Title: Russell v. Armitage

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

Russell v. Armitage  (95-364); 166 Vt. 392; 697 A.2d 630

[Filed 2-May-1997]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                            No. 95-364

Sherry Russell                               Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
   v.                                          Rutland Family Court

John Armitage                                January Term, 1996

Theresa S. DiMauro, J.

       Agnes S. Hughes, Child Support Collections Attorney, Rutland, for
  Vermont Office of Child Support

       Robert Appel, Defender General, and William A. Nelson, Appellate
  Attorney, Montpelier, for defendant-appellant

PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.

       GIBSON, J.   Defendant John Armitage appeals from an order of the
  Rutland Family Court that ordered him incarcerated for failing to purge
  himself of civil contempt in this child-support enforcement action. 
  Defendant contends that the court erred by (1) failing to appoint counsel
  to represent him at the initial contempt hearing; (2) holding him in
  contempt without first finding that he had the present ability to pay the
  child support; and (3) imposing a purgative condition so indefinite that he
  was unable to comply.  In addition, the Defender General moves to withdraw
  as counsel on the ground that the public defender act, 13 V.S.A. §§
  5201-5277, does not authorize assignment of a public defender in a civil
  contempt proceeding.  We affirm the trial court's order of incarceration
  and deny the motion to withdraw.

       Sherry Russell and John Armitage were married in 1980 and divorced in
  1986.  They have two daughters.  The final order of divorce granted custody
  to plaintiff and ordered defendant to pay child support in the amount of
  $35 per week per child, with support payments to increase annually by $2
  per week per child.  Defendant soon fell behind in his support  payments,
  and in

 

  1989 a wage assignment was ordered.  In 1992, the Office of Child Support
  (OCS) brought enforcement proceedings, and the magistrate issued a new
  order, which the family court affirmed, entering judgment for accumulated
  arrearages and setting support at $389 per month. In 1993, OCS filed
  another petition for contempt.  The court again entered judgment for
  arrearages and renewed the support order.

       In March 1994, OCS commenced this enforcement proceeding, alleging
  once more that defendant had willfully failed to comply with the
  child-support order.  The magistrate issued another order maintaining
  defendant's support obligation at $389.97 per month, but noted that
  defendant shortly expected to settle a workers' compensation claim, and
  accordingly, scheduled a hearing for November 1994 to review the support
  order.  Following the November hearing, the magistrate found that defendant
  owed child-support arrearages of $28,847.85 and would have the ability to
  pay the arrearages upon settlement of his workers' compensation claim, but
  that he had refused to settle the claim because he did not want plaintiff
  to have the money.  Based on these findings, the magistrate referred the
  matter for contempt proceedings before the family court judge.  See 4
  V.S.A. § 462(a).

       At a December 8, 1994 hearing, the court found that defendant had
  presented no medical evidence to show that he is unable to work, and had
  made little effort to find employment or settle his workers' compensation
  claim.  The court concluded that defendant was in contempt of the
  magistrate's orders but stated that it would allow defendant to purge
  himself of the contempt before ordering incarceration.  In its written
  order, issued on December 12, 1994, the court set four conditions that
  defendant was required to satisfy to purge himself of contempt:

        1.  Defendant shall report to the Vocational Rehabilitation office in
     Bennington, Vermont no later than December 16, 1994 and get himself
     enrolled in their program.  He shall participate fully in any programming
     recommended by that agency.  He shall provide documentation at the next
     hearing that he has complied with this order.

        2.  Defendant shall, no later than December 16, 1994, go to Dr. Block's
     office and review the results of his MRI test.  If Dr. Block is not 
     available due to his schedule to review the MRI results by December 16, 
     1994, Defendant shall make an appointment by December 16, 1994 to review 
     the

 

     test results as soon as possible.

        3.  Within 14 days of the above review of Defendant's MRI test results,
     he shall provide a statement from his treating physician(s) to this Court
     regarding the nature of his medical condition, his ability to work, and any
     restrictions on his ability to work.

        4.  Defendant shall diligently pursue his worker's compensation claim 
     and provide documentation at the next hearing regarding the progress of the
     claim.

  The court further ordered that a hearing be scheduled to monitor
  defendant's compliance with the court's conditions.  Defendant took no
  appeal from the contempt order.

       At a hearing on May 19, 1995, defendant admitted that he had failed to
  meet with Dr. Block to review his MRI results, and as a result had not
  obtained an evaluation of his medical condition sufficient to satisfy the
  second, third, and fourth contempt conditions.  Based on defendant's
  statements, the OCS attorney requested that defendant be incarcerated for
  failing to purge himself of contempt.  The court responded:

  Well, before I can consider incarcerating an individual for nonpayment of
  child support, I have to appoint an attorney to represent [defendant], and I
  will do that at this point.  We will call someone from the public defender's
  office to come over and talk to you [defendant], before we continue with this
  hearing.

  Following a recess, during which defendant was found to be a financially
  needy person who qualified for assigned counsel, attorney William Buckman
  from the Rutland Public Defender's Office appeared in response to the
  court's call.

       After reviewing defendant's circumstances, Mr. Buckman conceded that
  defendant had not complied with the contempt order but claimed, as his
  defense, the inability to comply.  He requested a continuance to allow him
  to become more familiar with the case and to amass evidence to support the
  defense.  The court granted a continuance until June 28, 1995 and indicated
  that the burden would be on defendant to show an inability to comply with
  the order.

       Before the June 28 hearing, Mr. Buckman moved to withdraw as counsel
  on the ground that the public defender act did not authorize assignment of
  a public defender to represent a defendant in a civil contempt proceeding. 
  At the hearing, the court denied the motion to

 

  withdraw without rationale.  Mr. Buckman then stated that he had no
  evidence to present for the defense.  Later, he claimed that defendant had
  met with the doctor to review the MRI results and presented a letter from
  an employer indicating that defendant was currently working for him as a
  painter.  The court found that defendant continued to be in contempt and
  ordered him incarcerated under 12 V.S.A. § 122.  Defendant was told that he
  could purge himself of contempt by complying with the four conditions of
  the December order.  Mr. Buckman requested clarification of the order, and
  the court stated that it would accept letters from the people with whom
  defendant was required to meet indicating that he had complied.  The
  present appeal followed.

                                     I.

       Defendant was entitled to appointment of counsel prior to being
  incarcerated under our decision in Choiniere v. Brooks, 163 Vt. 625, 625,