Title: PRESERVE THE DUNES INC V DEPT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 30, 2004 
PRESERVE THE DUNES, INC., 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 122611 
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, 
Defendant, 
and 
TECHNISAND, INC., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
______________________________ 
PRESERVE THE DUNES, INC, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 122612 
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
and 
TECHNISAND, INC, 
Defendant. 
_______________________________ 
1  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
CORRIGAN, C.J.    
Defendant Michigan Department of Environmental Quality 
(DEQ) and defendant TechniSand, Inc., appeal a Court of 
Appeals decision holding that the DEQ improperly granted a 
sand dune mining permit to TechniSand, contrary to the 
Michigan environmental protection act (MEPA), MCL 324.1701 
et seq.1 
The only issue properly before us is whether MEPA 
authorizes a collateral challenge to the DEQ’s decision to 
issue a sand dune mining permit under the sand dune mining 
act (SDMA), MCL 324.63701 et seq., in an action that 
challenges flaws in the permitting process unrelated to 
whether the conduct involved has polluted, impaired, or 
destroyed, or will likely pollute, impair, or destroy 
natural resources protected by MEPA. Because MEPA does not 
authorize such a collateral attack, we reverse the decision 
of the Court of Appeals and remand to that Court for 
expedited review of the remaining issues of plaintiff 
Preserve the Dunes (PTD).2 
1 253 Mich App 263; 655 NW2d 263 (2002). 
2 PTD is an ad hoc organization of local citizens
formed for the purpose of instituting this lawsuit. 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I. Factual Background and Procedural Posture 
In 1991, defendant TechniSand purchased a sand mining 
operation with a mining permit that was set to expire in 
1993. 
That permit did not allow mining in adjacent 
property, the Nadeau Site Expansion Area (NSE), which had 
been classified in 1989 as a “critical dune” area under MCL 
324.35301 et seq. 
Mining in critical dune areas was prohibited after 
July 
5, 
1989, 
subject 
to 
certain 
narrowly 
defined 
exceptions to MCL 324.63702(1): 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this
part, the department shall not issue a sand dune
mining permit within a critical dune area as
defined in part 353 [MCL 324.35301 et seq.] after
July 
5, 
1989, 
except 
under 
either 
of 
the 
following circumstances: 
(a) The operator seeks to renew or amend a
sand 
dune mining permit that was issued 
prior to July 5, 
1989, subject to the criteria 
and standards applicable 
to 
a 
renewal 
or 
amendatory application. 
(b) The operator holds a sand dune mining 
permit issued pursuant to section 63704 and is 
seeking to amend the mining permit to include
land that is 
adjacent to property the operator
is permitted to 
mine, and prior to July 5,
1989, the operator owned 
the land or owned 
rights to mine dune sand in the land 
for which 
the operator seeks an amended permit. 
In late 1994, TechniSand applied for an amended permit 
under MCL 324.63702(1)(b). In April 1995, the Department of 
3  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Natural Resources (DNR)3 denied the application on the 
ground that TechniSand was ineligible for an amended permit 
under 
subsection 
1(b) 
because 
it 
had 
purchased 
the 
operation after July 5, 1989. 
In May 1996, TechniSand amended and resubmitted its 
application and supporting documentation to the DEQ. After 
a public hearing, the DEQ approved TechniSand’s application 
on November 25, 1996. TechniSand began mining the NSE area 
thereafter. 
Nineteen 
months 
later, 
in 
July 
1998, 
PTD 
sued 
defendants, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief under 
MEPA. 
MEPA provides a cause of action for declaratory and 
other equitable relief for conduct that is likely to result 
in the pollution, impairment, or destruction of Michigan’s 
natural resources. MCL 324.1701 et seq. 
PTD alleged that the DEQ violated MEPA when it 
approved TechniSand’s amended mining permit.  It further 
alleged that TechniSand’s mining conduct violated MEPA. 
Defendants sought summary disposition because PTD’s action 
was time-barred. The circuit court denied defendants’ 
3During this time, the DNR was the administrative 
agency 
that 
regulated 
sand 
mining. 
In 
1995, 
this 
responsibility was transferred from the DNR to the DEQ by
Executive Reorganization Order No. 1995-16 (codified at MCL
324.99903). 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
motion. 
PTD sought summary disposition after the original 
circuit judge had retired. 
His successor ruled that PTD’s 
claim under the SDMA was indeed time-barred. It also held 
that plaintiff had established a prima facie MEPA claim on 
the basis of TechniSand’s mining conduct. 
After a seven-day bench trial on the MEPA claim alone, 
the court ruled that defendants had successfully rebutted 
PTD’s prima facie case and  entered a judgment of no cause 
of action. 
The court specifically found that “any adverse 
impact on the natural resources which will result from the 
sand mining will not rise to the level of impairment or 
destruction of natural resources within the meaning of 
MEPA.” 
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for entry 
of an order granting summary disposition for PTD. The Court 
of Appeals concluded that (1) the DEQ’s decision to grant 
a permit could be challenged at any time under MEPA and (2) 
TechniSand did not qualify for a permit under § 63702. The 
DEQ and TechniSand filed applications for leave to appeal 
in this Court, and we granted leave.4 
4 468 Mich 869 (2003). 
5  
 
 
 
II. Standard of Review 
The issue presented involves a question of statutory 
interpretation. We review de novo questions of statutory 
interpretation. Oade v Jackson Nat’l Life Ins Co, 465 Mich 
244, 250; 632 NW2d 126 (2001). 
III 
A. Overview of MEPA 
MEPA is contained in part 17, MCL 324.1701 et seq., of 
the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act, MCL 
324.101 et seq. 
To prevail on a MEPA claim, the plaintiff 
must make a “prima facie showing that the conduct of the 
defendant has polluted, impaired, or destroyed or is likely 
to pollute, impair, or destroy the air, water, or other 
natural resources, or the public trust in these resources. 
. . .” 
MCL 324.1703(1). 
The defendant may rebut the 
plaintiff’s showing with contrary evidence or raise an 
affirmative defense that (1) there is no feasible and 
prudent alternative to the conduct and (2) the “conduct is 
consistent with the promotion of the public health, safety, 
and 
welfare 
in 
light 
of” 
the 
state’s 
concern 
with 
protecting Michigan’s natural resources. Id. The focus of 
MEPA is on defendant’s conduct. 
MEPA 
provides 
for 
immediate 
judicial 
review 
of 
allegedly harmful conduct. The statute does not require 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
exhaustion of administrative remedies before a plaintiff 
files suit in circuit court. MCL 324.1701(2). A court may, 
however, “direct the parties to seek relief” in available 
administrative proceedings. MCL 324.1704(2). 
B. Overview of SDMA Permit Process 
The DEQ may authorize mining in critical sand dune 
areas under two specific conditions set forth in MCL 
324.63702(1)(a) and (b): 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this
part, the department shall not issue a sand dune
mining permit within a critical dune area as
defined in part 353 [MCL 324.35301 et seq.] after
July 
5, 
1989, 
except 
under 
either 
of 
the 
following circumstances: 
(a) The operator seeks to renew or amend a
sand dune mining permit that was issued prior to
July 5, 1989, subject 
to 
the 
criteria 
and 
standards applicable to a renewal or amendatory
application. 
(b) The operator holds a sand dune mining 
permit issued pursuant to section 63704 and is 
seeking to amend the mining permit to include
land that is adjacent to property the operator is
permitted to mine, and prior to July 5, 1989, the
operator owned the land or owned rights to mine
dune sand in the land for which the operator
seeks an amended permit. 
If an operator does not fall within one of these 
limited exceptions to the SDMA ban on mining in critical 
dunes areas, the inquiry ends. 
Nowhere in this initial 
inquiry is the DEQ required to evaluate the permit seeker’s 
proposed conduct. 
Indeed, such an inquiry would be 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
pointless 
unless 
the 
DEQ 
first 
determined 
that 
the 
applicant was 
eligible for a permit on the basis of the 
applicant’s status as either a past owner or operator. 
Once the DEQ determines that an applicant is eligible 
to apply for a sand dune mining permit in a critical dune 
area under § 63702(1), the applicant must 
fulfill the 
requirements of § 63704. Specifically, applicants are 
required to submit the following to the DEQ: 
(a) A permit application on a form provided by
the department. 
(b) An environmental impact statement of the 
proposed mining activity as prescribed by section 
63705. 
(c) 
A 
progressive 
cell-unit 
mining 
and 
reclamation plan for the proposed mining activity as
prescribed in section 63706.
(d) A 15-year mining plan as prescribed by 
section 63707. 
After the DEQ determines that the applicant has 
satisfied §§ 63702(1) and 63704(2), it must next determine 
whether the applicant meets the requirement of § 63709. 
Section 63709 prohibits the DEQ from approving an amended 
permit if the applicant’s proposed conduct “is likely to 
pollute, impair, or destroy the air, water, or other 
natural resources or the public trust in those resources, 
as provided by part 17.” 
Thus, MEPA, in part 17, MCL 
324.1701 et seq., expressly controls the DEQ’s § 63709 
8  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
determinations. 
C. MCL 324.1701 and Nemeth v Abonmarche Development 
In addition to conferring power upon the attorney 
general, MCL 324.1701(1) authorizes a private cause of 
action under MEPA: 
The attorney general or any person may
maintain an action in the circuit court having 
jurisdiction where the alleged violation occurred
or is likely to occur for declaratory and 
equitable relief against any person for the 
protection of the air, water, and other natural
resources and the public trust in these resources
from pollution, impairment, or destruction. 
MCL 324.1701(2) provides: 
In granting relief provided by subsection
(1), if there is a standard for pollution or for
an antipollution device or procedure, fixed by
rule 
or 
otherwise, 
by 
the 
state 
or 
an 
instrumentality, agency, or political subdivision
of the state, the court may: 
*** 
(b) If a court finds a standard to be 
deficient, direct the adoption of a standard 
approved and specified by the court. 
 
Thus, in Nemeth v Abonmarche Development, Inc, 457 
Mich 16; 576 NW2d 641 (1998), we held that a violation of 
the soil erosion and sedimentation control act (SESCA), MCL 
324.9101 et seq., may establish a plaintiff’s prima facie 
showing under MEPA because the SESCA contains a pollution 
control standard. 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MCL 324.1702 is not applicable in this case because, 
unlike the SESCA, the SDMA does not contain an antipollution 
standard. 
Consequently, it is not within the exception 
created by MCL 324.1701(2). 
Nemeth, therefore, does not 
support the argument that a violation of the SDMA may serve 
as a prima facie violation of MEPA. 
The Court of Appeals decision to the contrary was 
based on a misinterpretation of our holding in Nemeth: 
[A]lthough 
subsection 
1701(2) 
speaks 
in 
terms of whether a “standard for pollution or
antipollution device or procedure” exists, but
does not specifically include whether a standard
for impairment or destruction of a natural 
resources exists, our Supreme Court in Nemeth did 
not seem to find that to be an important point in
that case in which soil erosion, rather than what
is commonly thought of as pollution, was at 
issue. [253 Mich App 263, 286 n 2; 655 NW2d 263 
(2002).] 
The Court of Appeals conclusion is incorrect. 
In 
Nemeth, we expressly justified our holding in part because 
erosion is a form of pollution. 
Nemeth, supra at 27 
(“Sedimentation and erosion is a [sic] well-recognized 
source of water pollution.”). 
10  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moreover, in Nemeth, as in all MEPA actions, the focus 
was on defendant’s actual conduct.5
 Specifically, this 
5 Although we held in Nemeth that the SESCA creates a 
pollution control standard applicable to MEPA claims, we 
also specifically stated: 
We emphasize that this is not the end of the
inquiry. The trial court held that plaintiffs'
showing 
of 
defendants' 
SESCA 
violations 
established a prima facie claim under the MEPA.
Then, defendants had the opportunity to rebut
that prima facie showing either by submitting
evidence to the contrary, i.e., that plaintiffs
have shown neither pollution, impairment, nor 
destruction, nor the likelihood thereof, in spite 
of proof of the SESCA violations, or by showing
that there is no feasible and prudent alternative
to defendants' conduct. 
Subsection 1703(1).
[Nemeth at 36 n 10 (emphasis added).] 
Thus, it is clear that a defendant’s opportunity to
rebut a prima facie MEPA violation remains the same whether 
that violation has been established independently or by
reference to another statute’s pollution control standard,
and 
that 
the 
determinative 
consideration 
is 
whether 
defendant’s conduct will, in fact, pollute, impair, or
destroy a natural resource. In the instant case, the Court
of Appeals erroneously concluded that § 63702 of the SDMA
creates a pollution control standard and that defendant
violated it. 
Having so concluded, the Court of Appeals
effectively concluded that defendant’s violation of § 63702
amounted to a MEPA violation per se.  It failed to consider 
at all whether TechniSand had submitted evidence sufficient 
to rebut the alleged prima facie MEPA violations.  The 
trial court, however, did consider this evidence after 
finding that PTD presented a prima facie MEPA violation 
independent of the SDMA. 
The trial court held that 
TechniSand had rebutted the prima facie MEPA violation.  
The Court of Appeals failure to consider whether TechniSand
could rebut the (erroneously found) prima facie MEPA 
violation evidences the extent to which it improperly
Footnotes continued on following page. 
11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Court reiterated in Nemeth the findings of fact required of 
a trial court as announced in Ray v Mason Co Drain Comm’r, 
393 Mich 294; 224 NW2d 883 (1975). In Ray, we stated: 
The trial judge must find the facts on which
the plaintiff claims to have made a prima facie
case 
under 
[§ 
1703(1)], 
namely 
that 
the 
defendant's 
conduct 
"has, 
or 
is 
likely 
to 
pollute, impair or destroy the air, water or
other natural resources.” . . . 
Obviously the
evidence necessary to constitute a prima facie
showing will vary with the nature of the alleged
environmental degradation involved. 
[Ray at 309 
(some emphasis supplied).] 
That the Court of Appeals failed to recognize that 
MEPA is concerned only with harmful conduct is readily 
apparent from its characterization of the circuit court’s 
focus on TechniSand’s mining conduct as error: 
Judge 
Schofield 
simply 
addressed 
whether 
TechniSand’s proposed mining was likely to “pollute,
impair, or destroy” the natural resource in this case—
the critical dune area. [253 Mich App 286.] 
Plaintiff and the dissent urge us to hold that 
although TechniSand’s mining operation may or may not be 
likely to pollute, impair, or destroy the air, water, or 
other 
natural 
resources, 
its 
predecessor’s 
allegedly 
deficient 
past 
relationship 
to 
the 
mining 
property 
negatively affects the environment. 
We decline their 
invitation to accept such fuzzy logic. Where a defendant’s 
failed to consider whether TechniSand’s conduct would 
actually “pollute, impair, or destroy” a natural resource. 
12  
 
