Title: Acordia of Ohio, LLC v. Fishel

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C. v. Fishel, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-2297.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-2297 
ACORDIA OF OHIO, L.L.C., APPELLANT, v. FISHEL ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C. v. Fishel,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-2297.] 
Mergers—Transferability of contracts with employees not to compete—Judgment 
affirmed. 
(No. 2011-0163—Submitted November 15, 2011—Decided May 24, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-1000071,  
2010-Ohio-6235. 
__________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal, we are asked to consider whether the ability to 
enforce an employee’s noncompete agreement transfers by operation of law to the 
surviving company when the company that was the original party to the 
agreement merges with another company.  We hold that in this case, the language 
of the agreement dictates that the surviving company cannot enforce the 
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agreement after the merger as if it had stepped into the shoes of the original 
company. 
I.  Facts 
A.  Background 
{¶ 2} As a condition of their employment with the insurance-services 
company that eventually became known as Acordia of Ohio, Inc. (“Acordia, 
Inc.”),1 appellees Michael Fishel, Janice Freytag, Mark Taber, and Sheila 
Diefenbach (collectively, “the employees”) entered into noncompete agreements 
by which they agreed to forgo competition with Acordia, Inc. for two years after 
termination of their employment there.  Fishel’s noncompetition agreement, for 
example, provides: 
 
In consideration of my employment and its continuation by 
Frederick Rauh & Company (hereinafter, Company) I hereby 
covenant as follows: 
A. For a period of two years following termination of 
employment with the company for any reason, I will not 
directly, indirectly, or through association with others 
solicit, write, accept or in any other manner perform 
any services relating to insurance business, insurance 
policies, or related insurance services for any of the 
following; 
(1) Any individual or entity for whom the company 
has written, accepted, or in any other manner 
performed any services relating to insurance 
                                                 
1  Initially known as Frederick Rauh & Company, Acordia, Inc. underwent a number of mergers, 
acquisitions, and reorganizations between 1993 and 2001.  Appellant will be referred to as “the 
L.L.C.” 
January Term, 2012 
3 
 
business, insurance policies, or related insurance 
services at any time while I was employed by the 
Company; 
(2) Any individual or entity whose name was 
provided me as a prospective client at any time 
while I was employed by the Company. 
B. For a period of two years following termination of 
employment with the company, I will not encourage nay 
[sic] other employees of the company, directly, 
indirectly, or through association with others to leave 
the Company’s employment. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  It is significant that this agreement of noncompetition does 
not contain language that extends to other employers, such as the company’s 
“successors or assigns.”  The other employees signed nearly identical 
noncompetition agreements, the only differences consisting of formatting 
changes, the substitution of company names, and the dates.  All agreements at 
issue were signed between 1993 and 2000. 
{¶ 3} Frederick Rauh & Company became known as Acordia of 
Cincinnati, Inc. after its acquisition by Acordia, Inc. in 1994.  Fishel began his 
employment with Frederick Rauh in 1993.  Freytag and Taber began employment 
with Acordia of Cincinnati, Inc. before it merged with other Ohio companies to 
become Acordia of Ohio, Inc. in 1997.  Diefenbach signed her noncompete 
agreement with the successor company, Acordia, Inc., in July 2000. 
{¶ 4} Wells Fargo acquired Acordia, Inc. in May 2001.  As part of this 
acquisition, the employees were required to complete several standard forms, 
including an acquisition-employment application, a United States Department of 
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Justice employment-eligibility-verification form, a background-investigation 
authorization form, and a new-hire team-member acknowledgment form. 
{¶ 5} Seven months later, Acordia, Inc. underwent a merger with the 
appellant, Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C. (“the L.L.C.”).  Following the merger, only 
appellant remained.  The employees continued to work for the L.L.C. until August 
2005, when they began employment with appellee Neace Lukens Insurance 
Agency, L.L.C. (“Neace Lukens”).  They soon used their contacts to recruit 
multiple customer accounts from the L.L.C. to Neace Lukens.  Within six months, 
19 customers had transferred $1 million in revenue to Neace Lukens from the 
L.L.C. 
B. The Lawsuit 
{¶ 6} The L.L.C. filed suit for injunctive relief and money damages in 
September 2005 against the employees, Neace Lukens, Neace and Associates 
Insurance Agency of Ohio, Inc., and Joseph Lukens, all appellees. The complaint 
claimed that the employees had violated their two-year noncompete agreement 
and would misappropriate the L.L.C.’s trade secrets.  After reviewing the 
evidence presented at preliminary-injunction hearings, the trial court denied the 
L.L.C.’s motion for a preliminary injunction.  The First District Court of Appeals 
affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding in part that a preliminary injunction 
was unwarranted because Acordia, Inc. and the employees did not intend to make 
the noncompete agreements assignable to successors such as the L.L.C.  Acordia 
of Ohio, L.L.C. v. Fishel, 1st Dist. No. C-060292 (May 9, 2007).  The trial court 
granted the employees’ motion for summary judgment, and the L.L.C. appealed, 
arguing in part that the noncompete agreements signed by the employees had 
transferred to the L.L.C. 
{¶ 7} The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision to grant 
summary judgment in favor of the employees.  Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C. v. Fishel, 
1st Dist. No. C-100071, 2010-Ohio-6235.  The court explained that while 
January Term, 2012 
5 
 
noncompete agreements transfer from the predecessor company to the successor 
company by matter of law after a merger, the employees’ noncompete agreements 
pertained only to the specific companies with which they had originally been 
employed.  Id. at ¶ 13-20.  Because the previous iterations of Acordia, Inc. had 
been merged out of existence more than two years before the employees left the 
L.L.C., the court of appeals concluded that the agreements had expired when the 
employees left and that the L.L.C. had no right to enforce them.  Id. at ¶ 17-18. 
{¶ 8} The L.L.C. appealed, and we accepted its proposition of law that 
states, “Pursuant to Ohio’s merger statutes, agreements between employees and 
employers that contain restrictive covenants are assets of the constituent company 
that transfer automatically by operation of law in a statutory merger from the 
constituent company to the surviving company and are enforceable by the 
surviving company according to the agreements’ original terms as if the surviving 
company were a party to the original agreements.”  Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C. v. 
Fishel, 128 Ohio St.3d 1458, 2011-Ohio-1829, 945 N.E.2d 522.  We reject that 
proposition and affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
II.  Legal Analysis 
{¶ 9} The pivotal question is whether the noncompete agreements apply 
only to the original contracting employer or whether after the merger, the L.L.C. 
may enforce the noncompete agreements as if it had stepped into the shoes of 
those original contracting employers. 
A. The Contract Assets 
{¶ 10} R.C. 1701.82 provides that a company’s assets transfer to the new 
company after a merger: 
 
(A) When a merger or consolidation becomes effective, all of the 
following apply:   
* * *  
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(3) The surviving or new entity possesses all assets and property of 
every description, and every interest in the assets and property, 
wherever located, and the rights, privileges, immunities, powers, 
franchises, and authority, of a public as well as of a private nature, 
of each constituent entity * * *. 
 
Because the statute specifies that the new company takes over all the previous 
company’s assets and property postmerger, it is clear that employee contracts 
transfer to the resulting company.  In this case, the employees’ contracts came 
under the control of the L.L.C. after it merged with Acordia, Inc. 
{¶ 11} Nevertheless, although the L.L.C. assumed control of the 
employees’ contracts after the merger, we agree with the First District Court of 
Appeals that the L.L.C. may not enforce the noncompete agreements as if the 
L.L.C. had stepped into the shoes of the company that originally contracted with 
the employees.  Appellant’s proposed outcome would require a rewriting of the 
agreements.  By their terms, the noncompete agreements are between only the 
employees and the companies that hired them. 
{¶ 12} We have previously explained that when a merger between two 
companies occurs, one of those companies ceases to exist:  “[A] merger involves 
the absorption of one company by another, the latter retaining its own name and 
identity, and acquiring the assets, liabilities, franchises and powers of the former. 
Of necessity, the absorbed company ceases to exist as a separate business entity.”  
Morris v. Invest. Life Ins. Co., 27 Ohio St.2d 26, 31, 272 N.E.2d 105 (1971).  
After the L.L.C. absorbed Acordia, Inc., the companies with which the employees 
agreed to avoid competition had ceased to exist.  Because the noncompete 
agreements do not state that they can be assigned or will carry over to successors, 
the named parties intended the agreements to operate only between themselves—
the employees and the specific employer.  While the employment agreements 
January Term, 2012 
7 
 
