Title: Burroughs v. Delaware

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
TYRESE BURROUGHS, 
§ 
 
§ No. 144, 2022 
 
Defendant Below, 
§  
 
Appellant, 
§ Court Below: Superior Court 
 
§ of the State of Delaware  
 
v. 
§  
 
§ Cr. ID No. 2011011781 (N) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§           
              
§ 
Appellee. 
§ 
_______________________ 
§ 
IN THE MATTER OF THE  
§ 
PETITION OF TYRESE 
§ No. 130, 2022 
BURROUGHS FOR WRIT 
§ 
OF PROHIBITION 
§  
 
 
Submitted: June 28, 2023 
Decided: 
August 30, 2023 
 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, GRIFFITHS, Justices 
and NEWELL, Chief Judge,1 constituting the Court en banc. 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED.  
 
ELLIOT M. MARGULES, Esquire, OFFICE OF DEFENSE SERVICES, 
Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellant Tyrese Burroughs. 
 
ANDREW J. VELLA, Esquire, DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellee State of Delaware.   
 
 
 
1 Sitting by designation under Del. Const. art. IV, § 12 and Supreme Court Rules 2(a) and 4(a) to 
complete the quorum. 
2 
 
 
TRAYNOR, Justice: 
 
It is reasonable to conclude that a previously convicted drug dealer, who is 
prohibited by law from possessing firearms but who is again arrested for drug 
dealing, this time while in possession of a loaded firearm, poses a risk of danger to 
the community.  Even so, the past-proven and currently putative gun-toting drug 
dealer says that, as a matter of federal and state constitutional law, he should have 
been released into the community while his new charges were pending free of any 
financial conditions to his release; money bail, according to the accused, is, to the 
extent it is designed to protect public safety, prohibited.  We disagree. 
 
In arriving at our decision, we recognize that a bail system that allows a 
dangerous, but affluent, defendant to gain pretrial release while a non-dangerous 
defendant without bail resources is detained pending trial is a system in need of 
repair.  At present, our bail framework expressly discourages the latter scenario, but 
recent legislative efforts to foreclose the former have come up short. 
 
In this case, we are presented with neither of the contrasting scenarios 
described above.  Instead, we are asked to decide whether, in light of our state 
constitutional right to bail, it is permissible to attach unaffordable financial 
conditions to a dangerous defendant’s pretrial release on bail and, if it is, what 
procedural protections must be observed when such bail is considered.  We subject 
the first question to strict scrutiny and answer in the affirmative.  As to the second, 
3 
 
we hold that the determination to set cash bail must be supported by clear and 
convincing evidence that (i) the defendant is a flight risk or poses a substantial risk 
to the community, victims, witnesses, or other persons, and (ii) nonmonetary 
conditions of release will not alleviate that risk.  When such evidence is adduced, 
the setting of cash bail—even at an amount that the defendant may not be able to 
afford—does not offend the “sufficient sureties” clause found in Article I, § 12 of 
the Delaware Constitution.  And because these answers are consistent with, and yield 
the same result as, the Superior Court’s decision on appeal, we affirm. 
I 
A 
 
In 2019, Tyrese Burroughs was convicted of felony drug dealing.  As one 
consequence of that conviction, Burroughs was, from then on, prohibited from 
possessing a firearm or ammunition.  According to an affidavit of probable cause, 
on November 25, 2020, the police caught Burroughs engaging in a hand-to-hand 
drug transaction while in possession of a “Smith and Wesson Walther .380 firearm 
loaded with seven live rounds.”2  Burroughs initially tried to flee but was quickly 
apprehended and searched by Wilmington police.  The gun was discovered in his 
waistband along with fifty-eight bags of heroin and small amounts of crack-cocaine 
and marijuana.  Burroughs was arrested and charged with six felonies, one 
 
2 App. to Opening Br. at A27, A43. 
4 
 
misdemeanor, and one civil violation:  possession of a firearm during the 
commission of a felony, possession of a firearm by a person prohibited, possession 
of ammunition by a person prohibited, two counts of drug dealing, carrying a 
concealed deadly weapon, resisting arrest, and possession of marijuana.  Together, 
these charges carried a minimum-mandatory of eight years and a statutory maximum 
of 77 years in prison. 
B 
 
Following his arrest, Burroughs was brought before a Justice of the Peace 
Court Magistrate who set cash bail—his firearm charges carried a presumption of 
cash bail under Delaware’s bail statute—at $110,501; the top end of his SENTAC 
bail-guidelines range.3  Burroughs did not post bail.  Burroughs’s preliminary 
hearing in the Court of Common Pleas (via Zoom) was scheduled for December 14, 
2021, but because the arresting officer was on medical leave, the hearing was 
continued for one week.  The Court of Common Pleas did, however, entertain 
 
3  The General Assembly established the Delaware Sentencing Accountability Commission 
(“SENTAC”) in 1984.  SENTAC’s “overall purpose . . . [is] to establish a system which 
emphasizes accountability of the offender to the criminal justice system and accountability of the 
criminal justice system to the public.”  11 Del. C. § 6580(b).  SENTAC comprises four members 
of the judiciary:  the Attorney General or the Attorney General’s designee; the Chief Defender of 
the Chief Defender’s designee; the Commissioner of Corrections or the Commissioner of 
Corrections’ designee; and four other members at-large.  11 Del. C. § 6580 (a)(1)-(5).  The bail 
guidelines referred to above appear in the SENTAC “Benchbook,” which is updated annually and 
available at https://cjc.delaware.gov/sentac.  According to the Benchbook, however, “THE BAIL 
GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS [published in the Benchbook] ARE THOSE OF 
THE 
JUSTICE 
OF 
THE 
PEACE 
COURTS 
AND 
NOT 
THE 
SENTENCING 
ACCOUNTABILITY COMMISSION.  THEY ARE PROVIDED [in the Benchbook] AS A 
CONVENIENCE FOR USERS.”  Benchbook at 142.  (all capital letters in original). 
5 
 
Burroughs’s request that the court lower his bail.  He did not request that his bond 
be released from all financial terms, only that it not be secured by cash only.  The 
State opposed this request, but the court granted it in part, modifying Burroughs’s 
bail to $20,000 to be secured by cash only and $14,501 subject to a secured bond.   
 
