Title: State v. Keith

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. KEITH, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Keith (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 514.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder — Death penalty upheld, when. 
(No. 96-1149 — Submitted March 4, 1997 — Decided October 1, 1997.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Crawford County, No. 3-94-14. 
 
Appellant, Kevin Keith, appeals from his convictions and sentence to death 
for the aggravated murders of  Marichell Chatman, Linda Chatman, and Marchae 
Chatman and his convictions for the attempted aggravated murders of Quanita 
Reeves, Quinton Reeves, and Richard Warren. 
 
On the evening of February 13, 1994, Marichell Chatman, her seven-year-
old daughter, Marchae, and Richard Warren, who had been living with Marichell 
and Marchae for several weeks, were at Marichell’s apartment in the Bucyrus 
Estates. At the time, Marichell was babysitting her young cousins, Quanita and 
Quinton Reeves. At approximately 8:45 p.m., Marichell’s aunt, Linda Chatman, 
arrived at the apartment to pick up Quanita and Quinton, Linda’s niece and 
nephew. 
 
A few minutes after Linda arrived, Warren, momentarily diverted from a 
basketball game he was watching on television, noticed a man standing outside the 
apartment door.  Although the man began to walk away without knocking, Warren 
opened the door.  The man turned and asked for Linda. 
 
While Linda went outside and spoke with the man, Marichell told Warren 
the man’s full name.  Although Warren could recall only the first name, Kevin, he 
later identified appellant as the man at the door.  Marichell also mentioned that 
Kevin had been involved in a big drug bust. 
 
After a short time, Linda and appellant returned to the apartment, where 
appellant and Warren had a brief conversation.  According to Warren, appellant 
 
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appeared to have his turtleneck shirt pulled up over the bottom part of his face and 
even drank a glass of water through it.  
 
After drinking the glass of water, appellant pulled a nine-millimeter 
handgun from a plastic bag he carried and ordered everyone to lie on the floor. 
Appellant repeatedly scolded Marichell for using his first name when she asked 
what he was doing and why.  Despite Marichell’s pleas with appellant on behalf of 
the children, appellant placed the gun to her head.  After ordering Marichell to be 
quiet, appellant said, “Well, you should have thought about this before your 
brother started ratting on people.”  Marichell responded, “Well, my brother didn’t 
rat on anybody and even if he did, we didn’t have anything to do with it.”  
Testimony at trial confirmed that Marichell’s brother, Rudel Chatman, was a 
police informant in a drug investigation involving appellant.  According to the 
presentence report, the month prior to the murders, appellant was charged with 
several counts of aggravated trafficking. 
 
Next, Warren heard a gunshot but was forced to turn away when a bullet 
struck him in the jaw.  Warren heard ten to twelve additional shots, two more 
striking him in the back.  After he heard the apartment door close, Warren ran out 
of the apartment, across a snow-covered field to Ike’s Restaurant, yelling for help.  
Four or five more shots were fired, one striking him in the buttocks and knocking 
him down.  Warren was able to get up and obtain help from the restaurant. 
 
Another Bucyrus Estates resident, Nancy Smathers, heard several popping 
noises at approximately 9:00 p.m.  As she looked out her front door, Smathers saw 
a large, stocky black man run to the parking lot and get into a light-colored, 
medium-sized car.  As the car sped away, it slid on the icy driveway and into a 
snowbank. When the driver got out of the car, Smathers noticed that the car’s 
dome light and the light around the license plate did not work.  The driver rocked 
 
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the car back and forth for nearly five minutes before he was able to free the car 
from the snowbank.  Several weeks later, Smathers informed Bucyrus Police 
Captain Michael Corwin that, after seeing appellant on television, she was ninety 
percent sure appellant was the man she had seen that night.  
 
When medical personnel arrived at the Bucyrus Estates apartment, Linda 
and Marichell Chatman were dead, having suffered multiple gunshot wounds, 
including fatal wounds to the neck or head.  All three children initially survived 
the attack.  However, Marchae’s two gunshot wounds to her back proved fatal. 
The Reeves children each sustained two bullet wounds and serious injuries. 
 
Approximately eight hours after the shootings, Warren was recovering from 
surgery at a Columbus hospital.  During a postoperative interview with a nurse, 
Warren wrote “Kevin” on a piece of paper as the name of his assailant. Later that 
day, Bucyrus Police Captain John Stanley had two telephone conversations with 
Warren.  During the second conversation, Stanley mentioned three or four possible 
last names for Kevin. At trial, Stanley could only recall that he mentioned the 
names Kevin Thomas and Kevin Keith.  Warren stated that he was seventy-five 
percent sure the name he heard from Marichell was Kevin Keith.  When shown a 
photo array of six suspects, Warren chose appellant’s picture and told police he 
was ninety-five percent sure that appellant was the murderer. 
 
Investigators recovered a total of twenty-four cartridge casings from the 
crime scene area, which had all been fired from the same gun.  In addition to 
those, investigators recovered a casing found on the sidewalk across from the 
entrance to a General Electric plant.  On the night of the murders, appellant picked 
up his girlfriend, Melanie Davison, from work at the entrance to the General 
Electric plant where the casing was found. 
 
4
 
At the snowbank where Smathers witnessed the getaway car slide, 
investigators made a cast of the tire tread and of the indentation in the snowbank 
made by the car’s front license plate number — “043.” The indentation from the 
license plate matched the last three numbers of a 1982 Oldsmobile Omega seized 
from Melanie Davison shortly after she visited appellant in jail, under the 
psuedonym of Sherry Brown, a few weeks after the murders.  
 
The Oldsmobile was registered to Alton Davison, Melanie’s grandfather, 
and was also regularly used by Melanie.  Davison had put four new tires on the 
Omega six months prior to the murders.  Davison estimated that by February 1994, 
the new tires had been driven less than 3,000 miles without any problems or need 
for replacement.  Although the cast taken of the tire tread at the crime scene did 
not match tires found on the Oldsmobile Omega one month later, the cast did 
match the tread of the tires purchased by Alton Davison as shown on the tire’s 
sales brochures. Additionally, the tires found on the Oldsmobile Omega had been 
manufactured in January 1994 and showed a minimal amount of wear. 
 
The grand jury indicted appellant on three counts of aggravated murder, 
each carrying a specification that the murder was committed as part of a course of 
conduct involving the killing of two or more persons. R.C. 2929.04(A)(5). 
Appellant was also indicted on three counts of attempted aggravated murder.  R.C. 
2923.02. 
 
After a two-week trial, a jury found appellant guilty of all counts.  
Following the verdict, defense counsel requested a presentence investigation and a 
postconviction sanity hearing.  During the penalty phase of the trial, defense 
counsel waived both opening and closing statements.  The court submitted, 
without objection, the presentence investigation report and the results of the 
psychological examination to the jury.  The jury recommended and the trial court 
 
5
imposed a death sentence for each of the aggravated murder counts.  The court of 
appeals affirmed the convictions and the sentence. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right.  
__________________ 
 
Russell B. Wiseman, Crawford County Prosecuting Attorney, Betty D. 
Montgomery, Attorney General, Stuart W. Harris and Michael L. Collyer, 
Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee. 
 
Reinhart Law Office and Harry R. Reinhart; Carol A. Wright and Stephen 
Cockley, for appellant. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J. 
Appellant presents this court with eight propositions of law, 
raising issues as to both the guilt and sentencing phases of his trial.  In accordance 
with the mandate of R.C. 2929.05(A), we have considered each of appellant’s 
propositions of law and have reviewed the sentence for appropriateness and 
proportionality. 
 
