Title: Ex parte Sam Smith

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

Rel: September 4, 2020
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2020
____________________
1180834
____________________
Ex parte Sam Smith, individually and in his capacity as
director of the Calhoun County Department of Human
Resources; Pamela McClellan; and Teresa Ellis
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: William David Streip, as personal representative of
the Estate of Jerrie Leeann Streip, deceased
v.
Sam Smith, individually and in his capacity as director of
the Calhoun County Department of Human Resources; Pamela
McClellan; and Teresa Ellis)
(Jefferson Circuit Court, CV-17-903149)
SHAW, Justice.
1180834
The defendants below, Sam Smith, director of the Calhoun
County Department of Human Resources ("CCDHR"); Pamela
McClellan, 
an 
adult-protective-services 
caseworker 
with 
CCDHR;
and 
Teresa 
Ellis, 
McClellan's 
supervisor 
(hereinafter 
referred
to collectively as "the petitioners"), petition this Court for
a writ of mandamus directing the Jefferson Circuit Court to
vacate its order denying their motion for a summary judgment
in a wrongful-death action filed by William David Streip
("David"), as the personal representative of the estate of his
sister, Jerrie Leeann Streip ("Leeann"), deceased,1 and to
enter a  summary judgment in their favor on the basis of
immunity.  We grant the petition and issue the writ.  
Facts and Procedural History
Leeann suffered from numerous serious physical, mental,
and emotional conditions beginning with her birth in 1971. 
Those conditions were exacerbated by brain surgery in 2013. 
Following that surgery, Leeann was released to a nursing-home
facility before being discharged into the care of her father. 
1In the materials before this Court, Leeann is referred
to as both "Leeann" and "Jerrie" interchangeably. When she is
referred to as "Leeann," her name is spelled various ways.  In
this opinion, we refer to her as "Leeann" and use the spelling
used in the majority of the materials before us. 
2
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Leeann subsequently reported to a CCDHR social worker
that her father had raped her. As a result, an adult-
protective-services case was opened under Alabama's Adult
Protective Services Act ("the APSA"),2 and McClellan was
assigned as  Leeann's caseworker.  Upon the conclusion of the
ensuing investigation, CCDHR removed Leeann from her father's
care.  Following a brief hospitalization and initial,
temporary placements, Leeann was placed by her then guardian
at Magnolia Place, an unlicensed "boarding home."  Leeann
remained at Magnolia Place from May 2014 until March 2016.  At
that time, in relation to concerns regarding Magnolia Place's
unlicensed status and the fact that it might be providing more
assistance than was permissible in a "boarding-home" setting,
CCDHR removed Leeann from Magnolia Place and, on or around
March 25, 2016, placed her at Leviticus Place, a licensed
boarding home.
On April 14, 2016, McClellan spoke with Leeann and
reportedly had no resulting concerns about Leeann's well
being.  On April 20, 2016, however, McClellan was notified
that Leeann had left Leviticus Place on April 15 and had not
2See § 38-9-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975.
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returned.  A body located in Birmingham was later identified
as Leeann's; her cause of death remains "undetermined."
Following Leeann's death, David sued, among others,
Smith, McClellan, and Ellis,3 alleging that they had committed
willful, malicious, or fraudulent acts or had acted in bad
faith or had failed to act and that those acts or omissions
violated specific laws, rules, or regulations of the Alabama
Department of Human Resources ("DHR") and had thereby caused
Leeann's death.  More specifically, David's complaint alleged
that, because of Leeann's mental and physical disabilities,
she was not capable of living in a "communal" living facility
like Leviticus Place and, instead, "required the level of care
of a 'nursing home,'" as purportedly recommended by her
physician.  David further alleged that the petitioners
negligently or wantonly placed Leeann in a boarding home
where, he alleges, she failed to receive appropriate
monitoring and supervision and that that decision, according
to David, both violated DHR policy and "put [Leeann's] health
and safety at risk."
3David's complaint indicated that he was suing Smith in
both "his individual and official capacities" and was suing
McClellan and Ellis "in [their] individual capacit[ies]."
4
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The petitioners filed a joint motion seeking a summary
judgment in their favor on David's claims against them. In
their motion, the petitioners argued that they were entitled
to a summary judgment because, they said, David could not
prove that they had proximately caused Leeann's unexplained
death; they were entitled to statutory immunity under § 38-9-
11, Ala. Code 1975, a provision of the APSA, because, they
said, they had exercised their duties in "good faith" and in
compliance with the DHR Adult Policy Services Manual ("DHR's
APS manual"); and they were entitled to State-agent immunity
because, they said, all decisions concerning Leeann's
placement were based on an exercise of discretion performed
within the scope of their duties.
In opposition to the petitioners' motion, David argued
that substantial evidence showed that the petitioners'
placement of Leeann in a boarding-home facility was the
proximate cause of Leeann's death because, he asserted, they
placed Leeann in a boarding home despite ample evidence
indicating that she "could not perform normal activities of
daily living" and that she "needed help with simple tasks such
as 
self-administering 
medication, 
bathing, 
toileting, 
cooking,
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1180834
and handling her finances" –- requirements that, according to
David, rendered Leeann ineligible for boarding-home placement
under the clear requirements of DHR's APS manual.  David
contended that Leeann's allegedly improper placement deprived
the petitioners of State-agent immunity available under Ex
parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000) (plurality opinion
setting out a restatement of law pertaining to State-agent
immunity, which restatement was adopted by a majority of the
Court in Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173 (Ala. 2000)).  David
also disputed that the petitioners were entitled to statutory
immunity under § 38-9-11 because, he says, the petitioners did
not satisfy the "good-faith" requirement of that Code section
in placing Leeann in a boarding-home setting, which, he
maintains, 
was 
in 
violation 
of 
DHR's 
APS 
manual. 
Alternatively, he argued that the immunity provided in § 38-9-
11 
"refers 
to 
immunity 
from 
claims 
stemming 
from
investigations and recommendations about the status of
neglect, incapacity and/or abuse claims, not to claims that
stem from DHR's work with individuals already determined to be
incapacitated."  (Emphasis omitted.) 
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Following further filings and a hearing, the trial court
entered an order denying the petitioners' motion for a summary
judgment.  In response, they filed the instant petition; this
Court subsequently ordered answers and briefs. 
Standard of Review
"A writ of mandamus is a
"'drastic and extraordinary writ that will
be issued only when there is:  1) a clear
legal right in the petitioner to the order
sought; 2) an imperative duty upon the
respondent to perform, accompanied by a
refusal to do so; 3) the lack of another
adequate remedy; and 4) properly invoked
jurisdiction of the court.'
"Ex parte United Serv. Stations, Inc., 628 So. 2d
501, 503 (Ala. 1993)."
Ex parte Wood, 852 So. 2d 705, 708 (Ala. 2002).  Although this
Court generally will not review a trial court's denial of a
summary-judgment motion, we will consider a challenge to a
denial of a summary-judgment motion that is "grounded on a
claim of immunity." Id.  Our review in such as case is limited
to the trial court's determination of immunity issues; we will
not consider secondary arguments that a summary judgment was
appropriate on other grounds or review the trial court's
conclusions on other issues.  See Ex parte Hudson, 866 So. 2d
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1115, 1120 (Ala. 2003) (explaining that, in reviewing the
denial of a summary-judgment motion that asserts immunity,
"[w]e confine our interlocutory review to matters germane to
the issue of immunity. Matters relevant to the merits of the
underlying tort claim, such as issues of duty or causation,
are best left to the trial court").
In reviewing the denial of a summary-judgment motion
asserting immunity, whether by petition for a writ of mandamus
or by permissive appeal, this Court applies the following
standard of review:
"If there is a genuine issue as to any material fact
on the question whether the movant is entitled to
immunity, then the moving party is not entitled to
a summary judgment.  Rule 56, Ala. R. Civ. P.  In
determining whether there is [an issue of] material
fact on the question whether the movant is entitled
to immunity, courts, both trial and appellate, must
view the record in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, accord the nonmoving party all
reasonable favorable inferences from the evidence,
and resolve all reasonable doubts against the moving
party, considering only the evidence before the
trial court at the time it denied the motion for a
summary judgment.  Ex parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911,
912 (Ala. 2000)."
Wood, 852 So. 2d at 708.
Discussion
8
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In their petition, the petitioners renew their claim that
they were entitled to a summary judgment and that the trial
court erred in denying their summary-judgment motion because,
they contend, they are entitled to statutory immunity under §
38-9-11 of the APSA.  Section 38-9-11 provides:
"Any officer, agent, or employee of the
department,[4] in the good faith exercise of his
duties under this chapter, shall not be liable for
any civil damages as a result of his acts or
omissions in rendering assistance or care to any
person."
(Emphasis added.)  According to the petitioners, in handling
Leeann's case, they acted at all times within the line and
scope of their duties as agents of DHR and CCDHR.  They
maintain that David has failed to demonstrate that their
placement decisions in Leeann's case were not made in good
faith so as to deprive them of statutory immunity.
As noted above, David contends that § 38-9-11, when read
in pari materia with the remainder of the APSA, clearly
demonstrates that its sole purpose is to provide DHR employees
with immunity for liability arising from their actions in
4For purposes of the APSA, the "department" is the Alabama
Department of Human Resources. See § 38-9-2(5), Ala. Code
1975. 
9
1180834
investigating reports of abuse or making related findings.  We
are unpersuaded by David's reading of § 38-9-11.
Section 38-9-11 states that it applies to the exercise of
duties under "this chapter"; "this chapter" refers to Chapter
9, Title 38, Ala. Code 1975, where the APSA is codified. 
Although certain portions of Chapter 9 govern investigating
reports of abuse, that chapter also governs arranging
protective services for a client, see § 38-9-4, Ala. Code
1975, and the placement of a client in an appropriate
facility, see § 38-9-6, Ala. Code 1975.  Those are "duties
under" Chapter 9 relating to "rendering assistance or care"
for which the plain language of § 38-9-11 provides immunity. 
"When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, as
in this case, courts must enforce the statute as written by
giving the words of the statute their ordinary plain meaning
...." Ex parte T.B., 698 So. 2d 127, 130 (Ala. 1997).  Because
the language of § 38-9-11 is "plain and unambiguous," there is
no need either to interpret the Code section or to resort to
the in pari materia rule of statutory construction. See
Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Walker Cty., [Ms. 1160926, June
28, 2019] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2019) ("If the language of
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1180834
a statute is not 'plain' or is ambiguous, then -- and only
then -- may a court construe or interpret it to determine the
legislature's intent.").  Because that plain and unambiguous
language fails to limit the immunity provided by § 38-9-11 to
investigations of 
abuse, 
David's 
interpretation is 
contrary 
to
the language of the Code section and thus meritless. 
We are also unpersuaded by David's alternate claim that
the petitioners failed to establish that they exercised their
duties "in good faith" in placing Leeann, so as to entitle
them to the immunity afforded by § 38-9-11.  As explained,
David alleges that the petitioners' placement of Leeann in a
boarding-home setting 
was 
violative 
of 
Leeann's 
best 
interests
and DHR policy and was clearly in bad faith when, he says,
Leeann could not perform basic tasks of daily living.  The
petitioners, however, counter that Leeann's placement was the
result of actions taken by them within the line and scope of
their job responsibilities, which specifically include
responsibility for 
the 
placement 
of 
incapacitated 
adults 
under
the APSA.  They further argue that David has failed to
demonstrate that Leeann's boarding-home placement was made in
bad faith.  We agree. 
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1180834
DHR's APS manual provides that protective services for
its adult clients, like Leeann, include: 
"[I]dentifying those in need of such services,
investigating their situations, assessing their
situations 
and 
service 
needs, 
providing 
case
management services to them and to others on their
behalf, ... arranging appropriate alternate living
arrangements, 
... 
arranging 
for 
protective
placement, ... filing adult protective service
reports, making required reports to the court and
[i]nformation and [r]eferral."
(Emphasis added.)  Although, as testimony below indicated,
making those decisions might not be an "exact science," DHR's
APS manual provides certain guidelines, including that DHR may
"refer clients or participate in planning for their
placement only in facilities approved, licensed, or
certified to provide the appropriate level of care
required by the client. No referral or planning for
placement may be made to a facility that is subject
to the licensing or approving authority of a local
or State agency and is unlicensed or not-approved.
No referral or planning for placement may be made to
a facility, though licensed or approved, if not
licensed or approved to provide the level of care
the client requires."
(Emphasis added.)  DHR's APS manual also provides that the
type of placement sought on behalf of an adult client depends
on "the client's particular needs and preferences, physician
recommendations, and resources available."  Under DHR's APS
manual, placement options include, among others, boarding or
12
1180834
rooming homes –- the majority of which apparently do not
restrict a client's ability to come and go at will. 
The materials reveal that in an assessment conducted at
or around the time of Leeann's postsurgery rehabilitation in
2013, Leeann's treating physician, Dr. Carla Thomas, opined
that LeeAnn required adult-protective services because, aside
from the alleged sexual abuse by Leeann's father, she believed
that Leeann did "not understand normal daily decisions" and
their consequences, that Leeann forgot to take prescribed
medications, that Leeann was physically unable to care for
herself, and that Leeann was mentally unable to handle her
financial affairs.  
Similarly, an affidavit submitted by CCDHR
to the trial court in determining guardianship issues at that
time indicated that Leeann "need[ed] daily assistance and care
and [could] no longer live independently."
According to McClellan, however, Leeann's condition
improved after her 2013 surgery.  Specifically, McClellan
indicated that, while housed at Magnolia Place,
"[Leeann] could ambulate independently. She no
longer needed the assistance of a walker.  She could
groom herself.  She could wash and bathe without any
help. She could dress herself. She could feed
herself. She could communicate well. She was even
compliant with treatment and medication through the
13
1180834
local mental health center. She could read and
write." 
When it became necessary to move Leeann from Magnolia Place,
McClellan, in determining what placement best fit Leeann's
needs at that time, explained in her affidavit that she
"[g]athered information from [Leeann's] doctor, from
[Leeann], from her case record, from her prior
service records and from her prior placements ....
[She] considered [Leeann's] financial resources, the
resources that were available to her and how policy
applied in her particular case. [McClellan] also
consulted with her supervisor[, Ellis,] and [they]
in turn, conferenced with [the] state office
consultant and other state office staff."
The affidavit testimony of Dr. Thomas, which the petitioners
offered in support of their summary-judgment motion, confirms
that, in April 2015, Dr. Thomas "made a recommendation [to
CCDHR] of boarding home placement for [Leeann]" with a
guardian to assist with financial matters –- a recommendation
that, also according to Dr. Thomas's testimony, did not change
from that time until the time of Leeann's death in April 2016. 
Because 
Leeann's 
primary 
deficiencies, 
according 
to 
McClellan,
were with managing money and cooking, the most appropriate
placement for Leeann under DHR's APS manual, as demonstrated
by Leeann's own needs and the recommendation of her treating
physician, was a boarding home –- a placement that, according
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to McClellan, met Leeann's needs while also providing the
maximum freedom required by the APSA.5  Thus, the petitioners
concluded that Leeann should be moved to Leviticus Place, a
boarding home offering daily staff supervision until 4:30 p.m.
DHR's APS manual concerning boarding or rooming homes
states:
"Placements or referrals to boarding or rooming
homes may be made for those individuals who need a
facility 
to 
provide 
only 
rooms 
and 
meals.
Individuals whose physical or mental disabilities
require any care or supervision from another
individual shall not be placed in or indirectly
referred to [a] boarding home.
"....
"The following requirements apply to admission to
Jefferson County boarding or rooming homes:
"a.
Residents must be able to perform
their personal care, such as bathing,
dressing, feeding, and taking their
own medicines.
"b.
All residents must be able to ambulate
independently 
without 
bodily
assistance...."
(Emphasis added.)  It further restricts from boarding-home
placement any client with chronic or communicable medical
conditions requiring medical care, treatment, or supervision.
5See, generally, § 38-9-3, Ala. Code 1975.
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In support of his claim that the petitioners' decision to
place Leeann at Leviticus Place was made in bad faith, David
points to purported "substantial evidence" indicating that
Leeann's boarding-home placement violated the above-quoted
policy.  Specifically, according to David, the petitioners
were aware that Leeann allegedly required assistance with
personal care, bathing, dressing, feeding, and taking her own
medicine –- all conditions that, according to 
David, indicated
that Leeann required more care and supervision than offered by
the boarding-home setting.  Thus, he contends, Leeann's
placement amounted to a clear violation of established DHR
policy, which, he says, deprives the petitioners of statutory
immunity in the present case.
David fails to acknowledge, however, that, as of her move
to Leviticus Place -– and even at the time of her earlier
residence at Magnolia Place -- Leeann's needs had decreased
and 
her 
ability 
to 
care 
for 
herself 
had 
improved. 
Specifically, each resource examined by McClellan before
Leeann's placement at Leviticus Place revealed that, at the
time of her boarding-home placement, Leeann could ambulate
independently and could groom, bathe, dress, eat, and
16
1180834
communicate without any help.  Importantly, Dr. Thomas agreed
that "Leeann [was] safe to stay in a boarding environment."  
Despite David's claim to the contrary, it is apparent
that, in selecting boarding-home placement for Leeann,  the
petitioners complied with both DHR's APS manual and the
provisions of the APSA.  David failed to counter the
petitioners' showing with substantial evidence to the
contrary.  Notably, David presented nothing demonstrating
either that, at the time of her placement, Leeann required a
facility 
providing 24-hour 
supervision 
or 
that 
the 
petitioners
exhibited bad 
faith in placing Leeann in the least-restrictive
environment and in a facility providing anything less than 24-
hour supervision.  This Court would be hard-pressed to
conclude that a placement made in accordance with and in
reliance on the recommendations of a client's treating
physician was in bad faith.  Because the petitioners provided
unrefuted evidence that they acted in "good faith" in
following DHR's APS manual and Dr. Thomas's recommendation in
choosing Leeann's placement, there is no remaining question of
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material fact as to the petitioners' entitlement to statutory
immunity under § 38-9-11.6
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the petitioners have established
that they are entitled to statutory immunity; they thus had a
clear legal right to a summary judgment in their favor on that
ground. The trial court is accordingly directed to vacate its
order denying the petitioners' motion for a summary judgment
and to enter a summary judgment in the petitioners' favor.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Parker, C.J., and Bolin, Wise, Bryan, Sellers, Mendheim,
and Stewart, JJ., concur.  
Mitchell, J., concurs specially.
6Because we hold that the petitioners are entitled to
statutory 
immunity, 
we 
pretermit 
discussion 
of 
the
petitioners' remaining claims.  See Favorite Market Store v.
Waldrop, 924 So. 2d 719, 723 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005).
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MITCHELL, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur with the majority opinion and write specially to
explain my view of the following statement in the opinion:
"Because the language of § 38-9-11 is 'plain and
unambiguous,' there is no need either to interpret
the Code section or to resort to the in pari materia
rule of statutory construction.  See Deutsche Bank
Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Walker Cty., [Ms. 1160926, June 28,
2019] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2019) ('If the
language of a statute is not "plain" or is ambiguous,
then –– and only then –– may a court construe or
interpret 
it 
to 
determine 
the 
legislature's
intent.')."
___ So. 3d at ___.  I understand this statement to mean that
when a statute is ambiguous –– i.e., its plain meaning in its
appropriate context is not clear –– it may be necessary to
apply appropriate canons of statutory interpretation.  See
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The
Interpretation 
of Legal 
Texts 
at 
53, "Interpretation
Principle" (Thomson/West 2012). 
19