Title: VanLente v. University of Wyoming Research Corp.

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

VanLente v. University of Wyoming Research Corp.1999 WY 33975 P.2d 594Case Number: 98-73Decided: 03/26/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming

William D. VanLENTE, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING RESEARCH CORPORATION, d/b/a 
Western Research Institute Corporation; and

James G. Speight, Appellees 
(Defendants).

 

    

 

Appeal from the District Court, Albany County, 
Jeffrey A. Donnell, J.

 

   

     Bernard Q. Phelan, 
Cheyenne, Wyoming, Representing Appellant.

      Bruce B. Waters of 
Brown, Nagel, Waters & Hiser, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming, Representing 
Appellees.

 

     Before LEHMAN, 
C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* JJ.

    * 
Retired November 2, 1998.

 

     THOMAS, 
Justice.

    
[¶1]     William D. VanLente (VanLente) presents 
as his primary claim for relief the proposition that this Court should recognize 
a contract remedy for an at-will employee based upon breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment relationship. The 
district court entered a summary judgment in favor of the University of Wyoming 
Research Corporation, d/b/a Western Research Institute Corporation (the 
Institute), and James G. Speight 
(Speight), ruling that such a claim for relief is not recognized in Wyoming law. 
As a secondary issue, VanLente asserts that genuine issues of material fact 
exist relative to the existence of a special relationship between him and the 
Institute which would support his tort claim for breach of the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. We hold that the district court did not err 
since there is no contract remedy available to VanLente based upon breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and the record does not suffice 
to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of a special 
relationship. The Order Granting 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is affirmed.

 

   [¶2]     In the Brief of Appellant, filed on 
behalf of VanLente, the issues are stated as:

 

                      
A.

 

            Should Wyoming 
recognize a cause of action for contractual breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith in a wrongful discharge case 
where the termination is contrary to justifiable expectations of the employee 
and there is evidence of dishonesty in fact?

 

   

                      
B.

 

            Was there a 
genuine issue of fact regarding the existence of a special relationship, 
improper motive and dishonesty in 
fact precluding summary judgment?

 

   The issues are restated in this 
way in the Brief of Appellees, filed on behalf of the Institute and 
Speight:

 

            1. The District Court 
properly applied Wyoming law in determining that the proposed Amendment 
to Plaintiff[']s Complaint would 
not affect the outcome of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment.

 

            2. The District Court 
properly granted Summary Judgment on Plaintiff[']s cause of action 
for tortious breach of the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing.

 

   [¶3]     When reviewing an order granting a 
summary judgment, this Court invokes the same standards that are applicable in 
the district court. We examine the record in the light most favorable to the 
party who opposed the motion, affording to that party all favorable inferences 
that can be drawn from the demonstrated facts. 40 North Corp. v. Morrell, 964 P.2d 423, 426 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting Raymond v. Steen, 882 P.2d 852, 856 (Wyo. 
1994)); Moore v. Lubnau, 855 P.2d 1245, 1248 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Zmijewski v. 
Wright, 809 P.2d 280, 282 (Wyo. 1991)).  
When the record is so considered, summary judgment is permissible only 
when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the prevailing party 
is entitled to receive a judgment as a matter of law. Ahearn v. Tri-County 
Federal Sav. Bank, 948 P.2d 896, 897 (Wyo. 1997); Hermreck v. United Parcel 
Service, Inc., 938 P.2d 863, 866 (Wyo. 1997); Kirkwood v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc., 
937 P.2d 206, 208 (Wyo. 1997); see also 
W.R.C.P. 56(c).

 

   [¶4]     Considering the record in the light of 
these rules of appellate jurisprudence, the facts that are material are 
relatively brief. VanLente had been employed by the Institute in the role of 
Human Resources Manager for a period of about nine years, and had successfully 
performed the duties of that position. VanLente described his position as a 
second level management position, and, in the course of his presentation to the 
district court, he explained that he had also assumed functions previously 
assigned to other department managers.  
VanLente claims that on three separate occasions he was threatened with 
losing his employment, or he perceived such a threat, if he did not comply with demands from 
Speight, the Institute's Chief Executive Officer, that he assist Speight in 
retaliating against an employee who had submitted a complaint under the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act. VanLente asserted that his work environment became 
increasingly hostile, and he was overloaded with responsibility because of 
Speight's efforts to make him appear incompetent.

