Title: Chestnut v. State

State: florida

Issuer: Florida Supreme Court

Document:

538 So. 2d 820 (1989)
Adam Blaine CHESTNUT, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 70628.

Supreme Court of Florida.
January 5, 1989.
Rehearing Denied March 22, 1989.
Michael E. Allen, Public Defender and Paula A. Saunders, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Royall P. Terry, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for respondent.
GRIMES, Justice.
This is a petition to review the First District Court of Appeal's decision in Chestnut v. State, 505 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), which held that evidence of diminished mental capacity was inadmissible to negate the specific intent required to convict of first-degree premeditated murder. The district court certified the following question as one of great public importance:
Id. at 1356. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We answer the question in the negative.
Chestnut and two codefendants, Jackie Bolesta and Gary German, robbed and killed the victim, Carl Brown, as the result of a robbery/murder scheme. German, the state's chief witness, was granted immunity and testified that Bolesta and Chestnut planned to rob and kill Brown on a trip to look at horses ostensibly being offered to Brown for sale. He testified that Bolesta demanded the victim's money while Chestnut held an axe handle over the victim and then struck him across the forehead. German further testified that Bolesta, armed with a machete, and Chestnut then took the victim "down the road." After the victim was killed, German and Chestnut hid the body in the woods. Chestnut was charged with both first-degree premeditated murder and felony murder.
In a statement to police officers, Chestnut admitted he was aware that Bolesta *821 planned to rob the victim but denied any knowledge of a planned murder. Further, Chestnut claimed that Bolesta hit the victim in the head with the axe handle, robbed him, and murdered him. Chestnut admitted he concealed the body at Bolesta's order.
The state filed a pretrial motion seeking to prohibit anticipated testimony by defense witnesses who would present evidence concerning appellant's mental condition below that standard recognized by the M'Naghten rule. The trial court granted the state's motion finding that "`absent an insanity plea, expert testimony as to mental status, especially when offered to bolster an affirmative defense would be improper in and of itself since it would only tend to confuse the jury.'" 505 So. 2d  at 1353.
At trial, counsel proffered expert testimony seeking to establish that Chestnut did not have the mental state required for premeditated first-degree murder. The proffered testimony revealed that Chestnut's intelligence was in the lowest five percent of the general population. Further, it showed that, several years earlier, appellant was kicked in the head by a bull, sustaining a fractured skull and brain damage which caused a posttraumatic seizure disorder that required medication. Chestnut also proffered evidence that he has diminished mental capacity with moderate impairment of verbal memory and has a passive personality which causes him to avoid physical confrontation; as a result, he is easily led and manipulated.
At the instruction conference, the trial court denied appellant's request for a special verdict form that would separate premeditated murder from felony murder. Chestnut was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for twenty-five years, the state declining to seek the death penalty.
The trial court's ruling was consistent with many previous Florida decisions. In Ezzell v. State, 88 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 1956), the defendant sought to introduce testimony which intended to show that he had a psychopathic personality so severe that it would prove he lacked the specific intent to commit first-degree premeditated murder. The defendant had previously withdrawn his insanity plea. In approving the rejecting of this evidence, we held: "Since the plea of insanity was out and there was no defense based on mental defects less than insanity, there was no reason for ... testimony or to labor the question." Id. at 282. We reached the same conclusion in Everett v. State, 97 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 941, 78 S. Ct. 432, 2 L. Ed. 2d 422 (1958). There, the defendant had pled not guilty by reason of insanity to a charge of first-degree murder. On appeal, this Court rejected the contention that the trial court erred in refusing to give an instruction that the defendant's mental condition could be considered by the jury in deciding whether he was capable of forming a premeditated design even though he was not found insane.
Similarly, in Tremain v. State, 336 So. 2d 705, 706 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), cert. denied, 348 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 1977), the Fourth District Court of Appeal addressed the issue of "whether testimony regarding the mental state of a defendant in a criminal case is admissible in the absence of a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity." That court answered the question in the negative and said:
Id. at 707-08. Accord Zeigler v. State, 402 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1035, 102 S. Ct. 1739, 72 L. Ed. 2d 153 (1982); Bradshaw v. State, 353 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 2d *822 DCA 1977). As recently as 1987, this Court held that evidence of mental retardation was inadmissible during the guilt phase of a first-degree murder case in the absence of a defense of insanity. Kight v. State, 512 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1987), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S. Ct. 1100, 99 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1988).
The only departure from this line of authority is found in Gurganus v. State, 451 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1984), in which it was said that "evidence of any condition relating to the accused's ability to perform a specific intent" is relevant. However, this statement was obiter dictum because that issue was not before the Court. Gurganus simply reaffirmed the long-standing rule in Florida that evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible in cases involving specific intent. Accord Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 9 So. 835 (1891). Most states follow the same rule, although a few of them decline to permit evidence of involuntary intoxication as a defense even to specific intent crimes. See Annot., Modern Status of the Rules as to Voluntary Intoxication as Defense to Criminal Charge, 8 A.L.R.3d 1236, at § 3[a] (1966).
The issue presented by this case is not a new one. In his article entitled "Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Cases for Purposes Other Than the Defense of Insanity," Professor Lewin explains:
26 Syracuse L.Rev. 1051, 1054-55 (1975) (footnotes omitted).
Differing terminology has sometimes clouded an understanding of the defense, as explained in Muench v. Israel, 715 F.2d 1124, 1142-43 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied sub nom. Worthing v. Israel, 467 U.S. 1228, 104 S. Ct. 2682, 81 L. Ed. 2d 878 (1984):
Following the lead of California, approximately one-half the states and federal jurisdictions now approve the defense. 1 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Laws § 4.7 (1986). Yet, it was recently noted in State v. Wilcox, 70 Ohio St.2d 182, 186, 436 N.E.2d 523, 525 (1982):
It is also clear that a state is not constitutionally compelled to recognize the doctrine of diminished capacity. Muench v. Israel. See also Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 66 S. Ct. 1318, 90 L. Ed. 1382 (1946).
The adoption of the principle of diminished capacity has usually been justified on the premise that mentally deficient persons should be treated in the same manner as intoxicated persons. See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir.1972). However, several recent cases have sharply rejected this analogy. Thus, in Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 88 (D.C. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911, 97 S. Ct. 2979, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1095 (1977), the court said:
(Footnotes omitted.)
In the same vein, the court in State v. Wilcox said:
70 Ohio St.2d at 194, 436 N.E.2d  at 530 (citation omitted). Accord State v. Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d 703 (Minn. 1982).
The adverse consequences of adopting the defense of diminished capacity were recognized by the court in Bethea v. United States:
365 A.2d  at 90-91 (footnotes omitted).
To permit the defense of diminished capacity would invite arbitrary applications of the law because of the nebulous distinction between specific and general intent crimes. See Linehan v. State, 442 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), approved, 476 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1985). Moreover, a recognition of the defense would open the door to consequences which could seriously affect our society. In a case of first-degree premeditated murder,[*] a finding of diminished mental capacity would serve to reduce the conviction to a lesser homicide. However, in the case of robbery, which was held to be a specific intent crime in Bell v. State, 394 So. 2d 979 (Fla. 1981), the application of diminished capacity could result in an absolute acquittal of any crime whatsoever. This is so because the only necessarily lesser included offense of robbery is petit theft and that, too, is a specific intent crime. State v. Allen, 362 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1978). Apparently, the same would be true for battery, Mellins v. State, 395 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 402 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 1981). Since burglary is also a specific intent crime, Presley v. State, 388 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980), one acquitted of that offense could only be convicted, if at all, of trespass. Unlike the case where one is found not guilty by reason of insanity, there would be no authority to commit these persons for treatment except through the use of civil remedies and its concomitant burdens.
In criticizing the principle of diminished capacity, Abraham Goldstein, in his comprehensive book entitled The Insanity Defense, stated:
A. Goldstein, The Insanity Defense 192 (1967).
We acknowledge the cogent reasons expressed in Bethea v. United States for declining to adopt the defense of diminished capacity:
365 A.2d  at 87-88 (footnotes omitted).
Finally, we note the pertinent comment in State v. Wilcox:
70 Ohio St.2d at 198-99, 436 N.E.2d  at 533. See also State v. Doss, 116 Ariz. 156, 568 P.2d 1054 (1977); State v. Edwards, 420 So. 2d 663 (La. 1982); People v. Atkins, 117 Mich. App. 430, 324 N.W.2d 38 (1982), all of which have recently rejected the doctrine of diminished capacity.
It could be said that many, if not most, crimes are committed by persons with mental aberrations. If such mental deficiencies are sufficient to meet the definition of insanity, these persons should be acquitted on that ground and treated for their disease. Persons with less serious mental deficiencies should be held accountable for their crimes just as everyone else. If mitigation is appropriate, it may be accomplished through sentencing, but to adopt a rule which creates an opportunity for such persons to obtain immediate freedom to prey on the public once again is unwise.
We approve the decision of the district court of appeal.
It is so ordered.
EHRLICH, C.J., and McDONALD, J., concur.
SHAW, J., concurs specially with an opinion.
OVERTON, J., dissents with an opinion, in which BARKETT and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
SHAW, Justice, specially concurring.
I agree fully with the majority opinion. I write only to note again that the nebulous distinction between general and specific intent crimes and the defense of voluntary intoxication bear reexamination in a suitable case. Linehan v. State, 476 So. 2d 1262, 1266 (Fla. 1985) (Shaw, J., dissenting).
OVERTON, Justice, dissenting.
In my view, it is totally unreasonable and illogical to allow a defendant to present evidence of voluntary intoxication and drug use as a defense to the element of specific intent to commit first-degree premeditated *826 murder, but then to prohibit another defendant from presenting objective evidence of involuntary organic brain damage on the same issue. This results in a clear injustice. One court addressed the indefensibility of this position and stated:
United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 999 (D.C. Cir.1972). The rule expressed by the majority is contrary to the weight of authority, the Model Penal Code, and the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice.
The issue here should be rephrased and limited to the evidentiary question of whether a defendant may introduce objective evidence of organic brain damage to establish that he lacked the requisite mental state of first-degree premeditated murder. I totally disagree with the characterization of the issue as one of whether we should adopt the diminished capacity doctrine.[1] The relevant issue in this case is clearly distinguishable from the question of whether we should adopt the diminished capacity doctrine as an insanity defense. The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice articulate this distinction and state:
Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 7-6.2 commentary at 316-17 (1986) (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).
Regrettably, Florida has not adopted a consistent standard for admitting mental condition evidence to establish whether a defendant had the requisite specific intent to commit a particular crime. On the one hand, Florida has permitted evidence of voluntary intoxication concerning a defendant's mental state for specific intent crimes for almost one hundred years. In Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 9 So. 835 (1891), this Court stated:
Id. 28 Fla. at 153-54, 9 So.  at 845. We recently reaffirmed this view in Gurganus v. State, 451 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1984), holding:
Id. at 822-23 (citations omitted; emphasis added). On the other hand, as the majority noted, there are Florida decisions expressly rejecting other types of evidence concerning a defendant's mental state. See Kight v. State, 512 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1987), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S. Ct. 1100, 99 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1988); Zeigler v. State, 402 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1035, 102 S. Ct. 1739, 72 L. Ed. 2d 153 (1982); Everett v. State, 97 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 941, 78 S. Ct. 432, 2 L. Ed. 2d 422 (1958); Ezzell v. State, 88 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 1956); Bradshaw v. State, 353 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); Tremain v. State, 336 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), cert. denied, 348 So. 2d 954 (1977).
A clear majority of other jurisdictions have held that organic brain damage evidence is admissible, at least in first-degree murder cases, on the question of specific intent. See People v. Wingo, 14 Cal. 3d 169, 534 P.2d 1001, 121 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1975); Becksted v. People, 133 Colo. 72, 292 P.2d 189 (1956); State v. Burge, 195 Conn. 232, 487 A.2d 532 (1985); State v. Clokey, 83 Idaho 322, 364 P.2d 159 (1961); Wilson v. State, 263 Ind. 469, 333 N.E.2d 755 (1975); State v. Plowman, 386 N.W.2d 546 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986); Todd v. Commonwealth, 716 S.W.2d 242 (Ky. 1986); Commonwealth v. Grey, 399 Mass. 469, 505 N.E.2d 171 (1987); People v. Mangiapane, 85 Mich. App. 379, 271 N.W.2d 240 (Ct.App. 1978); State v. Anderson, 515 S.W.2d 534 (Mo. 1974); Starkweather v. State, 167 Neb. 477, 93 N.W.2d 619 (1958); State v. Roman, 168 N.J. Super. 344, 403 A.2d 24 (Super.Ct.App.Div. 1979); State v. Holden, 85 N.M. 397, 512 P.2d 970 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 85 N.M. 380, 512 P.2d 953 (1973); People v. Morales, 125 A.D.2d 605, 509 N.Y.S.2d 658 (1986), appeal denied, 70 N.Y.2d 651, 518 N.Y.S.2d 1044, 512 N.E.2d 570 (1987); State v. Nichols, 3 Ohio App.2d 182, 209 N.E.2d 750 (Ct.App. 1965); State v. Schleigh, 210 Or. 155, 310 P.2d 341 (1957); Commonwealth v. Terry, 513 Pa. 381, 521 A.2d 398, cert. denied, 482 U.S. 920, 107 S. Ct. 3198, 96 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1987); State v. Correra, 430 A.2d 1251 (R.I. 1981); Cowles v. State, 510 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); State v. Romero, 684 P.2d 643 (Utah 1984); State v. Smith, 136 Vt. 520, 396 A.2d 126 (1978); State v. Edmon, 28 Wash. App. 98, 621 P.2d 1310 (1981); State v. Flattum, 122 Wis.2d 282, 361 N.W.2d 705 (1985); Kind v. State, 595 P.2d 960 (Wyo. 1979). Further, both the Model Penal Code[2] and the American Bar Association *828 Standards for Criminal Justice[3] state that organic brain damage evidence should be admitted on the issue of specific intent.
In the case primarily relied on by the majority, Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64 (D.C.App. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911, 97 S. Ct. 2979, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1095 (1977), that court, while emphatically rejecting subjective psychiatric evidence, expressly recognized that objective evidence of epilepsy and senility was a proper matter to be presented to the jury concerning mens rea, and stated:
Id. at 88 (emphasis added).
Clearly, epilepsy and senility are no different from other objective evidence of brain damage. While I could agree that it is justifiable to reject subjective evidence of an abnormal mental condition, I find no justification for rejecting objective evidence of organic brain damage. A uniform rule should be applied for both intoxication and objective brain damage. I would also note that the majority's decision appears to violate the equal protection and due process clauses of both the United States and Florida Constitutions because no reasonable classification or distinction to justify different treatment exists.
In this case, the defendant established evidence of permanent organic brain damage. Consequently, he was entitled to present this evidence to address whether he had the specific intent required for first-degree premeditated murder. This defense, as it would for an intoxicated defendant, would allow the jury to reduce the offense from first-degree premeditated murder to second-degree murder or manslaughter since the latter two are not specific intent crimes.
I would rephrase the First District's certified question as follows:
Given the circumstances and the long-established defense of intoxication in Florida, I would answer this question in the affirmative. If we are going to exclude organic brain damage, then we should also exclude intoxication.
BARKETT and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
[*]  Ironically, the defense might not be available to one charged with first-degree felony murder providing the underlying felony was not a specific intent crime.
[1]  This doctrine is also known as the diminished responsibility doctrine or the partial responsibility doctrine.
[2]  Section 4.02(1) reads as follows: "Evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect is admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the defendant did or did not have a state of mind which is an element of the offense."
[3]  Standard 7-6.2 states: "Evidence, including expert testimony, concerning the defendant's mental condition at the time of the alleged offense which tends to show the defendant did or did not have the mental state required for the offense charged should be admissible."