 
 
                                                 
conduct itself does not offend MEPA, no MEPA violation 
exists. 
D. Review of the DEQ’s MCL 624.63702(1) Decisions6 
We reject the dissent’s gloomy prediction that this 
orderly understanding of MEPA “insulates [SDMA] permit 
eligibility determinations from judicial review.” 
Post at 
22. 
As previously discussed, DEQ determinations of permit 
eligibility under §§ 63702(1) and 63704(2) are unrelated to 
whether the applicant’s proposed activities on the property 
violate MEPA. Therefore, MEPA provides no private cause of 
action in circuit court for plaintiffs to challenge the 
DEQ’s determinations of permit eligibility made under §§ 
63702(1) and 63704(2). 
An improper administrative decision, standing alone, 
does not harm the environment. 
Only wrongful conduct 
offends MEPA. 
In general, judicial review of an administrative 
decision 
is 
available 
under 
the 
following 
statutory 
schemes: (1) the review process prescribed in the statute 
applicable to the particular agency, (2) an appeal to 
6 PTD does not challenge TechniSand’s satisfaction of
the requirements under § 63704(2). 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
circuit court pursuant to the Revised Judicature Act (RJA), 
MCL 600.631, and Michigan Court Rules 7.104(A), 7.101, and 
7.103, or (3) the review provided in the Administrative 
Procedures Act (APA), MCL 24.201 et seq. Palo Group Foster 
Care, Inc v Dep't of Social Services, 228 Mich App 140, 
145; 577 NW2d 200 (1998). 
The SDMA does not expressly establish procedures for 
disputing a DEQ determination in a contested case unrelated 
to MEPA. 
We need not decide here whether PTD’s challenge 
to the DEQ’s permit decision is governed by the RJA or the 
APA because the challenge is time-barred under either 
statute. PTD brought this action nineteen months after the 
DEQ’s decision to grant TechniSand’s application for an 
amended permit, which far exceeds the sixty-day period 
allowed by the APA, MCL 24.304(1), and the twenty-one-day 
period provided by MCR 7.101(B)(1), which governs appeals 
under MCL 600.631 of the RJA pursuant to MCR 7.104(A). The 
DEQ and TechniSand properly interposed this defense in 
their initial pleadings. 
Thus, PTD’s claim was time­
barred. 
E. 
Participation and Intervention
During The Permit Process Under the SDMA or MEPA 
Parties who wish to intervene during the permit 
process have two options. 
They may intervene either under 
14  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the procedures governed by the SDMA or those governed by 
MEPA. 
MCL 324.63708(5) of the SDMA establishes a procedure 
for notifying interested parties of permit applications: 
The department shall provide a list of all
pending sand dune mining applications upon a 
request from a person. 
The list shall give the
name and address of each applicant, the legal
description of the lands included in the project,
and a summary statement of the purpose of the
application. 
Thus, the SDMA provides a mechanism whereby interested 
parties may learn of and participate in agency decisions 
regarding approval of critical dune area mining permits. 
MEPA provides another procedure for intervention in 
permit proceedings. MCL 324.1705(1). This statute requires 
a potential intervenor to file a pleading asserting that 
the proceeding or action for judicial review involves 
conduct that has violated, or is likely to violate, MEPA. 
Thus, while PTD could have intervened in TechniSand’s 
permit process under MEPA, its only basis for intervention 
would have been TechniSand’s proposed conduct. 
MEPA does 
not allow such intervention on the basis of anything other 
than alleged wrongful conduct. 
F. Review of DEQ’s MCL 324.63709 Determinations 
As already discussed, a challenge under MEPA may be 
filed in circuit court before or during the time that the 
15  
 
 
 
 
  
 
alleged MEPA violation occurs, without any requirement that 
a litigant exhaust administrative remedies. 
Thus, whether 
TechniSand was ineligible for the permit under § 63709 on 
the basis of alleged harmful conduct was a question that 
was properly before the circuit court. 
The circuit court 
ruled against PTD. 
The Court of Appeals has not reviewed the circuit 
court’s decision that TechniSand’s conduct did not violate 
the MEPA standard incorporated into the SDMA under § 63709. 
Because the Court of Appeals never reached PTD’s claim that 
TechniSand’s mining operation violates MEPA, that issue is 
not ripe for this Court’s review. 
We remand the case to 
the Court of Appeals to review the circuit court’s findings 
regarding TechniSand’s sand mining activity. 
The Court of 
Appeals is directed to expedite its consideration of this 
case. 
F. 
Response to the Dissent 
The dissent initially contends that it is undisputed 
that TechniSand is “ineligible for a permit.” Post at 2. 
We 
disagree. 
The 
time 
for 
challenging 
TechniSand’s 
eligibility for a permit is long past. 
TechniSand is 
lawfully entitled to mine sand dunes in Michigan according 
to the DEQ permit.  Whether the DEQ’s permitting decision 
was “unprincipled” or an “illegal about-face” is not a 
16  
 
