Title: People v. Phillips

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 99568-Agenda 11-September 2005.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 							
JOANNE Y. PHILLIPS, Appellee.
Opinion filed December 1, 2005.
	JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Joanne Y. Phillips, was charged in the circuit court of
Henry County with unlawful possession of a controlled substance with
intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West 1998)), unlawful
possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West
1998)), unlawful possession of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/4(a) (West
1998)), and driving while license suspended (625 ILCS 5/6-303 (West
1998)). A jury found defendant guilty of the charged offenses.
Defendant was subsequently sentenced to four years' imprisonment
for the offense of possession of a controlled substance with intent to
deliver. The conviction for possession of a controlled substance was
vacated; defendant was sentenced to time served on the cannabis
conviction; and a conviction was entered for the offense of driving
while license suspended.
	Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the admission into
evidence of lab reports violated her constitutional right to be
confronted with the witnesses against her, an argument that appears
to have been premised, "significantly," upon our decision in People v.
McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d 127 (2000) (holding section 115-15 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure unconstitutional because it impermissibly
required a defendant to take a procedural step to secure his
constitutional right of confrontation). The appellate court affirmed the
judgment and sentence of the circuit court. People v. Phillips, 326 Ill.
App. 3d 157 (2001). The court found defendant's confrontation
contention "unavailing," noting that "the lab reports were properly
admitted into evidence *** pursuant to the stipulation of the parties."
326 Ill. App. 3d at 161.
	This court denied the defendant's ensuing petition for leave to
appeal, but issued a supervisory order directing the appellate court to
vacate its judgment and reconsider in light of People v. Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d 203 (2003), "to determine if a different result is warranted."
See People v. Phillips, 208 Ill. 2d 550 (2004) (supervisory order).
	In compliance with this court's directive, the appellate court
reconsidered the confrontation issue and reached a contrary result.
352 Ill. App. 3d 867. We allowed the State's petition for leave to
appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and we now reverse the judgment of
the appellate court. The following facts are pertinent to our
disposition.
BACKGROUND
	Defendant was tried before a jury on May 3, 2000. From the
outset, in opening statements, it was made clear to the jury that the
contested issue, with respect to the controlled substance charge, was
whether the defendant knowingly possessed the cocaine discovered in
her vehicle. In his opening statement, the prosecutor outlined the
evidence the State expected to present in support of the controlled
substance charges. Defense counsel, in his initial remarks to the jury,
presented defendant's theory of the case, claiming that defendant had
no knowledge of the cocaine found in her car, and that the cocaine
belonged to one or both of her passengers. Defense counsel noted that
defendant had denied knowledge of the drugs for a considerable time
after the drugs were found. He suggested that defendant had only
given an inculpatory statement because she was afraid of the male
passenger in the car and "because of what she felt were promises by
Deputy Hampton" that " it would be better for her and easier for her
if she just said the stuff was hers."
	With respect to the custody and analysis of the drugs, the
prosecutor advised the jury in his opening remarks that there was "an
agreement between the State and *** defense counsel" regarding the
testimony of people who handled and tested the drugs found in
defendant's car. On four occasions, the prosecutor referred to
stipulations concerning that evidence. Defendant was present when
the remarks were made. Defense counsel did not object to those
references.
	The first and only witness called by the State was Henry County
sheriff's deputy Glenn Hampton. Hampton testified that he stopped
defendant's vehicle in the early morning hours of November 5, 1999,
because defendant's vehicle had veered off the roadway. Hampton
asked the defendant for her license, registration, and proof of
insurance. The defendant produced a driver's license, and Hampton
escorted her to his squad car, while the defendant's two passengers
remained in her vehicle. Defendant indicated that she thought her
license was suspended, and shortly thereafter Hampton received radio
confirmation of the suspension. Hampton then placed the defendant
under arrest for driving with a suspended license and returned to the
defendant's vehicle.
	Hampton asked the two passengers to step out of the vehicle, and
he proceeded to search the vehicle's interior. Underneath the driver's
seat, near the transmission hump, Hampton found a crumpled paper
towel, inside of which were 25 individual plastic bags containing a
white substance that appeared to be crack cocaine. In the front
ashtray, Hampton found a half-burnt marijuana cigarette.
	Hampton walked back to his squad car and confronted the
defendant with the substances he had recovered from her vehicle. She
asked what it was. After Hampton read the defendant her Miranda
rights, he told her "we have to discuss this[.] I found this cocaine in
your car right next to your feet[.] We need to discuss this." Defendant
again indicated she had no idea what the substance was.
	Hampton then returned to defendant's vehicle and questioned her
passengers. Hampton subsequently advised the defendant that her
passengers had denied knowledge of the cocaine. He pressed her again
to discuss the matter. Hampton said he then noticed the defendant
becoming teary-eyed. According to Hampton, defendant told him she
needed money to pay bills and feed her children. She said the two
passengers in the car did not know anything about the cocaine, which
she had picked up in Chicago.
	Hampton transported defendant to the county jail and again read
her Miranda rights. Defendant signed a written statement which was
consistent with the oral admissions she had made to Hampton.
Hampton denied that he had made any promises to defendant to obtain
her inculpatory statement.
	Under cross-examination, Hampton acknowledged that the
defendant's passengers had remained in her vehicle, unattended, when
Hampton initially spoke with defendant in his squad car prior to the
search of defendant's vehicle.
	After Hampton's testimony, the State introduced the defendant's
written statement, and an Illinois State Police lab report signed by
Denise Hanley, a forensic scientist. Hanley's report was accompanied
by an "Affidavit in Lieu of Court Appearance," "provided in
accordance with *** 725 ILCS 5/115-15." The report revealed that
"5.4 grams of off-white chunks from five plastic bags" were tested and
were found to contain cocaine. Hanley did not test the 7.1 grams in
the remaining bags. The State introduced a second report signed by
Robert Streight, an employee of the Henry County sheriff's office,
indicating that 0.1 gram of plant material submitted to him contained
cannabis. Defense counsel indicated he had no objection to admission
of the lab reports. Defendant was present when the reports were
admitted, and she voiced no dissent.
	In her defense, the defendant testified that, in exchange for $100
and gas money, she was transporting the two passengers to Chicago
and back to Davenport, Iowa. When Hampton stopped her, she did
not know there was cocaine in the car, and she so advised the officer
after he found it and confronted her. She said Hampton badgered her
into confessing. She indicated that Hampton had informed her if she
cooperated the judge would be notified, she would be home with her
children the next day, Hampton would not notify the Department of
Children and Family Services, and her car would not be towed. In
addition, the defendant testified it was only after Hampton threatened
to charge her with drug trafficking and possession of a stolen vehicle,
and indicated that she would never see her children again, that she
admitted knowledge of the drugs. The defendant acknowledged
signing the written statement, but testified at trial that the statement
was untrue. She maintained that she did not know of any drugs in the
car except the marijuana, and she had told the passenger smoking the
marijuana to stop.
	The defendant was convicted of all counts. At sentencing, the
defendant adamantly maintained her innocence. The trial judge
indicated that he would have placed the defendant on probation, but
that the legislature had stripped him of his discretion to do so. The
defendant was sentenced to four years' imprisonment for unlawful
possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. As noted,
the court vacated the unlawful possession of a controlled substance
count, gave the defendant credit for time served on the cannabis
count, and entered judgment on the conviction for driving while
license suspended.
	On appeal, the appellate court characterized defendant's
confrontation argument as follows:
			"Relying significantly on the recent case of People v.
McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d 127, 729 N.E.2d 470 (2000), the
defendant argues that because an element of her alleged
drug-related offenses was proven through lab reports, she
was denied her sixth amendment right to be confronted by the
witnesses against her." Phillips, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 160.
	We note, in McClanahan, this court struck down a statute that
allowed the State, in drug prosecutions, to use lab reports in lieu of
actual testimony as prima facie evidence unless the defendant filed a
demand for the testimony of the witness who prepared the report
within seven days of the defendant's receipt of the report. We held
that the statute impermissibly required the defendant to take a
procedural step to secure his confrontation rights. McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d  at 140.
	In defendant's first appeal, the appellate court rejected
defendant's argument, noting the holding of People v. Avery, 321 Ill.
App. 3d 414 (2001), an appellate decision subsequent to
McClanahan. The Avery court held that, absent the defendant's
objection at trial, the trial court could properly consider hearsay lab
reports regardless of the existence, or application, of section 115-15.
Avery, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 418. The court reasoned that " 'testimony
based on hearsay that is not objected to at trial should be given
appropriate consideration.' " Avery, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 418, quoting
People v. Becerril, 307 Ill. App. 3d 518, 526 (1999).
