Title: Rhineway v. DFS

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DAVID RHINEWAY, SR.,1 
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 23, 2005      
 
Petitioner Below, 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below: Family Court of  
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware in and for 
              v. 
 
§ 
New Castle County 
 
 
§ 
DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES for § 
File No. 99-06-3TK 
CHILDREN, YOUTH and their 
§ 
FAMILIES, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Respondent Below, § 
 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted: August 24, 2005 
 
 
Decided 
September 8, 2005 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 8th day of September 2005, upon consideration of the briefs of the 
parties and the record in this case, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) The respondent-below appellant, David Rhineway, appeals from an 
order of the Family Court terminating his parental rights in his four children.  On 
appeal Rhineway argues that the Division of Family Services did not sufficiently 
prove the statutory elements required to terminate his parental rights.  Because the 
Family Court correctly found that the Division of Family Services had proved all 
of the required elements by clear and convincing evidence, we affirm. 
                                          
 
1 The Court, sua sponte, has assigned pseudonyms to the parties under SUPR. CT. R. 7(d). 
 
2
 
(2) The Division of Family Services (“DFS”) has been involved with the 
Rhineway family since 1990.  Between 1990 and 1997, DFS investigated claims 
against Rhineway and his wife of child abuse, neglect, and deplorable living 
conditions, as well as claims that Rhineway had sexually abused the children.  DFS 
took custody of the four children—David, Jr., Christopher, Teresa and Jonathan—
in December 1997, and placed them in foster care.  In 2001, the Family Court 
denied DFS’s first petition to terminate Rhineway’s parental rights, finding that 
DFS had not used reasonable efforts to reunite the family.  After that ruling, DFS 
and Rhineway agreed to a “case plan” designed to reunite Rhineway and the 
children.  Rhineway failed to satisfy all the terms of that case plan, however, and 
all four children consistently refused to see their father.   
 
(3) In March 2004, DFS filed a second petition to terminate Rhineway’s 
parental rights in his four children.  The petition also sought to terminate the 
parental rights of the childrens’ biological mother, Ruby Williams.  At the 
termination hearing, the mother consented to a permanent guardianship for 
Jonathan and David and to alternative permanent planned living arrangements for 
Christopher and Teresa.  The mother was then dismissed from the action, and DFS 
proceeded against the father, Rhineway.   
 
(4) At the hearing, the Family Court heard evidence that, despite having 
agreed to do so in the case plan, Rhineway had not obtained housing that would 
 
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accommodate the needs of the children, nor had he provided DFS with proof of his 
employment.  Rhineway met with two doctors, both of whom testified that he had 
a personality disorder and that he was unwilling or unable to understand his 
childrens’ needs. 
 
(5) The Family Court also heard testimony about each child’s living 
situation and emotional problems.  David, the oldest and the most stable of the four 
children, was living in a foster home, together with his brother, Jonathan.  David 
recalled being physically abused by his father, but after being placed in the foster 
home he had blossomed.  David stated that he never wanted to see his father again.  
Teresa was in a group home, and suffered from severe emotional and behavior 
issues.  She told her counselors that her father had sexually abused her, and her 
therapist testified that in his opinion, such sexual abuse had occurred.  Teresa told 
one of the counselors at the group home that when she turns 18 she plans to buy a 
gun and kill her father.  One of her counselors testified that Teresa became suicidal 
because of the memories of the abuse.  Christopher, Teresa’s twin brother, was 
also residing in a group home and suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder.  
Christopher recalled being sexually abused by his father, and his therapist testified 
that Christopher would have to be institutionalized if he has any contact with his 
father.  Finally, Jonathan was happy and comfortable in his foster home.  His 
counselors testified that Jonathan was beginning to “open up” about the abuse that 
 
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Rhineway allegedly perpetrated against him, and that he was terrified of his father.  
Dr. Zingaro, who met with Jonathan, testified that Jonathan would suffer emotional 
harm if he were reunited with his father. 
 
(6) After a three day hearing, the Family Court determined that DFS had 
proved the statutory elements for termination by clear and convincing evidence.  
Based on those findings, the Family Court terminated Rhineway’s parental rights 
in all four children.  Rhineway appeals from that order. 
 
(7) The parental rights termination statute, 13 Del. C. § 1103, requires DFS 
to prove the statutory elements for termination by clear and convincing evidence.  
In this case, DFS was required to prove that:  (a) DFS used reasonable efforts to 
reunite Rhineway and the children; (b) Rhineway failed to plan for the childrens’ 
needs; and (c) termination was in the best interests of the children.  Rhineway 
claims that DFS did not prove those elements by clear and convincing evidence.  
We disagree. 
 
(8) On appeal from an order terminating parental rights, this Court will 
uphold the Family Court’s factual findings if they are sufficiently supported by the 
record and are not clearly wrong.2  To the extent that the Family Court’s rulings 
implicate questions of law, this Court exercises de novo review.3 
                                          
 
2 In re Stevens, 652 A.2d 18, 23 (Del. 1995); Harris v. State, 305 A.2d 318, 319 (Del. 1973). 
 
3 In re Heller, 669 A.2d 25, 29 (Del. 1995). 
 
5
 
(9) Because DFS sought termination based on Rhineway’s failure to plan 
adequately for his childrens’ needs, the trial court was required to find that DFS 
made bona fide reasonable efforts to reunify the family.4 
 
(10) Here, DFS developed a plan with Rhineway, under which Rhineway 
agreed to:  (a) meet with Dr. Zingaro and complete a psychiatric examination as 
Dr. Zingaro recommended; (b) obtain appropriate housing; (c) participate in 
counseling as recommended by the childrens’ counselors; (d) visit the children as 
recommended by their counselors; and (e) present proof of employment to the 
Department of Services for Children, Youth, and their Families (“DSCYF”).   
 
(11) Pursuant to that plan, DFS provided a psychiatrist (Dr. Raskin) and a 
psychologist (Dr. Zingaro) to meet with Rhineway.  During their meetings, 
Rhineway told both doctors that the childrens’ allegations of abuse were false, and 
that DFS was drugging the children and coaching them to make false allegations 
against him.  Rhineway told them that the Delaware Family Court and the federal 
government were conspiring to take his children away from him.  Both doctors 
concluded that Rhineway had a personality and/or delusional disorder. 
 
(12) Rhineway argues that the above-described plan did not constitute a 
reasonable effort to reunite the family, because DFS did not provide permanent 
                                          
 
4 In re Hanks, 553 A.2d 1171, 1179 (Del. 1989); In re Burns, 519 A.2d 638, 649 (Del. 1986).  
See 29 Del. C. § 9003(3), (13) regarding the Department’s obligation to provide reunification 
services.  See also “Adoption Safe Family Act” 42 U.S.C. § 671 (a)(15)(d), which requires states 
to attempt safe reunification of the child and family. 
 
6
counseling opportunities for Rhineway, which might have helped improve his 
psychological disorders.  That argument fails, because the two doctors who met 
with Rhineway concluded that he was not amenable to treatment, and because any 
counseling would have been futile since the children refused to be reunited with 
their father. 
 
(13) Drs. Zingaro and Raskin both testified that they did not believe 
Rhineway would be amenable to counseling.  Dr. Zingaro did not believe any 
treatment plan could be developed that would remedy Rhineway’s own mental 
health problems or educate him about the childrens’ needs.  Dr. Raskin testified 
that Rhineway’s fixation that there was a conspiracy against him, left Rhineway 
unable to consider the needs of his children—needs that were extensive because of 
the childrens’ psychological trauma.  Because two doctors testified that Rhineway 
was not amenable to treatment, it was reasonable for DFS not to provide further 
counseling services for him.5 
 
(14) Even if DFS had provided further counseling for Rhineway, that would 
not have changed the fact that none of his children wanted to see him.  After 
meeting with the children, Dr. Zingaro testified that “all the children without 
                                          
 
5 Dr. Raskin recommended that Rhineway undergo the Minnesota Multiple Personality Inventory  
2 (“MMPI 2”) to diagnose his disorder more accurately.  That test was never given to Rhineway.  
On appeal, Rhineway argues that DFS should have issued the test as part of a reasonable effort to 
reunite the family.  That contention lacks merit, however, because the test would only have 
provided an additional diagnosis of Rhineway’s problems, but would not have provided any 
treatment for those problems. 
 
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hesitation do not want a relationship” with Rhineway, and that reunification would 
emotionally harm the children.  Because further counseling of Rhineway would not 
change the childrens’ feelings toward their father, it was reasonable for DFS not to 
provide those services.   
 
(15) In short, DFS proved that it established a case plan for Rhineway, and 
that Rhineway failed to complete it.  The testimony of Drs. Raskin and Zingaro 
established that Rhineway was not amenable to treatment and that even if 
treatment were provided, reunification with the children would be emotionally 
harmful to them.  Thus, DFS proved by clear and convincing evidence that it had 
made bona fide reasonable efforts to reunite the family.   
 
(16) In addition to proving that it made reasonable efforts toward 
reunification, DFS must prove at least one of the six statutory grounds for 
termination by clear and convincing evidence.6  DFS sought to terminate 
Rhineway’s parental rights under 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5), which requires DFS to 
prove that “the parent … [is] not able, or [has] failed, to plan adequately for the 
child’s physical needs or mental and emotional health and development.…” 
 
(17) The Family Court found that Rhineway had failed to plan adequately 
for his childrens’ physical, mental, and emotional needs; and the evidence 
supported that finding.  Rhineway depended upon his mother and girlfriend for 
                                          
 
6 13 Del. C. § 1103(a). 
 
 
8
financial support, and was already several thousand dollars behind in child support.  
Despite having agreed to do so in the case plan, Rhineway did not obtain, nor did 
he have a strategy to obtain, adequate housing.  Rhineway testified that if he 
received custody of the children, they would live with his mother, who was 78 
years old and had told DFS that she was unable to care for the children.  Rhineway 
also acknowledged during the hearing that his mother’s home did not have enough 
space to accommodate the children.  Both Drs. Zingaro and Raskin testified that 
Rhineway’s own mental problems and his preoccupation with “clearing his name” 
prevented him from understanding and caring for the childrens’ psychological 
needs.  That evidence was clear and convincing that Rhineway had failed to 
adequately plan for his childrens’ physical and emotional needs. 
 
(18) Besides proving a general failure to plan, DFS must prove one or more 
additional statutory elements, which include:  
1. The child has been in the care of the Department for a period of 1 
year.…; 
*** 
 
4. The respondent is unwilling or unable to assume promptly legal 
and physical custody of the child and to pay for the child’s support, 
in accordance with the respondent’s financial means; or  
 
5. Failure to terminate the relationship of parent and child will result 
in continued emotional instability or physical risk to the child.7 
                                          
 
7 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(5). 
 
9
 
(19) The Family Court found that DFS had proved each of those elements.  
It is undisputed that the children had been in the care of the Department since 
1997.  Because of his lack of adequate housing and his inability to provide 
financial support for his children, Rhineway was unable to assume prompt custody 
of the children.  Finally, the Family Court credited the testimony of all the 
childrens’ counselors that reunification would be harmful to any progress the 
children had made. 
 
(20) Finally, Rhineway argues that DFS did not prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that termination was in the childrens’ best interests.  13 Del. 
C. § 1103(a) requires DFS to prove that termination is in the childrens’ best 
interests, weighing eight factors listed in 13 Del. C. § 722(a), as follows:  
 
(1) The wishes of the child’s parent as to his or her custody and 
residential arrangements; 
 
 
(2) The wishes of the child as to his or her custodian(s) and 
residential relationships; 
 
 
(3) The interaction and interrelationship between the child with 
his or her parents, grandparents, siblings … [and other] 
persons who may significantly affect the child’s best 
interests; 
 
 
(4) The child’s adjustment to his or her home, school and 
community; 
 
 
(5) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved; 
 
 
(6) Past and present compliance by both parents with their rights 
and responsibilities to their child under Section 701;  
 
10
 
(7) Evidence of domestic violence as provided for in [13 Del C. 
§ 701, et. seq.]; and 
 
 
(8) The criminal history of any party or other resident in the 
household.… 
 
(21)  After considering each factor, the Family Court found that factors (2) 
through (7) favored termination, factor (1) disfavored termination, and factor (8) 
did not apply.  Specifically, the Family Court found that the children uniformly 
wanted no contact with their father, whom they had not seen since 1998.  David, Jr. 
and Jonathan, who lived in a foster home, were well adjusted to that home and 
family, and were performing well academically.  Christopher was doing well in his 
group home environment, and Teresa was beginning to adjust to the group home 
where she was living.  The childrens’ counselors and social workers who testified, 
all stated that it would be psychologically harmful to Christopher, Teresa, and 
Jonathan if they had any contact with their father.  The Family Court noted that 
Rhineway had not complied with his parental responsibility to pay child support.  
Finally, the Family Court found credible evidence that Rhineway had physically 
and/or sexually abused the children, even though he had not been criminally 
charged with abuse.  In sum, the Family Court concluded that all of those factors 
supported termination. 
(22) The Family Court found that Rhineway wanted to retain his parental 
rights and take custody of the children, and that factor disfavored termination.  The 
 
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other factors favoring termination outweighed Rhineway’s wishes, however.  On 
appeal Rhineway argues that the Family Court placed too much emphasis on the 
childrens’ wishes, but the record belies that argument.  The Family Court found 
that six of the eight factors favored termination, and it did not place greater 
emphasis on one factor than any other. 
(23) Rhineway also argues that the Family Court should have interviewed 
David, Jr. before deciding that termination was in his best interests.  The Family 
Court did not need to interview David directly, however, because the Court heard 
the testimony of David’s foster parent, and because the court-appointed-special-
advocate testified about David’s current situation and his wishes regarding contact 
with his father.  Rhineway does not articulate how interviewing David, Jr. would 
have changed the Family Court’s analysis of the childrens’ best interests. 
(24) The Family Court found that DFS proved by clear and convincing 
evidence that termination was in the childrens’ best interests.  The evidence amply 
supports that finding. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
____________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                    Justice