Title: Langevin v. Allstate Ins. Co.

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2013 ME 55 
Docket: 
Cum-12-140 
Argued: 
April 10, 2013 
Decided: 
June 4, 2013 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, 
JJ. 
 
 
PATRICK LANGEVIN et al. 
 
v. 
 
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY 
 
 
GORMAN, J. 
 
[¶1]  Patrick and Cora P. Langevin appeal from the entry of a summary 
judgment in the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Warren, J.) in favor of 
Allstate Insurance Company on the Langevins’ reach and apply action, brought 
pursuant to 24-A M.R.S. § 2904 (2012).  The Langevins argue that the court erred 
in determining that a homeowners insurance policy issued by Allstate to Charles 
Johnson did not cover the damages they suffered as a result of purchasing property 
from Johnson, including damages for loss of investment, undisclosed physical 
problems with the property, and emotional distress.  Because those damages do not 
constitute covered “bodily injury” or “property damage” pursuant to the Allstate 
homeowners insurance policy, we affirm the judgment. 
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  In August 2010, the Langevins filed a complaint against Charles 
Johnson (“underlying complaint”) arising out of their purchase from Johnson of 
property located at 866 Cape Road in Hollis.1  Although the underlying complaint 
includes ten counts, the Langevins are pursuing only the counts of negligence, 
negligent misrepresentation, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, based on the following allegations. 
During the pendency of the sale of the Cape Road property, Johnson 
misrepresented the condition of the property and failed to disclose its prior use as a 
junkyard.  As a result of Johnson’s misrepresentations, the Langevins purchased 
the property for $315,000 pursuant to an April 6, 2005, purchase and sale 
agreement and suffered damages, including loss of the investment value of the 
property, undisclosed physical problems with the property, and emotional distress.   
 
[¶3]  While he owned the property at 866 Cape Road, Johnson maintained a 
homeowners insurance policy with Allstate.  The Allstate policy provides:   
Subject to the terms, limitations and conditions of this policy, 
Allstate will pay damages including prejudgment interest which an 
insured person becomes legally obligated to pay because of bodily 
injury or property damage arising from an occurrence to which this 
policy applies, and is covered by this part of the policy.  
 
                                         
1  The underlying complaint also named Johnson’s real estate agent and agency as defendants but the 
court later dismissed the claims against those parties without prejudice, pursuant to the parties’ 
agreement.  
 
3 
“Bodily injury,” “property damage,” and “occurrence” are all defined terms in the 
policy.  It defines “bodily injury” as 
physical harm to the body, including sickness or disease, and resulting 
death, except that bodily injury does not include:   
a) any venereal disease; 
b) Herpes; 
c) Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS); 
d) AIDS Related Complex (ARC); 
e) Human Immunodefiency Virus (HIV); 
 
or any resulting symptom, effect, condition, disease or illness related 
to (a) through (e) listed above. 
 
The policy defines “property damage” as “physical injury to or destruction of 
tangible property, including loss of its use resulting from such physical injury or 
destruction.”  It defines “occurrence” as “an accident, including continuous or 
repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions, during the 
policy period, resulting in bodily injury or property damage.”   
[¶4]  When the Langevins sued him, Johnson tendered the underlying 
complaint to Allstate but Allstate refused to defend or indemnify Johnson, citing 
the policy’s contract exclusion, which excludes from coverage “any liability an 
insured person assumes arising out of any contract or agreement.”  Following that 
denial, the Langevins and Johnson reached an agreement resolving the underlying 
complaint.  Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, the Superior Court (Cumberland 
 
4 
County, Warren, J.) entered a judgment against Johnson in the amount of 
$330,000.2  That judgment does not specify the basis for liability or damages. 
[¶5]  Armed with the judgment, the Langevins initiated a reach and apply 
action against Allstate, pursuant to 24-A M.R.S. § 2904.  On cross-motions for 
summary judgment, the court concluded that (1) Johnson’s homeowners insurance 
policy’s contract exclusion did not apply to exclude coverage, (2) the damages 
sought did not constitute “property damage,” and (3) any damages for injury to the 
property did not result from an “occurrence.”  Accordingly, the court granted 
Allstate’s motion for summary judgment, denied the Langevins’ motion for 
summary judgment, and entered judgment for Allstate.  The court’s order entering 
judgment does not discuss the Langevins’ claim that the policy covers any 
damages resulting from their emotional distress.  The Langevins timely appealed 
pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 1851 (2012) and M.R. App. P. 2. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶6]  The Langevins contend that the court erred in concluding that the 
Allstate policy did not cover the damages awarded in the underlying judgment.  
They first argue that the $330,000 judgment awarded damages for loss of 
investment and physical problems with the property on their negligent 
                                         
2  As part of their agreement, the Langevins agreed not to execute the judgment against Johnson 
personally. 
 
5 
misrepresentation claim, as well as damages for emotional distress on their claims 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress or negligence.  The Langevins then 
argue that (1) the damages for loss of investment and physical problems with the 
property constitute covered “property damage” and (2) the emotional distress 
damages constitute covered “bodily injury.”3  Allstate essentially argues that none 
of the Langevins’ claims supports recovery of their claimed emotional distress 
damages.  Additionally, Allstate argues that there was no “property damage” that 
entitles the Langevins to recover on their negligent misrepresentation claim.4 
 
[¶7]  “We review the grant of a summary judgment de novo.”  Trott v. H.D. 
Goodall Hosp., 2013 ME 33, ¶ 11 n.5, --- A.3d --- (quotation marks omitted).  
Where, as here, there are no genuine issues of material fact, our review is focused 
on whether Allstate was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See Travelers 
Indem. Co. v. Bryant, 2012 ME 38, ¶ 8, 38 A.3d 1267. 
                                         
3  The Langevins also argue that the court erred by placing the burden of proving coverage on them 
because Allstate breached its duty to defend Johnson, Allstate’s insured.  Because the Langevins are 
neither insureds with respect to the Allstate policy nor Johnson’s assignees, however, there is no basis for 
affording the Langevins any collateral benefits of Allstate’s contractual duty to defend Johnson.  See 
Smith v. Allstate Ins. Co., 483 A.2d 344, 346 (Me. 1984) (observing that an injured party “has no 
judicially protectible interest” in the defense owed by the insurer to the insured).  As we stated clearly in 
Jacobi v. MMG Insurance Co., the judgment creditor has the burden of proof in a reach and apply action.  
2011 ME 56, ¶ 14, 17 A.3d 1229. 
 
4  Allstate also contends on appeal that the court erred in concluding that the policy’s contract 
exclusion did not apply to preclude coverage for the Langevins’ claims.  Allstate, however, did not file a 
cross-appeal.  Because it failed to preserve its argument regarding the policy’s contract exclusion, we do 
not address it on appeal.  See Lyle v. Mangar, 2011 ME 129, ¶ 22, 36 A.3d 867 (declining to disturb a 
conclusion of the court when the appellee failed to file a cross-appeal); Millien v. Colby Coll., 2005 ME 
66, ¶ 9 n.3, 874 A.2d 397 (same). 
 
6 
 
[¶8]  Maine’s reach and apply statute, 24-A M.R.S. § 2904, enables a 
judgment creditor to satisfy a judgment from the judgment debtor’s insurer if “the 
judgment debtor was insured against such liability when the right of action 
accrued.”5  Sarah G. v. Me. Bonding & Cas. Co., 2005 ME 13, ¶ 6, 866 A.2d 835.  
To resolve a reach and apply action, we first identify the basis of liability and 
damages from the underlying complaint and judgment.  Jacobi v. MMG Ins. Co., 
2011 ME 56, ¶ 14, 17 A.3d 1229.  We then review “the homeowners insurance 
policy to determine if any of the damages awarded in the underlying judgment are 
based on claims that would be recoverable pursuant to the homeowners policy.”  
Id.  “[T]he party seeking to recover pursuant to the reach and apply statute . . . has 
the burden to demonstrate that [his] awarded damages fall within the scope of the 
insurance contract.”  Id. 
 
[¶9]  We review “the interpretation of an insurance policy de novo.”  Cox v. 
Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 2013 ME 8, ¶ 8, 59 A.3d 1280.  We interpret 
                                         
5  Title 24-A M.R.S. § 2904 (2012) provides in relevant part that:   
 
Whenever any person, administrator, executor, guardian, recovers a final judgment 
against any other person for any loss or damage specified in section 2903, the judgment 
creditor shall be entitled to have the insurance money applied to the satisfaction of the 
judgment by bringing a civil action, in his own name, against the insurer to reach and 
apply the insurance money, if when the right of action accrued, the judgment debtor was 
insured against such liability and if before the recovery of the judgment the insurer had 
had notice of such accident, injury or damage. 
 
It is undisputed that Johnson notified Allstate of the underlying complaint before the court entered 
judgment in favor of the Langevins. 
 
7 
unambiguous policy language consistent with its plain meaning and “construe 
ambiguous policy language strictly against the insurance company and liberally in 
favor of the policyholder.”  Id. 
 
[¶10]  To begin our analysis, we must identify which of the damages sought 
in the underlying complaint constitute the $330,000 judgment.  See Jacobi, 
2011 ME 56, ¶ 14, 17 A.3d 1229; Sarah G., 2005 ME 13, ¶¶ 3, 7, 866 A.2d 835.  
The judgment entered by the court, pursuant to the parties’ agreement, does not 
specify the basis of Johnson’s liability nor does it specify what damages the 
$330,000 award redresses.  Thus, we turn to the underlying complaint.  In that 
complaint, the Langevins pursued recovery of damages for loss of investment and 
physical problems with the property on a claim of negligent misrepresentation and 
damages for emotional distress on claims of negligence, negligent infliction of 
emotional distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  So long as each 
claim permits recovery of the damages sought, we cannot rule out the possibility 
that the judgment awards damages for loss of investment, physical problems with 
the property, and emotional distress.  Accordingly, we must determine whether the 
claims advanced in the underlying complaint permit recovery of the damages 
alleged and whether those damages are covered by the Allstate policy.  
 
8 
A. 
Damages for Negligent Misrepresentation 
 
[¶11]  The Langevins contend that any portion of the judgment awarded for 
their loss of investment and the undisclosed physical problems with the property 
on their negligent misrepresentation claim constitute covered “property damage.” 
Negligent misrepresentation is a vehicle for asserting “claims for economic harm.”  
Dan D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 9.1 at 544 (2d ed. 1993); see also Jourdain v. 
Dineen, 527 A.2d 1304, 1307 (Me. 1987) (observing that fraud actions “protect 
economic interests”).  We define the tort of negligent misrepresentation as follows:  
One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or 
in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies 
false information for the guidance of others in their business 
transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them 
by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise 
reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the 
information.   
 
St. Louis v. Wilkinson Law Offices, P.C., 2012 ME 116, ¶ 18, 55 A.3d 443; see also 
Chapman v. Rideout, 568 A.2d 829, 830 (Me. 1990) (adopting the definition 
articulated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552(1) (1977)).   
[¶12]  Although it is clear from that formulation that the Langevins could 
recover their loss of investment through a negligent misrepresentation claim, such 
recovery is not available from Allstate because damages for loss of investment do 
not constitute “property damage.”  See Vigna v. Allstate Ins. Co., 686 A.2d 598, 
 
9 
600 (Me. 1996) (“Economic injury does not constitute ‘property damage’ for 
purposes of insurance coverage.”).   
[¶13]  To overcome that bar to coverage, the Langevins argue that because 
they also sought recovery for physical problems with the property, their damages 
for negligent misrepresentation fall within the policy’s definition of “property 
damage.”  That argument also fails because the physical problems with the 
property did not result from the “occurrence” alleged in the Langevins’ negligent 
misrepresentation count.   
[¶14]  The Allstate policy requires that any damages for “property damage” 
be caused by an “occurrence.”  With respect to the Langevins’ negligent 
misrepresentation count, the only factual allegation in their complaint that arguably 
constitutes an “occurrence” is Johnson’s act of misrepresenting the condition of the 
property.  The Langevins’ theory of damages is based solely on those 
misrepresentations.  Thus, to be compensable as “property damage,” damages for 
the physical problems with the property must have resulted from Johnson’s 
misrepresentations.  The summary judgment record, however, does not contain any 
support for that assertion.  Rather, any physical damage to the property resulted 
from its actual use as a junkyard, which, according to the underlying complaint, 
predates Johnson’s statements regarding the condition of the property.  Therefore, 
damages for undisclosed physical problems are not covered by the policy because 
 
10 
those physical problems did not result from the “occurrence” alleged in the 
underlying complaint.  See Veilleux v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 206 F.3d 92, 123-24 
(1st Cir. 2000) (stating that, in order for harm suffered to be compensable as 
damages for negligent misrepresentation, the negligent misrepresentation must be 
the legal cause of the harm suffered); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552B(1) 
(1977) (same).  Accordingly, the court correctly determined that the Langevins 
failed to establish that their damages for loss of investment and physical problems 
with the property are covered by the Allstate policy. 
B. 
Emotional Distress Damages 
[¶15]  This leaves only the Langevins’ claim for emotional distress damages, 
which the trial court did not discuss.6  The Langevins argue that (1) their claims for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence could support an award 
of emotional distress damages7 and (2) emotional distress damages constitute 
“bodily injury” regardless of how that term is defined in the Allstate policy.  We 
                                         
6  It is not clear why the trial court did not discuss the Langevins’ claim for emotional distress 
damages, and we note that neither party brought that omission to the court’s attention.  That 
notwithstanding, the court’s omission is at most harmless error because of our ultimate conclusion that 
the Allstate policy does not cover the Langevins’ emotional distress damages.  See M.R. Civ. P. 61. 
 
7  As the Langevins recognize, their claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress cannot, on its 
own, provide for recovery of emotional distress damages when, as here, the Langevins did not plead 
bystander liability or some other special relationship.  Jacobi, 2011 ME 56, ¶ 17, 17 A.3d 1229; Curtis v. 
Porter, 2001 ME 158, ¶ 19, 784 A.2d 18.  Rather, there must be an independent tort that caused the 
emotional distress, and there must be coverage for that independent tort and for the damages it allegedly 
caused pursuant to the Allstate policy.  Jacobi, 2011 ME 56, ¶ 17, 17 A.3d 1229.  The independent tort 
cannot be negligent misrepresentation because that tort does not permit recovery for emotional harm.  
Curtis, 2001 ME 158, ¶ 19, 784 A.2d 18.  
 
 
11 
need not decide, however, whether the Langevins’ claims for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress and negligence could support recovery of their claimed 
emotional distress damages because such damages do not constitute “bodily 
injury” as that term is defined in the Allstate policy.   
[¶16]  The Langevins contend that our decision in Vigna conclusively 
establishes that emotional distress constitutes “bodily injury” regardless of how 
that term is defined in an insurance policy.8  We disagree.  In Vigna, we held that 
Allstate had a duty to defend a couple against a complaint alleging emotional 
distress resulting from their failure to pay a contractor for home renovations.  
686 A.2d at 599, 601.  Allstate had issued two policies to the couple, a 
homeowners policy and an umbrella policy.  Id. at 599.  The homeowners policy 
provided coverage for “bodily injury . . . arising from an accident” and the 
umbrella policy provided “coverage for personal injury . . . caused by an 
occurrence.”  Id. at 599-600 (quotation marks omitted).  Based on the possibility, 
observed in Maine Bonding & Casualty Co. v. Douglas Dynamics, Inc., 594 A.2d 
1079, 1081 (Me. 1991), that “bodily injury, sickness or disease” could result from 
emotional distress, we concluded that “[u]nless excluded, a claim for emotional 
                                         
8  The Langevins also contend that our decision in Jacobi stands for the same proposition, but we did 
not discuss the question of whether emotional distress constituted “bodily injury” in Jacobi.  The outcome 
of that case turned on other policy language, and Jacobi does not, therefore, stand for the proposition that 
emotional distress constitutes “bodily injury” regardless of a policy’s definition of “bodily injury.”  
Jacobi, 2011 ME 56, ¶¶ 16, 18, 17 A.3d 1229. 
 
12 
distress triggers an insurer’s duty to defend under ‘bodily injury’ coverage if the 
emotional distress is caused by an ‘accident or occurrence’ within the meaning of 
the policy.”  Vigna, 686 A.2d at 600 (emphasis added).  Vigna did not establish 
that emotional distress always constitutes “bodily injury” when determining 
whether an insurer has a duty to indemnify.  It determined that, given the 
allegations made in that complaint, and the language of the applicable policy, 
emotional distress could constitute “bodily injury” and, therefore, that the insurer 
was obligated to defend the claim.  Vigna, 686 A.2d at 599-601. 
[¶17]  More recently, in Ryder v. USAA General Indemnity Co., a couple 
sought a declaratory judgment to determine whether “their bystander claims for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress” constituted claims for “bodily injury” 
pursuant to a policy defining “bodily injury” as “bodily harm, sickness, disease or 
death.”  2007 ME 146, ¶¶ 1, 6, 938 A.2d 4 (quotation marks omitted).  Rather than 
holding that emotional distress always constitutes “bodily injury” regardless of the 
policy definition, we evaluated the policy’s definition of that term and concluded 
that the term was ambiguous as a result of the definition’s grammatical structure.  
Id. ¶ 17.  In reaching that decision, we also noted that when a policy defined 
“bodily injury” as “injury [or harm], sickness or disease,” a majority of 
jurisdictions have held that the definition is “unambiguous and encompasses only 
physical harm.”  Id. ¶ 15 (alteration in original).  In short, we affirmed that the 
 
13 
question of whether a policy affords coverage for emotional distress still depends 
in the first instance on whether emotional distress constitutes “bodily injury” or 
some other type of damage for which coverage is available pursuant to the 
language of the policy. 
[¶18]  The Allstate policy at issue here defines “bodily injury” in relevant 
part as “physical harm to the body, including sickness or disease, and resulting 
death.”  Unlike the definition of “bodily injury” at issue in Ryder, this definition is 
unambiguous.  See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Russo, 829 F. Supp. 24, 26 (D.R.I. 
1993); Black’s Law Dictionary 784 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “physical harm” as 
“[a]ny physical injury or impairment of land, chattels, or the human body”).  The 
definition in this policy quite clearly restricts “bodily injury” to physical ailments 
and/or resulting death such that an ordinary person would understand that it does 
not encompass emotional pain and suffering.  See Bryant, 2012 ME 38, ¶ 9, 
38 A.3d 1267 (stating that policy language is ambiguous if its meaning is not 
readily understandable by an ordinary person).  Because the Langevins’ claim did 
not include any sort of bodily injury, physical harm, sickness or disease, and 
because the policy definition of “bodily injury” does not include emotional 
distress, the Allstate policy also does not cover any part of the judgment 
attributable to emotional distress damages. 
 
14 
 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
__________________________________ 
 
On the briefs and at oral argument: 
 
Peter Clifford, Esq., Hodsdon & Clifford, LLC, Kennebunk, for appellants 
Cora P. Langevin and Patrick Langevin 
 
Martica S. Douglas, Esq., Douglas, Denham, Buccina & Ernst, Portland, for 
appellee Allstate Insurance Company 
 
 
 
Cumberland County Superior Court docket number CV-2011-340 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY