Title: Watson v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
EMIL WATSON,   
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 298, 2010 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0312019673 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: June 21, 2010 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: July 19, 2010 
 
Before HOLLAND, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 19th day of July 2010, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Emil Watson, filed an appeal from the 
Superior Court’s April 28, 2010 order denying his third motion for 
postconviction relief.  The plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has 
moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is 
 
2 
manifest on the face of the opening brief that the appeal is without merit.1  
We agree and affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record reflects that, in August 2004, Watson, acting pro se, 
was found guilty by a Superior Court jury of Trafficking in Cocaine, 
Possession With Intent to Deliver Cocaine, Maintaining a Vehicle for 
Keeping Controlled Substances, Conspiracy in the Second Degree, and 
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.  He was sentenced as a habitual offender 
to life in prison.2  Watson’s conviction was affirmed by this Court on direct 
appeal.3  Watson subsequently filed two postconviction motions, both of 
which were denied by the Superior Court.  Watson appealed the Superior 
Court’s denial of his first postconviction motion to this Court.  We affirmed 
the Superior Court’s decision.4  
 
(3) 
In this appeal, Watson claims that “newly-discovered evidence” 
demonstrates that his counsel provided ineffective assistance.  The evidence 
referred to by Watson consists of a signed plea agreement dated February 
24, 2004, which, Watson claims, his counsel failed to return to the 
prosecutor.5  Watson does not dispute that his claim is both time-barred6 and 
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
2 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4214(b). 
3 Watson v. State, 892 A.2d 366 (Del. 2005). 
4 Watson v. State, Del. Supr., No. 338, 2007, Holland, J. (Mar. 12, 2008).  
5 The plea agreement encompassed a violation of probation (“VOP”) in connection with a 
previous sentence as well as the new drug charges.   
 
3 
procedurally barred,7 but insists that the prejudicial effect of his counsel’s 
error warrants review of his motion on the merits,8 including an evidentiary 
hearing,9 and, presumably, vacation of his convictions.     
 
(4) 
While the State may have made a plea offer and Watson may 
have signed a plea agreement in February 2004, the record in this case does 
not reflect that Watson ever seriously considered following through with a 
plea of guilty.  Watson would have this Court accept that, having signed a 
favorable plea agreement that he now claims would have disposed of the 
case, he went forward with the VOP hearing and, several months later, 
represented himself at trial, never raising the issue of the favorable plea 
agreement even when questioned by the judge regarding his decision to 
represent himself.  Then, five years later, having already filed two 
postconviction motions without mentioning the existence of the plea 
agreement, he came into possession of a copy of the plea agreement, realized 
that his attorney never sent the signed plea agreement to the prosecutor, and, 
on that basis, filed his third postconviction motion.  Watson’s claim based 
on “newly-discovered evidence” flies in the face of logic and self-interest.  
                                                                                                                                                 
6 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1). 
7 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3). 
8 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3)(A) and (B); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5). 
9 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(h). 
 
4 
Because the claim is simply not credible, the Superior Court’s denial of 
Watson’s postconviction motion must be affirmed.       
 
(5) 
It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that the appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by 
settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, 
there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State of Delaware’s 
motion to affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is 
AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice