Title: Commonwealth v. Browne (ORDER)

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

VIRGINIA:  
 
 
In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court Building in the  
City of Richmond on Thursday the 11th day of April, 2024.  
 
Present:  All the Justices 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, 
 
 
 
 
 
APPELLANT, 
 
 against 
Record No. 230379 
 
 
Court of Appeals No. 1373-21-4 
 
 
JAMES FREDERICK BROWNE, 
 
 
   APPELLEE. 
 
UPON AN APPEAL FROM A  
JUDGMENT RENDERED BY THE  
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA. 
 
Upon consideration of the record, briefs, and argument of counsel, the Court is of the 
opinion that this appeal is moot. 
I. 
On January 19, 2022, the Circuit Court of Page County revoked the suspended sentences 
of James Frederick Browne, resuspended portions of the sentences, and ordered Browne to serve 
a period of active incarceration.  The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the circuit court, 
concluding that the circuit court erred by ordering Browne to serve a period of active 
incarceration that exceeded the maximum period of active incarceration permitted by Code 
§ 19.2-306.1.  See Browne v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1373-21-4, 2023 Va. App. LEXIS 
228, at *1-2 (Va. Ct. App. April 11, 2023).  The Commonwealth of Virginia subsequently 
appealed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, challenging the judgment on several grounds. 
In a letter filed in response to the Commonwealth’s petition for appeal, Browne advised 
the Court that he had already served the entire period of active incarceration imposed by the 
circuit court.  Consequently, Browne acknowledged that “there is no risk to him even if the case 
were to be reversed on appeal.”  Under these circumstances, Browne did not “object” to the 
Commonwealth’s petition for appeal. 
At oral argument, the Court asked both parties to address whether the appeal was moot in 
light of the fact that Browne had already served the entire period of active incarceration at issue.  
The Court also permitted the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing the potential 
 
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mootness of the appeal. 
Both parties argued that the appeal was not moot.  In his supplemental brief, however, 
Browne recognized that he could no longer benefit from the pertinent provisions of Code 
§ 19.2-306.1 (i.e., the provisions that impose certain sentencing limitations when an individual 
commits a first or second technical violation, as defined under the terms of the statute) in 
subsequent revocation proceedings addressing the suspended sentences at issue. 
At oral argument, Browne advised the Court that he had incurred additional revocations 
of his suspended sentences after he served the period of active incarceration at issue in this 
appeal.  The Commonwealth attached documentation to its supplemental brief confirming that 
Browne incurred three additional revocations of his suspended sentences following the 
revocation at issue in the present case.  The attached documentation demonstrated that the 
additional revocations were based, at least in part, on technical violations set forth in Code 
§ 19.2-306.1. 
II. 
 
“[A] case is moot and must be dismissed when the controversy that existed between 
litigants has ceased to exist[.]”  Daily Press, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 447, 452 (2013).   
“Whenever it appears . . . that there is no actual controversy between the litigants, or that, if it 
once existed, it has ceased to do so, it is the duty of every judicial tribunal not to proceed to the 
formal determination of the apparent controversy, but to dismiss the case.”  Id. (quoting E.C. v. 
Virginia Dep’t of Juvenile Justice, 283 Va. 522, 530 (2012)). 
“It is not the office of courts to give opinions on abstract propositions of law, or to decide 
questions upon which no rights depend, and where no relief can be afforded.”  E.C., 283 Va. at 
530.  “This Court does not issue advisory opinions on moot questions.”  Board of Supervisors v. 
Ratcliff, 298 Va. 622, 622 (2020). 
 
Recently, the Court explained that an “action that involves a live controversy at its 
inception may become moot during the course of litigation.”  Berry v. Board of Supervisors, 302 
Va. 114, 129 (2023).  In some cases, “[c]hanging events during litigation may make it impossible 
for a court to award a litigant the relief requested.”  Id.  An appellate court may consider 
extrinsic evidence that is not already part of the record when considering whether a case has 
become moot during the pendency of an appeal.  See Hamer v. Commonwealth, 107 Va. 636, 
638 (1907). 
 
