Title: Lititz Mutual v. Bell

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Lititz Mutual Insurance Company v. John Edwin Bell, Sr. et el., No. 55, September Term,
1998
[Liability Insurance - Declaratory judgment coverage action - Alleged insured admitted
intentionally punching plaintiff in underlying "negligence" suit.  Held:  Because the touching
is the harm, insured's conduct falls within intentional injury exclusion.  Result not altered by
insured's impulse-control disorder (intermittent explosive disorder).]
Circuit Court for Montgomery
County Case # Civil 140430
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 55
September Term, 1998
_________________________________________
LITITZ MUTUAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY
v.
JOHN EDWIN BELL, SR.
et al.
_________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
  
Bloom, Theodore G.
  (retired, specially assigned),
JJ. 
_________________________________________
Opinion by Rodowsky, J.
_________________________________________
Filed:   February 16, 1999
This is a liability insurance coverage case that was decided in the circuit court on
summary judgment.  The case presents another effort by a tort plaintiff to avoid the operation
of an exclusion for bodily injury that is expected or intended by the insured.  Here the
plaintiff's submission is that, due to a psychiatric disorder, the alleged insured had no intent
to injure the plaintiff when the former struck the latter with his fist.  As we explain below,
this attempt to convert a battery into negligence fails on the facts and the law.
I
In December 1991, the alleged insured, John Edwin Bell, Jr. (Bell), aged 15, was a
resident patient at the Psychiatric Institute of Montgomery County (Fairbridge).  Bell had
been admitted because he had a very explosive temper and needed to learn how to control
it.  He had previously been admitted at Johns Hopkins and Sheppard Pratt hospitals for the
same problem.
During the first week of December 1991, Bell applied for a pass to spend part of the
upcoming weekend with his mother.  By Thursday his pass had been approved for Saturday.
On Saturday, December 7, 1991, Bell's mother arrived at Fairbridge sometime between 10
a.m. and 1 p.m.  They requested the weekend pass.  Eloise Smith (Smith), the plaintiff in the
tort action underlying this coverage case, and Cheryl Moore (Moore) were at the nurse's
station where passes were kept in a notebook.  The pass was in the back sleeve of the
notebook rather than in the "passes" section where it should have been.  This alerted Smith
that "something was not exactly okay." 
-2-
Smith attempted to reach her supervisor by telephone and explained to Bell's mother
that she (Smith) could not approve the pass until her supervisor returned her telephone call.
Approximately five to ten minutes later, Bell's mother asked to be let out of the unit.  At
deposition, Bell described what happened next:  "When I saw my mom walk off I kicked out
the front door to the unit, which is the last door in.  And I went to follow my mom."  A
second, locked door, however, blocked his exit.  Smith telephoned for help but none was
then available.  Meanwhile, Moore was able to talk Bell into going to an area known as the
"Quiet Room." 
The Quiet Room is approximately 8' to 10' x 8' to 11', with no furniture, only an
exercise mat on the floor, and a single small window near the ceiling.  The room connects
to the main hallway by a small hallway, approximately 4' x 4'.  One door (the first door)
connects the main hallway to the small hallway, and another door (the second door) connects
the small hallway to the Quiet Room.  There is a bathroom off the main hallway across from
the first door. 
Bell described why he walked into the Quiet Room:
"I turned around and the staff had followed me out, a few staff members had
followed me out.  I walked back to the quiet room and sat down and asked for
my space, which is what we were supposed to do when we became angry.  If
we put ourselves in, okay, I am going in here, I need my space, leave me alone
for 15, 20 minutes." 
