Title: Landry v. Fuselier

State: louisiana

Issuer: Louisiana Supreme Court

Document:

88 So. 2d 218 (1956) 230 La. 271 Christopher LANDRY v. Hiram FUSELIER and Globe Indemnity Company. No. 42385. Supreme Court of Louisiana. May 7, 1956. Rehearing Denied June 11, 1956. Carmouche & Martin, Lake Charles, for plaintiff. Moss & Graham, Lake Charles, for defendant-respondent. MOISE, Justice. Under Article VII, Sec. 11, Louisiana Constitution of 1921, LSA, a writ was granted to review a judgment of the Court of Appeal for the First Circuit, 78 So. 2d 442, which affirmed a judgment of the trial court denying plaintiff workmen's compensation insurance. On April 14, 1953, Christopher Landry, a carpenter, was severely injured while assisting in the demolition of a building at Elton, Louisiana, owned by his employer, Hiram Fuselier, his son-in-law. The building rafters gave way and the building collapsed, pinning plaintiff under the lumber. As a result, he is permanently and totally disabled. Hiram Fuselier operates a service station and a grocery store, and he owns a rent house and a one-half interest in a saloon. He, likewise, owned the building which collapsed. He had leased it to the Army for use as a Trade School, at a rental of $100 per month, and when the Army discontinued the use of the building he decided to demolish it. To assist him in the demolition he employed plaintiff, who had previously worked on and off for him as a carpenter, and three other workmen. Part of the lumber was used to build a storeroom for his saloon and part to construct a new roof over his gasoline service station. He intended to use the remainder of the lumber to build a home, but this he never did. At the time of the trial he was still living in a rented house. At the time of the accident Hiram Fuselier carried workmen's compensation insurance with the defendant, Globe Indemnity Company. In previous years the coverage had mentioned carpentry, and, therefore, he was under the impression that his policy covered his repair and carpenter work as well as his service station. In fact, a payroll audit statement, rendered after the accident, shows that the Globe Indemnity Company accepted a premium for wrecking of buildings. However, the policy classified his occupation as follows: The policy also contained the two following clauses: This policy was cancelled as of May 25, 1953. Plaintiff was paid workmen's compensation until August 11, 1953, together with some of his medical and hospital bills. The insurer made full settlement with Richard Thomas, another workman injured in the same accident. When the insurer refused to make any additional payments to plaintiff, he filed suit for total and permanent disability, penalties and attorney's fees against his employer and the Globe Indemnity Company. Proceedings against the employer were subsequently withdrawn. Plaintiff contended that at the time of the accident he was doing carpentry work for his employer in his employer's trade, business or occupation in demolishing a building, and that he was entitled to recover workmen's compensation because the demolition was in connection with his employer's regular business of a filling station. He further argued that the very issuance of the policy entitled him to compensation. The trial court, having first rendered judgment for plaintiff for total and permanent disability, reversed itself on rehearing and dismissed the suit. The Court of Appeal, by a divided court, affirmed the judgment of dismissal. We have reviewed the record, and we believe that the dissenting opinion of Judge Tate correctly states the facts and the law applicable to this case. The majority opinion has placed undue emphasis on a self-serving declaration made by the employer to his own insurer, which he and his wife fully explained when placed on the witness stand under oath as witnesses for plaintiff. In his dissenting opinion, which we adopt as the opinion of this Court, Judge Tate states [78 So.2d 449]: *220 "However, this testimony is not contradicted, and I feel that the plaintiff has borne his burden of proof. "This proof is disputed only by inference and innuendo. Plaintiff is entitled to recover for total and permanent disability-that is, the sum of $30 per week for a period not exceeding 400 weeks, subject, to credit for compensation previously paid for a period of 17 weeks ending August 11, 1953. He is also entitled to recover his medical expenses up to the statutory limit. According to the record, defendant insurer has paid some of these expenses, but there is still due and unpaid the sum of $333. The fee of Dr. C. V. Hatchette, as expert witness for plaintiff, should be fixed at $50 and taxed as costs. Since the defendant insurer has not acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, we do not think that this is a case where the penalties should be imposed. For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the Court of Appeal for the First Circuit and the judgment of the Thirty-First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Jefferson Davis are reversed and set aside; and, it is now ordered that there be judgment in favor of plaintiff, Christopher Landry, and against the defendant insurer, Globe Indemnity Company, in the sum of $30 per week, during plaintiff's period of disability, not exceeding 400 weeks (beginning April 14, 1953), subject to credit for compensation paid for a period of 17 weeks up to August 11, 1953, with interest on past due weekly payments of $30 from the date each was due, and in the further sum of $333 for medical expenses, with legal interest from date of judicial demand; and, it is further ordered that the expert fee of Dr. C. V. Hatchette be fixed at $50 and taxed as costs. Defendant, Globe Indemnity Company, is to pay all costs.