Title: Larry Liner, Etc. v. Workers Temporary Staffing, Inc.

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC07-1470 
____________ 
 
LARRY LINER, etc.,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
WORKERS TEMPORARY STAFFING, INC., 
Appellee. 
 
[July 31, 2008] 
CORRECTED OPINION 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This case is before the Court on appeal from a decision of the Fourth District 
Court of Appeal, Liner v. Workers Temporary Staffing, Inc., 962 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 
4th DCA 2007), which declared a state statute invalid.  We have jurisdiction.  See 
art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons expressed in our analysis, we reverse 
the Fourth District with regard to the constitutional issue but hold that Workers 
Temporary Staffing, Inc. (“WTS”) is not liable to Larry Liner concerning its 
alleged violation of section 448.24(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2004).1  
                                          
 
 
1.  This case involves our interpretation of the Florida Labor Pool Act (“the 
Act”) as it existed during the years 2002-2004.  For ease of presentation, we have 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
From approximately December 2002 to March 2004, Liner worked as a day 
laborer for a labor hall that was operated by WTS in Broward County, Florida.  See 
Liner, 962 So. 2d at 346.  WTS charged day laborers a fixed, uniform price of 
$1.50 each way for transportation from this Broward County labor hall to any of 
the worksites it serviced in the Palm Beach, Broward, and Dade County area (“tri-
county area”).  See id.   
 
On May 3, 2004, Liner filed an original class-action complaint against WTS, 
alleging that it had violated section 448.24(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2004), by 
overcharging Liner and other day laborers for transportation to various worksites 
from its Broward County labor hall and other workers for transportation from 
various labor halls located throughout the state—i.e., the City of Tallahassee, 
Brevard County, Pasco County, Marion County, Manatee County, St. Johns 
County, and the City of Gainesville.  Liner alleged that the class contained more 
than 500 day laborers and sought relief in the amount of $1000 per violation 
pursuant to section 448.25(1).  On August 5, 2004, Liner filed a first amended 
class-action complaint in which he limited the claim to the labor halls that WTS 
operated in Broward, Brevard, Marion, and Volusia Counties. 
                                                                                                                                        
cited the 2004 versions of the relevant statutes; however, our analysis pertains 
equally to the 2002 and 2003 versions. 
 
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On January 31, 2005, the trial court held a case-management conference 
with regard to whether class discovery should proceed before class certification.  
The trial court ruled that Liner was required to make a preliminary showing during 
an evidentiary hearing that a valid cause of action existed under the Act before the 
court would proceed to class-related matters.  On February 2, 2005, WTS filed a 
counterclaim for declaratory relief.  Specifically, WTS sought a judicial 
declaration that (1) it had complied with the Act;2 (2) section 448.24(1)(b) is 
unconstitutionally vague; and (3) the statutory-damages provision of section 
448.25(1) is unconstitutionally excessive.  WTS also asserted that its transportation 
service was more similar to a “demand-responsive carrier,” which would deliver 
day laborers directly to a designated worksite, than a bus system that followed 
fixed routes. 
On June 1, 2005, Liner filed a second amended class-action complaint.  In 
this complaint, Liner limited the claim to those day laborers overcharged by WTS 
for transportation from the Broward County labor hall to Broward County 
worksites.  Liner asserted that WTS overcharged in violation of section 
448.24(1)(b) because the cost of one-way bus travel on the Broward County 
                                          
 
 
2.  At the relevant time, the Act consisted of sections 448.20-.25, Florida 
Statutes (2004). 
 
 
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Transit system at that time was $1.00, while, in contrast, WTS charged $1.50 each 
way for its site-to-site transportation.  
On November 14, 2005, the trial court—pursuant to the earlier case-
management order—commenced an evidentiary hearing on Liner’s individual 
claim and the declaratory-judgment counterclaim of WTS.  See Liner, 962 So. 2d 
at 346.  The evidence revealed that (1) Liner was seeking $265.50 in actual 
damages and $177,000 in statutory damages; (2) on-time arrival at the worksites 
for job assignments was crucial; (3) for those job assignments that commenced 
prior to 5:30 a.m., there was no bus service to ensure on-time arrival; (4) Liner 
worked 234 job assignments for WTS in the tri-county area between December 
2002 and March 2004; and (5) the average cost—measured by the least expensive 
form of public transportation3 that would ensure on-time arrival—for public 
transportation to a random sample of these job assignments was $32.00.4  
   After the evidence was presented, the parties stipulated that the trial court 
should consider the evidentiary hearing as a bench trial on the issue of WTS’s 
liability to Liner under section 448.24(1)(b).  Thus, the parties contemplated that 
any order of the trial court would constitute a judgment on liability only, not 
                                          
 
3.  Limousine service was not considered. 
 
4.  Timely arrival at some of the designated worksites would have required 
the use of more expensive modes of transportation that do not follow fixed routes 
(taxicab service being the primary example).  These more expensive fares thus 
increased the above-listed average cost. 
 
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damages.  The trial court subsequently ruled that (1) WTS had complied with the 
Act; (2) section 448.24(1)(b) is unconstitutionally vague; and (3) the statutory-
damages provision of section 448.25(1) is unconstitutionally excessive. 
 
On appeal, the Fourth District only affirmed the ruling of the trial court that 
section 448.24(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2004), violates the Due Process Clauses of 
both the United States and Florida Constitutions.  See Liner, 962 So. 2d at 346-48.5  
The district court reasoned that section 448.24(1)(b) is unconstitutionally vague.  
See id.  On August 3, 2007, Liner filed a notice of appeal with this Court.  
II.  ANALYSIS 
 A.  WTS’s Liability to Liner Under the Act 
i.  Introduction 
 
Liner asserts that WTS violated section 448.24(1)(b), Florida Statutes 
(2004), by overcharging him for transportation from the labor hall in Broward 
County to various worksites within that county.  The trial court ruled that WTS is 
not liable to Liner under section 448.24(1)(b).  We agree.  We review the statutory 
interpretation conducted by the trial court to reach this ultimate ruling de novo, 
while we defer to those factual findings of the trial court that are supported by 
                                          
 
 
5.  The Fourth District did not affirm the ruling of the trial court that section 
448.25(1) is unconstitutional.  See Liner, 962 So. 2d at 346 n.2 (“The circuit court 
also held that section 448.25 is unconstitutional.  We do not agree that the section 
is unconstitutionally vague.”).  We do not address the constitutionality of section 
448.25(1) because this question is unnecessary to our resolution of this case. 
 
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competent, substantial evidence from the record.  See N. Fla. Women’s Health & 
Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, 866 So. 2d 612, 626-27 (Fla. 2003).  
 
At the outset, we emphasize that our statutory analysis applies exclusively to 
the version of the Florida Labor Pool Act that applied when WTS allegedly 
overcharged day laborers for transportation to and from its Broward County 
worksites between December 2002 and March 2004.  At that time, section 
448.24(1)(b) read: 
(1)  No labor pool shall charge a day laborer: 
 
 
. . . . 
(b)  More than a reasonable amount to transport a worker to or 
from the designated worksite, but in no event shall the amount exceed 
the prevailing rate for public transportation in the geographic area . . .  
 
§ 448.24(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004).  This version of section 448.24(1)(b) was in effect 
from 1995—when the Act was enacted—until 2006.  See ch. 95-332, § 1, at 2932, 
Laws of Fla.  In 2006, the Legislature amended section 448.24(1)(b) by making the 
following changes: 
(1)  No labor pool shall charge a day laborer: 
 
. . . .  
(b)  More than a reasonable amount to transport a worker to or 
from the designated worksite, but in no event shall the amount exceed 
$1.50 each way the prevailing rate for public transportation in the 
geographic area . . . . 
 
Ch. 2006-10, § 1, at 198, Laws of Fla; § 448.24(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2006).6   
                                          
 
 
6.  Amended statutory language appears in underlined text; deleted statutory 
language appears in strike-through text. 
 
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ii.  Remedial or Penal in Nature 
WTS asserts that the Labor Pool Act is penal in nature.  In Florida, the 
general rule is that any ambiguity present in a civil statute of a penal nature is 
construed in favor of the party alleged to have violated the statute.  See Diaz de la 
Portilla v. Fla. Elections Comm’n, 857 So. 2d 913, 917 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003).  
Conversely, a remedial statue should be liberally construed to suppress the evil 
targeted by the Legislature and to fulfill the intended remedy.  See Golf Channel v. 
Jenkins, 752 So. 2d 561, 565-66 (Fla. 2000).  In opposition to WTS, Liner asserts 
that the Legislature intended for the Act to be remedial in nature: 
The Legislature finds that this part is necessary to provide for 
the health, safety, and well-being of day laborers throughout the state 
and to establish uniform standards of conduct and practice for labor 
pools in the state, and this part shall be carried out in accordance with 
this purpose. 
§ 448.21, Fla. Stat. (2004) (entitled “Legislative intent”). While the Act is designed 
to remedy a specific evil, we nevertheless conclude that section 448.24(1)(b) is a 
civil statute that is penal in nature because of the potentially extreme punitive 
damages provided by section 448.25(1).  Therefore, we must construe any 
ambiguity present in the Act in favor of WTS.   
The statutory language present in section 448.21 is not dispositive.  Instead, 
the determinative factor is the nature of the provision for damages imposed for 
violations of the Act: 
 
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(1)  Any worker aggrieved by a violation of s. 448.24 shall have the 
right to bring a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction against 
the labor pool responsible for such violation.  In any action 
commenced pursuant to this part, the worker shall be entitled to 
recover actual and consequential damages, or $1,000, whichever is 
greater, for each violation of this part, and costs. 
§ 448.25(1), Fla. Stat. (2004) (entitled “Remedies; damages; costs”) (emphasis 
supplied).  Due to the nature of a claim filed pursuant to section 448.24(1)(b), the 
actual damages suffered by a complainant will usually be significantly less than the 
statutory damages ($1000 per violation) afforded by  section 448.25(1).  Here, 
Liner claimed that WTS violated section 448.24(1)(b) when it overcharged him 50 
cents for each instance of transportation to a Broward County worksite on 177 
separate occasions, which produced only $265.50 in actual damages.  However, 
those 177 separate transportation overcharges would produce $177,000 in statutory 
damages.  The amount of actual damages claimed by Liner is minimal when 
compared to the amount he has claimed in statutory damages.  It must also be 
remembered that the $1.50 fee that WTS charged for transportation to its Broward 
County worksites is very similar in amount to the cost of other inexpensive forms 
of bus-system transportation.  As reflected in the plain language of section 
448.25(1), the Legislature contemplated that the statutory-damages provision of 
$1000 per violation would virtually always yield an amount that would 
significantly exceed any actual damages produced by a violation of section 
 
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448.24(1)(b).  Thus, section 448.24(1)(b), interpreted in light of section 448.25(1), 
is a civil statute of a penal nature. 
Additionally, our prior interpretation of another civil statute supports this 
conclusion.  In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Laforet, 658 So. 
2d 55 (Fla. 1995), we held that section 627.727(10), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1992), 
was penal in nature notwithstanding the Legislature’s implementing language, 
which stated that the purpose of the legislation was to “reaffirm existing legislative 
intent, and as such is remedial.”  Id. at 60 (emphasis supplied).  This Court 
reasoned that section 627.727(10) was penal in nature because this statute provided 
the insured with an additional $200,000 in statutory damages that were not 
previously available in a first-party bad-faith action.  See id. at 61.  Section 
627.727(10) enabled a first-party insured to collect excess damages caused by an 
insurer’s bad faith even though that bad faith only injured the third-party victim.  
See id. at 60.   
Similar to section 627.727(10), section 448.24(1)(b) enables the aggrieved 
party to collect a significantly greater amount of damages than the actual damages 
inflicted upon that party.  We conclude that, in providing protection for the “health, 
safety, and well-being of day laborers,”7 the Legislature utilized the $1000-per-
violation statutory-damages provision to deter labor pool companies from 
                                          
 
 
7.  § 448.21, Fla. Stat. (2004). 
 
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exploiting—albeit through a transportation charge that may only slightly exceed 
the cost of other inexpensive forms of mass transportation—the day laborers that 
they employ.  Thus, section 448.24(1)(b), interpreted in pari materia with section 
448.25(1), is penal in nature, and any ambiguities must be construed in favor of 
WTS.  See Diaz de la Portilla, 857 So. 2d at 917 n.3 (holding that section 106.37 of 
the Campaign Financing Law—a violation of which can result in a maximum fine 
of $1000 per count and would necessarily have a “ruinous effect” on the 
candidate’s reputation—is a civil statute of a penal nature). 
iii.  General Framework for Section 448.24(1)(b) 
Liner asserts that section 448.24(1)(b) has both a subjective standard—i.e., 
the first clause which states that a labor hall shall not charge “[m]ore than a 
reasonable amount to transport a worker to or from the designated worksite”—and 
a separate objective standard—i.e., the second clause which states “but in no event 
shall the amount exceed the prevailing rate for public transportation in the 
geographic area.”  We disagree.  Instead, we conclude that the Legislature intended 
for section 448.24(1)(b) to constitute a single standard for evaluating the 
transportation fee charged by a labor hall owner. 
The plain language of the legislation supports an interpretation that the term 
“reasonable amount” is the centerpiece of section 448.24(1)(b).  The other 
language contained within this statute is designed to provide meaning and a 
 
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parameter for this term.  Specifically, the phrase “to or from the designated 
worksite,” which follows the term “reasonable amount,” in the first clause of 
section 448.24(1)(b), is intended to modify this term.  Logically, the transportation 
charge of a labor hall owner should only be evaluated against the cost of site-to-
site public transportation between the designated worksite and the labor hall.  
Additionally, the second clause—i.e., “but in no event shall the amount exceed the 
prevailing rate for public transportation in the geographic area”—was included to 
provide further meaning or a ceiling on that which may constitute a “reasonable 
amount.”  Finally, we conclude that the plain language of section 448.24(1)(b) 
establishes that the Legislature intended for the highly specific phrase “to or from 
the designated worksite,” which is contained within the first clause, to modify the 
entire second clause, which includes the more general term “geographic area.”  See 
Eicoff v. Denson, 896 So. 2d 795, 798 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (“[W]here an 
enumeration of specific things is followed by some more general word, the general 
word will usually be construed to refer to things of the same kind or species as 
those specifically enumerated.” (quoting Jacobo v. Bd. of Trustees of Miami 
Police, 788 So. 2d 362, 364 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001))).   
The legislative history of section 448.24(1)(b) also supports this 
interpretation.  In 1995, the Legislature initially attempted to enact a provision 
(with regard to the transportation fee that day laborers could be charged) that 
 
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consisted of a single clause, made no mention of “reasonable amount,” and capped 
the permissible transportation charge at $1.00.8  However, the Legislature 
ultimately enacted section 448.24(1)(b), which included two clauses that surround 
the central concept and term “reasonable amount.”  This history demonstrates that 
the Legislature intended to provide greater flexibility for transportation charges 
that could be assessed, while maintaining the framework of a single standard of 
reasonableness.  Tellingly, a staff analysis summarized the effect of the proposed 
language, which was ultimately enacted in identical form as section 448.24(1)(b): 
s. 448.24 , F.S. (Duties and rights):  Prohibits a labor pool from 
charging laborers . . . more than a reasonable amount, not to exceed 
the local prevailing rate for public transportation, for transporting the 
worker to or from the worksite . . . . 
Fla. H.R. Comm. on Commerce, CS/HB 595 (1995) Staff Analysis 3 (Apr. 19, 
1995) (on file with the Florida State Archives) (emphasis supplied).  This 
illustrates that the Legislature understood that the phrase “to or from the designated 
worksite,” which appears in the first clause of section 448.24(1)(b), modifies the  
additional language contained in both the first and second clauses.  In sum, the 
                                          
 
8.  The staff analysis prepared on March 10, 1995, stated: 
s. 448.24, F.S. (Duties and rights):  Prohibits a labor pool from 
charging laborers . . . more than a $1 [fee] for transporting the worker 
to or from the worksite . . . . 
Fla. H.R. Comm. on Commerce, HB 595 (1995) Staff Analysis 3 (Mar. 10, 1995) 
(on file with the Florida State Archives) (emphasis supplied).  
 
 
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relevant legislative history further supports our conclusion that section 
448.24(1)(b) contains a single standard centered upon the concept and term 
“reasonable amount.” 
iv.  The Framework as Applied to These Circumstances 
 
The circumstances in each case must be applied within this general 
framework to determine the context-specific meaning of the various words 
included within this version of section 448.24(1)(b).  Again, the Legislature could 
have utilized a fixed rate but, instead, chose to provide flexibility for that which 
constitutes a “reasonable amount” under discrete circumstances.  Here, we 
conclude that the trial court’s interpretation of the terms “public transportation” 
and “geographic area” was reasonable under these circumstances.  
 
In ruling that WTS was not liable to Liner under section 448.24(1)(b), the 
trial court made the following findings with regard to the meaning of “public 
transportation” and “geographic area”: 
1.  “Public transportation” is not limited to bus travel. . . .  3.  
“Geographic area” in this case means the tri[-]county area since that is 
the area serviced by WTS and the area within which Mr. Liner 
worked. 
 
On the facts of this case, we conclude that the trial court’s interpretation of 
“geographic area” to refer to the tri-county area is supported by competent, 
substantial evidence from the record.  During the evidentiary hearing, reasonable 
testimony established that transportation for this tri-county area is not planned 
 
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exclusively on a county-by-county basis but, instead, is predicated upon a tri-
county basis published by the South Florida Regional Transportation Authority.  
The record establishes that the rates for intra-county travel in South Florida vary 
between Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties.  For example, the bus fare for 
travel within Broward County between December 2002 and March 2004 was $1.00 
per ride, whereas the bus fare within Palm Beach County during the same time 
period was $1.25 per ride.9 
Regardless, the trial court correctly deduced that, even if the “geographic 
area” consisted solely of Broward County, this determination would not have 
altered its ultimate ruling that WTS is not liable to Liner under the Act.  The trial 
court reasoned: 
In order for Mr. Liner to prevail on his claim based on these 
facts “public transportation” must mean travel exclusively by bus.  
Any other form of public transportation would be more expensive 
than that charged by WTS.  Even the bus in combination with any 
other form of public transportation would be more expensive than that 
charged by WTS. 
The concept of “public transportation” simply cannot be limited to bus travel in 
this area, and under the circumstances of the instant case, Liner cannot prevail.  
                                          
 
 
9.  Liner asserts that “geographic area” can only mean Broward County 
because, in his second amended class-action complaint, he limited the claim to 
violations that allegedly occurred in Broward County.  We disagree.  The 
“geographic area” is based upon the public-transportation system in place for a 
particular area and is not controlled by the manner in which a party pleads a claim. 
 
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The Legislature intended for the phrase “to or from the designated worksite” to 
modify the entire second clause of section 448.24(1)(b).  Thus, in the context of 
any particular case, “public transportation” cannot be limited to a form of 
transportation that does not provide site-to-site service to the relevant worksites.  
This conclusion is supported by the statutory definitions that the Legislature has 
provided for this same term in other legislation:  “Public transportation” is not 
limited to bus service but, instead, also includes “motor vehicle[s]”10 and “other 
means of conveyance operating as a common carrier.”  §§ 163.566(8), 343.62(5), 
Fla. Stat. (2004).  Additionally, in a separate statute, the Legislature defined 
“public transit” as including both governmentally owned and privately owned 
transportation systems and also “paratransit,” which is defined as taxis, “dial-a-
ride” buses, and other means of conveyance that provide service between “specific 
origins” and are “characterized by their nonscheduled, nonfixed route nature.”  § 
341.031(5)-(6), Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphasis supplied).  We conclude that the 
Legislature similarly intended for the term “public transportation”—as enacted 
within the context of section 448.24(1)—to have a broad, general meaning to allow 
for flexible application under different, specific factual circumstances involving 
different, specific locations. 
                                          
 
 
10.  We note that the Legislature’s use of the term “motor vehicle[s]” means 
taxi service, which is considered “[p]ublic transportation” under sections 
163.566(8) and 343.62(5), Florida Statutes (2004). 
 
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Here, the record establishes that bus service in Broward County did not 
provide site-to-site service to the Broward County WTS worksites.  During the 
evidentiary hearing, competent, substantial evidence established that distances 
remained between the nearest arrival bus stops and any of the Broward County 
worksites included within the sample.  These additional distances did not exist 
when the day laborers used the site-to-site van service of WTS.  Thus, the cost 
associated with the distance from the nearest arrival bus stop to the worksite (and 
vice versa at the end of the workday) must be taken into account to determine 
whether WTS’s transportation charge of $1.50—which encompassed site-to-site 
transportation to or from the designated worksite—constituted a “reasonable 
amount.”  The evidence established that the least expensive form of site-to-site 
public transportation that could service these additional distances under such 
circumstances would be taxi service.  Further, the record establishes that (1) the 
taxi companies of Broward County could provide service from these arrival bus 
stops to the worksites; (2) the rates for taxi service in Broward County are 
established by the Broward County Board of County Commissioners; and (3) the 
rate for the first one-eighth of a mile (or any lesser distance) is $1.50.  When this 
cost of taxi service from the arrival bus stop to the designated worksite (i.e., $1.50) 
is added to the cost of bus travel from the labor hall in Broward County to the 
arrival bus stop (i.e., $1.00), it becomes apparent that WTS’s transportation charge 
 
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of $1.50 did not exceed the cost of public transportation to the designated 
worksite.11  Consequently, the term “public transportation” cannot be limited 
exclusively to the cost of bus travel under the circumstances of the instant case, 
and for that reason alone, WTS is not liable to Liner under section 448.24(1)(b). 
B.  Constitutionality of the Act 
 
WTS also asserts that both section 448.24(1)(b) and section 448.25(1), 
Florida Statutes (2004), violate the Due Process Clauses of the United States and 
Florida Constitutions.  We do not address these claims.  In Florida, it is well 
established that this Court should refrain from deciding constitutional questions 
when the case may be resolved on other grounds.  See Sullivan v. Sapp, 866 So. 2d 
28, 34 (Fla. 2004).  Further, this rule of last resort has been invoked by this Court 
in cases where jurisdiction was similarly based upon the constitutionality of a 
statute.  See Harbor Ventures, Inc. v. Hutches, 366 So. 2d 1173, 1173 (Fla. 1979) 
(declining to decide the constitutional claim because proper interpretation of the 
statute obviated such a decision; jurisdiction was based upon the trial court’s ruling 
that the statute was constitutional); De Jong v. Pallotto, 239 So. 2d 252, 253 (Fla. 
                                          
 
 
11.  We also note that there were additional distances—i.e., from the labor 
hall in Broward County to the nearest departure bus stops—that bus travel did not 
service but which were serviced by the WTS transportation program.  However, 
we choose not to measure the additional cost of taxi service between these 
distances because the cost of taxi service between the arrival bus stops and the 
worksites alone established that WTS did not violate section 448.24(1)(b).  
 
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1970) (substantially similar); P.C. Lissenden Co. v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 116 
So. 2d 632, 633-36 (Fla. 1959) (substantially similar).  Thus, we do not address the 
constitutionality of either section 448.24(1)(b) or section 448.25(1) because, as 
previously discussed, the trial court properly applied the statute and determined 
that WTS is not liable to Liner under the Act. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we disapprove the reasoning and analysis of the 
Fourth District in Liner v. Workers Temporary Staffing, Inc., 962 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 
4th DCA 2007), with regard to the alleged unconstitutionality of section 
448.24(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2004), and therefore reverse that decision.  We 
approve the trial court’s ruling that Liner has no claim of liability against WTS 
under section 448.24(1)(b) and remand to the Fourth District with directions to 
affirm the judgment of the trial court with regard to the non-liability of WTS.  
 
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, and LEWIS, JJ., concur. 
CANTERO and BELL, JJ., concur in result only. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the District Court of Appeal – Statutory or Constitutional 
Invalidity 
 
 
Fourth District - Case No. 4D05-4729 
 
 
(Broward County) 
 
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John G. Crabtree of The Florida Appellate Alliance, PLC, Key Biscayne, Florida, 
David J. George and Stuart A. Davidson, of Coughlin, Stoia, Geller, Rudman, and 
Robbins, LLP, Boca Raton, Florida, Gregg I. Shavitz and Perry Tanksley of The 
Shavitz Labor Pool Law Firm, PLC, Boca Raton, Florida, and Shannon McLin 
Carlyle of The Florida Appellate Alliance, PLC, The Villages, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
T. Todd Pittenger of Lowndes, Drosdick, Doster, Kantor, and Reed, P.A., Orlando, 
Florida, and Thomas R. Tatum of Brinkley, Morgan, Solomon, Tatum, Stanley, 
Lunny, and Crosby, LLP, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee