Title: People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Department of Agricultural Resources

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-12207 
 
PEOPLE FOR THE ETHICAL TREATMENT OF ANIMALS, INC.  vs.  
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURAL RESOURCES & another.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 6, 2017. - June 14, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Public Records.  Agriculture.  Animal.  Statute, Construction.  
Privacy. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
October 14, 2014. 
 
 
The case was heard by Christopher J. Muse, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
David Milton for the plaintiff. 
 
Amy Spector, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
defendants. 
 
Laura Rótolo & Jessie Rossman, for American Civil Liberties 
Union of Massachusetts, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
Jessica White, for Prisoners' Legal Services of 
Massachusetts, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
                                                 
 
1 Commissioner of the Department of Agricultural Resources. 
2 
 
 
LENK, J.  This case concerns the scope of two exemptions 
from the statutory definition of "public records."  
Specifically, it probes whether information, such as names, 
addresses, telephone numbers, and other information, contained 
on animal health certificates in the custody of the Department 
of Agricultural Resources, is subject to disclosure in response 
to a public records request.  A Superior Court judge determined 
that such information is protected from disclosure under 
statutory exemptions G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (n) and (c), 
implicating, respectively, public safety and privacy.  For the 
reasons that follow, we vacate that order and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.2 
 
Background.  1.  Public records framework.  At all times 
relevant to this case, two statutes governed access to public 
records:  G. L. c. 66, § 10, and G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth.3  
                                                 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs of the American Civil 
Liberties Union of Massachusetts and Prisoners' Legal Services 
of Massachusetts. 
 
 
3 Since the entry of judgment in this case, G. L. c. 66, 
§ 10, has been substantially revised, with the changes taking 
effect on January 1, 2017.  Compare G. L. c. 66, § 10, as 
amended by St. 2010, c. 256, §§ 58-59, with G. L. c. 66, 
§§ 10, 10A, as amended by St. 2016, c. 121.  General Laws c. 4, 
§ 7, Twenty-sixth (n) (exemption [n]), also has been revised, 
albeit in a less substantial way.  See St. 2016, c. 121, §§ 1-3 
(inserting phrase "cyber security" into exemption [n]).  This 
opinion refers to the versions of G. L. c. 66, § 10, and G. L. 
c. 4, § 7, that existed through 2015, the time period relevant 
to the adjudication of the plaintiff's public records request.  
 
3 
 
General Laws c. 66, § 10, sets forth the conditions under which 
government entities, through their records custodians, must 
provide access to public records.  "The primary purpose of G. L. 
c. 66, § 10, is to give the public broad access to governmental 
records."  Worcester Tel. & Gazette Corp. v. Chief of Police of 
Worcester, 436 Mass. 378, 382-383 (2002). 
 
The term "public records," in turn, is defined by G. L. 
c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth.  The definition sweeps in a wide array 
of documents and data made or received by employees, agencies, 
or other instrumentalities of the Commonwealth.  See Hull Mun. 
Lighting Plant v. Massachusetts Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 414 
Mass. 609, 614 (1993), citing G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth 
(1990 ed.).  This expansive definition of "public records" is 
statutorily limited by twenty enumerated exemptions in G. L. 
c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (a)-(u). 
 
Together, these statutes, and our cases interpreting them, 
favor disclosure of public records in two primary ways.  First, 
G. L. c. 66, § 10, imposes a presumption that the record sought 
is public and places the burden on the records custodian to 
"prove with specificity" that an exemption applies.  G. L. 
c. 66, § 10 (c).  To that end, "a case-by-case review is 
                                                                                                                                                             
Although not raised by the parties and while the point need not 
be settled today, it appears that, going forward, such revisions 
would not significantly alter our analysis as to the exemptions 
and their application. 
4 
 
required to determine whether an exemption applies."  Matter of 
a Subpoena Duces Tecum, 445 Mass. 685, 688 (2006).  Second, the 
statutory exemptions in G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth, are to be 
"strictly construed."  Hull Mun. Lighting Plant, 414 Mass. at 
614. 
 
The two statutory exemptions at issue in this case are 
found in subsections (n) (exemption [n]) and (c) (exemption [c]) 
of G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth.  Exemption (n) concerns 
records related to public safety.  Specifically, it allows a 
records custodian to withhold an otherwise public record if the 
record is sufficiently related to the safety or security of 
persons or infrastructure, and if disclosure of the record, in 
the "reasonable judgment of the record custodian," is "likely to 
jeopardize public safety."  G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (n). 
 
Exemption (c) concerns records related to privacy.  It 
permits a records custodian to withhold an otherwise public 
record if it is a personnel or medical file, or if it relates to 
a specifically named individual and its disclosure may 
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.  G. L. 
c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (c). 
 
These two exemptions share a common characteristic in that 
they both require consideration of the likely consequences of 
releasing the record sought.  Exemption (n), however, is unique 
among the statutory public records exemptions in including the 
5 
 
"reasonable judgment of the record custodian" as part of the 
calculation.  See generally G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth. 
 
2.  Facts.  In February, 2014, People for the Ethical 
Treatment of Animals, Inc. (PETA), submitted two requests under 
G. L. c. 66, § 10, to the Department of Agricultural Resources 
(department).  The first sought access to "any and all permits, 
licenses, health certificates, and other documentation related 
to the export and/or import of nonhuman primates in 
Massachusetts during 2013."  The second sought access to "all 
records referencing, reflecting, or relating to alleged or 
claimed safety risks posed to animals (including but not limited 
to nonhuman primates), people and buildings involved with 
housing and transporting non-human primates." 
 
The department responded in April, 2014.  With respect to 
the first request, the department provided copies of eleven 
pages of interstate health certificates for nonhuman primates.  
The department redacted from the certificates three categories 
of information:  (1) the names and addresses of consignors and 
consignees, (2) United States Department of Agriculture license 
or registration numbers, and (3) the names, addresses, telephone 
numbers, and license numbers of all veterinarians whose 
6 
 
information appeared on the health certificates.4  The department 
expressed its view that disclosing such information "could 
compromise the security of locations housing non-human primates, 
thus increasing the risk to public safety of the animals as well 
as the people and buildings involved with housing and 
transporting the animals."  As a result, the department believed 
the information was exempt from the definition of "public 
records" pursuant to exemption (n). 
 
The department's response also referenced, and provided a 
copy of, a 2013 memorandum from the United States Department of 
Veterans Affairs (VA memorandum).  In the VA memorandum, the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Office of the Veterans Health 
Administration advised its FOIA field officers "not to release 
any personal information" about "personnel engaged in any way in 
animal research in response to requests for that information." 
 
With respect to PETA's second request, the department 
stated that it did not have any records regarding alleged or 
claimed safety risks posed to animals, people, or buildings 
involved with the housing and transport of nonhuman primates. 
 
PETA appealed from the department's response to the 
supervisor of public records, pursuant to G. L. c. 66, § 10 (b).  
                                                 
 
4 Although not specified in this initial response, the 
Department of Agricultural Resources (department) later asserted 
that the redacted information encompassed information pertaining 
to both facilities and specifically named individuals. 
7 
 
In June, 2014, the supervisor of public records resolved the 
appeal in the department's favor, noting its reliance on the VA 
memorandum and upholding its redactions.  The supervisor of 
public records stated that "[a]lthough the FOIA exemptions cited 
in the [VA] memorandum are not available to the [d]epartment as 
a means of responding to [PETA's] request, the manner in which 
this information is treated by the [F]ederal government is 
persuasive when examining the [d]epartment's [e]xemption (n) 
claim." 
 
3.  Procedural history.  In October, 2014, PETA filed a 
complaint in the Superior Court challenging the department's 
redactions and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, per 
G. L. c. 66, § 10 (b).  In essence, the complaint alleged that 
the department had failed to meet its burden of showing that the 
sole exemption it relied on in making the redactions -- 
exemption (n) -- applied to the redacted information, and 
therefore that the department's refusal to provide unredacted 
copies of the health certificates violated G. L. c. 66, § 10. 
 
After answering the complaint, the department filed an 
emergency motion for a protective order to stay discovery.  The 
department argued that discovery was unnecessary because it had 
relied on only three documents in determining that exemption (n) 
applied:  (1) the VA memorandum, discussed supra; (2) a 2013 
decision of the supervisor of public records applying exemption 
8 
 
(n) to an earlier, similar public records request from PETA; and 
(3) a 2013 memorandum from the department's legal division 
explaining its view that exemption (n), as well as the privacy 
exemption under FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2012), authorized 
the withholding of much, but not all, of the information 
redacted from PETA's 2014 request.5  PETA opposed the motion, 
arguing primarily that exemption (n) requires a fact-intensive 
inquiry that justified its discovery requests.  After a hearing, 
the Superior Court judge deferred ruling on the motion in order 
to allow the department to file a "comprehensive statement in 
support of its reasons" for claiming that exemption (n) applied, 
as well as an anticipated dispositive motion. 
 