Once inside, Bell took off his shoes and emptied his pockets according to the facility's
rules for the Quiet Room.  He testified on deposition that Smith and Moore entered the Quiet
Room approximately five to ten minutes after he walked into the room (apparently in order
-3-
     Smith described being hit by Bell three times.  Bell moved toward Smith with his hands
1
clenched in fists and struck her with his fist in her right breast and rib areas as Smith was
trying to move out of Bell's way.  This first blow knocked Smith backward from the second
door to the first door.  Smith states that Bell struck her a second time, hitting her in her hand
as she attempted to protect herself, and her hand then hit her in her jaw and mouth.  This
second blow propelled Smith through the first door into the main hallway.  Smith states that
Bell struck her a third time with his fist, knocking her into the bathroom across the main
hallway.  Smith lost her balance and fell, her head struck a bathroom sink, and she was
rendered unconscious. 
to have Bell make a statement explaining his actions).  Bell's evidence is that he told Smith
and Moore that he needed "some space" but that, while Smith and Moore would initially step
back, they would again approach him and repetitively ask, "what is wrong, what bothers you,
calm down."  Bell described his feelings at this point:
"Q.
Could you feel yourself filling up with anger?
"A.
I was so boiling to the point I was lobster red at the time." 
Bell then struck Smith in her chest with his fist, knocking Smith backward.  In his
own words:
"After asking her for my space three or four times, I rose and punched
her in her chest region.  And I sat right back down.
....
"I need my space, and when I didn't feel I was getting what I was asking
for, I rose and struck her." 
Bell recalls striking Smith only once.  
1
Bell says that, after hitting Smith, he sat for approximately five minutes until staff
members took him into his bedroom and restrained him for approximately eight hours.
-4-
While being removed from the Quiet Room Bell recalls seeing paramedics tending to
somebody in one of the bathrooms, and he assumed that they were tending to Smith.  Bell
described his thoughts at that time:
"[M]y first concern was I really screwed up here, I have hurt somebody, I want
to make sure that person is okay.  ...
"Q.
You were aware at the time you had stuck somebody and you
had hurt somebody?
"A.
Yes, sir." 
In his answers to interrogatories Bell stated:
"There was never any intent by me to cause injury or damage to Eloise Smith.
The contact made between us was a result of a[n] unexpected attack of anger,
exacerbated by the conduct of Eloise Smith.  I believe that if Eloise Smith had
acted in accordance with the rules of the institution, and allowed me to remain
in the quiet room alone, that my anger would have subsided and the incident
would never have occurred." 
In March 1995 Smith filed a one count complaint in the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County against Bell, alleging that Bell had "negligently struck her."  
At the time of the occurrence Bell's parents and members of their household were
insured against liability under a homeowner's policy issued by Lititz Mutual Insurance
Company (Lititz).  Under the terms of the policy, Lititz is obligated to defend and indemnify
any claim or suit brought against an "insured" for "bodily injury" or "property damage"
caused by an "occurrence."  "Occurrence" is defined to mean "an accident, including
exposure to conditions, which results, during the policy period, in:  a. bodily injury; or b.
-5-
     In a letter dated April 1992 Smith agreed to limit collection of damages stemming from
2
the incident to any amount recovered under the Bells' insurance coverage in the underlying
tort suit, in consideration for the Bells' cooperation in providing information to Smith
concerning their insurance coverage.  "Ms. Smith will agree to accept as her entire recovery
from the third party action whatever she is able to obtain through suit or settlement with Mr.
Bell's homeowner's insurance carrier (and Mrs. Bell's, if applicable), and will not pursue any
action for restitution against him in the Juvenile Court or otherwise or any excess judgment
(continued...)
property damage."  Personal liability coverage under the policy "do[es] not apply to bodily
injury or property damage ... which is expected or intended by the insured[.]" 
In August 1995 Lititz filed a Complaint for Declaratory Relief in the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County, naming Bell, his parents, and Smith as defendants.  Lititz asserted,
inter alia, that Smith's alleged personal injuries and damages were not the result of a covered
"occurrence" because they were expected or intended by Bell and, therefore, excluded from
coverage.  Lititz requested that the court "determine and adjudicate the rights and liabilities
of the parties" and find that Lititz had no duty to defend or indemnify Bell.  The declaratory
judgment action was assigned to the same judge to whom the underlying tort action had been
assigned. 
