Title: State v. Kauhi

State: hawaii

Issuer: Hawaii Supreme Court

Document:

senor FOR PUBLICATION***
ee
No. 26943
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T

a

STATE OF HAWAI'I, Plaintiff-Appellee

 

GENESIS KAUHI, Defendant-Appellent Zi BF
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT = =
(CR. NO, 01-1-333) zg mm
> °
wi uM ion a
Nakayama,

C.J., Levinson,

(By: Moon,
and Duffy, JJ.)

eoba,

In this appeal, Defendant-Appellant Genesis Kauhi
(Genesis) appeals from the Septenber 16, 2004 Judgment, Guilty
Conviction and Sentence (judgment) of the circuit court of the
third circuit (the court)! convicting Genesis of Murder in the

Second Degree under Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707-701.5(1)

(1993)? (Count I) and Place to Keep Firearms under HRS § 134-6(a)

‘The Honorable Greg . Nakamura presided over this matter.

(2993), entitiea

 

2 dawas's Revised Statutes (HFS) § 707-702.5(1)
cwurder in the second degree,” provides that “Ls

 

NTRS TNRE S 07-701 (1) (Supp. 2008) pertasns to murder in the
fest degree end penalizes @ person who “intentionally or knowingly cause

ith" ef the following:
More than one person in the same or separate incident;

4
sedge, or prosecutor,

 

 

()
(B) Blew enorcenant ofticer,

Srising cut of the perforsance of official dutie:
lc) Alpersen known By the defendant to be e witness in a

Griminal prosecution;

 

 

(continued...)
‘*sNOT FOR PUBLICATION*#*

 

(Supp. 2005),? and sentencing her to life imprisonment with the
possibility of parole with a mandatory minimum term of
imprisonment of fifteen (15) years for Count 1, and twenty (20)
years for Count II, to be served concurrently. For the reasons
stated herein, the court’s judgment is affirmed.

1

AL

‘The facts following were adduced at trial. Genesis and

the victim, Gaylon Baldado (Gaylon) were married for
approximately twenty-two years, and divorced in 1995. Despite

their divorce, the couple continued a relationship wherein Gaylon

*(.. continued)
(gd) A person by a hired killer, in which event both the
persch hired and the person responsible for hiring the
Efller shail be punished under this sections oF
(e) B person while the defendant was imprisoned

   

 

2 as § 134-6(a) (Supp. 2005), entitled “carrying or use of firearm
in the commission of # separate felony: place to kesp firearms; penalty,”

states, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) Jt shal be unlaxtu for a person te knowingly

sancy on the person oF have within the eerscn’s imediate
Eentrol of intentionally use or thesaten to-use-2 firesrs
uhile engsued in the commission of 2 separate felony,

bbether the fizeare was loaded of not, and whether oGerable
‘Benet; provided tnat 2 person shall not be prosecuted under
Thle subsection where the separate felony ist

(2) A felony offense otherwise defined by this

 

 

 

Chapt

(2) The felony offense of reckless endangering in
the first degree under section 707-71

(3) The felony offense of terroristic threatening in

 

the flest’ degree under section [707-T16(1} (a) 1,
(707-716(1) (b)], and (707-716(2) (@)}7 oF

(4) The felony offenses of criminal property damage
in the first degree under section 708-820 and
criminal property damage in the second degree
nde section 700-821 and the firearm is the
Snstrument oF means by which the property damage
ie caused,
‘s#sNOT FOR PUBLICATION***

would Live with Genesis on a periodic basis at Genesis’ residence
in Hilo, Island of Hawai'i. Sometime in February 2000, Gaylon
moved to Johnston Island‘ in order to work.

Genesis and Gaylon continued to keep in contact by
telephone and through lettexs. According to Genesis, during the
period between May 2000 and October 2001, Genesis made over 1200
phone calls to Gaylon while he was on Johnston Island and they
continued to refer to each other as husband and wife. Between
June 1, 2001 and September 15, 2001, Gaylon transferred money
amounting to $16,100 from his Hawai'i Federal and State Employees
Credit Union (HFSECU) account to Genesis’ account. The record
also indicates that Gaylon assisted Genesis in repaying her $9000
truck loan, From March 2001 to October 18, 2001, Gaylon had $150

of his paycheck, which was deposited directly to his credit union

 

account, transferred to pay for Genesis’ truck, amounting to

$2400.

 

‘The HFSECU records also revealed that from January 2001
to October 18, 2001, a total of $26,715.94 was deposited into
Genesis’ account. During the sane period, Genesis’ monthly
expenses totaled $28,375.91. Genesis was also a named
beneficiary on Gaylon’s HFSECU account, as well as his account
with Ononea Federal Credit Union. According to Genesis, she only

found out that she was a beneficiary of these credit union

accounts after Gaylon’s death.

 

Johnston Island is located southwest of Honoluls.

3
‘+#¢NOT FOR PUBLICATION*** .
hen Gaylon made visits to Hilo in April, June, and

Novenber 2000, he stayed with Genesis. Sometime in March 2001,
Gaylon and his then-girlfriend, Jennifer Sheldon (Sheldon), who
worked with Gaylon on Johnston Island, took a trip to Honolulu,
apparently without the knowledge of Genesis. On the second day
after checking into the Hobron Hotel, Sheldon answered 2
telephone call from a wonan asking for Gaylon. According to
Sheldon, Gaylon appeared upset and asked the woman, “How did you
get this number?” After their conversation, Gaylon allegedly
stated that he would call Genesis “when I get back on the
island.” After their conversation ended, Gaylon and Sheldon
checked out of the Hobron Hotel and transferred to the Pagoda
Hotel. Despite this, Genesis called the Hobron Hotel three more
times the next day.

Sheldon related that sometime in June 2001, Gaylon

ked her to marry him and told her that he would inform Genesis

 

in person about their relationship. According to Sheldon in
Septenber 2001, Sheldon accepted the marriage proposal but no
date was set. On October 10, 2001, Gaylon returned to Hilo for
the fourth time for a dental appointment, and to negotiate and
arrange for the purchase of real property, again staying with
Genesis. Prior to his departure from Johnston Island, Sheldon
gave Gaylon a rose quartz heart medallion and a letter.
According te Sheldon, she and Gaylon were supposed to meet in

Honolulu on October 18, 2001, and they would proceed to Las Vegas
 

‘s#enOT FOR PUBLICATION***

a

after his trip to Hilo. Sheldon testified that Gaylon called her
fon October 15, 2001, wherein he allegedly denied that he was
staying with Genesis.
B.

on October 18, 2001, at approximately 5:12 a.m., the
first call to 9-1-1 regarding the incident was made by Genesis.
Officers John Stewart (Stewart) and James Correa (Correa)
responded to reports of a donestic incident with possible
gunshots, and shortly thereafter, arrived at the residence of
Elizabeth Lee (Lee), Genesis’ neighbor. Stewart found Gaylon
lying naked on the porch of Lee's residence with a towel draped
over him. Stewart pulled back the towel and saw a gunshot wound
and bloodstains on the towel. Stewart then asked Gaylon what had
happened, and Gaylon responded that Genesis had shot him.
Stewart inquired of Gaylon about the whereabouts of the gun, and
Gaylon responded by pointing his feet towards a nearby bush. The
police subsequently recovered a semi-automatic handgun in the
bush, two feet away from Gaylon.

