Title: Ulla U. v. Commonwealth

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12752 
 
ULLA U., a juvenile  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 9, 2020. - July 21, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Juvenile Court, Jurisdiction, Delinquent child.  Jurisdiction, 
Juvenile Court, Juvenile delinquency proceeding, Transfer 
hearing.  Practice, Criminal, Juvenile delinquency 
proceeding, Transfer hearing, Delay in commencement of 
prosecution, Interlocutory appeal.  Delinquent Child. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on May 16, 2019. 
 
 
The case was heard by Budd, J. 
 
 
 
Michelle Menken (Ziyad S. Hopkins, Committee for Public 
Counsel Services, also present) for the juvenile. 
 
Monica J. DeLateur, Assistant District Attorney (Michelle 
P. Slade, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Alison R. Bancroft, for youth advocacy division of the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, submitted 
a brief. 
 
 
LENK, J.  We take this opportunity to clarify certain 
procedural questions that have arisen in connection with the 
2 
 
 
"transfer hearing" in the Juvenile Court afforded juveniles by 
G. L. c. 119, § 72A.  That statute was enacted to close a gap in 
the statutory scheme as it concerned the treatment of those 
persons who had reached their nineteenth birthdays and were 
apprehended for acts allegedly committed when they had not yet 
reached their eighteenth birthdays.  See St. 1996, c. 200, § 13A 
(establishing transfer hearings); St. 2013, c. 84, § 23 (raising 
birthdays by one year). 
Because the Juvenile Court has limited jurisdiction, 
ordinarily not including those over eighteen years of age, and 
because "adult" courts have no jurisdiction over those whose 
acts occurred while the individual was still a juvenile (i.e., 
under age eighteen), no court had jurisdiction in such 
circumstances.  The Legislature remedied this state of affairs 
by creating the "transfer hearing," which was to take place in 
the Juvenile Court.  There, a Juvenile Court judge would 
determine whether probable cause existed and, if so, whether the 
public interest would be served best by prosecuting the 
individual as an adult in the District Court, or by discharging 
the individual.  See G. L. c. 119, § 72A; Commonwealth v. 
Mogelinski, 473 Mass. 164, 172 (2015) (Mogelinski II); 
Commonwealth v. Mogelinski, 466 Mass. 627, 646 & n.11 (2013) 
(Mogelinski I). 
3 
 
 
There has been lingering uncertainty, however, about the 
proper procedures to follow, both in the Juvenile Court and in 
seeking appellate review, when what is at issue is whether the 
prosecutor improperly delayed bringing criminal charges until 
after a juvenile's nineteenth birthday.  The merits of this 
juvenile's1 motion to dismiss on such grounds are not before us, 
and we express no view on that matter. 
Rather, we direct our attention to a determination whether, 
as the juvenile maintains, her motion to dismiss should have 
been heard by the Juvenile Court judge prior to her arraignment, 
or whether, as the Commonwealth maintains, the matter should 
have been heard by the Juvenile Court judge after arraignment, 
as part of the transfer hearing itself.2  We conclude that a 
Juvenile Court judge has authority to hear such a motion to 
dismiss as a part of the transfer hearing after arraignment.3  As 
to whether a juvenile has an automatic right of appeal under 
                                                     
 
 
1 We refer to the subject of the proceedings below as the 
"juvenile," even though she is now over twenty years old. 
 
2 Both parties are in accord, and we agree, that the 
Juvenile Court judge erred in declining to act on the juvenile's 
motion, under the belief that she had no authority to do so. 
 
 
3 If a juvenile moves to dismiss on the ground that the 
complaint fails to establish probable cause, a Juvenile Court 
judge may still decide this motion prior to arraignment.  See 
Commonwealth v. Humberto H., 466 Mass. 562, 575–576 (2013). 
4 
 
 
G. L. c. 211, § 3, where the motion is denied, we conclude that 
he or she does not. 
1.  Background.  Shortly after noon on October 14, 2016, 
officers of the Boston police department responded to a two-
vehicle crash in the Roslindale section of Boston.  They found 
one of the vehicles turned over onto the driver's side and 
identified the juvenile as the operator of the heavily damaged 
vehicle.  A reconstruction of the accident later would reflect 
that she had been driving at approximately seventy miles per 
hour, forty miles per hour over the speed limit, when she lost 
control of the vehicle.  At the time of the crash, she was 
seventeen years old.  The juvenile was taken to a local 
hospital, where she was treated for injuries that were not life 
threatening.  A rear seat passenger in the juvenile's vehicle 
was found unresponsive at the scene.  The passenger also was 
transported for medical treatment, but was pronounced dead at 
the hospital. 
In August of 2018, a detective with the Boston police 
department filed an application for a complaint against the 
juvenile.  On August 16, 2018, an assistant clerk-magistrate 
issued a complaint charging the juvenile with multiple offenses 
related to the accident, including one count of involuntary 
5 
 
 
manslaughter, G. L. c. 265, § 13.4  By that time, the juvenile 
was nineteen years old. 
The juvenile was summonsed to appear for arraignment in the 
Juvenile Court on September 21, 2018.  The arraignment was 
postponed until October by agreement of the parties.  On October 
10, 2018, prior to arraignment, the juvenile filed a motion to 
dismiss for prosecutorial delay and lack of probable cause.  In 
November 2018, a Juvenile Court judge determined that the 
complaint was supported by probable cause, and therefore denied 
the juvenile's motion on that ground.  She also allowed the 
Commonwealth's motion for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of 
prosecutorial delay.  Soon thereafter, however, the Commonwealth 
filed a motion to arraign the juvenile.  In that motion, the 
Commonwealth argued that a Juvenile Court judge lacked the 
authority to hear the juvenile's motion to dismiss for 
inexcusable or bad faith delay prior to arraignment. 
Following a nonevidentiary hearing in February 2019, the 
same judge denied the juvenile's motion to dismiss due to 
prosecutorial delay.  The judge concluded that, as a result of 
the limited jurisdiction granted to the Juvenile Court under 
                                                     
 
 
4 The juvenile also was charged with assault and battery by 
means of a dangerous weapon (the vehicle), G. L. c. 265, § 15A; 
reckless operation of a motor vehicle, G. L. c. 90, 
§ 24 (2) (a); speeding, G. L. c. 90, § 17; and unlicensed 
operation of a motor vehicle, G. L. c. 90, § 10. 
6 
 
 
G. L. c. 119, § 72A, she lacked the authority to decide the 
merits of the juvenile's motion.  The judge then determined that 
the juvenile's motion should be heard after the transfer hearing 
was complete and any subsequent complaint was issued in an adult 
court.  The judge also declined to report questions of law 
regarding her authority under G. L. c. 119, § 72A, and allowed 
the Commonwealth's motion to arraign the juvenile. 
In May 2019, the juvenile filed in the county court a 
petition for extraordinary relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  
In June 2019, the single justice denied the petition.  The 
juvenile subsequently was arraigned; she pleaded not delinquent, 
and was released on personal recognizance. 
In June 2019, the juvenile appealed to this court from the 
single justice's denial.  We allowed the juvenile's appeal to 
proceed, notwithstanding that, ordinarily, a juvenile may not 
seek review of the denial of a motion to dismiss until after 
trial.  While recognizing that the question of prearraignment 
dismissal was moot as to this juvenile,5 we noted that the issue 
                                                     
 
 
5 We note, however, that the question regarding the 
authority of a Juvenile Court judge to decide a motion to 
dismiss for prosecutorial delay is not entirely moot as to the 
juvenile.  Although she has been arraigned, no transfer hearing 
apparently has taken place.  Thus, because we conclude that a 
Juvenile Court judge has the authority to hear a juvenile's 
motion to dismiss as part of the transfer hearing after 
arraignment, see part 2.b.iv, infra, this decision well may 
affect the future proceedings in the Juvenile Court. 
7 
 
