Title: David Zink, Appellant, vs. State of Missouri, Respondent.

State: missouri

Issuer: Missouri Supreme Court

Document:

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
 
 
DAVID ZINK, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Appellant, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC88279 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
STATE OF MISSOURI,  
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Respondent.  
 
) 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ST. CLAIR COUNTY 
The Honorable William J. Roberts, Judge 
David Zink appeals the overruling of his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction 
relief from his conviction of first-degree murder and his sentence of death.  Because this 
case involves the death penalty, this Court has jurisdiction.  Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10.  
On appeal, Mr. Zink claims that the motion court erred in denying his multiple claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, in signing the attorney general's proposed findings, in 
violating his constitutional rights in giving penalty instructions, and in failing to find that 
Mr. Zink did not decide knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily to represent himself.  He 
also challenges the constitutional validity of lethal injection.  This Court affirms the 
motion court's judgment. 
 
2
I.  Factual and Procedural Background 
In the early morning hours of July 12, 2001, police responded to the report of a 
traffic accident near Stafford.  On their arrival, they found the victim's car abandoned 
with the keys in the ignition and the engine running, the headlights and hazard lights on, 
and the driver's window down.  Police found the victim's personal items in the vehicle, 
including her purse, credit card and medication.   
After the evening news broadcast the victim's disappearance, the owner of a motel 
near Camdenton recognized the victim's picture as the woman who checked into a room 
with Mr. Zink.  The motel owner provided the police with Mr. Zink's motel registration 
card, and, using this information, the police apprehended Mr. Zink at his home. 
After police showed him evidence that placed him near the scene of the abduction, 
Mr. Zink waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona,1 and confessed to killing and 
burying the victim.  He led police straight to the spot in a cemetery where he said he 
buried the victim's body, and the police discovered the body positioned just as Mr. Zink 
had described.  Pathologists found that the victim's neck was broken, she sustained 
injuries consistent with strangulation and being tied up, and she had eight broken ribs and 
between 50 and 100 blunt force injuries.  Semen found in the victim's anus matched Mr. 
Zink's DNA, hair samples taken from Mr. Zink's truck matched the victim's hair, and 
paint left on the victim's car from the accident matched paint from Mr. Zink's truck. 
In two videotaped confessions, Mr. Zink described the murder in detail.  He said  
                                             
 
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 
3
that he rear-ended the victim's car on an exit ramp.  In one confession, Mr. Zink told 
police that the victim voluntarily left the accident scene with him in his truck but later 
threatened to call police if he did not return her to her vehicle.  In another confession, he 
said that he gave the victim no choice but to get in his truck, but that she willingly went 
with him after she was in the truck.   
After he drove the victim around in his truck, they stayed for a short time at the 
motel near Camdenton.  Mr. Zink then decided to kill the victim because he was worried 
he would go back to prison if she called the police.  He took her to the cemetery and tied 
her to a tree.  He told her to look-up, and then he broke her neck.  He strangled her with 
his hands, and then with a rope, and stuffed her mouth with mud and leaves.  He looked 
for a spot to bury her and then dragged her body to that spot with the rope.  Because he 
was worried that she might revive, he stated that he stabbed the back of her neck with a 
knife to cut her spinal cord.  He then covered the body with leaves, went home to get a 
shovel, and came back to the cemetery and covered the body with dirt. 
The state charged Mr. Zink with first-degree murder.  Mr. Zink waived his right to 
counsel and asserted a voluntary manslaughter defense at trial, but he also allowed 
standby counsel from the public defender's office to present a diminished capacity 
defense.  The jury found Mr. Zink guilty of first-degree murder.   
Counsel from the public defender's office represented Mr. Zink in the penalty 
phase.  The jury found the presence of three statutory aggravators to support its 
unanimous recommendation for a death sentence:  (1) that Mr. Zink had two prior 
convictions for aggravated rape; (2) that the murder was committed for the purpose of 
 
4
avoiding a lawful arrest; and (3) that the murder involved depravity of the mind and was 
outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman.  The trial court sentenced Mr. 
Zink to death.  On appeal, this Court affirmed.  State v. Zink, 181 S.W.3d 66 (Mo. banc 
2005).   
Mr. Zink subsequently filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief under Rule 
29.15, which Mr. Zink's counsel later amended to present additional claims.  The state 
filed a motion to dismiss certain claims without an evidentiary hearing, which the motion 
court granted.  The motion court then conducted a five-day evidentiary hearing on Mr. 
Zink's remaining claims.  The motion court denied all claims.  Mr. Zink now appeals.  
 
 II.  Standard of Review 
 
In reviewing the overruling of a motion for post-conviction relief, the motion 
court's findings are presumed correct.  Worthington v. State, 166 S.W.3d 566, 572 (Mo. 
banc 2005).  A motion court's judgment will be overturned only when either its findings 
of fact or its conclusions of law are clearly erroneous.  Rule 29.15(k); Worthington, 166 
S.W.3d at 572.   To overturn, the ruling must leave the appellate court with a "definite 
and firm impression that a mistake has been made."  Id. 
 
To be entitled to post-conviction relief for ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
movant must satisfy a two-prong test.  First, the movant must show that his counsel failed 
to exercise the level of skill and diligence that a reasonably competent counsel would 
exercise in a similar situation.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  
Second, the movant must show that trial counsel's failure prejudiced the defendant.  Id.  
Both of these prongs must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence in order to 
 
5
prove ineffective assistance of counsel.  Anderson v. State, 196 S.W.3d 28, 33 (Mo. banc 
2006). 
 
Mr. Zink must overcome a strong presumption that counsel's conduct was 
reasonable and effective to meet the first prong of the Strickland test.  Id.  To overcome 
this presumption, Mr. Zink must point to "specific acts or omissions of counsel that, in 
light of all the circumstances, fell outside the wide range of professional competent 
assistance."  Id. 
 
Trial strategy decisions only may serve as a basis for ineffective counsel if they 
are unreasonable.  See id.  The choice of one reasonable trial strategy over another is not 
ineffective assistance.  Worthington, 166 S.W.3d at 573.  "[S]trategic choices made after 
a thorough investigation of the law and the facts relevant to plausible opinions are 
virtually unchallengeable."  Anderson, 196 S.W.3d at 33 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
690). 
 
To satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, Mr. Zink must demonstrate 
that, absent the claimed errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would 
have been different.  Id. at 33-34.  Regarding a sentence of death, a defendant must show 
with reasonable probability that the jury, balancing all of the circumstances, would not 
have recommended the death penalty.  Id. at 34.    
III.  Issues on Appeal 
On appeal of the motion court's denial of post-conviction relief, Mr. Zink asserts 
multiple points of error, some of which include multiple subpoints.  His points are 
consolidated and reordered here for ease of understanding.  He asserts that the motion 
 
6
court erred in denying his claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to:  (1) 
obtain a positron emission tomography (PET) scan and present supporting testimony as 
to the PET scan's relevance; (2) challenge Mr. Zink's competency to stand trial; (3) object 
to the trial court's ruling that Mr. Zink must wear a shackling device under his clothing 
throughout the trial; (4) object to certain guilt and penalty phase closing arguments made 
by the state; (5) object to two individuals serving both as courtroom security and 
witnesses in the trial; and (6) object to an autopsy report as hearsay evidence in violation 
of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 
In addition to his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, Mr. Zink also 
asserts that:  (7) his self-representation was involuntary; (8) the motion court erred by 
simply signing the attorney general's proposed findings; (9) the penalty instructions given 
violated his constitutional rights and appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise 
the errors on appeal; and (10) the motion court erroneously denied discovery and a 
hearing on Missouri's method of lethal injection.   
 
