Title: Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Macejko

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Macejko, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-322.] 
 
                                                                
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-322 
MAHONING COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION v. MACEJKO. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Macejko, Slip Opinion No.  
2022-Ohio-322.] 
(No. 2020-1513—Submitted June 16, 2021—Decided February 9, 2022.) 
Attorneys—Rules of Professional Conduct—Willfulness and intent of conduct 
under Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c)—Cause dismissed. 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 
Court, No. 2020-031. 
______________ 
Per Curiam Opinion announcing the judgment of the court. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Joseph Raymond Macejko, of Poland, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0070222, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1998. 
{¶ 2} In a July 2020 complaint, relator, Mahoning County Bar Association, 
alleged that Macejko violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) by 
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notarizing unsigned powers of attorney—one of which was later signed outside of 
his presence. 
{¶ 3} The parties submitted stipulations of fact and mitigating factors and 
agreed that no aggravating factors were present.  Macejko also testified at a hearing 
before a three-member panel of the Board of Professional Conduct and urged the 
panel to dismiss the complaint on the ground that his conduct was not intentional.  
After the hearing, the panel issued a report in which it found that Macejko had 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) and recommended that he be publicly reprimanded.  
The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
recommended sanction. 
{¶ 4} Macejko objects and renews his argument that relator’s complaint 
should be dismissed because Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) requires an element of intentional 
wrongdoing that is absent from this case.  For the reasons that follow, we sustain 
Macejko’s objection and dismiss relator’s complaint. 
The Conduct at Issue 
{¶ 5} In July 2017, Macejko’s friend and client, Robert Durick, asked 
Macejko to review the estate-planning documents of his parents, Joseph Jr., and 
Mary Lou Durick.  Shortly thereafter, Macejko prepared updated wills, durable 
powers of attorney, and healthcare powers of attorney for the Duricks.  Those 
documents named the couple’s three children as beneficiaries of the surviving 
spouse and designated Robert as the Duricks’ attorney-in-fact. 
{¶ 6} Macejko personally delivered the final drafts of the estate-planning 
documents to the Duricks for their review and approval in late July on his way home 
from the office.  For his own convenience, Macejko prenotarized the powers of 
attorney before leaving his office so that he would not have to remember to take his 
notary stamp and seal.  Macejko testified that he had planned to review the 
documents with the Duricks at their home that day or soon thereafter and that he 
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had planned to have the Duricks execute the documents during that meeting if the 
documents proved satisfactory to them. 
{¶ 7} When Macejko arrived at the Duricks’ home, their daughter, Janet, 
informed him that Mary Lou was not feeling well.  She asked if Macejko could 
come back another time.  He agreed to do so and left the documents for the Duricks 
to review with the expectation that Robert or Janet would call him to arrange 
another meeting.  A couple of weeks later, Robert asked Macejko to change the 
powers of attorney to designate Janet as the primary attorney-in-fact and himself as 
the successor attorney-in-fact.  Macejko testified that he made the requested 
changes to the powers of attorney on his computer but that he had intended to wait 
until he had all of the information that he needed to make the requested changes to 
the Duricks’ real-property deeds before making another trip to their home.  He also 
stipulated that he had planned to return to the Duricks’ home with a witness so that 
the Duricks could execute the documents—though we note that the document at 
issue here did not require a witness. 
{¶ 8} Sometime in August 2017, Macejko learned that the relationship 
between the Duricks’ children had deteriorated and that the Duricks had retained 
another attorney to handle their estate-planning needs.  Macejko never billed the 
Duricks for his services. 
{¶ 9} In mid-December 2017, Joseph Jr. died; he was preceded in death by 
Mary Lou in October of that year.  The will of Joseph Jr. was filed in the probate 
court as the surviving spouse.  Robert contested the will, which had left the Duricks’ 
entire estate to Janet. 
