Title: State of New Jersey v. Quddoos Farrad, a/k/a Ike Boxdale

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Coleman, J., writing for a unanimous Court. This appeal resolves the question of whether the crime of attempted robbery exists under the laws of this State and, if so, whether a vacated judgment of first-degree robbery can be molded into a conviction for a lesser included offense of attempted robbery. On January 25, 1994, detectives investigating several robberies of fast-food restaurants observed the defendant pacing in front of and peering into a Roy Rogers restaurant just prior to closing time. The officers watched the defendant step into the building and cover his face with a scarf and hat leaving only his eyes visible. Following defendant into the restaurant, the officers saw him approach an employee at the counter and place his hand in the right pocket of his coat. They grabbed defendant and removed a loaded revolver from his pocket. No employees of the restaurant testified at trial that they were verbally threatened or saw the gun prior to the actions taken by the officers. Defendant testified that he was set up by the officers and a friend who was also present at the restaurant, and did not intend to rob the restaurant. Based on defendant's testimony of a set up, the trial judge permitted predisposition evidence of defendant's prior convictions in New York for attempted robbery and robbery, and charged the jury on entrapment. The jury found defendant guilty of first-degree robbery. On appeal, the Appellate Division ruled that the elements of robbery were not proven and New Jersey did not recognize a crime of attempted robbery. The State's evidence was insufficient to prove robbery because defendant never spoke to the employees and never indicated that he possessed a gun. The court, being of the view that attempted robbery is not a cognizable offense in New Jersey, did not reach the issue of whether the vacated robbery conviction could be molded into a conviction for the lesser-included offense of attempted robbery. Finally, the court declined to mold a conviction for attempted theft, finding that the trial court erred in charging entrapment and admitting evidence of prior convictions. The court found that the prior-convictions evidence had the potential to influence the jury's decision on the charges of robbery and attempted theft. The court remanded for a new trial on attempted theft. The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for certification. HELD: Attempted robbery is a crime under New Jersey's Code of Criminal Justice, and a robbery conviction can be molded into a lesser-included inchoate crime of criminal attempt to commit robbery. 1. The crime of theft or attempted theft is a prerequisite for a robbery conviction. Theft is defined as the unlawful taking or exercise of unlawful control over the property of another with the purpose of depriving him thereof. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3. The crime of robbery, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1, occurs when, in the course of committing a theft, a person (1) inflicts bodily injury or uses force upon another; or (2) threatens another with or purposely puts him in fear of immediate bodily injury; or (3) commits or threatens immediately to commit any crime of the first or second degree. This provision of the Code further states that theft includes the attempt to commit theft. Criminal attempt to commit any crime, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1a, occurs where a person purposely does or omits to do anything which ... is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime. A defendant, then, can be convicted of robbery despite failure to complete the crime where a substantial step is purposefully taken to exercise unlawful control over another's property while threatening or purposely placing another in fear of immediate bodily injury. Here, the Appellate Division found that defendant never threatened anyone or placed anyone in fear of bodily injury, therefore the robbery conviction was not supported by the evidence. (pp. 9-13) 3. The Code did not change the common law that permitted conviction of a lesser-included offense not expressly charged in the indictment. The trial court possesses the power to mold a conviction into a lesser-included offense even if the court did not instruct the jury on that offense where the defendant had his day in court, the more serious offense includes all elements of the lesser-included offense, and guilt as to the lesser-included offense is implicit in the jury's verdict. (pp. 21-25) 4. In this case, retrial of the defendant on charges of attempted robbery is proper and will not offend double jeopardy considerations. No element that the State must prove to obtain a conviction for attempted robbery or attempted theft, both of which are lesser-included offenses of robbery, was rejected by the jury. Nor can defendant contend that he was unaware of a potential conviction for attempted robbery in light of its express mention in the criminal complaint, arguments during the probable cause hearing, and arguments made in the context of a pretrial motion. The trial court's error in permitting the use of other-crimes evidence mandates a retrial in light of the resulting prejudice to the defendant. As such, double jeopardy principles are not offended by ordering a retrial of the lesser-included offenses to robbery. (pp. 25-30) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED insofar as it precluded a retrial for attempted robbery, is otherwise AFFIRMED, and the matter is remanded for a new trial on attempted robbery and attempted theft. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES O'HERN, STEIN, LONG, VERNIERO, and LaVECCHIA join in JUSTICE COLEMAN's opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 43 September Term 1999 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. QUDDOOS FARRAD, a/k/a IKE BOXDALE, Defendant-Respondent. Argued May 1, 2000-- Decided June 22, 2000 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Jennifer L. Gottschalk, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Ms. Gottschalk and Robert E. Bonpietro, Deputy Attorney General, on the briefs). Jodi L. Ferguson, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Ivelisse Torres, Public Defender, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by COLEMAN, J. The critical issue in this appeal is whether the crime of attempted robbery exists under the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, N.J.S.A. 2C:1-1 to 104-9 (Code). A jury found defendant guilty of first-degree robbery. The Appellate Division vacated the robbery conviction, finding the State failed to establish either the use of force or the threat of immediate bodily injury, proof of which is an essential element of the crime of robbery. The panel declined to mold the verdict to enter a conviction for attempted robbery because it was of the view that such an offense is not cognizable under the Code. Even if attempted robbery had been recognized as an inchoate crime under the Code, the panel would not have molded the verdict to reflect a conviction for that offense because it found that the trial court had erred in permitting the State to inquire into the details of defendant's prior convictions. We conclude that attempted robbery is an offense contemplated by the Code and remand the matter for a retrial on attempted robbery. (1) Inflicts bodily injury or uses force upon another; or (2) Threatens another with or purposely puts him in fear of immediate bodily injury; or (3) Commits or threatens immediately to commit any crime of the first or second degree. An act shall be deemed to be included in the phrase in the course of committing a theft if it occurs in an attempt to commit theft or in immediate flight after the attempt or commission. In Carlos, supra, the court observed that the crime of robbery consists of the following elements: (1) theft or attempted theft; (2) intimidating or assaultive conduct consisting of (a) inflicting bodily injury upon another or (b) threatening another with or purposely putting him in fear of immediate bodily injury or (c) committing or threatening immediately to commit any crime of the first or second degree [or (d) using force upon another person]; (3) the intimidating or assaultive conduct must have occurred during the theft or attempted theft or in immediate flight after the theft or attempted theft, and (4) defendant must have acted purposely. Theft is defined, generally, as the unlawful taking or exercise of unlawful control over property of another with purpose to deprive him thereof. . . . N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3. Attempted theft is defined by combining the foregoing definition of theft with N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1a. It is an abortive effort to perpetrate a theft. [Carlos, supra, 187 N.J. Super. at 412 (footnote and internal citation omitted)]. A prerequisite for a robbery conviction is a theft or attempted theft. See N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3a. One can be found guilty of an attempt to commit a particular crime if acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission of the crime, he: (3) Purposely does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as a reasonable person would believe them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime. [N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1a]. Attempt can be easily defined. The difficulty lies in distinguishing between mere preparation and the substantial step requirement of an attempt. As noted in the 1971 New Jersey Penal Code Commentary, Vol. II, at 117, New Jersey Penal Code, Volume II: Commentary, Final Report of the New Jersey Criminal Law Revision Commission 117 (1971) (hereinafter Commentary), the Model Penal Code's approach to this problem is to set forth two requirements which in addition to the requisite criminal purpose, distinguish attempt from preparation: (1) The act must be 'a substantial step in the course of conduct' planned to accomplish the criminal result, and (2) the act must be 'strongly corroborative' of criminal purpose in order for it to constitute such a substantial step. Thus, the substantial step requirement in the attempt statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1a(3), is satisfied if a defendant acts in a way that is strongly corroborative of the 'firmness of his purpose' to carry out the crime. State v. Fornino, 223 N.J. Super. 531, 538 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 570, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 859, 109 S. Ct. 152, 102 L. Ed. 2d 123 (1988) (quoting Commentary, supra, at 117-18); N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1b. Based on the foregoing principles, a defendant can be convicted of robbery, even if the theft is unsuccessful, if he or she (1) purposely takes a substantial step (2) to exercise unlawful control over the property of another (3) while threatening another with, or purposely placing another in fear of, immediate bodily injury. See State v. Sein, 124 N.J. 209, 215 (1991). In the present case, the Appellate Division ruled that the State could not convict defendant of robbery because the aggravating circumstances were not present, that is, defendant never threatened anyone or placed anyone in fear of bodily injury. The State now seeks to retry defendant for attempted robbery. Under the State's theory, defendant committed attempted robbery because all of the elements of such an offense were established, namely that in the course of (1) purposely taking a substantial step (2) to exercise unlawful control over the property of another, defendant (3) purposely took a substantial step (4) to threaten another with, or place another in fear of, immediate bodily injury. [Model Penal Code & Commentaries, Part II, supra, 222.1 at 114-15 (emphasis added)]. Thus, we are persuaded that the Model Penal Code commentators, and the drafters of our Code, contemplated an attempted robbery charge under the facts of this case. At least one jurisdiction with a similar robbery statute has charged a defendant with attempted robbery under similar circumstances. In Commonwealth v. Lauer, 18 Pa. D. & C.3d 157 (Pa. Comm. Pl. 1981), aff'd, 474 A.2d 655 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984), defendant was arrested after being observed standing outside of a bank with a gun under a long raincoat, while wearing a ski-mask, on a warm, sunny day. Defendant was convicted of attempted robbery under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 3701, a robbery statute also modeled after the MPC. Lauer, supra, 18 Pa. D. & C. 3d at 160; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 3701 historical and statutory notes; see also Commonwealth v. Fulton, 462 A.2d 265, 267 n.5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (disagreeing with contention that there is no such crime as attempted robbery under Pennsylvania law ). No reported decision in this State has directly addressed the issue presented. The panel below cites two cases for the proposition that there is no crime of attempted robbery under the Code: State v. Schenck, supra, and State v. Carlos, supra. In Schenck, defendant entered a bank and presented a note to the teller reading Give me your money. I have a gun. Supra, 186 N.J. Super. at 237. Defendant was apprehended, charged and convicted of entering with intent to steal, and a previous version of robbery, N.J.S.A. 2A:141-1. The Resentencing Panel in Schenck ruled that the crime of entering [a] public place with intent to steal had been eliminated by the crime of burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2. Id. at 238. The State argued that the offense equivalent to entering a public place with intent to steal under the Code was not burglary, but rather attempted robbery. The court disagreed, ruling that because robbery is an aggravated form of theft, one who attempts to commit a theft (with the aggravating circumstances for a robbery being present) is guilty _ if at all _ of robbery. In other words he cannot be charged with attempt (N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1) to attempt to commit a theft (N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)). The State's argument that entering the bank with intent to commit robbery is the equivalent of an attempt to rob lacks rational underpinning. [Id. at 240]. Schenck observed that if a defendant attempts to commit a theft and the aggravating circumstances are present, then defendant is guilty of robbery, not attempted robbery. The present case involves a slightly different scenario. Here, the State argues that the aggravating circumstances were not present, but defendant took substantial steps toward the use of force or a threat of bodily injury. Therefore, Schenck is not instructive. The common law that permitted a conviction for a lesser included offense not specifically charged in an indictment was not changed by the Code. Our Code, which was modeled after the Model Penal Code, adopted the proposed Section 2C:1-7 as the lesser-included offense doctrine and codified it at N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8. That statute permits prosecutions for multiple offenses based on the same conduct, but it precludes a conviction for more than one offense, if [o]ne offense is included in the other, as defined in subsection d. of this section. N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8a(1). Pertinent to the present case, a lesser-included offense may consist of an attempt . . . to commit the offense charged or to commit an offense otherwise included therein. N.J.S.A. 2C:1 8d(2). Consequently, when the robbery statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1, the statutory rules for construing the Code, N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8, and the meaning of criminal attempt are read together, we are persuaded that the Legislature intended the inchoate crime of attempted robbery to constitute a lesser-included offense of robbery. The failure to complete the crime of robbery becomes part of the proofs essential to establish an attempt to commit robbery. The fact that a trial court must wait until after a finding of guilt has been made before deciding whether multiple convictions are appropriate, N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8a(4), supports our conclusion that the Code contemplates that verdicts may be molded. Thus, a finding of first-degree robbery by a jury can be molded to a lesser-included inchoate crime of criminal attempt to commit robbery under the Code based on N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1a and N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8d(2). Accord State v. Washington, 60 N.J. 170, 173 (1972) (reducing first-degree murder to second-degree murder); State v. Mann, 244 N.J. Super. 622, 628-29 (App. Div. 1990) (reducing third-degree theft to a fourth-degree crime and discussing inclusion of attempt as a lesser-included offense of the completed crime); State v. Alexander, 215 N.J. Super. 522, 531 (App. Div. 1987) (discussing lesser-included offenses). The authority to mold the verdict is also based on the trial court's power to enter a judgment of conviction for a lesser included offense where the jury verdict necessarily constitutes a finding that all the elements of the lesser included offense have been established and where no prejudice to the defendant results. State v. Greenberg, 154 N.J. Super. 564, 567-68 (App. Div. 1977), certif. denied, 75 N.J. 612 (1978). A guilty verdict may be molded to convict on a lesser-included offense even if the jury was not instructed on that offense if (1) defendant has been given his day in court, (2) all the elements of the lesser included offense are contained in the more serious offense and (3) defendant's guilt of the lesser included offense is implicit in, and part of, the jury verdict. State v. Hauser, 147 N.J. Super. 221, 228 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 75 N.J. 27 (1977). Based on that formal complaint, a probable cause hearing was conducted pursuant to Rule 3:4-3 on May 6, 1994. During that hearing, counsel for defendant argued, among other things, that there was no probable cause that Mr. Farrad was attempting to commit an armed robbery. The prosecution, on the other hand, argued that the proofs established probable cause to believe that defendant attempted robbery while armed because the substantial step requirement of N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 had been satisfied. At the conclusion of the probable cause hearing, the trial court found there was probable cause that defendant possessed a handgun without a permit and that he possessed the gun for an unlawful purpose. However, the court found that probable cause did not exist to believe that defendant attempted a robbery. The latter finding has no legal impact because the purpose of the preliminary hearing was solely to determine whether to bind defendant over to await the action of the Grand Jury. R. 3:4 3(a); State v. Smith, 32 N.J. 501, 537 (1960). In July 1994, a Bergen County Grand Jury indicted defendant for first-degree robbery and four other charges. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the robbery count of the indictment because there was no evidence that Rose, the Roy Rogers cashier, was placed in fear and because another judge had found no probable cause to believe that defendant had committed an attempted robbery. The trial court denied the pretrial motion, concluding that evidence presented to the Grand Jury established grounds for a prima facie conviction for attempted robbery pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8d(2), N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1. Because the court was of the view that an indictment should not simply charge attempted robbery, it did not dismiss or amend the robbery count. NO. A-43 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. QUDDOOS FARRAD, a/k/a IKE BOXDALE, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED June 22, 2000 Chief Justice Poritz