Title: Ennis v. State Highway Commission

State: indiana

Issuer: Indiana Supreme Court

Document:

231 Ind. 311 (1952)
108 N.E.2d 687
ENNIS
v.
STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION OF INDIANA ET AL.
No. 28,914.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed November 17, 1952.
*315 Nelson Grills, of Indianapolis, for appellant.
J. Emmett McManamon, Attorney General; Fred R. Bechdolt, Norman J. Beatty, Deputy Attorneys General, and Clyde H. Jones, Chief Counsel, for appellees.
JASPER, C.J.
This is an action by appellant seeking a declaratory judgment that Chapter 281 of the Acts of 1951 (Acts 1951, p. 848; §§ 36-3202, 36-3222, Burns' 1949 Replacement [1951 Supp.]) be declared unconstitutional, and that appellees be enjoined from carrying out the provisions of the act.
To appellant's complaint in one paragraph, appellees filed an answer under our Rule 1-3. It was found and adjudged that Chapter 281 of the Acts of 1951 is valid, and not in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of Indiana.
Appellant assigns as error the overruling of his motion for new trial. The motion for new trial asserts only that "The decision of the Court is contrary to law."
Appellant says that the title to Chapter 281 of the Acts of 1951 is not broad enough to cover that part of subsection (c) of section 4 of the act, which provides:
And also section 20 of the act, which provides:
The title to Chapter 281 is as follows:
*317 Appellant argues that the two last-cited sections of the statute are in violation of Section 19, Article 4, of the Constitution of Indiana, which provides:
In considering the constitutionality of an act in reference to its title, a very liberal interpretation will be adopted rather than a critical construction calculated to defeat it. As was stated in State v. Young (1874), 47 Ind. 150, 152, 153:
It is not necessary to express in the title matters which are germane and properly connected with the subject-matter of the act. W.A. Barber Grocery Co. v. Fleming (1951), 229 Ind. 140, 96 N.E.2d 108; State ex rel. Taylor v. Greene Circuit Court (1945), 223 Ind. 562, 63 N.E.2d 287. This court, in the case of Bolivar Twp. Bd. of Fin. of Benton Co. v. Hawkins (1934), 207 Ind. 171, 178, 191 N.E. 158, 161, said:
In State, ex rel. v. Commercial Ins. Co. (1902), 158 Ind. 680, 684, 64 N.E. 466, 467, 468, this court said:
The sections of the statute here in question are not specifically expressed in the title to the act. Therefore we must decide whether they are germane and properly connected with the subject expressed.
Since the State Highway Commission of Indiana is charged by law with the duties generally of constructing, maintaining, and repairing state highways, it seems to us that the title to the act is sufficient to put the legislators and the public in general on notice that the commission might be involved in the enforcement of the act in such a manner as to become liable for costs *319 incurred. Subsection (c) of Section 4, Chapter 281, of the Acts of 1951, defines the word "cost" as applied to toll projects. Therefore any obligation or expense incurred by the State Highway Commission would be a part of the cost of the toll road and should be reimbursed to the State Highway Commission. Section 36-3220, Burns' 1949 Replacement (1951 Supp.). That portion of subsection (c) of Section 4, Chapter 281, of the Acts of 1951, does not violate Section 19, Article 4, of our Constitution.
Section 20, Chapter 281, of Acts of 1951, provides for the reimbursement to the State Highway Commission of all funds expended "for the study of any toll road project or projects and to use its engineering and other forces, including consulting engineers and traffic engineers, for the purpose of effecting such study, and all such expenses incurred by the chairman of the state highway commission prior to the issuance of toll road revenue bonds ... shall be paid by the chairman and charged to the appropriate toll road project or projects...." The State Highway Commission of Indiana is continually expending money for the study of its highways, and using the necessary personnel to carry on this work. It is an incident to, germane to, and properly a part of the construction of highways in this state.
As this court has said, the title to an act need not contain an index to the act.
The title to the act here in question is not so restrictive as to prevent the expenditure of funds by the State Highway Commission of Indiana for the study of any toll road project or projects and for the use of its personnel. Such study and use of personnel is a proper cost of the toll road and properly connected with the construction.
*320 In the case of Bennett v. Spencer County Bridge Comm. (1938), 213 Ind. 520, 13 N.E.2d 547, a complaint was filed to enjoin the performance of a contract for the issuance of bonds to secure money with which to construct a toll bridge over the Ohio River, and to enjoin the board of county commissioners of Spencer County from paying any money to the bridge commission for expenses incurred in the operation and maintenance of a bridge built, in the event the tolls collected from traffic were not sufficient to pay the expenses. Among other questions raised, the title was challenged. The title, in substance, was similar to the title here questioned, except it authorized the county to build toll bridges through a bridge commission and issue bonds. That part of the statute which was criticized as not coming within the title provided:
Acts 1937, Chapter 141, Section 6, Page 801.
This court, speaking through Judge Fansler, said (pp. 524, 525 of 213 Ind., pp. 549, 550 of 13 N.E.2d):
We believe that the reasoning in the above case is applicable to the case at bar.
Section 20, Chapter 281, of the Acts of 1951, is germane to and properly connected with the subject of the title, and does not violate Section 19, Article 4, of the Constitution of Indiana. Subsection (c) of Section 4, Chapter 281, of the Acts of 1951, is germane to and properly connected with the subject as expressed in the title of the act.
Appellant further contends that the act is invalid for the reason that it is a revenue-raising measure, and was introduced in the Senate in violation of Section 17, Article 4, of the Constitution of Indiana. This section provides:
With this contention we cannot agree. This court has held that the term "raising revenue" is confined to acts to levy taxes, in the strict sense of the word, and does not apply to other purposes which may incidentally create revenue.[1]Stith Petroleum Co. v. Dept. of Audit and Control (1937), 211 Ind. 400, 5 N.E.2d 517; Andrews v. City of Marion (1943), 221 Ind. 422, 47 N.E.2d 968; Rosencranz v. City of Evansville (1924), 194 Ind. 499, 143 N.E. 593.
Section 1, Chapter 281, of the Acts of 1951, provides:
The purposes enumerated in the last-cited section tend to further the public welfare, alleviate congestion *323 on highways, and promote agricultural and industrial development, among others. Nowhere in the act is there any provision for the assessment of taxes. The payment of a tax is compulsory and not optional, and it entitles the taxpayer to receive nothing in return, other than the rights of government which are enjoyed by all citizens alike. Yourison v. State (1927), 33 Del. 577, 140 A. 691; Northern Counties Trust v. Sears (1895), 30 Or. 388, 41 P. 931, 35 L.R.A. 188.
Under this statute, the tolls to be charged are to be paid only by those using the toll roads. A person can use the toll roads or not at his option. If he does not use them, he need not pay toll. A person using the toll roads receives in return the privilege of using roads not bisected by crossings, and roads that are of the most modern design and embodying the latest safety devices.
Taxes are levied for the support of government, and their amount is regulated by its necessities. Tolls are the compensation for the use of another's property or improvements made, and their amount is determined by the cost of the property or improvements. The People v. Schommer (1945), 392 Ill. 17, 63 N.E.2d 744.
Chapter 281 of the Acts of 1951 is not a revenue-raising measure as contemplated by Section 17, Article 4, of the Constitution of Indiana.
Appellant next contends that the act creates a corporation by special act in violation of Section 13, Article 11, of the Constitution of Indiana. This section provides:
*324 Appellant argues that a portion of Section 3, Chapter 281, of the Acts of 1951, contravenes the last-cited section of the Constitution of Indiana.
However, Section 3 further provides:
The last-cited provision makes it clear that the commission is created for a public purpose. From a reading of the act in its entirety, it is apparent that it provides for the construction, operation, and maintenance of toll roads anywhere in the State of Indiana. The law applies to the entire state. It is neither local nor special. It is a general law under Sections 22 and 23, Article 4, of our Constitution. Bennett v. Spencer County Bridge Comm. (1938), 213 Ind. 520, 13 N.E.2d 547, supra.
The toll road commission here created is a commission of the state created for a public purpose. Application of Oklahoma Turnpike Authority (1950), 203 Okla. 335, 221 P.2d 795. It could not embark on an enterprise of a private character. State, ex rel. v. Ferguson (1951), 155 Ohio St. 26, 97 N.E.2d 660. Despite the fact that the commission is given the characteristics of a corporation, it is still a commission of *325 the State of Indiana.[2] Section 36-3205, Burns' 1949 Replacement (1951 Supp.).
The commission is not a corporation within the meaning of Section 13, Article 11, of the Constitution of Indiana.
The constitutional debates on the Constitution as adopted in 1851 show the intent to restrict Section 13, Article 11, to private corporations only. This court has extended this section to cover municipal corporations. Town of Longview v. City of Crawfordsville (1905), 164 Ind. 117, 73 N.E. 78; Sarlls, City Clerk v. State, ex rel. (1929), 201 Ind. 88, 166 N.E. 270. We will not further extend the section to cover boards or commissions of the state. See Report of the Debates and Proceedings of the Convention for the Revision of the Constitution of the State of Indiana, Vol. 2, pp. 1286, 1857, 1875, 2074, 2075, for debates on corporations.
Appellant further contends that the Legislature has improperly delegated authority to the Indiana Toll Road Commission without setting sufficient standards to guide it in exercising its authority, and therefore the act violates Section 1, Article 4, of the Constitution of Indiana, which provides:
*326 Reasonable standards must be imposed where the Legislature delegates discretionary duties to administrative officers and bodies. Kryder v. State (1938), 214 Ind. 419, 15 N.E.2d 386.
Appellant argues that no standard is provided for the selection of turnpike sites. Section one of the act (§ 36-3201, Burns' 1949 Replacement [1951 Supp.]) provides that the commission is authorized and empowered to construct, maintain, repair, and operate toll road projects "at such locations as shall be approved by the governor, and in accordance with such alignment and design standards as shall be approved by the highway commission." Section 4 (c) of the act (§ 36-3204, Burns' 1949 Replacement [1951 Supp.]) provides for "... other expenses necessary or incident to determining the feasibility or practicability of constructing any such project...." (Our emphasis.)
Section 10 of the act provides for the issuing of bonds on each project, and for the retirement of the bonds from the revenues of each project. Therefore the locations must be selected with this standard in mind.
The toll road commission is given broad powers to locate toll roads, but this is not in violation of the Constitution. 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 138 (8), p. 368. The powers here delegated are no broader than the powers granted to the State Highway Commission in selecting and constructing highways in this state. Section 36-307, Burns' 1949 Replacement.
After considering the sections of the statute heretofore cited, and the specific nature of the purposes to be accomplished by this act, and the fact that locations of all projects must be approved by the Governor, it seems that the standards set are as specific, definite, and certain as the necessities of the case permit.
*327 The foregoing provisions fix reasonable standards for the determination of the location of such projects.
Appellant contends that reasonable standards are not set for the fixing of toll charges. Section 5 (g) of the act (§ 36-3205, Burns' 1949 Replacement [1951 Supp.]) empowers the commission:
Section 14 of the act (§ 36-3214, Burns' 1949 Replacement [1951 Supp.]) provides:
It seems to us that section 14 of the act so obviously sets reasonable standards for the fixing of toll charges that a discussion thereof would be idle.
Appellant further argues that no standard or limit is placed on the borrowing of monies. However, the act provides, under § 36-3204, a definition of "cost," and, under § 36-3205 (f), authorizes and empowers the commission:
*328 Section 36-3209 provides for terms of the bonds to be issued.
The act discloses that reasonable standards have been set, for the reason that the amount of the revenue bonds to be issued are limited by the costs as defined in the act.
It is also contended that no standard is provided for points of ingress and egress on the toll road projects. The act provides that points of ingress and egress shall be established, located, controlled, and limited as necessary and desirable, in the judgment of the commission and the chairman of the State Highway Commission, to insure the proper operation of the projects, and prohibit entrance at points not designated. Section 36-3205 (j), Burns' 1949 Replacement (1951 Supp.). These are reasonable standards.
Appellant further contends that no standard is set for the expenditure of funds by the State Highway Commission under sections 4 (c) and 20. The Legislature provided in the act that the chairman of the State Highway Commission would provide funds "as may be necessary," and this only with the approval and consent of the controlling board. The necessity for the expending of funds must be determined and be bona fide. This, coupled with the fact that the toll roads must be feasible and surveys made must show the toll roads to be self-financed, would set reasonable standards for the authority delegated under sections 4 (c) and 20.[3] In Kryder v. State, supra, reasonable standards were discussed, and this court said (pp. 425, 426 of 214 Ind., pp. 389, 390 of 15 N.E.2d):
Appellant's next contention, that a tax exemption was granted in violation of Section 1, Article 10, of the Constitution of Indiana, is based upon his assertion that the act creates a private corporation. Since we have found this not to be a private corporation, this contention is without merit. Moreover, § 64-201, Burns' 1951 Replacement, provides for exemption of "The property of this state." All property involved in the act here questioned is property of the state. Application of Oklahoma Turnpike Authority (1950), 203 Okla. 335, 221 P.2d 795, supra. Section 1, Article 10, of the Constitution of Indiana, is not violated. *330 State, ex rel. v. Defenbacher (1950), 153 Ohio St. 268, 91 N.E.2d 512, supra.
