Title: State v. Warrior

State: kansas

Issuer: Kansas Supreme Court

Document:

1 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 101,799 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
ALESIA WARRIOR, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
 
1. 
 
The safeguards of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 
694, reh. denied 385 U.S. 890 (1966), are triggered only when an accused is (1) in 
custody and (2) subject to interrogation. A custodial interrogation is defined as 
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into 
custody or otherwise deprived of his or her freedom in any significant way. A custodial 
interrogation is distinguished from an investigatory interrogation, which occurs as a 
routine part of the fact-finding process before the investigation has reached the 
accusatory stage.  
 
2. 
 
Factors to be considered in determining if an interrogation is investigative or 
custodial include:  (1) the time and place of the interrogation; (2) the duration of the 
interrogation; (3) the number of law enforcement officers present; (4) the conduct of the 
officers and the person subject to the interrogation; (5) the presence or absence of actual 
physical restraint or its functional equivalent, such as drawn firearms or a stationed 
guard; (6) whether the person is being questioned as a suspect or a witness; (7) whether 
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the person being questioned was escorted by officers to the interrogation location or 
arrived under his or her own power; and (8) the result of the interrogation, for instance, 
whether the person was allowed to leave, was detained further, or was arrested after the 
interrogation. No one factor outweighs another, nor do the factors bear equal weight. 
Every case must be analyzed on its own particular facts. 
 
3. 
 
Two discrete inquiries are essential to an appellate court's review of a trial court's 
determination of whether an interrogation is custodial. Under the first inquiry, the 
appellate court determines the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, employing a 
substantial competent evidence standard of review. In determining if there is substantial 
competent evidence supporting the existence of the circumstances found by the trial 
court, an appellate court does not reweigh evidence, assess the credibility of the 
witnesses, or resolve conflicting evidence. The second inquiry employs a de novo 
standard of review to determine whether, under the totality of those circumstances, a 
reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the interrogation and disengage from 
the encounter. 
 
4. 
 
Generally, other things being equal, a person questioned in familiar, or at least 
neutral, surroundings does not face the same pressures as one questioned in a police-
dominated atmosphere and this factor weighs against a conclusion that an interview was 
custodial. 
 
5. 
 
Restraint, as contemplated by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 
16 L. Ed. 2d 694, reh. denied 385 U.S. 890 (1966), is the interference with a person's 
freedom which is imposed by law enforcement officers. Consequently, a law enforcement 
interview of an accident victim at a hospital is not a custodial interrogation unless the 
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victim's confinement is instigated by law enforcement or controlled for custodial 
purposes. 
 
6. 
 
The fact a suspect is the focus of an investigation, standing alone, does not trigger 
the need for Miranda warnings. 
 
7. 
 
Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), 
prosecutors have a positive duty to disclose evidence favorable to the accused when the 
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad 
faith of the prosecution. 
 
8. 
 
Because law enforcement's knowledge of evidence is imputed to the State, a Brady 
violation can occur when the prosecutor withholds material evidence that is not known to 
the prosecutor but is known to law enforcement.  
 
9. 
 
Evidence that is favorable to the accused encompasses both exculpatory and 
impeachment evidence. For Brady purposes, there is no distinction between these two 
types of evidence that are favorable to the accused; thus, impeachment evidence is 
considered exculpatory.  
 
10. 
 
There are three components or essential elements of a Brady violation claim:  (1) 
The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, 
or because it is impeaching; (2) that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, 
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either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) the evidence must be material so as to establish 
prejudice. 
 
11. 
 
Under the test for materiality governing all categories of Brady violations, 
evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been 
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. 
 
12. 
 
The sliding scale test of materiality utilized in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 
103-07, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1976), is no longer used to determine whether 
there has been a Brady violation, and Kansas cases utilizing the test are disapproved.  
 
13. 
 
A trial court's determination as to the existence of a Brady violation is reviewed de 
novo with deference to the trial court's findings of fact, but the trial court's denial of the 
defendant's motion for new trial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. A trial 
court abuses its discretion when it applies an incorrect legal standard, misapplies the 
correct legal standard, or relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact. 
 
14. 
 
Once a reviewing court has applied the reasonable probability test to determine if 
there is a Brady violation, there is no need for further harmless error review. 
 
15. 
 
In the context of a violation of evidentiary limitations proscribed by the Kansas 
Code of Evidence, as opposed to a violation of a constitutional right, an appellate court 
applies the statutory harmless error standard of K.S.A. 60-261 and K.S.A. 60-2105 to 
5 
 
determine if there is a reasonable probability the error affected the outcome of the trial in 
light of the record as a whole. The party benefitting from the introduction of the evidence 
has the burden of persuasion. 
 
16. 
 
A trial court errs in giving an Allen-type jury instruction that states "[a]nother trial 
would be a burden on both sides." 
 
17. 
 
Kansas' hard 50 sentencing scheme under K.S.A. 21-4635 is not unconstitutional 
under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), 
and Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S. Ct. 1215, 143 L. Ed. 2d 311 (1999).  
 
 
18. 
 
In a cumulative error analysis, an appellate court aggregates all errors and, even 
though those errors would individually be considered harmless, analyzes whether their 
cumulative effect is such that collectively they cannot be determined to be harmless. In 
other words, was the defendant's right to a fair trial violated because the combined errors 
affected the outcome of the trial? 
 
 
Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; JOHN J. MCNALLY, judge. Opinion filed May 11, 2012. 
Affirmed. 
 
 
Korey A. Kaul, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief for 
appellant. 
 
 
Sheryl L. Lidtke, deputy district attorney, argued the cause, and Jerome A. Gorman, district 
attorney, and Steve Six, attorney general, were with her on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
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LUCKERT, J.:  Alesia Warrior (Warrior) was convicted by a jury of the 
premeditated first-degree murder of her husband, in violation of K.S.A. 21-3401(a), and 
conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, in violation of K.S.A. 21-3302 and K.S.A. 21-
3401. Warrior received a controlling hard 50 life sentence. In this direct appeal, she 
argues:  (1) statements she made to law enforcement officers while she was hospitalized 
were the result of a custodial interrogation and should have been suppressed because she 
had not been read her rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 
L. Ed. 2d 694, reh. denied 385 U.S. 890 (1966); (2) the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying Warrior's motion for new trial in which she alleged the State failed to disclose 
exculpatory evidence that pertained to a prior juvenile adjudication of a key prosecution 
witness; (3) the trial court erred in allowing the State to present hearsay testimony 
regarding statements made by the victim, Warrior's husband, indicating his belief that his 
marriage was in trouble; (4) the trial court erred in giving a deadlocked jury instruction 
prior to deliberations; (5) Kansas' hard 50 sentencing scheme under K.S.A. 21-4635 is 
unconstitutional; and (6) cumulative error requires reversal of Warrior's convictions and 
remand for a new trial. 
 
 
We reject each of these contentions and affirm Warrior's convictions and sentence. 
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
The State's theory was that Warrior, Darell Rodgers, and Jamar Moore conspired 
to murder Warrior's husband, Jeremy Warrior (Jeremy). As evidence of motive, the State 
presented testimony regarding marital discord between Warrior and Jeremy and 
established that Warrior and Rodgers were having an extramarital affair. Financial gain 
was an additional motive; after Jeremy's death, Warrior received benefit payments in 
excess of $335,000 from life insurance policies she took out a few months before the 
murder.  
7 
 
  
 
The murder occurred in the predawn hours of April 23, 2005, as Warrior drove 
Jeremy to work. Typically, Jeremy would drive himself to work, but Warrior drove him 
that day. The reason for the change of routine, according to Warrior, was that Jeremy's 
car needed a new headlight, and she planned to take his car to a Firestone store to have 
the light replaced. The State cast doubt on this explanation through the testimony of the 
manager of the Firestone store. The manager told the jury that his store employees had 
broken the car's headlight when it had been in for repairs before Jeremy's death. The store 
had ordered a part and was planning to replace the headlight at no charge, but the part had 
not arrived before the day of Jeremy's murder.  
 
 
Warrior told the jury she had no part in planning the murder and did not know who 
committed the crime. According to Warrior between 5 a.m., and 5:30 a.m., the couple got 
into Warrior's car, a dark blue Nissan Altima, with Jeremy in the passenger seat and 
Warrior in the driver's seat. As they were about to crest a hill, the driver of the vehicle 
ahead of them, a sport utility vehicle (SUV), applied the brakes. Then, as Warrior and 
Jeremy drove up slowly, "someone came running towards the car" and fired a gun. 
Warrior testified she only heard one shot. The next thing she knew, she was in the 
hospital. As a result of the shooting, Warrior's spinal cord was damaged, and she was 
paralyzed from the waist down. Jeremy received multiple gunshot wounds, at least two of 
which could have caused his death.  
 
