Title: People v. Wilson

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 97354-Agenda 12-September 2004.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. DAVID 							
E. WILSON, Appellant.
Opinion filed January 21, 2005. 
	JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
	A jury convicted defendant, David E. Wilson, of two counts of
aggravated criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12-16(f) (West 2000)).
Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court of Clinton County
had erred in allowing the State to introduce other-crimes evidence
from two witnesses whose testimony about defendant's conduct
toward them was similar to the circumstances surrounding the two
charged offenses, but where defendant denied any sexual touching of
the alleged victims. The appellate court affirmed defendant's
convictions, with one justice dissenting. 343 Ill. App. 3d 742. We
allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.
BACKGROUND
	At the time of the alleged offenses, defendant was employed by
Central High School in Breese, Illinois. His primary duties were to
supervise students during in-school suspensions and to act as an
assistant football coach. The two alleged victims were students at the
high school. Count I of the information filed against defendant
charged that he knowingly touched Carol Z.'s breasts for the purpose
of sexual gratification, and count II charged that he knowingly
touched Crystal H.'s breasts for the purpose of sexual gratification.
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude testimony
from Lisa V. and Ashley A., two other female high school students
who had come forward to claim that defendant had sexually abused
them in ways similar to the charged offenses. Defendant alleged that
both students' testimony would involve uncharged conduct and that
the State had not disclosed Ashley A.'s identity to defendant until
three days prior to the scheduled trial date. The trial court denied
defendant's motion, and the case proceeded to trial.
	During defendant's opening statement, defense counsel told the
jury that witnesses against the defendant would complain about
conduct of defendant that occurred mostly in a third-period art class.
He further stated that to show that the alleged touching did not
happen, he would present the testimony of a teacher and several
students of that class who would testify that they had not observed
any physical contact between defendant and the two alleged victims.
Defense counsel then acknowledged that there would be some
evidence presented that would show that defendant touched people.
He then told the jury that "that's the type of person [defendant] is,
that he will occasionally shake people's hands, that he pats them on
the back." Defense counsel concluded his opening remarks by telling
the jury "that if there was ever any type of contact whatsoever
between my client and any of these people who are going to make
complaints against him here that it was simply incidental contact and
it had absolutely no sexual nature whatsoever."
	Crystal H. testified that in March 2001, when she was a 14-year-old high school freshman, she received an in-school suspension. The
in-school suspension room was furnished with desks separated by
room dividers to form cubicles. Crystal was seated at one of these
desks serving a suspension when defendant approached her from
behind and placed his hands around her waist. He then moved his
hands up from under her stomach to touch her breasts from
underneath. As he touched her breasts, he whispered into her ear,
asking her what she was doing there. At the time, there was only one
other person in the room-a student in another cubicle. She noted that
defendant had touched her on other occasions, but this was the only
time he touched her breasts.
	Crystal further testified that after the incident in the in-school
suspension room, defendant touched her on at least 10 other
occasions during art class. On those occasions, defendant came up
from behind her and placed his hands around her stomach with his
crotch area close to her body. She observed defendant hug other girls
in the same way in the art room. She later told several of her friends,
including Carol Z., about what had happened. On March 21, 2001,
Crystal passed a note to another student, describing what defendant
had done to her. The note stated, "I was sitting in ISS and the teacher
comes up behind me and tries to touch me. What a pervert." The note
was intercepted by a teacher and taken to the principal. That day,
Crystal told the principal about defendant's conduct and gave a
statement to the police. At that time, Crystal did not know anything
about Lisa V.
	Carol Z. testified that when she was a 15-year-old sophomore
during the 2000-01 school year, defendant made physical contact with
her in the art room and hallways some 15 times. Some of these times
he approached from behind, but other times he approached from the
front. On some occasions, he hugged her; on others, he held her hand
or touched her lower back. Sometimes he touched her eyes or her lips
or brushed her hair out of her face. She further testified that defendant
touched both her breasts and her buttocks, noting that he was always
"subtle," touching her in such a way that others would not be able to
see that he was doing anything more than hugging her. She also stated
that, on one occasion, defendant asked her about her sex life, which
made her feel uncomfortable.
	Carol further testified that after Crystal's note was intercepted,
Carol told the principal what had happened to her and gave a
statement to police. She had noticed defendant touching other girls,
but did not know if he had touched them on the breasts. However, a
number of other girls, including Ranee T., Mica H., Natalie J. and
Rachel J, told her that the same thing had happened to them. When
questioned, however, those girls did not want to have any part of the
case and would not talk about it. Carol did not know about Lisa V.'s
complaints about defendant.
	Lisa V. testified to three incidents of sexual contact with
defendant that took place in the fall semester of 2000, when she was
a 17-year-old junior. The first time, she was seated at a desk in study
hall, when defendant approached her from behind, grabbed her sides,
and then put his fingers under her breasts so that the sides of his index
fingers touched her breasts. The second time was also in study hall,
and the defendant did the same thing he did the first time. He then sat
across from her, winked at her, and took her daily planner and drew
a picture of a little devil and wrote next to it, "Lisa is a horny devil."
The third incident occurred during a makeup test for chemistry class
just before Christmas break. Defendant was acting as a proctor to
make sure that Lisa did not cheat on the test. During the test,
defendant twice approached her from behind and rubbed her shoulders
and breasts. He then approached her from the left side, put his right
hand on her back, and rubbed his crotch against her arm. She stated
that "there was an obvious bulge in his pants" when he did this. After
the holiday break and after consulting with her family about the
problem, she reported the incident to a school counselor. Defendant
later received a letter of reprimand from the school authorities over
the matter.
	Ashley A. testified about two incidents that occurred with the
defendant, the first when she was a sophomore in the spring of 2000
and the second when she was a junior in November of 2000. The first
physical contact defendant made with her took place in the art room
where she had gone to draw when no class was in session there. She
was sitting at a stool, drawing, when defendant came up from behind
her, brushed his hand against her back, and then stood very close to
her and "rubbed his genital area against her leg." The second incident
took place in study hall. There, she showed a group of friends a new
tattoo she had gotten on her shoulder. She wore a shirt over a tank
top and had pulled the shirt back to expose the tattoo. Defendant
approached the group, and she showed him the tattoo also. He came
from behind her to look at it, then rubbed his hand against her breast.
At the time, she thought it could have been accidental, but in
retrospect, she believed it was intentional. After the last incident, she
tried to avoid defendant as much as she could.
	Sergeant Mike Kreke of the Clinton County sheriff's department
talked to defendant in April 2001, and took a signed, written
statement from him, which is as follows: "It's not uncommon for me
to put my hand on somebody's shoulder while talking to them. I will
sometimes put my hand on the waist or back also. There is no sexual
connotation. To me what I have done is not inappropriate conduct."
Defendant also told the officer that he is a "touchy feely type person."
	Defendant testified on his own behalf. He denied any sexual
contact with the victims, but did not deny touching them. When asked
if he had any contact with Crystal H. in the in-school suspension
room, defendant answered that he "walked over and maybe put [his]
hand on her arm and asked her if she had anything to do." He further
testified that he could not have touched her in the way she described
because the kind of chair she was sitting in made it impossible. A
photograph of the desks and chairs used in the in-school suspension
room was admitted into evidence. The photograph shows that the
chair had a solid back, the height of which was level with the height
of the desk. The chair did not have arms and was not attached to the
desk.
	Defendant acknowledged that he did speak to Carol Z. at times
during her third-period art class. He explained that the art room was
a large, open area with numerous tables, and students would move
around while doing work there. When asked if he had any physical
contact with Carol Z. in the art room, defendant responded, "None
that I can recall."
	When asked if he had any physical contact with Ashley A.,
defendant replied, "None that I am aware of." He denied touching her
breasts. He also stated that he did not remember the incident with the
tattoo at all.
	When asked if he had any physical contact with Lisa V. on the
day of her makeup test, defendant answered, "None that I can recall."
Defendant claimed that because of the structure of the chairs and
closeness of the rows of chairs, it would have been impossible for him
to rub her breasts in the way she described. When asked about the
"horny devil" note in Lisa's school planner, defendant said, "I don't
recall that at all." On cross-examination, defendant was asked whether
he thought Lisa V. was "lying or misinterpreting" when she said
defendant touched her during study hall. Defendant answered,
"Misinterpreting," and then explained that "if ever I did anything to
her [I] just put my arm around her shoulder."
	A number of other witnesses testified on defendant's behalf.
Several students from the art class testified that they did not observe
defendant improperly touch anyone. A couple of students testified that
Carol Z.'s reputation for truthfulness was poor. Mica H. And Rachel
J. testified that defendant had never touched them inappropriately
during third-period art class, and that they had never told anyone that
he had touched them in that manner. Jared F. testified that he dated
Carol Z. during the 2000-01 school year, although they later had an
unfriendly breakup. During that year, Carol told him that defendant
was a pervert, but did not explain it further. Shortly before defendant
was fired, however, she explained to Jared, while crying, that
defendant had been touching her breasts and buttocks, and coming up
behind her and placing his hands on her lower stomach.
