Title: Remmick v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

HAILEY JACOBSEN REMMICK v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2012 WY 57Case Number: S-11-0015Decided: 04/11/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.  
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2012
 
HAILEY JACOBSEN 
REMMICK,
 
Appellant
(Defendant),
 
v.
 
THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,
 
Appellee
(Plaintiff).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County
The 
Honorable Dan R. Price, II, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Diane M. Lozano, 
State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Appellate Counsel; Eric M. Alden, Senior 
Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Mr. Alden.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Bruce Salzburg, 
Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Meri V. Geringer, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. 
Geringer.
 
Before KITE, C.J., 
and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]        
Appellant, Hailey 
Jacobsen Remmick, challenges her conviction of six counts of receiving stolen 
property and one charge of conspiracy to commit larceny by a bailee.  Ms. Remmick claims that 
pre-charging delay deprived her of due process of law and that there was 
insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict.  We affirm.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]        
Ms. Remmick presents 
two issues:
 
1.    
Was Appellant denied 
due process of law by pre-charging delay?
 
2.    
Was the jury verdict 
supported by sufficient evidence?
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]        
The charges against 
Ms. Remmick stemmed from actions taken by her mother, Julie Jacobsen, during 
2002 and 2003.  At that time, Ms. 
Jacobsen owned Better Bookkeeping and Accounting, which had a contract to 
perform bookkeeping duties for Fox Park Homeowners Association and Fox Park 
Service and Improvement District (Fox Park).  The Fox Park entities were the governing 
and operating bodies of a trailer park subdivision in Gillette, Wyoming, and 
were overseen by a common Board of Directors (Board).  
 
[¶4]        
As part of her 
duties, Ms. Jacobsen managed two bank accounts authorized by the Board, the 
money market account and the operating account.  Money from tax assessments, state 
grants, and bank loans, as well as money earmarked for special improvements, was 
kept in the money market account.  When payments from this account were 
authorized by the Board, Ms. Jacobsen filled out checks on this account and 
presented them for Board members’ signatures.  Two Board members’ signatures were 
required on each check.
 
[¶5]        
On June 15, 2002, Ms. 
Jacobsen wrote a $3,000.00 check from the money market account to Ms. 
Remmick.  The check on its face read 
“Fox Park” and bore the forged signatures of two Board members.  Ms. Remmick accepted and endorsed the 
check.  This check was the basis for 
Count I of the Information filed against Ms. Remmick.
 
[¶6]        
The operating account 
was funded through monthly dues paid by the Fox Park residents.  This account was used to pay normal 
day-to-day operating expenses.  Checks written on this account also had 
to bear the signatures of two Board members.  When Ms. Jacobsen received Fox 
Park’s bills at her business address, she filled out checks and presented them 
for Board members’ signatures.
 
[¶7]        
On April 15, 2003, 
Ms. Jacobsen presented a check to her bank for $3,000.00, which she had written 
on the Fox Park operating account and made out to her business, Better 
Bookkeeping and Accounting.  It bore 
the forged signatures of two Board members.  Ms. Jacobsen kept $200.00 in cash and 
deposited the remaining $2,800.00 in her personal checking account.1  That deposit increased her personal 
account balance from $334.23 to $3,134.23.  On that same date, she wrote a $1,200.00 
check to Ms. Remmick from that account.  This check formed the basis for Count VII 
of the Information.  

 
[¶8]        
Ms. Jacobsen also 
managed a third account, ostensibly in Fox Park’s name.  This account had not been authorized by 
the Board, and its members were unaware of its existence until law enforcement 
began investigating Ms. Jacobsen.  Ms. Jacobsen was the only signatory 
on the unauthorized account, and she made various transfers of money from the 
Fox Park operating and money market accounts into this account.  The checks for this account bore the name 
“Fox Park District.”
 
[¶9]        
Ms. Jacobsen wrote 
four checks to Ms. Remmick from the unauthorized account: one on June 15, 
2002, for $3,000.00 (Count II); one on January 21, 2003, for $1,200.00 
(Count III); one on June 17, 2003, for $1,000.00 (Count IV); and one on 
November 4, 2002, for $300.00 (Count V).  Each of the checks showed the name “Fox 
Park District” on the face of the check.  
Ms. Remmick endorsed the checks.
 
