Title: People v. Braden

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
CORY JUAN BRADEN, JR., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S268925 
 
Fourth Appellate District, Division Two 
E073204 
 
San Bernardino County Superior Court 
FVI18001116 
 
 
June 5, 2023 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Kruger, Groban, and 
Jenkins concurred.   
 
Justice Evans filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Liu 
concurred. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
S268925 
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
Penal Code1 section 1001.36 authorizes pretrial diversion 
for defendants with qualifying mental disorders.  Here we 
consider the latest point in the criminal proceedings at which a 
defendant may request such diversion.  We conclude that, in 
keeping with the statutory language and overall scheme, the 
request must be made before attachment of jeopardy at trial or 
the entry of a guilty or no contest plea, whichever occurs first.  
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal, 
which upheld the trial court’s denial of defendant’s request for 
diversion made for the first time after the jury returned its 
verdict.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
On April 25, 2018, defendant Cory Juan Braden, Jr., then 
38 years old, had a confrontation with his sister.  When their 
mother intervened, Braden kicked her in the groin and choked 
her, prompting his sister to call 911.  A uniformed sheriff’s 
deputy responded.  He had been told by dispatch that Braden 
was schizophrenic with a history of violence.  The deputy 
identified himself to Braden and asked him to submit to a pat-
down search to ensure everyone’s safety.  Braden initially 
complied, but then turned and punched the deputy in the face.  
 
1  
All further undesignated statutory references are to the 
Penal Code. 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
2 
The deputy backed up, and Braden advanced with fists 
clenched.  After the two men exchanged punches, the deputy 
tackled Braden, knocking him to the ground and punching him 
twice on the left side.  Braden continued to resist until two 
additional deputies arrived and the three officers were able to 
restrain him.  Braden’s mother later confirmed that he had 
“charged” at the first responding deputy.   
Braden was charged with resisting an executive officer 
with force or violence (§ 69) and having two prior qualifying 
felony convictions under the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. 
(b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)).2  Following a trial at which 
Braden represented himself, a jury found him guilty and found 
the prior conviction allegations true.3  Before sentencing, 
Braden requested and received appointed counsel, who moved 
to have Braden considered for mental health diversion under 
section 1001.36.  The People opposed the motion, and the trial 
court denied it, finding the motion both untimely and moot.  The 
court stated that it would “deny [the motion] in any event 
 
2  
Those convictions were assault with a firearm (§ 245, 
subd. (a)(2)) and discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent 
manner (§ 246.3).  Both offenses occurred on the same date in 
2006.  
3  
Braden was granted pro se status approximately a week 
after arraignment.  Before trial, he filed several written motions 
with supporting authority, including a motion to dismiss for 
outrageous police misconduct, a Pitchess motion (Pitchess v. 
Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531), a motion for pretrial 
discovery and disclosure of Brady materials (Brady v. Maryland 
(1963) 373 U.S. 83), a motion to reduce the charge to a 
misdemeanor, and a motion for sanctions for failure to preserve 
evidence.  
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
3 
because it would still be discretionary.”  The court sentenced 
defendant to four years in state prison.   
The appellate court affirmed, holding that Braden was 
ineligible for pretrial diversion because his request was not 
made before trial began.  (People v. Braden (2021) 63 
Cal.App.5th 330, 332, 342 (Braden).)  It considered the statute’s 
repeated use of the words “ ‘pretrial’ diversion” (id. at p. 333), 
the requirement that a defendant waive speedy trial rights (id. 
at pp. 334–335), and the nature of various other pretrial 
diversion programs, “which long have had a purpose of reducing 
the systemic burdens of criminal trials” (id. at p. 335).  In so 
concluding, the court expressly disagreed with People v. Curry 
(2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 314, review granted July 14, 2021, 
S267394 (Curry).  (See Braden, at pp. 340–342.)  Curry held that 
“a defendant may ask the trial court for mental health diversion 
until sentencing and entry of judgment.”  (Curry, at p. 325.)  A 
third appellate court subsequently held that a defendant may 
request pretrial diversion up until the verdicts are returned or 
the defendant enters a plea of guilty or no contest.  (People v. 
Graham (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 827, 833–835, review granted 
Sept. 1, 2021, S269509 (Graham).)   
We granted review to resolve the conflict in the Courts of 
Appeal. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
Enacted in 2018, section 1001.36 authorizes pretrial 
diversion for defendants with qualifying mental disorders.  
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
4 
(Stats. 2018, ch. 34, § 24; see § 1001.36, subd. (b)(1).)4  The 
question here turns on the statute’s definition of “ ‘Pretrial 
diversion,’ ” and specifically the phrase “until adjudication.”  
(§ 1001.36, subd. (f)(1), hereafter 1001.36(f)(1).)  The statute 
provides:  “As used in this chapter . . . ‘Pretrial diversion’ means 
the postponement of prosecution, either temporarily or 
permanently, at any point in the judicial process from the point 
at which the accused is charged until adjudication, to allow the 
defendant to undergo mental health treatment,” subject to 
specified conditions.  (Ibid.)   
We have once before considered the import of this 
language, in People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618 (Frahs), but 
our decision in Frahs does not answer the question now before 
us.  The question in Frahs was whether section 1001.36 applies 
retroactively to cases in which the judgment was not yet final on 
appeal when the statute went into effect.  Our inquiry was 
governed by the rule in In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 
which “rests on an inference that, in the absence of contrary 
indications, 
a 
legislative 
body 
ordinarily 
intends 
for 
ameliorative changes to the criminal law to extend as broadly as 
possible, distinguishing only as necessary between sentences 
that are final and sentences that are not.”  (People v. Conley 
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 657 (Conley).)  We held the Legislature 
did not clearly indicate a contrary intent as to retroactivity.  As 
a result, those defendants whose cases were not final on appeal, 
 
4  
Effective January 1, 2023, section 1001.36 was amended 
in various particulars, including relettering and renumbering of 
certain subdivisions and subparagraphs.  (Stats. 2022, ch. 735, 
§ 1.)  We refer to the statute by its current designations.   
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
5 
and who had no opportunity to request diversion in the trial 
court, should be permitted to do so.  (Frahs, at pp. 624, 628–637.)   
In so concluding, we made some observations about the 
normal order of proceedings in the trial court:  “[W]e view the 
definition of ‘pretrial diversion’ as simply reflecting the 
Legislature’s intent regarding how the statute will generally 
operate when a case comes before the trial court after section 
1001.36’s enactment.  In the ordinary course of procedure, a trial 
court determines whether a defendant is eligible for pretrial 
diversion before judgment is entered, and the defendant cannot 
be heard to seek such diversion afterward.  Broadly consistent 
with this common feature of pretrial diversion, the statute 
before us provides that diversion is available ‘until adjudication’ 
(§ 1001.36, [former subd.] (c)), which the People construe as until 
the charge or charges against a defendant are resolved.  But that 
expectation regarding how the statute normally will apply going 
forward is quite different from the specific retroactivity question 
presented here, to which the Estrada inference applies.”  (Frahs, 
supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 632–633, fn. omitted.)  We also rejected 
the People’s argument that allowing for retroactivity would 
impermissibly undermine the jury’s verdict, noting that such an 
outcome “would not provide a clear indication that the statute 
was not intended to apply retroactively.  The Legislature could 
well have intended to allow judges to decide under the statute 
whether a defendant’s mental disorder was a ‘significant factor 
in the commission of the charged offense’ [citation] even after a 
verdict in which a mental health defense had been presented but 
rejected by the trier of fact.”  (Id. at p. 636.)  The question of that 
intent, which Frahs did not decide, is squarely at issue here. 
In making its observations, Frahs made explicit that it 
was only evaluating the Legislature’s intent in the limited 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
6 
context of the Estrada retroactivity inquiry.  Unless it has 
included an express savings clause, the Legislature must 
demonstrate its intent to limit the retroactive effect of an 
ameliorative change “ ‘with sufficient clarity that a reviewing 
court can discern and effectuate it.’ ”  (Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th 
at p. 657.)  Accordingly, the question before us in Frahs “boil[ed] 
down to whether the Legislature ‘clearly signal[ed] its intent’ to 
overcome the Estrada inference that section 1001.36 applies 
retroactively to all cases not yet final on appeal.”  (Frahs, supra, 
9 Cal.5th at pp. 631–632.)  This inquiry is “quite different” from 
how the “statute normally will apply going forward” as to 
defendants who had the opportunity to seek pretrial diversion 
during the course of their criminal cases.  (Id. at p. 633; accord, 
People v. Weaver (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 1103, 1119 [under 
Estrada, the court must “employ[] a different lens on legislative 
intent”].)  Recognizing this distinction, Frahs expressly left open 
the precise meaning of the phrase “ ‘until adjudication,’ ” noting 
that “we have no occasion here to precisely define” that term, 
and “our analysis should not be read as tacitly adopting the 
People’s interpretation of this language.”  (Frahs, at p. 633 & fn. 
3.)   
Relying primarily on the Frahs discussion of legislative 
intent, our dissenting colleagues argue that today’s decision 
marks a “retreat” from Frahs’s recognition that the purpose of 
section 1001.36 was to “ ‘ “[i]ncrease[] diversion of individuals 
with mental disorders to mitigate the individuals’ entry and 
reentry into the criminal justice system.” ’ ”  (Dis. opn. of Evans, 
J., post, at p. 2, quoting Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 632.)  The 
dissent also cites the observation that the definition of pretrial 
diversion “simply reflect[s] the Legislature’s intent regarding 
how the statute will generally operate when a case comes before 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
7 
the trial court after section 1001.36’s enactment” (Frahs, at p. 
632, italics added), to argue that the statute’s reference to 
“pretrial diversion” is simply shorthand and not meant to 
establish a timeline for diversion requests.  (Dis. opn. of Evans, 
J., post, at pp. 6, 9.)  But the dissent applies too broadly the 
narrow focus of the Estrada retroactivity analysis.  As explained 
above, Frahs addressed those defendants whose cases were 
disposed of before section 1001.36 went into effect.  In that 
context it considered only whether the Legislature intended 
defendants, who had not had the opportunity to request mental 
health diversion in the trial court before the enactment, should 
be allowed to do so retroactively in cases pending on appeal.  We 
concluded that the “breadth of the statute’s statement of 
purpose . . . is consistent with the retroactive application of the 
diversion scheme” and “ ‘support[s] the conclusion that the 
Estrada inference of retroactivity is not rebutted’ — that is, that 
the Legislature intended to apply the provisions of section 
1001.36 [retroactively] to every case to which it constitutionally 
could apply.”  (Frahs, at p. 632, italics added.)  Further, we 
rejected the People’s argument that the phrase “ ‘until 
adjudication’ expressly limits retroactive application of the 
statute to defendants whose cases had not yet been, in the 
People’s words, ‘resolved by a trier of fact.’ ”  (Ibid., italics 
added.)  In doing so, we explicitly declined to determine whether 
the phrase “until adjudication” meant pretrial, during trial, or 
until sentencing for cases that come before the trial court after 
section 1001.36’s enactment.  (Frahs, at pp. 632–633 & fn. 3.)  
Because Frahs did not resolve that separate question, we turn 
to it here.  We are not now speaking of Estrada retroactivity, but 
considering how the new statute, that was in effect before 
Braden’s trial, applies to his case.    
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
8 
“ ‘ “ ‘When we interpret a statute, “[o]ur fundamental task 
. . . is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate 
the law’s purpose.  We first examine the statutory language, 
giving it a plain and commonsense meaning.  We do not examine 
that language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory 
framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and 
purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment.  
If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain 
meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd 
consequences the Legislature did not intend.  If the statutory 
language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, 
courts may consider other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, 
legislative history, and public policy.”  [Citation.] “Furthermore, 
we consider portions of a statute in the context of the entire 
statute and the statutory scheme of which it is a part, giving 
significance to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of an act 
in pursuance of the legislative purpose.” ’ ” ’ [Citation.]  The 
interpretation of a statute presents a question of law that this 
court reviews de novo.”  (Smith v. LoanMe, Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 
183, 190.) 
A. Statutory Language and Framework 
As noted, the statute defines “ ‘Pretrial diversion’ ” as 
“postponement of prosecution . . . at any point in the judicial 
process from the point at which the accused is charged until 
adjudication . . . .”  (§ 1001.36(f)(1).)  The statute does not 
separately define “adjudication.”  The basic legal definition of 
that word refers to either (1) “[t]he legal process of resolving a 
dispute; the process of judicially deciding a case” or (2) the 
“judgment.”  (Black’s Law Dict. (11th ed. 2019) p. 52, col. 1; see 
Busker v. Wabtec Corp. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1147, 1158–1159 
(Busker) [considering dictionary definitions as an aid to 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
9 
statutory interpretation].)  Accordingly, “adjudication” can 
mean (1) the process of resolving the criminal charges by trial 
or entry of plea or (2) the conclusion of all trial proceedings by 
an entry of judgment.  The holdings of the appellate courts 
reflect this variance.  The court below held that the defendant 
must request pretrial diversion either before trial begins or the 
defendant pleads guilty or no contest.  (Braden, supra, 63 
Cal.App.5th at pp. 332–333, 337, 342; accord, People v. Torres 
(2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 849, 855.)  Graham, supra, 64 
Cal.App.5th 827, held that the defendant may request pretrial 
diversion up until the verdicts are returned or the defendant 
enters a plea of guilty or no contest.  (Id. at pp. 833–835; accord 
People v. Rodriguez (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 584, 590–591, review 
granted Nov. 10, 2021, S270895.)5  And Curry, supra, 62 
Cal.App.5th 314, held that the defendant may request pretrial 
diversion up until sentence is pronounced.  (Id. at pp. 321–326.)  
While the phrase “until adjudication,” standing alone, is 
susceptible to more than one meaning, our task here is to 
construe it in the context of the legislative scheme as a whole. 
Turning to the text of section 1001.36, several aspects of 
the statute’s language and its framework support the conclusion 
that, to be timely, a request for pretrial diversion must be made 
before the process of adjudicating the charges begins, i.e., before 
jeopardy attaches at trial or the defendant enters a plea of guilty 
or no contest, whichever occurs first.   
 
