Title: White v. Commonwealth

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
WILLIAM WHITE, JR. 
 
v.  Record No. 051737  
 OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
November 3, 2006 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the defendant was 
improperly denied the opportunity to present evidence to a 
jury supporting his insanity defense. 
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
William White, Jr. (“White”) intended to present evidence 
of his insanity at his jury trial on charges of first degree 
murder, a violation of Code § 18.2-32, and assault and battery 
of a police officer, a violation of Code § 18.2-57.  However, 
the trial court granted the Commonwealth’s motion in limine to 
preclude White from presenting such evidence.  Consequently, 
White entered a conditional plea of nolo contendere reserving 
the right to appeal the trial court’s ruling on the motion in 
limine. 
 
On March 29, 2002, White was traveling in North Carolina 
when his car broke down on an interstate highway, and he made 
arrangements for a person he did not know, Elton Giliken 
("Giliken"), to drive him to New York.  At approximately 10:00 
p.m. while traveling through Greensville County, Virginia, 
White directed Giliken to take him to a residence.  White went 
 
2
to the front door at the house and inquired about someone 
named “Q.”  White returned to the car and then requested that 
Giliken take him to a specific motel near Route 301.  At the 
motel, White went to a room and asked the occupants for “Q.”  
He came back to Giliken’s car, and then returned to the same 
motel room where he conducted a conversation through the door 
with the occupant.  At this point, Giliken was concerned about 
White’s actions and attempted to dial 911 on his cell phone, 
but was unable to get service.  White returned to the car and 
asked Giliken to drive to the back of the motel where there 
were other rooms.  White ingested what appeared to be cocaine, 
pulled out a knife, tied a bandana around his head, and asked 
Giliken to wait for him.  Then he said, “I’m going to go kill 
me two mother f**kers” and exited the car.  Giliken sped away 
and notified the police about White’s behavior and provided a 
description of him. 
 
Minutes later, motel guests staying next door to the 
victim’s room heard banging sounds and saw a man run by 
outside their window.  Upon entering the room, the motel 
guests discovered the victim’s body, which was later found to 
have had 27 stab wounds.  Police investigating the murder 
determined that White was a primary suspect and a warrant was 
issued for his arrest. 
 
3
 
The following day, State Police Trooper K.W. Spencer 
noticed a man walking on Interstate Highway 95 who was dressed 
in a “white fur coat, no shirt, red tights, and yellow 
shorts.”  The trooper stopped to speak with the man, who was 
subsequently identified as White, and informed him that he 
“could not walk on [I-]95.”  White was reluctant to leave the 
interstate and argued that his family was looking for him and 
“wouldn’t be able to see him” if he left the interstate 
highway.  The trooper left but returned a few minutes later.  
On this occasion, he spotted White walking backwards on an 
exit ramp headed toward the interstate.  White approached the 
trooper’s car and expressed frustration at Trooper Spencer for 
checking on him again.  Trooper Spencer called for backup.  
After a physical altercation, Trooper Spencer and another 
officer subdued White.  At that time, they discovered that a 
warrant for murder had been issued for White. 
 
Prior to his trial, White followed the procedural steps 
required by statute to raise an insanity defense.  He 
requested a psychiatric evaluation to determine his mental 
state at the time of the alleged offense and his competency to 
stand trial. He gave timely notice to the Commonwealth of his 
intent to present evidence of insanity pursuant to Code 
§ 19.2-168.  The trial court appointed Dr. William D. Brock, a 
 
4
licensed clinical psychologist, to conduct the psychiatric 
examination and provide a report. 
 
The Commonwealth sought to preclude White from presenting 
any evidence regarding his state of mind at the time of the 
offense.  In its motion in limine, the Commonwealth asserted 
that Dr. Brock’s report did not support an insanity defense, 
that expert testimony is a “necessary predicate to asserting 
an insanity defense,” and that the defendant cannot “rise 
above his own evidence” citing to Massie v. Firmstone, 134 Va. 
450, 114 S.E. 652 (1922).1  Opposing the Commonwealth’s motion, 
defense counsel argued that Dr. Brock’s report could be 
“helpful” in establishing the existence of a mental disease or 
defect, and proffered additional testimony from lay witnesses 
to support White’s defense on this issue. 
 
The trial court granted the Commonwealth’s motion stating 
that “the introduction of the proffered testimony would not 
rise to the level of that which would warrant admissibility on 
the issue of insanity.”  As a result, the trial court barred 
the admission of any evidence to support White’s insanity 
defense.  After this ruling, White changed his plea to nolo 
contendere reserving his right to appeal the trial court’s 
ruling.  White was then convicted and sentenced to life in 
                     
1 The application, if any, of Massie v. Firmstone to this 
case is not an issue presented on appeal. 
 
5
prison for the first degree murder charge, and five years for 
the assault and battery of a police officer. 
 
A panel of the Court of Appeals reversed White’s 
conviction, White v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 429, 605 S.E.2d 
337 (2004), but upon rehearing en banc, White’s conviction was 
affirmed, White v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 123, 616 S.E.2d 
49 (2005).  White appealed to this Court upon one assignment 
of error:  that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the 
trial court’s ruling which precluded the introduction of any 
evidence of the defendant’s mental state at the time of the 
offense. 
II.  Analysis 
A.  Proffered evidence 
 
The defendant proffered evidence in support of his 
intended plea of insanity that included the original report 
submitted by Dr. Brock as well as lay witness testimony.  Dr. 
Brock’s report noted that White’s medical history reflected 
two hospitalizations for psychiatric treatment, the first 
occurring in Louisiana several months before the alleged 
offense, and the second shortly after his arrest. Each time 
White was treated with Haldol, an anti-psychotic medication.  
Prior to this report, Dr. Brock did not review hospital 
records from the Louisiana inpatient treatment because they 
were unavailable, but he opined that during that 
 
6
hospitalization White was likely treated for a “drug-induced 
psychosis” caused by “rather heavy abuse” of narcotics.  White 
reported to Dr. Brock that he used cocaine “multiple times 
daily” for at least three months preceding his arrest on these 
charges. 
White reported to Brock that he was traveling to New York 
because “‘God’ had something for him to do there;” he believed 
that God’s purpose would be revealed during the trip; he heard 
the voices of “both God and the Devil” during much of his 
journey; he was drawn to a particular motel room because of 
the number “15” on the door because “he believed the number 14 
to be a holy number and the number 15 to then mean ‘14 and 
me;’” the number “15” on the door caused him to believe that 
“he was to go to that room and, apparently, do battle with the 
individuals in it.” 
 
With regard to White’s mental state at the time of the 
offenses, Dr. Brock opined that “[b]y all indications, Mr. 
White was, indeed, experiencing symptoms of a psychosis at the 
time of the offenses for which he currently stands charged.”  
The report cites numerous factors supporting Dr. Brock’s 
opinion, including (1) White’s history of psychiatric 
treatment for psychosis, (2) White’s decision to return to 
drug abuse and quit taking his anti-psychotic medication after 
the Louisiana hospitalization, (3) White’s account of the 
 
7
events surrounding the offense, and (4) his “bizarre behavior” 
in walking backwards down the interstate after being warned by 
police to stay away from that area. 
 
Dr. Brock opined that while White “seems to meet the 
threshold criteria for an insanity defense,” his defense may 
not be “viable” for two reasons.  First, White’s psychotic 
symptoms “appear to have either been the result of, or have 
been exacerbated by (most likely the former), his voluntary 
and excessive use of cocaine.”  Second, White “made 
significant efforts to not be identified or get caught” which 
would indicate that he knew right from wrong.   
Dr. Brock submitted a second letter to the court after he 
had an opportunity to review the records from White’s first 
hospitalization.  In this letter, he stated that the medical 
records “confirm[ed]” his prior hypothesis that White “was 
suffering from a drug-induced psychosis” at the time of his 
hospitalization in Louisiana, resulting from “his abuse of 
cocaine, antihistamines and marijuana.”  Dr. Brock concluded 
that White’s psychotic symptoms were “almost surely the result 
of his substance abuse and not some other mental condition.” 
Additionally, White proffered the testimony of Joseph W. 
Skinner (“Skinner”), a licensed clinical social worker, who 
had treated White weekly for a period of about six months 
during his pre-trial incarceration.  Skinner was not qualified 
 
8
as an expert pursuant to Code § 19.2-169.5; however, he was 
offered as a lay witness.  Skinner would have testified that 
White told him on “many occasions” that he heard the voice of 
God “both before and after the incident and at times when he 
was not taking drugs.” 
 
White next proffered the testimony of his roommate, Troy 
Whidbee, who would have testified that “at some time . . . 
prior to coming to Virginia, that [White] had advised him that 
someone was out to kill him” and “God needed soldiers.”   
Next, White’s mother would have testified that her son was 
hearing voices prior to coming to Virginia, that he reported 
having “seen God in the woods,” and “that God and the Devil 
were talking to him trying to get him to do things regarding 
hurting himself and/or others.  That he believed God and the 
Devil were fighting over his soul.”  She would have testified 
that White had drawn red circles around “spiders” in his jail 
cell, which he alleged were brought there by jail personnel in 
order to kill him, and that the spiders could not cross the 
line because “the red symbolized the blood of Christ.”  
Finally, White proffered the testimony of two correctional 
officers who would have testified that White had expressed to 
them on several occasions after his arrest that he was hearing 
voices. 
B.  Insanity Defense 
 
9
 
Virginia has long recognized the common law defense of 
insanity.  See Boswell v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. (20 Gratt.) 
860, 876 (1871).  A criminal defendant is presumed to have 
been sane at the time of the commission of a criminal act.  
E.g., Stamper v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 707, 717, 324 S.E.2d 
682, 688 (1985).  However, under the M’Naghten test for 
insanity, recognized in Virginia, the defendant may prove that 
at the time of the commission of the act, he was suffering 
from a mental disease or defect such that he did not know the 
nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know 
it, he did not know what he was doing was wrong.  E.g., 
Commonwealth v. Chatman, 260 Va. 562, 567, 538 S.E.2d 304, 306 
(2000); Price v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 452, 457, 323 S.E.2d 
106, 108-09 (1984); Boswell, 61 Va. at 868.  We have 
previously stated: 
 
The first portion of M'Naghten relates to an 
accused who is psychotic to an extreme degree. It 
assumes an accused who, because of mental 
disease, did not know the nature and quality of 
his act; he simply did not know what he was 
doing. For example, in crushing the skull of a 
human being with an iron bar, he believed that he 
was smashing a glass jar. The latter portion of 
M'Naghten relates to an accused who knew the 
nature and quality of his act. He knew what he 
was doing; he knew that he was crushing the skull 
of a human being with an iron bar. However, 
because of mental disease, he did not know that 
what he was doing was wrong. He believed, for 
example, that he was carrying out a command from 
God. 
 
 
10
Price at 459-60, 323 S.E.2d at 110 (citing 2 C. Torcia, 
Wharton's Criminal Law § 100, at 9 (14th ed. 1979)).  In any 
case, when insanity is claimed as a defense, a mental disease 
or defect must be the cause of the defendant's failure to "know 
what he was doing" or to understand that "what he was doing was 
wrong." 
 
In this case, White maintains that he proffered sufficient 
evidence to make a prima facie case of insanity and that it was 
error for the trial court to refuse to allow this evidence to 
be admitted for the jury's consideration.  Prima facie evidence 
is "[e]vidence that will establish a fact or sustain a judgment 
unless contradictory evidence is produced."  Black's Law 
Dictionary 598 (8th ed. 2004).  We need only examine White's 
proffer of evidence supporting the existence of a mental 
disease or defect to resolve this appeal. 
C.  Intoxication and "Settled Insanity" 
 
Clearly, we have permitted the use of the insanity defense 
when prolonged, habitual, and chronic alcohol or drug abuse has 
created a mental disease or defect.  We adopted the common law 
distinction between temporary intoxication and permanent 
insanity long ago.  “Drunkenness is no excuse for crime.”  
Boswell, 61 Va. (20 Gratt.) at 872.  However, a mental disease 
or defect caused by chronic abuse of alcohol or drugs will 
support the defense of insanity.  Id. (“[i]f permanent insanity 
 
11
be produced by habitual drunkenness, then, like any other 
insanity, it excuses an act which would be otherwise 
criminal”).  We have also commonly referred to this permanent 
condition as "settled insanity."  See Arey v. Peyton, 209 Va. 
370, 375, 164 S.E.2d 691, 695 (1968).  Although he does not use 
the term, "settled insanity" is what White claims as his 
condition at the time of the offenses. 
 
The defense of "settled insanity" is not new and it 
requires that the condition be produced over a significant 
period of time.  See, e.g., People v. Travers, 26 P. 88, 91 
(Cal. 1891) ("[S]ettled insanity produced by a long-continued 
intoxication affects responsibility in the same way as 
insanity produced by any other cause."); Fisher v. State, 64 
Ind. 435, 440 (1878) (recognizing settled insanity defense 
"where the habit of intoxication, though voluntary, has been 
long continued, and has produced disease, which has perverted 
or destroyed the mental faculties of the accused"); State v. 
Riley, 13 S.W. 1063, 1064 (Mo. 1890) (holding that "long-
continued habits of intemperance producing permanent mental 
disease amounting to insanity" may relieve defendant of 
criminal responsibility); Cheadle v. State, 149 P. 919, 922 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1915) (recognizing settled insanity due to 
"excessive and long continued indulgence in alcoholic liquors, 
technically called 'delirium tremens' "); State v. Kidwell, 59 
 
12
S.E. 494, 495 (W.Va. 1907) (recognizing defense of settled 
insanity "superinduced by habitual and long continued 
intoxication").  For more recent cases illustrating the same 
principle, see, e.g., Evans v. State, 645 P.2d 155, 158 
(Alaska 1982) (recognizing insanity defense for "alcoholic 
psychosis such as delirium tremens, resulting from long-
continued habits of excessive drinking"); Kiley v. State, 860 
So. 2d 509, 511 n.3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) ("[T]he 
defendant must show that his long term and continued use of 
intoxicants produced a fixed and settled frenzy or insanity 
either permanent or intermittent.") (quotation omitted); State 
v. Clokey, 364 P.2d 159, 164 (Idaho 1961) (upholding 
instruction defining settled insanity as "produced by long 
continued intoxication"); State v. Smith, 490 P.2d 1262, 1264 
(Or. 1971) (recognizing insanity defense where "excessive and 
long-continued use of intoxicants produces a mental condition 
of insanity, permanent or intermittent") (quotations omitted).2 
 
White was 28 years old at the time of the offenses.  In 
his evaluation of White, Dr. Brock stated that White reported 
                     
2 While the Supreme Court of Vermont in State v. Sexton, 
904 A.2d 1092 (Vt. 2006), declined to decide if settled 
insanity was a defense to murder, its opinion provides a 
thorough history of the defense and the reason for it.  Id. at 
1100-04.  The Court found it unnecessary to decide if the 
defense was available because, even if it were, proof of drug 
usage for two weeks would be insufficient to establish the 
defense.  Id. at 1103-05. 
 
13
"a significant substance abuse history.  He reports rather 
heavy abuse of cocaine, alcohol, and marijuana, as well as 
occasional use of crack cocaine.  By Mr. White's report, he had 
been using cocaine multiple times daily for at least the three 
months prior to his arrest on the current charges." 
 
Dr. Brock also stated that White: 
 
[H]as a history of one prior psychiatric 
hospitalization while in Louisiana.  This 
occurred about three months ago.  The records for 
this hospitalization were not available at the 
time of this evaluation.  Mr. White reports that 
he was treated through use of Haldol, an 
antipsychotic medication, which would suggest 
that he was being treated for psychotic symptoms 
at that time.  The lack of psychiatric symptoms 
prior to age 27 or 28 and Mr. White's description 
of rather heavy cocaine abuse at that time would 
suggest that he likely was experiencing a drug-
induced psychosis at the time of that 
hospitalization.  Mr. White discontinued his 
Haldol once he got out of the hospital and, by 
his report, almost immediately began abusing 
cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol (as well as 
ecstasy) again. 
 
 
After reviewing the medical files from White's treatment 
in a psychiatric hospital while in Louisiana, Dr. Brock 
informed White's attorney, "Review of these records confirms my 
hypothesis that, at the time of his hospitalization in 
Louisiana, Mr. White was suffering from a drug-induced 
psychosis.  This condition resulted from his abuse of cocaine, 
antihistamines and marijuana."  Dr. Brock concluded that the 
"now available medical records simply confirm that Mr. White's 
 
14
psychosis was almost surely the result of his substance abuse 
and not some other mental condition."  Dr. Brock added, "Again, 
while his drug-induced psychotic state may potentially serve as 
a mitigating factor, it does not, in my opinion, meet the 
criteria necessary for an insanity defense."3 
 
The requirement of proof of substance abuse of long-term, 
chronic, and habitual nature is consistent with the concern we 
expressed many years ago when we stated, "Insanity is easily 
feigned and hard to be disproved, and public safety requires 
that it should not be established by less than satisfactory 
evidence."  Wessels v. Commonwealth, 164 Va. 664, 674, 180 
S.E. 419, 423 (1935).  In order to establish the existence of 
a mental disease or defect caused by alcohol or drug abuse, 
i.e., settled insanity, White's evidence would have to 
demonstrate long-term, chronic, and habitual abuse.  White's 
proffered evidence on this question was insufficient to 
establish a prima facie defense of insanity. 
III. Conclusion 
                     
3 Significantly, White's proffered testimony of Dr. 
Skinner included no discussion of White's drug use, or its 
duration, and concluded that White "had a type of psychosis 
that was a religious obsession."  Although Dr. Skinner 
testified at the sentencing hearing, his testimony reflected 
little on the subject of duration of abuse.  Additionally, his 
testimony was offered at the sentencing hearing and cannot be 
considered by this Court on appeal because it was not 
presented to the trial court contemporaneously with its 
decision which was made upon motion in limine prior to the 
guilt phase of trial. 
 
15
 
We hold that the trial court did not err in excluding 
White's proffered evidence of insanity.  The judgment of the 
Court of Appeals will be affirmed. 
Affirmed. 
JUSTICE KOONTZ, dissenting. 
I respectfully dissent.  I do so guided by the axiomatic 
principle that an accused is entitled to have a jury issue 
resolved by a jury and not by the trial court or appellate 
courts, including this Court.  Where, as here, there is 
evidence to indicate that the accused was legally insane at 
the time he committed a crime and there is other evidence 
showing that he was not, that conflict in the evidence 
presents an issue to be determined by the jury.  Jones v. 
Commonwealth, 202 Va. 236, 239-40, 117 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1960).  
In my view, in the present case in considering the 
Commonwealth’s motion in limine the trial court decided the 
merits of the insanity defense of William White, Jr. as an 
issue of law rather than permitting the jury to determine 
factually whether White was or was not legally insane.∗ 
                     
∗ White’s trial was scheduled to be conducted with a jury.  
As a result of the trial court’s granting the Commonwealth’s 
motion in limine on the morning of the trial, White’s sole 
defense of insanity was eliminated from further consideration 
in the guilt determination phase of the trial.  Consequently, 
White’s trial proceeded without a jury upon White’s 
conditional plea of nolo contendere and the Commonwealth’s 
uncontested summary of the evidence. 
 
16
While insanity is an affirmative defense in Virginia that 
the accused must prove to the satisfaction of the fact finder 
by a preponderance of the evidence, Shifflett v. Commonwealth, 
221 Va. 760, 769, 274 S.E.2d 305, 310 (1981), whether the 
evidence would meet that standard is not at issue in this 
appeal.  Rather, the sole issue is whether the evidence 
proffered by White in opposition to the Commonwealth’s motion 
in limine to exclude all evidence of his insanity defense was 
sufficient merely to establish a prima facie case of insanity. 
I will not unnecessarily lengthen this opinion by 
reciting the proffered evidence pertinent to this inquiry.  
The majority accurately recites that evidence which is not in 
dispute.  However, under familiar principles of appellate 
review, because the Commonwealth was the proponent of the 
motion in limine, the evidence proffered in support and in 
opposition to that motion is to be considered in a light 
favorable to White, the non-moving party.  Cf. Huffman v. 
Love, 245 Va. 311, 314, 427 S.E.2d 357, 360 (1993) (evidence 
viewed on appeal in light most favorable to one whose claim 
was stricken at trial); see also McGowan v. Lewis, 233 Va. 
386, 387, 355 S.E.2d 334, 334 (1987) (upon review of the grant 
of a motion to strike, appellate court will consider the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences arising therefrom in 
the light most favorable to the non-moving party, resolving 
 
17
any doubt as to the sufficiency of the evidence in favor of 
that party); Food Lion v. Melton, 250 Va. 144, 149-51, 458 
S.E.2d 580, 584-85 (1995) (same); Waters v. Safeway Stores, 
Inc., 246 Va. 269, 270, 435 S.E.2d 380, 380 (1993) (same). 
The thrust of the Commonwealth’s motion in limine was 
that the only expert who had examined White was Dr. William 
Brock, who would testify that White was not legally insane at 
the time White committed the crimes in question because, in 
Dr. Brock’s opinion, White was suffering from a drug induced 
psychosis but knew the difference between right and wrong.  
Accordingly, in the absence of any other expert evidence that 
White suffered from a “disease of the mind,” White could not 
introduce “lay evidence” to support his insanity defense. 
We have stated, however, that “[t]here is nothing 
sacrosanct about the evidence of an expert witness.”  Wessells 
v. Commonwealth, 164 Va. 664, 671, 180 S.E.2d 419, 422 (1935).  
“The evidence of an expert witness [on insanity] should be 
given the same consideration as is given that of any other 
witness, considering his opportunity for knowledge of the 
subject and subject matter as to which he testifies, his 
appearance, conduct, and demeanor on the stand.”  McLane v. 
Commonwealth, 202 Va. 197, 206, 116 S.E.2d 274, 281 (1960).  
And we also have stated that “[a]lthough sanity or insanity 
may be established by lay witnesses, it is generally 
 
