Title: Hazlett v. Toomin

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

2011 VT 73













Hazlett v. Toomin (2010-274)
 
2011 VT 73
 
[Filed 12-Jul-2011]
 
ENTRY ORDER
 
2011 VT 73
 
SUPREME COURT
  DOCKET NO. 2010-274
 
FEBRUARY TERM, 2011
 
Michael Hazlett 
}
APPEALED FROM:
 
}
 
 
}
 
     v.
}
Superior Court, Bennington Unit,
 
}
Family Division
 
}
 
Michelle Toomin
}
DOCKET NO. 304-12-05
  Bndm
 
 
 
 
 
Trial Judge: David A. Howard
 
In the above-entitled
cause, the Clerk will enter:
 
¶ 1.            
Father appeals the trial court's award to mother of primary legal and
physical rights and responsibilities for their daughter.  He contends
that: (1) the court gave insufficient consideration to his superior ability to
foster a positive relationship between the daughter and mother as compared to
mother's ability to support daughter's relationship with him; (2) the court did
not properly weigh an incident of mother allegedly abusing the daughter in
drawing its conclusion to award her custody; and (3) the court gave undue
weight to the conclusion that mother was the primary caregiver because it did
not consider the quality of her caregiving relationship with the
daughter.  Finding no flaw in the trial court's conclusions, we affirm.
¶ 2.            
Father expressly does not challenge the court's findings of fact, and we
relate them briefly for context.  The parents began their relationship in
2001 when mother lived in New Jersey and father lived in Vermont.  After
several years, mother moved to Vermont, and the parties rented a house
together. Both parents had children from earlier relationships, and some of
mother's children moved with her.  Though they discussed marriage, no firm
plans were ever made.  In 2005, when mother learned she was pregnant, she
informed father, who moved out of their shared house shortly thereafter. 
The relationship was experiencing some difficulties already, but the pregnancy
was a major contributing factor to father's departure. 
¶ 3.            
Parents had little contact during the pregnancyfather chose not to
attend prenatal appointments, and most of their contact was via phone or text
message.  Their daughter was born in September 2005.  Father attended
the birth and brought mother home afterward, but he did not move back into their
former residence.  For the next several months he continued to have little
contact with mother or the daughter.  Father's absence was due in part to
his employment as a truck driver and in part because, given father's decision
to leave their home, mother felt she had authority to decide when he could see
the daughter.
¶ 4.            
While pregnant, mother lost her job in Vermont, and her financial
difficulties continued after the daughter's birth.  Eventually she decided
to move to New Jersey and did not inform father before relocating.  Father
did not come to visit his daughter in New Jersey, and mother did not encourage
contact.  After paternity was established in 2006, father pursued a
successful order for parent-child contact and was awarded contact on alternate
weekends.  At this time, mother had returned to Vermont, and father began
to see the daughter even more than the terms of the existing order provided.
¶ 5.            
The parents reestablished their relationship.  Mother was renting a
residence for the daughter and four of her other children.  In December
2008, mother and the children moved to the house father had built, but mother
continued to rent her former residence.  Father's care for the daughter
increased.  He often picked her up from day care and would take care of
her until mother returned home from work when the two would share the duties.
¶ 6.            
The reconciliation was not altogether smooth.  One evening in
January 2009, mother went out with a friend.  When she did not returned by
midnight, father and his adult daughter, who was living in the home at the
time, went out looking for her.  Eventually all three people were back in
the home, and the adult daughter and mother got into a serious argument. 
Both women were somewhat intoxicated, and their argument escalated to pushing
and wrestling.  Eventually, mother took the daughter from the daughters'
bedroom and attempted to leave the house.  The dispute between mother and
father's adult daughter continued.  The police were called.  Mother
admitted to the officer that she had consumed alcohol that evening and told the
officer she intended to leave the residence with some of her children, but that
father and his adult daughter were preventing her.  Ultimately, with the
officer's assistance, it was decided mother would stay at the house and father
would bring the daughter to school in the morning.  The next day mother
moved out.
¶ 7.            
Father filed for a review of parental rights and responsibilities and to
reduce child support.  While these motions were pending, the parents again
reconciled and, again, both shared in caring for their daughter as their work
schedules allowed.  They were still together in November 2009 when another
significant conflict occurred.  The parents were arguing when father
suddenly decided to take daughter with him on a trip.  Mother resisted,
and the two struggled.  One of mother's other children moved the daughter
out of the way, at which point father unintentionally knocked mother to the
floor as he was trying to leave the room.  Mother also apparently struck
father in the face.  He left with the daughter and drove to the police
station.  Mother was initially charged with domestic assault, but the
State later dismissed the charges. As a result of this fight, both parents
sought relief from abuse (RFA) protection.  The RFA order issued without
written findings of abuse and granted father weekend visitation with the
daughter, but had parental rights "shared" and required the parents to
communicate about parent-child contact through a third party.  
¶ 8.            
Following a motion to modify parental rights and responsibilities, the
trial court held four days of hearings in March and April 2010.  The court
found a real, unanticipated and substantial change of circumstances, as
required by statute, 15 V.S.A. § 668, and then explained its analysis of the
factors for determining the best interests of the child.  See id. §
665(b).  In laying out each factor, the trial court concluded that many of
the factors balanced evenly between the parents.  It held that father had
a better ability to communicate and cooperate with mother than mother had with
father, and father was likewise better able to foster a positive relationship
between the daughter and mother.  In drawing these conclusions, the court
pointed to instances where mother failed to inform father of changes in the
daughter's day-care provider and made unilateral decisions to alter times when
the parents were supposed to meet to exchange the daughter.  Additionally,
the court stated its concern that mother had independently set up counseling
for the daughter as a possible "means of harming the relationship between
father and daughter rather than assisting the child in a neutral manner." 

