Title: KENNETH HALL V. BILL PERRY and HIDDEN CREEK OUTFITTERS

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

KENNETH HALL V. BILL PERRY and HIDDEN CREEK OUTFITTERS2009 WY 83211 P.3d 489Case Number: S-08-0167Decided: 06/30/2009
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
KENNETH 
HALL,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.BILL PERRY and HIDDEN 
CREEK OUTFITTERS,Appellees(Defendants).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Park County

The 
Honorable Steven Cranfill, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Matthew 
D. Winslow of Keegan & Winslow, P.C., Cody, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Murphy and Lori L. Gorseth of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., 
Casper, Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Murphy.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Kenneth Hall was 
injured when he was thrown from a horse while participating in a deer hunt 
guided by Hidden Creek Outfitters.  
The district court ruled that a document signed by Mr. Hall entitled 
"Release of Liability and User Indemnity Agreement Hunting and Camping" (the 
Release) precluded his negligence action and granted summary judgment in favor 
of Bill Perry and Hidden Creek Outfitters.  
Mr. Hall argues that the Release was not enforceable because it was not 
supported by separate consideration.  
We conclude that the Release was part of the parties' original agreement 
and, therefore, separate consideration was not required to make it 
enforceable.

 
 
[¶2]      We 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]      The dispositive 
question in this case is whether the district court properly ruled, as a matter 
of law, that the Release was enforceable without separate consideration.1

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      Mr. Hall, a 
resident of North Carolina, and three of his friends planned a guided mule deer 
hunt in northwestern Wyoming in the fall of 2005.  They contacted Bill Perry, the owner of 
Hidden Creek Outfitters, to act as their outfitter for the hunt.  Hidden Creek Outfitters sent a "Letter 
Contract of Agreement" (hereinafter "Letter Agreement") to Mr. Hall.  The Letter Agreement, signed by Mr. Hall 
(designated as "Client") on February 20, 2005, stated that Hidden Creek 
Outfitters (designated as "Outfitter") would provide him with a five-day guided 
hunt, preferably November 6 through 10, 2005.  Hidden Creek Outfitters agreed to 
"stress safety throughout the hunt" and "[p]rovide professional, licensed 
guides" as well as other necessities such as food, lodging, etc.  Mr. Hall agreed to "be personally 
responsible for each provision herein and sign each contract, agreement and 
attachment hereto."  The Letter 
Agreement further provided:

 
 
2.   . . . Client 
will provide Outfitter a list as to his physical limitations, allergies, health 
and weight problems, required medications, and dietary restrictions when 
returning this contract.  Client 
understands that notwithstanding any other provisions of this contract, 
Outfitter may, in his sole discretion return any fees and decline to accept 
Client for reasons stated on such form.  
CLIENT AGREES THAT HE ASSUMES THE RISK OF HUNTING BASED UPON ANY 
DISCLOSED OR UNDISCLOSED CODITION (sic) REQUIRED BY SUCH FORM.  

 
 

3.            
FEES 
AND CONDITIONS

 
 
In 
consideration of the Outfitter providing the services as set forth hereinabove 
the Client agrees to pay the Outfitter the sum of $ 2500.00 [handwritten] 
plus a 3% forest service fee, in U.S. funds or money order, as 
follows:

 
 

A.                
Deposit 
of [$1000.00 crossed out and $500.00 written in] which shall be paid by the 
Client to the Outfitter with a signed copy of this agreement OR the contract 
will be null and void and in no way binding on the Outfitter unless accepted by 
him in his sole discretion.  . . 
.

 
 

B.                 
The 
balance of the fee shall be paid in two (2) installments as 
follows:

(1)  
50% 
of hunt cost, minus deposit, when tag is drawn

(2)  
Balance 
due 30 days prior to hunt.

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
G.        In 
the event the Outfitter materially defaults in the performance of any portion of 
his obligations hereunder, due to his own fault, the Client, as his sole and 
exclusive remedy, either at law or equity, shall be entitled to the return of 
his fee in full upon demand.  . . . 

 
 

4.            
DISCLOSURES, 
DISCLAIMERS, AND WAIVERS

The 
Client acknowledges that he has signed, understood and (sic) the Release and 
Indemnity Agreement, incorporated above, and further acknowledges that he 
understands that the risks associated with the primitive conditions of the hunt 
area, the elevation, weather conditions, unavailability of medical attention, 
travel by foot, vehicle, or horseback . . . are substantial, and that while the 
Outfitter will attempt through ordinary and reasonable care to minimize the 
risks, such risks are specifically assumed by the Client.  

 
 
5.         
MISCELLANEOUS

 
 

A.           
Any 
attachment or addendum hereto signed by the parties, or one party as required by 
the terms thereof, shall be a part of this agreement and be incorporated herein 
by reference as if set forth verbatim.  
In the event that any provision contained in such attachment or addendum 
is contrary to or inconsistent with any provisions set forth herein, the 
provisions of the attachment or addendum shall supersede and prevail over any 
such provision herein as to such inconsistency.

 
 

B.           
This 
agreement, including exhibits, schedules, attachments, and addenda attached 
hereto sets forth the entire understanding and agreement between the parties and 
supersedes any prior agreement, written or oral. 

 
 
The 
signed Letter Agreement indicated that Mr. Hall had provided a $500.00 
deposit.

 
 
[¶5]      Mr. Hall's 
hunting party arrived at the lodge used by Hidden Creek Outfitters on November 
5, 2005.  They gathered around the 
dining table where a Hidden Creek Outfitters employee, Jim Keilholtz, gave them 
the Release.  They were asked to 
read over the document, ask any questions, and then sign and initial it in the 
indicated places.  The Release 
provided in relevant part:

 
 
I, 
[handwritten] Kenneth R. Hall (CLIENT) hereby acknowledge that I have 
voluntarily applied and contracted to participate in the sport or activity of 
hunting/camping from a primitive camp, with equipment and or services to be 
provided by BILL PERRY, D.B.A. HIDDEN CREEK OUTFITTERS/TETON WILDERNESS 
OUTFITTING, (OUTFITTER).  By my 
initials hereon and at each place hereafter marked (INITIAL [handwritten] 
KRH) I have signified my agreement with and acceptance of the terms, 
statements, and conditions herein.  

 
 
I 
UNDERSTAND AND AGREE that the described sport or activity and all other hazards 
and exposures connected with the activities conducted in the outdoors do 
involve risk and that I am cognizant of the risk and dangers inherent with 
hunting and camping, and in particular in the mountains of Wyoming and that I . 
. . [am] fully capable of participating in the activities contracted for and 
willingly assume the risk of injury as my responsibility, including . . . use of 
animals, . . . collisions with trees, rocks, or other manmade or natural 
obstacles, whether they are obvious or not obvious.  (INITIAL [handwritten] 
KRH).

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
I 
UNDERSTAND AND AGREE that any route or activity, chosen as a part of the 
hunting/camping trip in which I . . . am participating may not be the safest but 
has or will be chosen for its interest, challenge, or best meeting the goals of 
the services for which I am contracting.  
Should animals ever be used or are present as a part of our activities, I 
. . . understand that an animal irrespective of its training and usual past 
behavior and characteristics, may act or react unpredictably at times 
based upon instinct or fright which likewise is an inherent risk to be assumed 
by each participant in the activity.  
(INITIAL [handwritten] KRH).

 
 
AS 
LAWFUL CONSIDERATION for being permitted by Outfitter to participate in the 
referenced activities, I do hereby RELEASE FROM ANY LEGAL LIABILITY, AGREE 
NOT TO SUE, CLAIM AGAINST, ATTACH THE PROPERTY OF, OR PROSECUTE, AND FURTHER 
AGREE TO DEFEND INDEMNITY (sic) AND HOLD HARMLESS THE Outfitter . . 
. and all of [its] officers, members, organizations, agents, and employees for 
any injury or death caused by or resulting from my participation in the 
activities described above, WHETHER 
OR NOT SUCH INJURY OR DEATH WAS CAUSED BY THEIR NEGLIGENCE OR FROM ANY OTHER 
CAUSE. (INITIAL [handwritten] KRH).

 
 
Mr. 
Hall signed the Release and gave Hidden Creek Outfitters a check for the balance 
due on his hunt, less the $500.00 deposit.  
The next morning, he began his hunt, guided by Gary "Stretch" Bauer.  On the last day of the hunt, November 
10, 2005, Mr. Hall was thrown from a horse, resulting in multiple broken ribs 
and a hemothorax.2

 
 
[¶6]      Mr. Hall filed 
suit claiming that Hidden Creek Outfitters, acting through its guide, Mr. Bauer, 
was negligent in overseeing the hunters with the horses and that Mr. Bauer's 
actions amounted to willful and wanton misconduct.  Mr. Perry and Hidden Creek Outfitters 
filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that Mr. Hall's negligence claim 
was precluded by the Release and there were no facts to support the allegation 
that Mr. Bauer's actions amounted to willful and wanton misconduct.  Mr. Hall responded by arguing that the 
Release was not supported by consideration and violated public policy.  He also claimed that there were genuine 
issues of material fact as to whether Mr. Bauer's actions amounted to willful 
and wanton misconduct.

 
 
[¶7]      The district 
court granted summary judgment in favor of Hidden Creek Outfitters and Mr. 
Perry, ruling that the Release was part of the original contract, thereby 
requiring no additional consideration, and did not violate public policy.  It also decided, as a matter of law, 
that Mr. Bauer's actions did not amount to willful and wanton misconduct.  Mr. Hall appealed.3

 
 
SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT LAW

 
 
[¶8]      We review the 
district court's summary judgment order de novo, utilizing the same standards 
and reviewing the same materials as the district court.  Schlesinger v. Woodcock, 2001 WY 120, 
¶ 12, 35 P.3d 1232, 1236-37 (Wyo. 2001).  Summary judgment is proper only when 
there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. W.R.C.P. 56(c); Hovendick v. Ruby, 10 P.3d 1119, 1122 (Wyo. 2000); Mountain Cement Company v. Johnson, 884 P.2d 30, 
32 (Wyo. 1994). We examine the record from the vantage point most favorable to 
the party opposing the motion, and give that party the benefit of all favorable 
inferences which may fairly be drawn from the record.  Schlesinger, ¶ 12, 35 P.3d  at 
1236-37.  See also, Four Nines 
Gold, Inc. v. 71 Construction, Inc., 809 P.2d 236, 238 (Wyo. 
1991).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶9]      Mr. Hall claims 
that the district court erred by ruling that no new consideration was required 
to make the Release enforceable.  
Releases and exculpatory clauses are types of contracts.  Massengill v. S.M.A.R.T. Sports Medicine 
Clinic, P.C., 996 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Wyo. 2000); Kelliher v. Herman, 701 P.2d 1157, 1159 
(Wyo. 1985).  Like any contract, in 
order to enter into a valid release, there must be offer, acceptance, and 
consideration.  Mueller v. Zimmer, 2005 WY 156, 
¶ 18, 124 P.3d 340, 350 (Wyo. 2005).  
Contractual consideration is defined as "a benefit to the promisor or a 
detriment to the promisee."  Roussalis v. Wyoming Medical Center, 4 P.3d 209, 240 (Wyo. 2000).

 
 
[¶10]   Mr. Hall argues that, after he 
signed the Letter Agreement and provided the initial $500.00 deposit, Hidden 
Creek Outfitters was obligated to take him on the hunt.  He claims that the Letter Agreement 
formed the entire contract between the parties and the Release was a separate 
agreement which required consideration apart from the fee he paid for the 
hunt.

 
 
[¶11]   As suggested in Mr. Hall's 
argument, we follow the "pre-existing duty rule," meaning "an agreement to do 
what one is already bound to do cannot serve as consideration to support a 
modification" of the parties' agreement.  
Roussalis, 4 P.3d  at 239.  This Court explored the pre-existing 
duty concept in Schlesinger.  On several occasions, Ms. 
Schlesinger borrowed money for her business, Custom Syndicated Research, 
Incorporate (CSR), from Ms. Woodcock.  
Some of the loans were documented by promissory notes, which included 
terms of 25% interest, a short period for repayment and personal liability for 
Ms. Schelsinger.  Promissory notes 
were not, however, given for some of the loans.  Just prior to declaring CSR's 
bankruptcy, Ms. Schlesinger had Ms. Woodcock execute a modified loan agreement 
on terms much more favorable to Ms. Schlesinger, to-wit:  10% interest, a longer repayment period 
and eliminating her personal liability for the loans.  We ruled that the modified loan 
agreement was not enforceable because Ms. Schlesinger did not give Ms. Woodcock 
any new or additional consideration for it.  Ms. Schelsinger had a duty to repay the 
loans before the modified loan agreement was executed and she did not offer any 
additional benefit to Ms. Woodcock for the modification.  We said the modified loan agreement was 
unenforceable because "the performance of a duty imposed by law is insufficient 
consideration to support a contract."  
Schlesinger, ¶ 14, 35 P.3d  at 
1237.

 
 
[¶12]   In this case, Hidden Creek 
Outfitters argues that the preexisting duty rule does not apply because the 
Release was part of the parties' original agreement and, thus, no new or 
additional consideration was needed to make the Release enforceable.  Roussalis offers some guidance on this 
matter.  There, Wyoming Medical Center (WMC) and two 
doctors entered into an agreement in which the doctors agreed to convey a 
building they owned to WMC in return for its funding of the construction of a 
new medical office for them.  WMC 
argued that it was not required to incorporate certain "special features" into 
the new office building because that obligation was part of a subsequent 
contract modification and was not supported by consideration.  Rejecting WMC's argument, we ruled that, 
although not spelled out in detail, the original agreement contemplated the 
special features; consequently, no new consideration was necessary to support 
WMC's promise to provide the special features.  Roussalis, 4 P.3d  at 240.  Accordingly, under Roussalis, if the challenged provisions 
were contemplated in the parties' original understanding, although they may not 
be set out in detail, no new consideration is required to support such 
provisions.

 
 
[¶13]   In order to determine whether new 
or additional consideration was required to support the Release, we must 
interpret the Release in light of the Letter Agreement.  We construe the documents in accordance 
with our standard rules of contract construction.

 
 
In 
contract litigation, when the 
terms of the agreement are unambiguous, the interpretation is a question of 
law.... Examination Management Services, Inc. v. Kirschbaum, 927 P.2d 686, 689 (Wyo. 1996); Union Pacific Resources Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 
882 P.2d 212, 218-19 (Wyo.1994). Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question 
of law for the reviewing court.  
Prudential Preferred Properties v. J and J Ventures, Inc., 859 P.2d 1267, 1271 (Wyo. 1993).  We 
review questions of law de novo without affording deference to the decision of 
the district court.  Hermreck v. 
United Parcel Service, Inc., 938 P.2d 863, 866 (Wyo.1997); Griess v. 
Office of the Atty. Gen., Div. of Criminal Investigation, 932 P.2d 734, 736 
(Wyo. 1997).

 
 
According 
to our established standards for interpretation of contracts, the words used in the contract are afforded the plain 
meaning that a reasonable person would give to them. Doctors' Co. v. 
Insurance Corp. of America, 864 P.2d 1018, 1023 (Wyo. 1993). . . . In the 
absence of any ambiguity, the contract will be enforced according to its terms 
because no construction is appropriate.  
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Republic Ins. Co., 929 P.2d 535, 539 (Wyo. 
1996); Prudential Preferred Properties, 859 P.2d  at 
1271.

 
 

Farmer 
v. Rickard, 2007 
WY 19, ¶ 12, 150 P.3d 1185, 1191 (Wyo. 2007) (quoting Roney v. B.B.C. 
Corp., 2004 WY 113, ¶ 10, 98 P.3d 196, 200 (Wyo. 2004)).  When interpreting contracts, we seek to 
determine the intent of the parties.  
In undertaking that function, we consider the contract as a whole, giving 
effect to each provision, if possible.  
Common sense is a guiding principle in interpreting a contract's 
terms.  Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 
748 P.2d 704, 712 (Wyo. 1987); Schutkowski v. Carey, 725 P.2d 1057, 
1062 (Wyo. 1986); Wunsch v. Pickering, 
2008 WY 131, ¶ 17, 195 P.3d 1032, 1039-40 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 
[¶14]   Paragraph 4 of the Letter Agreement 
states that "[t]he Client acknowledges that he has signed, understood and (sic) 
the Release and Indemnity Agreement, incorporated above[.]"  Mr. Hall argues that, because the Letter 
Agreement indicated "the Release and Indemnity Agreement" would be signed prior 
to, or contemporaneously with, the Letter Agreement, the parties were not 
referring to the Release since it was not provided to the hunters until they 
arrived at the lodge to begin their hunt.  
Mr. Hall further asserts that the "Release and Indemnity Agreement" 
language in the Letter Agreement was not referring to the Release he signed at 
the lodge, but rather to the assumption of risk language pertaining to any 
medical issues set out in paragraph 2 of the Letter 
Agreement:

 
 
Client 
will provide Outfitter a list as to his physical limitations, allergies, health 
and weight problems, required medications, and dietary restrictions when 
returning this contract.  Client 
understands that notwithstanding any other provisions of this contract, 
Outfitter may, in his sole discretion, return any fees and decline to accept 
Client for reasons stated on such form.  
CLIENT AGREES THAT HE ASSUMES THE 
RISK OF HUNTING BASED UPON ANY DISCLOSED OR UNDISCLOSED CODITION (sic) REQUIRED 
BY SUCH FORM.  [Emphasis in 
original.]

 
 
[¶15]   The Release was entitled "Release of Liability and User Indemnity Agreement Hunting and 
Camping" (emphasis added).   
The title thus fits within the meaning of the Letter Agreement's 
reference to a "Release and Indemnity Agreement."  Mr. Hall signed and initialed the 
Release in several places, without any objection and without asking any 
questions, even though it was not presented to him prior to, or 
contemporaneously with, the Letter Agreement.  The plain language of the Letter 
Agreement references a "Release and Indemnity Agreement," which was to be 
separately signed and incorporated.  
The Release was incorporated in the opening clause of the Letter 
Agreement, which stated that "Client shall be personally responsible for each 
provision herein and shall sign each contract, agreement, and attachment 
hereto."  In order to accept Mr. 
Hall's position that the Release was not part of the parties' original 
agreement, we would have to ignore the Letter Agreement's clear reference to a 
separate Release and Indemnity Agreement.  
That would violate our rule of contract construction which requires us to 
give effect to all provisions of a contract.  Wunsch, ¶ 17, 195 P.3d  at 
1039-40.

 
 
[¶16]   In contrast, the medical risk 
provision was not titled "Release and Indemnity Agreement" and it did not 
require a separate signature.  
Because the medical risk provision was included in full in the Letter 
Agreement, no incorporation was required.  
Thus, the medical risk provision obviously was not the "Release and 
Indemnity Agreement" referred to in the Letter Agreement.  Considering the plain, unambiguous 
language of the Letter Agreement in a common sense fashion, it is clear that the 
parties contemplated that the provisions of the Release be included within their 
original understanding.  Thus, this 
case fits into the Roussalis 
rationale, and no new consideration was required to make the Release 
enforceable.

 
 
[¶17]   Additionally, the district court 
ruled that the Release was an addendum under Paragraph 5A of the Letter 
Agreement:

 
 
Any 
attachment or addendum hereto signed by the parties, or one party as required by 
the terms thereof, shall be a part of this agreement and be incorporated herein 
by reference as if set forth verbatim.

 
 
Although 
the district court recognized the Release was not attached to the Letter 
Agreement, it concluded that it was effective as an addendum because it was 
signed by Mr. Hall.  An addendum is 
defined as:  "[s]omething to be 
added, esp. to a document; a supplement."  
Black's Law Dictionary 41 
(8th ed. 2004).  Mr. Hall claims that the Release could 
not be an addendum because it did not refer to the Letter Agreement and the 
Letter Agreement did not refer to it.  
As is apparent from our discussion above, we believe the Letter Agreement 
did refer to the Release.  Moreover, 
while the Release did not refer to the Letter Agreement by name, it 
stated:

 
 
"I, 
Kenneth R. Hall (Client) hereby acknowledge that I have voluntarily 
applied and contracted to participate in the sport or activity of 
hunting/camping . . . with equipment and or services provided by BILL PERRY, 
D.B.A. HIDDEN CREEK OUTFITTERS/TETON WILDERNESS OUTFITTING, (OUTFITTER)." 

 
 
This 
statement is a clear reference to the document representing a contract between 
the parties, the Letter Agreement.  
Thus, we agree that the Release can be considered to be an addendum to 
the original contract and did not require additional 
consideration.

 
 
[¶18]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1In his opening brief, Mr. Hall articulates an additional issue 
challenging the district court's alternative ruling that, even if the Release 
was not valid, Mr. Hall was entitled only to contract damages under the terms of 
the parties' agreement and could not maintain an action in tort.  Given our conclusion that the Release is 
valid, we need not consider Mr. Hall's second 
argument.

 
 

2The parties disagree about the circumstances leading to Mr. Hall's 
injuries.  Mr. Hall testified that 
he was thrown from the horse when it bucked; Mr. Bauer testified that Mr. Hall 
simply fell from the horse after it tripped on a rock.  Although our summary judgment standard 
requires that we accept Mr. Hall's version of the facts at this juncture, the 
circumstances of Mr. Hall's injury are not relevant to our resolution of the 
issue presented.

 
 

3Mr. Hall does not challenge the district court's rulings that Mr. Bauer's 
conduct was not willful and wanton and the Release does not violate public 
policy.