The department then filed a memorandum in support of its 
motion.  In it, the department argued that it properly relied on 
exemption (n) in redacting the information described above.  It 
also argued, for the first time, that exemption (c) authorized 
the redaction of names, addresses, and telephone numbers 
pertaining to individuals (as opposed to facilities), which also 
appeared on the health certificates.  PETA argued in opposition 
that neither exemption applied.  Both sides attached numerous 
exhibits to their memoranda. 
                                                 
 
5 Specifically, this memorandum expressed the view that the 
name, address, and telephone number of the consignor "can be 
disclosed" under State and Federal law.  With respect to PETA's 
2014 request, however, such information was redacted. 
9 
 
 
After another hearing, the judge ruled largely in the 
department's favor.  He determined that because exemption (n) 
includes such "deferential language" as "reasonable judgment" 
and "likely to jeopardize public safety," it required the court 
to give "a heightened level of deference to the keeper and 
supervisor of public records."  Thus, based on the VA memorandum 
and other documents submitted by the department, the judge 
concluded that the department had demonstrated with sufficient 
specificity that, in the department's reasonable judgment, 
release of information on the health certificates pertaining to 
"persons and facilities located in the Commonwealth" was likely 
to jeopardize public safety, and therefore was protected under 
exemption (n).6  Further, the judge concluded that the names, 
addresses, and telephone numbers identifying individual persons 
as consignees, consignors, or veterinarians are protected from 
disclosure under exemption (c).7 
                                                 
 
6 The judge also concluded that similar information related 
to persons and facilities located outside of Massachusetts was 
not protected by exemption (n).  Neither party appeals from this 
component of the judgment.  Therefore, we do not review it. 
 
 
7 The decision below does not discuss whether other 
information redacted from the certificates, such as license 
numbers, accreditation numbers, permit numbers, and premises 
identification numbers, fall within the scope of the claimed 
exemptions.  Nor do the parties discuss those pieces of 
information in their briefs.  Accordingly, we do not address 
them here. 
10 
 
 
PETA appealed, and we transferred the case to this court on 
our own motion. 
 
Discussion.  It is uncontested that the animal health 
certificates that PETA requested fall within the general 
definition of "public records."  Thus, despite its unusual 
procedural background,8 this appeal turns on two questions of 
statutory construction:  the scope of exemptions (n) and (c).9  
We exercise de novo review of such questions.  See Monell v. 
Boston Pads, LLC, 471 Mass. 566, 569–570 (2015). 
 
1.  Exemption (n).  Exemption (n) contemplates the 
withholding of: 
"records, including, but not limited to, blueprints, plans, 
policies, procedures and schematic drawings, which relate 
to internal layout and structural elements, security 
measures, emergency preparedness, threat or vulnerability 
assessments, or any other records relating to the security 
                                                 
 
8 Primarily, this appeal requires us to review the grant of 
judgment to the department.  It is unclear on the record before 
us precisely which rule of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil 
Procedure the judge relied upon in granting judgment to the 
department.  Even assuming, as the parties urge, that the judge 
effectively granted summary judgment to the department, our 
approach would be the same because, given our interpretation 
today of the scope of exemptions (n) and (c), it cannot be said 
that "the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law" (citation omitted).  Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund 
v. Smith, 458 Mass. 561, 564 (2010). 
 
 
9 PETA also argues that the judge abused his discretion by 
entering judgment in the department's favor without permitting 
PETA further development of the factual record through 
discovery.  On remand, the judge should consider whether 
additional discovery may be necessary or appropriate in light of 
the scope of the relevant exemptions discussed in this opinion. 
11 
 
or safety of persons or buildings, structures, facilities, 
utilities, transportation or other infrastructure located 
within the commonwealth, the disclosure of which, in the 
reasonable judgment of the record custodian, subject to 
review by the supervisor of public records under [G. L. 
c. 66, § 10 (b)], is likely to jeopardize public safety." 
 
G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (n). 
 
The parties essentially agree that applying this exemption 
requires a two-part analysis.  First, it requires a threshold 
determination concerning the nature of the requested record.  
Id.  Second, it requires the records custodian to exercise 
"reasonable judgment" in determining that disclosure of the 
requested record is "likely to jeopardize public safety."  Id. 
 
