Title: KEVIN D. BOWEN v. STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

State: wyoming

Issuer: Wyoming Supreme Court

Document:

KEVIN D. BOWEN v. STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION2011 WY 1Case Number: No. S-10-0063Decided: 01/04/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
KEVIN D. 
BOWEN,

Appellant 
(Petitioner),

 
 
v.

 
 
STATE OF WYOMING, 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

Appellee 
(Respondent).

 
 
 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Goshen County

The 
Honorable Keith G. Kautz, Judge 

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

James 
A. Eddington of Jones & Eddington Law Offices, Torrington, 
Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney 
General; Douglas J. Moench, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jackson M. 
Engels, Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

VOIGT, Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      In this appeal we 
review a determination by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) to uphold 
the suspension of Kevin D. Bowen's (the appellant) driver's license.  The only question presented to the OAH 
was whether the appellant's breath test results were legally obtained, and thus 
admissible.  In finding that the 
suspension was proper, the OAH relied on a previous decision in the appellant's 
companion criminal case wherein the circuit court found that the breath test 
results were legally obtained.  We 
find, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, that the OAH's decision should 
be affirmed.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Was the appellant 
collaterally estopped from relitigating the question of the admissibility of his 
breath test results in his administrative license suspension hearing after the 
circuit court had already decided that issue against him in a criminal 
proceeding?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The facts in this 
matter are undisputed.  On January 
8, 2009, a Wyoming Highway Patrol trooper stopped the appellant after observing 
the appellant's vehicle traveling approximately 40 mph in a 30 mph zone.  The trooper observed signs of impairment 
and the appellant admitted to consuming alcohol prior to driving.  Additionally, the appellant's 
performance in the field sobriety tests indicated that he was impaired and a 
portable breath test administered at the site registered a 0.13% blood alcohol 
concentration (BAC).  The appellant 
was then arrested and transported to the detention facility where he again 
agreed to a breath test, which test revealed a 0.137% BAC.

 
 
[¶4]      The appellant's 
drunken driving resulted in both a criminal prosecution for driving while under 
the influence of alcohol in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(b) 
(LexisNexis 2007), and an administrative license suspension proceeding, as 
mandated by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-102 (LexisNexis 2007).  In the criminal case, the appellant 
moved to suppress the breathalyzer evidence, alleging that the trooper 
performing the test was not properly trained on the device used to administer 
it.1  The appellant's motion was heard and 
denied by a decision letter, issued April 22, 2009.  The appellant entered a conditional 
guilty plea and Judgment and Sentence was entered on June 9, 
2009.

 
 
[¶5]      In the 
administrative proceeding, after the appellant was notified of and objected to 
the suspension of his license, the OAH held a contested case hearing on March 
30, 2009.  At that hearing, the 
appellant took the same position he had taken in the criminal case: the trooper 
was not properly trained on the breathalyzer device and thus the suspension was 
improper.  Relying upon the circuit 
court's previous finding in the criminal case that the trooper was properly 
certified to operate the device, the OAH upheld the suspension on May 14, 
2009.

 
 
[¶6]      The appellant 
sought review of both the OAH decision and the Judgment and Sentence in the 
criminal matter.  After briefing by 
both parties, the district court entered its decision and order on appeal 
affirming the decisions in both the criminal and administrative proceedings. 
 The appellant timely filed a notice 
of appeal to this Court.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]                              
When considering an appeal from a district court's review of an 
administrative agency's action, we give "no special deference to the district 
court's decision," but instead review the case as if it had come directly from 
the administrative agency.  Dale v. S & S Builders, LLC, 2008 WY 
84, ¶ 8, 188 P.3d 554, 557 (Wyo. 2008).  Our review of an administrative agency's 
action is governed by the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, which provides 
in pertinent part that the reviewing court shall:

 
 
(i)         
Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; 
and

 
 
(ii)        Hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

 
 
(A)       Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

 
 
(B)       Contrary to 
constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;

 
 
(C)       In excess 
of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

 
 
(D)       Without 
observance of procedure required by law; or

 
 
(E)       Unsupported 
by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute.

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2009).

