Title: State v. Cherise A. Raflik

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2001 WI 129 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-1086-CR 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Cherise A. Raflik,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 4, 2001   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 12, 2001   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Washington   
 
JUDGE: 
Leo F. Schlaefer   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs by Michael J. 
Fitzgerald, Dean A. Strang, and Fitzgerald & Strang, S.C., 
Milwaukee, and Michael J. Fitzgerald, Craig W. Albee, and Glynn, 
Fitzgerald & Albee, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by 
Michael J. Fitzgerald. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by 
Stephen W. Kleinmaier, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2001 WI 129 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The 
final version will appear in the 
bound volume of the official 
reports.   
No.  00-1086-CR   
(L.C. No. 98 CF 259) 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Cherise A. Raflik,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 4, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Washington 
County, Leo F. Schlaefer, Judge.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.  This case requires us to decide 
whether suppression is the proper remedy when a telephonic 
application for a search warrant is not recorded in accordance 
with Wis. Stat. § 968.12(3)(d)1, and when the factual basis for 
the warrant is reconstructed in an ex parte hearing after the 
warrant has been executed.  We conclude that suppression is 
improper, and that the warrant application in this case was 
appropriately and adequately reconstructed. 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
00-1086-CR 
 
2 
 
¶2 
The State charged Cherise Raflik with seven felony 
drug counts, including possession of tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) 
with intent to deliver, drug tax stamp violations,2 possession of 
psilocybin with intent to deliver, and keeping a drug house.  
Raflik moved to suppress all of the evidence seized from her 
home because the State had not made a contemporaneous record of 
the telephonic search warrant application in accordance with 
§ 968.12(3)(d).  After conducting a hearing, the Washington 
County Circuit Court, Leo F. Schlaefer, Circuit Court Judge, 
denied Raflik's motion.  Raflik pleaded guilty to misdemeanor 
possession of THC, misdemeanor possession of psilocybin, and 
felony keeping a drug house.  On appeal, Raflik challenged the 
denial of her motion to suppress, and the court of appeals 
certified the case to this court. 
I 
¶3 
The relevant facts in this case are undisputed.  On 
August 4, 1998, shortly after 6:00 p.m., Detective Douglas 
Kocher, of the Washington County Sheriff's Department, met 
Assistant District Attorney Todd Martens at the Germantown 
Police Station, where they were going to apply for a telephonic 
search warrant.  Kocher sought to seize drugs and drug 
                                                 
2 We note that the drug tax stamp laws, Wis. Stat. 
§§ 139.87-.96, were found unconstitutional by this court in 
State v. Hall, 207 Wis. 2d 54, 557 N.W.2d 778 (1997), an opinion 
issued over 18 months before the charges in this case were 
filed.  However, because these charges were dismissed they are 
not at issue here. 
No. 
00-1086-CR 
 
3 
 
paraphernalia from the residence and garage of Cherise Raflik in 
the town of Jackson. 
¶4 
Kocher and Martens placed a call from the Germantown 
Police Department to Washington County Circuit Court Judge 
Annette Ziegler.  Both Martens and Kocher thought the phone line 
they were using was a recorded line.  Martens had brought along 
his own recording equipment, but was assured by local police 
that he did not need to use his equipment because the phone line 
was already being recorded.  Thus, Martens did not hook up his 
independent recording device. 
¶5 
Judge Ziegler took testimony over the phone from 
Detective Kocher and found that there was probable cause to 
issue the search warrant.  During the telephone conversation, 
Detective Kocher and Judge Ziegler each filled out a search 
warrant document with identical language that specified the 
location of the property and the items to be seized.  The search 
warrant was executed that evening, and law enforcement officials 
seized drugs, drug paraphernalia, and cash from Raflik's house 
and garage. 
¶6 
The next morning, Martens contacted the Germantown 
Police Department to obtain the recording of the search warrant 
application.  The department informed Martens that there had 
been a mistake and that the call had been made on a non-recorded 
phone line.  There was no evidence of improper behavior on the 
part of Martens, Kocher, or the Germantown Police. 
¶7 
At about 11:15 a.m. that same day, Martens notified 
Judge Ziegler of the mistake.  Judge Ziegler directed Martens to 
No. 
00-1086-CR 
 
4 
 
locate Detective Kocher and to have Kocher review his notes so 
he would be prepared to give testimony about the previous 
evening's warrant application.  Martens contacted Kocher, and 
Kocher prepared an affidavit, which recounted the warrant 
application of the night before.  Kocher's affidavit was 
prepared at approximately 12:15 p.m. on August 5th. 
¶8 
At 1:23 p.m. that day, Judge Ziegler convened an ex 
parte hearing with Kocher and Martens present.  Judge Ziegler 
explained 
on 
the 
record 
that they 
were 
"trying to, as 
contemporaneously as possible, provide a record of what exactly 
the testimony was that . . . supported the issuance of the 
search warrant."  At the hearing, Detective Kocher testified 
that he had met Martens the night before at the Germantown 
Police Station, where they had called Judge Ziegler for a 
telephonic search warrant.  Kocher testified that he thought the 
line they had used was recorded, and that he had found out that 
morning that the conversation, in fact, had not been recorded. 
¶9 
Kocher went on to testify to the contents of his 
warrant application from the previous evening.  Kocher recounted 
the location and description of the home in question, the fact 
that Raflik lived there, and the details of the investigation 
that led to his requesting the warrant. 
¶10 When Martens concluded his questioning, Judge Ziegler 
proceeded to ask Kocher several questions.  First, Judge Ziegler 
asked Kocher about his conversations with Raflik's landlord, 
Steven Wydirek.  Judge Ziegler also asked Kocher how he had made 
the inference that there might have been drugs in the house 
No. 
00-1086-CR 
 
5 
 
after seeing marijuana-like substances in the garage.  Finally, 
the judge confirmed Wydirek's reliability.  Each of the 
questions asked by Judge Ziegler was phrased in a leading 
format, that allowed Kocher to answer either "yes" or "correct."3  
                                                 
3 Raflik takes particular issue with the portions of the 
reconstruction hearing where leading questions by Judge Ziegler 
provided the nexus between the house and the garage, and where 
they provided the reliability of the informant.  See infra ¶¶44-
48.  This part of the hearing follows: 
COURT: 
. . . I also recall certain testimony of 
yours where you said that the single car 
garage is next to, or on this property, or 
property the landlord has access to. 
 
KOCHER: 
Correct.  It's attached, or the building 
adjoins another building that the landlord 
reserves for his own personal use. 
 
COURT: 
The garage? 
 
KOCHER: 
Correct. 
 
COURT: 
Okay, and you personally observed, through 
an open door, marijuana-like substances in 
the garage, right? 
 
KOCHER: 
Correct.  The main garage door was open. 
 
. . . 
 
COURT: 
 . . . And based on your conversations with 
the landlord, Mr. Wydirek, did you find him 
to be someone that was reliable and would 
have information in this regard? 
 
KOCHER: 
Yes, I did. 
 
COURT: 
Okay.  And so basically you had reason to 
believe what he was telling you, right? 
 
KOCHER: 
That's correct. 
No. 
00-1086-CR 
 
6 
 
After she finished questioning Kocher, Judge Ziegler found, from 
the facts presented and the inferences drawn from those facts, 
that there was probable cause to support the search warrant, and 
that they had adequately recreated the record of the warrant 
application.  The affidavit Kocher had drafted that afternoon 
was also attached to the record. 
¶11 Based on the evidence found when the search warrant 
was executed, Raflik was charged with possession of THC with 
intent to deliver, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1m)(h)2; 
three 
drug 
tax 
stamp 
violations, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 139.87, 139.88 and 139.95; manufacture of THC, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1)(h)2; possession of psilocybin 
with 
intent 
to 
deliver, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. Stat. 
§§ 961.41(1m)(g)1; and maintaining a drug house, contrary to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 961.42.  Raflik filed a motion to suppress the 
evidence found pursuant to the warrant on the grounds that the 
State had failed to make a contemporaneous record of the warrant 
application, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 968.12(3), the Fourth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and Article I, Section 11 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution. 
¶12 In a hearing on the suppression motion, Washington 
County Circuit Court Judge Leo Schlaefer ruled that the evidence 
seized pursuant to the search warrant should not be suppressed.  
                                                                                                                                                             
COURT: 
Okay.  And so you think that along with the 
items you saw in the garage, there will 
likely be items in the residence. 
 
KOCHER: 
That's also correct. 
No. 
00-1086-CR 
 
7 
 
The court noted that the State had exercised its best efforts to 
recreate the record within 24 hours of the original warrant 
application and that the record indicated that Detective 
Kocher's testimony at the hearing was consistent with the 
testimony he had offered the previous evening.  The trial court 
found that Raflik's substantial rights had not been prejudiced, 
and that, under the totality of the circumstances, the failure 
to record the warrant application was a technical irregularity 
under Wis. Stat. § 968.22.  The court held that suppression was 
not a proper remedy and denied Raflik's motion. 
¶13 Raflik pleaded guilty to the amended charges of 
misdemeanor 
possession 
of 
THC, 
misdemeanor 
possession 
of 
psilocybin, and felony keeping a drug house.  On appeal, Raflik 
challenged her conviction on the grounds that the trial court 
erred when it had denied her motion to dismiss.  The court of 
appeals, recognizing this as a case of first impression in 
Wisconsin, certified the appeal to this court. 
II 
¶14 Several constitutional rights are significant to this 
case: the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, 
protected by the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and 
Article 1, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution; the due 
process right to meaningful judicial review, protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; and the right to 
a meaningful appeal, protected by Article I, Section 21 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  The State concedes that Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.12(3)(d) was violated when no contemporaneous recording of 
No. 
00-1086-CR 
 
8 
 
the warrant application was made.  However, the State maintains 
that the failure to record the application only affects Raflik's 
right to have a meaningful record for the purposes of appeal, 
and that Raflik's right to a meaningful appeal was protected 
when the warrant application was reconstructed.  Raflik, on the 
other hand, argues that the failure of the State to meet the 
requirements of § 968.12 is not merely a technical irregularity, 
but instead renders the warrant constitutionally inadequate.  
Raflik concludes that such a significant violation warrants 
suppression. 
¶15 The suppression of evidence is not a constitutional 
right, but rather it is a judge-made rule used to deter 
misconduct by law enforcement officials.  Stone v. Powell, 428 
U.S. 465, 482 (1976).  Suppression is only required when 
evidence has been obtained in violation of a defendant's 
constitutional rights, State v. Hochman, 2 Wis. 2d 410, 419, 86 
N.W.2d 446, 451 (1957), or if a statute specifically provides 
for the suppression remedy.  State ex rel. Arnold v. County 
Court, 51 Wis. 2d 434, 439-440, 187 N.W.2d 354 (1971); see also 
State ex rel. Peckham v. Krenke, 229 Wis. 2d 778, 787, 601 
N.W.2d 287 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Verkuylen, 120 Wis. 2d 59, 
61, 352 N.W.2d 668 (Ct. App. 1984).  There is no specific 
statutory remedy provided for the failure to record a telephonic 
search warrant application.  See Wis. Stat. § 968.12.  Thus, the 
only question that remains is whether the failure to record the 
warrant application and the subsequent reconstruction of the 
application violated a constitutional right. 
No. 
00-1086-CR 
 
9 
 
¶16 We are presented with three potential constitutional 
violations which could warrant suppression.  First, as Raflik 
contends, the failure to record the warrant application may be a 
grievous enough error that the Fourth Amendment was violated in 
its own right.  Second, if the record cannot be reconstructed, 
or if the record was not adequately reconstructed, there would 
be no probable cause on the record to support the warrant and 
the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement would arguably 
not be met.  Finally, if the record was not adequately 
reconstructed, Raflik's Fourteenth Amendment due process right 
to meaningful judicial review and her right to a meaningful 
appeal under Article I, Section 21 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
may have been violated.  We now address each of these concerns. 
¶17 We conclude that the Fourth Amendment was not directly 
violated in this case.  The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution states: 
 
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects, 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
Here, Detective Kocher met all of the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment during his warrant application.  The parties agree 
that probable cause existed to issue the warrant, that a neutral 
and detached magistrate issued the warrant, and that the warrant 
described with specificity the places to be searched and the 
No. 
00-1086-CR 
 
