Title: In re Vaughn video

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 114,582 
 
In the Matter of CHARLES P. VAUGHN, 
Respondent. 
 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE 
 
Original proceeding in discipline. Opinion filed March 4, 2016. Suspension. 
 
Michael R. Serra, Deputy Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause, and Stanton A. Hazlett, 
Disciplinary Administrator, was with him on the brief for the petitioner. 
 
Caleb Boone, of Hays, argued the cause and was on the brief for respondent, and Charles P. 
Vaughn, respondent, argued the cause pro se. 
 
Per Curiam:  This is an original proceeding in discipline filed by the office of the 
Disciplinary Administrator against the respondent, Charles P. Vaughn, of Inverness, 
Florida, an attorney admitted to the practice of law in Kansas in 1981. 
 
 
On June 15, 2015, the office of the Disciplinary Administrator filed a formal 
complaint against the respondent alleging violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional 
Conduct (KRPC). The respondent filed an answer on July 6, 2015. A hearing was held on 
the complaint before a panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys on August 
20, 2015, where the respondent was present by telephone and was represented by 
counsel. The hearing panel determined that respondent violated KRPC 1.2(a) (2015 Kan. 
Ct. R. Annot. 456) (scope of representation); 1.3 (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 461) 
(diligence); 1.4(a) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 482) (communication); 1.15(d) (2015 Kan. 
Ct. R. Annot. 556) (preserving client funds); 8.4(c) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 672) 
2 
 
 
 
(engaging in conduct involving misrepresentation); and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice). 
 
Upon conclusion of the hearing, the panel made the following findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, together with its recommendation to this court: 
 
"Findings of Fact 
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
"8. 
The respondent has also been admitted to the practice of law in other 
jurisdictions. In January 1987, the Florida Supreme Court admitted the respondent to the 
practice of law. In February 1988, the Colorado Supreme Court admitted the respondent 
to the practice of law. In July 1994, the Montana Supreme Court admitted the respondent 
to the practice of law. 
 
 
"9. 
On June 25, 2014, a report of referee was entered in the Supreme Court 
of Florida, in Florida Bar vs. Charles Paul Vaughn, in case number SC13-2150. The 
report provided as follows: 
 
"REPORT OF REFEREE 
 
. . . . 
 
 
 
"II. 
FINDING OF FACT 
 
. . . .  
 
"Narrative Summary of Case. In or around August 2010, 
respondent was hired to represent [E.D.] in a dissolution of marriage 
proceeding. [E.D.]'s fees were paid by his friend, [C.C.], by credit card in 
two separate payments, one in the amount of $2,500.00 for attorney fees, 
3 
 
 
 
and the other in the amount of $500.00 for costs. These funds were 
placed in an account Respondent referred to as his cost account. During 
the pendency of the matter, in or around December 2010, Respondent 
disbursed $75.00 of the cost funds for the services of a court reporter. 
There was no testimony presented that respondent removed his fees, 
which were non-refundable, from the cost account within a reasonable 
time period and there was no testimony presented that any other costs 
were incurred. 
 
"The trial in the [E.D.] matter was scheduled for April 11, 2011. 
One of the matters of utmost importance to [E.D.] was that a court 
reporter be present for the trial. However, neither respondent nor his staff 
scheduled a court reporter and a court reporter was not present. The 
parties eventually reached a settlement agreement, the terms of which 
were presented to the trial judge. 
 
"Opposing counsel prepared the proposed final judgment and 
forwarded it to respondent for review. Respondent requested that 
opposing counsel add a paragraph addressing the minor child's school 
attendance and issues related to tardiness. Other than that change, the 
evidence established that respondent sought no other changes to the 
proposed order and opposing counsel forwarded it to the trial court. 
Thereafter, respondent's office forwarded the proposed final judgment to 
[E.D.] for his review. Upon receipt of the proposed final judgment, 
[E.D.] immediately notified respondent by email and then spoke with his 
staff the next day, informing respondent and his staff that the proposed 
final judgment contained errors and that respondent should not allow the 
judge to sign the order as drafted. There was no evidence presented that 
respondent attempted to address the matter at that time with opposing 
counsel or the court. The trial court issued the final judgment, which was 
not consistent with the agreement between the parties, on May 9, 2011. 
 
4 
 
 
 
"Once [E.D.] received the signed final judgment, he notified 
respondent the order had not been corrected and that he wanted it to 
correctly reflect the parties' agreement. In an email, [E.D.] again pointed 
out his issues of concern and the fact that he had specifically requested 
that respondent stop the judge from signing the proposed final judgment 
because it did not reflect the agreement of the parties. While the evidence 
indicated there was some contact between opposing counsel and 
respondent's staff regarding the incorrect order, there was no testimony 
or evidence presented indicating respondent attempted to address the 
matter. 
 
"An amended final judgment was submitted for the trial court's 
review. However, the correction made was of no significance to [E.D.]. 
The correction failed to address the child visitation and/or child support 
issues that [E.D.] had raised with respondent. Rather, the only correction 
made was more of a typographical correction, as testified to by opposing 
counsel, as it simply omitted a paragraph that had been placed in the 
proposed final judgment in error. The omitted paragraph indicated the 
parties had entered into a written settlement agreement when in fact the 
parties had reached an oral settlement agreement. The amended final 
judgment, which was entered on June 8, 2011, reflected the removal of 
that paragraph. 
 
