Title: Amendment To Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure - Rule 3.112

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC90635
____________
IN RE: AMENDMENT TO FLORIDA RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE–RULE 3.112 MINIMUM STANDARDS 
FOR ATTORNEYS IN CAPITAL CASES.
[February 21, 2002]
ANSTEAD, J.
At the Court’s request, the Committee on Minimum Standards for Attorneys
in Capital Cases (Minimum Standards Committee or Committee) has filed
proposed amendments to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.112 (Minimum
Standards for Attorneys in Capital Cases).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, §
2(a), Fla. Const.  By this opinion we accept most of the Committee’s proposals in
our continuing efforts to improve the capital litigation process in Florida.
BACKGROUND
This Court, in 1997, established the Committee on Minimum Standards for
Attorneys in Capital Cases to study and recommend for the Court’s review
minimum standards to ensure the competency of court-appointed counsel in death
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penalty cases.  See In re Proposed Amendment to Fla. Rules of Judicial Admin., 22
Fla. L. Weekly S407 (Fla. July 3, 1997).  The Committee proposed such standards,
the standards were published in The Florida Bar News, and a number of comments
were filed and forwarded to the Committee.  Based on the comments, the
Committee submitted revised proposed standards and oral argument was held on
the proposals. 
In 1998, the Court deferred consideration of the proposed standards pending
legislative study of the issue.  See In re Amendment to Fla. Rules of Judicial
Admin.–Minimum Standards for Appointed Counsel in Capital Cases, 711 So. 2d
1148 (Fla. 1998).  After unanimous recommendation by a legislative study
commission that this Court, rather than the Legislature, adopt standards for lawyers
in capital cases, the Court resumed consideration of the matter.  See In re
Amendment to Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure–Rule 3.112 Minimum Standards
for Attorneys in Capital Cases, 759 So. 2d 610, 611 (Fla. 1999).  In 1999, this
Court adopted the Committee’s proposed revised standards, with some
modification, as rule of criminal procedure 3.112, which went into effect July 1,
2000.  See id. 
As adopted, new rule 3.112 applies to “conflict” counsel–attorneys
appointed to represent defendants in capital cases where the services of the public
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defender are not available due to a conflict of interest.  See Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.112(a).  When adopting the new rule, the Court announced its “preliminary”
determination that the minimum standards “should be extended to lawyers
practicing law within the offices of the public defenders in order to ensure that
competent counsel is provided to all indigent capital defendants.”  759 So. 2d at
614.  However, recognizing that it had not previously announced its intention to
extend the rule to assistant public defenders, the Court sought comments on
extending the rule.  The Court also noted agreement with the views expressed by
Justice Lewis in his specially concurring opinion that “we have an obligation to
investigate and consider establishing standards for all counsel, including public
defenders, privately retained counsel, and others who represent capital defendants
during any phase of the proceedings.”  759 So. 2d at 614 n.9.  The Court,
therefore, asked the Minimum Standards Committee “to reconvene, and after
appropriate investigation and study, to make recommendations to this Court as to
whether we should adopt additional standards as suggested by Justice Lewis.”  Id. 
In response to the Court’s request, the Committee submitted two sets of
proposed amendments: the first proposal extends rule 3.112 to all attorneys who
handle capital cases; the second proposal amends the rule to cover all attorneys
except privately retained counsel.  The Court in turn published the two proposals
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for comment in the June 15, 2000, edition of The Florida Bar News.  A number of
comments were filed and oral argument was held in December 2000.  At oral
argument, much of the discussion focused on whether and how to extend the
standards to privately retained counsel.  In response to this Court’s request, the
Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (FACDL) subsequently filed a
supplemental comment addressing “the practical problems discussed at oral
argument regarding extension of the subject standards to privately-retained
counsel.” 
DISCUSSION
With this long history and wealth of input at hand, we adhere to our initial
decision to extend the rule 3.112 minimum standards to public defenders who
represent defendants in capital cases and further extend the standards to private
counsel retained to represent capital defendants at trial or on direct appeal. 
However, for the reasons expressed below, we decline to extend the standards to 
capital postconviction counsel.  When originally adopting rule 3.112, we took “an
important step in ensuring the integrity of the judicial process in capital cases by
adopting [minimum standards for conflict attorneys appointed in capital cases] to
help ensure that competent representation will be provided to indigent capital
defendants in all cases.”  759 So. 2d at 611.  Today, with the adoption of these
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amendments, we broaden that goal by requiring all attorneys who represent capital
defendants at trial or on direct appeal to meet the minimum standards of the rule.
Accordingly, we adopt the Minimum Standards Committee’s first proposal, with
the modifications discussed below.  We also address below, by general topic, a
number of suggestions and concerns raised by the comments or at oral argument.
REACH OF STANDARDS
As noted above, rule 3.112 currently applies only to conflict counsel who
handle capital trials and appeals.  When adopting the rule 3.112 standards, the
Court announced its intent to extend the standards to attorneys within the offices of
the public defenders who handle capital cases and sought input on that decision.
759 So. 2d at 614.  The majority of those who commented, including The Florida
Public Defender Association (Association), supports this extension; and we believe
that adopting minimum standards for public defenders who handle capital cases is a
logical extension of rule 3.112 which will ensure that all indigent defendants facing a
death sentence receive competent representation.   
Further extending the standards to privately retained counsel is
overwhelmingly supported by virtually all who addressed the issue in comments
and at oral argument, including the Florida Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers (FACDL), which represents private lawyers throughout Florida.  The sole
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opponent to this extension is the Criminal Procedure Rules Committee (Rules
Committee), which is concerned that requiring private attorneys to comply with rule
3.112 before they can represent a capital defendant could limit the constitutional
right of an accused, facing the death penalty, to retain counsel of his or her choice. 
Those who favor extending the standards to privately retained counsel counter this
concern by citing such cases as Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988)
(recognizing that “while the right to select and be represented by one's preferred
attorney is comprehended by the Sixth Amendment, the essential aim of the
amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather
than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom
he prefers”); and Vagner v. Wainwright, 398 So. 2d 448, 452 (Fla. 1981) (stating
that the same standards for evaluating claims of inadequacy and incompetency of
appointed counsel apply to such claims involving retained counsel).  The
proponents of the extension further argue that this Court’s inherent authority to set
standards for Bar admission and practice and to mandate qualifications for
certification in specified practice areas, see art. V, § 15, Fla. Const., would extend
to the adoption of minimum standards for private attorneys who wish to handle
capital cases. 
We are sensitive to the Rules Committee’s concern; however, we believe that
1.  See, e.g., Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 714 (requiring all attorneys who handle capital
cases to meet qualifications of the Capital Litigation Trial Bar).
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the uniform application of these standards to all attorneys who handle capital trials
and direct appeals should have little impact on a nonindigent defendant’s right to
choose counsel.  According to the supplemental comment filed by the FACDL,
retaining private counsel in a capital case is relatively rare and most of the private
attorneys who handle capital cases already meet the minimum standards.  The
FACDL further notes that, for those who do not meet the standards, there should
be no significant obstacles to their obtaining the necessary training and experience. 
The required continuing legal education programs are readily available and
mentoring programs exist throughout the state which permit private counsel to sit as
“second chair” in capital cases with court-appointed counsel or public defenders.  
Moreover, one of our goals in adopting these standards is to minimize
postconviction problems and delay at the back end of the process by focusing on
the quality of the trial and direct appeal proceedings at the front end.  If we do not
do as other states with similar standards1 have done and apply the standards to
retained counsel, we could leave an unnecessary gap in our quality-control efforts. 
As noted by Justice Lewis, “[t]hese standards are essential prerequisites if we are
to ensure a fundamentally fair adversarial process in this most serious class of
2.  Section 27.704, Florida Statutes (2000), specifically allows law school
graduates who are not qualified to serve as “full-time assistant capital collateral
counsel” to serve on the CCRCs legal staff but not serve as the sole counsel on a
case.  
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criminal cases.”  759 So. 2d at 615 (Lewis, J., specially concurring).   We agree
that this “net of protection” must be extended to all attorneys who represent capital
defendants at trial or on appeal “if our underlying purpose is truly to ensure that
competent representation is provided to capital defendants in all cases.”  Id.
There also is general support for the concept of adopting minimum
standards for capital postconviction counsel.  However, there are several aspects
of the Minimum Standards Committee’s proposal which raise concerns that lead us
to conclude that the standards should not be extended to collateral counsel at this
time.  For example, the Capital Collateral Regional Counsels (CCRCs) point out
that the proposals, as written, do not take into consideration the fact that many
attorneys who seek employment with the offices of CCRCs came to those offices
from law school and gain expertise in handling these highly specialized
postconviction proceedings by working with more experienced attorneys in those
offices.2  Thus, the proposed standards could discourage new graduates from
applying for these hard-to-fill positions and could result in qualified collateral
counsel being disqualified from lead counsel positions, further burdening these
3.  See §27.7001, Fla. Stat. (2000) (stating intent of Legislature to provide for
the collateral representation of any person convicted and sentenced to death).
4.  Section 27.704, Florida Statutes (2000), provides: 
Appointment of assistants and other staff.  Each capital collateral
regional counsel may:
(1)  Appoint, employ, and establish, in such numbers as he or
she determines, full-time or part-time assistant counsel, investigators,
and other clerical and support personnel who shall be paid from funds
appropriated for that purpose.  A full-time assistant capital collateral
counsel must be a member in good standing of The Florida Bar, with
not less than 3 years' experience in the practice of criminal law, and,
prior to employment, must have participated in at least five felony jury
trials, five felony appeals, or five capital postconviction evidentiary
hearings or any combination of at least five of such proceedings.  Law
school graduates who do not have the qualifications of a full-time
assistant capital collateral counsel may be employed as members of
the legal staff but may not be designated as sole counsel for any
person.
(2)  Contract with private counsel who are members in good
standing of The Florida Bar or with public defenders for the purpose
of providing prompt and cost-effective representation for individuals
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already taxed offices.  
We also are persuaded by the Minimum Standards Committee’s initial
determination not to include minimum standards for postconviction counsel in its
prior recommendations because the right to capital postconviction counsel is a
statutory right,3 and the Legislature has provided explicit standards for assistant
collateral capital counsel and for conflict counsel appointed in capital
postconviction proceedings, see section 27.704, Fla. Stat. (2000),4 as well as
who are sentenced to death in this state.  A private counsel or public
defender under contract with the regional counsel must have at least 3
years' experience in the practice of criminal law, and, prior to the
contract, must have participated in at least five felony jury trials, five
felony appeals, or five capital postconviction evidentiary hearings or
any combination of at least five of such proceedings.
(3)  Appoint pro bono assistant counsel, who must be members
in good standing of The Florida Bar, and who shall serve without
compensation at the discretion of the capital collateral regional
counsel.
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providing for judicial oversight and monitoring of assigned counsel’s performance
in postconviction proceedings.  See § 27.711(12), Fla. Stat. (2000).  Moreover,
while we are concerned with the competency of collateral counsel, our primary
concern in adopting rule 3.112 was to ensure that indigent capital defendants
receive competent trial and appellate representation.  If errors and claims of
ineffective assistance at the trial and appellate levels are avoided by ensuring
qualified legal representation at those “first-tier” proceedings, the workload of
collateral counsel at the “second-tier” postconviction proceedings should be
reduced.  
PUBLIC DEFENDER–REFUSAL OF APPOINTMENT
The Florida Public Defender Association originally proposed to the
Minimum Standards Committee a subdivision providing that “[t]he Public Defender
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may refuse appointment on new capital cases when his/her caseload is excessive
for the number of qualified attorneys working in the office.  The annual caseload
for an assistant public defender should not exceed three capital cases.”  The
Committee declined to include this language in its proposals, explaining that “it
would deprive the trial court of control over the assignment of counsel,” and that
excessive caseload issues can be addressed by the court under proposed
subdivision (j), Limitation on Caseloads.  The Association now “strongly urges this
Court to include within this rule a provision authorizing the public defender to
refuse an appointment in a capital case due to overload,” asserting that
[i]t is the constitutional duty and responsibility of each Public
Defender to decide, in the first instance, whether an Assistant Public
Defender is qualified to handle a particular case or caseload; and then,
in the second instance, to decide whether the qualified Assistant Public
Defender has an excessive caseload, thereby diminishing the likelihood
of effective representation.  No appointing court appoints a specific
Assistant Public Defender.  The Public Defender is appointed in every
criminal case.  See § 27.52(1)(d), Fla. Stat. (1999) (“If the court finds
that the accused person . . . [is] indigent . . . the court shall appoint the
public defender. . .”) (emphasis supplied).  Moreover, Public
Defenders, as all lawyers, are ethically obligated not to represent
clients when excessive caseloads impair representation.  See
generally Florida Rules of Professional Conduct.
The Association additionally notes that “implementation of the minimum standards
may have a fiscal impact on the [Public Defender Offices’] already strained
resources . . . [which] will be required to recruit, train, and retain qualified counsel.” 
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While acknowledging that the Association’s concerns are well taken, the
Committee suggests that excessive caseload issues, such as this, can be adequately
addressed by the court under proposed subdivision (j), Limitation on Caseloads,
which provides, in pertinent part:
As soon as practicable, the trial court should conduct an inquiry
relating to counsel’s availability to provide effective assistance of
counsel to the defendant.  In assessing the availability of prospective
counsel, the court should consider the number of capital or other
cases then being handled by the attorney and any other circumstances
bearing on the attorney’s readiness to provide effective assistance of
counsel to the defendant in a timely fashion.  No appointment should
be made to an attorney who may be unable to provide effective legal
representation as a result of an unrealistically high caseload.
While we generally agree with the Committee’s response, we are adding the
following paragraph to subdivision (j) to specifically focus on caseload issues
within the Public Defenders’ offices:
If a Public Defender seeks to refuse appointment to a new capital case
based on a claim of excessive caseload, the matter should be referred
to the Chief Judge of the circuit or to the administrative judge as so
designated by the Chief Judge.  The Chief Judge or his or her
designate should coordinate with the Public Defender to assess the
number of attorneys involved in capital cases, evaluate the availability
of prospective attorneys, and resolve any representation issues.
APPOINTMENT OF COCOUNSEL 
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At the suggestion of the Florida Public Defender Association, the Committee
added the last sentence of subdivision (e), Appointment of Counsel, which
provides, “In capital cases in which the Public Defender is appointed, the Public
Defender shall designate lead and cocounsel.”  The Association, as well as others
who commented, advocates that the appointment of cocounsel should be
mandatory in all capital cases, noting that “[t]he [American Bar Association] has
long taken the position that at least two qualified attorneys must be assigned to each
of the three stages of a capital case” and asks us to reconsider our prior
qualification of this requirement.  The American Bar Association joins in this
request.  However, as we explained in our earlier opinion:
Although we are in agreement with the committee’s legitimate concerns
in recommending [the appointment of two attorneys] to ensure
adequate and competent representation for capital defendants, we also
agree with the views expressed by others that the trial court should
retain some supervisory authority over the decision to appoint
cocounsel.  Therefore, while the standards we adopt today provide
that two lawyers should ordinarily be appointed, we leave the ultimate
decision to the discretion of the trial court.
