Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Cheselka

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Cheselka, Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-5286.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2019-OHIO-5286 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. CHESELKA. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Cheselka, Slip Opinion No.  
2019-Ohio-5286.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
including failing to act with reasonable diligence in representing a client, 
and the Rules for the Government of the Bar—Two-year suspension, with 
the second year stayed on conditions. 
(No. 2018-1764—Submitted May 8, 2019—Decided December 24, 2019.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 
Court, No. 2017-050. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Michael Joseph Cheselka Jr., of Cleveland, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0076667, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 
2003. 
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{¶ 2} In a January 2018 amended complaint, relator, disciplinary counsel, 
charged Cheselka with 28 violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct arising 
from his representation of six separate clients in criminal matters.  Relator alleged 
that among other violations, Cheselka failed to provide competent representation, 
failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness, failed to reasonably 
communicate with clients, failed to deposit a fee paid in advance into his client trust 
account, made a false statement of material fact to a court and to the Board of 
Professional Conduct in this disciplinary proceeding, and failed to cooperate in the 
investigation of three client grievances. 
{¶ 3} After a panel of the board conducted a hearing, the board issued a 
report in which it found that Cheselka committed 19 rule violations and 
recommended that we dismiss eight alleged rule violations.  On those findings, the 
board recommended that we suspend Cheselka from the practice of law for two 
years, with one year stayed on conditions, and order him to serve a one-year period 
of monitored probation upon reinstatement.  No objections have been filed. 
{¶ 4} We adopt the board’s findings of misconduct with the exception of 
one violation that was not alleged in relator’s complaint, dismiss the eight 
remaining alleged rule violations, and adopt the board’s recommended sanction. 
Misconduct 
Count I: The Jojwan Martin Matter 
{¶ 5} In 2008, Jojwan Martin was convicted of murder and sentenced to 18 
years to life in prison.  His conviction rested largely upon the testimony of two 
eyewitnesses, including Earwin Watters, who was in federal custody and awaiting 
sentencing on criminal charges at the time of Martin’s trial.  The Eighth District 
Court of Appeals affirmed Martin’s conviction. 
{¶ 6} In early 2011, Watters contacted Martin’s mother, Cynthia Bester, 
and told her that he had given false testimony against Martin under pressure from 
the police and prosecutors, that he had not actually witnessed Martin kill anyone, 
January Term, 2019 
 
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and that he wanted to recant his testimony.  On March 14, 2011, Watters executed 
a handwritten affidavit stating that he had been pressured to give false testimony at 
Martin’s trial to obtain a lesser sentence in his own criminal case.  Bester sent 
Watters’s affidavit and other materials regarding Martin’s case to the Ohio 
Innocence Project at the University of Cincinnati College of Law, but the project 
declined to take the case and returned the file to Bester in May 2012. 
{¶ 7} Bester and her mother met with Cheselka in November 2012 and gave 
him Watters’s affidavit.  Cheselka agreed to file a petition for postconviction relief 
on Martin’s behalf for a flat fee of $10,000 (plus $525 for a copy of the trial 
transcript), which Bester and her mother paid in installments from 2013 to 2015. 
{¶ 8} Between August 2013 and March 2016, Cheselka asked Watters to 
write and execute four additional affidavits—which he later claimed were 
necessary to correct procedural and substantive defects in Watters’s original 
affidavit.  But Cheselka did not file Martin’s petition for postconviction relief until 
May 13, 2016—approximately three and a half years after he first met with Bester 
and received Watters’s 2011 affidavit.  And even then, Watters had not signed the 
affidavit that Cheselka notarized and submitted with Martin’s petition for 
postconviction relief. 
{¶ 9} Because Cheselka filed the petition more than 365 days after the 
transcript was filed in Martin’s direct appeal, he was required to show that Martin 
had been unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts that supported the 
petition.  See R.C. 2953.21(A)(2) and 2953.23(A)(1).  In the petition, Cheselka 
explained that Martin “was unavoidably delayed beyond the 365 day deadline 
because Earwin Watters only provided his unsolicited affidavit in 2016, well-past 
the statute’s general rule and under circumstances unanticipated by [Martin].”  
