Title: State v. van Aelstyn

State: vermont

Issuer: Vermont Supreme Court

Document:

State v. van Aelstyn (2005-220)

2007 VT 6

[Filed 12-Jan-2007]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                  2007 VT 6

                                No. 2005-220


  State of Vermont                               Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.                                        District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit

  Philip van Aelstyn                             February Term, 2006


  Michael S. Kupersmith, J.

  William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and John Treadwell, Assistant
    Attorney General, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

  Mark E. Furlan of Abatiell Associates, P.C., Rutland, and Jeffrey A. Denner
    and Gary G. Pelletier of Denner Associates, PC, Boston, Massachusetts, for
    Defendant-Appellant.


  PRESENT:  Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and Burgess, JJ.

       ¶ 1.  BURGESS, J.  Defendant challenges his  convictions on two
  counts of extortion and one count of stalking following a jury trial. 
  Defendant argues that he is entitled to a new trial because: (1) the
  district court failed to determine whether defendant intended to waive his
  right to counsel before the case went to trial, and (2) a post-conviction
  amendment to the stalking statute should be applied retroactively.  We
  affirm.
   
       ¶ 2.  Defendant, a licensed Vermont attorney who moved to
  California, had difficulty  retaining counsel to represent him after his
  arraignment in February 2004 on two counts of extortion, 13 V.S.A. § 1701,
  and one count of stalking, 13 V.S.A. § 1062.  In late August 2004,
  defendant's original attorney moved to withdraw.  Defendant filed a notice
  of limited pro se appearance to address his counsel's request to withdraw. 
  At a hearing on the motion, the court allowed counsel to withdraw despite
  defendant's expressed concern that the deadline for motions and discovery
  was not being extended and that he did not have funds to hire other
  counsel. Defendant nevertheless indicated that he would attempt to retain
  counsel and would keep the court informed of his situation. 


       ¶ 3.       Defendant hired a second attorney in late September.  That
  attorney moved for and was granted leave to withdraw at the end of October. 
  Defendant again filed a notice of limited pro se appearance to respond to
  the withdrawal motion and to move to continue a scheduled status
  conference.  Again, defendant represented to the court that he intended to
  retain counsel despite financial limitations.  Defendant did not retain
  other counsel, however, but instead filed a general notice of pro se
  appearance on November 29, apparently in response to the State's refusal to
  communicate directly with him until he entered such an appearance.
   
       ¶ 4.       On December 7, defendant called the court to request a
  public defender application form, which was mailed to him.  On December 10,
  defendant filed three motions: (1) a motion to appoint a public defender;
  (2) a Rule 12(d) motion to dismiss; and (3) a motion to continue the
  scheduled December 13 jury draw.  Defendant's request for appointed counsel
  did not include a public defender application form or otherwise disclose
  the financial information required for assignment of counsel by the court. 
  See 13 V.S.A. § 5236 (providing for assignment of public defender based
  upon determination of financial need); A.O. 4, § 5(determination of
  financial need "shall take place following the completion of the
  Application for Public Defender Services form").  The court denied
  defendant's public defender request, noting only that "Defendant has
  indicated his intent to proceed pro se."  The court also denied the motion
  to continue the jury draw.  

       ¶ 5.         When defendant failed to appear for the draw, an arrest
  warrant was issued and a bail forfeiture hearing scheduled.  Defendant then
  moved to strike the arrest warrant and stop bail forfeiture, contending
  that he did not believe the jury draw would take place because of many
  outstanding issues in the case, including appointment of a public defender. 
  At the bail forfeiture hearing, defendant again noted the financial toll
  the case was taking on him, but the hearing concluded with the parties
  agreeing to appear at the next jury draw on January 18, 2005.

       ¶ 6.       At the jury draw, the court asked defendant if he wished to
  be introduced to the prospective jurors as an attorney representing
  himself.  Defendant agreed to this introduction, and the court stated:

     The first matter before the court this morning is State v. Philip
    van Aelstyn.  Mr. van Aelstyn is present and is representing
    himself.  He, it happens that he is an attorney, but he is
    representing himself, which he's entitled to do.  Of course,
    attorneys are also entitled to have attorneys, but he is
    representing himself today.

  Defendant made no objection to the statement and proceeded through jury
  draw and trial without counsel.  On the third day of trial, the jury
  returned guilty verdicts on all counts.  Defendant was sentenced on May 13,
  2005.  Coincidentally, the stalking statute under which defendant was found
  guilty in January and sentenced in May 2005, was amended effective July 1,
  2005.  2005, No. 83, § 4 (amending definition of "stalk" in 13 V.S.A. §
  1061); 1 V.S.A. § 212 (providing that laws take effect on July 1 following
  enactment unless otherwise provided).
       
                                   I.

       ¶ 7.  Defendant argues that he was forced to proceed pro se without
  making a valid waiver of his constitutional right to counsel.  Defendant
  does not argue that he was a needy person or that any of his rights under
  the Public Defender Act (FN1) were violated when the trial court summarily
  denied his motion to appoint counsel.  For that reason, we do not address
  the language or merits of the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to
  appoint a public defender.  Rather, we confine our inquiry to defendant's
  argument that his motion to appoint counsel was one of numerous expressions
  of his desire for representation that were ignored by the trial
  court-forcing him to proceed to trial pro se without making a knowing and
  voluntary waiver of his right to counsel. 
                                
       ¶ 8.  The United States and Vermont constitutions provide that a
  criminal defendant has a right to legal counsel.  U.S. Const. amend. VI;
  Vt. Const. ch. I, art. 10.  Valid  waiver of  this right must be voluntary,
  knowing, and intelligent.  State v. Brown, 2005 VT 104, ¶¶ 21-23, 179
  Vt. 22,