Title: State v. Griswold

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

State of Maryland v. David Crary Griswold, No. 62, September Term, 2002
Criminal Law - Appeal by State - Circuit court, purportedly acting under Rule 4-345
(Sentencing - Revisory Power) years after final judgments of conviction for third degree
sexual offenses involving victims under age fourteen, struck determinations of guilt and
imposed PBJ for fourth degree sexual offenses, charges which the State had nolle prossed.
Held:  PBJ is a prohibited disposition for third degree sexual offense involving victim under
age fourteen.  Court did not impose sentence specifically mandated by the Code.  Appeal
lies.
Circuit Court for Carroll County
Case No. K-1996-23295 & 
K-1996-23296
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 62
September Term, 2002
_________________________________________
STATE OF MARYLAND
v.
DAVID CRARY GRISWOLD
_________________________________________
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Rodowsky, Lawrence F.
  (retired, specially assigned), 
JJ. 
_________________________________________
Opinion by Rodowsky, J.
________________________________________
Filed:    April 11, 2003
1At age nineteen Griswold, who had been a brilliant student, was involved in a
motorcycle accident which left him with a mentally debilitating brain injury and unable to
maintain regular employment outside of the family home.  He also suffered from epileptic
type seizures. 
Here, the State appeals from the revision of judgments of conviction in two sexual
offense cases, contending that sentences mandated by statute were not imposed.  More than
five years after the original judgments had been entered, the Circuit Court for Carroll
County, purportedly acting pursuant to timely filed Maryland Rule 4-345(b) motions, altered
the charges in the indictment counts to which the defendant had pled guilty, and for which
he had been legally sentenced, to other crimes which the State had initially charged in other
counts, but which the State had nolle prossed at the time of sentencing.  The court then
modified the sentences to probation before judgment, a statutorily prohibited disposition of
the charges to which the defendant had pled guilty.  We shall reverse for the reasons set forth
below. 
In 1996 a Carroll County grand jury returned multi-count indictments against the
respondent, David Crary Griswold (Griswold), charging that he had committed sexual
offenses more than ten years before with children under the age of fourteen.  At the time of
the earliest of the offenses Griswold was in his thirties.1  Specifically, in case K-1996-23295,
Griswold was charged with four counts involving a male victim who was then
approximately six years old.  Count I alleged a violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1996
Repl. Vol.), Article 27, § 464B, providing in relevant part as follows:
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"§ 464B.  Third degree sexual offense.
"(a)
Elements of offense.--A person is guilty of a sexual offense in
the third degree if the person engages in:
....
"(3)
Sexual contact with another person who is under 14 years of age
and the person performing the sexual contact is four or more years older than
the victim[.]"
Count II in indictment 23295 charged a violation of Article 27, § 464C, which in relevant
part read:
"§ 464C.  Fourth degree sexual offense.
"(a)
Elements of the offense.--A person is guilty of a sexual offense
in the fourth degree if the person engages:
"(1)
In sexual contact with another person against the will and
without the consent of the other person[.]"
The remaining counts in No. 23295 charged common law battery and child abuse in
violation of Article 27, § 35C.  
The second case with which we are concerned on this appeal is K-1996-23296. The
victim was Griswold's niece, who was born in 1980.   The criminal acts were alleged to have
occurred between 1987 and 1994.  Counts I and II in that indictment charged third degree
sexual offense in violation § 464B(a)(3), and Counts III and IV charged fourth degree sexual
- 3 -
2A third indictment, No. 23297, returned against Griswold at the same time, involved
a third victim.  In that case Griswold pled guilty to child abuse.  That judgment of conviction
was also modified by the circuit court, but it is not involved in this appeal.
offense in violation of § 464C.  The remaining counts in No. 23296  charged sexual child
abuse of a family member, common law battery, and indecent exposure.2
On January 17, 1997, Griswold pled guilty to the first counts, charging third degree
sexual offense, in the two indictments involved in this appeal, and the State nolle prossed
all of the other counts of both indictments.  That day, the court sentenced Griswold on each
of the two counts of third degree sexual offense to five years, to be served concurrently.  The
circuit court suspended the execution of the sentence and released Griswold on probation,
under a number of conditions.  These included home confinement between the hours of 6:00
p.m. and 10:00 a.m. for a period of 180 days, that he continue counseling with his physician,
that he have no contact with the male victim, and that there be no unsupervised contact with
any children under eighteen years of age.  These sentences were not illegal.