 
Officers were dispatched to the crime scene around 5:34 a.m. Officers came upon 
the blue Nissan crashed into a ditch in the neighborhood, not far from the home Warrior 
shared with Jeremy. Jeremy was still and unresponsive, and Warrior was injured and 
moaning. Officers found bullet holes in the passenger window. There were no bullet 
holes in the driver's side door, but a bullet went into the right side of the driver's headrest 
near the passenger's seat and exited through the back of the driver's headrest. Two bullets 
entered the passenger's side of the car and exited out the rear door on the driver's side. A 
8 
 
forensic pathologist testified that the bullets that hit Jeremy entered the right side of his 
body and that the shooter would have been outside and in front of the passenger's side 
window.  
 
 
Neighbors testified to seeing Warrior's car and an SUV, which was described as a 
light-colored vehicle. One neighbor testified the car's lights were off when he first saw it, 
but the lights later came on. Another neighbor saw a person with a gun running up to the 
SUV and getting inside. He was able to describe what the person wore. 
 
Moore, a codefendant in this case, testified pursuant to plea negotiations. Moore 
was not arrested for Jeremy's murder until 3 years after Jeremy died, when Moore 
confessed. Up to that point, when officers questioned him, Moore generally denied any 
involvement. In his earliest statements to officers during the initial investigation, he 
relayed various versions of events, including a version in which Rodgers was involved in 
the attack, but the shooter was a person named "Syan Crawford." Moore even identified 
Crawford in a photo lineup. Years later, when Moore decided to confess, he explained he 
was coming forward because Warrior and Rodgers had promised to pay him from the 
insurance proceeds, but they never did. "[I]t was on my conscience and I got tired of 
protecting people that never really cared about me," he explained.  
 
Moore's testimony provided details regarding the planning of the murder and the 
shooting. He testified that he had known Rodgers for 8 or 9 years and first met Warrior in 
February 2005. In late March or early April 2005, Warrior asked Moore if he wanted to 
"kill somebody to make a couple thousand dollars." Neither Rodgers nor Warrior 
mentioned the identity of the intended victim, and no other details were discussed at that 
time. But a few weeks later, on the night before Jeremy's murder, Rodgers explained that 
Jeremy, Warrior's husband, was to be the victim. Moore testified that Rodgers and 
Warrior went over "how it was supposed to be done." The plan was to kill Jeremy and 
shoot Warrior in the leg. Rodgers persuaded Moore to drive what Moore described as a 
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"cream-colored" SUV, which previously had been rented by Warrior, to the place where 
Rodgers would commit the murder. 
 
Moore testified that between 2 a.m. to 3:30 a.m., Warrior drove to her home in her 
car while Rodgers and Moore followed in the SUV. When they arrived in Warrior's 
neighborhood, Moore parked down the block from Warrior's home to wait until it was 
time for Jeremy to leave for work.  
 
After waiting about 15 to 20 minutes, Rodgers used his cell phone to call Warrior 
and to ask her "what was taking so long." Moore heard Warrior's reply, in which she said, 
"I am trying to hurry it up." Five minutes later, Rodgers got out of the SUV and hid 
behind some trees in a yard, holding the gun at his right side.  
 
After another 5 or 10 minutes, Moore saw Warrior driving her car up the street, 
and as she got closer to them, she "hit the lights," turning off the headlights. According to 
Moore, this was a prearranged signal. At that point, Rodgers ran up to Warrior's car and 
fired six gunshots into it. Moore immediately drove the SUV up the street a little way, as 
Rodgers came running and jumped inside.  
 
Much of the other incriminating evidence presented in the trial came from 
Warrior's statements to law enforcement officers. After the shooting, officers questioned 
Warrior on four occasions during her hospitalization. Warrior did not receive Miranda 
warnings at any of these interviews. Greg Lawson, a detective for the Kansas City, 
Kansas, Police Department, testified about several statements made by Warrior, and the 
jury heard audio recordings of the interviews.  
 
The first meeting with Warrior occurred in the intensive care unit at the hospital 
on April 26, 2005. Warrior explained she was driving Jeremy to work when they came 
upon a red SUV with its taillights on. She said two Hispanic men jumped out of the 
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SUV—one out of each side of the back seat—and approached her car on opposite sides. 
Warrior described the men as short in stature and about the same age as her and Jeremy—
late 20's or early 30's. Warrior did not remember seeing or hearing any gunshots. She 
denied having an affair or experiencing any major problems in her marriage.  
 
During this first interview, Warrior also indicated she had been at a friend's 
apartment the night before the incident, and Rodgers and Moore were there as well. 
Warrior only casually mentioned Rodgers, claiming he was a close friend of the person 
who lived at the apartment. Warrior told the officers she left her friend's around 1 a.m. 
and called Jeremy to tell him she was on her way home.  
 
After the first interview, Detective Lawson inspected Warrior's telephone records 
and discovered numerous calls between Warrior and Rodgers. Of particular interest, on 
April 23, 2005, there were calls from Rodgers to Warrior just minutes before Jeremy's 
murder. Also, the records reflected calls from Warrior to Rodgers that morning at 4:57:00 
a.m., 4:57:17 a.m., and 4:57:28 a.m. Between February 1, 2005, and April 23, 2005, there 
had been 52 calls between Rodgers and Warrior at Warrior's work telephone number. In 
addition, during Warrior's hospital stay after the shooting, there were three telephone 
calls from her hospital room to Rodgers' mother's telephone.  
 
Officers returned a second time to the hospital on April 30, 2005, and questioned 
Warrior in her hospital room. They told her to tell them if she got tired during the 
interview and wanted them to leave. Detective Lawson testified that this interview only 
lasted 30 minutes and was not recorded. They indicated to Warrior that there were "things 
that we needed to get through in order to find a motive" and cover "all of our bases." The 
officers told Warrior that they did not want to embarrass her, but they had information 
indicating the possibility she was having an affair with Rodgers. She denied having an 
affair, and the officers left the room at Warrior's request.  
 
11 
 
The officers continued their investigation, speaking with other witnesses and 
gathering more information. In addition to discovering telephone calls between Rodgers 
and Warrior both before and after the shooting, the officers also learned that Rodgers had 
visited Warrior in the hospital. According to Detective Lawson, the officers had "strong 
cause" to believe Rodgers was somehow involved and wanted to hear the truth from 
Warrior. Thus, on May 3, 2005, the officers returned to the hospital to interview Warrior 
a third time. Warrior's sister, mother, and aunt were periodically present in the hospital 
room while officers conducted the interview.  
 
During this third interview, which was recorded, Warrior admitted to the officers 
she had an affair with Rodgers. She said that she was falling in love with Rodgers and 
that it caused problems with her husband because she was staying out late at night. 
Jeremy did not know about the affair, but he had his suspicions. Warrior told the officers 
that Rodgers got angry when Jeremy called her cell phone; on one occasion, about a 
month before the shooting, Rodgers got so angry he broke Warrior's cell phone with his 
hands. In the month before the shooting, Warrior would routinely pick up Rodgers in the 
morning at his mother's apartment and would drive him to her place of employment, 
where Warrior would get out and leave the car with Rodgers for the day. Rodgers would 
pick up Warrior at the end of the work day, they would spend some time together, and 
Warrior would return home alone.  
 
Warrior indicated that on the day before the shooting, she went to pick up 
Rodgers, but Rodgers had somehow acquired a gold SUV from a friend and wanted to 
drive her to work in it. After work, Rodgers also picked her up in the SUV. Later, 
Rodgers dropped Warrior off at her car, and she returned home alone around 7 p.m. 
Then, Warrior told Jeremy she was going out with friends, and she went to a friend's 
apartment. Rodgers and Moore arrived in the gold SUV. Warrior said she left the 
apartment after 1 a.m., but before she left, Jeremy had tried to call her several times. This 
upset Rodgers, who told her not to answer her cell phone. Nevertheless, Warrior talked to 
12 
 
Jeremy and told him she was on her way home. Warrior told the officers she had not 
wanted Jeremy to know about Rodgers because she loved Jeremy and had not wanted to 
hurt him.  
 
