Title: State v. Spencer

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2022 WI 56 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP942-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Petitioner, 
     v. 
Robert Daris Spencer, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 397 Wis. 2d 241, 959 Wis. 2d 241 
(2021 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 6, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 2, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Stephanie Rothstein   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of 
the Court, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, and HAGEDORN, 
JJ., joined. ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, 
in which DALLET and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  DALLET, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion, in which KAROFSKY, J., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by John J. Grau and Grau Law Office, Waukesha. There was 
an oral argument by John J. Grau.  
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-cross petitioner, there were 
briefs filed by Kara L. Janson, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There 
was an oral argument by Kara L. Janson.  
 
 
 
2022 WI 56 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2018AP942-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2014CF5088) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross 
Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Robert Daris Spencer, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
JUL 6, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of 
the Court, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, and HAGEDORN, 
JJ., joined. ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, 
in which DALLET and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  DALLET, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion, in which KAROFSKY, J., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed in 
part, reversed in part.   
 
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals1 affirming in part 
and reversing in part the circuit court's2 denial of a 
                                                 
1 State v. Spencer, No. 2018AP942-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2021). 
2 The 
Honorable 
Stephanie 
Rothstein, 
Milwaukee 
County 
Circuit Court, presided. 
No. 
2018AP942-CR   
 
2 
 
postconviction motion.  Following a jury trial, Robert Daris 
Spencer was convicted of one count of felony murder and one 
count of felon in possession of a firearm.  After the close of 
evidence——but before deliberations——the circuit court met in 
chambers with a juror who had become ill, without counsel 
present.  Upon determining the juror would not be able to 
continue serving, the judge dismissed the juror for cause. 
¶2 
Spencer filed a postconviction motion asserting the 
judge's ex parte contact with the juror violated his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel and claiming his counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object to hearsay testimony.  The 
circuit court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing.  
Spencer appealed, raising due process and equal protection 
challenges to the juror's dismissal in addition to the Sixth 
Amendment and ineffective assistance claims.  The court of 
appeals affirmed the denial of his motion, concluding Spencer 
forfeited his due process and equal protection claims and any 
error implicating the Sixth Amendment was harmless, but reversed 
and remanded on the ground that Spencer was entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing on the ineffective assistance claim. 
¶3 
Before this court, Spencer argues the judge's ex parte 
meeting with the juror violated his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel, the judge's dismissal of the juror violated his equal 
protection and due process rights and constituted an erroneous 
exercise of discretion, and he was entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing on his claim that counsel's failure to object to hearsay 
testimony constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.  The 
No. 
2018AP942-CR   
 
3 
 
State cross-petitioned on the evidentiary hearing decision, 
arguing Sholar3 does not mandate a hearing if the record 
conclusively shows the defendant is not entitled to relief. 
¶4 
We hold the judge's meeting with the ill juror was not 
a critical stage of the proceedings at which the right to 
counsel attached, and even if there were an error, it was 
harmless.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals on this 
issue.4  We reverse the court of appeals' decision to reverse the 
circuit court's denial of an evidentiary hearing.  If the record 
as a whole conclusively demonstrates the defendant is not 
entitled to relief, an evidentiary hearing is not mandatory.  
                                                 
3 State v. Sholar, 2018 WI 53, 381 Wis. 2d 560, 912 
N.W.2d 89. 
4 Before the court of appeals, in addition to his Sixth 
Amendment and ineffective assistance claims, Spencer also 
alleged the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion 
by dismissing the juror over Spencer's objection, in violation 
of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and equal 
protection.  The court of appeals determined Spencer forfeited 
his claims relating to the dismissal of the juror because he 
"failed to raise them below, either by objecting at the time of 
trial or by addressing them in his postconviction motion."  
Spencer, No. 2018AP942–CR, at ¶¶11–12.  We agree and conclude 
Spencer forfeited his claims relating to the dismissal of the 
juror.  See State v. Caban, 210 Wis. 2d 597, 604, 563 N.W.2d 501 
(1997) ("The general rule is that issues not presented to the 
circuit court will not be considered for the first time on 
appeal. . . .  [E]ven the claim of a constitutional right will 
be deemed waived unless timely raised in the circuit court.") 
(citations omitted).  At trial, defense counsel moved for a 
mistrial 
and 
renewed 
a 
Swain 
objection, 
but 
Spencer's 
postconviction motion neither mentioned the Swain objection nor 
argued the juror's dismissal was an erroneous exercise of 
discretion or a violation of Spencer's due process or equal 
protection rights.  See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).   
No. 
2018AP942-CR   
 
4 
 
See State v. Ruffin, 2022 WI 34, ¶3, __ Wis. 2d __, 974 
N.W.2d 432.  The circuit court properly exercised its discretion 
in denying an evidentiary hearing under this standard and the 
court of appeals erred in reversing that decision.   
I. 
BACKGROUND 
A. 
The Incident and the Trial 
¶5 
The State charged Spencer with one count of felony 
murder and one count of possession of a firearm by a felon for 
his involvement in an armed robbery resulting in the death of 
his accomplice, T.M.  On the night of the crime, police officers 
responded to reports of a shooting in Milwaukee, where they 
found the victim lying face down and observed a number of bullet 
holes and shell casings, later determined to be from two 
different guns.  The exchange of gunfire on the night of the 
incident was confirmed by neighbors, ShotSpotter, and officers 
at the scene, and forensic evidence indicated there were two 
shooters.     
¶6 
At trial, the State's theory was that Spencer had a 
debt to settle with R.S., a friend of Spencer and T.M.  The 
State contended that Spencer and T.M. approached R.S. as he 
stood outside a residence, and Spencer, armed with a firearm, 
robbed R.S. by grabbing him and "go[ing] through his pockets, 
tak[ing] money, tak[ing] his cell phone."  As R.S. broke away 
and began running, the State asserted Spencer shot at R.S. as "a 
second person with a firearm" located "right in front of the 
residence or out, or inside the residence shooting from a 
No. 
2018AP942-CR   
 
5 
 
window" began to return fire "to protect [R.S.]."  As a result 
of this exchange of gunfire, T.M. was shot and killed. 
¶7 
The State relied on witness testimony from Lerone 
Towns, a tow truck driver who testified he received a call for a 
tow that night from a Mr. Green.  He testified that when he 
reached 
the 
vehicle 
pickup 
location, 
he 
encountered 
an 
individual, later identified as R.S., waiting in a vehicle 
behind the one to be towed.  R.S. arranged for the vehicle to be 
towed to a house on the corner of 23rd and Townsend.  Upon 
arriving at the drop-off location, Towns testified he spoke with 
R.S. about writing his receipt and entering his information into 
the company system.  According to Towns, R.S. said he had to get 
the money for the payment, and "went straight to the back door," 
where he stood "for some amount of time."  While Towns was 
taking down information about the vehicle, he said he "turned 
around, heard somewhat of a commotion at the back door," and saw 
"two gentlemen standing in front of [R.S.]" with their backs 
turned toward Towns.  He did not see their faces, but stated 
"one of the individuals was lighter skinned than the other one" 
and they both appeared to be males.  He testified that "the 
lighter complected gentleman" pulled out a handgun and proceeded 
to "reach into [R.S.'s] pockets," and "proceeded to grab [R.S.] 
by the back of his shirt and drug him across the street, across 
Townsend in front of the residence on 23rd Street."  After 
"between 20 seconds to a full minute," Towns testified "there 
was nothing but gunfire after that" but he "did not see anyone 
shooting."  He saw R.S. run past him, and testified the gunfire 
No. 
2018AP942-CR   
 
6 
 
stopped "once [R.S.] got pretty much to the alley."  Towns said 
he then left——with the vehicle still attached to his truck——and 
received a call en route from R.S. to drop the vehicle off at a 
different location, where R.S. arrived with the individual 
identified as Mr. Green to pick it up. 
¶8 
In addition to Towns' testimony, the jury heard from 
R.S., who said he knew T.M. and Spencer——identified as "D or D-
Dog."  R.S. testified he and Spencer "were involved in business 
together," and he owed Spencer $5,000.  R.S. testified that he 
heard Spencer was looking for him because he had not paid this 
debt.5  R.S. also identified Mr. Green as his friend, Errion 
Green-Brown.  R.S. said he lived at the residence where the 
incident occurred, along with Green-Brown and another individual 
he identified as Danny McKinney.  R.S. testified that McKinney 
was present "in the upper unit of the residence" at the time the 
tow truck arrived.  
¶9 
R.S. confirmed he was robbed by two individuals, T.M. 
and 
a 
"lighter 
complected" 
individual 
whom 
he 
"couldn't 
recognize."  R.S. noted the second individual had a firearm and 
asked R.S., "Where is the money at?"  R.S. testified the 
individuals then "[w]ent in [his] pockets," took a cell phone 
and a "couple dollars," "snatched [him] up" by his shirt, and 
dragged him across the street toward a gold mini-van.  The 
                                                 
5  Although initially R.S. agreed he told the detective he 
"never paid that debt," on cross-examination he confirmed he 
"had already paid Mr. Spencer $3,000."  R.S. acknowledged later 
that "[t]he amount of the debt wasn't the same in each of the 
interviews" with the detectives.   
No. 
2018AP942-CR   
 
7 
 
investigation revealed Spencer's fingerprints on the van, and a 
traffic citation and receipt in Spencer's name were found inside 
the van.  Forensic evidence demonstrated one of the shooters 
shot from the residence and the other shooter was near the gold 
mini-van, in the area where T.M.'s body had been found.   
¶10 During 
his 
testimony, 
R.S. 
acknowledged 
he 
had 
identified Spencer as the second individual to the detectives 
during three separate interviews.  Additionally, R.S. identified 
Spencer as the second individual to others——even before he told 
the detectives.  He told "one of [his] girlfriends it was a 
person by the name of Spencer, who may be involved but not 
actually with a gun."  Two of T.M.'s sisters also testified 
regarding the incident.  One sister, K.G., testified she had 
dinner with both T.M. and Spencer on the night of the robbery.  
She said they left together hours before the shooting, in the 
same van later found at the scene of the crime.  Another sister, 
Q.G., testified that R.S., prior to his interview with the 
detectives, told her Spencer was involved in the robbery.  She 
said she called R.S. shortly after T.M. died, and when R.S. 
returned her call, he told her "D'Dog" was responsible.  Q.G. 
denied that she knew who D'Dog was.  She testified R.S. told her 
T.M. and D'Dog "pulled up in a van and D'Dog and [T.M.] got out 
[of] the van.  [T.M.] stood a little further off away from them 
with his hands behind the back and his head down and said D'Dog 
walked up to him and grabbed him by his shirt with a gun and 
told him . . . you're going to die today and tried to drag him 
down the street."  Q.G. recounted that she "asked [R.S.] would 
No. 
2018AP942-CR   
 
8 
 
he tell that same story to detectives and he said yes," and that 
she called the detectives immediately after her phone call with 
R.S. and told them what he had said.  During his testimony, R.S. 
denied that he told Q.G. that D'Dog was involved; instead, he 
said she told him "it was D-dog."  The prosecutor summed up: 
Q:  So, just so I'm clear, you told detectives that it 
was D-Dog because you felt threatened.  Correct? 
A:  Yes. 
Q:  You told one of your girlfriends it was a person 
by the name of Spencer, who may be involved but not 
actually with a gun.  Correct? 
A:  Yes. 
Q:  And you told [Q.G.] that, who the robbers were, 
but you don't remember saying it was D-Dog? 
A:  She told me it was D-Dog. 
¶11 At trial, numerous discrepancies surfaced between the 
story R.S. provided to detectives and his trial testimony.  
Detectives interviewed R.S. three times about the incident, 
during which R.S. identified Spencer as the other individual 
with T.M.  R.S. changed his story at trial, saying he "couldn't 
recognize" the individual with T.M.  R.S. admitted he had 
previously identified Spencer, or "D-Dog," and that he told the 
detective "Spencer walked up and stated, Where is the money at," 
took $400 from him, grabbed him by his collar and told him 
"[c]ome with me, you are going to die," and "pull[ed] out a dark 
gray large semi-automatic handgun from his left side and 
point[ed] it at [R.S.]"  He also testified that he remembered 
telling the detective Spencer dragged him across the street 
No. 
2018AP942-CR   
 
9 
 
toward a gold mini-van, and he broke away because he thought the 
men were going to put him in the van.  R.S. recounted that as he 
ran away, "[s]hots were fired," and he remembered telling the 
detective Spencer raised his firearm and fired one shot at him, 
and he heard more gunshots as he ran.  R.S. claimed Danny told 
him afterward he "was firing from the residence in an attempt to 
protect [R.S.]."  R.S. testified he did not call T.M. because he 
was "scared because [T.M.] was with [Spencer]." 
¶12 To explain the discrepancies, R.S. stated, "[the 
detectives] threatened me if I didn't cooperate, they would lock 
me up and charge me with the crime."  R.S. explained he used 
Spencer's name because "[t]he detectives told me if I didn't 
give up Mr. Spencer they would charge me with the crime."  R.S. 
reiterated throughout his testimony that he had "no idea who the 
individual was" and he "couldn't recognize him."  R.S. also 
admitted he lied to detectives about Green-Brown being at the 
second location, because Green-Brown "was on probation" and he 
"didn't want to get him involved."  He also said he was not "at 
first up front about Danny McKinney telling [him] he had fired 
to protect [him] as [he] ran away."  Additionally, R.S. stated 
he "didn't go to the back door to get money for the tow truck 
driver" because he had money in his pocket.6  Earlier in his 
testimony, however, R.S. indicated the two men took a "[c]ouple 
dollars" from his pockets, which again conflicted with both his 
                                                 
6 Earlier in his testimony, R.S. said he "went in the 
house . . . to use the bathroom."  
No. 
2018AP942-CR   
 
10 
 
testimony that he had enough money in his pocket for the tow 
truck driver and his statement to the detective that the men 
took $400 from him.   
¶13 The detective who conducted the first interview 
testified he never threatened R.S. into disclosing Spencer’s 
involvement, and that R.S. provided the names of the individuals 
who robbed him.  Throughout the detective's testimony, portions 
of his interview with R.S. were played for the jury.  In 
response to the prosecutor's questioning about whether the story 
R.S. gave to the detectives was true, R.S. explained: 
A:  I didn't say it's not true.  I never said it ain't 
true. 
Q:  So, you did hear, you did see the defendant put a 
gun in your stomach tell you you were going to die and 
shoot at you? 
A:  I didn't recognize the second person, but that is 
what happened. 
Q:  So, everything is true, except for the identity of 
the defendant as being the person who did all this? 
A:  Yes. 
Q:  Just so we are clear, a guy you owe money to? 
 . . .  
A:  Yes. 
B. 
The Judge's Meeting with Juror 2 
¶14 On the fifth and last day of trial, which began at 
8:59 a.m., a discussion about jury instructions was interrupted 
by a bailiff informing the judge that Juror 2 was ill.  The 
record reflects the court took a 45-minute recess, during which 
No. 
2018AP942-CR   
 
11 
 
the judge sent Juror 2 to the judge's chambers to rest.  The 
judge met with Juror 2 in her chambers, without counsel or the 
defendant, but "conferred with the attorneys" outside of the 
courtroom.  Following the meeting, at 10:05 a.m., the judge went 
back on the record to explain what had transpired: 
It's been over a half an hour at least, maybe 45 
minutes, since we went off the record earlier.  The 
Court went off the record because I was advised that 
we had a juror who was not feeling well.  And when I 
inquired and with the assistance of one of the 
bailiffs, we had the juror come out of the jury room, 
go into my chambers where there's a quiet place for 
her to rest to see whether she would be feeling 
better. 
She is not feeling well enough to proceed.  And when I 
asked her about 15, 20 minutes ago if she thought she 
would feel well enough to proceed in any particular 
length of time, her answer was very tentative and she 
said unlikely basically and she didn't know how long 
she would need before she could participate.  She is, 
if you want to know the details, queasy, light headed, 
just unwell generally. 
I did inquire.  She said she's been having some health 
issues as of late and believes that these are——her 
words——"the reminisce" of some health issues that have 
been going on I think last week. 
¶15 Although counsel was not in the room for the judge's 
interactions with Juror 2, the judge relayed at least one 
question from counsel.  The judge described the juror's response 
while documenting her handling of the situation: 
I conferred with the attorneys.  We met in the back.  
I advised the attorneys going along what was the cause 
for the delay and what was being done to assist the 
juror and we agreed to wait and we've now waited a 
significant period of time.  And I have to be mindful 
that we have the remaining 12 sitting back in the jury 
room waiting to move forward. 
No. 
2018AP942-CR   
 
12 
 
I understand the significance of this for both sides, 
frankly.  This is the only African-American juror on 
the panel.  But I am not prepared to put her health at 
risk by having her continue and go to deliberations 
when she is so unwell.  After we met, the defense 
asked a question for purposes of the record which I do 
not find inappropriate.  I did ask——I inquired along 
the lines of the concern that the defense had.  I 
asked the juror if her stress or her not being well 
enough to proceed had anything to do with her service 
as a juror or with the behavior of any of the other 
jurors.  Her response to me was "Oh, no.  This has 
nothing to do with the trial."  So I'm satisfied with 
that response.  I've made my record. 
Additionally, the judge noted, "the remainder of the jurors 
already were aware [the] juror was not feeling well, that she 
had been laying down . . . in the jury room.  She had been 
resting in there before she was excused to chambers.  So they're 
aware of the situation.  They're aware that it's regarding her 
health." 
C. The Dismissal of the Juror 
¶16 After meeting with the juror and explaining the nature 
of that meeting on the record, the judge provided opportunity 
for counsel to bring motions on the dismissal.  The judge 
explained, "At this point I will tell you I have resolved that 
we will go forward with the 12.  I understand that each of you——
one of you might have some motions to bring and I'll allow you 
to state your positions succinctly for the record[.]"  The 
prosecutor requested the juror be struck "for cause," which the 
circuit court granted.  Defense counsel moved for a mistrial and 
renewed her Swain challenge, both of which the judge denied.7  
                                                 
7  Defense counsel had argued in a pretrial motion that 
Milwaukee County's procedure of using driver's licenses to 
No. 
2018AP942-CR   
 
13 
 
The trial proceeded with the 12 remaining jurors.  The jury 
returned a guilty verdict on each count. 
D. 
Spencer's  Postconviction Motion 
¶17 Spencer filed a postconviction motion arguing the 
circuit court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by 
interviewing the juror ex parte and maintaining trial counsel 
was ineffective for failing to object to the meeting with the 
juror and failing to object to hearsay testimony.  Regarding the 
hearsay testimony, Spencer asserted R.S. "told the police that 
Mr. McKinney had told him that he, Mr. McKinney, had been 
shooting to protect [R.S.]" and that the testimony was used "to 
prove the truth of the matters asserted" because it was used "to 
show that Mr. McKinney was shooting to protect [R.S.]"  Spencer 
claimed this testimony was "key evidence in the State's theory 
of felony murder."     
¶18 The circuit court denied the motion without an 
evidentiary hearing.  With respect to the judge's interactions 
with the juror, the court concluded it could not find "the 
juror's health issue which arose in this case prior to closing 
arguments constituted a critical stage of the proceedings in 
which the defendant needed assistance with a legal problem and 
where counsel's presence was essential."  The court determined 
that even if it were error to meet with the juror outside the 
                                                                                                                                                             
summon jurors resulted in an unconstitutional racial composition 
of the jury panel, which in this case consisted of 2 Black 
citizens on the panel of 35, in violation of Swain v. Alabama, 
380 U.S. 202 (1965).  The circuit court denied the motion.   
No. 
2018AP942-CR   
 
14 
 
presence of the parties, it was harmless because the error did 
not prejudice Spencer's case or contribute to the guilty 
verdict.  With respect to the hearsay testimony, the court 
concluded, "even if trial counsel had objected and the testimony 
was struck, there is simply not a reasonable probability that 
the defendant would have been acquitted . . . because there was 
absolute overwhelming evidence of guilt."   
E. 
Court of Appeals Proceedings 
¶19 Spencer appealed the denial of his postconviction 
motion.  With respect to Spencer's Sixth Amendment claim, the 
court of appeals assumed the circuit court's discussion with the 
juror violated Spencer's right to counsel, but concluded "any 
such violation was harmless" because "counsel was still included 
in the process of deciding what to do in response to the juror 
falling ill."  State v. Spencer, No. 2018AP942-CR, unpublished 
slip op., ¶19 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2021).  The court noted 
counsel "agreed to wait" while the juror rested, and, upon 
resuming the record, the circuit court "made the decision, with 
counsel present, to dismiss the juror for cause," at which point 
counsel objected and moved for a mistrial.  Id.  The court 
further concluded Spencer received "a fair and impartial jury, 
and the communications cannot be said to have influenced the 
jury's verdict."8  Id., ¶21. 
                                                 
8 Judge White concurred in part and dissented in part.  
Judge White disagreed that the due process and equal protection 
claims were forfeited.  Spencer, No. 2018AP942-CR, at ¶30 n.1 
(White, J., concurring/dissenting).  She concluded the dismissal 
of the juror was a critical stage of the proceedings, 
implicating both due process and the right to counsel, id., ¶33, 
No. 
2018AP942-CR   
 
15 
 
¶20 Having affirmed the denial of the postconviction 
motion on the foregoing grounds, the court reversed the order 
with respect to Spencer's ineffective assistance claim.  Id., 
¶29.  The court remanded for a hearing on this claim, concluding 
"Spencer 
alleged 
sufficient 
material 
facts 
[in 
his 
postconviction motion] that would entitle him to relief, and the 
trial court was required to grant Spencer a Machner9 hearing."  
Id., ¶26 (citing State v. Sholar, 2018 WI 53, ¶51, 381 
Wis. 2d 560, 912 N.W.2d 89). 
¶21 Spencer appealed the affirmance of the circuit court's 
denial 
of 
his 
postconviction 
motion. 
 
