Title: James Wayne Lowe v. David Ballard, Warden (Memorandum Decision)

State: west-virginia

Issuer: West Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS James Wayne Lowe, FILED November 28, 2011 Petitioner Below, Petitioner RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA vs) No. 11-0546 (Mercer County 10-C-368) David Ballard, Warden, Respondent Below, Respondent MEMORANDUM DECISION Petitioner James Wayne Lowe appeals the circuit court’s order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus following an omnibus hearing. The respondent warden has filed a response. This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the parties’ written briefs and the record on appeal, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these reasons, a memorandum decision is appropriate under Rule 21 of the Revised Rules. Petitioner pled guilty to five counts of first degree sexual assault and one count of third degree sexual assault. The circuit court sentenced petitioner to fifteen to twenty-five years on the five counts of first degree sexual assault and one to five years for the one count of third degree sexual assault. The circuit court then suspended the sentences as to three of the five counts of first degree sexual assault and the one count of third degree sexual assault. The circuit court ordered that petitioner was to be placed upon probation for five years following his service of consecutive fifteen to twenty-five year terms as to the remaining two counts of first degree sexual assault. Petitioner filed the instant petition for habeas corpus relief and an omnibus hearing was held. Following this hearing, the circuit court denied the petition for habeas corpus in an eighty-four page order. Petitioner now seeks a reversal of the circuit court’s decision, alleging six assignments of error. Those assignments of error are: 1)Whether the failure of his trial counsel to request a competency hearing and further competency evaluation, and his failure to file a writ of mandamus to order the circuit court to rule on the issue of criminal responsibility prior to sentencing constituted ineffective assistance of counsel; 2) Whether the petitioner, who alleges that he was diagnosed with schizophrenia, major depression, a personality defect and borderline intellectual functioning, could form the requisite mens rea at the time of the criminal act; 3)Whether the petitioner’s plea was involuntary based upon the petitioner’s allegations that the circuit court did not fully educate him of the nature and consequences of his plea agreement and because the petitioner alleges that he suffered from effects of his anti- depression medication at the time he entered into the plea agreement; 4)Whether the petitioner never received the benefit of his plea bargain because the trial court considered allegedly impermissible evidence in imposing his sentence; 5) Whether a sentence of thirty to fifty years in the penitentiary is excessive and disproportionate to the character and degree of the offense pursuant to the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article III, Section 5 of the West Virginia Constitution; and 6) Whether the petitioner was denied his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when he alleges that he was coerced into giving a statement by threats from police officers. The Court has carefully considered the merits of each of the petitioner’s arguments as set forth in his petition for appeal. Finding no error in the denial of habeas corpus relief, the Court fully incorporates1 and adopts the circuit court’s detailed and well-reasoned “Order Denying the Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ad Subjiciendum and Removing it from the Court’s Active Docket,” dated March 24, 2011, and attaches the same hereto. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. Affirmed. ISSUED: November 28, 2011 CONCURRED IN BY: Chief Justice Margaret L. Workman Justice Robin Jean Davis Justice Brent D. Benjamin Justice Menis E. Ketchum Justice Thomas E. McHugh 1 The Court has redacted certain references within the circuit court’s order which would reveal the identities of some of the victims in this case in line with its practice in regard to sensitive matters. 2 NOTED CIVil DOCKET MAR 2"4' 20n'" IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MERCER COUNTY, WEST VIRG ~A. " JULIE BALL OLERK CIROUIT COURT STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA, ex reI. MERCER'CO\JNTY JAMES WAYNE LOWE, PETITIONER, ,v. Civil Action No.10-C-368-DS DAVI]) BALLARD, WARDEN, ' RESPONDENT. MT. OLIVE CORRECTIONAL COMPLEX, ORDER DENYING THE PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR , WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AD SUBJICIENDUM AND REMOVING iT FROM THE COURT'S ACTIVE DOCKET ," " . , On October 21,2010, this matter Gru:ne before the Court, the Honorable Derek C. Swope presiding, for a hearing 01\ the Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ad Subjiciendum, brought pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 53, Article 4A ofthe West Virginia Code, as , . amended, filed on Mr. Lowe's behalf by and thf~ugh his Court appointed counsel, Natalie N. Hager, Esq. The Petitioner and Joe Harvey, Esq., his counsel appeared. Timothy D. Boggess, ..' .: .~. . Esq., Prosecuting Attorney ofMercer County, West Virginia, appeared on behalf ofthe State of West Virginia. The Petitioner is seeking post-conviction.Ha:bea,s Corpus relief from his'May 22, 1995 plea agreement, in which Petitioner was sentenced to not le~s than fifteen (15) nor more than , ' twenty-five (15) years for each ofthe five'(5) counts of first degree sexual assault, [and'not less than ~me (1) nor more than five (5) years on one (1) count ofthird degree sexual assault. These [The sentence for a conviction of tirst degree sexual assault is fifteen to thirty-five years. This was the sentence in 1995,and remains the sentence today. See W. Va. Code Ann. §61-8B-3 (1995). However, prior to 1991, the maximum sentence was twenty-five years~ rather than thirty-five years. The Petitkmer apparently pled to Counts that p.ad occurred in the 1980's, , prior to the change in the law. As a < result, the Petitioner was properly sentenced to fifteen to tWen:ty-five years on these counts. 1 Appendix to Memorandum Decision Supreme Court Case No. 11-0546 (Order Redacted) sentences were imposed to run consecutively by the Honorable Judge John R. Frazier. The effect ofthe CoUrt's sentence in this case is that the Petitioner must serve a minimunt ofthirty (30) , ' years in the penitentiary, and a maximum offifty (50) years before he is eligible for release upon a period ofprobation offive (5) years after serving his sentence, absent a showing that he is being ~awfu.1ly detained due to prejudicial constitutional errors, in the Uilderlying criminal proceedings. Whereupon, the Court, having retired and considered the Petitions, the State's response, , the,Court files, the transcripts, the arguments ofcounsel, and the pertinent legal authorities, does hereby DENY the Petitioner's Petition for Habeas Corpus. ill support ofthe aforementioned ruling denying r,elief, the Court makes the following General Finding ofFa"ct and Conclusions ofLaw: I. FACTUALIPROCEDURAL mSTORY Case No. 95-F-03: The Indictment/Counts Specific to Each Offense A. The Indictment By a True Bill returned in February 1995 by the Mercer County Grand Jury, the Petitioner, James W. Lowe, was indicted in a twenty-five (25) count indictment for the offenses ofFirst Degree Sexual Assault, Sexual Abuse by a Custodian or Guardian and Third Degree , Sexual Assault. B. Counts Specific to Each Offense , Out ofthe twenty-five (25) count indictment, nineteen (19) counts were for Sexual Assault in the First Degree, namely, Counts 1,2,5,6,9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19,20,21, 22,23, and 24; four (4) counts were for Sexual Abuse by a Custodian or Guardian, namely, Counts 3, 4, 7,.and 8; and two counts were for Sexual Assault in the Third Degree, namely, Counts 16 and 25. C. Pre-Trial 'Proceedings The Petitioner was arrested on or about November 28, 1994, 'and transported to the Southern Regional Jail in Beaver,. West Virginia, by C. S.'Myers and John M: Bailey With the Bluefield Police Department. The Court appointed Tracy BUrks, Esq. to represent Mr. Lowe. On February 1, 1995, the Petitioner, by and through counsel, Tracy Burks, Esq. fIled a Motion for 2 I. Appendix to Memorandum Decision Supreme Court Case No. 11-0546 (Order Redacted) Mental Status Evaluation to determine wheth~r the Petitioner was competent to stand trial and to determine the Petitioner's criminal responsibility at the time ofthe alleged offenses. The Honorable John R. Frazier granted the Petitioner's Motion for Mental Status Evaluation on February 6, 1995. A psychiatric and psychological evaluation took place on March 6, 1995,2 at the . Charleston Psychiatric Group, Inc. Drs. Ralph S. Smith, Jr., M.D., and Rosemary L. Smith, Psy.D. conducted the evaluation, which consisted ofa clinical psychiatric interview, mental status examination, Structured Interview ofReported Symptoms, and psychological testing. fu the evaluation report dated March 6, 1995, the report made findings that Mr. Lowe's "common sense knowledge base was poor, and his social judgment in contrived situations was marginal ... 96.8% ofthe population functions intellectually better than he...he scored in the educably [sic Jmentally retarded range [on the spelling subtest] ... feelings ofunreality are present." However, Drs. Ralph and Rosemary Smith opined that Petitioner was found competent . , to stand trial and that he was criminally responsible at the times ofthe alleged crimes. On February 15, 1995, the Petitioner was indicted on the twenty-five (25) counts set out above. The Trial was set for May 25, 1995. On April 12, 1995, without holding a hearing on the competency evaluation, Judge Frazier sua sponte concluded that the Defendant was competent to stand trial. This conclusion was based upon his consideration ofthe psychiatric report from the Charleston Psychiatric Group. Judge Frazier made no finding as the whether the Petitioner was criminally responsible for the alleged criminal acts. The Petitioner's trial attorney, Mr. Burks, took no action to challenge Judge Frazier's decision. D. Plea Agreement . Petitioner entered a guilty plea to five counts ofSexual Assault in the First Degree (Counts 12, l3, 14,22 .and 23) and one count ofSexual Assault in the Third Degree (Count 25) on May 22, 1995. TIie remaining counts were dismissed. The countS pled to involved two . 2There is an apparent error in the Petitioner's brief, which states that Judge Frazier ordered the psychological. examination on the same date that the Defendant had the evaluation in Charleston. Instead, from the evaluation report, it seems that theev~luation took place on March 6; 1995, not Febtuary 6, 1995. 3 Appendix to Memorandum Decision Supreme Court Case No. 11-0546 (Order Redacted) victims, At the plea hearing Judge Frazier asked ifMr. Burks explained to the Petitioner his right to appeal the Court's decision on competency, to which Mr. Burks replied, "Your Honor, I'll be honest, I don't know if! went over the part about the challenging, but I infOlmed him ofthe results ... "4 The Court: Do you agree with the results? The Defendant: Well, I'm going. to say - I might get in troubl~ for saying it but that doctor down in Charleston don't know his - - [sic] from a hole in the ground. Mr. Burks: He didn't like the doctor too well, Your Honor. I don't think he disagree [sic] too much with - - we didn't - - about the competency part:~ During the plea hearfug the Petitioner appears to have been under the influence of prescription medication, specifically, Nortiptyline 100 mg, an anti-depressant: The Court: I take it, you've been injail now, for how long, Mr. Lowe? The Defendant: 175 days, today, sir. The Court: Almost six months, then? The Defendant: Yes, sir. The Court: And] t.ake it, during that time, you haven't used any illegal drugs? The Defendant: No, sir. They've got. me on some kind ofgeneric nerve pill but, as you can see, it does not work. The Court: I can see you're h~ving some reaction to it. I take it that doesn't interfere with your thinking though, your mind or anything; you know where you are and what's going on? 3Due to the sensitive matters in this case, the Court adheres to the common practice of using initials instead ofthe names ofthe young victims. 4Transcript, 5/22/1995 at page 32:12-14. sTranscript, 5/22/1995 at page 32:15-21. 4 Appendix to Memorandum Decision Supreme Court Case No. 11-0546 (Order Redacted) The Defendant: SometiIhes.6 The Court accepted the Defendant's plea on May 22, 1995. E. Sentencing Hearing At the sentencing hearing on June 26, 1995, Judge Frazier asked the Petitioner a series of .. questions pertaining to the plea agreement. Judge Frazier also explained the nature ofthe . sentence, stating at some points that the sentence for each ofthe counts ofFirst Degree Sexual Abuse would be up to thirty-five years, and alternatively, stating that the sentence would be ~t most twenty",five years:7 So, it is the judgment ofthis Court that as to each one ofthese sexual assault charges, that's Counts 12,.13, 14, 22nd and 23rd Counts, that you be sentenced to the penitentiary ofthis State for an indeterminate term ofnot less than fifteen nor more than thirty~five years... the effect of what I'm doin' [sic] here is to - ~ sentence you to th~ penitentiary for at least thirty years but nor more than fifty . years, and ifI said thirty-five years before, I meant twenty-five on each ofthe sexual assault first degree charges; that those 'are to run consecutively; one to five on the sexual assault to run cOnSecutively; I'm gonna [sic}suspend Counts 14, 22nd,.23rd and 25 and direct that once you serve the thirty year - - thirty to fifty year sentence - - that's correct isn't it ~ - fifty year sentence that you be returned and placed on probation at that time for that period oftime. That will get you into the latter part ofyour sixties, ifyou're stil1living at that time, and hopefully there would not be any further danger to the - - ~ to the community.8 The Court also permitted testimony from alleged.victims ofthe Petitioners' .at the sentencing hearing. However, the victims who testified were not the victims ofthe crimes to which the Petitioner pled guilty. F. Sentencing Order' Pursuant to the penalties prescribed by the West Virginia Code for the above offenses, on June 2~, 1995, Judge Frazier sentenced the Petitioner as follow~: This matter came on this day for disposition, there being present in Court Charles W. Pace, Assfstant Prosecuting Attorney for the State of West Virginia, and the 6Transcript 5/2211995; pg. 33, 17-24; 34. 7See Footnote 1. 8Transcript, 6/26/1995 at page 28. 5 Appendix to Memorandum Decision Supreme Court Case No. 11-0546 (Order Redacted) Defendant being led to the bar ofthe Court in custody ofthe Sheriff; came also Tracy P. Burks, counsel for Defendant, the Defendant having heretofore entered a plea to the criminal offense of Sexual Assault - 1 st Degree and Sexual Assault - 3rd Degree as the State in Counts 12, 13, 14,22,23 and 25 ofthe indictment and was adjudicated guilty of said offenses; and the Court having received the presentence inyestigation report from the Probation Department ordered the same filed, and after considering said report, hearing testinlony and the statements ofcounsel and defendant, the Court finds that the Defendant is not a fit and proper person for probation because (1) there is a substantial risk that the Defendant will commit another crime during any period ofprobation or conditional discharge; (2) probation or conditional discharge would unduly depreciate the seriousness ofthe Defendant's crime; (3) public good would not be served by placing the Defendant on probation, and (4) public good would be served by the Court imposing a sentence of incarceration; it is the judgment ofthe Court that the Defendant, James Wayne Lowe is guilty in 'manner and form of Sexual Assault - 1 st Degree and Sexual Assault - 3 rd Degree, . as contained in Counts 12, 13, 14,22,23, and 25 ofthe indictment, and the Court inquired ofthe Defendant is there was anything he had to say why the Court should not proceed to pronounce judgment against him and nothing being offered or alleged in delay ofjudgment, it is, therefore, ORDERED that James Wayne Lowe be taken from the bar of this Court to the Southern Regional Jail and therein confined until such time as the Warden ofthe penitentiary can conveniently send a guard for him and that he be taken . from the jail to the penitentiary ofthis State and therein confined for the indeterminate term ofnot less than fifteen (15) nor more than twenty-five (25) years on each ofCounts 12, 13, 14,22 and 23, on the charge ofsexual assault _1 st degree as contained in the indictment; it is further ordered that the Defendant be confined for an additional indeterminate term ofnot less than one (1) nor more than five (5) years for Count 25 on the charge ofsexual assault - 3rd degree as contained in the indictment, said sentences to run consecutively; it is further Ordered that Counts 14" 22, 23, and 25 ofthe indictment be, and the same are hereby suspended and the Defendant is hereby placed on probation for a period offive (5) years after serving his remaining sentence for Counts 12 and 13 of the indictment. It is further ordered that the Defendant receive credit ofseven (7) months on said sentence for .Count No. 12 ofthe indictment. Whereupon, counsel for the Defendant moved that the Defendant be placed under security while incarcerated, which motion is granted. The Court further recommends that the Defendant receive treatment for sex offenders. ' On motion ofthe State, it is Ordered that the remaining nineteen counts contained in the indictment be dismissed. G. Post-Trial Matters On October 18, 1995, the Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration ofhis sentence, which was denied by Judge Frazier on December 19,.1995. 6 Appendix to Memorandum Decision Supreme Court Case No. 11-0546 (Order Redacted) H. Appeal to the West Virginia Supreme of Appeals - Refused On October 23, 1995, the Petitioner, by and through counsel, filed an appeal with the West Virginia Supreme Court ofAppeals. The Petitioner's appeal was based on the following grounds: (I)That the Circuit Court erred in basing Petitioner's sentencing on impermissible factors; (2)That the Circuit Cour.t erred by refusing to consider Petitioner's suitability for probation; and . (3)That the Circuit Court erred by sentencing Petitioner disproportionately to the character and degree ofthe offense. The appeal was refused by the West Virginia Supreme Court ofAppeals on June 12; 1996. I. The Petitioner's Pro Se Petition under W. Va. Code §53-4A-l for Post Conviction Habeas Corpus' On'or about March 14,2000, the Petitioner, pro se, filed his first Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, which was summarily dismissed by the Circuit Court. On or about Novem1?er 20, 2001;the Petitioner, pro se, filed his second Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The Circuit Court appointed Bill Huffinan, Esq. to represent Petitioner in these proceedings. Mr. Huffman subsequently withdrew as counsel. On or about July 8, 2002, the Circuit Court appointed Steven Mancini, Esq., to represent the Petitioner on his second writ of Haheas Corpus. ' 2. The Amended Petition On October 30, 2002, the Petitioner, by and through counsel Steven Mancini, Esq., filed ' an amended petition for Writ ofHabeas Corpus. Counsel raised the following grounds: (A) THAT PETITIONER, AS DEFENDANT IN THE ORIGINAL TRIAL COURT PROCEEDING, SHOULD HAVE BEEN AFFORDED TIlE OPPORTUNITY FOR A SEXUAL OFFENDER EVALUATION PRIOR TO SENTENCING, AND THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT CONSIDER PETITIONER'S ELIGIBILITY FOR PROBATION (B) THAT THE TRIAL COURT IMPERMISSIBLY CONSIDERED, IN SENTENCING PETITIONER, FACTORS EXTRINSIC TO THE CHARGES UPON WHICH PETITIONER HAS PLED GUILTY 7 Appendix to Memorandum Decision Supreme Court Case No. 11-0546 (Order Redacted) (C} THAT THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO DECIDE ONE OF THE ISSUES IN PETITIONER'S AMENDED PETITION; TO WIT, THAT THE LANGUAGE IN THE TRIAL COURrS AMENDED COMMITMENT ORDER DID NOT SUPPORT CONSECUTIVE SENTENCING 3. Losh Checklist for the First Habeas Corpus Waived Grounds: In the Losh Checklist filed by Mr. Mancini, the Petitioner waived the following grounds for relief: Lack oftrial-court jirrisdiction Unconstitutionality of statute under which conviction obtained Indictment showing on its face that no offense was committed Prejudicial pre-trial publicity Mental competency at time" ofcrime Language barrier to understanding the proceedings Denial ofcounsel Unintelligent waiver ofcounsel Failure ofcounsel to take an appeal Consecutive sentence for the same transaction State's knowing ,use ofperjured testimony Falsification ofa transcript by prosecutor Double jeopardy Irregularities in arrest Excessiveness or denial ofbail No preliminary hearing megal detention prior to arraignment Irregularities or errors in arraignment Challenges to the compol:lition ofgrand jury, or to its procedures Defects in indictment Prejudicial joinder ofdefendruits Appendix to Memorandum Decision Supreme Court Case No. 11-0546 (Order Redacted) Lack offull public hearing Claim ofincompetence at time ofoffense. as opposed to time oftrial Claims concerning use ofinformers to convict Instructions to the jury Claims ofprejudicial statements by trial judge Claims o~prejudicial statements by prosecutor Sufficiency ofeVidence Acquittal ofco-defendant on same charge Defendant's absence from part ofthe proceedings Improper conimunications between prosecutor or witness and jury Asserted Grounds Mr. Mancini asserted the following Losh groun.ds and indicated that the following were still being investigated: Denial ofspeedy-trial right. Still being inv~stigated. Involuntary guilty plea. Still being investigated. Mental competency at time oftria lip lea, cognizable even ifnot asserted at proper time, or ifresolution not adequate. Still being investigated. Incapacity to stand trial/enter into plea due to drug use. Still being investigated. Coerced confessions. Still being investigated. Suppression ofhelpful evidence by prosecutor. Still being investigated: Unfulfilled plea bargains. See second ground in pro se petition. Information in pre-sentence report erroneous. See first and second ground in pro se petition. Ineffective assistance ofcounsel. Still being investigated. Failure to provide copy ofindictment to defendant. Still being investigated. Improper venue. Still being investigated. Pre-trial delay. Still being investigated. 9 Appendix to Memorandum Decision Supreme Court Case No. 11-0546 (Order Redacted) Refusal ofcontinuance. Still being investigated. Refusal to subpoena witnesses. Still being investigated. Non-disclosure ofGrand Jury minutes. Still being investigated. Refusal to turn over witness notes after witness has testified. Still being investigated. Constitutional errors in evidentiary rulings. Still being investigated. Questions ofactual guilty upon an acceptance ofguilty plea. Severer sentence than expected. See third ground in pro se petition. Excessive Sentence. See third ground inpro se petition. Mistaken advice ofcounsel as to parole or probation eligibility. Still being. investigated. . Amount oftime served on sentence, to be served or for which credit applies. See third ground 'in Amended Petition. J. The Febtuat:y 28, 2003 Habeas Hearing At the February 28,2003 Habeas hearing, the Court asked Mr. Mancini ifhe had given the Petitioner an opportunity to go over the Losh checklist: . Mr. Mancini: Uh, I just, I went through this with Mr. Lowe and then I . filled it out on my own. The Court: Did he sign it? Mr. Mancini: No, I signed it.9 Additionally, it was admitted that Mr. Mancini did not explain the Losh list to the Petitioner, nor did Mr. Mancini meet with the Petitioner prior to the Habeas hearing at the Mt. Olive Correctional Facility. At the hearing, Judge Frazier addressed the grounds of "impennissible factors in sentencing, failure to consider probation, and disproportionate sentencing. " On September 11,2003, Judge Frazier denied the Petitioner's Writ ofHabeas Corpus, addressing the three grounds raised at the Habeas hearing. Petitioner appealed the order, by and 9Transcript, 2/28/2003 10 Appendix to Memorandum Decision Supreme Court Case No. 11-0546 (Order Redacted) through counsel, Mr. Mancini, to the West Virginia Supreme Court ofAppeals on August 23, 2004. On September 1, 2004, the petition was refused. II. THE PETITIONER'S AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS .AD SUBJICIENDUM UNDER W. VA. CODE §53-4A-IILOSH CHECKLISTIRESPo.NSE . . TO. AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS Co.RPUS Amended Second Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus._ Ad Subiiciendum On August 18, 2009, the Petitioner, by and through counsel Natalie Hager, Esq., filed an amended second petition for Writ ofHabeas Corpus, ad subjiciendum.' The Petitioner argued:' (1) . THE DOCTRINE OF RESJUDICATA DOES NOT APPLY TO THE PRESENT PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, AD SUBJICIENDUM, BECAUSE PRIOR LOSH LIST WAS SUBMJITTED TO THE COURT WITHOUT PETITIONER'S KNOWLEDGE, CONSENT AND SIGNATURE AND BECAUSE THE COURT FAILED TO MAKE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AS TO THE GROUNDS RAISED IN PETmONER'S PREVIOUS PETITIONS (2) ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL PROVED TO BE INEFFECTIVE AT THE . TRIAL LEVEL AS WELL AS DURING PREVIOUS HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDING . (3) THE PETITIONER, WHO WAS DIAGNOSED WITH scmzoPHRENIA, MAJOR DEPRESSION, A PERSONALITY DEFECT AND BORDERLINE INTELLECTUAL FUNCTIONING, COULD NOT FORM THE REQUISITE MENS REA AT THE TIME OF THE CRIMINAL ACT (4) THE PETITIONER'S PLEA WAS lNVOLUNTARY BECAUSE THE CIRCUIT COURT DID NOT FULLY EDUCATE HIM OF THE NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES OF HISPLEA AGREEMENT AND BECAUSE THE J>ETITIONER SUFFERED FROM EFFECTS OF HIS ANTI-DEPRESSANT MEDICATION AT THE TIME HE ENTERED INTO THE PLEA AGREEMENT (5) THE PETITIONER NEVER RECEIVED THE BENEFIT OF HIS PLEA BARGAIN BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT CONSIDERED IMPERMISS]J3LE EVIDENCE IN IMPOSING HIS SENTENCE' (6) A SENTENCE OF THIRTY TO FIFTY YEARS IN THE PENITENTIARY IS EXCESSIVE AND DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE CHARACTER AND DEGREE OF THE OFFENSE PURSUANT TO THE WEST VIRGINIA STATE 11 Appendix to Memorandum Decision Supreme Court Case No. 11-0546 (Order Redacted) J CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE ill, SECTION 5 (7) THE PETITIONER WAS DENIED HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION .WHEN HE WAS COERCED INTO GIVING A STATEMENT BY THREATS FROM POLICE OFFICERS State's Response to Amended Second Petition: Respondent's Memorandum in Opposition to Petition for Writ ofHabeas Corpus The State responded to the motion from the Petitioner on December 3,2009. The State argued that the Petitioner's counsel at the Habeas stage was effective, because the actions ofMr. . . Mancini appear reasonable and that Mr. Mancini is a competent and exp~rienced attorney. 'Further, the State argued that the Petitioner crumot show that his Habeas petition would have been granted without the alleged errors by Habe&s counsel. The State did· not respond to any of the petitioner's other contentions, except to say they are beyond the scope ofthe proceedings. The Losh Checklist for the Second Habeas Corpus Waived Grounds: On August 18, 2009, by and through Petitioner's new counsel, Natalie N. Hager, Esq., the Petitioner waived the following. grounds: Lack oftrial-court jurisdiction Unconstitutionality ofstatute under which conviction obtained Indictment showing on its face that no offense was committed Prejudicial pre-trial publicity Denial ofspeedy trial right Language barrier to .understanding the proceedings . Denial'of counsel Unintelligent waiver ofcounsel I Failure ofcounsel to take an appeal Consecutive sentence for the same transaction Suppression ofhelpful evidence by prosecutor State's knowing use ofperjured testimony Falsification ofa transcript by prosecutor 12 Appendix to Memorandum Decision Supreme Court Case No. 11-0546 (Order Redacted) Double jeopardy Irregularities in arrest Excessiveness or denial ofbail No preliminary hearing Illegal detention prior to arraignment Irregularities or errors in arraignment Challenges to the composition of grand jury, or to its procedures Failure to provide copy of indIctment to defendant Defects in indictment Improper venue Pre-trial delay Refusal ofcontinuance Refusal to subpoena witnesses , Prejudicial joinder ofdefendants Lack of full public hearing Non-disclosure ofgrand jury minutes Claims concerning use of informers to convict Instruc,tions to the jury Sufficiency ofevidence Acquittal of co-defendant on same charge Defendant's absence from part ofthe proceedings Improper communications between prosecutor or witness and jury , Not WaivedINot Yet Asserted The following grounds were not waived but not yet asserted by Petitioner: Involuntary guilty plea Mental competency'at time of crime Mental competency at time oftriallplea, cognizable even ifnot asserted at proper time, or ifresolution not adequate. Incapacity to stand triaVenter into plea due to drug use. 13 Appendix to Memorandum Decision Supreme Court Case No. 11-0546 (Order Redacted) Unfulfilled plea bargains Claims ofincompetence at time ofoffense, as opposed to time of trial Information in pre-sentence report erroneous Ineffective assistance ofcounsel Constitutional errors in evidentiary rulings. Claims ofprejudicial statements by Trial Judge Claims ofprejudicial statements by pros~cutor Questions ofactual guilty upon an acceptance of guilty plea Severer sentence than expected Excessive Sentence· .Mistaken advice ofcounsel as to parole or probation eligibility The Hearing on the issue ofIneffective Assistance of Habeas Counsel On January 25; 2010, a hearing was held before this Court on the issue ofwhether the Petitioner had received effective assistance ofcounsel at the prior Omnibus Habeas petition. George Sitler, Esq., appeared on behalfofthe State, and Joseph Harvey, Esq., and Henry L. Harvey, Esq., appeared on behalfofthe ~etitioner. Petitioner James Lowe also appeared, although he did not testify. The only person to testify was Mr. Mancini, Petitioner's prior Habeas counseL During questioning, Mr. Mancini testified that he had not reviewed the Losh checklist with the Petitioner: Mr. Mancini: As far as the Lash list, I prepared that on my own. I. prepared that without consulting with Mr. Lowe other than to have reviewed his pleading ... 10 Mr. Mancini also indicated that he had not met with Petitioner to review the list: Mr. Harvey: You never met with Mr. Lowe and went over that list? Mr. Mancini: I don't believe so.l1 Additionally, it was indicated that Petitioner did not sign his own Losh checklist, instead, lOSummary ofTaped Transcript, 1125/10 lISummary ofTaped Transcript, i125/l0 14 Appendix to Memorandum Decision Supreme Court Case No. 11-0546 (Order Redacted) Mr. Mancini signed his own name to the list: The Court: And, so he didn't sign it, then, you signed it? Mr. Mancini: That's what it states in the position - -the petition­ - then I'm almost for sure that's accurate.12 Ruling on Habeas Corpus Petition On June 25,2010, the Circuit Court ofMercer County, West Virginia, granted the Petitioner the opportunity to file a new Omnibus Petition for Writ ofHabeas Corpus, having found that the Petitioner's counsel at the previous Habeas Corpus proceeding was ineffective. The Court gave the State of Wes~ Virginia thirty (30) days from the entry ofthat order to request . . the appropriate relief from the West Virginia Supreme Court ofAppeals. The State did not file an appeal or such other re.lief. III. THE NEW OMNIBUS HABEAS CORPUS PETITION FILED PURSUANT TO THE COURT'S ORDER OF JUNE 25, 2010 IN CIVIL ACTION NO. 09-C-212fLOSH CHECKLIST/STATE'S RESPONSE Omnibus Habeas Corpus Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. ad subjiciendum On July 29, 2010, the Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ ofHabeas Corpus ad Subjiciendum by his counsel, Natalie N. Hager, Esq. The Petitioner argued: (A) ATTORNEY TRACY BURKS' FAILURE TO REQUEST A COMPETENCY HEARING AND FURTHER COMPETENCY EVALUATION, AND HIS FAILURE TO FILE A WRIT OF MANDAMUS TO ORDER THE COURT TO RULE ON THE ISSUE OF CRIMINALRESPONSffiILITY PRIOR TO SENTENCING CONSTITUTED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL (B) THE PETITIONER, WHO WAS DIAGNOSED WITH SCHIZOPHRENIA, MAJOR DEPRESSION, A PERSONALITY DEFECT AND BORDERLINE INTELLECTUAL FUNCTIONING, , COULD NOT FORM THE REQUISITE MENS REA AT THE TIME OF THE CRIMINAL ACT 12Summary ofTaped Transcript 1125110 15 Appendix to Memorandum Decision Supreme Court Case No. 11-0546 (Order Redacted) (C) THEPETITIONER;S PLEA WAS INVOLUNTARY BECAUSE THE CIRCUIT COURT DID NOT FULLY EDUCATE HIM OF THE NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA AGREEME~ AND BECAUSE THE PETITIONER SUFFERED FROM EFFECTS OF HIS ANTI-DEPRESSANT MEDICATION AT THE TIME HE ENTERED INTO THE PLEA AGREEMENT (D) THE PETITIONER NEVER RECEIVED THE BENEFIT .OF HIS PLEA BARGAIN BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT CONSIDERED IMPERMISSIBLE EVIDENCE IN IMPOSING HIS SENTENCE (E) A SENTENCE OF THIRTY TO FIFTY YEARS IN TIlE PENITENTIARY IS EXCESSIVE AND DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE CHARACTER AND DEGREE OF THE OFFENSE PURSUANT· TO THE WEST VIRGINIA STATE CONSTITUTION ARTICLE III . SECTION 5 (F) THE PETITIONER WAS DENIED HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION WHEN HE WAS COERCED INTO GIVING A STATEMENT BY THREATS FROM POLICE OFFICERS The State's Response to the Petition for Writ ofHabeas Corpus The State responded to the Petition' for Habeas Corpus on November 22,2010. The State argued that Petitioner's trial counsel was effective, and that the Petitioner failed to prove any shortcoming ofcounsel that would have produced a different outcome. It also argued that there was no evidence provided which demonstrated that the Petitioner was not criminally responsible. . . at the time ofthe act. It further argued that the Petitioner's plea was' voluntarily made, that the Petitioner did receive the benefit ofhis plea bargain, that the Court did not consider impermissible factors in sentencing him, and that his sentence was not disproportionate: . Finally,. it argued that the Petitioner did not produce any evidence on the issue ofan involuntary confession. and that this issue was. waived by the entry ofa guilty plea. The Losh Checklist On July 29,2010, the Petitioner; by and through counsel, Natalie N. Hager, Esq. filed his LOsh checklist: ) COMES NOW the Petitioner, James Wayne Lowe, py and through counsel, Appendix to Memorandum Decision Supreme Court Case No. 11-0546 (Order Redacted) , ­ Natalie N. Hager, and files the following comprehensive 1ist OfgtO'lUlds specified in Losh' v. McKenzie, 166 W.Va. 762,277 S.E.2d 606 (1981), which might be considered sufficient for habeas corpus relief. Petitioner has marked, With an "X", each ground considered inapplicable­ to Petitioner's convictions, and- therefore, waived. As to grounds not waived, the Petitioner has identified the applicable ground in hispro se habeas petition; or in ' the Amended petition, or has indicated that said claim is still being investigated._ INAPPLICABLE: X (1) Lack oftrial court jurisdiction. X (2) Unconstitutionality ofstatute under which conviction obta,ined. - X (3) Indictment showing-on its face that no offense was committed X (4) Prejudicial pretrial pUblicity. X (5) Denial of speedy trial right. (6) Involuntary guilty plea. (7) Mental competency at time ofcrime. (8) Mental competency at time oftrial/plea, cognizable even ifnot ' asserted at pioper time, or ifresolution not adequate. (9) Incapacity to stand'trial/enter into plea due to drug use. X (10) Language barrier to understanding the proceedings. - X (11) Denial of counsel. X (12) Unintelligent waiver ofcounsel. X (13) , 'Failure of counsel to take an appeal X (14) Consecutive sentence for same transaction. (15) Coerced confessions: X (16) Suppressi~n ofhelpful evidence by prosecutor. X (17) State's knowing use ofpeIjured testimony. X (18) Falsification ofa transcript by prosecutor. ­ (19) Unfulfilled plea bargains. (20) Information in pre';sentence report erroneous. 17 Appendix to Memorandum Decision Supreme Court Case No. 11-0546 (Order Redacted) · (21) Ineffective assistance cif counsel. . X (22) Double jeopardy. : X (23) Irregularities in arrest. X (24) Excessiveness or denial ofbail. X (25). No preliminary hearing. X (26) Illegal detention prior to arraignment. X (27) Irregularities or errors in arraignment. X (28) Challen:ges to the Composition of grand jury, or to its procedures. X (29) Failure to provide copy ofindictment to defendant. X (30) Defects in indictment. X (3 i) Improper venue. X (32) Pre-trial delay. X (33) Refusal ofcontinuance. X (34) Refusal to subpoena witnesses. X (35) Prejudicial joinder ofdefendants. X (36) Lack offull public hearing. X (37) Non-disclosure ofGrand Jury minutes. X (38) Refusal to tUrn over witness notes after witness has testified. (39) Claim of ~ncorhpetence at time ofoffense, as opposed. oftime of . triaL X (40) Claims cpncelning use l32 (£)(1). An example ofpresentehCing report content can be foOOd in Cooper, wherein the presentencing report inCluded statements by the defendants, victim, arresting officers, family, prior criminal records, family information, educ~tional and social histories, and an evaluation and recommendation by the probation officer that the def~ndant receive a minimum sentence without probation. Cooper, 172 W. Va. At 270, 304 S·.E.2d at.855.· .In sentencing the Petitioner, the court considered over-sweeping ~vidence, . which involved victims outside ofthe Petitioner's pleaagreemeiJ.t, stating that "[i]n 70 Appendix to Memorandum Decision Supreme Court Case No. 11-0546 (Order Redacted) this: case, inmy opinion, five or six children's lives have been seriously affec~ed by Mr. Lowe's conduct ..." Transcript 6/2611995, page 25 (Exhibit J). Judge Frazier . . further-indicated that "[flirst ofall, he [Mr. Lowe] has pled guity to the_ family, didn't plead to the4llor_children. However, the Court believes, in - - in looking at the entire picture here, that he'was'involved with the~ and ~children". Id. Ai page 17. The court then proceeded to 'describe the allege.d crimes against_In detail, considering this evidence in its sentencing . . decision. Id. at pages 17-18. Judge Frazier also· considered 'inforrriation in the .present~ncing report that included sexual abuse allegations made by two other .gitls,"who never appeared in court, never exec1l;tedvictim. impact statements, and . . . who "Were not victims in any pfthe counts pleaded to by the Petitioner. These children Id. at pages 18­ 20. Hence, in sentencing the Petitioner, the trial court considered highly' infiamm.atory, prejudicial and impermissible evidence, and consequently, arrived at ail excessive sentence, which was disproportionate to the character and degree of the offenses as discussed in Section V. THE RESPONDENT'S ANSWER The issue was addressed in a prior ruling by Judge Frazier. I know that the Court in this case ~t bar h8s said that these issues will not be ~onsidered res judicata, but I feel that Judge Frazier accurately stated the appropriate la with respect to this issue. I will recite some ofthis findings'as they are appropriate to this issue. Inthe case· below the Court did. not consider impermissible factors at the petitioner's sentencing. According to West Virginia law; "[a] trial judge has broad . discretion to impose a sentenGe ifit is within statutory limits and not based 'on some impermissible factor." State v. Rogers; 280 S.E.2d 82 (W. Va. 1981). Furthermore, the West Virginia Supreme Court held that: 71 Appendix to Memorandum Decision Supreme Court Case No. 11-0546 (Order Redacted) The judge in determining the character and extent ofpunishment is not limited to considering only information which would be admissible under the adversary circumstances ofa trial. While it must exercise care to insure the accuracy ofinformation considered and to shield itself from what might be the prejudicial effect ofimproper materials (People v. Crews, 38 Il1.2d 331,231 N.E.2d 451), the court is not confined to the evidence showing guilt, for that issue has been settled by the plea. The rules of evidence showing guilt, for that issue has been settled by the plea. The rules of evidence which ordinarily obtain in a trial where guilt is denied do not bind the court in its inquiry. It may look to the facts ofthe (crime), and it may search anywhere, within reasonable bounds, for other facts which tend to aggravate or mitigate the offense. In doing so it may inquire into, the . general moral character ofthe offender, his mentality, his habits, his social environments, his abnormal or subnormal tendencies, his age, his natural inclination or aversion to commit crime, the stimuli which motivate his conduct, and, as was said in People V" Popescue, 345 m. 142, 177 N.E. 739, 77 A.L.R. 1199, the judge should know something ofthe life, family, occupation and record ofthe person about to be sentenced. State v. Houston, 273 S.E.2d 375 at 378 (W. Va. i980). Obviously, based on the Houston case, it is permissible for the court to inquire into such matters as the petitioner's general moral character, his habits, his social environments, his abnormal or sUbnormal tendencies, etc. These factors are .all relevant to the information received by the Court below. Furthenriore, the Court was aware ofthe allegations against other victims jUst by readlng ofthe indictment. Ifthe Court can separate that from other factors then certainly the Court can consider factors that meet the criteria outiined in Houston. In his previous order Judge Frazier stated "[t]he crimes admitted to by Petitioner were very serious in nature and the Court sentenced the Petitioner based. on the severity ofthese crimes and all other relevant and permissible factors." Finally, it is important to note that the sentence imposed by Judge Frazier was well 'within the statutory limits for the crimes the petitioner committed. It is the legislature that regulates the duration and limits on pUnishments. It is the Courts role to enforce the laws within ~e limits set forth by the legislature. Inthe present, the sentencing was well within the statutory r~quirements. For these 72 Appendix to Memorandum Decision Supreme Court Case No. 11-0546 (Order Redacted) reasons, this issue also is without merit and relief ~hould be denied. . . CLAIM: D: FINDINGS OF FACT AND 'CONCLUSIONS OF LAW (1) '. The West Virginia Supreme Court ofAppeals ,has stated that: "[t]he judge in determining the character and extent of punishment is not limited to considering only information which would be admissibl~ under the adversary circumstances ofa trial. While it must exercise care to insure the accuracy ~finformation considered and to shield itself.from what might be the prejudicial effect of improper materials (*208. People v. Crews, 38 ill. 2d 331, 231 N.E.2d 451), 'the court is not confined to the evidence showing' guilt, for that issue has been settled by the plea. The rules of evidenc~ which ordinarily obtain in a trial where'guilt is denied do not.bind the court in its inquiry. It may look to . the,facts ofthe (crim~), and it may search anywhere, within reasonable bounds, for othel,".facts which tend to aggravate or mitigate the offense. In doing so it may inquire into the {, : general moral character ofthe offender, his mentality, his habits, his social environments, his abnormal or subnormal tendencies, his' age,.rus natural inclination or:aversion to commit crime, the stimuli which motivate his conduct, and, as. was said in People v. Popescue,-345 Ill. 142, 177 N.E. 739, 77 A.L.R. 1199, the judge should know something of the life, family, occupation and record· ofthe person about to' be sentenced.'" State v. Houston, 166 W. Va. 202, 273 S.E.2d 375 (1980), citing People v. Adkins, 41 Ill. 2d~299 297,300-01,242 N.E.2d·258, 260-61 (1968). (2) The Court further stated that "(t)hese guidelines are not materially different than those that are contained iIi W. Va. Code 62-12-7, relating to the pre­ sentence report.'" rd. at 208, p. 378 (3) The Court fmds that the Petitioner was charged with twenty five counts involving serious crimes against minors and was allowed to plead guilty to six (6) of them in exchange for the dismissal ofthe remaining nineteen '(19) 73 Appendix to Memorandum Decision Supreme Court Case No. 11-0546 (Order Redacted) counts. (4) The Court finds that the trial court was within its discretion in considering the factors set forth during the sentencing hearing on June 26, 1995. These include crimes involving other victims, which constitute other facts which tend to aggravate Qr mitigate the offense. They go to his moral character, '~s tendencies, his inclination to commit crime, and the stilnuli which motivate his conduct. (See transcript ofsentencing hearing of June 26, 1995,1;lt pp. 15-28) See also State v. Grimes, 226 W. Va. 411, 701 S.E.2d ' 449 2009, Statate v. Goodnight, 169 W. Va. 287(1982), and State v. Rogers, 167 W.'Va. 358, 280 S.E.2d82 (19,81). (5) , The Court fmds and concludes that the claim that the'Petitioner never received the,benefit ofhis plea bargain because the trial court considered' impermissible evidence, in imposing his sentence is without merit. CLAIME: A':SENTENCE OF THIRTY TO FIFTY YEARS IN TliE PENITENTIARY IS EXCESSIVE AND DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE CHARACTER AND , DEGREE OF THE OFFENSE PURSUANT TO:THE WEST VIRGINIA , STATE CONSTITUTION ARTICLE ill, SECTION 5 THE PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT The Eighth Amendment ofthe United States Constitution and,Article Three Section Five ofthe West Virginia Constitution mandates thai "[penalties should 'be proportionate to the character and degree oftheofferise". U.S.C.A.'Amend vIIi; , W. Va. Const. Art. ill §5. Indeed, West Virginia common law dictates that while a triaIjudge's broad discretion in imposing a sentence "must be tempered by W. Va. 74 Appendix to Memorandum Decision Supreme Court Case No. 11-0546 (Order Redacted) Const. Art.·m §5, supra, requiring sentences to be proportional to the character and degree ofthe offense". State v. Cooper, 172 W. Va:266, 271 304 S.E.2d 851, 855 (l983) referring to Syl. pt. 8, State v. Vance, 164 W. Va. 216, 262 S.E.2d 423 (1980)). See also, Syl. pt. 8, State v. Davis, 189 W. Va. 59, 427 S.E.2d 754 (1993). In State v. Buck, the West Virginia Supreme Court held that a sentence of seyenty-five (75) years imposed upon a defendant, who was convicted of , aggravated robbery, was excessive. 173 W. Va. 243-,314 S.E.2d 406 (1984). In that case. the defendant. along with another individual, came into a store in Job, West Virginia, and asked the store owner for soft drinks. Id. at 244, 408. As the store owner proceeded to get them soft drinks, the ·defendant, who was the instigator ofthis' robbery, struck him on the head and robbed him of$1,210.12 Id. at 244, 247,408, 411. The co-defendant plead. guilty to grand larceny and was sentenced to one year injail. Following a trial and a conviction ofaggravated robbery, the defendant was sentenced to seventy-five years in the penitentiary. On .appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court viewed this·sentence is [sic] excessive, despite the fact that the defendant was the instigator ofthe robbery and that he struck ~e victim. rd. In arriving at its decisio~ the West Virginia Supreme Court reasoned that the defendant would have received alesser sentence ifhe had· actually killed the victim. rd. At 245, 408-409. The coUrt compared the seventy­ five year sentence to life imprisonment, and noted that under a: life sentence, the defeil~ant would be eligible for parole in ten years unless the jury had declined to . recommend mercy. However, under his seventy-five year sentence, the defendant· . woUld not be eligible for parole for twenty-five years. rd. Hence, finding this ~entence disproportionate to the character and degree ofthe offense charged, the West Virginia Supreme Court remanded the case:back to trial court for re­ sentencing.16 16mBuck, the defendant actually app~ed hi~ case on two occasions, arguing excessive .and disproportionate sentence. On the first ·remand, the circuit court essentially ignored the West Virgfuia 75 Appendix to Memorandum Decision Supreme Court Case No. 11-0546 (Order Redacted) Similarly, in State v. Cooper, the West Virginia Supreme Court found th:e , defendanes sentence to be disproportionate to the character and degree ofthe cFime committed, and remanded the case back to the trial court for re-seritencing. 172 W. Va. 266, 304 S.E.2d 851 (1983). In that case, the defendant, William Cooper~ was convicted ofrobbery and sentenced'to forty-fi~e (45) years in a ,penitentiary. ld. On appeal, the defendant challenged the proportionality ofhis sentence under West Virginia Constitution, Article m;Section 5. Id; at 268,852. The victim in that case had been knocked uncons~ious and robbed ofhis wallet, which contained a small amount ofcash and several ,credit cards. Despite the violent nature ofthe crime, the,West Virginia Supreme Court concluded that the forty-five year sentence was "offensive to' a system ofjustice in w:hich ' proportionality is constitutionally required" and,remand~d the case for re­ sentencing. ld. at 272,274;856, 859. In the case at bar, the Petitioner was sentenced to two consecutive sentences offifteen to twenty-five years iIi a penitentiary. Effectively, the ' . ' . . , Petitioner was sentenced to incarceration for the penod ofthirty to fifty years., The Petitioner was over thirty years old at the time ofsentencing to-wit, almost thirty­ ,two years ofage. West Virginia Code §62-i2-13aprovidesthat "[w]hen the prisoner has received an indeterminate sentence, the minimum sentence shall be considered as' an eligibility da~ for parole consideration but does not confer in the , prisoner the right to be released as ofthat date". Hence, he must serve thirty years inprison before becoming eligible for parole. He wil1.be over sixty years ofage at that'time. Therefore, this sentence is disproportionate to the degree and character ofthe offense, as follows: Had the Petitioner been convicted ofmurder in the fitst degree and sentenced to life with recommendation ofmercy, he would have been eligible for parole in twenty-five years. W. Va. Cpde' §61-3-2. However, there was no homicide involved in this 'case. Moreover, the trial court denied the sentencing proceeding. ld. at 248, 411. (Footnote No, 4 from pleading) 76 Appendix to Memorandum Decision Supreme Court Case No. 11-0546 (Order Redacted) ?etitioner a probation evaluation, notwithstanding its finding that the Petitioner may have been sexually abused as a child., Infact, as discussed in detail sup~a, the trial court; in sentencing the Petitioner, sentenced hill on the entire twenty-fiv.e· " , count indictment ~t~ad ofdnly six ~{j~ts'plead to by tlic·Peti:tioner. ill do~g so,' ", ••••~: '. " . . ' . • j.' • .:. ~"!; , . .,;: : . the trial court considere'4 unpennissible evidencer-such as"hearsayi-statements',~d '" .,. - . . ' . allocutions ofan unauthorized individual. . , , Accorqiugly, based bnthe foregoing, the Petitioner's sentence ofthirty t9. ' fifty years in,prison is ~sproportionate to the ch~acter and degree ofthe offense, '. . , ' and is repugnant to the pnnciples ofthe West Virginia State Constitution Article'ffi Section 5. THE RESPONDENT'S ANSWEIi The Respondent contends that the sentence imposed by the Court below is· not exyessiv~,or disproportionate. As previously stated, it is the legislature that sets forth the duration and: length ofsentence.s. The legislature makes these . rletemiinations·based on sObiety's view ag~stcert~ types ofoffenses.l7 Clearly fi:om looking, at the statutes regarditig sexual aSsault and seXual offensesinvolVfng children, it is dear to see' that the legislature iIl:tended to protect the children in our society by imposing lengthy sentences on those who violate these laws. The 'SeD;t~ces iJ?po~d,by Judge Frazier were no where near the maximuin. sentenc.e ~e " couId have imposed and were well within his discretion-irry limits ofthe .sentence " . . v he did impose. Fro.m reading the transcript;, it is clear 'that the Judge considered : this to be , very..serious crime and intended to b?tli punish the. defendant (petitioner) and protect society at the same ti.t?e. ' The offenses that the petitioner admitted to' were not isolated incidents but, in fact, were o'ngoing activities that the petitionerfound himselftaking advantage ofdueto the circumstances hi.:vhich he . t . l7The severity:ofthis type ofoffense is'further evidenced by the'legislature actua1ly'incr~asing , the amount ofume on~ can serve for viblatio~ ofthe'sexual assault statute. (Footnote.2 from pleading) 77 ", . Appendix to Memorandum Decision Supreme Court Case No. 11-0546 (Order Redacted) would find himself He was abusing the trust placed in him to protect and care for these' children. Based. on these facts, the petitioner's sentence is not excessive or disproportionate. , CLAIM E: FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW (1) The Court re-adopts the findings offact anet-conclusions oflaw set forth concerning Claim D, above, as is fully set forth hereinafter. (2) The Court finds and concludes that the trial cOUfl's sentence was within statutory limits and w~ not based on impermissible factors. State v.· . Goodnight, 169 W. Va. 366,287 S.E.2d 504 (W. Va. 1981) at syi. Pt. 4:, Statev. Sugg, 193 W. Va. 388,456 S.E.2d469·(1995). (3) 'The Court fmds and concludes that sentences which are within the statutory limits are not entitled to statutory review. State v. Koon, 190 W. Va. 632, 440 S.E.2d 442 (1993). (4) The Court finds and concludes that, while constitutional proportionality standards theoretically can apply to any crimlnal sentence, they are basically applicable to those sentences where there is either ~ofixed maximum set by or where there is a I,ife recidj.vist statute ..Wanstreet v. Bordenkircher, 166 W. Va. 523,276 S.E.2d205 (1981). at syl. Pt. 4. The' , sentences in this action are not ofeither .type. (5) The Court finds and concludes that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering these sentences. The trial court recited the factors it used in imposing these sentences on the record during the sentencing hearillg held on Iune 26,.1995. (See, disposition transcript, Iune 26;1995" Appendix to Memorandum Decision Supreme Court Case No. 11-0546 (Order Redacted) pp.15-28) (6) The Court finds and concludes that the claim that a sentence ofthirty to fifty years in the penitentiary is ·excessive and disproportionate to the character and degree ofthe offense pursuant to the West Virginia State Constitution Article ill, Section 5 is without merit. CLAIMF: THE PETITIONER WAS DENIED IDS FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION WHEN HE WAS COERCED INTO GIVING A STATEMENT BY THREATS FROM POLICE OFFICERS THE PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution offers protection against self-incrimination by providing that "[n]o person shall be ... compelled in . any criminal case to be a witness against himself ..." U.S.C.A. Const. Amend V; W. Va. Const. Art. ill §5. When it comes to evaluating whether a defendant's statement was voluntary, the main inquiry is "whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his 'constitutional rightS and· whether the confession was the product ofan essentially free and unconstrained phoice by its maker". Syl. pt. 7, State v. Bradshaw, 193 W. Va. 519, 45i S.E.2d 456 (1995). Furthermore,while the West Virginia Supreme Court continues to give trial· courts deference .concemirtg factual findings ofvoluntary confessions, it specifically reserves de novo·review oflegal concluSions to itself.. State v. Farley, 192 W. Va. 247,253, 45is.E.2~ 50, 53 (1994). However, in cases where a trial court rules that a confession was voluntary without inquiring into the totality ofthe circumstances of that case, such ruling will be upheld on appeal "but only ifa reasonable review of ·theev~dence clearly supports vohintariness". Id;(Referring to United State.v. 79 Appendix to Memorandum Decision Supreme Court Case No. 11-0546 (Order Redacted) Carter, 569 F.2d 801 (4th Cir.), and United States v. Lewis, 528 F.2d 312 (4th Cir,): Ultimately, the West Virginia Supreme Court adopted a yoluntariness. standard in Farley that stands for tJ::te proposition that while "representations or . promises made to a defendant by one in authority. do not necessarily invalidate a subsequent confession .. " [i]n determining the voluntariness ofa confession, the trial court must assess the totality ofall the surrounding circumstances", thus making no single factor decisive. Id. at 258,61. The'factors to be examined may involve defendant's youth, intelligence, lack ofeducation and advice ofthe 'constitutional rights to the defendant, th~ manner and length ofquestioning, the use· offood or sleep depriyation, and the length ofdetention. rd. In analy~ing these factors, it is important to assess "the factual circ.umstances surrounding the confession, ... the psychological impact on the accused, and ... the legal sigirificance ofhow the accused' reacted". rd. (Referring .to Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 81 S. Ct. 1860 (1961)). State v. Hilliard is an excellent example ofinadmissible confessions given as a direct consequence ofpolice coercion. 173 W. Va. 456, 318 S.E.2d 35 (198.4). In ¢.at cas~, the appellan~ testified at both in camera hearing and at trial that when . the police officer pulled him behind the truck,. th~ officer held up a long, black flashlight and said "[Y]ou better tell me who took this'car [or] I'm going to knock YQurhead off'. rd. The appellant did not immediately answer who stole the car, but .~ handcuffed, placed in the backseat ofa cruiser beside the 'officer who just threatened him, where another police officer read himhis Mir:anda rights. The' appellant 'confessed as soon as he received his Miranda wprnings. The trip from the s~ne to the courthouse took abo~t ten to fifteen minutes, and the officer, who had threatened him, took theappellanf to the courthouse. The appellant the~ signed a waiver ofrights and gave a written statement. Id at 457, 36. . In its opinion, the West Virginia Supreme Court the generaJ. rule on statement admissibility citing Syllabus point 5 o;fState v.Starr, 15& W. Va. 90.5, . . 216· S.E.2d 242 (1975): "The State must prove, at leastby a preponderance ofthe . . 80.· Appendix to Memorandum Decision Supreme Court Case No. 11-0546 (Order Redacted) evidence, that confessions or statements of an accused which amount to admissions ofpart or all ofan offense were voluntary before such may be admitted into the. evidence ofa criminal case". rd. at 458,37. To determine whether a statement was voluntarily made, the trial court must hold an'en [sic] camera hearing prior to admitting the statement into evidence. Id. The Court also noted that "[ e ]ven prior to Mi!,anda, it was universally recogmied that a coerced confession was inadmissible". rd. (Citing-State v. Goff, 289 S,E.2d 473,476 (W·. Va. 1982). While the state did not eve? attempt to introduce the sta,tements in the cruiser, the . crucial issue in this case was whether there existed a "break in the causative link 'running betWeen" the confession;, which took'place in the cruiser, and the one takenby the police about forty-five minuteslater. Th,e West Virginia Supreme , Court held that such causative link existed'despite the foity-five minutes between the two statements. rd. In making its decision, the West Virginia Supreme Court relied on its prior holding in State v. Williams, 249 S.E.2d'758 (W. Va. 1980) where "Justice Neely emphasized that despite the fact that the confessions involved had taken place over a: three day period, the subsequent cOllfessions were not independent ofor distinct from the original; the defendant suffered from a mental . disability; the defendant's detention was uninterrupted; he was repeatedly , . interrogated without a lawyer present; the same officers·were present at each ofthe . confessions; and the concessions appeared cumulative". rd.-at 459~ 38. The Court rea$oned tha~ in Hilliard, the appellant was threatened by a police officer, was forced to sit next to that police officer in the cruis<;rr, and was forced to give a statement at the courthouse with the threatening police officer in the vicinity. Hence, the West Virginia Supreme Court held that all ofthe appellant's cOnfessions were involuntarily made. rd. at 459-460,39-40. In the' case at bar, when the Petitioner was arrested on or. about November 28,.1994, he was subsequently transported to Southern Regional Jail in Beaver, .. . West Virginia, by.C. S. Myers ru;td John M. Bailey with the Bluefield State Police .. The Petitioner contends that during the trip to thejail, C. S: Myers and John M. ,81 Appendix to Memorandum Decision Supreme Court Case No. 11-0546 (Order Redacted) Bailey repeatedly threatened the Petitioner that they would "pull over and beat the fir~ Oqt .of me", and that Officer Bailey,also informed him that his mother and family would "pay for it" ifhe didn't confess 'his crimes. Subsequent to these threats, the Petitioner gave a statement to the police. Just as in Hi1liard~ the , Petitioner was riding in the same cruiser as the officers, who threatened him. Naturally, he ~ very apprehensive ofthem carrying .out their threliits toward hiniselfas well as'his family. In addition, the Petitioner,just like the defenda:nt in Williams, who had amental illness, suffered from mental impairments, as , evidenced by his medical records. Hence, his statement given subsequent tO'the , ' , threats made by C. S. Myers and John M. Bailey were the direct result oftheir ' threats to "pullover and beat the fire out of [him]" and to hurt his mother and the rest' ofhis family. Therefore, based on the foregomg,the Petltioner?s statement was involuntarily made, and' use ofsuch statement againSt him in the proceedings violated his Fifth Amendment right ~gainst self-incrImination. THE RESPONDENT'S ANSWER The,Respondent denies that the petitioner was coerced into giving a statement to law enforcement officers. It is well established law in a Habeas Corpus,proceeding, ~e petitioner has the burden ofpraYing the allegations in the petition and the Losh checklist In the present, the p~titioner did not produce a scintilia ofevidence to support this allegation. In the petition, it was alle~ed that ' the police .officers made threats to the petitioner qn his way to the Southern , , Regional Jail. This is absolutely false. The police had already gotten a statement from the petitioner priOl: to him being transported to the Southern, Regional Jail. Furthermore,. the petitioner waived all pretciaI defects when he entered into the plea agreement and pled before the Court. During the plea hearing, the C9urt reviewed with the'petitioner that he was waiving certain defects~, ifany, by entering into the plea. Giving a statement to the Police was one the items specifically mentioned in the plea hearing, so this was certainly known to the petitioner at the 82 Appendix to Memorandum Decision Supreme Court Case No. 11-0546 (Order Redacted) time the plea was entered and he chose to continue and enter the plea. The Court further advised that he would not be able to complain about these issues at a later date ifhe received a sentence greater than he anticipate~L The Court made the pe~tioner very aware that the plea was final. For these reasons, this argument too must fail. CLAIM F: FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW (1) The Court finds that Judge Frazier clearly advised the Petitioner that by pleading guilty he was waiving the right to raise pre-trial deficiencies, . specifically addressing coerced confessions. (See transcript ofplea hearing at pp. 29-31) (2) The Court fmds that the Petitioner testified as follows at the Omnibus Habeas Corpus proceeding: Q Sir, when you were arrested do you recall giving a statement to the police? A No, sir, I sure don't. . Q Okay. So you don'! recall giving a statement? A No, sir. Q You don't recall anyihingsurrounding the statement? A No, sir. Mr. Harvey: Okay. Thank you. That's all I have. The Court: Any questions about that? .Mr. Boggess: No, sir. (See Transcript ofOmnibus Habeas Corpus hearing at p. 103) 83 Appendix to Memorandum Decision Supreme Court Case No. 11-0546 (Order Redacted) (3) The Ceurt finds and concludes that the Petitioner haS abandoned the claim that he was denied his Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-Incriminatien when he was coerced into giving a statement by thereto. frem pelice efficers, and further fmds and cencludes that he waived any such issue when he entered his plea efguilty. Accerdingly, this claim is witheut merit. RULING· Wherefere, fer the reasens set ferth in the foregeing epinien, the Ceurt . hereby ORDERS ,and ADJUD'GES as fellews: (1) That the Petitioner for Habeas Corpus ad Subjiciendum is hereby DENIED and this actien is REMOVED frem the decket efthis Ceurt. (2) The Ceurt appeints Natalie N. Hager, Esq., to. serve as ceunsel for the Petitiener sheuld be cheese to.' appeal this ruling. (3) This is the final order. The Circuit Clerk is directed to. distribute a ' I certified cepy efthis Order to. Natalie N. Hager, Esq., at 1605 Henaker Avenue, Princeten, West Virginia, 24740; to. Scett A. As~ Esq., 'Presecuting Atterney efMercer Ceunty, West Virginia, at 120 Scett Street, Suite 200, Princeten, West Virginia, 24s740;an.d to. the • ""': 1 ; Petitienerat the Mt. Olive Cerrectienal Cemplex, 1 Mountainside .'. . Way, Mt. Olive, West Virginia, 25185. " 'f-I..- . . Ent~red this thed Lf day efMarch, 201l. l' .< , ~.C.~ 'DEREK C.SWOPE, JUDGE . : ,.1 ~ .. " ". ;:... .~ ~ /.~ ~:""I,:~ .....~~ 84 Appendix to Memorandum Decision Supreme Court Case No. 11-0546 (Order Redacted)