Title: LEO PAUL LAWRENCE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

LEO PAUL LAWRENCE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 183171 P.3d 517Case Number: S-07-0065Decided: 11/15/2007
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
LEO 
PAUL LAWRENCE,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OFWYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofUintaCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Tina N. 
Kerin, Appellate Counsel, WyomingState Public Defender Program, 
Cheyenne, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Michael M. Robinson, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne, Wyoming  

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      A jury convicted 
Leo Paul Lawrence of attempting to deliver methamphetamine in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(i) and § 35-7-1042.  On appeal, Mr. Lawrence claims the 
district court erred in admitting evidence of prior drug use by two defense 
witnesses.  We hold that the 
district court did not err in admitting the challenged evidence and affirm Mr. 
Lawrence's judgment and sentence.

 
 

ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Lawrence 
presents this issue statement:

 
 
Did the 
trial court err in admitting irrelevant and improper character evidence of prior 
drug use by defense witnesses?

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On the morning of 
December 15, 2005, Sarah Marchant contacted Ted Porter, a special agent with the 
Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI), and informed him she had arranged to 
purchase a quantity of methamphetamine from Mr. Lawrence.   Ms. Marchant was fitted with a 
wire, supplied with two hundred dollars in recorded "buy" money and dropped off 
by Mr. Lawrence's residence. DCI Agent Porter parked along a nearby street, 
where he could listen to the transmission from the wire over a radio 
frequency.  Two other DCI agents, 
Chris Brackin and Justin Mathson, were stationed in the area to monitor the 
transaction and provide assistance. 

 
 
[¶4]      Ms. Marchant 
approached Mr. Lawrence's residence on foot and knocked on the door.  Mr. Lawrence let Ms. Marchant in and had 
her lock the door. Ms. Marchant asked for a "teener" (one sixteenth of an ounce 
of methamphetamine).  A price of 
$140 was agreed upon, and Ms. Marchant placed the buy money on the table.  Mr. Lawrence got out a scale and a yellow 
baggie, which Ms. Marchant estimated contained approximately a quarter ounce of 
methamphetamine, and placed them on the table.  The transaction was interrupted by the 
arrival of Rebecca Pauly, a neighbor and friend of Mr. Lawrence's, and their 
mutual friend, Jeff Mathson, who is the brother of DCI Agent Justin 
Mathson.  Ms. Pauly informed Mr. 
Lawrence that on their way to his house they had observed a suspicious person in 
a vehicle parked nearby.  Based upon 
the description of the vehicle and driver, Mr. Lawrence identified the driver as 
DCI Agent Porter.  

 
 
[¶5]      Mr. Lawrence 
immediately turned on a police scanner.  
Jeff Mathson identified the voice of his brother, DCI Agent Justin 
Mathson, commenting about Jeff's arrival at Mr. Lawrence's residence.  They also heard DCI Agent Justin Mathson 
inform DCI Agent Porter that he had probably been identified  "burnt" in the 
parlance used by DCI Agent Mathson. Ms. Marchant indicated that she did not want 
to "leave here with nothing."  Mr. 
Lawrence replied that he did not want her to leave with it either.  Ms. Pauly said they needed to get out of 
there, and Ms. Marchant agreed.  Mr. 
Lawrence told all of them to go, and Ms. Marchant, Ms. Pauly, and Mr. Mathson 
left the residence.  Ms. Marchant 
left without any drugs or the buy money.

 
 
[¶6]      All three DCI 
agents returned to the police station with Ms. Marchant.  Mr. Lawrence and his residence were left 
unobserved for approximately thirty minutes. After DCI Agent Justin Mathson 
returned to surveil the residence, he observed Mr. Lawrence drive up and go 
inside.  Mr. Lawrence spent another 
thirty to forty-five minutes inside the residence before leaving again in his 
vehicle. At that time, the decision was made to arrest Mr. Lawrence.  Search warrants were subsequently issued 
for Mr. Lawrence's residence and vehicle.  
The buy money was found in a metal container on the floor of Mr. 
Lawrence's vehicle.  Two scales and 
two baggies, one of them yellow, were found inside the residence.  The scales tested positive for 
methamphetamine residue. The yellow baggy contained 0.11 grams of 
methamphetamine, while the other had a trace quantity of the drug.  

 
 
[¶7]      At trial, Mr. 
Lawrence's defense was that there was only an attempted buy on Ms. Marchant's 
part, but that he did not have any methamphetamine and did not attempt to sell 
any to her.  Ms. Pauly and Mr. Jeff 
Mathson both testified as defense witnesses that there were no drugs or 
paraphernalia in view when they were in the residence.  The prosecution presented the testimony 
of several law enforcement witnesses, including DCI Agents Porter and Mathson, 
who described the controlled buy, the arrest of Mr. Lawrence, and the results of 
the searches of his residence and vehicle.  
An expert chemist from the State Crime Lab testified regarding the 
testing done on the scales and baggies recovered from Mr. Lawrence's residence 
and the identification of methamphetamine and methamphetamine residue recovered 
from those items.  Ms. Marchant 
testified about the controlled buy and the aborting of the transaction upon 
discovery of the surveillance.  The 
jury returned a verdict of guilty, and Mr. Lawrence was sentenced to a term of 
not less than two years nor more than seven years in the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary.  He filed a timely 
notice of appeal. 

 
 
[¶8]      Additional facts 
specifically relevant to Mr. Lawrence's appellate issue will be provided in the 
discussion below.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶9]      Mr. Lawrence's 
error contentions are based on the admission of testimony relating to past drug 
usage by defense witnesses Rebecca Pauly and Jeff Mathson.  The testimony relating to Jeff Mathson's 
drug usage came without defense objection from DCI Agent Justin Mathson, Jeff 
Mathson's brother, during the prosecution's case-in-chief and from Jeff Mathson 
himself over a relevance defense objection during the defense's 
case-in-chief.  The testimony 
relating to Ms. Pauly's drug usage came over a non-specific defense objection 
during the defense's case-in-chief.

 
 
[¶10]   The standard of review applicable 
to these error contentions is familiar.  
Evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court 
and are not disturbed absent a clear abuse of that discretion.  Dysthe v. State, 2003 WY 20, ¶ 16, 63 P.3d 875, 883 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 11, 43 P.3d 80, 87 (Wyo. 2002); Robinson v. 
State, 11 P.3d 361, 367 (Wyo. 2000)).  
"Determining whether the trial court abused its discretion involves the 
consideration of whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did, and 
whether it acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner." Id.  The trial court's ruling is entitled to 
considerable deference and will not be reversed on appeal if a legitimate basis 
for the court's ruling exists.  
Id.  

 
 
[¶11]   To the extent no objection was 
interposed by defense counsel, the plain error standard applies.  Brown v. State, 2004 WY 57, ¶ 20, 90 P.3d 98, 104 (Wyo. 2004).  That 
standard places the burden on Mr. Lawrence to demonstrate that "the record 
clearly shows an error that transgressed a clear and unequivocal rule of law 
which adversely affected a substantial right."  Id. (quoting Compton v. State, 931 P.2d 936, 939 
(Wyo. 
1997)).

 
 
Testimony 
relating to Jeff Mathson's drug use

 
 
1.         
DCI Agent Justin Mathson's testimony

 
 
[¶12]   DCI Agent Justin Mathson testified 
during the prosecution's case-in-chief.  
On direct examination, the DCI agent described his brother's arrival at 
Mr. Lawrence's residence and subsequently hearing Mr. Lawrence identify DCI 
Agent Porter over the wire's radio transmission. He described how the DCI agents 
returned to the station after Ms. Marchant left the residence, leaving Mr. 
Lawrence and his residence unobserved for approximately thirty minutes.  DCI Agent Mathson also testified that 
when he returned to Mr. Lawrence's residence, he observed Mr. Lawrence returning 
to the residence in his vehicle, and that Mr. Lawrence remained inside the 
residence for approximately thirty to forty-five minutes before leaving in his 
vehicle again.  DCI Agent Mathson 
further testified the decision to arrest Mr. Lawrence was made at that 
time.  On cross-examination, Mr. 
Lawrence's counsel made the following inquiry:

 
 
Q:        As 
far as your observations in this case, you said that you saw your brother leave 
Mr. Lawrence's residence with a female?

 
 
A:        
Correct.

Q:        Did 
you know where Jeff was living at the time?

 
 
A:        I 
did.

 
 
Q:        Did 
anybody  did you do anything to try and follow up, like go interview him or 
have somebody else interview him at his place, go check at his place before the 
arrest of Mr. Lawrence?

 
 
A:        Not 
that day, no.

 
 
Q:        Any 
discussions with anybody about who's going to go follow up on these people and 
see what they saw, anything like that?

 
 
A:        Later 
on, yes.

 
 
Q:        
Anything done  any discussions like that before the arrest of Mr. 
Lawrence?

 
 
A:        Not 
that I can recall.  There might have 
been some talk but I can't recall if there was or not.

 
 
Q:        
Okay.  Do you know who that 
female was with Jeff?

 
 
A:        I 
do.

 
 
Q:        Who's 
that?

 
 
A:        I 
think her name is Rebecca Pauly.

 
 
Q:        
Okay.  Are you  do you talk 
to Jeff?  I mean, are you friends 
with him?

 
 
A:        We do 
not communicate or I haven't seen him for several months.

 
 
Q:        
Yeah.  Are there bad feelings between you 
two?

 
 
A:        I just don't agree with his life-style, so 
I just choose not to associate with him.

 
 
Q:        He's 
working in the oil fields?

A:        He 
is.  

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  The remainder of 
cross-examination focused on the gap in time when Mr. Lawrence's residence was 
not under surveillance, the decision to arrest, and the circumstances of the 
arrest.   

 
 
[¶13]   On redirect, the prosecutor asked 
DCI Agent Mathson to explain the answer defense counsel had elicited when asking 
about his relationship with his brother:

 
 
Q:        What 
do you mean by you don't agree with Jeff's life-style?

 
 
A:        From 
 well, I'm just assuming the places he hangs around, the places he goes, I'm assuming that he uses drugs.  And he still lives at home with family 
members.  That kind of does not set 
well with me, either, so . . . . 

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  Because Mr. Lawrence's 
trial counsel did not object to the "life-style" question and answer, this Court 
reviews his appellate error contention for plain error.  The parties agree the record clearly 
shows the testimony to which Mr. Lawrence now objects.  This Court has carefully read Mr. 
Lawrence's appellate brief to identify the clear and unequivocal rule of 
evidence he claims was violated when this testimony was admitted. At one point 
in his brief, after briefly recounting the testimonies of DCI Agent Mathson, 
Rebecca Pauly, and Jeff Mathson of which he complains, he asserts, first, that 
"all the above evidence was improper because it was irrelevant" and under W.R.E. 
402 irrelevant evidence is inadmissible, and second, that "these examinations by 
the prosecutor constituted introduction of improper character evidence" 
inadmissible under W.R.E. 608(b) (specific instances of conduct) and Blumhagen v. State, 11 P.3d 889 (Wyo. 
2000). At another point in his brief when specifically addressing only DCI Agent 
Mathson's testimony that he assumes his brother uses drugs, Mr. Lawrence again 
identifies W.R.E. 608(b) and Blumhagen.  The extent of his cogent argument on 
that basis is "[t]hat rule was violated when the trial court allowed Justin 
Mathson to put forth his opinion that his brother uses drugs.'"  At neither point in his brief does Mr. 
Lawrence quote the text of W.R.E. 608(b) and explain its application to DCI 
Agent Mathson's utterance.  Equally 
missing is an explanation of the application of Blumhagen to DCI Agent Mathson's 
utterance.  The extent of Mr. 
Lawrence's "irrelevance" argument about that utterance is simply that it was not 
"relevant to proving whether Mr. Lawrence attempted to deliver a controlled 
substance to Ms. Merchant."  

 
 
[¶14]   Responding to Mr. Lawrence's 
complaint about DCI Agent Mathson's utterance, the State counters that Mr. 
Lawrence's trial counsel "opened the door" to the prosecutor's redirect question 
asking the witness to explain his disagreement with his brother's lifestyle 
which was revealed by defense counsel's earlier cross-examination.  The State cites White v. State, 2003 WY 163, ¶ 11, 80 P.3d 642, 648 (Wyo. 2003):

 
 
            
"This Court has recognized that a defendant may open the door to 
otherwise inadmissible testimony when he inquires about a particular subject," 
including evidence of prior criminal misconduct.  Gayler v. State, 957 P.2d 855, 858 
(Wyo. 1998); see also Espinoza v. State, 969 P.2d 542, 546 (Wyo. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 818, 120 S. Ct. 59, 145 L. Ed. 2d 52 (1999).  
"When the defendant initiates a line of questioning, the prosecutor is 
entitled to make a permissible inquiry without crossing into prosecutorial 
overkill."  Espinoza, 696 P.2d  at 
546.

 
 
            
It is usually a basic function of redirect examination to allow a witness 
to explain his testimony elicited on cross-examination. . . . The opening of the 
door concept, however, reaches further and is an extension of that familiar 
rule.  Succinctly stated, the 
"opening the door" rule is that a party who in some way permits the trial judge 
to let down the gates to a field of inquiry that is not competent but relevant 
cannot complain if his adversary is also allowed to avail himself of the opening 
within its scope.

 
 

Sanville 
v. State, 593 P.2d 1340, 1344 (Wyo. 1979)

 
 
This 
Court agrees with the State that this was a permissible question for redirect in 
the circumstances.  The prosecutor 
limited his inquiry to that single question, thus "the prosecutor's redirect 
examination did not cross the line between permissible inquiry and prosecutorial 
overkill."  White, ¶ 12, 80 P.3d  at 648-49.  Once Mr. Lawrence's counsel opened the 
door to this line of questioning, he could not legitimately complain when the 
prosecutor went through it and asked the witness to clarify his 
cross-examination testimony.

 
 
[¶15]   Mr. Lawrence's argument alleging 
that DCI Agent Mathson's utterance constituted improper character evidence under 
W.R.E. 608(b) and Blumhagen lacks 
cogency.  He fails to quote the text 
of the rule of evidence and fails to provide legal analysis of either the rule 
or the Blumhagen holding and their 
application to the DCI agent's utterance.  
We decline to review this ground without cogent argument.  Marshall v. State, 2005 WY 164, ¶ 12, 125 P.3d 269, 274 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 
2.         Jeff 
Mathson's testimony

 
 
[¶16]   Jeff Mathson testified in Mr. 
Lawrence's case-in-chief.  On direct 
examination, defense counsel questioned Mr. Mathson regarding his knowledge of 
Ms. Pauly's drug use.  Mr. Mathson 
testified he did not have any direct knowledge of whether Ms. Pauly was into 
methamphetamine in December of 2005.  
He also testified he had not personally observed Ms. Pauly using 
methamphetamine during the three months preceding December 2005 or since that 
time.  With respect to his own drug 
use, Mr. Mathson declared that he was not a drug user and had not used 
methamphetamine in September, October, November, or December of 2005 or since 
then.  Direct examination then moved 
to foundational questions similar to those that had been asked earlier of Ms. 
Pauly and, likewise, Mr. Mathson admitted he was friends with Mr. Lawrence but 
stated that he would not lie for him and had not coordinated his testimony with 
other witnesses. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked a single question of 
Mr. Mathson regarding his drug use:  
"Now, I noticed that you were kind of asked to count back a few months if 
you've had any use of meth.  Isn't 
it true that you've admitted using meth up to at least six months before  
[?]"  Mr. Lawrence's counsel 
interrupted with a relevance objection which the trial judge overruled, saying, 
"It was raised.  It was raised for 
his credibility purpose. Overruled."  
The prosecutor repeated the question and Jeff Mathson answered, "Yes." 

 
 
[¶17]   Mr. Lawrence's appellate argument 
challenging the trial judge's relevance ruling is that Jeff Mathson's drug use 
"up to at least six months before" was irrelevant to proving whether Mr. 
Lawrence attempted to deliver a controlled substance to Ms. Marchant on December 
15, 2005; W.R.E. 402 provides that irrelevant evidence is inadmissible; 
therefore, the trial judge abused his discretion in admitting that 
evidence.  The State's rebuttal to 
this challenge is two-fold.  First, 
the State asserts that Mr. Lawrence's counsel "opened the door" to this evidence 
by eliciting the witness's testimony that he had not used drugs for a 
three-month period before December 15, 2005.  Second, the State points out that it 
served to counter the inference raised during the witness's direct examination 
that he was an impartial witness who had no connection with the drug 
culture.  The State correctly refers 
this Court to this passage:

 
 
A more 
particular attack on the witness' credibility is affected by means of 
cross-examination directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or 
ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly to issues or 
personalities in the case at hand.  
The partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, and is 
"always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his 
testimony."  3A J. Wigmore, Evidence § 940, p. 775 (Chadbourn rev. 
1970).  We have recognized that the 
exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important 
function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.  Greene v. McElroy 360 U.S. 474, 496, 79 S. Ct. 1400, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1377 (1959).

 
 

Hannon 
v. State, 2004 
WY 8, ¶ 16, 84 P.3d 320, 329-30 (Wyo. 2004)(quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 317-18, 
94 S. Ct. 1105, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974)); see also State v. Slane, 48 Wyo. 1, 13, 
41 P.2d 269, 273 (1935) ("interest, relationship, bias, and corrupt testimonial 
intent may always be shown either on cross-examination or by extrinsic 
testimony").

 
 
[¶18]   We agree with the State's arguments 
on this issue and hold that the trial judge's relevancy ruling was correct.  That does not end the matter, however, 
because Mr. Lawrence challenges the admissibility of Mr. Mathson's prior drug 
use on an evidentiary ground not raised at trial, namely, W.R.E. 608(b).  This Court has closely read Mr. 
Lawrence's appellate brief to identify a specific plain error analysis of this 
specific ground as applied to this specific evidence.  It is not to be found.  Invoking W.R.E. 608(b), without quoting 
the rule's text, and Blumhagen, Mr. 
Lawrence concludes that the prosecutor's cross-examination question about Jeff 
Mathson's drug use "at least six months before" had only the purpose to portray 
Mr. Mathson as an "unbelievable reprobate" and to imply that he was not credible 
in his testimony.

 
 
[¶19]   In response to Mr. Lawrence's 
argument, the State, after quoting the text of W.R.E. 608(b), notes that the 
purpose of the rule is to prevent improper witness impeachment through 
"extrinsic evidence" of that witness's specific conduct, citing Solis v. State, 981 P.2d 34, 37 (Wyo. 
1999).  The State correctly observes 
that the prosecutor elicited the testimony through cross-examination of the very 
witness whose impartiality was in question, not through the extrinsic evidence 
of another witness whose testimony was attacking the credibility of an opposing 
witness whose impartiality was in question.  In Blumhagen, a confidential informant 
testified in the prosecution's case-in-chief about the accused's delivery of 
drugs, but was not examined, either on direct or cross-examination, about her 
own drug use.  11 P.3d  at 892.  After the prosecution rested, the 
accused's counsel wanted to call a witness to testify about the confidential 
informant's prior drug use; to this end, the accused's counsel called this 
witness to testify in an offer of proof on that matter.  The trial court refused to allow that 
witness to testify before the jury.  
Id. at 893.  On appeal, this Court affirmed the trial 
court's refusal, holding that such testimony "amounted to extrinsic evidence 
concerning a specific instance of the confidential informant's conduct and was 
not, therefore, admissible to attack her credibility."  Id.  The State correctly distinguishes the 
instant case from Blumhagen; Jeff 
Mathson's testimony about his own drug use was not extrinsic evidence; rather, 
it was direct evidence elicited by permissible cross-examination following up 
evidence revealed on the direct examination by the accused's counsel.  

 
 
[¶20]   We agree with the State that there 
is a distinction between evidence that impeaches by proof of a witness's 
character or disposition for veracity, or the lack thereof, and evidence which 
establishes a lack of credibility through a showing of such things as bias or 
undue influence.  Gist v. State, 766 P.2d 1149, 1151-52 
(Wyo. 1988) 
(quoting 3 D. Louisell and C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 307, pp. 127-28 (1988 
supp.)).  The admission of evidence 
for the latter purpose is not controlled by W.R.E. 608(b).  Hall v. State, 2005 WY 35, ¶¶ 8-9, 14, 
109 P.3d 499, 503-04, 506 (Wyo. 2005) (where the defendant had been charged with 
running a clandestine drug lab, this Court held that it was error for the 
district court, pursuant to W.R.E. 608(b), to deny admission of extrinsic 
evidence that a co-conspirator had made false accusations of drug offenses 
against other people in the past, as such was evidence that the co-conspirator 
had a motive or self-interest to slant her testimony).  Moreover, as the State points out, the 
advisory committee's note to F.R.E. 608, which is substantively identical to the 
Wyoming 
provision, states that evidence of bias or interest is not an attack on the 
witness's character for truthfulness and, thus, the admission of such evidence 
is not governed by F.R.E. 608.  
F.R.E. 608 advisory committee's note (evidence of bias governed by Rules 
402 and 403); United States v. Ray, 
731 F.2d 1361, 1364 (9th Cir. 1984).  We agree with that 
note.

 
 
[¶21]   Clearly, witness bias is a proper 
subject for impeachment, both at common law and after adoption of the rules of 
evidence.  Hall, ¶ 10, 109 P.3d  at 504 (quoting United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 
51-52, 105 S. Ct. 465, 468-69, 83 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1984)); see also United States v. Calle, 822 F.2d 1016, 1020-1021 (11th Cir. 1987); Ray, 731 F.2d at 1363-65; 81 Am.Jur.2d 
Witnesses § 842 (2004) ("the rule 
encompasses all facts and circumstances which, when tested by human experience, 
tend to show that a witness may shade his or her testimony for the purpose of 
helping to establish only one side of the cause").

 
 
[¶22]   We agree with the State's 
observation that the thrust of Mr. Lawrence's direct examination of Jeff Mathson 
was that he had no bias or interest in the case and was an impartial witness as 
he was not a drug user and had no connection with the drug culture.  The prosecutor's cross-examination 
question and Mr. Mathson's answer revealed evidence from which the jury could 
reasonably infer that he was not an impartial witness.  Evidence of a witness's partiality is 
always relevant.  Hannon, ¶ 16, 84 P.3d  at 329-30.  We hold that the admission of Jeff 
Mathson's prior drug use was not plain error.

 
 

Testimony 
relating to Rebecca Pauly's drug use

 
 
[¶23]   After the prosecution rested its 
case, Mr. Lawrence called Ms. Pauly in his defense.  Mr. Lawrence's counsel began his direct 
examination of Ms. Pauly by asking a series of foundational questions that 
established that Ms. Pauly lived a block from Mr. Lawrence; she had known him 
for about three to four years and had visited his residence about ten times 
during that period; she was a separated mother of three children; she was a 
cancer survivor and a past victim of domestic violence and sexual assault. Ms. 
Pauly also testified that Jeff Mathson was her best friend and, over the 
prosecution's objection, that he was a "very responsible" and "good 
person."  Mr. Lawrence's counsel 
also elicited testimony from Ms. Pauly that despite her friendship with Mr. 
Lawrence she would not lie for him, she had not talked to any other witnesses in 
the case or tried to coordinate her testimony with theirs, and her testimony was 
the truth.  Mr. Lawrence's counsel 
then proceeded to the heart of the defense, which was testimony from Ms. Pauly 
that she had not seen any drugs, scales, weapons, money, or anything else 
evidencing a drug transaction was taking place at Mr. Lawrence's home the day of 
his arrest.  

 
 
[¶24]   The prosecutor began his 
cross-examination of Ms. Pauly by asking, "Now, you've admitted that you have 
had a meth problem in the past, is that correct?" Mr. Lawrence's counsel said, 
"Objection, this is a --" but was interrupted before stating the specific ground 
of the objection by the trial judge, who said, "Overruled.  You raised the subject. Go ahead, 
overruled."  Ms. Pauly then 
indicated that she had not admitted such a problem in the past, and the 
following series of questions and answers ensued:

 
 
Q:        
Okay.  Are you 
sure?

 
 
A:        I'm 
positive.

 
 
Q:        
Okay.  Do you recall 
testifying on June 14 of this year?

 
 
A:        Yes. 
(Pause)

 
 
Q:        
Okay.  May I approach the 
witness?

 
 
[The 
Court]:   Yes.  Tell counsel what pages you're referring 
to.

. . . 
.

 
 
Q:        If 
you read that, do you think it will refresh your memory a little? 
(Pause)

 
 
A:        
Yeah.  I said it, 
everything's that's here.

 
 
Q:        
Okay.  So you admit that you 
had an issue with meth in the past?

 
 
A:        
No.

 
 
Q:        
Okay.

 
 
A:        I  
that's not what I'm saying.

 
 
Q:        
Okay.  That you had used meth 
in the past?

 
 
A:        
Yes.

 
 
Q:        And 
that as recently  you admit to as recently as November of 2004 using 
meth?

 
 
A:        One 
time.

 
 
Q:        
Okay.  But that's not a 
problem?

 
 
A:        No. 
 

 
 
Mr. 
Lawrence's counsel then on redirect examination had Ms. Pauly read the totality 
of her prior statement about her methamphetamine use, which was that she had 
used methamphetamine when she was nineteen (at the time of trial she was 
apparently thirty-six) and that she had relapsed once, when her husband had 
beaten her, in November of 2002.

 
 
[¶25]   In Mr. Lawrence's appellate 
argument on this issue, he makes the same argument as he made on the issue of 
Jeff Mathson's testimony.  In 
response, the State counters with the same argument it made on that issue also, 
with the exception of the "opening the door" discussion.  For the same reasons we held that the 
trial judge did not err in admitting Jeff Mathson's prior drug use testimony, we 
also hold that the trial judge did not err in admitting Ms. Pauly's prior drug 
use testimony. Her cross-examination testimony was not extrinsic evidence and 
W.R.E. 608(b) does not apply; rather, her testimony revealed evidence from which 
the jury could reasonably infer that she was not an impartial witness, in 
contradiction to her testimony on direct examination.  We reiterate that evidence of a 
witness's partiality is always relevant.

 
 

[¶26]   We affirm Mr. Lawrence's judgment 
and sentence.