Title: Outdoor Media Dimensions Inc. v. State of Oregon

State: oregon

Issuer: Oregon Supreme Court

Document:

FILED:  March 8, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

OUTDOOR MEDIA DIMENSIONS INCORPORATED,an Oregon corporation,
Petitioner on Review,
	v.
STATE OF OREGON,JIMMY L. ODOM, JULIE EVEY,
and HENRY MONTES,
Respondents on Review.
(94-3953-L2; CA A91779; SC S44590)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted November 9, 1998.
	Alan R. Herson, Jacksonville, argued the cause and submitted
the briefs and memoranda for petitioner on review.
	Rives Kistler, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the
cause for respondents on review.  With him on the briefs were
Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor
General.
	James E. Mountain Jr., Salem, and Donald Joe Willis,
Portland, filed the briefs for amicus curiae Oregon Outdoor
Advertising Association.
	G. Kenneth Shiroishi, Portland, filed the brief for amicus
curiae American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Oregon.
	Madelyn Wessel, Portland, filed the briefs for amicus curiae
City of Portland.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Leeson,
and Riggs, Justices.**
	RIGGS, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the
circuit court are affirmed.  
	*Appeal from Jackson County Circuit Court, Loren L. Sawyer, Judge. 150 Or App 106, 945 P2d 614 (1997).
	*Van Hoomissen, J., retired on December 31, 2000, and did
not participate in the decision of this case.  Kulongoski and
De Muniz, JJ., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
		RIGGS, J.
		Outdoor Media Dimensions, Inc. (plaintiff) brought this
civil action that, among other things, challenges the
constitutionality of the Oregon Motorist Information Act (OMIA).  
ORS 377.700 to 377.840; ORS 377.992.  Plaintiff contends that the
OMIA, which regulates signs along Oregon highways, violates the
free speech provisions of both the state and federal
constitutions.  The trial court disagreed and granted summary
judgment to defendants, the State of Oregon and three of its
employees (collectively "the state").  The Court of Appeals
affirmed.  Outdoor Media Dimensions Inc. v. State of Oregon, 150
Or App 106, 945 P2d 614 (1997).  This court allowed review,
primarily to address plaintiff's arguments under the Oregon
Constitution.  As discussed below, however, we are unable to
reach those arguments in this case.  For the reasons that follow,
we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment
of the trial court.
I.  BACKGROUND
		The legislature enacted the OMIA in 1971.  Or Laws
1971, ch 770.  The OMIA was Oregon's effort to comply with the
federal Highway Beautification Act of 1965 (HBA), 23 USC § 131. 
The HBA established federal standards for erecting and
maintaining outdoor advertising signs, displays, and devices
along interstate and federally aided primary highways.  See 23
USC § 131(a) (stating purposes of HBA).  The HBA requires that,
unless a state provides "effective control" of outdoor
advertising signs, the state will lose 10 percent of its federal
highway funds.  23 USC § 131(b), (c).  "Effective control"
essentially requires states to prohibit all outdoor advertising
signs that are visible from an interstate or primary highway,
unless a particular sign meets one of five statutory exceptions
or is located in an industrial or commercial zone.  See 23 USC  
§ 131(c), (d) (setting out that prohibition and listing
exceptions). (1)  
		The OMIA generally prohibits erecting or maintaining
most signs visible to the traveling public from a state highway,
unless the sign complies with the provisions of the OMIA, rules
adopted under the OMIA, and any federal requirements.  ORS
377.715 (1991). (2)  As relevant to this case, the OMIA prohibits
all but certain pre-existing "outdoor advertising signs," ORS
377.725, and restricts the placement of those signs, id.; ORS
377.765(1).  An "[o]utdoor advertising sign" is one that
advertises:  (1) "[g]oods, products or services which are not
sold, manufactured or distributed on or from the premises on
which the sign is located," ORS 377.710(24)(a); or (2)
"[f]acilities not located on the premises on which the sign is
located," ORS 377.710(24)(b).  The exception to the OMIA's
general prohibition against outdoor advertising signs applies to
outdoor advertising signs that existed before June 12, 1975, in
commercial or industrial zones.  The OMIA permits the owners of
such signs to obtain permits allowing those signs to remain.  ORS
377.712; ORS 377.725.  With certain limits and upon written
notice, the owner of an outdoor advertising sign that meets the
above criteria may transfer the permit for that sign to another
sign owner.  ORS 377.725(2).
II.  FACTS
		As noted, the trial court resolved this case on summary
judgment.  Accordingly, we view the facts and all reasonable
inferences that may be drawn from the facts in favor of
plaintiff, the nonmoving party.  Jones v. General Motors Corp.,
325 Or 404, 408, 939 P2d 608 (1997).  Summary judgment is
appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  ORCP  
47 C.  A genuine issue of material fact is lacking when "no
objectively reasonable juror could return a verdict for the
adverse party on the matter that is the subject of the motion for
summary judgment."  Id.
		Plaintiff is an outdoor advertising company that owned
a billboard along Route 62 in Jackson County.  Plaintiff did not
have a permit for the billboard.  Plaintiff placed a religious
message on one side of the billboard and a radio station
advertisement on the other.  In February 1993, the state notified
plaintiff by letter that the billboard violated the OMIA:
		"This is to notify you that the referenced sign,
visible to a state highway, is in violation of the
Oregon Motorist Information Act.  The sign violates
Oregon Revised Statute (ORS) 377.725, installed without
permit authority.  The sign advertises an activity
which is not at the location of the sign and is,
therefore, an off-premise sign.  Oregon Law, pursuant
to the Federal Highway Beautification Act, has
prohibited the erection of new off-premise advertising
signs visible to state highways since June 12, 1975. 
The sign must be removed or corrected within 30 days
from the date of this notice.
		"* * * * *
		"Enclosed is a copy of the ORS Section of the law
under which this determination was made.  If you feel
your sign is not in violation of the law, you may
request a hearing before the Highway Engineer (within
30 days from the date of this notice) * * * [t]o
present your arguments.
		"If you fail to respond, or if the sign is not
removed or corrected as provided in this notice, it
becomes subject to removal by the Highway Division    
* * *."
(Boldface and underscoring in original.)
		Following receipt of the notice, plaintiff advised the
state of its intention to apply for a relocation permit for the
billboard.  An employee of the state told plaintiff that, because
plaintiff had expressed an intention to apply for a relocation
permit, the notice was moot and plaintiff should not seek a
hearing.  In reliance on that statement, plaintiff did not
request a hearing and, instead, attempted to obtain a relocation
permit.  That attempt failed. 
		At some point thereafter, the state informed plaintiff
that, if plaintiff removed all speech from the billboard, then
the state would not remove the billboard.  In April 1994, in
reliance on that statement, plaintiff removed the religious
message and the radio advertisement from the billboard, leaving
the structure empty.  Nevertheless, in September 1994, the state
removed the billboard.  Plaintiff filed this action shortly
thereafter.
		Plaintiff initially asserted two claims for relief: 
conversion and a claim under 42 USC § 1983 (1994). (3)  Shortly
after filing its complaint, plaintiff filed an amended complaint,
adding a third claim for relief for a declaratory judgment and
for an injunction.  Plaintiff's third claim pertained to a second
billboard, located along Interstate 5 near Ashland.  Plaintiff
had placed an advertisement on that billboard for stores that
were located off the premises of the sign.  As with the first
billboard, the state sent plaintiff a notice that the second
billboard violated the OMIA.
		With respect to that billboard, however, and unlike
plaintiff's course of conduct as to the first billboard,
plaintiff requested an administrative hearing.  Plaintiff did not
prevail at that hearing, removed the advertisement from the
billboard, and replaced the advertisement with a religious
message.  The state did not notify plaintiff to remove that
message.  Plaintiff nevertheless later removed the message.  In
its amended complaint, plaintiff alleged an intention to have the
billboard advertise an activity that was located off the premises
of the sign.  Based in part on that alleged intention, plaintiff
sought a declaration that the OMIA violates both the Oregon and
United States Constitutions, and an injunction prohibiting the
state from removing from the second billboard any advertisement
of an activity conducted off the premises. 
		In its answer, the state raised various affirmative
defenses.  Included among those was the claim that plaintiff had
failed to exhaust its administrative remedies and, therefore, was
barred from bringing its first and third claims for relief. (4)  
After the state filed its answer, plaintiff moved for summary
judgment on its third claim for relief.  Plaintiff argued that
the OMIA, on its face, was invalid under both the Oregon and
United States Constitutions and, therefore, as a matter of law,
plaintiff was entitled to the declaratory judgment and injunction
that it sought.  The state filed a cross-motion for summary
judgment, asserting that the OMIA was facially valid.  The trial
court granted the state's cross-motion.
		Plaintiff then filed a second amended complaint.  With
respect to the conversion claim, the second amended complaint
added a new allegation, viz., that the state had permitted
plaintiff to retake possession of the first billboard, but had
demanded that plaintiff pay the state $962.50 for the cost of
removing that billboard.  Plaintiff claimed $90,000 in damages
based on the alleged conversion and, in addition, requested a
declaration from the trial court that plaintiff was not indebted
to the state for the removal costs.  Plaintiff also claimed that
amount of damages with respect to its section 1983 claim.
		With respect to plaintiff's claim for declaratory and
injunctive relief, the second amended complaint added allegations
concerning a third billboard.  Plaintiff added those allegations 
because, during the intervening period, plaintiff had lost its
right to place advertisements or other signs on the second
billboard.  Plaintiff was concerned that, without the amendment,
the court would deem that claim moot.  Plaintiff alleged that it
had received permission from the owner of a property located near
Route 62 in Medford to place a billboard on that property. 
Plaintiff further alleged that it had erected the billboard and
had placed an advertisement on the billboard for an alarm system
sold by a local company.  As before, the state had sent plaintiff
a notice that the billboard violated the OMIA.  Plaintiff asked
the trial court to enjoin the state from ordering plaintiff to
remove "speech" from the third billboard.
		The state filed a second motion for summary judgment
that asserted various arguments and, later, a supplemental motion
based on the theory of claim preclusion -- an argument that it
asserted separately from its affirmative defense of failure to
exhaust administrative remedies.  In the state's view, because
plaintiff had had the opportunity to request an administrative
hearing, but had failed to do so, plaintiff was precluded from
litigating any of its claims in court.  Plaintiff opposed the
supplemental motion on various grounds, including that the state
was estopped from raising any claim preclusion argument because
the state had instructed plaintiff not to file a request for a
hearing in light of plaintiff's intention to seek a relocation
permit for the first billboard.  The trial court granted the
state's motion for summary judgment.  The order states that
plaintiff had acknowledged during oral argument that it timely
had requested an administrative hearing concerning the third
billboard. 
		As noted, the Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting each
of plaintiff's arguments.  This court granted plaintiff's
petition for review.
III.  ANALYSIS
A.	First Claim for Relief -- Conversion
	Plaintiff alleged that the state had removed the first
billboard "without right or justification."  In moving for
summary judgment against plaintiff's conversion claim, the state
asserted, in part: 
	"Plaintiff may argue that the cited statute is
invalid for various constitutional reasons, but that is
not the issue presented by the first claim for relief,
which is pled as a claim for conversion, nothing more."
To that assertion, plaintiff responded:
		"Defendants allege that constitutional reasons are
not presented in the First Claim for Relief, * * * but
this is not true.  [The second amended complaint]
alleges that the State's actions were without right or
justification.  One reason that the State had no right
or justification is that the statute relied upon is
void." 
	On appeal, the state continued to characterize
plaintiff's conversion claim as one that "sounds in tort."  The
state limited its briefing on that claim to whether the state had
complied with the procedural requirements of the OMIA in removing
the first billboard.  When the issue of the theory of plaintiff's
first claim for relief arose at oral argument at the Court of
Appeals, the state asserted that that claim was not predicated on
any constitutional arguments.
	The Court of Appeals agreed:
		"[P]laintiff's constitutional challenges to the
OMIA itself are confined to its second and third claims
-- that is, plaintiff does not contend that the [state]
effected a conversion because the provisions of the
OMIA on which it relied are unconstitutional." 
Outdoor Media Dimensions, 150 Or App at 112.  In its petition for
review and merits brief in this court, plaintiff continues to
assert that its conversion claim rests in part on the argument
that the state's action constituted a conversion because the
state relied on an unconstitutional statute.  For the reasons
that follow, we disagree.
	First, there is nothing in the way that plaintiff
pleaded its conversion claim that informed either the state or
the trial court that plaintiff's theory of conversion rested on
an assertion that the OMIA is unconstitutional.  Second, even if
plaintiff's theory of conversion in the trial court included a
constitutional component, plaintiff failed to provide the Court
of Appeals with any argument on that subject with respect to the
assignments of error that pertained to plaintiff's first claim
for relief. (5)  Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not err in
determining that plaintiff had confined its constitutional
challenges to the OMIA to plaintiff's second and third claims for
relief.  We proceed to consider whether there is any triable
issue respecting whether the state complied with the OMIA in
removing plaintiff's first billboard.
	2.	Whether the State Complied With the OMIA
		As pertinent to plaintiff's conversion claim, the OMIA
provides:
	"Any outdoor advertising sign which does not have
copy on the display surface for a period of six months
shall be deemed to have been abandoned by the owner
thereof and becomes a noncomplying sign subject to
removal by the highway engineer under the procedure set
forth in ORS 377.775."
ORS 377.773 (emphasis added).  ORS 377.775 provides, in part:
		"(1)  Any sign that fails to comply with ORS
377.700 to 377.840 hereby is declared to be a public
and private nuisance.  In addition to the penalties
provided by ORS 377.992 for violation thereof, such a
sign may be removed by the highway engineer or the duly
authorized representative of the engineer as provided
by this section.  The engineer may enter upon private
property and remove the sign without incurring any
liability therefor.
		"* * * * *
		"(3)(a)  If a noncomplying sign bears the name and
address of its owner or if the owner of the sign is
readily identified and located, the engineer shall
notify the owner that the sign is in violation of ORS
377.700 to 377.840 and that the owner has 30 days from
the date of the notice within which to make the sign
comply, to remove the sign or to request a hearing
before the engineer within the time specified in the
notice.
		"(b)  If the sign is not made to comply or is not
removed and if the owner does not request a hearing
within the time required, or if the owner after a
hearing fails to comply with the final order in the
proceedings, the highway engineer or the duly
authorized representatives of the engineer may remove
and destroy or otherwise dispose of the sign.
		"* * * * *
		"(5)  The owner is liable for, and the highway
engineer shall collect, the costs of removing a sign. 
Costs shall be determined by the highway engineer on
the basis of actual costs of removal or on a square-foot flat fee basis."
ORS 377.710(31) defines the term "sign" as
	"any sign, display, message, emblem, device, figure,
painting, drawing, placard, poster, billboard or other
thing that is designed, used or intended for
advertising purposes or to inform or attract the
attention of the public, and the term includes the sign
structure, display surface and all other component
parts of a sign[.]"
"Sign structure" means "the supports, uprights, braces, framework
and display surfaces of a sign."  ORS 377.710(35).
		As noted, plaintiff claims that a jury should be
permitted to decide whether the state committed conversion by
failing to comply with the requirements of the OMIA in removing
the first billboard.  First, plaintiff argues that it made the
first billboard comply by removing all copy from the billboard,
leaving the billboard blank.  Second, even if the blank billboard
remained a nonconforming sign under the OMIA, plaintiff argues
that ORS 377.773 provides that a billboard must be blank for at
least six months before the state may remove it.  The first
billboard was blank for only four or five months.  Third, with
respect to the 30-day period set out in ORS 377.775(3)(a),
plaintiff argues that, as a grammatical matter, that period
refers only to the time within which a hearing must be requested
and does not limit the time within which a sign must be brought
into compliance.  Therefore, according to plaintiff, the fact
that the first billboard might have been nonconforming for more
than thirty days after the notice does not insulate the state
from liability.  Finally, plaintiff argues that the state is
estopped from arguing that plaintiff failed to comply with the
statute, because one of its employees told plaintiff that the
state would not remove the first billboard if plaintiff removed
the copy from it.
		Respecting plaintiff's first argument, the state
responds that removing the advertisement or other message from an
otherwise noncompliant billboard does not bring the billboard
into compliance with the OMIA:
	"If one of the options [under ORS 377.775(3)(b)] is to
remove the sign (the message and the structure), it
would make little sense to conclude that the
legislature also intended to permit a person simply to
remove the message."
		Respecting plaintiff's second argument, the state
contends that ORS 377.773 does not apply to signs that already
violate the OMIA; rather, that statute applies only to situations
in which the blank sign otherwise complies with the OMIA. 
Plaintiff's billboard, as plaintiff implicitly acknowledges, was
erected without a permit and was a nonconforming sign under the
OMIA from the outset.
		The state rejects plaintiff's argument that the 30-day
period set out in ORS 377.775(3)(a) applies only to the time for
requesting a hearing.  It contends that the statute "makes clear
that the legislature understood that the 30-day period limited
the time in which any violation could be cured."
		Finally, respecting plaintiff's estoppel argument, the
state contends that plaintiff failed to advance an estoppel
theory on appeal.  Alternatively, the state argues that a state
employee has no authority to depart from the terms of the
statute.
		The Court of Appeals rejected each of plaintiff's
arguments regarding the conversion claim.  The court held that
the 30-day period applies to bringing a sign into compliance and
that removing the advertisement or other message from a sign does
not render the billboard compliant with the OMIA:
	"Compliance means obtaining a permit, ORS 377.725, and
removal of the 'sign' means removal of the 'structure.' 
See ORS 377.710[(31)] and [(35)] ('sign' includes 'the
sign structure,' which means 'the supports, uprights,
braces, framework and display surfaces of a sign'). 
Plaintiff took none of these actions within the
required time period, and the [state] therefore had
authority to remove the entire billboard structure,
whether or not plaintiff had removed the display
advertising."
Outdoor Media Dimensions, 150 Or App at 112 (footnotes omitted). 
The Court of Appeals further noted:
	"[O]ne of the policies underlying the OMIA is to
'preserve the natural beauty and aesthetic features of
[the state's] highways and adjacent areas.'  ORS
377.705.  A blank billboard is just as contrary to that
purpose as is a billboard with advertising."
Id. at 112 n 6 (second brackets in original).  The Court of
Appeals did not consider plaintiff's estoppel theory:
	"Although plaintiff's president alleged in an affidavit
that a [state] employee told plaintiff that if it took
down the radio ad the billboard structure would not be
removed, plaintiff does not argue on appeal that its
reliance on that advice somehow deprived the [state] of
authority to remove the structure.  Plaintiff only
argues that its removal of the advertising brought the
structure into compliance with the OMIA."
Id. at 112 n 7.
	We begin by addressing plaintiff's first two statutory
arguments together, as they are interrelated.  Those arguments
raise issues of statutory construction, to which we apply the
methodology set out in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317
Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993).  Under that methodology, we
first examine the text and context of the statutory provisions at
issue.  Id. at 610-611.  If legislative intent is clear based
upon an examination of text and context, then we proceed no
further.  Id. at 611.  
	We begin with two observations.  First, at least until
plaintiff removed the advertisement and religious message, the
first billboard was an "outdoor advertising sign" under the OMIA. 
ORS 377.710(24).  Second, during that period, the billboard also
was a nonconforming sign under the OMIA, because plaintiff had no
permit for it.  ORS 377.715; ORS 377.725.  With those
observations in mind, it becomes evident that plaintiff frames
its first question -- whether a blank billboard complies with the
OMIA -- too broadly.  The facts of this case present the question
whether a billboard that was a nonconforming outdoor advertising
sign under the OMIA becomes a complying sign when the owner of
the billboard removes the advertising or other message.
	We begin and ultimately end our analysis with ORS
377.773.  Again, that statute provides that "[a]ny outdoor
advertising sign which does not have copy on the display surface
for a period of six months shall be deemed to have been abandoned
by the owner thereof and becomes a noncomplying sign subject to
removal * * *."  (Emphasis added.)  "Any" is defined, in part, as
"one indifferently out of more than two : one or some
indiscriminately of whatever kind."  Webster's Third New Int'l
Dictionary, 97 (unabridged ed 1993); see also Fleming v. United
Services Automobile Assn., 329 Or 449, 456, 988 P2d 378 (1999)
(in context, "any" synonymous with "every"), modified on recons
330 Or 62, 996 P2d 501 (2000).  ORS 377.773, therefore, applies
to outdoor advertising signs of all species, including those that
do not comply with the OMIA.
	Plaintiff's argument to the contrary notwithstanding,
ORS 377.773 does not provide that the owner of a noncomplying
sign may bring that sign into compliance by removing the
advertisements or other messages from it.  That statute speaks to
only one way, abandonment, out of a number of possible ways, in
which an outdoor advertising sign might fail to comply with the
OMIA.  Moreover, ORS 377.773 does not purport, either expressly
or impliedly, to affect other compliance provisions of the OMIA. 
Thus, if an outdoor advertising sign complied with the OMIA
before abandonment, then ORS 377.773 would render that sign
noncompliant because of the abandonment.  If, however, an outdoor
advertising sign already had failed to comply with the OMIA and
subsequently was abandoned, then ORS 377.773 would provide an
additional basis for deeming the sign noncompliant.  In short,
there is nothing in ORS 377.773 that supports plaintiff's
argument.
		To the contrary, the six-month limit for which an
outdoor advertising sign lawfully may remain blank under ORS
377.773 suggests the opposite conclusion.  That is, at least with
respect to otherwise noncompliant outdoor advertising signs,
removing all advertisements or messages from the sign does not
bring the sign into compliance with the OMIA, at least in any
permanent sense.  Even under the interpretation of ORS 377.773
that plaintiff advocates, the best for which the owner of a
noncomplying sign could hope by removing the message would be a
six-month grace period.  If we were to adopt that construction --
and, as noted above, we do not -- then the result would not in
any sense be the broader, permanent notion of compliance that
plaintiff asserts that it achieved by removing the advertisement
and religious message from its first billboard.
		Nothing in the context of ORS 377.773 changes the
conclusion that the text of the statute supports.  ORS 377.775
sets out the procedural requirements for removing signs that do
not comply with the OMIA.  That statute provides the owner of an
assertedly noncomplying sign with three options:  (1) make the
sign comply; (2) remove the sign; or (3) request an
administrative hearing.  ORS 377.775(3)(a).  Although the parties
and the Court of Appeals each relied to some extent on ORS
377.775 in their respective analyses, we conclude that that
statute provides no clear insight as to whether the owner of a
nonconforming sign may make the sign comply with the OMIA by
removing the advertisement or other message.
		In that regard, the only option under ORS 377.775(3)(a)
and (b) that pertains to the question before us is the option to
"make the sign comply."  ORS 377.775(3)(a).  As noted above, the
Court of Appeals held that "[c]ompliance means obtaining a permit
* * *."  Outdoor Media Dimensions, 150 Or App at 112.  We
disagree.  The OMIA is not drawn that narrowly.  For example, in
this case, plaintiff also could have brought the first billboard
into compliance by, among other things, replacing the radio
advertisement with a sign that was not an outdoor advertising
sign or one that specifically is exempt from the OMIA permitting
requirement.  See ORS 377.735 (listing certain exempt signs). 
Thus, the fact that the statute permits the owner to make the
sign comply merely raises, but does not answer, the question of
what compliance means.  In the context of nonconforming outdoor
advertising signs, ORS 377.773 provides the answer to that
question and demonstrates, we think conclusively, that rendering
the sign blank does not constitute compliance.
		Having answered plaintiff's first question in the
negative, its second question remains:  Even if the first
billboard was a nonconforming sign, was the state required to
wait six months before removing it?  Our analysis above answers
that question.  The six-month abandonment provision does not
affect, expressly or impliedly, the other compliance provisions
of the OMIA.  Accordingly, if a blank outdoor advertising sign
otherwise complies with the OMIA, then the state may not remove
the sign until it has been blank for at least six months.
		Applying the foregoing analysis to the facts of this
case, plaintiff's act of removing the advertisement and religious
message from the first billboard did not make that billboard a
complying sign under the OMIA.  Because the first billboard did
not comply with the OMIA for reasons separate from whether the
billboard had been abandoned, that is, plaintiff had no permit
for it, the state was not required to wait for the sign to be
blank for six months before removing it.
		Plaintiff next argues that, even if making the
billboard blank did not render it compliant, and even if the
state did not have to wait six months under ORS 377.773 before
removing the billboard, the state nevertheless acted prematurely. 
Plaintiff argues that the 30-day period set out in ORS
377.775(3)(a) applies only to the time within which the owner of
a billboard must request a hearing following receipt of a notice
from the state that the billboard violates the OMIA.  That
period, plaintiff continues, does not limit the time within which
the owner either may remove the billboard or bring it into
compliance.  Such is the case, plaintiff argues, because
paragraph (3)(b) of the statute authorizes the state to remove a
sign only "[i]f the sign is not made to comply or is not removed
and if the owner does not request a hearing within the time
required * * *."  (Emphasis added.)  In plaintiff's words:  "The
time requirement does not refer to 'comply' since 'comply' and
'removed' are separated by 'or,' and both of those words are
separated from the hearing request provision with 'and.'"
		Plaintiff's argument is not well taken.  Plaintiff's
construction ignores and would nullify the wording in paragraph
(3)(a) of ORS 377.775 that immediately precedes the statutory
text on which plaintiff relies.  See State v. K.P., 324 Or 1, 8,
921 P2d 380 (1996) (whenever possible, court will construe
statute to give effect to all wording).  Paragraph (3)(a)
provides, in part, that "the owner has 30 days from the date of
the notice within which to make the sign comply, to remove the
sign or to request a hearing before the engineer within the time
specified in the notice." (6)  Paragraph (3)(a) establishes a 30-day
period within which an owner at least either must remove the sign
or make it comply with the OMIA. (7)
		We apply the same analysis to the prepositional phrase
in subsection (3)(b) -- "within the time required."  Plaintiff
correctly argues that that phrase applies only to the wording "if
the owner does not request a hearing."  The problem for
plaintiff, however, is that its argument stops there.  In so
limiting its argument, plaintiff appears to assume that no other
statutory provision bears upon the question that plaintiff
presents.  As noted, however, plaintiff's selective presentation
ignores the import of the text that immediately precedes
subsection (3)(b), which gives sign owners 30 days to remove the
sign or make it comply with the OMIA.  That provision answers the
question presented directly and, in our view, removes any
ambiguity that might arise from examining subsection (3)(b) in
isolation.
		Finally, plaintiff does not identify, and we have not
discerned, any other context respecting those statutory
provisions that would alter our reading of the plain text of the
statute.  Accordingly, we conclude that the intent of the
legislature is clear.  At least in the absence of a request for a
hearing, the OMIA limits sign owners to 30 days within which to
correct or remove the assertedly noncompliant sign before the
state may remove it.
		Plaintiff next argues that, even if the OMIA authorized
the state to remove the first billboard, the state is estopped
from relying on the OMIA as a defense against plaintiff's
conversion claim.  That is so, plaintiff contends, because a
state employee told plaintiff that, if plaintiff removed all
speech from the first billboard, then the state would not remove
the billboard.  Plaintiff asserts that it relied upon that
statement and removed all speech from the billboard.  Contrary to
its promise to plaintiff, however, the state still removed the
billboard.
		As noted, the Court of Appeals concluded that plaintiff
had not advanced on appeal the argument that plaintiff's reliance
on the employee's statement deprived the state of the authority
to remove the first billboard as a noncomplying sign under the
OMIA.  Outdoor Media Dimensions, 150 Or App at 112 n 7.  Instead,
the Court of Appeals concluded that plaintiff had argued only
that its removal of the advertising and religious message brought
the billboard into compliance with the OMIA and, accordingly, the
court did not entertain plaintiff's argument.  Id.  On review,
the state contends that the Court of Appeals correctly construed
the nature of plaintiff's estoppel argument on appeal.  We agree.
		In its appellant's brief in the Court of Appeals,
plaintiff did raise impliedly, as a question in the introductory
portion of its brief, the estoppel argument that it seeks to
maintain on review.  In its arguments in support of plaintiff's
assignments of error in that brief, however, plaintiff asserted
only that, "[a]fter negotiations with the individual defendants * * *, [p]laintiff made the sign comply by removing all speech." 
As the Court of Appeals concluded, that is not the same argument. 
Moreover, even were we to conclude that the placement of the
introductory question is not fatal in and of itself, plaintiff
failed to develop its argument, or cite to any pertinent
authority, in the body of the brief.  Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals did not err in concluding that plaintiff had failed to
argue on appeal that the state's alleged representation deprived
the state of the authority to remove the first billboard.  See
___ Or at ___ n 5 (slip op at 11 n 5) (noting that plaintiff's
failure to present argument regarding constitutional basis for
conversion claim constituted failure to make that argument on
appeal).
		In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not err in
granting summary judgment to the state on plaintiff's first claim
for relief. (8)
B.	Second Claim for Relief -- 42 USC § 1983
		Plaintiff's second claim for relief asserts a cause of
action under 42 USC § 1983 and is premised on allegations that
relate to the first billboard. (9)  Plaintiff alleges various
violations of its constitutional rights, two of which implicate
state law.  First, plaintiff claims that the state denied it due
process by enforcing the OMIA in the first instance, because the
statute violates Article I, section 8, of the Oregon
Constitution. (10)  Second, plaintiff asserts that, even if the OMIA
passes state constitutional muster, the state violated
plaintiff's due process rights by failing to apply that statute
correctly.  Those assertions, without more, are not well taken. 
As the state correctly responds, a "mere error of state law" --
which is all that plaintiff presents in its first and second
arguments -- does not constitute a denial of due process.  Engle
v. Isaac, 456 US 107, 121 n 21, 102 S Ct 1558, 71 L Ed 2d 783
(1982).  The trial court correctly granted summary judgment to
the state with respect to plaintiff's first two asserted
constitutional violations.
		Plaintiff also asserts that the state's acts of (1)
sending the notice that the first billboard be removed or
corrected and (2) subsequently removing the billboard violated
plaintiff's right to due process of law.  That is so, plaintiff
claims, because
	"[t]he OMIA violates the Due Process provisions of the
United States Constitution by not providing for a
specified brief period upon which [the state] must act
upon an application for a permit, and not providing for
prompt judicial review of a denial of a permit
application."
Relying primarily upon Freedman v. Maryland, 380 US 51, 85 S Ct
734, 13 L Ed 2d 649 (1965), plaintiff argues that the permitting
and hearing provisions of the OMIA effect an unlawful prior
restraint that "gives public officials the power to deny use of a
forum in advance of actual expression."
		The problem with that argument relates to causation. 
Plaintiff advances its argument in the context of plaintiff's
claim for money damages under section 1983 -- damages that
plaintiff alleges resulted from the state's violation of
plaintiff's constitutional rights.  Plaintiff, however, neither
pleaded nor argued that the state's application of the OMIA's
permit and hearing provisions caused plaintiff's alleged
damages. (11)  To prevail on its section 1983 claim, plaintiff must
prove that the asserted constitutional violation caused the
damages that plaintiff seeks to recover.  See, e.g., Brower v.
Inyo County, 489 US 593, 599, 109 S Ct 1378, 103 L Ed 2d 628
(1989) (discussing requirements of proximate causation with
respect to section 1983 claims).
		As noted, plaintiff's alleged damages do not derive
from the lack of time limits under the OMIA for obtaining permits
or judicial access.  Instead, plaintiff's asserted damages --
resulting from the loss of its first billboard -- derive from the
fact that the OMIA requires a sign owner to have a permit before
being permitted to relocate a billboard.  See ORS 377.767,
377.768 (respecting relocation permits).  Because plaintiff could
not obtain a permit, plaintiff was unable to relocate its first
billboard.  Plaintiff does not argue that, had the state given it
more time, plaintiff would have been able to secure a permit.
		On these facts, it is the validity of the permit
requirement -- which is not at issue respecting this alleged
constitutional violation -- and not the lack of time constraint,
that we must address in deciding plaintiff's claim for monetary
damages under section 1983.  Plaintiff's prior restraint theory,
therefore, is misplaced.  Accordingly, the trial court correctly
granted summary judgment to the state respecting plaintiff's
prior restraint allegation.
		We proceed to consider plaintiff's remaining
allegations.  Those pertain to the question whether the OMIA
violates plaintiff's free speech rights under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (12)
To those allegations, the state raised the affirmative defense of
qualified immunity in the performance of discretionary functions. 
		We begin by addressing the analytical framework for
assessing plaintiff's remaining section 1983 claims.  With
respect to section 1983 claims that involve, as here, a defense
of qualified immunity, the United States Supreme Court has
stated:
	"Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action
against any person who, acting under color of state
law, deprives another of his federal rights.  42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.  In order to prevail in a § 1983 action for
civil damages from a government official performing
discretionary functions, the defense of qualified
immunity that our cases have recognized requires that
the official be shown to have violated 'clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known.'  Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818[, 102 S Ct 2727, 73 L Ed
2d 396] (1982)."
Conn v. Gabbert, 526 US 286, 290, 119 S Ct 1292, 143 L Ed 2d 399
(1999).  Thus, the defense of qualified immunity is lost if two
elements are present: (1) a violation of a constitutional right;
and (2) that the right violated, at the time of the violation,
was clearly established.
		The Supreme Court also has stated that courts normally
should analyze those two elements in the order set out above:
	"[T]he better approach to resolving cases in which the
defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine
first whether the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation
of a constitutional right at all.  Normally, it is only
then that a court should ask whether the right
allegedly implicated was clearly established at the
time of the events in question."
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 US 833, 841 n 5, 118 S Ct
1708, 140 L Ed 2d 1043 (1998).  One of the reasons for that order
of analysis is that immunity is intended "to spare a defendant
not only unwarranted liability, but unwarranted demands
customarily imposed upon those defending a long drawn out
lawsuit."  Siegert v. Gilley, 500 US 226, 232, 111 S Ct 1789, 114
L Ed 2d 277 (1991).  Normally, deciding the "purely legal
question" that the first prong presents "permits courts
expeditiously to weed out suits which fail the test without
requiring a defendant who rightly claims qualified immunity to
engage in expensive and time consuming preparation to defend the
suit on the merits."  Id.
		As it reaches us, this case does not present that
concern.  The record does not indicate an issue of fact prolonged
the litigation below or prevented the trial court from summarily
ruling on plaintiff's section 1983 claim.  Neither do any of the
arguments advanced on review suggest that we should answer one
question before the other.  In addition, under the circumstances
of this case, we see little or no contribution for this state
court of last resort to make toward the advancement of what we
conclude is an unsettled area of First Amendment jurisprudence in
the context of plaintiff's section 1983 claims.  For those
reasons, we deem it appropriate to begin and end our discussion
of plaintiff's section 1983 claim with the question whether the
law clearly was settled at the time of the events in question. 
Thus, we proceed directly to that inquiry.
		Plaintiff claims that, by enforcing the OMIA with
respect to the first billboard, the state violated plaintiff's
free speech rights under the United States Constitution.  Both at
the time of the conduct at issue here and today, the leading case
addressing the constitutional parameters of governmental
regulation of billboards, and the one upon which plaintiff relies
most heavily, is Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 US 490, 101 S
Ct 2882, 69 L Ed 2d 800 (1981).  Although a majority of the Court
in Metromedia held that a San Diego billboard ordinance was
facially invalid under the First Amendment, 453 US at 521, that
majority could not agree on the reasoning for its holding.  As
did the Court of Appeals, we conclude that, as relevant here,
Metromedia fails to "establish a governing standard for future
cases."  Outdoor Media Dimensions, 150 Or App at 114 (internal
quotations and citation omitted).
		The state's conduct respecting the first billboard
occurred during 1993 and 1994.  No cases from the Supreme Court
decided during the twelve-year span between Metromedia and the
conduct at issue in this case (or after the conduct for that
matter) serve to clarify the state of the law respecting the
manner in which governments may regulate billboards without
infringing upon free speech rights to the extent that would
support the conclusion that the state in this case violated
plaintiff's clearly established rights.  With the law unsettled,
the state was entitled to summary judgment based upon its defense
of qualified immunity with respect to plaintiff's remaining
constitutional allegations.  Accordingly, the trial court did not
err in granting summary judgment to the state as to the entirety
of plaintiff's section 1983 claim.
		We turn finally to plaintiff's third claim for relief. 
As noted, that claim ultimately was premised upon facts relating
to the third billboard and sought (1) a declaration that the OMIA
violates both the Oregon and United States Constitutions, and (2)
an injunction prohibiting the state from ordering plaintiff to
remove any speech from that billboard.  The state argues in
response that plaintiff failed to exhaust its administrative
remedies.
		Before reaching the merits of the state's argument, we
first address whether the state is entitled to maintain that
argument in this court.  As noted, the state raised failure to
exhaust as an affirmative defense in its answer to plaintiff's
amended complaint.  The state, however, did not file a motion for
summary judgment on that basis.  Instead, the state argued that
claim preclusion barred each of plaintiff's claims for relief,
including the third.  Indeed, before the trial court, the state
expressly noted that its argument "[wa]s based on claim
preclusion, not exhaustion * * *."
		In the Court of Appeals, the state continued to press
its claim preclusion theory, but also argued that exhaustion
requirements barred plaintiff's third claim for relief.  The
Court of Appeals, however, refused to entertain the latter
argument:
	"Although the [state] raised 'exhaustion' as an
affirmative defense in its answer, it did not assert it
as a ground for summary judgment.  Plaintiff was
therefore denied the opportunity to develop a complete
factual record on that issue for appeal, and we decline
to affirm on those grounds."
Outdoor Media Dimensions, 150 Or App at 125.  In a footnote, the
Court of Appeals added:
		"For example, the trial court's order granting
summary judgment included a 'stipulation' that
plaintiff 'made a timely request for an administrative
hearing upon receipt of the notice of violation
regarding the third structure.'  It is doubtful whether
that alone established that plaintiff exhausted its
administrative remedies: the record does not indicate
whether plaintiff followed through on its request or
what was the outcome of that hearing.  Because the
[state] did not assert exhaustion as a ground for
summary judgment, plaintiff was not on notice of the
need to present additional evidence on that issue."
Id. at 125-26 n 28.
		We disagree with the Court of Appeals' application in
this case of the principle that an appellate court may affirm a
correct decision of a trial court on a basis other than that upon
which the trial court relied.  At times denominated the "right
for the wrong reason" principle, this court recently described it
as follows: 
	"When a trial court makes a ruling, we will affirm that
ruling on appeal, even if the trial court's legal
reasoning for the ruling was erroneous, if another
legally correct reason and, to the extent necessary,
the record developed in the trial court support the
ruling."  
State v. Rogers, 330 Or 282, 295, 4 P3d 1261 (2000).  In State
Farm Fire v. Sevier, 272 Or 278, 537 P2d 88 (1975), the court
explained the principle in this way: 
		"We are reluctant to reverse a trial court on
grounds or theories other than those on which a case is
tried and decided unless the parties have been afforded
an opportunity to submit further briefs or argument. 
The considerations are different in cases in which we
affirm a trial court.  In such cases, when the trial
court arrived at a correct result, but on grounds
different than those which, in our opinion, are more
proper as the basis for such a result, we believe that
it is not improper to affirm the trial court; provided,
of course, that the pleadings are sufficiently broad
and there is sufficient evidence in the record * * *."
Id. at 298.
	As developed by this court's decisions, the "right for
the wrong reason" principle permits a reviewing court -- as a
matter of discretion -- to affirm the ruling of a lower court on
an alternative basis when certain conditions are met.  The first
condition is that, if the question presented is not purely one of
law, then the evidentiary record must be sufficient to support
the proffered alternative basis for affirmance.  That requires:
(1) that the facts of record be sufficient to support the
alternative basis for affirmance; (2) that the trial court's
ruling be consistent with the view of the evidence under the
alternative basis for affirmance; and (3) that the record
materially be the same one that would have been developed had the
prevailing party raised the alternative basis for affirmance
below.  In other words, even if the record contains evidence
sufficient to support an alternative basis for affirmance, if the
losing party might have created a different record below had the
prevailing party raised that issue, and that record could affect
the disposition of the issue, then we will not consider the
alternative basis for affirmance.  The second condition is that
the decision of the lower court must be correct for a reason
other than that upon which the lower court relied.  Third, and
finally, the reasons for the lower court's decision must be
either (a) erroneous or (b) in the reviewing court's estimation,
unnecessary in light of the alternative basis for affirmance. 
	The Court of Appeals concluded that the record was
insufficient and that plaintiff had not been afforded an
opportunity to introduce evidence on the question of exhaustion
of administrative remedies.  Outdoor Media Dimensions, 150 Or App
125-26.  We disagree.  The present record is sufficient to
support the state's alternative basis for affirmance and,
although the state did not place emphasis on that basis until
appeal, plaintiff suffered no disadvantage thereby.
	In addressing the issue, we look to the evidence and
allegations surrounding the third billboard that, at the time
that the trial court granted final summary judgment, provided the
predicate for plaintiff's claim for declaratory and injunctive
relief. (13)  Respecting the adequacy of the factual record, as
noted, the parties stipulated in the trial court that plaintiff
timely had requested an administrative hearing after receiving
the state's notice that the billboard violated the OMIA.  The
Court of Appeals noted that plaintiff's stipulation did not
establish whether plaintiff followed through on its request for
the administrative hearing or, if it did, what the outcome of
that hearing was.  For those reasons, the Court of Appeals deemed
it "doubtful" whether the stipulation established that plaintiff
had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies.  Outdoor Media
Dimensions, 150 Or App at 125-26 n 28.  We have no disagreement
with the Court of Appeals' observations about the questions that
the trial court record leaves open.  The ultimate issue that this
court must address, however, is whether, in light of those
omissions, the evidentiary record permits us to conclude that
plaintiff failed to exhaust its administrative remedies.  We
believe that it does.
		This court has recognized the
	"general rule of administrative law that as to matters
within the jurisdiction of an administrative agency,
'[j]udicial review is only available after the
procedure for relief within the administrative body
itself has been followed without success.'"
Mullenaux v. Dept. of Revenue, 293 Or 536, 539, 651 P2d 721
(1982) (bracket in original); see also Jackson v. Dept. of Rev.,
298 Or 633, 637, 695 P2d 923 (1985) ("[a]dministrative remedies
are not exhausted unless applicable procedures, prescribed by
statute or by rule, have been satisfied").  The doctrine of
exhaustion applies when a party, without conforming to the
applicable statutes or rules, seeks judicial determination of a
matter that was or should have been submitted to the
administrative agency for decision.  See State ex rel MVD v.
Norblad, 320 Or 307, 313, 882 P2d 598 (1994) (party may not evade
administrative review by seeking interlocutory relief in circuit
court to overturn hearings officer's order quashing subpoena). 
As the court stated in Norblad:
	"[I]f the hearings officer's order quashing the
subpoena is an error, judicial review of that error is
available [as provided by statute], after a final order
issues.  * * * That is the statutorily prescribed form
of judicial review."
Id. at 314. 
	Neither does the fact that the issues presented here
are purely legal ones excuse the requirement that plaintiff
exhaust its administrative remedies.  See Dennehy v. Dept. of
Rev., 295 Or 574, 579, 668 P2d 1210 (1983) ("Statutorily required
administrative review may not be ignored simply because the issue
is a question of law.").  Indeed, "[a]lthough it is an authority
to be exercised infrequently, and always with care, Oregon
administrative agencies have the power to declare statutes and
rules unconstitutional."  Nutbrown v. Munn, 311 Or 328, 346, 811
P2d 131 (1991).  In short, the agency here had the authority to
adjudicate the claims at issue.  The question, then, is whether,
having acknowledged the availability of administrative review,
plaintiff has satisfied the applicable procedures before
initiating this litigation.
	As noted above, the OMIA provides three options to the
owner of a sign for which a notice of violation has been issued. 
The owner may (1) make the sign comply, (2) remove the sign, or
(3) "request a hearing before the engineer within the time
specified in the notice."  ORS 377.775(3)(a).  The record below
demonstrates without contradiction that, as to the third
billboard, plaintiff sought to avail itself of one of those
options, namely, the administrative remedy that ORS 377.775(3)(a)
provides.  Plaintiff  did so by timely requesting an
administrative hearing before the engineer.  Having begun the
administrative process with a timely request for an
administrative hearing, and regardless of the outcome of that
hearing, review of the agency's ruling would have been by
petition for judicial review in the Court of Appeals under the
Administrative Procedures Act.  ORS 183.482 (providing for
judicial review in Court of Appeals of contested cases).  That,
of course, did not happen, which is why the case came to us in
this posture.  For whatever reason, plaintiff chose to bring its
dispute in a new forum.  That decision is inconsistent with the
principles of exhaustion discussed above.  In our view, those
facts alone -- regardless of whatever else may have happened
later -- demonstrate that plaintiff did not exhaust its
administrative remedies.  No further record is needed to rule
upon the state's defense; neither could plaintiff have created a
different record below that might have altered the outcome of the
state's defense.  It follows that the trial court did not err in
granting summary judgment to the state with respect to
plaintiff's third claim for relief.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment
of the circuit court are affirmed.



1. 	For discussions of the history and provisions of the
HBA, see James Lynch, The Federal Highway Beautification Act
after Metromedia, 35 Emory L J 419, 425-33 (1986), and Roger A.
Cunningham, Billboard Control Under the Highway Beautification
Act of 1965, 71 Mich L Rev 1296, 1296-1326 (1973).

2. 	After this case was submitted, the 1999 Legislature
amended the OMIA in several respects.  Or Laws 1999, ch 877. 
Those amendments do not affect in any substantive way the
analysis of the issues that we address on review.  Also, the
conduct at issue in this case occurred between November 1992 and
February 1995.  Although the 1993 Legislature amended the 1991
version of the OMIA, those amendments are not relevant to the
claims or defenses of the parties.  Accordingly, for ease of
reference, we cite and refer to the OMIA as it appeared in the
1991 version of the Oregon Revised Statutes.

3. 	42 USC § 1983 (1994) provides, in part:
		"Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress."


4. 	Exhaustion generally is not a defense to a section 1983
action, which plaintiff alleged as its second claim for relief. 
See Nutbrown v. Munn, 311 Or 328, 338, 811 P2d 131 (1991) ("A
state generally may not erect procedural barriers such as
requiring that state remedies be sought and denied, before the
federal remedy is invoked.").

5. 	In reaching that conclusion, we note that plaintiff
listed in the introductory portion of its appellant's brief in
the Court of Appeals a number of questions -- including questions
that pertained to the constitutionality of the OMIA -- as
applying "to all claims for relief."  Because plaintiff
subsequently failed to present argument with respect to those
questions as they pertained to plaintiff's conversion claim, that
reference presented nothing for the Court of Appeals to review. 
See ORAP 5.45 (setting out requirement of and specifications for
assignments of error and arguments thereon).
		We further note that, in the argument that followed
plaintiff's sixteenth assignment of error, an assignment that did
pertain to the conversion claim, plaintiff incorporated certain
constitutional arguments from another assignment of error.  Those
arguments, however, were directed toward plaintiff's claim that
it could ignore the hearing requirements of the OMIA because the
OMIA is unconstitutional.  That presentation, likewise, did not
provide the Court of Appeals with notice that plaintiff had
premised its conversion claim on the assertion that the OMIA is
unconstitutional.

6. 	The phrase "within the time specified in the notice"
might permit the state to set a time other than 30 days from the
date of the notice within which to request a hearing.  That is a
question we need not answer because, regardless of the meaning of
that prepositional phrase, when determining its application, the
rule of the last antecedent limits the reach of the phrase to the
antecedent "to request a hearing."  See State v. Webb, 324 Or
380, 386-89, 927 P2d 79 (1996) (applying rule of last antecedent
at first level of statutory construction analysis).

7. 	Presumably, when a sign owner requests a hearing, the
timelines are adjusted to permit the agency to adjudicate the
owner's claims.  The notice sent to plaintiff suggests as much:
"If you fail to respond, or if the sign is not removed or
corrected as provided in this notice, it becomes subject to
removal * * *."  However, we need not and do not answer that
question, because it is not presented by the facts of this case. 
Here, plaintiff did not request a hearing respecting the first
billboard.

8. 	As noted, plaintiff's first claim for relief also
included a request for a declaratory judgment that plaintiff is
not liable for the $962.50 in costs that the state sought for
removing the first billboard.  Plaintiff's declaratory judgment
claim depends upon the disposition of its conversion claim. 
Because we have rejected plaintiff's arguments with respect to
plaintiff's conversion claim, plaintiff's request for a
declaratory judgment in the first claim for relief likewise
fails.

9. 	Plaintiff's section 1983 claim is directed at the three
state employees named individually as defendants.  For ease of
reference, we continue to refer to those defendants collectively
as "the state."

10. 	Article I, section 8, provides:
		"No law shall be passed restraining the free
expression of opinion, or restricting the right to
speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever;
but every person shall be responsible for the abuse of
this right."


11. 	Moreover, respecting prior restraint, none occurred
under the facts of this case.  As noted, plaintiff placed
advertising and a religious message on its first billboard
without obtaining a permit.  It was only after it both had placed
advertising and a religious message on the billboard and had
received the state's notice of violation that plaintiff attempted
to obtain a relocation permit.

12. 	The First Amendment provides, in part:  "Congress shall
make no law * * * abridging the freedom of speech * * *."  The
Fourteenth Amendment provides, in part:
	"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." 

13. 	We note that, when the trial court granted the state
summary judgment against plaintiff's second amended complaint,
the third claim for relief included allegations concerning both
the second and the third billboards.  As noted, plaintiff added
the allegations concerning the third billboard because it had
lost the right to place signs on the second billboard and was
concerned that, without allegations regarding the third
billboard, its claim for declaratory and injunctive relief might
be moot.  Plaintiff was well advised in that respect.  When it
lost the ability to place signs on the second billboard, it also
lost the ability to present a justiciable controversy on those
facts.  See, e.g. Brumnett v. PSRB, 315 Or 402, 405, 848 P2d
1194 (1993) (justiciability requires "that the court's decision
in the matter will have some practical effect on the rights of
the parties to the controversy"); Brown v. Oregon State Bar, 293
Or 446, 449, 648 P2d 1289 (1982) ("In order for a court to
entertain an action for declaratory relief, the complaint must
present a justiciable controversy.").  Accordingly, although
plaintiff failed to delete the allegations concerning the second
billboard from its second amended complaint, we need not consider
those allegations in deciding plaintiff's third claim for relief.