Title: Wilkins v. Peninsula Motor Cars

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
GERALD G. WILKINS 
 
 
                                  OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 022983                 JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
          October 31, 2003 
PENINSULA MOTOR CARS, INC. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 
Edward L. Hubbard, Judge 
 
 
In his suit against Peninsula Motor Cars, Inc. 
(“Peninsula”), a jury awarded Gerald G. Wilkins (“Wilkins”) 
enhanced damages of $12,000, a sum conceded by Peninsula to 
represent the trebling of $4,000 in actual damages under the 
Virginia Consumer Protection Act, Code §§ 59.1-196 to -207 
(“VCPA”).  By agreement of the parties, the issue of 
attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Code § 59.1-204(B) was 
reserved for determination by the trial court and was later 
fixed at $34,183.  Also, in his claim for common law fraud, 
the jury awarded Wilkins $1,862.86 in actual damages and 
$100,000 in punitive damages.  In this appeal, we consider 
whether the trial court erred in requiring Wilkins to elect 
between his remedies. 
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
On March 30, 1999, Gerald Wilkins purchased a 1998 BMW 
540I from Peninsula.  An employee of Peninsula represented to 
Wilkins that the car was new despite the fact that the car’s 
odometer had recorded 972 miles.  In fact, the car had been 
previously titled and was considered a used car. 
Wilkins discovered Peninsula’s misrepresentations when he 
received the title to the car in the mail.  Wilkins brought an 
action against Peninsula for fraud, violation of the VCPA, and 
violation of the federal Odometer Act.  After the close of 
evidence, the trial court struck the Odometer Act claim. 
After the jury returned the verdict and in response to a 
motion by Peninsula, the trial court required Wilkins to elect 
between the two verdicts.  The trial court explained that 
Wilkins had “advanced two alternative theories of recovery 
based on a single transaction or occurrence” and ruled that 
allowing Wilkins to receive both verdicts would permit a 
double recovery for his loss. 
Wilkins conceded that receiving both $100,000 punitive 
damages for the fraud claim and the additional $8000 above 
actual damages for his claim under the VCPA would constitute a 
double recovery.  He also conceded that receiving both 
$1,862.86 under the fraud claim and $4000 of the $12,000 
enhanced damages under the VCPA claim would constitute double 
recovery of actual damages. However, Wilkins maintained that 
no election between the two verdicts should be required and 
that he should receive $4,000 in compensatory damages, 
$100,000 in punitive damages, and the attorney’s fees 
 
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associated with his VCPA claim.  The trial court held that by 
“awarding damages under the VCPA and the plaintiff’s fraud 
cause of action, the jury essentially compensated the 
plaintiff and punished the defendant twice.”  Wilkins appeals 
the adverse judgment of the trial court requiring his election 
between verdicts based upon separate causes of action. 
II.  Analysis 
 
The issue before us involves a question of law.  We 
review de novo the trial court’s determination that Wilkins 
was required to elect between his verdicts.  Eure v. Norfolk 
Shipbldg. & Drydock Corp., 263 Va. 624, 631, 561 S.E.2d 663, 
667 (2002). 
 
The genus of election of remedies has many species. This 
case is not about claims that are irreconcilable, such as a 
claim for rescission of the contract accompanied by a claim 
for specific performance.  Nor does this issue involve 
questions of election between remedies at law or in equity.  
The only election of remedies issue presented in this case is 
whether the bar against double recovery justifies the trial 
court’s requirement that Wilkins elect between verdicts.  We 
had previously stated that the trial court must assure that a 
verdict, while fully and fairly compensating a plaintiff for 
loss, does not include duplicative damages.  Tazewell Oil Co. 
v. United Virginia Bank, 243 Va. 94, 113, 413 S.E.2d 611, 621-
 
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22 (1992).  While the precise circumstances presented by this 
case have not been addressed in Virginia, the principles 
resolving the matter are not unfamiliar. 
 
In determining whether multiple damage awards constitute 
impermissible double recovery, the trial court must consider 
the nature of the claims involved, the duties imposed and the 
injury sustained.  Advanced Marine Enterprises v. PRC Inc., 
256 Va. 106, 124, 501 S.E.2d 148, 159 (1998).  In Advanced 
Marine, the trial court had entered judgment of treble damages 
on a claim pursuant to Code § 18.2-499 and -500 for conspiracy 
to injure plaintiff in its reputation, trade, business or 
profession.  Additionally, the trial court had entered 
judgment for punitive damages on three separate counts 
involving “breach of fiduciary duty, intentional interference 
with contractual relations, and intentional interference with 
prospective business and contractual relations.”  Id.  
Concluding on appeal that the awards were not duplicative, we 
stated: 
The awards of punitive and treble damages were 
based on separate claims involving different 
duties and injuries. . . . To prevail in its 
business conspiracy claim, PRC was required to 
prove that the defendants combined, associated, 
agreed, or acted in concert together for the 
purpose of willfully and maliciously injuring 
PRC in its business “by any means whatever.” 
Code § 18.2-499. In contrast the [other claims] 
do not require such proof and relate solely to 
the employment relationship between PRC and the 
 
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PRC Managers and employees.  Thus, the 
chancellor did not err in awarding PRC both 
punitive and treble damages. 
Id. at 124-25, 501 S.E.2d at 159. 
However, when the claims, duties, and injuries are the 
same, duplicative recovery is barred.  In Moore v. Virginia 
Int’l Terminals, 254 Va. 46, 49, 486 S.E.2d 528, 529 (1997), 
we affirmed the right of an injured worker to seek 
compensation under either or both the federal Longshore Act 
and the state workers’ compensation statutes, but “[t]he 
claimant, however, is entitled to only a single recovery for 
his injuries.” 
 
Unlike the circumstances presented in Advanced Marine, 
the causes of action brought by Wilkins have the potential for 
duplication of damages.  However, Wilkins concedes that he is 
only entitled to one award of compensatory damages, one award 
of exemplary damages, and one award of attorney’s fees.  He 
does not seek a judgment for the actual damages awarded in the 
VCPA claim in addition to the actual damages awarded in the 
fraud claim.  He maintains that the trebled portion of the 
verdict under the VCPA is in the nature of exemplary or 
punitive damages and does not seek recovery of that portion of 
the award in addition to the punitive damage award.* Wilkins 
                     
* Consequently, we are not presented with the issue 
whether the enhanced damages under the statutory conspiracy 
 
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argues that judgment should be entered in his favor for $4,000 
actual damages (from the VCPA claim), $100,000 punitive 
damages (from the fraud claim), and $34,183 in attorney’s fees 
and costs (ancillary to the VCPA claim).  Acknowledging that 
the trial court was required to assure that there was not 
duplicative recovery, he argues that the trial court erred in 
requiring him to elect between his verdicts based upon the 
different causes of action.  We agree with Wilkins. 
 
This case does not present irreconcilable causes of 
action which would require Wilkins to elect between them.  
Rather, this case involves causes of action with different 
elements of proof and potentially duplicative damage awards.  
In these circumstances, Wilkins is entitled to full and fair 
compensation but not duplicative compensation.  The trial 
court erred in requiring Wilkins to choose between causes of 
action, when all that was required was supervision of the 
damage awards to avoid double recovery. 
 
Additionally, Peninsula argues that an award of 
attorney’s fees and costs under the VCPA is duplicative of 
punitive damages.  The plain language of the statute defeats 
this argument.  Code § 59.1-204(B) clearly states, 
                                                                
claim are duplicative of the punitive damages in the fraud 
claim. See United Laboratories, Inc. v. Kuykendall, 437 S.E.2d 
374 (N.C. 1993). 
 
 
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“Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, 
in addition to any damages awarded, such person also may be 
awarded reasonable attorney’s fees and court costs.”  
Peninsula suggests that such language was intended to apply 
only to damages awarded under the VCPA and does not apply to 
circumstances where damages are awarded for an independent 
cause of action.  First, damages were awarded under the VCPA 
in this case.  Second, if the General Assembly had intended 
such a restrictive view of a remedial statute, such an effect 
could have been evinced by plain language. See, e.g., City of 
Richmond v. Richmond Metro. Auth., 210 Va. 645, 648, 172 
S.E.2d 831, 833 (1970); Greenberg v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 
594, 600, 499 S.E.2d 266, 270 (1998); Barr v. Town & Country 
Props., Inc., 240 Va. 292, 295, 396 S.E.2d 672, 674 (1990). 
 
Additionally, the purpose of the attorney’s fees and 
costs provision is different from the purpose of punitive 
damages.  Punitive damages are designed to punish offensive or 
unlawful conduct and deter it in the future.  Flippo v. CSC 
Assocs., 262 Va. 48, 58, 547 S.E.2d 216, 222 (2001).  The fee 
shifting provisions of the VCPA are designed to encourage 
private enforcement of the provisions of the statute. 
 
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial 
court and remand with directions to enter judgment for Wilkins 
in the amount of $138,183 plus an award of reasonable 
 
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attorney’s fees and costs for successfully prosecuting this 
appeal. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
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