Title: McClellan v. Tottenhoff

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

McClellan v. Tottenhoff1983 WY 73666 P.2d 408Case Number: 5830Case Number: 5830Decided: 06/28/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
BILLY W. McCLELLAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS ADMINISTRATOR OF 
THE ESTATE OFCHAD W. 
McCLELLAN, DECEASED, AND STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS),

v.

MARY JANE TOTTENHOFF, 
INDIVIDUALLY AND DOING BUSINESS AS TODY'S LIQUORS AND MICHAEL "MIKE" BUFFINGTON, 
APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS). No. 5830

Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Paul T. Liamos, 
Jr., J.

Donald J. 
Sullivan, Cheyenne, for appellants.

Richard C. 
Hopkins of Guy, Williams, White & Argeris, and John B. Rogers, Cheyenne, for appellees.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and RAPER,* THOMAS, ROSE and BROWN, 
JJ.

* Retired June 13, 1983, 
but continued to participate in the decision of the court in this case pursuant 
to order of the court entered June 13, 1983.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant Billy W. 
McClellan, individually and as administrator of the estate of Chad W. McClellan, 
and appellant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company sued appellee Mary 
Jane Tottenhoff, individually and doing business as Tody's Liquors, and appellee 
Michael Buffington, an employee. The complaint alleged that appellees had 
negligently sold liquor to a minor at a drive-in area, that the minor became 
intoxicated and killed Chad W. McClellan in an automobile accident, and that the 
sale of the liquor was a proximate cause of the accident. The district court 
granted an order dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim. The 
court had no choice but to dismiss, based on our holding in Parsons v. Jow, Wyo., 480 P.2d 396 
(1971). The sole issue on appeal is whether a complaint against a vendor 
unlawfully selling liquor to a minor who becomes intoxicated and injures a third 
party states a claim for relief in Wyoming.

[¶2.]     We 
reverse.

[¶3.]     Under the traditional 
common law a cause of action against a liquor vendor for injuries to a third 
person by a consumer of alcohol was unknown. The basis for refusing to impose 
liability usually rested on the theory that it was the drinking of liquor, not 
the sale, which was the proximate cause of the injury. "[T]here may be sales 
without intoxication, but no intoxication without drinking." Collier v. Stamatis, 63 Ariz. 285, 290, 162 P.2d 125, 127 (1945). The earliest case which we found stating the common law rule 
was King v. Henkie, 80 Ala. 505, 60 Am.Rep. 119 
(1886). The case dealt with the death of the consumer, but the same rationale 
applied to a third party. If an injury to the consumer was too remote, injury to 
a third person was assuredly so.

"* * * [T]here must be 
some proximate connection between the wrong done and the damage claimed to 
result from it, that the two must be sufficiently conjoined so as to be 
`concatenated as cause and effect,' as often said. Had it not been for the 
drinking of the liquor, after the sale, which was a secondary or intervening 
cause co-operating to produce the fatal result, and was the act of deceased, not 
of defendants, the sale itself would have proved entirely harmless. Hence it 
cannot be said that the wrongful act of the defendants, in making sale of the 
liquor, caused the death of King; but rather his own act in drinking it. * * *" 
King v. Henkie, supra at 
122.

[¶4.]     This court has 
cursorily ruled that a third party injured by a consumer of liquor has no cause 
of action against a liquor vendor because there is no proximate cause. Parsons v. Jow, supra at 
397.

"We think it cannot be 
denied there was no cause of action at common law against a vendor of liquor in 
favor of one injured by a vendee who becomes intoxicated - this for the reason 
that the proximate cause of the injury was deemed to be the patron's consumption 
of liquor and not its sale. * * *"

[¶5.]     We also said in Parsons v. Jow, supra, at 
397-398:

"The legislature of 
Wyoming has 
not seen fit to change the common law rule as it applies in this case. Whether 
legislation in the nature of a dramshop act or civil damage statute should be 
included as a part of our liquor control code is within the province of the 
legislature."1

[¶6.]     Section 12-5-502, W.S. 
1977, does provide a claim for relief against a liquor vendor in favor of a 
limited group of injured third parties. Basically, it allows recovery for loss 
of support to a dependent when a licensed vendor sells alcohol, after a written 
notice from a dependent or spouse, to an habitual drunkard who is neglecting to 
provide support. It also allows parents or guardians to recover against a 
licensed vendor who sells to a child or ward after written 
notice.

[¶7.]     We hereby overrule Parsons v. Jow, supra. We think the 
statements from that case concerning the province of the legislature and 
proximate cause misconstrue the nature of common law. As pointed out in Choman v. Epperley, Wyo., 592 P.2d 714 (1979), Wyoming's adoption of the common law under § 
8-1-101, W.S. 1977, was not an adoption of a set code of law.2

"`* * * The common law of 
England, as modified by judicial 
decisions, so far as the same is of a general nature and not inapplicable * 
* * are the rule of decision in this state when not inconsistent with the laws 
thereof, and are considered as of full force until repealed by legislative 
authority.'" Choman v. Epperley, 
supra, at 716.

[¶8.]     We further said in Choman v. Epperley, supra, that we must 
decide cases in accordance with decisions subsequent to the times of James I, 
but that we are at liberty to follow comparatively recent decisions, or to base 
our decision on a fundamental principle underlying all the other 
decisions.

[¶9.]     This court said much 
the same thing in Collins v. Memorial 
Hospital of Sheridan County, Wyo., 521 P.2d 1339, 1341 (1974), when it 
abolished municipal immunity to the extent that the municipal entity was covered 
by insurance.

"The writer has oft been 
at odds with the theory that when the courts help create an `Aegean stable' the 
legislature has the sole responsibility for cleaning up the mess * * *. The 
writer freely concedes the importance, necessity, and strength of the doctrine 
of stare decisis * * * but is unable to utilize this doctrine as a justification 
for the continuance of an unfair and improper rule which operates to the 
detriment of those who may suffer tortious injury * * *."

[¶10.]  The rule that there is no cause of action 
when a vendor sells liquor to a consumer who injures a third party was created 
by the courts. We see no reason to wait any longer for the legislature to 
abrogate it. Common law created by the judiciary can be abrogated by the 
judiciary. As an Arizona appellate court said, the common law 
"* * * is not a thing of chiseled marble to be left unchanged for centuries." Lewis v. Wolf, 122 Ariz. App. 567, 596 P.2d 705, 706 (1979), quoting Mr. Justice Douglas:

"`Inherent in the common 
law is a dynamic principle which allows it to grow and to tailor itself to meet 
changing needs within the doctrine of stare decisis, which, if correctly 
understood, was not static and did not forever prevent the courts from reversing 
themselves or from applying principles of common law to new situations as the 
need arose. If this were not so, we must succumb to a rule that a judge should 
let others "long dead and unaware of the problems of the age in which he lives, 
do his thinking for him." * * *'"3

[¶11.]  Courts which base their finding of a 
cause of action against a liquor vendor using the common law of negligence state 
that a liquor vendor owes the same duty to the whole world as does any other 
person. See Alegria v. Payonk, 101 
Idaho 617, 619 P.2d 135 (1980); and Rappaport v. 
Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1, 75 A.L.R.2d 821 (1959). Once the general 
duty to use reasonable care is acknowledged, then courts focus their attention 
on the foreseeability of the resulting harm to establish proximate cause. We 
think this is a sensible and just approach. Henceforth, cases involving vendors 
of liquor and injured third parties will be approached in the same manner as 
other negligence cases.

[¶12.]  Negligence consists of a duty on the part 
of the defendant and a violation of the duty which proximately causes injury to 
the plaintiff. ABC Builders, Inc. v. 
Phillips, Wyo., 
632 P.2d 925 (1981). The question whether a duty exists is one of law. 
Dubus v. Dresser Industries, Wyo., 649 P.2d 198 (1982). The Wyoming common law of 
negligence imposes a duty on the defendants to exercise the degree of care 
required of a reasonable person in light of all the circumstances. Ruhs v. Pacific Power & Light, 671 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1982).

[¶13.]  Illinois, Idaho, 
Indiana, Minnesota, New Jersey, 
and Oregon 
recognize a common law negligence cause of action against a liquor vendor, 
although some of them do so in a circuitous way. Some of these cases concerned 
the sale of alcohol to already intoxicated persons, but the same rationale would 
apply to sales to minors.

[¶14.]  In Colligan v. Cousar, 38 Ill. App.2d 392, 187 N.E.2d 292 (1963), the Illinois court applied the common law of Indiana. It ruled that 
the Illinois dramshop act provided the sole 
remedy to someone injured in Illinois, but that 
the act did not give rise to a cause of action when the intoxication occurred in 
Illinois and 
the resulting accident occurred in another state. It went on to say that the 
negligence count could be interpreted as stating a cause of action in tort based 
either on a duty imposed on the defendants by the liquor control act or on a 
duty imposed on every person not to do an act, the consequences of which were 
known to him or could reasonably be anticipated, and which resulted in harm to 
another. The court held that had there been no dramshop act in Illinois, there would be 
a common law cause of action, either because of violation of a statute or 
because of violation of a common law duty. The court then decided that, since 
the question had never been ruled upon in Indiana, it would presume that the common law of 
Indiana was the same as in Illinois. It ruled that 
there was a common law cause of action in Illinois, and that, as far as it was 
concerned, there was also one in Indiana.

