Title: Seiniger Law Office v. North Pacific Insurance Co. Summary judment under the common fund doctrine

State: idaho

Issuer: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 33192 
 
SEINIGER LAW OFFICE, P.A. and WM.  
BRECK SEINIGER, JR., Attorney at Law,  
and VIVIAN JENNINGS,                   
                                                         
     Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Respondents,    
                                                                         
 v.                                                      
                                                         
NORTH PACIFIC INSURANCE  
COMPANY, a foreign corporation, 
CAMBRIDGE INTEGRATED SERVICES,  
a foreign corporation, LIBERTY  
NORTHWEST, a foreign corporation, and  
ONE BEACON INSURANCE COMPANY, a  
foreign corporation,       
                                                         
    Defendants-Respondents-Cross Appellants.   
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Twin Falls, November 2007 Term 
 
2008 Opinion No. 11 
 
Filed:  January 25, 2008 
 
Stephen Kenyon, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Twin Falls County.  Honorable John K. Butler, District Judge. 
 
The judgment is affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further 
proceedings. 
 
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC, Boise; Gordon Law Offices, Chtd., Boise; 
and Carty Law, P.A., Boise, for appellants-cross-respondents.  John Runft argued. 
 
Maguire & Kress, Pocatello, for respondents-cross appellants.  David Maguire 
argued. 
 
                               _______________________________________________ 
 
 
HORTON, Justice. 
 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellants Breck Seiniger and 
Vivian Jennings (collectively “Appellants”), awarding damages and attorney fees and costs as to 
their claim against Respondent North Pacific Insurance Company (North Pacific) under the 
common fund doctrine.  On appeal, Appellants assert the district court erred by failing to 
consider their claim based upon breach of contract and denying their motion to amend their 
 
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complaint to assert a claim for punitive damages.  North Pacific also cross-appeals the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment and award of attorney fees and costs.  We affirm in part, 
vacate the award of attorney fees and remand for further proceedings. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Jennings suffered bodily injuries as a result of an automobile accident.  Jennings was 
insured by North Pacific.  The driver of the other vehicle, Michael Wilhelm, was insured by 
Farm Bureau Insurance Company (Farm Bureau).  Jennings’s insurance policy provided medical 
pay coverage, obligating North Pacific to pay up to $5,000 for medical expenses she incurred as 
a result of her injuries.  The policy provided North Pacific with a subrogation interest in any 
third-party claim which Jennings might bring.  North Pacific paid the $5,000 policy limits for 
Jennings’s medical expenses. 
Jennings retained Seiniger to represent her in an action against Wilhelm.  Seiniger sent a 
letter of representation to North Pacific, notifying it that Jennings was pursuing a third-party 
claim against Farm Bureau and Wilhelm and offering to pursue North Pacific’s subrogation 
claim on a contingent fee basis and for a pro rata share of the costs.  North Pacific declined the 
offer and advised Seiniger that it would pursue its subrogation claim directly against Farm 
Bureau.  Seiniger replied by informing North Pacific of this Court’s decision in Wensman v. 
Farmers Ins. Co., 134 Idaho 148, 997 P.2d 609 (2000), and asserting his entitlement to fees and 
costs for any recovery made on behalf of North Pacific.  North Pacific responded that Seiniger’s 
services were not needed because it was bound by an intercompany arbitration agreement with 
Farm Bureau and that it was obligated to use its in-house counsel.   
North Pacific initiated arbitration proceedings against Farm Bureau by filing with 
Arbitration Forums, Inc., an inter-insurance company arbitration service.  North Pacific’s 
arbitration demand was accompanied by a request for a one-year deferral of the arbitration 
proceedings while Jennings’s injury claim was pending.  The deferral was granted. 
As a result of mediation involving Seiniger and Farm Bureau (acting on behalf of its 
insured), Jennings settled her claim against Wilhelm for $117,500.  Although North Pacific was 
not a party to the mediation, Farm Bureau refused to settle unless the settlement also addressed 
North Pacific’s $5,000 subrogated interest.  As a result, Jennings entered into a Release and 
Indemnity Agreement.  This agreement acknowledged Jennings’s receipt of $117,500 and 
 
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provided that Jennings would satisfy any subrogated interest of any party arising from the 
accident, specifically including subrogated claims “arising from payment for medical expenses.”   
Apparently based upon this language in the release, Seiniger requested that Farm Bureau 
issue a single check for $117,500.  Despite the absence of any action in relation to North 
Pacific’s arbitration demand, Farm Bureau issued separate checks, one for $5,000 payable to 
North Pacific, and the other for $112,500 payable to Jennings and Seiniger.  After Farm Bureau 
issued the check to North Pacific, Seiniger again demanded payment from North Pacific for a pro 
rata share of the attorney fees and costs related to the $5,000.  North Pacific refused the demand.  
Appellants brought suit against North Pacific.  The parties filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment.  Appellants also moved to amend their complaint to assert a punitive 
damages claim.  The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellants on their 
claim under the common fund doctrine, denied the motion to amend and awarded attorney fees 
and costs to Appellants.  Appellants then moved for the district court to amend the judgment to 
address their claim based upon breach of contract.  This motion was denied.  Appellants and 
North Pacific have each filed timely appeals from these decisions.     
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing a district court’s grant of summary judgment, this Court applies the 
same standard a district court uses when it rules on a summary judgment motion.  Jordan v. 
Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 589, 21 P.3d 908, 911 (2001).  Summary judgment shall be rendered when 
“the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law.”  I.R.C.P. 56(c).  This Court liberally construes the entire record in 
favor of the nonmoving party and draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party’s 
favor.  Steele v. Spokesman-Review, 138 Idaho 249, 251, 61 P.3d 606, 608 (2002).  If the 
evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, summary judgment is proper.  Id.      
III. ANALYSIS 
 
This opinion addresses the following issues, in turn: (1) whether the district court erred 
by failing to address Jennings’s claim based on breach of contract; (2) whether the district court 
erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Appellants on their common fund doctrine 
claim; (3) whether the district court erred by denying Appellants’ motion to amend their 
complaint to assert a claim for punitive damages; (4) whether the district court erred by awarding 
 
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attorney fees and costs to Appellants; and (5) whether either party is entitled to attorney fees on 
appeal. 
A.  The district court erred by failing to address Appellants’ claim for bad faith breach of 
      contract.  
The district court’s judgment was based solely on Appellants’ claim under the common 
fund doctrine.  Appellants’ first issue on appeal is their assertion that the district court erred by 
failing to address Jennings’s claim for “bad faith breach of contract.”  We agree. 
Appellants’ complaint asserted a claim for bad faith breach of contract.1  In its motion for 
summary judgment, North Pacific asserted that Jennings did not have “a legitimate bad faith 
claim.”  At oral argument before the district court, counsel for Appellants attempted to address 
this claim.  The district court declined to receive argument on the subject, stating “in reviewing 
the complaint, I see that the complaint is solely based on the common fund doctrine.”  After the 
district court entered judgment, Appellants moved to amend the judgment to reflect the Court’s 
ruling that the complaint was not “adequate to state any claim arising from or related to a breach 
of contract.”  This motion was denied.   
Generally, a claim for relief need contain only “a short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .”  I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1).  Under notice pleading, “a 
party is no longer slavishly bound to stating particular theories in its pleadings.”  Cook v. Skyline 
Corp., 135 Idaho 26, 33, 13 P.3d 857, 864 (2000) (citation omitted).  A complaint need only state 
claims upon which relief may be granted.  Id at 34, 13 P.3d at 865.  A party’s pleadings should 
be liberally construed to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive resolution of the case.  Vendelin v. 
Costco Wholesale Corp., 140 Idaho 416, 427, 95 P.3d 34, 45 (2004) (citations omitted).  The 
emphasis is to insure that a just result is accomplished, rather than requiring strict adherence to 
rigid forms of pleading.  Id.  “The key issue in determining the validity of a complaint is whether 
the adverse party is put on notice of the claims brought against it.”  Id.  Here, the question is 
whether North Pacific was put on notice of Appellant’s claim for bad faith breach of contract. 
                                                 
1 Appellants’ claim for “bad faith breach of contract” should not be confused with the tort of bad faith.  As this 
Court stated in White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., “‘the tort of bad faith is not a tortious breach of contract.  It is a 
separate intentional wrong, which results from a breach of a duty imposed as a consequence of the relationship 
established by contract.’”  112 Idaho 94, 97, 730 P.2d 1014, 1017 (1986) (quoting Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 
271 N.W.2d 368, 374 (1978)).  To establish the tort of bad faith, the party asserting the tort must demonstrate the 
following elements: (1) the insurance company intentionally and unreasonably denied or delayed payment of a 
claim; (2) the claim was not fairly debatable; (3) the denial or delay was not the result of a good faith mistake; and 
(4) the resulting harm was not fully compensable by contract damages.  Lovey v. Regence BlueShield of Idaho, 139 
Idaho 37, 48, 72 P.3d 877, 888 (2003). 
 
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The complaint is far from a model of draftsmanship and, standing alone, falls well short 
of the minimal standard imposed by I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1).  In the body of the complaint, Appellants 
simply alleged that Jennings was insured under a policy issued by North Pacific and set forth 
facts relating to the common fund claim.  The prayer for relief demanded “damages . . . for bad 
faith breach of contract.”  As an apparent substitute for well-pleaded causes of action, the 
complaint contained a catchall provision, which asserted that the complaint was intended to place 
North Pacific on notice of any claims that Appellants may have elected to pursue, even if those 
claims were based on facts not pleaded in the complaint.  Despite these deficiencies, we 
conclude North Pacific was put on notice of Appellants’ claim based on North Pacific’s answer 
to the complaint. 
In Vendelin, the defendant argued that an amended complaint was deficient as to a claim 
for punitive damages because it did not state the elements necessary to allege and prove a claim 
for punitive damages pursuant to I.C. § 6-1604.  Vendelin, 140 Idaho at 427, 95 P.3d at 45.  This 
Court concluded that the language in the amended complaint did not mirror the elements 
necessary to support an award of punitive damages.  Nonetheless, this Court upheld the award of 
punitive damages.  The Court concluded that the punitive damages claim was sufficiently plead 
because the demand portion of the complaint contained a prayer for punitive damages and the 
allegations contained in the amended complaint suggested that the prayer was based on injuries 
the plaintiff sustained from falling merchandise while shopping at the defendant’s store.  Id. at 
428, 95 P.3d at 46.  Additionally, the defendant raised three separate defenses to the claim for 
punitive damages in its amended answer.  Id.  This Court held the defendant’s answer was an 
acknowledgement of the claim for punitive damages.  Id.  (citing Zattiero v. Homedale Sch. Dist. 
Number 370, 137 Idaho 568, 572, 51 P.3d 382, 386 (2002) (rejecting claim that complaint failed 
to properly allege breach of contract, finding that  defendant acknowledged a breach of contract 
claim by filing answer which stated: “[t]o the extent that Plaintiff alleges a breach of Contract, 
Defendant did not breach such contract . . . .”)). 
Despite the glaring deficiencies in the complaint, North Pacific understood and responded 
to Jennings’s contract claim.  North Pacific’s answer raised the affirmative defense that it had 
discharged its contractual obligations to Jennings and North Pacific moved for summary 
judgment as to the bad faith breach of contract claim.  Like the defendant in Vendelin, North 
 
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Pacific’s response was sufficient to demonstrate that it had been put on notice of Appellants’ bad 
faith claim.     
North Pacific argues “[t]he prayer for relief forms no part of the statement of the cause of 
action.”  Dahlquist v. Mattson, 40 Idaho 378, 386, 233 P. 883, 885 (1925).  Even if we were to 
look past North Pacific’s affirmative defense that acknowledged the breach of contract claim, we 
would not find this argument persuasive.  First, the authority North Pacific provides in support of 
its argument predates the adoption of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure in 1958.2  Under the 
statutory rules of civil procedure in effect prior to 1958, a pleader was required to allege in a 
complaint “‘a statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise 
language.’”  Archer v. Shields Lumber Co., 91 Idaho 861, 867, 434 P.2d 79, 85 (1967) (quoting 
I.C. § 5-605 (1932)).  This is a different standard than what is required today by I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1), 
requiring a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.  
Second, consistent with the mandate of I.R.C.P. 1(a), this Court will construe the provisions of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure liberally in order to resolve cases on their merits instead of on 
technicalities.  Gerstner v. Washington Water Power Co., 122 Idaho 673, 676, 837 P.2d 799, 802 
(1992).  Therefore, in light of North Pacific’s answer to Jennings’s claim of bad faith breach of 
contract, we conclude that the district court erred by failing to address the claim.   
Normally this Court would vacate a grant of summary judgment when the trial court does 
not address a cause of action alleged in the complaint.  However, in the instant case, the error 
does not require that this matter be remanded for consideration of Appellants’ contract claim.  
The only contract damages Jennings seeks to recover flow from North Pacific’s failure to 
reimburse her for its pro rata share of fees and costs.  These damages are identical to those 
advanced under Appellants’ common fund doctrine claim.  We uphold Appellants’ recovery of 
those damages in Part III. B. of this opinion.   In Part III. C. of this opinion we uphold the district 
court’s denial of Appellants’ motion to amend their complaint to allege a claim for punitive 
damages.  Thus, inasmuch as Jennings has been awarded all damages that she might recover for 
breach of contract, we decline to remand this claim to the district court. 
                                                 
2 The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure were originally adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court, effective November 1, 
1958.  I.R.C.P. 1(a) n.1. 
 
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B.  The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Appellants based on  
      the common fund doctrine.                   
North Pacific challenges the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor 
of Appellants as to the claim based on the common fund doctrine.  North Pacific asserts that the 
common fund doctrine does not apply to the instant action because it did not consent to have 
Seiniger recover its subrogation claim and it was actively pursuing its own subrogation claim 
through arbitration.  North Pacific further argues that Seiniger did not provide an actual benefit 
to North Pacific, making the common fund doctrine inapplicable. 
Under the common fund doctrine, when an insured hires an attorney in order to pursue a 
claim against a tortfeasor “and the eventual settling of that claim results in the creation of a fund 
from which the insurer benefits, the insurer must pay a proportionate amount of the cost incurred 
in the creation of that fund.”  Wensman, 134 Idaho at 151, 997 P.2d at 612.  The general rule 
behind the common fund doctrine is that “the insured may retain out of the fund recovered from 
the wrongdoer . . . the costs and reasonable expenses incurred in the litigation, for it would be 
unjust to require him to incur expenses for the recovery of money for the benefit of the insurer, 
without being allowed to reimburse himself.”  Id. at 151-52, 997 P.2d at 612-13 (quoting 
Cedarhome v. State Farm, 81 Idaho 136, 142, 338 P.2d 93, 96 (1959)).   
Notice to the insurer is necessary before it is required to pay a proportionate share of the 
attorney fees in order to give the insurer the right to join the action and choose its own legal 
counsel, if it so elects.  Wensman, at 152, 997 P.2d at 613.  It is not necessary that the insurer 
consent to the representation by the insured because this “would essentially eliminate the 
[common] fund doctrine by allowing insurance companies to refuse the service of the attorney . . 
. knowing they would ultimately collect [their subrogation claim] from any settlement without 
having to pay a proportionate share of the costs of that settlement.”  Id.   
In Boll, the insurer refused to have its interest represented by the insured’s attorney.  140 
Idaho at 337, 92 P.3d at 1084.  This Court noted there had been some disagreement as to the 
holding in Wensman stemming from Justice Kidwell’s special concurrence, in which he stated 
“‘[t]he notice requirement would be worthless if after having been notified, the subrogee could 
not refuse the services it is being notified of.’”  Id. at 342, 92 P.3d at 1089 (citing Wensman 134 
Idaho at 153-54, 997 P.2d at 614-615 (Kidwell J. concurring)).  However, in Boll the Court 
reaffirmed its earlier articulation of the common fund doctrine, concluding that application of the 
 
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doctrine required notice and an actual benefit to the insurer, irrespective of the insurer’s consent 
to the representation by the insured.  Id.   
We decline to revisit the issue of whether the consent of the insurer is required to apply 
the common fund doctrine.  Our previous cases, including Boll, have settled this issue.  Although 
the circumstances surrounding this case are unique, we affirm the district court’s decision to 
grant summary judgment based on the common fund doctrine. 
This case is unique because of the circumstances surrounding the settlement of North 
Pacific’s subrogation claim.  North Pacific placed Appellants on notice that it did not wish for 
Appellants to pursue its subrogation claim.  However, Farm Bureau refused to settle Jennings’s 
claim unless it also settled North Pacific’s claim at the same time.  Despite the fact that North 
Pacific did not participate in the mediation between Appellants and Farm Bureau and these 
parties manifestly lacked the authority to resolve North Pacific’s claim, Farm Bureau issued a 
check to North Pacific in satisfaction of its subrogation claim.  North Pacific accepted this 
benefit when it accepted the check from Farm Bureau without pursuing its claim by way of 
arbitration.  Under the common fund doctrine, North Pacific must pay a proportionate share of 
Jennings’s costs in obtaining the benefit.   
For guidance purposes, we make it clear that neither the tortfeasor’s insurance company 
nor the insured possess the authority to insist that the insurer subrogation claim be included in a 
settlement.  It may be convenient for a tortfeasor or the tortfeasor’s insurance company to insist 
upon settling the insured’s claim and the insurer’s subrogation claim at the same time.  However, 
convenience does not justify exclusion of the injured party’s insurer from participation in the 
resolution of its claim.  In cases such as this, the insurer that wishes to avoid application of the 
common fund doctrine in cases may do so by the simple act of refusing to accept the benefits of 
a settlement in which it did not participate.          
In this case, Farm Bureau should have brought North Pacific into the negotiations in 
order to settle Appellants’ claim and North Pacific’s subrogation claim at the same time.  Failing 
that, North Pacific could have refused to accept the $5,000 check, and thus avoided application 
of the common fund doctrine.  However, once North Pacific accepted the benefits of Appellants’ 
efforts, it obligated itself to pay a proportionate amount of the attorney fees and costs associated 
with its recovery.  Therefore, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment with 
respect to the common fund doctrine. 
 
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C.  The district court properly denied Appellants’ motion to amend their complaint to   
      assert a claim for punitive damages. 
 
Appellants argue the district court applied the wrong legal standard when it denied their 
motion to amend the complaint to add a prayer for punitive damages.  We affirm the district 
court’s denial of the motion to amend. 
Appellants argue a party does not need to show both a “bad” state of mind and an 
extreme deviation from reasonable conduct as separate elements to support adding a plea for 
punitive damages.  Appellants also argue the district court failed to weigh circumstantial 
evidence regarding North Pacific’s fraudulent intent and it failed to consider the insurance policy 
as relevant, despite the fact the policy provides that North Pacific will pay its share of expenses, 
costs, and fees when it is paid out of a recovery made by the insured.  Finally, Appellants argue 
punitive damages are supported by North Pacific’s oppressive conduct in the marketplace, the 
gross disparity of bargaining power between North Pacific and Jennings, and a breach of the 
fiduciary duty North Pacific owed Jennings. 
The district court applied the correct legal standard when it ruled on Appellants’ claim for 
punitive damages.  A court shall allow the motion to amend the pleadings if, after weighing the 
evidence presented, the court concludes that the moving party has established at such hearing a 
reasonable likelihood of proving facts at trial sufficient to support an award of punitive damages.  
I.C. § 6-1604.  Punitive damages are not favored in the law and should be awarded in only the 
most unusual and compelling circumstances.  Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp., 122 Idaho 
47, 52, 830 P.2d 1185, 1190 (1992).  Idaho Code § 6-1604 provides in pertinent part: “[i]n any 
action seeking recovery of punitive damages, the claimant must prove, by clear and convincing 
evidence, oppressive, fraudulent, malicious or outrageous conduct by the party against whom the 
claim for punitive damages is asserted.” 
The issue of punitive damages “revolves around whether the plaintiff is able to establish 
the requisite ‘intersection of two factors: a bad act and a bad state of mind.’”  Myers v. 
Workman’s Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 503, 95 P.3d 977, 985 (2004) (citing Linscott v. 
Rainier Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 854, 858, 606 P.2d 958, 962 (1980)).  The action required 
to support an award of punitive damages is that the defendant “acted in a manner that was ‘an 
extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct, and that the act was performed by the 
defendant with an understanding of or disregard for its likely consequences.’”  Id. at 502, 95 P.3d 
 
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at 984 (citing Cheney v. Palo Verdes Inv. Corp., 104 Idaho 897, 905, 665 P.2d 661, 669 (1983)).  
The mental state required to support an award of punitive damages is “‘an extremely harmful 
state of mind, whether that be termed malice, oppression, fraud or gross negligence; malice, 
oppression, wantonness; or simply deliberate or willful.’”  Id.  Therefore, to support an award of 
punitive damages, Appellants must prove North Pacific’s actions towards Jennings constituted an 
extreme deviation from standards of reasonable conduct, which was done with knowledge of the 
likely consequences and an extremely harmful state of mind.   
A district court’s determination that a plaintiff is not entitled to amend the complaint to 
claim punitive damages is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  Weaver v. Stafford, 134 Idaho 691, 
700, 8 P.3d 1234, 1243 (2000).  The abuse of discretion inquiry examines (1) whether the trial 
judge correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial judge acted within 
the outer boundaries of his discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the 
specific choices available to him; and (3) whether the trial judge reached his decision through an 
exercise of reason.  Sun Valley Shopping Ctr. v. Idaho Power, 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 
1000 (1991). 
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellants’ motion to amend 
their complaint to add a claim for punitive damages.  The district court stated: “[w]hether or not 
to allow the amendment pursuant to I.C. § 6-1604 is a matter of discretion for the trial court.”  
Thus, the district court perceived the issue as discretionary.  The boundaries of the district 
court’s decision were well-defined; it could either grant or deny the motion.  The decision to 
deny the motion to amend was thus within the boundaries of its discretion.   
The only remaining issue is whether the district court’s decision was the product of 
reason.  In reaching its decision, the district court properly focused on North Pacific’s conduct.  
The district court observed that North Pacific had rejected Appellants’ offer to pursue its 
subrogation claim, that North Pacific was unaware of the mediation and that North Pacific was 
unaware of Farm Bureau’s insistence on settling its subrogation claim.  The district court 
rejected Appellants’ claim of fraud based upon North Pacific’s representation that it was actively 
pursuing its own subrogation interest, noting that there was simply no action on the part of North 
Pacific that led to Appellants’ decision to settle with Farm Bureau.  The district court’s decision 
was clearly the product of the exercise of reason.  For that reason, we affirm the district court’s 
denial of Appellants’ motion to amend the complaint to add a claim for punitive damages. 
 
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D. The award of attorney fees below must be vacated for consideration of all claims in the  
      instant action. 
 
North Pacific challenges the district court’s award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 
and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) in the amount of $6,540.63.3  The district court granted Appellants’ 
attorney fees concluding that North Pacific should have been aware of the holding in Wensman 
involving the common fund doctrine.   
Under Rule 54(e)(1), attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 “may be awarded by the court 
only when it finds, from the facts presented to it, that the case was brought, pursued or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.”  I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1).  I.C. § 12-121 applies to the 
case as a whole.  Walker v. Boozer, 140 Idaho 451, 457, 95 P.3d 69, 75 (2004) (citing Turner v. 
Willis, 119 Idaho 1023, 1025, 812 P.2d 737, 739 (1991)).  Where there are multiple claims and 
defenses, it is not appropriate to segregate those claims and defenses for purposes of awarding 
attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121.  U.S. Nat’l Bank of Oregon v. Cox, 126 Idaho 733, 735, 889 
P.2d 1123, 1125 (Ct. App. 1995). 
The district court awarded attorney fees below without considering Jennings’s claim for 
bad faith breach of contract.  Thus, it appears that the district court failed to evaluate North 
Pacific’s conduct in the case in its entirety.  Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s award of 
attorney fees and remand this matter for the district court to determine whether, considering the 
case as a whole, Appellants are entitled to attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121.      
E. Neither party is entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
 
Both parties seek attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121.  Each party has partially 
prevailed before this Court.  Therefore, we conclude that neither party is entitled to attorney fees 
on appeal. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellants with 
respect to the common fund doctrine and the denial of the motion to amend to assert a claim for 
punitive damages with respect to the common fund claim.  We vacate the award of attorney fees 
                                                 
3 Appellants sought to recover attorney fees in the amount of $20,865.25.  The district court noted that “[a]ttorney 
fees must be evaluated under a standard of reasonableness and the court must not blindly accept the fees advanced 
by an attorney and an ‘attorney cannot spend his time extravagantly and expect to be compensated by the party who 
loses at trial.’”  Craft Wall of Idaho, Inc. v. Stonebraker, 108 Idaho 704, 706, 701 P.2d 324, 326 (Ct. App. 1985).  
Under this standard, the district court reduced the award to $6,540.63. 
 
 
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and remand the case for application of the governing legal standard to the determination of the 
merits, if any, of Appellants’ request for an award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121.  We 
decline to award attorney fees on appeal. 
 
Chief Justice EISMANN, Justices BURDICK, J. JONES, and W. JONES CONCUR. 
 
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