Title: Starrett v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

SHAWN NATHAN STARRETT v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2012 WY 133Case Number: S-11-0284Decided: 10/18/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume. 
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2012
SHAWN 
NATHAN STARRETT,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).
Appeal 
from the District Court of Sweetwater County
The 
Honorable Nena R. James, Judge 
Representing 
Appellant:
Diane Lozano, State 
Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Chief Appellate Counsel; Eric M. Alden, Senior 
Assistant Appellate Counsel; Wyoming Public Defender Program
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory A. Phillips, 
Wyoming Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Justin A. Daraie, Assistant Attorney 
General
Before KITE, C.J., 
and GOLDEN,* HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
* Justice Golden 
retired effective September 30, 2012
GOLDEN, Justice.
[¶1]      
This appeal presents a question of first impression whether a criminal 
defendant’s judgment of conviction upon his plea of guilty to the felony of 
third degree sexual abuse of a minor must be set aside and he be permitted to 
plead anew because the district court failed to comply with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-11-507 which states:
(a)  No 
judgment of conviction shall be entered upon a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere to any charge which may result in the disqualification of the 
defendant to possess firearms pursuant to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. §§ 
922(g)(1), (9) and 924(a)(2) or other federal law unless the defendant was 
advised in open court by the judge:
            
(i) Of the collateral consequences that may arise from that conviction pursuant 
to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(33), 922(g)(1), (9) and 924(a)(2); 
and
            
(ii) That if the defendant is a peace officer, member of the armed forces, 
hunting guide, security guard or engaged in any other profession or occupation 
requiring the carrying or possession of a firearm, that he may now, or in the 
future, lose the right to engage in that profession or occupation should he be 
convicted.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-11-507 (LexisNexis 2011) (emphasis added).
[¶2]      
Shawn Nathan Starrett (Starrett) appeals the judgment of conviction entered by 
the district court upon his plea of guilty to third degree sexual abuse of a 
minor1 
after reaching a plea agreement with the State.  In their briefing, 
Starrett and the State agree the district court erred when it entered the 
judgment of conviction upon Starrett’s guilty plea without advising him in open 
court that his felony conviction may result in his loss of the right to possess 
firearms and ammunition and to engage in a profession or occupation requiring 
the carrying or possession of a firearm under the provisions of the federal law 
referenced in the above-cited statute.  Starrett and the State disagree, 
however, about the consequences of the district court’s error.  Starrett 
contends this Court must, under de novo review, set aside the judgment of 
conviction and remand to the district court where he is allowed to plead anew 
after that court advises him as the above-cited statute directs.  The 
State, on the other hand, maintains that, because Starrett did not object to the 
district court’s failed advisement, this Court must affirm the judgment of 
conviction since Starrett has not established the plain error prejudice prong, 
that is to say, he has not shown that his decision to plead guilty was 
influenced by his belief that under his felony conviction he would remain 
qualified to possess firearms and ammunition and to engage in a profession or 
occupation requiring his carrying or possession of a firearm.
[¶3]      
After thoughtful consideration and as explained below, we agree with Starrett’s 
contention that we must undertake de novo review of the issue presented; and, 
having applied that review, we conclude the district court must obey the 
legislative command of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-507 before entering the judgment 
of conviction upon Starrett’s plea of guilty in this case.  Consequently, 
we herewith set aside Starrett’s judgment of conviction and remand this case to 
the district court with instructions to advise Starrett in open court as the 
statute provides and allow him to plead anew.
ISSUE
[¶4]      
The State’s issue statement adequately presents the issue before us:
When a defendant 
seeks to plead guilty to a felony, a court must advise him, pursuant to Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-11-507, that federal law disqualifies felons from possessing 
firearms.  The district court never advised Starrett of this consequence 
when he pled guilty to felony sexual abuse of a minor.  Even so, can 
Starrett’s conviction be affirmed because he does not suggest that receiving the 
advisement would have led him to plead differently?
FACTS AND 
PROCEEDINGS
[¶5]      
On August 31, 2011, the district court entered a judgment of conviction and 
sentence against Starrett upon his plea of guilty to the charge of sexual abuse 
of a minor in the third degree, a felony in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-316(a)(iv), pursuant to a plea agreement between Starrett and the 
State.  The charge was based on Starrett’s sexual contact of the victim on 
April 27, 2011, in Rock Springs, Wyoming.  The district court sentenced 
Starrett to imprisonment of not less than eight years and not more than twelve 
years with credit for time served and the required monetary assessments.  
Starrett and the State agree in their briefing on appeal, as the record makes 
clear, that the district court throughout the proceedings from arraignment 
through entry of the judgment of conviction and sentence advised Starrett of all 
the advisements required under the relevant Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure; 
and Starrett and the State agree that the district court failed to advise 
Starrett in open court of the consequences of his guilty plea under federal law 
as set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-507.
DISCUSSION
[¶6]      
As a preliminary matter, we must determine the appropriate standard of review 
that is applicable to the issue presented in this appeal.  As shall be 
seen, our determination of that standard of review will drive our answer to that 
issue.
[¶7]      
Starrett insists that the applicable standard of review is de novo because the 
issue presented requires the interpretation and application of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-11-507.  The State, on the other hand, insists that the applicable 
standard of review is plain error because Starrett did not object or otherwise 
call the district court’s attention to its failure to give the statutory 
advisement.  More specifically, the State, while conceding that three of 
the four prongs of the plain error test exist in this record,2 
contends that Starrett has not satisfied the fourth prong of that test, namely, 
the district court’s failure to give him in open court the statutory advisement 
adversely affected a substantial right resulting in material prejudice to 
him.  Mebane v. State, 2012 WY 43, ¶ 9, 272 P.3d 327, 328 
(Wyo. 2012).
[¶8]      
In support of the State’s contention that the plain error test is the applicable 
standard of review, the State relies on United States v. Dominguez 
Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 124 S. Ct. 2333, 159 L. Ed. 2d 157 (2004), and 
Mebane.  In Dominguez Benitez, the criminal defendant’s 
appeal of his conviction entered upon a plea of guilty concerned the trial 
court’s failure to comply with F.R.Cr.P. 11(c)(3)(B) by not informing him he 
could not withdraw his guilty plea if the trial court did not accept the 
sentencing recommendation set forth in the plea agreement.  The United 
States Supreme Court held that, in the case of a F.R.Cr.P. 11 error, the 
applicable standard of review is the plain error standard of F.R.Cr.P. 
52(b).  Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S.  at 81-83, 124 S. Ct.  at 
2339-40.  In Mebane, the issue before us was whether the trial court 
adequately re-advised the criminal defendant of his right to remain silent 
immediately before he testified on his own behalf at trial after the State had 
rested its case-in-chief.  Mebane, ¶¶ 4-5, 10, 272 P.3d  at 
328.  The right-to-remain-silent advisement appears in W.R.Cr.P. 
11(b)(3).  Although we did not in Mebane identify W.R.Cr.P. 52(b), 
which addresses plain error, our decision in that case clearly applied the plain 
error test to Mebane’s claim of W.R.Cr.P. 11(b)(3) advisement error.  Both 
Dominguez Benitez and Mebane then concern application of the plain 
error standard of review to a criminal defendant’s claim of a Rule 11 advisement 
error.
[¶9]      
Starrett is not claiming a Rule 11 advisement error.  Both he and the State 
agree that he is claiming a statutory advisement error under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-11-507.  Because this statute is at issue, Starrett naturally reasons 
that interpretation and application of this statute is necessary to determine 
the consequences of the district court’s failure to advise him in open court of 
the consequences of his plea of guilty as set forth in that statute.  He 
asserts, therefore, we must apply our de novo standard of review to the issue 
before us.  Our rules of statutory interpretation and application are 
well-known:
            
This court interprets statutes by giving effect to the legislature’s intent. . . 
. We begin by making an inquiry relating to the ordinary and obvious meaning of 
the words employed according to their arrangement and connection. . . . We give 
effect to every word, clause, and sentence and construe together all components 
of a statute in pari materia. . . . Statutory interpretation is a 
question of law. . . . We review questions of law de novo without affording 
deference to the district court’s decision. If a statute is clear and 
unambiguous, we simply give effect to its plain meaning.  Only when we find 
a statute to be ambiguous do we resort to the general principles of statutory 
construction. An ambiguous statute is one whose meaning is uncertain because it 
is susceptible to more than one interpretation.  
            
It is a basic rule of statutory construction that courts may try to determine 
legislative intent by considering the type of statute being interpreted and what 
the legislature intended by the language used, viewed in light of the objects 
and purposes to be accomplished. . . .
We are guided by the 
full text of the statute, paying attention to its internal structure and the 
functional relation between the parts and the whole.  Each word of a 
statute is to be afforded meaning, with none rendered superfluous.  
Further, the meaning afforded to a word should be that word’s standard popular 
meaning unless another meaning is clearly intended.  If the meaning of a 
word is unclear, it should be afforded the meaning that best accomplishes the 
statute’s purpose.
In particular, we 
have repeatedly found the word “shall” in a statute to be mandatory.  Where 
the legislature uses the word “shall,” this Court accepts the provision as 
mandatory and has no right to make the law contrary to what the legislature 
prescribed. The choice of the word “shall” intimates an absence of discretion[.] 

In re 
MN, 
2007 WY 189, ¶¶ 4-5, 171 P.3d 1077, 1079-80 (Wyo. 2007) 
(internal citations omitted and parentheses and some quotation marks 
omitted).  We have also observed:
In addition, it is a 
well-known principle of law that courts are not free to legislate.  The 
first rule of statutory construction is that legislative intent, not a court’s 
perception of fairness, controls.  State Dept. of Revenue and Taxation 
v. Pacificorp, 872 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Wyo. 1994); Olheiser v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ 
Compensation Div., 866 P.2d 768, 770 (Wyo. 1994).  It is not the court’s prerogative to usurp the 
power of the legislature by deciding what should have been said. Barber v. 
State Highway Commission, 80 Wyo. 340, 342 P.2d 723, 725 (1959).  The 
courts must follow, and cannot extend, statutory definitions.  State v. 
Weeden, 17 Wyo. 418, 100 P. 114, 115 (1909).  For over a century, Wyoming courts have recognized 
that it is their duty only to interpret and declare what the law is, not to be 
responsible for its defects.  Hamilton v. Territory of Wyoming, 1 
Wyo. 131, 135 (1873).  And of specific importance to the instant case is 
the precept that exceptions not made by the legislature in a statute cannot be 
read into it. State ex rel. Peterson v. Ellsworth, 59 Wyo. 288, 139 P.2d 744, 748 (1943).  

Hede v. 
Gilstrap, 2005 WY 24, ¶ 6, 107 P.3d 158, 163 (Wyo. 
2005).
[¶10]   
Starrett focuses on the mandatory tenor of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-507 that “[n]o 
judgment of conviction shall be entered upon a plea of guilty . . . unless the 
defendant was advised in open court by the judge . . . .”  We see that that 
statute does not contain within itself either a harmless error or plain error 
standard of review or other obvious element of flexibility.  In essence, 
Starrett proclaims we must simply obey the legislative command:  because 
the district court did not give him the advisement in open court, no judgment of 
conviction shall be entered upon his plea of guilty.
[¶11]   
Apart from the parties’ arguments, our attention has been drawn to W.R.Cr.P. 32 
entitled “Judgment and sentence,” which contains a provision that a judgment of 
conviction upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere shall include “[a]ny 
other advisements required by law or that the court deems appropriate.” 
W.R.Cr.P. 32(b)(1)(E).  Clearly the advisement of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-11-507 is an advisement required by law.  Clearly the district court’s 
failure to give that specific advisement required by law is a Rule 32 
error.  On two recent occasions we have considered the consequences of Rule 
32 errors.  In Trumbull v. State, 2009 WY 103, 214 P.3d 978 (Wyo. 2009), we 
considered a district court’s failure to mention probation during the sentencing 
hearing and also in the written sentence as required by W.R.Cr.P. 
32(c)(2)(D).  We stated that our case law emphasizes “that the district 
court’s handling of the issue of probation at sentencing involves a fundamental 
right, and we consider it too important to be decided on the basis of treating 
the district court’s absolute silence as a tacit 'consideration’ of 
probation.”  Id., ¶ 16, 214 P.3d  at 982.  We held that the 
district court’s failure to “meaningfully adhere to the requirement” of that 
Rule 32 provision required us to reverse the sentence imposed by the district 
court and remand to that court with directions to consider sentencing 
anew.  Id., ¶¶ 16-17, 214 P.3d  at 982.  Most recently, in 
Clark v. State, 2012 WY 
61, 275 P.3d 488 (Wyo. 
2012), we revisited W.R.Cr.P. 32(c)(2)(D) because the district court failed to 
express in the written sentence that it had considered probation; but, in 
contrast to Trumbull, we noted the district court had at least stated 
during the sentencing hearing it had considered probation.  Id., ¶ 
19, 275 P.3d  at 494-95.  Although we declined to order a new sentencing 
hearing as we had done in Trumbull, we did remand to the district court 
with directions to enter an amended sentence reflecting that it had considered 
probation in accordance with the rule.  Id.
[¶12]   We 
can discern no reason to treat the Rule 32 error in Starrett’s case any 
differently from how we treated the Rule 32 error in Trumbull and 
Clark.  Indeed, we find it unacceptable to require the district 
court to strictly adhere to some Rule 32 requirements but not to others, 
particularly when the other is the subject of legislation touching the 
fundamental right of our citizens to bear arms.  Wyo. Const. art 1, § 24 
(the right of citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and of the State 
shall not be denied).  It is not to be forgotten that our legislature is 
the policy-making branch of our state government.  Rogers v. State, 
2008 WY 90, ¶ 18, 189 P.3d 265, 269-70 (Wyo. 2008); 
Union Pacific Resources Co. v. Dolenc, 2004 WY 36, ¶ 21, 86 P.3d 1287, 1294-95 (Wyo. 
2004).  With the clear language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-507, the 
legislature has established public policy in this area of the particular federal 
firearm consequences which result from a felony guilty plea.  We will not 
second guess the wisdom of that decision.  Whether this statute represents 
sound public policy is not our concern.  Members of this Court are vested 
with the authority to interpret this statute; but we do not possess either the 
expertise or the prerogative to make policy judgments.  Those judgments are 
entrusted to our state’s elected leaders, who can be removed from office on 
election day if our state’s citizens disagree with those policy judgments.  
It does not fall to the courts to protect the citizens from the consequences of 
their political choices.
[¶13]   
Substantial support for our decision today is also found in persuasive authority 
from sister jurisdictions in cases involving either the immigration consequences 
or firearms ban consequences of a guilty plea prescribed by the statutes in 
those jurisdictions.  There are many jurisdictions having statutes 
requiring the trial judge to advise a non-citizen criminal defendant of the 
possible immigration consequences of a guilty plea.  See John J. 
Francis, Failure to Advise Non-Citizens of Immigration Consequences of 
Criminal Convictions: Should This Be Grounds to Withdraw a Guilty Plea?, 36 
U. Mich. J.L. Reform 691, 694 n.13 (2002-2003).  In the District of 
Columbia, for example, a run of court decisions from 1991 through 2010 under the 
District’s statute mandating such advice holds that neither a plain error nor 
harmless error standard of review applies to the trial court’s failure to give 
the non-citizen criminal defendant the statutorily required advice; instead, the 
appellate court will simply reverse the trial court’s denial of the non-citizen 
criminal defendant’s motion to withdraw a guilty plea and remand for further 
proceedings.  Bautista v. United States, 10 A.3d 154 (D.C. 2010) 
(per curiam); Slytman v. United States, 804 A.2d 1113 (D.C. 2002); 
Daramy v. United States, 750 A.2d 552 (D.C. 2000); and Alpizar v. 
United States, 595 A.2d 991 (D.C. 1991).  In Slytman, for 
example, the court of appeals rejected the government’s advocating of the plain 
error standard of review which is applied to violations of F.R.Cr.P. 11, see 
United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 122 S. Ct. 1043, 152 L. Ed. 2d 90  
(2002), explaining that the District’s statute
contains no standard 
of review or other obvious element of flexibility, as we noted in 
Alpizar.  This is unsurprising given that the Council enacted § 
16-713 to overcome “the reluctance of the courts to grant a motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea when the defendant had not been advised of potential consequences 
with respect to the prisoner’s immigration status.”  Daramy, supra, 
750 A.2d  at 555-56.  We obey the legislative command.
Slytman, 804 A.2d  at 1118 
(emphasis added).  
[¶14]   
Following Slytman, that same court of appeals in Bautista 
reiterated “the courts must follow the legislative mandate that strictly 
requires that an alien defendant be properly advised before a court will accept 
a plea of guilty.”  10 A.3d  at 160.  
[¶15]   In 
Ohio, another of the jurisdictions having a statute requiring trial courts to 
advise non-citizen defendants of the possible immigration consequences of a 
criminal conviction before accepting a guilty plea, the supreme court recognized 
that with such a statute the Ohio legislature “has created a substantive 
statutory right for certain criminal defendants and that this right therefore 
prevails over the general procedural provisions of [Ohio] Crim. R. 32.1” which 
contains a manifest injustice standard to govern a motion to withdraw a guilty 
or no contest plea after sentencing has occurred.  State v. Francis, 
820 N.E.2d 355, 359 (Ohio 2004).  In a separate opinion concurring in the 
judgment, Chief Justice Moyer emphasized the great importance of the 
legislature’s use of the word “shall” in the statutory language “shall set aside 
the judgment and permit the defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty.”  
Id. at 367.  He noted that his court consistently holds that the 
word “shall” when used in a statute denotes that compliance with the commands of 
that statute is mandatory.  Id.  See also Commonwealth v. 
Hilaire, 777 N.E.2d 804 (Mass. 2002), and Commonwealth v. Soto, 727 N.E.2d 811 (Mass. 2000) (the words of the statute do not permit any other 
interpretation and the court is not free to ignore the clear expression of 
legislative intent).
[¶16]   In 
our sister state of Montana we have found an interesting case discussing both 
the immigration consequences of a guilty plea and the firearms ban consequences 
of a guilty plea.  In State v. Liefert, 43 P.3d 329 (Mont. 2002), 
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 892 (2002), Liefert had pleaded guilty in justice 
of the peace court to domestic violence partner assault; was later charged under 
federal law with unlawfully possessing a firearm; and then sought to withdraw 
his guilty plea to the domestic violence charge, arguing good cause because the 
justice of the peace court had failed to inform him of the federal prohibition 
of firearm possession as a result of his state law domestic violence 
conviction.  After lower courts denied his motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea because the federal prohibition of firearm possession is a collateral 
consequence of his state conviction, Liefert appealed to the Montana Supreme 
Court where the only issue he presented was whether a trial court must inform a 
defendant during the plea colloquy of the federal firearm ban when the defendant 
is charged with domestic violence under the applicable state law.  43 P.3d  
at 333.  Although Liefert advanced several points in his appeal, the one of 
interest to us was his argument that – just as courts are required under § 
46-12-210(f), Montana Code Ann., to inform defendants that a guilty plea may 
have federal immigration consequences – courts should similarly be required to 
inform defendants of the federal firearm possession consequences when pleading 
guilty to domestic violence under state law.  Id. at 334.  
Responding to that argument, the state attorney general asserted that the 
requirement regarding federal immigration law was a policy determination made by 
the Montana legislature, and any similar requirements regarding firearms 
possession must also be based on legislative action.  Id.
[¶17]   In 
rejecting Liefert’s argument, the Montana Supreme Court agreed with the state’s 
response, stating:
[I]f Montana’s courts 
are to inform defendants of other collateral consequences of a state guilty 
plea, such as the possibility of federal gun restrictions, such a requirement is 
properly left to the Legislature as a policy decision.
Id. at 336.
[¶18]   
Interestingly, the legislature in the State of Washington has made these policy 
decisions with both immigration consequences and firearms prohibition 
consequences.  In State v. Littlefair, 51 P.3d 116 (Wash. App. 
2002), review denied, 72 P.3d 761 (Wash. 2003), the court considered the 
statute requiring advice of federal deportation consequences.  Because the 
trial court had failed to advise the criminal defendant of those immigration 
consequences when the guilty plea was entered, the appellate court reversed and 
remanded.  Id. at 126. Similarly, in State v. Breitung, 267 P.3d 1012, 1016-18 (Wash. 2011), and State v. Minor, 174 P.3d 1162 (Wash. 
2008), because the trial courts failed to advise the criminal defendants of the 
firearms prohibition consequences of their guilty pleas, the appellate courts 
reversed the convictions.
[¶19]   In 
summary, we hold that we must apply our de novo standard of review to the issue 
before us because that issue requires our interpretation and application of a 
statute.  We hold that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-507 is clear and unambiguous; 
therefore, we must simply give effect to its plain meaning.  We hold that, 
because the legislature has used the word “shall” in its language, “[n]o 
judgment of conviction shall be entered upon a plea of guilty . . . unless the 
defendant was advised in open court by the judge,” this Court accepts the 
provision as mandatory and has no right to make the law contrary to what the 
legislature prescribed.  The word “shall” is this statute intimates an 
absence of discretion.  The advisement in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-507 is 
required, and W.R.Cr.P. 32(b)(1)(E) mandates that the judgment of conviction 
upon Starrett’s plea of guilty must include that advisement.  The district 
court’s failure to give Starrett that required advisement was a Rule 32 
error.  Consistent with our precedent dealing with Rule 32 error, we hold 
that the district court’s failure to include in Starrett’s judgment of 
conviction upon his plea of guilty the advisement required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-11-507 requires us to set aside Starrett’s judgment of conviction and remand 
to that court with directions that he be permitted to plead anew.  It is so 
ordered.
FOOTNOTES
1A person commits third-degree sexual 
abuse of a minor if the actor is at least seventeen years old and “knowingly 
takes immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with a victim who is less than 
seventeen (17) years of age and . . . is at least four (4) years younger than 
the actor.”  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-316(a)(iv) (LexisNexis 2011).
2In Rathbun v. State, 2011 WY 116, ¶ 28, 257 P.3d 29, 38 (Wyo. 2011), we 
listed the four prongs of the plain error test:
To establish plain error, the 
appellant must prove (1) the record clearly reflects the alleged error; (2) the 
existence of a clear and unequivocal rule of law; (3) a clear and obvious 
transgression of that rule of law; and (4) the error adversely affected a 
substantial right resulting in material prejudice to 
him.