Title: State v. Nathaniel L. Sumner

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2008 WI 94 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP102-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Nathaniel L. Sumner, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 297 Wis. 2d 585, 724 N.W.2d 703 
(Ct. App. 2006-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 15, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 11, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
William Sosnay   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Stephen W. Kleinmaier, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs by Craig W. 
Albee, Carol S. Josten, and Glynn, Fitzgerald & Albee, S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Craig W. Albee. 
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 94
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP102-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2004CF4085) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Nathaniel L. Sumner, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 15, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals,1 which reversed a 
judgment of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, William Sosnay, 
Judge.  The circuit court denied Nathaniel Sumner's (Sumner) 
motion to suppress evidence obtained during a protective frisk 
following a traffic stop, and he subsequently pled guilty to 
                                                 
1 State v. Sumner, No. 2006AP102-CR, unpublished slip op., 
(Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2006). 
No. 2006AP102-CR 
 
2 
 
possession of heroin, a violation of Wis. Stat. §§ 961.14(3)(k) 
and 961.41(3g)(am).2   
¶2 
The State appeals the court of appeals' decision 
reversing the circuit court's denial of Sumner's motion to 
suppress and his subsequent judgment of conviction.  The court 
of 
appeals 
reviewed 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances 
surrounding Deputy Timothy Johnson's protective frisk of Sumner 
and concluded that Johnson did not have the requisite reasonable 
suspicion that Sumner was armed and dangerous to conduct a 
protective 
frisk. 
 
State 
v. 
Sumner, 
No. 
2006AP102-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶¶1, 11 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2006).  
The court of appeals also addressed the legality of a search of 
Sumner's vehicle and concluded that the search was illegal.  
Id., ¶11 n.5.   
¶3 
We are presented with two issues: (1) whether Johnson 
had the requisite reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct a 
protective frisk of Sumner; and (2) whether the court of appeals 
should have addressed the legality of the search of Sumner's 
vehicle. 
¶4 
We conclude that the protective frisk of Sumner was 
justified by specific, articulable facts supporting a reasonable 
suspicion that Sumner was armed and dangerous.  With regard to 
the search of Sumner's vehicle, we conclude that it was not 
necessary for the court of appeals to address this issue because 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 2006AP102-CR 
 
3 
 
the vehicle search played no part in Sumner's conviction.  
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals.  
I. BACKGROUND 
¶5 
The following facts are taken from the August 3, 2005, 
hearing on Sumner's motion to suppress.3  Around 9 p.m. on July 
29, 2004, Milwaukee County Sheriff's Deputies Timothy Johnson 
and Kevin Johnson4 were on patrol in a marked Chevrolet Tahoe 
police vehicle (squad) traveling east on Locust Street near 21st 
Street in the City of Milwaukee.  Locust Street is a two-lane, 
undivided street with lanes going east and west.  Johnson's 
squad was stopped and waiting for cars in front of it to turn 
right when a red BMW (vehicle) passed the squad on the left.  
The vehicle's driver waved to the squad and crossed into the 
oncoming westbound lane of traffic.  The vehicle, driven by 
Sumner with no other occupants, forced cars in the oncoming lane 
to stop and pull over to their right to avoid a collision. 
¶6 
Johnson activated his emergency lights and stopped the 
vehicle in front of 1823 West Locust Street, approximately two 
blocks east of the 21st Street intersection.  As the BMW was 
pulling over, Johnson observed the driver making reaching 
gestures toward the passenger side of the vehicle.  Johnson 
mentioned these gestures to Kevin Johnson and notified police 
                                                 
3 Two witnesses testified at the hearing: Deputy Timothy 
Johnson and Nathaniel Sumner. 
4 Deputies Timothy Johnson and Kevin Johnson are brothers 
and patrol partners.  For the sake of clarity, we will refer to 
Deputy Timothy Johnson as "Johnson" and to Deputy Kevin Johnson 
as "Kevin Johnson."   
No. 2006AP102-CR 
 
4 
 
dispatch of the squad's location.  Johnson then approached the 
vehicle and asked Sumner for his driver's license or an 
identification card.  Sumner stated that he did not have either.  
Johnson then asked him for his name and other information to 
fill out a field interview card.  Sumner told Johnson his name 
and date of birth.  He was unable to give Johnson a street 
address. 
¶7 
Johnson observed that Sumner's vehicle was filled with 
objects, including office equipment, clothing, a vacuum, and 
bags. 
 
Citing 
Sumner's 
reaching 
gestures, 
lack 
of 
identification, and the amount of items in the vehicle, Johnson 
asked Sumner if he could search the vehicle.  Sumner said no.  
Johnson again asked whether he could search the vehicle.5  Sumner 
again declined.  As Johnson returned to the squad, Sumner asked 
if he could "hurry up."   
¶8 
Johnson told Kevin Johnson that he would keep an eye 
on Sumner because of his movements while Kevin Johnson ran 
Sumner's name through the squad's computer system.  Kevin 
Johnson ran Sumner's name while Johnson monitored Sumner's 
activity.  A computer check showed that Sumner's license was 
suspended, a fact he had not revealed to Johnson.  The deputies 
called for a tow truck, and Kevin Johnson began writing Sumner a 
citation for operating while suspended.  Johnson did not feel 
                                                 
5 Johnson testified: "I informed him that I would like to 
search the vehicle for my safety due to his gestures to the 
passenger side area and there w[ere] a lot of things in his 
vehicle which I thought he could have been hiding a weapon at 
that point." 
No. 2006AP102-CR 
 
5 
 
that it was necessary to have Sumner exit his vehicle while his 
driver's license was checked and the citation written, as he 
kept Sumner under surveillance. 
¶9 
After about 15 minutes, the deputies exited the squad 
and approached the rear of Sumner's vehicle.  Johnson did not 
see Sumner do anything suspicious during the 15-minute wait.  
The deputies asked Sumner to step out of the vehicle so that 
they could get a fingerprint for identification purposes.  
Sumner exited and moved to the rear of the vehicle.  The 
deputies told Sumner his driver's license was suspended, his 
vehicle would be towed because of his suspended license, and he 
would be walking home, as it was sheriff's department policy to 
tow a vehicle when the driver's license is determined to be 
suspended.  Kevin Johnson then commenced a search of the 
vehicle.  Johnson testified: 
At that point I was in the rear of his vehicle and Mr. 
Sumner was sweating.  Kept going in his pockets.  I 
told him to keep his hands out of his pockets at which 
point he again went into his pockets and at that time 
I thought with his gestures in the vehicle and his 
demeanor outside the vehicle, I asked if I could pat 
him down. 
¶10 When asked by the prosecutor what observations he made 
that led him to frisk Sumner, Johnson testified: 
By him continuously going in his pockets.  I told 
him to keep his hands out of his pockets.  His 
demeanor 
was——He 
appeared 
very 
nervous 
by 
him 
continuously going in his pockets and me telling him 
to keep his hands out of his pockets.  At that point I 
believe it was the second or third time I told him to 
keep his hands out, that's when I said, okay, I'm 
going to do a pat down for my safety. 
No. 2006AP102-CR 
 
