Title: State v. Davis

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Davis, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-309.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-309 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. DAVIS, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Davis, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-309.] 
Criminal law—Ineffective assistance of counsel—When defense counsel fails to 
request that the trial court waive court costs on behalf of a defendant who 
has previously been found to be indigent, a determination of prejudice in an 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel analysis depends on whether the facts and 
circumstances presented by the defendant establish that there is a 
reasonable probability that the trial court would have granted the request 
to waive court costs had one been made—Court of appeals’ judgment 
reversed and cause remanded. 
(No. 2018-0312—Submitted March 5, 2019—Decided February 4, 2020.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Licking County, 
No. 2017-CA-55, 2017-Ohio-9445. 
_________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2
FISCHER, J. 
{¶ 1} In this certified-conflict case, we are asked to determine whether trial 
counsel’s failure to file a motion to waive court costs at a defendant’s sentencing 
hearing constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel when the defendant has 
previously been found indigent.  We decline to answer the certified-conflict 
question in either the affirmative or the negative.  Rather, a court’s finding of 
ineffective assistance of counsel depends on the facts and circumstances in each 
case.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).  We hold that when an indigent defendant makes an 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim based upon counsel’s failure to request a 
waiver of court costs, a reviewing court must apply the test in State v. Bradley, 42 
Ohio St.3d 136, 141-142, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989), which adopted the standard that 
had been announced in Strickland, for determining whether a defendant received 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  If a court analyzes the prejudice prong, then it 
must consider the facts and circumstances of the case objectively to determine 
whether the defendant established the necessary prejudice sufficient to support that 
claim—i.e., but for counsel’s deficient performance, there exists a reasonable 
probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
I.  Background 
{¶ 2} A jury found appellant, Benjamin A. Davis, guilty of assaulting a 
peace officer, a violation of R.C. 2903.13(A) and (C)(5).  At Davis’s sentencing 
hearing, the trial court imposed a prison term among other penalties and assessed 
court costs against Davis.  Despite Davis’s indigent status, defense counsel did not 
request that the trial court waive Davis’s court costs. 
{¶ 3} Davis appealed the judgment.  He asserted that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to request that the trial court waive Davis’s court costs.  To 
support his argument, Davis relied on State v. Springer, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 
104649, 2017-Ohio-8861, in which the Eighth District Court of Appeals reaffirmed 
January Term, 2020 
 