5  
Like the Courts of Appeal (Graham, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th 
at p. 833; Braden, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 337), we see no 
distinction in this context between “ ‘adjudication of guilt based 
on a plea of guilt and [an adjudication by] trial on the merits.’ ”  
(In re Harris (1989) 49 Cal.3d 131, 135, quoting People v. 
Greenwell (1962) 203 Cal.App.2d 1, 4.) 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
10 
The text of section 1001.36 refers eight times to the 
diversion it provides for as “pretrial.”  As one Court of Appeal 
observed:  “ ‘pretrial diversion’ connotes a diversion away from 
trial.  One cannot divert a river after the point at which it has 
reached the sea.”  (Graham, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 833.)  
We also find it significant that the Legislature incorporated a 
definition of pretrial diversion that has been in existence for 
over 40 years.  In 1977, the Legislature enacted a statutory 
scheme authorizing local jurisdictions to implement diversion 
programs pursuant to certain guidelines.  (Former §§ 1001–
1001.10; Stats. 1977, ch. 574, § 2, pp. 1819–1821; see Davis v. 
Municipal Court (1988) 46 Cal.3d 64, 73–75 [discussing history 
of this legislative enactment].)  Former section 1001.1 codified 
for the first time the definition of pretrial diversion now used, 
with minor grammatical variations, in several statutes, 
including section 1001.36:  “pretrial diversion refers to the 
procedure of postponing prosecution either temporarily or 
permanently at any point in the judicial process from the point 
at which the accused is charged until adjudication.”  (Former 
§ 1001.1, italics added.)6  Consistent with the usual meaning of 
the defined term, appellate courts long have understood section 
1001.1’s definition of pretrial diversion as contemplating a 
request for diversion before trial begins.  (See, e.g., Gresher v. 
Anderson (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 88, 111–112 (Gresher); People 
v. Padfield (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 218, 227–229 & fn. 8.)  In 
 
6  
The same definition also appears in sections 1001.50, 
subdivision (c), 1001.70, subdivision (b), and 1001.80, 
subdivision (k)(1).  The current version of section 1001.1, 
adopted in 1982, contains nearly identical language, except to 
specify that it applies to “prosecution of an offense filed as a 
misdemeanor.”  (§ 1001.1; Stats 1982, ch. 42, § 2, p. 99.)   
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
11 
Gresher, for example, the court invalidated the Department of 
Social Services’ policy that those in diversion are ineligible to 
apply for trustline registration (see Health & Saf. Code, 
§§ 1596.60, subd. (e), 1596.601) because they are “ ‘awaiting 
trial.’ ”  (Gresher, at p. 111.)  It reasoned:  “The purpose of those 
programs is precisely to avoid the necessity of a trial.”  (Ibid.)  
Construing the definition of pretrial diversion set forth in 
section 1001.1, the court reasoned, “[g]iven that a trial is not 
contemplated without first holding a [hearing to terminate 
diversion], which is itself contingent on the person’s 
performance, it cannot reasonably be said that persons in 
diversion programs are ‘awaiting trial.’ ”  (Gresher, at p. 111, 
italics added7; accord, Padfield, at p. 228 & fn. 8 [explaining that 
the purpose of pretrial diversion is to spare defendants the 
stigma of a criminal record and reduce court congestion, and 
observing that “[i]f the defendant has a legal right to pretrial 
diversion, then the court should not proceed to trial”].) Under 
well-established canons of statutory construction, “when the 
same word [or phrase] appears in different places within a 
statutory scheme, courts generally presume the Legislature 
intended the word [or phrase] to have the same meaning each 
time it is used.”  (People v. Gray (2014) 58 Cal.4th 901, 906; 
accord, Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 634 [the Legislature “ ‘is 
 
7  
Contrary to the dissent’s assertion (dis. opn. of Evans, J., 
post, at p. 8 & fn. 4), we do not interpret Gresher’s statements as 
dictum.  The Department had argued that those on diversion 
were “ ‘awaiting trial.’ ”  (Gresher, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 
111.)  In a three-paragraph analysis the court considered and 
rejected the Department’s argument, relying on the language of 
various diversion statutes.  (Id. at pp. 111–112.)   
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
12 
deemed to be aware of existing laws and judicial constructions 
in effect at the time legislation is enacted’ ”].)   
Had the Legislature intended mental health diversion to 
be available up until the time of sentencing, it could easily have 
said so, as it has in other contexts.  Section 1368, subdivision 
(a), for example, provides the court shall inquire about the 
defendant’s mental competence if a doubt arises “during the 
pendency of an action and prior to judgment.”  (Italics added.)  
“[T]he terms ‘judgment’ and ‘ “sentence” ’ are generally 
considered ‘synonymous,’ ” and have a well-established meaning 
in the Penal Code.  (People v. McKenzie (2020) 9 Cal.5th 40, 46 
(McKenzie); see People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 344, fn. 
9; § 1191 et seq. [Title 8, “Judgment and Execution”].)  Instead, 
the Legislature adopted a definition of “pretrial diversion” that 
has long been understood as referring to the period before trial 
begins.   
The statute also provides for a grant of “pretrial diversion” 
“[o]n an accusatory pleading.”  (§ 1001.36, subd. (a).)  It makes 
no mention of a diversion grant following “conviction,” which 
would be the more logical terminology if diversion were also 
permitted after conviction by trial or plea.  The statute 
contemplates several sources of “relevant and credible evidence” 
that can be used to determine if the defendant’s mental disorder 
“was a significant factor in the commission of the charged 
offense.”  (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).)  Those sources include, but 
are not limited to, “police reports, preliminary hearing 
transcripts, witness statements, statements by the defendant’s 
mental health treatment provider, medical records, records or 
reports by qualified medical experts, or evidence that the 
defendant displayed symptoms consistent with the relevant 
mental disorder at or near the time of the offense.”  (Ibid.)  The 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
13 
enumerated sources are all categories of evidence available 
before trial.  Although the list is not exclusive, the omission of 
any reference to the testimony of trial witnesses is noteworthy.   
Likewise, the text provides that, upon a successful 
completion of diversion the court “shall dismiss the defendant’s 
criminal charges that were the subject of the criminal 
proceedings at the time of the initial diversion.”  (§ 1001.36, 
subd. (h).)  This language contemplates that the defendant is 
facing “charges” “at the time” diversion is granted.  The statute 
gives the court no authority to set aside a plea or trial verdict, 
which would be required if diversion were granted after 
“adjudication” of guilt by trial or plea.  Further the Legislature 
specifically provides that if charges are dismissed, “the arrest 
upon which the diversion was based shall be deemed never to 
have occurred.”  (Ibid., italics added.)  Again the Legislature 
made no mention of setting aside a plea or trial result.  
The statute also requires that the defendant “consent[] to 
diversion and waive[] the . . . right to a speedy trial,” unless the 
defendant is mentally incompetent to do so.  (§ 1001.36, subd. 
(c)(2).)  In Morse v. Municipal Court (1974) 13 Cal.3d 149 
(Morse), we considered similar language in the context of a 1972 
statute (former § 1000.1) which diverted first time drug 
offenders away from criminal prosecution.  The question there, 
as here, was “how far into the criminal process a defendant may 
go before he can no longer be afforded the right to consent to 
consideration for diversion under section 1000.1 and thereby 
secure the referral of his case to the probation department for 
investigation.”  (Morse, at p. 155, italics omitted.)  We found 
“that the language of the code itself carrie[d] us a considerable 
distance” in answering that question.  (Id. at p. 156.)  
Specifically, 
we 
observed 
that 
the 
statute’s 
language 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
14 
“unequivocally ma[de] a defendant’s consent to consideration for 
diversion contingent upon a simultaneous waiver of speedy trial 
rights.[8]  In using such language the Legislature was surely 
aware of precedent decisions [citations] which recognize that the 
right to speedy trial is one which must be asserted prior to the 
actual commencement of trial, usually by means of a motion to 
dismiss made at the time the trial date is set or at the time the 
case is called for trial.  Accordingly, the plain meaning of the 
waiver of speedy trial language of section 1000.1 is that the 
defendant’s consent to referral of his case to the probation 
department should be tendered to the district attorney prior to 
the commencement of trial.”  (Id. at p. 156.)  The statute, we 
concluded, established an affirmative restriction on the timing 
of a diversion request:  the “clear wording of the diversion 
provisions thus precludes a defendant from initiating diversion 
proceedings by tendering a consent after commencement of trial 
. . . .”  (Id. at p. 157; see also id. at p. 160.)9  We interpret a 
similar timing restriction from section 1001.36’s requirement 
that the defendant waive speedy trial rights in order to 
participate in diversion.10   
 
8  
The wording of the former statute, as quoted in Morse, 
provided:  “ ‘[I]f the defendant consents and waives his right to a 
speedy trial the district attorney shall refer the case to the 
probation department.’ ”  (Morse, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 156.) 
9  
Morse went on to conclude that the legislative policy to 
apply diversion liberally supported an interpretation that the 
defendant could request diversion anytime during the pretrial 
period.  (Morse, supra, 13 Cal.3d at pp. 157–160.)   
10  
Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th 618 is not to the contrary.  There, 
addressing the retroactive application question, the People 
argued that section 1001.36’s reference to “pretrial diversion” 
 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
15 
At the same time, the statute sets forth no procedure for 
granting a mistrial or waiving double jeopardy.  (See U.S. 
Const., 5th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15; Pen. Code, § 1023.)  
This absence supports a conclusion that the Legislature 
intended to require that the defendant request diversion before 
jeopardy attaches.  Notably, both the Graham and Curry rules 
allow for midtrial diversion requests after jeopardy has attached 
but before verdicts have been reached.  A waiver of the right to 
assert a once-in-jeopardy objection would be necessary in this 
 
and its requirement of a speedy trial waiver signaled the 
Legislature’s intent to deny retroactive application of the 
statute to those defendants whose trials had concluded and were 
no longer in a position to waive that right.  (Id. at pp. 633, 636–
637.)  We rejected this logic, reasoning, “this language simply 
explains how the mental health diversion program will 
ordinarily function:  In the normal course of operations, a trial 
court would determine before trial whether a defendant is 
eligible for pretrial diversion.  This phrasing does not 
demonstrate a legislative intent to ‘modify, limit, or entirely 
forbid the retroactive application of ameliorative criminal law 
amendments’ [citation] ‘with sufficient clarity that a reviewing 
court can discern and effectuate it’ [citation].”  (Id. at pp. 633–
634.)  We further concluded that “the potential logistical 
problems identified by the People in providing defendants with 
a diversion eligibility hearing after conviction . . . do not provide 
a sufficient basis to deny defendants the benefit of a hearing 
altogether.”  (Id. at p. 636; see also People v. Stamps (2020) 9 
Cal.5th 685, 705–709 [articulating special procedures for 
defendants seeking the benefit of an ameliorative statute for the 
first time on appeal].)  But as the quoted language from Frahs 
and our discussion, ante, make clear, our inquiry under Estrada 
does not necessarily inform how a statute will operate 
prospectively to defendants whose guilt is adjudicated after the 
statute’s effective date.  For such persons, we conclude the 
Legislature’s requirement of a speedy trial waiver conveys its 
intent to require that the defendant request diversion before the 
process of adjudicating guilt begins.    
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
16 
circumstance in the event that diversion fails and criminal 
proceedings are reinstated.  (See § 1001.36, subd. (g).)  Yet 
nothing in the statute anticipates the double jeopardy problem 
midtrial diversion would create, nor does it suggest how to 
overcome such issues.  The lack of any elaboration of the rules 
that would be required to implement midtrial diversion suggests 
the Legislature did not intend to authorize such a procedure.   
Finally, section 1001.36 is positioned in title 6 of part 2 of 
the Penal Code which is devoted exclusively to “Pleadings and 
Proceedings Before Trial.”  (§ 976 et seq., italics added; see City 
of Ontario v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 335, 343 
[considering statute’s placement in the code].)  This section of 
the code covers arraignment (§ 976), setting aside the 
information or indictment (§ 995), and various other diversion 
programs.11  It appears before, and separately from, the statutes 
covering the entry of a guilty plea (§ 1018), jury trial (§ 1093 et 
seq.), and sentencing (§ 1191 et seq.).  All of these features are 
consistent with the conventional understanding of pretrial 
diversion:  diverting a defendant’s case out of the adjudicatory 
system before the process of determining guilt by trial or plea 
begins.  Indeed, Morse found that section 1000.1’s similar 
placement in the code “cured” “[a]ny ambiguity that might exist” 
about requiring the defendant to request diversion before 
 
11  
Sections 1000 [drug diversion]; 1001.1 [pretrial diversion 
defined]; 1001.20 [diversion of defendants with cognitive 
developmental disabilities]; 1001.40 [diversion of traffic 
violators]; 1001.50 [diversion of misdemeanor offenders]; 
1001.60 [bad check diversion]; 1001.70 [parental diversion]; 
1001.80 [military diversion]; 1001.83 [primary caregiver 
diversion]; 1001.85 [law enforcement assisted diversion]; and 
1001.95 [court-initiated misdemeanor diversion]. 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
17 
commencement of trial.  (Morse, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 157, fn. 
4.)    
Braden and our dissenting colleagues offer several 
counterarguments in support of their view that the text of 
section 1001.36 entitled Braden to request diversion up until 
sentence was pronounced.  The arguments fail to persuade.   
Braden argues it is inappropriate to consider the plain 
meaning of the words “pretrial diversion” because section 
1001.36 includes its own definition of that term.  But as 
explained above, and as Braden acknowledges, section 
1001.36(f)(1)’s reference to “until adjudication” is susceptible to 
more than one meaning.  This ambiguity justifies considering 
the plain meaning of the term “pretrial diversion” in parsing the 
statutory language.  (See Busker, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1159.) 
Our dissenting colleagues contend that interpreting the 
term “until adjudication” to mean “until entry of judgment” is 
the most natural reading of the statute because it does not 
require “elaboration, refinement, or insertion of additional 
words.”  (Dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 4.)  The dissent further 
argues that such an interpretation “comports with the 
commonsense understanding that typically there is no 
adjudication of a matter until there is some outcome.”  (Ibid.)  
Braden echoes these arguments, and cites McKenzie, supra, 9 
Cal.5th 40, for the proposition that a case is not adjudicated, and 
a judgment not issued, unless and until a sentence is rendered.  
The arguments overlook the reality that if the Legislature 
intended to allow mental health diversion up until the time of 
“judgment,” it could have said so.  But it did not.  And, as noted 
ante, the definition of adjudication can mean either (1) “[t]he 
legal process of resolving a dispute; the process of judicially 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
18 
deciding a case” or (2) the “judgment.”  (Black’s Law Dict. (11th 
ed. 2019) p. 52, col. 1.)  Interpreting the word “adjudication” to 
refer to a point in the process rather than a result of that process 
is not novel.  As for Braden’s reliance on McKenzie, that case is 
inapposite.  There we considered at what point a case is reduced 
to a final judgment for purposes of Estrada retroactivity 
principles.  (McKenzie, at pp. 44–46.)  The case contained no 
discussion of the meaning of the word “adjudication.”  
Braden further argues that construing the word 
“adjudication” to mean the “legal process of resolving a dispute” 
(Black’s Law Dict. (11th ed. 2019) p. 52, col. 1) upends the 
sentence structure of section 1001.36(f)(1).  He urges that the 
legal process of resolving a dispute is not a single “point” in the 
process (§ 1001.36(f)(1)), but that the judgment is.  This 
semantic argument is unconvincing.  Our interpretation of the 
statute does indeed identify a discrete “point” in the judicial 
process:  the point at which adjudication of the charges begins, 
either when trial commences or the defendant opts to forgo trial 
by entering a plea of guilty or no contest, whichever occurs first.  
Read most naturally, this is the “point” in the process that the 
statute identifies.  
Significantly, interpreting “until adjudication,” to permit 
diversion mid- or posttrial, produces considerable dissonance 
with the overarching concept of “pretrial” diversion.  By 
contrast, interpreting “until adjudication” to require a request 
for diversion to be made before jeopardy attaches at trial or 
before defendant enters a guilty or no contest plea produces no 
such dissonance.  As the Court of Appeal below reasoned:  “If, as 
Braden would like, ‘until adjudication’ refers to a posttrial 
moment such as the time of sentencing, the definition of ‘pretrial 
diversion’ would be at odds with the ordinary meaning of the 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
19 
word pretrial.  That is, the very term being defined would be 
read out of the statute.  That is not a tenable way to read a 
statute.  Further, it is understandable why the Legislature used 
the term ‘until adjudication’ rather than a phrase such as ‘until 
trial.’  Most adjudications occur by guilty plea, rather than 
through trial, so defining ‘pretrial’ using the term ‘until 
adjudication’ encompasses both a plea hearing and an 
adjudication by trial.”  (Braden, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 337.) 
Our dissenting colleagues resist this conclusion by 
arguing that the label “pretrial diversion” is simply a shorthand 
for how the statute generally will operate, rather than an 
affirmative time constraint on diversion requests.  (Dis. opn. of 
Evans, J., post, at pp. 5–6.)  But if that were true, the word 
“pretrial” would be unnecessary.  The Legislature simply could 
have referred to “diversion” for persons suffering from mental 
disorders.  Moreover, the definition of pretrial diversion in 
section 1001.36(f)(1) unquestionably contemplates a timeline:  
“[A]t any point in the judicial process from the point at which 
the accused is charged until adjudication . . . .”  (Italics added.)  
The dissent’s interpretation, which allows for pretrial diversion 
requests from the time of charging until sentencing effectively 
states no timeline because it would authorize diversion requests 
at any point when the trial court exercises jurisdiction over the 
case.  This view renders the words “from the point at which the 
accused is charged until adjudication” superfluous.   
Both Braden and the dissent question our reliance on 
Morse’s holding that the requirement of a speedy trial waiver 
amounts to an affirmative restriction on the timing of a 
diversion request, requiring that the request be made before 
trial begins.  (Morse, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 156.)  They contend 
Morse is inapposite due to variations between the statute at 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
20 
issue there and section 1001.36, most notably, that former 
section 1000.1 did not expressly define pretrial diversion, while 
section 1001.36 does.  (Dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 10, fn. 
5.) But to the extent the phrase “until adjudication” is 
susceptible to more than one interpretation, the statute’s 
separate requirement that the defendant waive speedy trial 
rights enlightens the meaning of that term.  Morse directly 
addressed the significance of a speedy trial waiver in the context 
of a diversion statute and concluded that the requirement 
established an affirmative restriction on the timing of a 
diversion request.  (Morse, at p. 157.) 
Braden further observes that the Legislature amended the 
statute at issue in Morse (§ 1000.1) to expressly require, not only 
waivers of speedy preliminary and speedy trial rights, but also 
the waiver of a jury trial right itself (id., subd. (a)(3); Stats. 2017, 
ch. 778, § 2).  Yet, it did not similarly amend section 1001.36.  
Based on this variance, Braden argues that “[t]he express 
omission that a defendant must waive his or her right to a jury 
trial to be considered for mental health diversion supports the 
construction that diversion is an option after a trial has begun.”  
We read the statute differently.  The Legislature’s inclusion of a 
separate jury trial waiver in section 1000.1 means that 
defendants who fail drug diversion are only entitled to a court 
trial should criminal proceedings resume.  By contrast, 
defendants who fail mental health diversion will be able to 
exercise their full jury trial right.  As Morse explained, the 
requirement of a speedy trial waiver, applicable to both statutes, 
addresses a different issue:  the timing of a defendant’s request 
for diversion.  (Morse, supra, 13 Cal.3d at pp. 157, 160.)  In that 
respect, sections 1000.1 and 1001.36 remain the same.   
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
21 
Braden and the dissent look to section 1001.36, 
subdivision (e), which states that the court may require the 
defendant to make a prima facie showing of eligibility for 
diversion “[a]t any stage of the proceedings.”  Braden argues 
that this broad language includes sentencing, which is a stage 
of the proceedings.  And the dissent reasons that it “defies logic” 
to read this phrase as excluding the trial, which is “the most 
widely known stage of the proceedings.”  (Dis. opn. of Evans, J., 
post, at p. 11.)  But this language can also be understood to 
reflect that pretrial proceedings themselves have multiple 
stages.  Significantly, subdivision (e) does not define the terms 
“pretrial diversion” or “until adjudication.”  Instead, it identifies 
the defendant’s burden to make a prima facie showing that he 
or she “will meet the minimum requirements of eligibility for 
diversion and that the defendant and the offense are suitable for 
diversion.”  (Ibid.)  Section 1001.36(f)(1) employs similar 
language, referring to postponement of the prosecution “at any 
point in the judicial process,” but that language is qualified by 
the term “until adjudication.”  Likewise, subdivision (e)’s 
provisions are only as broad as the definition of “pretrial 
diversion” in subdivision (f)(1).  In other words, the trial court 
may require the defendant to make a prima facie showing of 
eligibility “at any stage of the proceedings” in which the 
defendant is entitled to request diversion.  Subdivision (e) does 
not assist us in understanding the definition of “pretrial 
diversion” in the first instance. 
Finally, the dissent asserts that sections 1001.2 and 
1001.51, dealing with misdemeanor diversion, authorize such 
diversion after the start of trial notwithstanding the same 
definition of pretrial diversion at issue here.  (Dis. opn. of Evans, 
J., post, at p. 9.)  In support, the dissent cites language in these 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
22 
sections exempting certain “pretrial diversion or posttrial 
programs” from their scope, and expressly stating that their 
provisions should not be read to authorize “pretrial diversion or 
posttrial programs” for certain Vehicle Code offenses.  (§ 1001.2, 
subd. (a), italics added; see also § 1001.51, subd. (b).)12  The 
dissent cites no authority, and we have found none, construing 
this exclusionary language to mean that misdemeanor diversion 
may be ordered after the start of trial.  On the contrary, the 
statutes’ separate references to pretrial diversion “or” posttrial 
programs suggests the opposite.13   
 
12  
The language, in context, reads as follows:  “This chapter 
shall not apply to any pretrial diversion or posttrial programs 
for the treatment of problem drinking or alcoholism utilized for 
persons convicted of one or more offenses under Section 23152 
or 23153 or former Section 23102 of the Vehicle Code or to 
pretrial diversion programs established pursuant to Chapter 2.5 
(commencing with Section 1000) of this title nor shall this 
chapter be deemed to authorize any pretrial diversion or 
posttrial programs for persons alleged to have committed 
violation of Section 23152 or 23153 of the Vehicle Code.”  
(§ 1001.2, subd. (a).)  “This chapter shall not apply to any 
pretrial diversion or posttrial program otherwise established by 
this code, nor shall this chapter be deemed to authorize any 
pretrial diversion or posttrial program for any person alleged to 
have committed a violation of Section 23152 or 23153 of the 
Vehicle Code.”  (§ 1001.51, subd. (b).) 
13  
The dissent further contends that the diversion scheme for 
individuals with cognitive disabilities (§§ 1001.20–1001.34) 
authorizes diversion after trial begins despite sharing several of 
the same features present in section 1001.36 that we have relied 
upon to support a contrary conclusion.  (Dis. opn. by Evans, J., 
post, at p. 10, fn. 6.)  Again, the dissent cites no authority for 
this proposition, and we have found none.  The diversion scheme 
for individuals with cognitive disabilities, operative January 1, 
 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
23 
B.  Section 1001.36 and Statutes Governing Incompetence 
to Stand Trial and Victim Restitution  
Both Braden and our dissenting colleagues look to the 
interplay between section 1001.36 and the statutes governing 
incompetence to stand trial (§ 1368 et seq.) to support the 
argument that mental health diversion may be requested up 
until sentencing.  (Dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at pp. 13–16.)  
They reason that, when the Legislature created mental health 
diversion, it also amended section 1370 to authorize trial courts 
to grant mental health diversion when a defendant is found 
mentally incompetent to stand trial.  (§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B)(iv), 
(v); as amended by Stats. 2018, ch. 34, § 25.)  Because an 
incompetency finding can occur midtrial, or even up until 
sentencing (see § 1368, subd. (a); People v. Rogers (2006) 39 
Cal.4th 826, 847), section 1370 authorizes mental health 
diversion at these later times.  According to Braden, our 
construction of section 1001.36 would effectively make the 
portions of section 1370 that allow for diversion after trial 
commences surplusage.     
The argument presumes that there is one uniform 
timeline that governs referral to mental health diversion for all 
defendants, whether competent or incompetent.  Not so.  There 
are significant differences between competent and incompetent 
defendants that would cause the Legislature to adopt a more 
flexible timeline for mental health diversion in the latter group.   
 
2021, (Stats. 2020, ch. 11, § 23) has not yet been construed by 
any appellate court.  We decline to undertake that task here.  It 
is sufficient for our purposes to note that this scheme does not 
include the definition of pretrial diversion that is the focus of our 
discussion.      
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
24 
An incompetent person is incapable of adequately 
defending against a charge.  Thus, under the federal 
Constitution, an incompetent defendant cannot be tried, 
convicted, or punished.  (Drope v. Missouri (1975) 420 U.S. 162, 
171–172; see § 1367, subd. (a); 5 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. 
Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) §§ 820, 821, pp. 1255–1258.)  A 
doubt about the defendant’s competency can arise at any time 
before judgment is pronounced (§ 1368, subd. (a)), and the 
statute imposes on the trial court a sua sponte duty to evaluate 
competency at any time such a concern arises (ibid.; Hale v. 
Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 221, 226; People v. Aparicio 
(1952) 38 Cal.2d 565, 568; Witkin & Epstein, supra, § 825, at pp. 
1262–1263).  Failure to comply with section 1368’s mandate goes 
to the legality of the proceedings and results in an act in excess 
of jurisdiction.  (People v. Superior Court (Marks) (1991) 1 
Cal.4th 56, 64–71; Witkin & Epstein, supra, §§ 821, 828, at pp. 
1255–1256, 1268–1270.)  By incorporating the provisions of 
section 1001.36 into the competency statutes, the Legislature 
signaled its intent to have mental health diversion operate in 
tandem with an incompetency finding, whenever it arises before 
judgment.   
Mental health diversion for competent defendants works 
differently.  There is no question that the court has jurisdiction 
over defendants who are competent to stand trial and assist in 
their own defense.  Competent defendants are capable of, and 
required to, request diversion, consent to it, demonstrate their 
eligibility, waive the right to a speedy trial, and agree to comply 
with treatment.  (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(2) & (3).)  “Nowhere . . . 
does the scheme mandate a sua sponte duty for trial courts to 
consider mental health diversion” (People v. Banner (2022) 77 
Cal.App.5th 226, 235), and the court’s decision to refer the 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
25 
defendant 
to 
mental 
health 
diversion 
is 
discretionary 
(§ 1001.36, subd. (a)).  The inquiry focuses on whether the 
defendant has been diagnosed with a specified mental disorder 
that was a significant factor in the commission of the offense.  
(§ 1001.36, subd. (b).)   
Such a condition is not a moving target, as can be the case 
with a person who becomes incompetent to be tried even after 
charges have been brought.  To support a diversion request, the 
condition in question must exist at the time of the offense.  
Section 1001.36, subdivision (b)(1) places the burden on the 
defendant to provide evidence in support of the diversion 
request, including the existence of a mental health disorder.  
Accordingly, when such a showing can be made there is reason 
to incentivize a competent defendant to make a timely request 
for diversion to encourage early intervention and obviate the 
need for trial.     
Incompetent individuals cannot agree to the diversion 
requirements and the court cannot preside over their trial or 
impose sentence on them.  The question of incentivizing a 
defendant’s agreement to treatment simply does not arise.  
Rather, as discussed in further detail below (see pt. II.D., post), 
the availability of diversion for individuals found incompetent 
to be tried was added to reduce the burden of housing such 
individuals by the State Department of State Hospitals.   
The wording of the statutory scheme bears out these 
differences.  Section 1370, subdivision (a)(1)(B)(iv)(I) provides 
broadly that the court may make a finding that the defendant is 
an appropriate candidate for mental health diversion “at any 
time after the court finds that the defendant is mentally 
incompetent and before the defendant is transported to a facility 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
26 
pursuant to this section . . . .”  (Italics added.)  Even after the 
defendant has been transferred to a facility, the court may make 
such a finding “at any time upon receiving any information that 
the defendant may benefit from diversion . . . .”  (Id., subd. 
(a)(1)(B)(iv)(II), italics added.)  Section 1370, subdivision 
(a)(1)(B)(v) makes clear that it establishes independent 
authorization for the court to consider mental health diversion 
pursuant to the timeline set out in that statute.  It provides:  “If 
a defendant is found by the court to be an appropriate candidate 
for diversion pursuant to clause (iv), the defendant’s eligibility 
shall be determined pursuant to Section 1001.36.”  (Id., subd. 
(a)(1)(B)(v), italics added; accord, § 1370.01, subd. (b)(1)(A) 
[upon a finding of incompetence, the court may “[c]onduct a 
hearing, pursuant to [section 1001.36], and, if the court deems 
the defendant eligible, grant diversion” pursuant to that 
section], italics added.)  Under section 1001.36, the question of 
the defendant’s eligibility for diversion (id., subd. (b)(1)) is 
separate from the timeliness of the request (id., subd. (f)(1)).   
Other aspects of section 1001.36 similarly distinguish 
between competent and incompetent defendants.  Section 
1001.36 specifically excepts incompetent persons from the 
statutory requirements that they consent to diversion, waive 
speedy trial rights, and agree to comply with treatment.  
(§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(2), (3).)  These variances defeat the call for 
parallel construction between the timelines governing referral 
of competent and incompetent defendants to mental health 
diversion.  Instead, the Legislature expressly authorized mental 
health diversion under section 1370 any time a finding of 
incompetency is made, thus creating a specific exception to the 
timeline in section 1001.36 that governs a diversion request by 
a defendant who is competent to stand trial.   
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
27 
Braden’s reliance on the provisions governing victim 
restitution is similarly misplaced.  He notes that section 
1001.36, subdivision (f)(1)(D) provides that the trial court, upon 
request, shall conduct a hearing to determine whether 
restitution is owed to any victim as a result of the diverted 
offense, and order payment of restitution during the diversion 
period.  Under the general restitution statutes, restitution is 
triggered by a conviction (§ 1202.4, subd. (a)(1)), and is 
ascertained at or after sentencing (id., subd. (f)(3)).  Braden 
argues that “[s]ince a person who is granted mental health 
diversion under section 1001.36 can be ordered to pay 
restitution, the statute must contemplate [that] the granting of 
diversion should be treated as a ‘diversion sentence’ and include 
[the period] after the determination of guilt at sentencing.”   
We are not persuaded.  Section 1001.36 subdivision 
(f)(1)(D) simply provides that the trial court can extend to a 
defendant all the benefits of mental health diversion, yet also 
make a victim whole by ordering the payment of restitution that 
would normally be ordered at sentencing.  In this situation, a 
court is not forced to choose between assisting a defendant with 
mental health concerns and ordering restitution for a victim.  
This approach makes sense.  A main feature of the diversion 
system is to allow the court to intervene early to support a 
defendant’s rehabilitation and recovery without the stigma of a 
conviction.  But, as with probation conditions, agreeing to make 
victim restitution can also be part of the rehabilitative and 
therapeutic process.  The inclusion of restitution in this context 
honors the victims’ interest in being made whole when they are 
injured by competent defendants who are willing to address the 
harmful consequences of their actions, and to seek treatment for 
the underlying causes of their behavior.  It reflects a legislative 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
28 
policy choice to consider the interests of defendants and victims 
alike.  
C. Legislative Purpose 
Both Braden and the dissent argue that interpreting 
section 1001.36(f)(1)’s definition of “pretrial diversion” to require 
a diversion request before trial begins or a plea of guilty or no 
contest is entered contravenes the Legislature’s intent to have 
mental health diversion apply as broadly as possible.  For 
support, they look to the Legislature’s codified statement of 
purpose, which appears in section 1001.35.  (See People v. 
Bryant (2021) 11 Cal.5th 976, 987; Carter v. California Dept. of 
Veterans Affairs (2006) 38 Cal.4th 914, 925.)  That section 
states:  “The purpose of this chapter is to promote all of the 
following:  [¶]  (a) Increased diversion of individuals with mental 
disorders to mitigate the individuals’ entry and reentry into the 
criminal justice system while protecting public safety. [¶]  
(b) Allowing local discretion and flexibility for counties in the 
development and implementation of diversion for individuals 
with mental disorders across a continuum of care settings.  
[And] [¶]  (c) Providing diversion that meets the unique mental 
health treatment and support needs of individuals with mental 
disorders.”  (§ 1001.35.)  Braden observes that in Frahs, we 
relied on section 1001.35’s policy statements to conclude that 
“ ‘the Legislature intended the mental health diversion program 
to apply as broadly as possible,’ ” so that defendants like Frahs, 
whose cases were not final on appeal, could take advantage of 
the new enactment.  (Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 632.)   
Braden and the dissent also look to newly enacted section 
17.2, which provides:  “(a)  It is the intent of the Legislature that 
the disposition of any criminal case use the least restrictive 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
29 
means available.  [¶]  (b)  The court presiding over a criminal 
matter shall consider alternatives to incarceration, including, 
without limitation, collaborative justice court programs, 
diversion, restorative justice, and probation.  [¶]  (c)  The court 
shall have the discretion to determine the appropriate sentence 
according to relevant statutes and the sentencing rules of the 
Judicial Council.”  (Added by Stats. 2022, ch. 775, § 2, eff. Jan. 
1, 2023.)  Braden asserts that “[f]ulfilling these purposes calls 
for broad application of the statute to as many qualified people 
as possible, which would require diversion to be available until 
sentence is imposed.  If the law could apply to a person, the 
underlying policy calls for applying it.”  The dissent agrees:  
“[W]hile earlier diversion consideration is better, later is still 
good.”  (Dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 20.) 
Contrary to these assertions, interpreting section 1001.36 
to include a timeliness requirement is not inconsistent with the 
Legislature’s stated goals regarding diversion.  Our holding 
today does not change the eligibility criteria or limit who is 
eligible for diversion.  (See § 1001.36, subd. (b).)  Instead, it 
establishes when eligible individuals must make a diversion 
request.   
Nor is it true that only the broadest possible reading of an 
ameliorative statute can be deemed consistent with the 
Legislature’s purpose in enacting such a statute.  When section 
1001.36 was enacted, it had long been recognized that the 
purpose of pretrial diversion programs “is precisely to avoid the 
necessity of a trial.”  (Gresher, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 111.)  
As one Court of Appeal observed, “Were we to construe section 
1001.36 to permit a defendant to seek pretrial diversion after 
the adjudication of guilt or after a plea (ostensibly, by construing 
the term ‘adjudication’ to mean ‘entry of judgment’), we would 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
30 
be inviting the inefficient use of finite judicial resources.”  
(Graham, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at pp. 833–834.)  By contrast, 
“[r]equiring 
diversion 
requests 
before 
trial 
encourages 
defendants to make their request to be exempted from the 
criminal process before they invoke the most burdensome aspect 
of it.”  (Braden, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at pp. 341–342.)14  The 
Legislature did not adopt a definition of pretrial diversion 
specific to the mental health context.  Rather, as noted above, it 
employed a definition that had been in existence since 1977.  
Given the statutory scheme of which section 1001.36 is a part, 
and the longstanding definition of “pretrial diversion” 
incorporated therein, we conclude that among the Legislature’s 
goals was conservation of judicial resources.  The Legislature’s 
codified statement of purpose to have diversion apply broadly 
cannot override its express language applying the statute to 
“pretrial diversion.”  (See In re Gadlin (2020) 10 Cal.5th 915, 
940–942 (Gadlin).)   
Although limiting diversion to pretrial requests might 
foreclose some otherwise potentially meritorious diversion 
claims, the Legislature was entitled to conclude that doing so 
would create better incentives to expeditiously surface and 
 
14  
We note that, in terms of inefficiencies, the Graham rule, 
which allows for midtrial diversion requests up until verdicts 
are returned, is most likely to result in wasted judicial 
resources.  In the case of a jury trial, advocates must prepare for 
trial, the jury will be empaneled, witnesses assembled, and 
evidence presented.  If the defendant makes a prima facie 
showing for relief, the trial court would be required to dismiss 
the jury without completing the trial or receiving verdicts.  
Further, section 1001.36 does not require a jury trial waiver 
upon request for diversion, so the case could well require a 
second jury trial if diversion is unsuccessful.   
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
31 
address mental health concerns, and that other forms of 
posttrial relief are sufficient to address mental health issues in 
a posttrial setting.  Notably, while section 17.2 states a 
preference for the least restrictive criminal disposition, the 
Legislature’s use of the words “available” and “according to 
relevant statutes and the sentencing rules of the Judicial 
Council” indicate that the Legislature did not intend to alter 
existing statutory requirements, including section 1001.36’s 
timeliness requirement.     
In the end the Legislature has chosen an approach which 
strikes a balance.  Requiring that a request be made before trial 
begins makes a diversion request available for all who qualify.  
If diversion is deemed appropriate, a grant saves pretrial 
expenditures, 
including 
those 
attendant 
on 
repeated 
appearances and pretrial custody costs, as well as resources 
consumed by trials.  Encouraging resort to early mental health 
treatment can increase the chances for therapeutic success and 
protect both the public and the defendant from future burdens 
resulting from treatable mental health conditions.  (See pt. II.D., 
post.) 
Braden’s counsel acknowledged at oral argument that it 
would be unusual for defense counsel to become aware only 
during trial that the defendant has a mental health disorder 
that factored significantly in the commission of the offense.  This 
is the type of evidence that the defense would be expected to 
develop early if relevant to a disputed issue at trial.  Once 
defense counsel announces ready for trial, he or she will most 
often be well aware of evidence that would support a request for 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
32 
diversion.15  The defense is likewise empowered to delay the 
entry of plea and to waive time for trial in order to investigate 
further or consider whether the defendant is “willing to 
embrace” mental health treatment.  (Dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, 
at p. 21.)  Given all of these considerations, the dissent’s concern 
that today’s ruling will severely compromise early intervention 
is unfounded.  (Dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at pp. 15–16, 19–22.)   
Moreover, it is important to note that the trial court is not 
without means to address a defendant’s mental disorder in the 
context of sentencing a defendant who has been convicted by 
trial or plea.  Even before section 1001.36 was enacted, a court 
could place the defendant on probation on the condition that he 
or she cooperate with mental health treatment.  That option 
 
15  
Such was the case here.  Braden’s family members advised 
police of his schizophrenia diagnosis when they called for 
emergency assistance.  Police dispatch made the responding 
officer aware of that diagnosis.  It appears that Braden, who was 
deemed competent to represent himself, was unaware of section 
1001.36’s pretrial diversion program, which became effective 
shortly before his trial.  The issue was raised for the first time 
after counsel was appointed to assist Braden at sentencing.  The 
general rule is that defendants who validly choose to represent 
themselves are charged with knowing the law.  Braden’s pro se 
status is therefore not a ground for excusing his failure to seek 
mental health diversion in a timely manner.  (See People v. 
Espinoza (2016) 1 Cal.5th 61, 75.)   
Nor does Braden argue that he should be excused from 
failing to timely seek mental health diversion before trial 
because he could not have anticipated the meaning we have 
attributed to the term “until adjudication” in section 1001.36.  
(Cf. People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 810–812; People v. 
Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 703–704; In re Gladys R. (1970) 1 
Cal.3d 855, 861.)   
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
33 
remains available and successful completion of probation is 
grounds to have a conviction vacated.  (§ 1203.4, subd. (a)(1).) 
In sum, although the phrase “until adjudication” 
(§ 1001.36(f)(1)), standing alone, is susceptible of more than one 
meaning, we resolve that ambiguity in light of the language of 
section 1001.36 as a whole and the entire statutory scheme 
governing diversion, including the Legislature’s codified 
statement of purpose.  Accordingly, we hold that, to be timely, a 
request for diversion must be made before attachment of 
jeopardy at trial or the entry of a guilty or no contest plea, 
whichever occurs first.  This interpretation best comports with 
the concept of “pretrial diversion,” harmonizes section 1001.36 
within the statutory scheme, and is consistent with the 
Legislature’s goals to accelerate mental health diversion, reduce 
pretrial incarceration, and preserve finite judicial resources.  We 
disapprove People v. Graham, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th 827, and 
People v. Curry, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th 314, to the extent they 
are inconsistent with the holding here. 
While the dissent offers several reasons why permitting 
mental health diversion until entry of judgment might be a 
preferable policy, the statutory language and contextual scheme 
point in a different direction.  Of course, if the Legislature 
wishes to expand the window during which a request may be 
made it is free to amend the statute.  But that is a policy choice 
for the Legislature to make.   
D.  Legislative History Materials  
Having reached this conclusion based on the statutory 
language and its context, “we need go no further.”  (Microsoft 
Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 750, 758.)  
Nonetheless, even if we were to consider extrinsic aids, a review 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
34 
of the legislative history of section 1001.36 comports with our 
reading of the statute.  (See, e.g., Gadlin, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 
936; Curle v. Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1057, 1067.) 
Section 1001.36 came into existence by a somewhat 
complex legislative process, which was aptly summarized in 
Tellez v. Superior Court (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 439 (Tellez).  We 
draw liberally from that discussion here.  “Before the enactment 
of Penal Code section 1001.36, two different bills proposed 
pretrial mental health diversion.  The bill that ultimately 
enacted Penal Code section 1001.36 was Assembly Bill No. 1810 
(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.).”  (Tellez, at p. 445; Stats. 2018, ch. 34, 
§ 24, eff. June 27, 2018.)  “Assembly Bill 1810 was an ‘omnibus 
health’ budget trailer bill authored by the Assembly Committee 
on Budget.  (Stats. 2018, ch. 34, § 37; Sen. Rules Com., Off. of 
Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1810 
(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.), as amended June 12, 2018, p. 1.) . . . [As 
first introduced,] the bill contained only one section and merely 
stated that the Legislature intended ‘to enact statutory changes 
relating to the Budget Act of 2018.’  (Assem. Bill 1810 (2017–
2018 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Jan. 10, 2018.)  The Senate 
amended the bill in June and added 37 sections, including the 
one that became Penal Code section 1001.36.  (Sen. Amend. to 
Assem. Bill 1810 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) June 12, 2018.)”  
(Tellez, at pp. 445–446.)   
“Senate Bill No. 215 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) . . .  separately 
proposed mental health diversion, and it eventually amended 
Penal Code section 1001.36” to address restitution for diverted 
offenses and to set forth a list of ineligible offenses.  (Tellez, 
supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 445; see id. at p. 447; Stats. 2018, 
ch. 1005, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2019.)  The mental health diversion 
language was added to the bill on January 3, 2018, predating 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
35 
the introduction of such language in Assembly Bill No. 1810 
(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 1810).  (Sen. Amend. to 
Sen. Bill No. 215 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) Jan. 3, 2018.)  Senate 
Bill No. 215 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 215) contained 
the same definition of “pretrial diversion” and the same 
requirement of a speedy trial waiver eventually enacted in 
section 1001.36.  (Sen. Amend. to Sen. Bill No. 215 (2017–2018 
Reg. Sess.) Jan. 3, 2018.)  Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at page 635 
considered legislative history materials related to Senate Bill 
215 in ascertaining the Legislature’s intent.  Likewise, both 
Braden and the Attorney General rely on various legislative 
history materials related to Assembly Bill 1810 and Senate Bill 
215, and we have granted their unopposed requests to take 
judicial notice of those documents.   
Braden and the dissent argue that the legislative history 
of section 1001.36 reflects the Legislature’s goal to provide 
mentally ill offenders with treatment, rather than incarceration.  
One analysis of Senate Bill 215 included the author’s statement 
that “ ‘[r]oughly a third of inmates in California’s jails suffer 
from serious mental illness’ ” and California’s jails are “ ‘ill-
equipped’ ” to treat such conditions or to deal with the housing 
and staffing demands such prisoners present.  (Assem. Com. on 
Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 215 (2017–2018 Reg. 
Sess.) as amended Jan. 25, 2018, p. 5; id. at pp. 5–6 
[summarizing statistics on incarcerated mentally ill offenders].)  
Another analysis observed that “[t]he goal of the diversion 
program created by this bill is to address the population of jail 
inmates who suffer from a mental disorder whose incarceration 
often leads to worsening of their condition and in some cases 
suicide.”  (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 
215 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended Jan. 3, 2018, p. 7.)  The 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
36 
legislative history recounted other deleterious effects, such as 
the inability of inmates with mental health conditions to 
function within the prison system and the tendency of 
incarceration to aggravate these preexisting conditions.  (Id.  at 
p. 4; Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 215, 
supra, p. 8.)  Braden reasons that, “[b]y focusing on getting 
mentally ill defendants the treatment they need prior to being 
incarcerated, the Legislature made clear [its] intention to give 
courts the ability to grant mental health diversion at any time 
before a defendant is incarcerated, which strongly supports the 
interpretation that diversion was meant to be an available 
option until sentence is imposed.”    
 Reducing the incarceration of mentally ill defendants was 
one legislative purpose, but it did not stand alone.  (See Palos 
Verdes Faculty Assn. v. Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified Sch. 
Dist. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 650, 663–664.)  Rather, the available 
legislative history bears out that the Legislature also considered 
the benefits to the defendant and the judicial system of having 
diversion occur pretrial.  The author’s statement in support of 
Senate Bill 215 explained that the statute was designed to 
remedy problems associated with the inability of trial courts to 
“order mental health treatment, relevant counselling, or 
adherence to a medication regime unless the [defendant] was 
first convicted, and then placed on probation or sent to jail at 
county expense.”  (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 
Unfinished Business Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 215 (2017–2018 
Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 23, 2018, p. 2, italics added.)  The 
comments continue:  “The predictable results of California’s 
reliance on this outdated method are higher costs for taxpayers, 
who are forced to pay for the continuous warehousing of the 
mentally ill, when early, court-assisted interventions are far 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
37 
more likely to lead to longer, cheaper, more stable solutions for 
the community, and for the person suffering from mental illness. 
[¶] . . . By granting courts the ability to divert those suffering 
from mental illness into treatment at an early stage in the 
proceedings, [Assembly Bill] 1810 seeks to reduce recidivism 
rates for mentally ill defendants, and to avoid unnecessary and 
unproductive costs of trial and incarceration.”  (Id. at pp. 2–3, 
italics added.)  A Judicial Council task force concurred that 
“interventions and diversion possibilities must be developed and 
utilized at the earliest possible opportunity.”  (Assem. Com. on 
Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 215, supra, p. 6, italics 
added.)  In assessing the fiscal effect of the legislation, one 
analyst observed that the cost of publicly funded programs 
“could be offset by savings achieved through reduced workload 
in not preparing for and litigating cases to trial.”  (Sen. Rules 
Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Sen. 
Bill No. 215 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended Jan. 25, 2018, 
p. 6, italics added; see also Assem. Com. on Public Safety, 
Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 215, supra, p. 5 [because diversionary 
sentences “ ‘take advantage of existing community resources for 
the mentally ill, research suggests that such sentences will save 
counties money in the short-term on reduced trial and 
incarceration costs, and in the long-term based on reduced 
recidivism rates’ ” (italics added)].)   
Moreover, the legislative history materials reflect that the 
Legislature considered the benefit to defendants of being 
diverted before suffering a conviction.  The author’s statement 
in support of Senate Bill 215 observed that, under current laws, 
trial courts were not able to rehabilitate mentally ill offenders 
“ ‘without first convicting them of the underlying offense, 
thereby damaging their prospects for future employment and 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
38 
housing.’ ”  (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill 
No. 215, supra, p. 5.)  The author explained that “[b]y reserving 
court-ordered services for the mentally ill until after a 
conviction, the prior system led to higher recidivism rates for 
mentally ill Californians, who were not only left untreated, but 
with the additional burden of a criminal record.  This approach 
was unfair, impractical and costly.”  (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of 
Sen. Floor Analyses, Unfinished Business Analysis of Sen. Bill 
No. 215, supra, p. 2, italics added.)  By contrast, under the 
proposed legislation to enact section 1001.36, “ ‘a court may (but 
is not required to) impose the same rehabilitative probationary 
conditions on a defendant it would have imposed had the 
defendant been convicted (including that the defendant comply 
with a mental health treatment plan, obey all laws and make 
restitution to any victims), with the added incentive that 
successful completion of diversion would result in dismissal of 
the criminal case, without the permanent detriment of a criminal 
record.”  (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 
215, supra, p. 5, italics added.)  As one analyst emphasized, 
“[b]ecause diversion does not result in a conviction, once a 
defendant completes diversion he or she would not be foreclosed 
from housing and employment opportunities.”  (Sen. Com. on 
Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 215, supra, p. 7, italics 
added; see also ibid. [explaining that the proposed legislation 
authorizes a court “to order treatment early in the process 
rather than waiting for the disposition of the case” (italics 
added)].)   
The comments in one analysis of Senate Bill 215 
emphasized the difference between pretrial diversion and 
deferred entry of judgment:  “In deferred entry of judgment, a 
defendant determined by the prosecutor to be eligible for 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
39 
deferred entry of judgment must plead guilty to the underlying 
drug possession charge.  The court then defers entry of judgment 
and places the defendant in a rehabilitation and education 
program.  If he or she successfully completes the program, the 
guilty plea is withdrawn and the arrest is deemed to have not 
occurred.  If the defendant fails in the program, the court 
imposes judgment and sentences the defendant.  [¶]  In pretrial 
diversion, the criminal charges against an eligible defendant are 
set aside and the defendant is placed in a rehabilitation and 
education program treatment. If the defendants successfully 
complete the program, the arrest is dismissed and deemed to not 
have occurred.  If the defendant fails in the program, criminal 
charges are reinstated. . . . [¶]  This bill would give the courts 
the authority to grant pretrial diversion to defendant charged 
with misdemeanors or felonies that are punishable in county jail 
under Realignment, if the defendant has a mental illness, the 
mental illness played a significant role in the commission of the 
offense, and the defendant would benefit from mental health 
treatment.”  (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill 
No. 215, supra, pp. 6–7.)  The comments to Senate Bill 215 
likewise emphasized the existing definition of pretrial diversion 
as “the procedure of postponing prosecution of an offense filed 
as a misdemeanor either temporarily or permanently at any 
point in the judicial process from the point at which the accused 
is charged until adjudication.”  (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. 
Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 215, supra, 
p. 1; Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 215, 
supra, p. 1.)  These comments indicate that the Legislature 
understood the existing definition of pretrial diversion as well 
as the difference between pretrial diversion and deferred entry 
of judgment.   
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
40 
Finally, the legislative history materials reflect the 
Legislature’s goal to reduce the number of persons referred to 
the State Department of State Hospitals after having been 
found incompetent to stand trial under section 1370.  (Assem. 
Con. Sen. Amends. to Assem. Bill No. 1810 (2017–2018 Reg. 
Sess.) as amended June 12, 2018, p. 7; Cal. Health & Human 
Services Agency, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 215 (2017–
2018 Reg. Sess.) prepared for Governor Brown (Sept. 4, 2018) 
pp. 1–2.)  As explained ante, the provisions of section 1370 
achieve this goal by broadly authorizing the trial court to 
consider a defendant for diversion “at any time after the court 
finds that the defendant is mentally incompetent and before the 
defendant is transported to a facility” (id., subd. (a)(1)(B)(iv)(I)) 
or, after the defendant is transported, “at any time upon 
receiving any information that the defendant may benefit from 
diversion” (id., subd. (a)(1)(B)(iv)(II)). 
The dissent urges that today’s opinion “narrowly fixates 
on the need to avoid costs of jury trials” when the Legislature’s 
primary purpose was to avoid the costs associated with 
incarceration and recidivism.  (Dis. opn. of Evans, J., post, at p. 
18.)  Our dissenting colleagues assert that the vast majority of 
cases are resolved by plea agreement and that the “costs of jury 
trials pale in comparison to the greater costs the Legislature had 
in mind — namely, costs associated with incarceration and 
recidivism.”  (Ibid.)  But as explained above, the dissent 
overstates the risk that imposing a timeline will leave 
defendants unable to avail themselves of diversion or otherwise 
receive mental health assistance as a condition of probation.  
Moreover, the dissent’s interpretation of the statute would 
incentivize jury trials, as well as delay treatment.  A defendant 
could wait until trial to seek an acquittal.  Then, if convicted, 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
41 
the defendant could request diversion.  Requiring a defendant 
to request diversion before proceeding to trial avoids such 
wasted resources and also assists the defendant by accelerating 
therapeutic intervention rather than incurring additional delay 
by waiting for trial.  (Graham, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at pp. 833–
834; Braden, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at pp. 341–342.)  At the 
same time, the statute does not require the defendant to plead 
guilty or waive the right to jury trial in order to participate in 
diversion.  If a diversion referral proves unsuccessful, the 
defendant may still exercise the jury trial right.   
Ultimately, it is for the Legislature to decide how to 
balance, on the one hand, reducing costs of incarceration and 
recidivism and, on the other, conserving judicial resources and 
encouraging early intervention.  Avoiding trial through “pretrial 
diversion” benefits the defendant, as well as victims and 
witnesses and the system itself.  The available legislative 
history bears out that the Legislature considered these benefits, 
and supports our interpretation of section 1001.36 to require 
that a request for mental health diversion be made before 
attachment of jeopardy at trial or the entry of a guilty or no 
contest plea, whichever occurs first.   
E. Rule of Lenity 
Finally, Braden invokes the rule of lenity to argue that any 
ambiguity in the statute’s scope should be resolved in his favor.  
“[W]e have repeatedly stated that when a statute defining a 
crime or punishment is susceptible of two reasonable 
interpretations, the appellate court should ordinarily adopt that 
interpretation more favorable to the defendant.”  (People v. 
Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 57, italics added.)  It is not apparent 
that the rule of lenity would extend to a procedural rule 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
42 
governing the timeliness of a diversion request.  But even when 
properly invoked, the rule applies “ ‘only if the court can do no 
more than guess what the legislative body intended; there must 
be an egregious ambiguity and uncertainty to justify invoking 
the rule.’ ”  (Id. at p. 58; accord, People v. Manzo (2012) 53 
Cal.4th 880, 889.)  In other words, “the rule of lenity is a tie-
breaking principle, of relevance when ‘ “two reasonable 
interpretations of the same provision stand in relative equipoise 
. . . .” ’ ”  (Lexin v. Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1050, 1102, 
fn. 30.)  We do not face such uncertainty here.  The language 
and structure of the statute, its placement in the code, the 
settled provisions of pretrial diversion, and the legislative 
history all point to an understanding that the Legislature 
intended to require that a defendant request pretrial mental 
health diversion before jeopardy attaches at trial or before the 
entry of a plea of guilty or no contest, whichever occurs first.   
III.  DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
 
1 
 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
S268925 
 
Dissenting Opinion by Justice Evans 
 
Cory Juan Braden, Jr., was involved in a confrontation 
with his sister.  Their mother intervened and Braden physically 
assaulted her.  Braden’s sister called 911 for assistance and 
informed the dispatcher that Braden was schizophrenic and was 
off his medication.  Braden fought with a responding deputy and 
was charged with resisting arrest and with having two prior 
strikes.  Braden represented himself at trial and a jury convicted 
him.  Before sentencing, he requested an attorney.  The attorney 
promptly requested that Braden be considered for mental health 
diversion under Penal Code1 section 1001.36.  After denying the 
motion as untimely and moot,2 the trial court sentenced Braden 
to four years in state prison.   
The question in this case is whether a trial court has the 
discretion to consider a defendant’s request for mental health 
diversion up until the entry of judgment.  Based on the 
legislative history, the plain language of the statute, and the 
 
1  
All further unspecified statutory references are to the 
Penal Code. 
2  
In summarily denying Braden’s mental health diversion 
request, the court remarked that it would have denied the 
motion as a matter of discretion had it not found it to be 
untimely and moot.  The court’s alternate ruling was invalid 
because it was not based on any apparent consideration of 
whether Braden was eligible or suitable for diversion.  (See 
§ 1001.36, subds. (b)–(c).)   
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Evans, J., dissenting 
 
2 
overall scheme of which it is a part, I would hold trial courts 
have such discretion.  Thus, I respectfully dissent.  
Section 1001.36 allows defendants to request mental 
health diversion “at any point in the judicial process from” the 
time they are charged “until adjudication.”  (Id., subd. (f)(1), 
italics added.)  The majority opinion holds that the statute’s 
reference to “until adjudication” requires a defendant to request 
diversion “before attachment of jeopardy at trial or the entry of 
a guilty or no contest plea, whichever occurs first.”  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 1.)  In so holding, contrary to legislative intent, the 
majority divests trial courts of the discretion to grant mental 
health diversion to suitable, mentally ill defendants.  The 
Legislature can correct today’s decision by expressly clarifying 
that the phrase “until adjudication” in section 1001.36 means 
until entry of judgment. 
Today’s decision marks a retreat from our recognition in 
People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618 (Frahs) of “[t]he breadth of 
the statute’s statement of purpose — aimed to ‘[i]ncrease[] 
diversion of individuals with mental disorders to mitigate the 
individuals’ entry and reentry into the criminal justice system.’ ”  
(Id. at p. 632.)  Although we did not squarely address the 
meaning of “until adjudication,” we understood that “[t]he 
Legislature could well have intended to allow judges to decide 
under the statute whether a defendant’s mental disorder was a 
‘significant factor in the commission of the charged offense’ 
[citation] even after a verdict . . . .”  (Id. at p. 636.)  While the 
majority discounts Frahs on the grounds it concerned the issue 
of retroactivity, Frahs’s recognition of mental health diversion’s 
legislative purposes, its import, and its features applies with 
equal force as we consider the “timeliness” issue before us today. 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Evans, J., dissenting 
 
3 
I. 
This case presents an issue of statutory interpretation.  
The mental health diversion statute, section 1001.36, authorizes 
courts to grant “pretrial diversion” to people with mental health 
conditions to divert them out of the carceral system and into 
treatment if they do not pose an unreasonable risk to public 
safety. Section 1001.36, subdivision (f)(1) defines “pretrial 
diversion” as “postponement of prosecution . . . at any point in 
the judicial process from the point at which the accused is 
charged until adjudication, to allow the defendant to undergo 
mental health treatment . . . .”   
In interpreting the meaning of a statute, the fundamental 
task of courts is to determine the Legislature’s intent in order to 
effectuate the statute’s purpose. (First Student Cases (2018) 5 
Cal.5th 1026, 1034–1035.)  We first consider whether the plain 
meaning of the statute is unmistakably clear from the statute’s 
text.  (Id. at p. 1035.)  We construe the statute’s language “ ‘in 
the context of the statutory framework, seeking to discern the 
statute’s underlying purpose and to harmonize its different 
components.’ ”  (Ibid.)  We must interpret a statute “ ‘ “with 
reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part so that 
all may be harmonized and have effect.” ’ ”  (Kavanaugh v. West 
Sonoma County Union High School Dist. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 911, 
919 (Kavanaugh).)  “In order to ascertain a statute’s most 
reasonable meaning, we often examine its legislative history.”  
(Id. at p. 920.) 
A.  The Language of Section 1001.36 
In interpreting the phrase “until adjudication,” the 
majority defines “adjudication” to mean “attachment of jeopardy 
at trial or the entry of a guilty or no contest plea, whichever 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Evans, J., dissenting 
 
4 
occurs first.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1.)  But the more natural 
reading is that “until adjudication” means “until entry of 
judgment.”  (See Black’s Law Dict. (11th ed. 2019) p. 52, col. 1) 
[defining adjudication as either (1) “[t]he legal process of 
resolving a dispute; the process of judicially deciding a case” or 
(2) the “judgment”].)  Unlike the definition adopted by the 
majority opinion, the latter definition does not require any need 
for elaboration, refinement, or insertion of additional words.  It 
also comports with the commonsense understanding that 
typically there is no adjudication of a matter until there is some 
outcome.3  (Kavanaugh, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 919 [we must be 
“careful to give the statute’s words their plain, commonsense 
meaning”].)  And it is in harmony with the Legislature’s intent 
that “the disposition of any criminal case use the least 
restrictive means available” and effectuates its corresponding 
mandate that trial courts consider alternatives to incarceration, 
such as diversion.  (§ 17.2, subd. (a), added by Stats. 2022, ch. 
775, § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2023, italics added; see Stats. 2022 ch. 775, 
§ 1, subds. (a), (b) [“California’s overreliance on incarceration 
has failed to improve public safety while disproportionately 
harming vulnerable and marginalized communities” and 
“California can . . . mak[e] greater use of alternatives to 
 
3  
The majority asserts this interpretation “effectively states 
no timeline because it would authorize diversion requests at any 
point when the trial court exercises jurisdiction over the case” 
and therefore “renders the words ‘from the point at which the 
accused is charged until adjudication’ superfluous.”  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 19.)  The majority is mistaken.  The deadline is the 
one the Legislature set:  defendants may request and courts may 
order mental health diversion at any point until adjudication 
(i.e., before entry of judgment).  After sentencing, a trial court 
would be precluded from granting a diversion request.   
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Evans, J., dissenting 
 
5 
incarceration, which often lead to better outcomes than 
incarceration, including reduced rearrest rates, better economic 
outcomes, and reduced racial disparities”].)   
The majority asserts that “[i]nterpreting the word 
‘adjudication’ to refer to a point in the process rather than a 
result of that process is not novel.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 18.)  I 
do not disagree.  However, adjudication either refers to the legal 
process itself (i.e., “[t]he legal process of resolving a dispute”) or 
the point at which the legal process is resolved (i.e., “judgment”).  
(Black’s Law Dict. (11th ed. 2019) p. 52, col. 1.)  What is novel is 
selecting more than one point in that process, as the majority 
has done, and claiming they both somehow mean “adjudication.”  
(See maj. opn., ante, at p. 18 [“Our interpretation of the statute 
does indeed identify a discrete ‘point’ in the judicial process:  the 
point at which adjudication of the charges begins, either when 
trial commences or the defendant opts to forgo trial by entering 
a plea of guilty or no contest, whichever occurs first”].)  The two 
points that the majority has selected — the commencement of 
trial and the entry of a plea — are not only different from each 
other, but also conflict and are inconsistent with the point 
provided in the definition of “adjudication” itself — “judgment.”  
(See McAlpine v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1, 7 
[explaining that, in a criminal case, the judgment is the 
conclusion of the legal proceeding].) 
In recognizing the ambiguity of the word “adjudication,” 
the majority excises the word “pretrial” from its context.  In the 
majority’s view, “until adjudication” must be narrowed to avoid 
“dissonance” between pretrial diversion requests and those that 
occur midtrial and posttrial.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 18.)  But the 
Legislature’s choice to label, in shorthand, mental health 
diversion as “pretrial diversion” has a different purpose.  (Cf. 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Evans, J., dissenting 
 
6 
Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 632 [“the definition of ‘pretrial 
diversion’ . . . simply reflect[s] the Legislature’s intent regarding 
how the statute will generally operate when a case comes before 
the trial court after section 1001.36’s enactment” (italics 
added)].)  Prior to the enactment of section 1001.36, courts were 
unable to order mental health services until after a defendant 
was convicted, sentenced, and then placed on probation or sent 
to jail or prison.  (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 
Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 215 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended 
Aug. 23, 2018, p. 2 [trial courts could not “order mental health 
treatment, relevant counselling, or adherence to a medication 
regime unless the person was first convicted, and then placed on 
probation or sent to jail at county expense”].)  The Legislature 
enacted mental health diversion to allow rehabilitative 
interventions before such occurrences.  Diversion requests 
before trial were, understandably, the ones most contemplated 
and anticipated by the statute since most defendants would 
prefer to avoid trial and, if detained pretrial, to be released from 
custody as early as possible.  Given this backdrop, the 
“dissonance” identified by the majority between the literal 
meaning of the word “pretrial” standing alone and the statutory 
definition of “pretrial diversion” disappears. 
In focusing on the word “pretrial” in isolation, the majority 
places undue emphasis on diverting defendants away from trial.  
Diversion from trial is one purpose of the statute to be sure.  (See 
Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Analysis of Sen. 
Bill No. 215 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 23, 2018, 
p. 2.)  However, the Legislature made clear that the overriding 
purpose of mental health diversion is to divert people with 
mental illness into treatment and rehabilitation and away from 
the normal criminal process — particularly incarceration.  (Sen. 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Evans, J., dissenting 
 
7 
Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 215 (2017–2018 
Reg. Sess.) as amended Jan. 3, 2018, p. 8 [“There is an urgent 
need for specific and targeted efforts to reduce the rates of 
incarceration of people with mental illness, and to facilitate 
successful diversion and reentry”]; Sen. Com. on Public Safety, 
Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1223 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) as 
amended Mar. 9, 2022, p. 5 [“ ‘To avoid incarceration, 
individuals with serious mental illness need to be diverted from 
the legal system and offered rehabilitative resources’ ”]; People 
v. Trask (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 387, 394 [the conventional 
understanding of pretrial diversion is to divert from “ ‘ “the 
normal criminal process” ’ ”]; People v. Superior Court (On Tai 
Ho) (1974) 11 Cal.3d 59, 61 [diversion programs serve to divert 
defendants into “program[s] of treatment and rehabilitation”].)   
The Legislature was focused on diverting individuals 
away from incarceration and into mental health treatment 
because incarcerating mentally ill individuals compromises 
public health and safety, whereas providing mental health 
treatment for mentally ill individuals advances it.  (See Sen. 
Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 215 (2017–2018 
Reg. Sess.) as amended Jan. 3, 2018, p. 5 [“For many people 
suffering from mental disorders, incarceration only serves to 
aggravate preexisting conditions and does little to deter future 
lawlessness [¶] . . . [and] diversion into treatment is . . . more 
likely to protect public safety by reducing the likelihood that a 
person suffering from a mental health disorder reoffends in the 
future”]; see also Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. 
Bill No. 1223 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 9, 2022, 
p. 9 [“ ‘California enacted AB 1810, which authorized courts to 
divert people with mental health conditions . . . out of the 
carceral system and into treatment.  By ensuring that these 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Evans, J., dissenting 
 
8 
people are connected to meaningful, long-term mental health 
treatment instead of simply jailed and released, the diversion 
statute protects public safety by lowering recidivism rates . . . 
and leads to better outcomes for these individuals and their 
families”].)  Incarceration — not trial — is “ ‘the sea’ ” from 
which the river is intended to be diverted.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 
10.) 
The majority argues the Legislature, in enacting section 
1001.36, has used the same definition of “pretrial diversion” that 
existed when section 1001.1 was enacted.  Relying largely upon 
dicta, the majority represents that “[a]ppellate courts long have 
understood section 1001.1’s definition of pretrial diversion as 
contemplating a request for diversion before trial begins.”  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 10, citing Gresher v. Anderson (2005) 127 
Cal.App.4th 88, 111–112 (Gresher) and People v. Padfield (1982) 
136 Cal.App.3d 218, 227–229 & fn. 8.)4  “Of course, we are not 
bound by . . . dicta.”  (Gomez v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 
 
4  
Contrary to the majority’s assertion, Gresher did not 
construe section 1001.1’s definition of pretrial diversion to 
preclude requests made after trial begins.  In Gresher, the court 
issued a writ of mandate directing the Department of Social 
Services to allow individuals in diversion and deferred entry of 
judgment programs to apply for Trustline registration.  Gresher 
rejected the Department’s argument that, because individuals 
in diversion and deferred entry of judgment programs are 
awaiting trial, it could close the application process for those 
individuals.  It reasoned that a hearing to terminate 
diversion — contingent upon one’s performance — was required 
before any trial would occur in the future, and thus, concluded 
“it cannot reasonably be said that persons in diversion programs 
are ‘awaiting trial.’ ”  (Gresher, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 
111.)  The issue in Gresher does not involve the construction of 
the definition of “pretrial diversion” and has no bearing on the 
issue before us today. 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Evans, J., dissenting 
 
9 
1125, 1155.)  More significantly, the majority simply ignores 
that diversion consideration after the start of trial is 
contemplated 
by 
other 
“pretrial” 
diversion 
programs 
notwithstanding their label or the definition of pretrial 
diversion in section 1001.1 and at issue here.  (See §§ 1001.1 
[same definition of “pretrial diversion”], 1001.50, subd. (c) [same 
definition of “pretrial diversion”].)  These statutes sanction 
diversion after trial begins.  (See §§ 1001.2, subd. (a) [listing 
certain Veh. Code offenses not eligible for “pretrial diversion or 
posttrial programs” (italics added)], 1001.51, subd. (b) [listing 
certain Veh. Code offenses not eligible for “pretrial diversion or 
posttrial program” (italics added)].) 
The majority highlights section 1001.36’s placement in a 
section of the Penal Code labeled “Pleadings and Proceedings 
Before Trial” to support its interpretation.  As we have observed, 
these headings “are not binding upon the courts.”  (In re 
Halcomb (1942) 21 Cal.2d 126, 130; see In re Young (2004) 32 
Cal.4th 900, 907, fn. 4 [“article headings are unofficial and do 
not affect the scope, meaning, or intent of a statute”].)  Section 
1001.36’s placement in this section of the Penal Code is practical 
given that diversion is typically sought prior to trial.  This is no 
different from other diversion statutes that operate pretrial and 
posttrial yet also are located in the “Pleadings and Proceedings 
Before Trial” section of the Penal Code.  (See § 1001.1 et seq.; 
§ 1001.50 et seq.)   
The other features of section 1001.36 relied upon by the 
majority reflect the expectation that mental health diversion 
“generally” will be sought prior to trial.  (Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th 
at p. 632.)  These features do not stand for the proposition that 
diversion consideration is foreclosed at all other points in the 
proceedings.  For instance, section 1001.36, subdivision (c)(2)’s 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Evans, J., dissenting 
 
10 
requirement of a speedy trial waiver is only applicable when 
relevant.5  And since jeopardy can be waived, the Legislature 
reasonably deemed it unnecessary to include a waiver procedure 
in section 1001.36.  (See People v. Batts (2003) 30 Cal.4th 660, 
679–680 [defendant may consent to a mistrial and waive 
jeopardy]; People v. Overby (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1237, 1243.)  
Each of these statutory elements should — and easily can — be 
harmonized with the statutory scheme and the Legislature’s 
purpose of diverting people with mental illness into treatment 
and out of the criminal justice system.6   
 
5  
Contrary to the majority’s assertion, Morse v. Municipal 
Court (1974) 13 Cal.3d 149 (Morse) did not hold the speedy trial 
waiver requirement was dispositive of whether a diversion 
request must be made before trial begins.  Instead, Morse 
discussed the significance of that requirement in another 
diversion statute, which did not include the definition of 
“pretrial diversion” at issue here, the unique provisions of 
section 1001.36, nor its legislative history. 
6  
The diversion scheme for individuals with cognitive 
disabilities (§ 1001.20 et seq.) is also located in Title 6 
(“Pleadings and Proceedings Before Trial”).  The Attorney 
General acknowledges that trial courts may consider section 
1001.20 diversion after trial begins notwithstanding that this 
diversion program has many of the very same features relied 
upon by the majority to support its conclusion that mental 
health diversion may only be considered before the start of trial 
or entry of a guilty or no contest plea.  Like section 1001.36, 
section 1001.20 et seq. is referred to as a “pretrial” diversion 
program (§ 1001.29; see generally § 1001.36); states that 
diversion may occur “upon an accusatory pleading at any stage 
of the criminal proceedings” (§ 1001.21, subd. (a); see § 1001.36, 
subd. (a)); requires a speedy trial waiver (§ 1001.23 subd. (a); see 
§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(2)); provides for the dismissal of charges 
without reference to setting aside a plea (§ 1001.31; see 
§ 1001.36, subd. (h)): and does not list a procedure for waiving 
double jeopardy (§ 1001.20 et seq.; see generally § 1001.36). 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Evans, J., dissenting 
 
11 
Stated plainly, the majority focuses on the wrong features 
of section 1001.36 while ignoring the significance of others.  For 
example, several features of section 1001.36 — including its 
prima facie showing and “relevant and credible evidence” 
provisions — confirm the Legislature meant “until adjudication” 
to mean until entry of judgment. 
Shortly after the enactment of the mental health diversion 
statute, the Legislature added a unique feature to section 
1001.36, enabling trial courts “at any stage of the proceedings” 
to require a defendant to make a prima facie showing of 
eligibility and suitability for diversion.  (§ 1001.36, subd. (e).)  
The prima facie showing provision serves as a gatekeeping 
mechanism for trial courts to quickly determine whether there 
is a need to conduct a hearing on the defendant’s diversion 
request or to proceed with regular criminal proceedings.  It 
defies logic that the Legislature would authorize courts to 
require a prima facie showing “at any stage of the proceedings” 
yet preclude courts from using the provision during the most 
widely known stage of the proceedings — i.e., “the process of 
resolving the criminal charges by trial.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 
9.)  
In addition to the prima facie showing mechanism, the 
Legislature conditioned eligibility for mental health diversion 
on there being a nexus between the defendant’s mental disorder 
and the offense.  (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2) [providing that one of 
the two eligibility requirements for mental health diversion is 
that “[t]he defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor 
in the commission of the charged offense”].)  In making this 
finding, “[a] court may consider any relevant and credible 
evidence, including, but not limited to, police reports, 
preliminary 
hearing 
transcripts, 
witness 
statements, 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Evans, J., dissenting 
 
12 
statements by the defendant’s mental health treatment 
provider, medical records, records or reports by qualified 
medical experts, or evidence that the defendant displayed 
symptoms consistent with the relevant mental disorder at or 
near the time of the offense.”  (Ibid.)  
The “relevant and credible evidence” provision confirms 
the Legislature intended trial courts to retain discretion to 
consider midtrial requests for diversion.  While evidence 
developed before trial may suffice in most cases, a trial court 
may determine it is only capable of making an informed 
determination regarding this eligibility factor or the defendant’s 
suitability for diversion for the first time during trial.  Indeed, 
trial courts may wish to defer ruling on a diversion request to 
allow for consideration of evidence adduced at trial.  (See, e.g., 
People v. Qualkinbush (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 879, 887 [in 
denying the defendant’s request for mental health diversion 
“ ‘without prejudice [for renewal],’ ” the trial court noted the 
possibility that, if “ ‘presented with additional evidence at trial, 
[it] could conclude that such diversion is appropriate’ ”].)  In 
some circumstances, the examination of lay and expert 
witnesses at trial may present the earliest possible opportunity 
to resolve this eligibility factor.  The absence of “witness 
testimony” in the enumerated sources is not significant, as the 
subdivision explicitly states the list of enumerated sources of 
evidence is not exhaustive.  Its absence from the list of 
enumerated sources makes sense because trial testimony is the 
relevant and credible evidence that courts routinely may rely 
upon, whereas the enumerated sources of evidence are ones that 
courts might not otherwise be able to consider.   
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Evans, J., dissenting 
 
13 
B.  Framework of Assembly Bill 1810 
The Legislature enacted mental health diversion as part 
of Assembly Bill No. 1810 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 
1810) (Stats. 2018, ch. 34, § 24, eff. June 27, 2018) — an 
omnibus trailer bill.  In the very same bill, the Legislature 
amended the mental competency scheme to incorporate a trial 
court’s authority to consider mental health diversion for 
defendants found incompetent to stand trial (IST).  (See State 
Dept. of State Hospitals, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 
1810 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) June 21, 2018, p. 2 [section 1001.36 
“allow[s] individuals who may be found IST on felony charges 
and referred to a DSH [(Department of State Hospitals)] facility 
to also be diverted to community-based mental health treatment 
thus potentially reducing the number of individuals referred to 
DSH for treatment”].) 
The Legislature was aware that an individual may be 
found incompetent to stand trial after a trial has started.  (See 
§ 1368, subd. (a); People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 847.)  
Yet, for both felony and misdemeanor cases, the Legislature 
authorized the court to consider whether an IST defendant is an 
appropriate candidate for mental health diversion “pursuant to” 
section 1001.36 — the mental health diversion scheme.  
(§§ 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B)(iv) [a court may determine an IST 
defendant is an appropriate candidate for mental health 
diversion “pursuant to Chapter 2.8A (commencing with Section 
1001.35) of Title 6” (italics added)], 1370, subd. (a)(1)(B)(v) 
[authorizing court to determine whether the IST defendant is 
eligible for mental health diversion “pursuant to Section 
1001.36” (italics added)], 1370.01, subd. (b)(1)(A) [upon a finding 
of incompetency, a court must either dismiss the case or 
“conduct a hearing, pursuant to Chapter 2.8A (commencing with 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Evans, J., dissenting 
 
14 
Section 1001.35) of Title 6” (italics added)], 1370.01, subd. 
(b)(2).)   
In doing so, the Legislature did not state that diversion 
consideration for IST defendants was “notwithstanding” any 
otherwise applicable deadlines for requesting diversion.  This 
reflects the Legislature’s understanding that consideration for 
mental health diversion is always available until entry of 
judgment. 
 
In 
Assembly 
Bill 
1810, 
the 
Legislature 
contemporaneously enacted interconnected statutes (mental 
health diversion and amendments to the competency scheme) 
intended to work together.  (Riverside County Sheriff’s Dept. v. 
Stiglitz (2014) 60 Cal.4th 624, 632 [“we consider the language of 
the entire scheme and related statutes, harmonizing the terms 
when possible”].)  The inextricable relationship between these 
two 
statutes 
is 
further 
evinced 
by 
the 
Legislature 
contemporaneously enacting subsequent amendments to each.  
(Stats. 2022, ch. 735, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2023; Sen. Bill No. 1223 
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.).) 
The provisions of sections 1370 and 1370.01 authorize a 
court to grant mental health diversion to IST defendants 
without restoration of competency and reinstatement of 
criminal proceedings.  Without this express authorization, 
mental health diversion would be unavailable to IST defendants 
due to the suspended nature of criminal cases while competency 
proceedings occur.  Together, the mental health diversion and 
mental competency schemes provide, where relevant, express 
exceptions applicable to IST defendants.  (See, e.g., § 1001.36, 
subd. (c)(2)–(3) [a speedy trial waiver and consent to diversion 
are not required for IST defendants because they are unable to 
provide such a waiver or consent due to their incompetency 
status].)   
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Evans, J., dissenting 
 
15 
The majority concludes that the Legislature intended a 
more 
“flexible” 
timeline 
for 
mental 
health 
diversion 
consideration for IST defendants than for other defendants.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 23.)  The majority’s interpretation lacks 
support.  Nowhere in the statutory scheme nor in the legislative 
history is there any indication that the Legislature intended to 
apply a different timing requirement based on one’s competency 
status.  The Legislature intended to treat all defendants the 
same regardless of competency status by enacting section 
1001.36 to divert all defendants who could potentially be found 
incompetent to stand trial.  (State Dept. of State Hospitals, 
Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 1810 (2017–2018 Reg. 
Sess.) June 21, 2018, p. 1 [noting the need for “the development 
of diversion programs for individuals with serious mental 
disorders with the potential to be found or who have been found 
Incompetent to Stand Trial (IST)” (italics added)].)  Had the 
Legislature meant to create an exception to any otherwise 
applicable timing requirement in section 1001.36, it would have 
said so just as it did with respect to the speedy trial waiver and 
consent requirements.  (See § 1001.36, subd. (c)(2)–(3).)  While 
there may be differences between competent and incompetent 
defendants that could justify adopting a more flexible timeline 
for mental health diversion in the latter group (maj. opn., ante, 
at pp. 23–24), that is not what the Legislature did here.  “We 
cannot . . . rewrite the statute to create an exception the 
Legislature has not enacted.”  (Wilson v. Cable News Network, 
Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 892.)   
Notably, the majority’s creation of two different timelines 
not only contravenes the Legislature’s efforts to divert 
individuals who could be found incompetent to stand trial, but 
wastes judicial resources and severely compromises early 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Evans, J., dissenting 
 
16 
intervention.  Under the majority’s interpretation, a trial court 
that wishes to grant a defendant’s midtrial mental health 
diversion request would be precluded from doing so.  Yet, if a 
doubt is later declared as to that same defendant’s competency, 
the trial court would be required to suspend criminal 
proceedings and then wait until the conclusion of competency 
proceedings — which can be lengthy and costly — before it could 
consider mental health diversion for the defendant if found 
incompetent.  The impact of delay on IST defendants is 
significant and can be damaging.  (See, e.g., In re Chunn (2022) 
86 Cal.App.5th 639, 650–651 [explaining how IST defendants 
“ ‘are usually held in solitary cells or restricted conditions for at 
least 6 weeks after the initial declaration of doubt regarding 
their competency as the court awaits alienist evaluations and 
placement recommendations.  These defendants have often 
clinically deteriorated even before the DSH commitment order 
is made and quite often . . . their troubling symptoms have 
increased during the period of time after the commitment order 
and before DSH offers them a bed.  The situation is dire for these 
patients as they routinely face another 60–90 days without 
treatment after the DSH commitment is made until treatment 
commences.’ . . .  ‘IST defendants have suffered and are suffering 
devastating injury as they are warehoused without meaningful 
treatment as they await DSH intervention’ ”].)  Allowing trial 
courts to consider diversion in the first instance — as the 
Legislature intended — would potentially save untold judicial 
resources, as well as time during which suitable defendants 
could have been receiving effective treatment. 
C.  The Purpose and History of Mental Health Diversion   
The Legislature enacted section 1001.36 to create a 
mental health diversion program to divert as many qualifying 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Evans, J., dissenting 
 
17 
mentally ill defendants out of the criminal justice system and 
into meaningful, effective mental health treatment. With 
incentives 
unique 
and 
distinct 
from 
probation 
and 
incarceration, the Legislature equipped trial courts with an 
effective tool that offers one of the best opportunities for 
advancing public safety and reducing recidivism.  (Sen. Com. on 
Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 215 (2017–2018 Reg. 
Sess.) as amended Jan. 3, 2018, p. 4 [“Courts, as one of the first 
points of contact between the mentally ill and the state, can 
serve as a useful function in identifying defendants with mental 
disorders and connecting them to existing services, thereby 
reducing recidivism”]; Sen. Com. on Appropriations, Analysis of 
Sen. Bill No. 215 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended Jan. 9, 
2018, pp. 3–4 [referencing a study that concluded “ ‘a mental 
health court can reduce recidivism and violence by people with 
mental disorders who are involved in the criminal justice 
system’ ”]; Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 
1223 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 9, 2022, p. 5 
[“Promoting treatment over incarceration has shown positive 
results in reducing recidivism”].)  
Since the passage of Assembly Bill 1810, the Legislature 
has taken steps to increase the use of mental health diversion 
in response to concerns that it has been “ ‘substantially 
underutilized.’ ”  (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. 
Bill No. 1223 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 9, 2022, 
p. 5 [“ ‘the mental health diversion law has been substantially 
underutilized 
due, 
in 
part, 
to 
its 
narrow 
eligibility 
requirements’ ”]; ibid. [“ ‘ “LA County has only diverted a few 
hundred people using the law[,] [y]et an estimated 61% of people 
in the LA County jail system’s mental health population were 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Evans, J., dissenting 
 
18 
found to be appropriate for release into a community-based 
diversion program” ’ ”].)7   
The majority ignores the Legislature’s demonstrated 
commitment to the broad application of mental health diversion.  
Notwithstanding the fact that approximately 94% to 97% of 
criminal filings are resolved by plea agreement (Missouri v. Frye 
(2012) 566 U.S. 134, 143), the majority narrowly fixates on the 
need to avoid costs of jury trials.  However, the costs of jury 
trials pale in comparison to the greater costs the Legislature had 
in mind — namely, costs associated with incarceration and 
recidivism.  (Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 635 [noting 
“community-based treatment for a mentally ill individual costs 
much less than jailing the same individual, and greatly reduces 
recidivism”].)  Community-based treatment costs roughly 
$20,000 per year, whereas incarceration costs approximately 
$106,000.  (See Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 
Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 215 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended 
Aug. 23, 2018, p. 2; see also Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis 
 
7  
Senate Bill No. 1223 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) amended 
section 1001.36 by, among other things, reducing barriers to 
eligibility and requiring courts to consider whether eligible 
defendants are suitable for mental health diversion.  The first 
eligibility factor no longer requires a court to find the defendant 
suffers from a mental disorder.  That factor is now satisfied by 
a diagnosis of a mental disorder within the last five years.  
(§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1).)  For the second eligibility factor, the 
court is now required to find that the defendant’s mental 
disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the 
charged offense unless there is clear and convincing evidence 
otherwise.  (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).)  If these two eligibility 
factors are met, “the court must consider whether the defendant 
is suitable for pretrial diversion.”  (§ 1001.36, subd. (c), italics 
added.) 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Evans, J., dissenting 
 
19 
of Assem. Bill No. 2167 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 
19, 2022, p. 2 [“ ‘it costs about $106,000 per year to incarcerate 
an individual in California prisons’ ”].)  Considering the 
potential prison exposure for many defendants, the savings 
captured by diverting defendants into treatment can be 
substantial.  For example, mental health diversion for the 
defendant in Frahs could have saved the state a total of 
$914,000:  $86,000 annually for each year in the two-year 
diversion program, plus $106,000 annually for each of the 
remaining seven years.  (See Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 635 
[“for an individual like defendant, who is currently serving a 
nine-year prison sentence, participation in a mental health 
diversion program rather than serving the remainder of his 
sentence could potentially result in substantial cost savings to 
the state”].)  In addition to the short-term cost savings of 
diverting defendants away from incarceration, the Legislature 
highlighted the long-term savings captured by reducing 
recidivism, 
as 
mental 
health 
diversion 
mitigates 
the 
compounding costs of future criminal proceedings and periods of 
incarceration.  (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. 
Bill No. 215 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended Jan. 25, 2018, 
p. 5 [mental health diversion “ ‘will save counties money in the 
short-term on reduced . . . incarceration costs, and in the long-
term based on reduced recidivism rates’ ”].)  By ignoring these 
short-term and long-term savings, the majority adopts a penny 
wise but pound foolish approach in contravention to the 
Legislature’s aims.  
The majority also misconstrues the legislative history of 
mental health diversion by juxtaposing pretrial diversion 
programs with deferred entry of judgment (DEJ).  The majority 
states the Legislature knew the difference between the two and 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Evans, J., dissenting 
 
20 
chose pretrial diversion.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 39.)  It is true the 
Legislature did not choose to enact a narrow DEJ scheme for 
mental health diversion, wherein a defendant is required to 
plead guilty.  The fact that DEJ programs exist is not contrary 
to or in tension with the Legislature’s intent to allow trial courts 
to grant mental health diversion up until sentencing and entry 
of judgment given the Legislature’s desire to divert mentally ill 
defendants away from the carceral system. 
Lastly, the majority implies its interpretation incentivizes 
early intervention and posits that allowing trial courts to grant 
diversion requests until entry of judgment “would incentivize 
jury trials.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 40.)  Certainly, I agree with 
the majority opinion that the earlier one can be diverted into 
mental health treatment, the better.  However, significant 
incentives for early treatment are baked into mental health 
diversion.  For one, mental health diversion “ ‘unquestionably’ 
offers an ‘ “ ‘ameliorating benefit’ ” ’ for a defendant diagnosed 
with a mental disorder to have the opportunity for diversion, 
and ultimately, a possible dismissal of the criminal charges.”  
(Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 630; id. at p. 631 [“the procedures 
instituted by the enactment carry the potential of substantial 
reductions in punishment for the aforementioned parties”].)  
Additionally, for some, it may mean release from detention and 
otherwise avoiding a lengthy period of incarceration.  (See ibid. 
[“the impact of a trial court’s decision to grant diversion can spell 
the difference between, on the one hand, a defendant receiving 
specialized mental health treatment, possibly avoiding criminal 
prosecution altogether, and even maintaining a clean record, 
and on the other, a defendant serving a lengthy prison 
sentence”].)   
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Evans, J., dissenting 
 
21 
In any event, I agree with Braden that, while earlier 
diversion consideration is better, later is still good.  The majority 
asserts that its holding today does not limit who is eligible for 
diversion, only when eligible individuals must make a diversion 
request.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 29.)  But the majority’s view is 
divorced from the reality of mental illness and intervention.  A 
defendant seeking mental health diversion must be willing to 
embrace treatment.  (See § 1001.36, subd. (c)(2).)  This is not a 
decision that persons with serious mental illness may arrive at 
on a neat and tidy timeline.  The facts of this case are illustrative 
of the reality that, although mental health diversion will 
ordinarily be requested before trial, there may be circumstances 
in which it is only requested later.  Braden, who is diagnosed 
with schizophrenia, represented himself at trial.  Although 
those who choose to represent themselves are charged with 
“knowing the law” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 32, fn. 15), those 
suffering from mental illness may not always appreciate or be 
immediately able to accept that they are in need of treatment.  
Once counsel was appointed, Braden promptly requested mental 
health diversion — yet his request was denied as untimely.  
Thus, as this case makes clear, requiring defendants to request 
mental health diversion early in the judicial process will limit 
who receives such treatment and necessarily exclude some who 
would benefit from the program.  This is contrary to the 
Legislature’s clear intent that courts provide appropriate 
alternatives to incarceration.  (§ 17.2.) 
II. 
Mental health diversion is a mechanism for trial courts to 
grant suitable defendants access to community-based mental 
health treatment in lieu of trial, conviction, and placement on 
probation or commitment to county jail or state prison.  By 
PEOPLE v. BRADEN 
Evans, J., dissenting 
 
22 
injecting an unnecessary timing requirement for requesting 
diversion consideration for defendants presumed to be mentally 
competent, the majority “foreclose[s] some otherwise potentially 
meritorious diversion claims.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 30.)  This 
is inconsistent with the Legislature’s purpose in enacting 
mental health diversion and its recent efforts to expand its use.  
Divesting trial courts of the discretion to consider midtrial and 
posttrial diversion requests contravenes the plain language of 
the statute, misapprehends the statutory scheme, undermines 
the statute’s codified purposes, and frustrates the general 
purpose of mental health diversion to avoid costs of 
incarceration and recidivism.   
Today’s decision will stymie the Legislature’s efforts to 
divert suitable defendants away from incarceration and the 
cycles of recidivism and will contribute to the continued 
underutilization of mental health diversion.  Allowing 
defendants to request and trial courts to grant mental health 
diversion — at any stage of the proceedings — is true to the 
plain language of the statute and effectuates the Legislature’s 
purpose.  The Legislature can correct today’s decision by 
expressly clarifying that the phrase “until adjudication” in 
section 1001.36 means until entry of judgment. 
I respectfully dissent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EVANS, J. 
 
I Concur: 
Liu, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Braden 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 63 Cal.App.5th 330 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S268925 
Date Filed:  June 5, 2023 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  San Bernardino 
Judge:  John M. Tomberlin 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Cindy G. Brines and Arthur Martin, under appointments by the 
Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, 
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland and Steve Oetting, 
Assistant Attorneys General, A. Natasha Cortina, Christine 
Levingston Bergman and Amanda Lloyd, Deputy Attorneys General, 
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Arthur Martin 
Appellate Defenders, Inc. 
555 West Beech Street, Suite 300 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 696-0282 
 
Amanda Lloyd 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 738-9015