Title: State v. Qualls

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Qualls, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-1111.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-1111 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. QUALLS, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State v. Qualls, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-1111.] 
Criminal law—Postrelease control—When a defendant is notified about 
postrelease control at the sentencing hearing, but notification is 
inadvertently omitted from the sentencing entry, the omission can be 
corrected with a nunc pro tunc entry and the defendant is not entitled to a 
new sentencing hearing. 
(No. 2011-0202—Submitted October 5, 2011—Decided March 20, 2012.) 
CERTIFIED BY the Court of Appeals for Meigs County, 
No. 10CA8, 2010-Ohio-5316. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
When a defendant is notified about postrelease control at the sentencing hearing, 
but notification is inadvertently omitted from the sentencing entry, the 
omission can be corrected with a nunc pro tunc entry and the defendant is 
not entitled to a new sentencing hearing. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
__________________ 
 
CUPP, J. 
{¶ 1} The defendant-appellant in this case was notified of postrelease 
control at his 2002 sentencing hearing, but the language indicating notification 
had been made was inadvertently omitted from the sentencing entry that resulted 
from that hearing.  When the omission came to light, the trial court, in 2010, 
corrected the sentencing entry through a nunc pro tunc entry that stated that the 
notification had been made and denied the defendant’s request for a new 
sentencing hearing.  The appellate court upheld the trial court’s actions as a 
permissible use of a nunc pro tunc entry.  For the reasons that follow, we agree 
that the trial court’s use of a nunc pro tunc entry was appropriate in the specific 
circumstances of this case, and we accordingly affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
I.  Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 2} On August 15, 2002, defendant-appellant, Eric A. Qualls, pled 
guilty before a three-judge panel in Meigs County Common Pleas Court to one 
count of aggravated murder and one count of kidnapping.  The state’s part of the 
plea agreement included dropping an additional count of aggravated murder and 
dismissing a death-penalty specification.  The trial court accepted the plea and 
imposed an aggregate prison sentence of 33 years to life, as recommended by the 
state, in the judgment of conviction.  Qualls did not appeal his conviction and 
sentence. 
{¶ 3} On January 15, 2010, Qualls filed in the trial court a pro se 
“motion for de novo sentencing hearing.”  In this motion, Qualls admitted that he 
was informed at his sentencing hearing that he would be subject to five years of 
postrelease control upon his release from prison, but contended that he was not 
subject to postrelease control because his conviction for aggravated murder was a 
January Term, 2012 
3 
 
special felony.1  Qualls argued that because R.C. 2967.28, the postrelease-control 
statute, was not applicable to him, he was entitled to a new sentencing hearing to 
correct the alleged error. 
{¶ 4} In its response, the state explained that postrelease control was not 
imposed for the aggravated-murder offense, but was imposed for the kidnapping 
offense only.  The state also asserted that Qualls had been orally informed of 
postrelease control at his sentencing hearing, had consulted with his attorney 
about postrelease control at that time, and had verified for the court that he 
understood why it was being imposed.  However, in formulating its response to 
Qualls’s 2010 motion, the state realized that despite notification at the sentencing 
hearing, the 2002 entry contained no mention of postrelease control.  The state 
therefore asked the trial court to issue a nunc pro tunc entry reflecting that the trial 
court had advised Qualls of postrelease control at his sentencing hearing. 
{¶ 5} Qualls argued in response to the state’s request for a nunc pro tunc 
entry that because the 2002 sentencing entry did not mention postrelease control, 
his sentence was void, and he asserted that he was entitled to a de novo sentencing 
hearing. 
{¶ 6} On March 29, 2010, by entry, the trial court agreed with the state’s 
arguments: it ruled that postrelease control applied to Qualls’s conviction for 
kidnapping and that Qualls was not entitled to a new sentencing hearing, because 
Qualls had admitted that he had been orally advised that he was subject to 
postrelease control at his 2002 sentencing hearing.  The trial court issued a nunc 
pro tunc sentencing entry that included two new paragraphs indicating that Qualls 
had been notified that he was subject to postrelease control. 
{¶ 7} The Fourth District Court of Appeals affirmed upon Qualls’s pro 
se appeal.  It held that the trial court correctly overruled the motion for a de novo 
                                                          
