Title: Benjamin Atkins v. Swimwest Family Fitness Center

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2005 WI 4 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
03-2487-FT 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Benjamin Atkins, a minor, as the only  
surviving child of Charis Wilson,  
deceased, by Alexander Kammer, guardian  
ad litem,  
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Swimwest Family Fitness Center a/k/a  
Swimwest School of Instruction, Inc.,  
Karen Kittelson, and West Bend Mutual  
Insurance Company,  
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 19, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 26, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael N. Nowakowski   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ROGGENSACK, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
WILCOX, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there were briefs by J. Michael 
Riley and Axley Brynelson, LLP, Madison, and oral argument by 
John M. Riley. 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief by Bradway 
A. Liddle, Sarah A. Zylstra and Boardman, Suhr, Curry & Field, 
LLP, Madison, and oral argument by Sarah A. Zylstra. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Patricia Sommer and 
Otjen, Van Ert, Lieb & Weir, S.C., Madison, on behalf of 
Wisconsin Insurance Alliance. 
 
2005 WI 4 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  03-2487-FT  
(L.C. No. 
02 CV 3149) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Benjamin Atkins, a minor, as the only  
surviving child of Charis Wilson,  
deceased, by Alexander Kammer, guardian  
ad litem,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Swimwest Family Fitness Center a/k/a  
Swimwest School of Instruction, Inc.,  
Karen Kittelson, and West Bend Mutual  
Insurance Company,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 19, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit court for Dane County, 
Michael N. Nowakowski, Judge.   Reversed and remanded.     
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This case is before the court 
on certification from the court of appeals, pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 
(Rule) 
809.61 
(2001-2002).1 
 
Benjamin 
Atkins 
                                                 
1 Unless otherwise indicated all references to Wisconsin 
Statutes are to the 2001-02 edition.  Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 
809.61 states, in relevant part:  "The supreme court may take 
jurisdiction of an appeal or other proceeding in the court of 
appeals upon certification by the court of appeals or upon the 
supreme court's own motion." 
No. 
03-2487-FT   
 
2 
 
(Atkins) appealed from an order of the circuit court, which 
granted summary judgment in favor of Swimwest Family Fitness 
Center a/k/a Swimwest School of Instruction, Inc., Karen 
Kittelson, and West Bend Mutual Insurance Company (Swimwest).  
Atkins filed suit for the wrongful death of his mother, Dr. 
Charis Wilson (Wilson), who drowned2 while using Swimwest's lap 
pool.  The circuit court held that the guest registration and 
waiver form signed by Wilson constituted a valid exculpatory 
provision, releasing Swimwest from liability.     
¶2 
We 
conclude 
that 
the 
exculpatory 
language 
in 
Swimwest's form is unenforceable, since it is contrary to public 
policy.  The waiver of liability language is, first, overly 
broad and all-inclusive.  The use of the word "fault" on the 
form did not make clear to Wilson that she was releasing others 
from intentional, as well as negligent, acts.  Second, the form 
served two purposes, guest registration and waiver of liability 
for "fault," and thus failed to highlight the waiver, making it 
uncertain whether Wilson was fully notified about the nature and 
significance of the document she signed.  Finally, Wilson did 
not have any opportunity to bargain.  If she had decided not to 
sign the guest registration and waiver form, she would not have 
been allowed to swim.  The lack of such opportunity is also 
                                                 
2 Wilson was found unconscious at the bottom of Swimwest's 
lap pool.  Swimwest employees pulled her from the pool and 
immediately administered CPR.  Wilson was then transported by 
ambulance to University Hospital, where she died the next day, 
May 4, 2001.  An autopsy revealed that death was caused by an 
Anoxic Brain Injury, the result of drowning.   
No. 
03-2487-FT   
 
3 
 
contrary to  public policy.  Accordingly, we reverse and remand, 
concluding also that Atkins is entitled to pursue his wrongful 
death claim.            
I 
¶3 
Swimwest is mainly an instructional swimming facility 
located in Madison, Wisconsin.  It is equipped with a lap pool 
that is open to both members and visitors.  On May 3, 2001,3 
Wilson, a local physician, visited Swimwest as part of a 
physical therapy and rehabilitation program.  Upon entering the 
facility, Wilson was assisted at the front desk by Swimwest 
employee Arika Kleinert (Kleinert).  Kleinert informed Wilson 
that because she was not a member of Swimwest, she was required 
to fill out a guest registration card and pay a fee before 
swimming.   
¶4 
Kleinert presented Wilson with the guest registration 
card. The form was preprinted on a five and one-half inch by 
five and one-half inch card that also contained a standardized 
“Waiver Release Statement.” This statement appeared below the 
"Guest Registration," which 
requested 
the 
visitor's 
name, 
address, phone, reason for visit, and interest in membership.  
The entire card was printed in capital letters with the same 
size, font, and color.  The waiver language printed on the card, 
                                                 
3 The actual form signed by Wilson is dated May 2, 2001.  
The complaint, coroner’s report, and Arika Kleinert's affidavit 
all indicate, however, that Wilson signed the form and was found 
unconscious in the pool on May 3, 2001.  The parties have 
presumed that the date on the form was incorrect.     
No. 
03-2487-FT   
 
4 
 
following the registration information requested, is reproduced 
below: 
WAIVER RELEASE STATEMENT 
I AGREE TO ASSUME ALL LIABILITY FOR MYSELF WITHOUT 
REGARD TO FAULT, WHILE AT SWIMWEST FAMILY FITNESS 
CENTER.  I FURTHER AGREE TO HOLD HARMLESS SWIMWEST 
FITNESS CENTER, OR ANY OF ITS EMPLOYEES FOR ANY 
CONDITIONS OR INJURY THAT MAY RESULT TO MYSELF WHILE 
AT THE SWIMWEST FITNESS CENTER.  I HAVE READ THE 
FOREGOING AND UNDERSTAND ITS CONTENTS. 
 
¶5 
The guest registration and waiver card had just one 
signature and date line that appeared at the end of the "Guest 
Registration" and the "Waiver Release Statement."  Wilson 
completed the requested "Guest Registration" portion and signed 
at the bottom of the "Waiver Release Statement" without asking 
Kleinert any questions.   
¶6 
Before entering the pool, Wilson told Dan Kittelson, 
Aquatic 
Director 
of 
Swimwest, 
that 
she 
did 
not 
require 
assistance getting into the water.4  She was observed entering 
the pool by Karen Kittelson, part owner of Swimwest, and the 
lifeguard on duty.  Karen Kittelson testified that she saw 
Wilson swimming the sidestroke up and down the length of the 
pool.   
¶7 
Soon after Wilson began swimming, another Swimwest 
employee, Elizabeth Proepper (Proepper), spotted Wilson lying 
                                                 
4 It was established in Atkins' affidavit that Wilson knew 
how to swim prior to May 3, 2001.   
No. 
03-2487-FT   
 
5 
 
motionless underwater near the bottom of the pool.  Proepper 
alerted Karen Kittelson, who pulled Wilson from the pool and 
administered CPR.  Wilson died at the hospital on May 4, 2001.  
An autopsy was performed, and drowning was listed as the 
official cause of death on the coroner's report. 
¶8 
Atkins, a minor and Wilson’s only child, filed a 
wrongful death action against Swimwest through his guardian ad 
litem.  Atkins’ complaint alleged that Swimwest was negligent in 
the operation of the pool facility, particularly in the 
management and observation of the pool area, that procedures to 
safeguard against the risk of drowning were not followed, and 
that negligence of its employees caused Wilson’s death.  
¶9 
The Dane County Circuit Court, the Honorable Michael 
N. Nowakowski presiding, granted Swimwest’s summary judgment 
motion and dismissed Atkins’ wrongful death action.  The circuit 
court concluded that the form Wilson signed was sufficient to 
absolve Swimwest of any liability for Wilson’s death.  The court 
reached its conclusion after considering whether the exculpatory 
clause was in contravention of public policy.   
¶10 Atkins appealed the circuit court decision.  The court 
of appeals, Judges Charles P. Dykman, Margaret J. Vergeront, and 
Paul B. Higginbotham, certified the appeal to this court to 
clarify 
Wisconsin 
law 
concerning 
the 
enforceability 
of 
exculpatory clauses in standard liability release forms.  
No. 
03-2487-FT   
 
6 
 
II 
¶11 This case involves review of whether the circuit court 
appropriately granted Swimwest's motion for summary judgment.  
In reviewing the grant of summary judgment, we apply the same 
methodology used by the circuit court in deciding the motion.  
Yauger v. Skiing Enters., Inc., 206 Wis. 2d 76, 80, 557 
N.W.2d 60 (1996); see Richards v. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d 1007, 
1011, 513 N.W.2d 118 (1994).  Although the standard for our 
review is de novo, we benefit from the analysis of the circuit 
court.  Yahnke v. Carson, 2000 WI 74, ¶10, 236 Wis. 2d 257, 613 
N.W.2d 102.  Wisconsin Stat. § 802.08(2) states, in relevant 
part, that the circuit court may appropriately grant summary 
judgment if evidence shows "that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law."   
¶12 This case turns on the interpretation of Swimwest’s 
guest registration and waiver form, and whether it relieves 
Swimwest of liability for harm caused by its negligence.  Merten 
v. 
Nathan, 
108 
Wis. 2d 205, 
210, 
321 
N.W.2d 173 
(1982).  
Wisconsin case law does not favor such agreements.  Richards, 
181 Wis. 2d at 1015; Dobratz v. Thomson, 161 Wis. 2d 502, 468 
N.W.2d 654 (1991).  While this court has not held that an 
exculpatory clause is invalid per se, we have held  that such a 
provision must be construed strictly against the party seeking 
No. 
03-2487-FT   
 
7 
 
to rely on it.  Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 81; Merten, 108 
Wis. 2d at 210-11.   
¶13 Generally, exculpatory clauses have been analyzed on 
principles of contract law, see Dobratz, 161 Wis. 2d 502; Arnold 
v. Shawano County Agr. Soc'y, 111 Wis. 2d 203, 330 N.W.2d 773 
(1983), overruled on other grounds, Green Spring Farms v. 
Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 317, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987), and on 
public policy grounds.  See Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d 76; Richards, 
181 Wis. 2d 1007; 
Merten, 
108 
Wis. 2d 205; 
see 
generally, 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 195 (1981).5  However, 
                                                 
5 Restatement 
(Second) 
of 
Contracts 
§ 195 
states, 
in 
relevant part:  
(1)  A term exempting a party from tort liability 
for 
harm 
caused 
intentionally 
or 
recklessly 
is 
unenforceable on grounds of public policy.   
(2)  A term exempting a party from tort liability 
for 
harm 
caused negligently 
is 
unenforceable on 
grounds of public policy if: 
(a) 
the term 
exempts 
an 
employer 
from 
liability to an employee for injury in the course 
of his employment;  
(b) the term exempts one charged with a duty 
of public service from liability to one to whom 
that duty is owed for compensation for breach of 
that duty, or  
(c) the other party is similarly a member of 
a class protected against the class to which the 
first party belongs.   
(3)  A term exempting a seller of a product from 
his special tort liability for physical harm to a user 
or consumer is unenforceable on grounds of public 
No. 
03-2487-FT   
 
8 
 
lately the contractual analysis has not been emphasized, as many 
of the factors previously reviewed on a contractual basis were 
reached in the more recent cases, like Richards and Yauger, on 
public policy grounds.  Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 86.  For a 
contractual inquiry, we need only "look to the contract itself 
to consider its validity.  Specifically, we examine the facts 
and 
circumstances 
of 
[the] 
agreement . . ." 
Arnold, 
111 
Wis. 2d at 211, to determine if it was broad enough to cover the 
activity at issue.  If not, the analysis ends and the contract 
should be determined to be unenforceable in regard to such 
activity.  If the language of the contract does cover the 
activity, as it does here, we then proceed to an analysis on 
public 
policy, 
which 
remains 
the 
"germane 
analysis" 
for 
exculpatory clauses.  Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 86.   
¶14 We generally define public policy as "'that principle 
of law under which freedom of contract or private dealings is 
restricted by law for the good of the community.'"  Merten, 108 
Wis. 2d at 213 (quoting Higgins v. McFarland, 196 Va. 889, 86 
S.E.2d 168, 172 (1955)).  In such a review of exculpatory 
clauses, this court "attempts to accommodate the tension between 
the principles of contract and tort law that are inherent in 
                                                                                                                                                             
policy unless the term is fairly bargained for and is 
consistent with the policy underlying that liability.   
No. 
03-2487-FT   
 
9 
 
such an agreement." Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 1016.6  For guidance 
on the application of these public policy principles, we examine 
our two most recent cases considering exculpatory contracts in 
Wisconsin.   
¶15 In Yauger, this court based its determination of the 
enforceability of an exculpatory clause on two grounds:  "First, 
the waiver must clearly, unambiguously, and unmistakably inform 
the signer of what is being waived.  Second, the form, looked at 
in its entirety, must alert the signer to the nature and 
significance of what is being signed."  Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 
84.  Yauger involved a wrongful death action against the owner 
of a ski hill area.  The claim, brought by the parents of a girl 
who fatally collided with the concrete base of a chair lift 
                                                 
6 The basic principles of contract and tort law as applied 
to exculpatory provisions were made clear in Richards v. 
Richards, 181 Wis. 2d 1007, 1016, 513 N.W.2d 118 (1994):  
The law of contract is based on the principle of 
freedom of contract; people should be able to manage 
their own affairs without government interference.  
Freedom of contract is premised on a bargain freely 
and voluntarily made through a bargaining process that 
has integrity.  Contract law protects justifiable 
expectations and the security of transactions.  The 
law of torts is directed toward compensation of 
individuals 
for 
injuries 
resulting 
from 
the 
unreasonable conduct of another.  Tort law also serves 
the "prophylactic" purpose of preventing future harm; 
tort law seeks to deter certain conduct by imposing 
liability for conduct below the acceptable standard of 
care.  Id. (citing Merten v. Nathan, 108 Wis. 2d 205, 
211-12, 321 N.W.2d 173).   
No. 
03-2487-FT   
 
10 
 
tower while skiing, alleged that the defendant negligently 
failed to pad the lift tower.  The defendant filed for summary 
judgment, relying on the exculpatory provision contained in the 
family ski pass signed by the girl's father.  The waiver read, 
in part: "'There are certain inherent risks in skiing and that 
we agree to hold Hidden Valley Ski Area/Skiing Enterprises Inc. 
harmless on account of any injury incurred by me or my Family 
member on the Hidden Valley Ski Area premises.'"  Id. at 79.   
¶16 In applying the two factors, the court in Yauger held 
that the release was void as against public policy.  First, this 
court held that the release was not clear because it failed to 
include language "expressly indicating Michael Yauger's intent 
to release Hidden Valley from its own negligence."  Id. at 84.  
Without any mention of the word "negligence," and the ambiguity 
of the phrase "inherent risks of skiing," the court held that 
Yauger was not adequately informed of the rights he was waiving.  
In regard to the second factor, this court held that the form, 
in its entirety, did not fully communicate to Yauger its nature 
and significance, because it served the dual purposes of an 
application for a season pass and a release of liability.  Id. 
at 87.  Furthermore, the waiver was not conspicuous.  It was one 
of five paragraphs on the form and did not require a separate 
signature.  Id. 
No. 
03-2487-FT   
 
11 
 
¶17 In Richards, the court adopted a slightly different 
approach 
to determining 
the 
enforceability 
of 
exculpatory 
contracts.  Richards involved the wife of a truck driver signing 
a "Passenger Authorization" release form issued by her husband's 
employer.  The form claimed to waive liability for "intentional, 
reckless, and negligent conduct."  She brought suit to recover 
for injuries she suffered while riding in her husband's truck as 
a passenger.  We used a combination of factors to determine that 
the 
exculpatory 
language 
was 
contrary 
to 
public 
policy.  
Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 1017.  The first factor was that the 
contract served two purposes, neither of which was clearly 
identified or distinguished.  Second, the court held that the 
release was broad and all-inclusive.  Finally, there was little 
or no opportunity to negotiate or bargain over the contract.  
Id. at 1011.   
¶18 Applying the factors from Yauger and Richards, we hold 
that Swimwest's exculpatory clause is in violation of public 
No. 
03-2487-FT   
 
12 
 
policy.7  First, this exculpatory waiver, which uses the word 
"fault," is overly broad and all-inclusive.  Yauger, 206 
Wis. 2d at 85-86; Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 1017-18.  Second, the 
form, serving two functions and not requiring a separate 
signature for the exculpatory clause, thus not sufficiently 
highlighting that clause, does not provide the signer adequate 
notification of the waiver's nature and significance.  Yauger, 
206 Wis. 2d at 86-87.  Third, there was little or no opportunity 
to bargain or negotiate in regard to the exculpatory language in 
question.  Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 1019.8  Under this framework, 
the waiver in question is unenforceable as against public 
policy.   
                                                 
7 We acknowledge that Yauger v. Skiing Enters., Inc., , 206 
Wis. 2d 76, 557 N.W.2d 60 (1996) and Richards place different 
weight 
on 
the 
public 
policy 
factors 
used 
to 
invalidate 
exculpatory clauses.  See Rose v. Nat'l Tractor Pullers Ass'n, 
Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 757, 765 (1998).  In Yauger, for example, 
"the presence of a single objectionable characteristic (was) 
sufficient to justify invalidating an exculpatory agreement."  
Id.  On the other hand, in Richards, the court stated that "none 
of 
these 
factors 
alone 
would 
necessarily 
have 
warranted 
invalidation of the exculpatory contract."  Richards, 181 
Wis. 2d at 1020; see Rose, 33 F. Supp. at 765.  Because all of 
the factors listed in those cases are present here, we do not 
address whether a single objectionable factor is sufficient to 
invalidate an exculpatory clause.   
8 According to the court in Yauger, it did not address this 
factor from Richards because both of the factors it had already 
addressed were sufficient to void the exculpatory clause in 
question.  Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d 76, 86 n.1.     
No. 
03-2487-FT   
 
13 
 
¶19 In addressing the first factor, we find the waiver's 
broadness raises questions about its meaning and demonstrates 
its one-sidedness. Id. at 1018.  The language chosen by Swimwest 
is not clear and could potentially bar any claim arising under 
any scenario.  The waiver begins: "I AGREE TO ASSUME ALL 
LIABILITY FOR MYSELF WITHOUT REGARD TO FAULT. . . ."  This 
language never makes clear what type of acts the word "fault" 
encompasses.  Although Swimwest alleges that negligence is 
synonymous with fault, we find that fault is susceptible to a 
broader interpretation.  Fault is currently defined as "[a]n 
error or defect of judgment or of conduct; any deviation from 
prudence 
or 
duty 
resulting 
from 
inattention, 
incapacity, 
perversity, bad faith, or mismanagement." Black's Law Dictionary 
623 (7th ed. 1999).  This definition is broad enough to cover a 
reckless or an intentional act.  A waiver of liability for an 
intentional act would clearly place the exculpatory clause in 
violation of public policy.  Merten, 108 Wis. 2d at 212; 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 195(1) (1981).  We again 
emphasize that exculpatory language must be strictly construed 
against the party seeking to rely on it.  Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 
81.       
¶20 If Swimwest wanted to make clear that the signer is 
releasing it from negligent acts, it could have included the 
word "negligence" in the waiver.  While this court has never 
No. 
03-2487-FT   
 
14 
 
specifically required exculpatory clauses to include the word 
"negligence," we have stated that "we consider that it would be 
very helpful for such contracts to set forth in clear and 
express terms that the party signing it is releasing others for 
their negligent acts. . . ."  Dobratz, 161 Wis. 2d at 525.   
¶21 Likewise, the broadness of the exculpatory language 
makes it difficult to ascertain exactly what was within Wilson's 
or Swimwest's contemplation.  We have consistently held that 
"[o]nly if it is apparent that the parties, in light of all the 
circumstances, knowingly agreed to excuse the defendants from 
liability will the contract be enforceable."  Id. at 520 (citing 
Arnold, 111 Wis. 2d at 213).  For example, in Arnold, we voided 
an exculpatory clause, because the accident that occurred was 
not within the contemplation of the parties when they signed the 
agreement.  The case involved a waiver signed by a racecar 
driver, whereby he agreed not to hold liable the race promoter, 
the racing association, the track operator, the landowner, and 
any other driver in the race for injuries arising from the race.  
The plaintiff was severely injured after he crashed his car, and 
the rescue personnel sprayed chemicals into his burning car.  
The fumes that the spray created were toxic and caused the 
driver severe brain damage.  In rendering the exculpatory 
language unenforceable, we held that "an issue of material fact 
exists as to whether the risk of negligent rescue operations was 
No. 
03-2487-FT   
 
15 
 
within the contemplation of the parties at the time the 
exculpatory contract was executed."  Arnold, 111 Wis. 2d at 212.   
¶22 Like the plaintiff in Arnold, Wilson likely would not 
have contemplated drowning in a four-foot deep pool with a 
lifeguard on duty, when she signed the guest registration and 
waiver form.  The question is not whether swimming carries with 
it the risk of drowning, but rather whether Wilson, herself,  
likely contemplated that risk.   
¶23 Here, the guest registration and waiver form does not 
provide adequate notice of the waiver's nature and significance.  
See Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 84.  In this case, the form provided 
by Swimwest served two purposes.  It was both a "Guest 
Registration" application and a "Waiver Release Statement."  
Just as in Richards and Yauger, the exculpatory language 
appeared to be part of, or a requirement for, a larger 
registration form.  In Yauger, for example, the plaintiff signed 
a one-page document that served as an application for a season 
ski pass and also contained a release of liability.  Yauger, 206 
Wis. 2d at 87.  The waiver in this case could have been a 
separate document, providing Wilson with more adequate notice of 
what she was signing.  Also, a separate signature line could 
have 
been 
provided, 
but 
was 
not. 
 
"Identifying 
and 
distinguishing 
clearly 
between 
those 
two 
contractual 
arrangements could have provided important protection against a 
No. 
03-2487-FT   
 
16 
 
signatory's inadvertent agreement to the release."  Richards, 
181 Wis. 2d at 1017.   
¶24 Another problem with the form was that there was 
nothing conspicuous about the paragraph containing the "Waiver 
Release Statement."  See Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 87.  "The form, 
looked at in its entirety, must be such that a reviewing court 
can say with certainty that the signer was fully aware of the 
nature and the significance of the document being signed." Id. 
at 88.  Here, the entire form was printed on one card, with the 
same size, font, and color.  The fact that the release statement 
is in capital letters is irrelevant since all of the words on 
the 
guest 
registration 
were 
also 
in 
capital 
letters.  
Furthermore, the only place to sign the form was at the very 
end.  This supports the conclusion that the waiver was not 
distinguishable enough.   
¶25 We also conclude that there was no opportunity for 
Wilson to bargain over the exculpatory language in the guest 
registration and waiver form.  According to the deposition 
testimony 
of 
Swimwest 
employee 
Kleinert, 
Wilson 
had 
an 
opportunity to read the form and ask questions.  She was told 
that the form included a waiver, and allegedly took her time 
reading the card.  This information alone, however, is not 
sufficient to demonstrate a bargaining opportunity.  The form 
No. 
03-2487-FT   
 
17 
 
itself must provide an opportunity to bargain.  See Richards, 
181 Wis. 2d at 1019.       
¶26 We were faced with an analogous situation in Richards.  
In that case, the plaintiff was forced to choose between signing 
a standardized waiver or not riding with her husband in his 
employer's truck.  The court invalidated the contract, in part, 
because she "simply had to adhere to the terms of the written 
form."  Id.  We held that an exculpatory clause would not be 
enforced when it is part of a standardized agreement that offers 
little or no opportunity to bargain.  Id.  Similarly, Wilson was 
without an opportunity to negotiate in regard to the standard 
exculpatory language used in the form.  She was forced to either 
sign the form or not swim at Swimwest.9  We hold, therefore, that 
such an exculpatory clause, where there is no opportunity to 
bargain in regard to its terms, presents another significant 
factor in the analysis of public policy. 
¶27 All of the factors discussed lead us to conclude that 
the exculpatory clause in the Swimwest form violates public 
policy, and, therefore, is unenforceable.        
III 
                                                 
9 In Karen Kittelson's deposition, she states: "You have to 
pay the fee and sign the waiver.  You are not allowed to use the 
facility unless you sign the waiver."   
No. 
03-2487-FT   
 
18 
 
¶28 The final issue we address is whether Atkins is 
permitted to bring a wrongful death claim against Swimwest.  
Under Wisconsin law, a wrongful death action may be brought 
under such circumstances "as would, if death had not ensued, 
have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and 
recover damages. . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 895.03.10   
¶29 As the son of Wilson, Atkins was a proper claimant for 
a 
wrongful 
death 
claim 
against 
Swimwest, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 895.04.11  However, because the circuit court 
determined that Wilson would have been barred from bringing 
suit, the court consequently determined that Atkins was also 
barred.  While caselaw does establish that wrongful death claims 
are derivative to any claim Wilson could have maintained, see 
Ruppa v. Am. States Ins. Co., 91 Wis. 2d 628, 646, 284 
N.W.2d 318 
(1979), 
having 
found 
the 
exculpatory 
clause 
                                                 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.03 states, in relevant part:  
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by a 
wrongful act, neglect or default and the act, neglect 
or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, 
have entitled the party injured to maintain an action 
and recover damages in respect thereof, then and in 
every such case the person who would have been liable, 
if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action 
for damages notwithstanding the death of the person 
injured; provided, that such action shall be brought 
for a death caused in this state.   
No. 
03-2487-FT   
 
19 
 
unenforceable as against public policy, Swimwest is no longer 
shielded from liability, since Wilson could have brought a claim 
against it.  Accordingly, Swimwest must now face the derivative 
wrongful death claim filed by her son, Benjamin Atkins.   
IV 
¶30 In summary, we conclude that the exculpatory language 
in Swimwest's form is unenforceable, since it is contrary to 
public policy.  The waiver of liability language is, first, 
overly broad and all-inclusive.  The use of the word "fault" on 
the form did not make clear to Wilson that she was releasing 
others from intentional, as well as negligent, acts.  Second, 
the form served two purposes, guest registration and waiver of 
liability for "fault," and thus failed to highlight the waiver, 
making it uncertain whether Wilson was fully notified about the 
nature and significance of the document she signed.  Finally, 
Wilson did not have any opportunity to bargain.  If she had 
decided not to sign the guest registration and waiver form, she 
would not have been allowed to swim.  The lack of such 
opportunity is also contrary to  public policy.  Accordingly, we 
reverse and remand, concluding also that Atkins is entitled to 
pursue his wrongful death claim.   
                                                                                                                                                             
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.04(1) states, in relevant part: "An 
action for wrongful death may be brought by the personal 
representative of the deceased person or by the person to whom 
the amount recovered belongs."    
No. 
03-2487-FT   
 
20 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the circuit court is reversed 
and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.   
 
No.  03-2487-FT.pdr 
 
 
 
1
 
¶31 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (concurring).   While I 
agree with the mandate to reverse and remand this matter, I 
write separately for two reasons:  (1) because the court paints 
with too broad a brush when it strikes down the waiver due to 
its conclusion that Swimwest Family Fitness Center did not give 
Charis Wilson the opportunity to bargain on the terms of the 
release, without explaining that while the opportunity to 
bargain is desirable, it is not a separate component that may be 
dispositive of a waiver's validity, and (2) because whether 
Wilson contemplated the possibility of her own death when she 
signed the waiver of liability is a question of fact that we 
should not decide on appeal. 
 
¶32 In the absence of legislation that prohibits them, 
waivers of liability, also known as exculpatory contracts, 
generally have been upheld.  Arnold v. Shawano County Agric.  
Soc'y, 111 Wis. 2d 203, 209, 330 N.W.2d 773 (1983).  However, 
exculpatory contracts, such as the one Wilson signed to obtain 
the opportunity to swim in the Swimwest pool, are not favored in 
the law. Id. 
¶33 When an exculpatory contract is reviewed by a court 
upon a claim that the contract violates public policy, there is 
a tension that is always present.  On one hand, the court must 
consider the right to contract freely in the management of one's 
affairs without government interference, and on the other hand, 
the court must consider that the shifting of responsibility for 
a tortfeasor's negligent acts may tend to permit more negligent 
conduct.  Id. at 209, n.2.  We have balanced this tension by 
No.  03-2487-FT.pdr 
 
 
 
2
consistently requiring that exculpatory contracts contain two 
components in order to survive a public policy challenge:  (1) a 
description 
that 
"clearly, 
unambiguously, 
and 
unmistakably 
inform[s the signer] of the rights he [or she is] waiving," 
Yauger v. Skiing Enters., Inc., 206 Wis. 2d 76, 86, 557 N.W.2d 
60 (1996), and (2) a description that "clearly and unequivocally 
communicate[s] to the signer the nature and significance of the 
document being signed."  Id. at 86-87.  In regard to these 
components, releases that serve two purposes and those that are 
not conspicuously labeled have been held to be insufficient to 
draw the signer's attention to the fact that he is waiving 
liability for other parties' negligence, as well as his own.  
Richards v. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d 1007, 1017, 513 N.W.2d 118 
(1994).  And a release that is so broad as to be interpreted to 
shift liability for a tortfeasor's conduct under all possible 
circumstances, including reckless and intentional conduct, and 
for all possible injuries, catastrophic as well as minor, will 
not be upheld.  Id. at 1017-18. 
¶34 In Richards, we also identified a third consideration 
that may be examined when exculpatory contracts are reviewed:  
Whether the injured party has had an opportunity to bargain in 
regard to the breadth of the release.  Id. at 1019.  However, 
contrary to our discussion of the two components set out above, 
which previous cases had evaluated, we offered no citation to 
precedent that would establish that the lack of an opportunity 
to bargain is a component necessary to a valid exculpatory 
contract.  Instead, we linked the lack of an opportunity to 
bargain to the component requiring releases to clearly state the 
circumstances and scope of injuries contemplated in order to 
No.  03-2487-FT.pdr 
 
 
 
3
inform the signer of the rights that he or she is waiving.  Id. 
at 1019-20. 
¶35 In a more recent decision where we invalidated a 
waiver because it "failed to clearly, unambiguously, and 
unmistakably inform [the signer] of the rights he was waiving," 
Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 86, and failed to "clearly and 
unequivocally 
communicate 
to 
the 
signer 
the 
nature 
and 
significance of the document being signed," id. at 86-87, we 
also explained: 
We need not address the third ground articulated 
in Richards, i.e., standardized agreement which offers 
little or no opportunity for negotiation or free and 
voluntary bargaining, inasmuch as either of the above 
principles was sufficient to void this contract. 
Id. at 87 n.1.  In so explaining that a lack of either of the 
two necessary components set out at pages 86-87 of our decision 
was sufficient to set aside an exculpatory contract, we chose 
not to establish as a third and necessary component of a public 
policy analysis a requirement that there be an opportunity to 
bargain on the terms of the release.  Rather, the lack of an 
opportunity to bargain was a fact that a court could consider in 
evaluating the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
execution of a waiver. 
¶36 It is against this background that the majority 
opinion strikes down the contract between Wilson and Swimwest, 
while concluding that one of the infirmities leading to 
invalidation is that Wilson was not given an opportunity to 
bargain about the terms of the release.  Majority op., ¶18.  It 
also opines that, "[b]ecause all of the factors listed in 
[earlier] cases are present here, we do not address whether a 
No.  03-2487-FT.pdr 
 
 
 
4
single objectionable factor is sufficient to invalidate an 
exculpatory clause."  Id., ¶18 n.7.  In so doing, it adds the 
lack of an opportunity to bargain as a component of the public 
policy analysis, rather as reasoning used to determine whether 
the release was overly broad, as we employed it in Richards.  It 
also implies that the lack of an opportunity to bargain could be 
sufficient to invalidate a release when it asserts, "The form 
itself must provide an opportunity to bargain."  Majority op., 
¶25.  This is an unnecessary broadening of the law that 
heretofore has set the framework for the analysis of an 
exculpatory contract on public policy grounds.  
 
¶37 My concern may seem like a minor matter, but it is 
very important in a practical sense.  For example, the reception 
desk of a recreational facility is not always staffed by the 
owner of the facility, but rather, it may be staffed by an 
employee, as was the case here.  It would be unrealistic to 
require that an employee be authorized to "bargain" about the 
terms of a release of liability, and it would be unrealistic 
that an owner always be present at the facility.  Additionally, 
what give and take has to occur in order that there be an actual 
opportunity to bargain?  What if a potential swimmer does not 
want to waive any potential claims for liability, but the owner 
is able to afford insurance only for catastrophic injuries, does 
the owner have the right to say that the person cannot swim in 
his pool?  Those are only a few of the questions that could 
arise.  Accordingly, I would not employ the opportunity to 
bargain in any way other than in an attempt to determine if the 
language in the release described the circumstances for which 
potential liability claims were being waived.    
No.  03-2487-FT.pdr 
 
 
 
5
¶38 Additionally, in holding that the opportunity to 
bargain is a component of a contractual waiver, the court has 
effectively removed the ability of most businesses that operate 
paid recreational facilities to limit any type of liability by 
contract.  In my view, this will result in an increase in 
lawsuits and in fewer swimming and other paid recreational 
facilities for Wisconsin citizens to enjoy, a result that does 
not further the public good. 
¶39 Exculpatory 
contracts 
may 
be 
invalidated 
on 
a 
contractual basis, as well as on a public policy basis, if the 
injury that occurred was not within the contemplation of the 
parties when the agreement was signed.  Arnold, 111 Wis. 2d at 
211.  As we have explained, "Exculpatory agreements that are 
broad and general in terms will bar only those claims that are 
within the contemplation of the parties when the contract was 
executed."  Id.  We have also explained that the determination 
of what risks the parties to the contract intended to include in 
the release are questions of fact for the jury.  Id. at 212. 
¶40 An overly broad and generally stated release that may 
prevent the formation of a valid contract because there was no 
meeting of the minds by the contracting parties presents a 
question similar to that presented by a failure to establish the 
components necessary to a public policy analysis.  However, 
under a contract analysis, the question presents as a fact 
question, unless the facts are undisputed and capable of only 
one interpretation, see Energy Complexes, Inc. v. Eau Claire 
County, 152 Wis. 2d 453, 466-67, 449 N.W.2d 35 (1989), and in a 
public policy analysis the question presents as a question of 
law, Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 1011.  The foundations are so 
No.  03-2487-FT.pdr 
 
 
 
6
similar that we have cited to cases that were decided under a 
contract-type analysis as support for a decision based on public 
policy.  See, e.g., id. at 1015-16 (a policy-based decision, 
citing Dobratz v. Thomson, 161 Wis. 2d 502, 520, 468 N.W.2d 654 
(1991), a contract-based decision).  
¶41 Here, the contract-formation question presented is 
whether Wilson contemplated the possibility of her own death 
when she signed the release.  The record provides that she was a 
swimmer and that the part of the pool in which she was swimming 
was only about four feet deep.  Therefore, if she tired of 
swimming, all she had to do to keep from sinking below the 
water's surface was to stand up.  Additionally, statements in 
the coroner's report included in the record, which repeated 
findings from the autopsy, relate that although Wilson's cause 
of death is listed as "drowning," she did not die from the 
aspiration of water into her lungs, as one would expect when 
breathing continues after a person is submerged under water.  
The physician who conducted the autopsy labeled this phenomenon 
a "dry drowning."  Although he did not assign any specific 
finding, such as a heart attack, as the cause of Wilson's 
failing to breathe, several 
possibilities 
were 
mentioned.  
Accordingly, there may have been medical circumstances that 
contributed to Wilson's death that had nothing to do with her 
being submerged in a 
swimming pool 
when 
she 
was 
found 
unconscious.  This presents the court with material factual 
questions about what risks Wilson contemplated when she signed 
the release.  In my view, there must first be a finding of what 
caused Wilson's death before a court can evaluate whether she 
No.  03-2487-FT.pdr 
 
 
 
7
could have agreed to waive that cause.  This cannot be decided 
on summary judgment.   
¶42 Furthermore, the majority opinion does not decide that 
as a matter of law Wilson could not have contemplated the 
possibility of her own death when she signed the release.  
Therefore, I would send the case back to the circuit court for 
determinations of what caused Wilson to stop breathing and 
whether Wilson and Swimwest intended the release to cover that 
catastrophic event.  In my view, until it is known why Wilson 
stopped breathing, it will not be possible to determine whether 
she contemplated that event when she signed the waiver of 
liability.  If the injury-causing event is found to be one that 
Wilson did not contemplate, the waiver she signed will have no 
effect on liability for her death.   
¶43 For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully 
concur. 
 
 
No.  03-2487-FT.jpw 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶44 JON P. WILCOX, J.   (dissenting).  I dissent.  While I 
certainly do not believe that all exculpatory agreements should 
be upheld, the majority opinion will render it virtually 
impossible to enforce any exculpatory agreement in Wisconsin.  
The majority concludes that the agreement in this case is 
unenforceable as against public policy for three reasons:  1) 
the agreement is overly broad; 2) the agreement serves two 
purposes; and 3) there was no opportunity for the signer to 
bargain or negotiate over the exculpatory language.  Majority 
op., ¶18.  These factors originate from this court's decision in 
Richards v. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d 1007, 1017-19, 513 N.W.2d 118 
(1994).  I disagree with the majority's application of factors 
one and two and while I am bound to accept the legitimacy of the 
third factor, I question the manner in which the third factor is 
applied in this case.  Further, the majority fails to articulate 
a clear test as to what types of exculpatory agreements are 
enforceable in this state.  The majority applies the above three 
factors in such a fashion so as to leave little possibility that 
any exculpatory agreement could be enforceable in this state.   
¶45 The law governing the enforceability of exculpatory 
agreements in Wisconsin has been anything but consistent and 
this court has, through its various articulations of standards 
applicable to such agreements, failed to ever adhere to a 
consistent test for determining their validity.  While parties 
wishing to execute such agreements certainly have a plethora of 
cases explaining when such agreements are not enforceable, our 
No.  03-2487-FT.jpw 
 
2 
 
jurisprudence has not provided a beacon for litigants to 
successfully navigate the rocky waters of this area of the law.   
¶46 The last time this court had the opportunity to 
examine the validity of exculpatory agreements in Wisconsin, we 
noted that our previous cases had used a variety of tests to 
evaluate the legitimacy of such agreements.  Yauger v. Skiing 
Enters., Inc., 206 Wis. 2d 76, 81-83, 557 N.W.2d 60 (1996).  We 
explained that although our past cases had not adhered to a 
single test, they all had a single common thread tying them 
together:  "[t]hese cases, in different ways, involved an 
exculpatory clause that failed to disclose to the signers 
exactly what rights they were waiving."  Id. at 81.  After 
analyzing our prior jurisprudence, including Richards, this 
court distilled a two-part test governing the legitimacy of 
exculpatory agreements: 
While the law grudgingly accepts the proposition 
that people may contract away their liability right to 
recovery for negligently caused injuries, the document 
must clearly, unambiguously, and unmistakably express 
this intention.  Furthermore, the document when looked 
at in its entirety must clearly and unequivocally 
communicate the nature and significance of the waiver. 
Id. at 88-89.  The majority in this case reverts back to the 
test used in Richards while ignoring the lessons of Yauger.  
¶47 Before analyzing the exculpatory agreement, it is 
important to set forth precisely the nature and contents of the 
agreement and consider the form on which it appears as a whole.12  
The agreement in question is contained on an index card that is 
                                                 
12 A copy of the agreement is attached as an exhibit at the 
end of this dissent.   
No.  03-2487-FT.jpw 
 
3 
 
five and one-half inches by five and one-half inches.  The card 
reads: 
 
 
GUEST REGISTRATION 
NAME__________________________________________________ 
ADDRESS_______________________________________________ 
CITY____________________________STATE_________________ 
ZIP______________________HOME PHONE___________________ 
REASON FOR VISIT______________________________________ 
HOW DID YOU HEAR OF SWIMWEST?_________________________ 
I WOULD LIKE MEMBERSHIP INFORMATION? 
 
YES  
NO 
 
DATE_________________________ 
 
 
WAIVER RELEASE STATEMENT 
I AGREE TO ASSUME ALL LIABILITY FOR MYSELF WITHOUT 
REGARD TO FAULT, WHILE AT SWIMWEST FAMILIY FITNESS 
CENTER.  I FURTHER AGREE TO HOLD HARMLESS SWIMWEST 
FITNESS CENTER, OR ANY OF ITS EMPLOYEES FOR ANY 
CONDITIONS OR INJURY THAT MAY RESULT TO MYSELF WHILE 
AT THE SWIMWEST FITNESS CENTER.  I HAVE READ THE 
FOREGOING AND UNDERSTAND ITS CONTENTS. 
 
SIGNED 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DATE 
That is the entirety of the agreement at question in this case. 
¶48 The first reason the majority provides for striking 
down the exculpatory agreement contained on this card is:  "this 
exculpatory waiver, which uses the word 'fault,' is overly broad 
and all-inclusive."  Majority op., ¶18.  The majority reasons 
that the language is ambiguous, could potentially cover a 
variety of claims, does not include the word "negligence," and 
No.  03-2487-FT.jpw 
 
4 
 
states that it is unclear whether the risk of drowning was 
within the signer's contemplation.  Majority op., ¶¶19-22.   
¶49 "Fault," as understood by a layperson, is defined as 
"[a] mistake; an error" or "[r]esponsibility for a mistake or an 
offense; culpability."  The American Heritage Dictionary of the 
English Language 665 (3d ed. 1992).  Thus, the clear meaning of 
the first clause in the waiver is that the signer agrees to 
assume all liability for herself, without regard to who is 
responsible for any mistake leading to an injury.  This language 
plainly covers negligent conduct.  The fact that the legal 
definition of "fault" covers reckless and intentional acts, 
majority op., ¶19, is not dispositive.  As the majority 
correctly indicates, waivers may not be enforced to prevent 
liability for reckless or intentional conduct.  Id.  However, 
neither reckless nor intentional conduct is at issue in this 
case.  The fact that the waiver may be unenforceable as to other 
tortious acts is not germane; the relevant inquiry is whether 
"the exculpatory clause . . . fail[s] to disclose to the signers 
exactly what rights they were waiving[,]" and whether the 
agreement unambiguously and unmistakably covers the tortious act 
at issue.  Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 81, 86.   
¶50 When read in context of the remaining language of the 
waiver release statement, the meaning of the first sentence, 
containing the word "fault," becomes even clearer.  See Folkman 
v. Quamme, 2003 WI 116, ¶28 n.11, ¶29, 264 Wis. 2d 617, 665 
N.W.2d 857 (words and phrases of a contract are to be read in 
context 
of 
the 
contract's 
other 
language 
in 
determining 
No.  03-2487-FT.jpw 
 
5 
 
ambiguity).  The second sentence of the waiver provides:  "I 
FURTHER AGREE TO HOLD HARMLESS SWIMWEST FITNESS CENTER, OR ANY 
OF ITS EMPLOYEES FOR ANY CONDITIONS OR INJURY THAT MAY RESULT TO 
MYSELF WHILE AT THE SWIMWEST FITNESS CENTER."  Thus, when the 
first two sentences of the waiver are read together in context, 
an ordinary reader would understand that she is agreeing to hold 
Swimwest harmless for any injuries she suffers while at Swimwest 
that are due to mistakes or errors for which Swimwest is 
responsible.  In other words, a layperson would understand that 
the waiver applies to any negligent acts of Swimwest or its 
employees.   
¶51 However, the majority argues that the decedent would 
not have contemplated the injury that occurred, majority op., 
¶22, and focuses on the fact that the agreement does not contain 
the word "negligence."  Majority op., ¶20.  The decedent in this 
case went to a facility called "Swimwest" in order to swim laps 
as part of her physical therapy.  Majority op., ¶3.  She took 
her time to read the waiver and then signed it.  Id., ¶¶5, 25.  
Yet, the majority somehow concludes that the decedent did not 
contemplate the risk of drowning.  Regardless of whatever other 
activities the waiver may or may not cover, it is almost 
inconceivable that a reasonable person would not understand 
that, at a minimum, a waiver at an aquatic facility would cover 
the risk of drowning.  What else would such a waiver cover if 
not the risk of drowning?   
¶52 Must a business list in the waiver each and every 
conceivable form of negligence that may result in injury to a 
No.  03-2487-FT.jpw 
 
6 
 
patron?  The majority opinion would seem to so indicate.  
Majority op., ¶22 ("Wilson likely would not have contemplated 
drowning in a four-foot deep pool with a lifeguard on duty.").  
Listing the myriad of ways in which the proprietor or its agents 
could be negligent would be unduly burdensome to a business and 
would necessitate a waiver that is much more than one page in 
length.  Such a waiver, in addition to being quite lengthy, 
would certainly not be easy to read or understand.   
¶53 In Yauger, this court cited with approval guidelines 
originally developed for the Uniform Commercial Code that govern 
warranty disclaimers.  Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 87 n.2.  One of 
the guidelines is that "the language of the negligence waiver 
should be readable. . . . and should not be written in legal 
jargon."  Id. (quoting Stephanie J. Greer & Hurlie H. Collier, 
The Conspicuousness 
Requirement:  
Litigating 
and Drafting 
Contractual 
Indemnity 
Provisions 
in 
Texas 
After 
Dresser 
Industries, Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 35 S. Tex. L. Rev. 
243, 265-70, Apr. 1994).  By focusing on the absence of a legal 
term of art in the waiver——"negligence"——and the fact that the 
waiver did not precisely mention the exact negligent act leading 
to injury in this case, the majority's rationale runs afoul of 
the principle that waivers should be easy to read and should not 
contain legal jargon.   
¶54 Next, the majority concludes that the waiver does not 
provide 
"adequate 
notice 
of 
the 
waiver's 
nature 
and 
significance" because it serves two purposes.  Majority op., 
¶23.  The majority states that as in Richards and Yauger, the 
No.  03-2487-FT.jpw 
 
7 
 
exculpatory language here is part of a larger registration form.  
Majority op., ¶23.  However, the waiver in this case is part of 
a simple five and one-half inch by five and one-half inch index 
card.  The only part of the card containing contiguous complete 
sentences is the waiver.  The remainder of the form is comprised 
of mere blank lines for the reader to fill in his or her contact 
information.   
¶55 Thus, the waiver is the only part of the form for a 
patron to read.  The form of the waiver in this case stands in 
stark contrast to the waiver in Yauger, which was "one paragraph 
in a form containing five separate paragraphs" that did not 
stand out from the other language.  Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 87.  
Here, the exculpatory language is the only language on the form 
to be read.  This is not a case where the exculpatory language 
is located in fine print at the end of a multi-page document or 
even a case where the waiver is located in the midst of several 
paragraphs on a single page form.  Aside from the blanks for 
contact information, the waiver is the form.   
¶56 While the top portion of the card does contain blanks 
for the signer to supply his or her contact information, such 
information would seem to be a necessary part of the waiver 
itself, as if injury did occur, it seems logical that the 
facility would be in need of the injured patron's contact 
information.  The fact that the top portion of the card is 
entitled "GUEST REGISTRATION" does not somehow alter the 
inherent nature of the form.  Indeed, one of the guidelines 
cited in Yauger is that the waiver should be separately labeled 
No.  03-2487-FT.jpw 
 
8 
 
to distinguish it from other parts of the agreement.  Yauger, 
206 Wis. 2d at 87 n.2.   
¶57 The majority also stresses that there is not a 
separate signature line for the waiver.  Majority op., ¶23.  
However, the signature line on the form is located directly 
under the exculpatory language, unlike the waiver in Richards, 
181 Wis. 2d at 1013.  One has to wonder why there would need to 
be a separate signature line under the blank lines in the top 
portion of the form.   
¶58 The exculpatory language in this case satisfies the 
guidelines cited in Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 87 n.2.  The waiver 
is conspicuous, as it is the only "paragraph" on the form.  The 
waiver is set off from the remainder of the form in a separately 
titled section.  The waiver is easy to locate.  The waiver 
appears directly above a signature line and the waiver is the 
only portion of the document requiring a signature.  The heading 
before the waiver is not misleading.  The waiver itself is 
written in plain, easy to read language and does not contain an 
abundance of legal jargon.  The waiver is written in large 
print.  In other words, there is no doubt that the waiver is 
conspicuous 
and 
informs 
the 
signer 
of 
its 
nature 
and 
significance.   
¶59 Yet, the majority concludes that the waiver "was not 
distinguishable enough."  Majority op., ¶24.  Apparently, the 
waiver would have been distinguishable if it appeared on a 
separate card, or if the form was multicolored and had but one 
more signature line, or if Swimwest had not utilized capital 
No.  03-2487-FT.jpw 
 
9 
 
letters when asking for contact information.  Id., ¶¶23-24.  
This type of analysis elevates form over substance and fails to 
consider the form on which the exculpatory clause appears as 
whole.   
¶60 The majority states that it is clarifying the law in 
Wisconsin concerning exculpatory clauses.  Majority op., ¶10.  
However, its application of these first two factors has done 
just the opposite.  In Yauger we stated that a waiver appearing 
on a form with other language should be conspicuously labeled, 
set apart, and should stand out from the rest of the form.  
Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 87 & n.2.  Here, this was done.  Yet, the 
majority uses the very fact that the "Waiver Release Statement" 
is labeled separately from the "Guest Registration" portion to 
conclude that the form serves two purposes and thus does not 
provide adequate notice of the significance and nature of the 
waiver.  Majority op., ¶23.  In Yauger, we suggested that a 
waiver should be easy to read and should not be written in 
legalese.  Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 87 & n.2.  Yet, the majority 
faults Swimwest for not utilizing a legal term of art——
"negligence"——in its waiver, and for not listing the precise act 
of negligence that allegedly occurred in this case.  Majority 
op., ¶¶20, 22.   
¶61 Further, as close reading of Yauger indicates, a 
document "serving two purposes" is not in and of itself 
questionable.  Rather, the concern arises that the signer may 
not be aware of the nature and significance of the waiver when a 
document serves two purposes and the waiver is not conspicuous.  
No.  03-2487-FT.jpw 
 
10 
 
Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 86-88.  This concern is not present here 
because the waiver is conspicuous and, read in context, clearly 
indicates what is being waived.  Thus, the fact that the form on 
which it appears arguably serves two purposes should not be 
dispositive.   
¶62 Finally, the majority concludes that the waiver is not 
valid because "there was no opportunity for Wilson to bargain 
over the exculpatory language[.]"  Majority op., ¶25.  This 
"bargaining" requirement originated in Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 
1019-20, and was not based on any existing case law.  The 
"bargaining" requirement was not utilized in Yauger.  The 
dissent in Richards, which I joined, indicated that this 
requirement was not based on existing law and discussed the 
inherent problems with such a requirement.  Richards, 181 
Wis. 2d at 1035-43 (Day, J., dissenting).  In particular, the 
dissent in Richards queried: 
[W]hat does it mean to "negotiate" in this context, 
and how would [a] company ensure that the negotiations 
were "equal"?  Are we to assess the competency of [the 
plaintiff] 
to 
negotiate 
and 
assume 
that 
any 
deficiencies must 
somehow 
be compensated 
for in 
substance by the company? . . . Or is it suggested 
that the company must appoint someone to help [the 
plaintiff] draft a counter-proposal?  Must the company 
then negotiate——in good faith, of course——about which 
terms of its own release it might be willing to drop 
in "negotiations"?  And what if, despite very skilled 
and fair negotiations on both sides, [the plaintiff] 
nevertheless agrees to accept the full release.   
Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 1041 (Day, J., dissenting).   
¶63 It is entirely impractical to require "bargaining" in 
this context.  Almost all releases are printed on standardized 
No.  03-2487-FT.jpw 
 
11 
 
forms and are a condition precedent to the use of recreational 
facilities.  Such releases are utilized by aquatic facilities, 
athletic clubs, ski resorts, canoeing and rafting outfits, and 
other high-risk ventures such as skydiving and bungee jumping.  
Many of these businesses are small firms whose continued 
existence is based on high customer volume.  Must the owner of 
such business, or other person with the authority to negotiate, 
be present at the desk of such facility during all hours of 
operation?  Must the proprietor employ a full-time attorney 
whose duties include negotiating with every person in the long 
line of skiers waiting to brave the slopes?  These businesses 
would grind to a halt under such practices or, at the very 
least, face long lines of angry customers.   
¶64 The 
reality 
is 
that 
there 
is 
almost 
never 
an 
opportunity to "bargain" over exculpatory clauses, as the 
majority describes it.  Rarely do ordinary consumers in today's 
fast-paced global economy have an "opportunity" to bargain over 
any of the terms of a contract (other than perhaps the price), 
as the majority describes "bargaining."  The only meaningful 
"bargaining" tool that an ordinary consumer possesses is his or 
her choice to frequent another business.   
¶65 While Richards has not been overruled and I am bound 
to accept the lack of the "opportunity to bargain" as a 
legitimate factor in the analysis of exculpatory agreements, the 
use of the "bargaining" factor in this case is particularly 
troublesome in light of the majority's refusal to set forth a 
workable standard describing what would satisfy the "opportunity 
No.  03-2487-FT.jpw 
 
12 
 
to bargain" requirement and its failure to decide whether a 
single 
objectionable 
factor 
is 
sufficient 
to 
render 
an 
exculpatory clause invalid.  Majority op., ¶18 n. 7.  Richards, 
which utilized the "bargaining" test, noted that no one factor 
alone was sufficient to invalidate an exculpatory agreement.  
Richards, 181 Wis. 2d at 1011.  Yauger, which did not discuss 
the bargaining factor, came to the opposite conclusion and held 
the presence of one factor was sufficient to invalidate an 
exculpatory clause.  Yauger, 206 Wis. 2d at 87 n.1.   
¶66 The majority fails to resolve this dispute and leaves 
open the possibility that even an exculpatory clause that is 
expertly drafted, conspicuous, and appears on a separate 
document may be invalidated merely because the signer had no 
"opportunity to bargain."  As such, the majority places the 
legitimacy of all exculpatory agreements in doubt.  If this 
court wishes to invalidate all exculpatory clauses, then it 
should so hold, rather than burdening businesses with confusing 
requirements that are impossible or unlikely to be met in any 
case.   
¶67 Individuals have a right to know what the law is so 
that they may conduct their affairs in an orderly fashion.  The 
majority has failed to articulate a clear, useable test that 
will provide meaningful guidance to those wishing to execute 
exculpatory 
agreements. 
 
Because 
the 
majority 
fails 
to 
articulate such a test, fails to apply the first two factors in 
accordance with the guidelines set forth in Yauger, and leaves 
open the possibility that the lack of an "opportunity to 
No.  03-2487-FT.jpw 
 
13 
 
bargain" alone is sufficient to invalidate an exculpatory 
agreement, I respectfully dissent.  
 
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