Title: State v. Childress

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

NO. COA13-449 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 5 November 2013 
 
 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Stanly County 
No. 12 CRS 1763 
JAMES PHILLIPS 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by defendant from order entered 5 December 2012 by 
Judge Theodore S. Royster, Jr., in Stanly County Superior Court.  
Heard in the Court of Appeals 26 September 2013. 
 
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General 
Kathleen N. Bolton, for the State. 
 
Arnold & Smith, PLLC, by Matthew R. Arnold and J. Bradley 
Smith, for defendant-appellant. 
 
 
BRYANT, Judge. 
 
 
Where the trial court failed to indicate in its criminal 
contempt order that the standard of proof applied in making its 
findings of fact was proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the order is 
fatally deficient.  Accordingly, we must reverse. 
During the Criminal Session of Superior Court in Stanly County 
commencing 16 July 2012, defendant James A. Phillips, Jr. – an 
attorney, appeared before the Honorable Sharon Tracey Barrett, 
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Judge presiding, for an unscheduled matter at the request of 
Assistant District Attorney Robyn Singletary.  The assistant 
district attorney brought to the Superior Court’s attention a 
matter involving a 9 July 2012 district court order entered 
pursuant to an ex parte motion made by Phillips.  The 9 July 2012 
district court order was for the disposition of physical evidence 
held by the Stanly County Sheriff’s Department.  The order was 
entered following the dismissal of a civil action filed pursuant 
to Chapter 50B but prior to the conclusion of a related criminal 
action against Phillip’s client – the defendant in both the civil 
and criminal actions. 
In open court on 19 July, Phillips acknowledged that his 
client, Ryan Van McLain, had been charged with six criminal 
offenses and had been the defendant in the related civil action 
seeking a domestic violence protective order pursuant to Chapter 
50B.  Both criminal and civil matters were heard in Stanly County 
District Court.  The trial court dismissed the civil action.  
Thereafter, Phillips prepared an order for the disposition of 
physical evidence seeking the return of his client’s cell phone, 
which had been seized by law enforcement officers.  The order 
presented to and entered by Judge Redwing included both civil and 
criminal docket numbers.  Phillips acknowledged to Judge Barrett 
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that while the civil matter had been dismissed, the remaining 
criminal charge – trespassing – was pending on appeal.  Phillips 
also acknowledged that prior to submitting the proposed order to 
Judge Redwing, he had no contact with the plaintiff in the civil 
action or the district attorney’s office prosecuting the criminal 
charges.  The assistant district attorney argued before Judge 
Barrett to stay or set aside the 9 July 2012 district court order 
on the grounds that the cell phone had been seized by law 
enforcement officers during the investigation of the pending 
criminal matter. 
On 19 July 2012, Judge Barrett issued an order to stay the 
disposition of physical evidence and ordered that Phillip’s 
client’s cell phone be retained pending trial.  Judge Barrett also 
ordered Phillips, both individually and as attorney for the 
defense, to later appear before the Stanly County Superior Court 
and show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court 
for preparing and submitting an order ex parte which was thereafter 
entered by the district court. 
On 5 December 2012, following a show cause hearing before the 
Honorable Theodore S. Royster, Jr., Judge presiding, the trial 
court entered an order in which it concluded that Phillips “[was] 
in contempt of court through gross negligence and subject to the 
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contempt sanctions of this Court” and decreed that Phillips was 
“hereby publicly CENSURED” and “fined $500.00.”  The trial court 
made the following findings of fact: 
2. 
[Phillips] attempted to obtain ex parte 
an order returning seized property in a 
pending criminal matter in violation of 
both the law and ethics. 
 
3. 
In spite of the fact that [Phillips] used 
a civil docket number on the order, 
[Phillips] knew of the pending criminal 
case and intentionally tried to obtain 
the signing of the said order through 
subterfuge. 
 
. . . 
 
5. 
[Phillips] violated G. S. 15-11.1 by not 
contacting the District Attorney and / or 
by not filing a motion for return of 
seized property and having a hearing (See 
also State v. Hill, 153 NCApp 718 (2002)) 
[sic]. 
 
6. 
Criminal contempt is necessary in this 
case in order to be administered as 
punishment for acts already committed 
that have impeded the administration of 
justice. 
 
7. 
The actions of Defendant have impeded the 
administration 
of 
justice 
and 
have 
brought the court system into disrepute. 
 
8. 
The defendant has violated his ethical 
duties as an attorney-at-law and as an 
officer of this Court 
 
9. 
Pursuant to Chapter 5A of the N. C. 
General Statutes, the Court has the 
following criminal contempt punishment 
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available: censure, Imprisonment up to 30 
days and/or a fine of up to $500.00 (or 
any 
combination 
of 
the 
three); 
in 
addition, the Court has the inherent 
power of disbarment. 
 
Phillips appeals. 
_____________________________________ 
 
On appeal, Phillips raises the following issues: whether the 
trial court (I) failed to apply the correct standard to its 
findings of fact; (II) lacked subject matter jurisdiction and 
personal jurisdiction; (III) erred as a matter of law in finding 
Phillips guilty of indirect criminal contempt; and (IV) violated 
Phillips’ Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. 
I 
Phillips first argues that the trial court’s 5 December 2012 
order concluding he was in contempt of court failed to apply the 
standard of proof “beyond a reasonable doubt” when making its 
findings of fact, as required by General Statutes, section 5A-
15(f).  For this reason, Phillips contends that the trial court’s 
order should be reversed.  We agree. 
 
This Court has previously held a trial court’s failure to 
state the standard of proof for findings of fact in a criminal 
contempt order to be a fatal deficiency.  See In re Contempt 
Proceedings Against Cogdell, 183 N.C. App. 286, 644 S.E.2d 261 
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(2007).  The defendant attorney in Cogdell was found guilty of 
criminal contempt following a summary proceeding when, as counsel 
for the defense in a criminal action, defendant attorney questioned 
two State witnesses regarding whether a polygraph test had been 
administered to a witness for the State.  The trial court entered 
a contempt order finding Cogdell in direct criminal contempt.  On 
appeal, this Court stated that the requirements of General 
Statutes, section 5A-14(b), governing summary proceedings for 
direct criminal contempt, included that a trial court “must find 
facts supporting the summary imposition of measures in response to 
contempt[, and] [t]he facts must be established beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”  Id. at 289, 644 S.E.2d 263 (emphasis suppressed).  
Applying the statutory requirements to the trial court order, the 
Cogdell Court held the contempt order fatally deficient where “the 
trial court's order failed to indicate that he applied the beyond 
a reasonable doubt standard to his findings as required by N.C.G.S. 
§ 5A–14(b).”  Id. at 290, 644 S.E.2d at 264.  In reaching its 
conclusion, this Court also acknowledged its holdings in State v. 
Ford, 164 N.C. App. 566, 596 S.E.2d 846 (2004) (contempt orders 
were fatally deficient where the lower court failed to indicate in 
its findings that the standard of proof of beyond a reasonable 
doubt was applied), and State v. Verbal, 41 N.C. App. 306, 254 
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S.E.2d 794 (1979) (reversing a trial court order holding attorney 
in criminal contempt where “we find implicit in the statute the 
requirement that the judicial official's findings should indicate 
that [the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’] standard was applied to his 
findings of fact”). 
 
In the matter currently before us, the trial court’s 5 
December 2012 order does not specify whether Phillips was found 
guilty of direct or indirect criminal contempt; however, the order 
does not support a conclusion of direct criminal contempt. 
(a) Criminal contempt is direct criminal 
contempt when the act: 
(1) Is committed within the sight or 
hearing of a presiding judicial official; 
and 
(2) Is committed in, or in immediate 
proximity to, the room where proceedings 
are being held before the court; and 
(3) Is likely to interrupt or interfere 
with matters then before the court. 
 
N.C. Gen. Stat. ' 5A-13(a) (2011).  The 5 December order does not 
contain any finding satisfying a requisite for direct criminal 
contempt.  “Any criminal contempt other than direct criminal 
contempt is indirect criminal contempt and is punishable only after 
proceedings in accordance with the procedure required by G.S. 5A-
15.”  N.C.G.S. ' 5A-13(b).  In accordance, we review the trial 
court’s 5 December 2012 order to determine whether Phillips was 
convicted of indirect criminal contempt pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 
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' 5A-15 and look to the procedure required therein for such 
convictions. 
Pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes, section 5A-15, 
[w]hen a judicial official chooses not to 
proceed summarily against a person charged 
with direct criminal contempt or when he may 
not proceed summarily, he may proceed by an 
order directing the person to appear before a 
judge at a reasonable time specified in the 
order and show cause why he should not be held 
in contempt of court. 
 
N.C. Gen. Stat. ' 5A-15(a) (2011).  “At the conclusion of the 
hearing, the judge must enter a finding of guilty or not guilty. 
If the person is found to be in contempt, the judge must make 
findings of fact and enter judgment. The facts must be established 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  N.C.G.S. ' 5A-15(f). 
 
In the instant case, the trial court made numerous findings 
of fact regarding defendant’s inexcusable and unacceptable 
behavior.  However, none of the trial court’s findings indicate 
that the trial court used “beyond a reasonable doubt” as the 
standard of proof, nor was there a finding of guilt.  On the 
contrary, the trial court concluded that defendant “is in contempt 
of Court through gross negligence and subject to the contempt 
sanctions of this Court.”  In accordance with Cogdell, supra, the 
trial court’s failure to indicate that he applied “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” as the standard of proof in finding facts, as 
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required by N.C.G.S. § 5A–15(f), renders the contempt order fatally 
deficient.  Accordingly, we must reverse. 
 
Because we find this matter dispositive of the appeal, we do 
not reach the remaining issues. 
 
Reversed. 
Judges McGEE and HUNTER, Robert C., concur.