¶ 9.            
The trial court determined that the daughter continuing to live with
mother would require less adjustment than living with father.  Most
importantly, the court concluded that mother was the primary caregiver and held
that "[t]his factor is an important one and counter balances the conclusions
favoring father . . . to a degree."  Finally the court
weighed whether there was any evidence of abuse.  While the court
recognized that "[t]he parents have certainly seen their relationship become
fairly high conflict," it also saw the potential for such conflict lessened by
the RFA orders and the parents' continued separation.  On balance the
court determined that the various altercations were not "crucial in the decision
as to parental rights and responsibilities."  In "a very close decision"
the court granted mother primary legal and physical rights and responsibilities
because of her "long-term" role as the daughter's primary caregiver.  It
gave father liberal parent-child contact laid out in an extensive
schedule.  Father appealed.
¶ 10.        
Father's first contention on appeal is that the trial court gave
insufficient weight to his ability to foster a positive relationship between
mother and the daughter and mother's inability to reciprocate.  He also
argues that in its best-interests analysis the court neglected to consider as
abuse mother's attempt to drive drunk with the daughter.  Finally, he
suggests the court did not assess the quality of the daughter's relationship
with mother as the primary caregiver when it weighted that factor in her favor.
 Thus, the court afforded that lone factor undue weight.  Finding no
abuse of discretion or any error of law on the trial court's behalf, we affirm.*
¶ 11.        
In determining custody, the trial court has broad discretion.  Begins
v. Begins, 168 Vt. 298, 301, 721 A.2d 469, 471 (1998).  We will not
disturb the court's custody award "if it reflects reasoned judgment in light of
the record evidence."  DeLenonardis v. Page, 2010 VT 52, ¶ 20,
___ Vt. ___, 998 A.2d 1072 (quotation omitted).  Furthermore, we afford
the trial court broad latitude in determining the child's best interests. 
Thompson v. Pafundi, 2010 VT 80, ¶ 11, ___ Vt. ___, 8 A.3d 476 (mem.).
¶ 12.        
Father's first argument focuses on instances of mother interfering with
his relationship with his daughter as evidence that she is unfit to act as a
custodial parent.  He claims the trial court improperly discounted the
importance of his "ability and disposition . . . to foster a positive
relationship and frequent and continuing contact with the other parent" in
assessing the daughter's best interests.  15
V.S.A. § 665(b)(5).  Citing Begins v. Begins, he notes
that this Court has recognized § 665(b)(5) as a "critical statutory factor,"
168 Vt. at 301, 721 A.2d  at 471,  and he claims the trial court should not
have "accorded [it] the same weight as all the other factors except
. . . primary caregiver."  Granting more weight to this factor,
father concludes, would have tipped the best-interests balance in his favor.
¶ 13.        
The ability to foster a positive relationship is a critical factor in
determining a child's best interests, but unlike the primary caregiver
relationship, we have not elevated it above other factors.  Cf. Nickerson
v. Nickerson, 158 Vt. 85, 89, 605 A.2d 1331, 1333 (1992) (noting
primary-caregiver factor "entitled to great weight" (quotation omitted)). 
In Begins, we expressly stated that, critical though the fostering-a-positive-relationship
factor may be, it "must be weighed in the balance" along with primary caregiver
status and the other factors.  168 Vt. at 301, 721 A.2d  at 471-72. 
We reversed the trial court's award of custody to the father in Begins
because it was based on the father's "willful alienation of a child from
the other parent" and the resulting hostility the children felt toward the
mother.  Id. at 302, 721 A.2d  at 472.  In so doing we
expressly rejected the trial court's reasoning, holding that "[a] parent who
willfully alienates a child from the other parent may not be awarded custody based
on that alienation."  Id. (quotation omitted).  
¶ 14.        
That is simply not the case here, and the trial court acted well within
its discretion in awarding custody on the basis of mother's primary care
status.  While some of mother's actions may have been spiteful, in the
trial court's assessment she had "a limited ability" to foster a positive
relationship between father and daughter.  This is a far cry from the
father in Begins whose "conduct and attitude demonstrated virtually no
capacity to place the interests of the children above his own in fostering a
positive relationship with mother."  Id.  Most importantly,
the trial court had adjudged the mother in Begins the primary caregiver,
but still awarded the father custody.  Here, in "a very close decision,"
the trial court exercised its discretion in determining that mother's role as
the primary caregiver "slightly outweighs father's noted advantage in the other
factors of cooperation and ability to foster a good relationship."  Cf. Thompson,
2010 VT 80, ¶¶ 12, 16 (affirming custody award in father's favor where
"[o]nly one of the nine factors favored mother: primary caregiver," and all
remaining factors favored father); Cabot v. Cabot, 166 Vt. 485, 491, 697 A.2d 644, 648-49 (1997) (affirming trial court decision which "recognized and
considered [mother's] attempts to exclude [father] from the child's life, but
on balance concluded that [mother's] role as primary care
provider . . . outweighed the other concerns.").  The
trial court appropriately valued each factor, and this decision is not error.
¶ 15.        
To the degree that father's claim is that the trial court failed to
"provid[e] some mechanism to insure that [mother] did not continue to alienate
[father]" in its final order, this argument is lacking.  The court granted
father liberal visitation and provided contingencies based on where mother and
the daughter reside.  Further, it left open the option to "impose
additional remedies including a modification of the current parent-child
contact order if found to be in the best interest of the child."  Finally,
father's ability to modify the trial court's order remains open in the future
upon a showing of a real, substantial and unanticipated change of
circumstances.  15 V.S.A. § 668.
¶ 16.        
Next, father alleges the trial court erred in failing to consider
mother's attempt to drive with the daughter while intoxicated in January 2009
as an incident of abuse under 15 V.S.A. § 665(b)(9).  This claim
lacks support in the court's findings.  The court found that the officer
who arrived at the parents' home "saw some signs of alcohol about
[mother]."  Mother also told the officer at the scene she "intended to
leave with some of her children, including [the daughter], and [father] and
[his adult daughter] were preventing this."  The officer then recommended
she not drive.  The court concluded, "[mother] just made it clear
she wanted to leave with [her daughter] and the children."  Contrary to
father's suggestion, the court never found that mother drove with her daughter
in the car, or that she was beyond the legal limit of intoxication, or even
that she entered a car while potentially intoxicated.  Cf. In re D.
McD., 2010 VT 108, ¶ 2, ___ Vt. ___, 12 A.3d 543 (mem.) (noting Department
for Children and Families substantiated father for abuse when he drove while
intoxicated with his children in the car).  Even so, in addressing this
factor under the best-interests analysis, the trial court noted that mother's
alcohol use during several of the parents' altercations was the "most serious
concern the court has from some of the evidence," but it ultimately discounted
any evidence of potential abuse.  We conclude the court properly
considered the evidence, and its conclusion is supported by the findings.
¶ 17.        
Finally, father claims that though the trial court "properly found
[mother] was the primary caregiver," it failed to correctly analyze the quality
of the daughter's relationship with her.  He suggests that because the
trial court did not expressly discuss the quality of mother's actions in the
primary care relationshipand thus failed to appreciate her poor abilityit
abused its discretion.  In support of this argument, he cites Habecker
v. Giard for the principle that "the weight accorded to the primary care
provider factor depends upon the quality of the relationship between the child
and custodian, as well as the likely effect that a change of custodian will
have on the child."  2003 VT 18, ¶ 14, 175 Vt. 489, 820 A.2d 215
(mem.).  
¶ 18.        
We have recognized that the trial court does not need to directly
address every element of every factor in assessing the best interests of the
child under § 665, "so long as the record as a whole indicates they were all
considered."  Thompson, 2010 VT 80, ¶ 12.  Father does not
allege that the trial court failed to consider this factor in its decision, but
suggests the court needed to take an additional step in its analysis under this
factor and discuss the quality of the relationship.  Even if we agreed
with father's contention, in reviewing the case law he cites, we recognize the
principle expressed in Habecker is not as mandatory as father may
wish.  In context, the Habecker decision holds that there is no
hard and fast rule that the primary custodian will be awarded custody so long
as that parent is fit.  The trial court's analysis of this factor
recognized that "awarding father primary custody [would] be a form of change"
in that the daughter "has not lived with him fulltime for some time and never
without her mother also there."  In so doing the court weighed the "likely
effect that a change of custodian will have on the child."  The court
concluded that the daughter had "long-term ties to her mother as the primary
care provider for most of her life."  Even without expressly analyzing the
quality of the relationship, this is sufficient analysis to support the court's
award of custody to mother.
           
Affirmed.
 
BY THE COURT:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paul L. Reiber, Chief
  Justice
 
 
  
 
 
John A. Dooley, Associate
  Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Denise R. Johnson,
  Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Marilyn S. Skoglund,
  Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Brian L. Burgess, Associate
  Justice
 
 
 

* 
Mother, pro se, untimely filed a reply brief in this case shortly before oral
argument.  We do not rely on that submission in deciding this case.