Title: Williams v. State

State: mississippi

Issuer: Mississippi Supreme Court

Document:

409 So. 2d 1331 (1982) James Allen WILLIAMS, by and Through His Mother and Next Friend, Maggie Williams v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 53092. Supreme Court of Mississippi. February 17, 1982. Blackmon, Smith & Nichols, Edward Blackmon, Jr., Jackson, for appellant. Bill Allain, Atty. Gen. by Marvin L. White Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. Before SMITH, ROY NOBLE LEE and BOWLING, JJ. BOWLING, Justice, for the Court: Appellant James Allen Williams was denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus by the Circuit Court of Yazoo County. He appeals from that denial. We affirm. In March 1980 appellant plead guilty to a charge of selling marijuana. He was sentenced by the Circuit Court to a term of ten years with the Department of Corrections. The entire sentence was suspended and appellant placed on probation for three years. On July 22, 1980, appellant was arrested again for the alleged sale of marijuana. On petition by the district attorney, a hearing requesting revocation of the suspended sentence and probation was held on August 20, 1980. After the hearing the circuit court granted the petition and revoked the suspended sentence and probation. Appellant was ordered to begin serving the sentence. On December 4, 1980, appellant filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus contending that his constitutional rights were violated for the reason that at the revocation hearing the public was barred from the courtroom. It is admitted that the reason for this action by the trial judge was that the principal witness was an undercover agent, who was still working in the area; that divulging his identity would be a threat to him personally and would serve to diminish his effectiveness. Appellant contends first that the public should have been admitted to the hearing completely under appellant's constitutional rights. Secondly, it is contended that the public, including members of appellant's family, should have been permitted at the hearing at all times other than during the testimony of the undercover agent. Appellant contends that the closed hearing denied his rights under Article III, Section 26, Mississippi Constitution (1890), and Amendment VI to the United States Constitution. A reading of those instruments shows that they clearly apply to "criminal prosecutions." The question then is primarily whether or not a revocation hearing *1332 comes within that term. Clearly, it does not. This statement is borne out by all authorities. This Court in the case of Gardner v. Collier, 274 So. 2d 662 (Miss. 1973), quoted the United States Supreme Court in its opinion in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972), and said the following: Morrissey, supra, further said: In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1973), the court said: We stop here to say that at the hearing on the petition for writ of habeas corpus, neither party introduced any of the proceedings conducted at the revocation hearing. There were some vague stipulations which were sufficient to verify that the allegation of a closed hearing was correct and that the reason for the closed hearing as stated by the lower court was correct. It is important to note that at the revocation hearing, appellant was represented by an attorney whose reputation and competence is not questioned. There is nothing in this record to show definite objection and the reasons therefor made at the revocation hearing. Also, the testimony of the attorneys in the habeas corpus hearing reflect that a request was made for the hearing to be open to the public, primarily to the members of appellant's family. We, therefore, are proceeding under the assumption that the revocation hearing was closed to the public and objection thereto was made and overruled. The principle before us was ably stated by the district court in United States v. Hollien, 105 F. Supp. 987 (W.D.Mich., 1952), and it is stated: We hold that the appellant's constitutional rights under either the United States or Mississippi Constitutions were not violated when the public was excluded from the hearing on the petition to revoke appellant's suspended sentence and probation. This was in the nature of an administrative summary proceeding growing out of a privilege that was granted appellant by the lower court when the suspended sentence and probation was granted. As stated in Morrissey, supra, the hearing was not a part of a criminal prosecution and thus, the full panoply of right due a defendant in a criminal prosecution under the requirements of the Constitutions does not apply to suspension and parole revocations. AFFIRMED. SMITH, and SUGG, P. JJ., and WALKER, BROOM, ROY NOBLE LEE and HAWKINS, JJ., concur. PATTERSON, C.J., and DAN M. LEE, J., took no part.