Title: State v. Dimitri Henley

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

No.  2008AP697  
(L.C. No. 
1998CF486) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Dimitri Henley, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
NOV 25, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
MEMORANDUM DECISION OF 
JUSTICE PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK 
 
 
Before Patience Drake Roggensack, J. 
 
¶1 
Dimitri 
Henley 
(Henley) 
has 
moved 
me 
to 
disqualify/recuse myself from continued participation in the 
above-captioned action, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(e) 
and (g) (2007–08)1 and SCR 60.04(4).  In regard to all three 
bases for disqualification/recusal, Henley claims that because I 
participated in the court of appeals panel that decided State v. 
                     
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2008AP697   
 
2 
 
Adams, No. 2002-0039-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
Nov. 7, 2002),2 even though I did not participate in Henley's 
appeal, State v. Henley, No. 2001-2768-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2002),3 I am disqualified by law from 
participating in the pending proceeding involving Henley.4   
¶2 
Henley contends that because he and Adams were co-
defendants during the trial of the underlying action, even 
though the appeals of their convictions proceeded separately and 
were decided by two different appellate judge panels, my 
participation in Adams' appeal causes the pending proceeding to 
come within the directive of Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(e) that 
prohibits an appellate judge from subsequent participation if 
he/she "handled the action or proceeding" while a judge of an 
"inferior court."  He also contends that, based on the same set 
of facts, I should conclude that my recusal is required by Wis. 
Stat. § 757.19(2)(g) and SCR 60.04(4) due to the appearance of 
partiality that he claims my participation in the appeal in 
State v. Adams produces.  And finally, Henley asserts that he 
was unaware of my participation in the court of appeals decision 
                     
2 State v. Adams, No. 2002-0039-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2002), was decided by a panel consisting 
of Judges Dykman, Vergeront and Roggensack. 
3 State v. Henley, No. 2001-2768-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2002), was decided by a panel consisting 
of Judges Dykman, Vergeront and Deininger. 
4 I served as a judge on District IV of the Wisconsin Court 
of Appeals from August 1, 1996 until July 31, 2003. 
No. 
2008AP697   
 
3 
 
in State v. Adams until recently, and that as soon as he learned 
of it, he brought the present motion.  Therefore, he contends 
that 
he 
has 
not 
waived 
his 
objection 
to 
my 
continued 
participation in this proceeding. 
¶3 
I agree with Henley that no waiver of objection 
occurred here.  I was as unaware as he that I had participated 
in State v. Adams while a court of appeals judge.5  I appreciate 
his 
bringing 
this 
interesting 
question 
to 
my 
attention.  
Further, based upon my research into the meaning of Wis. Stat. 
§ 757.19(2)(e) and (g) and SCR 60.04(4), and the application of 
those provisions to the facts that give rise to Henley's motion, 
I conclude that I am not precluded by law from participation in 
the above-captioned matter.  Accordingly, I deny Henley's motion 
for my disqualification/recusal in the pending review.   
I. BACKGROUND 
¶4 
Henley, Adams and another man were charged with 
numerous counts of sexual assault for events that were alleged 
to have occurred with a single victim in her college dormitory 
room.  Their first trial ended when the circuit court granted a 
mistrial.  At the second trial, only Henley and Adams were 
defendants and both were convicted of the commission or 
conspiracy to commit five counts of second-degree sexual 
assault, by use of force or violence, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
                     
5 During the seven years in which I served as a Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals judge for District IV, more than 2,100 cases 
were decided by various panels of District IV judges. 
No. 
2008AP697   
 
4 
 
§ 940.225(2)(a).  Each was sentenced to significant time in 
prison.   
¶5 
Although Henley and Adams were tried together, they 
filed 
separate 
appeals, 
and 
they 
proceeded 
separately 
thereafter.  Henley and Adams were represented by separate 
counsel during the course of their appeals.  Henley's conviction 
was affirmed on appeal,6 as was Adams'.7   
¶6 
Henley then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus 
in the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Wisconsin.  His petition for writ was denied, and Henley did not 
appeal that decision.   
¶7 
Adams filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Wisconsin.  His petition also was denied.  However, Adams 
appealed the denial of his habeas petition to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.  The Seventh Circuit 
concluded as follows:  the evidence established use of force and 
threat of force; the evidence established lack of consent; 
defense counsel's failure to seek a jury instruction for a 
lesser included offense was reasonable; defense counsel's 
failure 
to 
more 
vigorously 
cross-examine 
the 
victim 
was 
reasonable, but defense counsel was deficient "by not locating 
                     