transferred to the L.L.C. by operation of law pursuant to R.C. 1701.82, the 
wording within those agreements prevents the L.L.C. from enforcing a 
noncompetition period as if it were the original company with which the 
employees agreed not to compete.  The L.L.C. acquired only the ability to prevent 
the employees from competing two years after their employment terminated with 
the specific company named in the agreements. 
{¶ 13} We hold that noncompete agreements that are transferred as a 
matter of law by a merger between companies are enforceable according to their 
terms. 
B. Ohio merger law remains undisturbed 
{¶ 14} The L.L.C. argues that a decision in favor of the appellees-
employees would disturb the principle of corporate continuity established in 
merger law that constituent companies continue postmerger as a unified company 
vested with the identical contracts of the merged companies.  Our decision, 
however, rests firmly within this framework.  We emphasize that in accordance 
with R.C. 1701.82(A)(3), the surviving company possesses all assets and property 
and every interest in the assets and property of each constituent entity, including 
employment contracts and agreements. 
{¶ 15} When contracts pass to the surviving company following merger, 
the surviving company obtains the same bargain agreed to by the preceding 
company, nothing more.  Our decision today honors the noncompete agreement 
obtained by the employees’ original employers.  The L.L.C. argues that as the 
surviving company, it needs these agreements because they protect the goodwill 
and proprietary information obtained in the merger; however, extending these 
agreements would run counter to their plain language, which specifies that they 
apply only to “the Company” with which the employees agreed to avoid 
competing, not the company’s successors.  The L.L.C. could have protected its 
goodwill and proprietary information by requiring that the employees sign a new 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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noncompete agreement as a condition of their continued at-will employment, 
similar to the way in which Wells Fargo required them to complete a number of 
employment forms as a condition of continued employment when it acquired 
Acordia, Inc. 
{¶ 16} The L.L.C. also argues that we should follow the decisions of other 
jurisdictions.  Our decision in this case, however, is premised upon our 
application of Ohio law to the particular agreement in this case.  Our analysis of 
Ohio law and the noncompete agreements leads to the conclusion that although 
the employees’ noncompete agreements transferred automatically by operation of 
law to the L.L.C. following the merger, the merger did not alter the language of 
the agreements, and the noncompete agreements provided only that the employees 
would avoid competition during the two years following their termination from 
“the company” as defined by their respective noncompete agreements. 
C.  The employees did not violate the noncompete agreements 
{¶ 17} Because the noncompete agreements transferred to the L.L.C. upon 
completion of the merger, the L.L.C. obtained the right to enforce the agreements 
as written.  In other words, the employees were unable to compete with the L.L.C. 
for the two years following their termination from the “company” with which they 
each had signed their respective noncompete agreements. 
{¶ 18} In this case, the termination, or complete severance of the 
employer-employee relationship, occurred when the company with which the 
employee agreed not to compete ceased to exist, an event triggered by merger.  
The triggering event for Fishel, Freytag, and Taber occurred when Acordia of 
Cincinnati, Inc. merged with other Ohio companies to become Acordia of Ohio, 
Inc. in December 1997.  Consequently, their noncompete periods expired in 
December 1999.  The triggering event for Diefenbach occurred when Acordia of 
Ohio, Inc. merged with the L.L.C. in December 2001.  Her noncompete period 
accordingly expired in December 2003.  Because the employees’ noncompete 
January Term, 2012 
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periods had all expired before their resignations from the L.L.C. and subsequent 
employment with Neace Lukens, the L.L.C. had no legal right to enforce the 
noncompete agreements against the employees. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 19} The noncompete agreements between the employees and their 
original employers specified that they applied only to the specific companies that 
had originally hired each employee.  Because the agreements made no provision 
for the continuation of the agreement upon any acquisition of the original 
company by another company, the agreements are not enforceable by the L.L.C. 
according to the agreements’ original terms past the two-year noncompete period 
agreed to by the employees and their original employers.  We accordingly hold 
that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the employees. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL and CUPP, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 20} Respectfully, I dissent. 
{¶ 21} A noncompete agreement existing between an employee and a 
constituent entity is an asset of that entity and, in a statutory merger, transfers by 
operation of law to the surviving entity and is enforceable by the surviving entity 
as if it were a signatory to the original agreement.  As a result of a series of 
successive corporate mergers, Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C., acquired the noncompete 
agreements at issue in this case by operation of law, along with the ability to 
enforce them without regard to assignment. 
{¶ 22} Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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The Lead Opinion 
{¶ 23} In my view, the lead decision does not conform with state statutes 
governing corporate mergers, and it departs from century-old precedent holding 
that a successor entity steps into the shoes of an acquired entity and any 
predecessor entities, and thereby acquires the right to enforce agreements in its 
capacity as a successor entity. 
{¶ 24} In this case, the lead opinion concludes that Acordia of Ohio, 
L.L.C., cannot enforce the noncompete agreements it acquired by merger as if it 
had stepped into the shoes of the original corporate entities.  The lead opinion 
interprets the silence in these agreements regarding assignability or successorship 
as evidence that the parties intended the agreements to operate only between the 
employee and the corporate employer that was a party to the agreement, and not 
any successor entities.  While acknowledging that these agreements transferred by 
operation of law pursuant to R.C. 1701.82, the lead opinion concludes that “the 
wording within those agreements” precludes Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C., from 
enforcing the agreements as if it were one of the original contracting parties.  The 
lead opinion explains that the merger did not change the language of the 
agreements by expanding its scope to include surviving entities; thus, it 
concludes, Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C., can enforce the agreements only according to 
their terms, which enjoined each employee from competing for two years after his 
or her employment terminated with the specific corporate employer that was a 
party to the agreement.  This analysis, I submit, is faulty. 
A Noncompete Agreement is an Asset that  
Passes by Operation of Law 
{¶ 25} R.C. 1701.82(A)(3) states, “The surviving or new entity possesses 
all assets and property of every description, and every interest in the assets and 
property, wherever located, and the rights, privileges, immunities, powers, 
franchises, and authority * * * of each constituent entity, and * * * all obligations 
January Term, 2012 
11 
 
belonging to or due to each constituent entity” without reversion or impairment.  
R.C. 1705.39, which pertains to mergers between corporations or partnerships and 
limited liability companies, confers the same vestments on the surviving entity. 
{¶ 26} It is true that R.C. 1701.82(A)(1) states that a constituent entity 
ceases to exist as a separate business in a merger, but that statute also provides 
several exceptions to this general rule, including when “a conveyance, 
assignment, transfer, deed, or other instrument or act is necessary to vest property 
or rights” in a surviving entity.  In those instances, “the existence of the 
constituent entities and the authority of their respective officers, directors, general 
partners, or other authorized representatives is continued notwithstanding the 
merger or consolidation.”  Id.; compare R.C. 1705.39(A)(1) (contains similar 
exceptions). 
{¶ 27} R.C. 1701.82 and 1705.39, by their operation, vest all the assets 
and obligations of a constituent entity in the surviving entity without reversion or 
impairment.  When we examined the effect of R.C. 1701.82 in the context of a 
stock purchase agreement entered into by a constituent entity, we held that a 
properly executed contract is binding on the surviving entity “in a merger unless 
the agreement explicitly sets forth that in the event of a merger, the obligations of 
the constituent corporation cease to exist.”  ASA Architects, Inc. v. Schlegel, 75 
Ohio St.3d 666, 665 N.E.2d 1083 (1996), syllabus.  In that case, the agreement 
made no provision for what would happen in the event of a merger, the surviving 
entity in the merger assumed full responsibility for all obligations of the 
constituent entity, and the parties did not enter into a new agreement following the 
merger.  Id. at 673.  Based on those factors, we determined that the contractual 
obligations of the constituent entity flowed, by operation of law, to the surviving 
entity.  Id.  These same considerations are present here and compel a similar 
conclusion. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 28} The lead opinion correctly concludes that contract principles 
dictate that agreements must be enforced according to their terms; however, it 
ignores the fact that the entity entitled to enforce those agreements is determined 
by statute.  See R.C. 1701.82 and 1705.39. 
{¶ 29} More than 180 years ago, we recognized that contracts are 
subordinate to statutes, and the latter “may regulate them, prescribe their form, 
their effect, and the mode of their discharge, and every contract is supposed to be 
made with reference to those laws.”  Smith v. Pasons, 1 Ohio 236, 238-239 
(1823).  And almost 100 years ago, we construed railroad-consolidation statutes 
that contained language similar to that in R.C. 1701.82 and determined that in a 
merger, “the consolidated company merely steps into the shoes of the constituent 
companies.”  Marfield v. Cincinnati, D. & T. Traction Co., 111 Ohio St. 139, 161-
164, 144 N.E. 689 (1924).  The determination of the lead opinion that the terms of 
the agreements preclude Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C., from their enforcement runs 
counter to our century-old precedent. 
{¶ 30} We applied this analysis more recently, rejecting the argument that 
a change in corporate structure invalidated noncompete agreements originally 
entered into by the constituent entity.  Rogers v. Runfola & Assocs., Inc., 57 Ohio 
St.3d 5, 7, 565 N.E.2d 540 (1991).  There, the employees signed noncompete 
agreements while working for a sole proprietorship, which subsequently changed 
its business structure to that of a corporation, during their tenure of employment.  
Id.  In determining that the noncompete agreements were valid and could be 
enforced by the newly incorporated business, which had acquired all the assets 
and liabilities of the sole proprietorship, we were guided in our analysis by the 
fact that “[o]nly the legal structure of the business changed, not the business 
itself,” id., and that the change in corporate structure did not place additional 
burdens on the “duties or daily operations” of the employees.  Id.  This is the 
same circumstance that we confront in this case. 
January Term, 2012 
13 
 
{¶ 31} Here, Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C., acquired the noncompete 
agreements from Wells Fargo, which in turn had acquired them through a series 
of corporate mergers.  Those mergers, which began with Frederick Rauh & 
Company, did not affect the nature of the business—the sale of insurance 
securities; thus, the mergers changed only the corporate structure of the business 
operation.  Similarly, there is no evidence or claim in this record that additional 
employment duties or obligations resulted from these mergers.  Thus, Rogers 
supports the conclusion that Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C., is entitled to enforce the 
agreements it acquired in the merger that passed to it by operation of law. 
{¶ 32} In addition to this court, other courts construing similar statutes 
have rejected the conclusion reached by the lead opinion.  For example, in 
Corporate Express Office Prods., Inc. v. Phillips, the Supreme Court of Florida 
held that a surviving entity in a “merger assumes the right to enforce a 
noncompete agreement entered into with an employee of the merged corporation 
by operation of law, and no assignment is necessary * * * because in a merger, the 
two corporations in essence unite into a single corporate existence.”  847 So.2d 
406, 414 (Fla.2003).  And in AON Consulting, Inc. v. Midlands Fin. Benefits, Inc., 
the Supreme Court of Nebraska reached the same result when it construed a 
Maryland statute, concluding that a surviving entity could enforce a noncompete 
agreement acquired in a merger because it was an asset that passed by operation 
of law, and no assignment was necessary.  275 Neb. 642, 650-652, 748 N.W.2d 
626 (2008).  See also Natl. Instrument, L.L.C. v. Braithwaite, Md.Cir.Ct.No. 24-
C-06-004840, 2006 WL 2405831, *3 (June 5, 2006), (identifying cases in which 
courts construed merger statutes that vested in surviving entities the assets of a 
constituent entity without further act or deed, and which held that surviving 
entities could enforce noncompete agreements because they were business assets 
that passed by operation of law and not by assignment). 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Conclusion 
{¶ 33} Pursuant to R.C. 1701.82 and 1705.39, the primary statutes 
governing mergers in Ohio, assets pass to a surviving entity by operation of law.  
It has been understood for more than a century that contracts are subordinate to 
statutes and that the latter also determine the effect of merger contracts and their 
mode of discharge.  The agreements here automatically vested in Acordia of 
Ohio, L.L.C., without reversion or impairment, because they are assets that passed 
by operation of law, and Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C., can enforce the noncompete 
agreements as if it were a signatory to them. 
{¶ 34} For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals and hold that the surviving entity in a merger acquires the right to enforce 
a noncompete agreement entered into by a constituent entity by operation of law, 
and that neither assignment nor consent is necessary to effectuate that result. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON and CUPP, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissenting 
opinion. 
__________________ 
 
CUPP, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 35} I join Justice O’Donnell’s dissent, which cogently explains why 
the noncompete agreements in this case transferred by operation of law to 
appellant, Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C., through the series of mergers.  Therefore, I 
agree that the judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed. 
{¶ 36} The determination that the agreements transferred by operation of 
law pursuant to the statute through the several mergers, however, does not 
definitively resolve the separate and distinct question of whether the agreements 
are ultimately enforceable.  The transfer by operation of law does not, in my view, 
foreclose appropriate relief to the parties to the noncompete agreement under 
traditional principles of law that regulate and govern noncompete agreements. 
January Term, 2012 
15 
 
{¶ 37} During the progress of this case in the lower courts, it appears that 
there was insufficient appreciation of the legal distinction between the issue of 
transfer and the issue of the agreements’ enforceability after transfer.  As a result, 
there has been no specific and discrete inquiry thus far into the agreements’ 
enforceability.  Thus, if the transfer of the noncompete agreements by operation 
of law were appropriately recognized by our decision today, then this matter 
would properly be remanded for additional proceedings that could explore the 
enforceability of the subject agreements under the principles that govern such 
agreements. 
{¶ 38} As the lead opinion explains, at ¶ 2, the noncompete agreements at 
issue in this case were signed between 1993 and 2000.  The pertinent series of 
mergers and acquisitions started in 1994, when Frederick Rauh and Company, a 
single-office insurance agency in Cincinnati, was acquired by Acordia of Ohio, 
Inc. (“Acordia, Inc.”) and concluded when Acordia, Inc. merged with Acordia of 
Ohio, L.L.C., effective late in 2001.  When these employees resigned from 
Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C. in 2005, their employer had grown to have multiple 
offices, with 5,000 to 6,000 customers in the Cincinnati office alone.  The 
changes that occurred over the years and other factors in this record would seem 
to be relevant to the issue of the enforceability of these agreements. 
{¶ 39} The proceedings on remand would likely encompass those matters 
normally focused on when noncompete agreements are challenged, such as 
whether the agreements are reasonable and whether the employees incurred 
additional obligations or duties as the mergers occurred so that the agreements 
should not be enforced on their original terms.  See, e.g., Lake Land Emp. Group 
of Akron, L.L.C. v. Columber, 101 Ohio St.3d 242, 2004-Ohio-786, 804 N.E.2d 
27, ¶ 9 (noncompete agreements are enforceable if they contain reasonable 
geographical and temporal restrictions); Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 42 Ohio St.2d 
21, 325 N.E.2d 544 (1975), paragraphs one and two of the syllabus (a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
 
noncompete agreement that “imposes unreasonable restrictions upon an employee 
will be enforced to the extent necessary to protect an employer’s legitimate 
interests”; a noncompete agreement “is reasonable if the restraint is no greater 
than is required for the protection of the employer, does not impose undue 
hardship on the employee, and is not injurious to the public”). 
{¶ 40} Consequently, the issue of the enforceability of the noncompete 
agreements postmerger, an inquiry independent from the determination of their 
transfer by operation of law, remains to be explored. 
{¶ 41} The judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed, and this 
cause should be remanded for further proceedings. 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Katz, Teller, Brant & Hild, James F. McCarthy III, and Laura 
Hinegardner, for appellant. 
 
Denlinger, Rosenthal & Greenberg, L.P.A., Mark E. Lutz, and Michael P. 
Majba, for appellees. 
 
Taft Stettinius & Hollister, L.L.P., W. Stuart Dornette, John B. 
Nalbandian, and Ryan M. Bednarczuk, urging reversal for amici curiae Ohio 
Chamber of Commerce and Ohio Chemistry Technology Council. 
Beckman Weil Shepardson, L.L.C., and Peter L. Cassady, urging reversal 
for USI Holdings Corp. and USI Midwest, Inc. 
Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff, L.L.P., and Jennifer Turk, 
urging reversal for Willis of Ohio, Inc. 
Hylant Group, Inc., and Michelle Lafferty, urging reversal for Hylant 
Group, Inc. 
 
Jones Day, Robert P. Ducatman, and Meredith M. Wilkes, urging reversal 
for amicus curiae PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. 
January Term, 2012 
17 
 
 
Fortney & Klingshirn, and Neil Klingshirn; and Gregory Gordillo, urging 
affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Employment Lawyers’ Association. 
______________________