Title: CODY LEE EDWARDS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

CODY LEE EDWARDS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 146167 P.3d 636Case Number: 06-25Decided: 09/18/2007
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
CODY 
LEE EDWARDS,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OFWYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Tina N. 
Kerin, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  
Argument by Ms. Kerin.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; James Michael Causey, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Causey.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant Cody 
Edwards appeals the judgment and sentence of the district court convicting him 
of aggravated vehicular homicide.  
Edwards contends the district court improperly excluded evidence relevant 
to his defense, citing particularly W.R.E. 404.  We agree and reverse.   

 
 

ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Edwards presents 
a single issue for our review:

 
 
Did the 
trial court err in precluding relevant evidence of the deceased's prior conduct, 
prohibiting Appellant from fully presenting his defense?

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On February 5, 
2005, at approximately 10:30 p.m., Edwards and his passenger, David Southworth, 
were injured in a single-vehicle rollover on I-25 in Casper, Wyoming.  
Southworth suffered a crushed skull and died from his injuries en route 
to the hospital.  Both men were 
intoxicated at the time of the crash, each having a blood alcohol level in 
excess of .20 percent.  

 
 
[¶4]      The State charged 
Edwards with one count of aggravated vehicular homicide under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-106(b)(i) and (ii) (LexisNexis 2007).1  At trial, Edwards did not dispute his 
blood alcohol level or deny being the driver of the vehicle at the time of the 
accident.  Rather, Edwards' trial 
defense focused on the issue of causation.  
Edwards' defense was that Southworth, being drunk and depressed, caused 
the accident by grabbing the steering wheel, resulting in the vehicle leaving 
the roadway.   

 
 
[¶5]      Edwards sought to 
prove that defense with, among other evidence, the after-accident discovery of 
antidepressant medication in Southworth's belongings left at Edwards' 
residence.  The district court 
disallowed the evidence until such time as Edwards could lay a proper foundation 
for its relevance.  Edwards also 
sought to introduce testimony from Schon Demel, a common friend, that two weeks 
before the fatal accident a drunk and depressed Southworth had grabbed the 
steering wheel of Demel's vehicle, causing the vehicle to briefly leave the 
roadway.  The State objected, 
claiming it was inadmissible under W.R.E. 404 and otherwise irrelevant.  The district court excluded this 
evidence, finding that the evidence was distracting and of little probative 
value.  

 
 
[¶6]      After a four-day 
trial, the jury found Edwards guilty on the charged offense.  The district court sentenced Edwards to 
a term of imprisonment of eight to fourteen years.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]      We review a trial 
court's evidentiary rulings under the following standard:

 
 
Evidentiary 
rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court and include 
determinations of the adequacy of foundation and relevancy, competency, 
materiality, and remoteness of the evidence.  This Court will generally accede to the 
trial court's determination of the admissibility of evidence unless that court 
clearly abused its discretion.  We 
have described the standard of an abuse of discretion as reaching the question 
of the reasonableness of the trial court's choice.  Judicial discretion is a composite of 
many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means 
exercising sound judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.  In the absence of an abuse of 
discretion, we will not disturb the trial court's determination.  The burden is on the defendant to 
establish such an abuse.

 
 

Gabbert 
v. State, 2006 
WY 108, ¶ 24, 141 P.3d 690, 697 (Wyo. 2006) (quoting Brown v. State, 2005 WY 37, ¶ 12, 109 P.3d 52, 56 (Wyo. 2005)); see also Farmer v. State, 2005 WY 162, ¶ 8, 124 P.3d 699, 703 (Wyo. 2005); Holloman v. 
State, 2005 WY 25, ¶ 10, 106 P.3d 879, 883 (Wyo. 
2005).

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶8]      The dispositive 
issue in this appeal is whether the district court erred in refusing to admit 
evidence concerning an incident in which Southworth allegedly interfered with 
Demel's ability to operate his vehicle.  
As noted, Edwards defended on the theory that Southworth's action in 
grabbing the steering wheel was the proximate cause of the accident that 
ultimately resulted in Southworth's death.  
In an effort to support his theory, Edwards sought to introduce the 
testimony of Demel that Southworth had grabbed his steering wheel under similar 
circumstances two weeks earlier.  
Edwards argued the evidence was admissible to show identity, course of 
conduct, plan, motive and modus operandi under W.R.E. 
404(b).

 
 
[¶9]      Almost identical 
facts appear in State v. Young, 739 P.2d 1170 (Wash. App. 1987).  In Young, the defendant was driving a 
vehicle that was involved in an accident.  
The two passengers were killed.  
Young was charged with two counts of vehicular homicide.  Although Young was legally intoxicated 
at the time of the accident, he alleged that the accident was caused by one of 
the passengers, Vince Setzer, grabbing the steering wheel.  Young sought to introduce evidence that 
Setzer "had on four prior occasions within the last year and a half grabbed the 
steering wheel away from the driver."  
Id. at 
1172.  The trial court disallowed 
the evidence.  In analyzing the 
propriety of the exclusion of that evidence, the Washington Court of Appeals 
stated:

 
 
Mr. 
Young further argues the evidence should have been admitted pursuant to ER 
404(b) to prove identity, control, absence of mistake and modus operandi.  Calbom [v. Knudtzon], 65 Wash.2d [157,] 168, 396 P.2d 148 [(1964)].

