Title: Donlan v. Nevada

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

127 Nev, Advance Opinion |2.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

EUGENE WILLIAM DONLAN, No, 54689
Appellant,

‘THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Respondent.

 

Appeal from a district court order denying
terminate appellant’s duty to register as a sex offender under NRS
179.490. Fifth Judicial District Court, Nye County; Robert W, Lane,
Judge.

Affirmed,

‘Terrence M. Jackson, Las Vegas,
for Appellant.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City, and Binu G.
Palal, Deputy Attorney General, Carson City,
for Respondent.

   

BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.

OPINION

By the Court, CHERRY, J.

In this appeal, we consider whether someone convicted of a sox
offense in another state who now resides in Nevada must continue to
register as a sex offender in Nevada even though the requirement to
rogister as a sex offender in the other state has since been terminated by

WARYET

 

 
mon

an executive branch administrative action of that state, We conclude that
the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require Nevada to dispense with
its preferred mechanism for protecting its citizenry by virtue of
termination of the duty to register in another state, Accordingly, we
affirm the district court’s order denying appellant's petition to terminate
his duty to register as a sex offender in Nevada.
FACTS:
In August 1985, appellant Eugene W. Donlan pleaded guilty to

 

the crime of lewd and lascivious behavior on a child in California and was
sentenced to probation. According to Donlan, his probation wa
subsequently terminated, the charges against him were reduced to a
misdemeanor, and the conviction was later dismissed and set aside under
California statutory law.

In March 1986, Donlan began registering as a sox offender in
the State of California, In December 2005, he moved to Gardnerville,
Nevada. He has since relocated to Pahrump, Nevada. Donlan has
continually registered with the State of Nevada as a sex offender since
moving to this state. In July 2009, almost 25 years after his conviction,
the California Department of Justice, under the auspices of the California
Attorney General, terminated Donlan's requirement to register in
California as a sex offender through a notification letter.

‘Thereafter, Donlan filed a petition in the Fifth Judicial
District Court in Nye County, Nevada, to terminate his requirement to
register as a sex offender in the State of Nevada, which was opposed by
the Nevada Attorney General. In September 2009, after a hearing was
held on the petition, the district court denied Donlan's petition to
terminate his duty to register as a sex offender in the State of Nevada. On

 

 
appeal, Donlan contends that the district court abused its discretion in
denying his petition to terminate his duty to register as a sex offender,
DISCUSSION

Donlan argues that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
United States Constitution requires Nevada to recognize California's
termination of his requirement to register as a sex offender. We disagree
because California “lacks power to dictate the means by which [Nevada]
can protect its public.” Rosin v, Monken, 699 F.3d 574, 577 (7th Ci.
2010).

‘The Constitution requires that “Full Faith and Credit shall be
siven in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of
every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the
Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and
the Bffect thereof.” U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1; see Nevada v, Hall, 440 U.S.
410, 421 (1979); Mason v, Cuisensire, 122 Nev. 43, 47, 128 P.8d 446, 448
(2006). “The purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause “was to alter the
status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties, each free
to ignore obligations created under the laws or by the judicial proceedings
of the others, and to make them integral parts of a single nation
throughout which a remedy upon a just obligation might be demanded as
of right, irrespective of the state of its origin.”” Rosin, 599 F.3d at 576

(quoting Baker v. General Motors Corp,, 522 U.S. 222, 282 (1998) (quoting
Milwaukee County v. White Co,, 296 U.S. 268, 277 (1935))). While it is

clear that the California executive branch administrative decision based
on California statutory law is not a final judgment under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, we need not decide whether California’s decision to

terminate Donlan's duty to register is a public act or record because the

 

 
Supreme Court has “clearly establishe(d] that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause does not require a State to apply another State's law in violation of
its own legitimate public policy.” Hall, 440 U.S. at 421-22.1 The Court has
reasoned that “the full faith and credit clause does not require one state to
substitute for its own statute, applicable to persons and events within it,
the conflicting statute of another state, even though the statute is of
controlling force in the courts of the state of its enactment.” Pacific Ins,
Co, v, Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 602 (1939); see Hall, 440 U.S. at 422-28.
‘Therefore, “the Full Faith and Credit Clause cannot be used by one state
to interfere impermissibly with the exclusive affairs of another.” Rosin,
599 F.8d at 577; see Baker, 522 U.S. at 239 n.12 (holding that Michigan
judgment was not entitled to full faith and credit because it impermissibly
interfered with Missouri's control of litigation brought by parties who were
not before the Michigan court).

Even if California imposes less restrictive requirements upon

sex offenders, “[California] has no authority to dictate to [Nevada] the

“Regarding judgments... the full faith and credit obligation is
exacting[:] A final judgment in one State, if rendered by a court with
adjudicatory authority over the subject matter and persons governed by
the judgment, qualifies for recognition throughout the land.” Baker, 522
U.S. at 233; see Adams v. Adams, 107 Nev. 790, 792, 820 P.2d 752, 754
(1991) (The full faith and credit doctrine requires each state to give effect,
to the judicial proceedings of other states.”). While there is not a roving
public policy exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause concerning
judgments, the same cannot be said for public acts, records, and statutes.
Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1152 (10th Cir. 2007) (“In applying
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Suprome Court has drawn a
distinction between statutes and judgments.”).

 
‘manner in which it can best protect its citizenry from those convicted of
Rosin, 599 F.3d at 577. “The Full Faith and Credit Clause

 

does not compel ‘a state to substitute the statutes of other states for its
‘own statutes dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is
competent to legislate.” Baker, 522 U.S. at 232 (quoting Pacific Ins. Co.,
306 U.S. at 601); see Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 494
(2008) ("The State of Nevada is undoubtedly ‘competent to legislate’ with
respect to... one of its citizens within its borders.”). As such, Nevada
does not need to dispense with its preferred mechanism for protecting its
populace by virtue of a California executive branch administrative action
that terminated Donlan’s requirement to register as a sex offender. Rosin,
599 F.d at 677; see Clint Hurt & Assocs, v. Silver State Oil, 111 Nev.
1086, 1088, 901 P.2d 703, 705 (1995). To the contrary, the California
action only assures Donlan that he does not have to register as a sex
offender within the jurisdiction of California, See Rosin, 599 F.3d at 577.
‘That notwithstanding, Nevada is free to protect its populace from
individuals convicted of sex offenses by enforcing its own registration
requirements. See ASAP Storage, Inc. v. City of Sparks, 123 Nev. 639,
646 n.15, 173 P.3d 734, 739 n.15 (2007) (recognizing that the Legislature's
police power is essential for the protection and preservation of the public
safety); Douglas Disposal, Inc. v. Wee Haul, LLC, 123 Nev. 552, 559, 170
P.3d 508, 513 (2007) (‘Police power confers upon the states the ability to
enact laws in order to protect the safety, health, morals, and general

welfare of society.”).

 

 
Because California lacks the power to prescribe the manner in
which Nevada can protect its citizenry, we affirm the district court's order

 

 

denying Donlan’s petition to terminate his duty to register as a sex
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=NRS 179D.490, the statute governing the duration and termination
of a sex offender's duty to register, was amended in 2007 in Assembly Bill
(AB.) 579. 2007 Nev. Stat., ch. 485, § 41, at 2770-71. The new sex
offender registry requirements were to go into effect in July 2008. Id. § 57,
at 2780. However, the United States District Court for the District of
Nevada preliminarily and then permanently enjoined the State of Nevada
from enforcing the new requirements of Nevac ex offender registration
Jaws, including those in NRS 179D.490, in American Civil Liberties Union
vy. Cortez Masto, 719 F. Supp. 2d 1258 (2008) (enjoining the enforcement of
A.B. 579, which included amendments to NRS 179D.490). The permanent
injunction has been appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and a
decision has not been rendered. The parties and the district court did not
have an opportunity to determine the appropriateness of NRS 179D.490 as
a consequence of the injunction. In this appeal, Donlan also argues that
NRS 179D.490 is constitutionally defective because it does not provide a
remedy for a person in his position, and that NRS 179D.490 violates the
Equal Protection Clauses of both the United States and Nevada
Constitutions. Since the amendments to NRS 179D.490 have been
permanently enjoined, we do not reach the merits of these questions.