Title: State v. Linn

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2022 WI 16 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP1317-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Daniel J. Van Linn, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 395 Wis. 2d 294,953 N.W.2d 116 
(2020 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 24, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 27, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Oconto   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael T. Judge   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, 
HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., 
filed a dissenting opinion. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Andrew R. Hinkel, assistant state public defender. There 
was an oral argument by Andrew R. Hinkel.  
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by John 
W. Kellis, assistant attorney general; with whom on the brief was 
Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral argument by 
John W. Kellis. 
 
 
 
 
2022 WI 16 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2019AP1317-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2017CF44) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Daniel J. Van Linn, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
MAR 24, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in which 
ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, HAGEDORN, and 
KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion. 
 
 
REVIEW of a court of appeals' decision.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   After crashing his car, 
Daniel Van Linn was taken to the hospital, where two blood tests 
were performed:  the first one by the hospital for diagnostic and 
treatment purposes; a later one at the direction of a sheriff's 
deputy for investigative purposes.  Both blood tests revealed that 
Van Linn's blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) was over the legal 
limit.  The circuit court suppressed the results of the deputy's 
blood test, concluding that the deputy's blood draw violated the 
No. 
2019AP1317-CR 
 
2 
 
Fourth Amendment because the deputy did not have a warrant.  The 
State then subpoenaed the hospital for Van Linn's medical records, 
which included the hospital's diagnostic blood-test results.  Van 
Linn argues that those results should be suppressed under the 
Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule because the State subpoenaed 
the hospital only after it learned from the deputy's unlawful blood 
draw that Van Linn's BAC was over the legal limit.  The issue is 
whether hospital's blood-test results are nevertheless admissible 
under the independent-source doctrine, an exception to the 
exclusionary rule.  We hold that they are, and therefore affirm 
the court of appeals. 
I 
¶2 
Around 2:00 a.m. one Sunday morning, the Oconto County 
Sheriff's Office responded to a call about a car accident on a 
rural road in the Town of Mountain.  When a deputy arrived, he 
found Van Linn's car crashed into the back of a cabin.  The 
subsequent investigation revealed that Van Linn was driving to his 
cabin when he thought he saw an oncoming car in his lane and 
swerved to avoid it.  He veered off the road and into a ditch, 
where he hit a tree.  He then drove back onto the road, crossing 
both lanes of traffic before continuing into a ditch on the other 
side of the road, over a hill, and through a field, eventually 
crashing into the back of someone's cabin. 
¶3 
Ambulance personnel found Van Linn lying on the ground 
across the street.  He had a bump and some blood on his forehead 
and his hands were bleeding.  Van Linn claimed to know nothing 
No. 
2019AP1317-CR 
 
3 
 
about the accident and denied that he was driving.  The deputy 
noted a "moderate odor of alcohol" coming from Van Linn, and Van 
Linn told the deputy that he had drank "two beers" earlier that 
evening.  The deputy learned that because Van Linn had four prior 
OWI (operating while intoxicated) convictions, he was subject to 
a BAC limit of 0.02 and his driving privileges were revoked.1 
¶4 
Van Linn was taken to the hospital.  At 3:55 a.m., 
hospital personnel performed a "diagnostic workup," which included 
drawing Van Linn's blood.  The results of that blood test revealed 
that Van Linn's BAC was 0.226.  Not long after, the deputy arrived 
at the hospital and, based on his investigation at the accident 
scene, arrested Van Linn for his fifth OWI.  At the time of Van 
Linn's arrest, the deputy was unaware of the hospital's blood draw 
and its results. 
¶5 
Following his arrest, Van Linn admitted that he had in 
fact been driving and that he was the one who called the police to 
report the crash.  The deputy asked Van Linn to consent to a blood 
draw, which Van Linn refused.  Nevertheless, at his lieutenant's 
direction and without a warrant, the deputy had Van Linn's blood 
drawn at approximately 4:15 a.m., about twenty minutes after the 
hospital had taken Van Linn's blood.  A test of this second sample 
showed that Van Linn's BAC was 0.205. 
                                                 
1 The legal BAC limit in Wisconsin is typically 0.08.  Wis. 
Stat. § 340.01(46m)(a) (2019–20).  Persons with at least three OWI 
convictions are subject to a BAC restriction of 0.02.  See 
§ 340.01(46m)(c).  The conditions under which a person's driving 
privileges can be revoked are laid out in § 343.31.  All statutory 
references are to the 2019–20 version. 
No. 
2019AP1317-CR 
 
4 
 
¶6 
In the circuit court,2 Van Linn moved to suppress the 
results of the deputy's blood draw because the deputy did not have 
a warrant and no exceptions to the warrant requirement applied.  
The State argued that the deputy did not need a warrant because 
the natural dissipation of alcohol in Van Linn's bloodstream was 
an exigent circumstance.  The circuit court granted Van Linn's 
motion, suppressing the results of the deputy's warrantless blood 
draw on the grounds that no exigent circumstances justified the 
deputy's failure to get a warrant.3 
¶7 
Three months later, the State asked the circuit court to 
issue a subpoena to the hospital for Van Linn's medical records, 
which included the results of the hospital's diagnostic blood 
test.4  The State submitted an accompanying affidavit asserting 
there was probable cause for the subpoena because the deputy 
smelled alcohol on Van Linn at the scene, Van Linn had a reduced 
BAC restriction, and Van Linn admitted he had been drinking before 
the accident.  The affidavit referenced the deputy's blood draw 
and noted that testing of the sample showed that Van Linn's BAC 
was over the legal limit.  Van Linn moved to quash the subpoena, 
arguing that the State's subpoena request violated the circuit 
                                                 
2 The Honorable Michael T. Judge of the Oconto County Circuit 
Court presided. 
3 The State does not contest the circuit court's conclusion 
that the deputy's warrantless blood draw violated the Fourth 
Amendment. 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 968.135 authorizes the circuit court to 
issue a subpoena at the State's request and upon a showing of 
probable cause. 
No. 
2019AP1317-CR 
 
5 
 
court's suppression decision because it sought evidence that was 
"necessarily related to the previously suppressed blood draw."  
But the subpoena was issued and executed before the court held a 
hearing on Van Linn's motion to quash.  The hospital turned over 
Van Linn's treatment records, including the results of the 
hospital's diagnostic blood test.5 
¶8 
Van Linn then filed a motion to suppress the hospital's 
blood-test results.  He argued that the State was attempting to 
circumvent the circuit court's prior suppression decision by 
obtaining the "same information"——his BAC——that it learned from 
the deputy's unlawful blood draw.  Van Linn urged that suppressing 
the hospital's blood test was necessary to "give[] proper purpose 
and effect" to the court's prior decision.  The circuit court 
denied Van Linn's motion on statutory grounds without addressing 
whether its prior suppression of the deputy's unlawful blood draw 
precluded the State from acquiring the results of the hospital's 
blood test.6 
                                                 
5 The circuit court eventually held a hearing, concluding that 
the motion was moot since the hospital had already released the 
records. 
6 Van Linn also argued that he had an absolute privilege under 
Wis. Stat. §§ 146.82 and 905.04(2) to keep his medical records 
confidential.  The circuit court determined, however, that the 
exceptions to that privilege in §§ 148.82(2)(a)4. and 905.05(4)(f) 
applied.  The former allows for the release of privileged medical 
records "under a lawful order of a court," and the latter states 
that "[t]here is no privilege concerning the results of or 
circumstances surrounding any chemical tests for intoxication or 
alcohol concentration."  Van Linn has not challenged this part of 
the circuit court's decision. 
No. 
2019AP1317-CR 
 
6 
 
¶9 
On appeal, Van Linn argued that the United States Supreme 
Court's precedent——namely, Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United 
States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), and Murray v. United States, 487 
U.S. 533 (1988)——required the circuit court to suppress the 
hospital's blood-test results because the State was "prompted" by 
the suppression of the deputy's unlawful blood draw to subpoena 
the hospital for his medical records.  He further claimed that the 
State subpoenaed the hospital only because it knew from the 
deputy's unlawful blood draw that his BAC was over the legal limit.  
Van Linn explained that Silverthorne Lumber and Murray prevented 
the State from using that knowledge as the reason for its 
subsequent subpoena request.  The court of appeals rejected those 
arguments, holding that the independent-source doctrine, as 
described in Silverthorne Lumber and Murray, applied.  State v. 
Van Linn, No. 2019AP1317-CR, unpublished op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
Nov. 17, 2020).  It reasoned that, based on the deputy's 
investigation at the accident scene, the State had probable cause 
to believe that Van Linn was operating his car while intoxicated 
before it had "any inkling of what a blood test would reveal."  
Id., ¶24.  Although the State obtained the hospital's blood-test 
results only after it knew the results of the deputy's blood test, 
the hospital's blood test was an independent source of Van Linn's 
BAC because it was "created completely independently" of the 
deputy's unlawful blood draw.  Id., ¶20.  The court of appeals 
held that "the purpose of the exclusionary rule would not be 
effectuated" by suppressing the hospital's blood test "merely 
because it was of the same nature" as the unlawfully obtained 
No. 
2019AP1317-CR 
 
7 
 
evidence, because suppressing it would put the State in a worse 
position than it was in absent the deputy's unlawful conduct.  Id. 
II 
¶10 Whether the exclusionary rule applies to the hospital's 
blood test is a question of "constitutional fact," which we review 
under a mixed standard of review.  See State v. Jackson, 2016 
WI 56, ¶45, 369 Wis. 2d 673, 882 N.W.2d 422.  We accept the circuit 
court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.  State 
v. Carroll, 2010 WI 8, ¶17, 322 Wis. 2d 299, 778 N.W.2d 1.  
Determining whether those facts amount to a Fourth Amendment 
violation is a question of law that we review de novo.  Id. (adding 
that we nevertheless benefit from the lower courts' constitutional 
analyses). 
III 
¶11 The Fourth Amendment protects against "unreasonable 
searches and seizures."  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  When the State 
obtains evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment, that 
evidence typically must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.  
See State v. Prado, 2021 WI 64, ¶56, 397 Wis. 2d 719, 960 
N.W.2d 869.  The exclusionary rule can apply to both evidence 
discovered during an unlawful search or seizure and evidence 
discovered only because of what the police learned from the 
unlawful activity, also referred to as "fruit of the poisonous 
tree."  State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, ¶24, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 
N.W.2d 899.  Not all Fourth Amendment violations, however, justify 
No. 
2019AP1317-CR 
 
8 
 
applying the exclusionary rule.  Rather, the rule applies when 
excluding the unlawfully obtained evidence will "meaningfully 
deter" police misconduct such that interfering with the criminal 
justice system's truth-seeking objective is justified.  Prado, 397 
Wis. 2d 719, ¶¶57–58 (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 
U.S. 135, 144 (2009)).  Whenever the exclusionary rule applies, 
the scope of the remedy is limited to preventing the State from 
"profit[ing] from its illegal activity" without placing the State 
"in a worse position than it would otherwise have occupied" absent 
its illegal conduct.  Murray, 487 U.S. at 542; Carroll, 322 
Wis. 2d 299, ¶44.  It follows that excluding illegally obtained 
evidence "does not mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred 
and inaccessible," provided the State's knowledge of them is gained 
from a source unrelated to the State's illegal conduct.  
Silverthorne Lumber, 251 U.S. at 392. 
¶12 That idea is the foundation of the independent-source 
doctrine.  E.g., Murray, 487 U.S. at 537.  The doctrine is an 
exception to the exclusionary rule in that it allows for the 
admissibility of evidence or information tainted by an illegal 
evidence-gathering activity when the State otherwise acquires the 
same information——or "rediscover[s]" it——by lawful means "in a 
fashion untainted" by that illegal activity.  See id. at 537–38, 
541–42; Silverthorne Lumber, 251 U.S. at 392.  Subsequent lawful 
means, such as a subpoena, are "untainted" when the State can show 
that the illegal conduct neither "affected" the circuit court's 
decision to approve its subpoena request nor "prompted" the State's 
decision to seek a subpoena in the first place.  See, e.g., United 
No. 
2019AP1317-CR 
 
9 
 
States v. Markling, 7 F.3d 1309, 1315–16 (7th Cir. 1993).  The 
former question turns on "whether the [subpoena's supporting 
affidavit] contain[s] sufficient evidence of probable cause 
without the references to the tainted evidence."  See United States 
v. Huskisson, 926 F.3d 369, 375–76 (7th Cir. 2019); Carroll, 322 
Wis. 2d 299, ¶44.  Van Linn concedes that although the supporting 
affidavit referenced his BAC as discovered by the deputy's unlawful 
blood draw, the affidavit establishes probable cause for the 
subpoena without that reference.  Our analysis therefore focuses 
on the latter question of whether the State's decision to seek the 
subpoena was prompted by what it learned from the deputy's unlawful 
blood draw.  See United States v. Johnson, 994 F.2d 980, 987 (2d 
Cir. 1993) ("What is key is that [law enforcement's unlawful 
conduct] did not result in the government obtaining evidence it 
would not have otherwise obtained."). 
¶13 Van Linn argues that the State's decision to subpoena 
his medical records was "motivated specifically" by the knowledge 
it gained from the deputy's unlawful blood draw——that his BAC was 
over the legal limit.  According to Van Linn, if the deputy had 
not unlawfully drawn Van Linn's blood, the State would not have 
known that the hospital's blood test would show he had a prohibited 
BAC and, therefore, "would have had no reason to seek a subpoena" 
for his medical records.   
¶14 Murray, however, demonstrates that the independent-
source doctrine can apply even though the State knew the hospital's 
blood test would show an unlawful BAC.  In Murray, federal agents 
found marijuana during a warrantless search of a warehouse that 
No. 
2019AP1317-CR 
 
10 
 
they suspected housed a drug-trafficking operation.  The agents 
then applied for a search warrant, but included in the warrant 
application only information they knew prior to their warrantless 
entry.  A magistrate approved the warrant, and when the agents 
executed it, they "rediscovered" the marijuana.  487 U.S. at 535–
36.  The Court held that the marijuana evidence was admissible 
because, although the agents first discovered the marijuana during 
an unlawful search, they rediscovered it while executing a valid 
warrant.  And the agents had probable cause for the warrant based 
on what they knew prior to the unlawful search.  Id. at 541–42.  
In other words, neither the agents' decision to seek the warrant 
nor the magistrate's issuance of the warrant was "prompted by what 
[the agents] had seen during the [unlawful] entry"——even though 
the unlawful entry gave the agents a preview of what they would 
find when executing the warrant.  Id. (adding that, under such 
circumstances, "there [was] no reason why the independent source 
doctrine should not apply").  Thus, Murray teaches that the 
independent-source doctrine applies when the State has a separate 
reason to seek the challenged evidence apart from the knowledge it 
gains from an unlawful search.  See id. 
¶15 Here, the State had ample reasons to subpoena Van Linn's 
medical records for evidence of OWI, apart from what it learned 
from the deputy's unlawful blood draw.  At the accident scene, the 
deputy found Van Linn's car crashed into the back of a cabin.  His 
investigation revealed that Van Linn had veered off the road and 
into a ditch, where he hit a tree.  The deputy smelled an 
"intoxicant" on Van Linn, and Van Linn admitted to having had "a 
No. 
2019AP1317-CR 
 
11 
 
couple of beers."  While Van Linn was en route to the hospital, 
the deputy also learned that Van Linn had a reduced BAC restriction 
of 0.02.  Moreover, the deputy arrested Van Linn for OWI prior to 
conducting the unlawful blood draw.  Similar to the agents' 
unlawful entry in Murray, the testing results of the deputy's 
unlawful blood draw "only served to confirm [the State's] prior 
suspicions":  that Van Linn's BAC was over the legal limit.  See 
United State v. Pike, 523 F.2d 734, 736 (5th Cir. 1975) (declining 
to exclude evidence the FBI lawfully rediscovered because, prior 
to an earlier, illegal search that revealed identical information, 
the FBI's investigation had "already focused" on the defendant for 
the same crime); Murray, 487 U.S. at 535–36, 541.  Stated 
differently, the State's decision to subpoena Van Linn's medical 
records was not prompted by what it learned from the deputy's 
unlawful blood draw.  See Murray, 487 U.S. at 541.7 
¶16 Granted, the State did not subpoena Van Linn's medical 
records until after the circuit court suppressed the deputy's 
unlawful blood draw.  Van Linn argues that the State's subpoena is 
therefore the "direct result" of the deputy's unlawful conduct 
                                                 
7 This conclusion is consistent with how other courts have 
applied Murray.  See, e.g., United States v. Moody, 664 F.3d 164, 
167—68 (7th Cir. 2011) ("no indication" that illegal search in 
2007 of defendant's cell phone records had "any bearing" on 2009 
subpoena for the same records); Johnson, 994 F.2d at 987 (agents' 
decision to get warrant was prompted by the "obvious relevance" of 
what might be on audiotape recordings, not by the agents' 
unlawfully listening to the recordings before getting a warrant); 
United States v. Herrold, 962 F.2d 1131, 1140–41 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(police had evidence, prior to the unlawful search, that made it 
"inconceivable" they would not have lawfully discovered the same 
evidence). 
No. 
2019AP1317-CR 
 
12 
 
because, but for that conduct, there would have been nothing for 
the circuit court to suppress.  And but for the circuit court's 
suppression decision, the State would not have subpoenaed the 
hospital.  We hold that, despite the timing of the State's subpoena 
request, suppression is not justified for two reasons.   
¶17 First, in the exclusionary-rule context, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has rejected the strict but-for causality Van Linn 
presses here.  See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487–88 (evidence should 
not be excluded "simply because it would not have come to light 
but for the illegal actions of the police"); United States v. 
Carter, 573 F.3d 418, 423 (7th Cir. 2009).  The "more apt question" 
for whether the exclusionary rule applies is:  did the State 
"exploit[]" the deputy's unlawful conduct?  See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. 
at 487–88.  In this case, the State did not exploit the deputy's 
illegal conduct because, as explained above, the State had 
reasonable grounds to suspect Van Linn of OWI prior to anyone 
drawing his blood.  See also State v. Dasen, 155 P.3d 1282, 1286 
(Mont. 2007) (explaining that although "the invalidity of the first 
search necessitated a second [search], the State nevertheless 
possessed sufficient independent information to 'purge the taint' 
of the first search").  Additionally, the blood-test evidence 
contained in Van Linn's medical records is "untainted" by the 
deputy's unlawful conduct because the hospital drew Van Linn's 
blood for its own diagnostic and treatment purposes, not at the 
direction of law enforcement.  See Segura v. United States, 468 
U.S. 796, 813–14 (1984); cf. State v. Ravotto, 777 A.2d 301, 311 
(N.J. 2001) (rejecting the State's independent-source argument 
No. 
2019AP1317-CR 
 
13 
 
because the hospital drew the defendant's blood only at a police 
officer's request). 
¶18 Second, suppressing the hospital's blood-test results 
would not further the purpose of the exclusionary rule, which is 
to deter police misconduct.  The circuit court's suppression of 
the deputy's warrantless blood draw remedied the police misconduct 
in this case.  Suppressing the hospital's diagnostic blood test, 
however, would have no further deterrent effect because it involved 
no police conduct at all, let alone misconduct.  See Prado, 397 
Wis. 2d 719, ¶57; Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 237 (2011) 
("Real 
deterrent 
value 
is 
a 
'necessary 
condition 
for 
exclusion' . . . .") 
(quoted 
source 
omitted). 
 
Moreover, 
suppressing the hospital's blood test runs counter to the 
exclusionary rule because it would put the State in a worse 
position than it occupied absent the deputy's unlawful conduct.8  
See Murray, 487 U.S. at 537–38. 
¶19 Accordingly, we conclude that the results of the 
hospital's blood test are admissible under the independent-source 
doctrine.  The State's decision to subpoena the hospital for Van 
Linn's medical records was not prompted by the deputy's unlawful 
                                                 
8 The dissent oversimplifies the issue in asserting that the 
independent-source doctrine allows law enforcement to "circumvent 
a suppression decision by simply looking for the same information 
in a different place."  See dissent, ¶33.  The doctrine requires 
law enforcement to have had a reason to look elsewhere for the 
same information independent of the unlawful conduct that led to 
the suppression decision.  That requirement ensures the police do 
not get a "do-over" simply because "evidence gained through an 
unconstitutional search is suppressed."  See id., ¶7. 
No. 
2019AP1317-CR 
 
14 
 
conduct, because the State had reasonable grounds to suspect Van 
Linn of OWI prior to the deputy's warrantless blood draw.  The 
fact that the State subpoenaed those records only after the circuit 
court suppressed the deputy's unlawful blood draw does not change 
the independent nature of the State's suspicions that Van Linn's 
BAC was over the legal limit.  Furthermore, the evidence discovered 
through the State's subpoena——the hospital's diagnostic blood 
test——is untainted by the deputy's unlawful conduct, thus 
suppressing it would not serve the exclusionary rule's purpose. 
By the Court.—The court of appeals' decision is affirmed. 
 
No.  2019AP1317-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶20 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  Law enforcement 
drew Daniel Van Linn's blood without a warrant.  He refused to 
give consent for the blood draw, but an officer nevertheless 
proceeded to extract his blood. 
¶21 No exception to the warrant requirement permitted such 
a search.  After the circuit court suppressed the fruits of the 
State's unconstitutional foray, the State waited three months to 
try an end run around the Fourth Amendment and the circuit court's 
suppression ruling.  It subpoenaed hospital records containing the 
information that the circuit court had earlier suppressed——Van 
Linn's blood alcohol content. 
¶22 Providing the State with an insurance policy in the event 
of an unconstitutional search, the majority tells law enforcement 
not to worry.  The majority's message is:  "If you violate a 
person's Fourth Amendment rights and the resulting evidence is 
suppressed, there will be no consequences because you can still 
gain the information through other means."   
¶23 In contrast, my message is:  "Get a warrant."  This 
entire appeal would not exist if law enforcement had simply sought 
a warrant in the first place. 
¶24 This court should not promote a search first and warrant 
later approach.  And it certainly should not be condoning an 
approach that undermines the essence of the exclusionary rule, 
which is to prevent——not to repair. 
¶25 In giving its imprimatur to the State's tactic, the 
majority justifies its determination by invoking the independent 
source doctrine.  Its rationale rests on two assertions:  (1) that 
No.  2019AP1317-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
the State did not "exploit" the illegal search because it had 
"reasonable grounds" to suspect Van Linn of OWI before either law 
enforcement or medical personnel drew his blood; and (2) that 
disallowing the subpoena would have no effect on police misconduct.   
¶26 The first of these rationales answers the wrong 
question, 
obscuring 
the 
true 
inquiry 
of 
whether 
the 
unconstitutional search "prompted" the subpoena.  And the second 
insulates 
law 
enforcement 
from 
the 
consequences 
of 
its 
unconstitutional actions.  In doing so, the majority ignores that 
the consequence of its decision is to give a do-over to law 
enforcement 
in 
the 
event 
evidence 
gained 
through 
an 
unconstitutional search is suppressed. 
¶27 Because 
the 
majority 
obscures 
the 
constitutional 
inquiry, erroneously concludes that suppression of the hospital 
sample would have no effect on police misconduct, and turns the 
exclusionary rule on its head by creating a perverse incentive for 
law enforcement to conduct warrantless searches, I respectfully 
dissent. 
I 
¶28 Van Linn was suspected of OWI and taken to a hospital.  
Majority op., ¶¶3-4.  While at the hospital, he refused a 
warrantless blood draw.1  Id., ¶5.  Law enforcement directed a 
                                                 