 

  [¶5]       The matter came to a head in the 
summer of 1992 when the Institute conducted a reduction-in-force because of 
budgetary constraints. VanLente was discharged in the course of the 
reduction-in-force, and he asserts that Speight purposely included him in that 
action to carry out his previous threats to see that VanLente lost his 
position.

 

   [¶6]     VanLente first sought recourse before 
the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and that effort 
resulted in an adverse determination with respect to VanLente's claims of 
violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination and 
Employment Act. VanLente then filed an action in the United States District 
Court for the District of Wyoming, asserting that he was terminated from his 
employment primarily for his 
participation in the investigation and resolution of other employees' concerns 
about violations of fair employment laws. He sought reinstatement, the payment 
of back salary and benefits, costs, attorney's fees, and punitive and 
compensatory damages in the amount of two million dollars.  That action was dismissed because of 
VanLente's failure to prosecute it. Approximately eight months after the federal 
court action was dismissed, VanLente filed this case in the District Court of 
the Second Judicial District of the State of Wyoming in and for Albany 
County.

 

   [¶7]     The Institute and Speight answered 
VanLente's complaint, and following discovery, filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment and/or Motion to Dismiss. The district court granted the motion for 
summary judgment in favor of the Institute and Speight. The rationale 
articulated in the decision letter of the district court was that VanLente, on the material facts as to which 
there was no genuine issue, had failed to establish the special relationship 
necessary to support a tort claim for a breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, and although VanLente had offered to amend his complaint 
to include a breach of contract theory for violation of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, the law of Wyoming did not recognize that remedy. 
With respect to the tort claim of intentional infliction of emotional harm, the 
district court ruled that the claim was premised upon conduct which occurred 
more than four years prior to the date of filing of the complaint and that the 
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was barred by the Wyoming 
statute of limitations. VanLente appeals from the Order Granting Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment.

 

   [¶8]     VanLente's major effort in his appeal is 
to persuade this Court to adopt a contract remedy for breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an employment contract. We are 
satisfied that the essential fallacy in VanLente's approach is that it 
constitutes an effort to invoke a contract remedy when there is no contract. 
Wyoming is an employment at-will state. General Chemical Corp. v. Unemployment 
Ins. Com'n, Div. of Unemployment Ins., Dept. of Employment, 906 P.2d 380, 382 
(Wyo. 1995); Wilder v. Cody Country 
Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 217 (Wyo. 1994), and cases there cited. The 
effect of employment-at-will posture is that employers and employees are free to 
terminate the employment relationship at will, unless there is an express or 
implied contract created that establishes that the employee cannot be terminated 
except for cause. Loghry v. Unicover Corp., 927 P.2d 706, 710 (Wyo. 1996). 
VanLente made no attempt to demonstrate that either an express or implied 
contract had been created between him and the Institute. In his position as 
Human Resources Manager, VanLente must have been well aware of the pitfalls and 
potential benefits surrounding an express contract of employment, and yet the 
record does not disclose such an 
agreement. The essence of his argument here is that this Court should recognize 
a contract remedy which would result in acknowledging the existence of an 
express or implied contract when there is none.

 

   [¶9]     Similar contentions have resulted in a 
series of decisions which hold that Wyoming does not recognize a contract remedy 
for a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  Jewell v. North Big Horn Hosp. Dist., 
953 P.2d 135, 139 (Wyo. 1998); Townsend v. Living Centers Rocky Mountain, Inc., 
947 P.2d 1297, 1299 (Wyo. 1997); Loghry, 927 P.2d at 711-12; Hatfield v. 
Rochelle Coal Co., 813 P.2d 1308, 1309-10 (Wyo. 1991); Leithead v. American Colloid Co., 721 P.2d 1059, 1064 (Wyo. 1986). The result of our decisions is that an at-will employee 
who seeks relief for wrongful termination is limited to the tort remedies for 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; intentional 
infliction of emotional distress; and retaliatory discharge contrary to the 
public policy of Wyoming. Jewell, 953 P.2d  at 139.

 

   [¶10]  The most appealing argument that might 
be presented on behalf of VanLente would be that relief is essential to 
vindicate the public policy of Wyoming following the theories articulated in 
Griess v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware, 776 P.2d 752 (Wyo. 1989) 
and Allen v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 699 P.2d 277 (Wyo. 1985). VanLente has specifically disavowed any 
effort here to vindicate public policy. Even had he not disavowed such a claim 
for relief, he would encounter our rule that only when there are no other 
remedies available to vindicate public policy will this Court structure a 
remedy. See Griess, 776 P.2d  at 753 (quoting Allen, 699 P.2d at 284). The record 
makes it clear that both proceedings before the federal Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission and the United 
States District Court afforded to VanLente potential remedies that would have 
resulted in a vindication of any violation of public 
policy.

 

   [¶11]  We adhere to our rule that we do not 
recognize the contract remedy for breach of an implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing for an at-will employee. The district court did not err in 
refusing to permit VanLente's offered amendment of his complaint to assert that 
theory.

 

   [¶12]  VanLente's second claim of error is 
based upon the contention that there were genuine issues of material fact with 
respect to the existence of a special relationship between him and the 
Institute. The district court ruled that the record did not disclose facts upon 
which a claim of a special relationship could be premised, and, therefore, 
summary judgment was entered against VanLente with respect to that cause of 
action. We established the law in Wyoming on the subject of a special 
relationship in Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 221-22. We held that a breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing will be the premise for a tort action if 
a "special relationship of trust and reliance is demonstrated * * *." Id. at 
222. The situations are rare in which such a special relationship exists when 
employment is at-will. Up to this time, no case has been presented to this Court 
in which the facts demonstrate the existence of the requisite special 
relationship. Jewell, 953 P.2d  at 139.

 

   [¶13]  VanLente worked for the Institute for a 
period of nine years in the position of Human Resources Manager. In Wilder, we 
held that mere longevity of service does not suffice to create the special 
relationship leading to the tort remedy. Wilder, 868 P.2d  at 221-22. Garcia v. 
UniWyo Federal Credit Union, 920 P.2d 642, 646 (Wyo. 1996), added another factor 
to the concept of the special relationship. There we ruled that usually such a 
special relationship can be found only in a "long term employment relationship 
coupled with a discharge calculated to avoid employer responsibilities to the 
employee * * *." Id. at 646. More recently, we said in Loghry, that the trust 
and reliance necessary to give rise to the existence of such a tort claim may be 
found by "the existence of separate consideration, common law, statutory rights, 
or rights accruing with longevity of 
service." Loghry, 927 P.2d  at 712.

 

   [¶14]  The record presented to this Court 
discloses that VanLente did not allege that he was terminated in violation of 
common law, statutory rights, or rights accruing with longevity of service. The 
only point that VanLente presented in his Response in Opposition to Motion for 
Summary Judgment was that he had a special relationship of trust and confidence that 
justified the invocation of the tort remedy. VanLente contends that the 
relationship was one of "trust and reciprocal confidence with regard to 
extremely sensitive human resource policy and employment matters * * *." The 
relationship articulated by VanLente is simply one that is inherent in the 
duties of a human resources manager. It, therefore, was no more than one of the 
functions with which he was tasked, and did not arise from any special 
relationship as we have defined it. Longevity, coupled with performance of job duties, is not 
sufficient to structure the special relationship required by Wilder. Further, 
the record does not disclose any effort on the part of VanLente to demonstrate 
that the termination was driven by some motive to deprive him of the potential 
benefits. In light of this record, the district court correctly entered summary 
judgment in favor of the Institute and Speight on the alleged tort remedy of 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.

 

   [¶15]  VanLente did not appeal the summary 
judgment on his alleged second cause of action of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. The district court clearly was correct in invoking the 
statute of limitations found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105 (Michie 1997). All of 
the events that VanLente asserts structured his emotional distress occurred more 
than four years prior to the filing of his complaint. Consequently, his claim 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress was time 
barred.

 

   [¶16]  We do not choose to accept VanLente's 
invitation that we structure a contract remedy for breach of an implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing in an employment at-will situation where no 
contract is deemed to exist. We follow our precedent in this regard. The record 
clearly demonstrates that VanLente failed to present evidence that would suffice 
to structure a genuine issue of material fact with respect to his tort claim on 
breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. His other alleged 
cause of action was barred by the 
statute of limitations.

 

   

  [¶17] 
   The Order Granting Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment is affirmed.