Title: Midstate Siding & Window Co. v. Rogers

State: illinois

Issuer: Illinois Supreme Court

Document:

Docket No. 89059-Agenda 13-January 2001.
MIDSTATE SIDING AND WINDOW COMPANY, INC.,
Appellant, v. KENNETH ROGERS et al., Appellees.
Opinion filed April 24, 2003.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the Credit
Services Organizations Act (Credit Services Act) (815 ILCS 605/1
et seq. (West 1996)) applies to a transaction between a retailer,
Midstate Siding and Window Company, Inc. (Midstate), and
homeowners Kenneth and Ella Rogers (Rogers). We find that the
Credit Services Act does not apply. Consequently, we reverse the
judgments of the appellate court and circuit court, and remand for
further proceedings.

BACKGROUND
	On December 2, 1996, Midstate filed a complaint in the
circuit court of Knox County against the Rogers. In the complaint,
Midstate alleged that it is in the home remodeling business, and
that on July 24, 1996, it entered into a contract with the Rogers to
install windows and siding at their home at a cost of $19,600.
Midstate further alleged that the Rogers breached the contract by
refusing to allow Midstate to perform the work at their home.
Midstate sought damages of $4,000 for lost profit, costs and
overhead. Midstate also sought to recover its costs of suit and
attorney fees. Midstate attached a copy of the contract to its
complaint.
	In their answer to the complaint, the Rogers admitted that
Midstate is in the home remodeling business, and that they signed
the contract attached to the complaint. The Rogers also admitted
notifying Midstate that they did not want Midstate to perform the
work at their home. However, the Rogers maintained that the
contract is not enforceable because: (1) it lacks definite and certain
terms; (2) it violates the Credit Services Act (815 ILCS 605/1 et
seq. (West 1996)), and the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 1996)); (3)
the Rogers informed Midstate of their intent to cancel the contract
on July 28, 1996; (4) Midstate failed to obtain credit for the
Rogers, a condition precedent to performance of the contract; (5)
no payment is due under the terms of the contract; and (6) the
Rogers believed they were signing an estimate, not a contract. In
addition, the Rogers filed a counterclaim against Midstate. In the
counterclaim, the Rogers alleged that Midstate's salesman, Alan
Klunk, indicated that Midstate would obtain financing for the
Rogers and/or provide advice or assistance to the Rogers in
obtaining an extension of credit. However, in the contract,
Midstate failed to describe the services Midstate was to provide in
obtaining the extension of credit for the Rogers, in violation of the
Credit Services Act and the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act. The Rogers sought an award of court
costs, attorney fees and punitive damages.
	Midstate admitted that the Rogers filled out a credit
application, and that Midstate forwarded the application to several
lending institutions to obtain financing for the Rogers. Bank One,
Illinois, N.A., one of the institutions Midstate contacted, agreed to
provide a home equity loan to the Rogers. In a letter dated July 30,
1996, Bank One advised the Rogers of its commitment to lend the
Rogers the sum of $24,000 at prime plus 3.15%. Midstate
maintained that it provided a gratuitous service to the Rogers in
forwarding their credit application to the financial institutions.
	The matter proceeded to a bench trial at which testimony was
heard but not recorded. Following the trial, the circuit court issued
a letter opinion as follows:
			"I have considered the evidence and your arguments. I
find that the Credit Services Organization Act is
applicable to the case at bar. I have considered the cases
and find that the Act is to be liberally construed to protect
consumers. Plaintiff qualifies as a Credit Services
Organization i.e., that Plaintiff represented to Defendant
that it would assist or obtain for her an extension of credit.
			The contract between Plaintiff and Defendant is thereby
unenforceable in that it does not comply with [815] ILCS
605/7.
			Plaintiff argued that inadequate consideration existed to
support a credit contract. This was simply not true. In
order to remain competitive, the Plaintiff offered a service
to prospective buyers to assist them in obtaining financing
to purchase siding and windows. In fact, the agreement
between the Plaintiff and Defendant would never have
been consummated had the Plaintiff not helped them
obtain financing. The Plaintiff's assistance was more than
a mere service, but was part of the consideration to
support the agreement."
The circuit court awarded the Rogers attorney fees and costs in the
amount of $6,157.50. However, the court found that the Rogers
were not entitled to an award of punitive damages. Subsequently,
the circuit court denied Midstate's motion to reconsider and
clarified that Midstate had violated section 7(a)(2) of the Credit
Services Act (815 ILCS 605/7(a)(2) (West 1996)).
	The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court,
with one justice dissenting. 309 Ill. App. 3d 610. The appellate
court reasoned that the Credit Services Act applies to retailers
who, in exchange for valuable consideration, aid consumers in
obtaining extensions of credit. 309 Ill. App. 3d at 611. The
appellate court held that, by providing assistance to the Rogers
with regard to obtaining an extension of credit as part of an
agreement to side their home, Midstate acted within the purview
of the Credit Services Act. In addition the court held that the
Rogers were entitled to appellate attorney fees under the Credit
Services Act.
	We granted Midstate's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d
R. 315.

ANALYSIS
A. Record on Review
	As noted above, a transcript of the evidence at trial is not
available because the trial was not recorded. In the absence of a
transcript, it is incumbent upon the appellant to file a bystander's
report of the proceedings (166 Ill. 2d R. 323(c)) or an agreed
statement of facts (166 Ill. 2d R. 323(d)). Midstate failed to do so,
leading the Rogers to argue that we must affirm the judgments of
the lower courts because the record on review is incomplete. We
disagree.
	Midstate, as appellant, has the burden of presenting a
sufficiently complete record of the proceedings at trial to support
a claim of error (Foutch v. O'Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92
(1984); Landeros v. Equity Property & Development, 321 Ill. App.
3d 57, 63 (2001)), and, in the absence of such a record on appeal,
the reviewing court will presume that the order entered by the trial
court was in conformity with the law and had a sufficient factual
basis (Webster v. Hartman, 195 Ill. 2d 426, 433 (2001); Foutch, 99
Ill. 2d at 392). The court will resolve any doubts arising from the
incompleteness of the record against the appellant. Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d  at 392; In re K.S., 317 Ill. App. 3d 830, 832 (2000). However,
in the present case, we are not asked to determine whether the
evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the trial
court's finding. See Buckholtz v. MacNeal Hospital, 313 Ill. App.
3d 521, 526 (2000) (plaintiff maintained that the record fails to
establish that an expert witness' deposition fee was reasonable).
Instead, we are asked to interpret a statute, the Credit Services Act,
and determine whether the statute regulates the transaction at
issue. This is a question of law, and the lack of a complete record
does not bar our review. Candice Co. v. Ricketts, 281 Ill. App. 3d
359, 362 (1996); In re Estate of Day, 261 Ill. App. 3d 993, 996
(1994); In re B.H., 218 Ill. App. 3d 583, 586 (1991). Further,
because the issue before us is a matter of statutory construction,
our review is de novo. Sylvester v. Industrial Comm'n, 197 Ill. 2d 225, 232 (2001); Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Aldridge, 179 Ill. 2d 141, 148 (1997).

B. Credit Services Act
	In determining whether the Credit Services Act applies to the
transaction at issue, we are guided by established principles. The
primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give
effect to the intent of the legislature. Bridgestone, 179 Ill. 2d  at
149, quoting Illinois Power Co. v. Mahin, 72 Ill. 2d 189, 194
(1978); In re B.C., 176 Ill. 2d 536, 542 (1997). To do so, we
examine the language of the statute, the most reliable indicator of
the legislature's objectives in enacting the law. Michigan Avenue
National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 504 (2000). We
afford the language of the statute its plain and ordinary meaning
(Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d at 504) and construe
the statute as a whole (Sylvester, 197 Ill. 2d at 232). Words and
phrases must not be viewed in isolation but must be considered in
light of other relevant provisions of the statute. Sylvester, 197 Ill. 2d  at 232; Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d  at 504. We
also presume that in enacting the statute the legislature did not
intend absurdity, inconvenience, or injustice. Michigan Avenue
National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d  at 504.
	Where the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous,
the only legitimate function of the courts is to enforce the law as
enacted by the legislature. Henrich v. Libertyville High School,
186 Ill. 2d 381, 391 (1998). It is never proper for the courts to
depart from the plain language of the statute by reading into it
exceptions, limitations or conditions which conflict with the intent
of the legislature. Bridgestone, 179 Ill. 2d  at 149, quoting Harvey
Firemen's Ass'n v. City of Harvey, 75 Ill. 2d 358, 363 (1979).
There is no rule of statutory construction which authorizes the
courts to declare that the legislature did not mean what the plain
language of the statute says. Henrich, 186 Ill. 2d  at 391;
Bridgestone, 179 Ill. 2d  at 149.
	With these principles in mind, we turn to the arguments
advanced by the parties. Citing section 3 of the Credit Services
Act (815 ILCS 605/3 (West 1996)), the Rogers maintain that
Midstate is a credit services organization because Midstate agreed
to help the Rogers obtain financing for the improvements to their
home. Midstate counters that it provided a gratuitous service to the
Rogers in forwarding their loan application to the financial
institutions. Midstate maintains that, in enacting the Credit
Services Act, the legislature did not intend to regulate the actions
of retailers, such as Midstate, in facilitating the extension of credit
to their customers. We agree with Midstate that the legislature did
not intend to regulate the transaction at issue.
	Section 3 of the Credit Services Act provides in part:
			"(a) 'Buyer' means an individual who is solicited to
purchase or who purchases the services of a credit
services organization.
* * *
			(d) 'Credit Services Organization' means a person who,
with respect to the extension of credit by others and in
return for the payment of money or other valuable
consideration, provides, or represents that the person can
or will provide, any of the following services:
				(i) improving a buyer's credit record, history, or
rating[;]
				(ii) obtaining an extension of credit for a buyer; or
				(iii) providing advice or assistance to a buyer with
regard to either subsection (i) or (ii)." 815 ILCS
605/3(a), (d) (West 1996).
Looking to the definition of a "[b]uyer" and the definition of a
"[c]redit [s]ervices [o]rganization," it is clear that the Credit
Services Act regulates transactions involving the payment of
money or other valuable consideration in return for the services of
the credit services organization. In turn, the services of the credit
services organization are "improving a buyer's credit record,
history, or rating"; "obtaining an extension of credit for a buyer";
or "providing advice or assistance to a buyer" with regard to
"improving a buyer's credit record, history, or rating" or with
regard to "obtaining an extension of credit" for the buyer. 815
ILCS 605/3 (West 1996). Thus, the Credit Services Act requires
payment for credit services, not simply payment for other goods or
services.
	In the present case, the circuit court rejected Midstate's
contention that there was inadequate consideration to support a
contract for credit services. The circuit court observed:
		"In order to remain competitive, the Plaintiff offered a
service to prospective buyers to assist them in obtaining
financing to purchase siding and windows. In fact, the
agreement between the Plaintiff and Defendant would
never have been consummated had the Plaintiff not
helped them obtain financing. The Plaintiff's assistance
was more than a mere service, but was part of the
consideration to support the agreement."
In this, the circuit court committed error. The Credit Services Act
requires that the credit services organization, in return for the
payment of money or other valuable consideration, agree to
provide, or represent that it will provide, credit services to the
buyer. The services must be related to an extension of credit for
the buyer or improvement of the buyer's credit record, history or
rating. The contract at issue does not provide for payment of
money or other valuable consideration in return for credit services
provided by Midstate. Instead, the agreed consideration is for
payment of windows and siding to be installed at the Rogers'
home. Although we agree with the circuit court that the Rogers
would not have proceeded with the installation of the windows and
siding without assistance in obtaining an extension of credit, the
Credit Services Act requires additional consideration for such
assistance.
	Our reading of the statutory language is consistent with
section 5 of the Act. That section provides:
			"No credit services organization *** shall:
			***
			(2) Charge or receive any money or other valuable
consideration solely for the referral of a buyer to a retail
seller who will or may extend credit to the buyer if such
extension of credit is in substantially the same terms as
those available to the general public."  (Emphases added.)
815 ILCS 605/5 (West 1996).
The section prohibits a credit services organization from charging
a fee for referrals to a retail seller. The section also recognizes that
a retail seller is an entity that may extend credit to a buyer. The
major distinction between a credit services organization and a
retail seller is that the credit services organization, in return for the
payment of money or other valuable consideration, offers services
to a buyer dedicated to improving the buyer's credit history or
rating or to obtaining an extension of credit for the buyer.
	Our interpretation of the statutory language is also consistent
with the legislative findings and declarations set forth in the Act.
Section 2 of the Credit Services Act (815 ILCS 605/2 (West
1996)) provides in part:
			"(a) The ability to obtain and use credit has become of
great importance to consumers who have a vital interest
in establishing and maintaining their credit worthiness
and credit standing. As a result, consumers who have
experienced credit problems may seek assistance from
credit service businesses which offer to improve the credit
standing of such consumers. Certain advertising and
business practices of some companies engaged in the
business of credit services have worked a financial
hardship upon the people of this State, often on those who
are of limited economic means and inexperienced in
credit matters.
			(b) The purpose of this Act is to provide prospective
consumers of credit services companies with the
information necessary to make an informed decision
regarding the purchase of those services and to protect the
public from unfair or deceptive advertising and business
practices."
The Credit Services Act is aimed at remedying problems
encountered by consumers seeking to improve their credit history
or rating, obtain more favorable terms on current debt, or obtain an
extension of credit through services provided by credit services
organizations. As such, the Credit Services Act prohibits credit
services organizations from engaging in certain conduct (815 ILCS
605/5 (West 1996)) and requires that credit services organization
make certain disclosures to the buyers (815 ILCS 605/6, 7 (West
1996)). The Credit Services Act is not intended to regulate
retailers primarily engaged in the business of selling goods and
services to their customers. The goods and services provided by
retailers are not generally services aimed at improving the
consumer's credit or obtaining an extension of credit for the
consumer, otherwise unattainable because of the consumer's poor
credit history or rating. See Fogle v. William Chevrolet/Geo, Inc.,
No. 99-C-5960 (N.D. Ill. August 9, 2000) (mem. op.).

CONCLUSION
	For the aforementioned reasons, the judgments of the
appellate court and circuit court are reversed, and the cause is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment reversed;
cause remanded.
	JUSTICE RARICK took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
	The majority ignores the plain language of the Act and the
undisputed facts of this case. The majority does not stop there. It
also reads a requirement of "additional consideration" into the Act.
Slip op. at 7. Based on these fundamental errors, the majority
concludes that Midstate is not a "credit services organization."
Because I cannot agree with that erroneous conclusion, I
respectfully dissent.
	Initially, the majority cites the statutory definition of a credit
services organization, encompassing "a person who *** in return
for the payment of money or other valuable consideration" either
obtains "an extension of credit for a buyer; or *** provid[es]
advice or assistance to a buyer with regard to" obtaining an
extension of credit. (Emphasis added.) 815 ILCS 605/3(d)(ii),
(d)(iii) (West 1996); slip op. at 6. The majority also notes that the
statutory definition of a "[b]uyer" is one "who is solicited to
purchase or who purchases the services of a credit services
organization." 815 ILCS 605/3(a) (West 1996).
	After briefly acknowledging these definitions, however, the
majority does not consider their application in this case, choosing
instead to conclude summarily that Midstate is not a credit
services organization because "the Credit Services Act requires
payment for credit services, not simply payment for other goods or
services." Slip op. at 15. This conclusion fails to analyze fully the
key issue in this case, namely, whether Midstate's conduct brings
it within the statutory definition of a credit services organization.
The majority omits a fundamental analytical step by not applying
the Act to the relevant facts underlying the parties' transaction. A
complete analysis requires us to examine the undisputed facts in
this case.
	When the Midstate sales representative who met the Rogers
in their home informed them of the total cost of the remodeling
project, the Rogers explained that they had limited income and
could not afford the project. Mr. Rogers is disabled, with a gross
income of only $9,540 per year, and Mrs. Rogers works as a nurse,
earning an annual gross income of $19,760. As the majority
admits (slip op. at 7), the Rogers ultimately agreed to the contract
only because Midstate offered its services to help them obtain
third-party financing. The parties' agreement indicated no cash
payments and stated that the contract amount of $19,600 was
subject to a loan. It disclosed no information about the applicable
interest rates or monthly payment amount.
	Midstate concedes that it assisted the Rogers in securing a
third-party loan. One of its sales representatives provided the
Rogers with a credit application and directed them to complete it.
The representative informed the couple that Midstate would obtain
financing for them and that they would make monthly payments
for approximately 15 years. Again, the representative failed to
provide any information concerning the actual amount of the
monthly payments.
	After the representative's visit, a Midstate loan assistance
employee reviewed the Rogers' credit application. The employee
testified that Midstate assists customers with financing and that
her job is to help qualify customers for loans. In this capacity, she
reviews more than 50 credit applications each week. In this case,
she received the Rogers' credit application, reviewed it, and then
contacted a number of lending institutions on their behalf,
forwarding their credit application in an effort to secure a loan.
The first three institutions she contacted refused to extend credit
to the Rogers. Eventually, Midstate secured a loan commitment
from Bank One at a rate of 11.35%, adjustable monthly, but the
Rogers found this interest rate unacceptable. The record contains
no evidence that the Rogers ever independently met, or otherwise
undertook loan negotiations, with any lending institution. Thus,
Midstate acted as a de facto representative for the Rogers in
obtaining the loan commitment, for the mutual benefit of both
parties.
	When we focus on the specific facts of the transaction
between the parties in this case, we must conclude that Midstate's
actions went far beyond simply selling goods to the Rogers, as the
majority claims. Slip op. at 7. Midstate's conduct fulfilled two of
the Act's key criteria, not only "providing advice or assistance to
a buyer with regard to" "obtaining an extension of credit," but also
actually obtaining an extension of credit for the Rogers. See 815
ILCS 605/3(d)(ii), (d)(iii) (West 1996). The trial court properly
found Midstate's acts went beyond mere ancillary services
performed in conjunction with a retail sale and fall squarely within
the statutory definition of those provided by a "[c]redit services
organization." See 815 ILCS 605/3(d)(ii), (d)(iii) (West 1996).
	To determine whether Midstate itself was a credit service
organization under the Act in this case, however, we must address
two other, closely interrelated questions: (1) whether Midstate
performed the credit services "in return for the payment of money
or other valuable consideration" (emphasis added) (see 815 ILCS
605/3(d) (West 1996)) and (2) whether the Rogers were "buyers"
under the statute, meaning that they either were "solicited to
purchase" or actually purchased the services of a credit services
organization (see 815 ILCS 605/3(a) (West 1996)).
	In answering these questions, the majority abruptly concludes
that "the agreed consideration is for payment of windows and
siding" and is not "in return for credit services provided by
Midstate." Slip op. at 7. Based on that conclusion, the majority
holds that Midstate is not a credit services organization. The
majority's rationale is belied, however, by its subsequent statement
agreeing "with the circuit court that the Rogers would not have
proceeded with the installation of the windows and siding without
assistance in obtaining an extension of credit." (Emphasis added.)
Slip op. at 7. The circuit court expressly found that
		"[i]n order to remain competitive, the Plaintiff [Midstate]
offered a service to prospective buyers to assist them in
obtaining financing to purchase siding and windows. In
fact, the agreement between the Plaintiff and Defendant
would never have been consummated had the Plaintiff not
helped them obtain financing. The Plaintiff's assistance
was more than a mere service, but was part of the
consideration to support the agreement." (Emphases
added.) See slip op. at 6-7.
	Despite its stated agreement with this finding, the majority
nonetheless declares that "the Credit Services Act requires
additional consideration for such assistance." (Emphasis added.)
Slip op. at 7. This conclusion is unsupported by any language in
the Act. Thus, the majority both overlooks the plain language of
the statute and creates other requirements out of whole cloth,
without any legal justification.
	The majority cites section 5 of the Act as consistent with this
conclusion, but the connection between the two concepts remains
unexplained. Section 5 prohibits credit services organizations from
receiving valuable consideration solely for referring buyers to
retail sellers who may extend credit "if such extension of credit is
in substantially the same terms as those available to the general
public." 815 ILCS 605/5 (West 1996). First, there is nothing in the
record to suggest that this case meets the criteria in section 5.
Indeed, the record strongly suggests the opposite conclusion, i.e.,
the Rogers would not have been able to obtain the necessary
financing "in substantially the same terms as those available to
the general public." Thus, section 5 is not implicated in this case.
	Even more importantly, section 5 appears completely
unrelated to the majority's finding that "the Credit Services Act
requires additional consideration" for Midstate's assistance in
obtaining financing for the Rogers. Slip op. at 7. As the majority
aptly notes (slip op. at 5), we must not depart from a statute's plain
language by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions
not clearly intended by the legislature. See Bridgestone/Firestone,
Inc. v. Aldridge, 179 Ill. 2d 141, 149 (1997). Yet, the majority
departs from this same fundamental rule of construction by
reading into the Act a requirement that an agreement to assist
another in obtaining third-party financing be accompanied by
some form of "additional consideration." See slip op. at 7. The
majority does not, and cannot, point to any language in the Act
supporting this limitation.
	Contrary to the majority's rationale, to bring a credit services
organization within the ambit of the Act does not require any
additional monetary payment for performing the credit-related
services. The Act expressly requires only that the services be
provided "in return for the payment of money or other valuable
consideration." (Emphasis added.) 815 ILCS 605/3(d) (West
1996).
	Here, Midstate induced the Rogers to enter into the
remodeling project by offering to arrange a loan for them, and it
subsequently fulfilled this promise. As the majority admits, the
Rogers' agreement to proceed with the contract was strictly
contingent on Midstate's proffered assistance in obtaining credit.
Slip op. at 7. By expressly agreeing with the trial court's finding
that "the Rogers would not have proceeded" with the contract
without Midstate's substantial assistance in obtaining the requisite
financing (slip op. at 7), the majority also implicitly acknowledges
that Midstate's credit assistance was in fact supported by "other
valuable consideration" (see 815 ILCS 605/3(d) (West 1996)), i.e.,
the Rogers' ultimate agreement to enter into the remodeling
contract. This acknowledgment contradicts the majority's
conclusion that Midstate's credit services were gratuitous and not
supported by "additional consideration" (slip op. at 7). As the
majority admits, Midstate's assistance constituted an integral part
of the parties' contract, received in exchange for valuable
consideration.
	By giving "other valuable consideration" for Midstate's
proffered credit services, in addition to the promise of monetary
payment for windows and siding as noted by the majority (slip op.
at 7), the Rogers were "buyers" under the Act. 815 ILCS 605/3(a)
(West 1996) (defining a "[b]uyer" as one "who is solicited to
purchase *** the services of a credit services organization). Under
these facts, Midstate clearly falls within the statutory definition of
a "credit services organization," with the Rogers acting as
"buyers" of that organization's credit services. See 815 ILCS
605/3(a), (d) (West 1996). Therefore, the parties agreed to the
provision of credit services "in return for the payment of *** other
valuable consideration" (815 ILCS 605/3(d) (West 1996)), and
their transaction was governed by the Act.
	Holding that Midstate's conduct in this case qualified it as a
credit services organization is consistent with the Act's stated goal
of providing "prospective consumers of credit services companies
with the information necessary to make an informed decision
regarding the purchase of those services and to protect the public
from unfair or deceptive advertising and business practices." 815
ILCS 605/2(b) (West 1996). These protections were prompted by
"[c]ertain advertising and business practices of some companies
engaged in the business of credit services [that] have worked a
financial hardship upon the people of this State, often on those
who are of limited economic means and inexperienced in credit
matters." 815 ILCS 605/2(a) (West 1996). As prospective
consumers of Midstate's credit services, the Rogers were entitled
to these protections.
	As a credit services organization, Midstate was bound by the
statutory mandates contained in sections 6 and 7 of the Act (815
ILCS 605/6, 7 (West 1996)). Since the parties' contract failed to
comply with the mandatory terms of the statute, including the
requirement of full disclosure of "the terms and conditions of
payment, including the total of all payments to be made by the
buyer" (815 ILCS 605/7 (West 1996)), it violated the statute. "Any
contract for services which does not comply with applicable
provisions of [the Act] shall be void and unenforceable as contrary
to public policy." 815 ILCS 605/8 (West 1996).
	For this reason, the trial court and the appellate court properly
deemed the contract void and awarded the Rogers attorney fees
under section 11 of the Act (815 ILCS 605/11 (West 1996)). I
would affirm the appellate court on this issue and remand the
cause to the trial court with instructions to award reasonable
attorney fees in favor of the Rogers.
	I also believe the trial court's ruling could be affirmed on the
alternative basis that the contract violated the Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices Act (Fraud Act) (815 ILCS 505/1 et
seq. (West 1996)). The Rogers raised this issue in their
counterclaim, but the trial and appellate courts did not address it.
The Fraud Act provides that "the use or employment of any ***
misrepresentation or the concealment, suppression or omission of
any material fact, with intent that others rely upon" it constitutes
an "[u]nfair method[ ] of competition and unfair or deceptive act[ ]
or practice[ ]." 815 ILCS 505/2 (West 1996). Such conduct is
unlawful regardless of "whether any person has in fact been
misled, deceived or damaged thereby." 815 ILCS 505/2 (West
1996). In this case, the contractual interest rate was undoubtedly
a material fact, but it was not disclosed when the Rogers entered
into the agreement with Midstate. Because Midstate omitted the
applicable interest rate from the contract, it violated the Fraud Act.
For this reason, I would affirm the award of attorney fees to the
Rogers pursuant to section 10a(c) of the Fraud Act (815 ILCS
505/10a(c) (West 1996)).