Title: Commonwealth v. Amerson

State: virginia

Issuer: Virginia Supreme Court

Document:

Present:  Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, and Millette, JJ., and 
Carrico and Koontz, S.JJ.∗  
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     OPINION BY 
v. 
Record No. 100840 
 
JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         March 4, 2011 
MWANDO MICHAEL AMERSON 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 
A. Bonwill Shockley, Judge 
 
Pursuant to the Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent 
Predators Act (SVPA or Act), Code §§ 37.2-900 et seq., the 
Commonwealth petitioned the Circuit Court for the City of 
Virginia Beach to civilly commit Mwando Michael Amerson as a 
sexually violent predator (SVP) following his release from 
prison on a sexually violent offense.  The circuit court, by 
agreed order, found Amerson to be an SVP.  A hearing was then 
held to determine whether Amerson should be civilly committed 
or conditionally released.  At the conclusion of the hearing, 
the circuit court decided to conditionally release Amerson to 
an out-of-state agency, the Court Services and Offender 
Supervision Agency for the District of Columbia (CSOSA).  The 
question presented is whether the circuit court had the 
authority under the SVPA to conditionally release Amerson 
outside the Commonwealth. 
                                                 
 
∗ Justice Koontz presided and participated in the hearing 
and decision of this case prior to the effective date of his 
retirement on February 1, 2011; Justice Kinser was sworn in as 
Chief Justice on February 1, 2011. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
In December 1999, Amerson was convicted of attempted rape 
in the circuit court.  He was sentenced to five years’ 
imprisonment, with all but 10 months suspended, and three 
years’ supervised probation.  He was released from prison in 
March 2000. 
In October 2002, while on probation for the 1999 offense, 
Amerson was arrested and charged with first-degree child sexual 
abuse in Washington, D.C.  He entered a plea of guilty to 
second-degree child sexual abuse and was sentenced to three 
years’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised probation.  
While he was serving his sentence for the 2002 offense in the 
federal prison system, his probation for the 1999 offense was 
revoked in the circuit court.  Hence, after completing his 
sentence for the 2002 offense, he was transferred from the 
federal prison system to the Virginia Department of Corrections 
to serve the remainder of his sentence for the 1999 offense — 
four years and two months. 
In November 2008, shortly before Amerson was scheduled to 
be released from prison, the Commonwealth, pursuant to the 
SVPA, petitioned the circuit court to civilly commit him as an 
SVP.  In July 2009, the circuit court, by agreed order, found 
Amerson to be an SVP and ordered the Department of Behavioral 
 
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Health and Developmental Services1 (DBHDS) to prepare a report 
on possible alternatives to civil commitment in accordance with 
the SVPA. 
Six months later, in January 2010, the circuit court held 
a hearing to determine whether Amerson should be civilly 
committed or conditionally released.  During the hearing, two 
conditional release plans were presented:  one had Amerson 
residing in Virginia and being supervised by DBHDS (the 
Virginia plan), and the other had him residing in Washington, 
D.C. and being supervised by CSOSA (the Washington plan).  The 
Commonwealth opposed both plans, claiming, among other things, 
that Amerson would present an undue risk to public safety if he 
were conditionally released.  Nevertheless, it argued, if 
Amerson were to be conditionally released rather than civilly 
committed, he could only be conditionally released pursuant to 
the Virginia plan because the SVPA does not permit an SVP to be 
conditionally released outside the Commonwealth.  It also 
maintained that Amerson could not be transferred to CSOSA 
pursuant to the Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Adult 
Offenders (Interstate Compact), Code §§ 53.1-176.1 et seq., 
because he was no longer subject to supervision by the 
                                                 
 
1 Prior to July 1, 2009, the Department’s name was the 
“Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Substance 
Abuse Services.”  It was changed to the “Department of 
 
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Commonwealth as the result of the commission of a criminal 
offense. 
Amerson countered that he should be conditionally 
released, as opposed to civilly committed, because, after 
successfully completing state and federal sex-offender 
treatment programs, he no longer needed secure inpatient 
treatment.  He asserted, moreover, that he should be 
conditionally released in accordance with the Washington plan 
because:  (1) the individuals who would support him if he were 
conditionally released lived in Washington, D.C.; (2) CSOSA had 
agreed to supervise him under the Interstate Compact if he were 
conditionally released in Washington, D.C.; (3) he had been 
accepted by the University of the District of Columbia, where 
he intended to continue his studies in business accounting; and 
(4) he had two offers of employment in Washington, D.C. 
 
After hearing the testimony of several expert witnesses 
and the arguments of counsel, the circuit court took a recess 
to call CSOSA to verify that, in the event that Amerson were 
conditionally released in Washington, D.C., the agency would 
notify DBHDS if he violated the conditions of his release.  
When the hearing resumed, the circuit court informed counsel 
that it had spoken with a supervisor at CSOSA who said that the 
                                                                                                                                                           
Behavioral Health and Development Services” effective July 1, 
2009.  See 2009 Acts chs. 813, 840.  
 
