Title: K.J. v. Los Angeles Unified School District

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
K.J., a Minor, etc., et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., 
Defendants and Respondents; 
LUIS A. CARRILLO, 
Objector and Appellant. 
 
S241057 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Three 
B269864 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
BC505356 
 
 
January 30, 2020 
 
Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, 
Cuéllar, and Kruger concurred. 
 
1 
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT 
S241057 
 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
This case presents a narrow question of procedural law:  
Does a Court of Appeal have jurisdiction to review an order 
directing an attorney to pay sanctions when the notice of appeal 
identifies the attorney’s client as the appealing party, but other 
indicia make clear that the attorney was the party seeking 
review?  The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, concluding 
that the attorney’s client lacked standing to challenge the 
sanctions order and that the notice of appeal could not be 
liberally construed to include the omitted attorney.     
We reverse the Court of Appeal’s dismissal and hold that, 
when it is clear from the record that the omitted attorney 
intended to participate in the appeal and the respondent was 
not misled or prejudiced by the omission, the rule of liberal 
construction compels that the notice be construed to include the 
omitted attorney.  We further conclude that test is satisfied here 
based on the following:  (1) the notice of appeal expressly 
designated the sanctions order as the sole order or judgment at 
issue in the appeal; (2) the challenged order only imposed 
sanctions against the attorney and had no effect on the rights of 
the client; (3) during the trial court proceedings, the attorney 
engaged in substantial litigation regarding the sanctions 
motions that focused exclusively on whether the court had 
authority to discipline him; and (4) the adverse party, Los 
Angeles Unified School District, did not assert that it was misled 
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
2 
or prejudiced from the notice’s failure to reference the attorney 
as an appealing party.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. Trial Court Proceedings  
Attorney Luis Carrillo represented K.J., a minor, in a 
negligence action against the Los Angeles Unified School 
District and district personnel (collectively LAUSD) arising 
from a sexual assault that occurred on LAUSD property.  During 
the litigation, LAUSD filed an application for sanctions 
asserting that Carrillo had willfully obstructed a court-ordered 
psychiatric examination of K.J. by directing the examiner not to 
ask questions about the details of the assault.  LAUSD 
contended that Carrillo’s conduct directly violated a prior 
discovery order in which the trial court had declined to place any 
such limitations on the examiner. 
After issuing an order to show cause and holding an 
evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered an order of contempt 
finding Carrillo guilty of willfully disobeying the prior discovery 
order.  The court ordered Carrillo to serve 24 hours in county 
jail and to pay a $750 fine.  The court’s order also invited LAUSD 
to file a supplemental application to recover the fees and costs it 
had expended in litigating the sanctions motion and the 
contempt proceedings.  Carrillo filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus in the Court of Appeal challenging the contempt 
order.  On October 26, 2015, the Court of Appeal issued an order 
staying the order of contempt. 
While the stay was in effect, LAUSD filed its supplemental 
application, which sought $100,000 in sanctions from Carrillo 
and his law firm.  The requested sanctions included $52,247 in 
fees and costs that LAUSD had incurred in litigating the 
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
3 
original application for sanctions and an additional $47,752 
penalty to “deter future misconduct.” 
At the hearing on the supplemental application, the court 
informed the parties that it intended to order Carrillo to pay 
discovery sanctions totaling $16,111.  K.J.’s cocounsel, John 
Henrichs, argued that the Court of Appeal’s stay of the contempt 
order barred the trial court from entering any further sanctions 
against Carrillo.  In response, the trial court explained that it 
was not “looking at this as contempt sanctions.  I mean, it’s 
arising out [of] that incident and it came up in connection with 
a contempt hearing, but it’s really a motion for interference with 
[the] discovery process.  [¶] . . . [¶]  So, this particular decision 
will stand, in my view, regardless of what the appellate decision 
is.  [¶] . . . [¶]  There is no penal component on this award.”  On 
December 1, 2015, the trial court entered an order directing 
“Luis A. Carrillo, individually, and/or the Law Offices of Luis A. 
Carrillo, jointly and severally” to pay $16,111 to LAUSD.  The 
order pertained only to Carrillo; it had no effect on K.J.      
Several weeks after the order was filed, the Court of 
Appeal issued a “suggestive Palma notice” (see Brown, Winfield 
& Canzoneri, Inc. v. Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1233, 
1238; Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 
171), informing the trial court that there was insufficient 
evidence to find Carrillo had willfully disobeyed the discovery 
order, and that it intended to issue a peremptory writ of 
mandate compelling the trial court to enter a new order finding 
Carrillo not guilty of contempt. 
In response to the Palma notice, the trial court vacated its 
contempt order and issued a new order finding Carrillo not 
guilty of willfully disobeying the prior discovery order.  The 
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
4 
court’s order clarified, however, that the “new order [did not] . . . 
reverse or change the Court’s previous order, dated December 1, 
2015, awarding sanctions totaling $16,111.00 to LAUSD, based 
upon its finding that [Carrillo] had violated discovery 
statutes . . . .”   
On January 26, 2016, attorney Mark Allen filed a notice of 
appeal using Judicial Council form APP-002.  In the caption 
area of the standard form, Allen identified himself as K.J.’s 
attorney, and incorporated the same case title that was used in 
the trial court, “K.J., a minor through her guardian ad litem, . . . 
v. Los Angeles Unified School District.”  Section one of the notice 
stated:  “1. NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT . . . K.J., a 
minor through her guardian ad litem, . . . appeals from the . . . 
order in this case, which was entered on . . . December 1, 2015[.]”  
In a preprinted list that allows the appellant to designate the 
type of judgment or order being appealed from, a box was 
checked indicating an appeal of an order pursuant to “Code of 
Civil Procedure section 904.1(a)(3)–(13).”1  Allen signed the 
notice, which contained no reference to Carrillo.   
B. The Court of Appeal’s Dismissal of the Appeal 
1. The parties’ contentions on appeal 
The appellant’s opening brief argued that the trial court’s 
sanctions order should be reversed for two reasons.  First, 
appellant contended the Court of Appeal’s stay of the contempt 
                                        
1  
Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(11), 
authorizes an appeal “from an interlocutory judgment directing 
payment of monetary sanctions by a party or an attorney for a 
party if the amount exceeds [$5,000].”  Both parties 
acknowledge that the sanctions order at issue in this case is 
appealable under subdivision (a)(11). 
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
5 
order had divested the trial court of authority to issue the 
subsequent sanctions order.  In support, appellant noted that 
the contempt order included language inviting LAUSD to seek 
the very fees and costs the court had awarded in its subsequent 
sanctions order.  Second, appellant argued that once the trial 
court had vacated its contempt order, it had no basis to direct 
the payment of further sanctions based on the same conduct 
that was at issue in the contempt proceedings.  
In its respondent’s brief, LAUSD argued for the first time 
that the appeal should be dismissed based on K.J.’s “obvious 
lack of standing” to challenge an order that only imposed 
sanctions against Carrillo.  LAUSD did not address whether the 
notice of appeal could or should be construed to include Carrillo.  
LAUSD’s brief also responded to the merits arguments raised in 
the opening brief, contending that the Court of Appeal’s stay of 
the contempt order did not preclude the trial court from entering 
a separate sanctions order for discovery violations.   
Appellant’s reply brief did not dispute that K.J. lacked 
standing to challenge the sanctions order.  The brief asserted, 
however, that in furtherance of the “strong policy in favor of 
hearing appeals on their merits,” the notice of appeal should be 
liberally construed to include Carrillo as an intended party to 
the appeal.  The brief contended that because the notice sought 
review of an order that directed only Carrillo to pay sanctions, 
it was clear that Carrillo was the intended “underlying litigant.”  
2. The Court of Appeal’s ruling 
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction.  Citing Calhoun v. Vallejo City Unified School Dist. 
(1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 39 (Calhoun) and People v. Indiana 
Lumbermens Mutual Ins. Co. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1 (Indiana 
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
6 
Lumbermens), the court held that when a sanctions order is 
entered against an attorney, the right of appeal is vested “ ‘in 
[the attorney], not [the attorney’s client]. . . .  Absent any 
attempted appeal by the sanctioned party, the sanction ruling is 
not . . . reviewable.’ ”  (Quoting Calhoun, at p. 42.)  The court 
also rejected K.J.’s assertion that the notice of appeal should be 
construed to include Carrillo, explaining that the liberal 
construction requirement could not be “stretch[ed] . . . so far as 
to deem a notice of appeal to include an unnamed party.”  
Carrillo filed a petition for review seeking resolution of the 
following question:  Does the Court of Appeal lack jurisdiction 
to review an order imposing sanctions on an attorney when the 
notice of appeal is brought in the name of the client rather than 
the attorney, or does the liberal construction requirement set 
forth in California Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(2) permit the 
court to construe the notice to include the omitted attorney?    
II.  DISCUSSION 
“[T]he timely filing of an appropriate notice of appeal or 
its legal equivalent is an absolute prerequisite to the exercise of 
appellate jurisdiction.”  (Hollister Convalescent Hosp., Inc. v. 
Rico (1975) 15 Cal.3d 660, 670 (Hollister).)  The parties dispute 
whether Carrillo satisfied that jurisdictional requirement here 
given that the notice of appeal listed only K.J. as the appealing 
party.  Carrillo argues that, contrary to the Court of Appeal’s 
holding, the rule of liberal construction permits a reviewing 
court to construe a notice of appeal from a sanctions order to 
include a sanctioned attorney who is not referenced in the 
notice.  LAUSD disagrees, contending the Court of Appeal 
correctly concluded it had no authority to read an unnamed 
party into the notice.   
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
7 
A. Summary of the Rules Governing the Notice of 
Appeal  
California Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(1)2 requires that, 
“[t]o appeal from a superior court judgment or an appealable 
order of a superior court, . . . an appellant must serve and file a 
notice of appeal in that superior court.”  Rule 8.100(a)(2) further 
provides that “[t]he notice of appeal must be liberally construed.  
The notice is sufficient if it identifies the particular judgment or 
order being appealed.”  In an article describing the purpose and 
scope of the original Rules on Appeal, which became effective on 
July 1, 1943 and contained a provision that is essentially 
identical to current rule 8.100(a)(2) (see former rule 1(a)), the 
rules’ drafter, B.E. Witkin, explained that the Judicial Council 
had chosen not to impose any further “requirements . . . as to 
the contents of the notice . . . on the ground that . . . this basic, 
jurisdictional notice should be simple, to make it relatively 
immune from attack on technical grounds.”  (Witkin, New 
California Rules on Appeal (1944) 17 So.Cal. L.Rev. 79, 83 
(hereafter New California Rules on Appeal).) 
Rule 
8.100(a)(2)’s 
liberal 
construction 
requirement 
reflects the long-standing “ ‘law of this state that notices of 
appeal are to be liberally construed so as to protect the right of 
appeal if it is reasonably clear what [the] appellant was trying 
to appeal from, and where the respondent could not possibly 
have been misled or prejudiced.’ ”  (In re Joshua S. (2007) 41 
Cal.4th 261, 272; see Luz v. Lopes (1960) 55 Cal.2d 54, 59.)  The 
rule is intended to “implement the strong public policy favoring 
the hearing of appeals on the merits.”  (Norco Delivery Service, 
                                        
2  
All further references to rules are to the California Rules 
of Court.  
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
8 
Inc. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas, Inc. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 955, 
960; see Glassco v. El Sereno Country Club, Inc. (1932) 217 Cal. 
90, 92 [“notices of appeal are to be liberally construed with a 
view to hearing causes on their merits”]; Kellett v. Marvel (1936) 
6 Cal.2d 464, 471 [“notices of appeal are liberally construed to 
preserve the right of review unless it appears that the 
respondent has been misled”].)   
Considered together, rules 8.100(a)(1) and 8.100(a)(2) 
reflect the different standards that govern the filing of the notice 
of appeal versus the content of the notice with respect to 
appellate jurisdiction:  While the timely filing of a notice of 
appeal is an absolute jurisdictional prerequisite (see Hollister, 
supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 669; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(b) [“[i]f 
a notice of appeal is filed late, the reviewing court must dismiss 
the appeal”]3), technical accuracy in the contents of the notice is 
not.  (See Beltram v. Appellate Department (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 
711, 714 (Beltram) [“[t]he general rule is that although failure 
to file a notice of appeal is a jurisdictional defect that cannot be 
remedied, once a notice is filed it is to be construed liberally in 
favor of its sufficiency”].)  Once a notice of appeal is timely filed, 
the liberal construction requirement compels a reviewing court 
to evaluate whether the notice, despite any technical defect, 
nonetheless served its basic function — to provide notice of who 
is seeking review of what order or judgment — so as to properly 
invoke appellate jurisdiction.  
                                        
3  
California Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a) sets forth the 
requirements governing when a notice of appeal must be filed, 
typically the earliest of 60 days after service of the notice of 
entry of the appealable order or judgment, or 180 days after 
entry of the order or judgment.  There is no dispute that the 
notice in this case was filed in a timely manner. 
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
9 
In Chung Sing v. Southern Pacific Co. (1918) 178 Cal. 261 
(Chung Sing), we applied the liberal construction requirement 
to a notice of appeal that had misnamed one of the appealing 
parties.  The plaintiff in Chung Sing obtained a judgment 
against three defendants, Southern Pacific Company, H. W. 
Crumrine and George Blackburn.  Defendants’ counsel filed a 
notice of appeal that correctly listed two of the appellants — 
Southern Pacific Company and H. W. Crumrine — but 
erroneously listed the third appellant as C. A. Burton, rather 
than George Blackburn.  The plaintiff argued that defendant 
Blackburn should be dismissed from the appeal because he was 
not referenced in the notice.   
We rejected that argument, concluding that “[i]t [was] 
perfectly apparent from the notice, when read in connection 
with the record, that such notice was filed on behalf of 
[defendant Blackburn] . . . .”  (Chung Sing, supra, 178 Cal. at 
p. 263.)  We noted that Blackburn was one of the parties who 
had been named in the challenged judgment, and that “no one 
named Burton was involved therein.”  (Ibid.)  We explained that 
the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the record was 
that “the use of the name ‘C. A. Burton’ . . . to designate one of 
the appellants was solely due to inadvertence” (id. at pp. 263–
264), and that “the adverse party could not have been misled 
thereby” (id. at p. 264). 
In Vibert v. Berger (1966) 64 Cal.2d 65 (Vibert), we held 
that a notice of appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer 
could be construed to incorporate the judgment of dismissal 
entered thereon.  In our analysis, we explained that, under 
“ ‘hornbook law . . . [an] order sustaining a demurrer is 
interlocutory [and] not appealable, and that the appeal must be 
taken from the subsequently entered judgment.’ ”  (Id. at p. 67.)  
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
10 
However, quoting at length the reasoning in Evola v. Wendt 
Construction Co. (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 658 (Evola), we further 
observed that several courts addressing the same issue had 
nonetheless concluded that the notice should be construed to 
include the underlying judgment if the appellant’s intent was 
clear, and no prejudice would accrue to the respondent:  “ ‘There 
may be many situations where a notice of appeal from a 
nonappealable order cannot and should not be treated to be a 
notice of appeal from a judgment subsequently entered.  In 
many situations there might be doubts as to just what the 
appellant was seeking to have reviewed.  But there is no doubt 
in the instant case.  Clearly, the appellant was seeking to have 
reviewed the propriety of the order sustaining the demurrer . . . .  
[B]y incorrectly stating that he was appealing from the order 
instead of from the judgment, he should not be precluded from 
securing a review of what all concerned knew he was seeking to 
have reviewed.  No one was misled.  No prejudice to the 
respondent appears.  Respondent is simply trying to take 
advantage of a mistake made by appellant . . . .’ ”  (Vibert, at pp. 
68–69, italics omitted, quoting Evola, at p. 661.)    
Finding persuasive the analysis in Evola, supra, 158 
Cal.App.2d 658, we held that “[w]hether the error in the notice 
of appeal was merely one in describing the order or judgment or 
whether it was caused by appellant’s ignorance, the notice may 
without prejudice to respondent reasonably be interpreted to 
apply to [the] appealable order or judgment rendered before the 
appeal was noticed.  The appeal must therefore be heard on the 
merits.”  (Vibert, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 70.)  
More recently, in Walker v. Los Angeles County 
Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2005) 35 Cal.4th 15 
(Walker), we applied the rationale of Vibert to a notice of appeal 
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
11 
that sought review of an order denying a motion for new trial.  
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal based on Rodriguez v. 
Barnett (1959) 52 Cal.2d 154 (Rodriguez), a prior decision in 
which we dismissed an appeal from an order denying a new 
trial, and specifically “admoni[shed] . . . members of the bar . . . 
to cease appealing from such an obviously nonappealable order.”  
(Id. at p. 156.)   
In Walker, we agreed with the Court of Appeal’s finding 
that “an order denying a motion for new trial is not 
independently appealable,” and that the plaintiff had “thus 
plainly erred in seeking to appeal from the . . . order . . . rather 
than from the . . . judgment . . . .”  (Walker, at p. 19, italics 
omitted.)  We disagreed, however, that Rodriguez precluded the 
Court of Appeal from “construing the notice to encompass the 
underlying judgment” (ibid.), explaining that the dismissal in 
Rodriguez did not have “the effect of closing the doors to the 
party’s appeal since . . . the appealing party [in that case] had 
filed both a notice of appeal from the order denying a new trial 
and a timely notice of appeal from the underlying judgment. . . .  
[¶]  In this case, only one notice of appeal was filed, and 
dismissal would have the effect of completely denying [plaintiff] 
an appeal.”  (Id. at p. 20, italics omitted.)  Finally we held that 
“[b]ecause ‘[t]he law aspires to respect substance over formalism 
and nomenclature’ [citation], a reviewing court should construe 
a notice of appeal from an order denying a new trial to be an 
appeal from the underlying judgment when it is reasonably 
clear the appellant intended to appeal from the judgment and 
the respondent would not be misled or prejudiced.”  (Id. at p. 22.)   
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
12 
B. The Court of Appeal Erred in Concluding That a 
Notice of Appeal Cannot Be Liberally 
Construed To Include an Unnamed Party 
Based on the reasoning of our decisions above, we agree 
with Carrillo that a reviewing court is not categorically 
precluded from construing a notice of appeal from a sanctions 
order to include a sanctioned attorney who is not referenced in 
the notice.  Applying the standard set forth in Walker, supra, 35 
Cal.4th 15, we conclude that a reviewing court must construe a 
notice of appeal from a sanctions order to include an omitted 
attorney when it is reasonably clear that the attorney intended 
to join in the appeal, and the respondent was not misled or 
prejudiced by the omission.  
Although LAUSD is correct that the rule of liberal 
construction is most commonly employed to remedy defects in a 
notice’s designation of the order or judgment that is being 
appealed from, our holding in Chung Sing, supra, 178 Cal. 261, 
makes clear that the rule also applies to defects in the notice’s 
designation of the parties to the appeal.4  (See Chung Sing, at 
                                        
4  
B. E. Witkin, who drafted the original Rules on Appeal 
(see ante, at p. 7), appears to have anticipated that, in 
appropriate cases, the rule of liberal construction would be 
utilized to remedy defects in the notice’s description of the 
appealing parties.  Witkin noted that former rule 1(a)’s 
requirement that “ ‘[a] notice of appeal shall be liberally 
construed in favor of its sufficiency’ ” was intended to reflect 
“the rule of liberal construction declared in a number of cases.”  
(New California Rules on Appeal, supra, 17 So.Cal. L.Rev. at 
p. 82.)  In support, Witkin cited to several cases that had 
previously applied the rule, including Poggetto v. Bowen (1936) 
18 Cal.App.2d 173 (Poggetto), in which the reviewing court 
construed a notice of appeal that mistakenly identified the 
 
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
13 
pp. 263–264; see also 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) § 
562, p. 641 [under the rule of liberal construction, “[m]istakes in 
the designation of parties will not be fatal”, citing In re Estate of 
Strong (1937) 10 Cal.2d 389, 390 [notice that erroneously 
designated plaintiff as the executor of the estate construed to 
have been brought in plaintiff’s individual capacity], Boynton v. 
McKales (1956) 139 Cal.App.2d 777, 787–788 [notice that 
identified only one defendant as the respondent construed to 
include all of the codefendants], Poggetto, supra, 18 Cal.App.2d 
at pp. 175–176].) 
While Chung Sing, supra, 178 Cal. 261, involved a notice 
of appeal that had merely misnamed one of the appealing 
parties, other decisions have applied the liberal construction 
requirement to construe a notice to include a party who was 
omitted from the notice entirely.  In Beltram, supra, 66 
Cal.App.3d 711, for example, a judgment was entered jointly 
against the City of Los Angeles and an employee of the city.  The 
city filed a notice of appeal that did not refer to the employee.  
The court, however, concluded the notice was sufficient to 
preserve the employee’s right of appeal:  “Any liability of the 
City of Los Angeles to plaintiffs is wholly derivative from the 
liability of its employee . . . .  The issues as to the city and its 
employee [we]re identical.  Therefore, the inadvertent omission 
of the employee’s name from the notice of appeal [could not] have 
                                        
defendant as the appellant to have been brought on behalf of 
the plaintiff.  Poggetto included citations to Chung Sing, supra, 
178 Cal. 261, and other cases that had applied the rule to 
remedy errors in the notice’s designation of the parties.  
(Poggetto, at p. 176.)    
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
14 
prejudiced or misled plaintiffs or in any way affected their 
preparation for the appeal.”  (Id. at p. 715.)   
Similarly, in Toal v. Tardif (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1208, 
an attorney filed a notice of appeal from a judgment that was 
entered jointly and severally against a husband and wife.  
Although the husband had signed the notice, the area of the 
form designating the names of the appellants was left blank.  
The plaintiffs argued that because only the husband’s name 
appeared on the notice, the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction 
to consider any appeal by the wife, and thus the judgment 
against her must stand.  The court rejected the argument, 
concluding that because the challenged judgment subjected both 
husband and wife “to the same award,” the rule of “[l]iberal 
construction . . . compel[led]” the court to conclude she was an 
intended appellant despite her omission from the notice.  (Id. at 
p. 1216.)    
Our reasoning in Walker, supra, 35 Cal.4th 15, and Vibert, 
supra, 64 Cal.2d 65, is also instructive.  In each case, we 
explained that while the appellant had “plainly erred” by 
designating only a nonappealable order in the notice (Walker, at 
p. 19; see Vibert, at p. 69), the strong public policy favoring the 
hearing of appeals on their merits compelled that the notice be 
construed to incorporate the underlying judgment if the party’s 
intent was “apparent” from the record (Vibert, at p. 68), and the 
respondent was not misled or prejudiced by the omission.  As 
stated in Vibert, even if the notice’s defect was the result of 
“appellant’s ignorance” (id. at p. 70) of the technical 
requirements of appellate procedure, he “ ‘should not be 
precluded from securing a review of what all concerned knew he 
was seeking to have reviewed’ ” (id. at pp. 68–69, italics omitted, 
quoting Evola, supra, 158 Cal.App.2d at p. 661).  That reasoning 
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
15 
applies equally where it is clear from the record that an attorney 
intended to join in an appeal from an order directing him or her 
to pay sanctions, but, either through clerical error or ignorance 
of the law, was omitted from the notice of appeal.5   
The Court of Appeal reached a different conclusion, 
holding that the notice of appeal filed in K.J.’s name could not 
be construed to include Carrillo regardless of whether his intent 
to join in the appeal was otherwise clear from the record.  In 
support, the court relied on Calhoun, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th 39, 
one of several cases holding that a client’s notice of appeal from 
a sanctions order cannot be construed to include an omitted 
attorney.  (Id. at p. 43; see Indiana Lumbermens, supra, 226 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 10–11 [following Calhoun’s analysis]; In re 
Marriage of Knowles (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 35, 38, fn. 11  
[dismissing attorney’s appeal of sanctions order and citing 
Calhoun]; but see Kane v. Hurley (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 859, 
861, fn. 4 [liberally construing client’s notice of appeal from 
order sanctioning attorney to “include [the omitted attorney]”]; 
Eichenbaum v. Alon (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 967, 974 
[construing party’s notice of appeal from joint sanctions order to 
“include [party’s] attorney”].)  
                                        
5  
Although LAUSD contends that construing a notice of 
appeal that identifies a nonappealable order to include the 
underlying judgment is “far different” than construing a notice 
of appeal to include an omitted party, it fails to explain why 
those circumstances should be treated differently.  Where an 
omitted party’s intent to join in the appeal is clear from the 
record, the respondent suffers no more prejudice than when the 
notice erroneously designates a nonappealable order, but it is 
clear from the record that the appellant sought review of the 
judgment entered thereon.    
      
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
16 
Calhoun, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th 39, and its progeny 
effectively adopt a bright-line rule mandating that an attorney’s 
name appear in the notice of appeal to preserve his or her right 
to challenge a sanctions order.  We acknowledge this bright-line 
approach would provide the benefit of clarity, and relieve the 
Court 
of 
Appeal 
from 
having 
to 
make 
case-by-case 
determinations whether an omitted attorney’s intent to join in 
the appeal was sufficiently clear.  However, the same could be 
said of the various types of technical defects that we addressed 
in Chung Sing, supra, 178 Cal. 261, Vibert, supra, 64 Cal.2d 65, 
and Walker, supra, 35 Cal.4th 15.  In all those cases, we 
concluded that the defect in the notice did not warrant 
automatic dismissal.  Instead, we held that the public policy 
interests underlying the liberal construction requirement 
justified an examination of the record to determine whether, 
despite the notice’s defect, the appellants’ intent was 
nonetheless clear to the parties.  The same is true here.  
Whatever benefits might accrue from the formalistic approach 
set forth in Calhoun do not justify forfeiture of a party’s right to 
appeal in cases where his or her intent to participate in the 
appeal is reasonably clear from the record, and the omission has 
caused no confusion or prejudice to the opposing party.  (See 
Walker, at p. 22.)6 
                                        
6  
To the extent they are inconsistent with this opinion, we 
disapprove Calhoun v. Vallejo City Unified School Dist., supra, 
20 Cal.App.4th 39, and other prior cases that suggest an 
attorney’s name must appear in the notice of appeal to preserve 
his or her right to challenge a sanctions order, including People 
v. Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th 
at page 10, In re Marriage of Knowles, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th 
at page 38, footnote 1, and Taylor v. Varga (1995) 37 
Cal.App.4th 750, 761–762, footnote 12. 
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
17 
LAUSD presents two additional arguments in support of 
its contention that a reviewing court cannot construe a notice of 
appeal from a sanctions order to include an omitted attorney.  
First, LAUSD argues that the language of rule 8.100(a)(1), 
which states that an “appellant must serve and file a notice of 
appeal,” impliedly requires that a party’s name must be 
included on the notice to preserve his or her right to appeal.  
According to LAUSD, had the Judicial Council intended to allow 
reviewing courts to construe a notice of appeal to include 
appellants who are not expressly referenced in the notice, “they 
could have made that clear, but they have chosen not to do so.”   
We are not persuaded.  While it is true that rule 
8.100(a)(1) compels the “appellant” to file a notice of appeal, rule 
8.100(a)(2) specifically provides that the contents of the notice 
are to be liberally construed.  As explained above, prior case law 
makes clear that this rule of liberal construction applies to 
defects in the designations of the parties, including errors 
involving the omission of an intended appellant.  (See ante, pp. 
12–14.)  We find nothing in the text of rule 8.100 that prohibits 
construing a notice of appeal to include an omitted party whose 
intent to join in the appeal is otherwise clear from the record.  
LAUSD next asserts that construing a client’s notice of 
appeal to include the sanctioned attorney would contravene the 
well-established rule that a party lacks standing to “ ‘assert 
error that injuriously affected only nonappealing coparties.’ ”  
(Conservatorship of Gregory D. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 62, 67–
68, quoting Estrada v. RPS, Inc. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 976, 
985.)  Our holding, however, does not provide a client with 
standing to appeal a sanctions order on behalf of a sanctioned 
attorney.  Instead, our holding compels a reviewing court to 
construe a notice filed in the name of the client to include an 
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
18 
omitted attorney when it is reasonably clear that the attorney 
intended to join in the appeal, and the respondent was not 
misled or prejudiced by the omission.7 
That does not mean, however, that a client’s notice of 
appeal from a sanctions order must always be construed to 
include an omitted attorney.  There may be situations where an 
omitted attorney’s intent to join in the notice of appeal is not 
sufficiently clear from the record, or where the omission has 
otherwise caused prejudice to the respondent, rendering the 
attorney’s inclusion in the appeal improper.  To avoid any 
questions as to an attorney’s right to appeal, and to avoid 
unnecessary litigation regarding that issue, the better practice 
is for the attorney to file a notice of appeal that expressly 
identifies himself or herself as an appealing party.     
                                        
7  
Although the parties’ briefs include multiple references to 
“standing,” which is a jurisdictional requirement set forth in 
Code of Civil Procedure section 902 (see § 902 [“[a]ny party 
aggrieved may appeal”]; In re K.C. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 231, 236 
[“only a person aggrieved by a decision may appeal”]; Marsh v. 
Mountain Zephyr, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 289, 295 
[“[s]tanding to appeal is ‘jurisdictional’ ”]), neither party 
disputes that Carrillo, as the sanctioned party, has standing to 
challenge the sanctions order.  (See Bauguess v. Paine (1978) 22 
Cal.3d 626, 634, fn. 3 [sanctioned attorney entitled to appeal 
sanctions order].)  Similarly, neither party has argued that K.J., 
whose rights were not affected by the order, does have standing 
to appeal.  Thus, this case does not actually present any issue of 
standing.  Rather, the issue in dispute is whether a notice of 
appeal from a sanctions order that is brought only in the name 
of a client can be construed to include the client’s sanctioned 
attorney. 
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
19 
C. The Court of Appeal Should Have Construed 
K.J.’s Notice of Appeal To Include Carrillo as an 
Appellant    
Having articulated the conditions under which a client’s 
notice of appeal from a sanctions order should be construed to 
include an omitted attorney, we must next determine whether 
those conditions are present here.  Several factors weigh in favor 
of construing the notice of appeal filed in the name of K.J. to 
include attorney Carrillo.  
First, the notice expressly designates the sanctions order 
as the subject of the appeal; no other orders or judgments are 
referenced in the notice.  Thus, all parties were aware that the 
sole basis of the appeal was a challenge to the trial court’s 
sanctions order. 
Second, the trial court’s order only assessed sanctions 
against Carrillo; the order had no effect on K.J.’s rights.  The 
fact that Carrillo served as K.J.’s attorney in the underlying 
proceedings, and that he was the only party who was affected by 
the order (and thus the only party who had reason to challenge 
it), strongly suggests that he was in fact the intended appellant.  
(See Laurino v. Tate (10th Cir. 2000) 220 F.3d 1213, 1218 
[omitted attorney’s intent to appeal sanctions award was 
sufficiently clear because the challenged order only imposed 
sanctions against him]; see also Retail Flooring Dealers of 
America, Inc. v. Beaulieu of America, LLC (9th Cir. 2003) 339 
F.3d 1146, 1149 [the fact that the order only imposed sanctions 
against the omitted attorney was a factor establishing his 
“desire to appeal”].)   
Third, the record shows that, during the trial court 
proceedings, Carrillo vigorously challenged the court’s authority 
to issue sanctions against him.  After initially being found in 
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
20 
contempt for having willfully disobeyed a discovery order, 
Carrillo filed a petition for habeas corpus that resulted in a stay 
of the contempt order.  While the stay was in effect, the trial 
court held additional proceedings to address whether the stay 
precluded it from entering discovery sanctions against Carrillo 
based on the same misconduct that gave rise to the contempt 
order.  Over Carrillo’s objections, the trial court concluded it 
retained sanctioning authority, and entered the order that is the 
subject of the current appeal.  The fact that the parties engaged 
in substantial litigation regarding the issue of sanctions that 
focused exclusively on Carrillo provides additional indicia that 
he was an intended appellant.    
Finally, LAUSD’s briefing does not assert that it was 
misled or prejudiced by Carrillo’s omission from the notice of 
appeal.  Nor is any prejudice suggested by the record.  The only 
claim raised in the appellant’s opening brief was that the trial 
court had erred in sanctioning Carrillo.  LAUSD raised the 
jurisdictional argument for the first time in its respondent’s 
brief, which also addressed the merits of appellant’s claim.  
Thus, the fact that Carrillo was omitted from the notice had no 
apparent effect on the appellate proceedings, other than to cause 
LAUSD to raise the jurisdictional argument.8  (See Walker, 
                                        
8  
In response to questioning at oral argument, LAUSD 
contended for the first time that it had been prejudiced because, 
if the notice of appeal is now construed to include Carrillo, he 
would then be able to present the merits of his claims, which 
could result in a reversal of the sanctions order.  LAUSD has 
presented no authority suggesting that, in this context, allowing 
an opposing party to present the merits of his or her appeal 
qualifies as a cognizable form of “prejudice.”  Under LAUSD’s 
rationale, prejudice would always be present in cases where a 
 
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
21 
supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 21 [appellant made “colorable argument” 
of nonprejudice where the record showed that respondent raised 
appealability issue for the first time in a respondent’s brief that 
also addressed the merits]; Beltram, supra, 66 Cal.App.3d at p. 
715 [notice’s omission of codefendant found nonprejudicial 
because the “issues as to [all defendants were] identical,” and 
the omission thus did not “affect[] [plaintiffs’] preparation for 
the appeal”].) 
Considered 
together, 
the 
factors 
described 
above 
demonstrate with reasonable clarity that although Carrillo’s 
name did not appear in the notice of appeal, he nonetheless 
intended to participate in the appeal, and that LAUSD suffered 
no prejudice from his omission.  Accordingly, the Court of Appeal 
should have construed the notice to include Carrillo as an 
appealing party.   
III.  DISPOSITION 
The Court of Appeal’s dismissal of the appeal is reversed.  
The matter is remanded with directions to the Court of Appeal 
to set aside its order of dismissal and decide the merits of 
appellant Carrillo’s challenge to the sanctions order. 
 
 
                                        
party seeks excusal of a technical error in the notice of appeal.  
We think it clear that the mere fact an opposing party would be 
able to present his or her claims on appeal is, standing alone, 
insufficient to establish prejudice.  
      
K.J. v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
 
22 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  K.J. v. Los Angeles Unified School District 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 2/23/17 – 2d Dist., Div. 3 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted   
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S241057 
Date Filed: January 30, 2020 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Los Angeles 
Judge:  William P. Barry 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Werksman Jackson Hathaway & Quinn, Kelly C. Quinn and Mark W. Allen for Objector and Appellant. 
 
Coleman and Associates, John M. Coleman; Law Offices of Bruce T. McIntosh and Bruce T. McIntosh for 
Defendants and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Kelly C. Quinn 
Werksman Jackson Hathaway & Quinn, LLP 
888 West Sixth Street, Fourth Floor 
Los Angeles, CA 90017 
(213) 688-0460 
 
Bruce T. McIntosh 
Law Offices of Bruce T. McIntosh 
1055 E. Colorado Blvd., #500 
Pasadena, CA 91106  
(626) 201-6717