Title: State v. Batista

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Batista, Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-8304.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2017-OHIO-8304 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. BATISTA, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Batista, Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-8304.] 
Criminal law—R.C. 2903.11(B)(1)—Because R.C. 2903.11(B)(1) regulates 
conduct, not speech, it does not violate the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, and it is rationally related to the state’s legitimate 
interest in preventing the transmission of the human immunodeficiency 
virus to sexual partners who may not be aware of the risk and therefore 
does not violate the Equal Protection Clauses of either the United States or 
Ohio Constitutions. 
(No. 2016-0903—Submitted May 17, 2017—Decided October 26, 2017.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, 
No. C-1500341, 2016-Ohio-2848. 
_______________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
Because R.C. 2903.11(B)(1) regulates conduct, not speech, it does not violate the 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and it is rationally 
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related to the state’s legitimate interest in preventing the transmission of the 
human immunodeficiency virus to sexual partners who may not be aware 
of the risk and therefore does not violate the Equal Protection Clauses of 
either the United States or Ohio Constitutions. 
_______________ 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} Orlando Batista appeals from a judgment of the First District Court of 
Appeals that affirmed his felonious assault conviction for knowingly engaging in 
sexual conduct with his girlfriend, R.S., without disclosing to her that he had tested 
positive as a carrier of the human immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”). 
{¶ 2} Batista maintains that R.C. 2903.11(B)(1), which prohibits those 
persons with knowledge of their HIV status from “engag[ing] in sexual conduct 
with another person without disclosing that knowledge to the other person prior to 
engaging in the sexual conduct,” is a content based regulation that compels speech 
in violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.  He also 
contends that this statute violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 2 of the Ohio 
Constitution because there is no rational basis for a distinction between HIV 
positive individuals and individuals with other infectious diseases such as Hepatitis 
C or between the methods of transmitting HIV. 
{¶ 3} Because R.C. 2903.11(B)(1) regulates conduct, not speech, it does not 
violate the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and it is rationally 
related to the state’s legitimate interest in preventing the transmission of HIV to 
sexual partners who may not be aware of the risk and therefore does not violate the 
Equal Protection Clauses of either the United States or Ohio Constitutions.  
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
 
 
January Term, 2017 
 
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Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 4} In October 2001, while Orlando Batista was incarcerated on an 
unrelated charge, the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction tested him for 
HIV and informed him that he tested positive for the disease. 
{¶ 5} After his release on that charge, in November 2013, Batista began an 
intimate relationship with R.S. and knowingly engaged in intercourse with her 
without disclosing his HIV positive status to her prior to engaging in that conduct. 
{¶ 6} Two months later, she learned of his HIV positive status from his ex-
sister-in-law.  When she confronted him, he acknowledged he had tested positive, 
and he told her he had been infected when he was a teenager.  During a subsequent 
interview with the police, he admitted to having had intercourse with her without 
telling her he was HIV positive. 
{¶ 7} A grand jury indicted him for felonious assault in violation of R.C. 
2903.11(B)(1), which makes it a crime for a person who has tested positive for HIV 
to knowingly engage in sexual conduct with another without disclosing that 
information prior to engaging in the sexual conduct.  Batista moved to dismiss the 
indictment, arguing that the statute violates the First Amendment right to free 
speech and the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Ohio 
Constitutions. 
{¶ 8} The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion, and Batista 
presented the testimony of Dr. Judith Feinberg, a faculty member at the University 
of Cincinnati College of Medicine with a specialty in infectious diseases and a 
subspecialty in HIV disease.  Feinberg testified that the lifetime survival rate of 
those diagnosed with HIV who receive treatment is now comparable to the survival 
rate of people who do not have HIV.  She also acknowledged, however, that while 
there are ways to treat HIV, there is no cure.  She compared HIV to Hepatitis C, 
noting that there are medicines that can cure Hepatitis C, and acknowledged that 
although there is increasing recognition that Hepatitis C can spread through sexual 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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transmission, the most common way to spread it is through needles because the 
amount of Hepatitis C in blood is high compared to amounts in other bodily fluids.  
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied Batista’s motion. 
{¶ 9} Batista subsequently pleaded no contest to felonious assault, and the 
trial court found him guilty and sentenced him to eight years in prison. 
{¶ 10} The First District Court of Appeals affirmed that conviction and 
concluded that the statute does not violate the First Amendment.  The court 
reasoned that the statute is a content based law subject to strict scrutiny, that the 
state has a compelling interest in stopping the transmission of HIV through sexual 
conduct, and that the statute is narrowly tailored to serve that interest because it 
requires disclosure only to potential sexual partners. 2016-Ohio-2848, 64 N.E.3d 
498, ¶ 9-12.  It also held that R.C. 2903.11(B)(1) does not violate the Equal 
Protection Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions because the state 
has a legitimate interest in stopping the spread of HIV and because there is a rational 
relationship between the state’s interest and requiring disclosure of a positive HIV 
status before engaging in sexual conduct.  Id. at ¶ 6. 
{¶ 11} We accepted Batista’s discretionary appeal. 
{¶ 12} On appeal to this court, he argues that R.C. 2903.11(B) is subject to 
strict scrutiny review for the First Amendment and Equal Protection claims because 
the statute compels content based speech and implicates a fundamental right.  He 
acknowledges that the state has a compelling interest in reducing or stopping the 
spread of HIV and other infectious diseases, but he argues that the statute fails under 
strict scrutiny review because it is not narrowly tailored to further a compelling 
government interest: it does not prevent the spread of HIV, it compels speech even 
when the sexual conduct or bodily fluids cannot transmit HIV, and its existence is 
not necessary to prosecute HIV positive individuals for exposing people to HIV. 
{¶ 13} Batista further maintains that even if the statute does not compel 
content based speech, it violates equal protection because there is no rational basis 
January Term, 2017 
 
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for a distinction between HIV positive individuals and those individuals with other 
infectious diseases such as Hepatitis C.  He contends that both HIV and Hepatitis 
C can be transmitted sexually and by sharing needles, that there is no vaccine for 
either disease, and that both diseases can shorten the lifespan of the infected person.  
Batista maintains that by singling out HIV but no other infectious disease, the 
statute is motivated by an outdated stigma that surrounds the virus.  He also argues 
that the statute discourages people from getting tested for HIV and that it does not 
prevent the spread of HIV.  Lastly, he asserts that there is no rational basis for a 
distinction between the methods of transmission of HIV. 
{¶ 14} The state argues that the statute prohibits only uninformed sexual 
conduct and any effect this prohibition has on speech is incidental.  Alternatively, 
it argues that even if R.C. 2903.11(B)(1) compels speech, the statute withstands 
strict scrutiny review on the First Amendment and Equal Protection claims.  The 
state claims that it has a compelling interest in ensuring informed consent and in 
limiting the spread of HIV by means of sexual conduct and that the statute is 
narrowly tailored to that interest because it neither prohibits an infected person from 
having sexual relations with another nor compels public disclosure of a person’s 
HIV positive status. 
Issues 
{¶ 15} We are called upon to consider whether this statute violates the First 
Amendment right of free speech or the Equal Protection Clauses of the United 
States and Ohio Constitutions. 
Law and Analysis 
{¶ 16} R.C. 2903.11(B)(1) states: “No person, with knowledge that the 
person has tested positive as a carrier of a virus that causes acquired 
immunodeficiency syndrome, shall knowingly * * * [e]ngage in sexual conduct 
with another person without disclosing that knowledge to the other person prior to 
engaging in the sexual conduct.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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First Amendment 
{¶ 17} The First Amendment does not prevent statutes regulating conduct 
from imposing incidental burdens on speech.  Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & 
Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 62, 126 S.Ct. 1297, 164 L.Ed.2d 156 (2006), 
quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502, 69 S.Ct. 684, 93 
L.Ed. 834 (1949) (“ ‘it has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech 
or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part 
initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or 
printed’ ”); Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 567, 131 S.Ct. 2653, 180 
L.Ed.2d 544 (2011) (“the First Amendment does not prevent restrictions directed 
at * * * conduct from imposing incidental burdens on speech”). 
{¶ 18} This case presents an issue of first impression in this state.  However, 
two state supreme courts have held that statutes similar to R.C. 2903.11(B)(1) did 
not regulate speech and therefore did not violate the First Amendment. 
{¶ 19} In State v. S.F., 483 S.W.3d 385 (Mo.2016), where a Missouri statute 
made it “unlawful for any individual knowingly infected with HIV to * * * [a]ct in 
a reckless manner by exposing another person to HIV without the knowledge and 
consent of that person to be exposed * * * [t]hrough contact with blood, semen or 
vaginal secretions in the course of oral, anal or vaginal sexual intercourse,” 
Mo.Rev.Stat. 191.677.1(2)(a), the Missouri Supreme Court concluded that the 
statute “regulates conduct, not speech,” and because it “imposes only incidental 
burdens on speech, it does not violate the freedom of speech protections of the 
federal or state constitutions,”  S.F. at 387-388.  The court further stated that “the 
statute seeks to prevent certain conduct that could spread HIV to unknowing or 
nonconsenting individuals. While individuals may have to disclose their HIV status 
if they choose to engage in activities covered by the statute, any speech compelled 
by [the statute] is incidental to its regulation of the targeted conduct and does not 
constitute a freedom of speech violation.”  (Footnote omitted.)  Id. 
January Term, 2017 
 
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{¶ 20} And in People v. Russell, 158 Ill.2d 23, 630 N.E.2d 794 (1994), 
where Caretha Russell, who knew she was infected with HIV, engaged in sexual 
intercourse with Daren Smith without telling Smith of her infection and the state 
subsequently charged her with violating a statute that made it a crime for a knowing 
carrier of the HIV virus to transmit the virus to another person through intimate 
conduct, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that the statute did not have “the 
slightest connection with free speech.”  Id. at 26.  See former 720 Ill.Comp.Stat. 
12-16.2(A), 1989 Ill.Legis.Serv. P.A. 86-897 (“A person commits criminal 
transmission of HIV when he or she, knowing that he or she is infected with HIV: 
(1) engages in intimate contact with another. * * * (D) It shall be an affirmative 
defense that the person exposed knew that the infected person was infected with 
HIV, knew that the action could result in infection with HIV, and consented to the 
action with that knowledge”). 
{¶ 21} Like the statutes at issue in S.F. and Russell, R.C. 2903.11(B)(1) 
prohibits HIV positive individuals from engaging in sexual conduct without 
disclosing the HIV status prior to engaging in the conduct.  Although R.C. 
2903.11(B)(1) requires those who know they are HIV positive to disclose their 
status if they choose to engage in sexual conduct with another person, the disclosure 
is incidental to the statute’s regulation of the targeted conduct. Thus, this statute 
regulates conduct, not speech, and therefore does not violate the First Amendment 
right to free speech. 
Equal Protection 
{¶ 22} In State v. Williams, 126 Ohio St.3d 65, 2010-Ohio-2453, 930 
N.E.2d 770, ¶ 39, this court held that “a statute that does not implicate a 
fundamental right or a suspect classification does not violate equal-protection 
principles if it is rationally related to a legitimate government interest.”  Under 
rational basis analysis, a classification “ ‘must be upheld against equal protection 
challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a 
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rational basis for the classification.’ ”  Am. Assn. of Univ. Professors, Cent. State 
Univ. Chapter v. Cent. State Univ., 87 Ohio St.3d 55, 58, 717 N.E.2d 286 (1999), 
quoting Fed. Communications Comm. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 
307, 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993).  “[A] legislative choice is not 
subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation 
unsupported by evidence or empirical data.”  Beach Communications at 315. 
{¶ 23} The federal Equal Protection Clause does not forbid classification, 
but it requires that different treatment be related to the purpose of the law.  See State 
v. Mole, 149 Ohio St.3d 215, 2016-Ohio-5124, 74 N.E.3d 368, ¶ 24 (plurality 
opinion).  Here, the classification is individuals with knowledge of their HIV-
positive status who fail to disclose that status to someone prior to engaging in sexual 
conduct with that person.  The valid state interest is curbing HIV transmission to 
sexual partners who may not be aware of the risk.  The statute’s treatment of 
individuals with knowledge of their HIV-positive status who fail to disclose that 
status to a sexual partner furthers the state interest here. 
{¶ 24} Batista asks the court to weigh the wisdom of the legislature’s policy 
choices, but that is beyond our authority.  Because there is some conceivable basis 
to support the legislative arrangement, the statute does not violate equal protection.  
Batista’s argument that no rational basis exists to require only HIV-positive 
individuals to disclose their status while not requiring the same of individuals with 
Hepatitis C, for example, is misplaced.  We are not faced with a statute that requires 
individuals to disclose their Hepatitis C diagnosis or other contagious infection.  
We leave that policy decision to the General Assembly.  And the existence of other 
sexually transmitted diseases that may have serious public health and safety 
consequences does not eliminate the rational relationship between the classification 
here—individuals with knowledge of their HIV-positive status who fail to disclose 
that status to sexual partners—and the goal of curbing HIV transmission. 
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{¶ 25} There is also a rational basis for the statute’s focus on a specific type 
of HIV transmission; specifically, sexual conduct rather than transmission by other 
methods, such as blood or needles.  Sexual conduct remains one of the methods by 
which HIV is transmitted.  Simply because there are other methods of HIV 
transmission does not render the classification here without a rational basis. 
{¶ 26} We recognize that there have been advancements in the treatment of 
individuals with HIV that may have reduced the transmission and mortality rates 
associated with the disease.  However, we cannot say that there is no plausible 
policy reason for the classification or that the relationship between the classification 
and the policy goal renders it arbitrary or irrational.  See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 
U.S. 1, 11, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992); Pickaway Cty. Skilled Gaming, 
L.L.C. v. Cordray, 127 Ohio St.3d 104, 2010-Ohio-4908, 936 N.E.2d 944, ¶ 19-20. 
{¶ 27} Thus, Batista’s position that R.C. 2903.11(B)(1) is not rationally 
related to the state’s legitimate interest in preventing the transmission of HIV to 
sexual partners who may not be aware of the risk is not well taken, and the statute 
does not violate the right to equal protection under either the United States or Ohio 
Constitutions. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 28} R.C. 2903.11(B) does not violate the First Amendment right to 
freedom of speech because it regulates conduct and any speech compelled by the 
statute is incidental to the regulated conduct.  The statute also does not violate the 
Equal Protection Clauses of the United States or Ohio Constitutions because it is 
rationally related to the state’s legitimate interest in preventing the transmission of 
HIV to sexual partners who may not be aware of the risk. We therefore affirm the 
judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’NEILL and WRIGHT, JJ., concur. 
DEWINE, J., concurs, with an opinion joined by KENNEDY and FRENCH, JJ. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J., of the Eleventh Appellate District, sitting for 
FISCHER, J. 
_________________ 
DEWINE, J., concurring. 
{¶ 29} I agree with the majority that R.C. 2903.11(B)(1) does not violate 
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution or the Equal Protection 
Clauses of the United States or Ohio Constitutions.  I write separately because I get 
there by a different path. 
{¶ 30} In the majority’s view, the First Amendment is not implicated 
because the “statute regulates conduct, not speech.”  Majority opinion at syllabus.  
I disagree.  The statute plainly regulates both conduct and speech: one who tests 
positive for the human immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”) must tell his partner that 
he is HIV positive before engaging in sex.  When the government tells someone 
what he must say, it is regulating speech.  Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & 
Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 61, 126 S.Ct. 1297, 164 L.Ed.2d 156 (2006); 
Riley v. Natl. Fedn. of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795, 108 
S.Ct. 2667, 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988). 
{¶ 31} Having determined that the statute implicates the First Amendment, 
the next question is the proper test to determine the statute’s constitutionality.  
Citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 67 (1968), 
the state suggests that we should apply intermediate scrutiny because the statute 
combines speech and nonspeech elements.1  The United States Supreme Court, 
however, has limited the application of O’Brien to content-neutral restrictions on 
speech.  See Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289, 120 S.Ct. 1382, 146 L.Ed.2d 
265 (2000); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798-799, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 
                                                          
 
1 To be clear, the Hamilton County Prosecutor’s Office, which represents the appellee, the state of 
Ohio, argues for intermediate scrutiny.  Amicus curiae, the Ohio Attorney General, argues that the 
statute does not involve speech, but if the court concludes otherwise, the statute passes muster under 
strict-scrutiny analysis.   
January Term, 2017 
 
11 
105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989).  And the Supreme Court has determined that all compelled 
speech is content based, a conclusion that would suggest that O’Brien is 
inapplicable here.  Riley at 795.  Nevertheless, I find it unnecessary to consider 
whether intermediate scrutiny might be appropriate because I am convinced that 
R.C. 2903.11(B)(1) passes muster even under the more rigorous strict-scrutiny test. 
{¶ 32} Under strict scrutiny, a content-based regulation of speech will be 
upheld only if it is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest 
and it is the least restrictive means of doing so.  Painesville Bldg. Dept. v. Dworken 
& Bernstein Co., L.P.A., 89 Ohio St.3d 564, 567, 733 N.E.2d 1152 (2000), citing 
United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813, 120 S.Ct. 
1878, 146 L.Ed.2d 865 (2000).  Here, the government has two interests at stake.  
First, the government has an interest in limiting the spread of the HIV virus.  Public 
health is an important governmental concern.  See, e.g., Mussivand v. David, 45 
Ohio St.3d 314, 318-319, 544 N.E.2d 265 (1989).  Second, the government has an 
interest in ensuring informed consent to sexual relations.  Our society has long 
criminalized nonconsensual sexual relations.  See R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) and (c); 
R.C. 2907.03(A)(2) and (3); R.C. 2907.04(A); R.C. 2907.05(A)(2), (3), (4), and 
(5).  The government’s insistence that an HIV-positive individual inform his partner 
of his HIV status is perfectly consistent with this long-protected interest. 
{¶ 33} In challenging the statute, the appellant, Orlando Batista, points out 
that remarkable strides have been made in the treatment of acquired immune 
deficiency syndrome (“AIDS”).  He notes that HIV-positive individuals “can 
expect to live into their 70s” and “[w]hile there is no cure or vaccine for HIV/AIDS, 
it is not invariably fatal.”  In other words, Batista argues that the health risks from 
infection with the HIV virus are not really all that bad.  But the question is who gets 
to evaluate that risk: should the HIV-positive individual get to assess that risk for 
his sexual partner or should the partner get to make her own decision.  Fair to say 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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that most—if not all—people would insist on the right to make that decision for 
themselves. 
{¶ 34} The facts of this case illustrate vividly what is at stake.  In enacting 
the regulation in question, the government was protecting the victim’s right to make 
her own choice about whether to engage in risky sexual relations.  Though Batista 
invokes his right not to be forced to speak, the victim’s rights in this case are at 
least equally worthy of protection.  I would conclude that the interrelated interests 
of the government that are manifest in the statute—protecting public health and 
ensuring informed consent—rise to the level of a compelling governmental interest. 
{¶ 35} Moreover, I would conclude that the means chosen by the state to 
further these interests is narrowly tailored and constitutes the least restrictive means 
of doing so.  Under the statute, a person must disclose his HIV status only if he 
wishes to have sex and then only to the person with whom he wishes to have sex.  
The only speech that is compelled is speech that is directly necessary for informed 
consent.  I cannot fathom—and Batista has not advanced—any less restrictive or 
more narrowly tailored means that could have been employed by the government 
to achieve its interests here.  Thus, I find no violation of the rights guaranteed to 
Batista under the First Amendment. 
{¶ 36} Nor do I find merit to Batista’s equal-protection claim.  Relying upon 
its conclusion that the statute regulates conduct, not speech, the majority applies 
rational-basis review to the classification.  My conclusion that the classification 
affects a fundamental right causes me to apply a higher level of scrutiny.  See State 
v. Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 530, 728 N.E.2d 342 (2000).  I end up in the same 
place as the majority, however: because the statute is narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling governmental interest, there is no violation of Batista’s equal-protection 
rights under the Ohio or United States Constitutions. 
January Term, 2017 
 
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{¶ 37} For these reasons, I concur in the majority’s judgment that there has 
been no violation of the rights guaranteed to Batista under the First Amendment or 
the Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio or United States Constitution. 
 
KENNEDY and FRENCH, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula E. 
Adams, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Demetra 
Stamatakos and Joshua A. Thompson, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellant. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Eric E. Murphy, State Solicitor, and 
Samuel C. Peterson, Deputy Solicitor, urging affirmance on behalf of amicus curiae 
Ohio Attorney General Michael DeWine. 
Elizabeth Bonham and Joseph Mead; and Jeffrey Gamso, urging reversal 
for amici curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation, Inc., and 
Center for Constitutional Rights. 
Valerie Kunze, Assistant State Public Defender; Gibbons P.C., Lawrence 
Lustberg, and Avram Frey; and Catherine Hanssens and Mayo Schreiber Jr., urging 
reversal for amici curiae Center for HIV Law and Policy, American Academy of 
HIV Medicine, GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders, GLMA: Health 
Professionals Advancing LGBT Equality, Human Rights Campaign, National 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, National Center for Lesbian Rights, 
Office of the Ohio Public Defender, and Treatment Action Group. 
_________________