	The appellate court in this case determined that the record
revealed defense counsel had actually "stipulated" to admission of the
lab reports. Therefore, the appellate court rejected defendant's
contention "that she was denied her right to be confronted with the
witnesses against her by the application of section 115-15 of the
Code." Phillips, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 161.
	When the appellate court subsequently reconsidered this matter
at our direction, after our decision in Campbell, the appellate court's
analysis changed significantly. From our decisions in Campbell,
McClanahan, and People v. Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d 41 (1992), the
appellate court gleaned a minimal requirement that someone-defense
counsel or the circuit court-advise defendant of his options with
respect to stipulations, of the "implications" of stipulating, of the
"legal impact"of a stipulation, and that the record disclose such
advisement. 352 Ill. App. 3d at 872.
	The appellate court recognized that our decision in Campbell
requires admonishments with respect to stipulations in only two
instances: " '[w]here the stipulation includes a statement that the
evidence is sufficient to convict the defendant or where the State's
entire case is to be presented by stipulation.' " (Emphasis omitted.)
352 Ill. App. 3d at 872, quoting Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d  at 221. While
the appellate court acknowledged that Campbell does not require
admonishments under the facts of this case (352 Ill. App. 3d at 872),
it appears the appellate court fashioned its own broader rule out of
passages from Ramey and McClanahan that were quoted in
Campbell.
	With regard to the first quoted passage, the appellate court's
added emphasis is telling:
			" ' "[T]rial counsel has the right to make the ultimate
decision with respect to matters of tactics and strategy after
consulting with his client. Such matters include what
witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct
cross-examination, what jurors to accept or strike and what
trial motions should be made. [Citation.] Such matters also
include the defense to be presented at trial." ' " (Emphasis in
original.) 352 Ill. App. 3d at 871, quoting Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d  at 210, quoting Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d  at 54.
Immediately after the quoted passage, the appellate court concluded:
			"Construing the fundamental constitutional right [of
confrontation] in conjunction with the supreme court's
decision in Campbell, we conclude that in order to waive the
defendant's sixth amendment right of confrontation by
stipulating to the admission of evidence, there must be some
affirmative showing or indication by the defendant in the
record that he or she did not object to or dissent from the
attorney's decision to stipulate." 352 Ill. App. 3d at 871.
	 The appellate court then quoted language this court employed in
McClanahan. Referring to stipulations regarding lab reports, this
court stated, " 'these stipulations properly require a defendant to make
a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent decision whether he wishes to
waive his right to confront the preparer of the report.' " See 352 Ill.
App. 3d at 871, quoting McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d  at 137-38.
	 Synthesizing the foregoing quotations from McClanahan and
Ramey, the appellate court held that the record must demonstrate that
a defendant was advised of the consequences and implications of an
evidentiary stipulation (352 Ill. App. 3d at 872) and, absent an
"affirmative showing or indication *** in the record that he or she did
not object to or dissent from the attorney's decision to stipulate,"
there is no valid waiver of defendant's sixth amendment right of
confrontation (352 Ill. App. 3d at 871). Given its holding, the
appellate court found it unnecessary to consider whether the
agreement to stipulate was a sound trial tactic or prudent trial
strategy. 352 Ill. App. 3d at 872.
ANALYSIS
	As a preliminary matter, we note that supervisory orders issued
by this court are nonprecedential. People v. Durr, 215 Ill. 2d 283, 295
(2005). When, pursuant to our supervisory authority, we remand a
case for reconsideration in light of a recent decision, we do not
necessarily mean to imply that a different result is warranted. In some
instances, that may well be the case; however, in others,
reconsideration of the appellate court's analysis may simply be
desirable to account for the recent decision and to ensure a uniform
body of law. In any event, we expect the appellate court to exercise
its independent judgment in such matters.
	We begin our analysis with the well-established proposition that,
in criminal proceedings, an attorney is authorized to act for his client
and determine for him procedural matters and decisions involving trial
strategy and tactics. People v. Kaczmarek, 207 Ill. 2d 288, 297
(2003); People v. Bowman, 138 Ill. 2d 131, 141 (1990). As this court
has noted, this principle of agency is necessary in order for a
representative system of litigation to function. Bowman, 138 Ill. 2d  at
141. Indeed, as the Supreme Court aptly observed in Taylor v.
Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417-18, 98 L. Ed. 2d 798, 816, 108 S. Ct. 646,
657 (1988): "Although there are basic rights that the attorney cannot
waive without the fully informed and publicly acknowledged consent
of the client, the lawyer has-and must have-full authority to manage
the conduct of the trial. The adversary process could not function
effectively if every tactical decision required client approval." The
same principle operates in the appellate arena. See Jones v. Barnes,
463 U.S. 745, 751, 77 L. Ed. 2d 987, 993, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3313
(1983) (appellate counsel must be allowed to present the client's case
in accord with counsel's professional judgment by deciding what
issues to present).
