Title: ERIC DEMILLARD V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

ERIC DEMILLARD V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 93190 P.3d 128Case Number: S-07-0290Decided: 08/14/2008
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 

ERIC 
DEMILLARD,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OFWYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCarbonCounty

The 
Honorable Norman E. Young, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender, PDP; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. Kerin.  

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Eric Johnson, 
Director, PAP; Brian Hunter, Student Director, PAP; Jonah Buckley, Student 
Intern.  Argument by Mr. 
Buckley.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

            

[¶1]      The district 
court denied Mr. DeMillard's requests to modify the terms of his probation or to 
discharge him from probation.  He 
claims on appeal that his constitutional rights were violated because he was not 
present during the hearing on his motions.  
We conclude that the hearing was not part of his criminal prosecution and 
he was afforded all of the process he was due under the circumstances.  Consequently, no error occurred when the 
district court did not require his presence.

 
 
[¶2]      We affirm.     

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶3]      Mr.  DeMillard presents the following issue 
on appeal:

 
 
Was 
Appellant denied his right to be present at a critical stage of the 
proceedings?

 
 
Although 
more detailed, the State's statement of the issue is 
similar.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      The underlying 
facts in this appeal are not disputed.  
In 1999, Mr. DeMillard was charged with four counts of kidnapping, four 
counts of interference with custody, one count of interference with a peace 
officer, one count of possession of a weapon with unlawful intent and one count 
of aggravated burglary for keeping his children in his estranged wife's home in 
Rawlins, Wyoming for several days without her permission, while holding law 
enforcement at bay.      

 
 
[¶5]      During his 
criminal prosecution, there were considerable questions about Mr. DeMillard's 
mental health.  The district court 
finally determined that he was competent to proceed and he entered into a plea 
agreement with the State in which he agreed to plead guilty to burglary and 
attempted assault on a peace officer and nolo contendre to four counts of 
interference with custody and the State agreed to dismiss the remaining 
charges.  The district court 
accepted the agreement and sentenced Mr. DeMillard to prison, but suspended the 
sentences and ordered him to serve a long period of supervised probation.  One of the terms of his probation was 
that he have no contact with his ex-wife or children.   

 
 
[¶6]      On July 19, 2007, 
Mr. DeMillard filed a motion to modify his probation conditions to allow him to 
have telephone contact with his children.  
He also filed a separate motion requesting that the district court 
discharge him from probation altogether.1  The State contested his motions.    

 
 
[¶7]      The district 
court held a hearing on the pending motions on September 6, 2007.  The attorneys appeared by telephone, but 
Mr. DeMillard was not present at the hearing.  The district court asked about Mr. 
DeMillard's absence and defense counsel replied, "Your Honor, this was a 
telephonic conference.  I just did 
not feel the need for his presence here and could address it without his 
presence."  After the hearing, the 
district court denied Mr. DeMillard's motions, and he appealed.2    

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶8]      The question 
of whether a defendant had the right to be present at a hearing or specific 
phase of his trial is an issue of law subject to de novo review.  Seeley v. State, 959 P.2d 170, 175 
(Wyo. 
1998).  

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶9]      A criminal 
defendant has the right to be present during every critical stage of his 
criminal proceeding.  There are 
numerous federal and Wyoming guaranties of this right.  "The Sixth Amendment and the due process 
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
guarantee an accused the right to be present during every stage of the criminal 
proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to 
the fairness of the procedure."  Skinner v. State, 2001 WY 102, ¶ 20, 33 P.3d 758, 765 (Wyo. 2001).  Article 
1, § 10 of the Wyoming Constitution "is even more explicit in its guarantee to 
an accused of the right of presence at trial."  Maupin v. State, 694 P.2d 720, 722 
(Wyo. 
1985).  That provision states:  "In all criminal prosecutions the 
accused shall have the right to defend in person . . . ."  Wyo. Const., art. 1, § 10.  "The right to be present at trial stems 
in part from the fact that by his physical presence the defendant can hear and 
see the proceedings, can be seen by the jury, and can participate in the 
presentation of his rights.'"  Skinner, ¶ 21, 33 P.3d  at 765, quoting 
Bustamante v. Eyman, 456 F.2d 269, 
274 (9th Cir. 1972).  However, the 
"defendant's presence is not required when it would be useless, or the benefit 
but a shadow.'"  Seeley, 959 P.2d  at 177, quoting Snyder v. Com. of Mass., 291 U.S. 97, 106-07, 54 S. Ct. 330, 
332-33, 78 L. Ed. 674 (1934).

 
 
[¶10]   The constitutional guarantees are 
also incorporated into Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-202 (LexisNexis 2007) and 
W.R.Cr.P. 43(a) which provide that, except as otherwise provided by law, a 
defendant shall be present at his initial appearance, arraignment, plea, every 
stage of the trial (including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the 
verdict) and imposition of sentence.  
The constitutional provisions, Rule 43(a) and § 7-11-202 do not 
specifically refer to a motion to modify the conditions of probation or to be 
released from probation.  
Consequently, they do not answer the question of whether probation 
modification is a critical stage of the criminal prosecution.      

 
 
[¶11]   The State argues that a 
post-sentencing probation modification proceeding is not a critical stage in a 
criminal prosecution because it is not part of the criminal prosecution at 
all.  The United States Supreme 
Court has provided guidance on this issue.  
In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972), the Supreme 
Court ruled that revocation of parole is not part of the criminal 
prosecution.  Following up on the Morrissey decision, the United States 
Supreme Court stated in Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781-82, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 1759, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656 
(1973), that probation revocation proceedings are not part of the criminal 
prosecution.  Because 
post-sentencing proceedings related to probation are not part of the criminal 
prosecution, they are not governed by the specific constitutional provisions 
requiring a defendant's attendance.  
Id.; Morrissey, 408 U.S.  at 480.  
The Supreme Court recognized, however, that due process principles do 
apply to probation revocation proceedings because there is a potential for loss 
of liberty.  Id.  
See also, CT v. State (In re 
CT), 2006 WY 101, ¶ 9, 140 P.3d 643, 646 (Wyo. 2006).

 
 
[¶12]   Consistent with Morrissey and Gagnon, our statutes and rules recognize 
that a defendant is entitled to a hearing on a petition to revoke his 
probation.  See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-305(c) 
(LexisNexis 2007) and W.R.Cr.P. 39(a).  
In contrast, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-304(a) and W.R.Cr.P. 39(b) delineate 
the process that is due a defendant on a motion to modify the conditions of 
probation.  Section 7-13-304(a) 
states: "The court may impose, and at any time modify, any condition of 
probation or suspension of sentence."  
That statute indicates that the court can modify the conditions of 
probation at "any time," suggesting that a hearing is not necessary.  Similarly, Rule 39(b) states that a 
court "may" hold a hearing on an opposed petition to modify the conditions of 
probation, but it does not compel the court to do so.  We have ruled that, even in the context 
of criminal prosecution, when a hearing is not necessary on a particular motion, 
attendance by the defendant is not constitutionally required.  See, e.g., Monroe v. State, 2006 WY 5,  ¶ 21,  126 P.3d 97, 104 (Wyo. 2006).  It follows that, since Mr. DeMillard was 
not entitled to a hearing on his motions, the district court was not required to 
assure his attendance at the hearing it gratuitously 
allowed.

 
 
[¶13]   In addition, our rules relating to 
the procedures for requests for sentence reduction provide some guidance on the 
question presented here.  Section 
7-11-202 specifically states that "[t]he defendant's presence is not required at 
a reduction of sentence hearing."  
See also, W.R.Cr.P. 
43(c).   The probation 
condition that Mr. DeMillard was not to have contact with his children was 
included in his sentence.  He 
requested that the probation condition be modified to allow him to have 
telephone contact with his children or that he be released from probation prior 
to the date set forth in his sentence.  
Thus, his motions were essentially requests for sentence reduction and, 
under § 7-11-202 and W.R.Cr.P. 43(c), his presence was not required at the 
hearing.   

 
 
[¶14]   Although we have not been directed 
to or located any Wyoming cases that specifically considered a 
defendant's right to be present at a hearing on a motion to reduce a sentence or 
modify the conditions of probation, courts in other jurisdictions have addressed 
similar issues.  In State v. Sommer, 878 P.2d 1007, 1008 
(N.M. Ct. App. 1994), the New Mexico court of appeals concluded that the 
defendant did not have a constitutional right to be present at a hearing to 
reconsider his sentence and no such right existed pursuant to New Mexico rules 
or statutes, except where the hearing could result in a more onerous 
sentence.  Similarly, the Utah 
Supreme Court ruled that the defendant's presence was not required when the 
trial court entered an order continuing his probation.  State v. Janis, 597 P.2d 873, 874 
(Utah 
1979).  

 
 
[¶15]   Mr. DeMillard argues that the 
proceedings pertained to his fundamental right to associate with his children, 
thereby implicating constitutional protections, including the right to attend 
the hearing on his motions.  This 
argument fails to acknowledge that the right to associate with his children was 
already limited in his sentence, which included the probation condition that he 
have no contact with them.  He 
attended the sentencing hearing and, in fact, agreed to the condition.  His motion to change that condition did 
not raise the possibility that his fundamental right to associate with his 
children could be subject to greater limitation than had already been 
imposed.  

 
 
[¶16]   In summary, Mr. DeMillard's motions 
to modify the conditions of his probation or release him from probation were not 
part of his criminal prosecution and the specific constitutional, statutory and 
procedural rules requiring a defendant's attendance during the criminal 
prosecution do not apply.  Section 
7-13-304(a) and W.R.Cr.P. 39(b) did not mandate that the district court hold a 
hearing on Mr. DeMillard's motions for modification of his probation; 
consequently, he was not entitled to be present at the gratuitous hearing that 
was held.  Finally, his motions were 
essentially requests for a sentence reduction and, under § 7-11-202 and 
W.R.Cr.P. 43(c), he was not entitled to be present at the hearing on his 
motions.  Taking all of these 
authorities together, we conclude that Mr. DeMillard's legal rights were not 
violated when he was not present at the hearing on his motions to modify his 
probation conditions or release him from probation.  

 
 
[¶17]   Affirmed.                    

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Prior to the 
motions at issue here, Mr. DeMillard had filed many other requests with the 
district court to be allowed contact with his children.  

 
 

2Mr. DeMillard filed the 
notice of appeal pro se and 
incorrectly identified the order being appealed as the judgment and sentence 
instead of the order denying his motions.