Title: Barnett v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JAMES BARNETT, 
 
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 596, 2006 
 
Defendant Below, 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court of  
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware in and for 
              v. 
 
§ 
Sussex County 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§ 
Cr. I.D. No. 0311017379 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted: April 1, 2007 
 
 
Decided: 
May 7, 2007 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 7th day of May 2007, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties and 
the record in this case, it appears to the Court that: 
1. 
James Barnett (“Barnett”), defendant-below appellant, appeals from the 
denial by the Superior Court of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  Barnett 
contends that the trial court abused its discretion by finding that he failed to 
establish a “fair and just reason” to set aside his guilty plea.  Specifically, Barnett 
contends that:  (a) his plea was procedurally defective; (b) he had inadequate legal 
counsel; (c) he always asserted his innocence; and (d) granting his motion would 
not prejudice the State or unduly burden the Court.  Because Barnett failed to 
 
2
establish a “fair and just” reason to withdraw his guilty plea and the Superior Court 
correctly denied Barnett’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, we affirm.   
 
2. 
On November 23, 2003, Barnett and his co-defendant, Sylvester Smith 
(“Smith”), drove to Barnett’s ex-girlfriend’s apartment, where Smith shot and 
killed the victim, Nicholas Whaley (“Whaley”).  Barnett’s former girlfriend, 
Jasmin Bridell (“Bridell”), later told police that on the evening of the incident, 
Barnett called her apartment several times because he was upset that Whaley was 
in her home.  According to Bridell, Barnett threatened to come to her residence.  
Thereafter, Barnett and Smith drove together from Philadelphia to Bridell’s 
apartment in Delaware, and then entered the apartment.  At that point, Barnett 
picked up Jamier (Barnett’s and Bridell’s son) and moved him out of the way.  
Smith then shot Whaley three times.    
 
3. 
Based upon a theory of accomplice liability, the State indicted Barnett 
on murder in the first degree and other related charges.1  The State also indicated 
its intent to seek the death penalty.  Rather than face a capital murder trial, Barnett 
pled guilty to the reduced charges of murder in the second degree and a weapons 
offense in exchange for testifying at his co-defendant’s trial.  Thirteen months 
later, Barnett filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  Because Barnett 
                                                 
1 Barnett was also charged with possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, 
conspiracy in the first degree, burglary in the second degree and endangering the welfare of a 
child.   
 
 
3
claimed inadequate representation by counsel who represented him from his 
indictment until his plea agreement, the Superior Court appointed another attorney 
to represent him in post-conviction proceedings.  After an evidentiary hearing on 
Barnett’s motion, the Superior Court found that Barnett had failed to establish a 
fair or just reason to withdraw his plea and denied his motion.  Barnett has 
appealed from that order. 
 
4. 
“A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is addressed to the sound 
discretion of the trial court, and a denial of the motion is reviewable on appeal only 
for an abuse of discretion.”2  Where a defendant moves to withdraw his plea before 
sentencing, Superior Court Criminal Rule 32(d) permits that withdrawal for “any 
fair and just reason.”3  On such a motion, the defendant bears the burden of proof,4 
which burden is substantial.5   
                                                 
2 Lane v. State, 2006 WL 3703683, at *1 (Del. Dec. 18, 2006) citing Blackwell v. State, 736 A.2d 
971, 972 (Del. 1999). 
 
3 Superior Court Criminal Rule 32(d) provides:   
 
If a motion for withdrawal of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is made before 
imposition or suspension of sentence or disposition without entry of a judgment of 
conviction, the court may permit withdrawal of the plea upon a showing by the 
defendant of any fair and just reason. At any later time, a plea may be set aside 
only by motion under Rule 61. 
 
4 Hall v. State, 1995 WL 715630, at *2 (Del. Oct. 27, 1995) citing State v. Insley, 141 A.2d 619 
(Del. 1958). 
 
5 United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 2003).  
 
 
4
 
5. 
In determining whether a defendant has established a “fair and just 
reason” to withdraw his plea, the trial court must consider the following factors 
under Patterson v. State:6  (i) whether there was a procedural defect in taking the 
plea; (ii) whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily consented to the plea 
agreement; (iii) whether the defendant has an adequate basis to assert his legal 
innocence; (iv) whether the defendant had adequate legal representation throughout 
the proceedings; and (v) whether granting the motion will prejudice the State or 
unduly inconvenience the trial court.   
 
6. 
Although Barnett argues that he maintained his innocence throughout 
the proceedings, he did not provide the trial court with a legal basis to support his 
claim.  Instead, Barnett claims that he never actually pled guilty because when 
asked by the trial judge whether he was guilty of the offenses, Barnett replied, 
“no.”  But, immediately thereafter, the trial court carefully explained the theory of 
accomplice liability and how under that theory Barnett could be found guilty even 
if he did not actually “pull the trigger.”  When asked if he was thus guilty of the 
charges, Barnett responded, “yes.”  Barnett’s initial response—that he was not 
guilty—does not, therefore, provide a legal basis to establish his innocence.7  
                                                 
6 Patterson v. State, 684 A.2d 1234, 1238 (Del. 1996).   
 
7 See generally, State v. Friend, 1994 WL 234120 (Del. Super. May 12, 1994), aff’d by, Friend v. 
State, 1996 WL 526005 (Del. Aug. 16, 1996). 
 
5
 
7. 
Barnett contends that he did not have effective legal counsel throughout 
his proceedings, because his attorneys did not sufficiently communicate with him 
or adequately prepare for his upcoming capital murder trial.  Specifically, Barnett 
claims that as of two weeks before his trial, his attorneys:  (a) had not hired a 
mitigation specialist despite having received Superior Court approval to do so, (b) 
did not have a psychologist or psychiatrist evaluate him, (c) did not correspond 
with him and, a week before trial, did not visit him to discuss his case.  Moreover, 
Barnett contends that because he believed his attorneys were unprepared for his 
trial, he felt compelled to enter his guilty plea, and therefore, his plea was not 
knowing and voluntary. 8     
 
8. 
Our review of Barnett’s claims is “subject to a strong presumption that 
counsel’s conduct was professionally reasonable.”9  To establish that his attorneys 
were ineffective and, thereby, a “fair and just reason” to warrant withdrawal of a 
plea, Barnett must show that (a) counsels’ actions fell below an objective standard 
                                                 
8  However, during his plea colloquy Barnett stated, under oath, that he had no complaints as to 
how his attorneys represented him, and moreover, he stated that he was not forced to enter the 
plea.  App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A-31-39.  Barnett has failed to present any clear and 
convincing evidence as to why he should not be bound by those answers.   
 
9 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997), quoting Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 
(Del. 1988).  
 
 
6
of reasonableness and (b) there exists a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsels’ unprofessional errors, Barnett would have chosen to proceed to trial.10     
 
9. 
Although Barnett’s argument correctly states the law, it lacks merit for 
two reasons.  First, most of Barnett’s claims are moot because he entered his guilty 
pleas two weeks before his trial, and as noted by the Superior Court, trial 
preparation is an ongoing process.  Second, the trial judge did not find Barnett to 
be credible regarding the question of what work was being done by his attorneys.11  
Where a trial judge sits as a trier of fact, he or she is the “sole judge of credibility” 
and therefore, “this Court will not disturb conclusions of fact made by the Trial 
Judge when supported by competent evidence.”12 
 
10. Barnett argues that his plea was procedurally defective because he did 
not completely understand the consequences of his plea as Superior Court Criminal 
Rule 11 requires.  Compliance with Rule 11 means that “the plea is voluntarily 
offered by the defendant, himself, with a complete understanding by him of the 
nature of the charge and the consequences of his plea, and that the trial judge has 
so determined.” 13  
                                                 
10 MacDonald v. State, 778 A.2d 1064, 1075 (Del. 2001) quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 
(1985).  
 
11 State v. Barnett, 2006 WL 3308211, at *4 (Del. Super. Oct. 12, 2006). 
 
12 Sanchez v. State, 1993 WL 61707, at *3 (Del. Feb. 25, 1993). 
 
13 Brown v. State, 250 A.2d 503, 504 (Del. 1969). 
 
7
 
11. Barnett contends that his plea was procedurally defective because he 
believed (incorrectly) that he could void the agreement by not fulfilling its terms; 
i.e., by not testifying against his co-defendant, Smith.14  To support his claim, 
Barnett points to paragraph four of the March 4, 2005 letter from the State to his 
counsel.  That letter, which was incorporated into his plea agreement, reads, “If the 
Defendant breaches any part of the agreement, as set forth above and/or in the 
Superior Court Plea Agreement form, the plea agreement will be null and void, 
with the State reserving the right to prosecute the Defendant on the original 
charges.”   
 
12. The problem with Barnett’s argument is that it ignores the fact that the 
trial court addressed this precise issue in the plea colloquy:   
There is only one thing that I am going to comment on, and that is I 
am accepting this plea as knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently 
offered.  What that now means is that on Paragraph 4, if the State feels 
that there is a breach of the agreement, okay, then the State comes to 
the Court, and the Court makes a determination if there is a breach, 
and if that occurs, then this could be wiped out and start anew with 
prosecution.  It is not now the State’s sole decision.  They would have 
to plead it, prove it.  It is now my decision.15   
                                                 
14 During the evidentiary hearing on Barnett’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Barnett 
testified that he never intended to testify against Smith.  See App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at 
A-66.  The State argues that Barnett’s actions amount to a fraud on the State and the Court.  
Because Barnett’s plea was not otherwise procedurally defective, we need not consider whether 
Barnett acted fraudulently when entering into his plea agreement.  Inexplicably, the record does 
not disclose whether Barnett did (or did not) testify against Smith.   
 
15 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A-39. 
 
8
Moreover, immediately thereafter, the trial court asked Barnett if he had any 
questions, to which Barnett responded, “no.”  Earlier in the proceeding the trial 
court went to great lengths to make sure Barnett understood the finality of his plea 
agreement and Barnett answered that he understood.16  The trial judge’s colloquy 
was careful and detailed.  Absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, 
Barnett is bound by the answers he provided under oath during that plea 
colloquy.17  Having provided no such evidence,18 Barnett has failed to establish 
any procedural defect in the taking of his guilty plea.  
                                                 
16 
The Court:  Mr. Barnett, I use a phrase sometimes, and I don’t mean to use it 
lightly.  I use it because I think it brings to mind the importance of what we are 
doing here today.  When people get married, a lot of times the preacher will say 
speak now or forever hold your peace.  Have you heard that at weddings? 
The Defendant:  Yes. 
The Court:  Well, I say that to you. If you know of any reason why I shouldn’t 
accept this plea today and basically finish this matter as set for sentencing, which 
means there won’t be a trial, okay, speak now or forever hold your peace.   
The Defendant:  I have nothing to say.   
 
17 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 631 (Del. 1997).   
 
18 Barnett also claims that his incorrect belief that he could unilaterally void the agreement was 
reinforced by his trial attorney.  To support that claim, Barnett cites the following testimony 
from his evidentiary hearing:  
 
A: (Barnett’s Trial Attorney):  He went back and forth on whether or not he ever 
intended to fulfill his obligation. 
Q:  Sorry.  When I say “fulfill his obligation,” I mean testify against Sylvester 
Smith?” 
A:  That is what I assumed you meant. 
Q:  Thank you. 
A:  He would tell me, “Well, I am,” and he did.  “So I am going to take the plea, 
but I am not going to testify.”  I said, “Well, you understand that it’s not – you 
don’t get to pick and choose.  You either take the plea and you fulfill it, or you 
don’t take the plea.”  “Okay, I understand.”  And then we would go ahead, and we 
took the plea. 
 
9
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Justice  
                                                                                                                                                             
 
Afterwards, “Well, I am not going to fulfill my obligation to testify so.”  
“Well, you understand that if you do that, then the State is going to withdraw your 
plea offer.  You are going to be back at square one and look at the possibilities the 
same as they were before I advised you to accept the plea, and that is not a good 
position to be in.”  “Well, then I will go ahead and do what I have to do.” 
 
 
In our view, that ambiguous testimony does little to establish precisely what it was 
exactly that Barnett did not understand or how any alleged misunderstanding made his plea 
procedurally defective.  Moreover, Barnett’s answers during his plea colloquy indicate that any 
confusion on his part was resolved by the trial court’s explanations.