Title: STATE v DISTRICT COURT

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 13281 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1976 T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A , Applicant and Relator, THE DISTRICT C O U R T O F T H E THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, and t h e HON. CHARLES L U E D K E , ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: Counsel of Record : For Relator : Anderson, Symmes, Forbes, Peete & Brown, B i l l i n g s , Montana James L. Jones argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana J. Michael Young argued, Helena, Montana For Respondents: Keefer and Roybal, B i l l i n g s , Montana N e i l S. Keefer argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana Cate, Lynaugh, Fitzgerald and Huss, B i l l i n g s , Montana George Huss argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana Filed : Submitted: March 17, 1976 Decided: lidffi'td i2 1976 M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This case i s before t h e Court on a n a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a remedial w r i t f i l e d by t h e S t a t e of Montana t o p r o h i b i t f u r t h e r proceedings i n t h e t h i r t e e n t h j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n Cause No. 65626, Azure v. C i t y of B i l l i n g s and S t a t e of Montana. The basic i s s u e r a i s e d i n t h i s proceeding concerns t h e l i a b i l i t y of a c i t y and t h e s t a t e f o r t h e negligent a c t s of c i t y p o l i c e o f f i c e r s i n view of A r t . 11, 818, 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n and t h e Montana Comprehensive S t a t e Insurance Plan and Tort Claims Act, s e c t i o n 82-4301 e t seq., R.C.M. 1947 ( h e r e i n a f t e r c a l l e d Tort C l a i m s A c t ) . The p l a i n t i f f i n No. 65626, J e f f r e y Azure, w a s i n j u r e d i n 1974 when beaten i n a bar i n t h e C i t y of B i l l i n g s . For some time following t h e beating he wandered aimlessly along t h e streets of B i l l i n g s i n what appeared t o be a drunken stupor. A l o c a l r e s i d e n t observed Azure a c t i n g suspiciously and c a l l e d t h e B i l l i n g s p o l i c e department. Two o f f i c e r s a r r i v e d a t t h e scene and a r r e s t e d Azure on a charge of drunkenness. Azure w a s booked i n t o t h e c i t y j a i l and held t h e r e f o r approximately s i x t e e n hours before being taken t o a l o c a l h o s p i t a l f o r treatment. The p l a i n t i f f a l l e g e s he suffered s e r i o u s and permanent b r a i n damage as a r e s u l t of t h e beating and f a i l u r e of t h e C i t y p o l i c e o f f i c e r s t o t a k e him t o a h o s p i t a l f o r medical care. P r i o r t o commencing t h i s l a w s u i t , Azure f i l e d a t o r t claim with t h e City. When no a c t i o n w a s taken within s i x t y days, he f i l e d t h i s s u i t a g a i n s t t h e City. Thereafter Azure f i l e d a t o r t claim a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e of Montana " t o place t h e S t a t e of Montana on n o t i c e of t h i s c l a i m i n t h e event t h a t t h e d o c t r i n e s t a t e d i n Kingfisher v. C i t y of Forsyth, 132 Mont. 39, 45, 314 P.2d 876 (1957) i s still v i a b l e . " More than s i x t y days follow- ing, p l a i n t i f f f i l e d an amended complaint adding t h e S t a t e as a defendant. S u b s t a n t i a l discovery was undertaken, including t h e taking of a deposition from t h e c h i e f of p o l i c e of t h e City. The S t a t e moved t o be dismissed and t h e C i t y moved f o r sum- mary judgment. Azure r e s i s t e d both motions, contending t h a t both t h e City and S t a t e a r e l i a b l e . The S t a t e contended t h a t t h e C i t y is v i c a r i o u s l y l i a b l e f o r t h e a c t s of its employees, and t h a t no master-servant r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t s between t h e S t a t e and members of t h e B i l l i n g s P o l i c e Department. The C i t y contended t h a t p o l i c e o f f i c e r s of municipal corporations are agents of t h e S t a t e and not of t h e C i t y and t h a t only t h e S t a t e can be l i a b l e under t h e d o c t r i n e of respondeat superior. The latter argument is based on our holdings i n Kingfisher and a l a t e r supporting d e c i s i o n , Boettger v. Emp. L i a b i l i t y Assur. Corp., 158 Mont. 258, 262, 490 P.2d 717. O n January 16, 1976, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t granted t h e C i t y ' s motion f o r summary judg- ment i n its favor and denied t h e S t a t e ' s motion t o dismiss. P l a i n t i f f Azure appealed from t h e d e c i s i o n holding t h e City not l i a b l e . The S t a t e applied t o t h i s Court f o r r e l i e f i n order t o e s t a b l i s h its freedom from l i a b i l i t y and o b v i a t e i t s defense i n t h e main a c t i o n . O n February 2 4 , 1976, w e entered an o r d e r accepting j u r i s d i c t i o n , consolidating t h i s o r i g i n a l pro- ceeding with t h e pending appeal, and s t a y i n g f u r t h e r proceedings i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t . The i s s u e s presented a r e : 1. May t h e C i t y of B i l l i n g s be held l i a b l e f o r t h e neg- l i g e n t a c t s of p o l i c e o f f i c e r s employed by i t ? 2. May t h e S t a t e of Montana be held l i a b l e f o r t h e neg- l i g e n t a c t s of p o l i c e o f f i c e r s employed by Montana m u n i c i p a l i t i e s ? The arguments of a l l p a r t i e s focus on two a r e a s : t h e v i t a l i t y of t h e Kingfisher and Boettger d e c i s i o n s a s they relate t o municipal l i a b i l i t y f o r p o l i c e conduct; and t h e abrogation i n Montana of t h e d o c t r i n e of sovereign immunity through t h e 1972 Montana Constitution and t h e Tort C l a i m s Act. Kingfisher, decided i n 1957, s t a n d s f o r t h e p o s i t i o n long adhered t o by t h e c o u r t s and l e g i s l a t u r e of t h i s s t a t e p r i o r t o 1972 t h a t t h e sovereign was immune from s u i t i n t h e absence of i t s consent t o be sued. I n an a c t i o n a g a i n s t a c i t y and i t s policeman f o r wrongful death, it was held t h a t c i t y p o l i c e functions w e r e "governmental" f u n c t i o n s ordained by and f o r t h e b e n e f i t of t h e state a t l a r g e . Therefore, " * * * a c i t y policeman i n enforcing c i t y ordinances is a c t i n g as an agent of t h e s t a t e , and * * * t h e c i t y i s t h e r e f o r e not respon- s i b l e i n damages f o r h i s conduct." Taking t h e "agency" f a c t o r one s t e p f u r t h e r , t h i s Court s t a t e d i n Boettger: "Our d e c i s i o n i n Kingfisher i s n o t bottomed on t h e p r i n c i p l e of sovereign immunity a t a l l ; on t h e c o n t r a r y it rests on t h e absence of a principal-agent r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e c i t y and t h e policemen, thereby rendering t h e d o c t r i n e of respondeat superior inapplicable." The Court affirmed t h e d i s m i s s a l of a c i t y and its mayor and councilmen from a wrongful d e a t h a c t i o n "because t h e necessary element of agency i s lacking." Subsequent t o t h e s e c a s e s t h e 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n was r a t i f i e d . A r t . 11, S18 s t a t e s i n r e l e v a n t p a r t : "The s t a t e , counties, cities, towns, and a l l o t h e r l o c a l governmental e n t i t i e s s h a l l have no immunity from s u i t f o r i n j u r y t o a person o r property * * *." The Tort Claims Act of 1973 implements t h e quoted Con- s t i t u t i o n a l provision. "Governmental e n t i t i e s " a r e defined t o include, among o t h e r t h i n g s , cities and municipal corporations. s e c t i o n 82-4302 (2) and ( 3 ) , R.C.M. 1947. Section 82-4310 states: "Every governmental e n t i t y is s u b j e c t t o liability for its torts and those of its employees acting within the scope of their employment or duties whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary function." Section 82-4302(4) defines "Employee" as: " * * * an officer, employee, or servant of a governmental entity, including elected or appointed officials, and persons acting on behalf of the governmental entity in any official capacity temporarily or permanently in the service of the governmental entity whether with or without com- pensation * * *." Clearly Art. 11, 518, and the Tort Claims Act are direct overrulings by the people and the legislature, respectively, of our holdings in Kingfisher and Boettger. Notwithstanding the interpretation advanced in Boettger, Kingfisher is a sovereign immunity case as evidenced by its classic distinction between "governmental" and "proprietary" functions, Kingfisher at 44 and cases cited; see Prosser on Torts 4th ed. 1971, 5131, pp. 977-87. This artificial distinction has been expressly abrogated by the last clause of section 82-4310. As for the "absence of a principal-agent relationship be- tween the city and the policemen", as stated in Boettger, the definition of "employee" in section 82-4302(4) makes such an assertion untenable. In addition, reference to the ~etropolitan Police Law, section 11-1801 et seq., R.C.M. 1947, makes it abundantly clear that the principals of municipal government are in direct control of municipal police departments. The deposition taken of the Billings chief of police establishes several of the facets of a principal-agent relationship, or more accurately a master-servant relationship, between the City and the policemen. The most significant factor in this regard is that the City has the exclusive power to hire and fire its police officers. See 53 Am Jur 2d,Master and Servant, 52. The power in the City to control its policemen in both broad and detailed affairs related to their work brings the policemen squarely within the definition of "employee" and s u b j e c t s t h e City t o l i a b i l i t y under t h e terms of Section 82-4310 f o r t o r t s of i t s employees " * * * a c t i n g within t h e scope of t h e i r employment o r d u t i e s * * *." While t h e p o l i c e o f f i c e r s a r e t h e servants of t h e C i t y , it cannot be said t h a t they a r e s e r v a n t s o r agents of t h e S t a t e . The S t a t e e x e r c i s e s no d i r e c t , d e t a i l e d o r d a i l y supervision over City policemen; it i s powerless t o avoid o r prevent negli- gent a c t s by them. I t cannot pay, h i r e o r f i r e City policemen, and it does not provide p o l i c e s e r v i c e s f o r t h e City. I n s h o r t , t h e S t a t e does not c o n t r o l t h e a c t i v i t i e s of C i t y p o l i c e o f f i c e r s and cannot be held responsible f o r t h e i r negligence. Furthermore, t h e scheme of t h e T o r t Claims Act r e v e a l s t h e l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t t o make c i t i e s and o t h e r p o l i t i c a l sub- d i v i s i o n s responsible and l i a b l e f o r t h e negligence of t h e i r employees, r a t h e r than t h e S t a t e . Section 82-4303 provides f o r s t a t e purchase of insurance t o cover t h e exposures c r e a t e d by t h e 1972 Constitution. Section 82-4306 extends t o a l l p o l i t i c a l subdivisions t h e same a u t h o r i t y t o procure insurance. Section 82-4309 a u t h o r i z e s p o l i t i c a l subdivisions t o levy t a x e s t o pay t h e premiums f o r such insurance. Section 82-4318 allows t h e governing body of each p o l i t i c a l subdivision t o compromise and settle any claim f i l e d a g a i n s t it. Section 82-4326 a u t h o r i z e s p o l i t i c a l subdivisions t o levy and c o l l e c t t a x e s a t t h e earliest p o s s i b l e t i m e t o pay a claim f o r which t h e r e i s no insurance o r o t h e r fund a v a i l a b l e . It i s c l e a r t h a t p o l i t i c a l subdivisions such a s t h e City a r e f i n a n c i a l l y responsible, t o t h e exclusion of t h e S t a t e , f o r t h e conduct of t h e i r employees. I n summary, we hold t h a t t h e C i t y may be held l i a b l e f o r t h e negligence of its p o l i c e o f f i c e r s and t h e S t a t e i s n o t responsible f o r t h e conduct of City p o l i c e a c t i n g within t h e scope of t h e i r employment. Kingfisher and Boettger no longer represent t h e law i n Montana with r e s p e c t t o municipal l i a b i l i t y f o r p o l i c e conduct because of t h e adoption of t h e 1972 Con- s t i t u t i o n and t h e Tort Claims Act. W e express no opinion on t h e ultimate l i a b i l i t y of t h e City under t h e f a c t s of t h i s case as t h i s must await f u r t h e r proceedings. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t erred i n granting t h e C i t y ' s motion and denying t h e S t a t e ' s motion. These r u l i n g s a r e vacated. The motion of t h e City of B i l l i n g s f o r summary judgment i s denied, and t h e S t a t e ' s motion t o dismiss is granted i n Cause No. 65626 i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t . J u s t i c e W e concur: tices Jack Shanstrom, d i s t r i c t dge, s i t t i n g i n place of M r . hie£ J u s t i c e James T. Harrison.