A week later, the Court of Common Pleas conducted a preliminary hearing.  
After the arresting officer described what appeared to him to be a “hand-to-hand 
drug transaction”4 between Burroughs and an unidentified female, his approach to 
Burroughs, Burroughs’s flight and eventual apprehension, and the discovery of the 
loaded firearm and illicit drugs on Burroughs’s person, the court found probable 
cause to believe that Burroughs committed the charged offenses and Burroughs was 
bound over for further proceedings in the Superior Court.  The court, having “heard 
the actual facts,”5 acted sua sponte to “review and reset bail,”6 reinstating the original 
$110,501 cash bail.  Burroughs was unable to make bail and was thus detained 
through the duration of his proceedings. 
C 
 
After his case was transferred to the Superior Court, Burroughs filed a 
“Motion for Modification of Bail,” in which he requested, “[d]ue to his inability to 
 
4 App. to Opening Br. at A57. 
5 Id. at A58. 
6 Id. 
6 
 
post bail, . . . that his bail be converted to an unsecured or lower secured amount.”7  
Burroughs’s motion invoked, among other things, Article I, § 12 of the Delaware 
Constitution, which provides that “[a]ll prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient 
sureties, except for capital offenses . . . .”  A Commissioner of the Superior Court 
held a hearing on Burroughs’s motion, during which the State argued his financial 
conditions of release should be maintained because, in its view, there was strong 
evidence supporting his conviction and ample facts—given Burroughs’s disregard 
of his person-prohibited status—demonstrating that he posed a serious safety risk to 
the public.  The State also argued that this was Burroughs’s “third set of drug dealing 
charges,”8 although only one of the prior sets had resulted in conviction.  The State 
observed that the seriousness of Burroughs’s criminal behavior appeared to be 
“escalating” over time and emphasized the presence of a loaded firearm when 
Burroughs was arrested.  All these factors, for the State, weighed in favor of cash 
bail at the high end of the SENTAC guidelines range.  The Commissioner, in 
apparent agreement with the State, denied Burroughs’s motion, announcing that 
“[t]he bail shall remain as previously set.”9   
 
7 Id. at A63, A68. 
8 Id. at A369. 
9 App. to Opening Br. at A1, D.I. 4.   
7 
 
 
Burroughs was not deterred; the following day he filed a “Motion for Non-
Financial Conditions of Release” in which he argued, in what he has since 
characterized as an as-applied challenge to the amended bail statute,10 that   
(1) Delaware’s Bail practices violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment by disproportionately detaining indigent 
pretrial defendants[;] . . . (2) [Burroughs’s] Fourteenth Amendment 
Substantive Due Process Rights are violated by those same practices in 
that, without the constitutionally requisite justification, he has been 
entirely deprived of his fundamental right of liberty; and (3) Procedural 
Due Process requirements necessary to prevent erroneous deprivation 
of liberty are not provided under Delaware rules.11 
 
A Superior Court Commissioner rejected these arguments, holding that “the 
State ha[d] sufficiently demonstrated that [Burroughs] poses a flight risk and a 
danger to the community if released, and after considering all less restrictive 
alternatives ([i.e.,] non-monetary conditions of release) . . . that monetary bail is 
appropriate [given] the State’s goals of ensuring [he] appears at his future hearings 
and safety of the community.”12  The Commissioner thus concluded that Burroughs 
“h[ad] not established that his right to equal protection was violated, nor that he was 
 
10 See Opening Br. at 4 (“Burroughs has not argued the governing statutes are facially 
unconstitutional.”). 
11 App. to Opening Br. at A73.  According to the Commissioner’s September 7, 2021 Order, when 
the court denied Burroughs’s Motion for Modification of Bail on January 5, 2021, “it was agreed 
that the constitutional arguments would be preserved for future briefing.”  Opening Br., Ex. A at 
5 n.12 (“Comm’r Order”).  We note that neither the transcript of the January 5 hearing nor the 
Superior Court docket discloses the source of this agreement.  Moreover, the “constitutional 
arguments” raised in the “Motion for Non-Financial Conditions for Release” differ markedly from 
the constitutional issues flagged in Burroughs’s Motion for Modification of Bail. 
12 Comm’r Order at 52–53.   
8 
 
deprived of his right to substantive and procedural due process.”13  The 
Commissioner also rejected Burroughs’s argument under the “sufficient sureties” 
clause of the Delaware Constitution. 
D 
 
Burroughs filed a “Motion for Review of Commissioner’s Order,” arguing 
that the Commissioner erred by failing to test his motion under the strict-scrutiny 
standard of review on the grounds that he either fell into a suspect class by virtue of 
his indigency or that his pretrial detention deprived him of his fundamental liberty 
right under substantive-due-process principles.  If the Commissioner had properly 
conducted a strict-scrutiny review, Burroughs contended, then the State would have 
had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that “no other non-monetary 
conditions of release [could] accomplish” its “compelling interest in preventing 
crime.”14  Burroughs questioned the State’s ability to meet this burden. 
 
Burroughs also argued that the Commissioner’s order undermined his 
procedural-due-process rights and that his cash bail violated Article I, § 12 of the 
Delaware Constitution, which provides, by Burroughs’s lights, “a right to bail [that] 
is violated when bail is set at an amount deliberately calculated to incarcerate.”15 
 
13 Id. at 53. 
14 App. to Opening Br. at A332–33. 
15 Id. at A327. 
9 
 
 
The Superior Court Judge reviewing the Commissioner’s order rejected each 
of Burroughs’s contentions.  Starting with his equal-protection claim, the court noted 
that “poverty, standing alone, is not a suspect classification” meriting heightened 
scrutiny.16  The court thus tested Burroughs’s claim under the rational-basis standard 
of review, determining that “Delaware’s bail statute, as applied to [Burroughs], [was 
valid as] rationally related to ensuring public safety[.]”17   
 
Addressing his substantive-due-process claim, the Judge, “[f]or purposes of 
this case alone, . . . assume[d] [that] the attachment of an unaffordable bail that 
results in detention implicates a defendant’s fundamental right of liberty, triggering 
a strict scrutiny standard of review of Delaware’s bail statute.”18  Relying on the 
United States Supreme Court’s pronouncement in United States v. Salerno,19 the 
court found the State’s “interest in preventing crime by arrestees [] ‘both legitimate 
and compelling.’”20  The court concluded, moreover, that “the State presented clear 
and convincing evidence . . . that no less restrictive alternative other than cash bail 
assigned to [Burroughs] would satisfy the government’s compelling interest in 
protecting the public.”21  Or, to put it another way, “[n]o other means exist[ed] that 
would be less restrictive to ensure [that Burroughs] d[id] not possess another firearm 
 
16 State v. Burroughs, 2022 WL 1115769, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 13, 2022). 
17 Id. at *6.  
18 Id. 
19 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
20 2022 WL 1115769, at *7 (quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 749). 
21 Id. 
10 
 
while in public other than setting a high monetary bail.”22  In a footnote, the court 
expanded on this reasoning:   
The Defendant already was prohibited by law from possessing a 
firearm, but nonetheless was arrested with one allegedly in his 
possession.  Non-monetary conditions alone therefore were unlikely to 
deter him from doing so again.  In contrast, the threat of forfeiting a 
high cash bail was the only tool available to the Commissioner to 
achieve the State’s compelling interest in preventing such conduct.23 
 
The court also rejected Burroughs’s procedural-due-process claim after 
finding that he “was represented by competent counsel, his proceedings took place 
in open court before a neutral decision-maker, and he was provided notice of the 
charges.”24  And because Burroughs’s bail fell within the SENTAC guidelines and 
otherwise met the requirements of the bail statute, the court found that it did not 
violate the requirement of Article I, § 12 of the Delaware Constitution that 
defendants “shall be bailable upon sufficient sureties.”25 
E 
 
Immediately following the release of the Superior Court’s opinion—that is, 
on the same day—Burroughs requested a writ of prohibition from this Court 
directing that his “bail be modified to an amount without financial conditions” on 
the grounds that the Superior Court was “constitutionally prohibited from imposing 
 
22 Id.  
23 Id. at *7 n.69. 
24 Id. at *8. 
25 Id. 
11 
 
bail as currently ordered.”26  One day later, however, Burroughs pleaded guilty to 
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony and illegal possession of 
a controlled substance and was sentenced on that day to three years in prison, 
effective as of the date of his arrest.  Burroughs promptly filed a direct appeal 
focused primarily, like his writ of prohibition, on the constitutionality of his 
unaffordable cash bail.   
 
