Title: PEOPLE OF MI V THOMAS MCCLAIN HUNTER

State: michigan

Issuer: Michigan Supreme Court

Document:

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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED APRIL 24, 2002  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v  
No. 112713  
THOMAS McCLAIN HUNTER,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
PER CURIAM  
The defendant was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to  
possess with intent to deliver 650 grams or more of cocaine1  
and possession with intent to deliver 650 grams or more of  
cocaine.2  The Court of Appeals sustained the conviction for  
possession 
with 
intent to deliver, but reversed the conspiracy  
conviction on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to  
1 MCL 750.157a, 333.7401(2)(a)(i).  
2 MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i).  
show that defendant and his coconspirator agreed that the  
amount of cocaine would exceed the statutory minimum. We  
conclude that the evidence was sufficient, and reverse.  
I  
The evidence at trial showed that the defendant flew from  
Detroit to Los Angeles.  The details of his activities in  
Los Angeles were not established.  However, postal inspectors  
became suspicious of a package addressed to an apartment in  
Oakland County, Michigan, and contacted officials in Oakland  
County.
 A dog trained to detect controlled substances  
confirmed the presence of drugs.  The package was opened,  
inspected, and rewrapped.  It contained over 1,000 grams of  
cocaine.  
An officer then delivered the package to the apartment of  
Dorothy Jenkins, the defendant’s girlfriend, to which it was  
addressed.3  Ms. Jenkins signed for the package. 
Officers  
later entered the apartment with a search warrant and arrested  
her.  
Ultimately, Jenkins cooperated with the police.  She  
testified at length about her discussions with defendant  
concerning the California trip and the shipment of drugs, as  
well as the defendant’s activities before that time.  Jenkins  
said that after the package arrived, defendant opened it,  
3 Testimony indicated that handwriting on the package was 
defendant’s.  
2  
  
discarded the outer wrapping, and left, climbing out a back  
window.4  
The 
defendant 
was charged with conspiracy to possess with  
intent to deliver 650 or more grams of cocaine and with  
possession with intent to deliver that amount of cocaine.5  
The jury found the defendant guilty as charged, and he was  
sentenced to life in prison.  
II  
On appeal, the Court of Appeals majority rejected most of  
the issues raised by the defendant, but agreed with his claim  
that the evidence was insufficient to show an agreement  
regarding the amount of cocaine that the defendant would be  
sending.6  The majority concluded that the prosecutor’s  
evidence established an agreement between defendant and  
Jenkins to possess cocaine.  However, relying on People v  
Justice (After Remand), 454 Mich 334; 562 NW2d 652 (1997), it  
found that there was insufficient evidence regarding the  
quantity of drugs that they agreed to possess:  
In January of 1993, defendant was planning a 
trip to Los Angeles, California.  Before leaving  
4 Though some of his movements were later reconstructed, 
the drugs from the package were never recovered.  
5 Ms. Jenkins was charged with the same offenses, and 
pleaded guilty to a lesser charge as part of her agreement to 
testify.  
6 
 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued July 7,  
1998(Docket No. 182324).  
3  
  
 
for Los Angeles, defendant told Jenkins that he was 
going to send her a package and asked for her 
address.
 Jenkins admitted that she “had an  
agreement with [defendant] that [she] was going to 
sign for a package containing cocaine.”  However, 
she acknowledged that she did not know how much 
cocaine would be sent.  In Michigan, the crime of  
conspiracy is complete upon formation of the  
agreement. Justice, supra at 345-346.  Thus, the 
evidence clearly established a conspiracy to  
possess cocaine.  There was additional evidence  
from which the jury could infer that defendant  
intended to deliver in excess of 650 grams of 
cocaine.  However, there was no evidence, direct or 
circumstantial, that Jenkins had the specific 
intent to combine with defendant to deliver in  
excess of 650 grams of cocaine to a third person. 
Under these circumstances, the prosecution failed 
to prove an essential element of the conspiracy 
charge, Justice, supra at 349, and defendant’s 
conviction on that charge must be reversed.  
[Emphasis in original.]  
Judge Gribbs dissented.  He thought the testimony of  
coconspirator Jenkins sufficient to establish the quantity  
element, explaining:  
The coconspirator in this case had an intimate 
relationship with defendant and spent a great deal 
of time with him.  She testified that she saw  
defendant with “kind of a large quantity” of 
cocaine, larger than a sandwich bag, every two or 
three days. The conconspirator indicated the size 
of the bags with her hands for the jury.  Defendant  
arranged to go to California to “check on some 
situation” concerning cocaine, and told her that he 
was going to mail a package of cocaine to her 
apartment.
 The coconspirator testified that she 
and defendant discussed the package of cocaine on a 
regular basis and that defendant indicated that the 
package was worth “too much money” to walk away 
from.  The coconspirator knew that she could get 
into trouble for signing for the package, and knew 
that defendant planned to take the cocaine and “run 
with the package” immediately as soon as the 
package arrived.  
4  
 
 
  
 
Applications for leave to appeal were filed by both the  
prosecutor and the defendant, who raised a number of issues  
that the Court of Appeals had rejected.  We entered orders  
denying 
the 
defendant’s 
application7 
and 
holding 
the  
prosecutor’s 
application in abeyance for People v Mass, Docket  
No. 115820. 8 People v Mass has been decided, 464 Mich 615;  
628 NW2d 540 (2001),9 and we again consider the prosecutor’s  
application.  
III  
This case involves a claim that the evidence was  
insufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt of conspiracy  
to possess with intent to deliver 650 or more grams of  
cocaine. In People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748  
(1992), we summarized the principles appellate courts are to  
7 462 Mich 878(Docket No. 112783).  
8  Unpublished order, entered June 13, 2000 (Docket No. 
112713).  
9 People v Mass does not resolve the issue presented in  
this case. 
In Mass we held that the amount of controlled  
substance is an element of a charge of delivery of controlled 
substance, but that knowledge of the amount is not.  In a  
conspiracy case, however, we said that knowledge of the amount 
of a controlled substance is an element of conspiracy with 
intent to deliver a particular amount.  In Mass, the 
conspiracy conviction was reversed and reduced to a lesser 
offense because the trial court did not submit the amount  
element to the jury.  
Mass is not helpful to the disposition of this case 
because here the trial judge did instruct the jury that in 
order to convict it needed to find an agreement to possess 
with intent to deliver over 650 grams of cocaine.  
5  
 
apply in reviewing such claims:  
In short, when determining whether sufficient 
evidence 
has 
been 
presented 
to 
sustain 
a  
conviction, a court must view the evidence in a 
light most favorable to the prosecution and  
determine whether any rational trier of fact could 
have found that the essential elements of the crime  
were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations 
omitted.]  
IV  
In People v Justice, supra, we explained the elements of  
a conspiracy charge such as that involved in this case:  
To be convicted of conspiracy to possess with 
intent to deliver a controlled substance, the 
people must prove that (1) the defendant possessed 
the specific intent to deliver the statutory 
minimum as charged, (2) his coconspirator possessed 
the specific intent to deliver the statutory 
minimum as charged, and (3) the defendant and his 
coconspirator possessed the specific intent to 
combine to deliver the statutory minimum as charged 
to a third person. [454 Mich 349.]  
In this case, the prosecution had direct evidence that  
defendant and Jenkins conspired to possess with intent to  
deliver cocaine.  The evidence with regard to their intent  
about quantities was circumstantial.  Such evidence, however,  
unquestionably can establish the requisite element.  As we  
said in People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 526:  
Possession with intent to deliver can be  
established 
by 
circumstantial 
evidence 
and  
reasonable inferences arising from that evidence, 
just as it can be established by direct evidence. 
Peterson v Oceana Circuit Judge, 243 Mich 215, 217;  
219 NW 934 (1928); People v Maliskey, 77 Mich App  
444, 453; 258 NW2d 512 (1977).  See also [United  
States v Montes-Cardenas, 746 F2d 771, 778 (CA 11, 
1984)]; [United States v Castillo, 844 F2d 1379,  
6  
 
 
1392 (CA 9, 1988)]; State v Salas, 231 Neb 471, 
473-474; 436 NW2d 547 (1989); State v Poellinger, 
153 Wis 2d 493, 503-504; 451 NW2d 752 (1990). 
Indeed, we agree with the Supreme Court of  
Wisconsin 
that 
“circumstantial 
evidence 
is  
oftentimes stronger and more satisfactory than 
direct evidence.”  Id. at 501-502. 
For this  
reason, 
inferences 
drawn 
from 
circumstantial  
evidence are reviewed in the same manner as those  
drawn from direct evidence.  
Further, it is well established that it is not necessary  
that each of the coconspirators have full knowledge of the  
extent of the conspiracy:  
A person may be a party to a continuing 
conspiracy by knowingly co-operating to further the 
object thereof. People v Heidt, [312 Mich 629; 20 
NW2d 751 (1945)].  It is not necessary to a 
conviction for conspiracy that each defendant have 
knowledge of all its ramifications. 
People v  
DeLano, 318 Mich 557 [28 NW2d 909 (1947)]. Nor is  
it necessary that one conspirator should know all 
of the conspirators or participate in all of the 
objects of the conspiracy.  People v Garska, 303 
Mich 313 [; 6 NW2d 527 (1942)]. [People v Cooper, 
326 Mich 514, 521; 40 NW2d 708 (1950), aff’d on 
rehearing 328 Mich 159 (1950).]  
Applying these principles to the evidence, we conclude  
that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the  
defendant and Jenkins conspired to possess with intent to  
deliver 650 or more grams of a controlled substance.  The  
evidence clearly showed that defendant and Jenkins conspired  
to possess cocaine with intent to deliver. Defendant was to  
mail a package containing cocaine from California to Jenkins’  
apartment, where she would sign for it.  
Other evidence in the case was sufficient for the jury to  
7  
infer that the amount involved met the statutory minimum.  
Jenkins testified that she and the defendant spent a great  
deal of time together, and that the defendant frequently had  
substantial 
quantities of cocaine in his possession in plastic  
bags.  She described the bags as being “bigger than a sandwich  
bag.”  Using her hands, she demonstrated for the jury the size  
of the bags.  From those circumstances, the jury would  
reasonably infer that defendant and Ms. Jenkins would have  
understood that this California trip to obtain cocaine would  
involve amounts that were substantial in comparison to the  
quantities defendant normally had.  
Jenkins went to the airport with the defendant for his  
flight to California, and was present when he was stopped by  
law enforcement agents because he “pulled out a lot of money”  
when purchasing his ticket.  The agents questioned him  
“because he had all this money.”  Jenkins’ awareness of the  
amount of money in the defendant’s possession was one more  
circumstance from which the jury could infer her intent  
regarding the quantity of drugs to be obtained.  
Further, Jenkins testified that defendant asked her  
repeatedly about the package, and that after defendant’s  
return from California, he was upset that the package had not  
yet been delivered.  When she suggested that he “just leave it  
alone” or “let it go,” the defendant replied, “It’s too much  
money involved. I can’t just let it go.”  
8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, the amount of drugs the defendant mailed from  
California, which Jenkins signed for and accepted on  
defendant’s instructions, may be considered in evaluating the  
coconspirators’ intent regarding the amount to be obtained.  
What the conspirators actually did in furtherance of the  
conspiracy is evidence of what they had agreed to do.  See  
Mass, 464 Mich 634; People v Kanar, 314 Mich 242, 249; 22 NW2d  
359 (1946); People v Newsome, 3 Mich App 541, 560; 143 NW2d  
165 (1966). 
In this case, the package contained 1,040 grams,  
well above the statutory amount of 650 grams.  
From all this evidence the jury could have concluded that  
the defendant and Jenkins intended to possess an amount of  
cocaine in excess of the statutory minimum. Accordingly, we  
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in part and  
reinstate 
the 
defendant’s 
conviction 
for 
conspiracy 
to 
possess  
with intent to deliver 650 or more grams of cocaine.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and WEAVER, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ.,  
concurred.  
9  
___________________________________ 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
No. 112713  
THOMAS McCLAIN HUNTER,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
WEAVER, J. (concurring).  
I concur in the result of the per curiam opinion, but  
write separately because I continue to adhere to the view  
expressed by the concurring opinion in People v Mass, 464 Mich  
615; 628 NW2d 540 (2001).  Knowledge of the amount of drugs  
delivered should not be an element of a conspiracy to deliver  
offense.
 The judicial imposition of this knowledge  
requirement by the Mass majority is inconsistent with the text  
of both the delivery statute, MCL 333.7401, and the conspiracy  
statute, MCL 750.157a.  
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v 
No. 112713 
THOMAS McCLAIN HUNTER, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
___________________________________ 
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 
I would deny leave to appeal.  The Court of Appeals 
correctly reversed the defendant’s conviction for conspiracy  
to possess with intent to deliver more than 650 grams of  
cocaine 
because 
the 
prosecutor 
presented 
insufficient 
evidence  
of intent to combine and deliver the statutory minimum.  
Moreover, leave to appeal should be denied because the  
facts are close, because People v Mass, 464 Mich 615; 628 NW2d  
540 (2001), solidified this Court’s thinking regarding the  
necessary elements in conspiracy to deliver, and finally  
because the defendant’s life sentence will not be altered by  
this change.  
KELLY, J., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.