Title: Hulne v. International Harvester Co.

State: north-dakota

Issuer: North Dakota Supreme Court

Document:

322 N.W.2d 474 (1982) Michael HULNE, as Special Administrator for the Estate of Jerry Dennis Johnson, deceased, Plaintiff, v. INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER COMPANY, United Truck and Body Company, Defendants. Civ. No. 10192. Supreme Court of North Dakota. August 2, 1982. *475 James D. Cahill, and Kathleen A. Weir, Moorhead, Minn., for plaintiff; argued by David Maring, Moorhead, Minn. Pearce, Anderson & Durick, Bismarck, for International Harvester. Vogel, Brantner, Kelly, Knutson, Weir & Bye, Fargo, for United Truck and Body Co.; argued by M. Daniel Vogel, Fargo. ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice. The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota has certified, pursuant to Rule 47 of the North Dakota Rules of Appellate Procedure, the following question of law for determination by this Court: This Court has made the following determination on that question of law: The decedent, Jerry Dennis Johnson, died as a result of injuries received when he was trapped in the cab of a truck-tractor on October 17, 1978. Johnson died on the same date that the mishap occurred. Michael Hulne, as special administrator for Johnson's estate, filed a survival action, pursuant to Section 28-01-26.1, N.D.C.C., against International Harvester Company, United Truck and Body Company, and Raymond Larson.[1] The survival action, which was removed to the federal district court, is a tort action based upon the theories of negligence and strict liability. Although the record before this Court does not indicate the specific date on which the survival action was commenced it does indicate that the parties agree the action was filed more than one year but less than two years after Johnson's death. In Van Ornum v. Otter Tail Power Company, 210 N.W.2d 207 (N.D.1973), this Court held that a survival action is subject to the two-year statute of limitations under Subsection 28-01-18(4), N.D.C.C., which provides in relevant part: In Sheets v. Graco, Inc., 292 N.W.2d 63 (N.D.1980), this Court, upon holding that the two-year statute of limitations period under Subsection 28-01-18(4), N.D.C.C., applies to wrongful death actions, questioned the continuing validity of the Van Ornum, supra, holding that it applies to survival actions: Upon examining Subsection 28-01-18(4), N.D.C.C., in view of our holding in the Graco, supra, decision and our examination of Section 28-01-26, N.D.C.C., we conclude that the two-year statute of limitations under Subsection 28-01-18(4), N.D. C.C., does not apply to survival actions. Section 28-01-26, N.D.C.C., provides: By construing Subsection 28-01-18(4), N.D. C.C., as applying to survival actions the language of Section 28-01-26, N.D.C.C., which allows a representative to commence a survival action within one year from the decedent's death, would be rendered superfluous, having no effect. Consequently, we hereby overrule our holding in Van Ornum, supra, that the two-year statute of limitations under Subsection 28-01-18(4), N.D. C.C., applies to survival actions. Courts in other jurisdictions have construed provisions substantially identical to Section 28-01-26, N.D.C.C., as having the potential to extend, but not to shorten, the time period within which a survival action may be brought. Hopper v. Hemphill, 19 Wash. App. 334, 575 P.2d 746 (Wash.Ct.App. 1978); Sinka v. Northern Commercial Company, 491 P.2d 116 (Alaska 1971); Ruping v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, 279 A.D. 322, 109 N.Y.S.2d 286 (N.Y.App.Div. 1952); See also, Department of Mental Hygiene v. Lucas, 243 Cal. App. 2d 464, 52 Cal. Rptr. 552, (Cal.Dist.Ct.App.1966); Berger v. O'Hearn, 41 Cal. 2d 729, 264 P.2d 10 (1953); Banc.Prob.Prac.2d § 496, p. 639 and § 882, pp. 716-717. The Alaska Supreme Court in Sinka, supra, in construing A.S. 09.10.150, a statute substantially identical to Section 28-01-26, N.D.C.C., succinctly explains its interpretation of that provision: We construe Section 28-01-26, N.D. C.C., as the foregoing authorities have construed substantially identical provisions in their jurisdictions, to permit the commencement of a survival action at any time within the period which the decedent could have brought an action under the applicable statute of limitations if he had not died. We further construe Section 28-01-26, N.D. C.C., to permit the commencement of a survival action at any time within one year from the decedent's death if the applicable statute of limitations period expires within one year from the decedent's death. The survival action in the instant case is based upon two theories in tort and is, therefore, subject to the six-year statute of limitations under Subsection 28-01-16(5), N.D.C.C. See, Bender v. Time Ins. Co., 286 N.W.2d 489 (N.D.1979). It is undisputed that the survival action was commenced within six years after the cause of action accrued, and, accordingly, it is not barred by the statute of limitations. VANDE WALLE and PEDERSON, JJ., and MUGGLI, Surrogate Judge, concur. MUGGLI, Surrogate Judge, sitting in place of PAULSON, J., disqualified. SAND, Justice (concurring specially and dissenting). I agree that the actions involved in the questions certified to this court are not barred by any statute of limitations. Black's Law Dictionary states that the term "survival actions" "refers to actions for personal injuries which by statute survives death of injured person. Britt v. Sears, 150 Ind.App. 487, 277 N.E.2d 20, 23. An action or cause of action which does not become extinguished with the death of the party claiming the action." In my opinion, a wrongful death action per se is not a survival action but a new action which comes into being as a result of the death. The survival action for an injury is an independent action and is governed by § 28-01-18(4), NDCC, having a two-year limitation, whereas a wrongful death action is governed by § 28-01-16(2), NDCC, having a six-year limitation. See my dissent in Sheets v. Graco, Inc., 292 N.W.2d 63 (N.D.1980). The actions involved here were commenced more than one year but less than two years after death occurred; therefore, no statute of limitations applies unless § 28-01-26, NDCC, is made applicable. However, § 28-01-26, NDCC, is an extension statute rather than a time reduction statute and does not become operative in the actions involved here. Basically, the statute was designed to extend rather than to shorten. During the 1895 session some of the basic statutes and subsections involved here were enacted or amended not by separate bills but by the adoption of several codes (Criminal Code, Political Code, etc.), which were considered separately. Clement A. Lounsberry, North Dakota, History and People, Vol. I, page 437. My research has not brought to light any bills introduced or acted upon by the North Dakota Legislature which dealt with the subjects covered by § 28-01-18(4), or related matters. Unfortunately, we do not have the usual benefit of individual bills from which we can glean legislative intent and objectives in construing statutes such as are involved here. As a result, speculation and conjecture are invited. The Legislature is in a position to eliminate this problem. Nevertheless, I find it strange that, as a result of the rationale in Sheets, supra, a wrongful death action is limited to two years, whereas an action for injuries is limited to six years. In my opinion, the reverse should apply. [1] Defendant Larson, Johnson's employer, was dismissed from the lawsuit by order dated September 8, 1980. The defendant, International Harvester Company, was released from the litigation upon entering a settlement agreement with the plaintiff. [2] This Court did not determine the applicable statute of limitations for survival actions in Graco, supra, because the case involved a wrongful death action as to which that determination would have been irrelevant. Consequently, this Court in Graco, supra, did not attempt to analyze or construe Section 28-01-26, N.D.C.C., in its application to survival actions.