Title: Pardue v. State

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

571 So. 2d 333 (1990)
Ex parte State of Alabama.
(Re Michael R. PARDUE
v.
STATE).
89-313.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
June 22, 1990.
Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen., and Mary Elizabeth Culberson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.
Everett A. Price, Jr., Brewton, for respondents.
STEAGALL, Justice.
Michael R. Pardue was convicted of second-degree escape, first-degree theft, second-degree theft, and first-degree burglary. He was sentenced as a habitual offender to 10 years' imprisonment on the escape conviction, to life imprisonment on the first-degree theft conviction, to 20 years on the second-degree theft conviction, and to life without parole on the burglary conviction. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence as to the escape conviction; vacated one of the theft convictions, ordering the court to set aside either the first- or the second-degree theft conviction and to resentence accordingly; and reversed and remanded as to the burglary conviction, directing the court to set aside the first-degree burglary conviction, to find Pardue guilty of third-degree burglary, and to sentence him accordingly. After its application for rehearing was overruled, the State filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which we granted in order to consider whether a burglar is "armed with ... a deadly weapon" in accordance with Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-7-5(a), if he acquires a gun as loot during the burglary but does not use it or possess it for the purpose of its use or potential use as a weapon.
For a statement of the facts of this case, see Pardue v. State, 571 So. 2d 320 (Ala. Crim.App.1989).
The State contends that the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision is erroneous because, the State argues, it negates the intent of the legislature in adopting Code *334 1975, § 13A-7-5(a). In support of its contention, the State relies on Henry v. State, 448 So. 2d 432 (Ala.Crim.App.1983); Bates v. State, 468 So. 2d 207 (Ala.Crim.App. 1985); and Lovell v. State, 477 So. 2d 485 (Ala.Crim.App.1985). Those cases, which held that the taking of a firearm during a burglary would suffice to support a first-degree burglary conviction, were expressly overruled by the Court of Criminal Appeals in Buchannon v. State, 554 So. 2d 477 (Ala. Crim.App.1989), cert. denied, 554 So. 2d 494 (Ala.1989).
In Buchannon, the Court of Criminal Appeals made a distinction between the perpetrator who equips himself with a weapon prior to the crime and the perpetrator who steals a weapon during the crime, stating: "The mere showing that the defendant stole a weapon during the course of a burglary or robbery, without more, does not constitute being `armed.'" 554 So. 2d  at 492.
The offense of burglary in the first degree is defined in Code § 13A-7-5(a), as follows:
The statute clearly sets forth the conduct that is prohibited. A person commits the crime of burglary in the first degree when, in the course of committing a burglary, the person is armed with a deadly weapon. The statute does not require that the burglar be armed prior to entering a dwelling. Rather, the burglar must be "armed with explosives or a deadly weapon" at one of three points: 1) "in effecting entry"; or 2) "while in [the] dwelling"; or 3) "in immediate flight therefrom." Clearly, under the statute, the burglar could conceivably be "armed" at three different times during the course of the burglary.
We hold that the better view is that previously recognized by the Court of Criminal Appeals in Henry v. State, supra, Bates v. State, supra, and Lovell v. State, supra. This view has been adopted by Kentucky in Meadows v. Commonwealth, 551 S.W.2d 253 (Ky.Ct.App.1977), and by New Mexico in State v. Luna, 99 N.M. 76, 653 P.2d 1222 (App.), cert. quashed, 99 N.M. 148, 655 P.2d 160 (1982).
The applicable statute in Meadows was Ky.Rev.Stat. 511.020(1), which provides as follows:
Applying that statute where a defendant broke into an unoccupied dwelling and stole a gun, the Kentucky court held:
551 S.W.2d  at 255.
The court in Luna interpreted a statute similar to Code § 13A-7-5(a), and stated:
653 P.2d  at 1224. The New Mexico court held that the applicable statute is violated by a person who becomes armed with an unloaded weapon during the commission of a burglary.
The fact that Pardue armed himself with a deadly weapon while in the dwelling brings him within the purview of § 13A-7-5(a). Therefore, the decision in Buchannon, supra, is expressly overruled. We hold that Pardue was "armed" with a deadly weapon as that term is used in § 13A-7-5(a); we are persuaded that this holding is consistent with the intent of the legislature.
We, therefore, reverse that part of the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment directing the trial court to set aside the first degree burglary conviction, to find Pardue guilty of third degree burglary, and to resentence accordingly; and we remand this cause for action consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, ALMON, SHORES and HOUSTON, JJ., concur.
KENNEDY, J., concurs in the result.