Title: Lane Transit District v. Lane County

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed: May 29, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

LANE TRANSIT DISTRICT, a
municipal corporation,

	Petitioner on Review,

		v.

LANE COUNTY, OREGON, a
municipal corporation, and
ANNETTE NEWINGHAM, Chief Deputy
County Clerk of Lane County,
Oregon,

	Defendants,

		and

CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE PUBLIC
TRANSIT, a registered political
action committee,

	Respondent on Review.

(CC 16-95-02904; CA A89559; SC S44061)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*

	Argued and submitted September 9, 1997.

	Joel S. DeVore, of Luvaas, Cobb, Richards & Fraser, P.C.,
Eugene, argued the cause and filed the petition on behalf of
petitioner on review.

	Susan L. Stoner, Portland, argued the cause and filed the
brief on behalf of respondent on review.

	Paul Snider, Legal Counsel, Association of Oregon Counties,
Salem, filed a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Association of
Oregon Counties.

	Gerald G. Watson, of Churchill, Leonard, Brown, Lodine &
Hendrie, LLP, Salem, filed a brief on behalf of amicus curiae
League of Oregon Cities.

	Jeffrey M. Batchelor, of Lane Powell Spears Lubersky, LLP,
Portland, filed a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Tri-County
Metropolitan Transportation District and Eugene Public Schools,
District 4J.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, and Kulongoski, Justices.**

	KULONGOSKI, J.

	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part. 
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed in part and
reversed in part.

*	Appeal from Lane County Circuit Court,

	David V. Brewer, Judge.

	146 Or App 109, 932 P2d 81 (1997).

**	Fadeley, J., retired January 31, 1998, and did not
participate in this decision.  Graber, J., resigned March
31, 1998, and did not participate in this decision.

		KULONGOSKI, J.

		This case concerns a proposed initiative measure filed
by Citizens for Responsible Public Transit (Citizens) for a vote
by the electors of the Lane Transit District (LTD).  The measure,
if enacted, would reduce the current salary of LTD's general
manager and would establish procedures by which that salary could
be increased.  We are called upon to decide whether the subject
matter addressed by the proposed initiative measure is
legislative or administrative in nature.(1)  For the reasons that
follow, we hold that the subject matter of the proposed
initiative measure is administrative in nature and therefore not
properly the subject of the initiative process.

		We take the relevant facts, which are undisputed, from
the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals:

	"LTD is a mass transit district that serves the Eugene
and Springfield areas.  It is governed by a board of
directors (board), the members of which are appointed
by the Governor, subject to confirmation by the state
Senate.  ORS 267.090.  The board, in turn, appoints a
general manager, who holds that office indefinitely,
subject to removal by the board.  ORS 267.135.  The
general manager is the only LTD employee appointed
directly by the board.  All others are hired and
supervised by the general manager.

		"The current general manager was hired 16 years
ago.  Her current annual salary is approximately
$77,000.  The general manager negotiates her salary
with the board each year.  The salary is not determined
by reference to any particular schedule of ranges or
steps.  According to the chair of the board, it is
instead based on a comparison of compensation for
general managers in comparable transit districts.  The
board also takes into account general principles
expressed in a 'Salary Administration Policy,' which
governs salary determinations for other nonbargaining-unit employees by reference to salary grades and ranges
within each grade as determined by a salary
administration committee that is chaired by the general
manager.  Those general principles include a commitment
to 'fair and equitable compensation based on the
relative value of each position within LTD,' with due
consideration to 'rates of pay in like positions, for
comparable work in the marketplace, and the District's
financial position.'  However, by its terms, the Salary
Administration Policy does not govern the determination
of the general manager's salary; it describes policies
that the general manager is to implement in setting
salaries of employees subject to her authority. 
Nevertheless, there was uncontradicted testimony that,
in the past, the board has taken into account some of
the general considerations contained in the policy in
setting the general manager's salary.

		"Unhappy with the general manager's current salary
and the method by which it has been determined,
Citizens filed a proposed initiative measure containing
the following language:

		"'The people of Lane Transit District ordain
as follows:

		"'Section 1.	The
qualifications
do not justify
the salary and
benefits
provided for
and approved by
the Lane
Transit
District Board
when compared
to other
positions with
equal or
greater
authority and
responsibility.

		"'Section 2.	The annual
salary for the
Lane Transit
District
general manager
(as the highest
paid District
employee) shall
not exceed
$49,000.  In
addition,
benefits
provided to the
general manager
shall not
exceed the
benefits
authorized for
other Lane
Transit
District
employees.  It
is the intent
of this section
to severely
limit benefits
to the general
manager not
accorded other
employees.

        	"'Section 3.	The $49,000
salary
limitation may
be increased on
an annual basis
in an amount
not to exceed
the annual
increase
granted to the
lowest paid,
bona fide,
full-time
employee of the
Lane Transit
District.

		"'Section 4.	Other than as
provided in
Section 3, the
salary
limitation may
be changed only
by a vote of
the people at a
general
election.

		"'Section 5.	Severability. 
If a court
should hold
invalid or
unconstitutional any clause or
part of this
Ordinance, that
holding shall
not affect the
remaining parts
of this
Ordinance that
are not held
invalid or
unconstitutional.'"

Lane Transit District v. Lane County, 146 Or App 109, 111-13, 932
P2d 81 (1997) (boldface in original).  Citizens then filed with
Lane County the required number of supporting signatures, and the
County certified the measure to the local ballot.  Id. at 113.

		LTD brought this action against Lane County, seeking a
declaration that, among other defects, the proposed initiative
measure was administrative in nature and therefore not properly
addressed through the initiative process.  Additionally, LTD
sought an order enjoining Lane County and its elections officer
from placing the proposed initiative measure on the local ballot. 
Id.  Citizens intervened as a defendant and moved for dismissal,
alleging that LTD had failed to state a claim for which relief
could be granted and that the circuit court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction.  LTD moved for summary judgment, arguing that the
court had subject-matter jurisdiction and that Citizens' proposed
initiative measure was administrative in nature.  After the
circuit court denied Citizens' motion for dismissal, Citizens
also moved for summary judgment.  The circuit court denied
Citizens' motion for summary judgment, granted LTD's motion for
summary judgment, and entered an order enjoining Lane County and
Lane County's chief deputy clerk from placing the proposed
initiative measure on the ballot.  Id. at 114.  Citizens
appealed.  

		The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the
circuit court and remanded, concluding that the proposed
initiative measure is legislative in nature and that the circuit
court therefore erred in granting summary judgment to LTD and in
enjoining placement of the proposed initiative measure on the
local ballot.  Id. at 122.  We allowed LTD's petition for review
and now reverse in part the decision of the Court of Appeals.(2)

		On review of a summary judgment, we must determine
whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact and
whether LTD is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  ORCP 

47 C; Jones v. General Motors Corp., 325 Or 404, 420, 939 P2d 608
(1997).  Here, there is no dispute as to any material fact. 
Therefore, we review the relevant constitutional and statutory
provisions in order to determine whether LTD is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.  

		Article IV, section 1(1), of the Oregon Constitution
reserves to the people the powers of initiative and referendum. 
Article IV, section 1(5), further provides:

		"The initiative and referendum powers reserved to
the people * * * are further reserved to the qualified
voters of each municipality and district as to all
local, special and municipal legislation of every
character in or for their municipality or district."

In Foster v. Clark, 309 Or 464, 472, 790 P2d 1 (1990), this court
noted that the constitutional reservation of the initiative power
in Article IV, section 1(5), applies only to "municipal
legislation."  Proposed initiative measures addressing
administrative matters properly are excluded from the ballot. 
Id.  The operative word is "legislation."(3)  This court has
defined legislative activity as "making laws of general
applicability and permanent nature," id., and administrative
activity as that "necessary * * * to carry out legislative
policies and purposes already declared."  Monahan v. Funk, 137 Or
580, 584, 3 P2d 778 (1931).  

		In Foster, this court was called upon to answer the
same question addressed in this case:  whether the subject matter
of a local proposed initiative measure, which sought to rename a
Portland street, was "legislative" or "administrative" in nature. 
The Foster court determined that sections 17.93.010 to 17.93.060
of the Portland City Code constituted "a complete scheme for
changing Portland city street names, including rules on petition
forms, fees, review by various City officials, and final
consideration by the City Council," and that the scheme was a
"completed legislative plan, requiring no further legislative
contribution."  Foster, 309 Or at 473.  The court then held that
the subject matter of the proposed initiative measure, the
renaming of Martin Luther King, Jr., Boulevard, was
administrative in nature, and not legislative, because the
proposed initiative measure was filed after the legal framework
governing the renaming of Portland city streets was in place. 
Id. at 473-74.  This court has stated that a particular activity
is "administrative," and not "legislative," if it does not set
new policy, but merely carries out legislative policies and
purposes already declared.  Monahan, 137 Or at 584.  Because the
subject matter of the proposed initiative measure addressed in
Foster was administrative in nature, it was not appropriately
addressed through the initiative process.  Foster, 309 Or at 474. 

		In this case, a completed legislative plan for the
appointment, compensation, and removal of a transit district
general manager is declared in ORS 267.135 and ORS 267.200(5). 
ORS 267.135(1) specifies that the transit district board has the
power and is required to appoint a general manager:

		"The board shall appoint a general manager on the
basis of the qualifications of the general manager with
special reference to the actual experience in or
knowledge of accepted practices in respect to the
duties of the office of the general manager.  A general
manager shall hold office for an indefinite term and
may be removed by the board only by an affirmative vote
of a majority of the members."

The express power to appoint the general manager is coupled with
the express power to set the compensation for that position.  ORS
267.200(5) provides that a transit district "shall have full
power to carry out the objects of its formation," including the
power to "employ * * * persons and fix their compensation."(4)  ORS
267.135(2) provides that the transit district board has the power
to remove a general manager, and provides the procedures for
doing so:

		"Before a general manager is removed, the general
manager shall upon demand be given a written statement
of the reasons for removal.  If requested, the general
manager shall be given an open hearing at a meeting of
the board before the final vote for removal.  However,
the board may by resolution suspend the general manager
from office pending a hearing.  The action of the board
in suspending or removing a general manager, if
approved by a majority of the members of the board, may
be reconsidered by the board but is otherwise final and
not subject to appeal."

		Together, ORS 267.135 and ORS 267.200(5) thus declare
as legislative policy of the state that the board of a transit
district shall have the power to appoint a general manager for
the district, to fix the terms of employment for that position,
including compensation (i.e., salary and benefits), and to remove
the general manager.  This legal structure, like the City of
Portland's street-naming policy at issue in Foster, constitutes
"a completed legislative plan" for LTD's appointment,
compensation, and removal of a general manager.  Foster, 309 Or
at 473.  This completed legislative plan "requir[es] no further
legislative contribution."  Id.

		The proposed initiative measure purports to set the
salary and benefits for the general manager of LTD.  That is an
administrative task under the existing legal framework we have
set out above.  Foster, 309 Or at 474-75.  Because Citizens'
proposed initiative measure is administrative in nature, and not
legislative, we hold that the trial court properly removed the
proposed initiative measure from the ballot and granted summary
judgment to LTD.  The Court of Appeals improperly reversed the
trial court's grant of summary judgment on that issue.

		The fact that the proposed initiative measure contains
a severability clause does not alter our conclusion.  By its
terms, the severability clause is (and would have to be) aimed at
judicial construction of the measure after (and if) it becomes an
"Ordinance," i.e., after it is adopted.  Here, however, the
proposed initiative measure suffers from a defect that makes the
very act of submitting it to a vote legally inappropriate.  The
severability clause thus is inapplicable.

		The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed in
part.  The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed in part and
reversed in part.(5)

1. 	The constitutional reservation of the initiative power
in Article IV, section 1(5), applies only to "municipal
legislation."  Foster v. Clark, 309 Or 464, 471-72, 790 P2d 1
(1990).  For that reason, proposed initiative measures addressing
administrative matters properly are excluded from the ballot. 
Id. at 472.

2. 	In addition to granting summary judgment to LTD because
the subject matter of the proposed initiative measure was
administrative in nature, the trial court also ordered Citizens
to pay LTD's labor costs related to the production of documents. 
The Court of Appeals reversed on that issue.  Lane Transit
District v. Lane County, 146 Or App at 123-24, 932 P2d 81 (1997). 
Because the petition for review did not address that issue, we do
not discuss it here.

3. 	ORS 267.170(1), part of the statutory framework created
by the legislature to govern the operation of mass transit
districts, also specifies that the initiative process, as it
relates to matters associated with transit districts, is limited
to legislative matters:

		"The electors of a district may exercise the
powers of the initiative and referendum with reference
to legislation of the district, in accordance with ORS
255.135 to 255.205."  (Emphasis added.)

4. 	The express power to appoint the general manager
carries with it an implied power to fix the terms of the general
manager's employment, including salary and benefits:  "[W]here a
power is conferred by an act, everything necessary to carry out
that power and make it effectual and complete will be implied." 
Pioneer Real Estate Co. v. City of Portland, 119 Or 1, 10, 247 P
319 (1926).  See also Fales v. Multnomah Co. et al., 119 Or 127,
133, 248 P 151 (1926) ("When a power is given by statute
everything necessary to make it effectual is given by
implication.").

5. 	The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the
circuit court on the discovery costs issue.  See ante, note 2,
___ Or at ___ (slip op at 5).