Title: PHL Inc. v. Pullman Bank & Trust Co.

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket Nos. 96250, 96294 cons.-Agenda 12-May 2004.
PHL, INC., et al., Appellees, v. PULLMAN BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY et al. (Judy Baar Topinka, Treasurer, Appellant).-PHL,
INC., et al., Appellees, v. PULLMAN BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY et al. (Pullman Bank and Trust Company, Appellant).
Opinion filed June 3, 2005.
	CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the
court:
	Section 8(b) of the Court of Claims Act provides that the Court
of Claims shall have exclusive jurisdiction over "[a]ll claims against
the State founded upon any contract entered into with the State of
Illinois." 705 ILCS 505/8(b) (West 2000). At issue in this case is
whether plaintiffs' claim for breach of contract, which was brought
against the Treasurer of the State of Illinois, constitutes an action
"against the State" so as to come within this provision. The appellate
court concluded that it did not. No. 5-00-0206 (unpublished order
under Supreme Court Rule 23). For the reasons that follow, we
reverse.

BACKGROUND
	In 1982, the State of Illinois established the Illinois Insured
Mortgage Pilot Program (Mortgage Program) in an effort to stimulate
economic development within the state. Although the workings of the
Mortgage Program are somewhat complicated, it may be said, in
general, that the program was implemented through the creation of a
trust, funded with state money, from which loans were made to
various commercial enterprises that had difficulty obtaining
conventional financing.(1)
	The details of the Mortgage Program, including the terms
governing the creation of the trust and the manner in which loans were
to be made by the trustee, were embodied in a purchase agreement, a
trust indenture and a servicing agreement (collectively, the Trust
Agreement). The Trust Agreement was executed on July 14, 1982, by
the State of Illinois, acting through Treasurer Jerome Cosentino, with
the concurrence of Governor James Thompson, and American
National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago, both individually and
as trustee. Under the terms of the Trust Agreement, the state is the
sole owner of the trust estate and, through the Treasurer, directs the
trust's activities.
	In November 1982, in connection with the Mortgage Program,
a first mortgage loan in the amount of $13.4 million was made to an
Illinois limited partnership known as the Collinsville Hotel Venture.
The funds from the loan were used by the partnership to finance a
hotel in Collinsville, Illinois, which is now known as the Collinsville
Holiday Inn. In December 1983, a first mortgage loan was made to
another limited partnership, known as the President Lincoln Hotel
Venture, in the amount of $15.5 million. The funds from this loan
were used to finance the construction of a hotel in Springfield, Illinois,
which is now known as the Springfield Renaissance Hotel.
	Throughout the 1980s, both hotel ventures had difficulties
meeting their obligations under the Mortgage Program loans. As a
result, both loans were restructured on at least two occasions. In
1992, a dispute arose between the hotel ventures and then-Treasurer
Patrick Quinn regarding a term of the restructured loan agreements
which required each hotel venture to provide the Mortgage Program
trustee with a yearly "reliance letter." The trustee and Treasurer
threatened to declare the loans in default because they believed that
the reliance letters they had received were inadequate. In response, the
hotel ventures filed suit against the Treasurer and trustee to enjoin the
declaration of default.
	The circuit court of Cook County dismissed the hotel ventures'
action based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity. In October 1994,
the appellate court affirmed. See President Lincoln Hotel Venture v.
Bank One, 271 Ill. App. 3d 1048 (1994). The hotel ventures' request
for rehearing in the appellate court was denied on May 5, 1995.
Thereafter, the hotel ventures filed a petition for leave to appeal in this
court, which remained pending until October 1995.
	In November 1994, defendant Judy Baar Topinka was elected
Treasurer of the State of Illinois. After assuming office, Treasurer
Topinka installed defendant Pullman Bank and Trust Company
(Pullman Bank) as trustee of the Mortgage Program trust.
	Beginning in December 1994, and continuing through the first
part of 1995, the hotel ventures engaged in discussions with Treasurer
Topinka about the possibility of purchasing the hotel venture loans
from the state. The terms of sale which were discussed included the
settlement of the reliance letter litigation, which was still ongoing at
that time. As a result of these discussions, the plaintiffs in this case,
which are two entities described in the record as having a "business
relationship" with the hotel ventures, agreed to purchase the hotel
venture loans. Plaintiff PHL, Inc., agreed to buy the first mortgage
loan relating to the Collinsville Holiday Inn for $6.3 million, while
plaintiff The President Lincoln Hotel Corporation agreed to pay $3.7
million to acquire the first mortgage loan relating to the Springfield
Renaissance Hotel.
	On April 19, 1995, plaintiffs entered into separate buy-sell
agreements with Pullman Bank, as trustee of the Mortgage Program
trust, to purchase the hotel venture loans. The agreements were
identical, except for the name of the buyer and the purchase price.
Joinders to the agreements were signed by the hotel ventures and
Treasurer Topinka. Both buy-sell agreements expressly stated that
they were being entered into, in part, to settle the reliance letter
litigation and both agreements contained provisions in which the state
agreed not to pursue any claims against the hotel ventures in relation
to the loans. Closing on the buy-sell agreements was set for June
1995.
	After the Treasurer and trustee signed the buy-sell agreements,
Attorney General Jim Ryan publicly stated that he would review the
terms of the agreements. In July 1995, the Attorney General
announced that he would not approve the buy-sell agreements.
	The Attorney General's decision to withhold approval of the
agreements rested on two grounds, the first of which was financial. In
a report prepared by a group of University of Illinois professors, the
combined value of the two hotel venture loans was estimated at
approximately $18 million to $19 million. Thus, because the state was
to receive a total of only $10 million under the buy-sell agreements,
the Attorney General concluded that the consideration the state was
to receive for the hotel venture loans and the settlement of the reliance
letter litigation was inadequate.
	The second reason the Attorney General gave for withholding
approval of the buy-sell agreements was found in an opinion letter
issued by the Attorney General on July 10, 1995. See 1995 Ill. Att'y
Gen. Op. No. 95-003. In this opinion, the Attorney General observed
that the Trust Agreement, as it then existed, did not authorize the
Mortgage Program trustee to settle mortgage loans for an amount less
than their full value. The buy-sell agreements, however, did so.
Therefore, the Attorney General concluded, unless the Trust
Agreement was amended, at the direction of the state, the trustee
would have no authority to surrender or execute the documents
necessary to close on the buy-sell agreements.