10 
 
items to be seized.  Nothing in the Fourth Amendment requires a 
contemporaneous recording of the application. 
¶18 Raflik points to a number of decisions in support of 
her position that the mere failure to record the warrant 
application is of a constitutional magnitude.  In State v. 
Myers, 815 P.2d 761 (Wash. 1991), the Washington Supreme Court 
addressed a telephonic warrant that was, by accident, never 
recorded as required under that state's rule.  See Wash. Super. 
Ct. Crim. R. 2.3(c) (2001).  The day after the warrant had been 
executed (which was also the day after the warrant application 
had been made), the officer learned that the application had not 
been recorded and wrote down what he recalled from the day 
prior.  Over three months later, at the suppression hearing, the 
defendant challenged the adequacy of the warrant application.  
At the hearing, the issuing judge testified that he did not have 
an independent recollection of the events surrounding the 
issuance of the warrant. 
¶19 The Washington State Supreme Court determined that the 
failure 
to 
record 
the 
warrant 
application 
was 
a 
"gross 
deviation" from the rule.  Myers, 815 P.2d at 768.  The court 
went on to state that reconstruction of the application might 
have been acceptable if it did not "impair the reviewing court's 
ability to ascertain what the magistrate considered when he 
issued the warrant."  Id.  The court noted that the only 
evidence of the telephonic affidavit was the police officer's 
testimony, offered four months after the original application, 
and the officer's report made after the warrant was executed, 
No. 
00-1086-CR 
 
11 
 
and after it was discovered that there was no recording.  The 
court held that, under the circumstances, the reconstruction 
made it "impossible to accurately review what the judge 
considered" when he issued the warrant.  Id. 
¶20 Raflik emphasizes the policies cited by the Myers 
court that support strict adherence to statutory rules regarding 
recording telephonic warrants: facilitating judicial review, 
compelling respect for and observance of the constitutional 
guarantees 
of 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment, 
preserving 
judicial 
integrity, and removing any hint of misconduct or bad faith by 
the prosecutor or the police.  Id. at 767. 
¶21 We recognize the importance of these policies, but we 
find that they are not necessarily compromised by allowing a 
warrant application to be reconstructed.  Judicial integrity, 
the right to judicial review, and the observance of Fourth 
Amendment guarantees can be adequately protected when a careful 
reconstruction of a warrant application is made.  We also 
recognize the defendant's concerns about police misconduct and 
the possibility of police acting in bad faith.  In cases where 
the failure to record a warrant application is the result of 
misconduct by police, reconstruction may not be an adequate 
option, and suppression may be appropriate.  However, there was 
no evidence of police misconduct in this case, so we do not 
reach the question here. 
¶22 Raflik 
also 
directs 
our 
attention 
to 
City 
of 
Minneapolis v. Cook, 498 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. 1993), along with a 
number of federal cases that have examined situations where all 
No. 
00-1086-CR 
 
12 
 
or part of a warrant application was not recorded.  Like Myers 
and the present case, Cook involved a telephonic warrant 
application that was not recorded in conformance with a statute.  
In Cook, the Minnesota Supreme Court criticized the failure to 
record the warrant application, particularly because there were 
no contemporaneous notes relied upon by the officer in applying 
for the warrant, and no notes taken by the officer as he made 
his 
application. 
 
Id. 
at 
22. 
 
Because 
there 
was 
no 
"substantially 
contemporaneous 
record . . . made" 
the 
court 
suppressed the evidence that arose from the warrant.  Id. 
¶23 Likewise, in United States v. Hittle, 575 F.2d 799 
(10th Cir. 1978), the court found a search warrant inadequate 
when there was no oral testimony and an inadequate affidavit.  
The court held that the probable cause requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment would be "significantly weakened if a court can rely 
on the recollection of those concerned to support a probable 
cause finding long after the search warrant has been issued."  
Id. at 802. 
¶24 Still, Raflik admits that most federal courts have not 
seen fit to suppress evidence because of a failure to record 
some or all of the warrant application.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Richardson, 943 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding 
suppression inappropriate when the magistrate and prosecutor 
were unaware that the recording equipment did not work, and 
where no record was made); United States v. Rome, 809 F.2d 665 
(10th Cir. 1987) (refusing to suppress evidence when the 
preliminary discussions between the magistrate and the agent 
No. 
00-1086-CR 
 
13 
 
were not recorded); United States v. Loyd, 721 F.2d 331 (11th 
Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (holding that suppression is not 
necessary when the magistrate failed to certify the accuracy of 
the recorded transcript); United States v. Stefanson, 648 F.2d 
1231 (9th Cir. 1981) (declining to suppress evidence when the 
oath was not recorded); United States v. Johnson, 641 F.2d 652 
(9th Cir. 1980) (refusing to suppress evidence when the oath was 
not administered until after the oral affidavit). 
¶25 Raflik differentiates these cases from her own in 
several ways.  First, Raflik notes that in her case, the police 
bore the responsibility for recording the conversation, as 
opposed to the magistrate, who is responsible for recording a 
telephonic warrant application in a federal case.  See Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 41(2)(D) (2000).  Second, Raflik's case featured no 
contemporaneous recording at all, as opposed to the majority of 
the federal cases where only part of the warrant application was 
unrecorded.  Third, the time between the application and 
reconstruction, 18 hours in this case, was less than that in 
most cases——a fact which, Raflik concedes, benefits the State's 
position.  Finally, Raflik suggests that the judge lost at least 
some appearance of neutrality when she asked Kocher leading 
questions at the reconstruction hearing. 
¶26 We do not deny the importance of each of these 
factors, but none of them directly affects Raflik's Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search or 
seizure, and none of them warrants suppression in its own right.  
Each of the factors Raflik identifies, however, may be relevant 
No. 
00-1086-CR 
 
14 
 
to the question of whether an adequate reconstruction of the 
record can be made consistent with Raflik's right to a 
meaningful appeal, and her due process right to meaningful 
judicial review of the warrant process.  In particular, the 
length of the unrecorded segment and the time between the 
application and reconstruction can be taken into consideration 
by the trial court when determining the adequacy of the 
reconstruction.  See infra ¶¶41-43.  With regard to the 
possibility of the issuing judge becoming a prosecution witness, 
we recognize that it is not an ideal situation.  In the 
reconstruction of a warrant application, however, we find that a 
limited amount of judicial involvement is appropriate as long as 
the judge's participation is not excessive and the participation 
does not compromise the judge's neutral and detached role.  See 
infra ¶¶44-48. 
¶27 Raflik also asks us to consider Glodowski v. State, 
196 Wis. 265, 220 N.W. 227 (1928).  Glodowski is a Prohibition-
era case where the sheriff of Portage County applied for a 
warrant to seize illicit liquor from the defendant.  No record 
was made of the probable cause offered by the sheriff before the 
warrant was issued.  This court held that suppression of the 
evidence found pursuant to the warrant was appropriate based on 
the fact that no record had been kept.  The court emphasized 
that a record must be made "at or before the time that the 
judicial act was performed."  Id. at 271.  Raflik argues that 
the core of the Glodowski holding is that the failure to 
No. 
00-1086-CR 
 
15 
 
contemporaneously record a warrant application weakens the 
Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement.  We disagree. 
¶28 In Glodowski, this court stated that "[t]he essential 
thing is that proof be reduced to permanent form and made a part 
of the record, which may be transmitted to the reviewing court."  
Id. at 272.  The record of the warrant application "may consist 
of the sworn complaint, of affidavits, or the sworn testimony 
taken 
in 
shorthand . . . or 
of 
testimony 
reduced 
to 
longhand . . . or of a combination of all these forms of proof."  
Id.  We find that the focus of Glodowski was primarily on the 
ability of a reviewing court to assess the record, and not on 
the sufficiency of the warrant itself.  After discussing the 
probable cause requirement, the Glodowski court stated, "there 
must be a record upon which the reviewing court may determine 
whether there was proof of any facts before the magistrate which 
would support the finding of probable cause."  Id. at 271.  We 
find that the concerns raised in Glodowski can be adequately 
protected 
by 
the 
careful 
reconstruction 
of 
a 
warrant 
application, as outlined below. 
¶29 Finally, we note that several courts have invoked the 
"good faith exception"4 of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 
(1984), under circumstances similar to those here.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Chaar, 137 F.3d 359, 363-64 (6th Cir. 1998); 
United States v. Richardson, 943 F.2d 547, 549-51 (5th Cir. 
                                                 
4 This court adopted a version of the good faith exception 
last term in State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 
N.W.2d 625. 
No. 
00-1086-CR 
 
16 
 
1991).  However, since we find that the reconstruction in this 
case was sufficient to protect Raflik's constitutional rights, 
we do not address the good faith exception here. 
III 
¶30 Although we find that Raflik's Fourth Amendment rights 
were not directly violated by the accidental failure to record 
the warrant application, the failure to record the application 
does affect Raflik's right to meaningful judicial review of the 
warrant process, and her right to a meaningful appeal.  The 
right to appeal is absolute under the Wisconsin Constitution: 
"Writs of error shall never be prohibited, and shall be issued 
by such courts as the legislature designates by law."  Wis. 
Const. art. I, § 21(1).  We have interpreted the right to appeal 
to require that the appeal be meaningful.  State v. Perry, 136 
Wis. 2d 92, 99, 401 N.W.2d 748 (1987). 
¶31 Stemming from the right to a meaningful appeal is a 
criminal 
defendant's 
right 
to 
a 
full 
transcript 
of 
the 
proceedings.  Id.  Providing a defendant with a full transcript 
guarantees that the defendant has the opportunity to analyze the 
proceedings of the trial court and to challenge any errors.  In 
some cases, however, a functionally-equivalent substitute of the 
transcript may be provided if the substitute accurately portrays 
what happened during the course of the trial.  Id. 
¶32 Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 809.15(3) 
provides, 
in 
relevant part, that "[a] party who believes the record, 
including the transcript of the reporter's notes, is defective 
or does not accurately reflect what occurred in the trial court 
No. 
00-1086-CR 
 
17 
 
may move the court in which the record is located to correct the 
record."  This court has recognized that reconstruction is an 
acceptable method for correcting a missing portion of a trial 
record.  Perry, 136 Wis. 2d at 100-01.  Whether such a 
reconstruction is adequate is a question that is reviewed by the 
court ab initio.  Id. at 97.  The determination is one that is 
ultimately within the procedural supervisory jurisdiction of 
this court.  Id. 
¶33 The court of appeals first addressed the adequacy of a 
record reconstruction in State v. DeLeon, 127 Wis. 2d 74, 377 
N.W.2d 635 (Ct. App. 1985).  In DeLeon, the court reporter had 
lost some of her notes, comprising about fifteen minutes of 
trial testimony.  The trial court attempted to reconstruct the 
missing portion by having the witnesses recalled.  DeLeon then 
challenged the new record, claiming that it had not been 
properly reconstructed. 
¶34 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
noted 
that 
Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.15(3) allowed correction of a trial record, but 
that it did not set out any guidelines by which an adequate 
reconstruction could be made.  DeLeon, 127 Wis. 2d at 77-78.  
The court therefore laid out a procedure by which parties could 
reconstruct a missing portion of a trial record. 
¶35 As the court of appeals explained, the trial court 
must first make a facial inquiry as to whether the missing 
portion of the record can be reconstructed, weighing such 
variables 
as 
the 
length 
of 
the 
missing 
transcript, 
the 
availability of witnesses, and the amount of time elapsed 
No. 
00-1086-CR 
 
18 
 
between the trial and the reconstruction.  Id. at 81.  A trial 
court may find that a portion of a trial record cannot be 
reconstructed as a matter of law, in which case a new trial 
should be ordered.  Id. 
¶36 If the trial court finds that reconstruction is 
possible, the parties should first attempt to prepare an agreed 
statement of the record on appeal, either by stipulation, or by 
an amendment-counteramendment process similar to the one laid 
out in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(c).  Id. at 80-81.  
If any disputes remain, those disputes will be settled by the 
trial court.  If the reconstruction reaches this stage, the 
trial court may rely on its own recollection and notes or 
materials from the parties as an aid to reconstruction.  The 
trial court is also allowed to conduct hearings or consult with 
counsel.  Id. at 81-82.  Every step of this procedure is 
reviewable on appeal, and appellate courts should review errors 
in the reconstruction itself under the "clearly erroneous" 
standard.  Id. at 82. 
¶37 This court expanded on DeLeon in State v. Perry, 136 
Wis. 2d 92.  Perry involved a criminal defendant who sought to 
reconstruct a portion of his trial record.  Before a transcript 
of the trial was made, the notes of the trial were lost in the 
mail, en route from the primary court reporter to a substitute 
court reporter.  When the postal service finally located the 
notes, they were in poor condition and were incomplete.  Many of 
the notes could be pieced together, but large portions of the 
transcript were still missing, including significant portions of 
No. 
00-1086-CR 
 
19 
 
the final two days of the eight-day jury trial.  The trial court 
reviewed what was left of the record and found that, although it 
was not perfect, the record was at least "'sufficient . . . to 
provide the appellate court with a basis of reviewing the entire 
record . . . .'"  Id. at 97. 
¶38 On review, this court determined that the trial record 
was insufficient as a matter of law.  Id. at 108.  The court 
noted that the proper procedure for reconstruction had been 
articulated in DeLeon, and thereby adopted the methodology used 
by the DeLeon court.  This court went on to determine that the 
reconstruction of a record can protect a defendant's right to 
meaningful review when it meets certain criteria.  Expanding on 
the factors in DeLeon, this court held that when assessing the 
adequacy of a reconstruction, a court should consider "the 
nature of the case, the nature of the claim of error, the 
passage of time from the date a transcript originally was, or 
should have been, prepared, and whether the trial was to the 
court or to a jury."  Id. at 98.  Because the trial court did 
not take these factors into account at all, the Perry court 
deemed the reconstruction inadequate.  Id. at 108. 
¶39 We hold that the reconstruction procedures articulated 
in Perry and DeLeon may be used in a situation where a 
telephonic warrant application has mistakenly not been recorded.  
Where there is no evidence of intentional or reckless misconduct 
on the part of law enforcement officers, a reconstructed warrant 
application may serve as a functional equivalent of the record 
of the original application.  Such a reconstruction, when made 
No. 
00-1086-CR 
 
20 
 
appropriately, can protect the defendant's right to a meaningful 
appeal, as well as the defendant's ability to challenge the 
admission of evidence in a suppression hearing. 
¶40 The Perry court pointed out that when challenging the 
sufficiency of a record, the appellant has the burden to 
demonstrate that there is a "colorable need" for the missing 
portion of the record.  Id. at 108.  The appellant is not 
required to show prejudice, but the error cannot be so trivial 
that it is clearly harmless.  Id.  Given the pronouncement of 
the legislature in § 968.12 and the importance of the Fourth 
Amendment rights at stake in the issuance of a search warrant, 
we think that most, if not all, situations where a warrant 
application 
is 
inadvertently 
not 
recorded 
will 
require 
reconstruction if the defendant's due process right and right to 
a meaningful appeal are to be protected.  Without an appropriate 
reconstruction, there would be no probable cause on the record 
to support the warrant, which would arguably be grounds for 
suppression. 
¶41 When reconstructing a warrant application, many of the 
same factors announced by the Perry and DeLeon courts should be 
taken into consideration, particularly the length of time 
between the application and the reconstruction, and the length 
of the reconstructed segment in relation to the entire warrant 
request.  In addition to these factors, a trial court should 
also consider if there were any contemporaneous or nearly 
contemporaneous written documents, such as notes, that were used 
to reconstruct the record, the availability of witnesses used to 
No. 
00-1086-CR 
 
21 
 
reconstruct the record, and the complexity of the segment 
reconstructed. 
¶42 In the present case, we find enough evidence in the 
record to demonstrate that Raflik's due process right and her 
right to a meaningful appeal have been protected.  The length of 
the reconstructed section was relatively short and only one 
witness, Detective Kocher, was required to testify.  Even though 
the entire application was unrecorded, the facts that provided 
probable cause were uncomplicated and easily remembered by 
Kocher.  Many of the facts could be corroborated both by 
Kocher's affidavit and by the warrant documents filled in 
separately but simultaneously by Detective Kocher and Judge 
Ziegler during the original telephonic application. 
¶43 Perhaps 
most 
importantly, 
the 
application 
was 
reconstructed only 18 hours after the actual application, when 
the events of the previous night were still fresh in the minds 
of all of the participants.  Immediately after Assistant 
District Attorney Martens discovered that no recording had been 
made, he contacted the magistrate and Detective Kocher, and they 
prepared notes about the telephonic application the night 
before.  This is in sharp contrast to a case like Myers, where 
almost four months had elapsed between the application and the 
reconstruction.  See Myers, 815 P.2d at 768.  Finally, all of 
the participants in the original warrant application were 
available to the trial court when it reconstructed the record. 
¶44 Raflik 
expresses 
concern 
over 
Judge 
Ziegler's 
participation in the reconstruction hearing, and particularly 
No. 
00-1086-CR 
 
22 
 
over the fact that the judge asked Detective Kocher a series of 
leading questions.  Raflik argues that allowing a judge to 
question a witness is inappropriate, particularly when it is 
done in a leading manner, because the judge will be inclined to 
ask questions that tend to support the judge's decision to issue 
the warrant.  Raflik also suggests that the prospect of judges 
testifying is unseemly because it puts a judge into the role of 
prosecution witness and raises the specter that the judge might 
not act in a neutral and detached manner. 
¶45 We do not find Judge Ziegler's actions inappropriate 
in this case.  Although we do not necessarily encourage active 
judicial participation in the reconstruction of a warrant 
application, a limited amount of participation is appropriate as 
long as the judge's participation is relevant to the proceeding, 
is not excessive, and does not compromise the judge's neutral 
and detached role.  As this court noted in Perry, a judge is 
allowed to resolve disputes during the reconstruction of a trial 
record 
based 
on 
the 
judge's 
"recollection, 
trial 
notes, 
consultation with counsel, affidavits, or recall of witnesses."  
Perry, 136 Wis. 2d at 102.  We see no reason to deviate from 
that 
pronouncement 
for 
the 
reconstruction 
of 
a 
warrant 
application. 
¶46 Several factors may even make a judge's participation 
more 
appropriate 
during 
the 
reconstruction 
of 
a 
warrant 
application than it might be during the reconstruction of a 
trial segment.  A judge's recollections may, as in this case, 
corroborate the fact that the judge had been told certain 
No. 
00-1086-CR 
 
23 
 
information 
during 
the 
original 
application. 
 
This 
is 
particularly helpful given the ex parte nature of the warrant 
application process, and the limited number of participants in 
the application process.  In Myers, the Washington Supreme Court 
actually required a neutral person, such as the magistrate or 
court clerk, to testify whenever reconstruction is attempted 
because the judge or clerk has no stake in the outcome.  Myers, 
815 P.2d at 768. 
¶47 As an alternative to preventing the judge from 
testifying, Raflik asks us at least to establish a rule that 
would prevent a judge from asking leading questions during a 
reconstruction hearing.  We decline to do so.  The nature of the 
warrant application process sometimes requires a magistrate to 
clarify or question the law enforcement officer's basis for 
probable cause.  In such a case, a leading question from the 
magistrate may be appropriate.  We see no reason to prevent this 
practice, which is perfectly acceptable during the actual 
warrant application, from carrying over to a reconstruction 
hearing, as long as the judge's participation is not excessive 
and the judge's neutral and detached role is not compromised. 
¶48 Here, we find that Judge Ziegler's participation did 
not cross the line.  The questions asked by Judge Ziegler went 
no further than to clarify several points addressed by Detective 
Kocher and helped confirm that Kocher had, in fact, testified to 
the judge the previous evening about the nexus between the house 
and the garage, and about the reliability of the informants.  
No. 
00-1086-CR 
 
24 
 
The judge's questions did not amount to excessive testimony, and 
did not compromise the integrity of the proceeding. 
¶49 We 
also 
reject 
Raflik's 
request 
to 
make 
the 
reconstruction of a warrant application an adversarial hearing.  
In a situation like Perry, where a portion of the trial record 
is 
reconstructed, 
the 
participation 
of 
both 
parties 
is 
appropriate, and even required out of fairness, because the 
proceedings being reconstructed were originally adversarial.  
Perry, 136 Wis. 2d at 102.  If a portion of a criminal trial is 
being reconstructed, the defendant may also have a Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.  Id.  However, the same concerns do 
not exist for a warrant application. 
¶50 The 
Sixth 
Amendment 
right 
to 
counsel 
generally 
attaches when either a criminal complaint or a warrant for 
arrest is filed.  Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-89 
(1972); State v. Harris, 199 Wis. 2d 227, 235 n.3, 544 N.W.2d 
545 (1996).  At the time a search warrant is issued, there is 
technically no defendant, and the suspect does not have a right 
to counsel.  This should be apparent from the fact that the 
telephonic warrant application itself is ex parte.  When 
applying for a search warrant, the only participants need to be 
the law enforcement officials applying for the search warrant 
and a neutral magistrate.  As long as reconstruction of the 
application is done before the suspect is charged, there is no 
constitutional requirement that the hearing be adversarial, and 
we decline to impose such a requirement. 
No. 
00-1086-CR 
 
25 
 
¶51 Although we do not reach the question here, we note 
that if the reconstruction of a warrant application were to take 
place after the suspect is charged, the defendant may have the 
right to have counsel present at the reconstruction hearing.  We 
also note that, even though a warrant application may be 
reconstructed in an ex parte hearing, the defendant retains the 
protection of an adversarial proceeding when challenging the 
adequacy of the reconstruction at a motion for suppression and 
on appeal.  Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356-58 (1963); 
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932). 
¶52 In adopting this procedure for the reconstruction of a 
telephonic search warrant application, we sound a note of 
caution.  The preferred method for making a record of a 
telephonic 
warrant 
application, 
as 
articulated 
by 
the 
legislature 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 968.12(3)(d), 
is 
through 
contemporaneous recording, not reconstruction.  Where police 
intentionally or recklessly disregard the statute, or where the 
failure to record the application significantly prejudices the 
defendant, reconstruction might not be sufficient to protect the 
defendant's rights. 
IV 
¶53 As a final matter, we address the burden of proof for 
reconstruction. 
 
The 
State 
argues 
that 
when 
a 
warrant 
application is reconstructed, the trial court must find, by a 
preponderance 
of 
the 
evidence, 
that 
the 
reconstruction 
adequately replaces the missing portion of the record.  In the 
State's view, because the controlling burden of proof at a 
No. 
00-1086-CR 
 
26 
 
suppression hearing should be no greater than a proof by the 
preponderance of the evidence, see United States v. Matlock, 415 
U.S. 
164, 
177 
n.14 
(1974), 
the 
reconstruction 
of 
the 
application, which is likewise challenged at a suppression 
hearing, will only carry a burden of proof of a preponderance of 
the evidence.  Raflik contends that because the reconstruction 
of a warrant application is a portion of a larger criminal 
proceeding, the proper burden of proof is beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  We find the State's view persuasive. 
¶54 The DeLeon and Perry courts both held that in a 
reconstruction hearing, the judge must be satisfied that the 
reconstructed record accurately reflects what actually happened 
to the same level required in the proceeding itself.  Perry, 136 
Wis. 2d at 99; DeLeon, 127 Wis. 2d at 82.  That is, to 
reconstruct a portion of a criminal trial, the trial judge must 
find that the record has been adequately reconstructed beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Perry, 136 Wis. 2d at 99.  Likewise, to 
reconstruct a portion of a civil trial, the court must be 
satisfied that the record has been reconstructed to the level 
appropriate for that trial.  DeLeon, 127 Wis. 2d at 82. 
¶55 The 
proceeding 
in 
question 
here 
is 
a 
warrant 
application.  Because a warrant application is not a fact that 
constitutes an element of the charged crime, there is no 
requirement that the contents of a warrant application be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 
486-87 (1972); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).  
Additionally, the admissibility of evidence may be determined by 
No. 
00-1086-CR 
 
27 
 
a less stringent standard without affecting the reliability or 
constitutionality of a verdict.  Lego, 404 U.S. at 487.  This 
court has held that a preponderance of the evidence standard is 
generally appropriate in a suppression hearing.  See, e.g., 
State v. Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d 331, 345, 588 N.W.2d 606 (1999) 
("[T]he State must establish by a preponderance of the evidence 
whether a custodial interrogation took place."); State v. 
Santiago, 206 Wis. 2d 3, 12, 556 N.W.2d 687 (1996) ("[T]he State 
must prove the sufficiency of the Miranda warnings and the 
knowing 
and 
intelligent 
waiver 
of 
Miranda 
rights 
by 
a 
preponderance of the evidence."). 
¶56 Following the holdings of DeLeon and Perry, the trial 
court must find that a reconstruction is accurate to the same 
level of proof as the proceeding that is being reconstructed.  
Because a motion for suppression of evidence would be judged by 
a preponderance of the evidence standard, we hold that the 
reconstruction of a warrant application should be judged by that 
standard as well. 
¶57 Applying this standard, we find that the trial court 
had ample evidence to conclude that the State met its burden of 
proof in reconstructing the warrant application, and in doing 
so, protected Raflik's right to a meaningful appeal and her due 
process right to meaningful judicial review.  Because we find 
that the record was properly reconstructed, and because the 
parties agree that there was sufficient probable cause to 
support the warrant, the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant 
No. 
00-1086-CR 
 
28 
 
should not be suppressed, and Raflik's convictions must be 
upheld. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
 
No.  00-1086-CR.awb 
 
 
 
1
¶58 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  While I agree 
with the majority that there may be instances when a warrant 
application proceeding can be reconstructed, I cannot agree with 
the reconstruction procedure the majority has adopted.  The 
majority's approach fails to protect adequately a defendant's 
right to meaningful review and undermines the warrant judge's 
role as a neutral and detached decision maker. 
¶59 In analogizing to State v. Perry, 136 Wis. 2d 92, 401 
N.W.2d 748 (1987), and State v. DeLeon, 127 Wis. 2d 74, 377 
N.W.2d 635 (Ct. App. 1985), the majority sidesteps the import of 
the significant differences between the facts in those cases and 
the facts at hand.  Reconstruction of an ex parte proceeding 
requires additional safeguards if review is to remain meaningful 
and if the warrant judge is to remain neutral and detached. 
¶60 Even the State acknowledges that it would be better to 
have additional safeguards that the majority has now rejected.  
I would require procedures different from the majority's that 
would serve as the additional safeguards necessary in the 
reconstruction of an ex parte proceeding.  Because those 
safeguards were not present here, I conclude that Raflik's right 
to meaningful review was violated and that the evidence against 
her should have been suppressed.  Accordingly, I respectfully 
dissent. 
I 
¶61 I begin by highlighting the principal reasons that the 
majority's application of Perry and DeLeon gives me pause.   
First, both Perry and DeLeon arose in contexts where only a 
No.  00-1086-CR.awb 
 
 
 
2
portion of a full transcript was missing.  In DeLeon, 127 
Wis. 2d at 76, approximately 15 minutes of testimony was 
unavailable from the transcript of a first-degree sexual assault 
trial.  The court of appeals agreed with the circuit court that 
the testimony could be reconstructed adequately.  See id. at 83.  
In Perry, 136 Wis. 2d at 96, 107, "significant portions" of the 
transcript for two of eight days of a trial were missing.  We 
agreed with the court of appeals in Perry that the missing 
portions could not be adequately reconstructed, and we concluded 
"as a matter of law that the transcript is insufficient."  Id. 
at 104, 108-109. 
¶62 As 
the 
majority 
recognizes 
in 
form 
if 
not 
in 
substance, one of the factors for circuit courts to consider in 
determining whether reconstruction is appropriate is "the length 
of the missing portion in relation to the entire transcript."  
Perry, 136 Wis. 2d at 101.  Here, it is the full transcript of a 
proceeding that is unavailable, yet the majority has concluded 
that it may be reconstructed. 
¶63 Second, Perry and DeLeon involved the reconstruction 
of adversarial proceedings.  In DeLeon, the court of appeals 
explained that the reconstruction procedure would also be 
adversarial: 
 
[T]he parties should first attempt to prepare an 
agreed statement of the record on appeal, either by 
stipulation or by the amendment and counteramendment 
procedure outlined in Fed. R. App. P. 10(c).  Then, if 
any 
dispute 
remains 
as 
to 
what 
occurred, 
the 
difference shall be submitted to and settled by the 
trial court. 
No.  00-1086-CR.awb 
 
 
 
3
127 Wis. 2d at 79.  This court in Perry approved of this 
methodology.  136 Wis. 2d at 102.  The procedure contemplated by 
both Perry and DeLeon is an adversarial reconstruction of an 
adversarial proceeding.  In contrast, here both the proceeding 
to be reconstructed as well as the reconstruction procedure 
adopted by the majority are ex parte. 
¶64 Thus, Raflik's case presents a situation significantly 
different from those in Perry and DeLeon.  Given the standards 
the majority has adopted, I am not convinced that an ex parte 
proceeding 
reconstructing 
an 
ex 
parte 
proceeding 
will 
sufficiently protect a defendant's right to meaningful review.  
In DeLeon, 127 Wis. 2d at 82, the court of appeals recognized 
that reconstruction is "not a normal fact-finding process but is 
actually a process for refreshing recollection."  Therefore, the 
court concluded, procedural safeguards are necessary to protect 
an appellant's right to meaningful review.  Id.  In Perry and 
DeLeon, one of those safeguards was the defense's ability to 
challenge, as a first-hand witness of the trial, the State's 
recollection of the trial events.  Here, the parties do not 
stand on such a level playing field, and the majority has failed 
to build in additional safeguards to restore the equilibrium. 
¶65 My hesitation at the majority's decision is compounded 
by a close examination of this court's opinion in Glodowski v. 
State, 196 Wis. 265, 220 N.W. 227 (1928).  The Glodowski court 
rested its decision, at least in part, on principles of 
meaningful review.  Id. at 271.  Additionally, Glodowski is more 
No.  00-1086-CR.awb 
 
 
 
4
instructive than either Perry or DeLeon because it involved the 
impermissible supplementation of a warrant application.  
¶66 In Glodowski, a sheriff testified before a magistrate 
in order to establish probable cause for a warrant.  196 Wis. at 
266.  After the execution of the warrant, the magistrate 
testified at a suppression hearing as to "further statements 
made by the sheriff under oath before the warrant was issued," 
apparently to bolster the finding of probable cause.  Id.  The 
court admitted the evidence, and the defendant was convicted.  
Id.  This court reversed, explaining that a warrant judge is 
prohibited from contributing to the record after the probable 
cause determination has been made: 
 
Judicial action must be reviewed upon the record made 
at or before the time that the judicial act was 
performed.  The validity of judicial action cannot be 
made to depend on the facts recalled by fallible human 
memory at a time somewhat removed from that when the 
judicial determination was made. . . .  
 
Mature deliberation satisfies the court that 
State v. Blumenstein, 186 Wis. 428, 202 N.W. 684, and 
Hiller v. State, 190 Wis. 369, 208 N.W. 260, must be 
overruled in so far as these cases hold that the 
reviewing court may supplement the record made by the 
magistrate by taking oral testimony to disclose the 
proof that was in fact offered before the warrant was 
issued. 
Id. at 271-72.  We concluded: 
 
 
Upon hearing the motion to suppress, the court 
should not have considered the proof of additional 
testimony given by the sheriff before the warrant 
issued or the proof offered by the defendant, but 
should have considered only the record made before the 
search warrant was issued. 
Id. at 272. 
No.  00-1086-CR.awb 
 
 
 
5
¶67 The 
majority fails 
to acknowledge 
this language 
because the majority cannot reconcile Glodowski with its 
analysis.  When asked at oral argument whether a decision 
adopting its position would require this court to overrule any 
cases, the State answered:  "I think Glodowski presents the 
problem for the State."  That is because Glodowski forbids a 
warrant judge from supplementing the record after the warrant 
was executed, which is precisely what has occurred in this case. 
II 
¶68 This Glodowski prohibition leads into yet another 
concern I have with the majority's methodology.  The majority 
condones 
a 
warrant 
judge's 
active 
participation 
in 
reconstruction, thereby undermining the neutrality of the judge.  
Although the majority begins its discussion of active judicial 
participation by saying it does not encourage it, the majority 
then backtracks by explaining that some judicial participation 
is acceptable as long as it is not "excessive."  Majority op. at 
¶45.  The majority adds that a judge's participation is "more 
appropriate during the reconstruction of a warrant application 
than it might be during the reconstruction of a trial segment."  
Majority op. at ¶46. 
¶69 The majority asserts that the judge's testimony is 
"particularly helpful given the ex parte nature of the warrant 
application process, and the limited number of participants in 
the application process."  Majority op. at ¶46.  I, however, 
conclude that it is exactly these qualities of the warrant 
application process——the ex parte nature of the proceeding and 
No.  00-1086-CR.awb 
 
 
 
6
the presence of witnesses for only one side——that demand the 
strictest caution in reconstructing a warrant application.  I am 
bothered by the specter of a warrant-issuing judge as the 
State's star witness at a reconstruction proceeding.  As a 
general rule it will prove difficult for a judge's role as an 
active participant in a reconstruction hearing to coexist with 
that judge's role as a neutral and detached decision maker.  
Asking judges to fill both roles places them in an awkward and 
unseemly position. 
¶70 Some of the judge's questions at the reconstruction 
hearing in this case raise the Glodowski problem because they 
provide crucial information that was not a part of Detective 
Kocher's affidavit:  information supporting the reliability of 
the informant and information providing a nexus between the 
location of the search and the location set forth in the 
affidavit.  The search warrant included authorization to search 
Raflik's house, although Kocher's affidavit stated that he had 
seen marijuana plants only in an unattached garage and "in an 
orchard behind the residence."  Kocher's affidavit did not 
provide any particular facts establishing a nexus between 
Raflik's house and the drug evidence found in the yard and 
unattached garage.  Instead, it was the judge's leading 
questions that solidified a link between the house and the 
garage and verified the reliability of Kocher's informant.  Yet, 
the majority concludes that these questions "did not amount to 
excessive testimony" without telling us what would be excessive.  
Majority op. at ¶48. 
No.  00-1086-CR.awb 
 
 
 
7
III 
¶71 I 
would 
require 
procedures 
different 
from 
the 
majority's that would better protect the defendant's right to 
meaningful review and do less damage to the judge's role as a 
neutral and detached decision maker.  The police investigators, 
the district attorney, and the judge involved in the warrant 
application should independently prepare affidavits detailing 
their recollections of the information in support of probable 
cause.  Because police investigators who applied for the warrant 
may also have executed it, they should specifically aver whether 
the information supplied in their affidavits was known to them 
at the time of the warrant application.  As the State 
acknowledges, 
this 
sort 
of 
independent 
reconstruction has 
support in case law and is preferable to the procedure approved 
by the majority.  See State v. Smith, 941 P.2d 691, 694 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1997.) 
¶72 As the State also advances, if reconstruction is done 
independently, then the defendant has a meaningful opportunity 
to challenge the reconstruction at a suppression hearing.  At 
that hearing, a judge other than the judge who issued the 
warrant would preside.  This procedure would better maintain 
each judge's neutral role, and it is yet another safeguard 
recommended by the State that the majority does not require.    
¶73 Finally, I note that although the majority correctly 
acknowledges that under Perry and DeLeon, a circuit court is to 
determine that reconstruction is accurate to the "same level of 
proof as the proceeding that is being reconstructed," the 
No.  00-1086-CR.awb 
 
 
 
8
majority nevertheless concludes that the burden the State must 
meet is a preponderance of the evidence because that is 
"generally appropriate in a suppression hearing."  Majority op. 
at ¶¶55-56 (emphasis added).  The proceeding to be reconstructed 
in this case, however, is a warrant application where the State 
must establish probable cause.  See State v. Higginbotham, 162 
Wis. 2d 978, 989, 471 N.W.2d 24 (1991). 
¶74 What does the majority mean when it says it agrees 
with the State that "the trial court must find, by a 
preponderance 
of 
the 
evidence, 
that 
the 
reconstruction 
adequately 
replaces 
the 
missing 
portion 
of 
the 
record"?  
Majority op. at ¶53.  How does this burden relate to the 
requirement that the State show probable cause for a warrant or 
prove facts beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case? 
¶75 The majority's statement of the burden of proof is 
deceptively simple.  It gives little indication as to how the 
standard applies when it concludes without explanation that "the 
trial court had ample evidence to conclude that the State met 
its burden of proof in reconstructing the warrant application, 
and in doing so, protected Raflik's right to a meaningful 
appeal."  Majority op. at ¶57. 
¶76 In sum, I do not agree with the majority that Raflik's 
right to meaningful review was adequately protected by the 
reconstruction procedures employed.  Additional safeguards are 
necessary when a court attempts by an ex parte proceeding to 
reconstruct in its entirety another ex parte proceeding.  The 
procedures 
approved 
by 
the 
majority 
both 
compromise 
a 
No.  00-1086-CR.awb 
 
 
 
9
defendant's right to meaningful review and undermine the warrant 
judge's role as a neutral decision maker.  Thus, I would reverse 
the decision of the court of appeals.  
¶77 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
 
 
No.  00-1086-CR.awb 
 
 
 
1