Title: RICHARD B. OSBORN V. RUSSELL KILTS

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

RICHARD B. OSBORN V. RUSSELL KILTS2006 WY 142145 P.3d 1264Case Number: 06-9Decided: 11/06/2006
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
RICHARD 
B. OSBORN,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
RUSSELL 
KILTS,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from theDistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Richard 
B. Osborn, Pro Se.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Rick L. 
Koehmstedt of Schwartz, Bon, Walker & Studer, LLC, Casper, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

VOIGT, Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Richard B. Osborn 
appeals a decision of the district court ordering him to remove "all junk and 
debris" placed by him along an access easement he holds over the land of Russell Kilts.  Osborn claims that he owns the access 
road and can properly exclude Kilts, and also that he has the right to maintain 
his road as he sees fit.  Finding no 
merit in this appeal, we affirm and award costs to Kilts.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Osborn presents 
eleven issues on appeal1; however, these issues can be 
narrowed to the following questions:

 
 
           
1.   Whether Osborn's 
claims of road ownership are barred by the doctrine of res judicata?

 
 
           
2.   Whether the district 
court's findings were clearly erroneous?

 
 
Further, 
Kilts asks us to determine whether sanctions should be imposed against 
Osborn.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      In 2000, Kilts 
purchased a parcel of land from the Manning family that is adjacent to land 
owned by Osborn.  Osborn's history 
with the Manning family and others over his rights concerning these parcels is 
well known to this Court.2  When Kilts purchased his property, 
conflicts soon arose over the use of an access easement3 held by 
Osborn.

 
 
[¶4]      On June 27, 2002, 
Osborn filed a complaint which alleged that Kilts had impermissibly interfered 
with Osborn's exclusive use of the access road and had damaged the road.  The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Kilts to the extent that Osborn's claims were based on the 
assertion that he owned the road and therefore had the right to exclude Kilts 
from the use thereof.  The district 
court relied on the doctrine of res 
judicata in granting summary judgment to Kilts, particularly because 
Osborn's claim that he owned the road had previously been litigated, decided 
adversely to Osborn, and affirmed on appeal.  See Osborn v. Painter, 909 P.2d 960, 
961-62 (Wyo. 
1996).

 
 
[¶5]      A bench trial was 
later held on Osborn's claims that Kilts had interfered with the roadway and on 
counterclaims filed by Kilts alleging that Osborn barricaded the roadway, 
restricting Kilts' use, and that Osborn illegally destroyed a cattle guard 
erected by Kilts.  After Osborn 
presented his case, the district court granted Kilts' motion for a directed 
verdict.  The court determined that 
(1) there was no evidence that Osborn's use of the easement had been impeded; 
(2) any claimed interference with the easement was temporary and de minimus; (3) there was no evidence 
that Kilts had personally obstructed the easement; and (4) there was no proof 
offered regarding damages.  Kilts 
then presented evidence for his counterclaims and the district court ruled that 
Osborn had impermissibly interfered with Kilts' use of the roadway and had 
wrongfully destroyed the cattle guard.  
Osborn now appeals.  

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶6]      The application 
of the doctrine of res judicata is a 
question of law that we review de 
novo.  In re Big  Horn River System, 2004 WY 21, ¶ 19, 85 P.3d 981, 987 (Wyo. 2004).  We 
review a district court's findings of fact to determine whether they are clearly 
erroneous.  Baker v. Pike, 2002 WY 34, ¶ 9, 41 P.3d 537, 541 (Wyo. 2002).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶7]      While Osborn's 
individual issues are often difficult to discern, the majority of his brief is 
devoted to arguments regarding the legal status of his access road.  Osborn claims that he owns the road, has 
the right to sole possession, and may prevent Kilts from using the road.  Kilt responds that (1) Osborn is merely 
the dominant estate owner to an access easement; (2) Osborn's ownership claim 
has been previously litigated and determined against Osborn; and, therefore, (3) 
the doctrine of res judicata required 
the district court to reject Osborn's argument.  We agree that the district court 
properly applied that doctrine and granted Kilts summary judgment on this 
issue.

 
 
[¶8]      In February 1989, 
a Natrona County court determined that the

 
 
roadway 
is an easement, that the Defendant [Osborn] is the owner of the dominant estate, 
that the Plaintiff [Manning, Kilts' predecessor in interest] is the owner of the 
servient estate, that the roadway serves a two fold purpose, i.e., as the 
Defendant's means of access to the Defendant's property and as the Plaintiff's 
means of access to the Plaintiff's property and buildings . . . 
.

 
 
Both the 
district court and this Court affirmed that court's decision.  See Osborn v. Painter, 909 P.2d 690.

 
 
[¶9]      Osborn is no 
stranger to the application of res 
judicata.  In Osborn v. Painter, 909 P.2d  at 964, we 
said:

 
 
            
We then are confronted almost purely with the effect of the doctrine of 
res judicata.  In the case of Osborn v. Manning, 798 P.2d 1208, 1210 
(Wyo.1990), we summarized the doctrine of res judicata:  

The 
doctrines of res judicata and 
collateral estoppel

"incorporate 
a universal precept of common-law jurisprudence to the effect that a right, 
question or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of 
competent jurisdiction . . . cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the 
same parties or their privies.'"

Rialto 
Theatre, Inc. v. Commonwealth Theatres, Inc., 714 P.2d 328, 336 (Wyo.1986) (quoting Delgue 
v. Curutchet, 677 P.2d 208, 213 (Wyo.1984)).  Res judicata "constitutes an absolute 
bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand, or cause of 
action."  Barrett v. Town of Guernsey, 652 P.2d 395, 398 (Wyo.1982), quoted in Swasso v. 
State ex rel.    Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division, 
751 P.2d 887, 890 (Wyo.1988).  See Rialto Theatre, Inc., 714 P.2d 328 
(defining a cause of action).  

The 
criteria used to determine res judicata's applicability to a situation are: "(1) 
the parties were identical; (2) the subject matter was identical; (3) the issues 
were the same and related to the subject matter; and (4) the capacities of the 
persons were identical in reference to both the subject matter and the issues 
between them."

Newell 
v. Trumper, 765 P.2d 1353, 1355 (Wyo.1988) (quoting Swasso, 751 P.2d at 
890).

 
 
[¶10]   The "identical parties" requirement 
in a res judicata analysis is met 
when either the parties are actually the same parties to the previous 
proceedings, or they are in privity4 with those parties.  See Rialto Theatre v. Commonwealth 
Theatres, 714 P.2d 328, 336 (Wyo. 1986).  Because Kilts was the successor in 
interest to Manning, the parties in the instant case are identical to the 
parties in the 1989 litigation.5  It is equally clear that the last three 
elements of a claim of res judicata 
were met because the issue, the subject matter, and the capacity of the 
parties to argue the subject matter and issue are identical to the previous 
lawsuit, and Osborn presents no cogent argument claiming otherwise.6  Therefore, summary judgment was properly 
granted on Osborn's road ownership claim.

 
 
[¶11]   Likewise, Osborn raised a second 
issue that has previously been decided adversely to him.  Prior to trial, Osborn destroyed a 
section of a fence erected to prevent Kilts' cattle from traveling past a cattle 
guard and intermingling with other "breeding groups."  Osborn now argues that the district 
court erred when it determined that Kilts may replace that fence.  More specifically, he claims that 
because "the fence was a hazard to this appellant, he did not have to wait for 
several years for a court to order it removed."  The district court determined that the 
fence, which was placed beside the road at the bottom of an embankment, "in no 
way obstructs Mr. Osborn's use of the easement for ingress and egress," and may 
be replaced as long as it does not impede the free flow of 
water.

 
 
[¶12]   In Osborn v. Manning, 812 P.2d 545 
(Wyo. 1991), 
we affirmed an order of the district court in which this issue had been 
previously decided adversely to Osborn.  
In that case, the district court determined that Manning, Kilts' 
predecessor, could build a gate near the cattle guard, but was "enjoined from 
constructing or causing to be constructed any posts near the cattle guard . . . 
that have the effect of impeding the free flow of surface water."  Id. 
at 547.  In the instant case, Osborn 
raised the same issuewhether a gate may be constructed near the cattle 
guardand the district court's order conformed to the previous ordera gate may 
be constructed, but it cannot impede the free-flow of surface water.  We, therefore, affirm the determination 
of the district court on this issue.

 
 
[¶13]   Osborn next argues that it is his 
right to maintain the road as he sees fit, regardless of whether he owns the 
road or merely has an easement.  
Therefore, according to Osborn, it was error for the district court to 
require Osborn to remove refrigerators filled with dirt, half-buried tires, and 
barbed wire from the roadside, which items were ostensibly meant to maintain and 
divert water from the road. 

 
 
[¶14]   Osborn's argument on appeal ignores 
the basis for the district court's decision and, therefore, must fail.  The district court determined that the 
"debris, barriers, posts, wires, refrigerators, and the like . . . creates an 
unreasonable health risk to all persons using the property, is unsightly, is not 
shown to serve any useful purpose, and is not reasonably related to use of the 
dominant estate for ingress and egress by Richard Osborn."  Osborn's argument consists only of his 
insistence that he may maintain the easement, but fails to address the district 
court's finding of fact that his "maintenance" was unhealthy, unsightly, and 
ineffectual.  Because of this lack 
of cogent argument, we will affirm the district court's decision on this issue. 

 
 
[¶15]   The final two issues we can discern 
from Osborn's brief are that the attorney for Kilts committed a fraud on the 
court and that the district court judge should have been disqualified from 
presiding over this case.  We will 
summarily affirm those issues because they are not supported by cogent argument 
or citation to pertinent authority.  
Cathcart v. Meyer, 2004 WY 49, 
¶ 20, 88 P.3d 1050, 1060 (Wyo. 2004).  
Insofar as Osborn's brief contains various other complaints regarding the 
district court's order or Kilts' actions in general, the findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and judgment are affirmed in all respects for the same 
reason.

 
 
[¶16]   We must finally determine whether 
sanctions are appropriate.  
According to W.R.A.P. 10.05, we may award attorney's fees and damages if 
"there was no reasonable cause for the appeal."  We have said that "we will award 
sanctions in those rare circumstances where an appeal lacks cogent argument, 
there is an absence of pertinent legal authority to support the issues, or there 
is a failure to adequately cite to the record."  Welch v. Welch, 2003 WY 168, ¶ 13, 81 P.3d 937, 940 (Wyo. 2003).  Further, 
pro se litigants are not excused from 
following our rules of procedure, as Osborn well knows.  Id.; see also Osborn v. Warner, 694 P.2d 730 
(Wyo. 1985); Osborn v. Pine Mountain Ranch, 766 P.2d 1165 (Wyo. 1989); Osborn v. Painter, 909 P.2d 960; and Osborn v. Estate of Manning, 968 P.2d 932 (Wyo. 
1998).  In the instant case, 
sanctions are justified.  Osborn's 
substantive arguments on appeal are difficult to identify and, when 
identifiable, are frivolous; the arguments lack cogence and, often, coherence; 
his citations to the record for factual assertions largely reference his 
previous filings which are not factual evidence in the record; Osborn ignores 
the reasons for the district court's decisions and often seemingly argues that 
we should reverse the district court simply because he does not agree with the 
outcome; and any citations to legal authority are very general and are not 
pertinent to the facts and circumstances of this case.  Accordingly, Kilts' counsel shall submit 
a statement of costs and attorney's fees incurred in this appeal.  Upon review, we will enter an order 
awarding the appropriate costs and fees to Kilts.

 
 
[¶17]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1In his 
statement of the issues, Osborn fails clearly to identify any issues, instead 
merely presenting a single-page synopsis of factual assertions.  Indeed, his eleven issues are only 
identified in his statement of the facts.  
We have often repeated that the failure to comply with our appellate 
rules, including rules regarding the content of appellate briefs, "is ground . . 
. for such action as the appellate court deems appropriate, including but not 
limited to: refusal to consider the offending party's contentions; assessment of 
costs; dismissal; and affirmance."  
W.R.A.P. 1.03.  However, to 
avoid a similar appeal on these issues in the future, we will attempt to address 
the issues raised in Osborn's brief in this instance.

 
 

2See 
Osborn v. Manning, 685 P.2d 1121 (Wyo. 1984); Osborn v. 
Warner, 694 P.2d 730 (Wyo. 1985);  
Osborn v. Pine Mountain Ranch, 
766 P.2d 1165 (Wyo. 1989); Osborn v. 
Manning, 798 P.2d 1208 (Wyo. 1990); Osborn v. Manning, 812 P.2d 545 (Wyo. 
1991); Osborn v. Manning, 812 P.2d 549 (Wyo. 1991); Osborn v. Manning, 
817 P.2d 889 (Wyo. 1991); Osborn v. 
Painter, 909 P.2d 960 (Wyo. 1996); and Osborn v. Estate of Manning, 968 P.2d 932 (Wyo. 1998).  Osborn was also 
the appellant in Osborn v. Emporium 
Videos, 848 P.2d 237 (Wyo. 1993) and Osborn v. Emporium Videos, 870 P.2d 382 
(Wyo. 
1994).

 
 

3As will 
be explained more fully herein, Osborn claims that he owns the road across 
Kilts' land and it is not an easement; however, the road has long been deemed, 
through judicial proceedings, an easement for the benefit of 
Osborn.

 
 

4Privity 
means a "connection or relationship between two parties, each having a legally 
recognized interest in the same subject matter (such as a transaction, 
proceeding, or piece of property) . . . ."  
Black's Law Dictionary 1237 
(8th ed. 2004).

 
 

5We also 
note that Painter, the named appellee in the previous case, was Manning's 
attorney and Manning was also an appellee in that case.  Osborn v. Painter, 909 P.2d  at 
961.

 
 

6The 1989 
litigation involved the additional question of whether Osborn interfered with 
Manning's use of the servient estate by digging a ditch along the easement, but 
the threshold question of whether Osborn owned the road or had an easement was 
still necessarily decided.  See Osborn v. Painter, 909 P.2d  at 
963.