Title: State v. Godwin

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 167PA16  
Filed 9 June 2017 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
v. 
 
WILLIAM EDWARD GODWIN III 
 
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous decision 
of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 786 S.E.2d 34 (2016), finding prejudicial 
error in a judgment entered on 15 November 2013 by Judge Gary M. Gavenus in 
Superior Court, Mecklenburg County, and ordering that defendant receive a new 
trial.  On 22 September 2016, the Supreme Court allowed defendant’s conditional 
petition for discretionary review as to an additional issue.  Heard in the Supreme 
Court on 22 March 2017. 
 
Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Kristin J. Uicker, Assistant Attorney 
General, for the State-appellant/appellee. 
Rudolf Widenhouse, by M. Gordon Widenhouse, Jr., for defendant-
appellant/appellee. 
 
JACKSON, Justice.  
 
In this appeal we consider whether North Carolina Rule of Evidence 702(a1) 
requires a law enforcement officer to be recognized explicitly as an expert witness 
pursuant to Rule 702(a) before he may testify to the results of a Horizontal Gaze 
Nystagmus (HGN) test.  Because we conclude that such explicit recognition is not 
STATE V. GODWIN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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required and that the trial court implicitly recognized the law enforcement officer in 
this case as an expert prior to allowing him to testify as to the issue of defendant’s 
impairment, we reverse that portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals that is 
inconsistent with this determination.  Because we also conclude that the trial court 
did not err in denying defendant’s request for a special jury instruction to explain 
that results of a chemical breath test are not conclusive evidence of impairment, we 
affirm that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals holding there was no error in 
the trial court’s decision to deny defendant’s request for special jury instructions. 
The State’s evidence at trial tended to show the following: On the evening of 
18 January 2011, Officer Daniel R. Kennerly of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police 
Department initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle once he confirmed by radar that the 
vehicle was travelling fourteen miles per hour faster than the posted speed limit.  The 
driver of the vehicle, defendant William Edwin Godwin III, subsequently pulled over 
and stopped his vehicle on the side of the road.  After approaching defendant, who 
was still seated in his vehicle, Officer Kennerly detected an odor of alcohol and 
observed that defendant’s eyes were red and glassy.  Officer Kennerly asked 
defendant from where he had driven and whether he had been drinking.  Defendant 
responded that he was coming from a restaurant and had consumed three beers that 
evening.   
Based on his observations, training, and experience, Officer Kennerly then 
STATE V. GODWIN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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requested that defendant exit the vehicle in order to perform three standardized field 
sobriety tests: the HGN, the walk-and-turn, and the one-leg stand.  Officer Kennerly 
administered the HGN test to defendant twice in order to ascertain whether his eyes 
“jerked” during the test, which is an indication of impairment.  After observing four 
out of six possible indicators of impairment during the HGN test, Officer Kennerly 
determined that defendant might be impaired and proceeded with the remaining two 
field sobriety tests.   
Officer Kennerly observed two out of four possible indicators of impairment 
during the one-leg stand test and six out of eight possible indicators during the walk-
and-turn test.  At the conclusion of the three field sobriety tests, Officer Kennerly 
placed defendant under arrest for driving while impaired, transported him to the 
police station, and administered a breathalyzer test to defendant.  Defendant’s blood 
alcohol concentration (BAC) measured at 0.08 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of air.  
Defendant was charged with driving while subject to an impairing substance.  After 
being convicted in district court, defendant appealed his conviction.  Defendant was 
then tried during the 12 November 2013 criminal session of the Superior Court, 
Mecklenburg County.   
When Officer Kennerly testified at trial regarding his administration of the 
HGN test, defendant objected, arguing that pursuant to the 2011 amendment to 
North Carolina Rule of Evidence 702(a), the State should not be permitted to present 
STATE V. GODWIN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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testimony regarding the HGN test without qualifying the testifying officer as an 
expert.  In response, the State argued that Officer Kennerly did not need to be found 
explicitly to be an expert because he was merely testifying to the administration of 
the field sobriety tests and his resulting observations.  The State also argued that 
Officer Kennerly had completed the requisite training to administer field sobriety 
tests; therefore, he was qualified to testify regarding the subject.  At the conclusion 
of its own voir dire of the officer and a voir dire by both attorneys, the trial court 
concluded that Officer Kennerly could testify based upon his training and experience, 
regarding his administration of the three field sobriety tests as well as his 
observations of defendant during the tests.  Officer Kennerly then testified that he 
had received training as to how to administer the HGN test and how to identify 
indicators of impairment based upon the test.  He also testified that, after 
administering the three field sobriety tests to defendant, he concluded from his 
training, experience, and observations that defendant’s “mental and physical 
faculties were appreciably impaired.”    
At the close of the evidence, defendant proposed two relatively similar jury 
instructions concerning the results of the breathalyzer test and how the jury should 
analyze those results.  The proposed instructions suggested to the jury that it was 
not compelled to find defendant’s BAC to be 0.08 or more based upon the result of the 
chemical analysis.  In response, the State argued that such an instruction would 
merely draw attention to the 0.08 BAC and confuse the jury.  The State also asserted 
STATE V. GODWIN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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that it would be sufficient for the trial court to instruct the jury that it was the sole 
judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.  After 
consideration of the applicable case law and the arguments of counsel, the trial court 
refused to give defendant’s requested jury instructions and gave the pattern jury 
instructions on credibility and impaired driving.  
On 15 November 2013, the jury convicted  defendant of driving while impaired.  
Defendant appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals, arguing, inter alia, that 
the trial court failed to comply with the standards of Rule 702 in allowing Officer 
Kennerly’s testimony without requiring the State to tender the officer as an expert 
witness.  Defendant also argued that Rule 702(a1) obligated the trial court to find 
explicitly that Officer Kennerly was qualified to present expert testimony as an 
expert pursuant to Rule 702(a) before allowing him to testify about the HGN test 
results.  Defendant further maintained that the trial court erred in rejecting his 
proposed jury instructions.  Defendant contended that the proposed instructions were 
necessary to inform the jury that, although the breathalyzer results were sufficient 
to support a finding of driving while impaired, they did not compel a finding that 
defendant was guilty of impaired driving beyond a reasonable doubt.     
In response, the State argued before the Court of Appeals that the trial court 
properly limited Officer Kennerly’s testimony to the administration of the field 
sobriety tests and his observations of defendant during those tests.  The State further 
STATE V. GODWIN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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contended that if defendant believed that Officer Kennerly was not qualified to 
testify, it was defendant’s responsibility to refute the officer’s training and 
experience.  Noting that defendant tendered two experts to counter Officer Kennerly’s 
evidence at trial, the State highlighted that the jury still determined that defendant 
was guilty.  Regarding the trial court’s refusal to deliver defendant’s proposed jury 
instructions, the State argued that the requested instructions were given in 
substance, and that the jury was not misled or misinformed in receiving the pattern 
instructions.   
Concluding that Rule 702(a1) requires that a witness explicitly be found to be 
an expert before testifying to the results of an HGN test, the Court of Appeals 
determined that the trial court erred in failing to recognize Officer Kennerly as an 
expert pursuant to Rule 702(a).  See State v. Godwin, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 786 
S.E.2d 34, 37-38 (2016).  In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals relied on State 
v. Helms, in which this Court held that the HGN test “represents specialized 
knowledge that must be presented to the jury by a qualified expert.”  Id. at ___, 786 
S.E.2d at 36 (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Helms, 348 N.C. 578, 581, 504 
S.E.2d 293, 295 (1998)).  The Court of Appeals also highlighted potentially conflicting 
evidence regarding defendant’s performance on the other field sobriety tests and 
concluded that such evidence created “a reasonable possibility” that, “had the HGN 
test results not been admitted, a different result would have been reached at trial.”  
Id. at ___, 786 S.E.2d at 39.  Based upon its holding on this issue, the Court of Appeals 
STATE V. GODWIN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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awarded defendant a new trial.  Id. at ___, 786 S.E.2d at 40.  As to the jury 
instructions, the Court of Appeals rejected defendant’s argument, noting that the 
pattern jury instructions given by the trial court “informed the jury, in substance, 
that it was not compelled to return a guilty verdict based simply on the chemical 
analysis results.”   Id. at ___, 786 S.E.2d at 39 (quoting State v. Beck, 233 N.C. App. 
168, 171-72, 756 S.E.2d 80, 83, disc. rev. denied, 367 N.C. 508, 759 S.E.2d 94 (2014)). 
On appeal to this Court, the State argues that the trial court implicitly found 
that the witness was qualified as an expert.  Therefore, the State contends that the 
Court of Appeals erred by holding that the expert testimony was erroneously 
admitted.  We agree.  On conditional appeal, defendant argues that the Court of 
Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s refusal to give his requested jury 
instructions.  Defendant contends that without his proposed instructions, the jury 
would feel compelled to find he was impaired.  We disagree.  We now address these 
two issues in turn. 
According to Rule 702(a): 
If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert 
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may 
testify thereto in the form of an opinion, or otherwise, if all 
of the following apply: 
(1) The testimony is based upon sufficient facts or 
data. 
(2) The testimony is the product of reliable 
principles and methods. 
STATE V. GODWIN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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(3) The witness has applied the principles and 
methods reliably to the facts of the case. 
N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 702(a) (2015).  The three numbered requirements for admission 
of expert testimony were added to Rule 702(a) by amendment in 2011 to incorporate 
the standard from the line of United States Supreme Court cases beginning with 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.  See State v. McGrady, 368 N.C. 880, 
884, 888, 787 S.E.2d 1, 5, 7-8 (2016).  Also relevant to the subject matter of this case, 
Rule 702(a1) provides, in relevant part: 
A witness, qualified under subsection (a) of this section and 
with proper foundation, may give expert testimony solely 
on the issue of impairment and not on the issue of specific 
alcohol concentration level relating to the following:  
(1) The results of a Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus 
(HGN) Test when the test is administrated by a 
person who has successfully completed training 
in HGN.   
 
N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 702(a1) (2015).  Reading these subsections together, it is 
evident that the General Assembly envisioned the precise scenario we address today 
and made clear provision to allow testimony from an individual “who has successfully 
completed training in HGN” and meets the criteria set forth in Rule 702(a), as Officer 
Kennerly has done.  Id. § 8C-1, Rule 702(a1)(1).   
 
In assessing how a witness may be qualified as an expert, we have held that 
when the record contains sufficient evidence upon which the trial court could have 
based an explicit finding that the witness was an expert, an appellate court may 
conclude that the trial court found the witness to be an expert.   Apex Tire & Rubber 
STATE V. GODWIN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Co. v. Merritt Tire Co., 270 N.C. 50, 53, 153 S.E.2d 737, 739 (1967).  In Apex Tire the 
trial court explicitly denied counsel’s motion to declare a witness was an expert.  Id. 
at 54, 153 S.E.2d at 740.  The trial court then permitted the witness to testify in 
detail, as well as offer an opinion in the case.  Id. at 54, 153 S.E.2d at 740.  We 
concluded that, notwithstanding the trial court’s denial of the motion to recognize 
explicitly the witness as an expert, the record contained evidence on which the trial 
court could have based a finding that the witness was an expert.   Id. at 54, 153 S.E.2d 
at 740.  Accordingly, we inferred from its actions that the trial court made an implicit 
finding that the witness was an expert.  Id. at 53-54, 153 S.E.2d at 739-40. 
 
Since our decision in Apex Tire, we have reiterated the concept of implicit 
recognition of expert witnesses in several opinions.   We have held:  
In the absence of a request by the appellant for a 
finding by the trial court as to the qualification of a witness 
as an expert, it is not essential that the record show an 
express finding on this matter, the finding, one way or the 
other, being deemed implicit in the ruling admitting or 
rejecting the opinion testimony of the witness.   
 
State v. Perry, 275 N.C. 565, 572, 169 S.E.2d 839, 844 (1969) (citations omitted).  
Similarly, we have held that a trial judge implicitly recognized a witness as an expert 
by overruling defense counsel’s objection to the witness’s qualifications.  State v. 
Bullard, 312 N.C. 129, 143-44, 322 S.E.2d 370, 378 (1984) (citing Perry, 275 N.C. 565, 
169 S.E.2d 839).  In addition, we have determined that when a defendant interposed 
only general objections to trial testimony and never requested a finding by the trial 
STATE V. GODWIN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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court as to the witnesses’ qualifications as experts, the recognition that the witnesses 
were qualified to testify as experts was “implicit in the trial court’s ruling admitting 
the opinion testimony.”  State v. Aguallo, 322 N.C. 818, 821, 370 S.E.2d 676, 677 
(1988) (citing State v. Phifer, 290 N.C. 203, 213-14, 225 S.E.2d 786, 793 (1976), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1977)).  More recently, we ruled that a “trial court’s overruling 
of defense counsel’s objection to the opinion testimony constituted an implicit finding 
that the witness was an expert.”  State v. Wise, 326 N.C. 421, 430, 390 S.E.2d 142, 
148 (citing Bullard, 312 N.C. 129, 322 S.E.2d 370), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 853 (1990).   
Although we decided the aforementioned cases prior to the amendment to Rule 
702, the 2011 amendment did not categorically overrule all North Carolina judicial 
precedents interpreting that rule.  See McGrady, 368 N.C. at 888, 787 S.E.2d at 8 
(“Our previous cases are still good law if they do not conflict with the Daubert 
standard.”).  Relevant to the issue in this case, the 2011 amendment did not change 
the basic structure for a trial court’s exercise of its gatekeeping function over expert 
testimony.  See id. at 892, 787 S.E.2d at 10.  Moreover, our precedents continue to 
dictate that a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony “will not be 
reversed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion.”  See id. at 893, 787 S.E.2d 
at 11 (quoting Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 458, 597 S.E.2d 674, 686 
(2004), superseded by statute, Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 283, sec. 1.3, 2011 N.C. Sess. 
Laws 1048, 1049 (codified at N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 702(a)(1)-(3)), as stated in 
STATE V. GODWIN 
 
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McGrady, 368 N.C. at 888, 787 S.E.2d at 8).  Here we can detect no such abuse of 
discretion by the trial court. 
During both the pretrial hearing and the trial in this case, Officer Kennerly 
was “qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.”  
N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 702(a).  Officer Kennerly testified that he had completed 
training on how to administer the HGN test and other standardized field sobriety 
tests that he administered to defendant.  During direct examination, Officer Kennerly 
explained that he attended a thirty-four hour course in standardized field sobriety 
testing and DWI detection in 2006.  Officer Kennerly’s certificate of completion for 
this course was admitted into evidence.  He also testified that he attended an eight 
hour refresher course in 2009.  Both courses were approved by the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA).  Prior to the date he administered the HGN 
test to defendant, Officer Kennerly had conducted approximately three 
hundred impaired driving offense investigations.    
The trial court also established that Officer Kennerly’s testimony met the 
three-pronged test of reliability pursuant to the amended rule.  The trial court 
conducted its own voir dire of Officer Kennerly, which elicited testimony that the 
HGN test he administered to defendant on the day in question was given in 
accordance with the standards set by the NHTSA, and that those standards were 
derived from the results of a specific scientific study.  Additionally, the trial court’s 
STATE V. GODWIN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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voir dire confirmed that the principles and methods utilized in the HGN test were 
found to be reliable indicators of impairment, and that Officer Kennerly applied those 
principles and methods to defendant in this case.   
Defendant objected to Officer Kennerly’s testimony on the grounds that he was 
neither formally tendered as an expert witness by the State nor recognized as such 
by the trial court.  Yet we note that defendant did not object to any of Officer 
Kennerly’s actual qualifications, even clarifying his general objection by stating, “I’m 
not saying Officer Kennerly could not be qualified, but I think the State’s going to 
have to go through that.”  Defendant eventually narrowed his objection by 
acknowledging that if the State were to limit the officer’s testimony to his 
observations and the indications of impairment, then defendant had “less problem 
with it.”  The trial court then overruled defendant’s objection; however, as the 
colloquy between the trial court and the defense attorney indicates, Officer Kennerly 
only was permitted to offer testimony regarding his observations of defendant’s 
impairment as he administered the HGN test and was not permitted to comment on 
the HGN test’s reliability.  These distinctions are critical. 
TRIAL COURT:  . . . I will allow this officer to testify 
that he administered the HGN test, the walk-and-turn 
test, and the one-legged test.  He will be allowed to testify 
as to the indicators of impairment he observed of this 
defendant in giving these tests.   
 
Anything else? 
STATE V. GODWIN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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DEFENSE COUNSEL:  I’d ask the Court to note my 
exception.  Is the Court disqualifying him as an expert on 
the HGN? 
TRIAL COURT:  I’m not -- he doesn’t have to be 
qualified as an expert.  I’m not going to make that 
requirement.  I’m just going to let him testify based on his 
training and experience, what -- how the HGN should be 
administered and what the indicators are and what 
indicators he observed.    
 
In overruling defendant’s objection, the trial court implicitly found that Officer 
Kennerly was qualified to testify as an expert, and as such, in accordance with the 
guidance in Rule 702(a1), Officer Kennerly could “give expert testimony solely on the 
issue of impairment and not on the issue of specific alcohol concentration level.”  
N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 702(a1).   
Although the Court of Appeals relied on our prior decision in Helms to reach 
its conclusion that the expert testimony was erroneously admitted, several important 
facts render Helms distinguishable from the present case.   At issue in Helms was the 
reliability of the HGN test, not the observed impairment of the individual being 
subjected to the HGN test.  Helms, 348 N.C. at 582, 504 S.E.2d at 295.  Furthermore, 
although the officer in Helms testified that he had taken a forty hour training course 
in the use of the HGN test, the State presented no evidence regarding—and the court 
conducted no inquiry into—the reliability of the HGN test.  Id. at 582, 504 S.E.2d at 
295.  We also noted in Helms that nothing in the record of the case indicated that the 
trial court took judicial notice of the reliability of the HGN test.  Id. at 582, 504 S.E.2d 
STATE V. GODWIN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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at 295.  Accordingly, we concluded that because no sufficient scientifically reliable 
evidence existed as precedent to show the correlation between intoxication and 
nystagmus, “it [was] improper to permit a lay person to testify as to the meaning of 
HGN test results.”  Id. at 582, 504 S.E.2d at 295.  Additionally, the trial court 
permitted the law enforcement officer to testify as a lay person regarding the meaning 
of HGN test results, and there was no evidence in the record to support a finding that 
the trial court had implicitly found the officer to be an expert.  Id. at 582, 504 S.E.2d 
at 295.  This scenario plainly contrasts with the present case in which the trial court 
made a finding of reliability of the HGN test and an implicit finding that Officer 
Kennerly was qualified as an expert.  Furthermore, with the 2006 amendment to Rule 
702, our General Assembly clearly signaled that the results of the HGN test are 
sufficiently reliable to be admitted into the courts of this State.  See The Motor Vehicle 
Driver Protection Act of 2006, ch. 253, sec. 6, 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws (Reg. Sess. 2006) 
1178, 1183 (codified at N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 702(a1) (Supp. 2006)).  Based on these 
distinguishing factors, our decision in Helms is not dispositive of the present case.    
Notwithstanding our decision in this case, the better practice would have been 
for the trial court to refrain from stating, “[Officer Kennerly] doesn’t have to be 
qualified as an expert.  I’m not going to make that requirement.”  Furthermore, in 
light of the aforementioned findings regarding Officer Kennerly’s knowledge, skill, 
experience, and training, the appellate division’s ability to review the trial court’s 
oral order would have benefited from the inclusion of additional facts supporting its 
STATE V. GODWIN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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determination that Officer Kennerly was qualified to testify as an expert regarding 
his observations of defendant’s performance during the HGN test.   
Next, we turn to the issue of defendant’s proposed jury instructions.  When a 
defendant requests a special jury instruction that is correct in law and supported by 
the evidence, the court must give the instruction in substance.  State v. Monk, 291 
N.C. 37, 54, 229 S.E.2d 163, 174 (1976) (citation omitted).  Yet, “[e]ven if a defendant 
is entitled to requested instructions, the court is not required to give them verbatim.  
It is sufficient if they are given in substance.”  State v. Howard, 274 N.C. 186, 199, 
162 S.E.2d 495, 504 (1968) (citation omitted).  If “[t]he instructions given by the trial 
court adequately convey[ ] the substance of defendant’s proper request[,] no further 
instructions [are] necessary.”  State v. Green, 305 N.C. 463, 477, 290 S.E.2d 625, 633 
(1982) (citation omitted). 
Here one of defendant’s two proposed instructions stated: 
A chemical analysis of defendant’s breath obtained from an 
EC/IR-II which shows an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or 
more grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath is deemed 
sufficient to prove defendant’s alcohol concentration.  
However, such chemical analysis does not compel you to so 
find beyond a reasonable doubt.  You are still at liberty to 
consider the credibility and/or weight to give such chemical 
analysis when considering whether defendant’s guilt has 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
STATE V. GODWIN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Though worded slightly differently, the second proposed instruction also suggested to 
the jury that it was not compelled to find defendant’s alcohol concentration to be 0.08 
or more based on the result of the chemical analysis.1   
Defendant asserted at trial that without either of the requested instructions, 
the jury would be required to presume that the reading of 0.08 was conclusive proof 
of impairment.  Defendant argued that the purpose of his proposed instructions was 
to ensure that the jury realized it could consider the evidence presented by defendant 
of his lack of impairment, notwithstanding the evidence provided by the chemical 
analysis.  Following the pattern jury instruction on impaired driving, the trial court 
explained to the jury that impairment could be proved by an alcohol concentration of 
0.08 or more, and that this chemical analysis was “deemed sufficient evidence to 
prove a person’s alcohol concentration.”  The trial court also explained to the jurors 
that they were “the sole judges of the credibility of each witness and the weight to be 
given to the testimony of each witness,” and that if they decided that certain evidence 
was believable, they “must then determine the importance of that evidence in light of 
                                            
