Title: Shoup v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

Filed: January 31, 2003
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
MABLE SHOUP,
Petitioner on Review,
	v.
WAL-MART STORES, INC.,
Respondent on Review.
(97C-14504; CA A106153; SC S48171)
	En Banc
	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted November 6, 2001.
	J. Michael Alexander, of Swanson, Lathen, Alexander &
McCann, P.C., Salem, argued the cause and filed the briefs for
petitioner on review.  With him on the briefs was Charese Rohny,
of Vick & Conroyd, LLP, Salem.
	Peter R. Chamberlain, of Bodyfelt, Mount, Stroup &
Chamberlain, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for
respondent on review.  With him on the brief was Jennifer J.
Peet, Portland.
	Meagan A. Flynn, of Preston, Bunnell & Stone, LLP, Portland,
filed the brief for amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers
Association.					
	Lindsey H. Hughes, of Keating, Jones, Bildstein & Hughes,
P.C., Portland, filed the brief for amicus curiae Oregon
Association of Defense Counsel.
	BALMER, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part and
affirmed in part.  The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
	*Appeal from Marion County Circuit Court, Joseph V. Ochoa, Judge. 171 Or App 357, 15 P3d 588 (2000).
		BALMER, J.
		Plaintiff brought this negligence action against Wal-Mart, Inc. (defendant), after one of defendant's employees 
injured plaintiff by bumping into her and knocking her to the
floor.  The jury considered three specifications of negligence 
and returned a general verdict in plaintiff's favor.  The Court
of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for a new trial,
holding that one of plaintiff's specifications did not state a
claim for negligence under Oregon law and that defendant,
therefore, was entitled to a new trial under the "we can't tell"
rule that this court announced in Whinston v. Kaiser Foundation
Hospital, 309 Or 350, 788 P2d 428 (1990).  Shoup v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 171 Or App 357, 359, 15 P3d 588 (2000).  We allowed
plaintiff's petition for review.  As explained below, we conclude
that allowing defendant a new trial under the "we can't tell"
rule is incompatible with ORS 19.415(2), which provides that
"[n]o judgment shall be reversed or modified except for error
substantially affecting the rights of a party."  Accordingly, we
reverse in part the decision of the Court of Appeals.  
I.
		The record establishes the following material facts. 
Plaintiff, who was then 89 years old, entered defendant's store
and attempted to walk past defendant's employee, who was standing
in the aisle with his back toward plaintiff.  The employee, to
get out of the way of another shopper, suddenly stepped backward,
striking plaintiff in the face with his elbow and knocking her to
the floor.  Plaintiff was rendered momentarily unconscious, and
she suffered extensive bruises and other soft-tissue injuries.
		Plaintiff brought an action alleging that defendant was
negligent in (1) failing to supervise its employee, (2)
instructing its employee to stand in the aisle and thereby create
an obstacle to persons entering the store, and (3) failing to
train its employee to keep a proper lookout.  Plaintiff further
alleged that defendant was vicariously liable for the negligence
of its employee in (1) failing to use reasonable care, (2)
failing to keep a proper lookout, and (3) failing to maintain
control over his body.  Defendant admitted that its employee was
acting within the course and scope of his employment when he
injured plaintiff. 
		The action was tried to a jury.  At the close of
plaintiff's case, defendant moved for a directed verdict, making 
particular objections to each of plaintiff's specifications of
negligence.  The trial court granted defendant's motion in part,
but allowed three specifications to go to the jury:  whether
defendant was negligent in instructing its employee to stand in
the aisle; whether defendant's employee was negligent in failing
to use reasonable care; and whether defendant's employee was
negligent in failing to keep a proper lookout.
		At the close of defendant's case, plaintiff proffered a 
verdict form that asked two separate questions, one regarding
defendant's negligence and one regarding the negligence of
defendant's employee.  Defendant objected to plaintiff's form and
proffered a general verdict form that did not distinguish between
the negligence of defendant and its employee or between the two
specifications of negligence on the part of the employee.  In
response to defendant's objection, plaintiff withdrew her verdict
form, and the trial court used defendant's form.  As noted above,
the jury returned a general verdict in plaintiff's favor. 
Defendant neither moved for a new trial nor for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), and the trial court entered
judgment for plaintiff. 
		On appeal, defendant argued that the specification of
negligence based on defendant's instructions to its employee did
not state a claim for negligence under Oregon law and,
alternatively, that that specification was unsupported by the
evidence.  The Court of Appeals agreed that the specification did
not state a claim for negligence and held that the trial court
had erred in submitting it to the jury.  Shoup, 171 Or App at
364.  The Court of Appeals then held, citing Whinston, that,
because it could not tell on which specification of negligence
the jury had based its verdict, defendant was entitled to a new
trial.  The Court of Appeals explained that, under Whinston: 
	"[T]he prevailing plaintiff bears the burden of
developing a record (most often through a special
verdict) sufficient to establish the harmlessness of
the error of submitting a defective specification to
the jury.  That is the plaintiff's obligation; the
defendant need not do anything."
Shoup, 171 Or App at 373 (emphasis in original). 
		On review, plaintiff does not challenge the Court of
Appeals' decision that her direct liability specification does
not state a claim for negligence.  Neither does she disagree
that, under the "we can't tell" rule, defendant would be entitled
to a new trial because the reviewing court cannot determine
whether the jury based its verdict on the defective specification
of negligence or on one (or both) of the two valid
specifications.  Instead, plaintiff argues that this court should
abandon the "we can't tell" rule.  She contends that, because
there were two other, valid specifications of negligence and
ample evidence to support them, an appellate court cannot
conclude that the trial court's error in submitting the defective
specification of negligence to the jury substantially affected
defendant's rights.  For that reason, plaintiff asserts, to
reverse the trial court's judgment and order a new trial would
violate ORS 19.415(2), which precludes an appellate court from
reversing a judgment "except for error substantially affecting
the rights of a party." 
		Defendant contends that the application of the "we
can't tell" rule does not violate ORS 19.415(2) and urges us to
adhere to that rule.  Defendant asserts that, when the reviewing
court cannot tell whether the jury has based its verdict on a
defective or on a valid specification, the trial court's error in
submitting the defective specification to the jury was an error
that, per se, substantially affected the appellant's rights. 
Such an error, according to defendant, is prejudicial and
requires a new trial.
		As explained further below, we disagree with defendant
that such an error is prejudicial.  Accordingly, we conclude that
the "we can't tell" rule violates the limitation on appellate
courts set out in ORS 19.415(2).  Because of that infirmity, we
abandon the "we can't tell" rule.  We begin our explanation by
reviewing this court's decision in Whinston.       
II.
		Whinston was a medical negligence action that included
three specifications of negligence in one claim for relief
against a physician.  The plaintiff alleged that the defendant
physician had been negligent in (1) failing to perform a biopsy,
(2) failing to diagnose cirrhosis, and (3) failing to diagnose
vitamin A toxicity.  The jury returned a general verdict in favor
of the plaintiff, and the trial court entered a judgment on that
verdict.  The defendant then moved for a JNOV or, in the
alternative, a new trial.  The trial court concluded that there
was no evidence that the physician's conduct had fallen below the
applicable standard of care and entered a JNOV.  The plaintiff
appealed.
		The Court of Appeals reversed.  Whinston v. Kaiser
Foundation Hospital, 93 Or App 528, 763 P2d 177 (1988).  It
concluded that there was sufficient evidence that the physician
negligently had failed to diagnose cirrhosis and that, therefore,
the trial court had erred in entering a JNOV.  Id. at 532.  The
Court of Appeals then considered whether judgment should be
entered for the plaintiff based on the jury verdict or whether
the defendant nevertheless was entitled to a new trial because
the court could not tell whether the jury had based its verdict
on the specification that properly was submitted to the jury or
on one of the specifications that was not.  Relying on its
interpretation of earlier decisions from this court and on "the
constitutional and statutory admonitions that we reverse only
when we can determine that error was prejudicial," the Court of
Appeals remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to
enter judgment on the verdict, holding that "when several issues
are submitted to the jury, a general verdict will stand if any
one of the issues was properly submitted, even if there might be
errors related to others."  Id. at 530-31.
		On review, this court agreed with the Court of Appeals'
conclusion that one of the plaintiff's specifications of
negligence was supported by the evidence.  Whinston, 309 Or at
356.  Accordingly, it affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision
that the trial court erred in entering the JNOV.  However, this
court disagreed with the Court of Appeals' decision ordering
entry of judgment on the general jury verdict.  The court noted
that, despite contrary wording in some cases (see 309 Or at 357-59 (discussing cases inconsistent with "we can't tell" rule)),
precedent favored remanding for a new trial in such circumstances
and stated, "[W]e decline to adopt a different rule at this
time."  The court summarized its holding as follows:
		"In such cases, where (1) more than one allegation
of negligence is submitted to the jury; (2) one or more
of, but not all, the allegations are unsupported by the
evidence; and (3) it cannot be determined upon which
allegation the jury based its verdict, this court has
held that a new trial must be granted." 
Id. at 357.  The court dubbed that rule the "we can't tell" rule. 
Id.  
As the foregoing discussion reveals, in Whinston this
court did not view the question whether to remand for a new trial
or with instructions to enter a judgment for the plaintiff based
on the jury verdict as a question that required it to address
whether the "we can't tell" rule is consistent with ORS
19.415(2). (1)  The only aspect of this court's holding in Whinston
that directly implicated ORS 19.415(2) was its threshold
conclusion that the JNOV entered for the defendant should be
reversed because there was evidence to support the jury verdict
in the plaintiff's favor.  That aspect of the Whinston holding
was correct, because the trial court's entry of a JNOV, when
there was evidence to support the plaintiff's jury verdict,
"substantially affect[ed]" the plaintiff's rights.  However, the
problematic scope of the "we can't tell" rule is apparent in a
situation such as the one before us, in which the party that lost
a jury trial seeks to apply the rule in an appeal from a judgment
entered on a general verdict.  In such a situation, we are
squarely presented with the question whether the "we can't tell"
rule is compatible with the statutory authority of an appellate
court to reverse a judgment only for an error "substantially
affecting the rights of a party."  ORS 19.415(2).
III.
		As noted above, defendant argues that the "we can't
tell" rule and the mandate of ORS 19.415(2) are not inconsistent,
because the submission to the jury of an invalid specification,
per se, substantially affects the rights of the party opposing
that specification.  Defendant contends that the "substantially
affects the rights of a party" standard is whether, absent the
error, the "outcome of the trial may have been different."  In
support of that argument, it quotes the following passage from
Baker v. English, 324 Or 585, 590, 932 P2d 57 (1997):
	"[In] applying [ORS 19.415(2)], this court often
examines whether it is likely that a trial court's
error affected the outcome of the case below.  For
example, in cases in which a trial court's error either
did or may have affected the outcome, such as an error
concerning a key issue before the jury, this court has
concluded that the error substantially affected the
rights of a party and, therefore, was prejudicial.  The
rationale behind such a conclusion is obvious:  The
rights of an aggrieved party are substantially affected
if the outcome either would have or may have been
different had the error not occurred."
Defendant then contends that, in any case posing a "we can't
tell" problem, the possibility that the jury based its verdict on
an invalid specification indicates that the outcome of the trial
"might have been different" if the trial court had not erred. 
Therefore, defendant argues, application of the "we can't tell"
rule never runs afoul of ORS 19.415(2).  As we shall explain,
however, the standard that defendant invokes is based on an
overly broad reading of Baker and an incorrect interpretation of
the statute. 
		In Baker, this court reviewed case law applying ORS
19.415(2).  The court began that review -- in the passage quoted
above -- by noting that, to determine whether ORS 19.415(2)
permitted reversal of a judgment, the court historically had
examined whether the error had affected the outcome of the trial. 
324 Or at 590.  The court pointed out that an outcome-based test
appealed to common sense:  If there were no harm to the party
appealing, then there was no foul worth correcting.  See id. at
590-92 (contrasting "harmful" or "prejudicial" error with
"harmless" error).
		In so stating, however, this court did not offer the
phrase "whether the outcome 'may have been different'" as a
standard for determining when an error at trial requires
reversal.  To the contrary, this court emphasized that its
previous outcome-related inquiry, although useful, was not the
test that the statute mandates: 
		"The case law summarized above demonstrates that
an inquiry into the likelihood whether a trial court's
error affected the outcome of the case below can serve
as a useful tool in determining whether the error
resulted in prejudice to a party.  However, that
inquiry, albeit helpful in some cases, is not the test
for determining prejudice.  Rather, our focus in this
and all similar cases is the statutory test set forth
in ORS 19.[415](2):  'No judgment shall be reversed or
modified except for error substantially affecting the
rights of a party.' (Emphasis added.)  That is the only
statutorily mandated test for determining whether an
error requires reversal."
Baker, 324 Or 592-93 (underscoring added; italics in original;
footnote omitted).  Baker emphasized that the text of the statute
itself assumes that an error has occurred, but permits reversal
of the trial court judgment only if the error "substantially
affect[ed] those rights."  Id. at 593 n 8.  Thus, this court's
opinion in Baker did not use, and does not support, the "outcome
might have been different" standard that defendant proposes for
when an appellate court may reverse a judgment on appeal. (2) 
		Further consideration of defendant's "outcome might
have been different" standard also demonstrates that it is not,
as defendant argues, synonymous with the "substantially affects"
standard of ORS 19.415(2).  Under defendant's standard, if there
were any possibility that the error at issue affected the outcome
of the case, then the court must order a new trial.  Because it
is almost always possible that an error at trial affected the
outcome, defendant's proposed standard would lead to retrial of
most, if not all, cases in which there was trial court error in
submitting claims to the jury, among other possible trial errors.
		That result is the opposite of the policy determination
that ORS 19.415(2) embodies.  Under the statute, "no judgment
shall be reversed * * * except for error substantially affecting
the rights of a party."  (Emphasis added.)  The words of ORS
19.415(2) demonstrate that an error must cause something more
than the "possibility" of a different result before the appellate
court may reverse a judgment.  To "affect" means, among other
things, "to act upon: a: to produce an effect (as of disease)
upon * * * b(1): to produce a material influence upon or
alteration in * * * (2): to have a detrimental influence on * * *."  Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 35 (unabridged ed
1993).  Thus, an error "affecting" a party's rights is an error
that can be said to "produce a material influence" or "to have a
detrimental influence" on those rights, and not merely one that
"might" have changed the outcome of the case.  The use of the
adverb "substantially" further limits the type of error that can
result in reversal of a judgment.  "Substantially" means "in a
substantial manner," and the relevant definition of "substantial"
is "being of moment: IMPORTANT, ESSENTIAL."  Id. at 2280.  
		Those definitions indicate how far defendant's proposed
"outcome might have been different" standard is from the standard
set out in ORS 19.415(2).  The possibility that an error might
have resulted in a different jury verdict is insufficient under
the statute.  Instead, the court must be able to conclude, from
the record, that the error "substantially affect[ed]" the rights
of the losing party.  Moreover, the statute protects the trial
court judgment from reversal or modification "except for" error
substantially affecting a party's rights, indicating that
reversal of a judgment is the exception, not the rule.  The rule
embodied in ORS 19.415(2) is neutral as between plaintiffs and
defendants; it places the burden to make a record that
demonstrates prejudicial error on whichever party loses in the
trial court and then seeks reversal or modification of the
judgment on appeal.
		For the foregoing reasons, we find defendant's
arguments unpersuasive.  We conclude that the "we can't tell"
rule, which this court relied upon in some earlier cases and
synthesized in Whinston, is inconsistent with ORS 19.415(2). 
Because that court-made standard conflicts with the standard that
the legislature determined for reversal by an appellate court of
a trial court judgment, it must give way.  In every case, the
appellate courts must adhere to the limitation of ORS 19.415(2)
and reverse or modify a judgment only if it can be determined
from the record that the error "substantially affect[ed] the
rights of a party." 
IV.
In abandoning the "we can't tell" rule described in
Whinston, we recognize that we are overruling a prior court-created rule.  This court may change a prior court-created
procedural rule when the "reasons for [the rule] are no longer
present."  Heino v. Harper, 306 Or 347, 365, 759 P2d 253 (1988). 
This court also may overrule a substantive rule of common law in
several circumstances, one of which is when "[the] earlier case
was inadequately considered or wrong when it was decided."  Id.,
at 373, quoting G.L. v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Inc., 306 Or
54, 59, 757 P2d 1347 (1988).  As explained in part III, above, we
now conclude that the court-made rule in Whinston is inconsistent
with what appears to us to be the appropriate reading of ORS
19.415(2).  That conclusion, standing alone, is sufficient to
meet the Heino criterion for overruling an earlier court-created
rule of substantive law. (3)  Nonetheless, in light of this court's
earlier cases applying the "we can't tell" rule, we discuss here
in greater depth the reasons we believe that the "we can't tell"
rule stated in Whinston was "inadequately considered or wrong
when it was decided."  
		As we noted in our earlier summary, Whinston implicated
ORS 19.415(2) only in its threshold conclusion that the JNOV
should be reversed because there was evidence to support the
jury's verdict.  The court in Whinston nevertheless went on to
describe the "we can't tell" rule, which applies to appeals from
judgments based upon a jury's verdict and also is governed by ORS
19.415(2).  In describing the "we can't tell" rule, the court in
Whinston noted that this court previously had concluded that a
new trial was warranted when a trial court had erred in
submitting an invalid specification of negligence to the jury
over the appellant's objection and the reviewing court could not
determine whether the jury had based its verdict on the invalid
specification.  One such case, upon which Whinston relied, was
Pavlik v. Albertson's, Inc., 253 Or 370, 454 P2d 852 (1969). 
However, in Pavlik, this court merely stated that conclusion in a single sentence, providing no analysis or justification for the
rule and citing no case or statute.  253 Or at 375.  Pavlik thus
provides little analytical support for the proposition that,
without evidence that the jury relied on that specification, the
record demonstrates that a party's rights are substantially
affected when the trial court errs in submitting an invalid
specification of negligence to the jury.  Moreover, Pavlik did
not analyze, or even discuss, the proper role of ORS 19.415(2) in
its inquiry.   
		Neither does this court's decision in Layne v. Portland
Traction Co., 212 Or 658, 319 P2d 884 (1957), which Whinston also
cited, support the "we can't tell" rule.  In that case, the
court, citing former ORS 19.120 (1957), a predecessor statute to
ORS 19.415(2), concluded that a new trial was warranted not only
because the trial court erred in submitting to the jury a
specification of negligence that was unsupported by any evidence,
but also because the trial court erred in giving an "emergency"
instruction, which the plaintiff had requested, when there was no
evidence of an emergency.  212 Or at 674.  Thus, because the
court based its reversal upon consideration of both errors, Layne
does not stand for the proposition that a party's rights are
substantially affected by the submission of an invalid
specification of negligence alone.
		Finally, in other cases that Whinston cited, this court
had acknowledged that the erroneous submission of a specification
of negligence to the jury can be harmless error.  See, e.g.,
Martin Engineering v. Opton, 277 Or 291, 297, 560 P2d 617 (1977)
(so stating); Alvarez v. Great North. Railway Co., 261 Or 66, 76,
491 P2d 190 (1972) (same).  The Whinston "we can't tell" rule is
not consistent with that kind of harmless error approach. 
		The foregoing discussion reveals that, in addition to
conflicting with ORS 19.415(2), Whinston's vulnerability existed
at the time that the court made that decision.  Indeed, in
Whinston itself, this court recognized both the uncertain
provenance and the potentially clouded future of the "we can't
tell" rule.  First, the court specifically noted, in articulating
that rule, that "we decline to adopt a different rule at this
time," 309 Or at 359 (emphasis added).  In addition, the court
warned "careful practitioner[s]" to use special verdicts "to
guard against an untoward outcome were this court to retreat from
the Pavlik rule."  Id. at 359, n 10.  Thus, although the result
in Whinston was not without some support in prior case law, even
at the time it was articulated, this court clearly viewed the "we
can't tell" rule as a court-made rule, the foundations of which
were uncertain at best.