The 
State 
cross-
petitioned, arguing the case should not have been remanded for a 
Machner hearing.  We granted both petitions for review.  We now 
affirm the denial of the postconviction motion and reverse the 
decision to remand for an evidentiary hearing.    
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶22 This case requires us to determine whether Spencer had 
a constitutional right to be represented by counsel during the 
circuit court's ex parte meeting with the ill juror.  We review 
independently 
the 
interpretation 
and 
application 
of 
                                                                                                                                                             
and disagreed that the ex parte meeting was harmless error 
because the court's analysis was "devoid of 'a fact-specific 
due-process inquiry' that is required to determine if 'the 
communication between the judge and jury [denied] the defendant 
a fair and just hearing.'"  Id., ¶53 (quoting State v. 
Alexander, 2013 WI 70, ¶28, 349 Wis. 2d 327, 833 N.W.2d 126).   
9 State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 
1979). 
No. 
2018AP942-CR   
 
16 
 
constitutional provisions.  State v. Alexander, 2013 WI 70, ¶18, 
349 Wis. 2d 327, 833 N.W.2d 126 (citing State v. Hamdan, 2003 WI 
113, ¶19, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785); see also State v. 
Chambers, 2021 WI 13, ¶13, 395 Wis. 2d 770, 955 N.W.2d 144 
("This court independently reviews whether deprivation of a 
constitutional right has occurred." (quoting State v. Jones, 
2010 WI 72, ¶23, 326 Wis. 2d 380, 797 N.W.2d 378)).  
¶23 We apply a mixed standard of review to the court of 
appeals' determination that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion when it denied Spencer's postconviction 
motion without holding an evidentiary hearing.  Ruffin, __ 
Wis. 2d __, ¶26 (citing State v. Allen, 2004 WI 106, ¶9, 274 
Wis. 2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433).  We first independently consider 
"whether the motion on its face alleges sufficient material 
facts that, if true, would entitle the defendant to relief."  
Id., ¶27 (citing Allen, 274 Wis. 2d 568, ¶9).  "Whether the 
record conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is entitled 
to no relief is also a question of law we review independently."  
Id. (citing State v. Sulla, 2016 WI 46, ¶23, 369 Wis. 2d 225, 
880 N.W.2d 659).  If the record conclusively demonstrates the 
defendant is not entitled to relief, the circuit court has the 
discretion to decide whether to hold a hearing, which we review 
for an erroneous exercise of discretion.  Id., ¶28.       
III. DISCUSSION 
A. 
No Sixth Amendment Violation 
¶24 This challenge involves ex parte contact between the 
circuit court and a juror after the close of evidence but prior 
No. 
2018AP942-CR   
 
17 
 
to deliberations, concerning the juror's health.  Considering 
both the substance and the timing of the meeting, we conclude 
the judge's communications with the juror did not violate 
Spencer's Sixth Amendment rights because the meeting did not 
constitute a critical stage at which the presence of counsel was 
required.  Trial counsel was present for the court's decision to 
dismiss the juror, which was made on the record and with 
counsel's participation.  Even if the ex parte meeting were a 
violation, any error was harmless.  
1. 
The ex parte meeting was not a critical stage 
¶25 The Sixth Amendment provides, in relevant part: "In 
all 
criminal 
prosecutions, 
the 
accused 
shall 
enjoy 
the 
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."  
U.S. Const. amend. VI.  The historical underpinnings of this 
right are reflected in its "core purpose . . . to assure 
'Assistance' at trial, when the accused [i]s confronted with 
both the intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the public 
prosecutor."  United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309 (1973).  
The United States Supreme Court has accordingly applied a test 
"call[ing] for examination of the event in order to determine 
whether the accused required aid in coping with legal problems 
or assistance in meeting his adversary."  Id. at 313.      
¶26 The right to counsel attaches "at all critical stages 
of the criminal process."  Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 80–81 
(2004) (citing Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170 (1985); 
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967)).  Not every 
point in the criminal process is a "critical stage"; the 
No. 
2018AP942-CR   
 
18 
 
constitutional right to counsel has been expanded "only when new 
contexts appear presenting the same dangers that gave birth 
initially to the right itself."  Ash, 413 U.S. at 311.  The 
United States Supreme Court has identified as critical stages 
"proceedings between an individual and agents of the State 
(whether 'formal or informal, in court or out,' . . .) that 
amount to 'trial-like confrontations,' at which counsel would 
help the accused 'in coping with legal problems or . . . meeting 
his adversary.'"  Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 
212 n.16 (2008) (citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 
(1967); Ash, 413 U.S. at 312–13; Massiah v. United States, 377 
U.S. 201 (1964)) (internal citations omitted).  Points in the 
process are not critical if "there is minimal risk that 
[defendant's] counsel's absence at such stages might derogate 
from his right to a fair trial."  Wade, 388 U.S. at 228.   
¶27 Wisconsin courts have determined that voir dire, jury 
instructions, and jury deliberations constitute critical stages 
at which the right to counsel attaches.  See, e.g., State v. 
Tulley, 2001 WI App 236, ¶¶6, 11, 248 Wis. 2d 505, 635 
N.W.2d 807 (voir dire); State v. Mills, 107 Wis. 2d 368, 370, 
320 N.W.2d 38 (Ct. App. 1982) (jury instructions); State v. 
Koller, 2001 WI App 253, ¶62, 248 Wis. 2d 259, 635 N.W.2d 838 
(jury 
deliberations). 
 
In 
Koller, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
emphasized 
that 
"a 
trial 
court's 
communication 
with 
a 
deliberating jury in the absence of . . . defendant's counsel 
violates the defendant's constitutional right . . . to have 
counsel at every stage where he or she needs aid in dealing with 
No. 
2018AP942-CR   
 
19 
 
legal problems."  248 Wis. 2d 259, ¶62 (citing State v. Burton, 
112 Wis. 2d 560, 565, 334 N.W.2d 263 (1983), overruled on other 
grounds by Alexander, 349 Wis. 2d 327)). 
¶28 In 
State 
v. 
Lehman, 
108 
Wis. 2d 291, 
301, 
321 
N.W.2d 212 (1982), we held the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion by discharging ex parte a juror who 
became ill during jury deliberations.  We decided the case on 
purely statutory grounds, concluding the discharge of the juror 
violated 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 972.02(1) 
(1979–80), 
governing 
the 
defendant's right to jury trial by twelve persons, and Wis. 
Stat. § 972.05 (1979–80), governing the process for replacing 
regular jurors with alternates.  Id. at 301 n.6, 318 n.17.  
Additionally, we detailed the procedure a circuit court must 
follow before discharging a juror.  Id. at 300.  The record in 
Lehman was "totally devoid of any indication" as to the 
circumstances of the juror's illness and subsequent discharge, 
including "whether the circuit judge questioned the juror prior 
to her discharge."  Id. at 293–94, 301.  Given a deficient 
record, we declared, "[I]t is the circuit court's duty, prior to 
the exercise of its discretion to excuse the juror, to make 
careful inquiry into the substance of the request and to exert 
reasonable efforts to avoid discharging the juror."  Id. at 300.  
We noted the efforts of the circuit court "depend on the 
circumstances of the case."  Id.  Although Lehman did not 
implicate the Sixth Amendment, and the procedure outlined in 
that case is not a constitutional requirement, the court's 
No. 
2018AP942-CR   
 
20 
 
discussion of the nature of jury deliberations provides useful 
context for our constitutional analysis.     
¶29 Removing a juror during deliberations "poses a very 
difficult question for the fair and efficient administration of 
justice" because it impedes the deliberative process.  Id. at 
307–08.  We explained in Lehman: 
If, during deliberations, a juror is discharged and 
another substituted, the eleven regular jurors will 
have had the benefit of the views of the discharged 
juror while the alternate will not.  The eleven 
regular jurors will have formed views without the 
benefit of the views of the alternate juror, and the 
alternate juror who is unfamiliar with the prior 
deliberations will participate without the benefit of 
the prior group discussion.   
 Id.  The court of appeals in State v. Avery, 2011 WI App 124, 
337 Wis. 2d 351, 804 N.W.2d 216, also addressed the discharge of 
a juror during jury deliberations.  In Avery, the court assumed 
it was error for the judge to conduct ex parte communications 
with the juror.10  Avery, 337 Wis. 2d 351, ¶56.  In that case, 
the sheriff called the judge at his home late in the evening to 
relay a request from a juror to be excused due to an "unforeseen 
family emergency" and marital difficulties.  Id., ¶51.  After 
this conversation, the judge contacted the special prosecutor 
and defense counsel, who agreed the judge should speak with the 
juror and that the juror should be excused if the information 
could be verified.  Id.  Because the trial judge's discussion 
                                                 
10 The court assumed the ex parte contact violated Avery’s 
constitutional right to be present, but did not provide a 
detailed analysis on the constitutional claim.  State v. Avery, 
2011 WI App 124, ¶56, 337 Wis. 2d 351, 804 N.W.2d 216. 
No. 
2018AP942-CR   
 
21 
 
with the juror, who was ultimately excused, could not have 
influenced the remaining jurors——who had no further contact with 
the excused juror——the appellate court concluded Avery received 
a fair trial and the error was harmless.  Id., ¶58. 
¶30 In United States v. Schiro, the Seventh Circuit 
addressed a judge's ex parte discussion with a juror during the 
trial.11  679 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 2012).  After learning the juror 
was uncomfortable serving on the jury and observing that she 
seemed "anxious and even panicky," the judge "met with her in 
private and asked her whether everything was okay."  Id. at 531.  
Although she confirmed it was, the juror asked follow-up 
questions——including whether the trial was almost over and 
whether threats were made against her——which prompted the judge 
to remove her from the jury.  Id.  The Seventh Circuit 
determined 
counsel's 
absence 
from 
the 
meeting 
was 
not 
constitutionally problematic: 
Given her anxieties it would not have been a good idea 
to confront her with the defendants' lawyers——that is, 
agents 
of 
the 
defendants; 
she 
would 
have 
been 
intimidated by their presence.  A defendant's interest 
in being present at all stages of his trial is limited 
by the need for orderly administration of criminal 
trials. 
Id. (internal citations omitted).  The court concluded, however, 
that "before dismissing her the judge should have told the 
                                                 
11 As in Lehman, the court in United States v. Schiro did 
not consider whether the meeting was a "critical stage" under 
the Sixth Amendment; instead, the court determined "[t]he 
judge's failure to consult the lawyers was thus a harmless 
error."  679 F.3d 521, 531 (7th Cir. 2012). 
No. 
2018AP942-CR   
 
22 
 
lawyers about his discussions with her . . . , for they might 
have suggested that he question her further, albeit outside 
their presence."  Id. (internal citations omitted).  The court 
determined the error was harmless, acknowledging that "[s]he had 
already answered the essential questions . . . by saying she 
hadn't been threatened . . . and hadn't discussed her anxieties 
with the other jurors.  What more was there to ask her?"  Id.     
 
 ¶31 Guided by this precedent and having the benefit of a 
detailed record documenting the judge's communications with the 
juror as well as counsel, we conclude the judge's meeting with 
Juror 2 regarding her health did not constitute a critical stage 
of the proceedings because the meeting (1) occurred prior to 
deliberations and (2) involved only a discussion of the juror's 
health and ability to proceed.  Both the timing and substance of 
the communications dictate that counsel's absence did not result 
in a constitutional violation.   
¶32 As to timing, the meeting took place after the close 
of evidence but before deliberations began.  As the circuit 
court explained, the alternate juror had been present for the 
trial and had not been excluded from any juror deliberations.  
Whereas the concerns animating the court's reasoning in Lehman, 
Avery, and other jury deliberation cases arose from the 
difficulty in replicating the deliberative process with the 
substitution of an alternate juror, substitution prior to 
deliberations does not implicate these problems.12   
                                                 
12 Our conclusion is reinforced by Wisconsin's decision not 
to recognize "alternate" jurors.  See Wis. Stat. § 972.10(7) 
No. 
2018AP942-CR   
 
23 
 
¶33 As to substance, the judge's conversation with Juror 2 
regarding her health was not one in which Spencer "required aid 
in coping with legal problems or assistance in meeting his 
adversary."  See Ash, 413 U.S. at 313; see also United States v. 
Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985) ("[T]he mere occurrence of an 
ex parte conversation between a trial judge and a juror does not 
constitute a deprivation of any constitutional right.  The 
defense has no constitutional right to be present at every 
interaction between a judge and a juror, nor is there a 
constitutional right to have a court reporter transcribe every 
such communication." (quoting Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 
125–26 
(1983) 
(Stevens, 
J., 
concurring 
in 
judgment))); 
Alexander, 349 Wis. 2d 327, ¶22 ("A conference in chambers might 
well constitute part of the trial depending upon what matters 
are discussed or passed upon." (quoting Ramer v. State, 40 
Wis. 2d  79, 84, 161 N.W.2d 209 (1968)).  The record shows the 
communications centered on the nature of Juror 2's health 
issues.  The juror had been "laying down . . . in the jury room" 
and was brought to chambers to rest.  The judge communicated 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2019–20) ("If additional jurors have been selected under 
s. 972.04(1) . . . , the court shall determine by lot which 
jurors shall not participate in deliberations and discharge 
them.").  The legislature repealed the alternate juror provision 
in 1984 and amended related provisions to instead reference 
"additional jurors" in order to "promote an attentive attitude 
and a collegial relationship among all jurors."  See 1983 Wis. 
Act 226, §§ 3–5; Judicial Council Note, 1983, Wis. Stat. 
§ 972.04. 
 
This 
attempt 
to 
increase 
attentiveness 
and 
collegiality among all jurors minimizes if not eliminates any 
consequences 
of 
discharging 
any 
particular 
juror 
before 
deliberations. 
No. 
2018AP942-CR   
 
24 
 
Juror 2 was "not feeling well enough to proceed" and she would 
be "unlikely" to proceed "in any particular length of time."  
The judge described the "details" of her symptoms as "queasy, 
light headed, just unwell generally."  Additionally, the judge 
conveyed that Juror 2 "said she's been having some health issues 
as of late and believes that these are——her words——'the 
reminisce' of some health issues that have been going on I think 
last week."   
¶34 Spencer contends "there were legal issues to be 
addressed where trial counsel could have acted on behalf of her 
client, thus making the ex parte meeting a critical stage in the 
proceedings."  As one example, Spencer says counsel "could have 
thoroughly explored whether the nature of the juror's illness 
rose to the level of cause for dismissal, or whether her 
discomfort might have warranted a request for a continuance for 
a few hours, if appropriate, or even a day."  Spencer asserts 
counsel "could have thoroughly investigated whether the fact the 
juror was the lone African-American on the panel contributed to 
her discomfort."   
¶35 We are skeptical of the utility or propriety of this 
sort of adversarial approach to a juror's health status——
particularly because counsel could pose questions through the 
judge and deliberations had not begun.  The judge in fact 
relayed a question from defense counsel concerning the source of 
the juror's symptoms.  The court stated, "I did ask——I inquired 
along the lines of the concern that the defense had.  I asked 
the juror if her stress or her not being well enough to proceed 
No. 
2018AP942-CR   
 
25 
 
had anything to do with her service as a juror or with the 
behavior of any of the other jurors."  The judge indicated, "Her 
response to me was 'Oh, no.  This has nothing to do with the 
trial.'"     
¶36 The United States Supreme Court has recognized as 
"critical stages" those "step[s] of a criminal proceeding" which 
involve some adversarial confrontation, such as postindictment 
interrogations, 
plea 
hearings, 
preliminary 
hearings, 
and 
sentencing.  See Schmidt v. Foster, 911 F.3d 469, 480 (7th Cir. 
2018); see also Wade, 388 U.S. at 226 ("[T]he accused is 
guaranteed that he need not stand alone . . . where counsel's 
absence might derogate from the accused's right to a fair 
trial . . . .  The presence of counsel at such critical 
confrontations, as at the trial itself, operates to assure that 
the accused's interests will be protected consistently with our 
adversary theory of criminal prosecution.").  The meeting 
between the juror and the judge in this case was not an 
adversarial event in which "defense counsel was powerless to 
prime the pump of persuasion."  United States v. Parent, 954 
F.2d 23, 26 (1st Cir. 1992).  Indeed, Juror 2's response does 
not invite the force of the adversarial process to ferret out an 
answer that might better serve the defendant's interests.  This 
juror had been "laying down" in the jury room, the other jurors 
were aware that she had health concerns, and she told the judge 
she was "unlikely" to be able to continue.  At least under the 
facts 
of 
this 
case, 
when 
the 
juror 
became 
ill 
before 
deliberations and trial counsel was aware of the meeting, 
No. 
2018AP942-CR   
 
26 
 
"agreed to wait," and had the opportunity to relay questions, 
the adversarial process would not serve any proper role.  In 
fact, it may have subjected Juror 2 to more stress and soured 
her opinion of the criminal justice system.  The investigative 
and adversarial probing of jurors' symptoms——particularly when 
substitute jurors are available and the deliberative process is 
not 
compromised——is 
far 
afield 
of 
the 
Sixth 
Amendment's 
protections 
and 
antithetical 
to 
the 
idea 
of 
an 
orderly 
courtroom.13 
2. 
Trial counsel was present for the decision to dismiss 
¶37 Having determined the ex parte meeting between the 
judge and Juror 2 did not offend the Constitution, we turn to 
the trial court's decision to dismiss the ill juror——a related 
but procedurally independent event.14  In Alexander, we concluded 
                                                 
13 Consistent with the reasons underlying the constitutional 
protections, as a best practice lawyers should be present if 
possible.  See, e.g. Alexander, 349 Wis. 2d 327, ¶76 n.2 
(Ziegler, J., concurring) ("[I]t is a good practice to include 
defendants and counsel, if possible, when matters arise during 
trial."); State v. Lehman, 108 Wis. 2d 291, 300, 321 N.W.2d 212 
(1982) ("Such inquiry [into the substance of the discharge 
request] generally should be made out of the presence of the 
jurors and in the presence of all counsel and the defendant." 
(emphasis added)).  Nonetheless, the deviation from this 
practice under the circumstances of this case, which for the 
reasons set forth above counseled against the lawyers' presence, 
did not rise to a constitutional violation entitling Spencer to 
a new trial. 
14 At the court of appeals, Judge White dissented based on 
"Spencer's right to due process and his right to have counsel 
present during a critical stage in the legal proceeding, namely 
when a juror selected at voir dire was dismissed for cause 
before deliberations began."  Spencer, No. 2018AP942-CR, ¶33 
(White, J., concurring/dissenting).  This conflates the judge's 
ex parte communications with the juror and the judge's decision 
No. 
2018AP942-CR   
 
27 
 
the defendant "had no automatic constitutional right to be 
present during the circuit court's in-chambers discussions" with 
two of the jurors.  Alexander, 349 Wis. 2d 327, ¶30.  In our 
discussion on that point, we cited a Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals case holding "there is no constitutional right for a 
defendant to be present at a conference in chambers concerning 
dismissal of a juror."  Id., ¶29 (quoting United States v. 
Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985, 997–98 (3d Cir. 1980)).  
We 
emphasized, "[a]ll that the Constitution requires at such a 
conference is the presence of defense counsel."  Id. (citing 
Ellis v. Oklahoma, 430 F.2d 1352, 1355 (10th Cir. 1970)) 
(emphasis added).  In this case, defense counsel was present "at 
such a conference" "concerning dismissal of a juror."  See id.   
¶38 Prior to the discussion on the juror's dismissal, the 
judge was notified that a juror was feeling ill and laying down 
in the jury room, had Juror 2 moved to her chambers where there 
was "a quiet place for her to rest," proceeded to check on Juror 
2 in her chambers——meanwhile "conferr[ing]" with counsel who 
"agreed to wait"——and asked a question on behalf of defense 
counsel regarding the nature of the illness.  That was the 
extent of the ex parte meeting.  After roughly 45 minutes, the 
judge went back on the record and documented what transpired 
during her interaction with Juror 2, stated that she decided to 
dismiss the juror, and invited counsel to make any motions on 
                                                                                                                                                             
to dismiss, which was made on the record while counsel was 
present and had the opportunity to make motions and object——
which Spencer's counsel did. 
No. 
2018AP942-CR   
 
28 
 
the issue.  This decision to dismiss occurred on the record, in 
the presence of counsel, and with counsel's participation.  That 
is all the Constitution requires.   
B. 
Harmless Error 
¶39 Even if the judge's meeting with Juror 2 were a 
critical stage, any Sixth Amendment violation was harmless 
error.  "Ordinarily, the absence of counsel at a critical stage 
of the trial is not subject to harmless error analysis."  State 
v. Anderson, 2006 WI 77, ¶74, 291 Wis. 2d 673, 717 N.W.2d 74, 
overruled on other grounds by Alexander, 349 Wis. 2d 327, ¶¶26–
29.  However, we have held "a harmless error analysis may apply 
to certain violations of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel" 
including 
"when 
the 
circuit 
court 
has 
had 
ex 
parte 
communications with the jury." Id., ¶76.  In determining whether 
any error was harmless, "[w]e examine the circumstances and 
substance of the communication in light of the entire trial[.]"  
Koller, 248 Wis. 2d 259, ¶62 (citing State v. Bjerkaas, 163 
Wis. 2d 949, 957–58, 472 N.W.2d 615 (Ct. App. 1991)).  "An error 
is harmless if there is no reasonable possibility that the error 
affected the outcome of the trial."15  Id. (citing Bjerkaas, 163 
Wis. 2d at 958).   
                                                 
15 The principal dissent's misplaced emphasis on the record 
of the ex parte communications fails to properly contextualize 
Anderson, on which it relies.  See Justice Ann Walsh Bradley's 
Dissent, ¶75 ("In light of the absence of a sufficient record, 
an appellate court will have great difficulty concluding that 
the circuit court's erroneous procedure in communicating with 
the jury was harmless error." (quoting State v. Anderson, 2006 
WI 77, ¶81, 291 Wis. 2d 673, 717 N.W.2d 74, overruled on other 
grounds 
by 
Alexander, 
349 
Wis. 2d 327, 
¶¶26–29)). 
 
That 
No. 
2018AP942-CR   
 
29 
 
¶40 This case reflects the practical realities of running 
a courtroom.  "Judges face tough calls in the courtroom each 
day."  Alexander, 349 Wis. 2d 327, ¶77 (Ziegler, J., concurring) 
(citations omitted).  The United States Supreme Court has 
                                                                                                                                                             
statement concerned the circuit court's violation of the 
statutory requirement that "all statements or comments by the 
judge to the jury or in their presence relating to the case 
shall be on the record."  Anderson, 291 Wis. 2d 673, ¶78 
(quoting Wis. Stat. § 805.13(1) (2003–04).  
In Anderson, the circuit court responded to two notes from 
the jury during deliberations——neither of which were in the 
record and both of which concerned evidence introduced during 
trial——without 
consulting 
counsel. 
 
Id., 
¶14. 
 
After 
deliberations ended, the court informed counsel of the ex parte 
communications and "reconstructed from memory" the substance of 
the contact.  Id., ¶15.  We determined the lack of a record and 
the circuit court's decision not to read to the jury testimony 
it requested be read "combin[ed] 'to contribute to the verdict 
obtained.'" 
 
Id., 
¶117. 
 
We 
concluded 
when 
ex 
parte 
communications occur "during the deliberative phase of a 
criminal prosecution, the absence of a complete record as to the 
alleged communications has been held a factor weighing heavily 
in favor of reversal," because it deprives the appellate court 
"of an opportunity to make an assessment of the prejudicial 
effect of the communication."  Id., ¶118 n.72 (quoting 43 A.L.R. 
4th 410, § 24) (emphasis added).  This was particularly so in 
Anderson, in which "[t]he circuit court could have improperly 
influenced the jury deliberations, even if such influence was 
accidental."  Id., ¶118.  The jury's request to hear the 
testimony indicated "it had serious doubts about the outcome of 
the case and wanted to hear the testimony again to determine 
whether 
a 
guilty 
verdict 
was 
appropriate." 
 
Id., 
¶122.  
"Combin[ed]" with the lack of a record of the communications, 
the court could not determine "beyond a reasonable doubt" the 
errors did not contribute to the verdict.  Id., ¶¶117, 123.  The 
same combination of factors is not present in this case:  The ex 
parte communications occurred between the judge and a juror who 
did not participate in deliberations, and concerned the juror's 
health but not the case itself.  Unlike in Anderson, the judge 
in this case consulted counsel regarding the court's handling of 
the situation. 
No. 
2018AP942-CR   
 
30 
 
observed, "There is scarcely a lengthy trial in which one or 
more jurors do not have occasion to speak to the trial judge 
about something, whether it relates to a matter of personal 
comfort or to some aspect of the trial."  Rushen, 464 U.S. at 
118.  Concluding "that an unrecorded ex parte communication 
between trial judge and juror can never be harmless error 
ignores these day-to-day realities of courtroom life and 
undermines society's interest in the administration of criminal 
justice."  Id. at 119; see also United States v. Bertoli, 40 
F.3d 1384, 1399 (3d Cir. 1994) ("While it may have been 
preferable to have counsel present, . . . we cannot say that 
[the defendant] was prejudiced by the trial court's decision to 
conduct the interviews [with the jurors] without counsel 
present.").   
¶41 The State emphasizes that the "specific inquiry" in 
this case concerns "whether there's a reasonable possibility 
that counsel's absence during the ex parte discussions affected 
the outcome of Spencer's trial."  We agree with this narrow 
formulation and conclude any error was harmless.  In order to 
affect the outcome of the trial, counsel's presence at the 
meeting would have had to result in Juror 2's retention.  
Because the nature of the discussion concerned Juror 2's health, 
there is no reason on this record to believe counsel's presence 
would have had any impact on the juror's ability to proceed.  
The juror had been laying down in the jury room before being 
moved to the judge's chambers to rest, felt "queasy, light 
headed, just unwell generally," and said she was "unlikely" to 
No. 
2018AP942-CR   
 
31 
 
be able to continue after any particular length of time.  The 
judge relayed defense counsel's question about whether the 
illness was related to the trial, and Juror 2 responded no.  As 
the Seventh Circuit queried in Schiro, "What more was there to 
ask her?"  Schiro, 679 F.3d at 531. 
¶42 Had counsel's presence at the meeting resulted in 
Juror 2 remaining on the panel, there is no reasonable 
possibility her retention would have affected the outcome of the 
trial.  Juror 2 was removed prior to deliberations, so the kind 
of concerns inherent to the deliberative process were not 
implicated.  Spencer cites Hinton v. United States, 979 A.2d 663 
(D.C. Cir. 2009), for the proposition that "jurors are not 
fungible after they have heard the evidence."  In Hinton, the 
D.C. Circuit determined the trial court abused its discretion in 
removing an empaneled juror.  Hinton, 979 A.2d at 692.  The 
court 
emphasized 
it 
was 
not 
concluding 
"the 
erroneous 
replacement 
of 
an 
empaneled 
juror 
can 
never 
be 
found 
harmless[.]"  Id. at 689, 691–92 ("In many cases, where twelve 
impartial jurors have voted unanimously to find the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we might be persuaded that the 
erroneously removed thirteenth juror would not have viewed the 
evidence differently.  Thus, for example, we would suppose that 
if the government's case is strong and there is no reason 
apparent in the record to think the erroneously removed juror 
would have dissented, a reviewing court could be satisfied that 
the juror substitution had no substantial influence on the 
outcome.").  In that case, the court had "some information 
No. 
2018AP942-CR   
 
32 
 
concerning the removed juror's thoughts about the evidence" 
based on the juror's "pointed, probing inquiries" of the 
witnesses.  Id. at 692.   
¶43 Borrowing the language of Hinton, "this is not such a 
case."  Id.  The State's case was strong and there was no 
indication the discharged juror would have voted to acquit 
Spencer.  Instead, the State's case shows overwhelming evidence 
of Spencer's guilt.  The only fact disputed by R.S. during his 
trial testimony was whether Spencer was the second individual 
involved in the robbery.  Regarding R.S.'s story, the prosecutor 
asked, "So, everything is true, except for the identity of the 
defendant as being the person who did all this?" to which R.S. 
responded "Yes."   
¶44 Despite R.S.'s recantation on the stand of statements 
he made identifying Spencer during multiple interviews with the 
police, the jury heard testimony from a series of other 
individuals placing Spencer at the scene.  In addition to 
telling the detectives Spencer was involved, R.S. told "one of 
[his] girlfriends it was a person by the name of Spencer, who 
may be involved but not actually with a gun."  T.M.'s sister, 
K.G., testified she had dinner with both "D-Dog" and T.M. just 
hours before the robbery and shooting, and that "D-Dog" and T.M. 
both left together in the same van later found at the scene.  
Another sister, Q.G., testified R.S. told her after the 
incident——but before speaking to detectives——that D-Dog was 
responsible.  She said R.S. told her "D'Dog came to his block 
with [T.M.] and he said he tried to——that they tried to 
No. 
2018AP942-CR   
 
33 
 
kill. . . .  He said they pulled up in a van and D'Dog and 
[T.M.] got out [of] the van" and "D'Dog walked up to him and 
grabbed him by his shirt with a gun[.]"  She testified that R.S. 
told her he "pulled away from D'Dog," and "took off running down 
the street and D'Dog starting shooting at him."  Q.G. said R.S. 
told her he would tell the same story to detectives, and that 
she called the detectives immediately after her phone call with 
R.S.    Although R.S. testified he identified Spencer to 
detectives 
because 
they 
threatened 
him, 
Q.G.'s 
testimony 
indicates he had already told her and had voluntarily agreed to 
identify Spencer to the detectives.  Not only did the detective 
testify he never threatened R.S., but the interview was recorded 
and portions of it were played for the jury during the trial. 
¶45 Additionally, Towns testified that Green-Brown, who 
showed up with R.S. after the incident to complete the tow and 
whom Spencer suggested might be involved, was not one of the 
individuals he had seen during the robbery.  R.S. repeatedly 
told detectives D-Dog had robbed him, which he acknowledged 
during his testimony.  R.S. also testified he owed Spencer a 
debt of several thousand dollars, he had heard Spencer was 
looking for him regarding this debt, and the individual who 
robbed him said, "Where is the money at?"  Detective O'Day 
testified R.S. told him in the first of these interviews that 
Spencer "went into his pockets and pulled out $400 in U.S. 
currency," "grabbed him by the front of his shirt," "pulled out 
a gun with his left hand and stated, you're going to die," and 
"drag[ged] him northbound across Townsend to North 23rd Street."  
No. 
2018AP942-CR   
 
34 
 
He testified R.S. said he realized he was in trouble and began 
to run when he saw the gold mini-van, he saw Spencer shoot at 
him once, and he heard seven more gunshots.  The report of 
gunshots was corroborated by multiple witnesses, ShotSpotter, 
and forensic evidence, which placed Spencer at the scene through 
fingerprints lifted from the gold van and a traffic citation and 
receipt in his name found inside the van. 
¶46 Given this record, there is no reasonable possibility 
that trial counsel's absence during the judge's meeting with 
Juror 2 affected the outcome of the trial.  There is no reason 
to believe counsel would have altered Juror 2's symptoms somehow 
or asked more probing questions enabling Juror 2 to remain on 
the panel.  There is no reason to believe Juror 2's presence on 
the panel would have altered the outcome of the trial in the 
face of overwhelming evidence of Spencer's guilt and with no 
disruption to the deliberative process.    
C. 
No Evidentiary Hearing Required 
¶47 The court of appeals erred in concluding Spencer was 
entitled to a Machner hearing on his ineffective assistance 
claim.  See Spencer, No. 2018AP942-CR, at ¶29.  The court of 
appeals' analysis on this issue mirrors the court of appeals' 
analysis described in State v. Ruffin, decided this term.  2022 
WI 34, ¶¶39–41, __ Wis. 2d __, 974 N.W.2d 432.  In reversing the 
court of appeals' decision in Ruffin that the defendant was 
entitled to a Machner hearing, we reaffirmed the "well-
established" standard on this issue:  "[A]n evidentiary hearing 
is 
not 
mandatory 
if 
a 
defendant's 
motion 
presents 
only 
No. 
2018AP942-CR   
 
35 
 
conclusory allegations or if the record as a whole conclusively 
demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to relief."  
Id., ¶¶35, 38.   
¶48 As in Ruffin, the court of appeals in this case 
correctly stated the legal standard for holding an evidentiary 
hearing.  See Spencer, No. 2018AP942-CR, at ¶22; Ruffin, __ 
Wis. 2d __, 
¶40. 
 
The 
court 
below 
explained 
if 
the 
postconviction motion states sufficient material facts that, if 
true, would entitle the defendant to relief, "the circuit court 
must hold an evidentiary hearing."  Spencer, No. 2018AP942-CR, 
at ¶22 (quoting State v. Allen, 2004 WI 106, ¶¶9, 14, 274 
Wis. 2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433).  "'[I]f the [postconviction] 
motion does not raise facts sufficient to entitle the movant to 
relief, or presents only conclusory allegations, or if the 
record conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not 
entitled to relief,' a trial court may, in its discretion, deny 
a postconviction motion without a hearing."  Id. (quoting Allen, 
274 Wis. 2d 568, ¶9). 
¶49 As we emphasized in Ruffin, __ Wis. 2d __, ¶3, "even 
if the motion alleges sufficient facts, an evidentiary hearing 
is not mandatory if the motion presents only conclusory 
allegations 
or 
if 
the 
record 
as 
a 
whole 
conclusively 
demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to relief."  
Nevertheless, in both cases "the court of appeals neglected the 
'record conclusively demonstrates' analysis."  
Ruffin, __ 
Wis. 2d __, ¶41.  The court below determined only that Spencer 
pled facts sufficient to entitle him to a Machner hearing.  
No. 
2018AP942-CR   
 
36 
 
Spencer, 
No. 
2018AP942-CR, 
at 
¶26 
(citing 
Sholar, 
381 
Wis. 2d 560, ¶51).  The court "thus perform[ed] only half of the 
required analysis."  Ruffin, __ Wis. 2d __, ¶39.      
¶50 Applying this longstanding two-step framework, we 
conclude Spencer is not entitled to a Machner hearing on his 
ineffective assistance claim because "the record as a whole 
conclusively demonstrates that [Spencer] is not entitled to 
relief."  Id., ¶3; see also Sholar, 381 Wis. 2d 560, ¶50.  The 
circuit court determined "even if trial counsel had objected and 
the testimony was struck, there is simply not a reasonable 
probability that [Spencer] would have been acquitted of the 
crimes with which he was charged because there was absolute 
overwhelming evidence of his guilt."  We agree.  For the reasons 
set forth in the harmless error analysis above——which does not 
rely 
on 
the 
challenged 
hearsay 
testimony——the 
record 
conclusively shows Spencer is not entitled to relief.   
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
¶51 Under the circumstances of this case, the judge's ex 
parte meeting with Juror 2 did not constitute a critical stage 
at which the presence of counsel was required.  The meeting's 
timing and substance——the nature of Juror 2's health concerns 
and her ability to continue, prior to deliberations——did not 
implicate Spencer's need for "aid in coping with legal problems 
or assistance in meeting his adversary."  Ash, 413 U.S. at 313.  
The judge informed counsel of the situation, relayed a question 
from trial counsel, and after this meeting made the decision to 
dismiss the juror on the record with counsel's participation.  
No. 
2018AP942-CR   
 
37 
 
We 
accordingly 
decline 
to 
recognize 
as 
a 
constitutional 
violation counsel's inability to personally subject the ill 
juror to a "thorough[] explor[ation]" of the extent and nature 
of her symptoms in an adversarial setting.  Even if the ex parte 
meeting was error, it was harmless.  There is no reasonable 
probability that counsel's presence at the meeting would have 
changed the outcome of the trial. 
¶52 We further clarify that an evidentiary hearing is not 
required when "the record as a whole conclusively demonstrates 
that the defendant is not entitled to relief."  Ruffin, __ 
Wis. 2d __, ¶3; see also Sholar, 381 Wis. 2d 560, ¶50.  The 
record in this case conclusively demonstrates that Spencer is 
not entitled to relief on his ineffective assistance claim.  We 
reverse 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
decision 
remanding 
for 
an 
evidentiary hearing. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
 
 
No.  2018AP942-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶53 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  The Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution ensures that the 
accused shall have the assistance of counsel.  To this end, the 
right to counsel attaches at all critical stages of a trial.  
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967).   
¶54 The issue before the court is whether the circuit 
court's in chambers, off-the-record communications with an ill 
juror, resulting in the juror's dismissal for cause, constituted 
a critical stage of the trial at which the right to counsel 
attaches.  If Spencer did have a right to counsel at the 
meetings between the circuit court and ill juror, then he is 
entitled to a new trial unless the State can prove beyond a 
reasonable 
doubt 
that 
the 
constitutional 
error 
did 
not 
contribute to the verdict. 
¶55 In disposing of the Sixth Amendment claim, the 
majority errs in two ways.  First, it wrongly separates the 
circuit court's communications with the juror from the juror's 
dismissal, concluding that the communications between the 
circuit court and the juror without counsel present did not 
constitute a critical stage at which the right to counsel 
attaches.  Majority op., ¶4.  Second, it determines that this 
constitutional error was harmless by overlooking gaps in the 
record and ignoring the State's burden to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the constitutional error was harmless.  
See id., ¶41. 
No.  2018AP942-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
¶56 Contrary to the majority, I determine that the 
circumstances presented here constitute a critical stage of the 
trial.  Spencer's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated 
because his counsel was not present at this critical stage.  
Additionally, I conclude that, assuming harmless error applies, 
the State failed to meet its burden to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that this constitutional violation did not contribute to 
the verdict.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.1 
I 
¶57 Spencer was charged with one count of felony murder 
and one count of possession of a firearm by a felon.  Majority 
op., ¶5.  The case went to trial, and after the close of 
evidence but before deliberations, the bailiff informed the 
judge that a juror had fallen ill.  Id., ¶14.  As a result, the 
court took a 45-minute recess, during which time the judge met 
with the ill juror in chambers.  Id.  Neither the prosecutor nor 
Spencer's counsel was present for the meetings.  Id.  Nothing 
was on the record. 
¶58 After the communications outside the presence of 
counsel occurred, the court went on the record to recreate what 
had transpired in the 45-minute interval.  It memorialized the 
determination it had made before allowing the attorneys to state 
their positions for the record or make any motions.  At the 
outset, the circuit court indicated that it had made its 
decision that the juror would not proceed to deliberations, 
                                                 
1 Because I determine that Spencer's Sixth Amendment right 
was violated and the error was not harmless, I need not address 
the other issues presented. 
No.  2018AP942-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
explaining that the juror was "not feeling well enough to 
proceed" and that the court was "not prepared to put her health 
at risk by having her continue and go to deliberations when she 
is so unwell."  
¶59 The 
circuit 
court 
continued 
making 
the 
record, 
advising the attorneys about the juror's condition:  "She is, if 
you want to know the details, queasy, light headed, just unwell 
generally."  It further explained that it had advised the 
attorneys of the reason for the delay, that it conferred with 
the attorneys, and that the court waited "a significant period 
of time."  The circuit court also recognized that the ill juror 
was the only African-American juror on the panel and that the 
defendant was African-American. 
¶60 Additionally, the circuit court stated for the record 
that it had asked the ill juror a question "along the lines of 
the concern that the defense had."  The question asked was 
whether "her stress or her not being well enough to proceed had 
anything to do with her service as a juror or with the behavior 
of any of the other jurors."  The ill juror responded, "Oh, no.  
This has nothing to do with the trial."  Id.  Ultimately, the 
circuit court said, "I've made my record."2   
                                                 
2 The State explained to the circuit court that the juror 
could not be excused but instead should be dismissed for cause.  
It reasoned that the court could not designate the ill juror as 
an alternate because "alternates can only be picked at random" 
and therefore the court "can't designate her as an alternate per 
statute but [the court] can excuse her for a good reason."  See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 972.10(7) 
("If 
additional 
jurors 
have 
been 
selected . . . and the number remains more than required at 
final submission of the cause, the court shall determine by lot 
which 
jurors 
shall 
not 
participate 
in 
deliberations 
and 
discharge them."). 
No.  2018AP942-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
¶61 Nothing else was presented to illuminate the juror's 
condition or otherwise speak to the communications that took 
place between the court and the juror.  It was not until after 
the circuit court made a record of its prior decision to dismiss 
the juror for cause that the court invited the parties to bring 
motions and "state [their] positions succinctly for the record." 
¶62 At that time, defense counsel moved for a mistrial and 
renewed her Swain challenge.3  Id.  Subsequently, the jury 
convicted Spencer on both counts.  Id., ¶16.  Spencer filed a 
postconviction motion, arguing both that his Sixth Amendment4 
                                                 
3 In Swain v. Alabama, the United States Supreme Court held 
that, "Although a [Black] defendant is not entitled to a jury 
containing members of his race, a State's purposeful or 
deliberate denial to [Black people] on account of race of 
participation as jurors in the administration of justice 
violates the Equal Protection Clause."  380 U.S. 202, 203-04 
(1965).  Earlier in this trial, Spencer's attorney argued that 
"Milwaukee County's procedures when impaneling jury arrays 
systemically excluded African-Americans and, therefore, violated 
Spencer's right to equal protection of the law.  The trial court 
found that Spencer failed to prove that Milwaukee County's 
procedures systemically excluded African-Americans from jury 
service and denied Spencer's motion."  State v. Spencer, No. 
2018AP942-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶5 n.3 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 
9, 2021).  When Spencer's counsel renewed her Swain challenge, 
she argued that "the research shows . . . that even the presence 
of one African-American on a jury can make a difference in terms 
of reducing systemic bias." 
4 The Sixth Amendment provides in full:   
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
No.  2018AP942-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
right to counsel was violated and that his counsel was 
ineffective.  The circuit court denied the motion.  Id., ¶18. 
¶63 Spencer appealed,5 and the court of appeals affirmed 
the circuit court's denial of Spencer's postconviction motion on 
Sixth Amendment grounds.  However, it reversed the circuit court 
on Spencer's ineffective assistance of counsel claim and 
remanded the case for a Machner hearing.6  Id., ¶¶19-20. 
II 
¶64 The majority's first mistake is that it concludes the 
communications between the circuit court and the ill juror, 
taking place immediately before jury deliberations and resulting 
in the juror's dismissal for cause, did not constitute a 
critical stage of the proceedings at which the right to counsel 
attached.  See majority op., ¶4.  "A critical stage is any point 
in the criminal proceedings when a person may need counsel's 
assistance to assure a meaningful defense.  The assistance of 
counsel 
when 
a 
court 
communicates 
with 
the 
jury 
during 
                                                                                                                                                             
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence. 
Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution also 
provides for the right to counsel. 
5 Spencer also argued at the court of appeals and at this 
court that the dismissal of the juror was an erroneous exercise 
of discretion and violated his due process and equal protection 
rights.  The court of appeals determined that Spencer had 
forfeited those claims.  I need not reach these claims or 
address whether they were forfeited because, as noted, I would 
reverse on the basis of the Sixth Amendment violation. 
6 State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 
1979). 
No.  2018AP942-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
deliberations may be necessary to a meaningful defense."  State 
v. Anderson, 2006 WI 77, ¶68, 291 Wis. 2d 673, 717 N.W.2d 74, 
overruled on other grounds by State v. Alexander, 2013 WI 70, 
349 Wis. 2d 327, 833 N.W.2d 126.7   
¶65 Although not precisely defined, a critical stage 
generally includes proceedings that determine the composition of 
the jury.  See State v. Harris, 229 Wis. 2d 832, 839, 601 N.W.2d 
682 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Spencer, No. 2018AP942-CR, 
unpublished slip op., ¶50 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2021) (White, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Examples of 
"critical stages" are jury selection (including voir dire) and 
communications between the circuit court and the jury during 
deliberations.  See, e.g., Harris, 229 Wis. 2d at 839; Gomez v. 
United States, 490 U.S. 858, 873 (1989); Anderson, 291 Wis. 2d 
673, ¶69.  As particularly relevant here, "An in-chambers 
conference that deals with the ability of sworn jurors to 
continue to serve on the jury is an exceedingly important 
occurrence in a criminal trial . . . "  State v. Alexander, 349 
Wis. 2d 327, ¶49 (Crooks, J., concurring).   
¶66 The majority erroneously separates the off-the-record 
communications from their ultimate outcome, i.e. the dismissal 
of the juror.  By considering only "the substance and the timing 
                                                 
7 State v. Alexander overruled State v. Anderson to the 
extent that a defendant does not have a right to be present 
during out of court communications between the judge and the 
jury.  State v. Alexander, 2013 WI 70, ¶¶28-29, 349 Wis. 2d 327, 
833 N.W.2d 126.  It remains true that "[a]ll that the 
Constitution requires at such a conference is the presence of 
defense counsel."  Id., ¶29. 
No.  2018AP942-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
of the meeting," the majority concludes that "the meeting did 
not constitute a critical stage at which the presence of counsel 
was required."  Majority op., ¶24.  This analysis evaluates the 
communications in a vacuum and as a result, minimizes the right 
at issue.  See id., ¶33. 
¶67 To explain, the majority conclusively determines that 
because the communications were about the health of the juror, 
Spencer did not require aid in coping with legal problems.  Id.  
However, this takes too narrow of a view of the "legal problem" 
with 
which 
Spencer 
required 
aid. 
 
Properly 
framed, 
the 
communications between the court and the ill juror implicated 
the juror's ability to serve on the jury and participate in 
deliberations, a consequential event during which Spencer could 
have benefited from the aid of counsel.  See State v. Carter, 
2010 WI App 37, ¶18, 324 Wis. 2d 208, 781 N.W.2d 527; see also 
United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 313 (1973). 
¶68 Here, the ill juror sat through the entire trial 
except for the closing arguments.  Even though deliberations had 
not yet begun, they were soon to commence.  I agree with court 
of 
appeals 
Judge 
Maxine 
White's 
apt 
description 
of 
the 
situation:  "The meeting with Juror No. 2 was not innocuous 
communication or a de minimis interaction; it was not a foregone 
conclusion that Juror No. 2 would be removed from the jury."  
Spencer, No. 2018AP942-CR, at ¶51 (White, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
¶69 Spencer could have stood to benefit from his counsel's 
assistance in this situation.  At the very least, defense 
No.  2018AP942-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
counsel could have been apprised of the juror's condition 
firsthand and more thoroughly investigated all options.  For 
example, this would have allowed defense counsel to be in a 
better position to assess the import of this particular juror 
and whether a longer break would result in the juror's ability 
to continue serving.  
¶70 The majority questions the "utility" and "propriety" 
of an "adversarial approach to a juror's health status."  
Majority op., ¶35.  Once again, this distracts from the 
substantive legal problem with which Spencer required the 
assistance of counsel:  the dismissal of a juror for cause who 
observed the trial through the close of evidence.   
¶71 By separating the communications between the court and 
juror from the juror's dismissal and treating them as distinct 
events, the majority paints the communications as a benign 
interlude with no bearing on Spencer's rights.  To the contrary, 
the judge and juror were not merely discussing the juror's 
health.  They were discussing the juror's health to determine if 
the juror should be dismissed from finishing the trial and 
participating in deliberations.   
¶72 These communications between the circuit court and 
juror resulting in the juror's dismissal for cause were a 
critical stage of trial at which the right to counsel attached.  
Such communications affected the makeup of the jury, and Spencer 
could have benefited from the aid of counsel being in the room, 
at the very least to build a record.  Thus, the majority is 
wrong to conclude these communications were not a critical stage 
No.  2018AP942-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
and that Spencer was not entitled to his counsel's presence at 
the discussions between the circuit court and the juror.  It 
brushes off the import of the communications and how they were 
inseparable from the decision to dismiss the juror for cause. 
III 
¶73 Next, the majority stumbles again when it concludes 
that even if the communications were a critical stage, the error 
was harmless.  See majority op., ¶4.  The majority overlooks 
gaps in the record and ignores the State's burden of proof in 
making this determination.   
¶74 Whether to apply a harmless error analysis to a 
deprivation of counsel claim such as this has met with 
inconsistent treatment.  In some circumstances "[t]his court and 
the court of appeals have applied harmless error analysis to the 
denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel when the circuit 
court has had ex parte communications with the jury."  Anderson, 
291 Wis. 2d 673, ¶76; see State v. Koller, 2001 WI App 253, ¶62, 
248 Wis. 2d 259, 635 N.W.2d 838.  Thus, assuming the harmless 
error analysis8 applies to these communications between the 
circuit court and juror, the error was certainly not harmless as 
the majority claims.   
                                                 
8 Although in other circumstances courts have determined 
that deprivation of the right to counsel at a critical stage 
constitutes a structural error requiring automatic reversal, see 
State v. Travis, 2013 WI 38, ¶61, 347 Wis. 2d 142, 832 N.W.2d 
491, I do not decide whether structural error should apply to 
this Sixth Amendment violation.  Instead, I assume, without 
deciding, that harmless error applies in response to the 
majority's conclusion that the error was not harmless.  See 
majority op., ¶39. 
No.  2018AP942-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
¶75 Where the majority finds a record sufficient to 
determine the error was harmless, I find a record utterly 
lacking.  See Anderson, 291 Wis. 2d 673, ¶81 ("In light of the 
absence of a sufficient record, an appellate court will have 
great difficulty concluding that the circuit court's erroneous 
procedure in communicating with the jury was harmless error.").  
As detailed below and as referenced in Anderson, this case 
suffers from an insufficient record——an insufficiency which the 
majority overlooks and which precludes a determination that the 
State has met its burden of proof.  
¶76 If an error is subject to harmless error analysis, the 
beneficiary of the error must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict 
obtained.  State v. Hale, 2005 WI 7, ¶60, 277 Wis. 2d 593, 691 
N.W.2d 637; see also State v. Beamon, 2013 WI 47, ¶27, 347 Wis. 
2d 559, 830 N.W.2d 681.  In other words, the State here must 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Spencer would still have 
been convicted absent the Sixth Amendment violation. 
¶77 Simply put, the State has failed to meet its burden of 
proof to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the Sixth Amendment 
violation did not contribute to the verdict.  Neglecting to even 
mention the State's burden of "beyond a reasonable doubt," the 
majority determines that "there is no reason on this record to 
believe counsel's presence would have had any impact on the 
juror's ability to proceed."  Majority op., ¶41. 
¶78 Such a conclusion does not comport with our case law.  
In State v. Lehman, 108 Wis. 2d 291, 321 N.W.2d 212 (1982), we 
No.  2018AP942-CR.awb 
 
11 
 
were very specific about the procedure the circuit court must 
follow before it dismisses a juror.  It includes making careful 
inquiry regarding the substance of the request and exerting 
efforts to avoid dismissing the juror: 
When a juror seeks to be excused, or a party seeks to 
have a juror discharged, whether before or after jury 
deliberations have begun, it is the circuit court's 
duty, prior to the exercise of its discretion to 
excuse the juror, to make careful inquiry into the 
substance of the request and to exert reasonable 
efforts to avoid discharging the juror.  Such inquiry 
generally should be made out of the presence of the 
jurors and in the presence of all counsel and the 
defendant.  The juror potentially subject to the 
discharge should not be present during counsel's 
arguments on the discharge.  The circuit court's 
efforts depend on the circumstances of the case.  The 
court must approach the issue with extreme caution to 
avoid a mistrial by either needlessly discharging the 
juror or by prejudicing in some manner the juror 
potentially subject to discharge or the remaining 
jurors. 
Id. at 300. 
¶79 Lehman instructs how the circuit court should conduct 
an inquiry before dismissing a juror even before deliberations 
have begun.  The 45-minute gap in the record does not reflect 
the above inquiry, and the State has not otherwise proven the 
error was harmless.  It argues only that because the juror was 
sick, she would have been dismissed no matter what.   
¶80 There 
is 
no 
transcript 
of 
the 
off-the-record 
communications which the State can reference in endeavoring to 
meet its burden.  And although "[t]he circuit court's efforts 
depend on the circumstances of the case," the State has not 
shown from the gaps in this record that the circumstances 
No.  2018AP942-CR.awb 
 
12 
 
indicate the result would have been the same absent the 
constitutional error. 
¶81 It is clear that before the circuit court went back on 
the record, it had already made its determination that the juror 
would not continue serving on the panel.  What is not clear from 
the transcript is whether the juror had already left the 
courthouse before the court went back on the record——that is, 
before counsel even had an opportunity to make or renew any 
motions.  See Spencer, No. 2018AP942-CR, at ¶48 (White, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  A review of the 
transcript shows the circuit court's concern for making a record 
of the communications and its decision to dismiss the juror but 
does not shed light on when the juror was actually allowed to 
leave.  This presents a significant gap in the record.  The 
possibility that the juror had already left the courthouse 
before the court went on the record certainly would further 
exacerbate the error.   
¶82 Added to the mix, the communications between the 
circuit 
court 
and 
the 
juror 
were 
neither 
brief 
nor 
inconsequential.  See Koller, 248 Wis. 2d 259, ¶¶61, 67 
(assuming that the trial court erred when it responded through 
the bailiff without the assistance of counsel that two items the 
jury asked for were "not available," but finding the error 
harmless); State v. Bjerkaas, 163 Wis. 2d 949, 957-58, 472 
N.W.2d 615 (Ct. App. 1991) (noting the parties' agreement that 
it was constitutional error when the trial court wrote back "no" 
in response to a question posed by the jury without consulting 
No.  2018AP942-CR.awb 
 
13 
 
counsel, but finding no prejudice to the defendant).  Instead, 
it was an approximately 45-minute recess that determined the 
composition of the jury after most of the trial had concluded.  
A decision to dismiss a juror for cause can be consequential, 
implicating significant constitutional rights.  See State v. 
Mendoza, 227 Wis. 2d 838, 849-50, 596 N.W.2d 736 (1999). 
¶83 Admittedly, there may be occasions when a judge 
communicating with a juror outside the presence of counsel 
involve "the practical realities of running a courtroom," 
constituting harmless error.  See majority op., ¶40.  But this 
is not one of them.  Rather, the law provides a clear roadmap, 
requiring the State to prove the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt, which it has not done based on this deficient 
record. 
¶84 Judge White's separate writing at the court of appeals 
is instructive.  She explains that the dearth of a record of the 
communications between the circuit court and juror precludes the 
conclusion that the error was harmless.  See Spencer, No. 
2018AP942-CR, at ¶55 (White, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  I agree that "the scope and impact of the 
trial court's error is difficult to assess because of the lack 
of record."  Id.  We cannot know, and the State has not proven, 
whether the outcome would have been the same absent the 
constitutional violation.  In sum, the State has failed to meet 
its burden of proof that the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
¶85 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.   
No.  2018AP942-CR.awb 
 
14 
 
¶86 I am authorized to state that Justices REBECCA FRANK 
DALLET and JILL J. KAROFSKY join this dissent.  
No.  2018AP942-CR.rfd 
1 
 
¶87 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (dissenting).  I join 
Justice Ann Walsh Bradley's dissent in full.  As she correctly 
concludes, the circumstances under which the only Black juror 
was 
dismissed 
for 
cause 
prior 
to 
deliberations 
violated 
Spencer's Sixth Amendment rights.  I write separately to 
emphasize the importance of racially diverse juries to enhancing 
both a jury's performance in criminal trials and the public's 
perceptions of the fairness of the legal system.   
¶88 Racial diversity on juries has both constitutional and 
moral dimensions.  For example, a categorical bar on jury 
service by non-white citizens violates the Fourteenth Amendment.  
See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1879), 
abrogated on other grounds by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 
536 n.19 (1975).  Relatedly, the way potential jurors are 
summoned "must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in 
the community and thereby fail to be reasonably representative 
thereof."  Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538.  Otherwise, that method of 
summoning potential jurors violates the defendant's right to a 
jury of his peers.  See id. at 528 (explaining that "an 
essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
trial" is that the pool of potential jurors is a "representative 
No.  2018AP942-CR.rfd 
2 
 
cross section of the community").1  The Constitution not only 
requires that people of all races be included in the pool of 
potential jurors, but it also prohibits practices designed to 
keep jurors of any particular race off the final panel.  See, 
e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) (racially 
motivated peremptory challenges to potential jurors violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment).  Those principles, which are rooted in 
the Constitution's text, flow from the Constitution's underlying 
moral value of equality before the law:  "The very idea of a 
jury is a body . . . composed of the peers or equals of the 
person whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine; 
that is, of his neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having 
the same legal status in society as that which he holds."  
Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308.  In short, "[e]qual justice under law 
requires a criminal trial free of racial discrimination in the 
jury selection process."  Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 
2228, 2242 (2019).  These precedents underscore the importance 
of the circuit court's decision to dismiss the only Black juror 
on the panel after the close of evidence, and why the events 
leading up to that decision were a "critical stage" of the 
                                                 
1 In Wisconsin, potential jurors are summoned from lists of 
individuals with valid drivers' licenses or State IDs.  This is 
problematic because, in Milwaukee County, for instance, only 47% 
of Black adults and 43% of Hispanic adults have a valid drivers' 
license, as compared to 85% of white adults statewide.  See John 
Pawasarat, 
The 
Driver 
License 
Status 
of 
the 
Voting 
Age 
Population in Wisconsin, Emp. & Training Inst., Univ. of Wis.-
Milwaukee (June 2005).  Thus, that system excludes more than 
half of the Black and Hispanic adult populations in Milwaukee 
County from ever being summoned for jury duty, let alone being 
placed on a final jury panel. 
No.  2018AP942-CR.rfd 
3 
 
trial.  See generally United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 
(1984). 
¶89 Setting aside the constitutional and moral dimensions 
of jury diversity, research suggests that juries perform better 
simply if they include non-white members.  See, e.g., Samuel R. 
Sommers, On the Obstacles to Jury Diversity, 21 Jury Expert 1, 7 
(2009) ("[T]he nature and content of deliberations can actually 
vary by a jury's racial composition.").  Although there are many 
ways to assess jury performance, the research focuses generally 
on the length and breadth of jurors' discussions, the number of 
factual errors made in deliberations, and the reduction of 
jurors' individual biases, whether implicit or explicit.  See 
generally id.; see also Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity 
and Group Decision-Making, 90 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 597, 
606 (2006)   On each of these metrics, diverse juries perform 
better than all-white ones.  Specifically, juries that include 
even one non-white member tend to deliberate longer and discuss 
a wider range of evidence than all-white juries.  See Sommers, 
Racial Diversity, supra, at 608.  White jurors on diverse juries 
are generally more accurate in their discussion of the facts of 
the case than if they were on an all-white jury; and they are 
less likely to pre-judge the defendant's guilt, including before 
deliberations begin.  See id. at 606 (adding that diverse juries 
are 
less 
likely 
to 
tolerate 
prejudicial 
statements 
in 
deliberations than are all-white juries).  Similarly, jurors 
demonstrate "less biased reasoning when placed in a diverse 
decisionmaking 
group." 
 
See 
Michael 
Selmi, 
Statistical 
Inequality and Intentional (Not Implicit) Discrimination, 79 Law 
No.  2018AP942-CR.rfd 
4 
 
& Contemp. Probs. 199, 217 & n.92 (2016).  These findings mirror 
those in numerous other studies confirming that diversity has a 
positive effect on group performance in other settings.  See 
generally Vivian Hunt, et al., Why Diversity Matters, McKinsey & 
Co. (Jan. 2015) (finding that corporations with gender and 
ethnic diversity were significantly more likely to outperform 
their competitors); Lu Hong & Scott E. Page, Groups of Diverse 
Problem Solvers Can Outperform Groups of High-Ability Problem 
Solvers, 101 Proceedings of the Nat'l Academy of Scis. 16385 
(2004).   
¶90 There are many potential explanations for these 
effects.  One is that people bring their implicit biases with 
them to the jury room.  See generally Justin D. Levinson & 
Danielle Young, Different Shades of Bias, 112 W. Va. L. Rev. 
307, 326–31 (2010).  For instance, Levinson and Young found that 
mock jurors "who saw [a] photo of [a] perpetrator with a dark 
skin tone judged ambiguous evidence to be significantly more 
indicative of guilt than participants who saw [a] photo of a 
perpetrator with a lighter skin tone."  Id. at 337.  Likewise, 
people are more likely to remember "aggressive facts" about a 
Black character in a story than a white one.  See generally 
Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, 57 Duke L.J. 345, 
398-99 (2007).  But an even more fundamental explanation may be 
that when jurors expect to have discussions with people who have 
different perspectives than they do, they tend to listen to the 
evidence 
more 
closely, 
prepare 
for 
deliberations 
more 
thoroughly, 
and 
guard 
against 
preconceived 
notions 
more 
No.  2018AP942-CR.rfd 
5 
 
carefully.2  See Sommers, On Racial Diversity, supra, at 601.  
Diverse juries might also outperform all-white juries as a 
result of each juror contributing his or her own life experience 
to deliberations.  As Justice Thurgood Marshall put it:   
When any large and identifiable segment of the 
community is excluded from jury service, the effect is 
to remove from the jury room qualities of human nature 
and varieties of human experience, the range of which 
is unknown and perhaps unknowable. It is not necessary 
to assume that the excluded group will consistently 
vote as a class in order to conclude, as we do, that 
its exclusion deprives the jury of a perspective on 
human events that may have unsuspected importance in 
any case that may be presented. 
Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972).   
¶91 Racial diversity on juries also has a meaningful 
impact 
on 
the 
public's 
perceptions 
of 
the 
fairness 
and 
legitimacy of jury verdicts.  One study found that ordinary 
citizens' perceptions about the fairness of a trial and the 
correctness of a verdict varied depending on whether the jury 
was all-white or racially diverse.  See Leslie Ellis & Shari 
Seidman Diamond, Race, Diversity, and Jury Composition, 78 Chi.-
Kent L. Rev. 1033, 1043-45 (2003).  When participants were told 
that a particular verdict was reached by a racially diverse 
                                                 
2 This point and others were discussed more fully in a 
recent presentation by the National Center for State Courts 
(NCSC) entitled "Jury Diversity and its Role in Promoting 
Confidence in the Court System," which can be viewed here: 
https://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/juries/id
/339.  The presentation was part of NCSC's ongoing "Blueprint 
for Racial Justice" Project, which "is examining the systemic 
changes needed to make equal justice under law an enduring 
reality for all."  See https://www.ncsc.org/information-and-
resources/improving-access-to-justice/racial-justice/blueprint-
for-racial-justice.   
No.  2018AP942-CR.rfd 
6 
 
jury, they perceived the trial to be equally fair regardless of 
whether it ended in a conviction or an acquittal.  Id. at 1049.  
The same was not true, however, when the jury had no racially 
diverse members:  "[W]hen the jury did not include minority 
members, observers viewed the trial as less fair when it 
produces a guilty verdict than when it produced a not guilty 
verdict."  Id.  The key takeaway from this study is that 
participants thought a verdict was unfair "only when [they] 
questioned the procedure that procured it, i.e., the racial 
composition of the jury."   Id.     
¶92 I do not mean to suggest that discharging the only 
juror of color is always erroneous, or that doing so here 
prejudiced Spencer.  After all, "[d]efendants are not entitled 
to a jury of any particular composition."  Taylor, 419 U.S. at 
538.  Instead, I write to emphasize the importance of racially 
diverse juries to both the quality of verdicts and the 
perception of fairness in the judicial system.  Given that 
"[t]he purpose of the jury system is to impress upon the 
criminal defendant and the community as a whole that a verdict 
of conviction or acquittal is given in accordance with the law 
by persons who are fair," Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 413 
(1991), juries themselves must be perceived as fair, and 
therefore must reflect the communities from which they are 
drawn. 
¶93 I am authorized to state that Justice JILL J. KAROFSKY 
joins this dissent.   
 
No.  2018AP942-CR.rfd 
 
 
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