Title: Backus v. Waukesha County

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2022 WI 55 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP307 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Gregory M. Backus, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Waukesha County, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 5, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 6, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael O. Bohren   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
ZIEGLER, C.J., and ROGGENSACK, J., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there were briefs filed by 
Deborah B. Price, principal assistant corporation counsel. There 
was an oral argument by Deborah B. Price.  
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Erik S. Olsen, Andrew D. Weininger and Eminent Domain Services, 
LLC, Madison. There was an oral argument by Andrew D. Weininger.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Scott E. Rosenow and 
WMC Litigation Center, Madison for Wisconsin Manufacturers and 
Commerce, Inc.  
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Clayton P. Kawski, 
assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was Joshua L. 
Kaul, 
attorney 
general, 
for 
the 
Wisconsin 
Department 
of 
Transportation.  
 
 
 
 
 
2022 WI 55 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2020AP307 
(L.C. No. 
2018CV1379) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Gregory M. Backus, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Waukesha County, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
FILED 
 
JUL 5, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
ZIEGLER, C.J., and ROGGENSACK, J., joined. 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Waukesha 
County, Michael O. Bohren, Judge.  Reversed and cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
JILL J. KAROFSKY, J.   The court of appeals certifies 
the following question to us:  In light of 118th Street Kenosha, 
LLC v. DOT, 2014 WI 125, 359 Wis. 2d 30, 856 N.W.2d 486, is a 
temporary 
limited 
easement 
compensable 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.09(6g) (2019-20)?1  This question arises from a dispute over 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2020AP307 
 
2 
 
the proper compensation for a temporary limited easement (TLE) 
that Waukesha County acquired over Gregory Backus's property to 
construct a highway bypass along the Backus property's rear lot 
line.  Specifically, the County believes it need pay Backus only 
the rental value of the TLE.  Backus disagrees, arguing that 
under § 32.09(6g) he is entitled to severance damages measured 
by the difference between the fair market value of the whole 
property before and after the completion of the project.  In 
answering the certified question, we hold that § 32.09(6g) does 
not apply to TLEs.  Having answered the question, we remand the 
cause back to the circuit court for further proceedings 
consistent with our holding. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
The 
Waukesha 
West 
Bypass 
Project 
(the 
Project) 
reconstructed, relocated, and expanded five miles of County 
Trunk 
Highway 
TT, 
which 
abuts 
the 
backyard 
of 
Backus's 
residential property.  The Project had been in the making for 
over 50 years.  The highway itself was constructed on land 
already owned by the County, and in 2004 the Heritage Hills 
Subdivision Plat recorded an easement (HHS Easement) for highway 
and sidewalk slopes running the length of Backus's property and 
extending approximately 25 feet into his backyard.2 
¶3 
As part of the Project, in 2016 the County separately 
acquired a TLE over 0.032 acres of the easternmost portion of 
                                                 
2 The HHS Easement was originally obtained by the City of 
Waukesha and was subsequently transferred to Waukesha County in 
2016. 
No. 
2020AP307 
 
3 
 
Backus's property, the entirety of which fell within the 
existing HHS Easement.  The TLE stated that it was for the 
purposes of ingress and egress, operation of machinery, grading 
or creation of slopes, placement or removal of soil, and to 
remove or plant vegetation.3  The County terminated the TLE at 
the completion of the Project. 
¶4 
Backus seeks compensation from the County for the TLE, 
alleging a series of permanent damages to his property that he 
claims are attributable to the TLE.4  We limit this opinion to 
answering the certified question and thus do not reach any issue 
relating to Backus's specific damages. 
¶5 
The Waukesha County Condemnation Commission awarded 
Backus compensation for the TLE, but Backus appealed the amount 
to the circuit court.5  At the circuit court, Backus presented a 
                                                 
3 The exact relevant language is as follows: "A Temporary 
Limited Easement for the public purpose and right to construct a 
highway project, including the placement or removal of soil, 
grading of roadway slopes, and the creation of fill or cut 
slopes in the temporary limited easement area to match the new 
roadway grade, as well as the right of ingress and egress as 
long as required for the construction of the highway project, 
including the right to preserve, protect, remove or plant 
thereon any vegetation that the highway authorities may deem 
necessary or desirable." 
4 The County filed a motion to strike portions of Backus's 
brief that reference some of these damages, contending the 
referenced damages are unsupported by the record.  The motion 
further asks to strike references to the Petition and Complaint 
of a subsequently filed lawsuit not before the circuit court.  
These facts and arguments are relevant only to issues of damages 
which we do not reach in this limited opinion.  Thus, we deny 
the motion to strike as inconsequential. 
5 The Honorable Michael O. Bohren of the Waukesha County 
Circuit Court presided. 
No. 
2020AP307 
 
4 
 
before-and-after valuation of his property showing its value 
dropped from $308,000 to $217,300 after the project was 
completed.  He claimed he was owed the difference in value as 
severance damages under Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g).  He then added a 
$1,705 rental value for the TLE, for a total demand of $90,700 
(rounded) in damages. 
¶6 
The County moved for summary judgment.  For the 
purposes of the motion, the County stipulated that it owed 
Backus the $1,705 in rental value.  But it argued that the 
severance damages——measured by the diminution in the fair market 
value——were not compensable under our 118th Street decision 
because the Project as a whole caused the diminution in fair 
market value, not the TLE.  The circuit court denied the summary 
judgment motion, concluding that 118th Street did not foreclose 
the possibility of severance damages for a TLE, which raised 
disputed issues of material fact. 
¶7 
The County obtained leave to file this interlocutory 
appeal of the denial of its summary judgment motion.  The court 
of appeals then certified to us, and we accepted, the question 
left open in 118th Street:  is a TLE compensable under the 
valuation methodology in Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g)? 
II.  ANALYSIS 
¶8 
The certified question presents a straightforward 
issue of statutory interpretation that we review de novo.  See 
Bauer v. Wis. Energy Corp., 2022 WI 11, ¶11, 400 Wis. 2d 592, 
970 N.W.2d 243.  There is no dispute that a TLE is compensable; 
the question before us is whether that compensation is to be 
No. 
2020AP307 
 
