Title: State v. Homar

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

State v. Homar1990 WY 109798 P.2d 824Case Number: 90-10Decided: 10/09/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
THE STATE OF WYOMING; THE 
TOWN OF JACKSON, TETON COUNTY, WYOMING; AND THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF 
TETON COUNTY, 

APPELLANTS 
(DEFENDANTS),

v.

FRANK HOMAR; SALLY HOMAR; 
PAUL HOMAR; AND LINDA MARTIN, PARTNERS, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE FIRM NAME OF 
FLAT CREEK HOLDINGS, LTD., A LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 

APPELLEES 
(PLAINTIFFS).

 

District Court of Teton 
County, Elizabeth A. Kail, J.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., and Lawrence A. Bobbitt, III, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), 
for appellant State.

David K. Larson 
(argued), Jackson, for appellant Town of Jackson.

Paul O. Vaughn, 
Teton Deputy County Atty. (argued), Jackson, for appellant Teton 
County.

James K. Lubing 
(argued), of Goody and Lubing, Jackson, for appellees.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J.*, and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, 
MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

CARDINE, Justice.

[¶1]      This case 
concerns the permissible uses of an easement for a public road right-of-way. 
Appellants installed a bus turnout on the right-of-way. The trial court granted 
appellees' motion for summary judgment requiring removal of the bus 
turnout.

[¶2]      We reverse and 
direct entry of judgment in favor of appellants.

[¶3]      Appellants Board 
of County Commissioners of Teton County and Town of Jackson1 frame the issue as: 

"Whether the district 
court improperly applied principals of law governing private easements as 
opposed to principals of law governing public rights of way in determining that 
the construction of a bus turnout and sidewalk should be enjoined."

[¶4]      Appellant State 
of Wyoming presents these issues:

"I. Is the construction 
of a safety bus turnout within an existing highway easement a legitimate highway 
purpose?

"II. Whether the 
construction of a safety bus turnout is within the police power of the 
government so that any damage to the holder of the underlying fee interest is 
damnum absque injuria?"

Because the 
first issue raised by the State resolves this case, we do not reach the State's 
second issue.

[¶5]      This easement, 
acquired by the State in 1938 from Ella Karns, granted "the right to lay out, 
construct, inspect, operate and maintain a road for the use of the public over 
and across" the land. The Homars were aware of the easement when they purchased 
this land in fee in 1965. U.S. Highway 89-187 crosses Homars' land within the 
easement. The Homars' restaurant is located on this land adjacent to the 
easement. The land and restaurant are leased to Bubba's Restaurant.

[¶6]      The Jackson-Teton 
County Joint Powers Transportation Board operates a public transportation system 
which runs buses between Jackson, Wilson and Teton Village. Before construction 
of the bus turnout, the buses loaded and unloaded passengers in the parking lot 
used by Bubba's Restaurant and adjacent businesses in order to avoid stopping 
traffic on the highway. The highway is classified as a principal arterial 
highway and had an estimated traffic volume of 18,000 vehicles per day in 1986. 
During the winter months of 1986-87, a total of 3,211 passengers boarded the 
buses at this location. This number increased to 4,310 the following winter. In 
1986, representatives from the businesses in the vicinity requested that the 
joint powers board build a bus stop in this area. They were concerned that the 
practice of using the parking lots for loading and unloading the passengers was 
causing congestion in the parking lots.

[¶7]      Construction of 
the bus turnout began on November 1, 1988, and was completed on November 18, 
1988. The turnout is located within the highway easement and right-of-way. Frank 
Homar learned of the project when he drove by the property in November of 1988 
and observed the construction in progress. Suit was filed on November 23, 1988, 
seeking money damages and an injunction requiring removal of the bus 
turnout.

[¶8]      All of the 
parties filed motions for summary judgment. The court granted the Homars' motion 
for summary judgment holding that the addition of the bus turnout created an 
impermissible, additional burden on the servient estate. The court ordered that 
the bus turnout be removed and the property returned to its former state. The 
order requiring removal of the turnout was stayed pending this 
appeal.

[¶9]      The Homars ask us 
to review the proceedings as if the court had conducted a trial. They contend 
that, because all parties submitted motions for summary judgment, this "is an 
appeal from a case * * * `tried' on briefs and sworn affidavits." We disagree. 
First, despite a March 10, 1989 order stating that the matter was tried upon 
briefs and affidavits, a January 18, 1989 order and other parts of the record 
indicate that the matter was decided upon cross-motions for summary judgment. 
The fact that all parties filed motions for summary judgment does not require 
the trial court to grant any of the motions and preclude the need for a trial. 
10A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2720, 
pp. 16-25 (1983). Second, the denial of a summary judgment motion is not 
reviewable as it is not a final order. Kimbley v. City of Green River, 663 P.2d 871, 888 (Wyo. 1983); see W.R.A.P. 1.04 and 1.05. Thus, our review of a grant of 
a summary judgment motion is the same whether the review is of a grant of the 
first motion filed or of a cross-motion. See, e.g., Stratman v. Admiral Beverage 
Corp., 760 P.2d 974 (Wyo. 1988). The propriety of the court's granting the 
Homars' motion for summary judgment is reviewed in this appeal.

[¶10]   A grant of summary judgment is 
proper only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the prevailing 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. W.R.C.P. 56(c); Brazelton v. 
Jackson Drug Co., 796 P.2d 808, 810 (Wyo. 1990); Wagner v. First Wyoming Bank, 
N.A. Laramie, 784 P.2d 224, 226 (Wyo. 1989). The undisputed material facts in 
this case are that the State holds a perpetual easement for a road upon which 
the bus turnout was built and the Homars own the servient estate.

[¶11]   The rights of the easement holder 
in another's land are determined by the purpose and character of the easement. 
Bard Ranch Co. v. Weber, 557 P.2d 722, 731 (Wyo. 1976). The manner in which the 
easement is used does not become frozen at the time of grant. Id. An easement 
for a road or a highway does not limit its use to the movement of vehicles. Uses 
related to traffic movement are within the scope of the easement. The grant of a 
public road easement embraces every reasonable method of travel over, under and 
along the right-of-way. Herold v. Hughes, 141 W. Va. 182, 90 S.E.2d 451, 458 
(1955). Thus, the running of power and telephone lines above the ground and 
pipelines underneath do not increase the burden on the servient estate and are 
permissible uses. E.g., Bentel v. County of Bannock, 104 Idaho 130, 656 P.2d 1383 (1983); Fisher v. Golden Valley Elec. Ass'n, Inc., 658 P.2d 127 (Alaska 
1983). See W.S. 1-26-813. The reason underlying this policy is that the services 
and products these conveyances provide may change from earlier times when they 
were provided by messengers and freight wagons. Change was contemplated and must 
be accommodated in an advancing society. Thus, overhead transmission lines and 
underground pipelines are simply technologically advanced adaptations of 
traditional highway uses. Fisher, 658 P.2d  at 129.

[¶12]   The operation of a public mass 
transit system is also within the realm of permissible uses of a road easement. 
Indeed, like pipelines and transmission lines, the bus line provides an 
advancement in the more efficient use of transportation resources. Paramount to 
this use of the easement, as well as all others, is ensuring public safety. 
Ankrim v. South Carolina State Highway Dept., 251 S.C. 42, 159 S.E.2d 911, 914 
(1968). It is incidental to this use that the bus have a safe place to load and 
unload passengers. Without that right, not only would the safety of the public 
be jeopardized, but the right of the public to use the easement would be unduly 
restricted. See Johnston v. Boise City, 87 Idaho 44, 390 P.2d 291 (1964). The 
construction and operation of a bus turnout on the right-of-way is a legitimate 
use of the road easement held by the State.

[¶13]   As further proceedings in this 
matter would serve no useful purpose, on remand we direct entry of judgment in 
favor of the State. Oedekoven v. Oedekoven, 538 P.2d 1292, 1294 (Wyo. 
1975).

[¶14]   Reversed.

FOOTNOTES

1 The Jackson-Teton County 
Joint Powers Transportation Board is listed as joining in this brief. Although 
that entity is named on the caption in the district court action, it did not 
join with the other appellants in this appeal and is not named on the caption to 
this appeal.