Lititz moved for summary judgment, and Smith opposed the motion.  In the opposing
memorandum of facts and law counsel for Smith represented that Bell suffered from a
longstanding mental condition "known as 'intermittent explosive disorder,'" which "rendered
it impossible for him to form the intent necessary to deliberately cause" Smith's injury.
There is no indication in the record that Bell or his parents opposed in writing Lititz's motion
for summary judgment.   
2
-6-
     (...continued)
2
against John, Jr." 
At oral argument before this Court, Smith's counsel stated, with regard to the
underlying tort claim, "I am only characterizing it as negligent solely for the purpose of
trying to get insurance coverage."  In her brief to this Court, Smith stated:  "In the civil action
by Ms. Smith against John E. Bell, Jr., there was no basis for any attempt to hold his parents
liable.  Further, personal financial exposure on the part of John, Jr. was never a viable issue
because he has no assets.  The 'agreement' of Ms. Smith not to go after John, Jr.'s personal
assets is more illusory than real, and was made by Ms. Smith so as to facilitate her claim on
the insurance policy."
At the hearing on Lititz's motion for summary judgment the court took special interest
in Bell's mental condition and in whether Bell could be held criminally responsible.  The
court stated that "the reasonable layperson probably would believe that if the mental disorder
was so severe as to relieve them of criminal responsibility, that it would be severe enough
that it would afford them, under a reasonable interpretation of the policy, with coverage."
Accordingly, the judge declared that he was going to decide the coverage question according
to the standard stated in Maryland Code (1982, 1994 Repl. Vol.), § 12-108(a) of the
Health-General Article:  
"A defendant is not criminally responsible for criminal conduct if, at the time
of that conduct, the defendant, because of a mental disorder or mental
retardation, lacks substantial capacity:  
"(1) To appreciate the criminality of that conduct; or 
"(2) To conform that conduct to the requirements of law." 
Concluding that there was a potentiality of coverage on the theory that Bell may not
have been criminally responsible, the court denied Lititz's motion for summary judgment.
-7-
Then the circuit court conceptually fused its not criminally responsible theory that it had
applied to the coverage case with the elements of the plaintiff's case in the tort action. 
"THE COURT:  So, in effect, won't they have to litigate in the
underlying action that this was an unintentional act.  And the only way that it
could be unintentional or negligent or accidental in this context will be if they
can establish to a jury's satisfaction that he comes within the definition of a
person who would not be criminally responsible?
....
"THE COURT:  Maybe we can do this very easily because it is the
plaintiff who would have the burden ....  So if the plaintiff concedes that in the
underlying action, in order to prevail, to have to be able to establish that this
act which occurred — that at the time the act occurred that the defendant
would have been entitled to the defense of not criminally responsible, were
this a criminal action, then --
"[SMITH'S COUNSEL]:  I concede that, Your Honor.  If I prove that
he intentionally did it, then I lose the underlying action.
"THE COURT:  Well, do you concede in light of what I have ruled that
it is going to be incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove, in light of the facts of
this case, which but for the existence of this mental disorder, are on their face
intentional?
"[SMITH'S COUNSEL]:  Yes, sir." 
Having determined that the question of intent would be decided in the tort action, the circuit
court dismissed the declaratory judgment action.  
In its final order in the declaratory judgment action, the circuit court included the
following additional provision: 
"In order to prevail ... in the tort action ... Smith must prove, pursuant to
Section 12-108 of Maryland's Health-General Article that, because of a mental
disorder or mental retardation, Mr. Bell, Jr., at the time of the conduct in
question, lacked substantial capacity:  (1) to appreciate the criminality of that
-8-
     With regard to this part of the circuit court's order directed toward the application of the
3
criminal non-responsibility standard to the issues in the tort case, the Court of Special
Appeals ruled that the tort action was not before that court on the appeal and, therefore, that
court could not rule on the issue.  We agree. 