{¶ 10} One issue in the will contest was whether Macejko had prenotarized 
the estate-planning documents that he had prepared for the Duricks or whether he 
had received signed documents from the Duricks and notarized them at a later date 
outside of their presence.  Macejko was deposed in August 2019 as part of that 
action.  During Macejko’s deposition, the attorney for the estate presented an 
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executed copy of the power of attorney that Macejko had prepared and notarized 
for Mary Lou on July 28, 2017.  At that deposition, Macejko testified that he had 
never seen a copy of the executed document before his deposition and that he 
understood the Duricks had used the services of another attorney to handle their 
estate-planning needs.  Immediately after the deposition, Macejko went to his office 
and wrote a letter to relator reporting that his conduct in notarizing the documents 
may have violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Analysis 
{¶ 11} It is undisputed that (1) Macejko never saw the Duricks sign any of 
the documents that he had prepared for them, (2) the Duricks never acknowledged 
to Macejko that they had executed any of those documents, and (3) relator has 
presented evidence that one of those documents—a durable power of attorney—
was later signed by Mary Lou Durick. 
{¶ 12} R.C. 147.541 provides that in the context of a notary jurat, the words 
“acknowledged before me” mean that the person acknowledging the document 
(1) appeared before the person taking the acknowledgment, (2) acknowledged that 
he or she executed the instrument, and (3) executed it for the purposes therein 
stated.  Those words further mean that the notary knew or had satisfactory evidence 
that the person acknowledging the document was the person named in that 
document.  Id.  Macejko has admitted that his execution of the notary jurat on the 
power of attorney was a misrepresentation of fact because Mary Lou did not appear 
before him when he notarized the document.  Macejko argues, however, that 
because he did not intend for the power of attorney to be signed outside of his 
presence, his conduct did not constitute an intentional act of dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation.  He also notes that R.C. 147.141(A)(8), which took 
effect in September 2019, provides that a notary public shall not “[a]ffix the 
notary’s signature to a blank form of an affidavit or certificate of acknowledgment 
January Term, 2022 
 
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and deliver that form to another person with the intent that it be used as an affidavit 
or acknowledgment.” 
{¶ 13} Attorney-discipline cases involving the improper notarization of 
documents often involve the attorney’s having notarized one or more signed 
documents without witnessing the signature and without having the signatory 
personally appear before the attorney to acknowledge the signature.  For example, 
in Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Gottesman, 115 Ohio St.3d 222, 2007-Ohio-4791, 874 
N.E.2d 778, an attorney asked Gottesman to notarize a power of attorney 
purportedly signed by his wife.  Trusting that the signature was genuine, Gottesman 
notarized the document, swearing in the jurat that he had witnessed the wife’s 
signature when, in fact, the wife had not appeared before him or signed the 
documents.  The attorney who sought the notarization subsequently used the 
fraudulent document to obtain a line of credit secured by the residence that he 
owned with his wife.  We found that Gottesman violated DR 1-102(A)(4), the 
predecessor to Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c), and publicly reprimanded him for that 
misconduct.  See also Columbus Bar Assn. v. Dougherty, 105 Ohio St.3d 307, 2005-
Ohio-1825, 825 N.E.2d 1094 (publicly reprimanding an attorney who notarized a 
liquor-license application without witnessing the applicant’s signature, which 
turned out to be a forgery); Disciplinary Counsel v. Simon, 71 Ohio St.3d 437, 644 
N.E.2d 309 (1994) (publicly reprimanding an attorney who notarized and witnessed 
signatures on a real-property deed that had been signed outside of his presence, 
based upon the representation of the grantors’ son that the grantors had signed the 
document).  The notarization in Gottesman legitimized a fraudulent signature that 
had been placed on the document outside of the notary’s presence. 
{¶ 14} We have also publicly reprimanded attorneys who have notarized 
unsigned documents and then delivered them to others with the intent that they be 
executed outside of the notarizing attorney’s presence.  In Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. 
Thompson, 129 Ohio St.3d 127, 2011-Ohio-3095, 950 N.E.2d 550, we adopted a 
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consent-to-discipline agreement in which Thompson, an attorney, stipulated that he 
had notarized two unsigned documents in contravention of their jurats and had 
delivered the documents to his former law partner, who later presented the 
prenotarized documents to his business associate to be signed outside of 
Thompson’s presence.  The business associate did not sign the documents.  Unlike 
Macejko, Thompson delivered the prenotarized documents to his former partner 
with no intent to be present for their execution.  Thompson stipulated that his 
conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c), and we publicly reprimanded him for that 
misconduct. 
{¶ 15} And in Dayton Bar Assn. v. Brown, 124 Ohio St.3d 221, 2009-Ohio-
6424, 921 N.E.2d 220, an attorney notarized two unsigned affidavits with a jurat 
stating that the affidavits had been signed in his presence.  The attorney then mailed 
those affidavits to his client for her to sign.  Recognizing the impropriety of the 
notarization, the client refused to sign both affidavits.  Brown did not answer the 
disciplinary complaint or otherwise appear at the board proceeding.  We adopted 
the board’s findings that relator had established by clear and convincing evidence 
that Brown’s failure to ensure the authenticity of his client’s signature on the two 
affidavits violated DR 1-102(A)(4) and other disciplinary rules prohibiting lawyers 
from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice and 
conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law.  Because 
Brown had committed additional misconduct and failed to cooperate in the 
disciplinary investigation, we indefinitely suspended him from the practice of law. 
{¶ 16} In contrast to Brown, who mailed prenotarized documents to his 
client for her signature, defaulted in the proceedings before the board, and presented 
no evidence in his defense, Macejko has maintained throughout these proceedings 
that he always intended for the Duricks to execute the prenotarized documents in 
his presence.  He further acknowledged that when he left the documents for the 
Duricks to review, he should have removed the pages containing his notary jurat. 
January Term, 2022 
 
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{¶ 17} To support his argument that this case should be dismissed, Macejko 
points to this court’s decision in Disciplinary Counsel v. Freedman, 110 Ohio St.3d 
284, 2006-Ohio-4480, 853 N.E.2d 291, in which we publicly reprimanded an 
attorney who asked an associate to notarize his signature on a mortgage instrument 
and deed on which he had left the signature lines for his wife blank.  After the 
associate notarized the documents, Freedman signed his wife’s name to both 
documents.  The associate later averred that, because she had trusted that Freedman 
would not ask her to improperly notarize a document, she did not examine the jurat 
language and did not realize that she was notarizing the wife’s missing signature.  
Although Freedman was found to have violated DR 1-102(A)(4), Macejko notes 
that the associate was never charged with misconduct for notarizing documents 
containing blank signature lines.  Macejko contends that the associate was not 
charged because, like him, she had notarized the unsigned documents without 
intending to make a misrepresentation. 
{¶ 18} Macejko also notes that on at least one occasion, we have dismissed 
an alleged violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) on the ground that the attorney did not 
engage in an intentional act of dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.  In 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Mecklenborg, 139 Ohio St.3d 411, 2014-Ohio-1908, 12 
N.E.3d 1166, an attorney, who was also a member of the Ohio House of 
Representatives, was arrested and charged with operating a vehicle while 
intoxicated (“OWI”) in Indiana; his driving privileges were suspended in that state 
for refusing to take a breath test.  Four days after his arrest and arraignment—and 
acting on the advice of counsel—Mecklenborg appeared at an Ohio licensing 
agency and applied to renew his expired Ohio driver’s license.  There, he signed a 
form containing preprinted statements attesting that his driving privileges had not 
been suspended, revoked, or canceled and that he had no pending motor-vehicle-
related violations in Ohio or any other state.  We adopted the board’s 
recommendation that we dismiss a stipulated violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) on 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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the ground that Mecklenborg did not engage in an intentional act of dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.  Nevertheless, we accepted the parties’ 
stipulation that Mecklenborg’s OWI and negligent misrepresentation of facts on his 
application to renew his driver’s license adversely reflected on his fitness to 
practice law in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h).  And we publicly reprimanded him 
for that misconduct. 
{¶ 19} We note that the preamble to the Rules of Professional Conduct at 
paragraph 19 states: 
 
Failure to comply with an obligation or prohibition imposed 
by a rule is a basis for invoking the disciplinary process.  The rules 
presuppose that disciplinary assessment of a lawyer’s conduct will 
be made on the basis of the facts and circumstances as they existed 
at the time of the conduct in question and in recognition of the fact 
that a lawyer often has to act upon uncertain or incomplete evidence 
of the situation.  Moreover, the rules presuppose that whether or not 
discipline should be imposed for a violation, and the severity of a 
sanction, depend on all the circumstances, such as the willfulness 
and seriousness of the violation, extenuating factors, and whether 
there have been previous violations. 
 
Additionally, Gov.Bar R. IV(1) provides, “The willful breach of the Rules shall be 
punished by reprimand, suspension, disbarment, or probation as provided in Gov. 
Bar R. V.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 20} There can be no doubt that Macejko exhibited poor judgment in 
prenotarizing the Duricks’ powers of attorney and relinquishing control of those 
documents to the Duricks without voiding or removing the completed notary jurats.  
Indeed, we have stated that notaries “ ‘must not take a cavalier attitude toward their 
January Term, 2022 
 
9 
notary responsibilities and acknowledge the signature of persons who have not 
appeared before them,’ ” Lorain Cty. Bar Assn. v. Kennedy, 95 Ohio St.3d 116, 
117, 766 N.E.2d 151 (2002), quoting Lorain Cty. Bar Assn. v. Papcke, 81 Ohio 
St.3d 91, 93, 689 N.E.2d 549 (1998), because under Evid.R. 902(8), notarized 
documents are self-authenticating, id.  Here, however, Macejko testified that he had 
never prenotarized documents before the single incident at issue in this case—and 
that he never would again. 
{¶ 21} The parties stipulated that Macejko did not act with a dishonest or 
selfish motive, that he self-reported his error as soon as he realized that it had 
occurred, and that he exhibited a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary 
proceedings.  Macejko has also submitted 17 letters attesting to his honesty, good 
character, and reputation—most of which are from attorneys and judges who were 
aware of the charges against him.  Moreover, it appears that just one document was 
signed outside of Macejko’s presence, and there is no evidence that it was used for 
any purpose in the month that had elapsed between the time that Macejko left the 
document with the Duricks and their execution of new estate-planning documents. 
{¶ 22} Because Macejko always intended that the Duricks’ estate-planning 
documents would be executed in his presence, we find that his conduct did not 
amount to a willful breach of the rules.  We also find that his conduct was not nearly 
as egregious as the conduct at issue in Gottesman, Thompson, Brown, and 
Freedman, in which attorneys notarized signed documents without having the 
signatory appear before them, notarized unsigned documents with no intention of 
being present for their execution, or forged signatures on documents notarized by 
others.  And all but one of those cases resulted in a public reprimand—the lowest 
sanction that we impose for attorney misconduct.  See Gov.Bar R. V(12)(I) and (K). 
{¶ 23} On these facts, we decline to find that Macejko engaged in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation in violation of 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c). 
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{¶ 24} Accordingly, we sustain Macejko’s objection and dismiss this case. 
Cause dismissed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and DEWINE, J., concur. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs, with an opinion joined by DEWINE, J. 
STEWART, J., concurs in judgment only. 
BRUNNER, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by FISCHER and DONNELLY, 
JJ. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, J., concurring. 
{¶ 25} Because respondent, Joseph Raymond Macejko, did not willfully 
violate Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) when he notarized 
unsigned powers of attorney, I concur in the majority’s decision to dismiss this 
case.  I write separately to respond to the dissent’s contention that discipline is 
permissible and warranted. 
{¶ 26} Gov.Bar R. IV(1) provides: “The Ohio Rules of Professional 
Conduct, effective February 1, 2007, as amended, shall be binding upon all persons 
admitted to practice law in Ohio.  The willful breach of the Rules shall be punished 
by reprimand, suspension, disbarment, or probation as provided in Gov. Bar R. V.”  
Neither the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar nor the Rules of 
Professional Conduct define the word “willful.”  However, when interpreting a 
court rule, we give undefined words their ordinary meaning.  See Erwin v. Bryan, 
125 Ohio St.3d 519, 2010-Ohio-2202, 929 N.E.2d 1019, ¶ 22.  And willful 
misconduct, we have explained, involves “an intentional deviation from a clear duty 
or from a definite rule of conduct.”  Anderson v. Massillon, 134 Ohio St.3d 380, 
2012-Ohio-5711, 983 N.E.2d 266, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 27} Therefore, for Macejko to be subjected to discipline for violating 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) in this case, there must be evidence showing that he willfully 
January Term, 2022 
 
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and intentionally misrepresented that he had witnessed one of his clients sign a 
power of attorney in his presence.  The evidence in this case does not support a 
finding that Macejko acted with that mental state. 
{¶ 28} In this case, Macejko prepared a package of estate-planning 
documents for his clients to sign, and he intended to review those documents with 
his clients at their home and have them execute the documents in his presence.  He 
prenotarized the powers of attorney to avoid forgetting to take his notary stamp and 
seal to the clients’ home.  When he arrived at his clients’ home, he learned 
unexpectedly that he would be unable to meet with the clients, and he left the packet 
of estate-planning documents with the clients’ daughter.  However, Macejko did 
not intend for any of those documents to be signed by the clients outside of his 
presence, and when he learned that one of the powers of attorney had been signed, 
he self-reported his actions to relator. 
{¶ 29} The evidence presented in this case demonstrates that Macejko did 
not intend to misrepresent that he had been present and witnessed one of his clients 
sign a power of attorney.  And it is for this reason that the cases on which the dissent 
relies are distinguishable.  In each of those cases, the disciplined attorney had 
notarized documents that had already been signed outside of the attorney’s 
presence.  See Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Gottesman, 115 Ohio St.3d 222, 2007-Ohio-
4791, 874 N.E.2d 778; Columbus Bar Assn. v. Dougherty, 105 Ohio St.3d 307, 
2005-Ohio-1825, 825 N.E.2d 1094; Disciplinary Counsel v. Simon, 71 Ohio St.3d 
437, 644 N.E.2d 309 (1994).  Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, this distinction is 
material.  While Macejko did not intend to misrepresent that one of his clients had 
signed a legal document in his presence, the attorneys in each of the cases cited by 
the dissent did intend to make such a misrepresentation.  Those attorneys knew that 
the documents had been signed outside of their presence, and they therefore 
intentionally misrepresented that they had witnessed the signatures.  The attorneys 
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in those cases may have acted in good faith, but they nonetheless willfully and 
intentionally engaged in conduct involving misrepresentation. 
{¶ 30} What is immaterial, however, is whether the documents Macejko 
notarized were forged or whether his actions created a risk of forgery or of 
facilitating fraud, as the dissent contends.  The sole question presented in this case 
is whether Macejko willfully and intentionally committed professional misconduct.  
Because the evidence in this case does not establish that Macejko acted with that 
mental state, I concur in the majority’s decision to dismiss this case. 
DEWINE, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
BRUNNER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 31} I disagree with the majority’s decision to dismiss the complaint 
against respondent, Joseph Raymond Macejko. 
{¶ 32} This case is focused on Macejko’s notarization of a power of 
attorney that he had prepared for Mary Lou Durick.  He notarized the document on 
July 28, 2017, before Mary Lou had signed it.  He knew he would be delivering the 
document to her later that day and he anticipated that she would review and execute 
the document “at that time * * * or very soon thereafter.”  He chose to notarize the 
document in advance for his own convenience; he did not want to take his notary 
stamp and seal with him to their meeting, because when he had taken them out of 
his office in the past, he had forgotten to bring them back, which was an 
inconvenience the next time he needed them.  But Macejko did not meet with Mary 
Lou when he delivered the document on July 28, and at no point after that did he 
witness Mary Lou execute the power of attorney or have her acknowledge to him 
that she had signed the document.  Instead, Mary Lou appears to have signed the 
power of attorney outside of Macejko’s presence.  She and her husband later passed 
away and the document became an issue in litigation over her husband’s will. 
{¶ 33} Under Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c), it is professional misconduct for an 
January Term, 2022 
 
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attorney to “engage in conduct involving * * * misrepresentation.”  Macejko 
maintains that intent is an element of this rule.  He further claims that he always 
intended to be present when Mary Lou executed the prenotarized document, and he 
argues that this means he did not make an intentional misrepresentation in violation 
of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c).  He therefore asks this court to dismiss the complaint 
against him. 
{¶ 34} The lead opinion grants Macejko the dismissal he seeks, apparently 
on the premise that Macejko’s subjective intent at the time he notarized the power 
of attorney makes him not culpable.  It reasons that Macejko’s conduct was not a 
“willful breach” of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) and “not nearly as egregious” as the 
conduct of attorneys in several analogous cases.  Lead opinion, ¶ 22. 
{¶ 35} This reasoning does not hold up.  Two of the cases discussed by the 
majority involved attorneys who notarized documents that had already been signed 
outside of their presence.  See Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Gottesman, 115 Ohio St.3d 
222, 2007-Ohio-4791, 874 N.E.2d 778; Columbus Bar Assn. v. Dougherty, 105 
Ohio St.3d 307, 2005-Ohio-1825, 825 N.E.2d 1094.  We imposed a public 
reprimand in both cases.  Gottesman at ¶ 6- ; Dougherty at ¶ 9, 17.  The present 
case involves the same basic actions, but in reverse order: Macejko notarized the 
document first and then allowed it to be signed outside of his presence.  This 
difference is immaterial, however, because the same risk is presented, regardless 
whether the improper notarization occurred before or after the document was 
signed. 
{¶ 36} One of the main purposes of a notarization requirement is to protect 
against fraud.  See Closen & Dixon, Notaries Public From the Time of the Roman 
Empire to the United States Today, and Tomorrow, 68 N.D.L.Rev. 873, 874 (1992).  
Such fraud can occur when a signature is forged or when a signature is genuine but 
the signatory later claims it is a forgery in an attempt to avoid obligations created 
by the signature.  Id. at 874, fn. 6.  Because notarization provides protection against 
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this type of fraud, when a properly notarized document is presented in court as 
evidence, it does not need to be authenticated through extrinsic evidence.  A 
properly notarized document is self-authenticating.  See Evid.R. 902(8) (“Extrinsic 
evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility is not required 
with respect to the following: * * * Documents accompanied by a certificate of 
acknowledgment executed in the manner provided by law by a notary public or 
other officer authorized by law to take acknowledgments”). 
{¶ 37} When an attorney notarizes a document that was not signed in his 
presence, the attorney risks facilitating fraud.  In particular, the notarization may 
help a forged signature effect additional unlawful actions.  And that is exactly what 
happened in both Gottesman and Dougherty.  In both cases, the attorney’s improper 
notarization was used to legitimize a forged signature.  Gottesman at ¶ 3; Dougherty 
at ¶ 8. 
{¶ 38} The risk created by Macejko’s actions is the same.  By notarizing 
unsigned documents and leaving them at Mary Lou’s home, Macejko created a risk 
that Mary Lou’s signature could be forged on any of the documents, such as the 
power of attorney, which could then be used as a self-authenticating document to 
achieve an unlawful end. 
{¶ 39} One difference here is that we are not presented with any evidence 
that Mary Lou’s signature was forged or used for any unlawful purpose, but 
Macejko deserves no credit for that.  He never followed up with Mary Lou after 
delivering the prenotarized power of attorney to her home on July 28, 2017. 
{¶ 40} Nor does the fact that Mary Lou’s signature was not forged justify 
declining to find a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) or failing to impose a public 
reprimand.  In another case cited by the majority, an attorney notarized and 
witnessed signatures on a real-property deed that had been signed outside of his 
presence, based on the representation of the grantors’ son that the grantors had 
signed the document.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. Simon, 71 Ohio St.3d 437, 644 
January Term, 2022 
 
15 
N.E.2d 309 (1994).  In Simon, we did not indicate that the signatures had been 
forged.  Nonetheless, because the deed had been signed outside of the attorney’s 
presence, we found that the notarization constituted “conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation” and we imposed a public reprimand.  Id. at 438. 
{¶ 41} The result should be the same here.  Macejko admits that his 
“execution of the notary jurat on the power of attorney [that he had prepared] for 
Mary Lou Durick was a misrepresentation of fact because she had not appeared 
before him at the time he signed the document.”  Whatever his intention may have 
been at that time, his actions created a risk that the power of attorney could be used 
for an unlawful purpose.  I would therefore find that he violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) 
and impose a public reprimand. 
{¶ 42} I respectfully dissent. 
FISCHER and DONNELLY, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Ronald E. Slipski and David C. Comstock Jr., for relator. 
Montgomery Jonson, L.L.P., and George D. Jonson, for respondent. 
_________________