 
 
  
 
  
                                                 
 
 
determination for this Court to make. Post at 2.  That 
decision is time-barred. 
The dissent further asserts that the DEQ’s permit 
decision “will directly enable destruction of critical 
dunes.” Post at 3-4 (emphasis supplied). 
The dissent 
asserts that critical dunes will be destroyed because the 
Court of Appeals stated that TechniSand had acknowledged as 
much in an environmental impact statement. 
The entire 
environmental impact statement is not in the record.7 
Moreover, the trial court expressly found to the contrary 
when it ruled on the MEPA claim.  It specifically held that 
TechniSand’s mining would not destroy a critical dune. The 
Court of Appeals never addressed this finding. 
The dissent’s conclusion that the permitting process 
is subject to collateral attack is not defensible on the 
basis of MEPA’s language, structure, or purpose. Countless 
entities apply for and receive permits for conduct that 
affects Michigan’s natural resources. 
Under the dissent’s 
7 The excerpt in the record indicates that TechniSand
acknowledged 
that 
the 
project 
would 
“greatly 
alter” 
approximately 61% of the NSE.  In any case, the trial court 
expressly found more credible TechniSand’s expert witnesses
and ultimately held “the adverse impact on the environment
caused by the mining as permitted will not rise to the
level of impairment or destruction within the meaning of
MEPA.” 
17  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
regime, the permitting decision can never be final. 
Were 
we to adopt the dissent’s extreme understanding of MEPA, 
every permit that has ever been issued would be subject to 
challenge; 
any 
undotted 
“i” 
or 
uncrossed 
“t” 
could 
potentially invalidate an existing permit. 
We do not 
believe the Legislature intended MEPA to destabilize the 
state’s permitting system in this manner. 
Imagine the world that the dissent’s reasoning would 
create. 
The present energy crisis offers a good example. 
For many years, our country has sought to decrease our 
reliance on foreign sources of oil. Suppose an oil company 
decided to invest in oil exploration in Michigan in 
reliance on a DEQ-issued permit. Under the dissent’s view, 
MEPA would authorize a challenge at any time to flaws in 
the permitting process. 
Moreover, under the dissent’s 
reasoning, a court must accept as true the bare assertion 
that a company’s conduct will destroy natural resources. 
It can never rely on a permit to do business. 
What sane 
investor would take such a risk? 
As gas prices soar, few 
people in Michigan would thank this Court for “protecting” 
the environment in this radical fashion. 
The dissent’s regime would render the permitting 
process a useless exercise. It would cripple economic 
expansion in Michigan and probably lead to disinvestment. 
18  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No one would invest money to obtain a permit that is 
subject to endless collateral attacks. 
MEPA 
nowhere 
strips 
the 
permitting 
process 
of 
finality. 
It is the dissent that makes a mockery of 
legislative intent by failing to anchor its exaggerated 
claims in the statute’s actual language. See post at 3. 
MEPA does not impose the radical requirement that courts 
indefinitely 
police 
administrative 
agencies’ 
permit 
procedures and decisions. 
As noted in Oscoda Chapter of 
PBB Action Comm, Inc v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 403 Mich 
215, 232-233; 248 NW2d 240 (opinion by Levin, J.) (1978): 
A court is not empowered to prevent any
conduct . . . which does not rise to the level of 
environmental risk proscribed by [MEPA]. 
The 
standard, ‘has or is likely to pollute, impair or
destroy,’ is a limitation as well as a grant of
power. 
Moreover, the Court of Appeals never reached the issue 
of whether TechniSand’s actual conduct is likely to harm 
natural resources. 
As already noted, the trial court 
specifically held that TechniSand’s conduct did not violate 
MEPA. Given this procedural posture, we are puzzled by the 
dissent’s statement that defendant’s mining “will” destroy 
critical dunes. 
After taking extensive testimony on the issue, the 
trial 
court 
ruled 
that 
any 
“adverse 
impact 
on 
the 
19  
 
 
 
 
environment caused by the mining as permitted will not rise 
to the level of impairment or destruction within the 
meaning of MEPA.” 
The Court of Appeals did not explicitly 
reject the trial court’s findings. Instead, it erroneously 
concluded that a permit that affects the environment in any 
way may be challenged at any time under MEPA. 
For the 
reasons articulated above, the Court of Appeals erred in 
interpreting MEPA in this manner. 
CONCLUSION 
MEPA affords no basis for judicial review of agency 
decisions under MCL 324.63702(1) because that inquiry is 
outside the purview of MEPA. 
The focus of MEPA is to 
protect our state’s natural resources from harmful conduct. 
It offers no basis for invalidating an issued permit for 
reasons unrelated to the permit holder’s conduct. 
To hold 
otherwise would broaden by judicial fiat the scope of MEPA 
and create a cause of action that has no basis in MEPA’s 
language or structure. 
The Court of Appeals erred by treating PTD’s challenge 
to 
TechniSand’s 
eligibility 
for 
a 
permit 
under 
MCL 
324.63702(1) as a MEPA claim. 
Because PTD brought its 
claim more than nineteen months after the DEQ issued the 
permit, PTD’s claim is time-barred. 
We reverse the 
decision of the Court of Appeals on that issue. 
20  
 
 
 
  
We remand the case to the Court of Appeals to review 
the circuit court’s findings that TechniSand’s mining 
conduct does not violate MEPA, and direct the Court of 
Appeals to expedite its review. 
Maura D. Corrigan
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
21  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PRESERVE THE DUNES, INC, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 122611 
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, 
Defendant, 
and 
TECHNISAND, INC, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
PRESERVE THE DUNES, INC, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 122612 
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
and 
TECHNISAND, INC, 
Defendant. 
KELLY, J. (dissenting). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
In 1995, the Michigan Department of Natural Resources 
(DNR) denied defendant TechniSand permission to mine 
critical dunes because it was ineligible for a permit under 
the sand dune mining act1 (SDMA), MCL 324.63701 et seq. One 
year later, following Governor Engler’s reorganization of 
the DNR, the newly created Department of Environmental 
Quality (DEQ) invited TechniSand to apply again, citing 
“changes in state government.” 
TechniSand reapplied and 
the DEQ granted a permit despite the fact, now undisputed, 
that TechniSand remained ineligible to mine critical dunes. 
As a result, critical dunes that would otherwise remain 
untouched will be impaired and perhaps destroyed. 
Through the decision in this case, a court majority of 
four sanctions the DEQ’s unexplained and illegal about-face 
on TechniSand’s critical dune mining permit. 
In the 
process, it strikes a devastating blow to Michigan’s 
environmental law.2
 This majority perpetuates the DEQ’s 
1 The Sand Dune Mining Act is codified as part 637 of 
the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act, MCL
324.101 et seq. 
2 The majority’s decision to significantly narrow the
scope of the applicability of the Michigan environmental
protection act (MEPA), MCL 324.1701 et seq., in this case 
is compounded by its recent decision in Nat'l Wildlife 
Federation & Upper Peninsula Environmental Council 
Cleveland 
Cliffs 
Iron 
Co 
and 
Michigan 
Dep't 
of 
Footnotes continued on following page. 
2  
v 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
 
 
unprincipled decision to permit illegal mining of critical 
dunes by insulating it from the scrutiny of the Michigan 
environmental protection act (MEPA). 
MCL 324.1701 et seq. 
Its holding that the DEQ’s decision to grant the permit to 
mine critical dunes is “unrelated to” the destruction of 
those critical dunes defies reality. 
It mocks our 
Legislature’s intent to prevent environmental harm. 
In 
addition, it is contrary to this Court’s earlier MEPA 
decisions.3 
Critical sand dunes, like those at issue in this case, 
are specially protected natural resources. 
The mining act 
protects these irreplaceable resources by strictly limiting 
who is eligible to mine them. 
MEPA works in tandem with 
the mining act to, in its own words, supplement “existing 
administrative and regulatory procedures provided by law.” 
MCL 324.1706. 
Issuance of the permit will directly enable 
Environmental Quality, 471 Mich ___ ; ___ NW2d ___ (2004).
There, the same majority ignores thirty years of precedent 
and 
applies 
judge-created 
standing 
tests 
to 
MEPA 
plaintiffs. It makes this ruling despite the fact that the
statute explicitly grants standing to “any person” to 
maintain an action to prevent pollution, impairment, or
destruction of our natural resources. MCL 324.1701(1). 
3 See e.g., Eyde v Michigan, 393 Mich 453, 454; 225
NW2d 1 (1975), Ray v Mason Co Drain Comm’r 393 Mich 294,
304-305; 224 NW2d 883 (1975), West Michigan Environmental
Action Council v Natural Resources Comm, 405 Mich 741, 751;
275 NW2d 538 (1979) (WMEAC), and Nemeth v Abonmarche Dev, 
Inc, 457 Mich 16; 576 NW2d 641 (1998). 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
destruction of critical dunes that would otherwise remain 
untouched. 
Hence, it is inescapable that the DEQ’s 
decision to issue the permit may be challenged under the 
environmental protection act. 
Moreover, the environmental protection act does not 
impose a statutory period of limitations on legal actions 
that assert that a party’s conduct will cause environmental 
pollution, impairment, or destruction. 
Therefore, I would 
hold that plaintiff’s challenge is not limited by the 
statutory period of either the Administrative Procedures 
Act (APA) or the Revised Judicature Act (RJA). 
MCL 24.201 
et seq., MCL 600.101 et seq. 
I dissent because the majority’s decision subverts the 
purposes of the sand dunes mining act and the environmental 
protection act by incorrectly insulating the DEQ’s permit 
decision from scrutiny under the environmental protection 
act. 
Defendant TechniSand is not eligible for a permit to 
mine critical dunes sand under the sand dunes mining act. 
Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the Court of 
Appeals. 
4  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
The Majority's Response to the Dissent 
The majority’s “Response to the Dissent”4 is an abrupt 
departure 
from 
its 
precedent 
of 
declining 
to 
amend 
legislative policy decisions with which it disagrees.5 Its 
discussion of the wisdom of the Legislature's decision to 
bar sand dune mining by anyone who does not meet limited 
eligibility criteria is unsuited for a judicial opinion. 
Moreover, the majority’s comparison of the eligibility 
problem in the permit to a clerical error and its 
suggestion that my position would allow endless challenges 
for such trifles are gross exaggerations. 
Ante at 17-18. 
Granting a permit to mine critical dunes to an ineligible 
operator is a substantive fault. 
It is a violation of the 
law that allows conduct likely to pollute, impair, or 
destroy a natural resource specially protected by the 
Legislature. 
Economic development in this state has not 
ceased in the past thirty years. It will not now grind to 
a halt under the oppressive weight of permit challenges if 
4 Ante at 16-20. 
5 This Court has scrupulously declined to consider the
wisdom of the Legislature’s policy decision. 
See e.g.
Oakland Co Rd Commr’s v Michigan Prop & Cas Guaranty Ass'n,
456 Mich 590, 612-613; 575 NW2d 751 (1998). 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
this Court reaffirms its prior holdings that MEPA allows 
challenges to environmentally destructive permit decisions. 
Facts and Proceedings Below 
Defendant TechniSand purchased real property in 1991 
that included both critical and noncritical dune areas. 
Along with its purchase, it obtained a permit to mine sand 
in noncritical dune areas on one portion of the property. 
In 1994, TechniSand applied for an amendment of this permit 
to expand sand dune mining to critical dune areas on an 
adjacent portion of the property. 
The Michigan Department of Natural Resources, the 
agency charged with reviewing SDMA permit applications at 
the time, denied the application on the ground that 
TechniSand was ineligible for an amended permit. 
The 
original permit was to mine in noncritical dune areas and 
did not include the property’s critical dune areas. 
Also, 
TechniSand had purchased the land and mining operation 
after the deadline to apply for an unassociated permit to 
mine the critical dune areas. MCL 324.63702(1)(b). 
In 1995, Governor John Engler created a new agency, 
the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ). 
Executive Reorganization Order No. 1995-16 (codified at MCL 
324.99903). 
The 
DEQ 
was 
given 
responsibility 
for 
administering the SDMA and other environmental permitting 
6  
 
 
   
 
 
                                                 
programs, and the Governor appointed its director. The DEQ 
then wrote to TechniSand indicating that “changes in state 
government” and “additional information” from TechniSand 
would allow the DEQ to review the permit application.6 
TechniSand 
resubmitted 
the 
environmental 
impact 
statement and reclamation plan that it had submitted with 
its previous application, without providing additional 
information demonstrating how it was eligible for an 
amended permit. The DEQ issued the permit later that year. 
It did not explain how TechniSand met the eligibility 
criteria in the SDMA. 
Also, it does not now dispute that 
TechniSand is ineligible for a permit. 
Plaintiff Preserve the Dunes was formed in 1996. 
In 
1998, it sued TechniSand and the DEQ for injunctive relief 
to stop TechniSand’s mine expansion. 
Plaintiff alleged 
that TechniSand was ineligible for an SDMA permit and that 
its mine expansion violated MEPA. 
The trial court ruled that plaintiff’s challenge to 
the 
permitting 
decision 
was 
time-barred 
under 
the 
6 Letter dated April 1, 1996 from Douglas Daniels and
Kimberly Rice of the DEQ. The letter makes reference to an 
April 20, 1995, letter by which Roger Whitener of the DNR
informed TechniSand that, pursuant to an opinion of the
state attorney general, TechniSand was ineligible to mine
critical dunes. 
The April 1, 1996, letter did not address
TechniSand’s ineligibility to mine critical dunes. 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Administrative Procedures Act and that the environmental 
impact of the mining was insufficient to implicate MEPA. 
The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling. 
253 Mich App 
263; 655 NW2d 263 (2002). 
It held that the DEQ’s decision 
to grant TechniSand’s amended permit could be challenged 
under MEPA and that TechniSand did not qualify for a permit 
under § 63702 of the SDMA.  The DEQ’s decision to amend 
TechniSand’s permit, it concluded, violated MEPA. 
The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial 
court for entry of summary disposition for plaintiff. 
Because it had found TechniSand ineligible for a permit to 
mine the critical dune area, it did not review the trial 
court’s finding that the mining itself violated MEPA. This 
Court granted the applications for leave to appeal filed by 
the DEQ and TechniSand. 468 Mich 869 (2003). 
The Sand Dune Mining Act Protects Michigan’s
Critical Dunes from Destruction 
It is without contest that the Legislature enacted the 
sand dune mining act to stringently protect Michigan's sand 
dune areas from further destruction. 
They are one of the 
state's prized natural resources. The Legislature included 
in the act special provisions to preserve dune areas it 
labeled "critical." 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
It expressly indicated: 
The critical dune areas of this state are a 
unique, irreplaceable, and fragile resource that
provide 
significant 
recreational, 
economic,
scientific, 
geological, 
scenic, 
botanical,
educational, 
agricultural, 
and 
ecological
benefits to the people of this state and the
people from other states and countries who visit
this resource. [MCL 324.35302(a).] 
The Legislature enacted the SDMA out of concern that 
mining the dunes consumes them and harms the environment. 
The act is an expression of the state’s “paramount” 
interest in protecting the dunes. 
See MCL 324.1701. 
It 
defines “Sand dune mining” as the “removal of sand from 
sand dune areas for commercial or industrial purposes.” 
MCL 324.63701(l).7  It requires all persons seeking to mine 
sand dunes to obtain a sand dune mining permit. 
MCL 
324.63704. 
Regarding critical dunes, the act states that 
“the removal of any volume of sand that is not sand dune 
mining within a critical dune area as defined in part 353 
is subject to the critical dune protection provisions of 
part 353.” MCL 324.63701(l). 
7 The statute exempts from this definition the removal
of “volumes of less than 3,000 tons” of sand if the removal
is a “1-time occurrence and the reason the sand is removed 
is not for the direct use for an industrial or commercial 
purpose.” 
9  
 
 
     
                                                 
 
