Title: HOOS v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

HOOS v. STATE2003 WY 10175 P.3d 609Case Number: 00-224Decided: 08/26/2003
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                            

 

BRUCE 
HOOS,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Niobrara County

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Dion 
J. Custis, Cheyenne, Wyoming

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Georgia L. Tibbetts, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN*, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

GOLDEN, 
J., delivers the opinion of the court; LEHMAN, J., files a 
dissenting opinion

 

* 
Chief Justice at time of expedited conference

 

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]           
In 
this appeal, the primary issue we must consider is whether the presence of the 
alternate juror for a brief forty minutes during jury deliberations presents 
reversible error.  Appellant Bruce 
Hoos was convicted for one count of conspiracy to commit livestock rustling and 
challenges the presence of the alternate as a constitutional violation.  He presents other issues; however, we 
agree that the presence of the alternate juror during deliberations warrants 
reversal and is dispositive of this appeal.  

 

[¶2]      We 
reverse and remand for a new trial on one count of conspiracy to commit 
livestock rustling.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      Hoos 
and the State agree on the following statement of issues:

 

I.  Whether the trial court violated Wyoming 
Rules of Criminal Procedure 24 (e) and appellant's constitutional right to a 
fair jury when it allowed an alternate juror in the jury room during 
deliberations?

 

a.       
Did 
the trial court abuse its discretion and commit reversible error when it denied 
Appellant's motion for a mistrial?

 

II.  Whether there was sufficient evidence to 
convict appellant of conspiracy without substantial 
evidence?

 

III.  Whether the prosecution engaged in 
misconduct when he admitted inadmissible evidence to jury knowing that the 
evidence was improper 404(b) and 608 evidence?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      Tally 
Sharpe and Joseph Merante, college friends of Hoos' son, claimed they were 
recruited by Hoos to steal horses to sell to him.  The two stole five horses from a Lusk, 
Wyoming, rancher and sold them to Hoos for $1,500.00.   Hoos sold one of the stolen horses at a 
public auction.  The purchaser of 
the horse was the Lusk rancher from whom the horses had been stolen.  The sale prompted a police investigation 
during which Hoos told authorities that he had raised the horses, but he later 
admitted that he had bought the horses from Sharpe and Merante.  Sharpe and Merante provided police with 
confessions implicating Hoos in a conspiracy to steal horses.  Hoos was charged and tried for accessory 
before the fact in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-402(e) and conspiracy to 
commit livestock rustling in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-303 and § 
6-4-402(c). 

 

[¶5]      Before 
trial, Hoos requested notice of W.R.E. 404(b) and W.R.E. 608 evidence that was 
not received and filed a motion in limine to prohibit the State from introducing 
prior misconduct evidence.  The 
record shows that a pretrial order was entered prohibiting the State and its 
witnesses from mentioning prior drug usage and/or prior convictions involving 
the defendant.  At trial, during 
Hoos' cross-examination, the State asked whether he had been fired as a brand 
inspector twenty years earlier for making out false expense vouchers.  Hoos' objection to the line of 
questioning was sustained, and further questioning was prohibited; however, his 
motion for mistrial was denied.  

 

[¶6]      At 
the close of trial, the alternate juror retired with the rest of the jury to the 
jury room for deliberations.  Forty 
minutes later, the jury notified the trial court that the alternate juror had 
not been dismissed.  The court 
instructed the bailiff to notify the jury to stop deliberating and gave counsel 
two alternatives: either stipulate to a thirteen person jury or bring the jury 
back, discharge the alternate juror, and issue an instruction to the remaining 
jurors to disregard anything said by the alternate.  Hoos objected and moved for a mistrial 
based on the error.  The trial court 
denied the motion and instructed the jury to disregard the alternate juror's 
input and returned them to the jury room for further deliberations.  The instruction given 
stated:

 

For 
the rest of you, ladies and gentlemen, I am going to ask that you return to the 
jury room and deliberate and decide this case without any regard to [the 
alternate's juror's input].  If she 
participated, and we don't know whether she participated and had input in your 
deliberations at this point or not, but if she did, I will ask you to reconsider 
all of that deliberation without her input. 

 

 [¶7]     The 
jury returned a verdict acquitting Hoos' on the accessory charge but convicting 
for the conspiracy.  This appeal 
followed.   

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶8]      On 
appeal, Hoos contends that the trial court's failure to ascertain the extent of 
the alternate's input into the deliberations requires reversal and remand for a 
new trial because either (1) it is error per se; (2) the State failed to show 
the absence of prejudice; or (3) the trial court's instruction failed to 
properly instruct the jurors to begin deliberations anew.  This argument presents a question of law 
that we review de novo.

 

[¶9]      Hoos 
focuses his argument on the plain language of W.R.Cr.P. 24(e), which 
provides:

 

Alternate 
jurors. 
-- The court may direct that not more than six jurors in addition to the regular 
jury be called and impanelled to sit as alternate jurors.  Alternate jurors in the order in which 
they are called shall replace jurors who, prior to the time the jury retires to 
consider its verdict, become or are found to be unable or disqualified to 
perform their duties.  Alternate 
jurors shall be drawn in the same manner, shall have the same qualifications, 
shall be subject to the same examination and challenges, shall take the same 
oath and shall have the same functions, powers, facilities and privileges as the 
regular jurors.  An alternate 
juror who does not replace a regular juror shall be discharged after the jury 
retires to consider its verdict.

 

(emphasis 
added).

 

[¶10]   We 
have previously decided that with proper procedural safeguards, an alternate 
juror who has been discharged may subsequently replace a juror although the jury 
has begun deliberations.  Alcalde 
v. State, 2003 WY 99, ¶10.    
This case requires that we determine the prejudicial effect of a trial 
court's failure to dismiss an alternate juror as required by Rule 24.  The rule is modeled after an early 
version of the federal rule of criminal procedure1 and contains the same language that 
the United States Supreme Court has noted is mandatory.  United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 737, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1779, 123 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1993).  Generally, our approach to such an 
instance is to look to federal case law for guidance in the interpretation of 
our rule of criminal procedure where the state and federal rules of criminal 
procedure are similar.  Brock v. 
State, 981 P.2d 465, 469 (Wyo. 1999).

 

[¶11]   Olano 
examined whether a federal appeals court had properly applied the plain error 
review standard where attorneys had consented to the presence of an alternate 
during jury deliberations.  The 
Court noted that a judge's failure to abide by the strictures of Rule 24(c) 
violates the cardinal principle that the deliberations of the jury shall remain 
private and secret in every case.  Olano, 507 U.S.  at 737, 113 S. Ct.  at 
1779.  Although defense attorneys 
had consented to the alternate's presence and the trial court had instructed the 
jurors that the alternate was not to participate in the deliberations in any 
fashion, the Court held that the right to a jury free from outside influence 
cannot be waived.  Id.  

 

[¶12]   Olano 
recognized that the presence of alternate jurors during jury deliberations might 
prejudice a defendant specifically or presumptively either because the 
alternates actually participated in the deliberations, verbally or through "body 
language," or because the alternates' presence exerted a "chilling" effect on 
the regular jurors.  Id. at 
739, 113 S. Ct.  at 1780.  Olano's particular facts did not 
require it to presume prejudice.  
Id. at 740, 113 S. Ct.  at 1781.  
In Hoos' trial, no hearing was held to determine whether the alternate 
actually participated in jury deliberations, raising the issue of whether this 
matter should be remanded to the trial court for such a hearing.  That option, however, appears to be 
precluded by W.R.E. 606(b)'s restrictions to the scope of inquiry that can be 
made into jury deliberations.  It 
states:

 

(b) 
Inquiry 
Into Validity of Verdict or Indictment. 
-- Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not 
testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's 
deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or 
emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or 
indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith, nor may 
his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter about 
which he would be precluded from testifying be received but a juror may testify 
on the questions whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly 
brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly 
brought to bear upon any juror.

 

Olano 
recognized that F.R.E. 606(b) would be implicated if a hearing had been 
requested; however, it determined that it need not address the issue on its 
facts.  Olano, 507 U.S.  at 
740, 113 S. Ct.  at 1781. Additionally, Olano's majority, 
concurring, and dissenting opinions all noted concern with protecting the 
integrity of jury deliberations and the difficulties in determining the effect 
on jury deliberations caused by an alternate's participation.  

 

[¶13]       
Wyoming's 
W.R.Cr.P. 24(e) and W.R.E. 606(b) articulate the means for protecting the 
integrity of Wyoming jury deliberations, and we find that the more pertinent 
teachings of Olano should be carefully considered.  "The presence of alternate jurors during 
jury deliberations is not the kind of error that affects substantial rights' 
independent of its prejudicial impact." Olano, 507 U.S at 737, 113 S. Ct. 
at 1779.   We agree that, 
without more, the mere presence of alternate jurors during deliberations is not 
error per se and our ultimate inquiry is whether, by their presence, any 
participation occurred.  We, 
therefore, assess whether the presence of an alternate juror throughout the 
deliberations of the jury prejudiced the defendant either "specifically or 
presumptively." Id. 
at 739, 113 S. Ct. 
at 1780. "[T]he Supreme Court has cautioned that some errors to which no 
objection was made should be presumed prejudicial' if the defendant 
cannot make a specific showing of prejudice." United States v. 
Brown, 316 F.3d 1151, 1159 n.3 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing United 
States v. Adams, 252 F.3d 276, 285 (3d Cir. 2001)(quoting Olano, 507 U.S.  at 735, 113 S. Ct. at 1778)).  
We agree that the prejudice or its absence arising from an alternate's 
participation during jury deliberations cannot be assessed, and, in any event, 
after a verdict has been rendered an attempt could not be made without 
impermissibly inquiring into the effect of the matter upon each juror's mind in 
violation of Rule 606(b).  
Manning v. Huffman, 269 F.3d 720, 725 n.2 (6th Cir. 
2001).  

 

[¶14]       
In 
this case, however, the particular facts show that participation must be 
presumed to have occurred.  The 
trial court was notified during deliberations that the jury had been sent to the 
jury room to deliberate and presumably had been deliberating for some forty 
minutes before notifying the court of the alternate juror's presence.  Because deliberations had actually 
commenced, participation either by words or gestures must be presumed to have 
occurred.  The juror's participation 
requires that we determine that prejudice is manifest and the defendant has no 
obligation to show that he has been prejudiced by the error.  

 

[¶15]       
Such 
participation by an alternate is a violation of W.R.Cr.P. 24(e).  Trial courts are charged with the 
responsibility to consistently administer all procedural rules; however, we must 
disagree with Hoos' contention that this error is reversible error per se.  Although Hoos may have no obligation to 
show error, the presumption of prejudice requires that the State show that the 
prejudicial influence of the alternate juror's participation in deliberations 
had no effect on the jury's final verdict.  
We have determined that, in some circumstances, adequate procedural 
safeguards or the trial court's curative action can overcome such prejudice and 
"ensure that the defendant received a fair trial."  See Alcalde, 2003 WY 99, ¶10 
(prejudice can be rebutted "upon a showing that adequate procedural safeguards 
were undertaken," but case reversed because trial court did not utilize adequate 
procedural safeguards).  

 

[¶16]       
W.R.E. 
606 does not prohibit inquiry of jurors during trial that is limited to an 
assessment of whether jurors will be able to begin deliberations anew upon 
receiving instructions designed to cure prejudice arising from the failure to 
dismiss the alternate on schedule.  
Recognizing the rule violation, the trial court attempted to cure the 
error by dismissing the alternate and instructing the jury to begin 
deliberations anew.  The prejudice 
to the defendant posed by the alternate's presumed participation required that 
upon discharging the alternate juror, the trial court should have instructed the 
remaining jurors to "recommence deliberations anew and [should have inquired] 
whether they would be capable of disregarding their previous deliberations and 
any opinions formed during those deliberations."  Alcalde, ¶ 9.  

 

[¶17]       
Only 
by these curative instructions and procedural safeguards can the State show the 
absence of prejudice regarding the jury's final verdict.  The trial court's failure to inquire of 
the remaining jurors necessitates that we find that the State has not carried 
its burden of proving that the alternate's participation had no prejudicial 
influence on the jury's deliberations and final verdict.  Consequently, this case is reversed and 
remanded for new trial on the conspiracy charge.

 

[¶18]       
Reversed 
and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

  
            
LEHMAN, Justice, dissenting.

 

[¶19]   I 
respectfully dissent.

 

[¶20]   I agree that the inadvertent 
failure to dismiss the alternate juror violated W.R.Cr.P. 24(e), which 
specifies, "An alternate juror who does not replace a regular juror shall 
be discharged after the jury retires to consider its verdict."  (Emphasis added.)  However, while it is surely error to 
allow an alternate to participate in jury deliberations, I cannot say that the 
inadvertent presence of an alternate, who is for all purposes as qualified as 
every other juror in a case, for a portion of the deliberations irretrievably 
prejudices the regular jury.

 

[¶21]   In United States v. Olano, 
507 U.S. 725, 737-38, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1779-80, 123 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1993) (emphasis 
added), the Court stated:

 

The 
presence of alternate jurors during deliberations is not the kind of error that 
"affect[s] substantial rights" independent of its prejudicial impact. . . 
.

 

. 
. .  Although the presence of 
alternate jurors does contravene "the cardinal principle that the deliberations 
of the jury shall remain private and secret,'" Advisory Committee's Notes on 
Fed.RuleCrim.Proc. 23(b), 18 U.S.C.App., p.785 (quoting United States v. 
Virginia Erection Corp., 335 F.2d 868, 872 (CA4 1964)), the primary if not 
exclusive purpose of jury privacy and secrecy is to protect the jury's 
deliberations from improper influence.  
"[I]f no harm resulted from this intrusion [of an alternate juror 
into the room,] reversal would be pointless."  United States v. Watson, 
669 F.2d 1374, 1391 (CA11 1982). 

 

Such 
statements suggest a harmless error standard be applied in jury intrusion 
situations, especially considering that the phrase "substantial rights" appears 
in both the plain error and the harmless error standard.  W.R.Cr.P. 52(a) and (b). 

 

[¶22]   In that respect I would embrace the 
analysis of the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Acevedo, 141 F.3d 1421 (11th Cir. 1998).  
In Acevedo, the alternate jurors were inadvertently sent to 
deliberate with the regular jury and did, in fact, deliberate with the jury for 
less than an hour, even reaching a unanimous verdict.  Id. at 1422.  The judge sealed the verdict, dismissed 
the alternates, and instructed the regular jurors "to commence deliberations as 
if anew, taking into consideration all of the instructions I previously gave 
you."  Id. at 1423.  The jury deliberated for approximately 
five more minutes and returned a guilty verdict.  Id.  Acevedo made a motion for mistrial, 
which the district court denied.  On 
appeal, Acevedo claimed that the error was reversible as a matter of law and 
that the prejudice he suffered from the alternates' presence was 
incurable.

 

[¶23]   In resolving this issue, the 
Eleventh Circuit opined:  

 

The 
Supreme Court has held that the mere presence of an alternate in the jury room 
during deliberations is not inherently prejudicial to the defendant.  See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 739-41, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1780-81, 123 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1993).  The Court, however, implied that once 
the alternate participates in any waywhether through words or gestures 
prejudice is manifest.  See id. 
at 739, 113 S. Ct.  at 1780 (prejudice may arise "either because the 
alternates actually participated in the deliberations, verbally or through body 
language'; or because the alternates' presence exerted a chilling' effect on 
the regular jurors" (citations omitted)).

 

Id. 
at 
1424.  Nevertheless, 
the decision then went on to say that the court would assume that the 
alternates were a prejudicial influence on the jury's deliberations but that a 
mistrial is only warranted if there is a reasonable possibility that the 
violation actually prejudiced Acevedo by affecting the 
jury's final verdict.  
Id.  The 
Eleventh Circuit further decided that any prejudice caused by such an error is 
in fact curable.  Therefore, the 
true question becomes whether the district court's instruction eliminates the 
threat of prejudice to the defendant posed by the alternate's initial 
participation.  Id. at 
1426. 

 

[¶24]   In Olano, at least one 
alternate juror stayed for the entire deliberations.  Here, the alternate was in deliberations 
for only forty minutes and was excused before a verdict was reached.  While time is not necessarily 
determinative of the level of prejudice, it may indicate the extent to which the 
alternate actually participated.  
Furthermore, it must be recognized that an alternate juror is not simply 
an outside intrusion.  I simply 
cannot equate an alternate juror to a stranger.  I agree with the statement made by 
Justice O'Connor in Olano, when she said:

 

The 
Court of Appeals was incorrect in finding error "inherently prejudicial."  Until the close of trial, the 2 
alternate jurors were indistinguishable from the 12 regular jurors.  Along with the regular jurors, they 
commenced their office with an oath, received the normal initial admonishment, 
heard the same evidence and arguments, and were not identified as alternates 
until after the District Court gave a final set of instructions.  

 

Olano, 
at 740, 113 S. Ct.  at 1781 (citations omitted.)  I would further add that, under our 
established rules in Wyoming, the alternate juror was required to go through the 
same voir dire process, to have the same impartiality, and to have the same 
qualifications as the regular juror counterparts.  Thus, I would hold that whatever 
prejudice might have resulted from the alternate's presence was minimal in this 
case.

 

[¶25]   The ultimate inquiry is whether the 
trial court's instructions cured the threat of prejudice.  We have long held we assume that the 
jurors followed the court's instructions.  
Marquez v. State, 12 P.3d 711, 717 (Wyo. 2000) (citing Burke v. 
State, 746 P.2d 852, 857 (Wyo. 1987)).  
The jury was instructed to disregard what the alternate had said.  The jurors were to "reconsider all of 
that deliberation without her input."  
While the instruction was not as explicit as that in Acevedo, 
explicitly informing the jury that they should begin anew, I would consider it 
sufficient in this case.

 

[¶26]   Accordingly, I would hold that, in 
light of the judge's instruction, the violation of Rule 24(e) did not affect 
Hoos' substantial rights and is, therefore, harmless 
error.

 

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1F.R.Cr.P. 
24(c) (West Group 1999) provided:

ALTERNATE 
JURORS. The court may direct that not more than 6 jurors in addition to the 
regular jury be called and impanelled to sit as alternate jurors. Alternate 
jurors in the order in which they are called shall replace jurors who, prior to 
the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, become or are found to be 
unable or disqualified to perform their duties. Alternate jurors shall be drawn 
in the same manner, shall have the same qualifications, shall be subject to the 
same examination and challenges, shall take the same oath and shall have the 
same functions, powers, facilities and privileges as the regular jurors. An 
alternate juror who does not replace a regular juror shall be discharged after 
the jury retires to consider its verdict. Each side is entitled to 1 peremptory 
challenge in addition to those otherwise allowed by law if 1 or 2 alternate 
jurors are to be impanelled, 2 peremptory challenges if 3 or 4 alternate jurors 
are to be impanelled, and 3 peremptory challenges if 5 or 6 alternate jurors are 
to be impanelled. The additional peremptory challenges may be used against an 
alternate jury only, and the other peremptory challenges allowed by these rules 
may not be used against an alternate juror.