We have previously held that R.C. 2929.05 does not require this court to 
address and discuss, in opinion form, each proposition of law raised in a capital 
case. See, e.g., State v. Davis (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 107, 110, 666 N.E.2d 1099, 
1104; State v. Allen (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 626, 628, 653 N.E.2d 675, 680.  
Accordingly, we address only those issues that warrant discussion.  For the 
reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals as to both the 
convictions and sentence.  
I 
GUILT PHASE 
A 
 
6
Voir Dire 
 
In his second proposition of law, appellant argues that the trial court erred 
by instructing prospective jurors, prior to voir dire, that their sentencing 
determination would be a “recommendation” to the court.  The trial court 
instructed the jury:  “[D]epending on your action in the first trial, you might then 
be involved in a second proceedings [sic].  If the second proceeding takes place, 
you will have to make a recommendation, and I repeat, it is a recommendation to 
the Court on a sentence.  And one of the recommendations could be the death 
penalty.  If you do make a recommendation, before that sentence is ordered, this 
Court must independently determine if that recommendation is supported with the 
proof of the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.”  These comments, appellant 
argues, misstated the law and served to diminish the jury’s sense of responsibility 
in recommending an appropriate sentence. 
 
Appellant’s counsel made no objection to the court’s preliminary  
instruction and thus waived all but plain error.  See State v. Slagle (1992), 65 Ohio 
St.3d 597, 605, 605 N.E.2d 916, 925.  Plain error is an obvious error or defect in 
the trial proceedings that affects a substantial right.  Crim.R. 52(B).  Under this 
standard, reversal is warranted only when the outcome of the trial clearly would 
have been different without the error. State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 7 
O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 804, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
 
R.C. 2929.03(D)(2) states that “[i]f the trial jury recommends that the 
offender be sentenced to life imprisonment * * * the court shall impose the 
sentence recommended of the jury upon the offender.”  (Emphasis added.)  The 
trial court’s instruction accurately reflected the law.  At the heart of appellant’s 
complaint, then, is that the trial court informed the jury that a recommended death 
 
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sentence was reviewable by the court but did not inform them that a 
recommendation for a life sentence was binding upon the court.   
 
We prefer that no reference be made to the finality of the jury’s sentencing 
decision at all.  See, e.g., State v. Rogers (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 427, 433, 28 OBR 
480, 485, 504 N.E.2d 52, 57, reversed on other grounds (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 70, 
512 N.E.2d 581.  Thus, the trial court’s failure to inform the jury of the binding 
nature of the life sentence recommendation does not constitute plain error.  
Additionally, we have consistently rejected the argument that an instruction 
informing the jury that a recommendation of death is reviewable by the trial court 
constitutes reversible error.  See, e.g., State v. Carter (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 
559, 651 N.E.2d 965, 977; State v. Woodard (1993), 68 Ohio St.3d 70, 77, 623 
N.E.2d 75, 80-81.  Likewise, we find no plain error in the trial court’s preliminary 
instruction to the potential jurors in the case at bar.   
 
Nor do we find trial counsel ineffective for failing to object to the trial 
court’s “recommendation” language.  Reversal of a conviction on the grounds of 
ineffective assistance of counsel requires that defendant show, first, that counsel’s 
performance was deficient, and second, that the deficient performance prejudiced 
the defense so as to deprive defendant of a fair trial.  Strickland v. Washington 
(1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693.  We find 
that appellant has shown neither that counsel’s performance fell below an 
objective standard of reasonable representation nor that there exists a reasonable 
probability that, were it not for counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have 
been different.  State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, 
paragraphs two and three of the syllabus. 
 
In this same proposition of law, we are told that the trial court erred by 
excluding prospective jurors who expressed “scruples” about the death penalty.  
 
8
Appellant directs his complaint first at the form of the question the trial court 
posed to each potential juror.  The trial court asked whether “[i]n a proper case if 
the facts warrant it and the law permits it, could you join in signing a verdict form 
which might recommend to the Court the imposition of the death penalty?”   
 
Because appellant failed to object to the court’s question, we apply the plain 
error standard and reverse only if the outcome of the trial clearly would have been 
different without the error.  Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 7 O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 
804, paragraph two of the syllabus.  A prospective juror may be excused for cause 
because of his general opposition to the death penalty when “the juror’s views 
would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in 
accordance with his instructions and oath.”  State v. Rogers (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 
174, 17 OBR 414, 478 N.E.2d 984, paragraph three of the syllabus, vacated and 
remanded on other grounds (1985), 474 U.S. 1002, 106 S.Ct. 518, 88 L.Ed.2d 452, 
following Wainwright v. Witt (1985), 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 
841. 
 
Although it is true, as appellant now challenges, that the trial court did not 
use the language “prevent or substantially impair” in his question to the jurors, we 
find no plain error in the procedure utilized by the court.  The trial court’s question 
was designed to elicit a response that would ensure that jurors could fairly and 
impartially consider the death penalty in accordance with the law. 
 
 
Appellant next challenges the excusal of jurors based on their responses to 
the trial court’s question.  When asked if they could recommend the death penalty 
if the law permitted and the facts warranted it, three jurors responded, “No * * * I 
don’t think so,” “No, I don’t think I can,” and “I don’t think I can do that.”  Three 
other jurors responded, “That is bothering me,” “That would be an uncomfortable 
thing for me to do,” and “I have some problems with that.” Each juror was excused 
 
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by the trial court without further inquiry and without objection by defense counsel.  
Appellant argues that these jurors were erroneously excluded because they did not 
unequivocally state that they would not impose the death penalty. 
 
The Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of an impartial jury is violated by the 
exclusion of an impartial juror simply because he expresses some reservations 
about imposing the death penalty.  Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968), 391 U.S. 510, 
520-523, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 1776-1778, 20 L.Ed.2d 776, 783-785.  It is not violated, 
however, by the exclusion of a juror whose expressed reservations are such as to 
“‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in 
accordance with his instructions and his oath.’” Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. at 
424, 105 S.Ct. at 852, 83 L.Ed.2d at 851-852, quoting Adams v. Texas (1980), 448 
U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526, 65 L.Ed.2d 581, 589. Because determinations 
of juror bias largely depend on the trial judge’s assessment of the potential jurors’ 
demeanor and credibility, deference must be paid to the trial court.  Witt, 469 U.S. 
at 426, 105 S.Ct. at 853, 83 L.Ed.2d at 852-853.   
 
We conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion when it excluded 
prospective jurors whose responses to the court’s question reflected an inability to 
follow the law or the court’s instructions in imposing the death sentence.  State v. 
Mack (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 502, 510, 653 N.E.2d 329, 336.  We have deferred to 
the trial court’s determination of juror bias where, similar to this case, a juror 
responded that she did not think she could fairly consider the death penalty.  State 
v. Combs (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 278, 285-286, 581 N.E.2d 1071, 1078.   
 
The more difficult question arises in the instance of the jurors who indicated 
only that they would be either “bothered” or “uncomfortable” in recommending a 
death sentence or would find recommending the death penalty “difficult.”  
 
10
Nothing in the printed record indicates whether their discomfort with 
recommending the death penalty would impair their ability to follow the law.   
 
However, the fact that there were no objections to the removal of these 
prospective jurors may support the propriety of the trial court’s decision. 
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. at 434-435, 105 S.Ct. at 857-858, 83 L.Ed.2d at 858.  
Although the printed record may not be clear, the reason for the excusals may well 
have been readily apparent to those viewing the jurors as they answered the 
question.  Id.  This conclusion is further supported by the trial court’s conduct 
during the voir dire process.  Earlier in voir dire, the trial court noted hesitation in 
a juror’s response to the court’s question and on two occasions further probed into 
a jurors’ responses to the question.  Apparently, the trial judge did not think 
further inquiry was necessary in the challenged instances.  Likewise, counsel did 
not object or attempt to rehabilitate the jurors.  Accordingly, we defer to the trial 
court’s determination of juror bias under these circumstances. 
 
Even assuming there was error, given the absence of an objection, the error 
is not a plain one; that is, the outcome of the trial would not have clearly been 
different absent the error.  Cf. Bracy v. Gramley (C.A.7, 1996), 81 F.3d 684, 695, 
reversed on other grounds (1997), 520 U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 1793, 138 L.Ed.2d 97 
(in the absence of an objection, trial court’s error, if any, in excusing juror based 
on his answer that he would “probably” not consider imposing the death penalty 
was not an error of constitutional proportions). 
 
Finally, in this second proposition of law, appellant alleges that his trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the excusal of the “scrupled” 
prospective jurors.  Reversal of a conviction on the grounds of ineffective 
assistance of counsel requires that defendant show, first, that counsel’s 
performance was deficient, and second, that the deficient performance prejudiced 
 
11
the defense so as to deprive defendant of a fair trial.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 
104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693.  “[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have 
rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of 
reasonable professional judgment.”  Id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 
695. 
 
We have previously declined to call counsel ineffective for failing to 
rehabilitate jurors in this context, stating counsel was in a much better position to 
determine whether the jurors merited in-depth examination.  State v. Phillips 
(1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 85, 656 N.E.2d 643, 658-659.  Recognizing that voir 
dire is largely a matter of strategy and tactics, we find that counsel in the present 
case was in a much better position to determine whether the prospective jurors 
qualified to be on the panel. The reason for excusing these prospective jurors may 
have been readily apparent to those viewing the jurors as they answered the 
question.  Earlier in voir dire, counsel noted hesitation in another juror’s response 
to the trial court’s death penalty question and inquired further about her views on 
the death penalty.  In the case of the excused jurors, the trial court did not inquire 
further and counsel did not object or attempt to question when both had done so 
earlier in the voir dire process.  Moreover, counsel’s failure to object to the jurors’ 
excusal for cause may have saved him from later exercising a peremptory 
challenge to remove these jurors for some reason not evident from the printed 
record before us. 
 
Even if we were to assume counsel was deficient, we would nonetheless 
find that appellant was not prejudiced by counsel’s performance.  To demonstrate 
prejudice, appellant must show that there exists a reasonable probability that, were 
it not for counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have been different.  State v. 
 
12
Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, paragraph three of the 
syllabus. 
 
Although not cited by appellant in support of this proposition of law, we 
find that Gray v. Mississippi (1987), 481 U.S. 648, 107 S.Ct. 2045, 95 L.Ed.2d 
622, is significant here.  In Gray, the Supreme Court held that a wrongful 
Wainwright v. Witt exclusion was not subject to a harmless error analysis.  The 
court reasoned that prejudice to a defendant from a wrongful exclusion can be 
presumed because such an error results in a jury “stacked” against the defendant 
and “organized to return a verdict of death.”  Id. at 666, 107 S.Ct. at 2055-2056, 
95 L.Ed.2d at 638. 
 
We find, however, the Gray analysis unpersuasive in the context of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  First, Gray is distinguishable on factual 
grounds.  In that case, as the Supreme Court held, voir dire showed that the 
prospective juror was “‘clearly qualified to be seated as a juror under the Adams 
and [Wainwright v.] Witt criteria,’” and, thus, was wrongfully excluded.  481 U.S. 
at 659, 107 S.Ct. at 2052, 95 L.Ed.2d at 633; see, also, 481 U.S. at 669, 107 S.Ct. 
at 2057, 95 L.Ed.2d at 640 (Powell, J., concurring).  In contrast, in the case at bar, 
both the trial court and counsel agreed that the prospective jurors were not 
qualified to sit on the panel before that was clearly established by voir dire.  As the 
Gray court noted, the inadequate questioning regarding these jurors’ views 
precludes an appellate court from determining whether the trial judge erred in 
removing them.  481 U.S. at 662-663, 107 S.Ct. at 2054, 95 L.Ed.2d at 636. 
 
In any event, nothing in Gray persuades us to extend its holding regarding 
the presumption of prejudice to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  Thus, 
we decline to presume that counsel’s error, if any, resulted in an impaneled jury 
that was stacked against the defendant or organized to return a verdict of death.  
 
13
To the contrary, the record demonstrates that the seated jurors were able to follow 
their oaths and make a recommendation of death only when the law permitted and 
the facts warranted it.  Thus, we find that appellant has failed to demonstrate a 
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different.  
Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s second proposition of law. 
B 
Identification Testimony 
 
In his third proposition of law, appellant challenges the trial court’s failure 
to suppress the name array testimony, alleging that the procedure utilized by the 
police was so impermissibly suggestive as to result in an unreliable and 
inadmissible identification of appellant.   
 
The day following the shootings, Bucyrus Police Captain John Stanley 
contacted Warren, who was recovering from surgery in the hospital.  Stanley listed 
for Warren a series of four names, which included “Kevin Keith” and “Kevin 
Thomas,” to assist Warren’s recollection of the name Marichell had used to 
identify the shooter.  Though Warren thought one of the other names Stanley 
mentioned was Smith, neither Warren nor Stanley could recall any other names 
mentioned.  Stanley explained that he simply made the names up and forgot them.  
Nonetheless, Warren told Stanley that he was seventy-five percent sure the name 
he heard from Marichell was Kevin Keith.  When later shown a photo array of six 
suspects, Warren chose appellant’s picture and told police he was ninety-five 
percent sure that appellant was the murderer.   
 
Only one other court appears to have confronted this precise name-array 
issue.  In United States v. Tovar (1982), 687 F.2d 1210, 1216, the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held simply that the procedures utilized by the police in the 
name array were not “impermissibly suggestive.”  Assuming the same principles 
 
14
that apply to photo-array and line-up cases apply to a name array, we likewise find 
that appellant has failed to demonstrate that the procedure utilized by the police 
was improper or unduly suggestive.  Nothing in the record demonstrates that the 
names selected were suggestive, as would be a series of ethnic names.  We decline 
appellant’s invitation to apply a per se rule that the procedure used was unduly 
suggestive because of Stanley’s failure to recall the entire list of names included in 
the array.  Unless appellant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to 
preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of 
law, nor should it lead to a presumption of suggestiveness.  See, generally, 
Arizona v. Youngblood (1988),  488 U.S. 51, 57-58, 109 S.Ct. 333, 337, 102 
L.Ed.2d 281, 289.  No showing of bad faith has been made here.1 
 
Even if we were to assume, for argument’s sake, that the procedure utilized 
by the police in the name-array identification was impermissibly suggestive, we 
would, nonetheless, find the identification testimony admissible.  An 
unneccessarily suggestive identification process does not violate due process if the 
identification possesses sufficient indicia of reliability.  Manson v. Brathwaite 
(1977), 432 U.S. 98, 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 2253, 53 L.Ed.2d 140, 154.  In 
determining “whether under the ‘totality of the circumstances’ the identification 
was reliable even though the confrontation procedure was suggestive * * * the 
factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification include 
the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the 
witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the 
criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, 
and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.”  Neil v. Biggers 
(1972), 409 U.S. 188, 199, 93 S.Ct. 375, 382, 34 L.Ed.2d 401, 411. 
 
15
 
Considering the totality of the circumstances, we find sufficient indicia of 
reliability in Warren’s identification of appellant.  Shortly before the murders, 
Marichell told Warren appellant’s full name.  Warren identified appellant’s name 
the day after the murders.  Warren additionally declared that he was seventy-five 
percent sure of the name Keith.  Accordingly, we overrule the third proposition of 
law. 
C 
Affidavit of Indigency 
 
By his fourth proposition of law, appellant alleges that the trial court 
violated his right to counsel when the court failed to sufficiently inquire into an 
affidavit of indigency appellant filed two months before the trial began.  In the 
affidavit, appellant swore that he was “without the necessary funds with which to 
pay for the Attorney in this case and * * * without any possessions, real or 
personal of sufficient value to offer as security for such costs.”  At the time 
appellant filed the affidavit, he had already retained James Banks as his attorney. 
 
