Title: People v. Latona et al.

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

People v. Latona 
et al., No. 847102 (Ill. S.Ct.)
Docket Nos. 84102, 84125, 84221 cons.-Agenda 
10-September 1998.
Opinion filed November 19, 1998.
JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the opinion of the 
court:.
The central issue presented for our review in these three 
consolidated appeals concerns the interrelationship and proper application of 
sections 5-8-7(b) and 5-8-4(e)(4) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 
ILCS 5/5-8-7(b), 5-8-4(e)(4) (West 1994)) in a determination of custodial 
sentence credit for defendants sentenced to consecutive sentences. Subsidiary 
issues include the propriety of the circuit court's order amending the 
mittimuses of defendant Larry Williams and of the severity of the sentences 
imposed upon defendant Anzio Martinez.
In cause No. 84102, defendant, John Latona, was charged in 
the circuit court of Lee County with solicitation of murder and solicitation of 
murder for hire in violation of sections 8-1.1(a) and 8-1.2(a) of the Criminal 
Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, pars. 8-1.1(a), 8-1.2(a)). At the 
time the crimes allegedly took place, defendant was an inmate at the Dixon 
Correctional Center, serving an unrelated sentence for murder. A warrant was 
served on defendant at the correctional facility on July 31, 1989, the same day 
the charges were filed. As shown on the face of the warrant, bail was set in the 
amount of $500,000. Defendant did not post bail.
Defendant appeared in the circuit court several times on 
pretrial matters from July 1989 to January 8, 1990. Docket entries indicate that 
defendant was accompanied by Department of Corrections personnel in each 
instance and he was remanded to the Department of Corrections at the conclusion 
of the day's proceedings. On December 27, 1989, the trial court suppressed 
certain incriminating statements defendant had made to an undercover police 
officer in Dixon Correctional Center. The State appealed. The appellate court 
reversed and remanded the cause for further proceedings. People v. 
Latona, 218 Ill. App. 3d 1093 (1991).
On remand, the trial court dismissed the count alleging 
solicitation of murder for hire, and the remaining count was tried before the 
court. Defendant was found guilty of solicitation of murder, and the matter was 
set over for sentencing. Having served his sentence of imprisonment on the prior 
murder conviction, defendant was released from the custody of the Department of 
Corrections in June of 1992. He was immediately taken into the custody of Lee 
County authorities pursuant to an order of the circuit court entered on June 2, 
1992. On July 8, 1992, defendant was sentenced to 40 years' imprisonment. 
Defendant appealed. The appellate court affirmed defendant's conviction, but 
vacated his sentence and remanded the cause for a new sentencing hearing. 
People v. Latona, 268 Ill. App. 3d 718 (1994).
Defendant was resentenced to 36 years' imprisonment. A 
sentencing order entered May 31, 1995, indicates that the 36-year sentence was 
to be served consecutively to the defendant's prior sentence for murder. 
Defendant was given credit for time he had served in county custody after his 
release from prison on the murder conviction. An amended sentencing order 
entered June 9, 1995, specified that defendant was not to receive credit for 
time served on the sentence for murder.
Defendant again appealed, arguing that: (1) the trial court 
had considered an improper aggravating factor in sentencing, and (2) the court 
had erred in denying him credit for time he had spent in custody in the county 
jail on the solicitation charge following his release from the Department of 
Corrections. The appellate court concluded that defendant's first issue was 
meritorious and reduced his sentence to 30 years. The court did not address 
defendant's second issue. Latona, No. 2-95-0947 (unpublished order 
under Supreme Court Rule 23).
Defendant petitioned for leave to appeal to this court. 
Although that petition was ultimately denied, this court issued an order in the 
exercise of its supervisory authority, remanding the cause to the appellate 
court "to address the question of whether and to what extent defendant is 
entitled to credit for time served in custody prior to conviction, or to explain 
why the question cannot be reached." People v. Latona, 173 Ill. 2d 536 
(1997).
In response, the appellate court issued a supplemental order 
on September 19, 1997, briefly discussing section 5-8-7(b) of the Unified Code 
of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-7(b) (West 1994)) and this court's opinion in 
People v. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452 (1996). The appellate court 
determined that the "basis of defendant's custody" was, for periods of time, 
"ambiguous." The panel held that the trial court had "erred in denying credit 
for time served in custody awaiting trial, sentencing and resentencing on his 
conviction for solicitation of murder," concluding that the cause should be 
remanded for a determination of "the number of days credit the defendant is to 
receive." Indeed, with respect to the offense of solicitation, the time spent in 
county custody, and the basis for that custody, are matters unclear from the 
record in this case.
In any event, following the appellate court ruling, the 
State timely filed a petition for leave to appeal to this court pursuant to 
Supreme Court Rule 315 (166 Ill. 2d R. 315). This court granted that petition on 
December 3, 1997.
In cause No. 84125, defendant, Anzio Martinez, pled guilty 
to attempted murder and armed robbery in the circuit court of Du Page 
County. The trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive terms of 30 years' 
imprisonment for the attempted murder and 15 years' imprisonment for the armed 
robbery. The defendant appealed and the appellate court remanded for trial 
counsel's failure to comply with the certification requirements of Supreme Court 
Rule 604(d) (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)). On remand, defense counsel filed an 
obligatory certificate, and the trial court subsequently denied defendant's 
motion to reconsider sentence.
When the cause again came before the appellate court, the 
court rejected defendant's contention that his sentences were excessive, but 
determined that the trial court had erred when it failed to grant him a 379-day 
credit against each sentence for the 379 days he had spent in custody prior to 
sentencing, citing our decision in Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452. The 
appellate court modified the judgment of the circuit court, allowing defendant a 
379-day credit on each of his consecutive sentences. Martinez, No. 
2-95-0165 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
The State subsequently filed a timely petition for leave to 
appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315 (166 Ill. 2d R. 315) which this court 
granted on December 3, 1997. The cause was consolidated with Latona for 
review because of a similar sentence-credit issue presented therein.
In considering the issue of presentence custodial credit in 
the context of consecutive sentencing, we begin with an examination of the 
relevant statutes.
Section 5-8-4(e) of the Code provides in pertinent 
part:
Section 5-8-7(b) of the Unified Code of 
Corrections provides:
Simply put, the issue before us is whether 
a defendant sentenced to consecutive sentences is entitled to two days' sentence 
credit-one for each sentence-on account of one day actually spent in 
presentence, county custody as a result of the charged offense or offenses. All 
districts of the appellate court have now addressed this issue. The First, 
Third, Fourth and Fifth Districts have rejected a statutory construction which 
would entitle such a defendant to two days' credit. People v. Biggs, 
294 Ill. App. 3d 1046 (1st Dist. 1998); Johnson v. Washington, 294 Ill. 
App. 3d 472 (3d Dist. 1998); Feazell v. Washington, 291 Ill. App. 3d 
766 (4th Dist. 1997); People v. Plair, 292 Ill. App. 3d 396 (5th Dist. 
1997). The Second District has adopted that construction. People v. 
Johnson, 286 Ill. App. 3d 597 (2d Dist. 1997).
We begin our analysis with a review of rules pertaining to 
statutory construction. The cardinal rule of statutory construction
is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the 
legislature. In re A.P., 179 Ill. 2d 184, 195 (1997); People v. 
Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 457 (1996); Maloney v. Bower, 113 Ill. 2d 473, 479 (1986). The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the 
language of the statute itself. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d  at 457. In 
determining legislative intent, a court may consider the reason and necessity 
for the statute, the evils to be remedied, and the objectives to be attained. 
Cummins v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 178 Ill. 2d 474, 479 (1997); 
People v. Bole, 155 Ill. 2d 188, 195 (1993). In ascertaining the 
legislature's intent, this court has a duty to avoid a construction of the 
statute that would defeat the statute's purpose or yield an absurd or unjust 
result. Cummins, 178 Ill. 2d  at 479; Bole, 155 Ill. 2d  at 195. 
Where, as here, a court is faced with the construction of two statutes whose 
purview may overlap to some degree, a specific statutory provision shall control 
over a general provision on the same subject. People v. Villarreal, 152 Ill. 2d 368, 379 (1992).
We will first examine section 5-8-7(b) of the Code, which we 
have previously construed under other circumstances. The credit requirement of 
section 5-8-7(b) is meant to account for all time served in confinement for a 
particular offense. People v. Scheib, 76 Ill. 2d 244, 250 (1979). This 
court has stated that the purpose of the "credit-against-sentence" provision 
contained in section 5-8-7(b) is to ensure that defendants do not ultimately 
remain incarcerated for periods in excess of their eventual sentences. 
People v. Ramos, 138 Ill. 2d 152, 159 (1990), citing People v. 
Hughes, 167 Ill. App. 3d 265 (1988).
In Robinson, we applied section 5-8-7(b) in the 
context of a defendant who had been simultaneously in custody to some extent 
while awaiting trial and sentencing on two unrelated charges. There, we 
determined that defendant should receive sentence credit on both offenses for 
each day he spent in simultaneous custody and additional credit against each 
sentence for time spent in custody on that offense only. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d  at 454-56, 463. Our rule in Robinson will ensure that a 
defendant who is in simultaneous, presentence custody on separate offenses does 
not serve time in excess of his sentence to the extent his sentences are served 
concurrently. However, in Robinson, we were not called upon to consider 
the impact that section 5-8-4(e)(4) of the Code would have on the calculation of 
sentence credit for consecutive sentences.
Section 5-8-4(e)(4) of the Code specifically governs the 
calculation of consecutive sentences and impacts upon the application of 
sentence credit; therefore, it controls over section 5-8-7(b), which would 
otherwise, generally, apply to calculations of credit. See Villarreal, 
152 Ill. 2d  at 379. Section 5-8-4(e)(4) requires the Department of Corrections 
to treat consecutive sentences as a "single term" of imprisonment, and specifies 
that the offender shall be credited against that "aggregate *** term of 
imprisonment" for all time "served in an institution since the commission of the 
offense or offenses and as a consequence thereof." 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(e)(4) (West 
1994). Since consecutive sentences are to be treated as a single term of 
imprisonment, it necessarily follows that defendants so sentenced should receive 
but one credit for each day actually spent in custody as a result of the offense 
or offenses for which they are ultimately sentenced. While a defendant sentenced 
to concurrent sentences receives credit for time served against each 
sentence, because the sentences are served concurrently, the credits are applied 
in that manner as well. However, to allow an offender sentenced to consecutive 
sentences two credits-one for each sentence-not only contravenes the legislative 
directive that his sentence shall be treated as a "single term" of imprisonment, 
but also, in effect, gives that offender a double credit, when the sentences are 
aggregated, for each day previously served in custody. That cannot be what the 
legislature intended.
By enacting provisions relating to consecutive sentencing, 
the legislature sought to punish the commission of certain offenses more 
harshly. See People v. Curry, 178 Ill. 2d 509, 539 (1997). Allowing 
offenders sentenced to consecutive sentences a double credit for each day of 
actual custody would frustrate the legislature's clearly expressed 
intent.
Therefore, to the extent that an offender sentenced to 
consecutive sentences had been incarcerated prior thereto on more than one 
offense simultaneously, he should be given credit only once for actual days 
served. To the extent that he spent additional, nonsimultaneous time in 
presentence custody on one offense or the other, he should be afforded a single 
credit for that time as well. Defendants must be given credit for all the days 
they actually served, but no more.
Applying these principles to Latona, we hold that 
defendant should be given credit for any time served in county custody between 
his release from prison and sentencing on the instant offenses, as well as any 
additional time in county custody thereafter. Defendant Martinez should be given 
but one credit of 379 days toward his aggregate sentence.
Therefore, although we reject the reasoning of the appellate 
court's supplemental order in Latona, and vacate that judgment, we 
agree that cause must be remanded to the circuit court for a determination of 
the number of days of credit defendant Latona is to receive for time spent in 
county custody. We remand Latona to the circuit court for proceedings 
consistent with views herein expressed. With respect to this issue, we reverse 
the judgment of the appellate court in Martinez and affirm the judgment 
of the circuit court.
Defendant Martinez raises a separate issue, claiming that 
the trial court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences of 15 
and 30 years' imprisonment for armed robbery and attempted murder, respectively. 
Specifically, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by 
failing to consider his rehabilitative potential and imposed a sentence 
disproportionate to the consecutive sentences of six and nine years received by 
his codefendant.
We note that the trial court is the proper forum to 
determine a sentence and the trial judge's decision in sentencing is entitled to 
great deference and weight. People v. La Pointe, 88 Ill. 2d 482, 
492-93 (1981). It is the province of the trial court to balance relevant factors 
and make a reasoned decision as to the appropriate punishment in each case. 
People v. Streit, 142 Ill. 2d 13, 21 (1991). Defendant's sentencing 
issue has already been considered and rejected by the appellate court. 
Martinez, No. 2-95-0165 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 
23). We concur in the appellate court's analysis and conclusion.
Defendant planned the robbery of the victim and arranged the 
meeting during which the crime was committed. He and codefendant, Balkcom, met 
the victim at the victim's garage, where defendant struck the victim on the head 
at least four times with a hammer defendant had brought for that purpose. 
Defendant and Balkcom then took the victim's money, pager and the keys to his 
car. The victim was found approximately three hours later lying on the floor of 
the cold garage in a pool of blood. He had spent over 50 days in the hospital as 
of the date of defendant's sentencing and had not regained some of his motor 
skills or full use of the left side of his body.
In sentencing defendant, the trial court examined all of the 
evidence, both mitigating and aggravating. The court determined that a severe 
penalty was warranted due to the callousness and brutality with which defendant 
committed the crimes. We believe the record supports that 
determination.
Furthermore, we find that the disparity between the 
sentences of defendant and Balkcom is justified by the nature and extent of 
defendant's greater participation in the crime. Defendant was obviously the 
moving force in the commission of the crime and played the more active role. A 
more severe sentence is warranted on that basis. See People v. 
Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 216 (1997); People v. Godinez, 91 Ill. 2d 47, 55 (1982). Moreover, Balkcom pled guilty and agreed to testify against 
defendant. We conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion when it 
imposed consecutive sentences of 15 and 30 years. Consequently, we affirm the 
judgment of the appellate court on this issue.
Finally, we address the Department of Correction's petition 
for writ of mandamus in cause No. 84221. On November 30, 1995, 
defendant, Larry Williams, pled guilty to felony theft and possession of a 
stolen motor vehicle and was sentenced by the circuit court to consecutive 
prison terms of two years and six years, respectively, pursuant to a plea 
agreement by which defendant was also given credit for a total of 197 days' 
presentence custody, 125 days' credit toward the former sentence and 72 days' 
credit on the latter. The record is unclear-and the parties shed no light-on how 
the sentence credit was calculated. Initially, the court stated that defendant 
would be given 197 days' sentence credit on each sentence, but was later advised 
by defense counsel that the agreement contemplated 197 days "for both cases 
together." The court then gave defendant credit for 197 days "actually 
served."
In March of 1996, the judge began receiving letters from 
defendant in which defendant expressed his well-founded concerns that he was not 
being credited on each of his sentences. From letters which appear in the 
record, it seems that the Department of Corrections was giving only 125 days' 
credit toward his aggregate sentence. The record on appeal indicates that the 
judge and the attorneys for the State and defense addressed the sentence-credit 
problem in seven subsequent court proceedings.
In one instance, on June 4, 1996, Assistant State's Attorney 
Lea Norbut announced her belief that the parties would eventually resolve the 
sentence-credit issue by "an agreed order." Norbut indicated she had consulted 
with Department personnel about the problem. Prior to rescheduling the matter 
for yet another court date, the court expressed obvious frustration with the 
Department:
According to a docket entry dated June 25, 
1996, the judge on that date determined that the mittimus was correct and 
defendant would have to "take the problem up with the Illinois Department of 
Corrections." However, in the transcript of proceedings on that day, Assistant 
State's Attorney Norbut advised that she had spoken with the Department's legal 
counsel, Rachel McKenzie, who told Norbut that she did not deal with 
"bookkeeping procedure" and sentence-credit issues were handled by the 
"particular facility." Norbut said McKenzie had no idea how to rectify the 
problem. The judge rescheduled the case for status hearing on July 30, 1996, and 
her concluding remarks in the courtroom suggested that the parties agree upon 
wording for an amended mittimus by that date.
On July 30, 1996, the problem and parties were again before 
the court. On that date, Assistant State's Attorney Norbut represented to the 
court that she had been advised by various individuals employed by the 
Department of Corrections, including Jan Day, a records officer, Day's 
supervisor and Rachel McKenzie of the legal department, as to the proper wording 
of an amended mittimus that would effectuate the original intent of the court 
and the parties. Based upon that advice, Norbut and Assistant Public Defender 
Mary Rosiek-Cardin agreed upon language to be included in an order addressing 
the problem and authorizing the preparation of an amended mittimus in each case. 
An amended mittimus was in fact prepared in each case on July 30, 1996. The 
amended mittimus in cause No. 95-CF-5461 stated that defendant was to receive as 
credit against his six-year sentence "credit for 72 days actually served with 
credit for 72 days good time for a total of 144 days total to be aggregated to 
credit in 94 CF 5886." The amended mittimus in cause No. 94-CF-5886 stated that 
defendant was to receive as credit against his two-year sentence "credit for 125 
days actually served with credit for 125 days good time for a total of 250 days 
total to be aggregated to credit in 95 CF 5461."
On June 16, 1997, Cardin again appeared before the judge, 
this time with Assistant State's Attorney Susan Gerber, advising that 
defendant's transfer from Dixon Correctional Center to Robinson Correctional 
Center had engendered another intrainstitutional credit crisis among Department 
clerical employees concerned with such matters, and thus, Robinson Correctional 
Center was "not honoring the Court order." Cardin advised the court, "We put in 
the court order exactly what Dixon wanted." The judge directed Cardin to "sit 
down with the clerk and make sure [each mittimus was] worded exactly" in 
conformance with the court's prior order. The resulting amended mittimus of June 
19, 1997, in cause No. 95-CF-5461 refers to a six-year sentence and states that 
defendant is to be "given credit for 72 days actually served with credit for 72 
days good time ordered to apply for a total of 144 days. This time actually 
served and good time credit to be aggregated to 125 days time actually served 
and 125 days good time credit in 94 CF 5886." The amended mittimus in cause No. 
94-CF-5886 refers to a two-year sentence "consecutive to 95 CF 5461" with 
defendant to receive "credit for 125 days actually served with credit for 125 
days good time ordered to apply for a total of 250 days. This time actually 
served and good time credit to be aggregated to 72 days time actually served and 
72 days good time credit in 95 CF 5461."
On October 20, 1997, the Illinois Department of Corrections 
filed with this court a motion for leave to file a petition for an original writ 
of mandamus challenging what the Department argues is a double credit 
to defendant ordered by the circuit court in this case. We granted the 
Department's motion on December 3, 1997. On that date this court also granted 
leave to appeal in People v. Latona, No. 84102, and People v. Martinez, 
No. 84125. This case was consolidated with Latona and Martinez for review only 
because of the similar sentence credit issue presented therein.
We note at the outset of our analysis that issuance of a 
writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, discretionary in nature 
and appropriate only where there is a clear right to the requested relief, a 
clear duty of the respondent to act, and clear authority in the respondent to 
comply with the writ. Orenic v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 
127 Ill. 2d 453, 467-68 (1989); League of Women Voters v. County of 
Peoria, 121 Ill. 2d 236, 242-43 (1987). We may consider a petition for writ 
of mandamus when it presents an issue that is novel and of crucial 
importance to the administration of justice, even if all the normal requirements 
for the writ's award are not met initially. Orenic, 127 Ill. 2d  at 
468.
The Department requests that this court grant a writ of 
mandamus "directing the circuit court to vacate the orders awarding 
defendant Williams aggregate in-custody credit." According to the Department, 
mandamus is warranted because: (1) the issue of aggregate sentence 
credit is one of considerable importance to the administration of justice; (2) 
the trial court's orders were not in conformance with statutory requirements; 
(3) the court's orders are void in that it no longer had jurisdiction when the 
orders were entered; and (4) the court lacked jurisdiction over the Department 
in any event. We will address these contentions in order and only to the extent 
necessary for our disposition.
While our consideration of the issue of aggregate sentence 
credit in the context of consecutive sentencing evinces our determination that 
the matter is, as the Department suggests, "of importance to the administration 
of justice," that does not mean mandamus is appropriate here. The issue 
has now been resolved. Consequently, that factor does not figure prominently in 
our decision.
As we have previously stated in the course of our factual 
recitation, it is unclear from the record whether the separate sentence credits 
given defendant Williams in each case correspond to entirely separate periods of 
incarceration or whether there were periods of time when defendant was in 
simultaneous custody for both offenses and he may have received overlapping 
sentence credit to some extent. Given the state of the record before us, we see 
no clear evidence that the circuit court's credit calculations are 
incorrect or that its orders would result in an erroneous application of the 
provisions of section 5-8-4(e)(4) of the Code. Mandamus will not lie 
where the Department has not demonstrated a clear right to the relief requested. 
Orenic, 127 Ill. 2d  at 467-68.
We turn next to consider the Department's contention that 
the circuit court's orders were void because the court no longer had 
jurisdiction when the orders were entered. We disagree. Jurisdiction to modify 
the original judgment was not necessary because the original judgment was not 
modified.
While a court may not modify its judgment after it 
has lost jurisdiction of a case, it may correct the record to make it 
accurately reflect the judgment that was in fact entered. People v. 
Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381, 394 (1991); People v. Glenn, 25 Ill. 2d 82, 85 (1962). The power to do so extends to the amendment of a mittimus 
(Baker v. Department of Corrections, 106 Ill. 2d 100, 106 (1985)), 
which can be accomplished at any time (People v. Anderson, 407 Ill. 503, 505 (1950)). The circuit court had the authority to enter an order amending 
the mittimus in each case to reflect that which was previously done and to 
implement the judgment it had originally entered. That is what the court 
did.
In summary, the circuit court presided over defendant 
Williams' negotiated plea and sentence on November 30, 1995. At that time, the 
defense and the State agreed that Williams was to receive 197 days' total 
sentence credit for actual days served. The court concurred in the plea 
agreement and sentenced defendant accordingly. A mittimus was prepared in each 
case, allowing defendant a 72-day credit in one case and a 125-day credit in the 
other. Subsequently, it was discovered that the Department of Corrections was 
not affording defendant the sentence credit that the court intended and to which 
the State and defense agreed. The court having apprised the parties of the 
Department's actions, the assistant State's Attorney consulted with the 
Department of Corrections and, with its input, and with the help of defense 
counsel and the approval of the court, fashioned an order intended to better 
reflect and clarify the court's original judgment, and see to it that defendant 
received sentence credit pursuant to the parties' negotiated plea agreement. 
While the orders and mittimuses thus prepared may not resolve the issue of 
sentence credit to the Department's satisfaction, we reject its argument that 
the circuit court lacked the authority to enter them.
In passing, we note, with an appreciation of the irony and 
incongruity, that in Baker, 106 Ill. 2d  at 104, it was the 
Department that repeatedly urged the trial judge to amend the mittimus, 
well after the court had lost jurisdiction to modify the judgment itself. It 
appears that the Department indirectly participated in the amendments in this 
case as well through contact with the State's Attorney's office. The 
Department's current position is not only untenable, but would also seem to be 
more a product of convenience than conviction.
Finally, the Department claims that "the trial court's 
orders, compelling the Department of Corrections to apply aggregate credit, 
entered in a proceeding in which the Department of Corrections was not a party, 
are void." According to the Department, pursuant to section 5-8-4(e)(4) of the 
Code, "the calculation of a criminal defendant's prison term and the appropriate 
method of applying credit are matters entrusted solely to the Department of 
Corrections." The Department, it seems, objects to what it perceives as an 
attempt on the part of the trial court to order credit applied "in a particular 
manner" by "aggregating" the credits in defendant's two cases.
We find the Department's in personam jurisdiction 
argument particularly troubling. Judgments and mittimuses are prepared every day 
directing the Department to confine persons in correctional facilities and 
specifying the sentence credit due them. Surely the Department does not 
seriously suggest that it is free of any duty to confine those committed and 
grant them the credit specified because it is not a party to the proceedings in 
the circuit court. It cannot actually contend that the records officers at each 
of its facilities may routinely question the judicial interpretations inherent 
in every sentence. Yet, both propositions would seem to be logical extensions of 
the Department's argument.
Although we recognize that this court has held the 
extraordinary remedy of mandamus to be a proper remedy where a trial 
judge has imposed sentences not authorized by law (see People ex rel. Baker 
v. Cowlin, 154 Ill. 2d 193 (1992)), we see no clear evidence that has 
occurred here. Consequently, we deem it unnecessary to reach the Department's 
final issue given the procedural posture of this case. As we have previously 
stated, it is not evident from the record that the circuit court incorrectly 
applied the law in its order or that it lacked the authority to enter the order 
directing amendment of the mittimuses. If the circuit court was correct in its 
application of the law, our treatment of this issue now could result in a hollow 
pronouncement with no substantive effect in the case at bar. A court of review 
will not ordinarily consider issues that are not essential to the disposition of 
the cause before it; nor will it decide moot or abstract questions, review cases 
merely to establish precedent, or render advisory opinions. Condon v. 
American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 136 Ill. 2d 95, 99 
(1990).
For all the reasons heretofore stated, the judgment of the 
appellate court in No. 84102 is vacated and the cause is remanded to the circuit 
court; the judgment of the appellate court in No. 84125 is affirmed in part and 
reversed in part and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed; and the 
Department's request for a writ of mandamus in No. 84221 is 
denied.
No. 84102-Appellate court judgment 
vacated;
cause remanded with 
directions.
84125-Appellate court judgment 
affirmed
in part and reversed in 
part;
circuit court judgment 
affirmed.
No. 84221-Writ 
denied.