6 State v. Adams, No. 2002-0039-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2002). 
7 State v. Henley, No. 2001-2768-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2002). 
No. 
2008AP697   
 
5 
 
and talking to [Shawn] Demain, who could have conceivably served 
as a witness on Adams's behalf."  Adams v. Bertrand, 453 
F.3d 428, 433–35 (7th Cir. 2006).  The Seventh Circuit also 
concluded that prejudice existed because Adams' counsel did not 
"investigate [or] call Demain."  Id. at 438.  Based on its 
conclusion that ineffective assistance of counsel had prejudiced 
Adams, the Seventh Circuit reversed Adams' conviction and 
remanded the matter to state court.  Id.  The Jefferson County 
District Attorney chose not to re-try Adams.   
¶8 
Henley then moved the Jefferson County Circuit Court 
for a new trial in the interests of justice, based on the 
Seventh Circuit's decision in Adams' habeas appeal.  The 
Jefferson County Circuit Court granted Henley's motion, the 
State appealed, and the court of appeals certified the case.  We 
accepted certification and heard oral argument on the State's 
appeal on October 20, 2009. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. General Principles 
¶9 
A decision on Henley's disqualification/recusal motion 
requires me to interpret and to apply Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(e) 
and (g) and SCR 60.04(4).  Questions of statutory interpretation 
and application are questions of law.  Watton v. Hegerty, 2008 
WI 74, ¶14, 311 Wis. 2d 52, 751 N.W.2d 369.  The interpretation 
and application of Supreme Court Rules also are questions of 
law.  Filppula-McArthur v. Halloin, 2001 WI 8, ¶32, 241 Wis. 2d 
110, 622 N.W.2d 436.   
No. 
2008AP697   
 
6 
 
¶10 Statutory interpretation begins with the words chosen 
by the legislature in order to determine the meaning of the 
statute.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 
2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  In addition, 
the meaning of a statute may be ascertained from the context in 
which those words are used.  Id., ¶46.  If the words chosen by 
the legislature demonstrate a "plain, clear statutory meaning," 
without ambiguity, the statute is applied according to that 
plain meaning.  Id.  However, if a statute is "capable of being 
understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more 
senses[,]" then the statute is ambiguous.  Id., ¶47.  When a 
statute is ambiguous, we may consult extrinsic sources in an 
attempt to discern its meaning.  Id., ¶¶48, 50.  Although 
extrinsic sources are usually not consulted if the statutory 
language clearly sets forth the meaning of the statute, we may 
nevertheless examine extrinsic sources "to confirm or verify a 
plain-meaning interpretation."  Id., ¶51. 
¶11 We interpret Supreme Court rules in a similar fashion, 
beginning with the words chosen for the rule.  See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Trewin, 2004 WI 116, ¶38, 275 
Wis. 2d 116, 684 N.W.2d 121; In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Marcus, 107 Wis. 2d 560, 576, 320 N.W.2d 806 (1982).   
B. Wisconsin Stat. § 757.19(2)(e) 
¶12 Henley's motion asserts that because I participated in 
the court of appeals panel that decided the appeal in State v. 
Adams that I am disqualified by law from further participation 
No. 
2008AP697   
 
7 
 
in State v. Henley, according to the provisions of Wis. Stat. 
§ 757.19(2)(e).  Section 757.19 provides in relevant part:   
(2) Any judge shall disqualify himself or herself 
from any civil or criminal action or proceeding when 
one of the following situations occurs: 
. . . 
 
(e) When a judge of an appellate court previously 
handled the action or proceeding while judge of an 
inferior court. 
¶13 As a court of appeals judge, I did not participate in 
Henley's appeal.8  However, the question Henley now raises is 
whether I "previously handled the action or proceeding," as that 
phrase 
is 
used 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 757.19(2)(e), 
because 
I 
participated in State v. Adams.  Henley asserts that I fall 
within the proscription of the statute because Henley's and 
Adams' appeals arose out of a trial in which they were co-
defendants and their appeals contained similar issues.  Henley's 
assertion presents an issue of first impression in regard to the 
meaning of § 757.19(2)(e).   
¶14 In order to answer the question Henley poses, I begin 
by examining the statutory term, "action or proceeding," in the 
context in which it is used.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  
The term "action or proceeding" is used in more than one place 
in Wis. Stat. § 757.19.  For example, the prefatory language of 
subsection (2) states in relevant part, "shall disqualify 
himself or herself from any civil or criminal action or 
                     
8 Id.  
No. 
2008AP697   
 
8 
 
proceeding when one of the following situations occurs." 
(Emphasis added.)  The list of circumstances that follows that 
prefatory language uses "action or proceeding" in two places:  
paragraphs (2)(c) and (2)(e).  
¶15 The meaning of "action or proceeding" in the prefatory 
language conditions all of the paragraphs of subsection (2) that 
follow.  The prefatory language must refer to the matter then 
pending before the court, otherwise there would be no occasion 
to apply the directives of Wis. Stat. § 757.19.  For example, if 
it were not the then pending matter to which "action or 
proceeding" 
referred, 
subsection 
(2) 
and 
the 
subsequent 
provision 
on 
waiver 
in 
subsection 
(3), 
would 
have 
no 
application.  Stated otherwise, if "action or proceeding" in the 
prefatory language of subsection (2) did not refer to the action 
currently pending before a court, there would be no need to 
address a potential waiver in order to enable an otherwise 
disqualified judge to participate in that action or proceeding.  
¶16 In paragraph (2)(c), the term "action or proceeding" 
is also employed as a directive for the disqualification of a 
judge.  Paragraph (2)(c) provides:  "When a judge previously 
acted as counsel to any party in the same action or proceeding."  
Although 
paragraph 
(2)(c) 
has 
not 
been 
interpreted, 
its 
predecessor statute, Wis. Stat. § 256.19 (1969),9 has been 
                     
9 Wisconsin Stat. § 256.19 (1969) provided in relevant part: 
In case any judge of any court of record . . . shall 
have acted as attorney or counsel for either of the 
parties thereto such judge shall not have power to 
(continued) 
No. 
2008AP697   
 
9 
 
interpreted.  Sturdevant v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 142, 181 N.W.2d 
523 (1970).  In Sturdevant, we interpreted "action," the term 
then used in § 256.19, and concluded that participation of a 
judge was precluded only if the judge had acted as counsel "for 
either of the parties to the action or proceeding in the matter 
so to be heard or determined."  Id. at 145 (quoting State ex 
rel. Rowell v. Dick, 125 Wis. 51, 58, 103 N.W. 229 (1905)).  
Henley has provided no reason to interpret the term "action or 
proceeding" in paragraph (2)(c) differently than "action" was 
interpreted in Sturdevant, and I have found none. 
¶17 In Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(e), raised by Henley, the 
relevant 
phrase 
is 
"previously 
handled 
the 
action 
or 
proceeding."  The plain meaning of the relevant term encompasses 
only the case of State v. Henley because a judge could not have 
previously handled State v. Henley unless he had participated in 
it during an earlier stage of the litigation.  Further, my 
reading of paragraph (2)(e) is consistent with the meaning of 
"action or proceeding" in other parts of § 757.19, which is the 
context in which the term is found.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
¶46. 
¶18 My conclusion that "action or proceeding" refers only 
to the case before the court as that case proceeded through the 
judicial system is also consistent with the use of the term 
                                                                  
hear and determine such action or proceeding or to 
make any order therein, except with the consent of the 
parties thereto. 
No. 
2008AP697   
 
10 
 
"action or proceeding" in other statutes.  For example, Wis. 
Stat. § 809.15, which addresses the record on appeal, provides 
in relevant part:   
(1) Composition of record.  (a) The record on appeal 
consists of the following unless the parties stipulate 
to the contrary: 
1. The paper by which the action or proceeding 
was commenced. 
(Emphasis added.)  It would contravene common sense to conclude 
that the "action or proceeding" referred to in subdivision 
(1)(a)1. of § 809.15 refers to an action or proceeding other 
than the one then pending on appeal.10   
¶19 One could argue that because the term, "same" precedes 
"action or proceeding" in paragraph (2)(c) and the word "the" 
precedes "action or proceeding" in paragraph (2)(e) that 
paragraph (2)(e) refers to a broader category of matters than 
does paragraph (2)(c).  However, I conclude that the term "same" 
in paragraph (2)(c) is a codification of the limitation set out 
in Sturdevant.  What is more persuasive, however, is that 
because "action or proceeding" in (2)(e) is preceded by the 
phrase, "previously 
handled the," the statutory directive 
includes 
only 
those 
occasions 
where 
the 
appellate 
judge 
previously participated in the action or proceeding then pending 
before the court when disqualification/recusal is sought.   
                     
10 See also the use of "action or proceeding" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.58(4) addressing "Substitution of judge" in civil actions; 
Wis. Stat. § 799.205(1) addressing "Substitution of judge" in 
small claims actions. 
No. 
2008AP697   
 
11 
 
¶20 Even though I have interpreted Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2) 
through a plain meaning analysis, my interpretation also is 
supported 
by 
the 
legislative history underlying § 757.19.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 256.19 (1977) was the immediate predecessor of 
§ 757.19; it contained all of the substantive provisions on 
judicial disqualification that are found in § 757.19(2).   
¶21 Wisconsin Stat. § 256.19 (1977) was created by the 
laws of 1977, with the assistance of the Judicial Council.  
Minutes of Judicial Council, Dec. 19, 1975.  The Judicial 
Council Committee on Judge Substitution and Court Commissioners 
reviewed the statutes of all states then having a judicial self-
disqualification 
statute 
and 
its 
survey 
identified 
ten 
"significant 
criteria 
for 
disqualification." 
 
Richard 
R. 
Malmgren memorandum, Sept. 19, 1975.  
¶22 Paragraph (2)(e) of Wis. Stat. § 757.19 began as the 
tenth criterion identified by the Judicial Council Committee.  
As initially phrased by Mr. Malmgren, the tenth disqualification 
criterion read:  "A member of a state appellate court cannot 
deliberate upon a case in which he was previously the trial 
judge."  Id. at 2.  The Committee then revised this criterion to 
the language presently appearing in Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(e).  
Minutes of Judicial Council, Dec. 19, 1975. 
¶23 The legislative history shows that the limitation that 
was provided through the language "previously handled the action 
or proceeding," employed in paragraph (2)(e) is directed at the 
action or proceeding in which the judge previously participated.  
Accordingly, 
I 
conclude 
that 
disqualification/recusal 
is 
No. 
2008AP697   
 
12 
 
directed under Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(e) only when the same 
defendant in the action or proceeding on which an appellate 
judge has already participated as a judge is once again before a 
court on which the same judge is serving. 
C. Wisconsin Stat. § 757.19(2)(g) 
¶24 Henley also asserts that even if I am not required to 
disqualify/recuse myself under Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(e), I 
should nevertheless do so under Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g).  
Paragraph (2)(g) provides in relevant part:   
(2) Any judge shall disqualify himself or herself 
from any civil or criminal action or proceeding when 
one of the following situations occurs: 
. . . 
 
(g) When a judge determines that, for any reason, 
he or she cannot, or it appears he or she cannot, act 
in an impartial manner. 
The focus of paragraph (2)(g), when applied to an appellate 
judge, 
is 
that 
the 
judge 
should 
determine 
whether 
some 
circumstance causes the judge to conclude that he or she cannot, 
or that it appears to the judge that he or she cannot, act in an 
impartial manner in an appeal.  Donohoo v. Action Wis., Inc., 
2008 WI 110, ¶24, 314 Wis. 2d 510, 754 N.W.2d 480 (citing State 
v. Am. TV & Appliance of Madison, Inc., 151 Wis. 2d 175, 182-83, 
443 N.W.2d 662 (1989)).   
¶25 I have never participated in any action or proceeding 
involving Henley.  That I may have considered issues similar to 
those involved in Henley's appeal before the Wisconsin Court of 
Appeals is too broad a category to cause me to conclude that I 
No. 
2008AP697   
 
13 
 
will not address the issues in the State's appeal that is now 
before us in a fair and impartial manner.  I have considered 
thousands of issues since I became an appellate judge in 1996.  
Some issues I probably have considered many times.  Such is the 
nature of appellate judging, but that is no basis from which I 
can conclude that I am disqualified by law from participation in 
the certification of the State's appeal.  
D. Supreme Court Rule 60.04(4) 
¶26 Henley also asserts that I am disqualified from 
further participation under Supreme Court Rule 60.04(4).  He 
cites only the preamble and not any of the particular paragraphs 
of SCR 60.04(4).  Motion for Disqualification and or Recusal of 
Justice Roggensack on Statutory Grounds, ¶4.  The part of the 
SCR Henley relies on provides: 
Except as provided in sub. (6) for waiver, a 
judge shall recuse himself or herself in a proceeding 
when the facts and circumstances the judge knows or 
reasonably should know establish one of the following 
or 
when 
reasonable, 
well-informed 
persons 
knowledgeable about judicial ethics standards and the 
justice 
system 
and 
aware 
of 
the 
facts 
and 
circumstances the judge knows or reasonably should 
know would reasonably question the judge's ability to 
be impartial[.]  
¶27 This part of SCR 60.04(4) is similar to Wis. Stat. 
§ 757.19(2)(g), except that it could be read to include both a 
subjective and an objective test for the judge to apply, i.e., 
when "the judge knows or reasonably should know" and when 
"reasonable, 
well-informed 
persons 
. . . 
would 
reasonably 
question the judge's ability to be impartial."  However, it is 
No. 
2008AP697   
 
14 
 
not necessary that I decide which test to apply because, as I 
have already explained in my discussion of § 757.19(2)(e), my 
participation in State v. Adams does not fall within the meaning 
of "previously handled the action or proceeding," which phrase 
describes the conduct prohibited by paragraph (2)(e).  My 
participation in State v. Adams is the only conduct on which 
Henley bases his motion.   
¶28 Furthermore, even though I found no case addressing 
Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2) or SCR 60.04(4) that is bottomed on 
Henley's assertions, several cases show the thinness of his 
position.  For example, in State v. O'Neill, 2003 WI App 73, 261 
Wis. 2d 534, 663 N.W.2d 292, the court of appeals considered 
whether the circuit court's applying a trial procedure to a 
trial in which O'Neill was involved violated O'Neill's right to 
due process of law because the court of appeals had held that 
same trial procedure could not be applied in an earlier trial in 
which O'Neill had been a party.  Id., ¶16.  The court of appeals 
concluded that the circuit court's procedure did not violate 
O'Neill's rights where that same procedure as had been employed 
in the first trial was used again.  Id., ¶20.    
¶29 In Voigt v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 17, 211 N.W.2d 445 
(1973), we concluded that Voigt's right to due process was not 
impaired when a trial judge took the guilty plea of a co-
defendant and later acted as the trial judge in Voigt's trial 
where the former co-defendant testified for the State.  Id. at 
23.  And, in Milburn v. State, 50 Wis. 2d 53, 183 N.W.2d 70 
(1971), we concluded that information concerning the defendant 
No. 
2008AP697   
 
15 
 
which was received by the trial court in another proceeding did 
not affect the trial judge's impartiality by "negat[ing] the 
presumption that the trial judge, in fidelity to his oath of 
office, will try each case on its merits."  Id. at 62.  
¶30 Accordingly, I conclude that there is no basis on 
which SCR 60.04(4) requires my recusal. 
E. Disqualification/Recusal Policy Concerns 
¶31 Motions to disqualify a justice of this court from 
participation in pending cases have become motions de jour.  
Currently, nine such motions are pending before the court, 
directed at various justices.  While the attorneys practicing 
before the court assist us in the development of the law when 
they bring interesting legal issues to us for review, care must 
be taken by attorneys to thoroughly research the law that 
underlies any motion.  This is no less true when it is a motion 
for disqualification/recusal of a justice.  Such motions raise 
serious concerns for the justice and institutional concerns for 
the court.   
¶32 Concerns 
similar 
to 
mine 
in 
regard 
to 
disqualification/recusal motions have been expressed by various 
members of the United States Supreme Court when addressing 
motions for self-disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455, which 
applies to federal appellate judges.  While the wording of § 455 
differs considerably from Wis. Stat. § 757.19, § 455, as 
interpreted by several justices of the United States Supreme 
Court in regard to motions directed at their own participation, 
offers 
some 
guidance 
on 
the 
concept 
of 
judicial 
self-
No. 
2008AP697   
 
16 
 
disqualification for appellate judges and the tensions that can 
arise under statutes such as Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2).  See, e.g., 
Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972).  
¶33 In Laird, Justice Rehnquist interpreted the provisions 
of 28 U.S.C. § 455, as it then appeared, in regard to a motion 
that he disqualify himself from further participation in the 
Court's review of Laird.  He did so upon the allegation that: 
because of testimony which [he] gave on behalf of the 
Department of Justice before the Subcommittee on 
Constitutional Rights of the Judiciary Committee of 
the United States Senate at its hearings on "Federal 
Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights," and 
because of other statements [he] made in speeches 
related to this general subject.  
Id. at 824-25.  Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that there was 
one reference in Laird to his prepared statement to the United 
States Senate Subcommittee and one other general comment of his 
as well.  Id. at 826-27.   
¶34 However, what is most instructive about Laird is not 
Justice Rehnquist's decision refusing to disqualify himself, id. 
at 836, but rather, his extensive discussion of the tension 
between the "duty to sit" where not disqualified and the "duty 
to not sit" where disqualified, id. at 837.  Justice Rehnquist 
was particularly concerned with disqualification of a justice of 
the United States Supreme Court because of the unique nature of 
the Court.  He explained, "[t]here is no way of substituting 
Justices on this Court as one judge may be substituted for 
another in the district courts."  Id.  He was troubled by the 
disqualification of a justice that could result in an equally 
No. 
2008AP697   
 
17 
 
divided Supreme Court, where "[t]here is no higher court of 
appeal which may review an equally divided decision of this 
Court and thereby establish the law for our jurisdiction."  Id.  
Justice Rehnquist noted that one of the stated reasons for the 
Court's granting certiorari "is to resolve a conflict among 
other federal courts or state courts."  Id. at 838.  An equally 
divided court created by self-disqualification of one justice 
would preclude such conflict resolution and could result in "one 
rule in Athens, and another rule in Rome."  Id.   
¶35 The same policy concerns as those Justice Rehnquist 
discussed must be considered when a justice of this court is 
asked to disqualify himself or herself.  As with the United 
States Supreme Court, no other judge can replace a justice on 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court.  Therefore, disqualification of one 
justice could result in an evenly divided supreme court, thereby 
leaving the State of Wisconsin with no higher court to resolve 
the legal issue the case presents.  Furthermore, as with the 
United States Supreme Court, one of our criteria for granting 
review is the need to harmonize conflicts in the law among the 
branches of the court of appeals.  Wis. Stat. § 809.62(1r)(c).  
An equally divided court created by self-disqualification of one 
justice could result in one rule of law in Milwaukee and another 
in Madison.   
¶36 It is a far-reaching duty that we undertake when we 
take the oath of office to serve as a justice of the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court.  We assume a solemn duty to act in accord with 
our law-declaring function, unless our disqualification is 
No. 
2008AP697   
 
18 
 
required by law.  Therefore, no justice of the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court 
should 
disqualify 
himself 
or 
herself 
unless 
disqualification is required.  There certainly are times when it 
would be easier and less hassle for the justice to grant the 
motion for disqualification/recusal, and at this time in 
history, simply granting the motion may be the politically 
correct choice.  However, the oath of office requires much more 
of each justice at whom such a motion is directed.   
III. CONCLUSION 
¶37 In conclusion, I agree with Henley that no waiver of 
objection occurred here.  I was as unaware as he that I had 
participated in State v. Adams while a court of appeals judge.  
I appreciate his bringing this interesting question to my 
attention.  Further, based upon my research into the meaning of 
Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(e) and (g) and SCR 60.04(4), and the 
application of those provisions to the facts that give rise to 
Henley's motion, I conclude that I am not precluded by law from 
participation in the above-captioned matter.  Accordingly, I 
deny Henley's motion for my disqualification/recusal in the 
pending review.   
 
 
No. 
2008AP697   
 
 
 
1