Title: Kamaka v. Goodsill, Anderson, Quinn & Stifel

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

‘++ NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

No. 24577

a2q8

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'T

 

KITTY KAMAKA, Plaintitf-Appellee,

GOODSILL, ANDERSON, QUINN & STIFEL, A Law Corporation,
Defendant-Appellant,
and

JOHN DOES 1-10, Defendants.
a

APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(CIVIL NO. 97-4007)

01 PEN
(sy: Moon, C.J., Levinson, Nakayama, and Duffy, JJ., and
Intermediate Court of Appeals Judge Fujise, in place of Acoba,
Je, recused)

‘The defendant-appellant Goodsill, Anderson, Quinn &
Stifel, a Law Corporation (hereinafter, “Goodsill”] appeals from

the following collateral orders of the circuit court of the first
(2) the

 

circuit, the Honorable Virginia L. Crandall presidin:
September 6, 2000 order granting plaintiff-appellee Kitty
Kenaka’'s March 29, 2000 motion for sanctions against Goodsill
(hereinafter, “the September 6, 2000 order granting Kamaka’s
second motion for sanctions”) and (2) the March 9, 2001 order
granting Kamaka’s March 29, 2000 motion for sanctions against
Goodsill with clarification with respect to the Septenber 28,
2000 affidavit of Jared Kawashima pursuant to the September 6,
2000 order granting the June 8, 2000 motion for clarification of
+#% NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***
the May 23, 2000 oral ruling granting Kamaka’s motion for
sanctions [hereinafter, “the March 9, 2001 order granting

Kamaka’s motion for sanctions”).'

 

* on January 28, 2002, this court entered an order denying Kanaka’s

December 3, 2001 motion to dismiss for lack of appellate Jurisdiction, stating

In relevant pare as. follows
[e}t appears that the order sanctioning [Goodsill] to pay (Kanaka]
59,499-57 is a collaterel order that is appealable as a final order
Under [iawai's Revised Statutes (uks)) § e41-2(a) [(1993)) inasmuch as
the sanction for disobeying the circuit court’s rulings concerning
Slscovery from Larry Song iss matter completely separate fron the
nerits of [Kanaka’s] complaint end the directive to pay the sanction by
Zepteaber 24, 2001 placed (Goodell) in inmediate Jeopardy of being
found in contenpt of court for failure to make payment as directed. See

7 60 Haw. 467, 480, 591 P.2d 1060, 1070 (1979).
Dituissal’ of the appeal ie not warranted on the grounds raised in
‘the motion to dismiss appeal inasmuch ae: (1) the sanction matter,
Sppealed does not concern the propriety of [Goodsill's) assertion of the
Ritorney-client privilege ana the assertion of the privilege is not
Felated co the merits of (Kamaks’a] complaint; (2) the appealability of
ihe sanction order under Garada is based on the immediate enforceability
Sf the sanction through contempt proceedings before entry of Final
Sudguent, ‘not on whether the sanction is punitive or renedial or on
Shether contempt can be avoided; (3) (Goodsill's) appeal is not an
Uppeal of the circuit court's ruling that discovery from Larry Seng 1s
fot barred by the attorney-client privilege and is not an appeal of
Eecovery order involving the attorney-client privilege for which an
Gneediate oppeal 12 diesilowed; and (4) we have recognized, but declined
to follow the rule of the federsl courte disallowing immediate appeals
SE sanctions for discovery abuse; gee Harada(]y 60 Maw(-] at 480 hel,
591 P.20 at 1070 nil. Therefore,
TE 18 HERESY ORDERED that the motion to dlaniss appeal for lack of

jurisdiction is denied,

 

 

    

 

 

 

 

Et ds noteworthy thet in her answering brief on appeal to this court,
Kanaks "respectfully requests that (this) court reconsider its decision
Eegarding Jurisdiction in light of the fact that the arguments advanced in her
{sjotion co. [d]isnise effectively ask for overruling, modifying, or limiting
Unrada.” fanaka furthermore reiterates the contentions set forth in her

otion to dismiss.

ro F court ture all
ine carcicular case, including culinas made by the sides hinselt.—
fiopev. City and County of Honolulu, 66 Haw. 303, 396, G69 P-zd 157, 162
T1963)

‘taw of the case does not, however, have the inexorable effect of
kat ‘and dose not preclude the court from reconsidering an
Earlier ruling if the court feels that the ruling was probably
Cftonesus and more harm would be done by adhering to the earlier
Fale than from the delay incident to a reconsideration and the
‘continued.

 

 
‘**# NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

on appeal, Goodsill asserts as follows: (1) that “the
[circuit] court . . . abused its discretion when it sanctioned
[Goodsill] because nothing stated by [Goodsill] in its February
16, 2000 Letter can be deemed to have violated Judge Nakatani’ s
February 24, 2000 order”; (2) that “a (Hawai'l Rules of Civil
Procedure (HRCP)] Rule 37 [(2000)?] sanction cannot be based

\(sscontinued)

Possible change in the rule of Law to be applied.

f(g 12-14) p. 2266, nll.

caras SERRE GE law, 375, 382, 408 P.24 732, 779 (1965). In, fact,
Séihas been noted thet, 4 ne
Seats a a ee eee eee eeconere
SSB R is ase th-a.P.2a cir. 1999) (rejecting an argument that @
Judge was bound by law of the case established by his own prior oral

 

2 moore,

Order) (citing, inter alia, Eerxara & Hantnan vy Alvares, 124 F.34_567,
Ses (aa cir. 1997); Onited states v; Adeabite, 677 F.2d i74, 176 (2d
Cir. 1989))-

v " 8" 2. 2 of Hi, 92 Hawai’
Tir S52 F.28 127, 156 (2000) (enphases added)»

‘Sven that Kanata simply aezerte the same arguments in her answering
brief ss she did in her motion to dismiss, wo do not reconsider our January
36, 2002 crder denying Kamaka’s motion to dismiss for lack of appellate
jetediceions and we viow the claw of the case” doctrine as applying to the
Retsene acters 2d. We therefore disregard Kamaka's jurisdictiona
Brgunents.

      

RCP Rule 37 provides in relevant part:
(b) Failure to comply with order [compelling discovery].