 
1  Under R.C. 2967.28, postrelease control is not imposed following a conviction for aggravated 
murder, which is a special-category felony. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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sentencing hearing and that a nunc pro tunc entry was the proper remedy to 
correct the sentencing entry, considering that Qualls had admitted that he was 
informed at the 2002 sentencing hearing that he would be subject to postrelease 
control upon his release from prison.  State v. Qualls, 4th Dist. No. 10CA8, 2010-
Ohio-5316, ¶ 9-13. 
{¶ 8} The court of appeals certified that its decision conflicted with the 
decision of the Sixth District Court of Appeals in State v. Lee, 6th Dist. No. L-09-
1279, 2010-Ohio-1704, which held that a nunc pro tunc entry cannot be used to 
correct the omission of postrelease-control language from the sentencing entry in 
situations such as this, and that a defendant must be afforded a new sentencing 
hearing to correct the omission. 
{¶ 9} We recognized the conflict on the following question, as phrased 
by the court of appeals:  “If a defendant is notified about postrelease control at the 
sentencing hearing, but that notification is inadvertently omitted from the 
sentencing entry, can that omission be corrected with a nunc pro tunc entry?”  128 
Ohio St.3d 1424, 2011-Ohio-1049, 943 N.E.2d 571. 
II.  Analysis 
{¶ 10} Before analyzing the legal issue presented by this case, we clarify 
the parameters of the certified question we address.  The appellate court 
approached this case from the perspective that Qualls has conceded that the trial 
court’s notification regarding postrelease control at the 2002 sentencing hearing 
adequately informed him of postrelease control.2  Procedurally, we are thus 
                                                          
 
2  The appellate court observed that Qualls claimed in his merit brief that the trial court had failed 
to inform him of some other statutory information at the sentencing hearing, but the appellate 
court declined to consider those claims because they were raised for the first time on appeal and 
instead conducted its analysis from the standpoint that proper oral notification regarding 
postrelease control had occurred.  2010-Ohio-5316, at ¶ 10.  In its entry granting Qualls’s motion 
to certify a conflict, the court of appeals stated that Qualls has “freely admitted” that he was 
notified of postrelease control at his sentencing hearing and that the notification was “simply 
omitted” from the sentencing entry, and contrasted the situation here with cases in which oral 
January Term, 2012 
5 
 
required to accept as fact that the trial court’s 2002 notification regarding 
postrelease control in the sentencing hearing was statutorily compliant and that 
the notification was inadvertently omitted from the 2002 sentencing entry.  These 
features were also present in the conflict case, Lee.  See 2010-Ohio-1704, at ¶ 6 
(“It is undisputed that the trial court notified appellant at his sentencing hearing 
that he would be subject to mandatory postrelease control.  The trial court did not, 
however, include this notice in the sentencing entry”).  We also note that this 
appeal does not include any issue regarding Qualls’s plea and convictions, but 
involves only the sentencing question. 
{¶ 11} The essence of Qualls’s argument is that numerous decisions in 
this court’s postrelease-control precedents support the proposition that for a 
sentence imposed prior to the effective date of R.C. 2929.191, a trial court’s 
sentencing entry that failed to include postrelease control is void.  In that 
situation, Qualls further argues, the sentencing entry cannot be corrected through 
a nunc pro tunc entry, but instead the trial court must hold a de novo resentencing 
hearing to correct the void sentence and to properly impose postrelease control.  
See, e.g., Woods v. Telb, 89 Ohio St.3d 504, 733 N.E.2d 1103 (2000); State v. 
Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864; Hernandez v. 
Kelly, 108 Ohio St.3d 395, 2006-Ohio-126, 844 N.E.2d 301; State v. Bezak, 114 
Ohio St.3d 94, 2007-Ohio-3250, 868 N.E.2d 961, modified in part by State v. 
Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, paragraph two of 
the syllabus; State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 
568; State v. Bloomer, 122 Ohio St.3d 200, 2009-Ohio-2462, 909 N.E.2d 1254.  
Qualls especially relies on State v. Singleton, 124 Ohio St.3d 173, 2009-Ohio-
6434, 920 N.E.2d 958. 
                                                                                                                                                               