That being said, however, the parties disagree as to 
precisely what these two components mean, the relationship 
between them, and whether they were satisfied in this case.  In 
particular, they disagree about whether the animal health 
certificates that PETA requested are swept within the scope of 
the exemption by the "any other records" clause.  Further, they 
disagree about what constitutes "reasonable judgment" in 
predicting "jeopard[y] [to] public safety," terms that are not 
defined in the statute. 
 
Construing the scope of exemption (n) appears to be a 
question of first impression for this court.  "Our primary duty 
is to interpret a statute in accordance with the intent of the 
Legislature."  Pyle v. School Comm. of S. Hadley, 423 Mass. 283, 
12 
 
285 (1996).  Discerning the intent of the Legislature with 
respect to exemption (n) requires us to examine the plain 
meaning of the statutory language, and to draw upon the canons 
of construction known as noscitur a sociis ("it is known by its 
associates") and ejusdem generis ("of the same kind or class"), 
as well as the legislative history of the enactment.  See 
Black's Law Dictionary 631, 1224 (10th ed. 2014). 
 
We begin by examining the plain meaning of the statutory 
language, for if that language is "clear and unambiguous, it is 
conclusive as to the intent of the Legislature."  Deutsche Bank 
Nat'l Trust Co. v. Fitchburg Capital, LLC, 471 Mass. 248, 253 
(2015).  Upon examining the language of exemption (n), however, 
it is immediately apparent that the language is neither clear 
nor unambiguous as to the scope of the exemption. 
 
With respect to the first part of exemption (n), we 
confront a general term ("records"), followed by a nonexhaustive 
list of specific examples, followed by the general phrase "or 
any other records relating to the security or safety of persons 
or buildings."  G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (n).  As the 
department points out, if we focus too closely on the listed 
examples, we risk giving too little weight to the Legislature's 
decision to include the "any other records" clause, thereby 
improperly narrowing the scope of exemption (n).  On the other 
hand, as PETA points out, if we focus too closely on the breadth 
13 
 
suggested by the "any other records" clause, we risk giving too 
little weight to the list of examples that the Legislature saw 
fit to include, thereby improperly expanding exemption (n) 
beyond what the Legislature intended.  The latter approach also 
would contravene our usual practice of interpreting exemptions 
to the public records laws narrowly.  See Hull Mun. Lighting 
Plant, 414 Mass. at 614.  With respect to the second part of 
exemption (n), the language of the statute offers no specific 
guidance as to what the Legislature intended by the phrases 
"reasonable judgment" and "likely to jeopardize public safety."  
G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (n). 
 
When faced with a similar interpretive issue in the past, 
we have, on occasion, applied the canon of noscitur a sociis, 
which counsels that "ordinarily the coupling of words denotes an 
intention that they should be understood in the same general 
sense."  Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 459 Mass. 422, 432 (2011), 
quoting 2A N.J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction 
§ 47:16, at 352–353 (7th ed. 2007).  In other words, 
"[a] general term in a statute or ordinance takes meaning 
from the setting in which it is employed.  The literal 
meaning of a general term in an enactment must be limited 
so as not to include matters that, although within the 
letter of the enactment, do not fairly come within its 
spirit and intent." 
 
Kenney v. Building Comm'r of Melrose, 315 Mass. 291, 295 (1943).  
We also have applied a close relative of this doctrine known as 
14 
 
ejusdem generis.  See Banushi v. Dorfman, 438 Mass. 242, 244 
(2002).  This canon counsels that "[w]here general words follow 
specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are 
construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those 
objects enumerated by the preceding specific words."  Id., 
quoting 2A N.J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction 
§ 47:17, at 273–274 (6th ed. 2000). 
 
Applying those canons here suggests a narrow interpretation 
of exemption (n).  In particular, they caution against 
interpreting the general language regarding "any other records 
relating to the security or safety of persons or buildings" as 
enlarging the scope of the statute beyond the legislative raison 
d'etre evinced by the enumerated list of examples.  In other 
words, while the class of records that may qualify for 
exemption (n) is open, and not closed, we must interpret the 
"any other records" clause as embracing only those records that, 
when released, are "likely to jeopardize public safety" in a 
similar way to one of the examples listed in exemption (n). 
 
Where, as here, the language of a statute itself is not 
conclusive as to the Legislature's intent, we also may seek 
guidance from the legislative history.  ENGIE Gas & LNG LLC v. 
Department of Pub. Utils., 475 Mass. 191, 199–200 (2016).  Much 
of that history further supports a narrow interpretation of 
exemption (n). 
15 
 
 
Exemption (n) was enacted as one of twelve sections in "An 
Act providing protections against terrorism" (act).  See 
St. 2002, c. 313.  That title speaks for itself in terms of the 
Legislature's thinking at the time it adopted exemption (n).  
Its thrust is reinforced by other contextual clues, including 
the timing of the enactment and contemporaneous media coverage.  
Specifically, the act was passed by the Legislature and signed 
into law in September, 2002 -- the one-year anniversary of the 
September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon.  See Anti-Terror Bill Sent to [then Acting Governor 
Jane M.] Swift's Desk, State House News Service, Sept. 3, 2002; 
Swift Signs Anti-Terrorism Legislation, Executive Department 
Press Release, Sept. 10, 2002. 
 
The preenactment history behind exemption (n) corroborates 
the notion that protecting the public from terrorist attacks in 
a post-September 11, 2001, world was the animating principle 
underlying its adoption.  Exemption (n) was proposed by Acting 
Governor Swift.  See Letter from Acting Governor Swift to Senate 
and House of Representatives, June 26, 2002.  The letter makes 
clear that the acting Governor believed that such an exemption 
was necessary following the events of September 11, 2001.  Id.  
She described the legislation as "carv[ing] out a very narrow 
exemption to the definition of public records for those 
materials pertaining to public safety including threat 
16 
 
assessments, security plans and certain records depicting 
critical infrastructure."  Id.  The letter indicates that the 
acting Governor had in mind "certain records pertaining to state 
and local government's ability to protect its resources as well 
as other sensitive infrastructure" and hoped to "encourage 
private industries to share sensitive information regarding 
their respective security plans with law enforcement without the 
risk of automatic public disclosure."  Id.  Similarly, the 
Executive Office of Public Safety described exemption (n) as 
encompassing records of "the type that terrorists would find 
useful to maximize damage, such as threat assessments, security 
plans and structural documents depicting critical 
infrastructure."10  Memorandum, Executive Office of Public 
Safety, September 5, 2002 (EOPS Memorandum). 
 
Given this legislative history and the canons of statutory 
construction operative here, we conclude that the following 
construction of exemption (n) strikes the appropriate balance. 
                                                 
 
10 The Legislature's only substantive change to the language 
that Acting Governor Swift proposed for exemption (n) was to 
modify the "reasonable judgment of the record custodian" by 
adding the phrase "subject to review by the supervisor of public 
records [G. L. c. 66, § 10 (b)]."  See Amendment to House Doc. 
No. 5272 dated July 24, 2002.  While any decision by a records 
custodian to withhold records already was subject to review by 
the supervisor of public records, see G. L. c. 66, § 10 (b), the 
Legislature's emphasis on the availability of such review 
indicates its understanding that exemption (n) was not an 
unbounded, unreviewable expansion of the discretion of records 
custodians. 
17 
 
 
The first prong of exemption (n) probes whether, and to 
what degree, the record sought resembles the records listed as 
examples in the statute.  The touchstone of this inquiry is 
whether, and to what degree, the record is one a terrorist 
"would find useful to maximize damage," EOPS Memorandum, and in 
that sense jeopardize public safety.11 
 
The second prong of exemption (n) probes the factual and 
contextual support for the proposition that disclosure of the 
record is "likely to jeopardize public safety."  G. L. c. 4, 
§ 7, Twenty-sixth (n).  Because the records custodian must 
exercise "reasonable judgment" in making that determination, the 
primary focus on review is whether the custodian has provided 
sufficient factual heft for the supervisor of public records or 
the reviewing court to conclude that a reasonable person would 
agree with the custodian's determination given the context of 
the particular case.12 
                                                 
 
11 The statutory language makes clear that this jeopardy to 
public safety contemplates damage to "persons or buildings . . . 
or other infrastructure."  G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (n). 
 
 
12 On this point, we observe that the Secretary of the 
Commonwealth, through regulations and a guide, appears to view 
exemption (n) as uniquely permitting a records custodian to 
inquire into the requestor's purpose for seeking a particular 
record before determining whether to release it.  See 950 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 32.06(2)(h)(1) (2017); Secretary of the 
Commonwealth, Division of Public Records, A Guide to the 
Massachusetts Public Records Law 27 (updated Jan. 2017).  We do 
not decide whether this inquiry is appropriate, as that issue is 
 
18 
 
 
These two prongs of exemption (n) must be analyzed 
together, because there is an inverse correlation between them.  
That is, the more the record sought resembles the records 
enumerated in exemption (n), the lower the custodian's burden in 
demonstrating "reasonable judgment" -- and vice versa. 
 
In some cases, the first prong of exemption (n) will yield 
a strong resemblance between the record sought and the types of 
records listed in the statute -- for instance, when a requestor 
seeks access to exactly one of the types of records listed in 
exemption (n), such as a blueprint or emergency preparedness 
plan.  In those cases, with respect to the second prong of 
exemption (n), the custodian still bears the burden of 
demonstrating that it exercised "reasonable judgment" in 
determining that disclosure of the record is "likely to 
jeopardize public safety," G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (n).  
But this burden will be at its lowest. 
 
Conversely, as the resemblance between the record sought 
and the listed examples in exemption (n) decreases, the 
custodian's burden for demonstrating "reasonable judgment" 
increases.  Thus, when the requested record bears little or no 
                                                                                                                                                             
not directly before us.  We note, however, that nothing we 
discovered in our review of the legislative history indicated an 
intent to depart radically from the typical public records 
procedure, which would not permit such an inquiry.  See 950 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 32.06(2)(h).  See also note 10, supra. 
19 
 
resemblance to the listed examples, the custodian's burden for 
demonstrating that it exercised "reasonable judgment" in 
determining that disclosure of the record is "likely to 
jeopardize public safety" will be at its highest. 
 
We recognize that the Superior Court judge did not have the 
benefit of our construction of exemption (n) when he granted 
judgment to the department.  Therefore, we vacate the decision 
and remand the matter for consideration of PETA's request in 
light of this opinion.  See Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 649, 660, 
666 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1189 (2003) (reversing and 
remanding for further consideration in light of court's 
interpretation of governing statute). 
 
In this regard, it is well to note that exemption (n) is 
unique among the public records exemptions in its inclusion of 
the phrase "reasonable judgment of the record custodian."  See 
generally G. L. c 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth.  Such language neither 
requires or even invites any heightened level of deference to 
the records custodian's initial determination whether to 
disclose or withhold a record.  Rather, we agree with the 
department's concession at oral argument:  that a court should 
review the custodian's determination de novo.  Cf. Wakefield 
Teachers Ass'n v. School Comm. of Wakefield, 431 Mass. 792, 796 
(2000) (application of statutory exemption from definition of 
"public records" is question of statutory interpretation); 
20 
 
Champa v. Weston Pub. Sch., 473 Mass. 86, 89-90, 96 (2015) 
(following supervisor of public records' decision, court 
reviewed de novo order allowing judgment on pleadings). 
 
2.  Exemption (c).  The judge also approved the 
department's redaction of the names, addresses, and telephone 
numbers identifying individual persons as consignees, 
consignors, or veterinarians.  The judge concluded that 
exemption (c) protects such information from disclosure because 
the identified individuals "have a considerable privacy interest 
in their identities, addresses, and telephone numbers" that is 
not substantially outweighed by the public interest in releasing 
that information. 
 
Unlike exemption (n), exemption (c) previously has been the 
subject of our consideration in a number of different contexts.  
Exemption (c) permits the withholding of "personnel and medical 
files or information," as well as "any other materials or data 
relating to a specifically named individual, the disclosure of 
which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy."  G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (c). 
 
Exemption (c) requires a balancing test:  where the public 
interest in obtaining the requested information substantially 
outweighs the seriousness of any invasion of privacy, the 
private interest in preventing disclosure must yield.  See 
Champa, 473 Mass. at 96.  On one side of the scale, we have 
21 
 
looked to three factors to assess the weight of the privacy 
interest at stake:  (1) whether disclosure would result in 
personal embarrassment to an individual of normal sensibilities; 
(2) whether the materials sought contain intimate details of a 
highly personal nature;13 and (3) whether the same information is 
available from other sources.  Globe Newspaper Co. v. Police 
Comm'r of Boston, 419 Mass. 852, 858 (1995).  We have also said 
that "other case-specific relevant factors" may influence the 
calculus.  Id.  On the other side of the scale, we have said 
that the public has a recognized interest in knowing whether 
public servants are carrying out their duties in a law-abiding 
and efficient manner.14  Id. 
                                                 
 
13 Looking to the Federal counterpart to exemption (c) as a 
guide, we have said that such "intimate details" may include 
"marital status, legitimacy of children, identity of fathers of 
children, medical condition, welfare payments, alcohol 
consumption, family fights, [and] reputation" (citations 
omitted).  Attorney Gen. v. Assistant Comm'r of the Real Prop. 
Dep't of Boston, 380 Mass. 623, 626 n.2 (1980), and cases cited.  
We also have said that the "[n]ames and addresses of adults are 
not 'intimate details' of a 'highly personal nature'" (citation 
omitted).  Cape Cod Times v. Sheriff of Barnstable County, 443 
Mass. 587, 595 (2005). 
 
 
14 PETA has not attempted to articulate a public interest in 
obtaining the information sought.  Instead, it has argued that 
because there is no privacy interest whatsoever in business 
contact information, the burden has not yet shifted to PETA to 
articulate a public interest that might overcome the privacy 
interest.  Accordingly, if the judge on remand finds some 
privacy interest does exist in the redacted information, PETA 
must be afforded an opportunity to articulate a public interest 
on the other side of the balancing test. 
22 
 
 
PETA argues that the judge erred by presuming that publicly 
available business contact information implicated a privacy 
interest, and thereby inappropriately shifted the burden to PETA 
to show that the public interest in disclosure substantially 
outweighed a nonexistent privacy interest.  The department did 
not advance a privacy rationale until well after it made the 
redactions in question.  Nevertheless, it now urges us to adopt 
the judge's reasoning that the information in question does 
implicate a measurable privacy interest (stemming from the 
purported safety risks associated with releasing such 
information), and that this privacy interest is not 
substantially outweighed by any public interest in the release 
of the information. 
 
Exemption (c) requires a nuanced analysis.  At the outset, 
the application of exemption (c) in this case must account for 
the difference between the privacy interest in one's home 
address and the privacy interest in one's business address.15  
                                                 
 
15 PETA appears to assume that the redacted information 
related to individuals (as opposed to facilities) pertains only 
to their place of business; the department does not directly 
refute this point.  Because of the department's redactions, the 
record itself sheds no light on the subject.  On remand, in 
order to allow the judge to calibrate the privacy balancing test 
properly, the parties may stipulate as to the precise nature of 
this information, or the judge may employ some other mechanism, 
such as in camera review, for discerning the nature of the 
information sought.  See Worcester Tel. & Gazette Corp. v. Chief 
 
23 
 
Compare Federal Labor Relations Auth. v. United States Dep't of 
Navy, Naval Communications Unit Cutler, E. Machias, Me., 941 
F.2d 49, 55–56 (1st Cir. 1991) (privacy interest in one's name 
and home address is "discernible" and "real enough to be worthy 
of recognition and protection in appropriate circumstances"), 
with Cape Cod Times v. Sheriff of Barnstable County, 443 Mass. 
587, 595 (2005) ("Names and addresses of adults are not 
'intimate details' of a 'highly personal nature,'" therefore 
exemption [c] "does not bar inspection of records containing the 
names and addresses of individuals who serve as reserve deputy 
sheriffs" [citation omitted]); Pottle v. School Comm. of 
Braintree, 395 Mass. 861, 864 (1985) (public school employees' 
names and home addresses do not fall within exemption [c]); and 
Hastings & Sons Publ. Co. v. City Treasurer of Lynn, 374 Mass. 
812, 818 (1978) (municipal payroll records, which included names 
and addresses of employees, "not the kind of private facts that 
the Legislature intended to exempt from mandatory disclosure" 
with exemption [c]). 
 
We acknowledge that cases like Cape Cod Times and Pottle 
dealt with the home addresses of public employees, whereas this 
case appears to implicate the business addresses of nonpublic 
employees.  See Georgiou v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Indus. 
                                                                                                                                                             
of Police of Worcester, 436 Mass. 378, 384-385 (2002) 
(discussing various mechanisms for judicial inspection). 
24 
 
Accs., 67 Mass. App. Ct. 428, 435–436 (2006) (recognizing public 
employees' diminished expectation of privacy in certain 
information).  But exemptions to the public records laws must be 
applied on a case-by-case basis, Worcester Tel. & Gazette Corp., 
436 Mass. at 383–384, and "the same information about a person, 
such as his name and address, might be protected from disclosure 
as an unwarranted invasion of privacy in one context and not in 
another."  Torres v. Attorney Gen., 391 Mass. 1, 9 (1984).  
Accordingly, the exemption (c) balancing test in this case 
should account for the different privacy interests in a home 
address versus a business address, and held by a public employee 
versus a private one. 
 
Relatedly, the exemption (c) balancing test must account 
for the fact that the gravity of any putative invasion of 
privacy resulting from disclosure of the records sought may be 
reduced if "substantially the same information is available from 
other sources."  Attorney Gen. v. Collector of Lynn, 377 Mass. 
151, 157 (1979).  Indeed, one reason that a person's business 
address normally will give rise to a lower privacy interest than 
her home address is that business addresses typically are widely 
shared with others and, in this case at least, may well be 
exposed to scrutiny by researchers, government agencies, 
25 
 
shippers, and possibly others.16  See Brown v. Perez, 835 F.3d 
1223, 1235 (10th Cir. 2016) ("It is not intuitive to us that the 
referee physicians possess a cognizable privacy interest in 
their business addresses -- after all, it is in their economic 
interests to make their office locations generally available to 
the public, so that patients can visit for evaluation and 
treatment"). 
 
Finally, the department raises the suggestion that risks to 
the personal safety of individuals from the release of certain 
requested information should be factored into the exemption (c) 
balancing calculus.  Given the record and the briefs before us, 
it is a suggestion to be approached quite gingerly. 
 
On the one hand, we have not located any cases of this 
court interpreting or applying exemption (c) in the way the 
department proposes.  Indeed, our cases have cabined the scope 
of exemption (c) in a way that would seem to minimize the 
relevance of potential security concerns to the privacy 
                                                 
 
16 The department's observation that "PETA does not suggest 
that the identities of the same persons identified in the 
certificates at issue here have already been disclosed" rings 
somewhat hollow; PETA could not know the identities on the 
certificates because the department redacted them.  If the 
department decides to pursue that point on remand, it carries 
the burden of showing that the exemption applies.  See G. L. 
c. 66, § 10 (c).  Consequently, as mentioned in note 15, supra, 
some type of stipulation or in camera inspection might be 
necessary to determine whether some or all of the information is 
already available in the public domain before a ruling on the 
privacy exemption is possible. 
26 
 
calculus.17  See, e.g., Hastings & Sons Publ. Co., 374 Mass. at 
817-818 (municipal police officers' names and addresses not 
protected by exemption [c]); Cape Cod Times, 443 Mass. at 594 
(same regarding names and addresses of reserve deputy sheriffs).  
On the other hand, we have said that "the same information about 
a person, such as his name and address, might be protected from 
disclosure as an unwarranted invasion of privacy in one context 
and not in another."  Torres, 391 Mass. at 9.  Accordingly, we 
are unwilling to eliminate wholly the possibility that, in very 
limited circumstances where the department can identify specific 
information demonstrating that a significant risk to an 
individual's personal safety is posed by the disclosure of a 
home address or telephone number, that non-dispositive factor 
can add weight to whatever privacy interest exists on that side 
of the balancing test. 
 
In sum, the exemption (c) analysis should be tailored to 
the several "case-specific relevant factors," Globe Newspaper 
                                                 
 
17 It appears that precisely such concerns motivated the 
adoption, in 1996, of G. L. c. 66, § 10 (d), third par., as 
amended through St. 2010, c. 256, §§ 58-59, which, at the time 
relevant to this case, exempted from the definition of "public 
records" the "home address and home telephone number of law 
enforcement, judicial, prosecutorial, . . . and any other public 
safety and criminal justice system personnel."  See, e.g., 
Memorandum, Office of the Governor's Legal Counsel, Mar. 12, 
1996 (subsection (d), third par., aimed "to protect persons 
whose employment might subject them or their family members to 
harassment or retaliation"). 
27 
 
Co., 419 Mass. at 858, that PETA's request presents.  Among them 
are (1) whether the redacted information pertains to home or 
business addresses of public or private entities; (2) whether, 
and to what extent, that information is available from other 
sources; and (3) whether, and to what extent, the department can 
identify specific information demonstrating that a significant 
risk to an individual's personal safety is posed by the 
disclosure of a home address or telephone number that may be 
among the redacted information. 
 
Conclusion.  The entry of judgment for the defendant is 
vacated and set aside.  The matter is remanded to the Superior 
Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.