 
was one of the proper procedure and timing of efforts to appeal, 
did not reach the merits of the motion to dismiss, was 
"important, likely to recur in similar circumstances, but also 
likely to evade review in the normal course," and that the 
juvenile had no other means by which to seek relief.  See Acting 
Supt. of Bournewood Hosp. v. Baker, 431 Mass. 101, 103 (2000). 
Before us are the two questions raised in the juvenile's 
petition for extraordinary relief:  the scope of a Juvenile 
Court judge's authority to hear a juvenile's motion to dismiss 
for bad faith or inexcusable delay under G. L. c. 119, § 72A, 
and, if such a motion is denied, whether the juvenile has the 
right to an interlocutory appeal. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  "We will not 
reverse an order of a single justice in a proceeding brought 
pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, absent an abuse of discretion or 
other clear error of law.  Thus, we review independently the 
single justice's legal rulings to determine whether it is 
erroneous.'"  Commonwealth v. Bernardo B., 453 Mass. 158, 167 
(2009), quoting Youngworth v. Commonwealth, 436 Mass. 608, 611 
(2002). 
 
"To facilitate this determination, this court previously 
has exercised its power of review under {G. L.] c. 211, § 3, to 
examine the merits of the case presented to the trial judge." 
Commonwealth v. Nettis, 418 Mass. 715, 717 (1994), quoting 
8 
 
 
Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 
406 Mass. 701, 709 n.7 (1990).  Accordingly, we begin with the 
procedural issue presented to the Juvenile Court judge -- the 
scope of her authority to hear the juvenile's motion to dismiss 
prior to arraignment. 
 
b.  Judicial authority to hear motion to dismiss prior to 
arraignment.  As the motion judge recognized, the authority of 
the Juvenile Court is limited by statute, and "must either be 
articulated expressly or be capable of being deduced by 
necessary and inevitable implication" (quotation and citation 
omitted).  Johnson v. Commonwealth, 409 Mass. 712, 716 (1991).  
See Wallace W. v. Commonwealth, 482 Mass. 789, 792 (2019); 
Mogelinski I, 466 Mass. at 645.  To determine whether this 
authority extends to resolving a motion to dismiss for 
inexcusable or bad faith delay, we first must consider the role 
of G. L. c. 119, § 72A, in the broader statutory framework that 
defines the respective jurisdictions of the juvenile and adult 
courts. 
 
i.  Transfer hearings under G. L. c. 119, § 72A.  General 
Laws c. 119, § 72A, provides: 
"If a person commits an offense or violation prior to his 
eighteenth birthday, and is not apprehended until after his 
nineteenth birthday, the court, after a hearing, shall 
determine whether there is probable cause to believe that 
said person committed the offense charged, and shall, in 
its discretion, either order that the person be discharged, 
if satisfied that such discharge is consistent with the 
9 
 
 
protection of the public; or, if the court is of the 
opinion that the interests of the public require that such 
person be tried for such offense or violation instead of 
being discharged, the court shall dismiss the delinquency 
complaint and cause a criminal complaint to be issued.  The 
case shall thereafter proceed according to the usual course 
of criminal proceedings and in accordance with the 
provisions of [G. L. c. 218, § 30,] and [G. L. c. 278, 
§ 18].  Said hearing shall be held prior to, and separate 
from, any trial on the merits of the charges alleged." 
 
 
This language grants the Juvenile Court jurisdiction over 
juveniles who commit a crime before they are eighteen, but who 
are not "apprehended" -- meaning that no prosecution is 
commenced against them -- until after they are at least nineteen 
years old.  See Mogelinski II, 473 Mass. at 171 ("G. L. c. 119, 
§ 72A, confers jurisdiction in circumstances where . . . a 
defendant otherwise would face no possibility of prosecution"); 
Mogelinski I, 466 Mass. at 635; Commonwealth v. Porges, 460 
Mass. 525, 531 (2011) (discussing legislative efforts to ensure 
juveniles do not slip through "cracks").  Where the Juvenile 
Court exercises jurisdiction over a juvenile by virtue of its 
authority under G. L. c. 119, § 72A, a Juvenile Court judge has 
express authority to take one of two actions.  The judge may 
exercise his or her discretion to discharge the juvenile, in 
which case no criminal prosecution will occur, or the judge 
instead may dismiss the juvenile complaint and cause a criminal 
complaint to be issued in the District Court, where "[t]he case 
10 
 
 
shall thereafter proceed according to the usual course of 
criminal proceedings."  Id. 
 
