Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Greco

State: ohio

Issuer: Ohio Supreme Court

Document:

[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Greco, 107 Ohio St.3d 155, 2005-Ohio-6045.] 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. GRECO. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Greco, 107 Ohio St.3d 155, 2005-Ohio-6045.] 
Attorneys — Misconduct — Two-year suspension with 18 months stayed on 
condition — Conduct prejudicial to administration of justice — Neglect of 
client’s legal matters — Failure to promptly refund unearned portion of 
fee — Conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice law — Conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. 
(No. 2005-0799 — Submitted June 15, 2005 — Decided November 30, 2005.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, Case No. 04-029. 
____________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Anthony William Greco, of Columbus, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0061582, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 
1993. 
{¶ 2} On June 7, 2004, relator, Disciplinary Counsel, charged respondent 
with numerous violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.  A panel of 
the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline heard the cause and, 
based on the parties’ stipulated facts and exhibits and other evidence, made 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a recommendation.  The board adopted 
the panel’s findings, conclusions, and recommended sanction. 
Misconduct 
 
The Amyx Grievance 
{¶ 3} On April 1, 2002, William Amyx retained respondent to assist in 
collecting back wages from his employer.  Respondent agreed to accept the case 
for $1,500, plus ten percent of any recovery.  Respondent promised to send a 
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demand letter to Amyx’s employer and, if the letter proved unsuccessful, to file a 
lawsuit.  Respondent agreed to be paid the $1,500 in two equal installments and 
told Amyx that he would draft the demand letter but not send it until the second 
installment had been paid. 
{¶ 4} Amyx paid the last installment on April 12, 2002.  Respondent told 
Amyx that day that he needed more time to draft the demand letter and would 
mail Amyx a copy. 
{¶ 5} Amyx heard nothing from respondent for the next two weeks, so 
Amyx called respondent’s office and left several messages for respondent to 
contact him.  Approximately three weeks later, respondent advised Amyx that he 
was too busy to handle the case and that he was turning over Amyx’s file to 
another attorney.  Amyx agreed to the referral; however, the new attorney did not 
contact Amyx for several weeks and then missed a scheduled appointment to meet 
with Amyx.  The attorney spoke to Amyx by telephone and asked him for the 
same information that Amyx had given respondent months before. 
{¶ 6} Following that telephone conversation, Amyx left several 
messages for the attorney to call him, but he never did.  When Amyx called 
respondent for help, respondent also did not return Amyx’s calls. 
{¶ 7} In November 2002, seven months after their first meeting, 
respondent advised Amyx that he was taking over the case again because the 
successor attorney had moved his office.  Additional weeks passed in which 
respondent failed to advise Amyx of the status of the case or return his calls.  
Amyx sent respondent a letter asking for a refund, but he received no response.  
Respondent never sent a demand letter to Amyx’s employer, and he never filed a 
lawsuit.  On June 10, 2004, over two years after the initial meeting, respondent 
refunded Amyx’s $1,500 retainer. 
{¶ 8} As to the Amyx grievance, the parties stipulated and the board 
found that respondent had violated DR 1-102(A)(5) (a lawyer shall not engage in 
January Term, 2005 
3 
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice), 1-102(A)(6) (a lawyer 
shall not engage in any conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to 
practice law), 2-106(A) (a lawyer shall not charge a clearly excessive fee), 2-
110(A) (a lawyer who withdraws from employment shall promptly refund any 
part of a fee paid in advance that has not been earned), and 6-101(A)(3) (a lawyer 
shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him). 
 
The Mymo Grievance 
{¶ 9} On April 1, 2002, Victoria Mymo paid respondent $4,000 to 
represent her in a divorce action.  Approximately one week later, Mymo informed 
respondent that she and her husband had agreed to a dissolution, rather than a 
divorce.  On April 12, 2002, Mymo and her husband met with respondent and 
signed the separation agreement and petition for dissolution.  Mymo requested 
that respondent file the paperwork after May 31, 2002. 
{¶ 10} On June 5, 2002, respondent mistakenly filed the Mymo case in 
Franklin County rather than Delaware County.  Mymo later brought papers she 
had received from the Franklin County Child Support Agency to respondent, but 
he did not immediately tell her that the petition needed to be refiled.  On July 18, 
2002, respondent gave Mymo a new separation agreement and petition for 
dissolution that he had prepared for filing in Delaware County.  Respondent asked 
Mymo to have her husband sign the documents, and she returned with the signed 
documents the following day.  Respondent assured Mymo that he would file the 
dissolution that day or the following Monday. 
{¶ 11} From late July through August 2002, Mymo called respondent’s 
office repeatedly to learn the status of her case.  Respondent failed to return her 
calls.  Finally, in mid-August, respondent informed Mymo that her husband’s 
signature, dated July 19, 2002, had not been notarized.  The next day, Mymo’s 
husband went to respondent’s office and again signed the documents.  Respondent 
promised Mymo that he would file the dissolution that day. 
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{¶ 12} One week later, Mymo called the Delaware County Common Pleas 
Court and discovered that the dissolution had not been filed.  In September 2002, 
Mymo’s father contacted respondent.  Respondent told Mymo’s father that he had 
mistakenly filed the case in Franklin County and that he would hand-deliver the 
paperwork to Delaware County later that afternoon.  Respondent filed the petition 
for dissolution 11 days later. 
{¶ 13} Mymo learned from the court that the final hearing in her case was 
scheduled for October 31, 2002.  Mymo thereafter called respondent many times, 
but he failed to return her calls.  Respondent did not appear at the final hearing, 
and the court refused to grant Mymo the dissolution because she did not have a 
prepared dissolution decree and had not completed parenting classes.  Respondent 
had never advised Mymo that she needed to attend parenting classes. 
{¶ 14} The court rescheduled the final hearing for November 21, 2002, 
and in the interim, Mymo attempted to contact respondent repeatedly without 
success.  Mymo finally prepared her own dissolution decree and obtained 
parenting-class certificates.  Respondent also failed to appear at the November 21 
hearing, but acting without counsel, Mymo submitted her papers.  On the same 
day, the court granted her dissolution. 
{¶ 15} In January 2003, Mymo filed a grievance against respondent.  In 
September 2003, respondent refunded $1,500 of the $4,000 Mymo had paid him. 
{¶ 16} As to the Mymo grievance, the parties stipulated and the board 
found that respondent had violated DR 1-102(A)(5) and (6), 2-106(A), 2-110(A), 
and 6-101(A)(3). 
 
The Lang Grievance 
{¶ 17} In January 2003, Melissa Lang retained an attorney for $1,000 to 
help her obtain child support from her son’s father.  In February 2003, that 
attorney referred the case to respondent and advised Lang that respondent would 
appear at Lang’s February 25, 2003 court hearing to determine child support. 
January Term, 2005 
5 
{¶ 18} On February 20, 2003, respondent met with Lang for the first time 
and asked for a $1,500 retainer.  Respondent, with Lang’s approval, rescheduled 
the February 25 court hearing to April 15, 2003.  On February 24, 2003, Lang 
paid respondent $1,500, and agreed to meet respondent at his office the following 
Friday to sign an affidavit for temporary child support.  Respondent failed to 
appear at the scheduled meeting. 
{¶ 19} Over the following two weeks, Lang scheduled appointments to 
meet with respondent, but each time, respondent either failed to appear or had his 
secretary cancel the appointment. 
{¶ 20} On March 11, 2003, respondent took the affidavit to Lang’s office 
to obtain her signature.  Respondent promised that he would file the affidavit with 
a motion for temporary child support the next day and that he would inform Lang 
of her hearing date.  By March 17, 2003, respondent had not contacted Lang, so 
she called him.  Respondent falsely told Lang that he had filed the motion, that 
the clerk had not provided him with the hearing date, and that Lang would be 
notified of a hearing date by mail the following day. 
{¶ 21} The next day, Lang did not receive anything from the court, and 
she left a message for respondent, who did not reply.  One day later, Lang learned 
from the court that respondent had not filed the motion for temporary support. 
{¶ 22} Lang called respondent again, but, again, he did not return her call.  
He did, however, return a call from Lang’s father and conceded to him that he had 
not filed the motion for temporary support.  On March 24 and 25, 2003, Lang 
telephoned respondent again.  Respondent told her that he still did not have a 
court date and promised to call her later that day with the date.  He never called. 
{¶ 23} On March 27, 2003, Lang faxed a letter to respondent outlining the 
efforts she had made to contact him and threatening to file a grievance if he did 
not arrange a court date by March 31, 2003.  Respondent immediately called Lang 
and promised to go to the courthouse as soon as he hung up and report back that 
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day.  On March 28, 2003, respondent called and told Lang that her temporary-
support hearing was scheduled for April 15, 2003.  On that same day, respondent 
filed the motion for temporary support that he claimed to have filed more than 
two weeks before. 
{¶ 24} On April 14, 2003, respondent called Lang and relayed an offer 
from her son’s father to pay $750 per month in temporary child support.  Lang 
told respondent that she would settle for no less than $751 and that if the father 
did not agree, she wanted a judicial determination.  On April 15, 2003, respondent 
appeared in court and advised the judge that his client had agreed to accept $750 
per month as temporary child support. 
{¶ 25} Lang became extremely upset upon learning that respondent had 
settled her case without her consent, but she did not realize that she could object.  
Respondent later presented an agreed entry for approval, but the court rejected it 
because paternity had not been established. 
{¶ 26} On May 9, 2003, Lang left a message for respondent terminating 
his services.  Her message also asked for a refund of the $1,500 retainer and for 
him to turn over her file to her.  Respondent returned Lang’s call, but acted 
unprofessionally toward her.  In March 2004, respondent offered, through 
counsel, to reimburse Lang $750. 
{¶ 27} As to the Lang grievance, the parties stipulated and the board 
found that respondent had violated DR 1-102(A)(4) (a lawyer shall not engage in 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 1-102(A)(5) 
and (6), and 6-101(A)(3). 
 
The Davis Grievance 
{¶ 28} In August 2003, Donice Davis separated from her husband, and an 
attorney helped her obtain a civil protection order.  That attorney referred Davis to 
respondent when she asked for representation in her impending divorce. 
January Term, 2005 
7 
{¶ 29} Davis’s husband filed for a divorce on September 15, 2003.  On 
September 23, 2003, respondent agreed to represent Davis in the case for $225 an 
hour and asked Davis for a $2,500 retainer.  Respondent allowed Davis to pay 
$1,300 as a first installment and to pay the additional $1,200 within the next two 
weeks. 
{¶ 30} Over the next few weeks, Davis called respondent numerous times, 
but he did not return her calls.  Respondent also twice agreed to meet Davis at his 
office to sign paperwork, but later canceled both meetings.  On October 26, 2003, 
Davis met respondent at his office and signed papers.  She also informed 
respondent that she would not pay the remaining $1,200 until she saw some 
results. 
{¶ 31} The court set a final hearing in Davis’s uncontested divorce for 
December 12, 2003.  Throughout November, Davis attempted to get in contact 
with respondent, and when she could not, she asked her first attorney for help.  
That lawyer relayed to Davis a message that respondent planned to appear on her 
behalf at the final divorce hearing. 
{¶ 32} Respondent failed to appear as promised, and Davis discovered 
that he had not appeared at all in the case, even to answer the complaint.  Davis 
called respondent from the hearing, and he said that he was at the hospital with his 
son and had not known about the hearing.  Davis gave the phone to the judge’s 
bailiff, and respondent requested a continuance.  The court, however, denied his 
request. 
{¶ 33} Because of respondent’s neglect, Davis was unrepresented and 
unprepared for her divorce hearing.  And after the hearing, respondent continued 
to ignore her calls.  On December 18, 2003, respondent agreed to refund the entire 
$1,300 Davis had paid. 
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{¶ 34} As to the Davis grievance, the parties stipulated and the board 
found that respondent had violated DR 1-102(A)(5) and (6), 2-106(A), 2-110(A), 
and 6-101(A)(3). 
 
The Fearn Grievance 
{¶ 35} In September 2003, Kerstin Fearn paid respondent a $1,225 
retainer to represent her in a divorce.  On October 20, 2003, Fearn signed the 
divorce papers, and respondent informed her that her husband would be served in 
seven to ten days. 
{¶ 36} Three weeks later, after having heard nothing about the case, Fearn 
contacted respondent’s office.  A secretary said that Fearn’s husband should have 
been served with the divorce papers.  Fearn contacted the court and learned that 
her divorce had not been filed.  Fearn attempted to contact respondent on 
numerous occasions about her discovery, but he failed to return her calls. 
{¶ 37} When she finally reached respondent, Fearn terminated his 
services and demanded a full refund.  Respondent apologized and offered to 
convert his retainer to a flat fee, with no additional payments regardless of how 
much work was required.  Fearn accepted respondent’s proposal. 
{¶ 38} On November 20, 2003, Fearn contacted respondent to ask why the 
divorce had yet not been filed and to tell him that she needed temporary support.  
Respondent promised that Fearn’s husband would be served by Thanksgiving or 
he would refund her money.  By the end of November, the divorce still had not 
been filed.  Fearn also discovered that respondent had moved his office without 
leaving a forwarding address. 
{¶ 39} On December 4, 2003, respondent called Fearn to tell her that he 
had mailed a refund check by registered mail.  Fearn never received the check.  
On December 9, respondent told Fearn to contact his secretary and ask her to 
track the registered mail.  Respondent gave Fearn the wrong telephone number for 
the secretary.  When Fearn did reach the secretary, the secretary stalled, would not 
January Term, 2005 
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give Fearn the address of respondent’s new office, and provided her with a 
disconnected telephone number as the number for the new office. 
{¶ 40} Fearn hired another attorney for $2,500 to complete the divorce.  
On June 10, 2004, respondent refunded Fearn’s $1,225 retainer. 
{¶ 41} As to the Fearn grievance, the parties stipulated and the board 
found that respondent had violated DR 1-102(A)(4), (5), and (6), 2-106(A), 2-
110(A), and 6-101(A)(3). 
The Backus Grievance 
{¶ 42} In March 2002, respondent accepted a $1,500 retainer from 
Delbert and Vernetta Backus to represent them in breach-of-contract suit against a 
paving company.  Thereafter, respondent inspected work performed by the 
company, reviewed a core-sample report, completed an asset search on the 
company, and drafted a complaint. 
{¶ 43} Over the next several months, however, the Backuses’ calls to 
respondent were not returned.  On November 19, 2002, the couple sent a letter 
terminating respondent’s representation and requesting a refund of their retainer.  
Respondent never responded to their letter.  Respondent has since agreed to 
refund the $1,500 retainer. 
{¶ 44} As to the Backus grievance, the parties stipulated and the board 
found that respondent had violated DR 1-102(A)(5) and (6), 2-106(A), 2-110(A), 
and 6-101(A)(3). 
Sanction 
{¶ 45} In recommending a sanction for this misconduct, the board 
considered the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Section 10 of the Rules 
and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before the 
Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  In 
aggravation, the board found a pattern of misconduct and multiple offenses.  
Moreover, the board found that respondent had acted in his own self-interest in 
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neglecting his obligations to his clients and avoiding honest explanations for his 
actions.  BCGD Proc.Reg 10(B)(1)(b), (c), and (d).  In truth, respondent had 
begun to use cocaine and other illegal drugs and was also abusing alcohol. 
{¶ 46} Against these factors, the board weighed the considerable 
extenuating circumstances surrounding respondent’s misconduct.  The board 
found that much of respondent’s neglect and other misconduct was attributable to 
his diagnosed chemical dependency. 
{¶ 47} Respondent’s problem with drugs began in June 2001, when his 
law firm dissolved.  He had recently gotten divorced, and so, within a short period 
of time, respondent had lost the two structured environments in his life.  
Respondent reacted to the losses by turning to alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine.  
He also began taking on more cases than he could effectively manage. 
{¶ 48} In December 2003, respondent realized that his substance abuse, 
particularly of cocaine, was undermining his life and causing him to neglect his 
clients.  Respondent decided to abstain from using cocaine.  He isolated himself 
from his friends for 30 days and stopped practicing law for 90 days.  Respondent 
eventually realized that alcohol was also a problem for him, and he then abstained 
from alcohol as well. 
{¶ 49} Respondent immersed himself in recovery programs and treatment.  
He devoted himself to Alcoholics Anonymous (“AA”), at one point attending 93 
meetings in 90 days.  In May 2004, respondent enrolled in the Ohio Lawyers 
Assistance Program (“OLAP”).  In June 2004, he signed a three-year contract 
with OLAP and has complied with every obligation under his agreement. 
{¶ 50} Since becoming aware of his chemical dependency, respondent has 
fully committed himself to a lifetime of sobriety.  He attends AA meetings three 
to four times a week and acknowledges that he will have to continue to go to AA 
meetings for the rest of his life.  Additionally, respondent has recognized that he 
functions best in a highly structured setting.  In February 2004, respondent began 
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working with one of his former partners, and they have returned to a firm-like 
setting with additional attorneys and support staff. 
{¶ 51} In addition to respondent’s diagnosis by OLAP, Dr. Kevin Arnold 
conducted a psychological evaluation of respondent.  Arnold is an experienced 
clinical and forensic psychologist with a background in counseling and evaluating 
lawyers with substance-abuse problems.  Arnold testified that respondent would 
be able to return to competent, ethical legal practice if he were supervised and 
worked in a law-firm setting.  Arnold also testified that respondent is more likely 
to succeed in his recovery if he becomes more discriminating in his case selection, 
continues his participation in AA, and seeks counseling to deal with his 
depression. 
{¶ 52} Because respondent has a diagnosed chemical dependency that 
contributed to his misconduct and has successfully completed treatment programs 
allowing his recovery and return to the competent, ethical professional practice of 
law, the board considered his condition a mitigating feature under BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g).  The board also found that respondent was extremely 
cooperative and forthcoming throughout the entire disciplinary process.  
Moreover, the board found respondent’s expressions of remorse to be sincere.  
See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(d). 
{¶ 53} Respondent also submitted numerous letters attesting to his good 
character and reputation.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(e).  In addition, 
respondent was forthright about his substance abuse and the underlying 
misconduct, and he has created a substantial support system for his recovery 
among medical professionals, colleagues, friends, and family.  Moreover, 
respondent has apologized to the clients that he harmed and has agreed to make 
restitution. 
{¶ 54} Citing as comparable cases Disciplinary Counsel v. Jaffe, 102 
Ohio St.3d 273, 2004-Ohio-2685, 809 N.E.2d 1122, and Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. 
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McKinney, 101 Ohio St.3d 23, 2003-Ohio-6743, 800 N.E.2d 1125, relator 
requested that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years, 
with 18 months of the suspension stayed.  The panel recommended a two-year 
suspension with the entire two years stayed on the condition that respondent 
continue to comply with his OLAP contract.  The panel also recommended that 
respondent be placed on probation for two years.  The board adopted the panel’s 
findings of misconduct and recommended sanction. 
Review 
{¶ 55} We agree with the board’s findings that respondent violated DR 1-
102(A)(4), (5), and (6), 2-106(A), 2-110(A), and 6-101(A)(3).  However, 
consistent with Jaffe and McKinney, we find that a two-year suspension with 18 
months stayed upon condition and a two-year probation is the appropriate 
sanction. 
{¶ 56} Respondent repeatedly frustrated numerous clients with his neglect 
of their cases.  And when these clients asked him to refund their money, he 
delayed for long periods of time before reimbursing two clients in full and one 
client in part and agreeing to refund the fees paid by three other clients.  
Moreover, much of respondent’s conduct affected the lives of clients who are 
among the most vulnerable — those with cases pending in family court.  See Stark 
Cty. Bar Assn. v. Arkow, 104 Ohio St.3d 265, 2004-Ohio-6512, 819 N.E.2d 284, ¶ 
23.  Finally, despite respondent’s extenuating circumstances, he repeatedly lied to 
his clients to cover up his neglect.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. Jaffe, 102 Ohio 
St.3d 273, 2004-Ohio-2685, 809 N.E.2d 1122, ¶ 17. 
{¶ 57} For these reasons, we believe that an actual suspension is 
necessary to protect the public.  Accordingly, respondent is hereby suspended 
from the practice of law in Ohio for two years; however, 18 months of the 
suspension are stayed on the condition that respondent complies with his OLAP 
contract.  If respondent violates the condition of the stay, the stay will be lifted 
January Term, 2005 
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and respondent shall serve the entire two-year suspension.  In addition, 
respondent is placed on probation in accordance with Gov.Bar R.V(9) for the 
stayed portion of the suspension. 
{¶ 58} In any application for reinstatement that he files pursuant to Gov. 
Bar R. V(10), respondent shall show, in addition to the requirements of that rule, 
that he has made restitution in the amount of $750 to Melissa Lang, $1,300 to 
Donice Davis, and $1,500 to Delbert and Vernetta Backus. Costs are taxed to 
respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
RESNICK, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR 
and 
LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER and O’DONNELL, JJ., would suspend respondent for two years, all 
stayed. 
__________________ 
 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Joseph M. Caligiuri, 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
 
David M. Abromowitz, for respondent. 
______________________