Title: State v. Denhardt

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Denhardt1988 WY 107760 P.2d 988Case Number: 88-18Decided: 08/30/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
PETITIONER,

v.

R.B. DENHARDT, JUDGE, 
FREMONT COUNTY 
COURT, LANDER, WYOMING, RESPONDENT.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, and John C. 
Brackley, Deputy County and Pros. Atty., Lander, for petitioner.

Donald L. 
Legerski, Lander, for 
respondent.

Before CARDINE, C.J., THOMAS, URBIGKIT and MACY, 
JJ., and BROWN,* J., 
Retired.

* Retired June 30, 
1988.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Section 12-6-102(a), 
W.S. 1977 (July 1986 Repl.), provides:

"(a) No adult shall 
transport, or have in his possession or control, any alcoholic liquor or malt 
beverage, with the intent of furnishing the same to any minor, while operating 
or occupying a motor vehicle."

The sole and 
specific issue in this case is whether the legislature intended the phrase 
"while operating or occupying a motor vehicle" to modify the word "adult" or the 
word "minor." An incidental question is presented as to whether the statute may 
be void for vagueness. The judge of the County Court for FremontCounty ruled that the phrase modified the 
word "minor" and that an information charging a violation of the statute must 
allege that a minor was "operating or occupying a motor vehicle." We agree with 
the interpretation of the statute made by the county court judge and affirm his 
Order Denying Issuance of Summons.

[¶2.]     The State of Wyoming in its 
Petitioner's Brief in support of its Application for Writ of Certiorari, states 
its position in this way:

"Wyoming's Statute Section 
12-6-102(a) could be more comfortably worded. However, as written, it clearly 
prohibits adults from transporting alcoholic beverages in a motor vehicle when 
the adult intends to deliver the alcohol to minors (wherever the minors are 
located)."

The county court 
judge, in the Brief of Respondent, asserts that the issue 
is:

"Does the phrase `while 
operating or occupying a motor vehicle' in Section 12-6-102(a) W.S. 1977 apply 
to the word `minor' or to the word `adult' in said 
statute?"

[¶3.]     Deputies of the office 
of the FremontCounty sheriff, upon observing a car parked on a rural 
road near Lander, Wyoming, stopped to investigate the 
circumstances. They discovered that there were six people in the car: James H. 
Stewart, who was in the driver's seat, another nineteen-year old man and four 
minor girls. From the occupants of the motor vehicle, who were interviewed 
separately, the deputies learned that Stewart and the male passenger had picked 
up the girls in Lander. Stewart then drove to a liquor store, and he and the 
other male jointly purchased some beer and some tequila. The two men then shared 
the beer with the minor girls while they were driving around in the vicinity of 
Lander. All six occupants admitted that they had been drinking the alcoholic 
beverages while traveling in the car.

[¶4.]     From the petitioner's 
brief, we learn that the male passenger was charged with a violation of § 
12-6-101(a), W.S. 1977 (July 1986 Repl.), which makes it an offense to furnish 
alcohol to a minor, and he entered a plea of guilty to that offense.1 Stewart was not charged with 
furnishing alcohol to a minor in violation of § 12-6-101(a), but, instead, he 
was charged with a violation of § 12-6-102(a). The pertinent language of the 
charging information reads:

"1. The defendant, JAMES 
H. STEWART, JR.;

"2. On or about November 
22, 1987;

"3. In Fremont County, Wyoming;

"4. Did unlawfully 
transport alcoholic liquor or malt beverages;

"5. With intent of 
furnishing same to a minor;

"6. While operating a 
motor vehicle; * * *."

The disparity in 
treatment of the male passenger and Stewart is not explained, but it is clear 
that, if Stewart properly was charged with furnishing alcohol to minors while 
operating a motor vehicle, the passenger logically could have been charged with 
furnishing alcohol to minors while occupying the motor 
vehicle.

[¶5.]     The judge of the 
FremontCounty court refused to 
issue a summons on the information, ruling that the charge was insufficient 
because the State failed to allege that a minor was operating or occupying a 
motor vehicle. The State of Wyoming, acting 
through the office of the CountyAttorney for FremontCounty, responded to the position of the 
county court by filing with this court an Application for Writ of Certiorari. In 
accordance with the order granting the Application for Writ of Certiorari, a 
Response to Application for Writ of Certiorari was presented by the judge of the 
FremontCounty court, and a 
Petitioner's Brief and a Brief of Respondent subsequently were filed. The 
position of the judge of the Fremont County court is that the intent of the 
Wyoming state legislature was to address the evil of providing alcohol to a 
minor who was driving, or potentially might be driving, a motor vehicle and, in 
the alternative, that § 12-6-102(a), is unconstitutionally 
vague.

[¶6.]     When we have occasion 
to interpret or construe a statute, it is our duty to discern legislative 
intent. State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Division v. Holtz, 674 P.2d 732 (Wyo. 1983). The intent of 
the legislature will be ascertained as nearly as possible from the language 
incorporated in the statute, which must be viewed in light of its objective and 
purpose. Department of Revenue and Taxation, Motor Vehicle Division v. Andrews, 
671 P.2d 1239 (Wyo. 1983). We follow the rule that, if the 
language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we must accept and apply the 
plain meaning of that language. Phillips v. State, 760 P.2d 388 (Wyo. 1988); Deloges v. State ex rel. Worker's Compensation 
Division, 750 P.2d 1329 (Wyo. 1988); State ex rel. Motor Vehicle 
Division v. Holtz, supra. Even so, we refuse to interpret or construe a statute 
to the end that an absurd or unjust result is produced. If the plain meaning of 
the statute leads to an absurd or unjust result, the court must seek a 
construction that will implement the intent of the 
legislature.

[¶7.]     The application of 
commonly accepted rules of grammar would indicate that, by the proviso found in 
§ 12-6-102(a), which reads,

"[n]o adult shall 
transport, or have in his possession or control, any alcoholic liquor or malt 
beverage, with the intent of furnishing the same to any minor, while operating 
or occupying a motor vehicle,"

the legislature 
intended the phrase "while operating or occupying a motor vehicle" to modify the 
word "adult." Since the phrase is set off by a comma, it is a dangling 
elliptical clause unless it is assumed to refer to "adult," which is the subject 
of the main clause. J. Hodges & M. Whitten, Hodge's College Handbook (7th 
ed. 1972). In contrast, if the comma were not there, the phrase would modify the 
word "minor." While it is true that a court does not sit as a "panel of 
grammarians" to review statutes, neither is the judiciary permitted to regard 
ordinary principles of English prose as irrelevant when construing a statute. 
Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 150, 80 S. Ct. 630, 633, 4 L. Ed. 2d 623, reh. denied 362 U.S. 972, 80 S. Ct. 953, 4 L. Ed. 2d 901 (1960). 
Individual members of this court have previously noted this concept. 
Battlefield, Inc. v. Neely, 656 P.2d 1154 (Wyo. 
1983) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Matter of Voss' Adoption, 550 P.2d 481 
(Wyo. 1976) 
(Guthrie, C.J., dissenting, with whom McClintock, J., joined). See also Kindler 
v. Anderson, 433 P.2d 268 (Wyo. 
1967).

[¶8.]     Were we to assume that 
the legislature intended the phrase to modify the word "adult," the logical 
resolution is that the legislature meant to punish those who transport liquor in 
a car with intent to deliver to a minor more harshly than those who actually 
furnish the liquor to a minor. This effect would ensue by virtue of the penalty 
for violation of § 12-6-102(a), which is "a fine of not less than one hundred 
dollars ($100) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), imprisonment in the 
county jail for not more than one (1) year, or both." Section 12-6-102(b). (The 
statute also provides for suspension of the driver's license of a person who 
operates a vehicle in violation of this section for up to one year.) The 
contrasting penalty for a violation of § 12-6-101(a), forbidding the furnishing 
of alcohol to a minor, is only "a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty 
dollars ($750), imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, or both." The 
more severe punishment provided for what essentially is an attempt to furnish 
liquor to a minor as compared with actually furnishing liquor to a minor is an 
absurd and unjust result. As the court said in Oakley v. State, 715 P.2d 1374, 
1380 (Wyo. 
1986), "[t]his court seeks to avoid absurd results otherwise occasioned by 
strained interpretations." See also Phillips v. State, supra; Deloges v. State, 
supra; State v. Sodergren, 686 P.2d 521 (Wyo. 1984). In honoring this principle, we 
must conclude that, despite the comma, the legislature intended the phrase 
"while operating or occupying a motor vehicle" to modify the word "minor" in § 
12-6-102(a). An appropriate result is reached by such a 
construction.

[¶9.]     An examination of 
legislative history relating to the bill that became § 12-6-102(a), demonstrates 
that this construction is consistent with that history. While often quite 
limited in this jurisdiction, it is true that legislative history frequently 
constitutes the most fruitful source of instruction with respect to the proper 
interpretation of the statute. Flora v. United States, supra. In 1963, three 
bills were proposed that dealt with transporting or possessing alcoholic 
beverages in a vehicle. House Bill 110, 37th Leg. (1963), would have prohibited 
a minor from transporting or possessing alcohol while operating or occupying a 
motor vehicle. House Bill 111, 37th Leg. (1963), would have prohibited an adult 
from transporting or possessing alcohol while occupying a motor vehicle. Neither 
of these bills passed. The language that is incorporated in § 12-6-102(a), was 
first found in H.B. 112, 37th Leg. § 1 (1963), and read:

"No adult shall 
transport, or have in his possession or control, any intoxicating liquor, with 
the intent of furnishing the same to any minor, while operating or occupying a 
motor vehicle. The presence of a minor 
fifteen (15) years of age or older in any motor vehicle in which intoxicating 
liquor is being transported by, or in the possession and control of, an adult, * 
* * is prima facie evidence of an intent to furnish liquor to a minor." 
(Emphasis added.)

The language 
that we have emphasized was deleted from the bill as passed, but it demonstrates 
that the legislature intended to address the furnishing of alcohol to a minor 
who was in a vehicle rather than simply transporting an alcoholic beverage with 
the intent to furnish it to a minor. As a final note, Senate File 4, 47th 
Leg.Spec. Sess. (1978), proposed to amend § 12-6-102(a) by making the section 
read:

"(a) No adult shall 
operate or occupy a motor vehicle while having possession or control over any 
intoxicating liquor or malt beverage, with the intent of furnishing the same to 
any minor."

The failure of 
this bill, which clearly deletes any indication that the minor be operating or 
occupying a motor vehicle, lends credence to the proposition that the 
legislature intended that to be an element of the offense. This, when taken 
together with the other background from the legislature, manifests an intent 
that is consistent with our construction.

[¶10.]  The Fremont County court judge also suggests that § 
12-6-102(a), may be unconstitutionally vague because reasonable persons are 
required to guess at its meaning. "A statute * * * is not considered vague to 
the extent of being unconstitutional merely because a reviewing court believes 
the statute could have been drafted with greater precision." Caton v. State, 709 P.2d 1260, 1270 (Wyo. 1985), quoting Keser v. 
State, 706 P.2d 263, 266 (Wyo. 1985). It is only when the statute "fails 
to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated 
conduct is forbidden by the statute" that the statute violates the requirement 
of clarity, which is a part of the right under the constitution to due process 
of law. Keser v. State, supra, at 265-266, quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617, 
74 S. Ct. 808, 812, 98 L. Ed. 989 (1954). In any analysis of the question of 
whether a statute is so vague as to violate due process, we pursue an 
independent inquiry. Caton v. State, supra, at 1270. No reason appears which 
would raise any doubt that a man of ordinary intelligence must be aware that it 
is wrong to furnish alcohol to a minor and that it is even worse to furnish 
alcohol to a minor who is operating or occupying a vehicle. Section 12-6-101(a), 
prohibits furnishing alcoholic beverages to any minor under any circumstances 
except those listed in the statutes. Section 12-6-102(a), adequately serves 
notice to any man of ordinary intelligence that furnishing alcoholic beverages 
to minors who either are operating or occupying a motor vehicle is prohibited 
conduct. For this reason, § 12-6-102(a) cannot be considered as 
unconstitutionally vague.

[¶11.]  We hold that the phrase "while operating 
or occupying a motor vehicle" modifies the word "minor" in § 12-6-102(a), and 
that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague. We agree with the position of 
the county court judge that, given that construction of the statute, it is 
necessary to allege that the minor was either operating or occupying a motor 
vehicle in order to pursue a prosecution under the 
statute.

[¶12.]  The Order Denying Issuance of Summons, 
while perhaps unusual, is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 12-6-101(a), 
W.S. 1977 (July 1986 Repl.), provides:

"Every person who sells, 
furnishes, gives or causes to be sold, furnished or given away any alcoholic 
liquor or malt beverage to any person under the age of nineteen (19), who is not 
his legal ward, medical patient or member of his own immediate family, is guilty 
of a misdemeanor."