Title: Walton v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
PATRICK WALTON, 
 
§ 
No. 59, 2002 
  
 
§ 
     
Defendant Below, 
§ 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below: Superior Court of  
§ 
the State of Delaware in and for 
              v. 
 
§ 
Kent County 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE,       
§ 
Cr. A. No: IK00-10-0170 
§ 
Plaintiff Below, 
§ 
 
 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
Submitted: January 7, 2003 
Decided:  
April 25, 2003 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, HOLLAND, BERGER and STEELE, 
Justices, constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court. REVERSED and REMANDED.  
 
 
Sandra W. Dean, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, Dover, Delaware, for 
Appellant. 
 
John Williams, Esquire, Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware, for Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VEASEY, Chief Justice, for the Majority: 
 
 
 
In this appeal, we revisit the first degree robbery statute which requires the State 
to establish beyond a reasonable doubt both of the following elements:  (1) that the 
defendant commits the crime of robbery in the second degree; and (2) in the course 
thereof, "displays what appears to be a deadly weapon.”1  The present case involves a 
bank robbery where the defendant passed to the bank teller a note in which the 
defendant demanded money and stated that he had a bomb.  In an attempt to prove 
that the defendant “displayed” a bomb, the State presented evidence consisting of  
statements the teller made to a police detective in which she mentioned that she was 
scared and that the robber had his hand in his pocket.  Neither the detective nor the 
teller could elaborate on the defendant’s conduct or explain how the defendant’s hand 
in his pocket appeared to be a bomb.  We hold that a rational factfinder could not infer 
beyond a reasonable doubt from this evidence that the defendant “display[ed] what 
appeared to be a deadly weapon.”  
                                                          
 
1Title 11, Section 832 of the Delaware Code provides, in part:  
 
(a) A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree when the person commits the crime of robbery in  
the second degree and when, in the course of the commission of the crime or of immediate flight 
therefrom, the person or another participant in the crime: 
 
* * * 
(2) Displays what appears to be a deadly weapon[.] 
 
Also, we find no error in the Superior Court's evidentiary ruling refusing to 
admit in evidence defendant's offer of a hearsay statement made by the defendant to a 
psychiatrist.  Because the defendant neither sought treatment from the psychiatrist nor 
 
 
- 3 - 
did he seek to use the psychiatrist’s expert opinion at trial, the trial judge did not abuse 
his discretion by excluding the statement.  
The evidence establishes that the defendant committed the felony of second 
degree robbery.  But the Superior Court's sentence for robbery in the first degree must 
be reversed because the evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt the 
necessary statutory element that the defendant “displays what appears to be a deadly 
weapon," in the course of his commission of second degree robbery. Accordingly, the 
matter is remanded to the Superior Court so that the defendant may be sentenced for 
second degree robbery.   
Facts 
On September 18, 2000, Patrick Walton walked into the West Dover branch of 
Mellon Bank and handed a bank teller, Gita Parikh, a note that read, “I have a bomb.  
Give me all your money and no dye pack.”  Parikh gave Walton $420 in traceable “bait 
money.”  Walton took the money and ran out of the bank.  
The police arrived shortly after the robbery occurred.  Detective Eric Richardson 
of the Dover Police interviewed Parikh.  According to the detective’s notes from the 
interview, Parikh did not see anything that appeared to be a weapon on the robber’s 
person.  She told the detective only that the suspect “did have his hand in his pocket 
 
 
- 4 - 
which scared” her.2  Significantly, she did not say that the hand in the pocket 
"appeared" to be a bomb or other deadly weapon.   
The police recovered a latent fingerprint on the note used in the robbery.  That 
print matched Walton’s fingerprint.  The police arrested Walton shortly after Parikh 
identified him in a photograph lineup.  In a videotaped interview that began shortly 
after his arrest, Walton confessed to committing the robbery.  He explained that he 
owed $500 to his alleged drug dealer and needed the money to settle his debt.  
At trial in the Superior Court, Walton testified that he committed the robbery 
but denied actually having a bomb or displaying anything that appeared to be a bomb.  
His counsel asserted an affirmative defense of duress, claiming that he was forced to rob 
the bank, fearing his alleged drug dealer might kill him if he did not find money to 
repay his debt.  Counsel for Walton argued that the State could not convict him of first 
degree robbery because he did not have a bomb nor did he make any physical gesture 
intended to convince Parikh that he had, or appeared to have, a bomb.  
                                                          
 
2Tr. trans. at 51 (July 3, 2001).   
 
