Title: Ex Parte Gardner

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

822 So. 2d 1211 (2001)
Ex parte Betty GARDNER.
(Re Betty Gardner v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company et al.)
1001407.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
October 12, 2001.
Rehearing Denied December 14, 2001.
William Dudley Motlow, Jr., Don L. Hall, and W. Perry Webb of Porterfield, Harper & Mills, P.A., Birmingham, for petitioner.
Jay St. Clair and Kelly H. Estes of Bradley, Arant, Rose & White, L.L.P., Birmingham, for respondents.
HARWOOD, Justice.
Betty Gardner petitioned for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Civil Appeals' judgment affirming the trial court's judgment as a matter of law for State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company, Inc., and other defendants (hereinafter referred *1212 to jointly as "State Farm"). We granted her petition to review the alleged error she claims was made by the trial court and the Court of Civil Appeals. We affirm.
The Court of Civil Appeals summarized the pertinent facts as follows:
Gardner v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 822 So. 2d 1201, 1203-06 (Ala.Civ.App. 2001) (footnotes omitted).
The record contains a copy of the "Agent's Agreement" that Gardner alleged State Farm had breached. That Agent's Agreement states, in pertinent part:
Gardner argues that the interplay between the termination-notice provision, in provision A, and the termination-review provision, in provision B, created an ambiguity in the Agent's Agreement as to whether she could be terminated without cause, and that extrinsic evidence showed that State Farm did not represent, nor did Gardner understand, that the agreement allowed for her to be terminated at State Farm's will. She therefore argues that the trial court erred in determining that the Agent's Agreement was not ambiguous, and that the Court of Civil Appeals erred in affirming that judgment.
Our standard of review of a judgment as a matter of law is settled:
Glenlakes Realty Co. v. Norwood, 721 So. 2d 174, 177 (Ala.1998) (quoting Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So. 2d 860, 863 (Ala.1988)).
The trial court determined that the agreement was not ambiguous and that State Farm was due a judgment as a matter of law, in an order that, in pertinent part, stated:
While the trial court's order failed explicitly to address the issue of how the termination-review provision might relate to the termination-notice provision, the Court of Civil Appeals addressed both provisions, stating:
822 So. 2d  at 1208.
The rationale the Court of Civil Appeals relied upon from this Court's decision in Burrell v. Carraway Methodist Hospitals of Alabama, Inc., 607 So. 2d 193 (Ala.1992), is not fully dispositive of the issue Gardner presents. No written agreement was involved in Burrell; rather, the plaintiff in that case alleged the breach of an oral agreement that could be terminated only for cause, asserting that the agreement arose out of the "general behavior" of his employer. This Court reasoned that the *1217 circumstances relied on by the plaintiff had created nothing more than "a general, de facto policy" which could have given rise to nothing more than a "mere expectation," as opposed to an enforceable contract. "The only representation of any sort indicated by the record in regard to cause for termination is found in Burrell's employee handbook, which states that he may be terminated with or without cause." 607 So. 2d  at 196 n. 3. In the present case, we consider the effect of a termination-review procedure that was explicitly provided for by a provision of the written Agent's Agreement.
In light of the consideration that both the trial court and the Court of Civil Appeals gave to Gardner's argument that the Agent's Agreement was not conclusively a contract of "employment at will" because of the inclusion of the termination-review provision, we address that issue directly. This Court has stated:
Reeves Cedarhurst Dev. Corp. v. First Amfed Corp., 607 So. 2d 184, 186 (Ala. 1992).
The termination-notice provision in the Agent's Agreement states that the agreement may be terminated at any time by either Gardner or State Farm simply delivering notice to the other. The language in that provision places no limit on the agent's or State Farm's ability to terminate the employment relationship. As the Court of Civil Appeals correctly recognized, "Alabama has a well-established `employment-at-will' doctrine, under which an employer may terminate an employee at its discretion, if no provision in the employment contract provides for a specific term of employment or sets forth terms and conditions for dismissal." Gardner, 822 So. 2d  at 1207 (citing Burks v. Pickwick Hotel, 607 So. 2d 187 (Ala.1992)).
Furthermore, in Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725, 728 (Ala. 1987), this Court stated:
This Court has also followed this general rule in the context of similar insurance agent agreements. See Bosarge v. Bankers *1218 Life Co., 541 So. 2d 499 (Ala.1989); and Salter v. Alfa Ins. Co., Inc., 561 So. 2d 1050 (Ala.1990).
Whether the presence of a termination-review procedure changes the "at-will" nature of an employment contract, or more specifically in this case, the Agent's Agreement, has not been directly considered by this Court. We note that other courts interpreting similar State Farm agent agreements have determined that such agreements provide for termination at will. See Mooney v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 344 F. Supp. 697 (D.N.H.1972); and Melnick v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 106 N.M. 726, 749 P.2d 1105 (1988).[1] The Nevada Supreme Court recently discussed this exact issue in Kaldi v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 117 Nev. 273, 21 P.3d 16 (2001). That Court stated:
117 Nev. at ___, 21 P.3d  at 20-21.
We find the Nevada Supreme Court's analysis of this issue persuasive. Furthermore, the Texas Court of Appeals similarly concluded that the presence of a termination-review procedure did not change the "at-will" nature of a termination-notice provision in Threadgill v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 912 S.W.2d 264 (Tex.Ct. App.1995). In light of the strong general support for the concept of "employment at will" in this State, see Burks, supra, and Hoffman-La Roche, supra, and the rationale expressed by our sister states when addressing this exact issue, we conclude that the availability of a termination-review provision, in the context of this case, did not change the "at-will" character of the Agent's Agreement as a contract of employment. The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals, affirming the judgment as a matter of law for State Farm, is therefore affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
MOORE, C.J., and SEE, BROWN, and STUART, JJ., concur.
[1]  While the Court of Civil Appeals relied on the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama's interpretation of a similar State Farm agent agreement in Ventress v. State Farm Ins. Cos., (No. CV-99-1925-S) (N.D.Ala., September 18, 2000) (not reported in F.Supp.), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated that judgment on May 30, 2001, based upon its conclusion that the plaintiffs lacked standing.