Title: Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Minton

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

PRESENT: Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Millette, Mims, McClanahan, and 
Powell, JJ., and Koontz, S.J.  
 
EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
 v.  Record No. 111775 
JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR. 
 
 
 
JANUARY 10, 2013 
CONNIE MINTON, EXECUTOR OF THE  
ESTATE OF RUBERT E. MINTON  
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 
Timothy S. Fisher, Judge 
 
 
This appeal arises out of a jury verdict against Exxon 
Mobil Corporation (Exxon) based on injuries that Rubert E. 
Minton suffered as a result of developing mesothelioma from 
exposure to asbestos while working on Exxon ships during his 
employment at the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock 
Company (Shipyard). 
 
On appeal, Exxon assigns error to: (1) the circuit court's 
finding that the evidence was sufficient to show that Exxon 
either actively controlled Minton's work or that Exxon failed 
to intervene to protect him in the face of actual knowledge 
that the Shipyard was ignoring an obvious risk to his safety; 
(2) the circuit court's finding that the evidence was 
sufficient to show that Minton's mesothelioma was proximately 
caused by Exxon's breach of a maritime law duty; (3) the 
circuit court's exclusion of all evidence that the Shipyard 
knew of the relevant hazard and had asbestos controls in place; 
 
2 
and (4) the award of punitive damages.  For the reasons stated 
herein, we reverse and remand. 
I. Facts and Proceedings 
Minton was employed at the Shipyard from 1956 until 1993, 
except for two years spent in the Army Reserves.  From 1956 to 
1960, Minton worked as an apprentice shipfitter in the 
construction of new ships.  When he returned from the Reserves 
in 1962, he worked as a shipfitter and became a supervisor of 
other shipfitters.  During this time period Minton worked on 
the construction of new vessels and never worked aboard any 
Exxon vessels.  He was regularly exposed to asbestos from 
asbestos-containing materials as well as from asbestos dust 
from a dusty worksite and does not claim that Exxon is liable 
for this asbestos exposure. 
In 1966, Minton was promoted to ship repair staff 
supervisor and was responsible for supervising and coordinating 
the repair of vessels.  As the position did not involve hands-
on participation in the vessels' repair work, Minton did not 
personally handle asbestos products.  Nonetheless, Minton spent 
approximately half of his day walking through vessels on which 
repairs were being made with each vessel's repair supervisor or 
port engineer, to start new jobs and to inspect the repair work 
that was being done or that was recently completed.  During 
these inspections, Minton and the ship's port engineer viewed 
 
3 
various rooms in which asbestos was used, including the boiler 
and engine rooms. 
 
Between 1966 and 1977, Exxon frequently brought their 
vessels to the Shipyard's facilities for repair.  Over Minton's 
eleven years as repair supervisor, Exxon owned seventeen of the 
approximately two hundred vessels repaired by the Shipyard. 
 
In 2009, sixteen years after the conclusion of his 
employment with the Shipyard, Minton was diagnosed with 
malignant mesothelioma, a form of cancer caused by exposure to 
asbestos.  Minton filed suit against Exxon under the federal 
Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 
U.S.C. § 905(b), for failure to warn Minton of, and protect him 
from, the dangers associated with asbestos.  The jury found in 
favor of Minton and awarded him $12,000,000 in compensatory 
damages, $430,963.70 in medical expenses, plus punitive damages 
in the amount of $12,500,000.  Exxon's motions to set aside the 
verdict, for a new trial, and for remittitur were denied, 
except that the punitive damage award was reduced to 
$5,000,000, the amount sought in Minton's ad damnum clause.  
Exxon timely filed its appeal. 
II. Analysis 
A. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence to Show Duty of Care 
Exxon first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 
establish that it violated the requisite duty of care.  We 
 
4 
review the sufficiency of evidence on appeal by "examin[ing] 
the evidence in the light most favorable to . . . the 
prevailing party at trial, and the trial court's judgment will 
not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence 
to support it."  Nolte v. MT Tech. Enters., LLC, 284 Va. 80, 
90, 726 S.E.2d 339, 345 (2012) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Code § 8.01-680. 
Under 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) of the LHWCA, a vessel owner must 
use ordinary care in maintaining the vessel and its equipment 
so that an expert and experienced stevedore can load and unload 
cargo with reasonable safety.  Included under the protection of 
the LHWCA are ship repairmen and shipbuilders.  33 U.S.C. 
§ 902(3).  Under the version of the LHWCA in effect prior to 
1972, liability could be imposed upon a vessel owner by showing 
either that the vessel owner negligently caused the worker's 
injuries, or that the vessel itself was unseaworthy.  Green v. 
United States, 700 F.Supp.2d 1280, 1296 (M.D. Fla. 2010).  
Unseaworthiness did not require a showing of fault by the 
vessel owner, because the creation of an unsafe condition was 
enough to create liability.  Id.  In 1972, Congress amended the 
LHWCA to "shield shipowners from strict liability," imposing a 
negligence standard and removing the ability of a worker to 
bring a claim against the vessel owner for unseaworthiness.  
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also LHWCA 
 
5 
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1263 (codified 
as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 905(b)).  As a result, an injured 
worker seeking to sue a vessel owner must now show that the 
owner of the vessel "violated a duty owed to the injured 
worker" before liability can be established under the Act.  
Lormand v. Superior Oil Co., 845 F.2d 536, 541 (5th Cir. 1987). 
In Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 
156 (1981), the United States Supreme Court established the 
standard of care owed by a vessel owner to shipyard workers 
such as Minton under the current version of the LHWCA.  The 
three separate duties set forth in Scindia have been termed the 
"turnover duty," the duty of "active control," and the "duty to 
intervene."  Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co., S.A., 512 U.S. 
92, 98 (1994) (citing Scindia, 451 U.S. at 167-78). 
Exxon argues on appeal that the evidence presented at 
trial was not sufficient to prove a violation of any of the 
duties of care established by Scindia to create liability for a 
vessel owner under the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA.  We 
disagree and conclude that the evidence was sufficient for a 
reasonable jury to find that both the active control duty and 
the duty to intervene were owed to Minton and subsequently 
breached. 
 