1 As is his right.  State v. Prado, 2021 WI 64, ¶47, 397 
Wis. 2d 719, 960 N.W.2d 869 (explaining that "a person has a 
constitutional right to refuse a search absent a warrant or an 
applicable exception to the warrant requirement"). 
No.  2019AP1317-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
blood draw anyway, believing that exigent circumstances justified 
the warrantless search.  Id.   
¶29 The circuit court later determined that exigent 
circumstances were not present and suppressed the results of the 
blood draw.  Id., ¶6.  After this setback, and almost ten months 
after the arrest and three months after the State's first attempt 
to admit the blood evidence was rebuffed, the State pursued a 
different strategy.  It subpoenaed the results of a separate blood 
test the hospital took for purposes of Van Linn's medical 
treatment.  Id., ¶7.   
¶30 In support of its application for the subpoena, the State 
articulated grounds for its issuance, including the results of the 
unconstitutionally obtained blood draw indicating that Van Linn's 
blood alcohol content was above the legal limit——.205.  The State's 
second try was met with success.  The subpoena for the hospital 
records issued and the circuit court ultimately denied Van Linn's 
motion to suppress the results of the hospital sample.  Id., ¶8.   
¶31 Van Linn appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the 
circuit court's denial of this second suppression motion.  State 
v. Van Linn, No. 2019AP1317-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. 
App. Nov. 17, 2020).  The majority now affirms the court of 
appeals, concluding that the hospital sample is admissible under 
the independent source doctrine.  In the majority's view, "the 
State 
did 
not 
exploit 
the 
deputy's 
illegal 
conduct 
because . . . the State had reasonable grounds to suspect Van Linn 
of OWI prior to anyone drawing his blood."  Majority op., ¶17.  
Further, the majority concludes that "suppressing the hospital's 
No.  2019AP1317-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
blood-test results would not further the purpose of the 
exclusionary rule, which is to deter police misconduct."  Id., 
¶18. 
II 
¶32 The majority rests its conclusions on its application of 
the independent source doctrine.  This doctrine "derives from the 
principle that when the challenged evidence has an independent 
source, exclusion of such evidence would put the police in a worse 
position than they would have been in absent any error or 
violation."  State v. Carroll, 2010 WI 8, ¶44, 322 Wis. 2d 299, 
778 N.W.2d 1 (internal quotation and quoted source omitted).  The 
"ultimate question" is whether the search conducted pursuant to 
the subpoena was "in fact a genuinely independent source of the 
information and tangible evidence at issue."  Murray v. United 
States, 487 U.S. 533, 542 (1988). 
¶33 In determining whether the independent source doctrine 
applies, we utilize a two-pronged analysis.  First, we must 
determine whether, absent the illegal search, the officer would 
have sought the search warrant or subpoena.  Carroll, 322 
Wis. 2d 299, ¶45.  Second, we ask if information illegally acquired 
influenced the magistrate's decision to authorize the warrant or 
subpoena.  Id. (citing State v. Lange, 158 Wis. 2d 609, 626, 463 
N.W.2d 390 (Ct. App. 1990)).  The burden is on the State to 
convince the court on each of these prongs.  Id. (citing Murray, 
487 U.S. at 540).  
¶34 Van Linn focuses his argument on the first prong of the 
analysis, but I pause at the preface of the discussion to briefly 
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observe that a concession by the defense to the existence of 
probable cause may not be tantamount to answering the question 
posed in the second prong.2  Indeed, the State included in the 
subpoena application the results of the suppressed blood test.  
Why would the State include the fruits of the unconstitutional 
search other than in an attempt to influence the circuit court to 
grant the subpoena?  The .205 test result in and of itself would 
generally be sufficient to establish probable cause.  Once a 
circuit court sees that, "game over." 
                                                 
2 I acknowledge the Carroll court's statement that "[a]s 
applied to circumstances where an application for a warrant 
contains both tainted and untainted evidence, the issued warrant 
is valid if the untainted evidence is sufficient to support a 
finding of probable cause to issue the warrant."  State v. Carroll, 
2010 WI 8, ¶44, 322 Wis. 2d 299, 778 N.W.2d 1.  However, Carroll 
cites to Murray in support of that premise, but Murray represents 
a very different circumstance.  Although in Murray, law enforcement 
had both tainted and untainted evidence sufficient to support 
probable cause, only the untainted evidence was presented in the 
application for the search warrant.  See Murray v. United States, 
487 U.S. 533, 535-36 (1988).  Additionally, the Supreme Court 
voiced concern about the effect that the illegally obtained 
information might have on the magistrate IF it had been presented 
in the search warrant application.  See id. at 542. 
Moreover, the Carroll court's proclamation tells us nothing 
about the influence the tainted evidence had on a magistrate's 
decision to issue a subpoena.  The circuit court here made no 
explicit factual findings that law enforcement would have applied 
for the subpoena absent the tainted evidence.  "Murray simply does 
not contemplate that, in the absence of any relevant fact-finding 
by a trial court, an appellate court can reach its own 'inference' 
about whether the law enforcement officers sought the [subpoena] 
on the basis of evidence that is genuinely independent of the 
unlawfully obtained evidence."  Carroll, 322 Wis. 2d 299, ¶75 
(Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting). 
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¶35 The State's mention of the results of the suppressed 
test stands in stark contrast to the warrant application the United 
States Supreme Court upheld in Murray.  There, "In applying for 
the warrant, the agents did not mention the prior entry, and did 
not rely on any observations made during that entry."  Murray, 487 
U.S. at 535-36.  Thus, in addressing the question posed by the 
second prong——whether information illegally acquired influenced 
the magistrate's decision to authorize the warrant——the only 
tenable answer is:  Who knows?  The record does not reveal the 
answer.  As a result, I think it unlikely that the State met its 
burden. 
A 
¶36 With this background in hand, I move next to address the 
majority opinion's errors.  First, the majority rests its holding 
on the assertion that "the State had reasonable grounds to suspect 
Van Linn of OWI prior to anyone drawing his blood."  Majority op., 
¶17.  Herein lies the majority's first error. 
¶37 At the outset of its analysis, the majority correctly 
frames the question, focusing on "whether the State's decision to 
seek the subpoena was prompted by what it learned from the deputy's 
unlawful blood draw."  Id., ¶12.  Such a framing stems from the 
United States Supreme Court's decision in Murray, where, as 
indicated above, the Court wrote:  "The ultimate question, 
therefore, is whether the search pursuant to warrant was in fact 
a genuinely independent source of the information and tangible 
evidence at issue here."   Murray, 487 U.S. at 542.  Further 
refining the test, the Murray court explained that evidence does 
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not derive from a genuinely independent source "if the agents' 
decision to seek the warrant was prompted by what they had seen 
during the initial entry, or if information obtained during that 
entry was presented to the Magistrate and affected his decision to 
issue the warrant."  Id. (emphasis added). 
¶38 But the majority's analysis quickly strays from this 
inquiry.  It focuses not on whether any information gleaned from 
the illegal search prompted the subpoena application, but on 
whether law enforcement "exploited" the fruits of the illegal 
search.  In answering this question, the majority highlights its 
conclusion that there was enough information to seek a subpoena of 
the hospital sample before either blood draw was conducted.  See 
majority op., ¶17.  This is not the question that Murray poses. 
¶39 With our focus properly on the decision to seek a 
subpoena, we must ask whether the information learned from the 
first unconstitutional search "prompted" the second.  Common sense 
says yes.  After all, the illegal search gave the State a sneak-
peek of what it was going to find in the "lawful" search:  that 
Van Linn's blood alcohol level was above the legal limit.  In other 
words, when law enforcement filed for the subpoena of the 
hospital's test results, they already knew what they were going to 
find due to the illegal search.  Would officers really have sought 
the subpoena if the illegally obtained sample had shown that Van 
Linn's BAC was below the legal limit?   
¶40 Undoubtedly, the subpoena here was also prompted by the 
suppression of the law enforcement sample.  Without that 
suppression, there would have been no need to subpoena the hospital 
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sample.  Accordingly, the independent source doctrine should not 
apply here to give the State a do-over after it collected evidence 
in an unconstitutional manner. 
B 
¶41 Second, the majority concludes that "suppressing the 
hospital's blood-test results would not further the purpose of the 
exclusionary rule, which is to deter police misconduct."  Majority 
op., ¶18.  The majority says that "[s]uppressing the hospital's 
diagnostic blood test . . . would have no further deterrent effect 
because it involved no police conduct at all, let alone 
misconduct."  Id.  Herein lies the majority's second error. 
¶42 Far from having "no further deterrent effect," allowing 
law enforcement a second chance to "discover" the same information 
after it violates a person's rights in conducting a search 
encourages police misconduct.  Instead of taking the time to apply 
for a warrant, why wouldn't law enforcement give a warrantless 
search a try if it knew that it could get the same information 
admitted from another source in the event the fruits of the first 
search are suppressed?   
¶43 Justice Thurgood Marshall observed just this concern in 
his dissent in Murray:  "Under the circumstances of these cases, 
the admission of the evidence 'reseized' during the second search 
severely undermines the deterrence function of the exclusionary 
rule. Indeed, admission in these cases affirmatively encourages 
illegal searches."  Murray, 487 U.S. at 546 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting).  
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¶44 If the majority really wanted to discourage police 
misconduct, it would create a strong incentive for police to do 
things right the first time.  Instead, it provides law enforcement 
with an insurance policy.   
¶45 Under the majority's rule, an officer would feel free to 
seek evidence through unconstitutional means if the officer knew 
the evidence would later be available from a different source.  In 
contrast, if the State were not given the workaround the majority 
sanctions in this case, an officer would be encouraged to either 
get a warrant for the first search or forgo the first search and 
subpoena the hospital record later——both options that are 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment's protections. 
C 
¶46 Finally, I am concerned about the perverse incentive 
created by the majority opinion vis-à-vis a law enforcement 
officer's initial determination whether to get a warrant. 
¶47 This is an OWI case, and in the OWI context, the United 
States Supreme Court has determined that the dissipation of alcohol 
in the bloodstream does not create a per se exigency that excuses 
the need for a warrant.  Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 144 
(2013).  Rather, "[w]hether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-
driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case based 
on the totality of the circumstances."  Id. at 156. 
¶48 Warrantless searches are generally disfavored.  Indeed, 
they are deemed presumptively unreasonable unless an exception 
applies.  State v. Dalton, 2018 WI 85, ¶38, 383 Wis. 2d 147, 914 
N.W.2d 120.   
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¶49 Yet the majority here rewards a warrantless search.  
Imagine, if you will, the future officers who find themselves in 
an emergency room with an OWI suspect.  To get a warrant or not to 
get a warrant?   
¶50 Under the majority opinion, there is a perverse 
incentive to forgo a warrant application.  Just take the blood 
sample, and if it is thrown out, simply subpoena the hospital 
records.  No harm, no foul.  But this flips the exclusionary rule 
on its head and turns a subpoena into "an after the fact 'insurance 
policy' to 'validate' an unlawful search."  United States v. Eng, 
971 F.2d 854, 861 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing Center Art Galleries-
Hawaii, Inc. v. United States, 875 F.2d 747, 755 (9th Cir. 1989)). 
¶51 The above dilemma facing an officer will recur not only 
in the OWI context, but also throughout modern policing.  And the 
incentives provided by the majority will be the same, giving rise 
to concerning implications.  Take, for example, a hypothetical 
raised in Van Linn's reply brief:  "Consider the illegal search of 
a person's phone in Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 379 (2014), 
which turned up incriminating photographs.  After suppression of 
a search like that, could the government simply subpoena Google or 
Apple for those companies' copies of the same files as an 
'independent source'?"   
¶52 Law enforcement should not be able to circumvent a 
suppression decision by simply looking for the same information in 
another place.  Instead, it should do things right the first time.  
The exclusionary rule "is calculated to prevent, not to repair.  
Its purpose is to deter——to compel respect for the constitutional 
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guaranty in the only effectively available way——by removing the 
incentive to disregard it."  Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 
206, 217 (1960).   
¶53 Despite the perverse incentive created by the majority 
opinion, the next officer to confront this situation should still 
just get a warrant.  Indeed, the entire argument before this court 
would have been avoided from the get-go if law enforcement would 
have simply sought a warrant for the first draw of Van Linn's 
blood.  Judicial efficiency appreciates it and the constitution 
demands it. 
¶54 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
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