	This court noted in Campbell that criminal defendants possess
two types of constitutional rights, and a different waiver standard
applies to each. Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d  at 210; see also United States
v. Plitman, 194 F.3d 59, 63 (2d Cir. 1999). The first category includes
five decisions that ultimately belong to the defendant in a criminal case
after consultation with his attorney: (1) what plea to enter; (2)
whether to waive a jury trial; (3) whether to testify in his own behalf;
(4) whether to tender a lesser-included-offense instruction; and (5)
whether to appeal. Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d  at 210. Beyond those
decisions, however, " 'trial counsel has the right to make the ultimate
decision with respect to matters of tactics and strategy after consulting
with his client. Such matters include what witnesses to call, whether
and how to conduct cross-examination, what jurors to accept or strike
and what trial motions should be made. [Citation.] Such matters also
include the defense to be presented at trial.' " Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d 
at 210, quoting Ramey, 152 Ill. 2d  at 54.
	In Campbell, the defendant seized upon a single sentence in
McClanahan to support his contention that "any waiver of the right
to confrontation must be a knowing waiver made by the defendant
personally." Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d  at 212. As noted, the appellate
court in this case utilized the same sentence in its analysis. That
sentence, which refers to stipulations to lab reports, reads as follows:
"Unlike section 115-15, these stipulations properly require a
defendant to make a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent decision
whether he wishes to waive his right to confront the preparer of the
report." McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d  at 137-38. In Campbell, this court
flatly rejected defendant's contention that the foregoing language
required "a knowing waiver by the defendant personally." This court
stated:
			"We decline to read McClanahan so broadly. Contrary to
defendant's interpretation of McClanahan, this court has
never held that only a defendant can waive his sixth
amendment right of confrontation. In fact, this court has
never directly addressed the issue of whether defense counsel
may waive a defendant's right of confrontation by stipulating
to the admission of evidence. We note, however, that a
majority of the courts that have addressed the issue have held
that counsel in a criminal case may waive his client's sixth
amendment right of confrontation by stipulating to the
admission of evidence." Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d  at 212-13.
This court in Campbell reviewed federal and state decisions on point,
focusing, in particular, on the federal court of appeals' opinion in
Plitman. See Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d  at 213-14.
	In Plitman, defendant claimed that his attorney's stipulation to
certain testimony was invalid because: (1) Plitman had not waived his
sixth amendment right to confront the witnesses against him; (2) his
attorney never said that Plitman had waived his right of confrontation
and/or knew the risks involved in doing so; and (3) defense counsel's
actions were not justified as matters of trial strategy. See Plitman, 194 F.3d  at 62. The court of appeals rejected Plitman's argument that a
defendant must in every instance personally waive the right to
confront the witnesses against him. The court held that the
defendant's waiver of his right of confrontation, through counsel, was
valid because the defendant achieved several tactical advantages as a
result of the stipulation, and defendant did not object during the
discussion concerning the stipulation or when his attorney made the
decision to stipulate. Plitman, 194 F.3d  at 64. As the court noted in
Plitman, "Plitman himself was present" when his attorney waived his
right of confrontation, "and did not object to his lawyer's decisions."
Plitman, 194 F.3d  at 64. Moreover, citing Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 688-95, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693-98, 104 S. Ct. 2052,
2064-68 (1984), the court observed: "A well developed body of case
law protects defendants from constitutionally defective actions of their
attorneys." Plitman, 194 F.3d  at 64.
	After discussing Plitman, and the holdings of other courts, this
court stated in Campbell : "We agree that defense counsel may waive
a defendant's right of confrontation as long as the defendant does not
object and the decision to stipulate is a matter of trial tactics and
strategy." Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d  at 217. However, we held that a
defendant must personally waive the right of confrontation "when the
State's entire case is to be presented by stipulation and the defendant
does not present or preserve a defense ***, or where the stipulation
includes a statement that the evidence is sufficient to convict the
defendant." Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d  at 218. We attached no other
restrictions to defense counsel's authority to stipulate to the admission
of evidence, and, except in those specified instances where the
stipulation is tantamount to a guilty plea, we imposed no obligations
on the trial court or counsel to admonish the defendant and ensure
that the advisement is made a part of the record. Insofar as the
appellate court held otherwise, the court erred.