1  In its entirety the second proposed instruction stated: 
 
The results of the chemical analysis of the Defendant’s breath 
do not create a presumption that the Defendant had, at a 
relevant time after driving, an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or 
more grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.  You may find the 
Defendant’s alcohol concentration to be 0.08 or more.  You may 
find the Defendant’s alcohol concentration to be 0.08 or more 
based upon the result, but you are not compelled to do so.  
STATE V. GODWIN 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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all other believable evidence in the case.”  These statements signaled to the jury that 
it was free to analyze and weigh the effect of the breathalyzer evidence along with all 
the evidence presented during the trial.  Therefore, we hold that the standard jury 
instruction on credibility was sufficient in this case and that the trial court 
adequately conveyed the substance of defendant’s requested instructions to the jury.  
Accordingly, we affirm the holding of the Court of Appeals that the jury instructions 
were proper. 
For the reasons stated above, we also hold that the trial court implicitly found 
that Officer Kennerly was qualified to give expert testimony, and therefore did not 
abuse its discretion by allowing Officer Kennerly to testify as an expert regarding 
defendant’s impairment.  The trial court overruled defendant’s objection to Officer 
Kennerly’s testimony, determined that his testimony was relevant and reliable, and 
ascertained that he was qualified to testify as an expert.  Consequently, we conclude 
that the Court of Appeals erroneously determined that the trial court did not find 
Officer Kennerly to be an expert pursuant to Rule 702(a).   
Accordingly, as explained above, we hold that the trial court made no error in 
the trial of defendant’s case.  Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court of 
Appeals awarding defendant a new trial and instruct that court to reinstate the trial 
court’s judgment. 
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART.