Title: In re W.K.

State: north-carolina

Issuer: North Carolina Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
2021-NCSC-146 
No. 530A20 
Filed 5 November 2021 
IN THE MATTER OF: W.K. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 22 
September 2020 by Judge Laurie L. Hutchins in District Court, Forsyth County. This 
matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 30 September 2021 
but determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) 
of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.  
 
Andrew L. Fitzgerald for petitioner-appellees. 
 
No brief for appellee Guardian ad Litem. 
 
Peter Wood for respondent-appellant father. 
 
 
HUDSON, Justice. 
 
¶ 1 
 
This case involves a private termination of parental rights proceeding initiated 
by petitioners, the paternal grandmother and step-grandfather of W.K. (Wallace).1 
Respondent, Wallace’s father, appeals from the trial court’s order terminating his 
parental rights. We affirm. 
 
I. 
Factual Background and Procedural History 
                                            
1 A pseudonym is used to protect the identity of the juvenile and for ease of reading. 
IN RE W.K. 
2021-NCSC-146 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
¶ 2 
 
In April 2015, Wallace was born to respondent and Wallace’s biological mother 
in Virginia. Respondent and Wallace’s mother were never married. Wallace lived with 
his mother. Respondent did not live with them. On 25 November 2015, respondent 
was indicted on federal drug-related charges and subsequently pled guilty in the 
United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia to conspiracy to 
possess with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of methamphetamine. On 23 
September 2016, respondent was sentenced to a term of ninety-five months 
imprisonment, followed by four years of supervised release. His projected release date 
is 4 July 2022. 
¶ 3 
 
In June 2017, petitioners were contacted by the Wythe County Department of 
Social Services in Virginia after Wallace’s mother was arrested. A 16 June 2017 safety 
plan developed by the Wythe County Department of Social Services reflects 
allegations of physical and mental abuse and neglect of Wallace by his mother. 
Petitioners traveled to Virginia to pick up Wallace, and Wallace has been in 
petitioners’ custody in North Carolina since 16 June 2017. On 13 July 2017, 
petitioners were granted sole legal and physical custody of Wallace.  
¶ 4 
 
On 2 May 2019, petitioners filed a petition to adopt Wallace. That same day, 
petitioners filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights.2 Petitioners 
                                            
2 Petitioners also filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Wallace’s mother, 
and her rights were terminated. She is not a party to this appeal. 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
alleged that in December 2015, prior to having custody of Wallace, they reported to 
Wallace’s mother their observations that Wallace had weakness in the left side of his 
body and did not appear to be hitting age-appropriate milestones. However, Wallace’s 
mother did not seek medical attention for Wallace to address their concerns. After 
they took custody of Wallace, petitioners immediately established medical care for 
Wallace, and on 29 June 2017, Wallace was diagnosed with cerebral palsy. Wallace 
was also diagnosed with a vision development disorder. He has numerous medical 
caregivers, including a primary care provider, pediatric neurologist, pediatric 
orthopedist, occupational therapist, physical therapist, and speech therapist, and 
petitioners have managed all medical care for Wallace since June 2017.  
¶ 5 
 
Petitioners further alleged as follows: respondent failed to obtain adequate 
medical care for Wallace; Wallace had been abused or neglected by respondent; 
respondent was incapable of providing for the proper care and supervision of Wallace 
such that Wallace was a dependent juvenile, and there was a reasonable probability 
that the incapacity would continue for the foreseeable future; respondent had 
willfully abandoned Wallace for at least six consecutive months immediately 
preceding the filing of the petition; respondent had not had any physical contact or 
communication with Wallace since August 2018; and respondent had not made any 
payments to petitioners for the benefit of Wallace. 
¶ 6 
 
A hearing on the petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights was held 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
on 14 July 2020. The trial court entered an order on 22 September 2020 concluding 
that grounds existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights in Wallace based on 
neglect, willfully leaving Wallace in a placement outside of the home for more than 
twelve months without making reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led 
to his removal, failure to pay child support, and willful abandonment. The trial court 
also determined that it was in Wallace’s best interests that respondent’s parental 
rights be terminated, and the court terminated his parental rights. Respondent 
appeals. 
II. 
Analysis 
¶ 7 
 