In three separate points, Mr. Zink asserts that the trial court erred in denying him 
his right to counsel.  In those same points, Mr. Zink asserts that trial counsel was 
ineffective.  As claims of trial court error are not cognizable under Rule 29.15 and Rule 
29.15 is not a substitute for direct appeal, this Court will not consider Mr. Zink's 
allegations of trial court error and only will consider his assertions of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  Tisius v. State, 183 S.W.3d 207, 212 (Mo. banc 2006).2 
                                             
 
2 Claims of trial error may be considered in a Rule 29.15 motion if fundamental fairness 
requires and then only in rare and exceptional circumstances. Schneider v. State, 787 
 
7
1.  PET scan 
Mr. Zink first asserts that the motion court clearly erred in denying his claim that 
trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by (1) failing to obtain a PET 
scan of his brain and (2) failing to call Dr. David Preston to testify to its results.  He 
claims that the PET scan would have revealed to the jury that Mr. Zink has "organic 
anatomical physiological brain damage" and that the trial court should have presented Dr. 
William Logan's testimony that the brain damage was caused by a childhood fever.  This, 
Mr. Zink asserts, would have confirmed his mental disorders with "hard science" and 
would have shown that his mental illness is anatomically and physiologically based, not 
the result of volition.  As such, he asserts that the jury would have found that he acted 
with diminished capacity and found him not guilty of first-degree murder.  Alternatively, 
Mr. Zink argues that had this evidence been presented to the jury at the penalty phase of 
the trial, the jury would have voted to sentence him to life imprisonment instead of death. 
An investigator, a mitigation specialist and a psychologist recommended that Mr. 
Zink's attorneys arrange for Mr. Zink to undergo a PET scan prior to trial.  Ultimately, 
trial counsel decided not to conduct the PET scan because of time considerations and 
because of the number of other expert witnesses. 3 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
S.W.2d 718, 721 (Mo. banc 1990).  No rare and exceptional circumstances exist here to 
justify such a review. 
3 Multiple experts reviewed Mr. Zink's mental state.  While most of the experts that re-
viewed Mr. Zink agreed as to his diagnosis, there were certain illnesses diagnosed by 
some but not others.  The predominant finding throughout the various testimonies was 
that Mr. Zink suffered from a narcissistic personality disorder.  The findings were as fol-
lows:  Kenneth Benedict, Ph.D., determined that Mr. Zink suffered from an intermittent 
explosive disorder, predominantly the hyperactive-impulsive type; dysthymia; and a per-
 
8
In July 2006, Mr. Zink underwent a PET scan for purposes of his post-conviction 
proceeding.  According to Dr. Preston's testimony presented at the hearing on Mr. Zink's 
motion, the PET scan involved injecting Mr. Zink with the tracer fluorodeoxyglucose, a 
glucose-like radioactive compound.  The tracer compound localized in the most active 
areas of Mr. Zink's brain.  Mr. Zink's brain then was scanned, and the scans were 
processed into images indicating levels of activity in areas of Mr. Zink's brain. 
Dr. Preston reviewed the PET scan results and produced a report finding that Mr. 
Zink's brain had:  (1) excessive activity in his frontal lobe, the area involved with 
thinking, executive functions, planning behavior and brain activity; (2) asymmetry 
between the right and left frontal and parietal lobes; (3) lower activity in the cingulate 
gyrus, "a main communication between the frontal lobes and the rest of the brain;" and 
(4) an abnormality in the amygdala, a part of the brain involved in putting measures of 
risk to events and behavior. 
The motion court ruled that trial counsel's decision not to order the PET scan was 
reasonable and strategic in nature.  It found that trial counsel "decided not to expand the 
scope of the case in order to focus his resources on other issues, including the other 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
sonality disorder, mixed paranoid and narcissistic type.  Mr. Zink, according to his find-
ings, suffered from a history of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, oppositional defi-
ant disorder, alcohol abuse, cannabis dependence, and nicotine dependence.  Cynthia 
Brooks, Psy. D., a certified forensic examiner, found that Mr. Zink suffered from alcohol 
abuse, antisocial personality disorder and narcissistic personality disorder.  Robert Smith, 
Ph.D., diagnosed Mr. Zink with alcohol dependence and a narcissistic personality disor-
der.  David Preston, M.D., testified that Mr. Zink most likely suffered from an obsessive 
compulsive disorder.  William Logan, M.D., found that Mr. Zink possessed a personality 
disorder with narcissistic, paranoid, impulsive and antisocial features and that he also 
 
9
mental health experts, after being fully appraised of the possibilities that the PET scan 
could show."  Because trial counsel made the decision with full knowledge of the 
possible results and decided not to pursue it, the motion court ruled that the decision was 
strategic in nature and entitled to near-complete deference under Strickland.  The trial 
court has the "superior opportunity to determine the credibility of witnesses," and this 
Court defers to the trial court's factual findings and credibility determinations.  State v. 
Rousan, 961 S.W.2d 831, 845 (Mo. banc 1998).  As such, this Court accepts the trial 
court's findings as to trial counsel's knowledge and strategic decisions. 
a.  Guilt Phase 
Mr. Zink raised the issue of his personality disorders in the guilt phase to support a 
diminished capacity defense.  Section 552.015.2(8), RSMo 2000,4 allows a defendant to 
present evidence of a mental disease or defect to prove the defendant lacked a culpable 
mental state that is an element of the offense.  State v. Walkup, 220 S.W.3d 748, 754-55 
(Mo. banc 2007).  The element of deliberation, defined as "cool reflection for any length 
of time no matter how brief," is a mental state that distinguishes first- and second-degree 
murder.  Id. at 750-51; sections 565.002.3 and 565.020.1.  Had Mr. Zink's diminished 
capacity defense succeeded by showing that a mental disease or defect prevented him 
from deliberating at the time he murdered the victim, Mr. Zink could have been found 
guilty of second-degree murder instead of first-degree murder.  See id.  In this appeal, 
Mr. Zink claims that his trial counsel was ineffective by not ordering a PET scan of his 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
suffered from alcohol dependence.  Finally, David Hough, Ph.D., diagnosed Mr. Zink 
with narcissistic personality disorder and a paranoid personality disorder.     
 
10
brain, arguing the PET scan evidence would have strengthened his diminished capacity 
defense and negated the culpable mental state required for first-degree murder.     
With respect to the PET scan evidence, the motion court found that: 
 
The evidence about how the test was administered, and the general 
acceptance of the PET scan procedure in the medical community, was not 
contested and this Court accepts such as true.  This Court finds that Dr. 
Preston's testimony with regard to his interpretation of the scan, that there 
was an increase in frontal lobe activity and that there was a decrease in 
metabolism in the cingulate gyrus and the amygdale, was credible.  The 
Court also finds that Dr. Preston's testimony that he could not link these 
problems to any specific mental disease or defect, as well as the other 
doctors' testimony to this effect, was also credible. 
The Court finds that the various doctors' conclusions that Dr. 
Preston's findings corroborated their diagnoses of various personality 
disorders are not credible because there is no generally accepted scientific 
method or evidence that these specific defects were the cause of, or related 
to, any of [Mr.] Zink's mental problems.  In fact, this Court finds Dr. 
Preston's assertion in his report that [Mr.] Zink most likely suffered from 
obsessive-compulsive disorder, a finding not supported by any other expert 
testimony and not consistent with the diagnostic criteria for that disorder, 
telling as to the weakness of the experts' position.  None of the experts 
enunciated any credible scientific evidence that definitely linked the PET 
scan findings to [Mr.] Zink's mental condition.  The most that can be said is 
that the PET scan results were consistent with, but not definitively related 
to, [Mr.] Zink's diagnosed conditions.   
   
 
Because the PET scan results were, at most, consistent with Mr. Zink's diagnosed 
conditions and could not demonstrate any definite link to Mr. Zink's behavior at the time 
of the murder, the motion court held that Dr. Preston's testimony and report could not 
have aided Mr. Zink in establishing diminished capacity.  As such, the motion court ruled 
that the evidence would have been irrelevant and inadmissible, and counsel cannot be 
ineffective for failing to introduce inadmissible evidence in the guilt phase of trial.   
                                                                                                                                                 
 
4 All references are to RSMo 2000, unless otherwise indicated. 
 
11
 
In his argument, Mr. Zink does not refer to any evidence establishing a direct link 
between Dr. Preston's findings and his diminished capacity defense.  Instead, he 
references evidence that the PET scan results were consistent with the psychologists' 
mental disorder diagnoses – intermittent explosive disorder; personality disorder not 
otherwise specified with narcissistic, paranoid and compulsive features; and alcohol 
dependence.  Mr. Zink asserts, however, that psychology is a "soft" science, and 
psychologists' findings may be disparaged for not having the concrete verifiability of 
"hard" sciences.  He asserts that the state did so by eliciting from the psychologists that 
they possessed a Ph.D., not an M.D.  Mr. Zink argues that because Drs. Preston and 
Logan are medical doctors, their testimony would have offered "hard" scientific evidence 
to confirm the "soft" science diagnoses.  
 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to locate and 
call an expert witness, the movant must show that:  (1) such an expert witness existed at 
the time of trial; (2) the expert witness could be located through reasonable investigation; 
and (3) the expert witness's testimony would have benefited the defense.  State v. Davis, 
814 S.W.2d 593, 603-04 (Mo. banc 1991).  In this case, the first two conditions are 
satisfied.  In regard to the third condition, that the witness's testimony would have 
benefited the defense, Mr. Zink has failed to show there is generally accepted scientific 
evidence to link the PET scan results to any of Mr. Zink's diagnosed personality 
disorders.   
 
The PET scan results show differing levels of activity in certain portions of Mr. 
Zink's brain compared to normal brain activity, and Dr. Preston testified that these 
 
12
abnormalities can be associated with some behavioral traits.  Dr. Preston testified, 
however, that the PET scan neither would confirm nor deny personality disorders.  He 
stated that PET scans usually were not used to diagnose mental disorders and that he 
instead would defer to the psychiatrist or neurologist.  Dr. Logan, a psychiatrist, testified 
that there is no generally accepted scientific evidence as to what portions of the brain or 
brain deficits caused Mr. Zink's personality disorders because the research is not yet that 
advanced.  Dr. Logan would "consider" PET scan results in making a diagnosis but 
would not rely on them.  Further, Dr. Logan testified that narcissistic personality disorder 
and paranoid personality disorder originate in the person's childhood and social 
experiences.  Dr. Logan stated that "one of the frontiers of our knowledge is that we don't 
know what degree that personality styles are inherited or maybe even influenced by 
things like his meningitis that may have created some brain damage."  Likewise, both 
psychologists, Dr. Kenneth Benedict and Dr. Robert Smith, testified that there was no 
one-to-one correlation between PET scan results and Mr. Zink's personality disorders, 
only that the PET scan results could be related to certain patterns of behavior.   
The significance of the results of scientific procedures "may be admitted only if 
the procedure is sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the 
particular field in which it belongs."  State v. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d 313, 326 (Mo. banc 
1996) (internal quotations omitted).  The results of PET scans for determining personality 
disorders or mental disorders has not gained general acceptance in the field of 
psychology.  Only those principles and tests that have gained scientific acceptance in the 
scientific community are reliable.  See State v. Erwin, 848 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Mo. banc 
 
13
1993).  The results of such a scan, therefore, would be inadmissible as they would pertain 
to Mr. Zink's personality disorders.     
 
In sum, Mr. Zink fails to show that the PET scan testimony was admissible.  
Counsel is not ineffective for failure to obtain and introduce evidence in the guilt phase 
that would not be admissible.  See Williams v. State, 168 S.W.3d 433, 441 (Mo. banc 
2005).  Mr. Zink, as such, has not demonstrated that counsel was ineffective for failing to 
order the PET scan and present supporting testimony in the guilt phase.  
 
Additionally, even if the PET scan testimony would have been admissible to 
confirm Mr. Zink's personality disorders, the outcome of the trial would not have been 
different unless his personality disorders caused him not to act with deliberation in 
murdering the victim.5  Evidence that Mr. Zink killed with deliberation, however, was 
very strong.  "Deliberation for purposes of proving murder in the first degree occurs if 
the actor had time to think and intended to kill the victim for any period of time."  State v. 
Hudson, 154 S.W.3d 426, 429 (Mo. App. 2005).  Deliberation ordinarily is established 
through circumstances surrounding the crime.  State v. Strong, 142 S.W.3d 702, 717 
(Mo. banc 2004).   
 
Mr. Zink was calm and articulate in speaking to police in a videotaped confession 
less than a month after the murder.  In that confession, Mr. Zink said that he killed the 
victim because he was worried he would go back to prison if she told the police that he 
raped her.  He stated that if he was going to have to go back to prison, it would be for a 
                                             
 
5 A defendant commits first-degree murder "if he knowingly causes the death of another 
person after deliberation upon the matter."  Section 565.020.1.  
 
14
good reason.  As he drove to the cemetery, he told the victim that he would tie her up and 
leave her in a barn for the police to find her.  He expressed in the confession that she 
should have known he was going to kill her when they pulled up to the secluded 
cemetery because it was obvious at that point what was going to happen. 
 
When they arrived at the cemetery, he tied the victim to a tree.  In Mr. Zink's 
videotaped confession, he told her that he was going to have to kill her because she knew 
his name.  Mr. Zink stated that he stopped and thought about what would be the best way 
to kill her.  He told her to look up, and then he broke her neck with his hands.  Mr. Zink 
testified at trial that, after breaking her neck, he strangled the victim with his hands and 
then with a nylon cord.  He stuffed leaves and mud into her mouth.  He next dragged her 
down a hill and covered up the body.  Approximately 10 minutes after breaking her neck, 
Mr. Zink pulled out his pocket knife and stabbed the back of her neck to sever the spinal 
cord because he thought she might revive.  He then went home, got a shovel and returned 
to the cemetery to bury the body.  The victim's body was bruised significantly, indicating 
that Mr. Zink had struck her between 50 and 100 times before her heart stopped beating.   
 
Because there is overwhelming evidence that Mr. Zink acted with deliberation, 
this Court agrees with the motion court's finding that there is no reasonable probability 
that the PET scan evidence would have resulted in the jury returning a verdict of not 
guilty on the charge of first-degree murder.       
b.  Penalty Phase 
Mr. Zink also argues that had this evidence been presented to the jury at the 
penalty phase of the trial, the jury would have voted to sentence him to life imprisonment 
 
15
instead of death.  As with the guilt phase, Mr. Zink claims that Dr. Preston's testimony 
would have confirmed, with an M.D.'s expertise, Dr. Benedict's personality disorder 
diagnoses.  He also claims that Dr. Logan's testimony would have confirmed that Mr. 
Zink's personality disorders "were not a personal volitional choice" because Dr. Logan 
identified from Mr. Zink's childhood medical records that he had a high fever associated 
with meningitis and the mumps. 
 
