Title: GERMANY v. STATE

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

GERMANY v. STATE2000 WY 49999 P.2d 63Case Number: 99-78Decided: 03/16/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
FRANKIE GERMANY, 
Appellant (Defendant), v.THE STATE OF WYOMING, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Laramie County, Honorable Edward L. Grant, 
Judge.

Sylvia Lee 
Hackl, State Public Defender; and Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel, 
representing appellant.Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. 
Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General; and Robin Sessions Cooley, Senior Assistant Attorney General, 
representing appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN & HILL, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1] Appellant 
Frankie Germany appeals from the judgment and sentence entered by the trial 
court after a jury found him guilty of burglary and conspiracy to commit 
burglary.

[¶2] We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3] Germany 
presents the following issues for our consideration:

ISSUE 
I.

Was Appellant denied his 
constitutional right to a speedy trial under the United States Constitution, 
Sixth Amendment, and the Wyoming State Constitution, art. 1 § 10 when the trial 
court denied his motion to dismiss for violating W.R.Cr.P. 
48?

ISSUE 
II.

Did the trial court abuse 
its discretion when it allowed the admission of evidence regarding a fabricated 
alibi witness who testified in another case under W.R.E. 404(b) and the evidence 
of a prior burglary which was not unique nor peculiar?

ISSUE 
III.

Did the trial court 
improperly g[i]ve a flight instruction when identity was the only issue and 
improperly direct a verdict on an element of the crime?

FACTS

[¶4] In early 
October 1996, Germany and his ex-wife, Tamara Foster, traveled from Los Angeles, 
California, to Cheyenne in a rented car. Germany informed Foster that they were 
going to Cheyenne because "Wyoming owe[d] him." They arrived in Cheyenne on 
October 3, 1996, and checked into a motel under assumed names. Germany and 
Foster then drove around the city, looking for a jewelry store. They located 
Burri Jewelers, which was closed at the time. Germany got out of the car and 
looked into the store windows in the front and back of the building. Later that 
night, Germany and Foster drove from the jewelry store to the motel several 
times, searching for the best route between the two locations. They subsequently 
returned to their motel room and placed wire hangers through the tops of three 
pillowcases to make the pillowcases stand open.

[¶5] In the 
early morning hours of October 4, 1996, Germany and Foster returned to Burri 
Jewelers and parked behind the building. Germany broke one of the store windows 
with a crowbar, and the couple crawled into the store through the broken window. 
Germany broke the jewelry display cases with the crowbar, and he and Foster 
scooped the jewelry into the pillowcases.

[¶6] When 
Germany broke the store window, he activated an alarm which summoned law 
enforcement officers to the jewelry store. Germany and Foster were leaving the 
store when an officer arrived. Germany ran to their car, but Foster was tackled 
by the officer. Germany drove away in the car and, in the process, ran over 
Foster's knee.

[¶7] Germany 
checked out of the motel room at approximately 4:00 a.m. on October 4, 1996. 
Foster was arrested, and she gave a statement to the police, implicating Germany 
in the burglary. Germany was arrested on December 10, 1997, and he was charged 
with aggravated burglary and conspiracy to commit burglary. The trial court held 
a jury trial on July 7, 1998, through July 10, 1998. Germany insisted that he 
was in Las Vegas, Nevada, when the burglary occurred and that Foster had wrongly 
accused him of the crimes. The jury found him not guilty of aggravated burglary 
but found him guilty of simple burglary and conspiracy to commit burglary. The 
trial judge entered a judgment consistent with the jury's verdict and sentenced 
Germany to the Wyoming State Penitentiary. Germany subsequently perfected his 
appeal to the Wyoming Supreme Court.

DISCUSSION

A. Speedy 
Trial

[¶8] Germany 
contends that the trial court violated his right to have a speedy trial when it 
continued his trial to a date more than 120 days after the date of his 
arraignment. The state claims that the trial court complied with the 
requirements of W.R.Cr.P. 48. We agree with the state.

[¶9] W.R.Cr.P. 
48(b) protects a criminal defendant's constitutional right to receive a speedy 
trial. Newport v. State, 983 P.2d 1213, 1217 (Wyo. 1999). W.R.Cr.P. 48(b) states 
in pertinent part:

(b) Speedy trial. 
-

(1) It is the 
responsibility of the court, counsel and the defendant to insure that the 
defendant is timely tried.

(2) A criminal charge 
shall be brought to trial within 120 days following arraignment unless continued 
as provided in this rule.

(3) The following periods 
shall be excluded in computing the time for trial:

(A) All proceedings 
related to the mental illness or deficiency of the 
defendant;

(B) Proceedings on 
another charge;

(C) Delay granted by the 
court pursuant to paragraph (4) or (5);

(D) The time between the 
dismissal and the refiling of the same charge; and

(E) Delay occasioned by 
defendant's change of counsel or application therefor.

(4) Continuances not to 
exceed six months from the date of arraignment may be granted by the trial court 
as follows:

(A) On motion of 
defendant supported by affidavit; or

(B) On motion of the 
attorney for the state or the court if:

(i) The defendant 
expressly consents;

(ii) The state's evidence 
is unavailable and the prosecution has exercised due diligence; 
or

(iii) Required in the due 
administration of justice and the defendant will not be substantially 
prejudiced; and

(C) If a continuance is 
proposed by the state or the court, the defendant shall be notified. If the 
defendant objects, the defendant must show in writing how the delay may 
prejudice the defense.

[¶10] The trial 
court arraigned Germany on January 13, 1998, and scheduled his trial to begin on 
March 9, 1998. The court made it clear to the parties, however, that the trial 
setting was stacked and Germany's trial was scheduled behind a number of other 
trials which were also set for that day. The order setting the trial 
specifically addressed the possibility that Germany's trial would not be held on 
March 9, 1998:

This case is hereby, and 
one or more others have been or may be[,] set for jury trial on the 9th day of 
March, 1998, at 9:00 a.m. If on that date, this case and one or more others 
remain for trial (have not been disposed of by plea or agreement for plea) one 
will go to trial and the others will be continued, pursuant to Rule 48(b), 
W.R.Cr.P.

[¶11] Between 
the date of this Order and the trial date, the attorneys for the State and the 
Defendant shall confer with one another and Louise Anderson of the Court to 
determine which of the remaining cases will be tried on the trial date above and 
which will be continued. 

[¶12] If any 
subsequent trial date to which the captioned case is continued is more than 120 
days after the date of arraignment, and if the attorney for the defendant 
objects on the basis of Rule 48, the attorney shall forthwith file and serve on 
other counsel and the Judge, a statement of how, if at all, the delay may 
prejudice the defense. If prejudice is shown, counsel and the Court will confer 
concerning an alternative setting.

[¶13] The 
prosecutor notified the trial court and the defense counsel on February 27, 
1998, that Germany's trial would probably need to be rescheduled because other 
cases which were scheduled ahead of Germany's on March 9, 1998, were going to 
proceed to trial. The trial judge indicated that he and the attorneys needed to 
confer, in a timely fashion, about an alternate trial 
date.

[¶14] On April 
30, 1998, the trial court entered an order scheduling Germany's trial to begin 
on June 8, 1998. The defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss on May 13, 1998, 
stating that Germany's constitutional right to receive a speedy trial had been 
violated. The grounds for the motion to dismiss are somewhat obscure because the 
motion was primarily concerned with issues involving Germany's extradition from 
California and the delay in bringing him to Cheyenne to face the charges in this 
case. At a hearing on May 27, 1998, the defense counsel notified the trial court 
that he could not attend a trial on June 8, 1998. The trial court reset 
Germany's trial for July 7, 1998, and remarked:

There have been a number 
of previous trial settings in this matter which simply couldn't take place 
because there was not - it wasn't possible in view of the other matters facing 
the Court, and pursuant to the appropriate rule the matter was reset from time 
to time. But we are now at a point where I think we have to have an absolutely 
firm trial date, and from the Court's point of view, that will be the 7th of 
July.

[¶15] Germany 
filed a pro se motion objecting to the trial court's decision to reset the trial 
date for July 7, 1998. The trial began, as scheduled, on July 7, 
1998.

[¶16] One 
hundred seventy-four days passed between Germany's arraignment and his trial. In 
order to determine whether W.R.Cr.P. 48(b) was violated, we must look at the 
reasons for the delay in bringing him to trial. The parties agree that the 
twenty-nine days between June 8 and July 7, 1998, must be excluded from the 
calculation of time under W.R.Cr.P. 48(b) because the continuance was granted 
pursuant to the defense attorney's request.

[¶17] The trial 
court changed the trial date from March 9, 1998, to June 8, 1998, because other 
cases, which were scheduled ahead of Germany's case, were going to be tried on 
March 9, 1998. The first continuance was, therefore, "[r]equired in the due 
administration of justice" because of the crowded nature of the trial court's 
docket. W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(4)(B)(iii); see also McDaniel v. State, 945 P.2d 1186, 
1187 (Wyo. 1997). The trial court's decision to grant the first continuance was 
appropriate, and the court complied with the time limitations set out in 
W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(4) because Germany's trial was held within six months after his 
arraignment.

[¶18] Germany 
also failed to make an adequate showing that he was prejudiced by the pretrial 
delays. W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(4)(C) provides that, if a defendant objects to a 
continuance, he must show in writing how the delay will prejudice his defense. 
Germany filed several motions, claiming his constitutional right to receive a 
speedy trial had been violated. His early motions pertained primarily to his 
claim that his constitutional rights were violated when, after his extradition 
from California, the authorities took him to the Wyoming State Penitentiary to 
attend a parole violation hearing rather than bringing him directly to Cheyenne 
to face the charges in this case. Germany's concerns about the delay in bringing 
him to Cheyenne are not relevant to our W.R.Cr.P. 48(b) analysis because he had 
not been arraigned at the time the alleged delays occurred. In his later speedy 
trial filings, Germany complained about the amount of time that transpired after 
his arraignment while he was awaiting trial. He did not, however, explain 
precisely how he was prejudiced by the delay. He said he lost track of alibi 
witnesses, but he made that claim of prejudice in association with the manner of 
his extradition. Furthermore, he was able to present evidence at trial in 
support of his alibi. Even at the appellate stage, Germany does not set out 
specifically how he was prejudiced by the delay in commencing his 
trial.

[¶19] Germany 
directs us to Detheridge v. State, 963 P.2d 233 (Wyo. 1998), in support of his 
claim that the trial court should have dismissed his case because his right to 
receive a speedy trial was violated. In Detheridge, the defendant's initial 
trial date passed, and neither the prosecution nor the trial court made a 
meaningful effort to reset the trial date or to secure a continuance in 
accordance with W.R.Cr.P. 48(b). 963 P.2d  at 234. In this case, by contrast, the 
prosecutor and the trial court were concerned about the delays, and the trial 
court took appropriate steps to ensure that Germany's right to receive a speedy 
trial was protected. The facts of this case do not evince the callous disregard 
of the speedy trial rule illustrated in Detheridge. Consequently, the Detheridge 
ruling is not pertinent to our decision here.

[¶20] We 
conclude that the trial court complied with the terms and spirit of W.R.Cr.P. 
48(b) in scheduling Germany's trial. Germany's right to receive a speedy trial 
was not violated in this case.

B. Prior Bad 
Acts

[¶21] Germany 
burglarized a jewelry store in Laramie in 1993. At the preliminary hearing in 
that case, Germany presented a witness who testified that Germany was in Omaha, 
Nebraska, at the time of the burglary. Germany later admitted that he had 
burglarized the Laramie jewelry store and pleaded guilty to the 
crime.

[¶22] Germany 
contends that the trial court erred by allowing evidence of the Laramie burglary 
and his presentation of a fabricated alibi to be admitted at his trial in this 
case. The state argues that the trial court properly ruled that the evidence was 
admissible. We agree with the state.

[¶23] W.R.E. 
404(b) governs the admissibility of evidence of a defendant's other bad 
acts:

(b) Other crimes, wrongs, 
or acts. - Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove 
the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence 
of mistake or accident.

[¶24] This Court 
generally defers to the trial court's decision concerning the admissibility of 
other bad acts evidence; we will reverse the trial court's decision only if the 
court abused its discretion. Rigler v. State, 941 P.2d 734, 737 (Wyo. 
1997).

[¶25] A court 
does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the 
bounds of reason under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been 
an abuse of discretion, we must decide the ultimate issue of whether or not the 
court could have reasonably concluded as it did.

[¶26] Kenyon v. 
State, 986 P.2d 849, 851 (Wyo. 1999) (citation omitted).

[¶27] Germany 
filed a motion requesting that the prosecution give him notice if it intended to 
use evidence of his other bad acts. The prosecution notified him that it 
intended to offer evidence of the Laramie burglary. At the hearing on the 
admissibility of the other bad acts evidence, the prosecutor argued that the 
evidence of the Laramie burglary should be admitted for the purpose of 
identifying Germany as the perpetrator of the Cheyenne burglary because the two 
burglaries shared many similar characteristics. The trial court deferred its 
ruling on the issue and heard additional argument at trial. The prosecutor 
outlined the other bad acts evidence during a hearing held at Germany's 
trial:

Specifically, as it 
relates to this case, the 404(b) commonality factors would be Detective Bury 
would state [Germany, Foster, and two other persons] arrived [in Laramie] from 
Los Angeles in a rented car, that they checked into a motel room under the name 
of - or Tamara Foster checked them into the motel room; that they left the motel 
room after taking the pillowcases; that they, Mr. Germany, by his own admission 
to this crime, by the way, on May 4, 1994, went downtown, obviously busted out 
the lower glass portion, went inside, broke out the display cases, scooped the 
jewelry into the pillow cases, fled the scene, went back to the motel, hastily 
checked out and left.

[¶28] When later 
confronted by Detective Bury, he claims alibi, and he threatened witnesses 
against him. There was like 12 factors there that are virtually identical to the 
facts in this case. All of that goes to show 
identification.

[¶29] The trial 
court concluded that evidence of Germany's 1993 burglary of the Laramie jewelry 
store and his subsequent attempt to establish an alibi were admissible to prove 
identity.

[¶30] Because 
Germany professed his innocence in the case at bar and claimed he was in Las 
Vegas, Nevada, when the Cheyenne burglary took place, identity of the 
perpetrator was at issue during the trial. Evidence of an accused's other bad 
acts may be admissible for the purpose of proving identity. W.R.E. 404(b); 
Johnson v. State, 936 P.2d 458, 463 (Wyo. 1997).

[¶31] "The 
probity of evidence of other crimes where introduced for this purpose depends 
upon both the uniqueness of the modus operandi and the degree of similarity 
between the charged crime and the uncharged crime. Of course, it is not 
necessary that the charged crime and the other crimes be identical in every 
detail. But they must possess a common feature or features that make it very 
likely that the unknown perpetrator of the charged crime and the known 
perpetrator of the uncharged crime are the same person. The more unique each of 
the common features is, the smaller the number that is required for the 
probative value of the evidence to be significant. But a number of common 
features of lesser uniqueness, although insufficient to generate a strong 
inference of identity if considered separately, may be of significant probative 
value when considered together."

[¶32] Pena v. 
State, 780 P.2d 316, 322 (Wyo. 1989) (quoting United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1045 (5th Cir. 1977) (citation omitted)); see also Johnson, 936 P.2d  at 
463.

[¶33] Some of 
the similarities between the Laramie and Cheyenne burglaries do not necessarily 
make the crimes unique because they are common to most "smash and dash" type 
burglaries; e.g., breaking out store windows, collecting the stolen goods, and 
attempting to flee from law enforcement officers. There were, however, enough 
unique similarities to mark the two burglaries as the work of the same person. 
The characteristics that are peculiar to Germany's burglaries, include: The 
co-conspirators traveled in rented cars; they checked into local motels shortly 
before the burglaries were committed; they used wired pillowcases which were 
stolen from the motels to collect the jewelry; Germany and/or his 
co-conspirators checked out of the motels at odd times, either late at night or 
very early in the morning, shortly after the crimes were committed; and Germany 
used witnesses to attempt to establish that he was in another state at the time 
the crimes were committed. Comparing the characteristics of the Laramie and 
Cheyenne burglaries, we conclude that the crimes were sufficiently similar to 
justify admission of the evidence of the Laramie burglary for the purpose of 
proving Germany's identity as the perpetrator in the Cheyenne 
burglary.

[¶34] Germany 
argues that his presentation of a fabricated alibi in the Laramie case should be 
considered to be a separate bad act and that the trial court erred by allowing 
evidence of the fabricated alibi to be admitted at the trial in this case.1 Germany did not present this aspect 
of his argument to the trial court when he objected to the introduction of his 
other bad acts. The trial court apparently considered the fabricated alibi to be 
part and parcel of the Laramie burglary. The use of alibi witnesses, who stated 
that Germany was in other states when the burglaries were committed, was a means 
by which Germany attempted to avoid criminal responsibility for his burglaries. 
The elaborate nature of the concocted alibis was a unique part of his modus 
operandi. We cannot fault the trial court for allowing evidence of Germany's 
attempt to establish an alibi for the Laramie burglary to be presented at the 
trial in this case.

C. Jury 
Instructions

[¶35] Germany 
maintains that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury. The 
instructions that he takes issue with are: Instruction No. 11, which concerned 
his flight from authorities; and Instruction No. 3, which defined the term 
"larceny." The state argues that the instructions complied with the law, and we 
agree.

[¶36] The trial 
court has a duty to instruct the jury concerning the law applicable to the 
issues actually raised by the evidence. Hernandez v. State, 976 P.2d 672, 674 
(Wyo. 1999). The trial court has "wide latitude in instructing the jury; and as 
long as the instructions correctly state the law and the entire charge to the 
jury adequately covers the issues, reversible error will not be found." Baier v. 
State, 891 P.2d 754, 756 (Wyo. 1995). We consider the jury charge in its 
entirety to determine whether the instructions correctly stated the law and 
adequately covered the issues. Hernandez, 976 P.2d  at 674.

[¶37] Germany 
objected to Instruction No. 11 - the "flight instruction." The trial court 
overruled his objection and gave the instruction to the jury. Instruction No. 11 
stated: "Flight, by itself, is not sufficient to establish the guilt of the 
defendant. But it may be considered as a circumstance to be considered with 
other factors as tending to show a consciousness of guilt." Germany claims that 
a "flight instruction" should not be given when the identity of the perpetrator 
is at issue. He directs us to a Colorado Court of Appeals case entitled People 
v. Armendariz, 684 P.2d 252 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983), aff'd in part and rev'd in 
part on other grounds, 711 P.2d 1268 (Colo. 1986) (en banc), as support for his 
contention. The Armendariz decision does not, however, support his argument 
because the identity of the perpetrator was not at issue in that case. 684 P.2d  
at 256.

[¶38] A 
California Supreme Court case entitled People v. Mason, 802 P.2d 950 (Cal.) (in 
bank), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 879 (1991), is applicable to the issue presented 
here. Like Germany, Mason provided alibis for the times some of the crimes he 
was charged with were committed. 802 P.2d  at 969. As part of its charge to the 
jury, the trial court gave an instruction concerning how the jury should treat 
evidence that the defendant fled from the authorities. Id. Mason argued, on 
appeal, that the flight instruction should not have been given because the 
identity of the perpetrator of the crimes was at issue. Id. The California 
Supreme Court presented the following pertinent discussion in response to 
Mason's argument:

If there is evidence 
identifying the person who fled as the defendant, and if such evidence "is 
relied upon as tending to show guilt," then it is proper to instruct on flight. 
"The jury must know that it is entitled to infer consciousness of guilt from 
flight and that flight, alone, is not sufficient to establish guilt. The jury's 
need to know these things does not change just because identity is also an 
issue. Instead, such a case [only] requires the jury to proceed logically by 
deciding first whether [the person who fled] was the defendant and then, if the 
answer is affirmative, how much weight to accord to flight in resolving the 
other issues bearing on guilt. The jury needs the instruction for the second 
step."

Id. (quoting People v. 
London, 206 Cal. App. 3d 896, 903 (Ct. App. 1988)); see also People v. Jones, 811 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1991) (in bank), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 942 
(1992).

[¶39] In the 
case at bar, Foster identified Germany as the perpetrator of the crime and the 
person who fled from the authorities, and the prosecution relied on her 
testimony as tending to show Germany's guilt. We believe, like the California 
Supreme Court did, that a jury would consider the entire jury charge and employ 
its common sense to reach the conclusion that it should consider the relevance 
of Germany's flight only if it first identified him as the person who fled. We 
conclude, therefore, that a flight instruction is not necessarily improper 
simply because the identity of the perpetrator is at issue. The trial court 
properly informed the jury in Instruction No. 11 about the significance of 
Germany's flight from the authorities.

[¶40] Germany 
also complains that, in Instruction No. 3, the trial court improperly directed a 
verdict against him on an element of burglary. Germany did not, however, object 
at trial to Instruction No. 3. We, therefore, apply our plain error standard in 
reviewing his claim on appeal. "Plain error exists when 1) the record is clear 
about the incident alleged as error; 2) there was a transgression of a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law; and 3) the party claiming the error was denied a 
substantial right which materially prejudiced him." Sandy v. State, 870 P.2d 352, 358 (Wyo. 1994); see also Yetter v. State, 987 P.2d 666, 668 (Wyo. 
1999).

[¶41] 
Instruction No. 2 listed the elements of aggravated burglary 
as:

1. On or about the 4th 
day of October, 1996

2. In Laramie County, 
Wyoming

3. The defendant, Frankie 
Germany

4. Without 
authority

5. Entered a 
building

6. With intent to commit 
larceny or a felony therein, and

7. In the course of 
committing the acts in elements 5 and 6 was armed with a deadly weapon or 
inflicted bodily injury to Tamara Foster.

[¶42] 
Instruction No. 3 further defined the intent element of the 
crime:

One element of the crime 
of burglary requires proof of specific intent. The state must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant entered the building without authority and 
that he did that act with the intent to commit larceny or another felony 
therein. Breaking the display cases and stealing jewelry would constitute 
larceny. It is for you to determine whether he did the act and if so, whether he 
did it with the required intent.

[¶43] Germany 
maintains that, by instructing the jury that "[b]reaking the display cases and 
stealing jewelry would constitute larceny," the trial court relieved the 
prosecution of its burden of establishing each element of the offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt.

[¶44] Germany 
has satisfied the first element of the plain error standard because the record 
is clear about the instruction he alleges is incorrect. We turn, therefore, to 
the question of whether or not the trial court transgressed a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law. A trial court may not give an instruction which directs 
the jury to find that an element of the crime has been established because such 
an instruction would unconstitutionally relieve the prosecution of its burden to 
prove each of the essential elements of the crime. See Huff v. State, 992 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Wyo. 1999); Harley v. State, 737 P.2d 750, 754 (Wyo. 
1987).

[¶45] 
Instruction No. 3 did not compel the jury to find that the intent element of 
burglary had been established in this case. The trial court simply instructed 
the jury that breaking the display cases and stealing jewelry would fall within 
the definition of larceny. It did not tell the jury it was required to find that 
Germany did those things or entered the building with the intent to commit those 
acts. In fact, the last sentence of Instruction No. 3 specifically informed the 
jurors that it was for them to determine whether Germany did the act and, if he 
did, whether he acted with the requisite intent. The trial court did not violate 
a clear and unequivocal rule of law when it presented Instruction No. 3 to the 
jury.

[¶46] 
Affirmed.

Footnotes

1 Germany 
also claims that the trial court violated W.R.Cr.P. 12.1(f) when it allowed 
evidence of the fabricated alibi to be admitted. He did not, however, present 
this argument to the trial court. We refuse, therefore, to consider it on 
appeal. Koopman By and Through Koopman v. Fremont County School District No. 1, 
911 P.2d 1049, 1053 n.2 (Wyo. 1996).