Title: Weinstein v. Old Orchard Beach Family Dentistry, LLC

State: maine

Issuer: Maine Supreme Court

Document:

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
 2022 ME 16 
Docket: 
Yor-20-325 
Argued: 
November 4, 2021 
Decided: 
 March 8, 2022 
 
Panel: 
 STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ. 
Majority: 
 MEAD, GORMAN, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ. 
Dissent: 
 JABAR and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
Dubitante: 
 STANFILL, C.J. 
 
 
NEAL L. WEINSTEIN 
 
v. 
 
OLD ORCHARD BEACH FAMILY DENTISTRY, LLC, et al. 
 
 
GORMAN, J. 
 
[¶1]  Neal L. Weinstein appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court 
(York County, Douglas, J.) dismissing Weinstein’s seven-count complaint 
against Old Orchard Beach Family Dentistry, LLC, and Marina Narowetz.  
Weinstein challenges the court’s dismissal of portions of four of those counts 
based on the application of 14 M.R.S. § 556 (2021) and argues that the court 
erred by dismissing the remainder of his complaint pursuant to M.R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  We affirm the judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  In 2020, Weinstein, an attorney, filed a complaint against Marina 
Narowetz, DDS, and her dental practice, Old Orchard Beach Family Dentistry, 
 
2 
LLC (collectively, Narowetz).  Weinstein alleged that, in response to Narowetz’s 
handling of Weinstein’s request for the dental records of his client, he had filed 
a complaint against Narowetz with the Board of Dental Practice,1 prompting 
Narowetz to file complaints against him with the Maine Board of Overseers of 
the Bar, the Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers, and the United States Postal 
Service.  Based on statements that Narowetz made in her written answer to and 
testimony before the Board of Dental Practice and in her complaints to the 
Boards of Overseers and the Postal Service, Weinstein alleged seven counts: 
(1) libel, (2) slander, (3) defamation, (4) intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, (5) negligent infliction of emotional distress, (6) negligence, and 
(7) punitive damages.   
[¶3]  Narowetz moved to dismiss all counts of the complaint on two 
alternative grounds—first, that the counts were subject to dismissal pursuant 
to 14 M.R.S. § 556, Maine’s statute prohibiting “Strategic Lawsuits Against 
Public Participation” (the anti-SLAPP statute), Thurlow v. Nelson, 2021 ME 58, 
¶ 8, 263 A.3d 494, and, alternatively, that the counts failed to state claims, 
 
1  Narowetz appealed the resulting decision of the Dental Board—affirmed by the Superior Court, 
see M.R. Civ. P. 80C—in which the Dental Board found that Narowetz had engaged in unprofessional 
conduct.  Narowetz v. Bd. of Dental Prac., 2021 ME 46, ¶¶ 13-15, 259 A.3d 771.  We vacated the Dental 
Board’s decision and remanded the matter for further Dental Board proceedings.  Id. ¶¶ 22, 34. 
 
3 
see M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  Applying the anti-SLAPP statute, the court dismissed 
those portions of Counts 1, 3, 4, and 5 that were based on Narowetz’s 
statements to the Boards of Overseers and the Postal Service.  The court 
dismissed Count 2 and those portions of Counts 1, 3, 4, and 5 that were based 
on Narowetz’s statements to the Dental Board on grounds of privilege.  Finally, 
the court dismissed Count 6 based on Weinstein’s failure to allege a duty as a 
matter of law, and it dismissed Count 7 for the absence of any remaining 
underlying tort.  Weinstein appeals.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶4]  The anti-SLAPP statute, 14 M.R.S. § 556, is intended to provide for 
the swift and early dismissal of frivolous lawsuits that are meant to discourage 
the defendant’s exercise of his or her First Amendment right to petition.  
Hamilton v. Drummond Woodsum, 2020 ME 8, ¶¶ 15, 17, 223 A.3d 904; 
Desjardins v. Reynolds, 2017 ME 99, ¶ 6, 162 A.3d 228.  To that end, the statute 
provides that “[w]hen a moving party asserts that the civil claims, 
counterclaims or cross claims against the moving party are based on the 
moving party’s exercise of the moving party’s right of petition under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of Maine, the moving party 
may bring a special motion to dismiss.”  14 M.R.S. § 556.   
 
4 
[¶5]  Although we have recently refashioned the multi-step procedure 
that applies to the consideration and disposition of such special motions to 
dismiss, Thurlow, 2021 ME 58, ¶ 19, 263 A.3d 494, the initial steps—which 
were applied to the present matter—remain unchanged.  First, “the defendant 
must file a special motion to dismiss and establish, based on the pleadings and 
affidavits, that the claims against him are based on his exercise of the right to 
petition pursuant to the federal or state constitutions.”  Gaudette v. Davis 
(Gaudette I), 2017 ME 86, ¶ 16, 160 A.3d 1190 (alterations and quotation marks 
omitted); see Thurlow, 2021 ME 58, ¶ 22, 263 A.3d 494.  If the defendant meets 
the burden of establishing that the claims are based on petitioning activity, the 
burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish, “through the pleadings and affidavits, 
prima facie evidence that the defendant’s petitioning activity was devoid of any 
reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law and that the defendant’s 
petitioning activity caused actual injury to the plaintiff.”  Gaudette I, 2017 ME 
86, ¶ 17, 160 A.3d 1190 (quotation marks omitted); see 14 M.R.S. § 556; 
Thurlow, 2021 ME 58, ¶¶ 25-26, 263 A.3d 494.  The plaintiff’s failure to meet 
either portion of this burden requires that the court grant the special motion to 
dismiss with no further procedure.  Gaudette I, 2017 ME 86, ¶ 17, 160 A.3d 
1190. 
 
5 
[¶6]  Weinstein argues that the court erred by dismissing on anti-SLAPP 
grounds those portions of Counts 1, 3, 4, and 5 that relate to Narowetz’s 
statements to the Maine and Massachusetts Boards of Overseers and to the 
Postal Service based on its conclusion that Weinstein failed to meet his prima 
facie burden of establishing actual injury.2  We review de novo the trial court’s 
granting in part of Narowetz’s special motion to dismiss as to these four counts.  
See Gaudette v. Mainely Media, LLC (Gaudette II), 2017 ME 87, ¶ 10, 160 A.3d 
539. 
 
[¶7]  Although section 556 does not define “actual injury,” we have 
interpreted the term to mean “a reasonably certain monetary valuation of the 
injury suffered by the plaintiff.”  Desjardins, 2017 ME 99, ¶ 14, 162 A.3d 228 
(quotation marks omitted); see Maietta Constr., Inc. v. Wainwright, 2004 ME 53, 
¶ 10, 847 A.2d 1169.  “Actual injury could include . . . quantifiable losses of 
money or other resources or identifiable special damages.”  Nader v. Me. 
Democratic Party (Nader I), 2012 ME 57, ¶ 38, 41 A.3d 551.  We do not require 
the plaintiff to provide an “actuarial analysis” of such damages, Schelling v. 
 
2  Weinstein does not dispute the court’s conclusion that Narowetz’s complaints about Weinstein 
to two state agencies and one federal agency—the Boards of Overseers and the Postal Service—
constituted petitioning activity within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute.  See 14 M.R.S. § 556 
(2021) (defining petitioning activity to include “any written or oral statement made before or 
submitted to a legislative, executive or judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding”).   
 
6 
Lindell, 2008 ME 59, ¶ 18, 942 A.2d 1226; damages may instead be determined 
based on “the exercise of judgment applied to facts in evidence” as long as those 
facts allow a calculation based on “reasonable, as distinguished from 
mathematical, certainty by the exercise of sound judgment.”  Dairy Farm 
Leasing Co. v. Hartley, 395 A.2d 1135, 1140-41 (Me. 1978) (quotation marks 
omitted) (stating that damages “must not be left to mere guess or conjecture” 
(quotation marks omitted)).   
[¶8]  The existence of actual injury may be considered in this analysis 
only to the extent that the asserted injury was both alleged in the complaint and 
established on a prima facie basis in opposition to the special motion to dismiss.  
Desjardins, 2017 ME 99, ¶ 19, 162 A.3d 228 (“[B]oth parties must be limited in 
their anti-SLAPP filings to the universe of facts as actually alleged in the 
plaintiff’s complaint.”).  In Desjardins, for example, we affirmed the trial court’s 
conclusion that the plaintiff failed to establish actual injury in the form of an 
attorney’s retainer fee when the plaintiff did not seek that fee as a portion of his 
damages until filing the opposition to the special motion to dismiss.  Id. ¶¶ 15, 
19, 21.  In Nader v. Maine Democratic Party (Nader II), we concluded that the 
plaintiff had not met his prima facie burden when he referenced facts in his 
complaint but provided no evidence of those facts, either in documents 
 
7 
attached to the complaint or in opposition to the defendant’s special motion to 
dismiss.  2013 ME 51, ¶¶ 7, 20, 66 A.3d 571; see Desjardins, 2017 ME 99, ¶ 19, 
162 A.3d 228. 
[¶9]  The corresponding requirements for both the complaint and the 
opposition allow the plaintiff to meet his prima facie burden while also 
preventing him from “alleging a new form of harm for the first time solely in 
response to the special motion to dismiss,” thereby “thwart[ing] the purpose of 
the anti-SLAPP statute by expanding the scope of the litigation that [the 
defendant] must defend against.”  Desjardins, 2017 ME 99, ¶ 19, 162 A.3d 228.  
In this way, among others, complaints challenged by an anti-SLAPP special 
motion to dismiss differ from other civil complaints because a complaint’s 
notice pleading may be insufficient in the face of a special motion to dismiss.  
See id. ¶ 17.  The forgiving nature of notice pleading requires a plaintiff to 
provide only “fair notice of the cause of action by providing a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”  Id. 
(quotation marks omitted); see M.R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1).   
[¶10]  As we have noted, however, “[t]he special motion to dismiss 
procedure in anti-SLAPP matters is . . . a more precise mechanism” for which 
notice pleading is insufficient.  Desjardins, 2017 ME 99, ¶ 17, 162 A.3d 228; 
 
8 
see Maietta Constr., Inc., 2004 ME 53, ¶ 10, 847 A.2d 1169 (requiring 
“affirmative evidence of an injury”).  This precision is mandated by the language 
of the anti-SLAPP statute, which requires that the opponent of a special motion 
to dismiss show “that the moving party’s acts caused actual injury to [him].”  
14 M.R.S. § 556.  We recognize that a plaintiff may not always foresee that his 
complaint will be subject to such a special motion to dismiss, but a plaintiff who 
otherwise follows the edicts of notice pleading and is later required to defend 
against a special motion to dismiss may preserve his claim through the anti-
SLAPP process by seeking to amend his complaint to allege actual injury with 
greater specificity, and such motions to amend should be liberally granted.  See 
Desjardins, 2017 ME 99, ¶ 19 & n.4, 162 A.3d 228.  The anti-SLAPP statute also 
permits a plaintiff to bolster the complaint’s allegations of actual injury through 
affidavits, as Weinstein did in this case.  See Gaudette I, 2017 ME 86, ¶ 17, 160 
A.3d 1190; Nader II, 2013 ME 51, ¶¶ 19-20, 66 A.3d 571.   
 
[¶11]  Here, the only form of injury that Weinstein both referenced in his 
complaint and provided evidence about in his affidavit opposing the special 
motion to dismiss was injury in the form of embarrassment, shame, 
humiliation, emotional distress, and harm to his reputation.  Such “emotional 
injury” alone does not constitute actual injury for anti-SLAPP purposes, 
 
9 
however, “unless it is so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to 
endure it.”3  Schelling, 2008 ME 59, ¶¶ 22, 25-26, 942 A.2d 1226 (quotation 
marks omitted); see Desjardins, 2017 ME 99, ¶¶ 16, 20, 162 A.3d 228.  “In most 
instances,” such proof “will require expert testimony to establish that the 
plaintiff’s emotional injury qualifies for a diagnosis such as shock, 
post-traumatic stress disorder, or some other recognized medical or 
psychological disease or disorder.”  Lyman v. Huber, 2010 ME 139, ¶ 23, 10 A.3d 
707; see Desjardins, 2017 ME 99, ¶ 21, 162 A.3d 228.  Weinstein has offered no 
evidence that responding to two ultimately unsuccessful professional 
complaints resulted in emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person 
could be expected to endure it.  See Schelling, 2008 ME 59, ¶ 25, 942 A.2d 1226 
(noting that “hurt feelings . . . are not compensable”); Lougee Conservancy v. 
CitiMortgage, Inc., 2012 ME 103, ¶¶ 4-8, 26, 48 A.3d 774 (holding that property 
owners whose property was inadvertently foreclosed upon had not 
demonstrated compensable emotional distress).   
 
3  The types of emotional injury that Weinstein alleges are distinguished from emotional injury 
that in turn leads to quantifiable losses.  See Thurlow v. Nelson, 2021 ME 58, ¶¶ 29-30, 263 A.3d 494 
(recognizing actual harm where the emotional injury resulted in monetary loss in the form of costs 
for “medical, psychological, and psychiatric treatment” and lost income brought about by the 
plaintiff’s inability to work or renew his professional credentials). 
 
10 
 
[¶12]  Similarly, in claiming harm to his reputation, Weinstein has 
presented no evidence of actual injury or quantifiable loss.  At common law, 
defamation relating to the plaintiff’s business or profession is actionable 
“per se” without any proof of damages because harm to reputation is presumed.  
See Haworth v. Feigon, 623 A.2d 150, 158-59 (Me. 1993).  However, “the 
[anti-SLAPP statute’s] requirement that a plaintiff must demonstrate actual 
injury is not satisfied by the common law rule in libel cases that a plaintiff is not 
required to demonstrate that she has suffered any specific damages in order to 
recover on her claim.”  Schelling, 2008 ME 59, ¶ 18, 942 A.2d 1226.   
 
[¶13]  Weinstein also asserts that he suffered damages in the form of lost 
billable hours resulting from the time that he and his paralegal spent in 
preparing responses to Narowetz’s complaints to the Boards of Overseers.4  
 
4  Weinstein purported to present other grounds of actual injury, but none was properly presented 
in opposing the special motion to dismiss for several reasons.  First, we do not consider statements 
of harm raised for the first time in Weinstein’s memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss.  
See Gaudette v. Davis (Gaudette I), 2017 ME 86, ¶ 17, 160 A.3d 1190 (requiring a review of “the 
pleadings and affidavits” in evaluating an opposition to a special motion to dismiss); M.R. Civ. P. 7(a) 
(defining a “[p]leading[]” to include only a complaint, an answer, a disclosure under oath when 
trustee process is used, and a reply to a counterclaim).  Second, because the special motion to dismiss 
was granted only as to statements to the Boards of Overseers and the Postal Service, any harm that 
Weinstein alleged that he suffered as a result of Narowetz’s statements to the Dental Board is 
irrelevant.  Third, to the extent that Weinstein seeks compensation for the embarrassment, shame, 
or emotional distress that his paralegal suffered, the paralegal is not a plaintiff in this matter, and 
Weinstein asserts no legal basis on which he is entitled to recover for any harm suffered by the 
paralegal.  Fourth, as a matter of law, Weinstein’s allegation of defamation per se in his complaint 
cannot constitute actual injury within the meaning of section 556.  See Desjardins v. Reynolds, 
2017 ME 99, ¶ 14, 162 A.3d 228 (“The requirement of reasonable certainty also precludes the 
 
11 
Weinstein’s presentation of evidence of actual injury in the form of lost billable 
hours is indistinguishable, however, from that unsuccessfully undertaken by 
the plaintiff in Desjardins.  In Desjardins, the plaintiff had briefly mentioned in 
his complaint that he had retained counsel to investigate the defendant’s 
statements, but the complaint otherwise “never purported to seek damages for 
that cost . . . or to otherwise suggest that his retention of counsel constituted 
any aspect of the damages he was seeking in the litigation.”  2017 ME 99, ¶¶ 16, 
19, 162 A.3d 228.  Rather, the complaint alleged harm only in the form of 
emotional distress and reputational injury.  Id.  In opposition to the defendant’s 
special motion to dismiss, the plaintiff alleged that his actual injury included a 
five-hundred-dollar expenditure for retaining the attorney.  Id. ¶ 15.  Because 
the attorney’s retainer fee constituted “no part of [the plaintiff’s] request for 
damages in his complaint,” we rejected his attempt to provide in his opposition 
to the special motion to dismiss prima facie evidence of that fee.  Id. ¶ 19.  
[¶14]  Likewise, in his complaint, Weinstein alleged only that “[t]he 
Plaintiff and his staff were forced to prepare a detailed response to the 
complaint against him, with the Massachusetts Board[] of Overseers of the 
 
establishment of ‘actual injury’ when the plaintiff asserts only presumed damages (‘damages per se’), 
as is associated with common law causes of action for libel or slander.”).   
 
12 
Bar.”5  He did not suggest in his complaint that he suffered any loss as a result 
of that effort, nor did he allege that that time spent was a component of his 
damages claim.  It was not until the opposition to the special motion to dismiss 
that Weinstein stated, for the first time, that he sought lost billable income as a 
portion of his damages.6  Although lost income could constitute an actual injury 
for purposes of section 556, see Gaudette I, 2017 ME 86, ¶ 24, 160 A.3d 1190, 
Weinstein’s failure to include lost income as a form of injury in his complaint, 
compounded by his failure to seek to amend his complaint to add such an 
allegation, precludes consideration of that alleged harm as an actual injury in 
this matter, see Desjardins, 2017 ME 99, ¶¶ 16, 19 & n.4, 162 A.3d 228.7  In the 
 
5  Weinstein’s single-page response to the Massachusetts Board was attached to Weinstein’s 
complaint.  Weinstein made no mention in his complaint of the time spent preparing a response to 
the Maine Board of Overseers or to the Postal Service.   
6  Weinstein attested in his affidavit, “My paralegal and I were both forced to take time away from 
my busy practice and lose valuable billable hours, prepare detailed responses to the complaints with 
the Boards of Overseers of the Bar, and appear in Augusta for the disciplinary hearing against 
Dr. Narowetz” and “I have lost numerous hours of billable time in defending myself to those Boards 
on her frivolous and unsupported claims.”   
7  Even if Weinstein had alleged a loss of income in his complaint, the alleged loss likely would not 
constitute “actual injury” for purposes of section 556 because his claim is for the value of the time he 
spent defending himself against Narowetz’s complaints rather than for a measurable loss resulting 
from Narowetz’s alleged tortious conduct, such as the loss of a client’s business.  Attorneys who 
happen to be parties in litigation are not entitled to compensation for time spent defending 
themselves if a nonattorney party would not be entitled to compensation for such time.  See Tana Oil 
& Gas Corp. v. McCall, 104 S.W.3d 80, 82 (Tex. 2003); see also In re Hannaford Bros. Customer Data Sec. 
Breach Litig., 2010 ME 93, ¶¶ 10-12, 4 A.3d 492 (“Our case law . . . does not recognize the expenditure 
of time and effort alone as a harm.”); M. N. Landau Stores, Inc. v. Daigle, 157 Me. 253, 259-60, 170 A.2d 
673 (1961) (affirming the trial court’s determination that a plaintiff corporation was not entitled to 
reliance damages for time spent by corporate officers in negotiating a lease agreement breached by 
the defendant).  If Weinstein had been representing the plaintiff in this case, as opposed to being the 
 
13 
absence of prima facie evidence of actual injury, the court correctly granted 
Narowetz’s special motion to dismiss those portions of the complaint.   
 
[¶15]  Weinstein also challenges the court’s dismissal of his claims 
regarding statements that Narowetz made to the Dental Board.  The Superior 
Court properly concluded that Narowetz’s statements to the Dental Board were 
protected by the absolute privileges that preclude civil liability concerning 
relevant statements made in judicial and quasi-judicial pleadings, see Dineen v. 
Daughan, 381 A.2d 663, 664 (Me. 1978), and during judicial and quasi-judicial 
proceedings, see Bradbury v. GMAC Mortg., LLC, 2012 ME 131, ¶ 8, 58 A.3d 1054.  
See also Hurley v. Towne, 155 Me. 433, 436, 438-39, 156 A.2d 377 (1959); 
LaPlante v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 810 F. Supp. 19, 21 (D. Me. 1993); Lyons v. 
Bd. of Dirs. of Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 43, 503 A.2d 233, 236 (Me. 1986).  Although 
Weinstein contends that Narowetz’s statements to the Dental Board went well 
beyond the bounds of relevance, Narowetz’s statements, whether founded or 
not, were all relevant to Narowetz’s view of Weinstein’s actions, Weinstein’s 
credibility, and Weinstein’s motives for filing the complaint against her.  
Moreover, because the court properly dismissed Counts 1 through 6 of 
 
plaintiff, his client’s claim might be cognizable for purposes of an attorney fee award, but it is not 
cognizable for purposes of the required showing of “actual injury.”  14 M.R.S. § 556. 
 
14 
Weinstein’s complaint,8 the dismissal of Count 7—seeking punitive damages—
was also appropriate based on the lack of any remaining underlying tort.  
See Wuestenberg v. Rancourt, 2020 ME 25, ¶ 19 n.3, 226 A.3d 227.    
The entry is: 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JABAR, J., with whom HUMPHREY, J., joins, dissenting. 
 
 
[¶16]  I respectfully dissent because the definition of “actual injury” we 
adopted in Maietta Construction., Inc. v. Wainwright, 2004 ME 53, ¶ 10, 847 A.2d 
1169, and continue to follow is in derogation of our common-law definition of 
“actual injury” in defamation cases.  We should revisit our holding in Maietta to 
align our definition of “actual injury” in the anti-SLAPP context with our 
common-law definition.  The stated purpose of Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute is to 
screen out meritless cases, yet the narrow definition we adopted in Maietta 
results in the dismissal of meritorious cases.  If we were to apply the 
common-law definition of actual injury in defamation cases, Weinstein’s case 
 
8  Weinstein does not challenge the dismissal of Count 6 or those portions of Counts 1, 4, or 5 that 
were based on Narowetz’s statements to the Dental Board.  
 
15 
would survive Narowetz’s special motion to dismiss and M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss. 
I.  DEFINITION OF “ACTUAL INJURY” 
[¶17]  I believe that the trial court erred when it dismissed Counts 1, 3, 4, 
and 5, which contained claims based on complaints made to the Maine Board of 
Overseers of the Bar, the Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers, and the United 
States Postal Service (USPS), for the reason that Weinstein failed to present 
prima facie evidence of actual injury.   
A. 
Our Interpretation of “Actual Injury” 
 
[¶18]  Maine’s anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public 
Participation) statute, 14 M.R.S. § 556 (2021), enacted by the Maine Legislature 
in 1995, P.L. 1995, ch. 413, provides that the nonmoving party in a proceeding 
on a special motion to dismiss brought pursuant to the statute must prove that 
“the moving party’s acts caused actual injury to the responding party.”  The 
statute does not contain a definition for “actual injury,” nor does the statute in 
any way indicate that the Legislature intended to change Maine’s common law.  
See id. 
[¶19]  The common-law definition of “actual injury” in defamation cases 
has always allowed for the recovery of damages without evidence of 
 
16 
out-of-pocket expenses.  In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., a defamation case, the 
United States Supreme Court said: 
We need not define “actual injury,” as trial courts have wide 
experience in framing appropriate jury instructions in tort actions.  
Suffice it to say that actual injury is not limited to out-of-pocket 
loss.  Indeed, the more customary types of actual harm inflicted by 
defamatory falsehood include impairment of reputation and 
standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental 
anguish and suffering. 
 
418 U.S. 323, 349-50 (1974).   
[¶20]  We have followed that approach in numerous cases.  See Curtis v. 
Porter, 2001 ME 158, ¶ 19, 784 A.2d 18 (“We have long allowed recovery for 
mental anguish and loss of enjoyment of life in most tort actions.” (quotation 
marks omitted)); Rippett v. Bemis, 672 A.2d 82, 88 (Me. 1996) (“[Defamation] 
damages may include the elements of mental suffering, humiliation, 
embarrassment, effect on reputation and loss of social standing so far as they 
have been proved and may reasonably be presumed.”); Saunders v. VanPelt, 
497 A.2d 1121, 1126 (Me. 1985).   
[¶21]  The First Circuit Court of Appeals has provided its interpretation 
of damages recoverable in a defamation action under Maine’s common law: 
The common law of defamation is an oddity of tort law, for it allows 
recovery of purportedly compensatory damages without evidence 
of actual loss.  Under the traditional rules pertaining to actions for 
libel, the existence of injury is presumed from the fact of 
 
17 
publication.  Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349, 94 S. Ct. 2997.  Maine adheres 
to these traditional rules of defamation law in certain contexts. 
 
Under Maine law, defamatory words relating to “profession, 
occupation or official station” are libelous per se.  See Saunders, 497 
A.2d at 1124.  “When [defamation] per se is established, a plaintiff 
need not prove special damages or malice in order to recover a 
substantial award.”  Marston v. Newavom, 629 A.2d 587, 593 
(Me. 1993). . . . General damages include “elements of mental 
suffering, humiliation, embarrassment, effect upon reputation and 
loss of social standing, so far as they . . . may reasonably be 
presumed.”  Saunders, 497 A.2d at 1126 (citing McMullen v. Corkum, 
143 Me. 47, 54 A.2d 753, 756 (Me. 1947)). 
 
Galarneau v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 504 F.3d 189, 203 
(1st Cir. 2007) (last alternation in original). 
[¶22]  In its section on general damages, the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts provides that “[o]ne who is liable for defamatory communication is liable 
for the proved, actual harm caused to the reputation of the person defamed.”  
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 621 (Am. L. Inst. 1977).  The Reporter’s Notes 
continue, stating that “‘[a]ctual injury is not limited to out-of-pocket loss.  
Indeed, the more customary types of actual harm inflicted by defamatory 
falsehood include impairment of reputation and standing in the community, 
and mental anguish and suffering.’”  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 621 
Reporter’s Notes (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350). 
 
18 
[¶23]  We were not called upon to interpret the definition of “actual 
injury” in the anti-SLAPP statute until 2003, in Maietta.  The Maietta court did 
not adopt Maine’s common-law definition of “actual injury” as applied to 
defamation cases.  Instead it changed the term “actual injury” to “actual 
damages” without any explanation.  Maietta Constr., Inc., 2004 ME 53, ¶¶ 9-10, 
847 A.2d 1169.  The Maietta court also held, without elaborating or pointing to 
any source of authority, that the definition of “actual injury” did not include the 
“certain categories of defamation” where damages are presumed.  Id. ¶ 9.  The 
Maietta court defined “actual injury” under the statute as actual damages 
requiring quantifiable damages.  Id. ¶ 10.  It supported this change to “actual 
damages” by citing Dairy Farming Leasing Co. v. Hartley, a case involving 
liquidated damages in a contract action which held that “[w]hen recovery may 
be had only for actual damage sustained[, however,] the record must contain 
evidence from which damage in a definite amount may be determined with 
reasonable certainty.”  Maietta Constr., Inc., 2004 ME 53, ¶ 10, 847 A.2d 1169 
(second alteration in original) (quoting Dairy Farm Leasing Co., 395 A.2d 1135, 
1140 (Me. 1978)).  This is not the law of defamation.  See Galarneau, 504 F.3d 
at 203-04.  
 
