Title: State ex rel. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Henson

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Henson, 96 Ohio St.3d 33, 2002-Ohio-2851.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT, 
v. HENSON, JUDGE, ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Henson, 96 Ohio St.3d 33, 
2002-Ohio-2851.] 
Prohibition — Writ sought to prevent common pleas court judge from exercising 
jurisdiction over a reformation claim in a pending breach-of-contract 
common pleas court action — Mandamus sought to compel common 
pleas court judge to comply with two previous decisions involving the 
same parties and to strike or dismiss the pending common pleas court 
action — Court of appeals’ dismissal of complaints affirmed. 
(No. 2001-1711 — Submitted February 26, 2002 — Decided July 10, 2002.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Richland County, Nos. 01-CA-46 and 01-
CA-47. 
__________________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
{¶1} 
On April 1, 1994, appellant, Nationwide Mutual Insurance 
Company (“Nationwide”), terminated an agency agreement it had with appellee 
Hamilton Insurance Services, Inc., which had been incorporated by appellee Neil 
Hamilton.1 
{¶2} 
Hamilton filed an action in the Richland County Court of Common 
Pleas, alleging that Nationwide had wrongfully terminated the agency agreement.  
In his complaint, Hamilton alleged that the termination was a breach of contract 
because the agency could be terminated only for just cause.  Hamilton also 
alleged a reformation claim, i.e., that if the agency agreement authorized 
                                          
 
1. 
Appellees Neil Hamilton and Hamilton Insurance Services, Inc. are collectively referred 
to as “Hamilton” in this opinion. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Nationwide to terminate Hamilton’s agency without cause, the agreement should 
be reformed to reflect the intent of the parties that the agency could be terminated 
only for cause. 
{¶3} 
At trial, the common pleas court presented the breach-of-contract 
claim to a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of Hamilton.  The common pleas 
court adopted the jury verdict and additionally determined that Hamilton was 
entitled to certain post-termination payments.  On appeal, the court of appeals 
affirmed the judgment of the court of common pleas.  Hamilton Ins. Serv., Inc. v. 
Nationwide Ins. Cos. (Jan. 14, 1998), Richland App. Nos. 97-CA-27 and 97-CA-
42, 1998 WL 518137.  On further appeal, we reversed the judgment of the court 
of appeals and held that Nationwide did not breach the terms of the agency 
agreement when it terminated the contract in April 1994 because the 
unambiguous agreement was terminable with or without cause.  Hamilton Ins. 
Serv., Inc. v. Nationwide Ins. Cos. (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 270, 274-275, 714 
N.E.2d 898 (“Hamilton I”).  We ordered that a “mandate be sent to the Court of 
Common Pleas of Richland County to carry the judgment into execution.” 
{¶4} 
On remand, Hamilton filed a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from 
judgment in which he sought to proceed on his reformation claim.  On March 13, 
2000, the common pleas court granted the Civ.R. 60(B) motion and permitted the 
reformation claim to go forward.  On appeal, the court of appeals, in a two-to-one 
decision, reversed the judgment of the common pleas court.  Hamilton Ins. Serv., 
Inc. v. Nationwide Ins. Cos. (Oct. 19, 2000), Richland App. No. 00 CA 18, 2000 
WL 1591094 (“Hamilton II”). We did not accept the discretionary appeal.  
(2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 1449, 742 N.E.2d 146.  The court of appeals held that 
Civ.R. 60(B) could not be used to modify or vacate a judgment of a superior court 
and that “[e]ven if” it could be employed in this manner, “the matter is now res 
judicata and Hamilton cannot maintain his action for reformation.”  Id. at 9. 
January Term, 2002 
3 
{¶5} 
One day following the court of appeals’ judgment in Hamilton II 
and before this court had denied jurisdiction, on October 20, 2000, Hamilton filed 
a complaint in the Richland County Court of Common Pleas against Nationwide 
to refile his reformation claim.  In its answer and motion for summary judgment, 
Nationwide claimed that Hamilton’s reformation action was barred by res 
judicata, i.e., that Hamilton I and Hamilton II precluded the claim.  On May 25, 
2001, appellee Judge James D. Henson of the common pleas court denied 
Nationwide’s motion for summary judgment because it was “undisputed that 
Hamiltons’ reformation claim has yet to be adjudged on the merits by this or any 
other trial court” and that neither the court of appeals nor the Supreme Court 
intended to preempt the common pleas court’s jurisdiction over this claim. 
{¶6} 
On June 20, 2001, Nationwide filed complaints in the Court of 
Appeals for Richland County.  Nationwide requested a writ of prohibition to 
prevent Judge Henson from exercising jurisdiction over the reformation claim in 
the pending common pleas court action and a writ of mandamus to compel Judge 
Henson to comply with Hamilton I and Hamilton II and strike or summarily 
dismiss Hamilton’s pending common pleas court action.  Judge Henson filed an 
answer, and Hamilton filed motions for leave to intervene as respondents and 
answers.  On August 17, 2001, the court of appeals entered judgment dismissing 
Nationwide’s complaints on the basis that Nationwide had “an adequate remedy 
at law by way of appeal.” 
{¶7} 
This cause is now before the court upon Nationwide’s appeal as of 
right as well as its request for oral argument. 
Oral Argument 
{¶8} 
Nationwide requests oral argument in this appeal because the issue 
raised “is sufficiently important to the maintenance of the system of inferior and 
superior courts in Ohio to warrant” argument and oral argument “may assist” the 
court to better comprehend the parties’ history of litigation.  But this case involves 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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neither a matter of great public importance nor complex facts.  We have resolved 
comparable claims without the necessity of oral argument.  See, e.g., State ex rel. 
Crandall, Pheils & Wisniewski v. DeCessna (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 180, 652 
N.E.2d 742, and State ex rel. Willacy v. Smith (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 47, 676 
N.E.2d 109.  And the parties’ briefs are sufficient to resolve this appeal.  State ex 
rel. Painesville v. Lake Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 566, 569, 757 
N.E.2d 347.  Therefore, we deny Nationwide’s request for oral argument and 
proceed to consider the merits of its appeal. 
Prohibition and Mandamus 
{¶9} 
Nationwide asserts that the court of appeals erred in dismissing its 
complaints for extraordinary relief in prohibition and mandamus because Judge 
Henson disregarded the mandates of this court in Hamilton I and of the court of 
appeals in Hamilton II. 
{¶10} The court of appeals held that the writs would not issue because 
appellant had an adequate legal remedy by appeal.  Neither prohibition nor 
mandamus will issue if Nationwide has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course 
of law.  State ex rel. Kreps v. Christiansen (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 313, 316, 725 
N.E.2d 663.  In the absence of a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a 
court having general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own 
jurisdiction, and a party challenging that jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by 
appeal.  State ex rel. Shimko v. McMonagle (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 426, 428-429, 
751 N.E.2d 472. 
{¶11} To the extent that Nationwide asserts res judicata as a basis for 
extraordinary relief, res judicata does not divest a trial court of jurisdiction to 
decide its applicability, and the denial of this defense by the trial court can be 
adequately challenged by post-judgment appeal.  State ex rel. Whiteside v. Fais 
(2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 463, 464, 746 N.E.2d 1113; State ex rel. Miller v. Reed 
(1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 159, 160, 718 N.E.2d 428. 
January Term, 2002 
5 
{¶12} Finally, the cases cited by Nationwide are inapposite.  Those cases 
generally involve either a patent and unambiguous disregard of a superior court 
mandate, see, e.g., Heck, 72 Ohio St.3d 98, 647 N.E.2d 792, a continuing and 
vexatious abuse of judicial process with duplicative proceedings in multiple 
jurisdictions, State ex rel. Stark v. Summit Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1987), 31 
Ohio St.3d 324, 31 OBR 599, 511 N.E.2d 115 (four separate lawsuits in three 
different courts), or the use of res judicata to bar a defense in a mandamus action 
to appoint a board member, State ex rel. Cleveland Hts. v. Cuyahoga Metro. 
Hous. Auth. (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 47, 553 N.E.2d 249.  None of these 
circumstances is present here. 
{¶13} Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals correctly held that 
Nationwide has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to raise its 
claims.2  These remedies include appeal, see, e.g., Shimko, 92 Ohio St.3d 426, 751 
N.E.2d 472, and Miller, 87 Ohio St.3d 159, 718 N.E.2d 428, and a motion for 
contempt.  See, generally, State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts. (2001), 93 Ohio 
St.3d 1, 4, 752 N.E.2d 854, quoting Hunt v. Westlake City School Dist. Bd. of 
Edn. (1996), 114 Ohio App.3d 563, 568, 683 N.E.2d 803 (“in general ‘[t]he use of 
mandamus to enforce a judgment is not popular and widespread because other 
avenues of enforcement [e.g., motion for contempt] are readily available’ ” 
[bracketed insert added in Hunt]).  Because Judge Henson does not patently and 
unambiguously lack jurisdiction over Hamilton’s reformation claim, Nationwide 
is not entitled to the requested extraordinary relief in prohibition and mandamus.  
Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
                                          
 
2. 
By so holding, we need not consider Judge Henson’s claim that the issuance of the writs 
would violate the Open Courts Clause of Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.  State ex 
rel. Dillery v. Icsman (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 312, 318, 750 N.E.2d 156, fn. 1 (courts decide 
constitutional issues only when absolutely necessary). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
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Arter & Hadden, L.L.P., and Irene C. Keyse-Walker; Lutz & Oxley and 
Fred M. Oxley, for appellant. 
 
James J. Mayer, Jr., Richland County Prosecuting Attorney, and John 
Randolph Spon, Jr., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee Judge James D. 
Henson. 
 
Inscore, Rinehardt, Whitney & Enderle and Larry L. Inscore, for appellees 
Hamilton Insurance Services, Inc., and Neil Hamilton. 
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