Title: IN RE ESTATE OF ABRAHAM KARMEY, DECEASED

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chie f Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED APRIL 8, 2003  
In re ESTATE OF  
ABRAHAM KARMEY, Deceased  
MARIANNE KARMEY-KUPKA, GEORGE 
KARMEY, and IRENE KARMEY,  
Petitioners-Appellees,  
v 
No. 121082  
MARGARET KARMEY,  
Respondent-Appellant.  
PER CURIAM  
In their petition to set aside a will, the children of  
the decedent claimed that the beneficiary of the will,  
decedent’s second wife, had 
exercised 
undue 
influence 
over the  
decedent when he made her the sole beneficiary of his estate.  
The probate judge ruled that petitioners had failed to present  
sufficient evidence for a jury to find that decedent’s wife  
unduly influenced her husband, 
and 
the 
judge 
therefore granted  
respondent’s motion for a directed verdict.  The Court of  
Appeals reversed and remanded the case for trial, holding that  
there was a question for the jury whether decedent and his  
wife 
had 
a 
confidential or fiduciary relationship, which 
would  
create a rebuttable presumption of undue influence.  
The Court of Appeals reluctantly based its holding on  
this Court’s decision in Kar v Hogan, 399 Mich 529; 251 NW2d  
77 (1976), which the Court viewed as encompassing most  
marriages within the test for applying the presumption.  We  
conclude that marriage does not give rise to a presumption of  
undue influence.  We reverse that portion of the Court of  
Appeals decision necessitating a remand and reinstate the  
probate court’s grant of a directed verdict.  
I  
Abraham Karmey died in 1997, leaving his entire estate to  
his wife of twenty years, Margaret Karmey.  Margaret was  
Abraham’s second wife.  The three children of his first  
marriage, petitioners in this case, sought to have their  
father’s will set aside, alleging that Margaret had exerted  
undue influence over their father when he drafted the will.  
They based their contention in large measure on statements he  
had allegedly made a year before drafting the will in which he  
expressed his intent to give each of them $25,000, as well as  
a business to operate.  The inventory prepared by Margaret  
Karmey as the personal representative of her husband’s estate  
showed a worth of only $57,000 at the time of his death.  
The case proceeded to a jury trial in 1999, with the  
petitioners presenting testimony that Abraham feared Margaret  
2  
  
and that she had control of the family finances, especially  
after he became ill in his last years.  Margaret’s position  
was that she had a typical marriage in which she shared  
confidences with her husband.  At the close of petitioners’  
proofs, Margaret moved for a directed verdict.  The probate  
judge granted the motion, noting that for influence to be  
undue, it must have overpowered the decedent’s own free will.  
The judge said, “[T]he decedent may be influenced in the  
disposition of his property by specific or direct influences  
without such influences being undue.”  It is not improper,  
said the judge, for a spouse to use her powers of persuasion  
to shape the crafting of a will.  
The 
judge 
rejected 
petitioners’ 
argument 
that 
Abraham 
and  
Margaret were in a fiduciary relationship, so as to give rise  
to a presumption of undue influence:  
The Contestant——that’s you——has the burden of 
proving that there was undue influence exerted on 
the decedent in making the Will.  
And part of your argument is the spousal 
relationship 
becomes 
that 
of 
a 
fiduciary 
relationship. 
I’m going to say that that is not 
the law and that’s not the way I’m going to rule. 
She 
admitted that 
there 
was 
a 
confidential  
relationship but there should be a confidential 
relationship between all spouses.  
She also indicated that she didn’t handle his  
finances and he paid the bills. So other than that one  
statement the court does not believe that there’s  
sufficient factual basis that I can find a confidential  
relationship, therefore, the presumption doesn’t come 
into play.  
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing  
3  
that the judge’s conduct in admonishing witnesses denied them  
a fair trial and that the proofs of a trusting marital  
relationship between Abraham and Margaret Karmey established  
a mandatory presumption of undue influence that had not been  
rebutted, making the directed verdict inappropriate.  The  
Court rejected the first argument, but on a two-to-one vote  
agreed with the latter.  Unpublished opinion per curiam,  
issued February 8, 2002 (Docket No. 223270).  
The 
Court majority noted that Margaret 
Karmey’s 
own 
trial  
testimony had indicated that a trusting relationship existed  
with her husband.  Her relationship with Abraham, she agreed,  
was a “typical marriage” in which they were “very close” and  
he was her “closest friend,” sharing things with her that he  
would not share with other people.  Id. at 8. 
The Court  
determined that Abraham, at least on occasion, relied upon  
Margaret, and that she had an opportunity to influence him  
“because they were married and because he was allegedly afraid  
of her.”  Id. Because there was evidence that Abraham and  
Margaret had a “loving and trusting relationship,” it was  
appropriate, said the Court, for a jury to resolve the undue  
influence issue, including the question whether a fiduciary  
relationship existed. Id.  
The Court of Appeals majority recognized that under its  
holding, a presumption of undue influence could attach to all  
wills where one spouse leaves property exclusively to the  
remaining spouse, especially when to the exclusion of other  
4  
 
 
family members.  The majority admitted that it was “not  
particularly enamored of the possibility of such a result.”1  
Id. at 9. However, it felt compelled to reach its conclusion  
on the basis of this Court’s decision in Kar.  
II  
Kar concerned an action to set aside a property deed  
between a wife and husband on the ground that it was procured  
through undue influence.  The action was brought by the  
stepchildren of the deceased, Julia Merkiel, who had married  
their father in 1914.  The father died in 1951, and Julia  
married Edward Merkiel in 1953.  In 1969, property owned by  
Julia was deeded to her and Edward as tenants by “their  
entireties,” thereby precluding the children from gaining an  
interest in the property upon her death.  
After completion of the proofs, the trial judge found  
that Julia and Edward met the test for a confidential or  
1 This concern was echoed by the dissent, which warned:  
Were we to apply the three-part test to a will 
contest where a spouse leaves everything to a 
surviving spouse, then a factual finding of a good 
marriage would automatically mean that a rebuttable 
presumption of undue influence would arise.  This  
surely cannot nor should it be the law.  More  
should be shown to raise a presumption of undue 
influence between spouses than a good confidential 
relationship where each understandably looked to 
the other for advice and took the advice of the  
other.  To hold as the majority does and as the 
majority interprets Kar to have ruled, simply 
serves to penalize a good marriage by requiring a 
will contest trial if a third party objects to one 
spouse leaving virtually the entire estate to the 
surviving spouse.  
5  
 
  
fiduciary 
relationship and, as a result, 
applied 
a 
presumption  
of undue influence to the case.  He further found that  
defendant had 
rebutted 
the 
presumption, 
and he therefore ruled  
in defendant’s favor.  
The judge’s utilization of the presumption of undue  
influence was based on a widely applied three-factor test,  
which this Court detailed in Kar as follows:  
The presumption of undue influence is brought 
to life upon the introduction of evidence which 
would establish (1) the existence of a confidential 
or fiduciary relationship between the grantor and a 
fiduciary, (2) the fiduciary or an interest which 
he represents benefits from a transaction, and 
(3) the fiduciary had an opportunity to influence 
the grantor’s decision in that transaction. [399 
Mich 537.]  
Although Kar accepted the trial judge’s utilization of  
the presumption of undue influence, that was not the focus of  
Kar.  Instead, the critical issue for discussion concerned the  
burden of proof and the shifting evidentiary obligations of  
the parties when the presumption of undue influence has been  
found. Kar did not discuss what type of proofs were necessary  
to meet the three-part test.  It simply operated on the  
premise that the marriage at issue was subject to the  
presumption.  
The Court of Appeals majority in this case, recognizing  
that the Court in Kar had accepted the trial judge’s finding  
that the three-part test was met, concluded that Kar had  
established a rule that all spousal relationships of trust and  
confidence meet the three-part test, thereby bringing forth  
6  
 
 
 
the presumption of undue influence. 
We reject this 
implication in Kar. 
III 
“Fiduciary relationship” is a legal term of art,2 as is  
the 
phrase 
“confidential 
or 
fiduciary 
relationship.”3  
2 Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed) defines the term as  
[a] relationship in which one person is under a 
duty to act for the benefit of the other on matters 
within the scope of the relationship.  Fiduciary 
relationships—such 
as 
trustee-beneficiary,  
guardian-ward, 
agent-principal, 
and 
attorney­
client—require the highest duty of care. Fiduciary 
relationships [usually] arise in one of four  
situations:  (1) when one person places trust in 
the faithful integrity of another, who as a result 
gains superiority or influence over the first, 
(2) 
when 
one 
person 
assumes 
control 
and  
responsibility over another, (3) when one person 
has a duty to act for or give advice to another on 
matters 
falling 
within 
the 
scope 
of 
the  
relationship, or (4) when there is a specific 
relationship that has traditionally been recognized 
as involving fiduciary duties, as with a lawyer and 
a client or a stockbroker and a customer.  
3 Although a broad term, “confidential or fiduciary 
relationship” has a focused view toward relationships of 
inequality. This Court recognized in In re Wood Estate, 374  
Mich 278, 287; 132 NW2d 35 (1965), that the concept had its 
English origins in situations in which dominion may be 
exercised by one person over another.  Quoting 3 Pomeroy, 
Equity Jurisprudence (5th ed, 1941), § 956a, this Court said 
a fiduciary relationship exists as fact when “‘there is 
confidence reposed on one side, and the resulting superiority 
and influence on the other.’” 374 Mich 283.  
Common examples this Court has recognized include where 
a patient makes a will in favor of his physician, a client in 
favor of his lawyer, or a sick person in favor of a priest or 
spiritual adviser. 374 Mich 285-286. 
In these situations, 
complete trust has been placed by one party in the hands of 
another who has the relevant knowledge, resources, power, or 
moral authority to control the subject matter at issue.  
7  
 
 
Marriage, however, is a unique relationship, treated in law  
differently from other relationships, for a host of obvious  
reasons.  
In the context of this case and the analysis provided in  
Kar, it can be said that marriage is not a relationship that  
has traditionally been recognized as involving fiduciary  
duties.  It is a unique relationship based on mutual trust and  
commitment.  We do not believe the presumption of undue  
influence is applicable to such a relationship.  
One should not lose sight of the basic principles  
underlying the concept of undue influence. As this Court said  
in Kar:  
To establish undue influence it must be shown  
that 
the 
grantor 
was 
subjected 
to 
threats, 
misrepresentation, 
undue 
flattery, 
fraud, 
or  
physical or moral coercion sufficient to overpower 
volition, destroy free agency and impel the grantor 
to act against his inclination and free will.  
Motive, opportunity, or even ability to control, in 
the absence of affirmative evidence that it was  
exercised, are not sufficient. [399 Mich 537.]  
The influence of a husband or a wife over that person’s  
spouse could be great-
-
-at times almost overwhelming-
-
-without  
being “undue.”  Although we agree with the standard for  
application of the presumption of undue influence established  
in Kar, we hold that this presumption is not applicable to  
marriage.4  
4 
 To be clear, we hold that no presumption of undue  
influence arises by the fact of marriage. We do not exclude  
the possibility that, under facts other than those presented 
in this particular case, a person might exercise undue  
8  
 
IV  
In this case, the probate judge found that the proofs  
presented by the petitioners did not raise a question of fact  
about whether the relationship between Abraham and Margaret  
Karmey was a confidential or fiduciary relationship.  The  
record supports this finding. 
Further, the marriage  
relationship between 
Abraham 
and 
Margaret 
Karmey was not shown  
by any factual allegations to be a relationship of undue  
influence.  
Because the presumption of undue influence is not  
applicable to marriage, that portion of the Court of Appeals  
decision remanding this case for trial is reversed, and the  
probate court’s grant of a directed verdict is affirmed.  MCR  
7.302(F)(1).  
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman  
influence over a weakened or vulnerable spouse.  
9