19 
[¶24]  In turn, Dairy Farm Leasing cited McDougal v. Hunt, 146 Me. 10, 14, 
76 A.2d 857 (1950), a case involving a claim of unjust enrichment.  Dairy Farm 
Leasing Co., 395 A.2d at 1137, 1140-41.  The premise for requiring actual 
damages in McDougal was specific to the law of unjust enrichment, where 
“[a]ctual or compensatory damages are not to be presumed but must be proved.”  
146 Me. at 13, 76 A.2d 857, 860 (emphasis added).  This stands in stark contrast 
to “the traditional rules pertaining to actions for libel,” where “the existence of 
injury is presumed from the fact of publication.”  Galarneau, 504 F.3d at 203 
(emphasis added and quotation marks omitted); see Saunders, 497 A.2d at 
1124-25.   
[¶25]  The damages in a contract action involving the enforceability of a 
liquidated damages clause and an unjust enrichment case have no relationship 
to the definition of “actual injury” in a defamation case.  Maietta was the first 
time we defined “actual injury” under Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute, and we 
erroneously relied upon cases that dealt with the term “actual damages” in the 
context of a liquidated damages case and an unjust enrichment case instead of 
following our common law to determine what constitutes “actual injury.”  The 
Maietta court did not explain why it did not follow our traditional definition of 
“actual injury” in defamation cases, nor did it discuss whether the Legislature, 
 
20 
in enacting the anti-SLAPP statute, made it clear that it was changing Maine’s 
common-law definition of “actual injury.” 
[¶26]  The Court here also quotes Schelling v. Lindell, 2008 ME 59, 942 
A.2d 1226, acknowledging the change in common law, Court’s Opinion ¶ 12, but 
does not discuss where in the statute or the legislative history the Legislature 
intended to change the common law. 
[¶27]  We have unswervingly followed the Maietta approach numerous 
times in subsequent cases interpreting “actual injury” under our anti-SLAPP 
statute.  In Schelling, relying on the Maietta decision, we rejected the plaintiff’s 
argument that the common-law doctrine associated with defamation cases, 
which allows for the presumption of damages, satisfies the anti-SLAPP’s “actual 
injury” requirement.  2008 ME 59, ¶¶ 18-20, 942 A.2d 1226.  The Court said:  
[T]he statutory requirement that a plaintiff must demonstrate 
actual injury is not satisfied by the common law rule in libel cases 
that a plaintiff is not required to demonstrate that she has suffered 
any specific damages in order to recover on her claim. 
 
. . . . 
 
This is not the first occasion on which we have explicitly held 
that the presumed ‘damages per se’ traditionally associated with 
libel or slander relating to one’s trade or business do not satisfy the 
actual injury requirement of the statute.  See, e.g., Maietta Constr., 
Inc., 2004 ME 53, ¶¶ 9, 10, 847 A.2d at 1173 at 1173-74.  
 
 
21 
Schelling, 2008 ME 59, ¶¶ 18-19, 942 A.2d 1226; see also Camden Nat’l Bank v. 
Weintraub, 2016 ME 101, ¶ 13, 143 A.3d 788 (citing Schelling to define “actual 
injury” for the purposes of an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss); Desjardins v. 
Reynolds, 2017 ME 99, ¶ 14, 162 A.3d 228 (citing to the Schelling and Maietta 
family of cases to distinguish “actual injury” in anti-SLAPP cases from “actual 
injury” in “common law causes of action”). 
[¶28]  We have held that the Legislature must be clear when it changes 
the common law.  See Batchelder v. Realty Res. Hosp., LLC., 2007 ME 17, ¶ 23, 
914 A.2d 1116 (“[W]e have long embraced the well-established rule of 
statutory construction that the common law is not to be changed by doubtful 
implication, be overturned except by clear and unambiguous language, and that 
a statute in derogation of it will not effect a change thereof beyond that clearly 
indicated either by express terms or necessary implication.” (quotation marks 
omitted)); Ziegler v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 658 A.2d 219, 223 (Me. 1995) 
(“[L]egislative pronouncement[s] embodied in [a statute] alter[] common law 
only to the extent the Legislature has made that purpose clear.”). 
[¶29]  Requiring a litigant to prove a quantifiable loss to prove actual 
injury in response to a special motion to dismiss in a defamation case is in 
derogation of our common law.  In 2012, in a concurring opinion in Nader v. 
 
22 
Maine Democratic Party (Nader I), Justice Silver warned about the use of this 
procedural mechanism to substantively change our common law:  
Because of the way the statute has been misused with respect to its 
intended purpose, treating it as a substantive abrogation of 
common law claims has become very problematic; it serves to bar 
legitimate, valid claims that are brought in good faith, regardless of 
whether a plaintiff would be able to meet her burden on a motion 
to dismiss or for summary judgment.  While the Legislature may 
have the authority to do so, there is no indication that it intended to 
do so. 
 
2012 ME 57, ¶ 47, 41 A.3d 551 (Silver, J., concurring). 
[¶30]  As a result of changing the common-law definition of “actual 
injury,” we are violating one of the guiding principles of anti-SLAPP law—to 
screen out “meritless” cases, a principle we have consistently restated.  
See Thurlow v. Nelson, 2021 ME 58, ¶ 9, 263 A.3d 494; Hamilton v. Drummond 
Woodsum, 2020 ME 8, ¶ 17, 223 A.3d 904; Hearts with Haiti, Inc. v. Kendrick, 
2019 ME 26, ¶ 14, 202 A.3d 1189; Desjardins, 2017 ME 99, ¶ 6, 162 A.3d 228; 
Bradbury v. City of Eastport, 2013 ME 72, ¶ 9, 72 A.3d 512; Nader I, 2012 ME 57, 
¶ 22, 41 A.3d 551; Schelling, 2008 ME 59, ¶ 6, 942 A.2d 1226; Maietta Constr., 
Inc., 2004 ME 53, ¶ 6, 847 A.2d 1169; Morse Brothers, Inc., v. Webster, 2001 ME 
70, ¶ 15, 772 A.2d 842.  Both the highest courts of other states and academic 
analysts have made similar statements regarding the basic purpose of these 
statutes.  See Davis v. Cox, 351 P.3d 862, 874-75 (Wash. 2015); Duracraft Corp. 
 
23 
v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 691 N.E.2d 935, 940-41 (Mass. 1998); Steven J. André, 
Anti-SLAPP Confabulation and the Government Speech Doctrine, 44 Golden Gate 
U. L. Rev. 117, 119 (2014); Leah McGowan Kelly, Election SLAPPS: Effective at 
Suppressing Political Participation and Giving Anti-SLAPP Statutes the Slip, 
66 Me. L. Rev. 191, 192 (2013); John C. Barker, Common-Law and Statutory 
Solutions to the Problem of SLAPPS, 26 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 395, 399 (1993). 
[¶31]  In several of our anti-SLAPP cases, we have followed the approach 
utilized by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.  See Gaudette v. Mainely 
Media, LLC (Gaudette II), 2017 ME 87, ¶ 14 & n.2, 160 A.3d 539; Nader I, 2012 
ME 57, ¶ 22 & n.9, 41 A.3d 551; Morse Brothers, Inc., 2001 ME 70, ¶¶ 15, 17, 772 
A.2d 842.  Like us, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court emphasizes the 
importance of screening out meritless cases.  See, e.g., Duracraft Corp., 691 
N.E.2d at 942-43.  Recently, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court dealt 
with the definition of “actual injury” in the context of a second-stage analysis 
under the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute.  In 477 Harrison Ave., LLC v. JACE 
Boston, LLC (Harrison I), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that 
the plaintiff demonstrated that the defendant’s action caused “actual injury” 
under the second step in a special motion analysis because the instigation of 
criminal charges caused him “embarrassment” and he “feared” for his financial 
 
24 
health.  74 N.E.3d 1237, 1249 (Mass. 2017); see also 477 Harrison Ave., LLC v. 
JACE Bos., LLC (Harrison II), 134 N.E.3d 91, 100 (Mass. 2019) (citing Millennium 
Equity Holdings, LLC v. Mahlowitz, 925 N.E.2d 513, 531-32 (Mass. 2010)) 
(opining that embarrassment and financial concern regarding criminal 
complaint constitute “actual injury” for purposes of Massachusetts anti-SLAPP 
statute).  
[¶32]  In Harrison II, the court considered the affidavit of the plaintiff and 
said the following: 
For purposes of the second stage, we consider the pleadings, as 
well as the “supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts 
upon which the liability or defense is based.”  In Harrison I, for 
example, we concluded that the developer met its second-stage 
burden of demonstrating “actual injury” caused by the abutters’ 
application for a criminal complaint by means of an affidavit from 
the developer’s manager stating that he suffered “embarrassment,” 
“that he had to attend a probable cause hearing, and that he feared 
for the financial health of the plaintiff if the complaint had spawned 
criminal charges.” 
 
Harrison II, 134 N.E.3d at 100 n.3 (citations omitted). 
 
[¶33]  Once again, we should follow the approach used by the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.  Instead, by following the approach we 
adopted in Maietta, we are violating the primary purpose of anti-SLAPP 
statutes.  As in this case, if a plaintiff alleges defamation and loss of reputation 
because of an allegation of criminal conduct without any allegation of a 
 
25 
quantifiable loss, the case would survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and 
a M.R. Civ. P. 56 motion for summary judgment.  However, under the narrow 
definition of “actual injury” we first adopted in Maietta, such a case would be 
dismissed upon a special motion brought pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute.  
Maietta and its progeny have created a scenario where a meritorious case 
would be dismissed upon a special motion brought pursuant to Maine’s 
anti-SLAPP statute.   
[¶34]  As a result of the Maietta approach, the law presents an illogical 
policy allowing meritorious cases to be screened out by the anti-SLAPP statute.  
For example, if Weinstein had claimed the cost of one therapist visit as 
damages, he would survive this special motion to dismiss and the case would 
proceed.  In his case before a jury, Weinstein would not be limited to the cost of 
the one therapist visit, but he would be able to claim all damages available 
under our common law in a defamation case, including loss of reputation, 
embarrassment, and loss of standing in the community. 
[¶35]  It is time to revisit our holding in Maietta and define “actual injury” 
under Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute consistently with our traditional definition of 
“actual injury” in our common law.   
 
26 
B. 
Stare Decisis 
[¶36]  I recognize the doctrine of stare decisis and our consistent reliance 
on Maietta in the eighteen years following the decision; however, there are 
good reasons to revisit our holding in Maietta.  It is true that it is our policy, 
historically, to “stand by precedent” and not “disturb . . . settled point[s] of law.”  
Myrick v. James, 444 A.2d 987, 997 (Me. 1982).  However, we also recognize that 
precedents “do not become totally immune from change for all time.”  Id. at 998.   
[S]tare decisis is not an inflexible rule requiring this court to blindly 
follow precedents and adhere to prior decisions[,] . . . [and] when it 
appears that public policy and social needs require departure from 
prior decisions, it is our duty as a court of last resort to overrule 
those decisions and establish a rule consonant with our present 
day concepts of right and justice. 
 
Id. (quotation marks omitted).  “[W]e also recognize the dangers of a blind 
application of [stare decisis] merely to enshrine forever earlier decisions of this 
court.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  Finally, “where the authorities 
supporting the prior rule have been drastically eroded and the suppositions on 
which it rested are disapproved in the better considered recent cases and in 
authoritative scholarly writings, and the prior holding of the prior case is 
counterproductive to its purposes, the situation is appropriate for legal change 
by the court’s decision.”  Id. at 998-99 (alternations and quotations marks 
omitted). 
 
27 
 
[¶37]  There are many reasons to revisit the holding in Maietta.  At the 
time of the Maietta decision in 2003, we were interpreting a statute enacted in 
1995.  The statute was silent as to the procedures and the standards to be used 
in evaluating special motions brought under the statute.  We were not alone in 
struggling to interpret the law.  Anti-SLAPP statutes were being enacted all 
across the country, and there were very few cases interpreting the new 
procedures and terms contained in these anti-SLAPP statutes.  Courts struggled 
with the constitutional conflicts created by the statutes.  See Duracraft Corp., 
691 N.E.2d at 943 (describing the problem as a “conundrum [that] has troubled 
judges and bedeviled the statute’s application”).   
 
[¶38]  We have a tortured history as a court in dealing with many aspects 
of this statute.  We struggled with the burden of proof in special motions 
brought under the statute.  Initially we held that the defendant/moving party 
was to be given the benefit of all favorable inferences, Morse Brothers, Inc., 2001 
ME 70, ¶ 18, 772 A.2d 842, a rule that we characterized as a “converse 
summary-judgment-like standard,”9  Nader I, 2012 ME 57, ¶ 32, 41 A.3d 551.  
 
9  In Nader v. Maine Democratic Party (Nader I), 2012 ME 57, ¶ 29, 41 A.3d 551 we used the term 
“converse-summary-judgment[-]like standard,” to describe the burden of proof for special motions 
brought under the anti-SLAPP statute.  See John G. Osborn & Jeffrey A. Thaler, Maine’s Anti-SLAPP 
Law: Special Protection Against Improper Lawsuits Targeting Free Speech and Petitioning, 23 Me. Bar J. 
32, 37 (2008). 
 
28 
In Nader I, to avoid an unconstitutional application of the statute, we overruled 
Morse Brothers, Inc., and changed the standard to the usual motion-to-dismiss 
practice giving the plaintiff/nonmoving party all favorable inferences.  Id. ¶ 36. 
[¶39]  Six years later, in Gaudette v. Davis (Gaudette I), we described the 
problem of reconciling the plaintiff’s constitutional right to access the courts 
with the defendant’s right to petition the government as a “tension between at 
least these two coexistent constitutional rights.”  2017 ME 86, ¶ 6, 160 A.3d 
1190.  We abandoned the approach we adopted in Nader I by holding that the 
plaintiff’s presentation of prima facie evidence as to the elements necessary to 
defeat a special motion to dismiss was not sufficient to defeat a special motion, 
and we added a third step whereby the trial court would review affidavits or 
conduct an evidentiary hearing and then adjudicate disputed facts by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Id. ¶¶ 16-18.  Then, four years later in Thurlow, 
we admitted that we had gone too far in Gaudette I because we infringed upon 
another constitutional right—the plaintiff’s right to have a jury decide disputed 
issues of fact.  Thurlow, 2021 ME 58, ¶¶ 16-19, 263 A.3d 494.  We held that this 
third step violated the plaintiff’s right to have a jury decide disputed facts.10  Id. 
 
10  The right to a jury trial was not raised as an issue in Gaudette v. Davis (Gaudette I), 2017 ME 86, 
160 A.3d 1190. 
 
29 
¶¶ 18-20.  We reinstated the process that we had adopted in Nader I, holding 
that the plaintiff/nonmoving party’s presentation of prima facie evidence was 
sufficient to defeat a special motion to dismiss.  Id. ¶ 19. 
 
[¶40]  The Washington Supreme Court, in holding that the Washington 
anti-SLAPP statute was unconstitutional, stated, “We hold [Washington’s 
anti-SLAPP statute] violates the right of trial by jury under article I, section 21 
of the Washington Constitution because it requires a trial judge to invade the 
jury’s province of resolving disputed facts and dismiss—and punish—
nonfrivolous claims without a trial.”  Davis, 351 P.3d at 875 (Wash. 2015) 
(emphasis added).  
 
[¶41]  Members of this Court have also raised constitutional concerns 
about this law in the past.  In his concurrence to Nader I, Justice Silver wrote 
that “[t]he analytical acrobatics necessary here to reconcile the Constitution 
with the language of the statute and with our previous interpretations of it 
indicates that, as written, this statute presents serious constitutional 
questions.”  Nader I, 2012 ME 57, ¶ 51 41 A.3d 551 (Silver, J., concurring).  More 
recently in Franchini v. Investor’s Business Daily, Inc., Justice Hjelm also called 
attention to issues with the statute, stating that “[i]f anything, the problems 
inherent in [Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute], and our continuing efforts to fashion 
 
30 
a constitutionally sound and workable process to implement the statute, make 
it difficult to conclude with assurance that there is ‘clear controlling 
precedent[]’ for much of anything related to that statute.”  2022 ME 12, ¶ 51, --- 
A.3d --- (Hjelm, A.R.J., dissenting) (third alteration in original).  
[¶42]  After a review of our jurisprudence in the context of the numerous 
changes we have made with our interpretations of this flawed statute it does 
not make any legal sense to continue following the prevailing precedent 
adopted in Maietta.  It would have been better for the Legislature to give us 
guidance on whether it intended to change the common-law definition of 
“actual injury” and what standards we should be following in reviewing special 
motions to dismiss.   
[¶43]  Moreover, the decision for us “is less a matter of honoring stare 
decisis than a matter of resolving the sharp and hitherto unexplained conflict” 
between our anti-SLAPP jurisprudence and the common law of defamation.  
Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Shone, 2020 ME 122, ¶ 23, 239 A.3d 671.  We should 
resolve this conflict and harmonize the law by construing “actual injury” under 
Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute consistently with our common-law definition of 
“actual injury.” 
 
31 
C. 
Application 
[¶44]  Weinstein has alleged damages that would be recoverable in a 
defamation lawsuit brought in Maine.  In his complaint and affidavit, he alleges 
a loss of his reputation, a loss to his standing in the community, and/or 
emotional distress as follows. 
• Paragraph seventeen of Weinstein’s complaint states: “These 
statements have caused actual harm to Plaintiff’s reputation 
and livelihood and have inflicted emotional distress.”   
 
• Paragraph twenty-one of Weinstein’s complaint states: “The 
statements either are defamatory per se or caused special 
harm to the plaintiff, in that the Defendant’s statements 
harmed the character and reputation of the plaintiff . . . .”   
 
• Paragraph nineteen of the Weinstein’s affidavit states that he 
was “caused to suffer embarrassment, shame and emotional 
distress.” 
 
• Paragraph twenty-five of Weinstein’s affidavit states: “These 
statements have caused actual harm to my reputation with 
members of those Boards [Maine and Massachusetts 
Overseers of the Bar].”   
 
[¶45]  For the reasons stated above, I believe that we should conclude 
that Weinstein has satisfied the requirement of presenting a prima facie case of 
actual injury under Maine’s common law.11  There is merit to Weinstein’s case, 
 
11  The claim for damages in Weinstein’s case is the garden-variety claim of emotional distress 
associated with a defamation case and not an element of the tort, as it would be with the tort claim 
of intentional infliction of emotional distress.  The Court’s opinion cites Lyman v. Huber, 2010 ME 
139, ¶ 23, 10 A.3d 707, and Lougee Conservancy v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 2012 ME 103, ¶¶ 4-8, 26, 48 
 
32 
and but for our narrow definition of “actual injury,” he would be entitled to 
proceed forward with his case. 
II.  PRIVILEGE 
[¶46]  The Court’s opinion holds that Narowetz was entitled to absolute 
immunity regarding her testimony before the Dental Board, but it does not 
discuss whether Narowetz was entitled to any immunity regarding complaints 
she made to the Overseers of the Bar in Maine and Massachusetts and the USPS.  
Court’s Opinion ¶ 15.  The Court’s opinion does not discuss those claims 
because it affirms the trial court’s dismissal of those claims pursuant to 
Narowetz’s special motion to dismiss brought under Maine’s anti-SLAPP 
statute.  Court’s Opinion ¶ 14.  Because I believe that we should vacate the 
dismissals made by the trial court pursuant to Narowetz’s special motion, we 
need to address whether Narowetz was protected by immunity regarding those 
claims. 
 
A.3d 774, both involving claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, for the principle that 
emotional distress must be “so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.”  
Court’s Opinion ¶ 11 (quoting Schelling v. Lindell, 2008 ME 59, ¶ 25, 942 A.2d 1226 (quotation marks 
omitted)).  However, these standards of review involving emotional distress apply only when the 
cause of action is an independent tort (intentional infliction of emotional distress) and not when 
emotional distress is claimed as damages incidental to another tort, such as negligence or defamation.  
See Horton & McGehee, Maine Civil Remedies, § 4-3(c)(2) (4th ed. 2004) (“In addition to being an 
element of damages, mental anguish or emotional distress may be actionable as either or both of two 
independent torts: negligent infliction of emotional distress and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.” (emphasis added)). 
 
33 
[¶47]  There are two classes of privilege created by law: absolute 
privileges and qualified privileges.  Restatement (Second) of Torts ch. 25, 
topic 2, tit. B intro note (Am. L. Inst. 1977).  Absolute privileges recognize that 
people of a particular position or status should be free from fear that what they 
do or say may have an adverse impact upon them.  Id.  Qualified privileges are 
based upon a public policy that recognizes that it is desirable that true 
information be given whenever necessary for the protection of the speaker, 
third persons, or the general public.  Id.  In a Maine case directly on point, we 
have said that “[a]ny person has a qualified privilege to make statements to law 
enforcement or regulatory agencies regarding the conduct of others, where the 
person making the statement believes in good faith that the statement is true 
and indicates that a statutory standard administered by the agency may have 
been violated.”  Truman v. Browne, 2001 ME 182, ¶ 15, 788 A.2d 168.  
[¶48]  Here, Narowetz made complaints to various regulatory agencies.  
She filed a complaint with the Overseers of the Bar in Maine and Massachusetts, 
alleging harassment and intimidation by Weinstein.  She also made a complaint 
to the USPS, alleging that Weinstein was impersonating a postal employee, a 
federal crime.  These statements are allegedly defamatory in that they pertain 
to Weinstein’s profession as a lawyer and accuse him of violating the law.  
 
34 
Narowetz has admitted that the statements were false.  At this stage of the 
proceedings, Narowetz is not entitled to a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal based on an 
absolute privilege for claims that relate to complaints or statements made to 
Boards of Overseers and the USPS.  If Weinstein can convince the fact finder by 
a preponderance of the evidence that “either that the utterer ‘knew [her] his 
statement to be false or recklessly disregarded its truth or falsity, i.e., 
entertained a high degree of awareness of probable falsity or serious doubt as 
to the truth of the statement’ . . . or ‘acted entirely out of ill will’ toward 
[Weinstein],” then he may overcome the privilege.  Baker v. Charles, 919 F. Supp. 
41, 45 (D. Me. 1996) (quoting Staples v. Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co., 629 A.2d 601, 
604 (Me. 1993). 
[¶49]  The Court relies upon a number of cases to support its conclusion 
that Narowetz was entitled to absolute immunity, see Court’s Opinion ¶ 15, but 
none of these cases specifically speak to Weinstein’s claims relating to 
Narowetz’s complaints to the regulatory agencies.  In Truman, 2001 ME 182, 
¶ 15, 788 A.2d 168, we relied on Baker v. Charles, 919 F. Supp. 41, 44 
(D. Me. 1996), a Maine federal district court case that held that qualified 
privilege applied to communications to a government agency like Maine’s Land 
Use Regulation Commission, and we also adopted section 598 of the 
 
35 
Restatement (Second) of Torts.  See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 598 
(Am. L. Inst. 1977).   
[¶50]  Although Narowetz is entitled to absolute immunity for her 
communications with and testimony before the Dental Board, see LaPlante v. 
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 810 F. Supp. 19, 21 (D. Me. 1993), her statements to the 
Maine Board of Overseers of the Bar, the Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers, 
and the USPS are entitled to only qualified immunity, see Truman, 2001 ME 182, 
¶ 15, 788 A.2d 168.   
D. 
Conclusion 
[¶51]  Thus, although I agree that Count 2 of Weinstein’s complaint, 
which alleges slander in the proceedings before the Board of Dental Practice 
Board, was properly dismissed, I would vacate the Superior Court’s judgment 
dismissing Counts 1, 3, 4, and 5 upon Narowetz’s special motion to dismiss 
brought under Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute.  Furthermore, because I believe that 
Narowetz’s statements made to the Maine Board of Overseers of the Bar, the 
Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers, and the USPS were entitled only to 
qualified immunity, Counts 1, 3, 4, and 5 should not be dismissed pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure.  Thus, I would remand for 
further proceedings on Counts 1, 3, 4, and 5, as well as Count 7, which seeks 
 
36 
punitive damages based on those claims, except to the extent that those counts 
allege tortious conduct in the proceedings before the Board of Dental Practice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STANFILL, C.J., dubitante.12 
 
[¶52]  I think the tortured evolution of our anti-SLAPP jurisprudence has 
taken several wrong turns.  As recently stated, “our jurisprudential efforts to 
properly interpret and determine the proper use of section 556 and the process 
governing it have been valiant, but the results have been nothing short of fluid.”  
Franchini v. Inv.’s Bus. Daily, Inc., 2022 ME 12, ¶ 51, --- A.3d --- (Hjelm, A.R.J., 
dissenting).13  I agree that our case law interpreting 14 M.R.S. § 556 (2021) 
 
12   A dubitante . . . opinion indicates that “the judge doubted a legal point but was 
unwilling to state that it was wrong.”  Said Lon Fuller, “Expressing the epitome of the 
common law spirit, there is the opinion entered dubitante—the judge is unhappy 
about some aspect of the decision rendered, but cannot quite bring himself to record 
an open dissent.” 
Jason J. Czarnezki, The Dubitante Opinion, 39 Akron L. Rev. 1, 2 (2006) (footnote omitted).  
See Am. Inst. for Int'l Steel, Inc. v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1345 n.1 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2019) 
(Katzmann, J., dubitante) (“The dubitante opinion has also been issued where—as I do in the case 
before us now—a judge considers himself or herself to be constrained or bound by precedent, but 
wishes to suggest an alternative view.”) 
13  As Justice Hjelm further notes, “the problems inherent in section 556, and our continuing efforts 
to fashion a constitutionally sound and workable process to implement the statute, make it difficult 
to conclude with assurance that there is clear controlling precedent for much of anything related to 
that statute.”  Franchini v. Inv.’s Bus. Daily, Inc., 2022 ME 12, ¶ 51, --- A.3d --- (Hjelm, A.R.J., dissenting) 
(alteration and quotation marks omitted). 
 
37 
compels the result the majority reaches.  I also agree with the dissent that we 
have taken a wrong turn in defining “actual injury” as used in section 556, with 
the result that meritorious cases are dismissed.  I write dubitante and decline 
to join the dissent, however, because the doctrine of stare decisis cautions that 
the fact that a case was wrongly decided may be insufficient justification to 
overrule it.  See e.g., Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 455-56 (2015).  
And, despite the twisting path of our jurisprudence, the Legislature has not 
altered the statute.  See Charlton v. Town of Oxford, 2001 ME 104, ¶ 24, 774 A.2d 
366. 
[¶53]  There is value in correcting our course if we have erred, but I share 
the concern publicly expressed by other jurists that when we easily overrule 
precedent, we risk further undermining public confidence in the independence 
of the courts at a time when that public confidence has waned.14  I invite the 
Legislature to revisit the anti-SLAPP statute in light of legal developments in 
Maine and other states since it was enacted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14  See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 14-15, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., --- 
U.S. --- (2022) (No.19-1392), (comments of Justice Sotomayor), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2021/19-1392_gfbi.pdf.  
 
38 
Neal L. Weinstein (orally), appellant pro se 
 
Janna L. Gau, Esq., and Alfred J. Falzone III, Esq. (orally), Eaton Peabody, Bangor 
and Portland, for appellees Old Orchard Beach Family Dentistry, LLC, and 
Marina Narowetz 
 
 
York County Superior Court docket number CV-2020-71 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY