Title: State v. Martel Johnson

State: new-jersey

Issuer: New Jersey Supreme Court

Document:

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). STEIN, J., writing for a unanimous Court. The primary issue raised in this appeal is whether a jury must decide if a crime is violent for purposes of applying the No Early Release Act (NERA or the Act) or if that determination can be made by the sentencing court. NERA imposes a mandatory minimum prison term of 85 percent of the overall sentence and a mandatory three to four year period of post-release parole supervision, for any first or second degree conviction that is found to constitute a violent crime. The Act defines violent crime as a crime in which the actor causes death or serious bodily injury; uses or threatens the immediate use of a deadly weapon; and any aggravated sexual assault or sexual assault in which the actor uses or threatens the immediate use of physical force. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(d). The Act further provides that the grounds for imposing an enhanced sentence must be established at a hearing after the conviction and on written notice to defendant of the ground proposed. A grand jury returned an eleven-count indictment against defendant, Martel Johnson, accusing him of robbing two customers of a check-cashing establishment at gunpoint on August 8 and August 9, 1997, respectively, and of unlawfully possessing a firearm when he was later arrested. The indictment did not refer to NERA or charge Johnson with committing a violent crime within the meaning of NERA. Approximately one week after the incidents, defendant was arrested standing outside the check-cashing store. Officers found in his possession a black, pistol-shaped BB gun, later identified by one of the victims as the weapon used during the robbery. According to a State weapons expert, Johnson's BB gun was capable of causing serious bodily injury. The trial court severed the charges relating to the August 9 incident and Johnson's arrest from those relating to the August 8 incident. The first jury considered the August 9 and arrest-scene charges and found Johnson guilty on the firearm possession charge, but did not return a verdict on the robbery charges and a mistrial was declared on those charges. The second jury considered the August 8 incident and found Johnson guilty of first- degree robbery and firearm possession offenses. A defendant convicted of first-degree robbery or possession of a firearm with intent to use it against another is subject to a mandatory prison term of between one-third and one-half of the overall sentence. At Johnson's sentencing hearing, however, the State requested the court to impose enhanced mandatory-minimum sentences pursuant to NERA, because the facts adduced at trial established that Johnson threatened the victim with the BB gun. The trial court concluded that defendant was eligible for sentencing under NERA, but did not indicate whether it applied a preponderance of the evidence or a beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof. Applying NERA, the court sentenced Johnson to an overall term of eighteen years with a term of parole disqualification exceeding fifteen years, and a five year term of post-release parole supervision. Johnson appealed, arguing, in part, that the mandatory minimum sentence mandated by NERA constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Appellate Division upheld the enhanced sentence. This Court initially denied certification, but subsequently vacated that order and granted certification limited to Johnson's constitutional challenges to NERA. Following the grant of certification, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Apprendi v. New Jersey, __ U.S. __, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000) , holding that the New Jersey Hate Crimes Act was unconstitutional because the trial court, and not the jury, made the finding triggering an extended term of imprisonment based on a standard of proof less than beyond a reasonable doubt. 1. At issue in this case is the principle that the Constitution protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that these protections extend to determinations not only of a defendant's guilt or innocense, but also to the length of a sentence. Although earlier opinions of the United States Supreme Court limited application of the doctrine, Apprendi placed the continuing validity of those opinions in doubt. (Pp. 6-22) 2. The text of NERA does not specifically delegate whether it is the trial court or the jury that has the responsibility to make the factual determination whether Johnson's conduct constituted a violent crime within the meaning of the Act. If NERA is interpreted to require a jury to make the violent crime finding beyond a reasonable doubt, constitutional questions can be avoided. (Pp. 22-24) 3. The punishment imposed by NERA could be more severe than the punishment imposed by the hate crimes law held unconstitutional in Apprendi. In addition, NERA affords no discretion to the sentencing court, but requires a mandatory minimum of 85 percent of the base term. These considerations support the contention that application of NERA could be understood to require constitutional protections. (Pp. 24-29) 4. The Court therefore interprets NERA to require that the violent crime condition must be submitted to a jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court is confident that the legislature would prefer such a construction of NERA to its potential invalidation. (Pp. 29-30) 5. Notwithstanding the construction of NERA adopted today, the Court is satisfied that Johnson's jury did, in fact, find the NERA violent crime predicate in reaching its verdict. As noted, NERA defines violent crime as a crime in which the actor uses or threatens the immediate use of a deadly weapon. The only witness to the August 8 robbery who testified was the victim, and she testified on both direct and cross examination that Johnson aimed the BB gun at her. That testimony was not uncontradicted. Thus, the only conceivable conclusion that Johnson's jury could have reached in finding Johnson guilty of first-degree robbery was that Johnson threatened the victim with the BB gun in the process of robbing her. The jury therefore made the finding of the NERA violent crime predicate beyond a reasonable doubt. (Pp. 30-33) 6. Although the Court finds this construction of NERA to be a new rule, it declines to apply that rule retroactively. Retroactive application would result in post-conviction petitions from a large number of inmates currently serving NERA sentences. In the vast majority of those cases, however, a jury deliberation on the violent crime issue would not be likely to produce a different result, and the original sentences would be reaffirmed. In addition, the Court's decision rests on a theory of statutory interpretation, not on principles of constitutional law. Consequently, prospective application will not deprive NERA-sentenced inmates of any constitutional right. (Pp. 33-35) 7. The Court further finds that NERA survives Johnson's challenge under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eight Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The punishments imposed by NERA do not run afoul of objective standards of decency; nor are they grossly disproportionate. It is equally clear that the legislature's objective of increasing the punitive consequences of violent crime as defined by NERA is a valid and legitimate one. (Pp. 35-37) Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED, as MODIFIED. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES COLEMAN, LONG, LaVECCHIA, and ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE STEIN's opinion. JUSTICE VERNIERO did not participate. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. MARTEL JOHNSON, a/k/a HASSAN K. MUHAMMAD, Defendant-Appellant. Argued October 11, 2000 -- Decided February 28, 2001 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 325 N.J. Super. 78 (1999). Jay L. Wilensky, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Ivelisse Torres, Public Defender, attorney). Melaney S. Payne, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by STEIN, J. The No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2 (NERA or the Act), provides for mandatory minimum sentences for convictions constituting "violent crime" as defined by that statute. We granted certification to consider whether a jury must decide if a crime is violent for purposes of NERA or if that determination can be made by the sentencing court, and whether the mandatory minimum terms imposed by NERA constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the United States and New Jersey Constitutions. It follows, I submit, that if a State provides that a specific component of a prohibited transaction shall give rise both to a special stigma and to a special punishment, that component must be treated as a 'fact necessary to constitute the crime' within the meaning of our holding in In re Winship. [Id. at 96, 103, 106 S. Ct. at 2421, 2425, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 83, 87.] Torres: Even though it is arguable that Almendarez- Torres was incorrectly decided, and that a logical application of our reasoning today should apply if the recidivist issue were contested, Apprendi does not contest the decision's validity and we need not revisit it for purposes of our decision today to treat the case as a narrow exception to the general rule we recalled at the outset. [Id. at __, 120 S. Ct. at 2362, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 454-55.] Although the majority declined to address the continuing vitality of McMillan and Almendarez-Torres, Justice Thomas' concurrence concluded that both McMillan and Almendarez-Torres should be reversed. Id. at __, 120 S. Ct. at 2367, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 472 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The consequence of the above discussion for our decisions in Almendarez-Torres and McMillan should be plain enough . . . .). Justice Thomas began by echoing the historical analysis conducted by the majority: A long line of essentially uniform authority addressing accusations, and stretching from the earliest reported cases after the founding until well into the 20th century, establishes that the original understanding of which facts are elements was even broader than the rule that the Court adopts today. This authority establishes that a "crime" includes every fact that is by law a basis for imposing or increasing punishment (in contrast with a fact that mitigates punishment). [Id. at __, 120 S. Ct. at 2368, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 461 (Thomas, J., concurring).] Considering McMillan in light of those common-law roots, the concurrence found it "clear that the common-law rule would cover the McMillan situation of a mandatory-minimum sentence : No doubt a defendant could, under such a scheme, find himself sentenced to the same term to which he could have been sentenced absent the mandatory minimum. The range for his underlying crime could be 0 to 10 years, with the mandatory minimum of 5 years, and he could be sentenced to 7. (Of course, a similar scenario is possible with an increased maximum.) But it is equally true that his expected punishment has increased as a result of the narrowed range and that the prosecution is empowered, by invoking the mandatory minimum, to require the judge to impose a higher punishment than he might wish. The mandatory minimum entitles the government to more than it would otherwise be entitled (5 to 10 years, rather than 0 to 10 years and the risk of a sentence below 5). Thus, the fact triggering the mandatory minimum is part of the punishment sought to be inflicted; it undoubtedly enters into the punishment so as to aggravate it, and it is an act to which the law affixes punishment. [Id. at __, 120 S. Ct. at 2379, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 474 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations and quotations omitted).] B As noted, NERA imposes a mandatory minimum prison term of 85% of the overall sentence, and a mandatory three- to five-year period of post-release parole supervision, for any first- or second-degree conviction that is found to constitute a violent crime. The sentencing court interpreted NERA to empower the court, as opposed to a jury, to make the factual determination of whether Johnson's underlying conduct in his convictions constituted violent crime within the meaning of the Act. The text of NERA does not specifically delegate that responsibility. Subsection (e) of the Act provides that [a] court shall not impose sentence pursuant to this section unless the ground therefor has been established at a hearing after the conviction of the defendant and on written notice to him of the ground proposed. The defendant shall have the right to hear and controvert the evidence against him and to offer evidence upon the issue. [N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(e).] Robbery is a crime of the second degree, except that it is a crime of the first degree if in the course of committing the theft the actor attempts to kill anyone, or purposely inflicts or attempts to inflict serious bodily injury, or is armed with, or uses or threatens the immediate use of a deadly weapon. As noted, NERA defines "violent crime" as, for present purposes, any crime in which the actor uses or threatens the immediate use of a deadly weapon. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(d). Thus, the elements of the NERA violent crime factor do not overlap completely with the elements of first-degree robbery, because a defendant could be convicted of first-degree robbery where the defendant threatens the victim and is armed with a deadly weapon but does not threaten the victim with the deadly weapon. The only witness to the August 8 robbery who testified at trial was the victim, and she testified on both direct and cross examination that Johnson aimed the BB gun at her. That testimony was uncontradicted by any other evidence at trial. Thus, in view of the evidence adduced at trial, the only conceivable conclusion that Johnson's jury could have reached in finding Johnson guilty of first-degree robbery was that Johnson threatened the victim with the BB gun in the process of robbing her. Accordingly, notwithstanding the fact that the trial court failed to specifically instruct the jury to find the NERA violent crime predicate, we affirm Johnson's sentence because the facts adduced at trial establish that the jury made that finding beyond a reasonable doubt. III Johnson also contends that the mandatory minimums imposed by NERA violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the corresponding provision in Article I, paragraph 12 of the New Jersey Constitution. U.S. Const. amends. VIII, XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, par. 12. We have developed a three-part test for determining whether a criminal penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. State v. Maldonado, 137 N.J. 536, 556 (1994). We consider, first, whether the punishment conforms with contemporary standards of decency; second, whether the punishment is grossly disproportionate to the offense; and third, whether the punishment goes beyond what is necessary to accomplish any legitimate penological objective. Ibid. Absent a substantial showing that the statute violates those principles, the judiciary must respect the legislative will and enforce the punishment. State v. Hampton, 61 N.J. 250, 274 (1972). We find it apparent that NERA survives Eighth Amendment scrutiny. At least twenty-seven other States and the District of Columbia have enacted legislation similar to NERA. Bureau of U.S. Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice Special Report: Truth in Sentencing in State Prisons at 2 (Jan. 1999). When challenged, those laws have survived constitutional scrutiny. See State v. Lara, 580 N.W.2d 783 (Iowa), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1007, 119 S. Ct. 523, 142 L. Ed. 2d 434 (1998); State v. Williams, 936 S.W.2d 828 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). In addition, statutes imposing severe penalties have been enacted in New Jersey and upheld by this Court. See State v. Oliver, 162 N.J. 580 (2000) (holding that sentencing under Three Strikes Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1a, does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment); Maldonado, supra, 137 N.J. at 556-60 (upholding N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9, which imposes strict liability on manufacturers and distributors of certain controlled dangerous substances when death results from ingestion of those substances); State v. Des Martes, 92 N.J. 62, 82 (1983) (holding that sentencing under Graves Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3, does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment). The punishments imposed by NERA neither run afoul of objective standards of decency, nor are they grossly disproportionate to the violent crime that NERA punishes. It is equally clear that the legislature's objective of increasing the punitive consequences of violent crime as defined by NERA is a valid and legitimate one. IV In summary, we interpret subsection (e) of NERA to require that a jury determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a defendant committed a violent crime within the meaning of NERA before a sentencing court may impose the statute's mandatory minimum sentencing structure. On this record, however, we are satisfied that Johnson received all of the protections due to him under our interpretation of the Act. We also hold that NERA does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the New Jersey and U.S. Constitutions. Accordingly, as modified, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES COLEMAN, LONG, LaVECCHIA and ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE STEIN's opinion. JUSTICE VERNIERO did not participate. NO. A-83 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. MARTEL JOHNSON, a/k/a HASSAN K. MUHAMMAD, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED February 28, 2001 Chief Justice Poritz