Title: BELUE v STATE

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 81-501 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 198% TRAVIS BEEUE and AARON KEMPH, Plaintiffs and Appellants, THE STATE OF MONTANA, MUSSELSHELL COUNTY, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of the Fourteenth Judiciai District, In and for the County of Eilusselshell, Honorabie Nat Allen, Judge presiding Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Clarence T I Belue argued, Hardin, Montana For Respondents: Ask and Pratt, Roundup, Montana Thomas Ask argued, Roundup, Montana Submitted': July 8, 1982 Decided: August 16, 1982 Mr. J u s t i c e John C. Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. An a c t i o n was brought by t h e p l a i n t i f f s a l l e g i n g negligence and m a i n t a i n i n g a p u b l i c o r p r i v a t e nuisance. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t e n t e r e d summary judgment f o r t h e d e f e n d a n t s with r e s p e c t t o such c l a i m s and t h e p l a i n t i f f s a p p e a l . The s o l e i s s u e b e f o r e t h e Court is whether t h e f a c t s a s developed on a motion f o r summary judgment show t h a t a burning s l a g p i l e c o n s t i t u t e d t h e f o r e s e e a b l e r i s k of f o r e s t and range f i r e . The D i s t r i c t Court made its d e c i s i o n t o g r a n t summary judgment t o d e f e n d a n t s on t h e b a s i s of some t e n d e p o s i t i o n s , a f f i d a v i t s and o t h e r documents submitted t o it. Those d e p o s i t i o n s and a f f i d a v i t s e s t a b l i s h t h a t Republic Coal Company, a/k/a Klein Coal Mine, is l o c a t e d f o u r m i l e s south of Roundup, Montana, on S e c t i o n 3 6 , Township 8 North, Range 25 E a s t M.P.M. A c o a l mine was o p e r a t e d on t h i s p r o p e r t y from 1908-1909 u n t i l 1956, when it c l o s e d . During t h i s p e r i o d , s l a g ( r o c k s , c o a l , and o t h e r mine w a s t e p r o d u c t s ) was p i l e d i n c e r t a i n a r e a s on t h e s e c t i o n . One of t h e s l a g p i l e s i n q u e s t i o n is a p p r o x i ~ n a t e l y 100 f e e t high, covered with v e g e t a t i o n , and l o c a t e d on a r i d g e a d j a c e n t t o Highway 87. On t h e a f t e r n o o n of December 4 , 1979, d u r i n g a s e v e r e windstorm, a f i r e s t a r t e d near t h i s s l a g p i l e , and spread four and one-half t o f i v e ~ n i l e s a c r o s s d e f e n d a n t s ' land and onto t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' land. The t r i a l c o u r t found t h a t t h e s l a g p i l e s t a r t e d burning p r i o r t o 1950. Red embers were then v i s i b l e t o m o t o r i s t s d r i v i n g along t h e highway. I n l a t e r y e a r s t h e embers d i s a p p e a r e d , b u t fumes i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e f i r e may have moved t o d e e p l n s i d e t h e p i l e . However, a f t e r t h e c o a l mine c l o s e d t h e p i l e w a s n o t c o n s i d e r e d a f i r e h a z a r d , and no f i r e s were e v e r r e p o r t e d . When t h e s t a t e b u i l t a highway through a p o r t i o n of t h e s l a g i n 1961, t h e f i r e was a p p a r e n t l y dead. Plaintiffs sued t h e s l a g p i l e owners f o r f a i l u r e t o c o n s t r u c t a f i r e break o r o t h e r p r o t e c t i o n from b u r n i n g s l a g . The t r i a l c o u r t viewed t h e p r e m i s e s , c o n s i d e r e d d e p o s i t i o n s and a f f i d a v i t s , and g r a n t e d d e f e n d a n t s motions f o r summary judgment. The c o u r t noted t h a t t h e s l a g p i l e had never caused a f i r e i n t h a t a r e a , t h a t flames were n e v e r v l s i b l e on t h e s u r f a c e , and t h a t t h e p i l e had never been c o n s i d e r e d a n u i s a n c e o r hazard. The c o u r t t h e n concluded t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s conduct i n l e a v i n g t h e s l a y p i l e untouched u n t i l 1979 was r e a s o n a b l e , p r u d e n t , and d i d n o t create an u n r e a s o n a b l e h a z a r d . P l a i n t i f f s contend t h a t o t h e r c o n c l u s i o n s could be r e a s o n a b l y drawn from t h e same f a c t s : F i r e h a z a r d s may e x i s t w i t h o u t f l a m e s ; and t h e s t o r a g e o f c o m b u s t i b l e m a t e r i a l on o n e s p r o p e r t y can r e a s o n a b l y be e x p e c t e d t o s t a r t a f i r e . R u l e 5 6 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P., p r o v i d e s t h a t summary 1 udgment is p r o p e r i f : " . . . t h e p l e a d i n g s , d e p o s i t i o n s , answers t o i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , and a d m i s s i o n s on f i l e , t o g e t h e r wlth t h e a f f i d a v i t s , i f any, show t h a t t h e r e is no g e n u i n e I s s u e a s t o any m a t e r i a l f a c t and t h a t t h e moving p a r t y is e n t i t l e d to a judgment a s a matter of law." The movant must make a showing t h a t e x c l u d e s any reai doubt a s t o t h e e x i s t e n c e of any genuine i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t . Harland v . Anderson ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 169 Mont. 447, 548 P.2d 613. T h i s Court i n Mang v. E l i a s s o n ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 153 Mont. 431, 458 P.2d 777, o u t l i n e d a landowner's r i g h t s and d u t i e s , and a t h e o r y of n e g l i g e n t use i n g r e a t d e t a i l . In t h a t c a s e a j u r y found t h e defendant n e g l i g e n t i n t h e use of h i s p r o p e r t y . This Court overturned t h e j u r y v e r d i c t and found a s a m a t t e r of law t h a t t h e defendant was n o t n e g l i g e n t . The Mang c a s e , s u p r a , a r o s e i n t h e same d i s t r i c t and under t h e same judge a s heard t h i s c a s e and he r e l i e d on o u r o p i n i o n i n Nang i n d e c i d i n g t h i s i s s u e . The following a r e q u o t e s from Mang which apply t o t h i s c a s e : " B a s i c a l l y t h e r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of t h e use of p r o p e r t y by its owner must n e c e s s a r i l y be determined from t h e f a c t s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s of each p a r t i c u l a r c a s e a s it a r i s e s by t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of a p p r o p r i a t e p r o v i s i o n o r p r i n c i p l e s of law and t h e d i c t a t e s of mutual and r e c i p r o c a l j u s t i c e . F u r t h e r , b e f o r e n e g l i g e n c e can be p r e d i c a t e d on any g i v e n a c t , back of t h a t a c t must be sought and found a d u t y t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l complaining, t h e o b s e r v a n c e o f which d u t y would h a v e a v e r t e d t h e i n j u r y . . . "An a d d i t i o n a l t e s t of a c t i o n a b l e n e g l i g e n c e is n o t what might have prevented a p a r t i c u l a r a c c i d e n t , b u t what reasonably prudent men would have done i n t h e d i s c h a r g e of t h e i r d u t i e s u n d e r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s a s t h e y e x i s t e d a t t h e t i m e o f t h e a c c i d e n t . Milasevich v. Fox Western Montana T h e a t r e Corp., 118 Mont. 265, 272, 165 P.2d 195 . . . " I t h a s been w e l l s a i d t h a t a d e f e n d a n t who could n o t f o r e s e e any danger of d i r e c t i n j u r y r e s u l t i n g from h i s conduct o r any r i s k from an i n t e r v e n i n g f o r c e is n o t n e g l i g e n t . Taylor v. Chicago, Milwaukee, S t . Paul & Pac, Ry. Co., 142 Mont. 365, 371, 384 P.2d 759; Lencioni v. Long, 139 Mont. 135, 361 P.2d 455. " ' I n s t r i k i n g t h i s b a l a n c e - - t h a t i s , i n w e i g h i n g t h e l i k e l i h o o d o f harm, t h e s e r i o u s n e s s of t h e i n j u r y and t h e v a l u e of t h e i n t e r e s t t o be s a c r i f i c e d - - t h e law judges t h e a c t o r ' s conduct i n t h e l i g h t of t h e s i t u a t i o n a s it would have appeared t o t h e r e a s o n a b l e man i n h i s s h o e s a t t h e time of t h e a c t o r omission complained o f . Not what a c t u a l l y happened, b u t what t h e r e a s o n a b l y prudent person would t h e n have f o r e s e e n a s l i k e l y t o happen, of r e a s o n a b l e n e s s * * *' "Harper and James, The Law of T o r t s , s u p r a , a t page 1018, s t a t e t h e p r e v a i l i n g view. The o b l i g a t i o n of d e f e n d a n t s t u r n s on whether: " I . . . t h e o f f e n d i n g conduct f o r e s e e a b l y involved unreasonably g r e a t r i s k of harm t o t h e i n t e r e s t s of someone o t h e r than t h e a c t o r . . . [Tlhe o b l i g a t i o n t o r e f r a i n from . . . p a r t i c u l a r conduct is owed o n l y t o t h o s e who a r e f o r e s e e a b l y endangered by t h e conduct and o n l y with r e s p e c t t o t h o s e r i s k s and h a z a r d s whose l i k e l i h o o d made t h e conduct unreason- a b l y dangerous. Duty, i n o t h e r words, is measured by t h e scope of t h e r i s k which n e g l i g e n t conduct f o r e s e e a b l y e n t a i l s . ' 153 Mont. 437-38, 458 P.2d a t 781. From t h e p r i n c i p l e s of law s e t f o r t h i n Mang, s u p r a , w e can f i n d no genuine i s s u e s of m a t e r i a l f a c t s c o n s t i t u t i n g n e g l i g e n c e on t h e p a r t of t h e d e f e n d a n t s and f i n d no e r r o r i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s g r a n t i n g summary judgment on t h e i s s u e of n e g l i g e n c e . I n a d d i t i o n , p l a i n t i f f s argued t h a t s e c t i o n 50-63- 103, MCA, a p p l i e d t o t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a s e . T h i s C o u r t , i n a r e c e n t c a s e , DNRC v. C l a r k Fork Logging Company (1982) , Mont. P.2d I 39 - 1 - St.Rep. 1146, considered t h e above s t a t u t e and i n t e r p r e t e d t h e same t o apply o n l y t o t h e i n t e n t i o n a l s e t t i n g o r l e a v i n g a f i r e , t h e purpose of which is t o burn e x c e s s f o r e s t m a t e r i a l . That is c l e a r l y n o t t h e s i t u a t i o n h e r e , and we hold t h e s t a t u t e n o t a p p l i c a b l e . The next i s s u e is whether t h e s l a g p i l e was a p u b l i c o r p r i v a t e nuisance, t h e r e b y making t h e d e f e n d a n t s l i a b l e . S e c t i o n 27-30-101, MCA, d e f i n e s " n u i s a n c e " a s : " A n y t h i n g which is i n j u r i o u s t o h e a l t h , i n d e c e n t o r o f f e n s i v e t o t h e s e n s e s , o r an o b s t r u c t i o n t o t h e f r e e use of p r o p e r t y . . ." Here t h e undisputed f a c t s show t h a t t h e o l d s l a g p i l e e x i s t e d f o r many, many y e a r s along Highway 83 i n f u l l p u b l i c view. There is no showing t h a t it had ever p r e v i o u s l y caused f i r e s i n t h e a r e a and t h e r e is no showing t h a t it was c o n s i d e r e d a hazard t o neighboring p r o p e r t y owners. T h i s c o u r t h e l d i n F a u c e t t v. Dewey Lumber Co. ( 1 9 2 8 ) , 82 Mont. 250, 259, 266 P. 646, 648, r e f e r r i n g t o t h e s t a t u t e s covering p u b l i c and p r i v a t e n u i s a n c e s , t h a t " [ t ] he foregoing s t a t u t e s a r e , i n e f f e c t , b u t c r y s t a l l i z a t i o n s of t h e common law and a r e c o n s i s t e n t with t h e g e n e r a l r u l e s which have long been recognized by t h e c o u r t s . " "'A nuisance per s e is g e n e r a l l y d e f i n e d a s an a c t , o c c u p a t i o n , o r s t r u c t u r e , which is a n u i s a n c e a t a l l t i m e s and under any c i r c u m s t a n c e s , r e g a r d l e s s of l o c a t i o n o r surroundings. Other d e f i n i t i o n s a r e : any a c t o r omission o r use of p r o p e r t y o r t h i n g which is of i t s e l f h u r t f u l t o t h e h e a l t h , t r a n q u i l l i t y , o r morals, o r which o u t r a g e s t h e decency of t h e community; t h a t which cannot be so conducted o r maintained a s t o be l a w f u l l y c a r r i e d on o r p e r m i t t e d t o e x i s t ; and, a s r e l a t e d t o p r i v a t e persons an a c t o r use of p r o p e r t y of a c o n t i n u i n g n a t u r e , o f f e n s i v e t o and l e g a l l y i n j u r i o u s t o h e a l t h and p r o p e r t y , o r both. '39 Am.Jur., N u i s a n c e s , S e c . 11, p. 289." McCollum v . K o l o k o t r o n e s ( 1 9 5 7 ) , 131 Mont. 438, 443-444, 311 P.2d 780, 782-83. Here, f o r many y e a r s open flames were n o t v i s i b l e and any burning i n t h e a r e a occurred beneath t h e s u r f a c e . For t h e t e n y e a r s p r i o r t o t h e 1979 f i r e , underground burning was l e s s and l e s s obvious t o any o b s e r v e r and t h e r e have been no complaints t o p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s concerning t h e p i l e . T h e r e f o r e , we f i n d no genuine i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t t h a t t h e s l a g p i l e was a p u b l i c o r p r i v a t e n u i s a n c e . Whether t h e r e was o r was n o t s u b s t a n t i a l evidence is a m a t t e r of law. I n Flansberg v. Montana Power Company ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 154 Mont. 53, 460 P.2d 263, t h i s C o u r t , c o n s i d e r e d t h e g r a n t i n g of a motion f o r summary judgment and h e l d : " I f t h e r e is no evidence of any n e g l i g e n t a c t o r omission by t h e d e f e n d a n t , a n o n s u i t is p r o p e r l y g r a n t e d . ( C i t a t i o n o m i t t e d . ) T h i s r u l e is e q u a l l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a motion f o r summary judgment under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s d i s c l o s e d h e r e . 154 Mont. a t 60, 460 P.2d a t 267. "When t h e record d i s c l o s e s no genuine i s s u e a s t o any m a t e r i a l f a c t , t h e burden is on t h e p a r t y opposing t h e motion f o r summary judg- ment t o p r e s e n t evidence of m a t e r i a l and s u b s t a n t i a l n a t u r e r a i s i n g a genuine i s s u e of f a c t (Brown v. Thornton, 150 Mont. 150, 432 P.2d 386) and a s i n t h i s c a s e , t h e f a i l u r e t o s u s t a i n t h a t burden a u t h o r i z e s t h e g r a n t i n g of summary judgment. 154 Mont. 58, 460 P.2d a t 266. "Whether o r n o t t h e r e is s u b s t a n t i a l evidence p r e s e n t e d by p l a i n t i f f is a q u e s t i o n of law f o r t h e c o u r t and n o t a q u e s t i o n of f a c t f o r t h e jury." 154 Mont. 60, 460 P.2d a t 267. T h i s Court h a s h e l d i n a number of c a s e s t h a t t h e p a r t y seeking summary judgment h a s t h e i n i t i a l burden of showing absence of any i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t remaining, and then t h e burden p a s s e s t o t h e o p p o s i t i o n t o r a i s e such m a t e r i a l i s s u e of f a c t . See, DeWinter v. Capp Homes, Inc. ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 162 Mont. 19, 507 P.2d 1061. For t h e r e a s o n s s t a t e d t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e District Court is a f f irmed. We concur: Justices Mr. Chief J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell d i s s e n t i n g : I d i s s e n t . I n m y view a j u r y q u e s t i o n e x i s t s regard- ing whether t h e damage caused t o t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' land was foreseeable. Accordingly, t h e r e a r e genuine i s s u e s of m a t e r i a l f a c t precluding summary judgment. Rule 5 6 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P. The m a j o r i t y r e l i e s on Mang v. Eliasson (1969), 153 Mont. 431, 458 P.2d 777, t o support t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s g r a n t i n g summary judgment t o defendants. However, t h i s c a s e is d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e on its f a c t s from Mang. I n Mang t h e r e was no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e defendants' summer-fallowing t h e ground i n mid-September could have caused p l a i n t i f f s ' damage, absent a s t r o n g wind. I n t h i s case, Ben Mundie, a g e o l o g i s t employed by t h e S t a t e of Montana, Department of Lands, s t a t e d by a f f i d a v i t t h a t , "an extreme danger of p o t e n t i a l f i r e p r e s e n t l y e x i s t s and w i l l continue t o e x i s t s o long a s t h e c o a l gob p i l e continues t o burn." Mundie a l s o concurred with t h e b r i e f i n g papers of t h e A s s i s t a n t D i r e c t o r of Abandoned Mine Lands t h a t a "high p r o b a b i l i t y of i g n i t i n g f u t u r e range and f o r e s t f i r e s " e x i s t e d and t h a t t h e " f i r e is e x t r e m e l y d a n g e r o u s t o t r a v e l e r s u s i n g Highway 8 7 , l o c a l r a n c h e r s , and t h e surrounding communities. " I n m y view, t h e expert opinion evidence of Mundie r a i s e d a q u e s t i o n of f a c t t o be decided by t h e jury of whe- t h e r defendants could have reasonably foreseen p l a i n t i f f s ' damages from t h e smoldering gob p i l e . I would r e v e r s e f o r a t r i a l on t h e m e r i t s . ~ 4 $ . . W W 4 Chief Justlce I concur in the foregoing dissent of Chief Justice Haswell.