Title: State v. Weber

State: wisconsin

Issuer: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Document:

2016 WI 96 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2014AP304-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Richard L. Weber, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
November 29, 2016 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 6, 2016 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Wood 
 
JUDGE: 
Gregory J. Potter 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
KELLY, D., J. concurs (Opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, A. W., J. dissents (Opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, R. G., J. dissents, joined by 
ABRAHAMSON, J. (Opinion filed).  
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Nancy A. Noet, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the brief(s) was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief and oral 
argument by Kara L. Mele, assistant state public defender. 
 
 
 
 
 
2016 WI 96
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2014AP304-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2012CF274) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Richard L. Weber, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
FILED 
 
NOV 29, 2016 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals, State v. Weber, 
No. 2014AP304-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 
2015) (per curiam), which reversed the Wood County circuit 
court's1 order denying defendant Richard Weber's ("Weber") motion 
to suppress evidence of drunk driving, possession of marijuana, 
and possession of drug paraphernalia, and remanded the case to 
the circuit court with directions to vacate its judgment of 
conviction, permit Weber to withdraw his plea, and grant Weber's 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Gregory J. Potter presided. 
No. 
2014AP304-CR   
 
2 
 
motion to suppress evidence.  Weber, unpublished slip op., ¶¶1, 
10. 
¶2 
A deputy of the Wood County sheriff's department 
attempted to pull Weber over on a public highway by activating 
the emergency lights on his vehicle after observing that Weber's 
vehicle had a defective high-mounted brake lamp and watching the 
vehicle weave over the highway's fog line.  When Weber failed to 
yield to the traffic stop, the deputy pursued Weber into his 
driveway and apprehended him in his garage.  The question before 
this court is whether the deputy's warrantless entry into 
Weber's garage and subsequent arrest of Weber violated the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 
I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution, or whether the need 
for a warrant was obviated by the exigent circumstance of the 
deputy's "hot pursuit" of a fleeing suspect who had committed 
jailable offenses.  See, e.g., United States v. Santana, 427 
U.S. 38 (1976).  
¶3 
We conclude that the deputy's warrantless entry into 
Weber's 
garage 
and 
subsequent 
arrest 
of 
Weber 
were 
constitutional because they were justified by the exigent 
circumstance of hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect who had 
committed jailable offenses.  The deputy had probable cause to 
believe 
that 
Weber 
had 
committed 
two 
jailable 
offenses, 
immediately pursued Weber, and performed a limited entry into 
Weber's open garage for the purpose of preventing Weber's 
continued flight.  Under these specific circumstances, the 
No. 
2014AP304-CR   
 
3 
 
deputy's actions were constitutionally reasonable.  Accordingly, 
we reverse the decision of the court of appeals.  
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶4 
On April 20, 2012, Deputy Calvin Dorshorst ("Deputy 
Dorshorst") of the Wood County sheriff's department and Weber 
were driving in separate vehicles in Arpin, Wisconsin.  Deputy 
Dorshorst observed that the high-mounted brake lamp on Weber's 
vehicle was not working properly and saw Weber's vehicle "weave 
from its lane of travel" "[o]ver the white fog line."  Deputy 
Dorshorst activated his vehicle's emergency lights in an attempt 
to conduct a traffic stop.  Weber did not, however, stop his 
vehicle.  Instead, he drove about 100 feet, turned into a 
driveway, and pulled into an attached garage.  Deputy Dorshorst 
followed the vehicle and parked 15 to 20 feet behind it but 
outside of the garage with his vehicle's emergency lights still 
on. At some point during this process, Deputy Dorshorst 
"contact[ed] dispatch notifying them [he] had a traffic stop." 
¶5 
Weber and Deputy Dorshorst exited their vehicles at 
about the same time.  Weber began moving toward a door of the 
attached house inside the garage.  Deputy Dorshorst ran to the 
front of his vehicle and in the direction of the garage, where 
he witnessed Weber "walking slowly" and "somewhat staggering" up 
steps inside the garage leading to the door to the house.  As 
Deputy Dorshorst ran toward Weber he told Weber to stop and that 
No. 
2014AP304-CR   
 
4 
 
he needed to speak with him.2  Weber did not stop but instead 
continued up the steps to the house.  Deputy Dorshorst entered 
the garage and "secured [Weber's] arm" as Weber was "just inside 
his [house's] door" at the top of the steps.  Weber stopped and 
Deputy Dorshorst explained that he had stopped Weber because of 
the defective high-mounted brake lamp on Weber's vehicle.  
Deputy Dorshorst asked Weber to accompany him to Weber's vehicle 
so that Deputy Dorshorst could "point out exactly the reason for 
the stop and which light was defective."  During this time Weber 
tried to pull away from Deputy Dorshorst and enter his house.  
Deputy Dorshorst noticed that Weber had "slow, slurred speech" 
and "glassy, bloodshot eyes."  Additionally, Deputy Dorshorst 
could smell "a strong odor of intoxicants." 
¶6 
Weber and Deputy Dorshorst eventually exited the 
garage and walked back outside, where Deputy Dorshorst asked 
Weber if he had been drinking.  Weber informed Deputy Dorshorst 
that "he was drinking at his residence and a while after 
drinking a couple of beers, he left and went to the Village of 
Arpin, at which time . . . he went to another place and was 
drinking."  Weber was "unable to identify" the location in Arpin 
to which he had traveled.  After consuming "a few drinks" there, 
Weber explained, he had returned to his home.  Weber informed 
                                                 
2 There may be some dispute as to the deputy's position at 
the time he first spoke to Weber.  For a discussion, see infra, 
n.8. 
No. 
2014AP304-CR   
 
5 
 
Deputy Dorshorst that he thought he had had "way too much" 
alcohol.  
¶7 
Deputy Dorshorst asked Weber to perform field sobriety 
tests, but Weber refused.  Weber then tried to leave and reenter 
his garage, but Deputy Dorshorst advised Weber he was not free 
to do so.  Weber "aggressively pushed into [Deputy Dorshorst's] 
chest with his head" around the same time that a second deputy 
pulled into the driveway.  Deputy Dorshorst told Weber a second 
time that he was not free to leave.  Weber "continued to 
resist," and the two deputies "escorted the defendant to the 
ground and secured his arms."  Weber was put in handcuffs and 
placed under arrest.  
¶8 
The deputies searched Weber and he consented to a 
search of his vehicle.  In the vehicle the deputies found "a 
tinfoil square folded up with [a] green leafy vegetable 
substance 
inside, 
which 
was 
later 
tested 
positive 
for 
[tetrahydrocannabinols]," as well as a "metal pipe in the 
ashtray of the vehicle."  The pipe "had a burned residue inside 
it" and "smelled of burnt marijuana."  
¶9 
Weber was eventually taken to a hospital where his 
blood was drawn.  Later analysis of his blood showed a blood 
alcohol concentration of 0.24. 
II.  PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
¶10 On July 9, 2012, a criminal complaint was filed 
against Weber in Wood County circuit court charging him with one 
No. 
2014AP304-CR   
 
6 
 
count of operating while intoxicated, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.63(1)(a) (2011-12),3 tenth and subsequent offense, see Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.65(2)(am)7.; 
one 
count 
of 
operating 
with 
a 
prohibited alcohol concentration, contrary to § 346.63(1)(b), 
tenth and subsequent offense, see § 346.65(2)(am)7.; one count 
of possession of tetrahydrocannabinols, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 961.41(3g)(e); possession of drug paraphernalia, contrary to 
Wis. Stat. § 961.573(1); and resisting an officer, contrary to 
Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1).  On August 14, 2012, an information was 
filed in the case. 
¶11 On October 24, 2012, Weber filed a motion collaterally 
attacking one of his prior convictions for drunk driving on the 
ground that he had not properly waived his right to counsel when 
entering his plea in that case.  On October 29, 2012, Weber also 
moved the circuit court  
for an order excluding [Weber's] illegal arrest and 
evidence obtained as a result of the illegal arrest, 
including but not limited to the following: the blood 
alcohol 
concentration, 
officer's 
observations 
including glassy eyes, slurred speech, and odor of 
intoxicants, statements made by defendant, defendant's 
refusal to perform field sobriety tests, a metal pipe 
believed to be drug paraphernalia, and tin foil 
containing a green leafy vegetable substance believed 
to be tetrahydrocannabinols. 
¶12 On February 21, 2013, the circuit court granted 
Weber's 
motion 
collaterally 
attacking 
one 
of 
his 
prior 
convictions but denied Weber's suppression motion.  As to the 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2014AP304-CR   
 
7 
 
latter 
ruling, 
the 
circuit 
court 
concluded 
that 
Deputy 
Dorshorst's actions were justified by the exigent circumstance 
of hot pursuit.  Specifically, Weber was fleeing Deputy 
Dorshorst's lawful attempts to stop him, Deputy Dorshorst had 
probable cause to believe that Weber was committing a crime in 
so doing, and Deputy Dorshorst's pursuit of Weber for this 
offense was "promptly made and maintained."  
¶13 On May 23, 2013, an amended information was filed in 
the case.  On the same day, Weber pleaded no contest to 
operating 
with 
a 
prohibited 
alcohol 
concentration, 
ninth 
offense, possession of tetrahydrocannabinols, and resisting an 
officer.  The other two counts against Weber were dismissed.  On 
August 6, 2013, the circuit court sentenced Weber to four years 
of initial confinement and four years of extended supervision on 
the operating with a prohibited alcohol concentration charge and 
ordered that Weber pay costs on the other two offenses.  On 
August 12, 2013, the court's judgment of conviction of Weber was 
filed.  On January 30, 2014, Weber filed a notice of appeal. 
¶14 On October 8, 2015, the court of appeals reversed the 
circuit court's order denying Weber's motion to suppress 
evidence and remanded the case to the circuit court with 
directions to vacate its judgment of conviction, permit Weber to 
withdraw his plea, and grant Weber's motion to suppress.  Weber, 
unpublished slip op., ¶¶1, 10.  The court of appeals explained 
that "the exigent circumstances requirement means that there 
must be a potential for danger to life, risk of evidence 
destruction, or likelihood of escape."  Id., ¶7.  The court 
No. 
2014AP304-CR   
 
8 
 
added that the State failed to explain how this standard was 
met; the State instead "appear[ed] to assume that all hot 
pursuits qualify as exigent circumstances" but "provide[d] no 
legal argument to support that assumption."  Id., ¶¶8-9.  The 
court itself "fail[ed] to discern why an immediate warrantless 
entry was justified" and ultimately reversed on the ground that 
the State had conceded Weber's argument by failing to rebut it.  
Id., ¶9 (citing Charolais Breeding Ranches, Ltd. V. FPC Sec. 
Corp., 90 Wis. 2d 97, 108-09, 279 N.W.2d 493 (Ct. App. 1979)).  
¶15 On November 6, 2015, the State filed a petition for 
review in this court.  On February 3, 2016, this court granted 
the petition.   
III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶16 "Our review of an order granting or denying a motion 
to suppress evidence presents a question of constitutional 
fact."  State v. Iverson, 2015 WI 101, ¶17, 365 Wis. 2d 302, 871 
N.W.2d 661 (quoting State v. Robinson, 2010 WI 80, ¶22, 327 
Wis. 2d 302, 786 N.W.2d 463).  In answering these types of 
questions, this court "review[s] the circuit court's findings of 
historical fact under a deferential standard, upholding them 
unless 
they 
are 
clearly 
erroneous," 
then 
"independently 
appl[ies] constitutional principles to those facts."  Id., ¶18 
(quoting Robinson, 327 Wis. 2d 302, ¶22).  
IV.  ANALYSIS 
¶17 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
No. 
2014AP304-CR   
 
9 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects, 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const. amend. IV.4  Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution is a "substantively identical provision . . . that 
this court interprets consistently with the Fourth Amendment."  
State v. Richter, 2000 WI 58, ¶27, 235 Wis. 2d 524, 612 
N.W.2d 29 (citing State v. Secrist, 224 Wis. 2d 201, 208, 589 
N.W.2d 387 (1999)). 
¶18 "It is a '"basic principle of Fourth Amendment law 
that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are 
presumptively 
unreasonable."' 
 
Nevertheless, 
because 
the 
ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness,' 
the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions."  
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (citation 
omitted) (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004)).  
Relevant to the warrantless home entry that occurred in this 
case,5 this court has recognized that "a home entry, though 
unaccompanied by a warrant, is lawful if 'exigent circumstances' 
                                                 
4 The Fourth Amendment applies to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  E.g., State v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14, ¶18 & 
n.6, 315 Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598 (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643 (1961)). 
5 The State does not disagree with Weber's position that his 
garage was protected under the Fourth Amendment as curtilage of 
his home.  See, e.g., State v. Davis, 2011 WI App 74, ¶¶9-15, 
333 Wis. 2d 490, 798 N.W.2d 902. 
No. 
2014AP304-CR   
 
10 
 
are 
present," 
a 
condition 
satisfied 
when 
"it 
would 
be 
unreasonable 
and 
contrary 
to 
public 
policy 
to 
bar 
law 
enforcement officers at the door."  State v. Ferguson, 2009 WI 
50, ¶19, 317 Wis. 2d 586, 767 N.W.2d 187 (quoting Richter, 235 
Wis. 2d 524, ¶28).   
[T]here are four well-recognized categories of exigent 
circumstances that have been held to authorize a law 
enforcement officer's warrantless entry into a home: 
1) hot pursuit of a suspect, 2) a threat to the safety 
of a suspect or others, 3) a risk that evidence will 
be destroyed, and 4) a likelihood that the suspect 
will flee. 
Id., ¶20 (quoting Richter, 235 Wis. 2d 524, ¶29).  The State 
argues that the first of these categories, hot pursuit, 
justified Deputy Dorshorst's actions in this case. 
¶19 Before this court will uphold Deputy Dorshorst's 
warrantless entry on the grounds asserted, the State must 
"show[] that the warrantless entry was both supported by 
probable 
cause 
and 
justified 
by 
exigent 
circumstances."  
No. 
2014AP304-CR   
 
11 
 
Robinson, 327 Wis. 2d 302, ¶24.6  We now assess these two 
components of the State's claim. 
A.  Probable Cause 
¶20 "The probable cause requirement in the arrest context 
protects an individual's interest in his or her personal 
liberty.  Thus, the proper inquiry in an arrest challenge is 
whether probable cause exists to believe that a particular 
suspect has committed a crime."  State v. Hughes, 2000 WI 24, 
¶20, 233 Wis. 2d 280, 607 N.W.2d 621 (citing State v. Kiper, 193 
Wis. 2d 69, 82, 532 N.W.2d 698 (1995)).   
Probable cause to arrest is the quantum of evidence 
within the arresting officer's knowledge at the time 
of the arrest which would lead a reasonable police 
officer 
to 
believe 
that 
the 
defendant 
probably 
committed or was committing a crime. There must be 
more 
than 
a 
possibility 
or 
suspicion 
that 
the 
defendant committed an offense, but the evidence need 
not reach the level of proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
or even that guilt is more likely than not. 
                                                 
6 One fact that we need not consider in this case is Deputy 
Dorshorst's "subjective motivation" for entering Weber's garage. 
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006). "An action is 
'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the 
individual 
officer's 
state 
of 
mind, 
'as 
long 
as 
the 
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action.'" Id. 
(alteration in original) (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 
U.S. 128, 138 (1978)). "[W]hen an officer's Fourth Amendment 
search and seizure conduct is supported by an objectively 
ascertainable basis for probable cause or reasonable suspicion, 
the police conduct meets the Fourth Amendment's requirement of 
reasonableness, thereby causing subjective motivations to be of 
little concern." Kramer, 315 Wis. 2d 414, ¶27 (citing Whren v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811 (1996)).      
No. 
2014AP304-CR   
 
12 
 
Secrist, 224 Wis. 2d at 212 (citations omitted).  The test to 
determine probable cause is objective, cf., e.g., Robinson, 327 
Wis. 2d 302, ¶26 (search case), and requires an examination of 
the totality of the circumstances.  Kiper, 193 Wis. 2d at 82 
(citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).  Further, 
"probable cause eschews technicality and legalisms in favor of a 
'flexible, 
common-sense 
measure 
of 
the 
plausibility 
of 
particular conclusions about human behavior.'"  Secrist, 224 
Wis. 2d at 215 (quoting Kiper, 193 Wis. 2d at 83). 
¶21 The 
State 
argues 
that 
at 
the 
time 
of 
Deputy 
Dorshorst's entry into Weber's garage, Deputy Dorshorst "had 
probable cause to believe that Weber had committed two jailable 
offenses," 
namely 
violations 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 346.04(2t) 
("Obedience to traffic officers, signs and signals; fleeing from 
officer.") and 946.41(1) ("Resisting or obstructing officer.").  
The first of these statutes provides, "No operator of a vehicle, 
after having received a visible or audible signal to stop his or 
her vehicle from a traffic officer or marked police vehicle, 
shall knowingly resist the traffic officer by failing to stop 
his or her vehicle as promptly as safety reasonably permits."  
§ 346.04(2t).  The second of these statutes criminalizes 
"knowingly resist[ing] or obstruct[ing] an officer while such 
officer is doing any act in an official capacity and with lawful 
authority."  § 946.41(1).  Each of these offenses is punishable 
by a fine of $10,000, imprisonment for up to nine months, or 
both.  Wis. Stat. §§ 346.17(2t), 946.41(1), 939.51(3)(a).   
No. 
2014AP304-CR   
 
13 
 
¶22 In response, Weber argues that probable cause was 
lacking for both jailable offenses because Deputy Dorshorst 
possessed no evidence that Weber "knowingly resist[ed]," Wis. 
Stat. §§  346.04(2t), or "knowingly . . . obstruct[ed]," Wis. 
Stat. § 946.41(1), Deputy Dorshorst.7  
¶23 We conclude that at the time he entered Weber's 
garage, Deputy Dorshorst had probable cause to arrest Weber for 
violations of Wis. Stat. §§ 346.04(2t) and 946.41(1).  Deputy 
Dorshorst activated his emergency lights while driving behind 
Weber's vehicle but Weber failed to pull over.  Deputy Dorshorst 
pulled his flashing vehicle into Weber's driveway and parked it 
behind Weber's vehicle before Weber had even exited it, but 
Weber did not acknowledge the attempted stop.  Deputy Dorshorst 
called after Weber, but Weber made no reply.  "We evaluate the 
existence of probable cause objectively, concerned with whether 
law enforcement acted reasonably."  Robinson, 327 Wis. 2d 302, 
¶26 (search case).  Our focus is not on whether Weber in fact 
fled Deputy Dorshorst, but instead whether the circumstances 
would have led a reasonable law enforcement officer to believe 
that Weber was probably fleeing him.  See Secrist, 224 
Wis. 2d at 212.  A reasonable law enforcement officer would 
conclude on this evidence that Weber was likely feigning 
ignorance 
and 
thus 
fleeing; 
most 
individuals 
would 
have 
responded to Deputy Dorshorst's obvious attempts to catch his 
                                                 
7 Weber does not develop independent arguments relating to 
other portions of the statutes. 
No. 
2014AP304-CR   
 
14 
 
attention.  Cf. State v. Stewart, 143 Wis. 2d 28, 35, 420 
N.W.2d 44 (1988) ("Intent may be inferred from the defendant's 
conduct . . . .").  
¶24 Our 
conclusion 
that 
Deputy 
Dorshorst 
possessed 
probable cause to arrest Weber is only bolstered by the circuit 
court's finding that Weber was in fact "fleeing the deputy in 
order to avoid the stop," a finding which is not clearly 
erroneous because it is not "contrary to the great weight and 
clear preponderance of the evidence."  State v. Popke, 2009 WI 
37, ¶20, 317 Wis. 2d 118, 765 N.W.2d 569 (quoting State v. 
Turner, 
136 
Wis. 2d 333, 
343, 
401 
N.W.2d 827 
(1987)).  
Consequently, we are "bound not to upset" the court's factual 
finding.  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Turner, 136 Wis. 2d at 
343); see also Iverson, 365 Wis. 2d 302, ¶18 (characterizing 
applicable 
standard 
of 
review 
as 
"deferential" 
(quoting 
Robinson, 327 Wis. 2d 302, ¶22)). 
¶25 Weber 
contends 
that 
Deputy 
Dorshorst's 
verbal 
directive to Weber to stop as Weber neared his door is 
irrelevant to a probable cause analysis because Weber was 
already in the garage when it was issued.  We reject this 
argument.  The relevant question at this stage of the analysis 
is whether an officer would reasonably conclude prior to the 
officer's warrantless entry that Weber had committed a jailable 
offense and was now fleeing from arrest for that crime.  Cf., 
e.g., Santana, 427 U.S. at 42 ("In Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 
294 (1967), we recognized the right of police, who had probable 
cause to believe that an armed robber had entered a house a few 
No. 
2014AP304-CR   
 
15 
 
minutes before, to make a warrantless entry to arrest the robber 
and to search for weapons.").  Weber's failure to respond to 
highly noticeable "visible [and] audible signal[s]" directed at 
him while he was in the street and in his garage, Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.04(2t), strongly suggested that he was in the process of 
knowingly fleeing Deputy Dorshorst's lawful stop.  We stress 
that "an officer's conclusions must be reasonable under the 
circumstances, 
not 
technically 
certain." 
 
Secrist, 
224 
Wis. 2d at 215.  
The process does not deal with hard certainties, but 
with 
probabilities. 
Long 
before 
the 
law 
of 
probabilities 
was 
articulated 
as 
such, 
practical 
people formulated certain common-sense conclusions 
about human behavior; jurors as factfinders are 
permitted to do the same——and so are law enforcement 
officers. 
Id. (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (plurality 
opinion)). This court can properly consider Deputy Dorshorst's 
oral commands.8 
                                                 
8 Weber comments that "[t]he circuit court did not make an 
explicit finding as to whether the deputy was inside or outside 
the garage when he first spoke to [Weber]."  A fair reading of 
the record makes clear that a finding that Deputy Dorshorst was 
outside the garage at the time he first spoke to Weber was at 
least implicit.  Deputy Dorshorst specifically testified that he 
was not in the garage prior to first speaking to Weber.  The 
circuit court concluded that "[o]nce inside the garage, [Weber] 
did not wait for the deputy to approach," but "instead attempted 
to flee the deputy, even after obtaining verbal commands."  The 
court then continued, "because of the defendant's actions, the 
deputy took pursuit."  (Emphasis added.)  In other words, the 
court 
found 
that 
Weber's 
failure 
to 
respond 
to 
Deputy 
Dorshorst's verbal commands partly caused and thus preceded 
Deputy Dorshorst's entry into the garage.  
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP304-CR   
 
16 
 
¶26 Before he entered Weber's garage, the evidence before 
Deputy Dorshorst suggested, at the very least, that it was as 
likely as not that Weber had committed jailable offenses by 
failing to pull to the side of the road as soon as reasonably 
possible.  Consequently, Deputy Dorshorst possessed probable 
cause to arrest Weber.  See Secrist, 224 Wis. 2d at 212 (citing 
State v. Mitchell, 167 Wis. 2d 672, 681-82, 482 N.W.2d 364 
(1992)).  To conclude that probable cause does not exist on 
these facts could be construed as a sea change in the law.  
Weber's defense as to why he did not pull over earlier, instead 
proceeding into his garage and attempting to enter his home, all 
while the law enforcement vehicle had its emergency lights 
activated and despite Deputy Dorshorst calling out to him, is a 
question for the jury to weigh and consider but is not 
determinative of probable cause.  The court's determination of 
probable cause is distinct from a defense.  Neither statute at 
issue prescribes a time or distance requirement.  This court 
should neither read such a requirement into the statute nor 
                                                                                                                                                             
But even if the circuit court failed to make a specific 
finding on this point, to the extent such a finding would be 
outcome-determinative, we can assume the trial court made it.  
See State v. Echols, 175 Wis. 2d 653, 673, 499 N.W.2d 631 (1993) 
("When a trial court does not expressly make a finding necessary 
to support its legal conclusion, an appellate court can assume 
that the trial court made the finding in the way that supports 
its decision." (citing State v. Wilks, 117 Wis. 2d 495, 503, 345 
N.W.2d 498 
(Ct. 
App. 
1984), 
aff'd, 
121 
Wis. 2d 93, 
358 
N.W.2d 273 (1984)).  
No. 
2014AP304-CR   
 
17 
 
conflate the question of probable cause with a potential 
defense. 
B.  Exigent Circumstances 
¶27 We must next examine whether the exigencies of the 
situation justified Deputy Dorshorst's entry into Weber's 
garage, 
or 
whether 
Deputy 
Dorshorst 
was 
constitutionally 
required to obtain an arrest warrant.  As discussed, the State 
relies on Deputy Dorshorst's "hot pursuit" of Weber to validate 
the entry.9  
¶28 Both this court and the Supreme Court of the United 
States have recognized that "law enforcement officers may make a 
warrantless entry onto private property . . . to engage in '"hot 
pursuit"' of a fleeing suspect."  Stuart, 547 U.S. at 403 
(quoting Santana, 427 U.S. at 42-43); see, e.g.,  Ferguson, 317 
Wis. 2d 586, ¶20 (characterizing "hot pursuit of a suspect" as 
one 
of 
several 
"well-recognized 
categories 
of 
exigent 
circumstances" (quoting Richter, 235 Wis. 2d 524, ¶29)).  The 
basic ingredient of the exigency of hot pursuit is "immediate or 
continuous pursuit of [a suspect] from the scene of a crime."  
Richter, 235 Wis. 2d 524, ¶32 (alteration in original) (quoting 
State v. Smith, 131 Wis. 2d 220, 232, 388 N.W.2d 601 (1986), 
abrogated on other grounds by State v. Felix, 2012 WI 36, 339 
Wis. 2d 670, 811 N.W.2d 775). 
                                                 
9 Instead of relying on theories that were not briefed or 
argued, we base our conclusions on the long-established doctrine 
of hot pursuit. 
No. 
2014AP304-CR   
 
18 
 
¶29 For example, in Santana, a seminal case on hot 
pursuit, the Supreme Court concluded that officers with probable 
cause to arrest a defendant standing in the threshold of her 
residence and who "retreat[ed] into . . . her house" as the 
officers attempted to seize her could enter "through the open 
door" and "catch[] her in the vestibule."  Santana, 427 U.S. at 
40, 42-43.  And in Richter, this court determined that an 
officer responding to a report of a burglary at a trailer park 
who was told by the victim upon arrival that the burglar had 
entered a certain trailer could enter that trailer without a 
warrant.  Richter, 235 Wis. 2d 524, ¶¶1-2.  
¶30 Again, "[t]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth 
Amendment is 'reasonableness,'" and "the warrant requirement is 
subject to certain reasonable exceptions."  Kentucky v. King, 
563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Stuart, 547 U.S. at 403).  The necessity——and thus intuitive 
reasonableness——of a hot pursuit doctrine in our constitutional 
law is apparent.  In many cases, hot pursuit into a residence 
will serve the purposes of protecting a home's occupants, c.f., 
e.g., Hayden, 387 U.S. at 298-99, or preventing the destruction 
of evidence.  See, e.g., Santana, 427 U.S. at 43.  But 
"[e]xigent circumstances exist when 'it would be unreasonable 
and contrary to public policy to bar law enforcement officers at 
the door,'" Ferguson, 317 Wis. 2d 586, ¶19 (quoting Richter, 235 
Wis. 2d 524, ¶28), and even in the absence of these additional 
benefits, the hot pursuit doctrine serves an important public 
policy purpose: 
No. 
2014AP304-CR   
 
19 
 
Law enforcement is not a child's game of prisoner[']s 
base, or a contest, with apprehension and conviction 
depending upon whether the officer or defendant is the 
fleetest of foot. A police officer in continuous 
pursuit of a perpetrator of a crime committed in the 
officer's presence . . . must be allowed to follow the 
suspect into a private place, or the suspect's home if 
he chooses to flee there, and effect the arrest 
without a warrant. 
State v. Sanders, 2008 WI 85, ¶133, 311 Wis. 2d 257, 752 
N.W.2d 713 (Prosser, J., concurring) (alteration in original) 
(quoting State v. Blake, 468 N.E.2d 548, 553 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1984)); see also Santana, 427 U.S. at 42 (refusing to permit a 
defendant to "thwart an otherwise proper arrest" by withdrawing 
into her home).  "[C]reating an incentive for . . . suspects to 
flee to the home to escape lawful arrest," Sanders, 311 
Wis. 2d 257, 
¶133 
(Prosser, 
J., 
concurring), 
generates 
disrespect for the law and for law enforcement, risks putting 
the public and any participants in the chase in harm's way, and 
expends valuable law enforcement resources.  Consequently, the 
hot pursuit doctrine helps ensure that a criminal suspect will 
not be rewarded for fleeing the police and that the police will 
not be penalized for completing a lawful attempt to apprehend a 
suspect, who, by his own actions, has drawn the police into his 
home. 
¶31 Before 
proceeding, 
we 
reemphasize 
an 
important 
dimension of the hot pursuit doctrine.  In Welsh v. Wisconsin, 
466 U.S. 740 (1984), which was not a hot pursuit case, Welsh, 
466 U.S. at 753, the Supreme Court characterized its earlier 
decision in Santana as involving the "hot pursuit of a fleeing 
No. 
2014AP304-CR   
 
20 
 
felon."  Id. at 750 (emphasis added) (citing Santana, 427 U.S. 
at 42-43).  The court also concluded that "an important factor 
to be considered when determining whether any exigency exists is 
the gravity of the underlying offense for which the arrest is 
being made."  Id. at 753.  After Welsh, some uncertainty existed 
regarding whether the hot pursuit doctrine was limited to those 
cases where officers were in pursuit of a "fleeing felon."  
Compare, e.g., Sanders, 311 Wis. 2d 257, ¶¶77-83, 122, 134 
(Prosser, J., concurring), with id., ¶¶147, 149, 152 (Butler, 
J., concurring). 
¶32 In Ferguson this court concluded that "Welsh and 
Santana did not create a bright-line rule requiring the 
underlying offense to be labeled a felony in order for exigent 
circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry."  Ferguson, 
317 Wis. 2d 586, ¶27 (footnote omitted) (citing Sanders, 311 
Wis. 2d 257, ¶71 (Prosser, J., concurring)).  We instead 
clarified that "courts, in evaluating whether a warrantless 
entry is justified by exigent circumstances, should consider 
whether the underlying offense is a jailable or nonjailable 
offense, rather than whether the legislature has labeled that 
offense a felony or a misdemeanor."  Id., ¶29. 
¶33 Since then, the Supreme Court has confirmed our view 
that Welsh and Santana do not create a felony-misdemeanor 
distinction, stating: 
[T]hough Santana involved a felony suspect, we did not 
expressly 
limit 
our 
holding 
based 
on 
that 
fact. . . . Welsh . . . [did 
not] 
involve[] 
hot 
pursuit.  Thus, despite our emphasis in Welsh on the 
No. 
2014AP304-CR   
 
21 
 
fact that the crime at issue was minor——indeed, a mere 
nonjailable civil offense——nothing in the opinion 
establishes that the seriousness of the crime is 
equally important in cases of hot pursuit. 
Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 3, 6 (2013) (per 
curiam) (citations omitted).  While the Court in Stanton 
acknowledged a "basic disagreement" among "federal and state 
courts nationwide . . . on the question whether an officer with 
probable cause to arrest a suspect for a misdemeanor may enter a 
home without a warrant while in hot pursuit of that suspect," it 
did not "express [a] view" on the ultimate question.  Id. at 5, 
7.  Consequently, Ferguson remains the law and dictates that the 
mere fact that the underlying offenses at issue in this case are 
misdemeanors is not a bar to application of the hot pursuit 
doctrine. 
¶34 On the other hand, the State urges this court to 
establish a rule that "hot pursuit of a suspect based on 
probable cause for a jailable offense" will always justify a 
warrantless home entry and arrest.  We decline to conclude that 
the confluence of hot pursuit and probable cause to arrest for a 
jailable offense will always justify a warrantless entry.  The 
"touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness," and 
"[r]easonableness . . . is 
measured 
in 
objective 
terms 
by 
examining 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances." 
 
Ohio 
v. 
Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 
500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991)).   
No. 
2014AP304-CR   
 
22 
 
¶35 Evaluation of all the circumstances in this case 
convinces us that Deputy Dorshorst's entry into Weber's garage 
was constitutionally reasonable. 
¶36 To begin with, Deputy Dorshorst was indeed engaged in 
"immediate or continuous pursuit of [a suspect] from the scene 
of a crime."  Richter, 235 Wis. 2d 524, ¶32 (alteration in 
original) 
(quoting 
Smith, 
131 
Wis. 2d at 
232). 
 
He 
was 
attempting 
to 
apprehend 
Weber, 
who 
was 
fleeing 
Deputy 
Dorshorst's lawful traffic stop on a public highway.  There was 
no delay between Weber's illegal actions and Deputy Dorshorst's 
pursuit of Weber.  Cf. id., ¶36 ("There is no evidence in this 
record of any delay in [the deputy's] response or pursuit that 
would have interrupted the immediacy and continuity of the 
situation and therefore dissipated the exigency.").  
¶37  Next, violations of the statutes at issue, Wis. Stat. 
§§ 346.04(2t) and 946.41(1), are jailable offenses, Wis. Stat. 
§§ 346.17(2t), 946.41(1), 939.51(3)(a), and thus significantly 
grave.  Cf. Ferguson, 317 Wis. 2d 586, ¶29 ("[C]ourts, in 
evaluating whether a warrantless entry is justified by exigent 
circumstances, should consider whether the underlying offense is 
a jailable or nonjailable offense . . . .").  The available 
penalties——up to nine months in prison for violations of each 
statute, 
§§ 346.17(2t), 
946.41(1), 
939.51(3)(a)——demonstrate 
that the State has a strong "interest in arresting individuals 
suspected of committing [these] offense[s]."  Welsh, 466 U.S. at 
754 n.14.  
No. 
2014AP304-CR   
 
23 
 
¶38 We note that Deputy Dorshorst's intrusion here was 
appropriately limited.  Cf., e.g., Santana, 427 U.S. at 42-43 
("This case . . . is clearly governed by Warden [v. Hayden]; the 
need to act quickly here is even greater than in that case while 
the intrusion is much less." (emphasis added) (citing Hayden, 
387 U.S. 294)); id. at 43-44 (White, J., concurring) ("In these 
circumstances, a warrant was not required to enter the house to 
make the arrest, at least where entry by force was not 
required." (emphasis added)).10  Deputy Dorshorst did not damage 
                                                 
10 As part of its analysis in United States v. Santana, 427 
U.S. 38 (1976), the Supreme Court examined whether Santana 
possessed an "expectation of privacy" while standing in the 
doorway of her home.  See Santana, 427 U.S. at 42. One might 
argue that this reasoning is now suspect under two recent 
Supreme Court cases, United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. ___, 132 
S. Ct. 945 (2012), and Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. 
Ct. 1409 (2013), to the extent those cases are read to emphasize 
the idea that "for most of our history the Fourth Amendment was 
understood to embody a particular concern for government 
trespass 
upon 
the 
areas . . . [the 
Fourth 
Amendment] 
enumerates."  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950; see Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 
at 1414.    
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP304-CR   
 
24 
 
any property, open any doors or windows, or pull out any 
weapons.  He simply stepped into Weber's open garage and seized 
his 
arm. 
The 
two 
actions——entry 
and 
apprehension——were 
calculated to accomplish no more than was absolutely necessary 
to halt Weber's escape.  Additionally, the entry was a last 
resort.  Deputy Dorshorst had already attempted to stop Weber by 
activating his emergency lights and calling after him; it was 
due to Weber's actions that Deputy Dorshorst was forced to enter 
the garage to accomplish the stop.  Finally, Deputy Dorshorst 
ended the intrusion promptly, staying in the garage no longer 
than needed.  Cf., e.g., State v. Legg, 633 N.W.2d 763, 773 
                                                                                                                                                             
Jones and Jardines are both search cases. See Jones, 132 S. 
Ct. at 949 ("We hold that the Government's installation of a GPS 
device on a target's vehicle, and its use of that device to 
monitor the vehicle's movements, constitutes a 'search.'" 
(footnote omitted)); id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring) ("The 
Court does not contend that there was a seizure."); Jardines, 
133 S. Ct. at 1414 ("We granted certiorari, limited to the 
question of whether the officers' behavior was a search within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.").  Moreover, the Santana 
court's discussion of Santana's expectation of privacy pertained 
to whether she was in a public place "when the police first 
sought to arrest" her at the "threshold of [her] dwelling," not 
whether the area in which she was actually arrested, "the 
vestibule of her house," was protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
Santana, 427 U.S. at 40-43.  The Supreme Court's acknowledgement 
of the degree of the officers' "intrusion" in that case occurred 
during its subsequent consideration of whether the police could 
follow Santana into her house to effect an arrest.  Id. at 42.  
Here, Weber was clearly in a public place when Deputy Dorshorst 
began his pursuit.  And there is no dispute that a seizure 
eventually occurred in Weber's home.  The question at issue is 
thus whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the 
seizure 
which 
undoubtedly 
occurred 
was 
constitutionally 
reasonable. 
No. 
2014AP304-CR   
 
25 
 
(Iowa 2001) ("Another important circumstance in this case is the 
nature 
of 
the 
intrusion. 
 
[The 
officer] 
entered 
[the 
defendant's] garage, not her house proper as in Santana or her 
bedroom as in Welsh. . . .  In addition, the magnitude of the 
infringement was rather slight.  [The officer's] entry into [the 
defendant's] garage was no surprise to her; he was following 
closely on her heels when she entered the garage.  In addition, 
he entered through an open door and took only three steps 
inside.  Thus, the intrusion was peaceful and restricted to that 
which was necessary to allow the officer to speak with [the 
defendant]." (citation omitted)); State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, 
¶¶41-42, 
55, 
327 
Wis. 2d 346, 
785 
N.W.2d 592 
(analyzing 
"reasonable[ness]" of "police conduct" in community caretaker 
context by considering, inter alia, "the degree of overt 
authority and force displayed," including whether "any of 
the . . . officers employed any force or drew their weapons" and 
"the availability, feasibility and effectiveness of alternatives 
to the type of intrusion actually accomplished" (quoting State 
v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14, ¶41, 315 Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598)).11 
¶39 Deputy 
Dorshorst's 
actions 
in 
this 
case 
were 
manifestly reasonable.  As the State observed at oral argument, 
                                                 
11 Our 
community 
caretaker 
line 
of 
cases 
sets 
forth 
guidelines in a separate Fourth Amendment context for analyzing 
different aspects of intrusions by the State.  See, e.g., State 
v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶¶29, 41-42, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 
N.W.2d 592.  The cases are by no means controlling here, but are 
instead merely a helpful tool for discussing the reasonableness 
of Deputy Dorshorst's actions. 
No. 
2014AP304-CR   
 
26 
 
"this case is not about a bad brake light."  Instead, it is 
about a defendant, Weber, who declined to submit to a law 
enforcement officer's lawful attempts to conduct a traffic stop.  
Had Weber chosen to stop on the highway, or even in his 
driveway, Deputy Dorshorst never would have entered his garage.  
This is not the type of conduct that the Fourth Amendment brands 
"unreasonable"; the Fourth Amendment does not dictate that 
officers who fail to outpace suspects on their way to a 
residence are unable to act.  See Sanders, 311 Wis. 2d 257, ¶133 
(Prosser, J., concurring) (quoting Blake, 468 N.E.2d at 553). 
Taking the time to obtain an arrest warrant in this case would 
have required Deputy Dorshorst to halt an arrest which had 
already begun outside of Weber's home, an arrest lawfully 
premised on probable cause that Weber had committed jailable 
offenses and one which required minimal intrusion to complete.  
For numerous policy reasons we have already discussed, an arrest 
warrant is simply not mandated under these circumstances.  See, 
e.g., id. (Prosser, J., concurring) ("The enforcement of our 
criminal laws . . . is not a game where law enforcement officers 
are 'it' and one is 'safe' if one reaches 'home' before being 
tagged." (quoting Gasset v. State, 490 So. 2d 97, 98-99 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (denying certiorari))).12 
                                                 
12 We are not persuaded by Weber's references to general 
language in Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1552 
(2013). McNeely did not involve the hot pursuit doctrine. 
McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1558 (describing question at issue as 
"whether the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream 
establishes a per se exigency that suffices on its own to 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP304-CR   
 
27 
 
¶40 A counterargument could be made that Deputy Dorshorst 
should nonetheless have attempted to secure a warrant to arrest 
Weber.  Presumably, Deputy Dorshorst would have needed to stop 
at Weber's driveway and let Weber flee into the residence, then 
call for backup, secure a perimeter around the house so that 
Weber did not continue his attempts to escape law enforcement, 
and obtain a warrant.  And then what?  Would those who support 
this argument have Deputy Dorshorst knock on the door?  Given 
that Weber was openly fleeing Deputy Dorshorst, it is far from 
clear Weber simply would have turned around and opened the door 
for him.  If Weber did not open the door, was Deputy Dorshorst 
then to break the door in and apprehend Weber inside his actual 
house as opposed to inside his open garage?  Especially compared 
to that scenario, an immediate and limited entry into Weber's 
open garage to complete the stop was an appropriate approach.  
¶41 The court of appeals below settled upon a version of 
Weber's argument, stating that "the exigent circumstances 
requirement means that there must be a potential for danger to 
life, risk of evidence destruction, or likelihood of escape," 
Weber, unpublished slip op., ¶7, and suggested that such factors 
are not present in this case.  Id., ¶9.  This is a form of the 
"'hot pursuit plus' approach that upholds hot pursuits for 
offenses of varying degrees of seriousness where there are other 
exigent circumstances present, for example threats of violence 
                                                                                                                                                             
justify 
an 
exception 
to 
the 
warrant 
requirement 
for 
nonconsensual blood testing in drunk-driving investigations").  
No. 
2014AP304-CR   
 
28 
 
or destroyed evidence, or other emergencies or dangerous 
situations."  Sanders, 311 Wis. 2d 257, ¶153 (Butler, J., 
concurring) (emphasis added).  But this approach is contradicted 
by our case law.  See id., ¶118 (Prosser, J., concurring) 
("There is no implication in our case law that 'hot pursuit' 
cannot stand alone as an exigent circumstance justifying a 
warrantless home entry and arrest.  On the contrary, our cases 
explicitly 
recognize 
that 
hot 
pursuit 
is 
a 
sufficient 
justification for a warrantless entry and arrest." (citing 
Smith, 131 Wis. 2d at 229; Richter, 235 Wis. 2d 524, ¶29)).  
¶42 In 
Richter, 
for 
example, 
this 
court 
upheld 
a 
warrantless entry into a trailer on the basis of both hot 
pursuit of a fleeing suspect and the need to protect the 
occupants of the trailer.  Richter, 235 Wis. 2d 524, ¶2.  But 
our 
analysis 
made 
clear 
that 
these 
were 
independent 
justifications.  Id., ¶¶32-37, 41 ("We conclude that [the 
deputy's] entry was justified by the exigent circumstance of hot 
pursuit.  The State also argues that this entry was justified by 
the exigency of a threat to the safety of the suspect or 
others. . . . [W]e 
conclude 
that 
[the 
deputy] 
reasonably 
believed that the intruder he was pursuing posed a threat to the 
safety of the occupants of Richter's trailer." (emphasis 
added)).  And it would be somewhat strange to continually list 
"hot pursuit of a suspect" as one of "four well-recognized 
categories of exigent circumstances" separate from "a threat to 
the safety of a suspect or others," "a risk that evidence will 
be destroyed," and "a likelihood that the suspect will flee" if 
No. 
2014AP304-CR   
 
29 
 
one of these additional categories were required in order to 
justify a warrantless entry following hot pursuit of a suspect.  
Id., ¶29 (citing Smith, 131 Wis. 2d at 229); Ferguson, 317 
Wis. 2d 586, ¶20 (quoting 
Richter, 235 Wis. 2d 524, ¶29).  
Although the presence of one or more of these additional 
exigencies is relevant to the question of whether a warrantless 
entry is permitted, it is not a prerequisite to application of 
the hot pursuit doctrine.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jewett, 31 
N.E.3d 1079, 1089 n.8 (Mass. 2015) ("The defendant also attempts 
to argue that hot pursuit is not an exigency unto itself where 
the underlying crime is not felonious, but rather additional 
factors, such as the crime being violent or the suspect being 
armed, must be satisfied in order to justify a warrantless 
entry.  We disagree with this contention."); People v. Wear, 867 
N.E.2d 1027, 1045 (Ill. Ct. App. 2007) ("Most courts appear to 
take Santana's holding at face value, treating hot pursuit as an 
exception unto itself rather than as just another factor." 
(citations omitted)), aff'd, 893 N.E.2d 631 (2008); Sanders, 311 
Wis. 2d 257, ¶¶119-32 (Prosser, J., concurring) (collecting 
cases).13  
                                                 
13 The court of appeals below essentially relied on a 
discussion from this court's opinion in Smith to derive a test 
for exigent circumstances in the hot pursuit context, State v. 
Weber, No. 2014AP304-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶¶4, 7 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Oct. 8, 2015) (per curiam) (citing State v. Smith, 131 
Wis. 2d 220, 229, 231, 388 N.W.2d 601 (1986), abrogated on other 
grounds by State v. Felix, 2012 WI 36, 339 Wis. 2d 670, 811 
N.W.2d 601 (1986)), but as the Sanders concurrence explained, 
the test for exigent circumstances set forth in that case does 
not apply to the hot pursuit doctrine.  See State v. Sanders, 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP304-CR   
 
30 
 
¶43 Before we conclude, we acknowledge the concern that 
applying the hot pursuit doctrine to uphold a warrantless entry 
in a case where fleeing law enforcement was itself the violation 
giving rise to the pursuit will lead to the application of the 
hot pursuit doctrine in every case involving a fleeing suspect, 
no matter the gravity of the first offense committed, since 
flight itself can constitute a jailable offense.  The objection 
is a legitimate one, but it fails to persuade for several 
reasons.  First, the State will not always be able to establish 
probable cause that the suspect was knowingly fleeing.  Second, 
as stated above, we decline to adopt the per se rule set forth 
by the State.  The "touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
reasonableness," 
and 
"[r]easonableness . . . is 
measured 
in 
objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances." 
Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39 (quoting Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 250).  
Third, application of the hot pursuit doctrine in this scenario 
is not circular (i.e., the pursuit justifying the pursuit) 
because the legislature did not have to make knowingly fleeing a 
traffic stop a jailable offense, either at all or in all 
circumstances.  That it has chosen to do so means that this 
court must treat it with the seriousness that it does other 
                                                                                                                                                             
311 Wis. 2d 257, ¶117 (Prosser, J., concurring) ("[Hot pursuit] 
is not part of the objective test set forth in Smith . . . ."). 
Additionally, Smith was not a hot pursuit case. See Smith, 131 
Wis. 2d at 231-32 (summarily dismissing possibility of a hot 
pursuit claim in a single paragraph because "[t]he underlying 
offense . . . occurred nearly three weeks earlier").  
No. 
2014AP304-CR   
 
31 
 
jailable offenses.14  And fourth, a contrary holding would lead 
to the opposite problem: in every case involving a nonjailable 
offense, 
suspects 
would 
have 
an 
incentive 
to 
flee 
law 
enforcement because flight itself would not justify application 
of the hot pursuit doctrine. 
¶44 The record demonstrates that Weber committed jailable 
offenses and attempted to evade lawful apprehension and that 
Deputy Dorshorst's pursuit and response was immediate and 
measured.  A warrant was not necessary here; it was reasonable 
for Deputy Dorshorst to effectuate the lawful arrest he had 
begun outside of Weber's home.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
¶45 We conclude that the deputy's warrantless entry into 
Weber's 
garage 
and 
subsequent 
arrest 
of 
Weber 
were 
constitutional because they were justified by the exigent 
                                                 
14 For example, with regard to Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1), 
"[r]esisting 
or 
obstructing 
officer," 
we 
note 
that 
the 
legislature provided for steeper criminal penalties when a 
violation involves aggravating circumstances, such as injury to 
an officer, § 946.41(2r)-(2t), or, after a violator has given 
false information or placed physical evidence with intent to 
mislead an officer and a trier of fact at a criminal trial has 
considered this information or evidence, conviction of an 
innocent person as a result of that trial, § 946.41(2m).  The 
legislature could easily have taken similar steps in the 
opposite direction, instituting less significant penalties when 
resistance or obstruction is tied to potentially less serious 
circumstances, such as a traffic stop for a broken brake light.  
But it did not do so; any violation of § 946.41(1) is at least a 
Class A misdemeanor.  § 946.41(1).  Thus the legislature has 
indicated that it finds resistance or obstruction of an officer 
to 
be 
a 
serious 
matter 
regardless 
of 
the 
underlying 
circumstances. 
No. 
2014AP304-CR   
 
32 
 
circumstance of hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect who had 
committed jailable offenses.  The deputy had probable cause to 
believe 
that 
Weber 
had 
committed 
two 
jailable 
offenses, 
immediately pursued Weber, and performed a limited entry into 
Weber's open garage for the purpose of preventing Weber's 
continued flight.  Under these specific circumstances, the 
deputy's actions were constitutionally reasonable.  Accordingly, 
we reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No.  2014AP304-CR.dk 
 
1 
 
¶46 DANIEL KELLY, J.   (concurring).  I write separately 
because I do not think there is probable cause to believe Mr. 
Weber committed jailable offenses before entering his garage, a 
conclusion that precludes deployment of the "hot pursuit" 
doctrine.  I join the lead opinion's result, however, because 
there is a separate, and constitutionally-sufficient, basis for 
it. 
¶47 Our task in this case is determining whether Deputy 
Dorshorst had the authority to pursue Richard L. Weber into his 
garage, and subsequently arrest and search him, without a 
warrant.  Mr. Weber says the Wisconsin and United States 
Constitutions protected him from the deputy's warrantless 
intrusion (and, consequently, the search and arrest).  The 
State, on the other hand, says Deputy Dorshorst was in hot 
pursuit of an individual who had committed two jailable 
offenses, and so was relieved of the obligation of obtaining a 
warrant before entering the garage and executing the arrest and 
search.  I will address each of those asserted offenses 
separately, and then consider an alternative basis for Deputy 
Dorshorst's constitutionally-permissible entry into Mr. Weber's 
garage. 
I 
¶48 There is no evidence that, before Mr. Weber entered 
his garage, Deputy Dorshorst thought he was in hot pursuit of 
someone who had committed a jailable offense.1  Instead, the 
                                                 
1 The lead opinion's explanation of the "hot pursuit" 
doctrine is well-stated, and needs no further treatment here. 
No.  2014AP304-CR.dk 
 
2 
 
evidence demonstrates only that he was intent on performing a 
traffic stop.  That's what he told dispatch when he followed Mr. 
Weber into his driveway.  That's also what he told Mr. Weber 
after he apprehended him.  And there is no indication a 
different or additional rationale made its way into the report 
Deputy Dorshorst ultimately prepared.2  Nor was there any 
admissible evidence at the suppression hearing to suggest a 
different reason for entering Mr. Weber's garage. 
¶49 But we don't require that a law enforcement officer 
have in mind, at the time he enters someone's home, a 
constitutionally-permissible reason for doing so.  All we 
require is that the objective circumstances at the time could 
bring to mind a constitutionally-permissible basis for entry.3  
Although this standard invites post-hoc rationalizing of a law 
enforcement officer's intrusion into Fourth Amendment-protected 
spaces, we could hardly operate without such retrospective 
analyses.  It would be patently unreasonable to task a law 
enforcement officer with the responsibility of being consciously 
aware, minute by minute, of every possible constitutional basis 
for the next step he takes in the discharge of his duties.  We 
                                                 
2 If Deputy Dorshorst had recorded such additional or 
different rationale in his report, I suspect it would have been 
offered at the suppression hearing to help him refresh his 
recollection of why he entered Mr. Weber's garage. 
3 "[W]hen an officer's Fourth Amendment search and seizure 
conduct is supported by an objectively ascertainable basis for 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion, the police conduct meets 
the Fourth Amendment's requirement of reasonableness, thereby 
causing subjective motivations to be of little concern." State 
v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14, ¶27, 315 Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598. 
No.  2014AP304-CR.dk 
 
3 
 
expect him to follow the training he receives in constitutional 
requirements, but when he executes a traffic stop it is also 
reasonable to expect he will concentrate entirely on the 
functional task at hand, while simultaneously minimizing risks 
to 
the 
person 
of 
interest, 
the 
immediately 
surrounding 
community, and himself.   
¶50 So, the State properly invites us to go to the record 
and consider the facts of this case like a slow-motion review of 
a football play.  Having received such an invitation, we would 
be remiss if our analysis was less than precise, or we allowed 
factual nuances to escape our attention. 
A 
¶51 The constitutional dimension of Deputy Dorshorst's 
interaction with Mr. Weber centers on the garage's threshold:  
The legitimacy of what occurred beyond it depends on what 
occurred before it.  Therefore, I will first address the facts 
as they transpired up to the point that Mr. Weber's car crossed 
the garage's threshold, and determine whether they describe 
probable cause to believe he committed a jailable offense. 
¶52 On April 20, 2012, Deputy Dorshorst was driving behind 
Mr. Weber as they were both traveling northbound on County 
Highway E in the town of Arpin.  Deputy Dorshorst noticed that 
Mr. Weber's high-mounted brake light was not functioning 
properly, and so decided to initiate a traffic stop.  Deputy 
Dorshorst testified that "I activated my emergency lights and he 
was turning into his driveway" off of County Highway E.  The 
district attorney asked Deputy Dorshorst to clarify where he was 
No.  2014AP304-CR.dk 
 
4 
 
in relation to Mr. Weber when he activated his emergency lights.  
His response was that "he was probably when I activated my 
emergency lights maybe 100 feet prior to his driveway."  Mr. 
Weber "continued down his driveway and into his garage."  Deputy 
Dorshorst followed Mr. Weber into his driveway, and stopped 
outside the garage approximately fifteen to twenty feet behind 
Mr. Weber's car (which at that point was parked inside the 
garage).  During this period of time, Deputy Dorshorst was 
contacting dispatch to notify the station he was initiating a 
traffic stop.  Neither Deputy Dorshorst nor Mr. Weber had, at 
that point, exited their cars. 
¶53 This is the extent of the facts, up to the point Mr. 
Weber parked his car in his garage, of which we have been 
apprised.  The State finds in these few, bare facts probable 
cause to believe Mr. Weber violated Wis. Stat. § 346.04(2t) 
(2011–12).4  Because violation of that statute carries a 
potential jail sentence, the State asserts the "hot pursuit" 
doctrine to justify Deputy Dorshorst's decision to enter Mr. 
Weber's garage without a warrant. 
¶54 If the State is right, if there really is probable 
cause to believe this offense occurred, then it is also right 
                                                 
4 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
This statute commands that "[n]o operator of a vehicle, 
after having received a visible or audible signal to stop his or 
her vehicle from a traffic officer, or marked police vehicle, 
shall knowingly resist the traffic officer by failing to stop 
his or her vehicle as promptly as safety reasonably permits."  
Wis. Stat. § 346.04(2t). 
No.  2014AP304-CR.dk 
 
5 
 
that the "hot pursuit" doctrine allowed Deputy Dorshorst to 
enter the garage and conduct the search and arrest of Mr. Weber.  
State v. Ferguson, 2009 WI 50, ¶¶26–30, 317 Wis. 2d 586, 767 
N.W.2d 187 (holding that hot pursuit may exist where an 
individual has committed a "jailable offense").  But this record 
discloses no probable cause to believe Mr. Weber violated Wis. 
Stat. § 346.04(2t). 
¶55 The lead opinion correctly notes that "probable cause" 
is not a terribly high standard.  All one needs is evidence 
"sufficient to warrant a reasonable person to conclude that the 
defendant . . . committed or [was] in the process of committing 
an offense."  State v. Blatterman, 2015 WI 46, ¶35, 362 
Wis. 2d 138, 864 N.W.2d 26 (quoting State v. Richardson, 156 
Wis. 2d 128, 148, 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990)).  Here, that quantum of 
evidence must show that Mr. Weber: 
1. 
Operated a vehicle; 
2. 
Received a visible signal to stop his vehicle 
from a traffic officer or marked police vehicle; 
3. 
Failed to stop his vehicle as promptly as safety 
reasonably permitted; and 
4. 
Knowingly resisted the traffic officer by failing 
to stop his vehicle as required. 
Wis. Stat. § 346.04(2t). 
¶56 Mr. Weber does not contest the sufficiency of evidence 
to meet elements one through three, and the record confirms 
their satisfaction.  Deputy Dorshorst observed Mr. Weber driving 
his car on a public highway, and followed him until he parked 
his car in the garage.  There, Deputy Dorshorst observed Mr. 
No.  2014AP304-CR.dk 
 
6 
 
Weber exit the vehicle.  Thus, we know Mr. Weber was operating 
the vehicle.  As to element two, Deputy Dorshorst testified, 
without contradiction, that he activated his emergency lights 
while behind Mr. Weber on County Highway E, and that they were 
still on when both vehicles came to rest.  The third element is 
a closer call, but the evidence appears sufficient to support 
it.  Although it is difficult to know whether Mr. Weber could 
have safely and reasonably stopped his vehicle 100 feet after 
Deputy Dorshorst activated his emergency lights, we do know he 
was able to slow enough to enter his driveway within that space.  
And if that is true, then it must also be true that he could 
have stopped in the driveway.  That is, it was not reasonably 
necessary for him to drive into his garage. 
¶57 But that still leaves the fourth element.  There is no 
probable cause to believe Mr. Weber violated this statute unless 
there is evidence that the failure to stop his vehicle on either 
the county highway or his driveway would lead "a reasonable 
person to conclude" Mr. Weber was knowingly resisting Deputy 
Dorshorst.  On this, the record is silent. 
¶58 It is certainly true that we do not need to wait until 
Mr. Weber announces he is intentionally resisting Deputy 
Dorshorst before we find this element satisfied.  We may infer 
the intent to resist from conduct.  State v. Stewart, 143 Wis. 
2d 28, 35, 420 N.W.2d 44 (1988).  However, his conduct in 
relation to this element is unremarkable.  So completely 
unremarkable, in fact, that it compels me to depart from the 
lead opinion. 
No.  2014AP304-CR.dk 
 
7 
 
¶59 Maybe Mr. Weber could have stopped his car while still 
on County Highway E.  He certainly could have stopped on the 
driveway.  But was he knowingly resisting Deputy Dorshorst by 
parking in the garage instead of the driveway?  Of course not.  
Deputy Dorshorst knew how far Mr. Weber could possibly go with 
his car——the garage.  And after reviewing the record, so do 
we . . . unless we are to assume Mr. Weber was not planning to 
stop at the back wall.  There is nothing, however, to suggest 
this.  So we all know there was a sure and certain end to Mr. 
Weber's travels on the 20th of April, and whether it was the 
driveway or the garage, the difference is a matter of feet.  
Because Deputy Dorshorst knew the stopping point of Mr. Weber's 
car would be almost immediately in front of him, this gives us 
nothing at all from which he (or we) may conclude an intent to 
resist.  Probable cause may not be a rigorous standard, but it 
still requires some plausible evidence.  These facts are simply 
incapable of indicating the presence of the fourth element. 
¶60 This is no small quibble.  If these unremarkable facts 
satisfy the State's admittedly light burden, it is difficult to 
imagine a traffic stop that would not provide probable cause to 
believe a jailable offense has occurred.  Traffic stops normally 
take place on public highways, which means there is no sure and 
certain place that a law enforcement officer knows the person 
will stop.  The highway environment is much less controlled than 
here, the variables much greater.  Traffic, weather, road 
conditions, road construction activity, lighting, all will play 
into when and where the motorist might decide he can stop as 
No.  2014AP304-CR.dk 
 
8 
 
"promptly as safety reasonably permit[s]."  And that is before 
we even consider how quickly the motorist might recognize he is 
being signaled to stop.  This means the distance a law 
enforcement officer might follow a driver before he pulls over 
can vary significantly.  In the normal course of events, the 
officer assuredly cannot accurately predict, within a matter of 
feet, where the vehicle will come to rest (as he could here).  
So, unless an observant driver immediately slams on his brakes 
and comes to a screeching halt when he sees a patrol car's 
emergency lights, an officer who wants to search the car or 
arrest the driver will always be able to plausibly say the 
motorist could have stopped a few feet earlier. 
¶61 On that last point, we would do well to keep in mind 
that the State is asserting there was "probable cause," not just 
"reasonable suspicion" to believe Mr. Weber violated this 
statute.  That has consequences.  Probable cause regarding a 
jailable offense doesn't just give law enforcement officers a 
basis for asserting "hot pursuit."  It also authorizes them to 
arrest motorists and conduct warrantless searches of their 
persons and vehicles.  Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465 (1999) 
(per curiam) (stating that probable cause is sufficient for 
warrantless search under the "automobile exception" to the 
Fourth Amendment); State v. Paszek, 50 Wis. 2d 619, 624–25, 184 
N.W.2d 836 
(1971) 
(holding 
probable 
cause 
sufficient 
for 
arrest).  Under the State's reading, this statute is so powerful 
it 
can 
transmogrify 
the 
most 
minor 
imaginable 
equipment 
malfunction——a 
burnt-out 
light——into 
permission 
for 
a 
No.  2014AP304-CR.dk 
 
9 
 
warrantless arrest and search.  In finding probable cause here, 
we are telling Wisconsin's motorists that their protection from 
warrantless searches and arrests incident to traffic stops is 
not our constitution, but instead law enforcement officers' 
discretion.  It cannot be that easy to elide constitutional 
safeguards.  Not only does this record not support probable 
cause with respect to this statute, it must not. 
¶62 The facts the State offers us reveal no probable cause 
to believe Mr. Weber violated Wis. Stat. § 346.04(2t).  As a 
result, the State may not use the "hot pursuit" doctrine to 
justify Deputy Dorshorst's decision to enter Mr. Weber's garage 
without a warrant——at least with respect to this statute. 
B 
¶63 There is still, of course, the State's argument that 
Mr. Weber committed a second jailable offense capable of 
supporting its "hot pursuit" theory.  If we include Mr. Weber's 
actions after entering his garage, the State says there was 
probable cause to believe Mr. Weber was resisting a law 
enforcement officer in violation of Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1) 
(another jailable offense).  So now we extend the temporal 
horizon to reach those facts in determining whether they excuse 
the need for a warrant. 
¶64 When the replay of events paused to conduct the 
analysis above, Mr. Weber was in his car in his garage.  Deputy 
Dorshorst was in his patrol car on the driveway, just outside 
the garage with his emergency lights activated.  And the only 
constitutionally-relevant facts ascertainable at that point were 
No.  2014AP304-CR.dk 
 
10 
 
that one of Mr. Weber's brake lights was out, and he had driven 
into the garage instead of stopping on the driveway.  As already 
discussed, these facts support a traffic stop, but nothing more.  
The replay now picks up from there, and we learn the following. 
¶65 Mr. Weber and Deputy Dorshorst exited their vehicles 
at about the same time.  Mr. Weber started moving towards the 
door from the attached garage into his house.  Simultaneously, 
Deputy Dorshorst moved towards the front of his patrol car in an 
effort to keep Mr. Weber in view.  When Mr. Weber started 
walking up the stairs to the house door, Deputy Dorshorst told 
Mr. Weber he "needed to speak with him."  When Mr. Weber did not 
stop, Deputy Dorshorst entered the garage and again told him he 
"needed to speak with him."  Because this is the point at which 
Deputy Dorshorst passed into Fourth Amendment-protected space,5  
the replay must pause again so we can determine whether the 
objectively ascertainable facts at that point plausibly suggest 
a violation of Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1).6 
                                                 
5 Technically, we count an attached garage as part of the 
"curtilage" of Mr. Weber's home.  The curtilage comprises "the 
land and buildings immediately surrounding a house."  State v. 
Martwick, 2000 WI 5, ¶1 n.2, 231 Wis. 2d 801, 604 N.W.2d 552 
(citing United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987)).  For 
purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, we treat the curtilage as 
identical to the house itself.  State v. Dumstrey, 2016 WI 3, 
¶23, 366 Wis. 2d 64, 873 N.W.2d 502. 
6 A person violates this statute when he "knowingly resists 
or obstructs an officer while such officer is doing any act in 
an official capacity and with lawful authority . . . ."  Wis. 
Stat. § 946.41(1). 
No.  2014AP304-CR.dk 
 
11 
 
¶66 If 
the 
"hot 
pursuit" 
exception 
to 
the 
warrant 
requirement is to get Deputy Dorshorst inside the garage without 
a constitutional violation, there must be probable cause to 
believe Mr. Weber committed a jailable offense before he entered 
the garage.  "We thus conclude that a suspect may not defeat an 
arrest which has been set in motion in a public place, and is 
therefore proper under Watson,7 by the expedient of escaping to a 
private place."  United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 
(1976); see also State v. Smith, 131 Wis. 2d 220, 232, 388 
N.W.2d 601 (1986) (quoting Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 
(1984)) (stating that hot pursuit occurs "where there is an 
'immediate or continuous pursuit of [a suspect] from the scene 
of a crime'").  This makes sense——the entire purpose behind this 
exception is to prevent an offender's retreat into Fourth 
Amendment-protected space from frustrating an arrest that 
started outside that space. 
¶67 So the problem with the State's argument is that the 
jailable offense must have commenced before Mr. Weber reached 
his garage.  As discussed above, the objectively ascertainable 
facts by that point only supported Deputy Dorshorst's pursuit of 
Mr. Weber for a bad brake light.  Driving with a dysfunctional 
light is not a jailable offense.  Thus, nothing happened before 
Mr. Weber entered his garage capable of supporting a "hot 
pursuit" argument. 
                                                 
7 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (finding 
warrantless arrest of an individual in a public place upon 
probable cause does not violate the Fourth Amendment). 
No.  2014AP304-CR.dk 
 
12 
 
¶68 Even if we could consider the facts transpiring after 
Mr. Weber entered the garage, there is nothing to support a 
reasonable belief that a jailable offense had occurred, or was 
in the process of happening.  Before Deputy Dorshorst entered 
the garage, he said he told Mr. Weber that he "needed to speak 
with him."  Mr. Weber, however, continued moving towards the 
door into his house.  These additional facts, according to the 
State, are supposed to provide probable cause to believe Mr. 
Weber was knowingly resisting or obstructing an officer.  To 
make such a showing, the State must demonstrate that Deputy 
Dorshorst was acting in an official capacity, that he exercised 
lawful authority, and that Mr. Weber knowingly resisted or 
obstructed 
what 
Deputy 
Dorshorst 
was 
lawfully 
trying 
to 
accomplish in his official capacity.   
¶69 The State says the action with which Mr. Weber 
interfered was his refusal to stop when Deputy Dorshorst told 
him he "needed to speak with him."  This depends, in part, on 
what was meant by the deputy's statement.  "I need to speak with 
you," when considered in isolation, is of dubious import.  It 
could 
potentially 
be 
understood 
as 
a 
request 
to 
speak 
immediately, a command that Mr. Weber speak with him at some 
point, or a command that Mr. Weber speak with him immediately.  
But when a deputy sheriff makes this statement when his patrol 
car is just a few feet away with its emergency lights flashing, 
the only reasonable understanding is that one must immediately 
cease whatever one is doing and give him your undivided 
attention. 
No.  2014AP304-CR.dk 
 
13 
 
¶70 Deputy Dorshorst intended his statement to restrict 
Mr. Weber's freedom to move about in his home.  That is, he 
intended his words to effect a seizure of Mr. Weber just as 
surely as if he were physically restraining him.  And it is 
reasonable to understand those words as such.  Mr. Weber's 
failure to understand it that way (or heed the command) led 
Deputy Dorshorst to follow his words into the garage, and 
accomplish physically what his words could not.   
¶71 Thus, the question is whether Deputy Dorshorst had 
lawful authority to command Mr. Weber to stop what he was doing 
and submit to questioning.  The State's argument simply assumes 
we should answer that question affirmatively, but it provided no 
adequate explanation.  This is a significant shortcoming; if, by 
nothing more than his command, an officer has the lawful 
authority to freeze a person in place such that the failure to 
comply justifies warrantless entry of his home, then the Fourth 
Amendment is a false promise.8  An officer could manufacture a 
basis for crossing into protected space simply by commanding the 
occupant to come out.  Failure to comply would justify an 
incursion to fetch him.  This we do not tolerate.  See generally 
City of Sheboygan v. Cesar, 2010 WI App 170, ¶18, 330 
                                                 
8 Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee, 751 F.3d 542, 550 (7th 
Cir. 2014) ("At the core of the privacy protected by the Fourth 
Amendment is the right to be let alone in one's home."); Kylio 
v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) ("'At the very core' of 
the Fourth Amendment 'stands the right of a man to retreat into 
his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental 
intrusion.'" (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 
511 (1961))). 
No.  2014AP304-CR.dk 
 
14 
 
Wis. 2d 760, 796 N.W.2d 429 (noting that people inside their 
homes may "ignore [the officers'] requests that [they] cooperate 
and choose not to speak with them," though the officers could 
still seek a warrant). 
¶72 The State's argument doesn't hit true because it does 
not explain why Deputy Dorshorst can lawfully command a man in 
his own home to do anything under these circumstances.  Without 
that, there can be no violation of Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1).  And 
in the absence of a violation, the State cannot argue Deputy 
Dorshorst was in hot pursuit when he entered Mr. Weber's garage 
(even if we were to consider Mr. Weber's conduct after he 
entered his garage, which we may not do).  If this was the end 
of the analysis, I would have to conclude that Deputy Dorshorst 
unconstitutionally entered Mr. Weber's garage.  But it is not 
the end. 
 
II 
¶73 The reason Deputy Dorshorst could enter Mr. Weber's 
garage without violating constitutional guarantees is that Mr. 
Weber consented to his entry.  Warrantless searches and seizures 
are not "unreasonable" within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment when the suspect consents.  State v. Artic, 2010 
WI 83, ¶29, 327 Wis. 2d 382, 786 N.W.2d 430. 
¶74 When we consider this exception to the warrant 
requirement, we first look for words, gestures, or conduct that 
one can reasonably understand to manifest consent to the search.  
State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 197, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998).  
No.  2014AP304-CR.dk 
 
15 
 
We then examine the facts to ensure the suspect gave consent 
voluntarily——that is, "in the absence of duress or coercion, 
either express or implied."  Id. 
¶75 Here, Mr. Weber gave Deputy Dorshorst consent to enter 
his garage for the purpose of completing the traffic stop that 
had commenced on a public highway.  As discussed above, Deputy 
Dorshorst initiated the traffic stop while both he and Mr. Weber 
were on County Highway E.  Mr. Weber then slowed and pulled into 
his driveway.  He did not, however, stop there.  He instead 
pulled into his garage. 
¶76 Had Mr. Weber chosen to stop in his driveway, which he 
clearly could have done, this case would not be before us.  
Deputy Dorshorst would have approached the car, spoken with Mr. 
Weber, observed the indicia of intoxication, and the remaining 
events would likely have unfolded as they actually did.  But 
with 
one 
exception——it 
all 
would 
have 
happened 
outside 
constitutionally-protected space, and the sanctity of Mr. 
Weber's home would have remained intact. 
¶77 The reason the events at issue took place in Mr. 
Weber's garage is because that is where Mr. Weber chose for them 
to take place.  He was, without question, obligated to stop so 
that Deputy Dorshorst could investigate the defective brake 
light.  State v. Gaulrapp, 207 Wis. 2d 600, 605, 558 N.W.2d 696 
(1996) ("A traffic stop is generally reasonable if the officers 
have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has 
occurred, or have grounds to reasonably suspect a violation 
has been or will be committed." (citation omitted)); see also 
No.  2014AP304-CR.dk 
 
16 
 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968) ("[A] police officer may in 
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach 
a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal 
behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an 
arrest").  That obligation attached when Deputy Dorshorst 
activated his emergency lights, and it persisted thereafter 
until the lawful incidents to a traffic stop were complete. 
¶78 So as Mr. Weber continued from his driveway into his 
garage, he was operating under a continuing obligation to allow 
Deputy Dorshorst to complete the traffic stop that had commenced 
on County Highway E.  Entering the garage did not terminate the 
obligation——it followed him inside.  And because we presume that 
Wisconsin's citizens know the law,9 we can conclude that Mr. 
Weber knew he was under this obligation. 
¶79 Knowing his obligation, Mr. Weber chose where he would 
stop, and in doing so also chose where Deputy Dorshorst would 
perform his duties.  His conduct would communicate to a 
reasonable observer that he preferred to complete the traffic 
stop in his garage, rather than on the driveway.  Having 
extended that invitation, Mr. Weber may not fault Deputy 
Dorshorst for accepting it. 
¶80 The next step in the "consent" analysis is to 
determine whether Mr. Weber was under any duress or coercion 
                                                 
9 State v. Neumann, 2013 WI 58, ¶50 n.29, 348 Wis. 2d 455, 
832 N.W.2d 560.  This is the legal maxim of ignorantia juris 
neminem excusat, or "ignorance of the law excuses no one."  
Ignorantia Juris Non Excusat, Black's Law Dictionary, (10th ed. 
2014).   
No.  2014AP304-CR.dk 
 
17 
 
(whether express or implied) to provide that consent.  There are 
no facts of record to indicate he might have been.  Indeed, 
quite the opposite is true.  To the extent there was any duress 
or coercion in these facts, it was to prevent Mr. Weber from 
offering this conduct-based invitation to Deputy Dorshorst.  The 
patrol car's emergency lights were an unequivocal command to 
submit to a traffic stop.  Mr. Weber could have complied by 
stopping in his driveway.  To the extent the emergency lights 
exerted coercion or duress, they certainly weren't encouraging 
Mr. Weber to proceed into his garage.  Thus, Mr. Weber's consent 
was voluntary. 
¶81 Consequently, it was not constitutionally unreasonable 
for Deputy Dorshorst to enter Mr. Weber's garage for the purpose 
of performing the traffic stop that had commenced on a public 
highway.  A law enforcement officer may, during a lawful traffic 
stop, detain everyone in the vehicle.  Brendlin v. California, 
551 U.S. 249, 255 (2007) ("The law is settled that in Fourth 
Amendment terms a traffic stop entails a seizure of the driver 
'even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the 
resulting detention quite brief.'" (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 
440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979))).  The scope and duration of the stop 
are limited by the purpose for effecting the stop: "Like a Terry 
stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-
stop context is determined by the seizure's 'mission'——to 
address the traffic violation that warranted the stop, and 
attend to related safety concerns."  Rodriguez v. United States, 
135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015) (citations omitted).  Because of 
No.  2014AP304-CR.dk 
 
18 
 
the 
invitation 
Mr. 
Weber 
extended, 
Deputy 
Dorshorst 
was 
authorized to do all of this in the garage. 
¶82 It is at this point that I rejoin the lead opinion.  
My need to write separately stemmed only from the State's 
constitutionally-insufficient (in my view) basis for justifying 
Deputy Dorshorst's presence in the garage.  Because he did, in 
fact, have that authority (by virtue of the conduct-based 
invitation), he also had the lawful authority to command Mr. 
Weber to stop moving towards the house door so that he could 
complete the traffic stop.  When Mr. Weber failed to comply, 
Deputy Dorshorst lawfully and appropriately restrained Mr. 
Weber's further progress.  The discovery of incriminating 
evidence appropriately followed, as well as the conviction.  For 
that reason, I join the lead opinion's conclusion that the court 
of appeals must be reversed. 
 
No.  2014AP304-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶83 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  Facts shape the 
contours of our constitutional guarantees.  By lowering the 
standard to meet the facts in this case, the lead opinion would 
erode the constitutional rights of us all.1  It sets a trajectory 
where, bit by bit, almost unnoticed, we may awaken one day to 
discover that the freedoms for which so many have fought and 
sacrificed have been severely curtailed. 
¶84 Among those freedoms is the sanctity of the home and 
its curtilage.  "It is axiomatic that the 'physical entry of the 
home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth 
Amendment is directed.'"  Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 
                                                 
1 I use the term "lead" opinion for two reasons.  First, I 
am concerned that without this cue, the reader may mistakenly 
believe that the lead opinion has any precedential value.  
Although four justices join in the mandate of the opinion to 
reverse the court of appeals (Zeigler, J., joined by Roggensack, 
C.J., Gableman, J. and Kelly, J.), it represents the reasoning 
of only three justices (Ziegler, J., joined by Roggensack, C.J., 
and Gableman, J.).  Justice Kelly joined in the mandate, but 
would reverse on other grounds. 
Although set forth in three separate opinions, four 
justices——a majority of the court——disagree with the reasoning 
of the lead opinion.  Contrary to the lead opinion, four 
justices determine that there was neither probable cause nor 
exigent circumstances here (Abrahamson, J., Ann Walsh Bradley, 
J., Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., and Kelly, J.). 
Second, I use the term "lead" opinion because although it 
is undefined in our Internal Operating Procedures, its use here 
is consistent with past description.  We have said "that a lead 
opinion is one that states (and agrees with) the mandate of a 
majority of the justices, but represents the reasoning of less 
than a majority of the participating justices."  State v. Lynch, 
2016 WI 66, ¶143, 371 Wis. 2d 1, 885 N.W.2d 89 (Abrahamson & Ann 
Walsh Bradley, J.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) 
(citing Hoffer Props., LLC v. State, Dep't of Transp., 2016 WI 
5, 366 Wis. 2d 372, 874 N.W.2d 533). 
No.  2014AP304-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
(1984) (citing United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 
U.S. 297, 313 (1972)). 
¶85 Ignoring that the State has the burden to overcome the 
presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to warrantless 
physical entries of the home, the lead opinion determines that 
Deputy Dorshorst's warrantless entry into Richard Weber's garage 
and his subsequent arrest met the constitutional standard.  It 
posits that Dorshorst was "justified by the exigent circumstance 
of hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect who had committed jailable 
offenses."  Lead op., ¶3. 
¶86 I agree with both Justice Daniel Kelly and Justice 
Rebecca Grassl Bradley that there was no probable cause to 
believe that Weber committed a jailable offense.  Additionally, 
I agree that under no reasonable view of the facts of this case 
was there an emergency justifying an exception to the Fourth 
Amendment's warrant requirement.  The alleged "hot pursuit" 
occurred for no more than a few seconds and emanated from a 
routine traffic violation, a mere non-jailable civil offense. 
¶87 The lead opinion further errs by failing to apply the 
proper analysis for determining whether exigent circumstances 
justify warrantless entry into a suspect's home.  Instead, it 
advances a per se rule that contravenes United States Supreme 
Court precedent. 
¶88 Contrary to the lead opinion, and like a unanimous 
court of appeals, I conclude that the State failed to overcome 
the 
presumption 
of 
unreasonableness 
that 
attaches 
to 
a 
warrantless entry into a constitutionally protected area.  Here, 
No.  2014AP304-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
the government's warrantless, non-consensual intrusion into 
Weber's garage and the resulting search and seizure violated the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
of 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
 
¶89 During the daylight hours of April 20, 2012, Deputy 
Dorshorst noticed that Weber's vehicle had a defective high-
mounted brake lamp.2  He also observed Weber's vehicle weave in 
its lane, deviating over the fog line.  The State concedes that 
Dorshorst did not have probable cause to initiate a traffic stop 
based upon the lane deviation, but instead asserts that he 
initiated the stop because of Weber's defective high-mounted 
brake lamp. 
¶90 One 
hundred 
feet 
before 
Weber 
turned 
into 
his 
driveway, Deputy Dorshorst activated his emergency lights, but 
                                                 
2 A toxicology report (Exhibit 1) was offered and received 
into the record at the preliminary hearing.  It provides that 
blood was "recovered from Richard L. Weber on April 20, 2012 at 
1955 hours." 
Judicial 
notice 
may 
be 
taken 
of 
matters 
of 
common 
knowledge, such as the time of sunset on April 20.  See, e.g., 
State ex rel. Schilling v. Baird, 65 Wis. 2d 394, 399, 222 
N.W.2d 666 (1974).  On April 20, 2012, in the city of Arpin, 
Wood County, sunset began at 7:51 p.m and civil twilight ended 
at 8:21 p.m.  See Sunrise Sunset Calendar, Wisconsin Locations, 
http://www.sunrisesunset.com/usa/Wisconsin.asp 
(last 
visited 
Nov. 16, 2016). 
Given the intervening events that occurred from the time 
Dorshorst initiated the traffic stop to when he placed Weber 
under arrest, it is reasonable to conclude that Dorshorst 
initiated the traffic stop during daylight, well before Weber's 
blood was drawn at 7:55 p.m. 
No.  2014AP304-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
did not turn on the siren in his squad car.  The record does not 
reflect any of the usual indicia of fleeing, such as an increase 
in speed, a furtive glance back at the deputy or running from 
the vehicle.  Instead, the record reflects that Weber continued 
to drive for a few seconds, turned into his driveway and entered 
his attached garage. 
¶91 The one bit of testimony the State attempted to offer 
regarding an indicia of fleeing was excluded as speculative.  
Without any foundation, Deputy Dorshorst testified that "it 
seemed to me that he was attempting to evade me."  Defense 
counsel immediately objected and the circuit court agreed, 
concluding that the testimony was speculative. 
¶92 Leaving his emergency lights on, Deputy Dorshorst 
parked his squad car in Weber's driveway.  He then got out of 
his squad car and saw Weber walking up the steps in his attached 
garage leading to the house door.  Dorshorst followed him. 
¶93 According to Deputy Dorshorst's subsequent testimony, 
he "was just entering the garage" when he told Weber he needed 
to speak to him.  Weber did not respond, but continued up the 
steps within his garage toward the house door.  While in the 
garage Dorshorst "secured [Weber's] arm" as Weber was "just 
inside his [house's] door" at the top of the steps.  Deputy 
Dorshorst again advised Weber that he needed to talk to him. 
¶94 Deputy Dorshorst testified that he then told Weber 
that "I needed to talk to him and the reason why I was stopping 
him was for his high mounted brake lamp."  Dorshorst asked Weber 
No.  2014AP304-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
"to come out to his car so that I could point out exactly the 
reason for the stop and which light was defective." 
¶95 After Dorshorst made contact with Weber he observed 
that Weber had slow, slurred speech, a strong odor of 
intoxicants, 
and 
glassy, 
bloodshot 
eyes. 
 
During 
their 
conversation, Weber admitted that he had been drinking. 
¶96 Deputy Dorshorst testified that had he not entered 
Weber's garage he "would still have attempted to make contact 
with him."  According to Dorshorst, "I would have still 
attempted either way knocking on his door or I would have 
attempted other means.  I wouldn't have——I would not have just 
left."  It is unclear from the record whether the "other means" 
referred to obtaining a search warrant. 
¶97 Weber was never cited for the defective high-mounted 
brake lamp and the bit of testimony the State attempted to offer 
regarding an indicia of fleeing was excluded as speculative.  
Nevertheless, he was charged with resisting an officer by 
fleeing and other offenses.  Ultimately, he pleaded no contest 
to operating with a prohibited alcohol concentration as a 9th or 
subsequent offense, resisting an officer and possession of 
marijuana. 
II 
¶98 As observed above, "(i)t is axiomatic that the 
'physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the 
wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.'"  Welsh, 466 U.S. 
at 748 (citing United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. at 313).  
Accordingly, it is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law 
No.  2014AP304-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
that warrantless searches and seizures inside a home are 
"presumptively unreasonable."  Id. at 749. 
¶99 Under the Fourth Amendment, an attached garage has the 
same protections as the home.  Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 
1409, 1414 (2013) (the curtilage of the house "enjoys protection 
as part of the home itself."); see also State v. Dumstrey, 2016 
WI 
3, 
¶35, 
366 
Wis. 2d 64, 
873 
N.W.2d 502 
(courts 
have 
consistently concluded that a single family home's attached 
garage constitutes curtilage).  This basic premise is not 
disputed by the parties because the State concedes that Weber's 
attached garage is curtilage. 
¶100 The State has the burden to demonstrate both probable 
cause and "exigent circumstances that overcome the presumption 
of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home 
entries."  Welch, 466 U.S. at 750.  I examine first whether the 
State has met its burden of demonstrating that Deputy Dorshorst 
had probable cause to arrest Weber for a jailable offense. 
¶101 Probable cause exists where "the totality of the 
circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge at the 
time of the arrest would lead a reasonable police officer to 
believe that the defendant probably committed a crime."  State 
v. Koch, 175 Wis. 2d 684, 701, 499 N.W.2d 152 (1993).  The 
totality of the circumstances that constitute probable cause to 
arrest "must be measured by the facts of the particular case."  
State v. Paszek, 50 Wis. 2d 619, 625, 184 N.W.2d 836 (1971). 
¶102 The lead opinion concludes that "at the time he 
entered Weber's garage, Deputy Dorshorst had probable cause to 
No.  2014AP304-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
arrest 
Weber 
for 
violations 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 346.04(2t) 
[resisting by fleeing] and 946.41(1) [obstructing]."  Lead op., 
¶23.  Jailable offenses of resisting and obstructing both 
require a suspect to "knowingly resist" an officer.3  According 
to the lead opinion, it is reasonable to conclude that "Weber 
was likely feigning ignorance and thus fleeing" and that "most 
individuals would have responded to Deputy Dorshorst's obvious 
attempts to catch his attention."  Lead op., ¶23.  But this is 
the very type of assertion that the circuit court deemed 
inadmissible because it was speculative.  Any assertion that 
Weber on that day knew he had a duty to stop and intentionally 
chose to comply with that obligation by pulling into his garage 
is likewise speculative. 
¶103 The lead opinion is left with only one fact that is 
relevant to a determination of whether Deputy Dorshorst had 
probable cause to arrest Weber for "knowingly" resisting an 
officer.  This is the fact that for a few seconds "Deputy  
Dorshorst activated his emergency lights while driving behind 
Weber's vehicle but Weber failed to pull over."  Lead op., ¶23. 
                                                 
3 Wis. Stat. § 346.04(2t) provides:  "No operator of a 
vehicle, after having received a visible or audible signal to 
stop his or her vehicle from a traffic officer or marked police 
vehicle, shall knowingly resist the traffic officer by failing 
to stop his or her vehicle as promptly as safety reasonably 
permits." 
Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1) provides:  " . . . whoever knowingly 
resists or obstructs and officer while such officer is doing any 
act in an official capacity and with lawful authority is guilty 
of a Class A misdemeanor." 
No.  2014AP304-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
¶104 Although Weber does not dispute that Deputy Dorshorst 
activated his emergency lights, he does dispute whether he saw 
those lights in the seconds before he turned into his driveway 
and parked his vehicle.  Thus, when Weber disputes that he 
"knowingly" resisted an officer, he is in fact disputing that he 
received a visible signal or failed to stop promptly. 
¶105 The record reflects that Deputy Dorshorst activated 
his emergency lights, but he did so only a few seconds before 
Weber turned into his driveway and parked his vehicle.  Turning 
on the siren in his squad car may have given credence to the 
lead opinion’s speculation about Weber’s intent, but there is no 
dispute that Deputy Dorshorst failed to turn it on. 
¶106 Additionally, the record does not reflect any of the 
usual indicia of fleeing, such as an increase in speed, a 
furtive glance back at the deputy or running from the vehicle.  
The one bit of testimony the state attempted to offer regarding 
Weber’s intent was excluded as speculative. 
¶107 Deputy Dorshorst did not enter the garage because 
Weber was fleeing from the scene of two jailable offenses.  
Rather, he followed Weber into his garage because of a minor 
traffic 
violation. 
 
According 
to 
Deputy 
Dorshorst's 
own 
testimony, "the reason why I was stopping him was for his high 
mounted brake lamp." 
¶108 When Weber did not respond to Deputy Dorshorst's 
request to talk, Dorshorst followed Weber up the stairs of his 
attached garage and grabbed Weber's arm as he was just inside 
his house door.  He then told Weber "to come out to his car so 
No.  2014AP304-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
that I could point out exactly the reason for the stop and which 
light was defective." 
¶109 There are no additional facts in the record supporting 
a reason for the stop other than the defective high mounted 
brake lamp.  Thus, the State has not met its burden of 
establishing that Deputy Dorshorst had probable cause to arrest 
Weber for a knowing violation of either Wis. Stat. §§ 346.04(2t) 
(resisting) or 946.41(1) (obstructing). 
¶110 Without probable cause to arrest for resisting or 
obstructing an officer, the government's interest at the time 
Deputy Dorshorst entered Weber's home without a warrant was for 
a minor traffic violation.  This minor offense does not justify 
"the chief evil" of entry into the home "against which the 
wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed."  Welsh, 466 U.S. 
at 748 (citing United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. at 313). 
III 
¶111 The lead opinion's discussion of exigent circumstances 
is analytically unnecessary.  There is no need to reach the 
issue of exigent circumstances unless as a threshold matter at 
least four Justices have determined that probable cause exists.   
Nevertheless, I address exigent circumstances to respond to the 
assertions of the lead opinion. 
¶112 The State failed to meet its burden that there were 
exigent circumstances justifying Deputy Dorshort's warrantless 
intrusion into Weber's home.  It bears "the heavy burden of 
trying to demonstrate exigent circumstances to overcome the 
presumption of unreasonableness" that attaches to warrantless 
No.  2014AP304-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
home entries.  State v. Rodriguez, 2001 WI App 206, ¶9, 247 
Wis. 2d 734, 634 N.W.2d 844 (citing Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750). 
¶113 Under both Wisconsin and United States Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, it is well-established that "[w]arrentless entry 
is permissible only where there is urgent need to do so, coupled 
with insufficient time to secure a warrant."  State v. Smith, 
131 Wis. 2d 220, 228, 388 N.W.2d 601 (1986) abrogated on other 
grounds by State v. Felix, 2012 WI 36, 339 Wis. 2d 670, 811 
N.W.2d 775; see also Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1559 
(2013) (quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) (a 
warrantless search is potentially reasonable only when "there is 
compelling need for official action and no time to secure a 
warrant.")).  To determine whether a law enforcement officer 
faced an emergency that justified acting without a warrant, 
courts examine the "totality of circumstances."  McNeely, 133 
S. Ct. at 1559. 
¶114 The facts here cannot support a conclusion that Deputy 
Dorshorst had an urgent need to act with no time to support a 
warrant.  For example, the facts of this case stand in stark 
contrast to the facts in United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 
(1976), which the lead opinion relies upon as a seminal case on 
the exigent circumstance of hot pursuit. 
¶115 In Santana, the hot pursuit occurred when undercover 
officers rushed to Santana's residence after being informed that 
she had marked bills from their investigation in her possession.  
Id. at 39-40.  When the officers arrived, they saw Santana 
standing in the doorway with a brown paper bag in her hand.  Id. 
No.  2014AP304-CR.awb 
 
11 
 
at 40.  As the officers shouted "police" and displayed their 
identification, Santana retreated into the vestibule of her 
house.  Id. 
¶116 As the Santana court explained, once Santana saw the 
police there was "a realistic expectation that any delay would 
result in destruction of evidence."  Id. at 43.  Thus, in 
Santana, there was both an urgent need to act and no time to 
secure a warrant because delay would lead to the loss of 
evidence in an undercover drug investigation. 
¶117 The facts of this case could not be more different 
from those in Santana.  Here, Deputy Dorshorst stopped Weber for 
a defective high-mounted brake lamp.  In Santana, the police 
were in pursuit of a suspected drug dealer.  Here, there was no 
evidence to destroy regardless of whether the focus of the 
analysis is on a defective high-mounted brake lamp or Weber’s 
alleged flight from the police.  In Santana, the police had to 
act immediately or evidence would be destroyed. 
¶118 Any analysis of whether the State met the required 
showing that Deputy Dorshorst had an urgent need to act and no 
time to secure a warrant is completely absent from the lead 
opinion.  Why?  Because under the facts of this case it would be 
unable to meet the test. 
¶119 Instead, the lead opinion shifts the analysis and 
contends that it would be unreasonable to expect Deputy 
Dorshorst to knock on Weber's front door or take the time to 
obtain a warrant, rather than invade his home.  Lead op., ¶40.  
The lead opinion asserts that "Deputy Dorshorst would have 
No.  2014AP304-CR.awb 
 
12 
 
needed to stop at Weber’s driveway and let Weber flee into the 
residence, then call for backup, secure a perimeter around the 
house so that Weber did not continue his attempts to escape law 
enforcement, and obtain a warrant."  Lead op., ¶40.  "And then 
what?  Would those who support this argument have Deputy 
Dorshorst knock on the door?"  Lead op., ¶40. 
¶120 The answer is yes, because this is both what the law 
requires and what Deputy Dorshorst testified he would do.  
According to Dorshorst's own testimony, had he not entered 
Weber's garage he "would still have attempted to make contact 
with him."  He explained, "I would have still attempted either 
way knocking on his door or I would have attempted other means.  
I wouldn't have——I would not have just left."  Attempting to 
secure a warrant would not have allowed Weber to escape arrest 
or conviction. 
¶121 In essence, Deputy Dorshorst assumed the role of a 
magistrate.  "When an officer undertakes to act as his own 
magistrate, he ought to be in a position to justify it by 
pointing to some real immediate and serious consequences if he 
postponed action to get a warrant."  Welsh, 46 U.S. at 751 
(quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 460 (1948)).  
That is simply not possible here, when even Deputy Dorshorst 
acknowledged that he could have pursued alternative routes.  He 
testified that had he not entered the garage he would have 
knocked on the door or pursued some other means to make contact 
with Weber. 
No.  2014AP304-CR.awb 
 
13 
 
¶122 Under these facts, the State has failed to show that 
Deputy Dorshorst had no time to get a warrant and that there was 
an urgent need to act.  Accordingly, I conclude that the State 
has not met its burden of demonstrating exigent circumstances 
sufficient to overcome the presumption of unreasonableness that 
attaches to warrantless home entries. 
IV 
¶123 By advancing a per se rule that hot pursuit of a 
fleeing suspect is always an exigent circumstance, the lead 
opinion contravenes United States Supreme Court precedent.  A 
per se exception to the Fourth Amendment is contrary to the 
United States Supreme Court's recent decision in McNeely, 133 
S. Ct. at 1558-59.  In McNeely, the Supreme Court declined to 
adopt a rule that the dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream 
presents a per se exigency that justifies an exception to the 
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement for non-consensual blood 
testing in drunk driving cases.  Id. at 1556.  Declining to 
adopt a categorical rule for drunk driving investigations, 
McNeely 
refused 
to 
"depart 
from 
a 
careful 
case-by-case 
assessment of exigency . . . ."  Id. at 1561. 
¶124 The lead opinion would create a per se exception while 
simultaneously asserting that it is doing no such thing.4  See 
lead 
op., 
¶43. 
 
Initially, 
it 
acknowledges 
and 
calls 
"legitimate" the concern "that applying the hot pursuit doctrine 
to uphold a warrantless entry in a case where fleeing law 
                                                 
4 At oral argument, the State conceded that it was seeking a 
bright-line rule in this case. 
No.  2014AP304-CR.awb 
 
14 
 
enforcement was itself the violation giving rise to the pursuit 
will lead to the application of the hot pursuit doctrine in 
every case involving a fleeing suspect . . .."  Lead op., ¶43. 
¶125 Then, in attempting to explain away the legitimacy of 
the concern, the lead opinion contends that it does not support 
a per se rule for four reasons:  (1) the State will not always 
be able to establish probable cause; (2) reasonableness is 
measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the 
circumstances; (3) application of the hot pursuit doctrine is 
not circular because the legislature chose to make knowingly 
fleeing a jailable offense; and (4) a contrary holding would 
incentivize flight in every case involving a nonjailable 
offense.  Id. 
¶126 The lead opinion's first reason fails because it 
conflates probable cause with exigent circumstances.  According 
to the lead opinion, it is not creating a per se rule in every 
case involving flight from an officer because "the State will 
not always be able to establish probable cause that the suspect 
was knowingly fleeing."  Lead op., ¶43 (emphasis in original).  
However, as set forth above, the state must separately prove 
both probable cause to arrest and exigent circumstances in order 
to justify warrantless entry into Weber's home.  Payton v. New 
York, 445 U.S. 573, 587-90 (1980).  Thus, the lead opinion has 
created a per se rule because in every case where an officer has 
probable cause, the act of fleeing from an officer will be 
considered an exigent circumstance. 
No.  2014AP304-CR.awb 
 
15 
 
¶127 
The lead opinion's second reason fails because there 
is no legal support for the proposition that Dorshort's entry 
was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances because 
it was a limited intrusion.  In recent years, the United States 
Supreme Court has reaffirmed that the Fourth Amendment embodies 
"a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas 
('persons, houses, papers, and effects') it enumerates."  United 
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012). 
¶128 Prior to Jones, courts employed the Katz "reasonable 
expectation of privacy" test in analyzing the Fourth Amendment's 
protections.  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 
(1967) (What a person "seeks to preserve as private, even in an 
area 
accessible 
to 
the 
public, 
may 
be 
constitutionally 
protected."). 
 
However, 
Jones 
clarified 
that 
"the 
Katz 
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not 
substituted for, the common-law trespassory test."  Jones, 132 
S. Ct. at 952. 
¶129 Additionally, in Jardines, the Supreme Court further 
explained that "an officer's leave to gather information is 
sharply circumscribed when he steps off [public] thoroughfares 
and enters the Fourth Amendment's protected areas."  133 S. Ct. 
at 1415.  Jardines acknowledged that the porch of a home is a 
semi-public area, but nonetheless determined that the use of a 
trained police dog on Jardines' porch was a search within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 1415-18. 
¶130 Thus, 
Fourth 
Amendment 
jurisprudence 
emphasizing 
privacy over trespass is now inconsistent with Jones and 
No.  2014AP304-CR.awb 
 
16 
 
Jardines.5  In Santana, 427 U.S. at 42, on which the lead opinion 
relies in making its limited intrusion argument, the court 
determined that even though Santana was arrested in the 
threshold of her home, her Fourth Amendment rights were not 
violated because she "was not in an area where she had any 
expectation of privacy."  Id.  However, under Jones and 
Jardines, the reasonable expectation of privacy test may be 
"unnecessary to consider when the government gains evidence by 
physically 
intruding 
on 
constitutionally 
protected 
areas."  
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417; see also Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951-
52. 
¶131 Nevertheless, the lead opinion turns a blind eye to 
current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence when it suggests that 
limited intrusions into the constitutionally protected areas are 
just fine.  Conflating this case with community caretaker cases, 
the lead opinion deems the trespass here reasonable because 
Deputy Dorshorst did not: 
 damage any property; 
                                                 
5 In a footnote, the lead opinion attempts to distinguish 
this case from Jones and Jardines by emphasizing that the latter 
two are "search cases."  Lead op., ¶38 n.10.  This distinction 
fails because a search occurred when Deputy Dorshorst physically 
occupied Weber's private property for the purpose of obtaining 
information.  See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 
(2012); see also Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417 
(2013) ("That the officers learned what they learned only by 
physically intruding on Jardines' property to gather evidence is 
enough to establish that a search occurred."); United States v. 
Perea-Ray, 680 F.3d 1179, 1185 (9th Cir. 2012) ("Warrantless 
trespasses by the government into the home or its curtilage are 
Fourth Amendment searches."). 
No.  2014AP304-CR.awb 
 
17 
 
 open any doors or windows; 
 pull out any weapons; 
 stay in the constitutionally protected area longer 
than necessary; or  
 enter the house proper, but instead entered only the 
curtilage of the house.  Lead op., ¶38.6 
¶132 
What the lead opinion misses is that we are not 
examining the reasonableness of the conduct once inside the 
constitutionally protected area, but rather whether the officer 
should have been in the protected area at all.  The legal 
analysis for determining whether exigent circumstances justify 
warrantless entry is entirely unrelated to the reasonableness 
factors considered under the community caretaker doctrine. 
¶133 The third reason the lead opinion offers is logically 
flawed.  It asserts that the application of the hot pursuit 
doctrine in this case is not circular because the legislature 
chose to make knowingly fleeing a traffic offense jailable.  
Although the lead opinion is correct that the seriousness of the 
                                                 
6 The lead opinion relies on community caretaker cases.  
See, e.g., State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 
N.W.2d 592; State v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14, 315 Wis. 2d 414, 759 
N.W.2d 598.  Yet, the legal analysis of exigent circumstances is 
distinct from the community caretaker doctrine.  Compare 
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) ("Our decisions have 
recognized that a warrantless entry by criminal law enforcement 
officials may be legal when there is compelling need for 
official action and no time to secure a warrant."), with 
Pinkard, 327 Wis. 2d 346, ¶49 ("In considering the second 
reasonableness factor [under the community caretaker doctrine], 
we assess whether the time, location, the degree of overt 
authority and force displayed were appropriate under the 
circumstances.") (quotations and citation omitted). 
No.  2014AP304-CR.awb 
 
18 
 
underlying offense is a factor in determining whether there are 
exigent circumstances, the jailable offenses in this case 
emanate from the flight itself.  This is circular reasoning 
because it departs from a case-by-case analysis and creates an 
exigency in every case where there is a flight, no matter how 
minor the underlying offense. 
¶134 
According to the lead opinion, exigent circumstances 
exist because Deputy Dorshorst had probable cause to arrest 
Weber for "two jailable offenses."  Lead op., ¶3.  The two 
jailable offenses the lead opinion references here are resisting 
an officer and obstructing an officer.  Lead op., ¶23.  It then 
reasons that Deputy Dorshorst was in hot pursuit because Weber 
was "a fleeing suspect who had committed jailable offenses."  
Lead op., ¶3.  Thus, according to the lead opinion's circular 
logic, the crime from which Weber was fleeing was his own 
flight. 
¶135 Finally, the lead opinion's fourth reason fails 
because a case-by-case rule is required, even if the State 
wishes to discourage suspects from fleeing the police.  The lead 
opinion is correct that police officers and the communities they 
protect have a compelling interest in discouraging suspects from 
fleeing to their homes, but that interest must be balanced with 
the Fourth Amendment's fundamental protections.  However, as 
McNeely 
explained, 
the 
State's 
interests 
are 
adequately 
addressed under a case-by-case analysis and do not justify "the 
'considerable overgeneralization' that a per se rule would 
No.  2014AP304-CR.awb 
 
19 
 
reflect."  133 S. Ct. at 1561 (quoting Richards v. Wisconsin, 
520 U.S. 385, 393 (1997)). 
¶136 Ultimately, every rationale offered by the lead 
opinion in defense of its assertion that it has not created a 
per se rule is logically and legally unsound.  In order to reach 
its conclusion, the lead opinion conflates legal doctrines, 
disregards controlling United States Supreme Court precedent and 
engages in flawed circular reasoning. 
¶137 Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, I 
respectfully dissent. 
¶138 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
 
No.  2014AP304-CR.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶139 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  I agree 
with the lead opinion's holding that hot pursuit for a jailable 
offense can itself present exigent circumstances justifying 
warrantless entry into a citizen's home.  This court has already 
said so.  See State v. Ferguson, 2009 WI 50, ¶¶19-20, 26–30, 317 
Wis. 2d 586, 767 N.W.2d 187; State v. Sanders, 2008 WI 85, 
¶¶117-118, 311 Wis. 2d 257, 133-134 752 N.W.2d 713 (Prosser, J., 
concurring).  I cannot join the lead opinion, however, because 
the facts in this record (1) do not show hot pursuit and (2) 
fail to establish that probable cause to arrest for a jailable 
offense existed before the deputy entered Weber's garage.  The 
lead opinion——without precedent——extends the exigency of hot 
pursuit to the situation here where the jailable offense is the 
alleged "flight" itself.  This circular expansion of hot pursuit 
doctrine violates the Fourth Amendment, which the Founding 
Fathers enshrined in our Constitution to protect the people from 
unwarranted government intrusion.  Accordingly, I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶140 The objective facts here do not support probable cause 
for a jailable offense and do not establish any exigent 
circumstance.  Instead, the facts show a deputy concerned about 
a broken brake light who nevertheless had no urgent or immediate 
need to breach the threshold of Weber's home without first 
securing a warrant.  Merely because the officer's actions in 
this case may not strike us as particularly offensive does not 
mean this court should lower its guard over constitutional 
rights: 
No.  2014AP304-CR.rgb 
 
2 
 
[I]llegitimate 
and 
unconstitutional 
practices 
get 
their first footing . . . by silent approaches and 
slight deviations from legal modes of procedure.  This 
can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that 
constitutional provisions for the security of person 
and property should be liberally construed.  A close 
and literal construction deprives them of half their 
efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the 
right, as if it consisted more in sound than in 
substance.  It is the duty of the courts to be 
watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, 
and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886). 
¶141 Precisely because the absence of alarming facts in 
this case may render the court's encroachment on the Fourth 
Amendment a stealthy one, I write to caution against this latest 
contribution to the gradual depreciation of the right of a 
person to retreat into the home, free from unreasonable physical 
entry.  The Fourth Amendment does not permit governmental 
intrusion into a person's home premised on a de minimis traffic 
law violation like a broken brake light.  Entering the home 
without a warrant and absent any exigency is the "chief evil" 
against which the Fourth Amendment protects the people.  See 
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 (1984). 
¶142 Setting aside Fourth Amendment concerns, the deputy's 
actions do not seem egregious; if the deputy had done the same 
thing in a public place, his actions undoubtedly would not 
violate the Fourth Amendment.  But seizing Weber inside Weber's 
protected curtilage absent any exigency triggers the Fourth 
Amendment's protection and makes the deputy's warrantless entry 
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constitutionally unreasonable.1  Although the deputy's actions 
may seem less intrusive because he entered Weber's open garage 
rather than Weber's home, entering the garage is the constitutional 
equivalent of entering the home. The lead opinion's reasoning 
ignores this principle and opens the door for a future court to 
endorse an officer's warrantless entry into a home for a mere 
traffic violation. 
I 
¶143 The lead opinion concludes that this case involved hot 
pursuit.  I disagree.  Hot pursuit means "some sort of a chase."  
Sanders, 311 Wis. 2d 257, ¶109 (Prosser, J. concurring) (quoting 
United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 (1976)).  "Hot pursuit 
describes the situation when the police are pursuing a suspect 
who is in the process of fleeing from a recently committed 
crime."  State v. Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d 101, 109 (Iowa 2001) 
(citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967)).  It is 
the "immediate or continuous pursuit of the [suspect] from the 
scene of the crime."  Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753.  Although hot 
pursuit is not defined in terms of a particular length of time, 
it does involve some sort of chase and requires the recent 
commission of a jailable crime.  The chase commences from the 
scene of the crime, triggering the hot pursuit. 
                                                 
1 There is no dispute that Weber's attached garage is the 
equivalent of his home and therefore receives the same Fourth 
Amendment protections.  See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 
1409, 1414 (2013) (explaining that the curtilage "enjoys [the 
same] protection as part of the home itself"); see also State v. 
Dumstrey, 2016 WI 3, ¶35, 366 Wis. 2d 64, 873 N.W.2d 502 (noting 
that a single family home's attached garage is curtilage). 
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¶144 Calling what happened here "hot pursuit" stretches 
that term too far.  "[A]pplication of the exigent-circumstances 
exception in the context of a home entry should rarely be 
sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a 
minor offense, such as the kind at issue in this case, has been 
committed."  Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753 (involving first-offense 
drunk driving).  The facts here show there was no chase.  The 
deputy followed Weber 100 feet while Weber slowed his car down to 
turn into his driveway.  There was no recently committed 
jailable crime prompting the pursuit, nor was there a crime 
scene from which Weber fled.  Weber was driving with a broken 
brake light.  That is not a jailable crime. 
¶145 It may be tempting to validate the deputy's actions 
here in order to discourage traffic violators and serious 
criminals from ignoring the police and racing home to avoid 
traffic stops or police investigation.  Fourth Amendment 
protections, however, cannot be jettisoned based on fear that 
some citizens may attempt to run home and hide.  The 100 feet 
Weber travelled did not create an exigency because the deputy 
was not "chasing" Weber for a jailable crime recently committed.2  
There are, however, factual scenarios where a pursuit of 100 
                                                 
2 Although the information discovered after the deputy 
breached the garage threshold revealed that Weber had been 
drinking and driving, our Constitutional decisions must not be  
influenced by evidence obtained after an unlawful entry.  See, 
e.g., Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013) (excluding 
warrantless blood test showing driver had illegal BAC because 
search was unlawful under Fourth Amendment). 
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feet or an even shorter distance will justify warrantless entry.   
See, e.g., Santana, 427 U.S. at 43. 
¶146 We need not identify a precise distance that is 
acceptable or unacceptable because the Fourth Amendment draws 
the line at probable cause, exigency, and reasonableness.   
Police may enter a person's home without a warrant only if there 
is probable cause to believe a jailable crime has been committed, a suspect's 
flight creates an exigency such that there is no time to get a warrant, and the search or seizure is 
reasonable. 
II 
¶147 
The lead opinion essentially concludes the jailable 
offense at issue here was Weber's "flight."  The Fourth 
Amendment, however, does not support warrantless entry into a 
home when the jailable offense justifying entry is the flight 
itself.  To condone warrantless entry into the home, Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence requires probable cause that a jailable 
offense occurred before the flight began.  If the flight itself 
creates the jailable offense that serves as an exigency and 
overcomes Fourth Amendment protections, a police officer can in 
essence create a jailable offense out of any attempted traffic 
stop or any attempt to speak with a citizen——even though no 
other jailable offense has occurred.  At the point the deputy 
entered Weber's garage, all he knew was that Weber had a 
defective high-mounted brake lamp, pulled into his garage, 
walked to the door of his house inside the garage, and did not 
respond to the deputy's request to talk. 
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¶148 At the time the deputy seized Weber, the deputy's sole 
concern was the defective high-mounted brake lamp.   When asked 
why he tried to stop Weber, the deputy answered, "I attempted to 
stop him for defective high mounted brake lamp," and he added 
that he notified dispatch he "had a traffic stop."  Clearly, to 
the deputy this stop was not about pursuing Weber for a jailable 
offense.  It was about a broken brake light and the need to tell 
Weber about it. 
¶149 The lead opinion points out that the officer's 
subjective motivation does not govern our review; instead, we 
review the objective facts.  See lead op., ¶19 n.6.  But the 
objective facts are clear:  There was no recently committed 
jailable offense that sparked a hot pursuit into Weber's home.  
There was an attempted traffic stop for a broken brake light.  
The motorist showed no indication of knowing the deputy 
activated his squad car's emergency lights.  The motorist slowed 
down, drove 100 feet, turned into his driveway, pulled into his 
garage, and walked to the door of the house.  Because the law 
does not support warrantless entry under these circumstances, I 
respectfully dissent. 
 
 
 
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