	The appellate court's holding is premised upon a single sentence
from our opinion in McClanahan and the significance the appellate
court attributed to the words "after consulting with his client" from
our quotation of Ramey in Campbell. The appellate court has, in
effect, adopted the defendant's position in Campbell, a construction
we clearly rejected when we "decline[d] to read McClanahan so
broadly." Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d  at 212. The appellate court has taken
our limited holding in Campbell-applicable only "when the State's
entire case is to be presented by stipulation and the defendant does not
present or preserve a defense ***, or where the stipulation includes a
statement that the evidence is sufficient to convict the defendant"-and
has rendered a decision which would require, in every conceivable
situation, that a defendant be advised of the implications and
consequences of stipulation and that he approve on the record.
Indeed, if we were to interpret the quoted passage from Ramey as the
appellate court did, decisions regarding "what witnesses to call,
whether and how to conduct cross-examination, what jurors to accept
or strike and what trial motions should be made" (see Ramey, 152 Ill.
2d at 54) would all, logically, require consultation with defendant, and
his tacit approval, on the record. Since an evidentiary stipulation is, in
effect, nothing more than an acknowledgment of what a witness
would testify to if called, and a concomitant decision not to challenge
the testimony the witness would give, a stipulation is not much
different from a decision not to cross-examine. The notion that a
defendant would have to approve every aspect of defense counsel's
cross-examination-including "whether and how to conduct cross-examination"-highlights the impracticality of the procedure espoused
by the appellate court. A representative system of litigation cannot
function with those restrictions. We decline to impose them, and we
hold that they are not constitutionally required.
	As recently as our decision in People v. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d 455,
468 (2005), we reiterated that "courts look with favor upon
stipulations" insofar as " ' "they tend to promote disposition of cases,
simplification of issues, and the saving of expense to litigants." ' " As
a matter of trial strategy, defense counsel might choose to stipulate to
evidence in an effort to minimize the adverse impact it will have at
trial. For example, counsel might, in certain circumstances, decide to
stipulate to a defendant's prior felony conviction in order to avoid
disclosure of the name and nature of the prior felony conviction. See
People v. Walker, 211 Ill. 2d 317, 341 (2004). In this instance, to
contest the results of chemical testing, without a basis for doing so,
would have simply highlighted testimony regarding the nature of the
drug and would have unduly magnified its importance, when
defendant was better served by focusing the jury's attention on the
critical issue of whether defendant knowingly possessed the controlled
substance. See Woods, 214 Ill. 2d  at 474 (where the central issue is
whether defendant possessed a controlled substance, defense counsel
may reasonably decide to forgo the opportunity to cross-examine a
forensic expert in order to focus on other theories of the defense);
People v. Banks, 358 Ill. App. 3d 924, 926 (2005) ("counsel's
decision to enter into the stipulation in order to focus on other aspects
of the case, including challenging the recollection and credibility of the
officers, was sound"); People v. Scott, 355 Ill. App. 3d 741, 745
(2005) (appellate court recognized that, as a matter of trial strategy,
there was no reason to contest a lab report and distract the jury from
defendant's defense); United States v. Aptt, 354 F.3d 1269, 1283
(10th Cir. 2004) ( "it may be that defense counsel determined that the
likelihood of successfully excluding the stipulated exhibits was small
enough that it would be more advantageous for his client to bolster his
credibility by expressing, in the presence of the jury, a willingness to
let them see all of the evidence").
	We note, in passing, that the stipulation in Woods would not pass
muster under this appellate panel's holding, since there was no
indication in the record that the defendant had been advised of the
consequences of the stipulation. See Woods, 214 Ill. 2d  at 461. As we
stated in Campbell, "defense counsel may waive a defendant's right
of confrontation as long as the defendant does not object and the
decision to stipulate is a matter of trial tactics and strategy."
Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d  at 217. Other than the limitations noted, where
the stipulation is tantamount to a guilty plea, we did not qualify the
foregoing principle in Campbell, and we see no need to do so now. As
this court suggested in Campbell, it is only when counsel's
stipulations render defendant's trial the " 'practical equivalent of a
plea of guilty' " that a defendant must be "personally admonished
about the stipulation and must personally agree to the stipulation."
Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d  at 218, 221, quoting Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7, 16 L. Ed. 2d 314, 319, 86 S. Ct. 1245, 1248 (1966).
	Defense counsel in this case appears to have chosen, as a matter
of trial strategy, to focus the jury's attention upon the critical issue of
whether defendant knowingly possessed the cocaine found in her car.
Without contradiction, Officer Hampton testified that he searched
defendant's car and recovered 25 plastic bags, each containing a white
substance that appeared to be cocaine. When confronted with that
evidence, even the defendant acknowledged, "It looks like drugs."
Under the circumstances, we fail to see any tactical advantage
defendant might have obtained from extended forensic testimony
about the analysis and nature of "off-white chunks" found individually
packaged in 25 plastic bags. To the contrary, we believe such
testimony would have been an unnecessary distraction for the jury.
	Moreover, we note that defendant was present when the
prosecutor, in his opening statement, mentioned "an agreement
between the State and the defense counsel" regarding the testimony
of people who handled and tested the drugs found in defendant's car.
On four occasions, the prosecutor referred to stipulations concerning
that evidence. Defendant did not voice any dissent or objection when
those remarks were made. Defendant was also present when defense
counsel announced he had no objection to admission of the lab
reports. Again, defendant did not object.
	"[D]efense counsel may waive a defendant's right of
confrontation as long as the defendant does not object and the
decision to stipulate is a matter of trial tactics and strategy."
Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d  at 217. The criteria of Campbell are met in this
case. Since counsel's stipulations did not render defendant's trial the
" 'practical equivalent of a plea of guilty,' " there was no need for
defendant to be "personally admonished about the stipulation" and
"personally agree to the stipulation." See Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d  at 218,
221, quoting Brookhart, 384 U.S.  at 7, 16 L. Ed. 2d  at 319, 86 S. Ct. 
at 1248. The critical issue of knowing possession remained, and
indeed, that was the focus of trial. It was, therefore, unnecessary for
either the court or counsel to admonish defendant about the
implications and consequences of the stipulation; defendant's personal
agreement to the stipulation on the record was not required.
	Defendant obviously recognizes that the analysis of Campbell
does not support the appellate court's result, as she repeatedly calls
upon us to "overrule" Campbell. Defendant submits that Campbell is
"constitutionally infirm because it fails to recognize that the right of
confrontation is personal to a defendant" in every situation. Defendant
offers a hypothetical which she apparently believes shows the error in
Campbell's analysis. Defendant suggests, under the holding in
Campbell, "in a murder prosecution, twenty prosecution witnesses'
statements could be presented via affidavit upon stipulation by the
defense attorney, but as long as a sole witness testified in person, such
a trial would not offend the accused's confrontation-clause right."
Defendant's hypothetical suffers from an erroneous assumption that
runs throughout her brief, i.e., that form matters more than substance,
and that the consistent exercise of the right of confrontation, via
cross-examination, is more important than the effective exercise of the
right. Thus, in defendant's improbable hypothetical, if 20 witnesses
have nothing to say about the critical issues in the case, or if what they
have to say does not concern a controverted matter, there would be
no point in cross-examining each witness, thereby diminishing the
significance of the single witness whose testimony may be crucial.
	"Experienced advocates since time beyond memory have
emphasized the importance of winnowing out weaker arguments ***
and focusing *** at most on a few key issues." Jones, 463 U.S.  at
751-52, 77 L. Ed. 2d  at 994, 103 S. Ct.  at 3313. That observation,
made in reference to appellate advocacy, applies to trial practice as
well, as we noted in Woods. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d  at 474 (where the
central issue is whether defendant possessed a controlled substance,
defense counsel may reasonably decide to forgo the opportunity to
cross-examine a forensic expert in order focus on other theories of the
defense).
	In sum, it is not necessary for either the court or counsel to
admonish a defendant about the implications and consequences of a
stipulation, and defendant's explicit agreement to the stipulation on
the record is not required where, as here, (1) defense counsel's
decision to stipulate appears to have been a matter of trial tactics and
strategy and defendant does not object to counsel's decision, and (2)
the State's entire case is not presented by stipulation, the defendant
does present or preserve a defense, and the stipulation does not
include a statement that the evidence is sufficient to convict. See
Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d  at 217-18.
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is
reversed and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.