 
 
The 
admission of other acts under ER 404(b) has been used primarily where the 
prosecution offers the evidence to prove an essential element of the crime or 
rebut a defense of mistake.  State v. Dinges, 48 Wash. 2d 152, 292 P.2d 361 (1956); State v. Brown, 30 Wash. App. 344, 633 P.2d 1351 (1981) (two prior convictions for prostitution were 
admissible to prove intent on a charge of prostitution loitering); State v. Fernandez, 28 Wash. App. 944, 
628 P.2d 818 (1980) (admission of similar acts to prove modus operandi, 
identity, and rebut the defense's explanation of accident); State v. Bloomstrom, 12 Wash. App. 416, 
529 P.2d 1124 (1974), review denied, 85 Wash. 2d 1009 (1975) (acts of 
interest in other children admissible to show injury to victim was not 
accidental); State v. Messinger, 8 Wash. App. 829, 509 P.2d 382, review denied, 82 Wash. 2d 1010 (1973) (defendant's 
subsequent acts of misconduct admitted to show consciousness of guilt and 
identity); State v. Moxley, 6 Wash. App. 153, 491 P.2d 1326 (1971), review denied, 80 Wash. 2d 1004 (1972) (prior 
threat to kill wife admissible in arson case to show husband's identity and 
willfulness of act); State v. 
Stationak, 1 Wash. App. 558, 463 P.2d 260 (1969) (evidence of unrelated crime 
committed 5 1/2 months before admissible to rebut the defense's claim of 
accident).

 
 

            
Mr. Young argues the rule is not limited to use by the prosecution and 
should be equally available to a defendant when used to prove his theory of 
defense.  State v. Chapman, 209 Mont. 57, 679 P.2d 1210 
(1984).  We agree.  Here, Mr. Setzer's prior acts of conduct 
were relevant for the purpose of proving (1) the identity of the person 
responsible for the accident was Mr. Setzer, (2) it was he, not Mr. Young, who 
was in control of the vehicle at the time of the accident, and (3) Mr. Setzer's 
intentional interference with Mr. Young's steering was the proximate cause of 
the accident.  Although the evidence 
may have been probative to prove the similarity of acts, i.e., "modus 
operandi", Mr. Young failed to raise this as a basis for admission at trial and 
thus is excluded from raising it as error on review.  State v. Wixon, 30 Wash. App. 63, 631 P.2d 1033, review denied, 96 Wash. 2d 1012 (1981).

 
 
            
The court excluded the proffered evidence on the basis of ER 403.  Weighing the probative value of evidence 
under ER 403 against the dangers of confusion or prejudice, the general rule 
requires the balance be struck in favor of admissibility.  United 
States v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 782 (8th 
Cir. 1980).  ER 403 does not extend 
to the exclusion of crucial evidence relevant to the central contention of a 
valid defense. 5 K. Tegland, Wash.Prac., at § 105; United 
States v. Wasman, 641 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1981).  Here, evidence of Mr. Setzer's conduct 
on the night of the accident was highly probative and crucial to Mr. Young's 
theory of defense, that it was Mr. Setzer and not he that caused the accident. 
Nor is its probative value "substantially out-weighed" by the dangers enumerated 
in ER 403.  The balance should have 
been struck in favor of admissibility. Under these circumstances the court's 
failure to do so was an abuse of discretion.

 
 

Id. at 
1174-75.2

 
 
[¶10]   Similarly, under the facts and 
circumstances of the instant case, we find the proffered testimony of Demel was 
improperly excluded.  Edwards was 
charged with aggravated vehicular homicide, which required a finding that his 
wrongful conduct (driving while under the influence or recklessness) proximately 
caused Southworth's death. § 6-2-106(b)(i) and (ii); Glazier v. State, 843 P.2d 1200, 1204 
(Wyo. 1992); Buckles v. State, 830 P.2d 702, 706 
(Wyo. 
1992).  To be the proximate cause, 
the accident or injury must be the natural and probable consequence of the 
defendant's wrongful conduct; a substantial factor in bringing about the 
injuries or death.  Bloomquist v. State, 914 P.2d 812, 820 
(Wyo. 1996); 
Glazier, 843 P.2d  at 1204.  Evidence of a victim's actions is 
relevant whenever those actions have a bearing on the defendant's alleged 
wrongful conduct or in determining whether the defendant's wrongful conduct was 
the proximate cause of a victim's death.  
Buckles, 830 P.2d  at 
707-08.  The evidence of 
Southworth's prior actions was crucial to Edwards' defense that his conduct was 
not the proximate cause of the accident and Southworth's death.  Edwards advanced appropriate argument as 
to why the evidence should be admissible.  
The district court abused its discretion in excluding that evidence under 
either W.R.E. 403 or 404.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶11]   Demel's testimony was erroneously 
excluded.  Given our resolution of 
this issue, we need not address Edwards' other complaints concerning the 
district court's evidentiary rulings. We reverse this case and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1§ 
6-2-106(b)(i) and (ii) states:

 
 
(b)  A person is guilty of aggravated 
homicide by vehicle and shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary 
for not more than twenty (20) years, if:

(i)  While operating or driving a vehicle in 
violation of W.S. 10-6-103, 31-5-233 or 41-13-206, he causes the death of 
another person and the violation is the proximate cause of the death; 
or

(ii)  He operates or drives a vehicle in a 
reckless manner, and his conduct is the proximate cause of the death of another 
person.

2Washington's rules of evidence 403 
and 404 are substantially identical to W.R.E. 403 and 
404.