Title: Allison v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
IDYLL ALLISON,   
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 66, 2010 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0512013537 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: August 6, 2010 
 
 
 
 
Decided: September 24, 2010 
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 24th day of September 2010, upon consideration of the briefs on 
appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Idyll Allison, filed an appeal from the 
Superior Court’s January 29, 2010 order adopting the June 5, 2009 report of 
the Superior Court Commissioner, which recommended that Allison’s first 
motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 
61 be denied.1  We find no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record reflects that, in January 2006, Allison was indicted 
on charges of Robbery in the First Degree, Possession of a Firearm During 
                                                 
1 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §512(b); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 62. 
2 
 
the Commission of a Felony, Conspiracy in the Second Degree, Wearing a 
Disguise, and Possession of a Deadly Weapon By a Person Prohibited.  The 
charges stemmed from the December 19, 2005 armed robbery of the Audio 
Works store in Newark, Delaware, by two masked men.  Allison was tried, 
with a co-defendant, in July 2006.  The jury found Allison guilty of the 
conspiracy charge and one of the weapon charges and was hung on the 
remaining charges.  In September 2006, Allison again was tried before a 
jury, this time without the co-defendant, and was found guilty of the robbery 
charge and the other weapon charge.  He was sentenced as a habitual 
offender to a life term, plus a term of years at Level V.  This Court affirmed 
Allison’s convictions on direct appeal.2    
 
(3) 
In February 2009, Allison filed his first motion for 
postconviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.  Before 
making a recommendation, the Commissioner enlarged the record by 
directing Allison’s trial counsel to submit an affidavit responding to 
Allison’s claims and directing the State to file a response.3 
 
(4) 
  In this appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of his first 
postconviction motion, Allison claims that his trial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance by failing to a) move for judgment of acquittal at the 
                                                 
2 Allison v. State, Del. Supr., No. 653, 2006, Berger, J. (Jan. 31, 2008). 
3 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(g)(1) and (2). 
3 
 
close of the State’s case; b) call his co-conspirators to testify at his second 
trial; c) request a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense; and d) object 
to the prosecutor’s opening statement.  To the extent that Allison fails to 
present other grounds in support of his appeal that were raised below, those 
grounds are deemed to be waived and will not be addressed by this Court. 4 
 
(5) 
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that his counsel’s representation fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for his counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of 
the proceedings would have been different.5  Although not insurmountable, 
the Strickland standard is highly demanding and leads to a “strong 
presumption that the representation was professionally reasonable.”6  The 
defendant must make concrete allegations of ineffective assistance, and 
substantiate them, or risk summary dismissal.7 
 
(6) 
Allison’s first claim is that his counsel was ineffective for 
failing to move for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State’s case on 
the ground of insufficiency of the evidence.  Allison contends that the 
                                                 
4 Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993).  In his postconviction motion filed 
in the Superior Court, Allison also claimed that his attorney was ineffective for not 
objecting to the State’s failure to proceed on a theory of accomplice liability. 
5 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
6 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990). 
7 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990). 
4 
 
motion was warranted because the testimony of one of the witnesses at his 
second trial was inconsistent with the testimony presented at his first trial 
and there was no physical evidence connecting him to the crime.  The record 
reflects that the State presented sufficient evidence at trial to support 
Allison’s convictions.  Although Allison claimed not to be present at the 
time of the robbery, a witness observed Allison walk away from the store 
with his co-defendant after the robbery and get into the back seat of a 
waiting red Plymouth Neon being driven by a third man.  When the police 
arrested the robbers, Allison was seated in the back of the getaway car.  
Because there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to convict Allison,8 
his counsel can not be faulted for not moving for judgment of acquittal on 
the basis of insufficiency of the evidence.  We conclude, therefore, that 
Allison’s first claim is without merit.    
 
(7) 
Allison’s second claim is that his attorney was ineffective for 
not calling his co-conspirators to testify at his second trial.  The record 
reflects that, prior to Allison’s first trial, the driver of the getaway car 
pleaded guilty to second degree conspiracy in exchange for testifying against 
Allison and his co-defendant.  At his first trial, Allison was identified as one 
                                                 
8 Word v. State, 801 A.2d 927, 929 n.7 (Del. 2002) (In reviewing a claim of insufficiency 
of the evidence, the Court will uphold a conviction as long as any rational trier of fact, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could find the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.)   
5 
 
of the robbers by both of his co-conspirators.  In his affidavit, Allison’s 
counsel stated that, in light of the co-conspirators’ previous testimony, he 
deemed it imprudent to call them to testify at Allison’s second trial.  
Because that decision was well within the scope of reasonable trial strategy, 
Allison can not demonstrate ineffectiveness on the part of his counsel.9  We 
conclude, therefore, that Allison’s second claim also is without merit.   
 
(8) 
Allison’s third claim is that his counsel was ineffective for 
failing to request that the jury be instructed on the elements of second degree 
robbery as a lesser-included offense of first degree robbery.  In order to be 
entitled to an instruction on a lesser-included offense, a defendant must 
demonstrate the existence of “some evidence that would allow the jury to 
rationally acquit the defendant on the greater charge and convict on the 
lesser charge.”10  As reflected in Allison’s counsel’s affidavit, Allison’s 
defense at trial was that he was not present at the robbery at all.  Because an 
instruction on the lesser charge would have been entirely inconsistent with 
that defense, there is no basis for Allison’s claim that his counsel was 
ineffective for not requesting such an instruction.  We conclude, therefore, 
that Allison’s third claim also is without merit. 
                                                 
9 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689.   
10 Henry v. State, 805 A.2d 860, 864 (Del. 2002) (citing United States v. Humphrey, 208 
F3d 1190, 1206 (10th Cir. 2000)). 
6 
 
 
(9) 
Allison’s fourth, and final, claim is that his counsel was 
ineffective for not objecting to the prosecutor’s opening statement in which 
he stated that both robbers wore masks.  However, there was no dispute that 
the robbers wore masks and the evidence adduced at trial fully supported 
that statement.  As such, Allison’s counsel cannot be faulted for not 
objecting to it.  We conclude, therefore, that Allison’s fourth claim likewise 
is without merit. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Justice