Title: BAHM v DORMANEN

State: montana

Issuer: Montana Supreme Court

Document:

No. 12949 I N THE SUPREME C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1975 JOAN M. BAHM, as Administratrix of t h e Estate of F R A N K BAHM, Deceased and individually a s representative of herself and the minor children of FRAKBAHM, Deceased, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, R O N A L D DORMANEN, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable E. Gardner Brownlee, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellant : Johnson and Foster , Lewis town, Montana Robert L. Johnson argued, Lewis town, Montana For Respondent : Garlington, Lohn and Robinson, Missoula , Montana Gary L. Graham argued, Missoula, Montana Submitted : September 22, 1975 Decided :Ec f 0 1975 M r . J u s t i c e Wesley Castles delivered t h e Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal By p l a i n t i f f i n a personal i n j u r y action from a summary judgment f o r defendant by the d i s t r i c t court, Missoula County, the Hon. E. Gardner Brownlee, presiding. P l a i n t i f f i n i t i a t e d t h i s survival and wrongful death action a f t e r a head-on automobile c o l l i s i o n on U.S. Highway 93 south of Missoula involving a vehicle driven by her husband Frank Bahm, and a vehicle driven by one William Nordahl on October 31, 1970. Nordahl and Bahm died a s a r e s u l t of the accident. The vehicle driven by Nordahl was owned by Jack Tripp. Defendant Dormanen was not present a t t h e c o l l i s i o n scene. The events leading t o the f a t a l accident revolve about a decision made by Nordahl and defendant Ronald Dormanen t o go on a hunting t r i p . This decision was made while they were drinking a t the Florence bar i n Florence, Montana. After deciding t o go hunting, t h e two men proceeded t o Stevensville where they borrowed a pickup and horse t r a i l e r from Jack Tripp. Dormanen then drove the pickup and horse t r a i l e r t o ~ o r d a h l ' s home t o get Nordahl's horse. Next Dormanen drove the Tripp truck t o Florence so t h a t he could get h i s c a r and drive it home. Nordahl was t o follow Dormanen home i n the Tripp vehicle. The c o l l i s i o n between ~ a h m ' s vehicle and the pickup driven by Nordahl occurred before Nordahl reached Dormanen's home. Dormanen had already driven home i n h i s own c a r and did n o t learn of t h e accident u n t i l l a t e r . A t e s t of Nordahl's blood indicated t h a t he was intoxicated a t the time of the accident. Prior t o bringing t h i s action, p l a i n t i f f brought another survival and wrongful death'action against Jack Tripp and the Estate of William Nordahl, which was s e t t l e d out of court. I n the i n s t a n t case, a f t e r t h e answer was f i l e d and discovery accomplished, defendant moved f o r summary judgment. After a hearing Judge Brownlee granted the motion which i s now before t h i s Court on appeal. P l a i n t i f f c i t e s three aspects of the case which she contends present genuine issues of material f a c t making summary judgment improper. However, we need only discuss the aspect of the case r e l a t i n g t o the theory upon which the r i g h t t o recover i s based t o determine t h e propriety of summary judgment here. It is well established t h a t summary judgment pursuant t o Rule 56(c), Montana Rules of C i v i l Procedure, i s not a proper t o o l f o r resolving disputed issues of f a c t . The burden of establishing t h a t there i s no disputed issue of material f a c t i s on the moving party. Flanagan v. Curran, 164 Mont. 262, 265, 521 P.2d 200 and cases c i t e d therein. Before the d i s t r i c t court and i n t h i s Court, p l a i n t i f f asserted t h a t defendant has not met h i s burden because f a c t u a l determinations were required t o resolve defendant's l i a b i l i t y under the theory of negligent entrustment. But, a f t e r examining the record, we find no f a c t s i n existence o r offered t o the d i s t r i c t court which give r i s e t o a genuine i s s u e of material f a c t concerning negligent entrustment by the defendant. Specifically the theory of negligent entrustment provides t h a t the owner o r one i n control of the vehicle and responsible f o r i t s use who i s negligent i n entrusting it t o another can be held l i a b l e f o r such negligent entrustment. Anno. 19 ALR3d 1175,1192. See Smith v. Babcock, 157 Mont. 81, 482 P.2d 1014, f o r a p r i o r treatment of the concept by t h i s Court. In h i s memorandum t o the d i s t r i c t court, defendant c i t e d evidence from depositions which he asserted proved t h e absence of one of the elements of negligent entrustment---the r i g h t of control over the vehicle---because it had been loaned t o both Nordahl and defendant. P l a i n t i f f does not dispute this f a c t t h a t the vehicle was loaned t o both men, but i n s i s t s t h a t defendant did have the physical power (by depriving Nordahl of the keys) t o prevent Nordahl from taking the truck. This power p l a i n t i f f argues i s substantial enough control t o bottom l i a b i l i t y under negligent entrustment. Alternatively, p l a i n t i f f advances the theory of j o i n t enterprise a s a b a s i s f o r l i a b i l i t y , even i f Nordahl and defendant only shared control of the vehicle. Therefore, it i s necessary t o determine the scope of t h e concept of control a s it r e l a t e s t o negligent entrustment. W e look f o r guidance t o cases from t h e s t a t e of Maryland where t h e theory of negligent entrustment has had a r e l a t i v e l y long history. In adopting negligent entrustment i n the case of Rounds v. P h i l l i p s , 166 M d . 151, 170 A . 532, the Maryland court c i t e d Restatement of Torts, 5 260, a s support f o r t h e doctrine. That section i s now 5 390, 2 Restatement of Torts 2d, and i t s a p p l i c a b i l i t y was /reaffirmed i n the Maryland cases of General Valet Service, Inc. v. Curley, 16 Md.App. 453, 298 A.2d 190,192, and Curley v. General Valet Service, Inc., 270 Md. 248, 311 A.2d 231,237. 2 Restatement of Torts 2d, 5 390 provides: I t One who supplies d i r e c t l y o r through a t h i r d person a c h a t t e l f o r the use of another whom the supplier knows o r has reason t o know t o be l i k e l y because of h i s youth, inexperience o r otherwise, t o use it i n a manner involving unreasonable r i s k of physical harm t o himself and others whom t h e supplier should expect t o share i n o r be endangered by i t s use, i s subject t o l i a b i l i t y f o r physical harm r e s u l t i n g t o them. I I (Emphasis added.) Discussion following 5 390 s t a t e s it i s merely a special applica- t i o n of 5 308, which provides: 11 It is negligence t o permit a t h i r d person t o use a thing o r t o engage i n an a c t i v i t y which i s under the control of the a c t o r , i f the a c t o r knows o r should know t h a t such person intends o r i s l i k e l y t o use the thing o r t o conduct himself i n t h e a c t i v i t y i n such a manner a s t o c r e a t e an unreasonable r i s k of harm t o others. " (Emphasis added.) Comments t o 5 308, 2 Restatement of Torts 2d, indicate control means : 'I* * * t h a t the t h i r d person i s e n t i t l e d t o possess o r use the thing o r engage i n t h e a c t i v i t y only-by the consent of the a c t o r , and t h a t t h e actor has reason t o believe t h a t by withholding consent he can prevent the t h i r d person from using t h e thing o r engaging i n the a c t i v i t y . " (Emphasis added.) From the above sections and o f f i c i a l comments, it i s c l e a r t h a t the basis of negligent entrustment i s founded on control which i s greater than physical power t o prevent. A superior i f not exclu- sive l e g a l r i g h t t o the object is a precondition t o the imposition of the l e g a l duty. Defendant offered t o the d i s t r i c t court such proof a s t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t he did not have such exclusive o r superior con- t r o l of t h e Tripp truck. Thus, a s a matter of law, he was e n t i t l e d t o summary judgment unless p l a i n t i f f could overcome t h i s proof. p l a i n t i f f ' s physical control arguments a r e i n s u f f i c i e n t t o overcome defendant's proof i n view of the above discussion. The only other b a s i s f o r reversing summary judgment, according t o p l a i n t i f f , i s t h e theory of j o i n t enterprise. Montana case law has determined t h e elements of j o i n t venture t o include a community of pecuniary i n t e r e s t a s well a s j o i n t control. Rude v. Neal, 165 Mont. 520, 530 P.2d 428, 432, 31 St.Rep. 1033; KapLan v. Hauf, 158 Mont. 359, 366, 492 P.2d 213; Sumner v. Amacher, 150 Mont. 544, 554, 437 P.2d 630. Although p l a i n t i f f urges t h i s Court t o find a community of pecuniary i n t e r e s t i n the planned hunting t r i p we can find no evidence of a pecuniary motivation f o r t h e expedition. Rude v. Neal, supra. In addition there was not the r e q u i s i t e j o i n t control between Nordahl and defendant a t the time of the accident because Nordahl was driving alone. Hence, we find there was s u f f i c i e n t credible evidence and no material f a c t s t o the contrary t o permit the d i s t r i c t court t o grant summary judgment t o defendant. Judgment i s a££ irmed. We concur: Chief Justice