Title: State v. Yamada. Dissenting Opinion by J. Acoba [pdf]. Dissenting Opinion by J. Duffy [pdf].

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

LAW LIPRARY,
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATS OP HAWAT'T

 

 

STATE OF HAWAT‘T, Plaintiff-Appellant,

KALEOKALANI YAMADA, Defendant-Appellee.

 

 

No. 26506

  

a

APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(CR. NO. 03-31-1509)

‘oavHVH
gas

 

ocToBER 21, 2005

02:2 Kd 12 19080

 

HOON, C.J., LEVINSON, AND NAKAYAMA, Jd. 7 3
ACOBA, J., DISSENTING; DUFFY, J., DISSENTING
OPINION OF THE COURT BY MOON, c.g.
Plaintitt-appellant State of Hawai'i (hereinafter, the
prosecution] appeals from the March 15, 2004 findings of fact,
conclusions of law and order of the Circuit Court of the First
Circuit, the Honorable Michael A. Town presiding, granting a new
trial co defendant-appellee Kaleokalani Yanada, who had been
convicted of two counts of robbery in the first degree, in
violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 708-840(1) (b) (4)

and one count of assault in the first

 

and (ii) (Supp. 1998),

 

+ HRS § 708-840 provides in pertinent pare:

 

Robbery in the first degree. (2) X person commits the
offense of robbery in the firet degree if, in the course of
connitting theft:

(continued...)

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

in violation of HRS § 707-710 (1993).* On appeal, the

 

degree,
prosecution contends that the trial court abused its discretion
in granting Yanada’s motion for new trial inasmuch as the court
based its decision on the sole ground that a juror slept through
twelve minutes of defense counsel’s one-hour long closing
argument, “without a showing of actual prejudice from the defense
or a finding of prejudice by the circuit court, and where the
record as a whole evinced no prejudice to defendant." For the
following reasons, we vacate the circuit court’s March 15, 2004
order and remand this case for sentencing.
1. BACKGROUND

on duly 9, 2003, Yamada was charged by complaint with

two counts of robbery in the first degree and one count of

jault in the first degree, Trial commenced on November 24,

 

2003, The sole issue contested at trial was the identity of the
perpetrator. During his opening statement, defense counsel

stated to the jury:

(continued)

(b) The pergon {8 armed with a dangerous instrument

ands

(me person us
of anyone pr
Ehat person's physical resistance or
physigal power of resistat

(i) The person threatens the i
force against the
present with intent to compel acquiescence
Eo the taking of or escaping with the

Property.

 

  

2 ues § 707-710 provides in pertinent part: “A person commits the
offense of assault in the firet degree if the person intentionally or
Wmowingly cases serious bodily injury to another person."

 

   

 
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SSS

Mistaken identity, ladies and gentlemen... . The
evidence will show that [Yamada] Se not guilty(.]  itike
evidence will show that there are a lot of inaccuracies
here. There’s a lot of inconsistencies. There's reasonable
Goubt, and the State cannot prove these chargen beyond a
Feasonable doubt because [vanada] aid not do cnis.

 

 

At trial, the prosecution presented two witnesses who positively
identified Yamada in a police lineup. Yamada presented one alibi
witness who testified that she was with him at her house on the
night of the incident and that Yamada had remained with her until
the next afternoon. Additionally, Yamada’s then-enployer
testified for the defense as to Yamada’s physical appearance and
Pertinent company policies regarding physical appearance to
contradict the prosecution witnesses’ physical descriptions of
the perpetrator.

on Decenber 2, 2003, after the court read its
instructions to the jury, the parties presented closing
arguments. During defense counsel's closing argunent, the
bailiff signaled to the judge that a juror “might be sleeping.”
The judge noticed that one of the jurors’ “head was over,"
although he could not see her eyes.? At that point, the judge
interrupted defense counsel, asking, “Everybody wide awake?
Everybody awake? You can rest your eyelids, but lieten.* At
that point, the judge noticed that the foreperson either *Al,]
opened her eyes and was awake, or BI,] woke up." Despite the
interruption, defense counsel continued his argument without

repeating or requesting to repeat any portion of his argument.

 

* this particular juror later turned out to be the foreperson of the

jury

 

 
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After the prosecution's rebuttal, the court made its final charge

130 a.m. the next

 

to the jury with instructions to return at
morning, unless it reached a verdict that afternoon. The jury
Gid not reach a verdict and was, therefore, instructed to return
the following day.

The next morning, outside of the jury's presence,
defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the following grounds:
(2) several jurors “seemed sleepy [during defense counsel's
closing argument) and did not consider the closing argument” and
(2) the prosecution made improper statements regarding certain
evidence during its closing argument.‘ In support of Yamada’s

motion for mistrial, defense counsel recalled:

Vink {¢ was two or three jurors who seemed to be very
spy. infact, one of the Juror looked like she was
Sleeping. in fact, that juror turned out to be the
foreperson of the jury.

    

The prosecution similarly recounted that another juror, Joe

Gomez, appeared drowsy during closing argument:

[Prosecution] : Your honor, T did not notice (the
foreperson). However, T did notice the gentlesan right next
toher. 1 forget hie nane

‘fue COURT: Gomez.

[Prosecution [Gonez) had hie eyes closed 20 what =
id te 1 dropped -~ while T was doing ny closing argument,
he had Ais eyes closed and wasn’t locking at ne sof dropped
the pictures and made kind of a loud sound and it didn‘
appear that he was sleeping because as soon as I did that,
he locked up and, you know, it’s like he focused his

 

+ specifically, Yanada argued that the prosecution referred to certain
inadmissible evidence relating to Yanada’e identification; hovever, thie
je ia not before thie court on appeal

 

 
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a

After hearing further argument, the court rule

 

on the allegation there may have been a sleeping Juror, I'm
sein ea deny the mistrial now without prejudice to raise it
eiNG Sepending un the verdict, with your preference,
(Ettense) counsel. to take sone testisony from the

teeten tea if she wan asleep later agsuming today and if $0,
Galy Tene forepereon] or KE» Gomes (.)

The court also noted that, because a third juror, Thomas Saka,
emight have had his eyes closed[,] . . . I gotta talk to ‘em. We
gotta get it right.*

After the court denied Yamada’s motion, the jury
returned a unanimous verdict finding Yamada guilty as charged on
all counts. ‘The court then dismissed the jury, except for the
three jurors, who were believed to be sleeping during closing
arguments, The court then proceeded to voir dire Saka, Gomez,
and the foreperson. Of the three jurors, only Saka admitted to

sleeping during the parties’ closing arguments:”

 

HE court: [Saka], it's the procedure if someone ~~
Af a juror ie perceived to maybe have clor

Sine 23"Sieep Suring <= not the trial but closing, did at
Bene ES during clowing argunente when [the prosecution] oF
Tatkense counsel] were arguing the case, did you go to
sleep?

[sakal: I may have passed out @ couple of seconds,
pot 1 did notice on the Power Point, I think it vas during
ihe prosecution’® closing argument) and when T did open
{R06 Pie"Sane back up, st was Pretty mich on the sane bullet
point

 

 

 

 

‘THE COURT: What would ha
you would have gone to sleep?

geka). Maybe ten, 15 seconds. I'm not sure,

fae cour: Ten or 15 seconds? Okey «=.

Tee couRtioa)s Tf 1 understand correctiy, (Saka), this
was on my closing?

[Gera]: I'm pretty sure

[eekel clon)’ and you Yecall any similar evest when
[defense counsel] vas presenting their closing?

 

been the longest tine that

 

+ ge foreperson stated that she was not, sleeping: according to her,

she was novely Sloving her eyes aa her vay of "handling that kind of
ste wet Devcifncue getting disteactes with the repetitions.” Gones similarly
{eormed the court that he “never fell asleep.”

 

 

 

 
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The court

The court

[Saka]: 2 think it might have been [during defense
counsel's closing argunent] Because actually it was on this
sete was on the -- this boara that vas being shown.

Prosecution]: You're saying the waite board
underneath the clock?

{sakal: ves

THE COURT: Any questions, [defense counsel)?

[Defense counsel]: dust briefly. (Saka], do you
renenber what bullet point it was possibly, what area?

{Saka}: No, T don’t,

(Defense counsel]: Do you remenber what witness T vas
talking about or what part of the case I vas talking about?

‘saka): Not specificaliy, no.

[Betense counsel}: And you said it was just ten to 15
seconds oF 80?

{eaka}s. T think ao. t think when
on the same bullet point, yes.

[Defense counsel]: And you weren't really drifting
out in any pare or were you drifting?

(Saka): Tsay have been drifting. r/m not sure.

(Detense counsel]: You were drifting In ané out throughout
any closing?

spe tineal! 1 don't Ehink throughout the whole thing

[Defence counsel) +

 

 

 

 

 

you were stil

 

‘Throughout half of it or so?
‘than that.
‘About how mach? I'm sorry.
20 percent_at the nos
[Defense counsel) :" 20 percent at mest? Okay.
okay. And do you recall if it wae basically at th
beginning part of sy closing or the end of my closing?
(Saxal: Probably more towards the middle.
(Defense counsel]: More cowards the migdie? Okay.
‘Tank you very much.

   
    

 

summarized the jurors’ statements:

co me like [che foreperson], even though her eyes
ble to hear. She may have been a little

‘20 to speak, but people get drowsy. xr. Gomez

clearly was wide avake. acleep.

fo'ls seconds, but he doesn't know. Me may have miased as

uch #2 20 pecent of the defense closing.

 
  

   

dismissed the jurors and directed defense counsel to

file a written motion for new trial.

on December 12, 2003, Yamada filed a motion for new

trial, wherein he argued that, inter alia, juror misconduct

deprived him of a fair trial and a new trial was required “in the

interests

of justice.” On January 29, 2004, the court heard

argument on the motion.

 
 

*** FORPUBLICATION **

On March 14, 2004, the court entered an order granting

 

Yamada’s motion for new trial, finding and concluding as follow:

EINDINGS OF FACT

2. A complaint wae filed on July 8, 2003, charging
(vamadia] with ewo (2) counte of Robbery in the First
Degree and one (1) count of Assault in the Firat
Degree for an incident that occurred on Pebruary 1
2003. Following « jury trial, (Yamada) was convicted
45 charged of all offenses on Decenber 3, 200

2. Defendant's Motion for a New trial (hereinafter
SMotion") was f1led on December 12, 2003, within the
time period specified by Rule 33, Hawai
Donal Procedure. Inter alia, the Notion claimed chat
avnew trial should be granted because a juror fell
al Sounsel'® closing

 

 

 

 

 

   

or was ne 203) of
efende_counsel-2 closing arsunent. that was
auprcxiiately one hour long. thus the iurorwas asleep

4. The Coure had “serious discomfort’ with (the
prosecution] "a use of the bat as evidence establishing

 

 

{vamada}’s identity. (*)
ONCLUSIONS OF LAH
2. This court has jurisdiction over the Hotion pursuant
to Rule 33, ae ie was
fies within the tine period proscribed by that Rule.
2, pie Motion ie granted in the interest of justice.

 

AcconDINGLY I7 15 HERESY ORDERED that [Yamada'e] Motion for

@ Yew Trial be and the sane is hereby granted
(Bmphasis added) .
On April 12, 2004, the prosecution filed its timely

 

notice of appeal

TI. STANDARD OF REVIEW

As a general matter, the granting or denial of a
motion for new trial is within the sound discretion of the
Erial courr and will not be dieturbed absent a clear abuse
of discretion. The sane principle is applied in the context
of motion for new trial premised on Juror misconduct. The
Exial court abuses ite discretion when it clearly exceeds
Ehe bounds of reason or disregards rules or principles of
law or practice to the substantial detriment of = party,
Litigant. State v, Furstani, "76 Mawall 172, 176-79, 673
P.2g'5i, 57-58 (198a) (citations and quotations omitted) -

 

 

 

* see supra note 4

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

State v. Kim, 103 Hawai'i 285, 290, 81 P.3d 1200, 1205 (2003).
IIT. DISCUSSION

on appeal, the prosecution argues that the trial court
abused its discretion by granting Yamada’s motion for new trial
based on a juror sleeping during defense counsel’s closing
argument, “without a showing of actual prejudice from the defense
or a finding of prejudice by the circuit court, and where the
record as a whole evinces no prejudice to [Yamada] .”

Specifically, the prosecution asserts that finding that a juror

 

was sleeping, without more, does not demonstrate prejudice and

because (1) he

 

that any misconduct on Saka’s part was harmli
did not sleep through any testimony, evidence, or jury
instructions and (2) the portion of the argunent allegedly missed
waa not significant. Moreover, the prosecution pointa out that,
4€ defense counsel believed Saka slept through significant

1 wae under the duty

 

portions of the proceedings, defense coun!
to bring the misconduct to the court’s attention at that time for

the court te correct the problem immediately.

 

With respect to jury misconduct, this court has note

‘the sixth amendment to the United states
conetitution|)| and article I, section 14 of the Hawai't
Constitution "] guarantee the criminally accused a fair

 

7 ete sixth amendment to the United states Constitution provider in
relevant part that, "[iJa all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and
district wherein the crime shall have been comiteed wis, 203,
Bawal't at 290-91 a.5, 81 P.3¢ at 1205-06 n.5,

 

   
  

* sarticle 2, section 14 of the Hawai'i state Constitution, provides in
relevant part that, {iJn all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
(Continued.

   

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

trial by an impartial jury. state v. Gaballe, 63 Hawai'i
40, 45, 924 Piad 534, 539 (1996) (citation omitted). If any
juror was sot impartial, a new trial mist be granved. Id.
However, not all juror misconduct necessarily dictates the
granting S¢-a-sew trial Anew trial sili not be aranted if
‘can be shows that the lury coulé not have been influenced
bythe alleaed misconduct." Furuta, 76 Havart at 160,
a7 P.2d at 59)

im, 103 Hawai'i at 290-91, 61 P.3d at 1205-06 (emphasis and

brackets added) (footnote numbers altered). Consequently,

(when the basis for the motion [for new trial) is juror
misconduct (,]
ine hath
i
Qfaizcrial, whether it does rise to that level is
Sfainarily left to che discretion of the trial court.

76 Hawai'i} at 180, 873 .24 at 59 (citing skate
VaKeliinolokai, 58 Hav. 3s6,' 359, 569 7.24 991, 935)
G77)
tt

 

Far reabls

toreiudice {e taised and the court must investigate the
Eotality of circumstances fo determine if the sisconduct
impacted the jury's impartiality. Buritani. 76 Wawai't at,
isi, 873 P.2d at 60 (citing Stake v, Wilisnson, 72 Haw. 97,
02, 807 Pi2d 593, 596 (1981))-. In order to overcome the
rebuttable presumption, the prosecution quat show that the
Alleged deprivation of che right to a fair trial wae
Harmless bevond a reasonable doubt. Furutani, 76 Mavai't at
isi, 873, P2d at 60 (enphasis added)

State v. Adams, 10 Haw. App. 593, 599-600, 880 P.2d 226, 231-32

(2994) (ellipses pointe and emphases added). stated differently,

this court, in State v. Pauline, 100 Hawai'i 356, 381-82, 60 P.3d
306, 331-32 (2002), noted:

‘The defendant mst first make a prisa facie shoving of a
deprivation that could substantially prejudice he or her
right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. We aleo
suggested chat defendant shoulé firet present gone anecitic.
i wing a turer
Snee the deZendeat tae satisties this barton ete poet
court then determines whether the nature of the alleged
deprivation rises to the level of being substantially
Prejudicial. If the trial court determines that the alleged
deprivation is substantially prejudicial, the trial court

 

   

 

 

 

"(cont inued)
the right! to @ speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the district
wherein the crime shail have been committed... '* Kim, 103 Hawai't at 291

aie, 81 Pood at 1206 1.6.

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

then becomes duty bound to further invastisate the totality
sf circumerances murtounding the alleced deprivation to
‘Sete: jury inpas

(Citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted.) (Emphases

added.) Additionally, this court has stated that:

Error is not to be viewed in isolation and considered purely
in the abstract. I mst be examined in the light of the
entire proceedings and given the effect which the whole
Fecord shove it to be entitled. In that context, the real
Guestion becones() whether theze is a reasonable poasibility
that the error might Have contributed to the conviction

 

State v. Perez, 64 Haw. 232, 234, 638 P.2d 335, 337 (1981)
(citation omitted) .

Assuming that Saka’s sleeping constituted misconduct,
the trial court was under the duty to “determine whether the
misconduct [was] of a nature which could substantially prejudice
[vamada]‘e right to a fair trial.” Adams, 10 Haw. App. at 599,
860 P.2d at 232. The trial court did not expressly enter 2
finding of prejudice, but granted the motion for new trial von
the sole basis that a juror was asleep for about . . . twelve
(12) minutes.” Finding No, 3. Generally, courts have held that
“the mere falling asleep for a short time, by a juror, during the
argument of counsel for the defendant in a criminal cause, does
not of itself constitute a sufficient cause for a new trial.”
Whiting v, State, 516 N.F.2d 1067, 1068 (Ind. 1987) (citation
omitted); see also U.S. v. Springfield, 929 F.2d 860, 864 (9th
Cir, 1987) (finding no prejudice where a juror missed a portion

of witness testimony during a nap)

 

In U.S. v. Barrett, 703 F.2d 1076, ag amended, (9th

me test, noting:

 

Cir, 1982), the court followed the

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ven if the juror in the present case is found to have been
asleep during portions of the trial,

‘anew trial nay not be
Eequized if he dig not mise essential portions of che erie)
2 sider

Id. at 1083 (emphasis added); see also State v. Hampton, 549
N.W.24 756 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996); State v, wright, 453 P.2d 1
(Kan. 1969); Hasson v. Ford Motor Co., 185 Cal. Rptr. 654 (cal.
1982). Notwithstanding the trial court's failure in the instant
case to make a specific finding “that the juror misconduct could
+ substantially prejudice [Yamada’s] right to a fair and
impartial jury,” Adams, 10 Haw. App. at 600, 880 P.2d at 232, we
believe such finding was implicit in its grant of Yamada’s motion
for new trial. See Ala Moana Boat Owners’ Ass’n v, State, 50
Haw, 156, 158, 434 P.2d 516, 518, reh’a denied, 50 Haw. 181, 434

and

 

P.2d 516 (1967) (noting the “presumption of correctne:
regularity that attend the decision of the lower court")
(Citations onitted.), Thus, the dispositive question for us in
this appeal is whether the prosecution has overcome the
rebuttable presumption by showing that the alleged deprivation of
the right to a fair trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

We believe it ha:

 

Initially, as the prosecution points out, there is
nothing in the record of the instant case to suggest that Saka
slept through any of the evidence adduced at trial’ or any of the

jury instructions that were given. There is also nothing in the

 

+ AB this court has previously noted, “arguments of counsel are not
evidenc 85 Hawai'i 128, 144, 958 P.2d $59, 875 (1997)
(elears

 

coaitted):

oe
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

record to suggest that he was unable to fully participate in jury
deliberations. At the hearing on the motion for new trial,
defense counsel argued that his client was substantially
prejudiced because Saka missed crucial argunents “focused on
reasonable doubt and the inability of the [prosecution] to prove
the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.”

During closing argument, defense counsel focused on:
(2) hie contention that the prosecution's witnesses mistakenly
identified Yamada; (2) the lack of physical evidence confirming
Yamada’s involvement; and (3) what constitutes reasonable doubt.
Ae noted aupra, the defense presented ite theories of mistaken

identity and lack of evidence during his opening statement.

 

Further, the defense’s theory of the case was clearly presented

 

to the jury during the presentation of the its two witne:
Moreover, the prosecution argues that there is nothing to suggest
that Saka did not hear the instructions given prior to the

parties’ closing arguments, which included an explanation of the

 

reagonable doubt standard:

What the law requires before the defendant can be found
guilty is not suspicion, not probabilities, but proof of the
Sefendant’* guilt beyond reascnabie doubt

What ig reasonable douse?” Ie is a doubt in your mind
about the defendant's guilt which arises fron the evidence
Presented or from the lack of evidence and which is based on
Pesson and comon sense, Zach of you mst decide
Individually whether there is oF is not much a doubt in your
mind after careful and inpartisi consideration of the
evidence Whaat is proof beyond a reasonable doubt?
$e, steer consideration of the evidence and the law, you
hhave a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt, then the
prosecution has Ror proved the defendant's guile’ beyond a
Peasonable doubt, and it ie your duty to find the defendant
not guilty.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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If, after consideration of the evidence and the law,
you do not have a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt,
ind Le Ts your ducy to find the defendant guiiey-
‘you ust consider only the evidence that Aas been
presented to you in this case and such inferences therefrom
‘may be justified by reason and common sense.

 

 

Even if Saka was sleeping and did not hear a portion of defense
counsel's closing arguments, he was given the correct
instruction, and we presume he followed it. See State v.
Kupihea, 80 Hawai'i 307, 317-18, 909 P.2d 1122, 1132-33 (1996).
We, therefore, believe, based on the totality of circumstances,
that the prosecution has met its burden in establishing that the
alleged deprivation of the right to a fair trial was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.

‘The dissent, relying on People v. Evans, 710 P.2d 1167
(Col.), reh’g denied, cert, denied, 710 P.2d 1167 (1985),

maintains that, because closing argument is “one of the most

 

consequential parts of the trial,* id, at 1168, juror inattention
during argument is prejudicial. In our view, the decision of the

and those of other

 

court in Bvang ie consistent with our ca
jurisdictions that require more than an assertion that a juror’s
inattention -- or that sleeping per ae -- constitutes prejudice,
dictating the need for a new trial, In gvang, one of the jurors
was asleep during defense counsel’s closing argument. Defense

counsel, however, was unaware of the misconduct until the trial
court initiated contenpt proceedings against the juror following
the verdict. ven after finding that the juror’s conduct was

“unsatisfactory[] and was contemptuous of the seriousness of what

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we are talking about here," id., the trial court denied
defendant's motion for judgnent of acquittal, or alternatively
for a new trial because it believed that the facts “dlid] not
suggest that the defendant's rights were violated.” Id.

on appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals agreed “with
(the trial court’s] conclusion that the juror’s inattention
Guring that stage of the proceedings was not only ‘contemptuous
of the court, but contemptuous of the rights of the defendant.’”
4d. (emphasis added). Recognizing the inconsistency between the

misconduct was

 

trial court’s finding that the juror
“contemptuous of the rights of the defendant” and its ruling that
the defendant's rights were not violated, the appellate court
stated: Since the trial court obviously determined that the
juror’s misconduct was sufficiently grave to warrant a contempt
proceeding and imposition of a penalty, we fail to see how this
same misconduct falls short of constituting prejudice to the
defendant.” Id, (emphasis added). In other words, the appellate
court clearly recognized that the juror’s inattention was not
merely a case of sleeping per ge, but that the juror’s conduct
was 80 egregious it not only warranted a contempt proceeding, but
resulted in a finding of contempt, which the appellate court
equated with a finding of prejudice.

In the instant case, the trial court, unlike Evang,
specifically determined that its grant of a new trial was based

“sole [ly on the fact] that a juror was asleep . . . for twelve

wae
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minutes [of defense counsel's closing argument] ," gee Finding No.
3., and nothing more. Although we do not condone jurors sleeping

or being otherwise inattentive while court is in session, we

 

recognize -- as did the Supreme Court of California in Hasson vi.
Ford Motor Company, 650 P.2d 1171 (1982), that, at some point

during a trial, even the most diligent jurore may be less than
one hundred percent focused on the proceedings and may “reach the
end of [their] attention span at sone point during a trial and
allow [their] mind[s] to wander temporarily from the matter at
hand.* id, at 1190. At the outset, we emphasize that our
citation to Hasson should not be construed as indicating our
agreement with the ultimate decision to affirm the trial court’s
denial of the defendant's motion for new trial given the totality
of circumstances of the incidents of juror misconduct described
therein. As indicated, intra, we cite with approval the
principles espoused by the California Supreme Court with regard
to a jury's duty and the rebuttable presumption that arises from
any juror misconduct.

In Hagson, the court addressed a number of instances of
juror misconduct, including allegations of inattentiveness. ‘The
mieconduct involved, inter alia, five of twelve jurors reading a
novel or other extraneous materials and/or doing crossword
puzzles while witnesses and evidence were being presented. It
was alleged that such activities occurred “over approximately a

one-month period,’ ‘{ol]n many occasions,’ and ‘intermittently

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over a period of many days.‘* Id, at 1185. In addressing the
arguments made by the parties, the California Supreme Court

prefaced its analysis by stating:

We agree with the basic premise that 2 jury's failure to pay

ntcention to the evidence presented at trial is a form of

Misconduct which will justify the granting of a new erial if
= et Suty £0

[Iseen carefully during the presentation of evidence

trial is anong the most elenentary of = juror’s obligation.

     

Id. (emphasis added). The court concluded that,

 

by failing co fulfill their duty of attentiveness, the
Surore comitted misconduct.
‘shies snot, 7
i
‘fhe surore’inattent veness- ‘exiate if, in the

 

‘Of proven miaconduct, jsonably probable that
2 regule nore favorable to the complaining party would have
been achieved.
ime defendant) urges that ve should presuse
prejudice irom the fact of inattentivensss alone.” In People
i Soneveute (2977) 20 Cal. 34 150, 156, 141 Cal. Rptr. 688,
Bip pad 1050, wo stated: “Ie ie vell settled that a
euspeion of ee 2

 

 

   

 

 

Jd. at 1186 (emphases added) .
Although the trial court in the instant case did not
explicitly determine that the juror’s sleeping constituted
misconduct, we agree with its implicit finding that, by sleeping
for twelve minutes, the juror breached his duty of attentiveness
and that he was, therefore, guilty of juror misconduct. However,
as emphasized by the court in Haseon and as thie court has
repeatedly stated, “not all juror misconduct necessarily dictates
the granting of a new trial." Kim, 103 Hawai'i at 290-91, 61
P.3d at 1205-06 (citation omitted). As previously stated, once

the trial court determines that juror misconduct could

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substantially prejudice the defendant’s right to a fair and
impartial jury, -- which we believe was implicit in the trial
court’ granting of a new trial, -- a rebuttable presumption is
raised, and the prosecution mst then show that the alleged
deprivation of the right to a fair trial was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. And, as previously discussed, we agree with
the prosecution that, based on the totality of circunstances, the
juror misconduct in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.

Finally, we emphasize, as the court did in Hasson,
chat:

Retrials are to be avoided unless necessitated by a more
substantial dereliction of jurora’ duties than wan evident.
in this case. ["] “Society has a manifest interest in
avoiding needless retriais: they cause hardship to the
Litigants, delay the adsinietration of Justice, ang result
in social and economie waste.”

 

 

Ad. at 1190 (citation omitted). We believe that the requirements

set forth in our case law and as discussed herein provide the

fate that we do not concur with the Hasson court's
‘conduct in that case. In fact, it would appear that,
the dissent’s view would have been more appropriate

 

This misconduct was pervasive, involving five of the twelve
jurors including the “forewoman." It continied over an
extended period of tine, variously described as
‘Tapproximately one-month period,” or over « period of
several weeks,” of on many cecasions,” or “intermitcently
Over a period of many daye." It occurred

and evidence were being presented." The misconduct was not
the monentary dozing of a single juror in an isolated
Aneident. Rather, it involved almost half the Jury in
Erequent, prolonged, intentional mental activity of a type
that was diverting and that required thought and
contemplation... Such activities, invmy opinion, were
wholly incompatibie with a jurors duties (1

 

Hasson, 650 P.2d at 1193 (Richardson, J., dissenting) (underscored exphases in
original) (boi emphasis added)

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*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

assurance that the hardship and delay of a new trial are not
needlessly imposed.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court abused its
discretion in granting a new trial
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we vacate the circuit court's

March 15, 2004 order granting a new trial and renand this case
ar BE ian

Rescea Corny linen

for sentencing.

on the briefa:
James M. Anderson,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,
for plaintiff-appellant

Harrison L. Kiehm,
for defendant -appellee

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