V.
		Before we return to the case on review, we think that
it is appropriate to go further and address the application of
the "we can't tell" rule in cases such as Whinston, in which its
use does not directly violate the mandate of ORS 19.415(2).  As
explained above, we hold today that appellate courts, to act
within statutory limitations, may not apply the "we can't tell"
rule to order a new trial in a case involving a judgment on a
general verdict based on multiple specifications, one of which is
invalid, if there is evidence to support another, valid
specification.  However, in cases such as Whinston, the "we can't
tell" rule has been applied, not to reverse a judgment based on a
jury verdict but, instead, to order a new trial following
reversal of a JNOV.  Because we discern no reason to reject the
"we can't tell" rule when the appeal is from a judgment entered
on a jury verdict, as in this case, and to continue to adhere to
that rule when the appeal is from a JNOV, as in Whinston, we
conclude that a new trial is not warranted automatically in
either circumstance.  
		After reversal of a JNOV, the appellate court must
determine whether to remand the matter to the trial court for
entry of judgment in the nonmoving party's favor or for a new
trial.  That decision will depend on a variety of factors,
including, in particular, the other motions made in the trial
court and the grounds for those motions. (4)  In disavowing that
aspect of Whinston, we hold only that the reversal of a JNOV in a
"we can't tell" situation does not necessarily mean that the
court must order a new trial.
We note that the foregoing approach is consistent with
that used by a trial court to determine whether an error warrants
a new trial.  ORCP 64 B uses words similar to those in ORS
19.415(2) and provides that a trial court may set aside a
judgment and order a new trial when there has been a legal error
or insufficiency of the evidence "materially affecting the
substantial rights of a party * * *."  We see no reason to have a
less demanding standard when an appellate court must determine
the appropriate disposition after finding an error in a case on
appeal than when a trial court rules on a new trial motion. (5) 
VI.
	   	We return now to the question whether the trial court
error warranted reversal in this case.  The error at issue here
was the submission to the jury of the specification of negligence
based on defendant's instruction to its employee to stand in the
aisle to greet customers.  As noted above, the Court of Appeals
held that that specification did not state a claim for negligence
under Oregon law, and plaintiff did not seek review of that
ruling.  That specification was, however, submitted to the jury
along with specifications of negligence based on the failure of
defendant's employee to use reasonable care and to keep a proper
lookout, both of which are valid claims for negligence, and the
jury returned a general verdict for plaintiff.  The evidence that
plaintiff introduced in support of her negligence claim was
straightforward:  Plaintiff, her husband, her physician, and the
store employee were the only witnesses at trial.  There was no
dispute that plaintiff was injured when she was struck by the
store employee, who was backing up to get out of another
shopper's way.  All three specifications of negligence were based
on the same evidence, and the jury concluded that plaintiff had
proved her negligence claim.  
The issue before us is whether, based on the record,
the inclusion of the invalid specification of negligence
"substantially affect[ed]" defendant's rights.  Defendant has not
identified anything in the record to demonstrate that the jury
based its verdict on that specification. (6)  A special verdict
would have allowed defendant to show the claims or specifications
upon which the judgment was based and thus to provide us with a
record that would allow us to determine whether the trial court
error was prejudicial.  See Whinston, 309 Or at 359 n 10
(describing benefits of special verdict or interrogatories to
jury).  In this case, however, defendant objected to plaintiff's
proposed special verdict form, and the court used defendant's
general verdict form.  We agree with plaintiff that the record
does not demonstrate that the jury based its verdict on the
invalid specification and that defendant, therefore, is unable to
show that the trial court's error substantially affected
defendant's rights.  Accordingly, under ORS 19.415(2), there is
no basis to reverse the trial court judgment and order a new
trial.     
		The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed in
part and affirmed in part.  The judgment of the circuit court is
affirmed.   



1. 	As noted above, the Court of Appeals based its decision
in Whinston to remand for entry of a judgment on the verdict,
rather than for a new trial, in part on "constitutional and
statutory admonitions that we reverse only when we can determine
that error was prejudicial."  Whinston, 93 Or App at 530.  That
court cited the predecessor statute of ORS 19.415(2) as support
for the general proposition just quoted, although by its terms
the statute speaks only to when a trial court "judgment" may be
"reversed or modified" and not to the appropriate disposition
after reversal of a JNOV.  The latter question is more properly
analyzed as the trial court would analyze a motion for a new
trial, although the standards are similar, if not identical.  See
post, 335 Or at ____ (slip op at 18-19) (discussing standard for
granting new trial motion).  In any event, this court in Whinston
did not cite or discuss the predecessor statute of ORS 19.415(2). 

2. 	We note that this court, in Hernandez v. Barbo
Machinery Co., 327 Or 99, 106-07, 957 P2d 147 (1998), cited Baker
as indirect authority for the proposition that the rights of a
party are "substantially affected" if "the outcome of the case
either would have or may have been different had the error  not
occurred."  In that regard, Hernandez, like defendant's argument
in this case, takes this court's statement in Baker out of
context.  We do not, however, question the conclusion reached by
this court in Hernandez.  The error in jury instructions at issue
in Hernandez was "reversible" under ORS 19.415(2).

3. 	Because Whinston's "we can't tell" rule meets the
criteria for changing both court-created procedural and
substantive rules, we need not decide whether the "we can't tell"
rule is procedural or substantive as those terms are used in
Heino.

4. 	A party that moved for JNOV in the trial court might or
might not have moved, alternatively, for a new trial.  If that
party did not move for a new trial, then the motion is deemed to
be waived.  ORCP 63 C.  That waiver might mean that the party is
not entitled to a new trial.  See, e.g., Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Tualatin Tire & Auto, 325 Or 46, 53, 932 P2d 1141 (1997)
(failure to move in alternative for new trial operated as waiver
of remedy of new trial with respect to error at issue in motion
for JNOV).  If, on the other hand, the party did move
alternatively for a new trial, and if the trial court ruled on
that motion, then the record concerning that motion and ruling
may influence the appellate court's decision concerning the
appropriate disposition of the case after the reversal of the
JNOV.

5. 	Like the cases decided under ORS 19.415(2), the cases
applying ORCP 64 B (and its statutory predecessor, former ORS
17.610) show that a party is entitled to a new trial only when
the record demonstrates "substantial" or "prejudicial" error.  A
mere showing that the outcome of the trial "might" have been
different absent the error is insufficient.  In Landolt v. The
Flame, Inc., 261 Or 243, 492 P2d 785 (1972), for example, a jury
verdict was rendered for the plaintiff, but the trial court
granted the defendant's motion for a new trial based on various
evidentiary and instructional errors.  This court reversed and
ordered entry of a judgment based on the jury verdict, concluding
that the errors did not warrant a new trial:  "A new trial may be
granted only where there is a basis for a finding by the trial
judge of substantial prejudicial error."  Id. at 262, quoting
McIntosh v. Lawrance, 255 Or 568, 572, 469 P2d 628 (1970).  See
also Williams v. Laurence-David, 271 Or 712, 534 P2d 173 (1975)
(reversing trial court's granting of plaintiff's motion for new
trial following jury verdict for defendant because of no
"substantial prejudicial error").

6. 	As noted, the specification at issue in this case is
invalid because it fails to state a claim of negligence under
Oregon law.  Our analysis would be the same, however, if the
specification were invalid merely because of insufficiency of the
evidence.  We decline to create different rules depending on the
reason for which the specification is invalid, although we
recognize that other jurisdictions have chosen to do so.  Compare
H.E. Culbertson Co. v. Warden, 123 Ohio St 297, 175 NE 205, 207
(1931) ("two-issue" rule:  general verdict will be upheld if any
specification submitted to jury was free from error), with Ricks
v. Jackson, 169 Ohio St 254, 159 NE 2d 225, 227 (1959) ("two-issue" rule does not apply when jury is charged on issue about
which there should not have been charge; in such cases, prejudice
presumed).