Title: Doe v. Williams

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2013 ME 24 
Docket: 
Ken-11-454 
Argued: 
September 13, 2012 
Decided: 
March 5, 2013 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and 
JABAR, JJ. 
Majority: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and LEVY, MEAD, and GORMAN, JJ. 
Dissent: 
ALEXANDER, SILVER, and JABAR, JJ. 
 
 
JOHN DOE I et al. 
 
v. 
 
ROBERT WILLIAMS et al. 
 
 
MEAD, J. 
 
[¶1]  John Does I, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, X, XIII, XVI, XVIII, XXIV, and 
XLIII, joined by John Does XIX1 and XXIII, appeal from a summary judgment 
entered in the Superior Court (Kennebec County, Murphy, J.) in favor of numerous 
State officials on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment.  The Does 
challenge the constitutionality of Maine’s Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act of 1999 (SORNA of 1999), 34-A M.R.S. §§ 11201-11256 (2012).  
We affirm the trial court’s judgment, concluding that SORNA of 1999 as amended 
                                         
1  John Doe XIX was originally John Doe XVIII, but the trial court changed his pseudonym because it 
was already assigned to another John Doe. 
 
 
2 
following our decision in State v. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, 985 A.2d 4, does not 
violate the constitutional rights of the litigants before us. 
I. 
  BACKGROUND2 
[¶2]  John Doe I was previously before us in Doe v. District Attorney, 
2007 ME 139, 932 A.2d 552.  John Doe I pleaded guilty to and was convicted of 
unlawful sexual contact with a family member, id. ¶ 2, and in 1985 was sentenced 
to five years’ imprisonment with all but sixty days suspended and two years’ 
probation.  He has not been convicted of any sex offenses since. 
[¶3]  In 2005, the Legislature amended SORNA of 1999 to apply 
retroactively to all sex offenders sentenced on or after January 1, 1982.  P.L. 2005, 
ch. 423, § 1 (effective Sept. 17, 2005) (codified at 34-A M.R.S. § 11202(1) 
(2012)); see Doe, 2007 ME 139, ¶ 14, 932 A.2d 552.  John Doe I sued several 
State officials in their official capacities, arguing that the retroactive application of 
SORNA of 1999 violated his rights to procedural and substantive due process, 
equal protection, and a civil jury trial, pursuant to the Maine and United States 
Constitutions.  Doe, 2007 ME 139, ¶ 5, 932 A.2d 552.  Upon the State officials’ 
motion to dismiss, the Superior Court (Kennebec County, Studstrup, J.) dismissed 
                                         
2  Doe v. District Attorney, 2007 ME 139, ¶¶ 10-19, 932 A.2d 552, and State v. Letalien, 
2009 ME 130, ¶¶ 4-12, 985 A.2d 4, provide a detailed history of sex offender laws in Maine.  The 
background we provide here focuses on the factual and procedural history of the litigants and the 
amendments to SORNA of 1999 after Letalien. 
 
3 
John Doe I’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted.  Id. ¶ 1.  John Doe I appealed, and we concluded that (1) further factual 
development was required to determine whether SORNA of 1999 was an 
unconstitutional ex post facto law3 as applied to him,4 and (2) he should not have 
been foreclosed from pursuing his other theories of relief.  Id. ¶¶ 1, 36-37.  We 
then remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings on those issues.  
Id. ¶ 37.  On remand, John Doe I’s case was consolidated with cases brought by 
other convicted sex offenders who were also challenging the retroactive 
application of SORNA of 1999. 
[¶4]  In 2009, the Legislature created an exception from the duty to register 
for sex offenders meeting certain criteria who were sentenced on or after 
January 1, 1982, and before June 30, 1992.  P.L. 2009, ch. 365, § B-3 (effective 
Sept. 12, 2009) (codified at 34-A M.R.S. § 11202-A(1) (2009)).5  Sex offenders 
fall within the exception if, among other criteria, their underlying convictions did 
not include more than one Class A sex offense or sexually violent offense, they had 
                                         
3  Although John Doe I did not assert an ex post facto violation, the Superior Court treated his 
procedural due process claim as an ex post facto claim.  Doe, 2007 ME 139, ¶¶ 1, 8, 932 A.2d 552. 
 
4  We later held in Letalien that “[f]or ex post facto purposes, SORNA of 1999 is properly evaluated 
on its face” rather than by examining its application to any given individual.  2009 ME 130, ¶ 34, 
985 A.2d 4. 
 
5  Title 34-A M.R.S. § 11202-A (2009) was amended after Letalien, 2009 ME 130, 985 A.2d 4, and 
will be discussed in detail later in this opinion.  See P.L. 2009, ch. 570 (effective Mar. 30, 2010) (codified 
at 34-A M.R.S. §§ 11202-A, 11222, 11225-A (2012)). 
 
4 
no prior sex offense convictions, and they had no subsequent convictions for 
crimes punishable by imprisonment of one year or more.  34-A M.R.S. 
§ 11202-A(1)(A)-(F).  Because of the newly enacted exception, many of the John 
Does became eligible for relief from the duty to register and withdrew from the 
litigation.  Some Does who were eligible for relief, however, chose to continue 
with the litigation along with the Does who were ineligible for relief. 
[¶5]  We decided Letalien shortly after 34-A M.R.S. § 11202-A(1) became 
effective.  Pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act of 1995, Letalien’s 
sentence included a requirement that he register for fifteen years on the State’s sex 
offender registry; the sentence provided that after five years Letalien could seek a 
waiver “upon a finding that [he] ‘ha[d] shown a reasonable likelihood that 
registration is no longer necessary and waiver of the registration requirement is 
appropriate.’”  Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 5, 985 A.2d 4 (quoting 34-A M.R.S.A 
§ 11121(6)(C) (Supp. 1996)).  While Letalien was on probation, the Legislature 
enacted SORNA of 1999, which required him to register for life, prevented him 
from seeking a waiver, and established additional reporting requirements.  Id. 
¶¶ 6-8 (citing P.L. 1999, ch. 437, § 2 (effective Sept. 18, 1999) (codified at 
34-A M.R.S.A. §§ 11201-11252 (Pamph. 1999))).  Letalien challenged SORNA of 
1999 as unconstitutional under the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and 
Maine Constitutions.  Id. ¶ 1.  We concluded that SORNA of 1999 “impose[d] an 
 
5 
ex post facto punishment as to offenders sentenced in the years before the effective 
date of [the statute] for whom registration was a required part of their sentence and 
who were subsequently made subject to the more burdensome requirements.”  Id. 
[¶6]  In response to the Letalien decision, the Legislature amended SORNA 
of 1999 by enacting P.L. 2009, ch. 570 (effective Mar. 30, 2010) (codified at 
34-A M.R.S. §§ 11202-A, 11222, 11225-A (2012)).  The amendments extended 
the exception from registration provided by P.L. 2009, ch. 365, § B-3, making it 
available to qualifying offenders sentenced through September 18, 1999, the 
effective date of SORNA of 1999.6  See P.L. 2004, ch. 570, § 1.  The amendments 
also changed the reporting requirements for offenders’ registration information, 
such as residence and place of employment.  P.L. 2004, ch. 570, § 4.  Ten-year 
registrants are now subject to annual verification in writing and in-person 
verification once every five years.  34-A M.R.S. § 11222(4-A).  Lifetime 
registrants are now subject to quarterly verification in writing and in-person 
verification once every five years.  Id. § 11222(4-B).  Additionally, if a law 
enforcement agency with jurisdiction over a registrant or the State Bureau of 
Identification has “reason to believe the [registrant’s] appearance has changed 
                                         
6  None of the Does were removed from the registry as a result of the latest amendments in P.L. 2009, 
ch. 570 (effective Mar. 30, 2010) (codified at 34-A M.R.S. §§ 11202-A, 11222, 11225-A).  Instead, they 
were removed as a result of the enactment of P.L. 2009, ch. 365, § B-3 (effective Sept. 12, 2009) 
(codified at 34-A M.R.S. § 11202-A(1) (2009)), which allowed Does meeting certain criteria to be 
removed from the registry if they were convicted between January 1, 1982 and September 18, 1999. 
 
6 
significantly,” the agency or Bureau may instruct the registrant to appear in person 
with a current photograph or to allow a new photograph to be taken, or may 
instruct the registrant to submit a new photograph without appearing in person.  Id. 
§ 11222(4-A)(C)(1)-(2), (4-B)(C)(1)-(2). 
[¶7]  John Does I, IV, V,7 VI, VIII, and XVI were initially required to 
register, but successfully petitioned to be removed.  John Doe XXIV was also 
required to register, but he obtained a temporary restraining order preventing his 
information from being publically posted; he later successfully petitioned for 
removal from the registry.  John Does VII, XIII, and XVIII obtained temporary 
restraining orders relieving them from registering, and they were also statutorily 
relieved of the registration requirement.  John Does III, X, XIX, XXIII, and XLIII8 
remain on the registry and have viable claims. 
[¶8]  The Does and State defendants filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment.  The trial court issued its decision on the cross-motions on 
August 18, 2011, denying the Does’ motion on all of their claims, and granting the 
State defendants’ motion for summary judgment.  The court concluded that the 
                                         
7  John Doe V was removed from the registry after the parties submitted their briefs, but prior to oral 
argument. 
 
8  John Doe XLIII is not currently on the registry because he obtained a temporary restraining order, 
but he is ineligible to be relieved from the registration requirement because he does not meet the 
requirements of 34-A M.R.S. § 11202-A(1)(C). 
 
7 
cases of the Does who successfully petitioned to be relieved from the duty to 
register were moot, and that SORNA of 1999 as amended after Letalien was 
constitutional.  The court also denied the Does’ motion for attorney fees. 
[¶9]  The Does make numerous claims on appeal, namely that (A) the claims 
of the John Does who are no longer required to register as sex offenders are not 
moot; (B) SORNA of 1999 is an unconstitutional ex post facto law; (C) SORNA of 
1999 violates article I, section 1 of the Maine Constitution; (D) SORNA of 1999 
violates their procedural due process rights; (E) SORNA of 1999 violates their 
substantive due process rights; (F) SORNA of 1999 violates the Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Maine and United States Constitutions; (G) SORNA of 1999 
violates the Maine Civil Rights Act (MCRA), 5 M.R.S. §§ 4681-4685 (2012); 
(H) SORNA of 1999 violates 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 (Lexis 2012); (I) summary 
judgment was improperly granted; and (J) they are entitled to an award of attorney 
fees. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[¶10]  This case comes before us on a grant of summary judgment in favor 
of the State defendants, which we review de novo and will affirm “if the record 
reflects that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law.”  Levesque v. Androscoggin Cnty., 2012 ME 114, 
¶ 5, 56 A.3d 1227 (quotation marks omitted).  Because we find that there are no 
 
8 
genuine issues of material facts in dispute, we evaluate whether the State 
defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.  Summary judgment is 
properly granted when “the plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case for each 
element of [his] cause of action.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
[¶11]  The Does’ arguments based on procedural and substantive due 
process, equal protection, and the Ex Post Facto Clause challenge the 
constitutionality of SORNA of 1999.  Accordingly, the Does have “the burden of 
establishing [the statute’s] infirmity.”  See Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 15, 
985 A.2d 4 (quotation marks omitted).  We review challenges to the validity of 
statutes de novo.  Id.  We presume that the statute is constitutional, id., and must 
“avoid an unconstitutional construction of a statute if a reasonable interpretation of 
the statute would satisfy constitutional requirements,” Bagley v. Raymond Sch. 
Dep’t, 1999 ME 60, ¶ 14, 728 A.2d 127 (quotation marks omitted). 
III.  DISCUSSION 
[¶12]  We consider the Does’ challenges in the order the Does argue them. 
A. 
Justiciability 
[¶13]  The Superior Court determined that the claims of the Does who had 
been removed from the registry are moot because the court could not provide them 
any real or effective relief.  These Does argue that their claims are not moot 
because (1) they will be subject to the registry if they commit future crimes or 
 
9 
move to a different state, (2) their claims fit within the exceptions to the mootness 
doctrine, and (3) the court can retain jurisdiction in order to award costs and 
attorney fees. 
1. 
Technical Mootness 
[¶14]  We review de novo the trial court’s determination of mootness.  
McGettigan v. Town of Freeport, 2012 ME 28, ¶ 10, 39 A.3d 48.  “An issue is 
moot when there is no real and substantial controversy, admitting of specific relief 
through a judgment of conclusive character.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  In 
analyzing whether a case is moot, “we examine whether there remain sufficient 
practical effects flowing from the resolution of the litigation to justify the 
application of limited judicial resources.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
[¶15]  The Does’ first argument, that their future conduct may subject them 
to registration in the future, is insufficient to constitute a “real and substantial 
controversy.”  See id.  For a controversy to be justiciable it must declare rights 
“upon the existing state of facts and not upon a state of facts that may or may not 
arise in the future.”  See Madore v. Me. Land Use Regulation Comm’n, 
1998 ME 178, ¶ 7, 715 A.2d 157 (quotation marks omitted).  Here, the Does have 
alleged only facts that may or may not occur in the future, and thus their claims are 
moot. 
 
10 
[¶16]  Additionally, the Does have been relieved of the duty to register, the 
crux of the litigation.  See, e.g., Bennett v. State, 289 A.2d 28, 28, 32 (Me. 1972) 
(holding that the expiration of defendant’s sentence rendered his habeas corpus 
petition moot); State v. Irish, 551 A.2d 860, 861-62 (Me. 1988) (holding that the 
defendant’s constitutional challenge to the revocation of his intensive supervision 
was moot because he had been released from institutional confinement). 
[¶17]  Further, because we conclude that the Does are not entitled to an 
award of their fees and costs, there is no need for the trial court to retain 
jurisdiction over their claim. 
[¶18]  For these reasons, the claims of Does I, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, XIII, 
XVI, XVIII, and XXIV, who have been removed from the registry, no longer have 
controversial vitality and are therefore moot unless an exception applies. 
2. 
Exceptions to Mootness 
 
[¶19]  The Does’ claims also do not fit within the exceptions to the mootness 
doctrine.  We will consider an appeal that is otherwise moot if the appellant can 
show that 
(1) sufficient collateral consequences will result from the 
determination of the questions presented so as to justify relief; (2) the 
appeal contains questions of great public concern that, in the interest 
of providing future guidance to the bar and the public, we may 
address; or (3) the issues are capable of repetition but evade review 
because of their fleeting or determinate nature. 
 
 
11 
Anthem Health Plans of Me., Inc. v. Superintendent of Ins., 2011 ME 48, ¶ 8, 
18 A.3d 824 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶20]  Here, the collateral consequences exception is unavailable.  The Does 
argue that their registration status may be affected if they commit another crime or 
move to another state.  The collateral consequences exception will not apply if the 
appellant fails to “demonstrate that a decision on the merits of the appeal will have 
more than conjectural and insubstantial consequences in the future.”  Sordyl v. 
Sordyl, 1997 ME 87, ¶ 6, 692 A.2d 1386 (quotation marks omitted).  These 
consequences to the Does’ registration status that may or may not transpire in the 
future and which are entirely dependent on the Does’ own actions do not fall under 
the collateral consequences exception.  Additionally, the Does’ argument that their 
claims may have a potential impact on federal funding of Maine law enforcement 
is too tenuous and uncertain to be a collateral consequence. 
[¶21]  The two remaining exceptions to mootness, for issues of great public 
concern and issues capable of repetition, are also unavailable to the Does who have 
been removed from the registry.  Although it is true that the application of SORNA 
of 1999 is an issue of great public concern that is capable of repetition, the issue 
will not evade review because the cases of Does III, X, XIX, XXIII, and XLIII, 
who remain on the registry, are decided today.  Therefore, the claims of the Does 
who had been removed from the registry are moot. 
 
12 
B. 
Ex Post Facto Analysis 
[¶22]  The remaining Does argue that SORNA of 1999 as amended after 
Letalien is an unconstitutional ex post facto law.  The trial court concluded that the 
Does failed to establish by the clearest proof that SORNA of 1999 is punitive. 
[¶23]  Both the United States and Maine Constitutions prohibit the 
enactment of ex post facto laws.  U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . 
pass any . . . ex post facto Law . . . .”); Me. Const. art. I, § 11 (“The Legislature 
shall pass no . . . ex post facto law . . . .”).  We have explained that the 
Ex Post Facto Clauses of the two constitutions “are interpreted similarly and are 
coextensive.”  Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 25, 985 A.2d 4.  A statute violates the 
Ex Post Facto Clauses if it “makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime 
after it has been committed.”  Id. 
[¶24]  In making that determination, we employ the two-step “intent-effects 
test,” in which we first analyze the Legislature’s intent in enacting the statute.  See 
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003); Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 29, 985 A.2d 4.  If 
we determine that the intent of the statute is civil in nature, we then analyze the 
statute’s effects to determine whether the effects are so punitive that they 
overcome the Legislature’s civil intent.  Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003); 
Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 29, 985 A.2d 4.  We have already concluded that 
“SORNA was intended to be a civil, regulatory statute” under the intent aspect of 
 
13 
the analysis.  Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 29, 985 A.2d 4.  Therefore, our focus is on 
the second step of the inquiry—assessing the statute’s effects to determine if they 
are punitive.  See id. ¶ 30. 
[¶25]  In analyzing the effects of SORNA of 1999, we consider the seven 
factors we discussed in Letalien, commonly referred to as the Mendoza-Martinez 
factors.  Reformulated as questions, the seven factors are (1) does the sanction 
involve an affirmative disability or restraint?, (2) has the sanction been historically 
regarded as punishment?, (3) is the sanction imposed only upon a finding of 
scienter?, (4) does the operation of the sanction promote retribution and 
deterrence?, (5) is the behavior to which it applies already a crime?, (6) is there an 
alternative purpose to which the sanction may rationally be connected?, and (7) is 
the sanction excessive in relation to the alternative purpose?.  See Letalien, 
2009 ME 130, ¶ 31, 985 A.2d 4 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 
372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)). 
[¶26]  In order for us to conclude that SORNA of 1999 is an unconstitutional 
ex post facto law, the Does must, through the Mendoza-Martinez factors, 
“demonstrate by the clearest proof that the statute is so punitive in purpose or 
effect as to overcome the Legislature’s civil intent.”  See State v. Cosgro, 
2008 ME 64, ¶ 2, 945 A.2d 1221 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
14 
[¶27]  Letalien is the point of departure for our analysis of the 
constitutionality of SORNA of 1999 under the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United 
States and Maine Constitutions.  In Letalien, we concluded that the statute 
impose[d] an ex post facto punishment as to offenders sentenced in 
the years before the effective date of SORNA of 1999 for whom 
registration was a required part of their sentence and who were 
subsequently made subject to the more burdensome requirements of 
SORNA of 1999 after its effective date of September 18, 1999. 
 
2009 ME 130, ¶ 1, 985 A.2d 4 (emphasis added). 
[¶28]  There are numerous factual distinctions between the plaintiff in 
Letalien and Does III, X, XIX, XXIII, and XLIII who are before us today.  Unlike 
Letalien, who was required to register as a sex offender as part of his criminal 
sentence, id. ¶ 5, there was no sex offender registration law at the time the Does 
were originally sentenced, see Doe, 2007 ME 139, ¶¶ 10, 14, 932 A.2d 552.  The 
registration requirement of Letalien’s sentence included a waiver provision that 
was eliminated in 2001.  Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 8, 985 A.2d 4.  In contrast, the 
registration requirement originally imposed on the Does by SORNA of 1999 has 
been alleviated by the enactment of 34-A M.R.S. § 11202-A, which allows sex 
offenders to remove their names from the registry if they fall within the exceptions 
created by the statute.  Reporting requirements also differ.  Letalien was required 
to report in person to law enforcement officials every ninety days.  Letalien, 
2009 ME 130, ¶ 8, 985 A.2d 4.  Pursuant to the current law, ten-year registrants are 
 
15 
only required to report annually in writing and in person every five years; lifetime 
registrants are required to report quarterly in writing and in person every five 
years.9  34-A M.R.S. § 11222(4-A), (4-B). 
[¶29] 
Against 
that 
backdrop, 
we 
evaluate 
each 
of 
the 
seven 
Mendoza-Martinez factors in turn. 
1. 
Affirmative Disability or Restraint 
[¶30]  The first factor requires us to determine whether SORNA of 1999 
imposes an affirmative disability or restraint.  We consider “‘how the effects of the 
[a]ct are felt by those subject to it.  If the disability or restraint is minor and 
indirect, its effects are unlikely to be punitive.’”  Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 35, 
985 A.2d 4 (alteration in original) (quoting Smith, 538 U.S. at 99-100). 
[¶31]  In Letalien we held that this factor weighed in favor of finding the 
statute punitive because of the great burden associated with a registrant appearing 
in person every ninety days and being subjected to fingerprinting, photographing, 
and verification of residence and employment information.  Id. ¶ 37.  Since 
Letalien, the burden imposed by the registration requirements of SORNA of 1999 
has been significantly reduced.  Now ten-year and lifetime registrants are required 
                                         
9  In addition, registrants are required to report to law enforcement officials when they move or change 
employment, and must update their registrations if they significantly change their appearance.  
34-A M.R.S. § 11222(4-A), (4-B). 
 
16 
to appear in person every five years, which is no more onerous than renewing 
one’s driver’s license.  See 29-A M.R.S. § 1406(1) (2012) (requiring 
noncommercial license renewal every six years and commercial license renewal 
every five years).  Similarly, the burden of reporting in writing annually for 
ten-year registrants or quarterly for lifetime registrants is minimal when compared 
to an in-person reporting requirement. 
[¶32]  The Does argue that it is punitive to require that registrants submit a 
new photograph when a registrant’s appearance has changed significantly.  The 
Supreme Court analyzed a similar requirement in Smith, holding that the Alaska 
statute imposed no affirmative disability or restraint because “[a]lthough 
registrants must inform the authorities after they change their facial features (such 
as growing a beard) . . . they are not required to seek permission to do so.”  
538 U.S. at 101; see State v. Haskell, 2001 ME 154, ¶ 15, 784 A.2d 4 (finding no 
affirmative disability or restraint because the “movements and activities [of the 
registrants were] not restricted in any way”). 
[¶33]  We conclude that SORNA of 1999 imposes no significant restraint or 
disability, and that therefore this factor weighs against finding the statute punitive. 
2. 
Historically Regarded as Punishment 
[¶34]  The second factor we examine is whether the sex offender registry has 
historically been regarded as punishment.  The Does argue that the registry’s 
 
17 
availability on the Internet is punitive because of its stigmatizing effects.  The 
Supreme Court found that “[t]he purpose and the principal effect of notification are 
to inform the public for its own safety, not to humiliate the offender.  Widespread 
public access is necessary for the efficacy of the scheme, and the attendant 
humiliation 
is 
but 
a 
collateral 
consequence 
of 
a 
valid 
regulation.”  
Smith, 538 U.S. at 99.  In Letalien, we concluded that posting the registry on the 
Internet was not punitive “for the reasons articulated by the Supreme Court in 
Smith.”  2009 ME 130, ¶ 38, 985 A.2d 4. 
[¶35]  However, our analysis of this factor does not end there.  “The unique 
history of the development of sex offender registration laws in Maine is integral” 
to our analysis of whether the retroactive application of SORNA of 1999 should be 
regarded as punishment.  See Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 39, 985 A.2d 4.  The Sex 
Offender Registration Act of 1991, the original sex offender registration law 
enacted in Maine, and the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act of 1995, 
which affected Letalien, made registration an “integral part of the sentencing 
process and, thus, the resulting sentence.”  Id. ¶¶ 39, 42.  SORNA of 1999, on the 
other hand, is not tied to the sentencing process; this is the crucial distinction upon 
which Letalien was based.  See id. ¶¶ 1, 39, 60-61.  We conclude that this factor 
weighs against finding the statute punitive. 
 
18 
3. 
Scienter 
[¶36]  The third factor is whether the statute comes into play only on a 
finding of scienter.  Because SORNA of 1999 is not triggered on a finding of 
scienter, this factor weighs against finding SORNA punitive.  See id. ¶ 44; Haskell, 
2001 ME 154, ¶ 17, 784 A.2d 4. 
4. 
Promote Traditional Aims of Punishment 
[¶37]  The fourth factor requires us to determine whether SORNA of 1999 
promotes the traditional aims of punishment, specifically, retribution and 
deterrence.  The Does argue that SORNA of 1999 is retributive because it imposes 
registration obligations on them for past wrongdoing even though some of them 
have gone decades without reoffending; additionally, they argue that it is a 
deterrent because they are subject to increased supervision by the State and 
increased scrutiny by the public. 
[¶38]  In considering this factor in Smith, the Supreme Court concluded that 
although the Alaska sex offender registration scheme may deter future crimes, such 
a finding did not warrant a finding that the registration statute was punitive because 
“[a]ny number of governmental programs might deter crime without imposing 
punishment.”  538 U.S. at 102.  Further, even though the Alaska registration 
scheme differentiated among individuals based on the extent of their wrongdoing, 
 
19 
the corresponding length of the reporting requirements was “reasonably related to 
the danger of recidivism, and this is consistent with the regulatory objective.”  Id. 
[¶39]  In Letalien, we concluded that given the differences between Smith 
and Letalien in the length of registration for certain offenses, the sparse record 
provided “little basis to assess the reasonableness of this widely disparate treatment 
and whether Maine’s requirement of lifetime registration is reasonably related to 
the danger of recidivism.”  2009 ME 130, ¶ 46, 985 A.2d 4. 
[¶40]  We are unable to determine on this record whether SORNA of 1999 is 
more deterrent in effect than other civil regulatory schemes.  Likewise, on the 
record presented we cannot assess whether the registration requirements are 
reasonably related to the danger of recidivism.  See id.  Thus, we treat this factor as 
neutral.  See id. 
5. 
Whether Behavior is Already a Crime 
[¶41]  The fifth factor we examine is whether the behavior to which SORNA 
of 1999 applies is already a crime.  We determined in Letalien that the fifth factor 
weighed in favor of finding the statute punitive because it “applie[d] exclusively to 
behavior that is already a crime.”  Id. ¶ 48.  For that same reason, we agree that this 
factor supports a finding that the statute is punitive. 
 