Initially, respondent argues that the trial court committed prejudicial error by 
terminating his parental rights when it failed to articulate the specific statutory 
grounds supporting termination. Respondent’s argument is based on the failure of 
the trial court to state in its “CONCLUSIONS OF LAW” section of the termination 
order which subsection of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111 it was relying upon when determining 
that grounds existed to terminate his parental rights. We are not persuaded. 
¶ 8 
 
It is well established that in order to terminate a respondent’s parental rights, 
the trial court must “adjudicate the existence . . . of any of the circumstances set forth 
in G.S. 7B-1111.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(e) (2019). “[T]he trial court must enter sufficient 
findings of fact and conclusions of law to reveal the reasoning which led to the court’s 
ultimate decision.” In re D.R.B., 182 N.C. App. 733, 736 (2007). Whether a trial court 
IN RE W.K. 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
classifies statements as findings of fact or conclusions of law, “that classification 
decision does not alter the fact that the trial court’s determination concerning the 
extent to which a parent’s parental rights in a child are subject to termination on the 
basis of a particular ground must have sufficient support in the trial court’s factual 
findings.” In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. 71, 77 (2019).  
¶ 9 
 
Under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), a trial court may terminate parental rights if 
it concludes that the parent has neglected the juvenile within the meaning of 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-101. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) (2019). A neglected juvenile is defined, 
in pertinent part, as a juvenile “whose parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker does 
not provide proper care, supervision, or discipline; or who has been abandoned; . . . or 
who lives in an environment injurious to the juvenile’s welfare.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-
101(15) (2019).  
Termination of parental rights based upon this statutory 
ground requires a showing of neglect at the time of the 
termination hearing or, if the child has been separated 
from the parent for a long period of time, there must be a 
showing of a likelihood of future neglect by the 
parent. When determining whether such future neglect is 
likely, the district court must consider evidence of changed 
circumstances occurring between the period of past neglect 
and the time of the termination hearing. 
 
In re R.L.D., 375 N.C. 838, 841 (2020) (cleaned up). 
 
¶ 10 
 
Here, the trial court stated in finding of fact 88 that “[a]s to the ground of 
neglect in the for [sic] termination of parental rights, this Court has found herein 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
neglect in the past in 2017.” Wallace was placed with petitioners in 2017 due to 
respondent’s and Wallace’s mother’s drug addictions and the injurious environment 
in which Wallace was living. The trial court further found that there was a high 
probability of future neglect by respondent because he had not demonstrated that he 
had overcome his drug habit through completing substance abuse treatment in 
prison, by attending Narcotics Anonymous, or by receiving negative drug tests, and 
he 
had 
not 
completed 
any 
significant 
substance 
abuse 
treatment 
for 
methamphetamine use. In addition, the trial court found that respondent’s pattern 
of inconsistent contact and lack of interest in Wallace, both before and after 
incarceration, revealed “a pattern of neglectful behavior and a higher likelihood of 
neglect in the future.” These findings clearly reveal the trial court’s reasoning which 
led to its ultimate determination to terminate respondent’s parental rights for neglect 
under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1). Moreover, as later discussed, this determination is 
supported by ample evidence and findings. Thus, any potential error is harmless. See 
In re Bluebird, 105 N.C. App. 42, 51 (1992) (holding that although “[t]he more efficient 
and prudent practice for trial courts is to delineate the specific grounds for 
termination,” the error is harmless when the findings of fact support a legal 
conclusion that grounds for termination exist).  
¶ 11 
 
Next, respondent argues that the trial court erred in concluding that grounds 
existed to terminate his parental rights based on neglect. We disagree. 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
¶ 12 
 
 “Our Juvenile Code provides for a two-step process for termination of parental 
rights proceedings consisting of an adjudicatory stage and a dispositional stage.” In 
re Z.A.M., 374 N.C. 88, 94 (2020) (citing N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109, -1110 (2019)). “At the 
adjudicatory stage, the petitioner bears the burden of proving by ‘clear, cogent, and 
convincing evidence’ the existence of one or more grounds for termination under 
section 7B-1111(a) of the General Statutes.” In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. 3, 5–6 (2019) 
(quoting N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f) (2019)). If the trial court finds the existence of one or 
more grounds to terminate the respondent’s parental rights, the matter proceeds to 
the dispositional stage where the court must determine whether terminating the 
parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s best interests. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). 
¶ 13 
 
We review a trial court’s adjudication of grounds to terminate parental rights 
“to determine whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing 
evidence and the findings support the conclusions of law.” In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 
392 (2019) (quoting In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 111 (1984)). “A trial court’s 
finding of fact that is supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence is deemed 
conclusive even if the record contains evidence that would support a contrary 
finding.” In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. 372, 379 (2019). Unchallenged findings are deemed 
to be supported by the evidence and are binding on appeal. In re Z.L.W., 372 N.C. 
432, 437 (2019). “The trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewable de novo on 
appeal.” In re C.B.C., 373 N.C. 16, 19 (2019). 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
¶ 14 
 
Here, the trial court found that Wallace was born in April 2015, at a time when 
respondent was addicted to illegal drugs. In 2015, respondent was addicted to 
methamphetamines and supported his addiction by selling methamphetamines. 
After Wallace’s birth, respondent did not live with Wallace, had minimal contact with 
him, and did not bond with him. Respondent never paid child support to Wallace’s 
mother, who had custody of Wallace from his birth until 14 June 2017. Respondent 
was convicted in May 2016 in the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Virginia for conspiring to distribute methamphetamine and has a projected 
release date of July 2022. The trial court also made the following relevant findings of 
fact: 
48. This Court finds that [Wallace] was a neglected juvenile 
in June of 2017; neglect has been proven by clear cogent 
and convincing evidence. [Wallace] had cerebral palsy and 
blindness in his left eye for a considerable time period and 
the Respondents, both who were addicted to drugs, failed 
to treat these medical issues, or get adequate medical 
treatment causing [Wallace] to suffer. Further, while he 
was in the physical custody of Respondent/Biological 
mother, [Wallace] was left in an area accessible to illegal 
drugs and marijuana and left alone in an unsafe and 
injurious environment. Further, Respondent/Biological 
Father had a long history of criminal activity and drug 
addiction 
that 
led 
to 
his 
incarceration, 
and 
Respondent/Biological Father could not protect [Wallace] 
or provide safe placement for him. 
 
49. Since the Petitioners have had custody of [Wallace] 
from 
June 
2017, 
[Wallace] 
has 
visited 
with 
Respondent/Biological Father at the Bennettsville, S.C. 
Federal Prison facility. The visits occurred in 2016, 2017, 
IN RE W.K. 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
and 2018 when [Wallace] was 2, 3, and 4 years old. He has 
not visited with Respondent/Biological Father in 2019 and 
in 2020, for a period of two years. [Wallace] does not 
remember 
the 
visits 
with 
Respondent/Biological 
Father. . . . 
 
50. 
From 
June 
of 
2017 
to 
February 
2020, 
Respondent/Biological 
Father 
called 
his 
mother[/]petitioner 
approximately 
once 
a 
month. 
Respondent/Biological Father asked his mother for money 
for his jail commissary account. Respondent/Biological 
Father 
said 
“hello” 
to 
[Wallace] 
on 
some 
calls. 
Respondent/Biological Father did not always ask to speak 
to [Wallace]. When he did ask, he was never denied the 
chance to speak to [Wallace]. Any of Respondent/Biological 
Father’s conversations with [Wallace] at two and three 
years old were not substantive communication. When 
[Wallace] was 4 or 5, there was slightly more 
communication but not much. Respondent/Biological 
Father testified “it’s hard to get a child that age to talk”. 
The Court finds there was no meaningful substantive 
conversation between [Wallace] and Respondent/Biological 
Father during the calls that established a bond or a 
relationship between them. The Respondent/Biological 
Father did not inquire about [Wallace’s] health, but the 
Petitioners did tell Respondent/Biological Father about 
updates on his serious health conditions. [Wallace] did not 
call Respondent/Biological Father “Dad” on the phone calls.  
 
51. Since June of 2017 to June 11, 2020, the 
Respondent/Biological Father has sent emails on the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons website Core Links to his 
mother . . . . Respondent/Biological Father’s emails to her 
were about his own status in jail and requests for money 
and were not concerned about [Wallace]. [Respondent’s 
mother] told him Respondent/Biological Father that 
[Wallace] had cerebral palsy and about updates about 
[Wallace’s] health. The Court finds that the emails did not 
help 
establish 
a 
bond 
or 
relationship 
between 
Respondent/Biological Father and [Wallace]. 
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52. Respondent/Biological Father has not read books on 
cerebral palsy or any of [Wallace’s] medical conditions or 
educated himself on those topics by using the prison 
library. 
 
53. Respondent/Biological Father has never written a letter 
to [Wallace]. Respondent/Biological Father sent [Wallace] 
one birthday card. Respondent/Biological Father has been 
in prison for all five of [Wallace]’s birthdays. 
 
54. Respondent/Biological Father sent one gift to [Wallace] 
at Christmas 2018 through the Toys for Tots program in 
prison. 
 
. . . .  
 
60. That [Wallace] has numerous medical and related 
caregivers in Forsyth County, including, but not limited to 
a primary care provider, a pediatric neurologist, a pediatric 
orthopedist, an occupational therapist . . . , a physical 
therapist . . . , speech therapists . . . , and psychologists. 
 
. . . .  
 
74. Respondent/Father has not assisted, offered to assist, 
contacted, or requested any information regarding 
[Wallace]’s numerous providers. 
 
. . . .  
 
77. Neither Respondent has assisted, offered to assist, 
contacted, or requested any information about [Wallace]’s 
daycare, early childhood, or school enrollment, or academic 
progress. 
 
. . . .  
 
79. The Respondent/Biological Father testified he has 
completed 
a 
mandatory 
12-hour 
substance 
abuse 
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treatment course in 2017. He did not offer into evidence a 
certificate of completion. Therefore, the Court cannot 
assess the program. The Court does not find by clear, 
cogent, and convincing evidence that he completed a 
substance abuse program. 
 
80. Respondent/Biological Father testified that there is a 
residential drug abuse treatment program [RDAP] for 12 
months in the federal prison system. He stated he was on 
a waitlist. Significant to the Court is that he has not 
completed the program in the four (4) years he has been 
incarcerated. If he had completed it, [Wallace] would have 
been able to attend “family day” at prison and 
Respondent/Biological Father would have been able to 
spend quality time with [Wallace]. 
 
81. 
Respondent/Biological 
Father 
testified that 
he 
completed a parenting course in prison in 2017. He did not 
introduce a certificate of completion. Therefore, the Court 
cannot assess the program. The Court does not find by 
clear, 
cogent, 
and 
convincing 
evidence 
that 
Respondent/Biological Father completed a parenting class.  
 
82. 
[Respondent’s 
mother] 
testified 
that 
Respondent/Biological Father has admitted to her he still 
uses drugs in prison. She was concerned that the money 
she sent him was used to pay for drugs. On one occasion, 
she stated Respondent/Biological Father asked her to put 
money in a third party commissary account. When 
Petitioner looked up the third party on the Federal Bureau 
of Prisons ‘Find An Inmate’ website, she found this third 
person had been charged with selling drugs inside the 
prison. The Court does not find by clear, cogent, and 
convincing evidence that Respondent/Biological Father has 
continued to use illegal drugs in prison. He is given random 
drug screens in prison and no positive or negative tests 
were introduced into evidence for the Court to consider and 
make a finding of fact concerning drug use in prison. 
 
. . . .  
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
 
84. Respondent/Biological Father has a daughter . . . who 
is 
six 
months 
younger 
than 
[Wallace] . . . . 
Respondent/Biological Father communicates with [his 
daughter’s mother] weekly and speaks to [his daughter] 
weekly. There was no evidence [his daughter] has special 
needs. Respondent/Biological Father has paid child 
support . . . [for his daughter] while incarcerated in 
2016. . . . 
Respondent/Biological 
Father 
asks 
the 
Petitioners to bring [his daughter] to visit him in prison, 
but not [Wallace]. The Court finds as a fact that 
Respondent/Biological Father favors [his daughter] over 
[Wallace] in that he talks to her regularly, is interested in 
her wellbeing, and has sent financial support for her 
maintenance and not for [Wallace]. 
 
. . . .  
 
86. On June 11, 2020, Respondent/Biological Father 
removed Petitioners from his email contact list on Core 
Links. . . . This prevented email contact between the 
parties from June 11, 2020, to present, approximately one 
month. . . .  
 
. . . .  
 
88. As to the ground of neglect in the for [sic] termination 
of parental rights, this Court has found herein neglect in 
the past in 2017. The Court must further determine 
whether there is a future likelihood of neglect when the 
child has been separated from the Respondents for a long 
period of time. In the instant case, [Wallace] was placed 
with the Petitioners in 2017 due to both of the Respondents’ 
drug addictions and injurious environments. When 
Respondent/Biological Father was out on bail, he 
attempted a thirty day inpatient program for his 
methamphetamine addiction and failed to complete it. 
There has been no substantial change in three years to 
show the Court that either Respondent has beaten their 
drug habits. There has been no substantial change in three 
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years to show the Court that the Respondent/Biological 
Father has beaten his drug habit through substance abuse 
treatment in prison, by attending NA, or by negative drug 
tests. The Court finds there is high probability of neglect 
by both of Respondents as neither has completed any 
significant 
substance 
abuse 
treatment 
for 
methamphetamine. [This is true even if the Court 
considers Respondent/Biological Father’s 12 hours of 
treatment, as it is not enough for his level of addiction]. 
Each of the Respondents’ future behavior as addicts or 
using methamphetamines would create an injurious 
environment and have a severely adverse impact on 
[Wallace] and his course of treatment for serious medical 
conditions. This failure of both Respondents to complete 
substance abuse treatment is indicative of future neglect. 
The Court finds as a fact that the future likelihood of 
neglect has been proven by clear, cogent, and convincing 
evidence. 
 
89. Respondent/Biological Father’s incarceration is neither 
a sword nor a shield for him in this case. His incarceration 
does not shield him from his neglect of [Wallace]. The Court 
has looked at the Respondent/Biological Father’s behavior 
before and during his incarceration. In looking at his 
behavior 
before 
incarceration, 
Respondent/Biological 
Father has a long history of drug use and criminal activity 
which leads to the conclusion that there is a high indication 
of 
future 
neglect. 
Before 
his 
incarceration, 
Respondent/Biological Father had no bond or relationship 
with [Wallace]. His prior history of inconsistent visitation 
and 
contact 
with 
[Wallace] 
[when 
he 
was 
in 
Respondent/Biological Mother’s custody until the age of 
two] shows the Court a pattern of neglect. After 
Respondent/Biological Father’s incarceration, he has 
continued a pattern of inconsistent contact with [Wallace] 
through July of 2020 by sending no letters, sending one 
card, and only sending one gift in 4 years. During his 
[incarceration], the Respondent/Biological Father has 
established no bond or relationship with [Wallace]. Both 
periods of time, before and after incarceration, show 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
inconsistent contact and lack of interest in [Wallace] by 
Respondent/Biological Father. This shows a pattern of 
neglectful behavior and a higher likelihood of neglect in the 
future. 
 
¶ 15 
 
Respondent challenges findings of fact 48, 50, 82, 88, and 89. With regard to 
finding of fact 48, petitioners’ exhibit 3, which was submitted into evidence at the 
termination hearing, detailed respondent’s lengthy criminal history dating back to 
2012. Respondent’s mother testified to respondent’s history of drug use and that 
drugs were found within Wallace’s reach while Wallace was in his mother’s custody. 
Respondent’s mother testified that as far back as December 2015, she observed 
Wallace and had concerns about his development. Wallace was not using his left arm, 
crawling, or attempting to stand. Respondent’s mother voiced her concerns to 
Wallace’s mother, but Wallace’s mother did not seek medical attention. Immediately 
upon gaining custody of Wallace, petitioners took Wallace to get examined, and he 
was diagnosed with cerebral palsy and blindness in his left eye. Therefore, the trial 
court’s finding of fact 48 is supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. 
¶ 16 
 
As to finding of fact 50, testimony given at the termination hearing confirms 
that from the time petitioners had custody of Wallace until February, respondent 
would call his mother from prison approximately once a month. Petitioners testified 
that during these calls, respondent would ask his mother for money. Respondent 
testified that he would talk to Wallace on the phone “sometimes here and there.” 
While respondent’s mother allowed respondent to speak with Wallace, respondent 
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admitted that he could not “hold a conversation with a child [Wallace’s] age.” Wallace 
stopped calling respondent “ ‘dad’ a while ago.” Petitioners testified that although 
they shared Wallace’s diagnoses with respondent, respondent did not inquire about 
Wallace’s diagnoses or status of his health, inquire about Wallace’s medical 
treatment, request copies of medical records, or ask for the names of Wallace’s 
medical providers. Thus, finding of fact 50 is supported by clear, cogent, and 
convincing evidence, and the trial court’s finding that there was “no meaningful 
substantive conversation” between respondent and Wallace is a reasonable inference 
from that evidence. See In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. 835, 843 (2016) (stating that it is the 
trial judge’s duty to consider all the evidence, pass upon the credibility of the 
witnesses, and determine the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom). 
¶ 17 
 
Record evidence also supports finding of fact 82. Respondent’s mother testified 
that respondent admitted to still using drugs in prison. Respondent asked her to put 
money in another prisoner’s account, and when respondent’s mother searched online 
for that inmate’s name, she discovered that inmate was under investigation for 
smuggling drugs into prison. Respondent later testified that the prison administered 
random drug tests. From this evidence, it was within the trial court’s discretion to 
not find by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that respondent had continued to 
abuse illegal drugs in prison. See In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. at 843. 
¶ 18 
 
With regard to finding of fact 88, respondent’s mother testified that prior to 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
respondent pleading guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute fifty 
grams or more of methamphetamine in May 2016, he was out on bail. During this 
time, respondent began a thirty-day inpatient program for his drug addiction but 
failed to complete it. In June of 2017, Wallace entered petitioners’ custody after his 
mother was arrested. Respondent testified that he finished a twelve-hour substance 
abuse treatment program in 2017. However, an unchallenged finding of fact, which 
is binding on appeal, establishes that respondent did not offer a certificate of 
completion for the twelve-hour program, and the trial court could not find by clear, 
cogent, and convincing evidence that he actually completed the program. 
Unchallenged finding of fact 80 also indicates that there was a twelve-month 
residential drug treatment program available to respondent, but he failed to complete 
the program during the four years he had been incarcerated. As such, the trial court’s 
finding of fact 88 is supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. Based upon 
the foregoing evidence and findings, the trial court made the reasonable inference 
that respondent had not made any substantial change in three years to demonstrate 
he had overcome his substance abuse issues and that respondent’s future behavior of 
abusing drugs would create an injurious environment for Wallace. See id. The trial 
court’s determination that there existed a high probability of future neglect by 
respondent is more properly classified a conclusion of law, see Sparks, 362 N.C. at 
185, and we address respondent’s challenge to this conclusion later. 
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¶ 19 
 
Finally, respondent challenges finding of fact 89, but this finding is supported 
by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. As previously discussed, petitioners’ exhibit 
3 reveals respondent’s lengthy criminal history, and respondent’s mother attested to 
respondent’s history of drug use. Respondent was not present at Wallace’s birth, and 
between Wallace’s birth and respondent’s arrest, Wallace visited respondent’s house 
twice. During his four years of incarceration, respondent admitted to sending no 
letters, sending a single birthday card, and sending only one gift to Wallace. 
Respondent would talk to Wallace on the phone “sometimes here and there” when he 
called petitioners but stated that it was difficult to “hold a conversation” with 
Wallace. Wallace’s guardian ad litem testified that Wallace considered petitioners his 
parents, not respondent or Wallace’s mother. Accordingly, the trial court’s finding of 
fact 88 is supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. The trial court 
reasonably inferred from the foregoing evidence that respondent’s inactions showed 
inconsistent contact and lack of interest in Wallace. See In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. at 843. 
The trial court’s determination that this showed a pattern of neglectful behavior and 
a higher likelihood of neglect in the future is more properly classified a conclusion of 
law, see Sparks, 362 N.C. at 185, and we address respondent’s challenge to this 
conclusion next. 
¶ 20 
 
Respondent argues that evidence at the termination hearing showed his 
changed circumstances, in that he was no longer “the same man who had plead guilty 
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and went to prison” and that “[g]iven the steps taken by [him], the trial court 
erroneously found a probability of future neglect.” He specifically contends that given 
his inability to pay child support and the efforts he made by taking advantage of 
programs offered in prison, the trial court erred in concluding there was a probability 
of future neglect. We disagree. 
¶ 21 
 
 “Our precedents 
are 
quite 
clear—and 
remain 
in 
full 
force—that 
‘[i]ncarceration, standing alone, is neither a sword nor a shield in a termination of 
parental rights decision.’ ” In re M.A.W., 370 N.C. 149, 153 (2017) (alteration in 
original) (quoting In re P.L.P., 173 N.C. App. 1, 10 (2005)). Incarceration 
“does not negate a father’s neglect of his child” because 
“[t]he sacrifices which parenthood often requires are not 
forfeited when the parent is in custody.” Thus, while 
incarceration may limit a parent’s ability “to show 
affection, it is not an excuse for [a parent’s] failure to show 
interest in [a child’s] welfare by whatever means 
available . . . .” 
In re S.D., 374 N.C. 67, 76 (2020) (alterations in original) (quoting In re C.L.S., 245 
N.C. App. 75, 78, aff’d per curiam, 369 N.C. 58 (2016)).  
¶ 22 
 
Respondent’s argument that he lacked the ability to pay any child support 
because he only made $14 a month is undermined by the trial court’s unchallenged 
finding that he sent money for his daughter’s care while he was incarcerated. 
Moreover, the trial court also found, based on respondent’s testimony, that 
respondent made small salaries from various positions he had while in prison but did 
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not provide support for Wallace. See, e.g., In re Bradshaw, 160 N.C. App. 677, 682 
(2003) (affirming termination of parental rights based on neglect when the 
incarcerated respondent was able to earn a small income in prison but failed to 
provide any financial aid to the petitioner in support of his child). 
¶ 23 
 
Respondent’s contention that the efforts he made by taking advantage of 
programs offered by the prison are likewise without merit. It is undisputed that 
Wallace was placed with petitioners in 2017 due to both respondent’s and Wallace’s 
mother’s drug addictions and the injurious environment in which Wallace was living. 
The record demonstrates that respondent was incarcerated prior to the period of past 
neglect in June 2017 and was still incarcerated at the time of the termination hearing. 
Unchallenged finding of fact 80 establishes that during the four years respondent had 
been incarcerated, he did not engage in a residential drug abuse treatment program 
accessible to him through the prison system. This program would have given 
respondent the opportunity to spend quality time with Wallace through the 
attendance at “family day” in the prison. Unchallenged findings 79 and 81 also 
establish that respondent could not produce proof that he completed a twelve-hour 
substance abuse program and parenting course available to him in prison, and thus 
the trial court could not find by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that 
respondent completed either. The foregoing findings support the trial court’s 
determination that because respondent had not completed substance abuse 
IN RE W.K. 
2021-NCSC-146 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
treatment, there had not been a substantial change in circumstances occurring 
between the period of past neglect and the time of the termination hearing.  
¶ 24 
 
In addition, the evidence and findings show that respondent made minimal 
efforts to show interest in Wallace’s welfare while incarcerated. The last time 
respondent saw Wallace was in 2018. Although respondent called his mother 
approximately once a month, he did not always request to speak with Wallace and 
when he did, there was no meaningful, substantive conversation between them. 
Respondent’s communications with his mother concerned his status in jail and 
requests for money. Despite being informed of Wallace’s serious medical conditions 
from petitioners, respondent failed to inquire about Wallace’s health, ask for updates 
on Wallace’s serious health conditions, research any of Wallace’s medical conditions, 
or request any information regarding Wallace’s healthcare providers. In addition, he 
failed to request any information about Wallace’s daycare or academic progress. 
While he was in prison for all five of Wallace’s birthdays, he only sent a single 
birthday card to Wallace, never wrote a letter to Wallace, and sent only one 
Christmas gift to Wallace. Respondent removed petitioners from his email contact 
list in early June 2020, preventing the parties from communicating. Moreover, the 
evidence and findings show how differently he treated his daughter by 
communicating with her weekly, sending money for her benefit, inquiring about her 
welfare, and requesting that petitioners bring her to visit him in prison but not asking 
IN RE W.K. 
2021-NCSC-146 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
that they bring Wallace. 
¶ 25 
 
The record evidence and the trial court’s findings establish that respondent 
had not completed substance abuse treatment by the time of the termination hearing, 
and he failed to show interest in Wallace’s welfare through the means available to 
him. Thus, the trial court reasonably concluded that there was a high probability that 
Wallace would be neglected in the future were he placed in respondent’s care. See In 
re D.L.A.D., 375 N.C. 565, 572 (2020) (holding that the trial court reasonably 
concluded the minor child would be neglected in the future if he were placed in the 
respondent-mother’s care when she originally stated she wished to have her parental 
rights terminated, did not attempt to visit her child for a period of over a year, had 
substance abuse issues and no evidence showed she ever received treatment for those 
issues, and her boyfriend who had substance abuse issues lived in her home); In re 
S.D., 374 N.C. at 87−88 (holding that evidence supported findings of past neglect and 
a repetition of neglect when the respondent had a history of criminal activity and 
substance abuse that resulted in his incarceration, failed to establish a relationship 
with his daughter prior to her being removed from the mother’s care, only made 
minimal efforts to show interest in his daughter while incarcerated, failed to develop 
a relationship with or show an ability to care for his daughter since his release from 
incarceration, and failed to make significant progress toward correcting the barriers 
to reunification).  
IN RE W.K. 
2021-NCSC-146 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
¶ 26 
 
The trial court’s finding that Wallace was previously neglected, which 
respondent does not challenge, and its determination that there was a high 
probability of a repetition of neglect support its conclusion that grounds existed to 
terminate respondent’s parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1). Because we 
uphold the trial court’s adjudication of grounds to terminate respondent’s parental 
rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and respondent does not challenge the trial 
court’s best interests determination at the dispositional stage, we do not address 
respondent’s remaining arguments3 and affirm the trial court’s order terminating his 
parental rights in Wallace. In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 404 (1982) (holding that an 
appealed order should be affirmed when any of the grounds for termination upon 
which the trial court relied are supported by findings of fact based on clear, cogent, 
and convincing evidence); see also N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) (“The court may terminate 
the parental rights upon a finding of one or more [grounds for termination.]”). 
AFFIRMED. 
                                            
3 Respondent challenges the trial court’s conclusion that grounds existed to terminate 
his parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2)–(3), (7). He also argues that the petition 
to terminate his parental rights failed to provide sufficient notice that petitioners were 
alleging grounds under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2).