Title: STATE v PUZIO ALLEN

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 14628 I N THE SUPREME COuKr O F THE STATE O F Imwmw 1979 THE STATE O F MXFANA, Plaintiff and Appellant, -vs- GRJXDW P U Z I O and CELESTE ALLEN, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal fran: D i s t r i c t Court of the Thirteenth Judicial D i s t r i c t , Honorable Charles Luedke, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Pbntana Mike WCarter, Assistant Attomey General, argued, Helena, Mtana Harold F. Hanser, County Attorney, Billings, Wntana Jock W e s t argued, Deputy County Attomey, Billings, mntana For Respondents: mses, Tolliver and Wright, Billings, mntana Ralph S. Wright argued, Billings, lbntana John L. Adams argued, Billings, mntana -- Submitted: M a y 1, 1979 Decided : Lrm~ 3 0 1979 Filed: -KAY in 1 9 7 9 -- - & ! W . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Defendants w e r e a r r e s t e d on November 28, 1977, and subsequently charged with t h e crime of c r i m i n a l possession w i t h i n t e n t t o s e l l dangerous drugs. T r i a l w a s set by t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r October 10, 1978, some t e n and one-half months, o r 317 days, a f t e r a r r e s t . On September 26, 1978, defendant Puzio moved t o dismiss t h e m a t t e r f o r l a c k of a speedy t r i a l . The D i s t r i c t Court granted t h e motion. The S t a t e appeals under s e c t i o n 95-2403, R.C.M. 1947, now sec- t i o n 46-20-103 MCA. Before considering t h e speedy t r i a l i s s u e , however, w e must c l a r i f y a q u e s t i o n of t h e record w e w i l l consider. Both p a r t i e s i n t h e i r b r i e f s make statements of f a c t con- cerning t h e p a r o l e revocation of defendant Puzio which are n o t supported i n t h e record. The p a r t i e s on appeal a r e bound by t h e record and may n o t add a d d i t i o n a l f a c t s i n t h e i r b r i e f s o r by appendices t h e r e t o . T h r i f t v. T h r i f t (1918), 54 Mont. 463, 171 P. 272; Farmers S t a t e Bank of Conrad v. Iverson (1973), 162 Mont. 130, 509 P.2d 839. The statements of f a c t n o t contained i n t h e record concerning t h e p a r o l e revocation of defendant Puzio have n o t been considered. I n S t a t e v. Tiedemann (1978), Mont. , 584 P.2d 1284, 1287, 35 St.Rep. 1705, 1706-07, t h i s Court d i s - cussed t h e r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l : "The r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l i s guaranteed by both t h e United S t a t e s and Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n s . U.S. Const., Amend. V I ; 1972 Mont. Const., a r t . 11, S24. The r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l i s funda- mental, Klopfer v. North Carolina (1967), 386 U.S. 213, 223, 87 S.Ct. 988, 993, 18 L.Ed.2d 1, 8, and t h e f e d e r a l standard, as a minimum, i s imposed by t h e due process c l a u s e of t h e Four- t e e n t h Amendment on t h e states. See Dickey v. F l o r i d a (1970), 398 U.S. 30, 90 S.Ct. 1564, 26 L.Ed.2d 26; Smith v. Hooey (1969), 393 U.S. 374, 89 S.Ct. 575, 21 L.Ed.2d 607. "The touchstone i n any a n a l y s i s of t h e speedy t r i a l i s s u e i s Barker v. Wingo (1972), 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d 101, 116-17, i n which t h e Supreme Court set o u t a f o u r f a c t o r balancing approach w i t h t h e conduct of both prosecution and defense being weighed. The f o u r f a c t o r s t o be considered a r e : " (1) Length of delay; " ( 2 ) Reason f o r t h e delay; " (3) Defendant's a s s e r t i o n of t h e r i g h t ; and, " ( 4 ) P r e j u d i c e t o t h e defendant. "The Court emphasized t h e n e c e s s i t y of balanc- i n g t h e f a c t o r s : "'We regard none of t h e f o u r f a c t o r s i d e n t i f i e d above a s e i t h e r a necessary o r s u f f i c i e n t con- d i t i o n t o t h e f i n d i n g of a d e p r i v a t i o n of t h e r i g h t of speedy t r i a l . Rather, they a r e r e l a t e d f a c t o r s and must be considered t o g e t h e r w i t h such o t h e r circumstances a s may be r e l e v a n t . I n sum, t h e s e f a c t o r s have no t a l i s m a n i c q u a l i t i e s ; c o u r t s must s t i l l engage i n a d i f f i c u l t and sen- s i t i v e balancing p r o c e s s . ' 407 U.S. a t 533, 92 S.Ct. a t 2193, 33 L.Ed.2d a t 118. "This Court has adopted and a p p l i e d t h e f o u r fac- t o r balancing t e s t of Barker i n a series of de- c i s i o n s d a t i n g back t o 1973. See S t a t e v. C o l l i n s (1978) I - Mont. , 582 P.2d 1179, 35 St.Rep. 993; S t a t e v. Cassidy (1978), Mont. I 578 P.2d 735, 737, 35 St.Rep. 612; S t a t e ex rel. Briceno v. D i s t r i c t Court (1977), - Mont. -, 568 P.2d 162, 164, 34 St.Rep. 927; S t a t e v. Keller (1976), 170 Mont. 372, 377, 553 P.2d 1013, 1016; S t a t e ex rel. Sanford v. District Court (1976), 170 Mont. 196, 199, 551 P.2d 1005, 1007; S t a t e v. Steward (1975), 168 ?40nt. 385, 389, 543 P.2d 178, 181; F i t z p a t r i c k v. C r i s t (1974), 165 Mont. 382, 388, 528 P.2d 1322, 1325; S t a t e v. Sanders (1973), 163 Mont. 209, 213, 516 P.2d 372, 375. W e r e a f f i r m o u r support of t h i s t e s t a s t h e cor- rect and most complete standard a v a i l a b l e t o judge speedy t r i a l questions." The Court i n Tiedemann then went on t o d i s c u s s t h e f i r s t f a c t o r , l e n g t h of delay: "Length of delay. Length of d e l a y has been re- f e r r e d t o a s t h e t r i g g e r s e t t i n g o f f t h e speedy t r i a l i s s u e i n q u i r y : "'The l e n g t h of t h e d e l a y i s t o some e x t e n t a t r i g - g e r i n g mechanism. U n t i l t h e r e i s some d e l a y which i s presumptively p r e j u d i c i a l , t h e r e i s no neces- s i t y f o r i n q u i r y i n t o t h e o t h e r f a c t o r s t h a t go i n t o t h e balance. Nevertheless, because of t h e imprecision of t h e r i g h t t o speedy t r i a l , t h e l e n g t h of d e l a y t h a t w i l l provoke such an i n q u i r y i s n e c e s s a r i l y dependent upon t h e p e c u l i a r circum- s t a n c e s of t h e c a s e . ' Barker, 407 U.S. a t 530-31, 92 S.Ct. a t 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d a t 117. "Accord, Keller, 170 Mont. a t 377, 553 P.2d a t 1017; Steward, 168 Mont. a t 389, 543 P.2d a t 181." 584 P.2d a t 1287-88, 35 St-Rep. a t 1707. I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , t h e t i m e l a p s e i s s u f f i c i e n t t o t r i g g e r a n i n q u i r y i n t o t h e o t h e r t h r e e f a c t o r s of t h e balancing test. The d e l a y (317 days, t e n and one-half months, from d a t e of a r r e s t t o d a t e set f o r t r i a l ) i s longer than o r comparable t o t h e d e l a y s found s u f f i c i e n t t o w a r r a n t d i s m i s s a l i n F i t z p a t r i c k (seven months), Cassidy ( e i g h t months), Sanford ( t e n months), Briceno ( t e n and one-half months), and Keller (eleven months). "The l e n g t h of d e l a y t h u s s h i f t s t h e burden t o t h e S t a t e of e x p l a i n i n g t h e reason f o r t h e d e l a y and showing absence of p r e j u d i c e t o defen- dant." Tiedemann, 584 P.2d a t 1288. See a l s o Cassidy, 578 P.2d a t 738; Sanford, 170 Mont. a t 200, 551 P.2d a t 1007; and F i t z p a t r i c k , 165 Mont. a t 388, 528 P.2d a t 1326. Reason -- f o r t h e delay. The p a r t i e s a g r e e t h a t n e i t h e r defendants nor t h e county a t t o r n e y ' s o f f i c e was t h e cause of any g r e a t delay i n t h i s case. They contend t h a t t h e main reason f o r t h e d e l a y was crowded c o u r t dockets and inade- q u a t e calendaring procedures. W e agree. Judge Sande had j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e c a s e a t two d i f - f e r e n t t i m e s a s d i d Judge Luedke. Both Judge Wilson and Judge Martin assumed j u r i s d i c t i o n once. The main cause of t h e d e l a y w a s t h a t t h e c a s e simply s a t from t h e t i m e Judge Wilson assumed j u r i s d i c t i o n i n A p r i l 1978 u n t i l he excused himself August 9, 1978. On August 16, 1978, Judge Sande a g a i n assumed j u r i s d i c t i o n and was a g a i n s u b s t i t u t e d by defendant Puzio. Judge Luedke a g a i n assumed j u r i s d i c t i o n , and t h e m a t t e r was e v e n t u a l l y set f o r t r i a l on October 10, The S t a t e argues it prosecuted t h e c a s e with reasonable d i l i g e n c e and should n o t be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r crowded c o u r t dockets and t h e method of scheduling trials. W e do n o t agree. The c o u r t i n Cassidy f l a t l y h e l d t h a t t h i s p o s i t i o n of t h e S t a t e i s without m e r i t . 578 P.2d a t 738. The s i t u a - t i o n h e r e i s very s i m i l a r t o t h a t found i n Briceno i n t h a t t h e m a t t e r simply s a t on t h e calendar from A p r i l 1978 u n t i l it was e v e n t u a l l y set f o r t r i a l i n October 1978. I n United S t a t e s v. Jones (D.C. C i r . 1975), 524 F.2d 834, 849, t h e Court s t a t e d : ". . . The Supreme Court has h e l d t h a t d e l a y s due t o t h e o p e r a t i o n of t h e system a l s o must be placed a t t h e Government's door, s t a t i n g i n Barker v. Wingo: " ' A defendant has no duty t o b r i n g himself t o t r i a l ; t h e S t a t e has t h a t duty a s w e l l a s t h e duty of i n s u r i n g t h a t t h e t r i a l i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h due p r o c e s s . . . [Tlhe r u l e w e announce today, which comports w i t h c o n s t i t u t i o n a l prin- c i p l e s , p l a c e s t h e primary burden on t h e c o u r t s and t h e p r o s e c u t o r s t o a s s u r e t h a t cases a r e brought t o trial. ' " W e f i n d t h a t d e l a y s i n h e r e n t i n t h e system a r e n o t chargeable t o defendants b u t r a t h e r t o t h e S t a t e . The type of i n s t i t u t i o n a l d e l a y s w e have h e r e i n enumerated, where a c a s e i s allowed t o merely s i t awaiting t r i a l , cannot be overlooked, a b s e n t counterbalancing f a c t o r s . Defendants' a s s e r t i o n of - r i g h t s . W e f i n d t h a t defen- d a n t s a s s e r t e d t h e i r r i g h t s properly under t h e g u i d e l i n e s set f o r t h by t h i s Court i n S t a t e v. Steward (1975), 168 Mont. 385, 543 P.2d 178. The following statement by t h i s Court i n Cassidy i s d i s p o s i t i v e on t h i s f a c t o r : "3. Defendant's A s s e r t i o n of t h e Right. -- "The S t a t e argues, i n t h i s r e g a r d , t h a t defendant has f a i l e d t o e x p e d i t e t h e proceedings i n t h i s c a s e through any a c t i v e pleadings b e f o r e t h e D i s - t r i c t Court, such as by r e q u e s t i n g an e a r l i e r t r i a l d a t e . I n a d d i t i o n , it i s maintained t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s motion t o dismiss f o r d e n i a l of a speedy t r i a l w a s untimely, and should have been made a t some p o i n t between e n t r y of p l e a and t h e s e t t i n g of t h e t r i a l d a t e . The S t a t e does n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y contend, however, t h a t defendant i n some manner waived h i s r i g h t t o a s s e r t a d e n i a l of a speedy t r i a l . " I t is, of course, t h e g e n e r a l r u l e under t h e p r e s e n t s t a t e of t h e law t h a t '. . . an accused must t a k e some a f f i r m a t i v e a c t i o n t o o b t a i n a t r i a l t o be e n t i t l e d t o a d i s c h a r g e f o r d e l a y . ' S t a t e v. Steward, 168 Mont. 390, 543 P.2d 182. Such burden i s s a t i s f i e d , however, by t h e mak- i n g of an a p p r o p r i a t e motion, discussed by t h i s Court i n Steward a s follows: "'The " a p p r o p r i a t e motion" i s a motion t o d i s m i s s f o r d e n i a l of a speedy trial. The proper t i m e t o a s s e r t t h e r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l i s p r i o r t o t h e a c t u a l commencement of t h e t r i a l , u s u a l l y a t t h e t i m e t h e t r i a l d a t e i s set, o r t h e t i m e t h e c a s e i s c a l l e d t o t r i a l . . .' 168 Xont. 390-91, 543 P.2d 182. "Defendant's a s s e r t i o n of t h e r i g h t i n t h i s c a s e was i n a l l r e s p e c t s proper under t h e standard o u t l i n e d i n Steward, having been made between t h e t i m e t h e m a t t e r w a s set f o r t r i a l and t h e t r i a l d a t e i t s e l f ." 578 P.2d a t 739. P r e j u d i c e - t o defendants. The f i n a l f a c t o r t o be con- s i d e r e d i n t h e balancing process i s t h e q u e s t i o n of whether defendants were prejudiced by t h e delay. This p r e j u d i c e i s f u r t h e r d e f i n e d i n Barker: " P r e j u d i c e , of course, should be a s s e s s e d i n l i g h t of t h e i n t e r e s t s of defendants which t h e speedy t r i a l r i g h t was designed t o p r o t e c t . This Court has i d e n t i f i e d t h r e e such i n t e r e s t s : (i) t o prevent oppressive p r e t r i a l incarcera- t i o n ; (ii) t o minimize a n x i e t y and concern of t h e accused; and (iii) t o l i m i t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e defense w i l l be impaired." 407 U.S. a t 532, 92 S.Ct. a t 2193, 33 L Ed 2d a t 118. w i t h regard t o oppressive p r e t r i a l i n c a r c e r a t i o n , defendant Puzio has been i n c a r c e r a t e d s i n c e t h e day of h i s a r r e s t . Defendant Allen was n o t i n c a r c e r a t e d p r i o r t o t r i a l . Puzio w a s d e t a i n e d i n t h e Yellowstone County j a i l away from h i s family and f r i e n d s during t h e e n t i r e Christmas and New Year's holidays. Then h e was given a p a r o l e revoca- t i o n and was removed from t h e county j a i l t o t h e s t a t e p r i s o n . H e was t h e n r e t u r n e d t o Yellowstone County by t h e s h e r i f f f o r each of h i s c o u r t appearances and r e t u r n e d t o t h e p r i s o n . The second i t e m t o be considered i s t h e a n x i e t y and concern of t h e accused. Here, t h e d e l a y of 317 days, along w i t h P u z i o ' s removal from B i l l i n g s a c r o s s t h e state t o Deer Lodge, and t h e i n a b i l i t y t o communicate by telephone were reasons f o r Puzio t o have a g r e a t d e a l of concern about t h e p r o g r e s s i n h i s c a s e , and a g r e a t d e a l of concern about t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of h i s defense. The l a s t c o n s i d e r a t i o n under p r e j u d i c e t o t h e defen- d a n t s i s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e defense w i l l be impaired. Barker s t a t e s t h a t t h i s concern i s t h e most s e r i o u s because t h e i n a b i l i t y of a defendant adequately t o p r e p a r e h i s case skews t h e f a i r n e s s of t h e e n t i r e system. The c o u r t i n Barker commented on t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of w i t n e s s e s dying, w i t n e s s e s unable t o recall a c c u r a t e l y e v e n t s of t h e d i s t a n t p a s t , and l o s s of memory. These i t e m s a r e always a problem because t h e r e c o r d does n o t always r e f l e c t what has been f o r g o t t e n . I n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r case, Puzio has been i n c a r c e r a t e d i n t h e s t a t e p r i s o n , a g r e a t d i s t a n c e from h i s d e f e n s e counsel and t h e scene of t h e crime. H e has n o t been a b l e t o a s s i s t i n t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of h i s defense except by letter. F u r t h e r , w i t h r e g a r d t o memory, t h e S t a t e i s t h e only benefactor s i n c e i t s p o l i c y u s u a l l y r e q u i r e s witnesses t o type t h e i r s t a t e m e n t s and s c e n a r i o s of a c t i v i t y which a r e used t o r e f r e s h t h e i r r e c o l l e c t i o n . However, l a y witnesses c a l l e d by t h e defen- d a n t s r a r e l y have t h e i r p a s t r e c o l l e c t i o n s r e f r e s h e d by s t a t e m e n t s and s c e n a r i o s prepared by them a t t h e t i m e t h e e v e n t s occurred, which, i n t h i s c a s e , was November 28, 1977--two days a f t e r Thanksgiving. W e f i n d t h e f a c t t h a t Puzio has been i n c a r c e r a t e d t h e e n t i r e t i m e s i n c e h i s a r r e s t on November 28, 1977, demon- s t r a t e s a f f i r m a t i v e p r e j u d i c e a g a i n s t him. W e reemphasize t h a t w e a r e engaged i n a d e l i c a t e b a l - ancing process. The presence of p r e j u d i c e i n t h i s case should be weighed h e a v i l y i n t h e balancing of a l l f a c t o r s . On balance, w e f i n d t h e r e has been excessive d e l a y i n b r i n g i n g t h i s case t o t r i a l ; t h e S t a t e has f a i l e d t o e x p l a i n s a t i s f a c t o r i l y t h e reasons f o r t h e delay; t h e defendants p r o p e r l y and timely a s s e r t e d t h e i r r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l ; and, p r e j u d i c e t o defendant Puzio has r e s u l t e d by reason of t h e delay. W e b e l i e v e t h e comments of now Chief J u s t i c e Haswell i n K e l l e r , a s set f o r t h i n Tiedemann a g a i n b e a r r e p e a t i n g : "This Court, as w e l l a s many o t h e r c o u r t s , has o f t e n s t a t e d t h a t s o c i e t y a t l a r g e , as w e l l a s t h e i n d i v i d u a l defendant, has a s t a k e i n t h e speedy d i s p o s i t i o n of c r i m i n a l m a t t e r s . E.g., Barker, 407 U.S. a t 519-21, 92 S.Ct. a t 2186-87, 33 L.Ed.2d a t 110-11. I n view of t h e r e s u l t i n t h i s case, t h e comments of now Chief J u s t i c e Haswell i n K e l l e r bear r e p e a t i n g : 11 1 . . .Delayed c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e proceedings a r e undermining p u b l i c confidence i n t h e system i t s e l f . J u s t i c e delayed may n o t only be j u s t i c e denied b u t j u s t i c e brought s e r i o u s l y under ques- t i o n . The backbone of law enforcement and t h e j u s t i c e system i s p u b l i c support. The c o u r t s must n o t permit t h e e r o s i o n of t h a t support by p e r m i t t i n g unnecessary d e l a y between charge and c o n v i c t i o n o r r e l e a s e . ' . . . " Tiedemann, 584 P. 2d a t 1292-93. W e s t a t e d f u r t h e r i n Tiedemann: "While w e w i l l n o t t o l e r a t e undue d e l a y i n t h e p r o s e c u t i o n of an i n d i v i d u a l defendant, n e i t h e r w i l l s o c i e t y long t o l e r a t e d i s m i s s a l of c r i m i n a l charges f o r l a c k of speedy t r i a l . Prosecutors and c o u r t s must work t o avoid t h e kind of r e s u l t w e reach today." 584 P.2d a t 1293. W e recommend t h a t t h e judges of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t of t h e S t a t e of Montana would do w e l l t o cooperate t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e s i t u a t i o n t h a t occurred i n t h i s c a s e i s n o t repeated. The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court dismissing t h e charges f o r l a c k of a speedy t r i a l i s affirmed. W e concur: %ad??$. p A w d ! Chief r u s t i c e -4- /I J u s t i c e s