Title: Ruiz v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

116 Del. C. § 4753A(a)(2)(b).
216 Del. C. § 4751(a).
316 Del. C. § 4755(a)(5).
411 Del. C. § 512(1).
516 Del. C. § 4771. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
JUAN RUIZ,
§
No. 463, 2002
§
    
Defendant Below,
§
Appellant,
§
Court Below:  Superior Court of 
§
the State of Delaware in and for
              v.
§
New Castle County
§
STATE OF DELAWARE,
§
Cr.A. Nos: IN01-03-1132
§
IN01-03-1133
Plaintiff Below,
§
IN01-03-1134
Appellee.
§
IN01-03-1135
§
IN01-03-1136
Submitted: January 16, 2003
Decided:
April 1, 2003
 Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and HOLLAND, Justices.
ORDER
This 1st day of April 2003, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties it
appears to the Court that:
(1)
Appellant, Juan Ruiz, was convicted by a jury of trafficking in cocaine
of 50-100 grams,1 possession with intent to deliver cocaine,2 maintaining a dwelling,3
second degree conspiracy,4 and possession of drug paraphernalia.5  Ruiz now appeals
his convictions.
2
(2)
In early February 2001, the police received a complaint that some
individuals were conducting drug sales out of apartment B of 527 South Jackson
Street, in Wilmington.  Pursuant to the information, the police began to conduct
surveillance of the apartment.
(3)
Detective Curry of the police department testified that while he was
conducting surveillance of the apartment building he witnessed several people
attempting to enter apartment B and finding it locked.  He then saw appellant, Juan
Ruiz, unlock the door to apartment B and enter it.  Shortly thereafter several
individuals entered the apartment, remained a few minutes, and left.  Ruiz, at one
point, also came out of apartment B and used a key to enter another apartment,
apartment C.
(4)
On the evening of February 21 officers again observed Ruiz enter
apartment B with a key.  As before, several individuals then entered the apartment
after Ruiz arrived, remained for a few moments and left.  The police then participated
in a controlled buy of crack cocaine from apartment B.  After the buy, the police
obtained a warrant to search both apartments.
(5)
The police executed the search warrant on February 24.  Just before the
execution of the warrant police conducted surveillance of Ruiz, and a co-conspirator,
3
Tulio Para.  Both men arrived at and entered apartment B together.  Ruiz then left
apartment B and entered apartment C.  Afterwards he left the building in his car.
(6)
After Ruiz left in his car the police executed the search warrant.  A search
of apartment B revealed over fifty bags of cocaine.  A subsequent search of apartment
C yielded over four hundred pieces of a white chunky substance, a digital scale, clear
plastic bags, and several razor blades.
(7)
Ruiz was later apprehended in his vehicle.  No drugs were found on his
person or in his car.  He was subsequently indicted on charges of trafficking in
cocaine of 50-100 grams, possession with intent to deliver cocaine, maintaining a
dwelling, second degree conspiracy, and possession of drug paraphernalia.  Jury trial
began on February 26, 2002.  On March 1, 2002, the jury found Ruiz guilty of all
counts.  Ruiz now appeals.
(8)
On appeal Ruiz contends the trial court made two errors.  First he argues
that the trial court erred by permitting the State to discuss in its opening statement and
case-in-chief details about his activity prior to his arrest.  Second he asserts that the
trial court erred by denying his motion for mistrial where the State’s witness made
reference to a “Dominican Operation.”  We will address each issue in turn.
(9)
Ruiz first contends that the trial court erred by permitting the State to
introduce evidence, in its opening statement and case-in-chief, of the drug activity that
6Howard v. State, 549 A.2d 692, 693 (Del. 1988).
7Delaware Rule of Evidence 404(b) states, “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.”  The rule, however, provides a list of
exceptions.
4
occurred on February 19, 2001, prior to his arrest.  The State argues that the trial court
properly admitted the evidence.  This Court reviews for abuse of discretion the trial
court’s admission of evidence.6
(10)
During pre-trial proceedings Ruiz argued against the State’s use of
evidence of his alleged drug activity on February 19, 2001.  He asserted that the
evidence was inadmissible as a violation of Delaware Rule of Evidence 404(b).7  The
trial court, however, disagreed with Ruiz and admitted the evidence for two reasons.
First, the court found that the evidence was relevant to the elements of the charge of
conspiracy without raising issue with Rule 404(b).  The court also found the evidence
was inextricably intertwined with the State’s case.  In the alternative, the court ruled
that the evidence was admissible as evidence of intent, plan, and preparation under
404(b).  Each ruling of the court will be examined separately.
(11)
Delaware Rule of Evidence 402 states that, “All relevant evidence is
admissible, except as otherwise provided by statute or by these rules or by other rules
8DEL. R. EVID. 402.
9DEL. R. EVID. 403.
10Leasure v. State, 385 A.2d 730, 731 (Del. 1978).
11Pope v. State, 632 A.2d 73, 76 (Del. 1993).
5
applicable in the courts of this State.”8  Relevant evidence may be excluded, however,
if its probative value is outweighed by the fact that it is cumulative.9
(12)
In Ruiz’s case, the trial court believed the evidence was highly probative
and necessary because it helped the State prove the elements of conspiracy.
Conspiracy requires that the State prove that the defendant acted with the intention to
promote or facilitate the commission of an offense.10  Ruiz was not present at the
apartments when he was arrested.  Thus it was necessary to show that he had been at
the apartments with Para when drugs were being sold.  The court did not err in finding
the evidence of the activity on February 19 was proof of the conspiracy charge and
relevant to the State’s case.
(13)
The trial court also found the evidence was inextricably intertwined with
the case.  This Court has held a court may consider the inextricably intertwined
doctrine only after it has considered the admissibility of the evidence pursuant to the
exceptions set forth in 404(b).11  In light of the fact that the court did not believe
404(b) applied, it examined whether the evidence was inextricably intertwined with
12Id.
13DEL. R. EVID. 404(b).
6
the case.  This examination was conducted, however, after the trial court first
determined whether 404(b) applied.  The court’s analysis then was proper.
(14)
A trial judge may admit evidence under the inextricably intertwined
doctrine only for the purposes of avoiding the confusion which would be caused by
excluding the evidence.  The evidence is admitted only after the prejudicial effects of
its inclusion have been weighed.12
(15)
The court found the evidence of the prior acts was inextricably
intertwined with the State’s case because it demonstrated the motive the police
officers had for engaging in a controlled buy and subsequently obtaining a search
warrant.  It also indicated why the police officers arrested Ruiz who was not at the
apartment when the police executed the warrant.  Thus the court’s finding that the
evidence was inextricably intertwined was also correct.
(16)
In the alternative the trial court argued the evidence was admissible
because it met with the exceptions to Rule 404(b).  Rule 404(b) states that evidence
of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the person committed the
charged offense.13  Admission of such evidence is allowed, however, for other
14Id.
15Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726, 730 (Del. 1988).
16Id. citing Diaz v. State, 508 A.2d 861, 865 (Del. 1986).
17Id. at 731.
7
purposes including, “proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity or abuse of mistake or accident.”14
(17)
In Getz v. State, this Court held that Rule 404(b) forbids the proponent
of evidence of prior bad acts from offering the evidence to support a general inference
of bad character.15  This Court ruled, however, that “evidence of prior misconduct is
admissible when it has ‘independent logical relevance’ and when its probative value
is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”16  The evidence of
the prior bad act must be logically related to the material facts of the case.17
(18)
Getz sets forth guidelines for trial courts to use in determining whether
evidence of prior bad acts is admissible.  The guidelines are:  (1) the evidence must
be material to an issue or ultimate fact in dispute in the case; (2) the evidence must be
introduced for a purpose allowed under Rule 404(b) or any other purpose not
inconsistent with the basic prohibition against evidence of bad acts; (3) the other
crimes must be proved by evidence which is plain, clear and conclusive; (4) the other
crimes must not be too remote in time from the current charged offense; (5) the court
must balance the probative value of such evidence against its unfairly prejudicial
18Id. at 734.
19Deshields v. State, 706 A.2d 502, 506-07 (Del. 1998).
8
effect as required under Rule 403; and (6) the jury should be instructed concerning the
purpose for the admission of the evidence.18
(19)
Trial courts are also given nine factors to consider when balancing the
probative value of the evidence against any prejudicial effect as required in the fifth
Getz guideline.  These factors are:  (1) the extent to which the point to be proved is
disputed; (2) the adequacy of proof of the prior conduct; (3) the probative force of the
evidence; (4) the proponent’s need for the evidence; (5) the availability of less
prejudicial proof; (6) the inflammatory or prejudicial effect of admission of the
evidence; (7) the similarity of the prior wrong to the current charged offense; (8) the
effectiveness of limiting instructions; and (9) the extent to which prior act evidence
would elongate the proceedings.19
(20)
The trial court in Ruiz’s case applied both Getz and DeShields in its
analysis.  First, the court found that the evidence was material to issues of
fact—namely that of the conspiracy, the intent to deliver, and possession charges.
Second, the court found that the evidence satisfied several of the exceptions of 404(b)
because it demonstrated plan and preparation.  The third factor the court found
somewhat troubling but ultimately concluded that the evidence was plain, clear and
9
conclusive because other case law finds that eyewitness testimony of prior drug
dealings is sufficient to show intent for 404(b) purposes.  Fourth, the other crimes
occurred only a couple of days prior to the offenses at issue.  Fifth, the court found the
evidence was highly probative.  Finally, the court insured Ruiz that if he requested a
jury instruction one would immediately be given.
(21)
In balancing the probative value against the prejudicial effect the court
applied the DeShields factors.  The court first found that the evidence was probably
going to be disputed by Ruiz.  Second, the court ruled that the proof of the prior
conduct, in this case the testimony of the police officers conducting surveillance, was
adequate.  Third, the court found the probative value of the evidence was high because
it proved the elements of conspiracy and intent to deliver.  Fourth, the court believed
the State needed the evidence to prove the charges of conspiracy and intent to deliver.
Fifth, the court found that Ruiz did not offer less prejudicial proof and that none was
available.  Sixth, the court did not believe the evidence was prejudicial or
inflammatory.  The court, in analyzing the seventh factor, found that the evidence was
related but that the similarity did not foreclose against admission.  With respect to the
eighth factor the court believed the jury would be able to abide by a limiting
instruction.  Finally, the court did not believe the evidence would prolong the
proceedings.
20Taylor v. State, 690 A.2d 933, 935 (Del. 1997).
21Dawson v. State, 637 A.2d 57, 62 (Del. 1994) quoting Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1069, 1077 (Del. 1987).
22Id. citing Sawyer v. State, 634 A.2d 377, 380 (Del. 1993).
23Taylor, 690 A.2d at 935.
10
(22)
The court did not err by admitting the evidence of Ruiz’s alleged drug
activity of February 19, 2001.  The evidence was relevant to proving the charge of
conspiracy and intent to deliver and it was inextricably intertwined with the State’s
case.  Alternatively the evidence met some of the exceptions listed in 404(b).
Accordingly, no abuse of discretion occurred.
(23)
Ruiz raises a second issue on appeal concerning the trial court’s denial
of his motion for mistrial after a detective made reference to a “Dominican Operation”
in his testimony.  The State argues the trial court’s curative instruction properly cured
any prejudice and that a mistrial was not warranted.  We review for abuse of
discretion a trial judge’s denial of a motion for mistrial after an outburst by a
witness.20
(24)
A mistrial is necessary only when there are “‘no meaningful and practical
alternatives.’”21  Any prejudice that occurs from an outburst will normally be cured
by the trial judge’s instructions to the jury.22
(25)
When evaluating whether a witness’ outburst was so prejudicial that
denying a motion for mistrial was error this Court considers four factors.23  First, the
24Id.
25Trial Record at 7.
26Id. at 7-8.
11
Court examines the nature, persistency, and frequency of the witness’ outburst.  Then
we consider whether the outburst created a likelihood that the jury was misled or
prejudiced.  Third, we examine the closeness of the case.  Finally, this Court considers
the trial court’s attempts to mitigate any prejudice.24
(26)
In this instance Detective Michael Rodriguez testified for the State.
During his direct examination the State asked, “[W]hat did you do with regard to
executing the search warrant, to start out with?”25  To this the witness replied, “We
had information that it was a Dominican operation.”26  After the witness’ response the
prosecutor asked the question again.  Ruiz then asked the judge to approach the bench
where he requested that the detective’s comment be stricken from the record.
(27)
After considering the question and answer the court found the answer
was unresponsive to the question.  The prosecutor agreed and replied that it was for
this reason that she had asked the question again.  The court then informed Ruiz and
the State that it was going to strike the question and answer from the record.  It also
instructed the jury that, “[A]ny matter that’s stricken, you should not give it any
27Id. at 9.
28The trial court does point out that the jury is probably not aware that Ruiz is not Dominican.  It also indicates,
however, that the jurors are probably not aware, as some members of the criminal justice system are, that some
Dominican persons engage in drug trafficking. 
12
weight or consideration whatsoever.”27  Subsequent to the State’s close of its case
Ruiz requested a mistrial.
(28)
An analysis of the four factors draws the conclusion that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by failing to grant a mistrial.  First, the witness made one
comment.  It was not repeated or persistent in any matter.  Second, the witness’
outburst probably did not mislead or prejudice the jury.  It was not in response to the
State’s question and really did not have much to do with the matter.  Furthermore,
Ruiz is not Dominican.  Although this does not excuse the comment, it does support
the fact that it was probably not that prejudicial.28  Third, this was not a close case.
The State presented the eyewitness testimony of the police officers and admitted the
videotape of the surveillance of the apartments.  Finally, the judge did issue a curative
instruction informing the jury they were not to consider or give weight to the witness’
comment.
(29)
A motion for mistrial is a severe remedy, reserved only for those
instances where the prejudice cannot be cured in any other way.  The instruction given
by the trial judge here accurately cured any prejudice the statement may have caused.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to grant a mistrial.
13
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ E. Norman Veasey
      Chief Justice