Title: PRODUIT v. PRODUIT, JR.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

PRODUIT v. PRODUIT, JR.2001 WY 12335 P.3d 1240Case Number: 01-18Decided: 12/10/2001

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                
     

 

SUSAN 
ELIZABETH PRODUIT, 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

FRED 
ALLAN PRODUIT, JR.,

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable John R. Perry, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Kathryn J. Edelman of Law Office of Kathryn J. Edelman, Gillette, 
Wyoming  

 Representing 
Appellee:

            
Dwight F. Hurich of Hurich Law Office, Gillette, Wyoming  

  

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

  
            
KITE, Justice.

 [¶1]      Susan Elizabeth 
Produit (the mother) appeals the district court's divorce decree which awards 
Fred Allan Produit, Jr. (the father) custody of the two boys born during the 
marriage. We affirm.

 

 

 

[¶2]      The mother 
presents a single issue:

 

Did the district court abuse its 
discretion when it awarded primary custody of the parties' minor children to the 
father?  That is, was the ruling of 
the court inconsistent with the evidence, clearly erroneous or contrary to the 
great weight of the evidence?

 

The 
father similarly frames only one issue:

 

Did the 
district court have sufficient and material evidence to find that it was in the 
children's best interest to be in the primary custody of their 
father?

 

 

 

[¶3]      The mother and 
the father were married on April 6, 1991.  
The couples' first son was born on September 7, 1991, and their second 
son was born on June 25, 1995.  On 
April 25, 2000, the mother separated from the father, leaving the two boys in 
the father's care. The eldest child of the marriage has attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) for which he receives medication and educational 
assistance.  The mother also has 
another son, born prior to the marriage and by a different father.  At her husband's request, she took this 
child with her when she left the marital home.1 

 

[¶4]      In May of 2000, 
the father filed a divorce complaint and a motion for temporary custody of the 
two children.  The mother answered, 
counterclaimed, and filed a cross-motion for temporary custody.  Subsequent to a temporary custody 
hearing held on June 20, 2000, the district court issued an "Order of Temporary 
Custody, Visitation, Child Support, and Medical Insurance" awarding the father 
temporary custody and the mother visitation rights. This temporary order 
provided in relevant part:  

 

[T]he 
[father] shall have temporary care, custody, and control of the parties' minor 
children . . . subject to the [mother's] rights of visitation, 
pending final disposition of this matter or until further order of this 
Court.

 

. . . [T]he 
[mother's] rights of visitation during the pendency of this action shall include 
every other weekend when Friday is an odd numbered day, from the time the 
[mother] picks up the children from either the [father] or the babysitter after 
she gets off work until the following Monday.  The [father] will pick up the children 
from either the babysitter or the [mother] when he gets off work on these 
Mondays.

 

. . . [T]he 
[mother] shall have the right to have the minor children with her for one 
weeknight overnight per week during the pendency of this action, conditioned on 
the [mother] not working past 8:00 p.m. and being able to pick up the children 
shortly thereafter.

 

. . . [N]either 
party shall pay child support to the other during the pendency of this action or 
until further order of this Court.

 

. . . The 
[mother] shall cover all costs of babysitting for the minor children during the 
pendency of this action.

 

[¶5]      The father had 
custody of the two boys from the date of separationApril 25, 2000through the 
divorce trial held on October 17, 2000.  
At trial, the father testified on his own behalf and also called several 
witnesses including a frequent babysitter for the boys, a friend with whom the 
father had coached basketball for the boys, a friend who had witnessed an 
exchange with the mother, and the father's stepmother.  The mother testified on her own behalf 
but called no other witnesses.  

 

[¶6]      Subsequent to the 
evidentiary presentation, the district court made the following comments 
regarding his conclusions on the issue of custody:

 

As far 
as child custody is concerned, it appears to me that both parties are fit and 
proper parents and capable of raising the children.  It seems that the children have been 
doing reasonably well the last several months, so I think it would be in their 
best interest to continue with that same arrangement that is set forth in the 
temporary decree and making that permanent with the [father] to have custody and 
the [mother] to have the visitation as set forth in that order 
. . . .

 

The 
court further determined, consistent with the temporary custody order and the 
suggestion of the father's counsel, that in lieu of child support the mother 
would be required to personally provide and/or pay for necessary 
babysitting.  The record reflects no 
objection by the mother to this resolution of the child support issue.  

 

[¶7]      In the written 
decree issued December 15, 2000, the only findings the district court made 
specifically with regard to the custody issue were:

 

7.  Both 
parents are fit and proper persons to have custody of the minor children of the 
parties;

 

8.  The 
arrangements in the Order of Temporary Custody, Visitation, Child Support, 
and Medical Insurance entered on July 18, 2000 appear to be working 
reasonably well and it would be in the children's best interests to continue 
with these arrangements[.]

 

On these 
findings, the court ordered the father to be the custodial parent with primary 
responsibility for the care, control, and supervision of the minor children 
subject to the mother's rights of summer custody and other visitation. The terms 
of the ordered visitation were virtually identical to the terms set out in the 
temporary order, with minor language changes due to the permanent nature of the 
decree. 

 

[¶8]      The mother 
appeals contending the district court abused its discretion by failing to 
articulate the reasons for the custody award.  She also maintains the award constitutes 
a divided custody arrangement which is not favored by the courts.  Lastly, she argues the award is contrary 
to the great weight of the evidence and ignores the material and uncontroverted 
fact that she was the children's primary care giver prior to the 
separation.  

 

 

 

[¶9]      We have 
previously reiterated the well recognized standard of review for custody 
determinations:

 

Custody, 
visitation, child support, and alimony are all committed to the sound discretion 
of the district court.  It has been 
our consistent principle that in custody matters, the welfare and needs of the 
children are to be given paramount consideration.  The determination of the best interests 
of the child is a question for the trier of fact.  "We do not overturn the decision of the 
trial court unless we are persuaded of an abuse of discretion or the presence of 
a violation of some legal principle."  
Fink [v. Fink], 685 P.2d [34,] 36 [(Wyo. 
1984)].

 

Reavis 
v. Reavis, 955 P.2d 428, 431 (Wyo. 1998) (some citations omitted).  Judicial discretion is a composite of 
many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means 
exercising sound judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.  Pace v. Pace, 2001 WY 43, ¶9, 22 P.3d 861, ¶9 (Wyo. 2001); Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 
1998).

 

            
Our review entails evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
the trial court's decision, and we afford to the prevailing party every 
favorable inference while omitting any consideration of evidence presented by 
the unsuccessful party.  We cannot 
sustain findings of fact not supported by the evidence, contrary to the 
evidence, or against the great weight of the evidence.  Similarly, an abuse of discretion is 
present when a material factor deserving significant weight is ignored.  RDS v. GEMN, 9 P.3d 984, 986 
(Wyo. 2000).

 

Pace, 
¶10.

 

 

 

 

[¶10]   The mother contends the district 
court failed to articulate sufficient findings to support the custody award to 
the father.  She refers to both the 
district court's limited pronouncements at the conclusion of the trial and the 
decree findings at paragraphs 7 and 8, set out above in the recitation of the 
facts.  Although we have 
consistently and strongly urged the district courts to make a record of the 
critical circumstances and factors which constitute the foundation of a custody 
award, we have yet to command this be done in all 
instances.

 

In 
Reavis, we suggested that the trial court spell out its reasons so that 
counsel and the reviewing court will know what those reasons are, and be in a 
position to evaluate the soundness of its decision.  We continue to encourage a trial 
court relying on discretionary power to place on record the circumstances and 
factors that were crucial to its determination.  However, it is not required to do so. 

 

Additionally, our rules do not 
require the trial court to issue findings of fact "unless one of the parties 
requests it before the introduction of any evidence, with the view of excepting 
to the decision of the court upon the questions of law involved in the 
trial."  W.R.C.P. 
52(a). . . . Neither party made such a request and, as such, 
. . . will not be heard to complain of the absence of formal 
findings.

 

Resor v. 
Resor, 987 P.2d 146, 148 (Wyo. 1999) (citation omitted and emphasis added).  The general rule is that no findings are 
required absent a request pursuant to W.R.C.P. 52(a).  In this case, the parties made no such 
request.

 

[¶11]   In Pace, we enunciated 
one specific exception to the general rule in split custody 
situations.  We defined the concept 
of "splitting custody" to mean those instances where siblings are separated from 
one another through custody awards to different parents.

  

As 
future guidance to the trial courts, we hold that, when the exercise of its 
discretion in custody matters involves splitting custody of children between 
parents or other unconventional custody approaches, the trial court must provide 
an explanation of its reasoning and place its findings on the record.  A reasoned explanation and an expression 
of findings of a trial court's conclusion will assure this court that a 
comprehensive evaluation of all relevant factors occurred prior to the award of 
custody.

 

Pace, ¶17 
(footnote omitted).  The instant 
case does not present a split custody scenario, and, for this reason, the 
Pace exception is inapplicable.  

 

[¶12]     Although explicit findings are not 
generally compelled, we note that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(a) (LexisNexis 
2001) became effective July 1, 2000, and sets out the factors the court shall 
consider in the proper disposition of children in a divorce.  2000 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 34, §§ 1, 8.2  This statute, although not specifically 
requiring findings as to the various factors, does direct the factors the court 
shall consider in ordering the disposition of children.  On appeal, this court can ascertain 
whether the factors have been appropriately weighed only if the district court's 
consideration is reflected in the proceeding transcripts, by opinion letter, or 
as findings in the written order.

 

[¶13]   The instant case is somewhat 
unusual in that the Honorable Terrence L. O'Brien, now retired, presided over 
the temporary custody hearing; the Honorable Dan Spangler, retired, presided 
over the divorce trial; and the Honorable John R. Perry signed the divorce 
decree.  Given multiple judges 
presided over different phases of the same case, the record is not as clear as 
it could be.  However, bearing this 
in mind and having thoroughly reviewed this record, we are persuaded the § 
20-2-201(a) factors were considered in the course of the divorce trial.  We note, in the future, remand may be 
necessary if the consideration of § 20-2-201(a) factors is not patent in the 
district court record. 

 

B.        
Divided Custody Allegation

            

[¶14]   The mother also maintains the 
custody award constituted divided custody.  
Relying on Reavis, 955 P.2d 428, she further argues the district 
court's findings were inadequate.  
Her reliance on this case is misplaced.

 

[¶15]   Reavis presented a true 
shared custody arrangement wherein the children were to live with one parent for 
nine weeks and then go back to the other parent for the next nine weeks, 
alternating in this manner between the two parents and the two homes.  This type of divided arrangement is not 
favored and requires an evidentiary basis to support the conclusion such 
flux is in the children's best interest.  
Reavis, 955 P.2d  at 432; see also Martin v. Martin, 
798 P.2d 321, 322 (Wyo. 1990); Feaster v. Feaster, 721 P.2d 1095, 1098 
(Wyo. 1986).  However, "[w]e 
reversed in Reavis because there was no evidence to support the court's 
decision, not because it did not make findings of fact."  Resor, 987 P.2d  at 
148.

 

[¶16]   The instant custody award does not 
constitute a shared or divided arrangement.  It is only the mother's babysitting 
obligation that might arguably lend a divided or shared nuance.  The district court ordered, in lieu of 
the mother paying child support, that she provide babysitting, presumably as 
required by the parents' work schedules.  
This had been the situation provided by the temporary custody order.  During the summer months, it basically 
meant the mother ensured child care for the boys from the time she went to work 
through the time the father returned from work.  During the school year, it translated to 
her providing child care for the boys from the time school was over until the 
father returned from work.  At 
trial, the father's attorney suggested this situation could be continued.  The trial transcript reflects no 
objection by the mother, and the district judge clearly accepted the proposal 
stating: "That sounds all right to me if you want to." 

 

[¶17]   This babysitting requirement could 
as easily be characterized as a child support agreement.  Such a description is at least as 
accurate as, and perhaps more so than, labeling it a custody determination.  Further, the mother did not object to 
the provision.  Nor did she object 
to what she now portrays as divided or shared custody.  Excepting appeals which involve issues 
of jurisdiction or fundamental rights, we will not customarily consider 
contentions of error unless the trial court has first been apprised thereof and 
been given an opportunity to rule.  
Dennis v. Dennis, 675 P.2d 265, 266 (Wyo. 1984); see also 
Rowan v. Rowan, 786 P.2d 886, 889 (Wyo. 1990). Our determination that the 
district court was not required to make findings is not altered by the mother's 
arguments regarding Reavis or divided custody.

 

 

[¶18]   It is also argued that the custody 
award was contrary to the weight of the evidence and failed to consider the 
mother's primary care giver role prior to the separation.  It is well established that findings of 
fact not supported by the evidence, contrary to the evidence, or against the 
great weight of the evidence cannot be sustained. Pace, ¶10; 
Reavis, 955 P.2d  at 431; Resor, 987 P.2d  at 148.  Likewise, an abuse of discretion is 
present when a material factor deserving significant weight is ignored.  Id.  

 

[¶19]   Except for a Department of Family 
Services (DFS) report, the custody evidence consisted exclusively of trial 
testimony.  As noted in the facts, 
the father testified on his own behalf and presented four additional 
witnesses.  The mother also 
testified but presented no other witnesses.  Both parties acknowledged that the 
mother had been the primary care giver for the children during the marriage. 
They both believed whoever was awarded custody should keep the family mobile 
home so the boys would not have to be moved.  Both parties also testified DFS 
investigated the father in September of 1999 regarding a bruise he allegedly 
caused by spanking the child with ADHD.  
They also testified they attended counseling to improve their parenting 
skills and address marital issues as a result of this incident.3 

 

[¶20]   The testimony on the father's 
behalf indicated the mother left the family in April of 2000 on her own 
initiative due to alleged marital problems and her general feeling that she no 
longer wanted to be a full-time parent.  
While in their father's custody, the children did as well as, and 
possibly somewhat better than, they had prior to the separation.  The father had a stable five-year 
employment history and was purchasing the family mobile home from his employer 
through paycheck deductions.  The 
father's stepmother testified she lived very close to the father and would be 
able to assist with the children.  
The babysitter testified he regularly watched the boys and it was his 
general impression the father did a reasonable job of parenting and exerted 
better control of the children than the mother did.  The father acknowledged that the 
children spent significant time in the mother's care as a babysitter because of 
his long work hours.  

 

[¶21]   The mother testified she left the 
family home in order to care for her ill mother and, now that her brother had 
been "released from the Boys' School," he could take on this 
responsibility.  At the time of the 
temporary custody hearing, the mother had a job with irregular hours that 
required some evening work, but, by the time of the divorce trial, she had 
started a new job with daytime hours.  
Prior to the separation, the mother had a very sporadic work history, 
including multiple minimum wage jobs, which she stated was the result of 
accommodating her child care responsibilities.  The mother also testified regarding 
alleged instances of the father's inadequate care of the boys, including his 
failure to provide school lunches or lunch money, make or keep dentist 
appointments, and ensure medication prescriptions were refilled.  

 

[¶22]   The trial judge is in the best 
position to assess the credibility of the witnesses and weigh their 
testimony.  Raymond v. 
Raymond, 956 P.2d 329, 332 (Wyo. 1998); Goff v. Goff, 844 P.2d 1087, 
1092 (Wyo. 1993).  This entire case 
revolved around the assessment of credibility and the proper weight of 
testimony.  The evidence was 
relatively evenly distributed.  
However, it is conceivable that the district court weighed the evidence 
that the mother essentially abandoned the family and had a recent history of 
personal and employment instability against her former role as primary care 
giver.  It could have also weighed 
the evidence with regard to the father's parenting skills, employment stability, 
and conduct during the period of temporary custody to determine he was the more 
fit and stable parent.  Such an 
evaluation would require the assessment of the witnesses' credibility and the 
weighing of conflicting testimony.  
A process of this kind could readily swing the balance toward one party 
despite there being a material factor in favor of the other party.  Therefore, we cannot conclude the 
mother's former role as primary care giver, or any other material factor, was 
ignored.  Reavis, 955 P.2d  at 
431; Triggs v. Triggs, 920 P.2d 653, 657 (Wyo. 1996), abrogated on 
other grounds by Vaughn, 962 P.2d  at 151.  Due to the nature of the evidence this 
case presents, we must rely on the fact finder's determinations and accord them 
considerable deference.  
Raymond, 956 P.2d  at 332; Brown v. State, 944 P.2d 1168, 
1170 (Wyo. 1997).  We hold the 
custody award to the father is not against the great weight of the evidence and 
does not constitute an abuse of discretion.

 

[¶23]   Affirmed. 

FOOTNOTES

1Although the record does not reflect a 
birth date for this child, he appears to have been approximately ten years old 
at the time of the divorce trial and roughly one year older than the first son 
born during the marriage.

 

  2Section 
20-2-201(a) provides:

 

            
(a)  In granting a divorce, separation or annulment of a 
marriage or upon the establishment of paternity pursuant to W.S. 14-2-101 
through 14-2-120, the court may make by decree or order any disposition of the 
children that appears most expedient and in the best interests of the 
children.  In determining the best 
interests of the child, the court shall consider, but is not limited to, the 
following factors:

 

(i)  The quality of the 
relationship each child has with each parent;

 

(ii)  The ability of each 
parent to provide adequate care for each child throughout each period of 
responsibility, including arranging for each child's care by others as 
needed;

 

(iii)  The relative competency 
and fitness of each parent;

 

(iv)  Each parent's 
willingness to accept all responsibilities of parenting, including a willingness 
to accept care for each child at specified times and to relinquish care to the 
other parent at specified times;

 

(v)  How the parents and each 
child can best maintain and strengthen a relationship with each 
other;

 

(vi)  How the parents and each 
child interact and communicate with each other and how such interaction and 
communication may be improved;

 

(vii)  The ability and 
willingness of each parent to allow the other to provide care without intrusion, 
respect the other parent's rights and responsibilities, including the right to 
privacy;

 

(viii)  Geographic distance 
between the parents' residences;

 

(ix)  The current physical and 
mental ability of each parent to care for each 
child;

 

(x)  Any other factors the 
court deems necessary and relevant.

 

 

3The DFS "Notice of Conclusions" 
reflected that, although the allegations had been substantiated at low risk, the 
father's name would not remain on the Child Abuse/Neglect Central 
Registry.  The notice also indicated 
the case was opened in order to provide the services the father had 
requested.  This is presumably a 
reference to the counseling the father and the mother 
received.