"As before, upon receipt of the incorrect amended final 
judgment, [E.D.] immediately notified respondent via email, in a rather 
direct fashion, that none of his issues of concern had been addressed. He 
demanded that respondent 'fix it.' In addition to the concerns related to 
child visitation and child support, [E.D.] also notified respondent that the 
billing invoice he had received contained double billings and other 
billing items that he questioned. In his correspondence to respondent, 
[E.D.] made it clear that once the order was corrected to reflect the 
agreement between the parties, then the issues regarding the billing 
would be discussed. However, the evidence presented failed to show that 
5 
 
 
 
respondent and/or his staff addressed the billing concerns raised by 
[E.D.]. 
 
"At or around the end of August 2011, respondent forwarded a 
corrected amended final judgment to [E.D.] for his review. In separate 
correspondence respondent also notified [E.D.] that he had a duty to pay 
respondent's outstanding attorney's fees and that if [E.D.] failed to do so, 
respondent would pursue all collection avenues available to him. The 
amount respondent notified [E.D.] he owed included the items for which 
[E.D.] had been double billed. Shortly thereafter, [E.D.] notified the 
respondent the corrected amended final judgment reflected the agreement 
between the parties. He also specifically outlined the issues he had with 
respondent's billing invoice and indicated that he believed he owed 
respondent substantially less than respondent was invoicing. In addition, 
he forwarded a $50.00 check, explaining that was the amount he would 
be able to pay respondent each month until respondent was paid in full. 
Respondent cashed the check. However, he failed to file the corrected 
amended final judgment and he failed to notify [E.D.] he would not agree 
to being paid only $50.00 a month. 
 
"The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrated respondent 
failed to correct or address the billing issues. Likewise, the evidence 
clearly and convincingly demonstrated while respondent cashed [E.D.]'s 
$50.00 check, respondent had no desire to enter into a payment plan with 
[E.D.], especially in an amount of only $50.00 per month and that 
respondent failed to address this issue with [E.D.]. Further the evidence 
clearly demonstrated respondent made a conscious decision at that time 
that he would not file the corrected amended final judgment until and 
unless he received the remainder of his representation fee. 
 
"The evidence also established that [E.D.] failed to make any 
further payments to respondent. [E.D.] testified that he did not pay 
anything further because respondent failed to complete the representation 
6 
 
 
 
by filing the corrected amended judgment with the court. [E.D.] was 
clear that he believed respondent had a duty to complete the matter and 
that he was not going to pay until respondent performed the services for 
which he had been hired. The evidence further established that 
respondent did not take any steps to follow up on the matter nor did he 
move to withdraw. 
 
"Thereafter, in or around January 2012, respondent forwarded 
[E.D.]'s file to a collection agency. Based upon the invoices entered into 
evidence and the testimony presented, respondent had not addressed the 
double billing issues prior to sending the matter to collections. 
Consequently, the collection agency was attempting to recover all funds 
on respondent's behalf, including funds that had been improperly double-
billed. 
 
"[E.D.] then sought recourse through the Better Business Bureau 
by filing a complaint in or around March 2012. He complained about 
respondent's conduct as [well] as the billing issues. It was only after 
[E.D.] had to resort to contacting the Better Business Bureau that 
respondent finally addressed the double billing issue. However, in 
responding to same, he implied that while he had corrected the billing 
issues, [E.D.] still refused to pay the fees owed. Upon review of the 
evidence, it is clear that the same day respondent responded to the Better 
Business Bureau is the same day he corrected his billing invoices. As 
such, the implication being made by respondent in his response to the 
Better Business Bureau was less than forthright. In addition to the 
foregoing, respondent also invoiced [E.D.] for the time spent addressing 
the Better Business Bureau complaint and did not remove the charge 
from the billing invoices until after The Florida Bar became involved. 
The evidence presented in this regard demonstrated that respondent 
either failed to review the billing invoices in timely manner and address 
the error, or he simply refused to do so because he was not being paid. 
 
7 
 
 
 
"However, respondent engaged in other, more serious 
misconduct than that discussed above. The evidence showed clearly and 
convincingly that respondent applied the remaining $425.00 of cost 
funds he received to pay a portion of his attorney's fees and that he did 
not receive his client's permission to do so. Respondent and his assistant 
testified that the cost funds were always in the cost account. The other 
evidence presented, which consisted of the billing invoices and a ledger 
card, which was prepared manually and at a much later date does not 
support respondent's nor his assistant's position in that regard. The ledger 
card does not comport with respondent's billing invoices and contains 
errors. When questioned about why the cost funds were not segregated 
on the invoices and why invoices always showed that the entire retainer 
paid was applied, neither respondent nor his assistant provided a credible 
answer. For example, on the April 11, 2011, invoice prepared by 
respondent's office, the total amount of attorney's fees incurred was 
$5,398.50. The total disbursement (for the court reporter) was $75.00. 
Thus, the invoice indicates the total fee and disbursements equaled 
$5,473.50, less the retainers applied of $3,000.00 for a balance due of 
$2,473.50. Lastly, the invoice lists the payment detail noting attorney 
fees of 2500/costs 500 for total payments of $3000.00. . . . 
 
 
"Respondent and his assistant testified that the program simply 
worked that way and there was nothing that could be done. They testified 
that there was no way to ensure that the invoices the clients received 
accurately reflected how the payments were actually made. In essence, 
what respondent and his assistant testified to was that despite what the 
invoices stated, respondent did not use the remaining $425.00 towards 
his attorney's fees. This referee finds this testimony by respondent and 
his assistant lacking in credibility. Moreover, if respondent is to be 
believed, he did nothing to ensure that there was some type of 
notification to his clients the cost funds being held by respondent were 
not being used towards his attorney's fees. The invoices respondent 
provided to his clients clearly stated otherwise and the position espoused 
8 
 
 
 
by respondent, that there was simply nothing that could be done to 
accurately reflect how the funds paid by a client is disbursed, is 
untenable. 
 
"The evidence and testimony presented in this regard clearly and 
convincingly established that respondent used the cost funds for a 
purpose other than that for which the funds had been provided. The 
evidence also clearly and convincingly established that respondent knew 
little about how the system worked. Likewise, the evidence and 
testimony clearly and convincingly demonstrated that respondent left the 
billing issues up to his non-lawyer staff and that he had little to do with 
it. This referee did not find that respondent's lack of knowledge and/or 
interest in how his billing system worked to be a valid excuse for the 
manner in which the cost funds were handled. Respondent's conduct was 
not a mere technical violation of the trust rules and was disturbing to this 
referee. 
 
"Respondent similarly failed to properly and forthrightly address 
the issues related to the hiring of the court reporter. The evidence clearly 
established that a court reporter was not present at the dissolution trial on 
April 11, 2011, despite the fact [E.D.] had been emphatic that a court 
reporter was to be present for all court proceedings. In one piece of 
correspondence to [E.D.], respondent stated that a court reporter was 
present, but that since there was no trial, there was nothing for the court 
reporter to monitor. On the other hand, in response to [E.D.] 
approximately one year later, respondent stated that he had a court 
reporter on standby, but that he did not want to get stuck with the court 
reporter's bills like he had been stuck with his attorney's fees. This later 
response is clearly suspect. 
 
"There was no credible evidence presented during the final 
hearing that, at the time of the trial in the [E.D.] dissolution matter, 
respondent had notified [E.D.] he owed additional attorneys fees, [E.D.] 
9 
 
 
 
had been presented with an invoice showing he owed additional 
attorney's fees, or [E.D.] had refused to pay any additional attorney's 
fees. Rather, the evidence established that respondent had been away on 
vacation and that he failed to obtain a court reporter and that his staff had 
either not been instructed to obtain a court reporter or had failed to do so. 
The evidence presented by respondent that he may have had or may have 
attempted to have a court reporter on standby was not sufficiently clear 
or supported by other testimony and evidence presented. This referee 
found respondent's testimony and insistence that he could have had a 
court reporter present self-serving and lacking in credibility. 
 
"And finally, a grave concern to this referee was respondent's 
failure to submit the corrected amended final judgment to the trial court 
until some two years after the incorrect amended final judgment had 
been issued. Again, respondent did nothing to address this matter until 
after the bar's involvement. Further, the evidence established respondent 
failed to notify [E.D.] when he finally submitted the corrected amended 
final judgment to the trial court. By the time respondent filed the 
corrected amended final judgment and the trial court entered the order on 
July 23, 2013, nunc pro tunc to April 11, 2011, the parties involved have 
been forced to live with an incorrect order for more than two years. This 
referee finds this to be an intolerable breach of ethics. 
 
"Respondent's testimony in regard to his failure to complete 
[E.D.]'s matter was especially troubling to this referee. Respondent fully 
recognized that his client's matter was not resolved due to respondent's 
lack of diligence and that his failure in this regard required his client to 
live with an incorrect order that harmed his client. Respondent made a 
conscious decision to hold his client's matter 'hostage' until he was paid. 
Respondent testified that if his client had just paid him a 'little more' he 
would have completed the matter and written the fees off. However, 
respondent's testimony is not credible and is clearly belied by his actual 
conduct. Respondent did absolutely nothing to fulfill his obligations to 
10 
 
 
 
his client because he allowed his own interests, that being paid, to over-
ride his professional and ethical duty to his client. 
 
"The evidence presented in this matter, by way of testimony and 
exhibits, clearly and convincingly established that respondent failed to 
abide by his client's decisions, that he failed to act diligently for his 
client, that he failed to properly and adequately communicate with his 
client, that he made misrepresentations to his client, that he used cost 
funds improperly, and that he harmed not only his client for his own 
gain, but in doing so, he also harmed the judicial system and our 
profession. 
 
 
"III. 
RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO GUILT 
 
"I recommend that Respondent be found guilty of violating the 
following Rules Regulating The Florida Bar: 
 
"4-1.2(a) Subject to divisions (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by 
a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation, and, as 
required by rule 4-1.4, shall reasonably consult with the client as to the 
means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer may take such action 
on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the 
representation. A lawyer shall abide by the client's decision whether to 
settle a matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's 
decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, 
whether to waive jury trial, and whether the client will testify; 
 
"4-1.3 A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in representing a client; 
 
"4-1.4(a) A lawyer shall promptly inform the client of any 
decision or circumstance with respect to which the client's informed 
consent, as defined in terminology, is required by these rules; (2) 
11 
 
 
 
reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's 
objectives are to be accomplished; (3) keep the client reasonably 
informed about the status of the matter; and (4) promptly comply with 
reasonable requests for information; 
 
 
"4-8.4(c) A lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; 
 
"4-8.4(d) A lawyer shall not engage in conduct in connection 
with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, 
including to knowingly, or through callous indifference, disparage, 
humiliate, or discriminate against litigants, jurors, witnesses, court 
personnel, or other lawyers on any basis, including, but not limited to, on 
account of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, national origin, disability, 
marital status, sexual orientation, age, socioeconomic status, 
employment, or physical characteristic; and 
 
"5-1.1(b) Money or other property entrusted to an attorney for a 
specific purpose, including advances for fees, costs, and expenses, is held 
in trust and must be applied only to that purpose. Money and other 
property of clients coming into the hands of an attorney are not subject to 
counterclaim or setoff for attorney's fees, and a refusal to account for and 
deliver over such property upon demand shall be deemed a conversion. 
 
 
"IV. 
STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 
 
"I considered the following factors prior to recommending 
discipline:  the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or 
actual injury caused by respondent's misconduct, and the existence of 
mitigating and aggravating circumstances. I also considered, pursuant to 
The Florida Bar v. Liberman, 43 So.3d 36, 39 (Fla. 2010) citing to the 
criteria enunciated in The Florida Bar v. Pahules, 233 So.2d 130, 132 
(Fla. 1970) that the sanction recommended and imposed must be (1) fair 
12 
 
 
 
to the disciplined attorney, being sufficient to punish while at the same 
time encouraging rehabilitation; (2) fair to society, both in terms of 
protecting the public from unethical conduct and at the same time not 
denying the public the service of a qualified lawyer as a result of undue 
harshness; and (3) severe enough to deter others who might be tempted 
to engage in like violations. Finally, I considered the fact that the Court 
has moved toward stronger sanctions for attorney misconduct in recent 
years. The Florida Bar v. Herman, 8 So.2d 1100, 1108 (Fla. 2009) citing 
The Florida Bar v. Rotstein, 835 So.2d 241, 246 (Fla. 2003). 
 
"The bar argued the following aggravating factors exist in this 
case:  9.22(b) dishonest or selfish motive; 9.22(d) multiple offenses; 
9.22(h) vulnerability of the victim; 9.22(i) substantial experience in the 
practice of law and 12.1(b) actual harm to the client. Counsel on behalf 
of respondent argued the only two aggravating factors applicable in this 
case were 9.22(d) multiple offenses (due to the fact numerous rule 
violations were found) and 9.22(i) substantial experience in the practice 
of law. 
 
"In mitigation, the bar acknowledged that 9.32(a) absence of a 
prior disciplinary record and 9.32(g) character or reputation were 
applicable in this matter. Respondent argued that not only were 9.32(a) 
and 9.32(g) applicable, but that 9.32(b) absence of dishonest or selfish 
motive; 9.32(c) personal or emotional problems; and 9.32(e) full and free 
disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward 
proceedings; and 9.32(l) remorse also applied. 
 
"After careful consideration of the aggravating factors as applied 
to the facts before me and the arguments made by the bar and 
respondent, I find not only were the aggravating factors of 9.22(b), 
9.22(d), 9.22(h) and 9.22(i), applicable in this matter, but I also find 
aggravating factor 9.22(g) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of 
conduct applies. 
13 
 
 
 
 
"I find the mitigating factors for 9.32(a), 9.32(e) and 9.32(g) 
were demonstrated in this case. However, I did not find respondent 
lacked a selfish or dishonest motive [9.32(b)], nor did I find he 
demonstrated he suffered from personal or emotional problems [9.32(c)], 
and finally I did not find respondent demonstrated remorse [9.32(l)].  
 
"In regard to the finding that these three mitigating factors are 
not applicable in this case, this referee determined respondent displayed 
dishonesty and selfishness. He made misrepresentations to his client, he 
used cost funds improperly, and he clearly placed his own interests above 
those of his client's. Further, the limited evidence presented during the 
hearing does not support a determination [sic] respondent's personal 
matters (he was engaged in personal post-dissolution proceedings) were 
so consuming and/or overwhelming that he could not reasonably fulfill 
his obligations to his client. Furthermore, if the nature of respondent's 
personal problems were such that he could not provide reasonable, 
competent, diligent representation to his client, then respondent had a 
duty to notify this client that he was unable to fulfill his obligations and 
assist his client in finding another attorney. And finally, while respondent 
expressed remorse during a mitigation hearing, and while he apologized 
to the referee, the legal profession, and his client, this referee found the 
apology insufficient and untimely. Moreover, there was no evidence 
presented that respondent had actually apologized to his client for failing 
to timely address his matters, for failing to properly communicate, for 
failing to abide by his client's instructions to have a court reporter 
present, and for forcing his client to seek assistance to the Better 
Business Bureau and The Florida Bar. Apologizing in a setting in which 
the client was not present is of little consequence. 
 
