Title: Cramer v. State, DMV

State: nevada

Issuer: Nevada Supreme Court

Document:

126 Nev., Advance Opinion 3

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

| JOSHUA CRAMER, No. 53248 :
oma FILED
THE STATE OF NEVADA,

DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, ser a7 20
Respondent.

sae
THE STATE OF NEVADA, _ No. 53380

DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES,
Appellant,
vs.
CLAUDETTE JOSEPH,
Respondent.

 

Appeal from a district court order denying a petition for
judicial review in a Department of Motor Vehicles driver's license
revocation action (Docket No. 53248), and appeal from a district court

order granting a petition for judicial review in a Department o

 

 

Vehicles driver's license revocation action (Docket No, 53880).
Judicial District Court, Clark County, David Wall, Judge (Docket No.
59248); Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Mark R. Denton,
Judge (Docket No. 53380).

Reversed and remanded with instructions (Docket No. 63248)
affirmed (Docket No. 53380),

Law Offices of John G. Watkins and John Glenn Watkins, Las Vegas,
for Joshua Cramer and Claudette Joseph.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, and Carolyn L. Waters, Senior
Deputy Attorney General, Carson City,
for the State of Nevada, Department of Motor Vehicles.

 

os 10 -Ablge

 
BEFORE HARDESTY, DOUGLAS and PICKERING, JJ.
OPINION
By the Court, HARDESTY, J.

In 1995, the Legislature enacted NRS 50.320, which permits
ithe use of an affidavit to prove a person's blood-alcohol content in certain
proceedings, including driver's license revocation hearings, by a person
who has been previously qualified to testify as an expert witness by a
district court.

In Gramer v, State, Department of Motor Vehicles. Docket No.

 

}53248, we conclude that NRS 50.320 limits the use of an expert witness
affidavit to persons previously qualified by a distriet court to testify as an
lexpert witness. Therefore, an administrative hearing officer lacks
discretion to admit expert witness testimony by affidavit when the affiant
Jhas not been qualified by a district court or the affidavit fails to state the
district court in which the affiant was permitted to testify.

In State, Department of Motor Vehicles v. Joseph. Docket No.
53380, we reject the suggestion that the district court qualification
requirement in NRS 50.320 can be satisfied by way of a stipulation
entered into by parties in a separate, unrelated district court case.

FACTS
-amer appeal

In September 2007, appellant Joshua Cramer hit two parked
cars in an apartment complex, fled the scene, and then returned upon the
request of a Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (Metro) officer.
Cramer failed three field sobriety tests and was arrested for driving under
the influence (DUD). He was transported to the Clark County Detention

Center, where he provided a blood sample. ‘The blood analysis, conducted

   

 
by Michael Stypa, a Metro forensic scientist, showed that Cramer's blood-
alcohol concentration was over the 0.08 legal limit, registering at 0.192
Pursuant to NRS 484.385, respondent State of Nevada,
Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) revoked Cramer's driver's license,
and Cramer requested an administrative hearing. Among the evidence
considered by the administrative law judge was an affidavit from Stypa
tes

  

fying to his blood analysis findings. Cramer challenged the
admissibility of Stypa’s affidavit under NRS 50.320 because Stypa did not
state in his affidavit that he had been qualified to testify as an expert in
district court. The administrative law judge nevertheless admitted the
affidavit and affirmed the revocation of Cramer's license, finding that NRS
50.320 permits an administrative law judge to exercise discretion in
admitting an affidavit from a proposed expert in a revocation hearing.

Cramer then filed a petition for judicial review in district
court. The district court denied Cramer's petition, summarily stating that
the administrative law judge's decision was supported by substantial
evidence. This appeal follows.
Joseph appeal

In September 2007, respondent Claudette Joseph was pulled
over by the Nevada Highway Patrol for failing to maintain her travel lane.
Joseph failed a field sobriety test, was arrested for DUI, and then
submitted to a blood test. Joseph's blood sample, which was tested by

 

1The Legislature recently enacted NRS Chapter 484C, which

governs crimes associated with driving under the influence of aleohol or
prohibited substances; thus, NRS 484.385 is now NRS 484C.220. 2009
Nev. Stat., ch. 134, § 4, at 484.

 

 
 

Theresa Suffecool, an employee of Quest Diagnostics, indicated that

 

Joseph's blood-alcohol concentration was 0.28, more than three times the
logal limit of 0.08. Appellant DMV revoked Joseph's license, and she
requested an administrative hearing.

At the hearing, the DMV presented Suffecoo!’s affidavit, in
which she stated that she had previously been qualified in the Eighth
Judicial District Court to testify in an unrelated criminal case as an expert
for the testing of blood to determine the presence of alcohol Joseph
challenged the admissibility of Suffecool’s affidavit under NRS 50.320
[because in the case relied upon by the DMV to qualify Suffecool to testify
as an expert, the parties had stipulated to Suffecoo!’s qualifications
without providing any substantive or qualitative evaluation of her
background or experience. ‘The administrative law judge admitted
Suffecoo!’s affidavit in Joseph's case, concluding that the stipulation in the
unrelated criminal case constituted proper expert qualification by a
district court under NRS 50.520, and ultimately affirmed the revocation of
Joseph's license.

Joseph filed a petition for judicial review. The district court
reviewed the administrative record, as well as the procedural facts of the
district court case relied upon by the DMV qualifying Suffecool to testify
as an expert, and determined that

while the [DMV] can proceed with affidavits and
declarations of witnesses qualified by district court
order on stipulations pursuant to the statute, NRS
50.275, it should do so only where it is clear that
qualification by a district court has been done on a
record that at least shows the qualifications,

Because Suffecool’s qualifications were not evident from the record in
either the case relied upon by the DMV or in Joseph's case, the district

 
   

court granted Joseph's petition for judicial review and reinstated her
driver's license. This appeal follows.
DISCUSSION

Standard of review

When reviewing an administrative decision, “this court’s role
is ‘identical to that of the district court: to review the evidence presented
to the agency in order to determine whether the agency's decision was
arbitrary or capricious and was thus an abuse of the ageney’s discretion.”
Weaver v, State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 121 Nev. 494, 498, 117 P.3d 193,
196 (2005) (quoting United Exposition Service Co, v, SIS, 109 Nev. 421,
423, 851 P.2d 423, 424 (1993)). When reviewing questions of law,
including issues of statutory interpretation, this court applies de novo
review. State, DMV v. Taylor-Caldwell, 126 Nev. _, __, 229 P.3d 471,
472 (2010); State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles
199 P.3d 835, 836-37 (2009). If a statute is facially clear, this court will
not go beyond the plain language to determine legislative intent. Taylor-
Caldwell, 126 Nev. at__, 229 P.8d at 472.
Issues presented

In the Cramer appeal, Cramer argues that an affidavit or

Terracin, 125 Nev.

 

 

declaration regarding a driver's blood-alcohol content is admissible under
NRS 60.320 only if the affiant or declarant has been qualified to testify as
an expert by a district court. ‘Therefore, Cramer contends, because Stypa
was not properly qualified to testify as an expert, his affidavit regarding
Cramer's blood-alcohol content was inadmissible. The DMV, in response,
argues that while NRS 50.320 requires an administrative hearing officer
to admit an affidavit from an expert previously qualified by a district
court, the statute also allows a hearing officer to exercise his or her

discretion to admit an affidavit in an administrative hearing from a

 
 

person who has not previously been permitted to testify in district court as
Jan expert witness.

In the Joseph appeal, the DMV argues that Suffecool's
jaffidavit was admissible under NRS 50.320 because she had previously
Jbeen qualified to testify as an expert witness by a district court. Joseph
responds by arguing that the district court qualification requirement in
NRS 650.320 does not include the qualification of an expert witness by the
stipulation of parties in a separate case, Rather, Joseph argues that the
district court qualification under NRS 50.320 contemplates an evaluation
of the witness's qualifications pursuant to the standards set forth in NRS
50.275.

NRS 50.320 permits the admission of an_affidavit_when_an_affiant has
been previously qualified as an expert witness in district court

An affidavit is generally inadmissible hearsay. However, in
1995, the Legislature enacted NRS 50.320, see 1995 Nev. Stat., ch. 708, §
1, at 2712, which allows the admission of an affidavit in certain
proceedings, including driver's license revocation proceedings, from a
person who has been previously qualified by a district court to testify as
‘an expert witness about an individual's blood-alcohol content? See
DeRosa v, Dist. Ct, 115 Nev. 225, 229, 985 P.2d 167, 160 (1999) (stating
that “NRS 50.315, 50.320, and 60.325 provide . .. statutory exceptions to

"The Legislature amended NRS 50.320 in 2009, see 2009 Nev. Stat.,
ch. 16, § 1, at 32, after the disposition of the underlying matters; thus, the
2007 version of NRS 50.320 applies to this appeal. We note that, as part
of the 2009 amendment, the Legislature changed “district court” to “court
of record.” Soe id.

 
 

the hearsay rule”), overruled on other grounds by City of Las Vegas v,
Walsh, 121 Nev. 899, 906, 124 P,3d 203, 208 (2005).
NRS 50.320 perm:

 

the use of an affidavit to prove a person's

[blood-alcohol content as follows:

1, The affidavit or declaration of a chemist
and any other person who has qualified in the
district court of any county to testify as an expert
witness regarding the presence in the breath,
blood or urine of a person of alcohol... which is
submitted to prove

(®) The concentration of alcohol .

is admissible in the manner provided in this
section.

2. An affidavit or declaration which is
submitted to prove any fact set forth in subsection
1 must be admitted into evidence when submitted
during any administrative proceeding, preliminary
hearing or hearing before a grand jury. ‘The court
shall not sustain any objection to the admission of
such an affidavit or declaration.

Accordingly, in certain instances, an affidavit from an expert witness may
be admitted in lieu of live testimony.

‘The DMV acknowledges that Stypa's affidavit fails to state
that he was qualified in district court to testify about blood-alcohol
concentration but instead argues that hecause driver's license revocation
hearings are civil in nature and do not require safeguards as stringent as
those required in criminal proceedings, see Weaver, 121 Nev. at 498-99,
117 P.8d at 197, hearing officers possess diseretionary authority to admit
an affidavit from a person who has not previously been permitted to testify
as an expert witness in district court. We reject this argument on two

grounds,

 
First, a plain reading of NRS 50.320 demonstrates that the
statute imposes a duty upon a hearing officer in an administrative hearing
to admit an affidavit from an affiant who has previously been allowed to
testify as an expert witnoss in district court regarding the concentration of
alcohol in a person's blood, breath, or urine.’ However, nothing in NRS
50.320 grants a hearing officer the discretionary authority to admit an
affidavit from a proposed expert who has not been qualified by a district
court to offer testimony to prove that a person's blood-alcohol content
exceeded the legal limit at the time the test was conducted. See State,
Dep't of Taxation v, DaimlerChrysler, 121 Nev. 541, 548, 119 P.3d 135,
139 (2005) (‘[O]missions of subject matters from statutory provisions are
presumed to have been intentional.”); Galloway v, Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13,
26, 422 P.2d 237, 246 (1967) (‘The maxim ‘EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST
EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS’, the expression of one thing is the exclusion of

another, has been repeatedly confirmed in this State.”).¢

“In this opinion, we do not address whether a chemist who submits
an affidavit pursuant to NRS 50.320 must be qualified as an expert, as
that issue was not raised in this appeal. Additionally, we do not address
NRS 60.320(6)'s definition of “chemist” enacted by the Legislature in 2009.
See 2009 Ney. Stat., ch. 16, § 1, at 32

 

‘NRS 233B.128(1) governs the admissibility of evidence during
administrative proceedings and provides, in pertinent part, that
“[elvidence may be admitted, except where precluded by statute, if it is of
a type commonly relied upon by reasonable and prudent persons in the
conduct of their affairs.” (Emphasis added.) Because we conclude that
NRS 50.320 precludes the admission of affidavits from those not qualified
as expert witnesses by the district court, NRS 233B.123(1) doe’ not
provide an alternative basis for admission of such affidavits.

 

 
A person submitting an affidavit does not appear before the
hearing officer; therefore, there is generally no opportunity to examine the
witness regarding his qualifications. See State, Dep't Mtr. Veh, v, Evans,
114 Nev, 41, 45, 952 P.2d 958, 961 (1998) (citing NRS 233B.123(4))
(stating that a defendant in an administrative proceeding is entitled to
confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him). While we have
previously stated that “the DMV's blood-testing procedures are inherently
reliable,” State, Dep't Mtr, Veh, v, Bremer, 113 Nev. 805, 809, 942 P.2d
145, 148 (1997), we have never concluded, nor implied, that blood-alcohol
tests conducted by a person who is not qualified to testify as an expert
regarding the presence of alcohol in a person's blood are equally reliable.
Allowing an affidavit from a proposed expert, which lacks the reliability
and trustworthiness of an affidavit from one who has been qualified to
testify as an expert, would violate NRS 50.320's plain meaning and lead to
absurd results, including the revocation of driver's licenses based on a
layperson’s affidavit. See Fierle v. Perez, 125 Nev.__, __, 219 P.8d 906,
911 (2009) (stating that this court seeks to avoid interpretations of
statutory provisions that produce absurd results). We conclude that there
is no reason for us to read NRS 50.320 more broadly than the plain
language allows, even in the context of a driver's license revocation
hearing.

Second, the DMV’s position is inconsistent with NRS 50.275's
qualification standards for the admission of an opinion by an expert
witness. NRS 50.275 provides that “Lif scientific, technical or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert

by special knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify

 

 
4

 

to matters within the scope of such knowledge.”> Accordingly, the “three
overarching requirements for admissibility of expert witness testimony”
are “(1) qualification, (2) assistance, and (3) limited scope requirements.”
Higgs v. State, 126 Nev. _ 222 P.3d 648, 658 (2010).

‘The district court, in its role as a “gatekeep[or],” has *wide

 

discretion” when determining the admissibility of expert testimony. Id, at
222 P.3d at 658, This court has consistently stated that in performing
its gatekeeping duties, “the district court must first determine that the
witness is indeed a qualified expert.” Mulder v. State, 116 Nev. 1, 13, 992
P.2d 845, 852 (2000) (emphasis added); Hallmark v, Eldridge, 124 Nev.
492, 499, 189 P.3d 646, 650 (2008). In Hallmark, this court established a
nonexhaustive list of factors to be considered by the district court when
qualifying a witness to testify as an expert witness, including the witness's
formal education, training, licensing, and employment experience. 124
Nev. at 499, 189 P.3d at 650-51. The standard enunciated in NRS 50.275
“sets a degree of regulation upon admitting expert witness testimony,
without usurping the trial judge's gatekeeping function.” Higgs, 126 Nev.
at _, 222 P.3d at 658-59,

In the Cramer appeal, the DMV does not point to, nor did we
locate, any evidence in Stypa’s affidavit or elsewhere in the record

SNRS 50.320 and prior caselaw refer to a witness being “qualified”
as an expert witness in district court. However, the district court does not
actually declare a witness “qualified.” Rather, the district court makes a
determination that the witness's qualifications allow him to testify as an
expert in a particular area of expertise. See Thompson v. State, 125 Nev.
+ _. 221 P.3d 708, 713-14 (2009) (stating that the determination of
whether a proposed expert's testimony is admissible is within the district
court's discretion).

   

10

 
 

indicating that he was previously qualified as an expert in district court.
Because NRS 50.320 plainly limits the admission of an affidavit to prove a
person's blood-alcohol content to one from a person who previously
qualified to testify as an expert witness in a district court, we conclude
that Stypa’s affidavit was inadmissible. Consequently, it was an abuse of
discretion for the administrative law judgo to admit Stypa’s affidavit to
prove Cramer's blood-alcohol content.

Export qualification by stipulation docs not satisfy NRS 50,320

In the Joseph appeal, it appears that on the face of Suffecool’s
affidavit, NRS 50.20 is satisfied, as she states that she was previously
‘qualified to testify as an expert witness in district court “regarding the
testing of blood to determine the presence and amount of alcohol and
controlled substances.” “However, Joseph submitted evidence
demonstrating that Suffecoo!'s qualification to testify as an expert
occurred by stipulation of the parties in an unrelated district court
criminal case.

‘The general rule is that a stipulation is not binding against
lone who “was not a party to a proceeding and did not assent to the
stipulation.” Lincoln Lumber Co, v. Lancaster, 618 N.W.2d 676, 683 (Neb.
2000); see also Nev. Ind. Comm, v. Bibb, 77 Nev. 8, 11, 858 P.2d 360, 361
(1961) (concluding that a concession made by counsel representing a
nonparty could not bind the appellant); Pacific L. S. Co. v. Ellison R. Co.
52 Nev. 279, 298, 286 P. 120, 124 (1930) (determining that signatories to a
stipulation could not bind the other defendants not parties to the
stipulation); CRSC, Ine. v. Sage Diamond Co., Inc., 22 P.3d 97, 104 (Haw.
Ct. App. 2001) (noting that a nonparty cannot be bound by a stipulation).

 

When a stipulation is reached, there is no challenge to a person's expert
qualifications pursuant to NRS 50.275; thus, the person is not questioned

un

 
Jor cross-examined. Accordingly, the district court is not called upon to
make a judicial determination regarding whether that person is qualified
to testify as an expert witness,

We conclude that the rationale underlying the hearsay rule—
lack of reliability and trustworthiness—is implicated when an affiant, who

was a

 

ified by stipulation in one caso, socks to submit an affidavit to
prove a person's blood-alcohol level in another case. See Weber v. State,
121 Nev. 554, 577, 119 P.8d 107, 128 (2005) (stating that “{hJearsay
evidence is traditionally excluded ‘because it is not subject to the usual
tests to show the credibility of the declarant, Lacking is crose-
examination to ascertain a declarant’s perception, memory and
truthfulness.” (quoting Deutscher v, State, 95 Nev. 669, 684, 601 P.2d
407, 417 (1979))). Thus, we determine that NRS 50.820 precludes the

 

admission of an affidavit from a person who was previously qualified to
testify as an expert witness by stipulation in a case involving different
parties,

Joseph was not a party in the case relied upon by the DMV
and is therefore not bound by the stipulation entered into by the parties in
that unrelated case regarding Suffecool's qualifications to testify as an
expert witness. Moreover, because we conclude that a stipulation is not
sufficient to satisfy the qualification requirement in NRS 50.320, it was an
abuse of discretion for the administrative law judge to admit Suffecool's
affidavit,

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court in
the Cramer appeal, Docket No. 53248, and remand the matter to the

district court with instructions to, in turn, remand the matter to the

administrative law judge with instructions to reinstate Cramer's driver's

 

 
   
    
  

license, and we affirm the order of the district court in the Joseph appeal,
Docket No. 53380, granting Joseph's petition for judicial review and

reinstating her driver's license.

(Mer tuhy — y

Hardesty

   
 
      

Douglas

Fela Jd
Pickering

"Because we reverse on the ground that Stypa’s affidavit was not
admissible under NRS 60.320, we do not address Cramer's argument
regarding whether a blood test taken pursuant to NRS 484C.210 (formerly
NRS 484.384) must be conducted within two hours.