Title: Sloan v. Johnson

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson,
* Hassell, 
Keenan, and Koontz, JJ., and Poff, Senior Justice 
 
DAVID K. SLOAN, ET AL. 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.   Record No. 962264         September 12, 1997 
 
MILTON F. JOHNSON, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 
 
Charles H. Duff, Judge Designate 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether owners of certain 
lots in a subdivision may enforce express covenants that run 
with the land.   
 
Arlington Investment Corporation conveyed approximately 
25 acres of land to Jonathan R. Hagan in 1932.  From this 
grant, Hagan created a subdivision known as "Forest Park 
Addition to Waycroft" by plat of subdivision.   
 
By deed dated July 11, 1934, Hagan and his wife 
conveyed part of Lot 13 and all of Lot 14 in the subdivision 
to J. Frederick Abel and his wife as joint tenants.  The 
deed contained this express language:  
 
"This conveyance is made subject to the following 
conditions and restrictions which shall remain in 
force until July 1, 1943, and shall then be 
automatically renewed for a period of ten years 
and shall be automatically renewed every ten years 
thereafter: 
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
 
4.  Not more than one residence shall be 
erected upon this lot, the cost of which shall be 
not less than $4,000.00."   
 
 
Alberta C. Abel, "the unremarried widow of J. Frederick 
                     
     
*Justice Stephenson participated in the hearing and 
decision of this case prior to the effective date of his 
retirement on July 1, 1997. 
Abel," conveyed this property to Alberta C. Abel and Selina 
A. Taylor, trustees of the Alberta C. Abel Trust.  This 
conveyance was made subject to "the restrictions and 
conditions contained in the deed forming the chain of title 
to [the] property."  
 
Hagan conveyed Lot 11 in the subdivision to Joseph L. 
Gaddy in 1936.  That deed contained the same restriction 
included in the Hagans' deed to Abel.  Gaddy and his wife 
conveyed their property to James T. and Eva J. Newman by 
deed which stated that the conveyance was made subject to 
the restrictions and limitations of record.  The Newmans 
conveyed their property to Jack H. and Thelma A. Foster who 
subsequently conveyed the property, by deed, to David K. and 
Robyn D. Sloan.  These deeds contain provisions that each 
conveyance was made subject to the restrictions and 
conditions contained in the deeds forming the chain of title 
to the property. 
 
Jonathan Hagan conveyed Lot 12 and part of Lot 13 in 
the subdivision to Cameron R. and Catherine V. Dye in 1934. 
 This property is located between the property owned by the 
trustees of the Abel Trust and the Sloans' property.  The 
deed also contained a restriction which stated that "[n]ot 
more than one residence shall be erected upon this lot, the 
cost of which shall be not less than $4,000.00."   
 
Cameron Dye, who survived his wife, died testate, and 
Milton F. and Sharon A. Johnson inherited the property.  The 
Johnsons filed a plan to subdivide their lot with the zoning 
administrator of Arlington County.  The plan of subdivision, 
which was approved by the zoning administrator, permits the 
Johnsons to construct a second house on their lot.   
 
David and Robyn Sloan, Alberta and Selina Abel Taylor, 
trustees, and others, filed their bill of complaint seeking 
to enforce the restrictive covenants against Milton F. 
Johnson, Sharon A. Johnson, and Potomac Custom Builders, 
Inc., and to prohibit them from constructing a second 
residence on the Johnson property.  Potomac Custom Builders, 
Inc., was dismissed from the proceeding, and at the 
conclusion of a bench trial, the chancellor held that the 
covenant was unenforceable "because a general scheme or plan 
of development applicable to Forest Park Addition to 
Waycroft does not exist which gives other lot owners 
reciprocal rights of enforcement of the restriction."  David 
and Robin Sloan and Alberta and Selina Abel Taylor, 
Trustees, sought and were awarded an appeal.  (Hereinafter, 
the Sloans and the Trustees will be referred to as the 
complainants and Milton F. and Sharon A. Johnson will be 
referred to as the defendants.) 
 
The complainants contend that the chancellor erred by 
failing to enforce the express covenants which run with 
their land.  The defendants assert that the complainants are 
not entitled to enforce the covenants because the 
complainants' evidence failed to establish a general scheme 
or plan of development imposed on lots in the subdivision. 
 
Covenants, express or implied, which restrict the free 
use of land are not favored and must be strictly construed. 
 Mid-State Equipment Co. v. Bell, 217 Va. 133, 140, 225 
S.E.2d 877, 884 (1976).  We will, however, enforce such 
covenants when applicable, but the person claiming the 
benefit of the restrictions must prove that the covenants 
are applicable to the acts of which he complains.  Id., 
accord Friedberg v. Building Committee, 218 Va. 659, 665, 
239 S.E.2d 106, 110 (1977); Riordan v. Hale, 215 Va. 638, 
641, 212 S.E.2d 65, 67 (1975); Stevenson v. Spivey, 132 Va. 
115, 119-20, 110 S.E. 367, 368 (1922).   
 
We have recognized two separate and distinct types of 
restrictive covenants:  the common law doctrine of covenants 
running with the land and restrictive covenants in equity 
known as equitable easements and equitable servitudes.  Mid-
State Equipment Co., 217 Va. at 140, 225 S.E.2d at 884; 
Duvall v. Ford Leasing, 220 Va. 36, 43, 255 S.E.2d 470, 473-
74 (1979); Renn v. Whitehurst, 181 Va. 360, 366-67, 25 
S.E.2d 276, 279 (1943); Springer v. Gaddy, 172 Va. 533, 541, 
S.E.2d 355, 358 (1939). 
 
We have, on numerous occasions, thoroughly discussed 
the doctrine of restrictive covenants in equity.  For 
example, in Mid-State Equipment Company, we stated:  "[t]he 
doctrine of restrictive covenants in equity, distinct from 
the common law doctrine of covenants running with the land, 
establishes rights and obligations known as equitable 
easements and equitable servitudes."  217 Va. at 140, 225 
S.E.2d at 884; accord Minner v. City of Lynchburg, 204 Va. 
180, 187, 129 S.E.2d 673, 678 (1963); Cheatham v. Taylor, 
148 Va. 26, 37, 138 S.E. 545, 548 (1927).  The doctrine is 
that 
 
"when, on a transfer of land, there is a covenant 
or even an informal contract or understanding that 
certain restrictions in the use of the land 
conveyed shall be observed, the restrictions will 
be enforced by equity, at the suit of the party or 
parties intended to be benefited thereby, against 
any subsequent owner of the land except a 
purchaser for value without notice of the 
agreement.  The principal purposes of such 
agreements are to regulate the style and costs of 
buildings to be erected on a tract that is being 
sold in parcels for building lots, to restrict 
their location to certain distances from the 
street, and to prevent buildings in a locality 
from being put up or used for any other than 
residential purposes. . . .  The equity which is 
enforced prevents a third person, who has actual 
or constructive notice, from violating the 
equitable rights of another.   
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
 
And where a common grantor develops land for 
sale in lots and pursues a course of conduct which 
indicates an intention to execute a general scheme 
or plan of improvement for the benefit of himself 
and the purchasers of the various lots, and by 
numerous conveyances incorporates in the deeds 
substantially uniform restrictions, conditions and 
covenants against the use of the property, the 
grantees acquire by implication the equitable 
right, sometimes referred to as an implied 
reciprocal negative easement, to enforce similar 
restrictions against the residential lot or lots 
retained by the grantor or subsequently sold 
without the restrictions to a purchaser with 
actual or constructive notice of the restrictions 
and covenants." 
 
Mid-State Equipment Co., 217 Va. at 140-41, 225 S.E.2d at 
884 (citations omitted); accord Woodward v. Morgan, 252 Va. 
135, 138, 475 S.E.2d 808, 810 (1996); Burns v. Winchester 
Hospital, 225 Va. 545, 548-49, 303 S.E.2d 908, 910 (1983). 
 
The defendants argue that the trial court, relying upon 
Burns, was correct in deciding that the complainants "failed 
to prove the existence of a general scheme or plan of 
development which imposed a restriction on the number of 
houses."  However, in Burns, we considered whether 
residential owners could prevent a hospital from 
constructing a multi-level parking garage in their 
subdivision when the residential owners conceded that "no 
language in their deeds or those of the hospital [gave] them 
the explicit right to enforce restrictions contained in the 
hospital's deeds."  225 Va. at 548, 303 S.E.2d at 910. 
 
Having conceded their inability to enforce the 
restrictive covenants under the common law doctrine of 
covenants running with the land, the residential owners in 
Burns went on to argue that there was an equitable servitude 
based upon a general scheme of development restricting the 
subdivision to residential use, which prohibited the 
hospital's multi-level parking garage.  The trial court held 
"there was no general scheme of development in the 
subdivision," id. at 549, 303 S.E.2d at 911, and we affirmed 
that holding. 
 
Here, however, the complainants have not conceded their 
inability to enforce the restriction in dispute under the 
common law doctrine of covenants running with the land.  We 
must first determine, therefore, whether the complainants 
are entitled to enforce the restriction under that doctrine. 
 If so, it would be unnecessary in deciding this case to 
consider whether an equitable servitude exists. 
 
At common law, a landowner may enforce a covenant 
running with the land provided he establishes:  (1) privity 
between original parties; (2) privity between original 
parties and their successors; (3) an intent that the 
restriction will run with the land; and (4) that the 
covenant "touches and concerns" the land.  Additionally, the 
conveyance must be in writing.  7 Thompson on Real Property 
§ 62.03 (David A. Thomas ed., 1994); 9 Richard R. Powell and 
Patrick J. Rohan, Powell on Real Property, § 60.04[.1] 
(1997).   
 
Here, the evidence shows there was privity between the 
original parties, viz., Hagan and the respective grantees in 
the deeds he executed to convey the three lots involved in 
this controversy, namely, the Abels, Joseph L. Gaddy, and 
the Dyes.  There was also privity between the three original 
grantees and their successors in interest.  The three lots 
were all made subject to the restriction in dispute, and the 
words used in the deeds between Hagan and the predecessors 
in interest of the complainants and the defendants evinced 
an intent that the limitation on the number of houses which 
could be constructed on each lot would run with the land; 
those words provided for the automatic renewal of the 
restriction, essentially in perpetuity, negating any idea 
that the restriction was personal to Hagan.  The covenant 
"touches and concerns" the land because it limits the number 
of houses that may be constructed upon each lot.  Finally, 
the covenant is in writing.  Hence, the complainants are 
entitled to enforce the restriction under the common law 
doctrine of covenants running with the land. 
 
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial 
court and enter a declaration here that the restrictive 
covenants are enforceable and that the defendants may not 
construct a second house on their property.  This results in 
final judgment in favor of the complainants. 
 
Reversed and final judgment.