Title: STATE ex rel. DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVICES v. COLCLAZIER

State: oklahoma

Issuer: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Document:

STATE ex rel. DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVICES v. COLCLAZIER  STATE ex rel. DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVICES v. COLCLAZIER 1997 OK 134 950 P.2d 824 68 OBJ 3526 Case Number: 89356 Decided: 10/28/1997 Supreme Court of Oklahoma STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ex rel, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE JERRY COLCLAZIER DISTRICT JUDGE, McCLAIN COUNTY, STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Respondent. APPLICATION TO ASSUME ORIGINAL JURISDICTION; PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION. ¶0Petitioner seeks relief from an order of the Honorable Jerry Colclazier, District Judge, McClain County, Oklahoma, in a juvenile proceeding, which directed petitioner to move a deprived child, in the custody of petitioner, out of a foster home located approximately 100 miles away and to place the deprived child in a foster home in closer proximity to the child's home; and a subsequent order which directed petitioner to provide foster care expenses for the deprived child after the court removed the child from the custody of petitioner. APPLICATION TO ASSUME ORIGINAL JURISDICTION GRANTED; PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Diane File, Assistant General Counsel, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for petitioner. Carl Franklin, Norman, Oklahoma, for the mother. Charles N. Gray, Purcell, Oklahoma, for the deprived child. ALMA WILSON, Justice: [950 P.2d 825] ¶1 We grant petitioner's application to assume original jurisdiction to address two questions: 1) Whether the district court may direct changes in the placement, care and treatment of a child adjudicated deprived and placed in the custody of the Department of Human Services under the Oklahoma Children's Code; ¶2 In this original proceeding, petitioner, the Department of Human Services (DHS), seeks relief from two separate orders entered by the Honorable Jerry Colclazier, District Judge, District Court in McClain County, Oklahoma, in a juvenile proceeding styled In the Matter of J.U., An Alleged Deprived Child, No. JFJ-95-63. The orders direct DHS to move the deprived child from the care of foster parents who reside some 100 miles away from the child's home and place the child in another foster home nearer in proximity to her home and to pay foster care expenses. ¶3 The juvenile proceedings below began when J.U. was removed from her mother's custody by DHS in August, 1995, because her mother was hospitalized for mental health reasons. J.U., an alleged deprived child, was placed in a foster home where she remained until December, 1996, when DHS placed J.U. and her new-born brother in a foster-adoptive home at a location more than 100 miles away. ¶4 At the disposition hearing had on April 16, 1997, attorneys for the mother, the child, and the state, jointly, requested that five year old J.U. be removed from the foster-adoptive home as soon as the move could be effected with the least amount of anxiety to J.U. The court heard evidence tending to show that the foster-adoptive parents' behavior was not supportive of the ordered visitation and reunification plan and that the foster-adoptive parents had refused to transport J.U. for psychiatric and therapy services ordered by the court, and expert testimony that a change in placement is warranted where the foster home environment is contrary to reunification efforts, even though [950 P.2d 826] change in placement increases the risk of attachment disorders. The court determined that removal from the remote foster-adoptive home to a foster home located in McClain County or Cleveland County would be in the best interest of J.U. The court ordered DHS to change the foster home placement and approved a treatment plan designed to meet the goal of reunification of J.U. and her mother as required by statute. ¶5 On April 22, 1997, the district court granted a stay of its April 16 ¶6 DHS contends the April 16 I. The Order of April 16, 1997 ¶7 Title 10 O.S.Supp.1996, §7003-7.1(B)(1), as amended by 1997 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 386, §7, B. 1. If the child is placed in the custody of the Department of Human Services, whether in emergency, temporary or permanent custody, the Department shall determine the appropriate placement of the child. However, under no circumstances may the Department of Human Services return a child to a parent that contributed to the child being deprived due to abuse or neglect, without prior approval of the court. Any change in the placement of a child adjudicated to be deprived shall be in accord with the provisions of subsection B of Section 7003-5.4a of this title. (Emphasis added.) ¶8 DHS relies on the emphasized language for the proposition that it has placement authority at every stage of the juvenile [950 P.2d 827] proceedings ¶9 Statutory interpretation is not necessary where legislative intent is clear from a literal reading of the statute. [950 P.2d 828] ¶10 The district court's continuing authority over children adjudicated deprived is implicit in the scheme of the Children's Code: Custody orders are entered and periodically reviewed by the court guided by the "best interest of the child" standard; Department with authority to consent to the adoption of the child, and the jurisdiction of the committing court shall terminate upon final decree of adoption. . . ." [950 P.2d 829] ¶11 DHS' reading of §7003-7.1(B)(1) as vesting it with exclusive authority over placement of children in its custody diminishes the purpose and utility of numerous parts of the Oklahoma Children's Code that assure to all interested persons the availability of the courts for the protection of the child. Further, a forced meaning of exclusive placement authority assigned to the language of §7003-7.1(B)(1) "whether emergency, temporary or permanent custody, the Department shall determine the appropriate placement" would render superfluous the plain language of §7003-5.5(E) that the court shall vest DHS with "placement authority" when the court places "permanent custody" with DHS. ¶12 DHS' duty and authority to determine placement are expressly confined by the guidelines in §§7003-5.3 and 7004-1.1, for determination of individual treatment and service plans, and subjected to approval, disapproval, or modification by order of the district court in §§ 7003-5.5 and 7003-5.6 disposition and review proceedings. Accordingly, we conclude that DHS has the duty to determine the appropriate placement of a deprived child in its custody, in the first instance, which the district court will either approve or disapprove, according to the best interests of the child standard until the district court has terminated parental rights and placed permanent custody with DHS or until the child is no longer a ward of the court. ¶13 The district court had the statutory duty to order a program that would allow J.U.'s mother an opportunity for reunification and the authority to protect the order from non-compliance. The order of April 16, 1997, directing DHS to move J.U. from the remote foster-adoptive home to a foster home nearer in proximity to her home was not an excessive exercise of judicial power. DHS' request for writ of prohibition as to the April 16 II. The Order of May 29, 1997 ¶14 DHS makes a tenuous argument that the May 29 ¶15 In this matter, the district court removed custody of J.U. from DHS and placed her in a foster home approved by DHS. Without determining that DHS has the responsibility to provide foster care payments under the circumstances, the district court summarily ordered DHS to make the payments. Foster care payments may be available for the care of J.U. provided by the authorized foster home in which the court placed the child. However, the district court must determine that DHS has payment responsibility before it may order DHS to make foster care payments. The order was in error. Accordingly, we issue a writ of prohibition. ¶16 The Honorable Jerry Colclazier, District Judge, McClain County, Oklahoma, is hereby prohibited from enforcing the order directing DHS to provide foster care payments and clothing vouchers entered May 29, 1997, in the juvenile proceeding styled In the Matter of J.U., An Alleged Deprived Child, No. JFJ-95-63. [950 P.2d 830] APPLICATION TO ASSUME ORIGINAL JURISDICTION GRANTED; PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. SUMMERS, V.C.J., HODGES, HARGRAVE, WILSON, and WATT, JJ., concur. KAUGER, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part. SIMMS, J., dissents in part. LAVENDER and OPALA, JJ., dissent. FOOT