Title: JANE SHARRAI POWELL V. THE ESTATE OF JOHN EWING FLETCHER, DECEASED

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

JANE SHARRAI POWELL V. THE ESTATE OF JOHN EWING FLETCHER, DECEASED2006 WY 21128 P.3d 670Case Number: 05-84Decided: 02/21/2006
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
JANE 
SHARRAI POWELL,

 
 
Appellant

(Petitioner),)

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
ESTATE OF JOHN EWING FLETCHER,

DECEASED,

 
 
Appellee

(Respondent).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofSweetwaterCounty

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Jody 
L. James of James and Scott, P.C., Rock Springs, Wyoming, and Edward G. 
Collister, Jr. of Collister & Kampschroeder, Lawrence, 
Kansas.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

George 
Lemich and Clark Stith of Greenhalgh, Beckwith, Lemich, Stith & Cannon, 
P.C., Rock Springs, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Jane Powell 
married John Fletcher in 1963.  She 
subsequently married Ralph Takemire in 1995.  In 2003, Fletcher passed away.   Powell was not granted a share of 
Fletcher's estate under his will, so she sought her spousal elective share 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-5-101 (LexisNexis 2005).  The district court, sitting in probate, 
denied Powell's claim.  We 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Did the district 
court err when it placed the burden on Powell to prove her marriage to Fletcher 
had not been dissolved and found that Powell had not sustained that 
burden?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Powell first 
married Fletcher in 1958, but they divorced in 1961.  About a year and a half later, Powell 
and Fletcher remarried in California and cohabitated until 1971 when, 
according to Powell, Fletcher abandoned Powell and the couple's two 
children.  In the years immediately 
following the separation, there was apparently intermittent contact between the 
two, but they no longer lived together.

 
 
[¶4]      Some time after 
Fletcher and Powell separated, Powell moved in with Cleveland Menifee and took 
his last name. The couple had two children together.  Though they were not formally married, 
they held themselves out to some extent as man and wife until Menifee's death in 
1978.

 
 
[¶5]      In 1995, Powell 
married Takemire, to whom she remained married at the time of Fletcher's 
death.  Upon Fletcher's death, 
however, Powell claimed that her marriage to Takemire was invalid and sought a 
spousal elective share of one-half of Fletcher's estate under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
2-5-101.  The executor of Fletcher's 
estate denied her claim, believing that Powell was equitably estopped from 
asserting her rights as Fletcher's spouse by her "marital or common-law 
relationship" with Menifee and later marriage to Takemire.  Powell contested this finding and a 
hearing was held by the probate court.

 
 
[¶6]      The probate court 
agreed with the executor's conclusion, but applied a presumption that Powell's 
marriage to Takemire was valid and, therefore, Powell's previous marriage to 
Fletcher had been previously dissolved.  
The probate court concluded that Powell had failed to prove that her 
marriage to Fletcher had not been dissolved by divorce, and denied Powell's 
claim.  Powell now 
appeals.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]      We review a 
probate court's findings of fact to determine whether they are clearly 
erroneous, inconsistent with the evidence, or contrary to the great weight of 
the evidence, and its conclusions of law to determine whether they are truly in 
accordance with the law.  In re Estate of Jackson, 892 P.2d 786, 788 (Wyo. 1995).  We have said that,

 
 
"[t]he 
factual findings of a judge are not entitled to the limited review afforded a 
jury verdict.  While the findings 
are presumptively correct, the appellate court may examine all of the properly 
admissible evidence in the record.  
Due regard is given to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the 
credibility of the witnesses, and our review does not entail re-weighing 
disputed evidence.  Findings of fact 
will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous.  A finding is clearly erroneous when, 
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire 
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed."

 
 

Harber 
v. Jensen, 
2004 WY 104, ¶ 7, 97 P.3d 57, ¶ 7 (Wyo.2004) quoting, Life Care Centers of America, Inc. v. 
Dexter, 2003 WY 38, ¶ 7, 65 P.3d 385, ¶ 7 (Wyo.2003).  Furthermore, in reviewing a trial 
court's findings of fact, 

 
 
"we 
assume that the evidence of the prevailing party below is true and give that 
party every reasonable inference that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from 
it.  We do not substitute ourselves 
for the trial court as a finder of facts; instead, we defer to those findings 
unless they are unsupported by the record or erroneous as a matter of 
law."

 
 

Id.  Of course, we review the district 
court's conclusions of law de 
novo.  Double Eagle Petroleum & Mining Corp. v. 
Questar Exploration & Production Co., 2003 WY 139, ¶ 6, 78 P.3d 679, ¶ 6 
(Wyo.2003).

 
 

Powder 
River Ranch, Inc. v. Michelena, 
2005 WY 1, ¶ 8, 103 P.3d 876, 879-80 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶8]      Powell makes two 
arguments in support of her contention that the district court erred when it 
declined to award her a spousal elective share of Fletcher's estate.  First, she argues that the burden of 
proof was misplaced when the district court required her to prove that her 
marriage to Fletcher had not been dissolved by divorce.  Second, Powell argues that the evidence 
was insufficient to demonstrate that the marriage had been 
dissolved.

 
 
[¶9]      As a general 
rule, one who is already married cannot subsequently marry another and any such 
later marriage is void.  55 C.J.S. 
Marriage § 18 (1998).  However, there is a countervailing 
preference in the law to uphold the validity of a marriage, even when it appears 
that one of the parties to the marriage has been married before.  Id. § 52; Shreyer v. Shreyer, 155 P.2d 990, 992 
(Colo. 
1945).  In light of these competing 
propositions, a presumption exists that a subsequent marriage is valid and, as a 
consequence, any prior marriage entered into by one of the parties is presumed 
to be dissolved through death or divorce.  
55 C.J.S. Marriage § 53 
(1998).  We have said 
that:

 
 
            
As early as 1934 in the case of In 
re St. Clair's Estate, 46 Wyo. 446, 28 P.2d 894 (1934), this court stated 
that second marriages are presumed to be valid, and such presumption can be 
overcome only by clear and convincing evidence.  The court quoted with approval 18 R.C.L. 
419, 420, §§ 43, 44, as follows:

 
 
"* 
* * The presumption, which increases in strength with the lapse of time, can 
only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and the 
evidence to overcome it must be especially strong after the lapse of a great 
many years.  To overcome the prima facie case established by the 
showing of a subsequent marriage, proof of a former marriage is required, and 
also evidence from which it may be concluded that it has not been dissolved by 
death or divorce.  Mere proof of a 
prior marriage and that one party had not obtained a divorce is not sufficient, 
for the other might have obtained such divorce and left him or her free to 
contract the second marriage.'" Id., at 897.

 
 

In 
re Fray, 
721 P.2d 1054, 1058 (Wyo. 1986).

 
 

[¶10]   Powell claims that this rule does 
not apply in the instant case because it "does not involve two competing wives" 
who are vying for a single spousal inheritance, as in In re St. Clair's Estate and In re Fray.  However, Powell fails to explain why 
such a distinction should alter our established rule.  We think it evident that whether two 
wives marry the same decedent or one wife marries a decedent and later marries a 
third party, the burden remains on the party asserting the validity of the prior 
marriageand 
the invalidity of the subsequent marriageto 
prove the prior marriage was not dissolved.  The authorities in other jurisdictions 
agree.  See J. E. Keefe, Jr., Annotation, Presumption as to Validity of Second 
Marriage, 14 A.L.R.2d 7 (1950 & 1987-2005 Cum. Supp.); and 
55 C.J.S. Marriage § 53.  As we said in In re St. Clair's Estate, 

 
 
Every 
intendment of the law is in favor of matrimony.  When a marriage, therefore, has once 
been shown . . . the law raises a strong presumption in favor of its legality; 
so that the burden is with the party objecting, throughout, and in every 
particular, to prove, against the constant pressure of this presumption of law, 
that it is illegal and void.

 
 
 28 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1934) (internal citations and quotations 
omitted). 

 
 
[¶11]   Powell admitted that she married 
Takemire in 1995 and has never attempted to prove otherwise.  Our clear rule, then, places the burden 
on her to show that her marriage to Takemire is void because she was never 
lawfully divorced from Fletcher.  
Because the burden of proof was properly placed on Powell, her second 
argument that the estate's evidence "was insufficient to demonstrate that there 
had been a divorce" must clearly fail.  
Powell bore the burden of proving not only that she had not obtained a 
divorce from Fletcher, but that Fletcher had not obtained a divorce from her 
before her marriage to Takemire.  
This burden was particularly high in this case because more than thirty 
years had passed since Powell and Fletcher had separated.  See In re Fray, 721 P.2d  at 
1058.

 
 
[¶12]   The evidence presented to the 
probate court on this issue consisted of:  
(1) a statement by Powell that she had not obtained a divorce from 
Fletcher, (2) Fletcher's will, which stated that Fletcher was "not . . . 
married," and (3) an investigation conducted on the executor's behalf "to locate 
records pertaining to [Powell]."  
Powell's statement and the investigation report are relevant only to show 
that Powell had never obtained a divorce from Fletcher.  Powell did not testify that Fletcher had 
never obtained a divorce from her; rather, she testified only that she had not 
divorced him.  Similarly, the 
executor's report only sought records of Powell's marriages or divorces; it did 
not attempt or purport to seek Fletcher's records.  Therefore, at most, the record 
establishes that Powell had never sought to divorce Fletcher and, except for the 
statement in Fletcher's will, it is silent as to whether he had divorced 
Powell.

 
 
[¶13]   Our law is clear that "[m]ere 
proof of a prior marriage and that one party had not obtained a divorce is not 
sufficient, for the other might have obtained such divorce and left him or her 
free to contract the second marriage.'"  
In re St. Clair's Estate, 28 P.2d  at 897 (quoting 18 R.C.L. Marriage § 44 (1917)).  This rule persists "even when such proof 
involves the establishment of the negative proposition that there has been no 
divorce."  Shreyer, 155 P.2d  at 992.  Powell's contention that "[n]othing in 
the cases cited require[s] such a rule" is clearly inaccurate.  The presumption of the validity of a 
second marriage and invalidity of the first is one of the strongest presumptions 
known to the law.  55 C.J.S. Marriage § 53.  In order to overcome it, the party 
asserting the validity of the first marriage must prove to the trier of fact, 
through clear and convincing evidence, that the previous marriage had not been 
dissolved by death or divorce when the second marriage was contracted.  In re St. Clair's Estate, 28 P.2d  at 
896-97.  

 
 
[¶14]   Where the previous marriage was 
clearly not dissolved by death when the second marriage was formed, but both 
spouses are not available to testify when a dispute arises, proof of the 
negative proposition that no divorce was obtained may be difficult.  Evidence that the spouse asserting the 
validity of the prior marriage thoroughly searched records in any jurisdiction 
where the unavailable spouse lived and may have legally sought a divorce will 
normally be sufficient.  See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 896 F. Supp. 318, 321-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).  In the 
instant case, Powell made no attempt to rebut the presumption of validity of her 
marriage to Takemire by showing that her previous marriage to Fletcher was not 
dissolved.  Powell did not search 
for records of any divorce that may have been obtained by Fletcher.  In her brief, Powell claims that any 
such search would have been too burdensome because it may have required "proof 
of lack of marital dissolutions inside and outside the continental 
United 
States."  
Be that as it may in any particular case, such a search need only be 
thorough enough to persuade a trier of fact, by clear and convincing evidence, 
that no divorce had been obtained by the other spouse.  Clearly, because no search was conducted 
in the instant case, the probate court did not err in concluding that Powell had 
not satisfied her burden.

 
 
[¶15]   Affirmed.