Warrior told the officers that when she got home, she and Jeremy talked for 30 to 
40 minutes. In the morning, they showered and had sex before getting into Warrior's car. 
When they drove up the street, Warrior saw brake lights ahead on a gold SUV. Then, she 
saw Rodgers exit the passenger's side of the SUV and run to the passenger's side of her 
car. In this version of events, Warrior indicated she did not see a gun, but she heard one 
gunshot. After that gunshot, she felt pain and experienced a "floating" sensation. 
 
Warrior told the officers that Rodgers had called her in the hospital to see how she 
was doing. He had also asked if he could visit Warrior, who said, "Yes." Warrior's sister 
brought Rodgers up to the hospital room. When the sister left the couple alone for a short 
time, Rodgers apologized for shooting Warrior. Warrior told the officers that Rodgers did 
not explain why he shot Jeremy, but he told her not to talk to police. When asked about 
Rodgers' telephone call to Warrior on the morning of the shooting, Warrior explained she 
had not answered his incoming call, but she had immediately called Rodgers back. She 
said Rodgers called because he wanted to know whether she was coming to see him that 
day.  
 
As the officers were leaving the hospital room, Warrior asked Detective Lawson 
to come back in. She then told Lawson she had rented the SUV for Rodgers. According 
to Warrior, she wanted to tell the officers about the SUV because she did not want them 
to think she was involved in the attack.  
 
This revelation prompted officers to check car rental records, which confirmed 
that Warrior rented the gold or champagne SUV, a Ford Explorer, from Hertz at the 
Kansas City International Airport, on April 21, 2005, and paid for the rental with her 
13 
 
credit card. This information led to the fourth interview on May 5, 2005. During this 
fourth interview, Warrior explained she rented the SUV for Rodgers 2 days before the 
shooting because he wanted to take his children to Worlds of Fun in Kansas City, 
Missouri, on April 22, 2005. When asked what she had planned to do when Jeremy saw 
the credit card bill, Warrior told the officers that she was going to tell him about Rodgers. 
Warrior then identified Rodgers as the shooter.  
  
After Warrior made this last recorded statement, the officers had her moved to a 
different hospital room. The next day, Warrior called Detective Lawson and told him that 
Rodgers had called her at the new location. She was concerned that Rodgers had 
somehow learned of her room change.  
 
Sometime after this, in 2005, Rodgers was arrested in connection with the attack 
on Warrior and Jeremy. These charges were dismissed by the State when, just before 
Rodgers' preliminary hearing, Warrior recanted her identification of Rodgers as the 
shooter. Thereafter, officers continued to investigate the case. 
 
On February 2, 2006, Warrior gave a deposition at the district attorney's office. 
During the deposition Warrior, for the most part, reverted back to her first statement to 
officers and indicated that she could not identify the shooter. Warrior indicated her first 
statement about the two Hispanic attackers was accurate. Upon clarification, however, 
she said she had only "seen one" perpetrator. According to Warrior's deposition, the SUV 
at the scene was gold or champagne, not red, but she was "not for sure if it was the one I 
rented." When asked about her relationship with Rodgers at the time of the shooting, 
Warrior characterized it as a "friendship." She admitted that Rodgers had visited her in 
the hospital, but he simply "[a]pologized for seeing me hurt." She denied having further 
contact with Rodgers and denied that he had made any threats to her.  
 
14 
 
In 2008, upon Moore's confession, charges were filed against Warrior, Rodgers, 
and Moore. After Warrior was arrested, officers interviewed her again. She denied that 
either she or Rodgers was involved in the shooting. Warrior indicated to officers that at 
the time of her 2008 arrest, she was living with Rodgers. According to Warrior, she had 
previously identified Rodgers as the shooter because officers had pressured her to do so, 
and she was trying to help the police. Warrior claimed one Hispanic man had committed 
the crimes.  
 
Similar to her 2006 deposition, Warrior basically repeated much of her first 
version of events when she testified at her trial. Warrior explained she did not initially 
disclose the affair to officers because she did not want that information to come out. She 
no longer claimed that there was a red SUV involved in the attack; instead, a gold or 
champagne SUV was involved. When asked whether the SUV at the shooting was the 
same one she had rented from Hertz, Warrior said, "I believe so, I'm not for sure." She 
denied talking to Moore or anybody else about shooting Jeremy and claimed she did not 
know the identity of the shooter. Warrior also denied that there was any connection 
between Jeremy's murder and Warrior's acquisition of life insurance. She testified that it 
was Jeremy's idea to obtain life insurance after a family member had died and the family 
had to raise money for the burial.  
 
A jury convicted Warrior of premeditated first-degree murder and conspiracy to 
commit first-degree murder. The court imposed a hard 50 life sentence for the murder 
conviction and a concurrent sentence of 160 months' incarceration for the conspiracy 
conviction. Warrior now makes a timely appeal. This court's jurisdiction is under K.S.A. 
22-3601(b)(1) (appeal of murder conviction; off-grid crime; life sentence). 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
SUPPRESSION OF HOSPITAL INTERVIEWS 
 
Warrior's first argument on appeal is that the trial court erred by admitting into 
evidence certain statements made by Warrior to law enforcement officers who questioned 
her while she was a patient in the hospital. Specifically, Warrior contends the third and 
fourth hospital interviews conducted on May 3, 2005, and May 5, 2005, were custodial 
interrogations, and her statements should have been suppressed because she was not 
Mirandized. Warrior acknowledges officers had previously interviewed her at the 
hospital on April 26, 2005, and April 30, 2005, the first and second interviews, but she 
does not dispute the admissibility of her statements made during those encounters.  
 
Warrior objected to the admission of the statements before and during the trial, 
arguing she was considered to be a "suspect" early in the investigation of the case and 
that, although officers did not arrest Warrior at the hospital, she "certainly was not able to 
leave" at the time of the hospital interviews because of her physical condition. Therefore, 
she argued, the interrogations were custodial. 
 
After considering counsel's arguments, the testimony of both Warrior and 
Detective Lawson, and the transcript of Warrior's indictment proceeding held before a 
grand jury, the judge, at a pretrial hearing, found that the interviews were not custodial, 
stating: 
 
"[T]his brings to mind a quote from a famous detective, Inspector Clouseau, who 
indicated, 'I suspect everyone and I suspect no one,' and I think that was probably the 
case here, . . . is this defendant was never a non-suspect. I guess because she was a 
spouse and because information that came in early, but she certainly remained possibly 
only a victim all the way through this investigation, I guess up through her third 
statement. But the key here is she was never in custody. I think clearly this was not a 
custodial investigation, even by her own admission. She could have told [Detective 
Lawson] to leave, in fact, did so and he did leave."  
16 
 
Custodial Interrogations 
 
The trial court appropriately focused on whether the interviews were custodial 
interrogations because law enforcement officers are not required to administer Miranda 
warnings to everyone questioned, only to those who are (1) in custody and (2) subject to 
interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, reh. 
denied 385 U.S. 890 (1966); State v. Warledo, 286 Kan. 927, 935, 190 P.3d 937 (2008). 
A custodial interrogation is defined as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers 
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any 
significant way." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. A custodial interrogation is distinguished 
from an investigatory interrogation, which occurs as a routine part of the fact-finding 
process before the investigation has reached the accusatory stage. State v. Jacques, 270 
Kan. 173, 185-86, 14 P.3d 409 (2000).  
 
Factors to be considered in determining if an interrogation is investigative or 
custodial include:  (1) the time and place of the interrogation; (2) the duration of the 
interrogation; (3) the number of law enforcement officers present; (4) the conduct of the 
officers and the person subject to the interrogation; (5) the presence or absence of actual 
physical restraint or its functional equivalent, such as drawn firearms or a stationed 
guard; (6) whether the person is being questioned as a suspect or a witness; (7) whether 
the person being questioned was escorted by the officers to the interrogation location or 
arrived under his or her own power; and (8) the result of the interrogation, for instance, 
whether the person was allowed to leave, was detained further, or was arrested after the 
interrogation. State v. Morton, 286 Kan. 632, 640, 186 P.3d 785 (2008), cert. denied 555 
U.S. 1126 (2009). "No one factor outweighs another, nor do the factors bear equal 
weight. Every case must be analyzed on its own particular facts. [Citation omitted.]" 
State v. Schultz, 289 Kan. 334, 341, 212 P.3d 150 (2009). 
 
17 
 
 
An appellate court reviewing a trial court's determination of whether an 
interrogation is custodial, makes two discrete inquiries. Under the first inquiry, the court 
determines the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, employing a substantial 
competent evidence standard of review. In determining if there is substantial competent 
evidence supporting the existence of the circumstances found by the trial court, an 
appellate court does not reweigh evidence, assess the credibility of the witnesses, or 
resolve conflicting evidence. State v. Edwards, 291 Kan. 532, 545, 243 P.3d 683 (2010); 
State v. Gant, 288 Kan. 76, 80, 201 P.3d 673 (2009). The second inquiry employs a de 
novo standard of review to determine whether, under the totality of those circumstances, 
a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the interrogation and disengage 
from the encounter. Schultz, 289 Kan. at 340-41; State v. James, 276 Kan. 737, 751, 79 
P.3d 169 (2003).  
 
As we apply these principles to the circumstances in this case, nearly all the 
factors indicate the third and fourth hospital interviews conducted on May 3, 2005, and 
May 5, 2005, were investigatory, not custodial.  
 
 
1. Time and Place. The investigations occurred while law enforcement officers 
were still tracking down information and were prompted by new information disclosed 
through that investigation. With regard to the location of the questioning, the interviews 
occurred in Warrior's hospital room, a neutral location. The neutral atmosphere is further 
evidenced by the fact that Warrior's family members were present during the May 3 
interview. Generally, other things being equal, a person questioned in familiar, or at least 
neutral, surroundings does not face the same pressures as one questioned in a police-
dominated atmosphere and this factor weighs against a conclusion that an interview was 
custodial. See 2 LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 6.6(e), pp. 738-39 (3d ed. 2007) 
(discussing locations of interrogations in determining whether they are custodial). 
Additionally, "a hospital room does not produce the aura of police authority that a police 
18 
 
department interview room does." People v. Vasquez, 393 Ill. App. 3d 185, 191, 913 
N.E.2d 60 (2009).  
 
 
2. Duration of Interrogation. The interviews were short in duration and dealt with 
Warrior's accounting of events and the identification of the shooter. Warrior had been 
told she could ask the officers to leave; in other words, she was in control of the length of 
the interviews.  
 
 
3. The number of law enforcement officers present. There were two officers 
present in the room. We do not see this number as influencing our analysis. 
 
 
4. The conduct of the law enforcement officers and the person subject to the 
interrogation. The officers did not use coercive threats or employ a hostile or accusatory 
tone. Instead, they used a conversational tone, asked for the truth, and offered protection 
for Warrior, if needed. Warrior was not arrested at the end of either of these interviews. 
As for Warrior's conduct during the interviews, although she had experienced a traumatic 
event and was prescribed pain medication, there was no evidence she suffered from any 
mental, intellectual, or emotional problems that would have affected her perception of 
whether she was free to terminate the questioning.  
 
 
5. The presence or absence of actual physical restraint or its functional 
equivalent, such as drawn firearms or a stationed guard. Warrior contends she was in 
custody because she "was not at the hospital voluntarily and was paralyzed, effectively 
being medically restrained." While there is no dispute that Warrior's injuries prevented 
her from leaving her hospital room, physical incapacity resulting from forces outside the 
control of law enforcement does not amount to custody.  
 
Restraint, as contemplated by Miranda, is the interference with a person's freedom 
which is imposed by law enforcement officers. Consequently, this court has held that a 
19 
 
law enforcement interview of an accident victim at a hospital is not a custodial 
interrogation unless the victim's confinement is instigated by law enforcement or 
controlled for custodial purposes. State v. Louis, 240 Kan. 175, 181, 727 P.2d 483 
(1986); State v. Brunner, 211 Kan. 596, Syl. ¶ 3, 507 P.2d 233 (1973), disapproved in 
part on other grounds by State v. Murry, 271 Kan. 223, 21 P.3d 528 (2001); see State v. 
Canaan, 265 Kan. 835, 847, 964 P.2d 681 (1998) (defendant was not in custody where he 
was alone for significant periods of time and was not arrested at hospital; purpose of 
officers' presence at hospital was to determine when defendant would be released so they 
could later question him); see generally, What Constitutes "Custodial Interrogation" at 
Hospital by Police Officer Within Rule of Miranda v. Arizona Requiring that Suspect Be 
Informed of His or Her Federal Constitutional Rights Before Custodial Interrogation–
Suspect Hospital Patient, Annot. 30 A.L.R.6th 103, 120. 
 
There is nothing in the record to indicate that the officers exercised any control 
over Warrior's hospitalization before her interviews. After the fourth interview, officers 
had Warrior moved to another hospital room. Warrior seemed to understand this was for 
her safety because she contacted Detective Lawson and told him Rodgers had called her 
at the new location. More significantly, the room change occurred after the final 
interview. Also, the officers allowed Warrior to leave the hospital once she was 
discharged. 
 
Warrior argues another factor must be considered. Specifically, she contends the 
"repeated interviews" effectively put Warrior under police custody. According to 
Warrior, the "repeated intrusions gave the impression that although [Warrior] could 
terminate an interrogation, the police would return and the interrogation would resume." 
However, as the State notes, each hospital interview was prompted by new information. 
Between the first and second interviews, officers obtained Warrior's telephone records. 
Then, during the third interview Warrior revealed Rodgers was the shooter and—after 
calling Detective Lawson back into the room as he was leaving—that she had rented the 
20 
 
SUV for Rodgers. Following that revelation, the officers investigated the car rental and 
called on Warrior for some follow-up information. In light of the fact the ongoing 
investigation raised new issues to be discussed with Warrior, we do not find the serial 
nature of the interviews to necessarily mean the interviews were custodial.  
 
Further, it is noteworthy that at the beginning of the fourth hospital interview, the 
officers asked Warrior how she was feeling, made sure she was up to talking to them, and 
told her this would be a short visit. The officers had demonstrated that all Warrior had to 
do was ask to terminate the interview. Warrior asked to terminate the second interview, 
and the officers did so. This demonstrates that Warrior was aware she could terminate the 
interviews at any time. At the beginning of the fourth interview, Warrior agreed to speak 
with the officers and indicated they had been very helpful in this situation. She indicated 
she wanted to explain she had no role in the shooting. She then volunteered information. 
At no point were the officers openly accusatory or threatening, and, as we have 
repeatedly noted, they did not arrest Warrior after these hospital interviews. Compare 
Effland v. People, 240 P.3d 868, 874-76 (Colo. 2010) (hospitalized defendant was in 
custody for Miranda purposes, even though he was informed that he was not under arrest 
and his mobility was limited for medical reasons; officer was posted outside hospital 
room; officers ignored defendant's repeated statements that he did not wish to speak with 
them; officers sat between defendant and the closed door; defendant was emotionally 
distraught; officers' questions provided details of the incident and were designed to elicit 
agreement from defendant); and Louis, 240 Kan. at 183-84 (hospitalized defendant was in 
custody where defendant was notified that his blood was being drawn for law 
enforcement purposes while three officers were present, and defendant was arrested 
immediately upon release from hospital), with United States v. Robertson, 19 F.3d 1318, 
1320-21 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 513 U.S. 906 (1994) (defendant was not in custody 
where federal agent testified the FBI did not intend to take defendant into custody at time 
of interview, and defendant was free to check himself out of hospital), and United States 
v. Martin, 781 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1985) (defendant, who had been making bombs in 
21 
 
his apartment, had been injured in explosion, and had gone to hospital for treatment, was 
not in custody when officers went to hospital and questioned him, and thus, Miranda 
warnings were not required), and James, 276 Kan. at 751-52 (defendant was not in 
custody when officers questioned him in a hospital waiting room and at the police station 
regarding the deaths of two dependent adults in his care). 
 
We conclude Warrior was neither actually restrained by law enforcement nor 
under the functional equivalent of custody. 
 
 
6. Whether the person is being questioned as a suspect or a witness. Warrior also 
contends she was being questioned as a suspect. Detective Lawson testified that he did 
not begin to think of Warrior as a suspect until the time of Rodgers' 2005 preliminary 
hearing―well after Warrior's May 3, 2005, and May 5, 2005, interviews—when Warrior 
recanted her identification of Rodgers as the shooter. The trial judge apparently did not 
find this testimony entirely credible, as shown by the judge's finding that Warrior 
"certainly remained possibly only a victim all the way through this investigation, I guess 
up through her third statement." (Emphasis added.)  
 
Also, Warrior points out that in the time period between the second and third 
hospital interviews, officers talked to Warrior's sister about information indicating that 
Rodgers had called the sister's telephone sometime after the shooting. The officers told 
Warrior's sister she needed to be truthful in order to avoid possible obstruction charges. 
Warrior does not contend she was made aware of the officers' communications with her 
sister before her interviews, however. Consequently, we do not consider this as a factor in 
our analysis. 
 
Nevertheless, in the time period between Warrior's second and third hospital 
interviews, the officers did express to Warrior their doubts about her truthfulness 
regarding the possible affair with Rodgers. They told Warrior that if she was afraid to 
22 
 
relay information about Rodgers, they could provide protection from him. In encouraging 
Warrior to be truthful, the officers further stated that if it was later discovered Rodgers 
was involved in the shooting, "it would be hard to justify she wasn't involved." It was 
after this interaction with officers that Warrior admitted, during the third interview, that 
she was having an affair with Rodgers and identified him as the shooter. Warrior 
indicated she had not previously disclosed this information to officers because she was 
fearful of Rodgers. But she also called Lawson back into her room to report her rental of 
the SUV. 
 
Because the officers focused on her potential culpability during this third 
interview, Warrior argues she was an accused. She cites State v. Hewes, 558 A.2d 696 
(Me. 1989), to support her contention that she was in custody at the time of the May 3, 
2005, and May 5, 2005, hospital interviews. Besides the fact that Hewes is not binding 
precedent, it is not helpful to our analysis. In Hewes, a case involving a charge of 
manslaughter in the shooting death of a boarding house resident, the Maine Supreme 
Court concluded that the evidence supported the trial court's finding that the defendant, 
who was interrogated at the police station, was in custody, and the defendant's statements 
made to officers during two interviews were suppressible in the absence of Miranda 
warnings. Hewes was driven twice to the police station in a police cruiser, was 
questioned by officers for 50 minutes and 45 minutes respectively, and was asked for 
detailed and specific information about the victim's death. The Hewes court mentioned 
the fact that the interrogating officer told the defendant he could terminate the second 
interview and leave at any time "does not compel a finding that Hewes was not in 
custody." Hewes, 558 A.2d at 699 n.6. Also, the court focused on the specific and lengthy 
questioning. These factors are also present in this case, Warrior argues. 
 
However, the facts and circumstances in Hewes are too dissimilar to be of any 
assistance here. While Hewes was told he could terminate the interview, there was no 
suggestion he was free to leave, a possibility that would seem unlikely to a reasonable 
23 
 
person who had been transported to the police station in a police car. In contrast, the 
officers did not exercise control over Warrior's ability to leave the hospital and never 
gave her any indication she was in their custody. Further, on the one occasion when she 
asked to terminate the interview, the officers did so. 
 
Nevertheless, this factor gives at least some support to Warrior's position that she 
was in custody. 
 
 
7. Whether the person being questioned was escorted by officers to the 
interrogation location or arrived under his or her own power. Warrior was taken to the 
hospital for treatment, not by order of law enforcement.  
 
 
8. The result of the interrogation, for instance, whether the person was allowed to 
leave, was detained further, or was arrested after the interrogation. As the State points 
out, this was an ongoing investigation, where Warrior was seriously injured, and the 
officers wanted to learn the truth about Warrior's relationship with Rodgers and what 
motive Rodgers might have had to kill Jeremy. The officers did not arrest Warrior after 
any of these hospital interviews.  
 
 
Conclusion. At most, the only factor favoring Warrior's argument would be that 
the officers considered Warrior to be a possible suspect by the time they conducted the 
May 3, 2005, and May 5, 2005, the third and fourth interviews. But the fact a suspect is 
the focus of an investigation, standing alone, does not trigger the need for Miranda 
warnings. State v. Costa, 228 Kan. 308, 312, 613 P.2d 1359 (1980); State v. Bohanan, 
220 Kan. 121, 129, 551 P.2d 828 (1976); see Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 431, 
104 S. Ct. 1136, 79 L. Ed. 2d 409 (1984) (mere fact that investigation has focused on 
suspect does not trigger need for Miranda warnings in noncustodial settings); Beckwith v. 
United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347-48, 96 S. Ct. 1612, 48 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1976) (same); 2 
24 
 
LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 6.6(a) (3d ed. 2007) (discussing differences between 
custody and focus).  
 
The totality of the circumstances in this case shows that the investigation had not 
reached the custodial or accusatory stage. See Jacques, 270 Kan. 173, Syl. ¶ 7; State v. 
Gooden, 22 Kan. App. 2d 271, 276, 915 P.2d 169, rev. denied 260 Kan. 998 (1996). 
Consequently, we conclude that substantial competent evidence supports the trial court's 
finding that Warrior was not in custody at the time of the May 3, 2005, and May 5, 2005, 
hospital interviews. Further, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person 
would have felt free to terminate the interviews and disengage from these encounters. 
 
FAILURE TO DISCLOSE EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE 
 
Next, Warrior argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion for 
new trial on the basis that the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence which 
pertained to a juvenile burglary adjudication of Moore, a key prosecution witness. 
Warrior contends the State violated its disclosure obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 
373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), and, consequently, Warrior's due 
process rights under the United States Constitution were violated.  
 
Procedural Posture and Trial Court Findings 
 
Before trial, Warrior filed a discovery request, seeking, in part, the State's 
production of the "criminal record[s] of all non-police and non-medical witnesses for the 
State" and "[a]ll evidence exculpatory to the defendant." Sometime after the jury reached 
its verdict, the State informed defense counsel about its discovery of Moore's 1994 
juvenile adjudication for burglary, an adjudication of which the State was previously 
unaware. One of the arguments in Warrior's posttrial "Motion for Acquittal or in the 
Alternative for New Trial" claimed that because the State failed to provide information of 
25 
 
this adjudication before or during trial, Warrior was prejudiced because she was not able 
to use this "conviction involving dishonesty or false statement as a means of impeaching 
[Moore's] credibility as a witness." The exact timing of the State's discovery of this 
information is not clear from the record. The State simply asserted in its response to 
Warrior's motion for new trial that "[t]he State disclosed this information to Defendant 
upon receiving a copy of Moore's Pre-Sentence Report."  
 
At the hearing on Warrior's motion for new trial, the prosecutor explained that 
before trial the State had entered Moore's name into two national computer databases 
available to law enforcement, the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) and the 
Interstate Identification Index (Triple I). (NCIC is a computerized index of criminal 
justice information. United States v. McKenzie, 779 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1243 [D.N.M. 
2011]. Triple I is a criminal history database. Dempsey v. City of Baldwin, 143 Fed. 
Appx. 976, 980 n.7 [10th Cir. 2005] [unpublished opinion].) Unfortunately, Moore's 
juvenile adjudication, which occurred approximately 14 years earlier, did not show up on 
the computer search.  
 
The trial judge made the following findings regarding this evidence: 
 
"I think Mr. Moore was a substantial witness here, and he testified at length that he had 
lied to the police on several occasions. He was very forthcoming about that, as he pretty 
much had to be. Of course, he was as most people do when they are charged with a crime 
. . . not going to tell the police that he was involved in this case. . . . [A]ccording to the 
evidence that the Court heard and this jury heard, he was the least culpable of the three 
people involved in this by a long shot and he was the logical person for the State to make 
a deal with. They made that deal. He was cross-examined at length about the deal. I don't 
believe that the prior conviction from 14 years back as a juvenile was withheld by the 
State. I think it was in actual likelihood overlooked by the State, and I don't believe that it 
would have had any impact, given the other instances of him being untruthful. So I don't 
believe it is a basis, given the total weight of the evidence here, to grant a new trial. So 
the motion will be denied."  
26 
 
 
Standard of Review 
 
K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-3501(1) permits a trial court to grant a new trial to the 
defendant "if required in the interest of justice." Appellate courts review a trial court's 
ruling on a motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion. Judicial discretion is abused if 
judicial action (1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, in other words, if no reasonable 
person would have taken the view adopted by the trial court; (2) is based on an error of 
law, in other words, if the discretion is guided by an erroneous legal conclusion; or (3) is 
based on an error of fact, in other words, if substantial competent evidence does not 
support a factual finding on which a prerequisite conclusion of law or the exercise of 
discretion is based. State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 550, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 
132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012). "In some cases, this three-part standard may narrow the broad 
discretion previously allowed when this court routinely applied only the no-reasonable-
person-would-take-the-same-view standard." Ward, 292 Kan. at 550-51 (citing State v. 
Ransom, 288 Kan. 697, 715, 207 P.3d 208 [2009]) (mistrial abuse of discretion standard 
"does not change even if legal error prompted consideration of a mistrial"; applying 
standard of whether any reasonable person would take the same view). 
 
Brady Violations:  General Principles of Law 
 
In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that prosecutors have a positive 
duty to disclose evidence favorable to the accused when "the evidence is material either 
to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." 
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; see Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153, 92 S. Ct. 763, 31 L. 
Ed. 2d 104 (1972); accord State v. Gonzalez, 290 Kan. 747, 766, 234 P.3d 1 (2010); State 
v. Francis, 282 Kan. 120, 150, 145 P.3d 48 (2006); see also United States v. Bagley, 473 
U.S. 667, 678-81, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1985) (discussing discovery, after 
trial, of information favorable to the accused that had been known to the prosecution but 
27 
 
unknown to the defense); In re Jordan, 278 Kan. 254, 261, 91 P.3d 1168 (2004) 
(discussing prosecutor's duty to disclose negating and mitigating evidence under Kansas 
Rules of Professional Conduct [KRPC]); KRPC 3.8(d) (2011 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 578). 
Further, because law enforcement's knowledge of evidence is imputed to the State, a 
Brady violation can occur when the prosecutor withholds material evidence that is not 
known to the prosecutor but is known to law enforcement. See Francis, 282 Kan. at 150 
(citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 131 L. Ed. 2d 490 [1995]). 
 
Evidence that is favorable to the defendant encompasses both exculpatory and 
impeachment evidence. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S. Ct. 1936, 144 
L. Ed. 2d 286 (1999). For Brady purposes, there is no distinction between these two types 
of evidence that are "favorable to accused"; thus, impeachment evidence is considered 
exculpatory. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281; see Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676.  
 
There are three components or essential elements of a Brady violation claim:  (1) 
"'The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, 
or because it is impeaching' [citation omitted]"; (2) "'that evidence must have been 
suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently' [citation omitted]"; and (3) the 
evidence must be material so as to establish prejudice. Wilkins v. State, 286 Kan. 971, 
989, 190 P.3d 957 (2008); Haddock v. State, 282 Kan. 475, 506, 146 P.3d 187 (2006); see 
Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691, 124 S. Ct. 1256, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1166 (2004); see also 
Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290 (prejudice encompasses the materiality requirement of Brady).  
 
In the present case, the first two Brady elements are not at issue. It is undisputed 
that the evidence in question was exculpatory in the sense that it bore upon the credibility 
of Moore, a key witness for the prosecution. Further, it is undisputed that the State, for 
whatever reason, failed to timely produce the evidence of Moore's juvenile burglary 
adjudication. Thus, our analysis requires the consideration of only the third element, 
materiality.   
28 
 
 
Reasonable Probability Materiality Test 
 
In their appellate briefs, both parties cite to a sliding scale materiality analysis, 
which this court has endorsed in past cases. See State v. Adams, 280 Kan. 494, 501, 124 
P.3d 19 (2005); State v. Aikens, 261 Kan. 346, 381, 932 P.2d 408 (1997). This analysis 
was derived from the United States Supreme Court's materiality analysis in United States 
v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103-07, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1976), which varied 
depending upon the type of Brady violation, in other words, the level of intent behind the 
prosecutor's conduct and the specificity of the defendant's discovery request. See Adams, 
280 Kan. at 501 ("sliding scale" applies as "the level of intent supporting the State's 
conduct decreases").  
 
What the parties fail to recognize is that after Agurs the Supreme Court adopted a 
more narrow, uniform test for materiality governing all categories of Brady violations:  
"The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence 
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 
'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome." Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682; accord Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 470, 129 S. Ct. 
1769, 173 L. Ed. 2d 701 (2009). The Bagley Court emphasized that this reasonable 
probability test for materiality is "sufficiently flexible to cover the 'no request,' 'general 
request,' and 'specific request' cases of prosecutorial failure to disclose evidence favorable 
to the accused" that had previously served as the lines of demarcation for applying the 
Agurs sliding scale test. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. The Bagley Court did not specifically 
overrule Agurs, but it clearly rejected the use of a sliding scale analysis. Bagley, 473 U.S. 
at 682; see Stacy, The Search for the Truth in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 91 
Colum. L. Rev. 1369, 1392-93 (1991) (noting that Bagley adopted the narrowest of three 
potential materiality standards).  
 
29 
 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court has explained that the reasonable probability test 
does not require a demonstration that disclosure of the evidence would have resulted in 
the defendant's acquittal. Instead, it must be shown that "'the favorable evidence could 
reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine 
confidence in the verdict.' [Citation omitted.]" Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 
867, 870, 126 S. Ct. 2188, 165 L. Ed. 2d 269 (2006). 
 
Despite these rulings of the United States Supreme Court, which control our 
analysis of a due process issue brought under the United States Constitution, some 
Kansas cases decided after Bagley have continued to refer to the abandoned Agurs sliding 
scale materiality test. See, e.g., Adams, 280 Kan. at 501; Aikins, 261 Kan. at 381; State v. 
Carmichael, 240 Kan. 149, 152, 727 P.2d 918 (1986). These cases applying the sliding 
scale materiality test have not cited an independent Kansas basis for continuing to use the 
test and have failed to recognize the Supreme Court's disapproval of the test. Other cases 
have appropriately applied the reasonable probability test. Francis, 282 Kan. at 151; 
Haddock, 282 Kan. at 507; Ludlow v. State, 37 Kan. App. 2d 676, 685, 157 P.3d 631 
(2007). To reconcile these conflicting lines of cases, we clarify that the Agurs sliding 
scale test no longer applies and disapprove those cases utilizing the test.  
 
In our past cases applying the sliding scale test, this court reviewed the trial court's 
application of the test under an abuse of discretion standard. E.g., Adams, 280 Kan. at 
501; Aikens, 261 Kan. at 381. In contrast, this court typically conducts a de novo review 
of materiality, at least in other contexts. E.g., State v. Inkelaar, 293 Kan. 414, 424, 264 
P.3d 81 (2011) (determining materiality of evidence under K.S.A. 60-455); State v. 
Berriozabal, 291 Kan. 568, 586, 243 P.3d 352 (2010) (determining materiality of 
evidence as part of relevancy equation). Our treatment of materiality determinations in 
these other contexts raises the question of whether an abuse of discretion standard should 
be applied when reviewing a trial court's ruling regarding an alleged Brady violation 
under the reasonable probability test. Consistent with our general treatment of materiality 
30 
 
determinations, federal courts uniformly hold that the determination of a Brady violation 
is a legal question. Consequently, that question is reviewed de novo with deference to any 
factual findings. E.g., United States v. Turner, ___ F.3d ___, No. 10-60917, 2012 WL 
716885, at *2 (5th Cir. 2012). Some of these federal courts have explained that a de novo 
review of materiality does not conflict with the application of the abuse of discretion 
standard to the question of whether the trial court erred in ruling on a request for new 
trial. As one federal court explained:  
 
"The district court's determination as to the existence of a Brady violation is reviewed de 
novo, United States v. Miller, 161 F.3d 977, 987 (6th Cir. 1998), but the district court's 
denial of [the defendant's] motion for new trial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard. United States v. Jones, 399 F.3d 640, 647 (6th Cir. 2005). '"A district court 
abuses its discretion when it applies an incorrect legal standard, misapplies the correct 
legal standard, or relies upon clearly erroneous findings of fact."' [Citation omitted.]" 
United States v. Holder, 657 F.3d 322, 328 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 
See also, e.g., Turner, ___ F.3d ___, 2012 WL 716885, at *2 ("We review the denial of a 
motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion but consider alleged Brady violations de 
novo. This de novo review 'must proceed with deference to the factual findings 
underlying the district court's decision.'"); United States v. Pelisamen, 641 F.3d 399, 408 
(9th Cir. 2011) ("While the standard of review for a trial court's denial for a motion for a 
new trial is generally abuse of discretion, review is de novo when the asserted basis for a 
new trial is a Brady violation."); United States v. Wilson, 624 F.3d 640, 661 n.24 (4th Cir. 
2010) ("[M]otions for a new trial based on an alleged Brady violation are reviewed for 
abuse of discretion. It is an abuse of discretion for the district court to commit a legal 
error—such as improperly determining whether there was a Brady violation—and that 
underlying legal determination is reviewed de novo."); United States v. Graham, 484 
F.3d 413, 416-17 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied 552 U.S. 1280 (2008) (The appellate court 
"reviews denial of a motion for a new trial based on Brady violations under an abuse of 
discretion standard," but reviews "the district court's determination as to the existence of 
31 
 
a Brady violation . . . de novo."); United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 
2005), cert. denied 546 U.S. 1137 (2006) (An appellate court ordinarily reviews "a 
district court's ruling on a motion for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered 
evidence for abuse of discretion." But, where "the motion for a new trial is based on a 
Brady claim, which presents questions of law as well as questions of fact," the appellate 
court "'will conduct a de novo review of the district court's conclusions of law as well as 
a "clearly erroneous" review of any findings of fact.'").  
 
 
These decisions are consistent with one part of our three-part abuse of discretion 
standard, specifically, the one prong under which judicial discretion is abused if judicial 
action is based on an error of law. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, Syl. ¶ 3. Consequently, we hold 
that a trial court's determination as to the existence of a Brady violation is reviewed de 
novo with deference to a trial court's findings of fact, but the trial court's denial of the 
defendant's motion for new trial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.  
 
As a final note of clarification, we address the role of the harmless error standard 
in a Brady analysis because the State has cited to this standard, although it has done so in 
the context of the sliding scale test. The United States Supreme Court has explained that 
"once a reviewing court applying Bagley has found constitutional error, there is no need 
for further harmless-error review." Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 
131 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1995). Although Kyles was a habeas action—in other words, a 
collateral attack—the federal courts and commentators have recognized there is no need 
to conduct a harmless error analysis if a Brady violation is found in a direct appeal. E.g., 
United States v. Kohring, 637 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2011); Kahn, Presumed Guilty 
Until Proven Innocent:  The Burden of Proof in Wrongful Conviction Claims under State 
Compensation Statutes, 44 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 123, 160 n.164 (Fall 2010) (noting that 
Brady violations are exempt from harmless error analysis); see United States v. Snipes, 
751 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1288 n.9 (M.D. Fla. 2010) ("The 'reasonable probability' standard 
is substantially the same as the classic 'harmless error' standard."). 
32 
 
 
With these principles in mind we turn to application of the reasonable probability 
test to the facts of this case.  
 
Application of Reasonable Probability Test 
 
Again, in applying the reasonable probability test we must make a de novo review, 
giving deference to the trial court's factual findings, of whether there is a reasonable 
probability that, had Moore's juvenile burglary adjudication been disclosed to the defense 
before the end of Warrior's trial, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
In other words, does the evidence put the whole case in such a different light as to 
undermine confidence in the verdict? Although not stating the test in these terms, the trial 
judge answered the question by stating, "I don't believe that it would have had any 
impact."  
 
 
Our de novo review leads us to the same conclusion. Certainly, as Warrior points 
out in her appellate brief, Moore was a key witness for the prosecution in that Moore 
provided "first-hand knowledge" of Warrior's involvement in Jeremy's murder, detailing 
the plan and the execution of the plan. Yet, as the State observed, the credibility of Moore 
on the question of dishonesty was thoroughly attacked at trial. During defense counsel's 
extensive cross-examination of Moore, Moore admitted to initially naming a person other 
than Rodgers as the shooter and identifying that person in a photo lineup, changing his 
versions of events, repeatedly lying to officers, and "making up stuff." Moore also 
admitted to testifying in exchange for a plea agreement with the State. He was 
significantly impeached on his motive for testifying and his capacity for truthfulness—
the very factors that, according to Warrior, make this juvenile adjudication evidence 
prejudicial. See State v. Armstrong, 240 Kan. 446, 452, 731 P.2d 249, cert. denied 482 
U.S. 929 (1987) (impeachment evidence not material where witness had been impeached 
at trial with his prior inconsistent statements and with alleged "concessions" made to his 
33 
 
son); see also, e.g., Morris v. Ylst, 447 F.3d 735, 741 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied 549 
U.S. 1125 (2007) (indicating that if suppressed evidence is merely cumulative, then the 
failure to disclose is not a violation); United States v. Trujillo, 136 F.3d 1388, 1394 (10th 
Cir.), cert. denied 525 U.S. 833 (1998) (stating undisclosed impeachment evidence is 
immaterial where it was cumulative of evidence of bias or partiality already presented 
"and thus would have provided only marginal additional support for [the] defense"); 
Spence v. Johnson, 80 F.3d 989, 995 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 519 U.S. 1012 (1996) 
(stating information is not material under Brady if it is merely cumulative of other 
evidence already before the factfinder). 
 
 
Moreover, the undisclosed adjudication was for an offense committed by Moore as 
a juvenile and 14 years before the trial. Given that, evidence of the adjudication added 
little to the impeachment evidence presented to the jury. 
 
 
Therefore, it cannot be concluded that there was a reasonable probability that, had 
the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. The confidence of the jury's verdict has not been compromised.  
 
HEARSAY REGARDING MARITAL STRIFE 
 
Next, Warrior argues the trial court erred in allowing the State to present hearsay 
testimony regarding statements made by Jeremy indicating his belief that his marriage 
was in trouble. This testimony came from two witnesses—Jeremy's uncle and a friend 
who was also a coworker of Jeremy's. Jeremy's uncle testified that Jeremy was 
considering a divorce. The uncle described a telephone conversation several weeks before 
Jeremy's death in which Jeremy complained about Warrior being out all night. The uncle 
asked, "'Well, do you think she is messing around?'" Jeremy did not give him an answer 
but said he was going to wait a couple of weeks to make a decision. About a week later, 
Jeremy reported things had improved. But Jeremy's uncle testified, "[T]he night before he 
34 
 
got shot, he had called me and said that she had been gone all of that night, most of that 
night."  
 
The other witness, Jeremy's friend and coworker, testified Jeremy had confided 
about trouble in his marriage and suspected Warrior was not working as many hours as 
she claimed to be. The day before Jeremy was killed, the friend suggested Jeremy check 
Warrior's pay stub to see if her pay correlated with her claims of working late and then he 
should confront her. 
 
During the testimony of both witnesses, Warrior objected on the basis of 
"hearsay." Although the trial court found that the statements did not constitute hearsay 
because they were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, it also found the 
statements showed Jeremy's "impressions" and "feelings" at the time he made them, 
implying they fit into a hearsay exception. In making these rather ambiguous findings, 
the trial court did not explicitly reference any statutory exceptions to hearsay. Although 
the State notes that the trial court found the statements were not offered for the truth of 
the matter asserted, it did nothing more to advance this argument on appeal. Even if it 
had, the evidence of Jeremy's growing suspicions and discussions of divorce―indeed, the 
truth that those existed―impacted the State's evidence of motive. All but conceding this, 
the State offers suggestions for hearsay exceptions under which the trial court's rulings 
might fall. 
 
Despite the State's suggestions, it is impossible from the record to determine 
which, if any, exceptions the trial court might have contemplated as a basis for admitting 
the evidence. We need not attempt to divine the trial court's rationale, however, because 
even if the evidence was erroneously admitted, the admission was harmless.  
 
 
In making that determination in the context of a violation of evidentiary 
limitations proscribed by the Kansas Code of Evidence, as opposed to a violation of a 
35 
 
constitutional right, we apply the statutory harmless error standard of K.S.A. 60-261 and 
K.S.A. 60-2105 to determine if there is a reasonable probability the error affected the 
outcome of the trial in light of the record as a whole. The State, as the party benefitting 
from the introduction of the evidence, has the burden of persuasion. State v. McCullough, 
293 Kan. 970, 270 P.3d 1142 (2012) (citing Ward, 292 Kan. at 568-69).  
 
 
Here, the State has met that burden, primarily because the evidence from these two 
witnesses regarding Jeremy's suspicions added little to the considerable evidence from 
Moore and from Warrior herself about Warrior's and Rodgers' relationship. Moore 
testified that Rodgers and Warrior were having an affair. Warrior admitted to an 
extramarital affair and explained the when, where, and how aspects of the two spending 
time together on an almost daily basis. The jury heard the recording of Warrior's 
statements in her third hospital interview, in which she said she was falling in love with 
Rodgers and that her behavior caused problems with Jeremy because she was staying out 
late at night. Jeremy did not know about the affair, but he had his suspicions, she stated. 
These statements by Warrior are essentially the same as the hearsay statements to which 
she objects. The hearsay evidence added little or nothing to the issue. 
 
 
Hence, we find the admission of the evidence, assuming it was error, to have been 
harmless. 
 
DEADLOCKED JURY INSTRUCTION 
 
Next, Warrior challenges language found in an instruction given to the jury before 
deliberations that stated "[a]nother trial would be a burden on both sides." This 
instruction mirrored a prior version of PIK Crim. 3d 68.12 (2005 Supp.), commonly 
known as the "deadlocked jury" instruction or Allen-type instruction. See Allen v. United 
States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S. Ct. 154, 41 L. Ed. 528 (1896). Warrior admits she did not 
object to the instruction and that the clearly erroneous standard of review applies as a 
36 
 
result. See K.S.A. 22-3414(3). Nevertheless, she argues the trial court clearly erred in 
giving the instruction in light of our disapproval of this language in State v. Salts, 288 
Kan. 263, 265-66, 200 P.3d 464 (2009).  
 
Subsequent to Salts, this court has consistently confirmed its holding, which 
means that the instruction in this case was erroneous. But in numerous cases applying this 
holding, we have concluded that giving the instruction with the challenged language was 
not clear error. See, e.g., State v. Burnett, 293 Kan. 840, 270 P.3d 1115 (2012); State v. 
Washington, 293 Kan. 732, 740, 268 P.3d 475 (2012) (listing cases). Instructions are 
clearly erroneous only if the reviewing court is firmly convinced there is a real possibility 
the jury would have rendered a different verdict if the trial error had not occurred. Salts, 
288 Kan. at 265-66. 
 
Warrior attempts to distinguish the long list of cases that hold the instructional 
error was not clearly erroneous by arguing the evidence against her "was largely 
circumstantial and not overwhelming." This argument is not persuasive. There was ample 
evidence, both circumstantial and direct, of Warrior's guilt. There was evidence Warrior 
was having an affair with Rodgers, she plotted her husband's death with Rodgers and 
Moore, she offered to pay Moore out of the proceeds from her husband's life insurance 
policies, she rented the SUV used by Rodgers and Moore in the attack, she led Rodgers 
and Moore to her house on that fateful morning, she had at least one telephone 
conversation with Rodgers just moments before the shooting, and she signaled to 
Rodgers as she drove down the street. In addition to Moore's testimony, independent 
evidence corroborated many of these details.  
 
Moreover, Warrior's argument does not suggest why the misleading nature of the 
instruction might have made a difference in the jury's deliberations. Nothing in the record 
demonstrates the jury was near deadlock, deadlocked, pressured to reach a verdict, or 
concerned about the implications of another trial. 
37 
 
 
Consequently, we conclude there was not a real possibility that the jury would 
have rendered a different verdict had the error not occurred. The trial court's giving the 
Allen-type jury instruction was not clearly erroneous.  
 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF K.S.A. 21-4635 
 
Next, Warrior contends that because a jury does not determine the facts that 
increase the penalty beyond a reasonable doubt, Kansas' hard 50 sentencing scheme 
under K.S.A. 21-4635 is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 
120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), and Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 119 
S. Ct. 1215, 143 L. Ed. 2d 311 (1999).  
 
This court has previously rejected the same challenge in numerous cases. See, e.g., 
State v. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, 729-30, 245 P.3d 1030 (2011); State v. Ellmaker, 289 
Kan. 1132, Syl. ¶ 11, 221 P.3d 1105 (2009), cert. denied 130 S. Ct. 3410 (2010); State v. 
Martinez, 288 Kan. 443, 451, 204 P.3d 601 (2009); State v. Conley, 287 Kan. 696, 700-
01, 197 P.3d 837 (2008); State v. Warledo, 286 Kan. 927, 954, 190 P.3d 937 (2008); 
State v. Reid, 286 Kan. 494, Syl. ¶ 23, 186 P.3d 713 (2008). Warrior does not present any 
grounds for reconsidering our prior holdings, and based on those holdings, her argument 
fails. 
 
CUMULATIVE ERROR 
 
Finally, Warrior argues that cumulative error requires reversal of her convictions 
and remand for a new trial. She contends that even if the errors alleged on appeal do not 
individually require this court to reverse her convictions, the cumulative impact of the 
alleged errors denied her a fair trial. As discussed, the trial court erred in giving an 
erroneous deadlocked jury instruction and we have assumed the court erred in admitting 
38 
 
the hearsay evidence regarding Jeremy's statements about his deteriorating marriage. Two 
other points of error must also be discussed.  
 
The first of these is one that Warrior points to in her brief. She states in passing 
that during trial testimony a witness expressed his personal opinion that Warrior was 
involved in the shooting. Defense counsel objected to this statement, and the trial court 
ordered the witness' response to be stricken. Warrior fails to cite any authority or make 
any argument to support the contention that this incident, which was immediately dealt 
with by the trial court, contributes to "cumulative error." Moreover, we see no basis to 
believe the jury did not follow the court's instruction to disregard the evidence. 
Consequently, any harm caused by this error is extremely minimal, if not nonexistent. 
But the error did occur, even if immediately remedied. 
 
The second point relates to the alleged Brady violation. The State admits it failed 
to provide exculpatory evidence that was within the State's control. Nevertheless, we 
have determined there was not a Brady violation because the evidence was not material. 
The role of a failure to disclose evidence that is not a Brady violation in a cumulative 
error analysis seems to be a matter of some debate with federal courts adopting different 
approaches. For example, one panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held 
that the failure to provide exculpatory evidence that was not material does not factor into 
a cumulative error analysis. See United States v. Wilkes, 662 F.3d 524, 543 (9th Cir. 
2011). On the other hand, a different Ninth Circuit panel combined the materiality 
analysis of the Brady violation and a prosecutorial misconduct analysis, although it noted 
that "[i]t is unclear whether we should employ Brady's prejudice standard to evaluate the 
cumulative effect of the prosecutorial misconduct and the non-disclosure." Hein v. 
Sullivan, 601 F.3d 897, 914 (9th Cir. 2010). Because of this uncertainty, we reserve the 
determination of the question for another day when the parties in a case have argued the 
question. For our purposes, we will give Warrior the benefit of considering the failure to 
disclose in our cumulative error analysis. Nevertheless, because we have held that there 
39 
 
was not a Brady violation, we will not consider the State's failure to disclose the 
information as a constitutional error. 
 
Hence, we consider the cumulative effect of four nonconstitutional errors—the 
Salts error, the assumed hearsay error, the witness' statement regarding his belief in 
Warrior's guilt, and the failure to disclose Moore's 14-year-old juvenile adjudication.  
 
"In a cumulative error analysis, an appellate court aggregates all errors and, even 
though those errors would individually be considered harmless, analyzes whether their 
cumulative effect on the outcome of the trial is such that collectively they cannot be 
determined to be harmless. [Citation omitted.] In other words, was the defendant's right 
to a fair trial violated because the combined errors affected the outcome of the trial?" 
State v. Tully, 293 Kan. 176, 205, 262 P.3d 314 (2011).  
 
Where, as here, the only errors we have found or assumed are not constitutional in 
nature, we examine whether there is a reasonable probability the aggregated errors would 
have affected the outcome of the trial. See State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 578, 256 P.3d 
801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012). In making the assessment of whether the 
cumulative errors are harmless error, an appellate court examines the errors in the context 
of the record as a whole considering how the trial court dealt with the errors as they 
arose, including the efficacy, or lack of efficacy, of any remedial efforts; the nature and 
number of errors committed and their interrelationship, if any; and the strength of the 
evidence. See Ward, 292 Kan. at 578.  
 
As we have discussed, none of these errors or presumed errors were independently 
significant. The hearsay was cumulative of statements made by Warrior herself, the court 
immediately told the jury to disregard the witness' opinion regarding Warrior's guilt, 
Moore's juvenile adjudication was cumulative, and there is no reason to believe the Salts 
error had any impact. Further, these errors were not related. Finally, the evidence against 
Warrior, while largely circumstantial or based on a codefendant who had entered a plea, 
40 
 
was strong. Although Warrior's statements were inconsistent, in some of her interviews 
she implicated Rodgers as the shooter. And the telephone records show her contact with 
Rodgers just before the murder thereby providing circumstantial evidence implicating 
her. Furthermore, a neighbor identified the vehicle Warrior had rented as the vehicle at 
the scene, and another testified to seeing her lights off and then on―the prearranged 
signal, according to Moore. Moore, whose statements and testimony must be viewed in 
the light of our knowledge that he had a plea agreement with the State, provided details 
that were consistent with the telephone records, the neighbor's accounts of what they saw, 
the pathologist's opinion, and Warrior's own statements.  
 
In light of the record as a whole, we conclude there is not a reasonable probability 
the combined errors affected the outcome of the trial. 
 
 
Affirmed.