Title: Matthews v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
SHAHEED MATTHEWS, 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
§        C.A. No. 24, 2023 
§ 
§        Court Below—Superior Court 
§        of the State of Delaware 
§   
§        Cr. ID. No. 1806004163(N) 
§         
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: March 13, 2024 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
June 10, 2024 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, LEGROW, and 
GRIFFITHS, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Delaware. REVERSED AND 
REMANDED. 
 
Shaheed Matthews, pro se, New Castle, Delaware. 
 
John R. Williams, Esquire (argued), Delaware Department of Justice, Dover, 
Delaware, for Appellee State of Delaware. 
 
Garrett B. Moritz, Esquire (argued) and Elizabeth M. Taylor, Esquire, Ross 
Aronstam & Moritz LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, Amicus Curiae for Appellant.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 The Court expresses its appreciation to the law firm Ross Aronstam & Moritz, and in particular 
attorneys Garrett Moritz and Elizabeth Taylor, for serving by Court appointment as amicus curiae 
and their commitment of time and effort in pursuing postconviction relief on behalf of Mr. 
Matthews.  
 
2 
 
GRIFFITHS, Justice: 
 
On December 28, 2017, just after midnight in New Castle, Delaware, police 
found Antoine Terry lying on the sidewalk unresponsive due to multiple gunshot 
wounds.  He died from his injuries.  The police later arrested Terry’s friend, Shaheed 
Matthews, for the murder. 
In 2019, Matthews was tried for murder and possession of a firearm during 
the commission of a felony.  No direct physical evidence linked Matthews to Terry’s 
shooting.  Instead, the State relied on circumstantial evidence—including evidence 
from Matthews’s cellphone, witness testimony, video camera footage of varying 
quality, and gunshot residue of an unknown vintage found on Matthews’s jacket.  
On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Matthews’s convictions. 
Matthews then filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief in the Superior 
Court.  He claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective on four grounds.  The 
Superior Court denied Matthews’s motion and this appeal followed.  On appeal, 
Matthews limits the scope of his claim for relief to one ground:  that trial counsel’s 
failure to move to suppress the evidence obtained from his cellphone constituted 
ineffective assistance of counsel.   
With the State’s entire case dependent on circumstantial evidence, it was 
essential for trial counsel to suppress any inappropriately derived evidence. Our 
review leads us to conclude that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome 
 
3 
 
of the trial would have been different if Matthews’s trial counsel had moved to 
suppress the evidence obtained from his cellphone.  Therefore, we reverse his 
convictions and remand to the Superior Court for a new trial without the taint of the 
improperly seized evidence.     
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2 
A. The Shooting of Antoine Terry  
Antoine Terry and Shaheed Matthews were friends.3  Matthews frequently 
stayed with his girlfriend, Devon Johnson.  Johnson’s residence was located at 227 
Parma Avenue in New Castle, Delaware.4  The residence was in a “high crime area” 
with “a lot of shootings.”5  On December 27, 2017, Terry, Matthews, and Johnson 
spent the evening together at Johnson’s house watching a basketball game and eating 
Chinese food.6  Johnson testified that around 10:30 p.m., she went upstairs to use the 
restroom and grab additional layers of clothing because she planned to drive 
Matthews to the home of his longtime friend, Chanelle Brooks.7  She told the jury 
 
2 The facts, except as otherwise noted, are taken from the transcript of the trial testimony.  See 
App. to Amicus Curiae’s Opening Br. at AA1–239 [hereinafter “AA[_]”] (Trial Transcript 
[hereinafter “Trial Tr. at [_]”]). 
3 AA81 (Devon Johnson Testimony [hereinafter “Johnson Test. at [_]”] at 100:1–8). 
4 AA80 (Johnson Test. at 98:3–4).   
5 AA72, AA195 (Detective Eugene Reid Testimony [hereinafter “Reid Test. at [_]”] at 65:3–6; 
124:4–12); see also AA99 (Johnson Test. at 174:8–11).  
6 AA82–84, AA99 (Johnson Test. at 105:3–114:3; 171:9–172:16); see also AA341 (Transcription 
of Detective Smith’s Dec. 28, 2017 Body Camera Footage of Interview of Shaheed Matthews 
[hereinafter “Matthews Int.”]).   
7 AA84–85 (Johnson Test. at 114:7–115:10).  
 
4 
 
that when she came back downstairs, Matthews and Terry were gone.8  She testified 
that she waited in the house for Matthews to call her to pick him up and that she left 
to pick him up at a nearby church around 10:45 p.m.9  She then drove him to 
Brooks’s house.10  
At 10:42 p.m., the New Castle County Police Department received a call from 
a resident on Briarcliff Drive, which runs parallel to Parma Avenue.11  The resident 
reported hearing five or six gunshots.12  Around the same time, another resident from 
243 Parma Avenue called the police and reported being awakened by “three or four” 
gunshots.13  Multiple officers responded to the area.14  The police did not 
immediately locate a shooting victim.15  Shortly after midnight, however, police 
found Terry’s body on the sidewalk between 243 and 245 Parma Avenue.16    He 
 
8 AA85, AA86, AA89, AA99, AA103 (Johnson Test. at 116:13–15; 120:5–9; 131:18–132:1; 
173:1–3, 188:14–18).  
9 AA85, AA86, AA87, AA101 (Johnson Test. at 116:6–117:1; 121:18–122:10; 124:6–12; 180:11–
23). 
10 AA84–85, AA101 (Johnson Test. at 114:16–115:10; 182:6–8); see also AA115–116 (Chanelle 
Brooks Testimony [hereinafter “Brooks Test. at [_]”] at 14:16–16:5). 
11 AA51, AA71 (Reid Test. at 196:23–197:12; 60:23–61:10). 
12 AA51, AA71 (Reid Test. at 197:16–198:10; 61:11–20). 
13 AA36, AA38 (Antoine Harrison Testimony [hereinafter “Harrison Test. at [_]”] at 136:14–
137:16; 144:9–16).  
14 AA71 (Reid Test. at 62:3–5). 
15 AA51, AA72 (Reid Test. at 198:2–13; 63:1–15). 
16 AA10–11 (Master Corporal Casey Bouldin Testimony [hereinafter “Bouldin Test. at [_]”] at 
34:15–36:15); see also AA12 (Detective Ronald Phillips Testimony [hereinafter “Phillips Test. at 
[_]”] at 42:20–22).  
 
5 
 
was “cold and stiff” with multiple gunshot wounds.17  They observed that he had “a 
hoodie around his head” and “a couple marks in the back of his jacket.”18   
B. The Police Interview Matthews and Search His Cellphone  
On December 28, 2017, two detectives from the New Castle County Police 
Department interviewed Matthews about Terry’s death.19  During the interview, the 
detectives asked Matthews about his cellphone.  At first, he told them that he did not 
have a cellphone.20  Matthews ultimately relented and provided them with a 
cellphone number.21  When asked why he initially refused, he told them that he 
“didn’t want to give the number out.”22  The detectives then had the following 
exchange with Matthews:  
[Unknown Detective]: Well, listen, here’s one thing I want 
to go over with you, okay?  So everybody that we’ve 
talked to, okay, uh, I know you’re kind of like funny about 
your cellphone, and you don’t want to give me the 
cellphone number. 
 
[Matthews]: You can, you can have it [unintelligible][.] 
 
 
17 AA11 (Bouldin Test. at 35:20). 
18 Id. (Bouldin Test. at 36:1–3); see also AA14 (Phillips Test. at 47:2–5).  Detective Reid described 
a photograph of Terry from the scene:  “[i]t appears as though he has a – starting from the top, he 
has a white hood over his head, a black jacket, like a black puffy jacket.”  AA72 (Reid Test. at 
66:11–13).  
19 See AA338–52 (Matthews Int.).  The interview transcript identifies one of the detectives as 
“Detective Smith” and the other as “unknown detective.”  See, e.g., AA338 (Matthews Int.).  The 
interview was captured on Detective Smith’s body camera.  Id.   
20 AA338 (Matthews Int.).  
21 AA345 (Matthews Int.). 
22 Id.  
 
6 
 
[Unknown Detective]: Well, here’s the thing; we have a 
search warrant for it. 
 
[Matthews]: Okay. 
 
[Unknown Detective]: Okay?  So, uh, we’re going to take 
it anyway. 
 
[Matthews]: Yeah, you can [unintelligible][.] 
 
[Unknown Detective]: Um, and I don’t want you to think 
there’s any ill will behind it. 
 
[Matthews]: Mm-hmm. 
 
[Unknown Detective]: But what happens is if, if we know 
somebody had contact with him, we take their cellphone.  
And it’s not saying that we think you did anything wrong. 
 
[Matthews]: Uh, I don’t have it on me, but you can, you 
can definitely have the number. 
 
[Unknown Detective]: Okay. Where is, where is the 
physical cellphone at? 
 
[Matthews]: In town, uh, at my brother’s house.   
 
[Unknown Detective]: Okay. Um, we’re going to need to 
get [ahold] of that. 
 
[Matthews]: I got to buy a whole new phone? 
 
[Unknown Detective]: No, no, no, so here’s what happens, 
um, we get the phone.  We do what’s called a forensic 
examination.  
 
[Matthews]: Yeah, that’s – 
 
[Unknown Detective]: Basically hook it up to a computer. 
 
 
7 
 
[Matthews]: Oh, okay, alright. 
 
[Unknown Detective]: Um, they dump the contents of it, 
and then we give it right back to you.23 
 
At trial, Detective Eugene Reid, one of the lead detectives on the case, confirmed 
that the police seized Matthews’s cellphone:  “we had a search warrant to collect his 
[cellphone], and we collected that from him at his residence.”24  In fact, the police 
did not secure a search warrant until the following day.25  
 
On June 18, 2018, a grand jury indicted Matthews for first-degree murder, 
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, possession or control of 
a firearm by a person prohibited, and purchase of ammunition by a person prohibited 
(which was dropped by the State).26  The possession or control of a firearm by a 
person prohibited charge was severed and proceeded to a bench trial.27     
C. The Trial of Shaheed Matthews 
Matthews was tried for first-degree murder and for possession of a firearm 
during the commission of a felony in April 2019.  At the outset, the State 
 
23 AA349 (Matthews Int.).  
24 AA64 (Reid Test. at 32:21–23).   
25 The detectives interviewed Matthews on December 28, but the warrant was not applied for nor 
issued until the following day.  See App. to Opening Br., Ex. I.  
26 Matthews v. State, 241 A.3d 220, 2020 WL 6557577, at *2 (Del. 2020) (TABLE) [hereinafter 
“Direct Appeal Order”]. 
27 Id.  
 
8 
 
acknowledged that its case was “entirely circumstantial.”28  On numerous occasions 
throughout the trial, the State both referred to and asked witnesses about the evidence 
derived from Matthews’s cellphone.   
1. The State’s Opening Statement 
The State repeatedly referred to evidence obtained from Matthews’s cellphone 
in its opening statement.  For example:  
• “[Y]ou will hear evidence taking the form of video 
surveillance, [cellphone] evidence, and witnesses.”29  
 
• “[Y]ou will also hear evidence pertaining to the 
defendant’s [cellphone] . . . . And you will hear the 
contents of the defendant’s phone as it pertains to the 
evening of December 27th, 2017, into the following 
morning on the 28th.”30  
 
• “[G]oing with the defendant’s phone, ladies and 
gentlemen, you will hear evidence beginning with 7:36 
p.m. on the evening that Antoine Terry was murdered, and 
you will hear evidence that the defendant texted Antoine 
Terry.”31  
 
• “And you will hear additional [cellphone] evidence taken 
from the defendant’s [cellphone] where we expect you 
will hear that the defendant called his girlfriend, Devon 
Johnson, at 10:45 p.m.  They have a 29-second 
conversation.”32  
 
28 AA174 (Trial Tr. at 41:19–23) (“Our case is entirely circumstantial with respect to video 
evidence, gunshot residue, and the inconsistencies in the statements from prior witnesses, along 
with the reenactment video[.]”).  
29 AA5 (Trial Tr. at 14:6–8) (emphasis added).  
30 Id. (Trial Tr. at 14:10–18).  
31 AA5–6 (Trial Tr. at 14:20–15:1) (emphasis added). 
32 AA6 (Trial Tr. at 18:17–21) (emphasis added). 
 
9 
 
 
• “Going back to the defendant’s [cellphone] again, you will 
hear much evidence from that where you will hear 
evidence that the defendant calls a gentleman named 
Kevin Scott.”33   
 
• “You will also see from the records that are discussed that 
the evidence will show the defendant made zero calls or 
zero text messages to Antoine Terry after they parted ways 
the evening of December 27.”34   
 
• “[I]t’s the State’s burden to prove to you beyond a 
reasonable doubt . . . that the defendant was the one who 
murdered Antoine Terry . . . through the totality of the 
evidence of the defendant’s [cellphone], the statements 
from the witnesses . . . .”35 
 
2. The Cause of Terry’s Death & Related Physical Evidence  
The medical examiner assigned to the case testified that Terry’s cause of death 
was multiple gunshot wounds.36  She acknowledged that the State “[did not] know 
the time of [Terry’s] death.”37  
The police never found the murder weapon.38  Although the Delaware State 
Police’s firearm identification expert was able to identify the caliber class of the 
bullet fragments found at the scene—.38 caliber—he acknowledged that a “.38 
 
33 AA7 (Trial Tr. at 20:9–12) (emphasis added). 
34 Id. (Trial Tr. at 20:20–21:1). 
35 AA9 (Trial Tr. at 27:5–14) (emphasis added). 
36 AA140 (Dr. Jennie Vershvovsky Testimony [hereinafter “Vershvovsky Test. at [_]”] at 113:14–
114:2). 
37 Id. (Vershvovsky Test. at 114:21).  
38 AA156 (Reid Test. at 176:8–14).  
 
10 
 
caliber class includes several cartridge designations” that are all “very close in 
diameter” and can include “all of your 9 millimeters, .380’s, your .38’s, and .357 
magnum[,]” all of which are “very close in diameter.”39  He noted that there are 
many types of firearms that could fire a .38 caliber bullet and he therefore could not 
identify the specific type of firearm that was used.40   
3. Surveillance Video Evidence  
The State presented video surveillance evidence taken from the following 
locations: 
• A residence at 241 Parma Avenue.41 
 
• A residence at 19 Briarcliff Drive (which runs parallel to 
Parma Avenue).42 
 
• A playground near the Arbor Place Apartments (located in 
part on Parma Avenue).43  
 
• A laundromat at 256 Parma Avenue.44 
 
 
39 See AA146 (James Storey Testimony [hereinafter “Storey Test. at [_]”] at 136:9–18). 
40 Id. (Storey Test. at 136:19–138:9).  He also acknowledged that it was possible that more than 
one firearm could have been used.  See id. (Storey Test. at 138:4–9) (“Q. Yes.  So whatever 
generated the whole Projectile 3, it could have been the same gun that fired 1 and 2, or it could 
have been a different gun, correct?  A.  I couldn’t tell you whether it was the same or whether it 
was not.”).  
41 See AA45–46, AA49 (Detective Brandon Morris Testimony [hereinafter “Morris Test. at [_]”] 
at 171:1–178:11; 188:14–16). 
42 See AA46–47 (Morris Test. at 178:12–182:2; AA34–35 (Rasheeda Lee Testimony [hereinafter 
“Lee Test. at [_]”] at 129:12–131:2). 
43 See AA40–41 (Detective Alexandra Knorr Testimony [hereinafter “Knorr Test. at [_]”] at 
154:7–155:4, 156:19–157:14).  
44 See AA52–53 (Reid Test. at 202:17–203:7) 
 
11 
 
• A 24-hour continuously operating pole camera that was 
physically located on Parma Avenue but looked out on the 
nearby intersection of Bizarre Avenue and Briarcliff 
Drive.45   
 
The video surveillance evidence—devoid of sound and mostly in black and 
white—is of varying, and often poor, quality.  In the portions of the videos in which 
people are visible, the low quality of the images and the distance from which the 
video was recorded preclude any conclusive identification of the individuals.   
The State played eight video clips from a home surveillance system at 19 
Briarcliff Drive taken on the night of the shooting:  
• Two videos, approximately thirty seconds long (one is 
zoomed in), from 8:34 p.m. showing two distant figures 
exiting 227 Parma Avenue.46   
 
• Two videos, approximately forty-five seconds long 
(identical except for the fact that the latter is zoomed-in), 
from 9:47 p.m. showing three distant figures entering 227 
Parma Avenue.47  
 
• Three videos, approximately three minutes long, from 
10:38 p.m. showing a light go off and two grainy figures 
appearing to walk out of 227 Parma Avenue (identical 
except for the fact that the second video displays a yellow 
 
45 See AA42 (Detective Michael Santos Testimony [hereinafter “Santos Test. at [_]”] at 159:12–
160:23).  Santos, a detective on the case who specializes in electronic surveillance, described the 
“covert camera system located on Parma Avenue”:  “[t]hat system is a video only retention system 
where a covert camera is deployed to provide coverage of Parma Avenue at different locations.  
And that video is saved on a network video recorder at headquarters[.]”  Id. (Santos Test. at 
159:12–13, 17–22).   
46 See AA59 (Reid Test. at 11:13–13:12).  
47 See id. (Reid Test. at 13:13–14:14). 
 
12 
 
circle highlighting the entrance to 227 Parma, and the third 
is a zoomed-in version).48  
 
• One video, twenty-seven seconds long, from 10:46 p.m. 
showing one grainy figure walking out of the home.49 
 
When asked about whether he saw some type of altercation or argument in the above 
videos, Detective Reid said that “[a]ll [he] could testify to is that they’re just seen 
walking.”50 
The State also played three better quality clips of the surveillance video taken 
from 241 Parma Avenue.  Two videos, about eight seconds long, show two 
individuals running down Parma Avenue at 10:46 p.m.51  One individual appears to 
have at least one arm outstretched and seems to be running behind another individual 
wearing a dark jacket and a hood on their head.  The third video shows a car driving 
down Parma Avenue at 10:47 p.m.52  Detective Reid acknowledged that he could 
not clearly discern the vehicle’s make and model, nor could he see the vehicle’s 
license plate number or its occupants.53 
 
The State also showed the jury footage provided by management from the 
nearby Arbor Place Apartments.  One twenty-second-long video shows a playground 
 
48 See AA60–61 (Reid Test. at 14:15–17:20, 18:9–19:12).  
49 See AA62 (Reid Test. at 24:13–25:11).  
50 See AA69 (Reid Test. at 53:19–54:2). 
51 See AA61–62 (Reid Test. at 19:20–24:12).  
52 See AA62 (Reid Test. at 25:15–26:8).  
53 See AA70 (Reid Test. at 56:8–58:17). 
 
13 
 
and a car driving down Parma Avenue at 10:47 p.m.54  Another thirty-four second 
video shows the front of a laundromat at 256 Parma Avenue and a car driving down 
the street.55 
 
The last set of video surveillance clips shown by the State was from a New 
Castle County Police Department pole camera that looked out on the nearby 
intersection of Bizarre Avenue and Briarcliff Drive.  The first twenty-one second 
video from 10:48 p.m. shows a vehicle driving on Parma Avenue and taking a left 
turn at the end of the street.56  The second clip, which is fifteen seconds long and 
shot at 11:31 p.m., shows a car turning left onto Parma Avenue.57  The final sixteen-
second clip from 11:57 p.m. shows a car turning right onto Parma Avenue and 
driving down the street.58 
4. Non-Law Enforcement Witness Testimony 
The State also presented testimony from several civilian witnesses, including 
Matthews’s girlfriend, Devon Johnson; Terry’s then-girlfriend, Tia Mosley; 
Matthews’s close friend, Chanelle Brooks; Matthews’s friend, Kevin Scott, who 
lived at 231 Parma Avenue; and Antoine Harrison, a nearby resident who looked 
through his blinds after he heard gunshots.  
 
54 See AA62–63 (Reid Test. at 26:9–27:3).  
55 See AA63 (Reid Test. at 27:4–16).  
56 Id. (Reid Test. at 27:17–28:19). 
57 Id. (Reid Test. at 30:3–13). 
58 See AA63–64 (Reid Test. at 30:14–31:1).  
 
14 
 
Johnson testified about the state of Matthews’s and Terry’s friendship on the 
night of Terry’s shooting.  She noted that the two men had been “friends for about 
six years” and that on the evening of December 27, “everybody[] [was] having a 
good time” and that no one was “fighting, or yelling, or doing anything  . . . to 
antagonize anyone else during the game.”59  And, as further described below, the 
State questioned Johnson about several pieces of evidence derived from Matthews’s 
cellphone, including questions about his call logs—including calls between the two 
of them and as calls between Matthews and others—and  some of their text message 
exchanges.60 
Mosley, for her part, had little recollection of the night of the shooting.61  She 
could not recall the events of December 27 and 28, 2017, nor what she told Detective 
Reid when he interviewed her on December 28.62 
Chanelle Brooks, a close friend of Matthews, also testified.  She stated that 
her grandfather passed away on December 27 and that Matthews had visited her that 
day to offer his condolences.63  She told the jury that, later that night, Matthews came 
to her house before midnight to drop off her car, which he frequently borrowed.64  
 
59 See AA99 (Johnson Test. at 171:17–172:23).  
60 See infra I(C)(6).  
61 See AA76 (Tia Mosley Testimony [hereinafter “Mosley Test. at [_]”] at 80:18–81:5). 
62 See AA76–77 (Mosley Test. at 81:6–84:20).  
63 AA114–115 (Chanelle Brooks Testimony [hereinafter “Brooks Test. at [_]”] at 10:7–11:7). 
64 AA115–116, AA121 (Brooks Test. at 14:15–15:7, 36:4–7). 
 
15 
 
She said that Matthews came inside to give her back her keys.65  Mosley assumed 
that Johnson dropped Matthews off because “[Johnson] rarely [came] in the house, 
but [Matthews] never has anyone else drop him off or pick him up to my house 
besides [her].”66 
Harrison, a nearby resident, testified that when he looked through his blinds 
around 10:30 p.m. after hearing gunshots, he “[saw] a dark figure” who “had a 
hoodie on. . . . And [] was big.”67  He thought that the figure was wearing an outfit 
that was either “real dark gray or black” and that his hood “was over his head.”68  
Harrison told the jury that the figure appeared to have an extended arm, but he was 
not able to tell “whether . . . he was pointing,” and he “didn’t see a weapon” because 
“[i]t was too dark.”69  He also observed that “the pole light was not on, and that’s 
one of the bad parts about that too.”70  “If it was on[,]” Harrison speculated, “[he] 
might have [something] [more] [he] could really say about the situation.”71  He “just 
did not see what the figure looked like” and could not see “the figure’s face.”72 
 
 
65 AA116 (Brooks Test. at 15:3–6). 
66 Id. (Brooks Test. at 15:7–12); see also AA121 (Brooks Test. at 38:1–4).  
67 See AA36–38 (Harrison Test. at 136:14–145:4).  
68 AA38 (Harrison Test. at 143:1–13). 
69 AA37 (Harrison Test. at 140:17–23, 141:3–4). 
70 Id. (Harrison Test. at 139:7–10). 
71 Id.  
72 AA37 (Harrison Test. at 141:7–8, 142:18–20). 
 
16 
 
5. Physical Evidence 
The State also presented evidence of gunshot residue that was found on the 
right cuff of a dark blue winter jacket that the police recovered from Matthews when 
he was arrested.73  He wore the jacket to the New Castle County Police Department 
headquarters the day he gave the detectives his phone.74  A forensic scientist from a 
materials characterization lab testified that “there was a population of gunshot 
residue present” on Matthews’s jacket.75  She acknowledged that she could not tell 
how long the gunshot residue had been present on his coat, noting that she could not 
“say how [gunshot residue] got there, [or] when it got there. Just that it’s there.”76  
She conceded that “it was possible” that “it could have gotten there a month ago, a 
year ago” or even “multiple years ago” and that gunshot residue “can sometimes get 
trapped within the weave of the fabric” and can “actually stay . . . on fabric[] for a 
long period of time.77  She also described how gunshot residue can get on fabric by 
means other than firing a weapon, namely through being in close proximity to 
someone firing a weapon or through transfer, such as someone grabbing the material 
 
73 See AA132, AA133 (Tarah Helsel Testimony [hereinafter “Helsel Test. at [_]”] at 81:3–82:1; 
83:7–84:17); see also AA8 (Trial Tr. at 23:1–6). 
74 AA4 (Trial Tr. at 7:2–4).  
75 AA134 (Helsel Test. at 90:6–10). 
76 AA135 (Helsel Test. at 91:18–19).  
77 AA134–35 (Helsel Test. at 90:23–91:23). 
 
17 
 
or rubbing up against it.78  No gunshot residue was found on the left cuff or front 
right pocket of Matthews’s jacket.79   
6. Evidence from Matthews’s Cellphone 
The State presented and questioned witnesses extensively about the evidence 
that police derived from Matthews’s cellphone, including call records and text 
messages.   
The State questioned Johnson about the timing and content of text messages 
and calls between her and Matthews.80  For example, the State questioned her about 
a text message exchange she and Matthews had the morning after the shooting: 
Johnson: “I love you so much, and I cannot lose 
you.” 
 
Matthews: “You won’t babe.  Come to me as soon 
as you get off[.]” 
 
Johnson: “Changes have to be made now, okay[.]” 
 
Matthews: “I agree.”81 
 
The prosecution also asked Johnson about the phone calls she made to Matthews 
around 11:00 p.m. on the evening Terry was killed, as well as the two brief 
 
78 AA135 (Helsel Test. at 93:15–94:17).  
79 See AA133 (Helsel Test. at 83:7–84:17).   
80 See AA94–95 (Johnson Test. at 153:15–155:14, 157:12–158:9).  
81 See id. 
 
18 
 
conversations they had within the span of a few hours that night and a phone call 
they had around 7:00 a.m. the following morning.82 
 
The State next presented Brooks with Matthews’s call records.  The 
prosecution asked her about a phone conversation the pair had at 11:20 p.m. on the 
night of the shooting.83  The State also asked her about what appeared to be a missed 
call she received from Matthews at 11:35 p.m. and a twenty-four second call she 
made to Matthews five minutes later.84 
The State also questioned Kevin Scott, Johnson’s neighbor at 231 Parma 
Avenue, about Matthews’s call records, including calls between Scott and Matthews 
on the night of the shooting.  Scott told the jury that, during a call at 11:09 p.m., 
Matthews asked if Scott was “okay” because he heard that shots were fired nearby.85  
The State also asked Scott about a missed call he received from Matthews at 11:18 
p.m. and a brief conversation the two had at 11:20 p.m.86   
Additionally, the State presented evidence of Matthews’s text messages and 
internet search history related to a potential gun purchase. The trial judge admitted 
the evidence over trial counsel’s objection under Delaware Rule of Evidence 404(b).  
Specifically, the State introduced text messages that Matthews exchanged with an 
 
82 See AA93–94 (Johnson Test. at 149:23–153:14).  
83 AA116 (Brooks Test. at 15:16–16:21).  
84 See id.  
85 AA123 (Kevin Scott Testimony [hereinafter “Scott Test. at [_]”] 46:10–22).  
86 AA123–126 (Scott Test. at 46:23–55:6).  
 
19 
 
unknown person on December 20, 2017, in which Matthews inquired about the cost 
of a “Taurus Millennium,” and, after the individual replied “450[,]” Matthews 
responded with, “[t]hat’s too much.”87  In addition, the State presented evidence of 
Matthews’s search history on December 25 and 26, 2017, showing that he “searched 
through Google” the terms “Ruger 45” and “Ruger P97.”88  On cross-examination, 
Detective Reid acknowledged that Matthews’s internet search was “just a general 
search” and that “[t]here’s no indication a purchase was made, or any 
attempt to purchase.”89    
7. The State’s Closing Argument 
Evidence from Matthews’s cellphone also featured prominently in the State’s 
closing argument.  For instance: 
• “Now, [I] mentioned the defendant’s cellphone. 
[Matthews’s] [c]ellphone is important, it’s one of those 
things that’s consistent.  You got three calls, incoming 
missed from Devon Johnson at 10:49.  You got a call to 
Kevin Scott right afterwards at 11:09.”90  
 
• “You heard Detective Reid testify he went through the 
defendant’s cellphone, there’s no texts from anybody 
indicating that there had been shots fired from Parma and 
there were no other calls in between those missed calls 
from Devon Johnson and when the defendant called Kevin 
Scott to see if everything was [alright].”91  
 
87 AA184, AA185 (Reid Test. at 82:17–23; 83:5). 
88 AA184 (Reid Test. at 80:8–19).  
89 AA191 (Reid Test. at 109:13–17). 
90 AA220 (Trial Tr. at 34:15–21) (emphasis added). 
91 Id. (Trial Tr. at 35:8–14). 
 
20 
 
 
• “But then we go through the defendant’s cellphone some 
more, 7:34 in the morning: I love you so much and I can’t 
lose you.  Just seven minutes later. . . . [H]ow are those 
text messages in relation if she did not know already?”92  
 
• “There’s more from the defendant’s cellphone. . . . 
December 25th and 26th, the defendant has three searches 
for a firearm on his cellphone.  You heard Detective Reid 
testify that these searches were subsequently deleted 
before he handed that cellphone over to [the] New Castle 
County Police.”93  
 
• “December 20th, got text messages from an unidentified 
person on defendant’s phone saying: These folks just hit 
him.  They have a Taurus Millennium – the detective 
testified to is a gun.  He asks how much?  It’s 450.  There’s 
a picture of the gun.  The defendant says that’s too 
much.”94   
 
• “[A]t some point in time [Matthews] learns that his good 
buddy has been murdered blocks from his house – we 
don’t see a single text message.  Not to Antoine Terry 
asking him if he’s okay or to anyone else talking about 
how his good friend has now passed.  We don’t see a single 
phone call to Antoine Terry after the shots fired. . . . 
[M]aybe he didn’t call Antoine Terry because he knew he 
was dead because he’s the one that killed him.”95   
 
In total, the State mentioned the cellphone evidence at least eighteen times in its 
closing argument. 
 
 
92 AA221 (Trial Tr. at 38:18–39:15) (emphasis added). 
93 Id. (Trial Tr. at 39:18–40:1). 
94 Id. (Trial Tr. at 40:8–13). 
95 AA229 (Trial Tr. at 71:7–72:5) (emphasis added).  
 
21 
 
8. The Verdict & Sentencing 
The jury found Matthews guilty on both charges.  On July 1, 2019, the 
Superior Court sentenced Matthews to life plus three years in prison.96  Matthews’s 
direct appeal of his convictions followed.  
D. Matthews’s Direct Appeal 
On direct appeal, Matthews “raise[d] one narrow ground[—]whether the 
Superior Court abused its discretion when it permitted the State to admit evidence at 
trial about Matthews’s internet search history and text messages related to the 
possible purchase of a gun.”97  Specifically, he “limited his challenge to relevance, 
and contend[ed] that the State did not show a nexus between the possible gun 
purchase and the actual gun used to kill Terry.”98  This Court affirmed his 
convictions.99  
E. Matthews’s Motion for Postconviction Relief & Appeal 
In October 2021, Matthews filed a pro se Rule 61 motion for postconviction 
relief.100  He argued that trial counsel was ineffective on four grounds:  (i) for failing 
to disclose the pole camera “and/or investigate camera footage for exculpatory 
 
96 AA334 (Sentencing Order).  
97 Direct Appeal Order at *1.   
98 Id. at *2. 
99 Id. at *3.  
100 See AA240–245 (Matthews’s Motion for Postconviction Relief).  
 
22 
 
evidence[;]”101 (ii) for “unlinking” Matthews’s two criminal cases;102 (iii) for failing 
to call Detective Smith (Detective Reid’s partner) to testify;103 and (iv) for failing to 
prepare for trial “and/or for failing to challenge the introduction of Mr. Matthews[’s] 
[cellphone] evidence[.]”104  
The Superior Court ordered Matthews’s trial counsel to respond and counsel 
subsequently submitted an affidavit.105  As to Matthews’s claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel on the ground that trial counsel should have moved to suppress 
the evidence derived from Matthew’s cellphone, counsel averred that he “did not see 
a basis for objecting to the exclusion of all the [cellphone] information as a whole” 
and “recall[ed] objecting to a portion of the [cellphone] data in conference with the 
State and [the trial judge] . . . but [the] objection was overruled.”106 
On January 3, 2023, the Superior Court rejected all of Matthews’s arguments 
for postconviction relief.107  Relevant to this appeal, the Superior Court made several 
holdings regarding whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move to 
 
101 AA244.  
102 Id.   
103 Id. 
104 AA245.  Matthews separately argued that his appellate counsel on direct appeal was ineffective 
on two grounds.  See id.  Neither of these arguments were raised on this appeal.  
105 See AA281–85 (Affidavit of Trial Counsel).  
106 AA283 (Affidavit of Trial Counsel).  
107 See State v. Matthews, 2023 WL 21545, at *1 (Del. Super. Jan. 3, 2023) [hereinafter 
“Postconviction Decision”].  
 
23 
 
suppress the evidence obtained from Matthews’s cellphone.108  The court first 
acknowledged that the cellphone warrant was invalid given that it was an 
unconstitutional general warrant.109  Even so, the court found that it did not matter, 
holding that Matthews provided valid consent to the officers because he “offered to 
provide his phone to the police” and that he “made the offer before officers notified 
him that they had already obtained a warrant for his phone.”110  The court further 
held that even if the consent was defective, the cellphone evidence “had no bearing 
on the outcome of the case” and thus was not prejudicial, because “[t]he video 
evidence, combined with [] Johnson’s statements, leaves the [c]ourt with no room to 
reasonably conclude anyone other than [] Matthews could have been the shooter.”111 
On appeal, Matthews sole ground for claiming that his trial counsel was 
ineffective is that trial counsel failed to move to suppress the evidence obtained from 
his cellphone.  The Court appointed pro bono counsel as amicus curiae for purposes 
of this appeal in August 2023.  
 
108 See id. at *8. 
109 Id.  
110 Id. at *8–9 (emphasis in the original).  
111 Id. at *9.  
 
24 
 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We review the Superior Court’s denial of a motion for postconviction relief 
for abuse of discretion.112  We review ineffective assistance of counsel claims de 
novo.113   
III. 
ANALYSIS 
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States guarantees the 
right to effective assistance of counsel in criminal prosecutions.114  Our Court has 
time and again reiterated that the right to counsel is the bedrock of our adversary 
system.115  Under Strickland v. Washington, a criminal defendant pursuing an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim must show two things:  (1) that his counsel’s 
performance was deficient; and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced his 
defense.116   
Defense counsel is deficient where counsel’s representation falls below an 
objective standard of reasonableness.117  Judgments made by trial counsel that are 
“so far out of the realm of reasonable trial strategy” can qualify as ineffective 
 
112 Starling v. State, 130 A.3d 316, 325 (Del. 2015) (citing Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 820 (Del. 
2013)).  
113 See Starling, 130 A.3d at 325; see also Purnell v. State, 254 A.3d 1053, 1093–94 (Del. 2021) 
(citation omitted). 
114 See U.S. Const. amend. VI.   
115 See, e.g., Reed v. State, 258 A.3d 807, 821 n.55 (Del. 2021) (citing Purnell v. State, 254 A.3d 
1053, 1104 (Del. 2021) (citing cases)).  
116 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  
117 See Starling, 130 A.3d at 325 (citing Gattis v. State, 697 A.2d 1174, 1178 (Del. 1997)).  
 
25 
 
assistance.118  To prove that trial counsel was deficient, a criminal defendant must 
show that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.119  A defendant bears a heavy burden to 
overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range 
of reasonable conduct.120   
To demonstrate that trial counsel’s ineffectiveness resulted in prejudice, a 
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.121  A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome and is a lower standard than “more likely than not.”122  For the reasons 
stated below, we find that Matthews has satisfied both prongs of this test.   
A. Trial counsel’s failure to move to suppress the cellphone 
evidence constituted deficient performance under Strickland’s 
first prong.  
 
Trial counsel should have moved to suppress the cellphone evidence on two 
grounds:  (1) the warrant for Matthews’s cellphone was an unconstitutional general 
warrant; and (2) Matthews did not provide valid consent to the police to search the 
contents of his cellphone.  Failure to do so was deficient under Strickland.   
 
118 Id. at 330.  
119 See Panuski v. State, 41 A.3d 416, 421–22 (Del. 2012).  
120 Hoskins v. State, 102 A.3d 724, 730 (Del. 2014). 
121 See Starling, 130 A.3d at 325 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).  
122 See Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d at 821 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693–94).  
 
26 
 
1. Trial counsel should have moved to suppress the 
cellphone evidence because the warrant for Matthews’s 
cellphone was an unconstitutional general warrant.   
 
As a general matter, absent a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, 
warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable.123  Here, the Superior 
Court held that the warrant obtained by police to search Matthews’s cellphone was 
an unconstitutional general warrant.124  The State does not dispute this holding or 
argue otherwise.125  And we agree—the warrant permitted police to conduct an 
“exploratory rummaging” through Matthews’s phone.126  And trial counsel should 
have been aware of the issues with the warrant, as Wheeler and Buckham had already 
 
123 See Flonnory v. State, 109 A.3d 1060, 1063 (Del. 2015) (citations omitted).  
124 See Postconviction Decision at *8 (citations omitted) (“[T]he [c]ourt finds the [cellphone] 
warrant to be a general warrant[—]that scrouge of executive overreach ‘abhorred by the colonists’ 
that permitted ‘a general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings’ for vaguely-defined 
categories of contraband.”).  This Court has recently addressed general warrants directed to the 
search of electronic devices at length.  See, e.g., Terreros v. State, 312 A.3d 651, 661–67 (Del. 
2024); Taylor v. State, 260 A.3d 602, 613–19 (Del. 2021); Buckham v. State, 185 A.3d 1, 18–19 
(Del. 2018); Wheeler v. State, 135 A.3d 282, 299–304 (Del. 2016).   
125 See Answering Br. at 8–10; AA306–312.  
126 Wheeler v. State, 135 A.3d at 298; see also Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976).  
For example, in the affidavit to the warrant, the officer attested that “through investigative 
interviews, it is alleged that Antoine Terry had shot Shaheed Matthews’[s] girlfriend in the leg 
approximately two years ago.”  App. to Opening Br., Ex. E. at ¶ 11.  Yet the scope of the search 
is not limited to the date of that supposed shooting, rather it is undefined.  And the scope of the 
search is broad and was targeted at “[t]he digital contents of any and all attached storage devices” 
to “include[,] but not limited to call logs, SMS (text messages), MMS (Media) messages, internet 
browsing history, images and or videos, any and all information that may identify subjects and or 
co-conspirators,” and “any and all information[.]”  App. to Opening Br., Ex. E.    
 
27 
 
been decided before the pendency of this case.  Matthew’s trial counsel plainly 
should have challenged the warrant’s constitutionality.   
Review of counsel’s performance under Strickland is deferential and we 
respect the “wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions.”127  But 
on this record, nothing suggests trial counsel’s choice was tactical.  In his affidavit, 
trial counsel averred that he “did not see a basis for objecting to the exclusion of all 
the [cellphone] information as a whole.”128  And during trial, counsel only made an 
evidentiary objection under D.R.E. 404(b) as to a subset of information derived from 
Matthews’s phone.  Here, the decision to object, “rather than being a tactical 
decision, is better described as damage control” after failing to move to suppress the 
warrant in the first instance.129  Accordingly, trial counsel’s failure to do so was 
deficient under Strickland.  
2. Trial counsel should have moved to suppress the 
cellphone evidence because Matthews did not provide 
valid consent to search his phone.    
Even if a search warrant is found to be an unconstitutional general warrant, a 
search will not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment if it is conducted with a person’s 
 
127 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; see id. (“Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly 
deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance after 
conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after 
it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was 
unreasonable.”). 
128 AA283 (Affidavit of Trial Counsel).  
129 See Starling, 130 A.3d at 328.   
 
28 
 
valid consent.130  Consent can be express or implied.131  Under Bumper v. North 
Carolina,132 the State has the burden of proving that Matthews voluntarily consented 
to the search of his cellphone.133  Its burden “cannot be discharged by showing no 
more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority.”134  The State did not meet 
its burden here.  
In its decision below, the Superior Court concluded that Matthews provided 
valid consent because he “offered to provide his phone to police” and did so “before 
officers notified him they had already obtained a warrant for the phone.”135  We 
disagree and believe the record supports a different conclusion.  The interview 
between Matthews and the detectives shows that Matthews did not provide the 
detectives with valid consent to search his phone:   
[Unknown Detective]: Well, listen, here’s one thing I want 
to go over with you, okay?  So everybody that we’ve 
talked to, okay, uh, I know you’re kind of like funny about 
your cellphone, and you don’t want to give me the 
cellphone number. 
 
[Matthews]: You can, you can have it [unintelligible][.] 
 
 
130 See Cabrera v. State, 173 A.3d 1012, 1023 (Del. 2017). 
131 Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803, 855 (Del. 2009). 
132 391 U.S. 543 (1968). 
133 Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548 (footnotes and citations omitted) (“When a prosecutor seeks to rely 
upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving that the consent 
was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given.”).  
134 Id. at 548–49.  
135 Postconviction Decision at *8–9.  
 
29 
 
[Unknown Detective]: Well, here’s the thing; we have a 
search warrant for it. 
 
[Matthews]: Okay. 
 
[Unknown Detective]: Okay?  So, uh, we’re going to take 
it anyway. 
 
[Matthews]: Yeah, you can [unintelligible][.]136 
 
This exchange cannot be fairly read to show that Matthews unequivocally consented 
to a search of his cellphone.  It is ambiguous at best.  The above excerpt suggests 
that before the detectives told Matthews that they had a warrant, they were 
discussing his cellphone number rather than the cellphone itself.  At most, Matthews 
provided consent to search his cellphone after law enforcement told him they had a 
warrant.  This is insufficient.  Under Bumper, there can be no consent where the 
official conducting the search has first asserted that they have a warrant.137 
 
The trial court and the State both assert that this case is factually analogous to 
the Blackwood case that this Court recently affirmed.138  There, the defendant’s 
consent was not obtained upon the announcement that the police had a warrant.   
Instead, the defendant’s consent was given freely:  he volunteered the pattern 
passcode that was required to search his phone, when the detective had trouble 
 
136 AA349 (Matthews Int.) (emphasis added).  The State does not dispute the unintelligible portions 
of the interview transcript.   
137 Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548.  
138 Postconviction Decision at *9 (citing State v. Blackwood, 2020 WL 975465, at *6–7 (Del. 
Super. Feb. 27, 2020), aff’d, 306 A.3d 529 (Del. 2023)).  
 
30 
 
accessing his phone with the passcode, he entered the passcode for the detective and 
instructed him again on how to gain access to his phone, and he also freely provided 
his cellphone number.139  He also encouraged the detective to access information in 
his cellphone to verify his alibi.140  Blackwood is thus inapposite.  Here, it is not clear 
that Matthews was referring to his cellphone when he said, “you can have it.”  
Rather, given the unintelligible portions of the transcript, and the context of the 
conversation, the statement was ambiguous at best.  
Ambiguity as to whether a party provided valid consent is resolved against a 
finding of consent.141  Here, we find that Matthews did not provide valid consent to 
the detectives to search his cellphone.  Thus, trial counsel’s failure to move to 
suppress the evidence obtained from Matthews’s cellphone was deficient under 
Strickland.  We now must determine whether Matthews’s claim passes muster on 
the prejudice prong of Strickland.  
B. Trial counsel’s failure to move to suppress the cellphone 
evidence prejudiced Matthews.   
 
We find that trial counsel’s performance prejudiced Matthews.  “When a 
defendant challenges a conviction, the question is whether there is a reasonable 
 
139 See Blackwood v. State, 306 A.3d 529, 2023 WL 6629581, at *6 (Del. 2023) (TABLE).  
140 Id.  
141 See State v. Harris, 642 A.2d 1242, 1247 (Del. Super. 1993) (finding “ambiguous and 
equivocal” purported “consent” insufficient); United States v. Taverna, 348 F.3d 873, 878 (10th 
Cir. 2003) (cleaned up) (government must “proffer clear and positive testimony that consent was 
unequivocal and specific and freely and intelligently given”).  
 
31 
 
probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt 
respecting guilt.”142  This is the case here.  We disagree with the Superior Court’s 
holding that “even if the consent was defective, the [cellphone] evidence had no 
bearing on the outcome of the case.”143  The trial record shows, and the State has 
repeatedly conceded, that it relied heavily on the cellphone evidence given that its 
theory of the case was premised entirely on circumstantial evidence.   
The other circumstantial evidence that the State presented was not so 
overwhelming that we can be confident that Matthews would have been found guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt without the cellphone evidence.  The trial court held that 
“[t]he video evidence, combined with [] Johnson’s statements, leaves [it] with no 
room to reasonably conclude anyone other than Mr. Matthews could have been the 
shooter.”144  We cannot agree.   
The video surveillance evidence is not as strong as the trial court purports.  
First, the video evidence from 19 Briarcliff does not—as the trial court suggests—
show with any certainty that two people were getting into a fight.  The nighttime 
video quality is very poor and the individuals in the video are not identifiable.  They 
 
142 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. 
143 Postconviction Decision at *9.  
144 Id.   
 
32 
 
appear to be walking.145  In the clearest set of surveillance footage from 241 Parma, 
although it shows two individuals running down the street with one person appearing 
to chase the other with an outstretched arm, the individuals remain unidentifiable, 
and their faces are never shown.  The other videos show an unidentifiable vehicle.  
Thus, even given Johnson’s statements as to when Matthews and Terry left the 
home, there is in fact room to conclude that the shooter could be someone other than 
Matthews.   
The remaining circumstantial evidence fares little better.  No murder weapon 
was found, the gunshot residue found on Matthews’s coat could not be linked to 
Terry’s killing, no witnesses linked Matthews to the shooting, and the trial testimony 
of both Johnson and Brooks was inconsistent with the prior statements they gave to 
the police.  Without the cellphone evidence, the State’s case is significantly weaker.  
And our objective assessment of the likely prejudicial effect of the evidence derived 
from Matthews’s cellphone is consistent with the trial court’s own statements that it 
made during trial.146 
 
145 Indeed, when asked about the footage, Detective Reid did not testify that it showed a physical 
altercation.  Rather, he told that jury that “all [he] could testify to was that it showed two 
individuals walking.”  AA69 (Reid. Test. at 54:1–2).  When asked about his opinion on what was 
happening in the video, he stated that “[w]hen [he is] viewing the video, it appears as though there 
are two figures standing there, granted, very small. . . . At some point in time those figures appear 
to be going back and forth, which I took as a physical altercation.”  AA202 (Reid Test. at 153:15–
22) (emphasis added).  
146 See, e.g., AA175–176 (trial judge acknowledging that certain cellphone evidence was both 
material and prejudicial).  
 
33 
 
Moreover, the trial record is replete with references to evidence obtained from 
the search of Matthews’s cellphone and demonstrates that it was material and 
significant.  From the start to the end of Matthews’s trial, the State repeatedly 
admitted how important Matthews’s cellphone evidence was to its case, including 
for purposes of proving plan, motive, and intent.147  The arguments that the State 
made in support of the admission of Matthews’s text messages about purchasing a 
gun and gun-related internet search history are particularly illustrative.  For example, 
the State underscored how “probative” and “material” that evidence was to its case, 
while also acknowledging that it was “certainly” prejudicial.148  Indeed, the 
prosecutor argued that the evidence was “need[ed]” because “[n]o gun was 
recovered[,]” “[t]here [we]re no eyewitnesses saying the defendant murdered 
Antoine Terry[,]” and the State’s case was “entirely circumstantial.”149  The State 
cannot now change position and disclaim the importance of the evidence.150   
 
147 See, e.g., AA220 (Trial Tr. at 34:15–17) (stating in closing argument how “important” evidence 
was from Matthews’s cellphone due to its “consistenc[e]” given that the testimonial evidence was 
inconsistent).   
148 AA173, AA174 (Trial Tr. at 37:13; 41:1–2).  
149 AA174 (Trial Tr. at 41:17–20).  The trial judge agreed:  “I think it is material.  Both the text 
message[s] and the [i]nternet search are material to the ultimate fact in dispute in this case as to 
whether or not the defendant intentionally killed the victim, Antoine Terry, with a gun.”  AA175 
(Trial Tr. at 45:10–16) (emphasis added).  And the judge concurred that such information was 
prejudicial:  “I think it’s got prejudice, and the State’s acknowledged that.”  AA176 (Trial Tr. at 
45:10–16).  
150 At oral argument, while conceding that its case was circumstantial, the State appeared to change 
tack, arguing that the cellphone evidence was merely “duplicative.”  See Delaware Supreme Court, 
 
 
34 
 
Without the evidence derived from Matthews’s cellphone, there is a 
reasonable probability that the outcome of Matthews’s trial would have been 
different.  Accordingly, Matthews was prejudiced by trial counsel’s deficient 
performance under Strickland’s second prong.   
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Superior Court erred in denying Shaheed 
Matthews’s Rule 61 motion for postconviction relief.  We therefore REVERSE and 
VACATE Matthews’s convictions.  We REMAND this case to the Superior Court 
for a new trial consistent with this opinion.  
 
Oral Argument Video, Vimeo, at 32:12–33:38; 45:12–24; 46:14–19 (March 12, 2024) 
https://vimeo.com/922089824.