Title: Zapata v. Commonwealth

State: kentucky

Issuer: Kentucky Supreme Court

Document:

RENDERED: APRIL 27, 2017
TO BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky

2016-SC-000020-MR
‘STEVEN ZAPATA APPELLANT

ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE MITCH PERRY, JUDGE
NO. 13-CR-002075

(COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE WRIGHT
VACATING AND REMANDING
Appellant, Steven Zapata, entered a plea under North Carolina v. Alford,
400 U.S. 25, 91 (1970), to one count of murder. In accordance with the plea
agreement, the trial court sentenced Zapata to 24 years’ imprisonment. He
appeals to this Court as a matter of right, Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b), and argues

that the “trial court erred by resolving an involuntary plea issue without taking

 

evidence and without appointing conflict-free counsel.”

I, BACKGROUND
A Jefferson County Grand Jury indicted Zapata on one count of murder
for his wife's death. Before trial, he made a motion under Faretta v. California,

422 U.S. 806 (1975), to be appointed as “co-counse!” in order to “assist his
{counsel] in his defense."! The trial court granted Zapata’s request to act as
hybrid counsel.

Before trial, Zapata entered an Alford plea to one count of murder. “Due
process requires a trial court to make an affirmative showing, on the record,
that a guilty plea is voluntary and intelligent before it may be accepted.”
Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 189 8.W.34 558, 565 (Ky. 2006) (citing Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 241-42 (1969)). The trial court conducted the Boykin
colloquy and explained that Zapata was waiving the right to challenge the
evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and offer evidence in his defense. The
court instructed Zapata that if he entered a guilty plea, “the case is over” and
he could not appeal. Zapata agreed that the Commonwealth had evidence to
prove that he had killed his wife and went ahead with the plea.

However, before sentencing, Zapata's counsel submitted a motion to
withdraw that plea, though she indicated “undersigned counsel takes no
position on this motion.” Zapata filed another motion to withdraw his plea and
for an evidentiary hearing under Edmonds. He asserted an evidentiary hearing
‘is required when, as here, a defendant makes an allegation of ineffective
assistance of counsel that cannot be resolved from referral to the record.” At

the hearing on the motion, Zapata argued, among other things, that his

® Neither party takes issue with the adequacy of the trial court's Faretta
colloquy; however, the parties disagree as to the effect of the trial court's ruling on the
motion. Zapata insists the trial court “never did rule on the Faretta question.”
However, the record shows that, while Zapata had yet to decide which roles he would
assume during trial, the trial court allowed him to act as co-counsel. The only thing
left open was Zapata’s role in the trial.

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‘counsel deceived him when she informed him he could withdraw his plea any
time before sentencing with “no problem” and that his plea was not voluntarily
entered. The trial court conducted @ hearing on the motion; however, it did not
take sworn testimony or allow Zapata to call witnesses or present other

evidence.

 

counsel concerning his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. As the United States Supreme Court held, “a trial is
unfair if the accused is denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial.” United
States v. Cronic, 466 U.S, 648, 659 (1984). This Court recently held that *a
pre-judgment proceeding at which a defendant seeks to withdraw his guilty
plea is a critical stage of the proceedings at which he is entitled to the
assistance of counsel.” Commonwealth v. Tigue, 459 S.W.3d 372, 382 (ky.

 

2015). Furthermore, ‘prejudice is presumed when counsel is burdened by an
actual conflict of interest,” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984)
(citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345-350 (1980).

Zapata's trial counsel did prepare a motion for him to withdraw his plea
and was present at the hearing on that motion. However, she stated that
Zapata's allegations toward her concerning the guilty plea put her in an
awkward position. However, she pointed the trial court to this Court's decision
in Tigue, 459 S.W.3d at 389, and insisted her client had @ right to
representation. She did note that she was unsure of how the fact that Zapata
‘was acting as hybrid counsel complicated the matter. Counsel indicated that

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she would only answer the questions the trial court ordered her to answer, but
“in the interest of representing him” it was “not prudent to offer responses to
those accusations.” When the trial court told the parties they should brief the
issue, Zapata's counsel declined.

‘The trial court determined that, while Zapata had the right to a lawyer at
1 motion to withdraw a guilty plea, his current counsel fulfilled that role.
When Zapata’s counsel asked the trial court if she could “effectively do that
under the circumstances,” the court stated that Zapata was representing
himself “at least in part.” Therefore, the trial court proceeded with the hearing
on the motion to withdraw the plea. Zapata did not ask for substitute counsel
due to his current counsel's conflict. Therefore, that issue is not preserved for

our review. However, Zapata requests palpable error review under RCr 10.26.

 

As this Court pointed out in Tigue, “the defendant is generally entitled to
an evidentiary hearing when it is alleged that the plea was entered
involuntarily.” 459 8.W.3d at 387 (citing Edmonds, 189 S.W.3d at 566). The
exception to this general rule is that ‘[tJhe trial court is free to deny a motion
under RCr 8.10 without an evidentiary hearing, ‘if the allegations in the motion
are inherently unreliable, are not supported by specific facts or are not grounds
for withdrawal even if true.” Ruano v. Commonwealth; No. 2014-SC-000469-
MR, 2015 WL 9243549, at *2 (Ky. Dec. 17, 2015) (quoting United States v.
Harris-Thompson, 751 F.3d 590, 603 (8th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). We
went on to hold in Ruano that “we do not go so far as to say a trial court may

always simply rely on its Boykin colloquy when faced with a motion to

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withdraw a guilty plea; but we do say that a defendant must present a
colorable argument before a trial court is required to hold an evidentiary

hearing on the motion to withdraw a guilty plea.” Jd. Here, just as in Ruano,

 

“the trial court did conduct a hearing during which (Zapatal and his counsel
‘were questioned . .. . However, neither [Zapata] nor his counsel was placed
under oath.”

In denying Zapata's motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing,
‘the trial court relied on the fact that Zapata was “a very sophisticated
defendant, and all along the way in the course of litigating this matter I have
allowed you to participate and communicate with me. And I am certain that
you knew what you were doing on that date and time.” Zapata's counsel had
nothing to add and he was left to argue the motion—which she clearly
‘opposed—alone.

First, as to the trial court's assertion that, because Zapata acted as
hybrid counsel, it was somehow okay for his public defender to have a conflict,
wwe disagree. As this Court held in Deno v. Commonwealth: “The wording of
Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution, unlike that of the similar provision

which appears in the United States Constitution, guarantees a criminal

 

defendant the right: (1) to represent himself pro se; (2) to be represented by
counsel; or (3) to have hybrid representation.” 177 8.W.3d 753, 757 (Ky. 2005)
(footnotes omitted). Zapata’s motion to the court was not to represent himself
pro se, but rather, to act as “co-counsel.” Because he never asked to conduct

his case on his own, but only to assist his court-appointed counsel in doing so,

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the fact that he was acting as hybrid counsel makes no difference to our

 

analysis, If we hold that his attorney had a conflict and was unable to
effectively represent him concerning his motion to withdraw his guilty plea,

then he was d

 

his right to counsel.
‘We will now turn to the facts of this case in order to determine whether
Zapata was deprived of his right to counsel. Zapata's counsel prepared a
motion for him to withdraw his plea (on which she indicated she took no
position), and attended the hearing on that motion. However, she did not
assist him during that hearing. In fact, she indicated to the trial court that she
had concerns about her effectiveness in representing her client due to the
subject of his withdrawal motion, “The decision to seck to withdraw a guilty
plea is not merely trial strategy, and cannot be made by counsel. If'a defendant
has entered a guilty plea and, before entry of final judgment, desires to seek to
withdraw that plea, whether because it was allegedly entered in error, under
duress, or other reason, he is entitled to the assistance of counsel in making
such a request.” Tigue, 459 S.W.3d at 386, We made it clear in Tigue that
“counsel's refusal to assist a client, at least in some circumstances, has the
same effect—a complete denial of counsel—as counsel's physical absence or

being prevented from assisting” Id. at 385. “To stand silent and refuse to act

 

on a decision that is personal to the defendant is no different than not being,
present at all, It is a complete denial of counsel.” id. at 386.
Likely worse than just not assisting her client was counsel's statement

that “in the interest of representing him" it was “not prudent to offer responses

6
to those accusations.” This seems to imply that her responses would be
adverse to her client's interests. This is just the sort of conflict we seek to

avoid. As we also cited approvingly in Tigue:

“to argue in favor of {her| client's motion would require admitting
serious ethical violations and possibly subject (her to liability for
malpractice; on the other hand, ‘ajny contention by counsel that
defendant's allegations were not true would . . . contradict {her}
client.’* Lopez: v. Scully, 58 F.3d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting
United States v. Ellison, 798 F.2d 1102, 1107 (7th Cir.1986)
{alteration and omission in original)

Tigue, 459 S.W.3d at 388. There is no doubt an actual conflict existed in this
case. Zapata's counsel was placed in the untenable position of defending her
own interests which were adverse to her clients.

Apart from the fact that Zapata's case involves hybrid counsel, this case
is on all-fours with our unpublished decision in Ruano, where:

According to Ruano, then, his counsel was given the impossible

role of both defending him while serving as a witness on behalf of

the guilty plea that she herself negotiated. In fact, at the beginning

of the trial court's inquiry, Ruano’s counsel made the trial court

aware that Ruano's decision to withdraw his plea was against her

advice. This alleged error is not preserved for our review, so Ruano
requests palpable-error review.

 

Id, at *3 (Ky. Dec. 17, 2015}. There, we held that the error was palpable,
stating that “[tJo say the trial court’s discussion on the record was not palpable
error would be to overlook our unbroken refrain that an attorney should not
testify at trial.” There was no actual testimony in either Ruano or in Zapata's
case from the attorney, but evidentiary hearings should have been held in both
‘at which the attorneys’ testimony would have been necessary. Therefore, we

hold that the error created a manifest injustice.

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‘The only remaining i

 

sue for this Court is to determine the relief to which
Zapata is entitled. We have addressed that issue in both Tigue and Ruano and
do not depart from our recent precedent here. We will ‘rewind this matter to
the point in time when [Zapata] had already entered his plea but before he was
sentenced. ... Thus, we think mandating a hearing on remand is
inappropriate. Instead, the appropriate remedy is to vacate the judgment but
not, at this point, the guilty plea, and to remand for further proceedings as may

be required, depending on” Zapata's actions. Tigue, 459 S.W.3d at 390.

Ml. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing re

 

ons, we vacate the judgment and the order denying
Zapata's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The case is remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Zapata also filed a
motion to advance or expedite the current appeal. We deny that motion as
moot

All sitting. All concur.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
‘Susan Jackson Balliet
Assistant Public Advocate
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Andy Beshear
‘Attorney General of Kentucky

James Daryl Havey
Assistant Attorney General