Neither party alerted this Court to Burroughs’s guilty plea and sentence and 
the effect they might have on the pending appeal and petition for writ of prohibition.  
We nevertheless requested supplemental briefs addressing whether Burroughs’s 
guilty plea mooted his petition for a writ of prohibition.  After receipt of the 
supplemental briefs and the parties’ briefs in Burroughs’s direct appeal, we 
consolidated Burroughs’s appeal and petition for oral argument and decision. 
II 
 
As he did in the Superior Court, Burroughs argues on appeal that his pretrial 
detention—the product of a cash bail he could not afford—violated his rights under 
the Equal Protection Clause, substantive and procedural due process, and Article I, 
§ 12 of the Delaware Constitution.  “In deciding legal or constitutional questions, 
we apply a de novo standard of review.”27  But we defer to the trial court’s factual 
 
26 Complaint in Proceedings for Extraordinary Writ, In the Matter of the Petition of Tyrese 
Burroughs for a Writ of Prohibition (Del. Apr. 13, 2022) (No. 130, 2022). 
27 Wheeler v. State, 296 A.3d 363, 372  (Del. 2023). 
12 
 
determinations “if they are based upon competent evidence and are not clearly 
erroneous.”28 
III 
A 
 
Our analysis starts with the threshold issue of mootness.  It is undisputed that 
Burroughs’s guilty plea and sentence resulted in incarceration that exceeded, but 
gave credit for, the span of his pretrial detention.  Typically, even though a dispute 
might have been justiciable when litigation is commenced, the action will be 
dismissed as moot if that controversy ceases to exist.29  Here, Burroughs concedes 
that “[t]he underlying controversies—which stem from the legality of [his] pretrial 
detention and the corresponding procedures—ceased on April 14, 2022[,] when [he] 
was convicted via guilty plea.”30 
 
There are two generally recognized exceptions to the mootness doctrine:  
“situations that are capable of repetition but evade review or matters of public 
importance.”31  Burroughs argues that his claims regarding the constitutionality of 
Delaware’s cash-bail system meet both exceptions; his is a situation capable of 
 
28 Burrell v. State, 953 A.2d 957, 960 (Del. 2008). 
29 Gen. Motors Corp. v. New Castle Cnty., 701 A.2d 819, 823 (Del. 1997). 
30 Petitioner’s Supplemental Submission Regarding Whether Petitioner’s Guilty Plea Moots the 
Petition for Writ of Prohibition, In the Matter of the Petition of Tyrese Burroughs for a Writ of 
Prohibition (Del. July 7, 2022) (No. 130, 2022). 
31 Gen. Motors Corp., 701 A.2d at 823 n.5. 
13 
 
repeating yet evading review and the issues he raises are a matter of public 
importance.32  We agree. 
 
As the Supreme Court remarked in Gerstein v. Pugh,33 
[p]retrial detention is by nature temporary, and it is most unlikely that 
any given individual could have his constitutional claim decided on 
appeal before he is either released or convicted.  The individual could 
nonetheless suffer repeated deprivations, and it is certain that other 
persons similarly situated will be detained under the allegedly 
unconstitutional procedures.  The claim, in short, is one that is distinctly 
‘capable of repetition, yet evading review.’34 
 
To state the obvious, the constitutionality of our bail system is of great 
importance to the administration of criminal justice.  Recent legislative efforts—
some successful and others that have failed—attest to this fact.  But the speed with 
which a typical criminal case moves from arrest to disposition and the unavailability 
of appellate review of interlocutory orders in criminal cases combine to deprive this 
Court of the chance to weigh in on this important issue.  Thus, even though the 
claims Burroughs presents in this appeal are moot as to him, we will yet consider 
their merits.  
 
32 Although this Court noted in Radulski for Taylor v. Delaware State Hosp., 541 A.2d 562, 566 
(Del. 1988) that “[t]he public-interest exception to the mootness doctrine is usually applied to 
issues which are ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review’[,]” the Court has also acknowledged 
a standalone public interest exception.  See Gen. Motors Corp., 701 A.2d at 823 n.5 (recognizing 
the “two . . . exceptions to the mootness doctrine [a]s situations that are capable of review or 
matters of public importance.”); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 80 A.3d 628, 633 (Del. 
2013) (same); McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 211 (Del. 1987) (holding that “where the 
question is of public importance, and its impact on the law is real, this Court has recognized an 
exception to the [mootness doctrine].”). 
33 420 U.S. 103 (1975). 
34 Id. at 110 n.11. 
14 
 
B 
 
Our task is complicated by Burroughs’s indecision as to whether he is 
mounting a facial challenge to Delaware’s bail system or a challenge to the system 
as it was applied to him.  To be sure, at oral argument in this Court, Burroughs 
emphasized that his was an as-applied challenge.  But that statement is at odds with 
the positions he took in the Superior Court and the categorical claims found in his 
briefs in this Court. 
 
In the Superior Court, for example, Burroughs’s equal-protection claim was a 
broad-based challenge to “money bail based pretrial confinement.”35  His 
substantive-due-process claim in the Superior Court, for another example, similarly 
takes aim at money bail as it is applied generally, and not specifically as it affected 
him.36  Indeed, the expert he tendered in support of this challenge had nothing to say 
about Burroughs but, instead, opined as to the inefficacy of secured money bonds 
and the adverse consequences of pretrial detention for all detainees.37  Likewise, 
Burroughs’s procedural-due-process claim in the Superior Court did not focus on 
the process Burroughs was afforded; rather, it was that “Delaware does not provide 
sufficient procedural safeguards prior to issuing unaffordable bail order[s].”38 
 
35 App. to Opening Br. at A74. 
36 Id. at A77. 
37 See id. at A91. 
38 Id. 
15 
 
 
With some minor exceptions, Burroughs’s focus on appeal also challenges the 
use of unaffordable money bail as a general matter and argues that, if it is to be used, 
the defendant must be afforded certain procedural protections, including a “clear and 
convincing evidence” standard.  Thus, despite Burroughs’s attempt to fix our 
attention exclusively on how the bail statute was applied to him, we see his challenge 
as more expansive than that.  This, and our inclination to address Burroughs’s 
arguments because of their broader ramifications even though they are moot as to 
him, lead us to frame our analysis in broader terms.39  With these considerations in 
mind, we address the following questions: 
1. 
Does the Delaware bail system violate the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution? 
 
2. 
Does the Delaware bail system violate substantive-due-process 
principles derived from the Fourteenth Amendment? 
 
3. 
Was Burroughs afforded procedural due process in connection 
with the setting and review of the conditions of pretrial release? 
 
 
39 Decisions of this Court support our decision to treat Burroughs’s claim as a facial challenge to 
the amended bail statute despite his insistence that he is levying an as-applied attack.  See 
Delaware Bd. of Med. Licensure & Discipline v. Grossinger, 224 A.3d 939, 956 (Del. 2020) (“We 
note preliminarily that, although Dr. Grossinger frames his argument as an as-applied challenge to 
the vagueness of the Regulations, his challenge is actually a facial one.”); Hazout v. Tsang Mun 
Ting, 134 A.3d 274, 287 (Del. 2016) (“As-applied challenges are well-understood, and striking a 
provision by judicial fiat is something that should result from a facial challenge to the validity of 
a statute.”).  See also John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 194 (2010) (“The label is not what 
matters.  The important point is that plaintiffs’ claim and the relief that would follow . . . reach 
beyond the particular circumstances of these plaintiffs.  They must therefore satisfy our standards 
for a facial challenge to the extent of that reach.”). 
16 
 
4. 
Did Burroughs’s bail run afoul of Article I, §12 of the Delaware 
Constitution? 
IV 
A 
 
Because we read Burroughs’s appeal as making a facial challenge to the 
amended bail statute, we begin our analysis with a general overview of Delaware’s 
bail system, including the genesis of recent revisions to the statute.   
To understand this system, one must consult an amalgam of interconnected 
text in the Delaware Constitution, Chapter 21 of Title 11 of the Delaware Code, the 
bail guidelines published by SENTAC, and the Special Rule of Criminal Procedure 
for Pretrial Release promulgated by this Court.  This endeavor starts with Article I, 
§ 12 of the Delaware Constitution, which provides that:   
All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital 
offenses when the proof is positive or the presumption great; and when 
persons are confined on accusation for such offenses their friends and 
counsel may at proper seasons have access to them.40 
This provision has been interpreted as conferring on defendants in Delaware 
a general right to bail,41 which precludes state judges from ordering preventive 
 
40 A similar provision appears in Delaware’s two previous constitutions—the Constitutions of 
1792 and 1831.  Neither the Declaration of Rights and Fundamental Rules of the Delaware State 
enacted on September 11, 1776, nor the Constitution of the State of Delaware adopted nine days 
later contains such a provision. 
41 See In re Steigler, 250 A.2d 379, 382 (Del. 1969) (“Article I, [§] 12 . . . grants a constitutional 
right to bail in all offenses, including capital offenses upon the stated condition, and does not limit 
the right in terms of indictment.”). 
17 
 
detention without bail for individuals not charged with a capital offense.42  As a 
result, courts’ only option for incapacitating dangerous non-capital defendants 
pending trial was through the imposition of unaffordable cash bail,43 which, used 
liberally, meant that “dangerous defendants with wealth [were] able to obtain [their] 
release even if they pose[d] a risk of harm to the public or a specific person” while 
defendants without access to similar resources were not.44 
In 2018, in an effort to alleviate this inequity, the General Assembly adopted 
significant revisions to Chapter 21 aimed at “modernizing the pretrial process” and 
reducing the “unnecessar[y] det[ention] [of] individuals who lack funds for their 
release.”45  To that end, the amended bail statute includes a presumption in favor of 
non-financial conditions of release where “it is reasonably likely that the defendant 
will appear as is required before or after the conviction of the crime charged and 
 
42 See State v. Miller, 2003 WL 231612, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 31, 2003) (finding it 
“inconceivable that the provisions of section 12 of article 1 of the Delaware Constitution would 
permit the legislature to mandate pretrial detention without bail” in any non-capital cases). 
43 See State v. Perkins, 2004 WL 1172894, at *1–2 (Del. Super. Ct. May 21, 2004) (denying 
defendant’s motion to modify $1,115,000 cash bail and noting the commissioner’s “recogni[tion] 
that . . . Delaware’s statutory bail scheme specifically embraces the notion of ‘preventive 
detention,’ i.e., pretrial detention for the sake of preventing the accused from posing a danger to 
the community.”).    
44 
Del. 
S.B. 
221 
syn., 
149th 
Gen. 
Assem. 
(2018), 
available 
at 
https://legis.delaware.gov/BillDetail?LegislationId=26736. 
45 
Del. 
H.B. 
204 
syn., 
149th 
Gen. 
Assem. 
(2018), 
available 
at 
https://legis.delaware.gov/BillDetail?LegislationId=25863. 
18 
 
there is no substantial risk to the safety of the community in permitting such 
unsecured release.”46   
This presumption is reversed, however, for defendants charged with one of 
the signal offenses enumerated in § 2107 of the amended statute.47  Signal offenses 
include any class A felony, rape, robbery, felony domestic violence offenses, serious 
weapons offenses and the like.  When dealing with a signal offense, courts are 
presumed to “set conditions of release bond guaranteed by financial terms in an 
amount within or above the guidelines published by [SENTAC] for that offense and 
secured by cash only[,]”48 with the goal of “requir[ing] such bail as reasonably will 
assure the reappearance of the defendant, compliance with the conditions set forth 
in the bond, and the safety of the community.”49  To assist in this inquiry, the 
amended statute instructs the bail-setter to consider 
the nature and circumstances of the crime charged, whether a firearm 
was used or possessed, the possibility of statutory mandatory 
imprisonment, whether the crime was committed against a victim with 
intent to hinder prosecution, the family ties of the defendant, the 
 
46 11 Del. C. § 2105(a).  See also 11 Del. C. § 2101 (“Each court shall utilize a system of pretrial 
release imposing reasonable nonmonetary conditions of release when those conditions adequately 
provide a reasonable assurance of the appearance of the defendant at court proceedings, the 
protection of the community, victims, witnesses and any other person, and to maintain the integrity 
of the judicial process.”). 
47 Although the signal offenses were not incorporated into Chapter 21 until June 30, 2021 (see Del. 
S.S. 
1 
for 
S.B. 
7, 
151st 
Gen. 
Assem. 
(2021), 
available 
at 
https://legis.delaware.gov/BillDetail/78868), they were applicable to Burroughs through the 
Interim Special Rule of Criminal Procedure for Pretrial Release promulgated by this Court to guide 
the implementation of the amended bail statute (later replaced by the Special Rule of Criminal 
Procedure cited in this opinion). 
48 11 Del. C. § 2107(c). 
49 11 Del. C. § 2107(a). 
19 
 
