Title: State v. Goyette

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Goyette  (96-067); 166 Vt. 299; 691 A.2d 1064

[Filed 28-Feb-1997]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                     No. 96-067

State of Vermont                                  Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
     v.                                           District Court of Vermont,
             					  Unit No. 2, Addison Circuit

Timothy Goyette                                   January Term, 1997

Michael S. Kupersmith, J.

       Sandra W. Everitt, Addison County Deputy State's Attorney, Middlebury,
  for plaintiff-appellee

       Thomas C. Nuovo of Nuovo, Gale & Fuller, P.C., Burlington, for
  defendant-appellant

       PRESENT:        Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ., and Allen,
  C.J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned

       JOHNSON, J.   Defendant, who was found guilty of violating a final
  relief-from-abuse order that had incorporated a stipulation prohibiting him
  from abusing or harassing his estranged wife, appeals the conviction on the
  grounds that the underlying order was invalid and that the trial court
  erred in instructing the jury on the definition of harassment.  We conclude
  that the court's instruction requires reversal of the conviction.

       Defendant and the complainant were married in 1983 and had three
  children before separating in September 1993, at which time a temporary
  relief-from-abuse ordered was issued against defendant.  As the result of
  incidents occurring during this period of separation, defendant was charged
  with domestic assault and with violating the temporary abuse-prevention
  order.  At the final relief-from-abuse hearing on October 12, 1993,
  defendant and the complainant, who were both represented by counsel,
  presented the family court with a stipulation (1) stating that defendant
  "shall be prevented and restrained for a period of one year from directly
  or indirectly harassing or abusing" the complainant; (2) establishing a
  schedule for temporary joint custody

 

  of the children; (3) making a temporary distribution of the parties' real
  estate and personal property; and (4) requiring the parties to attend
  various types of counseling.  The stipulation was incorporated by reference
  into the family court's final relief-from-abuse order.  In January 1994,
  defendant pled no contest to the charges of domestic assault and violation
  of the temporary relief-from-abuse order.

       In July 1994, defendant was charged with violating the final
  relief-from-abuse order by making harassing statements and threatening
  phone calls to the complainant on several occasions in late June and early
  July 1994.  After the district court denied his motion to dismiss and
  rejected a plea agreement reached by him and the State, defendant withdrew
  his no-contest plea. Following a two-day trial, a jury found defendant
  guilty of violating the final abuse-prevention order.  The district court
  ordered defendant to serve four months in jail, to be followed by a two-
  and-one-half-year probationary period, during which time he would be
  subject to numerous conditions dealing with counseling, substance abuse,
  and contact with the complainant.  On appeal, defendant argues that (1) the
  final relief-from-abuse order was defective because the family court failed
  to make findings that he had abused the complainant; (2) he was improperly
  prosecuted for and convicted of acts beyond the scope of the
  abuse-prevention statute; and (3) the definition of harassment contained in
  the district court's jury charge was overly broad and thus could have
  resulted in the jury convicting him for legitimate acts.

       Defendant was convicted of a felony for violating a provision in a
  final relief-from-abuse order that incorporated by mere reference a
  stipulation dealing with not only harassment and abuse, but also parental
  rights and responsibilities, property distribution, and counseling.  The
  family court incorporated the stipulation into its final abuse-prevention
  order without finding that defendant had abused the complainant or that the
  harassment provision in the stipulation was necessary to prevent future
  abuse.  Thus, the sole basis for the felony criminal prosecution against
  defendant was a stipulation that did not confirm prior abuse and that dealt
  primarily with issues more properly reserved for divorce or other custody
  proceedings.  See Rapp v. Dimino,

 

  162 Vt. 1, 5,