Title: Emjay Inv. Co. v. Village of Germantown

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2011 WI 31 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP1714 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Emjay Investment Company, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
 
Village of Germantown, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 327 Wis. 2d 799, 788 N.W. 2d 384 
(Ct. App. 2010 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 17, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 2, 2011   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
CIRCUIT COURT   
 
COUNTY: 
WASHINGTON  
 
JUDGE: 
DAVID G. RESCHKE   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Matthew R. Jelenchick, Niebler, Pyzyk, Roth 
& Carrig LLP 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief and oral 
argument by Amy J. Doyle, Crivello Carlson, S.C.  
 
 
 
 
 
2011 WI 31
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2009AP1714 
(L.C. No. 
2008CV598) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Emjay Investment Company, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Village of Germantown, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 17, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished per curiam decision of the court of appeals, Emjay 
Investment Co. v. Village of Germantown, No. 2009AP1714, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. June 30, 2010), that 
affirmed an order of the Washington County Circuit Court1 
granting the Village of Germantown's motion to dismiss Emjay 
Investment Company's appeal of special assessments levied under 
Wis. Stat. §§ 66.0701 and 66.0703 (2003-04).2  The circuit court 
                                                 
1 The Honorable David C. Resheske presided. 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2009AP1714   
 
2 
 
dismissed the appeal because Emjay Investment Company (Emjay) 
failed to appeal within 90 days after the date on which the 
Village 
of 
Germantown 
(Germantown) 
published 
its 
final 
resolution levying the special assessments or mailed notice of 
its final resolution to interested persons.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0703(12)(a), (e).  The court of appeals affirmed.  We 
granted Emjay's petition for review. 
¶2 
Emjay does not dispute that it failed to comply with 
the 
90-day 
period 
of 
appeal3 
set 
forth 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 66.0703(12)(a).  Instead, Emjay argues that § 66.0703(12)(a) 
does not apply in this case because (1) the special assessments 
were contingent; (2) the special assessments were levied after 
construction 
of 
the 
improvements 
was 
completed; 
or, 
alternatively, (3) the special assessments were fraudulent.  In 
any case, Emjay argues that its appeal can proceed under Wis. 
Stat. § 893.72, irrespective of the 90-day period of appeal in 
Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a). 
                                                                                                                                                             
Wisconsin Stat. §§ 66.0701 and 66.0703 were preceded by 
Wis. Stat. §§ 66.62 and 66.60 (1997-98), respectively.  See 1999 
Wis. Act 150, §§ 532, 544; Steinbach v. Green Lake Sanitary 
Dist., 2006 WI 63, ¶14, 291 Wis. 2d 11, 715 N.W.2d 195.  The 
statutes were recodified as a result of the legislature's effort 
to reorganize and modernize Wis. Stat. ch. 66.  See 1999 Wis. 
Act 150, prefatory note.  Wisconsin Stat. §§ 66.0701 and 66.0703 
are substantively identical to their predecessor statutes.   
3 The 
90-day 
period 
of 
appeal 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 66.0703(12)(a) has also been referred to as a 90-day period of 
limitations, see, e.g., Mayek v. Cloverleaf Lakes Sanitary Dist. 
No. 1, 2000 WI App 182, ¶13, 238 Wis. 2d 261, 617 N.W.2d 235, 
and a 90-day statute of limitations, see, e.g., Bornemann v. 
City of New Berlin, 27 Wis. 2d 102, 106, 109-10, 133 N.W.2d 328 
(1965). 
No. 
2009AP1714   
 
3 
 
¶3 
We disagree with Emjay and therefore affirm the court 
of appeals' decision. 
¶4 
We 
conclude 
that 
Emjay's 
appeal 
and 
complaint 
challenging the special assessments levied by Germantown are 
governed 
by the 90-day period of appeal in Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0703(12)(a).  We further conclude that Wis. Stat. § 893.72 
is inapplicable in this case.  It is undisputed that Emjay filed 
its notice of appeal and complaint years after the 90-day period 
of appeal had passed, and accordingly, the circuit court 
properly dismissed the action. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶5 
Mark and Donna Lohmann are the general partners of 
Emjay.  Until 2007, Emjay owned two parcels of land on the 
corner of Appleton Avenue (State Highway 175) and County Line 
Road (County Highway Q) in Germantown.  Emjay owned and operated 
Lohmann's Steak House on that corner for over 60 years. 
¶6 
In the late 1990s, Menard, Inc. (Menard) submitted a 
development plan to Germantown for a proposed retail development 
to be located at the intersection of Appleton Avenue and Maple 
Road. 
 
Menard 
and 
Germantown 
agreed 
that 
certain 
road 
improvements would need to be undertaken in order to accommodate 
the large retail development.  Specifically, Appleton Avenue 
would need to be widened, and a sewer lift station situated in 
the proposed expansion area would need to be relocated.  In 
addition, the intersection of Appleton Avenue and Maple Road 
would need to be reconstructed, including installation of 
traffic signals and turn lanes.   
No. 
2009AP1714   
 
4 
 
¶7 
On July 1, 2002, Germantown entered into a Development 
Agreement with Menard, in which Menard agreed to install and pay 
for the above-mentioned improvements.  In return, Germantown 
agreed to reimburse Menard for a portion of the cost through 
special assessments levied against and collected from benefitted 
properties.  The Development Agreement defined the benefitted 
properties 
as 
those 
abutting 
Appleton 
Avenue, 
or 
more 
specifically:  
Owners or purchasers of benefitted properties 
abutting STH 175, including without limitation, owner 
or purchasers of properties located on the south side 
of STH 175 running from CTH Q to the gas pipeline 
north of the Maple/STH 175 intersection and owners or 
purchasers of properties located on the north side of 
STH 175 running from the [Menard] Property to the gas 
pipeline north of the Maple/STH 175 intersection.   
It is undisputed that Emjay's property was located within that 
geographical description (hereinafter the "Special Assessment 
District"). 
¶8 
Menard commenced construction.  The improvements were 
significantly completed by the end of 2003. 
¶9 
During that time, on July 7, 2003, Germantown adopted 
a Preliminary Resolution declaring its intent to exercise its 
police powers under Wis. Stat. §§ 66.0701 and 66.0703 and under 
§ 8.04 
of 
Germantown's 
Municipal 
Code 
to 
levy 
special 
assessments against the Special Assessment District for the 
relocation of Sanitary Sewer Lift Station No.3 and for the road 
improvements to Appleton Avenue.  See Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(4).  
The 
Preliminary 
Resolution 
provided 
that 
"[t]he 
special 
No. 
2009AP1714   
 
5 
 
assessments 
shall 
be 
deferred, 
with 
interest, 
until 
the 
benefitted property is conveyed or developed, whichever comes 
first." 
¶10 On July 11, 2003, Germantown mailed notice of the 
Preliminary Resolution to all interested property owners, 
including Emjay.   
¶11 On or about April 25, 2004, Germantown's Director of 
Public Works and Village Engineer filed with the Village Clerk a 
report on the proposed special assessments.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0703(4), (5).  The report detailed the cost of the 
improvements, which totaled $3,144,313.44.  See § 66.0703(5)(b).  
The report also included a Statement of Benefits, which provided 
that the Director of Public Works examined the relevant area and 
made a benefit determination for each parcel included within the 
Special 
Assessment 
District. 
 
See 
§ 66.0703(5)(c), 
(d).  
Concerning the two parcels owned by Emjay, the report proposed a 
special assessment of $73,417.01 and $85,291.39, respectively.  
The Director of Public Works determined that "a benefit will 
accrue to each of the properties due to the improvement on the 
basis of providing improved safety through controlled traffic 
flow and turning movements and enhanced economical value to the 
property."   
¶12 On April 28, 2004, Germantown published notice of a 
May 17, 2004, public hearing on the Preliminary Resolution and 
mailed notice of the public hearing to all interested property 
owners, including Emjay.  See Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(7)(a). 
No. 
2009AP1714   
 
