Title: Coulthard v. Cossairt

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Coulthard v. Cossairt1990 WY 145803 P.2d 86Case Number: 89-230, 89-231Decided: 12/14/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
Max 
COULTHARD,

Appellant 
(Defendant)

v. 

Garth 
COSSIART,

Appellants 
(Plantiffs)

 

Garth COSSAIRT and Joe 
Finnerty, 

Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

Max COULTHARD, 

Appellee 
(Defendant).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Albany County, Arthur T. Hanscum, J.

Rebecca A. Lewis 
(argued), and John J. Metzke of Hirst and Applegate, Cheyenne, for 
Coulthard.

John E. 
Stanfield (argued), and Bruce B. Waters of Smith, Stanfield & Scott, 
Laramie, for appellee Cossairt.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J.*, and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

CARDINE, Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Max 
Coulthard appeals a $1.7 million award to appellee Garth Cossairt for injuries 
Cossairt sustained when Coulthard's vehicle went off a mountain road in Albany 
County. Cossairt, joined by another plaintiff in the original proceeding, raises 
an issue concerning the computation of costs on cross-appeal.

[¶2]      We affirm in all 
respects.

[¶3]      Coulthard phrases 
the issues in the following way:

"A. Did the trial court 
err in directing the verdict regarding liability against defendant/appellant 
Coulthard and not allowing the jury to make a determination regarding the 
comparative negligence of plaintiff/appellee Cossairt?

"B. Did the trial court 
err in denying defendant/appellant Coulthard's motion for new trial or amendment 
of judgment?

"C. Was the verdict 
excessive and a result of the influence of passion or prejudice?

"D. Was the verdict 
supported by sufficient evidence?"

[¶4]      On cross-appeal, 
Cossairt and Finnerty raise the following issue:

"[W]hether Wyoming should 
adopt a rule whereby the trial courts are allowed to review discovery activities 
and expenses and have the discretion to award discovery costs in appropriate 
cases."

FACTS

[¶5]      On July 25, 1987, 
Coulthard, Cossairt, Kirk Schrawyer, Joe Finnerty, and Mike Chesnut went to 
Mountain Home to celebrate Schrawyer's upcoming wedding with a bachelor party. 
They had decided to rent a cabin, celebrate and spend the night in order to 
avoid driving home following the planned drinking party. As one participant put 
it, "at the time that seemed like a great idea." It did not turn out that 
way.

[¶6]      The original plan 
called for all five men to ride from Laramie to Mountain Home in Chesnut's 
vehicle. Coulthard, however, also drove his truck for a reason not readily 
apparent from the record. Before leaving Laramie, they purchased beer and 
whiskey, which was kept in Coulthard's truck. On the way to Mountain Home, both 
vehicles stopped, and the men smoked marijuana and drank whiskey. Coulthard was 
also drinking while driving to Mountain Home.

[¶7]      Although they had 
no specific agenda for this party, they intended to stay at the cabin they had 
rented the entire time. After spending a little time at the cabin, Coulthard 
suggested they visit his uncle who lived across the highway. At his uncle's, 
Coulthard, who was the only one who brought fishing gear, suggested they go 
fishing. Coulthard's uncle recommended Pelton Creek as a good place to fish. 
They drove there in Coulthard's truck with Coulthard driving, Chestnut riding in 
the cab of the truck, and the other three riding in the back.

[¶8]      Coulthard had 
drunk at least eight cans of beer and half of a fifth of whiskey by the time 
they arrived at the fishing area. Instead of fishing all the time, Coulthard 
spent some time wrestling with Chesnut in piles of cattle droppings. When it 
came time to return to the cabin, no one, except for Coulthard himself, wanted 
Coulthard to drive because of his obvious intoxication. Cossairt got into the 
driver's side of the vehicle and told Coulthard that he should not drive. 
Coulthard was an all-state football player with a reputation for being tough. 
Cossairt was a quiet person whose interest in sports leaned toward cross-country 
running and skiing. Coulthard responded to Cossairt's suggestion by slapping 
Cossairt, pulling him from the driver's seat, and throwing him into the back of 
the truck. Acting threatening and loud, Coulthard declared, "I'm going to be the 
only one to drive that truck." The others felt intimidated enough by this to get 
into the truck as well. As with the trip to the fishing area, Chesnut rode in 
the cab of the truck, and the other three rode in the back.

[¶9]      From the moment 
Coulthard took off, his driving scared the three riding in the back of the 
truck. Driving at about 40 miles per hour on a curvy, washboarded gravel road, 
Coulthard caused the truck to fishtail and slide around the turns. Cossairt 
banged his hands on the roof and rear window of the cab and yelled in an attempt 
to get Coulthard to slow down. Schrawyer joined him in the banging and yelling 
when Coulthard did not respond to Cossairt's pleas.

[¶10]   After going through six or seven 
curves in this manner, the truck become airborne as it went off the road. 
Cossairt, Coulthard, Schrawyer and Finnerty were thrown from the 
truck.