"In this case, respondent, in essence, held his client's matter 
hostage in an effort to force his client to pay respondent's outstanding 
attorney's fees. The respondent clearly put his interests before those of 
14 
 
 
 
his client and his actions were knowing and deliberate. In determining 
that respondent refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his 
conduct, this referee is mindful of the numerous opportunities respondent 
had to address his client's concerns and the fact he failed to do so. 
 
"In addition to the foregoing, I also considered the following 
Standards argued by the parties:  4.12 (suspension is appropriate when a 
lawyer knows or should know that he is dealing improperly with client 
property and causes injury or potential injury to a client); 4.14 
(admonishment is appropriate when a lawyer is negligent in dealing with 
client property and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a client 
or where there is a technical violation of the trust account rules or where 
there is an unintentional mishandling of client property); 4.42(a) 
(suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly fails to perform 
services for a client and causes injury or potential injury to a client); 4.62 
(suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly deceives a client, 
and causes injury or potential injury to a client); and 7.2 (suspension is 
appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a 
violation of a duty owed as a professional and causes injury or potential 
injury to a client, the public, or the legal system). 
 
 
"Respondent argued that his conduct in this case was an 
aberration and that the testimony of his character witnesses, which 
included but was not limited to, judges and other attorneys, supported 
him in this regard. He additionally argued that the mishandling of the 
cost funds was unintentional and that once errors (such as the 
overbilling) were pointed out to him, the errors were corrected. He also 
argued [E.D.] was not actually harmed because the [sic] he and his ex-
wife were not abiding by the court's order and had not been. Further, 
respondent argued he was simply attempting to be paid for the services 
he had rendered, and that no misrepresentations had been made. And 
finally, respondent argued that the strength of his mitigation, which 
included not only his character and reputation, but also the fact he had 
15 
 
 
 
been a practicing attorney for 27 years without a blemish, he is a death-
qualified attorney, he founded the local chapter of the Florida 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and remains on the Board of 
Directors, and he provides numerous services to his local community as 
testified to by Dr. Douglas Alexander, supports a sanction of, at most, a 
public reprimand. 
 
"The bar, on the other hand, argued the facts demonstrated 
respondent engaged in knowing, intentional misconduct, that he placed 
his interests above those of his client's and that his failure to act 
diligently created a situation in which [E.D.] chose to disobey the 
dictates of the court's order because it was incorrect. The bar also argued 
respondent took little interest in correcting billing errors or attempting to 
work with [E.D.] to address his most significant concerns. The bar 
further argued respondent failed to abide by [E.D.]'s instructions and then 
presented a less than forthright explanation to [E.D.] for his failure to do 
so. Finally, the bar argued respondent misused client cost funds by 
paying them to himself to offset attorney's fees. Therefore, the bar argued 
that, despite the significant mitigation shown, the egregious nature of the 
misconduct engaged in by respondent warranted a rehabilitative 
suspension. 
 
"In determining respondent was guilty of the rule violations 
listed previously in this report, this Referee determined respondent's 
conduct was intentional and that the bar had met its burden in that regard. 
See, The Florida Bar v. Fredericks, 731 So.2d 1249 (Fla. 1999). 
Respondent had been notified timely by [E.D.] on more than one 
occasion that the order, as issued by the trial court, was incorrect. He had 
been told by [E.D.] that the visitation issues, which were of paramount 
importance to [E.D.], were not what he had agreed to and that he 
definitely wanted the order [sic] be fixed because he had already missed 
time with his child. Respondent was timely notified of the billing errors 
which went unaddressed by respondent until [E.D.] was forced to seek 
16 
 
 
 
the assistance of the Better Business Bureau. Respondent improperly 
used client cost funds and failed to rectify the situation until after the 
bar's involvement. In addition, respondent's testimony in regard to the 
hiring of a court reporter, which was also very important to [E.D.], was 
suspect. 
 
"But, more importantly, respondent intentionally and deliberately 
held onto the corrected amended final judgment in an effort to force 
payment from [E.D.]. Respondent's conduct caused [E.D.] to live with an 
incorrect order for a period of two years, simply because respondent 
chose to put his interests before those of his client. Respondent 
deliberately acted in a manner that placed our system of justice in 
jeopardy. The lynch-pin of our legal system is that individuals adhere to 
the orders issued by our courts. Respondent knew the order was incorrect 
and that it had a negative impact upon his client, yet he did nothing and 
then attempted to justify his misconduct by arguing that his client was 
not abiding by the order anyway. This referee finds respondent's conduct 
in this regard and his attempt at justification to be especially egregious. 
This referee finds the following statement by the Supreme Court of 
Florida in The Florida Bar v. Varner, 992 So.224, 231 (Fla. 2008) 
especially applicable in this case:  '[t]he profession of the practice of law 
requires lawyers to be honest, competent, and diligent in their dealings 
with clients, other lawyers, and courts. Clients expect no less from their 
lawyers and place great trust in lawyers in their times of need. Lawyers 
trust each other to accurately represent their clients' interests and courts 
trust lawyers to do the same.' Respondent failed to live up to the ethical 
standards expected of attorneys in Florida. 
 
. . . .  
 
". . . This referee is mindful of the fact that a recommendation of 
a rehabilitative suspension is consequential and that if imposed will have 
a significant impact on respondent. Likewise, this referee is mindful of 
17 
 
 
 
the fact that respondent has no prior discipline history and that the 
testimony and letters provided in mitigation support a determination is 
[sic] his well thought of in his legal community and his community at 
large. Nevertheless, respondent engaged in intentional, knowing, 
deliberate misconduct. He made misrepresentations, he mishandled client 
cost funds by applying them to his attorney's fees, he deliberately failed 
to finish his client's matter, despite knowing the order, as issued by the 
trial court was in error, solely because he had not been paid, and he failed 
to properly and adequately communicate and address issues with his 
client. This referee finds the misconduct in this case to be extremely 
serious and conduct that cannot and should not be tolerated. However, 
this referee does not find that respondent's misconduct warrants a one 
year suspension like that imposed in Varner and Centurion, but rather, 
that a ninety-one day rehabilitative suspension is appropriate. 
 
 
"VI. 
RECOMMENDATION AS TO DISCIPLINARY MEASURES  
 
 
TO BE APPLIED 
 
"I recommend that Respondent be found guilty of misconduct 
justifying disciplinary measures, and that [sic] be disciplined by: 
 
"A. 
Ninety-one day suspension and until rehabilitation has 
been shown; 
 
"B. 
Letter of apology to [E. D.], within 30 days after the 
issuance of the order of the Supreme Court of Florida in this matter, with 
a copy provided simultaneously to the bar's headquarters office, 651 East 
Jefferson St., Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300; and 
 
"C. 
Payment of the bar's costs in these proceedings, which 
are outlined below. 
 
18 
 
 
 
 
"10. 
Based upon the referee's report, on September 26, 2014, the Supreme Court of 
Florida suspended the respondent from the practice of law for a period of 91 days for having 
violated Florida's equivalent to KRPC 1.2, KRPC 1.3, KRPC 1.4, KRPC 1.15(d), KRPC 8.4(c), 
and KRPC 8.4(d). The respondent's suspension in Florida began October 26, 2014. To date, the 
respondent has not applied for reinstatement in Florida. 
 
 
"11. 
Thereafter, Colorado and Montana imposed reciprocal discipline. On December 
15, 2014, the Supreme Court of Colorado suspended the respondent's license to practice law in 
that state for 91 days. The respondent's license to practice law in Colorado will automatically be 
reinstated once the respondent is reinstated in Florida. The Supreme Court of Montana also 
suspended the respondent's license to practice law in that state for 91 days. 
 
"Conclusions of Law 
 
 
"12. 
Based upon Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 202, the respondent's stipulations, and the above 
findings of fact, the hearing panel concludes as a matter of law that the respondent violated 
KRPC 1.2(a), KRPC 1.3, KRPC 1.4(a), KRPC 1.15(d), KRPC 8.4(c), and KRPC 8.4(d), as 
detailed below. 
 
"Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 202 
 
 
"13. 
Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 202 provides, in part, as follows:  'A final adjudication in 
another jurisdiction that a lawyer has been guilty of misconduct shall establish conclusively the 
misconduct for purposes of a disciplinary proceeding in this state.' In this case, Florida, Colorado, 
and Montana entered final adjudications that the respondent was guilty of misconduct in those 
jurisdictions. Thus, the evidence of those final adjudications is conclusive evidence for purposes 
of this disciplinary proceeding. 
 
"KRPC 1.2(a) 
 
 
"14. 
KRPC 1.2(a) provides, '[a] lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning 
the lawful objectives of representation . . . and shall consult with the client as to the means which 
the lawyer shall choose to pursue. . . .' In this case, the respondent violated KRPC 1.2(a) when he 
19 
 
 
 
failed to file the corrected amended final judgment. Thus, the hearing panel concludes that the 
respondent violated KRPC 1.2(a). 
 
"KRPC 1.3 
 
 
"15. 
Attorneys must act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing 
their clients. See KRPC 1.3. The respondent failed to diligently and promptly represent [E.D.]. 
The respondent failed to promptly prepare and file a corrected amended final judgment. As the 
Florida referee pointed out, the respondent's lack of diligence caused his client to violate a court's 
order for 2 years. Because the respondent failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness 
in representing his client, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 1.3. 
 
"KRPC 1.4(a) 
 
 
"16. 
KRPC 1.4(a) provides that '[a] lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed 
about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.' The 
respondent violated KRPC 1.4(a) when he failed to keep his client adequately informed regarding 
the status of the case. Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated 
KRPC 1.4(a). 
 
"KRPC 1.15 
 
 
"17. 
KRPC 1.15(d) provides: 
 
 
 
'(d) 
Preserving identity of funds and property of a client. 
 
(1) 
All funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm, including 
advances for costs and expenses, shall be deposited in one or 
more identifiable accounts maintained in the State of Kansas 
with a federal or state chartered or licensed financial institution 
and insured by an agency of the federal or state government, and 
no funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm shall be deposited 
therein except as follows: 
20 
 
 
 
 
(i) 
Funds reasonably sufficient to pay bank charges 
may be deposited therein.  
 
(ii) 
Funds belonging in part to a client and in part 
presently or potentially to the lawyer or law firm 
must be deposited therein, but the portion 
belonging to the lawyer or law firm may be 
withdrawn when due unless the right of the 
lawyer or law firm to receive it is disputed by 
the client, in which event the disputed portion 
shall not be withdrawn until the dispute is finally 
resolved.' 
 
When the respondent applied the $425.00 in costs to the outstanding attorney's fees, the 
respondent violated KRPC 1.15(d). Therefore, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent 
violated KRPC 1.15(d). 
 
"KRPC 8.4(c) 
 
 
"18. 
'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.' KRPC 8.4(c). The respondent engaged in conduct 
that involved dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation when he (1) applied the cost funds 
which should have been held in trust to his attorney's fees, (2) double billed [E.D.], (3) stated that 
he had hired a court reporter, (4) led [E.D.] to believe that the corrected amended final judgment 
would be filed, and (5) stated that the cost funds were not applied to the outstanding attorney's 
fees. As such, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 8.4(c). 
 
"KRPC 8.4(d) 
 
 
"19. 
'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice.' KRPC 8.4(d). The respondent engaged in conduct that 
was prejudicial to the administration of justice when he intentionally and deliberately held onto 
21 
 
 
 
the corrected amended final judgment in an effort to force [E.D.] to pay the outstanding attorney's 
fees. As such, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 8.4(d). 
 
"American Bar Association 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 
 
 
"20. 
In making this recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel considered the 
factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 
(hereinafter 'Standards'). Pursuant to Standard 3, the factors to be considered are the duty 
violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's 
misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. 
 
 
"21. 
Duty Violated. The respondent violated his duty to his client to provide diligent 
representation and adequate communication. Additionally, the respondent violated his duty to his 
client to safeguard his client's property. Finally, the respondent violated his duty to the public to 
maintain his personal integrity. 
 
 
"22. 
Mental State. The respondent intentionally and knowingly violated his duties. 
 
 
"23. 
Injury. As a result of the respondent's misconduct, the respondent caused actual 
injury to his client and the legal profession. 
 
"Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 
 
 
"24. 
Aggravating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may justify an 
increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its recommendation for discipline, 
the hearing panel, in this case, found the following aggravating factors present: 
 
 
"25. 
Dishonest or Selfish Motive. The respondent made misrepresentations to his 
client, he used cost account improperly, and he placed his own interests above those of his 
client's. (The respondent established a special account which he referred to as his cost account 
which held cost funds so that his clients could pay their costs by credit card.) Accordingly, the 
22 
 
 
 
hearing panel concludes that the respondent's misconduct was motivated by dishonesty and 
selfishness. 
 
 
"26. 
Multiple Offenses. The respondent committed multiple rule violations. The 
respondent violated KRPC 1.2, KRPC 1.3, KRPC 1.4, KRPC 1.15, KRPC 8.4(c), and KRPC 
8.4(d). Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent committed multiple 
offenses. 
 
"27. 
Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law. The Kansas Supreme Court 
admitted the respondent to practice law in the State of Kansas in 1981. At the time of the 
misconduct, the respondent has been practicing law for approximately 30 years. 
 
 
"28. 
Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may justify a 
reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its recommendation for discipline, 
the hearing panel, in this case, found the following mitigating circumstances present: 
 
 
"29. 
Absence of Prior Disciplinary Offenses. The only discipline received by the 
respondent previously was based upon the instant facts. The States of Florida, Colorado, and 
Montana each suspended the respondent for a period of 91 days. Additionally, the State of Florida 
required the respondent to establish that he has been rehabilitated, prior to reinstatement.  Finally, 
the respondent is not eligible for reinstatement in Colorado until his license in Florida is 
reinstated. 
 
 
"30. 
The Present and Past Attitude of the Attorney as Shown by His or Her 
Cooperation During the Hearing and His or Her Full and Free Acknowledgment of the 
Transgressions. The respondent fully cooperated with the disciplinary process. Additionally, the 
respondent stipulated to the facts and rule violations. 
 
 
"31. 
Previous Good Character and Reputation in the Community Including Any 
Letters from Clients, Friends and Lawyers in Support of the Character and General Reputation of 
the Attorney. Prior to the misconduct in this case, the respondent was an active and productive 
member of the bar of Florida. The respondent also enjoyed the respect of his peers and generally 
23 
 
 
 
possesses a good character and reputation as evidenced by several letters received by the hearing 
panel. These letters are a testament to the respondent's general character and legal skills. 
 
 
"32. 
Imposition of Other Penalties or Sanctions. The respondent's licenses to practice 
law in Florida, Colorado, and Montana have each been suspended. 
 
 
"33. 
In addition to the above-cited factors, the hearing panel has thoroughly examined 
and considered the following Standards: 
 
'4.12 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows or 
should know that he is dealing improperly with client property 
and causes injury or potential injury to a client. 
 
'4.42 
Suspension is generally appropriate when: 
 
(a) 
a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for 
a client and causes injury or potential injury to a 
client; or 
(b) 
a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect and 
causes injury or potential injury to a client.  
 
'4.62 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly 
deceives a client, and causes injury or potential injury to the 
client. 
 
'7.2 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly 
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a 
professional, and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the 
public, or the legal system.' 
 
24 
 
 
 
"Recommendation 
 
 
"34. 
The disciplinary administrator recommended that the respondent be suspended 
for a period of 91 days. The respondent joined the disciplinary administrator's recommendation 
for reciprocal discipline of a 91 day suspension. The respondent, however, argued that he should 
be given credit for the period of suspension that he has served and continues to serve in Florida. 
 
 
"35. 
The hearing panel agrees that a 91 day suspension is in order in this case. Thus, 
based upon the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the Standards listed above, the hearing 
panel unanimously recommends that the respondent be suspended for a period of 91 days. 
However, because the respondent's practice was located in Florida and has no Kansas clients, the 
hearing panel believes that the respondent's reinstatement in Kansas should be tied to his 
reinstatement in Florida. Accordingly, the hearing panel recommends that before the respondent 
be allowed to practice in Kansas, he be required to satisfy the disciplinary administrator that he is 
a lawyer in good standing reinstated to practice law in the State of Florida. The hearing panel is 
trying to ensure that in no event will the respondent be allowed to practice in Kansas, if he is not 
allowed to practice in Florida. See In re Joslin, 270 Kan. 419, 424 (2000). 
 
 
"36. 
Costs are assessed against the respondent in an amount to be certified by the 
Office of the Disciplinary Administrator." 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
In a disciplinary proceeding, this court considers the evidence, the findings of the 
disciplinary panel, and the arguments of the parties and determines whether violations of 
KRPC exist and, if they do, what discipline should be imposed. Attorney misconduct 
must be established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Foster, 292 Kan. 940, 945, 
258 P.3d 375 (2011); see Supreme Court Rule 211(f) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 350). 
Clear and convincing evidence is "'evidence that causes the factfinder to believe that "the 
25 
 
 
 
truth of the facts asserted is highly probable."'" In re Lober, 288 Kan. 498, 505, 204 P.3d 
610 (2009) (quoting In re Dennis, 286 Kan. 708, 725, 188 P.3d 1 [2008]). 
 
Respondent was given adequate notice of the formal complaint, to which he filed 
an answer, and adequate notice of the hearing before the panel and the hearing before this 
court. The respondent did not file exceptions to the hearing panel's final hearing reports. 
As such, the findings of fact are deemed admitted. Supreme Court Rule 212(c) and (d) 
(2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 369). 
 
 
The evidence before the hearing panel establishes by clear and convincing 
evidence the charged misconduct violated KRPC 1.2(a) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 456) 
(scope of representation); 1.3 (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 461) (diligence); 1.4(a) (2015 
Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 482) (communication); 1.15(d) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 556) 
(preserving client funds); 8.4(c) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 672) (engaging in conduct 
involving misrepresentation); and 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice), and it supports the panel's conclusions of law. We adopt the 
panel's conclusions. 
 
The only remaining issue before us is the appropriate discipline for respondent's 
violations. At the hearing before the panel, the office of the Disciplinary Administrator 
and respondent recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law in 
the state of Kansas for a period of 91 days. The hearing panel agreed that the appropriate 
discipline is a 91-day suspension. The panel further recommended that before the 
respondent be allowed to practice in Kansas, he be required to satisfy the Disciplinary 
Administrator that he is a lawyer in good standing reinstated to practice law in the state of 
Florida. 
 
26 
 
 
 
As stated in the final hearing report, respondent is not only licensed to practice law 
in Kansas and Florida, but also in the states of Montana and Colorado. The Colorado 
Supreme Court suspended respondent for 91 days as of December 15, 2014. The 
Montana Supreme Court suspended him for 91 days as of February 26, 2015. 
 
At the hearing before this court, at which the respondent appeared, the office of 
the Disciplinary Administrator recommended that respondent be suspended from the 
practice of law in the state of Kansas for a period of 91 days. Respondent recommended 
that he be suspended from the practice of law in the state of Kansas for a period of 91 
days retroactive to the date of the Florida suspension. Further respondent requested that 
when he is reinstated in Florida, he be deemed reinstated in Kansas.  
 
We hold that respondent is to be suspended from the practice of law in the state of 
Kansas as of the date of this order until such time as he has satisfied the Disciplinary 
Administrator that he is a lawyer in good standing reinstated to practice law in the state of 
Florida. Further, after the state of Florida reinstates him in good standing, he may take the 
necessary steps to change his status from inactive to active in Kansas. 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE 
 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Charles P. Vaughn be and is hereby disciplined by 
suspension from the practice of law in the state of Kansas, in accordance with Supreme 
Court Rule 203(a)(2) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 293), as of the date of this order until such 
time as he satisfies the Disciplinary Administrator that he is a lawyer in good standing 
reinstated to practice law in the state of Florida. Further, after the State of Florida 
reinstates him in good standing, he may take the necessary steps to change his status from 
inactive to active in Kansas. 
 
27 
 
 
 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings be assessed to the 
respondent and that this opinion be published in the official Kansas Reports.