	During closing argument, defense counsel argued that the victims
were not telling the truth and that the evidence supported a finding
that defendant never touched them. Similar to assertions he had made
in his opening statement, defense counsel told the jury, "[I]t's possible
there was some incidental touching by [defendant] with these girls but
there is certainly nothing to show that he touched either girl with any
sexual intent." Defendant was convicted on both counts and sentenced
to 180 days in jail and 30 months of probation.
	The appellate court affirmed, finding that the other-crimes
evidence was admissible because it was relevant to show defendant's
modus operandi and to show his intent, which are two recognized
exceptions to the prohibition against other-crimes evidence. 343 Ill.
App. 3d at 748. One justice dissented, believing that the majority's
conclusion was contrary to People v. Bobo, 278 Ill. App. 3d 130 (5th
Dist. 1996), where the court found that the State was prohibited from
presenting evidence of uncharged fondling incidents of students
because the defendant teacher denied touching his accusers, and intent
was therefore not an issue. See 343 Ill. App. 3d at 753-54 (Kuehn, J.,
dissenting). The dissent also believed that the modus operandi
exception was not applicable because the uncharged offenses were not
so similar to the charged offenses as to earmark them as the
handiwork of a single person. 343 Ill. App. 3d at 755-56 (Kuehn, J.,
dissenting).

ANALYSIS
	Defendant argues that the testimony of Lisa V. and Ashley A. did
not fit within any recognized exception to the prohibition against
other-crimes evidence so that it could be introduced at trial.
Defendant further argues that because he denied any improper
touching, his intent was not at issue and the other-crimes evidence
was therefore not admissible. We disagree with both points.
	This court has repeatedly held that evidence of other crimes is
admissible if it is relevant for any purpose other than to show the
defendant's propensity to commit crimes. People v. Heard, 187 Ill. 2d 36, 58 (1999); People v. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d 53, 62 (1995); People
v. Cruz, 162 Ill. 2d 314, 348 (1994); People v. McKibbins, 96 Ill. 2d 176, 182 (1983); People v. McDonald, 62 Ill. 2d 448, 455 (1975);
People v. Dewey, 42 Ill. 2d 148, 157 (1969). For instance, other-crimes evidence is admissible to show modus operandi, intent,
identity, motive or absence of mistake. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d at 62-63;
McKibbins, 96 Ill. 2d  at 182. Other-crimes evidence may also be
permissibly used to show, by similar acts or incidents, that the act in
question was not performed inadvertently, accidently, involuntarily, or
without guilty knowledge. 1 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence §190
(5th ed. 1999). Where such other-crimes evidence is offered, it is
admissible so long as it bears some threshold similarity to the crime
charged. Cruz, 162 Ill. 2d  at 348-49. The admissibility of other-crimes
evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its
decision on the matter will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of
discretion. Heard, 187 Ill. 2d  at 58; People v. Placek, 184 Ill. 2d 370,
385 (1998).
	In the present case, the other-crimes testimony of Lisa and Ashley
fit squarely within the recognized exceptions, which allow such
evidence to show defendant's intent or to show that the acts in
question were not performed inadvertently, accidently, involuntarily,
or without guilty knowledge. Defendant was charged with two counts
of aggravated criminal sexual abuse pursuant to section 12-16(f) of
the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/12-16(f) (West
2000)). That section provides that "[t]the accused commits
aggravated criminal sexual abuse if he or she commits an act of sexual
conduct with a victim who was at least 13 years of age but under 18
years of age when the act was committed and the accused was 17
years of age or over and held a position of trust, authority or
supervision in relation to the victim." 720 ILCS 5/12-16(f) (West
2000). "Sexual conduct" is defined by section 12-12(e) of the Code
as "any intentional or knowing touching or fondling by the victim or
the accused, either directly or through clothing, of the sex organs,
anus or breast of the victim or the accused *** for the purpose of
sexual gratification or arousal of the victim or the accused." 720 ILCS
5/12-12(e) (West 2000).
	Aggravated criminal sexual abuse, as it was charged here, is a
specific-intent crime-the State must show defendant intentionally or
knowingly touched the victim on the breast for purposes of sexual
gratification. In cases involving specific-intent crimes, some courts
hold that intent is automatically at issue for purposes of deciding
whether to admit other-crimes evidence, regardless of whether the
defendant has made intent an issue in the case. See, e.g., People v.
Deenadayalu, 331 Ill. App. 3d 442, 448 (2002) (other-crimes
evidence is relevant in a specific-intent sexual assault prosecution to
prove defendant's intent or lack of an innocent frame of mind,
distinguishing other cases to the contrary on the basis that those cases
involved child victims); United States v. Monzon, 869 F.2d 338, 344
(7th Cir. 1989) (intent is always at issue when the crime charged
requires proof of specific intent, but in this case the proffered other-crimes evidence was inadmissible because nothing showed that it was
relevant to that intent); see also Commonwealth v. Seiders, 531 Pa.
592, 596-97, 614 A.2d 689, 691 (1992) (holding in part that intent
was not an issue in the case because intent was not an element of the
offense for which defendant was charged). Other courts have taken
the opposite approach. See, e.g., State v. Lipka, 174 Vt. 377, 391-92,
817 A.2d 27, 39-40 (2002) (intent was not "genuinely in issue" even
though the sexual assault charge at issue was a specific-intent crime;
this was because no jury that believed the sexual acts testified to by
the victim could have believed that they happened accidentally).
	Defendant is mistaken that his intent was not at issue simply
because he maintained that he had never actually touched the victims'
breasts. Defendant's argument ignores the inferences that can be
drawn from the testimony of the witnesses and the statements made
by his counsel during opening and closing argument. Defendant
testified that he liked to touch students. There was evidence presented
that he was a "touchy feely type person," who often placed his hands
on students. The victims' testimony indicated that defendant's sexual
touching was subtle. Defendant himself testified that one of the
victims "misinterpreted" his actions in touching her breasts. The jury
could have believed that defendant was either mistaken or lying about
his touching of female students in a sexual manner. Apparently aware
of this possibility, defense counsel acknowledged that defendant is the
kind of person that touches people, but even if there was contact with
the victims, it was merely incidental contact and not for sexual
arousal. Thus, defense counsel raised motive, intent and the possibility
that any of the complained-of touching was inadvertent in such a way
that the jury could acquit defendant even if it believed that he actually
touched the victims' breasts. A defendant may not use ambiguity by
denying commission of the act that comprises the offense, thereby
seeking to bar other-crimes evidence, while at the same time leaving
room to argue lack of intent to the jury. United States v. Colon, 880 F.2d 650, 659 (2d Cir. 1989). Under the circumstances presented
here, we find that defendant's intent was a genuine issue in the case.
	The principal cases relied upon by defendant are easily
distinguishable, as the actions of the defendants in those cases were
much more overt, and there was no question as to whether the acts
happened accidentally or with the requisite intent if they happened at
all. In People v. Bobo, 278 Ill. App. 3d 130 (1996), the defendant
took a female student into his office, moved his hand to her breast,
attempted to kiss her against her violent protests, and then informed
her that if she changed her mind, she knew where to find him. Bobo
held that evidence of other sexual misconduct with students was
unnecessary to show intent, guilty knowledge, accident, or absence of
mistake because these factors were clearly shown by the testimony
concerning the act itself. Bobo, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 133. Similarly, in
People v. Woltz, 228 Ill. App. 3d 670 (1992), there was no doubt as
to defendant's intent or whether the defendant's conduct was an
accident because it was alleged that the defendant inserted his finger
into the victim's vagina. In other words, no reasonable jury could have
believed that the charged events happened accidentally or
unintentionally. Moreover, the crime charged in Woltz did not require
proof of the defendant's intent. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par.
12-14(b)(1). In contrast to Bobo and Woltz, defendant's actions here
were much more subtle. The jury had to resolve whether defendant
may have inadvertently or accidentally touched the victim's breasts,
and therefore lacked any purpose of sexual arousal. We hold that in
this kind of case, evidence of other offenses similar to the charged
offenses may be admissible to show defendant's intent and to show
that the touching was not incidental or accidental.
	Furthermore, we note that this case is more like People v. Novak,
163 Ill. 2d 93 (1994), and People v. Deenadayalu, 331 Ill. App. 3d
442 (2002), than Bobo and Woltz. In Novak, the defendant blind-folded the 10-year-old victim and then sexually assaulted him under
the guise of applying various strength and flexibility exercises to
improve the victim's baseball skills. The defendant in Novak placed an
innocent construction on his acts, and argued that the testimony of
three other children could not be used to prove defendant's guilty
knowledge or intent. This court rejected defendant's contention,
holding that evidence of the commission of other crimes is admissible
when such evidence is relevant to prove any of the following: modus
operandi, intent, identity, motive, or absence of mistake. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d  at 117.
	In Deenadayalu, the criminal sexual abuse complaint brought
against the defendant physician alleged that he rubbed his genitals
against the leg of the victim for purposes of sexual arousal. The
defendant denied the conduct and placed an innocent construction on
his actions. The appellate court held that evidence of other similar
sexual conduct committed by the defendant was admissible because
intent and absence of mistake were crucial issues in the case.
Deenadayalu, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 449.
	Similarly, defendant in the present case attempted to place an
innocent construction on his acts: he claimed he did not touch breasts,
but that he was a touchy-feely person and his actions may have been
"misinterpreted." Novak and Deenadayalu are strong support for the
conclusion that the evidence in the present case was properly
admitted.
	Additionally, we note that less similarity between the facts of the
crimes charged and the other offenses is required when the evidence
is admitted to show intent, lack of accident or any other exception
other than modus operandi. In cases where evidence of other crimes
is offered, however, to establish modus operandi, a higher degree of
similarity between the facts of the crimes charged and the other
offenses is required. Cruz, 162 Ill. 2d  at 349. This higher degree of
similarity is necessary because modus operandi refers to a pattern of
criminal behavior so distinctive that separate crimes are recognized as
the handiwork of the same person. Cruz, 162 Ill. 2d  at 349.
Nevertheless, courts have acknowledged that even where evidence of
other crimes is offered to prove modus operandi, some dissimilarity
between the crimes will always be apparent. Cruz, 162 Ill. 2d  at 349;
People v. Taylor, 101 Ill. 2d 508, 521 (1984). But again, the same
degree of similarity is not necessary when evidence of the other crimes
can be offered, as is the case here, for some valid purpose other than
to show modus operandi. Cruz, 162 Ill. 2d  at 349. Instead, mere
general areas of similarity will be sufficient to allow the evidence to be
admitted in such cases. Cruz, 162 Ill. 2d at 349-50; Mckibbins, 96 Ill. 2d  at 185-86.
	Here, the uncharged crimes shared ample similarity to the
charged crimes. All of the offenses, both charged and uncharged,
occurred at the same high school, during school hours, and in the
course of the same one-year period from the spring of 2000 to the
spring of 2001. All four female students testified that defendant
approached them from behind before rubbing their breasts. Lisa's
testimony that defendant placed his hands on her side, and then put the
sides of his fingers on the lower part of her breast was nearly identical
to the facts of the charged offense involving Crystal, who testified that
defendant moved his hands from her stomach to touch her breasts
from underneath. Furthermore, both Lisa's and Ashley's testimony
that defendant rubbed his crotch or genital area against their bodies
was similar to Crystal's testimony that defendant placed his crotch
area close to her body. Perhaps most importantly, however, all of the
incidents involved a subtlety that would afford defendant an
opportunity to argue that the victims had "misinterpreted" his actions
if any complaints were made. Under these circumstances, we find that
the other-crimes evidence shared sufficient general similarity to be
admissible. We further find that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that the probative value of the evidence
outweighed any undue prejudice to defendant.
	Lastly, we note the State's argument that Lisa's and Ashley's
testimony was admissible under section 115-7.3 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115-7.3 (West 2002)),
which became effective January 1, 1998. Section 115-7.3 provides in
relevant part:
			"This Section applies to criminal cases in which:
				(1) the defendant is accused of *** aggravated criminal
sexual abuse ***
* * *
			(b) If the defendant is accused of an offense set forth in
paragraph (1) *** evidence of the defendant's commission of
another offense *** may be considered for its bearing on any
matter to which it is relevant.
			(c) In weighing the probative value of the evidence against
undue prejudice to the defendant, the court may consider:
				(1) the proximity in time to the charged or predicate
offense;
				(2) the degree of factual similarity to the charged or predicate offense; or
				(3) other relevant facts and circumstances.
			(d) In a criminal case in which the prosecution intends to
offer evidence under this Section, it must disclose the
evidence, including statements of witnesses or a summary of
the substance of any testimony, at a reasonable time in
advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial
notice on good cause shown." 725 ILCS 5/115-7.3 (West
2002).
	In People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 176 (2003), we recently
found that this statute enables courts to admit evidence of other
crimes to show a defendant's propensity to commit sex offenses if the
requirements of the statute are met. We further noted that to be
admissible under this statute, the other-crimes evidence should have
some threshold similarity to the charged crime. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d  at
184. As factual similarities increase, so does the relevance or
probative value. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d  at 184. However, where such
evidence can be offered for something other than modus operandi,
mere general areas of similarity will suffice. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d  at
184.
	Defendant argues that the State waived any reliance upon the
statute by failing to raise it before the trial court. Additionally,
defendant asserts that the State did not timely disclose Ashley's
testimony, as it did not disclose her until three days before trial and
there was no ruling by the trial court of "good cause shown," as is
required by the statute.
	We find it unnecessary to address these arguments, however,
because of our conclusion that the evidence was otherwise admissible
under our common law analysis.

CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in admitting the other-crimes evidence in this
case. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
Affirmed.



JUSTICE KILBRIDE, dissenting:
	I agree with the majority that other-crimes evidence is not
admissible if it is relevant only to establish the defendant's propensity
to commit crimes and that it remains admissible only to show identity,
motive, modus operandi, or absence of mistake. People v. Robinson,
167 Ill. 2d 53, 62-63 (1995). Here, however, I believe the majority
errs by holding that the testimony of Lisa V. and Ashley A. was
admissible to show intent and absence of mistake. Slip op. at 7. In my
view, neither exception is applicable, and therefore, I respectfully
dissent.
	Defendant was specifically charged with touching the victims'
breasts for sexual gratification. Defendant did not argue that he
touched the victims' breasts inadvertently or by mistake, or that he
had no sexual purpose in touching them. Indeed, even the majority
acknowledges that defendant denied touching the victims' breasts at
all. Slip op. at 8.
	Instead, the majority contends defendant's denial ignores the
inferences that could be drawn from the witnesses' testimony and the
arguments of defense counsel. Slip op. at 8. The majority asserts the
evidence established that defendant "liked to touch students" and
reasons the jury could have inferred that he was either lying or
mistaken about touching the victims' breasts. Slip op. at 8. The
majority also suggests defense counsel's awareness of this possibility
prompted counsel's argument that if defendant had touched students
it was merely incidental contact. This argument, according to the
majority, constituted an attempt to use ambiguity "to bar other-crimes
evidence, while at the same time leaving room to argue lack of intent
to the jury." Slip op. at 8-9. I disagree and believe the majority's
conclusions represent unjustified extensions of the actual evidence in
this case.
	For example, in his statement to police, defendant stated that it
was not uncommon for him to put his hand on a shoulder while talking
to someone and that he sometimes puts his hand on a waist or back
because he is a "touchy feely type person." Slip op. at 4. He did not
say, and the evidence did not show, that he just "liked to touch
students," as the majority suggestively summarizes the testimony. See
slip op. at 8. In his testimony concerning the complainants in this case,
defendant stated only that he might have put his hand on Crystal H.'s
arm. He did not indicate he may have also touched her breast and then
later attempt to justify his conduct by saying the act was inadvertent.
	As justification for admitting the other-crimes evidence, the
majority also cites defendant's testimony "that one of the victims
'misinterpreted' his actions in touching her breasts" because "[t]he
jury could have believed that defendant was either mistaken or lying
about his touching of female students in a sexual manner." Slip op. at
8. The majority implies that the "victim" who may have misinterpreted
defendant's actions was one of the complainants, but that is not the
case. As noted in the fact section (slip op. at 5), the purported
"victim" was Lisa V., who was not one of the complainants in this
matter and who provided some of the other-crime testimony at the
heart of this appeal. Using defendant's cross-examination responses
concerning the substance of other-crimes testimony to justify the
initial admission of that other-crimes testimony defies logic.
	In addition, the mere possibility suggested by the majority that
the jury might determine defendant is mistaken or lying about his
actions fails to justify the admission of the other-crimes evidence. See
slip op. at 8. The jury is always required to make credibility
determinations. That truism alone cannot justify the admission of the
other-crimes evidence in this case.
	Indeed, defendant's testimony actually belies any attempt to
justify an incidental touching of either Crystal H. or Carol Z.
Defendant testified that the seating arrangements in the in-school
suspension room precluded the type of contact claimed by Crystal H.
Slip op. at 4. Defendant's assertion that the alleged contact was not
physically possible cannot support a reasonable inference that the
contact may have occurred but was merely accidental.
	Similarly, in the case of Carol Z., defendant did not acknowledge
ever having any physical contact with her. Slip op. at 5. Again, his
testimony provides no rational basis for a jury to infer that defendant
may have accidentally touched her breast, as charged in the
information. Defendant's testimony did not justify the majority's
conclusion that the jury could have inferred that he accidentally
touched the complainants' breasts.
	In a closely related point, the majority also notes defense
counsel's argument that any physical contact with the victims was
merely incidental. The majority contends that defendant thus raised the
issues of motive and intent and intended to use ambiguity unfairly to
defendant's advantage. In reaching this conclusion, however, the
majority ignores the precise nature of the charged conduct, namely,
the touching of two minors' breasts, as well as the context of the
argument. When viewed in the context of the actual evidence
presented by the defense, counsel's argument simply summarizes
defendant's testimony that he may have touched Crystal H.'s arm and
attempts to counter the undue prejudice created by the admission of
the other-crimes evidence after the trial court's denial of defendant's
motion in limine. At no time did defendant lead the jury to believe he
may have also touched either Crystal H. or Carol Z. on the breast-but
only incidentally. There was no ambiguity on that point. Accordingly,
defense counsel's argument could not have been seeking an unfair
advantage from any ambiguity concerning defendant's intent in
touching the victims' breasts, contrary to the majority's reasoning.
Counsel's argument necessarily attempted to offset the adverse
inferences created by the improper admission of the other-crimes
evidence. There is no basis for concluding the argument was imposed
for an improper purpose.
	Next, the majority rejected defendant's reliance on People v.
Bobo, 278 Ill. App. 3d 130 (1996), and People v. Woltz, 228 Ill. App.
3d 670 (1992), claiming that the charged conduct in those cases was
more overt than the "subtle" actions in this case. Slip op. at 9. The
primary analyses in those decisions, however, actually focused on the
defendants' denial of the charged acts and the similarity of the other-crimes evidence to the facts in the case.
	In Bobo, the other-crimes evidence was offered at the defendant's
aggravated criminal sexual abuse trial "to show intent and/or motive
and/or knowledge." Bobo, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 132-33. The court
reasoned that because the defendant denied the charged contact and
did not attempt to excuse it as accidental, the other-crimes evidence
"served only to demonstrate defendant's alleged propensity to sexually
assault or harass female students." Bobo, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 133. In
reversing the defendant's conviction due to the "highly prejudicial"
nature of the erroneously admitted other-crimes evidence, the court
noted that while two incidents with other students "reveal[ed] several
similarities," "[m]uch of the evidence lacked any similarity to the
incident at bar, other than that it involved the alleged fondling of a
female student at the hands of defendant." Bobo, 278 Ill. App. 3d at
133. The same may be said in this case, where the charged and
uncharged conduct are similar only in the broadest of terms.
	In Woltz, the trial court admitted other-crimes evidence, in
relevant part, to show absence of mistake. Woltz, 228 Ill. App. 3d at
671. The appellate court rejected that ground, reasoning that the
defendant denied the charged conduct. Since the defendant did not
claim the acts may have occurred accidentally, there was no need to
refute that claim by the use of other-crimes evidence. Woltz, 228 Ill.
App. at 674. In the instant case, defendant also denies the alleged
contact, again making it unnecessary to admit other-crimes evidence
on the basis of lack of intent or absence of mistake. In addition, the
Woltz court did not rely on the obvious nature of the charged acts in
its decision. The majority's insistence that the overt nature of the
charged acts was determinative in this case is misplaced. See slip op.
at 9.
	My disagreement with the majority also extends to its heavy
reliance on People v. Deenadayalu, 331 Ill. App. 3d 442 (2002), and
People v. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d 93 (1994). Slip op. at 9. As even the
majority acknowledges in a parenthetical note, Deenadayalu
specifically distinguished cases holding that evidence of other crimes
is not relevant "on the basis that those cases involved child victims."
Slip op. at 8. See also Deenadayalu, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 449. Since
Deenadayalu explicitly distinguished cases such as the instant one
involving child victims, the majority's reliance on the rationale in that
case is seriously, if not fatally, flawed.
	The majority's reliance on Novak is also ill-advised. In Novak, the
defendant did not appeal the admission of the other-crimes testimony.
Rather, he argued that the jury instruction limiting the use of the
other-crimes evidence to the issue of modus operandi and intent was
inapplicable because he had provided "an innocent construction of his
acts." Novak, 163 Ill. 2d  at 116. Notably, he did not wholly disavow
the acts. Here, defendant did not attempt to impose "an innocent
construction" on his acts. Instead, defendant denied that he had
touched the complainants' breasts at all. That distinction alone is
sufficient to erode confidence in the majority's position. Thus, rather
than providing "strong support" that other-crimes evidence was
admissible under the circumstances in this case as the majority claims
(slip op. at 10), Novak and Deenadayalu significantly undermine the
majority's position.
	Furthermore, Deenadayalu is also damaging to the majority
opinion in yet another way. In addition to its express recognition that
its holding does not apply to cases such as the instant one where the
victims are children, Deenadayalu relied on cases that admitted other-crimes evidence based on far more numerous and specific similarities
than are present here. See Deenadayalu, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 448. The
Deenadayalu court discusses People v. Luczak, 306 Ill. App. 3d 319,
325 (1999), where the appellate court remarked that the two crimes
at issue "were remarkably similar." In each instance, the female
victims were walking when offered a ride by defendant, who "drove
each victim to a secluded alley in the same area of Chicago," attacked
each woman in his car, threatened to throw her into the lake or river,
called each victim a "tease" and other similar names, assaulted the
victims in the same manner, talked to each about his connection to the
Latin Kings, and, after the attack, drove the victim to her original
destination. Luczak, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 325.
		Deenadayalu also relies on People v. Harris, 297 Ill. App. 3d
1073 (1998), noting "the similarities between the two crimes-the
victims were abducted in the same area, driven to a similar location,
assaulted, and returned to locations near to where they lived and from
where they had been taken." Deenadayalu, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 448.
Finally, Deenadayalu discusses People v. Johnson, 239 Ill. App. 3d
1064 (1992), acknowledging "numerous similarities between the other
conduct and the charged offense, including that both victims were
abducted in the same manner and both victims were beaten, choked,
and bitten." Deenadayalu, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 448.
	In contrast, here the only similarities the majority cites between
the charged and uncharged conduct are: (1) the general setting,
namely a full calendar year at a public high school; (2) approaching the
victims from behind; and (3) the "subtlety" defendant allegedly
employed in the assaults. Slip op. at 11. The majority relies most
heavily on the third factor. Slip op. at 8-9, 11. That claimed similarity
is particularly suspect because it would be highly likely that any
potential perpetrator of sexual abuse in a busy public high school who
wished not to be immediately apprehended would indeed be
surreptitious in his conduct. That factor adds little weight in the
analysis.
	Likewise, it is not particularly notable that the alleged abuse took
place in the same general location and time frame. While the incidents
occurred during school hours, on school grounds, they encompassed
a one-year time frame and a variety of settings on the school grounds,
including an in-school suspension room with another student present,
an art room both with and without the presence of an ongoing class,
a study hall with other students present, and a room being used for a
makeup test. Thus, the specific circumstances and locations varied
widely within the broad perimeters of the school. Again, little weight
can justifiably be given to this purported "similarity."
	As for the allegation that defendant consistently approached the
victims from behind, that was not the case with complainant Carol Z.,
who testified that she was approached from both the back and the
front. Slip op. at 3. While the direction of approach was similar in
some incidents, that factor alone is far from being determinative given
the tremendous prejudicial effect the other-crimes evidence likely had
on the jury. See People v. Rogers, 324 Ill. 224, 229-30 (1926)
(recognizing the underlying basis for the common law rule against the
admission of other-crimes evidence as the concern that average jurors
will give that evidence too much weight and convict a defendant on
the basis of prior or cumulative conduct instead of the facts proven in
support of the charged offense).
	Moreover, the differences between the charged and uncharged
acts are far more distinctive and numerous than the claimed
similarities. Both Lisa V. and Ashley A. testified to a large number of
incidents involving no factual similarity to the charged conduct besides
being in the same school during school hours. As stated previously, in
all but one incident reported by Lisa and Ashley the uncharged
misconduct took place during study hall. Notably, none of the charged
incidents occurred in study hall. More importantly, the type of abuse
alleged varied dramatically in the charged and uncharged acts. The
information filed against defendant limited the charged acts to
touching breasts, but the uncharged incidents ranged from that to
rubbing genitals on various parts of the victims' bodies to suggestive
winking followed by the making of lascivious drawings and text.
Surely that range of conduct does not comport with the degree of
similarity required in Deenadayalu, relied on the majority, or by
Luczak, Johnson, and Harris, all cited with approval in Deenadayalu.
	Admittedly, less similarity is required in cases not involving the
question of modus operandi. Slip op. at 12. Nonetheless, the distinct
lack of much factual similarity at all between the charged and
uncharged acts is the most troubling aspect of the majority opinion. I
am deeply concerned that under the precedent set in this case, the
traditionally limited exceptions will be construed so broadly as to all
but swallow up our long-standing prohibition against the use of other-crimes evidence. See People v. Rogers, 324 Ill. 224, 229-30 (1926).
The majority's perfunctory conclusion that any undue prejudice to
defendant is outweighed by the probative value of the other-crimes
evidence (slip op. at 11) does little to assuage my concerns. For these
reasons, I must respectfully dissent.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN joins in this dissent.