The SDMA’s flat prohibition against mining any sand in 
designated critical sand dune areas is subject only to a 
narrow exception. That is, authorized mining entities that 
existed when the SDMA was enacted may continue operation 
(1) on land in which they had a mining interest before July 
5, 1989 or (2) on land adjacent to property in which they 
had a mining interest before that date. MCL 324.63702(1).8 
These 
“grandfathering” 
exceptions 
reflect 
the 
Legislature’s attempt to balance mining interests that 
predated the critical dune designation of July 5, 1989, 
with the preservation of the remaining and newly designated 
8 MCL 324.62702(1) provides in full: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this
part, the department shall not issue a sand dune
mining permit within a critical dune area as
defined in part 353 after July 5, 1989, except
under either of the following circumstances: 
(a) The operator seeks to renew or amend a
sand dune mining permit that was issued prior to
July 5, 1989, subject to the criteria and 
standards applicable to a renewal or amendatory
application. 
(b) The operator holds a sand dune mining 
permit issued pursuant to section 63704 and is 
seeking to amend the mining permit to include
land that is adjacent to property the operator is
permitted to mine, and prior to July 5, 1989 the
operator owned the land or owned the rights to
mine dune sand in the land for which the operator
seeks the amended permit. 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
critical dunes. 
New entities would be unable to begin 
operation. 
Existing 
entities 
would 
have 
limited 
opportunities to mine additional areas. 
By limiting 
critical dune mining to those entities with a preexisting 
interest, existing entities would be allowed to continue 
operating while ensuring that mining would not last 
indefinitely. 
The Legislature mandated that these narrow exceptions 
for 
sand 
dune 
mining 
would 
be 
implemented 
through 
regulatory permits. 
MCL 324.63704. 
The act created a 
permitting procedure to ensure that future mining would be 
only by parties with a pre-existing legal interest, and in 
a manner protective of critical dune areas. 
It cannot 
reasonably be suggested that the eligibility criteria that 
completely prohibit all but an expressly defined few 
operators from mining critical dunes are not a measure of 
environmental protection. 
Only 
if 
eligibility 
is 
verified 
do 
additional 
environmental 
protections 
come 
into 
play. 
Permit 
applications by eligible entities are reviewed on a case­
by-case basis to ensure that the proposed mining is 
environmentally acceptable. 
The applicant must submit an 
environmental impact statement describing the anticipated 
environmental damage that will occur from the mining 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
operation. MCL 324.63704(2)(b). The applicant must explain 
why alternative mining locations were not chosen. MCL 
324.63705(h). 
It must include a reclamation plan for the 
area to be mined. MCL 324.63704(2)(c), 324.63706. 
In reviewing the application, the DEQ must ensure that 
the proposed mining is unlikely to pollute, impair, or 
destroy natural resources or the public trust in those 
resources. 
MCL 324.63709. 
Any permit issued must require 
that the provisions of the applicant’s progressive cell­
unit 
mining 
and 
reclamation 
plan 
are 
met. 
MCL 
324.63706(3). 
If threatened or endangered species are 
present, the plan must include provisions either to protect 
them or to mitigate the effect of mining on them. 
MCL 
324.63706(3)(g). 
Plaintiffs May Challenge the Permit Eligibility
Determination Under the Michigan
Environmental Protection Act 
The environmental protection act provides that 
. . . any person may maintain an action in the
circuit court . . . where the alleged violation
occurred or is likely to occur for declaratory
and equitable relief against any person for the 
protection of the air, water, and other natural
resources and the public trust in these resources
from pollution, impairment, or destruction. [MCL
324.1701(1).] 
Under this act, a plaintiff makes a prima facie case 
by showing “that the conduct of defendant is likely to 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
. . . destroy the . . . natural resources or the public 
trust in these resources.” 
MCL 324.1703(1).9
 The 
Legislature 
expressly 
provided 
that 
MEPA 
supplements 
existing regulatory procedures that were provided by law. 
MCL 324.1706. 
The SDMA’s eligibility restrictions protect critical 
dunes from mining by ineligible operators whose conduct is 
likely to impair or destroy critical dunes that would 
otherwise remain untouched. 
Hence, the environmental 
protection act is applicable to decisions regarding an SDMA 
permit applicant’s eligibility. 
The SDMA specifically 
incorporates the Legislature’s recognition that critical 
dunes 
are 
“irreplaceable” 
natural 
resources. 
MCL 
324.35302(a). 
It provides that “the removal of any volume 
of sand . . . within a critical dune area . . . is subject 
to the critical dune protection provisions of part 353.” 
MCL 
324.63701(l). 
Its 
provisions 
strictly 
limiting 
eligibility to mine critical dunes are intended to help 
protect critical dunes from pollution, impairment, or 
destruction. 
9 The majority's reference to MCL 324.1702(2) is 
misplaced. Ante at 10. Plaintiffs are not challenging the
DEQ’s imposition on Technisand of the SDMA’s pollution
control standards. 
They do not challenge the manner in
which permissible activity is undertaken. 
They challenge
whether Technisand's conduct is permissible at all. 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
Thus, 
the 
majority’s 
suggestion 
that 
permit 
eligibility is unrelated to whether the conduct permitted 
will harm the environment is untenable. 
Issuance of a 
permit to an ineligible operator to engage in any mining of 
critical dunes will allow 
“conduct . . . likely to 
pollute, impair, or destroy . . . natural resources or the 
public trust in these resources.” 
MCL 324.1703(1); see 
also West Michigan Environmental Action Council v Natural 
Resources Comm, 405 Mich 741, 751; 275 NW2d 538 (1979) 
(WMEAC). 
MEPA is intended to prevent conduct that is likely to 
harm the environment as well as to stop conduct that is 
presently harming it. 
In WMEAC, this Court ordered that a 
permanent injunction be entered prohibiting the drilling of 
oil and gas wells pursuant to a DNR permit. 
The “issuance 
of permits was properly before the circuit court as conduct 
alleged to be likely to pollute, impair, or destroy” 
natural resources under MEPA. 
WMEAC at 751. 
The drilling 
would 
cause 
“apparently 
serious 
and 
lasting, 
though 
unquantifiable, damage” to elk herd population. 
WMEAC at 
760. 
This Court concluded that the previous MEPA, MCL 
691.1203(1), 
is violated whenever the effects of permit 
issuance harm the environment to the requisite degree. 
WMEAC at 751, 760. 
14  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
Unlike permit eligibility for fossil fuel drilling and 
other activities that may pollute the environment if done 
improperly,10 
SDMA 
permit 
eligibility 
is 
severely 
restricted. 
The applicant must demonstrate a preexisting 
mining interest, and no mining may occur until this 
requirement 
has 
been 
satisfied. 
It 
reflects 
the 
Legislature’s premise that the removal of even one bucket 
of sand from a critical dune by an ineligible operator will 
inordinately impair the state's critical dune areas. 
An 
action that enables such conduct may be challenged as 
destruction or impairment under MEPA. 
This Court observed in Nemeth11 that a violation of a 
permitting procedure can support a prima facie claim under 
MEPA. 
A “plaintiff’s prima facie case is ‘not restricted 
to actual environmental degradation but also encompasses 
probable damage to the environment as well.’” 
Nemeth, 
supra at 25, quoting Ray v Mason Co Drain Comm’r, 393 Mich 
294, 309; 224 NW2d 883 (1975).
 In the soil erosion and 
10 See also MCL 324.5505 and 324.3106, requiring 
permits for activities that may pollute the air and water
without imposing stringent eligibility criteria. 
11 See n 3. 
15  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
sedimentation control act,12 the Legislature created a 
pollution control standard that this Court held could be 
enforced through MEPA. Nemeth, supra at 35. 
The Legislature chose to make the SDMA more protective 
of the environment than the soil erosion and sedimentation 
control act. 
As already explained,13 the Legislature 
determined that any mining of critical dunes by ineligible 
entities is an unacceptable destruction of this natural 
resource. 
Hence, 
the 
majority’s 
conclusion 
that 
eligibility is unrelated to conduct is premised on an 
artificial and hypertechnical bifurcation of the permitting 
process. 
When concluding that permit eligibility is 
unrelated to conduct, the majority buries its head in the 
sand. 
Its characterization of the eligibility review as an 
“initial inquiry”14 is not based on the language of the 
statute. 
The eligibility criteria in MCL 324.63702 are as 
much a condition to engage in critical sand dune mining as 
the requirements in §§ 63704 through 63706. 
The SDMA does 
not enact a hierarchy or order to be followed by those 
12 MCL 324.9101 et seq. 
13 Supra beginning at 7. 
14 Ante at 7. 
16  
 
 
 
                                                 
reviewing a permit application. Unlike this Court’s recent 
decision in Nemeth, here the majority reads “likely to” out 
of the statute. 
The majority argues that an inquiry into the effect on 
the environment of the proposed mining “would be pointless 
unless the DEQ first determined that the applicant was 
eligible for a permit on the basis of the applicant’s 
status”. Ante at 7-8. We could not agree more. It would 
be pointless for the DEQ to review the effect of the 
proposed mining if the applicant were ineligible for a 
permit. 
If the applicant is not eligible, no mining will 
occur. Critical dunes will not be destroyed. 
The majority attempts to restrict the inquiry into 
Technisand's conduct to consideration of the nature of its 
relationship 
to 
the 
property 
at 
issue. 
This 
is 
misleading.15
 The conduct in question is more than 
TechniSand’s “relationship to the mining property.” 
It 
necessarily encompasses TechniSand’s proposal to remove 
large quantities of sand from designated critical dunes 
that would otherwise remain untouched. This is the “actual 
15 See, e.g., ante at 11 n 5. The majority’s implicit
recognition that [c]ountless entities apply for and receive
permits 
for 
conduct 
that 
affects 
Michigan's 
natural 
resources," 
ante 
at 
17, 
demonstrates 
the 
internal 
inconsistency of its argument. 
17  
 
 
conduct” that the permit at issue allows and that plaintiff 
alleges is “likely to pollute, impair, or destroy” critical 
dunes under MEPA. 
MCL 324.1703(1). 
Because the critical 
dunes could not have been mined by TechniSand at all 
without the erroneous eligibility determination, plaintiff 
should be allowed to pursue its MEPA cause of action. 
Statutory provisions must be read in the context of 
the entire act so as to produce a harmonious whole. Macomb 
Co Prosecutor v Murphy, 464 Mich 149, 159; 627 NW2d 247 
(2001). 
Subsections a and b of § 63702(1) must be read 
together because of their juxtaposition. 
Subsection b 
applies when the permit holder seeks to expand the permit 
to include adjacent land that contains a critical dune area 
that it owned before July 5, 1989. In contrast, subsection 
a applies to the amendment or renewal of a permit that 
already authorizes mining in a particular area. 
The permit issued to TechniSand authorized mining only 
in the noncritical dune areas. TechniSand had to apply for 
a permit amendment to add the adjacent critical dune areas 
to its permit. 
Therefore, subsection b applies to this 
case. 
However, TechniSand did not own the land or the 
rights to mine the sand before 1989 as required by the 
statute. 
Therefore, it could not have obtained the permit 
18  
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
 
 
amendment and could not have engaged in any critical sand 
dune mining. 
TechniSand’s 
environmental 
impact 
statement16 
acknowledged that mining the critical dunes at issue would 
“significantly impair the environment and would permanently 
destroy critical dune.” 
253 Mich App 269. 
Witnesses 
testified from the statement that the mining will change 
“the nature of the result in the environment . . . for 
hundreds of years”17 and a “large percent of the critical 
dune will be removed.”18  Plaintiff’s expert testified that 
“The critical dune will be gone.”19 
Nonetheless, 
the 
majority 
holds 
that 
the 
DEQ’s 
determination that TechniSand is eligible to mine critical 
dunes 
is 
unrelated 
to 
whether 
TechniSand’s 
mining 
activities will pollute, impair, or destroy a natural 
16 The majority criticizes me for citing a document
“not in the record.” 
Ante at 17. However, it was Exhibit
21 at trial, and witnesses read from it. 
See Trial Tr at 
122, 582, 785, and 932. Plaintiff’s brief on appeal in the
Court of Appeals quoted it at p 6. 
The record on appeal
includes all original papers filed in the courts below.
MCR 7.311(A). 
Plaintiff included an excerpt in the 
appendix (p 14b) to its brief on oral argument before this
Court. See MCR 7.308. 
17 Trial Tr at 935. 
18 Id. at 785. 
19 Id. at 122. 
19  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
resource. Thus, it concludes that plaintiff cannot rely on 
MEPA to challenge the permit that has been issued. 
The 
majority’s 
reasoning 
undermines 
the 
critical 
dunes 
protections in the SDMA, the intent of MEPA, and this 
Court’s earlier MEPA decisions. 
Plaintiff is not required to challenge issuance of the 
permit as an administrative decision under either the 
Administrative 
Procedures 
Act 
(APA) 
or 
the 
Revised 
Judicature Act (RJA). 
The MEPA is “supplementary to 
existing administrative and regulatory procedures provided 
by law.” MCL 324.1706. It was intended to create a common 
law of environmental protection. 
Ray at 306. 
It does not 
require that a plaintiff exhaust administrative remedies. 
MCL 324.1701(1). 
Accordingly, the statutory period of 
limitations of neither the APA nor the RJA apply to 
plaintiff’s 
MEPA 
claim.20
 
Plaintiff’s 
challenge 
to 
Technisand’s permit under the MEPA is not time-barred. 
The DEQ does not dispute that TechniSand is ineligible 
for a permit. 
Recognizing plaintiff’s claim under the 
20 The MEPA itself imposes no statutory period of
limitations, 
but 
equitable 
claims 
under 
the 
Natural 
Resources and Environmental Protection Act, which houses
MEPA, have been held subject to the six-year statutory
period of MCL 600.5813. 
Attorney General v Harkins, 257
Mich App 564, 571; 669 NW2d 296 (2003). 
20  
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
environmental protection act expresses no disrespect for an 
administrative agency’s decision. 
The majority abdicates 
its responsibility by refusing to review this permit 
eligibility determination under MEPA.21 
Conclusion 
The majority's decision today wrongly insulates Sand 
Dune Mining Act permit eligibility determinations from 
judicial review. 
The decision to issue a sand dune mining 
permit 
pursuant 
to 
the 
SDMA 
inherently 
includes 
an 
environmental component. I would hold that issuance of the 
permit in this case can be challenged under the Michigan 
environmental protection act. 
The Legislature intended the act to apply to permit 
determinations. 
Application 
of 
the 
act 
to 
permit 
determinations 
is 
entirely 
consistent 
with 
the 
Legislature’s intent to stringently preserve Great Lakes 
sand dunes against degradation and to protect the integrity 
21 The majority cites Oscoda Chapter of PBB Action 
Comm, Inc v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 403 Mich 215, 233;
268 NW2d 240 (1978) to support its finality argument. 
But 
its quotation from the case is taken out of context and is
from an opinion that did not garner a majority of votes.
The statement addressed the court’s authority to consider
feasible and prudent alternatives to proposed conduct, an
issue entirely unrelated to the majority’s decision that 
this permit challenge under MEPA is time-barred. 
21  
 
 
 
 
 
of that environment. 
The majority’s reasoning frustrates 
that intent. 
Plaintiff's cause is not barred by the statutory 
limitations periods of the APA and the RJA. 
The Court of 
Appeals correctly remanded the case for entry of an order 
granting summary disposition for plaintiff. 
Its decision 
should be affirmed. 
Because the majority ignores both the reality of the 
permitting process and the Legislature’s intent to protect 
critical dune areas from destruction, I must dissent. 
Marilyn Kelly
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
22