5 
 
calculated under the method set forth in Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g).  
We begin with a brief recap of 118th Street, which teed up the 
issue in this case.  We then explain how the plain language of 
§ 32.09(6g) does not allow for the valuation of temporary 
easements. 
¶9 
In 118th Street, the Department of Transportation 
(DOT) obtained a TLE to build a new driveway to connect a 
commercial property to a different street after DOT's relocation 
of 118th Avenue caused the commercial property to lose access to 
the avenue.  118th Street, 359 Wis. 2d 30, ¶11.  As a result, 
the commercial property's fair market value declined and the LLC 
that owned the commercial property sought compensation for the 
diminution in value under § 32.09(6g).  Id., ¶12.  In a 
footnote, the majority acknowledged that there are at least 
three reasons why § 32.09(6g) may not apply to TLEs at all: 
(1) the statute references "easements" and not "temporary 
limited easements"; (2) the before-and-after valuation creates 
confusion because it may fail to capture the temporary nature of 
a TLE; and (3) TLEs terminate upon completion of the project and 
thus 
the 
"after" 
valuation 
would 
leave 
no 
avenue 
for 
compensation for the TLE no longer in effect.  Id., ¶36 n.12.  
Nonetheless, the opinion assumed without deciding that a TLE was 
compensable under § 32.09(6g).  Id., ¶58.  We ultimately 
concluded that the project as a whole caused the diminution in 
value, not the TLE used to construct the driveway.  Id., ¶61.  
Now we take the opportunity to more fully analyze whether 
§ 32.09(6g) applies to TLEs. 
No. 
2020AP307 
 
6 
 
¶10 We begin with the language of § 32.09(6g), which 
reads: 
In the case of the taking of an easement, the 
compensation to be paid by the condemnor shall be 
determined by deducting from the fair market value of 
the whole property immediately before the date of 
evaluation, the fair market value of the remainder 
immediately after the date of evaluation, assuming the 
completion of the public improvement and giving 
effect, without allowance of offset for general 
benefits, 
and 
without 
restriction 
because 
of 
enumeration but without duplication, to the items of 
loss or damage to the property enumerated in sub. 
(6)(a) to (g) where shown to exist. 
We interpret this statute by looking to the text's plain 
meaning, giving the words their "common, ordinary, and accepted 
meaning."  See, e.g., Cree Inc. v. LIRC, 2022 WI 15, ¶16, 400 
Wis. 2d 827, 970 N.W.2d 837; Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1). 
¶11 Section 32.09(6g) concerns easements.  In Garza v. Am. 
Transm. Co., we stated that "an easement grants a right to use 
another's land."  2017 WI 35, ¶23, 374 Wis. 2d 555, 893 N.W.2d 
1.  The Wisconsin DOT Real Estate Program Manual sets out two 
categories of easements that can be acquired for eminent domain6 
projects: permanent easements and TLEs.  See Wisconsin DOT Real 
Estate Program Manual 2.4.6.3-2.4.6.4 (updated Mar. 2020).  The 
manual describes a TLE as "an interest in land that is limited 
in purpose and time."  In the specific context of a taking by 
eminent domain, the purpose of a TLE is "for construction," and 
                                                 
6 Eminent domain is "the inherent power of a governmental 
entity to take privately owned property, esp. land, and convert 
it to public use, subject to reasonable compensation for the 
taking."  Eminent Domain, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 
2019). 
No. 
2020AP307 
 
7 
 
all TLEs "expire at the completion of the construction project."  
Id. at 2.4.6.4. 
¶12 Section 32.09(6g) establishes that compensation for 
the "taking of an easement" be measured by "deducting from the 
fair market value of the whole property immediately before the 
date of evaluation, the fair market value of the remainder 
immediately 
after 
the 
date 
of 
evaluation, 
assuming 
the 
completion of the public improvement."  Although the statute 
does not label it as such, this before-and-after valuation of 
the whole property incorporates what is known as "severance 
damages."  Severance damages are defined as "compensation 
awarded to a landowner for the loss in value of the tract that 
remains after a partial taking of the land."  Damages: severance 
damages, Black's Law Dictionary 491 (11th ed. 2019); see also 
Brenner v. New Richmond Reg'l Airport Comm'n, 2012 WI 98, ¶13 
n.5, 343 Wis. 2d 320, 816 N.W.2d 291; 9 Nichols on Eminent 
Domain § 14.02[2] (2021) ("In a before and after calculation, 
severance 
damages 
are 
not 
separately 
calculated 
but 
are 
automatically factored into the calculation of the value of the 
reminder after the taking[.]").7 
¶13 Facially, § 32.09(6g) does not differentiate between a 
TLE and a permanent easement, and thus both Backus and the 
County maintain that the statute applies to all easements——
temporary and permanent alike.  That said, we are "not bound by 
the parties' interpretation of the law or obligated to accept a 
                                                 