Ais’ residence. As

 

Stewart and Correa proceeded to Gent

they approached the front porch area of Genesis’ residence,

 

Stewart called out, “Genesis.” Correa testified that Genesis

 

responded, “Yes. It's okay. Come inside.” On the other hand,
according to Stewart, Genesis only stated, “Yes.” As the
officers approached the front porch area, they saw Genesis

sitting on a chair in the living room through the open front
‘*¢NOT FOR PUBLICATION®**

door. As they walked up the stairway leading to the front door,
they observed blood splattered on the stairway and on the front
porch. Once inside Genesis’ residence, Stewart found Genesis
sitting with her hands on her lap. According to Stewart, Genesis
appeared calm but her hands were shaking.

Stewart then asked Genesis, “Are you okay? Are you
hurt? Is there anybody in the house?” Genesis informed Stewart
that she was not hurt and that no one was in her residence.
Genesis then asked how Gaylon was and stated that she was going
to take him to the hospital and that Gaylon was her ex-husband.
Stewart then told Genesis that Gaylon was being taken to the
hospital. Stewart informed Genesis that Gaylon stated that she
shot him, to which Genesis responded, “Yeah, I shot him. Grabbed
the gun. The gun went off.” Stewart then instructed Genesis not

to tell him anything more.

 

After being placed under arrest, Genesis complained
that the back of her neck was evollen. Although Stewart did not
notice any swelling, he noticed that Genesis had two reddish
marks or lines on the back of her neck. Genesis told Stewart
that Gaylon bashed her twice and that she may have blacked out.
When Correa left Genesis’ residence to retrieve paper bags, in
order to cover Genesis’ hands for possible evidence of gunpowder
residue, he observed en L-shaped stick on the porch. When he
stopped to examine the stick, Genesis stated, “I used that to hit

him and push him out.”
‘#sNOT FOR PUBLICATION***
—

After covering Genesis’ hands with the paper bags and
arresting her, Correa escorted her to the police vehicle. When
they passed a white Ford pickup truck parked outside Genesis’
residence, Correa noticed blood on the rocker panel underneath
the passenger door. As he looked into the passenger side window
and observed blood on the seat and console area, Genesis said,
“it’s like that because I tried to take him to the hospital.”

After Genesis was placed in custody, 2 search of
Genesis’ residence and truck revealed that there was blood in the
hallway fronting the entry to the bathroom and on the bathroom
floor. An examination of the shower curtain revealed that there
was a hole in the curtain about one-and-one-half to two inches in
diameter and gray colored residue around the hole. According to
measurements made by the police, the distance between the left
edge of the hole and the floor was forty-seven inches. When the
police opened the curtain, they found a small piece of the
curtain and blood on the shower stall floor. They also observed
‘a small piece of the curtain on the shover stall floor and
coagulated blood in the corner of the stall. They discovered a
bullet hole and a small piece of flesh on the rear shower stall
wall.

c.

 

On October 18, 2001, at approximately 8:40 a.m.,

following the incident at issue, Genesis was read her rights
‘sno? FOR PUBLICATION*#*

under Mizanda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),” and interviewed

by Detective Greg Esteban (Esteban). Genesis gave the following
rendition of the facts in that interview, which was recorded on

videotape.

At approximately 3:00 a.m., she and Gaylon woke up so
that Gaylon could be at the airport by 5:15 a.m. After they
engaged in sexual intercourse, they took a shower together at
about 4:00 a.m. Both exited the shower. Gaylon left the
bathroom and returned with a gun. Genesis initially stated that
she grabbed the gun and shot him or that he may have shot
himself. However, Genesis later stated that when she saw the gun
in Gaylon’s hand, she ducked into Gaylon, and he went on top of
her. When the gun had fallen to the ground following the
struggle, Genesis grabbed the gun and shot Gaylon. Genesis

dropped the gun, and Gaylon picked it up and pointed it at her.

 

5 an Miranda vs Arizona, 386 0.5. 436, 444-45 (2966) , the United
States Suprene Court summarized « criminal defendant's rights prior to
custedial questioning by law enforcenent officers in the following manner:

. fovstodial| ques

‘dafendantl nist be warned shat he basa tloht to remain
Shige that any statenent he dose male may be used as

‘Svidence against bin and that he basa right to the
Eresence of an attorney, clther retained or apesinted. the
Setendant nay waive effectuation of these rights, provides
the waiver 18 nade voluntarily, knowingly.) and
intelligently. 12, however, ne indicates in any manner and
fat any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with
an attorney before speakingl,) there’can be no
Guestioning...- The mere fact that he may have answered sone
Guestions of volunteered sone statenents on his own does not
Geprive hin of the right to refrain from answering any.
forther inguiries unesl he has consulted with an attorney
and therestter consents to be questioned.

 

 

 

(Enphasis added.)
‘senor FOR PUBLICATION***
a
Genesis wanted to call the police, but Gaylon

instructed her to call an ambulance and take him to the hospital.
Genesis related that, as they were leaving Genesis’ residence,
Gaylon had hit her with a stick, and, as a result, she had
wplanked” out. Genesis also recalled that she had hit Gaylon
with a chair. ‘They went outside and Gaylon got into Genesis’
truck. Genesis returned to her residence to call the police, at
which time, Gaylon went across the street to Lee's residence.
Genesis then went across the street to Lee’s residence. Genesis
told Lee and her grandson, Nano, not to help Gaylon because he
had a gun. When Genesis returned to her residence, the police
called back, The police subsequently arrived.

Recording to Genesis, she did not have an argument with
Gaylon the night before the shooting. The last argument they had
was three days prior, allegedly because Gaylon was unhappy that
Genesis had been living “a life of leisure” because the money he
deposited into Genesis’ account was spent on new furniture, a
computer, and on repairs of her residence.

At about 10:02 a.m, after Esteban was notified that an
attorney, Andrew Wilson (Wilson), had been hired on Genesis’
behalf, the interview was stopped. Later that day, at
approximately 7:00 p.m., Esteban visited Genesis in her cellblock
to inform her that Gaylon had died and she was now under
investigation for murder. In shock, Genesis sat up end asked,

“caylon died?” On October 19, 2001, at approximately 8:55 p.m,
‘+#¢NOT FOR PUBLICATION*#*

Esteban again made contact with Genesis at her cellblock to
notify her that she was going to be charged with Gaylon’s murder.
Genesis responded quietly by saying, “I don’t wanna live,
bruddah . . . . You can give me the lethal injection.” Esteban
then told Genesis that he was going to have her placed on suicide
watch to which she responded, “I’m a murderer, Bruh.”
qm.

on December 3, 2002, prior to trial, Genesis filed her
Motion to Suppress Defendant's Statements and Evidence (motion to
suppress) alleging, inter alia, that Genesis (1) “was not advised
of her constitutional rights to silence or to counsel at that
time, nor did [Stewart and Correa] adhere to the procedural
(Mixanda) requirements prior to the questioning[,]” (2) following
her arrest and being placed in custody, “{Genesis] was contacted
by [Esteban] . . . to expressly question [Genesis] about the
shooting{,]” (3) “sometime during the questioning Esteban advised
[Genesis} of her (Mixanda] rights - he had not done so prior to

the start of any questioning[,]” (4) “{Genesis] eventually

 

allegedly waived her rights to silence and to counsel[,
(5) “interrogation was interrupted when [Wilson] arrived at the
Hilo police station to assist (Genesis,)" (6) “[Genesis] was
allowed to confer with [initial counsel,]” (7) “{Wilson] told
Esteban that (Genesis was] not [to] be questioned further[,]
(8) “Esteban was contacted by Deputy Public Defender (Melody

Parker (Parker)], and was told that [she] was representing

10
‘+##NOT FOR PUBLICATION***
a

{Genesis} and that the police were not to interview or
interrogation [sic] in the future[,]" (9) “Esteban contacted
[Genesis} and told [her] of [Gaylon’s) death, eliciting from
[Genesis] a physical reaction and verbal statement [,]”
(10) “while at the . . . cellblock, [Genesis] was charged by [the
Hawai't County Police Department (HCPD)] with the instant
offenses{,]” and (11) “[i]n response to being told of the
charges, [Genesis] made several additional statements to the
officers of the HCPD.” On the same day, Plaintiff-Appellee State
of Hawai'i (the prosecution) filed its Motion to Determine
Voluntariness of Defendant's Statements.

on November 5, 2003, after hearing arguments on
Genesis’ and the prosecution's motions, the court concluded,
inter alia, that (1) Genesis’s statement, “Yeah, I shot him. He

was going to shoot me. Grab gun, went off{,]” (2) Genesis’

 

response to Esteban on October 18, 2001 at 7:00 p.m., “Gaylon
died?” and (3) Genesis’ responses to Esteban on October 19, 2001
at 8:55 p.m., “I no like live, braddah. Uh, give me the lethal
injection” and “I'm a murderer,” were not the product of police
interrogation and were voluntarily made

With respect to the statements made to Stewart and
Correa, the court found that the officers’ purpose for going to
Genesis’ residence was to contact Genesis, who they assumed shot
Gaylon, that Stewart also wanted to see if there were people

other than Genesis in her residence, as well as to check on

a
‘*8Nor FOR PUBLICATION*#*

Genesis’ physical condition. The court adopted Correa’s version
of the facts that Genesis stated “Yes. It’s okay, Come inside.”
‘The court found that Stewart’s purpose for making the statement,
“(W]e stated that you had shot him,” vas to advise her of the
allegations and statenents made by Gaylon and that it was not
made in a custodial interrogation setting.

According to the court, despite the fact that Genesis
was a suspect, she was not yet arrested and the officers “were
merely making sure that the area was safe.” The court noted,
however, that Stewart conceded it was possible that, in response
to his statement about Gaylon’s allegations, Genesis could have
made an incriminating statement. Nevertheless, the court
concluded that Stewart’s statement “was proffered in such a way
that he did not know nor should he reasonably have known that it
was probable that (Genesis) would respond with an incriminating
response” and that Stewart's statement “did not constitute
sustained questioning and (was) not designed to overcome the will
of (Genesis].” The court also noted that, “[iJn fact, [Stewart]
attempted to protect (Genesis’} interests by advising her not to
make any further statements.”

As to statements made to Esteban during the videotaped
interview, the court ruled that the statenents in that interview
were made voluntarily. The court also concluded that Genesis’
statements to Esteban while she was in her cellblock “were not

the result of police interrogation and were voluntarily made.”

2
 

qt.
R

During trial, Genesis elected to take the witness
stand. Genesis testified that she and Gaylon were in the shower
and that Gaylon left the shower first. According to Genesis,
Gaylon returned to the bathroom with a gun in his right hand and
with an “evil look” on his face. Genesis then “rushed out of the
shower and went straight for his legs.” Genesis maintained that
fa struggle ensued and that “the next thing [she knew], Gaylon
went into the shower stall . . . (with his) left shoulder.”
Genesis then related that, as Gaylon was in the shower, she “saw
the gun on the floor, . . . picked it up, . . . and shot."
Genesis admitted that she stood outside the shower, pointed a gun
in Gaylon’s direction, and pulled the trigger. Her purpose in
shooting Gaylon, Genesis asserted, was to “stop him from getting
the gun and shooting (her].” Genesis recounted that after the
shooting, she went back into her residence to get the keys of her
truck so that she could take Gaylon to the hospital, but that she
“blacked out.”

Genesis also testified that the first time she learned
about Gaylon having a girlfriend on Johnston Island was on the
night of Gaylon’s wake service, when her sister-in-law, Shirley
Baldado (Baldado), informed her of this fact. Baldado testified
that when she told Genesis about Gaylon having a girlfriend,

Genesis appeared to be in shock as though she did not know of

3
‘***NOT FOR PUBLICATION*#*
this. Genesis admitted to calling Gaylon at the Hobron Hotel in

March 2001, after receiving an anonymous phone call informing her
that Gaylon was in Honolulu. However, she denied that she
thought Gaylon was in Honolulu with a girlfriend or that she
suspected it was Gaylon’s girlfriend, Sheldon, who answered the
phone. Instead, Genesis believed that Gaylon was in the company
of three or four other individuals and that the woman who
answered the phone was the wife of Gaylon’s friend. Genesis
disagreed that she looked inside Gaylon’s attache case or that
she found a quartz medallion therein.

Genesis acknowledged Gaylon’s injuries but denied
knowing how Gaylon received them. According to Genesis, she did
not hit Gaylon with a stick, Gaylon also denied making the
statement, “No help that fuckah,” to her neighbors, denied that
she tried to clean up the “scene,” and denied that she tried to
shoot Gaylon a second tine but failed because the handgun jammed,
Gaylon related that she never saw the gun prior to the incident
and that she did not know from where the gun had come.

Genesis further denied that she vas financially
dependent on Gaylon, worried about losing financial support if
Gaylon had “another woman,” considered the consequences of Gaylon
leaving her, and thought about Gaylon not providing her money.
However, Genesis adnitted to “spending 2 lot of money” amounting
to moze than the income she earned. At trial, Genesis explained

that her testimony might have differed from the statement she

4
‘s#eNOT FOR PUBLICATION*#*
ee

provided to Esteban because she was tired, cold, dizzy, scared,
traumatized, and confused and that her condition affected her
ability to recall the events of that morning.

