Title: Shields v. Carnahan

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Shields v. Carnahan1987 WY 141744 P.2d 1115Case Number: 86-312Decided: 11/03/1987Supreme Court of Wyoming
KARI LOU SHIELDS, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

 
 
v.

 
 
ROBERT C. CARNAHAN, M.D., 
APPELLEE (DEFENDANT).

 
 
Appeal from the District Court,NatronaCounty, Harry E. Leimback, 
J.

 
 
Michael S. Messenger and 
Ronald P. Jurovich of Messenger & Jurovich, Thermopolis; and Carl V. Crow, 
Houston, Tex., for appellant 
(plaintiff).

 
 
Carl L. Lathrop and Peter 
K. Michael of Lathrop & Uchner, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellee 
(defendant).

 
 
Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

 
 

BROWN, Chief 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This case is a medical 
malpractice action. Appellant Kari Lou Shields, alleged that appellee Robert C. 
Carnahan, M.D., failed to properly treat and advise her after she was injured in 
an automobile accident. After a jury trial, the trial court entered judgment on 
the verdict for appellee. Before and after the judgment, appellant filed motions 
for a new trial, contending that prejudicial evidence was allowed to go to the 
jury in spite of an order in limine. These motions were denied, and an appeal 
followed.

 
 

[¶2.]     Appellant presents 
three issues:

 
 
"I. Did the trial court 
commit reversible error when it modified its order in limine as to where the 
plaintiff had been, who she had been with, and what she had been doing prior to 
the accident?

 
 
"II. Is defense counsel's 
direct violation of an order in limine reversible error entitling plaintiff to a 
new trial?

 
 
"III. Is the surprise to 
the plaintiff, caused by the trial court's modification of its order in limine 
and defense counsel's direct violation of the order in limine, sufficient to 
grant plaintiff a new trial?"

 
 

[¶3.]     Our holding on 
appellant's first issue obviates any review of alleged violations of Rule 403, 
Wyoming Rules of Evidence, regarding evidence of appellant's pre-accident 
activities, appellant's use of marijuana, or appellant's second and third 
issues. The trial court's first error is sufficient to grant a new 
trial.

 
 

[¶4.]     We will reverse and 
remand to the trial court for new trial.

 
 

[¶5.]     In the early morning 
hours of July 9, 1980, the automobile in which appellant was riding as a 
passenger was involved in a single car rollover. Appellant was thrown from the 
car and sustained serious injuries. She was taken to the NatronaCountyMemorialHospital where she was examined, admitted 
and became appellee's patient.

 
 

[¶6.]     On June 30, 1982, 
appellant filed an action against appellee, other doctors and the NatronaCountyHospital, alleging negligence in her 
medical treatment. After depositions were taken, all defendants were dismissed 
from the action except appellee, and the matter proceeded to trial. On the trial 
court's own motion, a mistrial was declared and the matter was reset for a 
second trial.

 
 

[¶7.]     Before the second 
trial, appellant filed a motion in limine to bar evidence concerning matters 
preceding the accident and appellant's history of drug use. After hearing on the 
motion, the trial court held that there was to be no mention of any drug use 
contained in the medical reports including amphetamines, LSD and marijuana. It 
further ordered that no inquiry be made into the subject of where appellant was 
going, whom she was with or what she was doing before the 
accident.

 
 

[¶8.]     In the second trial, 
appellant was called to the witness stand to testify. Before cross-examination 
by appellee, appellee made an offer of proof in chambers detailing evidence that 
would be presented if the trial court reversed its order in limine. After 
extended argument, the trial court held that certain facts before the accident 
would be allowed into evidence, partially changing its earlier ruling, but 
continued its ruling barring the admissibility of evidence involving drug use by 
appellant.

 
 

[¶9.]     During 
cross-examination of appellant, appellee explored the facts occurring before the 
accident, including the subjects of where appellant was going, whom she was with 
and what she was doing before the accident. Appellee questioned appellant about 
her history of drug use. Appellant objected and moved for mistrial, which was 
denied by the trial court. The trial court instructed the jury to disregard the 
evidence involving drug use.

 
 

[¶10.]  In its verdict, the jury found that 
appellant and appellee were equally at fault for injuries related to appellant's 
treatment, thus precluding any recovery of damages. Accordingly, judgment on the 
verdict was filed on July 21, 1986. Two days later, appellant filed another 
motion for new trial, which was also denied.

 
 

[¶11.]  Appellant contends that the admission of 
evidence of events occurring before the automobile accident by the trial court, 
contrary to its original order in limine, constituted an abuse of discretion 
severely prejudicing the presentation of her case. She argues that such evidence 
was irrelevant and inadmissible under Rules 401 and 402, W.R.E., or in the 
alternative, that even if such evidence could be considered relevant, it should 
have been excluded under Rule 403, W.R.E., as overly 
prejudicial.

 
 

[¶12.]  Appellee contends the evidence that 
appellant was on a late night trip with a man other than her husband is relevant 
on three theories. First, that these facts caused the Shields to quarrel and 
leave the hospital quickly. Next, that these facts created marital discord 
causing the Shields to disregard instructions to see an orthopedic physician 
upon returning to Riverton. Third, that appellant failed to see a specialist 
later in Riverton to avoid reminding her husband of the night of the accident, 
and because she did not want to explain the events to another 
physician.

 
 

[¶13.]  According to Rule 402, W.R.E., irrelevant 
evidence is not admissible. Rule 401, W.R.E. defines relevant evidence 
as:

 
 
"* * * evidence having 
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence."

 
 

[¶14.]  We first hold that the evidence regarding 
appellant's activities before her accident was irrelevant and inadmissible under 
Rules 401 and 402, W.R.E. Appellee's theories with respect to admissibility 
reflect nothing more than a motive for conduct which is not in issue. On the 
record, there is no question that appellant checked out of the hospital in 
Casper 
precipitously and did not contact an orthopedic specialist upon returning to 
Riverton. Under the circumstances, whether appellant was on a late night trip 
with a man other than her husband, or whether that man had been drinking before 
he drove the accident vehicle had nothing to do with the malpractice issues 
involved in this case. Such evidence did not remotely relate to the fact that 
appellant may have disregarded two doctors' instructions as urged by 
appellee.

 
 

[¶15.]  Once the evidence is held to be 
irrelevant and inadmissible our focus then shifts to whether or not the trial 
court committed reversible error by changing its original order in limine. There 
is no doubt that the original order excluding the evidence was 
correct.

 
 

[¶16.]  The applicable standards of review in 
such cases are based on the trial court's authority to make orders in limine, 
what constitutes an abuse of that authority and whether any such abuse rises to 
the level of harmful error warranting a reversal. A trial court has the power 
and authority to modify or rescind its orders in limine to assure a fair and 
impartial trial. Hayes v. State, Wyo., 599 P.2d 558, 565 (1979). The trial 
court should be cautious, even reluctant, to modify its pretrial orders during 
trial unless circumstances require modification to prevent manifest injustice. 
McCabe v. R.A. Manning Construction Co., Inc., Wyo., 674 P.2d 699 (1983). Further, 
evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the 
appellant must demonstrate trial court abuse of that discretion. Absent a clear 
showing of such abuse, the trial court's ruling will not be disturbed. Banks v. 
Crowner, Wyo., 
694 P.2d 101, 103 (1985).

 
 

[¶17.]  Because judicial discretion is a 
composite of conclusions drawn by the court from objective criteria, each case 
is examined on its own facts reviewing the court's discretion for arbitrariness 
in a particular set of circumstances. England v. Simmons, Wyo., 
728 P.2d 1137, 1140 (1986). Where an arbitrary decision is evident it 
constitutes harmful error if appellant proves that the error had prejudicial 
effect on her substantial rights. ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, Wyo., 632 P.2d 925, 934-935 (1981). We also 
reiterate that to find harmful error "`* * * there must be a reasonable 
possibility that in the absence of error the verdict might have been more 
favorable [to the losing party].'" Herman v. Speed King Mfg. Co., Wyo., 675 P.2d 1271, 1278 
(1984), quoting ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, supra at 
935.

 
 

[¶18.]  Appellant has carried this burden. 
Reversal of the original order in limine was arbitrary and prejudicially 
affected her substantial rights. In the absence of this evidence she might have 
prevailed. Even with the irrelevant evidence before them the jury found each 
party to be fifty percent negligent. Admission of this evidence was error and 
the proper remedy is a new trial.

 
 

[¶19.]  Reversed and 
remanded.