6 
 
¶13 Once Emjay received notice of the public hearing, Mark 
Lohmann telephoned Germantown's Village Hall.  According to Mark 
Lohmann, a person at Village Hall informed him that the special 
assessment would not affect Emjay's property because the 
property was already commercially developed.  
¶14 As noticed, Germantown conducted a public hearing on 
the Preliminary Resolution on May 17, 2004. 
¶15 On June 21, 2004, Germantown adopted Resolution No. 
R21-04, the Final Resolution levying special assessments against 
the Special Assessment District for the relocation of Sanitary 
Sewer Lift Station No.3 and for the road improvements to 
Appleton Avenue.  See Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(8)(c).  The Final 
Resolution explicitly provided that the special assessments were 
made pursuant to Germantown's police power and pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 66.0701 
and 
66.0703 
and 
§ 8.04 
of 
Germantown's 
Municipal Code.  In addition, the Final Resolution expressed 
Germantown's determination that the properties located in the 
Special Assessment District "have received a special benefit" 
from the improvements and that the proposed special assessments 
have a reasonable basis. 
¶16 Relevant to this case, the Final Resolution provided 
that pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 66.0715, the special assessments 
"shall be deferred, along with accrued interest . . . until the 
benefitted property is commercially developed or redeveloped."  
The special assessments were deferred for a period of up to 10 
years:  
No. 
2009AP1714   
 
7 
 
If a benefitted property, or a portion thereof, is 
commercially developed or redeveloped, within ten (10) 
years, as measured from the date of execution of the 
Developer Agreement on July 1, 2002, to the date on 
which the Village [of Germantown] shall grant final 
approval of a site plan for the commercial development 
or redevelopment of the benefitted property, the 
principal balance of the special assessments, plus 
accrued 
interest 
as 
provided 
for 
herein, 
shall 
immediately become due and payable in full to the 
Village of Germantown.   
The Final Resolution then stated that the special assessments, 
plus interest, collected from the benefitted properties will be 
paid to Menard, in accordance with the terms of the Development 
Agreement. 
¶17 The Final Resolution was published on June 30, 2004.  
See Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(8)(d).  On July 12, 2004, Germantown 
mailed notice of the Final Resolution to all interested property 
owners, including Emjay.  See id.  Emjay does not dispute that 
it received such notice. 
¶18 In September 2007, Mark and Donna Lohmann retired, and 
Emjay sold its two parcels to a developer.  Before the closing 
of the sale, Germantown sent Emjay two letters of special 
assessment, one for each parcel.  Germantown claimed outstanding 
special assessments of $73,417.01 and $85,291.39, respectively, 
plus six percent interest, due and payable in full upon the sale 
of the property.  In accordance with Germantown's claimed 
special assessments, the sale contract was amended, and Emjay 
was required to deposit $235,000 in escrow to cover the cost of 
the special assessments, subject to Emjay's right to contest the 
special assessments. 
No. 
2009AP1714   
 
8 
 
II. PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶19 On May 30, 2008, Emjay filed a "Notice of Appeal 
Pursuant to Wis. Stat. Sec. 66.0703(12) and Complaint" against 
Germantown.  The notice of appeal alleged that the special 
assessments were "defective"4 and requested a judgment annulling 
                                                 
4 Emjay's "Notice of Appeal" alleged that the special 
assessments were defective for the following reasons: 
a. 
The special assessments levied on the property 
exceed the value of the benefits accruing to 
the property. 
b. 
The special assessments as levied, have no 
reasonable basis. 
c. 
The area of the special assessments is not 
limited or determined by the special benefits 
conferred. 
d. 
The Village [of Germantown] does not have 
jurisdiction to specially assess the property 
since the property is not adjacent to or 
abutting the improvements. 
e. 
The special assessments, or any installations 
thereof, were never entered upon the tax rolls 
of the Village [of Germantown]. 
f. 
Accrued interest on the special assessments is 
not related to any bond, note or other 
financing expense, and therefore, is not 
recoverable 
as 
part 
of 
the 
special 
assessments. 
g. 
The special assessment does not become due 
until the property is finally approved for 
commercial development upon application to the 
Village [of Germantown], and may never be 
collected relative to certain properties that 
have been developed in the past or will not be 
developed in the future. 
No. 
2009AP1714   
 
