Title: State v. Brittain

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

‘+*# NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

    

wo. 26688 a

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'ISSIS ch
e5i2
Sale

   

ts

STATE OF HAWAI'I, Plaintiff-Appellee,

  
 

ase

GEORGE BRITTAIN, JR., Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT
(CR. NOS. 03-1-0365(2) and 04-1-0084(2))

MEMORANDUM OPINION
(By: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama,
Acoba, and Duffy, JJ.)

‘The defendant-appellant George Brittain, Jr. appeals
from the judgment of the circuit court of the second circuit, the
Honorable Shackley F. Raffetto presiding, filed on June 10, 2004,
convicting him of and sentencing him for the following offenses:
(2) 4n Ce. No. 031-0365 (2), (a) unauthorized control of a
propelled vehicle, in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS)
§ 708-836 (1993 & Supp. 2003), and (b) theft in the second
1, in violation of HRS § 708-831(1) (b) (1993 & Supp. 2003)?
and (2) in Cr. No, 04-1-0084(2), (a) possession of a prohibited

 

+ we note that Cr. Nos. 03-1-0365(2) and 0f-1-0084(2) are unrelated
yP and that the circuit court entered ©
Slogle judgnent of conviction ss to Doth criminsl numbers. Brittain’s appeal
Felates solely to the circuit court's imposition of mandatory minimun terms of
Imprisennent in Cr. Mo. 0¢-1-0084 (2).

 

       

 

aaa
‘*## NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

Weapon, in violation of HRS § 134-8(a) (1993),* and (b) place to
keep unloaded firearm, in violation of HRS § 134-6(c) (1993 &

Supp. 2003).

 

on appeal, Brittain contends that the circuit

 

+ URS § 134-8 provides An relevant part

 

) The manufacture, possession, sale, barter, trade, gift,
transfer, or acquisition of any of the following is’ prohibited:
Sssault pistols, except as provided by section 134-46)? automatic
firearms; rifies with barrel Lengths Less than sixteen inches;
Shotguns with barrel lengths less than eighteen inches; cannons
Buftiers, sliencers, or devices for deadening or muffiing the
found of discharged firearms; hand grenades, dynamite, blasting
Gaps, bore, oF Bonbsholis, or other explosives; or any type of
ammunition ox any projectile component thereof coated with teflon
Sr any other similar coating designes primarily to enhance its
Sapablaity to penetrate metal or pierce protective armory and any
‘ype of anminition or any projectile component thereof designed or
Intended to explode or segnent upon impact with its target.

 

 

 

 

 

 

(ay ‘Any’ person violating subsection (a) or (b) shall be
guilty of a Glass © felony and shall be imprisoned for # term of
Hye years withost probation. Any person violating subsection (c)
Shall be guilty of « misdemeanor except when a detachable magazine
Prohibited under this section if possessed while inserted into a
Pistol in which cage the person shall be guilty of @ cl
Felony.

 

 

> BRS § 134-6 provides in relevant part:

(e) Except az provided in sections 134-5 and 134-9, all,
firearms and ammunition shall be confined to the possessér’s place
Of business, residence, er sojourn) provided that it shall be
awful to carry unloaded firearns or ammunition or both in an
enclosed container fron the place of purchase to the purchaser’ s
Elace'Ge business, residences Or'so}cueny or between these places
Spon change of place of business, residence, or sojourn, or
Between these places and the following: a place of repair) a
target range; @ licensed dealer's place of business; an organized,
Scheduled firearms show or exhibity a place of formal hunter oF
firearm use training or instruction; or @ police station.
Stnelosed container" means a Tigidly constucted receptacle, or a
commercially manufactures gun case, or the equivalent thereof that
Sompietely encloses the firearm.

 

 

le} Any person violating subsection (a) or (b) shall be
guilty of a class A felony. Any person violating this section by
Garrying of possessing a loaded firearm or by carrying oF
Hing @ loaded oF unloaded pistol or revolver without @
weed a2 provided in section 13¢-9 shall be guilty of 2
Glass B felony. Any person violating this section by carrying or
(cont inved.

 

  

 

 

2
##% NOT FOR PUBLICATION *#*
court erred in imposing mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment,
pursuant to HRS $§ 706-660-1(3) (d) (1993),* in connection with
his convictions of possession of a prohibited weapon and place to
keep unloaded firearm in Cr. No, 04-1-0084(2), as evidenced by

 

(2) the plain language of HRS § 706-660.1, (2) the statute’
legislative history, (3) an in pari materia reading of HRS
95 706-660.1 and HRS $§ 134-6 and 134-8, and (4) the “rule of

lenity.”*

 

24. -continued)
possteaing an unloaded firearn, other than @ pistol or revolver,
Shall be guilty of a clase C felony

 

‘HRs $ 706-660.1 provides in relevant part:

Sentence of imprisonaent for use of a firearm, semiautomatic
fixearn, of automatic firears in a felony.

is}. ‘a’person convicted of a felony, where the person had a
semiautomatic firearm or automatic firearm in the person's
Possession of used oF threatened ite use uhile engaged in the
EGmmission of the felony, whether the semiautomatic firearm or
Sctonatie firearm was loaded or not, and whether operable or not,
Shall in addition to the indeterminate term of imprisonment
Provided for the grade of offense be sentenced to a mandatory
Eininum term of iaprisonnent without possibility of parole oF
Probation the length of which hall be as follows:

 

   

 

ai" For a class c felony ~~ five yea:

 

: ‘This court has recognized that “(a}mbiguity
concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be
solved in favor of lenity.” State v. Sakamoto, 101
Hawai't 409, 413 9.3, 10 P.98 635, 639 8-3 (2003)
(internal citations ‘and quotation signals omitted).
This "policy of lenity means that the [c]ourt will not
interpret 2 [state] criminal statute so as to increase
the penalty that it places on an individual when such
an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess
as to what (the legislature] intended.” Jd. (internal
Citations and quotation signals omitted) {some
brackets added and sone in original) «

 

   

State vs Haugen, 104 Hawai'i 71, 75 9.6, 85 P.36 178, 182 n.6 (2008).
3
‘#8 NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***
For the reasons discussed infra, we hold that the
circuit court erred in sentencing Brittain to mandatory minimum
terms of imprisonment, pursuant to HRS § 706-660.1(3) (d), in
connection with his convictions in Cr. No, 04-1-0084(2).

T. BACKGROUND

on July 21, 2003, a Maui grand jury returned an
indictment against Brittain charging him with the following
offenses in Cr. No. 03-1-0365(2): (1) unauthorized control of a
propelled vehicle (Count I), in violation of HRS § 708-836; and
(2) theft in the second degree (Count It), in violation of HRS
$ 708-831(1) (b).

on February 17, 2004, a Maui grand jury returned an
indictment against Brittain charging him with the following
offenses in Cr. No. 04-1-0084(2): (1) possession of a prohibited
weapon (Count I), in violation of HRS § 134-8(a), see supra note
2, and (2) place to keep unloaded firearm (Count II), in
violation of HRS § 134-6(c), see supra note 3. The indictment
against Brittain in Cr. No. 04-1-0084(2) read in relevant part as
follows:

COUNT ONE: 03-15998

That on or about the 19th day of February, 2003, in the

County of Maul, State of Hawaii, GEORGE Res ih

TRtentsonally or knowingly possess an ob:

prohibited weapon, which he believed, kn ty

Eloregarded the substantial and unjustifiable risk that the object

ras a prohibited weapon, to wit, a Remington 16

Rutomatic shotgun with @ barrel Length of les

{nches, thereby comitting the offense of Possession of

Prohibited Weapon or Device in violation of Section 134
‘the Hawai Revised statutes.

    

 

    

     

cour Ho: 02-15999
Fist on or about the 19th day of February, 2003, in
tthe county of Maul, state of Hawail, GEORGE H, BRITTAIN,

 
‘+## NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

did intentionally or knowingly carry on his person or
fn his possession, an object which was an unloaded
Elzearn, which he believed, Knew, or recklessly disregarded
fhe substantial and unjustifiable risk that the object was,
fan unloaded firearm, to wit, @ Remington 16 gauge seni-
fuconatic shotgun, without it being within an enclosed
Contained, and he believed, knew, oF recklessly disregarded
fhe substantis1 ang unjustifiable risk chat the unlosdes
Firearm was ina place other than his place of business,
Eesidence, or sojourn, thereby committing the offense of
Place to Keep Unloaded Firearm in violation of Section 134-
Sle) of the Hawaii Revised statutes.

   

   

 

 

on April &, 2004, Brittain entered a plea of no contest
to the two charges against him in Cr. No. 04-1-0084(2).

on May 4, 2004, Brittain entered a plea of no contest
to the two charges against him in Cr. No. 03-1-0365(2).

on June 1, 2004, the State of Hawai'i (hereinafter,
“the prosecution”) filed 2 motion for imposition of mandatory
minimum terms of imprisonment in Cr. No. 04-1-0084(2). The
prosecution sought a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of
five years as to both Counts I and II, pursuant to HRS § 706-
660.1(3) (4), see supra note 4.

on June 10, 2004, the circuit court conducted a hearing

 

on the prosecution's motion for mandatory minimum terms of
imprisonment and sentencing. The prosecution maintained that the
circuit court was “mandated by law to impose @ mandatory minimum
period of incarceration without the possibility of parole for
[Brittain’s) use of a semi-automatic shotgun.” Defense counsel
for Brittain argued “that the mandatory minimum of one year is
adequate and sends the right signal.” The circuit court granted
the prosecution's motion for mandatory minimum terns of
imprisonment, orally ruling as follows:

As far as [the imposition of] mandatory minima [terms
4a} concerned under [HRS] Section 706-(660.1(3)], there

 

5
‘+## NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

isn’t any real dispute that this was a semi-automatic
firearm. The statute clearly provides that it doesn’t
Rater whether it’s operable of not. So T'll impose a
five(-]year mandatory minimum under the statute in [Cr. No.]
4-1-0088 (2)

‘he circuit court sentenced Brittain to the following:

 

 

 

(1) an indeterminate five-year maximum term of imprisonment in
connection with both Counts I and IT in Cr. No. 03-1-0365(2)7 and
(2) an indeterminate five-year maximum term of imprisonment,
subject to a five-year mandatory minimum term, in connection with
both Counts I and II in Cr. No. 04-1-0084(2). The circuit court
ordered all counts to run concurrently.

on June 9, 2004, Brittain timely filed a notice of
appeal 2x officio at the circuit court of the first circuit.

[A sentencing judge generally has broad
discretion in impoaing a sentence. State v Gaylord,
Je tawalt 127, 143-64, 890 P.24 1167, 1163-84 (1995)7
State t. Valea, 74 Maw. 424, 435, 848 P.2d 376,
Serf 7 (1958). The applicable’ standard of review
for sentencing of resentencing matters is whether the
Court committed plain and manifest abuse of discretion
Sn ite decision. Gaulorg, 7e Hawai's at 244, 290 P.26
at tied; State v. Kamukay, 71 Haw. 218, 227-28, 787
Pi2d 682, 607-08 (1990); State v. Murcav(,] 63"
32, 25, 621 P.2d 334, 342-43 (1900); State ws Fry, 61
Haw. 226, 231, 602 P.2d 13, 16 (1979).
Keawe x tate, 79 Hawai'i 261, 264, 901 P.74 482, 484
Hes A iitccore wnien indicate ‘a plain and manifest
Sbose of discretion are arbitrary or capricious action by
the Juage and a rigid refusal to consider the defendant’ s
Gostentions.” Zev, 61 Haw. at 231, 602 P.2d at 17. And,
SSigieneraliy, £0 constitute an abuse it must appear that
thevoure clesrly exceeded the bounds of reason oF
Gisregardes rules or principles of law or practice to the
Substantial detriment of a party litigent.'*  Keawe, 79
Hawai at 204, 901 P.2d at 404 (quoting Gavlorg, 76 Hawai's
Be 144, 890 P.2d at 1i6e (quoting Kumukau, 7) Maw. at
227028, 787 P.zd at 688)).

State v. Rauch, 94 Hawai'i 315, 322, 13 P.3d 324, 331 (2000)

    

 

 

 

 

 

 

     

6
 

* NOT FOR PUBLICATION *#*

(brackets and ellipsis points in original).
B. Quest: nstiti "

We answer questions of constitutional Law ‘by

‘our own independent judgeent based on the facts
sr and, thus, qoastions of constitutional law
are reviewed on appeal “under the ‘right/wrong’ standard.”
Stacey. denking, 93 Hewai't 87, 100, 997 P.2d 23, 26 (2000)
(citations omitted) -

State v, Aplaca, 96 Hawai'i 17, 22, 25 P.3d 792, 797 (2001).
C. Statutory Interpretation

“(t]he sntezpretation of a statute...

is a question of law reviewable de nove.” State
84 Hawai'i 2, 20," 928 F.2d 643, 952

(W398) “(quoting state vs Camara, $1 Hawai'i 324,

329, 916 -2a 1225, 1230 (1996) (citations

onitted)).” See algo State v. Zovemura, 80

Hawaii 8, 16, 904 P-2a 885, 903 (1999); State
479 viawai't i, 3, 837 P.2d 928, 930

Tiss) State ve Naksta, 76 Hawai't 3

678 P.26 699,708 (1998)...

   

 

 

 

 

 
 

Tse, 14%, 931 F.2d Sel
some in original). See alao State v. Gata, 84 Hawai't 229,
236, 933 P.24 86, 73. (1337)

Construction is guided by
nen construing a statute, our forenest obligation is
to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the
Jegisiature, which 1s to be obtained primarily trom
the language contained in the statute itself. Ana we
must read statutory language in the context of the
Thtire statute and constrse st in a manner consistent
sith tee purpose.

When there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or
indistinctivenese or uncertainty of an expression used
inva statute, an ambiguity existe. .

Tn construing an ambiguous statute, “[t)he
meaning of the anbiguous words may be sought by
examining the context, witn which the ambiguous words,
Phrases, and sentences may be compared, in order to
Escertain their true meaning." aks § 1-15(1)
{(1993)]. Moreover, the courts may resort to
exteinole aids in determining Legislative intent. one
avenve is the use of legislative history as an
Interpretive tool.

Gray, 8¢ Hawaii at 148, 932 P.24 at 590. state 2

Tovamura, €0 Hawal't 0, 18-19, 904 P.24 893, 903-04 (1995)

{brackets and ellipsis points in original) (footnote

omitted). This court may also consider [t]he reason and

spirit of the law, and the cause which induced ©

Legisisture to ensct it... to discover its true meaning.”

wes $ 1-15(2) (2993). “taws in pari materia, oF upon the

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

7
**# NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***
sane subject matter, shall be construed with reference to
@ach other. What i clear in one statute may be called upon
Snaig to explain what is doubtful in another." HRS § 1-16
(2333)
Bauch, 94 Hawai'i at 322-23, 13 P.3d at 331-32 (quoting State
Kotis, 91 Hawai" 319, 327, 984 P.2d 78, 86 (1999) (quoting State
Ws Dudoit, 90 Hawai'i 262, 266, 978 P.2d 700, 704 (1999) (quoting
State v. Stocker, 90 Hawai" 85, 90-91, 976 P.2d 399, 404-05
(2999) (quoting Ho v. Leftwich, 88 Hawai'i 251, 256-57, 965 P.2d
793, 798-99 (1998) (quoting Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Temple v.
Sullivan, 87 Hawai'i 217, 229-30, 953 P.2d 1315, 1327-28

(2998)))90)

 

 

 

HII, DISCUSSION

Brittain argues that the circuit court did not have the
legal authority to impose mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment
in connection with Counts I and IT in Cr. No. 04-1-0084(2), given
the plain and unambiguous language of HRS § 706-660.1 and when
read in pari materia with HRS §§ 134-6(c) and 134-8(a).

Brittain maintains that his conduct could not trigger mandatory
minimum terms of imprisonment “because HRS § 706-660.1 is not
applicable where the defendant was convicted only of possessory
firearm offenses.” We agree with Brittain.

We have observed that “*{iJt is a cardinal rule of
statutory interpretation that, where the terms of a statute are
plain, unambiguous and explicit, we are not at liberty to look
beyond that language for a different meaning. Instead, our sole
duty is to give effect to the statute’s plain and obvious
meaning.” Haugen, 104 Hawai'i at 75, @5 P.3d at 182 (citations
‘**+ NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***
omitted) .

HRS § 706-660.1 is entitled “[s]entence of imprisonment
for use of a firearm, semi-automatic firearm, or automatic
firearm in a felony.” (Emphasis added.) See supra note 4. For
the circuit court to have imposed a legitimate mandatory minimum
term of imprisonment, Brittain must have (1) been convicted of a
felony (2) where he had a firearm or a semi-automatic firearm (a)
in his possession (b) or used (c) or threatened its use while
engaged in the commission of the felony. Nevertheless, Brittain
was convicted of possession of a prohibited weapon and place to
keep an unloaded firearm in Cr. No, 04-1-0084(2), the felonious
conduct being the possession of the firearm itself and the
failure to keep it in an approved “enclosed” container.

Accordingly, Brittain did not possess, use, or threaten
the use of a firearm while engaged in the commission of the
felonies of possession of a prohibited weapon and place to keep

an unloaded firearm. Brittain’s possession of the firearm was

 

the entire felonious conduct with respect to both offenses; in
other words, there was no underlying felony that Brittain
committed while possessing or using a firearm. As such,
Brittain’s conduct falls outside of the ambit of HRS § 706-660.1.
‘thus, by virtue of the plain language of HRS § 706-660.1,

ion of a semi-automatic firearm and failure to

 

Brittain’s poss

 

transport it in an approved container did not automatically
subject him to the enhancement of a mandatory minimum term of

imprisonment.
‘48 NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

‘this court's recent decision in State v. Vellina, 106

Hawai'i 441, 106 P.3d 364 (2005), 1s dispositive of the present
matter. In Vellina, we held that the circuit court erred in
sentencing Vellina to mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment

purauant to HRS $§ 706-660.1(1) (c) and (3)(c) in connection with
rm, inasmuch as the

 

two counts of first-degree theft of a fir
entire felonious conduct with respect to each count was the theft

of the firearm and Vellina had not used a firearm in the

commission of the felonies.

In State v, Ambrosio, 72 aw. 496, 824 P.2d 107
(1992), ‘this court hele that the defendant could

Sentenced to s nahdatory minimum term of imprisonment,
Pursuant to HRS § 706-660,1(a) (2) (1988), im connection with
B"Eldnapping conviction, but could not also be sentenced to
2 mandatory minimum term with respect to a charge of use of
 Eirearm during the commission of a felony,

 

HRS § 706-660.1(2) (2) provided:

[A person convicted of @ felony, where the person
had a firearm in Ais possession or threatened
Its Gse or used the firearm wnile engaged in the
Commission of the felony, whether the firearm
Mas loaded er not, and whether operable or not,
Gay in addition to the indeterminate term of
Imprisonment provided for the grade of offens
bbe sentenced £0 2 mandatory minimum term of
Imprisonment without possibility of parole or
Probation the length of which shall be as
follows:

 

 

2} For @ class A felony -- up to ten years[.J

 

‘This court state:

‘The Language of the above statute is clear
and unambiguous. The enhanced sentencing
Spplies to the conviction for the fe1ony in
Shich the firearm was Used. In this c
Mae the kidnapping.

‘The legislature has chosen to make the use
of a firearm in the commission of a felony the
Basis for enhanced sentencing for that felony,
and it hag also chosen to make such use @
Separate felony, but it clearly has not chosen
to impose two mandatory minimun sentences for
one use of 8 gun

a

 

 

 

 

10
  

accor ‘the judge below properly
applied the hen sentencing appellant
fer. kscnspe: “judge below improperly

applied the when sentencing appellant

 

ior the felony of using @ firearm in the
Commission of the kidnapping.

Ambrosio, 72 Haw. at 497, 624 P.2d at 108
Vellina, 106 Hawai'i at 448, 106 P.3d at 371.
Moreover, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA)

recently held in State v, Coelho, 2005 WL 980613 (April 28,
2005), that the court erred in imposing a mandatory minimum term
of imprisonment on a defendant who was convicted of being a felon

in possession of a firearm pursuant to HRS § 134-7(b).

costho was convicted of being a felon in possession of
a firearm; the felonious conduct was the possession of the
{steam itesl£. There was a0 underlying felony that Coelho
Conaitted while possessing or using @ firearm. convicting
Coeino of being 2 felon in possession of a firearm pursuant
to HRS § 134-7(b) and sentencing him to a mandatory minimum
term of imprisonment pursuant to HRS § 706-660-1(3) (c)
‘essentially punished Coelho twice for 2 single possession of
o'tirearn,

Goelhe, 2005 wL 980613.
“Analogously, the legislature has specifically chosen

 

 

to make the use of a firearm in the comission of a felony the
basis for enhanced sentencing in connection with that felony, and
it has also chosen to make” the possession of 2 prohibited weapon
and the unauthorized place to keep a firearm separate felonies,
“but it has nok chosen to impose a mandatory minimum prison term
for” either the possession of that firearm or the failure to keep
it in an authorized container. Vellina, 106 Hawai'i at 448, 106
P.3d at 371 (emphases in original).

Furthermore, we can conceptualize no scenario in which

a defendant may be subject to a mandatory minimum term of

an
‘+## NOT FOR PUBLICATION *#*
imprisonment under HRS § 706-660.1(3)(d) for use of a firearm in
the possession of a firearm. By contrast, we stated in Vellina

that there could be no imposition of a mandatory minimum prison

term for the mere theft of a firearm “unless a different firearm
is used in the commission of the theft.” 106 Hawai'i at 448, 106
P.3d at 371 (emphasis added). Therefore, the circuit court’s

 

reasoning that there wasn’t “any real dispute that [Brittain
used] a semi-automatic firearm” and that “[t]he statute clearly
provides that it doesn’t matter whether it’s operable or not” is
irrelevant to whether the circuit court's: imposition of mandatory
minimum terms was appropriate in Cr. No. 04-1-0084(2).

In essence, convicting Brittain of possession of a

prohibited weapon, pursuant to HRS § 134-8(a), and

 

ntencing him
to mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment, pursuant to HRS

§ 706-660.1(3) (d), punished him twice for the possession of the

 

sane firearm. Likewise, convicting Brittain of failure to keep
the unloaded firearm in an approved container, pursuant to HRS
§ 134-6(c), and sentencing him to mandatory minimum terms of
imprisonment, pursuant to HRS § 706-660.1(3) (4), punished him
twice for the possession of the same firearm.

Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court erred in
sentencing Brittain to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonnent
pursuant to HRS $$ 706-660.1(3) (d) in connection with Counts Z
and IT in Cr. No. 04-1-0084(2).

IV. CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing analysis, we vacate the

circuit court’s judgment of conviction and sentence and remand

2
‘##* NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

for further proceedings.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, July 5, 2005.

on the briefs:

Peter A. Hanano, fo

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,
for the plaintiff-appellee :
State of Hawai'i eR Lime
James 8. Tabe, & a
arin aro.

Deputy Public Defender,
for the defendant~appelient

George Brittain, dr. Boe

Vrms, Budags by

13