We note, however, that it is far from clear whether Bell's criminal responsibility
would be an issue in the tort case.  See Cross v. Kent, 32 Md. 581, 582-83 (1870) (affirming
a judgment against a defendant, commissioned "de lunatico inquirendo," in a trespass action
for setting fire to and burning a barn; "The distinction between the liability of a lunatic or
insane person in civil actions for torts committed by him, and in criminal prosecutions, is
well defined, and it has always been held, and upon sound reason, that though not punishable
criminally, he is liable to a civil action for any tort he may commit"); Hudnall v. Sellner, 800
F.2d 377, 384 (4th Cir. 1986) (affirming a district court judgment against a mentally deficient
defendant in a defamation, loss of consortium, and malicious prosecution action; of Cross
v. Kent, the court stated:  "While ... this case is old and its rule has been subject to some
criticism in the interval, its continued authority as Maryland law remains, so far as we are
advised, unquestioned.  Indeed it represents the current majority rule in this country"), cert.
denied sub nom. Sellner v. Panagoulis, 479 U.S. 1069, 107 S. Ct. 960, 93 L. Ed. 2d 1008
(1987); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895J (1979) ("One who has deficient mental
capacity is not immune from tort liability solely for that reason."); cf. id. § 895J cmt. c. ("The
mental condition of the defendant must, however, be taken into account in determining, not
whether he is liable for his torts, but whether in the particular instance any tort has been
committed at all.").
conduct; or (2) to conform that conduct to the requirements of law.  If Ms.
Smith does not satisfy this burden of proof by a preponderance of evidence,
then judgment shall be entered in favor of Mr. Bell, Jr. and against Ms. Smith
in that action, on her claim for negligence."   
3
 
Lititz appealed to the Court of Special Appeals from the final judgment in the
declaratory judgment action.  That court affirmed by a divided panel in an unreported
opinion. 
The majority in the Court of Special Appeals reviewed Brohawn v. Transamerica
Insurance Co., 276 Md. 396, 347 A.2d 842 (1975), and Allstate Insurance Co. v. Atwood,
319 Md. 247, 572 A.2d 154 (1990), concluding: 
-9-
"As we see it, this case does not present the precise concern that the
Court discussed in Atwood concerning 'clearly intentional' conduct, because
of [Bell's] alleged mental incapacity and his long history of mental illness.  In
our view, it would be a gross oversimplification of [Bell's] conduct if we were
to characterize his attack upon Smith as patently deliberate.  Moreover, the
issue of mental incapacity was of obvious concern to the trial court in the
declaratory judgment action.  Indeed, the trial court observed at the summary
judgment hearing that 'this is a most difficult case.'  Because of the seriousness
of the mental capacity issue, we are satisfied that the court was not required
to infer an intent to injure as a matter of law.  Rather, when the trial court
entertains doubt as to whether an intent to injure should be inferred as a matter
of law, we cannot quarrel with its discretionary determination to dismiss the
declaratory judgment proceeding and allow the issue to be resolved through
the underlying tort suit." 
The intermediate appellate court distinguished its decision in Pettit v. Erie Insurance
Exchange, 117 Md. App. 212, 699 A.2d 550 (1997).  (When the Court of Special Appeals
decided this case, this Court had granted certiorari in Pettit but had not yet decided the case.)
The court below distinguished its own Pettit decision on the ground that the insured in that
case had been diagnosed with pedophilia, a condition "not 'dependent upon ... any distortion
in cognition or perception'" (quoting Pettit, 117 Md. App. at 228, 699 A.2d at 559).  The
court looked to the definition of intermittent explosive disorder in American Psychiatric
Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders § 312.34, at 609-10 (4th
ed. 1994) (DSM-IV), thereby implying, by way of contrast, that Bell's mental condition
could interfere with cognition or perception. The court, however, noted that "the record does
not reveal whether Intermittent Explosive Disorder interferes with the formulation of intent."
Lititz petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari which we granted.  It presented two
issues.  Our answer to the first question, set forth below, is dispositive.
-10-
"Did the Court of Special Appeals misapply Atwood and err in affirming the
trial court’s decision to dismiss Lititz' declaratory proceeding and place the
coverage issues into a forum where these issues cannot possibly be 'fairly
litigated'?" 
