Title: Commonwealth v. Mack

State: massachusetts

Issuer: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Document:

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revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
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SJC-12319 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  EDDIE A. MACK, JR. 
 
 
 
Barnstable.     January 11, 2019. - May 16, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Fair Trial.  Jury and Jurors.  Evidence, 
Fingerprints, Authentication, Statement of codefendant, 
Joint enterprise.  Joint Enterprise.  Cellular Telephone.  
Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Jury and jurors, Fair 
trial, Assistance of counsel, Argument by prosecutor. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on January 11, 2013. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Gary A. Nickerson, J. 
 
 
 
Sharon Dehmand for the defendant. 
 
Elizabeth A. Sweeney, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  Andrew Stanley was shot and killed in his home 
in Hyannis while his hands and feet were bound by handcuffs, zip 
ties, and duct tape.  The ensuing police investigation resulted 
in the arrests of four coventurers, including the defendant, 
Eddie Mack.  A jury convicted the defendant of murder in the 
2 
 
 
first degree on the theories of felony-murder and extreme 
atrocity or cruelty.1,2  The defendant appeals from his 
convictions, arguing that he is entitled to a new trial for 
several reasons.  Specifically, he argues that a new trial is 
warranted because (i) the publicity surrounding his case 
deprived him of his right to a fair trial; (ii) fingerprint 
evidence was admitted in error for want of proper 
authentication; (iii) evidence from a coventurer's cell phone 
was admitted in error; (iv) his defense counsel was 
constitutionally ineffective for failing to move to suppress 
evidence obtained from searches of two cell phones; and (v) the 
prosecutor made two statements unsupported by the evidence 
during closing argument.  The defendant also alleges numerous 
other errors in a separate brief that he contends is filed in 
accordance with Commonwealth v. Moffett, 383 Mass. 201 (1981).  
Finally, he argues that we should exercise our authority under 
                                                 
 
1 The defendant was also convicted of home invasion, G. L. 
c. 265 § 18C; armed assault in a dwelling, G. L. c. 265 § 18A; 
and carrying a firearm without a license, G. L. c. 269 § 10 (a).  
The judge dismissed an armed robbery conviction, which was the 
predicate offense for felony-murder, contingent on the murder 
conviction being upheld. 
 
 
2 The defendant was tried with Steven Webster, who was 
convicted of, among other offenses, murder in the first degree 
on the theory of felony-murder.  We considered Webster's appeal 
separately and affirmed his convictions.  See Commonwealth v. 
Webster, 480 Mass. 161, 171-172 (2018).  Two other coventurers, 
Keiko Thomas and David Evans, pleaded guilty to several 
offenses, including manslaughter.  Id. at 162 n.2. 
3 
 
 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to grant him a new trial or to reduce or 
set aside the verdict of murder in the first degree. 
 
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the defendant's 
convictions and decline to grant extraordinary relief pursuant 
to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
Background.  The facts that the jury could have found in 
this case were set forth in detail in Commonwealth v. Webster, 
480 Mass. 161, 162-164 (2018).  We summarize many of them once 
again here, reserving certain details for discussion of specific 
issues. 
 
At approximately 1:20 P.M. on July 11, 2012, police 
responded to reports of shots fired at a home in Hyannis.  Upon 
arrival, police officers heard moaning and yelling coming from 
the home.  After one officer saw an individual he recognized as 
Keiko Thomas looking out a window of the home, the officers 
heard gunfire.  Three men were then seen fleeing from the home 
and jumping over an adjacent fence.  An officer recognized one 
of the fleeing men as the defendant.  Officers pursued the men 
on foot and apprehended Thomas and another individual, David 
Evans.  The fourth coventurer, Steven Webster, was not 
apprehended until several months later. 
 
With the aid of a canine unit, the police eventually 
tracked down and apprehended the defendant, who was hiding 
behind an air conditioning unit outside a nearby liquor store.  
4 
 
 
Police recovered several items near the area where the defendant 
had been hiding, including a large amount of marijuana inside 
the air conditioning unit and a large amount of cash and several 
cell phones underneath a pallet next to the unit.  Two of the 
cell phones were later determined to belong to the defendant and 
the victim, respectively.  Following his apprehension, the 
defendant was taken back to the crime scene and was identified 
by a witness as one of the men whom the witness saw fleeing the 
victim's home following the shooting.3 
 
Inside the home, police found the victim lying unresponsive 
on the floor.  His hands and feet were bound with handcuffs, 
duct tape, and zip ties.  He had numerous abrasions, injuries 
from blunt force trauma, and marks on his body consistent with 
the use of a stun gun.  The cause of death was a single gunshot 
wound to the torso.  In the parking lot next to the home, police 
located a backpack containing the following:  two firearms, one 
of which was a loaded .45 caliber Colt handgun; gloves; a roll 
of duct tape consistent with the duct tape used to bind the 
victim; a stun gun; an aerosol can; zip ties; and a black face 
mask, which had Webster's deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) on it.4  A 
                                                 
 
3 Specifically, the witness identified the defendant as "the 
kid that fell off of the fence" and "the first one that came out 
of the house . . . and then jumped over." 
 
4 The defendant's deoxyribonucleic acid was not found at the 
scene or on any of these items. 
 
5 
 
 
spent shell casing found at the scene was later determined to 
have been fired from the Colt handgun.  The bullet retrieved 
from the victim's body was consistent with having come from that 
type of firearm. 
 
Through the course of their investigation, investigators 
recovered forensic evidence tying each of the coventurers to the 
crime scene.5  For example, investigators found a piece of duct 
tape containing the defendant's fingerprint at the scene, and 
his palm print was located on the lower part of a window of the 
home.  Footwear impressions from a chair cushion and the kitchen 
and driveway of the home also were determined to be consistent 
with the type of popular shoe that the defendant was wearing at 
the time of his apprehension.  Additionally, tire impressions 
found in the dirt and gravel of the backyard of the home were 
consistent with the pattern made by the tires of a Chevrolet 
Impala vehicle that Evans had rented a few days prior to the 
killing.  Webster's DNA was located on the interior and exterior 
handles of the rear passenger's side door of the vehicle.  
Finally, cell site location information evidence placed the cell 
                                                 
 
5 Additionally, as described supra, a police officer 
recognized both the defendant and Thomas as they fled the 
victim's home following the shooting.  The defendant was also 
positively identified by a witness who saw the defendant flee 
the home. 
6 
 
 
phones belonging to Webster, Evans, and the defendant in the 
Barnstable area on the day of the killing. 
 
Investigators also used cell phone records to establish 
that the coventurers were in frequent communication with each 
other via calls and text messages prior to and on the day of the 
killing.  Specifically, these records showed that from July 1 to 
July 11, Webster called or sent text messages to numbers 
associated with Evans numerous times.  On July 3, Webster sent a 
text message to Evans that stated, "Got some heat lined up," and 
"Bring dem rollie up, in the arm rest."  On July 7, Webster sent 
another text message to Evans, stating, "I am to go snatch my 
lil heat by Norfolk and cum bak."  On July 8, the defendant sent 
a text message to Evans saying, "Gotta come down so I can 
explain it better bro so we can get better understandin feel 
me."  On July 9, Evans sent a text message to Webster asking, 
"So, what about mack?"  Webster responded, "We out their what 
time was u tryna head out their?"  Evans replied, "We gotta see 
dude at nine tho."  The day before the killing, the defendant 
sent another text message to Evans asking, "Yal good?"  Evans 
responded, "Yup.  We out there tomorrow night cuz."  On the day 
of the killing, the defendant sent a text message to Evans 
approximately one hour before the police responded to the 
victim's home, asking, "Yal ready?"  Evans responded, "Waiting 
on u."  Mack responded one minute later, saying, "We at table 
7 
 
 
. . . Com On."  Following the shooting, at 2:21 P.M., Webster -- 
the only coventurer who had yet to be apprehended by that point 
-- telephoned the defendant, using a calling feature to block 
the caller's identification. 
 
The jury eventually returned guilty verdicts on all five 
charges, and the defendant was subsequently sentenced to life in 
prison without the possibility of parole.  The defendant now 
appeals. 
 
Discussion.  The defendant argues that he is entitled to a 
new trial for the reasons identified supra.  We address each 
argument in turn. 
 
1.  Right to a fair trial.  The defendant argues first that 
the publicity surrounding his case deprived him of his 
constitutional right to a fair trial guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  His principal contention 
is that the trial judge improperly seated seven jurors on the 
first day of jury empanelment without having inquired of them 
whether they had been exposed to media coverage of the case and, 
if so, whether such exposure had led them to form a bias against 
the defendant. 
 
The Sixth Amendment and art. 12 guarantee the right of a 
criminal defendant to a trial by an impartial jury.  
Commonwealth v. Toolan, 460 Mass. 452, 462 (2011).  See Skilling 
8 
 
 
v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 377 (2010).  Determining whether 
extensive pretrial publicity violates this right requires a two-
step analysis.  First, we examine "whether a change of venue was 
required because the jury were presumptively prejudiced against 
him."  Toolan, supra.  If it is determined that the jury were 
not presumptively prejudiced, "we next examine whether the 
defendant has shown actual juror prejudice."  Id.  The defendant 
does not allege, and the record does not reveal, that the jury 
were presumptively prejudiced against him in this case.6  
Accordingly, we consider only whether he has shown actual juror 
prejudice. 
 
In assessing the existence of actual juror prejudice, we 
consider whether, "in the totality of the circumstances, 
pretrial publicity deprived [the defendant] of his right to a 
fair and impartial jury."  Commonwealth v. Hoose, 467 Mass. 395, 
408 (2014).  See Toolan, 460 Mass. at 466.  Where pretrial 
                                                 
 
6 Presumptive prejudice may be found where "the entire jury 
pool is tainted by exposure to pretrial publicity."  
Commonwealth v. Toolan, 460 Mass. 452, 463 (2011).  This 
presumption only arises, however, "in truly extraordinary 
circumstances."  Id.  Indeed, "[p]retrial publicity -- even 
pervasive, adverse publicity -- does not inevitably lead to an 
unfair trial."  Id., quoting Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 
358, 384 (2010).  Even if the defendant had raised this 
argument, as explained infra, the record before us does not 
reveal that the media coverage of this case tainted the jury 
pool against him.  See Commonwealth v. Morales, 440 Mass. 536, 
540 (2003) ("the publicity must be both extensive and 
sensational" [citation omitted]). 
9 
 
 
publicity renders the risk of juror bias "particularly acute" or 
"especially significant," both this court and the United States 
Supreme Court have emphasized the need for an adequate voir 
dire.  Toolan, supra at 466-467.  See Skilling, 561 U.S. at 384-
385.  The defendant argues that the trial judge's failure to 
conduct an individual voir dire of each of the seven jurors 
seated on the first day of jury empanelment regarding any 
potential media exposure resulted in actual prejudice.  We 
disagree. 
 
Before individual voir dire of potential jurors regarding 
exposure to pretrial publicity is warranted, there must be some 
showing that the allegedly biased jurors may have been exposed 
to said publicity.  See Skilling, 561 U.S. at 384 (voir dire 
warranted where case had "widespread community impact"); Toolan, 
460 Mass. at 466-467 (voir dire warranted where risk of juror 
bias from extensive pretrial publicity was "especially 
significant").  See also Hoose, 467 Mass. at 408-409 (no 
evidence that all seated jurors were prejudiced by pretrial 
publicity, as "only two seated jurors had been exposed to any 
pretrial publicity at all, and both were subjected to a thorough 
individual voir dire").  On the record before us, there is no 
evidence that any of the seven jurors seated on the first day of 
jury empanelment may have been exposed to any pretrial 
publicity.  Indeed, the only evidence of any media coverage of 
10 
 
 
the case comes in the form of several news articles published at 
various points during the trial.7  The first of these articles, 
however, was published on the second day of jury empanelment -- 
after the seven jurors at issue had already been seated.  These 
jurors therefore could not have been exposed to this article 
prior to being seated.  Moreover, once the media began to cover 
the trial, the trial judge took ample steps to guard against any 
prejudice stemming from the media coverage.  For example, after 
witnessing a journalist in the court room on the first day of 
jury empanelment, the judge instructed the seven seated jurors 
to avoid any media coverage of the case and to inform the court 
officer and the court if they did, in fact, become so exposed.  
Additionally, the judge conducted an individual voir dire of 
each of the remaining potential jurors regarding their exposure 
to any media coverage.  Finally, the judge repeatedly instructed 
the seated jurors throughout trial that they were required to 
avoid any and all media coverage of the case and that they must 
                                                 
 
7 The defendant also points to the fact that media members 
had twice sought leave of the court to cover pretrial 
proceedings.  Although the record reveals this to be true, the 
most recent attempt was over twelve months before trial.  The 
defendant does not explain how the presence of media members at 
a pretrial proceeding over one year before trial prejudiced the 
jurors seated on the first day of juror empanelment.  See 
Commonwealth v. Entwistle, 463 Mass. 205, 222 (2012), cert. 
denied, 568 U.S. 1129 (2013) (lapse of time between media 
coverage and jury empanelment factor when considering existence 
of juror prejudice). 
11 
 
 
inform the court if they did come across any coverage.  
Accordingly, in light of the lack of evidence that the seven 
seated jurors had been exposed to pretrial publicity, as well as 
the "steps taken by the trial judge to safeguard the defendant's 
right to an impartial jury," Hoose, supra at 409, we conclude 
that the defendant has failed to show actual juror prejudice by 
way of pretrial publicity.8  Cf. id. at 408-409 (no actual 
prejudice where judge allowed counsel to question individual 
jurors, "admonished potential and seated jurors not to discuss 
the case with anyone under any circumstances and not to come 
into contact with any local news accounts related to the case," 
and "inquired each time potential or seated jurors returned to 
                                                 
 
8 The lack of any meaningful pretrial publicity is also 
reflected by defense counsel's failure to request individual 
voir dire on this issue on the first day of jury empanelment.  
Indeed, defense counsel had a full and fair opportunity to ask 
each of the seven jurors seated on the first day if they had 
been exposed to any media coverage -- but he did not.  Instead, 
he stated that he was either "content" or "satisfied" with each 
of the seven seated jurors.  Defense counsel even went on to 
note on the fourth day of jury empanelment that he had not 
"see[n] anything extraordinary" with regard to the media 
coverage of the defendant's case. 
 
 
Moreover, each of the jurors seated on the first day of 
jury empanelment were individually asked if they could be "fair 
and impartial, listen to [the judge's] instructions, and decide 
this case on the evidence that's presented."  Each responded 
affirmatively.  Further, none of the seven jurors seated on the 
first day raised his or her hand when the entire venire was 
asked whether they had "formed or expressed any opinion with 
regard to this case," or whether they were "aware of any bias or 
prejudice of any kind with regard to this case." 
12 
 
 
court whether anyone had come into contact with any information 
related to the case and noted their responses for the record").  
Contrast Toolan, supra at 468 (actual juror prejudice shown 
where pretrial publicity was "extensive," where publicity was 
"prejudicial to the defendant's anticipated theory of defense," 
and where "many prospective jurors knew the victim, her family, 
or witnesses, [and] the influence of mass media coverage 
overlapped with, and was reinforced by, informal interactions 
and conversations"). 
 
2.  Admission of fingerprint evidence.  At trial, the 
Commonwealth introduced, over the defendant's objection, a piece 
of duct tape recovered at the crime scene through the testimony 
of State police Trooper Michael Lombard.  The duct tape itself, 
however, was initially discovered by Barnstable police Officer 
Mark Mellyn after he stepped on it as he entered the victim's 
home.  Mellyn testified that after he noticed that he had 
stepped on the duct tape, he carefully removed it from his shoe 
with gloves and placed it a few feet from the victim's body.  
Mellyn then identified the duct tape that he had stepped on in a 
photograph at trial.  The duct tape in the photograph was next 
to a yellow placard labeled no. fifteen (placard fifteen).  The 
duct tape was thereafter collected by Lombard, who testified 
that he collected the duct tape that was on the floor next to 
13 
 
 
placard fifteen.  Subsequent forensic testing of this duct tape 
revealed that it contained the defendant's fingerprint. 
 
On appeal, the defendant argues that this evidence was 
admitted without having been properly authenticated.  The 
defendant argues that the duct tape could have only been 
properly authenticated through the testimony of Mellyn, not 
Lombard.  We discern no error. 
 
To properly authenticate evidence, the proponent of the 
evidence must make a showing "sufficient to support a finding 
that the item is what the proponent claims it is.'"  
Commonwealth v. Woollam, 478 Mass. 493, 498 (2017), cert. 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 1579 (2018), quoting Mass. G. Evid. § 901(a) 
(2017).  See Commonwealth v. Purdy, 459 Mass. 442, 447 (2011), 
quoting M.S. Brodin & M. Avery, Massachusetts Evidence § 9.2, at 
580 (8th ed. 2007) ("The role of the trial judge in jury cases 
is to determine whether there is evidence sufficient, if 
believed, to convince the jury by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the item in question is what the proponent claims 
it to be.  If so, the evidence should be admitted, if it is 
otherwise admissible").  Here, we are satisfied that there was 
sufficient evidence to authenticate the duct tape introduced 
through Lombard.  Mellyn testified that the duct tape he stepped 
on was the duct tape photographed next to placard fifteen at the 
crime scene.  Lombard then testified that the piece of duct tape 
14 
 
 
he collected -- and which subsequent testing revealed to contain 
the defendant's fingerprint -- was located next to placard 
fifteen.  The judge did not abuse his discretion in concluding 
that this testimony sufficed to authenticate the duct tape and 
establish its chain of custody.9  See L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 
Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014) (abuse of discretion exists only 
where "judge made a clear error of judgment in weighing the 
factors relevant to the decision, such that the decision falls 
outside the range of reasonable alternatives" [quotation and 
citation omitted]). 
 
3.  Admission of coventurer's cell phone records.  The 
defendant also challenges the admission of evidence connecting a 
specific cell phone number with one of the coventurers, Evans, 
arguing that the Commonwealth failed to properly authenticate 
the cell phone number as belonging to Evans.  We considered and 
                                                 
 
9 To the extent that there were any concerns about the chain 
of custody of the duct tape, the trial judge allowed defense 
counsel to cross-examine each relevant witness as to the chain 
of custody of the duct tape and permitted defense counsel to 
argue its authenticity during closing argument.  The alleged 
defects in the chain of custody thus went to the weight of the 
evidence, not its admissibility, as was appropriate.  
Commonwealth v. Viriyahiranpaiboon, 412 Mass. 224, 230 (1992).  
Cf. Commonwealth v. Diaz, 478 Mass. 481, 492 (2017) (no error in 
admitting testimony regarding mishandled evidence where judge 
allowed defendant to argue defective chain of custody). 
15 
 
 
rejected this exact argument in Webster, 480 Mass. at 170-171.  
We decline to revisit it here.10 
 
4.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  The defendant next 
argues that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective 
for failing to move to suppress records obtained from searches 
of the defendant's cell phone and Evans's cell phone.  He argues 
that defense counsel should have moved to suppress these records 
because the affidavits in support of the search warrants for 
these cell phones failed to establish probable cause.  To 
prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel due to a 
failure to move to suppress evidence in cases of murder in the 
first degree, the defendant must demonstrate both that the 
motion would have been successful and that counsel's failure to 
make the motion created a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  Commonwealth v. Cruzado, 480 Mass. 275, 
282 (2018).  See Commonwealth v. Williams, 453 Mass. 203, 207 
(2009).  Because we conclude that any motion to suppress these 
records would have failed, the defendant's trial counsel was not 
constitutionally ineffective. 
 
For a search of the contents of a cell phone to be 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
                                                 
 
10 Specifically, we concluded that "the confirming 
circumstances that the Commonwealth presented were sufficient to 
meet its burden and that the judge properly admitted the 
evidence."  Webster, 480 Mass. at 170. 
16 
 
 
Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights, the affidavit in support of the search warrant must 
establish probable cause to believe (i) that a "particularly 
described offense has been, is being, or is about to be 
committed"; and (ii) that the cell phone's contents "will 
produce evidence of such offense or will aid in the apprehension 
of a person who the applicant has probable cause to believe has 
committed, is committing, or is about to commit such offense" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Fulgiam, 477 Mass. 20, 33, 
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 330 (2017).  When considering whether 
an affidavit has met these two requirements, our review "begins 
and ends with the four corners of the affidavit" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Dorelas, 473 Mass. 496, 500–501 
(2016).  "All reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the 
information in the affidavit may also be considered as to 
whether probable cause has been established" (quotations 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Holley, 478 Mass. 508, 522 (2017).  
Whether probable cause exists to believe that a cell phone 
contains evidence of a crime "is a fact-intensive inquiry and 
must be resolved based on the particular facts of each case."  
Commonwealth v. Morin, 478 Mass. 415, 426 (2017). 
 
a.  Search of the defendant's cell phone.  The affidavit in 
support of the search warrant for the defendant's cell phone 
satisfied both requirements.  See Fulgiam, 477 Mass. at 33.  As 
17 
 
 
to the first requirement, the affidavit clearly established 
probable cause to believe that a particularly described offense 
had been committed.  The affidavit described that police 
responded to the scene of a shooting and found an individual 
suffering from a gunshot wound lying face down on the floor with 
his hands bound.  The affidavit further stated that this 
individual subsequently died. 
 
As to the second requirement, the affidavit demonstrated 
probable cause to believe that the contents of the defendant's 
cell phone would produce evidence of the offense.  The affidavit 
described that while being interrogated by police, one of the 
coventurers, Thomas, stated that the defendant had telephoned 
Thomas on the day of the killing and told Thomas that he was at 
the victim's home to make a drug deal.  The affidavit further 
described that once police responded to a report of gunshots at 
the victim's home, the defendant, Thomas, and Evans were each 
seen fleeing from the crime scene.  Finally, the affidavit 
stated that at the time the defendant was apprehended, he was 
hiding behind a local liquor store and had attempted to conceal 
four cell phones in his immediate vicinity.  These facts, along 
with the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, established that 
the defendant was at the home of the victim close in time to the 
killing; that the defendant used his cell phone to communicate 
with a coventurer in advance of the killing; that the shooting 
18 
 
 
was likely connected to the drug deal that had taken place 
between the defendant and the victim that day; and that upon 
fleeing the crime scene once police arrived, the defendant felt 
it necessary to flee with and attempt to conceal several 
different cell phones, inferably because they contained content 
implicating his involvement in the crimes.  Cf. Holley, 478 
Mass. at 526 (inference that suspects took victim's cell phone 
because it contained inculpatory evidence reasonable).  It was 
therefore reasonable to infer that the defendant's cell phone 
communications were instrumental in the commission of the 
crimes.  Accordingly, the affidavit established probable cause 
to believe that the defendant's cell phone would contain 
evidence of the killing.  Cf. Cruzado, 480 Mass. at 282 
(probable cause to search cell phone where cell phone found next 
to defendant at time of apprehension, defendant and victim had 
been together on day of murder, and third party had overheard 
defendant confessing to crime on cell phone); Holley, supra at 
522–524 (probable cause to search cell phone where affidavit 
established that defendant called victim shortly before murder 
and shooting was likely connected to drug deal, even though 
"affidavit did not state specifically that [the defendant] was 
sending text messages").  Contrast Morin, 478 Mass. at 427 (no 
probable cause to search cell phone where affidavit stated that 
19 
 
 
codefendant had called defendant before and after homicide, but 
did not otherwise implicate defendant in crime). 
 
b.  Search of Evans's cell phone.  The defendant does not 
argue that the affidavit failed to establish probable cause to 
search Evans's cell phone.  Rather, he argues that because the 
affidavit in support of the search warrant for Evans's cell 
phone relied on information police obtained from searching the 
defendant's cell phone, the evidence from Evans's cell phone is 
properly considered the fruit of the illegal search of the 
defendant's cell phone.  As we have concluded that the search of 
the defendant's cell phone was lawful, this argument fails.11 
 
5.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  Finally, the defendant 
argues that the prosecutor made statements in closing argument 
that were not supported by the evidence, and that these 
statements amounted to reversible error.  Because the defendant 
did not object to these statements at trial, we review any error 
to determine whether it produced a substantial likelihood of a 
                                                 
 
11 Because we conclude that the search of the defendant's 
cell phone was lawful, we do not address the Commonwealth's 
argument that the defendant lacks standing to contest the search 
of Evans's cell phone. 
 
 
Additionally, because we conclude that the cell phone 
evidence was properly admitted, we do not address the 
defendant's argument that had this evidence been suppressed, he 
would have been entitled to a required finding of not guilty. 
20 
 
 
miscarriage of justice.  Commonwealth v. Parker, 481 Mass. 69, 
74 (2018). 
 
The defendant challenges two specific statements made 
during closing argument.  First, the defendant argues that the 
prosecutor erroneously stated that Evans's "street name" was 
"Trigger" and then improperly suggested that the jury could 
reasonably infer that "TR" -- a contact name stored in the 
defendant's cell phone -- referred to "Trigger," i.e., Evans.  
Second, the defendant argues that the prosecutor erred when he 
defined the abbreviation "W.g." contained in a text message 
between the defendant and Evans to mean "We good."  The 
defendant argues that these statements amounted to reversible 
error because they were not supported by the evidence and 
improperly allowed the jury to infer the existence of a "joint 
venture by authenticating evidence that could not otherwise be 
authenticated and by translating text messages supporting this 
conclusion." 
 
It is well established that during closing argument, a 
prosecutor "may not misstate the evidence or refer to facts not 
in evidence" (quotation and citation omitted).  Parker, 481 
Mass. at 74.  A prosecutor is, however, "entitled to marshal the 
evidence and suggest inferences that the jury may draw from it" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Roy, 464 Mass. 818, 829 
(2013).  Any suggested inferences "need only be reasonable and 
21 
 
 
possible based on the evidence before the jury."  Parker, supra.  
Statements made during closing argument are to be reviewed "in 
the context of the entire closing, the jury instructions, and 
the evidence introduced at trial."  Commonwealth v. Martinez, 
476 Mass. 186, 198 (2017).  We address the propriety of each 
statement separately. 
 
a.  Link between "TR" and "Trigger."  The jury received 
evidence from which they could infer that Evans's street name 
was "Trigger."  See Webster, 480 Mass. at 170-171.  There was 
also evidence that a contact in the defendant's cell phone was 
labeled "TR."  During closing argument, the prosecutor stated, 
"I suggest to you that it's a reasonable inference for you to 
draw that TR with that phone number would be Evans's phone 
number."12  Notably, the prosecutor did not argue that "TR" was 
undoubtedly a reference to "Trigger" or suggest that the link 
between the two names was a fact in evidence.  Rather, he stated 
only that such a link was a "reasonable inference for [the jury] 
to draw."  This suggestion was not an error.  Indeed, as we 
noted supra, prosecutors are permitted to suggest inferences 
that the jury may draw from the evidence that was put before 
                                                 
12 The defendant also argues that this statement was 
improper because the Commonwealth did not properly authenticate 
the telephone number associated with Evans as belonging to 
Evans.  As discussed supra, we have already concluded that ample 
evidence authenticated Evans's telephone number.  Webster, 480 
Mass. at 170-171. 
22 
 
 
them.  Roy, 464 Mass. at 829.  Moreover, these inferences "need 
only be reasonable and possible."  Parker, 481 Mass. at 74.  In 
the context of the entire argument and the evidence before the 
jury, it was not an impermissible inference that the 
abbreviation "TR" referred to Evans's street name "Trigger."  
Accordingly, the prosecutor's statement did not constitute 
error. 
 
b.  Suggestion that "W.g." means "We good."  Later on in 
his closing argument, the prosecutor began to describe several 
text messages between the defendant and Evans.  In one message, 
Evans responded to a question posed by the defendant with "W.g."  
In his closing, the prosecutor stated outright that this 
abbreviation stood for "We good."  The record does not appear to 
contain a basis from which the jury could reasonably infer that 
the abbreviation "W.g." in this text message meant "We good."  
The prosecutor's statement therefore amounted to speculation, 
rather than a suggestion of a reasonable inference.  
Accordingly, this statement was an error.  The error did not, 
however, create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice because it was not likely to have influenced the jury's 
conclusion.  Commonwealth v. Copeland, 481 Mass. 255, 264 (2019) 
(prosecutor's closing argument creates substantial likelihood of 
miscarriage of justice only where error is likely to have 
influenced jury's conclusion).  The defendant argues that he was 
23 
 
 
prejudiced by this statement because it enabled the prosecutor 
to "prove to the jury the existence of joint venture by . . . 
deciphering initials to support[ the] prosecutor's theory of the 
case."  This argument is unavailing, as the evidence of joint 
venture independent of this statement was overwhelming.  Indeed, 
three of the coventurers, including the defendant, were seen 
leaving the victim's home and fleeing the crime scene; the 
defendant and two other coventurers were arrested near the 
scene; multiple cell phones, rolls of duct tape, zip ties, and 
firearms were recovered near the scene; multiple cell phones and 
large amounts of cash and marijuana were found near the 
defendant at the time of his apprehension; and a vehicle rented 
under Evans's name and containing Webster's DNA left tire prints 
at the scene.  Additionally, telephone call records indicated 
that the coventurers were in close communication prior to the 
killing.  Accordingly, the meaning of "W.g." in one text message 
was of little significance to the question of the existence of a 
joint venture, and certainly was unlikely to have swayed the 
jury. 
 
6.  Defendant's Moffett claims.  The defendant, in what he 
characterizes as a brief filed pursuant to Moffett, 383 Mass. 
201, asserts numerous additional allegations of trial errors and 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  We conclude that 
all of these arguments are without merit. 
24 
 
 
 
7.  Review pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Finally, after 
a thorough review of the record, we find no reason to exercise 
our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to grant a new trial or 
to either reduce or set aside the verdict of murder in the first 
degree. 
 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the 
defendant's convictions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.