 
 
6 
1. 
Turnover Duty 
Exxon contends that Minton waived the turnover duty, which 
relates to the condition of the ship at the commencement of 
stevedoring operations.  Howlett, 512 U.S. at 98.  We agree, as 
the turnover duty was not argued at trial, and Minton expressly 
withdrew his argument as to the presence of a turnover duty 
pre-trial. 
2. 
Active Control 
Under the active control duty, a "vessel may be liable if 
it actively involves itself in the cargo operations."  Scindia, 
451 U.S. at 167.  Exxon argues that there was no active 
involvement because its supervision did not extend beyond 
general oversight.  Using the language of the court in Dow v. 
Oldendorff Carriers GMBH & Co., 387 Fed. Appx. 504, 507 (5th 
Cir. 2010), Exxon claims that Minton was required to prove that 
Exxon actively controlled the "methods and operative details" 
of the Shipyard workers' repair work.  Exxon argues that Minton 
provided no evidence to show that Exxon told the Shipyard 
workers how to complete their repair jobs on its vessels. 
Exxon also contends that Minton did not present any 
evidence to show that Exxon employees worked with asbestos in 
the vicinity of Minton, with Minton's witnesses testifying only 
that some of the Exxon employees' work might have included work 
with asbestos.  Exxon argues that Minton was unable to put 
 
7 
forward concrete evidence that any asbestos was being used in 
repair work without the necessary controls while Minton was on 
board the vessel.  We disagree. 
a. 
Control Over Specific Activities  
 
In order to establish the duty of active control, "the 
vessel must have substantially controlled or been in charge of 
(i) the area in which the hazard existed; (ii) the 
instrumentality which caused the injury; or (iii) the specific 
activities the stevedore undertook."  Davis v. Portline 
Transportes Mar. Internacional, 16 F.3d 532, 540 (3rd Cir. 
1994).  Sufficient evidence of any one of the three components 
triggers the duty of active control. 
 
Regarding Exxon's control over the specific activities 
that the Shipyard undertook, C. Lloyd Ware, a former estimating 
supervisor for the Shipyard, testified that Exxon's port 
engineer maintained "overall authority," leaving the Shipyard 
unable to tell Exxon's crew working on the vessel what to do.  
This exercise of authority was part of Exxon's designated 
procedure, evidenced by a portion of Exxon's 1974 Repair 
Procedures: 
The Repair Inspector[, with the assistance of the 
officers and crew,] has the responsibility of 
supervising the overhaul.  He issues all necessary 
instructions to the shipyard foremen, inspects the 
work to see that it is properly done and 
coordinates the necessary . . . inspections. 
 
 
8 
 
Moreover, Julian Draper, the Shipyard's pipefitter 
foreman, explained in his testimony that the Shipyard's trade 
foreman would contact Exxon's chief engineer, chief mate, or 
port engineer after receiving the job orders for repairs on 
Exxon's vessels to make sure that the Shipyard's personnel 
understood the job order, and to assure that the job would be 
completed to Exxon's satisfaction.  Sometimes, as Draper 
explained, the job orders would specifically require 
consultation with the chief or port engineer before a job order 
was commenced.  When no such requirement was in place, the job 
repair specifications, such as the 1975 job order which was 
presented to the jury, nevertheless provided detailed 
specifications for each step of each individual repair to be 
completed by the Shipyard. 
 
The evidence presented at trial as to Exxon's control over 
the repair work was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find 
that Exxon had a duty to Minton based on its control of the 
specific activities undertaken by the Shipyard employees. 
b. 
Presence of the Hazard 
 
Not only was the evidence sufficient to show that Exxon 
actively controlled the activities on its vessels, but the 
evidence also supports the jury's finding that the hazard at 
issue, asbestos, was present in the areas under Exxon's 
control.  Despite Exxon's argument that manufacturers were 
 
9 
using asbestos substitutes as early as 1971 because of 
widespread knowledge of the health risks surrounding the use of 
asbestos-containing materials, Minton presented evidence that 
Exxon's vessels contained asbestos during the period of time 
when Minton worked with Exxon at the shipyard.  Notably, Minton 
produced for the jury piecework orders for the Exxon New 
Orleans, the newest vessel that Minton worked on during his 
time as ship repair staff supervisor.  In the orders, asbestos 
blankets, asbestos plaster, and asbestos cloth are all listed 
with frequency. 
Multiple witnesses, including Draper, also testified to 
the use of asbestos-containing materials on Exxon vessels 
through the mid-1970s.  Draper recounted the methods and 
processes of using asbestos in the Exxon vessels, stating that 
the use of asbestos and the methods of using asbestos was "the 
way you did business" on the Exxon ships during the time he 
worked with Minton.  The evidence was therefore sufficient to 
establish that Exxon had active control of the asbestos, a 
hazard present on Exxon vessels during the 1966-1977 period 
during which Minton was employed as ship repair staff 
supervisor. 
3. 
Duty to Intervene 
The duty to intervene applies when a shipyard's judgment 
is "obviously improvident," and the vessel owner both "knew of 
 
10 
the defect [or hazard] and that [it] was continuing to [be] 
use[d]," and "should have realized the defect [or hazard] 
presented an unreasonable risk of harm to the longshoremen."  
Scindia, 451 U.S. at 175-76.  In order to establish the duty to 
intervene, Minton needed to show that: 
the vessel owner ha[d] (1) actual knowledge that 
a dangerous condition exist[ed] and (2) actual 
knowledge that the stevedore or independent 
contractor, or its employees, [could not] be 
relied upon to remedy the condition, and that if 
unremedied it [would] pose a substantial risk of 
injury. 
 
Lormand v. Superior Oil Co., 845 F.2d at 542. 
 
Exxon claims that no evidence was presented to show that 
any Exxon employee had actual knowledge that Minton was working 
amid conditions that were obviously dangerous.  Exxon argues 
that Minton proved only that Exxon should have known about the 
danger, but that this is not the standard to be applied to 
establish a duty to intervene. 
a. 
Actual Knowledge of the Dangerous Condition 
 
The first step in establishing the presence of a duty to 
intervene requires an evaluation of whether Exxon had actual 
knowledge that a dangerous condition existed.  James W. 
Hammond, Exxon's director of industrial hygiene, testified that 
the danger of pulmonary injury to humans from asbestos exposure 
was known by 1934.  Dr. Neill Kendall Weaver, Exxon's associate 
medical director, stated in a deposition presented to the jury 
 
11 
that industrial hygienists were aware of the dangers of 
asbestos exposure as early as the 1930s.  He indicated that, 
not only did Exxon know of the danger in the 1930s, but it also 
took precautionary measures in its refineries to protect 
workers from the harmful effect of asbestos. 
 
Dr. Weaver testified that in the 1950s he became aware 
that high exposures of asbestos were present in the 
shipbuilding industry.  According to Dr. Weaver, during the 
1950s, Exxon's industrial hygienists took voyages on Exxon 
vessels and reported their observations, including measurements 
of the amount of asbestos dust present on the vessels during 
the voyage. 
 
Dr. Weaver further testified that the scientific community 
was aware of the causal connection between asbestos and 
mesothelioma by 1964.  Significantly, Dr. R.E. Eckhardt, 
Exxon's director of medical records, attended a three-day 
conference in October, 1964, on the "Biological Effects of 
Asbestos," sponsored by the Section of Biological and Medical 
Sciences of the New York Academy of Sciences. The conference 
would later come to be known as the Selikoff asbestos 
conference.  When he returned, Dr. Eckhardt wrote a summary of 
the conference for Exxon, which was presented to the jury as 
evidence of Exxon's knowledge.  In this summary, after devoting 
five pages to the many presentations detailing the harmful 
 
12 
effects of asbestos exposure, Dr. Eckhart gives his own 
opinion: 
I would say that this three-day conference 
clearly suggests that exposure to asbestos is a 
most serious situation [and] it is very important 
to eliminate all unnecessary exposure to asbestos 
dust in the future. . . .  Certainly this appears 
to be a problem that cannot be taken lightly, and 
certainly it would seem that very careful control 
of exposures to asbestos throughout refinery 
operations should be instituted. 
 
(Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In his summary, he also 
specifically recognized the danger asbestos posed to 
bystanders, such as Minton, stating that "the foreman whose 
exposure is presumably quite light does not develop asbestosis 
but may in subsequent years go on to develop mesothelioma." 
 
Not only did Minton's evidence show that Exxon was aware 
that asbestos-containing products created dangerous working 
conditions, Minton's evidence as discussed in Part II.A.2.b., 
supra, also established that Exxon's vessels did contain 
asbestos throughout the period at issue, 1966-1977. 
b.  Actual Knowledge That the Shipyard Would Not Act, 
 and That the Condition, if Unremedied, Would Pose a 
Substantial Risk of Injury 
 
 
Minton also presented evidence of Exxon's actual knowledge 
that the Shipyard could not be relied on to protect Minton, 
thereby exposing him to the dangerous conditions present in an 
asbestos-containing environment without the protection of 
safety controls.  A 1972 letter from T.J. McTaggart, Exxon's 
 
13 
head port engineer, to captains and chief engineers on Exxon 
vessels prohibits the use of asbestos-containing materials on 
vessels, mandating that "[p]ersons packing the cartons . . . 
wear dust masks," and that "supplies of asbestos insulating 
materials . . . be packed in . . . sealed [boxes] and marked 
'Asbestos[:] Not To Be Used On This Vessel – Do Not Open Unless 
A Dust Mask Is Worn.' " 
 
Draper, the Shipyard's pipefitter foreman, testified that 
he did not, however, see any Exxon crew members use asbestos 
safety measures in the 1960s and 1970s, nor did he ever receive 
a warning from the Exxon crewmembers that asbestos was 
hazardous.  Ware, the former estimating supervisor for the 
Shipyard, testified that at no time prior to the late 1970s did 
he see any signs warning against asbestos exposure or any 
effort by Exxon crew members to isolate areas so that the 
Shipyard workers would not be exposed to asbestos dust, to take 
air samples, or to employ wet-down methods to hold down the 
dust.  Ware also testified that the Shipyard workers did not 
have showers or clean clothes provided to them when they worked 
around asbestos, nor did he see anyone, Exxon worker or 
Shipyard worker, wearing a respirator when working with or 
around asbestos products.  Nor did he see any warnings or 
barriers to protect the Shipyard workers.  The testimony of Dr. 
David Egilman, Minton's treating physician, emphasized the 
 
14 
extent of the danger created by these working conditions that 
existed without any warning to the Shipyard workers, 
analogizing the situation to a fire in a theatre to which no 
one speaks a word of warning. 
 
If accepted by the jury, the evidence of Exxon's knowledge 
regarding the dangers of asbestos both before and during 
Minton's employment at the Shipyard and the Shipyard's failure 
to warn its workers or protect individuals such as Minton in 
the presence of the danger was sufficient to establish Exxon's 
actual knowledge of the failure of the Shipyard to take the 
requisite steps to protect their employees.  Thus, if Minton's 
evidence was accepted by the jury, it would have been 
sufficient for the jury to conclude that Exxon failed 
unreasonably to protect Minton when the Shipyard had failed to 
do so. 
B. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence to Show Proximate Cause 
 
Exxon's second challenge is to the sufficiency of the 
evidence presented to establish that Exxon's breach of its duty 
of care caused Minton's injury.  The aforementioned standard of 
review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting a jury finding requires an "examin[ation of] the 
evidence in the light most favorable to . . . the prevailing 
party at trial" that is not to be disturbed unless "plainly 
wrong or without evidence to support it."  Nolte, 284 Va. at 
 
15 
90, 726 S.E.2d at 345 (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
also Code § 8.01-680. 
 
In arguing that the evidence was not sufficient to support 
a finding of causation, Exxon claims that the inability of 
Minton's medical experts to testify that Minton's prior 
exposure to asbestos could not have, on its own, caused 
Minton's mesothelioma precluded a finding that Exxon caused 
Minton's injury.  According to Exxon, because the experts 
testified that Minton's prior work in vessel construction was 
sufficient exposure to cause mesothelioma, any breach by Exxon 
could not be established as the cause of Minton's subsequently-
diagnosed mesothelioma.  Exxon argues that any finding of 
causation would be based on mere conjecture. 
 
We disagree with Exxon's argument and find that the 
evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury, as instructed, 
to find that Exxon's actions were a substantial contributing 
factor in causing Minton's injury.  Although Minton's experts 
did testify that Minton's prior exposure to asbestos could have 
been, on its own, enough to cause mesothelioma, it is 
established maritime law that "an injured party [may] sue a 
tortfeasor for the full amount of damages for an indivisible 
injury that the tortfeasor's negligence was a substantial 
factor in causing."  Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale 
Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 260 (1979).  This is true "even 
 
16 
if the concurrent negligence of others contributed to the 
incident."  Id.  Based on this principle, the jury was not 
precluded from finding that Minton's exposure to asbestos 
materials on Exxon's ships was a cause sufficient to establish 
liability for Minton's resulting indivisible harm. 
 
The question before the jury was therefore whether the 
evidence was sufficient to show that Minton's exposure to 
asbestos while on Exxon's vessels was a substantial 
contributing factor in the development of Minton's injury, 
mesothelioma.1  To answer this question, the jury was given an 
instruction that defined substantial, "not . . . by quantity 
but [by] quality[, meaning] that the exposure aboard Exxon's 
vessels was not an imaginary or possible factor or having only 
an insignificant connection with the harm." 
 
Based on this definition contained within an uncontested 
instruction, the evidence regarding the presence of 
                     
1 We have today rejected the substantial contributing 
factor analysis of proximate causation in cases tried under 
Virginia law when multiple sufficient causation is alleged.  
Ford Motor Co. v. Boomer, 285 Va. ___, ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ 
(2013) (this day decided).  In the case at bar, however, the 
appropriate theory of causation is not before us.  At trial, 
the substantial contributing factor theory of causation was 
presented to the jury in a jury instruction without objection 
by either party to the case.  In the absence of a 
contemporaneous objection, "[r]ight or wrong, the instruction 
given [becomes] the law of the case on that point, and [is] 
binding upon both the parties and the jury."  Hilton v. Fayen, 
196 Va. 860, 867, 86 S.E.2d 40, 43 (1955).  It cannot be 
questioned on appeal.  Id. 
 
17 
uncontrolled asbestos aboard Exxon vessels and the testimony by 
Minton's medical experts regarding the effect of such levels of 
asbestos were sufficient to support a finding of causation.  As 
noted in Part II.A.2.b., supra, the evidence made clear that 
asbestos, and repairs involving asbestos, were present on Exxon 
vessels in the 1960s and 1970s.  There was also evidence that 
Minton visited the Exxon ships in the course of his employment 
with the Shipyard, spending approximately half of every day 
walking through the vessels.  Exxon had seventeen vessels 
docked at the Shipyard during the eleven year period that 
Minton served as ship repair staff supervisor, when Minton 
spent over one thousand days walking through the asbestos-
containing area.  The evidence shows that Minton was not 
protected from asbestos exposure through the use of safety 
controls on any of those days, nor that he was aware of the 
risk. 
 
The testimony also included the details of daily repairs, 
including a description of work on asbestos-containing areas of 
the engine rooms of a vessel, which would include asbestos 
insulation being "thrown on the deck," after which cleaners 
would sweep the material, allowing the dust particles to 
repeatedly fly into the air.  Evidence was also presented 
regarding the "taking out of valves" on the vessel, which 
would, on a "case-by-case basis" require the removal of 
 
18 
asbestos insulation to reach the valve.  Based on this 
testimony and the extensive lists of asbestos-containing 
materials installed on the vessels, there was sufficient 
evidence to support a finding of significant asbestos exposure 
to Minton, who was frequently present on the ships while 
repairs were being completed. 
 
Dr. Egilman and Dr. John Coulter Maddox, a pathologist who 
has studied asbestos-related disease since the 1970s, testified 
as to the link between the prevalence of asbestos on Exxon's 
vessels and the injury to Minton.  Both Dr. Egilman and Dr. 
Maddox opined that the exposure to asbestos on Exxon's vessels 
when work was performed on pumps insulated with asbestos 
materials was a substantial contributing factor in Minton's 
injury.  Dr. Egilman opined that such work caused fibers of 
asbestos to circulate around the vessel, reaching bystanders at 
the time of repair.  Dr. Egilman attributed Minton's injury, at 
least in part, to his exposure as a frequent bystander during 
the repair work. 
 
Based therefore on the evidence of asbestos-containing 
materials on the Exxon vessels in the 1960s and 1970s, Minton's 
daily exposure to the asbestos, and the danger present in such 
exposures, we agree with Minton that there was sufficient 
evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Exxon's actions 
were a substantial contributing factor in Minton's injury.  
 