[¶15.]  The Indiana court in Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966), noted that it was not bound by the Illinois decision in Colligan v. Cousar, supra. It decided 
that a statute created a duty, but it went on to say that in the absence of 
special statutory provision, the general principles of common law negligence 
should be applied to cases involving intoxicating liquor.4

[¶16.]  In Trail v. Christian, 298 Minn. 101, 213 N.W.2d 618 (1973), the Minnesota court held that a common law negligence action 
would lie against a commercial vendor who illegally furnished 3.2 beer, since 
that situation was not covered by the civil damage act. In Fitzer v. Bloom, Minn., 253 N.W.2d 395 
(1977), the court reiterated that a common law cause of action for negligence 
would be allowed where the civil damage act did not apply.

[¶17.]  A well-known case which set out this 
common law duty is Rappaport v. 
Nichols, supra. That case acknowledged a common law cause of action based on 
whether a reasonably prudent person at the time and place should recognize and 
foresee an unreasonable risk or likelihood of harm or danger to others. It also 
acknowledged a duty based on a statute forbidding the sale of alcohol to minors 
or intoxicated persons.

[¶18.]  The Oregon court has also explicitly 
recognized a cause of action based on general negligence principles. In Campbell v. Carpenter, 279 Or. 237, 566 P.2d 893, 97 A.L.R.3d 522 (1977), the court approved the ruling of Rappaport v. Nichols, supra, and made it 
clear in a footnote that it was basing liability not on a statute, but on common 
law negligence.

[¶19.]  In Alegria v. Payonk, supra, the court said 
it is generally held:

"`* * * One owes the duty 
to every person in our society to use reasonable care to avoid injury to the 
other person in any situation in which it could be reasonably anticipated or 
foreseen that a failure to use such care might result in such injury.' Kirby v. 
Sonville, 286 Or. 339, 594 P.2d 818, 821 (1979). * * *"

The court said 
it perceived no justification for excusing the licensed vendor of intoxicants 
from the general duty which each person owes all others in our society. The 
vendors sold alcohol to a person whom they knew or should have known was a minor 
and whom they knew or should have known was intoxicated. The question was 
whether the conduct of the vendors in so doing fell below that of a person of 
ordinary prudence acting under the same circumstances and conditions. The court 
held that under the common law rule and under statute the vending of intoxicants 
could be the proximate cause of damage to third parties resulting from the 
tortious or unlawful acts of the consumer.

[¶20.]  We agree with the reasoning of the cases 
acknowledging a cause of action based on common law negligence. We hold that a 
vendor of liquor owes a duty to exercise the degree of care required of a 
reasonable person in light of all the circumstances.

[¶21.]  The duty of exercising care to protect 
another person may either exist at common law or be imposed by statute. Culver v. Sekulich, 80 Wyo. 437, 344 P.2d 146 (1959). The pertinent statutes in this case are §§ 12-5-301(a)(v) and 
12-6-101(a), W.S. 1977. Section 12-5-301(a)(v) provides:

"(a) Upon approval of the 
licensing authority, a drive-in area adjacent or contiguous to the licensed room 
may be used by the holder of a retail liquor license for taking orders, making 
delivery of and receiving payment for alcoholic liquor or malt beverages under 
the following conditions:

* * * * * 
*

"(v) No order shall be 
received from nor delivery made to a minor or intoxicated person in the 
area."

Section 
12-6-101(a) provides:

"(a) Every person who 
sells, furnishes, gives or causes to be sold, furnished or given away any 
alcoholic liquor or malt beverage to any person under the age of nineteen (19), 
who is not his legal ward, medical patient or member of his own immediate 
family, is guilty of a misdemeanor."

[¶22.]  Appellee argues that these statutes were 
meant only to protect minors. We disagree. At least fourteen jurisdictions have 
established a duty toward the general public based on similar statutes. See Marusa v. District of Columbia, 157 
App.D.C. 348, 484 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Alesna v. Le Grue, Alaska, 614 P.2d 1387 
(1980); Ono v. Applegate, 62 Haw. 
131, 612 P.2d 533 (1980); Elder v. 
Fisher, supra; Lewis v. State, 
Iowa, 256 N.W.2d 181 (1977); Pike v. 
George, Ky., 434 S.W.2d 626 (1968); Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 
498, 233 N.E.2d 18 (1968); Trail v. 
Christian, supra; Munford v. 
Peterson, Miss., 368 So. 2d 213 (1979); Rappaport v. Nichols, supra; Lopez v. Maez, 98 N.M. 625, 651 P.2d 1269 (1982); Mason v. Roberts, 33 Ohio St.2d 29, 62 Op.2d 346, 294 N.E.2d 884 
(1973); Walz v. City of Hudson, S.D., 
327 N.W.2d 120 (1982); Callan v. 
O'Neil, 20 Wn. App. 32, 578 P.2d 890 (1978).

[¶23.]  As we have previously noted, some of 
these cases have ruled concerning a statute forbidding the sale of alcohol to 
intoxicated persons. We see no difference whether the statutes forbid sales to 
intoxicated persons or to minors. The idea behind both statutes is that these 
people are more likely to be unable to handle alcohol, that they need protection 
from themselves, and that society needs protection from 
them.

[¶24.]  As the court in Rappaport v. Nichols, supra, 
reasoned:

"* * * It seems clear to 
us that these broadly expressed restrictions were not narrowly intended to 
benefit the minors and intoxicated persons alone but were wisely intended for 
the protection of members of the general public as well. See State v. Dahnke, 
244 Iowa 599, 603, 57 N.W.2d 553, 556 (Sup.Ct. 1953); Waynick v. Chicago's Last 
Department Store, supra, 269 F.2d 322 at * * *." Id., 156 A.2d  at 
8.

[¶25.]  We hold that both § 12-5-301(a)(v), 
supra, and § 12-6-101(a), supra, establish a duty toward the general public. The 
next question becomes whether the statutes establish the standard of conduct of 
a reasonable person, so that their violation is negligence per se, or whether it 
is instead evidence of negligence. We said in Distad v. Cubin, Wyo., 633 P.2d 167 (1981), that the court may adopt the requirements of a legislative enactment 
as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man. We also said in Distad that the 
establishment of negligence per se from the violation of a statute is not always 
appropriate.

"* * * `The enactment or 
regulation may, however, provide only for criminal liability, and not for civil 
liability * * *. In such cases the initial question is whether the legislation 
or regulation is to be given any effect in a civil suit. Since the legislation 
has not so provided, the court is under no compulsion to accept it as defining 
any standard of conduct for purposes of a tort action.' Id., at 
176-177.

* * * * * 
*

"`* * * The decision to 
adopt the standard is purely a judicial one, for the court to make. When the 
court does adopt the legislative standard, it is acting to further the general 
purpose which it finds in the legislation, and not because it is in any way 
required to do so.'" Id., at 177.

[¶26.]  We hold that the violation of either § 
12-5-301(a)(v) or § 12-6-101(a), supra, is evidence of negligence and may be 
considered by the trier of fact together with other circumstances in determining 
the issue of negligence. 

[¶27.]  We have now established a duty based both 
upon the common law and upon statutes. The question of proximate cause must also 
be addressed. Proximate cause means that the accident or injury must be the 
natural and probable consequence of the act of negligence. Frazier v. Pokorny, Wyo., 349 P.2d 324 
(1960). In determining what constitutes proximate cause, the same principles 
apply whether the negligence is a violation of a statutory duty or a 
nonstatutory duty. Zanetti Bus Lines, 
Inc. v. Hurd, 320 F.2d 123 (10th Cir. 1963). The question whether proximate 
cause exists is one for the trier of fact, unless the evidence shows that 
reasonable persons could not disagree. Kopriva v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 
Wyo., 592 P.2d 711 (1979); Endresen 
v. Allen, Wyo., 574 P.2d 1219 (1978); Caillier v. City of Newcastle, Wyo., 423 P.2d 653 (1967).

"`* * * Negligence must 
be determined upon the facts as they appeared at the time, and not by a judgment 
from actual consequences which were not then to be apprehended by a prudent and 
competent man. What was reasonably to be 
foreseen is generally a question for the jury.'" Endresen v. Allen, supra at 
1222.

[¶28.]  We hold that the ultimate test concerning 
proximate cause will be whether the vendor could foresee injury to a third 
person. This question will be one of fact based on the circumstances of each 
particular case. It is, however, not necessary that a specific injury be 
foreseen.

"* * * It is sufficient 
if a reasonably prudent person would foresee that injury of the same general 
type would be likely to happen in the absence of such safeguards. [Citations.]" 
Connett v. Fremont County School District No. 6, Wyo., 581 P.2d 1097 
(1978).

