Title: Jane Hausman v. St. Croix Care Center

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-0866 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Jane Hausman and Karen Wright,  
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants- 
 
Petitioners, 
 
v. 
St. Croix Care Center,  
 
Defendant-Respondent.  
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 
207 Wis. 2d 402, 558 N.W.2d 893 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1996) 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
December 19, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
October 8, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Pierce 
 
JUDGE: 
Robert W. Wing 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there 
were briefs by Carol N. Skinner, Peter M. Reinhardt and Bakke 
Norman, S.C., New Richmond and oral argument by Carol N. Skinner. 
 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief 
by Maureen A. Molony, John M. Loomis, Katherine L. Williams, and 
Beck, Chaet, Loomis, Molony & Bamberger, S.C., Milwaukee and oral 
argument by Katherine L. Williams. 
 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by William P. 
Donaldson for the Wisconsin Board on Aging and Long Term Care, 
Madison. 
 
 
Amicus curiae was filed by Betsy J. Abramson for 
the Elder Law Center of the Coalition of Wisconsin Aging Groups, 
Madison. 
 
 
Amicus curiae was filed by Timothy G. Costello, 
Mark A. Johnson, and Krukowski & Costello, S.C., Milwaukee for 
the Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce. 
 
No. 96-0866 
 
1 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-0866 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Jane Hausman and Karen Wright,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants- 
          Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
St. Croix Care Center,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent.  
 
FILED 
 
DEC 19, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   Plaintiffs Jane Hausman and 
Karen Wright seek review of a published court of appeals' 
decision affirming a circuit court order that dismissed the 
plaintiffs' suit for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted.1  The plaintiffs, discharged employees of the 
defendant, St. Croix Care Center, Inc. ("St. Croix"), first 
assert that the facts as alleged conform to the established 
public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.  In 
the alternative, the plaintiffs ask this court to broaden the 
public policy exception.  The plaintiffs also argue that Wis. 
                     
1  See Hausman v. St. Croix Care Center, 207 Wis. 2d 402, 
558 N.W.2d 893 (Ct. App. 1996)(affirming order of Circuit Court 
for Pierce County, Robert W. Wing, Judge). 
No. 96-0866 
 
2 
Stat. § 50.07(1)(e)(1993-94)2 provides an implied private right 
of action for retaliatory discharge.   
¶2 
We reject the plaintiffs' claims that the facts as 
alleged fit within the existing public policy exception and we 
decline to adopt a broad whistle-blower exception.  However, we 
recognize that the plaintiffs' compliance with an affirmative 
legal duty requiring them to take action to prevent abuse or 
neglect of nursing home residents comports with a well-defined 
public policy and the rationale of our public policy exception 
to the employment-at-will doctrine.  Accordingly, we apply the 
public policy exception to the allegations here and conclude 
that the trial court erred in granting St. Croix's motion to 
dismiss.  Therefore, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
¶3 
St. Croix, a private nursing home facility in St. 
Croix County, Wisconsin, employed the plaintiffs, Jane Hausman 
and Karen Wright.  Wright, a licensed nurse, worked as St. 
Croix's Resident Care Coordinator, while Hausman, a licensed 
social worker, was the Director of Social Services at St. Croix. 
 Both women were also members of a five-person interdisciplinary 
care team at St. Croix charged with ensuring that St. Croix 
provided appropriate and sufficient care to its residents. 
¶4 
In late 1992, Hausman, Wright, and two other members 
of the care team became concerned that certain residents of St. 
                     
2 Unless 
otherwise 
indicated, 
all 
future 
statutory 
references are to the 1993-94 volumes.  
No. 96-0866 
 
3 
Croix's nursing home were not receiving appropriate care.  These 
concerns included: patients falling from beds and suffering 
injuries, staff members failing to respond to residents' calls 
for help, disrespectful treatment of patients, improper diets, 
and a failure by St. Croix to investigate injuries to residents. 
Hausman and Wright approached St. Croix's director of nursing, 
also a member of the interdisciplinary care team, about these 
concerns.3  No action was taken. 
¶5 
Undeterred by the nursing home's lack of reaction, 
Hausman and Wright approached St. Croix's administrators in 
1993.  Once again, St. Croix failed to act to alleviate Hausman 
and Wright's fears of abuse and neglect.  Hausman and Wright 
then moved beyond filing internal complaints.  Instead, the 
plaintiffs contacted the Regional Ombudsman, the state officer 
entrusted 
by 
statute 
with 
the 
duty 
of 
identifying, 
investigating, and resolving complaints made by or on behalf of 
                     
3 Wis. Stat. § 940.295(3) states in pertinent part: 
ABUSE AND NEGLECT; PENALTIES. (a) Any person in charge 
of or employed in any facility or program . . . who 
does any of the following, or who knowingly permits 
another person to do so, may be penalized under par. 
(b): 
1. 
 
Intentionally 
abuses 
or 
intentionally 
neglects a patient or resident. 
2.  Recklessly abuses or recklessly neglects a 
patient or resident. 
 
Punishment for failure to act, be it through reporting or 
taking some other form of action, ranges from a Class B 
misdemeanor to a Class D felony. 
No. 96-0866 
 
4 
providers of nursing home care.4  After an investigation, the 
Regional Ombudsman concluded that "areas of concern" existed at 
St. Croix.  Hausman asked the Regional Ombudsman to request an 
investigation of St. Croix by the Bureau of Quality Compliance. 
 Hausman also contacted the relatives of some of St. Croix's 
residents and ultimately approached St. Croix's Board of 
Directors. 
¶6 
The Bureau of Quality Compliance investigated St. 
Croix's facilities beginning in July 1993.  The Bureau concluded 
its investigation without issuing any citations, and without 
interviewing any of the four members of the interdisciplinary 
team who brought forward concerns of alleged abuse or neglect. 
The Board of Directors of St. Croix also took no action to 
address the plaintiffs' concerns. 
¶7 
St. Croix suspended Hausman in late June 1993, pending 
investigation of a disciplinary matter involving a nursing 
assistant.  She was terminated by St. Croix two weeks later, 
allegedly for unprofessional conduct and breach of confidence.  
                     
4 42 U.S.C. § 3058(g) declares that the Regional Ombudsman 
shall investigate and resolve complaints that are made by or on 
behalf of residents that relate to actions or omissions that 
adversely affect the health, safety, welfare or rights of 
nursing home residents. 
In addition, Wis. Stat. § 16.009(4)(a) states in pertinent 
part:  
The [Board of Aging and Long Term Care] shall operate 
the office [of the Long Term Care Ombudsman] in order 
to carry out the requirements of the long-term care 
ombudsman program under 42 U.S.C. 3027(a)(12)(A) and 
42 U.S.C. 3058f to 3058h.  
No. 96-0866 
 
5 
She was never interviewed about the disciplinary matter.  St. 
Croix also terminated Wright three months later, on ten minutes 
notice, claiming budgetary constraints. 
¶8 
Hausman and Wright filed suit in the circuit court, 
alleging a private right of action under Wis. Stat. § 50.07,5 
wrongful termination through breach of public policy, negligent 
misrepresentation, 
and 
strict 
responsibility 
for 
misrepresentation.  The circuit court dismissed the plaintiffs' 
suit for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted.6 
                     
5 Wis. Stat. § 50.07 states in pertinent part: 
(1) No person may: 
 
(e) 
Intentionally 
retaliate 
or 
discriminate 
against any resident or employe for contacting or 
providing information to any state official, or for 
initiating, participating in, or testifying in an 
action 
for 
any 
remedy 
authorized 
under 
this 
subchapter. 
 
(2) Violators of this section may be imprisoned 
up to 6 months or fined no more than $1,000 or both 
for each violation. 
 
6 The plaintiffs also filed a complaint with the Department 
of Industry, Labor and Job Development, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 46.90.  Wis. Stat. § 46.90(4) states in pertinent part: 
(a) 1. Any person may report to the county agency 
that he or she believes that abuse, material abuse or 
neglect has occurred if the person is aware of facts 
or circumstances that would lead a reasonable person 
to believe or suspect that abuse . . . has occurred.  
 
(b) 1. No employer may discharge or otherwise 
discriminate against any person for reporting in good 
faith under this subsection. 
No. 96-0866 
 
6 
¶9 
The plaintiffs appealed.  Affirming the circuit court, 
the court of appeals held that a private right of action does 
not exist under Wis. Stat. § 50.07.  The court of appeals also 
held that the facts as alleged by the plaintiffs did not meet 
the requirements of Wisconsin's established wrongful discharge 
public policy exception and that it lacked the authority to 
apply the public policy exception to the plaintiffs' wrongful 
termination claim.  Finally, the court of appeals held that the 
plaintiffs' 
allegations 
did 
not 
state 
a 
claim 
for 
misrepresentation.7  
¶10 Dismissal for failure to state a claim is a question 
of law which we determine de novo.  See Watts v. Watts, 137 Wis. 
2d 506, 512, 405 N.W.2d 305 (1987).  In conducting our analysis, 
we must accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint as 
well as all reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts. 
 See id.  Accordingly, for purposes of our review, we accept as 
true the plaintiffs' allegations that they were terminated in 
retaliation for reporting their suspicions of abuse to the 
Regional Ombudsman.  Since the complaint is to be liberally 
construed, we may dismiss the claim only if it is "quite clear 
                                                                  
An administrative law judge dismissed the complaint because 
the plaintiffs reported their concerns to the state, instead of 
to a county agency.  The decision was affirmed by the Labor and 
Industry Review Commission as well as the circuit court of Dane 
County, Mark J. Frankel, Judge.  See Order, Case No. 96CV798, 
entered May 6, 1997. 
7 The plaintiffs do not appeal the court of appeals' 
dismissal of their misrepresentation claims.  
No. 96-0866 
 
7 
that under no conditions can the plaintiff recover."  Evans v. 
Cameron, 121 Wis. 2d 421, 426, 360 N.W.2d 25 (1985). 
¶11 The question of whether compliance with an affirmative 
legal command that causes an employee to report abuse of nursing 
home residents constitutes an exception to the employment-at-
will doctrine is one which this court has not previously faced. 
 To resolve this issue, we must reexamine the employment-at-will 
doctrine, survey the breadth of the narrow public policy 
exception to the doctrine, and determine whether the case at 
hand falls within its requirements.  In the event that it does 
not, we must consider whether applying the public policy 
exception to include individuals who comply with a legal 
obligation to prevent abuse of nursing home residents by 
reporting certain information comports with our prior case law.  
¶12 The employment-at-will doctrine is an established 
general tenet of workplace relations in this jurisdiction.  See 
Prentiss v. Ledyard, 28 Wis. 131, 133 (1871); Brockmeyer v. Dun 
& Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983).  Where 
applicable, the doctrine generally allows an employer to 
discharge an employee "for good cause, for no cause, or even for 
cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal 
wrong."  Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 567. 
¶13 However, the right to summarily fire an employee is 
not all-pervasive.  In the past we have recognized that there 
are instances in which application of the employment-at-will 
rule would lead to injustice.  "A wrongful discharge is 
actionable when the termination clearly contravenes the public 
No. 96-0866 
 
8 
welfare and gravely violates paramount requirements of public 
interest."  Id. at 573.  Accordingly, "an employee has a cause 
of action for wrongful discharge when the discharge is contrary 
to a fundamental and well-defined public policy as evidenced by 
existing law."  Id.; see also Wis. J.I.-Civil 2750. 
¶14 The Brockmeyer court discovered such fundamental and 
well-defined public policy in constitutional and statutory 
provisions.  See Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 573.  However, 
public 
policy 
statements 
that 
give 
rise 
to 
a 
wrongful 
termination 
action 
do 
not 
arise 
solely 
from 
explicit 
constitutional or legislative statements.  In Wandry v. Bull's 
Eye Credit Union, 129 Wis. 2d 37, 384 N.W.2d 325 (1986), we 
acknowledged 
that 
a 
plaintiff 
could 
find 
public 
policy 
foundations for a wrongful termination suit in "the spirit as 
well 
as 
the 
letter" 
of 
constitutional 
and 
legislative 
provisions.  Winkelman v. Beloit Memorial Hosp., 168 Wis. 2d 12, 
21, 483 N.W.2d 211 (1992)(discussing Wandry).  Moreover, in 
Winkelman, we determined that public policy could also be 
evinced by an administrative rule. 
¶15 Cognizant of the far reaching implications of holding 
that an employee's termination for acting in accordance with 
general 
public 
policy 
was 
actionable 
under 
the 
wrongful 
discharge doctrine, we expressly limited the scope of the policy 
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine in Bushko v. Miller 
Brewing Co., 134 Wis. 2d 136, 396 N.W.2d 167 (1986).  In Bushko 
we concluded that a discharge of an at-will employee only 
invokes the public policy exception where the employee is 
No. 96-0866 
 
9 
terminated for refusing a command, instruction, or request of 
the employer to violate public policy as established in existing 
law.  See id. at 142; see also Kempfer v. Automated Finishing, 
Inc., 211 Wis. 2d 100, 110-111, 564 N.W.2d 692 (1997).  
Accordingly, where an employee voluntarily undertakes acts 
consistent with public policy, "he does no more than obey the 
law.  Such consistent action, without an employer's command to 
do otherwise, is merely 'praiseworthy' conduct."  Bushko, 134 
Wis. 2d at 142.  
¶16 It is uncontested by the parties to this suit that the 
plaintiffs have identified a fundamental and well-defined public 
policy of protecting nursing home residents from abuse and 
neglect.  This policy is demonstrated in part by Wis. Stat. 
§ 50.07(1)(e) which prohibits a nursing home from retaliating 
against an employee who provides information regarding abuse or 
neglect to a state official, and by Wis. Stat. § 46.90(4)(b) 
which prohibits an employer from discharging an employee for 
reporting abuse or neglect of a resident to a county agency.  We 
also find the public policy of protecting nursing home residents 
to be present in Wis. Stat. § 940.295(3)'s imposition of 
criminal penalties on workers who knowingly permit abuse or 
neglect to occur. 
¶17 Accordingly, the question then becomes whether the 
plaintiffs can comport their claim for wrongful termination in 
violation of public policy with Bushko's dictates that the 
employee must violate an express command, instruction, or 
request to violate that public policy.  We conclude that the 
No. 96-0866 
 
10
narrow public policy exception laid out in Bushko does not 
encompass the plaintiffs' claim.  Despite counsel's attempts at 
oral argument to cast the facts of this case as something in the 
nature of an "implicit command" not to report abuse, we remain 
unpersuaded.  While St. Croix's termination of Hausman and 
Wright might be viewed as an implicit command to other employees 
not to report abuse or neglect, such an argument does not allow 
the plaintiffs herein to avail themselves of the existing public 
policy exception as defined by Bushko.  There was no command, 
request, or instruction.   
¶18 We are thus squarely faced with the plaintiffs' 
request in the alternative that we redefine the public policy 
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine to include actions 
for wrongful termination based on particular whistle-blowing 
activities of a discharged employee.  Other jurisdictions have 
recognized an inclusive whistle-blower exception on the grounds 
that "[p]ublic policy requires that citizens in a democracy be 
protected from reprisals for performing their civil duty of 
reporting 
infractions 
of 
rules, 
regulations, 
or 
the 
law 
pertaining to public health, safety, and the general welfare."  
Palmer v. Brown, 752 P.2d 685 (Kan. 1988); see also Moyer v. 
Allen Freight Lines, 885 P.2d 391 (Kan. App. 1994); Palmateer v. 
Int'l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 1981). 
¶19 Admittedly, adoption of such a wide-ranging whistle-
blower 
exception 
would 
advance 
the 
public 
interest 
by 
encouraging employees in diverse industries to report conduct 
that threatens the public's health, safety, and welfare.  Such a 
No. 96-0866 
 
11
wide extension of existing law by this court, however, would be 
contradictory to our established precedent. 
¶20 We 
have 
explicitly 
rejected 
such 
wide-ranging 
application of the public policy exception to scenarios like 
that in Palmer where the terminated individual was merely 
engaging in praiseworthy conduct consistent with public policy, 
not complying with an affirmative legal obligation.  See Bushko, 
134 Wis. 2d at 145.  The focus of our inquiry in the past has 
been not just on the public interest, but also on the valid 
interests presented by employers and employees.  As we noted in 
Brockmeyer: 
 
We 
believe 
that 
the 
adoption 
of 
a 
narrowly 
circumscribed 
public 
policy 
exception 
properly 
balances the interests of employees, employers and the 
public. 
 
Employee 
job 
security 
interests 
are 
safeguarded against employer actions that undermine 
fundamental policy preferences.  Employers retain 
sufficient 
flexibility 
to 
make 
needed 
personnel 
decisions . . . . Finally, the public is protected 
against frivolous lawsuits since courts will be able 
to screen cases on motions to dismiss for failure to 
state 
a 
claim 
or 
for 
summary 
judgment 
if 
the 
discharged employee cannot allege a clear expression 
of public policy. 
Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 574.  Thus, we reject application of 
a broad whistle-blower exception. 
¶21 However, while we refuse to adopt a broad whistle-
blower exception, our examination of the public policy exception 
is not complete.  The situation presented here is one we have 
not faced previously.  Wisconsin law imposes an affirmative 
obligation upon the plaintiffs to act to prevent suspected abuse 
or neglect of nursing home residents.  One such appropriate 
No. 96-0866 
 
12
action under this legal obligation is to report the abuse or 
neglect.  See Wis. Stat. § 940.295(3).  Had the plaintiffs 
failed to report their concerns, they could be subject to 
criminal prosecution. 
¶22 The plaintiffs' compliance with the specific legal 
mandate in this instance goes beyond mere "conduct [that] was 
praiseworthy or [conduct] that the public may derive some 
benefit from." Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 574 (citing Palmateer 
v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 883 (Ill. 
1981)).  While their actions were not in violation of a Bushko 
command, their actions were in response to a more significant 
legal command, one imposed by the legislature to further promote 
the strong public policy of protecting nursing home residents. 
¶23 Moreover, the concerns voiced in Brockmeyer arguing 
against a broad public policy exception do not lie with respect 
to conduct such as that engaged in by the plaintiffs.  The 
employer's personnel decisions are not impermissibly interfered 
with by a requirement that the employer not retaliate against an 
employee complying with the dictates of a fundamental public 
policy statement.  It is the duty statute enacted by the 
legislature, not any relief for wrongful discharge attached 
thereto by this court, that legitimately burdens the employer.  
In addition, applying the public policy exception to an 
employee's report of nursing home resident abuse or neglect will 
not open every termination decision by an employer to court 
scrutiny. 
 
The 
well-defined 
public 
policy 
of 
protecting 
residents of nursing homes and the affirmative obligations 
No. 96-0866 
 
13
placed upon nursing home employees are sufficiently certain to 
allow courts to easily identify covered cases. 
¶24 The 
public 
is 
also 
adequately 
protected 
if 
an 
employee's compliance with a legal command is protected by the 
public policy exception.  Because wrongful termination actions 
based on such an affirmative legal obligation would be easily 
identifiable, courts would be able to continue to screen out 
frivolous cases on summary judgment while still protecting well-
defined public policies. 
¶25 Finally, the interests of employees would continue to 
receive the same level of protection from wrongful termination. 
 By applying the public policy exception to the situation 
presented here, employees would be relieved of the onerous 
burden of choosing between equally destructive alternatives: 
report and be terminated, or fail to report and be prosecuted.  
Accordingly, while employees would gain an added level of 
protection 
to 
facilitate 
the 
public 
interest, 
the 
added 
safeguard would not extend to "merely praiseworthy conduct."  
¶26 For these reasons, we conclude that the public policy 
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine may apply beyond 
the four corners of Bushko.  The public policy of protecting 
nursing home residents from abuse is fundamental and well-
defined.  Where the law imposes an affirmative obligation upon 
an employee to prevent abuse or neglect of nursing home 
residents and the employee fulfills that obligation by reporting 
the 
abuse, 
an 
employer's 
termination 
of 
employment 
for 
fulfillment of the  legal obligation exposes the employer to a 
No. 96-0866 
 
14
wrongful termination action. In such instances, the employee may 
pursue a wrongful termination suit under the public policy 
exception regardless of whether the employer has made an initial 
request, command, or instruction that the reporting obligation 
be violated.8   
¶27 Having acknowledged that a wrongful discharge claim is 
actionable here, we turn to consideration of the defendant's 
claim that a wrongful discharge action should not survive where 
the legislature has already provided a remedy.  In Brockmeyer, 
we noted that "we are well aware that the legislature has 
enacted a variety of statutes to prohibit certain types of 
discharges," and that "[w]here the legislature has created a 
statutory remedy for a wrongful discharge, that remedy is 
exclusive."  Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 576, n.17; see also 
Yanta v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 66 Wis. 2d 53, 59-60, 224 N.W.2d 
389 (1974). 
¶28 Pointing to this language in Brockmeyer, the defendant 
asserts that the plaintiffs' cause of action for wrongful 
discharge in this case is barred by Wis. Stat. 50.07(2), which 
punishes employers for the wrongful termination of reporting 
                     
8 Because we find the plaintiffs have a claim upon which 
relief can be granted pursuant to the public policy exception to 
the employment-at-will doctrine, we do not reach the plaintiffs' 
claims that a private right of action exists under Wis. Stat. 
§ 50.07.  
No. 96-0866 
 
15
employees with up to six months in jail.9  In the defendant's 
view, the legislature has entrusted the State with the duty of 
deterring and punishing discharges that occur due to an 
employee's report of neglect or abuse, so individual civil 
actions are inappropriate. 
¶29 We disagree.  A criminal penalty is no remedy to the 
terminated employee.  While the State may choose to prosecute 
individual defendants for wrongful discharge, thus providing 
society with a remedy, the terminated employee who fulfilled the 
statutory obligation and reported suspected abuse remains just 
that: terminated.  Absent application of the wrongful discharge 
public policy exception, such an individual has no recourse to 
regain a former position or receive redress for a wrongful 
termination.  The criminal sanction provision of Wis. Stat. 
§ 50.07 is a penalty levied against violating employers, not a 
remedy for these plaintiffs, and is thus insufficient to bar the 
plaintiffs' cause of action.    
¶30  The plaintiffs' compliance with the legal command in 
Wis. Stat. § 940.295(3) requiring them to take action to prevent 
abuse or neglect of nursing home residents comports with the 
public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.  
Moreover, absent application of the public policy exception, the 
plaintiffs 
are 
without 
remedy 
for 
wrongful 
termination.  
                     
9 We also find no merit in the defendant's argument that we 
should withhold relief because a bill that addresses the 
statutes at issue in this case has been proposed to the 
legislature.   
No. 96-0866 
 
16
Accordingly, the plaintiffs have met the threshold requirement 
of stating a claim upon which relief can be granted and the 
circuit court erred in dismissing their claims.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
 
 
1