Title: Joseph B. Doerr Trust v. Cent. Fla. Expressway Auth.

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC14-1007 
____________ 
 
JOSEPH B. DOERR TRUST, et al., 
Petitioners, 
 
vs. 
 
CENTRAL FLORIDA EXPRESSWAY AUTHORITY, et al., 
Respondents. 
 
[November 5, 2015] 
 
LEWIS, J. 
 
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fifth District 
Court of Appeal in Orlando/Orange County Expressway v. Tuscan Ridge, LLC 
(Tuscan Ridge II), 137 So. 3d 1154 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014).  In the decision, the 
district court ruled upon a question that it certified to be of great public importance.  
We have jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. 
FACTS AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
Introduction 
 
Article X, section 6, of the Florida Constitution governs eminent domain.  
Subsection (a) of that provision states that “[n]o private property shall be taken 
 
- 2 - 
except for a public purpose and with full compensation therefor paid to each owner 
or secured by deposit in the registry of the court and available to the owner.”  
This case involves an award of attorney’s fees in an eminent domain 
proceeding.  The award of such fees is governed by section 73.092, Florida 
Statutes (2014),1 which provides, in pertinent part: 
(1)  Except as otherwise provided in this section and s. 73.015, 
the court, in eminent domain proceedings, shall award attorney’s fees 
based solely on the benefits achieved for the client. 
(a)  As used in this section, the term “benefits” 
means the difference, exclusive of interest, between the 
final judgment or settlement and the last written offer 
made by the condemning authority before the defendant 
hires an attorney.  If no written offer is made by the 
condemning authority before the defendant hires an 
attorney, benefits must be measured from the first written 
offer after the attorney is hired. 
 
 
. . . . 
(b)  The court may also consider nonmonetary 
benefits obtained for the client through the efforts of the 
attorney, to the extent such nonmonetary benefits are 
specifically identified by the court and can, within a 
reasonable degree of certainty, be quantified. 
(c)  Attorney’s fees based on benefits achieved 
shall be awarded in accordance with the following 
schedule: 
 
1. Thirty-three percent of any benefit up to 
$250,000; plus 
2.  Twenty-five percent of any portion of the 
benefit between $250,000 and $1 million; plus 
                                          
 
 
1.  The statute has not been amended since the condemnation proceeding in 
this case commenced in 2006. 
 
- 3 - 
3. Twenty percent of any portion of the benefit 
exceeding $1 million. 
 
(2)  In assessing attorney’s fees incurred in defeating an order 
of taking, or for apportionment, or other supplemental proceedings, 
when not otherwise provided for, the court shall consider: 
(a)  The novelty, difficulty, and importance of the 
questions involved. 
(b)  The skill employed by the attorney in 
conducting the cause. 
(c)  The amount of money involved. 
(d)  The responsibility incurred and fulfilled by the 
attorney. 
(e)  The attorney’s time and labor reasonably 
required adequately to represent the client in relation to 
the benefits resulting to the client. 
(f)  The fee, or rate of fee, customarily charged for 
legal services of a comparable or similar nature. 
(g)  Any attorney’s fee award made under 
subsection (1). 
 
(3)  In determining the amount of attorney’s fees to be paid by 
the petitioner under subsection (2), the court shall be guided by the 
fees the defendant would ordinarily be expected to pay for these 
services if the petitioner were not responsible for the payment of those 
fees. 
Tuscan Ridge I 
 
 
The Orlando-Orange County Expressway Authority, now the Central Florida 
Expressway Authority (the Authority),2 began a condemnation proceeding to 
acquire 9.81 acres of land identified as Parcel 406.  Orlando/Orange Cnty. 
                                          
 
 
2.  See ch. 2014-171, § 3, Laws of Fla. (amending section 348.753, Florida 
Statutes, to redesignate the Orlando-Orange County Expressway Authority as the 
Central Florida Expressway Authority).  
 
- 4 - 
Expressway Auth. v. Tuscan Ridge, LLC (Tuscan Ridge I), 84 So. 3d 410, 411 
(Fla. 5th DCA 2012).  Parcel 406 was owned by Joseph B. Doerr, as Trustee of 
The Joseph B. Doerr Revocable Living Trust dated 9/9/94 (Doerr).  Id.  In 
December 2005, Doerr conveyed fifteen percent of the Trust’s interest in the land 
to Ministry Systems, Inc. (Ministry), but the transfer was not recorded until July 
31, 2006.  Id.   
 
On June 5, 2006, the Authority submitted to Doerr a presuit written offer to 
purchase Parcel 406 for $4,914,221.  Id.  Doerr rejected the offer, and in August 
2006, the Authority filed an action to condemn the property.  Id.3  In February 
2008, a jury trial was held to determine the value of Parcel 406.  Id. at 412.  The 
jury found that the land had a fair market value of $5,744,830.  Id.   
 
Thereafter, Doerr and Ministry (collectively the Landowners) filed a motion 
for attorney’s fees.  Id.  The Authority sought to limit the fees to the benefits 
achieved formula under section 73.092(1), which generated an award of 
$227,652.25.  Id.  On the other hand, the Landowners asserted that they were 
entitled to attorney’s fees under section 73.092(2), which requires a trial court to 
consider qualitative and quantitative factors in determining the amount of a fee 
                                          
 
 
3.  At the time of the presuit offer, a company named Florida Container 
Services, Inc. (Florida Container), was leasing the property on a month-to-month 
basis.  Id.  Any claims Florida Container pursued against the Authority were settled 
at mediation, see id. at 412, and that entity is not part of this case.     
 
- 5 - 
award.  Id.  The trial court awarded fees under subsection (2) because it concluded 
that the Authority’s presuit written offer was insufficient to calculate the benefits 
achieved by each Landowner in the final judgment so as to permit a fee award 
under subsection (1).  Id. at 414.  Applying the factors listed in section 73.092(2), 
the trial court awarded the Landowners $816,000 in attorney’s fees for the 
proceedings that involved the valuation of Parcel 406.  Id. at 412-13.   
 
The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed.  Id. at 411.  The district court 
concluded that the presuit offer was not so indefinite that the benefits achieved by 
the Landowners could not be determined.  Id. at 416.  In its decision, the Fifth 
District noted that this case had been over-litigated, and the parties blamed each 
other for the significant attorney’s fees incurred: 
For the valuation proceedings, [the Landowners’ law firm] claimed it 
was entitled to be paid for 2,700.3 attorney hours at the rate of $350 or 
$375 per hour, and 460 paralegal hours at the rate of $120 per hour.  
Nearly 2,000 of the attorney hours pertained to services performed by 
[the] Landowners’ lead counsel . . . .  The fees collected by [the 
Authority’s] attorneys were similarly sizable. [n.5] 
[N.5.]  For the valuation proceedings alone, [the 
Authority] incurred 2,888 attorney hours and 1,005 
paralegal hours, for which it compensated its attorneys a 
total of $672,000.  It was also paid $150,000 for the cost 
phase of the trial. 
 
Id. at 413.  Although the Fifth District concluded that the attorney’s fees for the 
valuation proceedings were limited to those allowed by section 73.092(1), it 
remanded to the trial court for consideration of the Landowners’ claim that the 
 
- 6 - 
application of the benefits achieved formula violated their constitutional right to 
full compensation because the Authority caused excessive litigation.  Id. at 418-19.   
Tuscan Ridge II 
 
 
On remand from the Fifth District, the trial court found that the Authority 
had engaged in a “clear pattern” of excessive litigation.  The first source of 
excessive litigation was described as follows: 
Early on in these proceedings, after the Order of Taking was entered 
in August of 2006, [the Authority] made a decision to aggressively 
litigate this case to the potential detriment of [the Landowners’] right 
to full compensation.  Previously, the parties had agreed as to the 
highest and best use of the property, each side had a real estate 
appraiser to value the property as though vacant, and had agreed to try 
the case in early 2007.  [The Authority] retained an economist, Henry 
Fishkind.  [The Authority] then submitted Fishkind’s report in late 
November of 2006. 
 
 
In his November 2006 report, Fishkind employed an economic 
development approach to value the Doerr property based upon a 
hypothetical redevelopment of the property, although the property had 
been appraised by both parties’ property appraisers as though vacant.  
Using the development approach, Fishkind made 16 assumptions 
(e.g., the maximum square footage of buildings that could be built on 
the Doerr property; the cost of constructing such buildings; rental 
rates for buildings; vacancy rates for such buildings; insurance costs 
for such buildings; utility costs for such buildings; and real estate 
taxes for such buildings).  The most important assumption was that 
56,800 square feet of improvements was the maximum amount of 
building space that could be built on the property.  Fishkind relied on 
other sources as well in making his assumptions which formed the 
predicate underlying his analysis.   
 
To competently represent [the Landowners], it was necessary 
for [their] attorneys to determine and then rebut any faulty 
assumptions of Fishkind.  In order to do so it was necessary for [the 
 
- 7 - 
Landowners] to retain additional expert witnesses and request further 
services of previously retained experts to challenge Fishkind’s faulty 
assumptions.  Challenging Fishkind’s assumptions greatly increased 
the number of hours [the Landowners’] attorneys spent on the case.  
 
 
[The Landowners’] efforts to have Fishkind stricken as a 
witness throughout the pre-trial period to avoid unnecessary excessive 
litigation were vigorously contested by [the Authority].  Fishkind was 
ultimately not allowed to testify before the jury due to a ruling made 
by the Court.   
 
The trial court also found that the Authority caused excessive litigation by 
spending twice as much time deposing the Landowners’ experts as the Landowners 
spent deposing the Authority’s experts.   
 
The trial court noted that all of the attorney’s fees expert witnesses who 
testified as to what would constitute a reasonable fee, including the Authority’s 
expert, agreed that it would be unreasonable, given the circumstances of this case, 
to limit the Landowners to the $227,652.25 capped fee that the benefits achieved 
formula in section 73.092(1) generated.4  The court explained: 
 
Applying this Court’s conclusion that $350 an hour is a 
reasonable rate to such a fee would mean that [the Landowners] could 
only expend 650 attorney hours and no paralegal hours to defend its 
claim against [the Authority], whose attorneys expended 2,888 hours, 
and paralegal hours of 1005, for a total of 3,893 hours (for which they 
were paid $672,000).  [The Landowners] could not have litigated on 
an equal footing with [the Authority] under the circumstances of this 
                                          
 
 
4.  The trial court stated that a second expert for the Authority did not offer 
an opinion on this issue because his testimony was limited to “what the reasonable 
number of hours were for a whole-take case in which one disregards the particular 
facts of the litigation.”  
 
- 8 - 
case, if [the Authority] was permitted to expend more than five (5) 
times the number of hours than [the Landowners]. 
The trial court held that section 73.092(1) was unconstitutional as applied under 
the facts of this case because it operated to deny the Landowners their right to full 
compensation.  The court found that the Landowners reasonably incurred 2,200 
attorney hours and 400 paralegal hours through the entry of final judgment.  It then 
determined that the original fee award of $816,000: 
remains valid and applicable to the facts and circumstances of this 
case, based upon a property owner’s constitutional right to full 
compensation.  This is especially true since it was [the Authority] that 
was primarily responsible for the excessive litigation because of its 
decision to use Fishkind.   
The court noted that in determining the fee, it had considered and applied the 
factors delineated in sections 73.092(2) and (3).   
 
On appeal, the Fifth District again reversed.  Tuscan Ridge II, 137 So. 3d at 
1155.  The district court noted that the $227,652.25 fee award under the benefits 
achieved formula amounted to a blended rate of eighty-seven dollars per hour for 
attorney and paralegal time, and opined that such a fee did not appear to be 
“patently unconstitutional.”  Id. at 1156.  The court suggested that the Landowners 
could have sought sanctions that would have compensated them above the 
statutory fee.  Id.  The district court stated that instead of using other mechanisms 
to address the “purportedly” abusive tactics of the Authority, the Landowners 
“successfully convinced the trial court to scrap the entire fee formula as 
 
- 9 - 
unconstitutional.”  Id. at 1156.  The Fifth District held that the trial court erred 
when it awarded the Landowners $816,000 in attorney’s fees and remanded the 
case with instructions that judgment in the amount of $227,652.25 be entered.  Id. 
at 1157.  However, the district court certified the following question to this Court 
as one of great public importance: 
IN AN EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDING, WHEN THE 
CONDEMNING AUTHORITY ENGAGES IN LITIGATION 
TACTICS CAUSING EXCESSIVE LITIGATION AND THE 
APPLICATION OF THE STATUTORY FEE FORMULA RESULTS 
IN A FEE THAT COMPENSATES THE LANDOWNER’S 
ATTORNEYS AT A LOWER-THAN-MARKET FEE, WHEN 
MEASURED BY THE TIME INVOLVED, IS THE STATUTORY 
FEE DEEMED UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED, ENTITLING 
THE LANDOWNER TO PURSUE A FEE UNDER SECTION 
73.092(2)? 
Id.  For purposes of our review, we rephrase the question as follows: 
IN AN EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDING, WHEN THE 
CONDEMNING AUTHORITY ENGAGES IN TACTICS THAT 
CAUSE EXCESSIVE LITIGATION, IS THE BENEFITS 
ACHIEVED FORMULA IN SECTION 73.092(1), FLORIDA 
STATUTES, UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED TO 
CALCULATE ATTORNEY’S FEES FOR THE HOURS 
INCURRED IN DEFENDING AGAINST THE EXCESSIVE 
LITIGATION? 
 
ANALYSIS 
Standard of Review 
 
The determination as to the constitutionality of a statute is reviewed de novo.  
Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. City of Gainesville, 918 So. 2d 250, 256 (Fla. 2005).  
 
- 10 - 
However, statutes carry a presumption of constitutionality and must be construed 
whenever possible to achieve a constitutional outcome.  Crist v. Fla. Ass’n of 
Criminal Def. Lawyers, 978 So. 2d 134, 139 (Fla. 2008).   
Eminent Domain and Attorney’s Fees 
 
In clear and direct terms, article X, section 6(a), of the Florida Constitution 
provides that “[n]o private property shall be taken except for a public purpose and 
with full compensation therefor paid to each owner or secured by deposit in the 
registry of the court and available to the owner.”  (Emphasis supplied.)  It is also 
fundamentally clear that full compensation under the Florida Constitution includes 
the right to a reasonable attorney’s fee for the property owner.  Tosohatchee Game 
Pres., Inc. v. Cent. & S. Fla. Flood Control Dist., 265 So. 2d 681, 684-85 (Fla. 
1972); see also JEA v. Williams, 978 So. 2d 842, 845 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (“A 
landowner’s constitutional right to full compensation for property taken by the 
government includes the right to a reasonable fee for the landowner’s counsel.”).5  
                                          
 
 
5.  The right of private property owners to full compensation in eminent 
domain proceedings under the Florida Constitution is more expansive than that of 
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides that private 
property shall not be taken for a public use “without just compensation.”  U.S. 
Const. amend V.  The Supreme Court has held that “just” compensation under the 
Fifth Amendment does not include attorney’s fees.  United States v. Bodcaw Co., 
440 U.S. 202, 203 (1979); Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 368 (1930). 
 
- 11 - 
In Florida eminent domain proceedings, the goal is to render the private property 
owner as whole as possible because: 
the owner of private property sought to be condemned is forced into 
court by one to whom he owes no obligation, [and] it cannot be said 
that he has received “just compensation” for his property if he is 
compelled to pay out of his own pocket the expenses of establishing 
the fair value of the property, which expenses in some cases could 
conceivably exceed such value.  The plight of the land owner in this 
situation is well stated by the New York court in [In] Re Water 
Supply in City of New York, 125 App. Div. 219, 109 N.Y.S. 652, 
654[-55 (N.Y. App. Div. 1908)], as follows: 
He does not want to sell.  The property is taken 
from him through the exertion of the high powers of the 
[state], and the spirit of the Constitution clearly requires 
that he shall not be thus compelled to part with what 
belongs to him without the payment, not alone of the 
abstract value of the property, but of all the necessary 
expenses incurred in fixing that value.  This would seem 
to be dictated by sound morals, as well as by the spirit of 
the Constitution; and it will not be presumed that the 
Legislature has intended to deprive the owner of the 
property of the full protection which belongs to him as a 
matter of right. 
Dade Cnty. v. Brigham, 47 So. 2d 602, 604-05 (Fla. 1950) (emphasis supplied).   
 
 
Section 73.092 
 
 
The benefits achieved formula set forth in section 73.092 has encroached on 
this fundamental right, but has previously withstood a facial constitutional 
challenge.  In Seminole County v. Coral Gables Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, 
691 So. 2d 614, 614 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), the Fifth District rejected an assertion 
that section 73.092 is unconstitutional because it divests the judiciary of the ability 
 
- 12 - 
to determine reasonable attorney’s fees for a private property owner.  The district 
court held that the Legislature has the authority to establish a sliding-percentage 
scale for attorney’s fees awards: 
[T]he legislature essentially decided that a percentage of the benefits 
is a reasonable fee [in eminent domain cases], and in Schick[ v. 
Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, 599 So. 2d 641 
(Fla. 1992)], the supreme court stated that the legislature can enact 
attorney’s fees provisions which “it deems will result in a reasonable 
award.”  Id. at 644.   
Id.  at 615.  Subsequent to Seminole County, this Court addressed the benefits 
achieved formula in section 73.092(1) and notwithstanding the compromise of 
“full compensation” allowed the Florida Legislature to enact “reasonable” 
provisions to govern attorney’s fees awards in eminent domain proceedings.  
Pierpont v. Lee Cnty., 710 So. 2d 958, 960 (Fla. 1998).  Consistent with Pierpont 
and Seminole County, and in accordance with the directives of the statute, Florida 
courts have awarded attorney’s fees pursuant to section 73.092(1) where 
subsection (2) has no application.  See, e.g., Dep’t of Transp. v. Knaus, 737 So. 2d 
1130, 1131 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Teeter v. Dep’t of Transp., 713 So. 2d 1090, 
1091-92 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Dep’t of Transp. v. LaBelle Phoenix Corp., 696 So. 
2d 947, 948 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).   
Nonetheless, although the Legislature may establish reasonable parameters 
for the award of attorney’s fees in eminent domain proceedings, a statute cannot 
operate in a manner to so reduce a fee award that it runs afoul of the constitutional 
 
- 13 - 
guarantee that private property owners receive full compensation for a taking of 
their property.  Indeed, in Pierpont we acknowledged the possibility that section 
73.092 could be unconstitutional as applied in certain situations.  710 So. 2d at 
961.  While the landowners in Pierpont offered two scenarios, see id. at n.2, we did 
not indicate that these were the only potential areas for constitutional concern.   
Excessive Litigation in Eminent Domain Proceedings 
We have previously emphasized the importance of fair play in eminent 
domain proceedings because of the inherent disadvantage to the property owner: 
It must be borne in mind that in a condemnation proceeding the 
property of the land owner is subject to taking by the condemnor 
without the owner’s consent.  The condemnee is a party through no 
fault or volition of his own.  Our Declaration of Rights, Section 12, 
Constitution of the State of Florida, F.S.A., makes it incumbent upon 
the condemnor to award “just” compensation for the taking.  In view 
of this constitutional mandate, the awarding of compensation which is 
“just” should be the care of the condemning authority as well as that 
of the party whose land is being taken. 
Unlike litigation between private parties condemnation by any 
governmental authority should not be a matter of “dog eat dog” or 
“win at any cost.”  Such attitude and procedure would be decidedly 
unfair to the property owner.  He would be at a disadvantage in every 
instance for the reason that the government has unlimited resources 
created by its inexhaustible power of taxation.  Moreover it should be 
remembered that the condemnee is himself a taxpayer and as such 
contributes to the government’s “unlimited resources.” 
 
Shell v. State Rd. Dep’t, 135 So. 2d 857, 861 (Fla. 1961).  Here, the trial court 
found that it was the Authority which had caused the excessive litigation that 
operated to the detriment of the Landowners’ right to full compensation.  
 
- 14 - 
Moreover, the trial court noted that all of the attorney’s fees experts who testified 
as to what would be a reasonable fee, including the expert for the Authority, agreed 
that given the circumstances of this case, it would be unreasonable to limit the 
Landowners to the capped fee generated by the formula in section 73.092(1).   
We agree with the Landowners that where a condemning authority is 
responsible for excessive litigation, the application of subsection (1) to limit a fee 
award places private property owners at a considerable disadvantage because 
government entities, such as the Authority,6 possess potentially unlimited resources 
to allocate to abusive litigation and legal representation.  See generally Shell, 135 
So. 2d at 861.  Further, it is important to note that section 73.092 applies only to 
attorney’s fees for private property owners.  Thus, attorneys for government 
entities can still bill a substantial number of hours and charge substantial fees 
without the risk of having their fees reduced in any way or subject to a statutory 
cap or percentage.  We conclude that where private property owners are forced to 
defend against excessive litigation caused by a condemning authority, a mandatory 
statutory formula that generates a fee award below that which is considered 
reasonable denies those property owners their right to the full compensation that is 
guaranteed by the Florida Constitution.  Art. X, § 6(a), Fla. Const.; Tosohatchee, 
                                          
 
 
6.  The Authority is a State agency.  See § 348.753(1), Fla. Stat. (2014). 
 
- 15 - 
265 So. 2d at 684-85; JEA, 978 So. 2d at 845.  Accordingly, without a remedy to 
protect private property owners under such circumstances, section 73.092(1) would 
be unconstitutional as applied.   
Therefore, to construe section 73.092(1) in a manner that preserves its 
constitutionality, as we have a duty to do, see Crist, 978 So. 2d at 139, while 
simultaneously protecting the right of private property owners to full 
compensation, we hold that when a condemning authority engages in tactics that 
cause excessive litigation, the trial court shall utilize section 73.092(2) to calculate 
a reasonable attorney’s fee, but only for those hours incurred in defending against 
the excessive litigation or that portion that is considered to be in response to or 
caused by the excessive tactics.  The remainder of the fee shall be calculated 
pursuant to the benefits achieved formula delineated in section 73.092(1).  The two 
amounts added together shall be the total fee.  This bifurcated calculation strikes a 
fair balance by ensuring that private property owners receive the full compensation 
to which they are entitled under the Florida Constitution, without disregarding the 
legislative directive that attorney’s fees for the valuation portion of an eminent 
domain proceeding are to be calculated using the benefits achieved formula.   
We decline to attempt to define with absolute precision each and every 
element or item that could constitute or be considered excessive litigation in 
eminent domain cases other than to state it is litigation that diverges from what 
 
- 16 - 
both trial courts and the legal community would normally expect in a normal or 
usual condemnation case with regard to the work performed, theories and evidence 
advanced, and the number of attorney and paralegal hours expended.7  The trial 
courts of this state are in the best position to determine, based on evidence 
presented and legal experience, whether excessive litigation activity has occurred. 
Application to This Case 
Although the attorneys for the Landowners unquestionably expended a 
significant number of hours defending against certain litigation tactics, it does not 
appear that every action taken by the Authority during this entire eminent domain 
proceeding caused excessive litigation.  To the contrary, the trial court referenced 
two tactics utilized by the Authority, both of which occurred during the case 
proceedings: (1) the use of Dr. Fishkind, and related evidence, and (2) prolonged 
deposition times of the Landowners’ experts.  Nevertheless, the trial court did not 
attempt to identify the number of hours that the attorneys for the Landowners 
expended in defending against that portion or those actions that would be in the 
category of excessive litigation that resulted from the excessive tactics.  There was 
no need for the trial judge to do so at that time because the limits established by 
this decision were not in place.  The trial court concluded that section 73.092(1) 
                                          
 
 
7.  This definition is sufficiently broad to be applicable to other areas of the 
law. 
 
- 17 - 
was unconstitutional as applied and did not employ the benefits achieved formula 
to calculate any portion of the attorney’s fee award.  As a result, 2,200 attorney 
hours and 400 paralegal hours were multiplied by reasonable hourly rates under 
section 73.092(2) to obtain an award of $816,000.   
We conclude that application of a simple and normal hourly multiplication 
to calculate the attorney’s fee award is inconsistent with the language of section 
73.092(1), which provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section and 
s. 73.015, the court, in eminent domain proceedings, shall award attorney’s fees 
based solely on the benefits achieved for the client” (emphasis supplied).  To 
implement our holding today, an evidentiary hearing is required, during which the 
trial court is to determine the number of hours that were expended by the attorneys 
and related personnel for the Landowners that corresponds with the excessive 
litigation conduct caused by the Authority and may be determined to be that 
portion of the total work performed attributable to the excessive actions of the 
condemning counsel or party.  For solely those hours, the trial court shall calculate 
a fee pursuant to section 73.092(2).  This additional amount shall be added to the 
amount resulting from the application of section 73.092(1), which must be applied 
to determine the remainder of the fee based on benefit, which in this case is 
$227,652.25.    
 
 
- 18 - 
Sanctions 
 
The Fifth District criticized the Landowners for their failure to rely on 
sanctions to secure attorney’s fees above the statutory fee.  Tuscan Ridge II, 137 
So. 3d at 1156.  However, we disagree that the Landowners were required to 
pursue only sanctions and conclude that they are not sufficient to protect the 
constitutional right at issue here.  We reiterate that there is a constitutional right to 
full compensation for the taking of private property, art. X, § 6(a), Fla. Const., and 
a reasonable attorney’s fee is part of that compensation.  Tosohatchee, 265 So. 2d 
at 684-85; JEA, 978 So. 2d at 845.  The award of attorney’s fees as a sanction is a 
discretionary, punitive concept that is completely separate and distinct from this 
right under the Florida Constitution we consider today.   
Additionally, the over-litigation or excessive litigation of a case does not 
necessarily equate with bad faith or illegal motives.  While the trial court found 
that Dr. Fishkind’s valuation of Parcel 406 was based on faulty assumptions that 
had to be rebutted by the Landowners’ attorneys, this does not mean that the 
Authority acted in bad faith or with evil intent when it retained him.  Similarly, the 
fact that the Authority’s attorneys may have been overzealous and spent an 
inordinate amount of time deposing the Landowners’ experts does not lead to an 
automatic conclusion that the Authority engaged in bad faith conduct or was 
motivated by improper considerations.  Therefore, we reject the contention that the 
 
- 19 - 
Landowners were required to pursue sanctions in lieu of challenging the 
constitutionality of section 73.092(1) as applied where the Authority was 
responsible for excessive litigation.   
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, we answer the rephrased certified question in the 
affirmative.  We hold that when a condemning authority engages in tactics that 
cause excessive litigation, section 73.092(2) shall be used separately and 
additionally to calculate a reasonable attorney’s fee for the hours expended which 
are attributable to defending against the excessive litigation or actions.  This will 
result in an amount that must be added to the remainder of the fee calculated 
utilizing the benefits achieved formula delineated in section 73.092(1).  This is a 
two-step process that results in a total fee that is based both on benefit and any 
excessive litigation.   
The decision of the Fifth District is quashed.  This case is remanded with 
directions that the trial court conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the total 
attorney’s fees based on both the benefit and the portion of the work attributable to 
the excessive litigation and actions.   
It is so ordered.   
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, and 
PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
 
- 20 - 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Great Public Importance  
 
 
Fifth District - Case No. 5D13-1164 
 
 
(Orange County) 
 
Craig B. Willis and Joe W. Fixel of Fixel & Willis, Tallahassee, Florida; and 
Major Best Harding of Ausley & McMullen, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioners 
 
Beverly A. Pohl of Broad and Cassel, Fort Lauderdale, Florida; Richard Nash 
Milian and Edgar Lopez of Broad and Cassel, Orlando, Florida,  
 
 
for Respondents