ii.  Motion to dismiss for bad faith or inexcusable delay.  
When the Commonwealth proceeds against a juvenile under G. L. 
c. 119, § 72A, some degree of delay is inherent in the 
prosecution.  This delay often will result from circumstances 
entirely beyond the Commonwealth's control.  See, e.g., J.H. v. 
Commonwealth, 479 Mass. 285, 293 (2018) ("As we discern no 
indicia of bad faith from this record, and the timing of the 
prosecution appears directly connected to the complainant's 
willingness to proceed, we conclude that this argument [of bad 
faith delay] has no merit").  Where other means of prosecution 
are available, the possibility that a Juvenile Court judge might 
exercise his or her discretion to discharge a juvenile serves as 
a powerful disincentive from making use of G. L. c. 119, § 72A.  
Given this, we consistently have expressed confidence that the 
Commonwealth's resort to G. L. c. 119, § 72A, will be rare, and 
will be exercised only where seeking a timely complaint or 
indictment in the Juvenile Court was not feasible.  See, e.g., 
Mogelinski II, 473 Mass. at 172. 
 
Nonetheless, we have recognized that the transfer hearing 
procedure of G. L. c. 119, § 72A, could, in theory, be misused 
to proceed in an adult court against a person who committed an 
offense as a juvenile.  Under this scenario, the Commonwealth 
11 
 
 
intentionally could delay proceeding against a juvenile until 
after his or her nineteenth birthday, at which point the 
juvenile would have "'aged out' of the Juvenile Court's 
jurisdiction."  See Commonwealth v. Nanny, 462 Mass. 798, 806 
(2012).  Such inexcusable or bad faith delay would deprive a 
juvenile of certain advantages of the juvenile justice system.  
See G. L. c. 119, § 53 (proceedings in Juvenile Court are not 
"deemed criminal proceedings," and juveniles are "treated, not 
as criminals, but as children in need of aid, encouragement and 
guidance"); Commonwealth v. Humberto H., 466 Mass. 562, 575–576 
(2013) ("the juvenile justice system is primarily 
rehabilitative, cognizant of the inherent differences between 
juvenile and adult offenders, and geared toward the correction 
and redemption to society of delinquent children" [quotations 
and citation omitted]).6 
 
We have not identified an actual instance of such bad faith 
or inexcusable delay; nor are we aware of any case where another 
court in the Commonwealth has done so.  In the event that such 
delay occurs, however, we have provided a potential remedy for 
an aggrieved juvenile.  Because inexcusable or bad faith delay 
could implicate due process concerns, see, e.g., Porges, 460 
Mass. at 532 n.4, the "acknowledged remedy for delay" is 
                                                     
 
 
6 Of course, the most serious implication of delay is the 
possibility of being committed to adult prison. 
12 
 
 
dismissal of the charging instrument, Commonwealth v. Imbruglia, 
377 Mass. 682, 688 (1979).  On such a motion to dismiss, the 
juvenile has the initial burden of raising the issue of bad 
faith or inexcusable delay.  Once the issue is raised, the 
burden shifts to the Commonwealth to demonstrate the absence of 
bad faith, including "the unfeasibility of timely seeking and 
obtaining" alternative process.  See Mogelinski I, 466 Mass. at 
646 n.11.  See also, e.g., J.H., 479 Mass. at 293. 
 
iii.  Timing of a motion to dismiss due to bad faith or 
inexcusable delay.  The question before us is not whether the 
juvenile may pursue a motion to dismiss, but rather, when that 
motion may be decided.  To resolve this question involves two 
separate inquiries:  first, whether a Juvenile Court judge has 
the authority to hear the motion at all and, if so, whether the 
judge must arraign the juvenile before deciding the motion. 
 
The authority of a Juvenile Court judge to decide a motion 
to dismiss for bad faith or inexcusable delay is a "necessary 
and inevitable implication" of the transfer hearing process 
(quotation and citation omitted).  See Johnson, 409 Mass. at 
716.  General Laws c. 119, § 72A, expressly grants a Juvenile 
Court judge discretion to determine whether the public interest 
requires that a juvenile be tried or discharged.  To exercise 
that discretion, a judge necessarily must have the authority to 
consider the issue of prosecutorial delay.  If the Commonwealth 
13 
 
 
were to misuse the transfer hearing process through bad faith or 
inexcusable delay, the interests of the public would be ill 
served by permitting such a prosecution to proceed. 
 
Unduly limiting the authority of a Juvenile Court judge to 
consider these issues would frustrate one of the fundamental 
purposes of G. L. c. 119, § 72A, i.e., empowering Juvenile Court 
judges to decide "whether the prosecution may proceed 
altogether."  Nanny, 462 Mass. at 806.  We will not "impose an 
overly narrow or artificial construction on a statute that would 
frustrate a grant of jurisdiction that the Legislature clearly 
intended."  Mogelinski II, 473 Mass. at 171, quoting Porges, 460 
Mass. at 532. 
 
We turn to consider whether a Juvenile Court judge has the 
discretion to hear a motion to dismiss for inexcusable or bad 
faith delay prior to arraignment, or may do so only after 
arraignment.  Following arraignment, "the juvenile's name and 
delinquency charge become part of the juvenile's permanent 
[court activity record information (CARI)] record, and may not 
be expunged."  See Humberto H., 466 Mass. at 572, citing 
Commonwealth v. Gavin G., 437 Mass. 470, 473–474 (2002).  If, 
however, a Juvenile Court judge has discretion to dismiss a case 
prior to arraignment, he or she may choose to spare the juvenile 
from these "collateral consequences of a delinquency charge."  
Humberto H., supra at 576. 
14 
 
 
 
As a general rule, a Juvenile Court judge has no authority 
to dismiss a complaint prior to arraignment.  The decision to 
arraign ordinarily is tantamount to a prosecutor's exclusive 
discretion whether to prosecute a case.  See Commonwealth v. 
Newton N., 478 Mass. 747, 755–757 (2018).  Arraignment is the 
initial point at which a plea is entered, pretrial conferences 
are scheduled, and the discovery process begins.  See Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 7, as appearing in 461 Mass. 1501 (2012); Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 14, as appearing in 442 Mass. 1518 (2004).  To dismiss 
a valid complaint at this initial stage would "short-circuit[] 
the adversary process by silencing the people's elected voice," 
and thereby "usurp[] the decision-making authority 
constitutionally allocated to the executive branch."  
Commonwealth v. Gordon, 410 Mass. 498, 500-501 (1991).  This 
would violate art. 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights, which provides that "[i]n the government of this 
commonwealth . . . the judicial [department] shall never 
exercise the legislative and executive powers." 
 
There are only two circumstances under which we have 
recognized that a Juvenile Court judge may dismiss a complaint 
prior to arraignment without running afoul of the separation of 
powers set forth in art. 30.  First, the Legislature 
occasionally has expressly granted judges the discretion to 
decide whether a prosecution may go forward without the need for 
15 
 
 
conducting an arraignment.  Second, in the absence of express 
statutory authority, a Juvenile Court judge has discretion to 
consider a motion to dismiss a complaint prior to arraignment 
where that complaint on its face is not legally valid.  See 
Mogelinski II, 473 Mass. at 167 (lack of jurisdiction);7 Humberto 
H., 466 Mass. at 575 (lack of probable cause).  Neither of these 
exceptions is applicable here. 
 
Where the Legislature has intended to permit prearraignment 
dismissal, it has stated so explicitly.8  General Laws c. 119, 
§ 72A, is conspicuously silent on this point.  Had the 
Legislature sought to single out juveniles who are discharged 
pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 72A, and shield them from the 
                                                     
 
 
7 Here, the motion judge properly exercised her discretion 
to decide, prior to arraignment, whether the complaint against 
the juvenile established probable cause. 
 