20 
6. 
Rational Connection to Alternative Purpose 
[¶42]  The sixth factor is whether there is an alternative purpose rationally 
connected to the statute.  We determined in Letalien that SORNA of 1999 “serves 
a valid governmental purpose separate from punishment” because it is “among the 
most basic obligations state government owes its people—ensuring their safety.”  
Id. ¶ 50.  We discern no reason to depart from the determination we reached in 
Letalien and thus conclude that this factor weighs against finding that SORNA is 
punitive. 
7. 
Excessive in Relation to Alternative Purpose 
[¶43]  The seventh and final factor requires us to determine whether the 
statute appears excessive in relation to its public safety purpose.  The Does contend 
that requiring an individual previously convicted for a sex offense to register if he 
is later convicted of a non-sex-related offense punishable by more than one year is 
excessive.  We analyze excessiveness as it relates to the increased burdens on 
individuals who were originally sentenced before any statute requiring registration 
of sex offenders had been enacted and are now retroactively subject to ten-year or 
lifetime registration on the State’s sex offender registry.  “The excessiveness 
inquiry . . . is not an exercise in determining whether the legislature has made the 
best choice possible to address the problem it seeks to remedy.  The question is 
 
21 
whether the regulatory means chosen are reasonable in light of the nonpunitive 
objective.”  Smith, 538 U.S. at 105. 
[¶44]  Although the statutory reporting requirements of SORNA of 1999 are 
less stringent and oppressive than those we considered in Letalien, we nevertheless 
conclude again that we have insufficient information upon which to determine 
whether they are reasonable in light of the law’s nonpunitive purpose of public 
safety.  Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 52, 985 A.2d 4.  The record does not allow us to 
determine whether a less demanding regimen would serve the objective of public 
safety equally well.  We accordingly treat this factor as neutral.  See id. ¶ 55. 
8. 
Assessment of Mendoza-Martinez Factors 
[¶45]  The Does argue that a conviction-based scheme is inherently punitive 
and that the Legislature should implement a risk-assessment scheme.  However, 
“[i]t is not our role to ask whether the Legislature could achieve its goals through 
alternative means.”  Id. ¶ 56.  Our task is to determine whether the punitive effects 
of SORNA of 1999 overcome the Legislature’s civil intent by the clearest proof.  
See Cosgro, 2008 ME 64, ¶ 2, 945 A.2d 1221. 
[¶46]  Our ex post facto analysis in Letalien was informed and driven in 
significant part by the fact that registration was part of Letalien’s criminal 
sentence.  See Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶¶ 60-61, 985 A.2d 4.  Indeed, “the purpose 
of the ex post facto prohibition is rightfully considered to be at its apex when a 
 
22 
law’s retroactive application is more punitive than the punishment that was 
actually imposed against an offender as part of a sentence.”  Id. ¶ 61.  By 
definition, it was punitive to increase Letalien’s sentence retroactively.  Further, it 
was the cumulative effect of a combination of factors that produced a finding that 
the statute was unconstitutional in Letalien.  That is simply not the case here, 
where registration was not part of the Does’ sentences and where some of the most 
significant concerns we had in Letalien have been remedied by the Legislature. 
[¶47]  In our present discussion of the Mendoza-Martinez factors, we 
conclude that only factor five—whether the statute applies to behavior that is 
already a crime—weighs in favor of finding SORNA of 1999 punitive. 
[¶48]  The first Mendoza-Martinez factor, which is whether the statute 
imposes an affirmative disability or restraint, looms large in our conclusion that the 
statute is nonpunitive overall.  Title 34-A M.R.S. § 11222 significantly reduced the 
burden on individuals subject to the registry.  We disagree with the Does’ 
argument that requiring lifetime registration is a significant restraint in and of 
itself.  Regardless of the length of time an individual is subject to the registry, 
reporting to have his registration information verified in person every five years is 
a minimal burden, as is reporting in writing no more frequently than quarterly. 
[¶49]  Additionally, factor six, regarding the important and rational 
connection to a nonpunitive purpose—providing truthful information in 
 
23 
furtherance of public safety—underscores our conclusion that the statute is 
nonpunitive.  See Haskell, 2001 ME 154, ¶ 9, 784 A.2d 4 (“[T]he Supreme Court 
has intimated, in other cases, that the most significant question under the effects 
stage of the analysis is whether the law, ‘while perhaps having certain punitive 
aspects, serve[s] important nonpunitive goals.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 
United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 290 (1996))). 
[¶50]  Factor four, whether the statute promotes traditional aims of 
punishment, and factor seven, whether the statute is excessive in relation to the 
alternate purpose, are found to be neutral; accordingly, they do not weigh heavily 
in our analysis. 
[¶51]  After considering all of the Mendoza-Martinez factors, we conclude 
that SORNA of 1999 is nonpunitive.  As such, it does not violate the Ex Post Facto 
Clauses of the United States and Maine Constitutions. 
C. 
Equal Protection 
[¶52]  The Does argue that SORNA of 1999 violates the Equal Protection 
Clauses of the United States and Maine Constitutions because its registration 
requirements infringe on the Does’ fundamental rights under article I, section 1 of 
the Maine Constitution and are not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling 
governmental interest.  In the alternative, the Does argue that SORNA of 1999 
unlawfully and arbitrarily treats them differently from similarly situated sex 
 
24 
offenders in requiring some offenders to register for ten years and others for life.  
The Superior Court found that SORNA of 1999 does not implicate a suspect class 
or a fundamental right, and concluded that the Does failed to establish that the 
statute treats them differently from similarly situated persons in a way that is not 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 
[¶53]  The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause prohibits “any 
state from denying to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws, and requires, generally, that persons similarly situated be treated alike.  
Article [I], section 6-A of the Maine Constitution includes similar requirements.” 
Anderson v. Town of Durham, 2006 ME 39, ¶ 28, 895 A.2d 944 (citations and 
quotation marks omitted); see U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any 
State . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.”); Me. Const. art. I, § 6-A (“No person shall be . . . denied the equal 
protection of the laws . . . .”). 
[¶54]  In an equal protection challenge, a state law is subject to strict 
scrutiny analysis if it “infringes on a fundamental constitutional right, or 
involves . . . a suspect classification.”  Anderson, 2006 ME 39, ¶ 29, 895 A.2d 944.  
If strict scrutiny applies, the law must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling 
governmental interest.  Id.  “If the government action does not implicate either a 
fundamental right or a suspect class, different treatment accorded to similarly 
 
25 
situated persons need only be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”  Id. 
(quotation marks omitted).  Laws subject to rational basis review “bear[] a strong 
presumption of validity.”  Id.  “[T]he burden is on the party challenging the 
government action to demonstrate that there exists no fairly conceivable set of 
facts that could ground a rational relationship between the challenged classification 
and the government’s legitimate goals.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
[¶55]  As persons convicted of sex offenses, the Does are not members of a 
suspect or protected class for purposes of an equal protection challenge.  
See, e.g., United States v. Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d 999, 1009 (9th Cir. 2012); Doe 
v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1346 (11th Cir. 2005).  Additionally, the Does have not 
established that SORNA of 1999 infringes on a fundamental constitutional right; 
they merely refer generally to article I, section 1 of the Maine Constitution10 and 
argue in greater detail with regard to substantive due process that a fundamental 
right is implicated.  As we will discuss in our substantive due process analysis, we 
do not find that SORNA of 1999 implicates a fundamental constitutional right.  
Accordingly, the Does’ equal protection challenge is subject to the highly 
deferential rational basis review.  See Anderson, 2006 ME 39, ¶ 29, 895 A.2d 944; 
                                         
10  Article I, section 1 of the Maine Constitution provides, “All people are born equally free and 
independent, and have certain natural, inherent and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying 
and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and of pursuing and 
obtaining safety and happiness.” 
 
26 
Haskell, 2001 ME 154, ¶ 16 n.10, 784 A.2d 4 (SORNA’s classifications “need 
only be rationally related to a legitimate government goal.”). 
[¶56]  In order “[t]o succeed in an equal protection challenge where, as here, 
the challenging party is not a member of a suspect class” and has not had a 
fundamental right infringed, the Does “must show (1) that similarly situated 
persons are not treated equally under the law, and (2) that the statute is not 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”  See MacImage of 
Me., LLC v. Androscoggin Cnty., 2012 ME 44, ¶ 33, 40 A.3d 975 (quotation marks 
omitted). 
[¶57]  The Legislature has required individuals who are convicted of certain 
sex offenses to register for ten years while requiring others who are convicted of a 
“sexually violent offense” or multiple sex offenses to register for life.  See 
34-A M.R.S. § 11203(5), (8).  Although all registrants are labeled “sex offenders,” 
the Does have not established that ten-year registrants are similarly situated to 
lifetime registrants because different conduct triggers the different durational 
requirements.  See Green v. Comm’r of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 
2000 ME 92, ¶ 22, 750 A.2d 1265 (“There is a good argument that insanity 
acquittees and individuals civilly committed are not similarly situated for purposes 
of equal protection analysis because of the difference in circumstances giving rise 
to their commitment.”).  Contrary to the Does’ argument that all sex offenders are 
 
27 
similarly situated, the law does not treat offenders convicted of particular offenses 
differently because SORNA of 1999 is a conviction-based system.11 
[¶58]  We do not reach the second step in the analysis given our conclusion 
that the Does are not similarly situated to other sex offenders who are treated 
differently and the Does’ concessions (1) that protecting the public through 
publicizing offender information is a compelling state interest and (2) that we have 
previously held that the sex offender registration statutes were enacted to serve the 
legitimate governmental purpose of public safety.  See Letalien, 2009 ME 130, 
¶ 50, 985 A.2d 4. 
[¶59]  For these reasons, SORNA of 1999 does not violate the Equal 
Protection Clauses. 
D. 
Procedural Due Process 
 
[¶60]  The Does argue that the classification scheme of SORNA of 1999 
implies that they are “dangerous” and therefore they are entitled to challenge that 
classification at a hearing pursuant to the Due Process Clause.  The trial court 
concluded that the Does were not entitled to a hearing to establish whether they are 
                                         
11  The Does also argue that similarly situated Does can end up in different categories as a result of 
prosecutorial discretion.  However, “[i]t is well established that a reasonable prosecutorial discretion in 
the enforcement of criminal laws is inherent in our criminal justice system,” and the Does do not claim 
that “selective enforcement was deliberately made on an impermissible and unjustifiable standard such as 
race, religion, a desire to discourage the exercise of one’s constitutional rights or other invidious criteria.”  
See State v. Heald, 382 A.2d 290, 301 (Me. 1978). 
 
 
28 
potentially dangerous because that fact is immaterial with regard to their duty to 
register. 
 
[¶61]  The Maine and United States Constitutions create coextensive due 
process rights.  Northup v. Poling, 2000 ME 199, ¶ 9 n.5, 761 A.2d 872.  “We 
review a procedural due process claim in two steps.  First, we determine if the 
government has deprived a claimant of life, liberty, or property interests.  Second, 
if such deprivation occurred, we then determine what process, pursuant to the 
Fourteenth Amendment, is due . . . .”  DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Me. Revenue 
Servs., 2007 ME 62, ¶ 26, 922 A.2d 465 (citations omitted). 
 
[¶62]  The Supreme Court has articulated the “stigma-plus test” to determine 
whether procedural due process rights12 are implicated when the state imposes a 
stigma on an individual that negatively affects his reputation.  See Paul v. Davis, 
424 U.S. 693, 701, 711 (1976).  A state action is an infringement on due process 
rights pursuant to the stigma-plus test only if it both negatively affects an 
individual’s reputation and alters the legal status of an individual in a manner that 
affects his or her liberty, such as revoking parole or taking away the right to 
operate a vehicle.  Id. at 701, 708-09.  The Does’ legal status is unaffected by 
                                         
12  The stigma-plus test “is limited to consideration of the procedural guarantees of the Due Process 
Clause and is not intended to describe those substantive limitations upon state action which may be 
encompassed within the concept of ‘liberty’ expressed in the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Paul v. Davis, 
424 U.S. 693, 710 n.5 (1976). 
 
29 
SORNA of 1999. 
[¶63]  Other courts have held that sex offender registration requirements are 
not violations of due process under the stigma-plus test because registration does 
no more than make the fact of conviction public, just as SORNA of 1999 does 
here.  See, e.g., Does v. Munoz, 507 F.3d 961, 965-66 (6th Cir. 2007) (concluding 
that registration does not implicate a fundamental right because it disseminates 
accurate public information); cf. Gwinn v. Awmiller, 354 F.3d 1211, 1223-24 
(10th Cir. 2004) (holding that liberty interests were implicated under the 
stigma-plus test where the defendant was incorrectly placed on a sex offender 
registry without any process).  Because the registry contains no information that 
cannot be obtained through a routine criminal background check, the registry does 
not affect any of the Does’ liberty or property interests, and we therefore need not 
reach the question of what process is due. 
E. 
Substantive Due Process 
[¶64]  The Does argue that SORNA of 1999 violates their fundamental 
rights to privacy, reputation, and property, and their ability to pursue happiness, 
and that the law is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.  The 
trial court concluded that the statute does not violate the Does’ substantive due 
process rights because it does not infringe on any fundamental right and is 
reasonably related to a legitimate state interest. 
 
30 
 
[¶65]  We have previously determined that the substantive due process rights 
of the United States and Maine Constitutions are coextensive, Green, 2000 ME 92, 
¶ 13 n.2, 750 A.2d 1265, and there is nothing presented in this case that causes us 
to reconsider that determination.  A substantive due process analysis turns on 
whether the challenged state action implicates a fundamental right: 
First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially 
protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, 
deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition, and implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would 
exist if they were sacrificed.  Second, we have required in 
substantive-due-process cases a careful description of the asserted 
fundamental liberty interest.  Our Nation’s history, legal traditions, and 
practices thus provide the crucial guideposts for responsible 
decisionmaking that direct and restrain our exposition of the Due 
Process Clause. 
Id. ¶ 13 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997)).  In 
addition to the rights expressly protected by the Bill of Rights, “the ‘liberty’ 
specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the rights to marry, to have 
children, to direct the education and upbringing of one’s children, to marital 
privacy, to use contraception, to bodily integrity, and to abortion.”  Glucksberg, 
521 U.S. at 720 (citations omitted).  Courts must be cautious in recognizing 
fundamental rights that have not been clearly established because “extending 
constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest . . . place[s] the 
matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative action.”  Id. 
 
31 
[¶66]  If state action infringes on a fundamental right or fundamental liberty 
interest, the infringement must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state 
interest.  Id. at 721.  If the challenged state action does not implicate a fundamental 
right or fundamental liberty interest, it will be upheld if it is reasonably related to a 
legitimate state interest.  Id. at 722. 
 
[¶67]  We conclude that no fundamental liberty interest or fundamental right 
is implicated by SORNA of 1999.  In particular, the right to privacy alleged by the 
Does, i.e., the right to keep private the fact of conviction, is inapposite to the right 
to personal autonomy often described as a right to privacy by the Supreme Court 
regarding family relationships and bodily integrity.  Other courts have also 
concluded that no fundamental right is implicated by disclosure of truthful public 
information.  See, e.g., Paul, 424 U.S. at 713 (holding that publication of a record 
of an official act, such as an arrest, does not implicate any fundamental right); 
Moore, 410 F.3d at 1345 (“[W]e can find no history or tradition that would elevate 
the issue here to a fundamental right. . . . [A] state’s publication of truthful 
information that is already available to the public does not infringe the 
fundamental constitutional rights of liberty and privacy.”); Doe v. Tandeske, 
361 F.3d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[P]ersons who have been convicted of serious 
sex offenses do not have a fundamental right to be free from the registration and 
notification requirements . . . .”); In re W.M., 851 A.2d 431, 451 (D.C. 2004) 
 
32 
(“Under [the Sex Offender Registration Act] and its implementing regulations . . . 
only truthful and accurate information of a non-confidential, mainly public nature 
is disclosed.”). 
[¶68]  We do not here establish a new fundamental interest or right.  
Because no fundamental right or interest is at stake and the Does have conceded 
that SORNA of 1999 is reasonably related to a legitimate state interest, see 
Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 50, 985 A.2d 4, the Does’ substantive due process 
challenges must fail. 
F. 
Use of Guilty Pleas 
[¶69]  The Does argue that SORNA of 1999’s registration requirements 
exact more punishment than the Does agreed to in their plea bargain agreements 
and they urge us to recognize a right of fundamental fairness under Maine’s 
Constitution and to find a violation of the Does’ right to contract.  Because we 
have concluded that SORNA of 1999 is not punitive under an ex post facto 
analysis and implicates no fundamental rights, we do not find merit in this 
argument. 
G. 
Rights Afforded by the Maine Constitution 
 
[¶70]  The Does urge us to establish a fundamental right to privacy, a right 
to protection of reputation, and a right to fundamental fairness under article I, 
section 1 of the Maine Constitution.  We have already held that SORNA of 1999 
 
33 
does not implicate fundamental rights of privacy and reputation under the Maine 
Constitution in the context of the Does’ procedural and substantive due process 
claims.  We also decline to expand our interpretation of Maine’s Constitution to 
include a generalized right to “fundamental fairness.”  See Bagley, 1999 ME 60, 
¶ 13, 728 A.2d 127 (“[W]e have traditionally exercised great restraint when asked 
to interpret our state constitution to afford greater protections than those 
recognized under the federal constitution.” (quotation marks omitted)). 
H. 
MCRA and § 1983 
 
[¶71]  The Does seek prospective relief to protect them from registering in 
the future, and an award of the costs associated with registering and the fees 
associated with removing their names from the registry.  The trial court denied the 
Does’ monetary claims, finding that they had not sought any prospective relief and 
that their claim for reimbursement was tantamount to an award of damages and 
was thus prohibited. 
[¶72]  Title 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 states that “[e]very person who, under color 
of any [state law], subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 
States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law.”  The 
MCRA, 5 M.R.S. §§ 4681-4685, is patterned after § 1983 and “provides a private 
cause of action for violations of constitutional rights by ‘any person.’”  
 
34 
Jenness v. Nickerson, 637 A.2d 1152, 1158 (Me. 1994).  The Does have failed to 
establish that SORNA of 1999 violated their constitutional rights, thus barring their 
claim for prospective relief, which they first raised on appeal. 
[¶73]  We also conclude that the Does cannot claim a refund for the $31 they 
paid to remove their names from the registry.  The State’s sovereign immunity bars 
retroactive 
recovery 
of 
payments 
voluntarily 
made 
to 
the 
State.  
See Wellman v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 574 A.2d 879, 884 (Me. 1990) (holding 
that sovereign immunity barred retroactive recovery of any previously made 
payments).  The Does voluntarily paid the fee.  See State v. Van Reenan, 
355 A.2d 392, 395 (Me. 1976) (concluding that a defendant who voluntarily 
submitted to a breath test in order to avoid having his license suspended pursuant 
to a statute could not challenge the constitutionality of that statute because he was 
not subject to the sanctions of which he complained.). 
[¶74]  A state, including a state official in his or her official capacity, is not a 
person within the meaning of § 1983 or the MCRA, barring the Does’ additional 
monetary claims.  See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 71 
(1989); Jenness, 637 A.2d at 1158.  We are not persuaded by the re-stylization of 
the Does’ damage claims as anything other than monetary compensation from 
alleged past violations.  The court did not err in dismissing the Does’ monetary 
claims. 
 
35 
I. 
Summary Judgment 
 
[¶75]  The Does contend that the factual record on summary judgment was 
inadequate for the trial court to rule on the parties’ cross-motions.  In particular, 
they contend that there were insufficient facts for the court to decide the Does’ 
equal protection and procedural and substantive due process claims. 
[¶76]  We are not persuaded by the Does’ arguments that the record was 
inadequate.  Parties opposing summary judgment, in this case the Does, have the 
burden of presenting sufficient evidence to generate a genuine issue of material 
fact.  See M.R. Civ. P. 56(c) (“Judgment shall be rendered . . . if . . . there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact . . . .”); Estate of Pinkham v. Cargill, Inc., 
2012 ME 85, ¶ 16, 55 A.3d 1 (evaluating whether the plaintiff “presented enough 
evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact”); Cookson v. Brewer Sch. 
Dep’t, 2009 ME 57, ¶ 30, 974 A.2d 276 (“Because [plaintiff] has failed to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact . . . the court did not err in entering a summary 
judgment for [the defendant] . . . .”).  The Does failed to do so here. 
[¶77]  In their ex post facto argument, but not in their summary judgment 
argument, the Does refer to factual disputes they claim warranted the denial of the 
State defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment.  Two facts were in the 
Does’ statement of material facts and denied by the State defendants.  The first 
concerns the relationship between the number of convictions and the risk of 
 
36 
recidivism: “There is no empirical evidence and no accepted professional opinion 
that a person who committed two Class A sex offenses before 1985 would be more 
dangerous in 2010 as a sex offender than one who committed one such offense 
before 1985.”  The second fact concerns whether there is a relation between sex 
offenders who commit non-sex offenses and public safety risks: 
There is no empirical evidence and no accepted professional opinion 
that a sex offender who committed one sex offense before 1995 
followed by a Class C or higher offense unrelated to sexual activity is 
therefore more dangerous as a sex offender in 2010 than a pre 1995 
sex offender who has not committed a separate [C]lass C or higher 
offense after his sex offense but unrelated to any sexual activity. 
 
In their reply brief, the Does identify two additional facts included in the State 
defendants’ statement of material facts that the Does denied, and which relate to 
the rate of recidivism over time.13 
[¶78]  In the final analysis, the disagreement between the Does and the State 
on the disputed facts does not concern material issues that the trial court would 
necessarily address in further proceedings.  Instead, they constitute policy 
considerations that are appropriately addressed to the legislative process.  The fact 
that the parties do not agree upon them or their import is not an impediment to 
                                         
13  The two facts, with their citations omitted, are (1) “Over time, the cumulative rate of recidivism 
increases”; (2) “The recidivism rates for STATIC-99 show that cumulative re-offense rates are higher at 
15 years than 5 years.”  The Does identify four other facts in their reply brief, but the Does admitted those 
facts. 
 
37 
summary judgment.  We therefore conclude that the Does’ arguments that 
summary judgment was improperly granted are unpersuasive. 
J. 
Attorney Fees 
[¶79]  Does I, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, X, XIII, XVI, XVIII, XXIV, and 
XLIII argue that they should receive an attorney fees award as prevailing parties 
pursuant to § 1983 and the MCRA.  The trial court concluded that the Does were 
not entitled to recover attorney fees because they did not prevail on their motion 
for summary judgment.  The court also found that the “catalyst theory” was an 
unavailable avenue for recovering attorney fees pursuant to Maine law, and even if 
it were available, the Does were not entitled to recover pursuant to that theory. 
[¶80]  The trial court may award attorney fees to a prevailing party “in any 
action or proceeding to enforce a provision of § 1983.”  Bangs v. Town of Wells, 
2003 ME 129, ¶ 8, 834 A.2d 955; see also 42 U.S.C.S. § 1988(b) (Lexis 2012).  
The MCRA similarly provides that the court may award attorney fees to a 
prevailing party.  5 M.R.S. § 4683.  We review the trial court’s “determination 
regarding prevailing party status for clear error,” and review its denial of attorney 
fees for an abuse of discretion.  Bangs, 2003 ME 129, ¶ 7, 834 A.2d 955. 
[¶81]  The trial court’s finding that the Does were not prevailing parties is 
not clearly erroneous.  The court ruled in favor of the State defendants on all of the 
Does’ claims.  See Portland Co., 2009 ME 98, ¶ 32, 979 A.2d 1279.  Moreover, 
 
38 
the grant of temporary restraining orders does not satisfy the prevailing-party 
requirement.  In the Does’ case, “the preliminary injunction[s] . . . merely 
maintained the status quo, [they] did not effect a material alteration in the parties’ 
legal relationship and the plaintiffs therefore [are] not prevailing parties under 
§ 1988.”  See Advantage Media, LLC v. City of Hopkins, 511 F.3d 833, 837 
(8th Cir. 2008). 
[¶82]  The Does argue that they are “prevailing parties” pursuant to the 
catalyst theory.  The catalyst theory “posits that a plaintiff is a ‘prevailing party’ if 
[the lawsuit] achieves the desired result because [it] brought about a voluntary 
change in the defendant’s conduct.”  Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 601 (2001).  The State defendants 
contend that the Supreme Court’s rejection of the catalyst theory in Buckhannon 
Bd. & Care Home, Inc. foreclosed an award of attorney fees to the Does.  See 
532 U.S. at 600. 
[¶83]  The Does advance the catalyst theory in arguing that Doe v. District 
Attorney led to the enactment of P.L. 2009 ch. 365, § B-3 (effective date 
Sept. 12, 2009) (codified at 34-A M.R.S. § 11202-A(1) (2009)), providing for 
certain exceptions to the registration requirements, and the litigation in Letalien, 
leading to the legislative enactment of P.L. 2009 ch. 570 (effective date 
Mar. 30, 2010) (codified at 34-A M.R.S. §§ 11202-A, 11222, 11225-A), alleviating 
 
39 
the reporting requirements.  The connection between their lawsuit and the 
legislative changes is too tenuous.  In fact, at the time John Doe I’s case reached us 
in Doe, the plaintiff had expressly not pursued an ex post facto claim.14  Instead, 
our decision in Letalien, analyzing an ex post facto claim, triggered the recent 
legislative changes to 34-A M.R.S. § 11222.  Because the legislative changes to 
SORNA of 1999 are not the result of this litigation, we do not address the catalyst 
theory further. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
[¶84]  For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s decision that 
SORNA of 1999 is not an unconstitutional ex post facto law.  The Does’ other 
constitutional and statutory challenges are unpersuasive. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SILVER, J., with whom ALEXANDER and JABAR, JJ., join, dissenting. 
[¶85]  We respectfully dissent because the requirements of SORNA of 1999 
are punishment to those who have completed their sentences and paid back society 
                                         
14  “At oral argument, Doe’s counsel stated that he was not requesting that we reconsider whether 
SORNA is ex post facto as he recognized that State v. Haskell, and Smith v. Doe, had decided the issue.”  
Doe, 2007 ME 139, ¶ 21 n.4, 932 A.2d 552 (citations omitted). 
 
40 
long ago.  As we have already learned, tragically, here in Maine, the publication of 
names and pictures on the Internet is dangerous and dramatically affects the 
registrants’ lives.  See Associated Press, 2 Sex Offenders Shot to Death in Their 
Homes, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 2006, at A14; Raja Mishra, Suspect May Have 
Wanted to Kill Others, Boston Globe, Apr. 25, 2006, at B2.  Those who do not 
comply with the requirements of SORNA of 1999 face criminal sanctions similar 
to those imposed on defendants who violate conditions of release or probation.  
The requirements of SORNA of 1999, as they affect these Does, are ex post facto 
laws that violate the United States and Maine Constitutions.  Nowhere else in the 
realm of laws is such an ex post facto violation permitted. 
[¶86]  We do not dispute that the requirements of SORNA of 1999 may be 
enforced on persons whose sentences have been imposed since the requirements of 
SORNA of 1999 took effect.  The propriety of applying SORNA of 1999 to current 
offenders is not at issue in this appeal.  What is at issue is whether, after a person’s 
sentence has been imposed, and after that sentence has been served, the State may 
add to the sentence new and onerous burdens and restrictions that were not 
authorized when the offender was sentenced.  The constitutional requirements that 
govern this issue are not unique to SORNA of 1999.  If the State can impose 
additional burdens and restrictions here, it can do it for completed sentences for 
 
41 
any other crime that society decides, in hindsight, was not subject to tough enough 
sanctions the first time around. 
I.  UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
 
[¶87]  There are several reasons why SORNA of 1999 is punishment and 
violates the United States Constitution.  A look at some of the Mendoza-Martinez 
factors shows that many of them weigh in favor of finding the statute punitive. 
A. 
Affirmative Disability or Restraint 
[¶88]  We determined in State v. Letalien that “SORNA of 1999 [prior to the 
ch. 570 amendment] impose[d] a disability or restraint that is neither minor nor 
indirect” because “quarterly, in-person verification of identity and location of 
home, school, and employment at a local police station, including fingerprinting 
and the submission of a photograph, for the remainder of one’s life, is undoubtedly 
a form of significant supervision by the state.”  2009 ME 130, ¶ 37, 985 A.2d 4.  
Now, a lifetime registrant who was sentenced prior to September 18, 1999, is only 
required to report in writing every ninety days and report in person every five 
years, unless there has been a change in address or appearance.  34-A M.R.S. 
§ 11222(4-B) (2012).  Admittedly, this is a lower physical burden on the offender 
than predecessor acts’ requirements that the offender report every ninety days in 
person.  The level of state supervision, however, has not changed in a material way 
 
42 
because the State still maintains and distributes the same amount of highly 
personal information about the offender. 
[¶89]  The effect of the registration and reporting requirements of SORNA 
of 1999 is substantially more burdensome than renewing a driver’s license.  Most 
notably, if the offender fails to comply with the reporting provisions in SORNA of 
1999, he exposes himself to criminal liability, which reflects the punitive effect of 
the statute.  See 34-A M.R.S. § 11227(1) (2012) (providing that the first offense is 
a Class D crime).  In comparison, if an individual chooses not to renew his driver’s 
license he is simply not permitted to drive.  Although the changes to SORNA of 
1999 have reduced the physical burdens on the offender, the State’s supervision 
and control over the offender have not been reduced.  This supervision and control, 
as we recognized in Letalien, signifies the punitive effect of SORNA of 1999. 
B. 
Historically Regarded as Punishment 
 
[¶90]  Labeling a law’s burden as civil instead of criminal does not reduce 
the level of punishment attached to the burden, nor should it reduce the 
constitutional protection connected to the burden.15  Likewise, a burden that was 
imposed as part of a sentence does not become less punitive if it is later imposed as 
part of a regulatory requirement that parallels sentencing. 
                                         
15  The issue of whether a burden is civil or criminal was discussed in further detail in State v. Letalien, 
2009 ME 130, ¶¶ 73-74, 985 A.2d 4 (Silver, J., concurring). 
 
43 
 
[¶91]  In Letalien, we provided a detailed description of the evolution of the 
sex offender registry in Maine.  2009 ME 130, ¶¶ 4-12, 985 A.2d 4.  One aspect of 
the registry that has evolved is its relation to sentencing procedures.  Beginning in 
1996, the registration requirements of SORNA of 1995 were imposed as part of a 
sentence.  P.L. 1995, ch. 680, § 4.  Subsequently, the statute was amended to 
instruct the court to order convicted offenders to register at the time it imposed a 
sentence, but it was no longer “part of a sentence.”  P.L. 2003, ch. 711, § B-13.  
Although the statutory language removed the registry from the direct realm of 
sentencing, this change  “did not, in itself, make the registration requirements less 
punitive or otherwise remove the constitutional infirmity.”  Letalien, 
2009 ME 130, ¶ 74, 985 A.2d 4 (Silver, J., concurring). 
[¶92]  The stigma associated with publication on the Internet is 
demonstrative of SORNA of 1999’s role as punishment and its punitive effects.  
See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 115-16 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting 
that the public notification regimen of the registry “calls to mind shaming 
punishments once used to mark an offender as someone to be shunned”); Doe v. 
State, 189 P.3d 999, 1012 & n.98 (Alaska 2008) (noting that the act of registering 
is not analogous to shaming, but the dissemination provision is analogous).  The 
public does not have access to the pictures, home addresses, and work places of 
those convicted of robbery, arson, embezzlement, or any other crime.  We 
 
44 
acknowledge that there is a stigma connected to any criminal behavior and there 
often is retribution by the public against those who have committed crimes.  
However, in no other area of the criminal law do we allow the public to have 
access to such personal information.  Because these Does have not committed 
additional sex crimes since they completed their sentences, they were not required 
to be on a registry when the registry system was first created.  Placing them on the 
registry now forces them to face additional public ridicule.  See Human Rights 
Watch, No Easy Answers: Sex Offender Laws in the US 78-79 (2007), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/us0907/us0907web.pdf (discussing the serious 
impact the dissemination of registration information has on the registrants). 
[¶93]  In State v. Freeman we found that the civil proceeding by which some 
OUI laws were enforced had punitive consequences of the type that characterize 
criminal prosecution.  487 A.2d 1175, 1176-77 (Me. 1985) (finding the statute void 
because its purpose was frustrated).  In our analysis of the civil OUI proceeding, 
we considered, in part, the effect that the pre-charging mechanism for OUI 
defendants had on one’s reputation.  Id. at 1178.16  In this consideration, we noted 
that the stigma from the pre-charging mechanism associated with the civil 
                                         
16  In State v. Freeman, in addition to stigma, we also considered that the defendant is still subject to 
arrest and detention and the “civil” charge enhances the charge and sentence of subsequent OUI 
violations.  487 A.2d 1175, 1178-79 (Me. 1985). 
 
 
45 
proceeding for the OUI offense paralleled the stigma associated with the criminal 
proceeding.  Id.  As a result, we found that the stigma was “highly suggestive of 
the true criminal nature of the procedure.”  Id.; see also State v. Anton, 
463 A.2d 703, 708 (Me. 1983) (noting the lack of criminal stigma regarding the 
decriminalization of traffic offenses). 
[¶94]  Sex offenders who are required to register are subjected to stigma in 
part due to the underlying offense, but also in part due to the dissemination of 
information.  The registry makes significant personal information readily available 
to the public.17  The impact of this dissemination is heightened by the use of the 
Internet, thus correlating the dissemination “to the shaming and branding 
punishments used in colonial times.”  Doe v. Dist. Attorney, 2007 ME 139, ¶ 55, 
932 A.2d 552 (Alexander and Silver, JJ., concurring).  As discussed below in 
relation to the traditional aims of punishment, the stigma associated with Internet 
publication has the potential to cause “retributive and vigilante violence against 
registrants.”  Id.  The historic connection to criminal sentencing and shaming, 
                                         
17  SORNA of 1999 provides the public access to each offender’s name, date of birth, photograph, city 
or town of domicile and residence, address of employment, address of college or school, the statutory 
citation and name of the offense for which the registrant was convicted, and designation as a 10-year or 
lifetime registrant.  34-A M.R.S. § 11221(9)(A) (2012).  Additional information, including the mailing 
address and physical location of a registrant’s domicile and residence, is easily available to the public 
through a written request.  34-A M.R.S. § 11221(9)(B) (2012). 
 
46 
along with the retribution and deterrence discussed below, demonstrate SORNA of 
1999’s punitive effect. 
C. 
Traditional Aims of Punishment 
[¶95]  SORNA of 1999 promotes retribution and deterrence, especially as it 
relates to Does III, X, XIX, XXIII, and XLIII.  Such characteristics are present 
regardless of the intent of the Legislature.  As the Indiana Supreme Court said in 
its discussion of that state’s sex offender registration act:  
It is true that to some extent the deterrent effect of the registration and 
notification provisions of the Act is merely incidental to its regulatory 
function.  And we have no reason to believe the Legislature passed the 
Act for purposes of retribution—vengeance for its own sake.  
Nonetheless it strains credulity to suppose that the Act’s deterrent 
effect is not substantial, or that the Act does not promote community 
condemnation of the offender, both of which are included in the 
traditional aims of punishment. 
 
Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 382 (Ind. 2009) (quotation marks and citations 
omitted).  Although we accept that SORNA of 1999 is not intended as retribution 
for sex offenders’ crimes, it has that effect, due, in part, to its tendency to 
stigmatize the registrant.  As a result, “[i]t promotes community condemnation in 
its most extreme form: vigilantism.”  Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 75, 985 A.2d 4 
(Silver, J., concurring). 
[¶96]  As discussed in prior SORNA cases, and cited with concern by the 
Does in this case, acts of violence against those registered on the Maine Sex 
 
47 
Offender Registry are not unknown.  In 2006, “a Canadian man targeted and 
murdered two Maine sex offenders, who[m] he had located on Maine’s registry 
website.”  Doe, 2007 ME 139, ¶ 56 n.21, 932 A.2d 552 (Alexander and Silver, JJ., 
concurring); see also Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 75, 985 A.2d 4 (Silver, J., 
concurring).  More recent iterations of SORNA continue to invite the possibility of 
vigilantism by providing access to the registry via Maine’s registry website.  The 
use of the Internet registries allows anyone, anywhere in the world, to have 
unlimited access to the information. 
[¶97]  In addition to exposing the offenders to acts of vigilantism, there is 
evidence that registries do not achieve their primary objective of protecting the 
public.  See 34-A M.R.S. § 11201 (2012) (“The purpose of this chapter is to protect 
the public from potentially dangerous registrants and offenders by enhancing 
access to information concerning those registrants and offenders.”).  See also 
Kristen M. Zgoba & Karen Bachar, National Institute of Justice, Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification:  Limited Effect in New Jersey 2 (2009), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/225402.pdf (finding that the sex offender 
registry did not reduce the number of rearrests for sex offenses or the number of 
victims of sexual offenses).  Instead, the registry may promote criminally deviant 
behavior by socially isolating offenders.  See J.J. Prescott, Do Sex Offender 
Registries Make us Less Safe?, Regulation, Summer 2012, at 50 (discussing the 
 
48 
“negative collateral consequences” for registrants, including loss of social ties, that 
may cause an increase in criminal behavior).  As Justice Brennan noted in Trop v. 
Dulles, “I can think of no more certain way in which to make a man in whom, 
perhaps, rest the seeds of serious antisocial behavior more likely to pursue further a 
career of unlawful activity than to place on him the stigma of the derelict, uncertain 
of many of his basic rights.”  356 U.S. 86, 111 (1958) (Brennan, J., concurring).  
SORNA of 1999 clearly promotes retribution and deterrence by inadvertently 
creating an environment where the Does are stigmatized in a way that may invite 
violent attacks and stall rehabilitation. 
D. 
Excessiveness  
 
[¶98]  SORNA of 1999 requires defendants convicted of statutorily specified 
sex offenses to register.  34-A M.R.S. § 11203(5)-(8) (2012).  The registry widely 
disseminates information about all sex offenders convicted of these crimes.  The 
only information provided to the public upon which it can determine the potential 
risk each offender poses, however, is the statutory citation and name of the offense 
that placed the offender on the registry.  The registry, and therefore the public, 
does not take other factors into account, such as distinguishing between individuals 
“who have been evaluated by a clinical and forensic psychologist and determined 
to be at the lowest risk of reoffending, and those individuals who committed 
multiple crimes; victimized infants and toddlers; and tortured, maimed, or killed 
 
49 
their victims.”  Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶ 77, 985 A.2d 4 (Silver, J., concurring).  
By failing to distinguish among offenders, the registry exceeds its purpose of 
promoting public safety, making its effects on registrants punitive.   
E. 
Evaluation of the Mendoza-Martinez Factors 
[¶99]  We do not determine whether a statute has a punitive effect based on 
the mere number of factors that demonstrate such effect.  Instead, we assess these 
factors and their relative weight.  See Doe v. State, 189 P.3d at 1018.  The factors 
discussed here, as well as the majority’s discussion regarding whether the behavior 
is already a crime, demonstrate that SORNA of 1999 has a punitive effect.  Most 
notably, SORNA of 1999 imposes requirements that are historically regarded as 
punishment because of their connections to sentencing and the associated stigma.  
Additionally, the stigma associated with the registry subjects the offenders to 
retribution, which in turn promotes deterrence, which are traditional aims of 
punishment.  Overall, these factors provide clear proof that the statute’s punitive 
effect overcomes the Legislature’s civil intent.  See Smith, 538 U.S. at 92 (setting 
forth the United States constitutional standard for determining criminality of sex 
offenders registry). 
II.  MAINE CONSTITUTION 
[¶100]  SORNA of 1999, as it applies to the Does, violates the Maine 
Constitution.  The Maine Constitution provides an independent basis for decision, 
 
50 
while the United States Constitution merely prescribes the minimum constitutional 
protections that states must afford their citizens.18  We conclude that the Maine 
Constitution can be distinguished from the United States Constitution, and that 
SORNA of 1999 violates the Maine Constitution, even if it would pass muster 
under the United States Constitution.  Compare Smith, 538 U.S. at 105-06 (finding 
the Alaska sex offender’s registry constitutional pursuant to the United States 
Constitution) with Doe v. Alaska, 189 P.3d at 1003, 1007, 1019 (finding the Alaska 
sex offender’s registry unconstitutional pursuant to the state constitution). 
[¶101]  The placement of the Ex Post Facto Clause within the Maine 
Constitution, as compared to its placement in the United States Constitution, 
provides us a basis for applying a more heightened standard.  In the Maine 
Constitution, the Ex Post Facto Clause is located in article I, section 11, which 
declares the personal rights of Maine’s citizens, while the federal Ex Post Facto 
Clause is located in article I, section 9, which describes the powers and limitations 
of the legislative branch of the federal government.  Compare Me. Const. art. I, 
§ 11 with U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.  The placement of the clause in the Maine 
Constitution shows that the Maine Constitution establishes a right of the people to 
not be subject to ex post facto laws, unlike the clause’s placement in the United 
                                         
18  A more in-depth ex post facto analysis pursuant to the Maine Constitution, rather than the United 
States Constitution, is provided in Letalien, 2009 ME 130, ¶¶ 66-72, 985 A.2d 4 (Silver, J., concurring). 
 
51 
States Constitution, which merely prohibits Congress from enacting an 
ex post facto law as part of a list of limitations on the powers of Congress.  The 
distinction leads to a significant consequence: to obtain a declaration that SORNA 
of 1999 is in violation of the prohibition on ex post facto laws in the Maine 
Constitution, the Does need to merely overcome the presumption of 
constitutionality; under the United States Constitution, they have to show the 
“clearest proof” that the statute is punitive despite the legislative intent to make it 
civil.  See Smith, 538 U.S. at 92. 
[¶102]  Here, the State argues that SORNA of 1999 is presumed to have a 
civil effect, and thus be constitutional.  Our opinion in Freeman emphasizes that a 
statute such as SORNA of 1999, originally enacted as an explicitly criminal 
punishment, cannot change its criminal nature and its punitive purpose simply by 
changing its label and its citation.  Further, as the prior discussion of the 
Mendoza-Martinez factors demonstrates, the statute’s punitive characteristics rebut 
any presumption that the SORNA of 1999 law is somehow civil and non-punitive 
and thus compliant with the Maine Constitution’s prohibition on ex post facto 
laws.  SORNA of 1999 exposes the registrants to a level of supervision, stigma, 
and penalty that is not contemplated by civil statutes.  Similarly, it promotes the 
traditional aims of punishment by exposing the registrants to the same penalties as 
those newly convicted.  Whether these factors provide the “clearest proof” that the 
 
52 
effect of the statute is punitive is immaterial to the analysis under the Maine 
Constitution.  These factors show that there is no doubt that SORNA of 1999 has a 
punitive effect that successfully rebuts the presumption of constitutionality and 
makes SORNA of 1999 a criminal law. 
[¶103]  For all the foregoing reasons, SORNA of 1999 is a retroactive 
application of a criminal law, which punishes those who have paid their penalty to 
society.  Thus, it violates the Maine and United States Constitutions.  Accordingly, 
we would vacate the judgment of the Superior Court and remand for a declaration 
that the requirements of SORNA of 1999 cannot be imposed, retroactively, on the 
plaintiffs bringing this appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
James E. Mitchell, Esq., and Elizabeth H. Mitchell, Esq., Jim Mitchell and 
Jed Davis, P.A., Augusta, for appellants John Does I, III, IV, V, VI, VII, 
VIII, X, XIII, XVI, XVIII, XXIV, and XLIII 
 
Ronald W. Bourget, Esq., Law Offices of Ronald Bourget, Augusta, for 
appellants John Does XIX and XXIII 
 
William J. Schneider, Attorney General, Paul Stern, Dep. Atty. Gen., Laura 
Yustak Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Ronald Lupton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office 
of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine 
 
 
 
 
 
 
53 
At oral argument: 
 
James E. Mitchell, Esq., for appellants John Does I, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, 
X, XIII, XVI, XVIII, XIX, XXIII, XXIV, and XLIII 
 
Paul Stern, Dep. Atty. Gen., for appellee State of Maine 
 
 
 
Kennebec County Superior Court docket number CV-2006-113 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY