Title: University of Florida v. Massie

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

602 So. 2d 516 (1992)
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA, et al., Petitioners,
v.
Emmett H. MASSIE, Respondent.
No. 76414.

Supreme Court of Florida.
May 28, 1992.
Rehearing Denied August 17, 1992.
*517 David A. McCranie of McConnaughhay, Roland, Maida, Cherr & McCranie, Jacksonville, for petitioners.
Terence J. Kann, Jacksonville, for respondent.
H. George Kagan of Miller, Kagan & Chait, P.A., Deerfield Beach, amicus curiae for Florida Employers Service Corp.
Harold E. Regan, Tallahassee, amicus curiae for Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers.
McDONALD, Justice.
The University of Florida and the Division of Risk Management petition this Court to review Massie v. University of Florida, 570 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), in which the First District Court of Appeal reversed the deputy commissioner's denial of Massie's application for modification of a previously entered order denying him workers' compensation. The district court held that the deputy commissioner erred by not allowing modification pursuant to section 440.28, Florida Statutes (1985), because of "a complete absence of evidence to support the finding of fact in the prior order." Id. at 977. The district court also held that its prior decision approving the deputy commissioner's denial of compensation resulted in manifest injustice which justified an exception to the law of the case *518 doctrine. We find conflict with Power v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 120 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 1960), and Victor Wine & Liquor, Inc. v. Beasley, 141 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1961).[1] For the reasons expressed below, we quash the decision of the district court and direct that the order of the deputy commissioner denying modification be reinstated.
The deputy commissioner wrote the following in his original order dated February 17, 1984:
On February 23, 1984, Massie filed a motion to vacate and set aside, or to amend, the deputy commissioner's order. At the hearing on the motion, Massie asserted that the deputy commissioner's earlier finding, that Massie's stress was no greater than that to which the general public is exposed, was without evidentiary support. The following exchange took place on the record:
The deputy commissioner denied Massie's motion by order dated March 9, 1984. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the deputy commissioner, finding that "because there was expert testimony that Massie's stress was not `unusual' and that job stress causes `everyone' to have difficulty, we must hold that the deputy's holding was supported by competent substantial evidence." Massie v. University of Florida, 463 So. 2d 383, 384 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 472 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1985) [hereafter Massie I]. In reaching this decision the district court noted that stress is an emotional condition which is difficult to qualify and that prior cases had dealt with physical hazards.
On August 22, 1985, Massie filed a request for modification of the deputy commissioner's prior order, pursuant to section *520 440.28, Florida Statutes (1985),[2] alleging a change in his condition or a mistake in the deputy commissioner's determination of facts. At the hearing on the request for modification, Massie admitted that there had been no change in his condition. However, Massie's job placement expert, Alan Pappas, testified that his testimony at the original hearing had been taken out of context by the district court, that he had not testified that Massie's stress was not unusual, that Massie's stress at work was unusual, and that on a scale of one to ten, Massie's stress would rate "eight or nine." The deputy commissioner denied the request for modification by order dated April 30, 1986, and, finding that the request was filed without reasonable grounds, taxed the costs of the proceedings against Massie.
On June 29, 1990, the district court issued Massie v. University of Florida, 570 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) [hereafter Massie II].[3] The court found that Massie had sustained a compensable accident and held that the deputy commissioner had correctly denied modification based upon a change in Massie's condition. However, the court also held that "the deputy commissioner had the authority, and indeed the duty on this record, to recognize his mistake in a determination of fact and to consider the modification sought by appellant," id. at 973, despite the prior decision affirming the original order. In the alternative, even if the deputy commissioner was without authority to modify his original order after the district court's affirmance, the district court held that it could "correct its own mistake of law and fact to avoid manifest injustice," id. at 974, because its "duty in reviewing workers' compensation cases to administer justice under the law, outweighs its duty to follow an earlier decision of the court in the same case when, due to an error in reviewing the evidence, doing so will result in manifest injustice to a party." Id. at 975.
Finding that it was confronted with a clear instance of manifest injustice, the district court reviewed Pappas's testimony and reached the following conclusions:
Id. at 976. The court then applied an exception to the law of the case doctrine and reversed the deputy commissioner. On rehearing, the court acknowledged that the deputy commissioner's statement conceding lack of evidentiary support was made at the March 5, 1984, hearing on Massie's motion to vacate or amend the original order, which took place before the original appeal, rather than at the hearing on the request for modification, which occurred after the original appeal. In all other respects, the court denied rehearing.
