Title: The People v. Feliz Soriano Guerrero

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 12  
The People &c., 
            Respondent, 
        v. 
Felix Soriano Guerrero,
            Appellant.
William A. Loeb, for appellant.
Richard Nahas, for respondent.
READ, J.:
On July 20, 2006, defendant Felix Soriano Guerrero
pleaded guilty to second-degree intentional murder (Penal Law §
125.25 [1]) in exchange for an indeterminate sentence of 19 years
to life imprisonment.  At the subsequent sentencing hearing on
September 11, 2006, Supreme Court stated that defendant had
acknowledged "that he accepts the plea and the Court certainly
intends to go ahead and impose the sentence promised at the time
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we reached that agreement[;] that is[,] an indeterminate term of
imprisonment of 19 years to life."  The judge did not mention
that defendant was required to pay a mandatory surcharge of $150
and a crime victim assistance fee of $2 as a result of his
conviction.  These assessments were, however, listed on the
"Uniform Sentence and Commitment" sheet, which the clerk signed,
and the court worksheet, which the judge signed and stamped.  
Defendant appealed, arguing that the mandatory
surcharge and crime victim assistance fee should have been
pronounced by the judge in open court at sentencing.  After the
Appellate Division unanimously affirmed his conviction and
sentence, a Judge of this Court granted defendant leave to appeal
so that we might review his claim in light of our recent decision
in People v Sparber (10 NY3d 457 [2008]).  We now hold that the
mandatory surcharge and crime victim assistance fee mandated by
Penal Law § 60.35 (1) are not a part of a sentence within the
meaning of sections 380.20 and 380.40 of the CPL; therefore, a
judge need not pronounce them in a defendant's presence during
sentencing.
CPL 380.20 calls upon courts to "pronounce sentence in
every case where a conviction is entered"; CPL 380.40 directs 
that "the defendant must be personally present at the time
sentence is pronounced."  CPL 120 (13), in turn, defines
"conviction" as a plea or verdict of guilty, while CPL 120 (15)
defines "sentence" as "the imposition and entry of sentence upon
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a conviction."  Thus, although the CPL commands that a
defendant's "sentence" must be "pronounced" by the court in the
defendant's presence, it gives no guidance as to which
consequences of a conviction are covered by this requirement. 
This is where our decisions in Sparber and People v Nieves (2
NY3d 310 [2004]) come into play.  
In Sparber, we concluded that because postrelease
supervision (PRS) is a component element of a sentence, CPL
380.20 and 380.40 require a judge to pronounce the terms of PRS
at sentencing (10 NY3d at 468-469).  In Nieves we found a
defendant's unpreserved claim of error to be unreviewable under
the exception to the preservation requirement for an illegal
sentence.  This was so because "although the orders of protection
[in question] were issued at [Nieves'] sentencing proceeding, it
[wa]s evident from the statutory scheme that the orders were not
a part of defendant's sentence" (2 NY3d at 316).  In both cases,
we carefully examined the language of the statute imposing or
authorizing the particular consequence of conviction at issue in
order to decide whether it inhered in the sentence.  
For example, at the time of our decision in Sparber,
Penal Law § 70.45, entitled "Determinate sentence; post-release
supervision," deemed PRS to be "a part" of a determinate sentence
(see 10 NY3d at 468-69); the provision began as follows:
"1.  In general.  Each determinate sentence also
includes, as a part thereof, an additional period of
post-release supervision" (emphasis added).
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Concomitantly, Penal Law § 70.00 (6) specifies that the
determinate sentences for which it provides "shall also include,
as a part thereof, a period of post-release supervision in
accordance with section 70.45" (emphasis added).  By contrast,
the statute construed in Nieves -- CPL 530.13 (4) -- "[did] not
characterize permanent orders of protection as a component of
sentencing," and "[n]o reference [was] made in any . . .
provisions [governing sentences for criminal offenses] to an
order of protection as a permissible sentence" (Nieves, 2 NY3d at
316).  
The statute imposing the mandatory surcharge and crime
victim assistance fee, while noting that these assessments are to
be "levied at sentencing," describes them as distinct from "any
sentence required or permitted by law."  Specifically, Penal Law
§ 60.35 (1) states that "there shall be levied at sentencing a
mandatory surcharge, sex offender registration fee, DNA databank
fee and a crime victim assistance fee in addition to any sentence
required or permitted by law" (emphasis added), rather than as "a
part" of the sentence itself, as was the case with the statute we
interpreted in Sparber.  Unlike the statute we considered in
Nieves, section 60.35 (1)'s text clearly indicates that the
surcharge and fee are not incorporated into the sentence; it is
not merely silent as to this issue.  As a result, the fact that
this provision is within the Penal Law's sentencing scheme does
not lead to the conclusion that these assessments are component
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elements of the sentence.
Defendant argues, however, that the language of section
60.35 (1) does not mandate the outcome in this case because Penal
Law § 60.35 (2) refers to a "sentence to pay a mandatory
surcharge, crime victim assistance fee or supplemental sex
offender victim fee" (emphasis added).  But it is subdivision (1)
of section 60.35 -- not subdivision (2) -- which actually creates
the obligation to pay the mandatory surcharge and crime victim
assistance fee; subdivision (2) merely tells the court how to
calculate the surcharge and the various fees in cases where a
person has been convicted of two or more crimes or violations or
offenses.  Further, section 60.35 (1)'s legislative history
strongly supports the proposition that the Legislature did not
intend the surcharge or fee to be "an additional punishment
component" of a sentence (see Sparber, 10 NY3d at 469).
Section 60.35 was originally enacted as part of a
massive revenue-raising bill meant to "avert the loss of an
estimated $100 million in State tax revenues" (Legislative
Memorandum in Support, Governor's Bill Jacket, L 1982, ch 55, at
6; see also People v Quinones, 95 NY2d 349, 352 [2000] ["The
mandatory surcharge/crime victim assistance fee is paid to the
State to shift costs of providing services to victims of crime
from law-abiding taxpayers and toward those who commit crimes"]
[internal quotations marks omitted]; People v Barnes, 62 NY2d
702, 703 [1984] [mandatory surcharge levied and collected
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following every criminal conviction "appear[s] to be related . .
. to the State's legitimate interest in raising revenues"]).
Finally, the statute's nomenclature reinforces its non-
punitive nature: the assessments imposed by section 60.35 (1) are
called a "surcharge" or a "fee," not a "penalty."  Indeed, when
first enacted in 1982, Penal Law § 60.35 was entitled "Mandatory
penalty assessment required in certain cases" (emphasis added). 
The very next year, the Legislature changed every statutory
reference to "penalty assessment" in Penal Law § 60.35 and CPL
420.35 to "mandatory surcharge" (see L 1983, ch 15, §§ 2 and 3
[emphasis added]).  A "surcharge" is generally defined as "an
additional tax, cost, or impost" (see Merriam-Webster's
Collegiate Dictionary 1185 [10th ed 1996]).
The Senate-Assembly Memorandum in Support of the 1983
legislation -- the "subject and purpose" of which was to
"provide[] the revenues necessary to finance the 1983-84 State
Budget" (see Bill Jacket, L 1983, ch 15, at 9) -- states as
follows:
"SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS
"[. . .]
"Sections two and three amend the Penal Law and
the Criminal Procedure Law to make technical changes to
collection procedures first enacted in 1982-83.  These
technical changes correct the problems that were raised
by attorneys and judges alike, and will allow the
surcharge program to be implemented with a minimum of
confusion" (Senate-Assembly Memorandum in Support, Bill
Jacket, L 1983, ch 15, at 9).
Most of the technical changes made by sections two and
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three consisted of substituting "mandatory surcharge" for
"penalty assessment" (specifically, 13 separate substitutions in
Penal Law § 60.35, and two separate substitutions in CPL 420.35,
including in the title of both provisions).  While there is no
discussion or explanation in the legislative history of the legal 
"problems" or "confusion" the Legislature meant to dispel by
making these linguistic changes, the revised nomenclature
eliminated the implication connoted by use of the word "penalty"
that this assessment was meant to be punitive as well as to raise
revenue.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be affirmed.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   * 
Order affirmed.  Opinion by Judge Read.  Judges Ciparick,
Graffeo, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur.  Chief Judge Lippman
took no part.
Decided February 19, 2009