Title: State v. Dean

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Dean, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-5070.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-5070 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. DEAN, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Dean, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-5070.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder — Sixth Amendment violation — Death 
penalty conviction and sentence vacated, and cause remanded. 
(No. 2006-1126 — Submitted August 10, 2010 — Decided October 26, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Common Pleas of Clark County, 
No. 05-CR-348. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
{¶ 1} This case involves a defendant’s Sixth Amendment request to 
represent himself, which was denied by the trial judge because the request was 
viewed as involuntary.  Yet the trial judge’s bias against and threats to defense 
counsel created the involuntary nature of defendant’s choice.  Counsel stated that 
they could no longer fully represent their client because the judge had made 
statements against them.  This unusual conundrum had caused counsel to be 
apprehensive, anxious, and preoccupied over the judge’s intentions.  However, the 
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judge refused to allow them to withdraw from the case.  The defendant, seeing the 
drama between the judge and his counsel unfold, believed that adequate 
representation from these attorneys was impossible.  Thus, he asked to represent 
himself.  The judge refused the request because the defendant had stated that he 
was “under duress.”  But the judge himself had created that duress.  This dilemma 
permeated the entire trial. 
{¶ 2} This court has a responsibility to preserve the integrity of the 
criminal justice system, which includes a duty to ensure that all defendants have 
received a fair trial from an impartial judge.  Where the record demonstrates that 
such has not occurred, the remedy is a new trial.  We are mindful of both the 
anguish suffered by the family and friends of the victims and the substantial 
evidence of defendant’s participation in a senseless murder.  Yet based on the 
highly extraordinary facts of this case, we are required to  reverse the convictions,  
vacate the death sentence imposed on defendant-appellant, Jason Dean, and 
remand this case for a new trial.  To that end, our decision follows. 
Case history 
{¶ 3} Dean was accused of shooting at Yolanda Lyles and Andre Piersoll 
at a convenience store, shooting at the vehicle and home of Devon Williams, 
shooting at Shanta Chilton, Hassan Chilton, Shani Applin, and Applin’s young 
child Jaida Bullock,1 and then fatally shooting and robbing Titus Arnold.  Dean 
was indicted on two counts of aggravated murder.  Count 12 charged Dean with 
the aggravated murder of Arnold with prior calculation and design.  Count 13 
charged him with the aggravated murder of Arnold while committing aggravated 
robbery.  Both counts included death-penalty specifications because these crimes 
represented a course of conduct, R.C. 2929.04(A)(5), and because the murder 
occurred during the aggravated robbery, and although he was not the principal 
                                                          
 
1.  Jaida is referred to as Jaeada Applin in Count 10. 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
offender, Dean committed the aggravated murder with prior calculation and 
design, R.C. 2929.04(A)(7). 
{¶ 4} Dean was also indicted on six counts of attempted murder:  Count 
1 charged Dean with the attempted murder of Piersoll, Count 2 charged the 
attempted murder of Lyles, Count 7 charged the attempted murder of Shanta 
Chilton, Count 8 charged the attempted murder of Hassan Chilton, Count 9 
charged the attempted murder of Shani Applin, and Count 10 charged the 
attempted murder of Jaida. 
{¶ 5} Dean was also indicted on eight additional counts.  Counts 5 and 6 
charged Dean with discharging a firearm into an occupied structure.  Counts 3 and 
14 charged him with aggravated robbery.  Counts 4, 11, 15, and 16 charged Dean 
with having a weapon under a disability.  Additionally, firearm specifications 
were included under 12 counts of the indictment. 
{¶ 6} Dean pleaded not guilty to all charges.  However, the jury found 
Dean guilty, and he was sentenced to death. 
{¶ 7} Dean now appeals to this court as a matter of right.  In this appeal, 
Dean raises 23 propositions of law. 
Judicial bias and request for self-representation. 
{¶ 8} In proposition of law I, Dean argues that the trial court erred by 
overruling his request to waive counsel and represent himself.  In proposition of 
law III, Dean argues that his rights to a fair trial and due process were violated 
because the trial judge was biased against him and his attorneys.  Because these 
issues are intertwined, we shall address them together.  In addition, an 
understanding of the pretrial history is necessary to set the stage for the resulting 
conflict. 
{¶ 9} 1. Facts.  Before trial, the state certified to the court that disclosure 
of the address or whereabouts of a witness, Crystal Kaboos, Dean’s girlfriend, 
might subject her to physical harm or coercion.  See Crim.R. 16(B)(1)(e).  
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Thereafter, defense counsel, Richard Mayhall and John Butz, requested a hearing 
on the state’s certification. 
{¶ 10} On April 24, 2006, the trial court held a hearing on the 
certification.  No witnesses were called at the hearing, and the defense agreed to 
proceed on the basis of the state’s averments.  The state averred that threats had 
been made against Kaboos because she had testified against codefendant Wade.  
The trial court ruled that it “accepted the State’s certification that the disclosure of 
witness Kaboos’ address may subject her to physical harm or coercion.  
Accordingly, pursuant to Criminal Rule 16(B)(1)(e), the State need not disclose to 
the defense witness Kaboos’ address.” 
{¶ 11} On May 3, 2006, the defense moved for the trial judge to 
disqualify himself from presiding over Dean’s trial because the judge had heard 
evidence on the Crim.R. 16(B)(1)(e) certification.  The defense invoked State v. 
Gillard (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 226, 533 N.E.2d 272, paragraph one of the 
syllabus, which holds, “When the state seeks to obtain relief from discovery or to 
perpetuate testimony under Crim.R. 16(B)(1)(e), the judge who disposes of such a 
motion may not be the same judge who will conduct the trial.”  Gillard, which we 
reversed on other grounds, State v. McGuire (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 390, 402-403, 
686 N.E.2d 1112, adopted this rule because “when a judge hears information that 
a defendant has attempted to harm, coerce, or intimidate an opposing witness, 
there is an unnecessary risk that the judge will harbor a bias against that 
defendant.”  Id. at 229.  Nothing in the record establishes that the defense counsel, 
the trial judge, or the prosecutor was aware of, or remembered, the Gillard 
holding. 2 
                                                          
 
2.  During oral argument, appellate counsel for the state, who was also the prosecutor at trial, 
acknowledged that he had also failed to bring Gillard to the court’s attention.  He stated that he 
had overlooked Gillard because he had been focused on preparing for trial.  
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
{¶ 12} On May 4, 2006, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to 
disqualify.  On May 5, the trial court overruled the motion for two reasons.  First, 
the trial court anticipated “overwhelming evidence” of the defendant’s guilt at 
trial, which would render any Gillard violation harmless.  Gillard, 40 Ohio St.3d 
at 229, 533 N.E. 2d 272.  Second, the trial court stated that it “has not heard any 
evidence about the defendant and whether or not he and/or alleged cohorts have 
threatened State’s witnesses,” as the certification hearing involved lawyer 
argument only. 
{¶ 13} On May 8, 2006, jury selection began.  On May 10, 2006, trial 
counsel filed an affidavit of disqualification against the judge.  Trial counsel 
claimed in the affidavit that the judge had demonstrated bias and prejudice against 
the defendant by (1) overruling an unopposed defense motion to permit Dean to 
appear at trial without shackles, (2) presiding over the Crim.R. 16(B)(1)(e) 
certification hearing and then refusing to disqualify himself, and (3) prejudging 
the defendant’s guilt by making the statement that the court anticipated the 
presentation of “overwhelming evidence of guilt.”   Gillard, 40 Ohio St.3d at 229, 
533 N.E.2d 272. 
{¶ 14} In response to the defense motion for disqualification, the state 
claimed that the affidavit of disqualification was a calculated and deliberate 
attempt to have the judge removed from the case.  The state argued that trial 
counsel had neither raised the issue that the certification matter should be heard 
by another judge nor objected to the presiding judge’s participation.  The state 
supported its claim by providing an excerpt of an April 30, 2006 recorded phone 
conversation between Dean and his brother.  This conversation suggested the 
possibility that the trial judge might not be able to remain on his case because he 
had presided over the Gillard hearing. 
{¶ 15} On May 11, 2006, Chief Justice Thomas Moyer denied the 
affidavit of disqualification.  Chief Justice Moyer stated, “Although on their face 
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the judge’s statements in his judgment entry may appear to suggest a 
predisposition in this case, * * * the tone and the content of [the judge’s] response 
show that he is neither biased nor prejudiced against the defendant.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  
{¶ 16} After the parties were notified of Chief Justice’s Moyer’s decision, 
the relationship between the judge and the defense attorneys began to deteriorate.  
On May 12, 2006, the trial court and the parties discussed the denial of the 
affidavit of disqualification.  The trial court informed trial counsel that it had 
“some very serious concerns about the allegations that were set forth in the State’s 
response,” even though both the judge and the prosecutor had also overlooked 
Gillard.  Richard Mayhall, the lead defense counsel, denied doing anything 
wrong.  However, the trial court stated that the state’s allegation, which makes 
“serious accusations against defense counsel[,] * * * on its face appears to be 
corroborated by several facts, and the Court maintains some very serious concerns 
about defense counsel and the manner in which they’re operating in this 
courtroom.”  The trial court further stated that “in the interest of getting this case 
back on track, the Court will take that matter up at a later time; but I do assure the 
parties that that matter will be taken up * * *, preferably at the conclusion of this 
case.” 
{¶ 17} On May 15, 2006, John Butz, the assistant defense counsel, 
informed the trial court that defense counsel were concerned about possible 
disciplinary sanctions.  Butz stated, “[Q]uite honestly, we don’t think we can 
effectively represent Mr. Dean from this point on until whatever the issue is is 
resolved.”  Mayhall also told the court, “[A]fter your comments, I was 
intimidated; * * * if I did something wrong, I’ll accept responsibility for it.  But 
with this hanging over my head, * * * I don’t think I’m willing to risk further 
angering you, and I think that would affect my ability to represent Mr. Dean.” 
January Term, 2010 
7 
 
{¶ 18} In response, the trial court repeated that he would “handle the 
matter” after trial and “didn’t prejudge the situation.”  In response to a defense 
question about the allegations, the trial court stated, “I’m not saying that you’re 
guilty of them, but it appears from the allegations that you were manipulating the 
Court and deceiving the Court in an effort to have this Judge removed from the 
case.”  The trial court also told counsel, “I’m sorry you guys got yourself into this 
situation; but we’re going to proceed this morning.” 
{¶ 19} Later on the morning of May 15, trial counsel filed a motion to 
withdraw as counsel.  The motion included Mayhall’s and Butz’s affidavits.  
Mayhall expressed concern about aggressively representing his client when such 
actions might further anger the judge and expose counsel to harsher punishment at 
the end of trial.  Mayhall also stated that Dean is now potentially a witness against 
him regarding what he actually told Dean about the judge’s disqualification.  Butz 
stated that the trial court’s threat of contempt has caused him to be “physically 
and emotionally sick” and has had a “chilling effect” on his ability to zealously 
represent Dean. 
{¶ 20} The trial court denied the motion to withdraw.  The trial court 
stated that he “certainly had no intention of causing a chilling effect on defense 
counsel when it comes to zealously representing their client.”  He added, “Mr. 
Mayhall, I certainly have no problem with aggressive cross-examination.  * * *  I 
have no problem with objections that are made during the course of trial, and I 
have no problems with motions for mistrials if you think such motions are 
warranted.”  The trial court added, “I think that the events that happened last week 
— and, again, I’m not going to get to whether or not the allegations are true — 
but I think behavior in that fashion is something that this Court frowns upon.  * * 
*  I don’t like manipulation, and I don’t like — I just don’t like playing games.” 
{¶ 21} On May 16, 2006, Dean informed the court that he did not feel he 
could receive a fair trial with current counsel.  Dean said that he has “the 
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impression” that his counsel had offended the court and that the judge was taking 
the matter personally.  Dean requested new counsel or wanted to defend himself, 
a request he immediately asked to have stricken from the record.  The trial court 
told Dean, “I’m giving them free rein to defend you in an ethical manner * * * 
and so far I see them doing that.  So, I appreciate your concern, and I’ll continue 
to monitor the situation.” 
{¶ 22} Thereafter, 
Mayhall 
sought 
clarification 
about 
the 
term 
“unethical.”  The trial court responded, “Manipulating the Court, defrauding the 
Court, deceiving the Court.  I think that’s unethical behavior; and if it’s 
established that you did that, you’ll be held accountable.”  In reply, Mayhall said, 
“If we could get the issue settled one way or another, then I can come to work 
every day and think about this case, not think about what’s going to happen to me 
three weeks from now when it’s over.  And * * * I’ll tell you, Judge, that’s all I’m 
thinking about.”  The trial court replied, “I didn’t put you in that situation.  You 
put yourself there so I’m not here to bail you out.  You conduct yourself the way 
you think you should conduct yourself, and you deal with the consequences.  It’s 
not my responsibility to hold your hand.” 
{¶ 23} The next day, Dean informed the court that his counsels’ 
representation had continued to “deteriorate.”  He said that his counsel had shown 
a “lack of enthusiasm in their cross-examination of the witnesses” and mentioned 
“their lack of objections.”  Dean implored the court to resolve the allegations 
against his attorneys before the trial continued.  The trial court replied that earlier 
in the day, and with defense counsel’s consent, it had explored with the 
prosecution options for resolving the allegations, including staying the trial.  
However, the trial court had decided to continue with the trial, saying, “I stand 
behind the statement I made yesterday, that I did not put them in this situation.  
They’ve put themselves in it.  * * *  Your attorneys are concerned that they might 
January Term, 2010 
9 
 
be held in contempt.  I’m here to tell them to suck it up, be a professional, do the 
best job you can do.” 
{¶ 24} After the trial court denied counsels’ motion to withdraw, Dean 
informed the court, “I’d like to relieve Mr. Mayhall and Mr. Butz in this case.  I 
believe it’s my right to defend myself, and that’s what I’d like to do at this point.” 
{¶ 25} The trial court discussed the timeliness of the request and asked 
whether it was being made for purposes of delay.  Dean told the court, “I’m 
willing to proceed immediately.  * * *  This is not designed to delay this trial in 
any way.”  The parties also discussed arranging a psychological evaluation to 
determine Dean’s competency to waive counsel.  Trial counsel told the court that 
Dean had been evaluated extensively by Dr. Jeffrey Smalldon, a psychologist, and 
Dr. Smalldon would be able to address this issue without conducting a further 
examination. 
{¶ 26} The trial court then questioned Dean to determine whether he fully 
understood and waived his right to counsel.  During this colloquy, Dean informed 
the court that he was aware of the charges against him, that he understood that the 
death penalty was a possible sentence if he was found guilty of the capital 
specifications, and that he knew that he had the right to be represented by two 
capital-qualified attorneys throughout the proceedings.  Dean also understood that 
he would be representing himself and would be responsible for cross-examining 
witnesses, making objections and arguments, and presenting his own witnesses. 
{¶ 27} The trial court then questioned Dean regarding the voluntariness of 
his waiver.  Dean stated that no one had made any promises or threats to get him 
to waive counsel.  The trial court then conducted the following colloquy:  
{¶ 28} “The Court:  And is this something you want to do voluntarily? 
{¶ 29} “The Defendant:  Yes. 
{¶ 30} “The Court:  All right.  Well — 
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{¶ 31} “The Defendant:  I would just like the record to reflect that I’m 
doing this under duress due to you continually not addressing that issue of Mr. 
Butz’s and Mr. Mayhall’s alleged unethical actions.  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 32} “The Court:  All right.  Well, that’s going to be a problem because 
I’m not going to accept a waiver of counsel if you’re telling me it’s under duress.  
All right.  Because you’re essentially saying that the Court’s forcing you to do 
this, and I’m not going to put you or myself in that position.” 
{¶ 33} Following this exchange, the court recessed for the day to 
determine when Dr. Smalldon could testify about Dean’s competence.  The trial 
court added, “[I]t’s going to give you a night to sleep on this and think about it.  
Certainly you can change your mind.  But if you feel that you’re doing this under 
duress, then that’s going to be a problem.  * * * I’m not going to let you do it 
because that’s just not going to be appropriate.” 
{¶ 34} On the following day, the trial court asked Dean whether he still 
wanted to represent himself.  Dean replied, “Absolutely.”  The trial court and 
Dean then had the following exchange: 
{¶ 35} “The Court:  All right.  Well, I’ve had the evening to think about it; 
and as I told you yesterday when I was citing the case law, that you do have a 
constitutional right to represent yourself.  The problem I foresee * * * as I 
indicated yesterday, is your statement that you were doing this under duress. * * 
*. 
{¶ 36} “The Defendant:  I just — I made that statement just so that would 
be made for the record on future reference for the appeal. 
{¶ 37} “The Court:  Well, I understand that.  The problem is it’s one of 
those things where * * * you’ve said it; and now it’s out there, and I have 
concerns about letting you waive your right to an attorney because the way it 
appears, at least by your statement, is that I’m indirectly forcing you to do that. 
January Term, 2010 
11 
 
{¶ 38} “The Defendant:  That’s not the case at all.  As I said, the only 
reason I did that was for that to be on the record for future reference for my 
appeal in the process of this.  I fully understand what I did, why I made that 
statement.  * * *. 
{¶ 39} “I don’t feel in any way that you’re biased against me, prejudiced 
against me, have a vendetta against me.  I feel completely confident to defend 
myself.” 
{¶ 40} Thereafter, the trial court overruled Dean’s request to waive 
counsel because it was not “voluntary.”  The court stated, “I cannot accept a 
waiver of trial counsel in a capital case if there’s any hint that it’s not being done 
voluntarily and that it’s being done under duress, especially because he’s claiming 
that the duress or the pressure or the coercion is coming from the Court, whether 
directly or indirectly.”  The trial court said nothing about calling Dr. Smalldon as 
a witness. 
{¶ 41} Following the trial court’s ruling, Dean asked to retract his 
statement about waiving counsel under duress: 
{¶ 42} “The Defendant:  * * *  If necessary, I would like to retract any 
statements I made or any reference I made to being under duress if that’s the 
case.  Strike that from the record.  However you guys go about doing that. 
{¶ 43} “I feel at this point it is impossible for Mr. Mayhall and Mr. Butz 
to defend me adequately in any way, shape, or form.  And I — I need to defend 
myself because the truth needs to be [sic] come out here; and the way they’re 
doing it, it can’t happen.  It just can’t happen. 
{¶ 44} “My constitutional rights are being violated.  * * *  I can’t 
understand this at all.  Do I have the right to defend myself?  * * *  I would like to 
be granted that.  That’s all I ask.”  (Emphasis added.) 
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{¶ 45} Thereafter, the trial court stated, “[Y]our position has been made 
clear for the record” and ordered the trial to continue.  Dean said nothing further 
about representing himself. 
{¶ 46} On June 13, 2006, after the trial had concluded and Dean had been 
sentenced, the trial court filed an entry finding Mayhall and Butz in direct 
criminal contempt and fining them each $2,000.  The trial court made findings 
that “defense counsel, in a calculated scheme to remove this Court from the Dean 
case, manipulated the Court into presiding over a Criminal Rule 16(B)(1)(e) 
hearing so that the Court would be disqualified from presiding over the Dean trial 
pursuant to Gillard.”  The trial court determined that one of counsels’ motives 
stemmed from “a longstanding personal revulsion of the Court, dating back to 
when this Judge was an assistant prosecuting attorney.  Accordingly, the Court 
vehemently disagrees with Mr. Butz’s statement that ‘This is not a personal attack 
on the Court.’ ”   
{¶ 47} The Court of Appeals reversed the findings of criminal contempt.  
State v. Dean, Clark App. Nos. 2006CA61 and 2006CA63, 2007-Ohio-1031.  The 
court held that Mayhall and Butz should have been afforded a hearing on the 
contempt allegations.  Id. at ¶ 28.  The court also held that “statements from the 
trial court indicated that the court’s impartiality was impaired” and that a different 
judge should have conducted an evidentiary hearing.  Id. at ¶ 32-33.  On remand, 
the judge cited Mayhall and Butz for indirect criminal contempt and transferred 
the matter to a different judge for a hearing.3   
{¶ 48} 2. Discussion.  The issues of judicial bias and the defendant’s right 
to self-representation are inextricably entwined in this case.  “It is well settled that 
a criminal trial before a biased judge is fundamentally unfair and denies a 
defendant due process of law.”  State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181, 2002-Ohio-
2128, 767 N.E.2d 166, ¶ 34, citing Rose v. Clark (1986), 478 U.S. 570, 577, 106 
                                                          
 
3.  Nothing in the record indicates the disposition of further proceedings in the case.  
January Term, 2010 
13 
 
S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460.  Judicial bias has been described as “a hostile feeling 
or spirit of ill will or undue friendship or favoritism toward one of the litigants or 
his attorney, with the formation of a fixed anticipatory judgment on the part of the 
judge, as contradistinguished from an open state of mind which will be governed 
by the law and the facts.”  State ex rel. Pratt v. Weygandt (1956), 164 Ohio St. 
463, 58 O.O. 315, 132 N.E.2d 191, paragraph four of the syllabus. 
{¶ 49} In Liteky v. United States (1994), 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S.Ct. 
1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474, the Supreme Court held that “opinions formed by the 
judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the 
current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or 
partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that 
would make fair judgment impossible.  Thus, judicial remarks during the course 
of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the 
parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge.”  On 
the other hand, “[t]hey may do so [support a bias challenge] if they reveal an 
opinion that derives from an extrajudicial source; and they will do so if they 
reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment 
impossible.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. 
{¶ 50} The record shows that the trial judge harbored a bias against 
defense counsel that was manifested through his comments and rulings during the 
trial.  This bias first became apparent after counsel filed the affidavit of 
disqualification, and it continued throughout the rest of the proceedings.  We shall 
now review the trial judge’s actions that lead us to this conclusion. 
{¶ 51} As previously discussed, the trial judge suggested that counsel had 
manipulated, defrauded, and deceived the court in requesting him to preside over 
the certification hearing in order to disqualify him from sitting on the trial, even 
though the trial judge himself had a duty to be aware of Gillard.  The trial judge 
threatened counsel with sanctions and warned them, “[I]f it’s established you did 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
 
that, you’ll be held accountable.”  After counsel moved to withdraw from the 
case, the trial judge expressed his belief that counsel were using their concern 
about being held in contempt as “leverage to try to get this Court to come off of 
its stance to hold them accountable for anything they may have done.” 
{¶ 52} The trial court’s accusatory and threatening comments toward 
counsel were made during judicial rulings and other matters during trial.  
Normally, such remarks would not establish judicial bias.  Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555, 
114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474; see also State v. Sanders (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 
245, 278, 750 N.E.2d 90.  However, the trial judge’s comments provide evidence 
of judicial bias when they are considered in the context of the trial judge’s other 
rulings and ill-tempered remarks during and after the trial. 
{¶ 53} The trial court demonstrated this bias on other occasions by 
denying counsel reasonable opportunities to consult with Dean.  In the first 
situation, Terry Smith, a jailhouse informant, testified during the state’s case-in-
chief about Dean’s admissions to him describing his involvement in Arnold’s 
murder.  Smith also testified that Dean had admitted making disparaging remarks 
about Arnold’s family in letters that he had sent to Jason Mans.  Following 
Smith’s testimony, trial counsel asked for a recess to talk to Dean, and the 
following colloquy ensued: 
{¶ 54} “Mr. Mayhall:  And, you know, the only other person who knows 
anything about these statements would be my client.  I would just like five or ten 
minutes to talk with him. 
{¶ 55} “Mr. Schumaker [the prosecutor]:  And we have no objection to 
that. 
{¶ 56} “Mr. Mayhall.  Okay. 
{¶ 57} “The Court:  All right.  Hold on.  This witness was disclosed on 
May 11 or May 12.  That was — today’s the 23rd.  That was 12 days ago so we’re 
January Term, 2010 
15 
 
not going to take trial time to do investigation so you can proceed with your 
cross-examination.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 58} The trial court’s refusal to provide counsel with five or ten minutes 
to talk with Dean, particularly when the state did not object to such recess, 
displayed antagonism toward the defense and was unreasonable.  Moreover, the 
trial court’s rulings ran in one direction.  The trial court allowed the state to recall 
seven witnesses during the trial.  The trial court also granted the state a delay in 
presenting its case after a videotape malfunctioned.  Thus, the trial court’s refusal 
to grant the defense a short recess was not justified by the need to avoid 
unnecessary delays. 
{¶ 59} In another situation, the trial judge denied counsel a reasonable 
opportunity to consult with Dean after he informed counsel that he wanted to 
testify in his own behalf.  After the lone defense witness testified, trial counsel 
informed the judge that Dean had changed his mind and wanted to testify.  Trial 
counsel requested a recess to prepare Dean’s testimony because they had not 
planned for him to testify.  The trial court denied this request. 
{¶ 60} Trial counsel replied that they would be committing ineffective 
assistance of counsel if they were not allowed to prepare Dean’s testimony.  The 
prosecutor replied that he had no objection to “about a ten-minute recess.”  The 
trial court stated, “I don’t think they’re going to say a ten-minute recess is 
sufficient to prepare their client for testimony in a capital murder case.”  The trial 
court then said, “[T]his is a unilateral decision of the defendant’s * * *.  And if he 
wants to get up here and tell his side of the story * * * I don’t think it takes * * * 
much preparation for the defense attorneys just to say, ‘What happened?  What’s 
your side of the story?’ ”  The trial court also told counsel, “I understand your 
position.  There’s no question you’re being put in a horrible position.”  In 
response, trial counsel stated, “Ten minutes is better than no time at all.”  The trial 
court then stated, “All right.  We’ll give you ten minutes.”  Thereafter, trial 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
 
counsel informed the court that after consulting with Dean, “It is his wish not to 
testify and to allow us to rest and proceed to closing argument.” 
{¶ 61} Clearly, Dean’s decision to testify in his own behalf was one of the 
crucial decisions of the defense case.  The trial judge initially denied the defense a 
recess on the stated ground that the defense needed no additional time to prepare 
and present Dean’s testimony.  Trial counsel was ultimately given the ten minutes 
he requested to consult with Dean, their client on a death-penalty case.  However, 
trial counsel requested ten minutes to consult with Dean only after the trial judge 
had initially denied counsel any additional time to talk with Dean.  In this 
situation, the trial judge displayed annoyance and impatience with the accused 
and counsel.  We also find that the trial judge’s intemperate and one-sided 
comments manifested bias against them. 
{¶ 62} Finally, the trial judge’s finding of criminal contempt showed that 
his bias was based on feelings of ill will toward counsel that predated the trial.  
The trial judge found that one of counsels’ motives for trying to remove him from 
the case was their “longstanding personal revulsion of the Court, dating back to 
when this Judge was an assistant prosecuting attorney.”  He also stated that 
“defense counsel was setting the Court up for the next move” and characterized 
one of counsel’s arguments as being cast “in a suspiciously enthusiastic tone.” 
{¶ 63} Unlike his other statements, the trial court’s comments about 
counsel’s “longstanding personal revulsion” were from an “extrajudicial source.”  
Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555-556, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474.  These comments, 
representing an “extrajudicial source,” place the judge’s other accusatory and 
threatening remarks into context.  They show the likelihood that his earlier 
assurances that he would remain unbiased were untrue. 
{¶ 64} The state responds to Dean’s claims by pointing out that Dean told 
the judge that he did not believe that the judge was biased against him.  During 
questioning about self-representation, Dean told the court: “I don’t feel in any 
January Term, 2010 
17 
 
way that you’re biased against me, prejudiced against me, have a vendetta against 
me.” 
{¶ 65} Even assuming that Dean did not feel the judge was biased against 
him, we note that his claim that the judge was biased against his counsel remains.  
Judicial bias exists if it is directed toward counsel.  Indeed, “the judge who is so 
hostile to a lawyer as to doom the client to defeat deprives the client of the right to 
an impartial tribunal.”  Walberg v. Israel (C.A.7, 1985), 766 F.2d 1071, 1077. 
{¶ 66} In sum, we find that the judge was biased against counsel to such a 
degree that fair judgment was impossible.  Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555-556, 114 S.Ct. 
1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474.  The judge’s deep-seated bias against counsel also tainted 
his denial of Dean’s request to represent himself at trial, creating the impossible 
conflict.  We now address that issue. 
{¶ 67} “The Sixth Amendment * * * guarantees that a defendant in a state 
criminal trial has an independent constitutional right of self-representation and 
that he may proceed to defend himself without counsel when he voluntarily, and 
knowingly and intelligently elects to do so.”  State v. Gibson (1976), 45 Ohio 
St.2d 366, 74 O.O.2d 525, 345 N.E.2d 399, paragraph one of the syllabus, citing 
Faretta v. California (1975), 422 U.S. 806, 925 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562.  “In 
order to establish an effective waiver of right to counsel, the trial court must make 
sufficient inquiry to determine whether defendant fully understands and 
intelligently relinquishes that right.”  Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus; see also 
Crim.R. 44(A).  If a trial court denies the right to self-representation when 
properly invoked, the denial is per se reversible error.  State v. Reed (1996), 74 
Ohio St.3d 534, 535, 660 N.E.2d 456, citing McKaskle v. Wiggins (1984), 465 
U.S. 168, 177, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122, fn. 8. 
{¶ 68} The assertion of the right to self-representation must be clear and 
unequivocal.  State v. Cassano, 96 Ohio St.3d 94, 2002-Ohio-3751, 772 N.E.2d 
81, ¶ 38.  A request for self-representation may be denied when circumstances 
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18 
 
indicate that the request is made for purposes of delay or manipulation of the trial 
process.  See United States v. Frazier-El (C.A.4, 2000), 204 F.3d 553, 559. 
{¶ 69} Dean’s request to represent himself was clear and unequivocal.  
Furthermore, we do not find Dean to be manipulative when he stated, “I’m doing 
this under duress.”  Rather, Dean invoked his right to self-representation because 
he was caught in the middle of a dispute between the judge and his counsel in a 
case in which his very life was literally at stake.  The trial judge had demonstrated 
animosity toward his counsel since they filed the affidavit of disqualification 
against him.  The trial judge accused counsel of serious misconduct, threatened to 
sanction counsel if he confirmed his suspicions, and denied their repeated requests 
to withdraw from the case even though they informed the court that the 
allegations had a “chilling effect” on their ability to zealously represent Dean.  
Dean was present and heard all these exchanges.  Under these circumstances, 
Dean was legitimately concerned that the trial judge’s animosity and bias against 
his counsel might interfere with his ability to receive a fair trial.  Moreover, 
Dean’s motives for seeking to represent himself should have been clear to the 
judge because of what had transpired with counsel up to that point. 
{¶ 70} Matters then worsened.  When it was clear to Dean that the judge 
would not allow him to represent himself because of his statement about acting 
under duress, Dean attempted to retract those assertions.  The trial judge rejected 
Dean’s attempt to retract his statement.  Dean argued that his feelings of duress 
simply reflected his own doubts about his counsel’s willingness to represent him 
effectively; Dean tried to assert that his request to waive counsel was truly 
voluntary.  Dean’s explanation was not persuasive; he was clearly backtracking to 
try to persuade the judge to allow him to still represent himself. 
{¶ 71} United States v. Garey (C.A.11, 2008), 540 F.3d 1253, supports 
Dean’s argument.  In Garey, three days before trial, the defendant filed a motion 
to disqualify counsel, alleging conflicts of interest and irreconcilable differences 
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19 
 
with him.  Id. at 1258-1259.  The defendant requested substitute counsel.  Id. at 
1259.  Finding no conflicts, the trial judge denied these requests.  Id.  The judge 
then explained to the defendant his options and asked whether he wished to 
proceed to trial with his appointed counsel or wished to represent himself.  Id.  
The defendant replied, “I am not going to let [appointed counsel] represent me” 
and “I’m going to involuntarily represent myself * * *.”  Id. at 1259-1260.  The 
trial court ruled that the defendant could represent himself because he had 
“knowingly and voluntarily decided to proceed with representation of himself.”  
Id. at 1260.  The defendant appealed, claiming that the court denied him his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel because he had never affirmatively asked to 
represent himself.  Id. at 1262. 
{¶ 72} The trial court’s ruling was upheld on appeal.  The court stated that 
a defendant may “intentionally and voluntarily waive his right to counsel and 
accept the consequent necessity of self-representation in more than one way.”  
Garey, 540 F.3d at 1265.  The court stated, “So long as the trial court is assured 
the defendant (1) understands the choices before him, (2) knows the potential 
dangers of proceeding pro se, and (3) has rejected the lawyer to whom he is 
constitutionally entitled, the court may, in its exercise of its discretion, discharge 
counsel * * *.”  Id. at 1267.  In finding the defendant’s request voluntary, the 
court stated, “No less than four times, Garey rejected [his counsel’s] 
representation outright, and several times more he expressed his intent to 
represent himself (albeit ‘involuntarily’).  By rejecting appointed counsel, Garey 
voluntarily chose to proceed pro se as surely as if he had made an affirmative 
request to do so.”  Id. at 1269. 
{¶ 73} In this case, the scenario was even more complicated.  There is no 
evidence that Dean was dissatisfied with his attorneys until the dispute arose 
between counsel and the judge.  Dean did not become concerned that his attorneys 
could not represent him until counsel began telling the judge that they could not 
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20 
 
do so.  After the judge refused their request to withdraw, Dean saw self-
representation as his only hope, a choice that the judge refused.  This unique 
scenario may have no precedent, but it clearly resulted in a tainted trial, with the 
defendant caught in the middle. 
{¶ 74} As in Garey, Dean understood the choices before him regarding 
representation, he was fully advised about the potential dangers of proceeding pro 
se, and he rejected repeatedly the attorneys assigned to represent him.  Under 
these circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion by finding that Dean’s 
request for self-representation was involuntary and by refusing to allow him to 
proceed pro se, especially when the trial judge’s own conduct resulted in the trial 
court’s finding of involuntariness. 
{¶ 75} Based on the foregoing, we find that propositions I and III have 
merit, and the convictions and the sentence must be vacated.  We do not reach this 
decision lightly.  However, we must ensure that a defendant’s constitutional right 
to self-representation is protected and that we maintain the integrity of our judicial 
system.  Moreover, this case clearly went beyond the normal disputes that 
sometimes arise between counsel and the trial judge during trial.  Here, the 
disputes directly infringed upon the defendant’s right to self-representation. 
{¶ 76} Because of our disposition of this case, the remaining issues raised 
in the appellant’s brief are moot. 
Judgment vacated 
and cause remanded. 
 
BROWN, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and 
CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Stephen A. Schumaker, Clark County Prosecuting Attorney, and Darnell 
Carter and David Wilson, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee. 
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21 
 
 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Joseph E. Wilhelm, Kathryn 
L. Sandford, and Jennifer A. Prillo, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellant. 
______________________