Title: Attorney Grievance v. Slate

State: maryland

Issuer: Maryland Supreme Court

Document:

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gregory Allen Slate, Misc. Docket AG No. 5, September 
Term, 2017 
 
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – SANCTIONS – DISBARMENT – Court of Appeals 
disbarred lawyer who knowingly failed to disclose during bar application process that, in 
civil case to which lawyer was party, trial court found that lawyer had engaged in 
dishonesty and misconduct, and lawyer falsely stated to Bar Counsel that he had disclosed 
all required information during bar application process.  Such conduct violated Maryland 
Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) 8.1(a), 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and 
Disciplinary Matters), 8.4(c) (Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit, or Misrepresentation), 8.4(d) 
(Conduct That Is Prejudicial to Administration of Justice), and 8.4(a) (Violating MLRPC).
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
Misc. Docket AG No. 5 
 
September Term, 2017 
______________________________________ 
 
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION 
OF MARYLAND 
 
v. 
 
GREGORY ALLEN SLATE 
______________________________________ 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
Greene 
Adkins 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty, 
 
JJ. 
______________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Watts, J. 
______________________________________ 
 
Filed: March 2, 2018 
 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
Case No. 24-C-17-001903 
 
Argued: February 1, 2018 
 
 
This attorney discipline proceeding involves a lawyer who knowingly failed to 
disclose during the bar application process that, in a civil case to which the lawyer was a 
party, a trial court found that the lawyer had engaged in dishonesty and misconduct, and 
the lawyer falsely stated to Bar Counsel that he had disclosed all required information 
during the bar application process. 
 
Before becoming a member of the Bar of Maryland, Gregory Allen Slate, 
Respondent, initiated a civil case concerning alleged copyright infringement, claiming that 
hidden camera footage that he had recorded was used without his authorization.  The trial 
court dismissed the case on the ground that Slate had engaged in bad-faith litigation 
conduct.  The trial court found that Slate: fabricated a letter and submitted it to the trial 
court in bad faith; gave deposition testimony that was either perjurious or, at least, 
intentionally misleading; and repeatedly attempted to abuse the discovery process through 
such actions as attempting to fraudulently collect evidence, providing discovery materials 
in a soiled envelope that strongly smelled of excrement, improperly videotaping his own 
deposition testimony, and providing voluminous irrelevant and misleading materials.  Slate 
filed a motion for reconsideration.  The trial court denied the motion, and found that Slate’s 
filings in connection with the motion showed a continuing pattern of omissions and 
obfuscations.   
 
Slate did not attach copies of the trial court’s opinions to his bar application or 
provide any information about the findings therein.  In response to Question 11 on the bar 
application, which called for information about cases to which an applicant had been a 
party, Slate disclosed basic facts about the case, such as the circumstance that an appeal 
- 2 - 
was pending at the time.  Slate, however, did not disclose the trial court’s opinions or the 
findings therein.  Significantly, Slate responded “No” to Question 18—a “catchall 
question” that calls for any negative information that was not requested by, or given in the 
responses to, any of the other questions.1   
 
After submitting his bar application, Slate falsely affirmed under oath that all of the 
facts in his bar application remained correct.  Slate did not supplement his bar application 
with the trial court’s opinions or the findings therein.  Nor did Slate disclose the trial court’s 
opinions or the findings therein during the character interview.  Nor did Slate disclose the 
information during a meeting with the co-chairs of the Character Committee for the Fourth 
Appellate Judicial Circuit (“the Character Committee”).2  Consistent with the Character 
Committee’s co-chairs’ recommendation, the State Board of Law Examiners (“the SBLE”) 
cleared Slate for admission without a hearing.  This Court, unaware of the trial court’s 
findings of dishonesty and misconduct, admitted Slate to the Bar of Maryland.   
 
Within a year, a Maryland lawyer became aware of the trial court’s opinions, and 
filed a complaint against Slate with Bar Counsel.  Subsequently, Bar Counsel requested 
from Slate a response to the complaint.  In a written response, Slate stated that he had 
disclosed all required information during the bar application process.   
                                              
1See, e.g., Memorandum from Bedford T. Bentley, Jr., Secretary, State Board of 
Law Examiners, to First-Year Law Students at University of Baltimore School of Law 
(May 
18, 
2009), 
available 
at 
http://law.ubalt.edu/downloads/law_downloads/ 
Admiss_MSBE_Bar_Letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/62NS-LNVK] (“There is a catchall 
question on the [bar] application requiring disclosure of any matter [that] reflects adversely 
on character and [is] not called for specifically by other questions on the [bar] 
application.”). 
2The Fourth Appellate Judicial Circuit is comprised of Prince George’s County. 
- 3 - 
 
On March 30, 2017, on behalf of the Attorney Grievance Commission, Petitioner, 
Bar Counsel filed in this Court a “Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action” against 
Slate, charging him with violating Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct 
(“MLRPC”) 8.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), 8.4(c) (Dishonesty, Fraud, 
Deceit, or Misrepresentation), 8.4(d) (Conduct That Is Prejudicial to the Administration of 
Justice), and 8.4(a) (Violating the MLRPC).3   
On April 4, 2017, this Court designated the Honorable Jeannie Jinkyung Hong (“the 
hearing judge”) of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City to hear this attorney discipline 
proceeding.  On October 11 through 13, 2017, the hearing judge conducted a hearing.  On 
November 16, 2017, the hearing judge filed in this Court an opinion including findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, concluding that Slate had violated MLRPC 8.1(a), 8.1(b), 
8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(a).   
On February 1, 2018, we heard oral argument.  For the below reasons, we disbar 
Slate. 
BACKGROUND 
 
The hearing judge found the following facts, which we summarize. 
The ABC Case 
 
Before attending law school, Slate worked as a freelance investigative journalist.  In 
Fall 2007, Slate recorded footage as part of a hidden-camera investigation in Chicago.  On 
                                              
3Effective July 1, 2016, the MLRPC were renamed the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules 
of Professional Conduct, or MARPC, and renumbered.  We will refer to the MLRPC 
because most of the misconduct at issue occurred before this change. 
- 4 - 
September 16, 2009, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Slate 
sued ABC News, Inc., ABC News Interactive, Inc., and Disney/ABC International 
Television, Inc. (together, “ABC”), initiating Slate v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. (“the ABC 
Case”).  In the complaint, Slate alleged that ABC had committed copyright infringement 
by using his hidden camera footage without his authorization.   
 
ABC filed a motion for summary judgment and a motion to dismiss for bad-faith 
conduct of litigation.  In an Order and a separate Memorandum Opinion dated April 23, 
2013, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted the motion for 
summary judgment, and, in an alternative ruling, granted the motion to dismiss “as a 
sanction for [Slate]’s persistent course of bad-faith litigation conduct.”  Slate v. Am. Broad. 
Cos., Inc., 941 F. Supp. 2d 27, 53 (D.D.C. 2013).  The Court found that a letter4 that Slate 
had submitted was “not authentic and ha[d] been presented to [the] Court in bad faith.”  
Slate, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 47.  The Court found that the letter included a “glaring historical 
inconsistency” and was “fabricated after the fact[.]”  Id.  The Court found that Slate’s 
testimony at a deposition “was likely perjurious, or[,] at the very least[,] intentionally 
                                              
4The letter was dated August 21, 2006, and was purportedly sent by Slate to an ABC 
News producer.  See Slate, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 30-31.  In the letter, Slate stated that he “was 
confused when” ABC produced a story with his footage because it was his “understanding 
. . . that ABC and its affiliates were not interested in his footage[,] and he accepted [the 
producer’s] reimbursement proposal because he believed that his footage would retain its 
exclusivity and value.”  Id. at 31 (ellipsis in original) (brackets omitted).  Slate stated that 
he was “an independent freelance journalist[,]” and that he and ABC “should craft an 
explicit licensing agreement, ratified by both of [them], before [his] footage is broadcast[.]”  
Id.  Slate also stated: “In terms of compensation, I do not work for free or for expenses 
only [because] my recent success, including receiving an Emmy Award for Investigative 
Journalism, ha[s] substantially elevated the value of my work.”  Id.  
- 5 - 
misleading.”  Id. at 48 n.22.  The Court stated: 
[Slate] engaged in a course of conduct, which demonstrates that he does not 
take seriously his obligation to litigate in good faith.  Most notably, [] Slate 
has repeatedly attempted to abuse the discovery process, and his persistent 
course of conduct in this regard strongly suggests that he acted willfully.  
This conduct includes, but is not limited to: (1) attempting to fraudulently 
collect evidence; (2) producing discovery documents in a soiled envelope 
that had the strong odor of excrement; (3) improperly videotaping his own 
deposition testimony; and (4) producing voluminous amounts of irrelevant 
and misleading materials. 
 
Id. at 50 (footnotes omitted).  The Court also found that Slate “lack[ed] respect for the 
federal judicial process.”  Id. at 51.   
 
Slate filed a motion for reconsideration, as well as two other motions in which he 
requested that the Court alter or amend the April 23, 2013 Order.  In an Order and a separate 
Memorandum Opinion dated December 20, 2013, the Court denied the motions.  See Slate 
v. Am. Broad. Companies, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 3d 30 (D.D.C. 2013).  The Court stated that 
Slate’s “briefing in connection with his pending motion for reconsideration continue[d] to 
exhibit the clear and convincing pattern of omissions and obfuscations that warranted 
granting [ABC’s] motion to dismiss for bad-faith litigation conduct in the first place.”  Id. 
at 42 (citations omitted).   
 
Slate noted an appeal.  In an amended notice of appeal dated January 3, 2014, Slate 
stated: “Notice is also given, that [Slate] hereby appeals to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit from the judgment (Dkt. 102 and Dkt. 103) of 
this Court entered on the 23rd day of April, 2013 in favor of [ABC] against [Slate].”   
- 6 - 
 
In a per curiam opinion dated November 18, 2014,5 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the ABC Case for 
bad-faith conduct of litigation, concluding: 
The [D]istrict [C]ourt’s factual findings of misconduct were not clearly 
erroneous; and the [D]istrict [C]ourt did not abuse its discretion in 
determining that dismissal was warranted in light of the numerous instances 
of misconduct it cited and the materiality of some of that misconduct to 
adjudication of central issues in the case. 
 
Slate v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 584 F. App’x 2, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (citations 
omitted).   
Websites About Slate 
 
While working as a freelance investigative journalist, Slate became associated with 
a man named Diop Kamau.6  Slate and Kamau had a falling-out, after which Kamau began 
maintaining multiple websites that included information about Slate’s personal and 
professional life.7  Such information included the Memorandum Opinions in the ABC Case 
(“the Opinions”).  At the disciplinary hearing, Slate testified that, because of Kamau’s 
websites about him, he knew that he could never conceal the Opinions.   
Discussions Before Slate Submitted His Bar Application 
 
In August 2012, Slate began attending the University of Baltimore School of Law. 
                                              
5In providing the date of the opinion, the hearing judge inadvertently referred to 
November 18, 2017.   
6Kamau is a principal of a nonprofit organization called the Police Complaint 
Center.  See Slate, 941 F. Supp. 2d  at 29.  Slate worked with the Police Complaint Center 
during the hidden-camera investigation that gave rise to the ABC Case.  See id.  
7The hearing judge found that Kamau’s websites made clear “the sheer animosity 
between” Kamau and Slate.  
- 7 - 
In his third year, Slate became concerned about the impact of his litigation history on his 
bar application.  In April 2014, Slate told Jeffrey Shipley, the SBLE’s Secretary, that he 
had been involved in “contentious” litigation.  Slate, however, did not inform Shipley of 
the Opinions or the findings therein.  Slate asked about the impact of his litigation history 
on his bar application.  Shipley advised Slate to disclose his entire litigation history, and 
“to read and follow the directions” on the bar application.   
 
Also during his third year, Slate told Claudia Diamond, the Assistant Dean of 
Academic and Writing Support at the University of Baltimore School of Law, that he had 
been involved in “contentious” litigation.  Slate e-mailed Diamond regarding certain 
disclosures on his bar application.  Slate, however, did not inform Diamond of the Opinions 
or the findings therein.   
 
At the disciplinary hearing, Slate testified that Shipley, Diamond, and various other 
individuals advised him not to disclose the Opinions in his bar application.  Slate blamed 
these individuals for his failure to disclose the Opinions in his bar application.  The hearing 
judge found: “Perhaps the individuals did, in fact, navigate [Slate] toward nondisclosure 
on his bar application; nevertheless, [Slate]’s attempt to shift the blame does not absolve 
him of his responsibility to prove his character to practice law, and to do so without 
knowingly omitting material facts[.]”  (Citations omitted).   
Slate’s Bar Application 
 
On May 16, 2014, Slate signed his bar application, which included his responses to 
the Character Questionnaire.  At the time, Question 11(a) of the Character Questionnaire 
stated: 
- 8 - 
The following is a complete list of all suits in equity, action[s] at law, 
administrative proceedings, suits in bankruptcy or other statutory 
proceedings, civil citations, matters in probate, lunacy, guardianship, and 
every other judicial proceeding of every nature and kind, except divorce or 
criminal proceedings, to which I am or have been a party (If “None,” so 
state)[.]   
 
Question 11(a) also required the applicant to provide details regarding each civil case to 
which the applicant had been a party, including the case number, the filing date, the court’s 
name and address, the date of trial, the date of disposition, and the disposition.8  
 
In his bar application, Slate disclosed that he had been involved in thirty-three 
criminal cases, and had been a party to forty-three civil cases, including the ABC Case. 
Slate disclosed the ABC Case’s name, the filing date, the court’s name and address, the 
date of trial, and the date of disposition.  Next to “Disposition[,]” Slate wrote: “Dismissed 
pending appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for District of Columbia Circuit[.]” 
Slate responded “No” to the question “Are you [the] subject of any continuing court 
order?”  Slate also responded “No” to the question “Was the judgment entered against 
you?”  Slate responded “No” to Question 11(b), which stated: “Have any judgments ever 
been entered against you?”  Slate also responded “No” to Question 11(c), which stated: “I 
have attached to this Application certified copies of all judgments listed in 11(b), whether 
satisfied or unsatisfied, and listed below the names and present addresses (with zip codes) 
of the holders.”  
                                              
8At the disciplinary hearing, Shipley testified that, as a result of the events that arose 
from Slate’s bar application, Question 11 was modified, such that it now expressly requires 
an applicant to attach any court document that may bear on his or her character and fitness 
to practice law.  
- 9 - 
 
Slate responded “No” to Question 18, the catchall question, which stated as follows: 
Have there been any circumstances or unfavorable incidents in your life, 
whether at school, college, law school, business or otherwise, which may 
have a bearing upon your character or your fitness to practice law, not called 
for by the questionnaire or disclosed in your answers? 
 
If so, give details, including any assertions or implication of dishonesty, 
misconduct, misrepresentation, financial irresponsibility, and disciplinary 
measures imposed (if any) by attaching a supplemental statement.  You are 
not required to disclose, in response to this question, any juvenile proceeding 
or any criminal proceeding expunged pursuant to Maryland law.  Maryland 
law does not permit expungement of convictions.[9]   
 
 
Slate signed Question 20, which stated: 
Affirmation of Applicant’s Duty of Full, Candid Disclosure and 
Applicant’s Continuing Duty to Submit Written Notice of Changes to 
Information Sought by the Application: I understand that the required 
disclosures in this questionnaire are of a continuing nature.  I hereby 
acknowledge my duty to respond fully and candidly to each question or 
required disclosure and to ensure that my responses are accurate and current 
at all times until I am formally admitted to the Bar of the State of Maryland.  
I will advise the [SBLE] immediately and in writing of any changes in the 
information disclosed in or sought by this questionnaire, including any 
pertinent facts developed after the initial filing of this application and the 
facts of any incident occurring subsequent to the initial filing of this 
application. 
 
I do solemnly declare and affirm under the penalties of perjury, that the 
matters and facts set forth in the foregoing application are true and accurate. 
 
I have made and retained a copy of this entire application for my records and 
for use in the event that the original is lost in the mail or during the character 
investigation.   
 
(Emphasis in original).  Slate did not attach the Opinions to his bar application or 
summarize the Opinions in his bar application.  Nor did Slate ever supplement his bar 
                                              
9At the disciplinary hearing, Shipley testified that Question 18 has not been 
substantively modified since Slate took the Bar Examination.   
- 10 - 
application with the Opinions.   
 
The hearing judge found that, while testifying at the disciplinary hearing, Slate 
“distinguished mandatory disclosures and attachments on the bar application from the ABC 
Case.”  Slate disputed that any part of the bar application required him to attach the 
Opinions.  Slate opined that, in light of Question 11(b), the word “judgments,” as used in 
Question 11(c), refers only to money judgments, and thus did not apply to the Opinions.   
The hearing judge observed that, in the notice of appeal in the ABC Case, Slate 
referred to one of the Opinions as a “judgment.”  In any event, the hearing judge did not 
address whether Question 11 required Slate to disclose the Opinions.  Instead, the hearing 
judge concluded that Question 18—the catchall question—required Slate to disclose the 
Opinions.  The hearing judge determined that, by responding “No” to Question 18, Slate 
intentionally failed to disclose material information that reflected adversely on his 
character.   
Character Interview and Meeting with Character Committee’s Co-Chairs 
On May 19, 2014, the SBLE received Slate’s bar application, and, on the same date, 
Slate graduated from the University of Baltimore School of Law.  Slate passed the July 
2014 Bar Examination.  On November 2, 2014,10 Slate signed an Affirmation by General 
Bar Applicant, in which he affirmed under oath that all of the facts in his bar application 
remained correct.  The hearing judge found that Slate’s affirmation was false.   
Slate’s bar application was sent to the Character Committee for the Fourth Appellate 
                                              
10The hearing judge inadvertently referred to November 2, 2017.   
- 11 - 
Judicial Circuit.  On November 18, 2014, as part of the character and fitness investigation, 
Joseph A. Compofelice, a member of the Character Committee, interviewed Slate.  The 
hearing judge noted that Compofelice is responsible for following up on moral and ethical 
issues identified by the SBLE.  If an applicant’s character and fitness is called into question, 
Compofelice is responsible for recommending that the Character Committee’s co-chairs, 
William C. Brennan, Jr. and Roger C. Thomas, schedule a hearing before a three-member 
panel.   
At the disciplinary hearing, Compofelice testified that, at the character interview, he 
questioned Slate about all forty-three civil cases, including the ABC Case, that he had 
disclosed in his bar application.  Compofelice testified that Slate disclosed the ABC Case 
and its disposition.  Specifically, Slate disclosed that the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia had granted summary judgment and dismissed the ABC Case due 
to discovery violations, and that an appeal was pending.  During the character interview, 
however, Slate did not disclose the Opinions or the findings therein.  Compofelice testified 
that, had he known of the Opinions and the findings therein, “at a minimum[,]” he would 
have recommended a hearing.  Compofelice testified that he “absolutely believe[d]” that 
Slate should have disclosed the Opinions in his bar application.   
Based on the information in Slate’s bar application and his representations during 
the character interview, Compofelice conditionally recommended his admission to the Bar 
of Maryland.  Compofelice recommended, however, that Brennan and Thomas review 
Slate’s bar application and conduct a follow-up meeting regarding his litigation history.   
On November 20, 2014, pursuant to Compofelice’s recommendation, Brennan and 
- 12 - 
Thomas conducted an informal meeting with Slate.  The meeting’s purpose was to 
determine whether to hold a hearing, or recommend Slate’s admission without a hearing. 
At the disciplinary hearing, Brennan and Thomas testified that they questioned Slate about 
all forty-three civil cases, including the ABC Case, that he had disclosed in his bar 
application.  Brennan and Thomas testified, however, that there was no discussion of the 
Opinions or the findings therein.  Slate discussed the disposition of the ABC Case in 
general, without disclosing the substance of the findings in the Opinions.  Slate also 
indicated that an appeal was pending in the ABC Case.11  Brennan and Thomas testified 
that Slate’s failure to disclose the Opinions or the findings therein in his bar application 
and during the meeting inhibited the Character Committee’s and the SBLE’s efforts to 
investigate Slate’s character and fitness.  Brennan and Thomas testified that, had Slate 
disclosed the Opinions or the findings therein, the decision-making process would have 
significantly differed.   
Concerned with the volume of civil cases to which Slate had been a party, Brennan 
asked Shipley whether litigiousness alone was a basis for denying admission.  According 
to the hearing judge, Shipley responded that litigiousness alone does not warrant a hearing. 
Based on Shipley’s response, as well as Slate’s representations in his bar application and 
at the meeting, Brennan and Thomas recommended that Slate be admitted to the Bar of 
Maryland without a hearing.  Shipley cleared Slate for admission without a hearing.  On 
                                              
11Contrary to Slate’s assertion, the United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit had disposed of the appeal two days earlier, on November 18, 2014.  
See Slate, 584 F. App’x 2. 
- 13 - 
December 18, 2014, this Court admitted Slate to the Bar of Maryland.   
Slate testified that he was under the impression that the Character Committee and 
the SBLE would investigate the ABC Case.  The hearing judge found that, while testifying, 
Slate attempted to shift to the Character Committee and the SBLE the burden of verifying 
the facts in his bar application, including the ABC Case.  While testifying, Slate referred 
to Maryland Rule 19-203(a)(1)(B), which states in pertinent part: “On receipt of an 
application forwarded by the [SBLE], the Character Committee shall . . . verify the facts 
stated in the questionnaire[.]”  
Slate testified that he was under the impression that Kamau’s websites about him 
would be investigated, as he told Compofelice, Brennan, and Thomas about Kamau’s 
websites about him.  In summarizing Slate’s testimony at the disciplinary hearing, the 
hearing judge stated that Slate believed that, by telling Compofelice, Brennan, and Thomas 
about Kamau’s websites about him, he constructively disclosed the Opinions to the 
Character Committee and the SBLE.  The hearing judge found that Slate “distracted the 
SBLE and the Character Committee with extraneous information concerning . . . Kamau, 
his career as an investigative journalist, and his landlord-tenant litigation.”12   
The hearing judge found that Slate had multiple opportunities to disclose and/or 
discuss the Opinions and the findings therein before, during, and after completing his bar 
                                              
12The hearing judge did not make any other findings of fact regarding Slate’s 
landlord-tenant litigation. 
(Continued...) 
- 14 - 
application.13  The hearing judge found, however, that, throughout the bar application 
process, Slate knowingly omitted the Opinions and the findings therein.  The hearing judge 
found that Slate “used benign terms to describe” the ABC Case’s disposition and the 
findings in the Opinions.  The hearing judge found that Slate “concealed” the Opinions “in 
an attempt to deceive” the Character Committee and the SBLE so that he would get 
admitted to the Bar of Maryland.   
Complaint Against Slate and His Response to Bar Counsel 
George A. Weiss, a member of the Bar of Maryland, assisted another lawyer who 
represented someone whom Slate had sued as a pro se plaintiff.  Weiss visited one of 
Kamau’s websites about Slate.  Weiss used Public Access to Court Electronic Records, or 
PACER—the federal courts’ e-filing system—to confirm information about Slate, 
including the existence of the ABC Case, the Opinions, and the findings therein.   
On November 9, 2015, Bar Counsel received from Weiss a complaint against 
Slate.14  In the complaint, Weiss raised various concerns about Slate’s character and fitness 
prior to his admission to the Bar of Maryland, including the findings in the Opinions.   
On December 16, 2015, Bar Counsel sent Slate a letter advising him of the 
                                              
13The hearing judge stated that Slate had multiple opportunities to disclose and/or 
discuss the Opinions and the findings therein “before, during, and after the [bar] application 
process.”  In a footnote, the hearing judge specified that these opportunities were his 
discussion with Shipley, his communications with Diamond, his bar application, the 
character interview, the meeting with Brennan and Thomas, and the supplements that he 
submitted to the SBLE.  Accordingly, in the above quotation, the hearing judge was 
referring to opportunities before, during, and after completing his bar application, as all 
such opportunities occurred during the bar application process. 
14Before then, Weiss had never met, or directly communicated with, Slate.  
- 15 - 
complaint, and stating that Bar Counsel had “not yet determined whether this matter should 
be classified as a formal docketed complaint[,] or is one [that] is not disciplinary in 
nature[.]”  Bar Counsel stated that a “written response” would help “make this decision.”   
On January 5, 2016, Slate sent a written response to Bar Counsel’s letter, stating in 
pertinent part: “[T]he [complaint] speculates that I may have failed to disclose relevant 
information in connection with my application to the bar in violation of [MLRPC] 8.1. . . .  
I complied fully with [MLRPC] 8.1 because I disclosed everything necessary and more to 
the Character Committee during the review process.”15   
Aggravating Factors and Mitigating Factors 
The hearing judge found that Slate’s misconduct was aggravated by a dishonest or 
selfish motive, as Slate concealed material information to get admitted to the Bar of 
Maryland.  The hearing judge also found that Slate’s misconduct was aggravated by a 
refusal to acknowledge his misconduct’s wrongful nature.  The hearing judge stated that 
Slate “does not believe he was required to disclose, discuss, or [provide a] supplement” 
with, the Opinions and the findings therein.  Subsequently, the hearing judge found: “This 
clearly shows [Slate]’s impenitence and lack of respect for the SBLE, the Character 
Committee, and” the hearing judge.   
The hearing judge found that Slate had not established any mitigating factors.16  
                                              
15The hearing judge inadvertently stated that Slate’s response to Bar Counsel was 
dated December 5, 2016.  
16At the disciplinary hearing, as a witness for Slate, Barmak Naraghi, a recent 
graduate of the George Washington University Law School who is not a lawyer, testified 
that he assisted Slate with the bar application process.  Naraghi testified that Slate was 
(Continued...) 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
In an attorney discipline proceeding, this Court reviews for clear error a hearing 
judge’s findings of fact, and reviews without deference a hearing judge’s conclusions of 
law.  See Md. R. 19-741(b)(2)(B) (“The Court [of Appeals] shall give due regard to the 
opportunity of the hearing judge to assess the credibility of witnesses.”); Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. Chanthunya, 446 Md. 576, 588, 133 A.3d 1034, 1041 (2016) (“This 
Court reviews for clear error a hearing judge’s findings of fact.”  (Citations omitted)); Md. 
R. 19-741(b)(1) (“The Court of Appeals shall review de novo the [hearing] judge’s 
conclusions of law.”).  This Court determines whether clear and convincing evidence 
establishes that a lawyer violated an MLRPC.  See Md. R. 19-727(c) (“Bar Counsel has 
the burden of proving the averments of the petition [for disciplinary or remedial action] by 
clear and convincing evidence.”). 
DISCUSSION 
(A) Findings of Fact 
 
Bar Counsel does not except to any of the hearing judge’s findings of fact.  Slate 
raises eight exceptions as to the hearing judge’s findings of fact.  We overrule all of Slate’s 
exceptions, most of which pertain to factual allegations that are immaterial to this attorney 
discipline proceeding. 
 
First, Slate excepts to the hearing judge’s “failure to find that” he disclosed his 
                                              
“anxious” during the bar application process.  The hearing judge found, however, that 
Naraghi “did not proffer any substantive evidence regarding the merits of this” attorney 
discipline proceeding.   
- 17 - 
appeal of the Opinions in Question 11 on his bar application.  Slate is mistaken.  The 
hearing judge found that, in his response to Question 11(a), with regard to the ABC Case, 
next to “Disposition[,]” Slate wrote: “Dismissed pending appeal in the United States Court 
of Appeals for District of Columbia Circuit[.]”   
 
Second, Slate excepts to the hearing judge’s “failure to find that” he disclosed six 
civil cases that were related to the ABC Case.  Slate contends that the other civil cases were 
relevant because they “involve[d] and disclose[d] matters concerning the material 
allegations in the” Opinions.  Slate’s contention is a red herring.  In the Petition for 
Disciplinary or Remedial Action, Bar Counsel did not allege that Slate improperly failed 
to disclose information about a civil case other than the ABC Case.  Instead, Bar Counsel’s 
charges against Slate arose entirely from his failure to disclose the Opinions and the 
findings therein.  This attorney discipline proceeding turns on whether Slate improperly 
failed to disclose the Opinions and the findings therein, regardless of whether the ABC 
Case was related to other civil cases that Slate disclosed.  Slate’s alleged disclosure of other 
civil cases is immaterial. 
 
Third, Slate excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that he did not attach the Opinions 
to his bar application, or supplement his bar application with the Opinions.  Slate alleges 
that, in letters to the SBLE, he disclosed the existence of two civil cases in which copies of 
the Opinions were filed with trial courts.  Even if true, Slate’s allegations are completely 
consistent with the hearing judge’s finding that he failed to attach, or supplement his bar 
application with, the Opinions.   
 
Fourth, Slate excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that he did not disclose the 
- 18 - 
Opinions to Diamond.  Slate notes that Diamond did not testify at the disciplinary hearing, 
and that his own testimony was the only evidence of in-person communications between 
himself and Diamond.  Slate contends that, accordingly, there was no evidence that he did 
not disclose the Opinions to Diamond.  Slate completely ignores Respondent’s Exhibits 7 
through 12, which was a series of e-mails that Slate and Diamond exchanged regarding 
certain disclosures on his bar application.  The hearing judge found that, in his e-mails to 
Diamond, Slate did not disclose the Opinions or the findings therein.  In any event, it does 
not matter whether Slate disclosed the Opinions or the findings therein to Diamond, who 
was not a member of the Character Committee or the SBLE. 
 
Fifth, Slate excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that, after he told Shipley that he 
had been involved in “contentious” litigation and asked about the impact of his litigation 
history on his bar application, Shipley simply advised him to disclose his entire litigation 
history, and “to read and follow the directions” on the bar application.  Slate alleges that 
Shipley advised him to submit only the documents that the bar application directed 
applicants to submit, and told him that a member of the Character Committee would 
investigate his disclosures in his bar application.  Slate notes that Shipley testified with 
regard to Slate’s litigation history: “I told [Slate] that[,] certainly[,] his history would be 
investigated by his character investigator, that he needed to disclose his history, that his 
history would be investigated.”  Slate observes that Shipley also testified: “I think that we 
had a discussion about what documents needed to be attached[,] and[,] in that context[,] 
we talked about attaching the documents that the instructions printed in the bar application 
told you to attach.”  Slate notes that, when asked whether he told Slate not to submit 
- 19 - 
documents that the bar application did not direct applicants to submit, Shipley responded: 
“I think that’s part and parcel of the gist of the conversation that we had, that you need to 
answer the questions in the [bar] application.”   
 
We overrule Slate’s exception.  The portions of Shipley’s testimony that Slate 
quotes are completely consistent with the hearing judge’s finding that Shipley told Slate to 
follow the directions in the bar application.  This attorney discipline proceeding turns on 
which documents the bar application required Slate to submit, and the evidence 
demonstrates that Shipley advised Slate to follow the instructions on the bar application.  
The core issue in this attorney discipline proceeding is whether the bar application required 
Slate to submit the Opinions or the findings therein.  As discussed below, it did. 
 
Sixth, Slate excepts to the hearing judge’s “finding concerning ‘[t]he 
[i]nvestigation’ of the facts asserted in” his bar application.  Slate contends that 
Compofelice was unaware that he had been assigned as Slate’s character investigator, and 
that the Character Committee was obligated to “verif[y] the facts stated in the 
questionnaire” in Slate’s bar application under Maryland Rule 19-203(a)(1)(B).  Slate 
alleges that Compofelice testified that, if anyone was assigned as Slate’s character 
investigator, he was not so assigned.  Slate notes that, when asked: “[Y]ou didn’t do 
anything to verify the [ABC Case’s] disposition[,] as described on [Slate’s] bar 
application[,] that it had been dismissed pending appeal, correct?”, Compofelice 
responded: “No, nor am I required to.”   
 
We overrule this exception.  Even if Slate’s characterization of Compofelice’s 
testimony is accurate, it does not matter whether Compofelice was aware that he had been 
- 20 - 
assigned as Slate’s character investigator.  What matters is that Compofelice interviewed 
Slate as part of the character and fitness investigation.  Nor is it material whether 
Compofelice believed that he was obligated to verify the ABC Case’s disposition.  What 
is material is that, during the character interview, Slate failed to disclose or discuss the 
Opinions or the findings therein.   
 
Seventh, Slate excepts to the hearing judge’s findings “regarding the [b]ar 
[a]pplication’s questions and directives concerning ‘judgments’ and [Slate]’s responses 
thereto.”  Slate contends that the hearing judge implied that the Opinions were 
“judgments,” as that word is used in Question 11(a), which stated in pertinent part: “Was 
the judgment entered against you?”  Slate argues that, if the Opinions were not 
“judgments,” then Question 11(a) is irrelevant to this attorney discipline proceeding.  Slate 
notes that, when he completed his bar application, there was no express requirement for an 
applicant to attach any court document that may bear on his or her character and fitness to 
practice law. Slate asserts that an e-mail that he sent to Diamond while he was completing 
his bar application demonstrates that he did not believe that the Opinions were “judgments” 
against him.   
 
Slate’s arguments are beside the point.  In a footnote, the hearing judge observed 
that, in the notice of appeal in the ABC Case, Slate referred to one of the Opinions as a 
“judgment.”  At no point, however, did the hearing judge find that the Opinions constituted 
“judgments,” or determine that Question 11 required Slate to disclose the Opinions or the 
findings therein.  In other words, the hearing judge did not resolve Slate’s contention that 
the Opinions did not constitute “judgments” because they were not “money judgments.” 
- 21 - 
Instead, the hearing judge concluded that Question 18—the catchall question—required 
Slate to disclose the Opinions.  As discussed below, we agree with the hearing judge’s 
conclusion.  Accordingly, whether Question 11 required Slate to disclose the Opinions or 
the findings therein is not at issue. 
 
Finally, Slate excepts to the hearing judge’s “failure to find that[,] when asked[,]” 
he provided copies of the Opinions to bar admission authorities in other jurisdictions whose 
applications requested such documents.17  At the risk of pointing out the obvious, in this 
attorney discipline proceeding, Slate has not been charged with failing to be candid in his 
applications for admission to bars of other jurisdictions.  To the extent that Slate contends 
that, because he provided the Opinions to bar admission authorities in other jurisdictions 
whose applications requested such information, this circumstance establishes he was not 
withholding the Opinions in his application for admission to the Bar of Maryland, Slate is 
wrong.  Although Question 18 did not specifically require that the Opinions be attached to 
a bar application, Question 18 asked that an applicant give the “details, including any 
assertions or implication of dishonesty, misconduct, [and] misrepresentation[.]”  Question 
18 plainly required disclosure of the Opinions or the information contained therein.  That 
Slate may have disclosed the Opinions to bar admission authorities in other jurisdictions 
does not affect the outcome of this case.   
                                              
17The hearing judge’s opinion does not indicate whether Slate is a member of any 
bar other than the Bar of Maryland.  At oral argument, in response to a question from the 
Court, Slate stated that he is not barred in any other jurisdiction. 
- 22 - 
(B) Conclusions of Law 
 
Slate excepts to all of the hearing judge’s conclusions of law.  Bar Counsel excepts 
to the hearing judge’s conclusion that Slate violated MLRPC 8.1(b) by misrepresenting to 
Bar Counsel that he had disclosed all required information during the bar application 
process.  Bar Counsel contends that Slate’s misrepresentation about having disclosed all 
required information constituted a violation of MLRPC 8.1(a) instead of MLRPC 8.1(b).  
Bar Counsel argues that, in addition to the violation of MLRPC 8.1(a), Slate violated 
MLRPC 8.1(b) by failing to supplement his bar application with, or tell the Character 
Committee about, the Opinions or the findings therein.  Bar Counsel also excepts to the 
hearing judge’s failure to conclude that, in addition to violating MLRPC 8.4(c) by 
concealing the Opinions and the findings therein, Slate separately violated MLRPC 8.4(c) 
by misrepresenting to Bar Counsel that he had disclosed all required information during 
the bar application process.  For the below reasons, we sustain Bar Counsel’s exceptions 
and overrule Slate’s exceptions. 
MLRPC 8.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters) 
 
MLRPC 8.1 states: 
An applicant for admission . . . to the bar, or a lawyer in connection with a 
bar admission application or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall 
not: 
 
(a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or 
 
(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension 
known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to 
respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or 
disciplinary authority, except that this Rule does not require disclosure of 
information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6. 
- 23 - 
 
 
The hearing judge concluded that Slate violated MLRPC 8.1(a) by responding “No” 
to Question 18, the catchall question.  Immediately after quoting MLRPC 8.1(b), the 
hearing judge stated: 
As discussed above, [Slate] did not supplement his bar application or his 
discussions with the Character Committee with the [] Opinions or the 
findings therein.  [Slate] then knowingly made a false statement of material 
fact by misrepresenting to Bar Counsel that he “disclosed everything 
necessary and more to the Character Committee during the review process.”  
Thus, [the hearing judge concludes] by clear and convincing evidence that 
[Slate] violated MLRPC 8.1(b).   
 
 
Bar Counsel does not except to the hearing judge’s conclusion that Slate violated 
MLRPC 8.1(a) by responding “No” to Question 18, the catchall question.  But, Bar Counsel 
contends that, by making a misrepresentation to Bar Counsel, Slate violated MLRPC 
8.1(a), not MLRPC 8.1(b), as the hearing judge concluded.  Bar Counsel argues that Slate 
also violated MLRPC 8.1(b) by failing to disclose the Opinions or the findings therein in a 
supplement to his bar application or during the character interview.  We agree with Bar 
Counsel on both counts. 
 
Clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that Slate 
violated MLRPC 8.1(a) by responding “No” to Question 18, the catchall question.  
Question 18 stated in pertinent part: 
Have there been any circumstances or unfavorable incidents in your life, 
whether at school, college, law school, business or otherwise, which may 
have a bearing upon your character or your fitness to practice law, not called 
for by the questionnaire or disclosed in your answers?  If so, give details, 
including any assertions or implication of dishonesty, misconduct, [and] 
misrepresentation . . . by attaching a supplemental statement.   
 
(Emphasis added) (paragraph break omitted).  By its plain language, Question 18 is 
- 24 - 
designed to be broad.  Its express purpose is to require an applicant to disclose “any” 
information that “may having a bearing upon” the applicant’s character or fitness, where 
that information is not called for by, or disclosed in the applicant’s responses to, the 
character questionnaire’s other questions.  For example, if information about an applicant’s 
litigation history may having a bearing upon the applicant’s character or fitness, and that 
information is not called for by, or disclosed in the applicant’s answer to, Question 11, then 
Question 18 unequivocally requires that information.  Additionally, Question 18 
specifically requires an applicant to disclose information related to “any assertions or 
implication of dishonesty, misconduct, [and] misrepresentation[.]” 
 
Here, unquestionably, the Opinions and the findings therein would have had a 
bearing upon Slate’s character or his fitness to practice law, and constituted information 
that was related to dishonesty and misconduct.  Clearly, the Opinions included 
“implication[s] of dishonesty, misconduct, [and] misrepresentation[,]” which Question 18 
specifically called for.  Slate’s response of “No” to Question 18 plainly constituted a “false 
statement material fact” under MLRPC 8.1(a).  In the Memorandum Opinion dated April 
23, 2013, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the ABC 
Case “as a sanction for [Slate]’s persistent course of bad-faith litigation conduct.”  Slate, 
941 F. Supp. 2d at 53. The Court found that Slate had “fabricated” a letter and submitted it 
to the Court “in bad faith.”  Slate, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 48, 47.  The Court found that Slate’s 
testimony at a deposition “was likely perjurious, or[,] at the very least[,] intentionally 
misleading.”  Id. at 48 n.22.  The Court found that Slate’s conduct “demonstrate[d] that he 
d[id] not take seriously his obligation to litigate in good faith.”  Id. at 50.  The Court found 
- 25 - 
that Slate “repeatedly attempted to abuse the discovery process[,]” and that “his persistent 
course of conduct in this regard strongly suggests that he acted willfully.”  Id.  The Court 
stated that Slate’s misconduct during discovery included “(1) attempting to fraudulently 
collect evidence; (2) producing discovery documents in a soiled envelope that had the 
strong odor of excrement; (3) improperly videotaping his own deposition testimony; and 
(4) producing voluminous amounts of irrelevant and misleading materials.”  Id. (footnotes 
omitted).  The Court found that Slate “lack[ed] respect for the federal judicial process.”  Id. 
at 51.  In the Memorandum Opinion dated December 20, 2013, the Court stated that Slate’s 
“briefing in connection with his pending motion for reconsideration continue[d] to exhibit 
the clear and convincing pattern of omissions and obfuscations that warranted granting 
[ABC’s] motion to dismiss for bad-faith litigation conduct in the first place.”  Slate, 12 F. 
Supp. 3d at 42.   
 
The hearing judge’s opinion conclusively demonstrates that Slate’s response of 
“No” to Question 18—i.e., his false statement of material fact—was knowing, as required 
for a violation of MLRPC 8.1(a).  The hearing judge found that Slate “knowingly omitted 
the [] Opinions and the findings therein throughout the entirety of the bar application 
process”; that, “[b]y indicating ‘No’ to Question 18, [the catchall question, Slate] 
knowingly and intentionally failed to disclose material information reflecting adversely 
on his character at the time he submitted his bar application and throughout the pendency 
of the application process”; and that Slate “knowingly concealed material information 
from the SBLE and the Character Committee.”  (Emphasis added). 
 
Slate’s response to Question 11 did not obviate the need for him to disclose the 
- 26 - 
Opinions and the findings therein in response to Question 18.  In response to Question 11, 
Slate disclosed the ABC Case’s name, the filing date, the court’s name and address, the 
date of trial, and the date of disposition.  Next to “Disposition[,]” Slate wrote: “Dismissed 
pending appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for District of Columbia Circuit[.]” 
Without more, these circumstances—i.e., that Slate was a party to the ABC Case, that the 
ABC Case was dismissed, and that an appeal was pending in the ABC Case—did not reveal 
anything about Slate’s character.  The salient circumstance was that the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia had found that Slate had engaged in various 
instances of dishonesty and misconduct, including fabrication of evidence, attempted abuse 
of the discovery process, and possible perjury.  Slate was obligated to disclose these 
findings in response to Question 18.   
 
Compofelice, Brennan, and Thomas, i.e., members of the Character Committee, and 
the SBLE, were not obligated to independently locate copies of the Opinions.  “The 
applicant bears the burden of proving to the Character Committee, the [SBLE], and [this] 
Court the applicant’s good moral character and fitness for the practice of law.”  Md. R. 19-
203(d).  With regard to Question 18, the burden is on the applicant to provide all 
information that may have any bearing on the applicant’s character or fitness, and that was 
not called for, or disclosed in the responses to, the other questions.  The applicant does not 
meet this burden by merely having disclosed, in response to Question 11, the existence of, 
and basic facts about, a case to which the applicant was a party, where a court has issued 
an opinion in which the court finds that the applicant engaged in misconduct.  This is 
especially true where, as here, the case in question is merely one of dozens of cases to 
- 27 - 
which the applicant was a party, thus making it less likely that the Character Committee 
and the SBLE will focus on any particular case if the applicant does not provide any 
substantive information about the case.   
 
 Contrary to Slate’s contention, the applicant’s burden under Maryland Rule 19-
203(d) is unaffected by Maryland Rule 19-203(a)(1)(B), which states in pertinent part: “On 
receipt of an application forwarded by the [SBLE], the Character Committee shall . . . 
verify the facts stated in the questionnaire[.]”  In other words, Maryland Rule 19-
203(a)(1)(B) does not relieve the applicant of his or her burden to provide all required 
information in his or her bar application.  Maryland Rule 19-203(a)(1)(B)’s use of the 
phrase “verify the facts stated in the questionnaire” merely refers to the Character 
Committee’s obligation to investigate a bar application to the extent that “it finds necessary 
or desirable[.]”  Such an investigation must at least include “personally interview[ing] the 
applicant[,]” Md. R. 19-203(a)(1)(A), and “contact[ing] the applicant’s references[,]” Md. 
R. 19-203(a)(1)(B).  Under no circumstance is the Character Committee obligated to go on 
a fishing expedition for evidence of an applicant’s misconduct, especially where, as here, 
in the bar application and the character interview, the applicant furnishes no reason to 
suspect that such evidence exists.  Under Maryland Rule 19-203(d), throughout the entire 
bar application process, the burden remains on the applicant to prove his or her character 
and fitness, and to provide all required information. 
 
Slate mistakenly relies on Application of G.L.S., 292 Md. 378, 439 A.2d 1107 
(1982), for the proposition that he provided sufficient information in his bar application.  
In G.L.S., id. at 397, 439 A.2d at 1117, this Court determined that, in a bar application, an 
- 28 - 
applicant “provided sufficient information to alert the [Character] Committee to the need 
for further investigation and inquiry.”  Before attending law school, the applicant was the 
driver of a getaway car in a bank robbery, pled guilty to armed robbery, and was 
imprisoned.  See id. at 379, 439 A.2d at 1108.  In his bar application, the applicant did not 
list a residence for the years during which he was imprisoned.  See id. at 382, 439 A.2d at 
1109.  In response to Question 11, the applicant listed the month and year of his guilty plea 
and the name of the court in which he pled guilty, but he did not provide any information 
next to “Nature of Proceedings” and “Disposition[.]”  Id. at 382, 439 A.2d at 1110.  During 
the character interview, the applicant disclosed that he had been convicted of a felony and 
had been sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment.  See id. at 382, 439 A.2d at 1110.  This 
Court admitted the applicant to the Bar of Maryland, explaining: 
We recognize that the applicant failed to provide complete 
information on his [bar] application . . . .  We note, however, that he made 
full disclosure of his criminal conviction and incarceration on his application 
to law school.  On his [bar] application . . . , he provided sufficient 
information to alert the [Character] Committee to the need for further 
investigation and inquiry.  When his alleged failure to fully disclose was 
called to his attention, he conceded that the information he provided was 
incomplete[,] and then voluntarily provided the requisite information.  
Throughout the proceedings[,] he repeatedly asserted that he did not 
consciously intend to conceal information regarding his criminal activity.  
Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the applicant did not 
possess a sufficient degree of candor to qualify for admission to the Bar. 
 
Id. at 398, 397, 439 A.2d at 1118, 1117 (emphasis added). 
 
G.L.S. is materially distinguishable because its circumstances demonstrate that the 
omissions in the applicant’s bar application were the result of an oversight, not a deliberate 
attempt to conceal information.  In G.L.S., id. at 382, 439 A.2d at 1110, in his bar 
- 29 - 
application, the applicant indicated that he had been a party to a case in a certain court in a 
specified month and year, but did not fill in the blanks regarding the nature of the case or 
the disposition.  When asked about the case at the character interview, the applicant 
disclosed his guilty plea and sentence.  See id. at 382, 439 A.2d at 1110.  Before the SBLE, 
the applicant testified that the omission in his bar application “was an oversight” that 
occurred because he was in a hurry to complete the application by the filing deadline, not 
because he intended to conceal his guilty plea.  Id. at 383-84, 439 A.2d at 1110-11. 
 
By contrast, here, the hearing judge expressly found that Slate “conceal[ed] material 
information [] to gain admission to the” Bar of Maryland.  Unlike the applicant in G.L.S., 
Slate did not leave any part of his bar application blank with regard to the ABC Case, which 
may have prompted further investigation by the Character Committee and/or the SBLE.  
Instead, with regard to the ABC Case, Slate completely filled in every blank, and then 
responded “No” to the catchall question, thus indicating that he had provided all required 
information—when, in fact, he had not.  Additionally, unlike the applicant in G.L.S., Slate 
did not disclose the required information at the character interview.  The hearing judge’s 
findings indicate that, in his bar application and discussions with Compofelice, Brennan, 
and Thomas, Slate refrained from disclosing the Opinions and the findings therein in an 
attempt to fly under the radar and keep the Character Committee and the SBLE in the dark 
regarding the findings of his dishonesty and misconduct in the ABC Case. 
 
Slate also mistakenly relies on Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Dee, 306 Md. 799, 
511 A.2d 516 (1986), for the proposition that he effectively disclosed the Opinions.  In 
Dee, id. at 808, 511 A.2d at 520, this Court concluded that an applicant “effectively 
- 30 - 
disclosed any drug involvement in her past” in her bar application and her character 
interview.  Over a two-year period, the applicant bought illegal drugs for her own use and 
for resale.  See id. at 801, 511 A.2d at 516.  In her bar application, the applicant responded 
“No” to the catchall question.  Id. at 801, 511 A.2d at 516.  In response to a question 
regarding whether she had ever been addicted to drugs, the applicant stated “Yes”; the 
applicant also submitted to the Character Committee a letter that described her drug use.  
Id. at 807-08, 511 A.2d at 519-20.  Additionally, during the character interview, the 
applicant disclosed that she had received probation before judgment for possession of 
heroin, and submitted a report from a psychiatrist who had treated her while she was 
addicted to drugs.  See id. at 802, 511 A.2d at 517. 
 
This Court concluded that, by responding “No” to the catchall question, the 
applicant did not violate MLRPC 8.1’s predecessor, which stated: “A lawyer is subject to 
discipline if he has made a materially false statement in, or if he has deliberately failed to 
disclose a material fact requested in connection with his application for admission to the 
bar.”  Id. at 808, 805, 511 A.2d at 520, 519.  This Court explained: “Through her 
discussions . . . in her character interview and her revelations made pursuant to [the 
q]uestion [] of the bar application[ that pertained to drug use], we believe [that the 
applicant] has effectively disclosed any drug involvement in her past.”  Id. at 808, 511 A.2d 
at 520. 
 
Dee is materially distinguishable from this case because the lawyer in Dee disclosed 
her drug use not only in her bar application, but also in her character interview.  By contrast, 
in neither his bar application, nor the character interview, nor the meeting with Brennan 
- 31 - 
and Thomas, did Slate disclose the Opinions or the findings therein.  Unlike the lawyer in 
Dee, Slate violated MLRPC 8.1(a) by responding “No” to the catchall question and 
providing no additional information. 
 
We reject Slate’s contention that he did not violate MLRPC 8.1(a) because the 
hearing judge stated that Slate “believed” that he constructively disclosed the Opinions by 
telling Compofelice, Brennan, and Thomas about Kamau’s websites about Slate, and that 
he “to this day does not believe he was required to disclose, discuss, or supplement” the 
Opinions or the findings therein.  Slate argues that these are findings by the hearing judge 
that demonstrate that he did not knowingly fail to disclose material information in his bar 
application.   
Slate takes the hearing judge’s statements out of context.  With regard to both of the 
statements on which Slate relies, the hearing judge did not determine that Slate had a good-
faith, albeit mistaken, belief that he did not need to disclose the Opinions or the findings 
therein, or that he had constructively done so.  In the first instance, the hearing judge merely 
summarized Slate’s contention regarding his alleged constructive disclosure of the 
Opinions.  In the second instance, the hearing judge found that Slate’s misconduct was 
aggravated by a refusal to acknowledge his misconduct’s wrongful nature, as demonstrated 
by his arguments that he had done nothing wrong. 
Significantly, the hearing judge’s statement that Slate “believed” that he 
constructively disclosed the Opinions appears under a heading labeled “Respondent.” 
Under that heading, the hearing judge merely summarized Slate’s testimony, without 
finding any part of it credible or not credible.  The hearing judge’s statement about 
- 32 - 
constructive disclosure appears at the end of the following paragraph: 
[Slate] then engaged in a lengthy monologue which divulged into 
his pre-law endeavors, including his contentious relationship with [] Kamau.  
[] Kamau maintains multiple websites for the purpose of publishing 
information about [Slate].  The websites make pellucid the sheer animosity 
between [] Kamau and [Slate].  Nevertheless, the content on [] Kamau’s 
websites include[s] the [] Opinions and the findings therein.  Based on the 
continuous publication by [] Kamau, [Slate] testified that he knew the [] 
Opinions and the findings therein could never be concealed.  [Slate] further 
testified that he informed [] Compofelice, [] Brennan, and [] Thomas about 
[] Kamau’s websites, and was under the impression that the websites would 
be investigated.  Thus, [Slate] believed the [] Opinions were disclosed, at 
least constructively, to the SBLE and the Character Committee.  
 
(Emphasis added).  In context, it is clear that the hearing judge did not find that Slate 
believed that he constructively disclosed the Opinions.  Instead, the hearing judge was 
simply summarizing one part of Slate’s testimony, without assessing its credibility. 
 
The hearing judge’s statement regarding Slate’s belief that he did not need to 
disclose the Opinions appears under a heading labeled “Mitigation and Aggravating 
Factors[.]” Under that heading, the hearing judge discussed both mitigating factors and 
aggravating factors.  The hearing judge’s statement regarding Slate’s belief that he did not 
need to disclose the Opinions appears toward the end of the first of the following two 
paragraphs: 
[The hearing judge] does not find by a preponderance of the evidence that 
[Slate] established any mitigating factors.  Notwithstanding the disclosure 
requirement of “judgments” on Question 11, Question 18 unequivocally 
required [Slate] to disclose the [] Opinions and the findings therein.  A review 
of the [] Opinions reveal[s] the following: bad faith litigation, perjurious 
testimony, fabrication of evidence, and lack of respect for the federal judicial 
process.  [Slate] failed to disclose, discuss, or supplement the [] Opinions and 
the findings therein throughout the pendency of the bar application process.  
In fact, [Slate] to this day does not believe he was required to disclose, 
discuss, or supplement the [] Opinions and the findings therein to his bar 
- 33 - 
application.  This clearly shows [Slate]’s impenitence and lack of respect 
for the SBLE, the Character Committee, and [the hearing judge]. 
The Court of Appeals also delineated certain aggravating factors to 
consider in determining sanctions.  By clear and convincing evidence, [the 
hearing judge] finds that [Slate] acted with a dishonest or selfish motive by 
concealing material information in order to gain admission to the Maryland 
Bar.  [Slate] also refuses to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his 
misconduct, which only exacerbates the serious nature of his MLRPC 
violations.   
 
(Emphasis added) (citations omitted).  As this context makes clear, the hearing judge did 
not find that Slate had a good-faith belief that he did not need to disclose the Opinions or 
the findings therein.  Instead, the hearing judge simply referred to Slate’s contention that 
he did not need to disclose the Opinions, and determined that Slate’s contention 
demonstrated a lack of remorse and a refusal to acknowledge his misconduct’s wrongful 
nature. 
Having determined that the hearing judge correctly concluded that Slate violated 
MLRPC 8.1(a) by responding “No” to Question 18, the catchall question, we turn to Bar 
Counsel’s contention that, by making a misrepresentation to Bar Counsel, Slate violated 
MLRPC 8.1(a), not MLRPC 8.1(b).  MLRPC 8.1(a) applies where a lawyer “knowingly 
make[s] a false statement of material fact[.]”  Meanwhile, MLRPC 8.1(b) applies where a 
lawyer “fail[s] to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the 
[lawyer] to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail[s] to respond to a lawful demand 
for information from” Bar Counsel.   
We agree with Bar Counsel that, contrary to the hearing judge’s conclusion, Slate’s 
misrepresentation to Bar Counsel that he had fully disclosed all that was required by the 
bar application constituted a violation of MLRPC 8.1(a), not MLRPC 8.1(b).  In his letter 
- 34 - 
to Bar Counsel, Slate stated: “I complied fully with [MLRPC] 8.1 because I disclosed 
everything necessary and more to the Character Committee during the review process.”  In 
her analysis as to MLRPC 8.1(b), the hearing judge found that Slate’s statement was a 
“knowing[,] false statement of material fact[.]”  A knowing, false statement of material fact 
to Bar Counsel is a violation of MLRPC 8.1(a), not MLRPC 8.1(b).18  Thus, we sustain 
Bar Counsel’s exception to the hearing judge’s conclusion that Slate violated MLRPC 
8.1(b). 
That said, we agree with Bar Counsel that Slate violated MLRPC 8.1(b) by failing 
to disclose the Opinions and the findings therein in a supplement to his bar application, or 
during the character interview, and thereby failing to correct the misapprehension that he 
had fully disclosed all relevant information about the ABC Case.  In his bar application, 
Slate did not disclose the Opinions and the findings therein, despite the circumstance that 
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia found that Slate engaged in 
multiple instances of dishonesty and misconduct.  Despite his failure to disclose the 
Opinions and the findings therein, Slate answered “No” to Question 18, the catchall 
question, which called for “circumstances or unfavorable incidents[,]” “including any . . . 
implication of dishonesty, misconduct, [or] misrepresentation[.]”  By failing to disclose the 
Opinions or the findings therein, and answering the catchall question in the negative, Slate 
failed to correct, and indeed created or caused, a misapprehension with the Character 
Committee and the SBLE that the ABC Case contained no information bearing on his 
                                              
18In discussing the violation of MLRPC 8.4(c) below, we explain that Slate’s 
statement to Bar Counsel was, indeed, false.  
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character and fitness for admission to the Bar.  Despite disclosing the existence of the ABC 
Case on his bar application, Slate never supplemented his bar application with the Opinions 
and the findings therein.  Nor did Slate disclose the Opinions and the findings therein 
during the character interview, or during his meeting with Brennan and Thomas.  In light 
of the hearing judge’s finding that Slate “knowingly concealed material information from 
the SBLE and the Character Committee[,]” it is clear that Slate violated MLRPC 8.1(b) by 
“fail[ing] to disclose a fact necessary to correct [the] misapprehension” that he had created. 
MLRPC 8.4(c) (Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit, or Misrepresentation) 
 
“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit[,] or misrepresentation[.]”  MLRPC 8.4(c). 
 
The hearing judge concluded that Slate violated MLRPC 8.4(c) by concealing the 
Opinions and the findings therein.  Bar Counsel does not except to the hearing judge’s 
conclusion, but contends that Slate committed an additional violation of MLRPC 8.4(c) by 
making a misrepresentation to Bar Counsel.  We agree. 
 
Clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that Slate 
violated MLRPC 8.4(c) by concealing the Opinions and the findings therein.  Question 18, 
the catchall question, required Slate to disclose the Opinions and the findings therein.  
Slate, however, responded “No” to the catchall question.  Additionally, Slate never 
disclosed the Opinions and the findings therein in a supplement to his bar application, 
during the character interview, or during his meeting with Brennan and Thomas.  Both 
Slate’s response to the catchall question, as well as his silence with regard to required 
information after he submitted his bar application, constituted acts that involved 
- 36 - 
dishonesty, deceit, and misrepresentation, and violated MLRPC 8.4(c). 
 
Upon our review of the record, we agree with Bar Counsel that Slate violated 
MLRPC 8.4(c) by making a false statement to Bar Counsel.  The hearing judge found that 
Slate’s statement to Bar Counsel—namely, that he fully complied with MLRPC 8.1 by 
“disclos[ing] everything necessary and more to the Character Committee during the review 
process”—was a “knowing[,] false statement of material fact[.]”  Even a cursory reading 
of Question 18 shows that the question requests information that is related to dishonesty, 
misconduct, and misrepresentation.  The hearing judge specifically found that Slate “used 
benign terms to describe” the Opinions and the disposition of the ABC Case.  The hearing 
judge found that Slate concealed the Opinions “in an attempt to deceive” the Character 
Committee and the SBLE.  These determinations support the conclusion that, in advising 
Bar Counsel that he had disclosed all that was necessary during the bar application process, 
Slate was untruthful.  Stated otherwise, Slate knew at the time that he responded to Bar 
Counsel that he had been required to disclose the Opinions and the findings therein, but 
that he had not.  
 
We reject Slate’s contention that he did not violate MLRPC 8.4(c) because MLRPC 
8.4(c) applies only to conduct in which a lawyer engages after having been admitted to the 
Bar of Maryland.  Insofar as the claim that a lawyer cannot violate MLRPC 8.4(c) by 
conduct that occurs before the lawyer is admitted to the Bar of Maryland, this Court has 
held that a lawyer’s failure to disclose, or concealment of, material information on the 
lawyer’s bar application constitutes a violation of MLRPC 8.4(c).  See Attorney Grievance 
Comm’n v. Van Dusen, 443 Md. 413, 430, 116 A.3d 1013, 1023 (2015) (This Court 
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concluded that a lawyer violated MLRPC 8.4(c) where, after being admitted to the Bar of 
Maryland, the lawyer “continued to conceal his criminal conduct from [the] SBLE, the 
[Attorney Grievance] Commission, and this Court.”  This Court stated that the lawyer’s 
“deliberate and continued failure to disclose his misconduct in order to protect his 
Maryland [law] license [was] conduct involving dishonesty and misrepresentation.”); 
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hunt, 435 Md. 133, 142-43, 76 A.3d 1214, 1219-20 (2013) 
(This Court upheld a hearing judge’s conclusion that a lawyer violated MLRPC 8.4(c) 
where the lawyer “deliberate[ly and] continual[ly] failed to disclose his criminal activities 
[that he had engaged in prior to his admission to the Bar of Maryland] to the admissions 
authority” either during or after the bar admissions process.  The hearing judge noted that 
the lawyer’s “omission of such material information was purposeful and calculating with 
the intent to deceive the admissions authority in their admissions process to avoid the 
possibility of being denied admission to the Bar.”).   
In any event, this contention is without merit with respect to the allegation that Slate 
made a false statement to Bar Counsel.  To the extent that Slate contends that he cannot be 
sanctioned for conduct occurring before he was admitted to the Bar, Slate’s statement to 
Bar Counsel, i.e., the alleged false statement that he provided all information, was made in 
response to Bar Counsel’s inquiry to Slate regarding the complaint.  Slate was obviously a 
member of the Bar at the time that he made this statement.  
MLRPC 8.4(d) (Conduct That Is Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice) 
 
“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice[.]”  MLRPC 8.4(d).  “Generally, a lawyer 
- 38 - 
violates MLRPC 8.4(d) where the lawyer’s conduct would negatively impact the 
perception of the legal profession of a reasonable member of the public.”  Chanthunya, 446 
Md. at 602, 133 A.3d at 1049 (cleaned up). 
 
The hearing judge concluded that Slate violated MLRPC 8.4(d) by knowingly 
concealing material information from the Character Committee and the SBLE, falsely 
declaring under oath in the Affirmation by General Bar Applicant that the facts in his bar 
application remained accurate, and misrepresenting to Bar Counsel that he had disclosed 
all required information.  We agree.  We are satisfied that clear and convincing evidence 
supports the conclusion that, with his conduct in violating MLRPC 8.1(a), 8.1(b), and 
8.4(c), Slate also violated MLRPC 8.4(d).  In sum, Slate’s conduct was such that it would 
negatively affect a reasonable person’s perception of the legal profession.   
 
The hearing judge’s findings undermine Slate’s contention that he did not violate 
MLRPC 8.4(d) because he merely made a “mistake.”  As noted above, the hearing judge 
repeatedly and unequivocally found that Slate’s concealment of the Opinions and the 
findings therein was knowing.   
MLRPC 8.4(a) (Violating the MLRPC) 
“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to[] violate . . . the” MLRPC.  MLRPC 
8.4(a).  Clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that Slate 
violated MLRPC 8.4(a).  As discussed above, Slate violated MLRPC 8.1(a), 8.1(b), 8.4(c), 
and 8.4(d). 
(C) Sanction 
 
Bar Counsel recommends that we disbar Slate, who asks us to dismiss this attorney 
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discipline proceeding.   
In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Allenbaugh, 450 Md. 250, 277-78, 148 A.3d 300, 
316-17 (2016), this Court stated: 
This Court sanctions a lawyer not to punish the lawyer, but instead to protect 
the public and the public’s confidence in the legal profession.  This Court 
accomplishes these goals by: (1) deterring other lawyers from engaging in 
similar misconduct; and (2) suspending or disbarring a lawyer who is unfit 
to continue to practice law. 
 
In determining an appropriate sanction for a lawyer’s misconduct, this Court 
considers: (1) the MLRPC that the lawyer violated; (2) the lawyer’s mental 
state; (3) the injury that the lawyer’s misconduct caused or could have 
caused; and (4) aggravating factors and/or mitigating factors. 
 
Aggravating factors include: (1) prior attorney discipline; (2) a dishonest or 
selfish motive; (3) a pattern of misconduct; (4) multiple violations of the 
MLRPC; (5) bad faith obstruction of the attorney discipline proceeding by 
intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency; 
(6) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive 
practices during the attorney discipline proceeding; (7) a refusal to 
acknowledge the misconduct’s wrongful nature; (8) the victim’s 
vulnerability; (9) substantial experience in the practice of law; (10) 
indifference to making restitution or rectifying the misconduct’s 
consequences; (11) illegal conduct, including that involving the use of 
controlled substances; and (12) likelihood of repetition of the misconduct. 
 
Mitigating factors include: (1) the absence of prior attorney discipline; (2) 
the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; (3) personal or emotional 
problems; (4) timely good faith efforts to make restitution or to rectify the 
misconduct’s consequences; (5) full and free disclosure to Bar Counsel or a 
cooperative attitude toward the attorney discipline proceeding; (6) 
inexperience in the practice of law; (7) character or reputation; (8) a physical 
disability; (9) a mental disability or chemical dependency, including 
alcoholism or drug abuse, where: (a) there is medical evidence that the 
lawyer is affected by a chemical dependency or mental disability; (b) the 
chemical dependency or mental disability caused the misconduct; (c) the 
lawyer’s recovery from the chemical dependency or mental disability is 
demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful 
rehabilitation; and (d) the recovery arrested the misconduct, and the 
misconduct’s recurrence is unlikely; (10) delay in the attorney discipline 
- 40 - 
proceeding; (11) the imposition of other penalties or sanctions; (12) remorse; 
(13) remoteness of prior violations of the MLRPC; and (14) unlikelihood of 
repetition of the misconduct. 
 
(Cleaned up). 
 
In Van Dusen, 443 Md. at 416, 116 A.3d at 1015, this Court unequivocally stated: 
A lawyer must, at a minimum, be trustworthy.  One who wants to be 
a lawyer in Maryland must disclose to the . . . SBLE[] and this Court 
information that bears on that trait.  Failure to satisfy those requirements may 
prevent admission to the bar or, when discovered, result in disbarment. 
 
This Court further explained that disbarment is the appropriate sanction where a lawyer 
conceals material information during the bar admission process, stating: 
This Court has also found disbarment appropriate when it is learned 
that a lawyer concealed material information during the bar admission 
process.  The Court has reasoned that disbarment is warranted because the 
deliberate failure to disclose material information plainly reflects on the 
truthfulness and candor of the applicant and no character qualification to 
practice law is more important than truthfulness and candor.  [Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v.] Keehan, 311 Md. [161,] 169, 533 A.2d 278 [(1987)] 
(disbarring lawyer who withheld material information relating to his prior 
employment experience); Hunt, 435 Md. at 143-44, 76 A.3d 1214 (disbarring 
attorney who failed to disclose past criminal conduct); [Attorney Grievance 
Comm’n v.] Gilbert, 307 Md. [481,] 496-497, 515 A.2d 454 [(1986)] 
(disbarring an attorney who failed to disclose involvement in a civil suit). 
 
Van Dusen, 443 Md. at 432, 116 A.3d at 1024-25. 
Here, Slate violated MLRPC 8.1(a) by responding “No” to Question 18, the catchall 
question, when he should have disclosed the Opinions and the findings therein.  Slate also 
violated MLRPC 8.1(a) by mispresenting to Bar Counsel that he had provided all required 
information during the bar application process.  Slate violated MLRPC 8.1(b) by failing to 
supplement his bar application with, or tell Compofelice, Brennan, and Thomas about, the 
Opinions and the findings therein.  Slate violated MLRPC 8.4(c) by concealing the 
- 41 - 
Opinions and the findings therein throughout the bar application process.  Slate also 
violated MLRPC 8.4(c) by making a false statement to Bar Counsel.  Slate violated 
MLRPC 8.4(d) through his knowing concealment of required information in the bar 
application process and misrepresentation to Bar Counsel.  All of these circumstances have 
the potential to undermine the public’s confidence in the legal profession. 
 
We note five aggravating factors.  First, the hearing judge found that Slate had a 
dishonest or selfish motive, as he concealed material information to get admitted to the Bar 
of Maryland.  Second, the instant circumstances make clear that Slate has engaged in a 
pattern of dishonesty.  Slate engaged in dishonesty by responding “No” to the catchall 
question; falsely stating under oath that the facts in his bar application remained true; 
concealing required information during the character interview, as well as the meeting with 
Brennan and Thomas; failing to supplement his bar application with the required 
information; and then falsely stating to Bar Counsel that he had provided all required 
information.  Third, Slate committed multiple violations of the MLRPC.  Fourth, the 
hearing judge found that Slate refused to acknowledge his misconduct’s wrongful nature, 
and demonstrated “impenitence[.]”  Fifth, Slate’s pattern of dishonesty demonstrates that 
he is likely to repeat his misconduct—i.e., engage in dishonesty. 
 
The hearing judge stated that she did not find any mitigating factors.  Upon our 
independent review of the record, we discern only two.  First, Slate has not received prior 
attorney discipline.  Second, Slate lacked experience in the practice of law at the time of 
his misconduct.  He was not yet a lawyer during the bar application process; and, when he 
made the misrepresentation to Bar Counsel, he had been a lawyer for a little over one year.   
- 42 - 
 
We fully agree with Bar Counsel that the appropriate sanction for Slate’s 
misconduct is disbarment.  Slate knowingly engaged in dishonesty in multiple instances.  
He deliberately concealed the Opinions and the findings therein by: responding “No” to 
the catchall question in his bar application; falsely stating under oath that the 
representations in his bar application remained accurate; withholding the required 
information during the character interview and the meeting with Brennan and Thomas; and 
failing to supplement his bar application.  Additionally, Slate misrepresented to Bar 
Counsel that he had provided all required information.  There is little doubt that, had Slate’s 
dishonesty come to light during the bar application process, we would have determined 
that he lacked the character and fitness necessary for admission to the Bar of Maryland.19 
 
At oral argument, when asked about the appropriate sanction, Slate responded that 
“this is an all-or-nothing scenario.”  We agree.  “[A]bsent compelling extenuating 
circumstances, disbarment is ordinarily the sanction for intentional dishonest conduct[.]”  
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mahone, 451 Md. 25, 46, 150 A.3d 870, 883 (2016) 
(cleaned up).  Here, Slate does not contend that there are any compelling extenuating 
circumstances.  Upon our independent review, the hearing judge’s opinion is devoid of any 
facts that could possibly constitute compelling extenuating circumstances. 
                                              
19In our assessment of the appropriate sanction, we do not consider the misconduct 
that the United States District Court for the District of Columbia found to have occurred in 
the ABC Case.  The hearing judge did not address whether Slate violated any MLRPC in 
the ABC Case, and neither do we.  Slate’s violations of the MLRPC at issue arise solely 
from his failure to disclose the Opinions and the findings therein, as well as his 
misrepresentation to Bar Counsel about having provided all required information.  In other 
words, our focus is solely on Slate’s concealment of his past actions, rather than the past 
actions themselves.   
- 43 - 
 
For the above reasons, we disbar Slate. 
 
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY 
ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF 
THIS COURT, INCLUDING COSTS OF ALL 
TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND 
RULE 19-709(d), FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT 
IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY 
GRIEVANCE 
COMMISSION 
AGAINST 
GREGORY ALLEN SLATE.