Title: DeLEARY v ANACONDA ALUM CO

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12977 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1975 JERRY L, DeLEARY , Claimant and Respondent, -vs - ANACONDA A L U M I N U M COMPANY, Employer and Defendant and Appellant, Appeal from: District Court of the Eleventh J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Robert C. Sykes, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellant : Warden, Walterskirchen and Christiansen, K a l i s p e l l , Montana M e r r i t t N. Warden argued, K a l t s p e l l , Montana For Respondent : Robert W. Gabriel argued, Great F a l l s , Montana Filed: 8 C T 2 5 1975 Submitted: September 8, 1975 Decided : Qcr 2 st 1975 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This appeal is taken from a judgment entered i n the d i s t r i c t court, Flathead County. The Anaconda Aluminum Company (hereinafter referred t o a s employer) takes issue with the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s award of benefits t o claimant J e r r y L. DeLeary. The injury involved occurred on August 26, 1971, when claimant, employed by Anaconda Aluminum Company a t i t s reduction works a t Columbia F a l l s , Montana, slipped on a catwalk which resulted i n molten aluminum entering h i s l e f t shoe, severely burning h i s lower l e f t leg. Claimant was treated immediately by a l o c a l physician and l a t e r by a p l a s t i c surgery s p e c i a l i s t from Spokane, Washington. The s p e c i a l i s t performed two operations t o eradicate scars and a l l e v i a t e scar contraction, one i n February 1972, t h e second i n December 1972. Claimant chose not t o return t o h i s former employment and so n o t i f i e d the employer on May 5, 1972. Several months prior t o t h a t notice claimant obtained employment a t a f i l l i n g s t a t i o n where he began t o earn approximately $600 per month. H e remained there u n t i l September 1973, when he entered i n t o a program a s an appren- t i c e mechanic earning about $500 per month. A l l p a r t i e s agreed t h a t throughout t h i s period claimant experienced a t l e a s t a substantial degree of pain and discomfort from the i n j u r i e s and t h a t h i s leg t i r e d e a s i l y when he stood upon it f o r any length of time. The employer paid temporary t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y benefits from t h e date of t h e accident t o t h e date t h a t it was n o t i f i e d of claimant's in- tention not t o return. Employer was not aware claimant had gone t o work on another job i n March 1972. A t a hearing held i n Play 1974 before a hearing examiner of the workmen's Compensation Division t o determine whether any additional compensation was warranted, medical testimony from three physicians was taken. A MLssoula orthopedist gave a r a t i n g of 20% impairment of the lower extremity; a ECalispell orthopedist rated the impairment a t 15% of the leg below the knee. The p l a s t i c surgery s p e c i a l i s t from Spokane t e s t i f i e d and rated t h e impairment a s t h a t which would be equal t o a below the knee amputation. How- ever, the record shows t h a t t h e out of s t a t e physician based h i s opinion on the current practice i n t h e s t a t e of Washington, which admittedly does not employ the same system used i n the s t a t e of Montana. The Division hearing resulted i n an award of an additional 60 weeks a t a r a t e of $50 per week, l e s s the sum deemed overpaid during the healing period, which the examiner thought was limited t o 26 weeks under section 92-709, R.C.M. 1947. Claimant petitioned f o r a rehearing before the Division. O n September 13, 1974, following rehearing, an amended order was issued which s l i g h t l y modified the prior order. Claimant was deemed e n t i t l e d t o temporary p a r t i a l benefits and permanent p a r t i a l benefits which amounted t o $2359.28, approximately $20 more than the f i r s t order. Additionally the modified order dekted t h a t p a r t of the f i r s t order which provided f o r a set-off from the amount paid during the healing period i n excess of the 26 week limitation, holding t h a t t h i s limitation applied only t o t h e "loss of a member" under the s t a t u t e . From t h i s order of September 13, 1974, claimant appealed t o the d i s t r i c t court. W e note here t h a t no further evidence was taken or a l l o t ~ e d a t the rehearing since the p a r t i e s stipulated rehearing could be had on the b a s i s of the record before the division. The d i s t r i c t court considered additional evidence sub- mitted a t i t s hearing, but took under advisement the employer's objection t o the submission of t h i s evidence. The court, i n i t s findings of f a c t and conclusions of law, sustained the employer's objection and based i t s decision on the record made before t h e ~orlunen's Compensation Division. Specifically, the d i s t r i c t court granted claimant the following compensation: I ) Workmen's Compensation benefits pursuant t o section 92-706, R.C.M. 1947. 2) Temporary p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y benefits pursuant t o section 92-703, R.C.M. 1947, f o r a t o t a l of 31 and 6/7 weeks a t the r a t e of $23.07 l e s s per week than what claimant earned a t the time of injury. 3) Temporary t o t a l benefits pursuant t o section 92-709, R.C.M. 1947, f o r i n j u r i e s t o the lower l e f t extremity f o r a t o t a l of 150 weeks amounting t o $7,500 l e s s the 2% discount provided f o r by section 92-715, R.C.M. 1947, l e s s the sum of $1,900 already awarded and paid t o claimant. The underlying i s s u e i s whether the d i s t r i c t court may award a s t a t u t o r y benefit f o r functional impairment i n addition t o a l o s s ofearning capacity. O n appeal t h e employer places two issues before t h i s Court. F i r s t , t h i s Court i s asked whether the d i s t r i c t court erred by f a i l i n g t o correct the Division regarding i t s deletion of t h a t part of the hearing examiner's order dealing with the payments made i n excess of the 26 week s t a t u t o r y limitation. A t the time of the d i s t r i c t court hearing the employer, f o r the f i r s t time, raised the i s s u e of t h e temporary p a r t i a l award of $459.28 under section 92-703, R. C.PI. 1947. The d i s t r i c t court refused t o consider o r r u l e on t h i s matter, due t o claimant's timely objection pointing out t h e employer's f a i l u r e t o cross appeal from the ~ i v i s i o n ' s order re- garding t h i s issue. See: Rule 29(d), 1i.R.App.Civ.P. and section 92-829, R.C.M. 1947. W e find no reason t o disturb t h i s ruling on appeal. Second, the employer contends the d i s t r i c t court acted improperly, i n t h a t i t s actions were beyond the scope of review s t a t u t o r i l y imposed upon a d i s t r i c t court which functions a t the appellate level. W e agree. This Court on numerous occasions has ruled conclusively disposing of t h i s question. The function of the d i s t r i c t court i n appeals from the Workmen's Compensation Division i s t o examine the Division's findings of f a c t and con- clusions of law. These findings and conclusions a r e presumed t o be correct and a r e not reversible i f supported by credible evidence. Under section 92-834, R.C.M. 1947, the d i s t r i c t court must deter- mine : "Jc + : * whether o r not, t h e board regularly pursued i t s authority and whether or not the findings of the board ought t o be sustained, and whether o r not such findings a r e reasonable under a l l the circumstances of the case. 11 See: Hurlbut v. Vollstedt Kerr Company, M o n t . , 538 P.2d 344, 32 St.Rep. 752, 755; Birnie v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 134 Mont. 39, 328 P.2d 133. Th.e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s findings of f a c t , conclusions of law and judgment i n the i n s t a n t matter present an unusual s i t u a - tion. N o reference i s made t o the findings of f a c t and award made by the blorkmen's Compensation Division. Thus i t makes no attempt t o correct e r r o r s i n law or findings of f a c t based on i n s u f f i c i e n t credible evidence. The r e s u l t i s a completely new s e t of findings of f a c t and conclusions of law which t o t a l l y ignore the proceedings taken a t t h e administrative level. This action by the d i s t r i c t court seems apparently t o be based on two assumptions: 1) That the Division f a i l e d t o consider claimant's functional impairment i n terms of t h e d i s a b i l i t y , thereby depriving him of an award based on h i s future earning capacity; and 2) That under t h e authority of Jones v. Claridge, 145 Mont. 326, 400 P.2d 888, claimant was e n t i t l e d t o an award which, a t l e a s t i n p a r t , takes t h a t factor i n t o consideration. Thus the d i s t r i c t court, i n e f f e c t , exercised i t s assumed discretion i n an area where the Division admittedly refused t o a c t . In Jones t h i s Court i n t h e s p i r i t of l i b e r a l construction I 1 and under a given s e t of circumstances" held that an award f o r loss of prospective future earnings r e s u l t i n g from permanent p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y may be proper under section 92-709, R.C.M. 1947. However, an examination of what those circumstances might be, or t h e i r a p p l i c a b i l i t y t o t h i s particular case, i s a determina- t i o n we need not make. Section 92-834, R.C.M. 1947, allows the d i s t r i c t court t o amend, modify, o r reverse the actions of the workmen's Compen- sation Division only i f i t finds those actions unsupported by credible evidence o r unreasonable under a l l the circumstances of the case. Here, the d i s t r i c t court modified the ~ i v i s i o n ' s order on one hand, while s p e c i f i c a l l y adopting contrary findings and conclusions on the other. Thus the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s judgment was inconsistent and legally improper i n the context of the s t a t u t e i n t h a t a f t e r awarding t h e statutory benefit f o r functional i m - pairment it granted an additional amount f o r loss of earning capacity not authorized by s t a t u t e . Here, the f a c t s do not support the conclusions of law of the d i s t r i c t court. The judgment of the d i s t r i c t court i s reversed. The order of the ~ o r k m e n ' s Compensation Division upon rehearing i s reinstated. I , I I i 1 Justices