‘zi Sacrrons wy Count ax Wien Action Ts Prnorea. If @ party oF an
offices, director, of managing agent of a party or a person.
Sesignated under Rule 30(b)(6) oF 31(a) to testify on behalf of a
Safty satis to cbey an order to provide or permit discovery,
Pheldding an crder mage under subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule
35, of if a party fails to obey an order entered under Rule 26(f),
Ene court in'wnich the action is pending may make such orders in
Fegare to the failure ag are just. + +

 

 

In Lieu of any’of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the
court shall require the party {a:ling to obey the order or the attorney
Savising that party or both co pay the reasonable expenses, including
Seietney's fees, caused by the fellure, unless the court finds that the
fallure wae substantially Justified or that other circumstances make an
award of expenses unjust

 
+#* NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

simply on a vague and ambiguous finding that 2 party violated the
sintent and spirit’ of a discovery order”; (3) that, “even if it
were allowable to enter [HRC] Rule 37 Sanctions based on a
party's alleged violation of the ‘intent and spirit’ of a

discovery order, it was an abuse of discretion to sanction

 

{Goodsill] under the facts of this case,” inasmuch as (a)
Goodsill “cannot be sanctioned for maintaining the position that
it did not waive the attorney-client privilege and that Song's
disclosure of communications was to be made over (Goodsill’s]
objection[,]” (b) Goodsill’s “February 16, 2000 letter affirmed
ite obligation and intent to comply with Judge Nakatani’s
discovery order(,]” and (c) Goodsill’s “statement had nothing to
do with Song’s refusal to testify as to communications he
considered covered by the attorney-client privilege”; and (4)
that the circuit court’s “award of fees and costs incurred by
[Kamaka‘s] attorneys in connection with the July[] 1999
deposition of Larry Song should be vacated because it sanctions
{Goodsill) for conduct that Judge Nakatani specifically found was
not wrongful.”

Kamaka counters as follows: (1) that this court should
“overrule, modify[,) or limit{] Haradal v, Ellis, 60 Haw. 467,
480, 591 P.2d 1060, 1070 (1979),} and dismiss the present

 

appeal(,]” see supra note 1; (2) that “sanctions may be imposed
for violation of the ‘intent and spirit’ of a court's discovery
order”; and (3) that “the circuit court did not abuse its

discretion in imposing sanctions.”
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Goodsill replies as follows: (1) that Kamaka “cannot
point to an unequivocal discovery order that was violated by
[Goodsi12’s] February 16, 2000 letter”; (2) that, “contrary to
what (Kamaka] contends, Judge Nakatani did not require [Goodsill
to release its claim to the attorney-client privilege nor did she
order (Goodsill] to ‘direct’ Song to speak” because (a) “Judge
Nakatani expressly rejected (Kanaka’s] request that (Goodsill] be
ordered to ‘direct’ Song to testify[,]” (b) “Judge Nakatani and
Judge Crandall understood that [Goodsill] could not be ordered to
waive the attorney-client privilege[,]” and (c) “Judge Nakatani
never contemplated, much less unequivocally ordered{, Goodsill}
to take a certain position with respect to Song’s testimony in

the event it w ed to do so prior to the actual commencement

 

of Song's deposition”; (3) that Goodsill’s “February 16, 2000
letter was only written because (Kamaka] required that [Goodsill]
state what it{Js position would be concerning the communications
it considered privileged”; and (4) that “the February 16, 2000
letter did not ‘impede’ Song from testifying[.1”"

For the reasons discussed infra in section III, we
hold: (1) that the circuit court abused its discretion in
entering September 6, 2000 order granting Kamaka’s second motion

for sanctions and (2) that the circuit court abused its

 

Giscretion in entering the March 9, 2001 order granting Kamaka’s
notion for sanctions, which itself was based upon the September
6, 2000 order. Accordingly, we (1) vacate (a) the September 6,
2000 order granting Kamaka’s second motion for sanctions and (b)

the March 9, 2001 order granting Kamaka’s motion for sanctions
+#* NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***
and (2) remand this matter to the circuit court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1. BACKGROUND

‘The present matter arises out of the termination of

 

Kamaka’s employment with Goodsill. On October 1, 1997, Kamaka
filed a complaint against Goodsill alleging, inter alia, that
Goodsill had discriminated against Kamaka in violation of
Hawaii's Family Leave law, Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) Chapter
398. On October 27, 1997, Goodsill filed an answer to Kamaka’s
complaint.
AL on a

on December 23, 1998, after she had filed several
unsatisfied discovery requests, Kamaka filed, inter alia, 2
motion to compel the testimony and production of documents
relating communications by Larry Song, Esq. Song was @ former
partner with Goodsill who was also “retained by (Goodsill] to act
as their attorney in connection with issues involving . .

Kamaka.” On March 5, 1999, the circuit court, the Honorable Gail

 

C. Nakatani presiding, entered an order “granting item no. 5 (re:
Larry Song) of (Kamaka’s) motion to compel(,]” specifically
ordering, inter alia, “[t]hat (Goodsill] ha(d) not carried its
burden of establishing that the communications between (itself]
and... Song. . . [met] the test for establishing the
attorney-client privilege.” On June 9, 1999, Kamaka noticed
Song's deposition.

on July 6, 1999, Kamaka’s counsel deposed Song in Los

Angeles, California, where Song had resided since his departure

6
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from employment with Goodsill. During the deposition, song

stated as follows:

Moreover,

I wag asked to render ay expertise, my legal advice, and ay
counseling to (Goodsili], by and through its key employees,
the managenent conaittes, partners, lofty partners and very
eli respected partners of the firm. I was engaged to act
fe the fire's attorney, the firm being {Goodsiii,) sn
Approximately Septeaber 199, and 1 continuously’ advised
{Goodeil1] a client until’ sometime around Decenber of
1955, Therefore, any inquiries regarding wat was discussed
Goring those mestings that 1 Sttended are protected by the
attorney-client privilege and are absolutely sacred.