19 
C. 
Exclusion of Evidence on the Shipyard's Knowledge 
 
Exxon also assigns error to the circuit court's exclusion of 
evidence regarding the Shipyard's knowledge of the danger of 
asbestos exposure and its policies in place to protect the 
Shipyard workers from the hazard.  Exxon contends that, due to 
the court's denial of its requests to introduce evidence about 
the Shipyard's knowledge and safety measures, the jury was 
given the false impression that Exxon had unique knowledge and 
was therefore the only actor with the ability to protect Minton 
from harm.  Exxon argues that this error was highly prejudicial 
and therefore warrants reversal. 
 
Minton contends that the evidence is not relevant.  He 
argues that the sole purpose for admitting evidence of the 
Shipyard's knowledge of the danger of exposure to asbestos-
containing materials was to direct blame at a statutorily 
immune employer.2  Furthermore, even if attributing blame to the 
immune Shipyard was permitted, Minton claims that it would not 
be relevant to Exxon's duty of care.  Minton argues that the 
two elements he needed to prove were that the Shipyard's 
conduct was obviously improvident and that Exxon did nothing to 
remedy it.  As the Shipyard's knowledge was not relevant to 
                     
2 The Supreme Court has held, consistent with the 
Congressional intent underlying 33 U.S.C. § 905(b), that no 
attribution of liability may be made, either directly or 
indirectly, against a longshoreman's statutory employer.  
Edmonds, 443 U.S. at 263, 270 n.8. 
 
20 
either of these two elements of proof, Minton contends that it 
was properly excluded.  We disagree. 
 
When reviewing the discretionary exclusion of evidence by 
a trial court, the decision "will not be overturned on appeal 
absent evidence that the trial court abused [its] discretion." 
May v. Caruso, 264 Va. 358, 362, 568 S.E.2d 690, 692 (2002) 
(citation omitted).  An abuse of discretion can occur when "a 
relevant factor that should have been given significant weight 
[was] not considered."  Landrum v. Chippenham & Johnston-Willis 
Hosps., Inc., 282 Va. 346, 352, 717 S.E.2d 134, 137 (2011) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
As described in Part II.A., supra, the 1972 amendments to 
the LHWCA as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United 
States in Scindia established the standard of care owed by a 
vessel owner to an injured worker.  The three duties are the 
aforementioned "turnover duty," duty of "active control," and 
"duty to intervene."  Howlett, 512 U.S. at 98; see also 
Scindia, 451 U.S. at 167-78. 
 
The turnover duty is violated by the actions of the vessel 
owner, applicable when the owner fails to turn the vessel over 
free of "hidden dangers" and without any warning of dangers 
that do exist.  Scindia, 451 U.S. at 167.  The second duty, the 
active control duty, is also based on the vessel owner's 
actions.  It is violated if the vessel owner fails to "exercise 
 
21 
reasonable care to prevent injuries to longshoremen in areas 
that remain under the active control of the vessel."  Howlett, 
512 U.S. at 98 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
The duty to intervene, the third duty, requires that the vessel 
owner have "actual knowledge that an unsafe condition exists 
and that the stevedore is allowing that condition to continue," 
leaving the vessel owner under a duty to intervene if the 
stevedore, or shipyard, is "obviously improvident" in failing 
to remedy the danger.  Elberg v. Mobil Oil Corp., 967 F.2d 
1146, 1150 (7th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
 
Although all three duties are based in whole or in part on 
a vessel owner's acts or omissions, the duty to intervene 
stands alone in relying in part on the acts or omissions of the 
plaintiff's employer in improvidently allowing an unsafe 
condition to go unremedied.  In order for a jury to determine 
whether the evidence was sufficient to show that the vessel 
owner unreasonably failed to intervene in the face of a 
shipyard's failure to act, evidence is admissible to show that 
there was a basis for the vessel owner not to rely on the 
shipyard to provide the necessary protective measures.  This is 
a crucial consideration because the shipyard has the duty to 
"provide a reasonably safe place to work and to take safeguards 
necessary to avoid injuries," and a vessel owner may rely upon 
 
22 
the shipyard's concomitant responsibility to avoid exposing its 
employees to unreasonable hazards.  Howlett, 512 U.S. at 101 
(citing Scindia, 451 U.S. at 170); see 33 U.S.C. § 941.  The 
vessel owner can rely upon the shipyard's "expertise and 
reasonableness," Duplantis v. Zigler Shipyards, Inc., 692 F.2d 
372, 374 (5th Cir. 1982), as the shipyard is "in the best 
position to avoid accidents during cargo operations."  Howlett, 
512 U.S. at 101 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The 
shipowner has "justifiable expectations that those duties" will 
be performed by the repair company without the shipowner's 
supervision.  Scindia, 451 U.S. at 176. 
 
In order to establish a vessel owner's duty to intervene, 
a jury must be able to consider evidence of the employer's 
knowledge of the danger and ability to protect the employee.  
Until it is shown that the employer, who is presumed to have a 
higher level of expertise than the vessel owner, lacked the 
knowledge, intent, or ability to protect the employee, no duty 
to intervene can be attributed to the vessel owner, who "has no 
duty to anticipate inaction or carelessness of a ship 
repairer."  Bergeron v. Main Iron Works, Inc., 563 So.2d 954, 
957, 959 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (citation omitted).  It is only if 
there is sufficient evidence that the vessel owner could not 
rely on the employer or its expertise that the vessel owner, 
"if it has actual knowledge, is required to overrule the ship 
 
23 
repairer's judgment and correct the hazard."  Id. (citation 
omitted). 
 
The circuit court found the Shipyard's knowledge of the 
danger of exposure to asbestos and its ability and intent to 
remedy that danger irrelevant.  We hold, however, that evidence 
tending to show the Shipyard's knowledge of the danger and its 
ability and intent to remedy the danger is relevant in the 
determination of whether Exxon had a duty to intervene to 
protect Minton.  Exxon's proffered evidence of the Shipyard's 
knowledge, intent, or ability to protect Minton through 
programs created by the Shipyard included:  annual physicals 
for workers, the use of respirators when working with 
insulation projects, and the application of wet-down techniques 
to keep asbestos fibers from becoming airborne.  Such evidence 
was relevant to the jury's determination of whether the 
existence of these programs supported Exxon's argument that it 
had no duty to intervene because Exxon would have been acting 
reasonably in relying upon the Shipyard to adequately protect 
the Shipyard's own workers. 
 
We therefore hold that the trial court erred in refusing 
to admit evidence of the Shipyard's knowledge of the dangers of 
asbestos exposure and its procedures regarding precautions to 
be taken around asbestos, whether or not implemented.  Although 
we have determined that the evidence that Minton presented, if 
 
24 
accepted by the jury, was sufficient to support a verdict for 
Minton based upon a violation of Exxon's duty to intervene, we 
cannot say that the jury would still have concluded that Exxon 
violated the duty if it was presented with the excluded 
evidence.  Whether Exxon violated its duty to intervene was one 
of the two potential bases for the verdict in favor of Minton.  
Because we cannot determine from the record whether the jury 
found in favor of Minton based upon the duty to intervene 
without the opportunity to consider the excluded evidence, or 
because of Exxon's violation of the active control duty, we 
will reverse the judgment of the circuit court. 
D. 
Punitive Damages 
Finally, Exxon challenges the award of punitive damages, 
basing its argument on the language of 33 U.S.C. § 905(b), 
which it argues forecloses the remedy.  Exxon contends that, by 
stating that the allowance under the LHWCA for recovery against 
a vessel owner for negligence is "exclusive of all other 
remedies against the vessel," 33 U.S.C. § 905(b), the statute 
eliminates the ability of a court to supplement the statute's 
provided remedies. 
Minton argues that the award of punitive damages was not 
contrary to the statutory language of 33 U.S.C. § 905(b), which 
he claims does not address damages at all.  Without any express 
language departing from the common law understanding, Minton 
 
25 
argues that the common law must be applied.  As a result, 
Minton contends that punitive damages, which were available at 
common law and have been extended to federal maritime claims, 
should be affirmed in the case at hand. 
We recognize that a number of courts have allowed punitive 
damages in accordance with Minton's reading of the statute, 
holding that 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) is silent as to availability of 
punitive damages.  See, e.g., Kahumoku v. Titan Mar., LLC, 486 
F.Supp.2d 1144, 1151 (D. Haw. 2007) (finding the language of 33 
U.S.C. § 905(b) silent "as to punitive damages[,] indicat[ing]  
Congress' intent for the remedy to remain available under 
maritime law"); Wheelings v. Seatrade Groningen, BV, 516 
F.Supp.2d 488, 496 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (stating that "[because] the 
LHWCA is silent on the availability of punitive damages, the 
court follows general maritime law"). 
We reject this interpretation of 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) as 
contrary to the statute's plain language.  In making this 
determination, we review this question of law de novo.  David 
White Crane Serv. v. Howell, 282 Va. 323, 327, 714 S.E.2d 572, 
575 (2011).  The Supreme Court of the United States has 
established that "the general rule that punitive damages were 
available at common law extended to claims arising under 
federal maritime law."  Altlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 
U.S. 404, 411 (2009).  This remedy was applied with frequency 
 
26 
in lower federal courts "for tortious actions of a particularly 
egregious nature," thereby establishing itself as a recognized 
and often-applied remedy.  Id. at 411-12.  Accordingly, the 
common law remedy of punitive damages in the context of federal 
maritime law claims can be denied only if "Congress has enacted 
legislation departing from this common-law understanding."  Id. 
at 415. 
The LHWCA constitutes legislation that explicitly departs 
from the general rule under common law that punitive damages 
are an available remedy in federal maritime law claims.  The 
language of 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) states, in relevant part: 
In the event of injury to a person covered under 
this chapter caused by the negligence of a 
vessel, then such person, or anyone otherwise 
entitled to recover damages by reason thereof, 
may bring an action against such vessel as a 
third party in accordance with the provisions of 
section 933 of this title. . . .  The remedy 
provided in this subsection shall be exclusive of 
all other remedies against the vessel except 
remedies available under this [Act]. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  The plain language of the statute clearly 
limits the remedies available for a negligence action under the 
LHWCA to those included within the terms of the statute.  We 
have previously held that "[w]here the legislature has used 
words of plain and definite import the courts cannot put upon 
them a construction which amounts to holding the legislature 
did not mean what it has actually expressed."  Barr v. Town & 
 
27 
Country Props., Inc., 240 Va. 292, 295, 396 S.E.2d 672, 674 
(1990).  Consequently, as punitive damages are not a remedy 
made available within the terms of the LHWCA, and the language 
plainly restricts the damages to those remedies explicitly made 
available, they are extinguished as a category of recovery in 
LHWCA claims.  See Miller v. American President Lines, Ltd., 
989 F.2d 1450, 1457 (6th Cir. 1993) (stating that "[t]his 
statute creates a worker's compensation scheme for certain 
maritime workers which is exclusive of other remedies and does 
not provide for punitive damages"); McConville v. Reinauer 
Transp. Cos., 835 N.Y.S.2d 711, 713 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) 
(indicating that "[p]unitive damages are not available in an 
action brought pursuant to the LHWCA"); Welsh v. Fugro 
Geosciences, Inc., 804 So.2d 710, 716-17, (La. Ct. App. 2001) 
(recognizing the "trend in federal jurisprudential and 
statutory law to bar claims for nonpecuniary loss," including 
punitive damages) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Thus, we hold that the award of $12,500,000 in punitive 
damages was inappropriately granted because punitive damages 
are a remedy prohibited by the terms of LHWCA. 
III.  Conclusion 
 
For the aforementioned reasons, we will reverse the 
judgment of the circuit court based on its exclusion of 
relevant evidence regarding the Shipyard's knowledge of the 
 
28 
danger of asbestos exposure and its ability to remedy the 
danger, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.  We will also reverse the circuit court's award of 
punitive damages and enter final judgment as to that claim. 
 
Reversed and remanded.
 
JUSTICE MCCLANAHAN, with whom JUSTICE POWELL joins, concurring 
in part and dissenting in part. 
 
 
I agree with the majority's holdings that Minton presented 
sufficient evidence to prove Exxon violated the second and 
third Scindia duties, i.e., the active control duty and the 
duty to intervene.  I disagree with the majority's conclusion, 
however, that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of 
the Shipyard's purported "knowledge of the dangers of asbestos 
exposure and its policies in place to protect the Shipyard 
workers from the hazard."  In light of Minton's proof that 
Exxon had a duty to intervene, the Shipyard's asbestos-related 
knowledge and policies were irrelevant to Exxon's duty to 
protect shipyard workers on its ships.   
 
I also disagree with the basis for the majority's reversal 
of Minton's award of punitive damages.  Title 33 U.S.C. 905(b) 
of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) 
does not preclude as a matter of law a shipyard worker from 
seeking to recover punitive damages in a negligence action 
against a shipowner. 
 
29 
 
1. Shipyard's Knowledge and Policies  
The Scindia duty to intervene is violated if the shipowner 
(i) fails to intervene when it knows of an unreasonably 
dangerous condition that has developed during the course of an 
independent contractor's shipboard operations; and (ii) it 
knows that the contractor "improvident[ly]" intends to continue 
those operations in the face of the danger and thus cannot be 
relied upon to protect its workers.  Scindia Steam Navigation 
Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 175-76 (1981).  
 
I agree with the majority's conclusion in Part II.A. of 
its opinion that Minton presented sufficient evidence to prove 
Exxon violated this duty based on evidence of the following: 
(i) Exxon's knowledge, dating back to the 1930's, of the 
hazards posed by asbestos exposure from asbestos-containing 
products like those located throughout its ships; and (ii) 
Exxon's knowledge that, during the eleven year period Minton 
worked aboard Exxon's ships, the Shipyard took no asbestos 
control measures, and "could not be relied on," to protect its 
workers, including Minton, from asbestos exposure when 
conducting repairs on Exxon's ships. 
However, after reaching that conclusion, the majority 
concludes in Part II.C. that the Shipyard's asbestos-related 
knowledge and policies, which were excluded from evidence, were 
 
30 
relevant to "whether Exxon had a duty to intervene."  Those two 
conclusions are, in my opinion, patently inconsistent. 
Evidence of such knowledge or policies of the Shipyard 
would not have changed the uncontroverted fact at trial that 
the Shipyard did not act for eleven years to protect its 
workers, including Minton, from the hazards of asbestos 
exposure when aboard Exxon's ships.  And, it was that course of 
Shipyard inaction that triggered Exxon's ongoing duty to 
intervene to protect those workers in light of the jury's 
necessary finding regarding Exxon's own knowledge of the 
hazardous circumstances.  That duty could not then be negated 
by Exxon pointing to evidence of what the Shipyard may have 
known about the hazards of such exposure, or policies the 
Shipyard may have had "to protect the Shipyard workers from the 
hazard" when no such policies were being implemented by the 
Shipyard.  To be relevant, evidence must have a logical 
tendency to prove a fact at issue in the case.  Harrell v. 
Woodson, 233 Va. 117, 122, 353 S.E.2d 770, 773 (1987).  On the 
facts here, the Shipyard's actual asbestos-related knowledge 
and policies had no logical relation to the issue of Exxon's 
own knowledge of the circumstances giving rise to its duty to 
intervene.  Exxon's proffered evidence of the Shipyard's 
knowledge and policies was, therefore, irrelevant relative to 
Exxon's duty to act. 
 
31 
In deciding the relevancy of the proffered evidence, the 
majority correctly states that a shipowner has no duty to 
anticipate inaction on the part of a shipyard regarding the 
protection of its workers.  The majority further asserts, 
however, that no duty to intervene can be attributed to the 
shipowner until it is shown that the shipyard "lacked the 
knowledge, intent, or ability to protect" its own workers.  No 
part of that assertion is consistent with the Scindia standard 
for the duty to intervene.  In the face of the shipyard's 
inaction to protect its workers from an unreasonably dangerous 
condition that has developed during shipboard operations, it 
matters not whether the shipyard had the knowledge, intent or 
ability to protect its workers.  In that instance, it is self-
evident that the shipyard cannot be relied upon to do so, thus 
triggering the shipowner's duty to intervene on behalf of those 
workers to the extent the shipowner becomes aware of the 
hazardous circumstances.  At that point, the fact that the 
shipowner initially had no duty to anticipate the shipyard's 
inaction is not a relevant consideration. 
I would therefore hold that the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in excluding Exxon's proffered evidence 
regarding the Shipyard's asbestos-related knowledge and 
policies.  See John Crane, Inc. v. Hardick, 283 Va. 358, 367, 
722 S.E.2d 610, 614 (2012) ("[W]e will not disturb a trial 
 
32 
court's evidentiary ruling absent an abuse of discretion." 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
2. Punitive Damages Award 
 
Contrary to the majority, I would hold that a shipyard 
worker such as Minton, i.e., a worker covered under the LHWCA 
(33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950), is permitted as a matter of law to seek 
punitive damages under 33 U.S.C. 905(b) in a negligence action 
against a shipowner such as Exxon. 
Section 905(b), which was added by amendment in 1972, 
provides in pertinent part:  
Negligence of vessel.  In the event of injury to a 
person covered under this chapter caused by the negligence 
of a vessel, then such person, or anyone otherwise 
entitled to recover damages by reason thereof, may bring 
an action against such vessel as a third party in 
accordance with the provisions of section 933 of this 
title, and the employer shall not be liable to the vessel 
for such damages directly or indirectly. . . .  The 
liability of the vessel under this subsection shall not be 
based upon the warranty of seaworthiness or a breach 
thereof at the time the injury occurred.  The remedy 
provided in this subsection shall be exclusive of all 
other remedies against the vessel except remedies 
available under this [Act].  
 
33 U.S.C. § 905(b). 
Prior to 1972, a covered worker had a maritime law claim 
"against the shipowner if [his] injury was caused by the ship's 
unseaworthiness or negligence," Scindia, 451 U.S. at 164.  
While the addition of § 905(b) to the LHWCA by the 1972 
amendments "abolished" the worker's right to recover for 
 
33 
unseaworthiness, "his right to recover from the shipowner for 
negligence was preserved in § 905(b)."  Id. at 165 (emphasis 
added). 
 
A " 'tort of negligence' " claim under general maritime 
law has been recognized " 'for more than a century.' " Atlantic 
Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 421 (2009) (quoting 
Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Garris, 532 U.S. 811, 
820 (2001)).  At the same time, federal courts have recognized 
that punitive damages are "available in maritime actions for 
tortious acts of a particularly egregious nature."  Id. at 411.  
See Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 
U.S. 101, 108 (1893) ("[C]ourts of admiralty . . . proceed, in 
cases of tort, upon the same principles as courts of common 
law, in allowing exemplary damages . . . ."); see also Powers 
v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 855 F.Supp. 199, 202-03 (W.D. Mich. 
1994) ("In admiralty jurisdiction, where Congress has not 
spoken, the general maritime law, 'an amalgam of traditional 
common law rules developed by the judiciary, applies.' " 
(quoting East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 
476 U.S. 858, 864-65 (1986)).  
 
Congress did not indicate in § 905(b), when preserving the 
shipyard worker's negligence action against the shipowner, that 
it was nevertheless excluding the right of the worker to seek 
punitive damages as part of that claim.  Indeed, § 905(b) is 
 
34 
silent as to the type of damages that may be recovered; it 
merely states: "In the event of injury to a person covered 
under this Act caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such 
person, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages by 
reason thereof, may bring an action against such vessel[.]" 
 
Furthermore, the House Report accompanying the 1972 
amendments to the LHWCA did not give any such indication.  The 
House Report stated that "nothing in this bill is intended to 
derogate from the vessel's responsibility to take appropriate 
corrective action where it knows or should have known about a 
dangerous condition." H.R. Rep. No. 92-1441 (1972).  The House 
Report then explained that the issue of whether the vessel was 
negligent "can only be resolved through the application of 
accepted principles of tort law and the ordinary process of 
litigation - just as they are in cases involving alleged 
negligence by land-based third parties."  Id.  (Emphasis 
added.) 
 
We are also aided in our construction of § 905(b) by a 
long-standing principle of statutory construction under federal 
law: "No statute is to be construed as altering the common law, 
farther than its words import."  Shaw v. Railroad Co., 101 U.S. 
557, 565 (1879).  Reflective of this principle, the United 
States Supreme Court recently held in Townsend that punitive 
damages are available under general maritime law except where 
 
35 
they have been eliminated by "legislation departing from [the] 
common-law understanding" that punitive damages extend to 
maritime claims.  Townsend, 557 U.S. at 414-15.  Consistent 
with Townsend, at least one federal court addressing the 
instant statutory construction issue has held that punitive 
damages are allowable under § 905(b).  Kahumoku v. Titan Mar., 
LLC, 486 F.Supp. 2d 1144, 1151-52 (D. Haw. 2007).  See also 
Thomas J. Shoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 5-10 at 439-
40 (5th ed. 2012) (indicating that punitive damages are 
allowable under § 905(b)). 
The majority points to the last sentence of § 905(b) as 
the basis for concluding that punitive damages are precluded 
under this subsection as a matter of law.  Without dispute, the 
last sentence of § 905(b) does limit a covered worker's 
"remedy" against a shipowner to a negligence action.  That 
sentence expressly states: "The remedy provided in this 
subsection [a negligence action] shall be exclusive of all 
other remedies against the vessel except remedies available 
under this Act."  But that language does not limit in any way 
the damages that the covered worker may seek when bringing his 
negligence tort action against the shipowner.  A statutory 
"restriction on the remedies available" to an injured party is 
not a restriction on "damages."  Kosar v. Chesapeake and Ohio 
Rwy. Co., 449 F.2d 1238, 1240 (6th Cir. 1971).  "There is an 
 
36 
important distinction between a 'remedy' which Bouvier's Law 
Dictionary defines as 'the means employed to enforce a right or 
redress an injury,' and 'damages' which are defined as 'the 
indemnity recoverable by a person who has sustained an injury 
. . . and the term includes not only compensatory, but also 
exemplary or punitive or vindictive . . . damages.' "  Id.  It 
is thus a "misuse of the legal terminology" to refer to 
punitive damages as a remedy or right of action.  Id. 
 
Section 905(b) does not contain language that should be 
construed as an explicit departure from the common law 
tradition of allowing a party to pursue punitive damages in a 
maritime claim; and the legislative history, in fact, indicates 
that courts are to continue to adhere to the common law of 
torts in adjudicating such claims under § 905(b).  I would 
accordingly allow Minton to seek punitive damages upon the 
remand of this case for further proceedings if he be so 
advised.