As discussed above, because there is no direct link between the PET scan evidence 
and Mr. Zink's personality disorders, the PET scan evidence does not "confirm" Mr. 
Zink's personality disorders.  The PET scan evidence, however, still would have 
mitigating value.  "'Virtually no limits are placed on the relevant mitigating evidence a 
capital defendant may introduce concerning his own circumstances.'"  Hutchison v. State, 
150 S.W.3d 292, 304 (Mo. banc 2004) (quoting Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 285 
(2004)).  "[T]he question is simply whether the evidence is of such a character that it 
might serve as a basis for a sentence less than death."  Tennard, 542 U.S. at 287 (internal 
quotations omitted).  Evidence of an organic brain abnormality, therefore, can be 
mitigating. 
Furthermore, to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the movant must do 
more than demonstrate there was evidence that existed that was not presented.  Counsel 
has limited time and resources, and if there is a strategy that does not look promising, he 
may "cho[o]se not to expend his limited resources to that end.  This is a reasonable 
strategic decision."  State v. Brown, 902 S.W.2d 278, 298 (Mo. banc 1995). 
 
16
Even if trial counsel here was deficient in failing to present this additional 
mitigating evidence, counsel is not ineffective unless the failure to investigate and 
present the mitigating evidence was prejudicial to Mr. Zink.  "It is not enough for the 
defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the 
proceeding. … [N]ot every error that conceivably could have influenced the outcome 
undermines the reliability of the result of the proceeding."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693.  
"'To prove ineffectiveness with regard to death penalty sentencing, [Mr. Zink] must show 
that, but for his counsel's ineffective performance, there is a reasonable probability that 
the jury would have concluded after balancing the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, death was not warranted.'"  Anderson, 196 S.W.3d at 34 (quoting Rousan 
v. State, 48 S.W.3d 576, 582 (Mo. banc 2001)).  See also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696.   
The jury unanimously found three statutory aggravating circumstances:  (1) Mr. 
Zink had two prior serious assaultive convictions for aggravated rape;6 (2) he murdered 
the victim for the purpose of avoiding a lawful arrest; and (3) the murder involved 
depravity of mind and was outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman.  Zink, 
181 S.W.3d at 75.  Mr. Zink was on parole at the time he committed the murder, serving 
                                             
 
6 The victims of the prior rape and kidnapping convictions appeared and testified in the 
penalty phase.  One victim testified that Mr. Zink aggressively pursued her car on a 
Dallas, Texas, freeway.  She thought she lost him and drove home.  As she was getting 
out of her car, he kidnapped her with a knife.  The other was trapped by Mr. Zink while 
in a telephone booth, and he forced her back to his apartment with a knife at her throat.  
The evidence was that these offenses involved multiple rapes of each victim and multiple 
forced sexual acts, including oral sex. One victim was sexually assaulted using a carrot, 
cucumber, potato and a Coke bottle, in addition to multiple acts of forced sexual 
intercourse.  Mr. Zink made death threats against both victims, and he informed one 
 
17
concurrent 30-year sentences for two aggravated rape convictions.  In his taped 
confessions, he admitted to killing the victim because he was afraid he would go back to 
prison if she called the police.  The motion court found that these confessions showed 
Mr. Zink as "cold, callous, and calculating."  The state also presented evidence that Mr. 
Zink has two additional convictions in Texas for aggravated rape and a federal conviction 
for kidnapping for ransom. 
Sixteen witnesses testified on Mr. Zink's behalf in the penalty phase.  Mr. Zink's 
mitigating evidence included expert testimony that he has psychological disorders rooted 
in his family history and poor emotional development from negative circumstances in his 
childhood – inadequate parental attachment, parental alcohol abuse, chronic domestic 
conflict, emotional abuse, abandonment and sexually traumatic exposures.  The defense 
presented evidence that Mr. Zink is a caring person and a hard worker.  The evidence 
also showed that he has counseled other inmates in prison and that he is a low-risk 
inmate.  
In light of the evidence, there is no reasonable probability that Dr. Preston's 
testimony and the PET scan would have persuaded the jury to impose a punishment less 
than death.  First, the mitigating value of the PET scan evidence is limited because, as 
discussed above, there is no generally accepted scientific link between Mr. Zink's brain 
abnormalities and his diagnosed personality disorders.   
                                                                                                                                                 
 
victim that he would murder anyone she asked for help.  He used a knife against both 
victims' throats to force them to do what he demanded.   
 
18
Second, even if the PET scan results did support the personality disorder 
diagnoses, Mr. Zink's cognitive abilities are normal.  Mr. Zink's own experts testified that 
he has above-average intelligence and the ability to take in and process information in an 
intelligent way.  Where personality disorders do not affect cognitive abilities, their 
mitigating value is doubtful.  See, e.g., Schneider v. Delo, 85 F.3d 335, 340-41 (8th Cir. 
1996) (no prejudice in attorney failing to admit evidence of defendant's attention-deficit 
disorder and insomnia in penalty phase when cognitive abilities were normal and there 
was no evidence of schizophrenia or bipolar disorder); Whitmore v. Lockhart, 8 F.3d 614, 
617 (8th Cir. 1993) (attorney not ineffective for failing to introduce evidence of 
defendant's anti-social personality disorder in penalty phase when he suffered no mental 
impairment that would negate his responsibility); and Guinan v. Armontrout, 909 F.2d 
1224, 1229 (8th Cir. 1990) (highly doubtful that evidence of defendant's anti-social 
personality disorder would be considered mitigating by jury).  Similarly, the mitigating 
value of brain abnormality evidence itself, apart from the personality disorder diagnoses, 
is limited because there was no evidence that Mr. Zink's intellectual functioning was 
impaired.   
Finally, the aggravating factors in this case are very weighty.  This was a horrific 
murder that Mr. Zink admitted committing to avoid a lawful arrest.  Evidence showed 
that Mr. Zink has two prior aggravated rape convictions in which he kidnapped and 
brutally raped women multiple times.  Given the overwhelming aggravating factors, there 
is no reasonable probability that the omitted evidence would have changed the jury's 
conclusion as to punishment.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700.   
 
19
2.  Competency to Stand Trial 
 
Mr. Zink claims that the motion court clearly erred in failing to find trial counsel 
ineffective for not challenging his competency to stand trial.  Section 552.020.1 states 
that "[n]o person who as a result of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to understand 
the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense shall be tried, convicted or 
sentenced for the commission of an offense so long as the incapacity endures."  In 
addition, this Court has held, "The standard for competence to stand trial is whether the 
defendant has 'sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable 
degree of rational understanding' and has 'a rational as well as factual understanding of 
the proceedings against him.'"  State v. Tokar, 918 S.W.2d 753, 762 (Mo. banc 1996) 
(quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960)).  A defendant is presumed 
competent to stand trial, and the burden is on the defendant to show he is incompetent.  
Edwards v. State, 200 S.W.3d 500, 519 (Mo. banc 2006).    
 
Mr. Zink asserts that his trial counsel were ineffective when they seriously 
questioned whether Mr. Zink was competent to stand trial. He alleges they believed his 
mental impairments made it impossible for him to sufficiently consult with them, but 
they did not request a competency evaluation.  Mr. Zink's arguments in support of this 
claim of error rely on testimony from the evidentiary hearing by his trial attorneys that 
they thought Mr. Zink was not competent because Mr. Zink insisted on presenting the 
defense of voluntary manslaughter when trial counsel did not believe that defense was 
supported by the evidence and because the evidence Mr. Zink thought proved 
provocation for sudden passion was detrimental to him and would aid the state in 
 
20
convicting him of first-degree murder.  The motion court found this testimony not to be 
credible.   
"A person commits the crime of voluntary manslaughter if he … [c]auses the 
death of another person under circumstances that would constitute murder in the second 
degree under subdivision (1) of subsection 1 of section 565.021, except that he caused 
the death under the influence of sudden passion arising from adequate cause."  Section 
565.023.1.  "Sudden passion" is defined as "passion directly caused by and arising out of 
provocation by the victim or another acting with the victim which passion arises at the 
time of the offense and is not solely the result of former provocation."  Section 
565.002(7).  "Adequate cause" is defined as that "cause that would reasonably produce a 
degree of passion in a person of ordinary temperament sufficient to substantially impair 
an ordinary person’s capacity for self-control[.]"  Section 565.002(1).      
His lead trial attorney testified that he believed Mr. Zink was incompetent because 
Mr. Zink's mental illness kept him from understanding that his fear that the victim would 
report him to the police and he would be sent back to prison was not legally sufficient 
"provocation" for "sudden passion," a necessary element of the offense of voluntary 
manslaughter.  Sections 565.002(7) and 565.023.  Mr. Zink also relies on the testimony 
of expert witnesses that Mr. Zink's personality disorders prevented him from rationally 
consulting with counsel "because his rigid, inflexible thinking causes him to hyper-focus 
on insignificant details, and thereby, fail to grasp the larger picture."   
 
As noted above, the motion court found that this evidence was not credible and, 
instead, found credible the testimony of the doctor who conducted the only chapter 552 
 
21
competency examination.  In the competency examination the court ordered prior to trial, 
Dr. Brooks found that Mr. Zink was competent.  She determined that, to a reasonable 
degree of psychological certainty, Mr. Zink suffered from alcohol abuse, antisocial 
personality disorder and narcissistic personality disorder.  Dr. Brooks further found that, 
despite these disorders, Mr. Zink's personality disorders were not the type of mental 
illnesses that rendered an individual incompetent under chapter 552.  Mr. Zink's lead trial 
attorney testified that he did not agree with Dr. Brooks' findings, but he did not request 
an additional competency examination because he believed the trial court could find Dr. 
Brooks' findings credible.  That was a correct assessment of that evidence.     
There was also testimony from all the mental health experts that Mr. Zink had the 
cognitive ability to understand the function of the prosecutor, his attorneys, the judge and 
his possible defenses.  The record clearly demonstrates that Mr. Zink was intelligent and 
interested in formulating strategy about his defense.  It also demonstrates that his trial 
counsel disagreed with that strategy and shows how Mr. Zink responded to that 
disagreement.  Initially, Mr. Zink wanted to pursue a defense of justification.  For some 
period of time, he was not dissuaded from that defense even though his counsel told him 
that justification was not available as a defense to homicide.  He eventually did abandon 
the justification defense, as advocated by his counsel, but he then decided to pursue the 
defense of voluntary manslaughter, asserting that his actions were the result of sudden 
passion provoked by the victim's likelihood of causing him to return to prison.  He would 
not agree that the defense recommended by his counsel, diminished capacity, be 
presented and undertook, instead, to represent himself.  On the day of trial, however, he 
 
22
accepted the advice of his counsel and agreed that he would permit the public defenders 
to present the defense of diminished capacity along with the defense he was presenting – 
voluntary manslaughter.  When the jury found him guilty of first-degree murder, he 
changed his decision to represent himself with the public defender only acting as stand-
by counsel and agreed that the public defenders should represent him in the penalty phase 
of the trial. 
Despite Mr. Zink's failure to accept his counsel's advice to let them represent him 
and present the sole defense of diminished capacity, Mr. Zink's decisions and conduct 
during the trial show that he did consider and follow other advice of counsel when 
deciding what defense to pursue and whether to represent himself.  His decisions and 
conduct during the trial refuted the experts' testimony that his personality disorders 
prevented him from rationally consulting with counsel "because his rigid, inflexible 
thinking causes him to hyper-focus on insignificant details, and thereby, fail to grasp the 
larger picture."7   
 
The motion judge, who also served as the trial judge, also relied on his own 
observations during the case to determine that Mr. Zink was capable of rationally 
consulting with trial counsel and that he understood the proceedings and his possible 
                                             
 
7 This evidence also contradicts Mr. Zink's allegation that his mental illness caused an 
inability to change his mind once he made a decision.  Interestingly, Mr. Zink presents 
evidence that a public defender who served as lead counsel during the pendency of his 
case was unwilling to change her mind as to trial strategy once it was made up.  Her 
attitude was characterized as a negative trait for a trial attorney but he certainly did not 
suggest that it was evidence she was mentally incompetent.   
 
23
defenses.8  In its judgment, the motion court referred to the extensive 50 page colloquy 
the judge had with Mr. Zink when Mr. Zink chose to represent himself, finding that: 
[T]his Court is more than satisfied that [Mr.] Zink understood the 
significance and consequences of his decisions at the time of trial.  [Mr.] 
Zink's ability to converse with the Court at the time of trial about the law 
relating to his case also demonstrates that he had the ability to conduct a 
rational conversation with his attorneys. 
    
 
 
Given all of the aforementioned evidence, the record supports the motion court's 
finding that trial counsel's decision not to request an additional competency examination 
was reasonable, when viewed from trial counsel's perspective at the time of trial.  
Further, the record supports the motion court's finding that, even if counsel had 
challenged Mr. Zink's competency to stand trial, Mr. Zink would not have been found 
incompetent.  Mr. Zink, therefore, cannot show prejudice.  The motion court did not err 
in refusing to find trial counsel ineffective for not challenging Mr. Zink's competency to 
stand trial.  
3.  Hidden Leg Restraint 
Mr. Zink asserts that the motion court clearly erred in failing to find trial counsel 
ineffective for not objecting to the sheriff's requirement that Mr. Zink wear a leg restraint 
under his pants during trial.  The motion court found there was no credible evidence that 
                                             
 
8 When communication problems are caused by the defendant's desire to control the de-
fense, as opposed to mental impairments, and there is no indication that the defendant is 
generally incapable of cooperating with counsel, the defendant does not demonstrate that 
he is incompetent to stand trial.  Edwards, 200 S.W.3d at 520.  See also Ferry v. State, 
453 N.E.2d 207, 212 (Ind. 1983) (holding that the test of competency to stand trial is 
whether defendant has the ability to assist in preparing his defense, not whether defen-
dant is willing to assist).  Mr. Zink's strained relationship with trial counsel, and its affect 
on his communications with trial counsel, does not render him incompetent to stand trial. 
 
24
the jury ever saw the restraint.  Mr. Zink did walk with an altered gait throughout the 
trial, however, because the device prevented him from fully straightening his leg.  The 
jurors who testified via deposition explicitly stated that the restraint was not visible but 
that, because of his gait, they believed he was wearing a shackling device that was not 
openly visible.  Defense counsel stated he did not object because he thought the 
shackling device did not impair Mr. Zink's movement substantially.  The motion court 
found there was no violation of Mr. Zink's rights.   
In support of his claim, Mr. Zink cites a recent holding of the United States 
Supreme Court, Deck v. Missouri, where the Court addressed the shackling of the 
defendant during trial.  544 U.S. 622, 630-33 (2005).  In Deck, from the first day of the 
defendant's proceeding and throughout, he was shackled with visible leg irons, handcuffs 
and a belly chain.  Id. at 622.  The Court found that the due process clause prohibits the 
routine use of visible shackles during guilt and penalty phases of trial but that shackling 
may be justified based on the particulars of the circumstance.  Id. at 633 The Court 
emphasized that "where a court, without adequate justification, orders the defendant to 
wear shackles that will be seen by the jury, the defendant need not demonstrate actual 
prejudice to make out a due process violation."  Id. at 635 (emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court's decision in Deck does not aid Mr. Zink's claim of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel.  First, the nature of the restraint of Mr. Zink differs signifi-
cantly from that in the Deck case.  Mr. Zink was required to wear a knee brace that was 
not visible to the jury because it was concealed by his pants, whereas Mr. Deck was visi-
bly restrained by a belly chain, leg irons and handcuffs.  Mr. Deck's shackles were blatant 
 
