Title: JAMES DEMASIO MARTINEZ v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JAMES DEMASIO MARTINEZ v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 6199 P.3d 526Case Number: No. S-08-0025Decided: 01/23/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
JAMES 
DEMASIO MARTINEZ,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; and 
David E. Westling, Senior Assistant, Appellate Counsel.  Argument presented by Mr. 
Westling.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Cathleen D. Parker, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument presented by Ms. Parker.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, James 
Demasio Martinez (Martinez), challenges the district court's 
judgment and sentence for the crime of aggravated assault and battery.1  The victim of the battery was his 
girlfriend, Erica Duran (Duran), who was also the mother of his child.  He asserts that the district court erred 
in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal, which was filed at the end of 
the presentation of the State's evidence.  
That motion was based on Martinez's theory that the victim of his crime 
did not suffer a "severe disfigurement."  
He also contends that the district court failed to correctly instruct the 
jury on the governing law and that it erred in allowing the testimony of a 
substitute witness whose identity was not known to the defense until the day of 
trial.  Finally, Martinez asserts that the 
district court erred in awarding restitution because its findings with respect 
to restitution were incomplete.  We 
will reverse because the State did not present evidence which satisfied the 
"severe disfigurement" element of the crime of aggravated assault.  However, because the evidence of simple 
battery is overwhelming, we will direct entry of a judgment against Martinez for that crime 
and remand to the district court for sentencing.  Because we reverse and remand, we find 
it unnecessary and imprudent to address the other issues 
raised.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Martinez states these 
issues:

 
 
I.          
Did the district court err in refusing to grant [Martinez's] motion for 
judgment of acquittal in the absence of any evidence of a severe 
disfigurement?

 
 
II.         
Did the [district] court err by giving incorrect and inconsistent jury 
instructions?

 
 
III.        Did 
the [district] court err in allowing the testimony of an undisclosed expert 
witness?

 
 
IV.       Did the 
district court err by assessing fees and restitution in the absence of required 
findings?

 
 
The 
State's recitation of the issues is virtually identical to that presented by 
Martinez.

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      During the late 
night and early morning hours of May 11-12, 2007, Martinez attacked and beat Duran because he 
suspected her of cheating on him. He repeatedly punched her in the face and 
head.  The beating continued over a 
period of an hour and a half.  He 
threatened to kill her.  He kicked 
her in the head and face and tried to stuff both his hands, fingers extended, 
down her throat.  Duran was unable 
to breathe or scream during that time.  
She fell in and out of consciousness during the beating.  When she was able to, Duran screamed as 
loud as she could and banged on the door in order to summon 
help.

 
 
[¶4]      A neighbor heard 
her cries and called the police.  
When the police arrived, they handcuffed Martinez and took him away.  Many photos were taken of the injuries 
inflicted on Duran and some of those photos were introduced in evidence at 
trial.  They graphically depict the 
injuries that Duran tried to describe in her testimony.  The injuries included a wound on the 
inside of her lower lip that required 20 stitches to close.  She could not swallow food for five days 
because her throat was so sore from Martinez's assault.  Her throat was swollen and infected and 
required treatment with antibiotics.  
She took medication for the pain for about a week.  She also suffered a non-displaced 
fracture to her right sinus, and her right cheekbone was cracked.  Her eyes were blackened and bloodied and 
one was swollen almost shut.  She 
had bruises all over her head, neck, and ears.

 
 
[¶5]      Her throat was 
better in about six days.  The 
bruising on her head and face lasted a week and a half.  She testified that she has scar tissue 
around her mouth and eye, but that it is not noticeable.  She also testified that a friend 
commented to her that the side of her face where a bone was cracked appeared to 
be somewhat flatter than the other side of her face.  She was treated at the hospital for four 
hours and then stayed in her home for many days because she did not want to go 
out looking like the "elephant woman."

 
 
[¶6]      A radiologist, 
who reviewed Duran's x-rays and her medical file generally, testified and 
corroborated portions of Duran's testimony.  His testimony included his observations 
that the trauma to Ms. Duran's face was "mild to moderate," and he described the 
fracture to the sinus as "subtle" (it was not detected upon initial observation 
of the x-rays).  The subtle, 
non-displaced fracture of the sinus would not be noticeable looking at Ms. 
Duran.  The third issue noted above 
arose because the emergency room physician who treated Duran was scheduled to 
provide the medical testimony in this case.  Because he was not available on the day 
of trial, the radiologist was substituted in his place, and Martinez did not receive 
notice of that substitution until the day of trial.  We note in passing, that Martinez was not able to 
establish any meaningful prejudice because of the last-minute 
substitution.

 
 
[¶7]      Martinez conceded that he 
had assaulted Duran, but contended that she did not suffer "severe 
disfigurement" as contemplated by the aggravated assault statute.  He asked the district court to instruct 
the jury as follows:

 
 
The 
phrase "disfigurement" implies permanent or long-lasting 
effect."

 
 
"Bodily 
injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical 
condition.

 
 
The 
term severe is defined as "sharp, 
grave, distressing, violent, extreme, torture, rigorous, difficult to be 
endured."

 
 
The 
term disfigurement is defined as 
"that which impairs or injures the beauty, symmetry, or appearance of a person 
or thing, that which renders unsightly, misshapen, or imperfect, or deforms in 
some manner."

 
 
The 
district court refused those instructions.  
The failure of the district court to provide additional guidance to the 
jury on the subject of "severe disfigurement" gives rise to the second issue 
raised by Martinez in this appeal.

 
 
[¶8]      The district 
court gave the following instructions:

 
 
INSTRUCTION 
NO.  6

 
 
            
The elements of the crime of Aggravated Assault and Battery, as charged in this case, 
are:

 
 
            
1.  On or about the 12th day of May, 
2007;

            
2.  In the County of 
Laramie, and State of Wyoming;

            
3.  The Defendant, James Demasio 
Martinez;

            
4.  Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances 
which showed an extreme indifference to human life;

            
5.  Caused serious bodily injury to Erica 
Duran;

            
6.  Under circumstances which showed an extreme indifference to 
the value of human life.

 
 
            
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of 
these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find 
the Defendant guilty.

            
If, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all of the 
evidence that any of these elements has not been proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt, then you should find the Defendant not guilty.

 
 
INSTRUCTION 
NO. 7

 
 
"Serious 
bodily injury" means bodily injury which creates severe 
disfigurement.

 
 
[¶9]      Another issue 
noted by Martinez was the repetition of "under 
circumstances which showed an extreme indifference to human life" in the 
elements instruction.  Although the 
repetition was clearly unnecessary, it appears to be more of a typographical 
error than a deliberate attempt to emphasize a point detrimental to Martinez's 
cause.

 
 
DISCUSSSION

 
 
Denial 
of Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

 
 
[¶10]   A motion for judgment of acquittal 
is filed pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 29.  
Martinez 
filed his motion after the presentation of the State's evidence and did not, 
thereafter, offer any evidence of his own.  
See Swanson v. State, 981 P.2d 475, 479 (Wyo. 
1999).

 
 
[¶11]   The applicable standard of review 
is this:

 
 
            
Our responsibility in considering the propriety of a ruling on a motion 
for judgment of acquittal is the same as that of the trial court.  Cloman v. State, Wyo., 574 P.2d 410 
(1978).  The question raised is the 
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the charge, which is a matter to be 
determined within the sound discretion of the trial court.  Chavez v. State, Wyo., 601 P.2d 166 (1979); Montez v. State, Wyo., 527 P.2d 1330 
(1974).  In making that 
determination the district court must assume the truth of the evidence of the 
State and give to the State the benefit of all legitimate inferences to be drawn 
from that evidence.  If a prima 
facie case is demonstrated when the evidence is so examined, the motion for 
judgment of acquittal properly is denied.  
Russell v. State, Wyo., 583 P.2d 690 
(1978).  It is proper to grant a 
motion for judgment of acquittal only if there is no substantial evidence to 
sustain the material allegations relating to the offense that is charged.  Heberling v. State, Wyo., 507 P.2d 1 (1973), cert. denied 414 U.S. 1022, 94 S. Ct. 444, 38 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1973); Fresquez v. 
State, Wyo., 492 P.2d 197 (1971).  Such a result is indicated if the 
evidence requires the jury to speculate or conjecture as to the defendant's 
guilt or if a reasonable juror must have a reasonable doubt as to the existence 
of any of the essential elements of the crime when the evidence is viewed in the 
light most favorable to the State.  
Chavez v. State, supra; Russell v. State, 
supra.

 
 

Aragon 
v. State, 
627 P.2d 599, 602 (Wyo. 1981).

 
 
[¶12]   This argument is limited to the 
single issue of whether or not there was sufficient evidence so as to allow the 
jury to deliberate the aggravated assault charge when there was no evidence that 
Duran suffered a "severe disfigurement" as contemplated by the aggravated 
assault statute.

 
 
[¶13]   In Kelly v. State, 2007 WY 45, 
¶¶ 12-23, 153 P.3d 926, 929-31 (Wyo. 2007), we held as 
follows:

 
 
            
In his first issue, Mr. Kelly claims the State's evidence was 
insufficient to show he caused Mr. Osmon "serious bodily injury."  He asserts the evidence presented did 
not show the injuries he inflicted upon Mr. Osmon created a substantial risk of 
death or caused severe disfigurement or loss or impairment of any bodily member 
or organ.  Without such evidence, he 
contends, the conviction cannot stand.

 
 
            
The State argues the evidence was sufficient to show Mr. Kelly caused 
serious bodily injury.  The State 
points to the evidence showing Mr. Kelly beat Mr. Osmon with his fists and hit 
him on the head with an iron stove grate, causing profuse bleeding and permanent 
scarring.  The State asserts this 
Court previously held in State v. 
Woodward, 69 Wyo. 262, 240 P.2d 1157, 1160 (Wyo.1952), albeit under a 
different statute, that evidence of profuse bleeding, bruising and a head 
laceration resulting from a beating was sufficient to support an aggravated 
assault conviction.  The State also 
cites Lucero v. State, 14 P.3d 920, 
923 (Wyo.2000) in which we said the term "serious bodily injury" does not have a 
technical legal meaning so different from its ordinary meaning that an 
instruction defining the term for a jury is necessary.

 
 
            
The difficulty with the State's assertions is that the current statute 
specifically identifies the sort of bodily injury a defendant must cause in 
order to be convicted of aggravated assault under § 6-2-502(a)(i).  Pursuant to the definition of serious 
bodily injury applicable to the aggravated assault statute found in § 
6-1-104(a)(x), the injury must:  1) 
create a substantial risk of death;  
2) cause miscarriage;  3) 
cause severe disfigurement;  or 4) 
cause protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or 
organ.

 
 
            
This Court has specifically considered whether injuries constituted 
"serious bodily injury" within the meaning of the statutes in two cases.  In O'Brien v. State, 2002 WY 63, 45 P.3d 225 (Wyo.2002), the State claimed the victim was beaten so savagely that his 
life was endangered and his injuries created a substantial risk of death.  The State presented medical testimony 
showing the victim's jaw was broken at the back of the joint, a break that 
rarely results from a blow from a fist.  
The State also presented medical testimony indicating the break required 
surgery to prevent the victim's tongue from blocking his airways.  We held this evidence was sufficient to 
support the jury's determination that the defendant caused serious bodily 
injury.

 
 
            
In Cazier v. State, 2006 WY 
153, 148 P.3d 23 (Wyo.2006), the State presented evidence that the victim was 
hospitalized for several days after being whipped with a cable.  The State also presented medical 
testimony indicating the injuries were "extremely remarkable" and caused 
chemical abnormalities in the victim's body.  Additionally, the State presented 
photographs showing numerous wounds on the victim's head, face and body and the 
victim showed the jury the scars that still existed eight months after the 
assault.  We held the jury could 
have concluded from the evidence that the victim had, at a minimum, suffered 
severe disfigurement;  therefore, 
the State met its burden of proving the defendant caused serious bodily 
injury.

 
 
            
Under the particular facts presented in O'Brien and Cazier, we held rare, remarkable 
injuries that required surgery or resulted in inpatient hospitalization and 
scarring constituted serious bodily injuries within the meaning of § 
6-2-502(a)(i).  Although Mr. Osmon 
was left with a scar, his injuries did not result in inpatient hospitalization 
or surgery.  Also, there was no 
testimony, as there was in O'Brien, 
suggesting Mr. Osmon's injuries were life threatening.

 
 
            
Additionally, the manner in which Mr. Osmon and the emergency room 
responded raises questions about the seriousness of his injuries.  Mr. Osmon cleaned his wounds and went 
back to bed after the assault.  He 
testified he did not think he was seriously injured at the time.  He sought medical treatment only when 
Officer Seeman persuaded him to do so.  
At the emergency room, his wounds were cleaned, he was given an 
antibiotic and he was released.  His 
wounds did not require stitches, inpatient hospitalization, surgery or follow-up 
medical treatment.  He suffered no 
broken bones.  The scar on his scalp 
left by the stove grate was above his hairline and no evidence was presented 
showing it was readily visible at the time of trial.

 
 
            
Under the circumstances, we have no choice but to conclude the evidence 
did not support a verdict finding Mr. Kelly caused Mr. Osm[e]n serious bodily 
injury as the term is defined in our statute.  No evidence was presented showing the 
injuries inflicted on Mr. Osmon created a substantial risk of death or caused 
severe disfigurement or loss or impairment of function of a bodily organ or 
member.  (FN2)  While there is no question about the 
savageness of the attack, the nature of the attack is not the focus of the 
inquiry under the language the Wyoming legislature has chosen to employ.  Instead, under Wyoming's statutory 
language, the focus of the inquiry is the nature of the injuries inflicted.  Ferocious as the attack may have been, 
the injuries Mr. Osmon sustained did not result in serious bodily injury within 
the meaning of the aggravated assault statute.

 
 
            
Our holding is in accord with the results reached in other jurisdictions 
sharing the same or substantially similar statutory language.  To sustain a conviction for aggravated 
assault, the vast majority of cases from these jurisdictions require evidence 
showing the injury created a substantial risk of death or caused severe 
disfigurement or protracted impairment of a bodily function or member.  In State v. Pheng, 2002 ME 40, 791 A.2d 925 
(Me.2002), for example, the State presented evidence showing the victim was 
bleeding and unconscious, was transported to the hospital by ambulance, remained 
hospitalized for several days, missed the first quarter of school because of his 
injuries and could not eat solid food for several months after the attack.  The court held the evidence was 
sufficient to show serious bodily injury within the meaning of the Maine statute.  (FN3)

 
 
            
Similarly, in Fleming v. 
State, 604 So. 2d 280, 292 (Miss.1992), the court held the evidence was 
sufficient to show serious bodily injury under Section 210.0 of the Model Penal 
Code (1980) (FN4) where the victim was hospitalized for four days;  he suffered a laceration of the scalp 
requiring sutures, a non-displaced fracture of the left jaw bone and a 
comminuted fracture of the left forearm requiring surgery to attach a 
compression plate and perform a bone graft; and he was unable to work for four 
weeks.  See also State v. Flores, 1998 MT 328, 292 Mont. 
255, 974 P.2d 124 (1998) (holding the victim suffered a serious bodily injury 
where the evidence showed he sustained a wide, deep, gouge-wound to his right 
forearm exposing torn muscle, tissue, and bone;  the injury precluded him from working in 
his pre-injury occupation;  and he 
underwent physical therapy and, at the time of trial, still could not make a 
closed fist);  Commonwealth v. Lewis, 2006 PA Super 
314, 911 A.2d 558 (Pa.Super.Ct.2006) (holding the evidence was sufficient to 
sustain the conviction for aggravated assault where the defendant punched the 
victim in the stomach and face; the victim was in an unconscious guarded 
condition in the emergency room after being intubated and placed on a 
ventilator, had multiple facial lacerations many of which penetrated the muscle 
tissue down to the facial bones, and chip fractures to her cheekbone; she was 
hospitalized for nine days; blood was drained from her stomach to prevent 
aspiration pneumonia; her wounds were sutured; she needed someone to care for 
her for a month; she could not eat solids until the stitches were removed; she 
missed work for three months; and she still had scars on her face at the time of 
trial.)

 
 
            
Of equal significance to our conclusion, are cases from jurisdictions 
having similar statutory language to Wyoming where courts have held injuries did 
not constitute serious bodily injuries.  
In Moore v. State, 739 S.W.2d 347 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), for example, the defendant hit the victim in the face 
and stabbed him in the back with a knife.  
After the assault, the victim went home and laid down on the couch.  When he got up from the couch, he 
noticed blood in the spot where he had been lying.  The police were notified and they 
convinced the victim to seek treatment.  
He was taken by ambulance to the emergency room where he was treated and 
released.  The court held the 
evidence was insufficient to show he sustained serious bodily injury because 
there was no showing the injury was life threatening or caused permanent 
disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily 
member or organ.  See also State v. Kane, 335 N.J.Super. 391, 762 A.2d 677 (Ct.App.Div.2000) (holding that victim who received six stitches over 
her left eye and a broken nose when she was struck in the face did not sustain 
"serious bodily injury").

 
 
            
The above cases are representative of the many cases in which courts have 
considered whether an injury constituted "serious bodily injury" within the 
meaning of statutes containing language similar to § 6-1-104(a)(x).  To support a conviction for aggravated 
assault, nearly all of the cases require injuries significantly more serious 
than those Mr. Osmon sustained.  
Given the express language contained in our statute defining serious 
bodily injury as an injury creating a substantial risk of death or causing 
severe disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any 
bodily member or organ, we hold the evidence was not sufficient to support Mr. 
Kelly's conviction for aggravated assault.

 
 
(FN2.) 
In closing, the State argued that skin is the human body's primary organ and the 
blow to Mr. Osmon's head with the stove grate caused permanent scarring and 
impaired the skin.  However, no 
evidence was presented showing the blow caused "severe" disfigurement or 
"protracted loss or impairment of the function" of Mr. Osmon's skin.  Absent such evidence, the State simply 
did not prove the assault caused serious bodily injury.

 
 
(FN3.) 
The Maine 
statute defines "serious bodily injury" for purposes of aggravated assault 
as:  "bodily injury which creates a 
substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement or 
loss or substantial impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or 
extended convalescence necessary for recovery of physical health."  17-A M.R.S.A. 2(23) 
(1983).

 
 
(FN4.) 
Section 210.0 defines "serious bodily injury" as "bodily injury which creates a 
substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or 
protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or 
organ."

 
 
Also 
see Daniel v. State, 2008 WY 87, 189 P.3d 859 (Wyo. 2008); Sarr v. State, 
2003 WY 42, ¶¶ 6, 36-40, 65 P.3d 711, 714, 719 (Wyo. 2003); Tracy A. 
Bateman, Annotation, Sufficiency of 
Bodily Injury to Support Charge of Aggravated Assault, 5 A.L.R. 5th 243 (1992 and Supp. 2008).  Many of the cases cited in our Kelly opinion, and many of the cases 
included in the above-cited annotation, draw attention to the circumstance that 
the maximum penalty for battery is six-months of imprisonment, whereas the 
maximum sentence for aggravated battery is ten years of imprisonment, a 20-fold 
difference.  This difference in the 
potential penalty suggests that the legislature intended that the crime of 
aggravated assault be based upon injuries significantly more serious than those 
suffered by Ms. Duran in this case.  
We hasten to add that Martinez's conduct was despicable, 
reprehensible and brutal, but what the law has recognized as battery, and what 
it has recognized as aggravated battery, is separated by a considerable chasm 
which the legislature may want to address.

 
 
[¶14]   Based on the language used in the 
Wyoming Statute, our existing precedents on the subject, as well as those of 
many of our sister states, we are compelled to conclude that the State failed to 
introduce evidence that Duran suffered "severe disfigurement" as contemplated by 
the governing statute.  No amount of 
discussion or analysis has allowed us to alter this 
conclusion.

 
 
[¶15]   However, as we held in Kelly:

 
 
            
When we reverse a conviction for an offense, and the jury verdict 
supports conviction of a lesser-included offense, we have the authority to order 
re-sentencing on the lesser-included offense.  Goodwine v. State, 764 P.2d 680 684 
(Wyo.1988); Simonds v. State, 762 P.2d 1189, 1193 (Wyo.1988).  In this 
case, the district court appropriately instructed the jury on the offense of 
battery as a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault.  The evidence presented at trial was 
sufficient to support a jury verdict finding Mr. Kelly guilty of battery.  Therefore, we set aside the aggravated 
assault conviction, order entry of a battery conviction and remand to the 
district court for re-sentencing on the battery 
conviction.

 
 

Kelly, 
¶ 24, 153 P.3d  at 931-32.

 
 
[¶16]   That is also true in this case and 
hence, while we reverse Martinez's conviction for aggravated assault 
and battery and vacate the district court's judgment and sentence, we order 
entry of a battery conviction and remand to the district court for 
resentencing.

 
 
Instruction 
Errors

 
 
[¶17]   Martinez makes no complaint about the 
instruction with respect to battery.  
While there appear to be problems with the instructions associated with 
the aggravated assault and battery charge, those matters are not sufficiently 
developed below, nor are they adequately addressed in the briefs filed in this 
appeal.  Moreover, because we 
reverse as set out above any such issue(s) are moot.  Therefore, we decline to address the 
issues raised with respect to the instructions given in this 
case.

 
 
Testimony 
of Undisclosed Witness

 
 
[¶18]   The appearance of a substitute 
expert medical witness, without there being any significant notice to a 
defendant, poses a significant concern.  
However, we deem the error, to the extent it is error, to be harmless 
under the circumstances of this case, since the medical testimony was primarily 
directed at "severe disfigurement" and was of little relevance to the battery 
charge.  W.R.A.P. 
9.04.

 
 
Assessment 
of Fees and Restitution

 
 
[¶19]   Martinez asserts that the record will not 
support the assessment of fees and restitution as set out in the judgment and 
sentence.  Because we have vacated 
both the judgment and sentence, it is unnecessary for us to address this issue 
in this appeal.  However, we trust 
that appropriate procedures will be followed upon resentencing.  See Pinker v. State, 2008 WY 86, 
¶¶ 11-18, 188 P.3d 571, 576-78 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶20]   The judgment and sentence of the 
district court is reversed.  We 
hereby order entry of a battery conviction and remand to the district court to 
achieve that result and for resentencing on the battery 
conviction.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502 
(LexisNexis 2007) (emphasis added) provides:

 
 
6-2-502.  Aggravated assault and battery; 
penalty.

            
(a)  A person is guilty 
of aggravated assault and battery if he:

                        
(i)  Causes serious bodily injury to another 
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme 
indifference to the value of human life;

                        
(ii)  Attempts to cause, or intentionally or knowingly causes 
bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon;

                        
(iii)  Threatens to use a drawn deadly weapon on another unless 
reasonably necessary in defense of his person, property or abode or to prevent 
serious bodily injury to another;  
or

                        
(iv)  Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily 
injury to a woman whom he knows is pregnant.

            
(b)  Aggravated assault and battery is a felony punishable by 
imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years.

 
 
            
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-104(a)(x) (LexisNexis 2007) defines "Serious 
bodily injury' means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or 
which causes miscarriage, severe 
disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any 
bodily member or organ[.]"