Title: Shongutsie v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Shongutsie v. State1992 WY 23827 P.2d 361Case Number: 90-269Decided: 02/24/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Lindberg SHONGUTSIE, 

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The STATE of Wyoming, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, Fremont County, Elizabeth A. Kail, J.

Lee E. 
Christian, Jostad Associates, Fort Collins, Colo., for 
appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Sylvia L. Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Mary B. Guthrie, Jennifer L. 
Gimbel, Larry M. Donovan, Sr. Asst. Attys. Gen., for 
appellee.

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, and GOLDEN, JJ., and BROWN, J., 
Ret.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1]      The essential 
issue that the court must resolve in this case is whether the representation of 
Lindberg Shongutsie (Shongutsie) and his wife, Rebecca Shongutsie, by the same 
attorney at a joint trial deprived Shongutsie of his constitutional right to 
effective assistance of counsel. Collateral issues are presented involving the 
consent of Shongutsie to the joint representation; suppression by the State of 
discoverable materials; a claim of unlawful joinder; and the impropriety of the 
imposition of restitution at sentencing. We reverse and remand this case for a 
new trial because of the conflict of interest presented by the representation of 
Shongutsie and his wife by the same attorney, which led to a deprivation of his 
constitutional right to counsel. We deem it unlikely that the other questions 
will reoccur in light of this reversal, and our discussion of them will be 
limited.

[¶2]      Shongutsie 
presents the following issues in his Brief of Appellant:

I.          
Did Appellant's attorney's representation of conflicting interests deny 
the Appellant his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel?

II.          
Did the trial court err in failing to inquire into whether the Appellant 
knowingly and voluntarily waived his constitutional right to conflict-free 
representation?

III.         Did 
the prosecution's suppression of information that was helpful in conducting 
cross-examination deprive the Appellant of due process?

IV.        Was it 
plain error for the trial court to require the joinder of four co-defendants 
charged with separate and distinct crimes?

V.        Were 
restitution costs assessed by the trial court improper without a finding of 
ability to pay?

The State of 
Wyoming, as appellee, states the issues in this way:

I.          
Whether the representation of the appellant and his wife by retained 
counsel constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.

II.          
Whether the trial court had an affirmative obligation to inquire if the 
defendants approved of the joint representation.

III.         
Whether the State suppressed exculpatory evidence.

IV.        Whether 
joinder of the trials of the four codefendants was proper.

V.        Whether the 
trial court properly assessed costs of restitution on the appellant.

 

[¶3]      While arising out 
of a grim and repugnant background, the facts material to the disposition of 
this case are not complex. The Riverton Holiday Inn sponsored a public dance 
that commenced in the evening of September 9, 1989 and continued into the early 
morning hours of the following day. Citizens from the surrounding communities 
patronized the dance and, after it was over, a disturbance arose in the parking 
lot of the Holiday Inn. Personnel on the staff of the Holiday Inn and patrons of 
the Holiday Inn summoned the police because of the disturbance.

[¶4]      When they 
arrived, the police officers witnessed the aftermath of what had been a vicious 
street brawl involving an estimated twenty to thirty participants. The officers 
found damaged vehicles, broken windows, and a man lying on the pavement in a 
pool of blood. That individual was Richard "Dickie" Ferris, Jr. (Ferris), who 
had been severely beaten about the head. Ferris was in critical condition when 
transported by ambulance to the Riverton Memorial Hospital. Ferris then was 
transferred by air to the Wyoming Medical Center in Casper, where he died on 
September 14, 1989 as a result of blunt trauma to his head.

[¶5]      Following an 
investigation of these events and appropriate judicial proceedings, an 
information was filed charging Shongutsie with three criminal counts: I - first 
degree murder of Ferris; II - attempted aggravated assault of Donald Metzger, 
Jr.; and III - aggravated assault of Kelli Dollard. A separate information 
charged Rebecca Shongutsie with a single count of aggravated assault upon 
Ferris. Earl Warren also was charged with aggravated assault upon Ferris in a 
separate information. Finally, Russell Warren was charged with two counts of 
aggravated assault upon victims other than Ferris.