[¶29.]  The argument is also made that even if 
the sale of alcohol does eventually result in injury to a third person, the 
injury which the consumer of alcohol brings about is an independent intervening 
cause. An intervening cause is one which occurs after a defendant's negligent 
act or omission. A defendant is usually relieved of liability by an unforseeable 
intervening cause. Fagan v. Summers, 
Wyo., 498 P.2d 1227 (1972). However, an intervening cause does not relieve an 
earlier actor of liability if it was reasonably foreseeable. d'Hedouville v. Pioneer Hotel Company, 
552 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1977). The causal connection is not broken where the 
original wrongdoer could reasonably have foreseen that injury to another would 
be a probable consequence of his negligence. Tyler v. Jensen, 75 Wyo. 249, 295 P.2d 742 (1956). We agree with the reasoning in Rappaport v. Nichols, supra, 156 A.2d at 
9:

"* * * [A] tortfeasor is 
generally held answerable for the injuries which result in the ordinary course 
of events from his negligence and it is generally sufficient if his negligent 
conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the injuries. [Citations.] 
The fact that there were also intervening causes which were foreseeable or were 
normal incidents of the risk created would not relieve the tortfeasor of 
liability. [Citations.] Ordinarily these questions of proximate and intervening 
cause are left to the jury for its factual determination. * * 
*"

[¶30.]  When considering a motion to dismiss a 
complaint on the ground that it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, the facts alleged in the complaint are admitted and the allegations 
must be viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., Wyo., 
600 P.2d 733 (1979). The complaint here alleges that James Staatz was seventeen; 
that he purchased liquor at a drive-in window; that he was in his car; that he 
looked young; and that appellee made no effort to check the boy's 
identification. We are in no position to hold as a matter of law that any 
intervening cause could not be foreseeable or that there could have been no 
proximate causal connection between appellee's unlawful conduct and the 
plaintiff decedent's injuries.

"When alcoholic beverages 
are sold by a tavern keeper to a minor or to an intoxicated person, the 
unreasonable risk of harm not only to the minor or the intoxicated person but 
also to members of the traveling public may readily be recognized and foreseen; 
this is particularly evident in current times when traveling by car to and from 
the tavern is so common-place and accidents resulting from drinking are so 
frequent. [Citations.] * * *" Rappaport 
v. Nichols, supra, 156 A.2d  at 8.

[¶31.]  The fact that the risk to the traveling 
public may readily be recognized and foreseen is supported by disturbing 
statistics. In 1977, the year when the statute forbidding sale of alcohol to 
minors and the statute forbidding sale of alcohol at a drive-in to minors or to 
intoxicated persons were recodified, there were 212 fatal vehicular accidents in 
Wyoming; 119, or over fifty percent, involved alcohol as a contributing 
circumstance. Of the 144 drivers involved where alcohol was a contributing 
factor, 34 were under the age of 21. Nearly one-fourth of the drivers involved 
in fatal accidents where alcohol was a contributing factor, then, were under 21 
years old. (Wyoming's Fatal Accident Facts, Wyoming State Highway Department, p. 
32, 1977).

[¶32.]  Refusing to acknowledge a claim for 
relief against a liquor vendor harms society in two ways. First, it is an unjust 
doctrine which often limits recovery when an intoxicated minor driver injures 
someone. Businesses which sell liquor are usually in a more solid financial 
position than a minor. Second, it is reasonable to assume that the current state 
of the law places us all at more peril, because there is no effective deterrent 
to keep liquor vendors from selling liquor to minors or to intoxicated persons. 
Liquor licenses are seldom revoked. Perhaps the threat of civil liability or 
increased insurance premiums will serve to make liquor vendors more 
careful.

[¶33.]  We note that several courts have bemoaned 
the fact that an injured third person had no cause of action, even though they 
have continued to defer to the legislature.5 We do not choose to stand by and 
wring our hands at the unfairness which we ourselves have created. As expressed 
in the dissent in Meade v. Freeman, 
93 Idaho 389, 462 P.2d 54, 64-65, (1969), which position has now become the law 
in Idaho:

"* * * Some courts cling 
steadfastly to the myth that it is the drinking and not the sale that is the 
proximate cause of the ensuing injury and are wearing blinders when it comes to 
observing the ordinary course of human events. * * * I perceive no difference in 
regarding the sale of further intoxicants to one already drunk [or to a minor] 
as a proximate cause of ensuing injuries and in those cases wherein the sale of 
firearms to minors or incompetents, the sale of explosives to minors or 
incompetents, the sale of dangerous drugs to those known to be addicted, or the 
manufacture and release upon the market of dangerously defective commodities are 
held to form a basis for liability. The underlying principle of all these cases 
is that the seller is sending out into the public a thing of danger which a 
reasonably prudent person under like circumstances would apprehend would be 
likely to cause injury to someone else.

"When most people walked 
and few had horses or carriages, or even in the days when the horse and buggy 
was a customary mode of travel, it may have been that the common-law rule of 
non-liability arising from the sale of liquor to an intoxicated person was 
satisfactory. But the situation then and the problem in today's society of the 
imbiber going upon the public highways and operating a machine that requires 
quick response of mind and muscle and capable of producing mass death and 
destruction are vastly different. * * *"

[¶34.]  As another court said: "When the ghosts 
of the past stand in the path of justice clanking their medieval chains, the 
proper course is for the judge to pass through them undeterred."6

[¶35.]  This case is reversed and remanded for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 Dramshop: Archaic usage 
for barroom. Webster's Third New International Dictionary (G. & C. Merriam 
Company (1966)). A typical dramshop act or civil damage act imposes liability on 
liquor vendors in certain situations. See § 30-102, Connecticut General 
Statutes, Revision of 1958, Revised to 1981, which imposes limited liability on 
a seller who sells to an intoxicated person who injures another. Section 6-5-71, 
Code of Alabama, 1977, provides a right of action for every person injured by an 
intoxicated person "against any person who shall, by selling, giving, or 
otherwise disposing of to another, contrary to the provisions of law, any 
liquors or beverages, cause the intoxication of such person for all damages 
actually sustained, plus exemplary damages."

2 Section 8-1-101, W.S. 
1977:

"The common law of 
England as modified by judicial decisions, so far as the same is of a general 
nature and not inapplicable, and all declaratory or remedial acts or statutes 
made in aid of, or to supply the defects of the common law prior to the fourth 
year of James the First (excepting the second section of the sixth chapter of 
forty-third Elizabeth, the eighth chapter of thirteenth Elizabeth and ninth 
chapter of thirty-seventh Henry Eighth) and which are of a general nature and 
not local to England, are the rule of decision in this state when not 
inconsistent with the laws thereof, and are considered as of full force until 
repealed by legislative authority."

3 The Arizona intermediate 
appellate court was highly critical of the old rule that no cause of action 
existed but was constrained to follow the decisions of the Arizona Supreme 
Court. We suffer no such constraints.

4 This particular case 
involved an injury to a consumer, but the language of the case did not 
differentiate between an injury to the consumer and an injury to a third 
person.

5 Other cases which have 
ruled that the changing of the common law is a legislative function are Carr v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889, 385 S.W.2d 656 (1965); Nelson v. Steffens, 170 
Conn. 356, 365 A.2d 1174 (1976); Wright 
v. Moffitt, Del., 437 A.2d 554 (1981); State v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 78 A.2d 754 (1951); Holmes v. Circo, 196 Neb. 
496, 244 N.W.2d 65 (1976); Hamm v. Carson 
City Nugget, Inc., 85 Nev. 99, 450 P.2d 358 (1969); Garcia v. Hargrove, 46 Wis.2d 724, 176 N.W.2d 566 (1970).

[¶36.]  Four other jurisdictions which had ruled 
that this was a function for the legislature have overruled their cases. See Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619 P.2d 135 (1980), overruling Meade v. 
Freeman, 93 Idaho 389, 462 P.2d 54 (1969); Lewis v. State, Iowa, 256 N.W.2d 181, 
195 A.L.R.3d 1221 (1977), overruling Cowman v. Hansen, 250 Iowa 358, 92 N.W.2d 682 (1958); Lopez v. Maez, 98 
N.M. 625, 651 P.2d 1269 (1982), overruling Marchiondo v. Roper, 90 N.M. 367, 563 P.2d 1160 (1977); and Walz v. City of 
Hudson, S.D., 327 N.W.2d 120 (1982), implicitly overruling Griffin v. Sebek, 90 S.D. 692, 245 N.W.2d 481 (1976).

6 From United Australia, Ltd. v. Barclays Bank, 
Ltd., [1941] A.C. 1, 19; citation taken from fn. 69 in 19 Hastings Law 
Journal 1259, 1267 (1968).

ROONEY, Chief Justice, 
dissenting, with whom RAPER, 
Justice, Retired, joins.

[¶37.]  In this case, the majority opinion 
contends two separate grounds exist for finding liability on the part of 
appellees for injury to person or property which was occasioned by one to whom 
appellees furnished alcoholic liquor or malt beverages: (1) based on statutorily 
imposed liability under §§ 12-5-301(a)(v) and 12-6-101(a), W.S. 1977,1 and (2) based on common law 
pursuant to § 8-1-101, W.S. 1977.2

[¶38.]  I disagree.

STATUTORILY IMPOSED 
LIABILITY

[¶39.]  The majority opinion contends that the 
legislature intended the provisions of §§ 12-5-301(a)(v) and 12-6-101(a) to 
operate for the protection of the general public and not only for the protection 
of the minor or intoxicated person to whom the alcoholic liquor or malt beverage 
was sold. Thus, the majority opinion finds a duty to appellants. This contention 
is completely refuted by the exception placed in § 12-6-101(a) by the 
legislature. The general public is not protected at all if the minor can legally 
receive the alcoholic liquor or malt beverage from his guardian or from a member 
of his immediate family. The minor is protected from that which could result to 
him if someone gives him alcoholic liquor or malt beverages, but the ability is 
legislated for a guardian, etc., to forego the protection for his ward, etc. If 
the protection were intended to be for the general public, a child's guardian, 
etc., could not logically forego such protection on behalf of the general 
public. In other words, the duty to not furnish alcoholic liquor or malt 
beverage to a minor is legislatively imposed upon all but legal guardians, 
medical doctors and members of the minor's immediate family. Because certain 
classes of persons do not have a duty to refrain from furnishing such alcoholic 
liquor or malt beverages to minors, it cannot be said that the duty imposed on 
those not in such classes is one owed to the public. It would be discriminatory 
and irrational to impose a duty owed to the public by John Doe not to furnish 
alcoholic liquor or malt beverages to a minor but to exempt Richard Roe from the 
same duty. If the duty is imposed for the benefit of the minor, the exempt 
classification is rational inasmuch as the guardian or member of the immediate 
family responsible for the minor - or the medical doctor in treatment beneficial 
to the minor - is in a position to waive the benefit on behalf of the 
minor.

[¶40.]  None of the cases cited in the majority 
opinion as establishing a duty to the general public refer to a legislative 
exemption similar to that contained in § 12-6-101(a). The Annotation: 
"Common-law right of action for damage sustained by plaintiff in consequence of 
sale or gift of intoxicating liquor or habit-forming drug to another," 97 
A.L.R.3d 528, collects cases in which liability has, and has not, been 
established both (1) based on violation of liquor laws, and (2) based on tort 
apart from violation of liquor laws. None of the cases there referred to concern 
attachment of liability for violations of liquor laws where the legislative 
intention was manifest, as here, to impose the duty for the benefit of the minor 
and not for the benefit of the general public.3 The Wyoming legislature has 
addressed the issue of liability for sale of alcoholic liquor and malt beverages 
to minors, setting forth the scope of duty with reference thereto. In doing so, 
the liability of the seller was not extended to that here contended for by 
appellants.

[¶41.]  This court interpreted the antecedents of 
§§ 12-5-301 and 12-6-101 in Parsons v. 
Jow, Wyo., 480 P.2d 396 (1971), and denied recovery in favor of third party 
against one who furnished alcoholic liquor and malt beverages to a minor who 
subsequently injured the third party. Subsequent to the date of that opinion, 
the statutes there involved were amended and re-enacted by the legislature more 
than once without material change in the provisions thereof which are here 
involved. Accordingly, the legislature is presumed to have been familiar with 
the construction placed thereon by the court in Parsons v. Jow, supra, and to 
have adopted it as part of the law. Such is true unless a contrary intent 
clearly appears. Harvey v. Stanolind Oil 
& Gas Co., 53 Wyo. 495, 84 P.2d 755 (1938), reh. denied 53 Wyo. 495, 86 P.2d 735 (1939); Carpenter & 
Carpenter v. Kingham, 56 Wyo. 314, 109 P.2d 463, reh. denied 56 Wyo. 314, 
110 P.2d 824 (1941); and In Re 
Contas, 42 Wyo. 94, 291 P. 314 (1930).

[¶42.]  There is no statutory liability imposed 
upon appellees in favor of appellants.

[¶43.]  The majority opinion refers to Distad v. Cubin, Wyo., 633 P.2d 167 
(1981) as authority for the court to establish the requirements of a legislative 
enactment as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man. The majority opinion 
neglects to note that, in Distad, we adopted the language of the Restatement, 
Torts 2d, to this end. Following is part of that quoted from the Restatement (§ 
286) in Distad at 
:

"`The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of 
a reasonable man the requirements of a legislative enactment or an 
administrative regulation whose purpose is found to be exclusively or in 
part

"`(a) to protect a class of persons which includes 
the one whose interest is invaded, and

"`(b) to protect the 
particular interest which is invaded, and

"`(c) to protect that 
interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and

"`(d) to protect that 
interest against the particular hazard from which the harm results.'" (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶44.]  As demonstrated, supra, these conditions 
cannot exist for the purposes of this case in light of the exception contained 
in § 12-6-101(a). The statutes cannot be said to set a standard for evidence of 
negligence (including the element of duty).

COMMON LAW IMPOSED 
LIABILITY

[¶45.]  The foregoing, in effect, makes improper 
any application of common law liability. Inasmuch as the legislature has set the 
perimeters for liability - perimeters which do not include liability to 
appellants - any application of common law would be precluded by the proviso in 
§ 8-1-101 to the effect that common law is not effective "when inconsistent with 
the laws" of this state. When the legislature has dealt with the questions, as 
it has in §§ 12-5-301(a)(v) and 12-6-101(a), common law cannot be resorted to 
pursuant to § 8-1-101.

[¶46.]  Although such should be dispositive of 
the question of common law imposed liability, I note that § 8-1-101 adopts the 
common law of England "as modified by judicial decisions." Our decision in 
Parsons v. Jow, supra, refused to modify the common law, but approved and 
judicially adopted it in Wyoming. It established the common law on this issue 
pursuant to § 8-1-101. To overrule that decision under the guise of amplifying 
common law pursuant to § 8-1-101 sets the stage whereby the bar, bench and 
populace cannot know what the law is and what it is not in a given circumstance 
until that circumstance reaches this court. The end result is a state which is 
not one of law but is one at the whim of this court. Certainly, at the time the 
transaction took place in this case, appellees believed they were operating 
under the law as set forth in the Parsons case (statutory directions aside). 
Suddenly, they find that the whim of the supreme court says otherwise.4 This state and nation cannot 
successfully operate under such circumstances.

[¶47.]  I authored the opinion in Choman v. Epperley, Wyo., 592 P.2d 714 
(1979), which is heavily relied upon in the majority opinion for ability of the 
court to declare new common law at the whim of the court. The case does not 
support that position. After noting applicable law in common law as modified by 
judicial decisions, we pointed out that the proposition which we ultimately 
determined to be the law was probably the common law as of the fourth year of 
James I (1607), but that even if it were not, it was almost universally 
established law, and we cited and discussed several Wyoming cases which had 
established the proposition as the law in Wyoming. We did not, at our whim, 
overrule a case which held to the contrary, nor did we adopt the proposition at 
our whim. Rather, we recognized an already existing status of the 
law.

[¶48.]  It is not the court's business to make 
laws. That is the function of the legislature. After reviewing the general 
status of the law relative to liability for furnishing alcoholic liquor or malt 
beverages to a minor - from the common law position through the approach taken 
by the various states to the issue, we said in Parsons v. Jow, 480 P.2d at 
397-398:

"The legislature of 
Wyoming has not seen fit to change the common law rule as it applies in this 
case. Whether legislation in the nature of a dramshop act or civil damage 
statute should be included as a part of our liquor control code is within the province of the 
legislature." (Emphasis added.)

[¶49.]  Since the date of that opinion, February 
4, 1971, the legislature has not acted in the premises, reflecting satisfaction 
with the decision. The courts do not take kindly to intrusion by the legislature 
into court business, and such is improper. We should not intrude into the 
legislative business. To do so is also improper. Yet the majority opinion is 
doing just that in this case.

[¶50.]  I would affirm.

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 12-5-301(a) 
provides in part pertinent to delivery of alcoholic liquor or malt beverages in 
a drive-up area by a holder of a retail liquor license:

"(v) No order shall be 
received nor delivery made to a minor or intoxicated person in the 
area."

Section 
12-6-101(a) provides:

"(a) Every person who 
sells, furnishes, gives or causes to be sold, furnished or given away any 
alcoholic liquor or malt beverage to any person under the age of nineteen (19), 
who is not his legal ward, medical 
patient or member of his own immediate family, is guilty of a misdemeanor." 
(Emphasis added.)

2 Section 8-1-101 
provides:

"The common law of 
England as modified by judicial decisions, so far as the same is of a general 
nature and not inapplicable, and all declaratory or remedial acts or statutes 
made in aid of, or to supply the defects of the common law prior to the fourth 
year of James the First (excepting the second section of the sixth chapter of 
forty-third Elizabeth, the eighth chapter of thirteenth Elizabeth and ninth 
chapter of thirty-seventh Henry Eighth) and which are of a general nature and 
not local to England, are the rule of decision in this state when not inconsistent with the laws 
thereof, and are considered as of full force until repealed by legislative 
authority." (Emphasis added.)

3 Of course, many of the 
cases in such collection do not impose statutory liability or change the 
common-law rule that the seller of intoxicating liquor was not liable for 
injuries to those persons. The holdings being similar to that in Parsons v. Jow, Wyo., 
480 P.2d 396 (1971).

4 The majority opinion 
notes the binding effect of Parsons v. 
Jow, supra, on the trial court, but refuses to accord the same consideration 
to appellees.