18
recognized that it is advisable to adduce expert testimony to 
better resolve such a complex problem.”  Shifflett, 221 Va. at 
769, 274 S.E.2d at 311.  (Emphasis added).  This is so because 
a “lay witness” can testify only to facts, and cannot express 
an opinion as to the existence of a person’s mental disease or 
state of mind.  See Jones, 202 Va. at 241, 117 S.E.2d at 71.  
But see Ford v. Ford, 200 Va. 674, 680, 107 S.E.2d 397, 401 
(1959); Davis v. Alderson, 125 Va. 681, 691, 100 S.E. 541, 544 
(1919). 
Based solely upon Dr. Brock’s evidence, a jury would be 
compelled to conclude that White was psychotic at the time he 
committed the crimes.  In common parlance, White then was 
suffering from a severe mental disorder associated with a loss 
of contact with reality.  Clearly, because no evidence in the 
record suggests that White was not psychotic at that time, the 
jury could reasonably have accepted White’s psychotic state of 
mind as a fact. 
Dr. Brock further opined that while White “seems to meet 
the threshold criteria for an insanity defense,” his defense 
may not be “viable” because of his “efforts not to be 
identified or get caught” after committing the crimes and 
because his psychotic symptoms “were the result of his 
voluntary and excessive use of cocaine.”  Undoubtedly, White 
was an admitted abuser of cocaine and other narcotic drugs and 
 
19
had previously been admitted to a psychiatric hospital as a 
result.  The totality of this evidence would indicate that 
White, although psychotic, was not legally insane because his 
abuse of drugs was voluntary and apparently not of long 
standing. 
However, White proffered the evidence of numerous lay 
witnesses, including his mother, his roommate, a licensed 
clinical social worker, and prison personnel, that he 
displayed psychotic symptoms both before and after he 
committed the crimes when he was not taking drugs.  That 
evidence coupled with the other evidence of these lay 
witnesses that White believed he heard the voice of God 
directing his actions created a conflict in the evidence 
whether White’s psychotic state of mind resulted from his drug 
abuse or some other underlying mental disorder. 
In applying the M’Naghten test for insanity we have not 
required the accused to establish an expert diagnosis of the 
underlying mental disorder manifested by the accused’s 
psychotic state of mind in order to satisfy the first portion 
of that test.  Undoubtedly mental health experts would be the 
first to concede that satisfaction of such a requirement would 
not always be within the current expertise of those in the 
mental health field.  Nevertheless, in Price v. Commonwealth, 
228 Va. 452, 459-60, 323 S.E.2d 106, 110 (1984), we explained 
 
20
the application of the M’Naghten test for insanity that we 
follow in Virginia and that is facially implicated in this 
case.  There we explained that: 
The first portion of M’Naghten relates to an 
accused who is psychotic to an extreme 
degree . . . .  The latter portion of 
M’Naghten relates to an accused who knew the 
nature and quality of his act.  He knew what 
he was doing . . . .  However, because of 
mental disease, he did not know that what he 
was doing was wrong.  He believed, for 
example, that he was carrying out a command 
from God. 
 
Id.  
If accepted as fact by the jury, the evidence of the lay 
witnesses and White’s confirmation of that evidence in his 
account to Dr. Brock that he did not know that committing the 
crimes in question was wrong because he was carrying out a 
command from God provides an independent evidentiary basis to 
support White’s insanity defense.  That evidence is in sharp 
conflict with the evidence that White’s psychotic state of 
mind resulted solely from drug abuse as the trial judge, the 
majority of the Court of Appeals, and the majority of this 
Court seem to have accepted as a fact.  They all may be 
correct, but such was for the jury to decide because White’s 
proffered evidence was sufficient to establish a prima facie 
case of his insanity. 
 
21
 
For these reasons, I would reverse the majority decision 
of the Court of Appeals, and remand the case for a new trial 
in which the jury is allowed to decide whether or not White 
was legally insane at the time he committed the crimes in 
question.