[¶6]      Initially, 
Shongutsie was provided with counsel appointed by the court. Subsequently, 
Shongutsie and his wife retained private counsel to represent them jointly. Earl 
Warren and Russell Warren each obtained the services of a separate 
attorney.

[¶7]      At their 
arraignments, all of the defendants entered pleas of not guilty. Following 
numerous motions, hearings, and conferences, the four cases were consolidated 
for joint trial before a jury. Initially the cases had been stacked to be tried 
separately with Rebecca Shongutsie's case to be tried first. Then a decision was 
made that Shongutsie's case should be tried first. Shongutsie objected to the 
joinder of the cases for trial, but argued that his case should be tried last. 
He told the court at a hearing on the matter that he would prefer a joint trial 
of all four cases to having his case tried first. The trial court then ruled 
that the cases would be tried jointly.

[¶8]      The trial 
commenced on June 25, 1990 and concluded on July 3, 1990. By its verdicts, the 
jury found: Shongutsie was not guilty of first degree murder, but guilty of the 
lesser-included offense of second degree murder. Also, Shongutsie was found 
guilty of the attempted aggravated assault of Donald Metzger, Jr. He was found 
not guilty of aggravated assault upon Kelli Dollard. Rebecca Shongutsie was 
found not guilty of the aggravated assault upon Ferris. Earl Warren was found 
guilty of the aggravated assault upon Ferris. Russell Warren was found guilty on 
only one count of aggravated assault involving a different victim.

[¶9]      The court 
sentenced Shongutsie to a term of not less than twenty, nor more than fifty, 
years on the charge of second degree murder and a term of not less than two, nor 
more than five, years on the charge of attempted aggravated assault with the 
sentences to run concurrently. In addition to the sentence to the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary, the court required Shongutsie to pay $50 on each count to the 
Crime Victims Compensation Fund and to pay restitution in the amount of $39,300, 
as well as the costs of prosecution. Shongutsie appeals from the judgment and 
sentence.

[¶10]   The primary contention in this 
appeal is that Shongutsie was denied his right to effective assistance of 
counsel in contravention of the guarantees provided in the Constitution of the 
United States and the Constitution of the State of Wyoming. Specifically, 
Shongutsie asserts that his private counsel, in his dual advocacy, was 
confronted with actual conflicts of interest which adversely affected 
Shongutsie's representation. As an example of this conflict, Shongutsie argues 
that an actual conflict of interest arose when counsel had to decide whether to 
have Rebecca Shongutsie testify, in order to exonerate herself, knowing that she 
had made statements prejudicial to Shongutsie which were likely to come before 
the jury upon cross-examination. Shongutsie urges that the following exchange 
between counsel for the State and Rebecca Shongutsie was particularly 
prejudicial to his interests in the case:

[Examination was by 
counsel for the State and the witness was Rebecca Shongutsie.]

Q.        Okay. And 
after Mr. Thompson talked to you, you were in a cell with other 
females?

A.        Yes. Two 
women.

Q.        And at that 
time, you knew that the body behind the pickup was Richard Ferris, Jr., didn't 
you?

A.        That's what 
Mr. Thompson had indicated to me, yes.

Q.        And when 
you were in that cell, you made statements like, "I hope we killed him." Didn't 
you?

A.        No, I did 
not.

Q.        And you 
made statements like, "We beat him up." Didn't you?

A.        No, I did 
not.

Q.        And you 
made statements like, "I hope he dies."

A.        No, I did 
not.

Q.        And you 
made statements about, "I hope Mr. Ferris is happy now." Didn't you?

A.        
No.

Q.        And you 
make a statement saying that, "Well, we threw it in a horse trailer and they'll 
never find it." Didn't you?

A.        
No.

Q.        And you 
also made statements along the lines of, "We knocked his brains in, and I hope 
he dies."

A.        
No.

[¶11]   The right to counsel is guaranteed 
by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and is 
applicable to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States. In addition, it is specifically articulated 
in Article 1, Section 10, of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming which 
provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
defend in person and by counsel. . . ." This right to counsel includes a 
guarantee that the assistance of counsel be effective. Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).

[¶12]   The right to effective counsel 
encompasses the correlative rights that counsel be reasonably competent and that 
counsel be free from conflicts of interests. It is essential to differentiate 
between claims of ineffectiveness that are based upon lawyer incompetency and 
those that are based upon conflicts of interest arising out of multiple 
representation. Compare, United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 
80 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1984) (right to reasonably competent attorney), with Glasser v. 
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S. Ct. 457, 86 L. Ed. 680 (1942) (right to 
conflict-free representation). If the claim is based upon lawyer incompetency, 
competency is presumed, and the defendant must accept the burden of 
affirmatively demonstrating deficient performance by counsel and prejudice to 
his rights. With respect to claims based upon a conflict of interest arising 
from multiple representation, prejudice often is presumed. In this case, we 
address only the law and the appropriate public policy relating to ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims that are based upon the right to have an attorney 
who is free from conflicts of interest.

[¶13]   The purpose of the constitutional 
right to effective assistance of counsel has been said to be "to insure that 
criminal defendants receive a fair trial." Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 
108 S. Ct. 1692, 100 L. Ed. 2d 140, reh'g. denied 487 U.S. 1243, 108 S. Ct. 2918, 
101 L. Ed. 2d 949 (1988) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 669, 104 S.Ct. at 2055). 
The Supreme Court of the United States has emphasized that the denial of the 
assistance of counsel who is free from conflicts of interest "can never be 
treated as harmless error." Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489, 98 S. Ct. 1173, 1181, 55 L. Ed. 2d 426 (1978) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 
23, 87 S. Ct. 824, 827-28, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967)).

[¶14]   This court has adopted and applied 
federal precedent when analyzing effective assistance of counsel claims based 
upon the right to representation free from conflicts of interest. See King v. 
State, 810 P.2d 119 (Wyo. 1991); Gist v. State, 737 P.2d 336 (Wyo. 1987), appeal 
after remand 766 P.2d 1149 (1988); Reynoldson v. State, 737 P.2d 1331 (Wyo. 
1987); Chavez v. State, 604 P.2d 1341 (Wyo. 1979), cert. denied 446 U.S. 984, 
100 S. Ct. 2967, 64 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1980). The federal precedent in this area 
employs a two-fold analysis. First, the reviewing court examines the record to 
determine if the defendant or his attorney made timely objection to multiple 
representation at the trial level. If an objection was presented, the trial 
court is charged with the affirmative duty of appointing separate counsel or 
taking adequate measures to determine that the possibility of conflict is too 
remote to warrant the appointment of separate counsel. If the trial court fails 
to pursue those requirements, prejudice is presumed upon appeal and reversal is 
automatic. Holloway.

[¶15]   In those instances in which neither 
the defendant nor his attorney made any objection to multiple representation at 
the trial level, reversible prejudice is not automatically presumed according to 
federal precedent. In such an instance, the defendant is required to demonstrate 
on appeal that an actual, rather than an apparent, conflict of interest 
adversely affected the performance of his attorney. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1980). In the application of this standard, 
the defendant is entitled to a limited presumption of prejudice. He is required 
to show only that the performance of the attorney was less effective than it 
might have been absent the conflict of interest. Strickland; Cuyler. In aid of 
the defendant's position, the reviewing court is charged with a duty to search 
the record for an actual conflict and any corresponding adverse impact. 
Gist.

[¶16]   Federal precedent, in the context 
of a situation in which no objection was made, requires the reviewing court to 
undertake the highly speculative task of searching the record to identify actual 
conflicts of interest and some corresponding effect on representation. Review 
under such a standard is a purely ad hoc approach and, in our judgment, 
the standard is untenable. As the United States Supreme Court has pointed 
out:

Joint representation of 
conflicting interests is suspect because of what it tends to prevent the 
attorney from doing. For example, . . . [joint representation] may well . . . 
preclude[] defense counsel . . . from exploring possible plea negotiations and 
the possibility of an agreement to testify for the prosecution, provided a 
lesser charge or a favorable sentencing recommendation would be acceptable. 
Generally speaking, a conflict may also prevent an attorney from challenging the 
admission of evidence prejudicial to one client but perhaps favorable to 
another, or from arguing . . . the relative involvement and culpability of his 
clients in order to minimize the culpability of one by emphasizing that of 
another. Examples can be readily multiplied.

. . . .

[I]n a case of joint 
representation of conflicting interests the evil - it bears repeating - is in 
what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing, not only 
at trial but also as to possible pretrial plea negotiations and in the 
sentencing process.

Holloway, 435 U.S.  at 489-90, 98 S. Ct.  at 1181-82 (emphasis in original).

[¶17]   In conflict of interest cases, any 
effort to reconstruct trial strategy after the fact is exceedingly difficult and 
doomed to frustration because the record fails to tell a complete story. In our 
judgment, the right to effective, conflict-free representation is too 
fundamental to justify the court in engaging in "nice calculations as to the 
amount of prejudice [or adverse effect] arising from its denial." Glasser, 315 U.S.  at 76, 62 S. Ct.  at 467.

[¶18]   Application of the standard applied 
in those cases in which no objection was voiced also has been troublesome for 
the trial courts. When an objection is made to the multiple representation, the 
trial court clearly is obligated to inquire into the possibility of conflict of 
interest. Holloway. If the possibility appears at all likely, the trial court 
then has an affirmative obligation to appoint separate counsel, or to obtain a 
knowing and voluntary waiver from the defendant of his right to counsel free 
from any conflict of interest. The failure to establish this on the record leads 
to an automatic reversal upon review. Holloway. In those instances, the strict 
guidelines significantly reduce the possibility of a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel when the case is appealed. The defendant either will have 
had separate counsel appointed, or he clearly will have waived his right to 
representation that is free from conflict of interest.

[¶19]   By contrast, when no objection is 
set forth at the trial level, the federal cases establish that the trial court 
is under no affirmative obligation to inquire into the possibility of conflict 
of interest unless it "knows or reasonably should know that a particular 
conflict exists."1 Cuyler, 446 U.S.  at 347, 100 S. Ct. 
at 1717. Traditionally, the trial courts have relied upon the ethical sense of 
responsibility of the attorney to call to their attention potential conflicts of 
interest. Cuyler. If the attorney does not report the conflict of interest, and 
the defendant does not object to multiple representation, the tendency of the 
trial court is to not address the issue. Thus, in such cases, the appointment of 
separate counsel for the respective defendants is not accomplished, nor is any 
waiver of the right to representation by an attorney free from any conflict of 
interest obtained and made a matter of record. In every such instance, then, 
there is an opportunity to argue an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on 
appeal.

[¶20]   This case is illustrative of the 
problem. Shongutsie and Rebecca Shongutsie were co-defendants in a case in which 
Shongutsie was charged with murder. They hired the same attorney to represent 
them. Neither Shongutsie nor Rebecca Shongutsie objected to the joint 
representation at the trial level, and the attorney did not report any problem 
relating to the joint representation. The attorney did express some concern 
about the potential for conflict, but the assertion made to the trial court was 
that the possibility was not a real probability. The trial court acquiesced in 
the attorney's conclusion and neither appointed separate counsel nor obtained a 
specific waiver. Shongutsie and Rebecca Shongutsie were then tried and, during 
the course of the trial, a conflict was present. Shongutsie was convicted and, 
in his appeal, he now asserts ineffective assistance of counsel. There is no 
record of any specific waiver of his right to proceed without being afforded the 
opportunity to be represented by counsel who was free from any conflict. The 
case necessarily must be reversed, and Shongutsie must be retried.

[¶21]   In light of the preceding analysis, 
we deem it no longer prudent to follow the federal dichotomy in analyzing claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel that are premised upon a conflict of 
interest. Instead, we choose to more firmly protect the defendant's right to 
representation by an attorney who is free from any conflict of interest. As we 
stated in Richmond v. State, 554 P.2d 1217, 1223 (Wyo. 1976):

This court has never been 
blind to the fact that "protection of constitutional rights of an accused is not 
the peculiar province of the federal courts." Dryden v. State, Wyo. 1975, 535 P.2d 483, 491. Nor are we blind to the rule that constitutional standards 
announced by the Supreme Court of the United States are minimal, which rights 
may be enlarged under State constitutional provisions if 
justifiable.

Further, in 
Reynoldson, 737 P.2d  at 1336, we stated:

This Court is 
disinterested in establishing a rule which minimizes caution in corepresentation 
cases or, even with recognition of the limited resources of the public defender, 
which would not emphasize the importance of different counsel where any conflict 
in representation could be envisioned.

[¶22]   The potential for a conflict of 
interest not only can be visualized but, actually "inheres in almost every 
instance of multiple representation." Cuyler, 446 U.S.  at 348, 100 S. Ct.  at 
1718. In addition, we are cognizant of the fact that the potential for prejudice 
is so great where a conflict of interest exists that any case-by-case inquiry is 
ill-advised and unwise. We, therefore, articulate the rule that prejudice will 
be presumed in all instances of multiple representation of criminal defendants 
and, in the absence of an appropriate waiver, multiple representation will 
constitute reversible error.

[¶23]   The product of that presumption of 
prejudice is that the trial court must, in each case in which the same attorney 
represents more than one defendant, separately advise each of those defendants 
of the right to be represented by an attorney free from any conflict of interest 
and of the dangers inherent in the multiple representation. Should any defendant 
decide to forego the representation by the attorney who is representing another 
defendant, the trial judge will appoint separate counsel for any defendant who 
qualifies for state-appointed counsel. On the other hand, if any defendant 
insists upon being represented by the attorney of his choice and chooses the 
attorney who is representing another defendant, the trial judge must obtain from 
that defendant a request, preferably in writing, to be represented by the 
attorney who is representing another defendant and must also obtain a knowing 
and voluntary waiver of the right to be represented by an attorney free from any 
conflict of interest. All colloquy between the defendant, the court, and counsel 
must be reported and transcribed, and the written request, if one is executed, 
must be included in the record. Courts in other jurisdictions have seen fit to 
impose similar prophylactic measures. See, e.g., Harvey v. State, 96 Nev. 850, 
619 P.2d 1214 (1980); Moreau v. State, 588 P.2d 275 (Alaska 1978); Commonwealth 
v. Davis, 376 Mass. 777, 384 N.E.2d 181 (1978); State v. Olsen, 258 N.W.2d 898 
(Minn. 1977). See also Fed.R.Crim.P. 44(c).2

[¶24]   This rule of presumed prejudice 
that leads to reversible error promotes several important policies in a way that 
we find persuasive. First, the rule will discourage attorneys from accepting the 
role of a dual advocate in criminal cases and thereby potentially compromising 
their most fundamental duty - loyalty to the individual client. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct.  at 2052 (duty of loyalty is perhaps counsel's most basic 
duty); see also Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7 (1984). As one 
commentator has noted, counsel's entire approach to a case of multiple 
representation results in compromise of each respective client's 
interests:

The interests and 
defenses of co-defendants are, as a general rule, antagonistic; and, given the 
fact of joint representation, a strong likelihood arises that a conflict exists 
or will ensue. The inherent difficulty in such a situation is that a single 
attorney must simultaneously steer the defenses of each defendant on proper 
course thereby wasting much of his valuable courtroom concentration on the task 
of preventing scrapes and collisions between multi-client interests. He can no 
longer freely decide what will be most advantageous for the defense of one 
client without first weighing against it the disadvantages that might 
consequently accrue to the other. He must, in short, temper his strategy to a 
middle-of-the-road position. This condition, of course, imposes an artificial 
and strained approach on a singular counsel which prevents him from developing a 
full, aggressive defensive strategy. The shattering impact of skilled technique 
which ordinarily could be leveled in full force against the opposition must be 
partially, and often substantially, diffused in a constant concern to calculate 
the possible harm each maneuver might work on the co-defendant. Counsel must 
pick, choose, compromise and forego various attacks because of the threat of 
adverse repercussions to the interests of the co-defendant. He is thereby 
prevented from the use of all the weapons in his legal armory.

Arthur John 
Anderson, Jr., Note, Conflict of Interests in Criminal Proceedings, 23 
Ark.L.Rev. 250, 254-55 (1969) (footnotes omitted).

[¶25]   Second, the rule promotes the 
effective administration of justice. It assists trial judges in fulfilling their 
duty of "jealously guarding" a defendant's right to effective assistance of 
counsel by explicitly defining the trial court's role in a case in which 
multiple representation is present. See Glasser, 315 U.S.  at 71, 62 S. Ct.  at 
465. Corollary benefits are provided by the fact that the rule diminishes the 
likelihood of appeal premised upon ineffective assistance of counsel. In 
addition, the rule establishes a standard of review that is free from any 
factual speculation.

[¶26]   Third, and perhaps most important, 
the rule better ensures that all defendants will be fully apprised of their 
constitutional right to be represented by an attorney free of any conflict of 
interest. It demands that the trial court discuss with them the problems 
inherent in multiple representation, and assures a knowing choice if the 
defendant elects to proceed with an attorney who is representing another 
defendant.

[¶27]   Touching briefly on some of the 
other issues raised by Shongutsie, we are satisfied that, in this instance, the 
prosecution did not suppress any information that was helpful in conducting 
cross-examination so as to deprive Shongutsie of due process of law. The 
prosecutor did offer the entire investigative file of the law enforcement 
officers to counsel for Shongutsie. The material about which complaint is made 
apparently was not in the possession of the prosecutor, but was present in the 
investigative file. We cannot accept an argument that anything was hidden by the 
State when the opportunity to examine it was present.

[¶28]   With respect to the joinder of the 
charges for trial, they clearly did arise out of the same circumstance. The same 
evidence would be used in all cases. We accept the position of the trial judge 
that, in the exercise of discretion, the cases properly could be joined for 
trial, particularly in light of the preference expressed by Shongutsie that they 
be tried jointly if his case otherwise would be tried first. Certainly, there 
was no error on the part of the trial judge in declining to let Shongutsie 
select the order in which the cases should be tried.

[¶29]   One final matter requires our 
attention. The record is clear that the trial judge ordered Shongutsie to pay 
$39,300 as victim restitution pursuant to Wyo. Stat. §§ 7-9-101 - 112 (1987). 
Shongutsie urges the proposition that this order was inappropriate absent a 
finding by the trial court that he was, or would become, able to pay 
restitution. Sections 7-9-101 - 112 were somewhat ambiguous with respect to the 
duty of the trial court to determine a defendant's ability to pay prior to 
ordering victim restitution in connection with the imposition of sentence. See 
Wyo. Stat. § 7-9-103 (1987); Seaton v. State, 811 P.2d 276 (Wyo. 1991). This 
ambiguity has been addressed recently by the legislature of the State of Wyoming 
and, effective July 1, 1991, § 7-9-103 specifically requires that the trial 
judge find "ability to pay" or "reasonable probability" of ability to pay prior 
to requiring restitution. The record in this case does not disclose that the 
trial court made any specific findings of fact regarding Mr. Shongutsie's 
present or prospective ability to pay restitution. Under the amendment to the 
statute, such findings must be made if Mr. Shongutsie is found guilty of 
homicide at a new trial.

[¶30]   In summary, we recognize a 
presumption that Shongutsie was prejudiced by the multiple representation which 
was undertaken in the trial court. In the absence of a demonstration on the 
record that Shongutsie knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to be 
represented by an attorney free of conflict of interest, the judgment against 
Shongutsie must be reversed. The case is reversed and remanded to the district 
court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

CARDINE, J., and BROWN, 
J., Ret., filed dissenting opinions.

CARDINE, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶31]   This is a troubling case. Rebecca 
Shongutsie and Lindberg Shongutsie were husband and wife. They were charged 
separately in the killing of Richard Ferris. They employed an attorney to 
represent them in their defense at their joint trial. The possibility of 
conflict of interest resulting from a single attorney representing two 
defendants in the joint trial was discussed. The Shongutsies made no objection, 
but chose to proceed.

[¶32]   The majority opinion recites the 
question-and-answer cross-examination of Rebecca Shongutsie as an illustration 
of the prejudice resulting from the joint representation. I cannot discern 
prejudice resulting from her answers. She responded in the negative to every 
leading question where a yes answer would have been harmful to herself and her 
co-defendant. Her answers would exonerate both defendants.

[¶33]   I see merit in the rule adopted by 
the majority of the court. It is simple, clear-cut, and easy of application. 
Multiple parties may still be represented by one counsel, but they must clearly 
and voluntarily waive the right to separate counsel. Prejudice is presumed in 
such cases. The parties must be advised of the right to separate counsel and, on 
the record, make their election. I would, however, first, apply the rule 
prospectively and, second, would affirm this case because, even if prejudice 
were presumed, no prejudice was shown.

BROWN, Justice (Retired), 
dissenting.

[¶34]   The majority opinion is well 
written and generally contains sound law and logical reasoning. The small flaw 
in the opinion, as I see it, is that it deals with a different case than the one 
on appeal before this court. The majority address circumstances where the trial 
judge assigns an attorney to represent two or more defendants in the same case, 
and such dual representation results in prejudice.

[¶35]   In the case before this court, two 
defendants employed and chose, I repeat, chose, to be represented by the same 
attorney. Furthermore, there is not the slightest indication that either 
defendant was prejudiced by this dual representation or that there was a 
conflict of interest. The majority opinion does not cite a single case from any 
jurisdiction that addresses the same circumstances existing in this 
case.

Absent special 
circumstances, therefore, trial courts may assume either that multiple 
representation entails no conflict or that the lawyer and his clients knowingly 
accept such risk of conflict as may exist. Indeed, as the Court noted in 
Holloway [v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475] at 485-486 [98 S. Ct. 1173, 1179-80, 55 L. Ed. 2d 426 (1978)], trial courts necessarily rely in large measure upon the 
good faith and good judgment of defense counsel. "An `attorney representing two 
defendants in a criminal matter is in the best position professionally and 
ethically to determine when a conflict of interest exists or will probably 
develop in the course of a trial.'" Unless the trial court knows or reasonably 
should know that a particular conflict exists, the court need not initiate an 
inquiry.

Cuyler v. 
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346-47, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 1717, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1980) 
(citations omitted). This court should adopt the rule in Cuyler.

[¶36]   Suppose a different scenario in the 
case before us. Suppose the trial judge had refused to allow the lawyer employed 
by defendant to represent him and appointed another lawyer. If the defendant 
were then convicted, there would be a mighty weeping, wailing, and gnashing of 
teeth, complaining that defendant had been denied counsel of his choice as 
guaranteed by the constitution. How would the majority of this court handle the 
dilemma that it is backing itself into? The majority here is saying that the 
trial judge must assume the role of big brother, act as counsel, and determine 
what is best for a defendant, even if it means not allowing him to be 
represented by counsel of his choice.

[¶37]   At trial, Rebecca Shongutsie, wife 
of appellant, was called to testify by defense counsel. In the majority opinion, 
an exchange between the prosecuting attorney and Mrs. Shongutsie on 
cross-examination is set out. Apparently the majority cites this exchange as an 
example of prejudice to appellant. In the exchange, if "we" includes appellant, 
and I suppose it does, then Mrs. Shongutsie's testimony not only exonerated her 
but also the appellant. There is not one word in this exchange that would 
inculpate appellant by any stretch of the imagination.

[¶38]   It might be suspected that the 
majority had a predilection to reverse this case; it employed federal law that 
arguably supported its position and held contrary to federal law that would have 
upheld the trial court. According to the majority opinion, "federal cases 
establish that the trial court is under no affirmative obligation to inquire 
into the possibility of conflict of interest unless it `knows or reasonably 
should know that a particular conflict exists.' Cuyler, 446 U.S.  at 347, 100 S. Ct.  at 1717." At 365-366.

[¶39]   The majority here rejected the 
analysis of Cuyler and other Supreme Court cases, and adopted a rule more 
favorable to the criminal defendant:

[P]rejudice will be 
presumed in all instances of multiple representation of criminal defendants and, 
in the absence of an appropriate waiver, multiple representation will constitute 
reversible error.

At 
367.

[¶40]   After announcing the rule just 
indicated, the majority opinion details what the trial judge must do. The judge 
must, in effect, talk defendants out of being represented by the same attorney. 
They can only be represented by the same attorney if they "insist." As indicated 
earlier, the majority places a more arduous burden on the trial court with 
respect to dual representation than the United States Supreme Court 
requires.

[¶41]   This is not the first time the 
Wyoming Supreme Court has made prosecution more difficult than the United States 
Supreme Court requires. For approximately twenty years before the mid-1970's, 
the United States Supreme Court wreaked havoc on criminal prosecution. They 
worked overtime to find ways to reverse a conviction and to discover so-called 
rights of defendants that no one had ever dreamed of before. The United States 
Supreme Court recovered from this reversalitis in the mid-1970's, but the 
Wyoming Supreme Court was already infected. Of comparatively recent date, the 
Wyoming Supreme Court has exhibited more enthusiasm than even the United States 
Supreme Court in reversing criminal convictions. In Westmark v. State, 693 P.2d 220, 222 (Wyo. 1984) (Brown, J., specially concurring), the court reinstated a 
rule that any comment on, or allusion to, the accused's right to remain silent, 
however innocuous or inadvertent, resulted in an automatic reversal. The United 
States Supreme Court would not do that. See United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499, 103 S. Ct. 1974, 76 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1983). The United States Supreme Court held 
that an accused is not entitled to a jury trial for petty offenses. Frank v. 
United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148, 89 S. Ct. 1503, 1505, 23 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1969). 
However, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that they were. See Brenner v. City of 
Casper, 723 P.2d 558, 561 (Wyo. 1986) (Brown, J., dissenting). In Phillips v. 
State, 774 P.2d 118, 122 (Wyo. 1989) (Thomas and Golden, JJ., dissenting), and 
Harvey v. State, 774 P.2d 87, 93-94 (Wyo. 1989) (Thomas and Golden, JJ., 
dissenting), the Wyoming Supreme Court placed time limits on criminal 
prosecution much shorter than any time limit imposed by the United States 
Supreme Court.

[¶42]   I do not have much enthusiasm for 
reversing the trial court by imposing rules more arduous than required by the 
United States Supreme Court. Imposing federal procedure rules (F.R.Cr.P. 44(e)) 
on the trial courts by opinion rather than by regular rule-making process is not 
entirely unreasonable, but it should be prospective and should not apply to this 
case.

[¶43]   I would affirm the trial 
court.

FOOTNOTES

1           
On several occasions, different justices of the Supreme Court of the 
United States have argued strenuously that an affirmative duty should be imposed 
on trial courts to inquire into the propriety of multiple representation in 
every instance. See, Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 352, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 
1720, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (duty of trial court to 
ensure the defendants have not unwittingly given up right of effective 
assistance of counsel); Cuyler, 446 U.S.  at 354, 100 S. Ct.  at 1721 (Marshall, 
J., dissenting) (duty of trial court to inquire into whether there is multiple 
representation; warn defendants of inherent risks; and ensure multiple 
representation is by informed choice); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 800, 107 S. Ct. 3114, 3129, 97 L. Ed. 2d 638, reh'g denied 483 U.S. 1056, 108 S. Ct. 32, 97 L. Ed. 2d 820 (1987) (Blackmun, J., Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(duty to ask defendant if he is aware of potential of conflict and to obtain 
waiver).

2           
Fed.R.Crim.P. 44(c) provides, in pertinent part:

Whenever two or more 
defendants have been jointly charged . . . and are represented by . . . retained 
or assigned counsel who are associated in the practice of law, the court shall 
promptly inquire with respect to such joint representation and shall personally 
advise each defendant to the right to the effective assistance of counsel, 
including separate representation.