Title: State v. Lawson

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

204 S.E.2d 843 (1974)
285 N.C. 320
STATE of North Carolina
v.
Donald Samuel LAWSON.
No. 58.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.
May 15, 1974.
*845 Atty. Gen. Robert Morgan and Asst. Atty. Gen. Ralf F. Haskell, Raleigh, for the State.
Wheatly & Mason by L. Patten Mason, Beaufort, for defendant appellant.
MOORE, Justice.
Defendant first asserts that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence incriminating statements made by defendant to the investigating officer at the scene of the accident.
Defendant was arrested for public drunkenness by Patrolman Askew and placed in the patrol car. He was then advised of his constitutional rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), and questioned by the patrolman. Among his other rights, defendant was advised that he had the right to an attorney and that he could call an attorney when he arrived at the Newport Police Department. The patrolman asked defendant if he understood his rights. Defendant made no response. The patrolman then questioned defendant as to what had happened and defendant told him that he was driving the car and was attempting to turn around in the road when the car ran into the ditch. This statement was admitted into evidence over the objection of defendant. Without this statement the State had no direct proof that defendant was driving.
Defendant contends this statement was elicited by custodial interrogation before he had knowingly and intelligently waived his rights guaranteed by Miranda, and that the statement should have been excluded. Miranda warnings and waiver of counsel are required when and only when a person is being subjected to "custodial interrogation"; that is, "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda v. Arizona, supra; State v. Blackmon, 284 N.C. 1, 199 S.E.2d 431 (1973).
In State v. Sykes, N.C., 203 S.E.2d 849 (1974), Justice Huskins, for the Court, stated:
In the present case Patrolman Askew testified that he arrested defendant for public drunkenness and placed him in the patrol car. Clearly, the subsequent interrogation was "custodial interrogation," and the trial court erred in the conclusion of law that it made following the voir dire:
Defendant was highly intoxicated or drunk at the time of his arrest, and even assuming he was in condition to intelligently and understandingly waive his rights, the record discloses and the trial court found that he made no response when asked if he understood those rights. He was further advised by the patrolman that he could call an attorney when he reached Newport, but without waiting until they reached Newport the patrolman immediately started questioning him about what had happened. As a result of this questioning, the statement allegedly made by defendant was secured. See State v. Edwards, 282 N.C. 201, 192 S.E.2d 304 (1972).
The trial court next concluded:
Prior to amending his conclusions of law to the effect that defendant's statements were "voluntarily and understandingly made," the trial judge had heard the testimony of the arresting officer that defendant "was the drunkest man he had seen in a right good while." In further describing defendant's condition after he arrived at the police station, the patrolman stated:
The trial judge also had heard the following testimony from Officer Tomlinson who administered the breathalyzer test almost an hour after defendant had been arrested:
Assuming that defendant understood his rights, we hold that the court erred in concluding as a matter of law that by defendant's silence and continued answering of questions he waived any right to counsel. These facts are not sufficient to constitute a waiver of counsel. This is stated in State v. Blackmon, 284 N.C. 1, 10, 199 S.E.2d 431, 437 (1973):
However, the State contends that under State v. Beasley, 10 N.C.App. 663, 179 S.E.2d 820 (1971), a case factually similar to this case, no Miranda warnings were necessary. In Beasley, however, defendant was not in custody at the time of the questioning and his incriminating statement was made as a result of an on-the-scene investigation, an exception specifically recognized in Miranda. Hence, Beasley is distinguishable from the present case, for as stated in Lowe v. United States, 407 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1969):
See State v. Sykes, supra.
The Court of Appeals in Beasley quoted with approval from State v. Macuk, 57 N. J. 1, 15-16, 268 A.2d 1, 9 (1970), as follows:
We do not approve this language. This Court in State v. Hill, 277 N.C. 547, 553, 178 S.E.2d 462, 466 (1971), stated: "One who is detained by police officers under a charge of driving while under the influence of an intoxicant has the same constitutional and statutory rights as any other accused," citing State v. Morris, 275 N.C. 50, 165 S.E.2d 245 (1969). In State v. Strickland, 276 N.C. 253, 261, 173 S.E.2d 129, 134 (1970), a case in which defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, Justice Branch, speaking for the Court, stated:
See State v. Sykes, supra; Annot., 25 A. L.R.3d 1076 (1969).
In Miranda the Supreme Court adopted the following rule:
The Supreme Court of the United States in Miranda does not limit the rights it sets forth to persons charged with felonies or misdemeanors, and neither does this Court in State v. Strickland, supra; rather both Courts relate those rights to any individual being subjected to custodial interrogation concerning a criminal charge. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S. Ct. 2006, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1972). We hold, therefore, that after the defendant in this case was arrested and placed in the patrol car, the rules of Miranda were applicable to him just as any other person in custody on a criminal charge.
For the reasons stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded to that court with direction to award a new trial to be conducted in accordance with the principles herein set forth.
Reversed and Remanded.