759 So. 2d at 612-13 (footnote omitted).  We are confident that trial judges will act
in accord with the overarching purpose of the rule, which is to see that adequate
and competent representation is provided to all capital defendants.
PRIOR EXPERIENCE
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In response to the comments filed, we have changed proposed subdivisions
(f)(3) and (g)(2)(B) to make clear that the prior experience required for lead counsel
and cocounsel under those subdivisions can be obtained in either state or federal
court.
CLE REQUIREMENTS
Proposed subdivisions (f)(7), lead counsel, (g)(2)(E), cocounsel, and (h)(6),
appellate counsel, require that counsel attend at least ten hours of continuing legal
education devoted to the defense of capital cases each year.  Several of those who
commented urge us to provide busy litigators with more flexibility in meeting these
CLE requirements.  We are persuaded by this argument and believe that increasing
the number of hours of continuing legal education required from ten hours to twelve
hours and extending the time allotted to obtain the credits from one to two years
will provide capital attorneys with more flexibility and better opportunities to attend
meaningful training programs.  Cf. Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 714(b)(4)(i) (requiring at least
twelve hours of training in preparation and trial of capital cases within two years). 
Moreover, in order to ensure that qualified counsel will be available at the time these
amendments go into effect, we have added language providing that attorneys not
meeting the continuing legal education requirements when the amendments take
effect will have until March 1, 2003, or approximately one year from the date of this
5.  Subdivision (i), Notice of Appearance, of the proposed rule provides as
follows:
An attorney who is appointed in place of the public defender to
represent a defendant in a capital case shall immediately file a notice of
appearance certifying that he or she meets the qualifications of this
rule.  If the office of the public defender is appointed to represent the
defendant, the public defender shall certify that the assistants assigned
as lead and cocounsel meet the requirements of this rule. 
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opinion, in which to satisfy the requirements.  We have amended subdivisions
(f)(7), (g)(2)(E) and (h)(6) accordingly.
NOTICE TO CLIENT
Attorney William D. Matthewman suggests that the rule mandate service of
the Notice of Appearance5 on the accused so that the accused is made aware at the
outset whether the attorney is qualified to handle the capital case.  We agree that “it
is the client who has the greatest stake in the outcome of a capital case, and service
of the Notice upon the client will allow the client to address any concerns regarding
counsel’s qualifications at the outset.”  Accordingly, we have added language to
subdivision (i) which requires that the appointed attorney serve the capital
defendant with a copy of the notice of appearance. 
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
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Subdivision (k), Exceptional Circumstances, of the proposed rule provides
as follows:
In the event that the trial court determines that exceptional
circumstances require appointment of counsel not meeting the
requirements of this rule, the trial court shall enter an order specifying,
in writing, the exceptional circumstances requiring deviation from the
rule and the court’s explicit determination that counsel chosen will
provide competent representation in accord with the policy concerns
of the rule.
The Florida Public Defender Association “believes this Court should continue to
leave some leeway in the rule to appoint lawyers who do not precisely meet the
qualification standards, but only in exceptional circumstances,” recognizing that
“[t]his would help Public Defenders who presently do not have full complements of
qualified counsel, and it will help train lawyers to take on the responsibilities of
qualified lead and cocounsel in future cases.”  However, the Association is “gravely
concerned that the breadth of the [proposed] exception may swallow the rule itself,
authorizing appointing courts to exercise unbridled discretion to appoint unqualified
lawyers,” urging that
[d]ecisions to assign or appoint qualified counsel are among the most
critical decisions in any capital case.  Everything that occurs in the
death penalty process necessarily flows from the adequacy of the
initial choice of counsel.  As this Court knows well, the lives of capital
defendants often depend on that initial appointment.  Furthermore, the
discretion a court uses to determine whether counsel meets the
“exception” to the qualification standards may be largely unreviewable,
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at least under the present rule.  Thus, whatever decision is made as to
approving a lawyer who does not meet the standards must be made
properly, carefully, and within the most narrowly tailored limitations.
We share the Association’s concerns and reiterate that “trial judges responsible for
the appointment of counsel in cases where the very life of the defendant is at risk
must take care to appoint well-qualified lawyers.”  759 So. 2d at 613.  If the
minimum standards we adopt today are to guide trial judges in carrying out this
charge, the appointment of attorneys who do not meet the requirements of the rule
must be the rare exception and done only when the “trial court has complete and
unqualified confidence as to the quality of representation” that the appointed
attorneys will provide.  759 So. 2d at 613.  We trust that trial courts will heed our
counsel and make appointments in capital cases with the diligence necessary to
ensure the integrity of the process so as to minimize later claims of incompetency. 
CLIENT WAIVER
We decline to adopt a “client waiver” provision that would allow a capital
defendant to waive any of the requirements of rule 3.112.  As pointed out by the
FACDL, a capital defendant rarely retains private counsel and most private
attorneys who would undertake such representation already meet the rule 3.112
standards.  Further, if exceptional circumstances require representation by private
counsel not meeting the requirements of the rule, the court may allow the
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representation in accordance with subdivision (k).  As to conflict counsel or the
public defenders, we can see no valid reason to allow an indigent defendant to
waive the requirements of the rule as they apply to these court-appointed attorneys. 
An indigent defendant does not have a right to insist on representation by an
attorney appointed by the court at taxpayer expense.  Cf. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159
(recognizing that “a defendant may not insist on representation by an attorney he
cannot afford”).  Moreover, there is legitimate concern that allowing a capital
defendant to waive the requirements of the rule would undercut the rule’s purpose
of ensuring that competent representation will be provided to capital defendants in
all cases and could result in later claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
GRANDFATHER CLAUSE
We also decline to adopt a “grandfather clause” that would allow attorneys
who do not meet the new standards, but who previously have handled capital
cases, to continue to represent capital defendants.  As explained above, subdivision
(k) of rule 3.112 allows for representation by counsel not meeting the requirements
of the rule when the trial court determines exceptional circumstances warrant such
appointment.  As further explained above, in order not to render the standards
meaningless, trial courts must use great care in determining whether an attorney who
is not qualified under the new rule should be allowed to represent a capital
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defendant.  We fear that adding a blanket “grandfather clause” exception to the rule
would totally undercut the new standards.  Moreover, according to the written and
oral comments, there are numerous CLE and case experience opportunities
available for all attorneys who wish to represent defendants facing the death
penalty.  As noted above, attorneys who do not meet the continuing legal education
requirements will have until March 1, 2003, in which to satisfy the requirements.
COMMITTEE COMMENT 
The committee comment following the proposed rule provides in pertinent
part:
These standards are not intended to establish any independent legal
rights.  For example, the failure to appoint cocounsel, standing alone,
has not been recognized as a ground for relief from a conviction or
sentence.  See Ferrell v. State, 653 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1995); Lowe v.
State, 650 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 1994); Armstrong v. State, 642 So. 2d 730
(Fla. 1994).  Rather, these cases stand for the proposition that a
showing of inadequacy of representation in the particular case is
required.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct.
2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).  These rulings are not affected by the
adoption of these standards.  Any claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel will be controlled by Strickland.
The Florida Public Defender Association expresses concern about this language,
urging that “[f]irst, it is not appropriate for the Court in a rule to determine whether
or not separate causes of action may arise from the rule in a particular case yet to
be litigated,” and that “[s]econd, the Association is concerned that language in the
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comment may be interpreted by some to undermine the requirement that there be
qualified, effective counsel at every stage of a capital case, thereby undermining the
significance of rule 3.112 itself.”  The comment is that of the Committee.  It is
included in the rule for explanation and guidance only and is not adopted by this
Court as an official part of the rules.  The concerns raised by the Association are
more appropriately addressed in a true case and controversy.
CONCLUSION
This Court recognizes its continuing obligation to ensure the integrity of the
judicial process in all cases, but has been particularly vigilant to develop procedures
designed to ensure the integrity of capital proceedings where the accused faces the
ultimate penalty.  In this regard, the Court has taken a number of measured steps in
the last several years to improve the quality, fairness, and efficiency of capital
proceedings.  For example, in 1997 the Court adopted Florida Rule of Judicial
Administration 2.050(b)(10), requiring mandatory training for trial judges who
handle capital cases.  See In re Amendment to Fla. Rules of Judicial Admin., Rule
2.050(b)(10), 688 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 1997).  More recently, in order to eliminate
unnecessary delays in capital postconviction proceedings and ensure the quality
and fairness of those proceedings, we amended rule 3.851, Collateral Relief After
Death Sentence Has Been Imposed and Affirmed on Direct Appeal.  Amendments
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to Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.851, 3.852 & 3.993 & Fla. Rule of Judicial
Admin. 2.050, 26 Fla. L. Weekly S644 (Fla. Sept. 26, 2001).  In connection with
the rule 3.851 amendments, we adopted Florida Rule of Judicial Administration
2.070(i), requiring the chief judge of each circuit to enter an administrative order
developing and implementing a circuit-wide plan to expedite the preparation of
transcripts in all capital trials and capital postconviction proceedings.  Amendments
to Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.851, 3.852 & 3.993, 772 So. 2d 488, 534-35
(Fla. 2000).  In this case, by adopting minimum standards that apply to all attorneys
who represent defendants in trial and appellate-level capital proceedings, we hope
to further improve our capital punishment system by ensuring adequate
representation in these all-important “first-level” proceedings, thereby decreasing
the number of claims of ineffective assistance in postconviction proceedings. 
However, this Court is under no illusions that the mere act of enacting stronger
rules alone will bring about the desired improvement and hence increased
confidence in capital litigation.  In truth, it will be up to the good faith and
professionalism of Florida’s judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and all others
who support the capital litigation process, to give real meaning to these efforts in
Florida’s courtrooms.  We are confident that they are up to the task.
The Court greatly appreciates the Minimum Standards Committee’s
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assistance in developing these standards and asks the Committee to continue to
monitor the effectiveness of the standards and to evaluate ways to further improve
rule 3.112.  We specifically would like the Committee to consider the Florida Public
Defender Association’s suggestion concerning prescreening by conflict
committees, and Registry Counsel Christopher J. Anderson’s suggestion that a
subdivision be added to allow for the substitution of judicial law clerk or staff
attorney experience for one or more of the requirements of the standards.  We ask
the Committee to continue to consider these suggestions, as well as any other
issues raised in these proceedings that it determines merit further consideration, and
report back to the Court with any proposed amendments by July 31, 2003. 
Accordingly, we amend rule 3.112 as indicated in the appendix to this
opinion.  New language is indicated by underlining and deletions are indicated by
struck-through type.  The amendments shall become effective at 12:01 a.m., July 1,
2002, and shall apply only to attorneys appointed or retained on or after that date.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
HARDING, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE AMENDMENTS.
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HARDING, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with all of the majority’s changes to Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.112 except the application of the rule to privately retained counsel. 
While it is a worthy goal to seek that all counsel representing capital defendants be
qualified by education and experience, I find it troubling that this Court can deprive
a defendant of the right to retain counsel of his or her choice.  
Original Proceedings - Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure
Honorable Philip J. Padovano, Judge, First District Court of Appeal, Tallahassee,
Florida, Chair, Committee on Minimum Standards for Attorneys in Capital Cases;
Honorable Oscar H. Eaton, Jr., Chair, The Florida Bar Criminal Procedure Rules
Committee, Sanford, Florida, and John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, The
Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida;  Robert Trammell, General Counsel, Florida
Public Defender Association, Inc., Tallahassee, Florida; and James T. Miller,
Jacksonville, Florida,  Chair, Amicus Curiae Committee, Florida Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers, on behalf of David Rothman, President, FACDL,
for Petitioner
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Chet Kaufman and W. C. McLain,
Assistant Public Defenders, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida, William
P. White, Chief Assistant Public Defender and Alan Chipperfield, Assistant Public
Defender, Fourth Judicial Circuit, Jacksonville, Florida, and James Slater, Chief
Assistant Public Defender, Twelfth Judicial Circuit, Bradenton, Florida, attorneys
for The Florida Public Defender Association, Inc.;  Robert Fraser, Brandon,
Florida; William D. Matthewman of Seiden, Alder, Rothman, Petosa &
Matthewman, P.A., Boca Raton, Florida; Christopher J. Anderson, Capital
Collateral Registry Counsel, Jacksonville, Florida; Lawrence J. Fox, Chair,
Elisabeth Semel, Director, and Judy A. Gallant, Staff Attorney, American Bar
Association, Washington, D.C.; Gregory C. Smith, Office of the Capital Collateral
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Counsel Northern Region of Florida, Tallahassee, Florida, John W. Moser, CCRC,
Middle Region, Tampa, Florida, Michael P. Reiter, Chief Assistant, CCRC, Middle
Region, Tampa, Florida, and Neal A. Dupree, CCRC, Southern Region, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida,
Responding
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APPENDIX
Rule 3.112 Minimum Standards for Attorneys in Capital Cases
(a) Statement of Purpose.  The purpose of these rules is to set minimum
standards for conflict attorneys in capital cases to help ensure that competent
representation will be provided to indigent capital defendants in all cases.  Minimum
standards that have been promulgated concerning representation for defendants in
criminal cases generally and the level of adherence to such standards required for
noncapital cases should not be adopted as sufficient for death penalty cases. 
Counsel in death penalty cases should be required to perform at the level of an
attorney reasonably skilled in the specialized practice of capital representation,
zealously committed to the capital case, who has had adequate time and resources
for preparation.  These minimum standards for capital cases are not intended to
preclude any circuit from adopting or maintaining standards having greater
requirements.
(b) Definitions. A capital trial case is defined as any first-degree murder
case in which the State has not formally waived the death penalty on the record.  A
capital appeal case is any appeal in which the death penalty has been imposed.  A
capital postconviction case proceeding is any case postconviction proceeding
where the defendant is still under a sentence of death.
(c) Applicability.  This rule applies to all lawyers handling capital trials and
capital appeals, who are appointed or retained on or after July 1, 2002.  Subject to
more specific provisions in the rule, the standards established by the rule apply to
Public Defenders and their assistants.
(c) (d) List of Qualified Conflict Counsel.
(1) Every circuit shall maintain a list of conflict counsel qualified for
appointment in capital cases in each of three categories:
(A)  lead trial counsel; 
(B)  trial cocounsel; and 
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(C) appellate counsel.
No attorney may be appointed to handle a capital trial or appeal unless duly
qualified on the appropriate list.
(2) The conflict committee for each circuit is responsible for
approving and removing attorneys from the list pursuant to section 925.037,
Florida Statutes.  Each circuit committee is encouraged to obtain additional
input from experienced capital defense counsel.