[¶11]   Everyone was injured to some 
extent, with Cossairt sustaining the most serious injuries. Schrawyer, who 
attended to Cossairt and Finnerty after the accident, observed a gash in 
Cossairt's head and part of his calf missing. Cossairt was taken to Ivinson 
Memorial Hospital in Laramie, where it was feared he would not survive his 
injuries. He was then transported by helicopter to a Fort Collins, Colorado 
hospital. He remained hospitalized for 33 days, including five in intensive 
care.

[¶12]   Cossairt's injuries left him with 
permanent brain damage and physical disabilities. His skull was fractured and 
part of his brain was removed. He has difficulty with speaking and forming 
sentences. He has difficulty in using his right arm. His knee is unstable and 
susceptible to osteoarthritis. Academic testing following the accident places 
him in the bottom percentile for language and mathematic skills. In August 1988, 
he underwent cranioplasty surgery to repair his skull. He had additional knee 
surgery in May 1989.

[¶13]   Cossairt brought suit on November 
12, 1987. Coulthard answered, admitting the accident and the injuries. He raised 
defenses of contributory and comparative negligence. He claimed that his actions 
were not the proximate cause of the injury. He claimed that Cossairt's injuries 
resulted from a joint venture in which Cossairt participated with knowledge of 
the obvious and apparent danger. Cossairt's case was consolidated for trial with 
the cases of the three other passengers. Chesnut settled with Coulthard before 
trial. Schrawyer originally joined in the cross-appeal but was dismissed upon 
his own motion on February 9, 1990.

[¶14]   A five-day trial was held in July 
1989. The three plaintiff's testified and offered evidence from other witnesses. 
At the close of the plaintiffs' case, Coulthard rested without presenting a 
defense. Upon the plaintiffs' motion, the court granted a directed verdict 
finding Coulthard negligent with no comparative negligence on the part of the 
plaintiffs. See W.R.C.P. 50(a). The case went to the jury on the question of 
damages, including whether punitive damages should be awarded. The jury awarded 
Cossairt $1.7 million, Finnerty $20,100 and Schrawyer $6,500. It found that 
punitive damages should be awarded and, following testimony by Coulthard on his 
financial status, awarded $500 in punitive damages.

[¶15]   Coulthard moved for a new trial or 
amendment of judgment in Cossairt's case. Coulthard claimed the $1.7 million 
award appeared to be the result of passion or prejudice on the part of the jury 
and not supported by sufficient evidence. See W.R.C.P. 59(a)(4) and (6). The 
court admitted it was surprised at the size of the award but recognized that the 
court's surprise is no basis to amend the judgment or grant a new trial. Finding 
the damage award to be supported by sufficient evidence and not the result of 
passion or prejudice, the court refused "to interfere with the collective 
wisdom" of the jurors and denied the motion. Coulthard does not contest the 
awards to Finnerty and Schrawyer.

[¶16]   In October 1989, the court awarded 
costs to the three plaintiffs. Cossairt requested $4,831.19, but the court 
disallowed some expenditures for discovery and expert witness expenses, save for 
the time the experts spent testifying. The court awarded him $2,268.76 in costs. 
Finnerty requested $538.00 and was awarded $205.50. Schrawyer requested $548.42 
and was awarded $70.00.

DISCUSSION

A. Directed 
Verdict

[¶17]   As a preliminary matter, we address 
Cossairt's contention that Coulthard failed to preserve the matters decided on 
directed verdict by not raising those issues on his motion for a new trial. 
While we continue to recognize the value of allowing the trial court to correct 
asserted errors of law through a motion for a new trial, such a motion is not 
necessary to preserve the issue of a directed verdict on appeal. Cf. Harden v. 
Gregory Motors, 697 P.2d 283 (Wyo. 1985).

[¶18]   The rules in existence prior to the 
promulgation of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure and Wyoming Rules of 
Appellate Procedure required a motion for a new trial be made before bringing an 
assignment of error before this court. E.g. Schmidt v. First National Bank, 29 
Wyo. 260, 262, 212 P. 651, 652 (1923). However, a motion for a new trial was 
required as a condition for appeal only for grounds for which a new trial could 
be granted. In re Austin's Estate, 35 Wyo. 176, 181, 246 P. 459, 460 
(1926).

[¶19]   The Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure enumerate the grounds for which a court may grant a new trial. 
W.R.C.P. 59(a)(1) through (8). The enumerated ground relating most closely to a 
directed verdict is W.R.C.P. 59(a)(6), which concerns sufficiency of the 
evidence to support the verdict. The standard which must be met for granting a 
directed verdict is greater than that for granting a new trial. Cody v. Atkins, 
658 P.2d 59, 64 (Wyo. 1983). See also 11 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice 
and Procedure: Civil § 2806 (1973).

"`When the evidence is 
wholly insufficient to support a verdict, it is the duty of the trial court to 
direct a verdict or enter a judgment n.o.v., and the court has no discretion in 
that respect. But, the granting of a new trial involves an element of discretion 
which goes further than the mere sufficiency of the evidence. It embraces all 
the reasons which inhere in the integrity of the jury system itself.'" 658 P.2d  
at 64 (quoting Tidewater Oil Co. v. Waller, 302 F.2d 638, 643 (10th Cir. 
1962).

This higher 
standard eliminates the allegation of an erroneous grant of a directed verdict 
as a ground for motion for a new trial. To require that the issue be raised in a 
motion for a new trial would have no reasonable basis and would needlessly delay 
and prolong litigation. See Crosslin v. Alsup, 594 S.W.2d 379 (Tenn. 1980). We 
will decide the issue of the directed verdict on its merits.

[¶20]   In reviewing the grant of a 
directed verdict, we consider the evidence favorable to the party against whom 
the motion is directed, giving to it all reasonable inferences. Carey v. 
Jackson, 603 P.2d 868, 877 (Wyo. 1979). A grant of a directed verdict is proper 
when, without weighing the evidence or considering the credibility of witnesses, 
the evidence is such that there is but one conclusion which reasonable jurors 
could reach. Town of Jackson v. Shaw, 569 P.2d 1246, 1250 (Wyo. 1977). This 
court makes its determination without deference to the view of the trial court. 
Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187, 190 (Wyo. 1979). Since a directed verdict 
deprives the parties of a determination of the facts by a jury, such a motion 
should be cautiously and sparingly granted. Cody, 658 P.2d  at 61.

[¶21]   Coulthard contends that Cossairt 
was comparatively negligent, and the percentage of that negligence should have 
been submitted to the jury. The evidence he offers to support this contention is 
testimony that Cossairt had been drinking before the accident. The evidence is 
undisputed, however, that Coulthard refused to let anyone else drive his truck; 
he physically removed Cossairt from the driver's seat; struck Cossairt; and 
threw Cossairt in the back of the truck. No evidence shows that, of his own 
volition, Cossairt took that fateful ride. Even if we consider the testimony of 
Cossairt's drinking to amount to a scintilla of evidence to support Coulthard's 
contention, a scintilla is not enough. Carey, 603 P.2d  at 877. The question is 
not whether there is no evidence supporting the party against whom the motion is 
directed, but rather whether there is evidence upon which the jury properly 
could find a verdict for that party. Id.

[¶22]   Our examination of the record 
reveals nothing that would allow the jury to find for Coulthard on the 
negligence issue. Coulthard directs us to nothing, save Cossairt's drinking. 
That evidence does not counter the conclusion that Cossairt, drunk or sober, was 
riding in the truck against his will. Appellant cross-examined some of the 
witnesses. He presented no evidence of his own. Whether Coulthard successfully 
attacked the credibility of any of those witnesses is a matter we do not 
consider, it being readily apparent that a reasonable jury could arrive at but 
one conclusion in this case. Town of Jackson, 569 P.2d  at 1250. We hold, 
therefore, that the trial court properly granted a directed verdict on the 
question of negligence.

B. Motion for 
New Trial

[¶23]   A trial court has broad discretion 
when ruling upon a motion for new trial, and we will not disturb its decision 
absent an abuse of discretion. Medlock v. Merrick, 786 P.2d 881, 883 (Wyo. 
1990). An abuse of discretion occurs when the court commits an error of law 
under the circumstances. Waggoner v. General Motors Corp., 771 P.2d 1195, 1201 
(Wyo. 1989). Coulthard contends that a new trial was warranted because the 
verdict was so excessive as to be the result of prejudice or passion on the part 
of the jury, and it was not supported by the evidence.

[¶24]   When applied to the action of a 
jury, "passion or prejudice" means "anger, resentment, hate, absence of 
reflection, disregard of the rights of others, and kindred motives." Ries v. 
Cheyenne Cab & Transfer Co., 53 Wyo. 104, 79 P.2d 468, 474 (1938). We have 
further construed these terms by stating "passion" means "moved by feelings or 
emotions, or may include sympathy as a moving influence without conscious 
violation of duty," and by stating "prejudice" to include "the forming of an 
opinion without due knowledge or examination." Valdez v. Glenn, 79 Wyo. 53, 330 P.2d 309, 312 (Wyo. 1958).

[¶25]   The jury's determination of the 
amount of damages is inviolate absent an award so excessive or inadequate as to 
shock the judicial conscience and to raise an irresistible inference that 
passion, prejudice, or other improper cause had invaded the trial. Brittain v. 
Booth, 601 P.2d 532, 536 (Wyo. 1979). See also Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. 
Richards, 702 P.2d 1272, 1278 (Wyo. 1985). The amount of damages "`must be so 
excessive as to strike mankind, at the first blush, as being beyond all measure 
unreasonable and outrageous.'" Town of Jackson, 569 P.2d  at 1252 (quoting 
Coleman v. Southwick, 9 Johnson 45, 6 Am.Dec. 253, 258 (1812)). This standard 
recognizes a range within which the verdict must fall and recognizes the judge, 
who has observed, tried, and compared numerous cases of this kind, as 
knowledgeable in determining a reasonable value of damages to be awarded. The 
substantial evidence test was considered by us, but we concluded it was too 
vague to be workable. What is substantial evidence to one judge may be not 
substantial to another. On the other hand, the test of when the judicial 
conscience is shocked is one which has been found workable for decades, and we 
continue to apply the test in this type of case.

[¶26]   Under this standard, we cannot 
conclude that passion or prejudice led the jury to award Cossairt $1.7 million 
in damages. The jury spent some six hours deliberating the verdict. As discussed 
below, Cossairt presented sufficient evidence to prove his damages, eliminating 
any contention of prejudice. We find no evidence that leads to a conclusion that 
passion influenced this award, and Coulthard points us to none. The record leads 
us to the conclusion that the verdict is nothing but "the well-reasoned work 
product of twelve intelligent and caring jurors." Union Pacific Railroad Co., 
702 P.2d  at 1279.

[¶27]   When reviewing the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support a jury verdict, our approach is the opposite of that 
when we review the evidence to determine the propriety of a directed verdict. 
When determining whether a verdict is supported by the evidence, we assume the 
evidence in favor of the successful party to be true, leaving out of 
consideration entirely the evidence in conflict, and assigning every favorable 
inference to the evidence of the successful party that can be reasonably and 
fairly drawn from it. Medlock, 786 P.2d  at 883.

[¶28]   Damages must be proven with a 
reasonable degree of certainty; however, proof of exact damages is not required. 
Reposa v. Buhler, 770 P.2d 235, 238 (Wyo. 1989). Cossairt met that burden. 
Cossairt claimed damages for past and future expenses for medical care and 
treatment; emotional and physical pain and suffering; disability or the 
inability to live with a normal body; loss of the enjoyment of life; loss of 
income; and loss of earning capacity. His proof included testimony from himself, 
other lay witnesses, and experts. The experts included medical doctors, a 
psychologist, a vocational rehabilitation expert, and an economist. Coulthard, 
in his brief, lists eight different areas which he contends are unsupported by 
the evidence. To support his argument, he asks us at the very least to 
characterize the evidence in a light most favorable to him. We cannot, and will 
not, view the evidence in that manner. Cossairt's life has been changed 
dramatically as a result of this accident. Cf. Buttrey Food Stores Div. v. 
Coulson, 620 P.2d 549, 555, 20 A.L.R.4th 419 (1980). The evidence is sufficient 
to support the verdict when viewed in the proper light.

C. Award of 
Costs

[¶29]   Two of the plaintiffs below, 
Cossairt and Finnerty, center their cross-appeal on the assertion that the 
standards for awarding costs are unfair. They contend that the guidelines for 
recovery of expert witness and discovery costs lead to inequities between 
litigants.

[¶30]   The matter of costs is purely 
statutory. Weaver v. Mitchell, 715 P.2d 1361, 1373 (Wyo. 1986). Two statutes are 
relevant to the award of the costs in this matter. Wyoming Statute 1-14-102(b) 
allows for the payment of expert witness fees and the charging of those costs 
against a party. That statute states:

"In any civil or criminal 
case, any party may call expert witnesses to testify and if the court finds any 
witness to be a qualified expert and the expert gives expert testimony which is 
admitted as evidence in the case, the expert witness shall be allowed witness 
fees of twenty-five dollars ($25.00) per day or such other amount as the court 
allows according to the circumstances of the case. Expert witness fees may be 
charged as costs against any party or be apportioned among some or all parties 
in the discretion of the court."

The phrase "such 
other amount as the court allows according to the circumstances of the case" 
gives the court discretion in determining the amount to award. Stauffer Chemical 
Co. v. Curry, 778 P.2d 1083, 1105 (Wyo. 1989). This amount should be limited 
only to time spent actually testifying and should not include charges for 
pre-trial conferences or time spent during trial while waiting to testify. 
Hashimoto v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 767 P.2d 158, 169 (Wyo. 1989). Wyoming 
Statute 1-14-126 grants further discretion to the court in awarding and taxing 
costs. See also W.R.C.P. 54(d). Although we delineated some examples showing 
when awarding costs for discovery expenditures is warranted, Weaver, 715 P.2d  at 
1373, the court has discretion in making the award provided the expenditures are 
"reasonably required for trial preparation." Hashimoto, 767 P.2d  at 
169.

[¶31]   Because the award of costs is 
within the discretion of the trial court, we will not disturb the court's 
decision in this matter absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. Stauffer 
Chemical Co., 778 P.2d  at 1105. Whether the court abused its discretion must be 
determined by the particular facts of the case. England v. Simmons, 728 P.2d 1137, 1140 (Wyo. 1986) Cossairt and Finnerty contend the court awarded costs 
based on a somewhat mechanical application of the guidelines cited above. They 
fail, however, to cite the record to support the contention that such an 
application would amount to an abuse of discretion and establish that the 
discovery expenditures not awarded as costs were reasonably necessary. We have 
repeatedly cautioned litigants to comply with the record citation requirements 
of W.R.A.P. 5.01. See, e.g., Jung-Leonczynska v. Steup, 782 P.2d 578, 581 (Wyo. 
1989); Condict v. Condict, No. 89-51, Order dismissing appeal (Wyo., Jan. 24, 
1990). Without support from the record, we are unable to find any abuse of 
discretion.

[¶32]   The plaintiffs further argue that 
some litigants use discovery needlessly for the purpose of causing the 
opposition to spend so much money participating in the discovery process that 
the cost of litigation becomes prohibitively expensive. They urge adoption of a 
rule that would allow recovery for many discovery expenses to prevent this. The 
plaintiffs do not claim they were prejudiced by the amount of discovery 
conducted in preparation for this trial. Thus, to discuss this issue would 
amount to an advisory opinion which we ordinarily eschew. Wyoming Health 
Services, Inc. v. Deatherage, 773 P.2d 156, 158 (Wyo. 1989). We deviate slightly 
from this rule, however, to note that abusive discovery tactics can and should 
be brought to the attention of the court which has the power to control 
discovery. W.R.C.P. 26(c). See 8 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Civil § 2036 (1970). See also Pollack, Discovery - Its Abuse and 
Correction, 80 F.R.D. 219 (1979).

[¶33]   We find no error committed by the 
trial court in directing the verdict on the issue of Coulthard's negligence, in 
denying the new trial motion, and in awarding costs. This case is affirmed in 
all respects.

URBIGKIT, 
C.J., 
files a specially concurring opinion. 

URBIGKIT, Chief Justice, 
specially concurring.

[¶34]   I concur, but write further in 
analysis that the proven injury in this case reasonably justified the damage 
award and we need not apply an extreme test for what was fairly and reasonably 
determined by jury verdict. Specifically, I question our continued lack of 
judicial responsibility in jury supervision encompassed within characterizations 
of "shock[ing] the judicial conscience", "an irresistible inference that 
passion, prejudice or other improper cause had invaded the trial[]" or "so 
excessive as to strike mankind, at the first blush, as being beyond all measure 
unreasonable or outrageous."1 I suggest we abandon this language 
because a requirement that an award must "shock" an appellate jurist's 
conscience is no standard because it merely personalizes the appellate outcome. 
It is a test that exists without boundaries except those intrinsic to the mores 
of the trial judge or appellate court as decisional concepts of personal 
persuasion and political proclivity.

[¶35]   The intrinsic facts revealed within 
the recent course of Wyoming cases convince me that application of an asserted 
test of shock to the judicial conscience is a nonstandard in reality serving for 
a result oriented, unprincipled disposition by application of unboundaried 
decision. I have written before on this subject when the jury verdict itself was 
not justified on liability and apply equally the same concern as a test for 
either an excessive or insufficient damage award. See Medlock v. Merrick, 786 P.2d 881 (Wyo. 1990), Urbigkit, Justice, dissenting; Clarke v. Vandermeer, 740 P.2d 921 (Wyo. 1987); and DeJulio v. Foster, 715 P.2d 182 (Wyo. 
1986).

[¶36]   Three cases serve for illustration. 
First is Brittain v. Booth, 601 P.2d 532 (Wyo. 1979), where the rule was used to 
justify the $10,000 award for personal injury after the incurrence of $7,800 in 
medical expenses. The result in that case was clearly not justice. My judicial 
conscience would have been then, and certainly is now, shocked at the resulting 
net of the $5,100 actual award where the injured person suffered a thirty-five 
to forty percent total disability. Brittain cannot then be related to the 
$425,000 award against the Union Pacific Railroad Company for injury damages 
where this court added a further criteria of justification of "erroneous basis" 
to the "passion, prejudice or bias" test. Union Pacific R. Co. v. Richards, 702 P.2d 1272, 1278-79 (Wyo. 1985). Neither of these cases can be correlated to the 
reduction impressed by remitter against the successful plaintiff in Town of 
Jackson v. Shaw, 569 P.2d 1246 (Wyo. 1977), where the rule was stated, but did 
not accord with the reduction made in verdict. If Town of Jackson was a 
reasonable appellate decision, there is certainly no semblance of the same test 
in reason and fairness for justice in either Brittain or Richards. 
Unnecessarily, extremity of language in criteria invites not only result 
oriented adjudication, but discriminatory and uncontrolled results.

[¶37]   In this accelerative society,2 maintenance of the jury system 
requires vigilance so that relevance and rationality are retained. My persuasion 
remains constant that judicial action is required when the cognitive filters of 
the jury do not provide justice. See Medlock, 786 P.2d 881; Clarke, 740 P.2d 921; and DeJulio, 715 P.2d 182. We should apply a test of rationality to jury 
verdict supervision, not absolute unconditional acceptance except when 
particularized case features call for a rule disregard and result oriented 
decision. See Cates v. Eddy, 669 P.2d 912 (Wyo. 1983).

[¶38]   It is my contention that we should 
substitute a rule of reason and recognition of properly exercised discretion for 
the postevent shock to the judicial conscience supervisory review applied test 
for jury verdicts. In assessment, we should recognize this separate function 
provided by the jury in evaluation of general damages and special damages as its 
deliberative requirement. Standards for review should exist identically whether 
emplaced by the trial court in answering motions for a new trial or judgments 
notwithstanding the verdict or by the appellate court in assessing the exercised 
discretion of the trial court for direct appellate review of a contended 
improper verdict.

[¶39]   Actual or special damages could be 
assessed in review under our traditional substantial evidence standard and 
general damages could be reviewed within the province of the jury to exercise 
discretion in alignment and allocation of the intangibles of hurt, pain and 
future loss. Review of actual damage awards are appropriate under the 
substantial evidence standard because such damages are calculable from the 
evidence available at trial. See Boyd v. State, 747 P.2d 1143 (Wyo. 1987). The 
appropriate standard of review of the jury function could simply ask whether 
there was substantial evidence to justify the award.

[¶40]   Review of general damage awards are 
also appropriate under recognition of a discretionary determination because such 
damages are not subject to precise calculation and are designed to compensate 
the victim in full for all harm proximately caused, which includes intangible 
damages. Martinez v. City of Cheyenne, 791 P.2d 949, 959 (Wyo. 1990). The jury 
is asked to determine the appropriate damages and should be reversed only upon a 
clear showing of abuse of discretion. Because we have said "abuse of discretion 
has as its anchor point the query of `whether the court [or jury] could 
reasonably conclude as it did,'" Oien v. State, 797 P.2d 544, 549 (Wyo. 1990) 
(quoting Noetzelmann v. State, 721 P.2d 579, 583 (Wyo. 1986)), our review could 
give deference to the decision of the fact finder where some evidence exists in 
the record for support. The dispositive question for our standard of review 
would ask if the jury could reasonably conclude as it did if all favorable 
inferences are accorded the position taken by the jury. This would be similar to 
the standard now used to review a directed verdict. Cody v. Atkins, 658 P.2d 59, 
61 (Wyo. 1983). I argue our use of the "shock [to] the judicial conscience" 
standard reflects an inadequate appreciation of the function we have asked the 
jury to perform and, in fact, has no relation to jury performance or appropriate 
judicial supervision.

[¶41]   The use of these proposed standards 
of review would streamline our review of appeals for motions for new trials or 
judgments notwithstanding the verdict when those motions are grounded on 
excessive or inadequate jury awards. See Cody, 658 P.2d  at 63-64. Such standards 
of review would focus the appellate court's attention on the function of the 
trial court when ruling on these motions for new trial or judgments 
notwithstanding the verdict. We expect the trial court to defer to the fact 
finders when ruling on these motions for new trial or judgments notwithstanding 
the verdict. See Medlock, 786 P.2d  at 883. Under the proposed standards, we 
could expect the trial court to also recognize the discretion utilized by the 
jury to estimate the harm to the plaintiff. From the vantage point of such 
additional deference, the trial court could determine that the size of an award 
was an abuse of the jury's discretion only if the award could not be reasonably 
justified by assuming "the evidence in favor of the successful party to be true, 
leaving out of consideration entirely the evidence in conflict, and assigning 
every favorable inference to the evidence of the successful party that can be 
reasonably and fairly drawn from it." Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Admiral 
Beverage Corp., 638 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Wyo. 1982).

[¶42]   Review for the appellate court 
could then be the same standard used by the trial court in granting or denying 
the judgment notwithstanding the verdict or motion for new trial grounded on an 
excessive or inadequate verdict. The standards of review would be the same and 
easily identifiable by the appellate court - if the jury cannot be said to have 
abused its discretion in making its award, then a judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict or motion for new trial grounded on an excessive or inadequate verdict 
would be an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. Lassiter v. 
International Union of Operating Engineers, 349 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1976). As well, 
if an appellate court could not say the verdict was an abuse of discretion after 
assuming "`the evidence in favor of the successful party to be true, leaving out 
of consideration entirely the evidence in conflict, and assigning every 
favorable inference to the evidence of the successful party that can be 
reasonably and fairly drawn from it,'" Seaton v. State of Wyo. Highway Com'n, 
Dist. No. 1, 784 P.2d 197, 207 (Wyo. 1989) (quoting Reese v. Dow Chemical Co., 
728 P.2d 1118, 1120 (Wyo. 1986)), the jury verdict would stand 
undisturbed.

[¶43]   The Florida courts appear to have 
already begun moving in this direction.

     Two factors unite to 
favor a very restricted review of an order denying a motion for new trial on 
ground of excessive verdict. The first of these is the deference due the trial 
judge, who has had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and to consider the 
evidence in the context of a living trial rather than upon a cold record. The 
second factor is the deference properly given to the jury's determination of 
such matters of fact as the weight of the evidence and the quantum of 
damages.

Lassiter, 349 So. 2d  at 627. The court reviewed the trial court under its abuse of discretion 
standard.

[¶44]   The obsequiousness granted to the 
"shock the judicial conscience" standard of review for jury awards arose in 
Coleman v. Southwick, 6 American Decisions 253 (N.Y. 1812). There the editor of 
the New York Evening Post sued the publisher of The Albany Register for libel. 
Following an award of $1,500 and a motion for a new trial, the defendant 
appealed. That court indicated: "The question of damages was within the proper 
and peculiar province of the jury. It rested in their sound discretion, under 
all the circumstances of the case * * *." Id. at 257 (emphasis added). Had the 
opinion ended there, today's standard of review might well be "abuse of 
discretion;" but the opinion added:

[A]nd unless the damages 
are so outrageous as to strike every one with the enormity and injustice of 
them, and so as to induce the court to believe that the jury must have acted 
from prejudice, partiality or corruption, we cannot, consistently with the 
precedents, interfere with the verdict.

Id. at 
257.

[¶45]   While shocks to my conscience as an 
appellate jurist usually come from reading "rights skeptical" judicial 
opinions3 and the corrosive effects of those 
opinions on traditional understandings of due process and equal protection, I 
cannot endorse such a personalized reaction to be appropriate for a standard of 
review.

[¶46]   We should recognize that in some 
cases what may be too much for a jury verdict, may in many other cases, by 
application of the same conscience shock rule, justify too little to be awarded. 
Cf. Powers v. Johnson, 562 So. 2d 367 (Fla.App. 1990) (citing Butte v. Hughes, 
521 So. 2d 280 (Fla.App. 1988)); Thornburg v. Pursell, 446 So. 2d 713 (Fla.App. 
1984); and Hernandez v. City of New York, 156 A.D.2d 641, 549 N.Y.S.2d 139 
(1989). See also Tarin v. City Nat. Bank of Miami, 557 So. 2d 632 (Fla.App. 
1990).

[¶47]   I am comfortable with a test of the 
appropriateness of judicial results embodied in reasonableness and need not 
encounter shock of my judicial conscience to find cause for exercise of 
supervisory responsibility to reject injustice. I reserve "shock [to] the 
judicial conscience" for deprivation of constitutional rights in general and 
lack of due process or equal protection in specific. Additur and remitter should 
not be dirty words in delivered justice to either the plaintiff or defendant. Of 
course in this case, passion was applied in the jury decision. Any thinking 
human being would be called into passionate evaluation of the liability facts 
and the extent of injury. That, however, is not the kind of humanistic concern 
for right and wrong here applied by the jury that could be characterized as 
either lacking reason or rejecting justification for applied 
justice.

[¶48]   The failure of judicial supervision 
of the American jury as a defense for the system is not without comment and 
current academic consideration. See, for example, in particular within its many 
excellent articles, Daniels, The Question of Jury Competence and the Politics of 
Civil Justice Reform: Symbols, Rhetoric, and Agenda-Building, 52 Law & 
Contemp.Probs. 269 (1989). Equally impressive in analysis of the operation of 
the civil jury within an accelerated society and a complex social and economic 
system is the extensive analysis of Ansaldi, Texaco, Pennzoil and the Revolt of 
the Masses: A Contracts Postmortem, 27 Hous.L.Rev. 733, 840 (1990) (footnote 
omitted):4

     The jury verdict in 
the Texaco case, upheld on appeal under a highly deferential standard of review, 
is a classic case of "the wire snapping back" - a revolt of the masses not so 
much against the legal order as a whole as against an aberrant vision of legal 
obligation presented to them by a specialized subcommunity to which they did not 
belong, a model of justice and fair dealing having no basis in the mores of mass 
society. What does the case mean to lawyers and the legal system? Ultimately, it 
signals a serious threat to the place reserved for elite values in contract 
law.

[¶49]   Even a casual review of current 
cases reveals that the extreme protective envelope provided by this court by 
definition, if not necessarily by practice, is not generally followed in other 
jurisdictions. In recent case law, the state of Idaho has delineated in a series 
of decisions a modernized adaptation. Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609, 733 P.2d 1234 (1986); Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 727 P.2d 1187 (1986); Dinneen v. 
Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 603 P.2d 575 (1979).5 

[¶50]   Because many appellate issues are 
resolved under the abuse of discretion standard, we may well improve our 
supervision of the jury system and blunt the academic criticism occasioned by 
our traditional standard of review.6 A current example will serve for 
illustration. Otis Mason, who died of leukemia in 1979, had been employed as an 
instructor at the Coast Guard Engineering School in Yorktown, Virginia. The 
Coast Guard purchased benzene for his use and others at the school which was a 
very commonly utilized industrial and commercial product well-known to amateur 
and professional mechanics. Mason filed suit against the supplier of the test 
kit containing the benzene and, following his death, his widow was substituted 
as plaintiff in the survival action. In the 1990 federal court decision, the 
jury awarded $4 million for his personal injuries, $5,025,000 for his survivor's 
wrongful death claim and punitive damages of $25 million.7 The result shocked my conscience, 
but did not shock the trial judge who applied the Coleman, 6 American Decisions 
253, ratio decidendi of 1812 to a 1990 economics problem of international 
competition. Mason v. Texaco, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 1472 (D.Kan. 1990); Mason v. 
Texaco, Inc., 862 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1988); Mason v. Gerin Corp., 231 Kan. 718, 
647 P.2d 1340 (1982).

[¶51]   We would simplify our review if we 
apply the principle of deference which is intrinsic to questions of abuse of 
discretion. See Farber v. Massillon Bd. of Educ., 908 F.2d 65 (6th Cir. 1990). 
Applying the standard of review that I argue should be adopted by the court, 
leads me to join the majority in affirming the award. The dimensions of 
reasonableness, discretion and deference which accompany the proposed standards 
of review provide ample space for my concurrence without resorting to "shock" or 
"irresistible inference [of] passion" which could be otherwise left to 
interpersonal relationships. The damage award to Mr. Cossairt in this case was 
substantial, but so was the damage caused to him - damage which is tragic and 
undoubtedly lifelong.

[¶52]   Again, my complaint is not with the 
majority looking for a traditional standard of review for jury awards and 
motions for new trials - my dissatisfaction is with what those traditional 
standards of review really are. I respectfully urge this court to look to the 
1990's and not to incidental or accidental language of a by-gone era to 
enumerate a standard of review for jury awards and motions for new trials when 
the amount of damage awarded or not awarded is in 
question.

FOOTNOTES

1 Although phrased 
somewhat differently, the perception that is advanced by this approach was 
defined by the Minnesota appeal court in the analysis of an ATV injury case, 
Erickson By and Through Bunker v. American Honda Motor Co., 455 N.W.2d 74, 78 
(Minn.App. 1990):

     Second, Burnsville 
argues there is no competent evidence to support the damages for pain and 
disability and impairment of future earning capacity. The jury awarded $22,000 
in damages for past pain and disability, $90,000 for future pain and disability, 
and $688,000 for loss of future earning capacity. The trial court found the 
verdict amounts were well within the potential dollar parameters for the facts 
of the case, and we agree. * * * A rehabilitation psychologist presented several 
professional career scenarios that he said could have been reasonably expected 
for Christopher based on his school records and his parents' educational 
achievements. There was sufficient evidence to support the damages for pain and 
disability and impairment of future earning capacity.

2 See the dialogue in 
Goldberg, Bridging the Gap, 76 A.B.A.J. 44, 46 (Sept. 1990), where Roberta Ramo 
recognized:

[T]he law itself has 
changed. Both the complexity of the law and the rate of change have so 
accelerated in the last decade that it is virtually impossible to teach the law. 
It is increasingly difficult to acquire and maintain competence in any area. If 
we don't understand that, then we're missing a fundamental change in 
practice.

3 See Elfenbein, The Myth 
of Conservatism as a Constitutional Philosophy, 71 Iowa L.Rev. 401, 425-26 n. 
124 (1986) (quoting Sager, Rights Skepticism and Process-Based Responses, 56 
N.Y.U.L.Rev. 417, 441 (1981) and emphasis in original):

"The crucial operative 
aspect of rights skepticism is its attitude toward the resolution of [the] 
systemic tension [between majority rule and individual rights]. When a 
rights-supporting value of the Constitution is understood to be in arguable 
conflict with majority conduct, the rights skeptic insists that the case for the 
recognition of the right be made only under circumstances of textual, 
historical, or structural certainty; otherwise the majoritarian result must 
prevail. Under this conception, rights are narrowly defined exceptions to an 
otherwise prevailing general commitment to majority rule.

     An hierarchical 
paradigm supports this lopsided view of rights and majority will. Rights 
skepticism places majoritarian virtues on a plane different from and higher than 
the rights component of our political tradition. Rights themselves are viewed in 
this model as deriving from a prior commitment to majority rule; rights exist 
because they have been endorsed by political majorities in the course of the 
proposal and ratification of the Constitution and its amendments."

4      An interesting 
comparison can be made between the substantively dissimilar yet logically 
comparable subjects of Texaco with the topic found in Raveson, Advocacy and 
Contempt: Constitutional Limitations on the Judicial Contempt Power, 65 
Wn.L.Rev. 477 (1990).

5      It should be 
recognized that what shocked the public and consequently the legislature may not 
so easily shock the judicial conscience. Misinformation is the greatest cause of 
public misconception of the operation of the justice delivery system. However, 
realism, rationality and essential justice will ultimately, if not unilaterally, 
be defined and weighed by public perception for which the jury becomes the 
immediate barometer. Public perception that some juries provide extreme results 
will inevitably adversely affect fair justice in later juries which are 
perceptive to community standards and reaction. The wire will snap back and 
injustice may tend to cultivate resulting injustice reactively and 
retroactively.

6      See generally 
Ansaldi, supra, 27 Hous.L.Rev. at 840; Daniels, supra, 52 Law & Contemp. 
Probs. 269; and Vidmar, Foreword: Empirical Research and the Issue of Jury 
Competence, 52 Law & Contemp.Probs. 1 (1989).

7      The jury award, 
which was approved by the presiding judge as punishment against the major 
American corporation for selling the government what it had ordered, was 0.31% 
of net worth and 1.92% of annual net earnings after taxes.