trial with no
courtroom available [and] [t]here are currently 14 cases already pending on the list to be
moved to the first available court." Id.  Notwithstanding that there was a subsequent
postponement due to defense counsel’s  unavailability, we focused only on the postponement
resulting in a trial date beyond the 180 day limit and relied on the principles set forth earlier
in Frazier, supra, to hold that the critical postponement did not constitute a clear abuse of
discretion, warranting dismissal. See id. at 79, 472 A.2d at 476.   
III.
a.
Mindful of the cases mentioned heretofore, the respondent argues that this Court’s
decision in Rosenbach, changed the test for determining when a violation of Rule 4-271
occurs.  We find the respondent’s contention to be without merit.   Indeed, we view  the
holding in Rosenbach as entirely consistent with the Hicks-Frazier-Farinholt line of cases.
In Rosenbach, the only issue addressed was: “When a judge postpones, within the
prescribed 180 days, but delegates the assignment of a new trial date to Central Assignment
[Office] (CAO) which assigns a trial date beyond the 180 day limit, does the original
postponement qualify as a good cause postponement under Rule 4-271(a) and Md.Ann.Code
art. 27, § 591?” 314 Md. 473, 476, 551 A.2d 460, 461.  The defendant argued  that “the
requisite procedures were not followed [in granting the postponement] because neither Judge
Arabian nor any other judge took an active part in seeing that the case was rescheduled....
15
that the postponement ordered by Judge Arabian did not carry the case beyond 180 days;
rather, the CAO's failure to reset the case promptly caused that problem,” id. at 477-78, 551
A.2d at 462, and that “the purpose of the statute and the rule is to require ‘dismissal of cases
not tried within the 180 days that have not been postponed properly."’ Id. at 478, 551 A.2d
at 462.  We found those arguments to be meritless. See id.  In so doing, we acknowledged,
‘"[t]he critical order by the administrative judge, for purposes of the dismissal sanction, is
the order having the effect of extending the trial date beyond 180 days."’ Id. (quoting Frazier,
298 Md. at 428, 470 A.2d at 1272).  We further acknowledged  “that the postponing judge
need not make a specific finding that the postponement will of necessity carry the case
beyond the 180 days,” id. (citing Goins v. State, 293 Md. 97, 442 A.2d 550 (1982)), or
“personally reset or cause the case to be reset for a particular date.” Id. at 479, 551 A.2d at
463.
The Rosenbach Court then observed: 
“Once that occurs, the question is no longer whether there was a postponement
for good cause. The issue then becomes the length of the delay. A case
postponed for good cause may yet run afoul of the statute and rule if, after a
valid postponement, there is inordinate delay in bringing the case to trial. See,
e.g., State v. Bonev, 299 Md. 79, 80-81, 472 A.2d 476, 476-477 (1984);
Carey, 299 Md. at 22-23, 472 A.2d at 447; Frazier, 298 Md. at 448, 470 A.2d
at 1282-1283. The purpose of the rule is to promote the expeditious disposition
of criminal cases, Frazier, 298 Md. at 456-457, 470 A.2d at 1287, and this
purpose is not served if, after a good cause postponement, nothing further is
done to achieve that goal. Thus, the dismissal sanction may once again be
invoked if, after a good cause postponement, trial is not begun with reasonable
promptness. See generally Frazier, supra. But the burden of showing that the
post-postponement delay is inordinate, in view of all the circumstances, is on
the defendant. State v. Brookins, 299 Md. 59, 62, 472 A.2d 465, 467 (1984);
Frazier, 298 Md. at 454, 470 A.2d at 1286. Rosenbach has not met that burden
16
here; indeed, he has not attempted to do so.”
Id. at 479, 551 A.2d at 463. (Emphasis added).   Later, we added:
“The policy of the rule, of course, demands that both the court and prosecution
take appropriate steps to assure that there is no inordinate delay. See State v.
Robertson, 72 Md.App. 342, 350, 529 A.2d 847, 851 (1987); see also Md.
Rule 1200 d2(ii).  It is for this reason that a case must be dismissed if
inordinate delay is found.  But this does not mean that a postponing judge
must take an active part in the rescheduling of cases.  It does mean that the
official who undertakes to reset the case (administrative judge, designee, or
CAO) must make certain that the commencement of the trial is not
inordinately delayed.”