Appellant contends that section 20 of the act here questioned fails to provide properly for the expenditure of state highway funds, in violation of Section 3, Article 10, of the Constitution of Indiana. This section provides:
Section 20 of the acts, heretofore set out, provides for the expenditure of funds and services of the State Highway Commission, and that the chairman of the commission "shall expend out of any funds available for the purpose such moneys as may be necessary for the study of any toll road project or projects and to use its engineering and other forces...." The identical question was discussed in Application of Oklahoma Turnpike Authority, supra, where the court said (pp. 345, 346 of 203 Okla., p. 807 of 221 P.2d):
Chapter 217 of the Acts of 1951 (Acts 1951, p. 577) appropriates money for the construction of highways, among other things. The act before this court authorizes the State Highway Commission to expend funds. Funds have been appropriated for construction of highways, and Chapter 281 limits the funds to those necessary to be expended for the study of toll road projects. Chapter 281 places other duties on the State Highway Commission which would of necessity require a study by it of the projects, such as the requirements in Section 1 of Chapter 281.
Section 3, Article 10, of our State Constitution, is not violated, as funds of the State Highway Commission may be expended "out of any funds available for the purpose," and these were appropriated by Chapter 217 of the Acts of 1951. The amount of funds is limited by "moneys as may be necessary," and as appropriated to the State Highway Commission. State ex rel. v. Defenbacher (1950), 153 Ohio St. 268, 91 N.E.2d 512, supra.
Appellant contends that the act violates Section 2, Article 10, of the Constitution of Indiana, in that there is an improper utilization of income from a public works. This section provides:
Chapter 281 of the Acts of 1951 does not provide for the disposition of the net income from any toll road project. The act does provide for the paying of all expenses and costs of the project, including the bonds; and not until these have been paid do the roads become a part of the public works belonging to the state. Under the act they then become toll free. Section 36-3219, Burns' 1949 Replacement (1951 Supp.). Therefore, under the act, there could be no net income involved. Chapter 281 does not violate Section 2, Article 10, of the Constitution of Indiana.
Appellant further contends that state funds are being expended for a private purpose. The state is charged with the duty of providing and maintaining highways. Harmon v. Gephart (1910), 173 Ind. 391, 393, 90 N.E. 890, 891. In the last-cited case, this court said:
In State ex rel. Jackson, Attorney General v. Middleton (1939), 215 Ind. 219, 230, 231, 19 N.E.2d 470, 475, this court, in discussing taxes levied for a public purpose, said:
Since we have heretofore said that the purposes of the act are public in character, we need not further discuss this issue. It is without merit.
Appellant next contends that the act in question provides for a pledge of the state's credit in allowing the advancement of funds and services by the State Highway Commission to the Toll Road Commission, in violation of Section 12, Article 11, of the Constitution of Indiana. This section provides:
*334 It seems clear that this last-cited section of our Constitution has reference to the advancing of credit to private corporations or associations, and does not apply to an agency of this state.
Subsection (c) of Section 4 of Chapter 281 of the Acts of 1951 (§ 36-3204, Burns' 1949 Replacement [1951 Supp.]) is identical with Subsection (c) of § 1204 of the General Code of Ohio, and Section 20 of Chapter 281 of the Acts of 1951 (§ 36-3220, Burns' 1949 Replacement [1951 Supp.]) is identical with § 1220 of the General Code of Ohio. The Ohio Supreme Court, in the case of State, ex rel. v. Defenbacher, supra (pp. 282, 283 of 153 Ohio St., p. 520 of 91 N.E.2d), in discussing a question identical with the one here raised, said:
*335 We feel that the reasoning in the last-cited case is sound.
Chapter 281 of the Acts of 1951 does not create a private corporation, and does not violate Section 12, Article 11, of the Constitution of Indiana.
Appellant contends that Chapter 281 of the Acts of 1951 violates Section 5, Article 10, of the Constitution of Indiana, in that the act creates a debt of the state. This section provides:
Appellant also contends that the act is a subterfuge to avoid Section 1, Article 13, of the Constitution of Indiana, which provides:
Section 1, Article 13, applies solely to municipal corporations or to political corporations which are local and limited territorially. This section does not apply to the State of Indiana.
Section 5, Article 10, of the Constitution of Indiana, is binding upon the state. If the revenue bonds to be issued, as provided by the act here in question, are an indebtedness of the state, then Section 5 of Article 10 is violated.
Section 1 of Chapter 281 of the Acts of 1951 (§ 36-3201, Burns' 1949 Replacement [1951 Supp.]) provides in part:
Section 2 of the act (§ 36-3202, Burns' 1949 Replacement [1951 Supp.]) provides:
From the above sections, it is clear that this act does not create a debt of the state; Application of Oklahoma Turnpike Authority (1950), 203 Okla. 335, 221 P.2d 795, supra; State, ex rel. v. Ferguson (1951), 155 Ohio St. 26, 97 N.E.2d 660, supra; State v. Fla. State Improvement Commission (1947), 159 Fla. 338, 31 So. 2d 548; nor can tax monies of the state be used to pay the revenue bonds. Bonds which are to be paid solely from the revenue collected from a project have been discussed by this court many times, and have been held not to create a debt of the municipal corporation involved, under Section 1, Article 13, of the Constitution of Indiana. Property Owners, Inc. v. City of Anderson (1952), 231 Ind. 78, 107 N.E.2d 3; Edwards v. Housing Authority of City of Muncie (1939), 215 Ind. 330, 19 N.E.2d 741; Letz Mfg. Co. v Public Service Commission of Ind. (1936), 210 Ind. 467, 4 N.E.2d 194; Underwood v. Fairbanks, Morse & Co. (1933), 205 Ind. 316, 185 N.E. 118; Bennett v. Spencer County *337 Bridge Comm. (1938), 213 Ind. 520, 13 N.E.2d 547, supra; Voss v. Waterloo Water Co. (1904), 163 Ind. 69, 71 N.E. 208; Jefferson School Twp. v. Jefferson Twp. S. Bldg. Co. (1937), 212 Ind. 542, 10 N.E.2d 608; Fox v. City of Bicknell (1923), 193 Ind. 537, 141 N.E. 222.
We feel that the reasoning in the last-cited cases is equally applicable to the State of Indiana, and that therefore Chapter 281 of the Acts of 1951 does not violate Section 5, Article 10, of the Constitution of Indiana.
Appellant further argues that even if the bonds are payable from the revenue, the revenue covers real estate involved in the toll road projects. Section 4 (e) of the act (§ 36-3204, Burns' 1949 Replacement [1951 Supp.]) defines "revenues" as follows:
Section 5 (i) of the act (§ 36-3205, Burns' 1949 Replacement [1951 Supp.]) authorizes and empowers the toll road commission:
Section 7 of the act (§ 36-3207, Burns' 1949 Replacement [1951 Supp.]) provides that:
From a reading of the last-two cited sections concerning real estate, it is seen that an interest therein is acquired in the name of the state, and not in the name of the toll road commission. The section of the act defining "revenues" refers solely to personal property coming into the possession and under the control of the commission, and it is out of the revenues that the bonds are to be paid.
From a reading of the entire act, it is readily seen that real estate of the State of Indiana is not subject to payment of toll road revenue bonds.
After considering all of the questions to which our attention has been called, we find that the act does not violate the Constitution of the State of Indiana.
Finding no reversible error, the judgment is affirmed.
NOTE.  Reported in 108 N.E.2d 687.
[1]  See 4 A.L.R.2d 973, Ann.
[2]  Section 36-3203, Burns' 1949 Replacement (1951 Supp.), provides:

"... the construction, operation and maintenance of toll road projects shall be deemed and held to be essential governmental functions of the state, but the commission shall not however be immune from liability by reason thereof."
[3]  See State ex rel. v. Defenbacher (1950), 153 Ohio St. 268, 91 N.E.2d 512, and State, ex. rel., v. Ferguson (1951), 155 Ohio St. 26, 97 N.E.2d 660, supra.