 
 
This 
appeal involves only questions of law.  "Absent evidentiary dispute, the standard 
of review for contested case hearings is simply stated as whether an agency's 
conclusions are in accordance with the law."  Parodi v. Wyo. Dep't of Transp., 947 P.2d 1294, 1295 (Wyo. 1997).  Questions of law are reviewed de novo, and "[c]onclusions of law made 
by an administrative agency are affirmed only if they are in accord with the 
law.  We do not afford any deference 
to the agency's determination, and we will correct any error made by the agency 
in either interpreting or applying the law."  State ex rel. Workers' Safety & Comp. 
Div. v. Garl, 2001 WY 59, ¶ 9, 26 P.3d 1029, 1032 (Wyo. 2001) (citations 
omitted).

 
 

Jacobs 
v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 
2009 WY 118, ¶ 10, 216 P.3d 1128, 1131-32 
(Wyo. 2009).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶8]      In this appeal, 
we are reviewing the decision of the OAH to uphold the suspension of appellant's 
driver's license.2  As noted above, the appellant raised the 
exact same issue in both the criminal and administrative cases.  The circuit court found the breath test 
results to be admissible, and the OAH, relying on the circuit court's decision 
in the appellant's criminal case, as well as the decisions of two other Wyoming 
courts, reached the same conclusion.  The OAH stated: 

 
 
28.       While this 
case was pending, the Circuit Court . . . issued a decision letter in State of Wyoming v. Bowen . . . .  In the April 22, 2009 Decision Letter, 
the Circuit Court ruled that Trooper Sanders was properly certified to operate 
the Intoximeter EC/IR II on January 8, 2009 and Trooper Sanders was not required 
to undergo any additional training.

 
 
29.       Thus, three 
higher Wyoming Courts have ruled that an officer certified to operate the 
Intoximeter EC/IR is also certified to operate the Intoximeter EC/IR II without 
additional testing.  This Office 
cannot ignore such strong Wyoming precedent and will find as a matter of law 
Trooper Sanders' certification was valid for operating both the Intoximeter 
EC/IR and the Intoximeter EC/IR II at all times relevant to this 
case.

 
 
Although 
not specifically stating such, it appears from the language of the order that 
the OAH was relying on the doctrine of stare decisis in reaching its 
conclusion.

 
 
[¶9]      The district 
court reviewed and affirmed the OAH's decision on grounds of collateral 
estoppel, which doctrine it found to be more appropriate than stare decisis.  Although we do not give any deference to 
the district court's decision, we will likewise affirm the OAH's decision on 
collateral estoppel grounds.  

 
 
[¶10]   We recently reiterated that 
collateral estoppel may be applied in the context of administrative 
cases:

 
 

In Salt 
Creek Freightways, we 
noted that although many cases speak of res judicata in the administrative 
context, they actually apply collateral estoppel.  Salt Creek Freightways [v. Wyo. Fair Employment Practices 
Comm'n], 598 P.2d [435,] 437 [(Wyo. 1979)].  Collateral estoppel is the appropriate 
doctrine since collateral estoppel bars relitigation of previously 
litigated issues.  Salt 
Creek Freightways, 598 
P.2d at 438 (quoting Roush v. Roush, 589 P.2d 841, 843 (Wyo. 
1979) (per curiam)).  See also Bresnahan v. May Dept. Stores 
Co., 726 S.W.2d 327, 
329 (Mo. 1987) (when a fact is properly determined in one legal proceeding, 
it is given effect in another lawsuit).  
Res judicata on the other hand bars relitigation of previously 
litigated claims or causes of action.  Salt Creek 
Freightways, 598 P.2d  
at 437.  See also Batson v. Shiflett, [325 Md. 684,] 602 A.2d 
[1191,] 1201 [(1992)] (quoting Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. 
Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 
99 S. Ct. 645, 58 L. Ed. 2d 552 (1979)).  Since administrative decisions deal 
primarily with issues rather than causes of action or claims, collateral 
estoppel is the appropriate doctrine.  Salt Creek 
Freightways, 598 P.2d  at 437.

 

 

Jacobs, 
2009 WY 118, ¶ 12, 216 P.3d  at 1132 (emphasis in original) (quoting Slavens 
v. Bd. of County Comm'rs for Uinta County, 854 P.2d 683, 686 (Wyo. 
1993)).  When applying collateral 
estoppel, we consider four factors:

 
 
(1) 
whether the issue decided in the prior adjudication 
was identical with the issue presented in the present action; 
(2) whether the prior adjudication resulted in a judgment on the merits; (3) 
whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in 
privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) whether the party 
against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate the issue in the prior 
proceeding.

 
 

Wilkinson 
v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 991 P.2d 1228, 1234 (Wyo. 1999) (emphasis in original) 
(quoting Slavens, 854 P.2d at 
686).

 
 
[¶11]   The issue raised in this appeal is 
one of first impression for this Court.  
Furthermore, we are unable to find authority from any other jurisdiction 
addressing this particular factual scenario.3  Nevertheless, we find application of 
collateral estoppel to these facts to be clear and straightforward: 1) the issue 
was identical in both proceedings: whether the trooper was properly trained to 
perform the breath test using the EC/IR II making the breath-test results 
admissible; 2) the circuit court's determination that the trooper was properly 
trained and that the breath test was admissible was a final determination of 
that issue; 3) the appellant, the party against whom collateral estoppel was 
asserted, was a party to both proceedings; 4) finally, the prior criminal case 
afforded the appellant a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue.  When applying collateral estoppel to an 
issue raised in a civil action, which issue was previously litigated in a 
criminal action, we have said that criminal proceedings present a defendant with a full and 
fair opportunity to litigate the issues because a criminal defendant has strong 
incentives to defend vigorously the charges 
against him.  Worman v. Carver, 2002 WY 59, ¶ 21, 
44 P.3d 82, 87-88 (Wyo. 2002).  
In this case, the criminal proceedings afforded the appellant a full 
evidentiary hearing wherein he offered evidence, examined witnesses, and made 
arguments.4

 
 
[¶12]   We conclude that the doctrine of collateral estoppel 
precluded the appellant from relitigating the question of whether his breath 
test results were legally obtained.5  The OAH's determination is 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The 
appellant argued that the trooper did not have the necessary training to perform 
the breath test as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-105(a) (LexisNexis 2007) 
and certain Department of Health rules and regulations.  The trooper used an updated version of 
the breathalyzer device (Intoximeter EC/IR II rather than the Intoximeter 
EC/IR).  The appellant argued that 
because the trooper never received training on the updated device, the breath 
test violated the statute and rules and was invalid.

 
 

2When 
this case was docketed in this Court, the criminal case and the administrative 
case were docketed separately.  
However, this Court dismissed the criminal appeal because such review 
must be sought by petition for writ of review, not by appeal.  Thus, only the administrative appeal is 
before us for review.

 
 

3We 
note that courts have addressed the applicability of collateral estoppel under 
other circumstances involving criminal and administrative cases.  See Huelsman v. Kansas Dep't of Revenue, 
980 P.2d 1022, 1025-27 (Kan. 1999) (suppression of evidence in DUI prosecution 
based on lack of probable cause did not collaterally estop state from arguing in 
license suspension proceeding that officer had "reasonable grounds" to request a 
breath test pursuant to the implied consent law); State v. Young, 530 N.W.2d 269, 273-77 
(Neb. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that collateral estoppel does not require a 
criminal court to accept as binding an administrative proceeding's license 
revocation determination); In re 
Mehrer, 273 N.W.2d 194, 197 (S.D. 1979) (no collateral estoppel in license 
revocation proceedings despite dismissal of DUI charge against defendant in 
criminal case because different elements must be proven to show DUI versus 
violation of implied consent laws); City of Manhattan v. 
Huncovsky, 913 P.2d 227, 232 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996) (criminal court 
not collaterally estopped from deciding validity of breath test where agency 
questioned validity of breath test results and dismissed administrative 
proceedings).

 
 

4The 
parties have not raised the question of whether the application of collateral 
estoppel should be affected by the fact that the appeal in the criminal case was 
still pending at the time the district court made its ruling.  See Rantz v. Kaufman, 109 P.3d 132, 141 
(Colo. 2005) ("for the purposes of issue preclusion, a judgment that is still 
pending on appeal is not final").  
This Court has not directly answered that question.  See Wilkinson, 991 P.2d  at 1234 and Slavens, 854 P.2d  at 687.  We need not answer the question now 
because the criminal appeal has since been dismissed, meaning it would not be a 
bar to the application of collateral estoppel were we to remand the 
case.

 
 

5We 
note the limited nature of our decision in this matter.  Although we find that collateral 
estoppel applies under these specific circumstances, the same may not be true in 
other similar situations.  For 
example, we cannot say that collateral estoppel would always bar an 
administrative body from addressing an issue previously decided by a criminal 
court; nor does this holding stand for the proposition that a criminal defendant 
should be collaterally estopped from arguing an issue in his criminal case that 
had previously been decided in an administrative proceeding.  Neither of these questions, nor any 
others not specifically addressed, were raised by the parties nor do they arise 
under the facts of this case.