Title: Thomas v. State

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Circuit Court for Charles County
Criminal No. 08-K-98-000906
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
September Term, 2002
______________________________________________
No. 33
GARRISON THOMAS
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
______________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
______________________________________________
Opinion by Raker, J.
Bell, C.J. concurs in the result and in the opinion
except Part IV
______________________________________________
Filed:   December 18, 2002
Garrison Thomas, petitioner, was convicted in the Circuit Court for Charles County
of felony murder, robbery, and second-degree murder.  In this appeal, he raises two questions
for review.  The primary question is whether the trial court erred in admitting as evidence of
consciousness of guilt the fact that petitioner resisted when, pursuant to a search warrant, the
police sought to obtain a sample of his blood.  The second question is whether the trial
court’s rulings restricting the cross-examination of a key State’s witness and limiting access
to that witness’ psychiatric records violated petitioner’s right to confrontation.  We shall hold
that the evidence of petitioner’s refusal to provide a blood sample was inadmissible to show
consciousness of guilt.  Accordingly, we shall reverse. 
I.
Petitioner was convicted of killing Beverly Renee Mitchell.  A passerby discovered
Ms. Mitchell’s body in Charles County on the evening of March 23, 1995.  Police collected
physical evidence surrounding her body, including her ATM card and a bank receipt for a
withdrawal of $60.00 dated March 22, 1995.  The medical examiner ruled her death a
homicide, caused by strangulation and blunt force injuries to the head.  
Marva Mitchell, the victim’s mother, last saw her daughter on the evening of March
22, 1995.  She had asked her daughter to bring some money to her sister’s husband, James
Porter.  Marva Mitchell had stopped at the Porter residence earlier that day to tell Mr. Porter
that Beverly Mitchell would be bringing the money he needed to get to work the next day.
Petitioner, who lived in the basement of the Porters’ home, was present during that
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conversation.  Beverly Mitchell visited her mother that evening around 9:00 p.m.; when she
left, she said that she was going to the Porters’ home.  Porter testified that Ms. Mitchell
dropped off $10.00 at his house that evening.  
On the morning of March 24, 1995, the police located Ms. Mitchell’s car in the 1100
block of 10th Street, Southeast, in Washington, D.C.  On that same day, police located
witness Novella Lee Harris.  Harris directed investigators to the victim’s car keys and told
the police information that linked petitioner to the car.  Harris recounted that at
approximately 2:30 a.m. on March 23, 1995, petitioner knocked on her door.  He was
wearing a dark brown wig and women’s clothing and identified himself as “Cookie.”  He was
seeking narcotics.  Petitioner was driving a car later identified as the car belonging to the
victim.  
Harris, petitioner, and another man smoked crack together for much of the following
day.  Petitioner, appearing nervous about the car, told Harris differing stories about how he
got the car, wiped the car down to remove his fingerprints, and moved the car to the location
where police discovered it.  Harris saw petitioner discard the car keys in two different
locations and saw him attempt to set fire to the car.  Petitioner finally left Harris’ home
around 8:00 a.m. on March 24, 1995.  
On June 25, 1998, approximately three and one quarter years after the murder, with
the investigation at a standstill, the police decided to approach petitioner to collect hair and
blood samples.  Because petitioner was then living in the District of Columbia, police sought
1The validity of that warrant is not at issue in this appeal.  In Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 768, 770-71, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1834, 1835-36, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908
(1966), the United States Supreme Court clarified that the seizure of blood with a warrant
may be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and held that, under the circumstances
presented, a warrantless seizure of blood was reasonable.
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and secured a search warrant, issued by the District of Columbia, for blood and hair samples
from petitioner.1  The police met petitioner at his residence and took him to a police station
in the District of Columbia.  At the station, police showed him the warrant and gave him an
opportunity to read it.  Detectives explained that because of the search warrant, petitioner
was required to give police hair and blood samples.  Petitioner resisted, stating, “You ain’t
getting it.”  He was restrained forcibly on the ground, and a nurse from a local hospital drew
a blood sample.  Petitioner calmed down after the blood was drawn and cooperated with the
officers in providing hair samples.  He also cooperated with police in giving a second blood
sample.  The laboratory examination of the blood sample excluded petitioner as a source of
the blood found at the crime scene. 
Petitioner’s trial commenced in June 1999 in the Circuit Court for Charles County.
Novella Lee Harris was a key witness against petitioner.  Petitioner filed two Motions for
Subpoena for Tangible Evidence and In Camera Review to obtain pre-trial discovery of
Harris’ psychiatric records from Crownsville State Hospital, located in Crownsville,
Maryland, and St. Elizabeth’s Hospital, located in the District of Columbia.  Petitioner
requested an in camera review of the records from Crownsville State Hospital to determine
whether the records contained relevant information regarding any psychiatric disorders that
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could provide background for cross-examination.  He also asked the court to subpoena
records from St. Elizabeth’s Hospital in order to conduct a similar review.  
After the Circuit Court conducted an in camera review of the Crownsville Hospital
records, the court focused on a thirty-day commitment for a mental evaluation of Harris that
occurred in May and June of 1982.  The court ruled that the records were not relevant to any
issue before the court.  The judge denied petitioner’s motion to subpoena privileged records
for pre-trial review from St. Elizabeth’s Hospital on the following two grounds: petitioner
did not show any likelihood that the records contained any relevant information, and St.
Elizabeth’s Hospital is not an agency under Maryland control.
At trial, during the cross-examination of Harris, petitioner asked about her “history
of emotional problems.”  In response to the State’s objection, petitioner argued that he
wanted to explore Harris’ “weird feelings” and whether they resulted from smoking crack
or emotional problems.  The court sustained the objection but permitted some latitude to
defense counsel, ruling as follows:
“You can ask her what was causing her weird feelings.  I have
no problem with that.  And if you want to ask her anything
further about emotional problems then you can approach the
bench because I don’t know where we are going to go and I
don’t believe that you do either.”
Defense counsel never questioned Harris further about her feelings or psychiatric history. 
Petitioner moved in limine to preclude the State from introducing testimony that
petitioner resisted when the police officers sought to draw a sample of his blood.  The State
2At the conclusion of all of the evidence, the trial court, using Maryland Criminal
Pattern Jury Instruction (MPJI-Cr) 3:26, instructed the jury on concealment of evidence as
consciousness of guilt:
“[C]oncealment or destruction of evidence as consciousness
of guilt.  This is another one of those inferences that you’re
permitted but don’t have to draw.  You have heard evidence
from which you could find that the defendant may have
concealed or destroyed or may have attempted to conceal or
destroy evidence in this case.  Concealment or destruction of
evidence is not enough by itself to establish guilt but may be
considered as evidence of guilt.  Concealment or destruction
of evidence may be motivated by a variety of factors, some of
which are fully consistent with innocence.  You must first
decide whether the defendant has concealed or destroyed or
attempted to conceal or destroy evidence in the case.  If you
find that he has, then you must decide whether that conduct
shows a consciousness of guilt.”
-5-
argued that the refusal to give the blood sample was admissible as evidence to show
consciousness of guilt.  Petitioner argued that the evidence was not relevant because the
police attempted to take the blood sample over three years after the murder and because many
innocent reasons other than consciousness of guilt could explain a person resisting police
attempts to procure a blood sample.  Petitioner maintained that the evidence of his refusal
was ambiguous and therefore irrelevant.  He argued that even if the evidence were relevant,
its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.  The trial court denied petitioner’s
motion, and the State offered the evidence at trial.2  Petitioner was convicted, and the judge
sentenced him to life imprisonment for felony murder and merged the other convictions for
sentencing purposes.
Petitioner noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  In an unreported
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opinion, the intermediate appellate court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in admitting the evidence of Thomas’ refusal to provide a blood sample as
evidence of consciousness of guilt.  The court also held that the trial judge did not abuse his
discretion by excluding Harris’ psychiatric records as irrelevant and by limiting cross-
examination regarding her alleged emotional problems.
We granted Thomas’ petition for writ of certiorari to answer the following questions:
“Whether testimony that the accused resisted attempts to draw
his blood is admissible as evidence of ‘consciousness of guilt.’
“Whether the accused’s right to confrontation includes pre-trial
disclosure of the State’s key, non-victim witness’ psychiatric
history, as well as cross-examination of that witness regarding
her psychiatric history.” 
Thomas v. State, 369 Md. 570, 801 A.2d 1031 (2002).  We hold that the trial court erred in
admitting the testimony regarding petitioner’s refusal to submit to blood testing to show
consciousness of guilt.  
II.
Petitioner’s first argument is that the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine
to exclude testimony regarding his refusal to submit to a blood test.  He contends that the
evidence is irrelevant because it is ambiguous in that the demand for the blood occurred more
than three years after the murder and that his conduct was susceptible to many possible
innocent explanations.  Even if probative, any probative value it might have is substantially
-7-
outweighed by the danger of prejudice.
The State argues that petitioner’s resistance, after he was informed of his legal
obligation to comply, was  relevant to show a consciousness of guilt.  The State contends that
any possible innocent explanation for the conduct goes to the weight of the evidence but not
its admissibility.  The State argues that petitioner’s refusal to submit to blood testing,
unaccompanied by any indications of religious or other concerns, shows his fear that the test
results might produce inculpatory evidence linking him to Ms. Mitchell’s murder.  The State
concludes that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in admitting the evidence to
show consciousness of guilt.  
Petitioner’s second issue relates to his ability to cross-examine Ms. Harris.  He argues
that the trial court erred in denying his Motions for Subpoena for Tangible Evidence and In
Camera Review.  He argues that the trial court should have subpoenaed records from St.
Elizabeth’s Hospital even though the hospital is not a Maryland agency.  Petitioner also
contends that although the trial court briefly reviewed the Crownsville Hospital records in
camera, due process required that the court conduct a thorough review for information
relevant to Harris’ mental state.  Denial of pre-trial access to the psychiatric records, he
argues, undermined his ability to prepare a proper cross-examination.  Finally, petitioner
asserts that, in contravention of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, the trial
court deprived him of a fair trial by limiting his cross-examination of Harris about her
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psychiatric history. 
The State argues that the trial court properly denied petitioner’s motions as to Harris’
Crownsville psychiatric records.  In addition, the State argues that because petitioner actually
had the Crownsville records pre-trial, the scope of the court’s in camera review made little
or no difference.  Moreover, petitioner could not identify anything relevant in those records.
As to the St. Elizabeth’s Hospital records, the State contends that because the Hospital is an
out-of-state agency and the defense could not show any likelihood that the records contained
relevant information, the trial court did not err.  Finally, as to the scope of Harris’ cross-
examination, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
III.
The fundamental test in assessing admissibility is relevance.  Maryland Rule 5-402
provides as follows:
“Except as otherwise provided by constitutions, statutes, or these
rules, or by decisional law not inconsistent with these rules, all
relevant evidence is admissible.  Evidence that is not relevant is
not admissible.”
Relevant evidence is evidence “having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that
is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence.”  Md. Rule 5-401; see also Snyder v. State, 361 Md. 580,
591, 592, 762 A.2d 125, 131 (2000)(noting that evidence is relevant when “in conjunction
with all other relevant evidence, the evidence tends to make the proposition asserted more
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or less probable”).  Relevant evidence is generally admissible.  See Md. Rule 5-402.  A trial
court, however, may exclude otherwise relevant evidence “if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”  Md. Rule 5-403. 
A person’s behavior after the commission of a crime may be admissible as
circumstantial evidence from which guilt may be inferred.  This category of circumstantial
evidence is referred to as “consciousness of guilt.”  We observed in Snyder v. State, 361 Md.
580, 591, 762 A.2d 125, 131 (2000) that “[i]f relevant, circumstantial evidence regarding a
defendant’s conduct may be admissible under Md. Rule 5-403, not as conclusive evidence
of guilt, but as a circumstance tending to show a consciousness of guilt.”  361 Md. at 593,
762 A.2d at 132; see also Martin v. State, 364 Md. 692, 706, 775 A.2d 385, 393 (2001);
Whittlesey v. State, 340 Md. 30, 62 -65, 665 A.2d 223, 239-40 (1995); Hunt v. State, 312 Md.
494, 508-09; 540 A.2d 1125, 1132 (1988); Wright v. State, 312 Md. 648, 654-55; 541 A.2d
988, 991 (1988); Davis v. State, 237 Md. 97, 105-06, 205 A.2d 254, 259 (1964), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 945, 86 S. Ct. 402, 15 L. Ed. 2d 354 (1965); Westcoat v. State, 231 Md. 364, 368,
190 A.2d 544, 546 (1963).  Conduct typically argued to show consciousness of guilt includes
flight after a crime, escape from confinement, use of a false name, and destruction or
concealment of evidence.  See, e.g., Whittlesey, 340 Md. at 63-65, 665 A.2d at 239-40
(flight); Sorrell v. State, 315 Md. 224, 230-31, 554 A.2d 352, 355 (1989)(failure to return
during trial); Wright, 312 Md. at 654-57, 541A.2d at 991-92 (use of false name to conceal
identity); Sewell v. State, 34 Md. App. 691, 694-95, 368 A.2d 1111, 1114 (1977)(destruction
-10-
of evidence); 2 McCormick on Evidence § 263, at 172-73 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed.
1999)(flight from scene or from jurisdiction after crime, assuming false name, changing
appearance, resisting arrest, attempting to bribe arresting officers, forfeiture of bond by
failure to appear, escape from confinement); 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 276, at 111 (3d ed.
1940)(flight, escape from custody, resistance to arrest, concealment of evidence, assumption
of false name).  
A person’s post-crime behavior often is considered relevant to the question of guilt
because the particular behavior provides clues to the person’s state of mind.  The reason why
a person’s post-crime state of mind may be relevant is because, as Professor Wigmore
suggested, the commission of a crime can be expected to leave some mental traces on the
criminal.  1 Wigmore, supra, § 173, at 632.
Applying our accepted test of relevancy, “guilty behaviour should be admissible to
prove guilt if we can say that the fact that the accused behaved in a particular way renders
more probable the fact of their guilt.”  Andrew Palmer, Guilt and the Consciousness of Guilt:
The Use of Lies, Flight and Other ‘Guilty Behaviour’ in the Investigation and Prosecution
of Crime, 21 Melb. U. L. Rev. 95, 98 (1997).  As is the nature of circumstantial evidence, the
probative value of “guilty behavior” depends upon the degree of confidence with which
certain inferences may be drawn.  Professor Wigmore has identified two distinct
inferences—first, an inference of a guilty state of mind from the guilty behavior; and second,
an inference of guilt from the guilty state of mind.  See 1 Wigmore, supra, § 173, at 632.
-11-
Some courts have identified four inferences that are necessary to establish admissibility.  In
the context of flight as consciousness of guilt evidence, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the probative value of the evidence 
“depends upon the degree of confidence with which four
inferences can be drawn: (1) from the defendant’s behavior to
flight; (2) from flight to consciousness of guilt; (3) from
consciousness of guilt to consciousness of guilt concerning the
crime charged; and (4) from consciousness of guilt concerning
the crime charged to actual guilt of the crime charged.” 
 
United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1049 (5th Cir. 1977); see also, e.g., United States v.
King, 200 F.3d 1207, 1215 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Hankins, 931 F.2d 1256, 1261-
62 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Dillon, 870 F.2d 1125, 1126-27 (6th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Howze, 668 F.2d 322, 324 (7th Cir. 1982); Ex parte Weaver, 678 So.2d 284, 290
(Ala. 1996); State v. Reyes, 705 A.2d 1375, 1377 (R.I. 1998).  While refusal to give a blood
sample is not the same as flight, it is analogous conduct and a similar analysis is required.
1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence § 401[10], at 72-75 (1993); cf. Wright,
312 Md. at 655, 541.2d at 991-91 (noting that in the context of consciousness of guilt, while
assumption of an alias is not the same as flight, it is analogous conduct).  
In Snyder v. State, this Court identified four inferences that must be satisfied before
the evidence that Snyder failed to inquire about the progress of the police investigation into
his wife’s murder was admissible to show consciousness of guilt.  361 Md. at 596, 762 A.2d
at 134.  We discussed the reasoning process undergirding the relevancy of consciousness of
guilt evidence:
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“The relevance of the petitioner's failure to inquire depends
upon whether that evidence supports four inferences: [1] from
the failure to inquire, satisfaction of the case not being solved or
actively pursued; [2] from the satisfaction of the case not being
solved or actively pursued, a consciousness of guilt; [3] from a
consciousness of guilt, a consciousness of guilt of murder; and
[4] from a consciousness of guilt of murder, actual guilt of
murder.”
Id. at 596, 762 A.2d at 134. 
Although evidence of consciousness of guilt has long been allowed as evidence in the
courts of this State and universally is admitted in courts around the country, courts have
nonetheless recognized the danger with respect to this category of evidence and increasingly
have become cautious in evaluating it.  See, e.g., Myers, 550 F.2d at 1049-50; Miller v.
United States, 320 F.2d 767, 770-73 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Ex parte Weaver, 678 So.2d at 287-91;
State v. Lee, 381 So.2d 792, 794-95 (La. 1980); 2 McCormick, supra, § 263, at 173-74.
Several cases seem to recognize such evidence as potentially unreliable and unfairly
prejudicial.  See, e.g., Howze, 668 F.2d at 324-25; Myers, 550 F.2d at 1049-50; Miller, 320
F.2d at 770-73; Lee, 381 So.2d at 794-95; State v. Onorato, 762 A. 2d 858, 859-60 (Vt.
2000); 2 McCormick, supra, § 263, at 174.  In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 483
n.10, 83 S. Ct. 407, 415 n.10, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963), the United States Supreme Court
noted: “[W]e have consistently doubted the probative value in criminal trials of evidence that
the accused fled the scene of an actual or supposed crime.” 
It is the Myers third prong, from consciousness of guilt to consciousness of guilt
3We do not suggest that merely because the evidence may show that a defendant
also has committed other crimes there is a basis to exclude the evidence.  The point is that
the evidence must at least be connected to the crime charged.  McCormick suggests that
older cases simply overlooked this problem.  See 2 McCormick on Evidence § 263, at 173
n.19 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999).
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concerning the crime charged, that in the instant case is particularly important. 3  Knowledge
that the person is suspected of the charged crime is important because the value of the
conduct lies in the culprit’s knowledge that he or she has committed the charged offense and
in his or her fear of apprehension.  In the context of flight, one court noted:
“From this analysis of the reasons for the admissibility of such
evidence, the force of the rule that evidence of flight because of
one crime cannot be considered on the trial of another and
entirely different offense is apparent, as in such case the flight
does not disclose any guilty conscience in regard to the offense
in question.”
Ex parte Jones, 541 So.2d 1052, 1056 (Ala. 1989)(quoting State v. Bonning, 199 P. 274, 275
(Mont. 1921), overruled on other grounds State v. Campbell, 405 P.2d 978 (Mont. 1965)).
Thus, many courts emphasize the importance of connecting a defendant’s consciousness of
guilt to a consciousness of guilt for the specific crime alleged.  See, e.g., Snyder, 361 Md. at
596, 762 A.2d at 134; United States v. Murphy, 996 F.2d 94, 96-97 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 971, 114 S. Ct. 457, 126 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1993); United States v. Beahm, 664 F.2d
414, 419-20 (4th Cir. 1981); Myers, 550 F.2d at 1050; Lee, 381 So.2d at 794; Reyes, 705
A.2d at 1376-77; 2 McCormick, supra, § 263, at 174.  There must be an evidentiary basis,
either direct or circumstantial, to connect a defendant’s consciousness of guilt to the
particular crime charged in order to submit the evidence for jury consideration.  See Snyder,
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361 Md. at 596, 762 A.2d at 134; Myers, 550 F.2d at 1049-51; Commonwealth v. Osborne,
249 A.2d 330, 333 (Pa. 1969).
On several occasions, this Court has held that a defendant’s conduct was too
ambiguous and equivocal to be admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt.  In Snyder,
this Court noted that the evidence of the defendant’s conduct, not inquiring as to the progress
of the police investigation of his wife’s murder, failed to satisfy the four inferences necessary
in order to be relevant.  361 Md. at 596, 762 A.2d at 134.  Concluding that the evidence was
not probative of the defendant’s guilt and hence was inadmissible, we reasoned:
“We believe that, under the circumstances of this case, evidence
that the defendant failed to call the police to inquire about the
status of the investigation, even for seven years, is too
ambiguous and equivocal to support such inferences.  At best,
the admission of the evidence invites the jury to speculate.”
Id. at 596, 762 A.2d at 134.
Similarly, in Bedford v. State, 317 Md. 659, 668, 566 A.2d 111, 115 (1989), we held
that the evidence offered by the State to show consciousness of guilt was so equivocal that
it should have been excluded because it was more prejudicial than probative.  In that case,
we addressed evidence of an escape attempt.  When Bedford was strip-searched in
preparation for a visit off prison grounds, officers discovered inside his undergarments a
four-inch piece of metal sharpened to a point.  The State argued that the wire supported an
inference that Bedford planned to escape.  We noted:
“The authorities are uniform that evidence of a consciousness of
guilt is generally circumstantial and should be more probative
-15-
on the issue of ultimate guilt than prejudicial to the defendant.
If the judge finds that the proposed material is likely to lead a
reasonable jury to infer the defendant’s guilt without causing
him substantial prejudice, then the judge may allow the jury to
consider the evidence in reaching a verdict as to the charged
offense.  If, however, the inference as to ultimate guilt is weak
and the circumstantial evidence merely tends to create in the
minds of jurors the impression that the defendant is of
questionable character and has a propensity for bad acts . . . then
the evidence should be excluded.”  
Id. at 667-68, 566 A.2d at 115 (citations omitted).  We reasoned that “[t]here are too many
other possible reasons why Bedford could have been in possession of that wire” to make the
wire probative of guilt and, instead, the evidence could cause the jury to make other,
impermissible inferences about him.  Id. at 668, 566 A.2d at 115. 
The relevance of the evidence as circumstantial evidence of petitioner’s guilt depends
on whether the following four inferences can be drawn: (1) from his resistance to the blood
test, a desire to conceal evidence; (2) from a desire to conceal evidence, a consciousness of
guilt; (3) from a consciousness of guilt, a consciousness of guilt of the murder of Ms.
Mitchell; and (4) from a consciousness of guilt of the murder of Ms. M itchell, actual guilt
of the murder.  The question in this case is whether the evidence of petitioner’s refusal to
submit to the drawing of his blood was connected sufficiently with the murder charge and
whether its probative value was outweighed by any unfair prejudicial effect.  We conclude
that the trial judge erred in admitting the evidence in this case.
There is no evidence in this record for the jury to have found that any alleged
consciousness of guilt on petitioner’s part was connected to a consciousness of guilt of the
4The length of time between the conduct and the crime is not determinative of the
admissibility of the evidence.  We have noted that the “lapse of time between the crime
and the attempted flight goes only to the weight to be accorded to this circumstance, not
to the admissibility of the attempt as some evidence of consciousness of guilt.”  Davis v.
State, 237 Md. 97, 105, 205 A.2d 254, 259 (1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 945, 86 S. Ct.
402, 15 L. Ed. 2d 354 (1965).  Each case must decided on its own facts and
circumstances.  A circumstance may be so remote, however, as to be of no real value and
thus inadmissible.  The more remote in time the alleged conduct is from the time the
person is aware that he or she is the focus of the investigation for the crime, however, the
greater the likelihood that the conduct in question resulted from something other than
feelings of guilt concerning the offense charged.  
5It is unclear from the officer’s testimony whether the search warrant that
petitioner was given to read included the supporting affidavit, nor is there any evidence as
to whether petitioner read the warrant or whether the police read it to him.  The officer
could have testified that petitioner was advised that the evidence sought was in
connection with the M itchell murder.
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murder of Ms. Mitchell.  The record indicates that Ms. Mitchell was killed on March 22,
1995.  The police did not seek to obtain a blood sample from petitioner until three and one
quarter years later, on June 25, 1998.4  When police decided to seek a search warrant for
blood and hair samples from petitioner, the investigation had stalled, and they were hoping
to “get lucky.”  Officer Knowlan testified at trial that police gave petitioner the search
warrant to read and explained that legally he was obligated to have his blood taken.  There
is no evidence in this record, either direct or circumstantial, that petitioner was aware that the
police wished to test his blood in connection with the murder investigation of Ms. Mitchell.
The officer never testified as to what, if anything, police told petitioner as to the reason why
they wanted his blood.  Moreover, the State never entered the search warrant into evidence.5
Therefore, there was absolutely no evidence from which the jury could conclude that
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petitioner knew that the blood sample was in any way connected to the Mitchell murder.  For
the evidence to have value as evidence of consciousness of guilt, and then as evidence of
guilt of the murder, there must be evidence to support an inference from petitioner’s conduct
to a consciousness of guilt for the particular crime charged.  The jury should not have been
permitted to draw an inference of guilt from petitioner’s conduct unless the conduct was
related to the murder investigation.  Because there is no evidence connecting petitioner’s
refusal to allow the officers to draw his blood and a consciousness of guilt of the murder of
Ms. Mitchell, the evidence of defendant’s conduct lacks probative value and was
inadmissible.
IV.
Although we reverse on the first question, we will address the remaining issue for the
guidance of the trial court on remand.  Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in denying
his motions seeking pre-trial discovery of Harris’ psychiatric records from two area hospitals.
He also contends the trial court deprived him of a fair trial by precluding cross-examination
of Harris about her alleged history of emotional problems.  The State, in response, argues that
the trial court properly denied petitioner’s motions as to Harris’ psychiatric records mainly
because petitioner failed to proffer that there was any likelihood that they held relevant
information.  The State also asserts that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in
controlling the scope of Harris’ cross-examination.  
The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, affirmed the trial court’s
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judgments, finding no abuse of discretion.  In terms of the Crownsville records, the
intermediate appellate court noted: 
“In Goldsmith v. State, 337 Md. 112 (1995), the Court of
Appeals held that the victim’s psychiatric records were
privileged and not discoverable.  Id. at 127-28.  It went on to say
that even if not privileged, the records sought by the defendant
were not discoverable because the defendant failed to show a
likelihood that the records contained relevant information.  Id.
. . . . [Thomas] did not proffer how the Crownsville records were
relevant in any way.  We are satisfied that [the trial judge] did
not abuse his discretion in declaring irrelevant records relating
to an admission that occurred 13 years prior to the incident at
issue.” 
With respect to the St. Elizabeth records, the court also agreed with the trial court, reasoning:
“As was the situation in Goldsmith, the St. Elizabeth records are
privileged and therefore not discoverable in the instant case.
Moreover, [Thomas] failed to show a likelihood that the records
contained any relevant information.  Additionally, St.
Elizabeth’s Hospital is not a state agency and the records do not
fall with the ambits of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963)(holding that exculpatory information in the hands of the
State is subject to disclosure).  Thus, [the trial judge] did not
abuse his discretion when he ruled that the records would not be
subpoenaed.”
Finally, the Court of Special Appeals upheld the trial court’s treatment of Harris’ cross-
examination as follows:
“In the case at bar, [the trial judge] asked [Thomas’] counsel
what evidence he had demonstrating any emotional problems
that would affect Harris’ memory.  [Thomas’] counsel pointed
to the witness’ statement regarding weird feelings.  [The trial
judge] allowed [Thomas] to ask the witness about weird
feelings, but counsel declined to ask.  To be relevant, Harris’
mental history had to be of consequence to her ability to
perceive events on the night in question.  Without some
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additional foundation, the proposed cross-examination would
not have linked the witness’s prior emotional problems with her
ability to remember the events relating to the murder.  Thus, [the
trial judge] did not abuse his discretion when he refused to allow
[Thomas] to cross examine Harris about her mental problems.”
We find the reasoning of the Court of Special Appeals persuasive and agree that the
trial court properly exercised its discretion in its rulings as to Harris’ psychiatric records and
psychiatric history on cross-examination. 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED.  CASE REMANDED
TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO
REVERSE 
THE 
JUDGMEN T 
OF 
THE
CIRCUIT COURT FOR CHARLES COUNTY
AND TO REMAND THE CASE TO THAT
COURT FOR A NEW TRIAL.  COSTS IN THIS
COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS TO BE PAID BY CHARLES
COUNTY.
Bell, C.J. concurs in the result and in the opinion except Part IV.