Within ninety days of the imposition of these sentences Griswold filed identical
motions in each case, headed, "Motion for Modification or Reduction of Sentence."  He
moved "pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-345(b) for a modification and/or reduction of sentence
imposed in the above case."  The motions simply described the sentences imposed and asked
the court to "consider revising its judgment and sentence in the above-captioned case."  
Maryland Rule 4-345, "Sentencing-Revisory power of court," provides in relevant
part:
- 4 -
3P.B.J., in general, means that, with the consent of a person guilty of a criminal
offense, the court exercising criminal jurisdiction has power to "stay the entering of
judgment, defer further proceedings, and place the person on probation[.]"     Former
(continued...)
"(b)
Modification or reduction--Time for.  The court has revisory
power and control over a sentence upon a motion filed within 90 days after its
imposition ... in a circuit court, whether or not an appeal has been filed.
Thereafter, the court has revisory power and control over the sentence in case
of fraud, mistake or irregularity[.]
....
"(d)
Open court hearing.  The court may modify, reduce, correct, or
vacate a sentence only on the record in open court, after hearing from the
defendant, the State, and from each victim or victim's representative who
requests an opportunity to be heard."
The State responded to the motions, asserting that the sentence was "fair, reasonable
and within the statute," that there was no "unconscionable burden" on Griswold, and that
"nothing has occurred since the time of sentencing to warrant a reduction in the sentence."
By longhand notations on the margins of the motions, the court directed that they be
held sub curia, awaiting the decision of counsel as to when a hearing would be requested.
A hearing was requested in late December 1998, but canceled the following month.  In
September 2001 Griswold again requested a hearing on the pending motions.  At that
hearing, held January 10, 2002, Griswold asked for probation before judgment (P.B.J.).
When Griswold was originally sentenced, Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.),
Article 27, § 641, dealing with P.B.J., contained a limitation on that type of disposition that
is relevant here.3  That limitation, found in § 641(a)(4), read:
- 5 -
3(...continued)
§ 641(a)(1)(i)1.  Section 641, without substantial change, has been recodified as Maryland
Code (2001), § 6-220 of the Criminal Procedure Article.
"Notwithstanding paragraph (1) of this subsection, a court may not stay the
entering of judgment and place a person on probation for a violation of any
of the provisions of §§ 462 through 464B of this article for an offense
involving a person under the age of 16 years."
At the time of the revision of the judgments to P.B.J. in the instant matter, the limitation was
found in Maryland Code (2001), § 6-220(d)(3) of the Criminal Procedure Article (CP),
reading:
"Notwithstanding subsections (b) and (c) of this section, a court may not stay
the entering of judgment and place a defendant on probation for:
....
"(3)
a violation of any of the provisions of Article 27, §§ 462
through 464B of the Code for a crime involving a person under the age of 16
years."
At the January 10, 2002 hearing on the motion Griswold's counsel, in part, argued as
follows: 
"I would ask you to consider modifying this to a P.B.J.  I think we had
two Third Degree Sex Offenses, which typically cannot be modified.  ...
"I would ask you to consider modifying the Third Degree Convictions
to Fourth so they could then be P.B.J.  ... I'm asking this on behalf of his
mother.  I ask that she not have to live with the conviction that's on his record.
I don't think there's a need for him to be reporting as a sex offender on an
annual basis or to be on any list."
- 6 -
The State expressly opposed the requested modifications with respect to cases 23295
and 23296 on the ground that "[a] P.B.J. cannot be given as they are Third Degree Sex
Offenses."
After taking the matter under advisement, the circuit court, on March 6, 2002, caused
the docket to reflect the following:
"ORDERED, that Defendant's convictions in K-96-23295 and K-96-
23296 of Art. 27, § 464B, Third Degree Sexual Offense be, and they hereby
are, modified to Art. 27, § 464C, Fourth Degree Sexual Offense; and it is
further
"ORDERED, that Defendant's convictions in ... K-96-23295 and K-96-
23296, Art. 27, § 464C, Fourth Degree Sexual Offense be, and they hereby
are, modified to Probation Before Judgment, pursuant to Md. Criminal
Procedure Code Ann. § 6-220 (2001)." 
The State timely noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  This Court issued
the writ of certiorari on its own motion prior to consideration of the matter by that court.
A single question is presented by the State, namely:
"Where Griswold was convicted and sentenced on two third degree
sexual offense convictions, did the circuit court err when it later changed the
convictions to fourth degree sexual offenses in order to modify Griswold's
sentence to probation before judgment?"
In answer to that question the State submits that the circuit court violated CP § 6-
220(d)(3) when it modified the sentences for third degree sexual offense to P.B.J.  In
opposition, Griswold's principal submission is that P.B.J. was imposed for convictions of
fourth degree sexual offenses, dispositions which were not prohibited by statute.  The result,
- 7 -
he contends, is that the State has no right of appeal and that the appropriate mandate is to
dismiss the appeal. 
I
A limited right of appeal by the State is conferred by Maryland Code (1974, 2002
Repl. Vol.), § 12-302(c) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (CJ).  Pertinent here
is subsection (2) which reads:
"(c)
In a criminal case, the State may appeal as provided in this
subsection.
....
"(2)
The State may appeal from a final judgment if the State alleges
that the trial judge failed to impose the sentence specifically mandated by the
Code."
Resolution of the principal issue between the parties ultimately turns on the
appropriate analysis for applying CJ § 12-302(c)(2).  Under the State's analysis, we are to
compare the original charging document to the modified sentence.  At the initial sentencing
Griswold pled guilty to third degree sexual offenses and the sentences imposed were not
prohibited by the predecessor of CP § 6-220(d)(3).  In the State's view, the circuit court
changed those judgments of conviction by modifying the sentence element thereof to a
statutorily prohibited sentence while, throughout, the determination of guilt remained, in
legal effect, the commission of third degree sexual offenses.
On the other hand, Griswold's position looks at the proceedings below as consisting
of distinct steps.  First, per the timely filed Rule 4-345 motions, there was a modification
- 8 -
from third degree to fourth degree sexual offenses of the guilt determination element of the
judgments.  Then there was a modification of the sentences to sentences that are lawful for
fourth degree sexual offenses.  Consequently, argues Griswold, there being no sentence
specifically mandated by the Code for fourth degree sexual offenses, there is no right of
appeal by the State.
The State presents the proper analysis, as demonstrated by our decision in State v.
Hanna, 307 Md. 390, 514 A.2d 16 (1986).  There the defendant pled guilty to common law
robbery and to the use of a handgun in the commission of a felony.  Maryland Code (1957,
1982 Repl. Vol., 1985 Cum. Supp.), Article 27, § 36B, mandated a minimum five year
sentence for the handgun violation.  At sentencing, the circuit court struck the plea of guilty
to the handgun offense and entered P.B.J.  On the robbery count Hanna was sentenced to ten
years, all but two suspended, followed by five years probation.  On the State's appeal of  the
disposition of the handgun charge, this Court reversed and remanded for imposition of the
statutorily mandated minimum sentence.
In this Court, Hanna challenged the State's right to appeal under CJ § 12-302(c)(2).
He contended that, by first striking the plea of guilty to the handgun charge and then
imposing P.B.J., the circuit court had not entered a final judgment on the handgun count,
thereby rendering CJ § 12-302(c)(2) inapplicable.  As part of that argument Hanna sought
to distinguish State ex rel. Sonner v. Shearin, 272 Md. 502, 325 A.2d 573 (1974), and State
- 9 -
v. Wooten, 277 Md. 114, 352 A.2d 829 (1976), as cases in which sentences had been
imposed and then execution of the sentences suspended.  Rejecting that argument we said:
"This Court recognized the State's appeals in Sonner and in Wooten to have
been taken from appealable orders not because those orders suspended
sentences which had earlier been imposed, if only by an instant, but because,
by virtue of some other provision of law, the orders allegedly were beyond the
authority of the sentencing courts."
Hanna, 307 Md. at 400, 514 A.2d at 21.  We then held that P.B.J. is a "final" judgment
within the meaning of CJ § 12-203(c)(2).  Thus, in Hanna, we looked through the striking
of the guilty plea to the offense charged to determine whether a Code mandated sentence had
been imposed.  Here, the appropriate analysis looks through the purported modification by
the circuit court of the first counts in the indictments and looks to the charges brought by the
State to which Griswold pled guilty.  P.B.J. is not a permitted disposition of the grand jury's
charges.
Shilling v. State, 320 Md. 288, 577 A.2d 83 (1990), involved a subsection of the
P.B.J. statute which is a companion to the prohibition against P.B.J. involved in the instant
matter.  Maryland Code (1957, 1987 Repl. Vol., 1989 Cum. Supp.), Article 27, § 641(a)(2),
now CP § 6-220(d)(1), prohibited P.B.J. for a second or subsequent violation of the driving
while intoxicated or driving under the influence prohibitions of Maryland Code (1977, 1987
Repl. Vol., 1989 Cum. Supp.), § 21-902(a) of the Transportation Article.  There, in
describing the operation of CJ § 12-302(c)(2), Judge Cole, writing for the Court, said that
the statute "confers a right of appeal on the State under circumstances where the State
- 10 -
alleges that the trial court failed to impose a sentence specifically mandated by the statute
under which the defendant is charged."   Shilling, 320 Md. at 294, 577 A.2d at 86 (emphasis
added).
The instant matter presents an even more compelling case for appealability under CJ
§ 12-302(b)(2) than was presented in Hanna.  In Hanna, no final judgment had been entered
when the guilty plea was stricken, so that the court retained broad discretionary power to
strike that plea.  Here, the circuit court, in its first step,  undertook to modify that portion of
the judgment of conviction "defining a defendant's culpability."  Shilling, 320 Md. at 293,
577 A.2d at 85.  Griswold argues that the authority for that alteration is Rule 4-345(b).  That
rule, however, limits the circuit court's revisory power to a "sentence."  In Webster v. State,
359 Md. 465, 754 A.2d 1004 (2000), we said that 
"[t]he meaning of 'sentence' in the criminal context is clear--it refers to
the act of the court in pronouncing sentence, announcing the sanction that is
being imposed on the defendant.  It is that part of the final judgment that
postdates the rendition of a verdict of guilty.  But a trial court may modify a
sentence.  See Maryland Rule 4-345(b)[.]"
Id. at 482, 754 A.2d at 1013.
A more fundamental defect in Griswold's position is that the circuit court had no
authority to alter the charging document over the objection of the State's Attorney.  The first
counts of the indictments, to which Griswold pled guilty, charged third degree sexual
offense, but the circuit court, years later, undertook to alter those charges to fourth degree
sexual offenses, which had been charged in later counts in the indictments.  The State's
- 11 -
4Maryland Rule 2-404, "Charging document--Amendment," reads in relevant part:
"On motion of a party or on its own initiative, the court at any time
before verdict may permit a charging document to be amended except that if
the amendment changes the character of the offense charged, the consent of
the parties is required."
Attorney had disposed of the fourth degree sexual offenses by nolle prosequi.  Maryland
Rule 4-247(a) provides, in relevant part, that "the State's Attorney may terminate a
prosecution on a charge and dismiss the charge by entering a nolle prosequi on the record
in open court."  This Court views as
"well settled that 'the entry of a nolle prosequi is generally within the sole
discretion of the prosecuting attorney, free from judicial control and not
dependent upon the defendant's consent,' Ward v. State, 290 Md. 76, 83, 427
A.2d 1008, 1012 (1981); see also In re Darren M., 358 Md. 104, 112, 747
A.2d 612, 616 (2000) ... and that it 'may be entered as to an entire charging
document, or one or more counts, or even a part of a count.'  Ward, 290 Md.
at 83, 427 A.2d at 1012."
State v. Martin, 367 Md. 53, 55, 785 A.2d 1270, 1271 (2001).  Further,
"a nolle prosequi discharges the defendant on the charging document or count
which was nolle prossed, and ... it is a bar to any further prosecution under
that charging document or count ...."
Ward v. State, 290 Md. at 84, 427 A.2d at 1012-13.
Nor can we view the circuit court's alteration of the first counts in the indictments as
an amendment, because it was made after verdict and the "amendment" changed "the
character of the offense charged."  Maryland Rule 4-204.4  The changes to fourth degree
sexual offense eliminated the element that the victims were under fourteen years of age
- 12 -
while Griswold was more than four years older than those victims.  Even if the amendment
had been attempted before the guilty plea was entered, that substantial a change could not
be made without the consent of the State.
This is not a case like Chertkov v. State, 335 Md. 161, 642 A.2d 232 (1994), where
the State argued the illegality of the modified sentence based on the violation of a Maryland
Rule of Procedure.  In Chertkov the defendant pled guilty to misdemeanor medicaid fraud
and conspiracy to commit felony medicaid fraud.  The plea was entered pursuant to a plea
agreement, approved by the court pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-243(c), under which the
defendant was sentenced to three years incarceration, all but 179 days suspended, followed
by five years probation and 1500 hours of community service.  Id. at 164, 642 A.2d at 233.
Pursuant to a timely filed motion under Maryland Rule 4-345, the defendant sought revision
of the sentence after service of the unsuspended portion thereof.  Over the State's objection,
the circuit court entered P.B.J.  The State noted an appeal, contending that the sentence was
illegal because the court's action violated Rule 4-243, governing plea bargains.  Although
we agreed with the State that the modification of the sentence violated the court's obligations
under the plea bargain rule, the appeal was dismissed.  This was because, when CJ § 12-
302(c)(2) "referred to a failure to impose the sentence specifically mandated by the Code,
it was not referring to the Maryland Rules or anything else other than the statutory law of
this State."   Chertkov, 335 Md. at 169, 462 A.2d at 236.
- 13 -
Similar to Chertkov is Cardinell v. State, 335 Md. 381, 644 A.2d 11 (1994).  The
defendant had been found guilty of drug offenses and lawfully sentenced.  After the circuit
court had denied a timely filed Rule 4-345 motion to revise the sentence, the defendant filed
a second Rule 4-345 motion, well beyond the time limit of ninety days from imposition of
sentence.  Id. at 385, 644 A.2d at 13.  Based on that motion the circuit court revised the
sentence, and the State appealed under CJ § 12-302(c)(2), alleging noncompliance with the
time limits in Rule 4-345 as the illegality in the modified sentence.  Although Cardinell was
later overruled on other grounds by State v. Green, 367 Md. 61, 785 A.2d 1275 (2001), this
Court was unanimous in concluding that § 12-302(c)(2) did not authorize the State's appeal.
Cardinell, 355 Md. at 387, 644 A.2d at 14.  See also State v. Green, 367 Md. at 84-85, 785
A.2d at 1288-89 (Wilner, J., concurring); State v. Warfield, 148 Md. App. 178, 181, 811
A.2d 382, 384 (2002).
Neither Chertkov nor Cardinell involved crimes for which the Code mandated or
prohibited a specific sentencing disposition.  In those cases the State sought to substitute a
rule violation for a statutory mandate or prohibition applicable to the crime of which the
defendant was guilty.  Comparison of the sentence that had been imposed to the rule
violation did not satisfy CJ § 12-302(c)(2).  
We will not extend the holdings of Chertkov and of Cardinell to preclude the State's
reliance on violations of the Maryland Rules of Procedure in order to demonstrate that the
portion of the judgment of conviction determining criminal culpability has been altered, in
- 14 -
5The view which we take of this case makes it unnecessary to address whether the
action by the circuit court constituted an unconstitutional invasion by the Judiciary
Department of State Government on the State's Attorney's "'most awesome discretionary
power:  to determine whether or not to prosecute.'"   Lykins v. State, 288 Md. 71, 86, 415
A.2d 1113, 1121 (1980) (quoting Murphy v. Yates, 276 Md. 475, 495, 348 A.2d 837, 848
(1975)).  
violation of the Rules, to a crime which is different from that on which a mandatory sentence
was originally imposed and which carries no sentence specifically mandated by the Code.
The obvious purpose of CJ § 12-302(c)(2)'s conferral of a right of appeal on the State from
the imposition of sentences contrary to a specific mandate of the Code is to insure that the
courts carry out the legislative policy embodied in statutes mandating or prohibiting certain
sentences for certain crimes.  The purpose of those statutes, including CP § 6-220(d)(3),
easily could be thwarted if circuit courts could, in violation of the Rules of Procedure,
amend charging documents over the prosecutor's objection, resurrect nolle prossed counts,
substantially change offenses from those on which the determination of guilt was predicated,
and, by those means, produce a judgment of conviction for a crime for which the Code does
not mandate any sentencing requirement.5
Consequently, the State's appeal lies.
II
Griswold also makes some ancillary arguments which will not long detain us.  First,
he suggests that there is no violation of CP § 6-220(d)(3) because a lawful sentence was
originally imposed, and the modified sentence was based upon an offense for which
- 15 -
Griswold originally could have been found guilty.  In State v. Green, 367 Md. at 83, 785
A.2d at 1288, we rejected "the petitioner's alternate argument that because the Circuit Court
originally sentenced him as [the statute there involved] requires, the court did not fail to
impose the sentence specifically mandated by the Code."  
Griswold also cites Madison v. State, 205 Md. 425, 431, 109 A.2d 96, 99 (1954), for
the proposition that all judgments are under the control of the court during the term in which
they are entered.  We note that, under Maryland Rule 16-107.a, terms of the circuit courts
now exist only for "accounting and statistical reporting purposes."  In any event, Griswold
does not demonstrate that the revision of the judgment of conviction in 2002 took place in
the same term of court as the imposition of the lawful sentence in 1997.  
For the foregoing reasons we enter the following mandate.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
CARROLL COUNTY REVERSED; CASE
REMANDED TO THAT COURT FOR
REINSTATEMENT OF THE JUDGMENTS OF
CONVICTION IN K-1996-23295 AND IN
K-1996-23296.  COSTS IN THIS COURT TO
BE PAID BY THE APPELLEE, DAVID
CRARY GRISWOLD.