defendant’s employment, financial resources, character and mental 
condition, the length of residence in the community, record of 
convictions, habitual offender eligibility, custody status at time of 
offense, history of amenability to lesser sanctions, history of breach of 
release, record of appearances at court proceedings or of flight to avoid 
prosecution or failure to appear at court proceedings.50 
To further reduce unnecessary pretrial detentions, even in the face of a signal 
offense, the amended statute requires courts to conduct a review of bail conditions 
for any defendant “who remains detained after 72 hours from [his] initial 
presentment because he is unable to meet conditions of pretrial release,” with such 
review occurring “within 10 days from the date of detention.”51  Moreover, under 
the Special Rule of Criminal Procedure for Pretrial Release, which guides the 
implementation of Chapter 21, judges are required to consider a defendant’s 
financial circumstances when imposing cash bail52 and set forth findings on the 
record as to why “a condition[] of release bond guaranteed by financial terms is or 
is not necessary . . . .”53   
But the 2018 amendments to the bail statute did not eliminate the problem 
identified in the synopsis of one of the operative bills—that wealthy but dangerous 
defendants could still gain pretrial release, while similarly dangerous defendants 
 
50 11 Del. C. § 2105(b). 
51 11 Del. C. § 2110(a). 
52 Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 5.2(m). 
53 Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 5.2(k). 
20 
 
without bail resources could not.  This prompted an initiative to amend the Delaware 
Constitution. 
In the summer of 2019, an Act was introduced in the General Assembly, 
proposing that Article I, § 12 be amended to allow the preventive detention without 
bail of persons accused of certain felonies when “[t]he proof is positive and the 
presumption great” that the accused had committed the felony.  The proposed 
amendment provided, moreover, that, to support preventive detention without bail, 
the proof must be “clear and convincing that no condition or combination of 
conditions other than detention will reasonably assure the person’s appearance in 
court when required, or protect the safety of any other persons or the community, or 
prevent the person from obstructing or attempting to obstruct justice.”54   
Both Houses of the 151st General Assembly approved the proposed 
amendment to Article I, § 12 in 2022.  But amending the Delaware Constitution is a 
“‘two-legged’ process requiring the approval of two-thirds of the members of both 
Houses by two successive General Assemblies[.]”55  And because the 152nd General 
 
54 
Del. 
S.B. 
151., 
150th 
Gen. 
Assem. 
(2019), 
available 
at 
https://legis.delaware.gov/BillDetail?LegislationId=47897.  According to the General Assembly’s 
website, this version of the amendment was “[i]ntroduced on 7/31/19” and “[a]wait[ed] 
consideration in Committee.  An identical bill—Senate Bill No. 11—was introduced in the 151st 
General Assembly in April 2021, passed by the Senate in May 2022, and passed by the House of 
Representatives 
in 
June 
2022. 
 
S.B. 
11, 
151st 
Gen. 
Assem., 
available 
at 
https://legis.delaware.gov/BillDetail?LegislationId=68641. 
55 Albence v. Higgin, 295 A.3d 1065, 1077 & n.66 (Del. 2022) (citing Del. Const. art. XVI, § 1 
and noting that there are actually two procedures for amending our constitution.  It has been 
observed that the second procedure which authorizes the submission of proposals to revise the 
21 
 
Assembly, which commenced in 2023 with a second regular session to occur in 
2024,56 has not yet acted on the second leg of the amendment, Article I, § 12 and its 
bail requirement for non-capital offenses stands. 
B 
 
Against this backdrop, we proceed to Burroughs’s arguments regarding the 
unconstitutionality of Delaware’s bail system, starting with his claim that the 
statute’s embrace of unaffordable cash bail violates the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment by unjustly discriminating against defendants with 
insufficient bail resources. 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause provides that “[n]o 
State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.”57  In practice this language guarantees “a right to be free from invidious 
discrimination in statutory classifications and other governmental activity.”58  When 
asked to decide whether a government action deprives a class of citizens of the rights 
afforded to them by the Constitution, a court must first determine whether the 
 
constitution to a constitutional convention, “has fallen out of practice . . . [and] is probably 
unconstitutional under the United States Constitution.”).  See Randy J. Holland, The Delaware 
State Constitution 286 (2d ed. 2017). 
56 See 29 Del. C. § 701. 
57 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
58 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980). 
22 
 
challenged act discriminates against a suspect class.59  If so, then strict scrutiny is 
applied to test the act’s validity.60  If not, then rational-basis review applies.61   
 
The rational-basis standard is highly deferential—it clothes a statute in a 
“strong presumption of validity,” requiring plaintiffs to prove the absence of “a 
rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate 
governmental purpose.”62  Put differently, statutory “classification[s] [reviewed 
under the rational basis test] must be upheld against [an] equal protection challenge 
if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis 
for the classification.”63  Strict scrutiny, on the other hand, requires the state to 
demonstrate a compelling, rather than merely legitimate, governmental purpose.64  
Strict scrutiny requires a “daunting two-step examination,” which the governmental 
action will survive only where the state demonstrates that the classification is used 
to “further compelling governmental interests,” and “narrowly tailored—meaning 
necessary—to achieve that interest.”65  
 
59 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973) (“We must decide, first, 
whether the Texas system of financing public education operates to the disadvantage of some 
suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the 
Constitution, thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny.”). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1993). 
63 Id. at 320. 
64 Id. 
65 Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 143 S. Ct. 2141, 
2162 (2023) (citing Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 311–12 (2013)); see also Doe 
v. Wilmington Hous. Auth., 88 A.3d 654, 666 (Del. 2014).   
23 
 
 
The list of inherently suspect classifications includes race, color, religion, and 
ancestry.66  “Poverty, standing alone[,] is not a suspect classification.”67  Burroughs 
concedes this point but maintains that his claim requires heightened scrutiny because 
of the general rule that “a state cannot condition a person’s liberty on a monetary 
payment she cannot afford unless no alternative measure can meet the state’s 
needs.”68  In invoking this rule, Burroughs relies on the United States Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Griffin v. Illinois69 and Bearden v. Georgia.70   
 
But both Bearden and Griffin dealt with post-conviction issues, not pretrial 
detention.  In Griffin, the Supreme Court held that indigent defendants were deprived 
of their right under state law to adequate appellate review when they were denied 
access to trial transcripts that non-indigent defendants were able to purchase.71  The 
denial of appellate review based on indigency potentially deprived defendants of the 
“correct adjudication of guilt or innocence.”72  In Bearden, after the defendant 
pleaded guilty to burglary and theft, the state considered “the goals of punishment 
 
