Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Brown

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL V. BROWN 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Brown (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 316.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Permanent disbarment — Engaging in illegal 
conduct involving moral turpitude — Engaging in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation — Engaging in conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice — Engaging in conduct 
adversely reflecting on fitness to practice law — Failing to deliver all 
papers and property to which client is entitled — Failing to promptly 
refund any part of a fee paid in advance that has not been earned — 
Neglecting an entrusted legal matter — Failing to seek lawful objectives of 
client — Neglecting or refusing to assist in disciplinary investigation. 
(No. 99-1572 — Submitted October 12, 1999 — Decided December 22, 1999.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 98-100. 
 
The following facts gave rise to the disciplinary charges brought against the 
respondent, Bruce E. Brown of Shaker Heights, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 
0039782.  In 1997, Delphine Coleman retained respondent to expunge two 
criminal convictions from her record.  Coleman paid respondent in full, and 
respondent gave Coleman a copy of an application for expungement.  The 
following month, however, Coleman was denied a residential lease on the basis of 
 
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her criminal record.  Coleman later discovered that the court had no records 
showing that her application for expungement had ever been filed.  Coleman called 
respondent on more than one occasion to inquire about the problem, but respondent 
was reachable only through a pager, and rarely returned Coleman’s calls.  
Eventually, Coleman fired respondent and requested that he refund her money and 
return her file.  Respondent, however, refused to do either. 
 
Coleman complained to relator, Office of Disciplinary Counsel, which sent a 
letter of inquiry to respondent.  Respondent, however, failed to respond to relator’s 
first letter of inquiry.  Accordingly, relator sent a second letter of inquiry to 
respondent, and this time respondent provided a response.  Relator then served 
respondent with a subpoena duces tecum ordering him to appear for a deposition in 
October 1997.  Respondent failed to appear for the deposition, even though he had 
assured relator that he would be present.  Eventually, respondent appeared at a 
rescheduled deposition.  At that time, respondent conceded that he had received 
relator’s first letter of inquiry, as well as the subpoena for the original deposition. 
 
At the rescheduled deposition, respondent claimed that some of his conduct 
resulted from his addiction to cocaine, which he had started using in law school.  
For example, respondent claimed that he had traveled to Columbus with the 
intention to attend the originally scheduled deposition but that he had missed the 
 
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deposition after he used cocaine that day.  Respondent also admitted that his 
addiction to cocaine caused him to miss one or two court appearances for other 
clients but that he was able either to contact the court with an excuse for his 
nonappearance or secure a replacement on those occasions. 
 
Respondent testified that he had stopped using cocaine a few months before, 
though unaccompanied by any treatment or counseling.  Respondent admitted that 
although Disciplinary Counsel had previously provided contact information for the 
Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”), he had failed to contact OLAP 
before the deposition.  Once again, Disciplinary Counsel urged respondent to 
contact OLAP, and he agreed, but later refused to participate in the rehabilitative 
program. 
 
At his deposition, respondent also admitted that he had been sanctioned on 
three previous occasions for failing to meet Ohio’s continuing legal education 
requirements and that this conduct resulted in a temporary suspension from the 
practice of law in Ohio from August 1995 to November 1996. 
 
Relator charged respondent with violating several Disciplinary Rules, as 
well as a Rule for the Government of the Bar.  Respondent failed to answer, and 
the matter was submitted to a panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances 
and Discipline of the Supreme Court (“board”) on the complaint, relator’s motion 
 
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for default judgment, and attached exhibits. 
 
The panel found the facts as previously set forth and concluded that 
respondent’s conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(3) (engaging in illegal conduct 
involving moral turpitude), 1-102(A)(4) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 1-102(A)(5) (engaging in conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice), 1-102(A)(6) (engaging in conduct 
adversely reflecting on a lawyer’s fitness to practice law) (two violations), 2-
110(A)(2) (upon withdrawal, failing to deliver all papers and property to which the 
client is entitled), 2-110(A)(3) (upon withdrawal, failing to promptly refund any part 
of a fee paid in advance that has not been earned), 6-101(A)(3) (neglecting an 
entrusted legal matter), 7-101(A)(1) (failing to seek the lawful objectives of the 
client), and Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) (neglecting or refusing to assist in a disciplinary 
investigation).  In mitigation, the panel found that respondent’s conduct was 
“apparently caused” by his cocaine addiction. 
 
Disciplinary Counsel requested that respondent be permanently disbarred.  
The panel recommended, however, that respondent be indefinitely suspended from 
the practice of law in Ohio.  The board adopted the findings, conclusions, and 
recommendation of the panel. 
__________________ 
 
5
 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Kenneth R. Donchatz, 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
 
Bruce E. Brown, pro se. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J.  We adopt the findings and conclusions of the board, but we 
determine that disbarment is the appropriate sanction in this case.  In Part I, we 
demonstrate that our decision to disbar respondent in this case comports with 
sanctions we have imposed in previous cases involving comparable ethical 
violations.  In Part II, we support our determination with the methodology 
employed in the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, which closely 
track guidelines for sanctions that were recently proposed for adoption by the 
Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court. 
I 
 
Although we decide disciplinary matters on a case-by-case basis, other 
similar disciplinary proceedings are helpful in determining sanctions.  Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Gallagher (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 51, 693 N.E.2d 1078.  Already this 
year, we have disbarred an attorney for violations similar to those in the case at 
bar.  Columbus Bar Assn. v. James (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 379, 704 N.E.2d 241.  
Like the respondent here, the attorney disbarred in James exhibited a history of 
 
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substance abuse, neglected his clients’ interests, failed to attend scheduled court 
appearances, failed to cooperate in the disciplinary investigation of his misconduct, 
and failed to complete a voluntary drug rehabilitation program.  Although the 
respondent in James also entered a guilty plea to a felony charge for cocaine 
possession, formal criminal charges or convictions are not a prerequisite to 
disbarment.  Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Weaver (1975), 41 Ohio St.2d 97, 100, 70 
O.O.2d 175, 177, 322 N.E.2d 665, 667.  The court’s purpose in a disciplinary 
proceeding is “not to enforce the criminal code, but rather to investigate the 
conduct and fitness of one of its officers.”  Id. 
 
In another recent case, we disbarred an attorney who neglected legal matters, 
failed to rectify his client’s complaints, returned a client file in disarray, billed 
clients for services not performed, and failed to cooperate in the disciplinary 
investigation of his conduct.  Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Clower (1998), 84 Ohio 
St.3d 151, 702 N.E.2d 412.  Like the respondent in the case at bar, the respondent 
in Clower also failed to answer the disciplinary complaint, and thus faced a motion 
for default filed by the board. 
 
Based on our precedent, we also conclude that the respondent’s chemical 
dependency does not qualify as a mitigating factor here.  In a recent disciplinary 
case involving a chemically dependent former judge, we noted that “[g]enerally, 
 
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we do temper our decision where substance abuse is involved and the respondent 
has demonstrated a commitment to sobriety.”  (Emphasis added.) Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Gallagher (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 51, 53, 693 N.E.2d 1078, 1079. 
 
In this case, respondent admitted drug use, but did not demonstrate a 
commitment to sobriety.  Respondent here failed to contact OLAP when he 
initially received information about the program from Disciplinary Counsel.  At 
the rescheduled deposition, Disciplinary Counsel reminded respondent that his 
failure to seek rehabilitative assistance could have serious ramifications not only 
for his addiction, but also for his license to practice law.  Respondent refused to 
seek assistance.  We do not view respondent’s chemical dependency as a 
mitigating factor. 
II 
 
Our decision to disbar respondent for his violations of our state’s 
Disciplinary Rules also comports with the American Bar Association’s Standards 
for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA Standards”).  American Bar Association 
Center for Professional Responsibility, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 
(1991 & Amend.1992), Standard 9.3, and Commentary to Standard 9.32.  The 
ABA Joint Committee on Professional Sanctions developed the ABA Standards to 
alleviate some of the inconsistencies in attorney discipline that can arise both 
 
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within and across jurisdictions, due to the unique factual circumstances underlying 
each case. Id., Preface at 1.  Inconsistent sanctions harm the efficacy and 
credibility of disciplinary systems.  Sanctions that are too lenient fail to adequately 
deter misconduct, and sanctions that are too onerous can impair confidence in the 
system and deter attorneys from reporting misconduct.  Id. 
 
The ABA Standards suggest that courts adhere to a four-step methodology 
when imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct.  First, the court is to determine 
which ethical duties were violated by the attorney.  Second, the court examines the 
attorney’s mental state at the time of the violations.  Third, the court assesses the 
extent of the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct.  
Equipped with this information, the court makes an initial determination as to the 
appropriate sanction.  Finally, in the fourth step, the court examines any 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances and arrives at a final determination.  Id., 
Theoretical Framework at 5.  In Part A, below, we undertake the first three steps of 
the ABA Standards methodology and reach an initial determination that 
disbarment is the appropriate sanction in the present case.  We apply step four in 
Part B to support our conclusion that respondent’s chemical dependency does not 
qualify as a mitigating factor in this case. 
A 
 
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Under the first step of the model for sanctions, the ABA Standards ask 
whether the attorney violated a duty to his client, the public, the legal system, or 
the profession.  Id.  Respondent violated the duty of diligence that he owed to his 
client when he failed to file the expungement, an entrusted legal matter, in 
violation of DR 6-101(A)(3).  Under step two of the ABA Standards, our review of 
the record indicates that this was a knowing violation.  Respondent had received 
phone calls from the client regarding this matter, and admitted at his deposition 
that he knew the expungement document was “once again lost.” Respondent also 
admitted having confrontational conversations with Coleman, and even anticipated 
that she would file a complaint with the grievance board.  As for injury, which 
constitutes step three of the ABA Standards approach, respondent’s knowing 
violation of his duty of diligence resulted in potentially serious injury to Coleman, 
who was denied a residential lease on the basis of her record, and then was unable 
to contact respondent for redress or to obtain her file. 
 
As the following excerpt indicates, the ABA Standards recommend an initial 
determination of disbarment in such cases: 
 
“Disbarment is generally appropriate when: 
 
“(a)  a lawyer abandons the practice and causes serious or potentially serious 
injury to a client; or 
 
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“(b)  a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes 
serious or potentially serious injury to a client; or 
 
“(c)  a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect with respect to client matters 
and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client.”  Standard 4.41. 
 
The first three steps of the methodology suggested by the ABA Standards, 
then, support disbarring respondent for his breach of his duty to Coleman in 
violation of DR 6-101(A)(3).  Respondent, however, also violated duties to the 
public (engaging in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude, DR 1-102[A][3]), 
the legal system (engaging in conduct adversely reflecting on the lawyer’s fitness 
to practice law, DR 1-102[A][6]), and the profession (neglecting or refusing to 
assist in a disciplinary investigation, Gov.Bar R. V[4][6]), among other violations.  
Respondent’s knowing violations of these additional duties also support the 
sanction of disbarment. 
B 
 
Once we determine the sanction that respondent’s conduct warrants, 
the ABA Standards suggest that the court then consider aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances to determine whether that sanction should be adjusted.  ABA 
Standards, Theoretical Framework, at 6.  The ABA approach is entirely consistent 
with this court’s history of considering aggravating and mitigating factors before 
 
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adopting, increasing, or decreasing the sanction recommended by the board.1   
Standard 9.0 collects the aggravating and mitigating factors into helpful lists that 
organize and focus what is an inherently factual determination.  We note that this 
strategy—collecting aggravated and mitigating circumstances into manageable 
lists—resembles the board’s recently proposed Guidelines for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions (“Ohio Guidelines”), which recite the ABA Standards’ lists of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances nearly verbatim.  Cf. Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, Proposed Rules and Regulations 
Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings, Section 10, Guidelines for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions; ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 
(1992 Amend.), Standards 9.2 and 9.3.  At the time of writing this opinion, these 
Ohio Guidelines had been approved for public comment by this court. 
 
Chemical dependency is one of the mitigating factors recognized in both the 
Ohio Guidelines2 and the ABA Standards (Standard 9.32[I]).  Like the ABA 
Standards, the Ohio Guidelines encourage the board to consider chemical 
dependency as a mitigating factor, but only under limited circumstances.  Ohio 
Guidelines at Section 10(B)(7).  Before the board recommends a less severe 
sanction on the basis of addiction, the Ohio Guidelines recommend that the board 
determine whether the respondent’s chemical dependency satisfies a three-part 
 
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threshold showing.  First, the Ohio Guidelines call for a diagnosis by a qualified 
health care professional that the respondent is indeed chemically dependent.  
Second, as reflected in our case law requiring a “commitment to sobriety,” the 
Ohio Guidelines call for the respondent to produce a certificate indicating the 
successful completion of an approved treatment program.  Finally, the Ohio 
Guidelines call for a prognosis from a qualified health care professional or 
substance abuse counselor that the respondent will be able to return to competent, 
ethical, professional practice under specified conditions.  Id. 
 
If these Ohio Guidelines were applied to respondent, the record shows that 
respondent would not satisfy any of the elements in the board’s threshold test for 
consideration of chemical dependency as a mitigating factor.  The record here 
lacks an official diagnosis of chemical dependency, a certificate of completion 
from a treatment program, or a prognosis of future competent practice.  We do not 
suggest here that the board erred when it adopted the panel’s finding of chemical 
dependency as a mitigating circumstance in this case, because the Ohio Guidelines 
had not been formally adopted at the time of the board’s recommendation in this 
case.3 
 
With no mitigating factors to affect the appropriate sanction of disbarment, 
respondent is hereby permanently disbarred from the practice of law in Ohio.  
 
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Costs taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., dissent and would order an indefinite 
suspension against respondent as recommended by the board. 
FOOTNOTES: 
 
1. 
As mitigating factors, this court has recognized, among others, 
cooperation with disciplinary authorities (Bar Assn. of Greater Cleveland v. 
Sanders [1986], 24 Ohio St.3d 5, 24 OBR 4, 492 N.E.2d 449); restitution (Stark 
Cty. Bar Assn. v. Whitaker [1986], 26 Ohio St.3d 1, 26 OBR 1, 496 N.E.2d 891); 
and remorse (Bar Assn. of Greater Cleveland v. Sanders, supra).  As aggravating 
factors, this court has recognized, among others, failure to cooperate with 
disciplinary authorities (Toledo Bar Assn. v. Wood [1987], 32 Ohio St.3d 166, 512 
N.E.2d 671); prior misconduct (Toledo Bar Assn. v. Westmeyer [1991], 58 Ohio 
St.3d 38, 567 N.E.2d 1016); and lack of candor (Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Osborne 
[1991], 62 Ohio St.3d 77, 578 N.E.2d 455). 
 
2. 
The other seven mitigating factors listed in the Ohio Guidelines are 
absence of a prior disciplinary record, absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, 
timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify consequences of 
 
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misconduct, full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude 
toward proceedings, character or reputation, imposition of other penalties or 
sanctions, and other interim rehabilitation.  Ohio Guidelines, at Section 10(B)(7). 
 
3. 
We also note that the record supports a finding of several aggravating 
factors listed in the Ohio Guidelines but absent from the board and panel reports.  
These include the respondent’s prior disciplinary offenses, a pattern of misconduct, 
and a lack of cooperation in the disciplinary process.  As for additional mitigating 
factors listed in the Ohio Guidelines, we note from the record that the respondent 
freely disclosed his cocaine dependency at the rescheduled deposition.