Title: Edward E. May v. Alabama State Bar

State: alabama

Issuer: Alabama Supreme Court

Document:

REL: June 5, 2020
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2019-2020
____________________
1180570
____________________
Edward E. May
v.
Alabama State Bar
Appeal from the Disciplinary Board of the Alabama State Bar
(ASB-18-903)
MITCHELL, Justice.
Edward E. May appeals from a decision of the Disciplinary
Board of the Alabama State Bar ("the Board") disbarring him. 
We affirm.
1180570
Facts and Procedural History
May was admitted to the Alabama State Bar ("the Bar") on
September 26, 1980.  On August 14, 2014, he entered a guilty
plea with the Bar for failure to employ proper trust-
accounting procedures in violation of the Alabama Rules of
Professional Conduct, and he was suspended from the practice
of law.  That suspension was put in abeyance for a
probationary period (initially two years, but extended to 
four
following two interim violations) scheduled to end on August
13, 2018.  On April 4, 2018, after he violated the terms of
the probationary period for a third time, the Board revoked
May's probation and suspended him from the practice of law for
91 days.  May did not request reinstatement after the
suspension expired on July 4, 2018, and thus remained
suspended from practicing law. 
While he was suspended, May represented parties in two
separate legal matters between May and August 2018.  Although
May did not request compensation for his work in either
matter, he also did not disclose to the parties he represented
or to opposing parties that he had been suspended from the
practice of law.
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1180570
First, May represented his personal doctor before the
Alabama State Board of Medical Examiners with respect to a
medical-licensing issue.  As part of that representation, May
identified himself as the attorney of record, submitted
documents falsely stating he was authorized to represent his
doctor, appeared at more than one proceeding, entered into
binding stipulations, and ultimately agreed to a 
binding legal
agreement on behalf of his doctor. 
Second, May attended the sworn examination of a suspect
being questioned under oath by an insurance company about an
alleged arson.  The suspect was represented at the time by
May's son, who was also an attorney.  May objected on behalf
of his son's client throughout the proceeding, and his son's
client testified during the examination that May had
represented him in a criminal matter on a previous date while
May was suspended.
On January 3, 2019, the Bar filed charges against May for
violating Rule 5.5 (Unauthorized Practice of Law) and Rules
8.4(d) and (g) (Misconduct) of the Alabama Rules of
Professional Conduct.  On April 10, 2019, May appeared pro se
at a hearing before the Board.  At the hearing, May admitted
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1180570
that he had falsely represented that he was an authorized
attorney, though he also stated his belief that neither
individual he represented while suspended thought he 
was 
their
legal counsel.  Based on his admissions and the evidence
presented by the Bar, the Board found May guilty of violating
Rules 5.5, 8.4(d), and 8.4(g).
The Bar then asked the Board to disbar May in accordance
with the guidelines in Standards 6.11 and 8.1 of the Alabama
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline.  In imposing the
appropriate 
discipline 
for 
May, 
the 
Board 
considered
aggravating and mitigating factors, as required by Standard
3.0(d).  The Board found five of the aggravating factors
listed in Standard 9.22: (a) prior disciplinary history; (b)
dishonest or selfish motive; (c) a pattern of misconduct; (d)
multiple offenses; and (i) substantial experience in the
practice of law.  The Board also found two of the mitigating
factors listed in Standard 9.32: (b) an absence of a dishonest
or selfish motive and (l) remorse.  Based on the disciplinary
guidelines and the findings of aggravating and mitigating
factors, the Board issued a Report and Order on April 11,
2019, disbarring May.  May appealed.
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1180570
Standard of Review
In reviewing a disciplinary order of the Board, this
Court "will presume that the Board's decision on the facts is
correct; and the disciplinary order will be affirmed unless
the decision on the facts is unsupported by clear and
convincing evidence, or the order misapplies the law to the
facts."  Hunt v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Alabama State Bar,
381 So. 2d 52, 54 (Ala. 1980).  All legal conclusions by the
Board, however, are reviewed de novo.  Tipler v. Alabama State
Bar, 866 So. 2d 1126, 1137 (Ala. 2003).
Analysis
May contends that the Board erred in disbarring him
because, he says, his violations of the suspension order did
not cause an injury to a client and because, he says, the
Board should have considered additional mitigating factors. 
We reject those arguments.
In disbarring May, the Board relied on the guidelines
provided in Standards 6.11 and 8.1(a) of the Alabama Standards
for Imposing Lawyer Discipline.  We need not discuss the
Board's reliance on Standard 6.11 because we hold that the
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1180570
Board's disbarment order was supported by Standard 8.1(a),
which states:
"Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
"(a) Intentionally or knowingly violates the
terms of a prior disciplinary order and such
violation causes injury or potential injury to a
client, the public, the legal system, or the
profession ...."
May does not dispute that his actions violated the order
of suspension.  Instead, he argues that he is not subject to
disbarment because, he says, his actions did not cause injury
to his clients.  Under Standard 8.1(a), the Board was required
to find that May's violations caused an injury or a potential
injury to disbar him.  The first sentence of the definition of
"injury" in the Alabama Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Discipline tracks the language of Standard 8.1(a), defining
"injury" as "harm to a client, the public, the legal system,
or the profession that results from a lawyer's misconduct." 
The second sentence of the definition discusses the level of
injury and states that "a reference to 'injury' alone
indicates any level of injury greater than 'little or no'
injury."  Standards, § II, Definitions.  Although the Bar did
not attempt to prove that May's violations directly caused an
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1180570
injury to a client, it argued that May's violations injured
the public and the legal system, to which he owed ethical
duties under the Alabama Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Discipline.  Those ethical duties require every lawyer to
"exhibit the highest standards of honesty and integrity" and
"to not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud or
interference with the administration of justice."  Standards,
§ I, Ethical Duties.  A lawyer also owes an ethical duty to
the legal system to "operat[e] within the bounds of the law." 
Id.  We agree with the Bar.  By participating in more than one
legal matter while he was suspended, May knowingly breached
those ethical duties to the detriment of the public and the
legal system, making him subject to disbarment under Standard
8.1(a).  
We now evaluate whether the Board, in ordering May's
disbarment, properly considered and weighed the aggravating
and mitigating factors set forth in Standard 9.0 of the
Alabama Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline, as required
by Standard 3.0(d).  The Board considered those factors to
determine whether a discipline other than disbarment was
justified.  The Board found five aggravating factors as set
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1180570
forth in Standard 9.22(a)-(d) and (i).  First, the Board found
that May failed to comply with a variety of disciplinary
measures imposed by the Board over a period of four years. 
Second, the Board found that May acted dishonestly by
submitting false documents to the Alabama Board of Medical
Examiners and by acting as legal counsel for two individuals
while he was suspended.  Third, the Board found that after
practicing for 39 years, including four years while on
probation, May had sufficient experience to know that he was
violating his suspension order.  Fourth, the Board found that
May violated his suspension order multiple times during his
91-day suspension but never applied for reinstatement even as
he continued to represent parties.  Finally, the Board found
that May's actions presented a pattern of misconduct that
continued even after an order of suspension was issued.  These
aggravating factors are supported by the record and indicate
that maintaining May's suspended status or administering a
public reprimand was unlikely to be rehabilitative.
The Board found two mitigating factors set forth in
Standard 9.32 to be applicable: (b) absence of a dishonest or
selfish motive and (l) remorse.  The record indicates that May
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1180570
also asked the Board to consider his desire to retire after 40
years of practice "not in disgrace," his plan not to be active
in legal practice going forward, and his belief that he had
never "made a mistake where a client suffered" as compelling
reasons to allow him to maintain his law license.  Although
May now argues that the Board should have considered
additional mitigating factors under Standard 9.32 of the
Alabama Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline, he did not
present those additional factors to the Board during the
penalty phase of the proceeding; therefore, he has waived
those arguments on appeal.  Clements v. Alabama State Bar, 100
So. 3d. 505, 512 (Ala. 2012).  The Board properly found the
existence of mitigating factors and also properly concluded
that those factors were outweighed by the applicable
aggravating factors, thus supporting the Board's decision to 
disbar May under Standard 8.1(a).
Conclusion
Based upon relevant provisions in the Alabama Standards
for Imposing Lawyer Discipline, the evidence presented, and
the aggravating factors and the mitigating factors found by
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1180570
the Board, the Board's order disbarring May is appropriate. 
We affirm. 
AFFIRMED.
Parker, C.J., and Bolin, Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Sellers,
Mendheim, and Stewart, JJ., concur. 
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