notification either “was absent altogether or there was a misnotification,” in which a nunc pro tunc 
entry would not have been appropriate. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 12} Qualls additionally argues that this court’s more recent decision in 
Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, does not change 
that result.  He contends that Fischer, which modified Bezak in part and held that 
the new sentencing hearing to which an offender is entitled when postrelease 
control was not properly imposed is limited to the proper imposition of 
postrelease control, has “abrogated” the right of a defendant such as himself to a 
de novo sentencing hearing.  Consequently, he asserts that Fischer should not 
apply retroactively to him and that his resentencing hearing must be de novo 
rather than limited. 
A.  Standards for Nunc Pro Tunc Entries 
{¶ 13} This court recently explained, in a decision not cited by Qualls, 
that when a trial court properly notified a defendant of postrelease control at the 
sentencing hearing, but the initial sentencing entry did not accurately reflect the 
details of the notification, the imperfect sentencing entry can be corrected through 
a nunc pro tunc entry.  In that situation, “[n]o new sentencing hearing is required, 
because the trial court’s failure to include the postrelease-control term in the 
original sentencing entry was manifestly a clerical error.  * * *  Although trial 
courts generally lack authority to reconsider their own valid final judgments in 
criminal cases, they retain continuing jurisdiction to correct clerical errors in 
judgments by nunc pro tunc entry to reflect what the court actually decided.”  
State ex rel. Womack v. Marsh, 128 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-229, 943 N.E.2d 
1010, ¶ 13, citing State ex rel. Cruzado v. Zaleski, 111 Ohio St.3d 353, 2006-
Ohio-5795, 856 N.E.2d 263, ¶ 18-19, and Crim.R. 36 (“Clerical mistakes in 
judgments, orders, or other parts of the record, and errors in the record arising 
from oversight or omission, may be corrected by the court at any time”).  See 
State v. Lester, 130 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-5204, 958 N.E.2d 142, ¶ 18-19 
(courts possess the authority to correct an error in a judgment entry so that the 
record speaks the truth); State v. Miller, 127 Ohio St.3d 407, 2010-Ohio-5705, 
January Term, 2012 
7 
 
940 N.E.2d 924, ¶ 15 (an error corrected by a nunc pro tunc entry does not 
involve a legal decision or judgment). 
{¶ 14} Because the notification of postrelease control was accurately 
given in the sentencing hearing in Womack, and the error in the sentencing entry 
was merely clerical in nature, the mistake was correctable by nunc pro tunc entry 
and no new sentencing hearing was required.3  Womack at ¶ 14.  A nunc pro tunc 
entry issued under those conditions relates back to the original sentencing entry 
and does not extend the time to file an appeal.  Id. at ¶ 15.  See also Lester at ¶ 19-
20 (a nunc pro entry applies retrospectively to the judgment it corrects and does 
not create a new final order from which a new appeal may be taken). 
{¶ 15} The primary characteristic distinguishing this case from the 
situation in Womack is that in this case the sentencing entry contained no mention 
of postrelease control, while the sentencing entry in Womack imposed an incorrect 
term of postrelease control.  We determine, however, that given the specific 
circumstances of this case, a nunc pro tunc entry can be used to correct the failure 
to include in the sentencing entry notification of postrelease control that was 
properly given in the sentencing hearing. 
B.  A Sentencing Entry that Contains No Reference to 
Postrelease Control Must Be Timely Corrected 
{¶ 16} For purposes of addressing the certified issue, we recognize two 
important principles that our postrelease-control precedents have emphasized.  
One principle is that unless a sentencing entry that did not include notification of 
the imposition of postrelease control is corrected before the defendant completed 
the prison term for the offense for which postrelease control was to be imposed, 
                                                          
 
3 The type of nunc pro tunc entry discussed in Womack and at issue in this case is different from 
the “entry nunc pro tunc” provided for in R.C. 2929.191, which is issued after a court holds a 
hearing in accordance with R.C. 2929.191(C).  A consideration of the standards regarding 
conventional nunc pro tunc entries issued pursuant to Crim.R. 36 makes evident that an “entry 
nunc pro tunc” issued pursuant to R.C. 2929.191 after a hearing is not equivalent to a Crim.R. 36 
nunc pro tunc entry, which is limited to the correction of a “clerical mistake.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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postrelease control cannot be imposed.  Hernandez, 108 Ohio St.3d 395, 2006-
Ohio-126, 844 N.E.2d 301, at ¶ 28-30; compare Watkins v. Collins, 111 Ohio 
St.3d 425, 2006-Ohio-5082, 857 N.E.2d 78, ¶ 48-51 (when a sentencing entry 
made some reference to postrelease control, any deficiencies in the entry could 
have been raised on appeal, and postrelease control can be imposed upon the 
defendant’s release from prison). 
{¶ 17} That basic principle is not specifically implicated in this case in 
part because of the lengthy prison term Qualls is serving.  If we affirm the 
judgment of the court of appeals, the nunc pro tunc sentencing entry will have 
corrected the deficiency in the original sentencing entry, thereby allowing 
postrelease control to be enforced upon Qualls on his release from prison.  Even if 
we were to reverse the judgment and order a new sentencing hearing here, the 
trial court would still be able to timely issue a new sentencing entry correcting 
any deficiency. 
C.  The Importance of Notification 
{¶ 18} Another important principle reiterated in our precedents is that in 
order to comply with separation-of-powers concerns and to fulfill the 
requirements of the postrelease-control-sentencing statutes, especially R.C. 
2929.19(B) and 2967.28, a trial court must provide statutorily compliant 
notification to a defendant regarding postrelease control at the time of sentencing, 
including notifying the defendant of the details of the postrelease control and the 
consequences of violating postrelease control.  Woods, 89 Ohio St.3d 504, 733 
N.E.2d 1103, at paragraphs one and two of the syllabus; Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 
21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864, at paragraph one of the syllabus; Bloomer, 
122 Ohio St.3d 200, 2009-Ohio-2462, 909 N.E.2d 1254, at ¶ 2. 
{¶ 19} We have also stated that a trial court must incorporate into the 
sentencing entry the postrelease-control notice to reflect the notification that was 
given at the sentencing hearing.  E.g., Jordan, at paragraph one of the syllabus, 
January Term, 2012 
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see current R.C. 2929.14(D).  But our main focus in interpreting the sentencing 
statutes regarding postrelease control has always been on the notification itself 
and not on the sentencing entry.  See id. at ¶ 23 (recognizing that the “statutory 
duty” imposed is “to provide notice of postrelease control at the sentencing 
hearing”); Cruzado, 111 Ohio St.3d 353, 2006-Ohio-5795, 856 N.E.2d 263, at 
¶ 26 (stressing the importance of notification); Watkins, 111 Ohio St.3d 425, 
2006-Ohio-5082, 857 N.E.2d 78, at ¶ 52 (stating that the “preeminent purpose” of 
the statutes is “that offenders subject to postrelease control know at sentencing 
that their liberty could continue to be restrained after serving their initial 
sentences”). 
{¶ 20} In many situations, a failure to properly impose postrelease control 
in a sentencing entry will not be correctable through a nunc pro tunc entry.  The 
reason for that result is not that the sentencing entry was deficient, but rather that 
the notification given did not comply with the statutory requirements.  Womack is 
an example of a situation where a nunc pro tunc entry can correct a sentencing 
entry’s failure to properly impose postrelease control. 
D.  Resolution of the Conflict Question 
{¶ 21} Our prior decisions did not address the specific issue presented by 
this case.  As the court of appeals recognized in its entry certifying a conflict, this 
case is unlike either Jordan or Singleton because notification of postrelease 
control was not proper in either of those cases.  Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-
Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864, at ¶ 2-3, involved situations in which the sentencing 
courts failed to properly notify the defendants of the imposition of postrelease 
control at the sentencing hearings, although notice was contained in the 
sentencing entries.  In Singleton, 124 Ohio St.3d 173, 2009-Ohio-6434, 920 
N.E.2d 958, at ¶ 4, although the sentencing entry did mention some aspects of 
postrelease control, the sentencing court failed to properly notify the defendant at 
the sentencing hearing of the consequences of violating postrelease control. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 22} Our review of our many other postrelease-control precedents 
shows that the situation in this case also differs from those other precedents.  In 
no previous case in which a sentencing entry was silent as to postrelease control 
have we specifically considered the significance of proper postrelease-control 
notification at the sentencing hearing.  Moreover, we have not specifically 
evaluated the efficacy of a trial court’s use of a nunc pro tunc entry to correct a 
deficient sentencing entry when the sole error in imposing postrelease control was 
the failure to incorporate the notification that was given at the sentencing hearing 
into the entry of conviction. 
{¶ 23} Here, where notification was properly given at the sentencing 
hearing, there is no substantive prejudice to a defendant if the sentencing entry’s 
failure to mention postrelease control is remedied through a nunc pro tunc entry.  
Our precedents requiring a new sentencing hearing (either de novo or limited) to 
correctly impose postrelease control do not apply to this situation.  The rationale 
underlying those decisions is that a sentence that does not properly impose 
postrelease control is void, and a remand for a new sentencing hearing is 
necessary, because the trial court’s erroneous imposition of postrelease control 
must be corrected in a new hearing at which the defendant is present to receive 
notification that complies with the statutes.  See, e.g., Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 
2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864, at ¶ 17 and 23. 
{¶ 24} But when the notification of postrelease control was properly given 
at the sentencing hearing, the essential purpose of notice has been fulfilled and 
there is no need for a new sentencing hearing to remedy the flaw.  The original 
sentencing entry can be corrected to reflect what actually took place at the 
sentencing hearing, through a nunc pro tunc entry, as long as the correction is 
accomplished prior to the defendant’s completion of his prison term. 
{¶ 25} Qualls argues that because his sentencing entry did not include any 
language regarding postrelease control, he could not appeal any issues relating to 
January Term, 2012 
11 
 
the postrelease-control portion of his sentence until the trial court corrected the 
allegedly void sentence by holding a hearing and properly imposing postrelease 
control.  Only this, he asserts, would have provided him with a final order from 
which he could appeal.  However, in this case, which concerns only the 
sentencing entry’s failure to include a reference to postrelease-control 
notification, that argument fails.  Because Qualls conceded that notification of 
postrelease control was properly given at the sentencing hearing, he has no 
substantive grounds upon which to pursue an appeal relating to the imposition of 
postrelease control. 
{¶ 26} As the appellate court accurately observed in its entry certifying a 
conflict, a nunc pro tunc entry pursuant to Crim.R. 36 to modify a sentencing 
entry cannot serve to correct the failure to notify a defendant of postrelease 
control or a mistake in the notification that was given.  A nunc pro tunc entry 
cannot go beyond correcting a clerical error to conform the sentencing entry to 
reflect that notification had occurred when it did not; that action would 
improperly change the substance of the entry to include events that never 
occurred.  See Cruzado, 111 Ohio St.3d. 353, 2006-Ohio-5795, 856 N.E.2d 263, 
at ¶ 19 (a nunc pro tunc entry cannot be used to reflect what the court might or 
should have decided); Miller, 127 Ohio St.3d 407, 2010-Ohio-5705, 940 N.E.2d 
924, at ¶ 15 (a nunc pro tunc entry that does not reflect the events that actually 
occurred at a sentencing hearing is improper). 
{¶ 27} Although this case is different from Womack because the 
sentencing entry in this case did not mention postrelease control, nevertheless, 
like Womack, this case is one in which a nunc pro tunc entry can correct a flawed 
sentencing entry. 
{¶ 28} We do not address Qualls’s argument that despite this court’s 
holding in Fischer, he is entitled to a de novo resentencing hearing.  That 
argument is predicated on this court concluding that Qualls must receive a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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resentencing hearing.  However, we determine that a nunc pro tunc entry can be 
used to correct the postrelease-control deficiency in this case and that Qualls is 
not entitled to a resentencing hearing. 
{¶ 29} Our resolution of the issue of this case is narrow and is made 
within only the context of postrelease control, an area in which the numerous 
decisions of this court have shaped the development of the law. Our decision by 
its nature applies to those postrelease-control cases involving an omission of the 
type that occurred here, without regard to whether the sentencing hearing was 
held after the effective date of R.C. 2929.191 or held prior to the effective date of 
that statute, as occurred in this case. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 30} We hold that when a defendant is notified about postrelease control 
at the sentencing hearing, but notification is inadvertently omitted from the 
sentencing entry, the omission can be corrected with a nunc pro tunc entry and the 
defendant is not entitled to a new sentencing hearing.  We accordingly answer the 
certified question in the affirmative, and we affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, and 
MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
LANZINGER, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
LANZINGER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 31} This court’s precedent on postrelease-control error continues to 
bedevil us, requiring backtracking on issues that logically flow from the idea that 
sentences with postrelease-control error are “void.”  I would overrule State v. 
Singleton, 124 Ohio St.3d 173, 2009-Ohio-6434, 920 N.E.2d 958, and hold that 
the procedure enacted by the General Assembly to correct postrelease-control 
January Term, 2012 
13 
 
error may be applied retroactively.  See Singleton at ¶ 56-66 (Lanzinger, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  R.C. 2929.191(C) addresses due 
process concerns by allowing a defendant a hearing, after which there would be 
the opportunity to inspect any entry altered to comply with the requirements of 
imposing postrelease control. 
I.  The complete absence of postrelease control in a 
sentencing entry is more than a clerical error 
{¶ 32} Today the court holds that absence of postrelease control in a 
sentencing entry is mere clerical error that may be corrected through a nunc pro 
tunc entry without a new hearing, provided that the sentencing court properly 
notified the defendant of the imposition of postrelease control at sentencing. 
{¶ 33} But an amendment of the kind before us is more than the 
correction of a clerical error.  Qualls was sentenced August 15, 2002, and 
postrelease control was not mentioned in his sentencing entry.  The majority 
states that “[w]hen the omission came to light, the trial court, in 2010, corrected 
the sentencing entry through a nunc pro tunc entry that stated that the notification 
had been made.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 1.  But the addition to Qualls’s sentencing 
entry made eight years after his sentencing hearing corrects far more than a 
clerical error; this was not a mistake in transcription, a slight correction, or even a 
single, omitted fact.  See State v. Lester, 130 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-5204, 
958 N.E.2d 142 (nunc pro tunc entry added statement that the defendant had been 
convicted by a jury).  The following two additional paragraphs were entered: 
 
For the Kidnapping offense only, the Court notified the 
Defendant that upon his release from prison, if such event should 
ever happen, the Defendant shall be subject to a five year 
mandatory period of post-release control, by the Parole Board.  
The Court further advised the Defendant that if he violates any 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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condition of any post-release control sanctions by committing a 
new felony, the sentencing Court for that felony may terminate the 
period of post-release control and impose a prison term for that 
violation, the maximum of which shall be the greater of twelve 
months or the period of post-release control for the earlier felony 
minus any time the Defendant has spent under post-release control 
for the earlier felony. 
The Defendant was further advised that if he should be 
released from prison and after his release he should violate the 
terms and conditions of Post Release Control, the Adult Parole 
Authority could send him back to prison for up to nine (9) months, 
and for repeated violations for a term not to exceed 50% of the 
original term as Ordered by this Court.  He was further advised 
that if the violation is a new felony, he could not only be sent to 
prison for the new felony, but that the sentencing Court could add 
to that sentence the greater of one year or the balance of the time 
remaining on Post Release Control. 
 
{¶ 34} We have stated that postrelease control is a part of the original 
judicially imposed sentence and that unless the sentencing entry includes proper 
notice, the parole board has no authority over a defendant at the time of release.  
Woods v. Telb, 89 Ohio St.3d 504, 512-513, 733 N.E.2d 1103 (2000).  And 
although the court has the statutory duty to accurately notify a defendant of 
mandatory postrelease control, it is also axiomatic that “[a] court of record speaks 
only through its journal entries.”  State ex rel. Geauga Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. 
Milligan, 100 Ohio St.3d 366, 2003-Ohio-6608, 800 N.E.2d 361, at ¶ 20; see also 
Kaine v. Marion Prison Warden, 88 Ohio St.3d 454, 455, 727 N.E.2d 907 (2000); 
Schenley v. Kauth, 160 Ohio St. 109, 113 N.E.2d 625 (1953), paragraph one of 
January Term, 2012 
15 
 
the syllabus (“A court of record speaks only through its journal and not by oral 
pronouncement or mere written minute or memorandum”).  “Were the rule 
otherwise it would provide a wide field for controversy as to what the court 
actually decided.”  Indus. Comm. v. Musselli, 102 Ohio St. 10, 15, 130 N.E. 32 
(1921). 
II.  R.C. 2929.191 provides a sensible approach to correcting 
sentencing entries that fail to include postrelease control 
{¶ 35} There are three ways in which a trial court might err with respect 
to postrelease control.  First, the trial court could fail to properly orally notify the 
defendant about postrelease control or properly impose it at the sentencing 
hearing.  Second, the trial court could fail to incorporate the proper notification 
given or the imposition of postrelease control in the judgment entry.  Third, the 
trial court could fail to do both—to give oral notification and to include 
postrelease control language in the judgment entry.  As the majority stated in 
Singleton, the opinion refusing retroactive application to R.C. 2929.191, the 
General Assembly intended to cover all types of error: 
 
Effective July 11, 2006, R.C. 2929.191 establishes a procedure to 
remedy a sentence that fails to properly impose a term of 
postrelease control.  It applies to offenders who have not yet been 
released from prison and who fall into at least one of three 
categories: those who did not receive notice at the sentencing 
hearing that they would be subject to postrelease control, those 
who did not receive notice that the parole board could impose a 
prison term for a violation of postrelease control, or those who did 
not have both of these statutorily mandated notices incorporated 
into their sentencing entries. R.C. 2929.191(A) and (B). 
 
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(Emphasis added.)   124 Ohio St.3d 173, 2009-Ohio-6434, 920 N.E.2d 958, ¶ 23.  
R.C. 2929.191 provides that a trial court may, after conducting a hearing with 
notice to the offender, the prosecuting attorney, and the Department of 
Rehabilitation and Correction, correct an original judgment of conviction by 
issuing a nunc pro tunc entry that includes statements that the offender will be 
supervised under R.C. 2967.28 after the offender leaves prison and that the parole 
board may impose a prison term if the offender violates postrelease control. 
{¶ 36} The legislation enacting R.C. 2929.191, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 137, 
151 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7622 (“H.B. 137”), also amended R.C. 2967.28, 
2929.14, and 2929.19.  The legislation provides a procedure to correct sentences 
in which the trial court failed either to notify the offender of postrelease control or 
to include postrelease control in the sentencing entry. As amended, R.C. 
2967.28(B)4 provided: 
 
Section 2929.191 of the Revised Code applies if, prior to July 11, 
2006, a court imposed a sentence including a prison term of a type 
described in this division and failed to notify the offender pursuant 
to division (B)(3)(c) of section 2929.19 of the Revised Code 
regarding post-release control or to include in the judgment of 
conviction entered on the journal or in the sentence pursuant to 
division (F)(1) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code a statement 
regarding post-release control. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Likewise, R.C. 2929.14(F)(1) and 2929.19(B)(3)(c) and (e), 
also amended by H.B. 137, provide that if a court imposed a sentence before July 
11, 2006, and failed to either notify the offender of postrelease control or to 
include postrelease control in the judgment entry, then R.C. 2929.191 applies. 
                                                          
 
4 R.C. 2967.28 has been amended twice since 2006.  The language quoted here is from H.B. 137.  
January Term, 2012 
17 
 
{¶ 37} R.C. 2929.191 provides: 
 
(A)(1) If, prior to the effective date of this section, a court 
imposed a sentence including a prison term of a type described in 
division (B)(3)(c) of section 2929.19 of the Revised Code and 
failed to notify the offender pursuant to that division that the 
offender will be supervised under section 2967.28 of the Revised 
Code after the offender leaves prison or to include a statement to 
that effect in the judgment of conviction entered on the journal or 
in the sentence pursuant to division (F)(1) of section 2929.14 of the 
Revised Code, at any time before the offender is released from 
imprisonment under that term and at a hearing conducted in 
accordance with division (C) of this section, the court may prepare 
and issue a correction to the judgment of conviction that includes 
in the judgment of conviction the statement that the offender will 
be supervised under section 2967.28 of the Revised Code after the 
offender leaves prison. 
* * * 
(2) If a court prepares and issues a correction to a judgment 
of conviction as described in division (A)(1) of this section before 
the offender is released from imprisonment under the prison term 
the court imposed prior to the effective date of this section, the 
court shall place upon the journal of the court an entry nunc pro 
tunc to record the correction to the judgment of conviction and 
shall provide a copy of the entry to the offender or, if the offender 
is not physically present at the hearing, shall send a copy of the 
entry to the department of rehabilitation and correction for delivery 
to the offender.  If the court sends a copy of the entry to the 
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department, the department promptly shall deliver a copy of the 
entry to the offender.  The court's placement upon the journal of 
the entry nunc pro tunc before the offender is released from 
imprisonment under the term shall be considered, and shall have 
the same effect, as if the court at the time of original sentencing 
had included the statement in the sentence and the judgment of 
conviction entered on the journal and had notified the offender that 
the offender will be so supervised regarding a sentence including a 
prison term of a type described in division (B)(3)(c) of section 
2929.19 of the Revised Code * * * . 
* * * 
(C) On and after the effective date of this section, a court 
that wishes  to prepare and issue a correction to a judgment of 
conviction of a type described in division (A)(1) or (B)(1) of this 
section shall not issue the correction until after the court has 
conducted a hearing in accordance with this division.  Before a 
court holds a hearing pursuant to this division, the court shall 
provide notice of the date, time, place, and purpose of the hearing 
to the offender who is the subject of the hearing, the prosecuting 
attorney of the county, and the department of rehabilitation and 
correction.  The offender has the right to be physically present at 
the hearing, except that, upon the court’s own motion or the 
motion of the offender or the prosecuting attorney, the court may 
permit the offender to appear at the hearing by video conferencing 
equipment if available and compatible.  An appearance by video 
conferencing equipment pursuant to this division has the same 
force and effect as if the offender were physically present at the 
hearing.  At the hearing, the offender and the prosecuting attorney 
January Term, 2012 
19 
 
may make a statement as to whether the court should issue a 
correction to the judgment of conviction. 
 
{¶ 38} I continue to believe that R.C. 2929.191 provides “a simple means 
by which trial courts might correct judgments that lacked a mandatory term of 
postrelease control.”  Singleton, 124 Ohio St.3d 173, 2009-Ohio-6434, 920 
N.E.2d 958, ¶ 65 (Lanzinger, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  The 
statute includes a number of procedural protections—including the right to notice 
and to be present at the hearing—to ensure that postrelease control is properly 
imposed.  In enacting the statute, the General Assembly specifically provided that 
these protections apply when the court failed to include a statement regarding 
postrelease control in the sentencing entry. 
{¶ 39} The majority makes much of the fact that Qualls conceded that 
proper oral notification was given during the sentencing hearing.  Because he 
failed to challenge the oral notification of postrelease control, the majority 
concludes that “he has no substantive grounds upon which to pursue an appeal 
relating to the imposition of postrelease control.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 25.  This 
statement ignores the fact that even if proper oral notification is given, a trial 
court also errs in imposing postrelease control when it does not include that 
notification in the judgment entry.  Furthermore, the statement ignores that R.C. 
2929.191 specifically states that it applies when a court fails to include a 
statement regarding postrelease control.  Because I agree with the General 
Assembly that the failure to include postrelease-control notification in a 
sentencing entry should be remedied by conducting a hearing pursuant to 
2929.191, I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 40} The majority today adds another layer of complexity to the thicket 
of postrelease-control decisions through which both the state and defendants must 
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navigate when dealing with a trial court’s failure to properly impose postrelease 
control.  This opinion whittles away at the legislative process adopted to address 
postrelease-control errors by stating that today’s decision “applies to those 
postrelease-control cases involving an omission of the type that occurred here, 
without regard to whether the sentencing hearing was held after the effective date 
of R.C. 2929.191.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 29.  Thus, a conflict appears with both 
the corrective statute (in which a hearing must be held in all cases pursuant to 
R.C. 2929.191 when no statement regarding postrelease control is included in the 
sentencing entry) and this court’s decision in Singleton, 124 Ohio St.3d 173, 
2009-Ohio-6434, 920 N.E.2d 958, paragraph two of the syllabus (in which trial 
courts “shall apply the procedures set forth in R.C. 2929.191” when correcting 
sentences imposed on or after July 11, 2006, that “failed to properly impose 
postrelease control”).  The simpler solution is to use the procedure set forth in 
R.C. 2929.191 in all cases. 
{¶ 41} The fact that Qualls does not argue that his notification of 
postrelease control was inadequate at the time he was sentenced should not bar 
him from the opportunity to have a hearing pursuant to R.C. 2929.191(C) before 
the entry is corrected.  I respectfully dissent. 
_________________ 
 
Colleen S. Williams, Meigs County Prosecuting Attorney, and Amanda 
Bizub-Franzmann, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Katherine A. Szudy and E. 
Kelly Mihocik, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellant. 
___________________