 
- 5 - 
The jury convicted Walton of first degree robbery.  The Superior Court 
sentenced Walton to life imprisonment.3  This is Walton's direct appeal. 
Issues On Appeal 
Walton raises two arguments on appeal.  His principal argument is that the State 
did not produce sufficient evidence for a jury to convict him of first degree robbery.  
The single reference to Walton placing his hand in his pocket, he argues, does not 
amount to a "display" of "what appears to be a deadly weapon," as required by the 
statute.4  He also argues that the trial judge erred by refusing to admit into evidence the 
testimony of a psychiatrist who could have recounted Walton’s fear that his alleged drug 
dealer would murder him if he did not repay his debt.  According to Walton, the 
testimony is a permissible hearsay statement under the diagnosis or treatment exception 
provided by Delaware Rules of Evidence ("DRE") 803(4).  
The State Did Not Present Sufficient Evidence To Find That Walton Displayed 
What Appeared To Be A Deadly Weapon 
 
                                                          
 
3Because he was convicted of committing a felony on two prior occasions, Walton’s first degree robbery 
conviction warranted a life sentence as an habitual offender.  See 11 Del. C. § 4214(b). 
411 Del. C. § 832(a)(2). 
 
 
- 6 - 
Walton asks this Court to overturn his first degree robbery conviction and 
remand his case to the Superior Court for a new sentencing for second degree robbery.  
To do so, we must find that no rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the State, could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential 
elements of first degree robbery:  the elements of second degree robbery and an 
additional aggravating factor.  Walton concedes that the evidence supports the elements 
of second degree robbery:  threatening the immediate use of force against another to 
compel that person to surrender or deliver up property.5  The additional aggravating 
factor that elevates the crime to first degree robbery is that the defendant “displays what 
appears to be a deadly weapon.”6  
The State had difficulty proving the aggravating factor at trial.  Parikh testified 
that she surrendered the money to Walton simply because the bank trained her to do 
so.  She did not testify that Walton "displayed" anything other than the note.  To 
establish the "display" element, the State tried to rely on an earlier statement that Parikh 
made to the investigating officer, Detective Richardson.  At trial, the detective read 
aloud his notes from the interview, which mentioned that,  while Parikh did not see any 
                                                          
 
511 Del. C. § 831(a). 
611 Del. C. § 832(a)(2). 
 
 
- 7 - 
weapons, the suspect “did have his hand in his pocket which scared” the victim.  But 
there was no evidence that the hand in the pocket "appeared to be a deadly weapon."  
Courts rarely confront the obvious case where a defendant "displays what appears 
to be a deadly weapon" by brandishing a real or toy gun.  Robbery often involves a 
subtle threat where the robber gestures toward a deadly weapon or a bulge hidden on 
the person of the robber so that a rational juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the bulge "appeared to be a deadly weapon."7  The boundaries of the conduct 
punishable under the first degree robbery statute are marked by cases where the 
defendant has displayed what appears to be a concealed deadly weapon.  
                                                          
 
7For example, this Court has upheld first degree robbery convictions where the defendant had “placed a hand in 
his jacket pocket and pointed it in the direction of one of the victims as to appear that the robber possessed a weapon,” 
State v. Smallwood, 346 A.2d 164, 166 (Del. 1975), and where a defendant pointed to a bulky object underneath his shirt. 
 Deshields v. State, 706 A.2d 502, 505 (Del. 1998).   
 
 
- 8 - 
To address these difficult cases, this Court has adopted a two-part analysis to 
apply the "display" requirement in Section 832(a)(2).8  First, the victim must subjectively 
believe the defendant has a weapon.9  Second, the defendant’s threat must be 
accompanied by an objective manifestation of a weapon.10  The objective manifestation 
requirement attributes a broad meaning to the term “display” in order to punish the 
robber who gestures toward something that appears to be a concealed deadly weapon on 
the robber's person.11      
Walton first contends that the State did not prove that Parikh subjectively 
believed Walton was armed since Parikh testified at trial that she handed Walton the 
money because the bank trained her to do so as part of routine bank procedure under 
such circumstances.  Nevertheless, Parikh told the detective that she was scared.12 The 
jury could infer from Parikh’s apprehension that she subjectively believed Walton was 
                                                          
 
8Id. 
9Smallwood, 346 A.2d at 166.  This requirement is consistent with an essential element of the offense.  Robbery 
“[r]equires the existence of a named human victim as a material element.”  Coffield v. State, 794 A.2d 588, 592 (Del. 2002).   
10See Deshields, 706 A.2d at 507. 
11Id. 
12The jury was permitted to place greater weight on Parikh’s contemporaneous statement to the detective than to 
her testimony at trial.  Word v. State, 801 A.2d 927, 928 n.4 (Del. 2002) (quoting 11 Del. C. § 3507, which states, “(a) In a 
criminal prosecution, the voluntary out-of-court prior statement of a witness who is present and subject to cross-
examination may be used as affirmative evidence with substantive independent testimonial value”). 
 
 
- 9 - 
armed,13 thus satisfying the subjective element of the State's case.  But that is not the 
end of the inquiry.  
                                                          
 
13See Harrigan v. State, 447 A.2d 1191, 1193 (Del. 1982) (holding that “the circumstances of record, the threats 
and yielding of money . . . show beyond any reasonable doubt the apprehension of the two victims to the display 
manifested by the defendant”).   
 
 
- 10 - 
Walton next argues that Parikh’s statement to Detective Richardson, which 
merely refers to Walton having his hand in his pocket, without any elaboration, cannot 
constitute an “objective physical manifestation” sufficient to support the requirement of 
an objective physical manifestation that the defendant "displays what appears to be a 
deadly weapon."  Walton relies on our decision in Word v. State where we held that the 
State could not prove the defendant “displayed” a gun when the bank teller could not 
see both of the defendant’s hands, one of which may or may not have been in an empty 
bag in which the robber wanted the teller to put the money.  The teller could not recall 
any conduct that amounted to an “objective physical manifestation” of a weapon.14   
The State counters by observing that Parikh observed some physical conduct (i.e., the 
hand in the pocket) that supported her  subjective fear that Walton was armed, whereas 
the teller in Word based her apprehension solely on the threatening note.15  The State 
contends that Walton's handing over the note and having his hand in his pocket 
                                                          
 
14Word v. State, 801 A.2d at 930-31.  In Word we referred, among other cases, to a  summary order of a panel of 
this Court in McKamey v. State, 1997 WL 45060 (Del. Supr.).  See Word, 801 A.2d at 931.  In McKamey we upheld a 
first degree robbery conviction upon evidence showing only that the defendant robbed a cab driver where the defendant 
"sat behind the driver in a moving cab and told the driver that he had a gun."  Id. (quoting McKamey,1992 WL 45060 at 
*2).  We said in Word that we did not "read our summary order in McKamey that was entered before our Deshields 
opinion as reliable precedent to permit a finding of 'displays what appears to be a deadly weapon' where the victim did 
not perceive any display or physical manifestation of a weapon."  Id.  We now conclude that the facts of McKamey 
cannot be substantially  distinguished from the facts in Word or from the facts of the case before us.  Therefore, in this en 
Banc case, we now overrule McKamey to the extent that it is inconsistent with the instant holding or the holding in Word. 
  
15Word, 801 A.2d at 932. 
 
 
- 11 - 
constituted a sufficient basis for a rational jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt 
that this conduct satisfied the element of a "display" of "what appeared to be a deadly 
weapon."  We disagree.   
First, this conduct cannot be construed as a "display."16  Second, the hand in the 
pocket cannot lead to a permissible inference of an "appearance" of a deadly weapon.  
The solitary reference to Walton’s hand in his pocket is not an objective  physical 
manifestation that Walton displayed what appeared to be a bomb.  The State asks us to 
apply the objective manifestation analysis to give “display” a limitless reading that would 
effectively permit a first degree robbery conviction to stand even if the defendant 
displays nothing at all.   
                                                          
 
16According to Webster’s Dictionary, “display” means “to spread before the view: exhibit to the sight or mind: 
give evidence of.”  WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICT. 654 (8th ed. 2000).  We have always 
accorded the word “display” its plain meaning in interpreting Section 832(a)(2).  See Smallwood, 346 A.2d at 166 
(quoting the identical definition from an earlier edition of Webster’s Dictionary).    
 
 
- 12 - 
The State did not present evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Walton supported his threat, “I have a bomb,” with accompanying physical conduct 
that could be viewed objectively as "display[ing] what appears to be a deadly weapon."  
The sole evidence presented to describe Walton’s conduct consisted of Detective 
Richardson’s notes in which Parikh mentioned that the suspect “had his hand in his 
pocket which scared” Parikh.  Richardson testified that Parikh’s statement was a 
response to the question, “Did the suspect have any weapons?”17  His notes merely 
reveal that Parikh did not see a weapon or anything that appeared to be a weapon, only 
that Walton had his hand in his pocket.  This statement, without more, does not even 
suggest that Walton made a gesture toward a bulge or other object on his person that 
“appeared to be a deadly weapon.”18  
                                                          
 
17Tr. trans. at 50 (July 3, 2001).   
18Other jurisdictions addressing statutes similar to Section 832 have also underscored the necessity of an 
objective inquiry because the first degree offense requires more than the threat of deadly force.  See Hughes v. State, 363 
S.E.2d 336, 337 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (requiring “Some physical manifestation of a weapon” to sustain a first degree 
robbery conviction) (quotation omitted); People v. Parker, 339 N.W.2d 455, 459 (Mich. 1983) (reasoning that the fact 
 
 
- 13 - 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
finder must determine that the defendant was “armed” with an article that leads the victim to believe the defendant 
possessed a deadly weapon); State v. Fortune, 608 So.2d 148, 149 (La. 1992) (stating that the first degree robbery statute 
“requires the state to prove that the offender induced a subjective belief in the victim that he was armed with a dangerous 
weapon, and that the victim’s belief was objectively reasonable under the circumstances”); People v. Lopez, 535 NE.2d 
1328, 1332 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that the first degree robbery statute requires the defendant “by his actions, consciously 
manifest the presence of an object to the victim in such a way that the victim reasonably perceives that the defendant has 
a gun”); In re Bratz, 5 P.3d 759, 765 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (adopting a two-part inquiry identical to, and relying upon, 
the Delaware approach articulated in Deshields and Smallwood). 
 
 
- 14 - 
The State's argument is tantamount to a contention that the mere verbal threat of 
a bomb—perhaps strapped to the robber's body hidden by clothing like a suicide 
terrorist—is distinct from a threat involving other deadly weapons and belongs in a 
separate category that  ispo facto establishes a "display."  But the logical extension of 
such a contention would be to create an entirely new statutory category for bomb 
threats that can be satisfied by merely claiming to have a bomb.  This Court is not a 
legislative body and, therefore, cannot create such a special category for bomb threats 
over gun or knife threats.  We are constrained by the limitations of the statute, and we 
may not ignore or trivialize the express statutory elements that are mandated by the 
General Assembly, requiring a "display" of "what appears to be a deadly weapon."19  
                                                          
 
19See State v. Cephas, 637 A.2d 20, 28 (Del. 1994) (“It is the General Assembly and not this Court which has 
the prerogative to legislate.  This Court’s role is to construe existing legislation.”).   
 
 
- 15 - 
The first degree offense hinges on the conduct accompanying the verbal20 threat of 
force rather than the language of the threat itself.21  The "display" is the  conduct  
establishing  the additional, aggravating element that elevates second degree robbery to 
the more serious, first degree offense.  Section 832(a)(2) was initially drafted to punish 
only those defendants that the State could prove were armed with a deadly weapon.22  
The deterrent value of the prior version of Section 832 was diminished to the extent the 
State could not convict a defendant because the weapon could not be recovered for 
trial. When the statute was amended to punish the “display of what appears to be a 
deadly weapon,” the focus of the aggravating factor shifted to the victim’s perception, 
which eased the State’s burden of proof and broadened the range of punishable 
conduct.  We have noted that a different offense, Section 1447, which prohibits the 
possession of a deadly weapon during commission of a felony, deters the defendant 
                                                          
 
20We use the word "verbal" in the dictionary sense to encompass both written and oral communications of the 
threat.  See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICT. 2542 (8th ed. 2000) (defining verbal as “relating to 
words”).   
21See Johnson, 1991 WL 28889 at *2 (“While we agree that a mere physical appearance [of a weapon] will 
suffice, there must be more than the victim’s belief in the existence of a weapon.”).  
22See 11 Del. C. § 832(a)(2) (1973) (“A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree when he commits the crime of 
robbery in the second degree and . . . [i]s armed with a deadly weapon . . .”); See also Del. Crim. Code with Commentary, 
Section 832 (1973) (“Robbery in the first degree is a very serious crime, carrying class B felony punishment, because it 
seems desirable to deter the use of dangerous and deadly weapons, even if simple robbery must occasionally happen.”). 
 
 
 
- 16 - 
from carrying a deadly weapon during a robbery.23 By holding out greater punishment 
for the robber who, at his peril, engages in conduct that leads the victim to believe the 
robber is armed, however, Section 832(a)(2) provides an additional deterrent by holding 
out the possibility of convicting the defendant who is armed but for whom the State 
cannot prove the possession charge under Section 1447.  This additional deterrent 
value would be lost if defendants like Walton are convicted of first degree robbery, 
when no physical conduct supports the deadly threat.   
                                                          
 
23See LeCompte v. State, 516 A.2d 898, 903-04 (Del. 1986).  
 
 
- 17 - 
A verbal threat cannot, itself, be a "display" of what "appears to be a deadly 
weapon."24  If that were so, the elevation from second degree to first degree robbery 
would depend on the sensitivity of each particular victim solely to a verbal threat, and 
would add nothing to the elements of the felony of second degree robbery of which 
Walton is admittedly guilty and will be sentenced.25  
The Trial Court Properly Excluded The Hearsay Statement Walton Made To The 
Psychiatrist Retained To Evaluate Walton’s Mental Competence  
 
Walton contends that the trial judge erred by refusing to admit in evidence the 
offer by Walton of a hearsay statement he made to a psychiatrist who evaluated 
Walton’s competence to stand trial.  During the evaluation, Walton told the psychiatrist 
that shortly before the robbery Walton’s alleged drug dealer held a gun to Walton’s 
head and threatened to kill him if he did not repay his $500 debt.  Although the State 
presented a videotaped confession to the jury in which Walton recounted an identical 
                                                          
 
24A verbal threat is not  sufficient to sustain a first degree robbery conviction because such a threat cannot be 
seen as  a “display” to the victim’s “mind.”  While this Court continues to define “display” as an exhibition to the “sight 
or mind,”  we believe a display “to the mind” necessarily references the defendant’s conduct.  Thus, a display to the mind 
refers to situations where the defendant physically gestures to a concealed weapon on his person.  The “deadly weapon” 
is not displayed to the victim’s sight, but rather to the victim’s mind by forcing the victim reasonably to infer from the 
defendant’s conduct the presence of a weapon.  See Smallwood, 346 A.2d at 167 (“[O]ne who is made to feel by the 
sense of touch the presence of an apparent gun may never see it but there is recognition by his mind and that 
manifestation is just as effective . . . as putting a gun in plain view.”).   
25See 11 Del. C. § 203 (requiring that criminal statutes be construed to "promote justice and effect the purposes 
of the law as stated in § 201 of this title"); and 11 Del. C. § 201(4) prescribing as one of the purposes of the criminal code 
that it "differentiate upon reasonable grounds between serious and minor offenses and to prescribe proportionate penalties 
therefor. . . .").   In analyzing a similar statute, the Louisiana Supreme Court has noted that an inquiry into the 
defendant’s conduct “excludes unreasonable panic reactions by the victim but otherwise allows the victim’s subjective 
beliefs to determine whether the offender has committed first degree robbery or the lesser offense of simple robbery. . . .” 
 
 
- 18 - 
statement to the police, Walton argues that the exclusion of the statement prejudiced 
his right to a fair trial because Walton was forced to testify in order to present these 
statements to the jury. Walton’s testimony permitted the State to impeach his credibility 
by introducing into evidence his dishonesty crimes. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 Fortune, 608 So.2d at 149.  
 
 
- 19 - 
Walton relies on DRE 803(4), which permits the admission of hearsay statements 
“made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or 
past or present symptoms . . . or the inception or general character of the cause or 
external course thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.”  We 
review for an abuse of discretion the trial judge's refusal to admit the hearsay 
statement.26  
A statement made to a psychiatrist may be admissible under DRE 803(4).27  To 
admit the statement, Walton was required to show that (1) his motive in making the 
statement was consistent with the purpose of treatment and that he was aware that the 
diagnosis depended on the accuracy of the statement; and (2) the psychiatrist reasonably 
relied on this kind of information in reaching his diagnosis.28   If these requirements 
were satisfied, the trial judge would conduct a DRE 403 analysis to ensure that the 
                                                          
 
26Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 586 (Del. 2001). 
27Id. at 624.  Although 803(4) may be used in some circumstances to admit statements made to a psychiatrist, we 
have noted that such statements will not always “or even usually” be admissible.  Id.  
28Id. (citing United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 83-84 (8th Cir. 1980)). 
 
 
- 20 - 
probative value of the statement is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice.29  
                                                          
 
29Id. In reaching his decision, the trial judge in the present case was mindful that applying 803(4) to statements 
made to a psychiatrist must be scrutinized carefully to ensure that the proponent of the statement is not using 803(4) to 
“circumvent the rule against hearsay.”  See id. at 625. 
Walton did not make his statement “with the purpose of promoting treatment.”  
Walton’s statement was relayed to a court-appointed psychiatrist on the eve of trial.  
Under some circumstances, a hearsay statement may be admissible when made to a 
psychiatrist in anticipation of litigation, but the trial judge did not abuse his discretion 
by excluding Walton’s statement because defense counsel did not plan to use the 
psychiatrist as an expert witness at trial.   
 
 
- 21 - 
While we recognize that DRE 803(4) abolishes the distinction between 
statements made to a treating physician and statements made to a physician hired in 
anticipation of litigation,30 this departure from the common law is justified only as a 
practical acknowledgment that a jury may be unable to parse the distinction between 
admitting a statement for its truth and admitting the statement merely as a basis for an 
expert’s opinion.31  Because Walton neither sought treatment from the psychiatrist nor 
did he wish to introduce the statement as a basis for the expert’s conclusions, the trial 
judge properly excluded the statement because its admission would stray too far from 
the purpose of DRE 803(4).  This was not an abuse of discretion.  Accordingly, we deny 
Walton’s request for a new trial.   
 
Conclusion 
 
                                                          
 
30See John W. Strong, McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 278 (5th ed.) (“Courts were hesitant to admit statements 
made to doctors consulted only for diagnosis because when the declarant does not anticipate that the effectiveness of 
treatment depends upon the accuracy of his or her statement, the traditional underlying rationale for the exception – a 
selfish treatment interest – does not exist.”).   
31DRE 803(4) tracks the corresponding Federal Rule of Evidence.  The Advisory Notes to Federal Rule 803(4) 
states: 
 
Conventional doctrine has excluded from the hearsay exception . . . statements to a physician 
consulted only for the purpose of enabling him to testify.  While these statements were not admissible 
as substantive evidence, the expert was allowed to state the basis of his opinion, including statements 
of this kind.  The distinction thus called for was one most unlikely to be made by juries.  The rule 
accordingly rejects the limitation.   
 
Adv. Comm. Note to Fed. R. Evid. 803(4). 
 
 
- 22 - 
Walton’s sentence for first degree robbery is reversed, and this matter is  
remanded to the Superior Court for a new sentencing for second degree robbery.  
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 18, the time within which a motion for reargument 
may be filed in this matter is shortened to seven days from the date of this Opinion.  
 
 
- 23 - 
BERGER, Justice, dissenting: 
The majority opinion significantly modifies the meaning of the phrase “displays 
what appears to be a deadly weapon” for purposes of a first degree robbery conviction.  
This new interpretation conflicts with several of our precedents and prevents the 
prosecution of many serious crimes at the level the General Assembly intended.  I see no 
need to take the restrictive construction now adopted by the majority and, therefore, 
dissent.   
For more than 25 years, Delaware courts have relied on the decision in State v. 
Smallwood32 in deciding whether a defendant “displays what appears to be a deadly 
weapon.”  Smallwood explained that the word “display” means “exhibit to the sight or 
mind,”33 and held that the “display” requirement of § 832 is satisfied if the weapon is 
“manifested to any of a victim’s senses.”34  In that case, defendant had his hand in his 
jacket pocket and pointed it at the victim as if holding a weapon.  Other first degree 
robbery convictions have been sustained where: 1) defendant had one hand inside a coat 
and made a verbal threat;35 2) defendant had his hands clasped together pointed at the 
                                                          
 
32346 A.2d 164 (Del. 1975). 
33Id. at 166 (citing Webster’s New International Dictionary Merriam (1964)).  
34 Id. at 167. 
35Harrigan v. State, 447 A.2d 1191 (Del.1982) (Defendant threatened to shoot one of the victims); Wright v. 
State, 1997 WL 317409 at *1 (Del. Supr.) (Defendant said, “Don’t make me use this.”). 
 
 
- 24 - 
victim and told her to “Hold it right there;”36 3) defendant tapped a bulge in his 
waistline and made a verbal threat;37 and 4) defendant reached into his coat pocket while 
threatening the victims.38  Applying Smallwood, this Court also upheld a first degree 
robbery conviction where the victim could not see the defendant, and the only 
“manifestation” of a weapon was the defendant’s verbal threat.39    
Thus, until last year, the “display” requirement could be satisfied based only on 
the victim’s belief that defendant possessed a deadly weapon and some objective 
manifestation of a weapon.  In most cases, the objective manifestation involved 
defendant claiming to have a weapon while concealing his hand under a piece of 
clothing.  In the one case where a conviction was overturned, there was no verbal threat 
or manifestation of a weapon.  Defendant said “This is a holdup,” but he never claimed 
                                                          
 
36Williams v. State, 494 A.2d 1237, 1238 (Del. 1985). 
37Mercado v. State, 1986 WL 17411 at *1 (Del. Supr.) (Defendant told the victim he would “pull this piece” if 
the victim did not hand over the money.); Deshields v. State, 706 A.2d 502 (Del. 1998). 
38DeShields v. State, 1988 WL 71442 (Del. Supr.). 
39McKamey v. State, 1997 WL 45060 (Del. Supr.) 
 
 
- 25 - 
to have a weapon and the victim never saw defendant’s hands to know whether he 
appeared to be concealing something.40      
                                                          
 
40Johnson v. State, 1991 WL 28889 (Del. Supr.). 
 
 
- 26 - 
Then, in a 2002 panel decision, this Court modified the long line of precedents 
reviewed above.  In Word v. State,41 defendant gave a bank teller a note that demanded 
money and stated, “I am armed.” Defendant’s hand was concealed inside a bag that he 
placed on the counter after passing the teller his note.  The Word Court held that these 
facts were insufficient to support a first degree robbery conviction because the teller’s 
belief that defendant had a gun was based on his note and not on the fact that his hand 
was concealed in a bag.   
                                                          
 
41801 A.2d 927 (Del. 2002). 
 
 
- 27 - 
The Word Court made no effort to reconcile its holding with the recent precedent 
in McKamey v. State.42  In that case, the victim was a cab driver who never saw anything 
that purported to be a weapon.  The defendant was seated behind him and simply told 
the driver that he had a gun.  This Court upheld his conviction of first degree robbery, 
citing Smallwood, Harrigan, Deshields, and Mercado for the proposition that a person 
displays what appears to be a deadly weapon when he “intimidates [the victim] by ... 
manifesting the presence of such a weapon even though it is not seen by the victim.”43  
The Word court ignored McKamey, calling it unreliable precedent.44  
Now, we have the follow-up to Word and, again, the majority tries to make it seem 
that it is simply applying settled principles as announced in Smallwood.  In Smallwood, 
however, the Court expressly recognized that a weapon is “displayed” to a victim if the 
weapon is exhibited to the victim’s mind through any of the victim’s senses.45 Using that 
long-standing definition, the display requirement would be satisfied here.  The victim 
saw a note saying defendant has a bomb, and also saw defendant’s hand concealed in his 
                                                          
 
421997 WL 45060 (Del. Supr.). 
43Id. at *2. 
44The majority now acknowledges that Word overruled McKamey.  The majority does not, however, explain 
how it happened that our recent precedent was overruled without consideration by the Court en banc.  See: Internal 
Operating Procedure VI(6), mandating en banc consideration before overruling a prior decision of this Court. 
45346 A.2d at 165. 
 
 
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pocket.  The note contained the threat and the objective manifestation of that threat was 
the concealed hand, which could have been holding a detonator, grenade, or small 
explosive device.  Under settled law, these facts are sufficient to support a conviction of 
first degree robbery. 
The majority suggests that upholding this conviction would trivialize the statutory 
elements of the crime of first degree robbery.  If that is so, then the “display” element has 
been trivialized for 25 years.  This Court has always required a verbal threat and some 
objective manifestation of that threat.  In almost every case, the objective manifestation 
was a hand concealed under clothing.  The victim generally did not see the weapon or 
even the outline of a gun-shaped object in the defendant’s concealed hand.  All the 
victim saw was the concealed hand.  Here, too, the victim saw a concealed hand – the 
same “conduct” that satisfied this Court in the past. 
Finally, I dissent because the majority’s construction of the statute is  preventing 
an important category of serious crimes from being prosecuted to the extent intended by 
the General Assembly.  A person who robs a bank or other business establishment 
presents a grave threat to its employees and any members of the general public who 
happen to be there during the robbery.  If the robber threatens the victim by saying he 
has a gun or a bomb while concealing his hand in a pocket or bag, under the majority 
 
 
- 29 - 
opinion, he will not be subject to prosecution for first degree robbery.  Indeed, if the 
alleged weapon is a bomb, it is unclear from the majority opinion whether anything 
short of waving the device in plain sight would suffice as a “display” of what appears to 
be a deadly weapon.  Yet the potential presence of a deadly weapon greatly increases the 
risk of harm to all who are present, since the victim, and well-meaning bystanders, may 
react by attempting to “disarm” the robber through force or with weapons. 
In sum, I would not modify our long line of precedents on the meaning of the 
“display” element of first degree robbery.  Our prior interpretation of the statutory 
language was settled, clear and readily understood by prosecutors and defense lawyers.  
In my view, that precedent gave full effect to the intent of the General Assembly and full 
protection to the public.  I would affirm defendant’s conviction of first degree robbery.  
Accordingly, I dissent.