Title: The People v. Kenneth Hayes

State: new-york

Issuer: New York Appellate Court

Document:

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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 79  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Kenneth Hayes,
            Appellant.
John Schoeffel, for appellant.
Gina Mignola, for respondent.
JONES, J.:
This appeal presents two issues for our review.  First,
whether the failure of the police to interview witnesses after
overhearing two potentially exculpatory statements constituted a
Brady violation.  Second, whether defendant was improperly
precluded during cross-examination from challenging the adequacy
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No. 79
of the police investigation. 
I
It is undisputed that in the early morning of August 8,
2004, Charles Shell and ten friends attended the 1:00 a.m.
showing of a movie in a Times Square theater.  In the crowded
theater -- a two-level auditorium with a capacity for
approximately 578 people -- Shell and his friends were loudly
talking during the early portions of the movie when someone
shouted at them to be quiet.  At this point, the versions of the
salient facts diverge.  
According to the People, when Shell looked away from
the movie, he observed his friends out of their seats and facing
a group of approximately ten people standing on the balcony level
of the theater.  The group, which included defendant Kenneth
Hayes, descended from the balcony level.  Shell and his friends
left their seats to approach the group and observed defendant
pacing back and forth in a "rocking motion," saying "Who want
it?"  When Shell confronted defendant, defendant grabbed Shell's
left wrist, blocked his right arm, punched Shell twice in the
stomach, and fled from the theater.  Shell realized that he had
been, in fact, stabbed when he observed blood on his shirt.  
Defendant claims that he went to the lower level of the
theater to politely ask Shell and his friends to refrain from
talking during the movie.  After he made the request, Shell leapt
from his seat and confronted defendant, making a gesture with
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No. 79
respect to his belt -- an indication to defendant that Shell had
a weapon.  Shell removed a knife from his waistband and swung at
defendant with his left arm.  Defendant used his left hand to
grab Shell's arm and his right hand to wrest the knife away. 
During the course of the altercation, defendant was pushed onto
the stairs leading up to the balcony of the theater.  While he
was on the ground, leaning on the stairs with possession of the
knife, defendant attempted to block a further punch, but the
forward momentum of Shell resulted in him being stabbed. 
Defendant fled the theater to escape an alleged chase by Shell's
friends.  
Ultimately, defendant was apprehended outside of the
movie theater by Sergeant Mack who had observed him fighting
within the vestibule of the theater and throwing a metal object
into the street -- later recovered and identified as a gravity
knife.  After the arrest, in the midst of a hectic setting,
Sergeant Mack then assigned officers to either secure the crime
scene, control the crowd, gather evidence, or interview possible
witnesses.  
Sergeant Fitzpatrick was tasked with safeguarding the
crime scene to prevent contamination of blood evidence.  While
guarding the location, Sergeant Fitzpatrick overheard two
separate individuals claim, "That's the guy (referring to Shell),
he had the knife first, he got it taken away from him, he got
what he deserved" and "That guy (Shell) pulled the knife out
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No. 79
first, the other guy took it away from him."  Sergeant
Fitzpatrick did not ascertain the identities of the potential
witnesses, obtain contact information, or otherwise investigate
these two statements.
During trial preparation, Sergeant Fitzpatrick
disclosed these two statements to the prosecution, and the People
immediately advised defendant of this newfound information. 
Defendant argued before the trial court that the lack of police
investigation of the two statements and the failure to obtain
contact information constituted a Brady violation.  Defendant
also sought to use the statements for the non-hearsay purpose of
challenging the completeness of the police investigation.  The
trial court ruled that no Brady violation was committed by the
People and precluded defense counsel, during the cross-
examination of Sergeant Fitzpatrick, from eliciting testimony
regarding the two statements.  After a jury trial, defendant was
acquitted of first degree assault, but convicted of second degree
assault and weapon possession.
In a 3-2 decision, the Appellate Division affirmed the
judgment, holding that the People did not violate their
disclosure obligations under Brady and had no duty to obtain the
identities or contact information of the bystanders (72 AD3d 441,
441-442 [1st Dept 2010]).  Furthermore, the Appellate Division
held that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in
limiting defendant's cross-examination for the purpose of
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No. 79
challenging the thoroughness of the police investigation (id. at
442).  A Judge of this Court granted defendant leave to appeal,
and we now affirm.
II
In the seminal case Brady v Maryland (373 US 83, 87
[1963]), the United States Supreme Court held that a criminal
defendant's right to due process is violated when the prosecution
suppresses favorable evidence that is material to guilt because
every criminal defendant should "be afforded a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense" (California v
Trombetta, 467 US 479, 485 [1984]).  To establish a Brady
violation, a defendant must show that (1) the evidence is
favorable to the defendant because it is either exculpatory or
impeaching in nature; (2) the evidence was suppressed by the
prosecution; and (3) prejudice arose because the suppressed
evidence was material" (People v Fuentes, 12 NY3d 259, 263
[2009]; see also Strickler v Greene, 527 US 263, 281-282 [1999]). 
Here, defendant claims that the police and the People
committed a Brady violation by failing to interview, or at a
minimum, acquire the contact information of the two individuals
who made the statements overheard by Sergeant Fitzpatrick.  While
defendant's argument is couched in Brady terms, when distilled,
he essentially seeks a rule that would impose an affirmative duty
upon the police to obtain potentially exculpatory evidence for
the benefit of a criminal defendant.  However, this Court has
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No. 79
declined to impose such an obligation.  
In People v Alvarez (70 NY2d 375 [1987]), the
defendant, charged with various Vehicle and Traffic Law offenses
for intoxicated driving, asked this Court to require the police
to obtain and preserve additional breath samples for later
testing because the initial samples were destroyed when tested by
the police.  We concluded that there is no "basis for a rule,
sought by defendants in this case, that would require the police
to affirmatively gather evidence for the accused" (Alvarez, 70
NY2d at 381).  And in People v Reedy (70 NY2d 826, 827 [1987]),
where the defendant sought a copy of a personal account written
by the victim of an attempted rape, we held, among other things,
that the People had no obligation to disclose evidence "not in
their possession or control."  In addition, the Supreme Court has
similarly noted that it is "[l]ess clear from our access-to-
evidence cases the extent to which the Due Process Clause imposes
on the government the additional responsibility of guaranteeing
criminal defendants access to exculpatory evidence beyond the
government's possession" (Trombetta, 467 US at 486).
While this Court has instructed that "[a] necessary
corollary of the duty to disclose is the obligation to preserve
evidence until a request for disclosure is made" (People v Kelly,
62 NY2d 516, 520 [1984]), defendant erroneously equates the word
"preserve" with "obtain" or "acquire."  There is a difference
between preserving evidence already within the possession of the
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No. 79
prosecution and the entirely distinct obligation of affirmatively
obtaining evidence for the benefit of a criminal defendant.  The
protection of Brady extends to "discoverable evidence gathered by
the prosecution" (Kelly, 62 NY2d at 520) and seeks to ensure the
disclosure, or prevent the destruction of exculpatory information
already within the People's possession (see e.g. Kelly, 62 NY2d
at 520 [in a larceny and criminal possession of property case,
the Court found a Brady violation when the police permanently
lost property within their possession; People v Cortijo, 70 NY2d
868 [1987] [Court found a Brady violation when the People failed
to disclose the identities of two witnesses that were within
their knowledge and possession]).  Here, the People met their
obligation under Brady when they disclosed the statements to
defendant; the prosecution was not required to impart identifying
information unknown to them and not within their possession.
The recent Federal case of United States v Rodriguez
(496 F3d 221 [2d Cir 2007]) is illustrative.  There, the
defendant sought to compel production of any notes created by the
government during their investigation of witnesses.  The
government claimed that no notes were created memorializing the
interviews, and the defendant responded that this constituted a
Brady violation.  The Second Circuit held that while exculpatory
information that had been procured must be disclosed, the
government investigators had no affirmative obligation to create
notes for the benefit of the defendant (id. at 224-225).  Here,
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No. 79
similarly, while the People fulfilled their duty by apprising
defendant of the content and substance of the statements, they
had no responsibility to acquire the contact information of the
makers of the statements.  
Accordingly, we adhere to our precedent, decline to
impose an affirmative obligation upon the police to obtain
exculpatory information for criminal defendants, and hold that
the failure of the police and the People to investigate the
sources of the two statements was not a Brady violation. 
III
Defendant additionally argues that he was improperly
precluded from utilizing the two statements and challenging the
thoroughness of the police investigation pursuant to Kyles v
Whitley (514 US 419 [1995]).  Defendant's argument is unavailing.
In Kyles, the Supreme Court, discussing the materiality
under Brady of witness statements that were not disclosed,
acknowledged that it is a common and accepted tactic for
defendants to challenge the adequacy of a police investigation. 
There, during the investigation of a murder, the police relied
upon an informant named "Beanie."  Although Beanie should have
been considered a suspect, the police failed to question and
investigate him, instead relying on him despite his "eager[ness]
to cast suspicion on Kyles" (id. at 425), as evidenced by an
internally inconsistent, and continuously evolving narrative of
the incident.  The Supreme Court reasoned that "the defense could
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have examined the police to good effect on their knowledge of
Beanie's statements and so have attacked the reliability of the
investigation in failing even to consider Beanie's possible
guilt" (id. at 446).  If this line of inquiry were pursued, "the
defense could have laid the foundation for a vigorous argument
that the police had been guilty of negligence" (id. at 447).
Despite this recognized strategy, a criminal defendant
does not have an unfettered right to challenge the adequacy of a
police investigation by any means available.  It is well settled
that "[a]n accused's right to cross-examine witnesses . . . is
not absolute" (People v Williams, 81 NY2d 303, 313 [1993]).  The
scope of cross-examination is within the sound discretion of the
trial court (see People v Corby, 6 NY3d 231, 233 [2005]) and it
must "weigh the probative value of such evidence against the
possibility that it 'would confuse the main issue and mislead the
jury . . . or create substantial danger of undue prejudice to one
of the parties'" (People v Davis, 43 NY2d 17, 27 [1977]).  
Defendant contends that the statements were germane to
his justification defense because it established that Shell was
the initial aggressor and possessed the knife first.  Based on
that premise, defendant sought to utilize the statements and
argue that the investigation was inadequate because the police:
(1) failed to fingerprint the knife, and (2) failed to interview,
or obtain the contact information of the two individuals who made
the statements.
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No. 79
While a defendant has a constitutional right to present
a defense, "[t]he right to present a defense 'does not give
criminal defendants carte blanche to circumvent the rules of
evidence'" (People v Cepeda, 208 AD2d 364, 364 [1st Dept 1994]
citing United States v Almonte, 956 F2d 27, 30 [2d Cir 1992]). 
Challenging the adequacy of a police investigation may constitute
a permissible non-hearsay purpose where appropriate, but there is
no rule requiring the automatic admission of any hearsay
statement (see Buie v Phillips, 298 Fed Appx 63, 66 [2d Cir 2008]
[there is no "unfettered right to introduction of hearsay
testimony bearing no assurance of reliability"]).  Here, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the
use of the anonymous hearsay in cross-examination would have
created an unacceptable risk that the jury would consider the
statements for their truth.
Furthermore, the hearsay statements were not so
critical that their exclusion deprived defendant of due process
(cf. Chambers v Mississippi, 410 US 284 [1973]).  Penal Law 35.15
(2)(a) provides that deadly physical force may not be used
unless:
"(a) The actor reasonably believes that such
other person is using or about to use deadly
physical force.  Even in such case, however,
the actor may not use deadly physical force
if he or she knows that with complete
personal safety, to oneself and others he or
she may avoid the necessity of so doing by
retreating."
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No. 79
Despite the conflicting accounts of the incident in
question, it is undisputed that at a certain point during the
altercation, defendant came into possession of a knife and Shell
was unarmed.  Defendant's justification defense must be viewed at
this focal point and the true, crucial inquiry is whether
defendant was justified in the use of deadly physical force
against an unarmed Shell (see People v Aska, 91 NY2d 979, 981
[1998]).  Even accounting for the claim that Shell continued to
struggle with, and swing at defendant, Shell was no longer
capable of using deadly physical force against defendant. 
Therefore, the relevancy of the statements is diminished because
the question of whether the knife was initially possessed by
Shell is not decisive of the issue of defendant's justified use
of deadly physical force at the time of the alleged stabbing.  As
such, the two statements that Shell initially possessed the knife
did not have the great probative force anticipated by defendant.  
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting the use of the
hearsay statements and precluding defendant from challenging the
adequacy and thoroughness of the police investigation where the
probative force of the proposed evidence was outweighed by the
dangers of speculation, confusion, and prejudice (see generally
Davis, 43 NY2d at 27).  
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be affirmed.
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People v Kenneth Hayes
No. 79
LIPPMAN, Chief Judge(dissenting):
I agree that the apparent failure of the police to
collect contact information respecting the putative witnesses
overheard by Sergeant Fitzpatrick was not a due process violation
sanctionable under Brady v Maryland (373 US 83 [1963]); this was
not a case in which information favorable to the accused in the
possession or control of the prosecution was suppressed and,
accordingly, Brady does not come into play (see id. at 87).  It
does not follow, however, and I do not agree, that defendant was
properly precluded from using the statements overheard by
Fitzpatrick to question the adequacy of the investigation upon
which his prosecution was premised. 
In analyzing this second point, the majority first 
acknowledges that the admission of out-of-court statements for
the purpose of showing that the police were aware of, yet failed
to pursue, information potentially exculpatory to the accused, is
not barred by the hearsay rule -- indeed, that the defense tactic
of relying upon such statements is "common and accepted"
(majority opn at 8, citing Kyles v Whitley, 514 US 419, 446-447
[1995]).   The majority, however, concludes that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in excluding the statements at issue
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No. 79
because their probative value was outweighed by their potential
to engender "speculation, confusion and prejudice" (majority opn
at 11).  This analysis is, in my view, flawed, principally
because the record does not disclose that there was any exercise
of discretion involved in the trial court's decision to deny
defendant use of the bystander statements, but also because the
exercise of discretion now described by the majority is not
consistent with a defendant's basic right to present a defense.
The trial court excluded the proffered bystander
statements simply as hearsay, stating at the time of its ruling,
"I decide whether [the statement] comes in under the rules of
evidence.  And if I rule that you're bringing it out for an
impermissible purpose and it's hearsay, it doesn't come out" (A
401).  This was nothing more than an erroneous application of the
hearsay rule -- a legal error -- arising from the court's
misunderstanding of the rule and the purpose for which the
statements were proposed to be introduced.  It should be
corrected as such; there is absolutely no indication that the
court, although recognizing that there was no legal bar to the
statements' admission, nevertheless determined that they should
not be received because, after performing a discretionary
balancing of the sort the majority now retrospectively imputes,
it had concluded they would likely mislead the jury.    
But, even if some discretionary exercise had been
involved, it would have been an abuse of discretion to deny
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defendant the limited use of the statements sought.  The
statements were facially indicative of the existence of
independent witnesses whose accounts of the altercation agreed
with defendant's in crucial respects and were supportive of his
claim that his conduct was justified.  While, because of the
cited police omission, the reliability of the statements could
not be tested, there was, as noted, no hearsay bar to their
admission precisely to show that an investigative lapse had
occurred leaving room for reasonable doubt as to the adequacy of
the evidence offered by the People to meet their burden of
disproving the defense of justification (see Penal Law § 35.00;
Matter of Y.K., 87 NY2d 430, 433 [1996]).  The use of the
statements for this legally permissible purpose would, of course,
have been accompanied by appropriate limiting instructions, and
as we have frequently noted, it is presumed that such
instructions are heeded (see e.g. People v Tosca, 98 NY2d 660
[2002]).1  Moreover, the People would have been afforded the
opportunity to respond with evidence showing that their
1While the majority alludes to some discretionary exercise
in which the trial court concluded that there was an unacceptable
risk that the bystander statements would be considered for their
truth, there is no evidence of any such exercise or conclusion in
the record.  Nor is it explained how such a conclusion in this
case would be reconciled with the presumption, most frequently
invoked by the prosecution, that limiting instructions are
abided. 
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investigation was in fact suitably thorough.2 
The discretionary preclusion of defendant's use of the
statements on cross-examination would, under these circumstances,
have been insupportable since a trial court has no discretion to
cut off a legally permissible, non-collateral, indeed potentially
exculpatory, line of inquiry by a criminal defendant.  Such
discretion would be utterly incompatible with the constitutional
right to present a defense (see People v Carroll, 95 NY2d 375,
385-386 [2000]; People v Hudy, 73 NY2d 40, 57 [1988] abrogated on
other grounds by Carmell v Texas, 529 US 513 [2000]; see also,
Chambers v Mississippi, 410 US 284, 294 [1973] [“The right of an
accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the
right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's
accusations”]).  It is no answer to say, as the majority does,
that the relevancy of the statements at issue is "diminished"
(majority opn at 11) because it is undisputed that at the time of
the stabbing defendant possessed the knife.  If the stabbing
occurred under the circumstances described by defendant -- as an
incident of  defendant's disarming of the initial aggressor at
close quarters -- it is plain that defendant's possession of the
2The People, for example, maintain that although Officer
Fitzpatrick did not record the contact information of the
declarant bystanders, there were numerous other officers on the
scene assigned to interview witnesses and that, if the
declarants' contact information was not obtained, it was probably
because, after the declarants were interviewed, it was determined
that they had no first-hand information.
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knife at the moment of the stabbing, and the concomitant
circumstance that Shell was then unarmed, would not have been
preclusive of a finding of justification (see e.g. People v
Huntley, 59 NY2d 868, 869 [1983], affirming 87 AD2d 488, 491 [4th
Dept 1982]).
 Accordingly, while due process was not violated by the
State's apparent failure to develop leads seemingly favorable to
defendant, it was violated by the court's failure to permit
defendant to bring what were evidently highly material
inadequacies in the State's investigation to the factfinder's
attention.  The State in our adversary system of justice has no
affirmative duty to seek out evidence favorable to the accused,
but when its failure to do so may reasonably be understood to
impair the adequacy of the proof of guilt, judicial discretion is
not properly deployed to shield the alleged infirmity from the
jury's scrutiny.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order affirmed.  Opinion by Judge Jones.  Judges Ciparick,
Graffeo, Read, Smith and Pigott concur.  Chief Judge Lippman
dissents in an opinion.
Decided May 10, 2011
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