We must answer two questions in resolving this case. First, do the circumstances of Massie's case constitute an "accident" for purposes of workers compensation? Second, can a district court, under the circumstances of this case, reverse its prior decision sustaining the deputy commissioner's denial of compensability?
Section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes (1989),[4] defines "accident" as follows:
This Court has clarified this definition in various cases dealing with different types of workers' compensation claims. Most analogous to the case currently before us are the "heart attack" cases, those where an employee has been injured as a result of some physical failure not due to any external force or agency in the workplace and not due to an occupational disease. Typically, these cases have involved heart attacks and the aggravation of pre-existing cardiovascular disease.
In Victor Wine this Court adopted the following rule for heart attack cases:
141 So. 2d  at 588-89. This test clearly requires the occurrence of some physical strain or exertion.
This Court clarified the Victor Wine rule and extended it to other internal failures of the cardiovascular system in Richard E. Mosca & Co., Inc. v. Mosca, 362 So. 2d 1340 (Fla. 1978). Mosca suffered a ruptured congenital cerebral aneurysm at the end of a stressful business meeting and at a time when he was having business problems which caused him tension and pressure. We concluded that Mosca failed to meet the test of Victor Wine and stated:
362 So. 2d  at 1342. We have not deviated from that principle since.
In Tintera v. Armour & Co., 362 So. 2d 1344 (Fla. 1978), released the same day as Mosca, this Court agreed with the Industrial Relations Commission's denial of coverage to a claimant who had suffered a heart attack due to stress. We quoted with approval the following findings of the commission:
362 So. 2d  at 1346.
During the same year, this Court decided Richards Department Store v. Donin, 365 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1978), in which Donin asserted that a myocardial infarction, his second in four years, was "precipitated by a series of unusual, non-routine, work-related, emotionally traumatic events and circumstances compressed within a specific period of time, rather than a single isolated event." Id. at 386. Donin had experienced a substantial increase in his work duties and hours and had lost his assistant. We held the heart attack not compensable and stated:
365 So. 2d  at 386-87.
In City of Miami v. Rosenberg, 396 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1981), we again found a heart attack not compensable. Rosenberg, who had a history of heart disease, experienced stress at his job due to pressure from his superiors to retire. He was transferred to different duties, was eventually assigned no duties, and was forced to endure a confrontational atmosphere. The judge of industrial claims denied compensation, finding that "the unusual stress and over-exertion occurred over a period of six months and is not related to a `specifically identifiable event.'" Id. at 164. The Industrial Relations Commission found that Rosenberg had moved some heavy boxes during the week before his heart attack; consequently, it reversed. This Court reversed the commission and stated:
Id. at 165.
This Court has allowed compensation in situations where unusual physical exertion is accompanied by psychological stress. In Silvera v. Miami Wholesale Grocery, Inc., 400 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1981), we considered "whether Silvera's heart attack was `caused by the unusual strain or overexertion of a specifically identifiable effort not routine to the work the employee was accustomed to performing.'" Id. at 440 (quoting Richards Department Store, 365 So.2d at 386). We found that it was because physical exertion was present in addition to emotional stress. We stated:
Id. at 441.
In the past, the First District Court of Appeal has correctly followed our holdings in the aforementioned cases. In Hammersmith, Inc. v. Zanfardino, 425 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), review denied, 436 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 1983), the district court denied compensability where a claimant died as a result of a ruptured aorta, which medical testimony showed was related to a polygraph examination administered to the claimant during an investigation of pilferage, and stated:
Id. at 81. The First District Court of Appeal has applied this principle to other types of internal failures as well. See Wolbert, Saxon & Middleton v. Warren, 444 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (denying compensability where claimant's severe asthma attacks were brought on by emotional trauma after she discovered some alleged discrepancies and irregularities in her employer's trust account); Polk Nursery Co. v. Riley, 433 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (denying compensation to claimants who experienced physical symptoms of poisoning because of agitation due to their incorrect belief that they had been poisoned on the job).
In both Massie I and Massie II the district court relied upon its decision in Festa v. Teleflex, Inc., 382 So. 2d 122 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 388 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 1980). In Festa the district court observed that cases in Florida involving exposure to deleterious substances usually resulted in the awarding of compensation, while those involving injuries resulting from repeated trauma usually resulted in the denial of compensation. The court sought to "bring together and clarify the exposure rationale," *524 id. at 123, and set forth the following test:
Id. at 124 (citation omitted).
In Festa the district court included in its discussion of exposure cases the seminal heart attack case, Victor Wine. However, there is clearly a difference between cases involving a pre-existing heart condition and an exposure case like Worden v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, 256 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1971), where the claimant developed cataracts from looking into a high intensity furnace over a period of several years, a form of exposure or repeated trauma.[5] Thus, although the district court may have fashioned a standard for dealing with exposure cases and repeated trauma cases, it did not go far enough because it did not provide for the additional requirements set forth in Victor Wine and its progeny.
Care must be taken in analyzing exposure cases where the deleterious substance or condition caused the injury and those where the deleterious substance or condition exacerbated an existing defect. For example, Czepial v. Krohne Roofing Co., 93 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 1957), which the Festa court included in its discussion of exposure cases, involved a claimant whose continuous inhalation of dust and fumes at work exacerbated his pre-existing tuberculosis. Such a case is obviously different from exposure cases like Worden and Alexander Orr, Jr., Inc. v. Florida Industrial Commission, 129 Fla. 369, 176 So. 172 (1937), where a death by sunstroke was caused by job-related excessive heat.
Thus, we are faced with the problem of how to treat cases where a pre-existing defect is exacerbated by work conditions. In the heart attack cases, a pre-existing condition may be exacerbated by some physical over-exertion, which may or may not be accompanied by psychological stress, and in cases like Czepial, the pre-existing condition may be aggravated by some deleterious substance or condition in the workplace. However, in both types of cases, some physical stimulus causes a pre-existing condition to become worse. Consequently, an additional requirement should be added to the First District Court of Appeal's test enunciated in Festa. Quite simply, the additional requirement should be that which we set forth years ago in Victor Wine and in the cases which followed it. In order for a pre-existing condition to be compensable, it must be exacerbated by some nonroutine, job-related physical exertion, or by some form of repeated physical trauma. This may or may not involve psychological pressures closely related to the physical activity. In the case of exposure which exacerbates a pre-existing condition, or causes a new injury, that exposure must be of a physical nature, be it some deleterious substance or extreme environmental condition.
We acknowledge that psychological pressures often have negative physical results. For example, in the case now before us the stress of long hours and mounting job responsibilities could take a physical toll. However, such stresses are neither a physical cause nor an accident under our workers' compensation law. They are also not uncharacteristic of the stresses which all managers must occasionally face, as the deputy commissioner noted in his order. We are not willing to redefine workers' *525 compensation coverage to include situations where psychological causes may have physical effects. The legislature is the appropriate body to take such action.
In Massie II the district court failed to consider that the deputy commissioner could have properly ignored any testimony concerning psychological stress because, as a matter of law, such stress is not properly considered in the context of workers' compensation unless it accompanies some nonroutine, job-related physical exertion or repeated physical trauma. Pappas' testimony characterized stress as being of a psychological and physical nature, but no witness ever testified to an incident of nonroutine physical exertion, exposure to some deleterious substance or extreme environmental condition, or repeated physical trauma. As there was no such testimony, the deputy commissioner's factual determination was not improper.
Having determined that the deputy commissioner did not err in determining that Massie's claim was not compensable, we now address the First District Court of Appeal's reversal of Massie I by Massie II. We choose not to address the district court's lengthy discussion of the tension between the finality of decisions and the discretion of deputy commissioners to correct mistakes of fact because the deputy commissioner properly found no mistake of fact. In Massie II the district court states that the deputy commissioner conceded "the complete absence of competent evidence to support the alleged mistake of fact," id. at 973, but actually his comments at the hearing on Massie's motion to vacate seem merely to acknowledge the irrelevance of the extent of Massie's stress. The deputy commissioner therefore had no duty to consider Massie's later request for modification based upon this prior "concession" because he determined there had been no mistake of a material fact.
We acknowledge that a deputy commissioner may modify a workers' compensation order upon a showing of mistake of fact, regardless of whether an appellate court has affirmed the original order. We note that there is no indication in this record that the deputy commissioner felt compelled by the district court's affirmance to deny Massie's request for modification. We also acknowledge that, in rare instances, a court may correct its own erroneous prior decision to prevent manifest injustice. However, in the instant case, the First District Court of Appeal did not have adequate reasons to reconsider Massie I. It simply re-reviewed the record and erroneously changed its conclusion. This is what we proscribed in Power v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc. The district court itself properly stated its review standards in Stinson v. Stroh's Brewing Co., 540 So. 2d 893, 894 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 547 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. 1989):
In the instant case, there was competent substantial evidence to support the deputy commissioner's findings that Massie was not subjected to repeated physical trauma and that his stress was in the nature of psychological trauma, which is not compensable. Dr. David Mouat, a neurologist who examined and treated Massie, gave the following testimony during his deposition:
(Emphasis added.) In addition, the district court itself in Massie I acknowledged that "[i]t is difficult to qualify stress, an emotional condition." 463 So. 2d  at 384 (emphasis added). Clearly, the district court's finding in Massie II that the deputy commissioner's findings were unsupported by competent substantial evidence was erroneous.
In revisiting Massie I, the district court in Massie II placed great significance upon the deputy commissioner's comments at the hearing on the motion to vacate. As we have already stated, those comments do not have the significance urged by the district court when one considers that the level of stress experienced by Massie was irrelevant as a matter of law. While it is true that the district court incorrectly characterized Pappas's testimony in Massie I, it is also true that Pappas's testimony concerning the level of Massie's stress was irrelevant and that Pappas's testimony that Massie's stress was physical as well as psychological was equivocal and refuted by Dr. Mouat. Therefore, the district court had no basis for substituting its factual findings for that of the deputy commissioner and holding that Massie I resulted in manifest injustice.
We believe that Massie II is based upon the view that workers' compensation should be awarded when a claimant's pre-existing physical defect is exacerbated by job-related stress. Whether or not we agree with that view, we find that it is contrary to the existing workers' compensation statute and it would be improper for the courts to so amend that statute. Recently, in Leon County School Board v. Grimes, 548 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 1989), we reviewed another attempt by the First District Court of Appeal to broaden the purpose of workers' compensation and concluded that by adopting the district court's view "we would be amending the purpose of chapter 440 to allow compensation to injured employees without regard to whether industry brought about the injury." Id. at 208. We refused to engage in such judicial legislation then, and we refuse to do so now. As we stated in Grimes: "We find that the legislature, which established this means of compensation, is the proper branch to broaden the purpose of chapter 440." Id.
In conclusion, while we are sympathetic to Massie's situation, we hold that he is not entitled to workers' compensation for the exacerbation of his multiple sclerosis under the circumstances of this case. We therefore quash the decision of the First District Court of Appeal and remand with directions *527 that the deputy commissioner's order denying modification be affirmed.[6]
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, GRIMES and HARDING, JJ., concur.
SHAW, C.J., dissents with an opinion, in which BARKETT and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
SHAW, Chief Justice, dissenting.
The question presented in this case is whether manifest injustice occurred such as to support the decision of the district court. I believe it did; I would therefore approve the district court.
The majority's first error is in attempting to apply the test of compensability employed in heart attack cases  a type of case universally recognized as unique, and an exception to the general rule of compensability in workers' compensation cases. I see no reason to apply the test developed in heart attack cases to employment-exacerbated multiple sclerosis which manifests itself in an unusual event, happening suddenly.
The second error in the majority's reasoning occurs in the transmuting of the "physical strain" requirement, Mosca, 362 So. 2d  at 1342, into a requirement that "some physical stimulus cause[] a pre-existing condition to become worse," majority opinion at 17, a requirement that exists neither in our former cases nor in the language of the statute.[7] If an "additional requirement," id., for compensation is to be imposed, it must be imposed by the legislature, not this Court. Just as "the legislature, which established this means of compensation, is the proper branch to broaden the purpose of chapter 440," Grimes, 548 So. 2d  at 208, so too is it the proper branch to narrow the purpose of the act.
As noted by Professor Larson, despite preexisting disease, injury arising out of employment is compensated from workers' compensation. See 1 Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 12.21 (1990).
Id. at 3-381  3-433 (footnotes omitted).
Id. § 12.24, at 3-452  3-453 (footnote omitted).
I agree with the appellate court in Oregon that the exacerbation of an employee's multiple sclerosis is compensable when it is "causally connected to his work-related stress." State Accident Ins. Fund Corp. v. Carter, 73 Or. App. 416, 698 P.2d 1037, 1038 (1985). See also Abbott v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 45 Or. App. 657, 609 P.2d 396 (1980) (compensation award upheld where stressful employment exacerbated *528 multiple sclerosis). I also agree that the question whether mental stress can cause the exacerbation of multiple sclerosis is "of course, a medical, rather than a legal, question," and, therefore, any decision to award compensation must necessarily be rendered "without prejudice to future medical developments or to previous medical developments of which we have not been made aware and which may be presented in a future case." Carter, 698 P.2d  at 1040 n. 5. The majority opinion, by announcing a rule of law relative to multiple sclerosis, arrogates to the legal realm questions that are essentially medical questions and invites future contradiction from science.
As this Court said in Protectu Awning Shutter Co. v. Cline, 154 Fla. 30, 31-32, 16 So. 2d 342, 343 (1944) (affirming an award to one subject to fainting spells):
And as the Court said in Mobile Elevator Co. v. White, 39 So. 2d 799, 800 (Fla. 1949), if the worker is "hurt while [engaged in the employer's activity], then the employer who benefits or profits from that activity must relieve society of the consequences of a broken body, a diminished income, an outlay for medical and other care."
The majority opinion violates both the plain language and the purpose of the act. For these reasons I dissent.
BARKETT and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
[1]  We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
[2]  This section reads as follows:

440.28 Modification of orders.  Upon a deputy commissioner's own initiative, or upon the application of any party in interest, on the ground of a change in condition or because of a mistake in a determination of fact, the deputy commissioner may, at any time prior to 2 years after the date of the last payment of compensation pursuant to any compensation order, or at any time prior to 2 years after the date copies of an order rejecting a claim are mailed to the parties at the last known address of each, review a compensation case in accordance with the procedure prescribed in respect of claims in s. 440.25 and, in accordance with such section, issue a new compensation order which may terminate, continue, reinstate, increase, or decrease such compensation or award compensation. Such new order shall not affect any compensation previously paid, except that an award increasing the compensation rate may be made effective from the date of the injury, and, if any part of the compensation due or to become due is unpaid, an award decreasing the compensation rate may be made effective from the date of the injury, and any payment made prior thereto in excess of such decreased rate shall be deducted from any unpaid compensation, in such manner and by such method as may be determined by the deputy commissioner.
[3]  On June 2, 1988, the district court issued Massie v. University of Florida, no. BN-98 (Fla. 1st DCA June 2, 1988), in which it reversed the order of the deputy commissioner. However, the court withdrew this opinion two weeks later.
[4]  This subsection was numbered 440.02(18) in 1981, when Massie's employment with the University of Florida terminated.
[5]  As the district court has recognized, repeated trauma cases are exposure cases: "In Keller Building Products of St. Petersburg v. Shirley, IRC Order 2-3263, cert. denied 362 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 1978), the IRC resolved this disparate treatment by classifying repeated trauma as a facet of exposure, thereby bringing repeated trauma cases within the ambit of the exposure rationale." Festa v. Teleflex, Inc., 382 So. 2d 122, 123 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 388 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 1980).
[6]  With regard to Judge Ervin's concurring opinion, we continue to adhere to the views expressed in Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
[7]  The statute requires: "an injury arising out of and in the course of employment." § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. (1989). "Injury" means an "accident [which is defined as an "unusual event or result, happening suddenly"] arising out of and in the course of employment." § 440.02(1), (16), Fla. Stat. (1989) (emphasis added). Here Mr. Massie, after continued extraordinarily long hours (up to eighteen hours per day, six to seven days per week, continuing for months), combined with a supervisor-initiated request to perform illegal acts, went to bed one night and awoke unable to "control his right leg or right arm"; "he could not get out of bed." At 517-518. Waking up unable to move certainly is an unusual result, happening suddenly. Expert medical testimony exists in the record, provided by Dr. Mouat, opining that the exacerbation of Mr. Massie's preexisting disease arises out of his employment. The legislatively-created conditions for compensation have been met. In view of the long hours Mr. Massie was required to work for months, the court-created condition of "physical strain" also has been met.