 

Goodsil1’s counsel stated:

[GOODSILL'S COUNSEL:) Just. go the record is clear, it
Ae (Goodaiil’s} position that as of Septenber 21st (, 1998,)
Mr. Song was acting as legal counsel to (Goodsill),’and for
the purpose of providing legal advice to (Goodsil1)
regarding ts. Kanakal. ‘t]herefore, it("]s. (Goodsil2" s)
position that all communications between (Goodsill) and Mr.
Bong during that tine were in our privilege pursuant to
[Rule] $03 of the Hawas["}i (RJules of (E]¥idance [(HRE)].
Daring that tine[,] Mr. Song's role as consultant to the
fizm was separace’and part from his ole as Miss Kamaka’ s
Supervising parsner, which he Began on Novenber 21st of
1985. After November 2ist of "38, Mr. Song served in a dual
capacity, both as consultant to the firm, as Ms. Kanaka’s
Supervising partner, and we will rely upon Mr. Song to,
exercise the attorney-client privilege with respect to
Subsequent communications that are in an appropriate manner.
(Goodsi11) does not... vaive the attorney-client
privilege.

Kamaka’s counsel subsequently engaged Goodsill’s

  

 

 

counsel in the following colloquy:

(HAMAKAS COUNSEL:} Let me just make a statement for
tthe record, and I think we are going to have to go off the
Fecord to call the court. The issue with respect. to the
attorney-client privilege wae thoroughly briefed and decided
By the (circuit) court. in Hawal(]i by a court order that T
had previously given to the parties involved. 1
Understand Mr. Song's position, and 1 understand that?
position he would need to take in view of his purported
Client's positions however, I intend to make a phone call
ind have & conference call not involving Mr- Song
hecessarily of nis counsel, Dut the counsel for [Goodsiil)
in this cage. When we go Off the Fecord, and we are going
£0 be asking for sanctions because our purpose of coming to
line Angeles at this tine was specifically the tine to be
after the court ruling with respect to that privilege issue,
and we would not have made this trip had we known that

he

 

 
testified

 

 

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[coodsitl was) going to violate thet court{] order. So I do
{Ste thie satter off the record right now and we willl make
that conference. call.

TGOSDSTLL’S COUNSEL:) Just before I do, let's make
the relord clear we are fot violating any court order, we
are simply not waiving the attorney-client privilege end
ore Sybu say that the matter was choroughty briefed before.
ie'was not thoroughly briefed. There was not a proper
foundation, and the Judge in her ruling said simply at that
point we had not carried the burden of establishing the
Egamunieation between Hr. Song and [Goodsill] meets the
teat.

Mr, Song's testinony now makes it clear that ne was
acting ao consultant to the firm, and the testimony .
[sslocher ss attorney [for Goodsili) since the judge’ s
Follngi] eiso sakes it clear that Mr. Song's role during the
pertinent persed was solely and exclusively as the attorney
For the firm, and although subsequently he . . . went into
the duel capacity after Novenber the 21", even during that
Eine, certainly things thet were told to him in his capacity
be ah attorney ought to be privileged. taw firms . when
they are clients are entitled to be able to rely upon the
Stedeney-client privilege, And all (Goodsili] has done is
Sinply declined fo waive the Ton" ehink
fhe jodge"s ruling to date ha: fies of Mee
Song's Cestinony and without the benefit of the other...
attorneys. [for Goodsill], Aas done anything to require Mr.
Song to testify .

TKRMAKA’S GOUNSEL:) the court order reads as follows:
teen Non 5, to compel testimony relating to communications
Ey'Larcy Song, (Esqe], ie hereby granted. So what the court
Rentioned we will get’ from the juage.

TcooDStLL'S GOUNSEL:)~ Well, Keep in mind that that,
follows the sentence that (Goodsill} has not carried the

[KAMAKR’s COUNSEL:] Well, the judge will decide. So
ett make that call

When the parties returned on the record, however, Song

 

 

    

 

 

as follows:

(als was made perfectly clear on the record by [Goodsii1's
Ehnseil, the elients in this case... ha(vel not waived
the sttofney-client privilege. Therefore, have no
Fecourse, given my duty ae an attorney to that firm,
Fegarding eaters that are clearly covered by the attorney
Eilent privilege. I cannot testify as. . . to those
atte

 

 

iret. For ns

on November 1, 1999, Goodsill filed a motion for

consideration of the March 5, 1999 order granting Kamaka’s
 

* NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

motion to compel. On November 5, 1999, Kamaka filed a memorandum
in opposition to Goodsill’s motion for reconsideration.
on November 9, 1999, Kamaka filed a motion for

sanctions against Goodsill based on Song’s refusal to testify on
certain matters at the July 6, 1999 deposition. Kamaka attached
to her motion the affidavit of her counsel, which stated in
relevant part:
During the deposition, I asked the (circuit
clourt to intervene in che dispute over [Goodsili‘s claim of
Sttorney-client] privilege. The [cireuit cjourt called the

‘and heard arguments regarding Song’s statement and
deill"s] continued assertion of the privilege. The

jously stated on the
re Was no motion oF

 

 

 
 
 
      

Nigpede” ‘the deposition and that Song was to answer all
gucsetong Fegnraing hie Somunisatione wich (Gcodeh31] with

on November 10, 1999, Goodsil1 filed a reply memorandum
in support of its motion for reconsideration of the March 5, 1999
order granting Kamaka’s motion to compel.

on December 6, 1999, Goodsill filed a memorandum in
opposition to Kamaka’s November 9, 1999 motion for sanctions,
arguing, inter alia, that it “had both the right and the
obligation to state on the record that it was not voluntarily
waiving the attorney[-Jclient privilege through Mr. Song’ s
testimony(.1”

on December 14, 1999, the circuit court conducted a
hearing regarding Kamaka’s motion for sanctions. During the

hearing, the circuit court stated as follows:

 

THE COURT: . . . [I]t does appear to me that to a

great extent that this decision was. . Song's decision
Sfp discussion with his attorney.” So. +. By

incalnation now: ss i@. + €0 4s4ue an Order basically
** NOT FOR PUBLICATION *#*

‘advising (Goodsill) that if there is a redeposition of
Song, which Iwill allow at (Kanaka’ s} discretion and
election, that the position of (Goodsill] is that. . Song
Comply with this court's order

GWAKA"S COUNSEL: T-agree. 1 think that’s an
appropriate order to give to [Geodsill].