(Emphasis added.)  Cheselka failed to mention that Watters first came forward to 
recant his testimony in 2011 and that he had executed four previous affidavits.  
Cheselka continued that deception in his May 2017 response to relator’s letter of 
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inquiry, in which he affirmatively stated that “[t]here was no affidavit provided in 
2011” and that “[t]here was never a proper affidavit executed before March of 
2016.”  And at his disciplinary hearing, Cheselka admitted that there was no legally 
significant difference between the first and final affidavits.  The trial court denied 
Martin’s postconviction petition without an opinion. 
{¶ 10} The board found that Cheselka’s conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 
(requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence in representing a client), 3.3(a) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly making a false statement of fact or law to a 
tribunal), 8.1(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly making a false statement of 
material fact in connection with a disciplinary matter), and 8.4(c) (prohibiting a 
lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation).  Citing the insufficiency of the evidence, however, the board 
recommends that we dismiss relator’s allegations that Cheselka had failed to 
reasonably communicate with Martin and that Cheselka had failed to promptly 
refund any unearned portion of his fee at the conclusion of his representation.  We 
adopt the board’s findings of misconduct and dismiss the remaining allegations of 
misconduct with respect to this count. 
Count II: The Barbara Clark Matter 
{¶ 11} In October 2015, Barbara Clark pleaded guilty to stealing more than 
$188,000 of United States Social Security Administration Supplemental Security 
Income benefits by continuing to collect her mother’s benefits for approximately 
30 years after her mother’s death.  Due to Clark’s age and deteriorating health, her 
counsel urged the trial court to deviate from the guideline sentence of 18 to 24 
months of imprisonment and confine her at home.  On February 17, 2016, the court 
sentenced Clark to six months in prison followed by three years of supervised 
release. 
{¶ 12} Shortly after the sentencing hearing—and before the trial court 
issued its sentencing entry—Clark’s son met with Cheselka and expressed his 
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concern that Clark would die in prison.  Cheselka agreed to file an emergency 
motion to modify Clark’s sentence.  Cheselka had never filed such a motion before 
but was aware that pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c), once the trial court issued its 
sentencing entry, only the director of the Bureau of Prisons was permitted to move 
the court to modify the sentence. 
{¶ 13} Cheselka understood that the trial court could issue the sentencing 
entry at any time, but he took no immediate action.  He testified that he was waiting 
for Clark’s family to respond to his request to compel medical records documenting 
her deteriorating health.  In contrast, Clark testified that once her family paid 
Cheselka, all communication with him ceased.  And although Clark’s son called 
and left multiple messages, Cheselka called him only one time, to ask for more 
money. 
{¶ 14} Approximately three weeks after Clark’s sentencing hearing, her son 
arranged for a physician’s letter to be faxed to Cheselka’s office.  It consisted of a 
one-paragraph summary of Clark’s medical history followed by the doctor’s 
opinion that “incarceration would place even further stress on her heart, possibly 
worsening her cardiac condition.”  Cheselka waited nearly two more months before 
he filed the emergency motion, which the board found was just “an abbreviated 
recap” of trial counsel’s original sentencing memorandum.  The motion offered no 
additional medical evidence and very little in the way of new argument or legal 
authority.  The trial court summarily denied the motion one day after it was filed. 
{¶ 15} At his disciplinary hearing, Cheselka attempted to justify the filing 
of the motion based on his belief that “[a] federal judge can do whatever a federal 
judge wants to do,” regardless of statutory prohibitions and case authority.  But the 
board found that his explanation “bespeaks of more than just a lack of diligence”—
“[i]t demonstrates a lack of competence.”  The board found that Cheselka’s conduct 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 (requiring a lawyer to provide competent representation 
to a client), 1.3, 1.4(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed 
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about the status of a matter), and 1.4(a)(4) (requiring a lawyer to comply as soon as 
practicable with reasonable requests for information from a client).  But having 
found that Cheselka provided incompetent representation to Clark, the board 
declined to find that he violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(b) (requiring a lawyer to explain 
a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit a client to make informed 
decisions regarding the representation) by failing to explain to Clark or her family 
that which he did not know.  The board also recommended that we dismiss another 
alleged violation based on the insufficiency of the evidence.  We adopt the board’s 
findings of misconduct and dismiss the remaining allegations of misconduct with 
respect to this count. 
Count VI: The Darryl Hill Matter 
{¶ 16} In June 2015, Darryl Hill pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor and three 
felonies and was sentenced to 12 years in prison.  Hill’s fiancée, Kimberly 
Cleveland, retained Cheselka to appeal Hill’s convictions.  Cleveland signed a 
written fee agreement and paid a flat fee of $5,000 in installments, but Cheselka 
did not deposit any portion of the fee into his client trust account. 
{¶ 17} On August 1, 2015, Cheselka filed an untimely appeal of Hill’s 
convictions and sentence—without an accompanying motion for leave to file a 
delayed appeal—but he did no other work on Hill’s behalf.  Hill later filed a pro se 
motion for delayed appeal.  The court initially dismissed the appeal but granted the 
motion for delayed appeal on reconsideration after Hill alleged that Cheselka had 
failed to provide effective assistance of counsel. 
{¶ 18} At Cheselka’s disciplinary hearing, Cleveland testified that she had 
made multiple inquiries about the status of Hill’s case but that Cheselka had 
virtually no memory of the matter and that each conversation was “like starting all 
over.”  Although she participated in several three-way telephone calls with 
Cheselka and Hill, she had to go to the courthouse to learn that Cheselka had filed 
an untimely notice of appeal on Hill’s behalf.  By July 2017, Cleveland was 
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7
frustrated with Cheselka’s inaction and went to his office to demand a refund.  
Cheselka, however, was not there, and shortly thereafter, he ceased all 
communication with her. 
{¶ 19} Cheselka maintained that Hill’s goal was not to prevail on appeal but 
to induce the victim of his offenses to recant and then use that evidence to withdraw 
his guilty plea.  But Hill testified that he had not agreed to employ that strategy in 
lieu of a direct appeal of his convictions—and that Cheselka never told him that he 
had not followed through with the direct appeal.  He also complained that Cheselka 
did not return his phone calls, took months to respond to his requests to discuss his 
case in person at the prison, and took almost a year to provide requested copies of 
his plea- and sentencing-hearing transcripts. 
{¶ 20} In November 2017, Hill wrote to Cheselka to terminate his 
representation and demand a refund.  In response, Cheselka agreed to give 
Cleveland a partial refund.  At Cheselka’s disciplinary hearing, he agreed that he 
owed Cleveland a $2,500 refund. 
{¶ 21} The board found that Cheselka’s conduct in this count violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, 1.15(c) (requiring a lawyer to deposit into a client trust account 
legal fees and expenses that have been paid in advance), 1.4(a)(3), and 1.4(a)(4), 
and we adopt those findings.  However, we reject the board’s finding that Cheselka 
also violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.16 by failing to refund the unearned portion of Hill’s 
fee, see Prof.Cond.R. 1.16(e) (requiring a lawyer to promptly refund any unearned 
fee upon the lawyer’s withdrawal from employment), because relator did not allege 
that violation with respect to this count.  See Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Rothermel, 
112 Ohio St.3d 443, 2007-Ohio-258, 860 N.E.2d 754, ¶ 9. 
Count III: The Adrian Williams Matter 
{¶ 22} On February 3, 2014, Adrian Williams pleaded guilty to two felonies 
and the state agreed to recommend that he receive a five-year prison sentence.  The 
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trial court did not inform Williams that it was not bound by the parties’ agreement 
and sentenced him to eight years in prison. 
{¶ 23} Williams’s daughter paid Cheselka $5,135 to appeal her father’s 
convictions, and Cheselka filed a notice of appeal on Williams’s behalf on April 4, 
2014.  But he later dismissed the appeal and filed a motion to withdraw Williams’s 
guilty plea and vacate his sentence based on the trial court’s failure to advise 
Williams that it was not bound by his plea agreement.  The trial court denied the 
motion to withdraw the guilty plea, and Cheselka appealed that order.  The court of 
appeals held that res judicata precluded Williams’s claim because he could have 
advanced that argument in his direct appeal.  State v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 
No. 103144, 2016-Ohio-2629. 
{¶ 24} At his disciplinary hearing, Cheselka explained that he decided to 
dismiss Williams’s direct appeal based on his associate’s erroneous research that 
led him to believe that he could appeal only Williams’s sentence—and not the 
underlying guilty plea—at that time.  Cheselka admitted his error to Williams’s 
family and explained that they could pursue another appeal because he had 
provided ineffective assistance of counsel. 
{¶ 25} Based on this conduct, the board found and we agree that Cheselka 
failed to provide competent representation to Williams in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 
1.1.  In accord with the board’s recommendation, we dismiss one additional alleged 
violation with respect to this count. 
   
Counts IV and V: The Franklyn Williams and Dale Rodano Matters 
{¶ 26} Counts IV and V of relator’s amended complaint arise from 
Cheselka’s representation of Franklyn Williams and Dale Rodano in separate 
criminal matters.  The board recommends that we dismiss the underlying 
allegations of misconduct based on the insufficiency of the evidence.  We accept 
the board’s recommendation and dismiss one alleged violation with respect to 
Count IV and two alleged violations with respect to Count V. 
January Term, 2019 
 
9
Cheselka’s Failure to Cooperate 
{¶ 27} In light of Cheselka’s admitted failure to respond to multiple letters 
of inquiry regarding the grievances filed by Adrian Williams, Franklyn Williams, 
and Dale Rodano, the board found clear and convincing evidence that Cheselka 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(b) and Gov.Bar R. V(9)(G) (both requiring a lawyer to 
cooperate in a disciplinary investigation) as charged in Counts III, IV, and V of 
relator’s amended complaint.  We accept those findings of misconduct. 
Sanction 
{¶ 28} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the 
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions 
imposed in similar cases. 
{¶ 29} The board found eight aggravating factors in this case.  Specifically,  
Cheselka acted with a dishonest or selfish motive, committed multiple offenses, 
engaged in a pattern of misconduct, failed to cooperate in the disciplinary process, 
submitted false statements in the disciplinary process, refused to acknowledge the 
wrongful nature of his conduct, caused harm to vulnerable clients, and failed to 
make restitution.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(2) through (9). 
{¶ 30} As mitigating factors, the board found that Cheselka had no prior 
discipline in his 15-year legal career, during which he had tried tough cases as a 
low-cost criminal trial lawyer, and that he had submitted six letters attesting to his 
good character and reputation.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1) and (5).  The board 
also attributed mitigating effect to the stress brought on by his parents’ declining 
health and their deaths in June 2015 and September 2016.  A clinical and forensic 
psychologist diagnosed Cheselka with depression and anxiety and theorized that 
those conditions may have kept Cheselka from responding to some of relator’s 
letters of inquiry—but she also testified that she did not see any evidence that his 
conditions had affected the quality of his legal representation.  The board was not 
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persuaded by the psychologist’s explanation that Cheselka’s disorders ebbed and 
flowed.  Noting that Cheselka’s disorders seemed to ebb whenever they could have 
compromised his ability to practice law and seemed to flow only when it was 
necessary to cooperate with relator’s investigation, the board attributed little 
mitigating effect to the disorders.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7). 
{¶ 31} Cheselka argued that a one-year suspension, fully stayed on the 
condition that he make restitution of $2,500 in the Hill matter, was the appropriate 
sanction for his misconduct.  Relator, on the other hand, argued that Cheselka 
should be suspended for two years with no stay, ordered to make restitution, and 
required to serve two years of monitored probation upon his reinstatement to the 
practice of law. 
{¶ 32} While recognizing that Cheselka had committed significant ethical 
violations, the board noted that much of his misconduct arose from his efforts to 
“do too much with too little during a discrete period of time when his personal life 
was unsettled.”  The board therefore considered the facts of this case to be akin to 
those in three cases in which we suspended attorneys for two years with the second 
year stayed on conditions and ordered them to serve a one-year period of monitored 
probation—Disciplinary Counsel v. Folwell, 129 Ohio St.3d 297, 2011-Ohio-3181, 
951 N.E.2d 775; Disciplinary Counsel v. Talikka, 135 Ohio St.3d 323, 2013-Ohio-
1012, 986 N.E.2d 954; and Toledo Bar Assn. v. Stewart, 135 Ohio St.3d 316, 2013-
Ohio-795, 986 N.E.2d 947. 
{¶ 33} Folwell neglected several client matters, provided incompetent 
representation to one client, failed to promptly refund unearned fees, failed to 
maintain required trust-account records, and engaged in dishonest conduct in two 
client matters.  As aggravating factors, we found that he had acted with a dishonest 
or selfish motive, engaged in a pattern of misconduct, and committed multiple 
offenses.  Mitigating factors consisted of his clean disciplinary history and his 
cooperation in the disciplinary proceeding. 
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{¶ 34} Talikka neglected several client matters, failed to inform two of 
those clients that their cases had been dismissed, failed to refund unearned fees, 
failed to maintain required trust-account records, and engaged in dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation in five client matters, among other misconduct.  
Although Talikka had acted with a dishonest or selfish motive, engaged in a pattern 
of misconduct, committed multiple offenses, caused harm to vulnerable clients, and 
initially failed to make restitution, we also found he had no prior discipline in more 
than 40 years of practice, had taken on more work than he could handle to maintain 
his self-esteem as he faced significant health problems, had accepted full 
responsibility for his misconduct, and had submitted several letters attesting to his 
good character. 
{¶ 35} Similarly, Stewart failed to provide competent and diligent 
representation to several clients, failed to reasonably communicate with several 
clients, failed to return client files and unearned fees after his representation was 
terminated, and failed to cooperate in several of the ensuing disciplinary 
investigations.  Nonetheless, we found that Stewart’s clean disciplinary record and 
difficult personal circumstances at the time he committed some of his misconduct 
outweighed the aggravating effect of his pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, 
failure to cooperate in the disciplinary process, failure to acknowledge the wrongful 
nature of his misconduct, and efforts to downplay the gravity of that misconduct. 
{¶ 36} After observing Cheselka’s character, testimony, and demeanor 
during his four-day disciplinary hearing, the panel was convinced—and the board 
agreed—that removing Cheselka from the legal marketplace for two years would 
do no more to protect the public than removing him for two years with one year 
stayed on  conditions designed to address his poor management practices and the 
stress of his chosen area of practice.  Having reviewed the record and considered 
Cheselka’s misconduct, the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors, and the 
sanctions we have imposed in comparable cases, we agree. 
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{¶ 37} Accordingly, Michael Joseph Cheselka Jr. is suspended from the 
practice of law in Ohio for two years, with the second year stayed on the conditions 
that he (1) engage in no further misconduct, (2) make restitution of $2,500 within 
60 days of the date of this order to Kimberly Cleveland relative to Cheselka’s 
representation of Darryl Hill, (3) submit to an evaluation by the Ohio Lawyers 
Assistance Program (“OLAP”), and (4) pay the costs of these proceedings.  If 
Cheselka fails to comply with any condition of the stay, the stay will be lifted and 
he will serve the entire two-year suspension.  In addition to the reinstatement 
requirements set forth in Gov.Bar R. V(24), Cheselka shall be required to 
demonstrate that he has complied with any treatment or counseling 
recommendations arising from his OLAP evaluation and has completed six hours 
of continuing legal education focused on law-office management in addition to the 
requirements of Gov.Bar R. X.  Upon reinstatement to the practice of law, he shall 
serve a one-year term of monitored probation in accordance with Gov.Bar R. V(21). 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH and FISCHER, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion joined by 
DEWINE, J. 
DONNELLY and STEWART, JJ., not participating. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 38} I agree with the court’s determination that a two-year suspension 
from the practice of law, with the second year conditionally stayed, is the 
appropriate sanction for the misconduct committed by respondent, Michael Joseph 
Cheselka Jr.  I also agree with the court’s imposition of monitored probation.  
However, because Gov.Bar R. V(21) requires this court to impose specific 
conditions on any term of probation we impose, I disagree with the court’s decision 
not to impose any specific conditions on Cheselka’s probation. 
January Term, 2019 
 
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{¶ 39} Our decisions do not reflect a consistent approach to imposing 
conditions when sanctioning respondents in attorney-discipline cases.  For 
example, in some cases, this court simply states, when ordering probation, that a 
respondent is on probation for a set term, e.g., Akron Bar Assn. v. DeLoach, 143 
Ohio St.3d 39, 2015-Ohio-494, 34 N.E.3d 88, ¶ 20, while in other instances, we 
specify detailed conditions of probation designed to protect the public and assist 
the respondent in returning to the ethical practice of law, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Bennett, 146 Ohio St.3d 237, 2016-Ohio-3045, 54 N.E.3d 1232, ¶ 19.  Or, as 
another example, when we order restitution, it is sometimes as a condition of future 
reinstatement to the practice of law, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Gonzalez, 138 
Ohio St.3d 320, 2014-Ohio-851, 6 N.E.3d 1149, ¶ 35, 39, sometimes as a condition 
of the stay, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Ford, 133 Ohio St.3d 105, 2012-Ohio-
3915, 976 N.E.2d 846, ¶ 27, and sometimes as a condition of probation, e.g., 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Floyd, 74 Ohio St.3d 599, 600, 660 N.E.2d 1150 (1996). 
{¶ 40} This scattershot approach may allow the court flexibility in the 
disciplinary process—but only at the price of predictability and sometimes 
coherence. 
{¶ 41} As a case in point, the court today orders Cheselka, as a condition of 
the stay on the second year of his suspension, to submit to an evaluation by the 
Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”), and his compliance with any 
treatment or counseling recommendations arising from his OLAP evaluation is a 
condition of his future reinstatement to the practice of law.  However, continuing 
compliance with OLAP’s recommendations appears to be unenforceable after 
reinstatement, because it is not a condition of the stay or of monitored probation.  
Similarly, payment of restitution is a condition of the stay—meaning that 
Cheselka’s failure to pay restitution within 60 days from today would result in his 
serving the full two-year suspension—but restitution is not a condition of either 
reinstatement or monitored probation, so it is possible that Cheselka could return to 
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the practice of law and complete his probation without ever having compensated 
the victim of his misconduct. 
{¶ 42} Rather than being self-defeating, the conditions we impose should 
work in tandem to protect the public from future misconduct while promoting the 
respondent’s rehabilitation.  After all, the primary purpose of our attorney-
discipline system is not to punish the offending attorney but to protect the public 
from attorneys whose misconduct draws their fitness to practice law into question.  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Agopian, 112 Ohio St.3d 103, 2006-Ohio-6510, 858 
N.E.2d 368, ¶ 10. 
{¶ 43} The need for consistency, predictability, and coherence can largely 
be satisfied by turning to the Rules for the Government of the Bar, which establish 
express conditions for reinstatement to the practice of law following a suspension 
and also provide a detailed system of monitored probation to allow for the 
continued supervision of a disciplined attorney from his or her reinstatement until 
the time the conditions of probation we impose have been satisfied. 
{¶ 44} Gov.Bar R. V(12)(A) establishes the manner of an attorney’s 
discipline for professional misconduct.  Among other sanctions, this court may 
suspend an attorney from the practice of law for a period of six months to two years 
subject to a stay in whole or in part.  Gov.Bar R. V(12)(A)(3).  If we impose such 
a term suspension, Gov.Bar R. V(12)(A)(4) authorizes us to also impose 
“[p]robation for a period of time upon conditions as the Supreme Court 
determines.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 45} Gov.Bar R. V(24) provides the procedure for an attorney serving a 
term suspension to apply for reinstatement to the practice of law.  This rule requires 
this court to reinstate the respondent if no formal disciplinary proceedings are 
pending against the respondent and the respondent has paid all costs of the 
proceedings as we had previously ordered, complied with our order of suspension 
and with the continuing-legal-education (“CLE”) requirements of Gov.Bar R. X, 
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and completed serving any criminal sanctions that have been imposed.  Gov.Bar R. 
V(24)(C).  In contrast to Gov.Bar R. V(25)’s requisites for reinstatement from an 
indefinite suspension, Gov.Bar R. V(24) does not expressly provide additional 
conditions on reinstatement, such as making appropriate restitution or possessing 
the mental qualifications required to practice law as shown through an OLAP 
evaluation.  See Gov.Bar R. V(25)(D)(1)(a) (conditioning reinstatement from 
indefinite suspension on restitution) and (b) (conditioning reinstatement from 
indefinite suspension on the respondent’s “possess[ing] all of the mental, 
educational, and moral qualifications that were required of an applicant for 
admission to the practice of law in Ohio at the time of his or her original 
admission”).  Nonetheless, we have sometimes imposed specific conditions on 
reinstatement to ensure that the respondent complies with our order.  See, e.g., 
Gonzalez, 138 Ohio St.3d 320, 2014-Ohio-851, 6 N.E.3d 1149, at ¶ 35, 39. 
{¶ 46} Staying a suspension from the practice of law on conditions can be 
a preferable method to compel compliance with our disciplinary order without 
“overburden[ing] attorneys who contribute their time to volunteer as probation 
monitors,” Disciplinary Counsel v. Harmon, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2019-Ohio-4171, 
___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 57 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  In contrast to Gov.Bar R. V(21)’s 
provisions on monitored probation, the Rules for the Government of the Bar do not 
provide any specific requirement or procedure for the relator or a monitoring 
attorney to supervise the respondent’s compliance with the conditions of a stayed 
suspension.  Rather, when we impose conditions on the stay of a suspension, we 
reserve our power to dissolve the stay and reinstate the suspension from the practice 
of law, encouraging a disciplined attorney to take control of his or her rehabilitation 
and comply with his or her professional obligations. 
{¶ 47} But here, the court has determined, and I agree, that the respondent’s 
misconduct warrants the imposition of monitored probation.  When this court 
imposes probation, Gov.Bar R. V(21) requires that we impose conditions for the 
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probation.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Halligan, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2019-Ohio-3748, 
___ N.E.3d ___, at ¶ 41-45 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
Moreover, the monitored-probation scheme established by Gov.Bar R. V(21) 
cannot function effectively without this court’s imposition of conditions of 
probation.  After all, the first duty of monitoring attorneys that is listed in Gov.Bar 
R. V(21)(B)(1) is to “[m]onitor compliance by the respondent with the conditions 
of probation imposed by the Supreme Court.”  (Emphasis added.)  And probation 
cannot be terminated unless “the respondent has complied with the conditions of 
probation.”  Gov.Bar R. V(21)(D). 
{¶ 48} This court’s imposition of specific conditions of probation is 
“essential to the scheme” of probation established by Gov.Bar R. V(21).  Halligan 
at ¶ 43 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  The Rules for the 
Government of the Bar give this court—and only this court—the authority to 
impose those conditions, id. at ¶ 42, and “our failure to attach conditions to 
probation is more than a missed opportunity to set the criteria and goals for 
professional redemption, it is an abdication of our duty under the Rules for the 
Government of the Bar,” id. at ¶ 41.  When this court does not provide guidance to 
the relator, the respondent, the monitoring attorney, and the Board of Professional 
Conduct as to the conditions of probation—conditions specifically designed by this 
court to protect the public and rehabilitate the respondent—it undermines the 
effectiveness of the probation scheme established by Gov.Bar R. V(21). 
{¶ 49} The court imposes a term of probation without ordering any 
conditions specific to Cheselka’s misconduct for him to follow while he is serving 
it.  Except for the generic duties Gov.Bar R. V(21)(C) imposes on all attorneys on 
probation, Cheselka and his monitoring attorney have no direction regarding their 
respective duties during the term of monitored probation.  The lead opinion does 
not describe what the monitor should be monitoring during the monthly in-person 
meetings that will be required by Gov.Bar R. V(21)(C)(1), nor does it determine 
January Term, 2019 
 
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what access the monitor should have to Cheselka’s client files and records or even 
what would constitute a violation of probation.  The lead opinion gives no 
explanation of how this court would ever be able to find that Cheselka had violated 
the conditions of probation pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(21)(K) when no conditions 
will have been imposed by the court in the first instance.  Without express 
conditions, imposing probation is not only unworkable as a practical matter, but it 
also raises due-process concerns regarding a disciplined attorney’s right to fair 
notice of what is expected of him or her during the term of probation. 
{¶ 50} Therefore, I would impose the following specific conditions for the 
one-year term of monitored probation to facilitate the supervision of Cheselka’s 
office-management practices: (1) Cheselka shall meet in person with his monitoring 
attorney on a monthly basis as required by Gov.Bar R. V(21)(C)(1); (2) Cheselka 
shall provide his monitoring attorney with a written release or waiver for use in 
verifying compliance regarding medical, psychological, or other treatment as 
required by Gov.Bar R. V(21)(C)(2); (3) Cheselka shall cooperate and work with 
the monitor, who shall act as a mentor and provide guidance to Cheselka regarding 
the proper operation and management of a law practice; (4) Cheselka—with the 
monitoring attorney or relator, disciplinary counsel—shall design a comprehensive 
plan to ensure that he is reasonably diligent in the representation of his clients—in 
the event that Cheselka cannot act with reasonable diligence in representing his 
clients, relator or the monitoring attorney may limit the number of active cases 
Cheselka may maintain; (5) Cheselka shall maintain an active-case list or a 
docketing system and shall give the monitoring attorney an inventory of active 
cases each month; and (6) Cheselka shall give the monitoring attorney access to 
nonconfidential client materials and files, ledgers, and account statements as 
needed to allow the monitoring attorney to review Cheselka’s active cases to ensure 
his compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct, see Allen Cty. Bar Assn. v. 
Williams, 95 Ohio St.3d 160, 2002-Ohio-2006, 766 N.E.2d 973, ¶ 16. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 51} However, because monitored probation is appropriate in this case, I 
would also include the following requirements as conditions of probation:  
Cheselka shall (1) engage in no further misconduct, (2) make restitution of $2,500 
to Kimberly Cleveland relative to Cheselka’s representation of Darryl Hill, (3) 
submit to an evaluation by OLAP, (4) comply with any treatment or counseling 
recommendations arising from his OLAP evaluation, and (5) complete six hours of 
CLE focused on law-office management in addition to the requirements of Gov.Bar 
R. X. 
{¶ 52} “An effective attorney-probation system—one that follows the Rules 
for the Government of the Bar—requires the considered input of this court in 
establishing the conditions of probation.”  Halligan, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2019-Ohio-
3748, __ N.E.3d __, at ¶ 47 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
Because the court fails to impose specific conditions on Cheselka’s probation, I 
dissent in part. 
DEWINE, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Joseph M. Caligiuri, Disciplinary Counsel, and Lauren A. Gardner, Special 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
Alkire & Nieding, L.L.C., and Richard C. Alkire; and Robert V. Housel, for 
respondent. 
_________________