Only Lititz and Smith submitted briefs to this Court and participated in oral argument; the
Bells did not do so.
II
The general rule in Maryland is that it is inappropriate for a liability insurer to bring
a declaratory judgment action to resolve an insurance coverage issue that is the same as an
issue presented in a pending, underlying tort action that has not yet gone to trial.  Brohawn
v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 406, 347 A.2d 842, 849 (1975).  There are, however,
circumstances under which a declaratory judgment is appropriate while the tort trial is
pending.  We recently reviewed these circumstances in Pettit v. Erie Insurance Exchange,
349 Md. 777, 709 A.2d 1287 (1998), where we said:
"Erie is entitled to a summary judgment declaring that it has no duty to
defend Kowalski only if it is manifestly clear that in the underlying tort suit
the petitioner cannot allege facts giving rise to a potentiality of coverage.  See
Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 408, 347 A.2d 842, 850
(1975) ('Even if a tort plaintiff does not allege facts which clearly bring the
claim within or without the policy coverage, the insurer still must defend if
there is a potentiality that the claim could be covered by the policy.').
Although declaratory judgment actions are disfavored in liability insurance
coverage cases while the underlying tort action is pending, such relief is
appropriate prior to trial of the tort action where the allegations in the
underlying tort claims 'obviously constitute a patent attempt to recharacterize,
as negligent, an act that is clearly intentional....'  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Atwood,
319 Md. 247, 253, 572 A.2d 154, 157 (1990); see also Brohawn, 276 Md. at
406, 347 A.2d at 849.  Under the unique circumstances in Atwood, this Court
permitted a post tort-trial, declaratory judgment coverage action after the jury
in the tort case may well have found that a battery was negligence.  We
-11-
examined how, because both the plaintiff and the defendant in a tort suit share
a common interest in coverage being applicable, there may be collusion and
an effort to manipulate coverage.  As a result, 'plaintiffs' attorneys bring suits
for "negligent rape, negligent sodomy, ... and negligent sexual molestation."'
Atwood, 319 Md. at 253, 572 A.2d at 156-57 (quoting Brief of Allstate Ins.
Co.).  Both parties to the tort action profit by a jury's ruling that '"even the
most obvious and blatant criminal and/or intentional acts [are] negligent
conduct."'  Id. at 253, 572 A.2d at 157 (quoting Brief of Allstate Ins. Co.)."
Id. at 780-81, 709 A.2d at 1289.
In the underlying tort action in Pettit a mother alleged that the insured had negligently
sexually molested her minor children.  Id. at 779, 709 A.2d at 1288.  Prior to trial, the insurer
sought a judgment declaring that it had no duty to indemnify or defend because of an
exclusion for "injury or damage expected or intended" by the insured.  Id., 709 A.2d at 1289.
This Court affirmed a summary judgment for the insurer.  The principal argument supporting
coverage was based on the affidavit of a psychiatric expert who opined that the defendant
had no subjective intent to injure the children because of his diagnosed pedophilia, a disorder
that caused the defendant to believe that it was healthy and normal to engage in sexual
activity with children.  Id. at 784, 709 A.2d at 1291.  Although the pedophile in Pettit
"intended to engage in the conduct constituting sexual acts and contacts," the tort plaintiff
submitted that, because the pedophile "subjectively believed that the sexual acts and contacts
were not harmful," there was coverage.  Id. at 785, 709 A.2d at 1291.
Rejecting this subjective intent argument, we stated that "sexual molestation is a tort
which is only committed intentionally."  Id. at 786, 709 A.2d at 1292.  We explained:
"There is no dichotomy between the 'damages' resulting from Kowalski's
conduct and his intent to perform the acts of sexual child abuse.  Unlike
-12-
[Allstate Insurance Co. v.] Sparks, [63 Md. App. 738, 493 A.2d 1110 (1985),]
the harm committed by Kowalski--sexual molestation of two young boys--is
entirely contained within the activity which he admits; the resulting harm is
Kowalski's conduct itself.  See Doe [v. Archdiocese of Washington], 114 Md.
App. [169,] 186, 689 A.2d [634,] 643 [(1997)] ('In a case of battery ... the
invasion of the victim's dignitary interest is invariably concurrent with the
actions that constitute the intentional tort itself.'); Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 19 [(1965)]."
Id.
As the Court of Special Appeals explained in its decision in Pettit, "By definition,
Kowalski's sexual molestation of the boys constituted common law battery."  117 Md. App.
at 224, 699 A.2d at 556.  The court quoted the definition of battery from the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 13 (1965), and stated that "[i]f the act is done with the intention of
making the offensive contact, it is immaterial that the actor is not motivated by any personal
hostility or intent to injure."  117 Md. App. at 224, 699 A.2d at 557 (citing Restatement
(Second) of Torts §§ 13 cmt. c, 16 cmt. b).
Also relevant is Saba v. Darling, 320 Md. 45, 575 A.2d 1240 (1990), aff'g 72 Md.
App. 487, 531 A.2d 696 (1987).  While intoxicated, the defendant punched the plaintiff in
the face outside of a bar, inspiring an action for assault and battery and for negligence.  Id.
at 47, 575 A.2d at 1241.  The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the assault and battery claim
after discovering that the defendant's insurance policy excluded coverage if bodily injury was
intended by the insured.  Id.  At trial the jury found for the defendant, apparently on the
ground that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent.  Id.  The plaintiff appealed, arguing
that the trial judge failed to respond to a question from the jury regarding contributory
-13-
negligence.  The Court of Special Appeals refused to consider that issue, concluding instead
that the plaintiff’s injuries were the direct result of an assault and battery and that the issue
of negligence never should have gone to the jury.
This Court affirmed on the following rationale:
"Despite the host of conflicting stories in the record before us, we do
know that on June 16, 1984, Charles Darling intentionally hit Markus Saba
causing injury to his jaw.  Such an event is the sine qua non of an intentional
tort.  A battery has been defined as a harmful or offensive contact with a
person resulting from an act intended to cause the person such contact.  See
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 13.  The act in question must be some
positive or affirmative action on the part of the defendant.  Prosser & Keeton,
The Law of Torts, § 9 (5th ed. 1984).  The facts of the instant case as set forth
above illustrate that each element of this definition has been met.  Although
Darling testified that he did not intend to break Saba's jaw, obviously he
intended to strike Saba and the severity of the injury is of no consequence in
an analysis of Darling's state of mind."
320 Md. at 49, 575 A.2d at 1242.  We specifically noted that the defendant was not so
intoxicated as to be unable to formulate an intent to strike the plaintiff.   Id. at 50, 575 A.2d
at 1243.
III
Here, there is no dispute that Smith's injuries were the direct result of Bell's punching
her.  According to Bell's deposition testimony, he punched Smith because she continued to
talk to him and would not leave him alone.  Bell need only have intended to bring about the
offensive contact, that is, to intend to strike Smith, in order for his conduct to be considered
a battery.  That much is admitted by Bell.  
-14-
Smith argues, however, that Bell suffered from intermittent explosive disorder and
that this condition rendered him incapable of formulating an intent to injure or harm her. 
Intermittent explosive disorder is recognized by the American Psychiatric Association
as an impulse-control disorder that is characterized by the criteria described below:
"The essential feature of Intermittent Explosive Disorder is the occurrence of
discrete episodes of failure to resist aggressive impulses that result in serious
assaultive acts or destruction of property (Criterion A).  The degree of
aggressiveness expressed during an episode is grossly out of proportion to any
provocation or precipitating psychosocial stressor (Criterion B).  A diagnosis
of Intermittent Explosive Disorder is made only after other mental disorders
that might account for episodes of aggressive behavior have been ruled out
(e.g., Antisocial Personality Disorder, Borderline Personality Disorder, a
Psychotic Disorder, a Manic Episode, Conduct Disorder, or Attention
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder) (Criterion C).  The aggressive episodes are not
due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (e.g., a drug of abuse, a
medication) or a general medical condition (e.g., head trauma, Alzheimer’s
disease) (Criterion C).  The individual may describe the aggressive episodes
as 'spells' or 'attacks' in which the explosive behavior is preceded by a sense
of tension or arousal and is followed immediately by a sense of relief.  Later
the individual may feel upset, remorseful, regretful, or embarrassed about the
aggressive behavior."
DSM-IV § 312.34, at 609-10.  Other recognized impulse-control disorders include
kleptomania, pyromania, pathological gambling, and trichotillomania (the last being
characterized by the recurrent pulling out of one's hair for pleasure, gratification, or relief of
tension, resulting in noticeable hair loss).  Id. at 609.
Contrary to Smith's argument that Bell's mental condition rendered him unable to
formulate an intent to injure Smith, if Bell was able to formulate an intent to hit Smith, this
factor would be "the sine qua non of an intentional tort."  Saba, 320 Md. at 49, 575 A.2d at
1242.
-15-
Indeed, Smith admits that Bell had the ability to formulate an intent to strike her.
During oral argument before this Court, Smith's counsel conceded six times that Bell
intended to strike Smith:
"COURT:
What wasn't intentional?  The striking or the injury?
"[SMITH'S COUNSEL]:
The injury.
"COURT:
Okay, the striking was intentional.
"[SMITH'S COUNSEL]:
I believe so.
"COURT:
With one's fist.
"[SMITH'S COUNSEL]:
I believe so.
....
"COURT:
Did the act.  We're not talking about whether he intended
to injure or whether he intended the act to cause injury.  If he did the act, it
was not accidental.
"[SMITH'S COUNSEL]:
The actual striking her was not accidental.
....
"[SMITH'S COUNSEL]:
It's characterized as negligence only because
it wasn't intentional.
"COURT:
Well, he intended to punch her.  You acknowledge that.
"[SMITH'S COUNSEL]:
Yes.  Yes.
....
"COURT:
... So under your argument now he acknowledges he
intended to strike her.
"[SMITH'S COUNSEL]:
Yes.
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....
"[SMITH'S COUNSEL]:
I think what I'm saying is he had the
requisite mental capacity to understand that he was hitting her.
....
"[SMITH'S COUNSEL]:
... I’m saying based on his testimony it
seems to me that he understood that he was hitting her."
Of course, "[c]oncessions at oral argument are appropriately considered on decision
of an appeal."  Maryland Life & Health Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Perrott, 301 Md. 78, 86, 482
A.2d 9, 13 (1984).  See also J.I. Case Credit Corp. v. Insley, 293 Md. 483, 487, 445 A.2d
689, 692 (1982) ("Where the appellee abandons a ground of support for the decision below
by making an express concession in this Court, we need not, in our discretion, undertake a
review of the matter conceded."); Cloverfields Improvement Ass'n, Inc. v. Seabreeze
Properties, Inc., 280 Md. 382, 373 A.2d 935, motion for reconsideration denied per curiam,
280 Md. 400, 403-04, 374 A.2d 906, 908-09 (1977) (holding as a "binding concession" a
"stipulation or concession in open court on behalf of one of the parties as to a method for
termination of a part of the litigation which was duly accepted by the other party, a
concession intended to persuade this Court that it was unnecessary for us to address a certain
portion of the contentions of the plaintiff below in this proceeding").
Smith argues that this case is distinguishable from Pettit because "[i]t is not a sexual
molestation case," and that it is more analogous to Allstate Insurance Co. v. Sparks, 63 Md.
App. 738, 493 A.2d 1110 (1985).  At issue in Sparks was whether intentional conduct
exclusions applied to liability for fire damage.  Id. at 740, 493 A.2d at 1111.  Three boys,
-17-
while attempting to syphon gasoline from a truck parked near a mill building, lit a cigarette
lighter for better illumination and the flame ignited fumes that resulted in the mill being
consumed by fire.  Id.  The insured argued that the boys intended to steal the gas but did not
intend to damage the property.  Id.  The Court of Special Appeals held that the intentional
conduct exclusions only applied if the boys intended the damages and not simply the causing
act.  Id. at 742, 493 A.2d at 1112.
Smith also relies on Sheets v. Brethren Mutual Insurance Co., 342 Md. 634, 652, 679
A.2d 540, 548 (1996), for the similar proposition that "an act of negligence constitutes an
'accident' under a liability insurance policy when the resulting damage was 'an event that
takes place without [the insured's] foresight or expectation.'" 
Smith ignores the concept that where the facts indicate a battery, the harm is the
contact itself.  Pettit, 349 Md. at 786, 709 A.2d at 1292.  The acts of sexual molestation in
Pettit were acts of battery, and the rationale of the decision is framed in the law of battery.
See id.  Pettit's reasoning is in accord with Sparks and Sheets.  If Bell had not intended the
contact itself due to a mental condition, then the act might be considered an "accident" and
not intentional because the contact (the harm) would have taken place without his foresight
or expectation.  However, where the actor intends to cause an offensive contact, the legally
recognized harm, ipso facto, cannot be said to have taken place without his foresight or
expectation.
Smith also argues that "[t]he majority of state courts that have considered the issue
have held that an exclusion in a liability insurance policy for acts expected or intended by
-18-
the insured does not apply if the insured lacks the mental capacity to intend the result."
Several jurisdictions have adopted an "insanity" avoidance of the intentional conduct
exclusion where the tortfeasor either was diagnosed with a mental disorder that rendered him
unable to intend the act, or was adjudicated criminally insane.  See Rosa v. Liberty Mutual
Ins. Co., 243 F. Supp. 407, 409 (D. Conn. 1965) (tortfeasor diagnosed with acute
schizophrenia); Globe American Cas. Co. v. Lyons, 131 Ariz. 337, 342, 641 P.2d 251, 256
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (tortfeasor diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia); Clemmer v.
Hartford Ins. Co., 22 Cal. 3d 865, 878, 151 Cal. Rptr. 285, 291, 587 P.2d 1098, 1104 (1978)
(tortfeasor diagnosed with acute paranoia); Magnus v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 41 Colo.
App. 217, 218, 585 P.2d 304, 305 (1978) (tortfeasor adjudicated criminally insane); Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Dichtl, 78 Ill. App. 3d 970, 978, 398 N.E.2d 582, 589 (1979) (tortfeasor
adjudicated criminally insane); von Dameck v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 361 So. 2d
283, 288 (La. Ct. App.) (tortfeasor diagnosed with paranoid psychosis), cert. denied, 362 So.
2d 794, 802 (La. 1978); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Wicka, 474 N.W.2d 324, 326 (Minn.
1991) (psychiatrist testified that insured had a "deranged mental intellect which did deprive
him of the capacity to govern his conduct in accordance with reason"); Ruvolo v. American
Cas. Co., 39 N.J. 490, 494, 189 A.2d 204, 206 (1963) (tortfeasor diagnosed with paranoid
schizophrenia). 
Here there is no need to analyze the above-cited cases.  In the case before us it is
admitted that Bell knowingly struck Smith.  The touching is the harm.  Under Pettit the
exclusion for a bodily injury intended by the insured applies here.
-19-
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED.  CASE REMANDED
TO THAT COURT FOR THE ENTRY OF A
JUDGMENT REVERSING THE JUDGMENT
OF 
THE 
CIRCUIT 
COURT 
FOR
MONTGOMERY 
COUNTY 
AND
REMANDING 
THIS ACTION TO THE
CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY
COUNTY 
FOR 
THE 
ENTRY 
OF 
A
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT CONFORMING
WITH THIS OPINION.  COSTS IN THIS
COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS 
TO 
BE 
PAID 
BY 
THE
RESPONDENT, ELOISE SMITH, ONLY.