Appellant relies upon State v. Deal (1969), 17 Ohio St.2d 17, 46 O.O.2d 
154, 244 N.E.2d 742, in support of his argument.  In that case, the court imposed 
an affirmative duty upon the trial court to inquire, on the record, into a defendant’s 
complaints regarding the adequacy of his appointed counsel.  In Deal, as in the 
other cases cited by appellant, the defendant expressed his dissatisfaction with his 
counsel to the trial court.  See, also, State v. Prater (1990), 71 Ohio App.3d 78, 
593 N.E.2d 44 (defendant specifically informed the court that he did not want 
assigned counsel to represent him); State v. VanMeter (July 11, 1985), Franklin 
App. No. 84AP-987, unreported, 1985 WL 10073 (prior to trial, defendant 
requested a continuance so that he might obtain new counsel). 
 
16
 
Although appellant argues that the affidavit itself was an indication of his 
dissatisfaction with his retained counsel, we find no support in the record for such 
a finding. There is no complaint in the affidavit that his counsel, Banks, was 
providing inadequate representation.  The affidavit alleges only that appellant was 
without the necessary funds to pay for costs of representation and defense.  Such 
an affidavit would be appropriate for other reasons, such as to secure the services 
of experts at the state’s expense.   
 
There is no other evidence in the record that should have alerted the trial 
court to appellant’s dissatisfaction with his retained counsel.  Upon appellant’s 
motion to correct the record after trial, the trial court issued the following 
statement: 
 
“Why wasn’t there any action taken on Kevin Keith’s affidavit of indigency 
which he filed with the Court?  * * *  The Court recalls specifically asking the 
Defendant if he agreed to proceed with his attorney and he offered no objection.  
As the Court explained to one of the appellate attorneys, it does not recall whether 
or not this was on the record during any of the proceedings, however, this Court 
specifically remembers the look on Defendant’s face when the Court asked him 
the question.” 
 
We find nothing in the record to support appellant’s contention that the trial 
court should have further inquired into appellant’s satisfaction with his retained 
counsel.  Therefore, we overrule appellant’s fourth proposition of law. 
D 
Publication of Videotape 
 
In this fifth proposition of law, appellant challenges the playing of a 
videotaped television interview of Gracie Keith, appellant’s aunt and alibi witness.  
During the trial, Keith testified that appellant was with her at her home at the 
 
17
approximate time of the murders.  On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked 
Keith if she remembered telling a television interviewer, “I can’t say that 
[defendant was with me during the killings] [’]cause I don't know what time it was 
* * *.”  Keith denied that she made such a statement.  On redirect, defense counsel 
attempted to clarify her statement, suggesting that she had denied knowing when 
the murder was, not when appellant was with her. 
 
During the state’s rebuttal case, Bucyrus Police Captain Blankenship 
testified that he possessed a videotape, subpoenaed by the grand jury, that 
contained taped footage of the crime scene and interviews broadcast by Channel 
68 in Mansfield.  Appellant objected to the playing of the videotape under Evid.R. 
801(D)(1), pointing out that Keith was not under oath when she gave the 
interview, and claiming that the alleged inconsistent statement should have been 
raised when she testified.  The trial court overruled the objection and permitted the 
state to show the videotape to the jury.  Appellant now complains that the trial 
court erroneously played the videotape when it lacked the proper foundation and 
authentication and was not admitted into evidence.  Because appellant did not 
object to the videotape on these grounds at trial, he waived these issues absent 
plain error. 
 
The state presented the videotaped statements for purposes of impeaching 
Keith.  Pursuant to Evid.R. 613(B), when extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent 
statement is offered into evidence, a foundation must be established through direct 
or cross-examination in which (1) the witness is presented with the former 
statement, (2) the witness is asked whether he made the statement, (3) the witness 
is given an opportunity to admit, deny, or explain the statement, and (4) the 
opposing party is given an opportunity to interrogate the witness on the 
inconsistent statement.  Mack, 73 Ohio St.3d at 515, 653 N.E.2d at 339, quoting 
 
18
State v. Theuring (1988), 46 Ohio App.3d 152, 155, 546 N.E.2d 436, 439.  We 
find that the state properly established the foundation under Evid.R. 613(B) for the 
use of Keith’s prior inconsistent statement. 
 
Appellant also complains that the trial court permitted the state to play the 
videotape when the tape was not authenticated.  The requirement of authentication 
is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is 
what its proponent claims.  Evid.R. 901(A).  Here, Captain Blankenship testified 
only that the videotape he possessed was the same videotape containing crime 
scene footage and interviews of Channel 68 subpoenaed by the grand jury.  
Nonetheless, we find that the playing of the videotape did not alter the outcome of 
the trial and does not constitute plain error.  Gracie Keith was not appellant’s sole 
alibi witness.  Judith Rogers placed appellant’s leaving his apartment at 8:45 p.m., 
the approximate time the assailant arrived at the Chatman apartment.  Thus, it is 
not clear that absent the playing of the videotape, the outcome of the trial would 
have been different. 
 
Appellant also contends that the trial court’s instructions regarding the 
jury’s consideration of the videotape’s contents “hopelessly confused” the jury.  
When the trial court denied the jury’s request to play the videotape during its 
deliberations, the jury asked, “We would like to know why we can’t see the taped 
interview of Grace Keith?  If it was not introduced as evidence why was it shown 
to us?”  The trial court explained that “although what was said by Gracie Keith 
was evidence, you have to take it as if it came from the witness stand.  The actual 
physical tape was not introduced into evidence.  Therefore, I cannot play the tape 
for you.  You are going to have to judge that tape by the testimony as if she said it 
right from the witness stand to your best collective recollection of what she said.”  
Upon objection from defense counsel, the trial court further instructed the jury that 
 
19
“you really can’t consider the conversation on that tape as if it comes from the 
witness stand because she was not under oath when she gave it.  However, the 
words are still before you.  What that was, was just the television interview.” 
 
Viewing the instructions as a whole, we find that they are neither confusing 
nor prejudicial.  The court’s erroneous instruction was immediately remedied by a 
curative instruction, to which defense counsel did not object.  We find that 
appellant’s fifth proposition of law lacks merit. 
E 
Juror Misconduct 
 
By his sixth proposition of law, appellant charges that several instances of 
juror misconduct deprived him of a fair trial.  To support his argument, appellant 
relies on State v. King (1983), 10 Ohio App.3d 161, 10 OBR 214, 460 N.E.2d 
1383, paragraph one of the syllabus, for the proposition that any improper juror 
conduct automatically raises the presumption of prejudice.  On numerous 
occasions, however, we have reaffirmed a long-standing rule that a court will not 
reverse a judgment based upon juror misconduct unless prejudice to the 
complaining party is shown.  See, e.g., State v. Grant (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 465, 
480, 620 N.E.2d 50, 67; State v. Hipkins (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 80, 83, 23 O.O.3d 
123, 125, 430 N.E.2d 943, 946.  In cases of improper outside juror 
communication, the defense must establish that the communication biased the 
juror.  State v. Phillips (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 88-89, 656 N.E.2d 643, 661.  
Furthermore, trial courts are granted broad discretion in dealing with the outside 
contact and determining whether to declare a mistrial or replace an affected juror. 
Id. at 89, 656 N.E.2d at 661.   
 
The first instance of alleged misconduct involved reports that a juror, Julie 
Dyer, discussed the case with several persons where she worked.  During an in-
 
20
chambers hearing, Dyer, while under oath, denied discussing the case with anyone, 
except to tell her boss that she was serving as a juror.  Thereafter, the court 
questioned Tammy Lacey, the person who had contacted the court about the 
possible misconduct.  Lacey testified that while at Dyer’s workplace, another 
employee, Pat Emmer, told her that Dyer was talking to everyone about the case, 
although Lacey did not have firsthand knowledge of what Dyer had said.   
 
After the court suspended the trial proceedings until the allegations had 
been resolved, Dyer informed the trial judge that she remembered telling her boss 
that she was asked a question about bowling during voir dire.  She also told her 
boss some of the reasons why people were not selected for the jury.  Dyer also 
recalled that she had told Emmer, her co-worker, that she thought that the trial was 
interesting and found defense counsel “more compelling or more interesting as a 
lawyer.” 
 