(3) No attorney may be qualified on any of the capital lists unless he or
she has attended within the last year a continuing legal education program of
at least ten hours’ duration devoted specifically to the defense of capital
cases.  Continuing legal education programs meeting the requirements of this
rule shall be offered by the Florida Bar or another recognized provider and
should be approved for continuing legal education credit by the Florida Bar. 
The failure to comply with this requirement shall be cause for removal from
the list until the requirement is fulfilled.
(d) (e) Appointment of Counsel. A court must appoint lead counsel and,
upon written application and a showing of need by lead counsel, should appoint
cocounsel to handle every capital trial in which the defendant is not represented by
retained counsel or the Public Defender.  Lead counsel shall have the right to select
cocounsel from attorneys on the lead counsel or cocounsel list.  Both attorneys
shall be reasonably compensated for the trial and sentencing phase.  Except under
extraordinary circumstances, only one attorney may be compensated for other
proceedings.  In capital cases in which the Public Defender is appointed, the Public
Defender shall designate lead and cocounsel.
(e) (f) Lead Counsel.  Lead trial counsel assignments should be given to
attorneys who:
(1) are members of the bar admitted to practice in the jurisdiction or
admitted to practice pro hac vice; and
(2) are experienced and active trial practitioners with at least five years
of litigation experience in the field of criminal law; and
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(3) have prior experience as lead counsel in no fewer than nine state or
federal jury trials of serious and complex cases which were tried to
completion, as well as prior experience as lead defense counsel or cocounsel
in at least two state or federal cases tried to completion in which the death
penalty was sought.  In addition, of the nine jury trials which were tried to
completion, the attorney should have been lead counsel in at least three cases
in which the charge was murder; or alternatively, of the nine jury trials, at
least one was a murder trial and an additional five were felony jury trials; and
(4) are familiar with the practice and procedure of the criminal courts
of the jurisdiction; and
(5) are familiar with and experienced in the utilization of expert
witnesses and evidence, including but not limited to psychiatric and forensic
evidence; and
(6) have demonstrated the necessary proficiency and commitment
which exemplify the quality of representation appropriate to capital cases,
including but not limited to the investigation and presentation of evidence in
mitigation of the death penalty.; and
(7) have attended within the last two years a continuing legal education
program of at least twelve hours’ duration devoted specifically to the defense
of capital cases.  Attorneys who do not meet the continuing legal education
requirement on July 1, 2002, shall have until March 1, 2003, in which to
satisfy the continuing legal education requirement.
(f) (g) Cocounsel. Trial cocounsel assignments should be given to attorneys
who:
(1) are members of the bar admitted to practice in the jurisdiction or
admitted to practice pro hac vice; and
(2) Who qualify as lead counsel under paragraph (e) (f) of these
standards or meet the following requirements:
(A) are experienced and active trial practitioners with at least
three years of litigation experience in the field of criminal law; and
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(B) have prior experience as lead counsel or cocounsel in no
fewer than three state or federal jury trials of serious and complex
cases which were tried to completion, at least two of which were trials
in which the charge was murder; or alternatively, of the three jury trials,
at least one was a murder trial and one was a felony jury trial; and
(C)  are familiar with the practice and procedure of the criminal
courts of the jurisdiction; and
(D) have demonstrated the necessary proficiency and
commitment which exemplify the quality of representation appropriate
to capital cases, and
(E) have attended within the last two years a continuing legal
education program of at least twelve hours’ duration devoted
specifically to the defense of capital cases.  Attorneys who do not
meet the continuing legal education requirement on July 1, 2002, shall
have until March 1, 2003, in which to satisfy the requirement.
(g) (h) Appellate Counsel.  Appellate counsel assignments should be given
to attorneys who:
(1)  are members of the bar admitted to practice in the jurisdiction or
admitted to practice pro hac vice; and
(2) are experienced and active trial or appellate practitioners with at
least five years of experience in the field of criminal law; and
(3) have prior experience in the appeal of at least one case where a
sentence of death was imposed, as well as prior experience as lead counsel
in the appeal of no fewer than three felony convictions in federal or state
court, at least one of which was an appeal of a murder conviction; or
alternatively, have prior experience as lead counsel in the appeal of no fewer
than six felony convictions in federal or state court, at least two of which
were appeals of a murder conviction; and
(4) are familiar with the practice and procedure of the appellate courts
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of the jurisdiction; and
(5) have demonstrated the necessary proficiency and commitment
which exemplify the quality of representation appropriate to capital cases.;
and
(6) have attended within the last two years a continuing legal education
program of at least twelve hours’ duration devoted specifically to the defense
of capital cases. Attorneys who do not meet the continuing legal education
requirement on July 1, 2002, shall have until March 1, 2003, in which to
satisfy the requirement. 
(i)      Notice of Appearance. An attorney who is retained or appointed in
place of the Public Defender to represent a defendant in a capital case shall
immediately file a notice of appearance certifying that he or she meets the
qualifications of this rule. If the office of the Public Defender is appointed to
represent the defendant, the public defender shall certify that the assistants assigned
as lead and cocounsel meet the requirements of this rule. A notice of appearance
filed under this rule shall be served on the defendant.
(j)
Limitation on Caseloads.
(1) Generally.   As soon as practicable, the trial court should conduct 
an inquiry relating to counsel’s availability to provide effective assistance of 
counsel to the defendant.  In assessing the availability of prospective 
counsel, the court should consider the number of capital or other cases then 
being handled by the attorney and any other circumstances bearing on the 
attorney’s readiness to provide effective assistance of counsel to the 
defendant in a timely fashion. No appointment should be made to an 
attorney who may be unable to provide effective legal representation as a 
result of an unrealistically high caseload.  Likewise, a private attorney 
should not undertake the representation of a defendant in a capital case if 
the
attorney’s caseload is high enough that it might impair the quality of 
legal
representation provided to the defendant. 
(2) Public Defender.  If a Public Defender seeks to refuse 
appointment to a new capital case based on a claim of excessive caseload, 
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the matter should be referred to the Chief Judge of the circuit or to the 
administrative judge as so designated by the Chief Judge.  The Chief Judge 
or his or her designate should coordinate with the Public Defender to assess 
the number of attorneys involved in capital cases, evaluate the availability 
of prospective attorneys, and resolve any representation issues.
(h) (k) Exceptional Circumstances.  In the event that the trial court
determines that counsel meeting the technical requirements of this rule is not
available and that exceptional circumstances require appointment of other counsel
not meeting the requirements of this rule, the trial court shall enter an order
specifying, in writing, the exceptional circumstances requiring deviation from the
rule and the court’s explicit determination that counsel chosen will provide
competent representation in accord with the policy concerns of the rule.
Committee Comments
Introductory Statement.  These standards are based on the
general premise that the defense of a capital case requires specialized
skill and expertise.  The Supreme Court has not only the authority, but
the constitutional responsibility to ensure that indigent defendants are
provided with competent counsel, especially in capital cases where the
State seeks to take the life of the indigent defendant.  The Supreme
Court also has exclusive jurisdiction under Article V section 15 of the
Florida Constitution to “[r]egulate the admission of persons to the
practice of law and the discipline of persons admitted.”  Implied in this
grant of authority is the power to set the minimum requirements for the
admission to practice law, see In re Florida Board of Bar Examiners,
353 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1977), as well as the minimum requirements for
certain kinds of specialized legal work.  The Supreme Court has
adopted minimum educational and experience requirements for board
certification in other specialized fields of the law.
The experience and continuing educational requirements in these
standards are based on existing local standards in effect throughout
the state as well as comparable standards in effect in other states. 
Specifically, the committee considered the standards for the
appointment of counsel in capital cases in the Second, Sixth, Eleventh,
Fifteenth, and Seventeenth Circuits, the statewide standards for
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appointing counsel in capital cases in California, Indiana, Louisiana,
Ohio, and New York, and the American Bar Association standards for
appointment of counsel in capital cases.
These standards are intended to apply only in those cases in
which the court is appointing a lawyer in place of the public defender. 
Nothing expressed herein should be interpreted as an infringement of
the defendant’s right to select retained counsel. 
Furthermore, tThese standards are not intended to establish any
independent legal rights.  For example, the failure to appoint
cocounsel, standing alone, has not been recognized as a ground for
relief from a conviction or sentence. See Ferrell v. State, 653 So. 2d
367 (Fla. 1995); Lowe v. State, 650 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 1994); Armstrong
v. State, 642 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1994).  Rather, these cases stand for the
proposition that a showing of inadequacy of representation in the
particular case is required. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984).  These rulings are not affected by the adoption of these
standards.  Any claims of ineffective assistance of counsel will be
controlled by Strickland.
(d) Appointment of Counsel.  At the time of appointment of
qualified counsel, the trial court should conduct an inquiry relating to
counsel’s availability to provide effective assistance of counsel to the
defendant.  In assessing the availability of prospective counsel, the
court should consider the number of capital or other cases then being
handled by the attorney and any other circumstances bearing on the
attorney’s readiness to provide effective assistance of counsel to the
defendant in a timely fashion.
The American Bar Association Standards and many other state
standards require the appointment of two lawyers at the trial level in
every prosecution that could result in the imposition of the death
penalty.  The committee has modified this requirement by allowing the
trial court some discretion as to the number of attorneys, and by
eliminating certain provisions that may be unnecessary or economically
unfeasible.  Paragraph (d) (e) minimizes the potential duplication of
expenses by limiting the compensable participation of cocounsel.  In
addition, the standard adopted herein requires an initial showing by
lead counsel of the need for cocounsel and, while the standard
suggests that cocounsel should ordinarily be appointed, the ultimate
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decision is left to the discretion of the trial court.
The committee emphasizes that the right to appointed counsel is
not enlarged by the application of these standards.  The court should
appoint conflict counsel only if there is a conflict and the defendant
otherwise qualifies for representation by the Public Defender.  A
defendant who is represented by retained counsel is not entitled to the
appointment of a second lawyer at public expense merely because that
defendant is unable to bear the cost of retaining two lawyers.  As
previously noted, these standards apply only to those cases in which
the defendant is indigent and unrepresented and not to a case in which
the defendant has retained private counsel.