Title: State v. Pelfrey

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State v. Pelfrey, 112 Ohio St.3d 422, 2007-Ohio-256.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. PELFREY, APPELLEE. 
                 [Cite as State v. Pelfrey, 112 Ohio St.3d 422, 2007-Ohio-256.] 
Criminal law— R.C. 2945.75 — Verdict form must include the degree of the 
offense of which a defendant is convicted or statement that an aggravating 
element has been found by the jury to justify conviction of a greater 
degree of a criminal offense. 
(Nos. 2005-2075 and 2005-2211 – Submitted October 17, 2006 – Decided  
February 7, 2007.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County,  
No. 19955, 2005-Ohio-5006. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
Pursuant to the clear language of R.C. 2945.75, a verdict form signed by a jury 
must include either the degree of the offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or a statement that an aggravating element has been found to 
justify convicting a defendant of a greater degree of a criminal offense. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J. 
{¶ 1} The Second District Court of Appeals has certified this case 
pursuant to Section 3(B)(4), Article IV, Ohio Constitution and App.R. 25.  The 
Second District Court of Appeals found its judgment to be in conflict with the 
judgments of the Fourth District Court of Appeals in State v. Wireman (Apr. 2, 
2002), Pike App. No. 01CA662, the Eighth District Court of Appeals in State v. 
Sullivan, Cuyahoga App. No. 82816, 2003-Ohio-5930, and the Twelfth District 
Court of Appeals in Cockrell v. Russell (Nov. 18, 1996), Warren App. No. CA96-
07-071, on the following issue: “Whether the trial court is required as a matter of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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law to include in the jury verdict form either the degree of the offense of which 
the defendant is convicted or to state that the aggravating element has been found 
by the jury when the verdict incorporates the language of the indictment, the 
evidence overwhelmingly shows the presence of the aggravating element, the jury 
verdict form incorporates the indictment and the defendant never raised the 
inadequacy of the jury verdict form at trial.”  The answer to this question is yes. 
{¶ 2} The Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) regularly 
performs covert audits on the employees of Enviro-Test Systems, which performs 
automobile-emissions tests (“E-checks”) for the state of Ohio.  During a routine 
covert audit, an EPA employee, dressed in plainclothes and without any 
identification to show that she was an EPA employee, received an offer from an 
Enviro-Test Systems inspector to pass her vehicle, though the vehicle had failed 
the emissions test.  The Enviro-Test Systems employees revealed to the 
undercover EPA employee a scheme that involved issuing illegitimate waivers in 
exchange for $30 and arranged with the undercover EPA employee to 
fraudulently “waive” her vehicle. 
{¶ 3} An Enviro-Test Systems employee, appellee, David Pelfrey, was 
arrested and charged by indictment with tampering with records, in violation of 
R.C. 2913.42, which requires an enhanced charge of third-degree felony when the 
defendant’s tampering involves government records.  R.C. 2913.42(B)(4).  A jury 
found Pelfrey guilty, and he was sentenced on the third-degree felony conviction 
to serve four years in prison.  The Second District Court of Appeals affirmed 
Pelfrey’s conviction, rejecting a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence argument.  State 
v. Pelfrey, Montgomery App. No. 19955, 2004-Ohio-3401. 
{¶ 4} The court of appeals subsequently granted Pelfrey’s application to 
reopen the appeal under App.R. 26(B).  Pelfrey argued that the trial court had 
erred in entering a conviction of a third-degree felony because the verdict form 
and the trial court’s subsequent verdict entry were inadequate to support a 
January Term, 2007 
3 
conviction of tampering with government records.  Instead, Pelfrey argued that he 
could have been convicted only of the misdemeanor offense of tampering with 
records.  See R.C. 2913.42(B)(2).  In support of his argument, Pelfrey cited R.C. 
2945.75(A)(2) which requires that a guilty verdict state either the degree of the 
offense of which the offender is found guilty or that the additional elements that 
make an offense one of a more serious degree are present.  If neither is included, 
R.C. 2945.75(A)(2) directs that “a guilty verdict constitutes a finding of guilty of 
the least degree of the offense charged.”  In this case, neither the verdict form nor 
the trial court’s verdict entry set forth the degree of the offense or that the jury had 
found that the records involved were government records. 
{¶ 5} The Second District Court of Appeals agreed with Pelfrey’s 
argument and stated, “ ‘Pelfrey’s failure to raise this defect at trial did not waive 
it, and the fact that the indictment and jury instructions addressed the government-
records issue did not cure the non-compliance with R.C § 2945.75(A)(2).’ ”  State 
v. Pelfrey, Montgomery App. No. 19955, 2005-Ohio-5006, ¶ 23, quoting State v. 
Woullard, 158 Ohio App.3d 31, 2004-Ohio-3395, 813 N.E.2d 964, ¶ 23.  The 
court of appeals held that “the trial court was required to enter a conviction for 
first-degree misdemeanor tampering with records, which is the least degree of the 
offense under R.C. § 2913.42.”  Id. 
{¶ 6} We accepted jurisdiction over the state’s discretionary appeal and 
also determined that a conflict exists. 
{¶ 7} R.C. 2945.75 provides: 
{¶ 8} “(A) When the presence of one or more additional elements makes 
an offense one of more serious degree: 
{¶ 9} “(1) The affidavit, complaint, indictment, or information either 
shall state the degree of the offense which the accused is alleged to have 
committed, or shall allege such additional element or elements. Otherwise such 
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affidavit, complaint, indictment, or information is effective to charge only the 
least degree of the offense. 
{¶ 10} “(2) A guilty verdict shall state either the degree of the offense of 
which the offender is found guilty, or that such additional element or elements are 
present. Otherwise, a guilty verdict constitutes a finding of guilty of the least 
degree of the offense charged.” 
{¶ 11} This court has repeatedly stated that “ ‘if the meaning of a statute 
is clear on its face, then it must be applied as it is written.’"  Hartmann v. Duffey,  
95 Ohio St.3d 456, 2002-Ohio-2486, 768 N.E.2d 1170, ¶ 8, quoting Lake Hosp. 
Sys., Inc. v. Ohio Ins. Guar. Assn. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 521, 524, 634 N.E.2d 
611.  “Thus, if the statute is unambiguous and definite, there is no need for further 
interpretation.”  Id.  "To construe or interpret what is already plain is not 
interpretation but legislation, which is not the function of the courts."  Lake Hosp. 
Sys., Inc. v. Ohio Ins. Guar. Assn. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 521, 524, 634 N.E.2d 
611, quoting Iddings v. Jefferson Cty. School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1951), 155 Ohio 
St. 287, 44 O.O. 294, 98 N.E.2d 827. 
{¶ 12} The statutory requirement certainly imposes no unreasonable 
burden on lawyers or trial judges.  R.C. 2945.75(A) plainly requires that in order 
to find a defendant guilty of “an offense * * * of more serious degree,” the guilty 
verdict must either state “the degree of the offense of which the offender is found 
guilty” or state that “additional element or elements are present.”  R.C. 
2945.75(A)(2) also provides, in the very next sentence, what must occur if this 
requirement is not met:  “Otherwise, a guilty verdict constitutes a finding of guilty 
of the least degree of the offense charged.”  When the General Assembly has 
written a clear and complete statute, this court will not use additional tools to 
produce an alternative meaning. 
{¶ 13} In this case, Pelfrey’s offense of tampering with records would 
have constituted a misdemeanor under R.C. 2913.42(B)(2)(a) but for the 
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5 
additional element that the records at issue were government records, a 
circumstance that elevates the crime to a third-degree felony under R.C. 
2913.42(B)(4).  However, neither the verdict form nor the trial court’s verdict 
entry mentions the degree of Pelfrey’s offense; nor do they mention that the 
records involved were government records.  The statute provides explicitly what 
must be done by the courts in this situation:  the “guilty verdict constitutes a 
finding of guilty of the least degree of the offense charged.”  R.C. 2945.75(A)(2).  
In this case, therefore, Pelfrey can be convicted only of a misdemeanor offense, 
which is the least degree under R.C. 2913.42(B) of the offense of tampering with 
records. 
{¶ 14} Because the language of R.C. 2945.75(A)(2) is clear, this court 
will not excuse the failure to comply with the statute or uphold Pelfrey’s 
conviction based on additional circumstances such as those present in this case.  
The express requirement of the statute cannot be fulfilled by demonstrating 
additional circumstances, such as that the verdict incorporates the language of the 
indictment, or by presenting evidence to show the presence of the aggravated 
element at trial or the incorporation of the indictment into the verdict form, or by 
showing that the defendant failed to raise the issue of the inadequacy of the 
verdict form.  We hold that pursuant to the clear language of R.C. 2945.75, a 
verdict form signed by a jury must include either the degree of the offense of 
which the defendant is convicted or a statement that an aggravating element has 
been found to justify convicting a defendant of a greater degree of a criminal 
offense. 
{¶ 15} We therefore affirm the judgment of the court of appeals, which 
reversed Pelfrey’s conviction of tampering with government records and 
remanded the cause for the trial court to enter a judgment convicting Pelfrey of 
tampering with records as a first-degree misdemeanor. 
Judgment affirmed. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
GALLAGHER, PFEIFER, O’CONNOR and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’DONNELL, JJ., dissent. 
 
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., of the Eighth Appellate District, was assigned to 
sit for RESNICK, J., whose term ended on January 1, 2007. 
 
CUPP, J., whose term began on January 2, 2007, did not participate in the 
consideration or decision of this case. 
__________________ 
 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 16} Pelfrey knew the nature of the indictment against him, which 
indicated that the record he had tampered with was a government record. 
{¶ 17} The verdict form here referred to the offense of tampering with 
records, “as charged in the indictment.”  No confusion existed regarding this 
matter during trial, and Pelfrey never objected when the trial court submitted the 
verdict form to the jury. 
{¶ 18} Now, however, Pelfrey complains of a lack of compliance with 
R.C. 2945.75 because the verdict form did not include either the degree of the 
offense or a statement regarding the aggravating element, i.e., that the record 
involved was a government record, in order to justify conviction of a greater 
degree of the offense of tampering with records. 
{¶ 19} With respect to judicial compliance with a statutory requirements, 
the standard has been that of substantial compliance.  See, e.g., State v. Stewart 
(1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 86, 5 O.O.3d 52, 364 N.E.2d 1163.  Here, I believe the 
issue is whether the verdict form substantially complied with the mandate of the 
statute. 
{¶ 20} The majority is correct – the verdict form did not exactly comply 
with the statute in that the form specified neither the degree of the offense nor the 
aggravating factor, i.e., that the record allegedly tampered with was in fact a 
government record. 
January Term, 2007 
7 
{¶ 21} However, the verdict form signed by all 12 members of the jury 
did specify that the jury found Pelfrey guilty of “the offense of Tampering with 
Records as charged in the indictment.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 22} The indictment charged that Pelfrey and Kilbarger “on or about the 
2nd day of August in the year two thousand two * * * knowing the person has no 
privilege to do so, and with purpose to defraud or knowing that the person is 
facilitating a fraud did falsify, destroy, remove, conceal, alter, deface, or mutilate 
any writing, computer software, data or record, to-wit:  E-check Vehicle 
Inspection Report having been kept by or belonging to a local, state or federal 
governmental entity.” (Emphasis added) 
{¶ 23} Accordingly, no confusion could exist with respect to what records 
became the subject of the tampering charge.  Neither did this case involve 
multiple counts or multiple documents that would suggest possible confusion with 
regard to either the nature of the indictment presented or the defense to be offered.  
The only records here concerned the “E-check Vehicle Inspection Report having 
been kept by or belonging to a local, state or federal governmental entity.” 
{¶ 24} Thus, one of the central issues here is whether the language of the 
verdict form using the phrase “as charged in the indictment” substantially 
complies with the statutory mandate.  I believe that it does, and so do appellate 
judges in three appellate districts. 
{¶ 25} Assuming arguendo, however, that the language does not 
substantially comply with the statute, I cannot understand why Pelfrey has not 
been determined to have waived his right to contest this issue when he did not 
raise it in the trial court at a time that the court could have prepared a different 
verdict form. 
{¶ 26} For the longest time, the law has been that errors not raised in the 
trial court are waived in the absence of plain error.  State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio 
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St.2d 91, 7 O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 804; Crim.R. 52(B).  Here the majority refers 
to a conclusory statement from the appellate court’s opinion. 
{¶ 27} The appellate court, for its part, determined that Pelfrey had not 
waived this issue, based upon its holding in State v. Woullard, 158 Ohio App.3d 
31, 2004-Ohio-3395, 813 N.E.2d 964, in which the court also addressed a trial 
court’s breach of R.C. 2945.75(A)(2).  The court held, without analysis or citation 
to authority, that “because the error is structural in nature, it is not waived by 
defendant-appellant’s failure to object.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 34. 
{¶ 28} That conclusion, in my view, is erroneous in two respects.  First, 
the error in this case is not structural.  In State v. Perry, 101 Ohio St.3d 118, 
2004-Ohio-297, 802 N.E.2d 643, we addressed a situation in which a trial court 
violated R.C. 2945.10(G), which “clearly and unambiguously requires the trial 
court to maintain the written jury instructions with the ‘papers of the case.’ ”  Id. 
at ¶ 8.  Though we determined that an error had occurred, we rejected the 
assertion that the trial court’s failure amounted to “structural error” because “the 
failure of the trial court to maintain the written jury instructions is a statutory, 
rather than constitutional, defect.”  Id. at ¶ 24, citing State v. Esparza (1996), 74 
Ohio St.3d 660, 662, 660 N.E.2d 1194 ("the trial-error/structural-error distinction 
is irrelevant unless it is first established that a constitutional error has occurred" 
[emphasis sic]). 
{¶ 29} Similarly, in this case, the trial court’s failure to prepare a verdict 
form in compliance with R.C. 2945.75(A)(2) is a statutory rather than 
constitutional error.  Furthermore, the error in this case does not comport with the 
“very limited class of cases” in which the United States Supreme Court has 
concluded that a structural error occurred.  Johnson v. U.S. (1997), 520 U.S. 461, 
468-69, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718, citing Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), 
372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (complete denial of counsel); Tumey v. 
Ohio (1927), 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (biased trial judge); 
January Term, 2007 
9 
Vasquez v. Hillery (1986), 474 U.S. 254, 106 S.Ct. 617, 88 L.Ed.2d 598 (racial 
discrimination in selection of grand jury); McKaskle v. Wiggins (1984), 465 U.S. 
168, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (denial of self-representation at trial); Waller 
v. Georgia (1984), 467 U.S. 39, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (denial of public 
trial); Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993), 508 U.S. 275, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 
182 (defective reasonable-doubt instruction). 
{¶ 30} Second, it is now well established that structural errors do not 
preclude an appellate court from applying the plain-error standard when the 
defendant has failed to object.  See State v. Hill (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 191, 749 
N.E.2d 274, and State v. Perry, 101 Ohio St.3d 118, 2004-Ohio-297, 802 N.E.2d 
643. 
{¶ 31} Here, Pelfrey failed to raise the matter at trial and hence denied the 
trial judge the opportunity to at least consider modifying the verdict form to more 
closely track the statute.  In my opinion, this constitutes a waiver and requires 
application of the plain-error doctrine. 
{¶ 32} “Notice of plain error * * * is to be taken with the utmost caution, 
under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of 
justice.” State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 7 O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 804, 
paragraph three of the syllabus.  We have held that “[p]lain error does not exist 
unless it can be said that but for the error, the outcome of the trial would clearly 
have been otherwise.”  State v. Moreland (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 58, 62, 552 
N.E.2d 894, citing Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 7 O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 804, 
paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 33} On this record, I do not believe that but for the trial court’s failure 
to comply with R.C. 2945.75(A)(2), the outcome in Pelfrey’s trial would have 
been different.  The jury found him guilty of tampering with records, and no 
question exists that the records involved belonged to a local, state, or federal 
governmental entity. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 34} I believe that the appropriate standard of review for an alleged 
violation of a statutory requirement is substantial compliance and that the trial 
judge substantially complied with this statute.  Further, the record fails to 
demonstrate that Pelfrey even attempted to call this alleged error to the trial 
court’s attention at a time when it could have been corrected.  I believe, therefore, 
that he waived the issue and that he cannot demonstrate plain error.  For these 
reasons, I would reverse the decision of the court of appeals and affirm the 
judgment of the trial court in this case. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Mathias H. Heck Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Jennifer B. Frederick, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
______________________