66 Turnbull v. Fink, 668 A.2d 1370, 1379–80 (Del. 1995). 
67 Harris, 448 U.S. at 323. 
68 Opening Br. at 24. 
69 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
70 461 U.S. 660 (1983). 
71 See Griffin, 351 U.S. at 16–18 (“Plainly the ability to pay costs in advance bears no rational 
relationship to a defendant’s guilt or innocence and could not be used as an excuse to deprive a 
defendant of a fair trial. . . . There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny 
the poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which effectively denies the poor 
an adequate appellate review accorded to all who have money enough to pay the costs in 
advance.”). 
72 Id. at 18–19. 
24 
 
and deterrence” and sentenced him under Georgia’s First Offender’s Act to four 
years’ probation on the condition that he pay a $500 fine and $250 in restitution.73  
Bearden paid $200 but was unable to pay the $550 outstanding balance and his 
probation was revoked.74  This revocation “turned a fine into a prison sentence,”75 
based on no other apparent basis than Bearden’s indigency.76   
Here we deal with the regulatory matter of pretrial detention, not the 
adjudication of guilt or post-conviction sentencing.77  Bail is used to detain a 
defendant under limited circumstances, not in order to punish, but to “adequately 
provide a reasonable assurance of the appearance of the defendant at court 
proceedings, the protection of the community, victims, witnesses and any other 
person, and to maintain the integrity of the judicial process.”78   
Neither Bearden nor Griffin held that indigency is a suspect classification or 
applied strict scrutiny to reach their respective holdings.79  We thus see no reason to 
 
73 Bearden, 461 U.S. at 662, 671–72.   
74 Id. at 663.   
75 Id. at 674. 
76 See id. at 672 (“If the probationer could not pay despite sufficient bona fide efforts to acquire 
the resources to do so, the court must consider alternate measures of punishment other than 
imprisonment.  Only if alternate measures are not adequate to meet the State’s interests in 
punishment and deterrence may the court imprison a probationer who has made sufficient bona 
fide efforts to pay.”). 
77 See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746 (discussing that pretrial detention under the Bail Reform Act is 
“regulatory, not penal[.]”).  
78 11 Del. C. § 2101. 
79 For Griffin, see supra note 71.  For Bearden, see Bearden, 461 U.S. at 666–67 (“Whether 
analyzed in terms of equal protection or due process, the issue cannot be resolved by resort to easy 
slogans or pigeonhole analysis, but rather requires a careful inquiry into such factors as ‘the nature 
of the individual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, the rationality of the connection 
25 
 
depart from the widely accepted principle that “financial need alone [does not] 
identif[y] a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis.”80 
 
Accordingly, because Burroughs cannot demonstrate that Delaware’s bail 
statute targets a suspect class, his claim is assessed under the deferential 
rational-basis standard of review.  And it is clear to us that the statute meets this 
standard:  by imposing a cash-based barrier to the pretrial release of dangerous 
defendants and those at risk of fleeing the state, Delaware’s bail scheme is rationally 
related to the government’s legitimate—and compelling81—interest in ensuring 
public safety and reappearance at judicial proceedings.  
C 
 
But the analysis thus far only forecloses one route to strict scrutiny.  A second 
route—not yet travelled—is through substantive due process. 
 
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that “[n]o person shall . . . be 
 
between legislative means and purpose, [and] the existence of alternative means for effectuating 
the purpose . . .’”) (quoting Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 260 (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
80 Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977). 
81 See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 739, 749–50 (“[t]here is no doubt that preventing danger to the 
community is a legitimate regulatory goal” and the “[t]he government’s interest in preventing 
crime by arrestees is both legitimate and compelling.”).  Salerno further explains that the 
government’s already legitimate and compelling interest “is heightened when the Government 
musters convincing proof that the arrestee, already indicted or held to answer for a serious crime, 
presents a demonstrable danger to the community.  Under these narrow circumstances, society’s 
interest in crime prevention is at its greatest.”  
26 
 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”82  Substantive due 
process prevents the government from “engaging in conduct that ‘shocks the 
conscience,’ or interferes with rights ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”83  
Consequently, if a state regulation affects a fundamental right—such as life, liberty, 
or property—courts will subject that statute to exacting strict-scrutiny review.84   
 
Burroughs argues that pretrial liberty is a fundamental right whose deprivation 
triggers substantive-due-process protections and strict-scrutiny testing.  To pass this 
test, Burroughs contends, the State must show “clear and convincing evidence that 
money bail is necessary and the least restrictive means of addressing a compelling 
interest.”85  Two assumptions are implicit in Burroughs’s conception of the strict-
scrutiny standard as he applies it to the facts of his case:  (1) that pretrial detention 
via unaffordable bail infringes on a fundamental right; and (2) that Delaware’s bail 
statute must apply the evidentiary standard of clear and convincing evidence to pass 
constitutional muster.  In our view, Burroughs’s argument on this point conflates the 
constitutionality of our bail system and, to the extent that the system passes 
constitutional muster, the procedural protections that are required to ensure that the 
 
82 Id. at 746.  See Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 815 (Del. 2000) (discussing the incorporation 
doctrine by which “the United States Supreme Court began to hold that selected provisions of the 
federal Bill of Rights also afforded protection against state action by virtue of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
83 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746 (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) and Palko v. 
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325–26 (1937)). 
84 See supra note 82. 
85 Opening Br. at 8 n.6. 
27 
 
system is fairly administered.  We disentangle these issues, addressing first 
Burroughs’s substantive-due-process challenge to the bail system and then his 
procedural-due-process concerns as they relate to him individually.   
i 
 
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Salerno, upheld the constitutionality 
of a federal statute permitting the pretrial detention of a defendant upon the 
government’s showing “by clear and convincing evidence after an adversary hearing 
that no release conditions ‘will reasonably assure . . . the safety of any other person 
and the community.’”86  In reaching its decision, the court recognized the 
“fundamental nature” of an “individual’s strong interest in liberty[,]”87 weighed it 
against the government’s “legitimate and compelling” interest in “preventing crimes 
by arrestees[,]”88 and concluded that, in situations where “an arrestee presents an 
identified and articulable threat to an[other] [] or the community,”89 the individual’s 
liberty interest could be “subordinated to the greater needs of society.”90   
 
Although jurisdictions are admittedly split as to whether Salerno considered 
pretrial detention as infringing on a fundamental right,91 we believe that where, as 
 
86 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 741. 
87 Id. at 750. 
88 Id. at 749. 
89 Id. at 751. 
90 Id. at 750–51. 
91 See Comm’r Order at 23–29 (discussing the jurisdictional split between courts interpreting 
Salerno). 
28 
 
here, a trial court has the discretion to issue monetary conditions of release secured 
by cash in an amount above a defendant’s ability to pay after considering his 
financial circumstances, such bail operates as a de facto detention implicating the 
defendant’s fundamental liberty right.  The point was expressed well by the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Brangan v. Commonwealth.  The Brangan court 
concluded that “where a judge sets bail in an amount so far beyond a defendant’s 
ability to pay that it is likely to result in long-term pretrial detention, it is the 
functional equivalent of an order for pretrial detention, and the judge’s decision must 
be evaluated in light of the same due process requirements applicable to such a 
deprivation of liberty.”92   
 
We thus agree with Burroughs’s position that principles of substantive due 
process require Delaware’s bail statute to satisfy strict-scrutiny review.  And we 
believe that the statute, by being narrowly tailored to advancing the State’s 
compelling interests in protecting community safety and reducing risk of flight,93 
meets this exacting standard.  Our revised system of bail requires judges to make 
individualized assessments regarding a defendant’s right to financial or non-
financial conditions of release; mandates that the application of cash bail be 
supported, in writing, by articulable facts; and commands the judge to consider the 
 
92 Brangan v. Commonwealth, 80 N.E.3d 949, 965 (Mass. 2017). 
93 See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 754–55 (identifying both risk of flight and community safety as 
compelling interests). 
29 
 
defendant’s risk profile and individual financial circumstances.  Any defendant 
detained pretrial is, moreover, entitled to a prompt review of his conditions of bail.  
These requirements, along with the “clear and convincing evidence” standard we 
discuss next ensure that cash bail is employed in a manner that is narrowly tailored 
to advancing the State’s compelling interests.   
ii 
 
But just because the bail statute satisfies substantive-due-process concerns 
does not mean that it passes muster under procedural-due-process principles, which 
provide that “even when government action depriving a person of life, liberty, or 
property survives substantive due process scrutiny, it must still be implemented in a 
fair manner.”94  For Delaware’s amended bail statute to be fair, Burroughs contends, 
the State must, when seeking the imposition of unaffordable cash bail, present clear 
and convincing evidence of a defendant’s dangerousness or risk of flight.  The 
protections built into the statute are not, in other words, sufficient on their own to 
meet demands of procedural due process without the adoption of the “clear and 
convincing evidence” standard.  We agree. 
 
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Addington v. Texas95 supports 
this view.  There, the court considered the standard of proof required by the 
 
94 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). 
95 441 U.S. 418 (1979). 
30 
 
Fourteenth Amendment “to commit an individual involuntarily for an indefinite 
period to a state mental hospital[,]”96 concluding that because “civil commitment for 
any purpose constitute[d] a significant deprivation of liberty[,]”97 “due process 
require[d] the state to justify confinement by proof more substantial than a mere 
preponderance of the evidence.”98  The court also recognized, however, that 
requiring the stringent criminal standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt” for civil 
commitments could undermine the state’s legitimate interest in “protect[ing] the 
community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill.”99   
 
So, “[h]aving concluded that the preponderance standard f[ell] short of 
meeting the demands of due process and that the reasonable-doubt standard [wa]s 
not required,” the court looked for “a middle level of burden of proof[,]”100 
ultimately finding that, though the exact formulation was a matter of state law, a 
“burden equal to or greater than the ‘clear and convincing’ standard . . . [wa]s 
required to meet due process guarantees.”101  In like manner, the setting of cash bail, 
which risks defendants’ pretrial liberty, should be supported by clear and convincing 
evidence.102  In adopting this standard, we recognize the practical difficulty the State 
 
96 Id. at 419–20. 
97 Id. at 425. 
98 Id. at 427. 
99 Id. at 426, 430. 
100 Id. at 431. 
101 Id. at 433. 
102 This standard of proof should not be confused with the rules governing the admissibility of 
evidence at bail hearings.  Just as the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply at detention hearings, 
31 
 
and the Justice of the Peace Court will encounter when bail is set immediately 
following arrest at a defendant’s initial presentment before a committing magistrate.  
In light of the exigencies surrounding that appearance, it would be unreasonable, in 
our view, to require the State to present clear and convincing evidence at that stage.  
We therefore hold that this evidentiary standard will be triggered at the review 
required under 11 Del. C. § 2110(a).103  Before that, whether the conditions of a 
release bond are to be guaranteed by financial terms, including cash-only security, 
“shall be in the discretion of the court subject to . . . chapter [21 of Title 11 of the 
Delaware Code]”104 and the Special Rules of Criminal Procedure for Pretrial 
Release. 
 
In this case, the State met its burden.  Burroughs is a person prohibited from 
possessing a firearm who was caught in public selling drugs while in possession of 
a loaded gun.  And, in addition to disregarding a government order, his charge was 
yet another in a series of escalating criminal acts.  In short, we find no fault in the 
 
see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B), the Delaware Rules of Evidence do not apply to . . . [m]iscellaneous 
proceedings such as . . . [a] [d]etention hearing in criminal hearings.  D.R.E. 1101 (b)(4); see also 
Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure (5th ed. 2009) § 12.1(d) (“Information received at a 
bail hearing need not conform to the rules pertaining to the admissibility of evidence at trial.  
However, this should not be taken to mean that information must be accepted by the court without 
regard to its reliability.  Thus, whether hearsay is admissible in a bail hearing must ultimately be 
determined on a case by case basis by asking whether in the particular circumstances it is the kind 
of evidence on which responsible persons are accustomed to rely in serious affairs.”)  
103 See supra p. 19. 
104 11 Del. C. § 2104(e)(1). 
32 
 
Superior Court’s finding that the evidence was clear and convincing and that 
Burroughs represented an articulable threat to public safety. 
 
We disagree, however, with the Superior Court’s finding that Burroughs’s bail 
was justifiable on the ground that “the threat of forfeiting a high cash bail was the 
only tool available to the Commissioner to achieve the State’s compelling [safety] 
interest[.]”105  Section 2113 of the amended bail statute provides that, 
“[n]otwithstanding any law to the contrary, no property, cash, surety or other assets 
shall be forfeited except upon failure of the accused to appear as required by any 
court.”106  Because an individual does not risk forfeiture of his cash bail upon the 
commission of a crime while awaiting trial, the imposition of financial conditions of 
release cannot be supported on that ground.  Put differently, cash bail set to ensure 
law-abiding conduct while on pretrial release is not narrowly tailored to the State’s 
public-safety interest because that cash is not risked by subsequent criminal acts; 
absent the risk of forfeiture, monetary conditions of release provide no deterrent to 
a defendant’s unlawful conduct while awaiting trial. 
D 
 
Up to this point, we have hewed to Burroughs’s concession at oral argument 
that the use of money bail to preventively detain individuals is permissible under the 
 
105 See supra note 23. 
106 11 Del. C. § 2113(b). 
33 
 
federal constitution so long as its imposition is supported by clear and convincing 
evidence.107  But Burroughs also argues that Article I, § 12 of the Delaware 
Constitution prohibits the use of unaffordable money bail to address public-safety 
concerns.  Even though the use of high cash bail is valid under the federal 
constitution, it is, according to Burroughs, invalid under our state constitution, at 
least when used to advance the government’s safety interest rather than to reduce a 
defendant’s flight risk.108 
 
As mentioned earlier, Article I, § 12 provides that, except for capital offenses, 
“[a]ll prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties . . . .”109  Burroughs interprets 
this language to mean that “bail is an unconditional right in . . . [non-capital] 
cases.”110  Defendants cannot, in other words, be intentionally detained pending trial 
unless they have been charged with a capital offense.  It follows, the argument goes, 
that using high cash bail to increase the likelihood of pretrial detention for non-
capital crimes is an invalid workaround of this section.   
 
We agree with Burroughs that Article 1, § 12 extends to defendants the right 
to pretrial release via bail when not charged with a capital offense.  The amended 
 
107 Oral Argument at 4:57–6:29, Burroughs v. State IMO a Writ of Prohibition, Nos. 144, 2022 
and 
130, 
2022 
(Del. 
argued 
June 
28, 
2023) 
https://livestream.com/accounts/5969852/events/10842489/videos/236685661/player. 
108 Burroughs distinguishes bail that serves the government’s public-safety interest from bail that 
deters a defendant from fleeing the state, noting that, under 11 Del. C. § 2113(b), defendants who 
fail to appear at court risk forfeiting their bail money.  See supra note 107 at 6:29–7:45. 
109 See supra note 40. 
110 Opening Br. at 33–34 (quoting Steigler, 250 A.2d at 383). 
34 
 
bail statute codifies this concept through §§ 2102(2) (defining “bail” as “the pretrial 
release of a defendant from custody upon the terms and conditions specified by an 
order of the court”) and 2104(a) (providing that “[a]ny person who is arrested and 
charged with any crime other than a capital crime shall be released upon execution 
of” a court-ordered conditions of release bond).111  We are not persuaded, however, 
that this right is violated—as Burroughs claims that it is—when a defendant is 
detained awaiting trial because he could not afford to post his bail. 
 
To put a finer point on it, the Delaware Constitution, when stating that all 
prisoners are bailable by sufficient sureties, guarantees every non-capital defendant 
the right to receive some amount of bail considered sufficient by the court to permit 
his pretrial release.  It does not follow that that amount must be adjusted downward 
until proportionate with the defendant’s ability to pay; if it did, all criminal 
defendants not charged with a capital offense would be guaranteed their freedom 
before trial regardless of the danger they pose to society or the severity of their 
alleged offenses. 
 
It bears emphasis here that Burroughs’s argument on this point is not that cash 
cannot be used to achieve the purposes of bail but only that, should cash or other 
financial conditions be attached to a defendant’s bail, the amount of cash must not 
 
111 11 Del. C. §§ 2102(2), 2104(a). 
35 
 
be unaffordable.112  Burroughs does not, however, explain how he teases the notion 
of affordability from Article I, § 12’s text.  His argument, moreover, fails to account 
for Article I, § 12’s designation of the type of “sureties” that will secure a 
defendant’s pretrial release:  “sufficient sureties.”  “Sufficient,” as we see it in this 
context, “was meant to be a qualification that provide[s] a measure of discretion for 
judges to set the type and level of bail necessary to fulfill the purpose of bail . . . .”113  
And, to reiterate, the purpose of bail in Delaware is to “adequately provide a 
reasonable assurance of the appearance of the defendant at court proceedings, the 
protection of the community, victims, witnesses and any other person, and to 
maintain the integrity of the judicial process.”114  A construction that mandates the 
release of a dangerous defendant runs contrary to that purpose.115 
 
112 We note that several other states have considered whether cash bail is permissible under 
“sufficient sureties” clauses similar to ours.  There appears to be a split of authority on this 
question.  Compare Trujillo v. State, 483 S.W.3d 801, 806 (Ark. 2016) (“[B]ased on the plain 
language of the constitution and our stated purpose for bail, we hold that the term ‘sufficient 
sureties’ refers to a broad range of methods to accomplish ‘sufficient sureties,’ including cash.”); 
Saunders v. Hornecker, 344 P.3d 771, 778–82 (Wyo. 2015) (surveying the split of authority 
regarding the definition of “sufficient sureties” and concluding that cash-only bail is a permissible 
method to accomplish the primary purpose of bail consistent with Wyoming’s “sufficient sureties” 
clause) with State v. Barton, 331 P.3d 50, 59 (Wash. 2014) (holding that, under Washington 
“sufficient sureties” clause, “‘surety’ contemplates a third-party arrangement as, distinguished 
from the accused depositing cash or property directly with the court.”). 
113 State v. Jackson, 384 S.W.3d 208, 213 (Mo. 2012). 
114 11 Del. C. § 2101. 
115 See In re Kowalczyk, 301 Cal. Rptr. 3d 648, 662 (Cal. Ct. App. 2022) (taking up a claim 
regarding the constitutionality of unaffordable cash bail, the California Court of Appeals analyzed 
the phrase “sufficient sureties” and found that “[a]lthough we have found no California case 
expressly interpreting the phrase ‘sufficient sureties,’ the phrase must be construed in conjunction 
with section 12’s requirement that trial courts fix the amount of bail upon consideration of ‘the 
seriousness of the offense charged, the previous criminal record of the defendant, and the 
probability of his or her appearing at the trial or hearing of the case.’  When viewed as a whole, 
36 
 
 
By contrast, our reading comports with how our trial courts have applied the 
amended bail statute.  Courts impose conditions of release on defendants awaiting 
trial.  These conditions are typically non-financial unless the defendant has 
committed a signal offense.  To avoid the arbitrary imposition of cash bail for signal 
offenses, courts look to the factors enumerated in 11 Del. C. §2105(b) and the 
SENTAC guidelines to inform their consideration of what amount defendants must 
pay to secure their release.  In Burroughs’s case, the guidelines authorized a cash 
bail of $110,501.  He would have been released following payment of that amount.  
Simply put, there is no textual warrant in Article I, § 12 for the notion that he must 
be released anyway because of his inability to make such a payment.  We therefore 
agree with the Superior Court’s denial of Burroughs’s state constitutional claim. 
V 
 
To sum up, we hold that our State’s bail system as reflected in Chapter 21 of 
Title 11 of the Delaware Code and related rules does not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Nor does it violate that amendment’s Due 
Process Clause so long as bail-setting courts, when imposing financial conditions 
that will result in a defendant’s pretrial detention, observe the procedural protections 
 
and with reference to section 28(f)(3)’s additional considerations of public and victim safety, the 
most natural reading of section 12 is that a person has a right to be released upon the posting of a 
sufficient security which a court, in its discretion, determines is adequate to accomplish the 
purposes of bail, i.e., to protect public and victim safety and to ensure a defendant’s presence in 
court.”). 
37 
 
set forth in the bail statute and apply a “clear and convincing evidence” standard as 
described above.  And finally, we conclude that the “sufficient sureties” clause found 
in Article I, § 12 of the Delaware Constitution does not require that the financial 
conditions attached to release bonds be affordable. 
 
We recognize that, absent an amendment to Article I, § 12, the setting of cash 
bail for persons accused of signal offenses will result in the pretrial detention of 
many defendants, but only where clear and convincing evidence establishes that the 
purposes of bail can be served in no other way.  We also understand that some 
defendants no less dangerous than those detained will be able to secure pretrial 
release because of their superior bail resources.  This flaw, as we have endeavored 
to explain, is not constitutional in magnitude; whether it is tolerable is for the 
democratic process to decide. 
 
We affirm the Superior Court’s judgment.