Title: State ex rel. Windeknecht v. Mesmer

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
STATE ex rel. STEPHANIE 
) 
WINDEKNECHT,  
) 
) 
Petitioner, 
) 
) 
v. 
) 
No. SC96159 
) 
ANGELA MESMER, 
) 
) 
Respondent. 
) 
and 
STATE ex rel. JOSHUA HOLMAN, 
) 
) 
Petitioner, 
) 
) 
v. 
) 
No. SC96160 
) 
JENNIFER SACHSE, 
) 
) 
Respondent. 
) 
and 
STATE ex rel. SUMMER ROBINSON, 
) 
) 
Petitioner, 
) 
) 
v. 
) 
No. SC96165 
) 
ANGELA MESMER, 
) 
) 
Respondent. 
) 
Opinion issued October 5, 2017
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and 
 
STATE ex rel. SCARLETT R. ADAMS,  
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Petitioner, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC96187 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
ANGELA MESMER, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Respondent.  
 
 
) 
 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS IN HABEAS CORPUS 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
 
Stephanie Windeknecht, Joshua Holman, Summer Robinson, and Scarlett R. Adams 
(collectively, “Petitioners”) were each charged pursuant to section 570.030.3(1)1 with a 
class C felony for stealing property worth $500 dollars or more but less than $25,000 
dollars. Each pleaded guilty and was sentenced to either six or seven years’ imprisonment 
based on the felony classification. Petitioners, who are each still incarcerated,2 now seek 
habeas corpus relief, relying on this Court’s decision in State v. Bazell, 497 S.W.3d 263 
(Mo. banc 2016) (per curiam). Petitioners claim they were sentenced in excess of the 
maximum sentence authorized by law because the offense of stealing is a class A 
                                              
1  Statutory citations are to RSMo Cum. Supp. 2013. 
2  Windeknecht pleaded guilty in January 2014. She was sentenced to six years and her sentence 
was executed in March 2014. She is currently incarcerated in Audrain County. Holman pleaded 
guilty and was sentenced to two consecutive seven-year terms in July 2008, with the latter sentence 
for class C felony stealing. His sentences were executed in December 2010 and he is currently 
incarcerated in St. Louis County. Robinson pleaded guilty in August 2011. She was sentenced to 
seven years and her sentence was executed in May 2012. She is currently incarcerated in Audrain 
County. Adams pleaded guilty in September 2012. She was sentenced to seven years and her 
sentence was executed in November 2012. She is currently incarcerated in Audrain County.   
3 
 
misdemeanor that could not have been enhanced to a felony pursuant to the statute then in 
effect. Habeas relief is denied.   
I. 
 
At all times relevant to Petitioners’ claims, section 570.030.1 provided: “A person 
commits the crime of stealing if he or she appropriates property or services of another with 
the purpose to deprive him or her thereof, either without his or her consent or by means of 
deceit or coercion.” Section 570.030.9 provided: “Any violation of this section for which 
no other penalty is specified in this section is a class A misdemeanor.” However, 
section 570.030.3(1), pursuant to which Petitioners were charged and convicted, provided:  
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any offense in which the value of property 
or services is an element is a class C felony if . . . [t]he value of the property or services 
appropriated is five hundred dollars or more but less than twenty-five thousand dollars[.]”   
In 2012, the court of appeals addressed a direct appeal wherein the appellant argued 
the offense of stealing could not be enhanced to a class C felony pursuant to section 
570.030.3 because “the value of the property or services” simply is not an element of the 
offense of stealing as defined by section 570.030.1 – and thus the stealing conviction had 
to be classified as a class A misdemeanor. State v. Passley, 389 S.W.3d 180, 182-83 (Mo. 
App. 2012), abrogated by Bazell, 497 S.W.3d at 267 n.3. The court of appeals rejected this 
argument in Passley, holding it would lead “to the absurd and illogical result that the 
legislature chose to amend the stealing statute to provide an enhanced punishment for some 
other offense or offenses but not for the offense [of stealing] mentioned in that very 
statute.” Id. at 184.  Transfer of Passley to this Court was not sought. Four years later, this 
4 
 
Court considered the same argument for the first time. See Bazell, 497 S.W.3d at 266-67. 
In Bazell, this Court came to the opposite conclusion of the court of appeals in Passley, 
explaining: 
Stealing is defined in section 570.030.1 as “appropriat[ing] property or 
services of another with the purpose to deprive him or her thereof, either 
without his consent or by means of deceit or coercion.” The value of the 
property or services appropriated is not an element of the offense of stealing. 
. . . . 
Here, there is no need to resort to tools of interpretation because the language 
of section 570.030.3 is clear. We cannot know why the legislature, in 2002, 
decided to amend section 570.030.3 to add the requirement that only offenses 
for which “the value of property or services is an element” may be enhanced 
to a felony, but this is what the legislature clearly and unambiguously did.  
As a result, section 570.030.3 does not apply here. Defendant’s offenses must 
be classified as misdemeanors because they cannot be enhanced to felonies 
by the terms of section 570.030.3.    
 
Id. (footnotes omitted). This Court also stated Passley “should no longer be followed.” Id. 
at 267 n.3.3 
 
Recently, this Court in State v. Smith, 522 S.W.3d 221 (Mo. banc 2017), reaffirmed 
its holding in Bazell. In rejecting the State’s argument that this Court’s holding in Bazell 
was limited to a felony enhancement made pursuant to section 570.030.3(3), this Court 
explained: 
This argument misconstrues the holding of Bazell and the structure of section 
570.030. Bazell’s analysis regarding the applicability of section 570.030.3 to 
the offense of stealing does not depend on which particular enhancement 
provision is at issue. Instead, Bazell looked at the definition of the offense of 
stealing in section 570.030.1 and held that, because the definition does not 
contain as an element “the value of property or services,” “section 570.030.3 
does not apply here.” Bazell draws no distinction among the numerous 
subcategories enumerated within section 570.030.3. 
 
                                              
3  Section 570.030 has been amended and, effective January 1, 2017, no longer contains the same 
language addressed in Passley and Bazell. 
5 
 
Furthermore, the structure of the statute compels this conclusion because, 
unless the offense contains the value of property or services as an element, 
section 570.030.3, in its entirety, cannot be used to enhance the offense to a 
felony. To argue one of the subcategories for enhancement under section 
570.030.3 can be used to supply the value element for an offense otherwise 
lacking that element is flawed and circular reasoning. Appropriation of 
property or services worth more than $500 may be charged as a felony under 
section 570.030.3(1) only if the underlying offense contains as an element 
“the value of property or services.” 
 
[Furthermore,] Judge Stith’s [dissenting] opinion understates the importance 
of this operative language in the introductory clause of section 570.030.3.  
This language conditions the application of all the subdivisions enumerated 
below it—including section 570.030.3(1)—on the presence of a value 
element in the offense for which enhancement is sought. In other words, 
enhancement pursuant to one of those subdivisions is available “if” “the 
value of property or services” is an element. According to this plain and 
unambiguous statutory language, an offense must contain the “value” 
element before considering whether additional facts justifying enhancement 
under one of the subdivisions of subsection .3 is available. As this Court 
concluded in Bazell, because of this language, “section 570.030.3 does not 
apply here.” 
 
Smith, 522 S.W.3d at 230 (internal citations omitted). 
 
Based on this Court’s decision in Bazell, each of the Petitioners sought habeas relief 
in the appropriate lower courts. See Rules 84.22(a), 91.02(a). After being denied by the 
lower courts, Petitioners sought habeas relief in this Court. Petitioners argue their sentences 
are, according to Bazell, in excess of the maximum authorized by law because the sentences 
should have been based on a class A misdemeanor rather than a class C felony.4 
II. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has held a state supreme court is not 
constitutionally compelled to make retroactive a different interpretation of a state statute. 
                                              
4  The sentence for a class A misdemeanor cannot exceed one year. Section 558.011.1(5). 
6 
 
Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 23-24 (1973) (per curiam).5 “A state in defining the 
limits of adherence to precedent may make a choice for itself between the principle of 
forward operation and that of relation backward.” Id. at 24 (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also State v. Nunley, 341 S.W.3d 611, 623-24 (Mo. banc 2011). Exercising 
this authority, the Court orders the Bazell holding only applies forward, except those cases 
pending on direct appeal.    
Petitioners received a sentence that was authorized by a different interpretation of 
section 570.030 without objection and should not receive the benefit of retroactive 
application of this Court’s decision in Bazell. Habeas relief is, therefore, denied. 
 
All concur. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
5  Although Wainwright dealt with a state supreme court reversing its own prior interpretation of 
a state statute there is no basis to assume this same principle of federalism would not apply to a 
state supreme court’s authority to choose to prospectively apply a different interpretation than a 
prior subordinate appellate court.