The prosecution called Jeffrey Wheeler (Wheeler), @
forensic bionechanic who recreated @ scale model of Genesis’
shower, and used the model to conduct a trajectory analysis.
Wheeler's opinion was consistent with Genesis’ admission at trial
that she shot Gaylon while he was in the shower. According to
Wheeler, the only way the shooting occurred would be with Gaylon
standing in the shower upright. Wheeler further opined that a
shooter with the height consistent with that of Genesis
approached the shower holding a gun out in front of her
approximately forty-three-and-one-half inches above the floor,
stood close to the shower curtain, pointed the gun toward Gaylon,

and shot him while he stood upright inside the shower with his

 

back to the faucet. Wheeler also testified that, bi

 

don the
measurements he made of the width of the shower stall, which was
thirty-five inches, Gaylon would “basically fill this space.”

‘The prosecution called Raphael Kaupu, a neighbor of
Genesis, who heard pounding on Lee's front door and Gaylon
yelling for help. He testified that he also heard Genesis from
her house saying, “Mrs. Lee, no help that fuckah.”

The prosecution called Dr. Alvin Omori (Omori), a
forensic pathologist, who testified that in addition to the

gunshot wound, Gaylon also received numerous injuries. According

45
‘*8NOT FOR PUBLICATION***

 

to Omori, Gaylon suffered scalp injuries consistent with being
hit by the stick recovered from Genesis’ residence. Omori
related that Gaylon had an injury to the web area between the
left thunb and left second finger caused by blunt force trauma,
and that this injury was possibly a defensive wound.
2

on July 21, 2004, at the close of trial, the court
ruled, over defense counsel’s objection, that it would be
instructing the jury on the lesser included offense of reckless
manslaughter.‘ Genesis’ counsel argued that if the court gave
the reckless manslaughter instruction,’ the defense was also
entitled to an extreme mental and enotional disturbance (ENED)

instruction as well.? The court denied defense counsel's request

* uns § 707-7022) (1993), entitled “Manslaughter,” provides in
Pertinent part that “(al person comnits the offense of mansiaughter if .
[hje reckiesely causes the desth of another person.”

7 on appeal, Genesis does not object to the court’s instruction on
reckless manslaughter’

* counsel for befendant-Appellant Genesis Kavhi (Genesis) proffered
the following instruction concerning extrene mental OF enotional disturbance
(EMED) manslaughter!

1f and only 4£ you unanimously find that all the
elenents of (mJurder in the [elecond [d]egree have been
proven by the prosecution Beyend a reasonable doubt (and you
Unanimously find that (Genesis) was not justified in using
Geadly force], then you must consider whether, at the time
[Genesis] caused the death, she was under the influence of
extrene mental or emotional disturbance for which there <8 a
Feasonsble explanation. The reasonableness of the
explanation shall be deternined fron the viewpoint of =
person in ([Geneais"] situstion under the circunstances of
Jihich (Genesis) wer amare or se (Genesis) believed then to
Be.

 

    

(Some brackets in original and sone added.)

16
‘**NOT FOR PUBLICATION®#*
SSS

for an EMED instruction.” After about @ day-and-a-half of jury
deliberations, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged.
w.

on appeal, Genesis contends that (1) her statements
(a) to Stewart at her residence, “Yeah, I shot him. He was gonna
shoot me. Grab gun, went off,” (b) to Esteban while in custody
on October 18, 2001, “Gaylon died?” and (c) to Esteban on
october 19, 2001, “I no like live, braddah. Uh, give me the
lethal injection[,]" and “I'm a murderer,” were procured in
violation of her constitutional right against self-incrimination:
and (2) she was entitled to have the jury instructed on the
mitigating defense of EMED manslaughter." Accordingly, Genesis
urges this court to “reverse” the court’s judgment because her

statements were used against her in violation of her rights under

 

In rejecting defense counsel's request for an instruction on
EMED manslaughter, the court stated as follows:

 

In this cese, [Genesis] has not testified that she acted
‘onder extreme wental [cr] emotional disturbance. she
testitied that she was responding to a perceived threat from
Gaylon Baldado in the form of him holding = firearm and
heving a threatening deseancr.

 

   

She did not testify ae to the existence of any other event
hich resulted in extrenely unusual or overwhelming stress,
ihich os @ result self control and reasonable was (sic)
Gverborne by intensity such as passion, anger, distress,
Grief, excessive agitation or other similar emotion.

her wor Hs no vides
i sing BED inst
(emphasis edded.)

1 Genesis does not raise any arguments regarding the defense of self

defense although an instruction as to that was apparently given.

nv
‘*sNOT FOR PUBLICATION***

Oe

the Fifth! and Fourteenth Amendments" to the United States
Constitution and under article I, section 10 of the Hawai'i
Constitution. Moreover, Genesis contends that the court's

refusal to instruct the jury on EMBO manslaughter deprived her of

NThe FAEEh Amendnent to the United States Constitution provides:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, oF
otherwise infeous crime, unless on a presentment oF
{hulctnent of 2 Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the
lend or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
Service in tine of War or public danger nor shall any
Person be subject for the sane offence to be twice put in
Jeoparay of 1ife or Limb

 

nor Be
Seprived of iife; iiberty, oF property, without due proce
of laws net shall private property be taken for public use,
Wienout Just compensation.

  

(Emphasis added.)

Section 1 of the Fourteenth Anendnent to the United States

[ALL persone born or naturalized in the United stat
land subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No

State shall make er enforce any law which shall abridge the

privileges of inmunities of citizens of the United States:

 

 

5 aitheut a Sf Lgy; nor deny to any person
Eithin ite jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

(emphasis added.)

Article T, section 10 of the Hawai'i Constitution states as

 

No pergon shall be held to answer for a capital or
otherwise infarous crime, unless on presentment oF
Gpdictment of @ grand jury or upon a finding of probable
couse after a preliminary hearing held as provided by law or
Spon information in writing signed by a legal prosecuting
Officer under conditions and in accordance with procedury
that the legislature may provise, except in cases arising in
the armed forces when if actual service in tine of war oF
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the sane
siiice put in Jecpardys

 

 

 
 

 

 

(Emphasis added.)

18
‘*enOT FOR PUBLICATION***

ee

 

her substantial rights, and the error requires that she be given
a new trial.

In its answering brief, the prosecution maintains that
(2) the statements to Stewart and Esteban were not in violation
of Genesis’ Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination
inasmuch a8 (a) Genesis’ statements to Stewart were spontaneously
made and Genesis was not subjected to custodial interrogation,
(b) Genesis’ statements to Esteban were unsolicited and not the
result of custodial interrogation; (2) even if Genesis’
statenents to Stewart and Correa should have been suppressed,
this court should rule that the admission was “harmless beyond 2
reasonable doubt"; and (3) Genesis did not satisfy the
subjective/objective test by proferring a “reasonable
explanation” for the EMED instruction.

In her reply brief Genesis contends as to (3) of the
prosecution's argument that “because the record reflected the
circunstances as [she] believed them to be [which] supported a
reasonable explanation or excuse for her disturbance, (she)
satisfied the ‘subjective/objective’ test.” Genesis did not

respond to items (1) and (2) of the prosecution's argument on the

 

grounds they were “fully addressed by the opening brie

 

ve
on appeal, a trial court’s ruling on a motion to
suppress is reviewed de nove “to determine whether the ruling was

‘right’ or ‘wrong.’” State v. Maldonade, 108 Hawai'i 436, 442,

18
‘+#4NOT FOR PUBLICATION®**
OO
121 P.3d 901, 907 (2005) (quoting State v. Kauhi, 86 Hawai's 195,
197, 948 P.24 1036, 1038 (1997)). The proponent of a motion to
suppress has the burden of establishing “not only that the
evidence sought to be excluded was unlawfully secured, but also,
that his or her own . . . rights were violated.” State

Edvards, 96 Hawai' 224, 232, 30 P.3d 238, 246 (2001) (brackets
omitted) (quoting State v. Augafa, 92 Hawai'i 454, 464, 992 F.2d
723, 733 (App. 1999). “The proponent of the motion to suppress
must satisfy this burden of proof by a preponderance of the
evidence[.]” Id. (quoting State v. Wilson, 92 Hawai'i 45, 48,
987 P.2d 268, 271 (1999)).

This court has stated that “factual determinations made
by the trial court deciding pretrial motions in a criminal case
is governed by the clearly erroneous standard” and that “a
finding of fact is clearly erroneous when (1) the record lacks
substantial evidence to support the finding, or (2) despite
substantial evidence in support of the finding, the appellate
court is nonetheless left with a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made.” Edvards, 96 Hawai"i at 231, 30
P.3d at 245. A circuit court's conclusions of lew are reviewed
under the right or wrong standard. Id, at 231-32, 30 P.3d at
245-46 (citing State v. Bleneki, 92 Hawai'i 562, 564, 993 P.2d
1191, 1193 (2000)). Therefore, “{a] conclusion of law is not
binding upon an appellate court and is freely reviewable for its

correctness.” State v, Keliiheleug, 105 Hawai'i 174, 178-79, 95

20
‘+#eNOT FOR PUBLICATION***
see

P.3d 605, 609-10 (2004) (quoting State v. Furutani, 76 Hawai'i
172, 180, 873 P.2d $1, $9 (1994)). This “court examine(s] the
facts and answer[s) the question without being required to give
any weight to the trial court’s answer to it.” Id, at 179, 95
P.3d at 610 (quoting Island Ins. Co. v. Perry, 94 Hawai'i 498,
501, 17 P.3d 947, 850 (App.2000)).

With respect to jury instructions, it has been said
that “[w]hen jury instructions or the omission thereof are at
Assue on appeal, the standard of review is whether, when read and
considered as a whole, the instructions given are prejudicially
insufficient, erroneous, inconsistent, or misleading.” State v.
Hatori, 92 Hawai'i 217, 221, 990 P.2d 115, 119 (App. 1999)
(quoting State v. Kinnane, 79 Hawai'i 46, 49, 897 P.2d 973, 976
(1995)). Erroneous jury instructions are “‘presumptively harmful
and are a ground for reversal unless it appears from the record
as a whole that the error was not prejudicial.'" State v. Jones,
97 Hawas‘s 23, 30, 32 P.3d 1097, 1104 (App. 1998) (quoting State
vs Binere, 70 Haw, 509, 527, 778 P.2d 704, 715 (1989).

Moreover, with respect to erroneous jury instructions, this court

 

has stated as follows:

Error is not to be viewed in isolation ané considered purely
inthe abstract. It must be examined in the light of th

entire proceesings and given the effect which the whole
$cord shows it fo De entitled. Ja that context, the rea
Gussticn becomes whether there ie a resonable sossibility

 

 

State v, Cullen, 86 Hawai'i 1, 8, 946 P.2d 955, 962 (1997)
(emphasis added) (quoting State v. Heard, 64 Haw. 193, 194, 636
P.2d 307, 308 (1981)).

a
‘*sNo? FOR PUBLICATION***
ve

It should be noted “that the protections enumerated in
[Mixandal” are also “independently grounded in the privilege

against self-incrimination contained in the Hewai't

Constitution.” State v. Joseph, 109 Hawai'i 482, 493, 128 F.3d
795, 806 (2006) (quoting State v. Santiago, 53 Haw. 254, 265-66,

492 P.2d 657, 664 (1971)). This court has held that a criminal
defendant's rights under Miranda is triggered by two criteria:
(2) the defendant must be under interrogation; and (2) the
defendant must be in custody.” State v. Ah loo, 94 Hawai'i 207,
210, 10 P.3d 728, 731 (2000) (quoting Kauhi, 86 Hawai'i at 204,
948 P.2d at 1045). Interrogation has been construed by this
court as “express questioning or its functional equivalent.”
State v. Melemai, 64 Haw. 479, 481 n.3 643 P.2d 541, 544 n.3
(1982) (quoting Bhode Island v, innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01
(1980)). ‘The Supreme Court in Innis also explained that
interrogation “refers not only to express questioning, but also
to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than
those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response from the suspect.” Id, at 301. According to the Innis
court, “[t]he latter portion of this definition focuses primarily
upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of
the police.” Id.

‘The Supreme Court said in Miranda that custodial
interrogation concerns “questioning initiated by law enforcement

22
‘+enNoT FOR PUBLICATION***
ee

officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his (or her] freedom of action in any significant
way.” 384 U.S. at 444. In order to determine whether
“interrogation” is “custodial” in nature, this court has said
‘the totality of circumstances at the time of questioning” must
be examined. State v. Sugimoto, 62 Haw. 259, 265, 614 P.2d 386,
391 (1980) (quoting State v. Patterson, 59 Haw. 357, 361, S61
P.2d 752, 755 (1978)). In examining the totality of the
circumstances, the relevant factors include “time, place and
length of the interrogation, the nature of the questions asked,
the conduct of the police at the time of interrogation, and any
other pertinent factors.” Kauhi, 86 Hawai‘i at 204, 948 P.2d at
1045 (quoting State v, Blanding, 69 Haw. 583, 586, 752 P.2d 99,
100 (1988).

Among the factors to be considered in deciding whether
custodial interrogation took place are whether or not an
investigation’s “focus” had fixed on a defendant, and when,
where, and in what surroundings the making of the statement took
place. Patterson, 59 Haw. at 359-61, 581 P.2d at 754-55. While
focus of the investigation is not a determinative factor, “it
nevertheless continues to be an important factor in the
determination of whether the defendant was subjected to custodial
interrogation.” Id. at 361, $81 P.2d at 755. In State v,
Ketchum, 97 Hawai'i 107, 126, 34 P.3d 1006, 1025 (2001), the

following test to determine custody was adopted:

23
‘***NOT FOR PUBLICATION®#*

[je hold that ¢ person is “in custody" for purposes of
Etticle 1, section 10 of the Hawaii Constitution if an
Objective azsesoment of the totality of the circumstances
feflects either (1) that the person has become impliedly
accused of committing a crime because the questions of the
Police nave becone sustained and coercive, such that they
Ere no longer reasonably designed briefly to confirm or
Gispel their reasonable suspicion or (2) that the point of
arrest hae arrived because either (a) probsble cause to
irvest has developed or (b) the police have subjected th
person to an unlawful "de facto” arrest without probable

 

 

Where statements made by a defendant are not the
product of custodial interrogation, it need not be shown that @
defendant was advised of his or her rights in order for the
statements to be admitted. State v. Pahio, 58 Haw. 323, 327, 568
P.2d 1200, 1204 (1977). It has also been held that “unsolicited,
spontaneous, and voluntary” statements are admissible. State v.
Medeiros, 4 Haw. App. 248, 253, 665 P.2d 181, 185 (1983) (citing
State v. Lincoln, 3 Haw. App. 107, 116, 643 P.2d 807, 614-15
(2982), superseded in part by statute es stated in Briones w.
State, 74 Haw. 442, 456 n.7, 848 P.2d 966, 974 n.7 (1993).

With respect to temporary investigative detentions,
this court in Bh Loo stated that a person “is not subjected to
custodial interrogation when the officer poses noncoercive
questions to the detained person that are designed to confirm or
dispel the officer's reasonable suspicion.” 94 Hawai'i at 211,
10 P.3d at 732 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme
Court has also stated that in an investigatory stop, “[an]
officer may ask the detainee a moderate nunber of questions to
determine his identity and to try to obtain information

confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicions,” Berkemer vw.

24
‘*eNOT FOR PUBLICATION*+*

 

McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984), “that a particular person has

 

committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime,” id,

vir.

With xespect to Genesis’ contention 1(a) concerning her
statenent to Stewart, Genesis challenges the court’s finding of
fact (FOF) no. 20, in denying Genesis’ notion to suppress and
granting the prosecution's motion to determine voluntariness of
Genesis’ statements, that stated as follows:

According to [Stewart], after entering the residence
land determining that it was safe, he asked (Genesis) Af she
woe yes.” “He then asked [Genesis] if

the S” She said, “No.”

(er 2° 'ang stated that she was
going to take him to the hospital. Officer Stewart said
thet the paramedics were taking care of him and were going
to take him to the hospital. Further, in the next breath,
[Seeware}, told [Genesis] that “(Gaylon) stated that you had
hot him." The purpose for making che statement was to
Advise nor of the sliegstions end statesents that were made
by (Gaylon]: (Genesis) stated, “Yeah, 1 shot him. He was
Gonna shoot me. Granbed the gun, went off.”

 

   

 

 

 

 

Genesis also challenges the court's conclusion of law (COL) No.

 

13, which was entered in the following manne:

 

Based upon the totality of the circumstances,
Icenesis"} statements set forth in FOF 20, were not the
Product of police interrogstion. This 1s'based upon the
Following circumstances: At the tine the statements were
ace, (Genesis) wae a suspect. However, [Genesis] wae not
yer arrested, The police officers were merely making sure
thatthe area was sefe. 7

 

i snd was safe. [Stewart's] statement

tetenent, (Genesis! could sake an ineriainstin

= enable have known
= To any case, (Stewart's) question

 

Sno etavenent cid not constitute sustained questioning and
fe not designed to overcene the will of (Genesis). In
fact, "[Stenart) attempted to protect (Genesis) interest by
advising her not to make any further statenents. The

Statemente were also voluntarily made.

 

 

25
seenon FOR PUBLICATION®##
a
(Emphasis added.) Genesis argues that Stewart's remark, “Gaylon
stated that you had shot him,” was the “functional equivalent of
express questioning” because Stewart “reasonably should have
known that his words would likely elicit an incriminating
response.” According to Genesis, “there was clearly no
legitimate purpose to inform [her] of Gaylon’s accusation.”
Genesis explains that “[i]t is unreasonable to suggest that @
suspect, who was not informed of her Miranda rights, would simply
remain silent” but that “it is reasonable and highly likely that
fa suspect, who was not given her Mixanda rights, would respond to
Stewart’s remark, by either admitting, denying or explaining the
circumstances of the shooting[.J” Genesis states that she and
Stewart “were engaged in conversation” and that Stewart conceded
that “it was possible that such a statement would invite a
response.” Genesis concludes that "when one considers the
totality of the circumstances, it is clear that Stewart’s remarks
constituted interrogation.”

‘The circumstances lead to the conclusion that the first
of the Ah Loo factors, namely that “the defendant must be unde
interrogation,” 94 Hawai'i at 210, 10 P.3d at 731, is met.
Stewart's remark constitutes “express questioning or its

functional equivalent,” Melemai, 64 Haw. at 481 n.3, 643 P.2d at

544 n.3, which “was . . . reasonably likely to evoke an
incriminating response,” State v. Roman, 70 Haw. 351, 387, 772

P.2d 113, 116 (1969), from Genesis. However, it cannot be said
that such interrogation was made while Genesis was in custody.

26
‘#enoT FOR PUBLICATION***
a

Genesis contends that she “was clearly in custody as
the point of arrest ha(d) arrived,” inasmuch as Stewart had
probable cause to arrest her. Genesis argues that “[t]he police
had already observed that Gaylon had been shot, and Gaylon had
told them that [Genesis] had shot him.” However, a determination
of whether Genesis was in custody at the time of Stewart's remark
requires more than assertions that there was a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity on the part of law enforcement
officers.

A review of the circunstances surrounding the making of
Stewart's renark and Genesis’ response to that remark reveals
that after Gaylon told Stewart that Genesis shot him, Stewart and
Correa proceeded to Genesis’ residence and noticed that the door
was open. The court found credible Correa’s recollection that
after Stewart called out Genesis’ name, she replied, “Yes. t's

okay, come inside.” Genesis appeared calm to Stewart and Corre:

 

when asked by Stewart if she was hurt and if anyone else was in
her residence, Genesis informed him that she was not, and that no
one else was in the residence. Genesis asked how Gaylon was, and
stated that she was going to take him to the hospital and that
Gaylon was her ex-husband, Stewart told Genesis that Gaylon was
being taken to the hospital. Stewart informed Genesis that

Gaylon stated that she shot him, to which Genesis responded,

 

“Yeah, I shot him. Grabbed the gun. The gun went off.” Genesis

was then instructed by Stewart not to say anything further.

2
‘+*¢NOT FOR PUBLICATIONS#*

‘The evidence indicates that, in the course of their
investigation, Stewart and Correa may have had a reasonable
suspicion to believe that criminal activity had taken place.
However, the circumstances do not indicate that Genesis was
“impliedly accused of committing a crime because the questions of
the police [had] become sustained and coercive,” Ketchum, 97
Hawai'i at 126, 34 P.3d at 1025. Also, it cannot be concluded
that “probable cause to arrest has developed or . . «(that
Stewart and Correa had] subjected [Genesis] to an unlawful “de
facto” arrest without probable cause to do so[,]” id., inasmuch
as the circumstances of the shooting were unknown to them at the
time. Stewart and Correa responded to reports of a domestic
dispute. Beyond the fact of shooting, Stewart and Correa were
unaware of how or why Genesis shot Gaylon. Inmediately after
Genesis made her statement, “Yeah, I shot him. . . {g]rabbed the

ais not to

 

gun... {t]he gun went off,” Stewart admonished G
say anything moze. Genesis neither argues that Stewart's
questioning was coercive in nature nor that she felt that she was
not free to leave. Hence, Genesis was not the subject of
custodial interrogation when Stewart posed noncoercive questions
to Genesis. Ah Loo, 94 Hawai'i at 211, 10 P.3d at 732.

Under Miranda, it cannot be said that Genesis was
“deprived of freedom of action in a significant way.” 384 U.S.
at 444. As the prosecution maintains, there is no indication in
the xecord that Stewart and Correa informed Genesis or impressed
upon her that she was not free to go. The record is also devoid

28
s#NoT FOR PUBLICATION***

a

 

of any suggestion that Genesis was subjected to sustained
questioning. Accordingly, inasmuch as the court’s finding with
regard to Genesis’ statement to Stewart was supported by
sgubstantial evidence,” Edwards, 96 Hawai'i at 231, 30 P.3d at
245, and it cannot be said that this court is “left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made,” no
error arises from FOF no. 20 with regard to Genesis’ statement.

As to the court’s conclusion in COL no. 13, it appears
that the court placed undue emphasis on Stewart's purpose and
Sntent in informing Genesis of what Gaylon had told him. See
Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 (stating that custodial interrogation
“focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather
than the intent of the police”). However, the court's decision
that Genesis’ statement “was not a product of police
interrogation” was ultimately right but on the ground, as earlier
stated, that Genesis was not in custody at the time of her
statement."

vit.

Ae to Genesis’ contentions (1) (b) and (c), her
statements to Esteban, namely, (1) “Gaylon died?", made on
october 18, 2001 after Esteban informed her that Gaylon had died
and that Genesis wes now being investigated for murder, (2) “I

don’t wanna live, bruddah . . . . You can give me the lethal

1 We express no opinion as to the court's other reasons in
concluding thst the statements made by Genesis to Stewart were not # product
of police interrogation

29
‘sno? FOR PUBLICATION*#*

 

injection{,]" made on October 19, 2001, and (3) “I’m a murderer,
Bruh,” made on October 19, 2001, should have been suppressed.
Genesis challenges COL No. 16, which concluded that these
statenents “were not the result of police interrogation and were
voluntarily made.”

Contrary to the court’s conclusion, assuming that the
three statenents to Esteban were either inculpatory or
exculpatory, the challenged statements constituted custodial
interrogation. There is no dispute that Genesis was in custody.
Esteban was the detective who had conducted the initial
interrogation of Genesis. In this context Esteban “should have
known that his . . . words or conduct [in his subsequent
contacts} were reasonably Likely to evoke an incriminating
response.” Roman, 70 Haw, at 357, 772 P.2d at 116.

Additionally, this court has held that “once an accused
has expressed his desire to deal with police interrogators only
through counsel, he cannot be further questioned until counsel
has been made available to him, unless the accused initiates
further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the
police.” State v. Maile, 69 Haw. $1, $3, 731 P.2d 1264, 1266
(1987) (citing Edvards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981).
Thus there is “a ‘bright-line’ rule that once the right to
counsel has been invoked{,] all questions must cease.” Mailo, 69
Haw. at 53, 731 P.2d at 1266 (quoting Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S.
91.96 (1984); see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74 (stating that

30
‘senor FOR PUBLICATION***
es
“(Af the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior

to or during questioning that he wishes to remain silent, the
interrogation must cease” (emphasis added) )-

As Genesis argues in her opening brief, Esteban knew
that when he approached Genesis in her celiblock, Genesis had
previously asserted her Miranda rights through her initial
counsel, Wilson. This terminated the earlier interview on
videotape. Further, Genesis’ second counsel, Parker, advised the
police that they were not to interview or interrogate Genesis in
the future. The record does not indicate that Genesis initiated
a conversation with Esteban. Despite this, Esteban proceeded to
reinitiate contact with Genesis on two separate occasions.

Speaking to Genesis on these occasions amounted to the
“functional equivalent,” Melemai, 64 Haw. at 481 n.3, 643 P.2d at
544 n.3, of express questioning by the police and violated
Genesis’ privilege against self-incrimination and her rights
under Maile. Accordingly, it wae error for the court to rule in
its COL no. 16 that Genesis’ statements to Esteban were voluntary
and not @ product of custodial interrogation.

1K.

Despite the court’s admission of Genesis’ statements to
Esteban, the prosecution contends in its second argument that
reversal or vacatur of the court's judgnent is not warranted.
With respect to the erroneous admission of statements, this court

has stated that “[wJhere there exists a reasonable possibility

3
‘+#eNOT FOR PUBLICATION***
OO

that a constitutional error of the trial court contributed to the
conviction of the defendant, the error necessitates reversal.”
State v. Amorin, 61 Haw. 356, 363, 604 P.2d 45, 50 (1979). TE no
“reasonable possibility” exists that the erroneous admission
contributed to the conviction, such error is deemed “harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

In Light of the substantial evidence against Genesis,
as pointed out by the prosecution, it cannot be said that
Genesis’ statements to Esteban raised 2 “reasonable possibility

. . that the erroneous admission [of those statements]
contributed to [her] conviction{.]" Id, Based on the evidence,
it appears that the prosecution's position is correct. First,
Gaylon indicated to Stewart that Genesis had shot him. Second,
Genesis adnitted to Stewart that she did shoot Gaylon, @
statement that was admissible in evidence. See supra. Third,
the prosecution's expert witness, Wheeler, opined, based on the
trajectory of the bullet, that a person of Genesis’ stature had
shot Gayion while he was in the shower stall and with the shower
curtain closed. Fourth, Genesis adnitted to Esteban, during the
videotaped interview, that she grabbed the gun and fired in
Gaylon’s direction. Fifth, Genesis reiterated her assertion that
she shot Gaylon from outside the shower stall. Finally, evidence
was adduced at trial that Gaylon possibly suffered a defensive
wound from the recovered stick. Genesis does not specifically

address the prosecution’s harmless beyond @ reasonable doubt

32
‘seenoT FOR PUBLICATION***
a

argument. In sum, as the prosecution contends, Genesis’
conviction was supported by substantial evidence and admission of
her statements to Esteban, although in error, was “harmless

beyond @ reasonable doubt.” amorin, 61 Haw. at 363, 604 P.2d at

50.

 

With respect to Genesis’ challenge (2) to the court's
failure to instruct the jury on EMED manslaughter, the court did
not err. As described in HRS § 707-702(2) (Supp. 2005), in a
prosecution for murder or attempted murder, “it is an affirmative
defense, which reduces the offense to manslaughter or attempted
manslaughter, that the defendant was, at the time the defendant
caused the death of the other person, under the influence of

extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is 2

 

reasonable explanation.
a

Genesis makes the following arguments in her opening
brief. Genesis contends that the ENED instruction should have
been given because evidence showed that Genesis “had an emotional
reaction to Gaylon’s romantic affair with another woman, as a
result of which there was a loss of self-control and reason wa
everborne by intense feelings of passion, anger, and jealousy.”
According to Genesis, she had “very intense romantic and
passionate feelings for Gaylon even though they divorced in

1995.” In addition, Genesis states that “there was evidence that

33
‘+#¢NOT FOR PUBLICATION®#*

Gaylon's feelings toward (her] was mutual, or at least Gaylon led
(her) to believe that, he too, had the same feelings for her.”
Genesis maintains that Gaylon continued to support her
financially, Gaylon stayed with her whenever he visited Hilo, and
they spent significant time together. Genesis contends that
because Gaylon, who she was financially dependent on, was having
2 romantic and sexual affair with another woman, a reasonable
explanation, or excuse exists for her to “lose self-control and
| be overborne by intense feelings of passion, anger, and

jealousy.” Genesis states that even if she asserted that she
only killed Gaylon in self-defense, “she had the right to not
only argue inconsistent defenses of self-defense and EMED
manslaughter but also was entitled to have the jury instructed on
EMED manslaughter.”

on the other hand, the prosecution maintains that the
refusal by the court to give an EMED instruction was proper
because Genesis was “unable to provide evidence that supports a
defense of EMED" and that, therefore, Genesis was not entitled to
an EMED instruction.

8

Both Genesis and the prosecution rely on this court's
decision in State v. Sawver, 88 Hawai'i 325, 966 P.2d 637 (1996).
According to Genesis, “[i)f the record reflects any evidence of a
subjective nature that the defendant acted under the influence of

EMED, the instruction must be given and the jury decides whether

34
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ee

the State disproved the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” The
prosecution declares that under Sauver, this court held that a
defendant must meet a “subjective/objective” test, explained in
that case as follows:
First, in the subjective portion, She record must reflect
Second, in satistyang the objective portion, ‘The record aust

Mach Confusion hes arisen over whether the court or
the jury determines the reasonableness of the defendant's
Explansvion er excuse. We hold that ihe trisl court

    

ee ven hat the cred
Sie i er
SneteUc the tury cn SED manslaughter, However, if the

yecord reflects any evidence of 2 subjective nature that the
Gefendant acted under the influence of extrene mental oF
Sectional disturbance, then the issue must be submitted to
the jury, and the trial court should instruct the jury on
EMED manslaughter, The Jury then decides whether or not the
prosecution has disproved the mitigating ENED manslaughter
Eefense beyond « ressonable doubt.

 

Id. at 333, 966 P.2d at 645 (emphases added). The prosecution
maintains that Genesis fails to meet the “subjective/objective”

test under Sauver.

 

sis argues in her opening and reply briefs that
there was evidence in the record to support the subjective
portion of the “subjective/objective” test under Sawyer. she
contends this evidence was (1) that she was aware that Gaylon was
having an affair with another woman because (a) @ woman answered
the telephone when she called the Hobron Hotel sometime in March
2001 and (b) the quartz heart medallion was found in Gaylon’s
attache case on the morning of October 18, 2001; (2) that her
conduct at the time of the offense “was indicative of someone who
wes acting under the influence of ENED” for a witness, Sandra

38
‘**¢NOT FOR PUBLICATION®#*

 

Cox, testified that “she heard muffled voices, which sounded as

 

someone fighting, coming fron Genesis’ house”? (3) that she had
tried to fixe more than one shot but the handgun jammed; (4) that
after shooting Gaylon, she continued to attack him with a stick?
and (5) that when Gaylon went across the street to seek help,
Genesis told her neighbors not to help Gaylon, who she referred
to at that time as “that fuckah.”

However, with respect to the subjective prong, the
following is pointed out in the prosecution’s answering brief.
Genesis repeatedly testified that she did not know Gaylon had a
Girlfriend until the time Gaylon’s sister-in-law, Baldado,
informed her about Sheldon on the night of Gaylon’s wake.
Genesis stated that she did not even consider the possibility
that Gaylon may have had a girlfriend. Also, Genesis related
that her call to the Hobron Hotel in March 2001 did not raise a
question in her mind that Gaylon was possibly having an affair
and that she believed that the female who answered the phone was
the wife of Gaylon’s friend. According to Baldado, Genesis
appeared to be in shock when she informed Genesis about Gaylon’s
relationship with Sheldon. Genesis indicated that she did not
know that the quartz heart medallion was in Gaylon’s attache
case. Moreover, Genesis denied that she was financially
dependent on Gaylon and that even if he had not deposited money
into her account, she would not have any problem financially

without his assistance.

36
‘enor FOR PUBLICATION***
a

Based on the above, the record “reflect[s that) the
circumstances as [Genesis] believed them to bel,]” ids, were that
Gaylon was not involved with Sheldon and that Genesis adamantly
denied being financially dependent on Gaylon. Hence, the record
does not show “any evidence of a subjective nature that (Genesis)
acted under @ loss of self-control resulting from extreme mental
or emotional disturbance," id., due to Gaylon’s relationship with
sheldon, On the contrary, the evidence supports the
prosecution's assertion that Genesis was unaware ‘of @
relationship between Genesis and another person.”* Because
Genesis fails to satisfy the subjective prong of the two-part
“subjective /objective” test under Samyer, the court did not err
in refusing to instruct the jury on EMED. See also State v
Aaanon, 97 Hawai'i 299, 304, 36 P.3d 1269, 1274 (2001) (stating
that “{iJf the record does not reflect [evidence of a subjective
nature that the defendant acted under a loss of self-control
resulting from extreme mental or emotional disturbance], then the
trial court shall properly refuse to instruct the jury on EMED
manslaughter”); State vy. Moore, 82 Hawai‘! 202, 210, 921 P.2d
122, 130 (1996) (stating that “[w]here evidentiary support for
the asserted defense, or for any of its essential components, is

clearly lacking, it would not be error for the trial court either

 

%S Also, contzary to the EMED erguments in her briefs enunerated
aunts, in her seatinony Genesis denied thet she tried to shoot Gaylon a second
Sumtty in She attacked hin with a stick, and that she referred to Gaylon ae
Nthat fockah.”

 

37
‘*sNOT FOR PUBLICATION*#*

 

to refuse to charge on the issue or to instruct the jury not to
consider it” (citation omitted)).
xr
Accordingly, the court's Septenber 16, 2004 judgment. is
affirmed.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, May 31, 2006.

on the briefs:
James S. Tabe, Deputy Public
Defender, for’ defendant- Blass Yor

appellant.

County of Hawa, for
plaintiff-appeliee. a Getta

Gow ©. Rata re

38