3
its decision in State v. Gibson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104363, 2017-Ohio-102, 
and stated that “a prior finding by the trial court that a defendant was indigent 
demonstrated a reasonable probability that the trial court would have waived costs 
had counsel made a timely motion,” Springer at ¶ 46. 
{¶ 4} The Fifth District, in analyzing Davis’s ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claim, rejected the Eighth District’s rationale in Springer.  Recognizing 
that Gibson relied on State v. Clevenger, 114 Ohio St.3d 258, 2007-Ohio-4006, 871 
N.E.2d 589, an opinion from this court that predated the enactment of R.C. 
2947.23(C)—which allows a trial court to waive the costs of prosecution at any 
time after sentencing—the Fifth District determined that Davis was “not prejudiced 
by trial counsel’s failure to request waiver of costs at sentencing because he [was] 
not foreclosed from filing a request at a later time.”  2017-Ohio-9445, ¶ 31.  The 
Fifth District thus determined that “the basis for a finding of ineffective assistance 
of counsel for failure to request that waiver no longer exists.”  Id. 
{¶ 5} Subsequently, the Fifth District certified a conflict between its 
judgment and the Eighth District’s judgment in Springer.  This court accepted the 
following conflict question for review: “ ‘Is trial counsel’s failure to file a motion 
to waive court costs at sentencing ineffective assistance of counsel when defendant 
has previously been found indigent?’ ”  152 Ohio St.3d 1441, 2018-Ohio-1600, 96 
N.E.3d 297, quoting the court of appeals’ February 13, 2018 judgment entry. 
II.  Analysis 
A. Davis’s right to assert ineffective assistance of counsel 
{¶ 6} As a preliminary issue, the second dissenting opinion raises a concern 
over whether Davis has a constitutional right to assert ineffective assistance of 
counsel based on defense counsel’s failure to request a waiver of court costs.  We 
recognize that this issue was not raised by either party.  Without either party having 
preserved that argument and without briefing, we decline to hold in this case that a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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defendant has no right to assert an ineffective-assistance claim based on counsel’s 
failure to request a waiver of court costs. 
{¶ 7} We recognize that court costs are not punishment, State v. Threatt, 
108 Ohio St.3d 277, 2006-Ohio-905, 843 N.E.2d 164, ¶ 15, superseded by statute 
as stated in State v. Braden, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2019-Ohio-4204, __ N.E.3d __, and 
are thus not a part of a sentence, State v. White, 156 Ohio St.3d 536, 2019-Ohio-
1215, 130 N.E.3d 247, ¶ 14.  However, under R.C. 2947.23(A)(1)(a), the General 
Assembly has nevertheless ordered trial courts to include the costs in an offender’s 
sentence and judgment.  Because R.C. 2947.23 costs are imposed at sentencing and 
because sentencing is a critical stage in which a felony offender has a right to 
counsel, State v. Schleiger, 141 Ohio St.3d 67, 2014-Ohio-3970, 21 N.E.3d 1033, 
¶ 15, see also Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 
393 (1977), an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim regarding counsel’s failure 
to request a waiver of costs may be raised on appeal, as they are a particular result 
of the sentencing process.  To hold otherwise would permit the parsing of the right 
to effective counsel to particular instances rather than to critical stages of 
proceedings.  We decline to adopt such a ruling without the benefit of argument 
and briefing. 
{¶ 8} We acknowledge the second dissenting opinion’s concern regarding 
the impact of this interpretation on R.C. 2947.23(C) motions that are made after 
sentencing.  But the treatment of those motions need not be addressed in this 
opinion.  The only issue currently before this court is determining the correct 
analysis for whether defense counsel may be found ineffective for failing to a 
request a waiver of an indigent client’s court costs. 
{¶ 9} Therefore, we proceed to address the certified-conflict question. 
B. Appellate courts must apply the test announced in Bradley 
{¶ 10} In order to prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a 
defendant must prove that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the 
January Term, 2020 
 
5
defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance.  Bradley, 42 Ohio 
St.3d at 141-142, 538 N.E.2d 373; Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 
L.Ed.2d 674.  Thus, the defendant must demonstrate that counsel’s performance 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there exists a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.  See Bradley at paragraphs two and three of the syllabus.  “ ‘A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.’ ”  Id. at 142, quoting Strickland at 694. 
{¶ 11} The conflict cases address the same question but reach different 
results, specifically as to the prejudice prong of the ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel test.  In Springer, the Eighth District determined that “ ‘it is nearly 
impossible to establish prejudice as a result of counsel’s failure to move for a 
waiver of costs at sentencing’ because under R.C. 2947.23(C), as amended in 2013, 
trial courts now retain jurisdiction to waive, suspend or modify the payment of court 
costs at any time.”  2017-Ohio-8861 at ¶ 45, quoting State v. Mihalis, 8th Dist. 
Cuyahoga No. 104308, 2016-Ohio-8056, ¶ 33.  The court found, however, that a 
narrow exception applied for indigent defendants: “a prior finding by the trial court 
that a defendant was indigent demonstrated a reasonable probability that the trial 
court would have waived costs had counsel made a timely motion.”  Springer at  
¶ 46.  After determining that counsel’s performance was deficient and that Springer 
was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance, the court determined that 
Springer had received ineffective assistance of counsel.  Id. 
{¶ 12} The Fifth District, on the other hand, rejected the argument that 
defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request that the trial court waive 
Davis’s court costs due to demonstrated indigency, relying solely on the prejudice 
prong of the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel analysis.  2017-Ohio-9445 at ¶ 31; 
see also State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 389, 721 N.E.2d 52 (2000) (“A 
defendant’s failure to satisfy one prong of the Strickland test negates a court’s need 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6
to consider the other”).  The Fifth District determined that Davis was “not 
prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to request waiver of costs at sentencing because 
he [was] not foreclosed from filing a request at a later time.”  2017-Ohio-9445 at 
¶ 31. 
{¶ 13} R.C. 2947.23(A)(1)(a) requires a trial court to impose the costs of 
prosecution against all convicted criminal defendants.  White, 103 Ohio St.3d 580, 
2004-Ohio-5989, 817 N.E.2d 393, at ¶ 14.  While the imposition of those costs is 
mandatory, the court may waive the payment of all costs when the defendant is 
determined to be indigent.  Id.; see also R.C. 2743.70, 2949.091, and 2949.092.  
R.C. 2947.23(C) permits the trial court “to waive, suspend, or modify the payment 
of the costs of prosecution, including any costs under section 2947.231 of the 
Revised Code, at the time of sentencing or at any time thereafter.” 
{¶ 14} An appellate court’s reliance on the fact that a defendant may move 
for a waiver of costs at a later time under R.C. 2947.23(C) in its prejudice analysis 
is improper.  Whether the defendant may move for a waiver of court costs at a later 
time has little or no bearing on whether the trial court would have granted a motion 
to waive court costs at the time of sentencing.  The enactment of R.C. 2947.23(C) 
did not change how courts of appeals should evaluate the prejudice prong of the 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel analysis.  The analysis remains the same: a court 
must review the facts and circumstances of each case objectively and determine 
whether the defendant demonstrated a reasonable probability that had his counsel 
moved to waive court costs, the trial court would have granted that motion. 
{¶ 15} To evaluate whether a defendant has been prejudiced, as part of an 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a court does not assess whether the 
defendant was simply harmed by counsel’s alleged deficient performance.  More 
specifically, the court does not analyze whether the defendant has been required to 
pay court costs at a given moment, see, e.g., State v. Cowan, 7th Dist. Columbiana 
No. 18 CO 0010, 2019-Ohio-2691, ¶ 59, or even whether the defendant has the 
January Term, 2020 
 
7
ability to have court costs waived in the future.  Furthermore, a determination of 
indigency alone does not rise to the level of creating a reasonable probability that 
the trial court would have waived costs had defense counsel moved the court to do 
so, contrary to the Eighth District’s holding in Gibson, 2017-Ohio-102, and in 
Springer, 2017-Ohio-8861.  See State v. Dean, 146 Ohio St.3d 106, 2015-Ohio-
4347, 54 N.E.3d 80, ¶ 233; State v. Smith, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2010–06–057, 
2011-Ohio-1188, ¶ 63-64, rev’d in part on other grounds, 131 Ohio St.3d 297, 
2012-Ohio-781, 964 N.E.2d 423 (an indigent defendant fails to show that there is a 
reasonable probability that the trial court would have waived costs when the trial 
court made a finding that the defendant had the ability to work and therefore had 
the ability to pay the costs in the future).  The court of appeals, instead, must look 
at all the circumstances that the defendant sets forth in attempting to demonstrate 
prejudice and determine whether there is a reasonable probability that the trial court 
would have granted a motion to waive costs had one been made. 
{¶ 16} For these reasons, we answer the certified-conflict question neither 
in the affirmative nor in the negative.  Instead, we conclude that when trial counsel 
fails to request that the trial court waive court costs on behalf of a defendant who 
has previously been found to be indigent, a determination of prejudice for purposes 
of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel analysis depends upon whether the facts and 
circumstances presented by the defendant establish that there is a reasonable 
probability that the trial court would have granted the request to waive costs had 
one been made. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 17} Because the Fifth District incorrectly analyzed the prejudice prong 
of the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel analysis in this case, we reverse its 
judgment and remand the cause to that court so that it may conduct the ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel analysis set forth in Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d at 141-142, 538 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8
N.E.2d 373, in accordance with this opinion.  See In re Adoption of P.L.H., 151 
Ohio St.3d 554, 2017-Ohio-5824, 91 N.E.3d 698, ¶ 33. 
Judgment reversed  
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH, DONNELLY, and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
DONNELLY, J., concurs, with an opinion. 
KENNEDY, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
DEWINE, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
_________________ 
DONNELLY, J., concurring. 
{¶ 18} I concur in the majority’s decision to reject the categorical 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel analyses advocated by the parties and reverse the 
judgment of the court of appeals.  I agree that a reviewing court must objectively 
consider, on a case-by-case basis, the specific facts and circumstances of a case 
when determining whether a reasonable probability exists that a sentencing court 
would have waived a defendant’s payment of court costs had such a request been 
made by defense counsel. 
{¶ 19} In reviewing those facts and circumstances, courts should be mindful 
of the true impact that court costs have.  Many jurisdictions impose interest and late 
fees on court costs, thereby multiplying the financial burden on those debtors who 
are least able to pay.  See, e.g., Sara Dorn, Some Cuyahoga County Municipal 
Courts 
Bluff 
About 
Their 
Payment 
Plans 
(Apr. 
27, 
2017), 
https://www.cleveland.com/metro/2017/04/some_cuyahoga_county_municipal.ht
ml (accessed Oct. 4, 2019) [https://perma.cc/NK5L-RR4X].  Aggressive collection 
practices against an indigent defendant may result in negative collateral 
consequences, such as damaging a person’s credit, interfering with a defendant’s 
other commitments (like child support), restricting employment opportunities, and 
otherwise impeding a defendant’s rehabilitation and reentry into society.  When 
January Term, 2020 
 
9
coupled with these debilitating collateral consequences, court-costs debt imposes 
an enduring burden that may sometimes exceed the penalty for the crime.  See 
Appleman, Nickel and Dimed into Incarceration: Cash-Register Justice in the 
Criminal System, 57 B.C.L.Rev. 1483 (2016); Development in the Law Policing, 
Chapter One Policing and Profit, 128 Harv.L.Rev. 1723 (2015).  The law permits 
the prison-commissary accounts of those who are incarcerated to be attached, 
depriving inmates from purchasing necessities and small creature comforts that 
their meager earnings or family contributions are able to provide.  R.C. 2949.14; 
Ohio Adm.Code 5120-5-03.  Thus, the burdens imposed by assessing court costs 
on indigent defendants are by no means inconsequential. 
{¶ 20} As a former trial-court judge, I am keenly aware that certain costs 
(such as witness-subpoena fees) have been incorrectly assessed against a first-
named defendant in a case involving one or more codefendants.  An indigent 
defendant would have no way of knowing whether a cost has been imposed 
inequitably.  Thus, it is incumbent on defense counsel to ensure that any court costs 
that have been assessed against his or her client are accurate and equitable. 
{¶ 21} It is not unreasonable for a client who has already been declared 
indigent to expect counsel to move for a waiver of court costs at sentencing.  The 
process for doing so is not particularly difficult, but the failure to do so could expose 
a client to significant financial burdens and subject defense counsel to a claim of 
professional nonfeasance. 
{¶ 22} I agree with the majority’s determination that the court of appeals’ 
analysis was improper because whether Davis may move for a waiver of court costs 
at a later time has little to no bearing on whether the trial court would have granted 
a motion to waive court costs at the time of sentencing.  Because the court of 
appeals did not apply the correct analysis to Davis’s claim for ineffective assistance 
of counsel, I concur. 
_________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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KENNEDY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 23} This court accepted this case based on a certified conflict that 
presents the following question: “ ‘Is trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to waive 
court costs at sentencing ineffective assistance of counsel when defendant has 
previously been found indigent?’ ” 152 Ohio St.3d 1441, 2018-Ohio-1600, 96 
N.E.3d 297, quoting 5th Dist. Licking No. 17-CA-55 (Feb. 13, 2018).  In contrast 
with the majority’s determination that the certified-conflict question cannot be 
answered with a simple yes or no, I would answer the certified-conflict question in 
the negative. 
{¶ 24} Courts should apply the two-prong test for ineffective assistance of 
counsel established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 104 S.Ct. 
2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and adopted by this court in State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio 
St.3d 136, 141-143, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989), to determine whether a defendant has 
met his burden of demonstrating that counsel was ineffective, State v. Gondor, 112 
Ohio St.3d 377, 2006-Ohio-6679, 860 N.E.2d 77, ¶ 62, for failing to file a motion 
to waive court costs.  And here, the Fifth District Court of Appeals—like the Eighth 
District Court of Appeals in the conflict case, State v. Springer, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 
No. 104649, 2017-Ohio-8861—created a bright-line rule for determining whether 
trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to waive court costs at sentencing constitutes 
ineffective assistance of counsel for a defendant who has previously been found 
indigent.  Because bright-line rules are contrary to Strickland, I dissent. 
{¶ 25} An application of the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis to 
appellant Benjamin Davis’s case shows that he has failed to demonstrate that he 
was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to waive court costs at 
sentencing.  Consequently, I would affirm the judgment of the Fifth District but on 
different grounds. 
{¶ 26} Resolution of the certified-conflict question begins with an 
examination of the underlying facts in this case and in Springer.  In this case, Davis 
January Term, 2020 
 
11 
argued in the court of appeals that in accordance with Springer, a previous 
determination of indigency by the trial court required the court of appeals to hold 
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a waiver of court costs at his 
sentencing hearing.  The Fifth District began its analysis by setting out Strickland’s 
two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel: 
 
First, the trial court must determine whether counsel’s assistance was 
ineffective; i.e., whether counsel’s performance fell below an objective 
standard of reasonable representation and was violative of any of his or her 
essential duties to the client.  If the court finds ineffective assistance of 
counsel, it must then determine whether or not the defense was actually 
prejudiced by counsel’s ineffectiveness such that the reliability of the 
outcome of the trial is suspect.  This requires a showing [that] there is a 
reasonable probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional error, the 
outcome of the trial would have been different. 
 
2017-Ohio-9445, ¶ 25.  The appellate court recognized that to find trial counsel’s 
performance ineffective, Davis needed to establish both prongs of Strickland.  Id. 
at ¶ 26. 
{¶ 27} In rejecting Davis’s challenge, the Fifth District considered only the 
prejudice prong.  See State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 389, 721 N.E.2d 52 
(2000) (an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel challenge lacking in merit may be 
expediently disposed of by finding that the defendant failed to establish one of the 
Strickland prongs), citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 
674.  The Fifth District held, “Because R.C. 2947.23(C) grants [Davis] the ability 
to seek waiver of costs at any time, including after sentencing, [he] has not been 
prejudiced by the failure of his counsel to request a waiver at sentencing.”  2017-
Ohio-9445 at ¶ 27.  Therefore, considering only the effect of R.C. 2947.23(C), the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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appellate court created a per se rule, holding that trial counsel’s failure to file a 
motion to waive court costs at the time of a defendant’s sentencing hearing could 
never constitute prejudice in an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim because the 
defendant is able to file a motion to waive court costs at any time after sentencing. 
{¶ 28} Similar to the Fifth District’s analysis, the Eighth District’s 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel analysis in Springer also focused on the prejudice 
prong: “As to Springer’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel relating to the 
imposition of costs, he must show that a reasonable probability exists that the trial 
court would have waived payment of the costs if such motion had been filed.”  
2017-Ohio-8861 at ¶ 45. 
{¶ 29} The Springer court held that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to request a waiver of court costs when the trial court had previously found Springer 
indigent.  Id. at ¶ 46 (“under such circumstances counsel’s failure * * * was 
deficient and prejudiced the defendant” [emphasis added]), citing State v. Gibson, 
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104308, 2016-Ohio-8056, ¶ 16.  Considering only 
Springer’s prior determination of indigency, the Eighth District enforced a per se 
rule that that prior finding “demonstrate[s] a reasonable probability that the trial 
court would have waived costs had counsel made a timely motion.”  Id. at ¶ 46, 
citing Gibson at ¶ 16. 
{¶ 30} The majority sets forth the two-prong test of Strickland.  However, 
neither the Fifth District nor the Eighth District actually applied the Strickland test.  
Each court established a bright-line rule. 
{¶ 31} As set forth above, the Fifth District held that a defendant who has 
previously been found indigent could never be prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure 
to file a motion to waive court costs at sentencing, because R.C. 2947.23(C) permits 
the defendant to file a motion to waive court costs after sentencing.  Conversely, 
the Eighth District held that a defendant who has previously been found indigent is 
always prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to waive court costs at 
January Term, 2020 
 
13 
sentencing.  By creating bright-line rules, however, both courts failed to “consider 
the totality of the evidence,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 
L.Ed.2d 674, in determining whether prejudice was established.  See also Lee v. 
United States, __ U.S. __, 137 S.Ct. 1958, 1966, 198 L.Ed.2d 476 (2017). 
{¶ 32} Therefore, I would answer the certified-conflict question in the 
negative.  When a defendant has previously been found to be indigent, trial 
counsel’s failure to file a motion to waive court costs at sentencing does not 
constitute per se ineffective assistance of counsel.  When reviewing whether a 
defendant has met his burden of demonstrating that trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to file a motion to waive an indigent defendant’s court costs, see Gondor, 
112 Ohio St.3d 377, 2006-Ohio-6679, 860 N.E.2d 77, at ¶ 62 (defendant has the 
burden of proof to establish ineffective assistance of counsel), lower courts should 
apply the two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel established in 
Strickland, 687-688, and adopted by this court in Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d at 141-
143, 538 N.E.2d 373.  And when considering the second prong of the Strickland 
test, courts should review the totality of the evidence.  See Strickland at 695; Lee at 
__, 137 S.Ct. at 1966. 
{¶ 33} Moreover, contrary to the majority’s determination, I would not 
remand this cause to the Fifth District.  Davis has the burden to prove that he was 
prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to waive court costs at 
sentencing.  See Gondor at ¶ 62.  To satisfy the prejudice prong, Davis needed to 
show that but for trial counsel’s error in failing to file the motion to waive court 
costs at sentencing, there was a reasonable probability that the trial court would 
have waived court costs at sentencing.  Strickland at 694.  In support of his claim, 
Davis relies on the Eighth District’s opinion in Springer, 2017-Ohio-8861, and the 
fact that the trial court had previously declared him to be indigent.  Having rejected 
the analysis in Springer, I would hold that evidence of a prior determination of 
indigency, standing alone, does not support a finding of prejudice. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
14 
{¶ 34} R.C. 2947.23 addresses the imposition of court costs.  In State v. 
White, this court held that the plain language of R.C. 2947.23 requires a trial court 
to impose court costs on all defendants, including those defendants who have been 
determined to be indigent.  103 Ohio St.3d 580, 2004-Ohio-5989, 817 N.E.2d 393, 
¶ 8, 14.  This court further held that it is within the sound discretion of the trial court 
whether to waive an indigent defendant’s court costs.  Id. at ¶ 14.  Therefore, a prior 
determination that a defendant is indigent, standing alone, does not demonstrate 
prejudice in an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim when trial counsel’s sole 
failure is not filing a motion to waive his client’s court costs at the time of 
sentencing.  Based on this record, Davis has failed to satisfy his burden.  Therefore, 
I would affirm the Fifth District Court of Appeals on different grounds. 
{¶ 35} I dissent. 
_________________ 
DEWINE, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 36} The majority today remands this case for the court of appeals to 
decide whether Benjamin A. Davis’s rights under the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution were violated when his attorney failed to file a motion 
for a waiver of court costs on the day of Davis’s sentencing.  I respectfully dissent. 
{¶ 37} To start with, Davis’s right to effective assistance of counsel could 
not have been violated in this case because there is no Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel to ask for a waiver of court costs.  “[W]here there is no constitutional right 
to counsel there can be no deprivation of effective assistance.”  Coleman v. 
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991), citing 
Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 102 S.Ct. 1300, 71 L.Ed.2d 475 (1982).  Thus, 
before determining whether to remand for application of Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the majority should have 
first asked whether Davis possessed a right to counsel to request a waiver of court 
costs. 
January Term, 2020 
 
15 
{¶ 38} The answer is most assuredly no.  By its terms, the Sixth Amendment 
guarantees an accused the right “to have the [a]ssistance of [c]ounsel for his 
defen[s]e” against a “criminal prosecution[].”  Once the right to counsel 
commences through the initiation of a criminal prosecution, it applies to any 
“critical stage” of the proceedings.  Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., Tex., 554 U.S. 191, 
212, 128 S.Ct. 2578, 171 L.Ed.2d 366 (2008).  A stage is critical if appointed 
counsel is necessary to “guarantee effective assistance at trial.”  Id. at 218 (Alito, 
J., concurring).  The Supreme Court of the United States has never suggested that 
the right extends beyond the defense of criminal charges to include a right to 
counsel to seek a waiver of court costs. 
{¶ 39} Under Ohio law, a judge “shall include in the sentence the costs of 
prosecution * * * and render a judgment against the defendant for such costs.”  R.C. 
2947.23(A)(1)(a).  The judge, however, retains jurisdiction to “waive, suspend, or 
modify” the payment of costs “at the time of sentencing or at any time thereafter.”  
R.C. 2947.23(C).  Court costs are not a criminal sanction but rather a civil 
obligation that “may be collected only by the methods provided for the collection 
of civil judgments.”  Strattman v. Studt, 20 Ohio St.2d 95, 103, 253 N.E.2d 749 
(1969).  Because court costs are a civil matter, the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel “for defen[s]e” against a “criminal prosecution[]” simply does not apply. 
{¶ 40} Indeed, if one accepts the majority’s premise that there is a right to 
counsel to seek a waiver of court costs, there is no plausible justification to limit 
that right to the time of a defendant’s sentencing.  If such a right is really guaranteed 
by the federal Constitution, then the defendant has the right to counsel whenever 
he decides to ask for a waiver of court costs. 
{¶ 41} That there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel to ask for a 
waiver of court costs is not to say that counsel has no duty to advise his client about 
court costs and a possible waiver—counsel is always bound to provide “competent 
representation” to his client.  See Prof.Cond.R. 1.1.  And it may well be a good idea 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
as a policy matter for state and county public-defender offices to instruct appointed 
counsel to seek a waiver of court costs for indigent clients unless there are good 
reasons not to do so.  But nothing in the Sixth Amendment requires that counsel be 
provided for that purpose.  At the very least, before remanding for an assessment 
whether Davis was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to file a motion to waive 
court costs at sentencing, the majority should consider whether the Sixth 
Amendment even guarantees such a right. 
{¶ 42} The majority protests that neither party has properly preserved the 
issue about the existence of a right to counsel to seek a waiver of court costs.  But 
there is no way to determine whether Davis suffered a constitutional deprivation 
when his counsel failed to request a waiver without first determining whether the 
Constitution guarantees him a right to counsel for that purpose.  As we have 
explained: 
 
When an issue of law that was not argued below is implicit in 
another issue that was argued and is presented by an appeal, we may 
consider and resolve that implicit issue.  To put it another way, if we 
must resolve a legal issue that was not raised below in order to reach 
a legal issue that was raised, we will do so. 
 
Belvedere Condominium Unit Owners’ Assn. v. R.E. Roark Cos., Inc., 67 Ohio 
St.3d 274, 279, 617 N.E.2d 1075 (1993).  This is such a case.  If there is no right to 
counsel to ask for a waiver of court costs, it is nonsensical to remand to ask if that 
right was violated.  And if the majority’s concern is a lack of briefing, it would be 
far better for it to order additional briefing on the matter than to blithely presume 
the existence of a previously unrecognized constitutional right. 
{¶ 43} Furthermore, even setting aside the questionable underpinnings of 
the majority’s opinion, Davis has suffered no prejudice of a type that calls for a 
January Term, 2020 
 
17 
remand.  As mentioned, a convicted criminal defendant has the option to ask a trial 
court to “waive, suspend, or modify” the payment of court costs “at the time of 
sentencing or at any time thereafter.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 2947.23(C).  So, if 
Davis is successful in the remand ordered by the majority, what he will get is no 
more than what he already has. 
{¶ 44} Indeed, we recently rejected an argument similar to the one that 
prevails today.  In State v. Beasley, the trial court did not mention court costs during 
the sentencing hearing but imposed them in its entry.  State v. Beasley, 153 Ohio 
St. 3d 497, 2018-Ohio-493, 108 N.E.3d 1028, ¶ 263.  Beasley asked this court to 
order a remand, but we refused.  Id.  We held that a remand was not necessary in 
order for Beasley to file a motion to waive costs because R.C. 2947.23(C) already 
allowed him to do so.  Id. at ¶ 265.  Based on the majority’s decision today, Beasley 
was wrongly decided. 
{¶ 45} Finally, I agree with much of the first dissent’s analysis.  The record 
does not demonstrate a reasonable probability that the trial court would have 
waived court costs had it been requested to do so.  But I see no need to get to this 
issue.  Because there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel to request a waiver 
of court costs, Davis has not suffered a deprivation of his constitutional rights. 
_________________ 
 
William Hayes, Licking County Prosecuting Attorney, and Clifford J. 
Murphy, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Anzelmo Law and James A. Anzelmo; and Durst Law Firm and Alexander 
J. Durst, for appellant. 
 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Nikki Trautman Baszynski, 
Assistant Public Defender, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Office of the Ohio 
Public Defender. 
___________________