Title: TEREX CORPORATION v. HOUGH

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

TEREX CORPORATION v. HOUGH2002 WY 11250 P.3d 317Case Number: 01-173Decided: 07/18/2002

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

                                                                                                                                   

TEREX 
CORPORATION, a Delaware

corporation; 
and LOUIS LOPEZ, 

Appellants(Defendants),

v.

BETTY A. 
HOUGH, Personal Representative

of the 
Estate of ROY W. HOUGH, deceased, 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

Representing 
Appellant Terex Corporation: 

            
Anthony T. Wendtland of Davis & Cannon, Sheridan, 
Wyoming. 

Representing 
Appellant Louis Lopez: 

Joe M. 
Teig, P.C. and Paula A. Fleck of Holland & Hart, LLP, Jackson Hole, 
Wyoming. 

Representing 
Appellee: 

Stephen 
H. Kline of Kline Law Office, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming, and Kenneth E. Barker of 
Barker, Wilson, Reynolds & Burke, Belle Fourche, South 
Dakota.

            

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN,* KITE, and 
VOIGT, JJ.

VOIGT, 
Justice, delivered the opinion of the Court; 
HILL, 
Chief Justice, filed a dissenting opinion. 

*  Chief Justice at time of oral 
argument. 

  

            
VOIGT, Justice. 

[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from the district court's dismissal of a wrongful death action based on a lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction.  We 
conclude that, at the time the district court ruled on the motions before it, it 
did have subject matter jurisdiction, and we, therefore, reverse.1  In doing so, we overrule our previous 
holding in Makinen v. PM P.C., 893 P.2d 1149 (Wyo. 1995).

ISSUES

[¶2]      The appellant, 
Terex Corporation (Terex), states the issues as:

1.         
Are the District Court's Findings, Conclusions and Order concerning 
Plaintiff's initial effort to file a wrongful death case against Defendants, 
Terex Corporation and Louis Lopez, void because the District Court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction when it attempted to enter 
them?

2.         
Pursuant to Makinen v. PM PC, 893 P.2d 1149, 1153 (Wyo. 1995) 
citing Amrein v. Wyoming Livestock Board, 851 P.2d 769, 771 (Wyo. 1993), 
should the Court address whether the Wrongful Death Act['s] two year filing 
requirement precludes Mrs. Hough's ability to pursue a cause of action for 
wrongful death?

3.         
Are Mrs. Hough's pending wrongful death claims viable given Mrs. Hough's 
acknowledged failure to meet the two year condition precedent to filing a 
wrongful death suit in Wyoming?

The 
appellant, Louis Lopez (Lopez), phrases the issues as:

            
A.        Did 
the District Court err as a matter of law when it entered Conclusions of Law 
before finding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and dismissing Appellee's 
Complaint without prejudice?

            
B.        Does 
Wyoming's "savings statute," W.S. § 1-3-118, apply to Appellee's wrongful death 
claim?

The 
appellee, Betty A. Hough as personal representative of the Estate of Roy W. 
Hough (appellee), defines the issues as:

            
1.         
Do Appellants raise sufficient issues regarding the judgment below to 
sustain an appeal?

            
2.         
Does the savings statute, Wyo. Stat. 1-3-118, apply to allow the 
plaintiff to refile a wrongful death case which was commenced within two years 
of the decedent's death, but eventually dismissed without prejudice for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction, where the action is refiled within one year of the 
dismissal of the original action, but not within two years of the death of the 
decedent?

FACTS

[¶3]      The incident 
giving rise to this action occurred on July 2, 1998.  Lopez drove a coal haul truck over the 
cab of the pickup truck in which Roy Hough (Hough) was sitting.  Hough later died from the injuries he 
sustained in the accident.  Triton 
Coal Company employed Hough at its Buckskin Mine near Gillette where the 
accident occurred.  Terex designed 
and manufactured the coal haul truck that Lopez was driving.  Hough's widow, the appellee, filed a 
wrongful death complaint on June 28, 2000, against Lopez and Terex.  The complaint alleged against Lopez 
willful, wanton, and/or intentional acts, and against Terex it alleged products 
liability.  On January 16, 2001, 
Terex filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(c) 
and an Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to W.R.C.P. 56, alleging 
that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the appellee 
had failed to serve the complaint on the Wyoming Attorney General and the 
Director of the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division as required by Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 27-14-105(b) (LexisNexis 2001), the pertinent portion of which 
reads:

The 
director and the attorney general shall be served by certified mail return 
receipt requested with a copy of the complaint filed in any suit initiated 
pursuant to subsection (a) of this section.  Service of the complaint on the director 
and attorney general is a jurisdictional requirement in order to maintain the 
suit.

[¶4]      The appellee 
responded to Terex's motions by having the attorney general and the director 
served on January 18, 2001.  About a 
week later, she filed a Motion to Amend Complaint to reflect that service.  The district court heard Terex's motions 
on February 14, 2001.  On July 11, 
2001, the district court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and a 
separate Order Dismissing Case Without Prejudice and Denying Permission to Amend 
Complaint.  Terex, Lopez and the 
appellee all appealed.2

DISCUSSION

[¶5]      "Subject matter 
jurisdiction is the authority to hear and decide cases of the general class to 
which the proceedings in question belong."  
Bruns v. TW Services, Inc., 2001 WY 127, ¶ 16, 36 P.3d 608, 613 
(Wyo. 2001).  This Court has 
stated:

"It is 
fundamental, if not axiomatic, that, before a court can render any decision or 
order having any effect in any case or matter, it must have subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Jurisdiction is 
essential to the exercise of judicial power.  Unless the court has jurisdiction, it 
lacks any authority to proceed, and any decision, judgment, or other order is, 
as a matter of law, utterly void and of no effect for any purpose.  Subject matter jurisdiction, like 
jurisdiction over the person, is not a subject of judicial discretion.  There is a difference, however, because 
the lack of jurisdiction over the person can be waived, but lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction cannot be.  
Subject matter jurisdiction either exists or it does not and, before 
proceeding to a disposition on the merits, a court should be satisfied that it 
does have the requisite jurisdiction."

Boyd v. 
Nation, 909 P.2d 323, 325 (Wyo. 1996) (quoting United Mine Workers of 
America Local 1972 v. Decker Coal Co., 774 P.2d 1274, 1283-84 (Wyo. 
1989)).

[¶6]      The district 
court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this wrongful 
death case because binding precedent, namely Makinen, 893 P.2d 
1149 and Boyd, 909 P.2d 323, 
dictated that conclusion.  The facts 
in Makinen are nearly identical to those in this case.  In Makinen, we resolved the issue 
of subject matter jurisdiction as follows:

            
In order to determine whether the district court had jurisdiction over 
this case, we must construe the relevant portions of § 27-14-105.  In construing a statute, we must 
determine whether the statute is clear or ambiguous.  "[A] statute is unambiguous if its 
wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree as to its meaning with 
consistency and predictability."  
Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Wyoming State Board of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 220 (Wyo.1991).  "[A] 
statute is ambiguous only if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to 
varying interpretations."  813 P.2d  
at 219-20.  "[W]hether an ambiguity 
exists in a statute is a matter of law to be determined by the court."  813 P.2d  at 220.  If the language of a statute is clear 
and unambiguous, we apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the words and do not 
resort to the rules of statutory construction.  Soles v. State, 809 P.2d 772, 773 
(Wyo.1991).

            
The Makinens contend that the district court had jurisdiction over the 
case because they served the complaint on the director and the attorney general 
in compliance with the statutory notice requirement.  They assert that § 27-14-105 is 
ambiguous with respect to when the complaint must be served upon the director 
and the attorney general, and they argue that service of the complaint is not 
required in order for the district court to obtain jurisdiction over the 
case.  PM P.C. and Mr. Larscheid 
maintain that the statute is not ambiguous.  They contend that, pursuant to § 
27-14-105, service must be made upon the director and the attorney general 
before or concurrently with the filing of an action in order for the district 
court to acquire jurisdiction over the matter.

            
Section 27-14-105 is clear and unambiguous in the context of this 
case.  Under the clear language of 
the statute, the district court does not obtain jurisdiction over any case which 
involves an injured worker until the complaint has been served upon the director 
and the attorney general.  
Accordingly, the district court did not have jurisdiction over the 
case at the time that PM P.C. and Mr. Larscheid filed their motion for a summary 
judgment.

Makinen, 893 
P.2d at 1152-53 (emphasis added).  The result in Boyd was similar, 
but the facts were different.  In 
Boyd, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction was raised sua sponte by 
this Court because the record contained no indication that the director and the 
attorney general had ever been served with the complaint.  Boyd, 909 P.2d  at 326.

[¶7]      We now find 
several things wrong with the Makinen decision.  To begin with, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-105(b) is ambiguous because it contains no deadline for service of the 
complaint upon the attorney general and the director, and because the word 
"maintain" does not clearly establish a point at which service must be 
accomplished.3    This situation is unlike the filing 
of a complaint under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, where the claim 
must be made prior to suit, so the complaint must reference that 
process.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113 
(LexisNexis 2001); Dee v. Laramie County, 666 P.2d 957, 959 (Wyo. 
1983).  Here the complaint could not very well 
reference service that has not yet occurred, and we know of no precedent 
requiring service of a complaint before it is filed.

[¶8]      The second thing 
wrong with Makinen is that, while we recognized in that opinion that the 
district court would obtain jurisdiction over the case upon service of the 
complaint upon the attorney general and the director, we declared that the 
district court lacked jurisdiction despite the fact that the 
attorney general and the director had been served prior to the motion hearing 
where the district court found it had no jurisdiction.  Makinen, 893 P.2d  at 
1153.  We held, without basis in the statute or 
other authority, that the district court lacked jurisdiction because service had 
not yet been accomplished at the time the summary judgment motion was 
filed.  Id.  Yet, there is nothing in the statute to 
suggest that the date of filing of a motion seeking dismissal or a similar 
remedy establishes the period of limitation for service.

[¶9]      Finally, our 
present review leads us to conclude that in Makinen, we paid insufficient 
attention to the legislative purpose behind the requirement for service of the 
complaint upon the attorney general and the director.  That legislative purpose was recently 
emphasized in Streeter v. Amerequip Corp., 968 F. Supp. 624, 629 (D.Wyo. 
1997):

            
Wyoming law requires that legislative intent be ascertained, as nearly as 
possible, from the language of the statute viewed in the light of its object and 
purpose.  Moncrief v. Harvey, 
816 P.2d 97, 105 (Wyo.1991).  One of 
the significant provisions of the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act, § 
27-14-105(b) . . . is designed to protect the state's lien rights, in the event 
of a settlement or judgment in favor of the injured worker in an action 
involving third parties or others.  
The provisions requiring notice to the Department of Employment and the 
Attorney General are designed to provide a mechanism that will ensure 
preservation of the State of Wyoming's lien rights.  * * *  The primary beneficiary of Wyo. Stat. § 
27-14-105 is the State of Wyoming.

In 
Streeter, 968 F. Supp.  at 630, Chief Judge Johnson cited to Clark v. 
Pacificorp, 118 Wash. 2d 167, 822 P.2d 162 (1991) and Hattaway v. McMillian, 903 F.2d 1440 (11th Cir. 1990), as 
cases where statutes similar to Wyoming's were interpreted so as to allow a 
plaintiff to cure noncompliance with the service requirements before trial, at 
least so long as no prejudice to the State had been shown.  Finally, Chief Judge Johnson 
concluded:

             
In the case now before the Court, granting defendant's motion to dismiss 
for failure to comply with the notice requirements of Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-105 
would frustrate the legislature's purposes in enacting this provision.  The Act is intended to be a sword for 
the State of Wyoming, one intended to permit the State to protect its 
reimbursement and lien rights in cases where an injured employee either settles 
or receives a judgment in his or her favor after having also received worker's 
compensation benefits.  The Act is 
not intended to be a shield for third party tortfeasors.

Streeter, 968 F. Supp.  at 631.  In the context of a case such as this, 
the State is best able to protect its lien rights and to recoup benefits paid if 
the suit is allowed to continue rather than being dismissed through an overly 
technical reading of the service requirement.

[¶10]   The gist of the decision in this 
case is the recognition that a plaintiff in a suit brought under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 27-14-104 (LexisNexis 2001) and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-105(a) must be allowed 
a reasonable amount of time to meet the requirements of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-105(b).  We realize that the 
statute itself imposes no limitation on the time in which this may be 
accomplished, and we are mindful of the constitutional separation of 
powers.  Wyo. Const. art. 2, § 
1.  Yet, because Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-105(b) makes such service a jurisdictional requirement, it is imperative 
that a time limitation exist.  
Otherwise, the question of the district court's jurisdiction could remain 
"in limbo" indefinitely.

[¶11]   This Court has a "general 
superintending control over all inferior courts, under such rules and 
regulations as may be prescribed by law."  
Wyo. Const. art. 5, § 2.  
This control "encompasses the authority to prescribe rules of practice 
and procedure in those courts.'"  
Squillace v. Kelley, 990 P.2d 497, 501 (Wyo. 1999) (quoting 
White v. Fisher, 689 P.2d 102, 106 (Wyo. 1984)).  Consistent with that authority, we 
conclude that it is appropriate, prospectively, to establish a specific time 
limitation during which, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-105(b), the 
attorney general and director must be served with a copy of the complaint.  Because "within a reasonable time" is a 
standard that would provide little guidance to litigants or the district court, 
we hold that service must be made within sixty days of the complaint's 
filing.  We choose sixty days 
because that is the same period under W.R.C.P. 3(b) for service of the complaint 
on the party defendants if the suit is to be deemed to have been commenced on 
the date of filing.

CONCLUSION

[¶12]   The district court had subject 
matter jurisdiction over this matter at the time it ruled on Terex's 
motions.  The holding to the 
contrary in Makinen, 893 P.2d 1149 is overruled.4  We reverse and remand for further 
proceedings in the district court.  
This resolution renders the other issues raised herein 
moot.

  

            
HILL, 
Chief Justice, 
dissenting. 

[¶13]   If this case had arisen as a matter 
of first impression, I might have been inclined to agree with the majority.  However, seven years ago this Court 
unanimously found the language in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-105 to be 
unambiguous.  The majority agrees 
that the facts of this case are nearly identical to those in Makinen, yet 
reaches a different result based on the conclusion that the language in § 
27-14-105 is ambiguous.  Yet, the 
language of the statute has not changed since we decided Makinen.  Furthermore, I do not ascribe the weight 
to the legislature's purported intent in adopting § 27-14-105 that the majority 
assigns to it.  In fact, in my 
opinion the legislature's intent can be discerned to support continuing 
adherence to the rule laid out in Makinen.  In the seven years since we decided 
Makinen, the legislature has not amended the statute.  If the legislature disagreed with our 
interpretation there, then it certainly had the opportunity to rectify the 
effect of that decision.  It is 
telling that it did not.  In 
State Tax Commission v. BHP Petroleum Company, Inc., 856 P.2d 428, 437 
(Wyo. 1993), we held that Section 14 petitions pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
39-1-304(a)(xiv) are not constrained by a time limit.  Later, when our interpretation of that 
statute was challenged, we said:  
"The legislature is aware of this decision, and it has not amended 
Section 14 to include a time limit.  
We believe that limiting the time to present Section 14 allegations is a 
job for the legislature, not this court."  
Exxon v. Board of County Commissioners, Sublette County, 987 P.2d 158, 164 (Wyo. 1999).  Similarly, 
the legislature was aware that we required service upon the director and the 
attorney general as a condition precedent for jurisdiction to vest in the 
district court.  In light of the 
legislature's acquiescence in our interpretation of § 27-14-105, any change 
thereto is a job for the legislature and not this Court.

[¶14]   I do not believe in following the 
doctrine of stare decisis blindly.  
However, in this case, I see no compelling reason to abandon our 
unanimous decision in Makinen.

FOOTNOTES

  1On appeal, 
neither appellant challenges the district court's determination that it lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction, and a cross-appeal by the appellee was dismissed at 
her request prior to oral argument.  
Nevertheless, the "first and fundamental question on every appeal is 
that of jurisdiction; this question cannot be waived; it is open for 
consideration by the reviewing court whenever it is raised by any party, or it 
may be raised by the court of its own motion.'"  Hirschfield v. Board of County Com'rs 
of the County of Teton, 944 P.2d 1139, 1141 (Wyo. 1997) (quoting 
Pawlowski v. Pawlowski, 925 P.2d 240, 243 (Wyo. 1996) and Gookin v. State 
Farm Fire and Cas. Ins. Co., 826 P.2d 229, 232 (Wyo. 1992)).  Furthermore, the question of subject 
matter jurisdiction is fundamental in this case because the issues presented by 
the appellants pre-suppose that the district court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction.

  2The cross-appeal 
of appellee, Supreme Court Case No. 01-174, has been 
dismissed.

  
3We have recently 
recognized specific legislative intent when the word "maintain" rather than the 
word "begin" or the word "commence" is used in a statute of limitations or 
condition precedent to suit.  See 
Rodriguez v. Casey, 2002 WY 111, __ P.3d __ (Wyo. 2002) (No. 01-195, decided 
7/18/02).  In the present context, 
"maintain" means that the suit may be filed, but it may not be continued toward 
judgment until the attorney general and the director have been served.  The ambiguity results from the statute's 
lack of any guidance as to when that must be accomplished. 

  4Boyd, 909 
P.2d 323 is not overruled because that holding was 
based upon a record that failed to show that the attorney general or the 
director had ever been served with a copy of the 
complaint.