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agency had accepted Amerson under the Interstate Compact and 
that it would enforce all of the conditions of his release as 
set forth in the circuit court’s order, including any condition 
requiring notification to DBHDS in the event of a violation.  
Apparently satisfied with the supervisor’s representations, the 
circuit court ordered Amerson’s conditional release to CSOSA 
under the Washington plan. 
Following the hearing, the Commonwealth filed a motion to 
stay the execution of the circuit court’s order conditionally 
releasing Amerson to CSOSA.  The circuit court denied the 
motion to stay and entered its final order.  The Commonwealth 
noted its appeal and filed with this Court a motion to stay the 
execution of the circuit court’s final order.  We granted both 
the Commonwealth’s motion to stay and its petition for appeal 
on the following assignment of error: 
The trial court erred by ordering that Amerson be 
conditionally released as a sexually violent predator 
to reside and be supervised outside of the 
Commonwealth of Virginia without authority to do so 
and contrary to the SVPA.  
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
Whether the SVPA permits the conditional release of an SVP 
outside the Commonwealth is a question of statutory 
interpretation.  As such, it “ ‘presents a pure question of law 
and is accordingly subject to de novo review by this Court.’ ”  
Warrington v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 365, 370, 699 S.E.2d 233, 
 
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235 (2010) (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 121, 124, 
661 S.E.2d 412, 414 (2008)). 
 
“ ‘[T]he primary objective of statutory construction is to 
ascertain and give effect to legislative intent.’ ”  Conger v. 
Barrett, 280 Va. 627, 630, 702 S.E.2d 117, 118 (2010) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Turner v. Commonwealth, 226 
Va. 456, 459, 309 S.E.2d 337, 338 (1983)).  “ ‘When the 
language of a statute is unambiguous, we are bound by the plain 
meaning of that language.’ ”  Commonwealth v. Morris, 281 Va. 
70,76, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (2011) (quoting Conyers v. Martial 
Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104, 639 S.E.2d 174, 
178 (2007)).  And “ ‘[i]f a statute is subject to more than one 
interpretation, we must apply the interpretation that will 
carry out the legislative intent behind the statute.’ ”  Id. 
(quoting Conyers, 273 Va. at 104, 639 S.E.2d at 178). 
Moreover, although SVPA proceedings are civil, rather than 
criminal, in nature, we have held that the Act is subject to 
the rule of lenity because “ ‘[c]ivil commitment for any 
purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that 
requires due process protection.’ ”  Warrington, 280 Va. at 
370, 699 S.E.2d at 235 (quoting Townes v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 
234, 240, 609 S.E.2d 1, 4 (2005)).  It “ ‘must therefore be 
strictly construed.’ ”  Id. (quoting Townes, 269 Va. at 240, 
609 S.E.2d at 4). 
 
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The Commonwealth argues that the circuit court could not 
conditionally release Amerson to CSOSA under the SVPA because 
the Act contains no provision permitting the conditional 
release of an SVP outside the Commonwealth.  Amerson concedes 
that the SVPA does not explicitly authorize the conditional 
release of an SVP outside the Commonwealth, but contends that 
it does so implicitly.  He first points to the following 
language of Code § 37.2-912(A):  “The court shall subject the 
respondent to the orders and conditions it deems will best meet 
his need for treatment and supervision and best serve the 
interests of justice and society.”  Amerson submits that this 
language demonstrates that the General Assembly understood that 
each SVP is different and thus intended to give courts 
discretion to “mold the shape of the SVPA to fit the SVP; not 
the SVP to fit the SVPA.” 
Next, Amerson points out that, under Code § 37.2-912, a 
conditional release order may be implemented by DBHDS “or, if 
the [SVP] is on parole or probation, the [SVP’s] parole or 
probation officer.”  Because “‘[p]arole or probation officer’ 
is not preceded by a specifying term confining the officer to 
the Commonwealth of Virginia,” Amerson argues, the General 
Assembly “le[ft] open the possibility that the conditions of 
release could be implemented by ANY parole or probation 
officer.” 
 
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Lastly, Amerson points to Code § 37.2-909(A), which 
provides in relevant part:  
 
Any respondent committed pursuant to this 
chapter shall be placed in the custody of [DBHDS] for 
control, care, and treatment until such time as the 
respondent’s mental abnormality or personality 
disorder has so changed that the respondent will not 
present an undue risk to public safety.  [DBHDS] 
shall provide such control, care, and treatment at a 
secure facility operated by it or may contract with 
private or public entities, in or outside of the 
Commonwealth, or with other states to provide 
comparable control, care, or treatment. 
 
Amerson contends that, if DBHDS may contract with another 
entity outside the Commonwealth to provide control, care, or 
treatment for a civilly committed SVP, then it surely may do so 
for a conditionally released SVP.  After all, Amerson 
continues, had the General Assembly intended for every SVP to 
remain inside the Commonwealth, it could have said so in the 
SVPA, but “[t]here is no provision, code section, or even 
reference to a single word or term confining an offender to 
remain in Virginia.” 
We find Amerson’s arguments unpersuasive for several 
reasons.  First, while it is true that courts are given some 
discretion under the SVPA to set the conditions for release, 
they do not have the authority, as Amerson puts it, to “mold 
the shape of the SVPA to fit the SVP.”  A court’s authority to 
civilly commit or conditionally release an SVP is wholly 
derived from and limited by the SVPA.  Thus, a court may not go 
 
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beyond the authority granted in the Act in determining the 
proper course of action for an SVP, even if it believes that 
doing so would “best meet his need for treatment and 
supervision and best serve the interests of justice and 
society.”  Code § 37.2-912(A). 
Second, although the SVPA does not define “parole or 
probation officer,” we think it clear that the General Assembly 
was only referring to Virginia parole and probation officers.  
As the Commonwealth notes, the Act also does not define 
“Department of Corrections,” “Attorney General,” “community 
service boards,” “judicial officer,” and “law-enforcement 
officer.”  It is, however, manifest from the context in which 
those terms are used that they only refer to Virginia entities 
and personnel.  Further, as the Commonwealth maintains, the 
General Assembly could not have intended to legislate with 
reference to entities and personnel over which it has no 
authority. 
Third, Amerson reads too much into Code § 37.2-909(A).  By 
its terms, that section only refers to the placement of SVPs 
who are civilly committed, not conditionally released.  As Code 
§ 37.2-909(A) demonstrates, had the General Assembly intended 
to allow DBHDS to contract with an entity outside the 
Commonwealth to monitor or supervise a conditionally released 
SVP, then it certainly knew how to include such a provision.  
 
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For us to adopt Amerson’s reading of Code § 37.2-909(A), then, 
we would have “to add language to the statute that the General 
Assembly declined to employ.”  Virginian-Pilot Media Cos., LLC 
v. Dow Jones & Co., 280 Va. 464, 468, 698 S.E.2d 900, 902 
(2010).  Time and again, we have “refused to engage in that 
enterprise” because “ ‘[w]e must determine the legislative 
intent by what the statute says and not by what we think it 
should have said.’ ”  Id. at 468-69, 698 S.E.2d at 902 (quoting 
Carter v. Nelms, 204 Va. 338, 346, 131 S.E.2d 401, 406-07 
(1963)). 
Finally, when the SVPA is read as a whole, we believe it 
evident that the Act does not provide for the conditional 
release of an SVP outside the Commonwealth.  For instance, as 
the Commonwealth points out, Code § 37.2-913(B), which 
addresses the execution of an emergency custody order for an 
SVP who has violated the conditions of his release, only 
contemplates the conditional release of an SVP inside the 
Commonwealth: 
The emergency custody order shall require a law-
enforcement officer to take the respondent into 
custody immediately.  A law-enforcement officer may 
lawfully go to or be sent beyond the territorial 
limits of the county, city, or town in which he serves 
to any point in the Commonwealth for the purpose of 
executing an emergency custody order pursuant to this 
section. 
 
 
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(Emphasis added.)  Had the General Assembly intended to 
permit the conditional release of an SVP in and outside the 
Commonwealth, we would expect a provision of the SVPA 
addressing the emergency custody of an SVP who was 
conditionally released outside the Commonwealth — but there 
is no such provision. 
The circuit court recognized this problem, but 
nonetheless ordered Amerson to be conditionally released to 
CSOSA because, in its view, a capias could be issued for 
him if he violated the conditions of his release.  As the 
Commonwealth contends, a capias is not an adequate 
substitute for the retrieval mechanism laid out in Code 
§ 37.2-913(B) because it cannot be served outside the 
Commonwealth.  But even if it were adequate, we find it 
unlikely that the General Assembly would have left it up to 
courts to devise such a substitute retrieval mechanism on 
an ad hoc basis. 
In sum, we conclude that no provision of the SVPA 
authorizes the conditional release of an SVP outside the 
Commonwealth.  We therefore hold that the circuit court erred 
in conditionally releasing Amerson to CSOSA in accordance with 
the Washington plan.2 
                                                 
 
2 Amerson also claims that the circuit court had authority 
to transfer him to CSOSA under the Interstate Compact.  We 
 
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III.  CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the 
circuit court and remand the case in order to allow that court 
to determine whether Amerson should be conditionally released 
pursuant to the Virginia plan. 
Reversed and remanded. 
                                                                                                                                                           
disagree for two reasons.  First, the Interstate Compact gives 
the Interstate Commission, not courts, the power “[t]o oversee, 
supervise and coordinate the interstate movement of offenders.”  
Code § 53.1-176.2, art. V.  Second, the Interstate Compact does 
not apply to him because he is not “an adult placed under, or 
subject to, supervision as the result of the commission of a 
criminal offense.”  Id., art. II.  Rather, he is subject to 
supervision by the Commonwealth because he has been found to be 
an SVP under the SVPA – which is a civil, not a criminal, 
statutory scheme.  Code § 37.2-901.       
 
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