Title: Bliss v. Johns Manville

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Bliss 
v. Johns Manville, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4366.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-4366 
BLISS, EXR., APPELLANT, v. JOHNS MANVILLE, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Bliss v. Johns Manville, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4366.] 
Employer intentional-tort liability—R.C. 2745.01—Summary judgment—When 
reviewing a trial court’s denial of summary judgment in cases in which a 
jury ultimately reached a verdict in the nonmoving party’s favor, an 
appellate court must construe the evidence before it most strongly in favor 
of the nonmoving party when applying the relevant law—Court of appeals’ 
judgment affirmed. 
(No. 2021-0800—Submitted May 11, 2022—Decided December 8, 2022.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lucas County, No. L-20-1091,  
2021-Ohio-1673. 
__________________ 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2 
FISCHER, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case, we are asked to address how an appellate court should 
review a trial court’s decision to deny summary judgment in a case in which a jury 
ultimately reached a verdict in the nonmoving party’s favor.  We reaffirm that in 
conducting its de novo review of a trial court’s decision to deny summary judgment, 
an appellate court must construe the evidence before it most strongly in favor of the 
nonmoving party when applying the relevant law.  Because the Sixth District Court 
of Appeals did not err in its review below, we affirm the decision of that court. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} The appellant in this case is Darlene L. Bliss as executor of the estate 
of her deceased husband, Robert A. Bliss.1  Robert Bliss, a former employee of 
appellee, the manufacturing company Johns Manville, was allegedly injured while 
operating a machine on the job.  Bliss filed a lawsuit alleging that Johns Manville 
intentionally caused the injury in violation of R.C. 2745.01.  Specifically, Bliss 
alleged that either, sometime prior to his injury, Johns Manville removed bolts to 
an access window on the machine or that Johns Manville had never bolted the 
access window—which ultimately led to Bliss’s injury. 
{¶ 3} Johns Manville filed a motion for summary judgment in which it 
alleged that Bliss’s evidence did not establish that Johns Manville had acted with 
the requisite deliberate intent to injure another under R.C. 2745.01.  Bliss filed a 
response supported by an affidavit of his expert, Gerald Rennell.  In its response, 
Johns Manville moved to strike the affidavit of Rennell.  The trial court denied the 
motion to strike the affidavit.  Noting that Bliss had filed an expert affidavit, the 
 
1. After the oral argument in this case, counsel for Bliss filed a suggestion of death notifying this 
court that Robert Bliss had passed away.  Counsel stated that Bliss’s wife, who was also a plaintiff 
in the original complaint, intends to prosecute the case on behalf of Bliss’s estate in an effort to 
reinstate the jury verdict.  We subsequently granted a motion for substitution of party, substituting 
Darlene Bliss as executor of the estate of Robert Bliss for Robert Bliss as appellant.  ___ Ohio St.3d 
___, 2022-Ohio-3637, __ N.E.3d ___.  For ease of discussion, we will refer to the appellant as 
“Bliss” in this opinion. 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
3 
trial court concluded that Johns Manville had failed to show that there were no 
genuine issues of material fact and denied the motion for summary judgment. 
{¶ 4} At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found in favor of Bliss. 
{¶ 5} On appeal, Johns Manville raised eight assignments of error, 
including challenges to the trial court’s decision to deny the motion to strike 
Rennell’s affidavit and the trial court’s decision denying Johns Manville’s motion 
for summary judgment.  2021-Ohio-1673, 172 N.E.3d 1146, ¶ 14.  In a unanimous 
decision, the Sixth District reversed and entered judgment in Johns Manville’s 
favor.  Id. at ¶ 47. 
{¶ 6} In its analysis, the Sixth District first concluded that the trial court 
abused its discretion in failing to strike Rennell’s affidavit.  Id. at ¶ 22.  It reasoned 
that the affidavit comprised legal conclusions regarding statutory terms and was 
accordingly impermissible.  Id. 
{¶ 7} The Sixth District then proceeded to address whether the trial court 
erred in denying Johns Manville’s motion for summary judgment.  Id. at ¶ 24.  The 
court noted that in denying the motion for summary judgment, the trial court did 
not conclude as a matter of law that the access window was an equipment safety 
guard.  Id. at ¶ 7.  The Sixth District held, as a matter of law, that the equipment at 
issue in this case did not constitute an “equipment safety guard” under R.C. 
2745.01.  2021-Ohio-1673 at ¶ 37.  Without the affidavit, the court concluded, Bliss 
presented no evidence of an “equipment safety guard” and, accordingly, Bliss was 
not entitled to the presumption that removal of an equipment safety guard was 
committed with an intent to injure.  Id. at ¶ 39-40.  The court then concluded that 
while Johns Manville’s actions may constitute negligence, there was no evidence 
presented in this case that Johns Manville intended to injure Bliss.  Id. at ¶ 44. 
{¶ 8} The Sixth District accordingly concluded that summary judgment 
should have been granted in Johns Manville’s favor and that the case should not 
have been given to the jury.  2021-Ohio-1673, 172 N.E.3d 1146, at ¶ 45.  It reversed 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
4 
the trial court’s decision and concluded that Johns Manville’s remaining 
assignments of error (which challenged various aspects of the trial proceedings) 
were moot.  Id. at ¶ 46. 
{¶ 9} This court accepted jurisdiction over the first proposition of law in 
Bliss’s appeal: “Following a favorable verdict based on a full record, de novo 
review of a trial court’s decision to deny summary judgment cannot include 
weighing the evidence against the non-moving party, overlooking evidence, and 
misapplying legal definitions created by the Supreme Court.”  See 164 Ohio St.3d 
1440, 2021-Ohio-3233, 173 N.E.3d 1228. 
ANALYSIS 
{¶ 10} Bliss argues that the Sixth District “misapplied controlling 
authority” and erred in vacating the jury’s verdict and concluding that Johns 
Manville should be granted summary judgment.  He asserts that the Sixth District’s 
decision should not be allowed to stand and that this court’s intervention is 
necessary to prevent courts from following the court of appeals’ analysis in the 
future.  Bliss further asks this court to “clarify” when expert testimony on factual 
issues is appropriate in employer-intentional-tort cases. 
{¶ 11} Johns Manville responds that the Sixth District correctly analyzed 
the facts of this case under the settled law and that this court should accordingly 
affirm the Sixth District’s decision. 
{¶ 12} Appellate courts review the denial of a motion for summary 
judgment de novo, governed by the standards of Civ.R. 56.  Piazza v. Cuyahoga 
Cty., 157 Ohio St.3d 497, 2019-Ohio-2499, 138 N.E.3d 1108, ¶ 14, citing Vacha v. 
N. Ridgeville, 136 Ohio St.3d 199, 2013-Ohio-3020, 992 N.E.2d 1126, ¶ 19, citing 
Comer v. Risko, 106 Ohio St.3d 185, 2005-Ohio-4559, 833 N.E.2d 712, ¶ 8.  
“Civ.R. 56(C) provides that summary judgment shall be granted when the filings 
in the action, including depositions and affidavits, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
5 
matter of law.”  Bonacorsi v. Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co., 95 Ohio St.3d 314, 
2002-Ohio-2220, 767 N.E.2d 707, ¶ 24. 
{¶ 13} In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the evidence must be 
construed most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party.  See Harless v. Willis Day 
Warehousing Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 66-67, 375 N.E.2d 46 (1978).  It is axiomatic 
that in construing evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, a court 
may not ignore evidence in that party’s favor.  And a court may not misapply legal 
definitions set forth by this court, as courts have no discretion to make errors of 
law, see Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d 
463, ¶ 39. 
{¶ 14} It is also clear that appellate courts may review a trial court’s denial 
of a motion for summary judgment after an adverse final judgment has been 
rendered in a case:  “A trial court’s denial of a motion for summary judgment is 
reviewable on appeal by the movant from a subsequent adverse final judgment.”  
Balson v. Dodds, 62 Ohio St.2d 287, 405 N.E.2d 293 (1980), paragraph one of the 
syllabus.  While any error in the denial of a motion for summary judgment will 
often be rendered moot or harmless when the trial proceedings show that there were 
genuine issues of material fact supporting a judgment in favor of the party against 
whom the motion for summary judgment was made, this court has noted that the 
denial of a motion for summary judgment is not harmless when the denial was 
predicated on a pure question of law, see Continental Ins. Co. v. Whittington, 71 
Ohio St.3d 150, 158, 642 N.E.2d 615 (1994). 
{¶ 15} Having reaffirmed these basic legal principles, we proceed to 
analyze whether the Sixth District correctly applied them in this case.  We conclude 
that it did. 
{¶ 16} The critical issues in this case are whether the machine’s access 
window constituted an “equipment safety guard” under R.C. 2745.01(C) and 
whether Johns Manville intended to injure Bliss under R.C. 2745.01(A).  The Sixth 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6 
District did not err in concluding that the access window did not constitute an 
“equipment safety guard” and that there was no evidence of an intent to injure Bliss.  
See 2021-Ohio-1673, 172 N.E.3d 1146, at ¶ 45. 
{¶ 17} Under R.C. 2745.01(A), an employer shall not be liable for an 
intentional tort “unless the plaintiff proves that the employer committed the tortious 
act with the intent to injure another or with the belief that the injury was 
substantially certain to occur.”  The General Assembly specified that the phrase 
“substantially certain,” as used in R.C. 2745.01, “means that an employer acts with 
deliberate intent to cause an employee to suffer an injury, a disease, a condition, or 
death.”  R.C. 2745.01(B).  Thus, in order for Bliss to prevail, he had to show that 
Johns Manville committed the allegedly tortious act either with the intent to injure 
another or with a deliberate intent to cause an employee to suffer an injury, a 
disease, a condition, or death.  As this court has previously stated, “absent a 
deliberate intent to injure another, an employer is not liable for a claim alleging an 
employer intentional tort.”  Houdek v. ThyssenKrupp Materials N.A., Inc., 134 Ohio 
St.3d 491, 2012-Ohio-5685, 983 N.E.2d 1253, ¶ 25.  R.C. 2745.01(C) provides that 
the deliberate removal of an “equipment safety guard” creates a rebuttable 
presumption that the employer acted with such intent. 
{¶ 18} Significantly, much of the Sixth District’s analysis was premised on 
its conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Johns Manville’s 
motion to strike the affidavit of Bliss’s expert, in which the expert opined that Johns 
Manville deliberately removed a safety guard.  See 2021-Ohio-1673 at ¶ 22.  Bliss 
argues that we should “clarify” when expert testimony is appropriate in cases like 
this; however, this argument—and any other arguments regarding the admissibility 
of the expert report—are beyond the scope of the proposition of law we accepted 
for review in this appeal.  For purposes of our analysis here, we must accept the 
conclusion of the Sixth District regarding the admissibility of the expert affidavit. 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
7 
{¶ 19} Without the expert affidavit, Bliss failed to offer any evidence that 
the access window was an “equipment safety guard” under R.C. 2745.01(C).  Bliss 
had the burden of production, and he simply failed to produce any evidence to 
support his assertions.  For example, while Bliss cited to a Johns Manville 
PowerPoint presentation terming the access window a “guard,” Johns Manville’s 
use of the generic term “guard,” standing alone, fails to provide any support for a 
conclusion that the access window is an “equipment safety guard” under R.C. 
2745.01(C).  The Sixth District correctly analyzed the issue and concluded that 
Johns Manville was entitled to summary judgment on the issue whether the access 
window constituted an “equipment safety guard,” and that Bliss accordingly was 
not entitled to the rebuttable presumption of intent under R.C. 2745.01(C). 
{¶ 20} The Sixth District also correctly concluded that there was no 
evidence that Johns Manville intended to injure Bliss.  As the Sixth District 
explained, the facts of this case indicate that Johns Manville may have been 
negligent, but such negligent conduct does not support an intentional-tort claim.  
2021-Ohio-1673, 172 N.E.3d 1146, at ¶ 44, citing Stetter v. R.J. Corman 
Derailment Servs., L.L.C., 125 Ohio St.3d 280, 2010-Ohio-1029, 927 N.E.2d 1092, 
¶ 66.  Without any evidence of an intent to injure, Bliss’s claim fails and Johns 
Manville is not liable under R.C. 2745.01. 
{¶ 21} For these reasons, the Sixth District’s decision to reverse the trial 
court’s judgment was correct, given that the trial court’s denial of summary 
judgment was predicated on an erroneous legal determination.  See Whittington, 71 
Ohio St.3d at 158, 642 N.E.2d 615. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 22} When reviewing a trial court’s decision to deny summary judgment 
in cases in which a jury ultimately reached a verdict in the nonmoving party’s favor, 
an appellate court must construe the evidence before it most strongly in favor of the 
nonmoving party when applying the relevant law.  In this case, the Sixth District 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8 
did not err in applying the relevant law when reviewing Johns Manville’s motion 
for summary judgment.  We accordingly affirm the decision of the Sixth District 
Court of Appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY and DEWINE, JJ., concur. 
DONNELLY, J., would dismiss the appeal as having been improvidently 
accepted because the majority opinion merely reaffirms well-settled law. 
STEWART, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by BRUNNER, J. 
_________________ 
STEWART, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 23} While I agree with the law set forth in the majority opinion, I 
disagree with its conclusion that the Sixth District Court of Appeals correctly 
applied that law in this case.  I therefore respectfully dissent. 
{¶ 24} The majority states: 
 
Significantly, much of the Sixth District’s analysis was 
premised on its conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion 
in denying [appellee] Johns Manville’s motion to strike the affidavit 
of [appellant John] Bliss’s expert, in which the expert opined that 
Johns Manville deliberately removed a safety guard.  See 2021-
Ohio-1673[, 172 N.E.3d 1146,] ¶ 22.  Bliss argues that we should 
“clarify” when expert testimony is appropriate in cases like this; 
however, this argument—and any other arguments regarding the 
admissibility of the expert report—are beyond the scope of the 
proposition of law we accepted for review in this appeal.  For 
purposes of our analysis here, we must accept the conclusion of the 
Sixth District regarding the admissibility of the expert affidavit. 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
9 
Majority opinion, ¶ 18. 
{¶ 25} The majority then concludes, “Without the expert affidavit, Bliss 
failed to offer any evidence that the access window was an ‘equipment safety guard’ 
under R.C. 2745.01(C).  Bliss had the burden of production, and he simply failed 
to produce any evidence to support his assertions.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 19. 
{¶ 26} When reviewing whether a trial court properly granted a summary-
judgment motion, however, we review the record de novo.  Piazza v. Cuyahoga 
Cty., 157 Ohio St.3d 497, 2019-Ohio-2499, 138 N.E.3d 1108, ¶ 14, citing Vacha v. 
N. Ridgeville, 136 Ohio St.3d 199, 2013-Ohio-3020, 992 N.E.2d 1126, ¶ 19, citing 
Comer v. Risko, 106 Ohio St.3d 185, 2005-Ohio-4559, 833 N.E.2d 712, ¶ 8.  
Moreover, Bliss raised this exact issue in his second proposition of law in his 
jurisdictional appeal to this court (“It is not an abuse of discretion for a trial court 
to admit an expert affidavit on summary judgment when the affidavit is based on 
evidence, set forth facts, and is instructive to the court”), but a majority of this court 
declined to accept Bliss’s second proposition of law.  See 164 Ohio St.3d 1440, 
2021-Ohio-3233, 173 N.E.3d 1228.  It is one thing for this court to summarily 
dismiss an appellant’s argument for failure to raise a significant issue on appeal, 
but here, Bliss raised the issue in his second proposition of law.  A majority of this 
court declined to accept that proposition, and now a majority of this court uses the 
absence of argument on that issue to rule against Bliss.  In other words, Bliss was 
prevented from having this court decide key issues regarding his expert’s affidavit, 
and now this court uses the absence of expert evidence against him. 
Trial-court proceedings 
{¶ 27} Johns Manville moved for summary judgment on the ground that 
there was insufficient evidence to establish it acted with intent to injure another 
under R.C. 2745.01, which states: 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10 
(A) In an action brought against an employer by an 
employee, or by the dependent survivors of a deceased employee, 
for damages resulting from an intentional tort committed by the 
employer during the course of employment, the employer shall not 
be liable unless the plaintiff proves that the employer committed the 
tortious act with the intent to injure another or with the belief that 
the injury was substantially certain to occur. 
(B) As used in this section, “substantially certain” means that 
an employer acts with deliberate intent to cause an employee to 
suffer an injury, a disease, a condition, or death. 
(C) Deliberate removal by an employee of an equipment 
safety guard or deliberate misrepresentation of a toxic or hazardous 
substance creates a rebuttable presumption that the removal or 
misrepresentation was committed with intent to injure another if an 
injury or an occupational disease or condition occurs as a direct 
result. 
 
{¶ 28} In response, Bliss opposed Johns Manville’s motion, arguing that 
Johns Manville violated R.C. 2745.01(A) and (C).  Bliss supported his opposition 
with the affidavit of his expert, Gerald Rennell, a “machine safety guarding expert.”  
Johns Manville replied that there were “no facts before the court supporting 
[Bliss’s] arguments” and that it was “entitled to summary judgment as a matter of 
law.” 
{¶ 29} Johns Manville also moved to strike Rennell’s affidavit.  Rennell 
stated in his affidavit: 
 
6. Johns Manville knew the guard on the base fiber feeder 
was defective because it was not secured in position with bolts 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
11 
requiring hand tools to open the guard.  Having an unsecured and 
defective guard is the same as removing a guard. 
* * * 
8. Johns Manville knew because of a previous incident that 
the guard on the base fiber feeder should be secured with bolts 
requiring hand tools to open the guard. 
9. Johns Manville knew because of a previous injury that 
cleaning the moving base fiber feeder would result in injury. 
10. Johns Manville knew according to Mr. Bliss’s testimony 
that employees were cleaning the base fiber feeder while it was 
under power. 
11. Johns Manville showed a total and complete disregard 
for the safety of its employees by failing to secure guards in place 
with bolts. 
* * * 
13. It is my opinion that Johns Manville deliberately 
removed a safety guard when its personnel failed to bolt the guard 
in position (even though the guard had previously been bolted 
following an identical incident) and allowed the unguarded machine 
to be operated in violation of OSHA 1910.212(a)(2).  In other words, 
another incident was inevitable.  While it is impossible, at this 
juncture, to determine the state of mind of any Johns Manville 
supervisor or safety personnel, what is clear is that the decision to 
remove this equipment guard in this instance came as a result of 
deliberate, intentional, and volitional actions.  These same people, 
with specific knowledge of an identical incident to one of its 
employees, took these actions and left Mr. Bliss to suffer the 
inevitable consequences. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
12 
 
{¶ 30} The trial court denied Johns Manville’s motion to strike Rennell’s 
affidavit and Johns Manville’s summary-judgment motion.  The trial court found 
that based on Rennell’s affidavit, Johns Manville failed to show that there were no 
genuine issues of material fact.  The trial court did not, however, conclude as a 
matter of law that the access window and/or modified lift apron was an “equipment 
safety guard.” 
{¶ 31} As the majority sets forth, the case proceeded to a jury trial; the jury 
found in favor of Bliss and awarded him $451,000 in damages. 
Sixth District’s opinion 
{¶ 32} Johns Mansville appealed to the Sixth District, which reversed the 
trial court’s judgment.  2021-Ohio-1673, 172 N.E.3d 1146, at ¶ 1.  First, it found 
that the trial court erred when it denied Johns Manville’s motion to strike Rennell’s 
affidavit.  Id. at ¶ 22.  The Sixth District concluded that Rennell’s affidavit 
“specifically opined that the employer deliberately removed a safety guard.”  Id.  
The Sixth District further explained: 
 
Rennell stated “what is clear is that the decision to remove this 
equipment guard in this instance came as a result of deliberate, 
intentional, and volitional actions.”  With this affidavit, [Bliss] 
attempted to establish that [Johns Manville] deliberately removed 
an equipment safety guard.  However, the interpretation and 
meaning of these phrases from R.C. 2745.01 is a question of law for 
the court to determine, not a question of fact for which expert 
testimony would be permissible.  Fickle [v. Conversion 
Technologies Internatl., Inc., 6th Dist. Williams No. WM-10-016, 
2011-Ohio-2960,] ¶ 25.  Further, Civ.R. 56 and the Rules of 
Evidence regarding expert opinion testimony require affidavits to 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
13 
set forth facts and not legal conclusions.  Warren [v. Libbey Glass, 
Inc.,] 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-09-1040, 2009-Ohio-6686, at ¶ 15, 
citing Youssef v. Parr, Inc., 69 Ohio App.3d 679, 689, 591 N.E.2d 
762 (8th Dist.1990).  Thus, the expert affidavit, comprised of legal 
conclusions regarding statutory terms, is impermissible, and the trial 
court abused its discretion in denying appellant's motion to strike the 
expert affidavit. 
 
2021-Ohio-1673 at ¶ 22. 
{¶ 33} Next, the Sixth District concluded that without Rennell’s affidavit, 
Bliss “presented no evidence that the modified lift apron is an equipment safety 
guard.”  Id. at ¶ 39.  The appellate court then found that “the modified lift apron 
does not constitute an equipment safety guard based upon our own interpretation of 
the applicable statute.”  Id.  The court further concluded that Bliss presented no 
evidence that Johns Manville intended to injure him, explaining, “The fact that 
[Johns Manville] failed to bolt down the spare lift apron may constitute some level 
of negligence, but it is equally clear that negligent conduct does not support a claim 
based on an intentional tort.”  Id. at ¶ 44.  The Sixth District vacated the trial court’s 
judgment and entered judgment in favor of Johns Manville.  Id. at ¶ 45. 
Law and analysis 
{¶ 34} In Hewitt v. L.E. Myers Co., 134 Ohio St.3d 199, 2012-Ohio-5317, 
981 N.E.2d 795, ¶ 17, this court explained that R.C. 2745.01(C) does not define 
“equipment safety guard.”  We explained that “the interpretation of undefined terms 
within a statute is a question of law for the court.”  Id. at ¶ 31, citing Akron Centre 
Plaza, L.L.C. v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Revision, 128 Ohio St.3d 145, 2010-Ohio-5035, 
942 N.E.2d 1054.  In defining “equipment safety guard” in that case, we looked to 
the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms.  Id. at ¶ 17.  We stated: 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
14 
The word “guard,” a noun, is modified by the adjectives 
“equipment” and “safety.”  Reading the words in context and 
according to the rules of grammar as we must, R.C. 1.42, we 
determine that the phrase “an equipment safety guard” means a 
protective device on an implement or apparatus to make it safe and 
to prevent injury or loss. 
 
Id. at ¶ 18. 
{¶ 35} In Hewitt, we discussed another Sixth District case and other 
appellate-court decisions that have defined equipment safety guard: 
 
The Sixth District Court of Appeals so interpreted the phrase 
[equipment safety guard] in Fickle, 2011-Ohio-2960, modified by 
Beyer v. Rieter Automotive N. Am., Inc., 6th Dist. No. L-11-1110, 
2012-Ohio-2807, 973 N.E.2d 318.  In [Fickle], the plaintiff’s hand 
and arm were caught in a roller on an adhesive-coating machine.  
She alleged that her employer had failed to train her to use a jog 
switch that would stop the roller when not depressed and also had 
disconnected an emergency stop cable.  The Fickle court concluded 
that these devices were not “equipment safety guards,” because they 
did not prevent the plaintiff’s hands from being exposed to the 
dangerous point of operation of the machinery she had been 
operating.  Id. at ¶ 42.  Thus, the court concluded that these facts did 
not demonstrate a “[d]eliberate removal by an employer of an 
equipment safety guard” to establish a presumption of intent under 
R.C. 2745.01(C). 
Fickle rejected the argument that “equipment safety guard” 
included “ ‘any device designed to prevent injury or to reduce the 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
15 
seriousness of injury.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 39.  “The General Assembly did not 
make the presumption applicable upon the deliberate removal of any 
safety-related device, but only of an equipment safety guard, and we 
may not add words to an unambiguous statute under the guise of 
interpretation.”  Id. at ¶ 42.  Thus, Fickle defined “equipment safety 
guard” as a “device that is designed to shield the operator from 
exposure to or injury by a dangerous aspect of the equipment.”  Id. 
at ¶ 43. 
Other appellate districts in this state have similarly construed 
this phrase.  See Beary v. Larry Murphy Dump Truck Serv., Inc., 5th 
Dist. No. 2011-CA-00048, 2011-Ohio-4977, ¶ 21 (“equipment 
safety guard” commonly means a device designed to shield the 
operator of equipment from exposure to injury by a dangerous 
aspect of the equipment; a vehicle’s backup alarm does not guard 
anything); Barton v. G.E. Baker Constr., 9th Dist. No. 
10CA009929, 2011-Ohio-5704 (a trench box to secure the sides of 
a trench from collapse is not “an equipment safety guard” because 
it is not a piece of equipment designed to protect an operator of 
equipment); Roberts v. RMB Ents., Inc., 197 Ohio App.3d 435, 
2011-Ohio-6223, 967 N.E.2d 1263, ¶ 24 (12th Dist.) (a tire bead and 
bead taper, alleged safety features of a wheel-assembly unit, do not 
constitute “equipment safety guards,” because they are not devices 
designed to shield the operator from exposure to or injury by a 
dangerous aspect of the equipment). 
 
Hewitt, 134 Ohio St.3d 199, 2012-Ohio-5317, 981 N.E.2d 795, at ¶ 19-21. 
{¶ 36} We disagreed with the Sixth District’s conclusion in Beyer, 6th Dist. 
No. L-11-1110, 2012-Ohio-2807, 973 N.E.2d 318, that “even ‘personal protection 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
equipment’ such as a face mask at a manufacturing plant was ‘an equipment safety 
guard’ because the masks were used to prevent the employee’s exposure to toxic 
dust.”  Hewitt at ¶ 23, quoting Beyer at ¶ 12-13.  We specifically rejected the 
contention that the phrase should apply broadly “to any safety-related item that may 
serve as a barrier between the employee and danger.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at ¶ 22, 
24.  We stated, “To construe ‘equipment safety guard’ to include any generic safety-
related item ignores not only the meaning of the words used but also the General 
Assembly’s intent to restrict liability for intentional torts.  As the Ninth District 
observed in Barton v. G.E. Baker Constr., [9th Dist. Lorain No. 10CA009929,] 
2011-Ohio-5704, ¶ 11, ‘[f]rom these common dictionary definitions, it becomes 
apparent that not all workplace safety devices are “equipment safety guards” as that 
term is used in Section 2745.01.’ ”  Hewitt at ¶ 24. 
{¶ 37} We held in Hewitt, “As used in R.C. 2745.01(C), ‘equipment safety 
guard’ means a device designed to shield the operator from exposure to or injury 
by a dangerous aspect of the equipment, and the ‘deliberate removal’ of an 
equipment safety guard occurs when an employer makes a deliberate decision to 
lift, push aside, take off, or otherwise eliminate that guard.”  Id. at syllabus. 
{¶ 38} In this case, the Sixth District concluded that the trial court should 
have struck Rennell’s affidavit because he “specifically opined that the employer 
deliberately removed a safety guard” and “the interpretation and meaning of these 
phrases from R.C. 2745.01 is a question of law for the court to determine, not a 
question of fact for which expert testimony would be permissible.”  2021-Ohio-
1673, 172 N.E.3d 1146, at ¶ 22. 
{¶ 39} “Expert affidavits offered in * * * opposition to summary judgment 
must comply with Civ.R. 56(E) as well as the evidence rules governing expert 
opinion testimony, Evid.R. 702-705.”  Frederick v. Vinton Cty. Bd. of Edn., 4th 
Dist. Vinton No. 03CA579, 2004-Ohio-550, ¶ 23.  Thus, “the affidavit must set 
forth the * * * facts or data [the expert] considered in rendering his opinion.”  Id.  
January Term, 2022 
 
 
17 
“It is improper for an expert’s affidavit to set forth conclusory statements and legal 
conclusions without sufficient supporting facts.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at ¶ 28. 
{¶ 40} Civ.R. 56(E) provides: 
 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant 
is competent to testify to the matters stated in the affidavit. 
 
{¶ 41} Regarding the admissibility of expert testimony, Evid.R. 702 
provides that “[a] witness may testify as an expert if,” among other requirements, 
the expert’s “testimony is based on reliable scientific, technical, or other specialized 
information” and the expert “is qualified as an expert by specialized knowledge, 
skill, experience, training, or education regarding the subject matter of the 
testimony.”  The facts or data upon which the expert bases an opinion must be those 
“perceived by [him] or admitted in evidence at the hearing,” as provided by Evid.R. 
703.  Under Evid.R. 704, an expert’s opinion “is not objectionable solely because 
it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact,” if the expert’s 
opinion is otherwise admissible. 
{¶ 42} I would conclude that the Sixth District erred when it determined 
that the trial court should have struck Rennell’s affidavit.  Bliss submitted Rennell’s 
affidavit in response to Johns Manville’s summary-judgment motion.  In that 
response, it was Bliss’s burden to put forth evidence to establish that Johns 
Manville was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because genuine issues of 
material fact remained.  Bliss met his burden with Rennell’s affidavit.  Rennell 
simply set forth his expert opinion based on facts that he observed from reviewing 
evidence that was in the record. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
{¶ 43} Even without Rennell’s affidavit, Bliss presented evidence that the 
guard was not bolted in place at the time of Bliss’s injury.  Bliss testified in his 
deposition that the bolts had been removed and were sitting on top of the machine 
and that he told this fact to his supervisor, Paul Culbertson.  Culbertson admitted in 
his affidavit that in 2013, there was a prior incident with another employee who 
sustained a hand injury after opening the unbolted access window on the lift apron.  
Culbertson stated that after the 2013 incident, Johns Manville “bolted down the 
access windows” on the lift aprons of the Base Fiber Feeder.  Culbertson further 
stated that his investigation showed that the access window on the machine on 
which Bliss was injured “was not bolted down.” 
{¶ 44} Thus, based on evidence other than Rennell’s affidavit—i.e., Bliss’s 
own deposition testimony and Culbertson’s affidavit—Bliss met his burden of 
establishing that a question of fact remained as to whether Johns Manville 
deliberately removed the equipment safety guard on the lift apron. 
{¶ 45} Accordingly, I would conclude that the Sixth District erred when it 
reversed the trial court’s judgment denying summary judgment to Johns Manville.  
The Sixth District determined, as a matter of law, that the modified lift apron was 
not an “equipment safety guard” and that therefore the case should never have gone 
to the jury.  2021-Ohio-1673, 172 N.E.3d 1146, at ¶ 37-40, 45.  The Sixth District 
stated that “a lift apron designed to see inside of and allow access to a machine does 
not become an object designed to shield the employee simply because bolts were 
added to it.”  Id. at ¶ 37.  But Bliss presented evidence, when construed in his favor, 
establishing that a question of fact remained as to whether Johns Manville 
deliberately removed the bolts on the access window of the lift apron. 
{¶ 46} Lastly, as Bliss points out, in addition to receiving a jury verdict 
under R.C. 2745.01(C), he also obtained a jury verdict under R.C. 2745.01(A), 
which provides for recovery when a tortious act is committed “with the intent to 
injure another or with the belief that the injury was substantially certain to occur.”  
January Term, 2022 
 
 
19 
The Sixth District held that Bliss did not establish that there was a question of fact 
regarding this subsection either and that therefore, this claim should not have gone 
to the jury.  2021-Ohio-1673 at ¶ 45.  I disagree.  Bliss’s evidence established that 
a question of fact remained regarding whether Johns Manville knew that another 
injury was substantially certain to occur. 
{¶ 47} For the foregoing reasons, I dissent and would reverse the judgment 
of the Sixth District Court of Appeals.  Following a favorable verdict based on a 
full record, de novo review of a trial court’s decision to deny summary judgment 
cannot include a reviewing court weighing the evidence against the nonmoving 
party, ignoring pertinent evidence, and misapplying the law. 
BRUNNER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Gallon, Takacs & Boissoneault Co., L.P.A., Kevin J. Boissoneault, and 
Jonathan M. Ashton, for appellant. 
 
Bugbee & Conkle, L.L.P., Mark S. Barnes, and Gregory B. Denny, for 
appellee. 
 
Murray & Murray Co., L.P.A., and Margaret M. Murray, urging reversal 
for amicus curiae Ohio Association for Justice. 
 
Garvin & Hickey, L.L.C., Preston J. Garvin, and Michael J. Hickey, urging 
affirmance for amici curiae Ohio Manufacturers’ Association and National 
Federation of Independent Businesses/Ohio. 
_________________