 
8 For some offenses, juveniles are now eligible by statute 
to participate in pretrial, prearraignment diversion programs, 
if a judge determines that a particular program would be 
suitable for the juvenile, see G. L. c. 119, § 54A (b), inserted 
by St. 2018, c. 69, § 75; or, with the Commonwealth's approval, 
if the juvenile agrees to participate in a restorative justice 
program, see G. L. c. 276B, § 2, inserted by St. 2018, c. 69, 
§ 202.  "A child complained of as a delinquent child may, upon 
the request of the child, undergo an assessment prior to 
arraignment to enable the judge to consider the suitability of 
the child for diversion. . . .  If a case is continued pursuant 
to this subsection, the child shall not be arraigned and an 
entry shall not be made into the criminal offender record 
information system until a judge issues an order to resume the 
ordinary processing of a delinquency proceeding" (emphasis 
added).  See Commonwealth v. Newberry, 483 Mass. 186, 194-195 
(2019), quoting G. L. c. 119, § 54A (b). 
16 
 
 
consequences of a CARI record, "it could have used similar 
language; it chose not to do so."  Commonwealth v. Newberry, 483 
Mass. 186, 195 (2019).  We will not read such additional 
protections into this statute, particularly where doing so 
unnecessarily would implicate separation of powers concerns.  
See Commonwealth v. Dayton, 477 Mass. 224, 228 (2017) ("where 
the Legislature used specific language in one part of an 
enactment . . . , but not in another . . . , the language should 
not be implied where it is not present"). 
 
In the absence of legislative authorization, a Juvenile 
Court judge may also dismiss a complaint prior to arraignment 
only where the complaint itself, on its face, is invalid.9  Cf. 
Newton N., 478 Mass. at 755-756.  Under such circumstances, the 
judge may determine the issue of legal validity based on the 
"four corners of the complaint," and without the need for an 
evidentiary hearing.  Commonwealth v. Orbin O., 478 Mass. 759, 
762 (2018), quoting Humberto H. 466 Mass. at 565. 
 
Assessing an allegation of inexcusable or bad faith 
prosecutorial delay under G. L. c. 119, § 72A, presents a 
substantially different inquiry.  Such delay does not implicate 
the validity of the delinquency complaint itself, or the 
                                                     
 
 
9 Here, the motion judge properly exercised her discretion 
to decide, prior to arraignment, whether the complaint against 
the juvenile established probable cause. 
17 
 
 
jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court to hear it.  Rather, it calls 
into question whether a District Court ultimately may exercise 
jurisdiction over the juvenile. 
 
As noted supra, the legislatively prescribed vehicle for 
determining whether the case should proceed to the District 
Court is the second stage of the transfer hearing under G. L. 
c. 119, § 72A.  We repeatedly have recognized that the transfer 
hearing in the Juvenile Court serves the same function as a 
bind-over probable cause hearing in the District Court.  See, 
e.g., Nanny, 462 Mass. at 805.  It is notable that when the 
District Court does not exercise final jurisdiction over a 
defendant pending a probable cause hearing, our rules of 
criminal procedure nonetheless explicitly contemplate that an 
arraignment must occur in the District Court.  See Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 7 (b) (4) ("At a District Court arraignment on a 
complaint which is outside of the District Court's final 
jurisdiction or on which jurisdiction is declined, the court 
shall schedule the case for a probable cause hearing" [emphasis 
added]).  We see no reason to treat the analogous transfer 
hearing under G. L. c. 119, § 72A, differently in this respect. 
 
Moreover, a motion to dismiss for inexcusable or bad faith 
delay cannot be resolved merely by referring to the face of the 
complaint.  While some delay will always be apparent in a 
complaint subject to G. L. c. 119, § 72A, the presence of bad 
18 
 
 
faith will not.  Instead, the Juvenile Court judge likely would 
need to hold an evidentiary hearing where the judge could 
receive testimony from Commonwealth witnesses, such as 
investigating officers, as to why a timely complaint or 
indictment in the Juvenile Court was not feasible.  At the very 
least, because such an inquiry would occur as part of the 
transfer hearing, the juvenile would have the opportunity to 
"present a defense and cross-examine witnesses."  Nanny, 462 
Mass. at 805.  This necessarily complex assessment is far 
removed from a probable cause determination based on the four 
corners of a complaint; it must be conducted following an 
arraignment. 
c.  Right to immediate appeal.  Finally, we turn to the 
single justice's determination that the juvenile in this case 
did not have a right to pursue an immediate appeal pursuant to 
G. L. c. 211, § 3. 
Our supervisory authority under G. L. c. 211, § 3, is 
"exercised only in exceptional circumstances and where necessary 
to protect substantive rights in the absence of an alternative, 
effective remedy" (quotation and citation omitted).  MacDougall 
v. Commonwealth, 447 Mass. 505, 510 (2006).  "Relief under G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, is not available where the [defendant] has or had 
adequate and effective avenues other than G. L. c. 211, § 3, by 
19 
 
 
which to seek and obtain the requested relief" (citation 
omitted).  Lanoue v. Commonwealth, 427 Mass. 1014, 1015 (1998). 
As we noted in our order permitting this appeal, "[i]n 
general, 'there is no right to interlocutory review of the 
denial of a motion to dismiss pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.'"  
N.M. v. Commonwealth, 478 Mass. 89, 91 (2017), quoting Flood v. 
Commonwealth, 465 Mass. 1015, 1016 (2013).  We have allowed such 
appeals only in very narrow circumstances, where proceeding 
without an appeal completely and irreparably would deprive a 
defendant of his or her fundamental rights.  See Gangi v. 
Commonwealth, 462 Mass. 158, 160 n.2 (2012) (allowing 
"temporarily" committed defendant to appeal from denial of 
motion to dismiss sexually dangerous person petition "[i]n light 
of his immediate liberty interest in resolution of this dispute" 
[quotation and citation omitted]); McGuinness v. Commonwealth, 
423 Mass. 1003, 1004 (1996) (permitting appeal from denial of 
motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds). 
Given that we ordinarily do not allow interlocutory review 
of motions to dismiss, the single justice did not abuse her 
discretion by declining to reach the merits of the juvenile's 
claims.  "A single justice, in his or her discretion, may . . . 
properly decline to employ the court's extraordinary power of 
general superintendence where exceptional circumstances are not 
present."  Aroian v. Commonwealth, 483 Mass. 1008, 1009 (2019), 
20 
 
 
quoting Commonwealth v. Narea, 454 Mass. 1003, 1004 n.1 (2009).  
Cf. Commonwealth v. Fontanez, 482 Mass. 22, 26 (2019) ("we 
routinely uphold single justice denials of . . . petitions where 
there are no novel, systemic, or case-determinative issues, or 
other aspects that make the petitions exceptional"). 
Here, the single justice recognized that the juvenile had 
other adequate avenues by which to obtain appellate review, 
namely, by appeal following any subsequent conviction.  The 
single justice cited this court's decision in N.M., 478 Mass. at 
91, and the Commonwealth's statements in its opposition, both of 
which discuss just such a remedy.  Thus, while the Juvenile 
Court judge's conclusion that she lacked the authority to decide 
the motion to dismiss was clearly erroneous, the single justice 
was not compelled to address that error at the stage of the 
proceeding before her.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Richardson, 454 
Mass. 1005, 1005–1006 (2009) ("We will review interlocutory 
matters in criminal cases only when substantial claims of 
irremediable error are presented . . . and only in exceptional 
circumstances . . . where it becomes necessary to protect 
substantive rights" [quotations and citation omitted]).  Because 
the single justice properly applied the standard of G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the 
petition. 
21 
 
 
While the single justice did not err in declining to reach 
the merits of the petition, we are not precluded from reaching 
the procedural questions now.  The second question remains:  
whether a juvenile ordinarily may seek interlocutory review 
under G. L. c. 211, § 3, from the denial of a motion to dismiss 
under G. L. c. 119, § 72A, on the grounds of inexcusable delay 
or bad faith.  As this issue has been fully briefed, and is 
capable of repetition yet evading review, we exercise our 
discretion to resolve it.  For the reasons discussed infra, we 
conclude that a juvenile has no automatic right to an 
interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss for 
bad faith or inexcusable delay. 
The juvenile maintains that when the Commonwealth 
inexcusably delays in bringing a prosecution under G. L. c. 119, 
§ 72A, the Juvenile Court has no jurisdiction to hear the case, 
and the juvenile has the right not to be tried.  To delay her 
appeal until after the resolution of the criminal case against 
her irreparably would deprive her of that right.  Therefore, she 
urges us to treat a motion to dismiss in such circumstances like 
a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds, and to permit 
interlocutory appeal.  Cf. McGuinness, 423 Mass. at 1004. 
 
We do not agree.  In our prior cases, we have noted that an 
adult defendant may not appeal immediately from the denial of a 
motion to dismiss on grounds similar to those at issue here, 
22 
 
 
including undue preindictment delay, see King v. Commonwealth, 
442 Mass. 1043, 1044 (2004), and even violations of due process, 
see Jackson v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 1008, 1009 (2002).  Nor 
have we allowed an immediate appeal simply because a motion to 
dismiss was considered and denied prior to arraignment.  See 
Brea v. Commonwealth, 473 Mass. 1012, 1013 (2015).  Further, 
even if we agreed with the juvenile that inexcusable delay could 
deprive the Juvenile Court of jurisdiction, we previously have 
concluded that the denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction likewise is not immediately appealable.  See 
Fitzpatrick v. Commonwealth, 453 Mass. 1014, 1015 (2009); Gouin 
v. Commonwealth, 439 Mass. 1013, 1013 (2003). 
 
That the juvenile seeks to appeal from a decision of the 
Juvenile Court does not alter our analysis.  See A Juvenile v. 
Commonwealth, 466 Mass. 1035, 1036 (2013) (applying G. L. 
c. 211, § 3).  In Fitzpatrick, 453 Mass. at 1015, we determined 
that a juvenile had no right to immediate appeal from the denial 
of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction where a judge of 
the Juvenile Court transferred that juvenile's case to adult 
court pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 72A.  We noted that, in the 
event that the juvenile were to be convicted, "any error [could] 
be adequately remedied in his direct appeal."  Id.  We 
subsequently reached the same conclusion where a juvenile, like 
the petitioner here, argued that the Commonwealth inexcusably 
23 
 
 
delayed prosecution until the juvenile had aged out of the 
jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court, necessitating resort to 
G. L. c. 119, § 72A.  See A Juvenile, supra. 
 
The petitioner has presented no compelling reason to depart 
from this reasoning, and thus to apply G. L. c. 211, § 3, more 
expansively in her case.  While we acknowledge that "the 
ordinary appellate process will not restore the protective 
nature of juvenile proceedings," should error later be 
discovered, "even the absence of an adequate alternative remedy, 
as the juvenile claims here, does not by itself make review 
under G. L. c. 211, § 3, automatic."  N.M., 478 Mass. at 92-93. 
 
Finally, it is not a fait accompli that this juvenile 
indeed will face the range of possible consequences of 
prosecution as an adult; to date, no Juvenile Court judge has 
concluded that her case should be transferred to adult court.  
In the event that her case were to be transferred, and she 
ultimately were to be convicted, she would be able to raise the 
denial of her motion to dismiss for bad faith or inexcusable 
delay on direct appeal. 
 
Therefore, we affirm our earlier holding in A Juvenile, 466 
Mass. at 1036, and conclude that a juvenile subject to G. L. 
c. 119, § 72A, does not have a right to an immediate appeal 
under G. L. c. 211, § 3, from the denial of a motion to dismiss 
for bad faith or inexcusable prosecutorial delay. 
24 
 
 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The matter is remanded to the county 
court, where an order shall enter remanding the matter to the 
Juvenile Court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.