Title: Baldwin v. Upper Valley Services, Inc.

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

BALDWIN_V_UPPER_VALLEY_SERVICES_INC.93-375; 162 Vt. 51; 644 A.2d 316

[Opinion Filed May 6, 1994]


 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 93-375


 Mark Baldwin                                 Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Orange Superior Court

 Upper Valley Services, Inc.                  March Term, 1994


 Alan W. Cook, J.

 Harry A. Black and Joanne M. Ertel of Black Black & Davis, White River
   Junction, for plaintiff-appellant

 Peter G. Anderson, Kimberly R. Elia and Alison Cole-Hadley of Diamond &
   Associates, P.C., Montpelier, for defendant-appellee


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      ALLEN, C.J.   Following termination of his employment, plaintiff Mark
 Baldwin sued his employer, defendant Upper Valley Services, Inc. (UVS), on
 numerous grounds.  He appeals from an order granting defendant a directed
 verdict on a claim of wrongful discharge, and granting summary judgment to
 defendant on claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and
 failure to compensate for work performed.  We affirm in part and reverse in
 part.
      UVS is a private, nonprofit organization providing residential services
 to mentally retarded individuals in Orange County.  In March 1989,
 defendant hired plaintiff as a substitute staff member to work in several of
 its facilities.  In July 1989, plaintiff was made a full-time residential

 

 trainer, which required him to supervise clients directly in an assigned
 residential facility.  Defendant worked three and one-half days per week and
 remained at a residential facility overnight for three nights, a customary
 schedule for residential trainers.
      Between 11:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m., hours known as "sleep time,"
 residential trainers are not paid unless a client requires attention and
 keeps them awake.  The compensation rules for sleep time are not in dispute.
 To be paid for spending time with a client during this period, a trainer
 must:  (1) record the time on a time sheet, and (2) complete an incident
 report.  If a client keeps a trainer awake a total of three hours or more
 during sleep time, federal law requires that the trainer be paid for all
 eight hours.
      Plaintiff alleges that UVS wrongfully deprived him of sleep-time
 compensation.  He contends that defendant, contrary to established rules,
 never informed him of the right to compensation during sleep-time periods
 and never explained the time sheet and incident report requirements.  On
 March 9, 1990, plaintiff filed a complaint with the United States
 Department of Labor, alleging that defendant never compensated him for sleep
 time in violation of 29 U.S.C. { 207(a)(1).(FN1)  A Labor Department

 

 representative conducted an investigation with respect to the complaint and
 concluded that defendant was not required to pay plaintiff for the hours in
 question.  He did find, however, that defendant had been improperly applying
 a regulation concerning "on-call" time.  Consequently, defendant sent each
 employee affected by the error, including plaintiff, a check for unpaid
 wages in amounts determined by the Department.
      On June 28, 1990, plaintiff delivered a written complaint to the
 program director at the facility where he worked, alleging that his
 co-workers had sexually harassed and verbally abused him based on their
 perception that he was homosexual.  Defendant's program director thereafter
 informed him that he would no longer have to work with the individuals in
 question, other than for a ten-minute shift overlap, due to a decrease in
 staffing requirements at the facility.  After his meeting with his
 supervisor and the program director, plaintiff did not report any further
 sexual harassment.
      On August 1, 1990, plaintiff met with his supervisor concerning
 allegations that plaintiff had attempted to purchase illegal drugs, during
 working hours, in the presence of a client.  Because plaintiff's account
 differed from the allegations, his supervisor decided to suspend him
 pursuant to the terms of the personnel manual, pending further
 investigation and a final decision by the executive director on the merits
 of the allegations.  About two weeks later, the executive director
 scheduled a meeting with plaintiff to discuss the allegations and his
 suspension.  Plaintiff cancelled the meeting and declined to meet until he
 received a written response to his sexual harassment complaint and a written
 notice concerning the circumstances of his suspension.  Plaintiff contends

 

 that his request for a written response to his sexual harassment complaint
 was not a condition precedent to this meeting.  The executive director
 perceived plaintiff's response as an act of gross insubordination, and she
 terminated his employment on such grounds by letter dated August 16, 1990.
      On January 28, 1991, plaintiff sued UVS alleging retaliatory discharge,
 rights to damages on a promissory estoppel theory arising from reliance on
 alleged promises made by UVS, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
 and failure to compensate for sleep time.  The trial court granted
 defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the last three claims, and
 after the close of evidence granted a directed verdict on the first.
 Plaintiff has waived appeal on the issue of promissory estoppel.
                                     I.
      We first consider the directed verdict for UVS on plaintiff's wrongful
 discharge claim.  At trial, plaintiff offered evidence of a personnel manual
 to prove the existence of an implied contract between UVS and him.  The
 trial court ruled that the manual could not serve as the basis for a
 contractual relationship.  Pending appeal of this case, this Court decided
 Taylor v. National Life Ins. Co., 4 Vt. L.W. 371, 373 (Dec. 17, 1993),
 holding that "personnel manual provisions inconsistent with an at-will
 relationship may be used as evidence that the contract of employment
 requires good cause for termination."  The parties have requested remand of
 the discharge claim in light of Taylor, which applies retroactively to this
 case as a case pending on direct review.  See American Trucking Ass'n v.
 Conway, 152 Vt. 363, 377, 566 A.2d 1323, 1332 (1989).  Viewed most favorably
 to plaintiff's claim of an implied contract, the proffered employee manual
 represents evidence that could fairly and reasonably support the claim;

 

 therefore, a directed verdict cannot stand.  See Lussier v. North Troy
 Engineering Co., 149 Vt. 486, 490,