Title: Redland v. State

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

Redland v. State1989 WY 8766 P.2d 1173Case Number: 87-199Decided: 01/06/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
MATT ERIC 
REDLAND, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE 
OF WYOMING, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from 
the District Court, WashakieCounty, Gary P. Hartman, 
J.

 
 
Julie D. 
Naylor, Appellate Counsel, and Steven E. Weerts, Sr. Asst. Public Defender 
(argued), for 
appellant.

 
 
Joseph B. 
Meyer, Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl, Sr. 
Asst. Atty. Gen., and Jerry Williams, Student Intern, Prosecution Assistance 
Clinic (argued), for 
appellee.

 
 
Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT and 
MACY, JJ., and BROWN, J., Retired.*

 
 

* Retired 
June 29, 1988.

 
 

CARDINE, Chief 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellant was tried and 
convicted by a jury of aggravated homicide by vehicle, in violation of W.S. 
6-2-106(b). On appeal to this court, he contends that he was prejudiced by an 
erroneous jury instruction which was an incorrect statement of the law. We 
agree, and the judgment entered must be reversed.

 
 

[¶2.]     On the evening of 
November 26, 1986, appellant went to the Tensleep Bar in Tensleep, Wyoming, and met Sharon Kay Meyers. During the 
course of the evening, appellant consumed a substantial amount of alcohol. 
Between 1:30 and 2:00 the following morning, appellant and Ms. Meyers left the 
Tensleep Bar to go to a private party out of town. While driving to this party, 
appellant lost control of his vehicle, an accident occurred, and Ms. Meyers was 
ejected from the vehicle. She required emergency medical treatment. Appellant 
was taken into custody for driving while under the influence of alcohol in 
violation of W.S. 31-5-233. A breath test and a blood alcohol test were 
administered, the breath analysis test indicating a .139 blood alcohol content, 
and the blood test indicating a .1638 blood alcohol content. As a result of the 
injuries sustained in the accident, Ms. Meyers later died. Appellant was charged 
with aggravated homicide by vehicle. The statute in effect at the time of this 
incident read in pertinent part:

 
 
"(b) A 
person is guilty of aggravated homicide by vehicle and shall be punished by 
imprisonment in the penitentiary for not more than twenty (20) years, 
if:

 
 
"(i) While 
driving a motor vehicle in violation of W.S. 31-5-233, he causes the death of 
another person and the violation is the proximate cause of the death * * *." 
W.S. 6-2-106 (Cum.Supp. 1986).

 
 
Section 
31-5-233 read in pertinent part:

 
 
"(a) It is 
unlawful for any person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor, to a degree which renders him incapable of 
safely driving a motor vehicle, to drive or have actual physical control of 
any vehicle within this state." (emphasis added) W.S. 31-5-233 (Cum. Supp. 
1986).

 
 

[¶3.]     At trial, over 
appellant's objection, the court gave the following instruction to the 
jury:

 
 
            
"Instruction 13

 
 
"The phrase 
`under the influence of intoxicating liquor,' as used in statute making it an 
offense to operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor means a condition, caused by the 
consumption of intoxicants, that makes a person less able, either mentally or 
physically, or both, to exercise clear judgment, and with steady hands and 
nerves, operate an automobile with safety to himself and to the public." 
(emphasis added)

 
 
Three other 
instructions contained the statutory standard of "incapable of safely 
driving."

 
 

[¶4.]     Appellant maintains 
that Instruction 13 incorrectly lowered the standard from "incapable of safely driving" to "less able * * * to exercise clear 
judgment * * * with steady hands and nerves." (emphasis added) We agree that it 
was error for the court to give the challenged instruction, as there is 
obviously a substantial difference between a standard of "less able" to safely 
drive a motor vehicle and "incapable" of safely driving a motor 
vehicle.

 
 

[¶5.]     Appellee contends that 
when read with all the other instructions and considered as a whole, the giving 
of Instruction 13 did not cause prejudice to appellant. We cannot agree. 
Inconsistent instructions may confuse a jury. As we stated in State v. Berger, 
72 Wyo. 422, 265 P.2d 1061, 1067-68 (1954):

 
 
"Where a 
charge of the court to the jury has contradictory elements in it this puts upon 
the jury the burden of determining which Instruction they should follow. As said 
in State v. Vliet, 120 N.J.L. 23, 197 A. 894, 895:

 
 
"`Where the 
law is thus incorrectly charged, although it has been correctly stated elsewhere 
in the court's charge, it puts the burden upon the jury to determine which part 
of a contradictory charge is correct, and this is not, and cannot be, a jury's 
duty under any circumstances.'"

 
 
Because 
there is a reasonable possibility that the jury may not have convicted appellant 
if it had not considered Instruction 13, appellant must have a new trial. Jones 
v. State, 735 P.2d 699 (Wyo. 1987).

 
 

[¶6.]     The appellant's 
conviction is reversed, and this case is remanded to the district court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 
 

THOMAS, J., files 
a dissenting opinion and partially joined with BROWN, J., 
Retired.

 
 

BROWN, J., 
Retired, files a dissenting opinion.

 
 

THOMAS, Justice, 
dissenting.

 
 

[¶7.]     I disagree with the 
result of the majority's opinion in this case, and I must dissent. I join in the 
dissent of Justice Brown, Retired, insofar as he would find any error to be 
harmless. I am not so readily persuaded that error exists, but if it does, I 
agree that it is harmless.

 
 

[¶8.]     A consideration of the 
instructions read together discloses that the trial court instructed the jury on 
the elements of § 31-5-233, W.S. 1977 (Nov. 1984 Repl.), because that section is 
referred to in § 6-2-106(b), W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1987), the criminal statute 
which Redland was convicted of violating. The court stated the third element of 
the offense described in § 31-5-233, W.S. 1977 (Nov. 1984 Repl.), to 
be:

 
 
            
"3. The defendant was under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor."

 
 
In the 
accused instruction then, the court chose to define the phrase "under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor," one of the elements of the offense referred 
to in § 6-2-106(b), W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1987), the criminal statute. As Justice 
Brown, Retired, points out, these instructions repeatedly advised the jury that 
they must find that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor 
to a degree which rendered him incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle. In 
context, while the instruction may not have been necessary, I cannot discern 
error in offering a definition of a phrase used in one of the elements of the 
offense which the jury must find to have been committed in order to convict of a 
violation of the statute under which Redland was charged.

 
 

[¶9.]     I am willing to concede 
that the instruction was not necessary because the thrust of Morad v. Wyoming 
Highway Department, 66 Wyo. 12, 203 P.2d 954 (1949), is that the 
phrase "under the influence of intoxicating liquor" simply means "while 
intoxicated," citing authorities which equate the phrase with intoxication or 
drunkenness. Since that is a concept about which lay witnesses may offer their 
opinion when testifying, State v. Cantrell, 64 Wyo. 132, 186 P.2d 539 (1947), 
the concept must be one with which lay people are sufficiently familiar that it 
requires no definition.

 
 

[¶10.]  Were I a member of the jury which 
convicted Redland, however, I would take umbrage at the assumption by the 
majority that I was so impercipient, or uncomprehending, or foolish as to have 
been misled by this instruction. Defense counsel established the relationship 
between Instruction 13 and the elements of the offense of driving while under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor in his closing argument. The case is summed 
up by the testimony of the arresting officer, who in the course of discussing 
his advice of rights to Redland, said that Redland agreed to the appropriate 
test for intoxication. The officer went on to testify, quoting Redland as 
follows:

 
 
            
"He says I don't see that there is any reason to do so, you know I'm 
drunk and I know I'm drunk."

 
 
The jury 
knew that Redland was drunk, too, i.e., he was "under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor, to a degree which render[ed] him incapable of safely 
driving a motor vehicle, * * *." Section 31-5-233, W.S. 1977 (Nov. 1984 Repl). 
Under the circumstances, any possible error in the instruction was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.

 
 

BROWN, Retired 
Justice, dissenting, with whom THOMAS, Justice, partially 
joins.

 
 

[¶11.]  Instruction Number 13 served no purpose 
and should not have been given. However, if it was an error to give the 
instruction, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

 
 

[¶12.]  In the bundle of instructions given, the 
court consistently told the jury that the state must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor to a degree which rendered him incapable of 
safely driving a motor vehicle. The degree of intoxication that must be 
proved was repeated three times in Instruction No. 9, three times in Instruction 
No. 11 and mentioned for the seventh time in Instruction No. 
14.

 
 

[¶13.]  After the focus and stress placed on the 
key phrase, "to a degree which rendered him incapable of safely driving," it is 
inconceivable that the jury was misled into considering a lesser degree of 
intoxication than the statute required.

 
 
This court 
examines instructions in their entirety when it is called upon to decide whether 
instructions are erroneous. They must be considered as a whole and not according 
to isolated phrases and paragraphs.

 
 
Scheikofsky 
v. State, 636 P.2d 1107, 1111 (Wyo. 1981) (citation 
omitted).

 
 

[¶14.]  Instruction No. 13 does no more than 
attempt to explain or define the term "under the influence." It does not dilute 
or change in any way the definition of degree of intoxication required to be 
proved, that is, "to a degree which rendered him [appellant] incapable of safely 
driving a motor vehicle." This unfortunate instruction does no more than "gild 
the lily."

 
 

[¶15.]  I would affirm the 
conviction.