Title: State v. Scribner

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Scribner  (97-073); 170 Vt. 537; 746 A.2d 145

[Opinion Filed 3-Aug-1999]
[Motion for Reargument Denied 4-Oct-1999]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 97-073

                              MARCH TERM, 1999

State of Vermont	             }	APPEALED FROM:
	                             }
	                             }
     v.	                             }	District Court of Vermont,
	                             }	Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit
Kevin Scribner	                     }
	                             }	DOCKET NO. 5627-10-95CnCr

       In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Defendant appeals from a jury conviction for attempted murder in the
  second degree and  aggravated assault.  He raises three claims on appeal: 
  (1) he was wrongfully charged under the  general criminal attempt statute
  instead of the specific attempted murder statute; (2) he was  improperly
  convicted of two offenses arising from the same conduct in violation of his 
  constitutional right against double jeopardy; and (3) the trial court
  committed plain error by failing  to instruct the jury on attempted
  voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense.  We vacate  the
  conviction for aggravated assault but affirm in all other respects.

       During the late evening of October 20, 1995, some teenage girls
  playing in a yard noticed  defendant standing on the sidewalk staring at
  them.  The oldest girl became uncomfortable and  signaled to some teenage
  boys she knew who were in front of a nearby store.  The boys told 
  defendant to move on.  Defendant, who had been drinking that evening,
  turned to walk away but as  he did so lifted his jacket to expose a
  handgun.  He then stopped and began staring at the girls  again.  The
  cousin of one of the girls, John Casey, then came walking around the
  corner.  After the  girl complained to Casey about defendant staring at
  them, Casey approached defendant and asked  why he was bothering the girls. 
  In response, defendant pulled out the handgun and pointed it at  him. 
  Casey asked whether defendant was going to shoot him.  Defendant then fired
  a shot that  apparently went into the ground.  Defendant turned and walked
  away.  Casey followed him, first  walking and then running.  Just before
  Casey reached defendant, defendant turned and fired a  second shot, this
  time into Casey's groin.  Casey knocked defendant down, attempted to get
  the gun  and yelled for someone to call the police.  The store owner came
  out and stepped on defendant's  hand holding the gun.  He told a bystander
  to call the police.

       When a police officer arrived, defendant did not respond to the order
  to drop the gun even  after the officer placed his gun against defendant's
  head and repeated the order.  The officer  eventually disarmed defendant by
  twisting the gun out of defendant's hand.  The gun was cocked  with the
  hammer back.  The cylinder of the gun contained six shells, and defendant
  had thirty five 

  additional shells in his pocket. 
           	
       The jury acquitted defendant of attempted first degree murder but
  convicted him of the lesser  included offense of attempted second degree
  murder.  In addition, they convicted him of aggravated  assault.  The judge
  sentenced defendant on the two convictions concurrently:  twenty years to
  life  imprisonment for attempted second degree murder and five to fifteen
  years for aggravated assault.

       Defendant first argues that he should have been charged under the
  specific attempted murder  statute, 13 V.S.A. § 2307, which carried a
  lesser penalty for attempted murder than did 13 V.S.A.  § 9, the general
  criminal attempt statute, after it was amended in 1993.  He claims the
  attempted  murder statute -- which was later explicitly repealed, see 1995,
  No. 170 (Adj. Sess.), § 32 -- was  still in effect at the time and was not
  impliedly repealed by the 1993 amendment to 13 V.S.A. § 9.  He further
  contends that § 9 defers in this instance to § 2307 because § 9 punishes an
  attempted  offense as a completed one unless another "express provision" of
  law exists that punishes the  attempt.  He claims that § 2307 operated as
  just such an express provision even after the 1993  amendment to § 9.

       Out of judicial respect for legislative authority over lawmaking, we
  recognize a presumption  against implied repeal.  See State v. Foley, 140
  Vt. 643, 646,