	The Attorney General's opinion further observed that the Trust
Agreement did not specify who may execute the consent to amend the
Trust Agreement on behalf of the state, nor the form the consent
should take. The Attorney General noted, however, that the
Governor's involvement was "indispensable to the creation and
ongoing operation" (1995 Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 95-003, at 7) of the
Mortgage Program and, further, "that in 1992, when a similar
outstanding loan was settled, the Governor's signature was affixed to
the direction authorizing the Trustee to execute the instruments
necessary to accept the settlement." 1995 Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No.
95-003, at 7-8. Moreover, according to the Attorney General, the
Trust Agreement itself provides "that the parties to the Agreement
include the Trustee and the State of Illinois, which is described as
'acting by and through its Treasurer ***, with the consent of its
Governor ***.' " 1995 Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 95-003, at 8. From
this, the Attorney General concluded that
		"it was clearly contemplated by the parties that the
representatives of the State, for purposes of acting under the
Trust Agreement, are the Treasurer and the Governor, and
that the concurrence of both the Governor and the Treasurer
is necessary to validate actions taken on behalf of the State
thereunder. Consequently, it is my opinion that both the
Governor and the Treasurer must authorize the amendment
of the Trust Agreement and give their consent to the
proposed transaction in order to effectuate it." 1995 Ill. Att'y
Gen. Op. No. 95-003, at 9.
Because the Governor had not authorized any amendment of the Trust
Agreement or consented to the buy-sell agreements, the Attorney
General concluded that the agreements were invalid.
	After the Attorney General made his views on the buy-sell
agreements known, Treasurer Topinka publicly indicated that she
disagreed with the Attorney General's financial assessment of the
agreements. The Treasurer stated that, in her view, the buy-sell
agreements represented the best financial deal that could be made by
the state with respect to the hotel venture loans. Nevertheless, based
on the legal opinion of the Attorney General, and because the
Governor had not consented to the buy-sell agreements, the Treasurer
declined to close on the agreements.
	In October 1995, the hotel ventures, the Treasurer, Pullman Bank
as the Mortgage Program trustee, and the Attorney General executed
an agreement settling the reliance letter litigation. Plaintiffs in the case
at bar were not parties to this settlement, which did not reference the
buy-sell agreement or any sale of the hotel venture loans. The same
day that the settlement agreement was reached, the hotel ventures
withdrew their petition for leave to appeal in the reliance letter
litigation which was pending before this court. See President Lincoln
Hotel Venture v. Pullman Bank & Trust Co., 163 Ill. 2d 586 (1995)
(petition for leave to appeal withdrawn).
	Approximately two months after the settlement of the reliance
letter litigation, on December 29, 1995, plaintiffs filed the present
action in the circuit court of Madison County against the Treasurer
and Pullman Bank. In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the
Treasurer possessed the "unqualified constitutional authority" to
approve the sale of the hotel venture loans without the concurrence of
the Governor. Plaintiffs further alleged that, by adhering to the
Attorney General's legal opinion and failing to close on the buy-sell
agreements, the Treasurer was "acting in derogation of her
constitutional duties and in abuse of her discretion and authority."
Plaintiffs requested the circuit court to "[o]rder the Treasurer to
perform her constitutional duties" and to enforce the provisions of the
buy-sell agreements calling for the state to sell the hotel venture loans.
	The litigation which followed the filing of plaintiffs' suit was
lengthy and involved. It is recounted here only as necessary to address
the issues presented in this appeal.
	After plaintiffs filed their complaint, both the Treasurer and
Pullman Bank filed motions to dismiss, in which they argued that
plaintiffs' cause of action was barred by sovereign immunity.
Defendants maintained that, although plaintiffs' suit for breach of
contract was brought against the Treasurer in her individual capacity,
the state was in fact the real party in interest because a judgment in
favor of plaintiffs would require the state to divest itself of the hotel
ventures loans. In addition, because Pullman Bank was merely the
agent of the state and could only act at the direction of the Treasurer
with respect to the trust estate, defendants maintained that any action
against Pullman Bank was also against the state. Defendants further
noted that, under section 8(b) of the Court of Claims Act (705 ILCS
505/8(b) (West 2000)), the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction
over claims brought against the state for breach of contract. Thus,
defendants argued that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hear
plaintiffs' complaint and that the suit properly belonged in the Court
of Claims. The circuit court denied defendants' motions to dismiss.
	Thereafter, the Treasurer filed a motion for summary judgment
in which she argued that the buy-sell agreements were unenforceable
as a matter of law both because the Governor had not consented to
them and because they lacked the Attorney General's approval. This
latter argument was based on the fact that the buy-sell agreements
were not simply contracts, but also settlement agreements which
conclusively resolved the then-pending reliance letter litigation. Citing
to Gust K. Newberg, Inc. v. Illinois State Toll Highway Authority, 98 Ill. 2d 58 (1983), the Treasurer maintained that it is the prerogative of
the Attorney General to settle pending litigation in which the state is
involved. Thus, according to the Treasurer, because the Attorney
General had not consented to the settlement portions of the buy-sell
agreements, the settlement was invalid. And, the Treasurer argued,
because the settlement of the reliance litigation was a material
covenant to the buy-sell agreements, the agreements themselves never
became valid contracts and were therefore unenforceable. Pullman
Bank also filed a motion for summary judgment which raised similar
arguments.
	In response to defendants' motions, plaintiffs filed a cross-motion
for summary judgment, in which they argued that the Treasurer had
the exclusive authority to close on the buy-sell agreements and that
the Attorney General's approval of the buy-sell agreements was
unnecessary. Plaintiffs did not dispute defendants' contention that, in
general, it is the prerogative of the Attorney General to settle state
litigation. However, plaintiffs argued that, in this case, the settlement
of the reliance letter litigation in October 1995, although separate
from the buy-sell agreements, nevertheless rendered the settlement
portions of the buy-sell agreements irrelevant. Accordingly, because
the settlement portions of the buy-sell agreements were no longer at
issue, plaintiffs maintained that the Attorney General's approval was
not needed and that the court could order specific performance of the
buy-sell agreements.
	After hearing argument, the circuit court denied defendants'
motions for summary judgment and granted plaintiffs' cross-motion.
In so ruling, the circuit court held that consent of neither the Governor
nor the Attorney General was necessary to render the buy-sell
agreements enforceable. In a subsequent order, the court held that
plaintiffs had been ready, willing and able to fulfill their obligations
under the buy-sell agreements in June 1995. Finally, on March 13,
2000, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs. The
court ordered the Treasurer and Pullman Bank, as trustee of the
Mortgage Program trust, to specifically perform the buy-sell
agreements. Defendants appealed.
	In a divided opinion, the appellate court affirmed. No. 5-00-0206
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The appellate
court rejected defendants' contention that plaintiff's suit was barred
by sovereign immunity. In so holding, the appellate court observed
that an exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity applies when
the state officer who is the subject of the complaint acts in excess of
his or her authority. The appellate court reasoned that this exception
was applicable in the case at bar because the Treasurer had "back[ed]
out of an obligation based on an opinion of the Attorney General"
and, in so doing, had improperly "relegat[ed]" her constitutional
authority as Treasurer to the Attorney General.
	Both defendants filed separate petitions for leave to appeal in this
court. The petitions were allowed and defendants' appeals were
consolidated.

ANALYSIS
	The Illinois Constitution of 1970 abolished the doctrine of
sovereign immunity "[e]xcept as the General Assembly may provide
by law." Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII, §4. Pursuant to its constitutional
authority, the General Assembly reestablished sovereign immunity in
the State Lawsuit Immunity Act. 745 ILCS 5/0.01 et seq. (West
1998); City of Springfield v. Allphin, 74 Ill. 2d 117, 123 (1978).
Section 1 of that enactment states that "[e]xcept as provided in [an
act] to create the Court of Claims *** the State of Illinois shall not be
made a defendant or party in any court." 745 ILCS 5/1 (West 1998).
The Court of Claims Act, in turn, provides that the Court of Claims
shall have exclusive jurisdiction over "[a]ll claims against the State
founded upon any contract entered into with the State of Illinois." 705
ILCS 505/8(b) (West 2000).
	As they did in the courts below, defendants maintain that
plaintiffs' complaint is barred from the circuit court by section 8(b) of
the Court of Claims Act. Defendants contend that plaintiffs' complaint
is one for breach of contract; that Pullman Bank may act only at the
direction of the Treasurer and, therefore, the Treasurer's actions are
the relevant focus of inquiry in this case; that the complaint against the
Treasurer is, in fact, against the state because a judgment in plaintiffs'
favor would "operate to control the actions of the State" (emphasis
omitted) (Currie v. Lao, 148 Ill. 2d 151, 158 (1992)) by forcing the
state to sell the hotel venture loans; and, therefore, that plaintiffs'
complaint must be heard in the Court of Claims.
	Plaintiffs, in response, do not dispute that their complaint alleges
a breach of contract, that the Treasurer's actions should be the focus
of this appeal, or that an adjudication in their favor would cause the
state to sell the hotel venture loans. Nevertheless, plaintiffs contend
that section 8(b) is not controlling in the case at bar because an
exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, often referred to as
the "officer suit" exception, is applicable here.
	In Illinois, the leading historical expression of the officer suit
exception is found in Schwing v. Miles, 367 Ill. 436 (1937):
		"where the action at law or suit in equity is maintained
against a State officer or the director of a department on the
ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or
invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff under
an unconstitutional act, or under an assumption of authority
which he does not have, such suit is not against the State.
(Noorman v. Department of Public Works and Buildings,
supra; Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516; United States v. Lee,
106 id. 196; White Eagle Oil and Refining Co. v. Gunderson,
205 N.W. (S. Dak.) 614; 43 A.L.R. 397.) The presumption
obtains that the State, or a department thereof, will not, and
does not, violate the constitution and laws of the State, but
that such violation, if it occurs, is by a State officer or the
head of a department of the State, and such officer or head
may be restrained by proper action instituted by a citizen."
Schwing, 367 Ill.  at 441-42.
Stated otherwise, it is said that when an action of a state officer is
undertaken without legal authority, such an action "strips a State
officer of his official status *** [and] his conduct is not then regarded
as the conduct of the State, nor is the action against him considered
an action against the State." Moline Tool Co. v. Department of
Revenue, 410 Ill. 35, 37 (1951).
	The officer suit exception has a long and complex history, with
its origination in the federal courts. See Schwing, 367 Ill.  at 441, citing
Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516, 43 L. Ed. 535, 19 S. Ct. 269 (1899);
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 27 L. Ed. 171, 1 S. Ct. 240
(1882); see also Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 52 L. Ed. 714, 28 S. Ct. 441 (1908). In Illinois, the officer suit exception has been
described as a means of protecting the rights of plaintiffs:
		"[W]here the defendant officer act[s] in excess of his
statutory authority, the rights of the plaintiffs to be free from
the consequences of his action outweigh the interest of the
State which is served by the sovereign immunity doctrine."
Senn Park Nursing Center v. Miller, 104 Ill. 2d 169, 188
(1984).
See also Moline Tool Co., 410 Ill.  at 37 (not all suits against state
officers are barred because "[s]uch a holding would have blunted the
effectiveness of many constitutional guaranties by preventing their
judicial enforcement").
	In Smith v. Jones, 113 Ill. 2d 126 (1986), this court held that the
officer suit exception may be raised, as a general matter, in breach of
contract cases which would otherwise fall under section 8(b) of the
Court of Claims Act. Smith, 113 Ill. 2d  at 131-32. However, this court
also held that the exception does not apply when the action which the
plaintiff alleges was taken in excess of authority is simply a breach of
contract and nothing more. Smith, 113 Ill. 2d  at 132-33 ("The
plaintiffs['] complaint, thus, alleges only that the Director exceeded
his authority by breaching a contract. Such an allegation does not
deprive the defendants of the protection of the bar of sovereign
immunity"). In the case at bar, defendants cite to Smith and contend
that plaintiffs' cause of action is merely a breach of contract case and,
therefore, that the officer suit exception is inapplicable.
	Plaintiffs, however, maintain that the present case is unlike Smith.
According to plaintiffs, in this case, the Treasurer did not simply
breach a contract, she also acted in excess of her legal authority,
specifically, the authority given her under article V, section 18, of the
Illinois Constitution of 1970. That provision states:
			"The Treasurer, in accordance with law, shall be
responsible for the safekeeping and investment of monies and
securities deposited with him, and for their disbursement
upon order of the Comptroller." Ill. Const. 1970, art. V, §18.
Plaintiffs allege in their complaint that the Treasurer acted "in
derogation of her constitutional duties" under article V, section 18, by
"adhering to the Attorney General's financial analysis and legal
opinion." Thus, plaintiffs contend, the officer suit exception applies
and their complaint properly belongs in the circuit court.
	Initially, we note that the Treasurer did not, in fact, adhere to the
Attorney General's financial analysis of the buy-sell agreements.
Indeed, there has never been any question in this case that, after the
Attorney General announced the findings from the report prepared by
the University of Illinois professors, the Treasurer publicly stated that,
in her view, the buy-sell agreements were the best financial deal that
could be made for the state with respect to the hotel venture loans.
The circuit court, in its order on the parties' cross-motions for
summary judgment, stated as an "undisputed fact" that "[t]he parties
never closed on the Buy-Sell Agreements or the related Settlement
Agreements because, on advice of the Attorney General, the Treasurer
refused to do so." On appeal, the appellate court agreed, stating that
"[a]fter entering into the Agreements, the Treasurer declined to act,
based upon the advice contained in an opinion letter." No. 5-00-0206
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The lower courts'
statements of the facts are not contested by the parties on appeal.
Thus, with respect to whether the Treasurer acted "in derogation of
her constitutional duties," the question we must decide is whether the
Treasurer's decision to "adher[e] to the Attorney General's *** legal
opinion" violated article V, section 18, of the Illinois Constitution.
The answer to this question is no.
	Article V, section 18, is a general grant of authority. Nothing in
that provision forbids the Treasurer from receiving or following the
advice of the Attorney General on a legal matter relating to the proper
interpretation of trust documents. Accordingly, the fact that the
Treasurer, in this case, chose to adopt the Attorney General's legal
opinion interpreting the Trust Agreement as her own does not mean
that she acted outside the authority given to her under the
constitution.(2)
	Plaintiffs nevertheless express concern that a holding in this case
that the Treasurer did not violate the constitution would mean that the
Attorney General would have "veto authority over the Treasurer's
right to enter into contracts to sell state investments." We disagree. As
noted, in July 1995, the Attorney General issued an opinion letter in
which he reasoned that the buy-sell agreements were invalid because,
in order for those agreements to take effect, an amendment to the
Trust Agreement was required and such an amendment could not be
made, under the terms of the Trust Agreement itself, without the
consent of the Governor. From the Treasurer's perspective, the
Attorney General's opinion was persuasive authority but it was not
legally binding. See President Lincoln Hotel Venture, 271 Ill. App. 3d
at 1056; Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill. 2d 391, 399 (1994). The opinion did not, in a legal sense, stop or block
the Treasurer from taking any action she wished with respect to the
buy-sell agreements. The Treasurer, of her own volition, decided to
follow the legal advice of the Attorney General and forgo closing on
the buy-sell agreements. Nothing in our decision in this case forces the
Treasurer to adopt the advice of the Attorney General or gives the
Attorney General the authority to unilaterally invalidate contracts
entered into by the Treasurer. Our holding is simply that when, as in
this case, the Treasurer chooses to follow the legal advice of the
Attorney General regarding the proper interpretation of trust
documents, the Treasurer does not violate article V, section 18.(3) 
	In addition, we note that were we to hold that the officer suit
exception applies in this case, it would follow that every time the
Treasurer decided to adopt any legal advice she would risk violating
the constitution. Indeed, counsel for plaintiffs essentially conceded this
point during oral argument before this court. Explaining why plaintiffs
believe the Treasurer acted improperly in this case, counsel stated that
"the Treasurer had a responsibility not to allow the Attorney General
to dissuade her from her contract." But this assertion is unreasonable.
The Treasurer should not be placed in the position of having to refuse
to hear legal advice in order to avoid violating the constitution.
Important decisions affecting the finances of this state should not have
to be made in a legal vacuum. 
	The appellate court below, in discussing whether the Treasurer
had exceeded her constitutional authority, concluded that the
Treasurer's argument that the buy-sell agreements were ineffective
without the Governor's consent was incorrect, as was her contention
that the Attorney General's approval was necessary because the buy-sell agreements settled the reliance letter litigation. Based on these
conclusions, the appellate court determined that the Treasurer had
exceeded her constitutional authority because, as the appellate court
stated, she had no authority not to execute the buy-sell agreements.
Again, we disagree.
	It is well settled that a state officer's erroneous exercise of a
broad grant of delegated authority does not constitute an ultra vires
act. As the United States Supreme Court has stated:
		"[W]here the officer's powers are limited by statute, his
actions beyond those limitations are considered individual and
not sovereign actions. The officer is not doing the business
which the sovereign has empowered him to do or he is doing
it in a way which the sovereign has forbidden. His actions are
ulta vires his authority and therefore may be made the object
of specific relief. It is important to note that in such cases the
relief can be granted, without impleading the sovereign, only
because of the officer's lack of delegated power. A claim of
error in the exercise of that power is therefore not
sufficient." (Emphasis added.) Larson v. Domestic & Foreign
Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689-90, 93 L. Ed. 1628,
1636, 69 S. Ct. 1457, 1461 (1949).
	In the case at bar, we express no opinion on whether the
Governor's consent was, in fact, required to effectuate the buy-sell
agreements or whether the Attorney General's approval of the
agreements was needed because the agreements settled litigation in
which the state was involved. We note, however, that even accepting
the appellate court's holdings on these issues as correct, the most that
can be said with respect to the Treasurer's actions is that (1) she
misread the terms of the Trust Agreement as requiring the Governor's
consent for an amendment to that agreement when such consent was
not, in fact, required and (2) she incorrectly believed that the
settlement provisions contained in the buy-sell agreements were
material covenants to those agreements when, in fact, the provisions
were rendered irrelevant by the settlement of the reliance letter
litigation in October 1995. These are errors of contract and trust
interpretation. They are not actions forbidden under article V, section
18, and, hence, they are not ultra vires acts.
	The parties also contest whether plaintiffs' cause of action is one
which seeks prospective relief within the meaning of this court's
decision in Bio-Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Trainor, 68 Ill. 2d 540
(1977). As this court has noted, Bio-Medical Laboratories "stands for
the proposition that if a plaintiff is not attempting to enforce a present
claim against the State, but rather seeks to enjoin a State officer from
taking future actions in excess of his delegated authority, then the
immunity prohibition does not pertain." Ellis v. Board of Governors
of State Colleges & Universities, 102 Ill. 2d 387, 395 (1984); see also
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 39 L. Ed. 2d 662, 94 S. Ct. 1347
(1974) (drawing a distinction between prospective and retrospective
relief in the context of sovereign immunity). Plaintiffs contend that
their cause of action is not a present claim because they seek only to
compel the Treasurer to take future action, i.e., to close on the buy-sell agreements. Defendants, however, maintain that because plaintiffs'
action is one for breach of contract, it necessarily seeks to enforce
current or existing agreements. Thus, according to defendants,
plaintiffs' cause of action cannot be viewed as simply seeking
prospective relief.
	The rule stated in Bio-Medical Laboratories is that sovereign
immunity will not bar a cause of action in the circuit court where the
plaintiff seeks to bar "a State officer from taking future actions in
excess of his delegated authority." (Emphasis added.) Ellis, 102 Ill. 2d  at 395. Because we have determined that, in this case, the
Treasurer did not take any action in excess of her delegated,
constitutional authority, we need not consider whether plaintiffs'
cause of action is a present claim or one which seeks prospective
relief. 
	Finally, the dissent states that it is troubled by this court's
approach to the question of "whether the Court of Claims can provide
the remedy of specific performance." Slip op. at 26 (Freeman, J.,
dissenting). The dissent states that "[i]t would appear from the
conclusion reached by this court that the implicit answer to that
question is yes." Slip op. at 26 (Freeman, J., dissenting). This
statement is incorrect. Nowhere in this opinion has this court made
any determination, either explicit or implicit, as to whether the remedy
of specific performance is available in the Court of Claims. Our
decision in this case is limited solely to the question of whether the
circuit court had jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs' complaint and,
specifically, whether the officer suit exception is applicable in this
case. The parties have not briefed the issue of whether the remedy of
specific performance is available in the Court of Claims, and it is not
necessary to decide that issue in order to resolve this case.

CONCLUSION
	The officer suit exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity
is inapplicable under the facts of this case. Thus, section 8(b) of the
Court of Claims Act is controlling, and the circuit court lacked
jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs' complaint. Accordingly, the judgments
of the circuit and appellate courts are reversed. The cause is remanded
to the circuit court with directions to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint.

	Nos. 96250 & 96294-Appellate court judgment reversed;
	circuit court judgment reversed;
	cause remanded with directions.

	JUSTICES GARMAN and KARMEIER took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case.

	JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting:
	The court reverses the judgments of the appellate and circuit
courts in this case, which held that jurisdiction over this cause rested
in the circuit court of Madison County. I am unable to join in the
opinion, however, because I believe several of the more troubling
aspects of this case have been overlooked in the court's haste to rule
that jurisdiction lies not in the circuit court but in the Court of Claims.
In my view, the court's conclusory analysis with respect to the issue
of sovereign immunity is at odds with the spirit of the officer suit
exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. I believe today's
opinion will have a negative impact on the future willingness of private
citizens to do business in Illinois with state officials and therefore
respectfully dissent.
	The sovereign immunity issue was first raised in the circuit court
in a motion to dismiss filed by defendants. The trial judge denied the
motion because he believed that the case involved an inseparable
combination of contractual and constitutional issues, which were
inappropriate issues for the Court of Claims to decide. The appellate
court agreed, holding that, inter alia, "[s]overeign immunity cannot
provide a defense where the court must determine if a State agent
acted in violation of statutory or constitutional law or in excess of
authority." PHL, Inc. v. Pullman Bank & Trust Co., No. 5-97-1064
(July 28, 1998) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
	The genesis of this suit was the 1982 establishment of the Illinois
Insured Mortgage Pilot Program (Mortgage Program), which, as the
court correctly notes, was designed to stimulate economic
development in depressed areas within central and downstate Illinois.
State monies were used to create a trust, which would lend money to
various commercial enterprises that had experienced difficulty
obtaining conventional financing. The trust agreement at issue in this
case was executed by the State of Illinois, with the Treasurer directing
the trust's activities. Relevant here is the fact that the Treasurer was
charged under this statutory program with the responsibility of
overseeing the state's investment.
 	In November 1982 and December 1983, two loans were made
pursuant to the Mortgage Program to different hotel ventures.
Unfortunately during the years that ensued, these borrowers had
difficulty in meeting their financial obligations under the Mortgage
Program loans. The terms of the loans were eventually restructured,
but new disputes subsequently arose over the terms of the
restructuring. As a result of the disputes, in 1994, plaintiffs began
discussions with Treasurer Judy Baar Topinka regarding the
possibility of purchasing the loans from the state. These discussions
led to the creation of the buy-sell agreements that are at the heart of
this case. The Treasurer and the trustee signed the buy-sell agreement
on April 19, 1995. At that time, the Treasurer held a news conference
where she explained the agreement and the benefits it would inure to
the state. According to the terms of the agreements, the closing date
was to be on or before June 30, 1995.
	Shortly thereafter, on May 3, 1995, the Illinois Attorney General
announced that he would investigate the propriety of the Treasurer's
selling of the loans to plaintiffs and that the proposed closing would
not take place until his review was completed. During the tenure of
the "investigation," plaintiffs were told of the actions of the Attorney
General with respect to his intervention into the buy-sell agreements
and of the fact that the Treasurer "was acquiescent in the Attorney
General's assertion that he would make the ultimate decision related
to her right to proceed with the buy-sell agreements." Affidavit of
Kathleen Vyborny, Defendants' Appendix, at A-117. The final day for
the closing, June 30, 1995, passed without action.
	On July 11, 1995, the Attorney General announced that he would
not "approve" the agreements based upon the financial advice of a
team of University of Illinois professors. On that same date, he also
sent an opinion to State Senator Penny Severns in which he took the
position that the Treasurer does not have "the authority to create a
program of this sort, which extends to matters far in excess of the
Treasurer's statutory and constitutional duties." 1995 Ill. Att'y Gen.
Op. No. 95-003, at 6. The Treasurer publicly disagreed with the
Attorney General's financial assessment of the agreements because, in
her view, the agreements represented the best financial deal that could
be made by the state with respect to the initial hotel venture loans.
According to the record, the proposed sale was 20% higher than any
other offer received for the loans, 30% higher than the June 1994
appraised value of the loans, and 50% higher than the book value of
those loans. As a result of the Attorney General's opinion, the deal
was considered "dead." Letter of Chief of Staff of the Attorney
General, dated July 11, 1995, Defendants' Appendix, at A-112. In a
letter to plaintiffs' attorney, the Attorney General spoke of the need
to look to the future in light of the fact that the deal was dead and that
"to that end, and to aid this office in an analysis of the current status
of the agreement of or any future proposal, please consider this our
request to you, on behalf of your clients, to allow us the opportunity
to examine the books and expense records of both hotels." Letter of
Chief of Staff of the Attorney General, dated July 11, 1995,
Defendants' Appendix, at A-112. Soon thereafter, this lawsuit
commenced.
	Plaintiffs argue that the Treasurer acted in derogation of her
constitutional duties in refusing to perform her agreement to divest the
state's holdings with respect to the hotel ventures after entering into
binding agreements to do so. Defendants respond that the doctrine of
sovereign immunity deprives the circuit court of jurisdiction over this
cause. They maintain that plaintiffs' cause of action is a simple breach
of contract case and that, as such, it must be brought in the Court of
Claims.
	Whether an action is in fact one against the state and hence one
that must be brought in the Court of Claims depends not on the formal
identification of the parties, but rather on the issues involved and the
relief sought. Healy v. Vaupel, 133 Ill. 2d 295, 308 (1990). The
prohibition " 'against making the State of Illinois a party to a suit
cannot be evaded by making an action nominally one against the
servants or agents of the State when the real claim is against the State
of Illinois itself and when the State of Illinois is the party vitally
interested.' " Healy, 133 Ill. 2d  at 308, quoting Sass v. Kramer, 72 Ill. 2d 485, 491 (1978 ). The doctrine of sovereign immunity "affords no
protection, however, when it is alleged that the State's agent acted in
violation of statutory or constitutional law or in excess of his
authority, and in those instances an action may be brought in circuit
court." Healy, 133 Ill. 2d  at 308 (and cases cited therein). The
doctrine serves to "protect[ ] the State from interference in its
performance of the functions of government and preserve[ ] its control
over State coffers." S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. State, 93 Ill. 2d 397,
401 (1982).
	The court holds that the officer suit exception to the doctrine of
sovereign immunity is inapplicable here. In doing so, the court notes
that "the most that can be said with respect to the Treasurer's actions
is that (1) she misread the terms of the Trust Agreement as requiring
the Governor's consent for an amendment to that agreement when
such consent was not, in fact, required and (2) she incorrectly believed
that the settlement provisions contained in the buy-sell agreements
were material covenants to those agreements, when, in fact, the
provisions were rendered irrelevant by the settlement of the reliance
letter litigation in October 1995." Slip op. at 14. The court then
concludes that these errors are "errors of contract and trust
interpretation" and are not unconstitutional, ultra vires acts. I find this
conclusion rather troubling under the facts of this case because this
case concerns more than just mere questions of contract
interpretation.
	As an initial matter, my disagreement with my colleagues lies not
in the recitation of facts, with which I agree, but rather in the
interpretation of those facts. Similar to the lower courts, I am troubled
by the way in which the Attorney General left the Treasurer with little
choice but to follow his opinion even though the Treasurer did not
agree with it. In this case, we have a very public disagreement between
the Attorney General and the Treasurer as to what steps to take to
protect the state's interest in the Trust Agreement. It is clear from the
record that the Treasurer was represented by counsel when she entered
into the agreements with plaintiffs. The record is also clear that the
Treasurer did not seek the Attorney General's input into the matter.
Had the Treasurer wanted the Attorney General's opinion, it stands to
reason that she would have sought it prior to signing the agreements
in the first place. The record indicates clearly that the Attorney
General, on his own initiative, only entered into the fray after news
accounts started to be published about the impending transaction.
Indeed, the Attorney General's public posturing in this case at the time
in question smacks more of sound-bite politics than of true legal or
even financial acumen. As I shall explain, our state constitution does
not give the Attorney General authority over the Treasurer in the
manner that was exercised in this case. Nor does the Trust Agreement
give the Attorney General the duties of oversight that the Attorney
General willed unto himself. I believe that these concerns are what
caused the lower courts that have addressed this issue to rule that
sovereign immunity does not lie under these facts. The record makes
clear that once the Attorney General entered into the matter, the
Treasurer, for all and intents and purposes "opted out," despite her
conviction that the deal she brokered was in the best financial interests
of the state. The record establishes that the Treasurer did not act in
June because she was going to let the Attorney General make the
ultimate decision on her right to close. It is clear from reviewing the
contemporaneous statements regarding the transaction that are
contained in the record that the Treasurer was ready and willing to
execute the buy-sell agreements, which she believed to be in the best
financial interests of the state, until the Attorney General intervened.
As noted previously, plaintiffs were informed in early May 1995, that
the ultimate decision regarding the sale would be made by the Attorney
General. And it is here where I part company with my colleagues
because I do not believe that it is proper to use the doctrine of
sovereign immunity under these circumstances. The Treasurer violated
her constitutional obligation by allowing the Attorney General to make
the ultimate decision regarding whether the sale would be made.
	As I noted,	the Trust Agreement does not charge the Attorney
General with any oversight responsibilities. The Trust Agreement
names the Treasurer as the constitutional officer charged with such
duties. The record affirmatively demonstrates that, despite having this
authority, it was the Attorney General who announced that he would
not "approve" the agreements. Meanwhile, the Treasurer allowed the
closing date to pass while she awaited the final word regarding its
merits, both financial and legal, from the Attorney General. Thus, for
all intents and purposes, it was the Attorney General who took charge
of the oversight of the Trust Agreement. The Attorney General's
review was not completed until July 10, 1995, and it was at that time
that he publicly announced that the Treasurer did not have the
authority to make the transaction and that her doing so was in excess
of any of her statutory or constitutional duties. The Attorney
General's July 11, 1995, letter to plaintiffs, in which he requested the
books and expense records of both hotels, indicates to me, at least,
that the Attorney General was taking over a greater role in the
handling of the Trust Agreement.
	In light of the above, the Attorney General killed the deal on the
basis of his legal conclusion that the buy-sell agreements were invalid
and his conclusion that the agreements were fiscally inadvisable for the
state. These facts are recounted in the news accounts that were made
a part of the record, which reveal that the Attorney General on the day
that he announced that the deal was "dead" was quoted as saying,
"After a careful, comprehensive review by both my staff and the U of
I team, I conclude that it is not in the state's best interest *** to settle.
It's a bad deal for the state." Defendants' Appendix, at A-123. The
Attorney General also took the position that any loan arrangement
made by the Treasurer would need his approval.(4) Contrariwise, at a
separate news conference held on the same day, the Treasurer was
quoted as saying that she told the Attorney General that she "could
not accept the numbers" and insisted that the deal she struck was
financially the most lucrative the state could hope for. Defendants'
Appendix, at A-121. Clearly, the record establishes that the Attorney
General would not allow the Treasurer to proceed with this
transaction. Stated simply, the situation we have at bar has two
constitutional officers at loggerheads over who has the authority to do
what. The Attorney General placed the Treasurer in a situation where
she was forced to choose between doing her job, i.e., exercising her
judgment on financial matters with respect to the Trust, or following
the unsought advice of a fellow state officer. The court states that the
Treasurer's actions must be construed as voluntary because the
Attorney General's advice was not legally binding and that she was
free to disregard it. I disagree because the tone and tenor of the
contemporaneous comments suggest otherwise. The Attorney General
repeatedly stated publicly that the deal would not go through without
his approval. Indeed, letters contained in the record indicate that it
was the Attorney General, not the Treasurer, who would examine "the
books and expense records" with respect to any analysis of the
agreement in question or any future proposal. It would seem that this
type of conflict would fall within the officer suit exception to the
doctrine at least with respect to the circumstances here.
	On the day that the Attorney General stated his opinion and
announced that the deal was dead, the Treasurer publicly
characterized the opinion as "illogical" and "unrealistic" and likened
the Attorney General's actions to "reversing the outcome of the Super
Bowl on the basis of armchair speculation from Monday morning
quarterbacks." The Treasurer further stated that the agreements were
valid, yet still inexplicably followed the Attorney General's opinion.
The Treasurer's colorful sporting analogy reveals that the Treasurer
did in fact delegate her duties to the Attorney General. The only way
a Monday morning quarterback can control the outcome of the Super
Bowl is if the officials whose job it is to rule on calls allow themselves
to be reversed by others. The Treasurer, whose job it was to "make to
the call" in this case allowed herself to be reversed by an official who
had no legal or constitutional right to "make the call." This
demonstrates the type of constitutional derogation of duty that both
the lower courts in this case were troubled by and why they ruled that
the doctrine sovereign immunity did not apply to this case. The court
today chooses to characterize the Treasurer's actions as purely
voluntary, but I do not. In my view, the Treasurer, at the time all of
these events occurred took a "my hands are tied" approach to the
Attorney General's intervention. The plaintiffs allege that by taking
such approach, the Treasurer delegated her constitutional duties in
such a way as to render inapplicable the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. I agree. The record indicates that the Treasurer believed the
agreements were valid and the Attorney General was wrong on a
financial level. The Treasurer was constitutionally and statutorily
obligated to protect the state's assets and follow through on her
contractual obligations.
	In her brief, the Treasurer claims that her actions in failing to
perform the contract cannot be equated with her violating any
constitutional or statutory duty. I believe her argument, however,
oversimplifies matters to an extent-the Treasurer failed to perform the
contract because the Attorney General would not let her proceed and
she did nothing to prevent him from doing so. This raises the troubling
specter of our Attorneys General having the power to invalidate every
contract entered into by state officials at his or her whim. It is also
suggests that the Attorney General has the power to "go over the
head" of the Treasurer in matters related to the duties of her office.
Such a holding would appear to be at odds with our case law in this
area.
	Under our current state constitution, the Treasurer "in
accordance with law, shall be responsible for the safekeeping and
investment of monies and securities deposited with him." Ill. Const.
1970, art. V, §18. Although our Constitution does not provide a
precise explanation of the Treasurer's duties, this court has noted that
		"[i]n the absence of a constitutional definition of his powers
and duties the primal functions of a treasurer are necessarily
implied. He is required to perform the duty of receiving and
safely keeping the public funds which are entrusted to him,
even in the absence of a statute. The very name given to his
office denotes his obligation in this regard and the
constitution implies it. Both the power and the duty of
receiving and safely keeping the public funds entrusted to him
are within the purview of the powers and duties which are
inherent in his office and in no way depend upon the authority
of the General Assembly. He can neither be deprived of the
power nor relieved of the duty." People ex rel. Nelson v.
West Englewood Trust & Savings Bank, 353 Ill. 451, 465
(1933).
Moreover, the Treasurer, under the terms of the Trust Agreement,
was made the state officer responsible for directing the trust activities,
a trust which was funded with state monies.
	Here, it is clear that the Treasurer believed that she had the
authority to enter into the agreements and, until the time the Attorney
General intervened, was prepared to close on the deal because she
believed that it represented the best financial deal the state could get.
These actions are consistent with her authority under the Trust
Agreement and under her general duties as Treasurer. The Attorney
General then stepped into the matter and asserted both his legal and
financial opinions over it. I believe that once the Treasurer signed the
agreements with plaintiffs, it was too late for the Attorney General to
offer his opinion as to the validity of the agreements. Had the
Attorney General had doubts about the legality of the Treasurer's
actions, the better approach would have been for him to have initiated,
as the state's chief legal officer, some type of injunctive action to
preclude the sale in which a judicial determination regarding how
many of this state's constitutional officers were needed to authorize
these agreements could be made. In fact, the Attorney General's
office's "Guidelines" suggest that this is the proper course of action
to take in such instances. See appendix ("Statement of Policy of the
Attorney General Relating to Furnishing Written Opinions, Adopted
March 29, 1962").(5) The legal questions regarding the authority to
enter into the agreements are, at the end of the day, questions that can
only be resolved with definitiveness by the judicial branch. Attorney
General opinions are advisory in nature and are not binding upon the
state or the courts. Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board,
158 Ill. 2d 391 (1994); W. Scott, The Role of Attorney General's
Opinions in Illinois, 67 N.W. L. Rev. 643 (1972). Thus, we do not
know whether the Attorney General's opinion is correct-the analysis
used in today's opinion is such that judiciary need never determine
whether that opinion withstands scrutiny. See slip op. at 14
(expressing "no opinion" as the correctness of the Attorney General's
opinion). Unfortunately, the court's treatment of this issue prevents
our courts from addressing any of these important matters.
	The primary case upon which the court relies, Smith v. Jones,
113 Ill. 2d 126 (1986), can be distinguished in that the plaintiffs there
did not allege a violation of the law. Indeed, the complaint itself
recognized that the state official's actions in question were done
"pursuant to the letter of the [Lottery] Act and the rules and
regulations thereunder." (Emphasis in original.) Smith, 113 Ill. 2d  at
132. The court in Smith stressed that the allegations of the complaint
were only that the official exceeded his authority by breaching the
contract. In contrast, the allegations here are that the Treasurer
abdicated her authority to the Attorney General. Plaintiffs argue that
the contract was breached, not because the Treasurer was following
the letter of the law, but was allowing, contrary to the constitution and
her duty under the Mortgage Program, another state official to make
calls that she alone had the authority and the discretion to make.
Whereas what was involved in Smith was, in the court's words,
"simply a drawing in which the amount of prize money due the
plaintiffs is in dispute" (Smith, 113 Ill. 2d at 133), what is involved
here is whether it is proper for a constitutional officer to pass her
duties on to another constitutional officer.
	As noted previously, one of the purposes of sovereign immunity
is to preserve the state's coffers. Ironically, the court's decision to
invoke the doctrine here does more to harm those coffers than to
protect them. The record is replete with references to the financial
cost to the state in maintaining the initial loans. The agreement
reached by the Treasurer and the plaintiffs had many benefits-the first
of which was that state would no longer be liable for the hotel
properties, which had the potential to end up in foreclosure. The state
was also to receive more money than was previously offered by other
potential buyers. The record contains no mention of the current
financial status of the loans, and the parties have not apprised us of
any change to that status. As a result, there is no reason for this court
to ignore the record evidence in this case, namely, that the agreements
reached by the Treasurer had many financial benefits for the state.
Based on the facts as they are currently before us, it is my belief that
the application of sovereign immunity to this case frustrates, rather
than serves, the goal behind the doctrine.
	In my view, the court's opinion simply concludes that any errors
made by the Treasurer in this case constitute errors of contract law.
I believe this approach fails to address the crux of plaintiffs'
arguments. The question is not whether the Treasurer made a mistake
in interpreting a contract or a trust agreement. Rather, the question is
whether the Treasurer abdicated her duty by allowing her actions to
be dictated by the Attorney General knowing that the financial
interests of the state were better served by closing on the agreements.
The court states that the Treasurer "should not be placed in the
position of having to refuse to hear legal advice in order to avoid
violating the constitution." Slip op. at 13. I am not advocating putting
the Treasurer in the position of "refusing to hear legal advice." The
Treasurer in this case did not have to "refuse to hear" the Attorney
General's advice, but she did have an obligation to refuse to follow
that advice when she believed that the advice was not in the best
interests of the state. The record makes clear that the Treasurer
publicly and openly disagreed with the Attorney General on every
level-she believed that her agreements with plaintiffs were valid and
that the deal was in the financial interests of the state. When such
conflicts arise amongst constitutional officers, the solution is not for
one to "back down" to the other as the court seemingly suggests
today. I am concerned about this because I believe this case, at root,
represents the ability of our citizens to trust and have faith in the
actions of our public officials. They need to trust, for example, when
dealing with a state treasurer in negotiations such as these, that
another constitutional officer will not be able to "kill" the deal with
such unfettered power. Today's opinion certainly does not allay fears
that dealings with state officials are not fair and even-handed.
	I also find another aspect of the court's opinion troubling. The
court notes that the proper tribunal for the adjudication of this claim
is the Court of Claims. Plaintiffs here, however, are seeking specific
performance. During oral argument, the parties were asked whether
the Court of Claims can provide the remedy of specific performance.
It would appear from the conclusion reached by this court that the
implicit answer to that question is yes. The Court of Claims, however,
has persistently recognized that it cannot grant equitable relief (see
Garimella v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 50 Ill. Ct.
Cl. 350 (1996) (and cases cited therein)) despite pronunciations by
this court and our appellate court which would appear to take a
contrary view. See Ellis v. Board of Governors of State Colleges &
Universities, 102 Ill. 2d 387 (1984); Management Ass'n of Illinois,
Inc. v. Board of Regents of Northern Illinois University, 248 Ill. App.
3d 599 (1993); Brucato v. Edgar, 128 Ill. App. 3d 260 (1984). Given
the differing opinions that exist on this issue and the fact that
questions were raised at oral argument with respect to it, I would
order additional briefing on the matter so that our opinion in this case
would speak clearly on this important issue.
	In light of the above, I am unable to join in my colleagues'
opinion and respectfully dissent.
1.ï»¿The original investment of state funds for the Mortgage 
Program trust was made under section 22½ of the Deposit of State Moneys Act 
(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 130, par. 41a), a general provision which, at that 
time, authorized the state Treasurer, with the approval of the Governor, to 
invest state funds in programs such as the Mortgage Program trust.
2. 
The dissent states that the Treasurer disagreed with the Attorney General's 
opinion letter and that she "publicly characterized the opinion as illogical' 
and unrealistic.' " Slip op. at 22 (Freeman, J., dissenting). Although the 
dissent does not indicate the source of the Treasurer's statements, it appears 
that the dissent has taken them from an allegation found in plaintiffs' 
complaint and that the allegation has been misquoted. In paragraph 40 of their 
complaint, plaintiffs alleged that "on July 11, 1995, the Treasurer issued a 
press release stating that the University of Illinois report was illogical' and 
unrealistic.' " (Emphasis added.) Paragraph 40 alleges that the Treasurer 
disagreed with the financial assessment offered by the University of Illinois 
professors, not that the Treasurer disagreed with the Attorney General's opinion 
letter. In addition, the press release described in plaintiffs' complaint was 
not mentioned in any of the circuit court's subsequent rulings and we have been 
unable to locate it in the record.
3. The dissent states 
that the Treasurer's decision to forgo closing on the buy-sell agreements was 
not "voluntary" (slip op. at 22 (Freeman, J., dissenting)) and repeatedly 
asserts that the Attorney General "would not allow" the Treasurer to proceed 
with the buy-sell agreements (emphasis in original) (slip op. at 21-23 (Freeman, 
J., dissenting)). Notably, however, the dissent never identifies the means by 
which the Attorney General prevented the Treasurer from closing on the 
agreements. The closest the dissent comes to doing so is the dissent's statement 
that the "Attorney General placed the Treasurer in a situation where she was 
forced to choose between doing her job, i.e., exercising her judgment on 
financial matters with respect to the Trust, or following the unsought advice of 
a fellow state officer." Slip op. at 21 (Freeman, J., dissenting). In other 
words, according to the dissent, the Treasurer's actions were not "voluntary" 
because she had to decide whether or not to follow the Attorney General's legal 
opinion. This reasoning is unpersuasive. If the Treasurer chose to follow the 
Attorney General's legal opinion, then, by definition, her actions were 
voluntary.
4. ï»¿It is important to note that nowhere in the 
statutory program which spawned the Trust Agreement is authority to approve loan 
arrangements given to the Attorney General. Nor does the statute provide the 
Attorney General with fiscal oversight with respect to the best interests of the 
state. Rather, under the statutory framework of the Mortgage Program, the 
Treasurer was charged with these responsibilities.
5. The 
Guidelines give four examples of situations in which no opinion will be issued. 
At least three of the four situations indicated in the guidelines are arguably 
at play in this case, including (i) opinions will not be furnished regarding the 
exercise of executive judgment, (ii) opinions should not be requested unless a 
bona fide need exists by the party requesting it with respect to the performance 
of his or her official duties, and (iii) opinions should not be furnished in 
cases of difficult or important questions of law and resort should be made to a 
declaratory judgment action. See appendix ("Statement of Policy of the Attorney 
General Relating to Furnishing Written Opinions, Adopted March 29, 1962").