Title: Garduno v. State

State: delaware

Issuer: Delaware Supreme Court

Document:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
GERARDO GARDUNO, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 657, 2010 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below—Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No. 0311010209 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Submitted:  September 9, 2011 
Decided:  December 9, 2011 
 
 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices. 
  
O R D E R 
 
 
This 9th day of December 2011, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Gerardo Garduno, has appealed the Superior 
Court’s March 24, 2010 and June 17, 2011 denial of his second motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 
61”).  Having reviewed the parties’ briefs, the Superior Court’s June 17, 
2011 decision on remand, the parties’ supplemental memoranda, and 
Garduno’s “motion for injunction,” we conclude that the appeal is without 
merit and affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. 
2 
 
(2) 
In November 2003, Garduno was arrested on charges of having 
raped a young girl.  The record reflects that Garduno confessed to having 
fondled the victim but denied penetrating her.1     
(3) 
Garduno was indicted in January 2004 on ten offenses arising 
from the alleged rape.  In June 2004, Garduno pled guilty to one count of 
Attempted Rape in the Second Degree and one count of Sexual Solicitation 
of a Child.  As part of the plea agreement, the State agreed to dismiss the 
other charges, which included four counts of Rape in the First Degree, and to 
recommend no more than twelve years at Level V.  After a pre-sentence 
investigation, the Superior Court sentenced Garduno, on September 24, 
2004, to fifteen years at Level V suspended after eleven years for decreasing 
levels of supervision.  
(4) 
Garduno did not file a direct appeal from his 2004 conviction 
and sentencing, and he also did not appeal the Superior Court’s denials of 
his sentence modification motions filed in 2004 and 2007.  Garduno did, 
however, file an appeal from the Superior Court’s 2009 dismissal of his first 
motion for postconviction relief.   
(5) 
In his appeal from the denial of his first postconviction motion, 
Garduno claimed that his confession had been coerced.  When affirming the 
                                          
 
1 Garduno v. State, 2009 WL 3451912, at ¶ 2 (Del. Supr.).  
3 
 
Superior Court’s judgment, however, we concluded that “[g]iven the 
absence of any support for [his] claim of a coerced confession,” Garduno 
could not overcome the procedural bars of Rule 61.2  
(6) 
In his second motion for postconviction relief, Garduno claimed 
ineffective assistance of counsel based on his defense counsel’s alleged 
failure to investigate and develop facts supporting his claim of a coerced 
confession.  Garduno also claimed that his defense counsel was ineffective 
for failing to file a direct appeal from the 2004 conviction.   
(7) 
Garduno’s second postconviction motion was referred to a 
Commissioner for a report and recommendation.  By report dated February 
26, 2010, the Commissioner recommended that the motion should be 
summarily dismissed under Rule 613 as untimely4 and repetitive.5  By order 
dated March 24, 2010, the Superior Court adopted the Commissioner’s 
report and recommendation and denied Garduno’s second motion for 
postconviction relief.  This appeal followed.   
(8) 
Upon submission of the parties’ briefs and review of the record, 
the Court discovered that the Superior Court had not considered Garduno’s 
                                          
 
2 See Garduno v. State, 2009 WL 3451912, at ¶ 6 (Del. Supr.). 
3 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (listing procedural bars to postconviction relief). 
4 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (barring claim filed more than three years after 
judgment is final) (amended 2005 to reduce filing period to one year). 
5 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2) (barring “[a]ny ground for relief that was not 
asserted in a prior postconviction proceeding”). 
4 
 
objections to the Commissioner’s report.6  Thus, by Order dated June 13, 
2011, we remanded the case to the Superior Court for consideration of 
Garduno’s objections.  
(9) 
By order dated June 17, 2011, the Superior Court, after 
considering Garduno’s objections, again adopted the Commissioner’s report 
and denied Garduno’s second postconviction motion.  Upon return of the 
matter from remand, the parties filed supplemental memoranda in response 
to the Superior Court’s June 17, 2011 decision, and the case was resubmitted 
for decision.  
(10) In his opening and reply briefs on appeal, Garduno expands on 
the claims that he made in his second postconviction motion, i.e., that his 
defense counsel was ineffective when he failed to investigate the 
circumstances leading to Garduno’s confession and when he failed to file a 
direct appeal.  For relief from the alleged inadequacies of his counsel, 
Garduno asks that the Court remand his case for resentencing so that he can 
file a direct appeal from his 2004 conviction. 
(11) In his opening and reply supplemental memoranda, Garduno 
claims that the Commissioner neglected to “examine, investigate and 
basically check the facts” of Garduno’s claim of a coerced confession, and 
                                          
 
6 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 62(a)(5)(ii) (allowing for written objections filed within ten 
days of a Commissioner’s report and recommendation).  
5 
 
he cites inadequacies of the prison law library as cause for his failure to raise 
ineffective assistance of counsel in his first postconviction motion.  Finally, 
in his “motion for injunction,” Garduno asks that the Court enjoin the prison 
from requiring his participation in a counseling program requiring that he 
admit his crimes. 
(12) The Court has not considered Garduno’s complaints concerning 
the prison law library and his request for an “injunction” from having to 
participate in a prison counseling program.  Those matters were not raised in 
the Superior Court and are not otherwise justiciable in Garduno’s appeal 
from the denial of his second postconviction motion. 
(13) Having carefully considered the parties’ positions on the 
matters properly raised on appeal, the Court has concluded that Garduno’s 
second postconviction motion was properly barred under Rule 61 as 
untimely and repetitive without exception.  Garduno’s belated claim that his 
defense counsel failed to file a direct appeal from his 2004 conviction does 
not warrant consideration in the interest of justice7 or due to a miscarriage of 
justice.8  Second, Garduno has not convinced the Court that his defense 
counsel’s investigation of the circumstances of his confession would have 
                                          
 
7 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2) (barring a claim not raised in a prior 
postconviction proceeding unless consideration is warranted in the interest of justice). 
8 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5) (providing that the procedural bars do not apply to 
a colorable claim of a miscarriage of justice). 
6 
 
changed counsel’s recommendation or that Garduno would have insisted on 
proceeding to trial.9   
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED.   
 
 
 
  
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
                                          
 
9 See Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 60 (Del. 1988) (providing that on a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel within the context of a guilty plea, a defendant must 
demonstrate “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would 
not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial” (quoting Hill v. 
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985))).