Id. at 480, 551 A.2d at 463. (Emphasis added).    It is interesting to note that, despite the
references to the commencement of trial, the Court in Rosenbach focused on the
postponement that resulted in a trial date beyond the 180 day limit, as the critical
postponement, and relied upon Frazier, which, for the first time, and forcibly, defined the
critical postponement. See id. at 478-80, 551 A.2d at 462-63.  It also focused on Bonev, in
its discussion of inordinate delay, in which there was a  postponement subsequent to the
critical one. See id. at 479, 551 A.2d at 463.  Thus, Rosenbach is consistent with the Hicks-
Frazier- Farinholt line of cases.  
In any event, the discussion of inordinate delay is dicta.   As such, it does not establish
a new test for compliance with § 591 and Rule 4-271, or, as that would require, overrule
Frazier and Farinholt.
b.
The cases decided since Rosenbach, State v. Parker, 347 Md. 533, 702 A.2d 217
(1995); Dorsey v. State, 349 Md. 688, 709 A.2d 1244 (1998); and State v. Fisher, 353 Md.
17
297, 726 A.2d 231(1999),  do not remotely suggest, nor do they recognize, that Rosenbach
changed the good cause test for postponement in any way or that any change in this Court’s
Rule 4-271 and § 591 jurisprudence was intended.   Indeed, each reiterated, or recognized,
what has been firmly established since Hicks, that the dismissal sanction applies only when
to do so furthers the purpose of the prompt disposition of criminal cases in the circuit court.
See Parker, 347 Md. at 540-41, 702 A.2d at 220; Dorsey, 349 Md. at 706, 709 A.2d at 1252-
53; Fisher, 353 Md. at 305, 726 A.2d at 235.  
In  Parker, the defendant was arraigned in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County
on December 14, 1992; thus the 180 day period, mandated by Rule 4-271, would expire on
June 12, 1993. See Parker, 347 Md. at 535-36, 702 A.2d at 218.   His case was scheduled
for trial  on March 30, 1993. See id. at 535, 702 A.2d at 218.   That trial date was postponed
by the administrative judge, however, because the defendant did not appear and a bench
warrant for his arrest was issued.  See id.  The defendant was arrested on the warrant on May
12, 1993 and, thereafter, the State’s Attorney rescheduled his trial for July 21, 1993. See id.
 On that date, the State’s request for a one week continuance having previously been granted,
the court heard argument on the defendant’s motion to dismiss for violation of Rule 4-271.
See id.   Concluding that “Md.Rule 4-271 had been violated because the State, after Parker's
arrest in mid-May, had not scheduled a trial date prior to the  Hicks date or sought a good
cause finding for scheduling a trial date thereafter,” the circuit court dismissed the case.  Id.
at  536,  702 A.2d at 218.   It did not address the length of delay from the date of the
postponement to the rescheduled trial date, however. See id.   We reversed the judgment of
The Court reasoned:
4
“The error made by both the Court of Special Appeals and the circuit
administrative judge was reading Rule 4-271 as requiring a specific good cause
finding prior to scheduling of the case beyond the 180-day limit.  The
scheduling of the case by the Office of the State's Attorney was not the action
that required good cause--the March 30 postponement was.”
State v. Parker, 347 Md. 533, 540, 702 A.2d 217, 220 (1995).   
18
the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. See id.  
Having identified the critical postponement as March 30, the date the defendant failed
to appear for trial, because it was that postponement that carried the trial date beyond 180
days,  the Court explained:
4
“Because good cause existed for the March 30 postponement by the circuit
administrative judge in the instant case, the only remaining question in
applying the principles set forth above is that of inordinate delay.  Judge
Thieme refused to make a finding on this issue at the hearing on Parker's
motion to dismiss, and the intermediate appellate court also did not address the
issue.  The indefinite postponement was granted on March 30, but Parker was
not arrested until mid-May.  Thereafter, counsel were engaged in efforts to
resolve the case without a trial.  Little more than two months passed between
Parker's second arrest and the new trial date.  As a matter of law, we hold that
the delay in this case between the time the defendant was arrested after his
failure to appear for the initial trial date and the time of his ultimate trial date
was not inordinate.”   
Id. at 541, 702 A.2d at 220-21.   What is significant is that the Court’s focus in Parker was
on the postponement that resulted in a trial date beyond the 180 day limit and on the first trial
date following that postponement.  In Parker, as in Rosenbach, that trial date and the
“ultimate date of trial” just happened to be the same. 
The focus in State v. Fisher was identical to that in the aforementioned cases, but the
19
major issue addressed, in Fisher, was whether the administrative judge was required to
“expressly find and articulate good cause” when granting a postponement that results in a
trial date beyond the 180 day limit. See Fisher, 353 Md. 297, 726 A.2d 231.  As to the length
of delay, the Court’s primary concern was the period between the date of the postponement
and the rescheduled trial date, as to which we observed that the defendant had “presented no
reasons as to why the scheduling of the new trial date amounted to a clear abuse of
discretion.” Id. at 311, 726 A.2d at 238.
The Court of Special Appeals acknowledges that the State’s argument - that the
applicable period of delay for purposes of the length of delay component of the good cause
determination is that between the critical postponement and the next scheduled trial date -
is a reasonable interpretation of the case law; indeed, it concedes that Farinholt is supportive
of that argument and that “[t]o date, the cases that have addressed the concept of inordinate
delay have dealt with the length of delay between the critical postponement and the next
scheduled trial date rather than a series of post- Hicks postponements such as are at issue in
this case.” Brown, 124 Md.App. at 254, 721 A.2d at 273 .   Noting that the respondent was
not tried until more than ten months after the date of the critical postponement, during which
period, the case was called for trial and postponed seven times due to the unavailability of
a judge, the intermediate appellate court concluded it was not foreclosed from considering,
in this case, the length of the delay between the critical postponement and the ultimate trial
date, reasoning:
“While it is true that, after the December 12, 1996 postponement, appellant
20
was given a trial date of February 18, 1997, that trial date apparently had no
meaning whatsoever. The series of postponements in this case, for
unavailability of a judge, was tantamount to not scheduling appellant's case at
all until it finally was tried in October, 1997.”
Id. at 256, 721 A.2d at 274.
We reject the Court of Special Appeals’ approach.   It runs afoul of our cases, as we
have seen, as well as the rationale underlying the dismissal sanction, see Hicks, 285 Md. at
316-17, 403 A.2d at 359-60; Frazier, 298 Md. at 426-28, 470 A.2d at 1270-72; the dismissal
sanction is intended to further the goal of the prompt disposal of criminal cases at the circuit
court, applying it to postponements other than the critical one does not further that goal, and,
thus, is inappropriate. See Farinholt, 299 Md. at 41, 472 A.2d at 456.  Very recently, this
Court reiterated what we said quite forcibly in Frazier and Goins and have followed ever
since, that the burden is on the defendant to establish either a clear abuse of discretion or a
lack of good cause for postponement as a matter of law. See Fisher, 353 Md. at 306, 726
A.2d at 235 (quoting Frazier, 298 Md. at 454, 470 A.2d at 1286).  If we were to follow the
decision by the Court of Special Appeals in the case sub judice, we would have to overrule
our cases, since the effect of its ruling is to shift the burden of proof from the defendant to
the court.
IV.
In summation, we reaffirm our holdings in the Frazier line of cases, that the critical
postponement for purposes of Rule 4-271 is the one that carries the case beyond the 180 day
deadline.  It is that postponement to which a reviewing court looks, and, when deciding
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[i]n all
5
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy … trial.  Similarly, 
Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides: [t]hat in all criminal prosecutions,
every man hath a right …to a speedy trial.” See also Epps v. State, 276 Md. 96, 345 A.2d 62
(1975) (discussing the accused’s right to a speedy trial pursuant to federal and state
constitutional law principles); see Jones v. State, 241 Md. 599, 217 A.2d 367 (1966).
21
whether to dismiss a case for inordinate delay, it is the length of the delay between the
postponed trial date and the rescheduled date that is significant.  We repeat and emphasize
that “[w]hile the rule was adopted to facilitate the prompt disposition of criminal cases, it
stands on a different legal footing than the Sixth Amendment’s constitutional right to a
speedy trial,”  Hicks,  supra, 285 Md. at 320, 403 A.2d at 361-62, and our decision in no
5
manner impairs any remedy the respondent may have pursuant to that right.  The Court of
Special Appeals tended to merge the respondent’s remedies pursuant to the constitutional
amendment and the rule, and in doing so, it erred.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED.  CASE REMANDED TO
THAT 
COURT 
TO 
CONSIDER 
THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED BY
THE  RESPONDENT.  COSTS IN THIS COURT
TO BE PAID BY THE RESPONDENT. COSTS IN
THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO ABIDE
THE RESULT.