7 The parties also refer to this as "proximity damages." 
No. 
2020AP307 
 
8 
 
party's concession of law."  State v. Carter, 2010 WI 77, ¶50, 
327 Wis. 2d 1, 785 N.W.2d 516.  In this case, DOT offered an 
amicus brief arguing that the statute does not apply to TLEs.  
DOT contends that TLEs should be compensated according to the 
Wisconsin Constitution and common law principles.8 
¶14 We 
agree 
with 
DOT 
and 
hold 
that 
portions 
of 
§ 32.09(6g) necessarily limit its application to permanent 
easements alone.  As a practical matter, § 32.09(6g)'s before-
and-after valuation methodology is a poor fit for TLEs.  As the 
definitive treatise on eminent domain law explains "[t]he 
valuation of permanent easements is a difficult task and the 
valuation of temporary easements is even more difficult," and 
while the before-and-after valuation method is typical for 
permanent easements, it does not "logically apply to valuing 
temporary easements because [that] method attempts to measure 
permanent reductions in fair market value."  See Nichols 
§ G32.08[1][a] & [1][e]. 
¶15 The language of § 32.09(6g) also conflicts with that 
provision's application to TLEs.  The term "remainder," as 
contrasted with "whole property," is particularly informative as 
the former denotes that the property has been divided or severed 
in some way.  See Remainder Oxford English Dictionary ("[T]hat 
which remains when a part has been taken away, used, or 
otherwise dealt with; the rest," or "the remaining part or 
                                                 
8 See Wis. Const. art. I, § 13. 
No. 
2020AP307 
 
9 
 
fragment of something.").9  But a TLE takes land only for 
temporary use; all portions of the land and related rights 
remain under the property owner's control upon the TLE's 
termination.  See Nichols § G32.01[3] (delineating that one 
difference between temporary and permanent takings is that in 
temporary takings, "after the taking period expires, the 
landowner's legal interest and occupation is reestablished").  
Without a continuing division or severance of land, what 
"remainder" is there to value? 
¶16 TLEs are further inconsistent with the statutory 
language setting out the benchmark for the before-and-after 
valuations.  The "before" value captures the value of the whole 
property immediately before the easement is recorded. The 
"after" value is calculated assuming "the completion of the 
public improvement."  § 32.09(6g).  But by definition all TLEs 
expire upon completion of the public improvement, so to assume 
the completion of the public improvement is to also assume the 
termination of the TLE.  In other words, the "before" value 
captures the value of the property before the TLE exists and the 
                                                 
9 Although the use of "remainder" in this context may be 
susceptible to a technical, industry specific definition, 
treatises and guides appear to use the term consistent with this 
common and ordinary meaning to reference what is left after a 
partial taking.  See, i.e., 9 Nichols on Eminent Domain 
§ 14.02[3][c][iv] (2021) ("When a partial taking reduces the 
size or shape of the remainder to such a degree that it 
negatively affects what can be constructed on the remainder in 
the after, the owner has been damaged."); Wisconsin DOT Real 
Estate Program Manual 2.4.1.1 ("The appraiser must keep in mind 
that valuing the part taken as a separate entity results in a 
total taking.  There is no remainder[.]"). 
No. 
2020AP307 
 
10 
 
"after" value assumes the TLE has ceased to exist.  A before-
and-after valuation therefore never captures the actual value of 
the TLE while it exists.  Instead, the before-and-after 
valuation will capture the effect the public improvement project 
as a whole has on the fair market value of the property, which 
is not the correct compensation amount.  See 118th Street, 359 
Wis. 2d 30, ¶43 (stating that easement damages "are limited to 
those caused by the easement at issue"). 
¶17 That 
is 
precisely 
what 
happened 
in 
this 
case.  
Backus's expert evaluated the fair market value of the property 
before the Project began and after the Project was completed by 
using comparable sales from the area that were also affected by 
the Project.  But this method captured the value of the property 
before the TLE was recorded and after the TLE was terminated.  
As such, the expert captured and compared the value of the exact 
same property interests——the whole property burdened with the 
HHS Easement but not the TLE.  Logically, this before-and-after 
valuation cannot represent the value of the TLE because the TLE 
never factors into the equation.  This is a stark example of why 
a TLE cannot be compensated under the before-and-after fair 
market value method of § 32.09(6g). 
¶18 Finally, even though subsec. (6g) incorporates the 
possibility of non-duplicative recovery for items of loss or 
damages listed in § 32.09(6)(a)-(g), those items contemplate 
permanent losses or involve damages from "actual severance of 
land" and thus would compensate for only limited aspects of a 
No. 
2020AP307 
 
11 
 
TLE.10  Indeed, appraisers regularly rely on § 32.09(6g)'s 
"without restriction because of enumeration" language to use 
common unenumerated valuation methods that better capture a 
TLE's value.  In this case, for example, both Backus and the 
County considered the TLE's rental value despite rental value 
being absent from § 32.09(6)'s enumerated list.  However, the 
availability of an unrestricted list of additional damages in 
§ 32.09(6) does not cure the fact that § 32.09(6g) requires a 
                                                 
10 Items 
of 
loss 
or 
damage 
listed 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.09(6)(a)-(g) are as follows: 
(a) Loss of land including improvements and fixtures 
actually taken. 
(b) Deprivation or restriction of existing right of 
access to highway from abutting land . . . . 
(c) Loss of air rights. 
(d) Loss of a legal nonconforming use. 
(e) Damages resulting from actual severance of land 
including 
damages 
resulting 
from 
severance 
of 
improvements or fixtures and proximity damage to 
improvements remaining on condemnee's land.  In 
determining severance damages under this paragraph, 
the condemnor may consider damages which may arise 
during 
construction 
of 
the 
public 
improvement, 
including 
damages 
from 
noise, 
dirt, 
temporary 
interference with vehicular or pedestrian access to 
the property and limitations on use of the property. 
 . . .  
(f) Damages to property abutting on a highway right-
of-way due to change of grade where accompanied by a 
taking of land. 
(g) Cost of fencing reasonably necessary to separate 
land taken from remainder of condemnee's land . . . . 
No. 
2020AP307 
 
12 
 
before-and-after 
valuation 
and 
before-and-after 
valuations 
logically do not capture the value of a TLE.11 
¶19 Given that the method listed in § 32.09(6g) cannot 
capture the value of a TLE, the far more reasonable reading of 
that statute is that it applies only to easements that continue 
to exist beyond the completion of a public improvement project.  
Therefore, § 32.09(6g) does not apply to TLEs, which must 
instead be compensated under constitutional and common law 
principles.12 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶20 Because 
the 
text 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.09(6g) 
is 
incompatible with the valuation of a TLE, we hold that 
compensation for a TLE is not calculated under the methodology 
of § 32.09(6g). 
By the Court.—Reversed and cause remanded. 
 
