Title: STEVEN CHRIS SANCHEZ V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

STEVEN CHRIS SANCHEZ V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 116142 P.3d 1134Case Number: 04-145Decided: 09/20/2006
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
STEVEN CHRIS 
SANCHEZ,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

The Honorable W. Thomas 
Sullins, Judge

 
 
Representing Appellant:

Dion J. Custis, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing Appellee:

Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, 
Deputy Attorney General ; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; 
James Michael Causey, Assistant Attorney General.

                                    
                        
            

Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
* Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]      A jury found 
Steven C. Sanchez 
guilty of first degree felony murder and second degree murder for causing the 
death of a seventeen-month-old child.  He appeals from his 
judgment and sentence alleging several errors.  He claims the district court erred by: 
(1) denying his motion for a change of venue; (2) admitting evidence under the 
Wyoming Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 609; (3) permitting expert testimony; and 
(4) imposing time constraints on closing arguments.  Mr. Sanchez also contends the verdict 
was not supported by sufficient evidence.  
We 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      The following 
issues are presented on appeal:

 
 

I.                     
Did the district court 
err in denying Mr. Sanchez's motions for change of venue?

 
 

II.                   
Did the district court 
abuse its discretion in admitting evidence under W.R.E. 
404(b)?

 
 

III.                  
Did the district court 
abuse its discretion in admitting evidence under W.R.E. 
609?

 
 

IV.               
Did the district court 
abuse its discretion in placing a time restriction on closing 
arguments?

 
 

V.                 
Did the district court 
abuse its discretion in admitting the expert testimony of Dr. 
Sirotnak?

 
 

VI.               
Was there sufficient 
evidence to support Mr. Sanchez's convictions of first degree felony murder and 
second degree murder?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On July 7, 2003, 
Mr. Sanchez was babysitting his girlfriend's seventeen-month-old son, JZ.  At approximately 3:10 p.m., the 
Evansville Police Department received a call indicating that JZ had been hit in 
the chest at Mr. Sanchez's trailer home.  
Upon arrival, Officer Joseph Vigneri approached Mr. Sanchez who was 
holding JZ in his arms.  The child 
was covered in vomit and was not breathing.  Believing that JZ was choking, Officer 
Vigneri attempted to resuscitate him.  
A few moments later, medical personnel arrived and resuscitation efforts 
were continued.  Their efforts were 
unsuccessful and the child was taken to the WyomingMedicalCenter in Casper.

[¶4]      At the hospital, 
Dr. Mel Meyer was advised that JZ had been hit in the chest and was not 
breathing.  Upon examination, Dr. 
Meyer determined JZ had two collapsed lungs, but no external injuries existed 
except for an injury to the left side of his head and a soft mass on the right 
side of his head.  Dr. Meyer called 
in a trauma surgeon who inserted tubes into JZ's chest to remove the air that 
had accumulated in his chest cavity.  
A neurosurgeon was also consulted due to the severity of JZ's head 
injury.  A CAT scan was 
ordered.

 
 
[¶5]      Upon review of 
the CAT scan, the neurosurgeon concluded that JZ suffered a massive blow to his 
head.  Surgery was performed to 
alleviate the pressure mounting in JZ's head and damaging his brain.  The surgery alleviated some pressure, 
but JZ's chance of survival remained quite poor due to the extensive brain 
damage that had already occurred.

 
 
[¶6]      After the 
surgery, JZ was stabilized and flown to the Children's Hospital in Denver, Colorado.  Despite being seen by several physicians, 
his condition worsened.  JZ died the 
following day.

 
 
[¶7]      An investigation 
ensued to determine the cause of JZ's injuries.  Officer Vigneri learned from the 
physicians at the Casper hospital that JZ's condition was the 
result of massive trauma to his head.  
When asked about the incident during subsequent interviews with the 
police, Mr. Sanchez gave varying versions, but ultimately told officers that he 
ran through a door in the trailer home and somehow hit JZ with his knee and/or 
the door, "taking him out."  Mr. 
Sanchez repeated this statement to the investigator for the Department of Family 
Services.  

 
 
[¶8]      Mr. Sanchez was 
taken to the police department for another interview.  Mr. Sanchez eventually admitted to 
hitting JZ in the back of the head.  
He also admitted that he was angry for various reasons when he went 
through the door.  Mr. Sanchez was 
arrested and charged with first degree felony murder, committed in the 
perpetration of the abuse of a child under the age of 16 years, in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101, and second degree murder in violation of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-2-104.  A jury convicted 
Mr. Sanchez of both offenses.  He 
was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 
Change of 
Venue

 
 
[¶9]      Prior to jury 
selection, Mr. Sanchez moved for a change of venue claiming he would be unable 
to receive a fair and impartial trial in NatronaCounty as a result of pretrial 
publicity.  The motion was 
denied.  Five days before jury 
selection, Mr. Sanchez filed a motion to reconsider his change of venue request. 
 The motion was based upon the same 
allegations as the first, but emphasized that the continuing media coverage was 
increasing the likelihood of prejudice.  
This motion was also denied.

[¶10]   Mr. Sanchez challenges the district 
court's decision to deny both of his motions.  We review decisions on motions for a 
change of venue under our abuse of discretion standard.  Sides v. State, 963 P.2d 227, 231 
(Wyo. 
1998).  "We will not interfere with 
a trial court's decision concerning venue unless it acted in a manner exceeding 
the bounds of reason under the circumstances."  Nixon v. State, 994 P.2d 324, 327 
(Wyo. 
1999).  Mr. Sanchez bears the burden 
of showing prejudice so great that a fair trial cannot be obtained.  Id.  Mr. Sanchez must also show actual 
prejudice in the minds of the jurors.  
Id.

 
 
[¶11]   Article 1, § 10 of the Wyoming 
Constitution grants the right to trial "by an impartial jury of the county or 
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed."  "The legislative provision mirroring the 
constitution requires every criminal case shall be tried in the county in which 
the indictment or offense charged is found, except as otherwise provided by 
law.'"  Nixon, 994 P.2d  at 327 (quoting Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-7-102(a) (LEXIS 1999)).  
"Trial proceedings are transferred to another county only if the court 
is satisfied that there exists within the county where the prosecution is 
pending so great a prejudice against the defendant that the defendant cannot 
obtain a fair and impartial trial in that county.'" Id. (quoting 
W.R.Cr.P. 21(a)).

 
 
[¶12]   Mr. Sanchez contends the district 
court abused its discretion by applying the wrong standard when it analyzed his 
request for a change of venue.  Mr. 
Sanchez argues that although the court required him to show actual prejudice, 
the pretrial publicity in this case was so inflammatory that prejudice may be 
presumed and a change of venue required as a matter of law pursuant to Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 85 S. Ct. 1628, 14 L. Ed. 2d 543 (1965).  He 
claims that the overwhelming publicity coupled with the connection of Mr. 
Sanchez's case to other homicides involving the use of methamphetamine supports 
a presumption of prejudice.1  We disagree.

 
 
[¶13]   Presumed prejudice is rarely 
invoked and only in extreme circumstances.  
United 
States v. Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d 1168, 1177 
(10th Cir. 1991).  
Because pretrial publicity in topical criminal cases is inevitable, a 
defendant's rights are impacted only when the publicity dictates the community's 
opinion as to guilt or innocence.  
Estes, 381 U.S.  at 536, 85 S. Ct.  at 1629.  In rare cases, the 
community is so predisposed that prejudice can be presumed and venue must be 
transferred as a matter of law.  Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S. Ct. 1507, 16 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1966); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 83 S. Ct. 1417, 10 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1963).  

 
 
[¶14]   For example, in Estes, prejudice was presumed because 
the pretrial publicity amounted to eleven volumes of press clippings.  Estes, 381 U.S.  at 535, 85 S. Ct.  at 1629.  In Rideau, prejudice was presumed when the 
defendant's confession to the sheriff was filmed and televised on the local 
news, compromising due process.  Rideau, 373 U.S.  at 727, 83 S. Ct.  at 1419.  In Sheppard, five volumes of news clippings 
accumulated in a six month period.  
Newspapers published the names and addresses of potential jurors who were 
peppered with letters and telephone calls regarding the upcoming trial.  Again, prejudice was presumed.  Sheppard, 384 U.S.  at 342-343, 
86 S. Ct.  at 1512.

  

[¶15]   In contrast, the evidence of the 
pretrial publicity in this case consisted of one newspaper clipping and one 
segment from a local news broadcast.  
That evidence reflects mostly statements of fact gathered from public 
records.  Although the media did 
report Mr. Sanchez's case, the adverse publicity did not permeate the community 
to such a degree that empanelling a fair jury would have been impossible.2  United 
States v. Affleck, 776 F.2d 1451, 1454 
(10th Cir. 1985).  This 
is not a case where prejudice may be presumed.  

[¶16]   Alternatively, Mr. Sanchez contends 
that even if prejudice is not presumed, actual prejudice tainted his trial and 
the district court erred by denying his motions.  To determine whether pretrial publicity 
requires a change of venue, we utilize a two-part test.  Duke v. State, 2004 WY 120, ¶ 25, 99 P.3d 928, 940 (Wyo. 2004).  First, 
the nature and extent of the publicity must be considered.  Id.  Second, the difficulty or ease in 
selecting a jury must be considered along with the amount of prejudice which 
actually appears during voir dire 
examination.  Id.  

 
 
[¶17]   In his motions, Mr. Sanchez 
contended that selecting an impartial jury in NatronaCounty would be impossible considering the 
small population and the amount of news coverage.  However, the nature and extent of the 
pretrial publicity in this case was not unusual and jury selection did not prove 
to be difficult.  Relatively few 
potential jurors stated they had seen or heard about the case in the media.  Of those potential jurors, only one 
claimed to have formed an opinion based on the media coverage and was 
excused.  Five of the initial twelve 
names drawn ultimately served on the jury.3  The other seven jurors selected were 
individually polled about the media coverage and each indicated that even if 
they had seen or heard anything over the months preceding the trial, that 
coverage would have no impact on their ability to evaluate the evidence 
presented to them at trial.  These 
indications are sufficient to guard against juror bias and 
impartiality:

 
 
Even where a juror may 
have formed or expressed an opinion as to the defendant's guilt from having read 
or heard news coverage, that juror may hear the case if the juror states, and 
the court is reasonably satisfied, that the juror can lay aside his opinion and 
render a verdict based only on the evidence presented in court.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-106 
(1997).

 
 

Nixon, 994 P.2d  at 327 
(quoting Sides v. State, 963 P.2d 227, 231 (Wyo. 
1998)).  

 
 
[¶18]   The pretrial publicity in this case 
was not overwhelming.  Detailed 
areas of inquiry were made by defense counsel during voir dire.  Potential jurors with preformed opinions 
were excused while remaining jurors repeatedly affirmed they could be fair and 
impartial.  Defense counsel passed 
the jury panel for cause indicating satisfaction that the potential jurors could 
render a fair and impartial verdict.  
See, e.g., Collins v. State, 
589 P.2d 1283, 1289 (Wyo. 1979).  Also of significance is that defense 
counsel failed to renew the motion for a change of venue, after voir dire, despite an invitation by the 
district court to do so in the event difficulties arose in seating the 
venire.  We find no abuse of 
discretion.

 
 
W.R.E. 
404(b)

 
 
[¶19]   Mr. Sanchez claims error from the 
district court's decision to admit evidence that he called JZ a "niglet" and 
used other derogatory terms while talking about African Americans.  Mr. Sanchez contends that both the State 
and the trial court failed to follow the factors set forth in Gleason v. State, 2002 WY 161, 57 P.3d 332 (Wyo. 2002), in determining whether this evidence was properly admissible 
under W.R.E. 404(b).  He asserts 
that the remarks served no purpose in the case other than to inflame the 
jury.  

 
 
[¶20]   Rulings on the admission of 
evidence are placed within the sound discretion of the trial court and, in order 
to successfully challenge these rulings on appeal, an appellant must show that 
the trial court committed a "clear abuse of discretion."  Billingsley v. State, 2003 WY 61, ¶ 9, 
69 P.3d 390, 395 (Wyo. 2003).  A 
trial court's rulings on the admissibility of evidence are entitled to 
considerable deference, and, as long as there exists a legitimate basis for the 
trial court's ruling, that ruling will not be disturbed on appeal.  Id., ¶ 9, 69 P.3d  at 395.  The appellant bears the burden of showing 
an abuse of discretion.  Trujillo v. State, 2 P.3d 567, 571 (Wyo. 
2000).

 
 
[¶21]   Mr. Sanchez questions whether the 
remarks are properly considered prior bad acts as contemplated by W.R.E. 
404(b).  Pursuant to W.R.E. 404(b), 
evidence of prior crimes or other wrongdoings may be admissible if used for 
certain purposes:

 
 
            
(b)       
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. 
 Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith.  It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident.

 
 

Id.  Although the terms "other wrongs or 
acts" are not further defined by W.R.E. 404(b), possible interpretations of 
those terms are discussed in Wright & Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: 
Evidence.  The purpose of 
"wrongs" is to "bring within the rule any sort of conduct that is likely to 
reflect adversely on the person in the eyes of the jury even though it has not 
been forbidden by the positive law."  
Wright & Graham, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 5239, at 456.  "Other acts" can be interpreted to 
include any conduct, good or bad, that tends to show the character of the person 
involved.  Id.  Based on these interpretations of the 
rule, statements made by Mr. Sanchez which tended to show his character could be 
considered as other wrongs or acts.  
An inquiry under 404(b) was therefore proper.  

  

[¶22]   In considering whether to admit 
evidence of prior crimes or wrongdoings, a trial court must subject the proposed 
evidence to a certain level of analysis and must provide some details as to why 
it allowed the evidence to be admitted:

 
 
In Rigler, 941 P.2d  at 737-38, we held 
that, so long as the record revealed that the trial court had subjected proposed 
uncharged misconduct evidence to the appropriate test of its probative value and 
prejudicial effect, the trial court need not make express findings on the record 
on each of these factors.  Since 
that opinion was published, however, we have repeatedly been called upon to 
assess a trial court's exercise of discretion on such rulings, and we now remind 
the trial courts that, while express findings on each factor are not necessary, abuse 
of discretion, or lack thereof, cannot be determined by reviewing a record that 
contains no information as to how that discretion was exercised. 

 
 
                        
. . . 

                        

In applying [an abuse of 
discretion] standard, we cannot determine whether conclusions were drawn from 
objective criteria if we do not know what criteria were applied.  We cannot determine whether sound 
judgment was exercised under the circumstances if we do not know what 
circumstances were considered.  We 
cannot determine whether the trial court acted arbitrarily or capriciously if we 
do not know what the trial court did in reaching its 
decision.

 
 
            
In future cases involving the admissibility of evidence under W.R.E. 
404(b), the record shall reflect the trial court's identification of the purpose 
or purposes for admission of the evidence, the findings and conclusions 
establishing relevance and probative value, and the factors considered in 
balancing probative value against the potential for unfair prejudice.  The "shotgun approach" of listing every 
conceivable purpose for admissibility, followed by a bald statement that 
probative value outweighs prejudicial effect will no longer be sufficient.  While the trial court need not make an 
express finding on every factor from Dean and Rigler, the record must contain 
sufficient findings to support the trial court's conclusions.  The burden, of course, will be upon the 
proponent of the evidence to supply the foundation for its 
admission.

 
 

Gleason, ¶¶ 28-30, 57 P.3d  at 
343 (emphasis in original). 

 
 
[¶23]   Upon our review, we find the State 
and the trial court followed the requirements of Gleason.  Prior to trial, the State advised the 
trial court and defense counsel of its intent to introduce evidence that Mr. 
Sanchez made numerous racial slurs regarding JZ and JZ's father and that he 
treated JZ differently than his biological children.  The State indicated it would use the 
evidence to show course of conduct, motive, and intent to rebut any claim of 
accident or mistake.  The State 
contended that no other evidence was available to serve this same purpose.  The State also claimed that the events 
involving the evidence were relatively recent because all occurred within the 
last twelve months.  The State also 
contended that the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial because the other 
wrongdoings were not as reprehensible as the crimes with which Mr. Sanchez was 
presently charged.

 
 
[¶24]   The trial court agreed with the 
State's analysis.  In its decision 
letter, the court determined that the evidence could properly be used to show 
motive and intent and that it was relevant to show the relationship between the 
victim and Mr. Sanchez.  Citing Longfellow v. State, 803 P.2d 848, 854 
(Wyo. 1990), the trial court stated that such evidence would be helpful to 
explain what happened between Mr. Sanchez and JZ based upon the reasoning that 
"events do not occur in a vacuum."  
In determining that the probative value of the evidence was not 
substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice, the court 
discussed each of the Gleason factors 
and provided its findings concerning each factor.  We find no error in the court's decision 
to allow the evidence under W.R.E. 404(b).

 
 
W.R.E. 
609

 
 
[¶25]   Mr. Sanchez claims the district 
court abused its discretion by allowing the State to use evidence of his two 
prior convictions for child abuse for the purposes of attacking his credibility 
as a witness pursuant to W.R.E. 609.  
He argues that this evidence was especially prejudicial in his case 
because he was much more obligated to testify because he and the victim were the 
only witnesses to the event.  He 
also argues that due to the remoteness in time of the convictions, the court 
should have excluded the evidence.

 
 
Evidentiary rulings are 
within the sound discretion of the trial court and include determinations of the 
adequacy of foundation and relevancy, competency, materiality, and remoteness of 
the evidence. This court will generally accede to the trial court's 
determination of the admissibility of evidence unless that court clearly abused 
its discretion.  We have described 
the standard of an abuse of discretion as reaching the question of the 
reasonableness of the trial court's choice. Judicial discretion is a composite 
of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it 
means exercising sound judgment with regard to what is right under the 
circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. In the absence 
of an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the trial court's 
determination.  The burden is on the 
defendant to establish such abuse.

 
 

Wilks v. 
State, 
2002 WY 100, ¶ 19, 49 P.3d 975, 984 (Wyo. 2002) (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted).  

 
 
[¶26]   W.R.E. 609 provides in pertinent 
part:

 
 
            
Rule 609.  Impeachment by 
evidence of conviction of crime.

 
 

(a)               
General rule.  
For the 
purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, 

 
 

(1)               
evidence that a witness 
other than an accused has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject 
to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 
one (1) year under the law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence 
that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the 
court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs 
its prejudicial effect to the accused; 

 
 
. . . 

 
 
(b)       Time Limit.  Evidence of a conviction 
under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than ten (10) years has 
elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from 
the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless 
the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of 
the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially 
outweighs its prejudicial effect.  
However, evidence of a conviction more than ten (10) years old as 
calculated herein, is not admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse 
party sufficient advance written notice of intent to use such evidence to 
provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such 
evidence.

 
 
[¶27]   In this case, the trial court ruled 
that Mr. Sanchez's prior convictions would be admissible under W.R.E. 609 if Mr. 
Sanchez chose to testify.  Mr. 
Sanchez does not dispute that the convictions fell within the timeframe 
permitted by W.R.E. 609.  Rather, he 
contends that because his prior convictions barely fit within the ten-year 
period, the potential for unfair prejudice was great and the trial court should 
not have admitted the evidence in light of W.R.E. 403.  Our focus, therefore, is limited to 
whether the district court abused its discretion when it concluded the evidence 
was not unfairly prejudicial to Mr. Sanchez.

 
 
[¶28]   "[T]he balancing of prejudice 
against probative worth is ordinarily a discretionary matter for the trial 
court. . ."  Miller v. State, 784 P.2d 209, 211 
(Wyo. 
1989).  As a threshold matter, it is 
Mr. Sanchez who must "clearly demonstrate the inflammatory nature of the 
evidence and establish that it had little probative value."  Id.  Mr. Sanchez has failed to carry this 
burden.   

 
 
[¶29]   Mr. Sanchez testified on his own 
behalf.  His version of the events 
differed significantly from the physical evidence presented at trial and the 
testimony elicited from expert witnesses.  
The evidence of his conviction was used to impeach Mr. Sanchez's 
credibility pursuant to W.R.E. 609.  
An appropriate limiting instruction was given to the jury.  See Mazurek v. State, 10 P.3d 531, 
539  (Wyo. 2000) (holding that 
"[g]enerally, the trial court should instruct the jury that evidence of a 
witness' conviction may be used only for the limited purpose of impeachment and 
not as substantive evidence of guilt").  
We find no abuse of discretion.  

 
 
Time Limit on Closing 
Arguments

 
 
[¶30]   Mr. Sanchez claims that he was 
denied his right to a fair trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution and Article 1, Sections 6 and 10 of the Wyoming 
Constitution because the trial court imposed a time restriction on closing 
arguments.  Mr. Sanchez argues that 
the forty-five minutes allotted for his closing was an insufficient amount of 
time to summarize the evidence because of the number of witnesses and the 
variance in the criminal charges.  
This insufficient time, he claims, deprived him of effective assistance 
of counsel. 

 
 
[¶31]   A trial court's decision to place 
time restrictions on closing arguments is reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard.  Herring v. New 
York, 422 U.S. 853, 862, 95 S. Ct. 2550, 2554, 
45 L. Ed. 2d 593 (1975); Cole v. Tansy, 
926 F.2d 955, 958 (10th Cir. 1991).  "Judicial discretion is a composite of 
many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means 
a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without doing so arbitrarily and capriciously."  Penner v. State, 2003 WY 143, ¶ 7, 78 P.3d 1045, 1047 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
[¶32]   The Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution provides:

 
 
In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by 
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to 
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence.

 
 
[¶33]   Notwithstanding those rights, 
however, trial courts are afforded discretion in controlling their courtrooms 
and the proceedings therein, including closing arguments:

 
 
            
. . . In a criminal trial, which is in the end basically a fact[-]finding 
process, no aspect of such advocacy could be more important than the opportunity 
finally to marshal the evidence for each side before submission of the case to 
judgment.

 
 
            
This is not to say that closing arguments in a criminal case must be 
uncontrolled or even unrestrained.  
The presiding judge must be and 
is given great latitude in controlling the duration and limiting the scope of 
closing summations.  He may 
limit counsel to a reasonable time and may terminate argument when continuation 
would be repetitive or redundant.  
He may ensure that argument does not stray unduly from the mark, or 
otherwise impede the fair and orderly conduct of the trial.  In all these respects he must have broad 
discretion. 

 
 

Herring, 422 U.S.  at 862, 95 S. Ct.  at 2554 (emphasis added).

 
 
[¶34]   Many courts have failed to find an 
abuse of discretion or a Sixth Amendment violation despite a time restriction on 
closing arguments.  For example, in 
United States v. Rogers, 960 F.2d 1501, 1513 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1035, 113 S. Ct. 817, 121 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1992), the court upheld a time restriction of forty-five 
to fifty minutes where the defendant was tried on twenty-six counts of violating 
various federal laws.  The Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld a restriction of ten minutes for each 
defendant in a case which covered a six-year period and involved multiple 
conspiracies, 40 witnesses, 133 exhibits, a 12 count indictment, and 22 pages of 
jury instructions.  United States v. Sotelo, 97 F.3d 782, 
793 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. 
denied, 519 U.S. 1135, 
117 S. Ct. 1002, 136 L. Ed. 2d 881 (1997); 520 U.S. 1149, 117 S. Ct. 1324, 137 L. Ed. 2d 486 (1997).  Similarly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed 
the decision of the trial court to limit closing arguments to thirty minutes 
where the government's case involved twelve witnesses and twenty-seven 
exhibits.  United 
States v. Davila, 693 F.2d 1006, 1008 (10th Cir. 1982).

 
 
[¶35]   In light of these decisions and 
under the circumstances of this case, forty-five minutes for summation is not 
unreasonable.  Mr. Sanchez's trial 
lasted approximately eight days  two of which were expended on jury selection 
and the unavailability of a witness.  
Sixteen witnesses were called.  
Defense counsel did not use all of the allotted time and did not lodge an 
objection as to what, if anything, he was unable to cover in his summation.  Based on the foregoing, we find no abuse 
of discretion.

      

Admission of Dr. 
Sirotnak's Testimony

 
 
[¶36]   After several physicians had 
testified concerning JZ's injuries, the State called pediatrician Andrew 
Sirotnak, M.D., as a witness.  Dr. 
Sirotnak testified about his qualifications and experience as an associate 
professor of pediatrics for the University of Colorado School of Medicine and as 
the director of the child protection team at the Denver Children's 
Hospital.  He explained that the 
child protection team treats and evaluates child patients and consults other 
departments treating children who are suspected victims of abuse.  Upon request from the State, the 
district court qualified Dr. Sirotnak as an expert without 
objection.

 
 
[¶37]   Dr. Sirotnak testified that his 
team received a referral when JZ was being transferred to Children's Hospital, 
and they evaluated JZ's case.  Dr. 
Sirotnak examined JZ, reviewed medical records, and consulted with JZ's 
mother.  Dr. Sirotnak expressed the 
opinion that JZ's death was not the result of an accident.

 
 
[¶38]   Mr. Sanchez claims the district 
court erred by admitting Dr. Sirotnak's testimony.  First, he claims that permitting Dr. 
Sirotnak to provide cumulative testimony was an abuse of discretion.  Second, he claims Dr. Sirotnak 
improperly invaded the province of the jury by providing a legal conclusion 
regarding an element of the crime, i.e., that JZ died as a result of child 
abuse.  Finally, he claims Dr. 
Sirotnak impermissibly opined as to the credibility of Mr. Sanchez.    

 
 
A.  Cumulative 
Testimony

 
 
[¶39]   As Dr. Sirotnak was explaining the 
basis of his opinion, defense counsel objected that the testimony was cumulative 
because the jury had "already heard from other physicians, and he's not 
providing us anything we haven't heard . . . ."  In response, the State explained that 
Dr. Sirotnak had a different specialty and had seen JZ after he was 
transferred.  The district court 
overruled the objection, noting Dr. Sirotnak's sub-specialty and his discussion 
of JZ's entire history, while other physicians had testified regarding JZ's 
condition at specific points in time.

            

[¶40]   "Rulings on the admissibility of 
evidence are committed to the sound discretion of the district court and 
are not subject to appellate second guessing absent an abuse of 
discretion."  Curl v. State, 898 P.2d 369, 373 
(Wyo. 
1995).  Mr. Sanchez does not 
identify any prejudicial abuse by the district court in exercising its 
discretion to allow the testimony.  
Accordingly, we find no error.  

 
 

B.    
Element of the 
Crime

 
 
[¶41]   Next, Mr. Sanchez challenges Dr. 
Sirotnak's testimony because he used the phrase "child abuse" throughout his 
testimony.   He claims that 
whether child abuse occurred was a "legal conclusion which should be left for 
the jury to decide."  Mr. Sanchez 
claims that "there is no way a doctor can tell if this was child abuse or not" 
and, therefore, Dr. Sirotnak should not have been allowed to give his 
opinion.  Mr. Sanchez did not object 
to this aspect of the testimony at trial.

 
 
We review evidence to 
which the defense does not object [to] at trial using the three-part test of the 
plain error standard. First, the record must be clear as to the incident which 
is alleged as error. Next, the party claiming error must demonstrate that a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated. Finally, it must be proved that 
a substantial right has been denied, resulting in material prejudice. Unless 
admission of the evidence achieves the status of plain error, reversal is not 
warranted. 

Trujillo v. 
State, 953 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Wyo. 
1998).

 
 
[¶42]   We first note that "[t]estimony in 
the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable 
because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact."   W.R.E. 704.  We have held that 

 
 
the jury can reject 
testimony that speaks directly to ultimate issues, and there is no reason to 
think that testimony of this sort is especially likely to overwhelm a jury or 
persuade it to give up its independence.  
Concerns that a jury would give up its responsibility to look critically 
at testimony and just take the word of the witness are overstated since juries 
have the power and authority to reject even decisive and informed testimony, and 
are told as much before they retire to deliberate.

 
 

Hannon v. 
State, 
2004 WY 8, ¶ 87, 84 P.3d 320, 353 (Wyo. 2004) (internal citation and quotation 
marks omitted).

 
 
[¶43]   Prejudice does not automatically 
occur when a term or phrase is used in a question or argument that may have a 
meaning other than its legal meaning.  
Armstrong v. State, 826 P.2d 1106, 1113 (Wyo. 1992).  When a term or phrase is not used in its 
strict legal sense, it may be allowed.  
Id.  Dr. Sirotnak was qualified as a child 
abuse expert by the trial court.  As 
demonstrated by the following testimony, Dr. Sirotnak used the phrase "child 
abuse" to explain JZ's medical diagnosis.  
The following excerpts from his testimony illustrate how he used the 
phrase: 

 
 
[PROSECUTION]  . . . Do you have any background or 
experience in diagnosing or treating victims of child 
abuse?

 
 
[DR. SIROTNAK]  Yes.  That's the majority of my clinical work 
at the hospital.

 
 
* * 
*

 
 
[PROSECUTION]  What . . . items do you use to rely on 
to determine whether a person is a victim of child abuse or 
not?

 
 
[DR. SIROTNAK]  Well, in addition to, just like any 
medical diagnosis, sexual abuse, sexual assault, rape, physical abuse, physical 
assault, those are all medical diagnoses as well.  So we start with the history.  Why are you here today, or why are you 
referred to us to talk with you to help you.  And the physical exam; referring 
records; records, again, if a child is being admitted may have hospital transfer 
records; radiology studies frequently have been done; laboratory studies may 
have been done; and other medical provider's notes of medial care that has 
already occurred sometimes when they're coming into our 
institution.

 
 
                        
* * *

 
 
[PROSECUTION]   After reviewing all of this  were you 
satisfied that [JZ] did not die of natural causes?

 
 
[DR. SIROTNAK]  It's clear that this was not a natural 
death. 

 
 
[PROSECUTION]  Okay. By that, what do you 
mean?

 
 
[DR. SIROTNAK]  This is a death that occurred in a       non[-]accidental  as a result of trauma 
to his head and very clearly in a non[-]accidental manner.

 
 
                        
* * *

 
 
[PROSECUTION]  And based on your review of all of the 
medical records, relying on your extensive training and experience in the field 
of child abuse and also in pediatric medicine, did you make a medical diagnosis 
regarding the cause of death for [JZ]?

 
 
[DR. SIROTNAK]   Yes.

 
 
[PROSECUTION]  And what was that? 

 
 
[DR. SIROTNAK]   This is a case of child 
abuse.  It's a case of fatal, 
physical abuse of [a] child.  

 
 
[PROSECUTION]  Now, Doctor, all the opinions that you 
have rendered today, are they based on your education, training, and experience 
in the field of pediatric medicine and child abuse?

 
 
                        
[DR. SIROTNAK]   
Yes.

 
 
[PROSECUTION]  And are they generally accepted in the 
medical community?

 
 
[DR. SIROTNAK]   In terms of how to make a 
diagnosis? 

Yes.

 
 
[¶44]   In contrast, "child abuse," in its 
legal sense is made up of the following elements:  

 
 
(i) The actor is an adult 
or is at least six (6) years older than the victim; and 

(ii) The actor 
intentionally or recklessly inflicts upon a child under the age of sixteen (16) 
years: 

(A)              
Physical injury as 
defined in W.S. 14-3-202(a)(ii)(B); or

(B)              
Mental injury as defined 
in W.S. 14-3-202(a)(ii)(A).

 
 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-503(a) 
(LexisNexis 2005).  The jury's role 
was to determine whether those elements were met.  While the phrase "child abuse" has a 
legal meaning, it also has meaning in the medical context.  Against that backdrop, we find no error 
in the expert's use of the phrase "child abuse."  

 
 

C.    
Opinion as to Mr. 
Sanchez's Credibility

 
 
[¶45]   Mr. Sanchez next asserts that Dr. 
Sirotnak impermissibly testified regarding Mr. Sanchez's credibility.  Specifically, he claims it was improper 
for Dr. Sirotnak to comment upon Mr. Sanchez's version of events being 
inconsistent with the doctor's opinion of the cause of death.  Mr. Sanchez did not raise an objection 
to the district court, thus limiting our review to a search for plain 
error.  Gayler v. State, 957 P.2d 855, 860 
(Wyo. 
1998).

 
 
[¶46]   Dr. Sirotnak testified that the 
various versions of the incident leading to JZ's death, provided by Mr. Sanchez, 
were inconsistent with the injuries JZ sustained:

 
 
[DR. SIROTNAK]  . . . This injury of did his knee hit 
his chest?  [D]id his knee or the 
door hit his chest?  [W]as it just 
the door?  Was it the knee and the 
door and the tricycle?  [W]as it the 
door and the tricycle, it just evolves.  
None of it makes clinical sense that the severity of the head bump from 
that kind of fall from a standing height, whether or not he was pushed forward 
by a knee or a door or both, it does not explain the severity of this child's 
massive left-sided injury.

 
 
[¶47]   The credibility of witnesses and 
the guilt of the accused are questions for the jury to resolve.  Gayler, 957 P.2d  at 
860.

 
 
A witness, lay or expert, 
is not permitted to articulate an opinion as to the guilt of the accused under 
W.R.E. 704. Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60 (Wyo. 
1989). The obvious reason is that opinion testimony about guilt or innocence 
does not address areas that assist the jury in resolving factual issues. Bennett v. State, 794 P.2d 879 
(Wyo. 1990). 

Armstrong, 826 P.2d  at 1111.  See also McCone v. State, 866 P.2d 740, 
751 (Wyo. 
1993) (no witness should be permitted to testify that another witness is or is 
not telling the truth).  

 
 
[¶48]   "However, testimony assisting the 
jury in understanding some aspect of the testimony of another witness that does 
not comment directly on that 
witness' credibility or veracity, is not invasive of the role of the 
jury.'"  Seward v. State, 2003 WY 116, ¶ 19, 76 P.3d 805, 814 (Wyo. 2003) (emphasis added) (quoting Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 618 
(Wyo. 1993)); Curl, 898 P.2d  at 374 
(stating "[a]lthough that testimony might have had the collateral or incidental 
effect of supporting VD's credibility, it was not a direct comment on his 
credibility or veracity and cannot be said to constitute error").  

 
 
[¶49]   Although Dr. Sirotnak discussed the 
implausibility of the explanations for JZ's injury given by Mr. Sanchez, Dr. 
Sirotnak did not comment directly on Mr. Sanchez's veracity or his 
credibility.  He was explaining his 
opinion that JZ's injuries were not consistent with an accident.  We find no error.

 
 

Sufficiency of the 
Evidence

 
 
[¶50]   Mr. Sanchez claims that 
insufficient evidence exists to support his conviction for first degree felony 
murder and second degree murder, and therefore, the convictions must be 
reversed.  Although difficult to 
glean from his brief, Mr. Sanchez appears to contend that it is impossible to 
find that he acted recklessly and, at the same time, acted purposely and 
maliciously.  Because he concludes 
that the two states of mind are mutually exclusive, he contends the State could 
not have proven both crimes.  

 
 
[¶51]   Mr. Sanchez's argument has no 
merit.  We have held that 
intentional conduct encompasses reckless conduct.  See Simmons v. State, 2003 WY 84, ¶ 30, 
72 P.3d 803, 814 (Wyo. 2003) (holding that "if the evidence supports a finding 
that a reasonable jury could conclude [the appellant] intentionally inflicted 
physical injury upon [the child], recklessness is established").  The verdict form indicates the jury 
found Mr. Sanchez guilty of second degree murder which requires that he acted 
purposefully and maliciously.  It 
follows necessarily that Mr. Sanchez also acted recklessly.  "[I]f the crime can be committed 
recklessly, it is no less committed if the actor acted purposely."  Simmons, 2003 WY 84, ¶ 30, 72 P.3d  at 
813-814.  In addition, the two 
crimes were properly merged for sentencing.  We find no error.

  

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶52]   For the foregoing reasons, we 
affirm the Judgment and Sentence entered by the district 
court.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1There were 
no allegations of methamphetamine use in this case.

  

2Neither of 
the exhibits provided by Mr. Sanchez with his motions for change of venue 
reflects the media reporting his case in conjunction with other homicides 
involving the use of methamphetamine.

 
 

3Three of 
those initial twelve were excused for cause - not because of an inability to set 
aside information that had been seen or heard in the media, but because of 
preformed opinions due to the nature of the allegations and the characteristics 
of the victim.