9 
 
the assessments under § 66.0703(12)(d).  Emjay's complaint 
                                                                                                                                                             
h. 
That the special assessments expire in 2012 
and may never be collected by the Village [of 
Germantown] relative to properties that are 
not developed before then. 
i. 
The improvements, or a portion thereof, sought 
to be paid by the special assessments were not 
for municipal purpose, and were not public 
works. 
j. 
The special assessments include interest from 
the date of the Development Agreement with 
Menard, Inc. and not of any special assessment 
notice. 
k. 
The Director of Public Works did not prepare a 
preliminary or final report as required to be 
part of the Resolution. 
l. 
The Director of Public Works did not prepare 
any 
preliminary 
or 
final 
plans 
and 
specifications for the improvements to be part 
of the report. 
m. 
The Director of Public Works did not produce 
any estimate of the entire cost of the 
improvements or a statement of the final cost 
of the improvements to be part of the report. 
n. 
The Director of Public Works did not make any 
statement that each property against which the 
special assessments were levied had been 
inspected and were benefitted, setting forth 
the basis of such benefit. 
o. 
The report of the Director of Public Works was 
never filed with the Village Clerk. 
p. 
The Village [of Germantown] did not adopt any 
resolution directing the work or improvement 
to be carried out and paid for in accordance 
with the Director of Public Works' report. 
q. 
The Village [of Germantown] did not approve 
the plans and specifications by resolution. 
No. 
2009AP1714   
 
10 
 
sought a judgment declaring the special assessments illegal and 
void and a judgment declaring that Germantown had no interest in 
Emjay's property for purposes of levying special assessments.  
In 
addition, 
Emjay's 
complaint 
alleged 
that 
the 
special 
assessments were "false, a sham and frivolous" and therefore 
impaired title to Emjay's property; the special assessments 
tortuously interfered with Emjay's contractual right to receive 
the full value of its property; and the special assessments were 
confiscatory in nature and effectively constituted a taking of 
Emjay's property without just compensation and without due 
process of law. 
¶20 Germantown moved the circuit court to dismiss Emjay's 
appeal and complaint, arguing that Emjay's claims are barred by 
the 
90-day 
period 
of 
appeal 
set 
forth 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 66.0703(12)(a).  Germantown maintained that Emjay's inclusion 
of other causes of action in the complaint does not save the 
claims from § 66.0703(12)(a), since the additional causes of 
action "[arise] out of and are based entirely on the alleged 
improper assessments . . . ." 
¶21 On 
April 
13, 
2009, 
the 
circuit 
court 
granted 
Germantown's motion, dismissing Emjay's appeal and complaint on 
the grounds that Emjay failed to comply with the strictly 
enforced 90-day period of appeal in Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a).  
¶22 Emjay appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed.  
Emjay, No. 2009AP1714.  In an unpublished per curiam decision, 
the court of appeals agreed with the circuit court that Emjay's 
No. 
2009AP1714   
 
11 
 
action was barred by the 90-day period of appeal in Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0703(12)(a).  Id., ¶3. 
¶23 Emjay petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on September 22, 2010.  We now affirm. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶24 A motion to dismiss based upon a failure to appeal 
within a statutorily mandated period functions as a motion for 
summary judgment.  Whether the circuit court properly granted a 
motion for summary judgment is a question of law that we review 
de novo, applying the same standards used by the circuit and set 
forth in Wis. Stat. § 802.08 (2009-10).  See Town Bank v. City 
Real Estate Dev., LLC, 2010 WI 134, ¶31, 330 Wis. 2d 340, 793 
N.W.2d 476; Tatera 
v. FMC Corp., 2010 WI 90, ¶15, 328 
Wis. 2d 320, 786 N.W.2d 810.  Summary judgment "shall be 
rendered 
if 
the 
pleadings, 
depositions, 
answers 
to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law."  § 802.08(2) (2009-10). 
IV. ANALYSIS 
¶25 A "special assessment," also known as an "assessment 
for benefits," is defined as "[t]he assessment of a tax on 
property that benefits in some important way from a public 
improvement."  Black's Law Dictionary 112 (7th ed. 1999); see 
also Park Ave. Plaza v. City of Mequon, 2008 WI App 39, ¶17, 308 
Wis. 2d 439, 747 N.W.2d 703 ("A special benefit has the effect 
of furnishing an uncommon advantage to a property.  An uncommon 
No. 
2009AP1714   
 