                                                 
11 The statutory language says that "the compensation to be 
paid by the condemnor shall be determined by" the before-and-
after analysis.  § 32.09(6g)(emphasis added). The word "shall" 
is generally presumed mandatory when it appears in a statute.  
See State v. Fitzgerald, 2019 WI 69, ¶25 n.8, 387 Wis. 2d 384, 
929 N.W.2d 165. 
12 To be abundantly clear, this opinion does not limit a 
property owner's access to compensation for any provable damages 
caused by a TLE.  This includes, but is not limited to elements 
of value currently included in the WI DOT Real Estate Program 
Manual section 2.4.6.4 such as the rental value of the TLE and 
damages for permanent loss of site improvements within the TLE.  
We do not speculate about the extent of Backus's damages. 
No.  2020AP307.rgb 
 
1 
 
 
¶21 REBECCA 
GRASSL 
BRADLEY, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
certified question in this case has an obvious answer; in fact, 
both parties agree that a temporary limited easement (TLE) is 
compensable under Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g).  Section 32.09(6g) 
begins with the phrase, "[i]n the case of the taking of an 
easement[.]"  (Emphasis added.)  Ignoring this clear language, 
the majority errs by inserting the word "permanent" in front of 
the word "easement."  The majority usurps the legislature's 
lawmaking power with this rewrite of duly enacted law.1  See, 
e.g., State v. Neill, 2020 WI 15, ¶23, 390 Wis. 2d 248, 938 
N.W.2d 521 ("One of the maxims of statutory construction is that 
courts should not add words to a statute to give it a certain 
meaning."  (quoting Fond Du Lac County v. Town of Rosendale, 149 
Wis. 2d 326, 334, 440 N.W.2d 818 (Ct. App. 1989))).   
¶22 The 
majority 
also 
disregards 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.09(intro.) which states, "[i]n all matters involving the 
determination 
of 
just 
compensation 
in 
eminent 
domain 
proceedings, 
the 
following 
rules 
shall 
be 
followed[.]"2  
(Emphasis added.)  Although there are no statutory exceptions, 
                                                 
1 The legislature knows how to refer to a specific subset of 
easements.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § (6r)(a) ("In the case of a 
taking of an easement in lands zoned or used for agricultural 
purposes . . . .").  It did not qualify the word in any manner 
in the statute we interpret in this case. 
2 The majority is selective in its interpretation of the 
word 
"shall," 
rendering 
it 
optional 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.09(intro.) but deeming it compulsory in § 32.09(6)(g).  See 
majority op., ¶18 n.11 ("The word 'shall' is generally presumed 
mandatory when it appears in a statute."  (citation omitted)). 
No.  2020AP307.rgb 
 
2 
 
the majority nevertheless tells Gregory M. Backus (and all 
similarly situated property owners) their remedies lie beyond 
the statute, which is unequivocally applicable to "all matters" 
regarding "just compensation" in an "eminent domain proceeding."3  
Under the majority's restructured statutory scheme, "shall be 
followed" 
is 
rewritten 
to 
"may 
be 
followed"——if 
in 
the 
majority's view there is a better "fit" somewhere beyond the 
statute. 
¶23 The majority also threatens individual freedom by 
eroding private property rights.  Even though Backus claims to 
have suffered substantial damages, the majority's statutory 
rewrite will likely limit Backus' damages to merely $1,705 for 
the purported "rental value" of the interest taken in his 
property.  The majority takes diminution in fair market value 
off 
the 
table 
based 
on 
its 
misguided 
sense 
that 
the 
legislature's 
formula 
for 
compensating 
a 
TLE 
taking 
is 
inadequate.  Its misinterpretation of the law calls into 
question the constitutionality of Wisconsin's scheme for just 
compensation in cases of TLEs.  See generally 1 William 
Blackstone, 
Commentaries 
*135 
(explaining 
the 
State 
is 
"oblige[d]" to pay property owners "a reasonable price" when it 
"indulges" its great power of eminent domain). 
¶24 In recognition of the primacy of private property 
rights as a first principle, the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:  "[N]or 
shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
                                                 
3 Id., ¶19. 
No.  2020AP307.rgb 
 
3 
 
compensation."4  This constitutional protection of property 
rights is "necessary to preserve freedom" and "empowers persons 
to shape and to plan their own destiny in a world where 
governments 
are 
always 
eager 
to 
do 
so 
for 
them."  
Murr v. Wisconsin, 582 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1943 (2017).  
"The Founders recognized that the protection of private property 
is indispensable to the promotion of individual freedom.  As 
John Adams tersely put it, '[p]roperty must be secured, or 
liberty cannot exist.'"  Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 594 
U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2071 (2021) (quoting Discourses on 
Davila, in 6 Works of John Adams 280 (C. Adams ed. 1851)); see 
also Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. 627, 657 (1829) (Story, J.) 
("The fundamental maxims of a free government seem to require, 
that the rights of personal liberty and private property should 
be held sacred."  (emphasis added)). 
¶25 The majority's error stems in part from a fundamental 
misunderstanding of basic property law principles.  But often 
motivating a court's decision to disregard the law as written is 
a desire to improve the legislature's work, which the majority 
in this case deems unreasonable.  Once again dangerously 
distorting a canon of statutory construction to achieve a result 
the majority favors, the majority is oblivious to the damage it 
inflicts on private property rights.  I dissent. 
                                                 
4 Article I, Section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
mirrors the language of the Fifth Amendment's Taking Clause:  
"The property of no person shall be taken for public use without 
just compensation therefor."  Whether Wisconsin's constitutional 
guarantee affords greater protection to property owners is 
beyond the scope of this case.   
No.  2020AP307.rgb 
 
4 
 
I.  A FINE FIT 
¶26 The majority begins its analysis by noting, "[a]s a 
practical matter, [Wis. Stat.] § 32.09(6g)'s before-and-after 
methodology is a poor fit for TLEs."5  This emphasis on 
"practical[ity]" and "fit" is antithetical to the job of the 
judge, which is to apply the statute's meaning despite judicial 
misgivings, not to second-guess the legislature's wisdom in 
choosing to enact it.  Although the majority purports to apply 
the statute's plain meaning, it couches its explanation for 
deciding 
TLEs 
are 
something 
other 
than 
easements 
in 
consequentialist rather than textual terms, another "transparent 
revelation of the results-oriented motivations underlying its 
opinion."  Container Life Cycle Mgmt. v. Dep't Nat. Res., 2022 
WI 45, ¶78, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __ (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, 
J., dissenting).  The majority rejects the statutory text, which 
applies——without limitation or qualification——to easements, in 
favor of a construction the majority thinks will "produce 
sensible, desirable results, since that is surely what the 
legislature must have intended.  But it is precisely because 
people differ over what is sensible and what is desirable that 
we elect those who will write our laws——and expect courts to 
observe what has been written."  Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. 
Garner, Reading Law:  The Interpretation of Legal Texts 22 
(2012). 
¶27 For at least the third time this term, the majority 
misappropriates the absurd or unreasonable results canon of 
                                                 
5 Majority op., ¶14. 
No.  2020AP307.rgb 
 
5 
 
statutory construction as a cover for rewriting a statute it 
deems deficient.  "[E]rror-correction for absurdity can be a 
slippery slope.  It can lead to judicial revision of public and 
private texts to make them (in the judges' view) more 
reasonable."  Id. at 237.  "It is a misuse of the canon to 
invoke it as a tool for discarding the plain meaning of an 
unambiguous statute in favor of an interpretation" preferred by 
the majority.  Brown County v. Brown Cnty. Taxpayers Ass'n, 2022 
WI 13, ¶84, 400 Wis. 2d 781, 971 N.W.2d 491 (Rebecca Grassl 
Bradley, J., dissenting).  "The oddity or anomaly of certain 
consequences may be a perfectly valid reason for choosing one 
textually permissible interpretation over another, but it is no 
basis for disregarding or changing the text."  See Scalia & 
Garner, Reading Law, at 237.   
¶28 "Although the absurd or unreasonable results canon 
applies only rarely and in rather narrow circumstances, many 
courts cannot resist the temptation to invoke it to justify a 
preferred outcome."  Container Life Cycle Mgmt., __ Wis. 2d __, 
¶79.  "The absurdity doctrine applies only to textual errors 
that may be fixed 'by changing or supplying a particular word or 
phrase whose inclusion or omission was obviously a technical or 
ministerial error.'"  Schwab v. Schwab, 2021 WI 67, ¶44 n.1, 397 
Wis. 2d 820, 
961 
N.W.2d 56 
(Rebecca 
Grassl 
Bradley, 
J., 
dissenting) (quoting Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 238); see 
also State ex rel. Associated Indem. Corp. v. Mortensen, 224 
Wis. 398, 402, 272 N.W. 457 (1937) (explaining the unreasonable 
results canon does "not . . . justify a court in amending the 
No.  2020AP307.rgb 
 
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statute or giving it a meaning to which its language is not 
susceptible merely to avoid what the court believes are 
inequitable or unwise results").   
¶29 In this case, the majority changes the text to exempt 
TLEs from a statute that facially and when read in context with 
surrounding statutes unequivocally applies to any sort of 
easement, whether temporary or permanent.  See State v. Grunke, 
2008 WI 82, ¶31, 311 Wis. 2d 439, 752 N.W.2d 769 (explaining the 
unreasonable results canon applies only "when [a different] 
interpretation would render the relevant statute contextually 
inconsistent or would be contrary to the clearly stated purpose 
of the statute").  Wisconsin Stat. § 32.09(6g) does not display 
any obvious technical or ministerial errors, so the unreasonable 
results canon cannot justify the majority's insertion of the 
word "permanent" as a limitation on the types of easements to 
which the statute applies.  Nothing about the statutory language 
makes it susceptible to such judicial amendment, particularly 
because the majority's revision also violates the text of 
§ 32.09(intro.) by creating just compensation cases to which the 
statute does not apply despite an unequivocal command to apply 
it 
to 
"all 
matters 
involving 
the 
determination 
of 
just 
compensation in eminent domain proceedings[.]" 
¶30 "[T]he ideal rule for the honest judge is, 'garbage 
in/garbage out[.]'"  Antonin Scalia, Q&A Justice Antonin Scalia, 
C-SPAN 
(July 
19, 
2012), 
https://www.c-
span.org/video/transcript/?id=8335.  "If you're dealing with an 
inane statute you are duty bound to produce an inane result."  
No.  2020AP307.rgb 
 
7 
 
Id.  Properly interpreted, there is nothing inane about Wis. 
Stat. § 32.09(6g) or its application to a TLE.  The before-and-
after methodology actually "fit[s]" just fine, and the majority 
is wrong to conclude otherwise; however, even if the majority's 
concerns were valid, the unreasonable results canon would not 
apply.  The unreasonable results canon is not a license to 
inject judicial policy preferences into the written law.  "If 
courts 
ignored 
the 
law 
every 
time 
they 
deem 
a 
result 
unreasonable, the rule of law would be supplanted by the rule of 
judges."  Schwab, 397 Wis. 2d 820, ¶44 n.1.  "Misapplication of 
the canon disturbs the constitutional allocation of power among 
the branches of government."  Container Life Cycle Mgmt., __ 
Wis. 2d __, ¶79.   
¶31 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.09(6g) instructs the evaluator to 
assess the fair market value immediately before the property 
became 
encumbered 
and 
its 
value 
immediately 
thereafter.  
Effectively, 
for 
a 
TLE, 
the 
evaluator 
must 
capture 
the 
"[d]iminution of the fair market value of the property during 
the period of the taking."  9 Nichols on Eminent Domain 
§ G.32.08[1][e] 
(2021). 
 
As 
this 
treatise 
acknowledges, 
sometimes determining the diminution in fair market value caused 
by the taking of a TLE is challenging; however, this court is 
not at liberty to cast aside a statutory command merely because 
its application may be difficult. 
¶32 Consider if Backus were trying to sell his property on 
the date of the taking, which is the statutory "date of 
evaluation" for purposes of the fair market value calculations.   
No.  2020AP307.rgb 
 
8 
 
118th St. Kenosha, LLC v. Wis. Dep't of Transp., 2014 WI 125, 
¶37 n.13, 359 Wis. 2d 30, 856 N.W.2d 486 ("The 'date of 
evaluation' generally is the date on which the easement is 
acquired.").  Before the taking, Backus' property was worth 
$308,000, so he uses that as the list price.  Prospective buyers 
learn that Waukesha County has a TLE giving it: 
[The] right to construct a highway project, including 
the placement or removal of soil, grading of roadway 
slopes, and the creation of fill or cut slopes in 
the . . . area to match the new roadway grade, as well 
as the right of ingress and engress as long as 
required for the construction of the highway project, 
including the right to preserve, protect, remove or 
plant 
thereon 
any 
vegetation 
that 
the 
highway 
authorities may deem necessary or desirable. . . .  
The above temporary limited easement is to terminate 
upon the completion of this project or on the day the 
highway is open to the traveling public, whichever is 
later. 
The fair market value of Backus' property is adversely impacted 
by the TLE; prospective buyers prefer to purchase unencumbered 
property.  The damage to fair market value in this case may be 
amplified by the TLE's expansive and unlimited "rights" accorded 
the government.  The "right to construct a highway project" 
clause is followed by "including," after which the TLE details a 
non-exhaustive list of what the construction right encompasses.  
A canon of construction presumes "include" and its derivatives 
"introduce[] examples" and "not an exhaustive list."  Scalia & 
Garner, Reading Law, at 132.  The TLE grants Waukesha County the 
additional right to make permanent changes to the land (e.g., 
"remove or plant thereon any vegetation").  Although the 
incursion may be temporary, in some situations the aftereffects 
No.  2020AP307.rgb 
 
9 
 
are not.  Backus alleges this is one of those cases, and in 
denying Waukesha County's motion for summary judgment, the 
circuit court properly recognized this disputed issue of fact 
belongs to the jury to resolve. 
 
¶33 The majority creates the illusion that this TLE was 
set to terminate upon the completion of the construction 
project, ignoring the actual terms of the TLE.  The majority 
truncates the TLE's termination language,6 which provides, "[t]he 
above temporary limited easement is to terminate upon the 
completion of this project or on the day the highway is open to 
the traveling public, whichever is later."  (Emphasis added.)  
By the TLE's own terms, the public improvement could be complete 
but the TLE would not expire if the highway were not "open to 
the traveling public[.]"  Contrary to the majority's assertion, 
"all TLEs" do not "expire at the completion of the construction 
project."7   
 
¶34 The majority's "poor fit" rationale rests on its 
erroneous 
belief 
that 
all 
TLEs 
terminate 
upon 
project 
completion.  They don't.  As the majority notes, the after value 
is 
calculated 
"assuming 
'the 
completion 
of 
the 
public 
improvement.'"8  Because the majority erroneously believes that 
"all TLEs expire upon completion of the public improvement" it 
erroneously concludes that "to assume completion of the public 
                                                 
6 Id., ¶3 n.3. 
7 Id., ¶11 (quoting Wisconsin DOT Real Estate Program Manual 
2.4.6.4 (updated Mar. 2020)). 
8 Id., ¶16 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g)). 
No.  2020AP307.rgb 
 
10 
 
improvement is to also assume the termination of the TLE.  In 
other words, the 'before' value captures the value of the 
property before the TLE exists and the 'after' value assumes the 
TLE has ceased to exist.  A before-and-after valuation therefore 
never captures the actual value of the TLE while it exists."9  
The majority misinterprets the statutory language.   
¶35 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.09(6g)'s method of determining 
damages does not calculate "after" damages based on the 
expiration of the TLE; rather, "[t]he 'date of evaluation' 
generally is the date on which the easement is acquired."  118th 
St. Kenosha, LLC, 359 Wis. 2d 30, ¶37 n.13.  Accordingly, 
"compensation for an easement is calculated by considering the 
fair market value of the whole property immediately before and 
after the 'date of evaluation'" which is "the date on which the 
easement is acquired."  Id., ¶37.  If the majority applied the 
actual 
terms 
of 
the 
TLE 
instead 
of 
hypothetical 
facts 
(apparently based on assertions in Wisconsin Department of 
Transportation (DOT) guidance documents), the before-and-after 
methodology (properly applied) could easily capture the impact 
of the TLE on the fair market value of the property.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 32.09(6g) may require the evaluator to assume completion 
of the public improvement; however, it does not command the 
evaluator assume the highway is open to the public.  
¶36 What the majority characterizes as "the actual value 
of the TLE while it exists"10 may be captured by language of the 
                                                 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
No.  2020AP307.rgb 
 
11 
 
statute the majority does not address anywhere in its opinion11:  
"In determining severance damages under this paragraph, the 
condemnor 
may 
consider 
damages 
which 
may 
arise 
during 
construction of the public improvement, including damages from 
noise, dirt, temporary interference with vehicular or pedestrian 
access to the property and limitations on use of the property."  
Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6)(e).  And if those damages do not 
adequately capture the property owner's actual damages, the 
statute does not preclude consideration or utilization of other 
measures of damages because "the compensation to be paid by the 
condemnor" is "without restriction because of enumeration" under 
§ 32.09(6g). 
II.  A THREAT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 
¶37 The majority's "poor fit" rationale is not the 
majority's only error.  As explained in the prior section, the 
majority 
misapplies 
legal 
terms 
of 
art 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.09(6g).  Properly understood, those terms pose no barrier 
to Backus' argument, as even Waukesha County concedes.  More 
fundamentally, the majority's misunderstanding of fundamental 
property law principles endangers private property rights.  
Taking the majority's reasoning to its logical conclusion, there 
has not even been a taking in this case. 
¶38 First, the majority states the word "remainder" ("as 
contrasted with 'whole property'") means "[t]hat which remains 
when a part has been taken away, used, or otherwise dealt with; 
                                                 
11 The majority relegates the language to a footnote and 
never analyzes it.  Id., ¶18 n.10. 
No.  2020AP307.rgb 
 
12 
 
the rest," or "the remaining part or fragment of something."12  
The majority then claims, "a TLE takes land only for temporary 
use; all portions of the land remain under the property owner's 
control upon the TLE's termination. . . .  Without a continuing 
division or severance of land, what 'remainder' is there to 
value?"13  The majority seems to suggest Waukesha County did not 
take any property at all, in which case, no compensation is due; 
however, the majority acknowledges the taking of a TLE is 
compensable.  With such conflicting statements, the majority 
only compounds the confusion spawned by its opinion.  See 
generally Zinn v. State, 112 Wis. 2d 417, 427–28, 334 N.W.2d 67 
(1983) ("[I]t would violate the constitutional mandate of the 
just compensation clauses of the Wisconsin and United States 
Constitutions 
to 
hold 
that 
a 
temporary 
taking 
is 
not 
compensable."). 
¶39 The majority's error in this regard stems from its 
failure 
to 
consider 
the 
temporal 
component 
of 
property.  
Although the TLE eventually expired, its expiration does not 
restore the temporal interest taken.  A taking occurs whenever 
"government action directly interferes with or substantially 
disturbs the owner's use and enjoyment of the property."  Bros. 
v. United States, 594 F.2d 740, 741–42 (9th Cir. 1979) (citation 
omitted); see also Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co., 80 
U.S. 166, 179 (1871) ("[T]here are [nu]merous authorities to 
                                                 
12 Id., ¶15 (quoting Remainder, Oxford English Dictionary 
(edition and year not provided)). 
13 Id. 
No.  2020AP307.rgb 
 
13 
 
sustain the doctrine that a serious interruption to the common 
and necessary use of property may be . . . equivalent to the 
taking of it, and that under the constitutional provisions it is 
not necessary that the land should be absolutely taken.").  
Although the government's interference or disturbance of private 
property may end at some point, it is nonetheless a compensable 
taking. 
¶40 "The right to exclude is 'one of the most treasured' 
rights of property ownership."  Cedar Point Nursery, 141 S. Ct. 
at 2072 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 
458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982)).  Even if the government's invasion of 
Backus' land did not cause permanent or physical damage to his 
property, the government's invasion is a taking for which Backus 
must be compensated.  "According to Blackstone, the very idea 
of property entails 'that sole and despotic dominion which one 
man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, 
in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the 
universe.'"  Id. at 2072 (quoting 2 William Blackstone, 
Commentaries *2).  "[T]he right to exclude is 'universally held 
to be a fundamental element of the property right,' and is 'one 
of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are 
commonly characterized as property.'"  Id. (quoting Aetna v. 
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176, 179–80 (1979)). 
¶41  Backus alleges more than an interference with his 
right to exclude, however; he also claims the TLE adversely 
affected the value of the remainder by creating a permanent 
embankment——in the easement area——with damaged and dying trees 
No.  2020AP307.rgb 
 
14 
 
on his property.  Backus also alleges that trees and other 
vegetation were removed and not replaced.  Nevertheless, the 
majority asks, "[w]ithout a continuing division or severance of 
land, what 'remainder' is there to value?"14  The majority seems 
to ignore Backus' complaint altogether.   
¶42 The majority couples its faulty understanding of 
"remainder" with its equally faulty conception of "severance 
damages," a phrase appearing nowhere in Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g).  
It 
asserts 
"[t]he 
term 
'remainder' . . . 
is 
particularly 
informative as it denotes that the property has been divided or 
severed in some way."15  The majority seems to think "severance" 
means physical division or detachment.  The majority is wrong. 
¶43 Severance damages do not presuppose the government 
permanently took a physical parcel of land.  Severance damages 
compensate a property owner whose interest in the land has been 
taken——severed from the remaining interests in the land, 
resulting in a loss to the remainder's fair market value.  E.g., 
Narloch v. State Dep't of Transp., Div. of Highways, Div. II, 
115 Wis. 2d 419, 422 n.2, 340 N.W.2d 542 (1983) ("Severance 
damage means the diminution in value of the remaining property 
resulting from the taking."  (citation omitted)); Wis. JI——Civil 
8102, at 1 (2008) ("Severance damages reduce the fair market 
value 
of 
the 
remaining 
property 
because 
of 
the 
partial 
taking."); see also United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 376 
(1943) (explaining that "severance damages" is a "somewhat 
                                                 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
No.  2020AP307.rgb 
 
15 
 
loosely" used phrase and defining it to "include any element of 
value arising out of the relation of the part taken to the 
entire tract"  (emphasis added)); 26 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent Domain 
§ 281 (updated May 2022) ("A landowner may recover as just 
compensation not only the fair market value of land actually 
taken but also damages for injuries to the owner's remaining 
lands, frequently called 'severance damages.'  An award may be 
made for any diminution in the value of the remainder as long as 
those damages are directly caused by the taking itself.").  "In 
the case of an easement," "[s]everance damages," are calculated 
by "us[ing] the fair market value of the entire tract 
immediately before and immediately after the taking."  Ala. 
Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Jones, 574 So. 2d 734, 735 (Ala. 1990) 
(citation omitted). 
¶44 The majority's misconception of severance damages 
permeates its discussion of Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6).  That 
subsection contains an illustrative list of damages a property 
owner may seek in addition to the diminution in fair market 
value.  The statute commands "giving effect" to "items of loss 
or damages to the property" regardless of whether the statute 
specifies them ("without restriction because of enumeration but 
without duplication") provided the property owner proves them 
("where shown to exist").  Despite this unambiguous language, 
the majority treats the list as if it were exhaustive, and then 
proclaims, "those items [in the list] contemplate permanent 
losses or involve damages from 'actual severance of land,' and 
No.  2020AP307.rgb 
 
16 
 
thus would compensate for only limited aspects of a TLE."16  The 
majority quotes the "actual severance of land" language in the 
first sentence of § 32.09(6)(e) but conveniently does not 
address the very next sentence of the statute, which is not only 
more expansive but expressly encompasses temporary invasions of 
property: 
 
"In 
determining 
severance 
damages 
under 
this 
paragraph, the condemner may consider damages which may arise 
during construction of the public improvement, including damages 
from noise, dirt, temporary interferences with vehicular or 
pedestrian access to property and limitations on use of the 
property."  This statutory language defeats the majority's 
hyper-literal construction of "actual severance of land."  See 
Brey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2022 WI 7, ¶13, 400 
Wis. 2d 417, 
970 
N.W.2d 1 
(rejecting 
a 
"hyper-literal 
approach"). 
¶45 Contrary to the majority's atextual conclusion that 
the statute is a "poor fit" for anything but permanent 
easements, the statutory language expressly grants compensation 
for "temporary interferences" with access to property, which is 
precisely (at least in part) the taking for which Backus seeks 
to be compensated.  The majority's failure to address the second 
sentence——containing 
the 
non-exhaustive 
list 
of 
possible 
damages——shows the lengths to which the majority will go in 
order to justify its results-oriented decision in this case.  
Backus is statutorily entitled to present evidence of the 
damages he sustained as a result of the TLE, and to recover them 
                                                 
16 Id., ¶18 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6)(e)). 
No.  2020AP307.rgb 
 
17 
 
if "shown to exist."  Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g).  The majority 
instead removes this statutory compensation for takings in the 
form of TLEs.  
 
¶46 If the majority were correct, its logic would seem to 
foreclose Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g)'s application not only to TLEs 
but to many permanent easements as well.  Few easements 
literally "sever" land in a literal and physical sense; 
nevertheless, the United States Constitution requires just 
compensation.  See, e.g., Cedar Point Nursery, 141 S. Ct. at 
2074 (reasoning that "a physical appropriation is a taking 
whether it is permanent or temporary. . . .  [T]he duration of 
an 
appropriation . . . 
bears 
only 
on 
the 
amount 
of 
compensation. . . .  [A]fter finding a taking by physical 
invasion, [this court has] remanded the case to the lower court 
to determine 'whether the easement taken was temporary or 
permanent,' in order to fix the compensation due"  (citations 
omitted; quoted source omitted)).  Section 32.09 was obviously 
drafted to comply with the constitutional command to justly 
compensate property owners whose interests in land are taken by 
the government, however temporarily.  See 260 N. 12th St., LLC 
v. State of Wis. Dep't of Transp., 2011 WI 103, ¶44, 338 
Wis. 2d 34, 808 N.W.2d 372 ("Wisconsin Stat. § 32.09 codifies 
the constitutional requirement that a property owner receive 
just compensation for the taking of his or her property.  
Because § 32.09 is a statute intended to benefit an owner whose 
property is taken against his or her will, we afford it liberal 
construction."  (citations omitted)).  The statute, after all, 
No.  2020AP307.rgb 
 
18 
 
applies "[i]n all matters involving the determination of just 
compensation in eminent domain proceedings[.]"  § 32.09(intro.).  
The majority's engrafting of a permanence prerequisite does not 
comport with the Takings Clause and creates a situation not 
contemplated by the statute's introduction:  a just compensation 
case in which the statute's rules will not be applied. 
¶47 Logically, if Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g) does not apply to 
TLEs, they cannot be easements within the meaning of the 
statute.  And if they are not easements under § 32.09(6g), then 
§ 32.09(6) must govern compensation for their taking.  Section 
32.09(6) applies "[i]n the case of a partial taking of property 
other than an easement" but the majority does not calculate 
compensation under its terms, without explaining why.  Of 
course, the calculation in this case would be no different than 
under § 32.09(6g), so the majority silently deactivates this 
section of the statute too, ostensibly to avoid a "result" it 
regards as "unreasonable." 
II.  CONCLUSION 
¶48 The 
majority 
acknowledges, 
as 
it 
must, 
that 
"[f]acially, [Wis. Stat.] § 32.09(6g) does not differentiate 
between a TLE and a permanent easement, and thus both Backus and 
the County maintain that the statute applies to all easements——
temporary and permanent alike."17  Its entire analysis should 
have 
ended 
there. 
 
Instead, 
the 
majority 
adopts 
an 
underdeveloped argument raised in an amicus brief submitted by 
the self-interested DOT, which advocated for a statutory 
                                                 
17 Id., ¶13. 
No.  2020AP307.rgb 
 
19 
 
construction benefitting the government at the expense of 
property owners.  The result is a bad precedent, to which I 
dissent. 
¶49 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and Justice PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join 
this dissent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2020AP307.rgb 
 
 
 
1