[¶10]     
On December 6, 2002, 
Ms. Jacobsen wrote a check for $2,600.00 to her business, Better Bookkeeping, 
from the unauthorized account.  She 
deposited the check in her personal bank account, increasing her ledger balance 
from $1,714.50 to $4,314.50.  This 
same day, she wrote a $2,000.00 check to Ms. Remmick from her personal account. 
 Ms. Remmick endorsed that 
check.  This check formed the basis 
for Count VI of the Information. 
 
[¶11]     
In addition, on 
January 28, 2003, Ms. Jacobsen opened a $1,000.00 line of credit in Fox Park’s 
name at Checker Auto Parts.  She did 
so without authorization from the Board.  
The list of authorized users of this account included Ms. Jacobsen, 
Ms. Remmick, Ms. Remmick’s sister, and a friend.  Ms. Remmick later used this charge 
account, charging $65.39 worth of items and signing her name to the sales 
receipt.  The receipt identified the 
charge account holder as Fox Park.  
This transaction served, in part, as evidence of the conspiracy alleged 
in Count V against Ms. Remmick.2
 
[¶12]     
Campbell 
County law enforcement began investigating Ms. Jacobsen in late 2003, and 
eventually notified federal investigators and prosecutors of the results of 
their investigation.  A federal 
grand jury indicted Ms. Jacobsen on July 13, 2005 on tax evasion charges, 
to which she pled guilty.  The 
federal court sentenced her on August 25, 2006, to serve a period of 
incarceration of eighteen months, followed by three years of supervised 
probation.  At the request of the 
U.S. Attorney’s Office, the Campbell County Attorney’s Office deferred 
prosecuting Ms. Jacobsen during the pendency of the federal case.  Three months after Ms. Jacobsen was 
released from federal custody, the Campbell County Attorney’s Office filed 
charges of forgery and larceny against her.  On October 23, 2009, the jury returned 
guilty verdicts on all ten counts that had been brought against Ms. 
Jacobsen.  She was not present in 
court when the verdict was received, however, apparently because she had 
absconded from the jurisdiction.  

 
[¶13]     
Although the 
prosecution of Ms. Remmick stemmed from events that occurred between June, 2002 
and June, 2003, the charges against her were not brought until October 28, 2009, 
after Ms. Jacobsen had been found guilty.  
On March 3, 2010, Ms. Remmick filed a Motion to Dismiss for 
Prearrest Delay as a Denial of Due Process.  Her contention was that, because the 
State had delayed her prosecution until after her mother had left the 
jurisdiction, her mother was no longer available to assist her in preparing a 
defense.  After a hearing, the 
district court denied the motion.  
Trial was originally scheduled for May, 2010.  Ms. Remmick, however, filed a motion for 
continuance seeking additional time to prepare for trial. She also filed a 
Waiver of Speedy Trial.  The motion 
was granted and trial was held in August, 2010.  After a two-day trial, the jury found 
Ms. Remmick guilty on all counts.
 
[¶14]     
The court imposed 
terms of imprisonment of four to nine years on each count, to be served 
concurrently with one another and consecutively to one imposed in a separate 
criminal case.  The court suspended 
the period of imprisonment in favor of nine years of supervised probation.  Ms. Remmick filed this timely 
appeal.
 
DISCUSSION
 
Pre-Charging 
Delay
 
[¶15]     
In her first issue, 
Ms. Remmick claims that the delay in bringing charges against her resulted in an 
infringement of her due process rights.  
Because this is a claim involving constitutional rights, our review of 
the district court’s decision is de 
novo.  Bush v. State, 2008 WY 108, ¶ 72, 
193 P.3d 203, 221 (Wyo. 2008).
 
[¶16]     
In 
order to prevail on her claim, Ms. Remmick bears the burden of proving both “an 
intentional delay by the state to gain a tactical advantage over the accused and 
actual prejudice resulting from that delay.”  Id., ¶ 73, 193 P.3d  at 221; Vernier v. State, 909 P.2d 1344, 1348 
(Wyo. 1996).  As we previously 
explained: 
 
Wyoming 
has no statute of limitations for criminal offenses, and prosecution for such 
offenses may be commenced at any time during the life of the offender.  Story v. State, 721 P.2d 1020, 1026, 65 
A.L.R.4th 1011 (Wyo. 1986).  However, when a delay in bringing charges 
results in prejudice to a defendant, due process considerations may arise.  Id. at 1027; United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 
789, 97 S. Ct. 2044, 2048, 52 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1977).  In order to require dismissal of a 
charge, it is necessary that a preindictment delay cause “substantial prejudice 
to [appellant’s] rights to a fair trial and that the delay was an intentional 
device to gain tactical advantage over the accused.”  Story, 721 P.2d  at 1027, quoting from United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 
324, 92 S. Ct. 455, 465, 30 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1971).
 
Phillips 
v. State, 
835 P.2d 1062, 1069 (Wyo. 1992).
 
[¶17]     
To show prejudice, an 
appellant must demonstrate “the loss of a witness, exhibit or other evidence, 
the presence of which would probably bring a different result.”  Id., 835 P.2d  at 1069.  We have made it clear that only “actual 
prejudice, not possible prejudice,” will suffice to establish that a delay in 
prosecution resulted in a due process violation.  Ms. Remmick has failed to satisfy that 
burden. 
 
[¶18]     
Ms. Remmick bases her 
claim of prejudice on the fact that Ms. Jacobsen was not available to help 
Ms. Remmick prepare for trial.  She 
argues that Ms. Jacobsen’s participation was crucial because of her knowledge of 
the documents and transactions on which the charges were based.  She also bases her claim on the fact 
that Ms. Jacobsen was unavailable to testify in Ms. Remmick’s defense.  
 
[¶19]     
We note initially 
that Ms. Remmick filed her motion to dismiss on March 3, 2010.  After the motion was denied, Ms. Remmick 
requested and received a continuance, allowing her additional time to prepare 
for trial.  Trial was not held until 
late August, 2010.  She did not, and 
does not, claim that she needed additional time to prepare for trial in light of 
Ms. Jacobsen’s absence.  
Although the State conceded that it did not know Ms. Jacobsen’s 
whereabouts, Ms. Remmick never stated in her motion or at the hearing that she 
was unable to contact Ms. Jacobsen.  
In fact, there are indications that some family members were in contact 
with Ms. Jacobsen.  During the 
motion hearing, the prosecution advised the court:  “For the court’s information Pete 
Deliramich, her husband, now ex-husband, was interviewed shortly after Ms. 
Jacobsen fled and admitted that he was in telephonic contact with her and 
declined to assist law enforcement in trying to track her down.”  Ms. Remmick never advised the court of 
any attempts she made to locate Ms. Jacobsen, and never sought a continuance for 
the purpose of trying to locate her mother and obtain her testimony or 
assistance in preparing her defense.
 
[¶20]     
Additionally, Ms. 
Remmick has not established that Ms. Jacobsen would have testified if 
available.  We note that Ms. 
Jacobsen did not testify at her own trial, and had not yet been sentenced in 
that case.  Further, Ms. Remmick 
does not specify how Ms. Jacobsen’s testimony would have led to a different 
result in this case.  
Ms. Remmick has failed to identify any document, potential 
testimony, or other evidence of any kind that Ms. Jacobsen could have 
offered in her daughter’s defense.  
Because Ms. Remmick has offered no more than speculation that 
Ms. Jacobsen’s participation would have brought about a different result, 
we are not convinced that Ms. Remmick suffered any actual prejudice due to Ms. 
Jacobsen’s absence.
 
[¶21]     
 More significant, however, is Ms. 
Remmick’s failure to prove that 
the State’s delay in prosecuting her was an intentional effort to gain a 
tactical advantage over her.  During 
the hearing, Ms. Remmick’s defense counsel conceded that she could not “show 
what the prosecutor’s motive was” or prove any “malevolent motive” on the part 
of the prosecution.  On appeal, she 
asserts that the timing of the charges itself implies an improper motive.  She points to “the precipitous filing of 
charges against [her] days after [her] mother absconded” and argues that “[t]his 
timing smacks of vicarious retaliation against mother.”
 
[¶22]     
The 
prosecution, however, provided the district court with an alternative 
explanation for the delay in prosecuting Ms. Remmick.  As set forth 
previously, the Campbell County Attorney’s office deferred its prosecution of 
Ms. Jacobsen while the federal case was pending.  State charges against Ms. Jacobsen 
were brought three months after she was released from federal custody.  According to the State, it 
chose to prosecute Ms. Jacobsen before Ms. Remmick in order “to 
establish that there was indeed a case upon which to rest subsequent 
prosecutions, if any.”  Once 
Ms. Jacobsen was found guilty on all charges, the prosecution proceeded 
promptly against Ms. Remmick.  

 
[¶23]     
In 
addition, after Ms. Jacobsen did not appear in court for the jury’s verdict, 
law 
enforcement executed a warrant to search her house, and found 
additional evidence that apparently assisted in the prosecution of Ms. 
Remmick.  Charges were filed against 
Ms. Remmick the day after this search warrant was executed.  There 
is no indication that the delay in bringing charges was motivated by an 
intentional effort to gain tactical advantage over Ms. Remmick.  Accordingly, we conclude that the 
district court did not err in denying Ms. Remmick’s motion to dismiss the 
charges.
 