25
and strongly implied to the jury that Mr. Deck was a dangerous man who needed to be 
restrained.  In contrast, Mr. Zink was well dressed, and his appearance did not convey 
that he was dangerous; one juror who testified by deposition stated that Mr. Zink looked 
as though he could have been appearing on a bad check charge. 
Mr. Zink argues that a due process violation still occurs when a defendant is 
forced to wear a leg brace under his pants and the jury sees the effects of the restraint.  
The Supreme Court's decision in Deck is not authority for that proposition.  In Deck, the 
Supreme Court discussed the historical development of the law regarding the shackling 
of a criminal defendant in the guilt phase of a criminal trial.  In its discussion, it noted 
that "[t]he law has long forbidden the routine use of visible shackles during the guilt 
phase; it permits a State to shackle a criminal defendant only in the presence of a special 
need."  Id. at 626 (emphasis added).  In its principle holding, the Supreme Court ruled 
that: 
[T]he Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the use of physical restraints 
visible to the jury absent a trial court determination, in the exercise of its 
discretion, that they are justified by a state interest specific to a particular trial.  
Such a determination may of course take into account the factors that courts 
have traditionally relied on in gauging potential security problems and the risk 
of escape at trial. 
 
Id. at 629.  There is further indication that the Court's ruling was limited to restraints that 
are visible, in that it expressly noted that the trial court did not explain "why, if shackles 
 
26
were necessary, [the trial court] chose not to provide for shackles that the jury could not 
see – apparently the arrangement used at trial."9  Id. at 634-35.   
More importantly, Deck does not support Mr. Zink's claim that his trial counsel 
was ineffective for failure to object to the shackling of Mr. Zink because Mr. Zink was 
tried in July 2004, prior to the Deck decision.  It was not until October 2004 that the 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, Deck v. Missouri, 543 U.S. 942 (2004), 
and not until 2005 that the Court ruled, as discussed, that a criminal defendant shall not 
be visibly shackled during a jury trial unless there are particular concerns regarding the 
individual defendant, such as security concerns, that demonstrate the special need for 
shackling.  Deck, 544 U.S. at 633.   
"In reviewing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, counsel's conduct is 
measured by what the law is at the time of trial."  Glass v. State, 227 S.W.3d 463, 
472 (Mo. banc 2007).  "Counsel will generally not be held ineffective for failing to 
anticipate a change in the law."  Id. (citing State v. Parker, 886 S.W.2d 908, 923 (Mo. 
banc 1994)).  Mr. Zink's trial occurred prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Deck that 
                                             
 
9 Several jurisdictions have considered whether the holding of Deck regarding visible 
shackles should be extended to shackles that are not visible, but there is not unanimity in 
their decisions.  A number of courts emphasize Deck's application to visible restraints, not 
covered restraints.  See Garnett v. Morgan, No. C05-1438MJP, slip op. at 8-9 (W.D. 
Wash. 2008); Wrinkles v. Buss, 537 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2008);  United States v. 
Miller, 531 F.3d 340, 347-48 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Howard, 480 F.3d 1005, 
1012 (9th Cir.2007); Sager v. Hall, No. 05-CV-1812-AC, slip op. at  7 (D. Or. 2008);  
James v. Lamarque, No. C 02-4606, slip op. at 8 (N.D. Cal. 2006).  But see United States 
v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1244 (11th Cir. 2005) (applying Deck where restraints were not 
visible to jury); United States v. Waagner, 104 Fed. Appx. 521, 526 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(considering same factors whether or not restraints were visible to jury). 
 
 
27
changed the law regarding visible shackles.10  Trial counsel, therefore, was not 
ineffective for failing to object to Mr. Zink's concealed leg brace.   
4.  Guilt and Penalty Phase Closing Arguments 
 
Mr. Zink asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to various 
arguments made by the prosecutor during the guilt and penalty phase closing arguments.  
The motion court held that Mr. Zink failed to prove ineffective assistance. 
a. Guilt Phase 
Mr. Zink contends that trial counsel should have objected to three statements 
made by the prosecutor in the guilt phase closing arguments:  (1) that Mr. Zink was 
attempting to "feed" into a diminished capacity defense through his actions during trial; 
(2) that the jury had a duty to return justice – "do your duty;" and (3) that so long as Mr. 
Zink deliberated for even a "millisecond," it constituted deliberation for purposes of a 
conviction.   
An attorney's failure to object during closing arguments only results in ineffective 
assistance of counsel if it prejudices the accused and deprives him of a fair trial.  State v. 
Clemons, 946 S.W.2d 206, 228 (Mo. banc 1997).  Even assuming, arguendo, that defense 
counsel should have objected to any statements made in the prosecutor's guilt phase 
closing arguments, Mr. Zink cannot demonstrate prejudice.  Mr. Zink twice admitted to 
                                             
 
10 Mr. Zink asserts that because appellate counsel was involved with both Mr. Deck's 
case and his own, counsel should have known that the United States Supreme Court 
might grant certiorari in Deck and, therefore, should have objected.  Knowledge of 
appellate counsel is irrelevant because it is trial counsel, not appellate counsel, who is 
responsible for objections at trial.  In any event, Mr. Zink cites no authority that to be 
competent counsel is obligated to anticipate a grant of certiorari and object accordingly. 
 
28
police that he murdered the victim.  He led police to the body.  He described his actions 
and thought process that resulted in her death.  Mr. Zink's guilt, by his own admission, is 
indisputable.  Mr. Zink, therefore, suffered no prejudice as a result of the prosecutor's 
guilt phase closing arguments.   
b. Penalty Phase 
Mr. Zink's contention that he suffered prejudice due to the prosecutor's penalty 
phase arguments also fails.  Mr. Zink contends that counsel should have objected to false 
statements about William Tecumseh Sherman, Civil War General, and to four specific 
statements during the penalty phase arguments:  (1) "I will always seek the death penalty 
when you kill a little girl;" (2) "The only thing I can tell you is that if this is not a 
situation for the death penalty, all these facts and aggravation taken as a whole, I cannot 
imagine what is;" (3) that the death penalty "is societal self-defense.  We have the right to 
remove the predators from the sheep;" and (4) "You are the ones who will decide 
whether society is going to defend itself from this man [pointing at Mr. Zink]."      
In his Rule 29.15 motion, Mr. Zink asserts that counsel should have objected to 
the argument about General Sherman because it was based on facts not in evidence, 
personal opinion, and appealed solely to passion and prejudice.  Because Mr. Zink did 
not challenge the accuracy of these statements below, this Court may only consider 
whether counsel should have objected.  This Court, therefore, must consider whether 
counsel should have objected to any of these penalty phase arguments and, if so, whether 
such failure to object prejudiced Mr. Zink and deprived him of a fair trial.  Clemons, 946 
S.W.2d at 228.   
 
29
As to the argument made concerning General Sherman, the motion court found the 
point of this argument, which was to emphasize that people with difficult backgrounds 
still can grow into successful adults, was permissible.  This Court agrees and need not 
assess the accuracy of the information given.  The first and second challenged statements 
during the penalty phase arguments, (1) and (2), constituted the prosecutor's personal 
opinion as to whether the death penalty should be imposed, and such opinions are 
permissible provided they are based fairly on the evidence.  See State v. Edwards, 116 
S.W.3d 511, 547 (Mo. banc 2003).  With regard to statements (3) and (4), an "argument 
of societal self-defense, has previously been upheld by this Court and the United States 
Supreme Court as being permissible and not violative of a defendant's rights to a fair 
trial."  State v. Forrest, 183 S.W.3d 218, 228 (Mo. banc 2006) (footnote omitted).  
"Prosecutors may discuss the concept of mercy in their closing arguments because mercy 
is a valid sentencing consideration, and in that connection may argue that the defendant 
should not be granted mercy."  Id.  "Mere failure to object is not ineffective assistance of 
counsel, and trial counsel is not ineffective for failing to make non-meritorious 
objections."  State v. Lewis, 874 S.W.2d 420, 427 (Mo. App. 1994) (citations omitted).  
Because objections to these statements would lack merit, there was no ineffective 
assistance of counsel.   
Furthermore, even if defense counsel should have objected to any statements made 
in the prosecutor's penalty phase closing arguments, Mr. Zink fails to demonstrate any 
prejudice.  Mr. Zink "must show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."  Strong v. 
 
30
State, 263 S.W.3d 636, 647 (Mo. banc 2008) (internal citations omitted).  Mr. Zink 
cannot meet this burden and, therefore, there is no ineffective assistance of counsel. 
5.  Courtroom Security as Witnesses 
At his Rule 29.15 hearing, Mr. Zink informed the motion court of his desire to 
dismiss three claims from his amended petition, including a claim addressing the issue 
that certain individuals served as courtroom security during the proceedings but also 
served as witnesses in the proceeding itself.  The court discussed the ramifications of 
such a dismissal with Mr. Zink and questioned Mr. Zink to ensure he had sufficient time 
to discuss such dismissals with his attorneys.  Mr. Zink stated that he had sufficient time 
to discuss the matter with his attorneys, understood the consequences of such a dismissal 
with prejudice, and still desired to dismiss three specific claims, including a claim 
regarding individuals serving both as courtroom security and as trial witnesses. 
Mr. Zink now asserts that he was incompetent to proceed at his Rule 29.15 hearing 
and, therefore, that the motion court should not have dismissed his claims and counsel 
was ineffective for allowing such dismissal despite Mr. Zink's explicit request that the 
claims be dismissed.  A claim of ineffective assistance of post conviction counsel is 
categorically unreviewable.  State v. Lyons, 129 S.W.3d 873, 874 (Mo. banc 2004). 
6.  Autopsy Report 
Mr. Zink asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to testimony 
from a medical examiner about an autopsy report and the prosecutor's closing argument 
 
31
concerning the autopsy report and the medical examiner's testimony.11  At trial, the 
medical examiner who conducted the autopsy was unavailable because he was seriously 
ill with cancer.  A different medical examiner – who had read the report, examined 
autopsy photographs of the victim and discussed the autopsy with the preparer of the 
report – testified as to the contents of the report.  Mr. Zink asserts that this testimony and 
closing argument about the autopsy violated his right to confrontation as recognized by 
the United States Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington.   
In Crawford, the Court found that testimonial hearsay is inadmissible unless the 
defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examination the declarant and the declarant 
was unavailable at trial.  541 U.S. at 68.  This Court summarized the significance of the 
Crawford holding in Glass v. State: 
In Crawford, the Court substantially altered the Confrontation Clause 
analysis for hearsay evidence.  Cases before Crawford focused on whether 
the evidence at issue had adequate indicia of reliability to justify admission.  
The Crawford opinion held that the Confrontation Clause protects a 
defendant from the use of testimonial hearsay as substantive evidence 
against him, unless the non-testifying witness is unavailable, and the 
defendant has a prior, meaningful opportunity to cross-examine that 
                                             
 
11 In his point relied on, Mr. Zink does not assert that his counsel was ineffective for 
failure to object to the admission into evidence of the autopsy report, which was admitted 
into evidence.  The testimony of the medical examiner about the autopsy report would be 
cumulative of the report itself, so the admission of the autopsy report would eliminate 
any prejudice from trial counsel’s failure to object to testimony and oral argument 
concerning the report.  See State v. Lopez, 128 S.W.3d 195, 202 (Mo. App. 2004) 
(emphasizing that "[w]hen evidence challenged on constitutional grounds is cumulative 
of other properly-admitted evidence, the disputed evidence could not have contributed to 
the defendant's conviction and is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt").  Nevertheless, 
this Court gratuitously will consider Mr. Zink's claim of error as though he includes the 
claim his counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the admission of the autopsy 
report.   
 
32
witness.  The Confrontation Clause analysis thus centers on whether the 
particular evidence at issue is "testimonial" in nature. 
 
227 S.W.3d 463, 472 (Mo. banc 2007) (citations omitted).   
In its Crawford opinion, the Supreme Court expressly left "for another day any 
effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of 'testimonial,'" but found that "[w]hatever 
else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, 
before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations."  Crawford, 541 
U.S. at 68.  The Supreme Court "set forth '[v]arious formulations' of the core class of 
'testimonial' statements, but found it unnecessary to endorse any of them, because 'some 
statements qualify under any definition.'"  Davis v. Washington¸ 547 U.S. 813, 822 
(2006) (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52) (citations omitted).  The majority opinion 
noted the criticism of the dissent that its refusal to comprehensively define "testimonial" 
would cause "interim uncertainty" and responded that "it can hardly be any worse than 
the status quo."  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 n. 10.  
Mr. Zink's trial occurred four months after the Crawford decision and, at that time, 
there was no precedent in Missouri that an autopsy report is testimonial in nature and the 
protections of Crawford would apply.  In fact, at the time of Mr. Zink's trial, only 
Alabama had addressed whether an autopsy report was testimonial in nature.  See Perkins 
v. State, 897 So.2d 457 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004); Smith v. State, 898 So.2d 907 (Ala. 
Crim. App. 2004).  The unsettled state of the law as to what constitutes "testimonial" 
statements under Crawford was, again, recognized in a later Supreme Court decision, 
Davis v. Washington, where the Court addressed whether statements made during a 911 
 
33
call and statements made to a police officer responding to a dispatch for a domestic 
disturbance were testimonial.  547 U.S. at 817-20, 822.  The Court held that a statement 
is "testimonial" when the "primary purpose" of the interrogation is not to respond to an 
ongoing emergency but "to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later 
criminal prosecution."  Id. at 822.  
It was 2007 before a Missouri intermediate appellate court held that an autopsy 
report was testimonial.  State v. Davidson, 242 S.W.3d 409, 417-18 (Mo. App. 2007).  To 
date, this Court has not ruled on the issue, although it has held that a laboratory report 
that identified a substance seized as cocaine base was testimonial because it was prepared 
for use in prosecution and, in so ruling, cited cases pertaining to autopsy reports.  State v. 
March, 216 S.W.3d 663, 666-67 (Mo. banc 2007).  In so ruling, this Court applied the 
"primary purpose" standard from Davis that was adopted long after Mr. Zink's trial.  Id. 
at 666.   
As previously noted, counsel's conduct is measured by what the law is at the time 
of trial.  Glass, 227 S.W.3d at 472.  "Counsel will generally not be held ineffective for 
failing to anticipate a change in the law."  Id.  At the time of Mr. Zink's trial, his counsel's 
performance was consistent with existing law, and he was not required to predict whether 
autopsy reports would be found to be testimonial in nature and entitled to the protections 
of Crawford.  Trial counsel, therefore, was not ineffective for failing to object to 
testimony and closing argument concerning the autopsy report.  
 
 
 
34
7.  Involuntary Self-Representation  
Mr. Zink asserts that he was deprived of his right to counsel because his decision 
to represent himself was made involuntarily.  He claims that his decision to waive 
counsel was forced on him and, therefore, was not voluntary due to:  (1) insufficient staff 
in the public defender's office available to assist him; (2) his mental illness; and (3) the 
trial court's failure to advise him that he could not approach witnesses and he would have 
to wear a leg brace under his pants prior to him making the decision to waive counsel.   
A post-conviction motion cannot be used as a substitute for a direct or second 
appeal.  See Tisius, 183 S.W.3d at 212.  This Court previously heard Mr. Zink's direct 
appeal in which he alleged that his waiver of the right to counsel was not given 
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.  Zink, 181 S.W.3d at 70.  In that appeal, this 
Court held that Mr. Zink was competent to waive counsel and that this "waiver was given 
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently."  Id. at 70.  This Court found that:  
The transcript of the hearing on [Mr. Zink's] motion [to proceed without 
counsel] and the legal file both confirm that [Mr. Zink] was fully informed 
of the charges; the potential penalties he faced if convicted, including 
confinement or death; his rights to appointed counsel and to a trial by jury; 
the perils of self-representation; and all potential consequences associated 
with the waiver of counsel.    
 
Id. at 70.  This Court also noted that the trial court told Mr. Zink that he could change his 
mind at any time during the trial by simply notifying the court, but that Mr. Zink never 
did so.   Id. at 70-71.   
 
While Mr. Zink now raises different factual bases for his claim, the underlying 
claim is the same.  This Court will not review the same underlying claim for a second 
 
35
time.  A movant cannot use a Rule 29.15 motion to raise claims that could have been, but 
were not, raised on direct appeal except in rare and exceptional circumstance.  Schneider 
v. State, 787 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Mo. banc 1990).  By adding additional factors that he 
claims forced him to waive his right to counsel so that his waiver was involuntary, Mr. 
Zink is attempting to raise claims that could have been and should have been raised on 
appeal.  There are no rare or exceptional circumstances to permit him to do so.  
"Furthermore, even if the issue of waiver of counsel were held to be cognizable in this 
post-conviction proceeding, the record amply refutes [Mr. Zink's] contention that he did 
not knowingly and intelligently waive his constitutional right to counsel."12  Henderson 
v. State, 786 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Mo. App. 1990).  And, because this Court has found Mr. 
Zink competent, there can be no prejudice due to counsel's failure to challenge Mr. Zink's 
competency to waive counsel. 
The only claim that could arguably be cognizable is Mr. Zink's assertion that his 
counsel was ineffective in failing to advise him prior to his waiver of counsel that the 
trial court could require him to be shackled and not permit him to approach witnesses if 
he waived of counsel.  The claim is without merit, however, because Mr. Zink suffered 
no prejudice.  Mr. Zink was aware throughout the trial, including after he was informed 
that he was required to wear a leg brace and that he could not approach witnesses, that he 
could change his mind and be represented by the public defenders.  Despite being told by 
                                             
 
12 The evidence shows that Mr. Zink did not choose to represent himself because of 
inattention due to the understaffing and overwork of the public defender's office but 
rather because he disagreed with counsel's failure to use a lengthy list of questions that 
 
36
the trial court that he could withdraw his waiver, he chose to continue to represent 
himself.   
8.  Signing of the Attorney General's Proposed Findings 
Mr. Zink alleges that the motion court erred by signing the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law prepared by the attorney general's office.  He contends that because 
the motion court found individuals to be credible on certain matters and the same 
individuals to be incredible on other matters, the Rule 29.15 hearing and conclusions 
were a meaningless formality.   
"As the trier of fact, the trial court determines the credibility of witnesses and is 
free to believe or disbelieve all or part of the witnesses' testimony."  Blue Ridge Bank and 
Trust Co. v. Hart, 152 S.W.3d 420, 426 (Mo. App. 2005).  Simply because the motion 
court found individuals to be credible on certain issues and not credible on others does 
not indicate any error by the motion court.  While "[t]rial judges are well advised to 
approach a party's proposed order with the sharp eye of a skeptic and the sharp pencil of 
an editor," Massman Const. Co. v. Missouri Highway & Transp. Com'n, 914 S.W.2d 801, 
804 (Mo. banc 1996), "[a]s long as the court thoughtfully and carefully considers the 
parties' proposed findings and agrees with the content, there is no constitutional problem 
with the court adopting in whole or in part the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
drafted by one of the parties."  State v. White, 873 S.W.2d 590, 600 (Mo. banc 1994) 
(overruled in part on other grounds).   
                                                                                                                                                 
 
Mr. Zink prepared for his examination during a suppression hearing and disagreed over 
defense strategy.   
 
37
Here, there is no indication that the court did not consider thoughtfully and 
carefully the parties' proposed findings.  Furthermore, the record supports these findings.  
As such, there is no evidence of any constitutional problems.   
9.  Penalty Phase Instructions 
Mr. Zink alleges that appellate counsel erred in failing to argue that the penalty 
phase instructions violated his constitutional rights, as articulated in Ring v. Arizona, 536 
U.S. 584 (2002), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).  To be entitled to 
relief, Mr. Zink must demonstrate that competent and effective appellate counsel would 
have raised the error and that there is a reasonable probability the appeal's outcome 
would have been different.  Williams, 168 S.W.3d at 444. 
To determine whether an individual is eligible for the death penalty, there are four 
steps under section 565.030.4.  Mr. Zink asserts that steps two and three of the penalty 
instructions violate his constitutional rights. The penalty phase instructions for step two, 
section 565.030.4(2), required the jury to find whether there were facts or circumstances 
in aggravation of punishment that warranted imposition of the death penalty. The penalty 
phase instructions for step three, section 565.030.4(3), required the jury to determine 
whether there were facts or circumstances in mitigation of punishment that were 
sufficient to outweigh the facts or circumstances in aggravation.  The court did not 
require the jury to find either of these steps beyond a reasonable doubt.  Mr. Zink asserts 
that appellate counsel's failure to raise the instructions pertaining to these two steps as a 
violation of his constitutional rights, as articulated by the United States Supreme Court in 
Apprendi and Ring, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Apprendi holds that, 
 
38
"[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt."  Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.  Ring applied Apprendi, 
emphasizing that "[i]f a State makes an increase in a defendant's authorized punishment 
contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact – no matter how the State labels it – must be 
found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."  Ring, 536 U.S. at 584. 
Step two requires the jury to find whether the aggravation evidence warrants death 
and step three directs the jury to determine whether the evidence in mitigation 
outweighed aggravation.  Neither of those obligations requires a finding of a fact that 
may increase Mr. Zink's penalty.  Instead, the jury is weighing evidence and all 
information before them.  Only findings of fact that increase the penalty for a crime 
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum are required to be found by a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  This Court previously has recognized this distinction and held that 
steps two and three do not need to be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  See 
State v. Glass, 136 S.W.3d 496, 520-21 (Mo. banc 2004); State v. Gill, 167 S.W.3d 184, 
193 (Mo. banc 2005).  Mr. Zink fails to demonstrate how the failure of appellate counsel 
to raise a meritless claim would have resulted in a different appellate outcome.  See 
Nicklasson, 105 S.W.3d at 487. 
10.  Constitutional Validity of Lethal Injection 
 
Mr. Zink asserts the motion court erred in denying discovery and a hearing on his 
claim that Missouri's method of lethal constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.  When 
a condemned person has not yet exhausted his appeals, it is premature to consider a 
 
39
claim involving the method of execution, as "it is unknown what method, if any, of 
lethal injection may be utilized by the State of Missouri at such future time, if any, as 
[Mr. Zink's] right to seek relief in state and federal courts is concluded and his execution 
date and method are set."  Worthington, 166 S.W.3d at 583 n.3.  As such, Mr. Zink's 
claim challenging the constitutional validity of the method of execution is not yet ripe, 
and the motion court did not err in denying discovery and a hearing on an unripe claim.   
IV.  Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that the motion court did not clearly err 
in overruling Mr. Zink's motion for post-conviction relief.  The judgment of the motion 
court, therefore, is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   PATRICIA BRECKENRIDGE, JUDGE  
 
 
Stith, C.J., Price, Teitelman, 
Russell and Wolff, JJ., concur. 
Fischer, J., not participating.