12 
 
advantage is one that differs in kind, rather than in degree, 
from the benefits enjoyed by the general public." (Internal 
citation omitted.)).   
¶26 A municipality's power to levy special assessments 
against private property owners is statutory.  Steinbach v. 
Green Lake Sanitary Dist., 2006 WI 63, ¶13, 291 Wis. 2d 11, 715 
N.W.2d 195.  Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 66.0701(1), the governing 
body of a village "may, by ordinance, provide that the cost of 
installing or constructing any public work or improvement shall 
be charged in whole or in part to the property benefited, and 
make an assessment against the property benefited in the manner 
that the governing body determines."  Consistent with its 
authority under § 66.0701(1), Germantown enacted § 8.04 of its 
Municipal Code for purposes of levying special assessments.  
Section 8.04 is based upon Germantown's police powers.  See 
Mowers v. City of St. Francis, 108 Wis. 2d 630, 636, 323 
N.W.2d 157 (Ct. App. 1982). 
¶27 In addition, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(1)(a), 
the governing body of any city, town or village may, by 
resolution, "levy and collect special assessments upon property 
in a limited and determinable area for special benefits 
conferred 
upon 
the 
property 
by 
any 
municipal 
work 
or 
improvement." 
 
Furthermore, 
§ 66.0703(1)(a) 
permits 
the 
municipality to fund the cost of the work or improvement out of 
the proceeds of the special assessments. 
¶28 Wisconsin Stat. § 66.0703(4)-(8) then outlines the 
procedure by which the municipality must exercise its power to 
No. 
2009AP1714   
 
13 
 
levy special assessments, culminating in the adoption of a final 
resolution under subsection (8)(c)5 and the publication of the 
final resolution under subsection (8)(d).6   
¶29 Of significance to this case, Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12) 
provides the exclusive procedure by which an aggrieved property 
owner may appeal from the municipality's adoption of a final 
resolution to levy special assessments under § 66.0703(8)(c).  
Section 66.0703(12)(a) states, in relevant part:  
A person having an interest in a parcel of land 
affected by a determination of the governing body, 
under sub. (8)(c) . . . , may, within 90 days after 
the date of the notice or of the publication of the 
final 
resolution 
under 
sub. (8)(d), 
appeal 
the 
determination to the circuit court of the county in 
which the property is located. . . .   
In other words, pursuant to § 66.0703(12)(a), a 90-day period of 
appeal commences once the municipality publishes its final 
resolution 
levying 
the 
special 
assessments 
or 
once 
the 
municipality mails notice of the final resolution to interested 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 66.0703(8)(c) 
states: 
"When 
the 
governing body finally determines to proceed with the work or 
improvement, it shall approve the plans and specifications and 
adopt a resolution directing that the work or improvement be 
carried out and paid for in accordance with the report as 
finally approved."  "[T]he report" in subsection (8)(c) refers 
to the report that a designated municipal officer or employee 
must prepare at the proposal stage of the special assessment.  
See § 66.0703(4), (5). 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 66.0703(8)(d) states: "The city, town or 
village clerk shall publish the final resolution as a class 1 
notice, under ch. 985, in the assessment district and a copy of 
the resolution shall be mailed to every interested person whose 
post-office address is known, or can be ascertained with 
reasonable diligence." 
No. 
2009AP1714   
 
14 
 
persons, whichever is later.  See Mayek v. Cloverleaf Lakes 
Sanitary Dist. No. 1, 2000 WI App 182, ¶11 & n.9, 238 
Wis. 2d 261, 617 N.W.2d 235.  "The statute thus sets dates 
certain from which the time limit proceeds rather than a more 
ephemeral date such as when a property owner knows of the 
assessment."  Id., ¶11. 
¶30 An aggrieved property owner must strictly comply with 
the 90-day period of appeal in Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a); the 
failure to do so is a forfeiture of the right to appeal.  See 
id., ¶13 ("A notice served more than ninety days after 
publication of the assessment is untimely, and a property 
owner's appeals rights are foreclosed."); Gamroth v. Vill. of 
Jackson, 215 Wis. 2d 251, 259, 571 N.W.2d 917 (Ct. App. 1997); 
Bialk v. City of Oak Creek, 98 Wis. 2d 469, 472, 297 N.W.2d 43 
(Ct. App. 1980).  "[T]he policy consideration behind this rule 
is to maintain a simple, ordinary and uniform way of conducting 
legal business in our courts.  Uniformity, consistency and 
compliance with procedural rules are important aspects of the 
administration of justice.  If the statutory prescriptions are 
to be meaningful, they must be unbending."  Gamroth, 215 
Wis. 2d at 259 (internal quotations omitted). 
¶31 The legislature has explicitly directed that an appeal 
under Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12) is the "sole remedy" of a 
property owner aggrieved by a special assessment levied under 
§ 66.0703:  
An appeal under this subsection is the sole 
remedy of any person aggrieved by a determination of 
No. 
2009AP1714   
 
15 
 
the governing body, whether or not the improvement was 
made according to the plans and specifications, and 
shall raise any question of law or fact, stated in the 
notice 
of 
appeal, 
involving 
the 
making 
of 
the 
improvement, the assessment of benefits or the award 
of 
damages 
or 
the 
levy 
of 
any 
special 
assessment. . . .   
§ 66.0703(12)(e); see also Harbours Pointe of Nashotah, LLC v. 
Vill. of Nashotah, 278 F.3d 701, 705 (7th Cir. 2002) ("A clear 
reading 
of 
the 
statute . . . demonstrates 
that 
section 
66.60(12)(a) 
[renumbered 
as 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 66.0703(12)(a)] 
explicitly provides a claimant with the 'sole remedy' for any 
complaint regarding a municipality's collection of assessments 
under section 66.60 [renumbered as § 66.0703].").  Section 
66.0703(12)(e) lists only two types of appeals that are excepted 
from the 90-day period of appeal in subsection (12)(a): "appeals 
based [1] on fraud or [2] on latent defects in the construction 
of the improvement discovered after the period of limitation." 
¶32 Turning to the facts of this case, Emjay does not 
dispute that it failed to comply with the 90-day period of 
appeal set forth in Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a).  The 90-day 
period of appeal commenced on July 12, 2004, the date on which 
Germantown mailed notice of the Final Resolution to all 
interested 
property 
owners, 
including 
Emjay. 
 
See 
§ 66.0703(12)(a); Mayek, 238 Wis. 2d 261, ¶11 & n.9.  Emjay, 
however, did not file its notice of appeal and complaint until 
May 30, 2008, nearly four years after Germantown mailed notice 
of the Final Resolution.  Indeed, Emjay's brief to this court 
acknowledges that "[t]he notice of special assessment was made, 
and the 90 Day Appeal Limitation had passed, years before Emjay 
No. 
2009AP1714   
 
16 
 
filed suit in 2008."  As made clear in Mayek, 238 Wis. 2d 261, 
¶13; Gamroth, 215 Wis. 2d at 259; and Bialk, 98 Wis. 2d at 472, 
an aggrieved property owner's failure to strictly comply with 
the 90-day period of appeal in § 66.0703(12)(a) requires 
dismissal of the appeal. 
¶33 Emjay maintains, however, that its failure to comply 
with the 90-day period of appeal is not dispositive because Wis. 
Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a) does not apply in this case.  In support 
of its position, Emjay advances several arguments, the most 
notable of which include: (1) Section 66.0703(12)(a) does not to 
apply to contingent special assessments like those levied in 
this case; (2) Section 66.0703(12)(a) does not apply because 
Germantown levied the special assessments after construction of 
the improvements was completed; and (3) the special assessments 
are fraudulent, evident by Germantown's "procedural failure" and 
neglect "to actually endeavor what [§ 66.0703] charges it to 
do."  According to Emjay, these alleged deficiencies evince 
Germantown's lack of authority to levy the special assessments 
in the first instance.  Citing Germantown's alleged lack of 
power, Emjay urges us to apply Wis. Stat. § 893.727 to its appeal 
instead of Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a).   
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.72 governs generally "[a]ctions 
contesting special assessment":  
An action to avoid any special assessment, or 
taxes levied pursuant to the special assessment, or to 
restrain the levy of the taxes or the sale of lands 
for the nonpayment of the taxes, shall be brought 
within one year from the notice thereof, and not 
thereafter.  This limitation shall cure all defects in 
No. 
2009AP1714   
 
17 
 
¶34 Emjay's arguments miss the mark.  Whether the special 
assessments were defective or even whether Germantown had the 
power to levy the special assessments do not bear on the 
preliminary issue of whether the 90-day period of appeal in Wis. 
Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a) applies in this case.  The issue of 
whether § 66.0703(12)(a) applies entails a much more straight-
forward analysis. 
¶35 We conclude that Emjay's appeal and complaint are 
governed by the 90-day period of appeal set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0703(12)(a).  Had Emjay filed its notice of appeal and 
complaint within the 90-day period of appeal, the circuit court 
would have been able to address the merits of Emjay's arguments—
—including whether the special assessments were defective or 
whether Germantown had the power to levy the special assessments 
in the first instance. 
¶36 As previously explained, an appeal under Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0703(12) is the "sole remedy" of a property owner aggrieved 
by 
a 
special 
assessment 
levied 
under 
§ 66.0703.  
§ 66.0703(12)(e).  In this case, there is no question that 
Germantown levied the special assessments under § 66.0703 and 
that Emjay received notice of the same.   
                                                                                                                                                             
the proceedings, and defects of power on the part of 
the officers making the assessment, except in cases 
where the lands are not liable to the assessment, or 
the city, village or town has no power to make any 
such assessment, or the amount of the assessment has 
been paid or a redemption made. 
(Emphasis added.) 
No. 
2009AP1714   
 
18 
 
¶37 Both 
the 
Preliminary 
Resolution 
and 
the 
Final 
Resolution expressly provided that the special assessments were 
being levied pursuant to Germantown's authority under Wis. Stat. 
§§ 66.0701 and 66.0703 and § 8.04 of its Municipal Code.  
Section 
8.04(4) 
of 
Germantown's 
Municipal 
Code 
expressly 
incorporates the provisions of Wis. Stat. § 66.0703,8 and 
notably, section 8.04(6) specifically provides that the appeal 
provisions of Wis. Stat. §§ 66.0703(12) and 66.0701(2)9 "apply to 
any special assessment levied under this section."  Emjay does 
not dispute that it received notice of both the Preliminary 
Resolution and the Final Resolution.  In this context, such 
notice is all that due process requires.  See Estate of Wolff v. 
Town Bd. of Town of Weston, 156 Wis. 2d 588, 596, 457 N.W.2d 510 
(Ct. App. 1990) ("A notice must be sufficient to enable the 
                                                 
8 Section 8.04(4) of Germantown's Municipal Code provides: 
"The provisions of § 66.60, Wis. Stats. [renumbered as Wis. 
Stat. § 66.0703], including those related to notice, hearing and 
the adoption of a final resolution shall, to the extent not 
inconsistent with this section, apply to special assessments 
levied under this section."   
9 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 66.0701(2), 
in 
turn, 
expressly 
incorporates 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 66.0703(12). 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 66.0701(2) states, in relevant part, that "[a]ny person 
against whose land a special assessment is levied under the 
ordinance may appeal in the manner prescribed in s. 66.0703(12) 
within 40 days of the date of the final determination of the 
governing body."  Because it is undisputed that Emjay failed to 
comply with the 90-day period of appeal in Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0703(12)(a), and therefore necessarily failed to comply 
with the 40-day period of appeal in Wis. Stat. § 66.0701(2), we 
make no determination as to which of the two limitation periods 
controls in this case. 
No. 
2009AP1714   
 
19 
 
recipient 
to 
determine what he must do to prevent the 
deprivation of his interest."). 
¶38 Furthermore, neither the Preliminary Resolution nor 
the Final Resolution mentions Wis. Stat. § 893.72.  While this 
court has recognized an apparent conflict between Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0703(12) and the more general right to file a civil action 
under Wis. Stat. § 893.72 to contest a special assessment, see 
Bornemann v. City of New Berlin, 27 Wis. 2d 102, 111, 133 
N.W.2d 328 (1965), the latter is simply not implicated in this 
case.  Germantown explicitly levied the special assessments 
under Wis. Stat. § 66.0703.  See State ex rel. Robinson v. Town 
of Bristol, 2003 WI App 97, ¶¶13-14, 264 Wis. 2d 318, 667 
N.W.2d 14.  An appeal under Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a) and (e) 
is limited to special assessments levied by municipalities under 
Wis. Stat. § 66.0703.  Wisconsin Stat. § 893.72, on the other 
hand, applies to all special assessments generally.  See 
Bornemann, 27 Wis. 2d at 111.  "One of the well-recognized 
canons of statutory construction is that, in event of a conflict 
between a general and a specific statute, the latter controls."  
Id.  Indeed, Wis. Stat. § 893.01 expressly recognizes that civil 
actions under chapter 893 "may be commenced only within the 
periods prescribed in this chapter, except when, in special 
cases, 
a 
different 
limitation 
is 
provided 
by 
statute."  
(Emphasis added.)  Wisconsin Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a) provides a 
different period of appeal. 
¶39 Accordingly, whether Emjay classifies its challenge to 
the special assessments as a notice of appeal under Wis. Stat. 
No. 
2009AP1714   
 
20 
 
§ 66.0703(12) or as a complaint comprised of separate causes of 
action is a distinction without a difference: because all of 
Emjay's claims are based upon the special assessments that 
Germantown levied under § 66.0703, Emjay's exclusive remedy is 
an appeal under § 66.0703(12).  See Harbours Pointe of Nashotah, 
278 
F.3d 
at 
705-06 
(concluding 
that 
the 
plaintiff's 
constitutional 
takings 
claim 
was 
governed 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 66.60(12)(a) [renumbered as Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a)] and 
that "any contrary interpretation of this statutory scheme would 
undermine the clear intent of the Wisconsin legislature"). 
¶40 Wisconsin Stat. § 66.0703(12)(e) lists only two types 
of appeals that are excepted from the 90-day period of appeal in 
subsection (12)(a): "appeals based [1] on fraud or [2] on latent 
defects in the construction of the improvement discovered after 
the period of limitation."  Emjay concedes that its appeal is 
not based on any "latent defects in the construction of the 
improvement."  See § 66.0703(12)(e).  Instead, Emjay argues that 
the 90-day period of appeal in § 66.0703(12)(a) does not apply 
in this case because the special assessments are fraudulent.   
¶41 It is true that an appeal based on fraud is expressly 
excluded from the 90-day period of appeal.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0703(12)(e).  However, neither Emjay's notice of appeal nor 
complaint alleges fraud or otherwise conveys an intent to 
mislead on the part of Germantown.  When pressed at oral 
argument, Emjay advised the court that the special assessments 
are fraudulent because of Germantown's "procedural failure" and 
its neglect "to actually endeavor what [§ 66.0703] charges it to 
No. 
2009AP1714   
 
21 
 
do."  However, absent an intent to mislead, such procedural 
deficiencies, assuming they exist, do not constitute fraud.  
Rather, procedural deficiencies are precisely the type of 
allegations 
that 
"shall" 
be 
raised 
in 
an 
appeal 
under 
§ 66.0703(12).  See § 66.0703(12)(e) (providing that an appeal 
under § 66.0703(12) "shall raise any question of law or fact, 
stated in the notice of appeal, involving the making of the 
improvement, the assessment of benefits or the award of damages 
or the levy of any special assessment"). 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶42 We 
conclude 
that 
Emjay's 
appeal 
and 
complaint 
challenging the special assessments levied by Germantown are 
governed 
by the 90-day period of appeal in Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0703(12)(a).  We further conclude that Wis. Stat. § 893.72 
is inapplicable in this case.  It is undisputed that Emjay filed 
its notice of appeal and complaint years after the 90-day period 
of appeal had passed, and accordingly, the circuit court 
properly dismissed the action. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No. 
2009AP1714   
 
 
 
1