Sufficiency of the 
Evidence
 
[¶24]     
As her second issue, 
Ms. Remmick asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s 
guilty verdict on any of the charges.
 
When 
reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim in a criminal case, we must 
determine whether a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of 
the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  We do not consider conflicting evidence 
presented by the unsuccessful party, and afford every favorable inference which 
may be reasonably and fairly drawn from the successful party’s evidence.  We have consistently held that it is the 
jury’s responsibility to resolve conflicts in the evidence.  We will not substitute our judgment for 
that of the jury [and] our only duty is to determine whether a quorum of 
reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, have come to the same 
result as the jury actually did.
 
Breazeale 
v. State, 
2011 WY 10, ¶ 13, 245 P.3d 834, 839 (Wyo. 2011), quoting Masias v. State, 2010 WY 81, ¶ 8, 233 P.3d 944, 947 (Wyo. 2010).
 
[¶25]     
Ms. Remmick was 
convicted of six counts of receiving stolen property.  At the time of the incidents giving rise 
to her prosecution, the applicable statute provided:
 
(a) A person who 
buys, receives, conceals or disposes of property which he knows, believes or has 
reasonable cause to believe was obtained in violation of law is guilty of:  (i) A felony punishable by 
imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of not more than ten 
thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both, if the value of the property is five 
hundred dollars ($500.00) or more[.]
 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-3-403(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2003).3  Ms. Remmick concedes that the evidence 
was sufficient to prove that Ms. Jacobsen obtained money from Fox Park in 
violation of law, and that Ms. Jacobsen transferred some of that money to 
Ms. Remmick.  She contends, 
however, that there was insufficient evidence that she knew, believed, or had 
reasonable cause to believe that the money she received from her mother was 
obtained illegally.
 
[¶26]     
Ms. Remmick is 
correct that there was no direct evidence of her actual or imputed 
knowledge.  However, we have 
previously observed that 
 
proof of guilty 
knowledge, like proof of intent, is rarely capable of establishment by direct 
evidence, [and, therefore] circumstantial evidence – independent facts from 
which an inference of the ultimate fact to be established may rationally be 
drawn in light of common experience – most often is the only manner of proof 
available.
 
Russell v. 
State, 583 P.2d 690, 700 
(Wyo. 1978).  Accordingly, “Guilty 
knowledge may be established by direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or by 
both types of evidence.”  Tageant 
v. State, 
673 P.2d 651, 654 (Wyo. 1983).
 
[¶27]     
There was evidence 
that Ms. Remmick received money from Fox Park bank accounts when there was no 
reason for Fox Park to pay her any money.  
Ms. Remmick had never been employed by Fox Park, and there was no 
evidence that she had ever furnished goods or services to Fox Park.  Yet five of the checks Ms. Remmick 
received were written on Fox Park bank accounts.  The fact that Ms. Remmick received 
illegally obtained money that she had no reason to receive was sufficient to 
allow the jury to infer that she had reason to believe that the money was 
obtained in violation of law.  

 
[¶28]     
Two of the checks 
Ms. Remmick received were written on her mother’s personal account.  The timing and amounts of these two 
checks corresponded closely with deposits into that account of money 
Ms. Jacobsen had obtained illegally from Fox Park.  For example, on December 6, 2002, 
Ms. Jacobsen wrote a check for $2,600.00 from the unauthorized Fox Park account 
to her accounting business.  She 
deposited that check in her personal account, raising the balance from $1,714.50 
to $4,314.50.  That same day, she 
wrote a check from her personal account to Ms. Remmick for $2,000.00.  As the prosecution pointed out, this 
check would have been returned for insufficient funds if Ms. Jacobsen had 
not made the deposit of the money obtained from Fox Park.  The prosecution also presented evidence 
that Ms. Remmick was an authorized signatory on Ms. Jacobsen’s personal bank 
account, that she had written a check to herself from that account, and that she 
had deposited a check into that account.  Based on this evidence, the prosecution 
contended that Ms. Remmick had some knowledge of the deposits into and 
debits from Ms. Jacobsen’s personal bank account, and in turn, some knowledge of 
the illegal source of those funds.  
The State admits that this evidence is not a “smoking gun” that, by 
itself, establishes Ms. Remmick’s guilt.  However, it forms a sufficient basis 
from which a jury could reasonably infer that Ms. Remmick knew or had 
reason to believe that the money she received from her mother had been obtained 
in violation of law.  We conclude 
that the evidence was sufficient to support her convictions on the charges of 
receiving stolen property.
 
[¶29]     
Ms. Remmick was also 
convicted on one count of conspiracy to commit larceny by a bailee.  The statute governing conspiracy 
provides that “A person is guilty of conspiracy to commit a crime if he agrees 
with one (1) or more persons that they or one (1) or more of them will commit a 
crime and one (1) or more of them does an overt act to effect the objective of 
the agreement.”  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-1-303(a).  Ms. Remmick 
admits that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Ms. Jacobsen 
had done overt acts to effect larceny by a bailee, and that some of the money 
illegally obtained was given to Ms. Remmick.  She contends, though, that there was a 
complete lack of evidence that she had entered into any agreement with her 
mother to commit any crime.
 
[¶30]     
For a conspiracy 
conviction to be sustained, “the evidence must show beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the parties to the conspiracy voluntarily agreed to commit an 
offense.”  Martinez v. State, 943 P.2d 1178, 1183 
(Wyo. 1997).  
 
In Smith v. State, 902 P.2d 1271 (Wyo. 
1995), we considered what type of agreement was necessary for a conspiracy to 
exist.
 
“One might suppose 
that the agreement necessary for conspiracy is essentially like the 
agreement or 'meeting of the minds’ which is critical to a contract, but this is 
not the case.  Although there 
continues to exist some uncertainty as to the precise meaning of the word in the 
context of conspiracy, it is clear that the definition in this setting is 
somewhat more lax than elsewhere.  A 
mere tacit understanding will suffice, and there need not be any written 
statement or even a speaking of words which expressly communicates agreement. . 
. .
 
Because most 
conspiracies are clandestine in nature, the prosec[u]tion is seldom able to 
present direct evidence of the agreement.  Courts have been sympathetic to this 
problem, and it is thus well established that the prosecution may 'rely on 
inferences drawn from the course of conduct of the alleged conspirators.’”  
 
902 P.2d  at 1281-82 
(quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW at 460-61 
(1972)).
 
Martinez, 943 P.2d  at 
1183.
 
[¶31]     
The conspiracy charge 
considered by the jury in Count V alleged that Ms. Remmick and her mother 
had conspired, over a period of time from June 15, 2002 to June 26, 
2003, to commit the crime of larceny by bailee against Fox Park.  This time period began with the date of 
the first check Ms. Remmick had received from the Fox Park account, the check 
that formed the basis of Count I against Ms. Remmick.  It included the dates of the other 
checks that formed the bases for Counts II, III, IV, VI, and VII against Ms. 
Remmick.  It ended on the date that 
the State alleged Ms. Remmick had used the unauthorized Fox Park charge account 
that her mother had opened at the auto parts store.  The evidence relating to the conspiracy 
charge included all of the evidence relating to the remaining six 
counts.
 
[¶32]     
In addition, evidence 
was presented in Ms. Remmick’s trial that her mother opened a charge account in 
Fox Park’s name at an auto parts store, and included Ms. Remmick as a 
signatory on the account.  The 
account was not authorized by the Fox Park Board, and two of the directors 
testified that they were not aware of its existence.  Not only was Ms. Remmick aware of 
the unauthorized charge account, but further, she used it.  It is reasonable to infer that she could 
not have done so without an agreement with her mother, at least the tacit sort 
of agreement necessary to sustain a conspiracy charge.  When we afford to the State the 
favorable inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence, we conclude 
that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that there was an 
agreement between Ms. Remmick and Ms. Jacobsen, and on that basis to 
convict Ms. Remmick of conspiracy to commit larceny by a 
bailee.
 
[¶33]     
Affirmed.
 
 
FOOTNOTES
1Although this is 
referred to as Ms. Jacobsen’s personal account, Ms. Remmick was also an 
authorized signatory on this account, and had also used the 
account.
2In 
the original information, the conspiracy charge (Count V) alleged a conspiracy 
to commit larceny by bailee extending from June 15, 2002 to June 18, 2003.  During trial, the prosecution amended 
the conspiracy charge to include the Checker Auto Parts 
transaction.
3The legislature 
amended this statute in 2004, raising the $500.00 property value threshold to 
$1,000.00.  2004 Wyo. Sess. Laws 
ch. 126, § 1.