6 
 
¶11 With respect to Sumner's sweating, Sumner testified 
that "[i]t was very hot."  But, when asked on cross-examination 
if he wasn't sweating because he was "nervous regarding the 
items that [he] had on [his] person and that were in the car," 
Sumner replied: "I suppose it was partly that, yes." 
¶12 Sumner complied with Johnson's request for a pat down 
search, turned away from Johnson, and put his arms out at his 
sides and parallel to the ground.  Sumner was wearing a t-shirt 
and either "sweat pants" or "running pants" with front and rear 
pockets.  Johnson performed a protective frisk of Sumner, 
starting at the top of his body and working down.  When Johnson 
reached the waistband area, he felt a lump in Sumner's right 
rear pocket.  Johnson asked Sumner what the lump was, and Sumner 
stated that it was just a napkin.  According to Johnson's 
testimony, Sumner removed the napkin from his pocket and placed 
it on the vehicle's trunk.6 
¶13 Johnson returned to frisking the front of Sumner's 
waistband, and two small bindles fell to the ground from 
Sumner's pants leg.  Johnson questioned Sumner about the 
bindles, and Sumner stated that they contained heroin.  At that 
point, Johnson arrested Sumner, put him in handcuffs, and then 
opened the napkin that had been placed on the trunk.  Johnson 
found three additional bindles of heroin in the napkin.  Johnson 
also assisted Kevin Johnson in the search of Sumner's vehicle.  
                                                 
6 Sumner testified that Johnson reached into Sumner's pocket 
and removed the napkin himself.  This dispute will be discussed 
below in section III. B. of this opinion.  
No. 2006AP102-CR 
 
7 
 
Their search revealed multiple syringes, a rubber tourniquet, 
and cooking caps.7 
¶14 On August 1, 2004, Sumner was charged with one count 
of 
possession 
of 
heroin 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 961.14(3)(k) and 961.41(3g)(am).  He moved to suppress the 
evidence obtained during the traffic stop as illegally obtained.  
The circuit court held a hearing and denied Sumner's motion.  
Sumner then pled guilty to possession of heroin, and a judgment 
of conviction was entered.  Sumner appealed.   
¶15 On October 19, 2006, the court of appeals reversed and 
remanded.  Sumner, No. 2006AP102-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶28.  
The court determined that based on the totality of circumstances 
Johnson did not have a reasonable suspicion that Sumner was 
armed and dangerous when he conducted a protective frisk for 
weapons.  Id.  The court of appeals emphasized that "the lapse 
of time between the stop and the frisk mitigated any reasonable 
suspicion of danger" and that "[a]n objectively reasonable 
officer would not leave an occupant of the vehicle who was 
believed to be armed and dangerous unattended for fifteen 
minutes."  Id. (citing State v. Mohr, 2000 WI App 111, 235 
Wis. 2d 220, 613 N.W.2d 186).  The court of appeals further 
concluded that because Johnson lacked a reasonable suspicion to 
                                                 
7 In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the 
circuit court found "that it is common practice as it was here 
and 
the 
court 
does 
not 
find 
specifically 
that 
it 
was 
unreasonable that prior to the tow that the vehicle be 
searched." 
No. 2006AP102-CR 
 
8 
 
frisk Sumner, the deputies also lacked a reasonable suspicion to 
search Sumner's vehicle.  Id., ¶11 n.5. 
¶16 The State petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on June 12, 2007. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶17 In reviewing a motion to suppress, this court employs 
a two-step analysis.  State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, ¶16, 285 
Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582.  First, we will uphold the circuit 
court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  Id.  
Second, we review de novo whether those facts constitute 
reasonable suspicion.  Id. 
III. ANALYSIS 
¶18 We will first analyze whether Johnson possessed the 
requisite reasonable suspicion to frisk Sumner.  Next, we will 
analyze a dispute regarding the circuit court's findings of fact 
regarding that frisk.  Finally, we will address whether the 
court of appeals should have decided the legality of the search 
of Sumner's vehicle. 
A. 
Reasonable Suspicion 
¶19 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution8 
and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution9 prohibit 
                                                 
8 In relevant part, the Fourth Amendment states: "The right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated."  U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
9 In relevant part, Article I, Section 11 states: "The right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated."  Wis. Const. art. I, § 11. 
No. 2006AP102-CR 
 
9 
 
unreasonable governmental searches.  State v. Johnson, 2007 WI 
32, ¶20, 299 Wis. 2d 675, 729 N.W.2d 182.  This court ordinarily 
construes the protections of these constitutional provisions 
coextensively.  Id.   
¶20 The Fourth Amendment's touchstone is reasonableness, 
which is measured in objective terms by examining the totality 
of 
the 
circumstances, 
eschewing 
bright-line 
rules 
and 
emphasizing 
instead 
the 
fact-specific 
nature 
of 
the 
reasonableness inquiry.  Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 34 
(1996).  A determination of the reasonableness of the search 
must balance "the government's need to conduct the search 
against the invasion the search entails."  State v. McGill, 2000 
WI 38, ¶18, 234 Wis. 2d 560, 609 N.W.2d 795 (citing Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).   
¶21 "During 
an 
investigative 
stop, 
an 
officer 
is 
authorized to conduct a [protective] search[10] of the outer 
clothing of a person to determine whether the person is armed if 
the officer is 'able to point to specific and articulable facts 
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, 
reasonably warrant that intrusion.'"  Johnson, 299 Wis. 2d 675, 
¶21 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21).  The purpose of a 
protective search is "to determine whether the person is in fact 
                                                 
10 The terms "protective search," "pat-down," and "frisk" 
are commonly used to refer to the protective measure endorsed by 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  See generally Thomas K. 
Clancy, Protective Searches, Pat-Downs, or Frisks?: The Scope of 
the Permissible Intrusion to Ascertain if a Detained Person is 
Armed, 82 Marq. L. Rev. 491 (1999). 
No. 2006AP102-CR 
 
10 
 
carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical 
harm."  State v. Kyles, 2004 WI 15, ¶9, 269 Wis. 2d 1, 675 
N.W.2d 449 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 24).  In evaluating a 
search, "due weight must be given, not to [the officer's] 
inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,' but to the 
specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from 
the facts in light of his experience."  Id. (quoting Terry, 392 
U.S. at 27); Bies v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 457, 466, 251 N.W.2d 461 
(1977) (same).   
¶22 "The reasonableness of a protective search for weapons 
is an objective standard . . . whether a reasonably prudent man 
in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his 
safety and that of others was in danger because the individual 
may be armed with a weapon and dangerous."  Kyles, 269 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶10 (citation and internal marks quotation omitted).11  
                                                 
11 We have previously noted that this standard of objective 
reasonableness has been codified in Wis. Stat. § 968.25, which 
is construed in light of Terry and its progeny.  State v. 
Johnson, 2007 WI 32, ¶22 n.8, 299 Wis. 2d 675, 729 N.W.2d 182.  
Wis. Stat. § 968.25 provides in full: 
 
Search during temporary questioning. When a law 
enforcement officer has stopped a person for temporary 
questioning pursuant to s. 968.24 and reasonably 
suspects that he or she or another is in danger of 
physical injury, the law enforcement officer may 
search such person for weapons or any instrument or 
article or substance readily capable of causing 
physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried 
in public places by law abiding persons. If the law 
enforcement officer finds such a weapon or instrument, 
or any other property possession of which the law 
enforcement officer reasonably believes may constitute 
the commission of a crime, or which may constitute a 
threat to his or her safety, the law enforcement 
No. 2006AP102-CR 
 
11 
 
"In determining whether a frisk was reasonable, a court may look 
'to any fact in the record, as long as it was known to the 
officer at the time he conducted the frisk and is otherwise 
supported by his testimony at the suppression hearing.'"  Id. 
(quoting McGill, 234 Wis. 2d 560, ¶24).  Circuit courts must 
determine whether a frisk was reasonable on a case-by-case 
basis, evaluating the totality of circumstances.  Johnson, 299 
Wis. 2d 675, ¶22; Kyles, 269 Wis.2d 1, ¶49. 
¶23 Our protective search or "frisk" jurisprudence has 
consistently emphasized that the totality of all circumstances 
present and known to the officer must be taken into account to 
assess the legality of the procedure.  Naturally, some factors 
will be of greater import than others in the reasonable 
suspicion calculus in a particular case.  Our cases, most 
notably Kyles, have first broken down the reasonable suspicion 
issue into an analysis of each primary factor present and then 
concluded by viewing these primary factors in the totality of 
circumstances.  See id., ¶¶17-18, 68-72 (listing "six factors 
that compose the totality of the circumstances" in that case, 
and then evaluating them in their totality).  The court of 
appeals followed this methodology.  Sumner, No. 2006AP102-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶¶11, 26-28 (noting that the court 
"examine[d] each of the key factors . . . separately and then in 
                                                                                                                                                             
officer may take it and keep it until the completion 
of the questioning, at which time the law enforcement 
officer shall either return it, if lawfully possessed, 
or arrest the person so questioned. 
No. 2006AP102-CR 
 
12 
 
their entirety").  This is the most logical approach for a court 
evaluating reasonable suspicion because the standard set forth 
in Terry requires specificity: "[I]n justifying the particular 
intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific 
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational 
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion."  
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (emphasis added).  Therefore, we first 
list the factors relied upon by the State to indicate Johnson's 
reasonable suspicion to search.   
¶24 The State's brief lists four factors to evaluate 
reasonable suspicion: 
1. 
Johnson saw Sumner reaching to the passenger side of 
the vehicle (reaching gestures);   
2. 
Johnson said Sumner was nervous; 
3. 
Sumner repeatedly put his hands in his pockets; and  
4. 
Johnson said he was concerned about his safety. 
¶25 The State argues that the totality of circumstances, 
weighing the factors above and all other circumstances known to 
Johnson, indicate that Johnson had a reasonable suspicion that 
Sumner 
was 
armed 
and 
dangerous 
before 
he 
performed 
the 
protective search.  We agree. 
1. 
Sumner's Reaching Gestures 
¶26 Johnson observed Sumner make reaching gestures toward 
the passenger side of the vehicle as Sumner was pulling over to 
stop.  This observation aroused the deputy's suspicion that 
Sumner might be retrieving or hiding a weapon.  An unexplained 
reaching movement or a furtive gesture by a suspect during a 
No. 2006AP102-CR 
 
13 
 
traffic stop can be a factor in causing an officer to have 
reasonable suspicion that a suspect is dangerous and has access 
to weapons.  See Johnson, 299 Wis. 2d 675, ¶37.12  The importance 
                                                 
12 Other courts have also noted furtive reaching gestures as 
indicative of grounds to conduct a protective search.  See 
United States v. Edmonds, 240 F.3d 55, 61, (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(recognizing that a furtive gesture made in response to the 
presence of police can be a significant factor to support 
reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing); United States v. 
Green, 465 F.2d 620, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding that officers 
were justified in conducting a limited protective search when 
they stopped a car for a traffic violation and "observed the 
driver making furtive movements as though pulling something out 
of his belt and placing it under his seat"); State v. Quinlan, 
921 A.2d 96, 108 (R.I. 2007) ("We are satisfied that the 
officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct a pat-down frisk 
for weapons after they had observed furtive and suspicious 
behavior [continuously reaching to the floor of a Jeep] and 
after the occupants repeatedly ignored orders to keep their 
hands where Officer Kerrigan could see them."); State v. 
Kennedy, 726 P.2d 445, 451 (Wash. 1986) ("[Officer] Adams saw a 
furtive gesture sufficient to give him an objective suspicion 
that Kennedy was secreting something under the front seat of the 
car.  From his vantage, in his own car behind Kennedy's, he had 
no way of knowing what Kennedy was hiding.  When he had Kennedy 
outside the car, he did not frisk him, as he could have had he 
suspected Kennedy might be armed.  However, there remained the 
gesture, the unknown object under the front seat, and the 
passenger inside the car who had easy access to the object."); 
State v. Dilyerd, 467 So. 2d 301, 304-05 (Fla. 1985) (holding 
that a search for weapons was permissible when a car was 
illegally trespassing in an orange grove at night and the 
passenger leaned forward and appeared to do something with his 
hands on the floorboard of the car); State v. Menezes, 648 
S.E.2d 741, 745 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) ("Observation of what 
reasonably appear to be furtive gestures is a factor which may 
properly be taken into account in determining whether probable 
cause exists." (quotation omitted)); State v. Sutherland, 637 
N.E.2d 366, 369 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the search of 
a vehicle's passenger compartment after a traffic stop was 
reasonable when an officer had viewed the defendant and a 
passenger making "furtive" movements in the vehicle that might 
have concealed a weapon). 
No. 2006AP102-CR 
 
14 
 
of a movement or gesture is influenced by its nature, its 
timing, and whether it can be explained either by the suspect or 
by the officer's subsequent observations. 
¶27 With regard to Sumner's reaching gestures, two sub-
issues are raised by the parties: Johnson's decision not to 
order Sumner out of the vehicle immediately upon approaching it 
after noting his reaching gestures; and the impact of the 
passage of time between Johnson seeing the reaching gestures 
when he stopped the vehicle and later frisking Sumner.  The 
State argues that the court of appeals incorrectly concluded 
that any concern for safety aroused by Sumner's reaching 
gestures was mitigated by the passage of approximately 15 
minutes between the gestures and Johnson's protective search.  
Sumner, No. 2006AP102-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶28.  The State 
disagrees with the court of appeals' conclusion that "[a]n 
objectively reasonable officer would not leave an occupant of 
the vehicle who was believed to be armed and dangerous 
unattended for fifteen minutes."  Id.  The court of appeals 
relied 
on 
Mohr 
for 
this 
proposition 
and 
considered 
it 
"significant that the officer [in Mohr] had been on the scene 
and allowed Mohr to remain in the vehicle for twenty minutes 
while he dealt with the driver and another passenger."  Id., ¶21 
(citing Mohr, 235 Wis. 2d 220, ¶16).   
¶28 In Mohr, police stopped a vehicle with four passengers 
for a traffic violation on a January night at 1 a.m.  Mohr, 235 
Wis. 2d 220, ¶¶2-3.  An officer approached the vehicle, asked 
the driver for identification, and noted the strong odor of 
No. 2006AP102-CR 
 
15 
 
intoxicants emanating from within.  Id., ¶3.  The officer asked 
the driver to step out to perform a field sobriety test while 
the passengers remained in the vehicle.  Id.  The test revealed 
that the driver was not intoxicated, and the officer then asked 
the driver for permission to search the vehicle.  Id., ¶4.  The 
driver consented to the vehicle search, and the passenger 
immediately behind the driver was asked to step out of the 
vehicle for safety reasons.  Id., ¶¶4-5.  Ten minutes had passed 
since the vehicle was pulled over.  Id., ¶16.  The passenger, a 
minor, appeared intoxicated and was arrested for consumption of 
alcohol.  Id., ¶5.  The driver and minor were placed in a squad 
car and monitored.  Id.   
¶29 After ten more minutes, the officer returned to the 
vehicle and asked the name of the front seat passenger, Mohr, 
and requested that he exit the vehicle for safety purposes.  
Id., ¶¶6, 16.  The officer noted that Mohr stumbled getting out 
of the vehicle and smelled strongly of intoxicants.  Id., ¶6.  
The officer asked Mohr to sit in a squad car, but he refused.  
Id.  Mohr stated that he wanted to go home; the officer told him 
to wait until his identification was confirmed.  Id.  Because of 
the cold, the officer told Mohr to sit in the squad car.  Id.  
Mohr put his hands in his pockets, became resistive, and acted 
nervous. Id., ¶¶6-7.  The officer requested that Mohr take his 
hands out of his pockets, but Mohr refused.  Id., ¶6.  After he 
refused to remove his hands a second time, Mohr was handcuffed 
for officer safety.  Id., ¶7.  
No. 2006AP102-CR 
 
16 
 
¶30 Four or five minutes later, the officer frisked Mohr 
and discovered a plastic baggie that contained marijuana.  Id., 
¶8.  Mohr was placed under arrest.  Id. 
¶31 The court of appeals held that the frisk of Mohr was 
not supported by reasonable suspicion because it occurred 
approximately 25 minutes after the initial traffic stop, and 
"the most natural conclusion is that the frisk was a general 
precautionary measure, not based on the conduct or attributes of 
Mohr."  Id., ¶15.  The court of appeals concluded that the 
officer who frisked Mohr was apparently not concerned for his 
safety when he made the traffic stop because he did not order 
the passengers out of the vehicle and left the vehicle 
unattended while spending 20 minutes with the driver and minor.  
Id., ¶16.   
¶32 In Mohr the defendant was a passenger in a car whose 
driver was given only a traffic warning.  Id., ¶4.  The 
defendant was not suspected of any offense and wanted to leave 
the scene, alleging that his house was only two blocks away.  
Id., ¶6.  The officers did not permit Mohr to leave, and asked 
him to sit in a squad car.  Id.  When he refused and kept 
putting his hands in his pockets while standing outside at 1 
a.m. on January 31, he was cuffed with his hands behind his 
back.  Id., ¶7.  The arresting officer said Mohr had been 
nervous and resistive.  Id.  Several minutes later the officer 
conducted a pat-down search that uncovered marijuana in Mohr's 
jacket pocket.  Id., ¶8.  It was in this context that the court 
of appeals pointed to "the fact that the frisk occurred 
No. 2006AP102-CR 
 
17 
 
approximately twenty-five minutes after the initial traffic 
stop" and concluded that the frisk was "a general precautionary 
measure," as opposed to a focused protective search.  Id., ¶15.  
Although there are some similarities between Mohr and this case, 
Mohr is distinguishable on the facts and does not stand for a 
rule that time necessarily diminishes suspicion or risk.   
¶33 The State's brief points out that there is no golden 
rule regarding whether to order a suspect to stay in his vehicle 
or to step out during a traffic stop.13  We agree.  "[T]he 
millions of traffic stops that occur every year are not 
fungible," hence the decision to order a suspect out of a car is 
not so universal that it is always necessary or even reasonable.  
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 121 (1977) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  We therefore disagree with the court of appeals' 
conclusion that "[a]n objectively reasonable officer would not 
leave an occupant of the vehicle who was believed to be armed 
and dangerous unattended for fifteen minutes."  Sumner, No. 
2006AP102-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶28 (emphasis added).  
Clearly, the myriad circumstances an officer might face in a 
traffic stop would suggest ordering passengers out of their 
                                                 
13 The 
State 
has 
cited 
several 
cases 
from 
other 
jurisdictions and some police training manuals in its brief 
regarding the varied treatment of an officer's decision to order 
a stopped vehicle's driver and passengers to stay in or step out 
of the vehicle.  We need not recount these authorities but 
recognize that each traffic stop will require a tailored 
response by law enforcement. 
No. 2006AP102-CR 
 
18 
 
vehicle in some cases but not in others.14  We do not believe the 
facts of this case indicate that Johnson was objectively 
unreasonable 
in 
not 
ordering 
Sumner 
out 
of 
the 
vehicle 
immediately upon approaching it the first time.  Two deputies 
were present at the scene, and Sumner was under constant 
surveillance. 
¶34 The State conceded in its brief and at oral argument 
that Johnson did not possess the requisite reasonable suspicion 
necessary to perform a protective search immediately after 
observing Sumner's reaching gestures and after approaching his 
vehicle.  See Johnson, 299 Wis. 2d 675, ¶43 (declining to adopt 
a per se rule that a single reaching gesture alone provides the 
reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct a protective frisk).  
Consequently, we are puzzled by the court of appeals' conclusion 
that "[a] reasonable officer would have ordered Sumner out of 
the vehicle and performed a frisk if there was a serious safety 
concern."  Sumner, No. 2006AP102-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶22.  
Because Johnson did not possess the requisite reasonable 
suspicion at the time he saw the gestures, he was neither 
                                                 
14 Justice John Paul Stevens wrote in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 
434 U.S. 106 (1977), that one cannot assume that "ordering the 
routine traffic offender out of his car significantly enhances 
the officer's safety."  Id. at 119 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
"Arguably, such an order could actually aggravate the officer's 
danger because the fear of a search might cause a serious 
offender to take desperate action that would be unnecessary if 
he remained in the vehicle while being ticketed."  Id.; see also 
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 416-17 (1997) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (observing that statistics on officer traffic 
assaults do not conclusively indicate whether ordering persons 
out of a vehicle increases or decreases danger to police).   
No. 2006AP102-CR 
 
19 
 
obligated nor permitted to frisk Sumner at this stage in the 
traffic stop.  However, we recognize that Johnson likely 
possessed a reasonable concern for safety at this point, albeit 
not a concern sufficient by itself to justify a protective 
search.   
¶35 The court of appeals relied on Mohr's emphasis on the 
passage of time to conclude that "the lapse of time between the 
stop and the frisk mitigated any reasonable suspicion of 
danger."  Id., ¶28 (referencing Mohr).  We do not find that the 
temporal elements emphasized in Mohr and relied upon by the 
court of appeals are convincing indicators that Johnson's 
objectively reasonable fears regarding Sumner should have been 
quelled by the mere passage of time.15  An officer can be as much 
                                                 
15 The instant case is similar to People v. Jackson, 948 
P.2d 506 (Colo. 1997).  In Jackson, as officers were stopping a 
vehicle for a routine traffic violation they observed the 
defendant, a passenger in the vehicle, take a coat from the back 
seat and place it on his lap.  Id. at 506.  The officers 
approached 
the 
vehicle, retrieved identification from the 
defendant, and ran a computer check on the occupants.  Id. at 
507.  The check revealed no outstanding warrants for either the 
driver or the defendant.  Id.  After 10 to 15 minutes, the 
officers removed the occupants and performed a protective pat-
down search of the defendant.  Id. at 507-08.  During the 
search, a plastic bag containing crack cocaine fell from the 
defendant's pants leg and was seized.  Id. at 506-07. 
The Colorado Supreme Court noted the passage of 10 to 15 
minutes between the initial stop, the defendant's movement to 
the back seat, and the pat-down search.  Id. at 508.  The court 
upheld the search as reasonable, despite the passage of time 
from the initial stop to the search.  Id.  The court emphasized 
that "under the facts of this case, the trial court found 
specifically that at the time of the pat down of the defendant, 
the officer was concerned for his safety . . . [and therefore] 
the purpose of the pat-down search . . . was reasonable."  Id. 
No. 2006AP102-CR 
 
20 
 
in danger at the end of a traffic stop as at the beginning.16  
Under the circumstances present, Johnson's reasonable belief 
that he was in danger grew as time passed.  
¶36 We therefore disagree with the court of appeals that 
the passage of 15 minutes from the time of the reaching gestures 
and traffic stop to the time of the protective search mitigated 
"any reasonable suspicion of danger," id. (emphasis added), and 
instead view Sumner's unexplained reaching gestures as one 
factor in the totality of circumstances that are indicative of 
Johnson's reasonable suspicion that Sumner was armed and 
dangerous.17 
                                                 
16 See State v. Vandenberg, 81 P.3d 19, 28 (N.M. 2003) 
("[W]e refuse to draw a bright-line, temporal cut-off point. We 
decline to say that an investigating officer cannot be in as 
much danger at the end of a traffic stop as at the beginning, or 
at least reasonably believe that to be so."). 
17 When Johnson approached Sumner's BMW, he was wary of the 
reaching gestures he had seen moments earlier.  As the deputy 
spoke to Sumner, he had the opportunity to observe the contents 
of Sumner's vehicle.  There was a great deal of clutter in the 
vehicle.  Johnson observed nothing——such as a wallet on the 
front seat——that provided a natural explanation of why Sumner 
had reached over to the passenger side of the vehicle.  Rather, 
the clutter that Johnson saw on the front seat suggested a 
convenient place to hide or retrieve a weapon.  Although Johnson 
expressed his concerns to Sumner, Sumner did not offer any 
explanation of his reaching gestures.  As he returned to his 
squad, Johnson knew that Sumner had not been reaching to get his 
vehicle registration out of his glove compartment or to find his 
driver's 
license 
because 
Sumner 
did 
not 
produce 
any 
identification.  See Johnson, 299 Wis. 2d 675, ¶43.  He did not 
know why Sumner had been reaching.  Thus, the gestures were 
completely unexplained at the time Johnson conducted the pat-
down.  In short, nothing that Johnson perceived or heard allayed 
his concerns. 
No. 2006AP102-CR 
 
21 
 
2. 
Suspect's Unusual Nervousness 
¶37 Johnson testified that Sumner "seemed very nervous" 
and "was sweating," and the circuit court found that Sumner was 
"very nervous" and sweating. 
¶38 Nervousness during a routine traffic stop is typical, 
but unusual nervousness of a suspect may indicate wrongdoing.18  
Our cases hold that a suspect's unusual nervousness is a 
legitimate factor to consider in evaluating the totality of 
circumstances for reasonable suspicion.  Kyles, 269 Wis. 2d 1, 
¶54 (citing McGill, 234 Wis. 2d 560, ¶29; State v. Morgan, 197 
Wis. 2d 200, 213, 215, 593 N.W.2d 887 (1995)).19  The record 
reflects that Sumner was "very nervous," and this type of 
behavior might reasonably indicate that a threat of harm to 
Johnson was present. 
¶39 Visible perspiration can be a symptom of nervousness.  
In this case, the traffic stop occurred around 9 p.m. in late 
July.  Johnson testified that he did not believe that he himself 
                                                 
18 See United States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 918-19 (8th 
Cir. 1994) (noting that it is customary for a suspect in a 
routine traffic stop to be "somewhat nervous" but that the 
"fidget[ing]" behavior of a suspect, in the totality of 
circumstances, suggested that wrongdoing was afoot).   
19 See also United States v. Arnold, 388 F.3d 237, 238 (7th 
Cir. 2004) ("[Officer Ford] noticed that Arnold appeared very 
nervous and was sweating 'a little bit.'"); United States v. 
McRae, 81 F.3d 1528, 1531 (10th Cir. 1996) (where an officer 
observed McRae's "unusual," nervous behavior, such as sitting 
more upright and adjusting his mirrors to watch the officer.  
Officer Colyar testified that "the way [McRae] was watching me, 
the intensity with which he was doing it, yes, I consider that 
to be unusual."). 
No. 2006AP102-CR 
 
22 
 
was perspiring because of the temperature; whereas Sumner 
acknowledged that he could have been sweating because of the 
heroin on his person and drug paraphernalia in his vehicle.  We 
observe that, in addition to the appearance of nervousness or 
erratic behavior——e.g., trembling, shaking or fidgeting hands, 
shifting eyes, tapping one's fingers or feet, placing one's 
hands in and out of one's pockets, and the like20——visible 
                                                 
20 Professor LaFave has listed numerous examples of erratic 
behavior 
or 
unusual 
appearance 
that 
courts 
have 
found 
sufficiently indicate reasonable suspicion:  
a characteristic bulge in the suspect's clothing; 
observation of an object in the pocket which might be 
a weapon; an otherwise inexplicable sudden movement 
toward a pocket or other place where a weapon could be 
concealed; an otherwise inexplicable failure to remove 
a hand from a pocket; awkward movements manifesting an 
apparent effort to conceal something under his jacket; 
backing away 
by the suspect under circumstances 
suggesting he was moving back to give himself time and 
space to draw a weapon; awareness that the suspect had 
previously been engaged in serious criminal conduct; 
awareness that the suspect had previously been armed; 
awareness of recent erratic and aggressive conduct by 
the suspect; discovery of a weapon in the suspect's 
possession; discovery that the suspect is wearing a 
bullet proof vest as to which he makes evasive 
denials; and awareness of circumstances which might 
prompt the suspect to take defensive action because of 
a misunderstanding of the officer's authority or 
purpose.   
4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.6(a), at 628-30 (4th 
ed. 2004) (footnotes omitted). 
No. 2006AP102-CR 
 
23 
 
perspiration 
is 
a 
factor 
that 
courts 
have 
taken 
into 
consideration in the totality of circumstances.21   
¶40 Therefore, we consider Sumner's nervous demeanor and 
visible perspiration as supportive of Johnson's reasonable 
suspicion in the totality of circumstances. 
3. 
Suspect's Hands in Pockets 
¶41 Johnson testified that Sumner repeatedly placed his 
hands in his pockets, even after Johnson ordered him not to do 
so. 
 
Johnson 
also 
testified 
that 
Sumner 
followed 
his 
instructions, except for putting his hands in his pockets. 
¶42 The circuit court found that Sumner was putting his 
hands in his pockets "and he was asked not to do that on a 
number of occasions."  The court acknowledged that there was 
some question about Johnson's order to Sumner to keep his hands 
out of his pockets because Johnson had not recounted that point 
in his police report.  However, the circuit court placed this 
alleged deficiency "in the context of the overall set of 
                                                 
21 See, e.g., State v. Triplett, 2005 WI App 255, ¶2, 288 
Wis. 2d 515, 
707 
N.W.2d 
881 
("The 
officer 
noticed 
that 
Triplett's 
hands 
shook 
and 
perspiration 
appeared 
on 
his 
forehead."); Caldwell v. State, 780 A.2d 1037, 1043 (Del. 2001) 
("The officer testified at the suppression hearing that Caldwell 
appeared 'extremely nervous,' was perspiring and his hands were 
shaking."); P.W. v. State, 965 So. 2d 1197, 1199 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2007) ("P.W. then walked over to the car and appeared upset 
and was sweating.  The officer asked what P.W. was doing in the 
area and P.W. responded that he was going to catch a bus.  At 
this point, the officer exited his police car and asked 
appellant if he could pat him down."); State v. Rider, 172 P.3d 
274, 276 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) ("Defendant was sweating profusely 
and was obviously nervous.").  
No. 2006AP102-CR 
 
24 
 
circumstances" and found that "the defendant was putting his 
hands into his pockets . . . on a number of occasions."  In his 
testimony, Sumner did not deny that he had been told to keep his 
hands out of his pockets. 
¶43 We consider a defendant's placing his hands in his 
pockets repeatedly, despite an officer's admonitions, as a 
substantial factor in the totality of circumstances.  As we 
stated in Kyles, "[o]fficers need to see a person's hands so 
that they can determine whether the individual is reaching for a 
weapon.  Officers have a legitimate, objective concern for their 
own safety when an individual reaches into his pockets."  Kyles, 
269 Wis. 2d 1, ¶41.  Other courts have properly relied upon this 
No. 2006AP102-CR 
 
25 
 
factor in evaluating the totality of circumstances,22 and we do 
so as well. 
¶44 Therefore, we consider the fact that Sumner repeatedly 
put his hands in his pockets, contrary to instruction, as a 
legitimate and important factor in the totality of circumstances 
indicating reasonable suspicion to conduct a protective search.  
4. 
Officer's Subjective Fear for His Own Safety 
                                                 
22 See United States v. Harris, 313 F.3d 1228, 1236 (10th 
Cir. 2002) ("[T]he more important factor here is that Defendant 
refused to take his hands out of his pockets after Officer Allen 
requested that he do so.  Officer Allen testified that he asked 
Defendant to take his hands out of his pockets because he was 
concerned that Defendant might be concealing a weapon."); 
Commonwealth v. Whitmore, 92 S.W.3d 76, 79 (Ky. 2002) ("When the 
officer entered the apartment, Whitmore began fidgeting and 
turning away from her.  He then gave the officer a false name 
and refused to remove his hand from his pocket upon request."); 
State v. Gannaway, 191 N.W.2d 555, 556 (Minn. 1971) ("[Officer] 
Pelton testified that he warned Gannaway to keep his hands out 
of his pockets but that Gannaway seemed intent on reaching into 
the right pocket of his outer coat."); People v. Smith, 721 
N.Y.S.2d 311, 312 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) ("The officer noticed 
that when defendant exited the car, he appeared fidgety and 
nervous, and was looking over his shoulder, as he stood facing 
the officer with his hands near his pockets.  The officer again 
asked defendant to show him his hands, and he also asked him if 
he possessed any weapons.  Defendant replied that he did not 
have any weapons, but he did not produce his hands."); Williams 
v. State, 754 N.E.2d 584, 586 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) ("Officer 
Wildauer observed that Williams was nervous, sweating, and his 
legs were shaking.  Officer Wildauer asked Williams, two or 
three times, to take his hands out of his jacket pocket and away 
from his waistband, but Williams failed to comply, causing 
Officer Wildauer to fear for his safety.  Officer Wildauer then 
ordered Williams to place his hands on the police car so that he 
could conduct a pat down search for weapons.  Williams again 
placed his hand in his pocket."). 
No. 2006AP102-CR 
 
26 
 
¶45 Johnson testified that he informed Sumner he wanted to 
search Sumner's vehicle because he feared for his own safety.  
This fear was due to Sumner's gestures to the passenger side of 
the vehicle and the fact that the vehicle's interior was 
littered with various objects, which "could have been hiding a 
weapon."  Johnson also testified that when he frisked Sumner he 
did so as a measure to protect his own safety. 
¶46 The circuit court found that Johnson's "fear for his 
safety" was part of the totality of circumstances that justified 
the protective search. 
¶47 In Kyles, we rejected any rule that an officer's 
subjective apprehension that an individual is armed may not be 
considered as part of the totality of circumstances.  Kyles, 269 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶39.  However, we also held that reasonable suspicion 
for a protective search does not turn on an officer having a 
subjective belief that his own safety or that of others is in 
danger.  Id., ¶30.23  Instead, we determined that an "officer's 
fear or belief that the person may be armed is but one factor in 
the totality of the circumstances that a court may consider in 
determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to 
effectuate a protective weapons frisk."  Id., ¶39. 
¶48 A court may look "to any fact in the record, as long 
as it was known to the officer at the time he conducted the 
                                                 
23 See 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.5(a), at 
472 (4th ed. 2004) (noting that the test for reasonable 
suspicion 
is 
"purely 
objective" 
and 
that 
"there 
is 
no 
requirement that an actual suspicion by the officer be shown"). 
No. 2006AP102-CR 
 
27 
 
frisk and is otherwise supported by his testimony at the 
suppression hearing," to help determine whether a frisk was 
reasonable.  Id., ¶10 (quoting McGill, 234 Wis. 2d 560, ¶24).  
The record demonstrates additional factors about which Johnson 
indicated concern.  Sumner identified himself orally but never 
produced any identification to confirm what he said, much less a 
photo driver's license.  That is why taking a fingerprint was 
necessary.  Although he was driving with a suspended license, 
Sumner called attention to himself by waving to the deputies as 
he passed, even though his driving maneuver forced other 
vehicles to take defensive action.  Johnson testified that he 
"couldn't believe" the maneuver and thought Sumner's wave to the 
deputies was "odd."  When questioned, Sumner could not give his 
street address, but he still asked the deputy to "hurry up."  
Johnson thought the latter comment was "unusual."  In short, 
Sumner exhibited unusual and erratic behavior. 
¶49 Accordingly, we weigh the fact that Johnson feared for 
his safety as a factor in the totality of circumstances.   
5. 
Totality of Circumstances 
¶50 We have examined each of the four factors enumerated 
by the State and pointed to other concerns.  We now examine 
these factors in the totality of circumstances. 
¶51 The traffic stop occurred at approximately 9 p.m.24 on 
July 29, 2004.  The vehicle was stopped for a traffic violation 
                                                 
24 See State v. Kyles, 2004 WI 15, ¶58, 269 Wis. 2d 1, 675 
N.W.2d 449 (noting that the time at which a protective search 
occurs is a factor to be considered in the totality of 
circumstances).   
No. 2006AP102-CR 
 
28 
 
on a Milwaukee street.  The State does not contend that the area 
was a high crime area.  Sumner made reaching gestures toward the 
passenger side of the vehicle as he was being pulled over.  
Johnson approached the vehicle and observed that the passenger 
compartment was filled with many objects, making it a ready 
place to hide a weapon.  Sumner had no driver's license or 
identification with him.  He could not give a street address. 
¶52 Johnson was concerned for his safety as soon as he 
observed Sumner's reaching gestures to the passenger side of the 
vehicle.  He twice asked Sumner to search the vehicle as a 
protective safety measure, citing Sumner's reaching gestures, 
lack 
of 
identification, and the clutter in the car as 
indications that Sumner might be hiding a weapon.  Sumner 
offered no explanation of the reaching gestures, but he did ask 
the deputy to "hurry up."   
¶53 A computer check on Sumner revealed that his driver's 
license was suspended.  After the computer check, Kevin Johnson 
wrote a citation while Sumner waited in his vehicle.  Johnson 
monitored Sumner from the squad for about 15 minutes. 
¶54 Johnson and Kevin Johnson then approached Sumner's 
vehicle.  The deputies asked Sumner to step out of the vehicle 
to fingerprint him and informed Sumner that his BMW would be 
towed because of his suspended driver's license.  Kevin Johnson 
began searching Sumner's vehicle.  Johnson observed that Sumner 
was "very nervous" and sweating as Kevin Johnson began the 
search.  Sumner was wearing a t-shirt and "sweat pants" or 
"running pants."  His pants contained no unusual bulges, but he 
No. 2006AP102-CR 
 
29 
 
repeatedly reached into his pants pockets.  Johnson instructed 
Sumner not to place his hands in his pockets, but he did not 
comply. 
¶55 We conclude on these facts that an officer in 
Johnson's position would possess the objectively reasonable 
suspicion that Sumner was both armed and dangerous.  The time of 
night, Sumner's initial reaching gestures, the clutter in the 
vehicle, Sumner's lack of identification and suspended driver's 
license, Sumner's nervous demeanor, visible perspiration, and 
other erratic behavior, and the fact that Sumner repeatedly 
reached into his pockets after being instructed not to do so, 
all validate Johnson's reasonable suspicion that Sumner was both 
armed and dangerous under the totality of circumstances.  
¶56 We reject the contention that Johnson's reasonable 
suspicion was obviated by the fact that 15 minutes passed 
between the time of the stop, when Johnson viewed Sumner's 
reaching gestures, and Johnson's protective search of Sumner.  
After 
all, 
Johnson 
had 
kept 
Sumner 
under 
continuous 
surveillance.  The passage of time can be a factor in the 
totality of circumstances, but it is not likely to be a 
determinative factor in establishing or eliminating reasonable 
suspicion for a frisk.  The passage of time may calm the nerves 
of a suspect or build on his apprehension, depending on what the 
suspect is thinking and what he fears may be disclosed.  In the 
same vein, information gained by an officer, including the 
officer's observations during a delay, may dispel or heighten 
the officer's suspicions.  The passage of time will have 
No. 2006AP102-CR 
 
30 
 
different effects if the officer's computer reveals that a 
driver has a spotless record, or a suspended license, or an 
arrest warrant for armed robbery. 
¶57 In a memorable case, State v. Kelsey C.R., 2001 WI 54, 
243 Wis. 2d 422, 626 N.W.2d 777, Milwaukee police officers 
stopped their squad car to speak with a suspected 15-year-old 
runaway.  Id., ¶5.  After answering a few questions, she fled.  
Id.  When the police gave chase and caught her, they gave the 
young woman a citation and clarified her status, promising her 
mother by telephone to give her a ride home.  Id., ¶6.  Before 
transporting her in their squad car, however, the officer wanted 
to perform a pat-down search for their safety.  Id., ¶7.  They 
called for a female officer.  Id.  The officers and the juvenile 
then waited 20 minutes for the female officer to arrive.  Id.  
When she came, the female officer conducted a protective pat-
down search and discovered that Kelsey was carrying a small, 
loaded handgun.  Id.  The passage of 20 minutes did nothing to 
change the fact that Kelsey had concealed a handgun in her 
jeans. 
¶58 In this case, the passage of 15 minutes led to the 
issuance of a citation and increased Sumner's nervousness, 
particularly when Kevin Johnson began to search Sumner's 
vehicle.  The passage of time did not counter the cumulative 
factors for reasonable suspicion. 
¶59 We do not fault Johnson or Kevin Johnson for choosing 
not to order Sumner from the vehicle immediately upon speaking 
with him.  Police officers should be given the discretion to use 
No. 2006AP102-CR 
 
31 
 
their professional judgment and experience to determine when it 
is appropriate to order a suspect from a vehicle to diffuse a 
potential safety threat.  The fact that the deputies chose not 
to do so immediately should not discount the other factors 
indicative of Johnson's reasonable suspicion to frisk Sumner. 
B. 
Circuit Court's Factual Finding Regarding Removal of Napkin 
 
¶60 Before commenting on the second issue presented for 
review, we should address a dispute concerning the circuit 
court's finding of fact regarding who removed the napkin from 
Sumner's pocket.   
¶61 Johnson testified that while he was frisking Sumner he 
became alerted to a lump in Sumner's right rear pocket.  Johnson 
asked what it was, and Sumner replied that it was just a napkin.  
Johnson testified that Sumner then removed the napkin and placed 
it on the trunk of his vehicle.  Johnson remembered the napkin 
as a "Subway" napkin. 
¶62 By contrast, Sumner testified that during the frisk 
Johnson felt something in Sumner's rear, zippered pants pocket.  
Johnson asked what it was, and Sumner replied that it was a 
napkin.  Sumner testified that Johnson then unzipped Sumner's 
pocket, reached in, and pulled out the napkin and opened it.  He 
testified that Johnson asked what was in the napkin, and then 
Johnson reached into Sumner's pocket and pulled out two more 
packets of heroin.  Sumner testified that no packets of heroin 
fell to the ground. 
¶63 Sumner's attorney, Craig Albee, cross-examined Johnson 
about the pat-down:   
No. 2006AP102-CR 
 
32 
 
MR. ALBEE: 
And he had a back pocket on those 
sweat pants?   
JOHNSON: 
Yes.   
MR. ALBEE: 
And you felt something, true?   
JOHNSON: 
True.   
MR. ALBEE: 
Something soft?   
JOHNSON: 
I won't say it was soft.  I felt 
something.   
MR. ALBEE: 
It clearly was not a weapon; true?   
JOHNSON: 
True.   
MR. ALBEE: 
You 
didn't 
know 
what 
it 
was; 
right?   
JOHNSON: 
Correct.   
MR. ALBEE: 
And you asked him what it was?   
JOHNSON: 
Correct.   
MR. ALBEE: 
And then you reached into his 
pocket and took it out.   
JOHNSON: 
No, I didn't.  He reached in and 
put it on the trunk of his car.   
MR. ALBEE: 
So Mr. Sumner reached into his 
pocket and grabbed a napkin, is 
[t]hat what you said?   
JOHNSON: 
Yeah.  He said——He stated it is 
just a napkin, and put it on the 
trunk of his car.   
MR. ALBEE: 
So the reason you were patting Mr. 
Sumner down is because you had 
some concern for safety; is that 
right?   
JOHNSON: 
Correct.   
MR. ALBEE: 
Did you believe he was armed?   
No. 2006AP102-CR 
 
33 
 
JOHNSON: 
I didn't know if he was or not.   
MR. ALBEE: 
Were you suspicious that he was 
armed?   
JOHNSON: 
Could have been.   
MR. ALBEE: 
And that's why you had him put his 
hands in the air?   
JOHNSON: 
Correct.   
MR. ALBEE: 
And you're telling me that you had 
some concern that you might have 
been suspicious that he was armed 
and you let Mr. Sumner reach into 
his pocket himself?   
JOHNSON: 
At that point, yes.   
MR. ALBEE: 
So you're patting him down for 
your safety and you let him bring 
his hands down and reach back into 
his pocket and pull something out 
that you don't know what it is; 
right?   
JOHNSON: 
Correct.  At that point I didn't 
think it was a weapon.   
MR. ALBEE: 
And is that how you were trained 
is to let the suspect reach into 
his 
own 
pockets 
when 
you're 
patting him down for your own 
safety?   
JOHNSON: 
I was in a pat down.  I wasn't 
doing a search.  I wasn't going to 
go in his pocket. 
¶64 The principal object of the suppression hearing was 
the five packets of heroin.  The court was confronted with a 
choice between sharply conflicting testimony about how the 
packets or bindles came to light. 
No. 2006AP102-CR 
 
34 
 
¶65 In its findings of fact, the circuit court stated:  
"The court further finds from the credible testimony that 
[Johnson] directed the defendant to take what was in his pocket 
out because the defendant had responded it was a napkin."  
(Emphasis added.) 
¶66 Admittedly, 
when 
the 
court 
found 
that 
Johnson 
"directed the defendant to take what was in his pocket out," its 
finding was based on an interpretation of testimony.  On a paper 
record, this finding is somewhat disconcerting.   
¶67 Nonetheless, the court said it found the testimony of 
Johnson to be credible and, on several occasions, it adopted 
Johnson's testimony over Sumner's testimony.  The court rejected 
Sumner's testimony that Johnson unzipped his rear pocket and 
took out the napkin.  It rejected the defendant's testimony that 
Johnson immediately opened the napkin that had been placed on 
the trunk.  The court adopted the testimony that Johnson 
continued to frisk Sumner until "he observed two packets fall 
from [Sumner's] pants which were later determined to be 
suspected contraband."  "[L]ater," the court found, "the napkin 
was opened up and it was discovered that there were additional 
packets of suspected contraband."  (Emphasis added.) 
¶68 Irrespective 
of 
how 
the 
napkin 
moved 
from 
the 
defendant's rear pants pocket to the trunk of his vehicle, we 
are presented with the court's finding of fact that the bindles 
that Johnson observed on the ground were found independent of 
and not dependent on the removal of the napkin from Sumner's 
pocket.  The court found that the bindles fell to the ground 
No. 2006AP102-CR 
 
35 
 
from Sumner's pants leg as Johnson proceeded to continue the 
protective search.  The bindles on the ground were observed by 
Johnson and in plain sight.  The incriminating nature of the 
bindles was revealed when Johnson asked Sumner about the bindles 
and was told that they contained heroin.  Sumner then blurted 
out that he was an addict. 
¶69 Although the court's finding that Johnson directed 
Sumner to remove the napkin is troublesome, it does not 
contradict Johnson's sworn testimony, inasmuch as Johnson was 
not asked and did not say whether he had said anything more to 
Sumner than ask what the lump was.  The court may have 
interpreted Johnson's simple question as a request to take the 
napkin out.  We see no useful purpose in remanding this case for 
clarification inasmuch as the court already found that Johnson 
did not open the napkin until after he saw two bindles fall from 
the defendant's pants leg.  The court clearly rejected the 
defendant's testimony on how Johnson found the heroin. 
C. 
Search of the Vehicle 
¶70 The State argues that the court of appeals should not 
have addressed the legality of the search of Sumner's vehicle.   
¶71 The State may believe it was blindsided by the court 
of appeals' decision to address this issue, see Sumner, No. 
2006AP102-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶11 n.5, inasmuch as search 
of the vehicle was barely alluded to in Sumner's brief to the 
court of appeals.  Furthermore, the State's contention that the 
search was justified as an inventory search was not addressed by 
the court of appeals.  On the other hand, because so little 
No. 2006AP102-CR 
 
36 
 
attention was paid to the search of Sumner's vehicle at the 
suppression hearing, the State failed to establish by testimony 
that 
the 
Milwaukee 
County 
Sheriff's 
Department 
has 
an 
established policy on inventory searches of the vehicles it 
tows.25  Because the vehicle search played no part in Sumner's 
conviction, we decline any further discussion of the issue.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶72 We conclude that the protective frisk of Sumner was 
justified by specific, articulable facts supporting a reasonable 
suspicion that Sumner was armed and dangerous.  With regard to 
the search of Sumner's vehicle, we conclude that it was not 
necessary for the court of appeals to address this issue because 
the vehicle search played no part in Sumner's conviction.  
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals. 
¶73 By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 In State v. Weide, 155 Wis. 2d 537, 455 N.W.2d 899 
(1990), we recognized the reasonableness and legality of a 
police inventory search as long as the search was conducted 
pursuant 
to 
departmental 
policy 
and 
for 
inventory, 
not 
investigatory, purposes.  See id. at 550-51.  We rejected the 
argument that the departmental policy regarding an inventory 
search must be in writing and instead upheld an inventory search 
based on the evidence regarding departmental policy that was 
presented at a suppression hearing.  Id. at 549. 
No. 2006AP102-CR 
 
 
 
1