Title: Dorr v. Newman

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Dorr v. Newman1990 WY 9785 P.2d 1172Case Number: 89-74Decided: 01/26/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
MARK DORR,

 APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF),

v.

PEGGY J. NEWMAN, FORMERLY 
PEGGY J. DORR, 

APPELLEE 
(DEFENDANT).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Campell County, William A. Taylor, J.

John M. Daly of 
Daly, Anderson & Taylor, P.C., Gillette, for appellant.

William D. 
Omohundro and Randall T. Cox of Omohundro & Palmerlee, Buffalo, for 
appellee.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J., THOMAS, URBIGKIT and GOLDEN, JJ., and ROONEY, J., 
Retired.

URBIGKIT, Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant Mark Dorr 
(Dorr) appeals from an amended order increasing alimony payments to his former 
wife, Appellee Peggy J. Newman (Newman). We affirm the decision of the district 
court except to require deletion of that portion of the final order which alters 
the tax consequences of the increased alimony award.

[¶2.]     Dorr questions 
whether:

     I. * * * the court 
erred in ordering additional alimony when additional alimony was not pled by 
defendant.

     II. * * * there has 
been a sufficient change of circumstances to justify a modification of the 
decree.

     III. * * * the 
evidence supports an increase in alimony.

     IV. * * * the evidence 
supports the court's finding of fraudulent conveyances by appellant.

 

[¶3.]     Newman, formerly Peggy 
J. Dorr, rephrases whether:

     I. * * * there has 
been a sufficient change of circumstances to justify the modification of the 
divorce decree.

     II. * * *, under the 
appropriate standard of appellate review, the record contains sufficient 
evidence to support the increase in alimony as ordered by the District 
Court.

     III. * * * the 
District Court committed any error by increasing alimony in response to the 
appellee's petition.

[¶4.]     Dorr generally 
addresses appropriateness of the relief granted by the district court in 
answering the Newman contempt petition. To answer that attack, we evaluate if 
alimony can be modified following entry of a divorce decree; if that 
modification was properly requested; if that modification was justified by a 
change of circumstances; if that modification was permitted within the sound 
discretion of the trial court; and finally, sufficiency of the evidence. This 
evaluation is hindered to some degree because of a wide difference in opinion 
between the litigants about the "facts" of this case.1 Essentially, this case involves an 
ex-husband unwilling to make good on previously agreed to property settlement 
payments which resulted in the district court fashioning a remedy by adjusting 
alimony payments to meet the recognized needs of the ex-wife.

[¶5.]     This divorce has drawn 
on the time and resources of three district court judges and five law firms. We 
decline the invitations implicit in the briefs presented to this court to become 
super-arbitrators and reweigh the legal effect here of economic distress 
conceded by both litigants. The district court was presented the unenviable task 
of providing a fair resolution to this divorced couple after years of venomous 
litigation. A quick review of the litigation history to this case puts into 
context the issues presented to this court.

[¶6.]     Mark Dorr and Peggy 
Newman married in 1976. Ashley Nichole Dorr was born to their family in 1981.2 On February 8, 1983, they were 
granted an uncontested divorce decree. As part of the divorce settlement, a 
Dorr-Newman partnership was established for:

The purpose of the 
partnership shall be to engage in the business of owning, operating and selling 
property and such other businesses as may be usual or incident thereto, or such 
further businesses as the partners may agree upon from time to time.

Cf. Overcast v. 
Overcast, 780 P.2d 1371 (Wyo. 1989). When boom times in Gillette vanished so did 
any civility to this tenuous co-existence. Dorr remarried and then the litigants 
really began to fight.

[¶7.]     In May 1984, Dorr filed 
a motion to modify the divorce decree and to clear up the terms of the child 
visitation agreement. That motion resulted in a order of July 19, 1984, 
clarifying custody and visitation. In June, Newman, residing with young Ashley 
in Colorado, petitioned the county court in Denver, Colorado for a change of 
name for their daughter. Not informed in advance of his daughter's name change 
from Ashley Nichole Dorr to Ashley Nichole Newman-Dorr, Dorr filed a motion for 
an order to show cause. This issue was terminated by stipulation in late 1984 
after an active course of pleadings.

[¶8.]     A lull in their 
litigation battles lasted until September 4, 1986, when Dorr filed a motion for 
supplemental property settlement and more defined child visitation. This new 
litigation resulted in a new judge being assigned to the case; and it is from 
his decisions that this appeal is taken. Newman responded with a petition for 
contempt in March 1987 as then "resolved" by order of May 14, 1987 by denial of 
the Dorr petition to modify with prejudice and in decision on the Newman 
petition and contempt proceedings involving property and support:

     IT IS THEREFORE 
ORDERED that the Plaintiff's Motion for Supplemental Property Settlement, which 
this Court has considered as a petition for modification of decree, be, and the 
same hereby is, dismissed with prejudice.

     The Defendant then 
presented her testimony and evidence regarding the Petition for Contempt as 
filed herein. The Court having considered said evidence, statement of counsel, 
and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, finds as follows:

     1. That on February 8, 
1983, this Court entered its Order incorporating into a Decree of Divorce a 
Property Settlement Agreement which the parties had previously negotiated and 
agreed upon.

     2. That subsequent to 
the entry of the divorce, the parties entered into an agreement on October 21, 
1985, introduced in this matter as a joint exhibit, which agreement provided for 
the quantification of certain sums as owed by the Plaintiff to the Defendant 
under the paragraph entitled "Office Building" of the previous Property 
Settlement Agreement, said sums being in the amount of $8,000 plus attorneys 
fees and costs in the amount of $1,500, which was due February 8, 
1987.

     3. In addition, 
pursuant to the original Property Settlement Agreement incorporated into the 
Decree of Divorce in this matter, the Plaintiff agreed to pay and was ordered to 
pay to the Defendant $17,500 plus interest at 8% from February 8, 1983, which 
sum was due and payable on February 8, 1987.

     4. The Plaintiff has 
not paid the Defendant any of said sums pursuant to the previous Orders of this 
Court or the parties' agreement of October 21, 1985, and by reason thereof, is 
in contempt of the Orders of this Court.

     5. By reason of the 
Plaintiff's contempt of the Orders of this Court, the Defendant has incurred 
attorneys fees in the amount of $1,659.25 which are reasonable and necessary, 
together with travel expenses and lost wages in the amount of $717.65, all as 
the result of the Plaintiff's actions.

* * * * * *

     THEREFORE, THIS COURT 
DOES HEREBY ORDER, ADJUDGE AND DECREE THE FOLLOWING:

     1. The Plaintiff, Mark 
J. Dorr, is in contempt of the previous Orders of this Court for failure to pay 
the Defendant the sums as owed to the Defendant, said sums being $9,500, due 
February 8, 1987, and the sum of $17,500 plus interest at 8% from February 8, 
1983 to date of payment, none of which the Plaintiff has paid to the Defendant 
to date.

     2. The Plaintiff may 
purge himself of said contempt by paying to the Defendant the  sum of $9,500 within 30 days of April 
15, 1987.

     3. The Plaintiff shall 
be allowed an extension of one year or until February 8, 1988, to pay to the 
Defendant the sum of $17,500, together with interest at 8% from February 8, 
1983, to February 8, 1987, and interest at 10% from February 8, 1987 to date of 
payment.

     4. The Plaintiff shall 
immediately transfer and assign unto the Defendant all stocks and bonds to which 
the Defendant is entitled pursuant to the original Decree of Divorce, including 
without limitation, the Kee Exploration stock. Such stock shall be assigned into 
the name of the Defendant and into the Defendant alone.

     5. If the Plaintiff 
shall pay to the Defendant the sum of $9,500 within 30 days as provided above, 
the Defendant shall bear her own attorneys fees of $1,659.25 and expenses of 
$717.65, provided, however, that should the Plaintiff fail to pay said sum 
within said 30 days, then the Plaintiff shall, together with said $9,500, pay to 
the Defendant said attorneys fees in the amount of $1,659.25 and expenses in the 
amount of $717.65.

    6. The Defendant shall 
convey her interest in the parties' former residence to the Plaintiff, provided 
that the Plaintiff shall, simultaneously, grant and convey a mortgage upon said 
residence in favor of the Defendant and in addition secure from the Plaintiff's 
present wife a release of her homestead interest and such other interest as said 
wife may have that would be superior to or interfere with the mortgage interest 
of the Defendant as contemplated in the original Decree of Divorce.

[¶9.]     That judicial 
resolution failed and Newman, having received none of the lump sum payment, by 
June 1987 filed a second petition for contempt. A further hearing was held 
without filed order in July and again without success in payment, a third 
application was made about a year later on July 15, 1988 by which she 
petitioned

this Court enter its 
order holding Mark Dorr in contempt for his failure to comply to with the orders 
of this Court, that Mark Dorr be ordered to pay Peggy Newman the sum of 
$500/month as maintenance and support until such time as he has paid in full all 
amounts owed by him as provided in this Court[]'s order of May 13, 1987, that he 
pay to Peggy Newman all attorneys fees which she has incurred in bringing this 
matter to the Court by this petition, and for such other and further relief as 
the Court may deem [j]ust and proper.[3] 

[¶10.]  Initially, at the time of the divorce, 
Dorr and Newman expected to remain in a business partnership after their 
divorce. The effort failed to be followed by an amended arrangement mutually 
adopted in 1985 to liquidate their partnership and provide for Newman's 
assignments of the interest to Dorr and:

The parties agree that 
the amounts as owed by Mark to Peggy arising out of the Decree of Divorce in 
Civil Action No. 12404, Campbell County, Wyoming, specifically the paragraph 
entitled "Office Building", shall be the sum of $8,000.00, including interest, 
which sum shall be due and payable as provided in the Decree of Divorce. Mark 
further agrees that he shall pay to Peggy, at that time, an additional 
$1,500.00, which sum is intended to reimburse Peggy for expenses and attorneys 
fees she has incurred in these matters since the Decree of Divorce was 
entered.

[¶11.]  This $9,500 obligation was in addition to 
the original agreement and decree:

     It is the desire of 
the parties to assure defendant that she will have the approximate sum of 
Seventeen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($17,500.00) within four (4) years from 
the date of the Divorce Decree herein is entered from this property, in order 
that at such time as she finishes her schooling she will be in a position to 
purchase a home.

Consequently, a 
lump sum payment of $27,000 (plus interest) became due and payable from Dorr on 
February 8, 1987. The divorce decree had provided for alimony during 1983 of 
$1,050; 1984 - $1,150; 1985 - $1,250; 1986 - $1,350; and for the then following 
seventy-three successive months in a reduced amount of $350 per month. The 
alimony reduction was scheduled to occur when Newman finished her schooling so 
that "she will be in a position to purchase a home" with the property settlement 
payment then to be made.

[¶12.]  Since March 1987, the district court has 
been faced with continued efforts by Newman to collect the unpaid attorney fees 
of $1,500; partnership dissolution agreement of $8,000; and the residual payment 
provisions of the decree of $17,500 with interest for her to have funds as 
originally agreed in 1983 to purchase the home for herself and Ashley. This 
litigative history as well as Dorr's argument about the district court's finding 
of fraudulent conveyance is related to the texture of the action taken by the 
district court. Dorr is a Certified Public Accountant (C.P.A.). Prior to April 
15, 1987, he practiced in a partnership under the name of Dorr and Associates. 
He was "expelled" because of concern about Newman trying to collect the divorce 
decree indebtedness. He first worked as an independent contractor for his prior 
partnership at $2,500 per month, and more recently as a salaried employee at 
about $20,000 per year. In June 1987, his present wife, Barbara Dorr, also a 
C.P.A., became a partner in exchange for his relinquished position, and the firm 
as first merged then continued today as Dorr, Bentley & Pecha. Barbara Dorr 
is paid $4,000 per month as a partner and Dorr is paid $2,000 per month as an 
ex-partner. Dorr's role in the accounting firm apparently did not significantly 
change after his expulsion as a partner and re-admission as an employee. Dorr's 
defensive strategy against payment pressure was well communicated and reasonably 
clear. He told both his ex-wife and a member of the accounting firm that he 
would file bankruptcy before paying his divorce settlement obligations.4

[¶13.]  To be first determined is whether alimony 
in Wyoming law is subject to modification by the court following entry of the 
divorce decree. This issue is decided. Yates v. Yates, 702 P.2d 1252 (Wyo. 
1985); Buchler v. Buchler, 65 Wyo. 452, 202 P.2d 670 (1949); Lonabaugh v. 
Lonabaugh, 46 Wyo. 23, 22 P.2d 199 (1933). Those cases also establish that 
modification can occur even if the original arrangement was established by 
agreement of the parties. Yates, 702 P.2d 1252.

[¶14.]  The basis of modification, similar to 
changes in child support, is a change in circumstance. Manners v. Manners, 706 P.2d 671 (Wyo. 1985). The decision rests in the sound discretion of the court 
provided that a change in circumstances does exist. Manners, 706 P.2d  at 671; 
Buchler, 202 P.2d 670; Lonabaugh, 22 P.2d 199. Cf. McMillan v. McMillan, 702 P.2d 1279 (Wyo. 1985). The test for decision in alimony revision, W.S. 20-2-116, 
like child support, is exercised discretion of the district court and will not 
be disturbed on appeal absent clear abuse. Overcast, 780 P.2d 1371; Blanchard v. 
Blanchard, 770 P.2d 227 (Wyo. 1989); Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894 (Wyo. 1986); 
Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 820 (Wyo. 1984); Chorney v. Chorney, 383 P.2d 859 (Wyo. 1963).

[¶15.]  With alimony modification proper, if 
appropriate, we next face three technical questions. Was that remedy properly 
requested? Was it justified by change of circumstance? Was it justified in the 
decision made? Dorr's first issue contends the prayer of the motion petition of 
July 15, 1988 "that Mark Dorr be ordered to pay Peggy Newman the sum of 
$500/month as maintenance and support" is insufficient to raise a question of 
increased alimony. Additionally, although a motion for leave to amend is not to 
be found in this record, it was addressed by the district court at the close of 
the hearing held on August 23, 1988:

     MR. DALY: May I make 
the objection? I understand where the Court is coming from. I want to object to 
any motion to amend at this time. The motion is made after the - at the close of 
the case not at the close of his evidence and is improperly made at this 
time.

     THE COURT: Go ahead. I 
overrule it.

Later, the 
district court judge said:

     I am going to order 
alimony and I will order enough alimony that if you never pay this property 
settlement, if you never in your life pay it, you are still going to pay your 
wife because she lived with you, she had your child, you had a divorce and you 
made your own agreement with her. You made it yourself. Mr. Daly wasn't 
involved. Mr. Omohundro wasn't involved. You said I will pay you this and that I 
will pay you anything to get out of the marriage. And you can't live with it and 
you change it and make a second agreement. The Court orders you to transfer 
stock and you couldn't do that. You can't do anything the Court tells you to 
do.

We find the 
issue of modification of alimony properly presented by a contested issue of 
pleading and, when addressed in hearing evidence, sufficient for a decision on 
the merits. See Lonabaugh, 22 P.2d 199. We next consider the change of 
circumstance issue charging abuse of discretion in finding and correcting a 
detrimental change of circumstance to the ex-wife by selecting the remedy from 
which Dorr now appeals. Gunter v. Gunter, 187 Md. 228, 49 A.2d 454 (1946). We 
must answer the question whether a divorced person's failure to comply with part 
of the integrated divorce settlement constitutes a change in circumstance to the 
former spouse. We hold for this case that the district court was entitled to 
find as it did, that a change of circumstance did occur with property settlement 
payment refusals as it related to the scheduled decline in alimony payments. In 
re Marriage of Hauger, 679 P.2d 604 (Colo. App. 1984). Continuing jurisdiction 
exists to enforce the expectation5 of the original divorce decree. 
Bjordahl v. Bjordahl, 308 N.W.2d 817 (Minn. 1981).

[¶16.]  The divorce settlement agreement and 
decree included funds for Newman to buy a home after she became self-supporting. 
Adequate alimony was built into the parties' agreement to allow Newman to 
complete her education. With her education and independence in place, the plan 
then followed with a scheduled reduction in alimony. What Newman encountered 
bore no resemblance to the plan when she was presented with a two-faceted 
problem by settlement agreement non-payment. This is an unforseen change in 
circumstances from the agreement included in the original decree and subsequent 
modification. O'Bymachow v. O'Bymachow, 12 Conn. App. 113, 529 A.2d 747, 
certification denied, 205 Conn. 808, 532 A.2d 76 (1987). Although the alimony 
dropped from the 1986 level of $1,350 per month to $350 per month, see Altman v. 
Altman, 101 N.M. 380, 683 P.2d 62 (1984), the funds committed to her to buy the 
home were not paid. The change in circumstance from Dorr's failure to abide by 
the original settlement plan was only later corrected by the district court 
order providing an increase in alimony to assure an alternative solution. We 
determine, as in Lonabaugh, 22 P.2d 199, where the income for the father 
declined because of the national depression constituting a change in 
circumstances for decreased alimony, that a failure of the father to abide by a 
planned divorce settlement can also be a change in circumstance to be addressed 
by increased alimony. The bankruptcy discharge cases provide a similar answer. 
Low v. Low, 777 S.W.2d 936 (Ky. 1989). Retirement can provide a basis for a 
converse result of payment reduction as also a change of circumstances. McFadden 
v. McFadden, 386 Pa. Super. 506, 563 A.2d 180 (1989). See also reduced income 
from changed employment and ex-wife's new found capacity to work constituting a 
material and substantial change of circumstances. Cooper v. Cooper, 219 Neb. 64, 
361 N.W.2d 202 (1985). Cf. Hardisty v. Hardisty, 183 Conn. 253, 439 A.2d 307 
(1981). As a result, we find not only an acceptable legal theory but also 
substantial evidence to sustain the change of circumstance for the district 
court's properly exercised discretion in the relief granted.6 Low, 777 S.W.2d 936.

[¶17.]  Our last concern arises from the taxation 
attribution provision in the order increasing the alimony payments: 

[A]ll increase in alimony 
ordered to be paid by this order shall not be includable in the income of Peggy 
J. Newman and not be deductible by Mark A. Dorr, it being the intention of this 
Court that all such payments shall be designated as alimony, maintenance and 
support and shall not be includable in the income of Peggy J. Newman under 
Section 71 of the Internal Revenue Code, and are not allowed as deductions under 
Section 215 of the Internal Revenue Code by Mark A. Dorr.

[¶18.]  The issue of taxability of the increased 
amount of alimony was not addressed by Dorr in appellate brief, although it 
became subject of comment and inquiry during oral argument. The federalist 
nature of American government renders state courts powerless to change 
congressional intent as defined in the Internal Revenue Code. Schatten v. United 
States, 746 F.2d 319 (6th Cir. 1984). Cf. Serrano v. Serrano, 213 Conn. 1, 566 A.2d 413 (1989), considering decree provision allocating the statutory tax 
exemption.

[¶19.]  There is a difference between the tax 
result directed by the district court, where the payment is designated alimony 
and decreed to have the tax effect it would have if it was a property 
settlement, and the tax result authenticated by the present provisions of 26 
U.S.C. § 71, changed by the Tax Reform Act of 1984, as found in 26 U.S.C. § 
71(b)(1)(B) by which discretion relating to designation whether alimony and 
property settlement is provided. See Comment, Tax Planning in Divorce: Both 
Spouses Benefit From the Tax Reform Act of 1984, 21 Willamette L.Rev. 767 (1985) 
for a general discussion of the flexibility afforded by the Tax Reform Act of 
1984 and also Note, Redefinition of Alimony Under the Tax Reform Act of 1984, 35 
Drake L.Rev. 187 (1985-86). We do not understand 26 U.S.C. § 71(b)(1)(C) to 
change the nature and effect of a payment designated as alimony under the 
attribution provisions of 26 U.S.C. § 62 and 215 which provide for the 
deductibility of alimony from deferred gross income and the parallel taxable 
income provision of 26 U.S.C. § 71.

[¶20.]  Although the new law affords marital 
partners far greater flexibility for designation of whether an award was alimony 
or property settlement, it does not also provide authority to change the taxable 
result once the designation is made. It is the intent of the district court as 
determinable from the text of the entered orders which establishes taxability 
status. In re McCauley, 105 B.R. 315 (E.D.Va. 1989). As applied to pre-1984 law, 
see Green v. C.I.R., 855 F.2d 289 (6th Cir. 1988); Schatten, 746 F.2d 319; 
Hayutin v. C.I.R., 508 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1974); Mills v. C.I.R., 442 F.2d 1149 
(10th Cir. 1971); Bardwell v. C.I.R., 318 F.2d 786 (10th Cir. 1963). See also 
Sellers v. Sellers, 775 P.2d 1029 (Wyo. 1989), Thomas, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part. The designated alimony created by the divorce decree 
amendment is taxable to the recipient and deductible by the payor.7 26 U.S.C. § 71(b)(1)(C) and 
215.

[¶21.]  We generally affirm the decision of the 
district court, but in conformity herewith remand for deletion of the tax 
attribution provision.

ROONEY, J., Retired, 
concurred.

ROONEY, Retired Justice, 
concurring.

[¶22.]  The majority of the court has here 
blurred the distinction between "just and equitable disposition of the property 
of the parties" and "alimony." The holding that failure to abide by a property 
disposition is a sufficient change in circumstances to warrant a modification of 
an alimony award is too broad. W.S. 20-2-114 provides:

     "In granting a 
divorce, the court shall make such disposition of the property of the parties as 
appears just and equitable, having regard for the respective merits of the 
parties and the condition in which they will be left by the divorce, the party 
through whom the property was acquired and the burdens imposed upon the property 
for the benefit of either party and children. The court may decree to either 
party reasonable alimony out of the estate of the other having regard for the 
other's ability and may order so much of the other's real estate or the rents 
and profits thereof as is necessary be assigned and set out to either party for 
life, or may decree a specific sum be paid by either party."

[¶23.]  Obviously, whether a property settlement 
is just and equitable should be determined as of the date of the decree. Kane v. 
Kane, 577 P.2d 172 (Wyo. 1978); Warren v. Warren, 361 P.2d 525 (Wyo. 
1961).

     "As a general rule, a 
final judgment is conclusive both as to the relief granted and as to the relief 
denied or withheld, and on its entry the jurisdiction of the court over the 
subject matter and the parties is exhausted unless preserved in the mode 
authorized by statute. Hence, any further judgment or order materially varying 
the first judgment is a nullity, except as it is rendered pursuant to the power 
which the court may have in opening, modifying, or vacating its own judgments 
and in accord with the practice prescribed for the exercise of such power. This 
rule has been applied in divorce proceedings."

24 Am.Jur.2d, 
Divorce and Separation, § 426 (1983).

[¶24.]  The doctrine of res judicata is to 
the effect that a judgment decided upon the merits by a court with jurisdiction 
is conclusive of that cause of action and facts or issues litigated, both as to 
the parties and their privies in any other action in the same or different court 
of concurrent jurisdiction on the same issues. CLS v. CLJ, 693 P.2d 774 (Wyo. 
1985); Delgue v. Curutchet, 677 P.2d 208 (Wyo. 1984).

[¶25.]  By statute, Wyoming has authorized 
revision and alteration of a decree for alimony. W.S. 20-2-116 
provides:

      "After a decree 
for alimony or other allowance for a party or children and after a decree for 
the appointment of trustees to receive and hold any property for the use of a 
party or children, the court may from time to time, on the petition of either of 
the parties, revise and alter the decree respecting the amount of the alimony or 
allowance or the payment thereof and respecting the appropriation and payment of 
the principal and income of the property so held in trust and may make any 
decree respecting any of the matters which the court might have made in the 
original action."

[¶26.]  But the modification can be made only on 
the showing of changed circumstances from those at the time of the former 
decree. Salmeri v. Salmeri, 554 P.2d 1244 (Wyo. 1976); Rubeling v. Rubeling, 406 P.2d 283 (Wyo. 1965); Lonabaugh v. Lonabaugh, 46 Wyo. 23, 22 P.2d 199 
(1933).

[¶27.]  There is no statutory authority for 
modification of a divorce decree's provision concerning property settlements. To 
use a failure to abide by a property settlement direction of the court through 
adjustment of alimony sidesteps the purposes of alimony and that of property 
settlements, and it is an improper extension of the exception to res judicata as 
provided by W.S. 20-2-116. Property settlement provisions of a divorce decree 
cannot be modified. Paul v. Paul, 631 P.2d 1060 (Wyo. 1981); Pavlica v. Pavlica, 
587 P.2d 639 (Wyo. 1978). Transferring its obligations to alimony is a 
modification of its provisions. The failure to abide by the property settlement 
directions of a court should be corrected through contempt 
proceedings.

[¶28.]  However, in this case, there are 
sufficient grounds for modifying the alimony provisions of the decree without 
any reference to or consideration of the property settlement. There has been a 
material change in the financial position of both parties. W.S. 20-2-116; Heyl 
v. Heyl, 518 P.2d 28 (Wyo. 1974); Rubeling, 406 P.2d 283. The changes of 
circumstances warranting an increase in alimony in this case are: A necessary 
accumulated debt by defendant in securing her education; unanticipated home 
rental payments by defendant; plaintiff's marriage to a high income-producing 
person; and a change in the relative assets of the parties whereby the 
plaintiff's assets increased and the defendant's assets 
decreased.

FOOTNOTES

 

 1 Perhaps this 
footnote can be characterized as a "word to the wise or otherwise." See Kost v. 
Thatch, 782 P.2d 230 (Wyo. 1989). Dorr's brief in statement of facts does not 
include a single record reference for the facts related. Newman 
responds:

The appellant's statement 
of the case refers to documents which are not in the record. Further, the 
statement of the case refers to numerous proceedings regarding child visitation 
and child custody, which matters are not relevant to the subject 
appeal.

Newman then offers a 
seven-page statement of the case with very detailed references to the record. 
Transcripts provided include sessions on May 24, 1984; April 15, 1988; August 
23, 1988; and November 3, 1988; and twenty-eight various exhibits. Lacking the 
sheer capacity to determine from Newman what Dorr discussed as unjustified in 
the record, we rely on the record of proceedings and facts otherwise stated by 
Newman which direct us specifically to the oral testimony and written 
exhibits.

Additionally, neither of 
the district court's decision letters, although discussed by both litigants, are 
found in the record itself. Attachment of documents to the appellate brief does 
not make a proper record.

2 Following divorce, 
Newman secured restoration of her maiden name.

3 It is this petition that 
initiated the present course of litigation. Following a hearing held August 23, 
1988 and a succeeding argument held November 3, 1988, an opinion letter of 
November 8 and January 26, 1989 were written and an order entered on February 
16, 1989 from which this appeal is taken.

The 
order provided:

The Court has considered 
all the evidence presented in this matter, statement of counsel and is fully 
advised as to all matters pertaining hereto, and based thereon finds as 
follows:

1) The Defendant, Peggy 
Newman (formerly Peggy Dorr), found it necessary, following the entry of the 
divorce in this matter, to continue her education.

2) The Defendant attended 
nursing school in Denver and obtained a R.N. degree.

3) The Defendant attended 
school under tight financial circumstances and has accumulated debt in financing 
her education.

4) The Plaintiff, Mark 
Dorr, did not pay the property settlement upon which he agreed, and, as a 
result, the Defendant was unable to purchase a house for herself and the 
parties' minor child and is still unable to secure permanent 
accommodations.

5) The Defendant's 
current income is insufficient to allow her to purchase a home.

6) The Plaintiff disposed 
of his interest in Dorr and Associates Accounting for no consideration but was 
paid upon termination a $7,500 consulting fee.

7) The Plaintiff's 
present wife assumed a position with the Plaintiff's old firm, now known as 
Dorr, Keller, Bentley & Peka [sic], at a salary of $4,000 per 
month.

8) The Plaintiff, who is 
a Certified Public Accountant and former partner, is presently employed by his 
old firm at an annual salary of $20,000.

9) The Plaintiff, while 
unable to pay the Defendant the property settlement, has traveled to Las Vegas 
and Disneyland with the parties' minor child.

10) The Plaintiff has 
failed to pay or arrange for the payment of the property settlement obligations 
which he himself negotiated and has in the eyes of the Court made a fraudulent 
transfer of his accounting business without consideration in an effort to avoid 
payment of his property settlement obligations.

11) The Defendant 
requires additional alimony to pay her debts and to secure adequate housing for 
herself and the parties' minor child.

12) There have been 
substantial changes in the circumstances of the parties warranting a 
modification of the Decree of Divorce and increase of alimony to be paid to the 
Defendant.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED 
that Mark A. Dorr shall pay to Peggy J. Newman, formerly Peggy J. Dorr, the sum 
of Three Hundred Dollars ($300.00) per month alimony in addition to the alimony 
payments he is currently paying her pursuant to the Decree of Divorce entered 
[in] this matter on February 8, 1983, said additional alimony payments to 
commence on December 1, 1988, and continue on the first day of each month 
through January 31, 1993.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED 
that beginning February 1, 1993 through January 31, 2003, Mark A. Dorr shall pay 
to Peggy J. Newman, formerly Peggy J. Dorr, the sum of Six Hundred Dollars 
($600.00) per month as alimony, maintenance and support.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED 
that all increase in alimony ordered to be paid by this order shall not be 
includable in the income of Peggy J. Newman and not be deductible by Mark A. 
Dorr, it being the intention of this Court that all such payments shall be 
designated as alimony, maintenance and support and shall not be includable in 
the income of Peggy J. Newman under Section 71 of the Internal Revenue Code, and 
are not allowed as deductions under Section 215 of the Internal Revenue Code by 
Mark A. Dorr.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED 
that the petition for an order of contempt as filed by Peggy J. Newman for the 
failure of Mark A. Dorr to pay the sums for property settlement agreed by him 
and ordered by this Court on February 8, 1983, is denied, upon a finding that 
this court cannot enforce a property settlement through its contempt powers. The 
Court finds that Peggy J. Newman would have the right to reduce the property 
settlement to judgment and to execute on the judgment according to 
law.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED 
that each of the parties shall pay their own attorneys fees and costs incurred 
by them arising out of the Petition for Order of Contempt and Enforcement of 
Court Order and Petition for Payment of Maintenance and Support as filed herein 
on or about July 14, 1988.

(Emphasis 
added.)

4 We do not even allude to 
conjectural answers about possible bankruptcy absolution of this divorce 
settlement obligation where it involved payment to provide a residence for 
ex-wife and child. This is a federal law question. See In re Messnick, 104 B.R. 89 (E.D.Wis. 1989) and 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(B). Although the bankruptcy 
discharge release of a divorce decree payment obligation is a federal law 
question, whether the release creates a change of circumstances for state court 
maintenance payment obligation is a state law decision. Low v. Low, 777 S.W.2d 936 (Ky. 1989); In re Danley, 14 B.R. 493 (D.N.M. 1981). An interesting result 
is achieved, as we shall later relate in our conclusion that the district court 
was justified in finding a change of circumstances from non-compliance with the 
payment agreement. If this rather minimal total sum where a family with a stated 
income of $6,000 per month were to be resolved, it would appear that the payment 
might cause another change in circumstances with or without bankruptcy so that 
reduction of the alimony to the original amount might then also be justified for 
such period of time as the obligation would continue. Nothing suggests that 
interim alimony payments would necessarily be credited on the property 
settlement "debt."

5 In re Jacobs' Marriage, 
102 Cal. App. 3d 990, 162 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1980); Hester v. Hester, 2 Cal. App. 3d 1091, 82 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1969).

6 Adequacy of income to 
pay the additional $300 per month after the alimony decreased from $1,350 per 
month to $350 is simply not in issue in this record. The calculated arguments by 
Dorr, a Certified Public Accountant, regarding his expulsion, employment and 
partnership substitution does not convince this Court that the observations by 
the district court were erroneous. Nor do those arguments satisfy us as a matter 
of law that Dorr should not abide by his agreement to provide support and 
housing funds for his prior family.

7 The additional payment 
can only be considered to be alimony since the district court would have no 
authority to readjust property division and settlement nearly five years after 
the initial divorce decree was entered. See McMillan, 702 P.2d 1279; Yates, 702 P.2d 1252; Finkbiner v. Finkbiner, 340 F.2d 878 (10th Cir. 1965).