Title: Hightower v. Bigoney

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

156 So. 2d 501 (1963)
C.E. HIGHTOWER, Appellant,
v.
William F. BIGONEY, Jr., Appellee.
No. 32209.

Supreme Court of Florida.
September 25, 1963.
McCune, Hiaasen, Crum & Ferris and Davis W. Duke, Jr., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
James E. Edwards, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
TERRELL, Justice.
William F. Bigoney, Jr., an architect, entered into a contract with the Hightowers wherein he agreed to furnish "complete Architectural Services consisting of *502 plans, specifications and supervision of construction, for the architectural work for a residence" to be located on certain real property owned by the Hightowers. The contract provided that Bigoney be paid specified percentages of the construction costs as compensation for his professional services. The total cost of the house was in excess of $200,000. As construction proceeded, disagreements arose over the design and other factors of the house in which the contractor, the architect and the Hightowers were involved. On or about July 1, 1959, pursuant to Chapter 84, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., Bigoney filed a claim of lien against the property, claiming that unpaid architectural fees in the amount of $14,393.44 were due him. Thereafter Bigoney instituted this suit in chancery to foreclose said architect's lien.
In their answer to the complaint the Hightowers challenged the validity of Bigoney's architect's lien and asserted that the bulk of the sum claimed by him was based on padded, fictitious or unsupportable items. In addition to their answer, the Hightowers filed a compulsory counterclaim for damages allegedly caused by Bigoney's careless and negligent performance of his contract for architectural services. The compulsory counterclaim included a request for trial by jury of the issues presented by said counterclaim. On motion, the trial judge struck the request for a jury trial and the Hightowers appealed that order to the district court of appeal.
The primary question presented to the district court of appeal was whether or not one may be denied a jury trial of legal issues and claims raised by a compulsory counterclaim filed in response to an equity suit notwithstanding Section 3, Declaration of Rights, Constitution of Florida, F.S.A., the request for jury trial having been seasonably made.
Before the district court of appeal, Hightower urged "that the denial of a jury trial on his counterclaim, which was a compulsory pleading, is error in view of Section 3 of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution, F.S.A. and Rules 1.13(1) and 2.1 of the 1954 Florida Rules of Civil Procedures, 30 & 31 F.S.A."
F.R.C.P. Rule 1.13(1), 30 F.S.A., provides:
It should be noted that failure to file a compulsory counterclaim, such as was involved in the instant case, would have foreclosed any right of action the Hightowers may have had because of such a claim. See Pesce v. Linaido, Fla.App. 1960, 123 So. 2d 747.
Upon consideration of the case, the district court of appeal affirmed the chancellor's decision denying the Hightowers' right to a jury trial on the issues presented by their counterclaim. (145 So. 2d 505.) The district court's opinion emphasized that Bigoney's original suit sought enforcement of a statutory lien unknown at common law; that the determination of the issues raised in the complaint and the counterclaim "undoubtedly necessitates extensive accountings and the consideration of numerous change orders * * *" and that "the pleadings comprehend some issues that are equitable and others that are legal in character; but these issues are very closely interwoven."
Answering the request for jury trial as provided by Section 3, Declaration of Rights, the court said:
The Hightowers, being dissatisfied with the district court's disposition of their appeal, seek review of said decision by the dual means of certiorari alleging direct conflict and by appeal on the theory that the district court of appeal initially construed a controlling provision of the Constitution of Florida, to wit, Section 3, Declaration of Rights, guaranteeing the right to trial by jury.
The appeal and the appeal by certiorari were consolidated for consideration and disposition.
The gist of the court's answer to the request for jury trial is a positive no, that notwithstanding the compulsory pleading rule, a counterclaimant's demand for jury trial in an equity suit rests within the reviewable discretion of the chancellor and may be granted or denied according to the circumstances. The answer then states some qualifications to the chancellor's discretion and concludes with this sweeping statement: "This broad exercise of equity jurisdiction does not, in the juridical sense, constitute a deprivation of the right to jury trial."
We realize that the language of some of the decisions when read in isolation may lead to the district court's answer but it is not supported by the cases we rely on and will presently discuss. We do not think it is the law. It is settled that one may by affirmative plea or by silence waive his right to a jury trial but when a litigant timely appears, as he did in this case, and enters a plea for it or claims it in proper manner, that claim and not the chancellor's discretion is the final word and it is the duty of the court to make provision for it because Section 3, Declaration of Rights, guarantees it.
The district court construed Section 3, Declaration of Rights, Constitution of Florida, guaranteeing jury trial. One cannot read the opinion and the record and not be driven to the conclusion that it was construing the applicable provision of the constitution initially. The district court of appeal was authorized to do this. Art. V, Sec. 4(2), Constitution of Florida; In re Kionka's Estate, Fla. 1960, 121 So. 2d 644. So we must have jurisdiction of the appeal.
So much in support of jurisdiction; now let us consider briefly the status of the historical aspect of the concept of trial by jury.
In Wiggins v. Williams, 36 Fla. 637, 18 So. 859, 30 L.R.A. 754 (1895), this court had occasion to consider problems related in principle to those involved in the instant case. The Wiggins case involved a complaint in equity by the owner of certain turpentine producing lands seeking an injunction and accounting for turpentine unlawfully taken. An injunction was granted *504 and the chancellor held the complainant was entitled to recover damages from defendants for removal of the turpentine crop. In its opinion the Supreme Court made the following pertinent pronouncement:
Prior to the adoption of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure in 1954 counterclaims in equity actions were governed by Equity Rule 35 (see 63.35[1] F.S.A.), the pertinent part of which is:
*505 This pronouncement was not out of step with the doctrine of the Wiggins case, supra.
Section 63.35(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A. (i.e. Equity Rule 35), in substance was adopted from the federal equity rule and being so, the general rule is that it should be construed in accordance with the federal decisions interpreting that rule, when not in conflict with Florida laws. Savage v. Rowell Distributing Corp., Fla. 1957, 95 So. 2d 415.
The leading Florida case interpreting Equity Rule 35 is Tilton v. Horton, 103 Fla. 497, 137 So. 801, 139 So. 142 (1931). The Tilton case involved a bill in equity to cancel certain promissory notes. The defendant filed his legal counterclaim in the equity action seeking a money judgment upon said notes. In disposing of the case on appeal, this court said:
In Tilton v. Horton, supra, this court held that where the defendant in an equity proceeding voluntarily files his legal counterclaim in equity, which is a permissive act pursuant to Equity Rule 35, by such affirmative action he waives his objection to equitable jurisdiction and his right of trial by jury.
So it was clear that prior to the adoption of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure in 1954, a defendant in an equity suit was not compelled to file his legal counterclaim arising out of the transaction which is the subject matter of the equitable suit but could assert them in an independent action at law where his constitutional right to a jury trial was protected. He could, however, waive these rights by voluntarily filing his counterclaim.
In 1954 the Supreme Court of Florida adopted the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. By said rules Section 1.13 was made applicable to both actions at law and suits in equity. Section 1.13(1) (set out verbatim elsewhere herein) compels the defendant in all suits to file as a counterclaim "any claim, whether the subject of a pending action or not, which he has against the plaintiff, arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the action * * *." If the defendant fails to file such counterclaim he may not thereafter assert his claim against the plaintiff.
Prior to the decision of the case at bar, some of the district courts of appeal had occasion to consider the concept of trial by jury as guaranteed by Section 3, Declaration of Rights.
Miller v. Rolfe, Fla.App. 1957, 97 So. 2d 132, is an example. The case is not directly in point, since no counterclaim was filed but the chancellor awarded a money judgment for reasons not detailed. Speaking through Judge Wigginton, the First District Court of Appeal said:
The following cases follow this line: Ganaway v. Henderson, Fla.App. 1958, 103 So. 2d 693; Jones-Mahoney Corp. v. C.A. Fielland, Inc., Fla.App. 1959, 114 So. 2d 18. Counterclaims were filed in these cases, compulsory in one and "permissive" in the other. Right to jury trial was waived in the first case and was not requested in the other. The chancellor recognized the right to jury trial in both cases but disposed of them in equity for the reasons so stated.
See also Black v. Boyd, 6 Cir., 1957, 248 F.2d 156, and Lisle Mills v. Arkay Infant Wear, D.C.N.Y., 1950, 90 F. Supp. 676. We quote the pertinent language of the court in the Mills case because it is so applicable to the case at bar:
It was pointed out in the discussion of related Federal Rule 13(a) in the recent case of Thermo-Stitch, Inc. v. Chemi-Cord Processing Corp., 5 Cir., 1961, 294 F.2d 486:
See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 1959, 359 U.S. 500, 79 S. Ct. 948, 3 L. Ed. 2d 988, strongly supporting this case.
*508 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, summarizes the federal view as follows:
We have quoted more liberally from the foregoing citations than has been our custom, but when one calls to his aid a "cloud of witnesses" to establish a cause, we have found no more convincing way to do this than to let them talk. The witnesses so called were profoundly versed in the history and philosophy of trial by jury, they knew its place in our jurisprudence and they knew that those who wrote it into the constitutions, state and federal, meant to preserve it.
Now let us revert to the case at bar for a moment. Appellee and the district court of appeal take the position that striking the request for jury trial was within the discretion of the chancellor because the legal and equitable issues were so complex and interwoven and because constitutional guarantees do not extend to the enforcement of a mechanics lien, in that such statutory rights were unknown to the common law.
The language in a few cases decided before the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure in 1954, if read in isolation, may lend support to this contention but we do not consider such cases well grounded and then they must have been proclaimed before the writer got to the end of his lesson. We find the contrary view expressed in Rizzo v. Euclid Urbana Co., Fla.App. 1960, 118 So. 2d 553, where the court said:
The compulsory counterclaim in this case is based on the alleged negligent and careless performance of Bigoney's contract for architectural services. It would be difficult to conceive a clearer case for common law action. It arises out of the main suit and entitles the defendant to a jury trial. The substance of the counterclaim and not the chancellor's discretion determines this. In fact, the chancellor's discretion vanishes and Section 3 of the Declaration of Rights takes over when the ingredients of trial by jury are shown by the counterclaim.
The case of Budd v. J.Y. Gooch Co., 151 Fla. 262, 9 So. 2d 633 (1942), is relied on to support appellee's contention here, but we do not think it is applicable. The facts are similar but it was decided before the 1954 Rules of Civil Procedure were effective and none of the parties asked for a jury trial. The issues raised by the foreclosure suit are not in question here. It is only those raised by the negligence action. Under Rule 1.13 (9) the chancellor may order separate trials of the issues made by any counterclaim when the ends of justice require.
A study of the federal cases quoted and relied on to fortify our position reveals that they are more compelling in their attitude toward jury trials than our own, if that be possible. Since we have called them to our aid it occurs to us that they were written with the Seventh Amendment to the Federal Constitution in mind and being so, that amendment should be brought to the reader's attention. It provides:
Section 3, Declaration of Rights, Constitution of Florida, no less than the Seventh Amendment to the Federal Constitution, preserves the right to trial by jury and planted deep in American law the distinction between legal and equitable causes of action. All the attempts by rule or statute to merge law and equity have done no more than produce the liberal joinder, the compulsory counterclaim and their counterparts which, as in this case, have created some confusion. They have discarded the old common law forms of action that were in use when the writer was admitted to the bar and are lucidly discussed in "The Common Law" by Mr. Justice Holmes. Equity was designed to level the inequalities and rough places in the common law but it was never expected to take the place of the common law or such part of it as was guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions.
Other cases could be cited in support of our thinking on the concept of trial by jury and its place in our jurisprudence. The cases we have cited show that it was at one time the right arm of common law but that it is now the dividing line that separates law from equity and that it is guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions. It has had a long and distinguished history and is now one of the main avenues through which the common man directs the working of democracy. To hold that the mere discretion of a chancellor can set it at naught tends to agitate the butterflies in the stomach of an old common law lawyer who imbibed the common law from Coke, Blackstone, Holdsworth's History of English Law, Lord Campbell's Lives of the Chief Justices, and Mr. Justice Holmes' The Common Law.
In summary, we hold that the filing of a compulsory counterclaim for relief cognizable at law in an action for equitable relief does not constitute the counterclaimant's waiver to the right to a jury trial of the issues raised by said compulsory counterclaim, provided, jury trial is timely demanded.
For the reasons above stated, the decision under review is accordingly reversed and the cause is remanded to the District Court of Appeal, Second District, for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
DREW, C.J., and THOMAS, ROBERTS and THORNALL, JJ., concur.