Title: Edwards v. Government Employees Insurance Co.

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
PETER EDWARDS 
 
v.  Record No. 972635   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN  
 
 
 
June 5, 1998 
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES 
INSURANCE COMPANY 
 
UPON QUESTIONS OF LAW CERTIFIED BY THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
 
 
Under the provisions of Rule 5:42, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit certified to this Court two 
questions of Virginia law asking whether a plaintiff in a 
personal injury action was "using" or "occupying" a motor 
vehicle at the time he was struck by another car.  The facts as 
stated in the certification order are set forth below. 
Terry Presmont asked Peter Edwards, an acquaintance, to 
change a flat tire on Presmont's car that was parked on a street 
in the District of Columbia.  Presmont gave Edwards a key to the 
car.  Edwards did not enter the driver's area of the car or use 
the key for any purpose other than to open the trunk. 
Edwards took the jack and the spare tire out of the trunk. 
He intended to install the spare tire in order to drive the car 
to a service station to have the flat tire repaired.  After 
raising the car with the jack, Edwards began to take off the lug 
nuts to remove the flat tire.  Before he could remove all the 
lug nuts, he was struck in the ankle by a car driven by an 
uninsured motorist.  Edwards suffered a fractured ankle for 
which he received medical treatment. 
At the time of the accident, Presmont was a Virginia 
resident.  Her car was insured by a motor vehicle liability 
insurance policy (Policy) issued in Virginia by Government 
Employees Insurance Company (GEICO).  The Policy provides 
liability coverage to insured persons occupying the insured 
vehicle.  The term "insured" is defined by the Policy in 
relevant part as "any other person while occupying an insured 
motor vehicle."  "Occupying" is defined by the Policy as "in or 
upon or entering into or alighting from" the insured vehicle. 
 
Edwards, a resident of the District of Columbia, filed a 
complaint against GEICO in the United States District Court for 
the District of Maryland (Southern Division), seeking damages 
for his personal injuries under the uninsured motorist and 
medical payment provisions of the Policy.  GEICO filed a motion 
for summary judgment, asserting that Edwards did not qualify as 
an "insured" under Code § 38.2-2206* because he was not "using" 
                     
 
*At the time of Edwards' injury, Code § 38.2-2206(B) 
provided: 
 
"Insured" as used in subsections A, D, G, and H of this 
section means the named insured and, while resident of the 
same household, the spouse of the named insured, and 
relatives of either, while in a motor vehicle or otherwise, 
and any person who uses the motor vehicle to which the 
policy applies, with the expressed or implied consent of 
the named insured, and a guest in the motor vehicle to 
 
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the insured vehicle at the time of the accident.  GEICO also 
argued that Edwards was not "occupying" the insured vehicle 
within the meaning of the Policy definition. 
 
The district court granted GEICO's motion for summary 
judgment, concluding that Edwards was neither "using" nor 
"occupying" the insured vehicle at the time of the accident.  
Edwards noted an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit, which presented the following certified 
questions to this Court: 
1. Was Edwards, who at the time of the accident was repairing 
a vehicle parked on the street with the intention of 
driving it to a service station, "using" the vehicle 
within the meaning of Virginia Code § 38.2-2206(B)? 
 
2. Was Edwards, who at the time of the accident was changing 
the tire of a vehicle parked on the street with the 
intention of driving it to a service station for further 
repairs, "occupying" the vehicle within the meaning of the 
GEICO policy definition? 
 
Edwards argues before this Court that he was "using" the 
insured vehicle at the time he was struck and, therefore, 
qualifies as an "insured" under Code § 38.2-2206(B).  In support 
of this argument, Edwards chiefly relies on Great American 
Insurance Company v. Cassell, 239 Va. 421, 389 S.E.2d 476 
(1990).  There, we held that a fire fighter, who was struck by a 
vehicle while standing approximately 20 to 25 feet from his fire 
                                                                  
which the policy applies or the personal representative of 
any of the above. 
 
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truck, was "using" the truck because he was engaged in a 
transaction essential to the truck's use at the time of the 
accident.  Id. at 424, 389 S.E.2d at 477.  Edwards asserts that, 
like the fire fighter in Cassell, he was "using" the insured 
vehicle when he was struck because the act of changing a flat 
tire was essential to use of the car. 
Edwards also contends that he was "occupying" the insured 
vehicle within the meaning of the Policy definition.  Edwards 
argues that his close proximity to the insured vehicle and his 
intention to occupy the car once his task was completed provide 
sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that he was 
"occupying" the insured vehicle. 
In response, GEICO first asserts that Edwards was not 
"using" the insured vehicle when he was struck because the car 
was not involved in any "mission" at the time of the accident.  
GEICO also argues that Edwards was not "occupying" the insured 
vehicle within the meaning of the Policy definition.  Citing 
Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Company v. 
Bristow, 207 Va. 381, 385, 150 S.E.2d 125, 128 (1966), GEICO 
contends that Edwards was not "upon" the insured vehicle 
because, while he was in close proximity to the car, he did not 
have sufficient intent to use it.  GEICO also relies on Stern v. 
The Cincinnati Insurance Company, 252 Va. 307, 311, 477 S.E.2d 
 
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517, 519 (1996), in which we held that a child crossing a street 
to board a school bus was not "occupying" the bus. 
We first consider the question whether Edwards was "using" 
the insured vehicle at the time of the accident within the 
meaning of Code § 38.2-2206(B).  The statute defines "insured," 
in material part, as "any person who uses the motor vehicle to 
which the policy applies, with the expressed or implied consent 
of the named insured."  Id.  The coverage mandated by the 
statute is limited to injuries sustained by the permissive user 
while actually using the insured vehicle.  Randall v. Liberty 
Mut. Ins. Co., 255 Va. 62, 65, 496 S.E.2d 54, 55 (1998); 
Insurance Co. of North America v. Perry, 204 Va. 833, 838, 134 
S.E.2d 418, 421 (1964). 
In determining whether Edwards was "using" the insured 
vehicle at the time he was injured within the meaning of Code 
§ 38.2-2206(B), the relevant inquiry is whether "there was a 
causal relationship between the accident and the use of the 
insured vehicle as a vehicle."  Randall, 255 Va. at 66, 496 
S.E.2d at 56; accord United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Parker, 250 
Va. 374, 377, 463 S.E.2d 464, 466 (1995); Travelers Ins. Co. v. 
LaClair, 250 Va. 368, 372, 463 S.E.2d 461, 463 (1995).  The 
coverage mandated by the statute for "use" of a vehicle is not 
limited to the transportation function of the vehicle.  Randall, 
255 Va. at 66, 496 S.E.2d at 56.  "If the injured person is 
 
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using the insured vehicle as a vehicle and as an integral part 
of his mission when he is injured, he is entitled to UM/UIM 
coverage under § 38.2-2206."  Id.; accord Parker, 250 Va. at 
377-78, 463 S.E.2d at 466; Cassell, 239 Va. at 424, 389 S.E.2d 
at 477. 
Our decisions in Randall and Cassell are determinative of 
this inquiry.  In Randall, a highway worker was struck and 
killed by a car while placing lane closure signs along the side 
of a highway.  He had driven the insured vehicle to the site, 
left the engine running, and kept on the flashing yellow bubble 
light on top of the truck's cab while completing his task.  The 
worker was six to ten feet behind the truck on the shoulder of 
the road when he was struck. 
We observed in Randall that the specialized warning 
equipment and its relationship to the worker's task made use of 
the truck more than merely a means of transportation.  255 Va. 
at 67, 496 S.E.2d at 57.  We concluded that the worker was 
"using" the insured truck when he was struck because he was 
utilizing the truck's specialized equipment to perform his 
mission.  Id. at 67, 496 S.E.2d at 56-57. 
In Cassell, a fire fighter was standing 20 to 25 feet away 
from the fire truck when he was struck and killed by a car.  The 
insured fire truck had transported to the scene both the fire 
fighter and the equipment used to fight the fire.  The truck 
 
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also was used at the scene as a physical barrier to restrict 
traffic flow.  At the time the fire fighter was struck, he was 
using a writing pad and a clipboard that he had taken from the 
truck to complete a required fire incident report.  We concluded 
that the fire fighter was "using" the fire truck at the time of 
the accident because the truck was an integral part of the fire 
fighter's mission, which had not been completed when the 
accident occurred.  239 Va. at 424, 389 S.E.2d at 477. 
Like the highway worker in Randall and the fire fighter in 
Cassell, Edwards was using the insured vehicle's equipment at 
the time of the accident to perform his mission.  That mission 
was to drive the car to a service station to have the flat tire 
repaired.  An integral part of the mission required use of the 
jack to remove the flat tire and to place the spare tire on the 
vehicle.  Thus, Edwards was in the process of performing a 
transaction essential to the use of the insured vehicle when he 
was struck. 
In using the vehicle's equipment to accomplish his mission, 
with the immediate intent to drive the vehicle after replacing 
the tire, Edwards was using the insured vehicle as a vehicle and 
as an integral part of his mission at the time of the accident.  
Thus, we conclude that there was a causal relationship between 
the accident and Edwards' use of the vehicle as a vehicle.  See 
 
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Randall, 255 Va. at 66, 496 S.E.2d at 56; Cassell, 239 Va. at 
424, 389 S.E.2d at 477. 
We disagree with GEICO's contention that Stern, as well as 
Perry, 204 Va. at 833, 134 S.E.2d at 418, compels us to reach a 
different conclusion.  In Stern, we held that a school bus was 
used by its driver to create a safety zone for a child crossing 
the street to board the bus, and that the driver's employment of 
the safety devices did not constitute a use of the bus by the 
child.  252 Va. at 312, 477 S.E.2d at 520.  In Perry, we 
concluded that a police officer, who was serving an arrest 
warrant when struck by an uninsured motorist, was not using his 
police cruiser at the time of the accident.  We based this 
conclusion on the fact that the officer had removed the key from 
his vehicle, gotten out, and walked 164 feet away from the 
cruiser when he was struck.  204 Va. at 838, 134 S.E.2d at 421.  
Unlike Edwards in the present case, the injured persons in Stern 
and Perry were not engaged in a transaction essential to the 
vehicle's use at the time of the accident.  See Cassell, 239 Va. 
at 424, 389 S.E.2d at 477.  Therefore, we answer the first 
certified question in the affirmative. 
We next consider the question whether Edwards was 
"occupying" the insured vehicle within the meaning of the Policy 
definition.  The Policy defines "occupying" as meaning "in or 
upon or entering into or alighting from" the motor vehicle.  We 
 
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considered this same policy definition in Bristow, and we 
conclude that our decision in that case primarily governs the 
present issue whether Edwards was "occupying" the insured 
vehicle.  In Bristow, a passenger in a truck had stopped to 
render assistance to the owner of a stalled vehicle.  In 
attempting to restart the stalled vehicle, Bristow, the "Good 
Samaritan," leaned over the motor and reached with his hands to 
examine some of the wires.  During the time that his legs were 
touching the car's bumper, a vehicle struck the stalled 
automobile from the rear.  As a result of the impact, Bristow 
was "thrown over in the ditch" and injured.  Bristow neither 
entered nor intended to enter the disabled vehicle.  207 Va. at 
382, 150 S.E.2d at 126. 
 
In considering whether Bristow was "occupying" the stalled 
vehicle when he was struck, within the meaning of the policy 
definition, we concluded that the determinative question was 
whether Bristow was "upon" the stalled vehicle when he was 
injured.  We observed that the word "upon" must be considered in 
relation to the word in the policy that it defines, namely, the 
word "occupying."  We stated that "a person may be said to be 
'upon' a vehicle when he is in a status where he is not actually 
'in,' or is not in the act of 'entering into or alighting from,' 
the vehicle, but whose connection therewith immediately relates 
to his 'occupying' it."  Id. at 385, 150 S.E.2d at 128.  Based 
 
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on this definition, we held that Bristow was not "upon" the 
stalled vehicle and, thus, was not "occupying" it because his 
touching of the vehicle was merely incidental to his act of 
assisting the driver of the disabled car.  Id. 
 
In Stern, we also considered the insurance policy term 
"occupying."  In concluding that the injured child was not 
"occupying" the bus when she was struck "several" feet from the 
bus, we observed that the word "occupying" denotes "a physical 
presence in or on a place or object."  252 Va. at 311, 477 
S.E.2d at 519. 
Applying these principles, we conclude that Edwards' act of 
attempting to replace the tire on the insured vehicle was not an 
act immediately related to occupancy of the vehicle.  Although 
Edwards ultimately intended to occupy the vehicle, his actions 
at the time of the accident immediately related to his attempt 
to change the flat tire.  Further, Edwards' actions did not 
constitute a physical presence in or on the insured vehicle.  
Thus, Edwards was not "occupying" the insured vehicle at the 
time of the accident within the meaning of the GEICO policy 
definition, and we answer the second certified question in the 
negative. 
First certified question answered in the affirmative. 
Second certified question answered in the negative. 
 
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