Shortly thereafter, Emmer testified that Dyer told her that the case was 
interesting, that the jury had visited the crime scene, and that the television 
reporter was not permitted to show the jurors’ faces.  Emmer also informed the 
court that one other person claimed that Dyer had talked about the case but Emmer 
discounted the possibility by adding, “[H]e could have been lying [’]cause that’s 
the type of person he is.”  
 
After excusing Emmer, the trial court discussed the situation with counsel.  
Defense counsel stated with respect to juror Dyer, “I am impressed.  She is saying 
for one thing it is interesting and she didn’t say anything factual and the fact that 
Channel 4 couldn’t take pictures.  Everybody knows that anyway. * * * I don't 
have any problem with her.”  Over the prosecutor’s objection, the court permitted 
Dyer to remain on the jury. 
 
21
 
The second allegation of juror misconduct concerns an incident that 
occurred during sentencing deliberations.  The court conducted a hearing in 
chambers with counsel when it learned that a juror had been in a police cruiser 
with a deputy sheriff.  The deputy explained that he had taken the juror to the bank 
to make a house payment before the bank closed.  Neither the deputy nor the juror 
discussed the case.  The juror remained on the panel without objection. 
 
The final claims of juror misconduct involve unusual telephone calls 
received by two jurors.  Juror Ogle reported to the court that someone left an 
“unsettling” message on his answering machine.  Although unintelligible to the 
court reporter, Ogle thought the message said, “I know who you are and I know 
where you live.”  Ogle, however, believed the call to be a prank and expressed no 
concern for his safety.  He informed the court that he wanted to continue serving 
on the jury and felt that the message would not affect his judgment.  Juror Ogle 
remained on the panel without objection from either party. 
 
The other unusual telephone call involved a juror who received three collect 
phone calls from a person who identified himself as “Jeff from the Correctional 
Institute.”  During an in-chambers hearing before counsel, the juror assured the 
court that she was “absolutely not” afraid to continue to serve as a juror and that 
the calls would not influence her deliberations.  Neither party objected when the 
court retained the juror on the panel. 
 
In each of the in-chambers hearings conducted by the trial court, counsel 
were freely permitted to inquire of the witnesses and jurors.  Nonetheless, 
appellant failed to object to any of the jurors’ remaining seated on the case and, 
thus, waived all but plain error.  The trial court promptly addressed each allegation 
of outside communications, and determined the facts and possible impact on the 
 
22
juror.  We find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion and no plain error in 
allowing the jurors to remain on the panel.   
 
We reject appellant’s argument that the trial court exacerbated the 
prejudicial effect of the alleged juror misconduct when the trial judge indicated his 
concern for his own safety to the juror who received the collect calls and informed 
the jurors he had placed “phone traps” on their telephones, with which calls to 
their homes could be traced.  We find these comments to be of a reassuring nature, 
and note that even after the trial judge made the comment, the juror assured the 
court that she was able to continue on the jury unaffected.  Thus, we decline to 
assume prejudice, as appellant would have us do. 
 
This sixth proposition of law is accordingly overruled. 
II 
SENTENCING PHASE 
 
We turn now to appellant’s first proposition of law, where he sets forth 
several issues regarding the mitigation phase of his trial.  Appellant initially takes 
issue with the trial court’s conduct toward the alternate jurors after the jury 
returned a verdict in the guilt phase.  The trial court instructed the alternate jurors 
to conduct their own deliberations to see if they agreed with the jury’s guilt phase 
verdict.  If they agreed with the jury’s verdict, the trial court informed the 
alternates, they would remain for the sentencing phase of the trial.  Thereafter, the 
alternate jurors informed the court that they agreed with the jury “100 percent.”  
 
By failing to raise an objection at trial, appellant waived any error in the 
instructions to the alternate jurors, absent plain error.  Slagle, 65 Ohio St.3d at 
604, 605 N.E.2d at 924.  Appellant cannot demonstrate plain error, however, 
because none of the alternate jurors ever sat on the jury. 
 
23
 
In this same proposition of law, appellant contests his waiver of the 
presentation of mitigation evidence.  At the outset of the mitigation phase, the trial 
court and appellant’s trial counsel engaged in the following colloquy: 
 
“COURT:  Counsel for defendant may proceed with his opening statement. 
 
“MR. BANKS:  Your Honor, my client is not desirous of making any 
statement with regard to this issue. 
 
“THE COURT:  Allright.  The state may proceed. 
 
“MR. WISEMAN:  We have nothing to present, sir.” 
 
Thereafter, the court proceeded with closing arguments.  After the state 
made a brief statement asking the jury to recommend the maximum sentence, 
defense counsel waived closing argument.  With the approval of counsel, the court 
submitted the presentence investigation report and psychological evaluation that 
were performed upon appellant’s request to the jury to consider during its 
deliberations. 
 
Appellant does not argue that the right to present mitigation evidence is one 
that cannot be waived.  A defendant may decide what evidence, if any, to present 
at a mitigation hearing and may decide to present no evidence, even against the 
advice of counsel.  State v. Tyler (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 24, 553 N.E.2d 576.  
Rather, appellant contends that the trial court committed a grave error when it 
failed to inquire of the appellant whether he knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waived the presentation of mitigating evidence.  Appellant likens the 
right to present mitigation evidence to other rights that must be personally waived 
by a defendant, such as the right to a jury trial and the right to testify at trial, citing 
Godinez v. Moran (1993), 509 U.S. 389, 398, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 2686, 125 L.Ed.2d 
321, 331; Wainwright v. Sykes (1977), 433 U.S. 72, 93, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 2510, 53 
L.Ed.2d 594, 612, fn. 1 (Burger, C.J., concurring).  The trial court, appellant 
 
24
continues, neglected to personally address him to determine whether he 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to present mitigation 
evidence. 
 
At the outset, we find fault with appellant’s arguments that his counsel 
presented no mitigation evidence.  To the contrary, the jury had the psychological 
report and presentence investigation report to consider during its sentencing 
deliberations.  Thus, appellant’s argument that defense counsel waived appellant’s 
right to present all mitigation evidence is unavailing.  Nonetheless, we consider 
appellant’s argument as it relates to waiving the right to present additional 
mitigating evidence. 
 
At least two states have adopted guidelines or procedures for trial courts 
when a defendant personally waives his right to present mitigation evidence.  
Koon v. Dugger (Fla.1993), 619 So.2d 246, 250; Wallace v. Oklahoma 
(Okla.Crim.App. 1995), 893 P.2d 504, 512.  Neither case, however, addressed the 
precise argument appellant presents, i.e., whether the right to present mitigation 
evidence was a fundamental right.  Thus, we find them unpersuasive in 
considering the issue. 
 
 
In Brecheen v. Reynolds (1994), 41 F.3d 1343, 1368, the Eighth Circuit 
discussed appellant’s precise argument.  The court explained that fundamental 
rights, including the right to appeal, the right to a jury trial, and the right to plead 
guilty, are waivable only by the defendant because of the personal nature and 
importance of the right.  Nonfundamental rights, those rights that primarily 
involve trial strategy and tactics, are waivable by defense counsel on the 
defendant’s behalf. 
 
The Eighth Circuit concluded that the “question as to the propriety of 
introducing additional mitigating evidence in this case is not a fundamental right * 
 
25
* * but rather, fits squarely into the category of rights that are nonfundamental and 
that are not reviewed for compliance with the heightened waiver standard.”  Id.  
The court elaborated in a footnote that “[i]n spite of the obvious importance of this 
issue, it is still, at its core, an evidentiary question that is inherently tactical in 
nature and therefore vested in the discretion of the trial counsel.”  Id. at 1368-
1369, fn. 22. 
 
We, too, find that the ultimate decision to introduce additional mitigating 
evidence is a not a fundamental right which needs to be personally waived by the 
defendant.  In State v. Johnson (1986), 24 Ohio St.3d 87, 91, 24 OBR 282, 286, 
494 N.E.2d 1061, 1065, we made clear that “the mere failure to present mitigating 
evidence at the penalty phase of a capital trial does not itself constitute proof of 
ineffective assistance of counsel or deprivation of the accused’s right to a fair trial.  
It is conceivable that the omission of such evidence in an appropriate case could 
be in response to the demands of the accused or the result of a tactical, informed 
decision by counsel, completely consonant with his duties to represent the accused 
effectively.”  Thus, we implicitly recognized that the presentation of mitigating 
evidence is a matter of trial strategy.  It follows that this right fits squarely into the 
category of rights that are nonfundamental and which may be waived by 
defendant’s counsel.  Accordingly, we find no duty for the trial court to secure 
from the defendant an on-the-record waiver of the right to present mitigating 
evidence. 
 
We additionally observe that the record reveals nothing to suggest that 
defense counsel proceeded against appellant’s wishes.  To the contrary, appellant’s 
proclamation of innocence in open court prior to sentencing supports our opinion 
that appellant waived additional mitigation because he maintained his innocence. 
 
26
 
Appellant next challenges the admission of the psychological evaluation to 
the jury because the report contained “material misstatements of law.”  After 
examining appellant, Dr. William Schonberg prepared a psychological evaluation 
report.  In part, the report stated: 
 
“Under the provisions of the Ohio Revised Code, Section 2929.04; Criteria 
for Imposing Death or Imprisonment for a Capital Offense, the death penalty will 
be precluded if the Court found any of three mitigating circumstances.  Mr. Keith 
states that he is innocent of these charges.  It would not appear that the offender 
acted under duress, nor would it appear that the victim of the offense induced or 
facilitated it.  The offense would not appear to have been a product of the 
offender’s mental deficiency or psychosis, the client having no psychiatric history.  
Therefore, based on interview impressions, it is this examiner’s opinion that there 
are no mitigating factors in this case.” 
   
Appellant did not object to sending the report to the jury.  In fact, defense 
counsel agreed with the trial court that the report “has to go” to the jury.  
Accordingly, he has waived all but plain error. 
 
Appellant argues that the psychological report makes the following 
misstatements of law: (1) that the presence of one or more mitigating factors 
precludes the death penalty; (2) that the only three mitigating circumstances are 
whether the offense was committed under duress, whether the victim induced or 
facilitated the offense, and whether the offense was a product of mental deficiency 
or psychosis; (3) that the trial court determines the presence of mitigating 
circumstances; and (4) that the report uses the wrong definition to determine the 
existence of the mitigating factor of R.C. 2929.04(B)(3), mental disease or defect. 
 
We agree that the psychological report does not accurately reflect the law.  
However, we find that any error in presenting the report to the jury does not rise to 
 
27
the level of plain error, i.e., that but for the misstatements of law, the jury clearly 
would have sentenced him to life.  Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 7 O.O.3d 178, 372 
N.E.2d 804, paragraph two of the syllabus.  In so finding, we consider that the first 
misstatement cited by appellant actually favored him in that it erroneously asserted 
that the mere presence of any one of the mitigating factors set forth would 
preclude the death penalty.  As to the other misstatements, the trial court cured any 
error when it instructed the jury as to its role, the proper standards and mitigating 
factors to consider, and the method of weighing the aggravating circumstances and 
mitigating factors. 
 
It is true, as appellant contends, that the jury correctly challenged the 
accuracy of some factual statements in the presentence investigation submitted to 
them.  Nonetheless, the jury’s attention to factual errors in the presentence 
investigation does not demonstrate that but for the misstatements of law in the 
psychological report, the jury would clearly have come to a different conclusion.  
Nothing in the record suggests that the jury was confused or otherwise affected by 
the misstatements in the psychological report.   
 
We also reject appellant’s challenge to the trial court’s penalty phase 
instructions.  Appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the 
jury that it was obligated to separately consider each aggravating circumstance and 
weigh it separately against any mitigating factors.  The proper standard, however, 
is that the jury is obligated to separately consider each count and separately weigh 
the aggravating circumstance or circumstances applicable to each count against 
any mitigating factors.  State v. Cooey (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 20, 544 N.E.2d 895, 
paragraph three of the syllabus.   
 
In this case, although only one aggravating circumstance was applicable, the 
trial judge’s instructions to the jury referred to aggravating circumstances.  We 
 
28
find no prejudicial error in the instruction, however, because there is no distinction 
between the aggravating circumstance which was attached to each of the three 
counts of aggravated murder.  Moreover, the aggravating circumstance itself was 
multiple murder. 
 
We also consider appellant’s argument that the trial court erroneously 
instructed the jurors:  
 
“You are to consider all things which are relevant to the nature and 
circumstances of the aggravating circumstances in the respect that this offense was 
part of a course of conduct involving the purposeful killing of two or more 
persons, or to any mitigating factors including but not limited to the nature of the 
offense and the history, character, and background of the Defendant, plus all of the 
following * * *.” 
 
The parties evidently agree that the trial judge mistakenly used the term 
“nature and circumstances of the aggravating circumstances,” when he meant the 
“nature and circumstances of the offense.”  If that is what the court meant, then the 
court committed error in instructing the jury, appellant argues, citing State v. 
Wogenstahl (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 344, 662 N.E.2d 311.  We disagree. 
 
Appellant did not object to the instruction and has waived all but plain error.  
State v. Underwood (1983), 3 Ohio St.3d 12, 3 OBR 360, 444 N.E.2d 1332.  In 
this case, the trial court did not instruct the jury to weigh the nature and 
circumstances against any mitigating factors.  See State v. Gumm (1995), 73 Ohio 
St.3d 413, 422, 653 N.E.2d 253, 263.  To the contrary, the trial court instructed the 
jury that the aggravating circumstances must outweigh the mitigating factors in 
order to impose a death sentence.  The trial court, though inartfully, informed the 
jury that it could consider the evidence upon which it based its findings that 
aggravating circumstances were proven in determining whether the aggravating 
 
29
circumstances outweighed the evidence presented in mitigation.  We find no plain 
error in the trial court’s instructions to the jury.  Viewed in the context of the 
entire charge rather than in isolation, State v. Thompson (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 1, 
12-13, 514 N.E.2d 407, 419,  we find no plain error under these circumstances.  
 
Appellant also claims the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on 
residual doubt.  However, a defendant is not entitled to such an instruction.  State 
v. Garner (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 56-57, 656 N.E.2d 623, 632.   
 
Finally, appellant objects to the trial court’s instruction on all the mitigating 
factors when no evidence was presented to support all of the factors.  Again, we 
have expressed our view that the better practice is for trial courts to refrain from 
even referring to mitigating factors not raised by the defendant, but this is not 
prejudicial error.  State v. DePew (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 275, 289-290, 528 N.E.2d 
542, 558. 
 
Having considered appellant’s arguments, we overrule appellant’s first 
proposition of law. 
 
In his seventh proposition of law, appellant alleges that the trial court failed 
to comply with R.C. 2929.03(F) by not addressing or recognizing the existence of 
any mitigating factors set forth in R.C. 2929.04.  In his sentencing opinion, the 
trial judge stated:  “Regarding mitigating factors, there were none.”  The trial court 
did not then discuss whether the aggravating circumstance outweighed the 
mitigating factors as to each count.  In State v. Fox (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 183, 
191, 631 N.E.2d 124, 131, we addressed similar arguments and held that 
inadequate explanations of the weighing process do not constitute reversible error 
because any such error may be readily cured by this court’s independent review. 
We adhere to that view. 
 
30
 
In his next argument, appellant correctly asserts that the trial court failed to 
file a sentencing opinion within fifteen days of its judgment entry as required by 
R.C. 2929.03(F).  Nonetheless, appellant has not demonstrated  prejudice.  State v. 
Martin (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 122, 132-133, 19 OBR 330, 339, 483 N.E.2d 1157, 
1166-1167.   
 
In this same proposition of law, appellant contends that the trial court was 
biased against him evidenced by the trial court’s anger toward appellant for his 
comments to the press.  Upon our review of the record, we are of the opinion that 
the judge’s comments do not show bias. 
 
Based upon the foregoing, we overrule appellant’s seventh proposition of 
law. 
III 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
 
In his eighth and final proposition of law, appellant raises twenty-four 
claims or instances of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Reversal of a conviction 
on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel requires that the defendant 
show, first, that counsel’s performance was deficient and, second, that the 
deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive defendant of a fair 
trial.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693.  To 
demonstrate that counsel is deficient, appellant must show counsel’s performance 
fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation.  Bradley, 42 Ohio 
St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, paragraph two of the syllabus.  To demonstrate 
prejudice, appellant must prove that there exists a reasonable probability that were 
it not for counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have been different.  Id. at 
paragraph three of the syllabus. 
 
31
 
Appellant argues here, and throughout his brief, that because his trial 
counsel was not certified pursuant to C.P.Sup.R. 65, he is not entitled to the 
presumption of competence we usually extend to properly licensed attorneys.  See 
State v. Wilkins (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 382, 390, 18 O.O.3d 528, 533, 415 N.E.2d 
303, 309.  
 
In order to represent an indigent defendant charged with an offense for 
which the death penalty may be imposed, C.P.Sup.R. 65 requires an attorney 
appointed by the court to be certified as experienced in capital cases.  
C.P.Sup.R.65(II)(B).  Although appellant’s counsel apparently did not meet the 
qualifications set forth in C.P.Sup.R. 65, we decline to impose a rule that creates a 
presumption of ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel has been retained 
by or for a defendant and is not qualified under C.P.Sup.R. 65.  The provisions for 
the appointment of counsel set forth in C.P.Sup.R. 65 apply “only in cases where 
the defendant is indigent [and] counsel is not privately retained by or for the 
defendant * * *.”  C.P.Sup.R. 65(I)(B). The rule further provides that “[i]f the 
defendant is entitled to the appointment of counsel, the court shall appoint two 
attorneys certified pursuant to this rule.”  C.P.Sup.R. 65(I)(C).  In this case, 
appellant privately retained his trial counsel, and certification under the rule was 
not required for this representation. 
 
We turn now to the specific allegations of ineffectiveness.  Appellant first 
contends that his trial counsel failed to properly investigate his case and/or failed 
to request sufficient time to do so.  Yet appellant points to nothing in the record to 
support his conclusory allegation. 
 
Seven claimed errors of trial counsel contained in appellant’s list of twenty-
four errors relate to alleged juror misconduct.  Appellant contends his trial counsel 
was ineffective for failing (1) to object to and make a record of “disruptive 
 
32
influences” occurring during the trial that affected the jury, (2) to request removal 
of the jurors who had outside communications, (3) to inquire as to why the court 
had “traps” placed on the jurors’ telephone lines, and (4) to request the trial judge 
to recuse himself after he expressed a concern for his own safety to another juror.   
 
We find, however, that none of these instances amounts to ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  Appellant has shown neither that counsel’s performance 
fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation nor that there exists a 
reasonable probability that, were it not for counsel’s errors, the result of the trial 
would have been different.  Bradley, supra. 
 
Keith also objects to counsel’s failure to object to hearsay when Captain 
Stanley testified at a hearing on the motion to compel discovery relating to the 
name array he presented to Richard Warren in the hospital.  However, this instance 
did not occur in the jury’s presence, and appellant otherwise fails to demonstrate 
prejudice. 
 
We similarly reject the merits of appellant’s allegation that counsel was 
ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the identification testimony of 
Richard Warren and Nancy Smathers.  Trial counsel did, in fact, attempt to 
suppress the testimony as to Warren’s identification, and we determined above 
that the court properly admitted the testimony.  We are also convinced that a 
motion to suppress Smather’s testimony would have properly been denied. 
 
Appellant additionally challenges the zealousness of trial counsel’s 
representation when he accepted, without question, allegations that appellant was 
intimidating the family of the victims.  The record reflects that a security officer in 
the courtroom reported to the court that he and another officer observed appellant 
winking and blowing kisses in the direction of the victims’ family.  We do not find 
 
33
that trial counsel acted unreasonably, especially in light of the fact that the 
allegations were not raised before the jury. 
 
Appellant next complains that counsel failed to move to withdraw from the 
case when he learned information that placed him in a conflict of interest.  
Appellant refers us to a portion of the transcript in which defense counsel related 
to the court and prosecutor a meeting he had with an unidentified woman who told 
defense counsel that she suspected another person was involved in the murders.  
The woman informed defense counsel of this person’s involvement in several 
other crimes, including murders.  In order to satisfy a Sixth Amendment claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must demonstrate that an actual 
conflict of interest adversely affected his counsel’s performance. Cuyler v. 
Sullivan (1980), 446 U.S. 335, 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1718, 64 L.Ed.2d 333, 346-
347; State v. Manross (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 180, 182, 532 N.E.2d 735, 737.  
Appellant does not state with any particularity either the conflict of interest or the 
adverse effect upon counsel’s performance.  We find nothing, from our review of 
the record, that would raise an inference of an actual conflict of interest.  Thus, we 
reject appellant’s argument. 
 
Appellant’s next claim of ineffective assistance raises counsel’s failure to 
object to two instances of hearsay testimony:  one from Captain Stanley that a 
nurse first mentioned the name “Keith” to him, and another from Joyce Reeves 
that her daughter, Quanita, referred to appellant as “Bruce” on prior occasions.  A 
statement is not hearsay “if it is admitted to prove that the declarant made it, rather 
than to prove the truth of its contents.”  State v. Williams (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 
346, 348, 528 N.E.2d 910, 914.  We find counsel did not fall below a reasonable 
standard of representation in not objecting to the testimony. 
 
34
 
We reject appellant’s allegations that counsel was ineffective for failing to 
make a complete record.  Appellant neither specifies what parts of the trial record 
he believes are incomplete nor demonstrates how he was prejudiced.  Notably, the 
record was supplemented by appellate counsel under App.R. 9(E). 
 
Appellant’s final allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel concern the 
sentencing phase of this trial.  Appellant challenges trial counsel’s request for a 
presentence investigation and postconviction sanity hearing.  We find, however, 
that appellant has failed to prove that counsel fell below a reasonable standard of 
representation in requesting or permitting the reports to be submitted to the jury or 
that absent the reports, there exists a reasonable probability that the outcome of the 
trial would have been different.  Although the psychological report and the 
presentence investigation report did contain some errors, these errors were not 
prejudicial.  The trial court corrected the minor errors in the presentence 
investigation report.  We have also determined that one error was favorable to 
appellant and others were cured  by the trial court’s instructions.  Additionally, the 
psychological report contained some evidence of mitigation, including references 
to appellant’s family background, work history, and personal interests that the jury 
would not have otherwise had available to it. 
 
We also consider trial counsel’s failure to present additional mitigation 
evidence.  The decision to forgo the presentation of additional mitigating evidence 
does not itself constitute proof of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Johnson, 24 
Ohio St.3d at 91, 24 OBR at 286, 494 N.E.2d at 1065.  In this case, counsel’s 
failure to present mitigating evidence was not a demonstrably deficient trial 
strategy in light of appellant’s decision to waive such a presentation.  Arguably, it 
was consistent with appellant’s claim of innocence. 
 
35
 
Regardless, we find that appellant has failed to prove prejudice.  To do so 
would require that there was mitigating evidence counsel failed to present and that 
there is a reasonable probability that the evidence would have swayed the jury to 
impose a life sentence.  Establishing that would require proof outside the record, 
such as affidavits demonstrating a lack of effort to contact witnesses or the 
availability of additional mitigating evidence.  Such a claim is not appropriately 
considered on a direct appeal.  See State v. Scott (1989), 63 Ohio App.3d 304, 308, 
578 N.E.2d 841, 844 (claim of failure to present mitigating evidence is properly 
considered in a postconviction proceeding because evidence in support of claim 
could not be presented on direct appeal). 
 
