Title: State v. Flowers

State: louisiana

Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court

Document:

#27682-r-SLZ  
 
2016 S.D. 63 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA 
 
* * * * 
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
 
 
 
v. 
 
YOLANDA MARIE FLOWERS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* * * * 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF 
THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
MINNEHAHA COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA 
 
* * * * 
 
THE HONORABLE JONI M. CUTLER 
Judge 
 
* * * * 
 
MARTY J. JACKLEY 
Attorney General 
 
KIRSTEN E. JASPER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Pierre, South Dakota 
Attorneys for plaintiff  
 
and appellee.  
 
 
MARK KADI  
Minnehaha County  
   Public Advocates Office 
Sioux Falls, South Dakota 
Attorneys for defendant  
 
and appellant. 
 
* * * * 
CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS  
ON AUGUST 29, 2016  
 
 
OPINION FILED 09/14/16 
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ZINTER, Justice 
[¶1.]  
Yolanda Flowers pleaded guilty to a Class 5 felony, and she admitted 
the allegations of a part II habitual criminal information alleging she had two prior 
felony convictions.  Because of the prior convictions, the circuit court imposed a 
Class 4 felony penitentiary sentence, and it did not state on the record or in the 
judgment any aggravating circumstances justifying a departure from presumptive 
probation.  On appeal, Flowers argues that the circuit court erred in failing to apply 
presumptive probation requirements and sentence her to probation.  Because 
Flowers was convicted of a Class 5 felony that implicated presumptive probation, 
and because aggravating circumstances were not stated on the record or in the 
judgment, we reverse and remand for resentencing. 
Facts and Procedural History 
[¶2.]  
On June 25, 2015, Flowers was arrested pursuant to an outstanding 
federal arrest warrant.  She admitted having methamphetamine in her purse.  At 
the time of her arrest, she was on state probation for felony convictions of 
possession of a controlled substance and failure to appear.  She was also on federal 
supervised release for violating federal probation. 
[¶3.]  
Flowers was indicted for possession of a controlled substance in 
violation of SDCL 22-42-5 (a Class 5 felony) and possession or use of drug 
paraphernalia in violation of SDCL 22-42A-3 (a Class 2 misdemeanor).  The State 
filed a part II information alleging Flowers had two previous convictions for felony 
possession of a controlled substance; one in October 2006 and one in January 2015.  
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Flowers pleaded guilty to the Class 5 felony charge 
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and admitted the allegations of the part II habitual criminal information.  The State 
dismissed the misdemeanor charge and recommended a four-year penitentiary 
sentence. 
[¶4.]  
At sentencing, the circuit court noted that the habitual offender 
admission enhanced the possible penalty to that applicable to Class 4 felonies.  The 
court indicated it was going to impose a penitentiary sentence.  The court stated it 
was basing its sentence “not out of anger towards” Flowers, but in hopes for 
rehabilitation.  Flowers received a Class 4 felony sentence of ten years in prison 
with six years suspended.  The court did not mention probation, a departure from 
presumptive probation, or aggravating circumstances warranting a departure from 
probation.  The final written judgment did not list any aggravating circumstances. 
[¶5.]  
Flowers appeals her sentence, arguing that she is entitled to 
resentencing because: (1) the circuit court failed to state aggravating circumstances 
warranting a departure from presumptive probation in violation of SDCL 22-6-11; 
and (2) the circuit court abused its discretion in departing from presumptive 
probation.  The State argues that Flowers was not entitled to be considered for 
presumptive probation because her sentence was enhanced to a Class 4 felony, and 
Class 4 felons are not entitled to presumptive probation under SDCL 22-6-11.1 
                                            
1. 
The question whether a sentence enhanced under SDCL 22-7-7 falls within 
the requirements of SDCL 22-6-11 is a matter of statutory interpretation.  
Statutory interpretation is a question of law we review de novo.  State v. 
Liaw, 2016 S.D. 31, ¶ 8, 878 N.W.2d 97, 100. 
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Decision 
[¶6.]  
South Dakota courts are required to sentence defendants convicted of 
certain Class 5 and 6 felonies (including possession of a controlled substance) to 
probation unless “the court finds aggravating circumstances exist that pose a 
significant risk to the public and require a departure from presumptive probation.”  
SDCL 22-6-11.2  The State argues that SDCL 22-6-11 does not apply to Flowers’ 
conviction because under SDCL 22-7-7, her admission to the part II information 
enhanced “the classification” of her crime to a Class 4 felony.  See SDCL 22-7-7 (“If 
a defendant has been convicted of one or two prior felonies . . . , the sentence for the 
principal felony shall be enhanced by changing the class of the principal felony to 
the next class which is more severe . . . .”).  Flowers, however, argues that her felony 
                                            
2. 
 The statute provides in full: 
The sentencing court shall sentence an offender convicted of a 
Class 5 or Class 6 felony, except those convicted under §§ 22-
11A-2.1, 22-18-1, 22-18-1.05, 22-18-26, 22-19A-1, 22-19A-2, 22-
19A-3, 22-19A-7, 22-19A-16, 22-22A-2, 22-22A-4, 22-24A-3, 22-
22-24.3, 22-24-1.2, 22-24B-2, 22-24B-12, 22-24B-12.1, 22-24B-23, 
22-42-7, subdivision 24-2-14(1), 32-34-5, and any person 
ineligible for probation under § 23A-27-12, to a term of 
probation.  If the offender is under the supervision of the 
Department of Corrections, the court shall order a fully 
suspended penitentiary sentence pursuant to § 23A-27-18.4.  
The sentencing court may impose a sentence other than 
probation or a fully suspended penitentiary sentence if the court 
finds aggravating circumstances exist that pose a significant 
risk to the public and require a departure from presumptive 
probation under this section.  If a departure is made, the judge 
shall state on the record at the time of sentencing the 
aggravating circumstances and the same shall be stated in the 
dispositional order.  Neither this section nor its application may 
be the basis for establishing a constitutionally protected liberty, 
property, or due process interest. 
SDCL 22-6-11. 
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classification was not changed because SDCL 22-7-7 enhances the “sentence” rather 
than the “principal felony.”  See id.   
[¶7.]  
South Dakota’s habitual offender statutes enhance a defendant’s 
sentence, not the underlying conviction.  Rowley v. S.D. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 
2013 S.D. 6, ¶ 10, 826 N.W.2d 360, 364 (“[T]he habitual offender statutes operate to 
increase the defendant’s sentence, but do not substantively change the class of the 
principal felony.” (emphasis added)).  Although Rowley interpreted SDCL 22-7-8.1, 
a separate enhancement statute, the dispositive language in SDCL 22-7-7 is the 
same.  SDCL 22-7-7, like SDCL 22-7-8.1, only provides that “the sentence for the 
principal felony shall be enhanced.”  And interpreting the statute to enhance the 
classification of the underlying felony “would require us to ignore the words ‘the 
sentence for,’ which we will not do.”  Rowley, 2013 S.D. 6, ¶ 8, 826 N.W.2d at 364.  
“Regardless of the nomenclature we chose, . . . the habitual offender statutes 
operate to increase the defendant’s sentence, but do not substantively change the 
class of the principal felony.”  Id. ¶ 10, 826 N.W.2d at 364; see also State v. 
Guthmiller, 2003 S.D. 83, ¶ 31, 677 N.W.2d 295, 305 (“The habitual offender statute 
SDCL 22-7-7 enhances the sentence to the next more severe felony class.” (emphasis 
added)); State v. Salway, 487 N.W.2d 621, 622 (S.D. 1992) (“[B]eing a habitual 
criminal enhances the punishment for the principal crime to a higher class of 
felony.” (emphasis added)).  Here, Flowers’ principal offense was a Class 5 felony.  
Therefore, the presumptive probation requirements of SDCL 22-6-11 applied.  
[¶8.]  
Because SDCL 22-6-11 applied, the circuit court could depart from 
probation only “if the court [found] aggravating circumstances exist[ed] that pose[d] 
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a significant risk to the public and require[d] a departure from presumptive 
probation.”  Additionally, the court was required to state the aggravating 
circumstances “on the record at the time of sentencing” and in the final written 
judgment.  SDCL 22-6-11.  Flowers argues that she is entitled to resentencing 
because the circuit court failed to follow these requirements.   
[¶9.]  
There is no dispute that the court did not state any aggravating 
circumstances on the record or in the written judgment.  The court only noted 
mitigating circumstances: Flowers had a “terrible childhood,” she was thirty years 
old, she had “a lot of life ahead” of her, and a penitentiary sentence would help her 
with rehabilitation.  The State does not argue that the court’s statements qualified 
as aggravating circumstances within the meaning of SDCL 22-6-11.  Because the 
court did not comply with the statute, we must next consider the appropriate 
remedy. 
[¶10.]  
We have previously held that a circuit court errs when it states the 
aggravating circumstances on the record but fails to restate them in the final 
dispositional order.  State v. Beckwith, 2015 S.D. 76, ¶¶ 16, 18, 871 N.W.2d 57, 61-
62; State v. Whitfield, 2015 S.D. 17, ¶ 20, 862 N.W.2d 133, 140.  That type of clerical 
error does not require a new trial or resentencing.  In those cases, the appropriate 
remedy is to “remand[] to the sentencing court to amend the dispositional order to 
include the aggravating circumstances considered on the record at the time of the 
sentencing hearing.”  Beckwith, 2015 S.D. 76, ¶ 16, 871 N.W.2d at 61; Whitfield, 
2015 S.D. 17, ¶ 20, 862 N.W.2d at 140.  
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[¶11.]  
But here, the record suggests that the circuit court may have believed 
SDCL 22-6-11 did not apply because the court did not state any aggravating 
circumstances on the record warranting a departure from presumptive probation.  
On the contrary, the only circumstances stated were more supportive of probation 
than imprisonment.  Additionally, there were no aggravating circumstances in the 
written judgment.  Because the errors here go beyond the clerical errors in 
Beckwith and Whitfield, we reverse and remand for resentencing in accordance with 
SDCL 22-6-11.  In light of this disposition, Flowers’ argument that the circuit court 
abused its discretion in departing from presumptive probation is premature. 
[¶12.]  
GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and SEVERSON, WILBUR, and KERN, 
Justices, concur.