 

After entertaining arguments by both parties, the circuit court

issued the following oral ruling:

‘THE COURT: ALL right. Here's what the court's going
to do. The court will grant the motion as follows.

The court will allow the redeposition of Larry Song
and he court will order Ghat’ (Goodelil"e] 1. obsection
ith respect to the (attorney-client) privilege is preserved
nd the Firm at the Feseposition may only take the position
that Me. Song comply with the court's ruling and order to
fanewer all questions posed to him-

The coure will allow [Kanaka), at (Kamaka‘s] election,
to conduct Mr. Song’ deposition either by phone,
teleconferencing or in person, [or] redepdeition in Los
Angeles.

‘The court believes that . . . good faith arguments
have been sade by (Goossill] in connection with their
actions at the deposition of Me- Song and st does appear
thet to sone extent Mr. Song along with his attorney made
tthe decision about not answering some of the questions, and
so'the fault is not all of [Goodsill’s]. And'so for these
Feasons, in all other respect(s] at this tine the motion
(ill be’ denied and the request for fees and sanctions,
Ronetary sanctions will be denied. However, with the
Sanonition that this deposition mist go forwardi:] Lf the
Court concludes thet, st the] depesition{,) {Goodsill)
fonehow inpedes [Kanaka’s] ability to conclude that
Geposition, then the court will grant leave to (Kanaka) to
Fefile its request for sanctions.

ALL righe.

[KAMAKR’S COUNSEL:} Your Honor, just for a point of
clarification, 1a it correct to say that the court directs
(Goodsil!) to tell Hr. Song thet ne answer?

THE COURT: He’G represented by counsel, T mean,
[Goodsill) is not ME. Song's attorney, right? =. -
[tine position they must take is that their position is that
Mr. Song. comply with the court's order,

THAMAKA’S COUNSEL:)\ And that their claim of privilege
wnich a preserved will not stand in the way of hie
anewering?

HE COURT

 

 

 

  

 

 

 

tha

 

correct.

on January 3, 2000, the circuit court entered an order
denying Goodsill’s November 1, 1999 motion for reconsideration of
the March 5, 1999 order granting Kamaka’s motion to compel,

10
ruling as

requested

By letter

‘+## NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

follows:

‘The [circuit clourt concludes that {Goodsill] did not

exercise die diligence in that [Goodsiil] knew where Mr

‘Song was and never contacted Mr. Song to get the evidence

Tof'the attorney-client privilege) (Goods:11] merely
jueption that Hr, ‘Song would be

 

   
    

fees) however, (Goodsil1] declined his request.
Hae Gong's testimony and/or declaration was available prior
fo the Motion to compel. The [circuit c)ourt concludes that
forte did not amount to due diligence
Sh’any event, the absence of Mr. Song's testimony was
onty one factor, which this [c]ourt considered in reling on
Ghe’uotion to Compel. she {cizeult clourt concludes thet ie
Sia not erroneously rule on the remaining four reasons for
Fejecting Igoedsill’s] arguments in opposition to the Motion
to Compel (-1
‘Sherefore, the motion ie hereby DENIED.

 

  

By letter dated February 3, 2000, Song’s counsel
the following of Kamaka’s counsel:
id a wasteful trip and sore importantly to avoié

ing He. gong’s tine and mine, the parties should have
The glgne, if one renains, fully’ worked out before traveling

   

 

 

{ts Los Angeles}, At the very least, we would like the
fosetGectoton position of [eoedsill) which it. intends to
Boke at the next deposition session relative to the issue of
{nformation fer which attorney-client privilege has, to.

 

Gate, been asserted. A letter from (Goodsill] mill’ suffice.
dated February 10, 2000, Kamaka’s counsel relayed

Song's counsel's request to Goodsill. Goodsill’s counsel

responded

 

by letter dated February 16, 2000, stating as follows:

‘This letter responds to [Song’s counsel's] letter of
Fepruary 3 and [kanske's counsel's) letter of February 10,
2000 and ateempts to set forth (Goodsill's] position
Zogarding the attorney-client privilege between it and Mr.
Seng

{Goodsii2} has not waived the attorney-client
privilege between st and Me. Song and we believe the
Feireuit clourt understood and acknowledged that no waiver
hes occurred. (Goodaiil] will abide by the (circuit)
Cjeure’s order ang will not take any position to hamper or
prevent Mr- Song ezom complying with the (circuit clourt’ s
Eiger compelling disclosure of information over (Goodsill' =]
Objection. It ia up to Mr. Song and his counsel to decide
the iesue of whether the Hawai (yi (circuit clourt’s Order
Eesches He. Song #8  deponent subpoonsed under California

un
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dew.
on February 24, 2000, the circuit court entered an

order granting in part and denying in part Kanaka’s motion for

sanctions, which provides in relevant part:

The Motion is GRANTED as follows: The motion is based
fon (Kanaka's) aasertion of the attorney-client privilege at
Lazy Song's deposition on July 6, 1999. The
Clout had previously rejected (Goodsiii’ 8)
Such attorney-client privilege; [Goodsill’ s]
been preserved. The (circuit clourt orders thet (Kanaka]
may retake Larry Song's deposition in person, or via
Relephone or teleconference. At such further deposition,
(Soodsii1) aay take only the position that Mr. Song comply
with the court("]e ruling and order to answer all questions
Bored to his.

‘he remainder of the Motion is DENTED.

 

 

   
   

 

on February 28, 2000, Song’s counsel sent a letter to

both parties, which asserted in relevant part:

[2m the face of the position set forth by (Goodaiii}
through [its counsel], by letter dated February 16, 2000,
Ehat *(Goodaiii] has Hot waived the attorney-citent
privilege between it and Mr. Songl,]"{) it ie our assessment
Ehat resumption of the deposition would be a waste of time,
money and energy by everyone, In this regard, I note that
[Goodeill's} position chat it has not waived the attorney-
client privilege between itself and Mr- Song() forces Mey
Seng to maintsin and protest sll privileges information, and
precludes Mr, Song from testifying as to matters which are
Protected by the attorney-client privilege. (]

‘The effective result of Mr. Song's obligation to
maintain the client's confidence, absent waiver, i that
There would be very lictle information discoversble through
the deposition of Mr. Song.

From our vantage point, it seems that the parties
should achieve a workable and intelligible resolution
Fegaraing the attorney-client privilege issue in order to
hake resumption of Mr. Song’s deposition meaningful.
Riternatively, ‘the (eizeuit) court. . - will have to speak
fo the issue with greater clarity and specificity.

‘should the parties maintain interest in proceeding
with Mr. Song's deposition, the foregoing notwithstanding,
Please call me for scheduling consideration far in advance.

‘Second Motion For Sanctions And Motion For
Clarification

on March 29, 2000, Kamaka filed a second motion for

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

sanctions against Goodsill. On May 15, 2000, Goodsill filed a

2
‘+4 NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

memorandum in opposition to Kamaka’s motion for sanctions. On
May 17, 2000, Kamaka filed a reply memorandum in support of her
motion for sanctions. On May 23, 2000, the circuit court, the
Honorable Virginia Lea Crandall presiding, conducted a hearing
regarding Kamaka’s second motion for sanctions. After
considering arguments by both parties, the circuit court orally
ruled as follows:
TRE COURT: Based on the [circuit clourt's review of
the record, Judge Nakatani has already determined the issue
thet Me. Song 2 to testafy and that (Gosdsill is) to take
ictione with respect to that matter, Judge Nakatani,

id the privilege for purposes of the record But,
Jled, in this [clourt's estimation, that Mr. Song

 

 

 
 
 

 

that transpired with respect to this last
go-round of his deposition raised some concerns for the
feizcult cloure with respect to, if not directly violating
[Sodge Nakatani") Order, going against the intent and
Spirit of her Order by continuing to indicate that. With
Fespect to preserving the privilege, Judge Nakatani has
‘Aiready preserved the privilege. The privilege is
freserved. she ruled there 1s to be no other action other
Phen to allow nim to testify and certainly the letters, T
think, were clearly within che spirit of thet with respect
fo nig testimony.

goat this time the (circuit clourt grants the motion
fas follows with respect to awarding (Kanaka her] fees end
Gosts for bringing this motion and the prior trip to L.A.
The [circuit clourt makes it clear that the privilege is
Preserved and that Hr. song is directed to testify. If
Ehere is 2 question with respect to compelling Mr. ‘Song to
testify in California, what the (circuit court would
Soggest, sf ME. Song and his attorney are amenable to that,
{o°Enat (Goodell) pay for their expenses to fly to
Nawal tli, we conduct the deposition in Hawai("]2, and be
Wocld then be in the jurieaiction of this [clout and the
eiecuit clourt could be available during the course of the
deposition.

on June 8, 2000, Goodsill filed a motion for

 

 

      

 

 

clarification of the circuit court’s oral ruling granting
Kamaka’s second motion for sanctions, and alternatively moved for
reconsideration of the order. On July 5, 2000, Kamaka filed a

memorandum in opposition to Goodsill’s motion for clarification.

3
‘48 NOP FOR PUBLICATION ***
on July 13, 2000, the circuit court conducted a hearing regarding
Goodsill’s motion for clarification. On September 6, 2000, the
circuit court entered an order granting Goodsill's motion for

clarification, ruling in relevant part:

1. The [etroust clourt did not impose sanctions on .
[Geodsili"s counsel] personally;

2. This [elourt made no Finding of bed faith on the part
Sf. {osodeiil) ae the hearing on May 23, 2000;

3. Shdge Nakatani": Order of Februsry 26, 2000[] did not

order [Goodsil1} to vaive its attorney-client
privilege with Larey Songer

4, Fhis (eloure, by its ruling on May 23, 2000, did not
Order (Goodsill} to waive its attorney-client
privilege with Larry Song:

5s. he [eteult cjourt imposed sanctions on May 23, 2000,
because (Goodsill’s) statement in its letter of
February 16, 2000, ‘that (Goodaill) has not waived the
attorney-client privilege between it and Mr. Song and
we believe that the (circuit clourt understood and
Eeknowledged that no waiver has occurred(,]” violated
the intent and spir[i]t of Judge Nakstanie Order of
February 24, 2000

6. This (elourt ordere that (Goodsill) comply with Judge
Nakatani's Order of February 24, 2000(,) that [alt
Sach furcher deposition, (Geodsili) may take only the
Position that Mr. Song Comply with the [circuit]
Gourt’s ruling and order to answer all questions posed
fo hinf.J"U)

7. Tanaka] is to submit 2 Declaration or Affidavit
getting forth the attorneys’ fees and costs requested

sanctions and (Goodail!] will have an opportunity

submit a response in writing. The [circuit court

MILI fasue a subsequent order specifying an award

Biter due consideration.

 

 

 

 

 

‘That same date, the circuit court entered an order
granting Kamaka’s second motion for sanctions, which provided in
relevant part: “IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Kamaka’s Motion for
Sanctions against {Goodsill] is hereby granted and (Kamaka] is
awarded fees and costs for bringing the Motion and for the prior
trip to Los Angeles.”

on Septenber 28, 2000, Kamaka filed an affidavit of her

counsel setting forth the attorneys’ fees and costs requested as

4
‘44% NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***
sanctions pursuant to the order granting Goodsill’s notion for
clarification. On October 6, 2000, Goodsill filed a memorandum
in opposition to the affidavit of Kamaka’s counsel. On March 9,
2001, the circuit court entered an order granting Kamaka’s second
motion for sanctions against Goodsill, with clarification with
respect to the affidavit of Kamaka’s counsel, ruling that Kamaka

  

and costs as sanctions agsinst {Goodsill) as
SI One-helf of attorney time spent preparing for
And attending notion for sanctions ($2,685.75); b) (Kamaka’s
Counsel's] tine spent preparing for ME. Song’ s deposition
from the period of July 2, 1999 through July 26, 1399 (26.3
hours x $215 ~ $€,084,50)7 c) airfare cost for deposition
trip. (9499.20); and a) hotel accommodations $259.92), for =
grand total of $9,499.37

 

ns For

 

Tor se

by letter dated April 25, 2001, Goodsill informed
Kamaka that it “decline(d] to pay the amount awarded and expects
to have the sanctions reversed before this matter is finally
resolved." On duly 17, 2001, Kanaka filed a motion to enforce
the sanctions order and for contempt sanctions. On September 6,
2001, Goodsill filed a memorandum in opposition to Kamaka’s
motion to enforce the sanctions order and for contempt sanctions.
on September 11, 2001, Kamaka filed a reply memorandum in support
of her motion to enforce the sanctions order and for contempt
sanctions. On September 14, 2001, the circuit court conducted a
hearing on Kamaka’s motion to enforce the sanctions order and for
contempt sanctions. Following the parties’ respective argunents,
the circuit court orally ruled:

THE COURT: With respect to [Kanaka’s) motion to
‘enforce the sanctions order(], it’s granted. As to the

 

15
*#* NOT FOR PUBLICATION *#*

Icirowtt clourt orders, (Goodsill) is ordered to pay the sum
Of 85,499.57 within ten days of today's date.

Based on the [circuit clourt’s review of the
correspondence - - . from Mr. Song's attorney, the (circuit
ESoaLt's peter order, ‘which intent was to recognize that the
[erecuit clourt hed not ordered (Goodsill] to waive the
ietofney client privilege, but the [errcuit cloure
Previously ordered that it could not be asserted, but
Epparentiy that wee confusing language for (Song! s cou

So the {circuit clourt would clarify and order that
with respect to the deporition of Me. song, the (circuit

‘cedere that the atrorney[-JeLient privile

Srouit c)ourt directs (Goodsi]2)
fo make the following statement to Mr. Song(:

TeGoadsiil’s} position, pursuant to (the) order of the
[circuit clourt, i that you mst answer all questions to
you by [Kenake’ ¢) counsel.("]

‘me other requests are denied without prejudice,

on September 24, 2001, Goodsill filed a notice of
appeal from (1) the September 14, 2001 oral order granting

 

 

        

   

Kamaka’'s motion te enforce sanctions and for contempt sanctions,
(2) the Mazch 9, 2001 order granting Kamaka’s second motion for
sanctions against Goodsill, with clarification with respect to
the affidavit of Kamaka’s counsel, (3) the September 6, 2000
order granting Kamaka’s second motion for sanctions, and (4) the
September 6, 2000 order granting Goodsill’s motion for
clarification. Goodsill cited, inter alia, the collateral order
doctrine as allowing for its appeal. See supra note 1. it is
noteworthy that Goodsill’s notice of appeal was premature because
the circuit court had not yet entered a written order
memorializing its September 14, 2001 oral ruling.

on September 25, 2001, Goodsill filed a motion for stay
of execution of the circuit court's September 14, 2001 oral order

granting Kamaka’s motion to enforce

 

nctions and for contempt
sanctions pending appeal. On October 19, 2001, Kamaka filed a

memorandum in opposition to Goodsill’s motion for stay of

16
‘0s Nor FOR PUBLICATION ***

execution of the circuit court’s oral order. On October 29,
2001, the circuit court conducted a hearing regarding Goodsill's
motion for stay of execution of the circuit court’s oral order.

on November 1, 2001, the circuit court entered an order
granting in part and denying in part Kamaka’s motion to enforce
the sanctions order and for contempt sanctions, ruling in

relevant part:

HP 18 ORDERED that . . . Kanaka’s Motion for Sanctions
to Enforce Sanctions Order and for Contempt Sanctions, filed
Say 17, 2001 Ls] is hereby GRANTED a8 follows:

1} “TGeodaii}) "shall pay (Kamake) the amount of
199,499.37 by September 24, 2001

2) The [eiroult clourt confirms the [elourt*
previous order that (Goodsi11] shall not assert the
Ettorney-client privilege with respect to Me. Larry Song,
ind confirma the order of the (circuit) court to have Me.
Song's depesitson proceed without interference. The
Teiroust clourt orders that [Goodsill] may not assert any
auch privilege, thst. (Goodsill) may only take the following
position, and which (Goodsiil} shall state to Mr. Song:

‘Sfgcodsill's) position, parsuant to (the) order of the
[circuit clourt, 12 that you gust answer all questions posed
to you by [Kanaka‘s} counsel.”

3), Other requeste
without prejudice

on Novenber 8, 2001, the circuit court entered an order

 

 

 

 

(ctlons are denied at this tine,

 

granting Goodsill’s motion for stay of execution of the circuit
court’s September 14, 2001 oral order, ruling as follows:

IT 1S HEREBY ORDERED that (Goodsill's) motion is
GRANTED a8 follow

(a), This. [e]ourt’s September 14, 2001 order
directing (Goodsill] te pay $8,499.37 within ten days of
that date (the “Order*) {a hereby stayed pending resolution
bf [Goadsill’s} appeal of said Orders

(2). This stay 9 limited to the payment of the
39,499.37

13) me supersedeas bond in the form of an
irrevocable standby letter of credit ("LOC") 1s hereby
approved; and

Ta) "the Loc is to be delivered to (Kamaka) following
the entry of this order,

 

 

uv
‘** NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***
on November 14, 2001, Goodsill timely filed a second
notice of appeal, again citing the collateral order doctrine.
With regard to the orders from which Goodsill stated that it was
appealing, Goodsill substituted the November 1, 2001 order
granting in part and denying in part Kamaka’s motion to enforce
the sanctions order and for contempt sanctions for the September
14, 2001 oral order granting Kamaka’s motion to enforce sanctions
and for contempt sanctions, but otherwise reiterated the same
orders as set forth in the September 24, 2001 notice of appeal.
In that connection, insofar as Goodsill alleges error
nly as to (1) the September 6, 2000 order granting Kamaka’s
second motion for sanctions and (2) the March 9, 2001 order
granting Kamaka’s motion for sanctions, we do not address infra
the November 1, 2001 order granting in part and denying in part
Kamaka’s motion to enforce the sanctions order and for contempt
sanctions. See Hawai'i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule
28(b) (4) (2002) (“Points not presented . . . will be disregarded
+ + +s). Moreover, because Goodsill does not advance any
arguments as to the Noverber 1, 2001 order, we deem any point of
error as to the November 1, 2001 order waived.’ See HRAP Rule
28(b) (7) (2002) ("Points not argued may be deemed waived.").

 

2 Although the Novenber 14, 2001 notice of appeal stated that

Goodsi1i was appealing the Septenber 6, 2000 order granting Goodsill's motion
for clarification, Goodsiil also failed to specifically aliege error = to
that order in its points of error on appeal. Nevertheiess, Goodsiil argues in
Sts opening brief, inter alia, that the reasoning set forth in the September
6, 2000 order granting Goedsiil’s motion for clarification was erroneous. AS
Such, we discuss the September 6, 2000 erder granting Goodsiil’s motion for
clarification {nfra, although our disposition of the present matter does not
alter the order~

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*# NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

It ig noteworthy that, on December 24, 2003, the
circuit court entered final judgment on the merits of Kamaka’s

complaint in favor of Goodsill and against Kamaka.

TI. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A circuit “court's imposition of a discovery abuse sanction
Te teviewabia on appesl for abuse of discretion. A
[circuit] court abuses ite discration whenever it exceeds
tke bounds of reason or disregards rules or principles of
{ik Sr practice to the substantial detriment of a party.”

79 Hawas's 527, 532-33,
Sor Fiza Set, Ste-4? Tapp. 1995) {citation end internal,
quotation marks omitted)

Kawamata Farms, Inc, v. United Aori Products, 86 Hawai'i 214,
241, 948 P.2d 1055, 1082 (1997).

 

TIT. DISCUSSION

Goodsill contends that “the [circuit c]ourt’s award of
sanctions should be vacated for two independent reasonsi,]” to
wit: (1) that Goodsill “could not have viclated Judge Nakatani’s
[olrder (that, at the continued deposition, Goodsill take only
the position that Song comply with the court’s ruling and order
and fully testify,] since . . . Song's deposition was not
retaken”; and (2) that Goodsill’s February 16, 2000 “letter was
an affirmation, not a repudiation of [Goodsili’s] intention to
comply with Judge Nakatani’s order.” We agree.

Hawai'i Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 503 (1993)
describes the “[LJawyer-client privilege” in relevant part as
follows:

A client has privilege to refuse to disclose and to
prevent any other person from disclosing confidential

PGmmunications nade for the purpose of facilitating the

Fendition of professional 1e9: fo the client
between the client or the client's representative and

     

19
‘4+ NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***
Lawyer of the lawyer's representative...

HRE Rule $03(b). Moreover, “[t]he privilege may be claimed by

the client (,]” and “[t]he person who was the lawyer . . . at the

time of the communication shall claim the privilege on behalf of

the client unless expressly released by the client.” HRE Rule

 

503(c), It is noteworthy that at no point during the present
matter did the circuit court expressly apply any of the
exceptions listed in HRE Rule 503(d) to Goodsill’s claim of the
attorney-client privilege.

As discussed supra in section I.B, the February 24,
2000 order granting in part and denying in part Kamaka’s motion
for sanctions ruled, inter alia: (1) that the circuit court had,

+ uRE Rute 503(¢) provide:

 

(a) Exceptions. There is no privilege under thie rule:

(2) Furtherance of Crine or Fraud. If the services of the lawyer were
sought, obtained, oF used to enable or aid anyone to commit or
plan £0 commit what the client knew or reasonably should have
Known to be a cris oF fraud?

(2) Prevention of Crime or Fraud, As to @ communication reflecting
the client's a'riminal or fraudulent act that
the lanyer reasonably believes is likely to result in death or
Substantial bodily har, or in substantial injury co the financial
interests or property of another:

(2) Glainants Through Same Deceased Client. As to a communication
Felevant to an itsue between parties sho claim through the sane
Geceased client, regardless of whether the claims are by testate
oF intestate succession or by inter vivos transaction:

(4) Breach of Duty by Lawyer or Client. “As to a communication
Felevant to an issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to the client
of by the client to the lawyer:

(5) Document Attested by Lawyer, As to a communication relevant to an
issue concerning an attested docusent to which the lawyer is an
attesting witness;

(6) Soint Clients. As to a communication relevant to 2 matter of
Connon interest between two or more clients if the communication
vas made by any of then to a lawyer retained or consulted in
Common, when offered in an action between any of the clients; or

(7) Lgnyer's" Professional Responsibility. As to 2 communication the
Gisclogure of which is required or authorized by the Hawaii rules
of professional conduct for attorneys

20

    

 

 

 

 

 
+#* NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***
prior to the July 6, 1999 deposition, “rejected [Goodsill’s}
assertion of [the] attorney-client privilege”; (2) that
“{Goodsill''s} exception [to the circuit court’s rejection of the
privilege had] been preserved”; and (3) that, at the retaking of
Song's deposition, “{Goodsill could) take only the position that
Mr. Song comply with the court {’]s ruling and order to answer all
questions posed to him.” We note that, although the September 6,
2000 order granting Goodsill’s motion for clarification states
that the May 23, 2000 oral order granting Kamaka’s second motion
for sanctions was based upon the circuit court’s conclusion that
Goodsill’s February 16, 2000 letter “violated the intent and
spir[iJt of Judge Nakatani’s Order of February 24, 2000," the
relevant order was necessarily Judge Nakatani’s December 14, 1999
oral ruling. In other words, Goodsill’s February 16, 2000 letter
could not have violated the circuit court’s February 24, 2000
order because it had not yet been entered. Cf. CRSC, Inc, ve
Sage Diamond Co., Inc., 95 Hawai'i 301, 305, 22 P.3d 97, 102
(app. 2001) (quoting Ellis v. Crockett, 51 Haw. 45, 59-60, 451
P.2d 814, 824 (1969), for the proposition that “H.R.C.P.() Rule
S8[,] providing that the judgment is not effective until filed or
entered[,] is equally applicable to orders dismissing a case”)
‘The cdreuit court’s December 14, 1999 oral ruling is
substantially similar to the February 24, 2000 written order,
stating in relevant part: (1) that Goodsill’s attorney-client
privilege objection was preserved; (2) that, at Song’s
redeposition, Goodsill could “only take the position that . .

Song comply with the [circuit] court’s ruling and order to answer

2
‘+#* NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***
all questions posed to him”; (3) “that [the] deposition must go
forward”; and (4) that, “if the [circuit] court [ultimately]
conclude(d] that{, at the] deposition[,] [Goodsill] somehow
impede[d] [Kamaka’s] ability to conclude [the] deposition, then
the court [would] grant leave to [Kamaka] to refile its request
for sanctions.”

Judge Crandall explained in the September 6, 2000 order
granting Goodsill’s motion for clarification that her May 23,
2000 oral ruling imposing sanctions upon Goodsill was predicated
upon the statement in Goodsill’s February 16, 2000 letter “that
*{Goodsill] ha[d] not waived the attorney-client privilege
between it and Mr. Song and we believe that the [circuit clourt
understood and acknowledged that no waiver has occurred[,]""
which Judge Crandall concluded was a “violat {ion of} the intent
and spir[i]t of Judge Nakatani's Order of February 24, 2000.”
Goodsill’s statement that it had not waived its attorney-client
privilege must therefore have somehow conflicted with Judge
Nakatani’s February 24, 2000 rulings (1) that the circuit court
had, prior to the July 6, 1999 deposition, “rejected [Goodsill’s]
assertion of [the] attorney-client privilege” or (2) that, [alt
{Song's [re]deposition, [Goodsill] may take only the position
that . . . Song comply with the court [‘]s ruling and order to
answer all questions posed to him.”

Nevertheless, the February 24, 2000 order did not
require either that Goodsill refrain from asserting its attorney-
client privilege or that Goodsill waive the privilege, but merely

reiterated that the circuit court had, prior to the July 6, 1999

22
‘+#* NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***
deposition, “rejected (Goodsill’s] assertion of [the] attorney-
client privilege.”? Moreover, Judge Nakatani’s December 14, 1999
oral ruling, which, as we have said, was the only order actually
in effect at the time of Goodsill’s February 16, 2000 letter,
merely affirmed that Goodsill’s “claim of privilege [was]
preserved [but would) not stand in the way of” Song’s testimony.
With regard to Judge Nakatani’s determination that, at the
xedeposition, Goodsill could only take the position that Song
comply with its ruling and to fully testify,* Goodsill could not
have contravened that order because the deposition was never
taken. Goodsill also asserted in the February 16, 2000 letter
that it would “abide by the [circuit cJourt’s order and [would)

not take any position to hamper or prevent . . . Song from

 

+ We acknowledge that the November 1, 2001 order granting in part
land denying in part Kanara’ motion to enforce the sanctions order and for
Contempt sanctions “eonfizn{ed) the [elourt’s previaus order that (Goodsill)

‘fesert the attorney-client privilege with respect to. . . Song
snel-Ot Emphasis added.) Nevertheless, the Hovenber 1, 2001 order and its
Characterization of the March 3, 2001 order granting Kenaka’s second motion
for sanctions against Goodsill are clearly prospective with regard co their
andate that Coodsiil not assert the privilege, as evidenced by the word,
Sthalle". Thus, our determination thet the February 24, 2000 order did not
require that Goodsill refrain from asserting its attorney-client privilege is
Consistent with the Novenber 1, 2001 order.

Te"is"also noteworthy that the foregoing mandate ultimately did not
amount to an order thet Goodsill expressly waive its attorney-client
privliege, aa evidenced by the relative narrowness of the statement to Song
Senanded cf Goodsill by the Novenber 1, 200] order:  °*(Goodsill's) position,
Pursuant to [the] order of the (circuit clourt, is that you must answer all
Questions posed to you by (Kanaka's] counsel-'* More specifically, Judge
Elandail herself stated in the Septenber 14, 2001 oral ruling granting in part
land denying in part. Kenaka’a motion to enforce the sanctions order and for’
Contenpt canctions thet the Septenser 6, 2000 order granting Goodsill’s motion
for clarification recognized “that the {circuit e]ourt had not ordered
[ceodsill} to waive the attorney client privilege, but [acknowledged that] the
[eirouit court previously ordered that it could ot be asserted(.1”

 

 

   

 

    

   

Both the December 14, 1999 oral ruling and the February 24, 2000
written order mandated that Goodeiil take the position set forth supra.

23
+#* NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***

complying with the court’s order compelling disclosure of
information over [Goodsill’s] objection.” In light of the
foregoing, Judge Crandall’s conclusion that Goodsill’s February
16, 2000 letter had “violated the “intent and spirit’ of Judge
Nakatani’s order of February 24, 2000” was so broad an expansion
of Judge Nakatani’s order as to constitute an abuse of
discretion. Kawamata Farms, 86 Hawai'i at 241, 948 P.2d at 1082.
Furthermore, neither Judge Nakatani’s nor Judge
Crandali's rulings mandated, nor could they properly mandate,
that Goodsill waive its attorney-client privilege, as Judge
Crandall herself explained in the September 6, 2000 order
granting Goodsill’s motion for clarification: (1) “Judge
Nakatani’s Order of February 24, 2000{] did not order {Goodsill'
to waive its attorney-client privilege with Larry Sona”; (2) the
circuit court, “by its ruling on May 23, 2000, did not order
Goods. o waive its attorney-client privilege with Larry
Song{.]” (Emphases added.) See also supra note 3. Kamaka
herself concedes that “(t]he circuit court did not order
[Goodsil1] to affirmatively waive any attorney[-]client
privilege.”
We therefore hold (1) that the circuit court abused its
discretion in entering September 6, 2000 order granting Kamaka’s
second motion for sanctions and (2) that the circuit court abused
its discretion in entering the March 9, 2001 order granting
Kamaka’s motion for sanctions, which itself vas based upon the

September 6, 2000 order.

24
‘4 NOT FOR PUBLICATION ***
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, we (1) vacate (a) the
September 6, 2000 ozder granting Kamaka’s second motion for
sanctions and (b) the March 9, 2001 order granting Kamaka’ s
motion for sanctions and (2) remand this matter to the circuit
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion,

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, August 31, 2005.

on the briefs:

John Winnicki, %y
‘of Ning, Lilly & Jones,
for plaintiff-appellee
kitty K, Kamaka

Edmund K. Saffrey,

Of Goodsili Anderson
Quinn « Stifely Becta Celie Arie
for defensant-appellant

Goadsill, Anderson,

Quinn « Stifel Goran €: Dubey dhe

25