Title: Donny L. Crook v. State Of Florida

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC03-455 
____________ 
 
DONNY L. CROOK,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[July 7, 2005] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Donny L. Crook, a defendant who was convicted of first-degree murder, 
appeals a circuit court judgment sentencing him to death.  We have jurisdiction.  
See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons expressed below, we reverse 
Crook’s death sentence and remand the case for the imposition of a sentence of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole to be served in addition to the two 
life sentences for convictions we have previously affirmed arising out of the same 
circumstances.    
 
 
 
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BACKGROUND 
Crook was tried and found guilty of first-degree murder, robbery with a 
deadly weapon, and sexual battery.  Crook v. State, 813 So. 2d 68, 69 (Fla. 2002).  
The evidence presented at trial that he brutally killed the victim, the co-owner of 
the bar where the robbery and murder occurred, is unchallenged.  Id.  However, at 
the penalty phase, Crook's mother and numerous mental health professionals 
presented uncontroverted mitigation testimony for the defense.  Id. at 70-73.  
During deliberations, the jury returned to the courtroom with a question as to 
whether a life sentence without parole really meant life.1  The trial court declined 
to answer the question.  Subsequently, by a seven-to-five vote, the jury 
recommended that Crook receive the death sentence for his murder conviction.  
813 So. 2d at 69.  After finding three statutory aggravators, the trial court imposed 
a death sentence for the murder and concurrent life sentences for the two 
noncapital convictions.  Id. at 73-74, 78. 
First Appeal 
 
In the first direct appeal opinion, this Court affirmed Crook’s multiple 
convictions and explained: 
The first-degree murder conviction was predicated on 
alternative theories of premeditated murder and felony-murder 
                                          
 
 
1.  We have previously held that it was error for the State to argue to a jury 
that a life sentence without the possibility of parole could be construed as 
permitting release.  Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 420 (Fla. 1998). 
 
 
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with the underlying offenses of robbery and sexual battery. The 
jury returned a general verdict of guilty of first-degree murder, 
as well as guilty verdicts on the separate charges of robbery and 
sexual battery. We find that there is competent substantial 
evidence to support the jury's verdict in this case. 
 
Id. at 70 n.1.  In that appeal, Crook did not challenge his convictions or the 
substantial aggravation involved in the crime.  Id. at 69.  Rather, he asserted three 
claims with respect to his penalty phase: (1) the trial court erred in failing to 
address and weigh his brain damage as mitigation; (2) the trial court erred in not 
finding that his intelligence level was borderline retarded; and (3) that despite 
substantial aggravation, the death sentence was disproportionate because his case, 
when properly evaluated, was one of the most mitigated.  Id. at 74.   
 
We found merit in Crook’s claim on mitigation, and, in an opinion 
remanding the case for reconsideration of the mitigation and sentence, we detailed 
the voluminous evidence of mitigation presented during the penalty phase.  Id. at 
70-73.  For example, we summarized Crook’s mother’s testimony that her first 
husband severely abused Crook, that Crook sustained head injuries at age four 
when he was beaten with a metal pipe, that subsequently Crook failed kindergarten 
and posed substantial discipline problems in the ten different schools he had 
attended “by the time he reached sixth grade and finally dropped out of school in 
eighth grade,” and that by age twelve Crook began using alcohol and drugs and 
huffing paint.  Id. at 70.   
 
 
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We also discussed the substantial and unrebutted evidence of brain damage 
and other mental defects that the mental health experts related to the instant 
murder.  Our opinion recounted the testimony of Dr. David McCraney and other 
mental health professionals.  Dr. McCraney opined that “Crook suffered from an 
impulse control disorder or organic brain syndrome affecting Crook's frontal lobe.”  
Id.  He testified that Crook’s school records indicated “that Crook was mildly 
mentally retarded.”  Id. at 71.  Dr. McCraney stated that “Crook was under the 
influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time he committed 
the crime, and that his brain damage was responsible for this.”  Id.  Importantly, 
“Dr. McCraney concluded that the circumstances surrounding the homicide were 
consistent with his diagnosis of frontal lobe brain damage, stating, ‘[T]he events do 
appear to conform to this blind animalistic rage that’s described with the orbital 
frontal syndrome.’ ”  Id.   
Dr. Ralph Dolente also testified that Crook suffered from frontal lobe brain 
damage, most likely resulting from trauma sustained when he was beaten as a child 
with a pipe.  Id.  Like Dr. McCraney, Dr. Dolente concluded that due to his frontal 
lobe brain damage, Crook was impulsive and prone to overreact and to rage 
attacks.  Id. at 71-72.   
We also detailed Dr. Thomas McClain’s testimony.  Dr. McClain stated that 
five factual factors interacted with each other to cause Crook’s frontal lobe brain 
 
 
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damage: “(1) genetic factors; (2) socioeconomic deprivation; (3) head trauma; (4) 
substance abuse; and (5) and [sic] birth trauma.”  Id. at 72.  Dr. McClain noted that 
“Crook’s brain damage would ‘render him hypersensitive to the usual negative 
effects of alcohol and other drugs.’ ”  Id.  After reviewing Crook’s IQ tests from 
his childhood, Dr. McClain opined that the scores, which ranged from 62 to the 
low 70s, revealed that “Crook suffered from borderline intellectual functioning.”  
Id.  Dr. McClain opined that “Crook was under extreme mental or emotional 
distress at the time of the offense” due to Crook’s increased sensitivity to 
intoxication and to “all of the factors . . . that have made him what he is today, 
namely his brain damage problem.”  Id.   
We summarized Dr. William Kremper’s psychological evaluation which 
took place some two years prior to the murder and which, by agreement of the 
parties, was submitted to the trial court for its review.  Id. at 72-73 & n.2.  Dr. 
Kemper examined Crook in 1994 as part of a social security disability 
determination and found that Crook had “a full scale IQ of 66,” which placed him 
in the “mild range of mental retardation.”  Id. at 72.2  Dr. Kremper opined that 
Crook’s frustration tolerance was severely limited, such that Crook was inclined to 
become physically aggressive with minor frustration.  Id. at 73.  “Dr. Kremper also 
                                          
 
 
2.  The social security evaluation included determinations that Crook was 
illiterate and totally disabled for employment purposes.  
 
 
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opined that Cook ‘experienced auditory and visual hallucinations which appeared 
to result from extensive substance abuse and head injuries.’ ”  Id.3  
 
Finally, after reviewing the “uncontroverted evidence of brain damage, 
mental retardation, and the age of the defendant,” we found that the trial court had 
not properly or fully considered this evidence in determining Crook’s sentence: 
We are not certain whether, if the trial court had properly considered 
the brain damage and borderline mental retardation and the effect of 
these mental mitigators on the crime in question, the trial court would 
have found that the aggravation outweighed the mitigation, especially 
in light of the abundance of nonstatutory mitigation. 
. . . [W]e vacate the sentence of death and remand the case to 
the trial court to reconsider and reweigh all available mitigating 
evidence against the aggravating factors, and to determine the proper 
penalty in accordance with Florida law. 
 
Id. at 77-78 (citations omitted).  In concluding that the case must be remanded for 
reconsideration of the extensive mitigation, this Court did not reach the issue of 
                                          
 
 
3.  Our opinion in the first direct appeal also explained that the trial court 
considered psychological evaluations conducted by Drs. Charles Haskovec and 
Roy Mercer: 
 
Dr. Haskovec examined Crook when Crook was five years old 
and found that Crook had an IQ of 76, which according to Dr. 
Haskovec, placed Crook “within the Borderline range of 
functioning.” Dr. Mercer examined Crook in 1995 when Crook 
was nineteen years old. According to Dr. Mercer's report, 
Crook had a full scale IQ of 75, which “plac[ed] his current 
level of overall intellectual functioning in the Borderline 
Range.” 
Crook, 813 So. 2d at 72-73 n.3.  
 
 
 
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proportionality.  Id. at 78 n.8.  However, we affirmed both the convictions and the 
life sentences imposed for the two other felony convictions.  Id. at 78.  
RESENTENCING 
On remand, the trial court conducted another sentencing hearing, during 
which the prior evidence of mitigation was supplemented with the testimony of 
two mental health experts.   
Dr. Elizabeth McMahon, a psychiatrist, testified that Crook suffers from 
damage to the left side of his brain and possibly the right side as well.  She 
compared his personality development to that of a three- or four-year-old.  She 
hypothesized that Crook suffers from frontal lobe damage which could have been 
caused at birth or during the incident when he was beaten with a pipe.  She 
reviewed a report noting that after the pipe beating, Crook switched from being 
right-handed to left-handed.  Dr. McMahon observed Crook to be socially limited 
and to be without coping mechanisms.  She opined that because of his frontal lobe 
damage, he does not have the ability to modulate his impulses.  She summed up 
Crook's physical condition as an axis one diagnosis of organic brain damage.   
Dr. McMahon commented that the crime scene in this case showed evidence 
of a great deal of energy expended on the victim's murder.  Crook told her that he 
attacked the victim pursuant to a conversation in which the victim made some 
upsetting comments about his family.  Crook reported that he stomped on the 
 
 
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victim's face, but remembered nothing else.  Crook also told her that he tried to 
make the incident look like a robbery.  Dr. McMahon attributed his actions to his 
mental defects and his “inordinate attachment to some members of his family.”  
Dr. McMahon concluded that when Crook gets angry, he strikes out because he 
cannot differentiate between a feeling and a behavior.  She also related that before 
the murder Crook consumed a great deal of beer, smoked crack cocaine, and 
smoked four joints of marijuana laced with heroin.4  She stated that those 
chemicals would have certainly affected his already impaired brain in explaining 
his conduct at the time of the murder.   
Dr. Kremper also testified at the resentencing hearing, utilizing his complete 
review of the records about the case, including his evaluation in 1994 of Crook’s 
total disability for employment purposes and his illiteracy; Crook’s prior medical 
records; consultations with other doctors; and his additional psychological 
evaluation and testing of Crook in 1998.  Dr. Kremper stated that his conclusion 
from his earliest evaluation in 1994 was that Crook had attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder that could be related to organic brain dysfunction caused by 
head injuries and substance abuse.  Dr. Kremper also related that Crook stayed in 
                                          
 
 
4.  Crook has consistently maintained that he ingested alcohol and cocaine 
on the day of the murder.  See Crook, 813 So. 2d at 69-70.  On the day of the 
murder, a witness saw Crook with a case of beer.  Id. at 69.  Further, according to 
the report of Mr. Rene del Sol, a mental health specialist who interviewed and 
evaluated Crook at the jail’s request, Crook “had been drinking . . . , sniffing paint 
thinner, and shooting heroin” on the day of the murder.  
 
 
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the hospital for eight days after his birth, likely because his mother was recovering 
from a Caesarian section, but stated that a loss of oxygen at birth was probably a 
consideration.  Records indicate that at age five, Crook was having trouble 
concentrating and was taking Ritalin for his disorder.  Dr. Kremper stated that 
Crook's personal history of abuse and trauma, combined with his use of alcohol 
and drugs and history of huffing paint, would have a major impact on frontal lobe 
functioning.  He deferred to other experts as to a diagnosis of organic brain 
damage.  However, he testified that he now believed his earlier diagnosis in 1994 
of mental retardation was wrong, and that Crook’s low test scores were attributable 
to his extensive use of drugs, his agitation and poor attention span, or his 
malingering in refusing to properly respond to questions.   
After the resentencing hearing, the trial court again imposed a sentence of 
death, and found three aggravators: (1) the murder was committed in the course of, 
in an attempt to commit, or in flight after a sexual battery; (2) the murder was 
committed for pecuniary gain; and (3) the murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel 
(HAC).   
The trial court found a number of statutory mitigating factors: (1) the 
defendant’s age of twenty at the time of the murder (slight weight); (2) the murder 
was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance (significant weight); (3) the capacity of the defendant to 
 
 
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appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law was substantially impaired (significant weight); and (4) the 
existence of an additional eighteen factors in the defendant's background that 
would mitigate against the imposition of the death sentence.   
The background factors were listed as: (a) the defendant's psychological and 
emotional age was less than his twenty years (moderate weight); (b) the defendant 
shares reciprocal love with his family (slight weight); (c) the defendant has never 
had a peer group relationship (not proven); (d) the defendant is borderline mentally 
retarded (low range of intelligence and learning disabilities proven, moderate 
weight); (e) the defendant was predisposed to a subnormal life performance 
(moderate weight); (f) the defendant was delivered by Caesarian section, causing 
problems to him (not proven); (g) the defendant has spent his life in poverty (slight 
weight); (h) the defendant was sickly as a child (not proven); (i) the defendant had 
an unstable home life (moderate weight as in (e)); (j) the defendant had no role 
model in his life (moderate weight as in (e) and (i)); (k) the defendant was 
emotionally and physically abused (previously considered as part of other 
mitigation topics and weight already assigned); (l) the defendant exhibited signs of 
brain damage and psychological dysfunction by age five (previously considered as 
part of other mitigation topics and weight already assigned); (m) the defendant's 
educational attempts were frustrated early (slight weight); (n) the defendant began 
 
 
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abusing drugs at age eight (slight weight); (o) the defendant suffered trauma due to 
the deaths of close relatives when he was young (slight weight); (p) the defendant 
has previously been hospitalized for suicidal behavior (proven to the extent it was 
established as part of the statutory mitigation in (2) and (3)); (q) the defendant was 
emotionally impaired because his mother was a prostitute and his troubled brothers 
often cared for him (moderate weight); and (r) the defendant's prior criminal 
activity is devoid of violent behavior (slight weight).   
The trial court also made findings as to numerous nonstatutory mitigators: 
(1) the defendant did not flee after the offense was committed (slight weight); (2) 
the defendant did not resist police and cooperated with them (slight weight); (3) the 
defendant expressed remorse in a confession (slight weight); (4) the defendant was 
under the influence of alcohol and drugs at the time of the offense (previously 
considered and given weight under statutory mitigators); (5) the defendant 
displayed good courtroom behavior (slight weight); (6) the defendant should be 
given mercy (slight weight); and (7) society can be protected by giving a life 
sentence (not proven). 
PROPORTIONALITY 
Crook now challenges the proportionality of his death sentence in this 
appeal.  Crook maintains that the imposition of the death sentence in his case is 
disproportionate because his crime, while substantially aggravated, is not one of 
 
 
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the least mitigated, and in fact, is one of the most mitigated.  He maintains that 
under this Court’s case law on proportionality, these circumstances require that his 
sentence be reduced to life without the possibility of parole.  We agree.   
In Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1998), we explained our 
proportionality review: 
 
Proportionality review “requires a discrete analysis of the 
facts,” Terry v. State, 668 So. 2d 954, 965 (Fla. 1996), entailing a 
qualitative review by this Court of the underlying basis for each 
aggravator and mitigator rather than a quantitative analysis.  We 
underscored this imperative in Tillman v. State, 591 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 
1991): 
 
We have described the “proportionality review” 
conducted by this Court as follows:  
 
 
Because death is a unique 
punishment, it is necessary in each case to 
engage in a thoughtful, deliberate 
proportionality review to consider the 
totality of circumstances in a case, and to 
compare it with other capital cases.  It is not 
a comparison between the number of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  
Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060, 1064 (Fla. 1990).  The 
requirement that death be administered proportionately 
has a variety of sources in Florida law, including the 
Florida Constitution’s express prohibition against 
unusual punishments.  Art. I, § 17, Fla. Const.  
 
. . . Thus, proportionality review is a unique and 
highly serious function of this Court, the purpose of 
which is to foster uniformity in death-penalty law. 
 
Id. at 169 (alterations in original) (citations and footnote omitted).  As 
we recently reaffirmed, proportionality review involves consideration 
 
 
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of “the totality of the circumstances in a case” in comparison with 
other death penalty cases.  Sliney v. State, 699 So. 2d 662, 672 (Fla. 
1997) (citing Terry, 668 So. 2d at 965). 
Urbin, 714 So. 2d at 416-17. 
 
Further, this Court has consistently held that because death is a unique and 
final punishment, the death penalty must be reserved only for those cases that are 
the most aggravated and least mitigated.  Kramer v. State, 619 So. 2d 274, 278 
(Fla. 1993).  In Almeida v. State, 748 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1999), we explained: “Thus, 
our inquiry when conducting proportionality review is two-pronged:  We compare 
the case under review to others to determine if the crime falls within the category 
of both (1) the most aggravated, and (2) the least mitigated of murders.”  Id. at 933.  
Hence, our proportionality review requires us to consider the facts and 
circumstances in Crook’s case to determine whether the case is among the most 
aggravated and least mitigated so as to justify the imposition of death as the 
penalty. 
As to the first prong, relating to aggravation, Crook has conceded, and we 
agree, that the trial court’s finding of three aggravators is supported by the record 
and those findings place this case among the most aggravated of murders.  
Accordingly, under our death penalty jurisprudence as stated in Almeida and other 
decisions, we are next required to determine whether this case also falls within the 
category of the least mitigated of murders for which the death penalty is reserved.   
 
 
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Notably, this Court has previously vacated death sentences, especially in 
cases where substantial mental health evidence established the case as among the 
most mitigated.  For example, in Cooper v. State, 739 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 1999), this 
Court found that despite the existence of substantial aggravation, there was 
substantial mitigation, making the death penalty disproportionate under our case 
law.  Id. at 85-86.  While we noted the important mitigators of age and abusive 
childhood, as well as an eight-to-four jury vote on punishment, we particularly 
emphasized the extensive mental health mitigation in our analysis: 
In the present case, as noted above, the trial court found that three 
aggravators had been established, i.e., commission of a prior capital or 
violent felony (based on a robbery-murder Cooper committed several 
days after the present crime), commission during a robbery and for 
pecuniary gain, and CCP. This Court in other capital cases has 
affirmed the death penalty where comparable or less aggravation was 
present.  Thus, the first prong of the above standard appears to be 
satisfied.  
The trial court additionally found that two statutory and several 
nonstatutory mitigators were established, including Cooper's low 
intelligence (i.e., Dr. Schwartz testified that Cooper's test results 
placed him in the borderline retarded category) and his abusive 
childhood.  This Court has reversed the death penalty in cases where 
multiple aggravators were posed against comparable mitigation.  In 
addition to the evidence of brutal childhood, brain damage, mental 
retardation, and mental illness (i.e., paranoid schizophrenia) in the 
present case, the defendant was eighteen years old at the time of the 
crime and had no criminal record prior to the present offense.  We 
note that the jury vote was eight-to-four.  On this record, we cannot 
conclude that the present crime is one of the least mitigated murders 
this Court has reviewed.  In fact, the record shows just the opposite–
i.e., that this is one of the most mitigated killings we have reviewed.  
Accordingly, Cooper's death sentence is disproportionate. 
 
 
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Id. (footnotes omitted).  While no two cases are exactly alike, we find the 
similarities between Cooper and this case compelling.5  
As in Cooper, we find that the aggravating circumstances present here, 
though substantial, do not outweigh the combination of unrefuted and 
overwhelming mitigation that we have determined in other cases requires a life 
sentence: Crook’s young age; his abusive childhood; his mental deficiencies, 
including organic brain damage; and his substance abuse problem, which 
aggravated his mental deficiencies.  As in Cooper’s case, the record reveals that 
Crook committed a murder that was accompanied by extreme mitigation, including 
evidence of frontal lobe brain damage, diminished control over his inhibitions, a 
disadvantaged home life, a substance abuse problem, and his age of twenty at the 
time of the murder.   
                                          
 
 
5.  The cases present remarkably similar circumstances.  While Cooper had 
no criminal record, the trial court here found in mitigation that Crook lacked any 
history of violent criminal behavior.  However, the evidence of mental health 
mitigation appears even stronger in Crook’s case and was directly connected to the 
crime.  The jury vote in Crook was an even closer seven-to-five, one vote away 
from a life recommendation.  In addition, we note that the substantial mental health 
mitigation presented in Crook’s case was essentially unrebutted, while the State 
presented substantial rebuttal evidence in Cooper.  Further, while Cooper was 
slightly younger than Crook, the mental health evidence in Crook’s case included 
expert testimony that his personality development was comparable to that of a 
three or four-year-old child.  The aggravation in the two cases, while different, is 
also comparable: both involved three aggravators, the most serious in Cooper 
being another murder, and the most serious here being HAC.   
 
 
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We are particularly influenced by the unrefuted testimony of the mental 
health experts that relate the rage and brutal conduct in this crime to the 
defendant’s brain damage and mental deficiencies.  While there is no contention 
that these mental defects rise to the level of insanity so as to bar Crook’s 
conviction for the murder––nor do they rise to the level of mental retardation that 
would constitutionally limit his sentence––our case law has consistently held that 
these substantial mental deficiencies merit great consideration in evaluating a 
defendant’s culpability in a proportionality assessment.   
We conclude that this case falls squarely in the category of cases where we 
have reversed death sentences as being disproportionate in light of the 
overwhelming mitigation, especially the mental mitigation related to the 
circumstances of the crime.  See, e.g., Hawk v. State, 718 So. 2d 159, 163-64 (Fla. 
1998) (death disproportionate despite substantial aggravation, including 
contemporaneous attempted murder of separate victim, where mental mitigation 
was substantial); Robertson v. State, 699 So. 2d 1343, 1347 (Fla. 1997) (death 
disproportionate where HAC and other aggravation offset by age, impaired 
capacity, childhood abuse, and mental mitigation); Morgan v. State, 639 So. 2d 6, 
14 (Fla. 1994) (death disproportionate despite HAC and other aggravation where 
copious mitigation included brain damage and youth).  See also Larkins v. State, 
739 So. 2d 90, 95 (Fla. 1999) (“The killing here appears to be similar to the killing 
 
 
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that occurred in Livingston and to have resulted from impulsive actions of a man 
with a history of mental illness who was easily disturbed by outside forces.”); 
Urbin, 714 So. 2d at 417-18 (death disproportionate despite multiple aggravators, 
including prior violent felony, where mitigation included impaired capacity, 
deprived childhood, and youth); Knowles v. State, 632 So. 2d 62, 67 (Fla. 1993) 
(death disproportionate despite contemporaneous murder aggravator where 
substantial mitigation included brain damage and impaired capacity); Nibert v. 
State, 574 So. 2d 1059, 1062-63 (Fla. 1990) (death disproportionate where HAC 
aggravator offset by abused childhood, extreme mental and emotional disturbance, 
and impaired capacity due to alcohol abuse); Livingston v. State, 565 So. 2d 1288, 
1292 (Fla. 1988) (death disproportionate where aggravators, prior violent felony 
and murder committed during a robbery, offset by severe childhood abuse, youth 
and immaturity, and diminished intellectual functioning); Miller v. State, 373 So. 
2d 882, 886 (Fla. 1979) (death disproportionate despite substantial aggravation, 
including HAC, where mental mitigation was substantial and related to crime). 
Most persuasive in the mitigation evidence is the unrefuted testimony of 
Drs. McCraney, McClaine, and McMahon directly tying Crook’s impairments to 
his functioning at the time of the murder––which clearly supports the trial court’s 
attribution of “significant weight” to the statutory mitigators involving Crook’s 
 
 
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diminished mental capacity.6  These circumstances, especially the testimony 
linking the combination of Crook’s brain damage and substance abuse to his 
behavior at the time of the murder, counterbalance the effect of the aggravating 
factors.  We also find it compelling that the unrefuted expert testimony indicated 
that Crook would be especially uninhibited when his already damaged brain was 
exposed to the negative effects of alcohol and drugs.  As our cases demonstrate, 
the existence of this mitigation, and especially that evidence connecting the mental 
mitigation to the crime, prevents us from classifying this case as among the most 
aggravated and least mitigated.   
Accordingly, we conclude that under our case law the death sentence is 
disproportionate here.  Based on the foregoing, we vacate the death sentence and 
remand this case for the imposition of a life sentence without the possibility of 
parole on the first-degree murder conviction.7  Of course, Crook’s other 
convictions and sentences, including two other life sentences, remain intact, as 
they were affirmed in the previous appeal. 
                                          
 
 
6.  The statutory mitigators involving Crook’s diminished mental capacity 
are: (1) murder committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme 
or emotional disturbance and (2) defendant’s capacity to appreciate the criminality 
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was 
substantially impaired. 
 
 
7.  In light of the reversal and remand of this case for an imposition of a life 
sentence, we do not reach Crook’s claim that the Florida death penalty statutory 
law and procedure are unconstitutional. 
 
 
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It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, C.J., and ANSTEAD, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., 
concur. 
WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
WELLS, J., dissenting. 
 
I dissent.  I do not agree that the death sentence is disproportional to the 
death sentences in Lawrence v. State, 846 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 2003); Johnston v. 
State, 841 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 2002); Smithers v. State, 826 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 2002); 
and Pope v. State, 679 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1996). 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Highlands County,  
J. David Langford, Judge - Case No. CF96-188 
 
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender and Steven L. Bolotin, Assistant Public 
Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida and Candance M. 
Sabella, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee