Title: Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson

State: california

Issuer: California Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
RAND RESOURCES, LLC, et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
CITY OF CARSON et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
 
S235735 
 
Second Appellate District, Division One 
B264493 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
BC564093 
 
 
February 4, 2019 
 
Justice Cuéllar authored the opinion of the court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, 
Kruger, and Ashmann-Gerst* concurred. 
 
 
                                        
*  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate 
District, Division Two assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
1 
RAND RESOURCES, LLC v. CITY OF CARSON 
S235735 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
 
The City of Carson (City) hired Rand Resources as its 
agent to negotiate with the National Football League (NFL) 
about the possibility of building a football stadium in the City.  
But Rand Resources eventually sued the City, its mayor, and 
rival developer Leonard Bloom after the City replaced Rand 
Resources with Bloom’s company.  The defendants responded by 
making a motion under a California statute designed to hasten 
resolution of certain disputes commonly characterized as 
strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPP) –– 
lawsuits meant to chill the valid exercise of the public’s rights to 
free speech and petition for redress of grievances.  (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 425.16, subd. (a)1; see also Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 
Cal.4th 1048, 1055 (Rusheen).)  Known as the anti-SLAPP 
statute, this law permits a defendant facing such a lawsuit to 
dispose of it through a special motion to strike one or more 
causes of action. 
To describe the standard governing whether such a motion 
will succeed, the statute uses certain open-ended terms that 
raise nuanced questions of interpretation.  A special motion may 
target “cause[s] of action against a person arising from any act 
of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or 
free speech under the United States Constitution or the 
                                        
1  
All further references to section 425.16 are to the Code of 
Civil Procedure. 
RAND RESOURCES, LLC v. CITY OF CARSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
2 
 
California Constitution in connection with a public issue . . . , 
unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established 
that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the 
claim.”  (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)  A plaintiff who fails to persuade 
the court that he or she will probably prevail on the cause of 
action in question faces immediate dismissal of that cause of 
action.   
The question we tackle here is whether the causes of 
action asserted in Rand Resources’ dispute with the City and 
other defendants arise — as required to advance a valid anti-
SLAPP motion — from the defendants’ acts in furtherance of 
their right of free speech in connection with a public issue.  What 
we find is they do not, aside from two discrete claims asserted 
against Bloom and his company.  The relevant provisions of the 
anti-SLAPP statute procedurally protect statements made “in 
connection with an issue under consideration or review” by a 
legislative body (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(2)) or “any other conduct in 
furtherance of” the constitutional rights of petition or free 
speech “in connection with a public issue or an issue of public 
interest” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4)).   
The City Council indeed reviewed whether to renew 
plaintiffs’ contract with the City.  But the anti-SLAPP statute 
protects defendants’ statements made “in connection with” that 
issue only where such statements form the basis of plaintiffs’ 
claims — that is, where the statements themselves constitute 
the wrongs giving rise to the complaint.  In this case, the 
statements on which plaintiffs based their claims against the 
City defendants were either (1) unrelated to the issue 
considered by the City Council, or (2) made long before the issue 
came “under consideration or review” by the City Council.  
(§ 425.16, subd. (e)(2).)  Under such circumstances, we hold that 
RAND RESOURCES, LLC v. CITY OF CARSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
3 
 
these statements do not satisfy the requirements of section 
425.16, subdivision (e)(2).  In contrast, the statements 
attributed to the City’s codefendants — Bloom and his company 
— are at the heart of the intentional interference claims 
asserted against these codefendants.  These claims do fall within 
the ambit of subdivision (e)(2) because they rely on statements 
Bloom made “in connection with” the issue the City Council 
reviewed. 
We also find that none of defendants’ statements are 
within the scope of subdivision (e)(4) of the anti-SLAPP statute, 
save for those statements underlying the claims against Bloom.  
The parties in this case agree that the building of a sports 
stadium in the City of Carson to host an NFL team is — given 
the wide-ranging impact that a project of such scale could have 
on the City — an issue of public interest.  Yet, except as to two 
claims, the conduct providing the basis for plaintiffs’ claims has 
only the slightest bearing on whether or not, or how, the stadium 
should be built, nor does it concern any comparable matter of 
public interest.  Instead, the conversations underlying plaintiffs’ 
action relate only to who should be responsible for the ordinary 
functions associated with representing the City in the 
negotiations with the NFL — plaintiffs or the other entities 
named as the City’s codefendants.  Since there is no evidence or 
persuasive argument that the identity of the City’s agents was 
a matter of public interest in this case, defendants’ conduct does 
not qualify as protected activity under section 425.16, 
subdivision (e)(4). 
Because we find some of plaintiffs’ causes of actions are 
based on protected activities under subdivision (e)(2) and (e)(4) 
of section 415.26 but others are not, we affirm in part and 
reverse and remand in part the appellate court’s judgment. 
RAND RESOURCES, LLC v. CITY OF CARSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
4 
 
I. 
 
The plaintiffs in this case are Richard Rand and his 
companies, Rand Resources and Carson El Camino, LLC 
(collectively, Rand Resources or plaintiffs).  The defendants are 
the City of Carson and its mayor, James Dear (collectively, the 
City defendants).  Also named as defendants are Leonard Bloom 
and Bloom’s company, U.S. Capital, LLC (collectively, the Bloom 
defendants).  According to the complaint, in 2012, Rand 
Resources and the City entered into a contract in which Rand 
Resources was to act as the City’s exclusive agent in negotiating 
with the NFL to build “a new, state-of-the-art sports and 
entertainment complex within the City” that would serve as the 
home stadium for an NFL team.  All parties agree this 
development would have transformed the City and was a matter 
of public interest.   
The agreement did not begin under the most auspicious 
circumstances.  One of the City’s earlier mayors had attempted 
to extort a bribe from Rand, and Rand, instead of paying, sued 
the mayor and the City.  Rand won.  While the case was on 
appeal, the City and Rand Resources entered into an agreement, 
the Exclusive Negotiating Agreement (ENA), which governed, 
inter alia, development of Rand Resources’ own land within the 
parcel that the City was hoping to turn into a sports stadium.  
Rand Resources alleges the City extended the ENA multiple 
times. 
In 2012, Rand Resources and the City entered into a new 
agreement, the contract underlying the dispute in this case.  
Under this agreement, the Exclusive Agency Agreement (EAA), 
Rand Resources became the City’s exclusive authorized agent to 
negotiate with the NFL.  The EAA obligated the City not to 
RAND RESOURCES, LLC v. CITY OF CARSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
5 
 
“engage, authorize or permit any other person or entity 
whomsoever to represent City, to negotiate on its behalf, or to 
otherwise act for City” in “coordinating and negotiating with the 
NFL for the designation and development of an NFL football 
stadium.”  As part of that exclusivity condition, the City 
committed that it “shall not itself, through its officials, 
employees or other agents, contact or attempt to communicate 
with the NFL or any agent or representative of the NFL.” 
The EAA covered a term of two years but included an 
option for renewal.  The extension provision states:  “The term 
may be extended by mutual written consent of the parties for up 
to two (2) additional periods of one (1) year.  The City’s City 
Manager, or designee, may grant such extension upon receipt of 
an extension request and a report from Agent indicating in 
specific terms the efforts of Agent to date and the anticipated 
steps to be undertaken in the extension period for completion of 
the applicable planning and negotiation phases of the Project.  
To the extent that such efforts are reasonably determined by the 
City to be consistent with the requirements of this Agreement, 
the City shall grant such extension request.  The granting of any 
extension pursuant to this Section 5 shall be within the sole and 
unfettered discretion of the City.”   
Plaintiffs allege that City Attorney Bill Wynder 
nonetheless made certain representations to Rand regarding 
extension of the EAA.  In particular, plaintiffs assert that “[i]n 
August 2012 prior to Rand entering into the EAA, City Attorney 
Bill Wynder, acting on behalf of the City, told Mr. Rand that, 
even though the EAA only initially provided for a term of two 
years, the City would extend the EAA for two years beyond that 
period, just as it had with the ENA, so long as Rand showed 
reasonable progress with respect to bringing an NFL franchise 
RAND RESOURCES, LLC v. CITY OF CARSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
6 
 
to Carson.”  Plaintiffs allege that “[p]ursuant to the EAA,” they 
“expended significant time and resources in bringing an NFL 
team to Carson.” 
What prompted plaintiffs’ lawsuit was that the City 
“stopped adhering to the terms of the EAA” around April 2013, 
within the initial term of the agreement and shortly after Rand 
settled his earlier litigation against the City.  Rand alleges the 
City breached the exclusivity condition by, among other things, 
allowing the Bloom defendants to act as its representative in 
negotiating with the NFL. 
Plaintiffs advance a variety of allegations to support these 
claims.  The most pertinent ones involve speech and so 
potentially implicate the anti-SLAPP statute:  allegations that 
the Bloom defendants and Mayor Dear “would send each other 
‘confidential emails’ to discuss matters relating to building a 
stadium in Carson”; “Mayor Dear regularly sent Mr. Bloom and 
U.S. Capital, LLC private and confidential City of Carson 
documents relating to development of an NFL stadium”; and 
“Messrs. Bloom and Dear were involved in discussions with the 
City as to how to ‘get around’ the EAA.” 
With respect to the Bloom defendants specifically, 
plaintiffs allege, “Leonard Bloom and U.S. Capital, LLC, with 
the knowledge and support of representatives of the City, 
including Mayor Dear, were contacting NFL representatives 
and purporting to be agents of the city with respect to bringing 
an NFL franchise to Carson.”  In addition, “Mr. Bloom was using 
promotional materials that were derivative of those created and 
used by Rand in connection with meetings with NFL officials 
and others.”  In August 2014, Bloom also directed the vice 
president of his company “to form a new entity with the same 
RAND RESOURCES, LLC v. CITY OF CARSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
7 
 
exact name as Mr. Rand’s company that entered into the EAA, 
Rand Resources, LLC,” presumably so that he could pass off the 
entity as Rand’s company.   
Plaintiffs also contend the City and Bloom defendants 
sought to hide their activities.  In particular, plaintiffs allege 
that when Rand asked Mayor Dear about Bloom, “[t]he Mayor 
falsely told Rand that he did not know Mr. Bloom and was not 
aware of what, if anything, Mr. Bloom was doing with respect to 
the City and the NFL.” 
In July 2014, Rand Resources submitted to the City a 
request to extend the EAA for another year.  After Rand 
Resources presented its request but before the City voted upon 
the matter, Bloom “met with Mayor Dear and at least one 
Carson councilperson . . . to discuss and conspire about how to 
breach the EAA and not extend it.”  Another meeting also took 
place days before the vote, this one attended by Rand and City 
Attorney Wynder.  During this encounter, Wynder informed 
Rand that the City was not going to extend the agreement.  
Wynder further stated that “the City had been ‘walking on 
eggshells’ with Leonard Bloom and ‘did not need’ Rand 
anymore.”  According to plaintiffs, the City then committed 
another breach of the EAA when its City Council voted to deny 
the requested extension. 
On the strength of these allegations, plaintiffs lodged a 
six-count complaint against the City, Mayor Dear, and the 
Bloom defendants.  The first three causes of action are directed 
at the City and include breach of contract, tortious breach of 
contract, and promissory fraud.  The next count of fraud is 
asserted against all defendants; and the last two counts — 
intentional 
interference 
with 
contract 
and 
intentional 
RAND RESOURCES, LLC v. CITY OF CARSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
8 
 
interference with prospective economic advantage — are 
asserted against the Bloom defendants alone. 
Defendants responded by making special motions to strike 
the second through sixth causes of action.  The trial court 
granted their motions.  The appellate court reversed, concluding 
the causes of action at issue did not arise from conduct in 
furtherance of defendants’ constitutional rights of free speech in 
connection with a public issue, as defined by section 425.16.  We 
granted review to clarify the scope of the statute. 
II. 
A. 
The Legislature enacted section 425.16 in response to “a 
disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the 
valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech 
and petition for the redress of grievances.”  (§ 425.16, subd. (a).)  
These lawsuits prompted the Legislature to declare that “it is in 
the public interest to encourage continued participation in 
matters of public significance, and that this participation should 
not be chilled through abuse of the judicial process.”  (Ibid.)  To 
limit such risks, the anti-SLAPP legislation provides a special 
motion to strike “intended to resolve quickly and relatively 
inexpensively meritless lawsuits that threaten free speech on 
matters of public interest.”  (Newport Harbor Ventures, LLC v. 
Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (2018) 4 Cal.5th 637, 639.)  In 
1997, the Legislature amended the statute to provide that, 
directed to this end, the statute “shall be construed broadly.”  
(§ 425.16, subd. (a); see also Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer 
Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 59–60, fn. 3 (Equilon) 
[providing a history of the anti-SLAPP statute].) 
RAND RESOURCES, LLC v. CITY OF CARSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
9 
 
The procedure made available to defendants by the anti-
SLAPP statute has a distinctive two-part structure.  (E.g., Barry 
v. State Bar of California (2017) 2 Cal.5th 318, 321; Baral v. 
Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384 (Baral); Simpson Strong-Tie 
Co., Inc. v. Gore (2010) 49 Cal.4th 12, 21; Equilon, supra, 29 
Cal.4th at p. 67.)  A court may strike a cause of action only if the 
cause of action (1) arises from an act in furtherance of the right 
of petition or free speech “in connection with a public issue,” and 
(2) the plaintiff has not established “a probability” of prevailing 
on the claim.  (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1) [“A cause of action against 
a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of 
the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United 
States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection 
with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, 
unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established 
that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the 
claim”].) 
A defendant satisfies the first step of the analysis by 
demonstrating that the “conduct by which plaintiff claims to 
have been injured falls within one of the four categories 
described in subdivision (e) [of section 425.16]” (Equilon, supra, 
29 Cal.4th at p. 66), and that the plaintiff’s claims in fact arise 
from that conduct (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State 
University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1063 (Park)).  The four 
categories in subdivision (e) describe conduct “in furtherance of 
a person’s right of petition or free speech under the United 
States or California Constitution in connection with a public 
issue.”  (§ 425.16, subd. (e).)  Defendants here contend plaintiffs’ 
causes of action arise from two of those categories:  
communications “made in connection with an issue under 
consideration or review by a legislative body” (§ 425.16, subd. 
RAND RESOURCES, LLC v. CITY OF CARSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
10 
 
(e)(2)) and “conduct in furtherance of the exercise of . . . free 
speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public 
interest” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).). 
According to subdivision (e)(2) of section 425.16, “any 
written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an 
issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, 
or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by 
law” is an “act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or 
free speech under the United States or California Constitution 
in connection with a public issue.”  By requiring the 
communication to be in connection “with an issue under 
consideration or review” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(2), italics added), 
the terms of subdivision (e)(2) make clear that “it is insufficient 
to assert that the acts alleged were ‘in connection with’ an 
official proceeding.”  (Paul v. Friedman (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 
853, 867.)  Instead, “[t]here must be a connection with an issue 
under review in that proceeding.”  (Ibid.; see also McConnell v. 
Innovative Artists Talent & Literary Agency, Inc. (2009) 175 
Cal.App.4th 169, 177 [same]; Blackburn v. Brady (2004) 116 
Cal.App.4th 670, 677 [same].) 
Alternatively, under subdivision (e)(4) of section 425.16, 
plaintiffs’ causes of action must arise from defendants’ conduct 
“in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” 
(See, e.g., Tamkin v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc. (2011) 193 
Cal.App.4th 133, 142–143 [“A cause of action arises from 
protected activity within the meaning of section 425.16, 
subdivision (e)(4) if (1) defendants’ acts underlying the cause of 
action, and on which the cause of action is based, (2) were acts 
in furtherance of defendants’ right of petition or free speech 
(3) in connection with a public issue”].) 
RAND RESOURCES, LLC v. CITY OF CARSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
11 
 
Not surprisingly, we have struggled with the question of 
what makes something an issue of public interest.  (See Briggs 
v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 
1122 & fn. 9).  The appellate courts, however, have derived some 
guiding principles that characterize a matter of public interest.  
We share the consensus view that “a matter of concern to the 
speaker and a relatively small, specific audience is not a matter 
of public interest,” and that “[a] person cannot turn otherwise 
private information into a matter of public interest simply by 
communicating it to a large number of people.”  (Rand 
Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1080, 
1092 (Rand Resources), quoting Weinberg v. Feisel (2003) 110 
Cal.App.4th 1122, 1132–1133.)   
Here, the Court of Appeal properly identified three 
nonexclusive 
and 
sometimes 
overlapping 
categories 
of 
statements within the ambit of subdivision (e)(4).  (See Rand 
Resources, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1091–1092.)  The first 
is when the statement or conduct concerns “a person or entity in 
the public eye”; the second, when it involves “conduct that could 
directly affect a large number of people beyond the direct 
participants”; and the third, when it involves “a topic of 
widespread, public interest.”  (Rivero v. American Federation of 
State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFL–CIO (2003) 105 
Cal.App.4th 913, 919; see id. at pp. 919–924.)  
But to prevail on an anti-SLAPP motion, a defendant must 
do more than identify some speech touching on a matter of 
public interest.  As we have explained, “ ‘the defendant’s act 
underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action must itself have been 
an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.’ ”  
(Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1063 [holding that in deciding 
whether the “arising from” requirement is met, “courts should 
RAND RESOURCES, LLC v. CITY OF CARSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
12 
 
consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions 
by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form 
the basis for liability”].)  In other words, a claim does not “arise 
from” protected activity simply because it was filed after, or 
because of, protected activity, or when protected activity merely 
provides evidentiary support or context for the claim.  Rather, 
the protected activity must “supply elements of the challenged 
claim.”  (Id. at p. 1064.) 
In what follows, we consider counts two through six of the 
complaint within the above framework, asking, first, what 
conduct or statements underlie plaintiffs’ claims; and second, 
whether the conduct was “in furtherance of” defendants’ rights 
of petition or free speech “in connection with a public issue,” as 
defined by either subdivision (e)(2) or (e)(4).  (§ 425.16, subd. (e).)   
B. 
Plaintiffs’ second and fourth claims allege tortious breach 
of contract against the City defendants and fraud against all 
defendants, respectively.  But they rest on allegations that are 
virtually identical.2  Although plaintiffs’ third claim involves 
promissory fraud, it differs in material ways from the tortious 
breach of contract and fraud claims, so we treat it separately. 
The crux of the second and fourth claims is that 
defendants concealed and affirmatively lied about the City’s 
                                        
2  
We have established a “general rule precluding tort 
recovery for noninsurance contract breach,” except to the extent 
the claim is simply a fraud claim by another name.  (Freeman & 
Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 85, 102.)  
Plaintiffs’ tortious breach claim (count two) does appear to be a 
fraud claim by another name, and we thus refer to it as among 
plaintiffs’ fraud-based claims.  
RAND RESOURCES, LLC v. CITY OF CARSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
13 
 
breach of the exclusivity provision.  (See Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th 
at p. 1060.)  Plaintiffs allege that Mayor Dear and the Bloom 
defendants conspired to conceal the City’s breach of the 
exclusivity provision by meeting in secret, exchanging 
“confidential emails,” and “form[ing] a new entity . . . with the 
same exact name as Plaintiff Rand Resources” to “make it 
appear that [Bloom] was affiliated with and controlled Rand 
Resources.” 
 
Plaintiffs 
also 
allege 
affirmative 
misrepresentations, including that Mayor Dear falsely told 
Rand that the mayor “did not know Mr. Bloom and was not 
aware of what, if anything, Mr. Bloom was doing with respect to 
the City and the NFL”; and that Wynder “falsely told Mr. Rand 
that, so long as Rand showed reasonable progress,” the EAA 
would be renewed. 
Among these allegations, Mayor Dear’s and Wynder’s false 
statements to Rand supply an element of the fraud-based 
claims:  misrepresentation in the form of concealment, 
nondisclosure, 
or 
false 
representation.3 
 
These 
misrepresentations are not simply “evidence of liability or a step 
leading to some different act for which liability is asserted”; they 
are themselves the “wrong[s] complained of.”  (Park, supra, 2 
Cal.5th at p. 1060.)  They therefore satisfy the anti-SLAPP 
                                        
3  
Mayor Dear’s and Wynder’s statements, not directly or 
indirectly attributable to the Bloom defendants, cannot supply 
the elements of a fraud claim asserted against the Bloom 
defendants.  (See City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 
409, 426 [distinguishing between activities of the municipal 
government and those of individuals, who happened to be 
officials of the municipality]; Area 51 Productions, Inc. v. City of 
Alameda (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 581, 599–600 [agreeing that 
“Vasquez . . . ‘emphasizes that each person’s conduct is to be 
analyzed separately’ ”].) 
RAND RESOURCES, LLC v. CITY OF CARSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
14 
 
requirement 
that 
the 
challenged 
claim 
“aris[e] 
from” 
defendants’ conduct.  (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)  
But these particular statements were not made “in 
connection with” either the issue before the City Council — the 
relevant legislative body, under subdivision (e)(2) — or an issue 
of public interest, under subdivision (e)(4).  A closer look at the 
facts in light of these two statutory provisions shows why. 
Consider first subdivision (e)(2).  It is undisputed that the 
City Council met and took a vote affecting Rand Resources and 
the Bloom defendants.  But the issue that the legislative body 
reviewed, considered, and voted on was whether to extend the 
EAA with Rand Resources in 2014.  The City Council did not 
separately consider whether the Bloom defendants should be 
allowed to represent the City during the original term of the 
EAA, when the City was legally bound to use Rand Resources as 
its exclusive agent.  Only communications made in connection 
with the renewal of the EAA — what the City Council actually 
considered — constitute “written or oral statement[s] or 
writing[s] made in connection with an issue under consideration 
or review” by the City Council.  (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(2).)  Plaintiffs 
present no other rationale for treating statements that are the 
basis of these claims as covered by subdivision (e)(2).  
Statements concerning anything else at issue in these claims, 
including those reflecting or concealing a breach of the EAA’s 
exclusivity provision, fall outside the scope of this subdivision. 
As to subdivision (e)(4), the parties agree that building an 
NFL stadium in the City is a matter of public interest.  But 
defendants’ speech concerned only the narrower issue of who 
should represent the City in the negotiations with the NFL.  The 
affirmative misrepresentations, for instance, concerned only the 
RAND RESOURCES, LLC v. CITY OF CARSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
15 
 
falsehoods that Mayor Dear did not know Bloom and was not 
aware of his involvement in the NFL negotiations, and that the 
City would continue to let Rand be its exclusive agent if his 
company made “reasonable progress.”  Neither of these 
statements was directed to the public issue of whether to “hav[e] 
an NFL team, stadium, and associated developments in Carson” 
or what trade-offs might be entailed in the process.  (Rand 
Resources, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1093.)  Rather, what 
Mayor Dear and Wynder misrepresented — the issue “in 
connection with” their statements — was the identity of the 
City’s agent in negotiations with the NFL.   
Defendants disagree.  “Speech about ‘who’ should 
represent the City in its NFL negotiations,” they contend, “is 
just as protected as the speech ‘of’ that exclusive representation 
with the NFL” — “[t]he two kinds of speech are inextricably 
intertwined.”  What defendants fail to explain is how or why that 
is the case here, under circumstances where no obvious 
connection existed between the identity of the representative 
and a matter of public concern.   
Defendants instead contend that this case is no different 
than Tuchscher Development Enterprises, Inc. v. San Diego 
Unified Port Dist. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1219 (Tuchscher).  In 
Tuchscher, a developer had an exclusive deal with a city to “take 
preliminary steps and negotiate towards a development 
agreement for the creation of a mixed use real estate project . . . 
on certain bayfront property within the City.”  (Id. at p. 1227.)  
The parties did not dispute that the planned development was 
an issue of public interest.  (Id. at p. 1233.)   
Yet ultimately, the developer and city failed to reach an 
agreement on the project.  The developer then sued, alleging the 
RAND RESOURCES, LLC v. CITY OF CARSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
16 
 
defendants had interfered with the contract it had with the city.  
To support its claims, the developer introduced evidence of 
communications between the defendants, a rival developer, and 
the city.  The developer’s claims failed when the trial court 
granted the defendants’ motion to strike under section 425.16 
and the appellate court affirmed. 
Tuchscher is distinguishable.  Unlike any communications 
at issue here, those in Tuchscher pertained to the actual 
development of real estate — an issue of public interest — and 
formed the basis of the developer’s claims.  For instance, the 
challenged communications in Tuchscher included a letter from 
the rival developer to a defendant discussing such matters as 
the construction of “ ‘H St. Marina View Parkway,’ ” the 
demolition of “ ‘the existing structures on Port property,’ ” and 
the development of “ ‘residential housing on the adjacent fee 
owned property and commercial on Port property.’ ”  (Tuchscher, 
supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 1229.)  If, as the Court of Appeal in 
Tuchscher said, these communications were “the activity 
underlying [the developer’s] causes of action,” Tuchscher is 
instructive mainly in its differences from this case.  (Id. at 
p. 1233.) 
No such communications relating to the building of the 
NFL stadium underlie plaintiffs’ fraud-based claims.  True:  the 
defendants allegedly discussed building a stadium among 
themselves and with the NFL, while Bloom forged a deliberately 
confusing parallel entity.  But those discussions and activities 
are not the misrepresentations that form the basis of the fraud.  
Rather, they serve as evidence that the City’s statements to 
plaintiffs in denying Bloom’s involvement were fraudulent.  (See 
Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1068.)  In other words, 
communications exchanged between the City, the Bloom 
RAND RESOURCES, LLC v. CITY OF CARSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
17 
 
defendants, and the NFL did not defraud plaintiffs; the City 
defendants’ lie about their communications did.  The lie, 
however, related only to the matter of who was representing the 
City.  It had nothing to do with the merits of whether, how, and 
in what form the stadium should be built. 
Defendants also argue that the issue of who served as the 
City’s agent is a matter of public significance because “the better 
the negotiating party, the more likely that an NFL stadium 
would be delivered.”  As a preliminary matter, we reject the 
proposition that any connection at all — however fleeting or 
tangential — between the challenged conduct and an issue of 
public interest would suffice to satisfy the requirements of 
section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4).  (See, e.g., Jewett v. Capital 
One Bank (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 805, 814 [reversing the grant 
of a special motion to strike when “the attempt to connect the 
solicitations [the speech at hand] with an issue of public interest 
is tenuous at best”]; Bikkina v. Mahadevan (2015) 241 
Cal.App.4th 70, 84 (Bikkina) [holding that the defendant’s 
statements did not qualify as being in connection with an issue 
of public interest when the “statements were only remotely 
related to the broader subject of global warming or climate 
change”].)   
At a sufficiently high level of generalization, any conduct 
can appear rationally related to a broader issue of public 
importance.  What a court scrutinizing the nature of speech in 
the anti-SLAPP context must focus on is the speech at hand, 
rather than the prospects that such speech may conceivably 
have indirect consequences for an issue of public concern.  (E.g., 
Bikkina, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 85 [“Here, the specific 
nature of the speech was about falsified data and plagiarism in 
two scientific papers, not about global warming”]; Consumer 
RAND RESOURCES, LLC v. CITY OF CARSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
18 
 
Justice Center v. Trimedica International, Inc. (2003) 107 
Cal.App.4th 595, 601 [“If we were to accept [defendant’s] 
argument that we should examine the nature of the speech in 
terms of generalities instead of specifics, then nearly any claim 
could be sufficiently abstracted to fall within the anti-SLAPP 
statute”]; Commonwealth Energy Corp. v. Investor Data 
Exchange, Inc. (2003) 
110 Cal.App.4th 
26, 34 [“While 
investment scams generally might affect large numbers of 
people, the specific speech here was a telemarketing pitch for a 
particular service marketed to a very few number of people. . . .  
The speech was about [defendant’s] services, not about 
investment scams in general”].)  
We acknowledge that who precisely represents a city in 
sports franchise negotiations could indeed conceivably prove a 
matter of public interest.  The identity of the speaker and the 
concededly important subject of the speaker’s speech may, in 
some cases, be sufficiently linked so that the speech relating to 
the speaker’s identity constitutes “conduct in furtherance of the 
exercise of the constitutional right of . . . free speech in 
connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”  
(§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).)  But defendants’ argument does not 
allow us to justify such a conclusion here.  Defendants failed to 
suggest anything more than the most attenuated connection 
between the identity of the City’s agent and a matter of public 
importance.4  Nor is there anything in the record to support the 
                                        
4  
The Court of Appeal noted that the City was not paying 
Rand Resources at all for its work as an agent.  (Rand Resources, 
supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1094.)  As such, we need not 
address the City’s argument that “an EAA for the City’s agent 
to negotiate the potential development of a large-scale project . 
 
RAND RESOURCES, LLC v. CITY OF CARSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
19 
 
conclusion that the nature of the representation at issue 
involved more than routine functions ordinarily associated with 
such arrangements.  The failure to introduce such evidence is a 
material deficiency since defendants bear the burden at the first 
stage of the anti-SLAPP analysis.  (See Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th 
at p. 396 [“At the first step, the moving defendant bears the 
burden of identifying all allegations of protected activity, and 
the claims for relief supported by them”].)  Defendants have not 
carried their burden. 
Ultimately, the conversations underlying plaintiffs’ claims 
focus on who should be responsible for day-to-day functions 
associated with representing the City, not whether an NFL 
stadium should be built.  Any furtive communications and 
behind-the-scenes machinations that did relate to the merits of 
an NFL stadium did not form the basis of plaintiffs’ fraud 
claims. 
Similar complications arise in plaintiffs’ third claim, for 
promissory fraud against the City defendants.  Promissory 
fraud arises where a promise is made without any intention to 
perform.  (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638 
[“A promise to do something necessarily implies the intention to 
perform; hence, where a promise is made without such 
intention, there is an implied misrepresentation of fact that may 
be actionable fraud”].)  The claim arises directly from Wynder’s 
statement to Rand, before he signed the EAA, that “so long as 
Plaintiffs showed reasonable progress with respect to bringing 
an NFL franchise to Carson, the EAA would be extended,” 
                                        
. . fall[s] squarely within the definition of an issue of public 
interest [in part] because an agent could be paid a substantial 
amount of public funds for a project of great public significance.” 
RAND RESOURCES, LLC v. CITY OF CARSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
20 
 
followed by the City Council’s denial of an extension to the EAA 
in 2014. 
Because Wynder’s promise supplies an element of the 
promissory fraud claim (Rossberg v. Bank of America, N.A. 
(2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1498), it properly arises from 
speech that might be protected under section 425.16, 
subdivision (e)(2) or (e)(4).  (See Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at 
p. 1063.)  Wynder’s statement, unlike Mayor Dear’s, did relate 
to the EAA renewal issue before the City Council. 
Yet Wynder’s statement was made in 2012, about two 
years before the renewal issue even came before the City 
Council.5  Section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) protects only those 
“written or oral statement[s] or writing[s] made in connection 
with an issue under consideration or review.”  (Italics added.)  
The subdivision thus appears to contemplate an ongoing — or, 
at the very least, immediately pending — official proceeding.  
Conversely, if an issue is not presently “under consideration or 
review” by such authorized bodies, then no expression — even if 
related to that issue — could be “made in connection with an 
issue under consideration or review.”  (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(2).) 
What our appellate courts have declined to do is presume 
speech meets the requirements of section 425.16, subdivision 
(e)(2) when no official proceeding was pending at the time of the 
speech.  (Mission Beverage Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., LLC (2017) 
                                        
5  
Although the City Council approved the EAA in 2012, the 
parties do not dispute that the EAA is a valid contract, and 
defendants do not seem to have argued the City Council’s 
approval of the EAA in 2012 was relevant until they briefed the 
case before us.  We therefore do not consider the action of the 
City Council in 2012. 
RAND RESOURCES, LLC v. CITY OF CARSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
21 
 
15 Cal.App.5th 686, 703 [“[P]reparatory communications do not 
qualify as a protected activity if future litigation is not 
anticipated, and is therefore only a ‘possibility’ — and this is 
true even if the communication is a necessary prerequisite to 
any future litigation.”]; Kajima Engineering & Construction, 
Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 921, 930 
[“Kajima admits that ‘a majority of the alleged acts occurred, if 
at all, at or about the time [it] submitted its bid in early 1995.’ 
. . . Kajima was not exercising its right of petition at the time of 
the alleged acts; it was seeking to secure and working on a 
construction project”]; People ex rel. 20th Century Ins. Co. v. 
Building Permit Consultants, Inc. (2000) 86 Cal.App.4th 280, 
285 [stating that “[a]t the time defendants created and 
submitted their reports and claims, there was no ‘issue under 
consideration’ pending before any official proceeding” and 
concluding “defendants failed to make a prima facie showing 
that the causes of action in the lawsuit arose from free speech or 
petition activity”].)  We agree.  “[U]nder consideration or review” 
does not mean any issue a legislative body may conceivably 
decide to take up months or years in the future.  Wynder’s 
statement was not made at the time or on the eve of the renewal 
decision; it was made years before the issue came under review 
by the City Council.  Wynder did not even refer to the City 
Council’s review process in his promise.   
Nor does Wynder’s 2012 promise relating to the EAA 
extension merit protection as speech “in connection with a public 
issue or an issue of public interest” under subdivision (e)(4).  
Even charitably reading Wynder’s statement to encompass the 
identity of the City’s agent –– as we did in connection with 
plaintiffs’ other fraud-based claims –– defendants have not 
shown the issue to be one of public interest in this case.  (Cf. 
RAND RESOURCES, LLC v. CITY OF CARSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
22 
 
Tuchscher, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 1233 [finding claims 
within the ambit of subdivision (e)(4) where they arose from 
“communications to either the City or Lennar involving the 
proposed development of Crystal Bay and other bayfront 
property”].)  
The City elliptically suggests another basis to strike the 
promissory fraud claim:  in 2014, days before the City Council 
considered the EAA extension, Wynder told Rand the City would 
not be extending the EAA because it “did not need” Rand 
anymore and had been “walking on eggshells” with Bloom.  
True:  the statement may be evidence the City was acting in bad 
faith.  It tends to show the City had already made up its mind 
not to extend the EAA, certainly, and it involves protected 
activity (speech in the form of an oral statement) relating to an 
issue considered by a legislative body (renewal of the EAA).  But 
this is not enough. 
What the anti-SLAPP statute protects is speech that 
“provides the basis for liability.”  (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 
1060, 1065 [instructing that in determining whether a cause of 
action arises from protected speech, courts must distinguish 
“between speech that provides the basis for liability and speech 
that provides evidence of liability”].)  This, the statement does 
not do.  Rather, the statement is analogous to the comments 
found in Park to fall outside the scope of section 425.16.  (See id. 
at p. 1068 [“The tenure decision may have been communicated 
orally or in writing, but that communication does not convert 
Park’s suit to one arising from such speech.  The dean’s alleged 
comments may supply evidence of animus, but that does not 
convert the statements themselves into the basis for liability”].)  
As was the case in Park, Wynder’s 2014 statement — leaving 
aside any refusal to renew the contract — would not form the 
RAND RESOURCES, LLC v. CITY OF CARSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
23 
 
basis of a promissory fraud claim.  But the wrongful refusal to 
renew the contract, even without the prior communication, 
“surely could.”  (Ibid.) 
C. 
We turn next to plaintiffs’ claims against the Bloom 
defendants for intentional interference with contract and 
intentional interference with prospective economic advantage.  
Plaintiffs 
assert 
the 
Bloom 
defendants 
disrupted 
the 
relationship between plaintiffs and the City by interfering with 
plaintiffs’ twin rights under the EAA and with plaintiffs’ 
prospective economic advantage as the City’s exclusive agent in 
negotiations.  The two intentional interference claims share 
many elements — principally, an intentional act by the 
defendant designed to disrupt the relationship between the 
plaintiff and a third party.  (Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP 
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 937, 944 [stating that an intentional 
interference with prospective economic advantage claim 
requires, among other things, “an intentional act by the 
defendant, designed to disrupt the relationship”]; Quelimane Co. 
v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 55 [laying 
out the elements of an intentional interference with contract 
claim, one of which is that the defendant undertook 
“ ‘intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of 
the contractual relationship’ ”].)  
Plaintiffs advance two related arguments in making these 
claims.  First, they contend the Bloom defendants “began acting 
as the City’s agent” by “contacting NFL representatives” using 
Rand Resources’ promotional materials and company name.  
Second, plaintiffs claim that “[a]fter Rand provided the City 
with its [EAA] extension request but before the City voted on 
RAND RESOURCES, LLC v. CITY OF CARSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
24 
 
the extension,” the Bloom defendants met with Mayor Dear and 
a councilmember to “conspire about how to breach the EAA and 
not extend it.”   
These two courses of conduct are more than “merely a 
reference to a category of evidence that plaintiffs have to prove 
their claims.”  (Rand Resources, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 
1096.)  The Bloom defendants’ communications with the NFL 
served only as evidence of plaintiffs’ fraud-based claims.  Yet the 
very same communications constitute the conduct by which 
plaintiffs claim to have been injured in their intentional 
interference claims.  (See Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1064.)  
Similarly, although Bloom’s secret communications with the 
City served as evidence of, or context for, claims based in fraud, 
those very communications are the interference now complained 
of in claims five and six.  (See ibid.) 
Moreover, the Bloom defendants’ acts giving rise to 
plaintiffs’ intentional interference claims were “in connection 
with a public issue,” as defined in subdivision (e)(2) and (e)(4) of 
the anti-SLAPP statute.  In contrast to Wynder’s 2012 promise, 
the Bloom defendants lobbied Mayor Dear and a councilmember 
in 2014, “[a]fter Rand provided the City with its extension 
request but before the City voted on the extension.”  The Bloom 
defendants’ communications — designed to influence the City’s 
renewal decision while the renewal application was pending — 
are reasonably considered communications “in connection with 
an issue under consideration or review by a legislative . . . body” 
within the meaning of subdivision (e)(2).  Indeed, they appear to 
be part of Bloom’s lobbying the City not to renew the EAA and 
instead to use Bloom’s company as the City’s negotiator. 
RAND RESOURCES, LLC v. CITY OF CARSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
25 
 
 
Along with their direct lobbying efforts, the Bloom 
defendants 
allegedly 
contacted 
and 
met 
with 
NFL 
representatives to discuss a possible NFL franchise in the City.  
Although in this case the identity of the City’s exclusive agent 
was not a matter of public interest, the NFL’s possible franchise 
relocation to the City was a matter of public interest.  As in 
Tuchscher, the Bloom defendants’ statements to the NFL 
regarding that matter of public interest are themselves 
statements “in connection with a public issue or an issue of 
public interest.”  (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).) 
In short, the Bloom defendants’ communications with the 
NFL — like the communications at issue in Tuchscher, and 
unlike those in plaintiffs’ fraud-based claims — formed the basis 
of the interference claims.  Moreover, they were made “in 
connection with” the issue of bringing a football franchise to the 
City.  Likewise, defendants’ statements to Mayor Dear in 2014, 
while the EAA extension was pending before the City Council, 
also formed the basis of the interference claims and were made 
“in connection with” the issue of the EAA renewal that was 
before the City Council.  
III. 
At the heart of this case is a dispute about who represents 
a city in its negotiations with a national sports league.  
Defendants in that dispute made a motion under the anti-
SLAPP statute, which must be read broadly, in light of its 
remedial purpose.  (See, e.g., Equilon, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 59–60.)  
But we do not understand it to swallow a person’s every contact 
with government, nor does it absorb every commercial dispute 
that happens to touch on the public interest.  What the statute 
RAND RESOURCES, LLC v. CITY OF CARSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
26 
 
targets in a dispute like this one is liability premised on speech 
or petitioning activity “in connection with” a public issue. 
While many of the claims at issue here — those alleging 
fraud, for instance — necessarily involved oral and written 
exchanges, few of those exchanges were themselves the 
“wrong[s]” about which plaintiffs complained.  (Park, supra, 2 
Cal.5th at p. 1060.)  With two exceptions, the communications 
that did give rise to plaintiffs’ claims were not made “in 
furtherance of” defendants’ rights of free speech or petition “in 
connection with a public issue.”  (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)  Such 
speech does not merit anti-SLAPP protection. 
Plaintiffs’ intentional interference claims are different.  
Where other claims arose from speech peripherally related to 
the issue of public interest (the relocation of an NFL franchise) 
or tenuously involving an issue that would eventually come 
before a legislative body (the EAA extension), the intentional 
interference claims arose from the Bloom defendants’ speech “in 
connection with” both the EAA extension in 2014 and the public 
interest issue of attracting the NFL to the City.  The Court of 
Appeal erred in denying the motion to strike these two claims at 
the first stage of the anti-SLAPP analysis.  The court’s judgment 
in other respects was correct. 
We affirm in part and reverse in part the Court of Appeal’s 
judgment.  We remand the matter for proceedings consistent 
with this opinion — including a determination of whether 
plaintiffs have established a probability of prevailing on their 
intentional interference claims.  (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) 
 
 
 
RAND RESOURCES, LLC v. CITY OF CARSON 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
27 
 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
ASHMANN-GERST, J.* 
                                        
*  
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate 
District, Division Two assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 247 Cal.App.4th 1080 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S235735 
Date Filed: February 4, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Michael L. Stern 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Huang Ybarra Singer & May, Huang Ybarra Gelberg & May, Joseph J. Ybarra, Aaron M. May, Kevin H. 
Scott and Carlos A. Singer for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
Aleshire & Wynder, Sunny K. Soltani, William W. Wynder, Anthony R. Taylor and Christina M. Burrows 
for Defendants and Respondents City of Carson and James Dear. 
 
Tamborelli Law Group and John V. Tamborelli for Defendants and Respondents Leonard Bloom and U.S. 
Capital LLC. 
 
Burke, Williams & Sorensen, Thomas B. Brown and Amy E. Hoyt for League of California Cities and 
California State Association of Counties as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent City of 
Carson. 
 
Davis Wright Tremaine, Kelli L. Sager, Thomas R. Burke, Rochelle L. Wilcox and Dan Laidman for 
California Newspaper Publishers Association, Californians Aware, The Center for Investigative Reporting, 
First Amendment Coalition, The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, A&E Television 
Networks, LLC, BuzzFeed, Inc. Cable News Network, Inc., CBS Corporation, Dow Jones & Company, 
First Look Media Works, Inc., The Hearst Corporation, NBCUniversal Media, LLC, The New York Times 
Company and The Motion Picture Association of America as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and 
Respondents City of Carson, James Dear and Leonard Bloom. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Kevin H. Scott 
Huang Ybarra Gelberg & May 
550 South Hope Street, Suite 1850 
Los Angeles, CA  90071-1560 
(213) 884-4900 
 
Anthony R. Taylor 
Aleshire & Wynder 
18881 Von Karman Avenue, Suite 1700 
Irvine, CA  92612 
(949) 223-1170 
 
John V. Tamborelli 
Tamborelli Law Group 
21700 Oxnard Street, Suite 1590 
Woodland Hills, CA  91367 
(818) 710-3696