Title: State ex rel. Brinkman v. Indus. Comm.

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as State ex rel. Brinkman v. Indus. Comm., 87 Ohio St.3d 171, 1999-Ohio-320.] 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. BRINKMAN, APPELLANT, V. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO 
ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Brinkman v. Indus. Comm. (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 171.] 
Workers’ compensation — Industrial Commission abuses its discretion in 
denying wage-loss compensation, when. 
(No. 97-2142 – Submitted September 21, 1999 – Decided November 17, 1999.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 96APD10-1321. 
 
Appellant-claimant, William A. Brinkman, a Columbus policeman, 
sustained multiple injuries in a 1994 work-related car accident.  Examining doctors 
agreed that claimant could not return to his former job, and a disability retirement 
was granted that October. 
 
Following his retirement, claimant continued his National Guard duties and 
also found part-time work as a school bus driver.  He also unsuccessfully applied 
for security work with several local hospitals.  Finally, in February 1995, claimant 
obtained a part-time job paying $20 per hour at Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (“Busch”).  
According to claimant, Busch told him that part-time workers were given 
preference for full-time positions as they became available. 
 
Later that year, claimant moved appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio for 
wage-loss compensation.  Claimant submitted medical evidence of an inability to 
 
 
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return to his former position, together with wage statements and job search records 
in support.  A commission deputy on August 20, 1996, denied claimant’s 
application, writing: 
 
“[C]laimant requested wage loss from the date of his disability retirement * 
* *.  A DHO denied the request on 4-4-96 stating that there was no credible 
medical evidence relating claimant’s wage loss to the allowed conditions.  The 
DHO was unable to ascertain whether the claimant had made a good faith job 
search[,] as the physician examining claimant had not made a residual functional 
capacity assessment. On 4-18-96, Dr. Friedman completed a residual functional 
capacity assessment * * *.  On 5-20-96, an SHO awarded wage loss compensation 
from 2-12-95 and to continue. 
 
“The Deputy finds that there is medical evidence to reflect the claimant’s 
residual functional capacity between 7-21-95 to 4-17-96.  The record discloses Dr. 
Friedman examined the claimant on 7-21-95.  There is a nine (9) month gap 
between his examination and the residual functional capacity assessment of 4-18-
96.  However, since Dr. Friedman did not perform a new examination, his 
functional assessment must have been based upon his earlier examination.  The 
Deputy believes that by referencing his earlier exam Dr. Friedman had sufficient 
findings to issue a credible opinion on claimant’s residual functional capacity 
between 7-21-95 and 4-17-96. 
 
 
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“There is no medical evidence of claimant’s residual functional capacity 
from 10-15-94 to 7-20-95 and[,] therefore, the Deputy is unable to determine 
whether claimant’s job search after his retirement was consistent with his medical 
restrictions for this period.  Drs. Lohrman, Rutherford, Friedman and Mavian 
stated he was unable to return to police work but fail[ed] to indicate his residual 
functional capacity from 10-15-94 to 7-20-95.  Dr. Friedman finally provides an 
assessment on 4-18-96 based on an exam performed on 7-21-95.  Wage loss 
compensation is denied from 10-15-94 to 7-20-95 due to lack of medical evidence 
to relate wage loss to the allowed conditions. 
 
“Based on the report and residual functional capacity of Dr. Friedman, the 
Deputy finds claimant has had the ability to perform light work since 7-21-95.  He 
has found work within his physical restrictions and works on a part-time basis for 
Anheuser Busch.  He earns $20 per hour working week ends in the packaging 
department.  His testimony discloses he is not currently looking for other work 
within his physical restrictions as he does not believe he can find entry level work 
which would pay him what he was earning as a policeman.  He also stated he has 
the potential of going full-time at Anheuser Busch.  Recently, Anheuser began to 
hire full-time employment from the week-end employee list.  The Deputy finds 
that claimant’s anticipation of going full-time with Anheuser Busch cannot be used 
as a basis for not making a good faith search for full-time employment, nor does 
 
 
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his belief regarding procurement of entry level work preclude a good faith work 
search for full-time employment. 
 
“* * * 
 
“He has made a voluntary choice to maintain part-time work which results in 
an indefinite decrease in his wages.  * * * Therefore, the request for wage loss for 
the period 7-21-95 to 8-29-96 is also denied.” 
 
Claimant filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County, alleging that the commission abused its discretion in denying his 
application.  The court of appeals upheld the denial of wage-loss compensation 
from July 21, 1995 forward, based on a voluntary limitation of earnings.  It vacated 
wage-loss denial from October 15, 1994 through July 20, 1995, and returned the 
cause for further consideration, after finding that the commission erroneously 
reported the date of a pertinent medical examination. 
 
This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
Dean G. Reinhard Co., L.P.A., and Charles Zamora, for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Dennis L. Hufstader, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
 
Janet E. Jackson, City Attorney, and Stephanie Mitchell Hughes, Assistant 
City Attorney, for appellee city of Columbus. 
 
 
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__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Two periods of wage loss are at issue: October 15, 1994 
through July 20, 1995, and July 21, 1995 through August 20, 1996.  For the 
reasons to follow, the court finds that the commission abused its discretion in 
denying wage-loss compensation over both periods. 
 
Despite the laudable goals of wage-loss compensation, there is a heightened 
potential for abuse whenever weekly compensation and wages are concurrently 
permitted.  In response to this susceptibility, certain post-injury employment is 
more carefully scrutinized.  Among these are part-time and self-employment.  
Described generically as voluntary limitations of income, these two categories are 
examined to ensure that wage-loss compensation is not subsidizing speculative 
business ventures or life-style choices.  State ex rel. Ooten v. Siegel Interior 
Specialists Co. (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 255, 703 N.E.2d 306; State ex rel. Pepsi-
Cola Bottling Co. v. Morse (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 210, 648 N.E.2d 827. 
 
For the period July 21, 1995 through August 20, 1996, the commission ruled 
that claimant voluntarily restricted his income.  The commission initially appears 
to assume that the limitation of hours imposed by part-time work automatically 
equals a proscribed limitation of income.  With a $20 per hour job as we have here, 
however, this assumption is inappropriate.  Twenty hours part-time at Busch will 
most likely exceed forty hours of minimum-wage work elsewhere. 
 
 
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The commission also characterized claimant’s perceived income limitation 
as voluntary because claimant did not continue to look for full-time work after 
getting the job at Busch.  We have never specifically addressed the question of 
continuing a full-time job search after acquisition of part-time work.  We find 
particularly appealing Florida’s approach to this question due to its judiciary’s 
balance between the normal part-time concerns and economic reality. 
 
In Stahl v. Southeastern X-Ray (Fla.App.1984), 447 So.2d 399, the former 
employer alleged that claimant’s failure to look for a better-paying job after 
accepting other minimum-wage employment constituted a voluntary income 
limitation.  The court disagreed, writing: 
 
“Whether the acceptance of a particular job with lower earnings amounts to 
voluntary limitation should be determined based on the enumerated factors 
[physical impairment, age, industrial history, training and education, motivation, 
work experience, work record, diligence and availability of jobs] and not based 
simply on a requirement for continued diligent search by claimant after 
completion of his normal daily work schedule.”  Id. at 401. 
 
Rather than focusing simply on income, the Florida court viewed the 
claimant’s employment situation broadly.  Within the first three months of work, 
the claimant received a forty-cent-per hour raise and was given increased 
responsibility.  When asked why he had stopped looking for other work, claimant 
 
 
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responded that “ ‘[m]y boss has indicated that I have a future there, so I feel that I 
have a good job right now and it would be silly for me to leave a good thing.’ ”  Id. 
at 402.  The court agreed, concluding that “[t]he deputy’s order would compel 
claimant to forfeit any present or future commitment to a full-time job which 
appears to be appropriate in all ways other than presently diminished earnings.”  
Id. 
 
In this case, the commission is also asking the claimant to “leave a good 
thing.”  Stahl is admittedly distinguishable in that post-injury employment was 
full-time, not part-time, but whether that does or should excuse a broader-based 
analysis is questionable.  Wage-loss compensation is not forever.  It ends after two 
hundred weeks.  R.C. 4123.56(B).  Thus, when a claimant seeks new post-injury 
employment, contemplation must extend beyond the short term.  The job that a 
claimant takes may have to support that claimant for the rest of his or her life—
long after wage-loss compensation has expired. 
 
This does not mean that the claimant is entitled to turn down a job as paying 
too little and still claim wage-loss compensation.  Neither, however, should it 
compel the departure from a lucrative job with full-time potential for menial work 
simply because the latter is immediately available full-time. 
 
There is no evidence contrary to our claimant’s assertion that he took the 
Busch job because it was the first job—full or part-time—that was offered.  
 
 
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Claimant’s uncontradicted statements also indicate that part-timers were given 
preference when full-time slots opened.  This supports claimant’s assertion that a 
move to full-time was a realistic possibility. 
 
We find, therefore, that under these facts, the commission abused its 
discretion in finding a voluntary limitation of income.  Viewed in totality, the facts 
do not establish such a limitation or a life-style-motivated job selection—the two 
concerns that have prompted close examination of part-time work. 
 
Turning to the other period at issue, wage-loss compensation was denied 
from October 15, 1994 through July 20, 1995, for lack of medical evidence 
causally relating claimant’s wage-loss to his allowed conditions.  This finding, 
however, was premised on the commission’s mistaken belief that Dr. Friedman did 
not examine claimant until July 21, 1995.  Dr. Friedman actually examined 
claimant on July 21, 1994.  If Dr. Friedman’s recent report satisfied claimant’s 
medical wage-loss prerequisites for July 21, 1995 forward, it is valid also for the 
period October 15, 1994 through July 20, 1995. 
 
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and a writ of 
mandamus is hereby issued that orders the commission to award wage-loss 
compensation over the requested periods. 
Judgment reversed 
and writ granted. 
 
 
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MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.