3 
In Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1998), the Supreme Court of the United States 
held that an appeal challenging the revocation of a petitioner’s parole became moot after the 
petitioner finished serving the underlying criminal sentence.  As the petitioner had served his 
sentence in its entirety, the Court observed that the reincarceration resulting from the revocation 
of the petitioner’s parole could not “be undone.”  Id. at 8.  In light of this fact, the Court 
explained that the petitioner was required to demonstrate “some concrete and continuing injury” 
or ongoing “collateral consequence” of the revocation in order to maintain the litigation.  Id. at 7.  
As the petitioner had failed to make such a showing, the Court concluded that the case was moot.  
See id. at 14-18.    
In United States v. Hardy, 545 F.3d 280, 283-84 (4th Cir. 2008), the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit applied the rationale of Spencer to an appeal challenging the 
revocation of supervised release.  Like the petitioner in Spencer, the appellant in Hardy finished 
serving his underlying criminal sentence during the pendency of his appeal.  Id.  As the appellant 
failed to identify any remaining “collateral consequences” stemming from the revocation of his 
supervised release, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the appeal was moot.  Id. at 284-85. 
This Court addressed Spencer in E.C. v. Virginia Dep’t of Juvenile Justice, 283 Va. 522, 
531 (2012).  In E.C., a petitioner was released from custody while his petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus was pending.  Id. at 525.  Significantly, the habeas corpus petition challenged the 
validity of the petitioner’s underlying delinquency adjudications.  Id. at 536.   
Citing numerous federal cases, the Court explained that the “collateral consequences of a 
conviction may be sufficient to defeat a claim of mootness when the petitioner in a habeas 
proceeding has been released from custody subsequent to the filing of the petition.”  Id. at 531-
32.  Therefore, the Court determined that “[r]elease from confinement, probation or parole 
during the pendency of [a habeas corpus] proceeding does not automatically render the 
proceeding moot.”  Id. at 536.  
Relying on Spencer, the Court emphasized that “[w]hen a petitioner challenging the 
legality of his conviction continues to suffer a concrete and continuing injury, which is a 
collateral consequence of the conviction, a case or controversy remains and release from the 
sentence imposed does not render the case moot.”  Id. at 531.  The Court, however, observed that 
“[n]ot all collateral consequences of a conviction will be sufficient to avoid a finding that the 
case is moot.”  Id. at 536.  The Court explained that the effect of such collateral consequences 
 
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should be evaluated on a “case by case basis.”  Id. 
Ultimately, the Court determined that the petitioner’s release from custody did not moot 
his habeas corpus petition.  Id.  The Court noted that the petitioner’s habeas corpus petition 
sought to avoid the collateral consequences of his adjudications by invalidating the challenged 
adjudications themselves—relief that could “be afforded by the [C]ourt exercising its habeas 
corpus jurisdiction.”  Id.  Although the petitioner had been released from custody, the Court 
concluded that the collateral consequences of the challenged adjudications were “sufficient to 
sustain a continued controversy.”1  Id. 
The present case is more similar to Spencer and Hardy than E.C.  At his revocation 
hearing, Browne conceded that he violated several conditions of his probation and suspended 
sentences.  Thus, Browne has acknowledged that the circuit court had an adequate basis to 
revoke his suspended sentences. 
This appeal does not involve a challenge to the revocation itself.  Rather, it only involves 
a challenge to the punishment imposed as a consequence of the revocation.  In the Court of 
Appeals, Browne argued that the circuit court erred by misclassifying some of his violations as 
non-technical violations under Code § 19.2-306.1.  Browne maintained that the violations at 
issue should have been classified as technical violations, triggering certain sentencing limitations 
set forth in the statute.  Specifically, Browne claimed that the circuit court could have only 
imposed a maximum of 14 days of active incarceration based on the violations at issue.  The 
Court of Appeals agreed with Browne’s argument, vacated the judgment of the circuit court, and 
remanded the case to the circuit court for the imposition of a punishment consistent with the 
requirements of Code § 19.2-306.1.  See Browne, 2023 Va. App. LEXIS at *23. 
As Browne has already served the period of active incarceration imposed by the circuit 
court, this appeal is now moot—notwithstanding the alleged erroneous application of the 
pertinent provisions of Code § 19.2-306.1.  At this point, Browne’s incarceration cannot be 
“undone” by the Court.  See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 8.  Browne cannot be ordered to serve a lesser 
period of incarceration based on the revocation of his suspended sentences because he has 
already served the entire period of incarceration imposed by the circuit court. 
 
 
1 The adjudications challenged in E.C. imposed significant collateral consequences that 
clearly continued to affect the petitioner after he was released from custody.  Among other 
things, the challenged adjudications required the petitioner to register as a sex offender for the 
rest of his life.  See E.C., 283 Va. at 533. 
 
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Furthermore, the circuit court’s alleged erroneous application of the pertinent provisions 
of Code § 19.2-306.1 has not caused Browne to incur a continuing injury.  Under the particular 
circumstances of this case, there are no collateral consequences arising from the alleged 
misclassification of the violations at issue. 
Browne’s suspended sentences were initially revoked on April 28, 2021, based in part on 
technical violations defined in Code § 19.2-306.1.  In the present case, Browne’s suspended 
sentences were also revoked based in part on technical violations defined in Code § 19.2-306.1.  
Moreover, Browne has acknowledged that his suspended sentences have been revoked based on 
additional violations that were committed after he was released from incarceration.  The 
documentation provided by the Commonwealth indicates that these revocations were based in 
part on technical violations defined in Code § 19.2-306.1.  Therefore, Browne’s suspended 
sentences have already been revoked based on at least two technical violations.2 
The sentencing limitations set forth in Code § 19.2-306.1 only apply to first and second 
technical violations.  See Code § 19.2-306.1(C).  A court “may impose whatever sentence might 
have been originally imposed for a third or subsequent technical violation.”  Id.  As Browne has 
already committed more than two technical violations, the sentencing limitations set forth in 
Code § 19.2-306.1 will no longer apply to Browne in subsequent revocation proceedings 
addressing the suspended sentences at issue.  Thus, the alleged misclassification of the violations 
at issue in this case can no longer affect Browne in subsequent revocation proceedings. 
An exception to the mootness doctrine applies when an underlying dispute is “capable of 
repetition, yet evading review.”  See, e.g., Daily Press, Inc., 285 Va. at 452 (quoting Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 563 (1980)).  The Supreme Court of the United 
States has explained that this narrow exception applies when: “(1) the challenged action is in its 
duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a 
reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again.”  
 
 
2 The memorandum opinion of the Court of Appeals questioned “whether a trial court’s 
prior findings of both technical and non-technical violations . . . at the same revocation hearing 
count as a prior technical violation for purposes of sentencing under Code § 19.2-306.1(C).”  
Browne, 2023 Va. App. LEXIS at *21, n.13.  The plain language of the statute does not support 
such an interpretation.  As explained in the concurring opinion of Judge Athey, an individual 
commits a technical violation under Code § 19.2-306.1 when he commits an act enumerated in 
subsection (A) of the statute—regardless of whether the violation is adjudicated simultaneously 
with a separate non-technical violation.  Id. at *24-25 (Athey, J., concurring). 
 
6 
Spencer, 523 U.S. at 17 (quoting Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 481 (1990)).  
“The capable-of-repetition doctrine applies only in exceptional situations.”  Id. (quoting Los 
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983)).  Therefore, it is applied “sparingly” by the Court.  
Daily Press, Inc., 285 Va. at 452. 
This case is not capable of repetition.  As previously explained, Browne’s suspended 
sentences have been revoked based on at least two prior technical violations.  Consequently, the 
sentencing limitations set forth in Code § 19.2-306.1 will no longer apply to Browne in any 
subsequent revocation proceedings concerning the suspended sentences at issue.  Under these 
circumstances, the mootness doctrine bars further review of the present appeal. 
 
When a case becomes moot during the pendency of an appeal through no fault of the 
appellant, “vacatur of [the] lower court judgment[] is generally appropriate.”  Ratcliff, 298 Va. at 
623; see also Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 712 (2011); United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 
340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950).  “[A] party who seeks review of the merits of an adverse ruling, but is 
frustrated by the vagaries of circumstance[,] . . . ought not in fairness be forced to acquiesce in 
that ruling.”  Ratcliff, 298 Va. at 623 (quoting Camreta, 563 U.S. at 712).  “[T]he equitable 
remedy of vacatur ensures that those who have been prevented from obtaining the review to 
which they are entitled [are] not . . . treated as if there had been a review.”  Id. (quoting Camreta, 
563 U.S. at 712). 
 
As Browne has already served the entire period of active incarceration that is the subject 
of this appeal and he has not suffered any ongoing injury as a collateral consequence of the 
alleged erroneous application of Code § 19.2-306.1, the present appeal is moot.  Therefore, the 
Court vacates the memorandum opinion and judgment of the Court of Appeals, reinstates the 
judgment of the circuit court, and dismisses this case. 
 
This order shall be published in the Virginia Reports and certified to the Court of Appeals 
and the Circuit Court of Page County. 
 
 
 
 
                A Copy, 
 
 
 
 
          
                    Teste: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           Clerk