We turn next to counsel’s failure to make any opening or closing statement 
in support of sparing appellant’s life.  We reject the concept that the failure to 
make an opening and closing statement will result in ineffectiveness per se.  In 
State v. Ballew (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 244, 256-257, 667 N.E.2d 369, 381, we 
called defense counsel’s “extremely brief final argument” at the sentencing 
hearing “questionable.”  Yet we also found that the defendant failed to establish 
that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
representation.   
 
In the present case, counsel’s failure to make an opening or closing 
statement complied with appellant’s decision not to present mitigating evidence 
and comported with his claims of innocence.  Assuming that counsel’s 
performance was deficient, we find that appellant has failed to prove that there 
exists a reasonable probability that the result would have been different had 
counsel made a closing argument against the death sentence.  We note that the 
state did not present any compelling arguments in support of imposing a death 
 
36
sentence.  Rather, the state waived opening and made a brief closing argument, 
asking only that the jury impose the “maximum sentence.” 
 
Appellant also asserts counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 
court’s instruction to the jury on all statutory mitigating factors.  However, we 
have already determined that there was no reversible error.  See State v. DePew, 
supra. 
 
Finally, appellant takes issue with counsel’s failure to object when the court 
suggested that a room could be set aside after trial for jurors who wanted to be 
interviewed by the press.  Appellant fails to demonstrate what bearing the court’s 
suggestion had on the outcome of his trial. 
 
In accordance with the above, we reject appellant’s Proposition of Law VIII. 
IV 
INDEPENDENT SENTENCE REVIEW 
 
Pursuant to R.C. 2929.05, we independently weigh the aggravating 
circumstances against the mitigating factors and determine whether appellant’s 
sentence is disproportionate to sentences in similar cases. 
 
The evidence supports beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant murdered 
Marichell, Marchae and Linda Chatman, and attempted to kill Richard Warren and 
Quanita and Quinton Reeves as part of a course of conduct involving the 
purposeful killing or attempt to kill two or more persons.  R.C. 2929.04(A)(5). 
 
We find that the nature and circumstances of these offenses do not offer the 
slightest mitigating value.  Appellant went to Marichell Chatman’s apartment and 
ordered its occupants, Marichell, her daughter, her aunt, her two young cousins, 
and her boyfriend, to lie on the floor.  When Marichell pleaded with appellant to 
spare the children, appellant replied that she should have thought of that before her 
brother started “ratting” on people.  Ignoring Marichell’s pleas, appellant fired 
 
37
multiple gunshots, killing three and seriously wounding the others.  Appellant then 
fired additional shots at Warren as Warren escaped the murder scene.   
 
Since appellant chose to waive the presentation of additional mitigating 
evidence, we review the presentence investigation and psychological report 
appellant requested and submitted to the jury.  From these, we learn that appellant, 
thirty years old at the time of the murders, has five half-siblings whose fathers are 
unknown to him, and two half-siblings by his own father.  He was raised by his 
grandparents until he was twelve years old because of his mother’s youthful age. 
After that time, he returned to live with his mother and stepfather.  He described 
his childhood as happy and normal. 
 
Appellant maintained a low-C average in high school, participated on the 
football team and completed the twelfth grade.  As an adult, appellant worked 
several jobs, including maintenance.  He has never been fired from a job. 
 
Appellant has a child who was seven years old at the time of trial and for 
whom he paid twenty-five dollars a week in support.  During the two years prior to 
his arrest, appellant lived with his girlfriend, who worked at General Electric.  
Since his last job ended, appellant had been attempting to open an “African store” 
in Mansfield. 
 
Appellant described himself as someone who gets along “great” with others, 
“like a big teddy bear at times.”  He denied abusing alcohol or engaging in 
significant substance abuse, although he admitted smoking marijuana from the age 
of fifteen.  At the time of his arrest, appellant had several counts of aggravated 
trafficking charges pending against him.  In addition, appellant had a robbery and 
two petty theft convictions.   
 
We find that the only relevant statutory mitigating factor in this case is R.C. 
2929.04(B)(7).  We accord some mitigating weight to appellant’s family 
 
38
background, work history, and personal character.  Nevertheless, we find that the 
aggravating circumstance of each murder count outweighs the mitigating factors 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
We finally consider whether the penalty imposed in this case is both 
appropriate and proportionate when compared with similar cases.  In reviewing 
other cases of murder as a course of conduct involving the purposeful killing or 
attempt to kill where we have upheld the death penalty, we find the death sentence 
both appropriate and proportionate in this case.  Compare State v. Hawkins (1993), 
66 Ohio St.3d 339, 612 N.E.2d 1227; State v. Loza (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 61, 641 
N.E.2d 1082; State v. Frazier (1991), 61 Ohio St. 3d 247, 574 N.E.2d 483. 
 
Accordingly, we affirm appellant’s convictions and sentence. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
FOOTNOTE: 
1. 
Although appellant challenges Nancy Smather’s identification, he presents 
no argument as to why the identification process in her case was unduly 
suggestive, nor does any reason appear in the record. 
APPENDIX 
 
“Proposition of Law No. I:  The defendant is denied a fair trial, the effective 
assistance of counsel, an impartial jury, and is subjected to an unreasonable risk of 
cruel and unusual punishment where, subsequent to the jury’s verdict on guilt, the 
court 1) failed to address the defendant personally in court and on the record in 
order to determine that he was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waiving his 
right to present mitigating evidence, 2) submitted  a ‘psychological evaluation’ to 
the jury which contained misstatements of facts and law, 3) failed to advise the 
 
39
jury that each aggravating circumstance must be weighed against mitigating 
factors, 4) failed to instruct the jury that residual doubt is a mitigating factor, 5) 
instructed the jury on statutory mitigating factors when no evidence was 
introduced to establish the existence of these factors, and 6) referred to the nature 
and circumstances of the offense as if [they] were an aggravating circumstance. 
  
“Proposition of Law No. II:  When the trial court gives improper 
preliminary instructions, repeatedly uses ‘mere recommendation’ language in voir 
dire, and improperly excuses scrupled jurors for cause without inquiry to 
determine substantial impairment, the defendant is denied a fair trial and a reliable 
sentence in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 10 and 16 of the Ohio 
Constitution. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. III:  Where identification of the accused by a 
witness lacks reliability and is the result of overly suggestive police identification 
tactics, the refusal of the trial court to suppress the witness’ identification 
testimony violates the right of the accused to Due Process requiring reversal. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. IV:  The trial court violated the appellant’s 
fundamental rights to counsel and due process when it failed to make sufficient 
inquiry on the record of the reasons for the appellant’s filing of an affidavit of 
indigency and request for appointed counsel and thereby forced the appellant to 
trial without the effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Section 10, Article 
I of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. V:  A defendant is substantially prejudiced when a 
trial court allows a publication of a videotape to the jury where no foundation was 
laid to make the videotape admissible, the tape was not authenticated, the tape 
 
40
itself was not admitted into evidence but the jury was nevertheless instructed that 
they could consider the videotaped conversation during deliberations. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. VI:  Where a trial court fails to remedy juror 
misconduct and, in fact, exacerbates certain improper influences on the jury by its 
own conduct an accused is denied his rights to due process and a fair trial by an 
impartial jury as guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. VII:  A defendant is denied a fair and reliable 
sentence when the trial court and the appellate court failed to comply with the 
dictates of R.C. § 2929.03 by not recognizing mitigating evidence, not timely 
filing the sentencing opinion, and by punishing a capital defendant for speaking 
with the press. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. VIII:  Defense counsel’s actions and omissions at 
Mr. Keith’s capital trial deprived him of the effective assistance of counsel as 
guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Sections 9, 10 and 16 of the Ohio Constitution.”