Title: State v. Burris

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2011 WI 32 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP956-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Donovan M. Burris, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 323 Wis. 2d 823, 781 N.W.2d 551 
(Ct. App. 2010 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 17, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 2, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
William Sosnay 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
PROSSER, J. concurs (Opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. dissents (Opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Maura F.J. Whelan, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs and oral 
argument by Byron C. Lichstein, Frank J. Remington Center, 
University of Wisconsin Law School, Madison. 
 
 
2011 WI 32
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2009AP956-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2007CF4362) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Donovan M. Burris, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 17, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals1 reversing the 
circuit court's judgment of conviction and denial of Donovan M. 
Burris's (Burris) motion seeking postconviction relief and a new 
trial.   The underlying incident began as an argument between 
Burris and the mother of his two young children, Khadijah 
Rashada 
(Khadijah), 
and 
escalated 
into 
the 
shooting 
of 
                                                 
1 State v. Burris, No. 2009AP956-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2010). 
No. 
2009AP956-CR   
 
2 
 
Khadijah's brother, Kamal Rashada (Kamal), which left Kamal 
paralyzed.  Burris was subsequently convicted of first-degree 
reckless 
injury 
while 
armed 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
940.23(1)(a) and § 939.63 (2007-08)2 and being a felon in 
possession of a firearm contrary to Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2)(a).   
¶2 
At trial, the central focus was whether Burris acted 
with utter disregard for human life, an element of Wis. Stat. 
§ 940.23(1)(a).  The State presented testimony about Burris's 
actions before and during the shooting from Kamal, Khadijah, and 
their mother Cathy Rashada (Cathy) that tended to show he acted 
with utter disregard for human life.  Burris testified on his 
own behalf, asserting that the shooting was an accident, and 
also 
attempted 
to 
impeach 
the 
Rashadas' 
testimony 
with 
inconsistencies between their testimony and in prior statements.   
¶3 
Both sides also put forth evidence of Burris's conduct 
after the shooting that was relevant to the utter disregard 
element.  Burris, Kamal, Khadijah, and Cathy all agreed that 
immediately after the shooting, Burris expressed remorse and 
stated that the shooting was unintentional.  The State also 
presented evidence that, after expressing his regret for 
shooting Kamal for about one minute, Burris left the apartment, 
did not contact the Rashada family to inquire about Kamal's 
condition, and evaded police for approximately five months.   
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2009AP956-CR   
 
3 
 
¶4 
After hearing this evidence and receiving the pattern 
jury instruction for first-degree reckless injury, Wis JI——
Criminal 1250, including the utter disregard for human life 
element, the jury asked: "Regarding the element of utter 
disregard, all other facts and circumstances relating to the 
incident, do we consider facts and circumstances after the 
shooting?"  The circuit court, after conferring with counsel and 
over 
Burris's 
objection, 
gave 
the 
jury 
a 
supplemental 
instruction, which quoted verbatim part of this court's decision 
in State v. Jensen, 2000 WI 84, 236 Wis. 2d 521, 613 N.W.2d 170. 
¶5 
Following 
his 
conviction, 
Burris 
moved 
for 
postconviction relief on several grounds, including a challenge 
to the supplemental jury instruction as unconstitutionally 
misleading, all of which the circuit court denied.  The court of 
appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial based on Burris's 
challenge to the supplemental jury instruction and thus did not 
reach Burris's other claims.  The State petitioned this court 
for review, which we granted.          
¶6 
The State raises the following issues for review: (1) 
whether a fact-finder, in determining whether a defendant acted 
with utter disregard for human life, should give his conduct 
after a crime less weight than his conduct before and during the 
incident, and (2) whether there is a reasonable likelihood that 
the 
jury 
applied 
the 
circuit 
court's 
supplemental 
jury 
instruction in an unconstitutional manner.   
¶7 
We conclude that, in an utter disregard analysis, a 
defendant's conduct is not, as a matter of law, assigned more or 
No. 
2009AP956-CR   
 
4 
 
less weight whether the conduct occurred before, during, or 
after the crime.  We hold that, when evaluating whether a 
defendant acted with utter disregard for human life, a fact-
finder should consider any relevant evidence in regard to the 
totality of the circumstances. 
¶8 
We further hold that Burris has not established a 
reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the supplemental 
jury instruction on the utter disregard for human life element 
in an unconstitutional manner.  We are satisfied that the 
supplemental instruction did not mislead the jury into believing 
that it could not consider Burris's relevant after-the-fact 
conduct in its determination on utter disregard for human life.    
¶9 
Therefore, we reverse the court of appeals decision 
and remand the case to allow the court of appeals to decide the 
other claims Burris raised before it. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶10 The Rashada family and Burris disagree about the 
details of what led up to the shooting on September 5, 2007, 
that led to the charges at issue in this case.  Relevant 
discrepancies in their testimony are discussed in more detail 
below; however, the basic facts are as follows. 
¶11 Burris arrived unannounced at the Rashada residence to 
talk to Khadijah and to see their two children.  Cathy, Kamal, 
Khadijah, and the two children were present when Burris arrived.  
Burris had with him a loaded .45 caliber pistol with a hair 
trigger and a disabled safety.  Burris and Khadijah got into an 
argument over the children and a male friend of Khadijah's, 
No. 
2009AP956-CR   
 
5 
 
which developed into a shouting match in which obscenities were 
exchanged.     
¶12 What happened during the argument leading up to the 
shooting was the heart of the dispute at trial regarding whether 
Burris acted with utter disregard for human life.   However, no 
one disputes that Kamal was shot in the neck, at close range, 
and as a result was hospitalized for two months and left 
paralyzed.   
¶13 After 
the 
shooting, 
Burris 
evaded 
police 
for 
approximately five months before turning himself in.  The State 
charged Burris with first-degree reckless injury while armed 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.23(1)(a)3 and § 939.63,4 and being a 
                                                 
3 Wis. Stat. § 940.23(1)(a) provides: "Whoever recklessly 
causes 
great 
bodily 
harm 
to 
another 
human 
being 
under 
circumstances which show utter disregard for human life is 
guilty of a Class D felony." 
4 Wis. Stat. § 939.63 provides in relevant part: 
(1) If a person commits a crime while possessing, 
using or threatening to use a dangerous weapon, the 
maximum term of imprisonment prescribed by law for 
that crime may be increased as follows: 
(a) The maximum term of imprisonment for a misdemeanor 
may be increased by not more than 6 months.      
(b) If the maximum term of imprisonment for a felony 
is more than 5 years or is a life term, the maximum 
term of imprisonment for the felony may be increased 
by not more than 5 years. 
(c) If the maximum term of imprisonment for a felony 
is more than 2 years, but not more than 5 years, the 
maximum term of imprisonment for the felony may be 
increased by not more than 4 years.     
No. 
2009AP956-CR   
 
6 
 
felon in possession of a firearm contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 941.29(2)(a).5  In a three-day trial before the Milwaukee 
County Circuit Court, the Honorable William Sosnay presiding, 
the State and Burris presented different accounts of Burris's 
conduct leading up to the shooting.   
¶14 For the State, Kamal, Cathy, and Khadijah testified to 
the following version of events.  When Burris arrived at the 
house, he briefly spoke with Cathy about buying diapers and 
formula for the children.  Shortly thereafter, Khadijah and 
Burris began to argue, and Burris began to threaten Khadijah and 
swear at her.  Khadijah and Burris continued this argument in 
the living room, where Burris had his gun out and was waving it 
around.  Cathy and Khadijah asked Burris to leave, but he 
refused and continued to threaten Khadijah and wave the gun 
                                                                                                                                                             
(d) The maximum term of imprisonment for a felony not 
specified in par. (b) or (c) may be increased by not 
more than 3 years. 
5 Wis. Stat. § 941.29 provides in relevant part: 
(1) A person is subject to the requirements and 
penalties of this section if he or she has been: 
(a) Convicted of a felony in this state. 
 . . . .  
(2) A person specified in sub. (1) is guilty of a 
Class G felony if he or she possesses a firearm under 
any of the following circumstances: 
(a) The person possesses a firearm subsequent to the 
conviction for the felony or other crime, as specified 
in sub. (1) (a) or (b). 
No. 
2009AP956-CR   
 
7 
 
around.  The two young children were present in the living room 
at the time.  While Burris and Khadijah were arguing in the 
living room near the front door, Kamal was standing behind 
Burris.  Kamal tapped Burris on his left side to get his 
attention and asked him to leave.  When Kamal tapped him, Burris 
turned around, raised the gun, called Kamal the "'N' word," and 
shot Kamal in the neck at close range.    
¶15 During cross-examination, Burris attempted to impeach 
these 
witnesses 
regarding 
some 
inconsistencies 
in 
their 
testimony.  Kamal's testimony differed from what he told Officer 
Vartanian in the ambulance right after the shooting.  Kamal told 
Officer Vartanian that Kamal pushed the gun away from Khadijah 
and then pushed Burris out the front door, at which time Burris 
reached back inside and shot Kamal.  Kamal explained at trial 
that Officer Vartanian may have misunderstood what he said, but 
that his testimony at trial was correct.  Cathy testified that 
she saw Burris raise the gun before shooting Kamal, but in an 
earlier statement to police she had stated that she did not see 
Burris raise the gun.  Khadijah testified that Burris waved the 
gun around before he raised it to shoot Kamal, but in an earlier 
statement to Officer Koscielak, Khadijah had stated that Burris 
kept the gun by his side.  Khadijah also testified that Kamal 
had only tapped Burris when Burris turned and raised the gun to 
shoot Kamal, but in an earlier statement to police she had 
stated that Kamal grabbed Burris's wrist before Burris shot him.  
On redirect, the State attempted to reconcile some of these 
inconsistencies.  
No. 
2009AP956-CR   
 
8 
 
¶16 Burris 
presented 
the 
following 
version 
of 
what 
happened leading up to the shooting.  Burris entered the 
apartment, spoke with Cathy briefly, and then went to the 
bedroom to put the gun he had with him under the mattress.  
Burris had a gun with him for his protection because, after an 
argument with some associates of the Rashadas' neighbors, he 
feared for his safety.  After stowing the gun, Burris went to 
the bathroom to talk to Khadijah and to see his children.  
Burris and Khadijah's conversation developed into an argument, 
which continued as they moved into the bedroom.  While they did 
get into a heated argument and exchange obscenities, Burris 
never threatened Khadijah.  When Cathy came into the bedroom and 
asked Burris to leave, he complied by grabbing his gun and 
heading for the door but began to argue with Khadijah again in 
the living room.  Burris never raised the gun or waved it around 
but kept it by his side.  Burris claimed that while Burris and 
Khadijah were arguing near the front door, Kamal grabbed 
Burris's right wrist from behind, and that when Burris turned 
and pulled his hand away, the gun went off and shot Kamal.  
¶17 The Rashadas and Burris presented similar testimony 
regarding what happened after the shooting.  Immediately after 
the shooting, Burris called out to Kamal and stated that he did 
not mean to shoot him and that he hoped Kamal would not die.  
Burris asked either Cathy or Khadijah to shoot him and tried to 
hand over the gun.  After about one minute, Burris stated he 
could not go to jail and left the apartment.  Burris then evaded 
police, leaving Milwaukee for about two weeks, before he 
No. 
2009AP956-CR   
 
9 
 
ultimately turned himself in a little less than five months 
after the shooting.  Burris did not contact the Rashada family 
to inquire about Kamal's condition.  Shortly before Burris 
turned 
himself 
in 
to 
police, 
he 
called 
Camilla 
Rashada 
(Camilla), Kamal's sister, to explain to her that he had not 
intended to shoot Kamal.   
¶18 The circuit court gave the pattern jury instruction 
for first-degree reckless injury, which, pertinent to the utter 
disregard for human life element, provides: 
In determining 
whether the conduct showed utter 
disregard for human life, you should consider these 
factors: What the defendant was doing, how dangerous 
the conduct was, how obvious the danger was, whether 
the conduct showed any regard for life and all other 
facts and circumstances relating to the conduct. 
Wis JI-Criminal 1250; see also Wis JI——Criminal 924A (providing 
a nearly identical instruction for the utter disregard element). 
¶19 At some point during the deliberations, the jury 
submitted 
the 
following 
question 
to 
the 
circuit 
court: 
"Regarding the element of utter disregard, all other facts and 
circumstances relating to the incident, do we consider facts and 
circumstances after the shooting?"   
 
¶20 To respond to the jury's question, the circuit court 
suggested 
giving 
a 
supplemental 
jury 
instruction 
quoting 
language in Jensen, 236 Wis. 2d 521, ¶32.  Burris responded that 
the pattern jury instruction was complete and sufficient, and 
that the circuit court could respond simply by charging the jury 
to apply their common sense reading of the pattern instruction.  
No. 
2009AP956-CR   
 
10 
 
Over Burris's objection, the circuit court gave the following 
supplemental instruction:  
First of all, I want to emphasize that you are to rely 
on the instructions that I gave you.  All right?  And 
to rely on all of the instructions that I gave you. 
And in response to this question, if this clarifies 
anything, after-the-fact regard for human life does 
not negate utter disregard otherwise established by 
the circumstances before and during the crime.  It may 
be considered by the fact-finder as a part of the 
total factual picture, but it does not operate to 
preclude a finding of utter disregard for human life.  
The element of utter disregard for human life is 
measured objectively on the basis of what a reasonable 
person in the defendant's position would have known. 
¶21 The jury convicted Burris on all charges, and Burris 
moved for postconviction relief on the following grounds: (1) 
Burris's counsel was ineffective because he elicited harmful 
other-acts testimony from Cathy, failed to request a cautionary 
instruction for this evidence, and failed to object to the 
State's 
improper 
closing 
argument 
regarding 
its 
charging 
decision, and (2) the circuit court erred by giving the jury 
this supplemental instruction.  The Milwaukee County Circuit 
Court, the Honorable Dennis R. Cimpl presiding, denied Burris's 
motion, and Burris appealed. 
¶22 The court of appeals reversed, concluding that, while 
the language in the supplemental jury instruction was legally 
accurate, there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury 
applied the supplemental instruction in an unconstitutional 
No. 
2009AP956-CR   
 
11 
 
manner.6  State v. Burris, No. 2009AP956-CR, unpublished slip 
op., ¶33 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2010).  The court of appeals 
stated that it agreed with the State and Burris that the correct 
answer to the jury's question was yes.  Id., ¶28.  The court of 
appeals concluded that, in response to the jury's question, the 
supplemental jury instruction, which took language out of 
context from Jensen, suggested that Burris's after-the-fact 
conduct was not significant and could not outweigh his conduct 
before and during the crime.  Id., ¶32.  Because the court of 
appeals concluded that this was an inaccurate portrayal of the 
law and that it was reasonably likely that the supplemental 
instruction misled the jury in this way, it reversed the circuit 
court's judgment of conviction.  Id., ¶¶32-33.  In his dissent, 
                                                 
6 Because the court of appeals reversed based on its 
conclusion that the supplemental jury instruction was erroneous, 
the court of appeals did not address Burris's three other 
claims.  Burris, No. 2009AP956-CR, ¶1.  Before the court of 
appeals, Burris argued that he was entitled to a new trial for 
the following reasons: 
(1) the trial court erroneously answered the jury's 
question concerning whether after-the-shooting conduct 
could be considered in a manner which misled the jury; 
(2) the trial court erred when it allowed the State to 
cross-examine Burris on an irrelevant issue and then 
also allowed the State to present rebuttal evidence on 
that issue; (3) trial counsel provided ineffective 
assistance in several respects; and (4) a new trial is 
warranted in the interest of justice. 
Id. 
As the State petitioned this court for review of the sole issue 
upon which the court of appeals decision was based, Burris's 
other claims are not before us. 
No. 
2009AP956-CR   
 
12 
 
the Honorable Ralph A. Fine noted that the supplemental 
instruction explained that the jury could consider after-the-
fact conduct "as a part of the total factual picture" and thus 
the instruction could not have misled the jury.  Id., ¶¶35-37 
(Fine, J., dissenting) (quoting Jensen, 236 Wis. 2d 521, ¶32).       
¶23 The State petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted.  We begin by clarifying that, in an analysis of whether 
a defendant acted with utter disregard for human life, the fact-
finder should consider the totality of the circumstances, 
including all relevant evidence of a defendant's conduct before, 
during, and after the crime.7  We then conclude, considering the 
proceedings as a whole, that Burris has not established a 
reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the supplemental 
jury instruction in an unconstitutional manner, that is, that 
the jury was misled into believing that it could not consider 
                                                 
7 While this first issue was not raised as a separate issue 
in the State's petition for review, we note that the State 
briefed and argued the issue of whether conduct after a crime 
should be entitled to less weight than other conduct.  In its 
petition for review, the State discussed but did not fully 
articulate its position on this issue; however, in its briefs 
before this court and during oral argument it clarified its 
argument in this regard.  Burris also addressed this issue in 
his brief and at some length during oral argument, asserting 
that 
this 
court 
should 
dismiss 
the 
State's 
petition 
as 
improvidently granted because the State had changed its position 
on the evidentiary weight due a defendant's after-the-fact 
conduct.  Because this issue presents a question of law, which 
both parties briefed and argued, and "is of sufficient public 
interest to merit a decision," we exercise our discretion to 
address it.  See State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, ¶45, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 
604 
N.W.2d 517 
(quoting 
Apex 
Elec. 
Corp. 
v. 
Gee, 
217 
Wis. 2d 378, 384, 577 N.W.2d 23 (1998)).   
No. 
2009AP956-CR   
 
13 
 
Burris's relevant after-the-fact conduct in its determination on 
utter disregard for human life.    
II. ANALYSIS 
¶24 Allegations that the jury improperly applied legally 
correct jury instructions in a manner that denied the defendant 
due process raise questions of constitutional fact that this 
court reviews de novo.  State v. Lohmeier, 205 Wis. 2d 183, 191-
92, 556 N.W.2d 90 (1996).  We examine the challenged jury 
instructions in light of the proceedings as a whole, keeping in 
mind that circuit courts have broad discretion in deciding which 
instructions to give.  Id. at 194; Nommensen v. Am. Cont'l Ins. 
Co., 2001 WI 112, ¶50, 246 Wis. 2d 132, 629 N.W.2d 301. 
A. Evidentiary Weight of a Defendant's After-the-Fact Conduct 
¶25 The State argues that, while it may be considered as 
part of the totality of the circumstances, a defendant's after-
the-fact mitigating conduct does not have the same evidentiary 
weight as a defendant's actions before and during the crime.  
The State relies on the language in Jensen quoted by the circuit 
court in the supplemental jury instruction, and on the court of 
appeals decisions in State v. Edmunds, 229 Wis. 2d 67, 598 
N.W.2d 290 (Ct. App. 1999), and State v. Holtz, 173 Wis. 2d 515, 
496 N.W.2d 668 (Ct. App. 1992).  The State notes that the court 
of 
appeals 
distinguished 
between 
the 
defendants' 
conduct 
depending upon when it occurred.  The State infers from these 
factual analyses that, in a determination of utter disregard, 
after-the-fact conduct is not as significant as conduct before 
and during the injury.  Further, the State asserts that language 
No. 
2009AP956-CR   
 
14 
 
to the contrary in State v. Miller, 2009 WI App 111, 320 
Wis. 2d 724, 
772 
N.W.2d 188, 
is 
based 
on 
an 
incorrect 
interpretation of Jensen.      
¶26 Burris disagrees with the State's interpretation of 
the utter disregard standard.  Burris argues that this court and 
the court of appeals have consistently held that whether a 
defendant showed utter disregard for human life is a totality of 
the circumstances analysis in which the fact-finder may consider 
conduct before, during, and after the incident.  Burris asserts 
that this is consistent with Wis. Stat. § 940.23(1)(a), the 
pattern jury instructions, Wis JI——Criminal 924A and 1250, and 
utter disregard case law, see, e.g., Miller, 320 Wis. 2d 724; 
Edmunds, 229 Wis. 2d 67; Holtz, 173 Wis. 2d 515; Jensen, 236 
Wis. 2d 521.  Burris notes that, in the decisions that the State 
relies on, this court and the court of appeals were evaluating 
the sufficiency of the evidence, and thus any characterization 
of a particular category of evidence was limited to the facts of 
that case.   
¶27 We reject the State's assertion and emphasize that in 
an utter disregard analysis there is no rule assigning more or 
less weight to a particular category of a defendant's conduct 
based on when that conduct occurred.  
¶28 Both parties agree that Wis. Stat. § 940.23(1)(a) is 
not 
instructive regarding what evidence establishes utter 
No. 
2009AP956-CR   
 
15 
 
disregard.8  Rather, decisions of this court and the court of 
appeals provide the well-established standard. 
¶29 We most recently addressed the proper analysis for 
utter disregard for human life in Jensen, 236 Wis. 2d 521.  
Jensen was convicted of first-degree reckless injury for 
vigorously shaking his infant son, leaving him with permanent, 
life-altering disabilities.  Id., ¶1.  The following facts were 
presented at trial.  During an overnight visit, Jensen's ten-
week-old, 12-pound son began to cry uncontrollably.  Id., ¶6.  
After unsuccessfully trying to soothe him, Jensen vigorously 
shook his son 7 to 15 times, such that the infant's head snapped 
forward, hitting his chest, and back, and Jensen stopped shaking 
him only when the baby stopped crying.  Id.  After about 30 
seconds, Jensen called 911 and told the operator that he had an 
"accident" with his son——tripping over a phone cord while 
holding him.  Id., ¶¶6-7.   
¶30 Jensen appealed the conviction, arguing that (1) the 
State was required to, but did not, prove Jensen's "subjective 
awareness that shaking his son posed an extreme risk of death," 
(2) the circumstances——the excessive use of disciplinary force——
were not sufficient to establish utter disregard for human life, 
and (3) calling 911 after he realized his son was having trouble 
                                                 
8 The statute does not elaborate on the definition of utter 
disregard for human life, or what conduct establishes that 
element, but simply proscribes recklessly causing injury "under 
circumstances which show utter disregard for human life."  Wis. 
Stat. § 940.23(1)(a).   
No. 
2009AP956-CR   
 
16 
 
breathing showed regard for his life and precluded a finding of 
utter disregard.  Id., ¶2.   
¶31 This court first clarified that whether a defendant 
acted with utter disregard for human life is an objective 
analysis, dependent upon "what a reasonable person in the 
defendant's position would have known," which may be "proven by 
evidence relating to the defendant's subjective state of mind——
by the defendant's statements, for example, before, during and 
after the crime."  Id., ¶17 (emphasis added).   
¶32 Turning to the sufficiency of the evidence, this court 
noted that in an utter disregard analysis "the factfinder is to 
consider 
'all 
the 
factors 
relating 
to 
the 
conduct . . . includ[ing] . . . what the defendant was doing; 
why he was doing it; how dangerous the conduct was; how obvious 
the danger was and whether the conduct showed any regard for 
human life.'"  Id., ¶24 (quoting Wis JI——Criminal 1250).  We 
elaborated that:  
In conducting such an examination, we consider the 
type of act, its nature, why the perpetrator acted as 
he/she did, the extent of the victim's injuries and 
the degree of force that was required to cause those 
injuries. We also consider the type of victim, the 
victim's 
age, 
vulnerability, 
fragility, 
and 
relationship to the perpetrator. And finally, we 
consider whether the totality of the circumstances 
showed any regard for the victim's life. 
Id. (quoting Edmunds, 229 Wis. 2d at 77) (emphasis added).   
 
¶33 Ultimately, under the sufficiency of the evidence 
standard of review and in response to Jensen's claim that the 
No. 
2009AP956-CR   
 
17 
 
911 call precluded a finding of utter disregard, this court 
concluded: 
After-the-fact regard for human life does not negate 
“utter 
disregard” 
otherwise 
established 
by 
the 
circumstances before and during the crime. It may be 
considered by the factfinder as a part of the total 
factual picture, but it does not operate to preclude a 
finding of utter disregard for human life. 
Id., ¶32. 
 
¶34 Viewed in light of the rest of our decision in Jensen 
and the context of that language, Jensen does not, as a matter 
of law, assign more or less weight to a defendant's conduct, 
whether that conduct occurred before, during, or after the 
incident.  After explaining that the fact-finder should consider 
a defendant's relevant conduct "before, during and after the 
crime" in reviewing, under the totality of the circumstances, 
whether the defendant acted with utter disregard for human life, 
we applied that standard to the particular facts in Jensen.  
Id., ¶¶17, 24.  In response to Jensen's claim that mitigating 
actions taken after the fact necessarily "preclude" a finding of 
utter disregard, we clarified that no such rule exists and that, 
given the circumstances in Jensen, his 911 call did not show 
sufficient regard for human life to require the reversal of the 
fact-finder's determination that his conduct as a whole evinced 
utter disregard.  Id., ¶¶30-32.  This conclusion should not be 
read in isolation, but rather along with the standard for an 
utter disregard analysis provided in Jensen.     
 
¶35 Nor should the way in which we distinguished some of 
our previous decisions in Jensen suggest that we created a new 
No. 
2009AP956-CR   
 
18 
 
standard based upon those distinctions.  See Id., ¶¶30-31 
(distinguishing Wagner v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 30, 250 N.W.2d 331 
(1977) and Balistreri v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 440, 265 N.W.2d 290 
(1978)).  In Wagner and Balistreri the mitigating conduct——the 
defendants' attempt to avoid an accident——led this court to 
conclude that there was insufficient evidence to support a 
finding 
of 
utter 
disregard. 
 
Wagner, 
76 
Wis. 2d at 
47; 
Balistreri, 83 Wis. 2d at 458.  The factual distinctions we 
pointed out in Jensen between Wagner's and Balistreri's attempts 
to avoid injuring someone and Jensen's decision to call 911 
after inflicting the injury simply supported our conclusion 
regarding the sufficiency of the evidence in Jensen.  This did 
not create a rule assigning less weight to a defendant's after-
the-fact conduct.   
 
¶36 The court of appeals concisely noted as much in 
Miller, 320 Wis. 2d 724, in response to an argument similar to 
the State's argument in this case regarding the role of after-
the-fact conduct in an utter disregard calculus: 
For this reason, we reject the State's suggestion that 
Wagner, Balistreri and Jensen may be read to stand for 
the proposition that evidence of “after-the-fact” 
regard for life is of less import than conduct 
evincing regard for life during and before the act. 
Courts consider the totality of the circumstances when 
determining whether the defendant showed some regard 
for life, which may include conduct occurring before, 
during and after the commission of the criminally 
reckless act itself. 
Id., ¶35 n.12 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
No. 
2009AP956-CR   
 
19 
 
¶37 Thus, the State's reliance on the court of appeals 
decisions in Holtz and Edmunds, rejecting sufficiency of the 
evidence 
claims 
premised 
on 
a 
defendant's 
after-the-fact 
mitigating conduct, is misplaced.  In Holtz, the court of 
appeals distinguished Wagner and Balistreri, concluding that the 
defendant's ultimate decision to stop his attack, in light of 
his other aggravating conduct, was not significant enough to 
reverse the finding of utter disregard.  Holtz, 173 Wis. 2d at 
519-20.  In Edmunds, the court of appeals also concluded that a 
911 call "when combined with the violence perpetrated against so 
fragile a victim, did not require the jury to find that 
Edmunds's conduct had not demonstrated an utter disregard."  229 
Wis. 2d at 78.  The court of appeals' assessment of the relative 
weight of the evidence in each case was not an endorsement of 
that delineation in every case.  Reviewing courts may find 
distinctions between defendants' conduct in sufficiency of the 
evidence 
cases 
useful 
in 
reviewing 
a 
fact-finder's 
determination, but their use of such patterns does not mean that 
new legal standards should be grafted onto the fact-finder's 
initial determination of whether certain conduct demonstrates an 
utter disregard.    
 
¶38 In its totality of the circumstances analysis, the 
fact-finder should consider all evidence relevant to whether a 
defendant acted with utter disregard for human life.  Jensen, 
236 Wis. 2d 521, ¶¶17, 24.  The weight to be given evidence of a 
defendant's conduct or statements is for the trier of fact, 
often a jury, to decide.  This accords with the well-settled 
No. 
2009AP956-CR   
 
20 
 
maxim in Wisconsin that "questions of the weight and reliability 
of relevant evidence are matters for the trier of fact."  State 
v. Fischer, 2010 WI 6, ¶36, 322 Wis. 2d 265, 778 N.W.2d 629.  
There is no bright-line rule regarding the evidentiary weight of 
a particular category of a defendant's conduct depending on when 
that conduct occurred relative to the crime.9 
¶39 We note that an instruction to consider the totality 
of the circumstances is a broad standard, but it is not without 
some limits.  As part of the totality of the circumstances 
analysis, the fact-finder should consider a defendant's relevant 
conduct before, during and after the crime.  Jensen, 236 
Wis. 2d 521, ¶¶17, 24.  A defendant's conduct is relevant if it 
occurs within a reasonable period of time after the crime.  The 
length of time will depend on the circumstances in each case and 
is limited by the requirement that evidence is admissible only 
if it is relevant to some element of the crime, in this case, 
whether the defendant acted with utter disregard for human life.  
See Wis. Stat. § 904.02 (2009-10).   
¶40 We also recognize a concern underlying the State's 
argument: that a jury could give undue weight to a defendant's 
remorse after the fact and return a finding of not guilty of a 
first-degree reckless offense even when a defendant's other 
conduct clearly evinces utter disregard.  However, this concern 
                                                 
9 As the court of appeals noted in State v. Miller, 2009 WI 
App 
111, 
¶37, 
320 
Wis. 2d 724, 
772 
N.W.2d 188, 
we 
have 
"carefully avoided per se rules in this area and instead [have] 
consistently applied a totality of the circumstances approach to 
the cases."  We continue along that path today. 
No. 
2009AP956-CR   
 
21 
 
does not justify creating a bright-line rule and limiting the 
jury's role of weighing evidence.10  We are satisfied that an 
instruction to consider the totality of the circumstances, i.e., 
not giving undue weight to any particular evidence, applied 
along with the jurors' common sense, will allow the jury to 
fairly and appropriately apply the instruction and follow the 
law.  See Wis JI——Criminal 924A (The Committee declined to 
further define what constitutes utter disregard because "[t]he 
jury should be able to give the phrase a common sense meaning in 
determining whether the conduct is such that it amounts to an 
aggravated reckless offense."); see also Wis JI——Criminal 1250 
n.5 (providing a nearly verbatim explanation).    
¶41 We reaffirm our previous decisions and hold that when 
evaluating 
whether 
a 
defendant's 
conduct 
reflects 
utter 
disregard for human life, the fact-finder should examine the 
totality of the circumstances surrounding the crime.  In this 
                                                 
10 Justice Prosser, in his concurrence, misinterprets the 
law providing what evidence a fact-finder may use to decide the 
utter disregard element.  As discussed above, this court and the 
court of appeals have consistently held that a fact-finder may 
consider relevant evidence of a defendant's state of mind to 
determine the subjective part of the element of utter disregard, 
including all of a defendant's relevant conduct and statements 
surrounding the crime.        
By including the phrase "under circumstances which show," 
the legislature has recognized that to determine whether a 
defendant acted with utter disregard for human life the fact-
finder must look to the surrounding circumstances, which include 
the defendant's relevant conduct and statements.  Wis. Stat. § 
940.23(1)(a).  Nothing in the statute limits the relevant 
circumstances to those before and during the crime, and logic 
dictates that those circumstances cannot be so limited. 
No. 
2009AP956-CR   
 
22 
 
analysis, the fact-finder should consider all relevant conduct 
before, during and after a crime, giving each the weight it 
deems appropriate under the circumstances.  Upon clarifying the 
appropriate standard for utter disregard, we turn to whether 
Burris established a reasonable likelihood that the supplemental 
jury instruction unconstitutionally misled the jury.  
B. Propriety of the Supplemental Jury Instruction 
¶42 Consistent with its argument above, the State first 
asserts that, since after-the-fact conduct is entitled to less 
weight, the supplemental instruction did not mislead the jury if 
it conveyed as much.  Second, the State argues that the court of 
appeals improperly failed to consider the proceedings and 
instructions as a whole when concluding that there was a 
reasonable likelihood that the jury was misled.  Third, the 
State asserts that the court of appeals failed to recognize that 
Burris had the burden of proof to establish a reasonable 
likelihood.  Fourth, the State points out that, under Lohmeier, 
reversal is warranted only if there is a reasonable likelihood 
that the jury applied the instruction in an unconstitutional 
manner, 
but 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
did 
not 
address 
any 
constitutional violation.  See Lohmeier, 205 Wis. 2d at 193-94.  
Finally, the State argues that it was just as likely that the 
jury considered Burris's aggravating after-the-fact conduct of 
fleeing as it was that the jury considered his remorse 
immediately after the shooting. 
¶43 Burris responds that the correct response to the 
jury's question was simply "yes," or an instruction to review 
No. 
2009AP956-CR   
 
23 
 
the previously given pattern jury instruction and to follow the 
directions within that instruction to answer its question.  
Burris argues that the Jensen language confused the jury and, 
because it was taken out of context, suggested "that the after-
the-fact conduct was less important and could not make the 
difference between finding or not finding utter disregard."  
Thus, Burris asserts that, given the conflicting testimony 
regarding what happened leading up to the shooting, the 
consistent 
testimony regarding Burris's remorse after the 
shooting, and the fact that the jury asked this question——
demonstrating that it thought Burris's after-the-fact conduct 
was significant——and got a confusing response, it is reasonably 
likely that the supplemental instruction was unconstitutionally 
misleading.   
¶44 There are two types of jury instruction challenges: 
those challenging the legal accuracy of the instructions, and 
those 
alleging 
that 
a 
legally 
accurate 
instruction 
unconstitutionally 
misled 
the 
jury. 
 
See 
Lohmeier, 
205 
Wis. 2d at 192.  This is the latter challenge.  Both parties 
agree that the language in the supplemental jury instruction, 
taken directly from Jensen, 236 Wis. 2d 521, ¶32, was legally 
accurate.  Thus, Burris challenges whether that instruction led 
the jury to misapply the law.   
¶45 A defendant is entitled to reversal if "there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged 
instruction[] in a manner that violates the constitution."  
Lohmeier, 205 Wis. 2d at 193.  The reviewing court should not 
No. 
2009AP956-CR   
 
24 
 
examine the challenged jury instruction in isolation but rather 
"should view the jury instructions in light of the proceedings 
as a whole."  Id. at 194.  We begin by clarifying certain 
aspects of the reasonable likelihood standard. 
¶46 It is the defendant's burden to establish a reasonable 
likelihood 
that 
the 
jury 
unconstitutionally 
applied 
an 
instruction.  See id. at 193; Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 
380 (1990); Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 129 S. Ct. 
823, 831 (2009).  While the question of burden of proof was not 
specifically addressed in Lohmeier, in clarifying the standard 
of review, we explained that we were following the standard set 
forth by the United States Supreme Court in Boyde.  Lohmeier, 
205 Wis. 2d at 193.  Thus, the placement of the burden in this 
United States Supreme Court case and others applying it is 
instructive here. 
¶47 In Boyde, the United States Supreme Court examined 
whether a jury instruction given in the penalty phase of a 
homicide 
trial 
prohibited 
the 
jury 
from 
considering 
the 
defendant's mitigating conduct relevant to whether the death 
penalty was warranted, even though not necessarily relevant to 
guilt or innocence of the crime charged.  494 U.S. at 373, 377-
78.  As we did in Lohmeier, the Supreme Court clarified the 
appropriate standard for challenges to legally correct jury 
instructions, and in so doing, suggested that the defendant bore 
the 
burden 
of 
establishing 
a 
reasonable 
likelihood 
of 
unconstitutional application.  Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380.   
No. 
2009AP956-CR   
 
25 
 
¶48 More recently, in Waddington, 129 S. Ct. at 831, the 
United States Supreme Court reaffirmed Boyde, and emphasized 
that the burden was the defendant's.  In reviewing a challenge 
to a legally accurate instruction on the basis that the jury may 
have been misled into incorrectly applying that instruction, the 
Court stated that "the defendant must show both that the 
instruction was ambiguous and that there was a reasonable 
likelihood that the jury applied the instruction in a way that 
relieved the State of its burden of proving every element of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt."  Waddington, 129 S. Ct. at 831 
(emphasis added and internal quotations omitted).  While, in 
Lohmeier, we had not explicitly placed the burden of proof on 
the defendant, we do so now.11 
¶49 A defendant meets this burden only if he or she 
establishes that a constitutional violation was reasonably 
likely.  Lohmeier, 205 Wis. 2d at 193.  "Wisconsin courts should 
not reverse a conviction simply because the jury possibly could 
have been misled; rather a new trial should be ordered only if 
there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury was misled and 
therefore applied potentially confusing instructions in an 
                                                 
11 This conclusion is in line with the placement of the 
burden 
in 
other 
contexts 
in 
appeals 
challenging 
the 
constitutionality of a criminal conviction.  See, e.g., State v. 
Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d 121, 127, 449 N.W.2d 845 (1990) (burden on 
defendant to prove reasonable probability of prejudice in 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim); State v. Smith, 2010 
WI 16, ¶¶8-9, 323 Wis. 2d 377, 780 N.W.2d 90 (burden on 
defendant to prove unconstitutionality of statute under which he 
was convicted).  It is also clearly in line with the United 
States Supreme Court cases discussed herein.  
No. 
2009AP956-CR   
 
26 
 
unconstitutional manner."  Id. at 193-94.  The United States 
Supreme Court has further explained in Boyde that, "[a]lthough a 
defendant need not establish that the jury was more likely than 
not 
to 
have 
been 
impermissibly 
inhibited 
by 
the 
instruction . . . [there is no constitutional violation] if 
there is only a possibility of such an inhibition."  494 U.S. at 
380.  Even some "ambiguity, inconsistency, or deficiency" in an 
instruction does not violate due process unless there is a 
reasonable likelihood that, considering the whole trial, the 
jury unconstitutionally applied the instruction.  Waddington, 
129 S. Ct. at 831-32 (quoting Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 
437 (2004)). 
¶50 A jury is unconstitutionally misled if there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the instruction was applied in a 
manner that denied the defendant "a meaningful opportunity for 
consideration by the jury of his defense . . . . to the 
detriment of a defendant's due process rights."  Lohmeier, 205 
Wis. 2d at 192.  Thus, a jury applies an instruction in an 
unconstitutional manner if it believes that such instruction 
precludes 
"the 
consideration 
of 
constitutionally 
relevant 
evidence."  Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380. 
¶51 Applying the above standard to the case at hand, we 
hold that Burris has not established a reasonable likelihood 
that the jury applied the supplemental instruction in an 
unconstitutional manner.  The jury applied the instructions 
properly if it understood that, in determining whether Burris 
acted with utter disregard for human life, it should consider 
No. 
2009AP956-CR   
 
27 
 
the totality of the circumstances including Burris's relevant 
conduct before, during and after the shooting.  See Jensen, 236 
Wis. 2d 521, ¶¶17, 24.  Because we examine the challenged jury 
instruction in light of the whole proceedings, the evidence 
presented at trial along with the initial instruction, the 
jury's question, and the supplemental instruction are all 
relevant to our analysis. 
¶52 The State presented evidence from the Rashadas about 
the events leading up to the shooting.  The parties agree that, 
if believed, the Rashada family's testimony——that Burris waved 
around a loaded .45 caliber pistol, raised the gun, pointed it 
at Kamal, and shot him in the neck at point-blank range——
established that Burris acted with utter disregard.  
¶53 Burris, however, presented a different account of how 
the shooting happened and what he did before it occurred.  His 
testimony, if believed, suggests that he did not act with utter 
disregard and that the shooting was an unfortunate accident.  
Burris 
also 
asserts 
that 
he 
significantly 
impeached 
the 
Rashadas' testimony about what happened before the shooting by 
highlighting several inconsistencies. 
¶54 Both 
Burris 
and 
the 
Rashadas 
testified 
that 
immediately after the shooting, Burris showed remorse, stated 
that he hoped Kamal would not die, and was so distraught that he 
offered his gun to either Cathy or Khadijah and asked one of 
them to shoot him.  By all accounts, this lasted about one 
minute.   
No. 
2009AP956-CR   
 
28 
 
¶55 Then, Burris left the apartment and evaded police for 
about five months before turning himself in.  To avoid capture, 
Burris left Milwaukee for approximately two and a half weeks.  
Sometime after the shooting and before turning himself in, 
Burris disposed of the gun used in the shooting.  He also did 
not contact the Rashada family about Kamal's well-being.     
¶56 Relevant to the element of utter disregard for human 
life, the circuit court gave the following instruction from the 
pattern jury instruction for first-degree reckless injury, Wis 
JI——Criminal 1250: 
In determining 
whether the conduct showed utter 
disregard for human life, you should consider these 
factors: what the defendant was doing; why the 
defendant was engaged in that conduct; how dangerous 
the conduct was; how obvious the danger was; whether 
the conduct showed any regard for life; and, all other 
facts and circumstances relating to the conduct.  
(Emphasis added.) 
¶57 After the jury instructions were given, the State and 
Burris made their closing arguments, which focused on whether 
Burris acted with utter disregard for human life.  Both the 
State and Burris brought up the significance of Burris's after-
the-fact conduct, including both his remorse immediately after 
the shooting and his decision to flee the scene and evade 
police. 
¶58 During deliberations, the jury submitted the following 
question to the circuit court: "Regarding the element of utter 
disregard, all other facts and circumstances relating to the 
No. 
2009AP956-CR   
 
29 
 
incident, do we consider facts and circumstances after the 
shooting?"12      
¶59 In response to the jury's question, the circuit court 
gave the following supplemental instruction: 
First of all, I want to emphasize that you are to rely 
on the instructions that I gave you.  All right?  And 
to rely on all of the instructions that I gave you. 
And in response to this question, if this clarifies 
anything, after-the-fact regard for human life does 
not negate utter disregard otherwise established by 
the circumstances before and during the crime.  It may 
be considered by the fact-finder as a part of the 
total factual picture, but it does not operate to 
preclude a finding of utter disregard for human life.  
The element of utter disregard for human life is 
measured objectively on the basis of what a reasonable 
person in the defendant's position would have known. 
¶60 Looking at the challenged supplemental instruction in 
light of the rest of the proceedings, we conclude that Burris 
has not met his burden.  Burris has not established a reasonable 
likelihood that the jury was unconstitutionally misled given the 
extensive evidence of Burris's after-the-fact conduct presented 
at 
trial, 
counsel's 
focus 
on 
this 
evidence 
in 
closing 
statements, and language in both the pattern and supplemental 
                                                 
12 As Burris points out, the jury submitted a substantially 
similar question while the circuit court and counsel were 
discussing whether to give a supplemental instruction and what 
to include in that instruction.  The jury asked, "Should we 
consider 
facts 
and 
circumstances 
after 
the 
shooting 
in 
determining utter disregard?"  Burris argues that it is 
significant that the jury asked two questions about whether it 
could consider after-the-fact conduct; however, we note that the 
foreperson clarified that the jury submitted two questions 
before receiving an answer from the circuit court, simply 
because the jury "thought to ask [the question] more directly."  
No. 
2009AP956-CR   
 
30 
 
jury instructions indicating that it could consider this conduct 
in its determination.  
¶61 There was extensive testimony at trial about Burris's 
after-the-fact conduct.  The key witnesses and Burris himself 
testified about Burris's remorseful conduct immediately after 
the shooting, and his actions in leaving the apartment without 
calling for help, or waiting for it to arrive, and then fleeing 
from police for approximately five months.  After the jury was 
instructed to consider "all other facts and circumstances 
relating to the [defendant's] conduct" in its utter disregard 
analysis, the State and Burris highlighted the significance of 
both the mitigating and aggravating after-the-fact conduct in 
their respective arguments during closing statements.  
¶62 The pattern jury instruction told the jury to consider 
"all other facts and circumstances relating to the [defendant's] 
conduct."  Based on its questions, even after this instruction, 
the jury was unsure whether it could consider after-the-fact 
conduct.  Significantly, the circuit court responded through the 
supplemental instruction that after-the-fact conduct "may be 
considered by the fact-finder as a part of the total factual 
picture."  While other language in the supplemental instruction 
regarding the role of after-the-fact conduct——"does not negate" 
and "does not operate to preclude"——taken out of context from 
Jensen, was potentially ambiguous, ambiguity or some possibility 
that the jury was misled, in and of itself, is not enough to 
No. 
2009AP956-CR   
 
31 
 
prove a violation of due process.13  Lohmeier, 205 Wis. 2d at 
193-94; Waddington, 129 S. Ct. at 831-32.   
¶63 Given all the evidence and arguments regarding his 
after-the-fact 
conduct, 
and 
the 
language 
in 
the 
jury 
instructions permitting the jury to consider such conduct, 
Burris has not established a reasonable likelihood that the jury 
ignored 
all 
of 
that 
because 
of 
a 
potentially 
ambiguous 
instruction.  Lohmeier, 205 Wis. 2d at 198 ("We find it is not 
reasonably likely that the jurors would believe this single 
instruction transformed all of the prior proceedings into a 
'virtual charade.'" (quoting Boyde, 494 U.S. at 383)).  The 
result, the jury's finding of utter disregard, does not indicate 
otherwise.  Indeed, the result is consistent with the jury 
considering all the evidence of Burris's conduct before, during, 
and after the shooting, including both the mitigating after-the-
fact conduct (Burris's immediate remorse) and the aggravating 
                                                 
13 Chief Justice Abrahamson's dissent would reverse Burris's 
conviction and grant him a new trial because of an "ambiguous" 
or a "potentially ambiguous" supplemental jury instruction, but 
this is not the appropriate standard.  See dissent, ¶¶93, 95, 
98.  As our past precedent and that of the United States Supreme 
Court advises, "Wisconsin courts should not reverse a conviction 
simply because the jury possibly could have been misled," State 
v. Lohmeier, 205 Wis. 2d 183, 193, 556 N.W.2d 90 (1996), or 
based on some "ambiguity, inconsistency, or deficiency" in the 
instruction, Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 129 S. Ct. 
823, 831 (2009) (quoting Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 
(2004)).  The reasonable likelihood standard demands that the 
defendant articulate something more than an ambiguity or a 
possibility that the jury was misled, and Burris has not done so 
in this case.  See supra ¶49. 
No. 
2009AP956-CR   
 
32 
 
after-the-fact conduct (Burris's flight from the apartment and 
from police).  
¶64  Burris has not established a reasonable likelihood 
that the jury was misled in this case, but supplemental 
instructions such as the one given here, taken out of context 
from Jensen, do have the potential to be confusing.  Thus, we 
recommend that the Criminal Jury Instruction Committee, in its 
comments to the "first-degree reckless" offense instructions, 
Wis JI——Criminal 1016-22, 1250, and the utter disregard for 
human life instruction, Wis JI——Criminal 924A, advise against 
taking certain language directly from utter disregard cases such 
as Jensen without providing the necessary context to fully 
explain the proper inquiry.  Additionally, we recommend that the 
Committee 
consider 
revising 
these 
instructions 
to 
more 
explicitly direct the jury that, in its utter disregard for 
human life consideration, it should consider the totality of the 
circumstances 
including any relevant evidence regarding a 
defendant's conduct before, during, and after the crime.    
III. CONCLUSION 
¶65 We conclude that a defendant's conduct is not, as a 
matter of law, assigned more or less weight whether the conduct 
occurred before, during, or after the crime.  We hold that, when 
evaluating whether a defendant acted with utter disregard for 
human life, a fact-finder should consider any relevant evidence 
in regard to the totality of the circumstances. 
¶66 We further hold that Burris has not established a 
reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the supplemental 
No. 
2009AP956-CR   
 
33 
 
jury instruction on the utter disregard for human life element 
in an unconstitutional manner.  We are satisfied that the 
supplemental instruction did not mislead the jury into believing 
that it could not consider Burris's relevant after-the-fact 
conduct in its determination on utter disregard for human life.    
¶67 Therefore, we reverse the court of appeals decision 
and remand the case to allow the court of appeals to decide the 
other claims Burris raised before it. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the court of appeals for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
No.  2009AP956-CR.dtp 
1 
 
 
¶68 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  The defendant, 
Donovan M. Burris, was convicted of first-degree reckless injury 
while armed in violation of Wis. Stat. §§ 940.23(1) and 939.63.  
I concur in the majority's decision to reverse the decision of 
the court of appeals, which had reversed the circuit court's 
denial of the defendant's motion for a new trial.  In my view, 
the circuit court's supplemental instruction to the jury was 
correct. 
¶69 I write separately because I am unpersuaded by the 
arguments and analysis about the relevance of conduct "after the 
crime." 
¶70 The majority opinion reads in part as follows: 
 
The State raises the following issue[ ] for 
review: (1) whether a fact-finder, in determining 
whether a defendant acted with utter disregard for 
human life, should give his conduct after a crime less 
weight 
than 
his 
conduct 
before 
and 
during 
the 
incident . . .  
 
We conclude that, in an utter disregard analysis, 
a defendant's conduct is not, as a matter of law, 
assigned more or less weight whether the conduct 
occurred before, during, or after the crime.  We hold 
that, when evaluating whether a defendant acted with 
utter disregard for human life, a fact-finder should 
consider any relevant evidence in regard to the 
totality of the circumstances. 
Majority op., ¶¶6, 7. 
¶71 I cannot join the conclusion stated in ¶7 of the 
majority opinion. 
¶72 The statute on second-degree reckless injury reads as 
follows: "Whoever recklessly causes great bodily harm to another 
human being is guilty of a Class F felony."  Wis. Stat. 
No.  2009AP956-CR.dtp 
2 
 
§ 940.23(2)(a).  A Class F felony is punishable by "a fine not 
to exceed $25,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 12 years and six 
months, or both."  Wis. Stat. § 939.50(3)(f). 
¶73 The elements of second-degree reckless injury are 
spelled out in Wisconsin Jury Instructions——Criminal 1252.  They 
are:  
(1) The defendant caused great bodily harm to (name of 
victim); and 
(2) The defendant caused great bodily harm by criminally 
reckless conduct. 
¶74 The instruction explains that "criminally reckless 
conduct" means: 
the conduct created a risk of death or great bodily 
harm to another person; and  
the 
risk 
of 
death 
or 
great 
bodily 
harm 
was 
unreasonable and substantial; and  
the 
defendant 
was aware that (his)(her) conduct 
created the unreasonable and substantial risk of death 
or great bodily harm. 
Wis JI——Criminal 1252. 
¶75 There is no suggestion that conduct "after the crime" 
is relevant to whether the defendant was "criminally reckless" 
or whether the defendant "caused" great bodily harm. 
¶76 The statute on first-degree reckless injury is exactly 
the same as the statute on second-degree reckless injury except 
that it adds an element, namely, "under circumstances which show 
utter disregard for human life."  Wis. Stat. § 940.23(1)(a).  
First-degree reckless injury is a Class D felony, meaning that 
it is punishable by "a fine not to exceed $100,000 or 
No.  2009AP956-CR.dtp 
3 
 
imprisonment not to exceed 25 years, or both."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.50(3)(d).  In other words, first-degree reckless injury 
doubles the period of potential imprisonment and quadruples the 
potential fine over second-degree reckless injury, if the state 
is able to prove a third element: that the great bodily harm 
occurred "under circumstances which show utter disregard for 
human life." 
¶77 To my mind, the clause "under circumstances which show 
utter disregard for human life" modifies the phrase "recklessly 
causes."  If this is correct, conduct "after the crime" cannot 
be an element of "the crime."  (Emphasis added.)  The crime is 
complete when the defendant "recklessly causes" great bodily 
harm. 
¶78 There might be a factual exception to this principle 
if the defendant fired multiple shots or inflicted multiple stab 
wounds or administered multiple blows to the victim, making it 
difficult to determine the effect and order of each individual 
wound, or if the injuries are considered together.  But where, 
as here, there was a single gunshot and no other conduct 
contributed to the great bodily harm, the crime is complete when 
the gun is fired and great bodily harm is caused as a result. 
¶79 The majority opinion holds that a defendant's conduct 
"after the crime" is to be evaluated the same as the defendant's 
conduct before and during the crime.  The logical implication of 
this holding is that a Class F felony can be increased to a 
Class D felony by a defendant's callous or abhorrent conduct 
"after the crime"; or that a defendant's Class D felony can be 
No.  2009AP956-CR.dtp 
4 
 
decreased to a Class F felony by a defendant's "after the crime" 
mitigating conduct and remorse. 
¶80 I can understand how a defendant's "after the crime" 
conduct could affect the defendant's sentence, but I cannot 
conceive of how a defendant's "after the crime" conduct could 
determine "the crime" itself. 
¶81 The state may desire to use words or conduct "after 
the crime" to reinforce its view of the "circumstances" before 
and during the crime, but, in my view, words and conduct "after 
the crime" cannot increase the gravity of the crime.  
¶82 A defendant may desire to mitigate "utter disregard" 
by his words and conduct after inflicting great bodily harm.  
However, such self-serving evidence should be unavailing. 
¶83 Yogi Berra famously remarked, "It's never over till 
it's over."  The majority opinion gives new meaning to Yogi's 
aphorism . . . at the expense of logic and order in the criminal 
law.   
¶84 The majority opinion——to be blunt——deprives us of any 
certainty as to when the crime of first-degree reckless injury 
is complete. 
¶85 Because 
the 
majority 
opinion 
is 
internally 
inconsistent, I respectfully concur in the result. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2009AP956-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶86 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  I join 
the majority in reaffirming our previous decisions holding that 
when evaluating whether a defendant's conduct reflects utter 
disregard for human life, the factfinder should examine the 
totality of the circumstances, including all relevant conduct 
before, during, and after a crime.  I disagree, however, with 
the majority's application of this rule of law to the jury 
instruction in the present case.   
¶87 I conclude that the supplemental instruction was 
ambiguous and that Burris has shown that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the instruction misled the jury about a critical 
element that distinguishes the charged crime from second-degree 
reckless injury.    
¶88 During deliberations in the present case, the jury 
posed the following question to the circuit court about the jury 
instructions:  "Regarding the element of utter disregard, all 
other facts and circumstances relating to the incident, do we 
consider facts and circumstances after the shooting?"  
¶89 The 
jury's 
confusion 
about 
interpreting 
the 
instruction and determining what evidence it might consider is 
apparent from the question asked the circuit court.   
¶90 Before the circuit court could answer this question, 
the jury posed another question in writing, again with regard to 
the element of utter disregard:  "Should we consider facts and 
circumstances 
after 
the 
shooting 
in 
determining 
utter 
disregard?"   
No.  2009AP956-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶91 On the basis of our past cases interpreting the "utter 
disregard for human life" element and the majority decision 
today, the correct answer to each of the jury's questions was 
"yes."  Instead of this simple affirmative response, the circuit 
court gave the jury a supplemental instruction, extracting an 
excerpt from State v. Jensen, 2000 WI 84, ¶32, 236 Wis. 2d 521, 
613 N.W.2d 170.  The following supplemental instruction is the 
basis for Burris's assertion that the jury instructions were 
confusing and misled the jury to apply the instruction in an 
unconstitutional manner: 
After-the-fact regard for human life does not negate 
"utter 
disregard" 
otherwise 
established 
by 
the 
circumstances before and during the crime.  It may be 
considered by the factfinder as a part of the total 
factual picture, but it does not operate to preclude a 
finding of utter disregard for human life.1   
¶92 The 
majority concludes that the circuit court's 
responding to the jury's question by giving the jury the Jensen 
supplemental instruction "was potentially ambiguous."2    
¶93 I conclude that the circuit court's response was 
ambiguous.  The Jensen supplemental instruction, taken out of 
the context of the Jensen case, is at odds with the "totality of 
the circumstances" approach reaffirmed by the majority today.  
The Jensen supplemental instruction language does not explain 
that the jury is to consider the totality of the circumstances, 
including Burris's actions before, during, and after the 
                                                 
1 State v. Jensen, 2000 WI 84, ¶32, 236 Wis. 2d 521, 613 
N.W.2d 170. 
2 Majority op., ¶62. 
No.  2009AP956-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
commission of the crime, in evaluating whether he acted with 
utter disregard for human life.     
¶94 I agree with the court of appeals that when "the 
Jensen language was read to the jury in answer to the question 
whether they could even consider after-the-fact actions, there 
is a reasonable likelihood that the jury interpreted the answer 
as suggesting that the trial court was implying that Burris's 
after-the-fact conduct was not important or compelling, that it 
should not be considered equally with other circumstances or 
that no amount of after-the-fact regard for human life could 
negate early behavior suggesting disregard for human life."  
State v. Burris, No. 2009AP956-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶32 
(Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2010) (emphasis in original).   
¶95 The majority opinion acknowledges that the Jensen 
language quoted in the supplemental jury instruction "was 
potentially ambiguous" when taken out of context.3  The majority 
advises the Criminal Jury Instruction Committee to refrain from 
quoting Jensen out of context.4  These statements are telling.  
If Jensen's language taken out of context does not have a 
reasonable likelihood of  misleading the jury, then why does the 
majority issue this advisory? 
¶96 The Jensen language was appropriate in the context of 
that case.  The Jensen court applied a "sufficiency of the 
evidence" standard of review, a highly deferential standard.5  In 
                                                 
3 Majority op., ¶62. 
4 Majority op., ¶64.   
5 Jensen, 236 Wis. 2d 521, ¶23. 
No.  2009AP956-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
context, the quoted language from Jensen rejected Jensen's 
argument that his showing of some regard for human life after 
the crime should have precluded the jury's finding that he acted 
with utter disregard for human life.6   
¶97 As the majority correctly points out, this language in 
Jensen should not be construed to mean that post-crime conduct 
is entitled to less weight than conduct before or during the 
crime.7 
¶98 Yet, when taken out of context, the Jensen language 
"was potentially ambiguous," making it reasonably likely that 
the 
jury 
applied 
the 
supplemental 
instruction 
in 
an 
unconstitutional manner.   
¶99 The Jensen supplemental instruction was misleading 
because it implied that if the jury were to find that Burris's 
conduct before and during the shooting showed utter disregard 
for human life, then a finding that he displayed some regard for 
human life after the shooting could not negate the finding of 
utter disregard. If the jury interpreted the instruction in this 
manner, then there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury was 
misled to believe that Burris's post-shooting conduct was either 
not entitled to weight or that it was entitled to less weight 
than his conduct before and during the shooting.  
¶100 Thus, there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury 
instruction misled the jury into believing that the State did 
not have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that 
                                                 
6 Jensen, 236 Wis. 2d 521, ¶¶30-32. 
7 Majority op., ¶34. 
No.  2009AP956-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
Burris exhibited utter disregard for human life under the 
totality of the circumstances, and instead only had the burden 
of proving Burris's actions before and during the commission of 
crime evinced utter disregard.         
¶101 I agree with the majority that we must view the 
supplemental instruction in light of the proceeding as a whole, 
rather than in isolation.8  The majority relies on the "extensive 
testimony" presented at trial regarding Burris's after-the-fact 
conduct, as well as the use of that conduct by counsel in 
closing arguments, to determine that Burris has not established 
a reasonable likelihood that the ambiguous instruction misled 
the jury into thinking it could not consider Burris's after-the-
fact conduct in determining the "utter disregard for human life" 
element of the crime.  Yet, as the majority states, after the 
"extensive testimony," the closing arguments, and the pattern 
jury instruction, "the jury was unsure whether it could consider 
after-the-fact conduct."9   
¶102 Although the supplemental instruction was but one part 
of the entire proceeding, it is clear that the supplemental 
instruction muddled the law regarding an element of central 
importance to Burris's defense, an element the jury focused on 
and was confused about.   
¶103 While the supplemental instruction may have been a 
correct statement of the law in the context of Jensen, I 
conclude that it was reasonably likely in the present case to 
                                                 
8 Majority op., ¶45 
9 Majority op., ¶62.   
No.  2009AP956-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
confuse the jurors and cause them to apply the instruction in an 
unconstitutional manner because the Jensen language was taken 
out of its proper context. 
¶104 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
No.  2009AP956-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1