Title: Peterson v. Castano

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  All the Justices 
 
EMERY C. PETERSON 
 
 
            OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.  Record No. 992478 
September 15, 2000 
 
LORENZO CASTANO, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA 
John E. Kloch, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the circuit court 
erred by denying the plaintiff's motion to amend his motions 
for judgment to increase each ad damnum clause. 
 
Plaintiff, Emery C. Peterson, was injured in a motor 
vehicle accident in Alexandria on April 10, 1996.  He filed a 
motion for judgment against Lorenzo M. Castano and his 
employer, El Mercado, Inc., and alleged that Castano's 
negligent operation of a motor vehicle was a proximate cause 
of the plaintiff's injuries.  The plaintiff also filed a 
separate motion for judgment against another driver of a motor 
vehicle involved in the same accident, Hira Naimi, and alleged 
that her negligence was also a proximate cause of his 
injuries.  The plaintiff sought damages of $50,000 in each 
motion for judgment. 
 
The circuit court consolidated the motions for judgment, 
and the litigants agreed upon a pretrial order which 
established a discovery deadline date of January 1, 1999 and a 
trial date of February 1, 1999.  In June 1998, in response to 
an interrogatory propounded by the defendants, the plaintiff 
stated that he had injured his neck and back in the accident 
and that he considered his "back injuries to be permanent."  
On December 11, 1998, the plaintiff filed a motion to amend 
his motions for judgment to increase each ad damnum clause 
from $50,000 to $150,000.  The circuit court denied the 
motion.  Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a motion to 
reconsider, or in the alternative, to grant him a nonsuit.  
The circuit court denied the motion. 
 
On February 1, 1999, the date scheduled for trial, the 
plaintiff requested a continuance because he was ill.  The 
circuit court granted the motion and set a new trial date for 
July 26, 1999.  The plaintiff also requested permission to 
increase each ad damnum clause to $150,000.  The circuit court 
did not grant the motion and entered an order dated February 
17, 1999 stating that "the Court will not entertain any 
further motion by Plaintiff to Amend his Motion for Judgment 
to Increase his Ad Damnum Clause." 
 
At the beginning of the jury trial in July 1999, the 
plaintiff again made a motion to amend the motion for judgment 
to increase each ad damnum clause to $150,000.  The circuit 
court denied the motion.  At the conclusion of the trial, the 
jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff against all 
defendants jointly and severally in the amount of $150,000.  
 
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The circuit court entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff 
in the amount of $50,000.  The plaintiff appeals. 
 
The plaintiff argues that the circuit court erred in 
denying his motion to amend the motions for judgment to 
increase each ad damnum clause.  The plaintiff, relying upon 
Rule 1:8, argues that leave to amend pleadings should be 
liberally granted and that the defendants would not have been 
prejudiced had the circuit court granted his motion.  
Continuing, the plaintiff argues that had the circuit court 
permitted him to increase each ad damnum clause when it 
continued the trial date from February to July, the defendants 
would have had sufficient time to undertake any additional 
discovery had they so desired. 
 
Responding, defendant Naimi asserts that the circuit 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's 
motions.  Naimi points out that the plaintiff was aware that 
his injuries were allegedly permanent at least four months 
before he filed his initial motion to amend the motions for 
judgment to increase each ad damnum clause.  Defendants 
Castano and El Mercado contend that the circuit court properly 
denied the plaintiff's initial motion to amend the motions for 
judgment to increase each ad damnum clause because of the 
potential prejudice to the defendants, the plaintiff's 
purported history of avoidance and delay, and further 
 
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potential delay which would have occurred had the motion been 
granted.  These defendants say that when the plaintiff filed 
his initial motion to amend the motion for judgment to 
increase each ad damnum clause, the trial date was rapidly 
approaching, and the plaintiff's failure to respond timely to 
discovery would have precluded the defendants from taking the 
discovery deposition of the plaintiff's treating physician 
without extending the discovery period. 
 
Continuing, defendants Castano and El Mercado observe 
that circuit courts have the inherent right and duty to 
control their trial dockets and to ensure that cases proceed 
to conclusion in an orderly and predictable manner.  These 
defendants contend that the circuit court properly denied the 
plaintiff's subsequent motions to amend his motions for 
judgment to increase each ad damnum clause, including the 
February 1, 1999 motion, because the circuit court's earlier 
rulings were "just and proper and no additional information 
was presented." 
 
Rule 1:8 states in relevant part: 
 
"No amendments shall be made to any pleading 
after it is filed save by leave of court.  Leave to 
amend shall be liberally granted in furtherance of 
the ends of justice." 
 
We have consistently held that the decision to permit 
amendments of pleadings rests within the sound discretion of 
 
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the circuit court.  Adkins v. Dixon, 253 Va. 275, 279, 482 
S.E.2d 797, 800, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 937 (1997); Brown v. 
Brown, 244 Va. 319, 324, 422 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1992).  When 
deciding whether to grant a motion to amend a motion for 
judgment to increase an ad damnum clause, a circuit court must 
consider whether the defendant will be prejudiced and whether 
such prejudice will affect the defendant's ability to have a 
fair trial.  The circuit court must also consider the 
plaintiff's right to be compensated fully for any damages 
caused by the defendant's acts or omissions.  On appeal, our 
review of the circuit court's decision to grant or deny a 
motion to amend a motion for judgment to increase the ad 
damnum clause is limited to the issue whether the circuit 
court abused its discretion.  See Hetland v. Worcester Mut. 
Ins. Co., 231 Va. 44, 46, 340 S.E.2d 574, 575 (1986). 
 
The record in this case reveals that the plaintiff made 
motions to amend his motions for judgment to increase each ad 
damnum clause on several dates:  December 11, 1998; January 
13, 1999; February 1, 1999; and July 26, 1999.  Because we are 
of the view that the circuit court abused its discretion in 
denying the plaintiff's motion to amend made on February 1, 
1999, we need not consider whether the circuit court abused 
its discretion when denying the plaintiff's other motions. 
 
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On February 1, 1999, the plaintiff requested a 
continuance and leave to amend the motions for judgment to 
increase each ad damnum clause.  As we have already stated, on 
that date, the circuit court continued the trial until July 
1999.  The defendants fail to explain, and the record does not 
show, how they would have been prejudiced had the circuit 
court permitted the plaintiff to increase the amount of each 
ad damnum clause after the trial date had been continued.  
And, Rule 1:8 mandates that leave to amend shall be liberally 
granted in furtherance of the ends of justice.  Mortarino v. 
Consultant Engineering Services, 251 Va. 289, 295-96, 467 
S.E.2d 778, 782 (1996). 
 
We hold that the circuit court abused its discretion by 
denying the plaintiff's February 1, 1999 request to amend his 
motions for judgment to increase each ad damnum clause because 
there is no evidence that the defendants would have suffered 
any prejudice, and the amendment would have been in 
furtherance of the ends of justice.  We recognize, as 
defendants Castano and El Mercado observe, that a court must 
control its docket to avoid unnecessary delay to the 
litigants.  And, we expect that courts will adjudicate cases 
in a timely manner.  However, a litigant's right to a fair 
trial must not be made subordinate to the judiciary's efforts 
to control its docket. 
 
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Accordingly, we will affirm that portion of the judgment 
holding that the defendants are liable to the plaintiff.  We 
will reverse that portion of the judgment that assesses the 
plaintiff's damages.  We will remand this proceeding with 
directions that the circuit court permit the plaintiff to 
amend his motions for judgment to increase each ad damnum 
clause, and on remand, the plaintiff will be entitled to a 
trial on the issue of damages only. 
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
                                           and remanded. 
 
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